A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SIGNAL by . William F. Friedman June 29, 1942° © e 2 a td Qt 8 . INTELLIGENCE SERVICE DECLASSIFIED per Seo. 2, EC. by Director, NSA/Chic# CS3 ie o- Fe. J
1.. "Prior to June 1917ho departzent of the Gorerccent conducted eryotensalytic activities whatsoever. Tra June 1916 to about Lay 1918 a considerabls amourrt of work along these lines: ¥as conducted curely as . x fee — e patriotic enterprise at his om axpense by Me.” George Fabyan, whose - Riverbank Laboratories: at Geneva, Tilincis, orgenised a small group of Lone ’ fairly we . ii-trained oryptenslyats to work upea fue codes and cit phers— . | oo an es were commer reed by the Var, Tavy, State, and. Justi ice Depar ements. ‘the oie : underss ned directed the eryytanslytic cperatioge and training «et the : - . ee wos a, . . 4 Biverbant Laboratories from tke tine oF the Anception of this vork until atte ° ea . . -- its close thereat in 1919, except for a.poriod of a yeer vhen he wes - on -« . : - - . a ee . . me ws bo : coe e oe e ° ~ “ > "% _7 . Ist Lieirs., MID, serving at GHQ-AEP in the Gerzen ~ode solving sS$cticn. " 25 In Jume 1917 the cryptanalytic activitier cf the War Dezarcreat were-initiated by Colonel Van Demen, G-2, with ths camissioning of i. o. Yarcley as lst Lieut., 1D. Yardley, tho had been a telegrapner at ths State Dorartment and had taken some intsrest in crypptogreshy, was given txo civilian enployees’to essist him. The werk grew repidiy end by the sutumn of 1917 the increased staff wes or genized es a section desizgmsted UI-8, which res subdivided into 6 subsections with cuties as indicated very briefly below: -.- . 7 ae _ (1) Code and cisher solution subsection. - This sucsection was what sould now be called the aypteralrtic subsection. It was thse largest cf the subsections of UT-8 end performed the crpptanalytic work mot only for the “ar Derertrent but also Zor all ether Gorernnent cetam- es rents, inecludire lizw7, State, Justic2, ané the txo censershicvs--~C2ble bey7,  3t2at2 2r¢ =n exsorshic abla e © vane bed ~~ ' < 4 oy » , he
=e ~e —— +s . sie], which «ere then semarate ors i oe (2) Cede and ci pher cecoilstica s-stsection. - Desvite ths fact = an tbat under Arey regulations the compilation and revision of ccées, 129 & , f:nction of the Chief Signal. officer, compilation activities uncer the- Signal Corps were apperently in ‘a moribund state, Inforzation having been ; 3. . received that the Gervens possessed ‘copies of the jiar Departzent Telegr2ph Code, MI-S deened it advisable to establish 2 code compilation subsection, and thet subsection produced several codes such ag Vilitary, Intelligence Codes No. 5 and No.- 3, spall pocket codes for secret agents, and the like. (3) Training subsection. - In add: ‘tion to training its crn ; ue . oe - C2. T - ee cersonnel LI-8 treined the rajority. of the ‘personnel sent overseas “for oa . cryptanalytiz cuties with field forces, both AEF and’ Siteria. « (4) Secret inks subsection. - A laboratory vas establishec 4 mined letters for secret ink writing and an average oi cver rer week were exani ned for the military and pestal censorsniv from July i; (6) Ceceunicaticns subsection, ~ This was established in fer kandling messages te and from militery attaches and intelligence efiicers serving ebread., In a seriod ef 9 months it sent and received abent 25,0CO such messages, practically all in cede 3. At the height of its Gevelconent, which was reached in Noverber , ws a ct pas is | OR) ia) SN t+ oO 1618, 11-8 was, for these devs, a rather Jarge unit, consi . : { 4
