Ne A- is “ome 7, ee , ~, THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR INTELLIGENCE ; / A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL . - ' Allen W. Dulles, Chairman William HR. Jackson Mathias F. Correa e ; , +} January 1949
) THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE LIEAN- ING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT, 50 U.S.C., 31 AND 32 AS AIMENDED. ITS TRANSHISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PRONIBITED BY LAW.
\ Vo smelt tee ‘ Pago TABLE OF CONTENTS otter of Tranumittal Sumnary e eo ° e eo e ee ° ea a e e ea e e e s ¢ * os e . e e e e ® e L Chapter I Introduction: Tho Intelligonce Problem in tho Unitod Staton . 2... 6 ow ww we ore te we we 8 45 Chanter IT National Intolligenco and the Hetional Security Act of 1917 2. 6 ww ew we tee wet we ew es 21 _Tho Duties of the Central Intelligence ; Agency under tho National Security Act... . 22 Control over the Contral Intelligence Agoncy . 2h © The Genoral Mission of the Central Intelligence -Agency . 2. 6 ee ee tee ww eee we wwe 26 Conclusions and Recomuendations. .. +. + +++ ‘87 . Chapter III The Organization and Administration of the Orgenization. see ee ee ee ee ee 29 Adninistration ° e s t a e * e ° e e « e o ° e 32 Budget... ww ew ew ee ee wee 33 Security s eo es e eo,¢ ¢ e $ cd a e s e e @ e e e 5h Pordey” Personnol. 2. + 0 eee ee ee ee ee we ee | FGDELETED Conclusions and Recommendations. ....... 38 Chapter IV Tho Responsibility of .the Central Intelligence Agoncy for the Coordination of Intelligence Activitios e . . . e e e e a e e s * e es e oe @e s e + fhe Statutory Provisions... . 26... eee) 1 . Tho Organization and Oneration of the Machinory for Coordination (1... ee ee te ee ee) OG Intolligonco Advisory Comittoo. . 6... 6 43 vii |
. Page Interdepsrtisental Coordinating and Planning Staff. e a e . a e a @ e e @ e e * ees e ° e e e 6 Offico of Collection and Dissemination . .. . - 48 National Security Council Intolligence Directives . 1. 6 1 ee ee ee ee et ee es 50 - Tho Degree of Coordination Achieved. ....- + 53 Scientific Intelligenco. . . . 1. +6 © «© «se « @ 55 Demestic Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Affecting the National Security. . . 1... 6 «+ 56 Camunications Intelligence. ....22++-+ 58 Proposals for Improved Coordination. ....« + 60 Conclusions and Recommendations. ...+.++ 63 Chapter Y The Responsibility of tho Central Intelligence . Agency for National Intelligence Estimetes. ... « 65 3 . . . . The Mendate under the National Security Act and the Directives... 6 sees eee ee) 65 The Concept of National Intelligence Fatimates . 68 fhe Organization and Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency for the Production of Na- tional Intelligence. . 6. eee ee ee te es 70 Proposals for Improving the Production of Na- tional Estimates . 2. ee eee ee eee wee , 16 Conclusions and Recommendations. . . « «+ « « « 81 Chapter YI Sorvicos of Common Concern: Intelligence Research end Reports ea e e eo e e e e e e se es e « e e eo e e e 83 Proposed Research and Roporta Division... . « 83 cos - ¢ Poriodicol Sumurics ... 0. ee ee ee eee Bk ¢ Misccllanoous Reports and Memoranda, ...-.e. 86 Tho National Intoliigonce Survey . . . eeeee 87 vill
‘\ te hae o pains Sanya casa eee ie Same * 5 EO Keonomic, Scientific and Technological Intelligence 2... 0 ee ee ee ee ee ew we) 8B \ . Conclusions and Rocommondationy . . . « « © 6 « 91 Chapter VII Services of Comnan Concern: ‘The Collection of Overt Intelligenco . 6.6 eee ee eee ee ee ew) Contact Brench . 1... se ec eee ew eee 95 Foreign Broadcast Information Branch .:. ... .- LOL Foreign Documonts Branch , . . 2 6 ee a 6 2 6 © «105 Conclusions and Recommendations .....-.. 104 Chapter VIII Services of Common Concern: The Collection of _ Secret Intelligence . .- 2.1. + + see ee ee eos 107 Tho Charter of the Central Intelligence Agency to Condust Secrat Intelligence Activities ... 108 Organization of the Office of. Special - Operations . . . 2. 2 es ee oe ew wee bw 110 a Field Activities of Covert Intelligence .... 127 Security of Secret Intelligence Activities ... 122 Counter-Espionage. 2 2 6 ee ee ete ee ee 12), Communications Intelligence. eee ese ee we 126 The Need for Policy Direction of Secret Intelligence . . 2:1 «ee se eo eh we ew we ww 127 General Appraisal. ....-e 50 ee eee ee es 1208 Conclusions and Recovmendations. .....e+ + 29 Chapter IX Services of Common Concorn: Tho Conduct of Secret Operations . «6 «+s ee ee tee wens 131 Relations botwooen Secret Intelligence and Secret Operations a ee ee | 131 Tho Office of. Policy Coordination ..... «6. 132 Conclusions and Rocommendations .. 1. «ee 6) 13h etyuitaan eta went 5 0. ‘pitmmanes nap aaeuits tities ose tah te
Chaptor X Tho Direction of the Central Inteiligenco Agency . 135 General Appraisal 6... ee ee te ew ew LBS Tho Question of Civilian Direction ... 4... 136 Conclusions and Recommendations . . cee ew we) 138 ~ Chapter XI The Service Intelligenco Agencies . . a aces 139 - Hission and Responsibilities . . 6 « 2 ee # « 139 Coordination of Service Intelligence Agencies . V1 Tho Status of Intelligence in the Services .. 16 Conclusions and Recommendations » . + +++. . 149 . Chapter XII The Intelligence Functions of the Department « of State... eee ee ewe ee ee os eeenn 151 Tho Research and Intelligence Staff .....-+. 152 Intelligence Relations between the State Doportment and Outside Agoncics . . 6 + 1 eo 157 Conclusions end Recommendations ........ 261 Chapter XIIT Conclusion... see ees eevee eeees 163
ANNIE XS viaipiucueovenbnai Page . Survey Croup Torms of Reforence (I): Memorandun catod Fobruury 13, 1948, from Sidncy W. Soucra, Exocutivo Scerctary, Natienal Socwrity Council. . 2... 2 6 ee ee 165 2. Survey Croup Terms of Roforonco (II): Memorandun dated March 17, 1945, from Sidney W. Soners, Executive Secre- . 3. Presidentiel lotter dated Januory 22, 1946, creating tho Central Intelligenco Group. . .. 2 eee eee eee et 169 4, Section 102 of the Nations] Security Act of 19'7.....- 271 5. Chart: Contral Intelligence Agency Organization as of January 1, WD. ee ee eee eee eee eee ees 173 6. Table: Personnel Strength of Central Intelligence Agency, . . as of December 24, 19h8 2. 2 a ew eee we ee ee ew we) 1E 7. Hational Security Council Intelligence Directive Wo. 1: “Duties end Responsibilities” . . 2. 1 6 et ee ee ee 175 8. Fattone? Sceurity Council Intelligence Directive No. 2: "Coordination of Collection Activities Abroad". ... ++ - 178 9. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 3: "Coordination of Intelligence Production. . ...«. ++. 180 10. Nationel Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 4; “National Intelligence Objectives”. . 2... «eee ew oe 184 Jl. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5: "Espionage and Counter-Zspionnge Operations". . .... . 185 12. National Security Council Intolligence Directive No. 6: . "“Foroign Wireless and Radio Monitoring” . . 2... 6 « « 186 13. Nationel Security Council Intolligenco Directive No. T: "Domestic Exploitation”... 2. ese eee ec ee we 187 1k. National Security Council Intolligenco Directive Ko. 8: ‘a “Biographical Data _ ou , s se ¢ e . e a ¢ a ® e e e ¢ e a 190 . é 15. Rational Security Council IntoLligence Directivo No. 9: “Communications Intolligonco. . . 2. 2 «0's ee eee 191 xi
wt weenie hatte cle an LETTER OF TRANSHITTAL January 15, 1949 National Security Council Weahington, D. C. ; Attontion: Mr. Sidney W. Souera Executive Secretary * Gentiozen: In accordance with the terms of tho memorandum to the under- eigned from Mr, Sidney W. Souers, Executive Secretary of tho National Security Council, dated February 13 , 1948, as. supplemented by hie memorandum of March 17, 1948,* we submit herewith our report on “The Central Intelligence Agency end National Organization for Intelligence." On January 13, 1948, the National Security Couficil reconmended to the Preoidont th nat a group comprising individuals not in Government service should make a “comprehensive, impartial, and objective survey of the organization, activities, and personnol of the Central Inteiligencse Agency." The group wes asked to report to the Council ite findings and recommendations on the following matters: . "(a) The adequacy end effectiveness of the present organi- zational structure of CIA. “(b) The valuo and efficiency of existing CIA activities.” “(c) Tho relationship of these actly ities to those of other Departments and-Agonciea. “(a) The utilization and qualifications of CIA personnel." As a result of this action, tho present Survoy Group wae created and the undersigned appointod by the National Security Council with the approval (Peeper nena errnasapiiaannaSesneNSAaA * Soo Annoxes. No. 1 and 2 for tho toxts of thana two momorands which conatituta the terms of reforenco for thiv awvoy. iil
—_ of the Prenident. Tho terszo of tho revolution approved by the National Secwrlty Council wero communicated to tho Group on Fobruary 13, 1948. Following discusvions with tho understgnod regarding the scopo of the aurvoy, the Executivo Socrotary of the Nations el Security Council, with the approval of the Secreterics of Stato, Defense, Army, Navy and ~- Air Forco , sent to the Survey Group on March 17, 1948, a second memo- rendun which constituted an extension of the scope of the survey as originally set forth by the National Security Council. In particuler, ' this memorandum included the following provisions: "The survey will comprise primerily a thorough and compre- hensive exemination of the structure, administration, activities and inter-agency relationships of the Central Intelligence Agency _ a8 outlined in the resolution of the Netional Security Council. It will also include en exeminsation of such intelligence activi- ties of other Covernznent Depertments and Agencies as relate to the national security, in order to meke recemzendetions for their effective operation end over-all ceordinetion, subject to the understending that the Group will not engege in an ectual physicel examinetion of departmental intolligence operations (a) outside of Washington or (b) in the collection of communications intelli- gence. On behalf of the Nationel Security Council, I will under- ' take to seek the cooperation in this survey of those Government Departzento and Agencies not represented on the Council which have an interest in intelligence as relates to national security. "Jt should be understood that tho Survey of the Central Intelligence Agency and its rolationship to other Departments and Agencies will be done for and with the authority of the National Security Council. The survey of the intelligence activities of tho Depsrtments of State, Army, the Navy, ond the Air Forco, however, will be for and with the authority of the rospective heads of thoso Departnents .* It was aloo providod that the Survey Group should submit from time to timo roconmondations on. individuals probiezs, and that probloma con- ” ‘ corning tho Contra). Intolligonce Agoncy should bo given priority ovor those involving othor agoncies. -. ewe ee
NL. a fhe Survey Croup haa gubultted tvo spocial reports to the Natlurnad Security Council, esch one in connoction with perticular problems boing conoidered by tho Council and ito mwembora. f - The second interim roport, datad May 13, 1948, doalt Cf , with tho “Rolaticns Betweon Socret Operations and Secret Intelligence." . The present report is based on an exazination and appraisal of our national intolligence structuro and operations as croated by the National Security Act of 1947 and developed in the Central Intelligence Agency and the individual departments end agencies concerned with national security. In accordance with the directive from the > National Security Council, emphasis has been placed upon the Central Intelligence Agency, but there has also been an exemination of the principal dopartmental intelligence egencies in order to determine their scope in the field of intelligence ; and their relations to each other and to the Central Intelligence Agency. our examination has been confined almost entirely to the over-all intelli- gence organization and activities in the Washington heedquerters of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Departments of State, Army, Navy end Air Force. Wo have met with members of the directorate and personnol of. the Central Intelligence Agency and with representatives of other agencies. | With the assistanco of our otaff, we havo conoulted approximately 300 porsons who by virtuo of their prosent position or past experionco are fomilioar with intolligonce problems. In addition, a series of confor- é ences vero held at vhich officials of all of tho intelligence agencies “woro invited to submit thoir.rocommendations and suegestions and discuss
= _ then with tho Group. Those conforonces ware ‘attoncod by roprosontatives from tho Depertmonto of Stato, Army, Navy end Air Force, tho Joint Staff, Research and Develop:cnt Board and Atonic Enorgy Cowaigsion. ~~ Ia conclusion, wo desiro to record our approciation for tho effoctivo vork of tho eteff mombors of the Survey Group, Robert Blum, Joseph Larocquoe, ‘s Jr., Wallace A. Sprague and Edword L. Saxo, in aosembling data with regard to our national intelligonce organization and in ansisting the mombors of tho Survoy Group 4n carrying out tho oxemination of. our intelligence structure on vhich this report is based. mot . Faithfully yours, Alien W. Dulles, Chairman eooe . : | ‘Mathias F. Corres ve se | ot Willdem H, Jackson
eer ree 0 0@#3? eee OA tome twee “tmetions to the Contrel Inteniigence Agency end creates a framework uyon which. : 2 - 8 : ae ‘sound Antenligence. eyetem. cen be built. “The Contral Intelligence Agoné: ' hes a -enpouraged to entablish, through ‘tte Director, clover. Maioon . with he two | Be ? eabera of ‘the ‘Yationah Socuity Covinett on whom At chiefly: “depente and who | SUMMARY Tho primury object of thio ourvoy hao boen tho Contral Intolligonce Agency, {to organiznution and ectivitios, and tho relationship of thouo activitica to tho intolligonce work of other Governnent agencios. Examination hao bocn sido “of these othor intolligonco agencies only to tho oxtont that their activitios bosr upon tho carrying out by the Contral Intolligence Agoncy of its acsignod functions.  Boction 102 \. tho Hetional Socurity Act of 19'7 creates the Central — Tntolligence Agoacy as an: indopendent egoncy under the d4roction of the: Natdenal Socurity Council... Tt given to the Council broad powers. in the sosiganent of Ss * -boen properly Placed under. ‘the Hatton, Security counet) for the” effective oa cariying out of ite. -agedgned function. : Tt. chould, however, ve empowered a and : nould vo. tho mas oot onts. of t , oduct: the: | Socretary of State, end 4
(3) Tho porformueco contrelly of cortain intolligenco services of conmion concern. Thono include sorvicus of a static naturo, such ug rovoarch in fiolds of coxzon woofulncso, and operational aervicoo such av tho colloction tiwough tho contral agoncy of sacret iniclligonco. fhoso-throe functions constitute tho basis of an integrated eyatom of in- telligence end thoy have been used as the — frane of reference for tho examina- tion of tho Contral Intolligencs Agency and the ‘roleted activition of other in- teLligonco agencios of the Govornsent represented on the ‘National Security ; Council, particularly tho Dopartuent of State and the Departments in the Na- tional Militery Eoteblisiment. ‘Yo. enendnont 4 to the provieton of the ‘Act. ‘relating to: intelligence ta re- quirstat¢ this tims. What is needed is action to give. effect to its true ‘intent. mane _ FESPONSTBILIEY OF THE CRTRAL INPELLIGENCE ACENCY, POR commu Te INTEL- ~ LICENCE . ACEIVIEESS | ‘Under ae atatuto, the Central | Intelligence ‘emer hes broad a resjons:bility oe a
consultetton with the other intelligence agencies, of taking the initiative in cooking @ircctives to offect St. Today this ccordinnting function of the Contra}. Intelliguonco Agoncy ia nol boing adcqualoly exerciocd. To susist it in carrying out this task tho Contral Intelligence Agency has availublo tho Intelligence Advisory Conmittoo. This group includes tho Director of Coritral Intelligence as chairmen, the tho hoads of the intelligence staffs of tho Departwents of State, Army, Navy and Air Force, tho Atomic Energy an Commission end the Joint TntelAtgence Group of tho Joint: Stafz. ae “A nunber of formal directives for the coordination of intelLigence ‘activi- ; ‘thes | have deen tssued by the ‘Retional Security Counet2. upon the récoumondation . - | of the Central, Intelaigence Agency ona the | “Intel Ligence Advisory Comittee. 7 These atroctives, | oxcopt those specifically assigning to the Central Tntelit- oo bh _, gomee Agency the. carzying out Of cortein consuon services: described velow, pave: ae 2 not ene: fer enough in defining the ‘scope © and Limits of departnen - intent: ee activities. ‘Those ¢ activities contime: to prosent many of ‘the ‘ems qurts et | een “the: + been © of ‘coortineted
“$ntedt igonce ‘eonerelly,: und ier: 3 to no ) Focognlzod procoduro: ‘for arriving at, 7 authori tative intel tganeo" ‘catinates an the: nesontis Sie field, with tho, ouatblo. : exception of atonie oncrey matters, ns Another inp ortant oxars “ple of lock of coordination is in tho ftola of ao- : - nootic intolLigencs and countor~intolls gone rolating to the’ national pocurity. durioas ction over countor-intolligence and ‘countor-ooptonage ectivitios ts a0- i oignea ‘to tho, Federal Bur eau of Tnveatigation in tho ‘Unito’ Staten and, the cone. ; tral Intelligence Agoney abioda. . Tove of, fart ob obluen activitios end. -eaptonaes wae
‘Socurity Act. - of f sotoraigs co acttvitios, it chould bo cxphanizod ‘that cooraination can | moat “for tho coordination of opocific intelligence activiticu. auic als wT, which might vo culled tho “Coordination Division, “ ghould oupport tho Dire ctor in fulfilling ‘ono of hic moot jnportant and difficult dutios undor tho National . ‘In concluding tho: ‘consideration of this nost vital probloa of coordination a 7 offoctively. bo achieved by mutual “agroomont, among. the. various: agencies. ‘With : the, aight moaguro of ‘eadorshsp on. ‘tho. part. of the Contral ‘ntéLligence Agency, a | wa Jor degree: of coordination can bo accomplished in that manner.
~ se iain Renta o's! saan nena cee a. dt vould yet tho. ‘tak of thio group Lo rev low the Intelligence products of othe ‘Tho fined Process of coordination pBhould tako place in tho Intelligence i a Anteldsgeheo ngencios and of ‘tho Central Intelligence Agency, and to preparo ; drafts of nations] intolligenca ontimiten for considcration hy tho Intolligoneo - i a havi sory Coratttoo. | Mirioorg Comittos whieh vould review end diecues. ‘the proposed. estinates. 7 ‘a ws finished. eatizato: should. be eloarly eotablished as 3 the product of all of the ° contributing ‘ogencies fn viich an share and. for which all tako: responsibility. ohowla a bo a enized as 3 ‘tho. “most authoritativo, ostinato available 8 the - igence mttors.are invol
+ waavor: sa CE CHRITRATAAY OF: SERVICES OF CONON COnCHRY ‘Under the iatonal. Security Act » the: Central Intelligence | Agency ohould | porforn, for the “pene it of: the oxisting intellige nco agencior, such sorvicos of coimsen concern a9 may be assigned to it by tho National Security Council. Theoo services , eanow being perforncd by tho Gontral Intelligence Agency, . can bo broken down: into. (2) otatic sorvicos ; consisting of intelligence research . and production cn certain essimned eubjecta which do not fall exclusively within tho function of -any one’ existing inteligence agency, and (2) operating gory 1co0, consisting of cortain types of intoligonce | collection end rolated soeret operations. aes
‘pred “eduetiou and coor dination by . the propoued Resourch ond ‘Roports Division, vould result in great oconoay of offort and Improvement of the product. For oxainploe, tho orgwizatien within thio alviolon of a ocicentific brench,, ataffod by nighly qualificd personne) and ompovored to draw upen tho ocicntific por- sonnel of ouch orgenizationa of Govornnont as tho Rogoarch ond Devolopment Bourd end tho Atanic Encrey Comission for tho purpose of dealing with spo- clalized ecientific problems, is a projoct which should have the highoot oo priority. ° - - ° - * e “ghia ‘division of tho Central Intelligence Agoncy should be “ptaftod in part ms o roprocontatives of the . depertnental intelligence services 60 that the reports : proguced vow ropresent authoritative end. coordinstod opinion and ‘be accepted oo 7 E a0 ich oy ‘tho. various consumer /agenotoa. + a
he ‘ortico of § spocial Oriern Jitmnasernoe co} lection of aceret _Antelasgence abrond | throvg) “ona; vend ‘tho conduct of nocrot oon ationo abrou 20 ‘auvoug tho Of fico of Policy ' f Coord inetion. ; . ~ ALD of thoce servicos aro appropriatoly allocated to tho Central Intolli- _ gone agency. " ‘Thoao operating functions are 60 intor-rolated and intor~ aaa “tor! of Centro Intoligoneo.
