January  1983 
Establishment  o£  the  United  States  Central 
Command  as  the  nation's  sixth  unified  command 
on  this  date  is  an  important  step  towards 
improved  security  in  Southwest  Asia,  the  Persian 
Gulf,  and  the  Horn  of  Africa. 
The  United  States  Central  Command's  mission 
is  to  serve  as  a  deterrent  to  war  in  our  area 
of  responsibility.   This  booklet  is  to  provide 
you  with  information  about  the  command,  its 
mission,  and  how  we  intend  to  carry  out  our 
assigned  tasks. 
I  hope  that  this  booklet  will  help  you 
understand  our  vital  concern  for  peace  and 
stability  in  the  Central  Command's  area  of 
responsibility  and  our  dedication  toward  that 
goal. 
.&*+E*~ 
R01ERT  C.  KINGSTON 
Lieutenant  General,  USA 
Commander  in  Chief 
U.S.  Central  Command
U.S.  Central  Command: 
Making  a  major  contribution 
toward  peace,  stability  and 
security  in  a  vital  region 
Activation  of  the  United  States  Cen- 
tral Command  (USCENTCOM)  on 
January  1.  1983  marked  a  major  mile- 
stone in  the  evolution  of  the  United 
States'  military  relationship  with  nations 
in  Southwest  Asia,  the  Persian  Gulf  and 
the  Horn  of  Africa. 
It  brought  to  fruition  a  major  change 
to  the  unified  command  plan  which  was 
developed  soon  after  the  end  of  World 
War  II.  This  change  provided  a  new 
theater  command  to  better  serve  U.S. 
interests  and  security  concerns  of 
friendly  states  in  SWA.  the  Persian  Gulf 
and  the  Horn  of  Africa,  which  is  collec- 
tively referred  to  as  the  "central  area." 
When  the  unified  command  plan  was 
created  at  the  end  of  World  War  II.  it 
was  not  possible  to  foresee  the  signifi- 
cant security  and  economic  issues  that 
would  develop  and  focus  attention  on  the 
area  in  the  1980's.  Consequently,  the 
boundary  between  the  U.S.  European 
Command  and  the  Pacific  Command 
cut  directly  through  the  region. 
With  the  establishment  of  the  U.S. 
Central  Command,  however,  the  unified 
command  plan  has  been  changed  to 
provide  a  single  U.S.  command  with 
responsibility   for   essentially  all  U.S.
military  activity  within  this  critical  re- 
gion, including- military  planning,  exer- 
cises involving  U.S.  and  regional  forces, 
administration  of  security  assistance, 
and  other  representational  activities. 
USCINCCENTS  ASSIGNED  AREA  OF  RESPONSIBILITY  includes  all  dates 
on  the  Arabian  Penisula  south  of  the  northern  borders  of  Saudi  Arabia  and  Kuwait;  the 
countries  of  Iran,  Iraq,  Jordan.  Afghanistan,  and  Pakistan  on  the  Middle  East 
landmass;  Egypt,  Sudan.  Ethiopia.  Djibouti,  Somalia,  and  Kenya  on  the  Horn  of 
Africa;  and  the  Red  Sea  and  the  Persian  Gulf. 
One  of  the  principal  advantages  of 
having  a  single  unified  command  for  the 
region  is  that  all  nations  will  have  only 
one  U.S.  command  to  deal  with  on  most 
security  issues.  And  the  new  command 
will  be  able  to  ensure  that  all  U.S.  secur- 
ity activity  in  that  area  is  fully  coor- 
dinated. 
TO  E ASETHE TRANSITION  and 
to  ensure  these  important  programs  con- 
tinue to  be  managed  properly,  the  U.S. 
Central  Command  will  work  closely  with 
the  European  Command  and  the  Pacific 
Command.  This  is  especially  true  of 
USCENTCOM's  security  assistance  re- 
sponsibilities for  the  region,  which  the 
new  command  will  assume  in  the  fall  of 
1983.
In  order  to  understand  why  the  U.S. 
Central  Command  has  been  established, 
it  is  necessary  to  review  the  recent  his- 
tory of  the  region. 
At  the  end  of  World  War  II.  there  was 
little  United  States  military  focus  on  the 
central  area.  This  stemmed  from  the  fact 
that  the  United  Kingdom  was  capably 
representing  western  interests  in  the 
area  and  significant  British  forces  were 
present. 
After  the  withdrawal  of  the  United 
Kingdom's  forces  from  east  of  Suez  in 
the  late  1960s  and  early  1970s.  Ameri- 
can involvement  and  attention  to  the  re- 
gion grew  more  rapidly.  U.S.  influence 
there  began  to  increase,  particularly  in 
Iran. 