officers, ZL civilian cry ptograpners acc crypitielysts, and 109 typists ’ end stencgrephers, The tine had cexe for the estebliszment of a definite policy for the future. Now, the guiding heads of vislitary Intelligence . wee - Veusigt- rendered by the crgptanalytic bureen, because they had been in positions ae -. | at that ‘tine fully recognized the “high izportance and valus of the services . where the products of the aaity ‘activity of ‘the bureau. cane directiy to. i wv. notice and they could not fail. to rote the influence and beering ahich : oo the work had, not only uron ‘the ilitery and raval but also upon the, . . iar ve ee, -< a a diplestic, polit jeal, and economic. phases of the. conduct of the rar. o, . ta, A fee. . ot They therefore had | ‘practical experience in- the matter aca could bring | - : < oo ae Tate m mee 2 = pe -. the weight of their” position ‘of ‘influence and their actuas experience to ToL Bes bear uron those in charge of the purse striz 3, with the result thet ‘they tiere able to obtain funds sufficient to keep a fairly large organization intact for @ year or two, An annual zpvropriation ef £100,000 was recon- mended in a G-2 study dated Way 16, (isi9 to be used as foilons: ; a _- . _«@. o, ; . ; . 7 - Rent, light , and heat -. | an $3,900 . were Reference books ; | 100 Pérsornel: Chief 2 : . _— 7 6,000 a - 10 code an nd cipher exverts $ 73,000 30,000. - an 15 code ina cinher experts © 42,0CC 36 ,c00 7 "25 clerks 6 #1,2C0 . 30,000 7 - Total 5100, 000 The item fer "rent, Light, and heat" {s expleinable when it is neted taat i! by the boreaz res to be roved from Weshinston with 2 vier toe Hiding its Oe re ne a re en ee te ee a rn ann GT A AA Arm en tO RR IS fe ~ exvisterce. Of the £100,000 recorrendec, the State Derartcent was to sro- ~id)e I2c,cce ane 240, eco mas to te provided for exmexditere by the A. C. of (7) (ad-~ s
frist Dunds per sainiag to "Contingexrcy S, €-2 ca “eonticen al = emorancda™ <-. Woeistery Intelligence Division"—that 4 is, by vouchers not sub ject i revaen by ft the Coaptroller General. ‘The Paper con taining the recommendations made ‘oy the A. C. of S3 2 to the Chief of Staff was "OX-ed" and initialled by Acting Secretary of State Folk on Way 17, 1919, and on Hay 19 it was approved by the Secretary pf War over the Signature of ‘General Uarch, Cinet of Staff. The plan Tas 5 put into effect, the bureau was installed in a private house at c East 36th Street, ‘Hew York “ty, and all pers sonnel oe, : + : ay together with “cxisting records were moved. ‘thereto. . he ‘It is impor rtant to ‘note that at, that ‘time mo provision whatsoever - : ao “ . . et . was made for recio > intercept as a source of raw material for cryptenalysis.- A few words on this “Subject may not ‘be amiss. Redio intercept of fixed station smater.2. in the “Ue S. by ‘the frmy cari ing onr active participation in the last war was rather fragment . Tae work.vwas, of course, 2 = 2 3 responsibility of the Signal Corps, but radio cozmumications could hardly; compete mith cible and wire gesmumications asa source of raw material tecause not or y did ‘the large governments use cable in preference to radio,but also redio as a means of communication betreen widely separated fixed staticns was then in its infancy. Tke Signal Corps did, however, have wnat were called "nodile tractor® units stattozed on the southern border, and in late 1918S one large intercent station was established at Eoulton, Mzine, far the purpose of copying. trans-Atlantic radio. The large intercept stations maintained by the Signal Corps in the AEF did furnish a large quantity of diplomatic traffic which was forwarded as raw material to G-2 in iiashington, but as soon as the war was over all these sources of intercept material were © OL
ebeadconed, : : This was, of course, «ec tone to 2 certain extent but wes not oy any means the whole truth. At any ba +e by 1929 the flow of messages furnished ‘GH2 had dwindled-to a mere trickle. In about the yer 1926 | the intercept station s of the Coast Guard . . > - sumitted to ne infornally 2 few radio intercepts of what appeared tc be Jaranesa code nessages, but these were omy sporadic occasional dntercerts . of trmsaissions in the Far Zast.’ They were usually frage sentary and eee afforded very poor ‘meterial al. Such: as. they mere, however, these cecasional . -. vets oe ve * on eset messages were: turned over to G2. ‘There were, ‘thereforp, clear indications ver? vs t=s% if a serious a expt * were made to obtais ‘this material better cory rar covld be obtain ed. _Hovever, no pressure was brought on the Signal. Corps 2 setupa regular in bercept ‘service, and aside from a few relatively _ weak efforts to es tablish an intercept station in the Philippine Department there was no real intercept service util after 1929, when resvonsibility a => erystanalysis was transferred fron G-2 to the Signal Corps. om this 05
