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Published 17 March 1949 
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| Papers of 
HARRY S. TRUMAN 
_\ PRESIDENT'S SECRETARY FILE 
DISSEMINATION NOTICE 
1. This copy of this publication is for the information and use of the recipient 
: 
designated on the front cover and of individuals under the jurisdiction of the recipient’s 
office who require the information for the performance of their official duties. 
Further 
dissemination elsewhere in the department to other offices which require the informa- 
tion for the performance of official duties may be authorized by the following: 
a. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research 
and Intelligence, for 
the Department of State 
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b.Director of Intelligence, GS, USA, for the Department of the Army 
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c. Chief, 
Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy 
d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force 
e. Director of Security and Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Com- 
) 
mission 
f. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff 
g. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other 
Department or Agency 
2. 
This copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning in accordance with 
applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by 
arrangement with the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA. 
DISTRIBUTION: 
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of Defense 
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State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee 
Joint Chiefs of Staff 
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Atomic Energy Commission 
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“Papers of 
| HARRY S. 
ILE 
ENT! 
SECRETARY F 
ORE 11-49 
THE CARIBBEAN LEGION 
SUMMARY 
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The Caribbean Legion, an irregular military group of several hundred exiles, well- 
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armed by Central American-Caribbean standards, has for some time exercised a con- 
siderable influence on the international relationships of the area. 
It has played a part 
in conspiracies against the Nicaraguan Government and was a deciding factor in the 
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1948 Costa Rican civil war. 
In relation to the countries within which it operates, the 
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Legion is a sufficient force to be a significant factor in the calculations of their govern- 
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ments relating to area foreign policy. 
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At present, this group is primarily motivated by a common desire for the overthrow 
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of the so-called “dictatorships”—especially Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic. 
It 
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is therefore aligned with and has become a clandestine instrument of public policy for 
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the “democracies,” particularly Cuba, Guatemala, and Costa Rica. 
The Legion as such 
has, however, nothing like a clearly defined ideology, and might contribute to the estab- 
lishment of governments as dictatorial as those which it now seeks to destroy. 
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Public pressure, such as that resulting from the advice of the Council of Organiza- 
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tion of American States (COAS) in December 1948 that Costa Rica remove from its 
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territory “groups of nationals of foreign military organizations,” may force public 
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‘disavowal of the Legion upon the “democracies” which in turn may force the Legion 
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into a temporarily passive role. 
Since, however, it has no real opposition among the 
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“democracies” in which it is based except from those who either resist change in exist- 
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ing political relations or object to the use of force as an instrument of public policy, it 
is highly improbable that the group will be actually disbanded. 
At the present mo- 
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ment the Legion is quiescent and handicapped by disunity, but it may become more 
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active at some future and more propitious time as a vigorous and significant force in. 
Central American-Caribbean intergovernmental relationships. 
Note: This report has been concurred in by the intelligence organizations of the Departments 
of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; for a dissent of the Intelligence Organization 
ofythe Department of State, see Enclosure A, p. 8. The report is based on information 
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available to CIA on 25 February 1949. 
TTBRARY 
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THE CARIBBEAN LEGION 
The presence in the Central American-Caribbean area of the self-styled “Caribbean 
Legion” is a highly significant factor for change and cortsequent uncertainty in area 
intergovernmental relationships. 
At the present time, the republics in the area tend to 
group themselves into two rival and competing blocs of power (see accompanying 
map) with Cuba, Guatemala, Costa Rica (and now possibly El Salvador), the so-called 
“democracies,” in opposition to the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and, to a lesser 
extent, Honduras, the so-called “dictatorships.” 
MHaiti’s traditional rivalry with the 
Dominican Republic makes its attempts to remain neutral difficult. 
The aim of the Caribbean Legion coincides with that of the “democracies” in a 
common hostility to the existing governments of the “dictatorships.” 
As a result, an 
informal but nonetheless intimate political and military relationship has developed 
between the two, and the Legion has become a clandestine and important instrument 
through which the “democracies” are pursuing their anti-“dictatorship” policy. 
