ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO ee ee Ad THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON 23, D.C. DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON SEP 12 1955 IGMORANDUN FOR PR, SHERIUN Anais THE WHITE ROUSE Subjects Repart of the Hoover Commission “ask Force on Intelligence sctivities. In accordance with your mumcrandum of Jane 13, 1955, < am submitting the enclesed statement setting ferth the - views of the Department of State on the recoxzmendatione of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence HERBERT HOOVER, JR. Acting Sacretary ons Sie, Enclogures Departzent of State Views on Subject Report.
ey ee CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON 25. D. C. 16 AUG 1955 OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR PRE PRESIDER Report of the Hoover Commission fask Force on Intelligence Activities (Appendix I) Regarding the Hetional Security Agency and Regarding Commmications and Electronics In secordance with the memorandum of June 13 from the Assistant to the President, it was requested that the coordinated views of the interested, departments and agencies with respect to the subject Ap-~ Pe ef the Hoover Commission Task Force Report be submitted with- in Cayce . The views of interested departments and agencies have been ob- tained by thorough discussion of the two parts of the Appendix in the United States Commmications Intelligence Board (USCIB) and in the United States Communications Security Board (USCSB}. The agreed comments of the two Boards on the two parts are enclosed herewith, together with the covering memoranda from the Acting Executive Secre- tary of USCIB, and from the Chairman of USCSB. In his special first 4ndorsement af Part 1 of the Appendix, the Chairman of the Task Force on Intelligence Activities esnecially en- phasized the importance. of Recommendation 2 of Part 1, which calis for a “much greater and continuing effort” to produce high level ma- terial. You will note, in connection with USCIB‘s comment on this recommendation that 1t is reported that steps sre being taken to ob- tain the services of the most highly qualified scientific and tech- nical experts for the purpose of conducting ean investigation of tne feasibility of solving the problen concerned. Until this investiga- tion has been completed and the steps referred to in USCIB‘s comments on Recommendation 2 have been taken, the Board feels that it should defer comment on the expansion of the ESA effort recommended by the Report. Is] We DECLASSIFIED ey at Enclosures: authority 4 YY -. {. 1. Comments by USCIB and USCSB 4 ; he we 2. Meno fr Acg Ex Sec, UCB. By wh? __. . MLE Date AISLES 3- Hemo fr Chairman, UCSB errr tippers rtp PORTIONS exter rep PETSESESUCESESESUCLSSSSCSSSBCESSSSSTOOCSSSSSSOSESISR 0. 12, see, 53a ) PP ee Sa DILILLLLLIILIIDULLLLLLlinbiiiiipiiiiinis . NLE DATE ffs” _ ee lee
eames < FEDERAL COAL MINE SAFETY BOARD OF REVIEW was WASHINGTON 25, D. C. ¥- July 28, 1955 ~ Dear Colonel Goodpastor: Reference Bulletin No. 56-2 of the Bureau of the Budget, dated July 13, 1955, Chairman Steidle of this Agency has directed that I submit a statement on the subject matter of that bulletin. This Agency has reviewed the following report of the Commission on Qrganization of the Executive Branch of the Government: Intelligence Activities The nature of our Agency is such that the above report has insufficient effect on our operations to warrant comment thereon. Sincerely yours, Robert J. Freehling General Counsel Colonel Andrew J. Goodpastor, Jr. The White House Washington 25, D. C.
C daly 26, 1955 ADMIRAL STRAUSS (Governor Adams asked ms.to Soars tox yet shat ‘ Colonel. GE, 5 Army ia < Stat Secretary
UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSIGNE S/HITE HOUSE duu 20 10 se AM °55 OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN MEMORANDUM FOR: Governor Sherman Adams The Assistant to the President Subject: Report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities. On June 13th you transmitted to me por-Jions of the classified report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities and asked that a review be made of it so that the views of the Com- mission with respect to it could be submitted within 60 days. Since so large a portion of my staff is directly connected with preparation for the Atomic Conference in Geneva and since I will probably be away from Washington for the first two weeks of August, this is to request that you allow me a two-week time extension. I would try to have our views before you by August 26th. Will this be satisfactory? at 3 hatty Lewis L. Strauss
. . H-23 , ° cy-l EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT Response to my oral OFFICE OF DEFENSE MOBILIZATION request for indication whethe WASHINGTON 25, D.C. ODM in agreement with "Special Recommendation" Orrice oF Tea Diagcron Joly 6, 1955 G MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL ARDESS J. OOODPASTOR Staff Secretary * The White House . Badjects Hoorer Commission Report In contiectios with the classified report en commnicetions intelligence prepared ty the Neever Commission, it is cur conclusion that the 4e correct in ite statements ef fact anf that, in principle, the conclusions and recammeafations are sound, ‘ ' As you my know, the Soience Advisery Committes, at the Girection of the Batienal Security Gouscil, made a wery thorough investigation of all phases ef our reedisess inolufing commnicetions, - and ite conclusions in gemeral parallel the findings of the Hoover Cemmission. Action recommendations on the Science Advisory Comnittce ‘report will be made te the National Security Couneil probably within _the next twe weeks, anf it would be ay suggestion that the Hoover Comission classified report be held ani reviewed with the President . after he bas heard the findings of the Science Advisory Comittee. The organisational recomeniations in the Science Advisory '* GCemmittee report are somevhat more far-reaghing than thoes sugested iM in the Heever Commiseion report aad, if adepted, weulé protebly ‘eutiety the recesmendaticns of the Hoover Gomaiesion report. We de tave twe stiner items in connection with the Hoover Commission Report that might warrant further attextion. They are as - Lellews: 1, Ie Yort Meade a enitable @{sperenl lesstien for the Mational Sesrity Agenay taking into account cemmmaications valnerability tegether with tedey's weapon sises? 2. We would urge that the Direster ef the National Security - Sgenay de onde o member er at least an observer on the Intelligence _Afvisory Cemmittes., Das to the long lead time required to implement actions takes by the Committee, a better programming job could be dons, I will be glad to discuss this master further vith you if you te desire. ‘ . . t é Arther 8. Pleuing reproduction . Bectromatic purposes DY tre tion ement ‘ tor ; for raplec - er Library ot tem scrt vg g gaterroratine rants
THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT July 6, 1955 MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Please fee) free to go ahead with the production of extra copies of the reports referred to in your memorandum to me (TS 103808) of | Jaly. This memozandum constitutes authorization as requested in your memorandum. 3. 4.
TS 103808 Copy #1 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON 28, D.C. OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR JUL 11955 MEMORANDUM FOR: Governor Sherman Adams, The White House SUBJECT: Consideration of Appendix I of the Report of the Hoover Commission Task Force by USCIB and USCSB 1. In your memorandum of June 13, you request that the views of USCIB and USCSB on Appendix I of the Hoover Commission Task Force be supplied to your office within 60 days. Analysis of the Report indicates that it will be necessary to reproduce the Report to a limited extent in order to make it possible for the two Boards concerned to consider it. 2, It is understood that the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Agency, as well as the CIA, have already received copies of the Report. Accordingly, authorization is requested to make six additional copies for the other members of USCIB, as PolLows: State, FBI, Air Force, Navy, Army and the Office of the Executive Secretary of USCIB. © _ 3. In addition to the above, in order to arrange for consideration of the pertinent sections of the Appendix by the USCSB, authorization is requested to reproduce 11 copies of these sections. These would be issued to NSA, CIA, OSD, Army, Navy, Air Force, FBI, State, Treasury, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Office of the Executive Secretary of the USCSB. The appropriate sections would be Section III of Part 1 (pp-19--24), with Recommendations 4 and 5, and Section VIII of Part 2 (pp 16--20), with Conclusion 11 and Recommendations 8, 9 and 10 and special recommendation. DULLES Director DECLASSIFIED Authority meOG -athl _ TOP-SEGRE py od ie oe qjaler
ASMORAKDUM FOR GOVERNOR ADAMS: Rez Report of the Hoover Commission Tesk Force on Intelligence ijctivities {Federal Bureau of Investigation) I have your asnorandun on the ebove subject, deted June 13, 1968. Thess excerpts from the classified report of the Hoover Connicsion Task Force on Intellisence Activities heave teen cerefully reviewed. I an enclosing < mesorsncdium to se frou the Director of the FEL, dated Jume 28, 1955, on this subject and have no Sarther comnzents to add. ae ‘ 75 =< ite. Hoover attachment / (\ This document consists si. fase
Jaly 5, 1955 MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. W. H. Godel Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense With reference to your letter of 1 July, your request to take the action described therein has been approved, A. JI. Goodpaster Colonel], CE, US Army Staff Secretary
QQOERee OFICIAL Communications Ta THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON 23, D.C. DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON duly 55 1955 MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL A. J. GOODPASTER THE WHITE HOUSE In accordance with the arrangements we made over the telephone with respect to the Hoover Commission Report on intelligence, this memorandum will introduce ur. Fisher Howe, Deputy Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence, who is cleared to receive State Department documents of all classifications. His area of the State Department is responsible for intelligence liaison with CIA. He has "Qn" clearance and is fully cleared and indoctrinated under USCIB Directive Noe 5. Las Row ner Robert Ge Barnes Deputy Director Executive Secretariat
104052. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY , WASHINGTON 25, D.C. Sn pe a SOSA 0 Se UM FOR: , Solonel Andrew ge SOE fhe White Bouse #3 SUBJECT: Reproduction of Appendix I of wes Report. of. the ae EE Se Pe “Hoover. “Commission” a Force ie wee fe ese © iad O44 Bas Fee i. Im pursuance of our teLephone conversation today, this is. te to inform’ you’ ‘that the ‘Director ' “or° Central” Titelligence-has’ “authorized ‘the* ‘reproduction ‘of ‘Appendiz t of the ‘Hoover “Commies fén task vorge Report *: : ‘in“order to make" possible its. consideration “by USCIB ‘and USC wage Te re Bt Ath. iswher ce Poa se ese o apse eee a ai IS Ss a Py wr 2. seproduction | wilt take place under the following conditiondit ‘se wot Bs. Torn a one ies . “pate tie ree ‘See fy eget ets a POEs. ERIE Sra’ ve a. Six aaaitional copies of Appendix I “both _parts , will : be made for those members -of DSCEB | which‘ t baie, “Hot already “been “supplied. with a* copy.” ‘These ‘erey* State,’ “FEI, ; Ais Force, ‘Navy, “Army and the Office of ‘the ‘Biecitive ‘gecnstary Of. usc. MATE . b. In connection with consideration of the pertinent sections of the Appendix by” USCSB » eleven copies will be _ reproduced of Section III of ‘Part 1 (pp 19--24), with ~ Recommendations 4 and 5, and ‘Séction VIII of Part 2 (pp 16-- 20), with Conclusion 11 and Recommendations 8, 9 and 10 and the special recommendation. ‘These will be Sasued to NSA, CIA, OSD, Army, Navy, Air Force, FBI, State, Treasury, AEC and the Office of the Breoutive’ Secretary of USCSB - a FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, CURRENT TRESLLIGRNCH: eA EDMOND A. KELLOGG i ‘e DECLASSIFIED Authority INR. 19 - 2 tT
D EL cc we COMMESSTON GH_ ORGANIZATION GF THE EXECUTIVE FRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT PRESS RELEASE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON 25, De Ceo Ter - Exctension 5491 nti “the secutive Branch of the Government. tov Ar yen “a, ia a report te the Congress: today on Intelligence Activities of the Gov- “ernment, the Hoover Gommisoion finds that such an arrangement 4s needed not only te review the efficiency. and effectiveness of the Intelligence effert, but also to reassure the people and inspire greater confidence in the trustworthiness of this phase of Federal operations. __ The Commission's recommendation involves the creation of two committees which might collaberate on important matters in this field, One would be a Joint Congressional committes on Foreign Intelligence, and the other would be a compact group of trustworthy private citizens to be named by the President and to serve on a part-time basis. The Intelligence fask Force, headed by General Mark We clark, now president ef the Citadel in Charleston, S.C., in a report to the Comission proposed the establishment of a "watch-dog't group for the same purposes, but ina different form. The task force urged the creation of a single small, permanent coumission by Act of Congress for the Intelligence surveillence Job, to be modeled after the Hoover Conmission and to include Members ef both Houses of Congress as well as distinguished private citizens. oo The other proposals of the task force, , Anvolving both adninistrative and legislative action and including broad recommendations for an anternal INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
| “its ‘basic statutory functions." Details and supporting factual matter relating to this recommendation were contained in a separate, highly classified report which was submitted by the task force to Mr. Hoover and presented by him directly to President Eisenhower. Much of this data could not be incorporated in the public report for security reasons. Both of the task force reports A based on exhaustive surveys in this country and first~hand studies abroad, emphasized that the major aim should be greater concentration on the collection of information about technological and military developments and plans of "our primary target!!l--the Soviet bloc-- and called for greater boldness and freedom of action for our Intelligence forces to overcome the present deficiencies in this country's knowledge of Communist plans. In a discussion of the State Department's responsibilities and the effect of foreign policies and diplomacy on Intelligence operations, the report said; "The task force has recognized the incompatibility in method between the practice of diplomacy and more direct and active operations incident to the collection of Intelligence and the conduct of eold war. While all contribute to the end in view, conflicts between them mst be resolved, usually on a high level, and always in the national interest. It must be realized that diplomacy is not an end in itself; that, while national ends mst be served and unjustifiable risks avoided, the collection of
c a . : : ste SS, a PURE SUC COMICLOCOLOLSL STG CMOSIC RESETS OCA LC ESCO eT SIT Scart e AST eETT ee : = tel se intelligence is a vital element in our national welfare and existence. Instances have come to the attention of the task force where too conservative an attitude has prevailed, often to the detriment of vigorous and timely action in this field." | The task force expressed the view that the legislation, and organizational set~up for Intelligence purposes are soundly conceived, but that administrative flaws have developed and it proposes remedies. "Failure to produce certain elements of intelligence has been due in part to the restrictive effects af some of our national attitudes and policies toward the collection of Intelligence so necessary for effective resistance to Soviet aggression," the report added, “Also, among some of those responsible for implementation of our foreign policy by diplomacy and negotiation, there seemg to exist an ebhorrence to anything that might lead to diplomatic or even protocol complications. "This negative attitude, usually at the desk level, at times has stifled initiative and action in the collection of intelligence. Some of these efforts, 4f permitted to proceed properly, might have brought direct and immediate results and made positive contributions to the national welfare that would have justified the attendant political risks and possible inconsequential diplomatic enbarrassment. "Security measures adopted by the Commmists have been provokingly con- ceived and boldly employed. They have been quite effective in comparison with our security measures, which have permitted the eollection of vital secrets in this country with relative ease. "The information we need, particularly for our Armed Forces » is poventially available. Through concentration on the prime target we mich exert every
a Zoceesvabre and practicable effort to get it. Success in this field depends h ‘on greater boldness at the policy level, a willingness to accept certain cal- culated political and diplomatic risks, and full use of technological capabilities." All elements of the Intelligence field wero surveyed by the task force, but major attention was paid to the CIA because of the special autonomous character of that agency and because "it is charged with the overall respens- ibility for coordinating the output of all the intelligence forces.!! The recommendations included provisions for lifting the prestige of the Intelligence forces, developing career ineentives, providing greater flexibility of recruitment of "the best qualified individuals, and relieving the shortage of trained personnel. They also enbraced suggestions for strengthening security surveys of Intelligence workers and employees of industrial plants engaged in "sensitive" work. In the matter of personnsl security checks, the task force had this to say: ‘The methods used for selection of personnel were reassuring in the light ef suspicions which have been voiced that subversive and Commnistic elements were readily infiltrating into these sensitive jobs. Our investigations indicated that the Intelligence leadership in all branches 1s alert to its responsibility and is functioning under strict rules to prevent any such infiltration. "One flaw in the present system, however, seems to be the absence of a general plan for periodic review of the security status of every person after employment in Intelligence activities, to guard against the possibility that some employee who was completely dependable and honorable when starting
Aevcen SSNS work might have changed character, fallen from grace, or succumbed to alien ‘ blandishments or some personal wealmess such as strong drink or sexual perversion.". To minimize this hazard, the task force recommended that measures be instituted in all agencies for rechecking the security status of all personnel engaged in Intelligence, at periodic intervals not to oxceed five years in any individual case. The Federal Bureau of Investigation makes such a periodic check of all its personnel. The investigations of the task force with respect to industrial personnel security indicated "a serious weakness! arising from the fact that an individual who has been declared to be a security risk although removed from work of a classified nature, might still be retained on some other work in the same plant, be in daily contact with workers engaged in sensitive production and enjoy freedom of movement within the plant. "The military departments are aware of the situation,' the task force _gaid, "and have recomended legislation to correct this deficiency. The task force commends such a proposal and feels that this loophole in our security barriers should be closed promptly. .. "Although detailed study of the policies, functions and procedures of the departments and agencies collecting and handling Intelligence data, as out- Lined to us by the Commission, did not primarily entail the investigation of the security angle of every individual engaged in Intelligence, we recognized the fact that the character of personnel affects these Intelligence functions , and we faced squarely the issue of individual cases under suspicion or brought to our attention from various sources, A mumber of names cane to us with supposedly derogatory information or merely with derogatory implications.