fo. and which shovld ho eble to guido its collection efforts moro effectively tan they dost prosent. Tho countor-iIntelligence functicn of the OFfice of Special Oper ations roquiro9 moro cmphagio and there io nead for botter coordimats on of “* all its aothy ition with the military, particularly in tho occupied arcas. 7 ome ORDANTZA TIO ND DIECTION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ACERCY * gho principal dofoct of tho Contral Intelligenco Agoncy is that its direc- . ton, edministrative -orgenization and porformenco do not show pufficient ap- . Precintion of: ‘the Agency asoignod fuactions, particularly in the fields of | : ace, ‘coordination ana the production of snitelLigonce entinstes. . Tho - ; ome has boon that the Contral Intelligence Agency 4 has tendod to docome dust Do
; In comacnting on adainigtration, the question of cecwrity chould also be atresied. fhe Director ig charged under the law wi th protecting intelligence sources end methods fron unsuthorized dluclosure. Ono of the best methods of achieving this is to correct the present situation where the Agency 16 viewed end generally publicized as the collectcr of sccrct intelligence and to bury ite cocret functions within a Centrel Intelligence Agency whowe chicf recog- nized activitios are the coordination of intelligence and the production of intel tgence estinctes. In reviewing. the work of the airectorate, consideration has been given to the, question whether or not the Director should be a civilian. The work of the Agency, fron its very nature, requires continuity in that office which is not dikely to. be achieved af a military men holds the poot, on a “tour of: auty" Z basis. For thts réeson, a well as because ‘freedom, fron Service ties is ae- sirable, the Director should be a civilian, Mite recoumendation does not ex- ' elude the: Possibility that the ‘post. night be held by a nilitery man sho has " g severed to 40 comection with tho Service ty. retirenent. me SERVI ‘DOERR AGENCIES AND THE ARELLIOENCR Foyortons oF mm i STATE
agoncsos chould concern therselvon principully with military InLolLiguncoe quentions, leny ing tho Central Intelligence agency to porform agrend central borvices of corn intereot. In addition, — continuing rosponsibility of thu Contral Intolligence Agency fox coordination nhould bo oxorclood vith rospoct to cortain Sorvico activities, for example , oppionags and countor-oupionago in oceupiod aroas. Tho Joint Intolligonce Comittee would continuo to operate with its momborship unchangod and would concoin itoelf exclusively with mili- tary and strategic questions as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Services would participate in the formulation of netional intelligence esti- mates through their membership in the Intelligence Advisory Committco and would ehare in the collective responsibilit Ly for these estimates. i? ih tho case of the Research end Intelligence staff cof the Stato Department, the conclusion has beon reached that thie steff, as at present constituted, is not ouffics tently close to operation end policy matters in the Depaxrtuont te - furaiesh the necessary liaison or the political intelligence estimates required by the Central Intelligence Agency for the preparation of nstdonel ostinates. . Accordingly, it is dcaireblo that a high officiel of the State Dopartment be | doaignated. cd its Intelligence Officer to coordinate those activities ; to act a as ‘the, Dopartnont's roprosentativo on. the Intelligence Advisory Committ oo and, =. | . in, goneral, toact. as 1intson with tho Central. Intollignce Agoncy with respoct, } in oAsgence and related. activities of ‘tho two agencion + and ‘40 develop. -Closo: working relations dotwoon ‘them, : .
a > ae - eb teste omni Mineo indicated In thia report, chould be able moro effectively to carry out the dution assigned it by law and thus bring ovr over-all Intelligonce nyetoa clocur to that point of officioncy which the nation gocurity domunda. * * & Tho foregoing owemry io only a brief outline of tho rain points of the *  roport end doses not tako tho place of the detailed discussion in the report and tho various conclusions and recommendations at tha cloco of the rospoctive , chapters.
eee ” em west samto = soe eewenes ase lament ie a cen oo nenms Gente oN CHAPTER I | oN INTRODUCTION THE INTELLIGENCE PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES Beforo considering tho adoquucy and cffectivenesa of tho work of .tho Central Intelligence Agoncy and ita rolations to our other intolligonco agon- cies, a brief word of background may bo holpful. Although the Central Intolligonce Agency is largely en outgrowth of our experience in World Ver II, it would be wrong to proceed from the preiiise that prior to the war our Covernment had operated without intelligence as to the capabilities and intentions of possible enemios or prospective allies. The Department of State had long maintained a widespread information - gathering service. The Army, the havy and certain other agpartmonts of the Covernnent had maintained their own systems of collecting information and preducin intelligence. Prior to World Wer II, however, WE had no intograted secret intelligunce service. ; We had not adequately exploited the available sources of overt in- tolligence. We had no central egency to coordinate intelligence collection and production, and to assemble the best available intelligence for expression in national eatimates to guide in the formuletion .of foreign policy and the preparation of our defense plans. In World Wars I and II our European Allios, Groat Britain in particular, had placed tho product of thoir intolligence servicoo largoly at our dispogal. While wo can expect in the future assistance fran tho intolligoncoe servicos of frionds and allios, wo havo rightly concluded that we should not depend on
then for our intelligence to tho oxtont wo wore fovceud to do in World War I and dwing tho early dsyu of Vorld War II. It was World War II which showed both our doficioncics in intolligonce and alee whet wo could accomplioh undor presouro. Through tho oxpansion of. the factlitios of tho Stato Dopartment and the military sorvicos, through the Offico of Strategic Servicoo -- our first move towenis a contrel intelligence agoncy -- through onlisting tho best porsonnel that could bo found, in and ont of Covermmont service,’ wo wero turning ovt avory croditablo porformanco in many phases of intelligence work well before the end of tlie war. Vo now recognizo that if wo arc to have adequate intelligence in times or crisis, we mst prepare in tino of peace, and we have seriously turned to tho task of buildixg up a central intelligence organizaticn. The country has now accepted the verdict, ‘even if somewhat rolucteantly, thet peaco-timo intelli- gonce is essentiel to security end, as many of our militery leaders have said, ow first line of dofense. It took us ¢ long timo to reack this conclusion, . and we are only now gradually getting over our suspicions of intelligence aud our tendency to confuse it with mere intrigue and tho more lurid s {de of ea- pionage. We are beginning to accept it as serious and honorable work em essen- tial to ow dofense. It is woll to rocognizg howover, that an efficiont intelligonco organiza- tion cannot eo built overnight. It will roquiro yoars of pationt work to provido akillod poxrs onnol to do tho job. DBiuoprints and orgsnization charta, ovon logisJation and emplo appro- priations will not tako the placo of © compotont and highly txainod won and 16
natn cm ia tere deena 7 oe cme ate 8S adem “Oe ate hak eh ee ant. Ho | talents lB ae oo me ee En ee Te Sd mee eae eee het es A bo women. Without then we ohil) have neither effective intelligence operations nor sound intelligence csotinaites. Unfortunately, in tho difficult organ iin tional period nince the war, tho future of intelljycnee ag a career has seemed so wicertain that many war-traincd and competent men have left the oervice, and it has been particularly difficult to find recruito to tako thoir place. Finally, oecurity for our intolligence activitios is not always casy to achieve bere in the United States. It io not only tho penetration of fifth: colunniste which we have to guard against. We have the general problem riaing out of our tradition thet all of the affairs of the Government shall be con- ducted in the open. Sometimes wo tend to carry this over even as regarda the publication of the intimate details of intelligence operations. In peacetine, particularly, it is not always easy to reconcile our vitsl interest in pro- tecting the frecdom of the press with the need for silencé on certain phases of intelligence. As against these debit items we could citea long list of highly favorable factors. America has the votential resources, humen and material, for the best intelligence service in the world. Within our borders we have every race ani nationality, loyal eons speaking every language, travelling ana resident © in every foreign country. Wo have a'wide geographical base for the development of intclligence work. We have the greatest reservoir of scientific and tech- nical oxills. We have imnortant allies abroad who are ready to join their Inowleds2 to ourg and to Bive us the bonefit of their ycars of exverionce in intolligence. And last, and possibly most ieportant of all, in tho ficid of intelligence work, we can develop the individual initiative, skill and ingenuity ‘of a free poople, and, in doaling with our main intclligcneo antagonista, oven - thouch thay oporate with tho tron dtaciplino imposed by tho Kremlin, wo can 17
ghow that frce men can bo vastly more cfficient than thous working for a finve ayutem. fhoso arc como of ow great asggta; our preblem io to mobilize then. hero aro real elements of urgency in necing that this tack is accompliened.” (1) America today, as never before in time of peace, ia vulnerable to , sudden end possibly devastating attack. To meet an initial attack, there are no sure military weapons of defense and 4t may well bo that our best protec- tion lies in adequate advance imowledge of the character and timing of the danger. (2) A vast area of the world stretching from the Elbe River in Germany to the Yangtse in China is largely behind an iron curtein whore the normal sources of information are partially or wholly lacking. The techniques of an intelligence service ought to be one of the important means of penetrating this barrier. . ; . - (3) A whole new area of Inowledge in the field of science has bdecore vital for our defonse. This field cuts across the functions of various Covern- mont departments and presents new problema from the viewpoint of inteclligencs collection and coordination. (4) Tho far-flung activities of the fifth colum, both here and abroad, prosent a now typo of throat to our socurity, and we roquire a concerted in- telligence program to countor this dangor. These aro only a few of tho devoloyments which give to intelligence an iuportanco in our dofonse system which it has nover had in tho past in time of peace. Fortunatoly, theno facta aro now bocoming woll undorsatood, and the 1%
4 ieee. ee ee Adminiotration, the Congrens and the people share with dond)y oerioudaoance tho dotomination that the United States here and, now shall build the beat IntclLi- gence service that our national genius and our great rosourcos can provide. 2 | 19 THERE IS NO PAGE 20: wo ag lama eae, eee ete
CHAPTER II ee NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY 4CT OF 1947 Boginning ao oarly ao 194) proparatioan wero umior wey for tho transition fron war-time intolligenco to a permanent intolligonce orgonization suitod* to our post-wer needs. In a aories of discussions exong the intorosted Governront agoncics as to how the country could most offectivoly orgenize its pormanent, long-range, poaco-tize intolligence thore was genoral egreonent on somo form of a central agency. Thore was, howevor, a sharp divergence of views as to the scops of tho activities of such an agency, the authority it should enjoy, the manner in which 4t should be administered and controlled end whero in the Governmont it euould be loceted, These issues wore resolved at that tine through the crea- tion by Presidential letter (See Annex No. 3) of the Contral Intelligence Group, and then more definitoly determined through the establishnont of the Central Intelligence Agency by Congress in Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947. (See Annex No, 4), THE DUTIES OF THE CEXPRAL INTELLICENCE AGENCY UNDER THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT Section 102 (4) of this Act definos tho dutios of the Central Intolli- genco Agency es follows: - "(a) For tho purpose of coordinating tho intolligonce activitios of tho soverul Government dupartments and agencico in tho intorosat of national secu- rity, it ohell bo tho duty of tho Agoncy, undvr tho diroction of tho Hationsl Security Council -- ; "(1) to advise tho National Socurity Council in mattors concorning ouch intollipenco activitios of tho Governuont departments and agoncioca as rolato to nutional security; Pad ar 21
Cy 2 a TT TS ST TT r- ae oe "(2) to make recomendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intolligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national security; "(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating tothe national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelli- gence within the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities: Provided, That the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, ~ ‘law-enforcement powers, or internal-eecurity functions: Provided further, That the departments and other agencies of the Government shall contizue to collect, svaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelli- gence: And provided further,. That the Director of Central Intelligences shall be responsible for protecting jmtelligence sourcea and methods. from unauthorized disclosure; *(4) to perforn, for the benefit of the exteting intelligence agen- cles, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally; "(5) to perform such other fumctions ani duties related to intelli- ‘gence affecting tle national security as the National Security Ceuncil may from time to time direct." So , In these provisions the -authora of the National Security Act showed & sound underatanding @ our basic intelligence needs by assigning to the Central Intelligence Agency three broad duties which had never before been adequately covered in our national intelligence structure. These duties are: (1) to adviae the National Security Council regarding the intelligence activities of the government and make recamendations for their coordination; (2) to pro- vide for the central correlation, evaluation and dissemination of intelligence relating to the national security; ani (3) to assure the performance, cen- trally, subject to National Security Council direction,of certain intelligence and related functions of common concern to various departments of the Government. . . The powers given to the National Security Council and the Central Intel- ligence Agency under Section 102 of the Act establish, in our opinion, the framework for a sound {intelligence service for this country, Accordingly, wo 22
do nob ouggont any azendaents to tho Act and boliove 1b would bs unviro to {aupor with thig logislation until wo havo had furthor oxporienco in opor- eting, undor it. Throughout our report wo strosn tho vital Leportance of giving offoct to tho real loginletivo intent through tho offoctive oxerc ioe by.the Centrel Intolligence Agency of thono functions aosignod to it by tho Act.. Wo rofer particularly to tho responsibility of the Contral Intol- ligonce Agoacy for tho coordination of intolligence activition end tho co- ordination of intelligence opinion in tho form of national intelligence ootimatos. In providing for 4 somi-eutonomous highly centrelized agency with a broad — varloty of intelligence responsibilitios affecting various Government asencies, wo have departed from the general. pattern followed by othor countries. There the tendency in not phases of intelligence has been to avoid such a degreo of contralizatian. Under the conditions oxieting in the United States we believe that the degree of centralization proposed undor the Netional Security Act can bo justified, provided that the distinctive functions of the Contral Intelli- gence Agoncy ere handled according to their special roquirononta. aul 23
CONTROL OVER THE CENTRAL TNTELLIGENCE AGENCY Wo do not agroo with tho argument, often advancod, that tho Contral Intol- ligonce Agency, or at loast its oporating sorvicos, should be placed undor the direct control of ono of the oxocutive dopartmonts of tho Governzont , ouch ag the Departxont of Stato or tho National Military EctabUigluzsnt, Tho activitios of tho Contrul Intelligence Agoncy do not concorn oither of thouo dopartnonta 24 . . . os FE I per meee
. ho en Senn Cavere oxclualvuly. Moreover, tha administrative arranconontoa oof these doparimonta aro not woll owltod to tho conduct of oxtenadve necrot foroignu sntolligence operations. Tho fact that in tino of war nocret ectivition ero primarily of concern to the military iu not, 4n ow: opinion, oufficiont Juatificetion for placing then under nilitery control in time of peace. The National Security Act is flexible enough end the authority of the National Security Counc4s1 pufficiontly bread to pomait any necearary adjustwonts within tho Contral In- tolligonce hyency co thet thoso oporations will bo rooponsive to tho noods of tho policy-making und operating dopartments of tho Government, without sub- ordinating thom directly to those depurtmonts. We have also considered tho question whother tho Central Intelligence Agency as e& wholo is properly placed in our governmental gizuctura undoz tho Netionsl Security Council, Whon the National Security Act was being drafted doubta wero expressed vhothor & comuittee such esthe Netionsl Security Council would bo able to give effective direction to tho Central Intelligences Agency. | It was argued that the National Security Council was too lergo ea body, would be preoceupicd with high policy mattors, ‘and would meet teo infrequently to be able to give sufficient attention to the propor functioning of the Contral In- | tolligence Agency. } Thoro is forco to tho criticism that a comitteo, no matter how augunt, 4a raroly encffoctivo body for the diroction of tho current oporations of | anothor agoncy. It io true that the National Socurity Council cennot offoc- tivoly asauro tho took of @irocting such curront oporations, and should not attorpt ta do o0, oxcept to tho oxtont of assuring 4toolf of carmlianco with ita directives. Howovor, tho Council, whoso chairman is tho Proaidont and Serre HONG monberahip coxprisos tho higheat authority in tho intorested dopartmonts ™j . 25
3 . a Sern ee = of the Gevernzcont, can remier effective service fn deteruining the nature and acepe Of the activitica of the Cuntral Intelligence Agency within the frnme- work of the Tintiounl Gecwriuy Act. We recowsegrd, however, that provJoion should be mide for closer liatuon between the Central Intelligence Agency and the two remtera of the National Security Council on whom it chicfly depends: namely, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defenne. We ovggest that ‘the Director of Central Intelligence be encoureged to seek current advice end continuing guidance from these tvo members of the national Security Covneil on matterna which may net properly be the subject of its formal directives, or which have not reached the point of requiring such directives. Such close association would help counteract whet we feel is a growing tendency for the Gentral Intelligence Agency to become a separate and inéependent avency of Governngnt working to some extent in com- petition vith, rather than for the pensfit of, those departmenta of Government which are the prircary users of what the Central Intelligence Agency should produce. THE GENERAL MISSION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ACENCY Unless the Central Intelligence Agency performs an easential service for each of these departments end coordinates their intelligence activities 1t will fail in its mission. The Central Intelligence Agency should not be mere - ly another intelligence agency duplicating and rivelling the exiting agencies of State, Aray, Navy and Air Force. It should not be e@ comeetitor of these agencies , but a contributor to them end ohould help to coordinate their intelligence activities. It must make maximum use of the resources of exist- ing agensiea; it munt not duplicate their work but help to put an end to 26 2 ERR fm meme ae eran SO NS ES OS ee Ee Ee ee EE 9 cneeE emp wien cg epee oo ee | ee ee we em a en ne gs oe ere
ant alll ls etis, ant fain eae a + cxieting duplication by aeesny to 4t that the bent quulitsed agency in cach phaoe of the Intelligence fleld ohowld anowse ond carry ont ita particular yeapongibllity. In the succeeding chapters of thin report we will pugesent concrete ateps for giving effect to these general principles. In doing ao we whJL otart froin the premise which we have stated above that the existing legislation affords a good vaois on which to build 4 central intelligence service. ‘Furthermore ; ag the wost practical method of approach, we will examine whet has been sccom- pliobed through the Central Intelligence Agency under this legislation and puggeat @8 we go along the specific and, in some cancs, fundamental changes which we consider desirable. In this way we will build upon what we now have rather then attempt to start anew and build from the ground up. CONCLUSIONS AXD RECOMMENDATIONS (1) Section 102 of the National Security Act of 2947 estsbliszes a framework for a sound intelligence system end no amendments to this Section of the Act ere deemed necessary at thie time. | (2) The Central Intelligence Agency is properly pleced in our gevern- mental structure under the Nationel Security Council. (3) The Centrel Intelligence Agency should be empowered and encouraged to establish through its Director closer liaison with the two members of the National Security Council on whom it chiefly depends. namely, the Secretarics of State snd Defense. THERE IS NO PAGE 28.
