■-'.  -•^-i'V.P^V-S'v.T--;^"*^.^''."- 
J>   •••  .-*      - 
yp-'OPAHDUM-  -■  _•  -  ■   '- . : 
TOr  Colon«r  Willi ««V."Cainn- 
FECf*t 
22  April  1948 
SUBJECTr-  necessity^- forr  Integration-  car  Coordination  or  St  end  1-2: 
Functions*- 
1..    This  najrorandual  represents  an  analrels  f  roa  the  SI  point  of 
vies-  of  the  eseeatial:  relationship  between  .the  functions  which   1-2 
perfprsta  or  should^  perform  and  thw-  overall  clandestine  intelligencs 
prograw.     It  la  atron.-lj  felt  bvSIT  that  operations  of  an  7-2  nat^rs 
ara-  indispensable  to  the  nalnteiuncs  of  effective  and   secure   positiv* 
Intelligence  work,  and  that,  a.  separation  of  foreign  courrter  Intelligence 
operations  ffoa  foreign  positive-  intelligence  operations  would  be-  dis- 
astrous- to  the- latter- and.  hampering  to  the  forcer. 
2.     Th*  functions  with  which  the  X-2  Office  la  charted  fall  eo=«- 
what  ratnrallj- into*itw©  oain  categories  x 
A_    The-  collection  and  processing  for  the  use  of 
other- Aceri can  gavemrwnt  agencies  of  intel- 
ligence directed  at  subversive  individuals  and 
particularly  at.  representatives  of  foreign 
Intelligence'  organisations  "abroad.     Such  infor- 
mation ia  essential.  %o  paesport  control  work, 
prevention  of  subversive  innigTation,   strengthen- 
ing of  internal  Aoerlcan  security  fron  foreign 
intelligence  penetration,   etc.  « 
B.     The   conduct  of  counter  intelligence   operations 
directed   toward  the  protection  of  American 
   foreign  intelligence  wyk.     Such  operationa 
thecaelves   fall  into  three   apecific  categories i 
'  1.     Tha  <*>llection  and   procescing  of 
\  biographical  lnforration  for  the 
)  purpose  of  vetting  foreign  person- 
r.*l  artier  consideration   for  ose   ae 
agents   or  acb~ag<rr.t«  in   kr.oricar\   foreign 
/
Paga  5. 
6.     It  should  be  apparent,   furthermore,   that  such  operations  as  thos«- 
descri.  r«d  above  can  only  be  successfully  perfort.ed  In  closest  coordination 
with  *.he  positive  intelligence  operations  of  the  American  service. 
Loo'icro'ss  results  *ay  be  anticipated  from  a  lack  of  this  coordination!  ,       : 
rrr.*  need  only  enrlsar;e   the  diligent  pursuit  of  Anerican  a^ent  personnel 
hy  AreVican  counter  intelligence  personnel  to  whom  their  colleagues  are? 
srkro-~:.     S*:ch  actions  would   be  useless  and  reprehensible  at  best,   but  in 
arM'?i*i~.  they  constitute  a  serious  danger  to  the  success  of  the  positive 
ir.t-ellifer.ee  w.ric,     Lacif  of  coonlin^tion  n»y  be  due  either  to  SI  or  1-2, 
ret  in  either  case  the  resvl*»  nre  equally  xinfortunate  and  cannot  b£ 
tolerated  in  a  professional  intelli-once  service* 
f.      T*-«    telle c Von  of  what  nrf  "ht  be.  called   positive   counter-intelligence 
fo>;-r*,    e-  in  *.  ar^   51  above)   is   In  roality  only  a  specialized  or  functional 
«re«  of  positive  clar/Satine-  ir.teliir'-r  ce.      It  requires  specialized  personnel 
^•jt  *r  do-e-s  v.;-*   oolleotlon  of  technical   or  rrilitary  or  fiscal  intelligence. 