The planned invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1947 by the organization which 
later became known as the Legion was frustrated only when certain Cuban officials 
temporarily confiscated its arms; its action was decisive in the 1948 Costa Rican civil 
war when it joined in the conflict in order to weaken the Somoza Government of 
Nicaragua; it is in a position to influence the foreign policies of Guatemala, Costa Rica, 
and Cuba; and it is still determined to destroy the present regimes in Nicaragua and the 
Dominican Republic against which it has already engaged in several conspiracies. 
Though it is at present somewhat divided and quiescent, it can and undoubtedly will 
become more active at any opportune moment, ready to promote its designs against 
the “dictators.” 
In any case, an understanding of the organization and potentialities 
of the Caribbean Legion is essential to a forecast of many developments in the Caribbean 
area. 
There is, at present, no evidence to demonstrate that the Caribbean Legion, its 
leaders, or the governments which have harbored and supported it, have in any way 
changed their hostile attitude toward the “dictatorships” as a result of COAS* 
inter-. 
vention in the recent Costa Rican-Nicaraguan disturbances. 
Although the govern- _ 
ments of Cuba, Guatemala, and Costa Rica may from time to time and for Various 
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redsons pursue a less cooperative attitude toward the Legion, coincidence of policy 
~~*,should prevent a complete severance in the ties which at present hing them together... .--+ 
dividual members remain in physical possession of arms and matériel, the Legion, in 
one form or another will not be dissolved. 
Physically it may move its base of opera- 
tions from one to another of the Latin American countries, and its cadre may be 
scattered among the several “democracies” of the area, but this development would 
: Council of the Organization of American States, aay known as the Governing Board of 
the Pan American Union. 
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not prevent its re-emergence at some future and more propitious time as a vigorous and 
active force in Central American-Caribbean intergovernmental relationships. 
The Caribbean Legion has no well-defined ideology, but is bound together by a 
common opposition to the highly personalized and authoritarian governments of 
Somoza and Trujillo. 
Given the power, however, there is no assurance in the case of 
some Legion members that they would refrain from many of the “dictatorial” practices 
they now oppose. 
Possibly the majority of members are inclined to believe in various 
principles of government now practiced in the US, Britain, France, or Cuba; yet with- 
in the group are also some Marxian socialists; conservative Catholics and active Masons; 
ex-Spanish Republicans and ex-members of the Franco regime in Spain; millionaires 
and paupers. 
The Figueres Government in Costa Rica which the Legion made possible 
has sponsored no radical philosophies nor un-American ideologies. 
It is improbable 
that a Legion-created government of Nicaragua would adopt such policies. 
Admittedly the Legion fosters underlying concepts of change and is groping for 
new norms of authority and administration, but these concepts are indistinct and un- 
defined. 
Individual opportunism is the prime motivation of the Legionnaires. 
The 
very lack of a definite program, however, probably accounts in large part for the ac- 
ceptance of the Legion in an area where the only militant opposition is to be found 
among those who either are against change in existing political arrangements or 
generally object to the use of force as an instrument of international policy. 
No matter what disturbances the Caribbean Legion may foment in the future, 
they will not, of course, affect the basic concept of Hemisphere defense and hence will 
have no direct bearing on US-Soviet rivalry. 
The Legion’s power, however, to modify 
and influence internal affairs and international relationships in the Caribbean cannot 
be overlooked. 
(For details on the organization and development of the Caribbean 
Legion 
see Appendix.) 
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APPENDIX 
ORGANIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CARIBBEAN LEGION 
The Caribbean Legion was formed as such during March 1948. 
Its leaders, who 
were dissidents and exiles from various of the Central American-Caribbean “dictator- 
ships,” joined with José Figueres (now Provisional President of Costa Rica) and assisted 
him to such an extent that he was able to overthrow the pro-Somoza, Calderén-domi- 
nated, government. 
Many of the Legion’s leaders, much of its matériel, and some of its men, however, 
weré part of the original attempted invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1947—other- 
wise known as the Cayo Confites expedition. 
This organized, well-equipped and inte- 
grated revolutionary plot was originally conceived by political exiles from the Domin- 
ican Republic, but was able to reach such proportions as a result of the informal 
agreement between President Arévalo of Guatemala; Rémulo Betancourt (then Presi- 
dent of Venezuela); the then Minister of Labor and now President Prio, and former 
Minister of Education Aleman of Cuba; and political exiles from the Dominican Re- 
public, 
Nicaragua, and Honduras. 