LATE  IN  1979.  however,  two  events 
fundamentally  changed  the  balance  of 
power  in  the  central  area:  the  Iranian 
revolution  and  the  Soviet  Union's  in- 
vasion of  Afghanistan. 
As  the  decade  of  the  1970s  drew  to  a 
close,  it  was  clear  that  the  stabilizing 
influence  of  Iran  had  disappeared  with 
the  revolution.  It  was  also  clear  that  there 
was  no  counter-balancing  military  force 
in  the  area  to  assist  in  maintaining  re- 
gional stability  and  safeguarding  free 
world  interests. 
Moreover,  the  Soviet  invasion  of  Af- 
ghanistan provided  tangible  evidence 
that  the  Soviet  Union  would  not  hesitate 
to  use  military  force  in  the  region  if 
doing  so  contributed  to  longstanding 
Soviet  ambitions  and  if  there  were  no 
serious  potential  for  effective  opposi- 
tion. 
Historically,  the  Soviet  Union  has  de- 
monstrated a  serious  desire  to  expand 
into  the  region.  Russia,  for  example,  has 
invaded  Persian  territory  five  times  dur- 
ing the  past  300  years— twice  in  this  cen- 
tury alone. 
The  fact  that  Soviet  military  forces 
continue  to  occupy  Afghanistan  in  con- 
siderable strength  makes  the  Soviet 
Union  a  formidable  force  in  the  central 
area.  There  is  no  military  force  in  the  re- 
gion with  more  combat  power. 
ONE  OF  THE  KEY  REASONS  the 
United  States  needs  a  new  unified  com- 
mand is  to  provide  a  focus  for  combined 
efforts  to  meet  any  threat  posed  to  the 
region.  The  establishment  of  the  new 
command  provides  a  means  to  satisfy 
that  responsibility. 
It  is  clear  that  the  United  States  and 
its  friends  and  allies  have  significant  in- 
terests in  the  central  region. 
In  addressing  those  interests,  there 
is  a  tendency  to  link  the  existence  of  the
Force  List 
A  full  deployment  of  the  U.S  Central  Command  could  involve  nearly  300.000  person- 
nel, including  those  who  would  operate  in  support  of  the  command.  A  full  deployment 
might  involve  the  following  types  of  forces: 
U.S.  Central  Command  Headquarters  (augmented)  1,100 
U.S.  Army  Forces  Central  Command  131,000 
Headquarters,  U.S.  Army  Central  Command  (Third  U.S.  Army) 
XVIII  Airborne  Corps  Headquarters 
82nd  Airborne  Division 
101st  Airborne  Division  (Air  Assault) 
24th  Infantry  Division  (Mechanized) 
6th  Cavalry  Brigade  (Air  Combat) 
1st  Corps  Support  Command 
U.S.  Naval  Forces  Central  Command 
Headquarters,  U.S  Naval  Forces  Central  Command  123.000 
3  Aircraft  Carrier  Battle  Groups  53.000 
1  Surface  Action  Group 
3  Amphibious  Ready  Groups 
5  Maritime  Patrol  Squadrons 
U.S.  Middle  East  Force 
U.S.  Marine  Corps  Forces  70,000 
1  Marine  Amphibious  Force  including: 
1  Marine  Division  (reinforced) 
1  Marine  Aircraft  Wing 
1  Force  Service  Support  Group 
1  Marine  Amphibious  Brigade,  including: 
1  Marine  Regiment  (reinforced) 
1  Marine  Air  Group  (composite) 
1  Brigade  Service  Support  Group 
U.S.  Air  Force  Forces  Central  Command  33,000 
Headquarters,  Central  Command  Air  Forces  (9th  Air  Force) 
7  Tactical  Fighter  Wings 
4  Tactical  Fighter  Groups 
1  Tactical  Fighter  Squadron 
1  Airborne  Warning  and  Control  Wing 
1  Tactical  Reconnaissance  Group 
1  Electronic  Combat  Group 
1  Special  Operations  Wing 
Unconventional  Warfare  and  Special 
Operations  Forces  3,500 
TOTAL    291,600
El 
Central  Command  to  oil  as  the  absolute, 
overriding  consideration. 
In  fact,  U.S.  national  interests  in  the 
central  region  go  well  beyond  simply  in- 
suring a  continued  flow  of  oil. 
Formation  of  USCENTCOM  as  a 
new  theater  command  provides  recog- 
nition that  the  United  States  has  strong 
diplomatic,  economic  and  security  inter- 
ests and  many  close  ties  with  nations  of 
the  region.  The  U.S.  wants  to  strengthen 
those  ties,  and  the  Central  Command  is 
intended  to  help  do  that. 