»:*    — .rh   vys'ializatior.  'Joes  not   prevent  pit4,   should   not  d5sconra{,e    the 
r~y, ?*&.'■  z  of  cV-ir  types  of  Intelligence   to  »»hich,    in  the  course  of  their 
op«*r*t'--«f   *peoi*lired  oprr*  ti^s  *re  erposeri.      RrchQ   baric   trainLog  in  all 
:.'*/»*::.-/>--.»   f.  »:•'.«   eboo'/i    y*   r~vri*led   Tot  voth  SI   and   X-2  operatives  in  order 
V*   «->oi -J   e-.-'h  e/^*  ..»-''*   cor'*-- . tr«*. '. on  *e  would 're';i..j  re  wasteful   duplication 
of   oo-»*.-»g*.      *r'*-t*'   P' «'•'•- ^ '*    oooperatWe    training,    and    the   clo.-.c    coordin- 
•  t:  or.    of  flefd   op* ..'*«.: '.'«   of   ootr.   51   aM    X-2    «rj]l   inevitably  eliminate  such 
e-,  p.  i  1 4 1:  or.   of  *f  fort   ».'d    of   yrf/rir.+l  t    both   staff  and    cp^raUn,    and  will 
/-*»r.i  % 
f    »-./"»* ►  ?f«oti  /«    fie.o    opereti  or;s,      S'.ch    clone   coordination   ia   only 
'/" **.'.'.•    «*•'    tT    *''•<    1-2    fi-.O'  V.  o-    a*    •    j-rtrt   of   *    H'ngl*    agency,
t\ 
., .       .....    i  J 
■  ".■•'•»:  i  >    .V..-  •-.■■■■      |       ( 
Pace  4. 
8.      Experienc*  in  CS£  has  ehc*n  that  Uclc  of  cloee  cooperation  lxs 
J-2  and  SI  work  ia   pqaaibla  «*«n  wb<sn  the   two  aer-ricea  operate  froa 
th«  ease  building.     It  should  bo  obvious   that  If   1-2  functions  are  to 
be   handled  tj  an  entirely  different  agency,   no  favorable  reaulte  at  ilII 
could   bo  erpected.     Any  diversity  of  agency  interests  would^sdliUte 
against  the   succacs  of  a   coordination  ^.v.ich  ie   ©aaential.      It  la  no 
exaggeration  to  say  that  if  the   X-Z  function  *ere  to  be  divorced  froas 
positive  intelligence  *ork,   the  SI  Offico  would  be  forced  to  estatliah 
its  own  1-2  operations.     Out  of  such  an  unfortunate  eituation  would 
arise  additional  governmental  duplication  and  the  possibility  of  a 
danjerous  conflict  orAnoxlean  counter  intelligence  aenriceo.     Rither- 
represents  a  cona-i-vr-atiou  to  be~  abliorred.. 
<*. 
y 
cc:      I'r.    Jar.es   '^ror
(Page  1) 
MEMORANDUM  22  April  1946 
TO:       Colonel  William  W.  Quinn 
FROM:      [Excised] 
SUBJECT:   Necessity  for  Integration  or  Coordination  of  SI  and  X-2 
Functions 
1.  This  memorandum  represents  an  analysis  from  the  SI  point  of 
view  of  the  essential  relationship  between  the  functions  which  X-2 
performs  or  should  perform  and  the  overall  clandestine  intelligence 
program.  It  is  strongly  felt  by  SI  that  operations  of  an  X-2  nature 
are  indispensable  to  the  maintenance  of  effective  and  secure  positive 
intelligence  work,  and  that  a  separation  of  foreign  counter  intelligence 
operations  from  foreign  positive  intelligence  operations  would  be  dis- 
astrous to  the  latter  and  hampering  to  the  former. 