cane to pass = :2 sson be detailed. 5. As indicated in Par. 3 above, the $100,000 appropriation, set : - up in 1919 took care of the bureau for + “the FY 1920, that is fren July 1, 1919 to Lune 30, (1920,. but! ren in June, 1920 it cane tine to set up the badget for FY 1922, the purse strings were already beginning to ba pulled tighter. Wany of the "old-timers" in G-2 had gone to other assignments; those remaining and the newcozers in G2 apparently had neither tre background nor the influence to prese the matter. The appropriation ‘was at once. out in halt, that is, to $50, C00, of which the “8 - "State Departaent share - sel continued to be $20, 000. Tne theory wes, evidently, that since the’ work " done by the bureau -was primarily, if not solely, for and of interest to the State Department, all. or nearly all of the funds should be Froviced by that departzen t. The Wer Depertnent overlooked some bed ° very important points in the sitvation—points rh hich will be Drought up and enpuasizad later in this sumary. +n order not to break the continuitr of the history at this poin®, tt wilt be stated merely that year by yeer “the fonds provided for the naintenance and operation of the bureau becams mare and sore constr racted until = the autumn of (1929 the following tabula- tica, based upon a letter dat ted July 17, 1929 fron Major 0. S. ‘Albrig ent, G2 to the Chie? Signal Officer (General Gibbs), shoxs how the bureau had been permitted to deteriorate: . oe $3,000 Rent Books , post2ge, travel, transportation,asc. 2,370 Personnel: 1 Chief (Yardley) 7,500 1 Code & cipereexpert 3,60 1 translator (Jap) 3,750 C6
1 secre tary 1,£09 : vee od clerk-typist . 1,600 mel. oe. ns coe fa clerk-typist - 1,320 . . a Z Total $25,000 7 In the foregoing “total afproprtation of $25, 000 the State Departoent furnished $15,000, the. Yar Departaent $10, 000. The activities of the . tte _ burean had by this. tine becone ‘sO ‘reduced that it vas sending in only . oe ae “4 occasional translatioas of a few Japanese divjcaatic “. ad oe we, Se oe messages. No research “mhatsoever ‘Tas conducted in cryptanalysis; there a oe were no training activi ies, no intercept, po coeds compilation, no oo secret ink work. ‘The personel consi sted of six persons all ‘told and 7” _ 373% of the total payrol went to one man, teo hed little interest on other than to consinue | as Long as possible to maintain-hinself in the . Sinecure into which he had been perait ted to establish hisself. - 6. } In the summer of of 1929 3 ¥ajor 0. s. flbright, Signal Corps , had been 2ssi goed, to G-2 to serve on ‘the Staff of the A. C. of S., E-2 to supervise amd coordinate sack ‘of the cryptographic and cr; ypeanalytic - activities of the Tas Pepartsent as “remained. After a careful study ZF the si suation and an aspraisal of how the existing cryptanalytic bureau was and Tas not serving the functions for which it had been intended, Major qlbright cene to the conclusion that the entire pictvre was wrong. He felt that the product (Vpulletin") which tae bureau was turing out every fem @ays was indeed of primary interest for its ovm saxe to the State Desartzent and while the War Department had O7