Dats Se EOS SON Cee Aere Cee iec lg tossccctis: starers Te antes IMENT Ne We ee then any sueh information or any name was brought to our attention from any source concerning individuals employed in the Intelligence field, or even if not so employed, every case except those obviously without merit was referred to the FBI, or where appropriate, to the responsible agency, or to both, with a request for a report. "Up to the time this report was prepared, some replies to our inquiry developed infcrmation to the effect that the records contained no adequate basis for suspicion of the individuals as security risks. Some replies indi- cated that the individuals were under investigation and that the investigations were contimiuing. One of the individuals is on leave without pay, pending completion of an investigation now in process, and appropriate disposition." The report by General Clark's group said its investigations showed that the "sensitive and vital work of the Intelligence community is being led by & group which is sincere and dedicated to the service of the nation,” and that : it felt the American people "can and should give their full confidence and support to the Intelligence program, and contribute in every possible way to the vital work." ttWe found the Director of Central Intelligence," it continued, "to be industrious, objective, selfless, enthusiestic and imaginative. We are con- vinced, however, that in his enthusiasm he has taken upon himself too many burdensome duties and responsibilities on the operational side of CIA's activities." The report suggested that the Director of CIA employ an executive director, or "chief of staff," so that he might be "relieved of the chore of many day-to- day administrative and operational problems, and tims be able-to give more time to the broad, overall direction of the agency and the coordination of the entire Intelligence effort."
fhe task ferce expressed concern over the "possibility of the growth of _ license and abuses of power where disclosure of costs, organization, person- nel and functions are precluded by law," as is the case with CIA. Although the investigation showed no indication of such abuses, as a matter of future dnsurance it recommended that its proposed watch-dog" commission including distinguished public-spirited citizens as members, be empowered by law to ask for and receive, under adequate safeguards against "leaks 9" any informa- tion from any source it might need for its own use. Within the Armed Services Committee, it explained, there is a liaison channel between the Congress and CIA which "serves a worthy purposett but which cannot include private citizens and does not encompass the wide scope of service and continuity which the investigators consider essential for this task. It found the same defect in more than a score of bills intreduced in this session of the Congress to provide for review of CIA's work. in a discussion of the evolution and growth of our Intelligence program, giving the public a@ clearer conception of the significance of the operations in modern times, the task force report says: "For self-preservation, the defenders of a free world need complete, prompt and continuing information on the plans and potentialities of those who would enslave it. Nations and people who value liberty and a sovereign national existence in a free world now look to the United States for leader- ship and inspiration in their struggle to safeguard these inherent rights. "In the historic family of nations, this country ranks as &@ comparative newcomer. In the early days of the Republic-=-not so long ago as the world measures time--our people felt comfortably distant from the hotbeds of foreign intrigue and conflict. + ee
ships and the pony express were so limited and so slow that they fostered a gerene assurance of isolation and geographical protection against possible aggressors. . - Our early philosophy of peace still prevails, but within our generation, and for our own protection, organized Intelligence has been forced upon us by the rapidly shrinking world of electronics, mclear weapons and planes which travel at supersonic speed. "The United States emerged from World War II as the political leader in free~world affairs and the outstanding military power. The advent of atomic bombs, together with the development of advanced methods for their delivery, intensified the need for adequate and timely intelligence so that we might — fulfill our responsibilities in international affairs and insure our ow "Effective Intelligence has become increasingly necassary for our pro- tection against the propaganda, infiltration, and aggressiveness of the Commmnist leaders. By trial and error, study and skill, we have made progress; but we must not labor under any complacent delusions. There is still mech to be done by our Intelligence community to bring ite achievements up to an acceptable level.' The task force report cites "the tremendous importance to our country of the Intelligence effort and the unpublicized and selfless duties performed," and says that these services "demand that the prestige of this functicn, and of the personnel involved, be recognized through the use of adequate career incentives and benefits te encourage full development of talent within the Intelligence community. “ To that end the task force recommends that the Executive Pay Bill of 19h9 be amended to increase the anmal salary of the Director of Central Intelligence
tame s “Ne "che equivalent of that of the Deputy Secretary of Defense ($20,000); to oy a ao eh st = . bring the pay of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence up to $17,500, the same as that of most under secretaries of the Executive Branch; and to provide operating directors of aress of responsibility in Intelligence with proportionate salaries. The recommendation further would provide that the chiefs of the various Intelligence units of the military services be elevated in the organizational structure to the level of Deputy Chiefs of Staff in the Army and Air Force, and Deputy Chief of Naval Operations in the Navy. Under this plan also the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1919 would be amended to provide additional medical end hospital. benefits and services for dependents of CIA employees when stationed overseas, similar to ths benefits authorized for dependents of the members of the Foreign Services; and statutory leave benefits, or accululation of leave, for employees of CIA overseas, as now applied to members of the Foreign Service. The task force calls attention to important contibutions which might be made to the Intelligence effort by retired civiliens with long business expe- rience in the foreign field, and suggests that "this resource should be exploited fully.tt It points also to the valuable reservoir of retired military personnel with foreign experience which might be utilized. One major advantage in the exploitation of these trained groups, accord- ing to the task force, would be the speed with which they could be Litted into the Intelligence picture. Certain outmoded restrictions now are placed on the full use of this pool of talent. To remedy this situation, the recommendation is made that the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 be amended to authorize the employment by the
“ 10 CIA of retired military personnel of the Armed Services twithout an arbitrary limitation on the mmber of such employees." The limit now is fifteen. Such personnel would be suthorized to accept either their military retirement pay plus any difference between their retirement pay and the proper pay of the © office they would hold in CIA, or the proper pay of the office, but not both. The recommendation further proposes that the Department of Defense make extensive use ef Schedule A of the Civil Service Regulations (non-competitive appointments) in the employment by the military services of civilian Intelli- gence analysts and other specialists tin order to provide the necessary flexibility in the recruitment of qualified civilian personnel and to facili- tate the interchange of such personnel between Zone of Interior competitive service and the overseas excepted service. Such appointments would take in retired citizens with wide previous business experience in the foreign field. Lack of adequate linguistic preparation often has proved to be a serious handicap to our representatives abroad," the task force further reports. "This became painfully apparent during the Korean War. The ability to write and speak the language fluently, and to interpret foreign words and idioms accu~ rately always helps an American to get around in a alien land, to win the confidence of its people, and to understand them." To meet the present deficiency, the task force recommends that a "compre- hensive, coordinated program be developed to extend linguistic training among American citizens serving the Intelligence effort; and that the Department of Defense expand and promote language training by offering credit toward Reserve commissions to ROTC students and drill credit to Reservs personnel for com- pletion of selected language courses." AS an added means of insuring adequate supervision over certain special- ized phases of Intelligence activities, the task force also urges that prompt
“7 vw Pa steps be taken "to introduce highly selective methods of choosing members of the coordinating committee on atomic energy Intelligence, not only to get the benefit of service by the most competent individuals, but also to assure long tenure in this inportant assignmente™ On the ground that efficient and economical handling of Intelligence information demands modern quarters for the personnel and records, General Clark’s group recommends that the Congress appropriate "as soon as possible" funds to construct adequate headquarters facilities for the CIA in or near Washington, De Ce It points out that after eight years of operation, the agency still lacks such facilities. The CLA is known to have its headquarters records and workers scattered about in more than thirty buildings here, some of them outmoded "temporaries" dating back to World War Ts A. bill now before the Congress cals for the erection of a central CIA structure estimated to cost about $50,000,000, with not more than $6,000,000 additional for an appropriate site and site improvementse Officials of the agency have estimated that about $2,920,000 could be saved annually if all of its offices, records and headquarters personnel could be brought under one reef. The savings would include $853,000 now spent for twenty-four-hour guard service in all buihdings and for extra guards necessary in protecting informa~ tion and records, orders and other material which must be shuttled about daily from one office to anothers; $607,000 in loss of time now required for officials and employees to get from building to building; $133,500 now being paid for some rented quarters; $80,000 for receptionists required ‘at each set of offices; $36,800 for shuttle service between offices; $32,800 in tele- phone mileage charges and $25,000 for PWX services; $69,900 for couriers and
a 2 _- messengers; $50,000 for building servicing; and more than $1,000,000 to pay for alterations and improvements to old buildings to keep them in suit- able shape and for heavy expense in moving and switching officese These expense items now are said to com to $3,800,000 a year, and could be cut to $880,000 a year in a single headquarters building, according to CIA estimatese The task force finds fault with the present system of gathering and assaying foreign scientific progress, and proposes new methods for handling this worke "Our Government and its Intelligence forces are not fully exploiting the possibilities of valuable military and technological data potentially available in scientific reports and technical publications issued in foreign countries," the report comments. "The State Department now is charged with this dutye Under this arrangements we lack adequate collection facilities and staff experts to evaluate the materiale" To correct this situation, it recommends that the responsibility for procurement of foreign publications and for collection of scientific Intelli- gence be removed from the State Department and placed in the hands of the Clay with authority to appoint such scientific attaches as may be necessary to carry on this work abroadet Serving with General Clark on the Intelligence Task Force were Admiral Richard Le Conolly (retired), of Brooklyn, now president of Long Island University; Ernest Fe Hollings, Lieutenant Governor of South Carolina; Hemry Kearns, manu~« facturer and executive, of La Verne, Calife; Captain "Eddie™ Rickenbacker, of New York, chairman of the board of Eastern Air Lines; and: Donald Se Russell, president of the University of South Carolina. The staff director was Hajor General James Ge Christiansen (retired) tAbiTtit
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25, D.C. JUL 1 1955 MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL GOODPASTER a: SUBJECT: Reproduction of the Report of the Task Force on Intelligence Activities. Permission is requested. to. reproduce approximately six copies of the main, body of: the. subject report and of Appendix 1. These additional copies are urgently needed in order to enable the numerous, elements. of the Department of Defense involved in intelli- gencs activities to make their contributions to the Departmest, of Defense comments. due. to the white House. . This office will undertake to insure that the additional copies are accounted for and destroyed after they have served this immediate purpose, and will inform you as soon as this. has been done. * ea G Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
/ / ene en THE WHITE HOUSE ae GLE 5G Lip ae a iit at wegers to EEE yf ely °. Pf Pa
Document removed by the staff of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library For further information, see entry / of the pink WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES) at the front of this folder
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COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT TASK FORCE CN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES GENERAL, ACCOUNTING OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON 25, D. C. The Honorable Herbert Hoover, Chairman, Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Washington 25, D. C. My dear Mr. Hoover: In my letter of submission of the Task Force Reports on Intelii- gence Activities of our Government, dated May 20, 1955, I indicated that the classified report was so assembled as to facilitate the dis- tribution of certain sections to the various departments and agencies to which they apply. You will recall that a number of recommendations which my Task Force made are of particular interest to and within the authority of the heads of various departments to adopt. The distrioution recan= mended in the attached table is designed to place in the nands of the neads of the deoartments and agencies affected so much of the report as pertains to their areas of responsibility. Tn addition to the single copy transmitted with my letter of May 20, 1955, a sufficient number of copies of the report have been reproduced to accomplish the distribution proposed herein. I suggest that these additional copies be placed at the disposal of the President, or his designated representatives Mark W. Clark, Chairman, Enclosure: Task Force on Intelligence Activities Table of Distribu- tion incerely,y 4
July 10, 1956 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DILLON ANDERSON In connection with the review your staff has been making of Department and Agency responses concerning the report of the Hoover Commissicn Task Force on Intelligence Activities, taire are attached CIA comments on those recommenda- tions of Chapter IV of the report which relate to matters of interest or concern to that Agency. Also attached is a copy of Chapter IV itself, to- gether with Department of Defense comments thereon. A. J. Goodpaster Colonel, CE, U S Army Staff Secretary
July 10, 1956 MEMORANDUM FOR | MR. DILLON ANDERSON Task Force on Intelligence Activities, there sre attached CIA comments on those recemmenda- tions of Chapter IV of the report which relate to matters of interest or coacera to that Agency. Also attached is & copy of Chapter IV itself, ta- gether with Department of Defense comments thereon. ; A. Jd. Goodpaster Colonel, CE, US Army
April 26, 1956 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JAMES LAY NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL In connection with the review you have been making of Department and Ageacy responses concerning the Report of the Hoover Commis- sion Task Force on Intelligence Activities, there are attached: a) a copy of Governor Adams' memorandum to Dr. Flemming re- gardiag the “Special Recommendation" in Appendix I, Part 2 of that report, and b) Dr. Flemmiag's responce to Governor Adams‘, enclosing copies of memoranda to Secretary Wilson, and from Secretary Wiisoa and Mr. Allen Dulles. A. Je Goodpaster Colonel, CE, U S Army Staff Secretary