The aim of the agreement was the “reinstatement 
of popular sovereignty in the Caribbean area,” and much was made of the “Bolivarian 
mission” of the Legion. 
From the political standpoint, the goal of the “pact” was 
simply the destruction of the existing governments of the Dominican Republic, Hon- 
duras, and Nicaragua, and their replacement by friendly governments. 
In preparation for invasion of the Dominican Republic, several landing craft, a 
dozen or more aircraft, an estimated 1,200 men supplied with adequate small arms, 
rifles, grenades, machine guns, and aerial bombs, were gathered on Cuban territory. 
Immediately prior to the expedition’s projected departure for the Dominican Republic, 
however, the Cuban Government—prominent members of which had been openly aiding 
and abetting the Legion’s activities—suppressed 
it, their reasons being internal 
political maneuvers and US pressure. 
The Legion’s leaders subsequently substituted 
Nicaragua in place of the Dominican Republic as the primary target. 
In order that it 
- might be nearer the target, the matériel was shipped and flown to Guatemala and then 
transshipped to Costa Rica, where it was first used in the Figueres-led civil war. 
’ ‘The Legion considered its Costa Rican operations as part of its projected Nicaraguan _ 
campaign and a preliminary to it. Two immedios~ 
wert tnus attained: the 
Somoza 
DY the ‘Substitution of a hostile for a friendly neigh- 
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poring government on its southern border, and the amount of equipment available for 
the ultimate Nicaraguan campaign was increased. 
In order to obtain the Legion’s 
support, present Provisional President Figueres had apparently agreed to give the Le- 
gion, at the close of the civil disturbances, twice the amount of equipment it lent him 
for arming his Costa Rican, as distinguished from his Caribbean Legion supporters. 
_ 
At the close of the Costa Rican fighting the Legion was at its highest point of 
power, prestige, and influence. 
Its successful attack on Puerto Limén confirmed its 
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military prowess and enhanced throughout Central America its military reputation; 
the rifles, submachine guns, and grenades it was able to deliver to Figueres during the 
civil disturbances confirmed its ability to supply arms and to deliver them where and 
when they were needed; its superiority in weapons and fighting men over that of the 
new Figueres government assured it the ability to enforce its demands on the latter— 
namely that it be repaid twice the amount of arms it had Joaned Figueres and that its 
personnel be housed and fed at Costa Rican Government expense until the debt had 
' been paid. The personal intimacy of its leaders with the Presidents of Guatemala, 
Cuba, and Costa Rica gave it a voice in the area foreign policies of those countries; and 
its refusal to concern itself with the domestic affairs of Costa Rica, despite the fact that 
it was in a position to do so, reassured many who suspected the Legion’s social-revolu- 
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tionary intents. 
The burst of optimism in revolutionary circles which followed the successful ter- 
mination of the Costa Rican disturbances, was soon dissipated, however, by disagree- 
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ments among the legionnaires. 
Divisions developed over the formulation of plans for 
the campaign against Nicaragua, especially within the so-called “Junta Revolucionaria 
Unificada de Nicaragua”, a subsidiary and largely theoretical organization of the Legion 
© 
striving for leadership of the projected attack. 
Rival factions of Nicaraguan exiles 
whose divisions reflected traditional internal political distinctions each contended for 
leadership of the Junta and for the support of Presidents Arévalo and Figueres. 
In Costa Rica the rivalries eventually narrowed down -to two contending groups. 
One led by Rosendo Argiiello, Jr., consisted of about 200 armed men who were under- 
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going daily training and comprised the liberal and more radical elements among the 
Nicaraguan exiles. 
This group, variously called the “Chendos” or the “Puros”, was 
superior in training, discipline, and physical condition to the rival group of about 100 
men led by Miguel Ramirez who were, for the most part, conservative Nicaraguan exiles. 
Provisional President Figueres of Costa Rica supported the Argiiello group, and Presi- 
dent Arévalo of Guatemala supported the Ramirez group. 
After much haggling, many conferences among the contenders, and high Costa 
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Rican, Cuban, and Guatemalan government officials, Rosendo Argiiello, Jr. was chosen 
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on 17 October 1948 to act as “Commiander in Chief” of the Nicaraguan Army of Libera- 
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tion, with Miguel Ramirez as CHief of Staff “with all the functions and inherent at- 
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tributes of such a position.” 
