pu (a) i NeDOrT 10 - The President anc the Secretary of Defense | on tne | | Department of Defense BY THE BLUE RIBBON DEFENSE PANEL f July 1970 National Command and Control Capability. and Defense Intelligence . EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING; DOD BIR 5260.10 DOES NOT APPLY os” Sec Def Control No. X-3547 Copy No. 2 _of_
sets wee By BLUE REGION DEFENSE PANEL WASHINGTON, ODO. C. 20001 July 1, 1970 Hy dear Nr. President: It is my honor to submit to you herewith the Report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel on Command and Control and Defense Intelligence. Because of the sensitive nature of the subject matter and the effect jts disclosure could have on our national well-being, the Panel asked its subcommittee on Operations to undertake the examination of these two important areas. a | -) ear ob enter hme ial Rael MABE sm ie A a AORN i Proveneany: —T ee re Intelligence activities are spread throughout the Depart- ment of Defense with little or no effective coordination. There is, as has often been charged, evidence of duplication between the various organizations. Redundancy in intelligence, within reason, is desirable, and it is particularly important that you and other decision-makers have more than one independent source of intelligence. We feel, however, that there is a large
imbalance in the allocation of resources, which causes more information to be collected than can ever be processed and used. Furthermore, there is a tendency within the intelligence community to produce intelligence for the intelligence community and to remain remote from and not give sufficient attention to the requirements of others who have valid needs for intelligence. The basic objective of the intelligence community should be to get the right information to the right people at the} right time. I hope the Panel's recommendations will not be considered criticisms of individuals, but will help to solve the problems associated with Command and Control and Intelligence in a way that effectively supports the objectives of the Department of _Defense and the Nation: I know my colleagues on the Panel join me in expressing te you our appreciation for giving us the privilege of under- taxing this important assignment at this critical period in our Nation's history. Respectfully yours, [ius 0 Pitfborg™ GILBERT W. FITZHUGH Chairman The President The White House
+" “ +o Ose Gey et ee THE PANEL Gilbert W. Fitzhugh, Chairman Chairman of Board, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company Wilfred J. McNeil Dir.-Advisoe Fairchild Hiller Corp., Pres., Tox Fouadstion Sohn M. Fluke President, John Fluke Dr. Mortha E. Peterson’ *” President, Bornard College Columbio University Manufacturing Co., Inc. Dr, Marvin L. Goldberger** Professor of Physics Mrs. Leono P. Thurman Attorney-at-Law Dr. Ruben F. Mettler” President, TRY, Inc. Princeton University . William Blackie Choirmon of Board Lewis F. Powell, Jr.” Attorney-ot-Law Robert C. Jackson* c ‘ller T c Choirman oterpilior Tractor ©o- Teledyne Ryan Aeronautical Dr. George J. Stigler Professor of American George Champion Lone Kirkland Secretory Treasurer AFL-CIO President of Economic Institutions, Univ. Development Board of NYC of Chicase Hobart D. Lewis President, Reoders Digest Cloude Young Office of Commissioner Williom P. Clements, Je. Chairman of Scord, SEDCO, Inc. Associotion, Ine. Professional Football *Members of the Operations Subcommittee. **Found it necessary to terminate his services on the Panel due to illness. ***Found it necessary to terminate her services on the Panel due to press of duties as President of Sarnard College. THE STAFF J. Fred Buzhordt, Jr. William G. Howard : * Major Rickerd T. Boer, USAF Mary E. McCausland (nee ry eae meee mennnts ate me Smee se se cme wees give bs,
PREFACE The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel was appointed by the President. and the Secretary of Defense in July 1969, and given the follow- . ing broad Charter, with instructions to submit its Final Report | by July 1, 1970: The general scope of the Panel is to study, report and make recommendations on: . : (1) The organization and management of the Department -of Defense, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense : Agencies and the military services, as it affects the Department! mission performance, decision-making process, the command -and F control function and facilities, and thé coordination with other. governmental departments and agencies, with emphasis on the oe responsiveness to the requirements of the President and the Secretary of Defense. (2) The Defense research and development efforts from the standpoints of mission fulfillments, costs, organization, time and interrelation with the scientific and industrial community. (3) The Defense procurement policies and practices, particularly as they relate to costs, time and quality. (4) Such other matters as the Secretary may submit to it from time to time. It is important to note that, while the Charter is very broad as to the Penel's function in the fields of structure, organization, and operating procedures of the entire Department of Defense, it excludes considerations of broad national policy. The Panel has endeavored to hew closely to this line.