| ocak ce ans tn amen tienen oo THE ORNGARIGATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE CIUENTRAL IVEPELLIGEACE AGENCY CHAPTER HI ORGANIZAYT OU | ho Natlonal Security Act of 1O4¥7 dogs not miko detatlod provi.alon Lor tho organization of the Central Intolligenco Agency. It providen that “the Agency ohell bo heeded bya Director of Central Intelligence and that ho “shall be eppointed by tho President, by and with the advico and consent of the Scn- atc, from song, the commissioned officers of the Arned Services or from anong 4ndividuale in civilien lifo". With ono exception, noted bolow, the Director in froe to organizo the Central Intelligence Agency as he chooses and to appoint to positions within tho organization persons of his own selecticn, @s woll es to terminste their . enploymont without regerda for normal Civil Servico procedures. In this chapter wo discuss the administrative orgenization of the Contral Intolligonce Agency, leaving for Chapter X, when we havo comploted our exami- - nation of the various activitios of tho Agoncy, an appraisal of the ovor-all direction of the organization in relation to ita assigned niosion. In carrying out his task of organizing the Central Tatolligoence Agency, tho Director hao designated as hio immediate subordinates a Deputy Director and en Exocutive Director*., Asolating thio directing group in a staff capacity aro the Interdepartinental Coordinating and Planning Staff (ICAPS); the General * Genoyal Order No. 11 of tho Central Intelligonco Agency, dated September Lh, 194S, which ig to: become offective shortly, abolishon tho poot of lxocutive Dlreetor. 29
terete 6 e. oo \ Court who hasllou all legal and leginiative wor 5 tho Exocutive for Adwinintration ani Management, fn charge of finwieial end budgetary mitlora, admiuictrative rorvices, oupply and general housotcoping, perconnol and mumeagement advico and muveyu; und tho Exocutivo for Inapection end Security, reopousible for internal security policies and Snvcentigetions, physical security arrangomenta, inapoctionn and audits. (For Orgunization Chirt ac of Jenuery 1, 1949, see Annex No. 5). ho Interdcrartusntul Coordinating and Planning Staff (ICAPS), compriuving persons nominated by the Dopartmonta of Stato, Aruy, Navy and Air Force, has the pricery responsibility for essisting the Diractor and tho Intelligence Advisory Comittee with respact tothe coordination of intelligence activitios. (Sco Chapter IV). The other fimctions of the Centrel Intelligonco Agency aro yperforrced in five Offices*, each headed by an Asolatent Director. Theres are the Offica of Reports end Estimates (ORE), Office of Special Oporationa (030), Offices of Policy Coordination (oFC ) , Offico of Oporations (00), ond Office of Colloction and Disserination (CCD). A chart showing tho porsonnel strongth of the various parto of tho Agonc: as of Decomber 24, 1948 is givon in Annex Ko. 6. Tho rosponsib.lity of tho Contral Intolligonco Agoncy to “corrolato and evaluate intolligence rolating to tho national rocurity" ta assigned to tho Offico of Roperts and Eatimates (ORE). However, av wo will point out lator, (Soo Chaptors V and YI), a cloar distinction has novor boon rade within tho * Vo understand that ainco thia report wan writton stops aro boing takon to Croato a nopurato Office of Schlontific Intelligence. 20
~~ a ~~. a : Ae ee Offico of Reports und Eatimwtes votwoon tho duty of corretating, nationnl ine telligence andi performing other miacollanvous roporting actlivitied which are moro in tho miuro of “static” counon cervice Puncticnu, The “operating” vervicos of common conccyn which havu been apsuigned to the Central Intelligence Agency aro carricd out by tree Officcu., Tho OLfieo of Sucsinl Operations fo reaponsible for foreign cuplonuge and counter-oopi onugo (Sco Chapter VIII). ‘Tho Office of Oporationa fa churged with the explot tation of doxcatic contacts for forcign intolligence, the monitoring of foreign bronad- caots and the exploitation of intelligence information found in fercign docu- menty, press and other publicationa (Seo Chapter VII). The Offico of Policy . Coordination is charged with conducting secret’ operations abroad under & ope- cial vandaie from the National Security Council which atipulated that tho An- sestant Director, Office of Policy Coordination, rist be nominated by the Secretary of State , ani that hig appointment by "the Director Lo subject to approval by the Nationa} Security Council. This 4s tho only cacc, as mentioncd above, in which the National Security Council has prencribed internal arrange- mente within the Central Intolligenco Agency or limited the appointive autbor- ity of the Diroctor. (Sco Chapter IX). The Office of Collection and Dioscwination cowbines avaricty of functions, cach senewhat differently rolatced to tho over-all misuion of the Central In- telligence Agency. It performy static sorvicea of common concorn in that it conpiles and maintains certain bios ‘aphical, Library and other reforence imte~ rinalo. It alno porforio a coordinating function in handling {nteLligonco col- lection requosta of the Central Intelligtnce Agency and the othes departments. Finally, it “perfortin administrative functions ouch ao tho reception and dis- . borlinition of docwaonts and roporta.- «6 sco Chaptor IV). | . 31
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_— BUISLE Tho Central Intolligcesce Aconcy appcaro to have no neriona budec tary problem end iv fevorod by adcauato Congressional eupport. The buiget proposala, ; ao approved by the Diroctor, are oubmittod cach year with tke authorization of _ the National Secwity Council to tho Bureau of the Budgot vhero thoy are =. pone eter, ea . onary handled by ono official who hea full security clearance. Then the buiget ia oupportcd veforo special sub-committees of the Appropristions Comaittee of the two Housts of Congress. ‘ALtor approval, arrangements are made with tho Bureau of the Budget so that vartous parts of the ‘budget are eppropricied to other departzents. Thus, thoro is no official appropriation to the Central Intelli- genco Agency, but there are a number of separate blenkot end wwidentitied ap- proprintions to other departments, which act as the vehicles for trencnitting the tunis fo tho Central Intclligonco Agency. Both Congresu and the Burcau of the Budgot ‘havo refreined from oxanini ng in dotailL tho intermal voriinga of the Central Intolligenco Agency in order to dotarnino the duets fication for the budeet. It ig important that such dia- cretion and nocuri ty ve continued anid that ppecial trontz nt bo accorded. Novovor, in order to juotify thio, it 4o necoosary that tho National Security Cowici) continuously acoure ituolt as to tho propor miaagonont and oporations of tha Contral Jntolligenco Agoncy, sorving as tho informed wuponvor of tho Agoncy avi as tho protector of itu socur ity,
twee es a jn ovemary, ve velfove that tho propont arrangencuta for Mandl ine: tho Br tre quantion of tho puigvot for tho Contral Jntelligencye Aponcy “ro sound 4 and that the Agency hea not deon hampered du carrying, oul ito present respon- oibilities by lack of funds. $4
0 mtn % - Semi ames . 1 Sm cat ae aan Lest further incidents of thio cheracter occur, ovory offort should bo made to provent tha public disclosuro of socrot information rolating to ths operations of ths Contral Intelligonce Agency. Uador . the National Security Acs (Section 102 (a) (3)), the Director of Central Intelligence is made ro- sponsible for protecting jntolligence sources. and methods fron unauthorized disclosure. fhis manjete eppears to give the Director authority to resist prosowe for dinclosw'e of secrot information. a if, however, in his relations with Congrese cr with other Govornmont fo- partzonts, the disclosure of secret information is sought from the Director, and if he has any doubt.us towhothor ho should comply, it should ve oatabl iahed practico for him to rofor tho " quostion to the National Socurity “Cowned) in ordor that itmiy dotomaino whother or not djaclosuro is in the public intorost. Wo voliove tbat othor - otopa can aluo by takon toward on improvemont of gocurity. Thoro should bo groater floxibility in tho Contral Intolligonce Agoncey's organization by diotinguishing votwaon those functions which arg writtun inte the atatuto and honco aro public and thoso whoue oxistenco, and te “A
ae en wes “y, EB . . . . | ere! oe ~ os a cortahdy whore operations, chow d remiin socrul. Tho two showld bo adminis- “tyatively end functiawlly soparnted, aud Gcppropriato cencanlment should be oo given to tho secret activities as diacwigad below. (Sea page 116), ; — At tho canoe tno, a serious endeavor chould bo mide to rovorca Uno prog- ont unfortunuto trond vhoroin tho Contral Intolligonce Agoney finda ituolf advortine3 elnost oxclusively as a socret servico organizetion. It should bo | “presentod incloed to tho public as the contralized coordinator of intclligonce. This would holp to cover rather than uncover its secrot operations. Evon with | . these specific oteps, in the long run only organizational disciplino and por- | Gonal digcrotion will inovro security. . ones 36
so anes Riccar ma nero awa cnet eae ties Donointare Bint AA it A RA ALS cheerios miPectine .R t eden = ENTIRE PAGE DELETED. 37 a “a ene meer o mere pre gen 0 ey ep CUE ad, ch me EE ag eefls A ees ee og ee en ee a 0 8 Ne eS Ee enn nen mane cae 2 SENET
(Soo Chaptor X). CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (i) Tho contralization of al) administration in ono offico is undosirable oince- gocrot operations roquixo thoir own separate adiainiotration. (2) Tho prosent arranganonte for handling tho difficult budgotary quos- tions of tho Central Intolliganco Agoncy aro soundly concoivod, and tho Agoncy hav not boon harpored in carrying out ita provunt rogponcibilitios by lack of fvnda. 33 +h a anes =. : 12 ene. we = ae ie em eee cee ne eee ween ean eee oe et en ee te Se a AO — oT edd
™~, N ~ NN wae eae dist ahstaninen (3) Yo asuiat tho Director in carrying out hig otatutory duty of protec t- ing intolligence sources end mothods hoe Ghonld, in canon whore the dive) osure of socrot information fs  aought from him and ho hna doubt ag to whother he chould carply, rofor tho. question to tho Natsonal Socurity Council in ordor that it way dotorsino- vhothor or not dinclonure ig in tho public intorent. (4) In tho intoerost of security, tho Contrel Intelligence Agonecy vhowld inercasingly caphavize its dutiou asp tho coordinator of intoll4 eonce rather than ite secret intolligenco activition in order to revorso tho prodont wn- fortunsto trond whero it finds itoolf advortised almost exclusivoly ana cocret worvico organization. In this wy it can help to covor up rather than to u- covor tho cocret operations entrusted to it. . C_— 39 THERE IS NO PACE 40. a a es AEG Gey we Ee . ; AN SL LT OS Ce eS OE OT ae Me geet ye an a, NO et See Se A ee CG Ge mE Oe eS ES ONS AY My me RN Oe
Se ve rene de heh Fee eles, CHARTER IV . WHE RESEONSIBILITY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGE ECE AGENCY FOR SHE CCORDINATION OY INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITH:S Tho coordsmition of tho intolligencoe activitios of tho several dopartzonto and egonci.ecs concornod with national security was a priuasxvy reason for ootab- Jiching tho Central Intelligenco Agency. ‘his 4o cleer from tho carly diccus- nicns concerning tho creation of a contreal ugoncy and froa tho language of | Section 102 of tho Kational Socurity Act. VUE SLATUTORY PROVISIONS {fo achieve this purpose, tho Contral tntolligenco Agency vas assigned tho _a—eooO duty of advising the HKationai Socurxity Covneil in matters concerning suck in- tolligence activitics as relate to the naticrel security end of making reccn- mendations to the Netional Security Council for thoir coordination. The Act doos not give the Central Intelligonce Agency {ndepondont authority to cocrdi- nate intolligonce activities. Final responsibility to establich policics ts in ee vested in the National Security Council. Snell This duty of advising the National Security Council, together with tho two other principal duties of correlating national intelligence and performing common services as detormined by tho National Socurity Council, all corvo the - Ce andl G@onoral prrpeso of coordination. In fact, those threo basic dutica of the Contral Intelligonco Agency, althovgh distinct in themsolyes, are necossarily antenatal intor-rolated and tho porformance of ono function may involvo another. Yor oxamplo, in performing ito duty of advising on tho coordination of bean een dd Intelligence activitios, tho Contral Intolligonce Agency my recommond to tho ~ National Security Cowicell the meano to bo omployed. in tho aodonbly of roporte 4} aa.
pe tact ANN a and obvinetes requisile Sor the porYanennce hy the Agency of ita second duty, the correlation of nitsonsl Intelligence. Ao mnother oxamplo, tho Cantral Jn- tolligence /gency may recozeend, Jn eccordmnce with die duty to ake recomnoans dations for the coordinition of Intulligenco activitacs, that a particutns in- telligenco function bo porformed honceforth by the Agoucy itsolf under its third duty of providing corvices of cormon concern roroe cfficiontly accom- plivhod centrally. The otatutory limitations upon tho authority of the Central Intolligenco . Agoncy to coordinate intolligonco uctivitics without the epprovel of tho Na- tional Security Council wero obviously dosigned to protect the autonony and Antearnal arrangezcnts of the various Gepartzents end egencies performing in- tolligenco functions. The Secrotarices of departments “ho are membors of tho National Security Couheil are in a position to roview recammondaticus of tho Central Intelligence Agoncy concerning their own departuents, and provieicn is made that othor devartmontal heads may be invited to attend meetings of the Nationsl Security Council when matters portaining to their activities ere under consideration. In spite of these calculated limitations on the authority of tho Central Intelligence Agency, it is clear that the Agency wag oxpocted to provide tho initiative end leadorahip in doveloping a coordinated intelligence systom. In practice, tho National Security Council hse, ablzost without oxcep- tion, approved the rocommondations cubaitted to it by tho Centsel Intolligence Agoncy for tho coordination of intelligonce activitios. . Tho National Socurity Act doos not defino the “intolligunco activitios" vhich aro tobe coordinated undor the diroction of tho National Socwrity Council, or ppocify the dopartmonts whose activition aro covorod. Prooumably all 42
NN intol}d foence nctdvitien rotating to tho nation) accurity aro included, fren” 7s collecting Infarzdbdon jn the frat inatonce to tha preparstidon and disgomsna- tion of Musehod Intolligensea reporta and outimates, ‘he eriterton, a vory broad oie, 4g “ouch Intelligence activiticu ...... an rolate to tho national gocurity" and not tho idontity of tho dopartrontsy concornod ox tho natin‘e or locnlo of tho intelligonco activity. Thus, practically no limitations aro set upon tho acapo of Wo intelligence activitics with vhich tho Central Intolli- gonco Aroncy is to concern itsolf. | e THE ORGWIZATION AWD OFSAATICN OF WWE MACHINERY FOR COORDINATION + Throo organizations assist the Director of Contral Intelligenco in dis- charging his responsibilities respecting the coordination of intolligenco ac-— tivities; tho Intelligence Advisory Comttoo (IAC), with to Standing Con- mittoo; the Interdopertmental Coordinating and Plenning ‘stort (10APS) ef the | Central Intelligenco Agency end the Office or Collection end Dissemination (OSD), aloo in the Central. Intolligenco Agency. | INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE Tho menbernhip of this Comnittoo, croutea by Natione1 Sour ity Counci) Inteltigence Dirsctivo No. 1 of Dacombor 12, 1947 (Soe Annox No. 7), includos tho Diractor of Central Inteclligonce, as chaixaan, tho heads of tho intelligence otaffa of the Dapartmontsy of Stato, Amsy, Navy and fir Forco » tho hoad of tho Joint Intelligence Group of tho Joint Staff and tho Diroctor of Intolligonce , of tlio Atwate Energy Commisaion. It ia tho direct ouccopsor to tho Intolligonco Adviuvory Board vhich vao created ty Propidont Yriaan in his lettor af January 22, KG aotting up the Central Intolligonco Group (Seo Amox No. 3).
™. NSD de naNuba Venn ae erenmrecncamad You toning with tho disenasions that preceded the crontJon of tha Corutttoo thor huve boca tvo different concopts ao to itu proper ipaton., On tha one hand wit t:0 viow, hold jn the varfous dopurtmontu, that the Committee should, jn uenso, bo & “governing board" Tor tho Contral Intelligonco Agency. On the cther hend, 4t was argved that Congrons had not up the Agency autonorously and that ony interdoparizcntal comittoo chould servo rorely in an advicory capacity at the ésecrotion of tho Director. The solution cetsblinshod in Intol- ligonce Directive No. 1 lien botwoon these viown. In practice, the rolo of the Conmitioo has not boon significant, and in owr opinion, this has been one of tho xoasons for the weakness of the prosent : arrangements for the coordination of intelligenco. In this chapter and tho ‘noxt wo will cubmit our recomendations for increasing the rouponsibility of the Intolligence Advieory Committco, both with respect to the coordination of intelligence estivities and the preparation of intelligonce cstinates. The mombers of the Intelligence Advisory Cozztulttec ure authorized to pass upon rocozmondationa of the Diroctor of Central Intolligonce to the Naticnal Socurity Council end upon directives proposed by the Diroctor in implementation of Kational Socurity Council Intolligenco Diroctives. Although itis incumbent upon tho Director to transmit to the Kational Sociwity Council dissents of monbors of tho Conmittce to his recommondutions, tho Conmmittoo my not provent tho Diroctor from making hio rocomendations to tho Kational Socwrity Council rogardless cf dissents. Whore manimity fo not obtainod on a proponodk diroc- tive asong tho military dopartmont moubors of tho Conmittos, tho Director is Yoqulred to refer the problem to tho Socrutary of Dofenso before proconting it to tho National Security Council. etematae . , , — COE ee” da ale toc altel . | . .
mew Soe he, iene HN te ~ t= ere aN wt, acca i The activitjou of the Intolliguncoe Advisory Casumittca have boon lnrgoly confined to taking formil action, usually by voting alipn, upon djroctivoa proposod by tho Director of Contra) Intolligence to bo aubialltad to tho National Security Cowmcil or upon Japlementiny directives. Thene nctiong aro prypared for tho Comittoo by tho Interdécpsrtmental Coordinating and Planning Staff and tho Comnittoo's ovn Standing Comalitoo of dopmartmontal roprosentativos. The Comuttos has mot only infrequently and hao had little to do with tho continu- Sng coordiniticn of intolligonco activities cr with tho propareation of coordi- nated intolligence ostimates.* This oitustion foprobably duo to a combinatioa of circimstences, including the failure of the Diroctor to appreciate the responsibility of the Central Intolligencoe Agoncy for bringing about coordina tion, lack of mutual confidence among the departments and tho Central Intolli- @ence Agency anda genorel failure to understand how a coordinsted fatolligence system cen be brovght Sout. The concoptim of the Intelligence Advisory Committee is sound. It is sound becauso intordeperimental coordination in such a complicated field ex intelligence cannot be achievod solely by directives and without the fullest cooperation of tho intorested departments. It requires frequent consultation and continuing collaboration on ald important quostions. Tho Jntelligonce A@visory Committee should be the medium for accomplishing this, but it will not succeod if it continuos to moot only infroquontly, end avoids sorious . gErappling with intoelligonco problems end continuous consultation on quostions of common intorost. ee EE | *On thiu subject, soo Chaptor V and particular y page 75 vhoro thore io a dis- cnaaicn of tho ad ioc conmalttoo pot up in March, 1948.
me epee PS Vem Bins o*' awe Oe LISEEEDEEANTUENTAL COORDIGATING AND PIAL OMG (ICAP) Thin was aot up aga otlaff unit of tho Director of Ceatral TIntolliyence to avpset hm in hia respaasibilition for the coordsmition of Intelligence ac- tivition. Its woubora aro roprosentatives nominatcd by tho datelligencu or- canizations of the Stato, Amy, havy wid Ady Forco Dopartrenta; tho scenior~ Stato Dopartrent repronvatetivo iu the Chabrman of tho group. Tho auntgnea tank of ICATS is to roviow ths intclligonce activitico of tho Government, and asnist the Diroctor in initiating measures of coordinaticn for rocommondation to the National Security Council. In ordor to eccompliob thie nissian effectively, it chovld havo intimate Imowlodge of the orgeniza- tions, responsibilities, activities and priorities of tho various intelligence agoncios. Actually, its achiovements roflect inudogtate imovledge of theso subjocta and failure to appreciate tho breadth of tho respensibility cf the Central Intolligenco Agency for coordination of intolligence activities. ICAPS has been largely concerned with the coordination of intelligonce activitios by assisting in the preparation of tho nine National Security Comeil Intolligonce Directives and tho four implezonting directives of the Director of Contral Intelligence. It was originally oxpocted that ICAPS would act as tho secrotariat . or ‘working staff for the Intolligonco Advisory Coamittoe , but owing jn part to tho infroquont mootings of tho Committce, this has not happonod. , Moroover, thoro has beon confusion botwoon tho functions of ICAPS and thouo of the Standing Comaittes comprising reprosontativas from tho staffo of tho mombors of tho Intolligonco Advisory Cousittoo, with tho remit that rosponsibilitios aro dividod and uncloar. Moroover, the status of tho wowhors of ICAYS haa boon 16 | Te ep ote a ae eee cement ee -
‘ NO. a. mabsgaoun bocurse 1 has never poon entirely clone vhether the Group waa pri~ mardly a oteaff of the Director of Contral Intelligenco or & committco ropra- ponting tho member egoacios. This han left the group with divided Loyalties and wicortasaty an to its mindato. The position of ICAPS haa teon rendorad more difficult bocnuso its inenbora hevo boon given operating rosponoibilitios which are not only unrolnted to thoir primary tank of nealuting to formilnto plans for tho coordinating of in- telligence, bDht aro rospensibilitics which caem to bolong ore properly to tho oporating brenchos of tho Contral Intelligonce Agency. Thus, one member of the staff serves ac tho full-tino linizon officer with the Joint Intolligoncoe Group of tho Joint Staff. Thies is purely an sntolligence rosearch end report- ing fwmction in which the Office of Reports and Estimates has almost exclusivo ak 4nteroot. Moreorcr, tho official lisison officor from ws Contral Inteliigsnace _ Agoncy to the National Security Council staff is the Chairmen of ICAPS. This function also concerns matters affecting primarily tho Office of Reports end Estimates and, in fact, a representative from that Office now also works with tho Rational Socurity Council staff. In these and other waya ICAPS has acquired operating rathor than planning functions and has become, to somo extont, a bufrer between the oporating parts of tho Contral Intolligonco Agency end outside agencioa. In carrying out both ito plenaing and operating functions, it is not in close touch with tho intol- ligenca branchoa of tho Contral Intclligonco Agency. Thore are nunorous com- plaints thatiticnot only failing to carry out ita own miggion properly, but is aotuslly taped ing tho othor parts of tho Contral Intolligonco Agoncy in carry- . ing out theira. Ts
i ase ee eet anew et a ee In goneral, vo have found that IAPS, atarfeda by Individealn vhone oxpar- , fence vith problems of Sntolligenca orgudiation Je not oxtonsivo, mand lack ti; a clear end firmoiailsto, okie fallud to widertake a broad ond offective pro- gran of coordinaticn of Intolligunco activitios. 1t lea boon ndloved to dig- wipato Jts energies in activitics for which 1% io not suited and to neglect ius pricury misoica. It hao not given tho jzprenoion within tho Central Intollt- gonco Agency or outside that it grasps tho nature of tho rospongibility for coordination of intelligence activitioo which is imposed upon the Contrel Yotolligenco Agency by the National Security het. OFFICE OF COLLECTION AND DISSsGATION The Office of Collection and Dissemination combines three functions, only ono of vhich is directly relatod to the task of coordinating intoiligonce activities, In the first placo, it acts as a service organization for tho other Of- fices of the Central Intolligence Agency by procuring intelligence data from othor agencies and by dioseminating to those agencies the intelligence collected or producod by those Offices. . Its second taok is the provision of certain services of cosmon concorn for tho penefit of tho Contral Intolligenco Agency and othor agoncion. Theso includo the maintenance of en intolligonce Library and of cartain central registors and indicos. Finally, the Office of Collection and Dissemination porforms cortain co- ordinating funotions with reapact to tho collection of intolligenco. It proc- 69000 all intolligence roequouty rocoivad by tho Contral Intolligonco Agoncy, Whether theno call woroly for docunontary material ar roquiro fiold collection. 48 ’
ante en ee NL a et Se te faa be, bee. Jt cunvancosd the collection capsbilition of the Aguncy mind wll other apyproprinte agenciun in order to doternifue how best to meot these roquestsa. Phua, Lf the Offices of Naval Intelligence riaut! raquank of tho Contral Intelligences Agency {nformition on the petrolcua producing espabilitiona of various foreign coun- tries, the Office of Colicction end Dissemination vould dotermina tho intel ]l4- gonco revourcos which should bo tapped in order to saticfy tho reauost. If tho roguest cannot bo satisfied within tho Central Intelligenco Agoncy it will de- termino “het outcide agency iv capablo of procuring nocossery tnforsation and will bo responsible for forwarding the request to such agoncy. In the course of this action, the Office of Collection and Dissemination will attempt to discover whothor any othor agency has a similer requirement fer information which might bo combined with the original request. In this manner the Office ausista in coordinating the roquiremeats end collection requests received from within the Central Intelligence Agency and from owtside egencics. It is obvious that this function of coordination is designed to meet cur- rent requests and does not involve a broad responsibility continucusly to mon- 4tor and coordinate the collecticn procedures end requirencnts of the various intelligence agoncies, including the Central Intelligence Agency. Such a ro- sponsibility would force the Office of Collection and Di poomination into tho position of a contral cloaring house for all colloction roquiromonts end re- quests of all agencies. It would be impractical to heave auch an arrangomont ‘duo to tho mass of administrative dotail Snvolved and the rosulting dolay in tho sutiofaction of tho roquosta. In practice, diroct intor-agency roquoots, not roguixing coordination, may by-pasa the Contral Intolligonce Agoncy complatoly. 49
email tAL GECURITY COUNCIL TFELLIGESCE DIRECTIVES. ho farvar accasplioiknent of over-all coordination io reprogonted minty by nino Jutalligonce Directives approved by tho KatJonal Gocurity Comneii. upon yocormometion of toe Director of Contral Intolligonco in consultation with tho Inte)ligence Advinory Comaitleo, and four inplomenling directivon vhich neod not te dincussed hore. Tho National Soswity Council Intelligence Diroctives* provide for tho coordination of intolligence activitios invariovs ways. The banic Directivos, Noo. 1, 2, 3 and 4 scok to achiove coordination of intolligencs activitics by allocation of general areas of rosponsibility to the soyeral dopartments and to tho Contral Intelligonco Agoncy. Directive No. 1, as -we have pointcd out, estabdlishos the general arrange- monte for such coordination. It sete up the Tatolligence Advisory Coumittee > discuonod above, to advise the Director of Contre 1 Intel ligenco, specifies the procodures for tho iosvance of Intelligenco Diroctives end defines tho duty of the Contral ‘Intolligence Agency ‘ith respect to the production of "national intolligon co." Innofsr as practicablo, the ‘Contral Intell. igence Agency “shall not duplicato tho intelligonco activities and research of tho various Dapart- montana and Agencies, Ddut shall ia} co uso of oxinting intolligenco facilitios." Tho Directive provieos for oxchange of information between the Contral Intol- ligonce Agoncsy and tho depsrtmontal agencion, and authorizes tho ansignnont of officers to tho Contral Intolligonco Agoney by tho dopartmontal orgunizationsa. It aluo jncludos provision for tho Contra Intolligenco Agoncy to roquoat au- thority to inmect intelligonco matorial in egencion of the Govermzont. wenn *So0 Aumexos Ko. t- 5 for tho toxtn of the Diractivon; 50 . it ecenaeutenmemtuiaees foe RS sree, yrmes 4 one epee, ve ° Fo RR mmr 6 ome, 7 OE ER EG oats Oo meeeRpTI Hee 7 omwes " i i Leas ci ee al
Directive No. 2 allocatos reoponuibility for the collection abroad of overt intelligence among the Departmonts of Stato, Army, Navy and Air Forco by establisning “certain broad categories of agency responsibility." Political, cultural and sociological intelligence are assigned to the State Department. Military, naval and air intelligence are assigned to the respective Services. The collection of economic, scientific and technological intelligence is allo- cated to each agency “in accordance with ita respective needs.“ The Directive provides for coordination of these collection activities in the field by the senior United States representative. Directive No. 3 is an elaborate definition of categories of intelligence production, i.e., basic, current, staff, departmental ani national intelligence, and it assigns the responsibilities of the departmental agencies and the Central Intelligence Agency in intelligence production. The eame areas of “dominant . interest" are specified as for intelligence collection, and the production of "national intelligence”: 4g reserved to the Central Intelligence Agency. How- ever, the terms of the various definitions are broadly draw, the exceptions ere numerous, end confusion of intelligence functions has continued despite the effort to eliminate it by definition. Directive No. 4 provides that the Central Intelligence Agency shall take the lead in preparing a comprehensive outline of national intelligence objec- tives, and from time to time shall indicate the priorities attaching to these objectives. Si
teen 8 me ue Four of tho Directives, Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 8, anoign certain “serviccs of corion concern" to the Contre) Intelligence Agency under the euthority granted in thoNational Socurity Act (Section 102 (d)). Those aro coordinating actions in tho sonso that, by common agreement, they assign to the Contral Intolligenco Agoncy primary or oxcluotvo responsibility for conducting certain intelligence - activitios of commen concern. Diroctivo No. 5 provides that tho Contral In- tolligonce Agency will conduct all oopionmgo and countor-copien:: “go oporations abroad oxcopt for cortauin agrood activitics and. it also provides that tho Cen- tral Intolligenco Agoncy will coordinate covort and overt collects on activities. (Soo Chaptor VIII). ? Diractive No. G givos tho Contral Intolligonce Agoney authority to conduct all fedoral monitoring of foresgn proon and ‘propsgiuda broadcavto, and airocta Some kl eee Tee wre te te te nee cae ees Te Te Mme sees Ogee Oe mem me a mm ema amapeN ey a eg gee pe reer sores
tho Agency to dJuuenimaito the Jaformatson thus rocolyud to intorontod dopurt- mental ugencios. (Sve Chapter VIL). © Piroctive No. 7 gives the Central Intailigence Agency authority for tho exploitation of domcotic sourcen of forvign Iintelligenco, and provides for tho participation of Aapartmental agencioo in thin activity. (Sco Chapter VII). ‘ ‘Phese Intelligence Directives allocate responsibilities to the Central Intelligence Agency in fields which have been concedsd to be those of conmon concern where work can beat be done centrally. This is also truc of the allo~ cation to the Central Intell gence Agency or responsibility for the conduct of pecret operations (other then intelligences) abroad by the Office ‘ef Policy Coordination which was accomplished by direct National Security Council action (xsc 10/2) end not by Intelligenco Directive submitted through the Intelligence Advisory Committoo. (Sco Chapter IX). In all of these caocs where perticular functions of common concern have been assigned, the allocation of functtons has deon generally accoptod as sound, THE DECRE® OF COORDINATION ACHIEVED , _In opite of these formal directives for tho coordination of 4ntolligonco activition, it ia probably corroct to cay thut dopartuontal intolligence ac- tivitios ero substantially unaffected by this program of coordination excopt whore tho Central Intolligonce Agency has been givon exclusive rosponsibility | '. for cartain activitics.