The general staff was composed of eleven officers, six of 
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whom (a majority) were Nicaraguan citizens, the others being Dominicans, Hondurans, | 
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and Cubans. 
Essentially the united group consisted of an officer cadre; large numbers 
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of enlisted men were 
not trained. 
The agreement als6 
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and succinctly ‘the felétionship 
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“Nicaraguan Army of Liberation” (the united Argiiello-Ramirez group in Costa Rica) 
_ and Legionnaires in Guatemala, under the command of General Rodriguez, a Dominican 
exile and original founder of the Legion. 
The Dominicans under Rodriguez were permitted to organize their own separate 
revolutionary force in Guatemala which, it was envisaged, would take full part in the 
attack on Nicaragua and would then, when the “Nicaraguan Army of Liberation” be- 
came the government of Nicaragua, become the Caribbean Legion for the eventual
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\ PRESIDENT 
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SECRETARY FILE 
attack on the Dominican Republic. 
In exchange for this support, the Argiiello- 
Ramirez group promised that if and when it obtained control of Nicaragua, it would 
assist the Rodriguez group by supplying it with Nicaraguan air, sea, and land bases; 
ammunition and weapons; air power, and money. 
Immediately after the agreement was signed in October, preparations went ahead 
for the attack on Nicaragua. 
Headquarters were established by the Rodriguez group 
in a house near the Government Palace of Guatemala and Jocated in such a position as 
to be within rifle shot of a Guatemalan Army cuartel (for President Arévalo was deter- 
mined that he should not, like Figueres, be subject to pressure from the armed body 
which he had invited into his country). 
General Rodriguez was in frequent personal 
contact with President Arévalo who, in all important decisions concerning the Legion, 
insisted that his Minister of War Arbenz and the Chief of the Armed Forces Arana be 
associated with him. A general staff consisting of six Dominicans, two Hondurans, one 
_ Nicaraguan and two Cubans was organized; and a skeleton organization of approxi- 
mately 200 consolidated. 
Precise armed strength is undetermined, but is believed to 
include two 2-inch cannon, 35 machine guns, 80 submachine guns, 800 grenades, and 
780 rifles. 
Guatemalan Army, Cuban Army, and commercial (i.e., TACA) aircraft were 
for all practical purposes made available to transport the men and matériel of the 
Legion to any designated Central American or Caribbean point, and a particular airport 
in Guatemala was designated for use by the Legian. 
President Prio of Cuba possibly 
promised to give the Legion, once the Nicaraguan attack got under way, such matériel 
as he still held from that confiscated during the Cayo Confites incident. 
This matériel 
included 2,000 grenades, 200,000 cartridges, 600 rifles, 32 machine guns, aerial bombs, 
boats, planes, and twelve bazookas. 
It was reported that officials of the Argentine 
_ Government approached some of the Legion officials with a view to holding discussions 
on the question of future Argentine support but that the Legion officials declined to 
discuss the matter lest ties with Perén arouse further anti-Legion feeling within the 
US Government. 
Meanwhile, and despite the October agreement, disunity within the Legion con- 
tinued, especially within the Argiiello-Ramirez unit based in Costa Rica. 
The Costa 
Rican Government, by virtue of arms purchases in the US, was apparently able to pay 
off the Legion’s Costa Rican-based unit and return to it all borrowed arms. 
Further- 
more, from mid-November Provisional President Figueres’ official attitude toward the 
Legion appears to have undergone a perceptible change, and the Costa Rican Govern- 
ment was no longer as cooperative toward the Legion as it had been. 
Rivalry within 
the Argtiello-Ramirez group broke out afresh, and ee 
in Guatemala recalled 
some Legior matériel and personnel from Cesta Rica... 
{In addition, the Legion appears to have developed a greater ania for the sidan hi 
of. the Nicaraguan Guardia Nacional to its chief, Somoza. 
The loyalty—or, more 
properly, the lack of loyalty—of the Guardia has always been a crucial factor in the 
Legion’s anti-Somoza plans, for all responsible Legion members realize that, despite the 
considerable matériel and personnel they have gathered, such a campaign as they 
might be able to launch against Somoza could not succeed unless at least a part of the 
Guardia Nacional, proved disloyal under pressure, and deserted. 
