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A 
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN GUATEMALA 
THE PROBLEM 
To estimate the current 
p 
velopments. 
clitical situation in Guatemala and probable future de- 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. The current political situatio nin Gus- 
temala is adverse to US 
Guatemalan Cormymunisis cmercise a 
ical influence far out of proportion to their 
small numerical strength. 
ence will probably continue to grov yas tong 
as President Arbenz remains ii novwor. 
2. Communist influence in Guatemaia is 
based on militanie advoca' cy of social 
forms and nationalistic policies identilicd 
with the Guatermalan Revolution of 1244. 
It is exervised through the persona2i in- 
fluence of individual Cornmunisis with 
the President end within the pro-Admin- 
istration politieat parties, through inii- 
tration of the bureaucracy, through con- 
trol of labor organizations,.aud througa 
leadership of the agrarian retorim move- 
ment. 
The Communists’ present odjec- 
tive is not open and direct control of 
Guatemala. 
Rather, they seek to neu- 
tralize Guatemala as an ally of the United 
States and tc convert its Government into 
an effective, taough indirectly controlied, 
instrument of Communism. 
43: President Arbenz still exercises per- 
““gonal control of the Administration and 
of the Army and the Police. 
It is 
still 
possible for him to break his tics with 
the Communists and to mocerate the 
policies of his Administration, but it is 
highly unlikely that he will do zo. 
&, Implementation of the Agrarian Re- 
form Law of 1952 will be the principal 
objective of the Arbenz Administration 
Curing 1953. 
It is to be expected that 
the large Guatemalan landholders and 
tne United Fruit Company will be vic- 
iimized in the process. 
J. The implementation of Agrarian Re- 
form has intensified a sense of insecurity 
which has had a depressing effect on 
vusiness activity in Guatemala. However, 
its Cirect efiect on agricultural produc- 
tion is likely to be negligible, at least for 
several years. As long as coffee prices . 
hoid up the general economy of Guate- 
mala will not be vitally affected. 
6. The net internal political effect of the 
implementation of the Agrarian Reform 
Law will probably be to strengthen the 
Arbenz Administration and to increase 
Communist influence and capabilities. 
iveither the landholders nor the Fruit 
Company can expect any sympathy in 
Guatemalan public opinion. 
Redistribu- 
tion of their land will be used to mobilize 
the hitherto inert peasantry in support 
of the Administration. 
dat oRNOM 
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7. The most efiective opposition to the 
Arbenz Administration is found in Guate- 
mala City. 
The urban clements which 
constitute this opposition are strongly 
anti-Communist, 
but 
they 
are 
also 
strongly nationalistic. 
in general they 
could not be expected to nmiake common 
cause with the landholders and the Fruit 
Company or to weicome foreign interven- 
tion in Guatemaian internal afairs, al- 
though some of them might be disposed 
to accept foreign assistance in overthrow- 
ing Arbenz. 
There is no likelihood taat 
this urban opposition could alicr tae 
course of the Government by political 
action. 
It could not succecd in 2 revolu- 
tionary attcmpt opposed by tke Army. 
8. The Army is the only organized cic- 
ment in Guatemala capable of rapidly 
and decisively altering the political situa- 
tion. 
Although a quick change of aiti- 
tude is always possible, there is no pres 
ent reason to do bt the continucd loyalty 
of the Army high command and of most 
of the Army to Arbenz. 
‘The Army under 
its present leaders could not be expected 
to take revolutionary action unicss they 
became convinced that their personal 
security and well-being were threatened 
by Communist infiltration and dorina- 
tion of the Government, or unless the 
policies of the Government were to re- 
sult in extrerne social disorder and eco- 
nomic collapse. 
9. So long as it remains united, the 
Guatemalan Army can defeat any force 
which the Governments of El Salvador,’ 
Honduras, and Nicaragua could deploy 
againstit. 
These Governments are fear- 
ful that the trend in Guatemala will lead 
to Communist subversion and socia! up- 
heaval in their territories. 
They are 
probably giving serious consideration to 
the possibility of effecting a political 
change in Guatemala through clandes- 
tine support of revolutionary action there. 