ee “gn general, thero fem absence of offuctive ceordination undar the Lend- eralip of tho Central Intolligence Agency and there favirtuntly no supervision 4 of the weys in which tho various dircetsves aro carried out, cxcopt that tho Central Intelligence Agency controlu those common cervico ectivitica usalgned to it. Conflicts of jurisdiction and duplicaticn of activitico remiin. In many cases they have not oaly been unrosolved, which is hardly surprising after euch a short time, but they remain unrecognized and unacimowlcdeed. Despite tho provisions of Directives Nos. 2 and 3 in regard to the allo- cation of dominant interest, cach department collects and produces the intel- ligence it chooses according to pricritico it establishes. The very large _ loopholes in these directives and the absence of any continuously effective monitoring of their implementation makes this possible. The Central Intelli- gonce Agency itself has become a competitive producer of intolligence on sub- jocts of its owm choosing which can by no atretch of the imagination ‘be called . national intelligence. (See Chavters V and VI). The amount of undesirable duplication among intelligence agencies is considerable and the absence of co- ordinated intelligence collection and production is serious. In our opinion, certain essentials for tho improvenent of this situation would includo: continuous examination on the initiativo of the Central Intel- ligonce Agoncy of instances of duplication and failuro of coordinstion; dirce- tivoe which ostablich more precisoly the reoponsibilitios of the various de- partronto; and the offectivo carrying out of plans through closo intor-dopart- wontal conawltation at all lovols. To a gronter orlossor degroo, all of those eusontinls ary lacking at tho prosent tino, 3t
va ee ace aa ee OE ee tenner atelee ee ame a nm Remnaen aN matare ce, moses oe Sema fae ain 0 oS cane APs Bs Abe. tamed, wae, + ees ee, RE te mee 8 ot Ane etal EER « Cloarly, «np pointed out above, tho authors ty of tho Contral Tntolli gence Agency to coorddnite diutelligonco activities ia onb joct to diroctivog of the Jintional Socur ity Council. Howover, tho senponnibs lity bonds so tho National Socurity Coune4}. end tomakoe recommondations for coordination is equaroly placed on the Contral Intelligence Agency. Therefore, lack ofnuthority in a opocific pituatson should not dotor tho Central itolligonco Agoncy from oxorcising its rosponoibility to submit rocomnendstiono so that proper coordination will ro- cuit. If thoro nro doubts as tohow tho coordination chould bo effected, it is “ tho duty of tho Agency to “nok the National Security Council to resolve thon. Tho coordinution of intelligeaco activities today isparticularly {mportsnt 4n three fiolds illustrative of the gonecral problem, namely -~ scientific in- telligence, domestic 4ntolligence and counter-intelligence affecting tho rma- tional security, end commmications intelligence. SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE* The field of acientific and tochnological intelligence is obviously ono which way over shadow all others in importance. At tho present time there is no propor coordination of effort in this field, which is one in which there ig a broad area of comion intorest. In fact, this diffusion of rosponsibility is | confimod in National Security Council Intolligenco Directives Nos. 2 and 3 which allocate collection and production rosponsibilitios for scientific ond | tochnological jntolligonce to “each agency jn accordanco with ita rospective noods:" *Sinco thio repert wag written, steps aro being taken to creato inthe Contral ‘Intelligonco Agency a ooparato Offico of Scientific Intolligoncs end to trans- for to it the Kucloar Enorgy Group. now in tho Offlca of Spocial Oporations. 59 tReet eee syd epReNNan mye © ETE Le ag RN ORCS Se NE enmmaeeey tin mS = me? Se ESSE 8 +
oe ay of tho nilitary Services collects sciontifie and tochnolozical Jn- , tolligonce 4 eccorcanco with ite own procriva and produces such roporte au it chooncn. Tho Contral Tntolligence Agency porformo cortain contral collocting ,; nor eicon through {tn Offico of Oporations and Offico of Spocial Oporationa. Tho Offico of Spyciel Qperatioan alco housoy tho Nucloar Enorgy Group which ipo | tho contral governmental wait for interpreting atonic onCcrey intolligonco. " Scpsrato fren it is a Soientific Branch fa tho Office of Reports and Esticatos vhich veo expocted tobecoms tho contral group for ntimileting and coordinating | _ pesontific intolligonco. It has not yot fillod this rolo. The Rescarch and — Devoloyrsnt Board docs not 4tc0lf actively engege in sciontific intolligenco Dut has en important interest in the fiold. Ita neods showld therofore bo —- givon nojer consideration in plans and arrangements for coordination. In. cusary, reeponsibilitics are scatterod, collection offorts are unco- —_ cA ordinats3, atomic cnercy intelligence ig divorced from scientific intellisace ‘gonerally, and there is no recognized procedure for arriving at authoritative sees, _ Sntolligenco ostizates in the aciontific field, with tho poesible exception of ae a atomic energy. Here is a situation vhich rot have priority in coordination of fntolligence activitios. In Chapter VI we propose cortain stops which coms within tho scope of this survey. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE AND COUNVER-INTELLICENCE AFFECTONG THE NATIONAL SECURITY - Jnathor broad field requiring coordination is that of foroign sntolligonce —_ dexsvod from domestic sources and the alliog fiold of domontic countor-intolli- gonco. Thio inciudoos the oxploitation of intolligonce fro: Unitod Statos buoi- ness firmo, travelloro, otc., oxploitation of tho intolligonco posoibilities - of groups end individuals of foreign nationality in tho Unitod Stutos, the won ee see semen. : + Ceres atte a enitet ae erento: - — eee og eee ey oe are EE AOS ee ORE OEY SOY BOE BEET ET TOE Aes oD ae we SneT Bee eee manage smmme aS ome seman mem =, fee ee we we en a ee oc ne cet 9 pre Ele gO eGE WFC OG FCO 8 TARE FEET A OARS mete aE NORE RENTS OT SARS
. a creeeatteent rolativg of Convutic countor-Intelligonco to forciga intelligence ard tho coordiuation of denontte countor-caplonage with countor-erplennge nbroud.  Er- copt for tho oxploitation of privato sources of foreign intolligenco in the Unitod States vhich iu conutralized in the Offico of Oporations of tho Contral Intolligence Agency (seo Chaptor VII), romponsibility for the other activities 40 ucattorod enong tho Stato Dopartment, tho Araed Services, the Foderal Jurcau of Invostigation ond the Contral Intelligences Agency. Thoro is little offoc- tive coordination asong thom, oxcept on a case basis. Tho Foderel Tureau of Investigation, vhich has primarily security and luv onforcozont responsidilitios, is concerned in fact with en important area of §ntelligenco. This includca aonostic countor-ospionage and countor-nabotago, control of communist and other mubveraiive activities and surveillence of alicn Snédividuals end Groups. All of those functions are closely rolated tothe cca- pareblo activities abroad of the Central Intelligenco Agency. Thoy ell have en important 4ntolligence agpoct, particularly today sinen intolligence from domastic and foroeiga sources is po closely rolatod. The fact that the Fedorel Burcau of Investigation is' primarily ‘concerned with sccwrity and Jaw enforco- ment Bay root ina failure to exploit the intelligence possibilitics of a attuation end reny creato difficuities in reconciling tho intelligence with the socurity intercota. Tho Foderal Bureau of Investigation is not part of tho oxioting ma— chinory for coordination of JntoLligonce through tho Intolligenco Advisary Cormittoo or ofsorviao. There ia no continuing mannor whoroby donootic intol- ligonce and cowitor-intolligence aro rolatod to over-all natiannl intolligonco: in ordar to servo tho gor:cral purpono sot forth in tho Ketional Socurity Aot pial nee
~ eed cet ene Oe ee Re et ee Ao ar nen eee Gime 2% ototn oR — awe aa en re eee me ETS ee - mt vee “of coondiiiting the Intolligencs activities of tha gevernl Governmont duparte mente end agencicn jn the interest of nitions security." In our opinion, the Contral Intelligence Agency hao the duty under tho Act to concorn itsolf with the problea of coordinnting those phasss of domoutic 4ntolligonce end countor-intolligonce which rolate to the national socw ity and chould ovbmait rocemsondutions on this subjoct to the National Socimity Council. This isnot inconsistent with the stipwlation of tho Hational Security Act that the Central Inteslligonce Agency “phald have no police, subpoena, law- onforcenent povors, or internal sccurity functions." It would in fact soxrve to carry out tho program of coordination set forth in the Act in a broad fiold which haa hitherto been lergely noglocted. A stop toward bringing about the coordination wo yecomzend would be to provide far closer asuociation of the Fedoral Buroan of Investigation with the intelligence egencies by msking it a mombor of the Intelligence Advisory Committee. COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE ( ) 27 Fe)
- a WSU H too *VYo wndorstend that, at tho diroctlon of tho Socrotary of Dofonse ’ . Com ihe compriaing reprocontativos of the threo Sorvicoa is completing a otucy ‘ : dine . ‘ a question of cresting a Joint erganization lor tho production of communication Intolligoncoe. ; $9 ° : . ote ene OE a tA ES Se a ett GENES A A A$? ae eT IOTD HEPA LOE TS REET Perper
"PROPCSALS FOR IMPROVED COORDDUTION _In order to remedy tho existing situation in rospect of coordination of activities, soveral nteps axe necessary. Tho Director of Contral Intolligence . must show a mich greater concern thsn hithorto with the goneral problen of co- ordiastion of intelligence activities which 46 cno of his eocontial otatutory . duties. His is a responsibility to 211 of the dopartments: concerned with na- tional security; it can be properly dischargod “by leaderehip, imegination, initiative and a realization that only a joining of efforts can achieve the Gocired results. The othar mombors of tho Intelligonce Advisory Comnittes mot also share in tho gonoral responsibility for carrying out tho intont of the National So- curity Aot by quickening thoir intorost and oxhibiting a spirit of activo co- | operation. No anondmont to the Committoo's chartor as cot forth in Intelligonce ixoctive No. 1 appears nocoonary to bring about thin Jsprovoront. In tho noxt chaptor vhoxe vo deal with the quostion of nntionzl intolli- 6GnCo ootimitoo Wo propove that the Intolligonca Adyinory Cozmittoc annua a GO . . bs beara . .
7 s+ a, SS een een Sarasin ae me, wae nore activo role in producing theso entimates. Jn our opinion, this vould not only improve the relovanco and quality of tho cotimeton but would givo tho Conmnittec tho inpetus ond the bickground it noods to deal effectively with the coordination of intcllisenco activition. More than any athex stage in tho ' 4ntolligence procese, tho conaidoration of ostimutes should revoul tho defi- cicncics and overlaps as well as tho accompliohzonts 4n intclligenco. Yo believe, as stated above » that the Fodcral Burceu of Investigation should bo added to the permenent membership of tho Intelligence Advisory Com- mittee. We aloo believe that the Atomic Energy Cozmicsion ond the Joint Staff might be dropped from the regular membership. The role of the Atomic Energy . Commissicn in intelligence isa limited one and confined toa highly specialized field. Tne representation of the Joint ‘stot? upon the Intelligence Advisory Committee apncars to be largely duplicative in view of the predominantly Serv- - fee membership of the Conmittes. However, they, together with other interested agencics such asthe Departments of Treasury and Comerce, the Research and De- yolopment Board end the Nations] Security Reecources Board, should attend meet- dings whonever matters of direct concorn to them are being considorod. Within the internal organization of tho Central Intelligence Agency tho Intordepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff (ICAPS) should be sot up clearly ag ei intogral part of the Agoncy, chargod with the task of seoking out, atudying and developing, in conoultation with tho other parts of tho Central Intelligence Agency and outsido agoencios, plans for tho coordination of intolligence activities. It should havo to reaponoibility for current opor- ations, except that certain current tanke of coordination (such aa como of mt horo now porformmed by tho Office of Collection and Dinseminution) might be
sn esis ea curicd out under Lis direction. Tho reconutitated TCARG which might appro- printoly bo called “Coordination Divinion™ ohould be mull. Ite membors should be persons jutcrented in, and qualificd to deal with, problems of inlolligence orgepizetion. Finally, and perhaps mout jmportant of all, tho Director must look upon thio reorganized and otrengthened group 25 his mijor support in ful- ' filling one of hio moot difficult assignacnty undor the National Security Act, that of advicing tho National Security Council on the intelligence ectivitics of the Goverrnent end making recommendations for their coordination. It 40 ow bolicf that the reletionship between certain of the functions presently performed by ICAPS and the Office of Collection and Diasomination obould be considerebly closer. ICAPS is responsible Yor the promulgation of . plane and policy in relation to the coordination of collection activities. As _ one of its tesks, the Office of Collection end Dinsemination coordinates actual collection end diesemination and in some respects is ina position to Laplement the gencrel plans end policies for coordination. Constantly dealing with the Qaoy-to-day “working level" problems of colicction, the Office of Collection and Dissemination is in a good position to make recommendations in regard to the improvement of collection procedures and the ‘coordination of collection activitics. : ‘Wo, therofore, recomnend that the collection and dissemination functions of this Offico be pleced under the new Coordination Divinion, subject to future dotormination of the extent to ‘which individual offices may conduct their own Aivoonination. (See Conclisions to Chapters VII and VIII). We further recon- ond that all of tho library, | indox and register function be separated from tho Offico of Collection and Diouewination and bo placed in a contralizod Re-~ fearch and Reports DMvision ag doncribed in Chapter VI. 62
OO en ee et [ (1) Sho reaponsidlisty of the Central Intolligenco Agency widor tho Ha- CONCLUSIONS Ap Rca MEE TATTONS tional Security Act vith reupect W the coordjnation of intolligsnce activit fon, whieh {9 onc of tho mont important one asuigned to the Central Intelligence Agency, has not been fully discharged. (2) Onc of the fmportant earcas whcro more active offort ts at coordination ~ are noeded is the ficlé of scientific intelligence. (Sco Cheptor VI). (3) Another 4nvortant aren is that of. domestic intolligence and counter- gntolligence insofer ao they rolato to the national decurity. To improve co- ordination in this erca and botwoen it end tho cntire intelligence ficid, ve -- + eae amen oot, vecommend that the Federel Bureau of Investigation should bo made a member of 5 the Intelligence Advisory Committee. an . Co . en (5) The Intelligence Advisory Comittec 49 noundly conceived, Ddut it choula participate more actively with the Director of Central Intolligence in the continuing coordination of intelligence activities. (6) The Intelligenco Advisory Committee chould consist a the Directo. of Central Intelligence and representatives of the Departments of Stato, Arny, Navy and Air Force and tho Federal Bureau of Investigation. Other departinents and agoncico vould cit as ad noe members when appropriate. (7) The Interdopartscntel Coord inating aniPlanning Staff should be rocon- stituted av a otaff* responaible only to the Dirootor of Central Intelligonca, #In thio chaptcr wo have cslled thio new staff "Coordination Division.“ It nhonld be noted that thia name and other name wo have given to proponcd | branchen of the Central Intelligence Agency aro only for prrpgrcs of illustra- tion and ojmplif ication and not given aa a Some. recommendation. 63
te tes oh ante eg rA with tho task of developing plana Sor the coordinntion of futclligenco activitica. (8) whe reuponsibilities of the Office of Collection ani Disnemtnution with respect to the coordination of collection requirements and requesto end the dissemination of intelligenco should be carricd out under tho new Coordi- nation Division. Mio io subject to future actormination of the cxtent to which individual Offices may conduct their own dissemination. GA
| CHAPTER V te THE RESPORSISILITY OF Vile CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FOR NATIONAL INTE LLIGZINCE ESTMAALES THE MANDATS USWER THE NATIONAL SECURELY ACT ALD TH DIRECTIVES Ons of tho principal. dutios aroigned to tho Contrel Intolligonco Agency "for the purpeso of coordinating tho intolligence activities of the sevoral Governzent dopartmontea and egoncies in tho intorest of national ececirity" is “to correlate and evaluate .intolligcnce relating to the national security, snd provide for ECS) eppropriate aiasemtnation," Tho Central Intelligonco Agency is thus given the responsibility of seoing to it that the United States has adoquate contral machinory for tho exeminaticn end interpretation of intellig gence so thet the national security will not be Jjoopardized by failure to co- ordinate the best intelligence opinion in the country, based on all aveileble information, .« In our opinion, this responsibility has not been adequately discharged, and remedial measures are necessary. Thore is confusion as to the proper role of the Centrei Intelligence Agency in tho prepsration of intolligence reports and ostinat.2s, This confusion has roeulted from incorrect interpretation and Jack of propor inplezentation of tho statute and tho directivos. The reasons for this go to the heart of the nationel intelligonce probiom and nood to be oxaminod in somo detail in ordor to discover how tho necessary improvement can bo mado, Although tho Act provides that "tho dopartronts and othor agoncies of tho Govornzont shall continuo to collect, ovaluate, corrolato, and dissominatoe do- partxontal intolligonco," tho statute doon not Mmit tho dutiog of tho Contral Bt Oe ee te cet gE EE ES Ree ETE Ee oe ee
Uilells once Agoncy to corrolato and ovalunto intolligonco, excopt by tho stuninrd of “nationsl gocurity," Intorprotation of thoso otatutory provisions wao jude by the Natjonal Sacarity Council in Intelligence Diroectivon No, 1 and No, 3. totligonco Diroctive No, 1 (Soo Annox Ho. 7) providos that tho Dixoctor of Contral Intelligence ohnall produce* intolligonco rolating to tho national nocurity, called national intolligonce, and thet “in so far aa practicable, he ‘hell not duplicate the intolligonce activitioa and rosoarch of the various Dopartmonta and. Ageneios but shall make uso of oxiating intelligence facilitios and shall utilizo departmental intolligonce for such preduction purposos." The directive elso stipulates that national intelligence éiscominated by the Central Intelligonce Agency “nhell be officially concprrod in by the Intelli- gence Agoncivs or shall carry cn agroed statement of substantial @issent." ; Those provisions cre to sono oxtont clarificd in Intelligence Directive No, 3 (Soo Annex No. 9) which defines national intelligence as “integratod de- partmontal intelligonco that covers the broad aspects of national policy end. ~ national ascurity, is of concorn to more than ono Department or Agency, and transconis the oxclusivo compotonce of a single Departament or Agoncy or tho Military Dotablishzont." ‘ Directive No. 3 thon plscos on tho Central Intolligonco Agoncy tho ro- ‘eponsibility for tho production and dissominatlon of national intolligonce. Such intolligonco is to be dovolopod and ascomblod in coordination with othor Copartaonta end agencicn in ordor to obtain intolligenco dovoloped within tho are eee . * Tha toria produce," as used hore, maans tho propsration and Jauunanco of as- Oemblod ant intarprutod fnutolUgonco rvportn and cutinutoa, (% ecepagees et nated Tee pep oa ee ee PE ae ie 2 alt is Sh Te are*.©
ae Pant anree# an tinatbiinasin gcops of their reapoctivo misolons which will agulot in the production ox can ploront tho assembly of neltlonul intolligenco. The d@irectivo also inatricts all agencica to iintain oafficiont rosoarch Lacllitics to mot thelr faiivid- val noody and to asuist in satisfying tho requtromonts of other agoncios,. Aroas of “dominant interoot," a tera vhich 1a not specifically dofinod, pre allocetod vy tho directive to tho various dopartmenta as follows: political, cultural and soclological Antolligence to tho Depurtmont of Stata; military _ fatolligonce to the Army, naval intelligence to the Navy, air intolligenco to the Air Forco; exd economic, actentific ana tochnological intelligence to “cach agency in accordance with ita respective necds," Upon this framowork is built the formal program of intolligence production by the dopartzental agoncies and -  . the Centrat Intolligonce Agency. The significant provision of Directive No. 3 for the Contrel Intelligencsa Agency 4s the -dofirittion of nationsl intelligence, for which tho “Agency ir given exclusive responsibility, although at is recognized es having rights and roaponsibilities with respect to othor forms of intelligencs es well. In ef- foct the diroctivo interprots tho vague provision of the National Socurity Act on "intelligence relating to the national security" to cover a particular typo of intelligonco reasonably dievinct Zrom dopartmental intelligenco and con- forming to admittodly broad but gonorally ccmprehonsible specifications, Tho purport of tho Kational Socurity Act as aupplowonted by the directive in rogerd to the production of national intelligence can be undoratood and Juotifiod in tho Might of the hictory and gonoral objoctivas of tho Act. Bo-= hindi tho concopt of a Contral Intolligonco Agoncy lny tho nocesnity not only Tor the coantinstion of divoroifiod intolligonco activitios (Soo Chaptor xv), and Tor tho porfonsunce by tho contol agoncy iteoif of cortain porvicons of vi
comzon vovfwross (Soo Chaptore VI-IX), it uleo for tho coordination of in- tolUgence opinion in the form of roporte or oatimitos affocting genorally the national cucurity ao 6 wholo, AXthowh tho Act and tha Intolligenco Diroctivos givo the Contral Intol- ligonco Agency tho 4ndopendent right of producing notional intolligonce , Diroc- tive No, 1 atdpulaton that ouch intolligenco shall bo officially concurrod in py tho intclligonce agoncies or chell carry otxtemont of substantial dissent. Ao a practical matter, such estimates can bo yritten only with the collabora~ tion of oxports in many fields of intolligonce and with tho cooporation of povorel dopertments and agencies of Govornient. A national intellLigenco report or ostinate as assembled and progucod by the Contral Intolligonce Agoncy should reflect the coordination of tho bost intelligence opinion, - -base@ on all available information. It ohowla deal with topics of wide scope relovent to the dotermination of basic policy, such as the © acgsocesent of a country's war potential, ite preparedness for war, ite stretogic capabil- ' Stdos end intentions, its vwilnerability to various forns of direct attack or indirect pressures, An intelligence estinate of such scope inevitably "tran- seconds tho exclusive compotence of a single Department or Agency or the Mili- tary Eotabliahzent, " A major objoctive, then, in establiching the Central In- | tolligence Agoncy was to provide. the administrative machinory for the coondi~ nation of intolligenco opinion, for ita assombly and review, objoctivoly and ; Aupartially, and for its expression in tho fora of oatinuton of nationsl scopo ang disportance, THE CONCEP? OF NAPIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES Tho concopt of national intolligonco ostimates widorlying tho otatute and tho afroctivoo is that of an authoritative intorprotation and apprainal that 68 . . 5 Cale dati etid 1 oa CA AD REIT ee Ae ace cee EE A ET NLT OE I