The Assistant to the President ” March 2, 1956 - MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE ARTHUR FLEMMING SUBJECT: Report of the Heover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities {Appendix I, Part 2) Reference is made to your memorandum to Colonel Goo July 6, 1955 whereia you set forth general comments relative to the . “Special Recommendation" of the subject report which suggests: "That .. the President set up a special commission composed. of technically ie . sentatives, to survey and produce recommendations as to ways and means to insure the more effective utilization of all communications and electronics resources of the United States in the national iaterests in case of war or national emergency." On the basis of further analysis, it now appears ‘desirable that more detailed views on this "Special Recommendation” Se provided by the Office of Defense Mobilization, the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Accordingly, it ie requested that you obtain the views of the latter agencies with respect thereto and provide them to this office together with your own views concerning the substaxe of the Special Recommendation. <f ben 7 DECLASSIFIED E.0. 12885, See ay i ae vee LULU) v4 60
i< THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON 7. f? ran fe ky ZL / . “, . / /p ; a et ii a a : 7 / Yes ce we S Ler€ COA Oey ew
The Assistant to the President . March 2, 1956 MEMORANDUM FOR _ THE HONORABLE ALLEN W. DULLES Subject: Report of the Hoover Commisecion Task Force on Intelligence Activities (Main Report} Enclosed is one copy of Chapter IV of the main report on the subject and one copy of the Defense Department comments thereca. Aithough Chapter IV of the subject report is. concerséd primarily with the Department of Defense, it is noted thet cértain of the recommends- tions of that Chapter, of which the following sre zoted, also relate to matters of interest or concern to the Central i Eatelligence Agency: Recommendation No. a gn Ho, "437 137 179 204 204 205 205 205 WN & we = a Ww It is requested that you examines the above-listed recommendations mlong the lines of your earlier review of other. segments of the Report (as outlined in my memorandum to you “Gated June 13, 1955) and that you furnish your views thereon at your earliest convenience. The enclosed material should be returned to this office at the time you . furnish your views tacreon. ot DECLASSIFIED > TR RAE? €.6. 1204 & ©. 3-208 i va nick tr R UO ME 4G -Z2 #2 » DAL ee HD ef
The Assistant to the President cues March 2, 1956 MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE ALLEN W. DULLES Subject: Report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities (Main Report} Enclosed is one copy of Chapter IV of the main report on the subject and one copy of the Defense Department comments thercon. Although Chapter IV of the subject report is concerned primarily with the Department of Defense, it is noted that certain of the recommenda- tions of that Chapter, of which the following aré noted, also relate to matters of interest or concern to the Central Intelligence Agency: Recommendation No. * Page No. 137 137 179 204 204 265 205 205 Ww Nm Wom hw om le It is requested that you examine the shove-listed recommendations along the lines of your earlier review of other segments of the Report {as outlined in my memorandum to you dated June 13, 1955) and that you furnish your views thereon at your earliest convenience. The enclosed material should be returned to this office at the time you furnish your views tkereon. ‘ of DECLASSIEITS Eg. ht son 5294
>a February 17, 1956 MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE SUBJECT: Report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities (Main Report) Enclosed is one copy of Chapter IV of the main report on the subject and one copy of the Defense Department comments thereon. Although Gapter Iv of the subject report is concemeg sprimarhiy CEU ftrnnanr © with the Department of Defense, it is ped. . that {she Soaatins recom- of “6 mendations of that Chapter aiso relate to-matter os eT erest or con~ cern to the Central Intelligence Agency: Recommendation No. Page No. 137 137 179 204 204 205 205 205 FW WNRWH EF It is requested that you gzamine the above-listed recommenda- tions along the lines of youn, review cf other segments of the Report {as outlined in my memorandum to you dated June 13, 1955) and that you furnish your views thereon at your earliest convenience. The enclosed material should be returned to this office at the time you finish your views thereon. Sones Sherman Adams Assistant to the President DECLASSIFTER Ed. 17@4 Son 2204 a4 Q _ of renee
SRE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON 25. 0. C. OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR pe f “To Mer Z The Honorable Sherman Adams : Special Assistant to the President fale L The White House ‘ A Washington, D. C. Dear Governor Adams: Reference is made to my letter dated 15 June 1955 con- cerning certain allegations against employees of this Agency which your office received from the Hoover Cornmission and which you turned over to this Agency on 2 June 1955. a@aeecerersrereceerevecee es ean evrerseaeeeeaseoeece wa wseese sees sse een ee eer et = lt Re ewe meee eee ase eerrsreere reese eoes have been considered by senior officials in the Central Intel- ligence Agency and I have approved their findings that these employees should be retained in their employment under the provisions of Executive Order 10450. eooece eee reve a ee. dicated under Executive Order 10450. Iiiiiiiiiilis no longer an employee and although he has re-applied, his acceptance will depend upon a favorable determination of his case. I will advise you separately at that time. / \ Sincerely yours, HOCLALSIFIED PORTONA ELIVATED Authority 1. A tc8 EG. IE ie cei tee 7a CTA Lutes sofsgl le Srepeg SEA oe » HAE. aa she, HTN pees ee
Jd / / coPyYy February 15, 1956 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ANDERSON SUBJECT: Report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities In response to your request there follows a list of the recommendations of the subject report which Coyne has flagged as being of particular interest from the standpoint of the White House or the NSC. The list is keyed to Coyne's 1/20/56 memorandum (copy attached) which analyzes the entire report and agency comments thereori. The Main Report Page Noe Recommendation No. Action Agency 1 1 White House ~*~ 2 5 tt it: ae 3 7 NSC possibly 7 3 NSC 9 k NSC possibly a 13 10 tt n se UT th 1 ft tt , 1S Ti ty n 15 5 t tt 22 2 White House rH Appendix I, Part 1 iL 2 NSC possibly Appendix I, Part 2 kh 1L White House Appendix IT 2 5 NSC possibly 3 1 " tt Attention is directed to the fact that som: of the attachments require Special. Handling in line with COMINT regulations. / sf Ee Go S. Everett Gleason Coyne/MMC Acting Executive Secretary DECLASSIFIER Attachments — authority mk 14-4 | eee ee
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL February 17, 1956 MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL GOODPASTER: Per conversation. PR Cafe J. Patrick Coyne Attachment Colonel A. J. Goodpaster Staff Secretary. The White House ie Pon CLASSIFIED OF cLAssiFIed ATTACHMENTS A-3532
/ ey THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON February 1), 1956 Memorandum for: Colonel A. J. Goodpaster Staff Secretary The White House Subjects Report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities On December 15, 1955, at the President's direction, you referred the following documents to me for further action and recommendations as appropriate: (1) the subject Report, and (2) departmental and agency comments upon applicable sections of the subject Report. To facilitate consideration of the material which you referred to me, a member of the NSC Staff has prepared the enclosed memorandum and analysis dated January 20, 1956. When you have reviewed the attachments I suggest that we jointly consider the next step which should be taken with respect to the subject Report, with particular reference to those recommendations of the Report which suggest action by the White House and the National Security Council. I want to specifically call your attention to those segments of the enclosed memorandum entitled "Additional Action Required" and "Observations." Because they were prepared by the aforementioned NSC staff representative merely in an effort to point up particularly relevant areas of the subject, and because they were included merely for our guidance, it is requested that they not be further disseminated by you. It is my understanding that representatives of the Budget Bureau have reviewed the subject report and their written observations thereon are expected to be received momentarily. Until we have had an opportunity to review this matter jointly, I do not contemplate taking any further action with respect to the subject. The Report, however, will be retained by us and, pursuant to the recent approval granted by you, will be made available to appropriate representat}ves. of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligencd Activities. Pi7: Fat inal tala’ NG £# DILION ANDERSON YANN G- wy wa Special Assistant Enclosure By DOLE cof Wie) 18 [6] to the President _-PRbrREGRE !
+3) Cr foe a Ef & eet k Report on Intelligence Activities in the Federal Government ed for the Commission on Organization of the Executive Sranch of the Government By the Task Force on Intelligence Activities May 1955 of U. S. Foreign Intelligence Activities CHAPTER I - Brief Histor) This Chapter contains no recommendations. CHAPTER II ~ The Central Intelligence Agency (Pages 13-75). Recommendation 1 (page 72): That "covert intelligence" and "cold war" functions of the current DD/P be assigned to separate Deputy Directors whose areas of responsibility shall be administratively and logistically self-supporting. (A minority of the Task Force members did not concur in this recommendation, believing that "covert intelligence" and "cold war" operations should be under the staff and operating control of a single operating Deputy Director - as at present.) . Agency Comment: CIA opposes the recommendation on the grounds that: (1) "the experience of CIA during the period of separate operation prior to 1952 proved the operational disadvantages of attempting to conduct, on a secure and efficient basis, two world-wide clandestine organizations, each compartmented from the other"; and (2) organization of separate supporting elements for each of the clandestine services would be duplicative, costly and ineffective. Additional Action Required: Presidential decision as to whetner the Task Force (majority) recommendation or the contrary views of CIA should be adopted. Observation: CIk's view should be adopted since the majority proposal of the Task force has been tried previously and found less satisfactory than present organizational arrangements which combine the covert and cold war functions of CIA. (The CiA view is consistent with that of the Doolittle Committee whose survey of CIA's clandestine services was much more extensive tnan that made by the Task Force.) Recommendation 2 (page 73): That CIA be reorganized with a Director, a Deputy Director, an Executive Director, a general Secretariat, necessary staff sections and offices of the administrative and logistic services and an operating Deputy Director of Intelligence with seven operating offices thereunder, including an Office of Basic Intelligence. 3 Agency Comment: CIA concurs in the creation of, and has established, an Office of Basic Intelligence. CIA notes that tne balance of this recommendation consists of suggesting that the names of four of the offices under the Deputy PORTIONS EXEMPTED DECLESSITIED E.0. 12065, Sec. rate ) mek 9 923 ag NLE vate 2/15) _ a flaw
. Director of Intelligence be changed. CIA will change the name of one of + these offices shortly, but believes that little will be accomplished in effecting the other name changes suggested. Additional Action Required: None. Recommendation 3 (page 73): That CIA re-establish the Office of Executive Director to relieve the DCI of the necessity of having to devote a large part of bis time to the solution of many daily adninistrative and minor operational problems. Agency Comment: CIA is opposed on the grounds that the interposition of another command echelon would not necessarily accomplish the intended objective. CIA is giving this recommendation further study, however. Additional Action Required: None by the White House or the NSC. Observation: This recommendation does not involve any major policy con- Siderations. Internal reorganizations of the type recommended should be left to.the sound discretion of the agency head. Recommendation (page 73): That the status of the three major operating Deputy Directors be changed from Civil Service appointees (now Grade GS~18) to Public Law Presidential appointees, at an annual salary of $16,000. Agency Comment: CIA concurs in the recommended pay increases but thinks it unvise that the Operating Deputy Directors require Senatorial approval, particularly where an individual's background and competence in clandestine operations would nave to be reviewed. CIA has received no indication of any Senatorial desire to review CIA appointments, other than the appointments of the DOI and his Deputy. Additional Action Required: None by the White House or NSC. CIA is taking action through appropriate channels in an effort to obtain the pay increases recommended. - Recommendation 5 (page 73): That the "cold war™operating deputy director be designated as CI4ts representative on the Operations Coordinating Board to free the DCI to devote a greater share of his time to the Agency's intelligence functions. Agency Comment: CIA is opposed. It notes that the DCI is required to personally attend OCB meetings by virtue of a Presidential Directive, and that his participation in OCB meetings is not unduly burdensome. CIA notes further that the Deputy Director/Plans is clesely associated with OCB activity in trat CIA members of OCB working groups are draw from CIA's clandestine services. we Eo
y . weer i ah ae ve pene a pr eee . Adeitional Action Required: Presidential decision as to whether the Task Force recommendatior should be adopted. Observation: Beceuse the benefits derived from DCI's participation in 0C3 meetings outweighs the burdens occasioned by such participation, tne Task Force recommendation should be rejected. If this observation is concurred in advice should be commmicated to CIA as to the Fresident's reaffirmation of the directive thich provides for Del's membership on the OCB. Recommendation 6 (page 73): That a comprehensive internal management survey of the Agency be conducted by CIA within a year following the reorganization of CIA, as recommended by the Task Force. Agency Comment: CIA presently has in progress three concurrent programs of an internal management nature. Additional Action Required: None, at this time. Recormendation 7 (page 7): That all NSC, IAC, and DCI Intelligence Directives be reviewed by the IAC and otners concerned, with a view to establishing clearer areas of responsibility and to allocating intelligence tasks in accord with each agency's capability, interest, and paramount national responsibilities. Agency Corment: The DCI will recormend the establishment of an IAC Sub- committee to review all such Intelligence Directives, as necessary, to clarify areas of responsibility or reallocate tasks. Additional Action Reauired: Action at appropriate levels (IAC, DCI, NSC) to be taken on the besis of the review of Intelligence Directives being initiated by CIA. SCeewevresreeeeereeceewre eerste see essneeresneseseonnesenseneense eee ere ene twee wate tose eeresere ever eerereeeersesreeeeeeeeeas ~~ et Pee eee sesetrsesrenesesresesretreesreneeeteeresesreeesreorsreraerererene ero eee eeeseearereeeee treet ereer ee neeeseerseeen etree neetrewnaseee? ee a ena sme reeerer eee sees et ete eensceceeseereteeeerereseatstaseeeer eres se eoeToeseeeseeeooeneeereeas ete tm eer ea sere etree erE sere eeeetaeteeaeereeer sere reer eeraneeseoeease Ceo eet e se eee crest ete ewnetantnesaewraeesrseersnane een eseeurseaeseeeore ee eee etree stew coren arene ereeaneaneerareseoereoseereeereseeeeesereeess eeeewneeteowntawrsteneeeennecseee sees eee seenezn eer eetenenwneer eee rsrse @seeerevraeneeeeneeerereteosene serene eseseseeenseeoreeensaeeeeeoe Peeeeecererezrecvees ee eeeseeseseerseeeeeresruaneerasnaaeesrenn ease nn eerste eeeeseerereeeasreeeas Poe o reese ereereae tester eee Bee eee eeeoeeeseeane tet eeaeenereneend ere reser seer ereereeesr earners ne COFeF eter eee ween eteeresseseo se eerrnerseet nse eeeaneesn nana senes « ees eee eet esn tessa eeeeseen sete ereneanesensn teen ne testes veseeeeseereeerosnee i i i ee ee) Additional Action Required: None by the ifhite House or the NSC.
