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Arlington,  Virginia  22212-5000 
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UNCLASSIFIED 
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WARNING 
•»--*.,-»•!•    i  ,,:■»■ 
i'.VV'     .,  -„  l?' 
TA-Wt 
THIS  DOCUMENT  CONTAINS  CLASSIFIED  INFORMATION 
AFFECTING  THE  NATIONAL  SECURITY  OF  THE  UNITED 
'<■  STATES  WITHIN  THE  MEANING  OF  THE  ESPIONAGE  LAVS, 
U.S.  CODE  TITLE  18,  SECTIONS  793,  79*,  AND  798. 
---   v     .  ,    THE  LAV  PROHIBITS  ITS  TRANSMISSION  OR  THE  REVE- 
*.-.X-..     LATION  OF  ITS  CONTENTS  IN  ANT  MANNER  PREJUDICIAL 
TO  THE  SAFETY  OR  INTEREST  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 
-:V  '        OR  FOR  THE  BENEFIT  OF  ANY  FOREIGN  GOVERNMENT  TO 
THE  DETRIMENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES. 
"  THIS  DOCUMENT  MUST  BE  KEPT  IN  "COMINT  CHANNELS  ~ 
AT  ALL  TIMESt   IT  IS  TO  BE  SEEN  ONLY  BY  U.S. 
PERSONNEL  ESPECIALLY  INDOCTRINATED  AND  AUTHOR- 
IZED TO  RECEIVE  COMINT  INFORMATION  ON  A  STRICTLY 
NEED-TO-KNOW  BASIS.   REPRODUCTION  AND/OR  FURTHER 
DISSEMINATION  OF  THIS  DOCUMENT  OUTSIDE  THE  U.S. 
ARMY  INTELLIGENCE  AND  SECURITY  COMMAND  IS  PRO- 
HIBITED WITHOUT  PRIOR  HCt  INSCOM  APPROVAL. 
S 
t  >   :  .v 
>  ■  -fi 
in    - 
I      003 
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED 
PREFACE 
(U)  The  Annual  Historical  Review  was  prepared  in  compliance  with  AR 
870-5,  Military  Historyt  Responsibilities,  Policies,  and  Procedures.  The 
purpose  of  the  report  is  to  provide  a  quick  reference  and  research  based 
of  the  significant  activities,  events,  and  accoapliahaents  of  the  U.S. 
Aray  Intelligence  and  Security  Commend  (ZNSCOM)  during  FT  1984.  - 
Principal  source  msteriale  used  in  compilation  included  the  annual 
historical  reports  submitted  by  headquarters  staff  elements  and 
subordinate  commands,  briefings,  interviews,  and  miscellaneous 
documents.    
(D)  The  Biannual  Conference  of  DA  Historians  held  in  March  1985 
centered  on  the  Annual  Historical  Review,  its  preparation  and  value.  A 
number  of  observations  emerged  which  are  reflected  in  the  INSCOM 
Review' a  format.  A  debate  existed  as  to  whether  or  not  an  adequate 
review  can  be  written  on  an  annual  basis,  perhaps  a  five-year  cycle   . 
would  be  more  fitting.  However,  the  annual  report  permits  the  recording  "'.-" 
of  events  and  gathering  of  information  while  aources  still  exist.  Our 
history  office  will  attempt  in  the  future  to  bring  together  the  best  of 
both  worlds  by  continuing,  as  in  the  past,  to  prepare  annually  a  quick 
reference  document,  but  with  each  change  of  command,  to  prepare  an 
overview  nummary  for  the  incluaive  dates.  This  will  mean  eliminating 
the  summary  portion  on  an  annual  basis  which  was  largely  repetitious  of* 
coverage  found  elsewhere  within  the  volume.  This  will  also  permit  a 
limited  effort  at  an  oral  hiatory  program  by  attempting  to  Involve 
departing  members  of  the  Command  Group.  To  date,  the  oral  history 
program  within  our  history  office  has  been  almost  nonexistent  since  the 
Vietnam  war  due  to  lack  of  administrative  personnel.  For  example,  it  is 
estimated  that  for  each  hour  of  interview,  40  hours  of  adminiatrative 
support  to  include  typing  is  required. 
(U)  This  summary  was  prepared  by  James  L.  Gilbert  and  Wane  L. 
Hamm,  who  both  wrote  and  edited  portions  of  the  document.  Final 
review  and  assembly  were  performed  by  Ms.  Hamm. 
September  1985  JAMES  L.  GILBERT 
-r.  Command  Historian 
•<■'■  s_. 
UNCLASSIFIED  1    004
CONTENTS 
Chapter 
Page 
I.   MISSION,  FUNCTIONS,  AND  LOCATIONS 
Mission  and  Functions   
Transfer  of  Production  Functions   
Location.....   
II.   COMMAND  AND  STAFF  RELATIONSHIPS 
Command  and  Staff  Relationships   
Counterintelligence  Assistance  to  DARCOM... 
Intelligence  Data  Handling  System  (IDHS) 
at  Fort  Bragg   
III.   ORGANIZATION 
INSCOM  Organization   
Resubordinatlon  of  U.S.  Liaison  Branch,, 
Field  Station  Okinawa  Closure   
Administrative  Survey  Detachment   
Opposing  Forces/Technical  Intelligence 
Office   .   
Reorganization  of  the  902d  MI  Group   
Hahn  Detachment   
EAC  Intelligence  Center  (EACIC)   
U.S.  Army  Theater  Intelligence  and  Security 
Command  Europe..,   
Army  of  Excellence   
Allocation  of  Arlington  Hall  Space   
Relocation  of  HQ  INSCOM   
Consolidation  of  HQ  INSCOM   
527th  MI  Battalion's  New  Mission   
HQ  INSCOM  Reorganization   
General  Officer  Space  in  Europe...   
IV.   RESOURCES  AND  MANAGEMENT 
Operations  and  Maintenance,  Army  (OMA) 
Funds   
Family  Housing  Units   
INSCOM  Program  and  Budget  Guidelines, 
FY  1981  (Authorized  Strength)   
DCSPER  Budget  Line-Item  (BLI)   
Civilian  Strength  by  Program   
Command  Personnel  Situation   
Director's  Trophy   
in 
P 
vil 
AiirMiyajxUL 
LOTl  WL1YJIJ1 
005
rnnnnrfiTIM 
Chapter 
IV.   RESOURCES  AND  MANAGEMENT  (Continued) 
Travis  Trophy ....«•    32 
Mobilization    32 
Enlisted  Personnel  Strength  Posture    32 
INSCOM  Key  Personnel    321 
Congressional  Inquiries    311 
Inspector  General  Acton  Requests  (IGAR's)..  311 
EEO  Complaints.  • .«    35 
Equal  Employment  Opportunity  Program    35 
Military  Justice.    36 
Public  Affairs  Activities.    37 
High  Performance  Programs  Information    37 
MI  Poster  Series    37 
Historical  Monographs   •    38 
Historical  Audiovisual  Production....    38 
1984  Cash  Award  Program    39 
Baccalaureate  Cooperative  Education 
Program.    39 
Command  Intern  Program..    39 
INSCOM  Average  Grade    40 
INSCOM  Senior-Level  Positions  (High) 
Grade    .40 
Junior  Officer  Cryptologic  Career  Program..  HO 
Standard  Information  Division  Personnel 
(SIDPERS)  Performance    40 
-  ~    Affirmative  Action  Program  Plan    itu 
Merit  Pay  System   ,    41 
Merit  Pay  Appraisals    41 
BG  Bernard  Adrisana  Award    42 
Communications  Upgrade  Arlington  Ball 
Station    42 
Freedom  of  Information  Act    42 
Investigative  Records  Repository  Unit    43 
IRR  Micro  Consolidation  Project    -43 
Central  Security  Facility  Productivity.....  44 
Status  of  Aircraft  Resources    44 
Service  Cryptologic  Element  (SCE)  Day    45 
Operational  Readiness    45 
Weaponeer    46 
Reserve  Affairs    46 
Chief  of  Staff,  U.S.  Army's  Award  for 
»             Maintenance  Excellence    46 
!             Exercises    47 
INSCOM  Beyond  Excellence  (IBEX)  Programs...  47 
UIUCIASSIFIED 
WMHT  1    006
A****-. 
;•-.'.»-.  .':4».v:': 
m: 
I 
GJjU....,,, 
Chapter 
IV*   RESOURCES  AND  MANAGEMENT  (Continued)   : 
Personnel  Security.  ••••••••••••  •••••■•;■.•••'•'• 
..^,:..  >.......  ■  Indorsation  Security. «..«.*««  ••••••••••j**,»"i^»  ^;  -^ 
Physical  Security.. ••••••..  ..•••••• ••r.V... 
Vault  3  Upgrade   
Special  DAIG  Inspection. ••••   ..'.V..... 
V.   OPERATIONAL  ACTIVITIES 
Multidisclpline 
U.S.  Ar»y  Tactical  Intelligence  Readiness  \ 
Training  (REDTRAIN)   
INSCOM  Bi-Weekly  Operational  Report   
Weather  Intelligence  and  Threat  Analysis 
->.. .^.-,  .   PrOgrSB  (WINTAP }  ............................. 
, 
";;;^';-  Tactical  Sinulation  (TACSIM)  Support  to  ""'*£".' ■■ 
CRESTED  EAGLE  O™ .......................... 
~ 
.,.-.*   Support  to  URGENT  FURT  (U.S.  Forces  in  ,  .  r  r^ 
Grenada) ••.••••••••• ... •••.••••••••.••.  •  • .^ 
Weather  Support  to  U.S.  Amy  Aircraft  in 
Central  Aaerlca   •   
•70th  MI  Group  IIR  Production.. ...... ...... 
iBprovlng  Intelligence  Support  to     ~    ^  . 
i >'   ^-.  J,.v  •   SQUTBCOn  •.......«.......•••».■...••.•.-.••.*  ^w 
•:,i>   The  IHSCOH  Plan* »»».». ».»»«>»»>««»«»..«». . . 
EC  IEW  Task  Analysis  Study. 
IHINT/Electro-Qptlcs^^^^^^^^^^^ 
...  i 
♦  .  •••^^^>^L^L^,A1^-^^J  *  ........ 
...  ..*••• 
•  *  «  .  .••'•«•..*••.........* 
**""  •••■   ^k^k^k^k^k^^0 
I  Detachment.   
SIGIHT/EW   V 
High  Frequency  Direction-Finding  Rear 
(HFDF-R)  Syatea..   
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Chapter 
V.   OPER 
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.^*&x*  i  .hi  ■>■'  H»  »  ■ 
** 
ACTIVITIES  (Continued)  %-;&kV*s?' 
I......  .......«.•  •'•-•.•  «  9  •  •  • 
"gh  Frequency  Direction  Finder  (HFDP); 
Rental 
lational  Collection  Manageaent  Center  .---'" 
•  •  •«••••  tf  •  ••••••  ••  •*••••••••.••'■ 
   r.  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •••  •••••••••  •■'•  •  •  •  •  •'•'•  •': 
lodernization  of  Field  Station  Sinop. ....... 
INSCOM  CONUS  Operations  Site   
Electronic  Processing  and  Dissemination   v.  , 
System  (EPDS)  " 
Remote  OperationimmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmWj 
-"-,&.'„;,.,>.■•■ 
Project  TIPE. 
Direction^Flndlng  Nets. . • »• . • • • •••*••••••••• 
Disposition  of  Army  SIGINT  Positions  by 
Type   
Disposition  of  the  Army's  SIGINT  Resources  5 
by  Sub-Element*. ••••  •••»«««.«•  •••.*•••»»•  •  •  • 
Field  Station  Sinop* s  Operational 
Highlight*   ..'•••■   
Field  Station  Berlin, 
Page 
65       ; 
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008
confllffii 
Chapter 
V.   OPERATIONAL  ACTIVITIES  (Continued! 
57Qti^i^Group 
Expanslonofji70th  MI  Group* a 
mmm.....   
SeaTer Document  Exploitation  Syatea 
(TDES 
CounterlntelllKence/Qperatlona  Security 
COMSEC  Insecurities, 
Electronic  Security  (ELSEC)  Collection  and 
Analyaia  Systeas  (ECAS)   < 
Developaent  of  the  Operationa  Security 
Evaluation  <OSE)   - 
Sensitive  Coapsrtaent  Information  (SCI)  .  . 
Coaaunicatlona  Support   
Mobile  TEMPEST  Teat  Syatea  <MTTS)   
.technical  Working  Croups..   
Peraonnel  Security  Inveetigatlona  (PSI) 
Support   •••   •   •••• 
Operationa  Security  Support  to  the  Cvajalein 
Miaaile  Range  (IMR)   .-.   
INSCOM  Port  Security  Miaalon.....   
INSCOM  Support  to  the  Ballistic  Missile 
Defense  Systems  Coaaand  (BMDSCOM)   • 
Polygraph  Activities. . ,   •   
Counterintellgience  Teak  Force  2 
 
INSCOM  Support  to  8«l  Olyaplca..   
Counterintelligence  Support  to  Operations 
in  Grensds   •   •   
Special  H70th  MI  Group  Counterintelligence 
Mission   
Pajje 
9* 
9* 
QU 
9* 
101 
.101 
102 
104 
105 
106 
I 
XV 
I      009
rniiinnffiiTiai  ^ 
Page 
Appendix 
A.  USAINSCOM  Organizational  Structure    112 
B.  TOE  Units    116 
C.  Changes   In  Status  of  TOE  Unita...    117 
D.  TDA  Unita    118 
E.  Changes  In  Statua  of  TDA  Unita....    120 
F.  USAINSCOM  Personnel  Strength  by  Unit    121 
G.  Provisional  Units    126 
R..  Changes  In  Status  of  Provisional  Units    127 
I.   USAINSCOM  Key  Personnel    128 
J.  Travis  Trophy  Winners    138 
K.   Director's  Trophy  Winners    1*0 
* 
PHOTOGRAPHS 
BG  Harry  E.  Soyster    1*1 
BG  Charlea  F.  Seanlon    1*2 
GLOSSARY    1*3 
INSCOM  Staff  Directory  -  Auguat  198* 
Tables 
No. 
1.  Direct  Funding  by  Subprogram...    26 
2.  Direct  Obligations  for  FY  198*4    29 
3.  INSCOM  Progras  and  Budget  Guidance,  FY  1984. ...  30 
4.  Civilian  Strength  by  Program    31 
5.  Enlisted  Personnel  Posture  for  FY's  198.3-1984..  32 
6.  Enlisted  Fersonnel  Posture  by  Area  and  Unit....  33 
7.  Serious  Crime  Offenses    36 
8.  FY  1984  Administrative  Eliminations    36 
I      9.   Disposition  of  Other  Offenses,  FY  1984.........  36 
10.   Approving  Official's  Decision  Plus  Presumptive 
Ratings  (PR)    k2 
WJClASSffTCD 
xvii 
010
rourjnriiiifii 
No.  Page 
11.  Productivity  Units,  FY  198H    *H 
12.  INSCOM  Aircraft  Resources    *»5 
13.  Disposition  of  Amy  SIGINT  Positions  by  Type...  73 
1*.   Disposition  of  Army  SIGINT  Resources  by  Sub- 
Element    7" 
15.  COMSEC  Insecurities,  CY  1983   •••  90 
16.  Polygraph  Activities,  3d  and  «th  Qtrs, 
FY  1981    101 
UAtCUSSIFIED 
xix 
^SMHSHTnSf  ^    011
,  CHAPTER  I 
MISSION,  FUNCTIONS,  AND  LOCATION      :*- ^%-^'j 
Mission  and  Functions.  (U)  The  mission  of  the  CG,  INSCOM  Is'to 
conduct  and  coordinate  electronic  warfare  (EW);  intelligence  collection 
processing,  analysis,  and  reporting;  counterintelligence  (CI)  activities; 
operations  security  (OPSEC)  support;  and  related  operations  in  support  of 
&$  +      the  U.S.  Army.  •  r^~-';T."V  .-?_:&?  s:^MrS--;  ......<,..#  r*:-:  .' 
1.  (U)  Commands  Bilitary  intelligence  organizations  tailored  to 
provide  supported  force  requirements  for: 
|§P#'v-'f'   *  -    a.  Intelligence  within  the  corps  commander* s  area  of  Interest  and 
0  :'  .  to  supplement  the  corps  intelligence  and  electronic  warfare  (IEW)  system 
&*£''*:  .  for  certain  Intelligence  within  the  corps  area  of  influence. 
$** 
b.  Intelligence  with  the  echelon  above  corps  (EAC)  commander's 
area  of  Influence  and  coordination  for/or  the  provision  of  intelligence 
within  the  EAC  commander's  area  of  Interest. 
/ 
e.  Counterintelligence  support  beyond  the  organic  capabilities  of 
$$??■■ 
all  supported  commanders. 
-'.--**  •%[%.■'*%*■?"''  -:y--t/V  ">v 
i*W#V*  -:1t? ';i 
:  <  "  s-  !  'V-?:  -A' 
4.  Specialised  intelligence,  Etf,  and  security  support. 
012
$■>■? 
8.  <U)  Conducts  «nd  coordinate*  counterintelligence  support  to  U.S. 
Amy  progress. 
9*  (C)  Conducts  electronic  surveillance  support  operation*. 
10.  (0)  Conducts  speelsl  operation*. 
11.  (U)  Conducts  end  coordinates  Etf  operations. 
12.  (0)  Operates  the  M  Special  Security  Systea. 
13*  (0)  Administers  functions  relating  to  aanagenent,  organisation, 
equipment,  -training,  administration,  logiaitiee,  and  autoaated  data 
processing.* 
Transfer  of  Production  Functions.  <U)  the  Intelligence  Organisation  and 
Stationing  Study  which  led  to  the  estsbllshaent  of  UtSCQH  in  1977  had 
recoaaended  that  all  Amy  intelligence  production  agencies  he 
consolidated  into  a  single  entity.  However,  only  those  production 
agencies  directly  under  0ACSZ  or  F0XSC0M  were  consolidated  under 
IMSC0M  on  1  January  1977.  Froa  thsse  newly  acquired  production 
eleaents,  ZKSCOM  formed  the  0.3.  Amy  Intelligence  and  Threat 
Analysis*  Center  (ZTAC)  in  1978.  However,  after  aubsequent  relooks, 
support  grew  for  s  larger  consolidation.  The  CC  BiSCOM'e  position  wss 
that  the  eleaents  should  he  consolidated  under  bis  aajor  Amy  comsnd 
(MAC0M),  hut  even  acre  iaportantly,  such  a  eonaolidatlon  ahould  take 
piece.  Aa  a  result  of  a  study  initiated  in  Septeaber  1963,  the  Vice  Chief 
of  Staff,  U.S.  Amy  directed  that  2TAC  he  placed  under  the  operational 
control  of  the  newly  established  U.S.  Amy  Intelligence  Agency  UIA) 
(Provisional),  a  field  operating  agency  under  0ACSI.  The  operational 
control  waa  transferred  in  July  1964,  but  adainiatrative  control  would 
not  be  rellngulabed  until  early  FX  1965. 
(U)  In  addition  to  aasuning  control  of  the  XTAC  resources,  the  Amy 
Intelligence  Agency  wss  also  est  to  receive  the  production  eleaents 
fomerly  subordinated  to  the  U.S.  Amy  Msteriel  Cosaand:  the  Foreign 
Science  and  Technology  Centef  at  Charlottesville,  Virginia,  and  the  U.S. 
Amy  Missile  Intelligence  Agency  st  Bedstone  Arsenal,  Alabana.  The 
only  Amy  production  eleaent  not  ocnsolidsted  wss  the  Amed  Force* 
Medical  Intelligence  Center,  an  agency  of  The  Surgeon  General  of  the 
Amy  operating  under  a  newly  acquired  joint  charter. 
l   013
UNCLASSIFIED 
(0)  In  June  1984,  Senator  Verne  r,  U.S.  Senetor  from  Virginia,  proposed  e 
Senete  Amendment  3174  which  would  have  prevented  the  transfer  of  the 
Foreign  Science  end  Technology  Center  to  AXA  without  approval  of  the 
Committees  on  Armed  Services  of  the  Senate  and  the  Bouse  of  ;ia£u 
Xepresentatlvea.  This  -momentarily  brought  into  question  the  DA  - 
General  Order  which  created  the  AIA.  However,  a  ruling  by  the  Judge 
Advocate  General  in  September  1081  removed  any  doubts,  and  the  '  
•' 
reorganization  proceeded  on  schedule.2 
Location.  (0)  Headquarters,  U.S.  Army  Intelligence  and  Security 
Command  was  located  at  Arlington  Hall  Station,  4000  Arlington 
Boulevard,  Arlington,  Virginia  22212.  Until  a  final  stationing  decision 
is  effected,  certain  staff  functions  will  continue  to  be  located  at  Fort 
George  G.  Meade,  Maryland  20755*  v. 
.''•-■■  •.-■*,+ J. ■..*?**».  >.-•'.•    -.        ..     '•  .     •.-■^'-iv     '<•  '-.>•  i> -^t>-4-^;'  ■■■•'  ■"■  ;*    ; 
ri.^-vi-./i-.,- 
UNCLASSIFIED 
l      014
EONLY 
FOOTNOTES:  CHAPTER  2.  MISSION,  FUNCTIONS,  AND  LOCATION 
1. 
2. 
W,  DCSRM,  subj:  AB  10-53t  Organization  and  Functions,  U.S.  Army 
Intelligence  and  Security  Command  (0)  (Undtd)  (C). 
"INSCOM  and  Its  Heritage,"  History  Ofc.  HQ  INSCOM  (1985),  "pp.  5. 
12,13  (0)J  FT  198H  DCSOPS  AHR  (TSBf,  pp.  16-19;  Foro  32,  aubj! 
Memorandum  of  Agreement,  AIA-ZC  (19  Sep  8U)  (0).  <-•: 
\ 
£ 
% 
'*  '-J 
y 
t   01b
EONLY 
CHAPTER  21 
COMMAND  AND  STATF  RELATIONSHIPS 
.>•  ^ 
Command  and  Staff  Relationships,  (fl)  The  CG,  INSCOM  is  under 
supervision  of  the  Chief  ©f  Staff,  U.S.  Army.  Directives,  authorities, 
policy,  planning,  and  programming  guidance,  approved  programs, 
resource  allocations  and  other  methods  of  command  direction  are  Issued 
to  CG,  INSCOM  by  the  Chief  of  Staff,  D.S.  Army. 
(U)  The  CG,  INSCOM— 
1.  Commands  all  assigned  units  and  activities. 
(0)  INSCOM  and  other  major  Army  commands  (WACOM)  are  coordinate 
elements  of  DA.  The  CG,  INSCOM  is  authorised  to  communicate 
directly  with  other  major  Army  commanders  or  with  heads  of  Army  Staff 
agencies  on  matters  of  mutual  Interest. 
(0)  The  CG,  INSCOM  will  maintain  liaison  as  necessary  with  other  "•: 
MAC0M*s,  field  operating  agencies,  other  nryptelogic  and  intelligence 
activities,  and  other  foreign  domestic  governmental  agencies  to  maintain 
an  awareness  of,  to  exchange  information  on,  and  to  ensure  coordination 
of  matters  of  mutual  concern.1 
Counterintelligence  Assistance  to  PAR COM.  (0)  In  November  1983,  a 
directed  study  on  the  intelligence  activities  in  the  U.S.  Army  Materiel 
Development  and  Readiness  Command  (DARCOM)  surfaced  a  serious 
deficiency  in  the  management  of  counterintelligence  and  -operations 
security  (OPSEC)  within  DARCOM.  As  a  result,  s  concept  was  approved 
to  centralize  intelligence  management  wittin  DARCOM.  A  working 
group  was  then  established  to  implement  this  concept  and  DARCOM 
requested  the  assistance  of  the  ACSI  it  obtaining  a  qualified  individual 
to  participate  in  the  working  group.  OACSI,  DA  tasked  INSCOM  to 
provide  the  individual.  LTC  Stephen  R.  Harris,  INSCOM  Liaison  Officer 
to  DARCOM,  was  selected  for  $0  days  TDY  beginning  in  mid-March 
198JI.2 
FO 
SEONU 
l      GIB
SEONLY 
Intelligence  Data  Handling  System  (IDHS)  at  Fort  Bragg.  (0)  The 
relocation  or  the  IDHS  Branch  of  the  INSCOM  Automated  System 
Activity  at  Fort  Bragg  with  the  future  consolidation  of  the  U.3.  Army 
Intelligence  and  Threat  Analysis  Center  became  a  sensitive  Issue  In  FY 
1983.  Among  it  functions,  the  IDHS  Branch  provided  tactical  mr»  on- 
line and  patch  computer  services  to  national  level  data  bases.'  The  CDR, 
XVIII  Airborne  Corps  wanted  to  keep  the  IDHS  and  recommended  *. 
FORSCOM  assimilate  it.  The  Deputy  Chief  of  Staff  for  Automation  -.        % 
(DCSAOT),  HQ  INSCOM,  position  was  that  the  ■spaces  involved  were        § 
critical  to  the  establishment  of  the  Army  Threat  Intelligence  Production   £ 
System  (ATIPS)  staffing  and  were  not  available  for  assimilation.         « 
Secondly,  some  automated  data  processing  could  be  left  in  place  to  ease 
the  transition,  but  it  was  important  that  FORSCOM  take  programming 
actions  in  the  FY  1985-89  Program  Objective  Memorandum  cycle  to 
provide  follow-on.  However,  at  the  end  of  FY  1983,  the  issue  was  still 
unresolved* 
(U)  During  FY  1984,  at  the  direction  of  the  ACSI,  HQDA,  the  IDHS 
Branch  was  funded  for  FY  1984  and  FY  1985  from  General  Defense 
Intelligence  Program  (GDIP)  funds  under  the  command  and  control  of 
INSCOM.  Initial  planning  had  called  for  FY  1986  and  beyond  funding  to 
be  provided  under  the  GDIP  as  a  submission  of  U.S.  Central  Command         «a 
(CENTCOM)  to  provide  an  Army-CENTCOM  (ARCENT)  IDHS  in  support  \ 
of  a  recognised  CENTCOM  IDHS  plan.  As  such,  CENTCOM  forwarded  & 
an  FY  1986  GDIP  submission  which  called  for  both  hardwareand        *     S 
software  upgrade  to  the  IDHS  site,  as  well  as  spaces  for  K|  people.         *@ 
(0)  Asa  result  of  the  CENTCOM  initiative,  Fort  Bragg  units  operating 
in  support  of  other  unified  and  specified  commands,  expressed  concern 
over  the  potential  loss  of  responsive  support  from  IDHS  Branch.  Their 
concern  culminated  In  a  visit  to  HQ  INSCOM  in  September  1984  where  it 
was  concluded  that  the  IDHS  site  at  Fort  Bragg  should  remain  under  the 
command  and  control  of  INSCOM  and  provide  support  to  the  ARCENT 
mission  as  well  as  to  the  missions  of  other  unified  and  specified 
commands  represented  by  Fort  Bragg  tactical  units. 
(U)  At  the  close  of  FY  1984,  the  future  of  the  Fort  Bragg  IDHS  site 
appeared  to  be  established  as  an  automated  intelligence/telecommunication 
processing  center  In  support  of  various  unified  and  specified  commands 
represented  by  Fort  Bragg  tactical  units  and  potentially  all  CONUS 
FORSCOM  units. 3 
SEONLY  L      01?
FOR  OF 
EONLY 
FOOTNOTES:  CHAPTER  II.  COMMAND  AND  STAFF  RELATIONSHIPS 
1.  DF,  DCSRM,  sub*:  AR 10-53?  Organization  and  Functions,  U.S.  Army 
Intelligence  and  Security  Command  (Undtd)  (C). 
2.  IA  Form  32,  IAOPS-OP-OC,  sub J:  Request  for  Assistance  in 
Development  of  Counterintelligence  Function  (15  Mar  84)  (U). 
3.  FY  1984  Ann  Hist  Review  (Tflf  pp.  13-14;  FY  1984  DCSAUT  (C), 
eh.  II,  pp.  28-29. 
% 
FOR  0 
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01b
FOR  OFF) 
SE  ONLY 
CHAPTER  III 
ORGANIZATION 
INSCOM  Organization.  (U)  At  the  close  of  FY  1984,  there  was  a  total 
of  78  units  (34  TOE  and  44  TDA)  within  INSCOM.  The  TDA  figure  does 
not  include  Augmentation  or  Provisional  units.  All  types  of  units  are 
listed  in  appendix  I.  For  individual  lists  of  TOE,  TDA,  and  Provisional 
units  at  the  close  of  FY  1984,  see  appendixes  B,  D,  and  G  respectively. 