Establishment  of  a  new  command 
that  can  respond  to  security  issues  un- 
derscores the  importance  of  nations  of 
the  region  to  the  United  States.  It  also 
serves  to  reinforce  the  message  that  the 
United  States  is  committed  to  help  those 
nations  deter  and  resist  agression. 
Another  key  reason  for  the  existence 
of  the  U.S.  Central  Command  is  to  help 
preserve  the  autonomy  of  states  of  the 
region. 
THE  PRIMARY  MISSION  of  the 
new  command  is  to  deter  aggression  and 
to  protect  U.S.  interests  in  Southwest 
Asia,  the  Persian  Gulf  and  the  Horn  of 
Africa.  Virtually  everything  the  com- 
mand does  is  related  to  providinga cred- 
ible capability  that  serves  as  a  deterrent 
to  armed  confrontation  in  the  region. 
The  United  States  works  closely  with 
many  nations  of  the  central  area  to  help 
them  achieve  and  maintain  regional  se- 
curity. Until  they  are  able  to  do  so.  the 
U.S.  will  continue  to  support  their  secur- 
ity needs  by  ensuring  that  U.S.  forces  are 
capable  of  efficiently  responding  to  their 
needs,  if  requested. 
Formation  of  the  U.S.  Central  Com- 
mand is  a  clear  signal  of  the  long-term 
resolve  of  the  United  States  to  help  pro- 
mote stability  and  peace  in  the  region. 
Implicit  in  this  is  U.S.  recognition  that 
the  issues  are  complex  and  that  the  key 
to  improved  security  rests  chiefly  with 
the  nations  of  the  area. 
U.S.  security  interests  in  the  central 
area  are  inseparably  tied  to  those  of  the 
region  and  are  based  on  three  dimen- 
sions of  capability: 
•  What  each  friendly  nation  of  the 
region  can  do  witl.  its  military  forces  if 
threatened; 
•  What  it  can  do  when  the  military 
forces  of  its  regional  friends  and  allies 
are  added;  and 
•  Whac  assistance  the  United  States 
can  provide  in  concert  with  regional 
forces,  if  the  U.S.  were  asked  to  assist. 
Because  of  the  command's  association 
with  the  region,  it  is  already  attuned  to  a 
total  regional  approach,  is  sensitive  to  its 
hosts'  political  climate,  and  is  aware  of 
U.S.  military  capabilities  and  limit- 
ations. 
THE  U.S.  CENTRAL  COMMAND  is 
building  the  necessary  expertise— both  in 
the  region  and  in  military  systems— to 
assist  friendly  nations  as  required.  More- 
over, as  security  assistance  and  military 
sales  programs  develop  new  capabilities 
for  these  nations,  the  Central  Command 
will  be  in  a  position  to  recommend  appro- 
priate adjustments  to  U.S.  assistance. 
While  USCENTCOM  is  responsible  for 
essentially  all  U.S.  military  activity  in  the 
central  area,  the  U.S.  ambassador  remains 
the  senior  U.S.  official  in  each  country.  All 
significant  USCENTCOM  actions  affect- 
ing a  host  country  will  be  coordinated  with 
or  approved  by  the  U.S.  ambassador  in 
IH
order  to  ensure  that  L'.S.  political,  military. 
economic  and  social  actions  are  consistent 
and  complementary. 
Although  it  would  be  useful  for  the 
new  command  to  place  a  limited  num- 
ber of  headquarters  personnel  in  the 
area,  there  is  no  desire  or  intention  to 
station  large  numbers  of  U.S.  forces 
there.  The  advantage  of  a  small  head- 
quarters element,  however,  is  that  it 
would  enhance  USCENTCOM's  ability 
to  provide  timely  response  to  a  variety  of 
requests  from  nations  in  the  area. 
Should  it  become  necessary  for  the 
United  States  to  assist  its  friends  in  the 
central  area,  the  new  command  will  use 
forces  based  primarily  in  the  United 
States.  Some  military  equipment  and 
supplies,  however,  may  be  p reposition- 
ed in  or  near  the  region. 
HOW  DOES  THE  NEW  COM- 
MAND differ  from  the  Rapid  Deploy- 
ment Joint  Task  Force  i  RD.JTF  s? 
The  RD.JTF  was  created  to  provide 
the  United  States  a  military  organization 
which  could  put  together  a  four-service 
fighting  force,  train  it.  and  deploy  and 
employ  it  in  areas  outside  NATO  and 
the  Republic  of  Korea. 