It is highly unlikely, however, that they 
would cr could mount an open military 
intervention in Guatemala, 
10. Guatemala will probably continue to 
assist Communist subversive activities in 
tac Caribbean area, but will probably 
avoid involvement in filibustering opera- 
tioms like those of the Caribbean Legion 
im 1948-1951. 
‘To counterbalance its iso- 
lation in Central America it will seek 
political support elsewhere, particularly 
in the United Nations. 
If actually in- 
vaded it would seek to invoke the Rio 
Treaty as well as the UN Charter. 
11. Guatemala 
has 
frequently 
taken 
occasion to demonstrate its independence 
of US leadership and in general has been 
| 
less cooperative than could be desired, <~ 
particularly in Hemispheric affairs. 
_— 
Moreover, the regime has systematically 
been hostile toward US private economic 
interests in Guatemala. 
Detriment to 
Hemisphere solidarity would not deter 
Guatemala from any course of action 
suggested by its own interests. 
DISCUSSION 
Adininistration 
| 
ep >} The present political situation in Guate- 
mala is the outgrowth of the Revolution of 
1944. 
That Revolution was soincthing more 
than a routine military coup. From it there 
ceveloped a strong national movement to free 
Guatemala from the military dictatorship, 
social backwardness, and “economic colonial- 
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ism” which had been the pattern of the past. 
These aspifations have inspired the loyalty 
and conformed with the self-interest of most 
politically conscious Guatemalans. 
The Ar- 
benz Administration still derives some 
strength from its claim to leadership of the 
continuing national revolution. 
13. In the name of the Revolution of 1944 the 
successive administrations of Arévalo (145- 
1951) and Arbenz have pursucd increasingly 
radical and nationalistic policies. 
‘Their per- 
secution 
of foreign economic 
intcrests 
in 
Guatemala, especially the United Iruit Com- 
pany, and their demands for the “restitution” 
of Belize (British Honduras) nave nod the 
support or acquiescence of almost all Gunte- 
malans. 
Their promotion of labor organiza. 
tion and agrarian reform has tended to neu- 
tralize political opposition by crea 
support for the present regime. 
Any ovicc- 
tion to the trend of developments in Guate- 
mala has been stigmatized as resisiance io the 
Revolution of 1944 by “feudal” and “impe- 
rialistic” interests. 
14. The toleration 
of Communist 
activity 
which characterized the early ycars of the 
Arévalo Administration has developed inte an 
effective working alluance between Arbenz and 
the Communists. 
The pursuit of leitist and 
nationalistic policies has beon greatly acccl- 
erated under the Arbenz Adininistra tion. 
Tis 
first year in ofilce was highlighted by active 
Government support for the formation oi a 
national labor confederation and by a joint” 
Labor-Govermment attack on the United I’ruit 
Company. ‘That atiack failed, but the aill- 
ance of the Government with Cominunist-led 
organized labor was firmly establishec in the 
course of the strugzgie. 
15. The point of reference for consideration of 
the present political tensions in Guatemala is 
the Agrarian Reform Law enacted in mid- 
1952. 
This Law provides for the expropria- 
tion of large tracts of unused Jand and their 
' distribution to farm workers. 
Alihough pre- 
- sented as a long-overdue measure of social aud 
-§conomie reform, the Law has strong political 
. motivation and significance. 
Communists 
“and fellow-travelers played a icading part in 
its enactment; they honcycormb the ‘National 
‘Immediately unsea 
this decision and replaced them 
others 
Agrarian Department established to adminis- 
ter it. 
The Communists have incited disor- 
derly peasant seizures of privately owned 
lands. 
The Law is being administered in such 
2 way as to destroy the political effectiveneas 
of the large landholders and to mobilize the 
hitherto politically inert peasantry in support 
of the regime. 
i6. The recent congressional electoral cam- 
paign has further emphasized Arbenz’ political 
alliance 
with 
the 
Communists. 
Pressure 
irom the President’s office forced some reluc- 
tant Administration supporters to accept the 
newly reorganized and legalized Communist 
Party (calicd the Guatemalan Labor Party, or 
PGT) into the Electoral Front, the pro-Admin- 
istration coalition. The Electoral Front swept 
the country, except Guatemala City, where iis 
ticket was decisively defeated by a strong anti- 
Communist vote. 
The over-all result of the 
election was a reduction of Opposition 
strength in Congress from eleven to five of 
the 56 seats. 