Changes  in  the  status  of  TOE,  TDA,  and  Provisional  are  listed  in 
appendixes  C,  E,  and  H. 
(U)  On  27  June  1984,  HG  Albert  N.  Stubblebine,  III  retired  and  was 
succeeded  by  BG  Harry  E.  Soyster,  who  left  his  position  at  OACSI.  On 
29  August,  BG  Soyster  was  promoted  to  major  general.  Throughout  FY 
1984,  BG  James  V.  Hunt  reaained  as  Deputy  Commander,  Intelligence. 
In  November  1983,  BG  Charles  F.  Scanlon  was  assigned  as  Deputy 
Commander,  Support,  arriving  from  having  served  as  the  executive 
officer  at  OACSI.  Early  in  1984,  the  "Intelligence*  and  "Support" 
designations  were  dropped  from  the  signature  blocks  of  the  deputy 
commanders,  but  were  retained  as  office  symbols  for  distribution  of 
correspondence.  COL  Charles  C.  Partridge  served  as  Chief  of  Staff  until 
his  retirement  on  31  January  1984.  On  1  February  1984,  COL  Louis  D. 
Kirk  assumed  the  position.  Throughout  FY  1984,  CSM  George  V.  Howell 
served  as  the  Command  Sergeant  Major. 
(U)  At  the  end  of  FY  1984,  Headquarters,  D.S.  Army  Intelligence  and 
Security  Command  was  organized  to  consist  of  a  Command  Group, 
Office  of  the  Chief  of  Staff,  Special  Staff,  Personal  Staff,  and 
Coordinating  Staff  as  shown  below:  (These  particular  major  divisions 
were  reflected  in  a  draft  of  INSCOM  Regulation  10-2,  dated  17  August 
1983,  which  was  circulated  for  use  in  the  implementation  of  the  HQ  :-" 
INSCOM  reorganization.  A  number  of  elements  to  include  the  Command 
Chaplain,  Scientific  and  Cryptologic  Affairs  Advisor,  and  Command 
Psychologist  which  had  in  the  past  fallen  within  the  category  of  Personal 
Staff  were  now  placed  under  Special  Staff  although  they  continued  to  be 
responsible  to  the  Commanding  General.  Under  this  grouping,  the  Office 
of  the  Chief  of  Staff  provided  general  administrative  support  to  these 
three  elements.) 
Command  Group: 
Commanding  General  (CG).   (UJ  The  CG,  U.S.  Army  Intelligence  and 
Security  Command  was  responsible  to  the  Chief  of  Staff,  U.S.  Army  for 
accomplishment  of  the  missions  and  functions  prescribed  by  AR  10-53 
and  was  concurrently  responsible  to  the  Chief,  Central  Security  Service 
for  all  SIGINT  aetivitij 
c 
CI 
USE  ONLY 
019
UNCLASSIFIED 
Deputy  Commanders  (DCG-I)  (DCG-S).  (0)  The  deputy  commanders 
assisted  the  commander  in  the  management  of  all  intelligence  and 
support  operations  of  INSCOM  to  Include  the  review  and  execution  of  all 
tasked  and  delegated  operations  and  the  determination  of  future 
requirements.  (Although  the  informal  division  of  responsibilities  while 
Generals  Runt  and  Scanlon  served  were  to  hsve  been  on  a  geographical 
basis,  in  fact,  BG  Hunt  oversaw  SICINT  units  worldwide  and  BC  Scanlon 
those  with  a  HUMINT  related  mission.) 
Command  Sergeant  Major  (CSM).  (0)  The  Command  Sergeant  Major  as 
the  senior  enlisted  person  in  the  command  provided  advice  and  assistance 
to  the  CG  on  all  matters  involving  enlisted  personnel. 
Office  of  the  Chief  of  Staff : 
Chief  of  Staff  (CofS).  (0)  The  CofS  acted  as  the  principal  coordinating 
agent  of,,  and  advisor  to,  the  CG  and  DCG's  on  those  matters  pertaining 
:  to  INSCOM;  directed  and  coordinated  the  staff  to  achieve  efficiency  and 
unit  of  action}  and  assisted  the  CG  and  DCG's  in  the  supervision  of  the 
execution  of  orders.  Directly  subordinate  to  the  CofS  were  the  Liaison 
Officers,  the  Office  of  Public  Affairs,  Organizational  Effectiveness 
Office,  and  Internal  Review  Office.  (During  FY  1984,  the  Internal 
Review  Office  was  transferred  to  the  CofS,  the  Information  Resource 
Management  Office  and  the  Mission  Analysis  Office  became  major  staff 
elements,  and  the  Equal  Employment  Opportunity  Office  and  Senior 
Reserve  Component  Advisor  were  reassigned  to  DCSPER  and  DCSOPS 
respectively.  The  Center  for  Excellence  (CENTEX)  was  redesignated  the 
Organizational  Effectiveness  Office.  Each  of  these  changes  are 
discussed  in  detail  under  the  appropriate  organization  subject  and  under 
the  topic  on  "BQ  INSCOM  Reorganization.**) 
Deputy  Chief  of  Staff  (PCS).  (U)  The  DCS  acted  for  the  Chief  of  Staff 
during  his  absence  and  assisted  to  coordinate  all  actions  of  the  BQ'* 
INSCOM  staff.  Supervised  the  activities  of  or  provided  support  to  the 
Building  Coordinator.,  Command  Chaplain,  Organizational  Effectiveness 
Office,  Secretary  of  the  General  Staff,  Staff  Psychologist,  Scientific  . 
Advisor,  Public  Affairs  Office,  and  INSCOM  Liaison  Officers. 
Secretary  of  the  General  Staff  (SGS).  (0)  The  SGS  acted  as  executive 
officer  for  the  CofS  and  as  office  manager  for  the  offices  of  the  CG, 
DCG's,  and  CofS. 
Special  Assistant  to  Chief  of  Staff.  (U)  The  Special  Assistant  to  Chief 
»  of  Staff  acted  as  special  advisor  and  consultant  to  the  Commander, 
{  Deputy  Commanders,  and  the  Chief  of  Staff. 
Protocol  Office.  (0)  The  Protocol  Officer  served  to  advise  the 
Command  Group  on  matters  related  to  protocol. 
UNCLASSIFIED  i    020
UNCLASSIFIED 
Building  Coordinator.  (0)  •  The  Building  Coordinator  administer*  the 
headquarter*  occupied  physical  facilities  and  administers  and  coordinates 
such  administrative  functions  as  local  transportation,  office  equipment,  . 
and  supplies.  As  part  of  the  HQ  INSCOM  reorganization,  the  position  of 
Building  Coordinator  was  established  in  March  1984  but  remained  - 
unfilled.  Because  of  garrison  support  and  a  general  lack  of  .-• 
responsibilities  to  be  carried  out  while  the  headquarters  remained  at 
Arlington  Hall  Station,  it  was  envisioned  that  the  position  would  not  be 
filled  until  a  move  of  the  headquarters  to  Fort  Bel  voir  was  effected. 
Liaison  Officered  (0)  The  liaison  officers  provided  liaison  representation 
to  FORSCOM,  TJUDOC,  OSAICS,  USAREOR,  OSACACDA,  and  other 
commands  as  required.  The  liaison  position  at  the  U.S.  Army  Materiel 
Command  (AMC)  was  discontinued  on  15  March  1984  when  the  Incumbent 
was  assigned  to  AMC  to  meet  a  special  operational  requirement  to  which 
INSCOH  was  tasked  by  OACSI  to  provide  an  officer.  Bowever,  INSCOM 
planned  to  have  discontinued  the  poaition  anyway. 
Special  Staff t  \     •'"  -  *v- ':  ••  ■  -"-^.;=r;,' '-^^H^.-IsV-t  •/ 
Chief t  Organizational  Effectiveness  (OE)  Office.  (U)  The  OE  Office 
assisted  INSCOM* a  senior  leaders  in  leading  the  human  element  of  their 
organizations  through  complex  organizational  change.  The  OE  Office 
also  provides  assistance  to  INSCOM* a  leaders  in  management  and 
leadership  training  programs.  Finally,  the  OE  Office  managed  the 
INSCOM*  a  OE  Program.  On  10  September  1984,  the  title  of  the  office 
was  changed  from  the  Center  for  Excellence  (CENTEX)  back  to  ita 
original  title  of  Organizational  Effectiveness.  The  change  was 
recommended  due  to  the  perception  that  the  primary  purpose  of  the 
office  was  to  promote  high  performance  programs,  many  of  which  were 
on  the  fringe  of  the  human  performance  movement  and  were  not  even 
handled  by  the  office. 
Chief.  Internal  Review  (IR)  Office.  (U)  Servea  as  the  principal  advisor 
to  the  CDR  INSCOM  on  internal  review  matters.  Conducts  independent 
review  and  examination  of  command  operations  and  Internal  controls  to 
provide  the  commander  with  an  objective  evaluation  of  the  effectiveness 
and  efficiency  with  which  his  financial  and  related  functions  are  being 
performed.  As  part  of  DOD  policy,  the  Internal  Review  Office  waa 
transferred  from  Deputy  Chief  of  Staff  Resource  Management  in  April 
1984  and  placed  under  the  Chief  of  Staff. 
Scientific  and  Cryptologlt  Affairs  Advisor.  (TJ)  Serves  as  the  princir»al 
advisor  to  the  CDR  INSCOM  and  his  ataff  on  scientific  and  cryptologic 
mattera.  -.<; 
Public  Affairs  Officer.  (0)  Serves  as  the  Public  Affaire  Officer  (PAO) 
of  INSCOM,  advising  the  commander  and  staff  on  all  public  affairs 
mattera. 
UNCLASSFIED 
l     021
UNCLASSIFIED 
Coaaand  Psychologist.  (U) ■  Serves  as  the  psychologist  for  INSCOM, 
advising  the  commander  on  matters  pertaining  to  mental  health  and 
providing  guidance  on  psychological  factors  pertaining  to  intelligence 
operations*  ■■^;#?'  's<-\- 
Command  Chaplain.  (D)  Serves  as  the  chaplain  of  INSCOM  providing 
advice  and  assistance  to  the  commander  and  his  staff  on  religious,  moral, 
moral  leadership,  and  human  self-development  matters. 
Personal  Staffs  '"-"• 
Inspector  General  (10). 
(P)  The  IG,  as  member  of  the  personal  staff,    / 
inquired  into  and  reported  upon  matters  affecting  the  performance  of 
mission  and  state  of  the  economy,  efficiency,  discipline,  and  morale  of 
every  phase  of  activity  which  was  within  the  sphere  of  responsibility  of 
the  CG  and  as  prescribed  by  law.  Throughout  the  report  period,  the  2G 
Office  continued  *to  be  comprised  of  an  Assistance  and  Investigations 
Division  and  Inspections  Division. 
Staff  Judge  Advocate  (SJA).  (D)  The  SJA  served  as  legal  advisor  to  the 
CG,  DCG*s,  CofS,  and  all  staff  elements  of  HQ  INSCOM  and,  as 
necessary,  to  subordinate  elements  of  the  command.  ,, 
General  Staff :  ..""   ■;'  !/>>,'-::- ■  'v'"'5-  ;.''-**■?■ :; ■■' \v^^-&^w.'  . 
Deputy  Chief  of  Staff.  Personnel  (DCSPER).  (0)  The  DCSPER  served  as 
the  principal  staff  officer  for  the  administration  of  military  and  civilian 
personnel.  Acts  for  the  CDR  INSCOM  in  the  direction,  supervision,  and 
coordination  of  plans,  policies,  and  procedures  for  personnel 
administration,  distribution,  and  management;  maintenance  of  order  and 
discipline;  safety;  welfare;  morale;  human  affairs;  and  nonappropriated 
fund  activities.  Exercised  staff  supervision  over  the 
Administrative/Audiovisual  Support  Activity  until  1  February  1984,  at 
which  time  DCSIRM  assumed  staff  supervision.  Also  as  part  of  the  HQ 
INSCOM  reorganization,  the  Equal  Employment  Opportunity  Office  was 
resubordinated  to  the  DCSPER,  reducing  span  of  control  at  the  Chief  of 
Staff  level,  on  1  March  1984.  During  the  same  reorganization,  the  Plans 
and  Broponency  Division  was  established  in  July  1984.  The  division  was 
in  response  to  a  growing  need  for  mid  and  long  range  personnel  planning. > 
In  addition,  the  area  of  proponency— -monitoring  the  structural  viability 
of  military  Job  specialties  (MOS/CMF)— needed  attention  after  years  of 
inactivity. 
>   (U)  In  May  1984,  with  the  promotion  of  the  civilian,  the  positions  of 
!   ADCSPER-Civilian  and  "ADCSPER-Military  were  created.  The  DCSPER 
had  previously  had  a  military  deputy,  but  now  there  was  a  division  of 
responsibility  within  the  staff  element.  The  ADCSPER-Military  oversaw 
the  Military  Personnel  Division  and  the  newly  formed  Plans  A 
Proponency  Division.  The  ADCSPER-Civilian  oversaw  the  Human 
Resources  Division  (redesignated  from  the  Plans,  Policy,  and 
UNCLASSIFIED 
022
UNCLASSIFIED 
Management  Division  in  April  1984),  the  Civilian  Personnel  Division,  and 
the  new  Equal  Opportunity  Program  Division,  which  was  formed  upon 
transfer  of  the  EEO  Office  in  March  and  its  combination  with  the  former 
Human  Relations/Equal  Opportunity  Of  floe,     ^-,,.  ^^  ,-^%^ 
Deputy  Chief  of  Staff.  Operations  (PCSOPS).  (0)  The  DCSOPS  is  the 
principal  coordinating  staff  officer  responsible  for  current  intelligence 
collection,  production,  electronic  warfare,  and  counterintelligence,  and 
security  support  operations.  Provides  operational  policy  guidance  and 
direction;  coordinates  and  supervises  current  operations*  Manages 
RESTRAIN  direction  and  program  as  Army  executive  agent.  Provides 
operationally  oriented  INSCOM  interfaces  between  national, 
departmental,  theater  (echelon  above  corps),  and  tactical  (echelon  below 
corps)  intelligence  organizations.  Is  the  staff  Budget  Director  (current 
and-  budget  year}  for  allocation  and  employment  of  Program  2,  3,  and  8 
operational  resources.  Coordinates  operational  matters  with 
Department  of  the  Army,  MSA  CSS,  Department  of  Defense,  DIA.  CIA,  ' 
FBI,  joint/combined  commands,  other  MACOM's,  and  other  governmental  > 
agencies.  Supervises  command  aviation  activities.  Prepares  and 
coordinates  command  operational  plans  and  manages  command 
operational  planning  system;  is  command  focal  point  for  reserve  affairs. 
Supervises  command  historical  program.  Exercises  staff  proponency 
over  the  Intelligence  Exchange  Support  Center,  Systems  Exploitation      .  . 
Detachment,  and  Administrative  Survey  Detachment.  Supervises  the   v, .  **%<*» 
Special  Disbursing  Office.  :  "    -' 
(U)  On  13  February  1980,  the  Reserve  Affaire  Office  was  transferred 
from  the  Office  of  the  Chief  of  Staff.  Pursuant  to  a  staff  study 
conducted  in  December  1983t  the  Reserve  Affairs  Office  underwent  a 
major  reorganization.  Prior  to  this  reorganization,  the  Reserve  Advisor 
occupied  a  one-person  office  and  reported  directly  to  the  Chief  of  Staff 
on  all  Reserve  component  matters.  However,  the  study  determined  that 
day-to-day  functions  of  the  office  should  be  placed  under  the  staff'*1 
supervision  of  the  DCSOPS.  On  questions  of  Reserve  policy  and 
procedure  with  command  implications,  the  Reserve  Advisor  still  reported 
directly  to  the  Chief  of  Staff  and  to  the  Commanding  General  when 
appropriate. 
(U)  At  the  close  of  FY  1984,  DCSOPS  consisted  of  the  following  major 
divisions:  Program  Policy  and  Readiness  Division,  Administrative 
Office,  History  Office,  Reserve  Affairs  Office,  ADCSOPS 
Plans/Training,  ADCSOPS  OPSEC,  ADCSOPS  HUMINT,  ADCSOPS  ' 
SIGINT/EW,  ADCSOPS  IMXNT/BO/and  ADCSOPS  Intelligence  Support. 
Deputy  Chief  of  Staff.  Logisitics  (PCSLO0).  (0)  DCSLOC  is  the 
principal  coordinating  staff  officer  for  logistics,  and  is  responsible  for 
integrated  logistics  planning  policy;  procurement/contracts;  budgeting; 
distribution,  storsge  and  maintenance  of  electronic  equipment  systems 
(less  telecommunications);  engineering;  construction;  support  services; 
UNCLASSIFIED 
l     02J
UNCLASSIFIED 
transportation;  materiel  readiness;  and  real  property  management.  The 
DCSLOG  also  bad  staff  supervision  of  the  Materiel  Support  Activity  and 
the  Maintenance  Assistance  and  Instruction  Tesa  Activity. '*$$£*.*  ?, 
(0)  During  FT  198<t ,  the  organisation  of  the  DCSLOG  remained  basically 
the  same  and  consisted  of  the  following:  Supply  and  Services  Division, 
Maintenance  Division,  Installation  Division,  Fixed  Ststlon  Engineering 
Division,  Management  Office,  and  Administrative  Office.  When  the 
Incumbent  departed  during  FT  1984,  the  position  of  ADCSLOG  at  Fort 
George  G.  Meade  as  well  as  the  portion  of  the  Supply  and  Services 
Division  at  Fort  Meade  was  discontinued.  -  •-.• 
Deputy  Chief  of  Staff.  Systems  (DCSSTS).  (0)  DCSSTS  is  the  principal 
coordinating  staff  officer  responsible  for  INSCOM  materiel/systems 
development.  DCSSTS  represented  INSCOM  as  the  Army's  materiel 
developer  of  fixed  strategle  signal  intelligence  systems  and  INSCOM 
operated  fixed  automated  systems.  Also  represents  INSCOM  in  the 
materiel  development  process  for  systems  to  be  used  by  INSCOM.  Is  also 
responsible  for  automation  policy.  On  14  February  1984,  DCSSTS 
assumed  staff  supervision  for  Automated  Systems  Activity. 
(0)  DCSSTS  was  established  on  14  February  1984  using  the  former 
Deputy  Chief  of  Staff ,  Force  Modernisation  (DCSFM)  as  a  base.  DCSFM 
Itself  bad  been  divided  on  1  October  1983  when  Its  Force  Modernization  . 
Division  was  transferred  to  the  newly  established  Deputy  Chief  of  Staff, 
Flans,  Programs  and  Modernization.  Also  on  14  February,  the  Deputy 
Chief  of  Staff,  Automation  (DCSAOT)  was  disestablished  and  its 
functions  less  the  Life  Cycle  Management  Division  wss  transferred  to 
DCSSTS.  The  DCSSTS  was  divided  into  the  Special  Assistant 
Automation,  Requirement  Division,  Systems  Division,  Automated 
Management  Division,  and  Support  Services  Division. 
Deputy  Chief  of  Staff.  Resource  Management  (DCSRM).  CO)  The  . 
DCSRM  is  the  principal  staff  officer  in  matters  concerning  management , 
financial  management',  and  manpower  management.  The  DCSRM 
established  and  maintained  administrative  control  of  appropriated  funds/ 
exercised  responsibility  for  manpower  management  and  The  Army 
Authorization  Document  System  (TAAD),  developed  and  supervised  the 
implementation  of  force  requirements,  administered  the  structure  and 
strength  program,  exercised  control  over  the  manpower  and  equipment 
survey  programs,  and  reviewed  and  prepared  financial  and/ or  manpower 
annexes  for  operational  and^force  development  plans.  In  addition,  the 
DCSRM* exercised  staff  supervision  over  the  Finance  and  Accounting 
t  Activity. 
(D)  During  FT  1984,  DCSRM  lost  two  of  its  major  internal  elements  and 
their  functions.  In  April  1984,  the  Internal  Review  Division  was 
transferred  to  the  Office  of  the  Chief  of  Staff,  and  on  15  July  1981,  the 
Program  Division  was  transferred  to  the  recently  established^  Deputy 
Chief  of  Staff,  Flan's,  Programs  and  Modernisation  (DCSPPM).  "Both 
UNCLASSIFIED  i    024
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UNCLASSIFIED 
transfers  wert  a  part  of  the  HQ  INSCOM  rtorganlzation  plan.  This  left 
DCSRM  tilth  the  following  eleaents:  Administrative  Office,  Budget 
Division,  Finance  and  leeounting  Division,  Management  and  Analysis 
Division,  and  Manpower  Division.  .  u. 
Deputy  Chief  of  Staff.  Telecommunications  (DCSTEL).  (0)  The  X 
DCSTEL  is  the  principal  staff  assistant  to  the  CDR  INSCOM  for  all . 
matters  pertaining  to  telecommunications.  Responsibilities  Include 
development,  coordination  and  staff  supervision  of  all  functions  related 
to  telecommunications  within  the  oommand.  The  DCSTEL  exercised 
operational  control  over  ihe  U.S.  Army  Information  Systems  Command 
Communications  Center  supporting  INSCOM,  Arlington  Ball  Station.  On  . 
23  January  1984,  the  Deputy  Chief  of  Staff,  Telecommunications  was 
redesignsted  from  the  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  Telecommunications.  At 
-.---  the  close  of  FX  1984,  DCSTEL  consisted  of  the  Plans,  Operations,  and 
Resources  Division  and  the  Engineering  and  Installation  Division.  The 
Communications  Electronics  Division  was  discontinued  in  October  1983. 
Deputy  Chief  of  Staff.  Plans.  Programs  and  Modernization  (DCSPPM). 
T5)  DCSPPM  ia  the  principal  coordinating  staff  officer  responsible  for 
INSCOM  long-range  and  mid-range  planning;  force  design  and  operational 
concepts;  and  resource  program  development  and  evaluation.  Represents 
INSCOM  la  the  combat  developments  process.  Smrrm*  as  staff  point  of   : 
-  contact  with  other  Army/DOD  activities  for  force  planning,  combat   .,.- 
developments,  TENCAP  planning  and  program  submiaaion. 
tO)  DCSPPM  was  established  on  1  October  1984  ss  the  first  step  in  a 
major  HQ-INSCOM  reorganisation.  It  was  formed  from  the  Mission 
Analysis  Office  along  with  the  Force  Modernisation  Division,  Deputy 
Chief  of  Staff,  Force  Modernization.  On  15  July,  the  Programs  Division 
from  DCSRM  was  subordinated  to  DCSPPM.  At  the  close  of  FT  1984, 
DCSPPM  consisted  of  the  Long  Range  Plans  and  Studiea  Office,  Force  ;. 
Modernization  Division,  Programs  Division,  and  Plana  Division.  .. 
.  Deputy  Chief  of  Staff.  Information  Resource  Management  (DCSIRM). 
CO)  DCSIRM  is  the  principal  coordinating  staff  element  responsible  for 
INSCOM  command  and  control  information  management  and 
administration.  The  ODCSIRM  provided  general  policy  guidance  and 
overall  management  for  the  Command  Information  Resource 
Management  Program  (IRMP).  On  1  February  1984,  the 
Administrative/Audiovisual  Support  Activity  was  transferred  to  DCSIRM 
for  staff  supervision.      _ 
*     Command  Security  Office  (CSO).  (0)  The  Chief,  CSO  formulated, 
!  implemented  and  supervised  policies  and  procedures  for  personnel, 
physical,  automation,  and  information  security  and  acted  aa  command 
and  headquarters  security  manager,  internal  OPSEC  manager,  TEMPEST 
Coordinating  Officer  (TCO),  and  chief  law  enforcement  official  for 
INSCOM. 
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r.c  Forces/Technical  Intelligence  Office.  (U)  During  ?Y   15SJJ,  an 
t  specifically  given  over  to  opposing  forces  (0?FOH)/foreign 
el  for  training/ technical  intelligence  (FXI/TI)  nission  was 
ished  under  the  Assistant  Deputy  Chief  of  Staff,  Operations 
igence  Support.  Its  charter  vas  to  function  as  the  Army's  executive 
ir.  supervising  and  sanegir.g  the  OrFOr.  Foreign  Materiel  for 
r.g  Fregras.  the  office  was  fbroed  by  hiring  a  CS 11/12 
igence  research  specialist  in  February  195*  and  detailing  a  senior 
os  the  203d  XI  Battalion  (Aberdeen  Proving  Ground,  Karyland) 
ingtcn  Hall  Station  in  October  19B3*5 
Petrrar.izaticr.  of  the  ?:2d  M~  Srcuo.   (2)  In  early  •,gE2t  the  Iirscoy. 
Ecr.elcr.  Above  Corps  ;IAC)  Study  dictated  that  the  £C2d  \C   Croup  be 
composed  cf  a  technical  battalion  and  geographical  battalions.  In 
addition,  there  vas  an  aver  expanding  DA  directed  mission  requirements . 
(V}  In  7  April  19*?,  the  USAZKSCOK  Security  Support  Detachment,  Fort. 
Meade  was  organized  into  a  provisional  battalion.  This  reorganization 
vas  ^riven  by  an  unwieldy  span  of  control  and  the  lack  of  a  staffing 
capability.  However,  at  the  tine,  the  Security  Support  Battalion 
trrtyisicnal)  was  net  organised  with  compary/deteehmer.t  level  elements 
subordinate  to  the  battalion  headquarters.  Additionally,  its  level  cf 
authorized  personnel  assets  did  net  meet  the  minimum  number  required 
ty  2k.     Since  the  battalio*  could  net  meet  the  requirements  for 
permanent  battalion  status,-  the  Security  S^-'pzri  Battalion  (Provisional) 
reverted  back  to  detachment  status.  However,  the  consolidation  cf  all 
the  JC2d  HI  Group's  technical  surveillance  ccuntermeesures  assets  under 
the  Security  Support  Detachment  in  order  to  combine  the  assets  with  the 
IN'SCCH  proponent  activity  and  school  made  the  detachment  the  largest 
unit  within  the  g02d  HI  Group.  On  1  October  198*,  the  detadhment  was 
scheduled  to  be  redesignated  the  SSAIKSCOK  MI  Battalion  (Security). 
02S
(0)  Because  of  severe  personnel  shortages  throughout  INSCOM,  and 
especially  the  902d,  new  structures  were  looked  to  .conserve  personnel 
resources  and  simplify  processes.  The  proposal  involved  the  deactivation 
of  the  GSAINSCOM  Counterintelligence  and  Signal  Security  Support  , 
Battalion,  Fort  San  Houston.  The  military  intelligence  detachments  and 
resident  offices  formerly  subordinate  to  the  battalion  would  be  allocated 
between  the  two  security  battalions  presently  located  at  Fort  George  6. 
Meade,  Maryland,  and  the  Presidio  of  San  Francisco,  California.  '' 
Headquarters  spaces  of  the  Fort  Sao  Houston  Battalion  would  be 
transfer  to  the  proposed  INSCOM  MI  Battalion  (Security).*  ., 
Hahn  Detachment.  (0)  The  Hahn  Detachment  was  transferred  as  a   '" 
paragraph  on  the  Field  Station  Augsburg  TDA  to  being  a  paragraph  on 
the  66th  MI  Group,  Augmentation  with  OPCON  to  the  502d  ASA 
Battalion  on  31  January  1984.  The  Hahn  Air  Base  where  the  unit  is 
located  lies  in  the  central  southwest  portion  of  Vest  Germany  in  a  region 
called  the  Hunsrueke.  Frankfurt,  West  Germany,  lies  60  miles  east  of 
Hahn  and  80  miles  north  of  Bonn.  An  expanding  mission  and  increased 
resources  led  to  the  transfer. 
(0)  From  Its  inception  in  January  to  the  end  of  FT  1964,  the     *; 
detachment's  actual  strength  grew  from  9  to  31  personnel.  Authorised 
strength  stood  at  67.  The  MCE  portion  of  the  mission  was  not  expected 
to  be  manned  by  the  various  intelligence  specialists  and  become 
operational  until  mid-way  through  FI  1985.' 