We were told that this is the first broad-scate study of the Department of Defense in many years -- in fact since the tuo Commissions on Organization of the Executive Department of the Government chaired by former President Herbert Hoover. tle decided to approach our assigninent with the same broad objectives as stated in the Hoover Commission Report, namely: (1) That the primary objectives of the Netional Security Organization is to preserve the peace, but that it must at all times be ready and able, promptly and effectively, to marshall all of our resources, human and material, for the protection of our national security. (2) That civilian influence must be dominant in the formulation of national policy and that civilian control of the military establishment must be clearly established and. firmly maintained. (3) That the Nation is entitled to the maximum possible return for every doltar of military expenditure. (4) That military efficiency -- in other words, readiness for war -- must be the fundamental objective of the National Milita Establishment. (5) That elimination of wasteful duplication is essential to gosd government, but that the preservation, within sound limits, of a healthy competitive spirit and of service pride and tradition are basic to progress and morale. Because of the vast scope of the operations of the Department of Defense, the Panel divided itself into four sub-committees, as follows: (1) Organization and Personnel Management. (2) Management of Materiel Resources (including research, development, procurement and management of weapons and supplies) planning, programming, budgeting, and similar procedures. (3) Military operations, intelligence, communications, automatic data processing. (4) Conflicts of interests, contract compliance, ~ domestic action, equal employment opportunity, etc. ii
The Panel interviewed many witnesses in depth, and ihe sub-committees many more. It mede a functional survey of the Defense headquarters organizations in the Washington area cover- ing some 1,600 organizational elements to elicit information on the actual operation of and interface between units of the Department of Defense. It aiso sent a questionnaire to a large number of people outside the Department of Defense who we thought might wish to give us the benefit of their thinking. We enjoyed a remarkable response, with answers ranging from a page to dozens of pages of detailed suggestions. The Panel members and the staff carefully reviewed many earlier reports of studies of the Department of Defense, and, many visits were made to important elements of the Department outside the Washington area. Members representing sub-committees Three and Four visited a number of military Commands in Europe, the Mediterranean, and Southeast Asia, to see how policies determined at Washington Headquarters were carried out in the operational units. Because of the sensitive nature of the subject matter and the effect its disclosure could have on the national well-being, the Panel asked sub-committee Three to undertake an examination of the areas of National Command and Control and Defense intel- ligence and make a classified report. The Panel wishes to extend its deep appreciation to the many people in the Department of Defense -- both military and civilian -- who contributed generously of their time in answer- ing its innumerable questions and volunteering so many constructiy suggestions. We found them uniformly anxious to help and enthu- siastic about the possibilities for improving operations. We realize that this would not have happened without the strong support of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, and Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard. To all these people who contributed so much to its endeavors, the Panel extends its deep thanks. : Ti
Page PREFACE i EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 COMMAND AND CONTROL 9 Introduction g Warning Time Tet 10 Presidential Survival 2 e® © 11 The Military Command Centers OF 13 Communications 15 Strategic Decisions 16. Strategic Launches V7 Strategic Defense 19 RECOMMENDATIONS 19 we DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE 2) % The Intelligence Community 21 The Defense Intelligence Community 23 The Office of the Secretary of Defense 23 The Cryptologic Community 25 General Defense Intelligence 29 The Defense Intelligence Agency 30 The Intelligence Process 32 Requirements 32 Collection 34 Processing 37 Production 37 Dissemination 40 Evaluation 4] Special Programs 4} Tactical Intelligence 42 Compartmented Intelligence &4 RECOMMENDATIONS 46 vo a lv
BLUE RIBBON DEFENSE PANEL REPORT ON NATIONAL COMMAND AHO CONTROL AND DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This summary provides a brief review of the report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel resulting from its examination off National Command and Controi capability and the Defense Irnmtel- ligence Community. Pe hans ae —_ * ..
With regard to intelligence, we find that: - The intelligence effort of the Department of Defense is a part of a coordinated national effort, and represents . roughliy# ; [the national intelligence resources. How- ever, responsibility for the management of Defense intelligence is fragmented between many elements of the Department and is neither well coordinated nor adequately directed toward satisfying proven consumer needs.
- There does not appear to be an effective mechanism for potential users of intelligence, either at flational level or internal to the Department of Defense, to express their needs. The Defense intelligence community appears to function largely in response to requirements generated within the intelligence community. - There is no effective mechanism to effect a proper balance in the allocation of resources between the various intel- ligence functions. The present production resources can make use of only a fraction of the information that is collected. - There is no effective mechanism for the allocation of collection resources to assure that needed information is collected in the most economical manner, consistent with the urgency of the need. ~ There is no substantial effort or procedure to. evaluate the intelligence process in the Defense intelligence community. It is not possible, today, to obtain an objective -assessment of the validity of the requirements which drive the process, the efficiency and effectiveness of the collection and production functions nor the value and utility of the sub- stantive output. - Personnel security investigations are performed by the investigative elements of the Military Departments. The regulations of each of the Military Departments make reference to accepting the validity of previous investigations completed by any agency of the Federal Government which meet the minimum investigative requirements of that particular Department. For all practical purposes, the Departments interpret this narrowly and usually do not accept the investigations of another Depart- ment as meeting their standards. 7 - ~ Each Military Department has a large organization devoted primarily to Mapping, Charting and Geodesy (MC&G) activities. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) attempts to coordinate these activities to eliminate duplication and set priorities for production. However, DIA coordinates through the intelligence elements of the Departmental staffs, and only the Air Force MC&8G agency is within the purview of the intelligence staff. The Army and Navy MC&G agencies are ne not a part of the intelligence community. Loe)
- There is no substantial corps of professional intel- ligence cfficers in the Military Services, nor a professional intelligence career service for civilians in the general Defense intelligence community. The National Security Agency secured special legislation which permits the employment of career analysts with compensation equivalent to Grade 16, 17, and 18 levels. The Director also has the authority to assign and reassign civilian personnel to the position and geographic loca- tion where their talents can be best used. ro see The Panel recommends that the Defense intelligence communi ty be restructured to provide a better management structure and to assure the provision of intelligence, as required, to the President other consumers at the national level and to all levels of the Department from the Secretary of Defense to operating units in the field. The new intelligence structure should: 1. Function in response to consumer requirements for intelligence and provide timely and quality products, responsive to those requirements, with a proper balance between collection, processing, and production activities. 2. Provide a clear chain of command from the President and the Secretary of Defense to the collection and production units that will assure the timely flew of intelligence information and minimize the injection of bias arising from Service affiliations, or operational location. 3. Provide for a single individual in the Office of the Secretary of Defense who is the clearly designated representa- tive of the Secretary of Defense to other Departments and Agencies of Government for intelligence matters and who is responsible to coordinate or direct all intelligence. activities within the Department.
4. Provide flexibility for timely development end distribution of limited, costly resources, both trained ser- sonnel and equipments, to meet changing priorities. 5. Provide the proper ervironment to develop an effective and efficient professional intelligence career service ror both military and civilian personnel. Specifically, it is recommended that the Secretary of Defense: 1. Designate the Deputy Secretary for Operations to be his agent for all matters relating to intelligence, to include the authority to designate those activities to be con- sidered intelligence activities. 2. Establish under the Deputy Secretary for Operations an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (ASD(1)), © with the additional title of Director of Defense Intelligence (DDI). The ASD(I)/DDI would be delegated the responsibility to represent the Secretary of Defense with other Departments and Agencies of Government for intelligence matters and to coordinate or direct all DOD intelligence activities, including national programs which are managed in the Department, in accordance with existing law and applicable National Security Council and Director of Central Intelligence Directives. Among his specific responsibilities, the ASD(I)/DD!I would: a. Serve as the Defense representative on the United States Intelligence Board, and appoint, with approval of the Deputy Secretary for Operations, representatives to other government-wide intelligence committees and boards. b. Direct and control all DOD intelligence activities not specifically designated by the Deputy Secretary’ for Operations as organic to combatant forces. c. Have the authority to delegate operation of any of these activities which he deems necessary to assure maximum exploitation of DOD resources. d. Review all proposed intelligence programs, monitor and evaluate all un-going intelligence activities and make recommendations to the Deputy Secretary for Operations with regard to allocation of resources. ‘“ .