Although Communist Party 
representation remained at four, the Con- 
fressional membership includes several addi- 
tional crypto-Communists and a majority may 
be considered sympathetic toward the Com- 
munist Party line so long as Arbenz favors it. 
i7. A further Increase in political tension has 
resulted from a Supreme Court decision favor- 
able to a Guatemalan landholder who had 
appealed for protection from arbitrary execu- 
tion of the Agrarian Reform Law.:. At the in- 
atigation of Arbengz, 
the Guate 
the justices ' who favored 
more reliable from its point of view. 
This 
action provoked an intense but transitory re- 
action on the part of professional and other 
elements in Guatemala City already anti- 
Administration in sentiment. 
— 
18. President Arbenz has a middle-class back- 
ground, as have most of his political associates. 
At least initially, his involvement with Revolu- 
tionary forces was probably as much a matter 
of simple political expediency and opportun- 
ism. as Of personal 
inclination. 
By now, 
however, he has become emotionally com- 
mitted to the social and nationalistic objec- 
tives of the Revolution of 1944, especially to 
Congress 
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Agrarian 
Reform. 
Although 
probabiy 
not 
himself 
a Communist, he has found Commu- 
nist leaders among his most ardent and usefui 
supporters and values accordingly his political 
alliance with them. 
Inasmuch as Arbenz has 
thus far kept personal contro] of the consid- 
erable powers of the Guatemalan Presidency, 
it is still possible for him to break with the 
Communists and to moderate the policies 
his Administration. 
He has shown no inclina- 
tion to do so, however. 
As the situation in 
Guatemala develops the poiilicai alicrnatives 
open to him are steadily reduced. 
Communist Strength and Influence 
19. The Guatemalan Laber 
(Communist) 
Party is estimated to have no move than 1,000 
members, of whorn perhaps less than one-nali 
are militants. 
The Party is in oper. commuuni- 
cation 
with 
(International 
Csrmmuaisin 
through the Communist-controlled interna- 
tional labor organizations (the Latin age 
can CTAL and the world-wide Wir) an 
through visits made to the Soviet Bloc by in- 
dividual Communists anu front group dele gas 
tions. 
: 
20. The Communists have achieved thelr pres- 
ent political influence in Guaicmala, not as a 
political party competing with others, but 
through personal influence with the President 
and through the coordinated activity of in- 
dividual Communists within the leftist pollti- 
- cal parties and labor unions which emerged 
from the Revolution of 1944. 
This Commu- 
nist infiltration of other sartien and organiza- 
tions has been facilitated by the coincidence of 
avowed Communist social and “anti-impcrial- 
ist” objectives with those of the Revolution. 
The recent legalization of the Party and its 
acceptance into the pro-Administration Licc- 
toral Front has not altered its basic strategy 
of seeking power through infiliration rather 
than through open political competition. 
Its 
immediate objective is not a ‘People’s Democ- 
racy” under open and direct Communist con- 
trol, but rather to neutralize Guatemala as an 
ally of the United States and to convert the 
Government into an effective, though indirect- 
ly controlled, instrument of Communism. 
21. With the assistance of the Government, 
Communist and Communist-influenced labor 
leaders have been the most successful organ- 
izers of Guatemalan labor. Their formation of 
the General Confederation of Guatemalan 
Workers (CGTG) and Government pressure 
‘or labor unity have facilitated the extension 
of their control over ail organized labor. 
In 
the important railway workers’ and teachers’ 
unions, however, there has been some rank- 
and-ile opposition to association with Com- 
imunism. 
In 1952, moreover, rank-and-file de- 
fecuuon from Communist leadership was an 
important factor in breaking a major strike 
against the United 
Fruit Company. 
The 
basic weekness of Guatemalan Communist 
lavor leadership is that it is imposed from 
above through top control of the machinery of 
labor organization and cannot 
be sure of renk- 
and-le support in all circumstances. 
22. Iinplementation of the Agrarian Reform 
Law has opened a new field of Communist or- 
gaszational activity. 