will sorvo eb a firma guide te policy-iskora and plannors. A national nitol- Jigence ostinato should roflect tho coordinaticn of the bust intelligence opinion. It should be baved on all availeble inforration asd be proprred with full kmowlelze of our own plans end intho light cfour ow policy requirements. Pho cetizszto should bo compiicd and ussomb].o6. contrally by an agoncy whoss objoctivity and dininterosteiness aro not opon to quovtion. Its ultinate approval shoulda rest upon tho collective rosponsibility of the highost officials gn the various intelligence agencios. Finally, 4t should command recognition and respect throughout the Govornment as tho best available and precumsbly the most authoritative intelligence estimate. The production of national intelligence estimates by tho Central Intelli- genes Agency falls fer short of such a concept, in pert for reasons which the Central Intelligence Agency doss not control. The principle of the authori- tetive national intelligence estimate does not yet Lave established acceptance in the Governzent. Each departzeat still depends moro or leas on tts own intel- ligence estimates and establishes ite plans and policies accordingly. In the Military Establishment there is some coordination through the Joint Chiefs of Staff who rely upon the edvice of the Joint Intelligence Committee which, in turn, reste primarily upon the contribution of the three Service departments. Neither the Central Intelligence Agency nor the Stato Depsriment participates directly in these procedures in the Military Establishment, and the estimtcs of ihe Joint Intelligcnco Coumittse are in most cases more restricted in acope than a natiooal intelligence estimate. Within the State Department the policy- makers aro, for the most part, their own intelligence advisors. . Finally, thero {0 no systemitic way of tapping that domcotic intelligenco information, which _fhoula be chiefly in tho hands of the Federal Burcau of Invootigation, having 69
te Neel cialis gangs 0 ve se a bearing cn brondor Jutclligence insuco. At the Kational Security Council level tho Intelligoncy catimate which io applied to policy pupers iu brought to beer throvgh tho individtial departmontal represcntativor and the independ- ently produced contributions of tho Central Intelligence Agency. Although the tank is mado moro difficult by a lack of general acceptance of the concept of national intelligence estimates in the Government, it is, nevertholens, the clear duty of the Central ‘Intelligence Agency under the otatute and tho diroctives to assembi.ic and produce such coordinated and euthori- tative cstiratos. {HE ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TOR THE PRODUCTION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE Unfortunately, the attention of the Central Intelligence Agency has been largely dfverted from the objective of producing netions) intelligence. We find in exenining its organization and activities , that major onphasis is not placed on the unique national intelligonce function of the Central Intelligence Agoncy but that this function is lergoely diffused end dispersed inan organiza- tion which concerns itself with a variety of intelligence-producing activitica. Those include sworaries of current devolopmento, political reports, background ptudios on countrios and areas, economic roports, ctc. (See Chaptor VI). In tho original Contral Intelligence Group it was conceived that thero vould boa call organization of highly qualified individuals which would limit itvolf strictly to national intolligonco problems and base ito work - primarily on tho spocialized roports and ootimates producod by tho dopertnents rather than employ a largo rofoarch and analysis organization .of itn om. However, . , ce
the chivactor of tho orgenicution changed, and the Offico of Reports and Euti- mates, Which now carrics out tho reaponsibility of the Contral Intolligence Agency for intolligonse reporting, discharges a largo mwabor of intelligence- producing functions. Theno includo, to a limitod cxtont, tho production and coordinatioa of national intolligonce but also other functions, to be doscrib- od in Chaptor VI. Some of tho lattor functions duplicata those cerriod on in othor dopartmentsa, and somo are moro in tho naturo of common services on bo- half of the other agencics, although thoy aro not always recognized ag ouch. vel
—— - Tho intelligence output of this orguntizution which can bo properly tomed “national intolJ gonco" io not iproesivo, Tho subjects aro normally voloctod on tho initiative of tho utaff-itoolf or ao tho rosult of discusniono in tho Notions) Security Cowicil otaff, whore a mombor of tho otaff of tho Offico of Reports and Estirotog gonorally participates. In producing theso reports tho Offico usually omploys tho rosvarch of ito oxn otef[f instord of drawing to- gothor end coordinating contributions from departmental agencios. Such depart- nontel contributions are available to the ortico of Reports and Estimates urdor tho terms of National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 3 as inter~ proted in No. 3/1 ("Stendard Oporating Procedure for tho Production of Staff Intol1t gence") but in fact only a erall numbor of tho _roports aro actually “derived from departmental contributions. The customary ‘proceduro hao been for the office of - Reports and Estimates to propare a basic draft which is then, efrowated to tho Departments of State, Arny, Nevy and Aix Force for thoir commonts and concurrence or dissent. This procedure bas proved to be ineffoc- tive as a means of producing coordinated national intelligence. Tho depert - ments participate more as outsiders reviowing the material of another agency than as collaborators sharing responsibility in an enterprise of equal concern to all. Jn spite of tho use of tho system of concurronces for certain typos of ‘ yoports, tho position today of tho Contral Intolligonce Agoncy is that of an indopondent producor of national intolligonco, tho quality of whoso product is arlable and tho influence of which is quoationablo, Tho tondoncy within tho Contyud Intolligenco Agoncy has boon to omphasizo tho indopondont production of intalligonco and this omphnaois has lod to two rosulto. 72 : ,
In the Strat placo, tho intolligonco produced by the Contral Intolijeunco Agoacy has not alwaya boon rolovant to policy royulremonts and has lacked off'ec- tivenoss. In tho second place, thoro has boon a failuro to develop coordinated national intolligonce waich would suporuode indopondont dopartmontal offorts to produce over-all intolligenco. It io perhapa truo that the efforta of tho Contral Intolligence Agoncy havo been criticized partly because the opinions expressed by the Agency woro occasionally at variance with tho opinions hold in the departments; but there havo boon othor roasons. Tho independent intolligonce estimate is felt to be weoful but nover decioaivo inasmuch as the Central Intelligence Agency cannot and does not by itsolf have all tho specialized qualifications needed to pro- duco national intelligence, and is not, as an independent agoncy, in constant and intimate association with the policy-makers end planners, a Jmovledge of wheso work ana intentions is indispensible to sound intelligence. There is also criticiam that the product of the Central Intelligence Asency, regardless of its quality or importance, gets formal circulation at the ‘highest levels in the Governnont’ even though | its content may not coincide with tho viows of dopartmontal officials whose own information may be nore reliable and complete. Thore is in fact a serious danger that the product of the Contral Intelligonce Agency ray bo looked upon as coordinatod national intelligence ) which it usually is not. What has happoned is that the croation in tho Contral Intelligence Agoncy of a largo Office of Roports and EotLlaatos porforming, as will bo omphasizod in tho noxt chaptor, a vurioty of frnctions that aro not truly rolatod to the wre nen ford ination of national intolligonce ostimaton, neconsarily moano that concorn — 13
with national IJntolligence problem: ig diminiuhed, that the area of compotition with ¢ho departmental agencies is enlarged and that tho Contral Intolligence Agoney concontratcs more on tho Indepenccnt production of intolligenco than on 4ta3 coordination. Adninistretive arrangomonto within tho Central Intelligenco Agoncy and Dotwoen the Agency and tho other departments and agoneios have contributed to this situation. Personnel in the Office of Roports and Estimates who aro rosponsible for national intelligence (and this includes almost everybody in part, inasmuch as national intclligonce functions are scattcred throughout all parts of tho Office) receive little guidence as to what they should report on. To a large extent they select their own subjects and establish thoir own priori- tios, and this prectice only increases the criticisn from which much of the product suffers. Finally, the liaison relationships with outside agencies are unsatisfactory although this situation is largely the-result of the lack of a cloar conception of the proper mission’ of the Central Intelligence Agency in the coordination’of intelligonce opinion in the form of naticnal iil a TW
OK Bicyee «pew an 8 In fact, cno of tho moot Szportsnt recomendations of this report io that a reconutituted Intolligenco Advisory Comaitteo should porform this function. In at leest ono othor situation requiring imrcdiate intelligence inter- protation there wee once again enly fortuitous coordination. Thia caso was tho rosult of intolligonce rocoived by tho Fedorel Burouu of Invootigation and aistributed by it. Tho Contre) Intolligenco Agency porformod only & socondary rolo end thore wes no formal intelligenco eotixate. This furthor illustrated tho fect that, under presont arrangements, recognized and prompt procedures aro Jacking for the authoritative coordinetion of intolligerco views in an omorgency situstion. In addition, 1% was scon that thero is no regular and agreed arrangement for participation by the Fodoral Bureau of Investigation end for the use of intelligence from damestic sources in & national estimate. PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING THE PRODUCTION OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES In order to remedy the prosent unsatisfactory arrengementa for the pro- duction of national intelligence estimates and provido for the coordination of intelligonce opinion at times of crieia and for long term planning, as contem~ plated in the National Security Act, there noods: to be a revision of the pres- ent arrangexents. Insofar as the Central Intolligence Agency is concerned it fe necessary, in tho first place, to make a clear distinction betwoon the function of corrolating national intelligonce opinion to assist plans and polley formulation on the highest level and those intolligonco reporting activities which may be aasigned to the Contral Intolligonco Agoncy as a cen- tral sorvico of conmon concern. Tho mission with rospoct to tho productionof national intolligonce camiot bo fulfillod oololy throngh a lnrgo staff such av the preoont Offico of Roports 16 . Ps os 7 TOT ee ne ee om no mm awes. wary ee en Am Sees, ee erm errene eee FNS ORE 8 Caen te ne em eeneneeee eee —_
and Eatisstes whose vork is alructod moro to . the production of niscollanevous ruporto than to tho coordination ef national intelligenco opinion. In our opinion the prusent Office of Reporte and Eutinatoa should bo replaced and for it substituted two officos ono of which, to bo doscribed in tho noxt chapter, will not bu involved with tho production of naticnal intolligenco but wiil porform intolligonco research and roporting nervicoa of common concorn. The other offico, an “Estimates Division," would cozpyiso onall group of highly polocted individuals whoso task it would be to draw upon end reviow the specialized intelligence product of the departmental agencies in ordor to pro- pare, for final discussion end approval by tho Intelligence Advisory Comaittes, a finished national intelligence estimate. This amsll group would rely pri- marily upon the intelligence reporte of the individual agencies Dut it would have access to such source material as it requires in order to review depart- mental contributions and prepare consolidated estizates for final action by the Intelligence Advisory Committee. National intelligence estimates, in order to bo authoritative, must be fully participated in by all of tho principal intelligence agoncios in order that the best advice may be tapped end responsibility shared for those major estimates on which high policy decisions depend. Therefore, the Intelligence Advisory Camitteo, under tho leadership of tho Director of Central Intel- ligence, should actively assist in establishing and supervising the national intelligonce production program es woll as aiacuss and roviow tho proposed estimatos mubaitted to it for approval. Tho Cormmittoe would, at tho samo tims, concorn ttoolf moro activoly than at prosont with tho coordination of tho othor intolligonco activitioa of tho various dopartments and agoncios, Qo discussed in Chaptor IV. In fact, by acsuaing an activo responsibility for GE EIN A POY, V7 re i a i nn nn ee] ciel in Ep OA ON A I
Lhyu roconciliantion of intulligenco ootdJiuatus the Conmittoa would ablmoot euto- matically bo eble to asgist tho Director more offeclively in coordinating in- tolligenco roquircsents and dovoloping sound arrangoncnts for tho coomlination of intelligence gonorally. Tho noemborship of the Intelligonco Advisory Comnittoo, au vo have poluted out in Cheptor IV, would includo tho Director of Central Intelligenco as chuir- man, and represcutatives from tho Dopertmentes of State,* Arny, Navy and Air Forco and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Ad hoc membership should be given to othor Azencies, “such as tho Atomic Enorgy Commission, Joint Staff? and Research and Development Bosrd, whenover appropriate. These revised arrangemcnts should make adequate provision for the handling - of major emergency situations so that there is automatic consultation and collective responsibility when quick estinetes are required. We have eeen that in the past euch consultation has been largely fortuitous end could not be relied upon to operate promptly. This proposal would not affect tho responsibility of tho Joint Intolligenco Camittes to prepare strictly militery estimates for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and perform such other military dutios as tho Joint Chicfo of Staff might aocign. Through the membership of the Sorvice intolligonce chiofs on the In- _ tolligence Advisory Committco end through close. liaison botwoon the Joint Intolligence Group . and the now Eatimatos Division in the Central Intelligonce Agency, ovory offort ohovld be mado to insure tho consistoncy of the Joint rN eRe AAAI Ae * Seo bulov, page 159, for a diacunsion of the status of the Stato Dopartzont Yoprocontativo,. ; ; 78 on fPnNe eased theca tc rremsen 8 aa cpap mete sven o gs OORT et COREA LENT NOE EO PCL GE TS POE TIE ee
} ; . . \ nan aemetenedat noe + estes Intolligence Conseittoo's military appraisals and tho brondor national ostimites of tho Central Intolligenco Agency and tho Intolligonco Advisory Comnittoo. -Whatever erranzenent is docided upen, there aro cortain onoral condi- re y F tions “hich must be observed, if intelligence ostimatos are to bo sound and wee timely. Al information, whothor it originates fran intolligenco sources or vhother it conos from othor sources including oporations, mot be available to tho intelligence pecplo who by putting togothor end studying £11 of tho bite of information mst provido the overall interpretation. Thore is alway a dengerous tendency, particularly in time of crisis, when it can be most sorious, for vital information to be withhold on the grounds that the intel- ligence personnel should not seo it ‘because it concerns operations or for .. alleged security reasons. In othor instances tho dissemination of vital but sensitive raterial ia restricted to a very few people at the top levels with the result that those individuals who are nost coupetent to analyze a particu- ler situation are left out of the picture entirely. It is therefore neccs- sary thet intelligence estimates be made in full light of our own policies and operations. The preparation of such ostimates should not be impeded by any barricrs arising from security considerations or otherwise, Which may jcop- Reneed = eeweld = Sneed nawne.P ardize the soundness of the intelligonce product. al Finally, any discussion of the preparation of national estimates would be in- & anne adoquate without two caveats. The first applics to thoso who prepare the estinetes ; tho second to thoso who my use thom. Prejudice in the form of stubborn adher- bined Bante enco tc preconcoived ideay is likoly tobe tho gravest danger to sound intelJi- gence, Estinatas are oubjoct tothe risk of boing colored and ‘twisted to roficct bneminall cr enmecepege tO projudicos of those who prepare thom. This can bost be counterod by providing 79
sonnonisie cheeks. and balances an wo have ondosavored to do in tho composition and rusponsibilitios of tho Intelligonce Advisory Conmitloe. TL, for cxamplo, tho Stato Department, which may be wedded to a purticuler policy, presonta tho facts distorted by faulty preconceptions, tho final product, ao rofloctod in an intolligonce estimate, will be dofectivo. It is hoped that in such a case tho now Estimates Group of tho Centrel Intolligonco Agency will supply en ini- tial corroctive and that the non-Stute Dopartment ‘members of the Intolligence Advisory Committees will havo sufficient breadth of lnowledge to challengo the State Departnont estinate. Likewise, ‘military estinstes should be submitted to scrutiny so that thoy are compatible with each othor and avoid the error, however unconscious, of magnifying the needs of their ow branch of tho Service. - . The Intelligence Advisory Committee, if it functions properly, and is es- ' gisted by tho adisintorosted work of the Contral Intelligence Agency is the boay whero such distortions should be caught and corrected and the prejudices of one mind challengsd by the thinking of a mind which at least does not suffer from tho same prejudices. In turn, projudico on the part of the policy-makers may render them blind ovon to brilliant achiovemonts of an intolligonce service. They unay just re- fuso to listen to what thoy do not like. Hence, nothing would be mre dan- Gorous than to boliovo that if we once had an effective intolligonce service and an officiont intoelligonco ostimating body, wo would bo immune to a disastor Liko Pearl Harbor. This doos not lend to tho conclusion that intolligonco is futile. It meroly shows its Limitations. If tho intolligonce appraisor can koop from tulating and coloring tho dula ho ruceivos and if tha policy-mator can Koop a x0
poet a AOS Te Cm ta relatively open mind and by prepared for continual re-ovaluation of the asyunyp- tions on waich he ic relying, then sound’ intelligence eotimates can be a piller of strength for our national occurity. CONCLUSIONS AD RECOLUENDATIOUS (1) In the Contral Intclligonce Agency thero hao been confusion between the responsibility of producing coordinated national intelligence estimates and responsibility for miscellancous reoearch and reporting activities. (2) The provisions of the National Security Act for the production of neticnal intelligence estimtes,. as interpreted by the National Security Council Intelligence Directives, are sound but heve not been effectively carried out. a (3) There should be created in the Central Intelligence Agency a small Estizates Division which would draw upon ani review the specialized intelli- gence product of the departmental agencies in onler to prepare coordinated national intelligence estimates. (4) Under the leadership of the Director of Centrel Intelligence, these estinates should be sulmitted for discussion and approval by the reconstituted Intelligence Advisory Committee whose members should assume collective respon- sibility for them. (5) Provision should de made in these arrangements for the handling of crisis cituations whon coordinated ostimatos aro required without delay. (6) Coordinated intolligence ostimatca producod in this way met, in ordor to bo offoctivoe, bo recognized as tho most authoritative entimates avail- ubloe to tho policy makers. 13 | cee eo Sale RE TS EE A ot OR AT EE Ae eT NR tT OP AE Oat aes wena oe
CHAPTER VI SERVICES OF COMRON CONCERN: INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH AND REPORTS PROPCSED F.ESEARCH AUD REPORTS DIVISION We have recorzondeod in tho preceding chapter that thore be creatcd a omall, high-level Estimatos Division to concern itself primarily with the cor- relation of national intolligenco, .subjoct to final approval by the Intel- ligenco Advisory Comaitteo. If the responsibility of ths Contral Intelligence Agency for tho production of national intelligence is assumed by this Esti- mates Divielon, there will remain cortain research and intelligence reporting functions now being performed by the Office of Reports and Estinates which might properly be cerried out as a service of common concern by & newly con- stituted “Research and Reports Division". Other activities of the Office of Reports and Estimates should be discarded as being superfluous . or coupetitive with the proper activities of depsrimentel. intelligence. There is presently within the Office of Reports end Estimates a nucleus for the proposed Research and Reports Division in fields of common concern. “fo these C, . thero should be added the Foreign Documents Branch of tho Offico of Operations : (Soe below, page 103) and the library, biographical and other regiaters end in- dicoun presontly maintained by tho Office of Collection and Dissomination. Gonerally speaking, this Division will bo reaponaible for authoritative rescarch and roports in economic, scientific and tochnological intolligence ; swnnres ere 3 es 83 nen een ee enn Ae terete re ren en ER CREE CE eA RA MIEN LE | RANT ae a a al
the maintenance of central reference factlitivos, ani such othor mittors as aro docned of corzaun concern. To tno oxtont neccasary, 4t wil also coordinate tho uetivities of the other agoncios in these ficlds. Its otaff should include in uppropristoe cases edoquato reprosontation from tho Stato Department and Serv- 4cun co that, subjoct to policy guidanco from tho principe]. conswiers, its products will reprosent the coordinated opinion of tho best availeble talont and vhould be fully responsive to the requircmonts of tho consumer agencies. In this chapter wo suggest the typo of activity “which should bo discon- tinued as wnossential or duplicative, tho type of activity which should be retained asa common service and same activities, not presently cerried out in tho Office of Reports and Estinates, which should be performed by the proposed Research and Reports Division es services of common concern: It would be the ronmponsibility of the National Security Council, ecting on the advice of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Committee, to dotormine which of these central services might properly be performed, and we " peliove that the Coordination Division (reconstituted Interdepartmontal Co- ordinating and Plenning Staff) should exemine this problem and prepare the necossary plans. PERIODICAL SUMMARIES Tho Offico of Reports and Estimates presently produces curront intolligence in two principal forms: a top secrot Daily Sumeary and a secret Weekly Suwanary. Tho former coxuprises abstracts of a small numbor of incoming and outgoing cablos recoived during tho preceding twonty-four hours. - Approxinatoly ninoty oy Por cont of tho contents of tho Daily Summary is dorivod from Stato Dopartmont Sources, including both oporational as woli as intolligonco material. Thoro- wf