the office wes atuinistered, etc. arly a secontary interest in the "bulletin" for the information Lt gave, the prizary interest af the War Peper treat in cryptacal;tic - vee - s tudies in peace tune was wnat it was ; intended to. provide a ears’ .for training ot personnel for inbediate war-tine effectiveness Major slbright found that not: only was there very little if any training being conductee but also thet all the persons in the _ burean, except far one clerk receiving the least pay, were "getting . along in years*—their potential usefulness for “possible war tine service practically ail. Moreover, the bureau was now hidden ewes - ina public office building in New York (under cover of the "Code ‘Conpi lation Con peony" ‘for alleged purposes of security) and far « away from direct supervision of anybody ccanected with the War Terartment or of c-2, _30 that nobody knew hat was going on, how. od Yerdley « voted nost of his ‘tine to tm or torve Dri vate enterorises (commercial code con ilation 2 reel estate brokerage, consultant in code natters to canmercial a firms) and he wes having a "field day" at Goverment expense. “There : mere, in addition, several other weighty factors which motivated Major Albright in presaring a G-2 study recommending that the su be teken out of G2 and its ts functions trangr erred to tne Sisnal Corps, chief anorg which was the desirability, if not necessity, of placing all coyptogrepiiic and eryptanalytic work of the Wer Department under one ezency, rather than distributing ib among tree (The Adjutant General, - for printing, storage, issue, and accounting of codes; The Chief Signal Officer, for conpiling codes and ciphers; Military Intelligence for Soustioa of codes and ciphers). A reaorancima on the sane subject was -B-
given in} ite Jor Albright!s- study end in Col, Wil son! Ss memorandcim wete.-:, “LR eRe ord we apparently deened valid by the-Chief of tafl, for ajer Albright's <7 07>. “* recomencut icas were, approved in Avril 1929 and ‘steps mere scot initiated by G-2 end the Chief Sign al Officer to put them into effect. The recom : mencatiors carried with nen rerely the vording of a changes to be made in AR 105-5; specifying the éuties of the Chief Signal citicer, these duties stcrage, distribution, aod account= | being 1g enlarged to include the printing, : ine of ecdes and. "in tire of Fez = ‘the. interception of eueay radio ‘and wire - ote : 2. etre Te ot “eins “ . . weg “get ; treftic, the geniouetric, Location of. eneny “radio statiods, the soluti ion of oN intercepted every code and cipher ressdges, bo ome eye et and laboratory arrangenents mee a et we i ho La . a. 7 tweet . for the exployment and detection of" secret inks.” - : oc. DEEL: 7. Eowever, vefore anything « coul aid be done acitally to transfer the - : at ee . ~ : . . a activity a ner and very disturbing factor entered into the picture. In | March 1929 a new adinist ration. took office, in which Lr. Stimsen becaze . Lette wee ewe ee OTT he had tecene sufficiently: rel oriented in the duties of his office to- funés provided in large par art by ime was acened cr 1929, however, the “espe for this measure, but it was with scome trepidation that a few trens- " lations £ Japanese code messages were placed on lr, Stinson's Gesk. Eis ’ - erring how the material reacticn was violent and his ection crastic. Upen lesrning unethical ard on was obtained, he characterizec the activity as being highl “4 f fren the cxoyptanelytic Q3
( cecitred thet it would ceese ir>eciately, so far es the State DPen-rtzent wes concerned, To put teeth into his cecision ke gave instructicns that 7 we: - weg tate Derert rent would be witbdrarm at ones. the necessary fupss of ‘the . : : . it mes only aft ter considerable tressure by the &. was dissuaded fron this coutrse, which might bave C. of S., G-2 ‘that, ‘be , hed serious consenuences by suddenly throwing cut of exployuent the six peovle concerned, at 2 tire t - ot of severe econonic Cepre ession. For these workers hed only special treiping industriel, shipping or - benking or t9 “educetional inst itutions. in a field tholely useless to commercial, firms, or to other goverment departments, therefor re nade to close tke office -- :: ae - nd then we to: - : a ot . - . immediately 30.7 fax concerned but to keep the personnel on the payroll for the