e. Estabiish procedures to review and validate requivements for intelligence production and collection and evaluate the product against the requirement. f. Establish procedures for and periodically conduct a systematic evaluation of the intelligence process in the Defense intelligence community. This evaluation should include -an assessment otf the utility of the intelligence pro- ducts provided to consumers outside the Defense intelligence community. g. Review and consolidate requirements for research and development in support of intelligence activities. h. Develop policies and procedures to insure the protection of intelligence and_of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. | 3. Establish under the ASD(I)/ODI: a. A Defense Security Command (DSECC) to be composed of the present Service Cryptologic Agencies and all other Defense intelligence collection activities except for those which have been specifically designated by the Deputy Secretary for Operations as organic to combatant forces. The DSECC should perform tnose processing activities which are most efficiently associated with collection facilities. Among his specific responsibilities, the Commander, DSECC would, under the direction of the DDI: (1) Command all those designated Defense intelligence collection and associated processing and reporting activities, with authority to delegate administrative management or operational control as he deems necessary. (2) Serve as Director, National Security ~ Agency.
(3). Insure the most judicious use of commen staff elements between nis DSECC and HSA. (4) Insure the timely dissemination of intel- Tigence information to all appropriate Nepartnants, Agencies, Conmands or opereting units. - (5) Prepare the Defense Security Program for those activities for which he is responsible, and review and coordinate the programs of intelligence collection activities organic to the combatant forces to insure maximum exploitation of resources. . b. A Defense Intelligence Production Agency (DIPA), ‘to replace the Defense Intelligence Agency, whose Director would | be respons*ble for Defense Intelligence production except for — ; those production activities specifically assigned to the combatant forces by the Deputy Secretary for Operations. Among his specific responsibilities, the Director, DIPA would: i (1) Direct those intelligence production activities which have been placed under his purview, with the authority to delegate administrative management or operational control as he deems necessary. (2) Provide current intelligence to designated individuals and organizations. (3) Provide threat assessments for all element of DOD, as required. (4) Provide finished intelligence to appro- priate elements of the Department in response to expressed needs. (5) Provide all DOD intelligence estimates and inputs to national estimates as directed by the DDI. (6) Manage all Defense intelligence production information systems, including those of the intelligence activitie organic to the combatant forces, to insure inter-operability and optimized intelligence flow to and from all echelons of DOD. (7) Prepare the Defense Intelligence Program for those activities under his direction, and review and coordinat the programs of intelligence production activities organic to ‘com- batant forces to insure maximum exploitation of resources.
4. txpand the responsibilities of the ational Security Ayency to include the processing, data bese maintenance and reporting of all intelligence information as directed by the DOI. 5. Establish within the OSECC a unified Defense Investi. gative Service responsible for all personnel security investiga- tioas within the DQD and its contractors. 6. Combine the Army Topographic Command, the Naval Oceanographic Office and the Aeronatuical Chart and Information Center into a unified Defense Map Service reporting to the Secre- tary of Defense through the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Mariage- ment of Resources). 7..Take the actions necessary (a) to extend to the entire Defense intelligence community the authority that the National Security Agency presently has to develop a professional career service, and (b) to establish an intelligence career service for military officers. .
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE 1. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY The National “intelligence community” consists of the Departments and Agencies of the Government which are responsible for the collection of information and production of foreign intelligence essential to the security of the United States. The principal departments and agencies of the intelligence community are the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department of State, the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). It is essential that the activities of © these departments and agencies be closely ccordinated to assure efficient and effective operation. The DCI is responsible for the general management and coordination of the intelligence community, tn addition to serving as the Director of CIA. The United States Intelligence Board (USIB) is the formal instrument established by the National Security Council (NSC) to advise and assist the DCI, as he requires, in discharging his statutory responsibilities. The responsibilities and func- tions of the USIB are set forth in National Security-Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No. 3. Its primary responsibility is to achieve an effectively coordinated intelligence community in the interest of National Security. The major functions assigned in NSCID No. 1 are: 1. To establish policies and develop programs for the guidance of all departments and agencies concerned. 2. To establish appropriate intelligence objectives, requirements and priorities. _ 3. To review the national intelligence effort and report to the NSC on its adequacy, integration and gaps identified 21
4. lo make recommendations on foreign intelligence matters to appropriate government officials, including particularly recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on intelligence matters within the jurisdiction of the Director, HSA. 5. To develop and review security standards and practices as they relate to the protection of intelligence and intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. 6. To formulate, as required, policies in regard to arrangements with foreign governments on intelligence matters. The functions «+ USIB are performed through its 14 committees and sub-committees. Most of the Chairmen of the USIB committees and sub-committees are representatives of the DCI, provided from the National Intelligence Program Evaluation Staff, which supports him. = . The Department of Defense is represented on the USIB by the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). When DIA was established jts Director replaced the senior intelligence officers of the three military departments on the USIB; however, they are permitted to participate in board meetings as observers and to add footnotes to USIB papers stating their points of disagreement. The military departments still retain full membership on the committees and sub-committees of the USI8. There is little or no coordination amona the Defense representatives and observers on the USIB and they often appear to be working at cross purposes. Intelligence requirements at the national level are determined in the USIB entirely by representatives of the intelligence com- munity. It is not clear that consumers of intelligence outside the intelligence community make a Significant contribution to this process. The Board of National Estimates (BNE) is composed of a number of distinguished men, appointed by the DCI, from industry, the academic community and the professions. The BNE pertodically sub- mits to USIB a program of proposed production of National Intelli- gence Estimates (NIEs) for approval. Upon approval, terms of reference for each estimate are prepared and contributions are obtained from the member agencies of the USIB. The BNE completes its evaluation and submits a first draft for coordination with * the member agencies. After revision, the estimate is submitted 22