Recommendation 9 (page 74): That the Scientific Estimates Committee be abolished “- and in lieu thereof there be established under the IAC a Scientific Intel-  ‘Iigence Committee with appropriate subcommittees to insure commmity-wide coordination. . Agency Comment: CIA is in general agreement with this recommendation. The substance thereof is under active consideration in the IAC. Additional Action Required: None, other than the normal actions which will flow from IAC consideration of the recommendation. . Recommendation 10 (page 7h): That the effectiveness of CIA's security program be re-evaluated to establish a system assuring personnel security rechecks on a minimm five year basis. Agency Comment: CIA reports that the recommended program has been in effect as of March 26, 1955 and, in addition, that there is a continuing review made of the security of its employees, including automatic rechecks in the case of personnel actions, such as transfers, promotions, appointments to special activities, etc. Additional Action Required: None. Recommendation 11 (page 74): That Congress be requested to appropriate funds to construct adequate CIA housing facilities in or near Washington. Agency Comment: CIA reports this has been done. ss Adcitional Action Required: None. Recommendation 12 (page 7h): That the CIA Act of 1949 be amended to authorize employment of "any" (instead of 15 now authorized) retired officers or warrant officers of the Armed Services; and to authorize overseas personnel additional dependent medical benefits and employee leave accumlations equivalent to those authorized for Foreign Service personnel. Agency Comment: CIA would welcome an increase in the number of retired officers of the Armed Services authorized to be employed by the Agency. It believes that the authorized number should be between twenty-five and fifty. CIA concurs in granting additional Foreign Service benefits for dependents as well as leave benefits and leave accumlations for CIA employees. (Current inquiry of CIA reflects the Agency has prepared draft legislation - now being processed by the Budget Bureau ~- designed to authorize employment of as many as forty retired oificers of the Armed Services, as well as draft legislation
designed to carry into effect the Task Force recommendations concerning CIA personnel, their leave accumlations, and additionel medical benefits for dependents of CIA emloyees stationed abroad.) Additional Action Required: None. mmendation 13 (page 75): That legislation be sought to increase the annual salary of the DCI to $20,000; to increase the comensation of .the Deputy DCT to $17,500; and to authorize the appointment of an Executive Director of CIA at an annual salary of $16,000. Agency Comment: The recommended increases in the salaries of the DCI and the Deouty DCI have been included in proposed amendments to the Executive Pay Bill of 19)9. CIA, as indicated in Recommendation 3 above, opposes establishing the office of Executive Director, but is giving further study to the Task Force recommendation on this point. Additional Action Required: None. CHAPTER III - The Department of State (Pages 76-88). Recormendation 1 (page 87): That the personnel strength of the Intelligence Area be maintained at 2 level consistent with functional responsibilities end work load. ; Agency Comment: State concurs. An increase of ten persons for the present fiscal year nas been authorized for the Intelligence Area. State is budgeting a substantial increase for its intelligence function in fiscal year 1957. Ldditional Action Required: None. Recommendation 2 (page 88): That HSCID No. 10 be revised to place responsibility for collection of information in the basic sciences in CIA. Agency Comment: State reports that while it is not possible to comment favor=- ably or unfavorably on this recommendation at this time, meetings on the subject are being held with CIA and every effort will be nade to develop a satisfactory solution. Additional Action Required: Action is dependent upon the outcome of the State-CIA meetings mentioned above and on the IAC review of all Intelligence Directives (to which reference is made in Chapter II, Recommendation 7). -5- A SECEET-
: a . . . ne veriodic review - 2 jon 3 (page 88): That State finalize its plans for the periodic eviey Eece See conned coming within the provisions of Executive Order 50. of t e t i i nought to the matter and agrees a Coz 3 tate has given substantial t ! ; ae ee for periodic review should be carefully considered. Through ite norpal chennels State will pursue the matter with interested agencies, such as Justice and the Civil Service Commission. . ron oh (page 88): peewee cen acne Peete eeees ee bo wpe aeunvnee see ze eoeene a | siesseccceenl 2: trcceecccce ell {te ** e© eee ewrevans ee aa a a eo a a i re ees eeeee Seen eae te eeeeeneworv ee enaevee eetne 7 @ @e@ toe eee eneseeaae oe eeeas eoeree eet awe Jo ee ese reson ne ee Se meme cnne eee nae a . ee eaeane eeee e@em eee Wee ercreesrnce ee ae enee eons eenroeee bee anscesnaen-- a a eeee a a . ; cenneei? Int Piiiiiiiis: : Recomnendation 5 (z eee Dtirtii: seeiititiiiiii ve eee tee acca lee nae wees eeee tee sae tecaee a a a a ans oe oe oe coos ewe ° a a a a ee eeeeaeeve eeerervrevsare eee * ovr eevee veaenanse 2e®ceeseee ese upeana ev, e@neesen esereeeceesa aes . Co pee eeeevsece ew eeeneeoease e@e@eeeeeaeve bere a acoue a pe ee PESOS ESEEESEEE EEE ETE eee Tee eee eee EEs ee ese eh waa mener-* -~ Peewee enacecesce : mae orem on CHAPTER IV - The Devartment of Defense (Pages 89-205). A. Office of Svecial Overations (Pages 89-9) ° ee rere ne ener, nN Rn j j j ew R endation 1 (page 94): That DOD Directive 5105.7 be examined with a vie ae clarifying and eliminating any ambiguities which oe wthoraty nf 0803 interoretation of the functions and misanplication fe) e ele ates and ti t tne relationships of 050 with tne intelligence organi zat on re 50s cod the military departments be spelled out more specifically to r possibilities of friction and misunderstanding. y Z irecti is ambiguous. ney Comment: DOD does not consider that the Directive 3s antes 5° ex re Dad will give continuing attention to the operations o ; the Directive.
Additional Aetion Reauired: None, beyond that referred to in DOD's comment. B. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (Pages 9h-99) This Section contains no recommendations. C. Department of the Army (Pages 99- 37) . Recommendation 1 (page 137): That the Army Attache System be manned to permit full exploitation of its collection potential and that present personnel ceilings imposed by DOD be lifted in order to achieve greater flexibility and permit more extensive prior training of assigned personnel. Agency Comment: DOD agrees with the concept calling for maximum exploitation of the intelligence potential of the Atteche System. it does not agree that present personnel ceilings are seriously inhibitive. DOD reports that its eilings on Attache strength (in the three services) are flexible; that DOD now has underway a program for consolidating and simplifying the Attache functions of the services; and that it is studying ways of improving selection and training of Attaches. Additional Action Required: Final decision by DOD as to lifting personnel ceilings in the Attache System. Recommendation 2 (page 137): That the (Army) Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, be elevated to the level of Deputy Chief of Staff. Agency Comment: DOD does not concur. It notes that the top staff of the Army was recently bly reorganized following a balanced consideration of all its aspects and it concludes that it would be premature to reorganize now as recommended, particularly since legislation would be necessary to achieve the Task Force's recomnendation. Additional Action Required: None by the White House or the NSC. Gbservation: This recommendation does not involve any major policy considerations. Internal reorganizations of the type recommended should be left to the sound discretion of the agency head. a a i ) 2 a) Pee Cer nme rere er eae mare ececce seater ansnecaasnenaszr sens escovceveocrtuacceoancunnennceecgeegneg gene se ew ee ee we ee mC ee He ee ttm emt mer were eee eaeore reer ansneerenemravrecereersecernereese se wane sen ee ewe neers escent neces e mn eee eserves seeerr :- alain es
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FOP SECRET Recommendation 6 (page 137): That the Army aggressively attack the linguist problem by developing and using outside sources for training in colleges and universities through the method of (for example) its comprehensive ROTC and Reserve programs. Agency Cozment: DOD reports that considerable use is now being made of civilian facilities for the purpose indicated, but that the problem involves quality rather than quantity and is most accute in the case of rare languages. The recommendation concerning POTC language training requires further study. , Additional Action Required: Decision by DOD following its further study. ee Recommendation 7 (page 137): That measures be instituted for the periodic security rechecking of rersonnel assigned in sensitive areas at intervals not to exceed 5 years. . Agency Comment: DOD believes that its current security practices essentially fulfill the objectives of this recommendation. The general subject will be reviewed by DOD however to insure that the wuderlying objective of the recom- mendation is adequately served. . Additional Action Required: Apart from the review referred to by DOD, no additional action is required. D. Department of the Navy (Pages 138-156) Recommendation 1 (page 156): That the Navy put its counterintelligence program on a@ wider base so as to bring its worldwide protection up to an adequate level. Agency Comment: DOD concurs but believes that the actual method of expansion should be further investigated. Additional Action Required: Further investigation as suggested by DID, followed by action consistent with its investigative findings and with the objective of establishing an adequate counterintelligence program in the Navy. Recommendation 2 (page 156): That the Navy provide for periodic review of the security status of intelligence personnel who come within the provisions of Executive Order 1050. Agency Comment: DOD believes that its current security practices essentially _ fulfill the objectives of this recommendation. The general subject will be reviewed by DOD however to insure that the underlying objective of the recommendation is adequately served.
Additional Action Required: None. Recommendation 3 (page 156): That the Navy expand its intelligence collection effort. Agency Comment: See DOD's comment on Recommendation 1 of the Task Force Report on the Department of the Army, (page 7, above). Additional Action Recuired: Final decision by DOD as to lifting personnel ceilings in the Atteche Systen. Recommendation (page 156): That the Navy continue and expand its efforts to improve intelligence consciousness at all ranks and levels of the Department. Agency Comment: DOD concurs. Instruction on the mission and role of intel- ligence is included in the regional training schools, intelligence centers , and in the curricula of line schools at all levels. Additional Action Reawired: None. E. Department of the Air Force (Pages 156-179) Recommendation 1 (page 178): That the position of Director of Intelligence, Air Force, be raised to that of a Deputy Chief of Staff. Agency Comnent: DOD does not concur. It notes that the Task Force made a similar recommendation (which DOD opposes) with respect to the Director of Intelligence, Army, but that it made no recommendation respecting the position of the Director of Naval Intelligence. Additional Action Reowired: None by the White House or the NSC. Observation: This recommendation does not involve any major policy considerations. internal reorganizations of tne type recommended should be left to the sound discretion of the agency head. Recommendation 2 (page 178): That a limited number of civilian personnel spaces for Air Force Intelligence be exemt from certain Civil Service requirements. Agency Comment: DOD concurs in general and has initiated a thorough study of the problem . Additicnal Action Required: Decision by DOD following its study of the problem.
a Recommendation 3 (page 178): That a board or commission be established to make | ~=“in equitable and coordinated allocation among the member agencies of personnel spaces. exempt from certain Civil Service requirements. Agency Comment: DOD has initiated a thorough study of the problem. Additional Action Required: None, pending the comletion of DOD's study. Recomnendation (page 178): That the Air Attache System be maintained at a Tevel wich will insure an adequate collection capability snd that Air Attache qualifications be commensurate with the collection potential of the station. Agency Comment: See DOD's comment on Recomuendation 1 of the Task Force's Report on the Department of the Army (page 7, ebove). Additional Action Reauired: Final decision by DOD as to the Attache Systen, its aGequacy, Dersonnel strength, training, qualifications, etc. Recommendation S (page 179): That an Intelligence Research Center be established under CiA to guide the total intelligence research program. Acency Coment: DOD notes that each service intelligence agency and OTA conduct research programs and it agrees that a common research service would be desirable. However, it believes that the effort to establish such a center "should be under the DCI acting for the IAC and not under the CIA." Additional Action Required: Joint consideration of this recomnencation by the LAC agencies. Observation: It would appear desirable that CIA be apprised of, and be afforded an opportunity to comment on, this recormendation.— This is particu- _ Marly so if the "additional action" indicated above is not taken (if such action is taken, CIA will automatically have such an opportunity by virtue of its identification with the LAC). Recommendation 6 (pare 179): That a board be esteblished to supervise declassi- mecommendation © \Pag t fication of security information. Agency Comment: DOD does not concur. It believes such a procedure would be cumbersome, and is of the view that its present practices in this area are adequate. Additional Action Required: None, because ultinate responsibility for such matters is lodged in the head of the Department concerned. -12-
. Reco . imendation 7 (page 179): That a periodic examination be made of Air Force Sntelligence publications to assure justification for both the publication and Gistribution thereof, Agency Cozment: DOD concurs; the recomended action is now being implemented. Additional Action Reauwired: None. Recomzendation 8 (page 179): That mechanical and electronic devices to analyze, cuzssify, file, and produce intelligence information be put into use at the acrliest possible mmnent. gency Coment: DOD concurs. It believes that automation in intelligence proiuction has undoubted value and it notes that considerable investigation has been conducted along the lines indicated in this recommendation. Additional Action Reauired: Implementation of the recommendation by DOU. Recommendation ? (page 179): That all possible resources be used to exploit technological means for intelligence collection. Agency Comment: DOD concurs, advising that the recommendation is currently receiving attention. Additional Action Required: None (assuming the attention being afforded this matter by DOD results in the implementation of this recommendation). Recommendation 10 {page 179): That the use of "overflights" to secure vital infor- mation receive constant consideration. Agency Comment: D3D concurs, noting that the constant support of other U. S. Government agencies is required if full results are to be achieved. (DOD observes that woon resolution of some of the details involved in this recommendation, it may te advisable to seek HSC action thereon.) Additional Action Reavired: Presidential and/or NSC consideration following receipt of DOD's recomzendation on the subject. Recommendation 11 (page 179): That the Air Force develop adequate procedures for the periodic security review of personnel occupying sensitive positions. Agency Comment: DID believes that its current security practices essentially fulfill the objective of this recommendation. The general subject will be reviewed hy DOD however to insure that tne underlying objective of the recommendation is adequately served. §@ Glew -13-
inal hin ee oo oN Tay te mae rt Ll irtibrticts- rs oe eae | tional Action Reauired: Apart from the review referred to by DOD, iditio ; AX see tional action is required. 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DoD concurs in this two-fold recommendation. I+ favors an NSCID for the purpose of aefining 4230's intelligence responsibility; but it believes that since the JABIC is a subcommittee of the IAC, a DOID (rather than an NSCID) will suffice to carry out the latter part of the recommendation. Additional Action Recwired: None, pending completion of TAC's processing of the directives envisezed by this recczomerdation. . cose asnvree ee eweseon eeee Recomne:.dation 3 (page 220): That the ASC define the responsibility and functions of its Division of Intelligence. Acency Comment: AC resorts that its Division of Intelligence has received the informal concurrence of the other intelligence agencies es to its national intelligence responsibilities. Yrollowing Comission consideration thereof, tne intelligence agencies will be formally notified of sane. . sacs tional Action Reavired: None. Recommendation h (page 220): That each of the mexber ecencies of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee insure that it is reoresented on that Comnittee by the best qualified individual available concerning the matter under dis- cussion, and that changes in representation be mace as infrequently as practicable. Agency Comment: ABC concurs. AC reports that every effort has been and will ‘continue tu be mace to comly with this recommendation. CIA reoorts that it has pressed for the assignment of the best quelified personnel to the Committee, and it notes that the record of the Comnittee in the matter of continuity and length of tenure is 2 very favorable one. DOD concurs in this recommendation noting that it will continue to make every effort to insure the fulrillment thereof. . State revorts that it has been following the practice recommended by the Task Force. Additional Action Required: Kone. TTS ritteeee eee DIDDIDIIIILIDIEDEEEEEEEEDIDDIDIIID PIlIniit: fitii: . SEeereee veces : wteeeauneene ee ee . . - . . . . . . . . e Ce ee 2) ad aae * eee eerove eorae . Py ° . ° eave * * 2 « . - . . see eseess e . ‘ . Poe ere ne nernere Ce oe er 2 I Lilii titre cc cece eee ° ees ee aeee eee eee eee ec eawe we ae - eater ene aera nas ee er ry a 2 on ee eeee teoaneneoe See eee eerees - -l17- ory ihe) = F fi] wey reek Se | « pon oe