tire necessary to wind uP affaizs, and get th files in shape reecy to 12a over to the Sigpel- Corps: This took 2 couple. . ronths,, = at the. a . Te a | 2k. “< . Jane 1929 the enplcyees were given three zonths! pey "in edvence" to tide them over the veriod in which they might be -jobless. Since they had been reid out of * confi ident fel funds" the y had no civil _ ; . ; Dae service status and no retirement benef fits; moreover, they were ineligible for transfer to othe r Goverment posit ions, - The danger was, of course, that their dissebisfaction with ‘what rust have apreared to then as Bigar Tee handed, arbit trary action cn the: sonal ‘sdtuation created for them by bis: helplessness in the sericus per then to indiscretions which right vrove most - Crastic actio might. Lead. * uver natioral to the Govermnent ‘and have serious consequences entacr2s sing deferse, It turned cut that whatever their private feelings, all the dis- cnargec personnel, except the chief beneficiary of tne old regime, remained to fired joes. ‘e icval end did the test ther could part t of a new official, and that their a 10
¢ VW ad J , , . “~ - 8. In Sctsber 1929 I wes sent to Yow York to teks over th r records andi files am to oversee their transvortation to Weshingecn. The - cryptanslytic activities,, research, “aad <sining now being under the ¢ . ive ‘Ai oo: : ? -. "'g o ty od ct - Sigeal offiter, stops Were ‘alia to, roorpaie the bureau and ite FOTke = . we The fis available “wore, of | cour se,. very slizn s--o0ly what remaized of eho. ye caee thet be ~: —— a " Gee . - War Department's: contribution af. $10, 000 for ‘the FY 1930 wus availedley because the recainder ‘of the State ‘Departzent 's ‘chere of $15, C00 t ‘ Pr. r 25 indi- catod above, rad already been withdrawn by the Stat 6 Depe rement 22 offer - oo _ of =sploynent was rade oo urs. Wil son, “en Japanese expert with rerdley, “but 7~- Sh - -. miss eos a0 MALE ~ : - . Pas — -i 4 " she was usable ts accer so since it involved movi ving €o Tiash os. "woe ‘ee <2 7 fs — TA ee — wes hn ington exd che. rada husband and child) in Mew. Yorx.’. Anoticr ‘eaployes, ure ‘Victor Weieskopf, ° vets . . wee . . Sings . . ae os, . le ET a a <i = ° Mei ee hada business in “Yew York and ~efised to move to Washing ton. The fecels “6. . ce ete - - - Te: * . - t clerical enployees were deemed unsuitable for oir purposes end, moresver, " . - . S - . -_ 4 A oo : having mo Civil Servi co status they could nos ve ‘taken en by transfer. oe we - . : >. . An offer of tenporary exployment “was mds tc Yardley but hs refS:sed the b Misst Seadsr. Instead, hea proceedsd secretly to mrevare 2 book which fis . oe o apvearsd in the form of amticles in she Saturd*y Evening Post and which 77 im much expanced form later appeared under the title "The Americas Black . tec r we Chember.™ The book and arti cles were highl sensati onal end mace desegin a & disclosir 3S: concerning the most secret activities ever conduct oy the “le - tet ant Goverment. "Before the “eppea: raxnce of .the articles and book, however, he” Le - oe - 2 A ._ had teken certain steps to proteck hinaolt from possible prosecutisna for his disclosures, among which was to-resign his commission as Majer in the te." Military Intelligence Reservs. Of course, Lad the suthori ties understocd . 3+ the real zvose of his resimatian they micht have vreventad it so as to - : b— o > = retain some hold on him. But deing in igsorancse of the real motives and . - ~ x) _ . : @secins it just an act af picus, the resizrstion was acesstec. The uxtortensto
