Venezuelan Communists 
and their leftist 
allies, who 
suceecded 
in wresting «control 
of the lower house of Congress 
from government parties, continue 
a variety of oppusition artivi- 
ties, 
including some small-scale guerriila operations 
The 
: 
governwent, 
alert 
te these operations, 
has formed 
a joint volice 
and armed forces headquarters and has succeeded 
tu lntating sone 
guerrilla training camps, 
The Venezuelan Army does nof have 
proof that Cuba is involved 
in these artivities, 
though convinced 
that extremists are receiving support from Castro, 
If the leftisie 
in Congress can hold their supporters together, which 
is un ertain, 
they may be able to prevent ena‘tion 
of President Betan: ourt'’s 
social 
and economic reform program and thus eventuaity threaten 
his tenure of office. 
Government control 
is precarious 
in Bolivia and E. wador 
but no imminent antigovernment action 
is expe: ted. 
Anti-Duvalier activity is apparently 
!:n- reasing 
in [lait 
and among Haitian exiles. 
Some of the latter are reportedly 
) 
receiving aid from Dominican groups, others from Castro, 
Bevause of alleged Dominican support 
for anti-Duvalier avtivi- 
ties, Haitian-Dominican relations have be.ome strained, 
Despiet rumors of underground activity, 
there 
is no indication 
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of any organized opposition within Haiti, 
’ 
There appears to be no immediate threat 
to the Dominican 
Republic's Council of State, although opposition elements 
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continue their agitation, 
President Bonnelly 
is seriously 
concerned over the activities 
of Castre’s paid vuderground 
agents as well as the lack of training of 
his owr police 
force. 
The 14 June Party continues bitter anti-f'S and anti- 
Council propaganda and may be receiving Cuban aid, 
The 
leftist Dominican vaperer Movement 
(MPD | is also increasing its 
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activities, 
Throughout Latin America, 
10:a! fowmunist parties are alert 
to any development which can be exploited, 
Cuban and Blor 
Communists 
-- individuals and groups 
-- travel 
through the area 
lending prestige to local Communists. 
encouraging «loser 
political, cultural and economic ties, and probably en- ouraging, 
and even directing, subversive activities, 
LYNDON 2AINES JOHNSON LIBRAR 
21 Mar 62 
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
WASHINGTON 25, D.C. 
" OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR 
APR 29 1852 
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESLDENT. 
“4 
The attached memorendum contains 2 brief roundup on 
the disturved situation in Letin 
nericas 
- 
Although there is unrest in 2 number cf areas, ond 
this may in some cases result in further violence, you 
will note that this condition cennot be etiributed to any 
‘single cause. 
It has Cevelozed primarily from inflation 
and other economic and financial Gifficulties, fron 
internal political tensions, fron Argentina proselytizing, 
_ and, to ea lesser extent, fron Communisa and anti-fmericanisn, 
‘Zhe success of the recent revolutions in Cuba end 
Bolivia has also undovotedly coniributed to the increase 
of instability in other Central smericean countries, since 
it has tended 
make revolutions 
WALTER B. SHLTH 
Director 
ii. 
far 
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28 April 1952 
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US OFFICIALS ONLY 
OCI No. 5888 
Copy No. 
A 
t 
vate 
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM 
Ju 
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Office 
of Current Intelligence 
: 
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
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MENCRANDUM 
SUSUECT: 
Increased instavillty in Letin 
The increased instability of several of the tventy Latin American 
Goverrment3 during the 
few months has reszlved pranarily 
in- 
flation and otnexr economic and financial difficulties, from internal polite 
- icel tensions, from Argentire proselyt4zing, and, to a lesser extent, fron 
Communism and anti-Anericanisa. 
During the past seven weeks there hzve been tyvo violent changes of 
government, in Bolivia and Cuba, and the possibilities for ovner revolue 
tions are increasing in Chile, Colombia, Eszsdor, Panara, 
and 
Venezuela. 
There follov3s a round-uo of the interral situation in the principal 
Latin American rations, including those mentioned above: 
ARGENTONA. 
Peron's strict security controls since last September 
have prevented the organization of a revolutionary movezent, 
covern- 
ment is extremely worried about continsed slot: sing, dissersion anorz lebor 
leaders, and labor unrest resulting from tne crivical econcaic situation. 