. secre sose boos erneeeeererrseone CC ee) errllilose lies. .: telilelse .2N Slee oer eererere sre eenee ee oe ee? lest se eeeresereserene ee oe eecnaeevenan eaves eooeees soe ae ee eeceewe weeovee wseoeee eee ve ere ececar eeneooe eooeevee eee oe eererees oeees on eenee eee ee weve race acaerve oeeene see e« ore wenen eooee eceeoe vee ae oeeeeeece wooave weoewne eee oe ceenesce oweee meses eae oe coe eewse wneee 8 eee CO ey erecesece eoane seee wees eee eeerewnsnas eons eran aeeee aeee erm ee wer vresrrecenece a ee) eeoeee evee ere erevevreoereerenee woo mevene eeeoe eeeoe SO ed ee « eonne eoocose ere reer esr esr erevrer er ee) eoevee eceoe eeoeceeceerer rere eves eer etree tee nas eeeee eore ee ey ae 7 eeoeererawrecar ee ee eee rrr tt ee eee eee secveetoneeee DOD concurs in this recommendation. State concurs. In order that the National Intelligence Estimates may reflect the full extent of available intelligence in this field, State recomnends specific courses of action which appear avpropriate for IAC consideration. Adcitional Action Reawired: Consideration by the Iac CHAPTER VI ~- The Federal Bureau of Investigation (Paces 221-226). This Chepter contains no recommendations. HASTE: telligence Production (Pares 227-2hy Recommendation 1 (page 24): That an agreed glossary of intelligence terms be produced and reviewed periodically. Agency Comment: DOD agrees and suggests’ that an IAC Subcommittee be appointed to produce it. State has no particular difficulty in this area, but it will be pleased to assist T4C in implementing the recomsendation. CIA reports that it has comiled a glossary of intelligence terms and that action will be taken through the IAC to secure acceptance thereof as the authoritative dictionary of intelligence nomenclature. Additional Action Reavired: Completion of the project by the IAC. eeoee oeeee eevee erecee eweoees eooeresenere eeaereenast 62") re ee * wn a ay se | pnd i £F, wie
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HPSEC aa Recommendation 2 (page 254): That the State Departnent's orograzs for integration and expansion of the Foreign Service and for acceleration of lanzuage and area training be pursued vigorously. Azency Comment: State reports that this matter is tne subject of vigorous action at all levels of the Department on a continuous and top priority basis. ChaPTER IX - Personnel (Pazes 255-27h). Recomnsendation 1 (sase 273): That DOD give consideration to the exploitation of the ROTC and reserve intelligence programs for language training purposes by offering credit toward reserve commissions and drill credits respectively, for the completion of selected language courses. Agency Comment: DOD notes that considerable use is now being mace of civilian facilities tor the purpose indicated in this recommendation; that the problen involves quality rather than quantity: that the recommendations concerning noTG language training reqwire thorough study: and that it would be umvise to give blanket accreditation for lang guage work rezardless of the type of service for wixicn the trainee is destined. Additional Action Required: Comletion of BD's study and consideration of the recomnendation. Recommendation * (page 273): That DOD conduct periodic surveys of service personnel procedures to insure that adequate consideration is being given to the require- ments of the intelligence agencies for their share of the best qualified military personnel. Agency Comment: DOD does not concur. DOD believes its current practices are adequate. It agrees that the highest practicable standards should be applied in the selection of attache personnel. Additional Action Required: None, assuming DOD's current vractices are in faci adequate. Recommendation 3 (pase 273): That DOD reauire that the iilitery Services study the problem of improving the prestige of the civilian analyst vis-a-vis his military colleagues. Acenc.: Comment: DOD concurs, noting that in practical terms there is no easy solution to this vroblem. DOD resorts much has beer done on the problem and that it will keep same under review. Recommendation (pace 273}: That DOD facilitate the explo-vment as intellicence specialists of qualified retired military personnel by initiating action toward anending the laws concerning rederal emlo;ment of retired military personnel, witn a view to removing the present ceiling on the Federal vay of such individuals. Tir x “ys ae eller al r Nereei =. . 90 - SPEBET
t ' i ‘ Agency Comment: DOD believes present laws on this subject are too restricted; =~ the other nand it is fearful lest statutory amendments be such as to permit retired officers with intelligence exserience to automatically find emsloyment as civilian intelligence analysts. LOD reports that the CSC has developed a proposal to relax existing legislative requirements along the general lines of this recomnendation. aan Additional Action Reouired: Executive Branch processing of CSC's legislative proposal and suomission thereof for Congressional consideration. Recommendation 5 (page 273): That DOD give consideration i» more extensive use of Schedule A" in the employment of civilian analysts and other intelligence specialists, in order to provide necessary flexibility in the recruitment of qualified civilien personnel by the military services, and to facilitate the interchanze of such personnel between the Zone of Interior competitive service and the overseas excepted service. Acency Comment: DOD agrees that greater flexibility in hiring and in the ability to shift civilian sersonnel between the cone of the Interior and foreign stations is essential. It velieves a degree of relaxation of Civil Service regulations is desirable to deal with these problems. DOD has initiated a thorough study of the matter. Additional Action Reazired: Aporopriate action by DOD following corpletion of its study of the problem. Recommendation 6 (page 273): That DOD, in the consideration of future economes, Give proper weight to the importance of intelligence in peace time, so as to avoid serious reductions-in-force in our centers of intelligence production. Azency Comment: DOD concurs, noting that the purpose of this recommendation can ve further served by applying such reductions-in-force as do occur to overhead positions rather than to basic productive elements. Recommendation 7 (page 27): That DOD take prompt action to insure that proper consideration in personnel planning is given to the impact or the time lag involved in our present clearance requirements for filling sensitive positions. Agency Comment: DOD believes this recommendation requires further study. Additional Action Reavired: Further study and appropriate action by DoD. CHAPTER X - Security (Paces 275-253). - Recommendation 1 (page 273): That any individual emloyed in an intelligence organi- zation “about whom sufficient doubt concerning his security has been raised see. shovld be removed Zrom employment vending Tinel determination of his case." . € cB mm re Len a ~ 21 - ARP RE ‘or ET * say
Agency Comment: DOD considers that its current security practices and pro- cedures essentially fulfill the objectives of this recomiendation. However, it reports that the general subject will be reviewed in order to insure that those objectives are adequately served. CIA reports that it is carrying out the intent of this recommendation in that it adheres carefully to Executive Order 10450 wich provides for the suspension of Federal employees ynen a reasonable doubt exists as to their security status. State reports that "this recommendation reauires no implementation in the Department of State" .... since State's regulations do not preclude exployee suspensions in such circumstances. Additional Action Reowired: Strict adherence to Executive Order 1050 by the agencies concerned - such adherence will accomplish the objective of this recommendation. Observation: State has missed the point of this recommendation. All agencies how have the authority to suspend emloyees under the circumstances indicated in the recommendation. The soint the Task Force appears to be making is that some of the agencies fail to suspend when there is sufficient cause and it is the Task Force's view that in the intelligence organizations of our govern- ment in particular, such suspension should occur pending final determination of the employee's case. Recommendation 2 (page 283): That the "findings and proposed disposition of those cases which were reported as still in process at the time the survey by this Task Force was concluded should be reported to the President." Agency Comment: DOD did not comment on this point. CIA noted that under normal reporting procedures as established by Executive Order 1050, information is furnished to the Civil Service Comission or the FBI on such cases, and that thereafter the status of such cases is available to the President,through the executive agencies he has designated, to report on the imlementation of Executive Order 1050. State advises that detailed reports concerning the very small percentage of such emloyees in its Intelligence Area have been made available to the Civil Service Commssion, and that CSC makes a composite report periodically on such cases in all government agencies. Observation: CIA and State seem to have missed the point of this recommendation. (DOD did not comment upon it at all.) If the recommendation is deened to have validity, the White House may wish to request that the neads of the intelligence agencies concerned report the jindings and Gisposition of alleged security risk cases (in their intelligence areas) in process at the time the Task Force concluded its survey.
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CLLPTER EII - Useos and Libraries (Paces 293-305). Recommendation 1 (pege 305): That tne LAC consider the adoption of @ single index ysten based on the Trtelligence Subject Code now in use by CIA. oment: CIA end DOD concur. CIA reports trav this recomnendstion ts currently under stucy in a special subcommittee of the IAC. The subcommittee is expected to report to the IAC within the next few Weeks. bo rt Ww ‘3 re) rt ] C3 . CERPTER XIII — Coordination in Overseas Areas (Pazes 306-309 ? Recommendation 1 (page 309): That senior military commanders in tne Fielc be given greaver ilexibility in their use of information on a need-tc-!mow giving due regard to the- protection of its scurce. bBewesaeeevrern- ~ Loency Comment? ftitliiiiiiiiiifiiininininiiiniiiiiiioiinninit SOIT a eoser eee eeese eee ever . es ee > DOD considers thet "current practices in the DID are satisfactory within the regulations imosed by other acencies." SLPTER KIV - Develooment of Kew Equipment Recommendation 1 (sage 311): That the TAC take positive action to insure that 2 —7“aofinite and concerted effort is made to develop new techniques, methods and equipment for the collection and. production of intelligence and insure that a free exchange of information concerning such projects is accomplished within the intelligence commnity. woe ewe ee ee a erse eeose ee ee oeee eee oe pee ete ecese rete secccewc sen ecereccss eave a ee eooee eee . re a a ee ee a eees eccee eer eesreescn ooee oes . | i a ee eocee eceooee a ee eeaeee ewer eee epeceoeere eres erene ~eoeoee ener eeeeoe ee ovawae beowea . eene ence eoee eserves a ee coene brit: eaee oerore eooee eocoee eo eee r error eres ese seaee ovee eeece Ae eocee ee ewveece yeoeee wee rernseerenereeresere seeee Pe eee rena ee ee eesereeeeresseeeern nm DOD concurs, stating that continuing efforts are being devoted to fulfiliment of this recommendation. DOD observes that in all cases full effectiveness can be achieved onl; with a frank and free interchange of information. State concurs, noting that it has initiated a nunber of steps in social science, psychological and research areas, 2ll of which are designed to further the objective of this recommendaticn. - 2h - aoe nee
CHAPTER XV - “iatch-Doe"™ Commission (Pares 312-317): -Recommendation 1 (page 317): That a small, permanent, binartisan commission, cormosed of members of both Houses of tne Congress and other public-spirited citizens commanding the utmost national respect and confidence, be established byy Act of Congress to make periodic surveys of the organization, functions, policies, and resvlts of the Government agencies handling foreign intelligence operations; and to report, under adequate security safeguards, its findings and recommendations to the Congress, and to the President, annually and at such other times es may be necessary or adviseibie. The proposed "watch-dog" comission should be empowered by law to demand and receive any information it needs for its own use. % would be patterned after the Cormission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (Eoover Comzission). Appointments by the Fresident of persons from private life to the proposed commission shoulé be made from a select list of distinguished individuals of unquestioned loyalty, integrity, and ability, with records of unselfish service to the nation. hcency Comient: CIA does not concyr in this recommendation. CIA believes, with the Hoover Cormnission itself, that "while mixed Congressional and citizens committees for temporary service are useful and helpful to undertake specific problems and to investigate and make recommendations, such committees, if permanent, present difficulties." CIA points out that it now reports to the Armed Service Committees of the Senate and House, and to the Senate and House fpprovriations Committees. As @ consequence Cla does not consider tnat a Joint Congressional Committee would add any essential helpful element. CIA does concur, however, in the appointment (as recommended by the Hoover Commission, but not by its Task Force) by the President of a committee of experienced private citizens to examine and report periodically on the work of the Government's foreign intelligence activities. DOD believes that the permanent, bipartisan commission recomended by the Task Force would afford improved protection for, as well as efficiency in, foreign intelligence operations. Additional Action Reawired: None, in view of the establishnent on danuary 13, 1956 by the President of a Board of Consultants to review veriodically the foreign intelligence activities of the Government. CHAPTER XVI - Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations (Pages 216-3h8). This Chapter is merely repetitious of information appearing earlier in the Keport. Conclusions and recommendations are restated in verbatim fashion in some instances; in other instances they are paraphrased and conbined with still other opinions and recommendations contained in the body of the revort. This Chapter does not appear to contain any new information. It merely restates, repeats, and re-exphesizes certain of the points previously made.
en eto se ea essere can st se se gso-amenseusesas . = a En EFS % 8.0% en Report on Intelligence Activities in the Federal Government Prepared for the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government By the Task Force on Intelligence Activities May 1955 Appendix I Part 1 - The National Security Agency (Pages 1-58) - - Recommendation 1 (page 1,6): That NSC direct USCIB to establish COMINT requirements in the light of COMINT realities and consideration of capabilities of other intelligence sources. This operational guidance to NSA should be so clear and succinct as to require minimm interpretation of what is required and of its degree of importance. USCIB should be primarily concerned with end products and the Director, NSA, should determine the best way of producing same. If USCIB fails after a reasonable Length of time to provide more adequate guidance to the Director, NSA, the latter should be made a member of the IAC. Agency Comment: USCIB considers the first part of this recommendation to be in hand in that a revised COMINT requirements list, prepared with NSA participa- tion, has been approved by a Working Committee within USCIB and will soon be presented for USCIB approval. With respect to the second part of the recommenda tion, USCIB does not believe that NSA membership on the IAC should be related é to the development of or failure to develop USCIB directives or requirements. DOD concurs, but is doubtful that the problem to which the latter part of the recomnendation is addressed would be solved by malkcing the Director, NSA, a member of the IAC. DOD is presently crystalizing its views on the general subject of intelligence and on the ultimate organization of the top structure of U. S. intelligence. DOD proposes to discuss the matter with State and CIA and hopes in due course, together with those agencies, to arrive at an agreed proposal for submission. Additional Action Required: As to COMINT requirements - none. As to NSA's membership on the IAC - defer decision pending a determination as to whether USCIB's revised COMINT requirements constitute sufficient guidance for NSA. (In the interim consideration should be given to granting observership status on the IAC to the Director, NSA.) oe Recomnendation 2 (page 8): That the Director, NSA, be given clear cut directives Which will enable him to make much greater and continuing effort to produce high level commmications intelligence. This is of such great imortance that monetary considerations should be waived and an effort at least equal to the Manhattan Project should be exerted at once. (It is noted that in forwarding Appendix I, Part 1, the Task Force indicated that "the importance of the adoption of Recommendation 2 is especially emphasized - this is believed to CXCHIPTES E.0).. 12356, SEC. 34 9) Ht. Wu, noe. 3 (25,4) aay ali col coal ee AisA M22 /pe. ALL afa3fty TBP-SERRET - —jL “sy . s £ :¢ a! “7