to the USIP for approval. IF any member of the USIB or any of the senior intelligence officers of the Services disagree with the estimate, the dissenting opinions are published as integral paris of the estimate. The value of the estimate process is often destroyed in the coordination - revision cycle as watered- down compromises are accepted rather than esteblishing the basic document, and then adding the disagreements. The National Intelligence Resources Board (MIRB) was recent); established to advise the DCI on needs for intelligence resources to support the U.S. foreign intelligence effort. The members of the NIRB are the Deputy, DCI, Chairman; the Director, Sureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration. TI. THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY The Defense Intelligence effort is normally programmed in two major packages: The Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP), with the Director, NSA designated Program Manager; and The General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP), with the Director, DIA cesignated Program Manager. While the Director, NSA and Director, DIA are designated Program Managers they do not in fact manage the Defense intelligence effort. The responsibility for management of the effort is fragmented within and between the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security. Agency, and the Military Departments. The Program Managers consolidate the submissions of all participants in the program, but do not have control of the budget. Once money to suppert the approved program is allocated to the Services, they may or may not use it for its intended purposes. From time to time special programs are established to develop some new intelligence resource or capability. In such cases a program manager is designated by the Secretary of Defense and the program becomes a part of the intelligence community. A. The Office of the Secretary of Defense Currently the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administra- tion (ASD(A)) is clearly the senior official in the Defense organ- ization for managing the intelligence effort. On August 1, 1969, the Secretary of Defense assigned “additional responsibilities . for intelligence" to the ASD(A) and stated: *
"In discharging these responsibilities, IT fully expect the ASO{A) to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the Defense intelligence community. In order to accomplish this improvement, he is charged with the following responsibilities: 1. To establish an intelligence resource review and decision-making process which will comprise: a. A mechanism for making comparisons and appropriate trade-offs between major intelligence activities and programs so that DOD decision makers can select the most efficient and effective systems for collecting, processing, producing and disseminating inteiligence. . b. A Five-Year Intelligence Resource Plan. c. A procedure for identifying and surfacing major issues of intelligence resource allocation and management. d. A continuing system for review of intelli- gence collection requirements balanced against collection resource 2. To improve intelligence communications among DOD agencies and between the Department of Defense and other agencies. 3. To evaluate intelligence organizational relationships, roles and missions. 4. To review security policies and eliminate unnecessary classification and compartmentations." ; The ASD(A) has limited his purview, initially, to resource allocation and has established a review process wherein each , Program Manager is responsible for resource management within his program. Procedures are worked out whereby each Program Manager conducts his review and then reports to the ASD(A). The ASD(A) then performs a review across all the programs to identify areas where there is a possibility of duplication or inefficiency The ASD(A) has adopted the Consolidated Intelligence Resourc information System (CIRIS) as a management tool to assist in his cross-program review. ~ 24
ars ecncek Atk ER i NOT CT bul 10 a, — It is not possible to make valid judgments on the proper allocation of a collection resource to a target without consider- ing why, and with what urgency, the information is required and balancing that against the degree to which the information collected by the resource satisfies the requirement. There is a real need to make comparisons and trade-offs between the major intelligence activities and programs to select the most efficient and effective systems for collecting, processin producing and disseminating intelligence. Resources should be allocated to attain a balance in the capability to collect, proces and produce intelligence. It appears at present that collection capabilities far exceed the capabilities to process and produce. B. The Cryptologic Community { The organizations involved in the signals intelligence (SIGINT) effort are referred to collectively as the Cryptologic Community. This community consists of the National Security Agency (NSA), at its head, and the service cryptologic agencies (SCAs). Also holding membership in this community, though not generally included in the term, is the SIGINT Committee, with its sub-committees, of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB} The current authority for organization and operation of this community is the National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No. 6, effective 15 September 1958, and revised 18 Januar 1961. This document provides the national policy for Communica- tions Intelligence (COMINT) and Electronic Intelligence (ELINT), collectively referred to as SIGINT. It defines the responsibiliti of the USIB, Secretary of Defense, NSA, Director NSA, DCI and. Military Departments... ‘ 4 ne ae "4 _ foe { = fj wenses. * 25
( : The fundamental community, NSA and the SCAs, can be described as a two-part system. NSA is the part providing the system tianage- ment, through operational and technical control, processing of the raw SIGINT data and disseminating the processed SIGINT inforination to the consumers. The SCAs are basically the collection portion of the system.
RSA has Muy SLi) statutory authority to develop a professionel career service for its civilian employees. DIRNSA has the authority to emp toyees of recruit, train, assign and promote tne civilien NSA. He can prescribe as a cenditicn of enploy- ment thet USA employees must serve any place in the world as the needs of to establish development, compensation Schedule. nal the Agency dictate. In addition, he has authority professional positions, primarily in research and at the basic compensation equal to rates of basic authorized for Grades 16, 17 and 18 of the General
C. General Defense Inteiligence ™ General defense intelligence encompasses the int2lligence activities, other than cryptologic, performed by elements of the Depart#ent of Defense, primarily tne Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Military Services. The General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) is the management tool used to progratn and manage the general defense intelligence effort. The Director, DIA is designated Program Manager and consolidates the submissions of the Military Departments. There is no substantial corps of professional intelligence officers in the Military Services and no professional intelligence career service for civilians in the general defense intelligence community. There are no incentives for a military officer to become an intelligence specialist, with the rasult that military billets in the intelligence community are filled by a succession of transient generalists. Civilians hecome intelligence special- ists largely on the basis of longevity only. The present Defense intelligence community with its fragmented responsibilities does not provide an environment in which a professional career intelli- gence service can be developed.