Argentina's intensified propasanda and labor activities have increased 
enti-US feeling, developed obstacles to hemisohere unihy, end created dife 
Yiculties amorg labor in other Latin American countries. 
Tue 
“proficiency o? these activities hes resulted in the estavlisnment of a’ 
third-vosition Latin American Comnittee for Syndical Unity 
insre2zsed 
Argentine influence emong sone inmportens labor leaders 
especially in 
Chile, Peru, Colombia, Bolivia end Panana. 
In Panama the Argentine Labor 
Atteche was able to organize a pro-Argentite political group, end in 
several other countries pro-Argeutine culturel spcieties have peen estae 
blished. 
Since most coun +zies in the 
have been 
of Argentina's mot yes » the laster's 
techaiqie 
the 
protection, of oats American interests, such as a just price for raw 
metorials, and capitalizes on national 
aud @issersion within 
trade unions. 
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BOLIVIA. 
The ftruggle for doninanse nstveen various factions o? the 
Nationalist Revolutionary Movement coula résult in further ciolenc2. 
The 
factions are President Paz Estexzssoro‘'s relatively moderate 
group and the extreme nationalists headed by Juan Lechin. Minister of 
Mines and Petroleum and an izportant laoor leader. 
Lechin, ¥yhno is pro- 
Argentine, hes urged the miners to retain arms, !which he vould provabdly 
not hesitate to use to threaten or displace Faz EstenssorO~- 
Peru and 
Chile are alarmed sbout poszible Axgensire end Communist involvement in 
tne revolt and by current egitation 
in ‘Bolivie. 
They foar vhat eny new 
disorders in Bolivia might eventually spread 
BRAZIL. 
Brezil is relatively st2ole. 
‘President Verg2s' tenure pos- 
sibly could be threatereé by a continuing division within the ermea forces 
and by an increase in the odat dissatisfaction o? certain high-renkxing 
army officers with his policies on Comminism, economics and foreign erfairs. 
CHILE, 
The political situation is 
vastable, and the country is ex- 
perierncing economic end financie! difficuities. 
A presidentiel election 
scheduled for September has precipitated increasingly vocal opposition to 
tne weak goverrment, and given rise to enti-US expressions. 
Tae rost 
povular presidential candidate toanzy appesr's vo re exedictator Ibanez 
del Campo, wro is pro-Peron end who may attemmt 
a coup if he loses. 
The Communist Party, outlawed in 1948, is now an ective, relatively 
overt organization with 40,059 to 50,000 members. 
Penetration of orgenized 
levor is significant, and the govermment is relustant to crack down. 
The 
vote potential of the Commnists, woo with imoortent Sociaiist groups are bn 
backing a “populer front" candidate, is sovsht by most parties. 
relations s+ the large US~operated copper 
mines which supply about 55 
of United States' copper inports, are 
at a low ebb. 
The coppe> workers of Anaconsa's two large mines started 
@ strike on 25 April. 
In 
or extreze nationalist pre-election state- 
ment3, the government's insecure position, end its declered interest in 
raising the price of copper sold to the Urited States, it le unsertain 
in whet quantity and at what prices copper will be available to the US 
during the rest of 1952. 
CUBA. 
General Batista'’s eppsreatly secure position hes the opposi- 
tion, much of it perhaps only vocal, of the majority of Students, the 
- Communists, some erbitctered army officers and others who did not bentit 
directly from the coup. 
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COLOMS3TA, 
guerrilia activity throzzhout much of the country, 
elong with a sharp division within the controlling Conservative Party, has 
forced the adninistzratioa to rely heavily on the erny. 
xovever 
growing 
army Gissatisfaction ov2> the government's 
handling of the gusrvrilla 
provien has incre2sed thepossibility cf 2 coup and a militmry aictator- 
Ship. 
The Communists have played little fart in tae guerrilla disturbde 
ances. 
The goverment, mearvaile, is trying to reconcile the opposing 
factions, and possibly may lave some success. 
ECUADOR. 
The possidiiity of coup and conunte r=coup, alvays present, 
: 
has been increasing with the epproaca or the 1 June presidenvial election. 
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Eerlicr prospects for a "relatively noimal" election nave been upset by 
the unexpected candidacy of the twice-deposed rightist| 
Velasco 
Ibarra and by the withdrawal o? the le?t-wing ccalition candidate. Salazar 
Gomez. 