The Communists are 
seeking to mobilize the hitherto inert mass of 
rural workers through the CGTG and the Na- 
tional Confederation of Guatemalan Peasants 
(CNCG), in which they exercise a strong in- 
fluence, 
23. Through their leadership in organized 
labor and their influence with the President 
and within the pro-Administration political 
parties, the Communists have gained many 
_ 
positions of influence within the Government: 
in Congress (where they domin&te the Spe- omy 
cial Committees on Agrarian Reform and La- 
bor Code Revision), in the National Electoral 
Board, the National Agrarian Department, the 
Institute of Social Security, the Labor Courts, 
the Ministry of Education, and the Presi- 
dential Secretariat of Propaganda, and in the 
official and pro-Administration 
press and 
radio. 
Their influence is extended by an in- 
definite number of Communist sympathizers 
in similar positions. 
At the same time, no 
Communist holds any position of Cabinet rank 
and the Communists appear to have made 
liitie or no effort as yet to gain control over 
the Police or the Army. 
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Anti-Communist Elemenis in Guatemala 
life. So far the Arbenz Administration has 
° 
treated Guatemalan urban economic interests 
with consideration, has supported them 
against foreign competition, and has made no 
sustained effort to break their strong political 
‘s 
growth of Conmmunist influence in that coun. 
sition in Guatemala City. 
‘cabin 
try. 
These elements, however, have shown 
site 
B. 
: 
little 
capucity 
to 
organize 
for re 
28. ‘The political effectiveness of the urban 
—: 
counteraction. 
In general, each has tended 
opposition has been hindered by the multi- 
sy 
24. Various elements in Guatemala, including 
ea 
many loyal adherents of the Revolution of 
rg 
1944, view with increasing concern whe rapid 
A 
> 
as 
a 
to react only as its own peculiar intercsts were _—_ plicity of its elements and by conflicts of in- 
directly affected and all have been 
deterred by 
‘terest among them, as well as by their con- 
e! 
the success of Admiristration propaganda in 
tinulng loyalty to the stated objectives of the 
: 
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stigmatizing any criticism as opposition to 
Revolution of 1944. 
Nevertheless, the opposi- 
¢ 
the principles of the Revolution ‘of i944 and 
‘tion won the mayoral election in Guatemala 
t- 
| 
support of “feudalism” 
aid “iorcign economic 
City in December 1951 and even more deci- 
Se 
imperialism.” 
: 
sively defeated the Electoral Front there in. 
ey 
= 
the Jan 
1953 congressional election. 
25. Aside from US private interes 
in Guate- 
of 
opposition 
mala,’ the lar 
Guatemaian i 
holders h: 
be identified with the landholders will remain 
been the 
chief 
an obstacie to the unification of all anti-Com- 
> 
the landholders failed in thei attempts to 
alter the course of the Revolution. 
They now 
‘ 
Bee 
appear to be politically isolated and incapable 
he Position of the Army and the Police 
of effective self-defense. 
(the Guardia Civil) 
— 
26. The Catholic hicrarchy in Guatemala is 
29. The Army (6,000 men) is the only organ- 
| 
t - t 
implacably opposed to Comraunism, but 
the 
ized element in Guatemala capable of rapidly 
| 
— 
Church has been excluded from an activerole 
ard decisively altering the political situation. 
| 
in national affairs since the late Nineteen‘h 
The two regiments (1,000 men) stationed in 
oS 
eT 
Century. 
Moreover, the Church 
is handi- 
the capital city are an elite force trained under 
e 
| 
capped by the meagerness of its resources, the 
the Supervision of the US Army Mission and 
small number of priests in proportion to pop- 
better equipped than other units of the 
>. 
ulation, the fact that mos! priests are aliens 
Guatemalan Army. 
The Guardia Civil (3,500 
f. 
| 
subject to deportation, and the lock of a pr 
men) is dispersed in small detachments—it 
| 
«rani capable of competing with the Commu- 
could neither defeat an Army coup nor itself .-...- | 
nist-led labor 
or with Agrarian 
overthrow the Government without Army sup- 
27. Urban op 
to Communism (largely 
| 
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confined to Guateraala City) is composed of: 
30. Since the Revolution of 1944 the Army 
. 
| 
ole 
| 
(2) commercial and manufacturing Interests; 
and the Police have refrained from active par- 
| 
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(b) certain professional groups; (c) university 
ticipation in politics while supporting the con- 
students; (d) moderate labor elements; and 
 stitutionally established administrations of 
(ce) the mark@t women of Guatemala City. 