a nro oscantonal coments by the Central Intelligence Agency on portions of tho Suizzary, but those,for ‘tho most part, appear gretuitoug and lend little wetynt to tho matorial iteolf. Tho result is ao fragnentary public:tion which decals with operetiony ag wollas intelligence, without necessarily being based on tho yooat significant materials in oither category. In a sunmaary of this typo, cir- culated to tho Prosidont ond the highest officials of tho Government, thero is on inhorent dangor that it will be misleading to ite conswers. This is because 4t 4c based lergely on abstracts of Stato Dopartnent materials, not in histor- ical porspective » lacking a full kmowledge of the background or policy involveil and with little previous consultation between the Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department. Moreover, it is incomplets because it is not based on all tho most important materials. The Weekly Summary is more widely circulated.than the Daily Summary, but also represents primarily political reporting end canvetes for attention with several depertmental weekly summeries, particularly those of the State Dopart- | ment and the Department of the Army. | Still another periodical publication is the monthly "Review of the World | Situation." These summaries, particularly the Daily, are the subject of considerable controvorsy and are recoivod with expressions ranging from moderate interest to strong criticion. The Wookly and tho Daily aro, to a cortain oxtent, duplica- | tivo in that tho Stato Department, to which political intolligenco has been | ausignod ao an aroa of dominant intcrost,also dissominatos its own oporational and intolligonco summarioo on tho highest levols. As both Swimaries consumo towne 32%3®eaeee OO ee eee revermemrenem el inordinate anount of timo and offort and appoar to be outaido of the domain F 85 ys OCCU OE ORE OOS POON ENTER Ot OEE ONES 6 RD ON EET repens sme Score WOR OFS
ele gpg os of fine ce ntral Intclligonce Agency, we vol Jove that tho Daily, end ponuibly tho Weokly, Suvmary should bo eiscontinuod in thoir provont form. We do, how- gver, appreciate tho fact thet , to some extent, thero my be a nocd for such oumnrien, end we suggest that tho newly constituted Coordination Divisicn ox- amino the situation to dotormine whother there io such a necad and how it can poat bo not. MISCELLANEOUS REPORTS AND MEMCRANDA Tho Office of Reports and Estinetes also produces a varioty of other ro- ports, studies and summaries. Sane of these are strategic and pasic otudics on foreign countries or areas, presenting the political, economic and military pituation. Others axe intended to be estimates of current international prob- iens. Thess are formal reports,dealing with a veriety of oubjecte renging fron “Possible Doveldpments in China" to “Opposition to the ECA". These est imato- , type roports are circulated throughout the various agencies for the purpose of obtaining concurrence or dissent. ‘But tho fact that thoy ore so circulated in - no way neans that they are properly coordinated estinates which represent the dent thinking on the subject under review. Thoy often deal with topics which ere not particularly rolovant to departmental problems or national issues, with tho result that the various agencicsa often fool that it is an imposition to be burdened with the responsibility for roviowing those documents, making appropriate coments and noting concurrenco or dicoont. Tho Offico of Roports and Eutimates also initiaton nor informal reports by monn of intelligence nemorande produced spontancounly or in ansvor to ape- Cific roquests. Those are not coordinated by cixcuintion throvgh the other NQEencies, Subjects again differ widely and includo auch topics ao “Soviot Fimmeing of tho Fronch Coal Striko" ond "Tangoton in South. Koron" : RG
ee a aR oy Reman NN | Much of this production fe acnéeaic, tends to duplicate work in othor Joo partzontn, hag little rolation to national intolligence, end ie not preduced an -a rocognized aorvico of cemnon concorn. On tho othor hand, somo of this prodsstion night, oubdjoct to general agrocmont, bo performed as a central ccn- mon sorvico. In our opinion, tho nowly constituted Roocarch and Reports Divi- sion ohowld rofrain from tho preduction of cosentinlly political studies and minacellanzous reports and should concentrate its offort upon tho production of reports in those fields clearly assigned to it as recognized services of con- mon concern. (THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY” Undor National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 3, the Central Intelligence Agency is charged with preparing an outline for the National In- telligence Survey -- an oxtonsive peries of basic studies on all countries and areas of the world -- and with coordinating the necessary departmental contribu- tions. This study bas been assigned to the Office of Reports and Estimates, not’ as tho producor, but rather as coordinator of tho program,under specifications and priorities approved by the Joint Intelligence Committee. This coordination is achieved through the allocation of topics for research and production for tho particular purposo of the Survey series ;vut there is no provision for cen- tralization or coordination of current production in thesao fields. Undor this series, various chapters and soctions have beon farmed out to tho State Department,the Servicoo, and othor qualifiod agoncios. For instance, tho Army has boon assigned tho responsibility for tho sections on transportation and communications. Tho agsigmicnt of those sections docs not moan that Amny fo recogniz See ogee, ed ac having olthor primary interoot Ln, or continuing rouponsibility 87
for, intolligenco with ronnect to trenoportation ond communications. For tho purposo only of the hendbooks, tho Hationul Intolligenco Survoy olinainatoy dup- ication of production in cortain ficlds end providos temporery oditorial coordination of tacsic intoligenco through tho allocation of topics. It doos not golvo the problem of centrelizing or coordinating continuing rosearch and production in tho ficlés of coxion intoroot. ECONGMIC, SCIENTIFIC AND SECOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE The Office of Roports and Estinates appears to have made no sorious attempt . to produce coordinated estimates or authoritative intelligence in the fiolds of economic, tochnological and oclentsfic intelligence, in which no doveritment ‘40 recognized as having a dominant interest. The six Geographic Brenches, the Beiontific Branch and ea number of the Consultant Penols ere variously interested in these fields but nave seldom produced authoritative intelligence contribu- tions therein. We heve found in our examination of the Central Intelligence Agency, State Department and the three Service intel igonce agencies that there 4s much duplication and little coordination of production on those subjects. _ ALthough often along pareliel lines, studies are indopendently produced by the various egencies and do not, therefore, represent the best available coordinated opinion. — Thore has been an attompt in National Security Council Intelligence Direc tive Ro. 3 to guide the offort of tho various agencios into coordinated chan- nele by tho allocation of certain fiolds of dominant intorest, but in tho Tiolds of oconcamic, sciontific and tochnological intolligenco, each agoncy is authorizod to produce in accordanco with its noods. Thus, 4t is in those T$0ldo, loft opon to all agoncios and for which rooponsibility ia now 88 : _ ‘ _— + are come carte cea nce sermere wens ©
divided and diffused, that tho propored Resomrch and Roportsa Diviston could perform a yaluebls sorvico of corsion interost by contralising or coordinating yooverch end intelligenco production. It 40 doubdtful whether such a high degree of contralization in those fic las, including some essentially military intolligence,ic desirable in this country. Our Service intolligence agencies havo beon assigned fields of dominant intorost, end they wild continue to produce militery intolligence within these areas. Howover, ovon if seach intelligence “agency confines itself almost entirely to tho production of intolligonce within ita field of dcminent intorest, there roraing a vast aroa of common intorest in such nocesosary pupporting ficlds as oconenic, sciontific and tochnological intolligonce. Tho oconomic fiold conld includo, for exanplo,induotrial production, oco- nomic resourcon, motallurgy, fuols, powor,.cormunications and tolocomaunications. 89
“Those ayo poms of the “ pudjecte whero thero io prosent duplication ‘eong our agoneics and in which a great cconeay of cffort and improvencnt of product would reoult if intelligence wero produced centrally. To provide an offoctivo contribution, tho contrally produced reports cn oconamic and industrial mattors must roprosent tho rost authoritative coordinated opinion on tho subjoct and muot bo accopted as such by tho consumer agencios. - A principal new consunor would bo the Eotimates Division, recosszonded in ‘the precoding chapter. We also recognize that tho requirements of tho various agoncies in theese mattern of common concorn will differ, and that each agoncy will need to adapt to its owm particular problems the intelligence produced in these fioclds. - Few subjects of intelligence are more important than science and tech- ‘nology, and yet little success -heas been achieved in this country toward coor- Ginating intelligence ‘collection and production in those fields. Among tho ‘agencies which ere interested and in a position to contribute are not only the Céntral Intelligence Agency, the State Department and the three Services, but also the Atenic Energy Commission and the Research end Devolopment Board.*
Sd banned Maree ~ not LO emmtenal freee fo fulfill its responsibilities as the chiof analytical and evaluating unit for scientific intelligonce, and consequently as the principal guide for collection, the Branch would have to be steffed by scientists of the highest - qualifications. We appreciete that in such a Branch it would be impossible to obtain a leading scientist for each of the many segrents of scientific and teck- nological intelligence, but we bolieve that ea staff of moderate size and of high quelity cen cope with the normal research and eveluation,co-opting, where necessary, personnel from such organizations as the Research and Development Board end the Atomic Enorgy Comission. CONCLUSIONS AND RECCAMENDATION: (1) In addition to the Estimatos Division rocemmendod in the previous Chapter, thoro should be created out of the presont Offico of Reports and Es- timates a Rencerch and Reports Division toacconplinh: coutral rosearch in, and ¢o-_ ordinated production of, intolligonce in f4olds of canmon interest. ‘Tho otaff 91 * ee. et megan, NAOT Out Cee mapa Rm VES. OE PCE PE St FE PAG AD LS SPL IE SS TT OE TEC A TS I SE Se ae SS LY RAY rer eer ap ert C8 cae a Re PD ES wy
- of thio Division should includo snfficlont repronontation fran tho State No- partsent and the Servicos to insuro that thoir noeds exo adoquatoly mat. (2) Tho Coordination Division (roconutituted Interdcpartzents1 Coor- @snating and Planning Staff) should bo givon tho responsibility for studying tho actusl occpe ef tho Recearch end Reports Divioiton and for recomuonding those sorvices of common concorn which should be porformod contrally. (3) Tho proprioty of the preparation by the Central Intelligenco Agency of ossentially political eumarios should bo reviewed, taking into considera- tion tho need for such swossries, the existence of a number of duplicating summaries and tho particular capabilities of the individual departments to prepare then. (4) The various reports, studies end summaries which are not national 4ntelligence or recognized services of common concern should be discontinued. 92 emery
CHAPTER VII SERVICES OF CORON CONCERN: THE COLLECTION OF COVERT INTELLIGENCE Tho Offico of Oporations, under an Aosistant Director, porforms a contral commen sorvico through tho collectionof ovort intolligonce by threo eaventially distinct moans: tho Contact Branch 13 rosponsible for tho exploitation of businoss concerna and othor non-governmental organizations and individuals in tho United States as sources of foreign intelligence information; the Foreign Broadcest Information Brench io responsible for all federal monitoring of foroign propaganda and press broadcasts; and tho Foroign Documents Branch ex- ploite foroign language documents ond foreign periodicals and press for intel- .Ligonce purposes. , CONTACT BRANCH * National’ Security Councti Intolligence Dizcetive No. 7 (Soe Annsx No. 213) provides that "Tho Central Intelligence Agency shall be responsible for tho exploitation, on a highly selective ‘basis » within the United States of busincas concerns, other non-governmental organizations and individuals as sources of a, Foreign intolligonce information", The directive also optablishes the ge..sral _ rulos unéor which those activitios are to be conducted and provides for tho ways in which the needs of the other intelligence agencies are to bo mot. This roprosents an importent step forward toward tapping a valuable source of in- tolligoxco and overcoming the difficulties encountored during World War II ’ whon precoduros for this purposo had to bo izproviced and the a Ce toroats of a nunbor of agencioa rocencilod. . : $3
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FOREIGH BROADCASE InFOR- LO! VRANCH ; meme ae ate ertacian Under ‘Rational Security Council Intolligenco Direct ivo No. 6 (Seo Annex No. 12), tho Contxal Intolligonco Agoncy ji asoignod tho mination of monitoring all foreig propagznds and pross brondcnuts ond Alenominating the rooulting {ntolliguace Thevs dutios are carried out by tho Foroign Broadcant Informi- tion Brench (FBIB) of tho Offico of Operations which conducts actual imonitor ing ‘oporations through two stations located in this country (on tho Eaut and Vest coasts reopoctively), one station in Cairo (being moved to Cyprus); ono in Tokyo and one in Hawaii (boing moved to Okinawa). “Aproxinatoly 2,000,000 words are monitored daily by these stations, of which 150,000 are cabled to this country after local editing. Upon receipt hore, this material is re-edited and published as a daily summary of approxi- mately 90,000 vords. In addition, weekly eumarics ana special  Gigeate on particuler topics aro propared. A consiGerable amount of data is produced for tho "Voico of Amorica" activity of the State Department. Most of this moni- toring work ia routino, ‘but tho Branch ulso recoives from various agoncios - atatenonts of thoiy contimung roquiremonta as woll as spocific requests. In gonoral, it can bo caid that tho Foroign Broadcast Information Branch porforms a non-controvoraiol cozron sorvico vhich ie woll recoivod by tho con- | sunor agencios. If thore te any rosorvation ac to tho usofulnoss of ita work, it Ao that tho matorial fo not analyzed ox ovaluatod prior to discsomination; " oe * ry 10}
a a - oe eee ea gt in merely compiled end presented factually. Howover, thio soon ta bo & proper exrengerent although thore vhowld bo approprinto machinory outside tho Pronash for taking tho monitoring’ roporto mid interproting them in light of otho: rolnted 4ntclligonco. This vould socm to bo a proper function of tho appraiso>s ana producers of intolligonco, althnovgh tho Foroign Broudcact in- formetion Brench, porsessing as it does tho full covorage, could continuo to’ mako sumzarios of tho traffic it monitors. If, ao was auggested in Chapter VI, a Rosvarch end Reports Division ic created for roscarch on quootions of ccmnon. interest, this might be tho proper placo where this moterial could be furtner onolyzed end eppropriete studies prepared. Tho political analysis, however, should bo done in the State Depertment. Wo have experienced somo aifficulty in arriving at a recamcondstion es to vhora tho Foroign Broadcast Information Branch should be placed in view of our recomondstions for tho disporsal of tho other functions of tho Office of Operations. Whilo tho work of tho Branch is escontially an oporating function, it io also @ purely overt ono, and this militates somowhat againot placing it in tho proposed Cporations Division which would bo ecncorned almost oxcluaivoly vith covort operations. On tho othor hand, tho fact that tho Branch is 102 . ; . mceieieaeen at
operational arguon aguingt placing 1 in tho proposed Reserrch and Reportu DiL- vision “hich would be ongagod in porforminco of puroly utatic functions. On wulanco, wo inclino to the view that, as betwuen the two, tho Oporations Divi- sion, with its grouter fucilitics Sor handling comunicatJon oporetionuy in gonorel, io tho prefereblo place within tho Central Iatolligonce Agency. Fur- thor, it is concoiveblo that tho facilitios of tho Foroign Broadcast Informa- tion Branch may, at some future tio, prove usoful to the proposed Operations Division in its covort activitios. Of course, tho product of the Brench shculd bo Immediately availeblo to tho new Rosearch end Reporte Division for anclysis. FOREIGN DOCUVENTS BRANCH The third Brench ef the Offico of Operations is the Foreign Documents Brench vhich has ‘the responsibility for exploiting foreiga lengusge documents end foreign periodicais and press for intelli igence purposes. Valike the Foroign Broadcast Information Branch and tho Contact Brench, which operete by virtue of charters accorded tho Central Intelligence Agency by National Security Council Intelligence Directive Nos. 6 and 7, respectively, the Foreign Docu- monto Branch has no such cherter and io, therofore, not recognized officially . as a wiique common servico. Tho other departmonts and agoncies do Boro of thoix own trenslations of foroign language docuzonts, otc., but also rely on « tho Foroign Documonts Branch. Tho Foroign Docwconts Branch is ongaged in completing its exploitation of largo quantities of matorials captwred during tho recent war. In addition, it ponitors current proses and poriodical publications and pooidos theso routine translations it occasionally translatou spocific documonto upon roquost. It also miintains for tho varloug conswror agonclos a continuing program of Pr TT Es OEE ye en ca ere: . 103 2 cscmmammasesece - ° ere ee seas em eet ewes - +e seers eee wee o- wamoe se - cae acne eee tee
avatracting froa porlodical prblicationu apocific matorLals jn ouch flolds as electronica, trangperteclon, otc. iY Troro iu a conntani and largo flow of production from tho Forolgn Docu- monts Prench in tho fornof oxtractu from tho foroign proas; curront poriodical abstracts, both gonoral and technical, denling with itons of intelligenco veluo _ contained in Soviet and other foreign poriodicala; on industrial card file rec- ord for inclusion in tho Foroiga Industrial Rogioter of the Offico of Colloc- ¢+ion and Dicecminstion; biographical intolligenco reports; a dbibliograpny of Russien poriodicsls, speciel accossion lists and various trancletions of cur- ront raterjal to reet continuing roquircuonts. ey Inasmuch as it is virtually - impossible to havo a large pool of oxpert ‘tranalators vbo are at the same tino specialists ‘in various fields, it -is most important that the work of an agoncy such as the Foreiga Documents Branch be porforsed in close relationship to and under the content guidance of the con- sumer egoncies. It would, thorefore, seen that inotead of being associated in the Office of Operstions with the Contact Branch end tho Foreign Brosdicest In- formation Branch, with which it has little da comion, it vould be proforable for tho Foroign Documents Branch to be a part of the proposed Research and Roports Division suggested in Chapter VI. | . CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1) Tho Offico of Oporations consists of “throe distinctive activities, which represent useful and recognized functiona in thoir ow Liold but have no particulax relation to oach othor. . (2) we Contact Branch should bo intograted with tho Offico of Spociol Oporat ions and Office of Policy Coordination undor binglo over-all diroction (Operations Division) within the Contral Intolligonco Agoncy. 108 uO
(3) Moro active offorta should bo made to oxploit fntollicence from foyolen nalicnality Groups and forcei¢en individuals in the United Stratos, and utopa should Le taxon by tho Director of Contral Intolligenco and tho Intoulli- gonce Advisory Cosmittoo to coordinate the activities of the varfous ngoneles in this fiold. (4) fre ¥oroign Docwsonts Brench should ba made part of the proposed Roescarch and Reports Divicion if one is crontod.. . (5) If tho Foreign Broadcest Information Prench rewaing a part of the Contral Intolligonce Agency, it ehowla. probably bo administered by the new Oporations Division, but its product should bs currontly avellablo for anolysis in the new Reaearch and Reports Division. i ‘ 06 f.._ZHERE_15 NO PAGE 106. t 00) ew ane Cee QaWS
Pecan, POT Ee ry CHAPYVER VII SERVICES OF COMMON CONCERN: THE COLLECTION OF SECREV INTELLIGENCE Under noriml peacotime conditionu, the bulk of the information on which & governzent basco itn actionintho internatioml field 40 obtainable by overt meano -- that ao to say, through iiplomtic and military catablishucnia, through the props, acientific end tochnical publications end the norma) chan- nels of trade and international intercouroe. With these fecilities available, the collection of intelligonce in poacotine through secrot means asowzos rela- tively secondary importence, In fact, as mentioned above, inoofer as ow? own Governrsnt ia concerned, covert collection of intelligence was a negligible factor prior to World War II. Todey it. is en understatement to describes conditions os werely abe aermal, They are uniquely difficult from the viewpoint of intelligence. vers Com- muniot regines are in control the ordinary moans of securing informetion ere generally iJacking. In these arenas, it is true, we have a few diplo- natic missions and here and there some consuler establichmonts. Thoir staffs, . howover, aro so restricted and spied upon that they cannot porform their usual information “gathoring functions. Evon the type of information that is ava iladle for the asking horo in tho United States io | wmobtainablo there. In this wholo great aroa of communist domination it is not only mil itary information which ia kopt socrot, but it is hurd to got oven sinple and soomingly innocuows = dotails relating to tho oconomic, financial and polit- {cal dovoloyaonta vhich may furnish vital cluos to political and military tronds, ae Vt ote ay . . “Fy 7 ae + 107 / FI
. ce wes cana _ Aloo, the methodo of fifth colunn ponotration practiced by tha Cosramiata follew um uniaud pattern in varioun foreign cowitrics end in tho Unitead Statens which callu for tho boot that wo havo in tho ficld of countor-intelligonco. Ag @ rocalt of thin, tharos fo an wyont call upon our okill and ingenulty to find mothoda of informing oursolves cbout Iron Curtaia countrios. An wo cannot do it adoquatoly ty orthodox mothodo, an incressingly heavy burden is placcd on.our secret Intelligence and countor-intellisance and hence thoy have todey a higher priority in ow over-all intelligence picture than in the past. THE CU:RTER OF TEE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGEXCY TO CONDUCT SECRET INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES . Tho responsibilities of the Central Intolligence Agency for the collection of covert inteclligsnce abroad aro porformsd as a “service of common concern" in accordance with the terma of National Security Council Intelligence Direc- tive Ro. 5 of Deconber 12, 1947. (See Annex No. 11). Unlike the collection i of oyort intelligence, whore the mission of the Central Intelligence Agency is Q& limited one, the collection of practically all covert foreign intelligonce ia agsigned to the Aconcy. Intelligence Directive No. 5 gives to tho Central Intelligonco Agency the following dutios: a. To conduct all organized fodeval oopionnge opsrationa abroad, oxcopt for ssroed netivitior by othor dopartments and agoncios. b. To conduct all organized fedoral counter-ospionago abroad, in- Cluding occupiod areas, &- To coordinate covort and ovort intolligenco collection, and to Coordinate the activitiou of cauunl ogontn amploycd on covort minaloun by
othor dopurtrante and arenctos, monbora of tho Intolligance Adv wary Comiultteo, da. To dionowinmsto tho Antolligonce thug obtuined to the vartoug dopartmonto and aguncios having an authorized Lfuterost in it. Covort collection thua includes auplonase and countor-oupLonsgo abrond, 4. 0., tho clandcotine colloction of information end countor-action agsinat forosgn socrot intolligenco activitiog. It doos not include {nteLlligence col- lection by eecrot but cascntially technical woans, such ay communications intelligence. National Socurity Council Intolligonce Directivo No. 2 sets forth the respective responsibilities of the dopsrtzental agencies for collection of - certain categories of foroign intelligonce information. Tho Army wea thue given privary responsibility for collecting foreign militery inforzaticn, tae Navy naval information, tho State Department political, cultural, and socio- logical information, etc. The effect of Directive No. 5, howover, is to limit these responsibilities to overt collection, and ast acide tho ontire ficla of - covert intellisonce operations (with a few exceptions) es the domain of tho Contral Intelligence Agency. Further, the Agency is “responsible for coordi- ‘and 4a also nating covert and overt intelligence collection actiritiog,' charged with coordinating tho activities of casval covert agents employed by other agencios with its own “organized covert activities." ‘It 49 {important to note, in this connection, that tho Rational Security Council has ve jected, and we dolieve rightly, tho concopt that oopionago might bo conducted by neveral agencies, cach independent of the other, and oach authorized to operate in the aumo arcan with roushly the namo objoctiven. Multiplo caplomygo of thin kind hag occaafonilly heen advocated oo a moans of re ARS NE 1