- 422,53 + + ‘ : - a a +2 eons clueces zttesdant upen the pudliceticn of the_soex | 1etaheration ~ . ° all « —— ee eee + ad , : Ty.res as Mine mearoin. ‘Suffice it to say trat a boilirg point when abcut 30,000 copies of the Jaranese translation of The American Black Chamber were sold in Tokyo in a period of less than 4 zonth {perhaps the book wes subsicized by the Ja nese Goverment itself.). The F t ties fell, as ; ‘pad ocor into which ali cryptarelysts and cryptanalytic activi a result: -of the difficulties which the publicity ¢: n the patter ty Jardley's -. di sei osures occesioned high governnent officials, had a bad effect upon the - . - - : . . =o: —-. : . . ~., attempted reorganizat tion cf the eryptanalyt ic tureau by the Chief Signal 77° + e ‘ Officer. Funds sere hard to set, and State Department sursort vas leckisg,. e PY a if not in the other direction al sogether. Tha mest serious consequences ef Yardley's disclosures, horever” ceme 10 yeers later and their eff sy “te 7 ae can bardly be estizated. I refer here to the jolt which his book gare o > the Japanese cryptog-ephers, leading them out of their blissful ignoranc t er snd ceusing thea to develod really complex methods ~hich are now civing us 40 “ many diffi cuities. The seme is ive probebly es rege>is ths Gerztan and jItalian cryptosrapners--thsir education has been entirely at Uncle Sen's expsnso asd the finel cemsecuerces of Yardley's work cen not yet be fcreseen. They may well ture out to be disastrous. ; 7 2. Ecwever, the Chief Sigral Crficer proceeded, erergetically es. possible under the cireusstances, to carry out the mission essigned hin. bow sno code and cipher solving section was placed under che tar Plans and -f 7 : . Teralax iss TL weed nL «4 a _ 5 + % Daviaiern since Sse compilation section was already there. A rather bao Vy el 24 = 4 — satalioed cirective unich was preoarod by G-2 and assrored by tne Secretary a. . -12- cur yrecerious relations with Jean vere brought to -:.”
. - tee 1 . of war /Sxhibdit 47, becase Se gitaing piss a? the rcaseganised sorvico, ° .whioh wes. now mene d the Sigoal intelligence Servicte. 58 personnel con= nn a toot sisting ‘of myself and. one or “tr lelerks soon was sugested oy & halt. dozen. peeaentats San oo © rel mors employees. tretaing literature and cour ses were prepared and put . aired . into good usage at.ance, A great goal was done in expending our cryptographic. - om. : work also, bY preparing reserve edi tion as of existing coces, compiling new codes and ciphers, 4 developiz ad cipher ‘aDpere tas, “amd sv on. Cryptenslytio - *e -<—- we . te ° te wo. ce, ° . . _— work was put on & fu! tasis of rescerch end treiniss, with ezoche sis on thls lattsr. for “¢3 re “existed ‘no intercept. services esd the raw neteri tal could ee not be chtaized , sence an intercept service mow was orgenized.end grea very slowly. A‘1 ohsses of signal ‘intelligence - %, 2° . “ a a aa “ . «o were unified wider one service and’ t sken under stud and action. Loreover, cooperation with the Favy in a the work wes also imitiated. How the ectivity - reg FTE, -- at Loe, has expanded sinss then requir es no ‘coment as this tine However, a few words about relations - with the. jtany are pertis nent . 10. cryptanaljitc actrees in our levy Deyartmers TerG prectically - . - 2" "4, sel” ierere ary non-exis tent ustil after the close.af the dast was, caring which, ae Wes oe - 1, oted above, wnatever problezs they Fed iz crypteralysis were “referred to . *: tte. bees : 4 - : ost 12-8. Bue in 1921. the Revy, recogniz ing the inpertant role which “crypt. anslysis was dourd to play in prture, hesan building up a large unit in the avy Department, with echelaas aficat.: Whereas tho Army placed caphasis upon civilian traininz zg, the Navy placed ecsonasis upon officer training; enc 7) for each dollar the iray wes able to obtain for cryptaralytic acd er;pto- a Grsaphio work the HNevy vas able to cbtain three to Nive dollars, ustil by ry