Arévaio and Arbenz. 
The present Army lead- 
Tae 
This urban opposition is strongly amti-Com- 
ers owe their personal advancement to the 
{ 
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-munist, but it is also strongly nationalistic. 
Revolution, and particularly to Colonel Ar- 
; 
ica 
| 
In particular, 
it resents the predominance of 
benz, who was a military leader in the Revolu- 
atau 
ae 
_ US private economic interests In Guatemalan 
tion and Minister of Defense under Arévalo 
T 
before himself becoming President. 
There is 
| 
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no reason to question their personal loyalty to 
ways 
of Central 
America, 
and 
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tricas (he principal electric Ught “and power 
Arbens. Any possible 
disaffection 
in the 
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company). 
Army would‘be likely to occur at the junior 
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officer level. 
Arbenz has sought to enhance 
inorale through pay increases, additional al- 
lowances, quarters for many field grade off- 
cers, promotions every three years, duty-free 
commissary privileges, and appointments to 
desirable 
government 
positions. 
“specially 
generous treatment has been providea for the 
Officers of the two regiments stationed at 
Guatemala City, while less reiiable oNicers 
have been assigned to isolated posts in the 
hinterland. 
The military 
units outside 
of 
| 
Guatemala City have little potential for effec- 
tive revolutionary action because of their dis- 
persion and isolation, the inferiority of their 
equipment and training, and the watehful 
supervision of trusted areacommancers. 
The 
rank-and-file of the Army is conscripted and is 
susceptible to the same political appeals which 
the regime addresses to the mass of the pepu- 
lation. 
There is little or no Communist pene- 
tration or influence in the Army. 
International Relations 
31. Guatemalan foreign policies reflect the 
- nationalistic and “democratic” attitudes asso- 
ciated with the Revolution of 1944. 
Although 
they have not been systematically antago- 
nistic toward the United States, Guatcmaia 
has frequently tai.en occasion to demonstrate 
its independence of US ieacdership and in 
general has been less cooperative than could 
be desired, particularly in Hemispheric affairs. 
Moreover, the regime has systematically been 
hostile toward US private economic interests 
in Guatemala (the United fruit Company, 
the International Railways of Central Ameri- 
ca, and Empresas Electrica). In keeping with 
its attitude toward “colonialism,” it has given 
tacit support to Puerto Rican nationalism. 
It has complicated its adherence to the Rio 
Treaty with reservations relating to its clalm 
to Belize 
(British Honduras). 
it has sub- 
scribed to the principle of inter-American 
military cooperation, but narrowly interprets 
that commitment. 
It voted 
for the UN 
“Uniting for Peace” resolution, but has de- 
clared that it would not implement it. These 
attitudes are not unigue in Latin America, 
but Guatemalan propaganda in relation to 
them has a strong anti-US slant. 
Detriment 
to Hemisphere solidarity has not deterred and 
would not deter Guatemala from any course 
of action suggested by its own interests. 
32. Since 1944 Guatemala has supported the 
“democratic” elements of other Caribbean 
countries in their struggles against “dictator- 
Ship” and has provided material assistance 
to “democratic” exiles from such countries. 
During 1948-1950 Guatemala supported the 
flibustering 
operations 
of the “Caribbean 
Legion” against the Dominican Republic and 
Costa Rica. 
Since 1950 the Legion has ceased 
to be operational, largely because of the with- 
crawal o. Guatemalan support for such opera- 
tions. 
However, Guatemalan official propa- 
ganda, with its heavy emphasis on conflict 
between democracy and dictatorship and be- 
tween national independence and “economic 
imperialism,” is a disturbing factor in the 
Caribbean area. 
Moreover, the Guatemalan 
Government, at the least, tolerates and in- 
directly assists clandestine Communist sub- 
versive 
activities 
in other countries. 
The 
Guatemalan Communist Party absorbs Carib- 
bean exiles into its local organization, particu- 
larly into its labor and front groups, and 
through them it maintains contact with dis- 
aslected elements in other countries, thus 
enhancing its capabilities as a focal point 
‘or subversive activity throughout the Carib- 
bean area. 