Agency Comment: USCIB does not concur in the inplication that guidance or lack thereof has adversely affected the production of high level commmications intel- Oe ee ee ee ee oe a a eee eveseserveseesteosee Ce ee ee | an nen aU Ane SE a a Oe ee ee ease eerseeresaeseseeserestere eeeeesenease eae e eee aas ees eo eee ore eons ae eeeeeoer ese ees ereereeneeseeeeseeeeuneee acetates eee eee eters 6 Seve sewo Pues ute eraeaWee sewers reen ere wr 9 See aeseeveconeces erm ae ses ee eteoeneeese sea eeseetetestene ne eevee veaseseneaseseoerereseeeneeewevesasee wees e ve eeseneaeesesesseseauese a ee ae ae a ee ee _ problem referred to above. . __provided.to .NSA in the’solution, of ite ma ma jor problem by thet. Teccnevcecccacccves if waeseeererenrsececeseeeeesece eaten an seeecese Coat ecensesreveserevagese certsssosesses SESTESE SEES >{ Based ‘thereon, the Special Committee of the ise for  GOMINT “(Sec/State and Sec/Def) has 2greed that an optimun, if not indeed 2 pre- __ requisite, step toward?::liiiititsenssnn renee DEED PIII END 4 To that, end’ Phe, Spe ial Committee has authorized marshalling “of all relevant; lIIIiIIiiitiiiist esources of the intel- _ eeeeeeeeeevneaneseece ligence agencies. ~emesereese ss Additional Action Required: Reconsideration by NSC's Special Committee for COMINT of the recommended expansion of NSA's efforts. . Observation: Such reconsideration should be deferred pending completion of the study and related steps referred to by USCIB and summarized above. Recommendation 3 (page 9): That ELINT and COMINT be integrated to the extent of placing ELINT under NSA for analysis of the product and guidance and coordination in the collection and dissemination of ELINT. The authority of operational _— commanders over the integral ELINT resources, however, should not be abridged. “ USCIB or the combined board which is recommended in this report to replace it should exercise only. policy control over ELINT matters. Agency Comment: USCIB believes this recommendation has been overtaken by the Gssuance of NSCID No. 17 and by the DOD Directive on ELINT dated July 13, 1955. USCIB believes no further action should be taken on this recommendation until these recent directives have been implemented and tried. Additional Action Required: Following a reasonable trial period the reference Directives should be re-examined in the light of this recommendation. Observation: The USCIB response is unclear. By inference it appears that ELINT has not been pleced under NSA, as recommended by the Task Force. Recommendation i (page 50): That the military services and NSA continue to strive for « bigher degree of cryptographic security; that the problem of commmications security be restudied by USCSB (or the combined board as recommended in this report) with a view to reducing to the lowest practicable level tho quantity of information released through telecommmications; and that NSC 168 be re- examined to ascertain if the Director, NSA, has sufficient authority to carry APPENDIZ I -~2- TACHA Pee ee tasey ee ee eee en een Inen en
~ Agency Comment: USCIB agrees with the need for a higher degree of commnica~ tions security and feels that efforts to attain this end should continue; however, it does not consider. that the recommendation falls within the purview of USCIB. USCSB reports that, at all times, the military services and NSA keep the problem of cryptographic security under thorough review. USCSB concurs in the recommended review of NSC 168, but notes that in essence this review is already underway pursuant to the provisions of NSC 168 itself. rY ° . out his COMSEC responsibilities. { Recommendation 5 (page 51): That a single board with appropriate technical sub- committees have policy guidance over commmications intelligence and com munications security. If the recommendation to place the evaluation and anelysis of ELINT under NSA is adopted, then policy guidance for ELINT as well as COMINT and COMSEC should be exercised by the proposed single board. Agency Comzent: ‘USCIB is not now willing to recommend establishment of a “single board “because the besic functions and organizational arrangements within a number of the interested agencies are sufficiently divergent to justify the continued separate existence of USCIB and USCSB." ~ USCSB opvposes the recommendation because of the difficulties of imlementation which would result from the establishment of a single board, as provosed. Recommendation 6 (page 51): That DOD study the organizational structure and proper positioning within its respective services of the three cryptologic agencies -—. AFSS, ASA, and RSG - with a view toward improving their prestige and effectiveness, _ thereby strengthening their personnel assignment poiicies and logistic support. Agency Coment: USCIB endorses the aim of this recommendation but considers it a problem internal to DOD. DOD believes that one means of achieving the objective of this recommendation is to constitute the service cryptologic agencies as major commands. The Air Force Cryptologic Agency (AFSS) has been so constituted for about seven years. The Army Cryptologic Agency (ASA) was designated as a major command following the submission of the Task Force Report. The Navy Cryptologic activity (NSG) is not so constituted at present; DOD will in the near future ask the Secretary of the Navy to review his cryptologic organization to determine whether it might be re-established on a basis paralleling that of the Army and the Air Force. Recommendation 7 (page 52): That the military services give greater attention to selecting officers for COMINT duties, assign regular or "career" reserve officers | to the maximum extent possible, indoctrinate officers in COMINT prior to sending | them to command field stations, and establish career opportunities for specialists equal to those of the line or general service officers. Rotation _and reolacement procedures should be irproved.- The feasibility of using Civilian s:::::::%: \ | Ce et i ee Devens >.:.. should be tested. It is also recommended that Congress enact legislati z a a Or | | APPENDIX I 3. ‘¢ f2 “ = 2S | ree
a ner Lom 9 to authorize NSA to employ especially qualified retired military personnel with no restriction on the number so employed. Such legislation should also _ permit Sec. Def. to recall active officers to duty with NSA and have those officers counted against the authorized strength of NSA, but not of the respective military services. ; Agency Comment: USCIB concurs in this recommendation. DOD reports that Sh full consideration of these proposals is currently ‘in progress within DOD. Recomnendation 8 (page 54): That the Secretary of Defense give further consideration ce to the allocation of an appropriate number of "super grades" and positions under Public Law 313 to NSA; to the possibility of further inducements or higher pay to selected consultants; and to privileges extended to civilians overseas. , Agency Comment: USCIB concurs in this recommendation. DOD also concurs and is taking the steps it deems appropriate in an effort to accomplish the objectives of this recommendation. : Recommendation 9 (page 55): That USCIB or its successor board clarify the objectives and functions of intelligence liaison detachments with NSA, establish uniform procedures to be followed for such detachments in their relationship with NSA, and specify maximum numbers of personnel to be assigned for liaison duties after examining the extent of interest of each agency concerned. ‘Intelligence personnel assigned to liaison duty with NSA should be required to attend an indoctrination course conducted by NSA. . . Agency Comment: USCIB does not concur in this recommendation. It agrees that mutual familarization with the requirements, capabilities and operations wists of both NSA and consvmer agencies is desirable; it feels, however, that be- - cause the necessary functions of intelligence liaison detachments vary continuously with the missions of the consumer agencies and the character of COMINT production activities, the arrangements called for by this recommendation cannot successfully be rendered uniform. . Additional Action Reavired: Decision as to whether the view of the Task Force or the view of USCIB should be adopted. Observation: USCIB's view is most sound. The Task Force recommendation should be rejected. Recommendation 10 (page 56): That NSA and the three cryptologic services give greater _ emphasis to, and continue to develop mutual cooperation. ¢TTs.; STeiiiiiiiis = ] eaeseaaneee Toe ease eneueeeeooessnssoeseeosenseseerscs® a alread . cw cc eee reece sa sessesesssesavesonsssceese ses lat eI mtn ner meme e eras eseeeorevnevneenere eeqouee eoeesteaoveaoned oer SEE eT ee a ee ee Oe ‘ -i-
Agency Comment: USCIB concurs. Greater emphasis has been given this matter and UJSC13 considers the arrangements which have been undertaken in this regard to be satisfactory. Recommendation 11 (page 56): That more thorough periodic re-investigations of personnel be made. Particular effort should be concentrated on persons occupying the more sensitive positions. Agency Comment: USCIB has established a special committee to investigate the matter, and USCIB is prepared to act on whatever recommendations are made by that committee. Observation: See "Observation" Section of Chapter X, Recommendation 3. Recommendation 12 (page 57): That the Director ; NSA, be given authority to inspect the service cryptologic schools and make appropriate recommendations for improvement where COMINT is affected. Agency Comment: USCIB concurs. ADPSNDIX TI 2 ee Sebi
» -4 --~reoe @aeeveesestsretovsseetereeoee® 68 Oe oH. + mop Secret - J. S. Eyes Only Ferretesesesestsesscerisersstetersesr’ - eevceos o: name Report on Intelligence Activities in the Federal Government Prepared for the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government By the Task Force on Intelligence Activities May 1955 A we Aovendix I Part 2 - Commnications and Electronics in Support of intelligence Activities Recommendation 1 (page 37): That an Intelligence Commmications and Electronics Subcommittee (ICES) to the Corbined Intelligence Board (this assumes that USCIB and USCSB have been combined into a single board, as proposed elsewhere - in the report) be established to review and produce recomendations to the —™ Combined Intelligence Soard with respect to all commmications and electronics proposals from intelligence activities which call for facilities, equipments, or additional personnel which cannot be chteined from existing resources; and to supply technical advice to the Board on such matters as it might request. Agency Comment: JUSCIP does not agree. It believes that the spirit of this recomiendation is being accomplished by exvert commmications and electronics advice provided from within the agencies concerned with the subject. Additional Action Reawired: None, assuming the USCIB comment on this recommenda~ tion is accurate. ° Recommendation 2 (page 38): That more effective use be made within DOD of the high potential value and know-how available in the Joint Commmnications-clectronics Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to deal with commmications and electronics problems related to the broad intelligence field. Responsibility should be placed on that group for reviewing and commenting on commmications and electronics requirenents that the ISA considers necessary to meet the intelligence objectives, and the demands being placed by NSA on the special commmications and electronics groups in the military services under KSA operational control; and for submitting recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on ways and neans to insure maximum coordination and effectiveness in the over-all commmications and electronics effort in support of intelligence. Agency Comment: USCIB considers trat existing procedures. for reviewing and commenting on NSA requirements are satisfactory. Recommendation 3 (page 38): That more effective technical advice be injected into Uscib deliberations to permit develooment of more appropriate statements of the intelligence objectives to be accormpkished by communications or electronics meense DECLASSIFIED PORTICHS EXEMPTED £0. 12356, SEC. 3.4 {b) E.0. 12255, 5 Bod. 12 (Q) sy lu | APPEMDIE I on t La, WA deelse, hse 2 /23)hy “— FOR etaat | neve B[L8Y 5.0002 SY
leche n“* Agency Comment: USCIB agrees with the spirit of this recommendation and believes that it is now being carried into effect. Recommendation (page 38): That the present basic policy for the provision of point-to-point commmications services to intelligence commnity activities from existing governmental or civil commmications services be continued. That eny attempt to set up separate, duplicate, or paralleling point-to-point commnications facilities be authorized only when the necessity therefor has been fully reviewed and agreed to by the Intelligence Commnications and Electronics Subcommittee recommended in Recommendation 1, above. Agency Comment: JUSCIB concurs in the first sentence of the recommendation. It agrees with the second sentence to the extent of believing that no separate facilities should be established for intelligence use without full consideration by aporopriate authority. Recommendation 5 (page 39): That a basic policy of utilising existing facilities, services, S, and equipment to the maximum degree be applied wherever it is deter- mined to be technically feasible in the COMINT, ELINT, and COMSEC operations (this applies particularly to certain aspects of the technical training phases, operational procedures » and logistics); that excentions to this policy be authorized only when the necessity therefor has been fully reviewed and agreed to by the Intelligence Commnications and Eléctronics Subcomzittee recommended in Recommendation 1, above. Agency Comment: USCIB considers that the spirit of this recommendation is. now being carried out. It does not agree that the additional review (called for in the last sentence) is either necessary or desirable. - Recommendation 6 (page 39): That any arrangements with respect to centralized control of ELINT give adequate consideration to the immediate and vital interest of the military in this field and the need to keep electronic countermeasures (EC) - a tactical weanon - clearly under military operational control. Agency Comment: USCIB believes that this recommendation has been overtaken by the issuance of NSCID 17 and the related Department of Defense Directive of duly 13, 1955. Recommendation 7 (page 39): That all planning and operation of communications and electronics efforts in support of intelligence activities include full considera- tion of the following to meet national emergency conditions: a. Day-to-day operation and training be based on realism in light of the situation and facilities expected to be available in time of war or national emergency. This applies in a special manner to planning operations to be effective in case of heavy jamming operations. AFPELIDIX I
smite: b. Key intelligence installations, served by costly, hard-to-replace electronics equipment and associated records be located outside established target areas. That these installations have integrated plans for national emergency or disaster operations. That all agencies involved in planning _ new, alternate, or emergency locations for Federal agencies expedite action to assist NSA in its current efforts to obtain a suitable site. c. Pending accomplishment of b, that effective interin disaster plans be developed promtly for each key intelligence installation to include as a minima (1) alternate site, (2) installed and tested minimum equipment with necessery basic records at the alternate site, and (3) adequate knowledge of disaster plans by key personnel. Agency Comment: USCIB concurs in Recommendation 7-a and considers that it is now being carried out. USCIB agrees in principle with Recommendation 7-b but notes that the great extension of target areas by fallout hazards would require relocation at such great distances that reduction in operational efficiency would be unacceptable and the agency concerned would be unable to retain or attract key personnel. USCIB reports that plans for the loca- tion of alternate NSA sites are now being developed by DOD. USCIB concurs in Recommendation 7-c and reports that it is being carried into effect except fee Ore 68 re eee. for.2eee ow ee ce cee ee eee ence seseasesesasseeeaeesesoososscesenss eeeoeseaae Recommendation 8 (page 0): That the present basic commnications (cryptographic) security plan, providing for centralized control with effective decentraliza- tion of operations, be continued; that each agency and service maintain effective inspection and vigorous training programs to reduce to the minimum cryptographic operational security violations. Agency Comment: USCSB concurs, noting that the Communications Security Plan referred to reoresents, in reality, a nunber of communications security arrange- ments each of which is considered satisfactory. o Recommendation 9 (page 40): That NSC determine ways and means to control more effectively release of valuable intelligence to potential enemies via clear text messages being transmitted over government and civil commmication networks. Agency Comment: USCSB considers that the policy responsibility for control of governmental clear text messages falis within its charter. It resorts that it has long recognized this problem and is working toward its solution. It does not believe that the problem is one for NSC consideration. JSOSB considers that the policy responsibility for control of nongovernmental clear text messages over civil commmications network is outside its purview. Additional Action Reaxzired: Referral of the nongovernmental aspects of the subject to Commerce for.consideration in the light of its NSC-assigned responsibilities relating to the safeguarding of unclassified strategic information. APPENDIX I
Recommendation 10 (page 0): That the general tendency within the communications intelligence and the communications security agencies to overemphasize the special security facets of their operations with respect to basic communications and electronics features be examined objectively and comrehensively by competent, technically qualified authority to insure that such overemphasis is not producing unnecessary duplication of facilities and operations in peacetime which will grow to completely unrealistic figures in wartime, and producing a system which may fail in an emergency because it will require considerable readjustment of basic overational practices at a critical time. Agency Comment: USCIB believes existing procedures for review of communications requirements are adequate. USCIB does not believe that the security aspects of COMINT are significantly overemphasized. Accordingly, USCIB opposes creation of the special committee called for by this recommendation. USCSB, in essence, concurs in USCIB's view; it believes that no separate examination of the problem is required. , Recormendation 11 (page 11): "SPECIAL RECOISSENDATION": That the President set uD a special commission composed of technically qualified civil and military com munications and electronics representatives, to survey and produce recommendations as to ways and means to insure the mre effective utilization of all commnications and electronics resources of the United States in the national interests iin case of war or national emergency. (This recommendation was singled out by the Task Force as one worthy of special emphasis and as one believed to be of great importance.) ' Agency Comment: ODI{ expressed the view (7/6/55) that the Report which was shortly thereafter to be made to the WSC by the Science Advisory Committee would contain organizational recommendations somewnat more far reaching than those suggested in the Task Force Report and, if adopted, would probably satisfy the recommendations of the Task Force Report. Additional Action Required: DOD, ODM and CIA views should be obtained on this recommendation, including recommendations as to its implementation. (The 0Du comment of 7/6/55 is not specific enough to assess the validity of the Task Force recommendation.) enoctonarr