EAC  Intelligence  Center  (EACIC).  (0)  Driven  by  the  513th  MI  Group, 
INSCOM  moved  ahead  with  doctrinal  plans  to  establish  a  CONUS-based 
echelon  above  corps  intelligence  center.  The  1?4th  MI  Company,  which 
had  the  closest  configuration  of  any  of  the  group* s  units  to  an 
Intelligence  center,  was  transferred  from  the  201st  MI  Battalion  to  the 
513th  MI  Group  itself  V  On  1  April  1984,  the  174th  MI  Company  was 
reorganized  into  a  provisional  intelligence  center  including 
establishment  of  corps  level  intelligence  support  elements  (ISE).8 
O.S.  Army  Theater  Intelligence  and  Security  Command "Europe.  (0)  On 
1  October  1982,  the  U.S.  Theater  Army  Intelligence  and  Security 
Command  Europe  was  established  at  Zweibrucken,  Germany.  The* 
ATISC,  Europe  was  programmed  to  transition  into  the  Military 
^BBal 
0?M
UNCLASSIFIED 
Intelligence  Brigade,  Europe  in  FY  1985.  However,  during  FY  198H,  the 
effort  ran  aground  due  to  the  question  of  OPCON  of  the  resources  and 
formally  discontinued  on  30  September  198*1.  USAREUR  viewed  the 
production  of  intelligence  by  ATISC,  Europe  as  being  duplicative  and  in 
conflict  with  the  effort  of  the  USAREUR  Intelligence  Center  Europe. 
Even  when  INSCOM  indicated  a  desire  to  take  the  ATSIC,  Europe' 
production  spaces  out  of  hide,  USAREUR  demanded  OPCON.  USAREUR 
did  not  see  a  need  for  an  echelon  above  corps  intelligence  center'  until 
transition  to  war  at  which  time  it  would  create  such  an  organization  as 
the  MI  Brigade  commander.  Facing  the  possibility  of  reduced  ceilings  in 
Europe,  INSCOM  elected  to  cut  the  ATSIC,  Europe.  The  reduction  in 
spaces  drill  was  brought  about  by  a  November  1983  DA  tasking  nen- 
•USAREUR  MACOM's  to  assess  a  5  percent  decrement  of  European 
military  spaces  for  FY  1985-90.  The  European  Command  (EUCOM) 
viewed  the  ATSIC,  Europe  as  being  a  layering  with  the  66th  MI  Group 
and  not  as  a  building  block  upon  which  to  merge  into  the  MI  Brigade.  In 
the  end,  however,  the  reduction  did  not  take  place  and  was  not  a  factor. r 
In  reality,  although  INSCOM  believed  in  the  ATSIC's  potential 
contribution,  lack  of  OPCON  was  too  high  of  a  price  to  pay.9 
Army  of  Excellence.  (U)  In  September  1983,  HQ  INSCOM 
representatives  participated  in  the  development  of  the  intelligence  and 
electronic  warfare  tactical  force  structure  within  the  constraints  of  the 
"Army  of  Excellence"  (AOE)  force  design  initiatives.  This  participation 
was  encouraged  by  the  U.S.  Army  Intelligence  Center  and  School  so 
INSCOM  could  provide  expertise  en  the  requirements  of  the  tactical 
echelon  above  corps  intelligence  and  electronic  warfare  force.  Force 
design  initiatives  for  an  "Army  of  Excellence"  provided  echelon  above 
corps  intelligence  and  security  support  to  the  European  Theater  by  the 
66th  MI  Group  (future  MI  Brigade).  Tables  of  organisation  and 
equipment  for  the  66th  MI  Group/Brigade  and  its  aubunits,  under 
development  since  August  1982,  were  published  and  forwarded  to  Europe 
in  draft  or  approved  form  in  the  3d  Qtr,  FY  198H.  Seme  parts  of  the: 
military  intelligence  AOE  structure  were  to  be  implemented  in  FY  1986 
to  provide  support  for  capabilities  removed  from  corps  and  division 
combat  electronic  warfare  and  intelligence  units  (SIGSEC,  HF  intercept, • 
and  HF  electronic  countermeasues).  The  brigade  TOE' a  which  were 
designated  for  expeditious  handling  were  the  MI  battalion  (SIGINT),  the 
MI  company  (SIGINT),  the  MI  battalion  (counterintelligence),  and  the  MI  " 
battalion  (collection  and  exploitation). 
(U)  Analysis  of  the  AOE  T0E;s  identified  that  the  brigade  had  not  been 
structured  to  meet  the  specific  requirements  of  the  European  theater  of 
»   operations.  Resolution  of  structure  problems  was  accomplished  through 
!   an  intensive  TOE  scrub  and  the  reconfiguration  of  designated  assets  to 
enable  the  brigade  to  meet  the  European  mission  requirements.  Further 
planning  of  the  MI  brigade  will  be  done  through  the  development  of 
MTOE's  and  TDA's  in  early  1985. 1° 
UNCLASSIFIED 
030
UNCLASSIFIED 
Allocation  of  Arlington  Hall  Space.  (U)  The  planned  relocation  of  MA 
from  Arlington  Hall  Station  generated  considerable. interest  among  other 
DOD  agencies  in  the  National  Capital  Region  in  the  space  and  facilities 
which  the  move  would  sake  available.  On  31  August  1983,  information 
was  received  that  the  long-tern  practice  of  transfer  of  excess  properties 
on  a  non-reimbursable  basis  to  other  Federal  agencies  outside  the 
Department  of  the  Army  had  ceased.  The  new  policy  indicated  that 
claimants  from  other  military  departments  must  compete  with  outside 
Federal  activities  on  the  basis  of  fair  marked  value  reimbursement. 
(U)  Host  of  the  Inquiries  were  directed,  not  at  acquisition  of  title  to 
property,  but  to  obtain  tenant  status.  CIA  indicated  an  urgent  need  for 
■  additional  space  until  its  new  building  was  ready  for  occupancy  In 
1987/88.  CIA  requested  the  allocation  of  approximately  20,000  square 
feet  to  be  vacated  by  DIA  in  "B"  Building  (T-450).  After  due  -.  . 
,. ..  consideration,  DA  advised  CIA  of  its  approval  and  Issued  a  permit  .for 
occupancy  on  27  August  1984.  DIA  elements  had  departed  by  the  end  of  . 
■   FT  1984,  and  CIA  had  initiated  projects  for  rehabilitation  and 
modifications  at  a  reported  level  of  $2  million.  CIA* a  formal  entry  was 
scheduled  for  March  1985. 
(0)  INSCOM  reported  to  DA  that  all  the  remaining  space  at  Arlington 
Ball,  with  the  35,000  square  feet  In  "A*1  Building  was  or  would  be  fully 
'  .utilised  in  accordance  r^ith  GSA  standards.  This  included  the  relocation 
' '"   of  the  U.S. Army  Special  Security  Group  from  the  Pentagon  at  BQDA  • 
direction  and  consolidation  of  BQ  INSCOM  elements.  Based  on 
INSCOM* s  report,  on  30  October  1984,  a  decision  was  made  by  DA  to 
allocate  24,000  square  feet  of  space  in  "A"  Building  to  meet  a 
requirement  of  the  Defense  Communications  Agency  (DCA).  The  DCA 
requirement,  like,  that  of  CIA,  was  also  temporary  in  nature,  to 
terminate  prior  to  relocation  of  INSCOM  to  Fort  Belvoir  and  closure  of 
Arlington  Ball.  Station  as  an  Army  Installation.  The  primary  difficulty 
imposed  was  that  DCA  personnel  did  not  possess  the  same  level  of  ... ' 
security  clearances  as  INSCOM  occupants  of  "A"  Building,  and  ■<  \' 
arrangements  had  to  be  made  to  separate  the  two  activities  for  ^ 
operational  effectiveness.  This  was  accomplished  by  a  construction 
project  funded  by  DCA  at  a  cost  of  approximately  $480,000.  This  still 
represented  a  significant  savings  from  what  DCA  would  have  been 
required  to  pay  if  it  had  to  lease  facilities  elsewhere.  DCA  was 
expected  to  be  at  Arlington  Ball  in  the  December  1984  to  January  1985 
time  period. 11 
Relocation  of  HQ  INSCOM.  {uf  In  October  1983,  the  Office,  Chief  of 
1  Engineers  (0CE)  notified  Congress  of  intent  to  expend  design  funds.  No 
!  opposition  eurfaced.  It  was  at  this  stage  in  the  process  of  the  previous 
attempt  to  site  an  INSCOM  headquarters,  then  at  Fort  George  G.  Meade, 
that  the  project  was  completely  derailed  by  Congressional  Committee 
disapproval  of  design  funding.  *  y>:^-  i/ 
*..■$. 
UNCLASSIFIED 
031
UNCLASSIFIED 
(U)  INSCOM  surveyed  several  sites  st  Fort  Bel voir  based  on  s  number  of 
considerations:  aesvi-J*,y,  access  to  facilities  and  services,  access  to 
housing  for  the  tr- .:■:-,  and  possibility  of  collocating  with  other 
intelligence  active >:  (i.e.,  Night  Vision  Lab  CNVL)  and  Engineer    v 
Topographic  Lab  T?l-;>,  MC  Stubbelbine  selected  Site  Number  J3,  after 
being  unable  to  i^tain  Belvoir  Master  Planning  approval  for  Site  Number 
6A.      .-....-..  .  '  .J-9vH\W~.rv 
(0)  An  important  feature  of  the  rationale  supporting  the  proposal  to 
relocate  the  Engineering  School  to  Fort  Leonard  Wood  has  always  been 
the  HQDA  plan  to  recoup  the  cost  of  the  major  construction  Involved  --'...\ ; :;; 
from  savings  realised  by  backfill  of  space  vacated  at  Fort  Bel voir. by 
activities  now  occupying  high-cost  leased  space  in  the  National  Capital 
Region.  The  first  two  weeks  in  October  1983  were  spent  by  TRADOC  in 
?*  <:  obtaining  a  decision  on  which  backfill  alternative  to  recommend..  The  --,  /*^* •'-...«*•: 
.;,.'.,  following  alternatives  were  proposed: ,A-J  ■^^..■^■y ^-v^-i^;^<&v  ■■—'■•'  -v;-^ 
^^#-•^1.  forward  the  study  to  DA  without  recommendation.  Sx^C^I^^ 
v    r   2.  Alternative  A  (INSCOM  backfill).  Opposed  by  INSCOM.  Although      ' 
.^-/  .cheapest  initially,  it  represented  little  long  term  savings.  .    .^.-^''^ 
";i=   .-I  3.  Alternative  B  (BARCOM  backfill).  TRADOC  favored  this   <y>:-'^r:^ 
alternative  because  BARCOM  was  assumed  to  have  the  most  experience  -  ?m& •.■^^■^ 
in  running  installations.  ■■■•^  *\  ' ■-■J.., ':'.,■'-' -c'-yrT^-- 
•<!S? 
W» 
4.  Alternative  E  (Office,  Chief  of  Engineers  backfill).  There  existed 
a  "sentimental"  rationale  to  keep  Fort  Belvoir  an  engineer  post. 
.  „,.  5.  Alternative  B  and  E.  ,  •,. ..r>_. .,.:;:-,.,.-.. .^,. 
(0)  In  all  the  alternatives,  with  the  exception  of  A,  INSCOM  stood -to   ' 
get  new  construction.  _  INSCOM  favored  either  B  or  E.  The  BA  staff  , 
elected  Alternative  E.  By  February  1984,  the  action  memorandum  had 
been  staffed  and  was'  on  the  desk  of  the  Vice  Chief  of  Staff.  Here  it 
stayed  the  rest  of  the  fiscal  year  due  to  election  year  politics.  The  move 
of  personnel  was  consistently  opposed  by  the  losing  political  entity. 
(0)  With  the  realignment  action  "hung  up"  at  VCSA  level  for  an 
uncertain  period,  HQ  INSCOM  along  with  HQDA  sought  means  to  keep 
the  construction  program  from  slipping  yet  another  fiscal  year.  The  Sale 
and  Replacement  Program  was  examined.  Somewhat  similar  to  the 
Befense  Relocation  Account  previously  considered,  this  was  a  payback 
program  in  which  properties  might  be  considered  for  sale  to  provide 
funds  for  replacement  at  another  location,  as  opposed  to  the  normal 
cycle  of  the  Military  Construction,  Army  Program.  On  7  September 
1984,  the  Arlington  Hall  Station  replacement  cost  was  calculated  to  be 
$28.9  million,  plus  another  $876,000  for  relocation  of  personnel  and 
equipment  and  caretaker  costs.  Unfortunately,  a  low  appraisal  for  the 
property,  approximately  $10  million,  washed  Arlington  Hall  Station  out 
.UNCLASSIFIED  Q32
UNCLASSIFIED 
of  the  program.  Appraisal  .was  obtained  by  Baltimore  District  Engineer 
from  a  local  appraiser.  In  the  opinion  of  the  INSCOM  engineer  staff,  this 
figure  was  considered  too  low  for  more  than  86  plus  acres  of  prime  real 
•state  In  Arlington  County.12  ......  ._  ..,^„  „,,„... ■_,„ .. ....  : ^ ,^4. . J^. , 
Consolidation  of  HQ  INSCOM.  (0)  During  a  briefing  for  the  INSCOM 
Chief  of  Staff  on  the  on-going  HQ  INSCOM  reorganization  study,  the 
question  was  raised  by  the  Chief  of  Staff  as  to  whether  or  not  INSCOM 
required  DA  authority  to  relocate  INSCOM  personnel  from  Fort  George 
G.  Meade,  Maryland.  .  After  failure  to  locate  specific  DA  authority,  the 
opinion  of  LTC  Keefe,  primary  action  officer  for  Army  Management  on 
the  consolidation  was  sought.  Be  warned  that  such  a  move  was 
politically  sensitive  and  required  DA  approval.  This  position  challenged 
the  validity  of  an  INSCOM  Chief  of  Staff  DF  dated  30  November  198 1 
which  alleged  that  the  "controlling  limitations  had  been  rescinded  and 
normal  MACOM  prerogatives  applied.*1  To  settle  the  issue,  HQ  INSCOM 
prepared  and  submitted  a  study  dated  15  August  1S33t  which  concluded 
that  DA  authority  was  required  in  accordance  with  AR  5-10.  This  ststed 
that  congressional  notification  was  required  for  all  moves  which  might 
result  in  the  involuntary  separation  or  dislocation  of  50  or  more 
permanent  civilian  employees  or  200  or  more  military  Jobs.  BQDA 
response  to  the  request  for  authority  to  relocate  INSCOM  Fort  George 
G.  Meade  personnel  stated  that  the  earliest  time  a  release  to  move  Fort 
Meade  personnel  could  be  expected  would  be  with  the  final  approval  of 
the  case  study  and  justification  folder  itself.1 3 _   -  . 
527th  MI  Battalion*  s  New  Mission.  CO  With  the  inaetivation  of  the 
511th  MI_ Battalion  on  1  October  1983,  the  527th  MI  Battallon*s 
reorganized  OPSEC  mission  wss  formally  complete.  The  527th  MI 
Battalion  primarily  provided  OPSEC  and  personnel  security 
investigations  (PSI)  at  echelon  above  corps  with  HQ  USAREUR  and  21st 
Support  Command  (SUPC0M)  being  the  major  supported  commands. 
Over  90  percent  of  the  EAC  units  in  the  theater  were  within  the    *' 
battalion* s  area  of  operations  and  when  assigned  strength  was  used  as  a 
criteria,  the  percent  was  much  higher.  This  distinction  was  significant 
because  the  corps  and  divisions  had  their  own  organic  MI  support  while 
the  21st  SOPCOM  and  ®ther  EAC  units  did  cot. ** 
*  •  •,''-■ 
HQ  INSCOM  Reorganization.  (O)  The  reorganization  plan  for  HQ 
INSCOM*  approved  in  July  1983,  was  to  be  Implemented  over  a  three 
year  period,  beginning  in  FY  1984.  Successful  completion  of  the  plan 
was  dependent  upon  DCSRM  submission  of  the  Reorganization  Concept 
Flan  and  subsequent  DA  approval.  The  staff  elements  at  Fort  George  G. 
Meade  being  relocated  .to  Arlington  Hall  Station  was  a  second  factor. 
Finally,  DIA's  movement  from  A  Building  was  a  determining  factor. 
(U)  During  FY  1984,  three  primary  staff  elements  were  either  created 
or  realigned  on  schedule.  First,  the  Mission  Analysis  Office  and  the 
Force  Modernization  Division  (the  letter  from  the  DCSFM)  were  merged 
on  1  October  1983  to  form  the  Deputy  Chief,  Plans,  Programs  *nd 
22  r- 
UNCLASSFIED  osj
pmTiAi 
Modernization  (Provisional}.  The  DCSPPK  was  responsible  for  IKSCOK 
long-range  and  progres  planning;  force  design  and  operating  concepts; 
ar.d  resource  prograe  development  and  evaluation.  On  15  July  1$6«,  the 
Progress  Division,  DCSRM  wts  resubcrdineted  to  the  5CSPPK.^r^| 
(U)  On  1  February  198*,  the  Inf creation  Resource  Kanageaeai  Off ice 
vas  changed  to  Deputy  Chief  of  Staff,  Inf creation  Resource  \A 
Kenegeser.t  (Provisional).  At  the  saae  tise,  the  operational  control  of 
the  USAIKSCOM  Adein/Audievisual  Support  Activity  vas  transferred 
froz  the  DCSPER  to  the  DCSPPM.  Finally,  on  9  February  190*5,  the 
deputy  Chief  of  Staff,  Force  Modernization  vas  redesignated  the  Deputy 
Chief  of  Staff,  Systess  and  assuaed  control  of  the  discontinued     * . ', 
D0SA3T,  sinus  the  Life  Cycle  Kanagesent  Division  which  vas    
subordinated  to  the  IKSCOK  Autcsated. Support  Activity.  At  the  saae 
;^  tire  the  OPCOK  of  the  Autosated  Support'  Activity  vas  placed  under  ., 
-yrr''"'  ti}*  newly  established  DCSSYS.  ■••v.  \  -^1^^^S%t^^^i;■:'v..■o^■.^•-■¥^.:i•■^:;b■^: 
^Ss&ae.P) .  *  ausber  ©f  ainor  changes  also  took  piece  vithin  the  headquarters  #- vf 
'*■' ""~'~"x~  related  to  the  reorganization  plan.  In  February  19&3,  the  Plans  and  :W& :-  + 
Propcnency  Division  vas  foraed  vithin  DCSPES.  This  new  eleaent  vas 
f eraelly  established  in  July.  It  grew  in  response  to  an  expanding  need 
for  aid-  and  long-range  personnel  planning;  the  division  was  also  given 
the  prcponeney  for  long  neglected  area  of  aonitoring  the  structural 
^|^v  Viability  of  silitary  Job  specialties.  In  April  196H,  the  Internal  Review5 
^1-^;  division  vithin  DCSRM  vas  sade  a  part  of  the  Chief  of  Staff1  s  office.   "  = 
^3  This  was  in  keeping  vith  DOD  acl icy.  The  internal  review  function  was  ;' 
primarily  that  of  direction,  su.-veillence,  and  evaluation  of  the  internal 
.-•   review_ activities  at  subordinate  cos-sands  and  installations. 
!7>  In  June  196*,  the  Chief  of  Staff  directed  postponesent  of  the 
ZZSZrS*   recrganizaticr.  rele  with  a  subsequent  unbiased,  fresh  relook  at 
:  ~h»  r.sad quarters  recrganizecicr.  concept.  COL  Powers,  the  DCSOPS, 
was  directed  to  relook  the '  DCSOFS  portion  of  the  plan  and  COL 
;"     Hasbric,  serving  as-a  special  assistant  to  the  Chief  of  Staff,  vas  tc 
relook  the  larger  reorganization  plan.  The  reason  that  a  hold  was  placed 
en  irpleaentttion  steaaed  frcz  the  arrival  of  a  new  Cossand  ~rcup 
whe  indicated  that  there  should  be  "expanding  operations."  At  the  sane 
tiaey  the  XDCSOPS  had  esiiaeted  that  26  cf  the  62  spaces  scheduled  tc 
ce  lest  by  the  ODCSOPS  in  the  reorganization  Bust  be  retained  if 
current  operations  were  to  ccr.tir.ue.  This  apparent  conflict  between  the 
scheduled  cut  in  ODCSCrS  spaces  ar.d  expanding  ©peraiicns  had  ce  be 
resclved.^5 
*      C-er.eral  Officer  Sptce  in  rurc?e.  J£^J^  Closely  aligned  to  the 
!   estat-lishaent  of  the  Amy  Theaterlntelligenee  Sucpcrt-Eurcpe/XI 
Brigade  was  en  ettezpt  tc  position  a  general  officer  in  ATISC,  Eurcpe  tc 
assist  CIXCUSASS33  in  cosaand  and  ccntrcl  of  IKSCOK  intelligence 
activities  and  coordination  cf  intelliger.ee  operations.. vIKSCOM  presence 
in  the  European  Theater  was  ccrprised  cf  five  separate  colonel  level 
cca.-ar.ds  tctaling  -approximately  ^|   pf-ersonr.el  under  the  European 
03  i
field  station^  ^nd  the  66th  HI  Group.  In  additional  to 
purely  doctrinareonsioeraticns,  introduction  of  the  MI  Brigade  U  general 
officer  cossand)  is  considered  imperative  to  unify  cossand  of  these 
separate  XKSCOK  subordinates  and  to  facilitate  integration  of  SAC 
intelligence  support  to  the  benefit  of  both  USAREUH  and  SUCOK.  The 
DCSI,  USAHEUB,  as  the  senior  U.S.  Arry  intelligence  staff  officer  in 
Europe,  has  no  single  consender  to  coordinete  and  ispleaent 
operational  tspectsfl       fro:  the  national  level  down.  uniike~t 
Air  Force  and  Kavy,  theArsyhas  had  three  field  station  cossanders 
(Berlin,  Augsburg,  and  Sinop)  interfacing^     Pandnc^esingle 
spokessan.  Esphesis  and  degree  of  control  BT-il 
alsc  likely  shift  froa  the  national  to  theater  level  during  a 
war.  Kct  long  after  the  A7S1C,  Europe/Ml  Brigade  issue  died  so  did  the 
general  officer  position.  KQBA  indicated  that  it  didn't  desire  tc  add 
another  general  officer  position  tc  Europe.  Although  the  Arsy  cf 
Excellence  called  for  an  XX  Brigade,  it  vill  be  largely  a  restructured 
€6th  JG  Group,  net  a  brigade  vith  field  stations  assigned.  A  irigede 
under  the  latter  concept,  headed  fcy  a  ranking' col cnel,  vould  have  been, 
an  organisation  subject  to  a  high  level  of  turnover,  rationale  for  a 
general  officer  position.1®    •:; 
transition 
to 
W-. 
0 3  b
rOSEONLY 
FOOTNOTES*  Chapter  XII.  ORGANIZATION 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5/ 
6. 
7. 
S. 
9. 
10. 
i 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
Fact  Sheet,  DCSOPS,  mubjt  Resubordination  of  OSLB  (17  Dae  64) 
(S/NOFORN);  Paper,  IAOPS-B-PCO,  subj:  Resubordination  of  OSLB  (5 
Feb  85)  (S/NOFORN). 
Form  32 »  IAOPS-SE-A,  aubj:  Letter  of  Instruction  for  the  Activation 
of  the  U.S.  Aray  Echelon  Above  Corps  (EAC)  Aviation  Intelligence 
Company  (13  Jul  83)  (C){  Ltr,  fa  COL  Partridge,  CofS  (23  May  83)  (0). 
OF,  IA0PS-SE-0.  aubj:  Okinawa  Decision  (20  Nov  84  fl  Wi  FT  1984 
DCSOPS  AER  (TS0,  p.  60;  Fact  Sheet,  IAOPS-SB-0.  sub?:  Okinawa 
SE-10/30  Mission  Planning  (28  Aug  84)  (2 
subj:  Field  Station  Okinawa  Closure 
n  Fact  Sheet.  IAOPS-SE-0, 
fro  0   
nt  of  the  513th  MI  Gp 
ft  1984  PCSIII"    Hill  1 1 'IP,  |i|i    LI3-94. 
FX  1984  Sec  Spt  Bet  ABR  (0),  Annex  I. 
FT  1984  502d  ASA  Bn  ABR  (Sfl  *  eh  III. 
DF,  IA0PS-PPR,  subjt    Organizi  Hon  Asse 
(EACIC)  (15  Oct  84)  (U). 
FX  1984  66th  MI  Gp  ABR  (S/NOFORN),  p.  65;  ?aper,  IA0PS-PPR,  aubj:  European 
Troop  Strength  Ceilings  (6  Jan  84)  (D); 
FX  1984  DCSPPM  ABR  (S/NOFORN),  ch  V;  Mono  for  CofS,  aubj: 
Thoughts  on  CG  Direction  via  EAC  Structure  (Undtd)  (0). 
FX  1984  DCSLOG  ABR  (U),  eh  II.  v~   . 
Ibid.  ■■■■■  ti:?.-> 
Ibid. 
FX  1984  527th  MI  Bn  ABR  (S),  «.  U. 
FX-1984  DCSPPM  ABR  (S/NOFORN),  ch  III,  Appendix  A;DF,  CofS, 
sub  J:  Establishment  of  Provisional  Deputy  Chief  of  Staff  for 
Systems  (14  Feb  84)  (D);  DF,  C,  IBMQ,  aubj:  BQ  Reorganization  of 
DCS3M  (9  Jan  84)  (0);  DF,  CDR  ASA,  aubj:  Submission  of  Appeals  for 
ADP  Acquisition  (13  Fab  84)  (B);  DFt  DCSOPS,  aubj:  Letter  of  .. 
Instruction-BQ  Reorganization  Implementation  Plan  (2  May  84)  (0);  DF, 
DCSRM,  aubj:  General  Soyster*s  Areas  of  Immediate  Concern  (2  Aug 
84)(0);  DF,  DCSPPM,  aubj:  BQ  Reorganization  of  DCSPPM  (5  Oct  83) 
(U);  Paper,  COL  Bambrlc,  aubj:  Memo  for  CofS  (26  Sep  84)  (0). 
Msg,  CDR  INSCOM,  subj:  FT  1985  European  Theater  Reduction 
Plan  (9  Mar  84)  (C);  Info  Paper,  IAOPS-SE-SP,  aubj:  Army  Theater 
Intelligence  Support  Command-Europe  (19  Dec  83)  (SflHBt  Fact  Sheet , 
IA0PS-PPR,  aubj:  Closure  of  the  U.S.  Army  Theater  Intelligence  and 
Security  Command  and  Establishment  of  the  Military  Intelligence 
Brigade  (Provisional)  j2May  84)  (U). 
\ 
f  ' 
FOR  OFFICIAL 
03b
ONLY 
CHAPTER  IV 
RESOURCES  AND  MANAGEMENT  .       ,. 
■"■""        ■'"r  '  '.'■'^^i'&v*J';:3fc'i: 
Operations  and  Maintenance,  Amy  (OMA)  Funds*  (0)  TIM  U.S.  Army 
Intelligence  and  Security  Command's  OMA  funding  program  at  the  close 
of  FX  1984  consisted  of  a  total  of  $191,862,000.  The  table  below  shows 
a  breakout  of  and  FY  1984  direct  funding  by  subprogram.1 
Table  1.  -  Direct  Funding  by  Subprogram 
(As  of  30  Sep  64) 
Subprogram  FY  1984 
F2  (Gensral  Purpose  Forces)  $  31»633*OO0 
.  P3I  (Intelligence  Activities) .'% :£«  - v'p^--  135,441,000  .  ,   r 
P3C  (Communications  Security)  3*189,000 
P7  (Troop  Issue)  123,000   V 
P8T  (Training)  1,371,000 
P80  (Education  Services)  969,000 
Base  Operations  (AHS  A  VHFS)  .   19.136.000 
TOTAL  $191.862,000 
(U)  The  following  la  an  audit  trail  ($  in  thousands)  from  the  DA  dollar 
guidance  for  preparation  of  the  FY  1984  Command  Operating  Budget 
(COB)  to  final  FT  1984  Approved  Funding  Program  (AFP): 
Program  2 
Dollar  Guidance  -  FY  1984  COB  $32,284 
..-.;'■  '  *: 
TENCAP       '...-■■■'■'■  1,058 
Stock  Fund  Obligation  (295) 
TENCAP  Withhold  (1,708) 
FY  1984  Initial  AFP  $  31»339         % 
mmmim —  2*7 
Forexfn^urrency  Adjustment  (31)         « 
7  Br  Rate  Adjustment  (2)         v 
TENCAP  1,708 
Quality  Dragon  s                                             200 
»   Manpower  Action    _,  6 
»   Flying  Hour  Program  333 
ELT  (299) 
Reprogram  to  P3C  (MTTS)  (200)    - 
Pay  Raise  28 
Tactical  Support  (1,696) 
Final  FY  1984  AFP  $  31.633 
SE  ONLY 
037
Sal  use  only 
SEONLY 
Program  31 
Dollar  Guidance  -  FT  1984  COB  $144,258       ;i      .^     
, 
•tips  ;  -           (too)  :S^JQ5^; 
External  Research  Analysis  (5*0)  ^  ^ /^ 
Congressional  Reduction  (800)  :;!&^$^¥ 
Congressional  Space  Adjustment  (470) 
AARCS  (1,100) 
Stock  Fund  Obligation  (140) 
Inflation  (1,239) 
Leased  Communications  (105) 
DA  Manpower  Actions  (78} 
CRA  Withhold  (12.247) 
»84  Initial  AFP  -'■^^^•■' :  :*■  #127,439 
  _  (2,849) 
Trna  from  DARCOM  (Free  Issue  Spt)  1,000 
Currency  Revaluation  (252) 
Congressional  Contracts  Adjustment  (643) 
Congressional  Space  Adjustment  Correction      190 
7  Hr  Rate  Adjustment  (140) 
Inflation  (11) 
CRA  Release  12,247 
ADP  Reduction  (Lease)  (377) 
Congressional  Reduction  (796) 
Ceam  Support  (To  ACE)  (557) 
TECRAS  Support  (To  DA)  (4) 
CI  Task^Foree  225 
ATIPS  Support  (253) 
Adjustment  to  Congressional  Action  -  437 
Transfer  to  EUC0M  (15) 
Documentation  Project  417 
TransfertoTAC  (50) 
Pay  Raise  1,513 
MmmmmmV  (135) 
TITrans^oDARCOM     ..  (1,015) 
DA  Trans  to  ISC  (525) 
Transfer  to  BASOPS  (1.087) 
Final  FY  1984  AFP  *135.4»M 
S>3b
-T— ^^^^^^m 
*$k, 
UNCLASSIFIED 
Program  3C 
Dollar  Guidance  -  FT  1983  COB  V  3»21j 
.  ".,i'4«-.ilS^-.:.'  -'. -i. 
cra  mthoid  %a^  ■^/■t-v^<?,^o>--v>--  -  C2B6) -■•^SgSM^Sfe':  - 
FT  1983  Initial  AFP  $  2,927  ,;"','3® 
■w."\'. 