From  its  inception— March  1.  1980— 
the  RD.JTF  had  its  focus  on  Southwest 
Asia,  the  Persian  Gulf  and  the  Horn  of 
Africa.  The  force  was  just  over  a  year  old 
when  the  Department  of  Defense  an- 
nounced that  it  would  transition  to  uni- 
fied command  status. 
The  Department  of  Defense  stated  on 
April  2-4.  1981  that  the  RDJTF  would 
become  a  unified  command  with  its  own 
geographic  responsibilities,  service  com- 
ponents, forces,  intelligence,  commun- 
ications, logistics  facilities  and  other 
support  elements.  The  plan  was  to  have  a 
single  unified  commander  responsible 
for  all  aspects  of  U.S.  military  planning 
and  operations  in  the  central  region. 
The  Rapid  Deployment  Joint  Task 
Force  only  focused  on  the  region  for 
planning,  joint  training,  exercises  and 
deployment/employment  of  designated 
forces.  Now.  the  U.S.  Central  Command
has  been  assigned  a  specific  geographic 
area  with  firm  boundaries  and  full  res- 
ponsibility for  that  area.  Also,  the  new 
command's  role  in  security  assistance 
programs  will  give  it  increased  flexi- 
bility both  to  deter  aggression  and  assist 
friendly  nations  in  other  ways. 
The  genesis,  purpose  and  role  of  US- 
CENTCOM  may  have  elements  which 
can  be  found  in  other  military  units  but. 
in  the  final  analysis,  the  U.S.  Central 
Command  is  a  unique  entity. 
First,  it  is  a  command  that  is  not  part 
of  any  formal  alliance  such  as  NATO, 
and  there  are  no  treaties  governing  its 
role.  Nevertheless,  the  command  expects 
considerable  assistance  from  allies  and 
friends  inside  as  well  as  outside  the 
region  to  support  any  contingency  oper- 
ations. Depending  upon  the  circum- 
stances, the  support  might  range  from 
political  assistance  through  the  granting 
of  overflight  rights  to  the  commitmentof 
military  forces  and  combined  operations. 
ANOTHER  UNIQUE  FEATURE 
of  USCENTCOM  is  that  its  headqmrt-
ers  and  military  forces  are  not  located 
within  the  theater.  Because  it  has  no  for- 
ward iand-based  forces.  USCENTCOM 
—working  with  the  U.S.  Readiness 
Command  and  the  Joint  Deployment 
Agency— has  a  capabilty  to  assemble 
forces  and  to  deploy  them  on  short 
notice.  In  effect,  the  forces  use  an  "over 
the  horizon"  projection  and  contingency 
concept.  They  would  arrive  only  after 
being  invited  and  depart  as  soon  as  pos- 
sible after  their  job  was  done. 
USCENTCOM  is  the  headquarters 
which  has  both  the  task  of  developing 
contingency  plans  and  implementing  the 
plans,  if  required. 
These  two  facets  of  the  command  are 
the  primary  factors  responsible  for  the 
size  of  the  new  headquarters  staff.  A 
headquarters  which  may  have  to  deploy 
and  provide  all  the  in-theater  command 
and  control  in  executing  its  own  con- 
tingency plans  must  of  necessity  have  a 
wide  range  of  capability  and  support. 
USCENTCOM  is  also  unique  in  that 
other  unified  commands  generally  have, 
in  place,  the  principal  communications 
facilities,  support  facilities,  supplies 
and  equipment  to  sustain  their  forces.  It 
is  a  fact  of  USCENTCOM's  existence 
that  if  the  command  must  deploy  it  will 
have  to  move  almost  all  of  those  assests 
thousands  of  miles  to  the  theater  of  oper- 
ations. 
AS  IT  TAKES  ITS  PLACE  along- 
side other  U.S.  unified  commands,  the 
U.S.  Central  Command  is  a  new.  unique 
and  important  part  of  the  U.S.  military 
structure. 
The  U.S.  Central  Command  has  a 
J*"a
-  1— »^-<'' 
heritage  of  accompiishment  dating- back 
to  March  1.  1980,  when  the  original 
Rapid  Deployment  Joint  Task  Force  was 
formed.  Further,  it  has  developed  excel- 
lent rapport  with  the  military  services, 
unified  commands,  and  other  major  com- 
mands on  which  it  is  so  dependent  for  its 
support. 
Finally.  USCEXTCOM's  establish- 
ment is  a  signal  to  friends  and  potential 
adversaries  of  the  importance  that  the 
United  States  places  on  the  freedom,  in- 
dependence and  right  of  seif-determina- 
tion  of  the  peoples  in  the  Central  region.