--- UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGINCY / WASHINGTON NU-St-\s APPEAL JUL 6 1962 OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Arms Control Aspects of Froposed Satellite Reconnaissance Policy Recommendations 18 and 19 of the "Report on Political and Informational Aspects of Satellite Reconneissence Policy" call attention to two issues on which the acencies concerned have been unable to reach agreement. Tne views of the Arms Control end Disermament Agency ere summarized below. #dvence Notification of Leunchings The Geneva Conference has agreed to discuss Seperete measures to reduce the risk of war through accident, mis- calculation or failure of comeunicetion. The purpose of such meesures would be to provicGe reessurence amor stetes “and to hold to the minimum the hecards that might arise from misinterpretation of abrupt ects of a military but non-belligerent character. Measures designed for this purpose might involve arrangements for ecévence notification of certain types of militery movements and maneuvers, including advance notification of missile leunchirgs, a measure already suggested by the Swedish Delegation, end possibly edvance notification of space vehicle launchings es well. Recommendation 18 of the Satellite Reconneissance Report would preclude the United States from meking or endorsing proposals for edvance notification cf missile and space vehicle launchings. In the case of space vehicle launchings, the recommendation is based on the contention that advance notificetion would facilitate pessive and active countermeasures against reconnaissence satellites. Advance notification of missile launchings is presumably ruled out because space vehicle launchings might become a collateral issue. SANITIZED
fo seme 9 a -2. ACDA does not wish to underestimate the counter- measures problem, but we have difficulty in essigning it over-ridire significance. Past end continuing publicity respecting reconnaissance satellites is sufficient to heve eroused Soviet interest in the possibility of countermeasures. If passive countermeasures are prectical, it is not unreason- able to suppose that the Soviet Union may underteke then whether or not éedvance notificetion is provided. In so far és active countermeesures are concerned, it is not evident that edvence notificetion need be so precise as to result in the pin-pointing of targets in outer space. To the extent that such notification might serve]  —~° — oT , such msneuvers as launching schedules might be employed rith_ a view to efrecting some attrition ORES ES ESUUEE He FISE- SE Har di erdeF te estoy SE! neutrelize a peaceful United States satellite, a variety of responses would be availeble, including a strengthened basis for United States political opposition to such ects, We may not, in fact, be able to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on eny type of edvaence notification. However, an affirmetive United States position would be consistent with our view that the objects we place in orbit represent legitimete uses of outer space. By carrying our concern regarding our space vehicles to the point where we are unwilling to discuss advance notification of missile leunchings, we mey encourage the conclusion that we are attempting to shield activities which we ourselves regard as suspect. It is difficult to see how such an approech could contribute to the political and legal defense of satellite reconnaissance. Furthermore, a seperate meesure for advance notifica- tions of missile and spece launchings, if egreed to by the United States end the Soviet Union, would constitute an important step in the arms control field. First, it would give greater assurance that a surprise missile attack could not take place in a way that would catch the U.S. off guard. Secondly, by having edvence notifications of such launchings, each party to the asreement would have a good record of the other party's planned programs in the space and missile fields, including both test programs end possible programs
for the further deployment of missiles. Third, edveance notifications of missile and space Leunchings would‘ decrease tension that is bound to come as the United States and the Soviet Union, and possibly ether countries as well, increase the number of missiles at their disposal. The more informa- tion that can be obtained about the intentions of potentially hestile parties, as the inited States end the Soviet Union increase their cependence on missiles for militery purposes, the less Likely it will be that one or the other party will miscaelculate and possibly stert or escalate e wer with missiles. There are issues of greeter consequence than meesures ‘to reduce the risk of wer."' However, other things being equal, it would seem desireble that the United Stetes seek limited gains in the arms control field aes well eas tajor ones. ACDA is not convinced that the arguments supporting Recom- mendation 18 outweigh these against it, end recomnends that it be disapproved. Prohibition of Bombs in Crbit The Cenadian Foreign Minister has pressed at Geneva for consideration of a separate measure to prohibit the placing in orbit of weepons of mass Gestruction (it is perhaps worth noting thet the United Stetes is currently pressing for a tracking station’ to support military space programs). The United Stetes has expressed willingness to discuss the possibility of such 2 separate Meesure, provided that it teke the ‘orm of an agreement which would be subject to inspection. To Gate, the Soviet Union has opposed consideration of the matter except in connection with general and complete disarmament. Recom- mendation 19 of the Satellite Reconnaissance Report raises a question as to whether we should continue to pursve our present course. ACDA believes that if en agreement could be reached to prohibit the placing in orbit of weapons of mass de- struction, such en agreement would be in the interest of the national security. To prevent extension of the arms race to outer space should be an important objective of arms control, and hence national security policy. This conclusion appeers velid even if such an egreement were fully effective only against very lerge and hence very high yield weapons such as those tested by the Soviet _ Union in its last test series. The fact that the Soviet
e- - Union would gain increased knowledge of our setellite reconnalisseénce capabilities does not seem a compelling argument against our acceptence of inspection procedures, particulerly in view of the present Soviet ability to estimate these capabilities with a substantiel degree of accuracy, a fact that is noted in the Satellite Reccn- neissence Report. The basic objection to the present United States position of willingness to consider a separate outer spece agreement appears to rest primarily on the ergument that discussion of a separate agreement might involve the United States, to its tactical disadvantege, in a pubdlic Biring of the satellite reconneissance issue. The Soviet Union hes, of course, already reised this issue not only in its propaganda output but elso in privete conversations with the United States and in discussions in the context of the United Nations Outer Spece Committee, Ambassador Stevenson is concerned that the issue may be raised in the General Assembly. There is good reason for such concern since the public record effords ample "evidence" to support a strong political attack. Under these circua- stances, the question way be where, not whether, the United States may have to debate the matter. ~ ~ : We may not be able to prevent the Soviét Union from speaking out in the forum of its choice, but if we continue to maintain thet Limitetions on military uses of outer espace are arms control matters and that Geneva is the proper plece to discuss them, we will have a reesonable tacticel besis for declining to join issue in the Cuter Space Committee or the General Assembly. We will also have reasoneble procedural grounds for ignoring, if not defeating, con- cemnatory principles of space lew or hortatory resolutions which might embarrass the satellite reconnaissance program. In view of the foregoing considerations, ACDA strongly urges that approval be given to an effort on the part of the United States to seek a separate agreement to prohibit the placing in orbit of weapons of mess destruction. Williem C. Foster aoe” - > > eae ioe Soe