>-.:?= 
CRA  Rel«aa«  I      286  "  ^;^^^ 
Taarend  Spending  (Cons  AdJ)  (100)  :  '/ 
7  Br  Rate  Adjustment  (5) 
MTTS  Reprogramming  (from  F2)  ^ >-   ^r.?;^-:  •■  200 
Pay  Raiaa  .--      ■::.■.■>.    ...Vi-3H^?/.'  .v  '  vv  '  "■.-•  48  /"'  -•■ 
DA  COMSEC  Spt  Withdrawal  .  (142) 
Transfer  to  BASOPS  (25) 
Final  FY  1983  AFP  ^»;£^;?y.U-'-v£  v   '.  A  3.189 
Program  7 
Dollar  Guidance  »  FY  1983  COB  $    123 
FY  1983  Initial  AFP  A    123 
Pay  Raise  •..•:"  '.  1  
' 
DA  Realignment  -^'':'  (2V 
Final  FY  1983  AFP  ;;^:    - ."^ ;  ^^f *' '  A    123 
Program  8T  , 
Dollar  Guidance  -  FY  1983  COB  $  1.396 
FY  1983  Initial  AFP  1  1,*96 
Foreign  Currency  (2) 
Physical  Fitness  Training  ,  Jj 
Military  Training  (127) 
Final  FY  1983  AFP       ',  A  1.371 
Program  80      '--*;'>'"" 
Dollar  Guidance  -  FY  1983  COB  A    509 
EDO  ^  10 
DA  Intern  Support       "'  301 
FY  1983  Initial  AFP 
Inflation 
DA  Intern 
EDG 
Pay  Raise 
DA  Intern/EDG  Support 
ACES  Support 
Final  FY  1983  AFP 
% 
920 
(13) 
116 
(2) 
(30) 
(23) 
♦ 
..  ,?*? 
 
UNCLASSFJED  '    03'J
(1,879) 
(9) 
(2J8) 
*  15,495 
1,879 
(5) 
(6) 
(14) 
(1) 
439 
127 
110 
1,087 
2? 
♦  19.136 
UNCLASSIFIED 
Base  Operations  (BASEOPS) 
Dollar  Guidance  -  FY  1984  COB  $  17,621 
CM  Withhold 
7  Hr  Rate  Adjustment  • 
Inflation 
FY  198*>  Initial  AFP 
CRA  Release 
Year  End  Spending  (Cong  Ad J) 
Excess/Surplus  Prop  Adjustment 
Consolidated  BASEOPS  Adj 
7  Hr  Rate  Adjustment 
Commercial  Activities 
Pay  Ra.oie    .  ".  .^.  :.-. 
RPMA  SAP        • 
Transfer  'from  P3I  •  - ; ■.  &%>'■". 
Transfer  from  P3C 
Final  FY  198*1  AFP 
(0)  The  following  table  reflects  direct  obligations  by  elements  of 
expense  for  FY  1984  ($  in  thousands):  Obligations  of  $191,077,000  and 
Annual  Funding  Program  of  #191,862,000  resulted  in  an  obligation  rate  of 
99.6  percent. 
Table  2.  -  Direct  Obligations  for  FY  1984 
ELEMENT  OF  BASE 
EXPENSE      P2     P32     PjC     F7.  P8T   P80   OPS     TOTAL  PERCENT 
Civ  Pay  A  . 
Benefits     843   JI5.023  1,504   31      598   4,813   52,812"*  28 
Travel     3,322  "  8,406    484   65  1,134  105     84   13,600    7 
Trans  of 
Things      105   ~   658     6  7     776    1 
Rents/Coma/ 
Otil        498    5,236     41 
Contr  Svc  18,228    54,332'  1,064    26 
Supplies  • 
&  Equip-   8,172    16,612    73 
FNIH         356     4.467      _ 
TOTAL     31,524   134,734  3,172  122  1,354  962  19,209*191,077  100 
1    3K7 
6,123 
214  251  12,584 
86,699 
6   7   1,374 
26,244 
Mi 
- 
4,823 
UNCLASSIFIED 
<      040
eopPAi 
Family  Housing  Pnlts.  (0)  •  The  U.S.  Army  Intelligence  and  Security 
Commend  operated  and  maintained  family  housing  units  at  Arlington 
Hall  Station  and  Vint  Hill  Farms  Station.  Funds  received  from 
Department  of  the  Army  for  these  units  for  FY  1984  were  $1,258  of 
which  $1,257  was  obligated  (99*9  percent),2.      wj*...-*fc  .-.*■.. 
INSCOM  Program  and  Budget  Guidance.  FY  1984  (Authorized  Strength). 
£27  Based  on  DA  Program  and  Budget  Guidance,  October  1981,  the' 
manpower  data  shown  in  *he  following  table  represents  the  authorized 
strength  for  end  of  FY  1984.3 
Table  3*  -  INSCOM  Program  and  Budge  Guidance,  FY  1984 
Authorized  Strength 
Program    .;   v  ,      OFF    »   ENL    MIL    US  CIV    FN  CIV  TOTAL 
P2  Gen  Purpose  Forces 
P3  Intel'  A  Comm 
P7  Supply 
P8  Training 
P3  Support  to  NSA 
MFH 
TOTAL-  -~ 
DCSPEB  Budget  Line-Item  (BLI).  (0)  The  ODCSPER  was  allocated 
$245K  for  five  ?38  BLI's.  With  the  exception  of  DCSPEB  travel  funds;, 
the  majority  of  these  funds  were  reallocated  to  support  programs  of  the 
subordinate  commands.-  Funds  received  and  amount  distributed  to  the 
field  by  BLI  are  indicated  below:4 
BLI 
.*  •        -*  -- 
DCSPER  Travel 
Alcohol 
HR/EO 
Safety 
»   Reenlistment 
I   IBEX 
•$72K  was  returned  to  DCSRM  in  mid-year. 
FY  Allocation 
Allocated  to  Field 
A80K 
21K 
A21K 
12R 
10K 
12K 
11K 
40K 
35K 
80K 
• 
041
Civilian  Strength  by  Program,  yfi   The  following  table  reflect! 
authorized  and  assigned  civilian  strength  by  program.  It  includes  foreign 
nationals,  temporaries,  and  permanent  overhires.5    ^O-.^v 
Table  U.  -  .Civilian  Strength  by  Program   *~   '  - 
,v**s 
. 
■&W&* 
•■".vl  ■'-■ 
Program                            Authorized    :  Actual 
2  Gen  Purpose  Forces 
3  ccp 
  ^^__^rt,;^. 
.  .  Cryptologic  Aetv  .^.,y  ;i  
■ :;?:  ..:..\^L-\ 
Base  Opns/RPMA  '"  ^>;v"  -■-'— ;^-'^-  -  •  ;>•  • 
Mgmt  HQ 
GDIP                        •  •  •  ,  * 
"&?..::■■.' 
.'■'  HOMIHT  1  •    .  .:/'.•«,"- r;-.;"^../^tv"--v. 
1   *■"■;-•-  •    1 
1    r.- -■.''A.  .■                    1 
*  J?  ■•„■  ■•         1 
|      -■^"■■^•■'■■.      I 
;■-•-  TECRAS  7  , 1  .. .  - 
"         .                   I 
ocss   '  '  *'*"■;  •■■■    -.,.:-::;-.:          1 
1*   '.   .                       1 
Mgmt  HQ                     ,*  -• 
OTHER 
I 
■:  £SE  ■■'■■'''■'.        "■■:'•  7^'."v--..1.;       1 
.COMSEC              „;-';■-.  .  ,^-':  .-.•:■  ,-^,-y.-  ■  ■  .     1 
.v;ji.-,  - 
Base  Opns/RPMA  .:.,^C\.\-;l':.'.'''.^:^^:-.-t  u-   1 
'Mgmt  HQ  -   ■-•■".'  :-C/:-.                  .     ~"  -             1 
.  CI4IA  '          >^:-. 
FCI 
S*IA_ 
Mgmt  HQ                            | 
7  TISA                              1 
8  ACES                                1 
MFH                                1 
H 
•a 
"TOTAL  :  '._.L—' 
Command  Personnel  Situation.  ^)  Actual  total  command  strength  for 
FY  1983  and  FX  1984  are  shown  below.*      ■.-.■.'■*'■* -'-x  ■->■/. 
30  September  1983 
OFF 
WO 
ENL 
TOT  MIL 
CIV 
GRAND  TOTAL 
Actual 
Jo 
30  September  19BU 
OFF     WO     ENL     TOT  MIL     CIV     GRAND  TOTAL 
Actual 
(0)  FT  1984  command  personnel  strength  by  unit,  see  appendix  F. 
XT 
042
L USE ONLY 
Director's  Trophy.  (0)  During  FY  1980,  Viet  Admiral  B.R.  Xnman, 
DIRNSA,  established  a  new  award  which  would  recognise  the  mobile 
SIGZNT  element  making  the  most  significant  contribution  to  the 
cryptologic  community  during  the  calendar  year.  For  1983,  DIRNSA 
chose  the  2d  Radio  Battalion  Fleet  Marine  Force,  Atlantic,  Camp 
LeJuene,  North  Carolina,  as  the  winner  of  the  Director's  Trophy. 
See  appendix  K  for  a  complete  list  of  the  years'  winners ,1 
Travis  Trophy.  (0)  The  Travis  Trophy  recognises  the  most  significant 
contribution  in  the  field  of  operations,  management,  and  administration 
by  fixed  field  stations.  NSACSS  announced  and  presented  the  6920  Air 
Force  Electronic  Security  Group,  Misswa  AB,  Japan,  as  the  winner  of 
the  1983  Travis  Trophy  winners.  See  appendix  J  for  a  complete  list  of 
previous  winners. ® 
Mobilization.  (0)  Mobilization  planning  began  to  emerge  aa  a  significant 
area  in  FX  1984.  D0D  and  DA  initiated  a  new  program  to  identify 
emergency-essential  employees  overseas  who  were  needed  to  remain  in 
their  positions  during  mobilisation  or  evacuation.  Two  hundred  and  nine 
positions  were  identified;  175  MICECP  and  34  DAC.  Only  9  were  not  in 
either  the  132  or  13*  series.  All  but  approximately  a  dozen  signed  a 
statement  of  understanding  a  new  condition  of  employment,  formalizing 
their  agreement  to  remain  with  their  units  during  emergencies  and 
evacuations. 
(0)  A  Memorandum  of  Understanding  (M0U)  was  drafted  and  awaits 
signature  between  CG,  INSCOM  and  RCPAC  establishing  a  separate 
reserve  unit  for  INSCOM  employees  in  Europe.  This  MOU  will  forestall 
the  screening  from  the  Reserve  of  any  INSCOM  civilian  emergency- 
essential  employees  who  are  also  in  the  Ready  Reserve. 9 
Enlisted  Personnel  Strength  Posture.  (U)  Enlisted  personnel  posture'  by 
M0S  (EW/Crypto  and  HUMINT  MOS's)  is  shown  in  the  table  below. W 
Table  5*  -  Enlisted  Personnel  Posture  for  FY's  1983-1984 
MPS 
05D 
05G 
05R 
05K 
33S 
98C 
98G 
98J 
982 
96B 
96C 
96D 
97B 
97C 
Auth 
FY  1983 
Act 
Percent  of  Fill 
Auth 
Act 
FY  1984 
AL  USE  ONLY 
\ 
Percent  of  Fill 
113 
101 
105 
113 
10H 
116 
\ 
043
FOR  OF 
DFB^fuS 
USE  ONLY 
Table  6.  -  Enliattd  Personnel  Posture  by  Area  and  Unit 
(As  of  30  Sep  84) 
Unit  ■'■^>>*v*/'j£s,:'»V'v<-'Vi:ju.-*>»..«.  .>,..,.   .-_     *!.'■"■' 
European  Area 
Field  Station  Augsburg 
Field  Station  Berlin 
Field  Station  Sinop 
U.S.  Any  Cryptologie  Support  Group 
€6th  MI  Group  -'•  .--  ..       . .   .,,;%:;;; 
U.S.  Army  Russian  Institute 
U.S.  Aray  Foreign  Lang  Trng  Ctr  Europe 
SubVfotal  v  •:■. ir."'K^-?:-M.- '*?&$$6f&  :.'■'•■  /\->'"V. 
Fanaaa  Area  -. 
«70tb  MI  group'  ^ 
EAC  Aviation  Intel  Company 
Field  Station  Fanaaa 
■■;'■£*■: -  ■■'$£:-    ■•■•:' 
Authorisations  :fp^|£-  Assigned 
■£-."5Vbt--*:  •*';*£> 
•■.■Sj?<;.--&-V, 
.  H 
•?##$^* 
Baaaaaaaaaaaaa 
■    -;'„"t<*;£>^*V  -■• 
^H 
^  -,>-,*>         •/--*J. 
*    -            ^| 
■  -"r"    -*<?'■;•■'■ 
-V:'.-  ■''-'  > 
Sub-Total  ~v /  '■'■' 
f     '  •'.'•-.«*.-v  ■'■•'■-'.'   '.■""  '  '-' 
MAIT  Team  •     •    . -;:.  >*--;.  •■•:-/'; 
U.S.  Aray  MATT  Teaa 
U.S.  Aray  Mission  Support  Activity 
"W 
■  -•  "''VWr',''-. 
Sub-Total 
Pacific  Area 
Field  Station  Kunla 
Field  Station .Okinawa 
1TIC-FAC 
500th  MI  Group 
501st  MI  Group 
\ 
Sub-Total 
*■-» .  - ".      -  _--.-  -   .-..-■ 
CONUS  Area 
Adnin/AV  Support  Actv 
Autoaated  Systems  Actv 
Admin  Survey  Det 
Central  Security  Facility- 
C0N0S  MI  Group      -- 
Finance  Accounting  Actv 
513th  MI  Group 
U.S.  Aray  Garrison  AHS 
HQ  IMSCOM 
HQ  Support  Actv 
Intel  and  Threat  Analysis  Center 
Intel  Exchange  and  Support  Center 
FOR  OF, 
EONLY 
t     044
-^A^&fiWUAmW»» 
Authorizations 
Assigned 
Unit 
Field  Station  Kty  West 
Little  Unit 
902<l  MI  Croup 
Operational  Group 
Field  Station  San  Antonio 
Systems  Exploitation  Det 
Special  Operations  Det 
Special  Security  Group 
U.S.  Amy  Garrison  VHFS 
National  Training  Center 
Sub-Total 
IHSCOM  Consolidated  .^ ,:;;. 
European  Area  . 
Panama  Area 
MAIT  Team 
Pacific  Area 
CON0S  Area 
TOTAL 
INSCOM  Key  Personnel.  (U)  Appendix  I  contains  a  listing  of  personnel 
occupying  l;ey  positions  within  the  U.S.  Army  Intelligence  and  Security 
Command,  as  of  3C  September  198ft.11 
c 
tn 
g 
— V 
& 
Congressional  Inquiries.  (£)  The  USAINSCOM  Office  of  the  Inspector 
General  is  the  only  Army  MACOM  IG  office  which  processess 
congressioii**!  inquiries.  During  FT  1984,  28  congressional  inquiries  were 
responded  to,  up  slightly  from  the  23  processed  in  FT  1983*  In  addition, . 
AIG's  reported  two  congressional  inquiries  processed  directly  between 
HQDA  and  INSCOM  subordinate  commands.  Of  the  30  total  inquiries, 
the  majority  were  defined  as  assistance  cases,  10  as  nonaubstantiated, 
and  1  was  substantiated.12  , \ 
.-  (*v 
Inspector  General  Action  Bequests  (ICAR*s).  (ft?   Responses  to  IGilR's 
received  by  HQ  INSCOM  detailed  IG's  from  complaint  periods,  conducted 
as  an  integral  part  of  all  general  inspections,  reflected  a  slight  increase 
in  FY  1984  totaling  105  compared  to  85  in  FY  1983*  Acting  inspectors 
general  at  major  subordinate,  units  processed  92  additional  IGAR's, 
representing  47  percent  of  the  total  IGAR  cases  as  compared  to  54 
percent  in  FT  1983*  Of  the  total  196  IGAR's  processed  by  INSCOM 
IG/AIG*s  in  FT  1984,  13  percent  were  substantiated,  18  percent  were 
nonsubstantiated  and  69  percent  were  assistant  cases. ^3  .. 
EOR  OFFICIAL  USE  ONLY 
3« 
tinriTtii 
(      045
UNCLASSIFIED 
ESQ  Complaints*  (0)  At  the  end  of  FT  1984 f  there  were  a  total  of  four 
active  complaint*.  Vint  Hill  Farna  Station  closed  out  all  of  there 
coaplaints  In  FY  1983*  The  two  active  complaints  are  located  at 
Arlington  Rail  Station.14 
-  One  complaint  awaiting  a  final  decision  from  DA.    '  ' 
-  One  complaint  awaiting  the  assignment  of  a  U.S.  Army  Civilian 
Review  Office  (USACAItO)  Investigator. 
Equal  Employment  Opportunity  Program.  (0)  The  following  is  a  brief 
command  overview  of  OSAINSCOM'*  efforts  in  eliminating  under- 
representation  of  women  and  minorities  in  mid  and  senior  level  positions 
in  the  workforce:^ 
As  of  30  September  1983 
. 
os^ 
0S-10 
03-11  i OS-12 
GS-13 
CS-14 
CS-15 
TOTAL 
White  Female 
SO 
no 
128 
Black  Male 
Black  Female 
Hispanic*  Male 
Hispanic*  Female 
Asian  Am/Pae  Isl  Male 
Asian  Am/Fac  Zsl  Female 
s 
Amer  2nd  Male 
Amer  Znd  Female 
• 
As  of  30 i  September  1984 
CS-9 
CS-1C I  6S-11 
CS-12 
GS-13 I  QS-14  CS-15 
TOTAL 
White  Female 
z 
SO 
146 
Black  Male 
Black  Female 
S 
!  30 
Hispanic  Male 
Hispanic  Female 
'0 
♦ 
I   Asian  Am/Pae  Isl  Male 
Asian  Am/Pac  Isl  Female 
Amer  Ind  Male 
Amer  Ind  Female 
UNCLASSIFIED 
04  b
UNCLASSIFIED 
Military  Justice.  (t>)  The  number  of  non- Judicial  punishments  imposed 
under  Article  15  in  FT  1984  was  561,  a  decrease  from  609  in  FY  1983. 
Courtsmartial  in  FT  1984  totaled  eight  Summary,  eight  Special,  and  four 
General;  in  FT  1983f  there  were  eight  Summary,  seven  Special,  and  four 
General.™  .-•.<.-#"•■ 
:    '    %  
■ '  '.:■ 
Table  7»  -  Serious  Crime  Offenses    .  '£•-?$&  »-£ 
Crime  of  Violence  FT  1983  FT  1984 
R»pe  _._..   ...,   _    2    T"" 
Bobbery  /  :^^.::  ,:".::•...._;: ;.^.';  ..  v: ;/,V;V.   ...  1.,.,..;      0 
Assault    *""-"'.^..'-       ■■-.■':;  ■•  _>.  .-■■  ••-;•'■•  ■  3q  :::•.•■■■      ^ 
Crimes  Against  Property 
Destruction  of  Property  ' ;'.      /.: .' -' - -x-w ":• ;"y'V"''  13  ■■■/.^v' '••'.- "  g  •  :' 
■^a**nr  ••  ^-\rJv^  0   ■'-'.•v  c-...*  -.■  
. 
Drug  Offenses 
Use/Possession  of  Marijuana  m  59 
Marcoties  5  iq 
Sale/Trafficking  *                   2  3 
/'.,.■       Table  8.  -  FT  1984  Administrative  Eliminations 
Authority  (AB  63S-2O0)  Hon  Gen   Less  Than  Hon 
Chapter  5  (Sep  for  Convenience  of  Govt)  """?  0       1 
Chapter _9  (Alcohol  or  Drug  Abuse)  10  5       0 
Chapter  10  (Discharged  for  Good  of  Service)  0  1  10 
Chapter  13  (Separated  for  Unsuitability)  23  15       0 
Chapter  14  (Separated  for  Misconduct)  16       1 
All  Others:  25  3  .  0 
Table  9.  -  Disposition  of  Other  Offenses,  FT  1984 
Number 
Article  86  (aVOL-Absenoes  Without  Leave)  ~ 
Article  86  (FTR-Failure  to  Repair)  158 
Article  89/90  (Disrespeet/Disob  v/Comm.  Officer)  8 
Article  91  (Disrespect/Disobedience  v/WO  or  HC0)  26 
Article  92  (Failure  to  Obey/Dereliction  of  Duty)  73 
Article  IH/112/134  (Offenses  re  Intoxication)  109 
All  Others:             s  18 
UNCLASSIFIED  047
UNCLASSIFIED 
Public  Affaire  actlvltlca.  •  (U)  The  Office  of  Public  Affairs  exercises 
etaff  auperviaion  over  Authorised  XNSCOH  unit  newapapere  and  critiques 
authorized  unit  newspapers  in  preparation  for  the  annual  faith  L.  Vara 
award*.  The  following  is  a  list  of  2NSC0M  publications  as  of  30 
September  198*. ^  f 
Publication  Onlt  Publlahar 
INSCOM  Journal  BQ  ZNSCOH 
Alamo  Wrangler  osAPS  San  Antonio 
Augsburg  Proflla  osAFS  Augsburg 
Diogenes  Review  OSAFS  Sinop 
Red  Dragon  50iat  MI  Group 
Scrambler  66th  MI  Group 
Torll  Typhoon  OSAFS  Okinawa 
Vint  Bill  Vansard  Tint  Rill  Paras  Station 
Write  On  INSCOM  CONBS  MI  Group 
High  Performance  Progress  Information.  (0)  On  1  May  1983,  DCSOPS 
received  proponency  for  several  high  performance  program*.  Ths 
programs  fall  into  acveral  categories:  Command  wide  progress  that 
would  be  institutionalised  throughout  INSCOM.  Pilot  test  programs  that 
would  be  evaluated  in  volunteer  units  or  staff  sections  In  terms  of 
organisational  Impact  and  eost  effectiveness.  The  results  of  the  pilot. 
test  was  to  determine  If  the  program  would  be  implemented  as  s 
command  wide  or  supplemental  program.  Supplemental  programs  were 
Ideas  and  off-the-shelf  technologies  which  would  be  made  available  to 
commanders  and  stsff  to  uae  as  desired.  Funding  for  the  programs  would 
come  from  the  using  unit.  These  programs  consisted  eft18 
a.  The  Corporate  Fitness  Programs  (pilot  test)  -  workshops  on  such 
topics  as  health  education,  stress  evaluation,  strength  development,  and 
biofeedback.  
* 
b.  Structured  Writing  (supplemental)  -  a  two-day  workshop  for 
individuala  who  prepared  a  normal  amount  of  oorreapondenee  in  the 
course  of  their  workday.  A  five-day  workshop  would  be  available  to. 
individuala  who  prepared  large  document*  aueh  as  training  manual a, 
directives,  regulations,  and  plans. 
e.  Group  Graphics  (supplemental)  -  INSCOM  did  not  desire  to 
schedule  this  particular  workshop  but  several  oopies  of  the  Group 
Graphic  workbook  were  purchased  and  disseminated  to  INSCOM  units  in 
J   September  1983. 
*  >  v  ■ 
d.  Bemi-Synch  (pilot  test)  -  designed  to  enhance  human  ability  in 
learning  akilla,  memory  capabilities,  relaxation,  physical!  and  mental 
functions.  v..'-#. 
'K 
e.  Time  and  Streaa  Management  -  an  ODCSOPS  initiative.*  Time/Life 
videocassctte  tapes  on  time  and  stress  management  were  purchased  and 
disseminated  for  rotation  among  INSCOM  units. 
:   -  JJN£a^ASSSF]ED  mb
UNCLASSIFIED 
MI  Potter  Series.  (0)  In  PI  I983t  tht  High  Performance  Task  Fore* 
established  a  gant  plan  to  enhance  the  productivity  and  cohesion  within 
organisations  of  the  command.  This  included  a  recommendation  that  the 
Command  History  Offioe  produoe  traveling  historical  displays.  Due  to 
Initial  oost  as  well  as  resources  required  to  administer  the  display,  a 
pictorial  history  of  MI  was  substituted  for  the  idea  of  traveling  displays. 
Because  of  the  time  delays  in  ssseobling  the  history,  a  24-plcture  poster 
aeries  was  created  in  FT  1981.  The  poster  series  wss  established  not  only 
aa  an  interim  project  while  the  pictorial  history  was  being  crested  but 
also  to  communicate  the  continuity  between  INSCOM' s  intelligence 
disciplines  and  those  of  the  post.  Five  hundred  oopies  of  the  24-plcture 
poster  series  was  duplicated  for  an  estimated  oost  of  #1,800  and 
distributed  to  internal  unite  and  DA  historians  and  museums.  A  future 
distribution  to  Active  and  Beserve  MI  units  is  proposed  for  FT  1985. ^ 
Historical  Monographs.  (U)  Xn  FT  19B3,  the  Command  History  Office 
completed  a  significant  breakthrough  regarding  a  new  writing  vehicle  for 
the  INSCOM  History  program.  The  historical  monographs  were 
distributed  throughout  the  command.  To  continue  the  affective  p3*n,  the 
Command  History  Offioe  was  able  to  initiate  a  plan  to  publish  a  pictorial 
history  to  oover  the  beginning  of  Military  Intelligence  in  1885  through  the 
post  Intelligence  Organization  Stationing  Study  (XOSS).  The  purpose  of 
the  pictorial  history  is  to  promote  individual  morale  and  educate  the  MI 
specialist  in  the  background  of  the  MI  profession. 
* 
(0)  In  August  1983 »  a  draft  text  of  the  pictorial  history  was  being 
written  and  photographs  to  be  used  in  the  book  had  been  ordered  from 
aelected  resource  files.  The  initial  draft  waa  staffed  and  commented  on 
in  June^1984  as  the  lsyout  of  the  book  began.  A  meeting  with  TAGO  was 
arranged  on  11  October  1984  for  last  minute  details  and  instructions  on 
the  pictorial  history  before  being  sent  to  the  Government  Printing  Office 
(GPO)  for  publication.  It  has  been  estimated  that  the  pictorial  book  will 
contain  250  photos  and  50  pages  of  text  which  will  ultimately  give  tihe 
and  product  around  192  pages  total.  An  estimate  oost  for  printing  the 
pictorial  history  was  between  $25,000  and  $30,000.  Coordination  for 
security  and  accuracy  was  under  taken.  There  will  be  3i000  copies 
received  by  ZNSCOM  to  be  distributed  within  the  INSCOM  command,  DA 
libraries  and  museums,  DA  historians,  MI  unite,  and  Army  and  DOD 
organizations.  It  is  also  anticipated  that  GPO  would  offer  the  book  for , 
public  sale.20 
Historical  Audiovisual  Production.  (0)  During  September  1983 i  the 
Command  History  Office  introduced  a  plan  to  create  an  audiovisual 
production  of  the  history  of.  Arlington  Hall  Station.  The  video  will  be 
presented  as  s  communication  objective  to  welcome  and  introduce  new 
personnel  to  Arlington  Hall  Station,  featuring  the  historical  background 
of  the  station. 