1939, 2s far as concsrasd nucders of cfficers and civilien personnel these sotivitios, anourt, of ogas 4cqnent on hand, end funds ~s re Shand eagssed in . a “yt Te. eee - Ps Luar, -. teers f available t= resear ch, ‘tae. wavy” nad coasiderably - outstripped the ‘hoon. - Coe oe . - a ee te met oe —— . - . o et et . ome ee a Oe we TN io ern Bowever, it may be said, with some, > justifiable pride perhaps, ¢ et | while. con . we - Pe ae thay were ahead of us in quantity, we were ahead in quality, for ell the important developrants ‘in both the “oryptogrephic and the cryptandlytie™ fields =ust be credited to Arey personnel. At first, cooperation petreen . ° - te” - -_" LS Ne ao ewe ete wott a the 47 services wag intermittent and at tines very indiFrerent——the ucvel - . , mutual suspicions and Je ealousies pervaded cur reletionshizs. “But, }2ppit iy; - . . . . - sot . . . for the mst threo. £0" “five ‘years cooperation has been much more wholeheerted, - “oe : a wo (eT Er went . Te eoeaat meee. . wus + ae Basi eet with the result thes it may now be said without” reserve - thet,” as regards: She their cryptogrephic and crypeanelytio acti ities, cooperation. petecen ths - tes ot, As I and Tavy is so close ag “£0 be the sa38 as though they were, under” ors uF : - nats ae « - .- 6 ~ z trot, ony, head. This, of course, is as ait should be ad mus = be in order to cein the : oe G@esired result franz such ‘activities. . . rn 11. It would bs of utmost value to the wicning of this wer if % . te Govermmesn at vere now in & position to read the codes end ciphers of ell tte foreign powers whose actions acd proveble intentions ere of interest and . . importsnce ia our prosecution of the ware it could heve ‘been in this fortu- - oo rate position had it given to eryptesel ytte studies the attention which it ers dessrves diring peace fine and bed “provi ded funds for their continuity on a scale safficient for the purpose for wnich Sey are intended. The matter eam be sicmcarized very succinctly in this statccent: Actusl or physicet xartere is intermite ame pout mental, that is,- erypranalytic, warfare is caz- sinucas. It is vital timt this be understood by those who exorcise tho ce=trol sver such studies,and a few words on ftiis point are given in the next peragram. 14
- WH . . ~ 12° There are four basic reasons why continuity in cryptesalytic studies is so importent..° They will te discussed briefly undes seperate . _ . an subparagraphs. wrestle. a a op .~ ' 1) %It aust be realized that cryptanalytic activities have no counterpart tn civil life. Therefore, on the outbreak af war there - ' is no Anportan® source from which ‘trained, experienced personnel can -g . be_dramm for immediate usefulness. Since sii in cryptenalysis can hardly be developed in a short t time ard cz ryptenalytic una ts capable of roducin wick results can Rot be inprovised in 2 hurry, umtless there - «3 : 33 is a good-sized nu cleus of such traines and “exper fenced personnel ‘no - : sme es fu. dee Cra ae "eee eV oT TRL ee NN ° oo et be - ‘* te ate woe : a a good cryptenelytic operations can be conduc ted in, the earl phases of a var that is, just at the tine ween results can us sually be obtained Bost vty : om - : easily anc when such results are extrensiy taper tant. Moreorer, it is in . . Coee 4 oy x the upper $s trata of eryptanalytic brain that continuity in studies is mst inportant. It is pessible, ender pressure, to obtain large numbers ef recruits of high intelli gence fron colleges and universities, but « . . ontil they have had at least £t ve “years actual experience and training tos7 are holly, unnre pared to attack the most difficult problens encountered in modern, uprto“date secret communic ations. Consider the present “purple” systen, for exaaple. Ie required alacst tro years of concentrated eft ffort to break down this systen and it was indeed fortunate this had been accenplished by Septeaber 1939. If we had not been able to start this study wntil Decenber 1941 it would not have been possible to ‘read those sessages snort of tao years! study, if at all, because the . problen is @ dfficuit to begin with and moreover the volume of traffic aveilable for malysis would be so,snall cocpared te what it =s befors Deceaber 7, 1941. Moreover, if we did not have the two years' experience JI