DIA was established tn 1@G] in an effort to create e mechanism to solve the probicns presented by tne disperete intelligence estimates being produced and duplicative efforts being engaged in by the Military Departments. DIA is assigned the responsibility for: 1. The organization, direction, management, and control of all DOD intelligence resources assigned to or included within the DIA. 2. Review and coordination of those intelligence functio retained by or assigned to the Military Departments. 3. Supervision of the execution of all approved plans, programs, policies, and procedures for intelligence functions not assigned to DIA. . 4. Qbtaining the maximum economy and efficiency in the allocation and management of Defense intelligence resources. 5. Responding directly to priority requests levied upon the DIA by the United States Intelligence Board. 6. Satisfying the intelligence requirements of the major components of the Department of Defense. Its charter reveals that DIA was originally intended to (1) provide for the assembly, integration and validation of al} Defense intelligence requirements, the policies and procedures for collection, and the assignment of relative priorities to the requirements, and (2) develop and produce all finished intelli- gence for the Department of Defense. It was intended that the Military Departments would retain the resources to collect and precess intelligence information, under the supervision of DIA. Concurrent with the establishment of DIA, the Directorate of Intelligence (J-2) of the Joint Staff was disestablished: and its functions assigned to the Director of DIA. The established reporting line for DIA was and is through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense. The principal problems of DIA can be summarized as too many jobs and too many masters. 30
Two areas of conflict are apparent. In addition to his administrative responsibilities as the Director of a Defense Agency, the Director of DIA must provide the steff assistance on intelligence matters to the Secretary of Defense and must also provide the staff assistance on intelligence matters to tne Joint Chiefs of Staff. On many intelligence issues, partic- ularly procedural issues with jurisdictional implications, the positions of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff can be and often are diverse. As staff officer and advisor to both, the Director of DIA finds himself in an impossible pesition. The result can be delays in staff work that in turn result in unresolved issues of significant moment. The second area of conflict is between DIA and the Military Services. The Director, DIA is charged with preparing the GDIP and with responsibility to supervise the collection and processing of intelligence by the Military Services, specifically by prescrib- ing procedures, validating requirements, assigning collection and production tasks, and reviewing the total intelligence programs of the Services. Yet, the Director of DIA reports directly to the doint Chiefs of Staff, comprised in four-fiftns majority by the Senior Officers of the four Military Services for whose intelligence programs the Director of DIA is charged with the responsibility to provide coordinated supervision... In addition, the Services determine which officers of what qualifi- cation are assigned to DIA, and they retain the power of promotion and future assignment over those so assigned. In consequence, the “supervision” by DIA of intelligence collection and processing by the Services and its fiscal control and coordination of the Service intelligence programs are largely impotent. The Military Departments are charged with organizing, train- ing and equipping intelligence forces for assignment to combatant commands, and to conduct those intelligence functions which peculiarly relate to departmental missions, including the develop- ment and support of intelligence systems organic to combatant forces. In addition, each department has retained the responsi- bility to manage and operate certain types of intelligence activi- ties, including counter-intelligence and investigative services, scientific and technical intelligence, mapping, charting and geodesy as well as their respective cryptoiogic agencies. While the DIA was established primarily to consolidate the. intelligence activities at Washington level, each Military Depart- ment currently has a larger intelligence staff than it had before the creation of DIA. Each departmental staff is still engaged in
activities clearly assigned to DIA such a5 intelligence produc- tion including the preparation of current intetligence. The Military Departments justity these activities on the basis that DIA does not have the capability to provide the intelligence they need. It is interesting that DIA cannot develop a capability to perfor: its assigned functions, while the Mibitary Departments, which provide a large proportion of DIA personnel, maintein the required capability and continue to perform the functions. A case in point is the capability to produce intelligence estimates, {or more properly, threat assessments), which are crucial to decisions on weapons systems research and development. DIA is charged with the responsibility, but has never been structured to discharge it. The Military Departments produce such estimates, and the Air Force, at least, intends to enlarge its capability. The intelligence process can generally be considered as consisting of five functions: requirements, collection, .proc- essing, production and dissemination. There is now no effective mechanism to effect a proper balance in the allocation of resources between these various functions. There is some evidence that much more information is being collected than can be processed, and unquestionably, more can be processed than can be used in pro- duction. a. Requirements In March 1962, shortly after the establishment of DIA, the JCS issued to DIA a memorandum, entitled: "Actions to Strengthen the Intelligence Capabilities of the Unified and Specified Commands," and concomitantly, a memorandum to the Commanders of each Unified and Specified Commands, entitled: "Autnority to Strengthen Intelligence Capabilities of Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands.” These memoranda directed that intelligence staffs and attendant intelligence activities be established. Specifically, an Intelligence Requirements/ Collection Office was directed to be established at each Unified and Specified Command Headquarters which would perform functions compatible with the requirements and collection functions of DIA. DIA was directed to issue guidance as to policies, procedures, format and priorities of intelligence raquirements to achieve standardization of requirements processing throughout DOD. Require ments flow would follow command channels to DIA for validation and for levy. This action was the basis for establishing layers of*
review. Tmo a@ message of arch 1962, from the JCS to the Comaanders of the Unified and Specified Commands, that body clearly pointed out that the channel for requirements is between DIA, acting for the JCS, and the Unified and Specified Comnanders; and in turn From the Unified and Specified Commanders to their components. The original intent of these actions was to take tne staffs and activities from the component commands and mave them one echelon higher, but this did not happen, since the Military Department Headquarters were still authorized direct access to the component commands. Throughout the 1960s, the various intelligence elements of the Military Departments complained about the inordinate time it takes for a requirement to be validated by DIA. The complaints are well-founded. The various layers of review consume time; tne mere courier forwarding and administra- tive handling within each organization adds to the delay. Addi- tionally, DIA was given the responsibility to insure that require- ments were not duplicative, that sufficient research was to be done to establish that the information was not in existence within the files of DIA, or other intelligence files within the intelli- gence community, prior to levying a specific collection require- ment. If the requirement had to be levied on a national agency, up to six months might pass before DIA was notified of the accept- ance of that requirement by that national agency. This time span has now been reduced to an average of about one month. Another problem has existed concerning the handling of coilection requirements for scientific and technical intelli- gence. When DIA was given the responsibility for management of scientific and technical intelligence, a specific Assistant Directorship was established and the Directorate took as its charter the DOD Directive 5105.28, which included the responsi- bility for the assembly, integration, validation, and assignment of priorities for all Defense technical intelligence collection and production requirements. The result was a conflict between the Assistant Director for Scientific and Technical Intelligence and the Assistant Director for Collection, from the chiefs down through the action officers. This reinforced the accusation that the requirements validation process was unreasonably slow, and that it was difficult to know to whom to direct requirements, questions, and/or correspondence concerning those requirements. The requirements process is slow, cumbersome and unwieldy. It functions almost entirely within the intelligence community and is fraught with an unyielding sense of sovereignty aw WwW
atoevery level. There dees not eppear to be an ef fective mechanism for potential users of intelligence to express their needs. The intelligence community must accept its responsibility to function in response to valid consumer requirements and develop procedures to permit such requirements to be expressed. It is clear that the authority and capability to coordinate intelligence requirenents, establish relative priorities, and assign collection and production tasks to the proper organizations, is the key to efficient and effective management of the intelligence process. b. Collection The Military Departments own, manage and operate almost all general Defense intelligence collection resources except the Defense Attaches, who are assigned from the Services and managed by DIA. The Departments have developed different organizational structures for controlling intelligence collection; however, they have two very important points in common: the senior intelligence officer of the Departmental Headquarters has some degree of operational control; and the intelligence units are structured in a common chain separate from the operational command structure, The Army has established the U.S. Army Intelligence Command (USAINTC) to discharge some of the Army's intelligence responsibilities including ali collection, other than that per- formed by the Army Security Agency. While USAINTC is a major command reporting directly to the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, maintains direct operational control of some of its more sensitive elements. The Navy has all of its general defense intelli- gence resources in the Naval Intelligence Command (NIC). The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence) is also the Commander, NIC. The Air Force has retained the control of non- technical sensor intelligence collection in the Departmental Staff. A world-wide human collection effort is controlled by the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, while al] the resources for counterintelligence and investigations are assigned to the Inspector General. There is no effective mechanism for the allocation of collection resources to assure that needed information is . collected in the most economical manner, consistent with the . urgency of the need.