63. Ever since the breakup of the Central 
Aimerican federation in 1839 there have been 
Periodic attempts to restore sofae degree 
of 
union among the five states.” Quaternala, as - 
_ 
the principal state, has usually been the 
leader in such efforts. 
In 1951 El] Salvador 
proposed the formation of an Organization 
of Central American States (ODECA) with 
a view toward gradual economic union and 
eventual 
political 
union. 
Guatemala 
at- 
terapted to assume the leadership of this 
movement, but El Salvador, Honduras, and 
Nicaragua, alarmed by the manifestations of 
Communist influence in Guatemala, showed 
themselves resolved to use ODECA as a means 
of combatting Communism. 
In consequence 
Guatemala 
has withdrawn 
from ODECA, 
alleging the existence of an international con- 
spiracy to interfere in Guatemala’s internal 
* 
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ond 
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affairs. 
This 
withdrawal 
confirms 
Guate- 
mala’s isolation in-Central America. 
34. Simultaneously with its withdrawal from 
ODECA Guatemala complained to the United 
Nations regarding this alleged foreign inter- 
ference. 
It is notable that Guatemaia by- 
passed the Organization of America States 
in addressing this complaint to the UN. It 
probably calculated that its charge thal Us 
private interests (i.e., the United sruit 
pany and its affiliates) were responsibie tor 
a “vast conspiracy” to subvert the existing 
regime would enlist the support of the Soviet 
and Arab-Asian Bilocs in addition to tnas of 
such Latin American countries as Argentina, 
Bolivia, Chile, and Mexico. 
35. El Salvador has shown extreme sensitivity 
regarding the danger of an extension o. Com- 
munist influence from Gustemzia inv El 
Salvador and other neighboring states; “sere 
are persistent reports that k) Saivacor is 
giving serious consideration to joint milllary 
action with Honduras and Nicaragua against 
Guatemala. 
Other Caribbean countrics, par- 
ticulariy the Dominican Republic, Colombia, 
and Venezuela, have aiso shown concern re- 
garding the development of Guatemaia as 
@ center of subversive influence and even of 
subversive operations. 
Probable Futuro Dovelopmcnts 
36. Implemeniation of the Agrarian Neforn 
- Law of 1952 will be the principal objective 
of the Arbenz Administraiion during 1953. 
In the process the large Guatemalan land- 
holders and the United Fruit Company will 
certainly be victimized. 
The net internal 
political effect of Agrarian Reform will prob- 
ably be to strengthen the Arbenz Adminis- 
tration. 
Neither 
the landholders 
nor the 
Fruit Company can expect sympathy from 
Guatemalan pubiic opinion. 
Nedistribution 
of their land will be used to mobilize the 
hitherto inert mass of rural workers in sup- 
port 
of the Administration. 
Agrarian Reform 
will also afford the Communists an opportun- 
ity to extend their influence by organizing 
the peasants as they have organized other 
workegs. 
37. Agrarian Reform has already intensified 
a sense of insecurity which has had a de- 
pressing effect on business activity in Guate- 
mala. 
As regards agricultural production its 
immediate effects are likely to be negligible: 
as presently implemented it will do little more 
than 
increase 
the number 
of subsistence 
farms. 
In the longer run it may seriously 
curtail the production of the Fruit Company 
plantations. 
As long as coffee prices hold 
up, however, the general economy of Guate- 
mala is not likely to be vitally affected. 
88. The dissatisfaction of important urban 
clements will probably increase, but effective 
political unity among these elements is not 
lsely to be achieved. 
The political union of 
rural and urban interests in opposition to 
the Arbenz Administration is even less Likely. 
No group or foresceable combination of groups 
is likely to be able to bring about any sgnifi- 
cant moderation of the Administration’s policy 
by political action. 
No revolutionary attempt 
opposed by the Army can be expected to 
succeed, 
39. The Army could effect a rapid and de- 
cliive change in the Guatemalan political 
situation if it were to take conc xrted action. 
Aithough a quick change of attitude is always 
possible, there is no present reason to doubt 
the continued loyalty of the Army high com- 
mand and of most of the Army t. President 
Arbenz. 
The Army could not be expected 
to take revolutionary action unless its leaders - 
became convinced that their personal securi- 
ty and well-being were threaténed by Com- 
~ 
munist infiltration and domination of the 
Government, or unless the policies of the 
Government were to result in extreme social 
disorder and economic collapse. 