npomen * wees APA, a eee ee a protecting HOCUVILY s It iy argued that tho ponotration of a contralized eaplomins egency ntehl deutroy ita entire rovsor of sgonts, Joaving the nation witkoul es effective vocrot iitolligonco gorvico in time of crisis, whoroas penetration of ero of covers capniomse units ight doutroy ita notworks, but would Jouve those of the othorn untouchod. -Wo consider this view to bo lurgoly thoorotical, provided osptonago is properly conducted to keop tho identity of chains ontiroly soperate and if proper security is maintainod in tho central offico. In any ovont, we foel that this dargor is loss serious then tho confusion and overlapping in the field of capionsge which would result 4f several servicos were engaged in it. Adoption of a centralized espionage structuro has meant that, except for cor- tain opsretions in occupied areas, the foreign -covart operations of other agencies of the Governzent have been dissolved or turned over to the Centra: Intelligence Agency. ° ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS The Central Intelligence Agency does not enter the intricets field of foreign espionsge and counter-espionsge without some background of expyrience. The covert oporations unit, known as the Offico of Spocial Operations (0S0), io in offect tho legatea of tho operating exporienso, the records, and many of the porsonnol of tho secret intolligence (SI) and comtor-ospionago (x-2) branchos of the former Offico of Strategic Sorvices and Stratogic Sorviceg Unit, War Dopartront, It also jnhorits tho valusvlo rolationubips puilt up by those organizations with cortsin foroiga intolligonce uorvicoo, In mworous instances tho Offico of Spocial Oporationa hao muintainod
sls "vie inde EL eon field wtations originally oponed by tho Office of Strategic Services und muinteined by the Strategic Services Untt. In ite hondquarters ctructure it hao dyevn heavily upon the previous oxporience of these orgsni2utions in conducting war and post-war operations. Aeninistreatively, the Office of Special Operations is on the game level ag tho four other Offices of the Contral Intolligonco Agoncy. Contact with tho Director is maintainod almost oxclusivoly by {ts chief, tho Assistant Director for Special Operations, and his deputy. Tho Assistant Diroctor's personal staff aleo includes an Executive Secretary, hoe autios are ap- proximately that of an executive officer, and sevoral consultants end advisers who decl with particular aspects of agent operations, archivos, budget and - the like. . Under the ‘Asoiotant Director, the orgenization is @ivided into three major . operating groups. Mt
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Before concluding ovr survey of tho headousrtors organization of tho Bim Ot Office of Spocial Opsrstiona, wo wish to adda recomondation to which we in steed attach particular importance and which affects tho rolationship of this Offico | to athor covort uctivitica of tho Contral Intolligonco Agency. * Soo above, Cheptor VI. Since this report waa draflod, wo undorstand that stops have been takon to transfor tho Nuclear Energy Croup to a now Office of Sclontific Intolligonco . "nee re ee ; . i oo 115 ba ne ne acc ee ee en tte reer t er ee
Py In Cheptern VIT ond IX we briefly conaideer the ofintlarity of the opera- tions and cauiniatrative problems faced by the Office of Gpeclal Operations, the Office of Policy Coordination and tho Contract Branch of the Offico of Oporations, Al throo officoo carry on activitioag of a highly confidential nature. Trevo activitics aro inter-rolated and roquire closo ccordination. In eddition thoy aro ablo mutually to sorvicu coach other. Tais is particularly truvo of tho overacan opsrationa of the Offica of Special Oporations and the Offico of Policy Coordination. We rocoxmend that the three activities be placed under the common control of a single directing head who would ba one of the chief aneistants of the Director. The threo Offices might be sot up as soparate branches of a common sorvice of secret activities which should senisy lerge autonony within the Central Intclligonce Asency and might eppropriately be called Operations Division. Whether eventually a cloger merger of the three uctivities should be effected can best be determined in the light of experience. As a part of such a centre] organization devoted to csovert operations 7 centralized administrative services should be established under the single chief of covert activities, and should not be identified with or combined with the administrative arrengements made for the balance of the Centrel Intelligence Agency. The covert organization thus cutablished. should, in psurticular, under- take its om personnel recruitment, using the facilities of the peraonuel Gocticn of the Central Intolligence Agency only insofar as thoy uppoar to serve the purpose of the covert organization. . In making thie recommendation, we appreciate that the Office of Tolicy Coordination under NSC 10/2 hao a apecial relationsilp to the Secretary of 116
State and tho Socrotary of Dolontne, Wo tolfovoe that onbutantisd bono! itsa would accruo in having thie came rolatdonahip oubloblishod, through tho howd of tho Operations Divlulen, with both of the secret oversons activitlog of tho Contral Intelligence Agjoncy, asowalas that they and the Contact Branch aro prought tozothor in tho manner wo recomacnd abavo. In this rocomniation wo have also had in mind tho desirability of quickly ovtablishing a particularly clono relationship botwoon the socrot activitios of tho Central Intolligonce Agency, tho Military Establinksent and tho Joint Chiofe of Staff in caco of war, If the moasuro of autonoxy wo suggest for thoso sorvicos fia achieved, thoy could be attached, without dolay, to the Socretary of Defense or to the Joint Chiefe of Steff, if tho National Security Council should consider this advisable, Subjoct to the foragoing recommendation, wo believe that the headquarters orgenization of the Offico of Special Operations ia soundly concsived and has mado a satisfactory start toward sotting up our socrot intelligence work, HZ
lL. mt cae tema a eterno In vow countries, contact hay boon eutebliohed with Local police,  In- tolligunco, or counsor-intolLligonce gorvices, Thoco relatSons aru often moat wuoful, and thei: potontinlitien for thu futuro aro qront, Tho moot succegaful oxamplo io tho cantinuing liaison with {n cortein friendly but throatonod countrioo, tho Office of Spociel Oporations _ has bogun arranging with thooe servicos for tho inutallation of atay-bohind agents to be weed in the ovont of a military oxcrgoncy. In moat , Snatancos indopondent networks are also being built up. The agent opsrations of the Office of Special Operations abroad have bocn criticized as boing too freauontly directed against fairly obvious, short-tcrs objectives, end as having overlooked or failed to exploit strategic targote. Tho Office is eleo sometimes criticized in the departmental egencies and in tho ffice of Roports and Estimates for producing quantity rather then quality. It can in part ansvor such critician by shoving that it has not rocoived adequate diroctives from the policy-makers. This serious failure should be renedied. 119 NON re nee ow,
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ra aA nn ae —_— Whe enceurtgemant of defection of  atrategicnlly placed personnel in Soviet and eeateliite governzent services should be another major objective of the field cperetiona of the Office of Speetal Operations and to oome extent of the Office of Policy Coordination. <A few auscenses have veen achieved in much ectivitica, but thus far mout Sovict defections have been largely fortuitous. In ovr opinion, neither the Central Intelligence Agency nor the Army hag fully exploited the intelligence posoibilities of nunerous individuela who heve filtered into the American zonea of Gexminy and Austria. Often interrogations have been so delayed or so conducted aa to be virtually fruiticss. There is also a domeatic phase of this problem both in the cease of defec- tors in the United States and inthe handling of those who may be brought here. | The entire question, both at home and abrosd, clearly involves the coordination of intelligence activities and is on importent one with which the Central In- telligence Agency should deal. Here it should assume its reaponsibilitics to work out enore effective procedure to coordinate the activities of the verious agencies involved. (See Chapter IV). SECURITY OF SECRET INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sean wmaredeny sagen, Bofore turning “rom the question of operation21 security, 4t may be ob- sorved that the headquarters socurity of the Offico of Special Operations is not impeccable. (Seo abovo, page 34). It-occupics a ocparate building readily idontifiable as bolonsing to tho Central Intolligenco Agoncy. Secret opera- tions of this nuture should preforably be located. in s building having so mony Services and visitors that tho idontification of a socrot staff and thoir visitors would bo rondored difficult. Furthor, tho staff could moro oasily covor tho oxplanition of ita work by giving a wéll-Imnown and rolatively in- nocuous addreacs, NS 6 wa wy oy = a | | j 123
The Central Intelligence Agency chovld then endeaver to reverso the preeont unfortunuto trend whore it finds itself advertised almost exclusively a6 0 cocrot service organization and become to the public tho centralizer and coordinator of intclligenco, not the sccret gethorar, If the changes we are rocomuonding ary offoected, they would furnish a good point of doparturo for tho Central Intolligonce Agency to do this. COUNTER-ZSPIONAGE Fopiousge and countor-ospionsgo havo beon unified in tho Oporations Croup of tho Offico of Spocial Operations, This arrangzoment roprosonts a doparturo 124
from the wartiro structure of tho Offico of Strategic Serviced in which tneue activS ties wero conducted iu seperate branches, It tu aluo different frost pout forciea corvicon, vhich have noparato coplennse and cornter-caplons.a branches, integrated only through thoir chiofs. Possibly wecause of this orgenizationsl unification countcr-ooplonage hay not yet been adequately ex- ploited es & novree of positive intelligence information, as a channel for deception, as a means of protecting esplonzgo operations and as a beola for penetrating fifth colwm operations abroad, which wy be tiod in with 7ifth colwin orcrations here, The techniques of espionage seem somewhat cimpler than those of countcr- : esplonzge, ani the former generelly is assumed topromise more decisive results. Factors suchas these have influenced.the concentrationof the Office of Special Cperations on espionage problems. It seems eprcrent ‘that the present counter- espionecse staff ‘of the Office of Special Operations should be materially strengthened and more intensive counter-esplonage work proroted. Cwing to the subcrdination of counter-espionage to enpionage, the ex- ploitation by the Cffice of Special Cperations of counter-intellisence oppor- tunities ani its general approach to the problems of counter-intelligence have not been rarxedly successful. Its liaison arrangements with the Federal Bureau o> Investigation, which 1s charged with all counter-copionese reaponaibilities in the United States, excent thoso affecting personnel of the Armed Services, have been limited for the most part to exchance of informtion on suspect individuals. Full collaboration en cowmter-eaplonsge plans end operations hag not yet owe been achieved, and neithor organization is Milly acquainted with the over-all 125
seamen a naeenncsnntn . progr or the othor, Since thy Guyver of forusen ouplonigo and tho marico of syfth column ectivitiua doua not olop or obart at our nuatsoun) boundsrdon, it fo deuirnalo that tho tivo egencioy meat concornwi with counter-ouplonsco should raintedn closor relatijono with ouch other. Wo havo alroudy pointod out in Chapter IV the oxtent of tho responsibility of the Central Intelligence Ayoncy to insuro coordinstion of certain countor-intolligencs activitios of tho Goverrzent. Wo can only obsorve hero that a major uepect of such coordination 4s a closo working relationship botoon tho Offica of Speciai Operations and the Fedoral Dureau of Invostigation. COMMUNICATIONS INLELLIGENCE
ete 00 nei. sie WED POR POLICY PTRECTICN GF Shoe? THYsLLIGiicn To be eenuinely cffeetive, oeercetl intelligence operations must be dlrected toward the intelligence objectives of greatent importance to the Covermient. Joday, 20 we mentionsd above, the Office of Special Operations lacks the direction which it necdo to insure the maximen relevancy of its operations -to the probloms of foreign and military policy. It io, indecd, a fundamentel failing of the American intelligence services that, in genoral, they are not edvinea of the current needa of policy-mihers. Unfortunately, continuing ef- fort is rarely mado by intelligence conowners to guide intelligence activitias toward the most meaningful targete. The formal requirement lista of tho military cervices are received by the Office of Speciel Operations; generally speaking, these areofa “spot", shert- term nature. They are often trenomitted with the implied expectation that the deeired ensvers can be secured almost iumwdiately. Adequate guidence from the State Department is leckings, except in the cases of a few officers of the Office of Special Operations who maintain personal contect with policy officcrs in the State Department. No regular evaluatory or other comenta are rerrived on the intelligence reports put out by the Office except from the Cffice of Reports and Estimates which is not neccasarily the best source for such judg- ments. It is thuo deprived of tho guidance in opecific casea which Service agencics and the State Dopartment could oupply. Wo bolieve that theac deficiencies vould be remodiod, at least in part, by tho attachment to the Offico of Special Operations, oo ouggestod oarlier in this chapter, of repreacntatives from tho Dopurtment of Stato and the Services and by tho creation of a yore direct rolationship to tho Sucretarios of State and Pofonao, . : { i
ee = Ges SAL APVERATSAL In apprasoing the eencral results of the operationsy of the Office of Special Operntions, Lt 19 too carly to arrive at Ceffnite concluufonn. Certain operationg nod being conducted, hitherto lacking in renults, my prove to be of the first i:portance at some tim» in the future, It can be caid, hoverer, that tho Office has beon succesaful in occuring certuin categorica of valuable intelligence, It has also ostablished or maintained rolations with the in- telligence services of several friendly countries, not only for the exchange of information but, in some cases, for tho conduct of operations. Many priority targets of secret intelligenco romain untouched. Few oig- nificant operations have been conducted within theSoriet Union, and operational plenning for othera remains at a fairly early stege. We recognize the vast agifficuities of this type of undertaking and the need for extreme caution. Throughout the departrentel intelligence services , as we have remarked earlier, there existe ageneral feeling that the rooults of secret intelligence operations have not yet attained the level which the current concentration of personnel and funds should warrent. This, we bolieve, 1s in part due to the lack of sufficiently intimate liaison between the Office of Special Operations, tho Services and the State Depertment. Xn thus asseooing achicvemento, it cannot be forgotten that tho agency io etill vory young. This in the reapon for some of tho defecta which have bacn pointed out in the foregoing discusalon. Tho organization doga have tho serv- ices of cow highly talonted and exporicncod pornonn, both in hoadquartorn and in the fiola. Yhoir prosonce giveo prowico of nyntexatic Improvenont for their vork as a wholo. ° 128
CONCLUGIONS AND NECOMMENDATICNS . eal (1) ‘Tho covert oporaticnn of the Office of Spocial Oparttdons and OFfica of Policy Coordjnatica end tho activitios of thy Contict Hranch of the Orfico of oporationu vhould bo Integrated, and tho three operaticnas anowld bo brought togother undor singlo over-all dirocticn (Qperations Division) within th: Contra] Intcelligenco Agoncy .* (2) “Covort intclligoncs activitios condustod by tho Contral Intelligence Agoncy and othor agencica in occupiod arcas should bo roviowod in ordor to of- foct close coordinnticn. (3) Mogsuroa should be initiated within tho Central Intelligence Agency looking toverd better coordination of the handling of defectors, which concerns fnerican intelligonce agencies abroad as woll agin thacontinentalUnited States. (4) ‘The Office of Special Operations (or the now Operations Division) must give primary attention to the building up of a corps of trained personnel for operations abroad. (5) The cover policies of tho Office of Special Operations in the field should be generally roviowed and tightened. Continuous and careful considora- tion should be given to increasing tha use of non-official cover at the sana time that demands for diplom=tic or military cover aro roduced to a minimun. (6) The counter-esplonsge activities of the Offico of Special Operations showld be increased in ocope and emphasis, and closer liaison tn this fieid should be established with the Fodoral Buroau of Investigation. (7) Relations with departmental agencies shold be brought closer, and tho guidance which tho Offico of Spocial Oporations rocoijves from intelligeuce ~ — : * For our recommendations regarding tho Foreign Broadcast Informatioa Branch TON Te Seem en, mereey of tho Offico of Operations, soo Chapter VII. . 129
en ee conmeura ehould bo otreagthenod. This antgnt bo achiuvoed by ineluding repro- tentatives of Unie Survice agencies and the Stato Vepartuont in tho Infomation Control Sustion of the Offico of Special Cporutions. (8) Tho Director ohowd asouro himself that the Offico of Special Opera- tions 16 receiving adoqusto information on tho current and ctretcgic Intolli- gonse needs of. tho Gcverrusont. This might be achioved by oatablinhing closer relations with the Secretaries of State and Defonso. (9) The Office of Special Oporationo should exorciso a greater measvro of control over the disconinetion of its own aatorial. (10) The Nuclear Energy Group showld be ioved fro: the Offico of Special Operations to the proposed Research and Reports Division where it should be a part of the general scientific work. ; : (11) The Office of Special Operations should beve access to commatcations intelligence to the full extent required for guidance in directing its opera- tions end for more effective conduct of counter-ecsploneage. 130
ewe ions etal memes betel Lt eenal Sos ermal on ae em arte Pome ge Comaget . "4 au eee am,» CHAP TIER IX SERVICES OF COMMON CONCERN: THE CONDUCT OF SECRET OPERATIONS RELATIONS PEW SECRIT TNTSLLIGCACE AND SECHOT OVLRATIONS Yho collection of vgocret intwlligonce ig clowoly related to tho conduct of secrot oporations in gupport of national policy. Theso operations, includ- ing covert psychological warfare, clandestine political activity, sabotago and gverrills activity, have alwayn been tho compsnions of sccrot intolligenca.- The two activitios support each other and can be dinagnoctated only to the detriment of both. Effoctive sccret intolligance is a prerequisite to sound socret operetiong and, whero security considerations permit, channels for secret intelligence may also servo secret operations. On tho other hand, al- though the acquisition of intolligence ia not the inmediate objective of secret ‘operations ; the latter ray prove to bo amost productive source, of intelligence. it was because of ow’ views on the intinate relationship between these two activities that we submitted our Interin Report No. 2, dated May 13, 1948, “Relations Between Secret Operations and Secret Intelligence ," which vec a comment on proposals, then boforo the National Security Council, for the ini- tiation of a program of secret operations. In that report we mado the follow- ing observations: "In carrying out those special operatione, the Director [ot Secret Oporationa/ and his otaff should havo intimato Imowledgo of what io being dono in the field of vocret intelligence and accoss to all tho facilities which my bo built up through a properly conutitutod sccrot intelligenco network, Sacrot cporsationy, particularly through support of rosistsnce 6roupa, provide ono of the most hiportant sources of secret intolligenco, . and tho information gained from oocrot iIntolligonco must immodintoly bo put to uso in guiding and directing socrot operations, In muny casos it ig nocossary to detormino whothor a particular agont or chain should
priearily bo used for aseres intelli gonce or for necrot oporationa, boe- cuuge the attoept to press both uses may endanger the security of ench. "Tho Allicd experience in the carrying out of nccret operations and pecrat intolligenco during the last war hso pointed up the close relation- ohip of tho two activities. The Brivish, for cxanple, who had scparste gyotern during the war, have new come around to the vicv thet oceret Jn- telligence and secret operations should be carried ont under a single operntional head end have reorgenized their cervices agecordingly." THE OFFICE OF POLICY COORDINATION The National Security Council in creating within the Central Intelligence Agency, in accordance ‘with Section 102 (a) (5) of the National Security Act, the Office of Special Projects (now known es the Office of Policy Coordination) recognized these’ views to the extent that both secrot intelligence and secret operations were included within the seme organizetion. However, this action did not go as far as ve had recommended, with the result that the Office of Policy Coordination (secret operations) and the Office of Special Operations (secrot intelligence) are not bound together by any special relationship and operate as entirely separate Offices. Although it is too carly to appraise the accomplishments of the Office of Policy Coordination which has been in existence only a few months, oxperienco has, in ow opinion, already shown that the organizational relationship bo- tweon it and the Office of Special Oporationa okould be closor. Although tho problena with which tho tto Offices aro concorncd aro co intimately rolated, thore {9 no arrangorent for coordinating thoir operationy undor comnon direc - Vion except inuofar aa they aro both under tho Director of Central Intelligence. V2 aaa
NN ; . sane am tinder von this rolatSonohip ia vwenkened by tho fact that hoo 10/2 which created the Office of Policy Coordination provides that "for purposes of security ond of flexibility of operations and tothe isyimun degrco consiotent with officioncy, tho Offico of Special Projects shall operate independently of other components of Central Inte)ligence Agency." Thuo,complete separation was made mandatory. The Offico of Policy Coordination, whichio the only Office in the Central Intolligence Agency cronted by direct order of the National Security Council, 40 aloo given & apecial position in that ite charter provides that the Dircc- tor of Centrel Intolligeace ohall bo responsible for “inauring, through desig- nated representatives of the Secretary of State andof the Secrotary of Dofonse, that covert operations are planned and conducted in a menner consistent with United States forcign and military policies and with overt activities" and that disagreements between the Director and these representatives shall bo re- ferred to the National Security Council for decision. Furthermore, the Chief of the Office of Policy Coordination can be appointed only upon nomination by the Secretary of State and approval by the National Security Council. In practico, the Office of Policy Coordination onjoya & position which gives it direct tics to tho Department of State and the Netional Military Estublishrent and support from thom not onjoyed by the Office of Special Opera- tions. Consequently, the two activitios which should be closely integraicd aro in fact operating with different outosade guidance and support, with dis- oimilar charters, and thoy occupy a different status within the Central Intol- Ligonco Agency. In our opinion, thin aituation iu undound. Tho cloge rolationship betwoon thore tyo activitiag, ao pointed out abova, noads to bo recognized along with |