aocpeoevoseeoreeepeest Resort on Invellizcence Activities in the Federal Government Prepared for the Commission on Organisation of the Executive Branch of the Sovernnent : By the Task Force on Intelligence Activities ay 7 1955 sat RnREREnn eee Aovendix Ii ane Clandestine Services of tne Central Intellirence Lrencv rE Ae SUES ee SI “cold wer fimotions" Recormendation 1 (page 2): That the “covert intellicence" and ty Directors whose OF oz the Denuty Director Plans be assigned to sevarate Deni areas of responsibility should be eaministratively and Jo supporting. . . ubs istically sel? a fgency Comment: Ci does not concur, noting that the recommended system had been tried Drior to 1952 and ebandoned; that Cift's experience curing the period of separate operations proved the operational disadvantages of attemiing to concuct on a secure and eflicient basis two worldwide clandestine organizations ; each compartmented from the other. adcitional fection Reauired: See Chanter Ii, Recomzendation 1, Page 1, above. Recommendation 2 (saze h2): That the part of CIA's July 15, 1952 Directive appdoini- ing area division chiefs as executives of the DCI and providing for their direct dealing with hin and senior overseas representatives be rescinded. rN n . : Agency Comment: Clix reports this Directive. has beer: reviewed enc rescinded. fen mn Recomsndation 3 (page 42): Thet the DOI re-establish the office of Zxecutive ~Sirect vor of that agenci. Agency Comment: CIA is opsosed to this recomnendstion on the cround that the interposition of another commend echelon would not necessarily eccormplish the intent of the recommendation. Far ther study, however, is being civen the subject. | . Observation: Secause this is purely of en intra-agency character, it would seen aporopriatse to defer i's judgment thereon. ott -< a eee ere me wena” - ee ee eae sneececn ee ry eves i a tees ecceee eo eee eee ene ere esrcesrececes eone iia oe eo eee eno ae Si i ee es . i i oo «s eeee 5 ee . i ee oe ees i i ee 2 a a 2 « hh a ee ee a oe aeee sees oe eee sreceerseceeve . eee een were neta seeseascecesersececcce . anon eae ee | . i ee ee Se ae a eeeuwnserve eos ee ey ry ee ey ees a eees a ed eu cneeoeen eocee wees oe a a ey . eevee ee ese esenecece 7. eer eseene eee tecane Sn ee es mee ee woe eeene wee se eee ee ae a ee es i i a twee rececae i a a rs . eer eee eee eee estas essere ee ssewnansn rere rsece a aes i eer erawae Sem eee awe reer na wears ersecnee scaerce eee eee reas Se a core we soece 5 a a a ee ee ee a ee Ci a aes evreeve . ece ee wanwe i a eo es ere srean se ecw ame nean a ne see ee PORTIONS EXEMPTED DECLASS:7}2p E.0. 12065, Sec. 3.301 (4A ) E.0. 12925, 5 2.292; Ca A saa) ay W562 Mme 19-3 #y nue pate JAP © DIF ou. AN efy
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TI a Tips = ~ ,
Recommendation 8 (page 3): That submission of individual budgets to the CLA Project "Review Committee by the area division chiefs be discontinued and funds for each cold wer component be orepared under the supervision of its chief and submitted for the comonent to the Project Review Commitee. Srency Comment: CIA observes that this recommendation is based on a sedaration of CLA "cold var" and "covert intelligence functions" with which CI4 does not concur. It notes, however, that in relation to its existing organization the programming system of the clandestine services now being put into operation assures a review by the DDP and his staff of the badget recommendations of the erea Givisions of CIA clandestine servicese Recosmendation 9 (page h3): That the nusber of auditors of the regular CIA audit staff be increased materially. Agency Comment: CIA concurs. This action is being taken as rapidly as possible in Line with an internal organizational survey made by CIA several months ago. wt ee em ee wee ee ee eee Recommendation 10 (page 43): HIciilliilililiiliiiiiisiit eoaveeve weoreeeoee eoeoeoeoweene @enececver ew eeees eee eee eeraeetreeerereseeereaereeens 4 eooeoere eeneceveeoe Ce ee) eee eaten . eeoeceeees eee ereeeoveoes eens eoereeeve a eeeereetenveeeeace eovvee eevee osreor seeeecceee coon neoeneae erm eeweanereersevesecs eros enser ermvstzxreoees eeoeerae rea sesene eceeee oeeve eoosen easee . . ee eene recon en Se a a ey . - . eer ereorseeoeseeeoeoe eeceee- ° - . . . . . eneeve oeoeeeeon tease ne «Peer eone seooeveerese eoeteasereeoe ° ° . ° . . ry . . . ° ° . ° . « eeoeecasersreove eoeee . eeoereeeoeoren eee eee eecre Recommendation 11 (page 3): That the NSC render a specific interpretation of t provisions of paragraoh l-b, HSC Shi2/1 as it affects the several members the intelligence commmity. f a ti) fe) ry Acency Comment: CIA notes that the reference paragraph directs that the Dol shall be responsible for “informing through appropriate channels and on a tneed-to-lmow!' basis, agencies of the U. S. government, both at home and abroad, including diplomatic and military representatives, of such operations as will affect them." CIA reports that it hes been scrupwlously careful to keep other agencies appropriately informed pursuant to the 'tneed-to-know" principle; anc that it is trying constantly to remedy and prevent individual instances of failure on the sart of its personnel in their eficrts to strike the difficult balance between the vroper range of interests of another agency and the restrictive principle of "need-to-!mow." CIA points out that as a standard procedure it provides individual briefings for Ambassadors and other State personnel, Defense Comtanders, Chiefs of Military i4Sissions, Attacnes, etc. Recommendation 12. (sage 43): That the CIA Act of 19L9 be anended to authorize the erploynent of “eny" (instead of fifteen now authorized) retired officers or warrant officers of the armed servicese Agency Comment: See Chapter II, Recommendation 12, Page hk, ebove. aprn.Dig II Carus ween ree * ~ igh -3- peter rh
Document removed by the staff of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library at For further information, see entry of the pink WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES) i+ at the front of this folder
DECLASSIFIED 7 4S By SEK te date Authority MK. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT c& NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON January 20, 1956 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LAY SUBJECT: Report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities 1. You will,recall that the President directed referral of the subject report and the agency comments thereon to Mr. D. Anderson for further staff action and recommendations as appropriate. Pursuant to that referral I have examined in their entirety the report and the agency comments thereon. 2. The subject report, totaling 583 pages, consists of: Ae The Main Report (362 pages) which is classified Top Secret. Be Appendix I, Part 1 (58 pages) (relating to the National Security Agency) which is classified Top Secret. This document contains code word material. It requires special handling. It should be tandled via Comint Channels on a Top Secret — U.S. Byes Only basis. C. Appendix I, Part 2 (ly pages) (relating to Commmications and Electronics in Support of Intelligence Activities) which is classified Top Secret. This document contains code word material. It requires special handling. It should be handied via Comint Channels on a Top Secret - U. S. Eyes Only basis. D. Appendix IT (k3 pages) (relating to CIA's Clandestine Sexvices) which is classified Top Secret and requires special mndling. E. The Published Report (76 pages), which is, of course, unclassified. 3. In an effort to facilitate the action directed by the President I have epared the enclosed memorandum which: A. Sets forth chronologically each recommendation in the report and its appendices (exclusive of the published report, which merely re- states some of the recommendations in the classified report); B. Sets forth the gist of the agency (agencies, in some instances) comments on each recommendation; C. Contains, where appropriate, my "Observations" and suggestions as to "Additional Action Required" (in terms of the recommendations in the report and the agency comments thereon). It is emphasized that the subparagraphs entitled “Additional Action Required" .and "Observations" are merely the suggestions and views of the writer, prepared only with the thought in mind that they might be helpful in pointing up unresolved problems to be considered by #hoge responsible for taking the further
com, “ “me ba] , ' staff action directed by the President. If the subparagraphs do not serve that purpose, they should Ls ignored. hk. The enclosed memorandum is lengthy, because the subject report is lengthy; it contains some duplication, partly because the subject report contains a great amount of duplication, but more particularly, because I have listed separately every recommendation in the report to insure that none is overlooked. S. It is to be noted that, due to the nature of the distribution made of the report, some of the agencies did not receive sections of the report containing data and recommendations on matters falling within their primary jurisdiction. 6. It is also to be noted that the report was submitted in May 1955; that agency comments thereon were submitted during the late Summer or early Fall of 19553 and that as a consequence, some of the recommendations which are flagged as possibly requiring additional action may have been acted upon during the period between the submission of the agency comments and the re- ferral of the subject to Mr. Anderson for attention. 7. Recommendation: That this memorandum and its enclosures be referred to Mr. Anderson for such further action as he deems appropriate. d. Patrick Coyne
NESS ADULTE LS SPSS TRENSRS DEO DS GF January 12,19 56 MEMORANDUM FOR DR. RALPE REID BUREAU OF BUDGET With regard to your memorandum attached, I have now advised Jimmy Lay to let Messrs. Macy, Perry and Hamilton have access to the Hoover Commiszsion Intel- ligence Activities report. A. J. Goodpaster Colonel, CE, US Army Staff Secretary GL ( [24 fifo hake Cit Peas etetitecel cos isici soit shes diel sd tte ld ate Pete Tate BYTES NCES ely
& tet NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS L FEDERAL CIVIL DEFENSE ADMINISTRATION / ‘ SRAGHEHOTON CPS BS — OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR Battle Creek, Michigan Honorable Rowland R, Hughes Director, Bureau of the Budget Washingtori 25, D, C. . Ce and ee eee Dear Mr, Hughes: The intelligence Activities Report prepared by the Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of the Goverriment has been reviewed in accordance with Bureau of the Budget Bulletin No, 55-5, The only recommendation on which it is appropriate for the Federal Civil Defense Administration to comment is number 5, concerning the rechecking of the security status of all personnel engaged in Intelligence activities, This Agency concurs in this recommendation and plans to institute rgchecka of all personnel engaged in such activities at five year iftervals, ncerely, fas oo) 1. pol — = rd “> is A uur Wie wudee! ect og erieorsy
MN NNER RN NER RENE P RE IES ERR INE LC PN EN EB IRTR RIES PLDI ER RRR RIR LEN PRIA LIE LEILA POLLEN OLIN EOE IOPLIE IE LPS IL OE PLDEIEPE EEL ILOPLIE TS OR TE MEMORANDUM FOR MR, DILLON ANDERSON “A eo eat yeaa. "Fer farther taf action of crmmentton as éppvopriate, mire dvected r6fer¥ al to: fou of the +f my of te Heover Cotsvistutot Pav pote se ,. The WES FECA ft 26< (sranidectys copy) and’ sootediae Sea tele ge testhe vartoun campanenthr'of the: For your: tndiyniation;- navi wt wer “he i maivcuetmacremncetnemmewmpure ery;, siucs lie: hed carillon tntleatve chante wil Ce ae ea ppempe nacereick wetland cherish Action with -regerG'tis: tie receentnuTmatlen ly a" watch: ons ratesion?’ ‘Terprocewaingieeparersty:. mealbahaaicts. Soateet recemm (ov: stead flethed attiba Tif reyate worthy speci ccarerd sated! om comnvanteastonvranacctbetiunte-revendcel'atrts deemed apprepriate: A Je }-eoapaater” Cotbaat; Cu; -U S:Atiay” statl Batectary
Atomic. Energy Commission Federal Bureau of Investigation Central Intelligence Agency (Bound Separately) Department of Defense Department of State Office of Defense Mobilization TabA Tab SB Tabc TabD Tab E Tab F
THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON Abe Peestiten.f. Sa fh Soot. Vea Co he. 7 Lee KX Agrees .
THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON Sz he. A CVE) - —_——
DRAFT December 13, 1955 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DILLON ANDERSON For further staff action and follow-up as appropriate, the President has approved and directed referral to you of the attached Depart- mental and Agency submissions relating to implementation of the report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities. These were received in response to memoranda to the Departments and Agencies indicating, on behalf of the Presi- dent, actions desired by him with respect to the report. Copies of these memoranda are attached, together with the full classified report of the Task Force (President's copy) and a schedule show- ing the distribution given to the various components of the report. For your information, this follow-up action was delayed until the matter could be taken up with the President following his recovery, | since he had earlier indicated that he wished distribution and handl- ing of the report to be only as personally directed by him. Action with regard to the recommendation for a “watch dog com- raission" is proceeding separately. Your action should include such further action with regard to the special commission on communications and electronic resources as is deemed appropri- ate. A. J. Goodpaster Colonel, CE, US Army Staff Secretary
\ Memo to AEC from@ov. Adams 6/13/55 Memo to Gov Adams From Adm Strauss “9/15/55 (2134-1A cy 1, Series a, 8 pgs Memo to Atty Gen 6/13/55 from Gov Adams Memo to Gov Adams 7/5/55 from Atty Gen cy 1; memo to atty Gen from the * °°" Director, FBI 6/28/85 (2 pages) 3 memos to Director, CIA from Gov Adams 6/13/55 Msmeo to the Prdsident from Director, CIA; 8/16/55 memo to Dir. CIA from H, D. Jones (USCIB) and ll pg 8/12/55 report Memo to Dir CIA from Gen Erskine 8/16/55 Cy 1 and 4 pg rpt Memo to Ex Sec NSC fm W P Armstrong 40/14/55 No 1 of 6 and 2 enclosures(TS) \ Mr. Dillon Anderson. ” Colonel! Goodpaster BT ate Top Secret Top Secret Top Secret Top Secret web tie, Top Secret Top Secret Top Secret Top Secret Top Secret Top Secret 11/16/55 525 (Special Handling)
8 Memos to Secy of Defense from Gov Adams 6/13/55 Mennvto President from Sec Def (TS143) cy 1 of 8 (2 pages); 29 page mimeo report (TS) (cy 1 of 8) Appendix (6 pgs, cy 1 of 8) Department of Defense Comments, Unclassified 8/17/55 Memto Secy of State from Gov Adams 6/13/55 . Memo to Gov Adams from Secy Hoover; 15-page report, cy 1 of 9, series A Memo to Col Goodpaster from Dr. Flernming H-23, cyl 7/6/55 Central Intelligence Agency Comments on Intell Act Report Task Force Report May 1955 Appendix I " Appendix I " g/2/ss No. 525 Continued Top Secret Top Secret Top Secret (Special Handling) Top Secret Secret Secret Top Secret Top Secret Top Secret Top Secret Top Secret
CHAP. CONTENTS SUBJECT LETTER OF SUBMISSION PREFACE I. HISTORY II. CIA III. DEPT. OF STATE Iv. DEPT. OF DEFENSE 0SO JCS ARMY NAVY AIR FORCE COVERT OPERATIONS Vv. AEC VI. FBI VII. INT. PRODUCTION VIII. FUNCTIONAL INTELLIGENCE IX, PERSONNEL X. SECURITY XI. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE XII, MAPS & LIBRARIES XITI, COORDINATION OVERSEAS XIV. DEVELOPMENT OF NEW EQUIP. XV. WATCH-DOG COMMISSION MAIN BODY OF THE REPORT PAGES Fe E OSO of; n vi ,vii x x viii to xxx | x} x x 1-12 x | x x 13-75 x 76-88 x 89-205 89-94 x 94-99 x 99-137 x 138-156 | x 156-179 | x 179-205 x 206-220 | x | x | x 221-226 x 227-244, | . x x 24 5—254 x |x x 255-274 x [x x 2750283 | xix | x 284-292 | x | x X 203-305 {| x jx {x 306-309 | x | x |x 310-311 x tx x 312-317 x | x x Een an Tesh eenteanmnnaenennemeninatmmninedaneateinateninagt cert eee asa FPG Eh" An A ES IE I Se CS DEFENSE JCS bed MM » DISTRIBUTION ATR MY | NAVY [FORCE S <= x FBI een eae ee ee eer eye iA AN CI ENE COS BIR EEES SENS STONOLES SOLO ne eres eee = ae eS A i See AS ae ee a ee RN an See en —
No. of Copies 1 APPENDIX I Parts 1 and 2 _.. Distribution U.S. COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE BOARD . and the U.S. COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY BOARD DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (0SO) NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY JOINT CHIEFS OF ST APPENDIX IT CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
we ane: salen A REA en eel nei Aamo _ July 7, 1955 MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD: Mr. Barnes at State called me on 5 July asking that Mr. Fisher Howe be permitted to read the full basic report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities, He did so on 6 July, indicated he did not think it necessary for State to have a copy of the report, although they might wish to read it again (to which I agreed), He asked that I read Appendix II from the standpoint of see- ing whether there are references to the State Department in it which would warrant a State representative reading it. I said I would do so, A, , “Goodpaster Colonel, CE, US Army 12 AL, - | (the to np, Glen Deth
June 20, 1955 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD: On direction of Governor Adams, I visited President Hoover on 27 May 1955. Among other matters discussed, he advised me that General Clark, early in the work of his Task Force on Intelligence Activities, had made certain contacts and under- takings to have an investigation made of certain individuals whose names were given to him, together with certain material relating to them. President Hoover indicated that the investigations were not complete, and that General Clark felt that he was under an obligation to arrange for their completion. President Hoover said he would not be able to carry out this action; his plan was to send the material to Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, who would then make a report to the White House. I undertook to consult with Gov- ernor Adams, see whether this procedure is suitable, and inform President Hoover's office appropriately. I thereupon informed Governor Adams of the foregoing, and he indicated that President Hoover could send the material directly to him at the White House. I also advised the Fresident on 31 May in general terms of the action being taken, and called Mr. Tuck of the Hoover Commission the same day and advised him of Governor Adams! decision in the matter. He said he would so inform the Commission, On 25 May, at Governor Adams' direction, I met with Mr. Brownell, who handed me a memorandum to him from Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, explained its contents, and discussed them briefly. He indicated that it would be acceptable to talk to Mr. Allen Dulles about it in general terms -- i.e., that the list was furnished, that an investi- gation was started and then halted because of a possible require- ment to examine CIA records, make interviews, etc. He indicated that Mr. Dulles has asked to be kept in touch with any further action, so as not to have any interference with special operations of CIA.