40. As long as President Arbenz remains in 
power? the Arbenz-Communist alliance will 
probabiy continue to dominate Guatemalan 
politics. 
Any increase in political tension in 
Guatemala would tend to increase Arbenz’ 
political dependence on this alliance. 
*Arbenz’ legitimate term in office wil) expire on 
March 15, 1957. Whether he will reach the end 
of his term, whether he would then retire, and 
what the character of his successor might be 
now be estimated. 
‘ 
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. 
* 
. 
41. The Governments of E] Salvador, Hon- 
cluras, and Nicaragua will continue to seek 
means to oppose the Communistic tendencies 
of Guatemala, and will give serious considera- 
tion to the possibility of effecting a political 
change in Guatemala through ciandestine 
Support 
of revolutionary 
activities. 
It 
is 
highly unlikely, however, that they would 
undertake an open military intervention in 
Guatemala 
or actually 
could 
organize 
an 
effective 
operation 
of 
thai 
character 
in 
view of the limited strength of their armed 
forces, the proportion of that sirength re- 
quired for the maintenance of their ovm in- 
ternal security, the fact that thelr iorccs are 
ill-equipped and untrained for ficid cpera- 
tions, the (for them) probably insuperabic 
logistical obstacles to an open invasion of 
Guatemala, and the internal and intermoeticn- 
al political difficulties which woulda 
cnrsuc. 
Moreover, foreign military intervention would 
tend to cause all factions in Guatemeia to 
unite to repel the invasion. 
So long as it 
remains united, the Guatemalan Army could 
defeat any force which ki Salvador, Koncuras, 
end Nicaragua were capable of deploying 
against it. 
In the event of such an invasion 
Guatemala could present a clear case of for- 
cign intervention 
to the Organization of 
American States. 
42. The Guatemalan Government will prob- 
ably continue to assist Communist subversive 
activities in the Caribbean area, but will prob- 
ably avoid involvement in military operations 
Lize those of the Caribbean Legion in 1948- 
1951. 
To counterbalance its isolation in Cen- 
tral America it will continue to seek political 
support elsewhere, particularly in the United 
Nations. 
If Latin American attitudes, as re- 
vocled at the UN, justify such a course, it will 
plovably raise the same issue of foreign inter- 
ference 
in the Organization of American 
States. 
It would certainly seek to invoke 
tre Rio Treaty as well as the UN Charter if 
it were to be invaded by its neighbors. 
45. Guatemala’s tolerance of Communism and 
hospitality toward exes makes it available 
as a convenient haven for Communist fugi- 
tives from the United States. 
- 
-. 
- 
- 
- 
> 
j 
| 
| 
|
=> 
33; 
“Urs 
1 June 1954 
“psy. 
| 
— 
. 
=. 
—" 
— 
* 
af 
| 
| 
Oc! 
| 
6362 
= 
| 
at 
| 
| 
| 
A 
| 
OF 
é-? 
: 
i 
. 
? 
» 
DAI 
INTE 
NY 
OFFIGE OF C! 
IGENCE 
|
ge. 
“ye. 
=>. 
\ 
/ 
. 
Tae Guatemalan vovernnent 
is “piantine” 
American arns 
On o> near United FruLt Company sronerties on tha Caribbean.: 
. 
coast and plans to “"Aiscover" 
the caches within 30 cays, 
afi 
according to a usually 
source who received his inforn- 
false cocunentation will rerortedly 
be used to “nrove" United 
Ssuosequently, 
the sovernment plens to atta 
the United States 
yviolentiy and may 
nte the company. 
>. 
> 
| 
* 
— 
© 
| 
7) 
| 
| 
ré 
>
. 
> 
\ 
Comment: 
successful, 
this nlot could go much to 
convince Otner Latin American nations that curren} Guatenalay 
- 
policy is justified by tae hostile inteations of Antirigan 
| 
vestors, principally the fruit company. 
Guatemala'’s 
pronatanda 
kes long maintained that the Conmuatst problem there is in- 
| 
Significant anc trat the real reason for deteriorating rolations 
beet 
with the United States is State Denartnent support of "inner~ 
foreiga investors wno try to block all social end 
\ 
° 
- 
)