Becki . alezed wuld “be extrenoly more difficult, if it cculd bo. gone 2t cil oefers too lste to bo useful. Again, our present eifficultioce _ a woe ae . ol iy “a. Eee0- . - _ e . Sy le. with Japssesé military systess are in large part ocens siczted ty our failure te devotes sufficient study to. thése caystes cver the past few seers; but ot TPS tees . : . ae it must be realized that Lintteti ons oa funds and persoonel meds such” 27” studies insossible beceuse kth, the scall stale | ef SIS personnel fran 1930 “49 1940 it ~as all that this personnel could do to keep abreast of the - = . see sa0rs3g. , - Javacess diplomas: ic systens, for which G-2 x@s eles 7 (2)) Cont einuity, in crypansiytic studies elso recuires continuit ~ oe ~ - at . . “se, : . - - 4m intercopt woric, for withost wt the. basic raw matorial no studies at en, con be conducted on acaual sraftic end “purely theoretical studies rey be far oft . pe UN ADS . 6b — - oe : ae the real targst altogstisr, ole) catter how sucsesstul. Coctimiity in inter- Doan foe RSE LE EE - Porleto : cept work means, ef course, that the equips ment and personnsl of the inter- - id cept services Inve a oroakx of war, for pursued the need for the gmintenance of adequate intercept stat immediate, useful work. »" ce eee - -. . iad ~ « ceintained wha’ thus theco are avsilable on the cut- Unless ervptanalytic studies are lens soon _diseppesrs, for it presently begins ‘to look as thouch the xork done by the intercept szersomel is useless and funds for this activity are witndrem. -—-—: . , . Ter, os te (3) Cont yoterslvsis is not a static science or art--it =sust erystozgracnic sciance prograssese baen sade in the electrical and mecha the cryptenalytic work done Curing the last war has deez alluded a@ wide influence in fn their sryptogrepky ao their qiard, causiss then to sn 6 a to above, "The American Black Chamber dsuity in cryptanalytic studies hanieal eryptographic devises anc masninery. putting certn#a mations wmhica -15- yvha 1D is ster, especislly as regards the develoment b rti a - progress In the past fer ;éars great strides have af complex Vue awe eorer, . icised. ag -_ on sudl cular has exercised ~ . ~ Lt wlN
@sveloczsnts for the inprovemnent-’of cheir codes and clinsss. The resub is thet the eryptogrepnic sys tens of shese naticns have became more and nore _ 72 : I> = aifticalt to analyze. _ . But. it, is” Liportant to note tat inprovenent ins a S35 aa . - i ate hele orto me aa . : - ~ . cryptography. uscally canes ‘tn. successive snall steps, end if the opposing . ee" : - ana cryptanelyst can keep sn ‘Step with these progressive increases in coaploxity he can, as a rule, be ina s position to read the rew systcaas alzost as fast. they are put into usage, but if there is. much of & lag in the eryptenalys: is oe the cryptography gets too far ahead ‘for tho’ exyptanslyst to catch ap qvickly. - - : (4) Picalty, + may be “noted. that conti inuity ; in eryptenalytte . at tee Tete oe sey . a fee studies brings ‘taprovenents in. ‘our own ‘cryptographic systess end methods, . : - tee ew —-- “me.” . . . 27st sT oe sell: . = ote without which ws ray de lulled into « false. .sense of, security ard remain blissfully ignoract of what sone foreign erjptemlytic bureen may be doing with our supposadly secret mssseages. It can be said that the grestest-dlor - oo ~. . that can be dealt to sismal intelligence work is lons of continuity in eryptanalytic studies, for it means shat a disastrous blow has been delivered to technical efficiency of both the eryotosreohic and cryptamalytic services -. for war-time Sanctioning. i?
14. “at the cis Fisally, if xe are not to repeat orce more ‘ so of the lmst wer in resooct.to signal intelligence: wo a) ard the mistezes =sde overy effort snezld be mede to piace the present orgenization on the most tira, permansne founcation it is possible to erect. The servi consid ered Corps only large scale Juns 29, 1 o n oe as merely an appendsg ge to the functions perlorsed by + wee in Hse of var tut asa permazent service thet cperctes on @ in peace time as woll as in wer tine. . illies F. Frieda, $42. _ Bead Cryptanalyst. Tc e should nos be - ‘Sigel 18