The Defense Atomic. Support Agency is the onty Defense Agency, other than DIA, with a stated intelligence mission, with the responsibility for the counter-intelligence and security mission associated with the physical security of nuclear weapons. (1) Personnel Security Investigations Personnel security investigations are a particular type of collection performed by the investigative elements of the Military Departments: The Army Intelligence Command; the Air Force Office of Special Investigations; and the Naval Investigative Service. All background investigations are controlled by these organizations at headquarters level. They perform the background investigations for all military and civilian personnel of their respective departments and a pro rata share of civilians assigned to the various agencies and elements of the Department of Defense not in one of the Military Departments. They participate by quota in industrial security background investigations. The purpose of a personnel security investi- gation is to establish that the individual is responsible, loyal and trustworthy. These investigations can generally be considered in three categories: a. A National Agency Check (NAC) is required for granting access to SECRET defense information. In addition, a final TOP SECRET clearance may be granted te Air Force and Navy military personnel based upon an NAC which has been made any time during the previous 15 years, provided that the individ- ual has been in continuous government service or on active duty during the past 15 years with no break in service in excess of six months. An NAC includes a check of the criminal and subver- sive files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and, as appro- priate, the files of the Military Departments, the Civil Service Commission, Immigration and Naturalization Service, the House Internal Security Committee and others. b. A Background Investigation (Bi) is required for granting a TOP SECRET clearance to Defense Depart- nent civilians, Army personnel on active duty and Navy and Air Force personnel who do not meet the criteria in a above. A . BI is a "thorough inquiry" covering the individual's life duritng* 35
pote pie ess the Tast 15 yeers or since the T&th birthday, whichever is shorter. [Pt includes verification of date end place of birth, citizenship, education, employment, military service, foreign irevel, foreign connections, character references, and a hatieonal Agency Check. c. An Expanded Background Investigation (EBI) is a prerequisite to granting access to special intelli- gence, compartmented intelligence and for assignment to an Uoitra Sensitive Position. Only U.S. citizens are eligible for these accesses, and reinvestigation is mandatory at least every five years. An EBI includes an NAC, not over 12 months old, and a BI. In addition, the individual's immediate family, including spouse and former spouse(s) are checked with FBI files. Passport Office and CIA files are checked if the individ- ual has traveled outside the US for pleasure or for non-US Government-sponsored trips. Verification of citizenship is made on members of the individual's immediate family. A credit check is made on the individual at each place of residence of more than six months. Neighborhood investigations are conducted to verify the current residence and at each of the former residences where the individual resided for six meaths or more. Court records are reviewed if the individual was divorced or legally: separated to ascertain any financial obligations prescribed by the courts. In addition to the differing requirements of the Wilitary Departments for granting security clearances as indicated above, there are variations in the manner in which the investigations are done. For instance, all Departments require an NAC as a part of a BI. The Army and Navy require an RAC without reference to previous NACs. The Air Force will accept an NAC if it is less than two years old. Army and Navy neighborhood investigations and credit record reviews are con- ducted "when deemed necessary” to prove or disprove derogatory information. Air Force reguiations do not mention neighborhood investigations nor credit record reviews. The Army requires a check of court records if the individual is divorced. Navy and Air Force do net require this check. The Army and Air Force grent access to trraphic materials based on a BI, while the Navy requires
The regulations of each of the Military Departments make reference to accepting the validity of previous investigations completed by any agency of the Federal Government which meet the minimum investigative requirements of that partic- ular Department. For all practical purposes, the Departments interpret tiis narrowly and usually do not accept the investiga- tions of another Department as meeting their standards. Most raw intelligence information must be processed in some way to put it in a form suitable for use by a production analyst. Each type of information requires its own processing; e.g., Captured documents are translated or SIGINT is processed by NSA. . The Director, Central Intelligence (DCI) provides as a service of common interest within the community the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) (C). The Director, NPIC (C), is appointed by the DCI and the member departments and agencies of the United States Intelligence Board furnish personnel and support as required.| = + « — + d. Production The intelligence production activities of the DOD can be classified into four major groups: Current Intelligence; Scientific and Technical Intelligence; Mapping, Charting and Geodesy (MC&G), and general intelligence production. The March 1962 memoranda from the JCS to DIA and the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands mentioned previously also directed that the Unified and Specified Commands establish and/or operate activities, except for activities under Service cryptologic agencies, to perform intelligence functions of common interest. This was amplified and specified in July 1962 by JCS memorandum to establish a current intelligence/indica:; tions function; intelligence production including estimates func- : tion; and target intelligence function. ~~ ~ 37
| It should be noted et this point that the Wilitary Departments had not yel transferved to DIA their intelligence production elements. Thet was done in January, February end March 1°63. The assignment of intelligence production mission to the Unified and Specified Commands directly contradicted the function spelled out in the DOD Directive 5105.21 which estab- lished DIA, that DIA would "develop, produce, and provide all Defense finished intelligence and supporting data, including area analysis, military capabilities, biographic data summaries, target intelligence, and related publications for the use of all DOD components...." The JCS further had charged DIA with ensuring that there would be no duplication in the production of intelli- gence. By 1966, DIA acknowledged the realities of the situation by issuing the Defense Intelligence Pian which had been extensively coordinated with the Military Departments and the Unified and Specified Commands. The purpose of the Plan was to provide the basis for integrated planning, programming and management of Defense intelligence. It delineated the intelligence responsibilities and relationships of Department of Defense components and instituted a Department-wide system for review and analysis of intelligence operations to facilitate mutual support and eliminate wasteful duplication. One of the principles which this Plan spelled out was that “intelligence produced at higher echelons must be supplemented by local pro- duction at lower echelons in order to satisfy particular command requirements." The Plan further acknowledged that "some degree of parallel and overlapping effort is normal and necessary." The primary role of DIA thus shifted from the production of all Defens intelligence to the production of some strategic or that intelli- gence used at the JCS/O0SD/national level. The members of the JCS, as chiefs of service, still maintain current intelligence and estimates capabilities on their respective staffs to support their positions vis-a-vis those of DIA. It should be borne in mind that these actions were the result of extensive negotiations with the Military Departments and the Unified and Specified Commands including component commands. DIA has no directive authority over military intelligence activities, but only review, coordination, supervisor and a nebulous management authority. But more and more, DIA has been pushed into a management role by those very elements which maintain that DIA is incapable of producing intelligence to meet their needs.