(0)  The  unelsssified  video  cassette  will  have  an  estimated  tiae  limit  of 
20-30  minutes  and  will  be  shot  in  color  with  historical  foo$age  in  black 
and  white.  The  film  will  consist  of  the  compiling  of  Arlington  Hall's 
history  dating  back  to  the  establishment  of  the  girl's  junior  college,  the 
UNCLASSIFIED  ow
UNCLASSIFIED 
-ijKVr 
%&%&■ 
£&?;-- 
Signal  Intelligence  move-in,  MI  accomplishments  in  World  War  XI,  end 
ending  with  the  present  status  of  the  station*       ^--.  -:.;., 
■'.. '"-%.^,-v "  ■; -'^^z-' "v/r  '"/3  ■■■■;■■' r;^- : •:" •■'-  •  •"   ■-•  ••  ;'^?^>^r'iP*5'' 
' 
(U)  In  January  1984,  a  draft  script  was  written  and  the  production  of  the 
video  began  with  an  estimated  eoapletion  date  of  December  1984. 
However,  because  of  delay  In  procurement  ordera  at  the  and  of  PI  1984, 
the  Coanand  History  Office  had  not  received  supported  filas  and  elides. 
The  delay  say  affect  the  proposed  eoapletion  date. 21  :,->■•  .  - 
'^>^-2'^i^.--w;..s'*  ?   ■■-. .* -;■;■:■■  '*«*• 
1984  Cash  Award  Program.  (Q)  ZNSCOM  policy  is  to  recognise  between 
^V^.. ■ ,  10-15  percent  of  all  CS  employees  who  deserve  either  Quality  Step 
jp£  ;..'?;  Increases  (QSI's)  or  Sustained  Superior  Performance  Awards  (SSPA's)'and  ^ 
an  additional  10-15  percent  who  deserve  Special  Acte  or  Service  Awards 
(SASA's).  It  is  also  IHSCOH  policy  to  recognise  25-40  percent  of  all 
merit  pay  employees.  Additionally,  coaasnders  and  ataff  heads  nave  ^  ;  ., 
been  directed  to  program  an  amount  equivalent  to  between  1  and  1}  ;C  ^^f^-v. 
mercent  of  their  combined  V^r^n»^^^^^00i^^^^^^^^-ig 
Baccalaureate  Cooperative  Education  Program.  <0)  TJtSCOM's        Of 
Bsccalaureete  Cooperative  Education  Program  is  a  direct  outgrowth  of 
IHSCOM's  RBC  Program.  In  September  1980,  the  eoaaanding  general 
authorised  15  FOB  spaces  for  the  Co-Op  Program.  The  Civilian 
-    Personnel  Division  recruits  for  those  15  spaces  for  entry  into  the 
^p|^prograa  in  4aauai^,aad;^uly.^^^^^^^^i^r^.^:,  ^..,^w^.,  _  .,iV.,;^ 
5^     (0)  IMSCOM  now  recruits  from  seven  colleges/universities.  They  are 
not  limited  to,  but  are  inclusive  of,  historically  black  colleges  and  one 
predominantly  hlepanic  college.  The  Civilian  Personnel  Division  provides 
:;■'/-":'_.   housing  Information  assistance,  employment  Information,  orientation, 
t-'^lj  f  ***  asserts  the  sponsorship  of  our  co-op  students. 23 
Command  Intern  Program.  (0)  Three  new  program  initiatives  were  ""  „'  
■ 
,w>  t/1„_>..  undertaken  during  FT  1984.24  ,^^^^^^:f^   ,..  ■v/:---^  ;;  ■:,■%.."'"".' 
^r'vTf     <1)  Placement  of  co-op  grade  into  Intern  Program  spaces:  The 
Vr  ■  _'  Civilian  Personnel  Division,  DCSPER  reviewed  the  files  of  all 
^'.M~r,  Cooperative  Education  Program  students  graduating  during  the  fiscal 
"■■'■.'->;■:■■.    year  for  potential  placement  Into  Intern  Program  positions.  As  a  result 
of  these  efforts,  four  co-op  grads  were  placed  into  intern  positions. 
(2)  Increased  MICECP  participation  in  program:  DCSPER  allocated 
five  Civilian  Training,  Education,  and  Development  (CTED)  Student 
Detachment  intern  spaces  to  -the  Administrstive  Survey  Detschsent  for 
#  the  MICECP  in  FT  1984,.. -The  command  had  previously  allocated  one 
I  spsce  in  FT.  1983  for  the  program.  By  the  end  of  FT  1984,  three 
MICECP  interns  were  on  board.  Two  additional  Interns  are  programmed 
to  come  "on  board"  in  FT  1985. 
(3)  Command  developed  a  Master  Intern  Training  Plan  (MITP)  for 
civilian  personnel  administration.  In  response  to  post  problems 
encountered  and  an  identified  need  for  e  single  and  comprehensive 
*39 
^■^Y-rt.V^.r.  -r   ; 
UNCLASSIFIED  fl50
UNCLASSIFIED 
command-wide  training  plan,  INSCOM  developed  a  WTP  for  civilian 
peraonnel  administration.  This  plan  ia  designed  to  permit  modifications 
in  order  to  meet  the  specific  needs  of  individual  intern  personnel 
selected  for  the  program.      ,  v  4- 
INSCOM  Average  Orade.  "(D)  The  DA  average  grade  assessment  to 
INSCOM  is  9.17.  The  FT  1983  average  grade  was  9.09.  During  PI  1984, 
the  average  grade  fell  to  8.64.  The  reason  for  the  drop  is  more  accurate 
statistics  and  the  loss  of  the  ITAC  to  ACSI  as  part  of  the  Army 
Intelligence  Agency  (AIA).25 
INSCOM  Senior-Level  Poaltlona  (High)  Orade.  (0)  In  March  1984,  DA 
lifted  the  high  grade  celling.  In  its  place,  OMB/OPM  directed  that  each 
agency  reduce  its  GS/GM1 1-1 5  population  by  two  percent  a  year  in  FY 
1985  through  FY  1988.  INSCOM  must  reduce  14  GS/GM11-15  positions 
to  grade  GS10  or  below  to  comply  with  this  directive  by  October 
1985.26  .,.-. ..      ■  ,--*-:  -     .■^.■•r.i.,  ./ ,;     .,.,.-.,.  ,- 
Junior  Officer  Cryptologlc  Career  Program.  (0)  In  FI  1984,  the  initial 
planning  was  established  for  a  formal  utilization  program  for  Junior 
Officer  Cryptologlc  Career  Program  (JOCCP)  graduates.  Such  a 
utilization  program  would  provide  for  assignment  and  professional 
development  policies  for  those  officers  completing  their  schooling 
assignment  at  the  National  Security  Agency.  Planning  continues  with 
the  goal  of  establishing  a  formal  utilization  program  in  F7  1985  and  * 
implementation  In  FT  1986.  INSCOM,  MILPERCEN,  and  NSA  action 
officera  are  involved  in  this  project.2? 
Standard  Information  Division  Personnel  Reporting  System  (SIDPERS) 
Performance.  (D)  A  SIDPERS  data  base  was  activated  at  USAFS 
Augsburg  on  1  May  1984.  This  is  the  first  SIDPERS  data  base  within 
INSCOM  dedicated  solely  to  the  servicing  of  INSCOM  units.  This  SID. 
will  provide  strength  accountability  and  normal  SID  services  for  ali: 
INSCOM  units  in  Europe,  to  Include  USAFS  Sinop,  Turkey.  The 
performance  of  INSCOM  unite  aupporting  host  command  SIDPERS  data 
bases  improved  significantly  over  the  previous  year.  Seventy-five 
percent  of  all  INSCOM  units  received  letter  of  commendation  from 
USAINSCOM  DCSPER  for  consistently  exceeding  the  HQDA  standards  of  ' 
95  percent  acceptability  and  seven  days  timeliness  for  submission  for 
personnel  data.  The  goal  of  the  command  is  to  have  all  units  meet  or 
exceed  the  DA  standards. 2B 
Affirmative  Action  Program  Plan.  (D)  The  Equal  Employment 
Opportunity  (EEO)  Policy  implementing  Affirmative  Action  Plan  (AAP) 
and  EEO  Programs  is  designed  to  ensure  equal  employment  opportunity 
for  all  USAINSCOM  civilian  employees  and  applicants  for  employment 
regardless  of  race,  color,  national  origin,  religion,  aex,  age,  and 
handicap,  and  provides  for  an  environment  free  of  sexual  harassment. 
(U)  The  U.S.  Army  Intelligence  and  Security  Command  work  force  has 
remained  relatively  atable  as  to  its  composition  of  minorities  and  women 
UNCLASSIFIED  051
UNCLASSIFIED 
during  the  past  year.  Total  women  employees  are  over  represented  by 
1}  percent;  nonmilitary  women  are  underrepresented  by  2}  percent, 
Hispanic  employees  are  still  severly  underrepresented  at  approximately  Ji 
percent  less  than  National  Civilian  Labor  Toro;  ■.■,•Si.^.\•f^■^.^viA^■ 
(0)  Due  to  insufficient  communication  with  potential  employment 
applicants  in  the  local  and  national  civilian  labor  force,  there  is  a 
low  number  of  Hispanic  applicants  being  hired  at  the  entry  level  of  the 
professional  and  administrative  series.  During  FT  198ft,  EEO/CPO 
officials  attended  minorities  and  women  conferences,  Washington  HEP 
Council  meetings  and  local  community  job-fairs  to  recruit  to  discuss 
career  opportunities  within  USAINSCOM.  Civilian  Personnel  FEQRP 
representatives  visited  predominately  women  and  minority  universities 
to  recruit  applicants  for  the  College  Cooperative  Education  (COE)  Program 
and'  for  hard-to-fill  positions  within  OSAINSCOM.   ;, 
(U)  The  COE  Program  consists  of  seven  colleges  to  Include  three  •, -*' 
'  "  Historically  Blaok  Colleges  (HBC's)  and  one  predominately  Hispanic 
university.  This  program  has  been  highly  instrumental  in  affirmative 
action  accomplishments  as  Indicated  below: «9 
COE  Students  FY  1963    FY  108ft    ^ 
,"  Black  Hen  =   -  6  .-^.  •■.■:■  8  ,{:■■,,.  ,_.  , -.  .  • 
Black  Women  12        U 
Hispanic  Men  0        1  ^'^V.^  -: 
-. : 
Hispanic  Women  1         2 
White.Men  3        7  -  ■■  ■■■'-•  *-w-. 
White  Women  7         6 
29        28 
Merit  Pay  System.  (U)  Congress  passed  a  major  change  to  the  Merit::?ay 
System.  The  program  name  has  been  changed  to  the  "Performance 
Management  and  Recognition  System  (PMRS)."  Provisions  for 
.  determining  the  "merit"  dollar  pool  and  for  distributing  funds  to 
Individual  members  were  changed  along  with  provisions  for  performance 
based'  cash  awards.  Specific  information  was  to  be  transmitted  as  soon 
as  the  Office  of  Personnel  Management  and  Department  of  Army  provided 
implementing  Instructions.  In  the  meantime,  198ft  merit  payout, 
normally  computed  and  effective  the  first  pay  period  in  October,  as 
delayed  because  of  the  requirement  to  implement  the  new  pay  provisions 
retroactive  to  October  198ft  ;"3° 
> 
t   Merit  Pay  Appraisals.  (0)  In  the  last  three  years  this  command  has  been 
consistent  in  approving  about  10  percent  of  all  merit  pay  employees  as 
Exceptional,  although  30  percent  and  more  have  been  recommended  by 
commanders  and  headquarters  staff  heads.  Fortunately,  this  year's 
change  in  the  merit  pay  system  that  required  only  a  majority  of  critical 
elements  be  exceeded  to  be  rated  Highly  Successful  has  allowed  for  an 
agreement  that  the  number  of  Highly  Successful  employees  within  the 
command  is  approximately  30  percent. 
ftl 
UNCLASSIFIED  052
UNCLASSIFIED 
r.-' 
&•:•-,>'*  -i'' 
(0)  The  following  table  depicts  all  Individual!  who  entered  aerit  pay  on 
or  before  the  first  day  of  the  firat  pay  period  in  October,  received  a 
presumptive  Fully  Successful  rating ,  and  will  be  receiving  a  aerit 
increase. 31 
Table  10. 
Approving  Official* a  Decision  Plus  Presumptive  Betings  (PR) 
%ftf--y 
!»•'>-'  -  - 
Onlt 
*  2  .■■' 
COMMAND  TOTAL 
Number 
J!X   HS   FS~(PB)— ' 
^11   31   *3<15V 
4   20   42(12) 
^*8  52   99(29) 
TOTAL 
66  . 
Percentage 
EX   RS   FS 
i.':=;.-v;^?:- 
2§ 
COMMAND  TOTAL  ^18   52  '  99(29).«:  |69  .^^^ ■11.  31   58 
TOTAL 
100 
100 
100 
-100 
?nr 
BO  Bernard  Ardlsana  Award.  (0)  SP4  Kevin  V.  Miller,  66th  MX 
Company,  Ft  Bliss,  Texas,  was  selected  for  his  Individual  achievement 
and  accoapliehment  in  being  rewarded  the  BG  Bernard  Ardiaane  Award 
for  1984.32  .-        ;..-.-..•,,.-•..-_..;•...'  .  J;  .. 
.  -f|..--.  ■:...-■■■     ■:■■•■    ..T.  ■.,...-*:.■.*•■         -v?'.--  •      I 
Communications  Upgrade  Arlington  Ball  Station.  £S?  The  Installation  of 
the  new  MITEL  secure  telephone  systea  at  Arlington  Ball  has  been 
eoapleted.  The  eutover,  which  was  tentatively  scheduled  for  22 
September  1984,  was  slipped  to  29  Septeaber  198ft  due  to  wiring  and 
equipaent  diacrepaneiea.  The  eutover  on  the  29th  was  successful  and 
BQ  INSCOM  ia  currently  on  the  new  syatea. 
b.  Activation  of  the  new  Terahedron-Node  at  ABS  has  been  delayed 
due  to  CAP* a  inability  to  supply  T-1  communications  lines  to  the 
communication*  facility.  0rLgin«2_i££lvation  date  was  17  Septeaber 
1984.  Informal  contact  with  HS  _ 
effort a,  indicates  that  no  definite 
«stabliahed.33  ...... 
nalact: 
*•  I 
.nlte  xm who  la  coordinating  CAP*  a 
iplementatlon  achedule  has  been 
<£« 
■-.  4-. 
Freedom  of  Information/Privacy  Act.  (0)  During  the  period  1  October 
1983  to  30  September  1984,  the  F0I/PA  received  and  proceaaed  908 
Freedom  of  Information  Act  requests  and  1,176  Privacy  Act  requests  for 
a  total  of  2,084  requests. 
(0)  The  total  number  of  requests  received  decreased  by  63  over  the 
previous  reporting  period  (2084  vs  2147).  Ho  special  aignifieance  is 
placed  on  this  slight  decrease;  however,  the  908  Freedom  of  Information 
Act  requests  were  the  highest  ever  received  in  the  office.  A  total  of 
100,219  pages  of  classified  records  were  reviewed  for  declassification  or 
retention.  An  additional  106,650  unclassified  pages  of  records  were 
reviewed  for  s  total  of  206,869  pages  processed  under  the  FOX  Act. 
Overall,  the  FOI/PA  processed  260,477  pages  of  records  to  requesters 
.  during  the  fiscal  year. 34 
UNOLASSFJED 
1     053
UNCLASSIFIED 
Investigative  Records  depository  (IRR).  CO)  During  FI  1984,  the  IRR 
reviewed  327,295  dossiers  for  release,  classification  review,  control, 
secession,  permanent  transfer,  or  destruction.  This  was  an  increase  of 
99,802  over  FI  1983.  .  "*.t-  ;::^--;vi/-.-::-v;;-::;--';:r:?.-  -:-^^afeT""  "'  " 
(0)  The  IRR  prooessed  97,992  requests  for  Information  from  oirer  400 
requesters  worldwide.  These  requests  required  over  48,196  microfilm 
searches  in  addition  to  hardoopy  searches.  The  ZRR  also  reviewed'  and 
processed  33,206  pieces  of  supplement/ad Judicative  material  resulting  in 
the  creation  of  an  additional  10,846  new  dossier  accessions  to  the 
repository.  This  represents  an  Increase  of  2,069  reviews  of  supplement  -- 
over  FI  1983.  ..:,"-  .'-  >.  -  <  ;../^,^.  ..--f -■;>-  ■/-.<  ;.,■  '■-'^.  ■■-.-;■. .•■•■-■:^:- -  v-  ■■  - 
(U)  During  the  fiscal  year,  the  Purge  Project  reviewed  161,622  dossiers 
with  deletions  totaling  125,276.  A  total  of  640  dossiers  determined  to  be  _  ,  -. 
of  historical  value  were  traKsferred  to  WRS^^^^^^^r^^,:.:  ^...;v.' 
.•»■-..  -■*•.*  ;i;  ;•.  ;■**■  ''*.'-  -f  . '-       ..  -   ""-  .  v  .*?  ***,»■;   f*-'Kv  'ft  •  -  '.*   .   7-..   ^-^   -•'        -■.--. 
(0)  The  Special  Actions  Officer  processed  476  cases  for  FI  1984.  These  ■■-;■..;.,' 
cases  were  litigations  and  congressional  requests/inquiries  for        "_^; 
information.  This  represents  a  decrease  of  89  eases  for  those  processed 
in  FI  1983.  By  the  end  of  FI  1984,  over  61,200  SCI  Non-Disclosure 
Agreements  (NDA's)  were  shipped  to  the  IRR  by  INSC0M  Special 
Security  Group.  Approximately  40,349  of  these  documents  were  field 
alphabetically  by  year  of  execution,  leaving  a  backlog  in  excess  of  20,851  ""'■"- 
as  of  30  September  1984, 
•-.-*■  »** .  *. . 
(0)  The  IRR  continued  with  the  Source  Data  Card  Project,  begun  in  Kay 
1983,  which  was  to  process  and  review  an  estimated  68,000  documents 
for  accession  into  the  IRR.  In  FI  1984,  33,989  documents  were  reviewed 
with  5,329  dossiers  being  created,  23 t 220  documents  deleted,  and  5,440 
documents  drop  filed  into  existing  IRR  dossiers. 
(D)  During  the  period  1  December  1983  to  30  September  1984,  Files  ' 
Maintenance  Review  Division  (FMRD)  reviewed  1983  and  prior  year  aged 
files.  A  total  of  26,285  dossiers  were  reviewed/resulting  in  24,657 
dossiers  being  deleted  and  1,628  retained,  a  deletion  rate  of  93.8  percent. 
Although  this  is  designed  as  an  annual  effort,  this  was  the  first  time  all 
files  so  designated  were  reviewed. 35 
IRR  Micro  Consolidation  Project.  (0)  The  first  step  toward 
modernization  and  eventual  micromation  of  IRR  holdings  occurred  on  13 
October  1983  with  the  reestab,lishment  of  the  Microfilm  Records  Review 
Branch  and  the  initiation  of 'the  project  to  review  microfilm  records  in 
1  conjunction  with  the  hard  copy  purge.  This  effort  resulted  in  the 
l  identification,  consolidation,  or  deletion  of  10,078  microfilm  dossiers 
:  which  were  either  identical  to  or  supplement  of  hard  copy  personality 
dossiers.  Continued  efforts  in  this  area  will  eventually  lead  to  the 
elimination  of  the  microfilm  holdings  (between  1  and  2  million 
records). 36  .;B-'i^*-i,  "^- 
ONCLASSiHED  fl5^
UNCLASSIFIED 
Central  Security  Fmcllity  Productivity.  (0)  The  chert  below  depicts  the 
overall  productivity  of  the  U.S.  Amy  Central  Security  Facility  units 
during  FY  1984  in  compliance  with  Federal  statues  and  in  response  to 
authorised  requeaters.37  -•^^**% 
Table  11.  Productivity  Onits,  FT  1984   .!V  &;;^ 
FOI/PA 
FOI  Cases  Opened  -  032 
PA  Cases  Opened  1  Xg2 
Administrative  Support  Actions  13^414 
Operational  Support  Actions  823  315 
TOTAL       83023 
*     ^  .,i -"  -    „■'  -  \  . 
Terminal  Requests  v-  •■  yJax^-i.        -99354' 
Creation  of  Files  12*353 
Requests  Processed  for  Files  97 ! 
992 
Error  Searches  1  435 
Purifications  31*890 
Filing/Refiles  114*233 
Controlled  Files  2*727 
Supplements  Processed  33 | 
206 
{Microfilm  Operations  86,888 
Name  Trace  Requests  2,429 
Reproductions  457.300 
-  ~  TOTAL       939,807 
Hard  Copy  Dossiers 
Reviewed  193,909 
Deleted  122,353 
Retained  71,556': 
.    Microfilm  Dossiers  • 
Reviewed  15,288  *  . 
Deleted  12,686 
Retained        -  2,602 
Status  of  Aircraft  Resources.  (0)  There  were  few  changes  in  INSCOM's 
aviation  resources  during  the  year.  By  the  close  of  FY  1984,  the  3d  MI 
Battalion  had  completed  change-over  of  its  OV-1  aircraft  and  their  APS- 
94F  SLAR  systems.  Replacement  aircraft  were  ferried  to  Korea  from 
♦   the  Grumman  plant  in  -Florida  via  Europe  and  Southern  Asia.  The  C-12 
>   aircraft  at  Sinop  were  undergoing  an  equipment  upgrade  change  from  the 
A  model  to  the  C  model. 38 
Kit 
UNCLASSIFIED  05;
FORO 
USE  ONLY 
Table  12.  INSCOM  Aircraft  Resources  (As  of  30  September  198I) 
Unit 
Type  of  Aircraft 
Field  Station  Augsburg' 
UH-1H 
3d  MI  Battalion 
R0-21H 
OV-1D 
RV-1D 
Field  Station  Korea 
UH-1H 
Field  Station  Sinop 
C-12 
EAC  Intel  Avn  Company 
RC-12G 
B-200 
Service  Cryptologic  Element (SCE)  Day.  1 
Number 
TOTAL 
    (0)  Based  on  stated  desires  of 
the  Command  Group  in  conjunction  with  results  of  NSA  Corporate 
Mangement  Review,  a  Service  Cryptologlc  Element  Day  was  planned  for 
19  June  198X.  It  consisted  of  a  field  trip  by  NSA  senior  management 
officials  to  HQ  INSCOM.  A  series  of  information  briefings  along  with  a 
luncheon  were  held;  all  of  which  was  well  received j  affording  the  NSA 
and  INSCOM  staffs  the  opportunity  of  meet  counterparts  face  to  face. 39 
Operational  Readiness.  (U)  Overall  the  personnel  readiness  posture  of. 
INSCOM' s  major  command  elements  was  relatively  good.  Enlisted 
personnel  shortages  do  exist  within  the  command.  However,  these  are 
shortages  which  were  normally  experienced  by  other  major  commands. 
The  shortages  in  the  intelligence  MOS's  (05G,  9&B&C,  97B&C,  and 
98C&G)  were  attributed  to  the  lack  of  adequate  assets  in  the  Army 
Inventory.  Shortage  support  MOS's  were  essentially  71L,  74D/F,  9»B  and 
95B. 
of  f icershortagesincluded  Specialty  Code  (SC)< 
       )d4|    HV  Shortages  also  existed  in  I 
whichr«  juired  language  skills.  This  was  particularly  acute  in 
JPtaerican  languages.  Traditional  shortages  in  the  Warrant. 
Tffficer  Corps  encompass  most  of  the  MI  warrant  officers  MOS's  though 
theJ|     P^MOS  was  beginning  to  reflect  a  marked  improvement 
throughTncreased  successions.  Shortages  will  continue  in  the_  general 
intelligence  MOSafl    ■■■■■  W  andf~ 
(0)  A  general  problem  with'lNSCOM  tactical  units  was  the  shortage  of 
required  equipment  to  "go  to  war."  Continuous  emphasis  was  being 
placed  by  DCSLOG  in  all  areas  of  preventive  maintenance  and  overall 
maintenance  management  of  assigned  equipment.  Considerable  effort 
and  money  was  being  expended  to  replace  and/or  upgrade  vintage 
equipment  in  both  tactical  and  strategic  units. 
(U)  Field  Station  Korea's  single  station  locator  (SSL)  which  consisted  of 
old  proto-type  equipment  requiring  constant  maintenance  and  scheduled 
to  be  replaced  by  new  equipment.  This  was  but  one  of  a  number  of 
FOR 
SEONLY 
056
UNCLASSIFIED 
perennial  problems.  Others  included j      WAt  Field  Station 
Slnop  which  was  being  upgraded  to  repTaceobsolete  equipment. 
Continuous  water  stoppages  st  Field  Station  Sinop  which  was  being 
resolved  by  the  ongoing  construction  of  a  de-sallnization  plant  to  be 
wholly  controlled  by  the  field  station.  Finally,  Field  Station  Augsburg's 
obsolete  OCC  526  Teletype  circuit  switch  equipaent  which  DCSTEL  was 
working  to  upgrade  or  replace  with  sore  nodern  equipaent. *0 
Weaponeer.  (0)  HQ  INSCOH  has  procured  11  Weaponeer  systems  since 
1983  in  an  effort  to  enhance  weapons  marksmanship  proficiency  for 
INSCOH  soldiers.  The  Weaponeer  is  an  indoor  M16A1  remedial  rifle 
marksmanship  trainer  capable  of  allowing  for  qualification  and  designed 
to  isolate  and  oorrect  individual  trainee  deficiencies.  The  slmulstors 
will  save  INSCOM  thousands  of  dollars  in  ammunition,  transportation  and 
personnel  time  while  Increasing  marksmanship  among  the  soldiers.111 
Reserve  affairs,  (0)  In  FY  1984,  the  Reserve  Affairs  Office  held  the 
first  INSCOM-wide  individual  mobilisation  augmentation  (IMA) 
conference.  Many  critical  topics  and  problems  were  discussed  and 
solved.  Based  oti  the  outstanding  success,  the  IMA  conference  will  be 
continued  as  an  annual  event. 
(0)  Another  new  initiative  during  FT  1984  was  the  assignment  of  IMA's 
to  MTOE  organisations,  authorised  by  HQDA  directive.  For  the  firat 
time,  IMA  personnel  can  be  assigned  to  fill  the  delta  between  the 
required  and  authorised  columns  in  authorisation  documents.  Two 
INSCOM  commands,  the  513th  MI  Group  and  the  66th  MX  Croup,  have 
taken  advantage  of  this  decision  and  have  already  established  IMA 
positions. 