the fagh that geeret intelligence requires the wane degree of control end sup- port fro the State Depestrent and the Military Eutabliatvent ag oecret opera- tiong. Ag recommended in Chapters VII and VILI, we propose therefore that these two activitien be closely Integrated falong with parto of the Office of Operations) ina gingle Operationa Division which would enjoy considerable au- tonomy, in accordance with our ovor-all roconmendations for changey in tho organization of tha Central Intelltgance Agency. As wo havo statod above, the operations of tho Office of Policy Coordina- ‘Vion have beon so recently initiated that it io premature to comment upon then in any detail. We beliovo, however, that the Assistant Director in charge of - the Office of Policy Coordination 19 proceeding wisely in building alowly in this most difficult field. CONCLUSIONS AND RECO!MENDATI ae (1) The close relationship between covert intel Ligence end covert opera- tions and the fact that the latter ia related to intelligence affecting the national security Justifics the placing of the Office of Policy Coordination within the Central Intelligence Agency. (2) The Office of Policy Coordination should be integrated with the othor covort Office of the Conirsal Intelligonce Agoncy, nancly,the Office of Special Operations, and with tho Contact Branch of the Office of Operations, and these throe operations should be undar Single over-all direction (Operations Divi- Bion) within tho Contral Intelligence Agency .* rene. * Yor ow racomnandationa regarding tha Foreign LBroadenst Information Branch of tho Office of Oporntions, ooo Chaptor VIL. ¥3t a
oy _— niente cs, CHAPTER X A enemies “allt, ,., THE DIRECTION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGERCE AGENCY SENERAL APPRAISAL Wo have resorved for this final chaptorca tho Central Intelligence Agency the discussion of tho post of Diroctor. An appraical of tho qualifications and achiovoments of tho directing. personnel in only possiblo in light of an exwaination of tho entire organization. Within the ecope of his mandato undor tho National Security Act, it is tho Director vho must guide the organization to the attainment of ita objectives, establish ite oporating policies and win the confidence of other branches of the Govormmont. This is not an easy task. The Contral Intelligence Agency has a diversi- fied end difficult mission to perform. Its success dcpenda, to a large extont, on the support ‘it recoives from other “agoncies which usy be ignorant of its problems and suspicious of its prorogatives: It has peculiar administrative, personnel ani security problems and has to handle complicated operating situa- tions. Moroover, the pressure to build repidly has been atrong and thero has doen little time in which to demonstrate substantial accomplishments. We beliovo that these difficultics cannot alone explain the principal de- ficicncies which wo have discussed in previous chapters. The diresting start of the Central Intolligence Agoncy has not demonstrated an adequato under- standing of tho mandato of the organization or the ability to discharge that mandato offoctivoly. Tho dution of the Conatral Intelligones Agoncy in rogard to the coordina- tien of intolligonco activities have not been fulfillod. Tho renponsibility
an vor the! correlation of nations lL intelligence has not been carriod out In such ammnes 4a provide tho polley-rakers with coomifneted national intelligence oatimitos. Some activities aro being carried out vy tho Central Intulliganse Ageacy which largely duplicate tho work of othor depaurtmonty and egencies, and thoro is been no adoquate attompt to coordinate or contralize othors. Gon- orally sponking, eatiofactory vorking relations have not boon ouetabliched with other dopartmonts and agencies. Within the Central Intelligonco Agency in- “adoquato guidance ag to the intelligonce reqguiromscnts of the Government is rocoivei from tho Director. Theso deficiencios oxist in spite of a broad stat- utory maniate, reasonable appropriations and support from the Nationel Security Council. Administrative policies within the Agency contribute to this situation. Tho interns) organization does not reflect en appreciation of the Agency's sev- eral distinctive yet ‘inter-related missions wnder the National Security Act. In fact, the scheme of organization tends to blur and impede the performance of the orgenization's essential intelligonce functions under the Act. The Directorato has given positions of pre-eminence to officials who are primarily administrators yet exert policy control over the intelligence Officos witnout being qualified to do so. Thoro is little clogso consultation on intolligence and policy matters botween tha various atratificd levols. Although tho heads of the savoral O22icos are allowed considerablo latitudo in conducting thoir reopoctivo oporations, thoy do not share substantially in tho dotermination of over-all policy. THE QUESTION OF CIVILIAN DIRECTION Wo havo alyo conoidorced the quostion whothor tho Diroctor ought to be a Civilian. Whilo wo racognizo that the otatuto providon that ho my bo oithor 136 : ‘ : mae
ek bennett ein en ne ————————————L Lal la, civilian or military wo hava ronchud the conclusion that he should bo « civil san. Wo do not inonn to oxelude the posnibility that a Sorvico man miy be oo- octed for tha post, but if this in dono ho should rocign from activo military duty aed theronStor work ag a civilian. Tn ouch @ caso appropriate provision whould be mado go that ho doon not loso hin votdrement bonefita. Wo have reached the conclusion that the Director chowld bo civilian be- cuudo vO aYre convrincea that contimaity of tenure is crstential end comploto iIn- dopenionce of sorvico tivs gesireble for carrying out tho duties of tho Diroac- tor. Tho post cannot properly bo filled ao a more tour of duty between mili- tary auutganonte. Unloss. there is such continuity of corvice and couplote in- dopondence of action, the Director will not bo able to build up tho ouprit do corps, tho technical officiency, the loyalty of homo steff and ficld workora, ‘which aro essential to the success of the enterprise. We agros with the intont of the provision o? tho Yetionsl Security Act that the Director “ahell be sub- joct to no suporvisios, control, restriction, or prohibition (military or oth- erwiso)" by the Sorvice departnonts, but do not fool that this provision can alono offset tho disadvantages to which wo have pointod. It 46 inovitable that thoro should be retation in tho Servico intelligence agoncios, though in recent years that rotation has hoon far too rapid in the top ranka. Howovor, in tho Central Intelligence Agency there should be sta- bility and continuity of loadorship. Finally, we recomand acivilian Director because vo boliove that in vork- ing out a woll halancod top ocholon canmittoo (tho rocenatituted Intolligenco Advisory Committeo) for appraining and coordinating Govermiwnt intolLiganco, tho otrong, and properly strong, reproountation of the military intolligonce _ SO et ee mere oe ew seme. “| 137
ce Acevinte ten san Des ES Kwereins® corejeus on such a body whould bo balanced with an equilly strong civilfan roprogentation. Wo havo conuidored the argent that tho Director of Central Tntolligence, pocuuno of tho high security requirczonts of the post, should bo a mina pore nontly devoted to Goverment service, amenable to tho disciplines of tho Sarv- icun ond froo of political tcbiticns or entanglements. Wo boliovo that tho qunlifications of tho Dirscter of Contral Intolligonco, vhether his past ox- porionce has doen in civilian lifo or in military or othor Govorrment service, phowla bo on £0 high alovol that thors would bo no nore dovbt as to tho loyalty and responsibility of tho Director than of the Secrotary of Stato or the Soc- rotary of Defonse. In appointing the Director of Central Intolligonce with the ; rosponsibilities ho must carry today, wo must select 4 ran te whom we would willingly entrust any position of responsibility vhateoever jn our Government. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1) he dirocting staff of the Central Intelligonce Agency has not dex- onstrated “an adequate understanding of tho mandato of the organization or the ability to discharge that mandates effoctively. (2) Administrative organization and policios tend to impede the carrying out of tho essential intolligonce functions of the Central Intelligence Agoncy wndox tho Act. (3) Continuity of sorvice is oscontial fox tho successful carrying out cf the dution of Diroctor of Contral Intolligonco. (4) Aa tho bout hopo for continuity of sorvice and tho groatect agour- ficu of indopendonce of action a civilian shoulda bo Director of Contrsal In- tolligonco. If a Service mu ia solocted for tho pout he should resign from activo military duty. Lt
eae Grad Geubwe Guest tan Satis Cama nent one Seal eee ens te ead Eee _ been not to a largo oxtont by the Survicou acting indopondently and without CHAPTER XI THE SERVICE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES | Who Survey Group hag boon prinardily concerned with oxaminiug tho struc- ture, administration, activities and intor-agoncy yoletionuhipa of tho Central WIntolligencs Agency. In the exsmination of tho Service intelligonce agencics, enphasio has boon placed on thoir contribution to national intelligonco and thoir relation to the Contral Intelligence Agoncy. On tho basin of this otudy ’ the Survoy Group doos not consider itsclf gqualifiod to submit recormendnations regarding either tho dotalle of the intornmwl] administration of the Services or of thoir methods of collecting information end producing iIntolligenco. MISSION AND RESPONSIBILITIES fho National Socurity Act, in providing for the systematic coordinstion of intoLligence, also safeguarded the rolo of the Services in intelligence by providing in Section 102 (a) (4) that “the dopartmonts end other agencies of the Governnent shall continue to collect, ovaluate, correlate, and disseminate dopartizontal intolligence." Subsequently, the National Security Council in Intolligence Diroctivo No. 3 (See Annox No. 9) defined departmental intoili- gonce as “that intolligenco needed by a Departmont or independent Agency of tho Foderal Governmont, and the subordinato units thereof, to oxocuto ite nis~ sion and to diochargo its lewful responsibilities." Tho minsion of tho military services involves tho onorour rosponoibility of insintaining the saocurity of tho Unitod Statos. It 19 incumbent upon then to produco or obtain from othor agoncios the intolligenco nocoasary to agoiot thom in fulfilling this mission, In tho past this nood fox intolligenco han me 139
/ tho benufit of oyotoantic coordination, Althouch 4t io now generally recog- nized that such coordination tu yrgontly needed, there ig otj]) a tondoncy on whe part of tho Services to Gtrivo to cronty thoir own solf-contratned aygtem of intolligenco. Tio tendency otors in part from tho militury doctrino that "Sntolligence 49 a function of cowasnd," 4 doctrine which has boon intorpretod to require the control of the collection and production of all necesaery intolligenco by the otaff of tho comaandor requiring it. Tho doctrine so construed cen only yosult in en obviously unsativfactory and Jmpracticel attexpt at self-sufficioncy. As a matter of fact, at all otaff levels intolligence must be supplemented by contributions of both rew information and finished intelligence from other de- partments and agencies. Tne genoral dofinition of departmontal intelligonce must therefore be qualified by prectical linitations and sudject to the overriding necessity for coordination of tho intolligonco activitiss of ell Government agencies, pur- suant to tha National Security Act, Tho need for limiting the tendency toward oolf-sufficiency, while acknowledging tho broad interosta of the departuents, 40 formally recognized in National Security Council Intelligenco Diroctives Non, 2 and 3, Thoso directives assign to the Dopartmonts of tho Army, Navy and Air Forco, respoctivoly, dominant intorast in tho collection and produc- tion of military, naval and air intolligonco. The diructivea algo rocognizo that tho concorn of the Sorvicos in intelligence ig broador then their apocific arons of dominant. interest. Directive No, 2, concorning {ntolligunco colloc- Vion, providoa: . ry er Lie _ |
NL “Ho intorsrotation of thong ontablishod over-all polieton and ab deg. tiven etal) mupale the baile principle that all Departcsentel repre dentatives abrond ero Indivieunlly reeponudble for tho collectton and for the appropriate trenoajuadon to their Nuepnartronte of all intelligence fpforsatsoan  portinent to thelr Dupertacntal rifantona." Giniler oefeguerdu aero Included in Directive No, 3 concurning intollicenca production which provides that: “Zech intolligonce agoncy hay tho ultimato rogponaibility for tho proporation of such staff Antelligonce es its own Depertsont shall roguire, It is recognized thet the staff iIntolligenca of oaen of the Depertaenta must be brouder in scopo than any allocation of co)lecticn responsibility or recosnitiona of dominant interost mi gat indicesta, In fact, tho full forelon intelligences picture i3 af dintorost in verying degrees ot adiffercnt timos to each of the Dopartzcnts." In practico, tha Servico departments, while concontreting on their respec- tive erves of dominant interest, collect and produco substential quantitico of information in ficlda with which they are not primarily concerned, As a raault, there ta considerable duplication in the material collected and produced bz then and by other agencios. COORDINATION OF SERVICE INTELLICENCE ACTIVITIES Intelligenco collection by tho Services is an important part of our intel- ligonce syste:n, Thore aro, for exemplo, tho intelligonce components of ovorscss comnands in Europo and the Far East, and attuchco atationod with United Statos GQiplomatic posts throvghout tha world who aro in a position through obsorva- tions and official liaison to collect valuable information, All. of thane channolo ara usod to moot tho collection ‘or — 141 Re ee ne
ee . PoP Ye ened of tho fervicos ey broadly fiveerproted by them, ag woll avy some of the collection roquiremcents oF other dopurtmcnts ond agencies which mike uuo of Service colloction fucilitios, Sone duplication end ovorlep du inberent in tho oxtetonco of boveral, In- depundent Service colloction agencics operating in all porta of tae world. An’ pojuted out in Chapter IV, there haa boon no continuing coordination of thoir offorts. The only formal Lirdtetions which havo been imponod ‘by diroctivon gonorally propibit cortein methods of intelligence colloction, “puch ay ooplo~ nage and the ronitering of foroiga broadcasts, which have becn aspignod to the Contral Intelligence Aygoncy as pervices of common concern. Moro effective co- ordination of collection is 6 rocogaized mnocessity and should bo performed in - accordance. vith the recommendations outlined in Chepter IV. In addition, co- ordination can bo inproved within the Services oithsr upon their ovn {muitiative or upon that of tho Secretary of Defense. The production of intolligence by tho Sorvice egoncies gonerelly falls 4nto tho threo catogorics of current, basic and staff intolligonco (including eotinates). . Current intolligenco is prepared by cach of tho Servicos in the form of daily, weokly ox monthly swenertoo, briofings ene digoats dorivod from varied pow'ces, Much of thie product, particularly that dealing with gonoral military . and political devoleyaents, io duplicative and of ouch conmon interest that somo consolidation of offort ts devirablo and should bo possible. Wo roconzond that thio situation vo yxoviowod in ordor to dctormino what offort may bo prop- orly diapenaod with, what consolidation is poastblo, and what common vorvicos the Central Intelligonco Agency might ronder in thin regard. .(Soo Chaptox VI). om ee eee i” ae meagre rR eR CHEE NN NOLO TOE LOE LOE CE Serres ater”
\ ee Jn addition to busig otudioy jn thoir reupsctive fJoldu of dominant Jn- torost, including such tasks au dotormining the armament potcntial and ordor of baltloe of various cowitrios, each Sorrice accomplinhes a largo amount of roscarch, compilation of date end roporting dn tho Siolda of ocononic, oscicn- tific and political iutolligoncs with which they 11 havo somo concer. mh ow oxeminutionof tho Contral Intelligence Agency end the intelligence éegencica of tho Departucnts of State, Amy, Navy and Aix orto, wo have found that thoro 40 ovorlupping of intorcst and duplicution of offort in intolligence rescarcn and production in euch fiolds as petroloiwa recourcos, cormunicetions, industrial production, guidod missilos end biological warfare. Eotablished procedures for coordination in those and related subjocta cro lacking. It' is in order to improve thie situation that we have rocormuonded in Chapter VI the creation, within the Central Intelligence Agency, of & Research and Roports Division which would perform research and production of intelli- gonce in fields of common concorn on behalf of all of the interested agencies, and would coordinate their efforts in theno fiolds when centralization was un- dootrabie. This office, which should operate in clove relationship with the Sorvices.and bo stoffod in part with Service persennol, should perform much of the xork now being dono intho fiolds of oconomic, scientific and technological intelligence. Thero will, of course, be specialized matters for which tho in- GQividual Services must continuo to bo ultdinatoly rosponsible, but there is a Vaut aroa of coztson interest from vhich they can all draw. Estinutes, proparod to maot tho requirements of tho dopartuonts and tho Joint Chiofs of Staff, aro tho mont important typo of staff intelligence pro- duced by tho Sorvices. Tho provont povition with rospoct to their production \ .
ee ae ell fa not vetiofectory. Fach Serviec produces Ita estJiaates {In accordance with agmuapiions, otdards and methoes of its ow selectson, and ylves to then tho nseope it cesires, not neceasarhly Luatting them to jts om ficid of intorest, Dupurtsontal plans end policies may bo besed on such Indepenicntly produced ostdstes, regwdlesn of tho divergent end even contradictory csutimates of other departmcnis, As poinicd out in Chepter V, tho Central Intelligence Agency has not ans yot udequately exercised its function to coordinate these and other estimates, for exemplo those.of the State Department, for tho purpose of preparing na- tional ostimates. The Joint Intelligonce Committce performs this task to sone extent in tho military spkere, but.arrangements are lacking for regularly in- suring that essuzptions are comparable, analytical mothods valid, andthe finel a eotinetes as sow:d ao pescible. In our opinion, an important step toward in- proving this uituetion would be takon if the rocommendations submitted in Chapter V reserding the production of national eetinates wore adopted. Those stops, togethor with the creation of tho Research and Reports Divi- sion in areasof common interest, would hevo the effect of bolstcring the Joint Intolligence Coiszittee in its special role and promoting the coordination of Sorvice estiaates in both broad and Limited ficlds. It ise important that the abrictly military eatinates of the Joint Intelligence Coxmittee and the national ontirates produced by tho Central Intelligence Agency and tho Intolligonco Advivory Committee, partly on basis of the samo materini, should bo in harmony. In tho genoral fiold of counter-intolligenco, tho Sexvicoo havo usually placod primuy onphasis on protuctivo avcurity activities which do not necoo-~- toarnly have intelligunco as thedr priimury aim and havo often been performed by f
noneintelligance porsonne) .* Tho moro apecsalized counter-opplonsce function, Lifech hog of its precigu objective tha Sdentifiention and thwarting of the pornonnol, methoda and aina of unfriendly forolen intollieence sorvicas, is a truo cocret. intelligence activity. Execluosve rogponsibility for ito conduct abrozd has bean properly ecoaignod to tho Central Intolligence Agoney, oxcept for the countor-intolligenco activities of the Services neconsary for thoir own security. (Soo Chaptor VIII). In tho areas of United Staton military oc- Counter Intelligence Corps, botiin Gormeny end Jepen, hea devoted conaiderablc effort to counter-ospionsgo, including tho use of intelligence networks extond- sng boyond the actual arees of occiepation, There has not beon adequate recognition of the need for coordination of _ these activities with the broader responsibilities of the Central Intelligence - Agoncy. The dieoipation of trained personnel, failure to centralize iInforze- tion concerning countor-intelligence targets, the risks inherent im the unco- ordinated conduct of agent operations, all tend to weaken our prospects of suc- cese in counter-~-espionage. This need for coordination of the counter-intelligence offort siso cxists in the United States where the responsibilities of the Services are limited in rolation to those of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. ** * Tho Air Force hao recognized this emphasis by transferring practically #11 counter-intolligenco functions from tho Director of Air Intelligence to tho Inspector General. , **Coordinution in this field ia carried out in accordance with tho Presidential monornndua of June 26, 1929, which stipulated that the War Departient, Navy Dopartsent and Federal Burenu of Investigation would be tho only agencies of the Governnent to conduct Investigations into matters involving csplonuga, counler-espionage, er gubotase. Tho principsl function of the Intordopart- mental Intelligence Conference sot up as a resultof this memorandum haw been to dolluit the rospective Investigative responaibilitica of the three agen- Clon in the United Etatos. | en .
Wo havo acon that within tho Military Kotablisheent thoro to no goncral nuchinery for Intelligence coordination, Tho Socrotary of Dufenna at provant hoo ny staff for tis purpeso or to do more than oxeresou vory gonoral ouper- yieion andi control, Ho fo ablo to initiate particular projocts for coord:un- tion end hen, Infect, dono so with reapoct to the production of comunications {ntolligenco and the attecho syotons, Yo can alco rosolvo particiulsr centro- yeraics which cannot bo aottled at a lowor Levol in the Military Fsatablishnont. Othur oxemploo within tho Military Eateablishment of coordinution in Linitod ffolds are tho Joint Intelligence Comitteo'y responsibility for eutinatog ro- _ guirod by the Joint Chiofa of Steff, arrengoucnts for tho production of comau- nicationa intolligenco, and tho oxistenco of the Air Intelligence Division for the production of eix intelligence by the Air Forco and Navy. Although coordination has boen attexpted or accomplished by the Servicee, eithar ou their own ‘initiative or at the instigation ef the Secretary of De- fonso, in limited areas such ae thoso mentioned above, effoctive coordination of the Sorvice intelligence agencies requiree the over-all coordination of the activitics of all intolligonco agonciea in the Governzent. This is a duty as- signed to the Central Intelligenco Agency in consultation with the Intelligonce Advisory Committea., In Chaptor IV we have recommonded that the Intelligence Advisory Comaitteo, on which the Sarvicesa are represented, should participate more activoly with tho Director of Central Intelligence in tho continuing co~ ordination of intolligonce activitios. To a vory conoidorable oxtent, reaponsi- bility for tho euccoosful operation of this muchinory rosts with the Servicos. THE STATUS OF INTELLICENCE IN THE SERVICES Recognition of the Lportant role of intolligonce 4n tho dotormination of national policy and of tho major rosponsibility which tha Sorvicos have in |