a . After studying the material provided by Mr. Brownell, I dis- cussed the matter with Governor Adams and prepared a mem- orandum for discussion with Mr. Dulles.as to further steps to be taken, and indicating the individuals named and the principal allegations made in the material submitted. On June 2 Governor Adams, Mr. Dulles and I met in Governor Adams' office, and after discussion it was agreed that Mr. Dulles would have a check made of the individuals and allegations indi- cated in the brief I had prepared, copy of which was furnished him, and would provide a memorandum reporting his findings and giving views in the matter as appropriate. Later the same day Colonel Dubbelde of the Clark Task Force turned over material which had been developed in the course of the Task Force work, including reports from the departments concerned on individuals and allegations substantially the same as those set forth in the material given to me by Mr. Brownell, On 15 June Mr. Dulles submitted to Governor Adams, with copies to the Attorney General and to the FBI, a memorandum reporting investigation made on the individuals and allegations provided to him, and relating this to previous actions of a similar kind. In his memorandum he advised that certain CIA employees listed were under investigation within the Agency and their cases are being turned over to the FBI together with investigative results of the CIA for whatever action is appropriate. (The memorandum also indi- cated that Mr. Dulles is forwarding a copy of it with a request for investigative action where deemed warranted under Executive Order 10450. ) IT advised General Persons today of the essentials of the foregoing (pursuant to direction of Governor Adams) for use in connection with any reference to the matter pertaining to his Legislative Liaison activities. A. J. Goodpaster Colonel, CE, US Army
May 27, 1955 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD: On direction of Governor Adams, I visited President Hoover this afternoon. He turned over to me the classified report with appendices of his Task Force on Intelligence Activities. He also made the following points: a. The Task Force is preparing about ten addi- tional partial copies, each of which contains material pertinent to a particular agency and would be suitable for referring to that agency if the President so desired. Mr. Hoover does not plan to send these reports to anyone but the President. At his request, Cir. fP nite hes | + undertoek to inform Mr. Hollister or Mr. Tuck OL, de vo: if it was desired to have these copies transmitted to Sead Moc «,. | the President. b. A considerable amount of highly classified material has been accumulated in the process of the Task Force work, Mr. Hoover has asked the Task Force to draft an order for him to them as to the disposal of this material, When he receives it, he will send it to rf v : Governor Adams for comment as to the proposed dis- CH fe See oe : sae te Lo fon Carag 4 position. feet t/! ta toe afer c. General Clark, early in the Task Force work, made certain contacts and undertakings to have an investiga- . rae ose names . tion made of certain individuals/were given to him, to- gether with certain material relating to them. These investigations are not complete, and he feels that he is under an obligation to arrange for their completion. President Hoover will not be able to carry this out; his
_ plan is to send the material to Mr. J. Edgar Hoover + alae who would then make a report to the White House. Gere” sed 3 ; I undertook to consult with Governor Adams and see Yllccy Comme jwhether this procedure is suitable. “ep agunt tin wea Ee “7 d. Mr. Hoover indicated that changes recently sug: gested in the unclassified report had been made. He also said that he thought he would not submit this report to the Congress until after the completion of his Commission's work, and his return from a vaca- tion which he expects to last for about four months. A.“@, Goodpaster Colonel, CE, US Army ) aduried Gow fons fo Ma forage, wen fl Aes ifoease as pace fed Yt, Lied Hh. Basle (ob wlan Loko kk / cxdfed Why, Fach oO AO howe, Fae. fAebemes’ Kclitinas —€2 a, i, * c, Me Shee hc. told — fo fafa fh CS Fr a ee
May 23, 1955 MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR ADAMS As action on the Hoover Task Force report on intelligence activities, I suggest that you (or I, if you wish) advise Mr. Hollister generally as foliows: - 1. On the basis of a reading of the report for security, it is felt that there are several passages to which further con- sideration should be given ‘<- one of these seems a rather clear-cut and unnecessary ‘disctosure of information poten- tially valuable to foreign countries, and the rest appear to be of an "optional character, in which the valve to foreign countries of the information disclosed would have to be weighed against ite value in terms of informing the American public. The passages referred to are: a. On page v, at the top of the page, a preferred ver- sion might read: “Two reports are submitted: one, unclassified; the other, classified TOP SECRET, with certain appendices which require specie} additional clearance." (This is the "clear-cut" case referred to above.) b. On page vil, the sentence in the first full paragraph beginning “Our effort to achieve, etc., which gives an indication of success attained in obtaining a steady and reliable flow of data, might be deleted. c. On page ix, in the second paragraph, the sentence beginning "The information we need, ctc.", which identifies Communist plans, progress and potential as fatalligence targets, might be deleted. d. There are several references authoritatively identify- ing attaches as intelligence-gatherers of major importance. These include the second sentence of the first paragraph on page 7, the second sentence of the second paragraph on page ll, the second full paragraph on page 22, and the second and fifth sentences of the paragraph beginning at
a the bottom of page 23. In addition, there is a similar identification of the Foreign Service in the last sentence on page 14, e. The recommendation concerning the NSA at the bottom of page 41 has the effect of giving emphasis to this agency in an intelligence context and might be deleted. 2. The outline of U. S&S. top organizations for intelligence is undoubtedly one for which foreign countries would have had to expend a considerable amount of money to obtain -- and would still not have had complete confidence that it was authoritative. Some generalising might be considered. 3. The reference to the "Under Secretary of Defense" on page 40 might be changed to "Deputy Secretary of Defense. "' Goodpaster
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT BUREAU OF THE BUDGET WASHINGTON 25, D.C. BULLETIN NO. 55=5 March h, 1955 TO THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND ESTABLISHMENTS SUBJECT: Study of reports of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government In accordance with Public Law 108, 83d Congress, the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government is currently sub- mitting its reports to the Congress. Reports on Personnel and Civil Service, on Paperwork Management, and on Federal Medical Services have been released, and it is understood that more than a dozen further re- ports will be issued during the weeks ahead. It is the desire of the President that each agency make a review of each of the Commission's reports and submit its views to the President through the Bureau of the Budget within thirty days after the release of the particular report. Each such statement should be forwarded in five copies. These reviews should determine the application to the agency of the Commission's recommendations, incluwiing task force recommendations specifically endorsed by the Commission. Zach agency statement should indicate the extent to which the recommendations can be put into effect and the manner of carrying them out. ROWLAND R. HUGHES Director
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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON NOV 10 1955 Dear Mr. President: The views of the Department of Defense Accordingly, it may be that after further con- sideration of this report we vill. have additional coments to mike. With great respect, I om Faithfully yours, SIGNED C. E. WILSON The President fhe White House
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS oN _. HOOVER COMMISSION REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (UNCLASSIFIED) October, 1955 av
a . ” a COMMENTS OF THE DFEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE HOOVER COMMISSION TASK FORCE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT The following comments are addressed to the Recommendations of the Task Force which are applicable to the Department of Defense. Recommendations (a) and (b) of the Commission itself, and Recommendations Nos. 1, 2, and 7 of the Task Force, are considered not to be sufficiently applicable to the Department of Defense to justify comment by it. RECOMMENDATION NO. 3 "That the chiefs of the various intelligence unite of the military ser- vices be elevated in the organizational structure to the level of Deputy Chiefs of Staff in the Army and the Air Force, and Deputy Chief of Naval Operations in the Navy." Non-concur Comment The Department of Defense agrees that it is essential that intelligence be given adequate weight and representation in the staff organization of the military services if it is to function with optimum efficiency, = but it considers that this can be assured without the recommended organizationa changes at this time. Implementation: None at thie time. RECOMMENDATION NO. 4 "That the Department of Defense make extensive use of Schedule A of the Civil Service Regulations (non-competitive appointments) in the employment by the military services of civilian intelligence analysts and other spe~ claliste in order to provide the necessary flexibility in the recruitment of qualified civilian personnel (to include retired citizens with wide previous business experience in the foreign field) and to facilitate the interchange of such personnel between zone of interior competitive service and the overseas excepted service." Concur Comment Each of the three Services has taken or is developing measures to apply Schedule A to elements of its civilian intelligence staff. In addition, the Departaent of Defense is studying the matter with a view to finding an optimum balance between desirable flexibility in hiring and rotation of skilled career personnel on the one hand and providing the fullest practicable job security and incentive (as a vital morale factor) on the other. °
<a Take action in accordance with the results of such study. RECOMMENDATION NO. 5 “That, measures be instituted in all agencies for rechecking the security status of all personnel engaged in intelligence activities at periodic inter- vals not to exceed 5 years in any individual case." Concur in principle. Comment It is considered that the current security practices and the procedures for acting on adverse information essentially fulfill the objectives of these reccamendations. Within the objectives, however, it is desirable to leave to each individual service reasonable latitude in the method of implementation. For example, it may in some cases aid the investigation not to alert the individual involved by suspending him. Measures are taken, of course, in such cases to insure that clessified information is adequately safeguarded. This general subject is being reviewed in order to insure that the under- lying objectives of these recommendations are adequately served. Implementation: Additional precautions indicated by such review. RECOMMENDATION NO. 6 "That the responsibility for procurement of foreign publications and for collection of scientific intelligence be removed from the State Depart~ ment and placed in the hands of CIA, with authority to appoint euch sclenti= fic attaches as may be necessary to carry on this work abroad." Conour in part Comment The collection of scientific intelligence is one of the most important. intelligence activities of the Government. It is of vital concern to the Department of Defense. The CIA should have coordinating responsibility but it would be unwise and inefficient to give it or any other agency a monopoly in this field, nor does any one agency now have such a monopoly. The Depart- ment of Defense considers it inappropriate for the Central Intelligence Agency to have overt attaches stationed abroad. Implementation: None by Department of Defense. RECOMNENDATION NO. 8 "That steps be taken to introduce highly selective methods of choosing members of the coordinating committee on atomic energy intelligence, not only to get the benefit of service by the most competent individuals, but also to assure long tenure in this important assignment.” 2 ‘a
Concur ment The salaries the Department of Defense can pay for top-flight talent in this field compare unfavorably with those offered outside the Government, and this makes it difficult to insure long-term continuity. Implementation: The Departaent of Defense will use its best efforts to carry out this Recommendation. RECOMMENDATION NO. 9 "That a comprehensive, coordinated program be developed to linguistic training among American citizens serving the Intelligence effort; and i. "That the Department of Defense expand and promote language training by offering credit toward reserve commissions to ROTC students and drill credit to Reserve persomel for completion of selected language courses." Concur in principle Comment, The Department of Defense endorses the importance of a comprehensive pro- grem of foreign language and area specialist training for persons serving the national intelligence effort and allied activities. It and ite elements have taken various measures during the past years to further such a program. But in the case of ROTC and reserves, the Department of Defense is reluctant to provide for additional language training if such training must be at the ex- pense of training in primary military subjects. Specifically, the Task Force's recommendation would make for wider participation but would, not by itself, produce well-trained linguists. Implementation: The various existing programs are being studied in the light of this recommendation with a view to achieving an optimum balance between qualitative and quantitative standards.
iol? ia» jee! 22 October 1953 Dear Mr. Chairman: I have recently read over the first printed volum of your hearings on "Security ~ Government Printing Office," and recall that at the time the hearings began, the press published several quotations to the effect that an alleged member of the Communist Party had access to secret data of the Central. Intelligence Agency. Subsequently it was developed that this person was a Goverment Printing Office employee. In addition, the Deputy Public Printer, Mr. Cole, was quoted in the papers ss stating 40.4 reporter, in referring to the main GPO plant, that he could not say positively whether they handled CIA material, but that it was his belief that they could or would. At the time these investigations were being conducted, I had a careful check made of our reproduction facilities and found that no classified CIA material is printed in the main GPO plant. The only CIA work which is handied there is routine unclassified matter such as blank forms. On 12 August Walter Prorzheimer, our Legislative Counsel, informed Mr, Carr of your staff of these facts. Mr. Cole informs us that these facte are correct, and in addition that he has submitted a statement of these facts to your Conmittee, The press reports mentioned in the first paragraph have received widespread circulation both in the United States and abroad, and have raised some questions as to our security. Under the circumstances, there- fore, I would appreciate it if you would include this letter in the printed hearings so that the fact that CIA does not have classified material printed in the main GFO plant is made a matter of record. It has occurred to me that in the course of your investigations you may possibly run across information concerning this Agency or its personnel. Naturally, I would appreciate it if you would make such information available to me so we can take a thorough look at such matters. Faithfully yours, /s/ Allen W. Dulles Allen W. Dulles Director
1io'? pl? 7 July 1954 The Honorable Joseph R. McCarthy Chairman, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations | Senate Committee on Government Operations Dear Senator McCarthy: During the closing days of the recently conducted hearings . before the Permanent Subcommittees you made several references to alleged Commmist infiltration of the Central Intelligence Agency. In reply to a similar charge made earlier in the Committee hearings . I denied such infiltration. In the event that you should have any evidence in support of these allegations, it would be of the utmost importance that I should have an immediate opportunity to investigate them. Accordingly I would appreciate it if you would let me have at the earliest possible moment any unfavorable information you may have bearing upon the loyalty or integrity of any employee of this Agency. Any such in- formation will be immediately investigated and appropriste action taken. _ I have noted that you have indicated that you are making available to General Clark your material on this subject. Consequently I an sending him a copy of this letter and asking that he kindly advise me if the information which he may receive from you is of a nature to require any investigation on ny part. I feel that any unfavorable information regarding any CIA employee would require any immediate action and should not necessarily await the report of the Task Force. Faithfully yours, (signed) Alien W. Dulles Director
g Q bs x 15 January 1955 General Mark W. Clark The Citadel Charleston, South Carolina Dear General Clark: The Press reports today that Senator Joseph R. McCarthy states that he gave to you yesterday information on “alleged communism and corruption" in the Central Intelligence Agency. Under date of 7 July 1954 I wrote Senator McCarthy as Chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations referring to his al- legations.of Commmist infiltration of the CIA and requesting that he make available to me any evidence he had in support of these allega- tions to permit an immediate investigation thereof. A copy of that letter was sent to you on 7 July 1954. I received no reply whatsoever from Senator McCarthy to this letter. In the event that any of the information which Senator McCarthy now states he has turned over to you contains, as alleged, any indica~ tion of Communism or corruption in the CIA, I would investigate the matter immediately and thoroughly. Certainly such investigation should not repeat not await the report or findings of your committee some months hence. Action should be taken now. Accordingly, I urgently request that you make available to me at the earliest possible moment any information in the material furnished you by Senator McCarthy which would permit an inmediate and thorough investigation of the McCarthy charges. Faithfully yours, Allen W. Dulles Director (Central Intelligence Agency) €