(0)  During  the  past  year,  the  Reserve  Affairs  Office  periodically  Issued 
a  IMA  newsletter  to  all  INSCOM  IMA  coordinators  worldwide.  It  proved 
to  be  one  of  the  best  ways  to  keep  coordinators  informed  of  changes ";in 
policy  and  procedure*  as  well  as  keeping  them  abreast  of  new 
developments.*2 
Chief  of  Staff,  U.S.  Army's  Award  for  Maintenance  Excellence.  (0)  .In 
March  1984,  it  was  announced  that  Field  Station  Okinawa's  Electronic 
Maintenance  Division  had  reoelved  the  1983  Chief  of  Staff,  U.S.  Army's 
Award  for  Maintenance  Excellence.  Field  Station  Okinawa  was  tops 
among  the  24  Army-wide  units  competing  in  its  TDA  category.  Five  key 
evaluation  areas  Included  readiness,  maintenance  management,  training, 
cost,  and  Innovative  execution.  For  example,  "Readiness  involved 
»   deadline  rates  and  equipment  availability  rates.  In  cost,  it  was  how 
»   much  money  did  you  use?  How  much  money  did  you  save?"1,3 
UNCLASSIFIED  057
Exercises.  Jtf)    HQ  ZNSCOM  participated  in  the  following  major 
exercises  during  FX  1984s    ' 
J6i  fl  reoaaand 
post  iimii  i  HPWHWffr^W  fliu  Inn  I  In  |m  Iml  ^M^H^MBMPnlih  h 
was  designed  to  exercise  plans  and  proeedurestostSuHleTBd  test 
operational  and  logistical  aspects  of  attainability  in  a  major 
conventional  conflict*]  |p>  Participation  of  this  headquarters 
lnvolved_iinnlng_the  Intelligence  Operations  Center  at  HQ  ZNSCOM 
withi  —    ~~ 
>st  exercise 
4^7  1  and  the 
participated  during  J  Pin  the  < 
Do^pn  of  Coabined  Forces  Command 
m      P  The  exerclae  provided  the  first  opportunity  for  the 
|   Ito  deploy  its  headquarters  to  its  alternate  site.  The 
of  HQ  ZNSCOM  was  In  res    
consisted  of  a 
>nse  to  a  request  from 
Although  the  exercise  occurred  ia^ mmmm 
  Actual  preparations  took  place  in  FT  1984.  Extensive  liaison  was 
5nduetedwiththe«|         Jf  whose  simulated  deployment  during 
this  m  aw'MOBfix  was  anticipated  to  he  the  most 
significant  learning  experience  during  A  Pan  extensive 
affort  was  aade  to  brief  the  BCSOPS  personally  and  to  involve  other  key 
•cabers  of  the  headquarters  (most  especially  the  DGSPER  and  the 
DCSLOG^ln  exerclae  preparations.44 
ZNSCOM  Beyond  Excellence  (IBEX)  Programs,  (U)  Zn  the  fall  of  1982, 
the  ZNSCOM  coaaander  convened  a  task  foroe  of  fifteen  persons  to 
conduct  a  •ecan"  of  the  environment  to  find  programs,  ideas,  techniques 
and  technologies  which  appeared  useful  In  promoting  and  developing . 
high  performance  in  an  organisational  context  and  extraordinary 
performance  (defined  as  performance  which  exceeded  what  an  individual 
thought  to  be  100  percent  of  his  potential)  at  the  Individual  levels 
(0)  *?be  purpose. of  this  affort  was  to  recommend  progress  and 
techniques  for  use  within  ZNSCOM  for  the  pursuit  of  three  outcomes: 
(a)  To  meet  increasing  mission  demands  and  requirements  by 
obtaining  quantitative  and/or  qualitative  enhancements .in  mission 
performance.  ^ 
(b)  To  save  resources  (personnel  spaces  aa  well  as  fiscal  resources). 
(c)  To  enhance  human  satisfaction,  improve  cohesion,  and  decrease 
stress  and  anxiety  levels  in  the  command* 
W»WL 
058
USEQNLY 
(0)  In  November  of  1963  an  in-proeeas-revlew  (ZPR)  conducted  in 
Baltimore  and  involving  ell  XKSCOH  major  fubordlnate  oommandera 
resulted  in  several  change*  to  structure  end  scheae  for  monitoring  IBEX 
Programs.  These  ehanges  consisted  of  the  dropping  of  a  number  of 
foundering  programs;  designation  of  command  vide  programs  to 
"mandatory"  programs;  and  the  opening  of  pilot  test  programs  to 
voluntary  use  by  commanders  other  than  those  who  had  originally 
volunteered  to  teat  them. 
(0)  After  a  five  month  study,  the  High  Performance  Task  Force 
published  a  report  which  promulgated  the  IBEX  effort  in  IMSCOM.  The 
programs  were  divided  into  three  categories,  each  representing  a 
different  level  of  implementation!  Command-wide  programs,  pilot 
programs,  and  supplemental  programs.  In  conclusion,  the  IBEX  has 
apparently  promoted  an  awareneaa  of  high  performance  and  elicited  a 
wave  of  enthusiasm  throughout  XNSCOH.  Moreover  at  the  macro 
(MftCCM)  level,  it  has  provided  a  unifying  focus  and  sense  of  direction 
for  moving  the  MACOM  through  complex  orgnalzational  change.  In 
other  words  it  has  served  a  forcing  function  and,  at  tt-  same  time, 
provided  a  psychological  impetus  for  change. "5 
Personnel  Security.  (D)  In  June  1983,  HQDA  filMX-CXS  requested  all 
MACOM 's  and  their  subordinate  elements  to  report  the  number  of 
personnel  (military  and  civilian)  currently  holding  TOP  SECRET, 
SECRET,  or  COHFIDEKTIAL  clearances  and  also  establish  a  new  report, 
Personnel  Security  Clearances  (ICSs  CSGlO-160).  Since  the  Initial 
request,  the  Information  to  be  provided  haa  expanded  to  Include  those 
individuals  indoctrinated  for  Special  Intelligence  Information.  The 
figures  submitted  to  BQDA  for  FT  198*  are  aa  follows:** 
Clearance  Level        Military  Civilian 
SCI       
TS  |  |  ^^H       IUR552NIB 
C 
Information  Security.  (0)  During  FT  1984  three  important  aecurity 
investigation*  were  initiated  within  INSCOM.  The  first  Involved  a 
missing  NATO  SECRET  document  from  the  66th  MI  Group.  The  informal 
investigation  under  AR  15-6  revealed  that  the  reason  the  document  could 
not  be  located  was  that  all  regiatered  mail  was  not  being  opened  upon  its 
arrival  at  the  66th  MX  Groups  The  aeeond  investigation  involved  three 
i   missing  TOP  SECRET  collateral  docuaenta  which  were  on  account  to 
I   DCSOPS.  At  the  end  of  the  fiacal  year,  the  informal  15-6  investigation 
continued;  however,  it  appeared  that  the  documents  would  not  be  located 
and  that  the  reason  for  the  document  to  be  missing  was  that  personnel 
did  not  follow  procedures  regarding  the  eontorl  of  TOP  SECRET 
information.  The  final  investigation  involved  35  miaaing  NATO  SECRET 
documents  from  IT  AC.  A  thorough  search  in  ITAC  and  an  informal  15-6 
USE  ONLY 
03y
investigation  brought  tht  total  of  missing  documents  to  19*  The  reason 
for  tht  Biasing  docuntnts  was  a  combination  of  procedural  and  human 
errore  and  administrative  mishandling  of  the  documents.  All  three 
Incidents  were  required  to  be  reported  to  ACSI  and  to  higher  authorities 
which  brought  unwanted  negative  attention  to  XNSCOM**? 
Physical  Security*  (C)  An  Electronic  Access  Control  (EAC)  system  was 
installed  at  HQ,  INS COM,  Arlington  Hall  Station,  Arlington,  Virginia,  and 
became  operational  in  Janaury  1984.  EAC*s  were  also  installed  at  Field 
Station  Berlin  (March  1980) •  Field  Station  Augsburg  (March  1981),  and 
Field  Station  Kunia  (June  1980)  .*8 
Vault  3  Upgrade.  (0)  The  single  blggeat  project  in  Automated  Systems 
Activity  in  FY  1984  was  the  Vault  3  Upgrade  Project.  The  design  of  the 
project  was  completed  in  late  1983 »  and  a  contract  was  awarded  to  J.C. 
Crimberg  Corporation.  Construction  began  in  February,  and  almost  from 
the  beginning  the* project  ran  into  trouble.  The  construction  waa 
originally  scheduled  to  last  from  February  until  the  end  of  July,  but  in 
reality,  contract  completion  will  mot  happen  until  the  and  of  November. 
During  theae  nine  months  of  eons  traction,  our  users  have  had  to  auffer 
the  inconvience  of  seven  individual  one  week  outages.  During  these 
outages,  all  three  of  the  computer  systems,  located  inside  Vault  3  (Top 
Sail  Caff,  Triple  Score,  and  the  ABS  XDHS  NODE)  ware  disconnected, 
moved,  and  reconnected  a  total  of  three  times. 
(?)  Some  of  the  problems  encountered  during  the  eonatructlon  included 
poor  soil  base  in  the  foundation  area  of  the  new  utility  building  which 
resulted  in  a  1-week  delay  and  overall  poor  or  incomplete  design  of  all 
areas  Included  in  the  upgrade.  Bowovcr,  in  apite  of  all  the  problems,  by 
October  1981,  the  nea  computer  facility  began  to  take  shape. 
Completion  of  this  project  is  now  expected  by  the  end  of  November 
1981. *9 
Special  DAIC  Inspection.  J^T  Beginning  in  the  2d  Quarter  FX  1980,  the 
DAIG  launched  a  special  inspection  of  Army  procurement  which 
potentially  would  have  a  long-term  affect  upon  INSCOM'e  operation*  and  . 
organisation.  Aa  the  laspec^iOA-BE&Kressed  through  severs!  major. 
INSCOM  subor* 
   the  number  of  findings  to  be 
developed  stow,  and  corrective  actions  were  begun.  Early  declsj 
made  included] 
060
ym 
USE  ONLY 
FOOTNOTES:  Chapter  IV.  RESOURCES  AND  MANAGEMENT 
1.  FT  1984  DCSRM  AHR  (C),  pp.  6-12. 
2.  FY  198*  DCSRM  AHR  (C),  p.  12.  '.4 "■  r- 
3.  FT  1981  DCSRM  ARR  (C),  p.  21. 
4.  FY  1984  DCSPER  AHR  (0),  p.  3. 
5.  FY  1984  DCSRM  ARR  (C),  pp.  21-22. 
6.  XNSCOM  Command  Strength  Report  from  Plans  A  Proponency 
Division,  DCSPER  as  of  30  Sep  84,  published  22  Oct  84  (0). 
7*  Travis  Trophy  Awards  Prograa  Brochure,  1984  (U). 
8.  Travis  Trophy  Awards  Prograa  Brochure,  1984  (0). 
9.  FY  1984  DCSPER  AHR  (D),  p.  42. 
10.  FY  1984  DCSPER  AHR  (D),  p.  18. 
11.*  Key  Personnel  Roster,  dtd  30  September  1984  (FOUO). 
12.  FY  1984  OXG  AHR  (D),  p.  11. 
13.  FY  1984  OXG  AHR  (0),  p.  11. 
14.  FY  1984  DCSPER  AHR  (0),  p.  45. 
15.  FY  1984  DCSPER  AHR  (0),  p.  45. 
16.  FY  1984  SJA  AHR  (U),  pp.  5-7. 
17.  FY  1984  PAO  AHR  (D),  tab  E. 
18.  FY  1984  DCSOPS  AHR  (TSA,  p.  12. 
19.  FY  1984  DCSOPS  AHR  tTSU,  p.  88. 
20.  FY  1984  DCSOPS  AHR  (TSM,  pp.  89-90. 
21.  FY  1984  DCSOPS  AHR  (TSM,  pp.  85-86. 
22.  FY  1984  DCSPER  AHR  (0),  p.  39. 
23.  FY  1984  DCSPER  AHR  (0),  pp.  37-39. 
24.  FY  1984  DCPSER  AHR  (0),  pp.  34-36. 
25.  FY  1984  DCSPER  AHR  (U),  p.  32. 
26.  FY  1984  DCSPER  ARR  (0),  p.  32. 
27.  FY  1984  DCSPER  AHR  (0),  pp.  12-13. 
28.  FY  1984  DCSPER  AHR  (U),  p.  4. 
29.  EEO  Affirmative  Action  Program  Plan,  Annual  Accomplishment 
Report^  FY  1984,  DCSPER,  3  Dec  84  (G). 
30.  Ltr,  XAPER-CP,  dtd  5  Nov  84,  subj:  Merit  Pay  Appraisals  and  New 
Change  to  the  Merit  Pay  System  (0). 
31.  Ltr,  XAPER-CP,  dtd  5  Nov  84,  aubj:  Merit  Pay  Appraisals  and  New 
Change  to  the  Merit  Pay  System  (0). 
32.  Ltr,  XAOPS-SE-0,  dtd  17  Jul  84,  subj:  Letter  of  Commendation  (0).  ■ 
33.  Ltr,  ASI-D,  dtd  11  Oct  84,  eubj:  Telecommunications  Information  (C). 
34.  FY  1984  Central  Security  Facility  AHR  (FOUO),  tab  A. 
35.  FY  1984  Central  Security  Facility  AHR  (FOUO),  tab  B. 
36.  FY  1984  Central  Security  Facility  AHR  (FOUO),  tab  B. 
i   37.  FY  1984  Central  Security  Facility  AHR  (FOUO),  ch  1. 
»   38.  FY  1984  DCSOPS  AHR  (TSfM  p.  67. 
39.     Ibid.,  p.  52.  '%, 
fc 
061 
USE ONLY
FOROFE 
EONLY 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45. 
46. 
47. 
48. 
49. 
50. 
Paper,  IAOPS-IOC,  subj:     Operational  Readiness  of  INSCOM's  Major 
Command  Elements  (17  Ju^84)  (0). 
FY  1984  DCSOPS  AHR  (TSflB  p.  81. 
Ibid.,  pp.  73-7*.  ^  -- 
FY  1984  FS  Okinawa  AHR  (TSflB  Annex  F.  *- 
FY  1984  DCSOPS  AHR  (TSflfc  pp.  79-80. 
Stati 
* 
Nemo,  ZACS-OE,  sub  J  J 
dtd  23  Jul  84  (U). 
FY  1984  CSO  AHR  (U), 
FY  1984  CSO  AHR  (0), 
FY  1984  CSO  AHR  (0), 
System  (Ondtd). 
FY  1984  ASA  AHR  (C), 
FY  1984  IG  AHR  (0),  p. 
P. 
P. 
P< 
istus  and  Impact  of  IBEX  Programs, 
3. 
4. 
6;  Poster  picture  of  INSCOM  Security  Badge 
11-247 
9i  DF,  lAOPS-HrPCO,  subjt 
Financial 
Management  Decision  Briefing  (30  Aug  84)  (C). 
USE ONLY 
062
UNCLASSIFIED 
'CHAPTER  V 
OPERATIONAL  ACTIVITIES 
Multidisclpllnet 
U.S.  Amy  Tactical  Intelligence  Readiness  Training  (REDTRAIN).  (0) 
The  training  effectiveness  analysis  (TEA)  of  the  REDTRAIN as  live 
environment  training  (LET)  prograa  began  in  full  swing  In  FT  1984.  The 
REDTRAIN  Division  contracted  with  TRADOC's  Systems  Analysis 
Activity  (TRASANA)  to  develop  testing  criteria  and  working  aids  for  six 
selected  military  intelligence  MOS's  (98C,  98G,  98J,  96J,  96C,  960,  and 
05H).  The  goal  of  the  REDTRAIN  TEA  was  to  determine  the 
effectiveness  of  LET  on  an  experimental  group  of  identified  MOS's  over 
a  fixed  period  of  time.  Two  groups  of  MI  soldiers  were  selected  from 
FORSCOM  and  USAREUR  units.  One  group  participated  in  a  LET 
opportunity;  while  the  control  group  remained  in  their  garrison  location. 
Both  groups  were  tested,  using  the  TRASANA  developed  evaluation 
tools,  to  determine  the  soldiers'  level  of  proficiency  prior  to 
participating  in  the  LET.  Upon  completion  of  the  LET,  both  groups  were 
retested  to  determine  their  proficiency  after  the  LET  opportunity.  The 
results  of  both  tests  were  statistically  evaluated  to  determine  any 
improvement  in  the  soldiers'  proficiency.  The  average  LET  period  was 
60  days;  after  which  time,  the  LET  group  returned  t©  their  parent  unit. 
After  a  period  of  90  days,  both  groups  were  to  be  tested  again.  The 
results  of  this  test  were  to  determine  the  amount  of  decay  in  the 
soldiers '-skills  over  an  elapsed  period  of  time  after  the  LET  experience. 
The  results  of  all  the  data  were  to  be  used  to  determine  the 
effectiveness  in  two  areas:  (1)  how  effective  is  the  REDTRAIN  LET 
program  and  (2)  how  effective  is  the  parent  units'  MI  training? 
(U)  The  REDTRAIN  TEA  Decay  Test,  originally  scheduled  for  August 
1984,  was  cancelled  because  the  Post  Live  Environment  Training  test 
showed  no  measurable  change  in  tested  skills;  therefore,  no  Decay  Test 
was  necessary.  The  lack  of  measurable  change  was  due,  in  part,  to  -the 
fact  that  the  testing  instruments  did  not  assess  the  particular  training 
skills  available  at  the  TEA  LET  sites.  The  tests  focused  on  the  soldiers' 
individual  "go-to-war"  technical  skills  listed  in  the  respective  MOS 
soldiers  manuals.  It  was  impractical  to  tailor  tests  for  each  LET  site, 
hence  the  decision  to  use  the  only  comprehensive  standards  available  to 
TRASANA.  The  tests  did  not  utilize  ADP  support;  however,  the  LET 
soldiers  in  some  MOS  groups  used  ADP  support  during  their  TDY.  Other 
i  LET  soldiers  did  not  exercise  all  the  tested  technical  skills  during  their 
l  LET.  Technical  skills  exercised  at  LET  sites  focused  on  "strategic 
:  technical  skills  that  did  not  completely  match  the  test  objectives. 
(U)  After  receiving  the  briefing  on  the  post  LET  results,  BG  Hunt,  DCG- 
I,  INSCOM  directed  that  soldiers  assigned  to  Field  Stations  Augsburg  and 
Berlin  and  the  66th  MI  Group  take  the  TEA  tests  in  order  to  determine 
the  basic  technical  skills  proficiency  of.  INSCOM  personnel.  In  August 
UNCLASSFJED  osa
WM\ 
IAL 
*.=c-,  the  REITEAIK  Division,  K;  IKSCOK,  initiated  a  project 
coordination  sheet  with  TRASAKA  to  establish  the  testing  for  2KSC0K 
units.  In  addition,  the  REDTRAIK  Division  TEA  prefect  officer 
ecccnper.ied  TEASA?JA  personnel  t:  the  aforementioned  IKSCOX  units   -- 
tc  cecrdinete  the  7EA  follow-cr.  testing  vhich  is  scheduled  for  October 
.as  the  program  tt  provide  tactical  SICXN1  toilers 
"with  a  realistic  training  environment  by  bringing  s  live  signs!  into  their 
ur.it'  s  garriscn  location 
CO 
.'if 
I?;SCCK  5i-Vceklv  Operational  Report.  (U)  A  bi-weekly  report  in 
ressage  forset  was  prepared  by  the  ODCSDPS,  EC  INSCOK,  *nd  ^M^f£: 
distributed  worldwide  to  INSCOM^units.  "The  report  ccnteined^^l^  ><: 
cperaticnel  highlights  end  kudos.  However,  because  the  sejcrity,*f  the 
iters  submitted  by  IKSCOM  subordinate  units  concerned  sensitive 
jTJICSm  5ICIKT,  end  2KIKT  operations,  it  .was  decided  to  discontinue 
the  cperationel  report  in  Kerch  ijSiJ  out  of  security  considerations  in 
keeping  vith  the  "need  tc  know"  principle.2 
"«£-.. -er  _-**!.: 
>e  and  Threat 'Analysis'  rrccrar.  Tsr,?.TA?). 
;:>,■■- ,^T'v 
   zeteivec  a  request  for  assistance  frca  the  U.S.  Arcy      .->-/--- 
Atncspheric  Sciences  Laboratory  (ASL)  for  weather  intelligence  on    >;; 
er.ery  chenical  and  electro-optical  activities.    The  request  for       ;"•   r.. 
assistance  was  answered  by  furnishing  a  ccpy  cf  the  Scientific  and 
Technical  Intelligence  Register  (<::?.).    This  request  is  the  first  cf  r.er.y 
expected  regarding  .weather  intelligence  end  indicated  a  need  to 
establish  a  »1KTA?  date  base.     Cecrdination  was  cade  with  ITAC  end 
r.S.  Amy  intelligence  Agency  (rrcvisicnel^  fcr  establishment  cf  a, 
•--*s •-.*.-' intelligence  data  base  fcr  ecllected  weather  intelligence. 5 
Taitital  Simulation   tTACSIK)  -guct-crt  tc  Cr.SSTES  IAS1E  Vl.     (U) 
I-ir.r  Zr.ZSZZZ  EAGLE  &^  nunc  reus  ZNSCOX  personnel  were  involved 
I  
in  providing  tactical  simulation  support  tc  exercise  pleyers/ccr.trcllers. 
•IKS:::-!  participation  included  personnel  from  H3  IKSCOK,  5"»3th  MI 
:-rc.;.   ttth  IZ  Grcup,  and  Field  Station  Augsburg.     The  IKSCOK    . 
;erstnnel  received  7ACSIK  training  at  rcrt  Kccd,  Texas,  ©r  KO   / 
'JSAr.r.-?..     Sue  to  numerous  problems,  2KSC2M  personnel  were       .    * 
*--. '.;*i  during  the  exercise  at  varying  degrees  cf  intensity,  with 
several  having  virtually  nothing  tc  do. 
rt£J
't^^ti0!£*g- g^ftWttgfffo vjgfe- ~ *■*■■ v  .'•-'"-■'•-:  "iff*!?:-- 
fcr  *'  1>___,  ;W>-,!^vh.«?^v*ii*^<:ii»*M(i,'-".-'-^_ 
.&i'*$h 
...  :-.,  ■:••  'v_  "}.•;  _'  -^'i^^r^s??"  -.-:.  -  •.•.•■• ■>■ 
Notwithstanding  TACSIM**  cany  shortcomings  during 
T3ESTED  £AGL£  84,  the  TRADOC  Combined  Arss  Test  Activity 
% :  (TCATA)  tactical  simulation  pr_ran  appeared  to  be  the  future  for  large 
scale 
a. 
p£ 
t.'-srfyjg'  '■  '■%*: 
■ ««,._£.'- 
tt3>  During  CHESTED  EAGLE  -Mt  the  TACSIM  support  effort  iM^" 
plagued  by  numerous  equipment  and  communications  problems.  3To  *<:  •   -  .-vr-v-v:-- 
overcome  anticipated  communications  problems  a  high  capacity 
communications  link  was  established  between  the  main  TACSIM 
computer  at  Port  Hood,  Texas,  and  a  remote  communications  processor    _-.._.>..; 
4I.C?)  at  HQ  BSAHEDR.  •  All  TACSIM  *eta  was  to  be  passed  across  the  v^^^iv 
Atlantic  via  this  circuit.  Vithin  L'SAREUR,  a  combination  of  pcint-to-   ^' 
i  "point  and  AUTODIK  circuits  were  to  be  used.  Uonreliebility  of  the  Tort  "' 
Hood-Heidelberg  nigh  capacity  circuit  resulted  In  all  TACSIM  output  ^■/-,"  ^: ^;-- 
^ ;;dete  being  introduced  into  the  AETODIH  system  at  Fort  Hood.  .Large     ^,,^_ 
^"•-  __id  lengthy  communications  delays  ensued.  As  a  consequence,  receipt  of 
-TACSIM  data  was  so  time-late  that  exercise  controllers  elected  to  hand  :_■ 
;<*- script  the  excereiae  play.  In  summary,  TACSIM  support  to  CHESTED 
*  r^A5LE  8*  was  siiniaal,  JLf  tiot  counterproductive.^* 
:.'»^'*y  _•*_  ^r**' "i*  ° -*°* 
*&*  Suncort  to  PRGSKT  FURY  CP.S.  Forces  "in  Grenade).  JjjpswrarrDae 
*;•*"  to  the  rapid  buildup  of  Cuban  and  Soviet  activities,  the  murder  of  Prime 
Minister  Maurice  Bishop,  the  potential  threat  to  U.S.  citizens,  and  the 
posed  -threat  to  surrounding  Caribbean  nations,  Dnited  States  and 
'Organization  Eastern  Caritbean  .States  tOECS)  forces  invaded  the  island 
_'  mazier,  of  Grenada  en  25  Octcier  *-c3-  The  operational  naze  for  the 
r '^invasion  was  URGSKT  FUM.  TNSCOK's  involvement  in  Operation  * 
>  VSGSSI  FURY  began  on  22  October  1983  »s  _  result  of  an  informal 
V-'.  request  for  assistance  cade  toy  X72II  Airborne  Corps  so  D.S.Army  - 
^.-Intelligence  and  Threat  Analysis  Stater's  General  Intelligence  ?**" 
r!\-  Production  Division  at  Fort  Bragg,  Sorth  Carolina.  Informal  assistance 
^  _o  c? eratlonal  forces  involved  in  Operation  URGEKT  FBRY  Cr fill  Abn  - 
'  Corps.  1st  Special  Operations  Command  and  Special  Forces  Operational 
7  Detachment-Delta)' continued  from  the  first  weeV:  of  the  operation  ar.i  *■ 
was  provided  by  a  number  of  IKSCCM  units,  to  include  I7AC,  IKSCOK 
Automated  Systems  Activity,  the  Intelligence  Exchange  and  Support 
Center,  and  the  513th  MI  Group.  " 
.  ^fr~  *:■?<•■>    .•*■-■•.■■.  "'"^        '       "" 
-Of  the  problensjeneountered  during 
nonehaf         * 
    ______         tasking,  requ: 
almost  immediate  response  and  did  not  allow  for  the  adequate 
* 
.  ■-" 
~"  c    os5  ;
__      Additionally, 
owledge  of  and 
fil)  The  first  formal  tasking  for  URGENT  FlfflY  raeeiVtd  by* 
TNSC0M  wis  on  27  October,  when  HQDA  directed  IHSCOM  to  provide 
Interrogation/debrieflngsupport  to  U.S.  forces  in  Granada.  In  turn,  the 
513th  MX  Group  deployed]  technical  intelligence  analysts  to  Grenada 
for  URGENT  FURY  operations?  ■  ■analysts  deployed  on  20  October. 
1983  in  support  of  Defense  Intelligence  Agency  and  CINCLANT,  and    
Corps. 
/'!•"." 
m*:: 
The  513th  ru  (.roup's  pePS5Mel  were  involved  in  the  identification. ani 
shipment  of  captured  foreign  equipment  to  CONOS.  Additionally, 
. .•;■.-; 
'imagery  interpretation  personnel  supported  CINCLANT  and  XVIII  Abn 
Corps  and  HQ  INSCOM  during  the  entire  operation.  Group  personnel  also 
presented  technical  briefings  and  displays  of  captured  equipoent  at 
Andrews  Air  Force  Base,  10-14  November.  .  Briefings  were  presented  to 
■ore  than  16,000  people,  to  Include  the  Vice  President,  Secretary  of 
Defense,  and  Secretary  of  the  Army.  Equipment  displayed  included  ZU- 
23AA  guns, -«.  BDRM  II,  20  32MM  mortars,. and  five  million  rounds  of  7162 
ammunition.  Personnel  completed  operations  in  Grenada  and  returned  to 
CONUS  6  and  7  December  1983* 
*?*%??\ 
«**:•■•'" 
-..«;> .-;. 
team,  the  TAREX 
and  handling  of 
interest 
involveme 
rapidly  respond 
U.S.  agencies. 
^___    osBhers  of  a  DIA 
representative  was  able  to  assist  in  the  identification 
over  10,000  pounds  of  documents  and  equipment  of 
One  of  the  lessons  learned  from 
elopaent  of  a  plan  to  enable  TAREX  %o 
to  future  situations  in  coordination  with  other  D0D  and 
Preliminary  work  was  begun  on  such  mn  operational  plan, 
probably  no  problem  encountered  in  Grenada  will  have  more  long- 
term  impact  on  the  Intelligence  community  than  the  wide-spread 
pilfering  and  destruction  of  Soviet  military  equipment  found  on  Grenada 
by  U.S.  troops. 
3F0RN)  The  acquisition,  accounting,  control,  and  safeguarding  of 
captured  foreign  equipment  was  either  totally  absent  or  totally 
unsatisfactory.  With  rare  exceptions,  most  foreign  equipment  was 
damaged,  ransacked,  or  destroyed  by  U.S.  forces.  No.  attempt  was  made 
to  establish  control  or  policy  regarding  foreign  materiel  until  it  was  too 
late.  Large  amounts  of  foreign  materiel  were  pilfered  bv  U.S.  forces, 
presumably  for  souvenirs  .| 
FOREIGN 
OSS
Examples  of  __«  «Ki£__lsa  Included 
tng  armored  vehicles  anre,  removing  all  ffitoe  *****■— *»^  ef  maintenance 
shop  vans  and  dumping  the  contents  on  the  rand.,  irerociaai  Dhe 
searchlights  from  vehicles ,  and  breaking  nedl©  •Qi_l£__n£L.  No  central 
collecting  point  was  designated  and  no  accouT_a__Uit_r  was  established. 