Each of the Military Departments has continued to strengthen the capability of its staff to produce general and current inteiligence and to supervise the production of Sa? intelligence and mapping, charting and geodesy (MC&G) activities. Each Department has a large organization devoted primarily to MC&G activities: The Army Topographic Coimand of the Corps of Engineers; The Naval Oceanographic Office under the Oceanographer of the Navy; and The Aeronautical Chart and Information Center reporting to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. DIA attempts to coordinate these activities to eliminate duplication and set priorities for production. However, DIA coordinates through the intelligence elements of the Depart- mental staffs, and only in the Air Force is the MC&G agency within the staff purview of the intelligence staff. The Army and Navy MC&G elements are in agencies which are not a part of the intelligence community. There appears to be great potential for savings of personnel and expensive equipment by consolidating these three agencies into one Defense Map Service with a single command staff. Each of the Military Departments produces S&T intelligence. The Army has two S&T production agencies; both subordinate to the Army Materiel Command: The Foreign Science and Technology Center reporting to the staff of the Army Materiel Command Headquarters; and the Missile Intelligence Directorate, an element of the Army Missile Command. The Air Force S&T intelligence production agency is the Foreign Tech- nology Division of the Air Force Systems Command. The Naval Scientific and Technical Intelligence Center is an element of the NIC. Both the Army and Air Force agencies are an integral part of the research and development community and their efforts are substantially augmented from research and development funds. DIA has tasking authority over each of the Centers and assigns the specific production tasks to be accomplished with a specified scope and format. The large majority of the require- ments for S&T intelligence production arise in the research and 39
Ae i] ately ny development laboratories of the Services. DIA reviews the individual requirements and generelizes them so that wany requirements will be satisfied by one general product. The format and scope of the product is aimed primarily at the Depertnental or major command staff planners. As # cansequence, it appears that S&f intelligence products do not satisfy the requirements of the scientists in the research and development laboratories, have no relevance to the managers at OSD level, and are generally not used by Departmental and major command staff planners. Threat assessments are a type of intelligence product that are based on S&T intelligence but are usually prepared by an agency other than an S&T intelligence producer. Any recommendation or decision to develop or produce a weapon or weapons system should inciude consideration of the enemy threat in the time period when the weapons or weapons systems will be operational. Such recommendations and decisions are made in the Services and OSD. The general defense intelligence community has not yet succeeded in producing threat assessments which are accepted by the research and development community, largely because each Service tends to see the threat that will advance the weapons or systems it owns or proposes. There are, of course, many instances, such as the so-called "missile gap” of 1960, where an intelligence threat assessment has been used to bring about major weapons decisions. / DDR&E has established his own group to prepare threat assessments for use at the 05D level. There is always a danger that intelligence will be misused when an organization prepares the intelligence assess- ments that provide a basis for its operating decisions. e. Dissemination The DIA, on a daily basis, disseminates reports to elements of the DOD intelligence community based on requests from the individual elements. Dissemination of a generel nature is based on statements of intelligence needs compiled by the Military Departments and the Unified and Specified Commands. Bulk copies are shipped to the Military Departments who further disseminate them to their subordinate elements and component commands of the Unified Commands. For those products not pro- duced by DIA, dissemination lists are compiled by DIA and furnished to the producing organization for direct dissemination. 40
f. Evaluation There is one other function which should be associated with the intelligence process: evaluetion. Dis- cussions with users and potential users of intelligence seen to indicate that only a sinall proportion of the intelligence produced is useful. Many individuals who are familiar wits the Defense intelligence community are critical of its opz@ra- tion. Responsible witnesses have told our sub-committee that: (1) The Defense intelligence community does not have an effective mechanism for accomplishing the selective validation of requirements for intelligence collection or production; (2) More intelligence information is collected than can ever be processed or used, much of it is collected because the sensor represents an advance in technology without regard to the need for the information; (3) The human collection activities of the Services add little or nothing to the national capability; (4) Defense attaches do more harm than good; (5) The intelligence production analysts are not competent to produce a sound, useful product; and (6) Once produced, the product seldom reaches the individuals who need it. None of these allegations can be either proved or disproved today, because there is no suostantial effort or procedure to systematically evaluate the intelligence process in the Defense intelligence community or its substantive output. D. Special Programs From time to time, special programs are established to manage the development of some new collection resource or capability. Such developments are usually expensive and involve some degree of cooperation with some other agency of Government. A program of this type is often designated as a “National Program" and the Secretary of Defense is designated Executive Agent for the Government. As a consequence, the responsibility for such a program tends to be piaced at a relatively high level in the 4)
Headquarters of one of the Military Departments. In addition, the Secretary of Defense has established a committee to review such programs and advise him with regard to the allocation of funds to then. Some program managers attempt to use the existence of this committee and the "National" designation of the program to avoid reporting to the ASD(A). Neither the Secretary of Defense nor the head of the cooperating agency sees any ambiguity in the reporting lines, but many manhours are wasted tn debate and the task of the Secretary's senior representative is made more difficult. Another effect of his type of parochial tactic is that it establishes a Fiction that permeates the entire staff of the program. Jn one particular program which was surveyed for the Panel, the Program staff was either ignorant of their responsibilities and relationships in tne community or deliberately misleading in their statements. A different type of problem also exists with programs of this sort. Since they are predominantly concerned with the development of a new capability, the management of the program is usually assigned to a development agency. This is necessary and proper for tne