2.  The  functions  with  which  the  X-2  Office  is  charged  fall  some- 
what naturally  into  two  main  catagories: 
A.  The  collection  and  processing  for  the  use  of 
other  American  government  agencies  for  intel- 
ligence directed  at  subversive  individuals  and 
particularly  at  representatives  of  foreign 
intelligence  organizations  abroad.  Such  infor- 
mation is  essential  to  passport  control  work, 
prevention  of  subversive  immigration,  strengthen- 
ing internal  America-?  security  from  foreign 
intelligence  penetration,  etc. 
B.  The  conduct  of  counter  intelligence  operations 
directed  toward  the  protection  of  American 
foreign  intelligence  work.  Such  operations 
themselves  fall  into  three  specific  catagories: 
1.    The  collection  and  processing  of 
biographical  information  for  the 
purpose  of  vetting  foreign  person- 
nel under  consideration  for  use  as 
agents  or  sub-agents  in  American  foreign 
SECRET
(Page  2} 
Page  5 
[Excised] 
6.    It  should  be  apparent,  furthermore,  that  such  operations  as  those 
described  above  can  only  be  successfully  performed  in  close  coordination 
with  the  positive  intelligence  operations  of  the  American  service. 
Ludicrous  results  may  be  anticipated  from  a  lack  of  this  coordination: 
one  need  only  envisage  the  diligent  pursuit  of  American  agent  personnel 
by  American  counter  intelligence  personnel  to  whom  their  colleagues  are 
unknown.  Such  actions  would  be  useless  and  reprehensible  at  best,  but  in 
addition  may  constitute  a  serious  danger  to  the  success  of  the  positive 
intelligence  work.  Lack  of  coordination  may  be  due  to  either  SI  or  X-2 , 
but  in  either  case  the  results  are  equally  unfortunate  and  cannot  be 
tolerated  in  a  professional  intelligence  service. 
7   The  collection  of  what  might  be  called  positive  counter-intelligence 
(described  in  A  and  Bl  above)  is  in  reality  only  a  specialized  or  functional 
area  of  positive  clandestine  intelligence.  It  requires  specialized  personnel 
just  as  does  the  collection  of  technical  or  military  or  fiscal  intelligence. 
But  such  specialization  does  not  prevent  and  does  not  discourage  the 
reporting  of  other  types  of  intelligence  to  which,  in  the  course  of  their 
operations,  specialized  operatives  are  exposed.  Broad  basic  training  in  all 
intelligence  fields  should  be  provided  for  both  SI  and  X-2  operatives  in 
order  to  avoid  such  exclusive  concentration  as  would  require  wasteful  dupli- 
cation of  coverage.  Joint  planning,  coorperative  training,  and  the  close  co- 
ordination of  field  operations  of  both  SI  and  X-2  will  inevitably  eliminate 
much  duplication  of  effort  and  of  personnel,  both  staff  and  operative,  and 
will  result  in  more  effective  field  operations.  Such  close  coordination  is 
only  possible  when  SI  and  X-2  function  as  part  of  a  single  agency. 
SECRET
(Page  3) 
Page  4 . 
8.    Experience  in  OSS  has  shown  that  .lack  of  close  cooperation  in 
X-2  and  SI  work  is  possible  even  when  the  two  services  operate  from 
the  same  building.  It  should  be  obvious  that  if  X-2  functions  are  to 
be  handled  by  an  entirely  different  agency,  no  favorable  results  at  all 
could  be  expected.  Any  diversity  of  agency  interests  would  militate 
against  the  success  of  a  coordination  which  is  essential.  It  is  no 
exaggeration  to  say  that  if  the  X-2  function  were  to  be  divorced  from 
positive  intelligence  work,  the  SI  office  would  be  forced  to  establish 
its  own  X-2  operations.  Out  of  such  an  unfortunate  situation  would 
arise  additional  governmental  duplication  and  the  possibility  of  a 
dangerous  conflict  of  American  counter  intelligence  services.  Either 
represents  a  consummation  to  be  abhorred. 
STLP:l?m 
[Excised] 
cc:  Mr.  James  Murphy 
SECRET