When  security  was  provided,  the  guards  permitted  atz&sne  a&o  wished  to 
wander  among  the  materiel  and  remove  items.  Sk_muT£_atf__2s 
equipment  was  removed  from  its  location  and  usually  te__en  in  the 
process.  Units  that  redeployed  from  Grenada  jwuwefl  aatrge  amounts  of 
foreign  Bateriel»  including  hundreds  of  awt.nmst.1r  s_sp_ns,  anti-aircraft 
guns  and  other  equipment.  No  effort  was  aade -to '"Shakedown"  these 
units.  All  the  above  situations  are  in  direst  opposition  to  AR  700-99, 
Acquisition.  Accounting.  Control  and  Foreign  Wat/erieS!,  It  was  obvious 
that  the  concerned  commands  were  unprepared  t_>  steal  «i__  the  large 
amounts  of  captured  equipment.  Very  few  plena  ©X  ag&ured  equipment 
were  labeled  in  any  Banner.  Zn  summary,  ftfae  __bss  _d  __s  Intelligence 
community  was  enormous. 5 
Weather  Support  to  O.S.  Army  Aircraft  In  garctnal  ___gri_na.  (0) 
Aviation  operations  In  Central  America  are  wnst'hwir  sensitive  due  to 
movement  of  the  later  Tropical  Zone  of  Convergence  producing  large 
■asses  of  thunderstorms..  The  Air  Weather  Serxlae  MS)  —as  a  TOT 
team  supporting  operations  in  the  area,  however,  aqidpaent  furniahed 
to  support  the  team  was  only  aarginally  aat±_5ketaary_  Coanunleations  • 
under  AR  115-10,  Weather  Support  to  the  0-S_  «n_r,  ess  sin  Amy 
responsibility,  and  communications  failure  ess  a  asftar  problem  in 
providing  weather  support. 
(0)  Zn  anticipation  of  the  fielding  of  the  XS___FH3_H__:  airborne  system 
in  the  near  future,  0ACSI  _  roposed  the  possibility  aff  leasing  a  Kavouras 
Triton-X,  Advanced  Weather  System  for  an  _q_w_tt___n__.  test  of  Army 
support  applicability.  The  lease  of  the  tfevorxus  SCrttcn  X  plus  Doppler 
Weather  Radar  would  cost  Approximately  $H  -rea-a—-  __sb_  ZNSC0H  and 
OACSI  would  each  fund  half;  the  equipment  emulfl  _s  spsorsted  by  the 
AWS  team  and  maintained  by  Xavorous.  At  *_•  ma d  xff  tbte  year,  the 
funding  proposal  was  before  Congress*' 
$70th  MI  Croup  ZIR  Production,  pn    during YX  H__W,  She  «70th  HI  Group 
undertook  a  number  of  administrative  and  quality  eoifibrol  actions  to 
improve  both  the  content  and  form  of  its  interest  ±m_ lligenee  reports 
(IIR).  The  470th  MI  Group  eliminated  trivial  Tepnrt±ngr  consolidated 
information  into  one  ZIR  where  possible,  and  Aevelsped  a  management 
information  system  to  provide  a  better  understanding  of  its  reporting. 
The  group  also  coordinated  its  ZIR*  a  with  country  Aa»m_  representatives, 
to 
iaproved  -ere__tt_____ar  for  the  «70th  MI 
Group  at  both  S0UTHQ0H  and  throughout  the  region.       r  _  % 
Mi  Best  Copy  Available
The  combined  elements  of  the  group  produced  •  total  of  83U  IIR«©  in 
FY  198H.  This  represented  •  20.5  percent  increase  over  the  previous 
year.  The  focus  of  the  IIR  reporting  changed  significantly.  In  1982,  81 
percent  of  the  group*  s  reporting  dealt  with  J    W1*   1983,  43  percent 
of  the  reports  concerned  M        Vand  in  198fl^hegroup«s  focus  had 
expanded  so  that  only  23Tercent  of  the  reporting  concerned^     ^ 
No  fewer  than  20  countries  in  the  region,  tfgf*  r»nrM»nt»rt  inthe«70tn 
MI  Croup's  reporting,  to  include' 
Improving  Intelligence  Support  to  S0UTHCOM.  JfrHtiPUfltfi    In 
November  1983,  the  OACSI,  HQDA  informally  requested  that  INSCOM 
develop  an  interim  Army  intelligence  architecture  for  support  to  the 
echelons  above  division  (no  U.S.  corps  present)  in  the  U.S.  Southern 
Command  as  part  of  an  overall  DA  staff  effort  to  lmon 
capabilities  of  Army  element: , 
Using  the  previously  approved  echelon  above  corps  intelligence,  security, 
and  electronic  warfare  architecture  for  the  Americas  with  expanded 
IMINT  and  document  exploitation  capabilities  as  the  long  term  objective 
architecture  (peace  and  war),  an  interim  architecture  was  developed 
which  projected  the  reouirement  to  incrementally  increase  the  size  of 
the  470th  MI  Group  by^^military  manpower  spaces  excluding  Field 
Station  Panama  which  «5s  already  being  reviewed  separately 
The  proposal  recognised  that  the  field  station  would  provii 
\ 
^^     le  interim  architecture  also 
proposed -reorganizing  the  U70th  MI  Group  into  an  EAC  MI  brigade  using 
the  new  34J-series  TOE.  The  INSCOM  proposals  were  forwarded  to 
OACSI  during  December  1983. 
J&    Following  extensive  discussions  within  the  Army  Staff  and  between 
the  Army  Staff  and  HQ  INSCOM,  a  formal  organizational  and  operational 
concept  was  requested  by  ODCSOPS,  HQDA  in  March  1984.  This 
concept  was  developed  through  refinement  of  the  architecture  previously 
developed  and  submitted  to  OACSI  on  an  informal  basis.  The  refined 
concept  envisioned  an  increase  of ^M  manpower  spaces  for  the  470th  MI 
Group  vice  the  Aboriginally  estimated.  It  was  otherwise  consistent 
with  the  previoasplanning  and  with  long  term  achievement  of  the 
objective  architecture  for  the  region, 
to  HQDA  on  23  March  1984. 
The  0&0  concept  was  submitted 
(U)  During  the  period  March' through  May  1981,  INSCOM  also  provided 
input  to  an  intelligence  mid-range  plan  being  developed  by  OACSI, 
HQDA.  That  plan  was  subsequently  forwarded  to  S0UTHC0M  for  review 
and  was  being  considered  in  development  of  the  S0UTHC0M  theater 
intelligence  architecture  under  a  DIA  sponsored  program  as  FY  198H 
ended.
In  mid- summer  19. 
__  fof  the  additional 
Crou 
98J. 
Jp  spaces  identified  as  require^©: 
by  INSCOM  in  its  0*0  concept  would  be  provided  MM: 
►r  the  U70th  MI 
in  FY  1985 
^jg  In  mid-summer  19^8J  ^HQDA  advised  SOUTHCOM  that  approximately 
>upb 
and  J  Jin  FY  1986).  However,  as  FY  198U  ended,  no  program  and  budget 
guidance  had  been  issued  to  provide  those  spaces  to  INSCOM.  By 
separate  action,  INSCOM  incorporated  additional  requirements  into  the 
TAA-91  process  by  adding  a  pluswpmilitary  manpower  spaces  for  the 
U70th  MI  Group  for  the  FY  1987-9Tprogram  objective  memorandum 
build.8         ,   . 
The  INSCOM  Plan.  (0)  The  INSCOM  Plan  replaced  the  former  INSCOM 
Consolidated  Cryptologic  Program  Mid-Range  Plan  and  the  INSCOM 
Support  to  Military  Operations  Mid-Range  Plan.  The  first  version  of  the 
INSCOM  Plan  was  approved  and  published  in  September  1981.  The 
purpose  of  the  INSCOM  Plan  is  to  serve  as  the  primary  mid  and  long-  -— 
range  program  planning  document  for  INSCOM.  It  is  the  first  program 
plan  for  INSCOM  which  covers  the  entire  command  and  provides  a  > -^-  *^r 
measurable  link  plan  for  planning  and  programming.  The  INSCOM  Plan   if 
synthesizes  user  based  requirements  from  subordinate  units  and      '"' 
supported  commands,  concept  based  requirements,  and  guidance  and   ,  ;:i-^ 
objectives  from  higher  headquarters  into  a  coherent  plan  providing   * 
unified  direction  for  INSCOM.  It  links  INSCOM  planning  to  goals  and 
objectives  established  in  the  Army  Plan,  the  Army  Intelligence 
Management  plan,  and  the  National  Security  Agency  (NSA)  planning  ,"  -'  > 
system.  The  plan  provides  the  basis  for  the  INSCOM  submission  to  the 
Army  Program  Objective  Memorandum,  the  General  Defense  Intelligence   ' 
Program,  the  Foreign  Counterintelligence  Program,  and  the  Consolidated 
Cryptologic  Program. 9 
-#&? 
063
ni-v- 
:i-j.$c 
cjptfta 
EAC  IEW  Task  Analysis  Study.  (0)  The  study,  begun  in  May  1984  by  HQ 
INSCOM,  will  analyze  echelon  above  corps  (EAC)  intelligence  and 
electronic  warfare  (IEW)  support  requirements  and  capabilities  within  > 
the  context  of  a  projected  threat  and  will  be  a  follow-on  to  the  EAC 
Intelligence,  Security,  and  Electronic.  Warfare  Architecture  Study  which* 
was  conducted  by  IHSCOM  and  approved  in  May  1982  by  the  Chief  of 
Staff,  U.S.  Amy  for  planning  purposes.  The  study  will  address  those  : 
apecific^EAC  IEW  tasks  (situation  development,  target  development, 
OPSEC -support,  and  EW)  and  sub-tasks  (sensoring  the  battlefield, 
analysis,  counterintelligence,  etc.)  that  Bust  be  performed  to  satisfy  the 
theater  commander's  IEW  force  structure,  to  Include  the  EAC  MX 
brigade/group,  and  to  provide  continuous  and  timely  support  to  the  Army 
commands  within  the  theater.  Analysis  will  be  based  on  wartime 
European  and  Southwest  Asia  scenarios  and,  when  possible,  subjective 
extrapolations  of  the  results  of  this  analysis  will  be  made  for  the  other 
theaters.  The  overall  methodology  for  the  study  will  be  that  utilised  in 
-the  conduct  of  a  Mission  Area  Analysis  (MAA).  Study  results,  which  are 
primarily  intended  to  provide  the  analytical  data  necessary  to  support 
INSCOM' s  plans  and  programs,  will  also  provide  a  basic  reference       • 
document  for  the  next  IEW  MAA  study  by  the  D.S.Army  Intelligence 
Center  and  School,  tentatively  programmed  for  FY  1986. 11 
>  ■•■' it 
JftDfllfUL 
070
-^-k.  r- 
^ii-.'x^% 
ftiscBoaiblUX. 
b-**,".    -    • 
-:A,>" 
'.  •ISv-f*,.  jS  ' 
';vt,--.-»V: 
» 
WITHHELD
■-.  ••■  '.-  ;_.'■'  '   ,'.  ..  '.  * 
S7rth  11  Sctecteer.t.  Jgffa UJ^WilK  ILL)  The  iaegery 
ir.ier?re^E*-icr.  detashnent  with  the  ^TOih  JC  Srsup  provided  a  r.ctsr  cf 
isEgery  intelligence  exploitation  products.  The  Supplesentel 
Photographic  Interpretation  ?.epsr;.  (SSPZS)  was  procuced  three  te  four 
tises  weekly. 
             'T^^vwrtncr^uly   preparec-  and  releasee 
within  So  hours  of  engine  shutdown  ti»e.  Multimission  Usegery 
Photographic  Interpretation  Hepcrts  (KIPIR)  were  generated  in  response 
t:  an  initial  disccvery  of  a  target  or  installation.  These  repels  involve: 
ET 
073
-vvV  '*■*■  "■  **.'*•■'■ 
*sy& 
-  .^*v*v>  *-. 
?■*    in-depth  target  analysis  arid  description 
..■     ''J    »•  ;* 
^^__^^^b^^^^^^__-^_ib^__^_m_^^^^^^^     roouets  ranged  from 
**$&**■ :- *  resuests  for  Inforaation  ana  ■jfttgery"co'n'rTrm»tion  of  ^targets  to  in-depth 
studies  and  enslysis^^^^^^^ 
target  por^syfir^elHSSg^ronlHIhT  analysis  and  graphics  reproduction 
vcre  ether  products  generated  by  Detachment  Z,  470th  MI  Croup. 
j^MPlfiP^RIfKfSL)    During  TIT  19B4.  Detachsent  I  produced  135 
.SwPIS's  and  KIPIR'a,  and  responded  Xo  242  special  taskings*    The  photo 
letcre^ery  produced  15,*92  aerial  prints,  35os  prints,  slides,  end  view- 
graphs— tpproxioetely  75  percent  of -which  were  aerial  prints  requested 
b?  *JSS5UTHC0K.    Icagery  products  «ere  used  in  briefings  to  the  U.S. 
|?#?  vtebessador  to  El-  Salvador  and  by  CICSOOTHC0M  before  the  United  *"&■■-   "  '"** 
■££■'.   States 
.'.} 
h  ■■&;-■ 
./-.   .  ,•*;...• 
,: .  •-•V- ^Ji^f^-l  ffe^#^^:-fe''*^^5;''''*^? 
v\  .«i  '^J*#/;-*i-  .•         -       -■      ■-..''-••■at*..*         -    --•.-   -.  _ 
».;-»'-   ■:-•■-•■&"   ■     •    *>••-.-:»     '.  .^-¥:  -■  ■  ■  •   *  ■  V-**"'  ?t.>i'rsjv"-  'T^^^  *^^>*;^V.-.«''-i«-1 -•^-■•iN«s;%i-.      -  •  • 
r'U'V^       .  '  '•  •  -■-.>?•  -*   "  "    '  "  --•    '  '■■■••.'    ■'  . 
'•?-jirf.' 
?:■■.!■$::,* 
-r..i;' 
B-'l*  : 
07]
rfrv 
vW,'-> 
*,■ 
Sigh  Frequency  Direction-Finding  Seer  (HTDF^)  Sygtea^^TThe^  v';:-  -~ 
organisational  end  operational  (040)  concept  provided  for  one  KFD"-?. 
syster  in  eech  of  three  EAC  nilitery  intelligence  brigades/groups.  The 
KFS?-?.  was  to  replace  the  AK/TRD-23A  HFDF  systess  currently-  •■*,  r  .... 
authorize*  the  tactical  EAC  units  (HQQth  ASA  Cespany  and  166th  JC 
Co=par.y). 
*■«*. '.'"-' 
,  ic^o,  secure 
.^-/^•.  ■   xr  cc=unicetions  aanxs  between  the  signal  channel  collection  systezs- 
#;r  ...  rear  (SCCS-?.)  .£nd  the  net  control  station.  Esitter  location  infcrsation  • 
..,..'<i-'^"-    wou--  ^  usPfl  t0  detersine  target  location,  aid  target  identification,  and 
SssSv*ici-:- - -recover  net' structures  after  conounications  changes.  -.,-.  .„ ^V ..;', ,.  . 
*^V?*>'^!4tff*Kov?everf  at  the  close  of  TY  198^,  the  contractor  was  incurri; 
large  cost  overruns. 
07; 
o
High  Frcouency  Direction  Tinder  (KFZ>F)  Bental.  (D)  la  recognition  cf  e 
longstanding  need  to  upgrade  the  KTD?  capabilities  cf  the  166th  KI 
Cosp&ny  and  the  409th  ASA  Company,  the  ODCSOPS,  HQ'XKSCOM, 
initiated  an  effort  in  August  198U  to  lease  a  mobile,  state  of  the  art, 
HTDF  system  to  be  used  by  these  two  companies  until  the  fielding  of  the 
Bear  Echelon  Collection  Systea  (F£CS)  which  was  currentlv  scheduled 
for  F2f  1987. 
iV)    Under  the  concept  being  prcpcsed  ty  C2CS5PS  at  the  end  cf  FY 
1 9BU ,  a  90-day  test  would  be  conducted  to  determine  whether  or  not  to 
pursue  the  leasing  of  two  K?2>F  systess.  Although  funds  had  yet  to  be 
approved  and  many  bureaucratic  obstacles  remained,  the  continued 
absence  of  a  replacement  system  for  the  AN/TRO-23  being  used  by  the 
two  companies  dictated  that  the  initiative  be  pursued. £ 
(C)  Field  Station  Augsburg  used  the  information  ccr.tained  in    
Vfcr  real  time  management  in  which  the  information  was  accessitlc 
^^ar,y  time  desired  and  showed  the  current  status  cf  either  a  specific 
section  or  the  total  overview  of  the  field  station.  flBBwa;  also 
used  for  trend  sanagement  in  which  information  was  prWBlec  peily  in 
hard  copy  and  stored  in  the  date  base  fcr  use  in  trendanalysis  of 
the  field  station's  mission  and  resources.  Through  tf    I,  Field 
077
SEOtfET 
uirements  by 
Station  Augsburg  intended  to  reduce  mam 
eliminating 
requirements! 
provide  &  true  picture  of  the  station's  mission  accomplishment 
highlight  areas  of  both  positive  and  negative  interest  affecting  overall 
mission  capability.  Finally,  f    Las  to  provide  the  capability  for 
Icr.g-range  trend  analysis  of  tnl^^W  station's  mission  productivity  and 
personnel  availability. 1 
  
|In  December  1SB3,  2NSC0K  was  informally  notified  by  the 
'ACS!  £j?.S  representative  to  expect  ACSI  tasking  to  man  the  Army 
pcrticn  cf  the  OCMC.  In  anticipation  of  the  ACSI  tasking  to  man  the 
O-MC,  a  review  of  manpower  spaces  wes  undertaken  by  COCSOPS,  KQ 
IKSCOM.  It  was  determined  that  the  spaces  dedicated  to  the  TRADDC 
Tcmiir.ed  Arms  Testing  Activity  (TCATA)  Intelligence  Cell  at  Fort 
r.zzi.   Texas,  might  provide  mere  benefit  to  the  Army  tr<:.  IKSC3K  if 
they  were  applied  to  the  OCMC  requirement.  The  TCATA  cell  consisted 
-'"  •■■  JP'personnel. 
i.-.iwu::,  Taskedth^TcsOP^toreccpture  the  INSCOM  spaces  by 
abrogating  the  MC'J  which  provided  IXSCCK  spaces  to  TCATA. 
Subsequently,  ACSI  tasked  INSCOM  tc  can  the  Army  portion  of  the 
t.- 
Qib
Modernization  cf  Field  Station  Sines.  J*%       Wht   overdue  Teissier, 
equipaent  nodernizetion  progras  at  Fi«ld  Station  Sinop  went  intt  fiii: 
swing  in  FY  1961.  Through  concerted  efforts  by  ODCSLOC  andf 
ODCSSYS,  HC  IKSCOK;!         ^ud  the  contractor,  thef 
sd  in  January  196U  with  the  Htvy»< 
^   
In  August  -198U,  all  existing] 
^^"systeas  were  installed  in  new  racks,  rewired, 
VICEROY/DAYBREAK  upgrade  equipment  installation.
(C)  In  February  1981,  the  Conaiender,  U.S.  Forces  Korea  (USFK) 
concurred  in  plans  to  dsploy  the  EPDS  to  Korea.  In  Kerch  1981,  the 
TZKCA?  General  Officer  Working  Group  approved  deployment  of  the 
E?-S  systes  tc  Korea.  lr.  Septerter  1961,  Field  Station  Korea  formally 
stated  their  recuireoent  t*..r   two  additional  TUT's.  The  res,uirenent  for 
these  additional  TUT's  was  validated  by  the  TEKCA?  General  Officer 
Vcrking;  Group  which  oet  in  Noveaber  1981. 
.i_..-r.c.*  ...  *  -tre  sade  available  for  'teres,  when  plans  zaterialired 
tc  field  an  enhanced  TUT  to  V  and  XVIII  Airborne  Corps  to  support  the 
Z?2S   interface  with. the  Interia  Tactical  loagery  Exploitation  System 
"hey  we?e  ir.feraec  that  the  equipment  would  be 
nar.r.ec  by  ikscok.- 'Within  IKSCOK,  it  was  decided  that  the  501st 
wculd  provide  four  personnel  out  of  hide,  and  the  regaining  four 
pe.-scr.nel  would  be  provided  fror  other  IKSCOK  resources. 
S 
!?3£iO     Prctler  areas  regained  to  be  resolved.  -  These  included 
"ccmunicatiens,  education  of  the  J-2  staff  retarding  the  capabilities  cf 
:e  £?rs,   and  the  training  cf  the  operators.12 
OSD
Tactical  Intelligence  Product  tnhancersent 
~2rZ)   is  £  rrcject  designed  to 
serviee  effort  involving  the  Amy  V  ■  the  Keval 
Intelligence  Center,  and  the  U.S.  Air  Force  Electronic  Security 
Z-ZT^itrx. .      (IN'SCOM  was  supporting  the  prefect  because  if  the  proj-ect 
was  successful,  the  operational  systea  which  would  he  fielded  would,  cue 
tc  the  nature  of  the  senscrs/nethods  involved,  likely  be  en  echelcn  above 
corps  asset.)  TI?£  has  the "potential  to  provide  U.S.  forces  the  capability 
^         In  addition,  ?Z?Z   ray  serve 
nT  to  ozner  U.S.  collection  capatilities.i 
-*1   |>ur-r't  ?*?  19&^,  slippage  occurred  due  tc  problems 
encountered  by  the  contractor.  The  experiment's  new  date  vbs 
rescheduled  for  3d  Otr  FY  1&65.  As  e  result  cf  the  rescheduling  alcr.r 
wizh_une>:pected  changes  in  the  grc-p's^erscr.nel  situation,  the! 
which  was  scheduled  to  prcvide9HK>erscnnel  for  the  or 
-  71
El 
experiencing  probleas  in  planning  for  the  personnel  needed  in  the 
future.16 
3irectlcn-?ir.cir.c  Kcts.^jtf^fc  At  the  close  of  ?r  ic£t,  2KSC0M 
direction-finclng  (DD  net  configurations  were  as  follovs:
Disposition  ef  Aray  SIGINT  Positions  by  Type.  yf5^  ^The  following 
ttblc  shows  the  disposition  of  Amy  SIGINT  positions  by  type  «s  ef  the 
«nd  of  ?1*  19B*j18 
•-. ..Ifcble  13.  -  Disposition  of  Aroy  SIGINT  Positions  by  T 
s 
084
risrssiticn  of  the  Aray's  SIGIKT  Resources  bv  Sub-Sleser.t.    ___ 
foiioving  table  shows  the  disposition  of  the  Arsy's  SIGIKT  resources  fcy 
subele=ent  ss  of  the  end  of  FX  198U:19 
Tsble  *-.  -  Disposition  of  Arsy  SIGIKT  Besources  by  Sab-Eleaer.t 
T 
03  5
•v-f'-f 
.  '*.■■'>.*•:  -      .  * 
buss  ass  xbjtja^ 
MGE(S) 
^/ 
WITHHELD
t-"  -    .-<.- 
fiusufiaaiyLiii 
# 
«CE(«       M'  /<*> 
WITHHELD
Counterlntelllgenee/Operatlons  Security* 
COMSEC  Insecurities.  (U)  Under  the  COMSEC  Insecurity  Program,  the 
following  reports  of  COMSEC  insecurities  were  reported  by  command 
during  CY  1983?  .: 
Table  15.  -  COMSEC  Insecurities,  CY  1983 
Command  Number 
USACC 
DARCOM 
USAREUR 
FORSCOM 
HQDA 
INSCOM  . 
Joint 
USA  Eight 
NG6 
TRADOC 
WESTCOM 
Other 
TOTAL 
224 
129 
503 
CU)  COMSEC  insecurities  had  increased  dramatically  in  the  three  year 
period  from  January  1981  to  December  '4983.  In  1981,  a  total  of  319 
were  reported.  In  1983  this  figure  increased  by  58  percent  to  503.  Of 
that  503*  USAREUR  reported  208  of  these  or  41  percent.  For  the  period 
1  January  to  30  September  1984,  395  COMSEC  insecurities  were 
reported.  USAREUR  reported  187  of  these  which  accounted  for  47.3 
percent  of  the  total.  Should  this  number  remain  a  valid  projection. for 
the  remainder  of  the  calendar  year,  USAREUR  will  have  249  COMSEC 
insecurities  which  represented  41  additional  eases  or  a  19.7  percent 
increase  over  the  208  cases  reported  in  CY  1983.  All  in  all,  there  was 
continuous  repetition  of  the  same  common  deficiencies.  Most  noticeable 
in  the  more  recent  statistics  was  the  significantly  large  number  of 
"destruction  irregularities." 
(U)  One  type  of  occurrence  that  decreased  in  1984  was  the  number  of 
unsecured  vaults  and  safes.  As  a  result  of  a  number  of  specific 
occurrences  of  unsecured  vaults  and  safes  reported  in  1983,  INSCOM 
conducted  a  COMSEC  vault  Iodic  reliability  survey  of  selected  USAREUR 
locations.  The  survey,  conducted  in  November  and  December  1983, 
found  no  evidence  of  tampering  but  did  detect  a  high  rate  of 
maintenance  deficiencies  in  locks  installed  on  surveyed  vault  locks.
Electronic  Security  {ELSEC )  Collection  and  Analysis  Systems  (ECAS). 
(U)  In  1977,  the  requirement  emerged  for  a  dedicated  ELSEC  van, 
referred  to  as  an  ECAS.  The  ECAS  would  be  designed  to  primarily 
support  operational  ELSEC  in  the  development  of  techniques  and 
procedures  and  industrial  ELSEC  aspects  of  operations  security 
evaluations  (OSE).  However,  by  the  end  of  FT  198U,  the  DCSFM  (HQ 
INSCOM)  had  not  finalized  a  draft  letter  requirement  since  ECAS  was 
considered  a  low  priority  item. 3 
Development  of  the  Operation's  Security  Evaluation  (OSE).  (U)  AR  530- 
1,  Operations  Security  (OPSEC),  dated  1  May  1978,  specified  that  "within 
authorized  resources,  the  CG,  INSCOM  will  provide  OPSEC  support  at 
levels  above  corps  to  include  performing  specialized,  Integrated, 
multidiscipline  threat,  and  vulnerability  analysis."  One  of  the  OPSEC 
support  services  authorized  by  AR  530-1  was  the  later  defunct  sensitive 
activity  vulnerability  estimate  (SAVE),  which  was  defined  as  "an  all- 
source  estimate  of  the  vulnerabilities  to  hostile  intelligence  targeting  in 
all  Its  forms,"  i.e.,  HUMINT,  SIGINT,  and  PHOTINT.  Another  OPSEC 
102
pPTOL 
support  service  authorized  by  AR  530-1  was  the  Security  Vulnerability 
Analysis  (SVA),  also  defunct,  which  was  defined  as  "an  OPSEC  support 
service  of  a  lesser  scope  and  was  performed  on  a  less  technical  level 
than  a  SAVE." 
(U)  The  OSE,  not  mentioned  in  Aft  530-1,  was  devised  by  INSCOM  to 
better  assist  the  CG,  INSCOM  in  fulfilling  OPSEC  support 
responsibilities  by  consolidating  the  techniques  of  the  SAVE  and  the  SVA 
into  a  single  service,  the  OSE.  The  first  OSE  was  completed  in  August 
1976.  The  changeover  from  the  SAVE  and  SVA  to  the  OSE  was  not  clear- 
cut.  The  first  SAVE  was  completed  in  September  1976  and  the  last  in 
June  1979.  The  first  SVA  was  completed  in  July  1974  and  the  last  in 
August  1981. 
(U)*  It  became  apparent  by  1980  at  ADCSOPS-OPSEC,  HQ  INSCOM,  that 
it  was  necessary  to  devise  a  more  systematized  method  of  programming 
OPSEC  support  services,  including  OSE* a,  than  heretofore  used.  The 
OPSEC  support  programming  letter  was  devised  to  meet  this  need.  The 
first  two  of  these  letters,  Issued  in  March  1981  and  January  1982, 
offered  support  in  the  form  of  the  OSE,  Technical  Services 
Countermeasures  (TSCM)  services,  and  the  services  included  in  the 
Automated  Data  Processing  System  Security  Enhancement  Program.  In 
each  of  the  two  letters,  guidance  for  requesting  the  above  three  types  of 
services  was  consolidated.  Use  of  a  single  letter  as  guidance  in 
programming  the  three  separate  types  was  discontinued  in  1983  because 
this  consolidation  generated  difficulties  in  administrative  routing  and 
necessitated  interbranch  coordination  which  was  often  tedious.  For  FY 
1984  programming,  a  separate  letter  was  issued  in  March  1983  for  OSE's 
only.  Consequently,  a  simplication  of  OPSEC  support  administration  was 
thereby  achieved,  along  with  tighter  compartmentation. 