This is especially true 
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in view of reported Legion strategy which calls for an initial air invasion of Nicaragua 
with landings at the airfields of the Siuna and Bonanza mines where large numbers of 
workers and Guardia garrisons are reported to be anti-Somoza. 
This was the situation up to Friday, 10 December 1948, when an organized group of 
Costa Rican exiles—numbers and armament undetermined—aided and abetted by 
Somoza and the army which he commands, crossed the frontier from Nicaraguan ter- 
ritory into Guanacaste province, Costa Rica. 
During the early hours of this invasion 
(one of the causes of which was the presence of the Caribbean Legion in Costa Rica 
and Guatemala, and Somoza’s fear of it) the Costa Rican Government made a formal 
agreement with the Argiiello-led Legion subsidiary. 
Although the precise terms of the 
agreeinent are unknown, there are strong indications that Provisional President 
Figueres again promised future support for the Legion’s aim of destroying the Somoza 
regime in exchange for help in suppressing the Somoza-supported revolutionary incur- 
sions against him. 
Specifically, individual Legion members were permitted to enlist 
in the Costa Rican Army. 
The General Staff of the Legion, which was to remain in- 
tact, was not to direct a counterattack in Nicaragua unless the invading forces had 
enough support from Somoza to place the outcome in doubt. 
This backing did not 
prove sufficiently strong and, as a Samenquencs, the Legion as such did not engage in 
anti-Somoza moves. 
The speed with which the Council of Organization of American States intervened in 
the disturbances was possibly a factor in deterring the Legion and the Figueres Govern- 
ment from precipitate action against Somoza. 
This and internal difficulties within 
Guatemala checked the Arévalo Government. 
On 24 December, the Council of Or- 
ganization of American States advised the Costa Rican Government to remove from its 
territory “groups of nationals or foreign military organizations” (i.e. the Caribbean 
Legion) conspiring against the security of Nicaragua and of other sister Republics. 
At present, although the Legion has outwardly become less active, its operational 
position remains comparable to what it has been for the past several months. 
Officers, 
men, and matériel are located in both Guatemala and Costa Rica. 
It still constitutes 
a sufficient force to be a significant factor in the calculations of the Caribbean govern- 
ments relating to local foreign policy, especially in the matter of rivalry between the 
“dictatorships” and the “democracies.” 
Presidents Prio of Cuba, Arévalo of Guatemala, 
and Figueres of Costa Rica remain favorably disposed toward it and willing to use it 
as an-instrument of public policy. 
There is evidence that Legion friends and sup- 
porters in Cuba are about to launch an active propaganda campaign on behalf of its 
Papers 
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“S. TRUMAN 
\ cRESTDENT'S SECRETARY FILE 
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gaRRY S. TRUMAN 
PRESIDENT'S SEC 
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RETARY FILE 
ENCLOSURE A 
DISSENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
The intelligence organization of the Department of State does not concur in sub- 
ject report in the following respects: 
We believe that the report places too much emphasis upon the political significance 
of the Legion as an organization because (a) in recent weeks the strength of the Legion 
appears to have materially declined and (b) the Legion is not put entirely in its proper 
perspective with reference to the political conditions of the area. 
With reference to 
the latter the intelligence organization of the Department believes that the Legion in 
itself is of less significance than the fact that it had its origin in the increased dissatis- 
faction in the area with traditional methods of government and in the fairly widespread 
desire for the development of political institutions along more progressive lines. Specifi- 
Cally, it is felt that insufficient emphasis has been placed upon the fact that the Legion 
found it possible to organize partly because of intense feeling existing both in and out of 
the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua against the repressive regimes of Trujillo and 
Somoza. 
The conflict which has made the Legion possible is a more persistent factor 
in the political relationships of the area than the Legion itself which might at any 
time fall apart as an organization, but which would in such case likely be succeeded in 
time by some other and possibly similar instrument of agitation and force as long as 
the self-seeking dictatorships remain. 
We believe that El Salvador should be omitted from any mention in connection 
with the tendency that has existed to form two rival and competing blocks of power in 
the area. 
SECRET 
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