The contest is now chaotic enovzh to enccurase a bid for Puwer 
from either the 
De?ons2 find Ster, Diaz Granados, or 
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Meyor of Gu2 eyaquil , Guevara Moreno. 
Should President Pleza 
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succeed ir conducting an election despite these threats, a victory or 
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rightewing candidate mignt set tne stage for a liberal revolt. 
GUATEMALA. 
Cuatemala is at present under a greater dezree of Con. 
munist ‘influence than any other Latin American country. 
<A small herd core 
of Communists has exerted inPluexce out of all proportion 
to its size. 
Recently, however, there has been a growing enti -Communiss movement which 
now extends to two ofthe major lavor unions. Even if Communist influsace 
Should be drastically reduced, it is unlikely that there would be eny 
diminution in the manifestations or nationalism and the campaign of harass- 
ment against US cormmenies operating in the contry. 
MEXICO, 
Until the 6 July elections, domestic political frictions rey 
cause outoreaks of violence. 
These ere not likely, Lovever, to affect 
either the government's atability or United Sates 
PANAMA, Current instability centers around the 11 May presidential 
election. 
‘he two chief candidstes are former police chief Jose Renon 
and his cousin Roberto Chiari. 
Remon's supporters sey that he will be 
Parara'’s next presicent, by frau cr force if necessary. 
Certein sup- 
porters of Chiari, however, assert thas they will oppose a Remon victory 
by ferce. 
Ex-Presicent Arnuifo Arias, who is 
aligned with neither side, 
probably holds the balance of voting strength. 
° 
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*@- 
Dead 
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Although Chieri's forces and, to a lesser extent, Remon's have both 
attacked US rolicies in the Canal Zone, neither candidate is basically 
° 
éenti-vs,. 
Pernamanian Communists ere more entagonistic to Remon tnen to 
Chieri, but have actively campaigned for neither candidate, and in any 
case control few votes. 
The Argentine Labor Attache has reportedly cam- 
paigned with some eucces3 for 
PARAGUAY. 
The current situation now eppears more favoravle to ree 
volutionery attemots than a vear 250. 
Tension can be expected to increase 
with political machinations 
anticivation~of the 1953 presidential 
election. 
Maiudministration, coszuption, the high cost of living e=d food 
shortages have caused growing discontent, even, reportedly, in the higher 
echelons. 
URUGUAY. 
<A traditionally steble country, Uruguay is faced with serious 
economic and financial difficulties, ond reportedly there is taal dis- 
sension in the newly-organized governnent. 
VENEZVELA. 
Prospects for trouble have remained at a feirly hich level 
since the Constituent 
election cempaign starte’ last ourzer and 
4% beceme clear that the governing junta intended to rig the results. 
The 
chief threat to stabi’ -ty is the cutlaved, leftist Nenocratic Action Party, 
whose exiled leaders hseve been vlotting to regain power since they rere 
cverthrown in 1948. 
Capabilities of the Domocratic Action have probably 
been reduced somewhat by the Cudan coup, vhich has made Havana unavailable 
es & base of operations, and by the fact that tke army is apparentiy still 
unived tehind the junta. 
Harassing atvivities end continued plotting, if 
not en actual revolt, can be expected. 
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SANITIZED COPS 
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ANNEX I1 
B-26 AIRCRAFT.IN LATIN AMERICA 
low-level attack bomber, 
Soviet bomber, 
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The B-26 was developed during World War II as a 
It compares favorably in terms 
of bomb load and combat radius with the IL-28, 
The B-26 
is a piston-engine aircraft, however, and it cannot 
operate at either the altitude or Speed of the twin-Jet 
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Comparative statistics on the two aircraft follow; 
IL-28 
B-26 
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Bomb load 
4,400 ibs. 
4,000 libs, 
Combat ridius 
700 n.m. 
800 
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Maximum speed ‘at 
460 kts/ 
300 kts/ 
Bes 
optimum altitude 
15,000 ft. 
10,000 ft. 
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A total of 116 B-26 sircraft are in the air forces 
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of Latin American countries, including Cuba: 
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Cuba 
Somiaicss Republic 
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Brazil 
Guatemala 
ae 
Chile 
Nicaragua 
Re 
Colombia 
Peru 
date 
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