(U)  As  early  as  1982,  it  became  apparent  that  INSCOM' s  performance,  of 
the  rather  large  number  of  OSE's  requested  caused  heavy  drain  on 
personnel  assets.  In  April  1983*  0AC5I  directed  a  letter  to  INSCOM 
suggesting  that  dwindling  personnel  assets  dictated  a  less  solieitious 
approach  to  would-be  requesters  in  the  annual  OSE  programming  letters 
to  discourage  unjustified  requests.  To  some  extent,  ADCSOPS-OPSEC's 
FY  1984  OSE  programming  letter,  dated  7  March  1983*  anticipated 
advice  in  the  OACSI  letter,  which  was  issued  in  April  1983,  by  urging 
requesters  that  in  case  of  any  uncertainty  on  their  part  as  to  whether  an 
OSE  was  actually  needed  they  should  obtain  advice  on  that  point  from 
the  local  INSCOM  unit.  Further,  as  suggested  in  the  programming  letter, 
the  would-be  OSE  requester  might  be  advised  by  the  INSCOM  unit  that 
»   an  OPSEC  service  of  a  lesser  scope  than  an  OSE  would  fulfill  their 
!   OPSEC  support  needs.  However,  indications  persist  that  unit/facility 
security  managers/OPSEC  officers  are  inclind  to  request  OSE's 
without  having  taken  all  inner-unit  measures  possible  on  their  own  to 
eliminate  their  OPSEC  deficiencies. 
^&1    A  report,  forwarded  to  ACSI  in  January  1984,  revealed  that  from  a 
review  of  150  OSE  reports  selected  from  the  previous  five  years  a 
Cjj^M. 
103
cppufRT 
number  of  vulnerabilities/shortcomings  were  frequently 
These  included  the  f< 
etltlous. 
(U)  The  902d  MI  Group  developed  an  OPSEC  support  service  termed 
Project  Security  Analysis  (PSA)  which  is  an  evaluation  technique 
designed  to  provide  units  with  a  reasonably  accurate  picture  of  the 
effectiveness  of  the  element's  OPSEC  program.  In  effect,  the  PSA  is  an 
abbreviated  OSE  focusing  upon  patently  sensitive  portions  of  a  unit's 
operations.  Zt  was  anticipated  that  in  CONUS,  the  PSA  will,  to  a 
considerable  extent,  supplant  the  OSE  in  the  interests  of  cost- 
effectiveness.  * 
Sensitive  Compartment  Information  (SCI)  Communications  Support.  (U) 
Problems  were  being  experienced  by  echelon  above  corps  (EAC)  units  in 
having  mobile  SCI  communications  support  provided  by  their  assigned 
U.S. Army  Special  Security  Group  (USASSG)  special  security  officers  (SSO) 
when  these  headquarters  deployed  to  the  field  for  contingency 
operations.  The  problem  was  first  expressed  by  Third  U.S.  Army  in 
December  1983  and  was  in  the  process  of  being  examined  by  ACSI  and 
DCSOPS,  DA  when  the  same  issue  was  raised  by  the  Combined  Field 
Army  (CFA),  Korea. 
X£7  A  6  January  1984  message  from  CFA  Korea  reported  that  one  of  the 
/major  problems  experienced  during  a  December  1983  deployment  to  the 
field  was 
___^^__  rrom  bc  Church,  J-2  U.S.  Forces 
(ores,  dated  30  December  1983,  further  described  this  proposal  and 
provided  the  required  concept  of  operations  according  to  AR  380-35* 
Action  on  that  letter  was  in  turn  passed  to  OACSI. 
(U)  SSG  and  OACSI  agreed  that  the  policy  was  adequate.  ZNSCOM 
provides  SSO  support  to  EAC  organizations  while  USACC  provides 
communications  equipment  and  personnel  under  the  OPCON  of  the 
USASSG.  Transfer  of  the  SSO  to  the  EAC  organizations  concerned 
(Combined  Field  Army,  Korea 'ind  Third  U.S.  Army)  would  not  solve  the 
problem  of  having  mobile  SCI  communications  provided  at  deployed 
locations.  USACC  must  acknowledge  this  requirement  and  provide  the 
necessary  fixes  in  both  the  short  term  as  well  as  the  long  term. 
,(8) 
JJST   OACSI  communicated  this  in  a  February  1984  letter  to  BC  Church, 
J2  U.S.  Forces  Korea.  The  letter  also  advised  that  MC  Odom,  ACSI,  had 
convened  a  working  group  to  address  a  short  range  solution  Co  the 
communications  problem  in  Korea.  In  the  meantime,  BG  Church 
QawttBmT 
104
informed  ACSI  that  he  too  had  initiated  ■  group  for  a  similar  purpose. 
At  the  close  of  FT  1984,  no  final  report  had  been  Issued  by  either 
working  group. 5 
Mobile  TEMPEST  Test  System  (MTTS).  (D)  In  1979,  HQ  INSCOM  requested 
research,  development,  and  acquisition  (RDA)  support  from  the  U.S.Army 
Signals  Warfare  Laboratory  (SWL)  to  upgrade  nine  FETTS-160  Field 
TEMPEST  Test  Systems  and  to  fabricate  a  tenth  system  for  deployment 
to  the  field.  The  Initial  emphasis  was  placed  on  improvement  of  testing 
capabilities,  effecting  weight  reduction,  and  improving  efficiency  of 
operations.  As  a  follow  up  to  the  existing  RDA  program,  HQ  INSCOM 
submitted  a  request  to  SWL  on  5  January  1981  to  replace  the  vehicular 
systems.  This  requirement  was  based  on  the  fact  that  the  FETTS-160 
vehicles  were  suffering  numerous  failures  due  to  operating  above  the 
recommended  maximum  gross  weight. .  . 
(0)  Curing  FT  1984,  six  modified  automatic  TEMPEST  test  receivers 
were  received  by  the  U.S.  Army  Electronics  Research  and  Development 
Cooaand  and  were  being  checked  out  by  the  TEMPEST  Laboratory.  In 
September  1984,  a  contract  was  let  to  Chonimetrics,  Inc.  for  logisitics, 
software,  training  and  technical  manuals,  and  installation  of  the 
equipment  in  the  MTTS.6 
[NSCOM  monitors  the  progress  of  emerging  COMSEC  systems  to  ensure 
that  the  Army*  a  COMSEC  policies  are  being  met  and  to  be  prepared  te 
»  provide  SIGSEC  support  to  users  of  this  equipment  upon  fielding.  During 
?  FT  1984,  HQ  INSCOM  participated  in  numerous  technical  working  &.*r>ups 
to  monitor  the  new  COMSEC  systems. 
(0)  In  an  attempt  to  bring  cohesiveness  and  direction  to  the  Army*s 
COMSEC  activities,  HQDA  directed  in  June  1983  that  TRADOC  and 
AMC  designate  COMSEC  focal  points  within  their  commands.  AMC 
designated  the  COMSEC  Division  of  the  Communications-Electronics 
PM 
105
UNCLASSIFIED 
Command  as  the  focal  point  -for  COMSEC  material  development  actions. 
TRADOC  designated  the  Signal  Center  as  their  focal  point  for  COMSEC 
doctrine  and  combat  development  actions  as  they  relate  to 
eryptoequipment.  INSCOM  continued  to  be  responsible  for  providing 
technical  assistance  in  the  application  of  and  adherence  to  Army 
COMSEC  policies. 
(0)  Representatives  from  HQ  TRADOC,  the  Signal  Center,  HQ  ZNSCOM, 
HQ  AMC,  and  CECOM  began  a  series  of  meetings,  the  first  of  which  was 
held  in  June  1984,  to  foster  better  working  relationships.  The  goal  is  to 
discuss  Army  COMSEC  combat  development,  material  development,  and 
policy  actions  to  bring  about  a  unified,  coordinated  approach  to 
identifying  and  solving  Army  COMSEC  problems* 
(0)"  The  meetings  held  in  June  and  September  1984  were  useful,  not 
because  of  the  actions  or  paperwork  which  resulted,  but  because  of  the 
spirit  of  cooperation  which  resulted  and  spirit  of  striving  to  achieve  what 
is  best  for  the  Army  as  a  whole.  For  some  years,  COMSEC  personnel 
within  TRADOC,  AMC,  and  INSCOM  have  sensed  that  the  Army  had  a 
fragmented  COMSEC  structure  which  resulted  in  everyone  pursuing 
COMSEC  for  their  own  command  objectives.  The  situation  had 
deteriorated  to  the  point  where  independent  action  was  the  rule  and 
coordination  was  the  exception. 8 
Personnel  Security  Investigations  (PSI)  Support.  (0)  On  1  October  1972, 
the  Defense  Investigative  Service  (DIS)  assumed  PSI  Investigative 
responsibilities  for  the  50  states,  the  District  of  Columbia,  and  Puerto 
Rico.  In  those  areas  outside  their  investigative  responsibility,  DIS 
requests  the  Military  Departments,  Department  of  State,  and  the 
Federal  Bureau  of  Investigative  (Canada)  to  complete  PSI  investigative 
requirements.  INSCOM  has  PSI  investigative  responsibility  to  conduct 
PSI  cases  pertaining  to  U.S.  Army  personnel  who  are  assigned  or  were 
assigned  in  outside  the  continental  U.S.  (OCONUS)  areas  where  INSCOM 
units  are  located.  INSCOM  units  that  receive  direct  PSI  requests  from 
DIS,  and  in- turn  return  the  completed  PSI  results  direct  back  to  DIS,  are 
as  follows: 
1.  Headquarters,  66th  MI  Group,  Munich,  Germany 
*2.  584th  MI  Detachment,  66th  MI  Group,  Vicenza,  Italy 
3*  766th  KZ  Detachment,  66th  MI  Group,  Berlin,  Germany 
4.  Headquarters,  470th  MI  Group,  Fort  Clayton,  Panama 
5.  Headquarters,  500th  MI  Group,  Camp  Zama,  Japan 
6.  Okinawa  Field  Office,  500th  KL   Group,  Okinawa,' Japan 
*7.  209th  MI  Company,  524th  MI  Battalion,  501st  MI  Group,  Seoul, 
»  South  Korea 
The  only  other  U.S.  Army  element  that  receives  PSI  requests  direst  from 
DIS  is  Headquarters,  650th  MI  Group,  Supreme  Headquarters  Allied 
Powers  Europe  (SHAPE),  Belgium. 
(U)  PSI's  are  investigations  required  for  the  purpose  of  making  a 
determination  as  to  the  eligibility  for  access  to  classified  information, 
UNCLASSIFIED  *0K
UNCLASSIFIED 
retention  in  sensitive  duties,  or  other  designated  duties  requiring  such 
investigation.  FSI's,  which  include  Investigations  of  subversive 
affiliations,  suitability,  and  hostage  situations,  are  conducted  for  the 
purpose  of  making  personnel  security  determinations.  They  also  include 
investigations  of  allegations  which  arise  subsequent  to  adjudicative 
actions  and  require  resolution  to  determine  an  individual's  current 
eligibility  for  access  to  classified  Information,  assignment,  or  retention 
in  a  sensitive  position.  By  their  very  nature,  these  investigations  delve 
deeply  into  the  person.il  life  of  the  subject  of  a  PSI  and  they  must  be 
conducted  in  a  most  discreet  and  highly  professional  manner  so  as  to 
avoid  unnecessary  damage  to  the  subject's  reputation  or  embarrassment 
to  the  Department  of  Defense  (DOD)  and  its  agencies. 
(D)  A  PSI  is  dependent  on  the  type  of  investigation  required  for  a  given 
level  of  clearance  or  access.  For  a  SECRET  security  clearance  a 
National  Agency  Check  (NAC)j  for  a  TOP  SECRET  security  clearance  a 
Background  Investigation  (BI),  or  Interview-Oriented  BI  (IBI);  and  for 
special  access  a  Special  BI  (SBI).  Each  type  investigation  has  required 
investigative  requirements,  called  leads,  thst  must  be  sstlsfied  so  the 
ease  of  s  subject  can  be  adjudicated.  The  Central  Clearance  Facility 
(CCF),  U.S.  Army  Military  Personnel  Center  (MILPERCEN),  DA,  Fort 
George  G.  Meade,  Maryland,  has  centralised  adjudicative  authority  for 
U.S.  Army  personnel. 
(U)  Upon  receipt  of  a  DIS  PSI  ease,  an  TJISCOM  unit  scopes  out  leads 
that  DIS  has  indicated  are  in  that  unit's  area  of  responsibility.  For 
instance  a  case  may  be  on  a  subject  who  was  assigned  to  Heidelberg, 
Germany,,  for  one  year  and  then  transferred  to  Mannheim,  Germany, 
where  he/she  may  be  presently  assigned  or  has  since  been  reassigned 
outside  of  the  unit's  area  of  responsibility.  Therefore,  leads  would  be 
scoped  to  the  INSCOM  subordinate  office  having  PSI  responsibility  for 
the  Heidelberg  area  and  to  the  office  having  PSI  responsibility  for.  the 
Mannhein  area.'  The  leads  would  cover  only  the  period  the  subject  vies  in 
the  respective  area.  -All  INSCOM  units  scope  out  leads  to  subordinate 
field/reaident  offices,  except  for  the  766th  MI  Detschment  and  Okinawa 
Field  Office,  which  nave  no  subordinate  units.  Headquarters,  66th  MI 
Group  and  the  209th  MI  Company  also  scopes  out  leads  to  tactical  MI 
units. 
(U)  The  problem  within  the  66th  MI  Group  of  a  large  backlog  of  PSI 
cases,  appears  to  have  developed  after  1972  when  DIS  took  over  the  PSI 
mission  in  CONUS  and  1982  when  HQ  INSCOM  became  aware  of  the 
problem.  Prior  to  October  1$72,  the  U.S.  Army  Intelligence  Command 
i   (USAINTC)  had  conducted  the  PSI  mission  for  the  U.S.  Army.  With  DIS 
I   taking  that  mission,  personnel  resources  from  USAINTC  were  transferred 
to  DIS  with  the  goal  being  to  completely  civillanize  DIS.  Between 
October  1972  and  July  1974,  USAINTC  focused  on  non-PSI  missions. 
However,  in  July,  USINTC  was  downgraded  to  a  field  operating  agency 
under  OACSI.  The  new  organization  was  known  as  the  U.S.  Army 
Intelligence  Agency.  In  turn,  the  U.S.  Army  Intelligence  Agency's 
mission  and  resources  were  absorbed  into  the  newly  established  U.S. 
UNCLASSiHED  J"
UNCLASSIFIED 
Amy  Intelligence  and  Security  Command  In  January  1977.  Throughout 
this  period,  the  OCONUS  PSI  mission  was  neglected  in  turn  by  USAINTC 
OSAINTA,  and  INSCOM.  With  the  creation  of  the  Central  Clearance    ' 
Facility  in  1977*  ODCSI,  USAREOR  no  longer  had  the  authority  to 
adjudicate  security  clearances  for  personnel  assigned  to  USAREUR.  The 
sum  total  was  that  there  was  no  monitoring  of  the  66th  MI  Group's  PSI 
mission  by  a  higher  headquarters,  and  the  group* a  priority  for  the  PSI 
mission  fell. 
(U)  On  3  February  1982,  INSCOM  received  its  first  indication  that  there 
might  be  a  problem  with  overdue  SIS  PSI  eases  in  units,  when  the 
Director,  DIS  notified  the  CDR,  INSCOM  that  DIS  was  initiating  a 
concerted  effort  to  reduce  their  PSI  cases  charged  to  overseas  units  that 
were  in  the  one  year  or  older  (0Y0)  status  and  requesting  INSCOM' s 
aupport  in  the  effort.  An  analysis  of  INSCOM  units  disclosed  that  the 
66th  MI  Croup  was.  the  only  unit  that  had  a  large  number  of  overdue  PSI 
eases  in  .the  0Y0  status  and  that  it  was  the  only  one  that  had  a  problem 
with  a  large  number  of  overdue  DIS  PSI  eases. 
(0)  Over  the  next  two  years,  a  aeries  of  correspondence,  meetings, 
briefings,  and  liaison  visits  took  place  between  DIS  and  INSCOM  in  order 
to  determine  the  exact  status  of  the  backlog  and  to  take  steps  to 
improve  process.  Some  of  the  problems  were  simple  tracing  errors,  for 
example,  a  number  of  the  very  old  eases  had  not  even  been  received 
from  DIS  and,  therefore,  a  lack  of  knowledge  of  these  eases  existed.  OT 
the  251  0Y0  eases  charged  to  the  66th  MI  Croup,  1«  were  in  fact 
pending  completion;  however,  113  bad  been  elosed  and  sent  to  DIS  and  27 
had  not- been  received.  Despite  improved  communications  and  an 
concerted  effort  by  the  66th  MI  Croup  to  reduce  the  010  cases,  no  real 
improvement  occurred. 
(0)  This  led  to  the  visit  of  the  Deputy  Director  (industrial  Operations), 
DIS  to  visit  Headquarters,  66th  MI  Croup  in  January  1983.  Again,  :; 
increased  communications  resulted.  Also  in  January  1983,  DIS  notified 
.  INSCOM  that  the  Deputy  Under  Secretary  of  Defense  (Policy)  had 
directed  that  Periodic  Reinvestigations,  formerly  Bring-up 
Investigations,  be  reins tituted  on  1  April  1983.  Headquarters,  INSCOM  ' 
immediately  requested  impact  statements  from  INSCOM  units  as  an 
increase  in  PSI  cases  would  result.  The  66th  MI  Croup,  which  was  of 
principal  concern,  indicated  a  25  percent  increase  in  their  PSI  workload. 
This  was  only  the  beginning  of  an  increased  workload.  In  late  1983,  the 
local  command  security  programs  such  as  checks  on  local- nationals  hired 
to  gdard  M-1  tank  motor  pools  and  Increased  emphasis  on  Operations 
»   Security  Evaluations  (OSE)  for  the  Pershing  II  missile  deployment  were 
I   examples  of  increased  workloads. 
* 
(U)  DIS  requested  support  for  a  new  program  called  wCateh*Em  in 
CONUS."  This  program  is  designed  to  interview  the  subject  of  an  IBI, 
who  is  on  orders  for  overseas,  prior  to  the  subject* s  departure.  This 
required  coordination  between  DIS  offices  that  conduct  PSI'e  and  the 
UNCLASSIFIED  -   ifl<?
UNCLASSIFIED 
individual's  losing  unit.  -If  the  losing  unit  doesn't  notify  the  MS  office  of 
the  individual  being  on  orders  for  an  overseas  assignment,  then  the 
program  would  not  be  effective.  This  program  was  seen  as  an  aid  in 
reducing  leads  normally  going  to  the  66th  MI  Group  to  conduct  the 
interview  portion  of  the  IBI  on  personnel  newly  arrived  in  Europe. 
However,  as  of  September  1984,  this  program  was  still  not  fully 
operational  and  no  benefits  in  the  reduction  of  cases  in  the  66th  MI 
Group  had  been  Identified. 
(0)  Although  by  the  end  of  FY  1984  the  problem  of  PSI  backlog  at  the 
66th  MI  Group  was  still  very  real,  two  important  factors  had  been 
addressed.  First,  HQ  INSCOM  had  become  an  active  player  in  the 
monitoring  of  the  66th  MI  Group's  £SI  mission.  Secondly,  HQ  INSCOM 
had  become  fully  informed  as  to  how  the  DIS  was  organized  and 
operated.  At  the  66th  MI  Group,  there  was  an  ongoing  effort  to  reverse 
the  priority  of  the  PSI  and  to  address  the  problem  of  lack  of  people 
needed  to  monitor  PSI  cases.  On  24  May  1984,  the  DCSI,  USAREUR  sent 
"  a  message  to  the  ACSI,  DA  proposing  the  civilianiration  of  the  66th  MI 
Group's  PSI  mission  in  OSAREUR  as  a  solution  to  reducing  the  PSI 
backlog.  At  the  close  of  FY  1984,  OACSI  was  still  working  on  the 
proposal. 
(D)  Unfortunately,  the  requirement  for  resources  in  Central  America 
prevented  INSCOM  from  providing  a  quick  fix  to  the  PSI  problem  by 
sending  TDT  personnel  to  the  66th  MI  Group  to  reduce  the  backlog.  OSD 
had  also  made  it  clear  that  the  military  services  had  accepted  the 
mission  to  conduct  PSI's  overseas  and  that  the  services  were 
substantially  responsible  for  the  increase  to  the  caseload  overseas  and 
must  utilize  internal  personnel  resources  to  resolve  any  problem.  OSD 
would  not  entertain  DIS,  which  was  also  suffering  from  reduced 
resources,  from  picking  up  any  overseas  missions. 9  - 
Operations  
Security  
Support  
to  the  
Kwajalein  
Missile  
Range  
(KMR).  
(0) 
In  March  1984,  COL  Bowe,  Commander,  Field  Station  Kunia,  met  with 
COL  Kirk,  Chief  of  Staff,  INSCOM,  and  expressed  his  desire  to  close  the 
INSCOM  Theater  Intelligence  Center-Pacific  (ITIC-PAC)  operations 
security  support  resident  office  (RO)  on  KMR.  COL  Bowe's  rationale- for 
terminating  full-time  on-island  support  was  that  unlike  other  RO's  within 
INSCOM,  the  RO  at  KMR  was  essentially  isolated  from  the  rest  of 
INSCOM  on  a  day-to-day  basis,  due  to  the  2,000  mile  distance  separating 
KMR  located  on  Kwajalein  atoll  in  the  Marshall  Islands  from  ITIC-PAC 
on  Hawaii,  and  that  the  KMR  community  would  be  best  served  if  the 
OPSEC  support  officer  were  an  internal  Ballistic  Missile  Defense 
»   Systems  Command  (BMDSCOM)  asset  since  BMDSCOM  controlled  KMR. 
!   ITIC-PAC  would  continue  to  provide  support  to  the  range  on  a  frequent 
TDY  basis  for  scheduled  technical  and  OPSEC  services. 
(U)  A  message  was  sent  to  Commander  BMDSCOM  in  Hunts villa, 
Alabama,  by  COL  Kirk  in  April  1984  stating  INSCOM  intention  ^to  close 
the  OPSEC  support  office  on  KMR  unless  full  justification  for  full-time 
support  was  provided  by  BMDSCOM.  BMDSCOM  provided  justification, 
UNCLASSIFIED  {   1Di>
UNCLASSIFIED 
and  further  stated  that,  due  to  the  sensitivity  of  the  OPSEC  support 
officer  position  and  the  requirement, to  regularly  interface  with  senior 
military  and  DOD  personnel,  it  was  essential  that  the  position  be  filled 
by  an  experienced  counterintelligence  officer.  This  concern  was 
expressed  because  the  ITIC-PAC  OPSEC  support  officer  position; 
although  authorised  at  the  grade  of  0-3  was  to  receive  personnel  fill  at 
the  0-1.  The  first  incumbent  to  the  position  which  was  created  in  June 
1981  as  a  result  of  an  memorandum  of  agreement  between  ITIC-PAC  and 
XMR,  was  a  first  lieutenant  who  had  ten  years  of  military  experience 
due  to  prior  unlisted  service.  He  was  scheduled  for  reassignment  in  July 
198*1. 
•  (U)  LTC  Thompson,  Acting  ADCS0PS-0PSEC,  ODCS0PS,  RQ  INSCOM, 
visited  KMR  in  June  1984  to  develop  a  proposal  mutually  acceptable  to 
the  commanders  of  BMDSCOM,  XMR,  ITIC-PAC,  and  Field  Station  Xunia 
regarding  how  OPSEC  support  to  XMR  would  be  provided.  Bis  proposal 
was  that  ITIC-PAC  provide  on-island  support  for  two  years,  during  which 
time  BMDSCOM  would  amend  its  authorisation  documents  to  reflect  a 
requirement  for  a  full-time  OPSEC  support  officer,  and  requisition 
personnel  fill  for  the  position.  The  position  would  be  converted  from  the 
grade  of  0-3  to  971  warrant  officer  in  order  to  Insure  fill  by  an 
•xperienced  CI  agent.  Beginning  July  1986,  BMDSCOM  would  assume 
the  mission  of  full-time,  on-island  OPSEC  support  to  KMR.  ITIC-PAC 
would  continue  to  provide  OPSEC  advice  and  assistance  and  conduct 
regulatory  Inspections  on  a  TDT  basis.  This  proposal  was  outlined  to 
Commander,  BMDSCOM  in  an  August  1984  message  signed  by  the 
Commander,  INSCOM. 
(0)  In  the  meantime,  coordination  between  the  BQ  INSCOM  staff  and 
ITIC-PAC  provided  the  following  resolution  to  the  manning  problem:  the 
authorized  grade  for  the  OPSEC  support  officer  position  would  be 
converted  from  03  to  E8,  since  ITIC-PAC  was  prepared  to  send  MSG 
Hammonds,  an  experienced  special  agent,  to  XMR  in  October  1984.  A 
compelling  need  statement  would  then  be  submitted  through  BQ  INSCOM 
to  MILPERCEN  to  transfer  MSG  Hammonds  from  ITIC-PAC  to  KMR  in 
January  1985. 
IV)    By  the  close  of  FT  1984,  the  Commander,  BMDSCOM  had  not 
responded  to  Commander,  INSCOM' s  proposal  provided  in  the  August 
1984  message,  nor  has  he  expressed  concern  over  INSCOM' s  providing 
TDY  personnel  during  August  and  September.10 
*  s 
INSCOM  Port  Security  Mission.  (0)  AR  380-89,  Port  Security,  assigns 
»   INSCOM  primary  Army  responsibility  to  meet  the  needs  of  the  DOD  Port 
!   Security  Program,  which  is  executed  by  the  Navy.  The  INSCOM  OPLAN 
1-84  defined  INSCOM' s  mobilization/wartime  port  security  role,  but 
conflicted  with  AR  380-89  regarding  reporting  channels  and  degree  of 
INSCOM  security  support  provided.  The  problem  of  developing  a  port 
security  mission  statement  for  the  INSCOM  mobilization  plan  was 
complicated  by  the  numerous  DOD,  federal,  local  government,  "and 
industrial  agencies  involved  with  port  security  and  the  lack  of  Army 
UNCLASSIFIED  ,    Ji0
wemi 
guidance  regarding  Amy  command  responsibilities  to  support  the 
security  of  ports. 
(U)  There  were  several  conflicting  areas  regarding  ZNSCOM  port 
security  mission  requirements  as  stated  in  Aft  380-89*  Port  Security,  and 
ZNSCOM  OPLAN  1-8U.  First  the  OPLAN  stated  that  HQ  INSCOM  would, 
upon  direction  by  OACSX,  coordinate  INSCOM  support  to  the  DOD  Port 
Security  Program.  AR  380-89  assigned  INSCOM  "primary  Army 
responsibility  to  meet  the  needs  of  the  DOD  Port  Security  Program"  and 
directed  that  INSCOM  communicate  directly  with  the  Navy  to  provide 
multidisciplined  security  support  to  ports  and  coordinate  with  Army 
Installations  and  units  to  support  Naval  Port  Security  Vulnerability 
Assessment  Program  (PSVAP)  surveys.  The  determination  of  which 
Army  installations  or  units  are  within  a  given  radius  of  a  Naval 
operation,  particularly  with  regard  to  Army  National  Guard  and  Reserve 
units,  is  properly  left  to  and  normally  performed  by  OACSI,  SA  as 
INSCOM  does  not  maintain  the  data  base  for  such  information.  AR  380- 
89  also  states  that  INSCOM  is  "responsible"  for  sensitive  Army 
installations.  This  is  incorrect.  INSCOM  only  provides  security  support 
to  these  installations  upon  validated  request. 
(U)  Secondly,  OPLAN  1-84  stated  that  INSCOM  will  provide  CI/SIGSEC 
support  only  to  MTMC  ports  designated  for  Army  unit  deployment.  AR 
380-89  stated  that  INSCOM  will  provide  multidisciplined  security  support 
to  any  CONUS  port  upon  Navy  request.  A  distinction  should  be  made 
between  peace  and  war  time  requirements  or  the  two  brought  in  line 
with  each  other.  INSCOM  has  a  long-standing  shortfall  in  resources  and 
capability  to  meet  unrealistic  security  support  mission  requirements  in 
mobilization  and  war. 
Thirdly,  the  OPLANstatedthat  deploying  units  will 
In  war,  providing 
P 
security  mission  is  the  conduct  oi  counterintelligence  and 
counterespionage  investigations  and  operations.  AR  380-69  states  that 
commanders  of  Army  commands  will  coordinate  with  local  INSCOM 
representatives  to  obtain  threat  data.  A  distinction  between  peace  and 
war  should  be  made. 
(U)  Finally,  OPLAN  1-84  addressed  the  exchange  of  intelligence 
between  military  and  civilian  agencies.  This  is  critical  to  providing 
effective  wartime  security  support  to  port  areas.  Although  the  need  is 
recognized,  there  is  widespread  ignorance  among  military,  government 
and  civilian  agencies  regarding  procedures  for  such  exchange.  The 
OPLAN  provides  inadequate  information  in  this  regard',  and  AR  380-89 
provides  none.^1 
100 
jprifii. 
111