development of the capability; however, it does not appear necessary that the output of the new capability also be managed by the development agency. Proper safeguards can be established to permit wider exploitation of the product on a more timely basis than at present. E. Tactical Intelligence All of the intelligence effort discussed to this point is called "Strategic" or "national" intelligence. It is the intelligence needed for planning and making decisions at the top levels of the Department of Defense as distinguished from "tactical" intelligence which is needed by the field commander for use in combat. In large part, the resources required to collect and process the raw intelligence information are identical for both strategic and tactical intelligence. However, "tactical" intellience resources are not specifically identified as such in the programming process and are not reviewed or funded in an intelligence program. The Wilitary Departments, in fulfilling their responsibility to develon and support intelligence systems organic to combat forces, can develop a significant intelligence capability that. is managed external to tha intelligence community. For examples the Air Force 440L system was developed to provide early warning
of an impending attack against the United StLales, however, the sensor system has the capability to collect Heny olner types of intelligence information, but the full Capability is not exploited. The DOD cannot afford to develop expensive resources exclusively for “strategic” or “tactical” intelligence purooses, nor to develop extensive duplicate resources for both. The development and operation of intelligence resources must be managed so that both types of requirements are satisfied at the minimum cost. The relative priorities of Strategic and tactical needs tend to permit minimum costs with good manage- ment. There is a continuum between peace and general war through which the priority needs for intelligence tend to shift from primarily strategic to primarily tactical. The same resources can be used to satisfy both needs by adjusting the application of resources to the changing pricrity. oo In time af peace or cold war, the priority is for the most timely and accurate intelligence at the national Vashington) tevel to provide a basis for the best policy and guidence decisions. The field commander should want this to be the case to insure that policy decisions affecting the force structure he might have to fight with were the best. ‘In this period of cold war, his principal intelligence need is continuity on strengths and positions of forces which might engage him if fighting erupts. In time of limited warfare, a localized force commander must have the best intelligence to conduct his operations and the national level needs timely intelligence to formulate national policy, insure the fighting commander sufficient forces, and best deploy the remaining forces to meet other commitments. In time of general war the priority is to provide the fighting force commander with the intelligence needed to prosecute the war; relatively less emphasis is placed on long-range policy decisions. The intelligence resources integral to the combatant forces must be programmed, developed and operated as a part of the Defense intelligence community. At the same time, it is necessary to manage and operate these resources in a way that assures that commanders at all levels have appropriate access to intelligence informatién they need without regard to the location or control of the sensors.
4 I rae Aad A pag TOF Ye A BAL OAR SEIT APRS A 60 SRN FD OW RATER OMAK PEE ITE LN STAM EZ at ay eanin ae, Cd SL There is a recognized need to limit access to extrenely sensitive intelligence materials because their disclosure or even knowledge of their existence could cause the source to be denied, lives to be in peril, or political repercussions that could jeopardize a U.S. position. The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, states: "The Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."
Pre Mo ee mmr BA Aen tes See resem Meanie eA dette coe Piek Om be A Lea eee Mek o. er ae ee oe sh apatite, We now find technical information, collection and processing operations and product which contain information that is precacted by more than one of the systems. It is necessary, therefore, for the user to demonstrate a need-to-know and be authorized access under each of the compart- mented areas which atfect control of a particular document. Investigative requirements and criteria for granting access to atl compartmented areas under the cognizance of the DCI are formalized in Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 1/14... However, access is actually granted by the manager of the compart-. mented system. | Since each of the major compartmented systems is managed by a different organization which jealously guards its prerogatives to control access to its information, many potential users have difficulty in determining that useful information is available and more difficulty in getting the multiple access required. _——— x a
Recommendations The Panel recomaends that the Defense intelligence community be restructured to provide a better management structure and to assure the provision of intelligence, as required, to the Presidant, other consumers at the national Tevel and to all levels of the Department from the Secretary of Defensa to operating units in the field. The new intelli- gence structure should: 1. Function in response to consumer requirements for intelligence and provide timely and quality products, responsive to those requirements, with a proper balance between collection, processing, and production activities. 2. Provide a clear chain of command from the President end the Secretary of Defense to the collection and production units that will assure the timely flow of intelligence informa- tion and minimize the injection of bias arising from Service affiliations, or operational location. 3. Provide for a single individual in the Office of the Secretary of Defense who is the clearly designated repre- . sentative of the Secretary of Defense to other Departments and Agencies of Government for intelligence matters and who is responsible to coordinate or direct all intelligence activities within the Department. 4. Provide flexibility for timely development and distribution of limited, costly resources, both trained per- sonnel and equipments, to meet changing priorities. 5. Provide the proper environment to develop an effective and efficient professional intelligence career service for both military and civilian personnel. Specifically, it is recommended that the Secretary of Defense: 1. Designate tne Deputu Seerctany for Operations to be hts agent for alk matters nelating to intelligence, to Anctude the authortty to designate those activities to be con- Aidened intelligence activities. +
. 2. ELstablzsh under the Deputy Secretary jor Operations an Assistant Secenetany of Defense for Infeblcaencee (ASO(T)] with the additional tiibe of Vanectonr of Defense Intelligence (VOI). The ASD{I)/0DL£ would be dekegated the acsponsrbality to nepnresent the Secretary of Deseuse with ether Departments and Agencies of Government for Intektltgence natters and te coondznate on déixect ak DOD intcelitaence actividtses, tnceluding national programs which are managed 4n the Department, «n accordance with exssting Law and applicable Natzenat Securtty Counci£ and Dinector of Central Intelligence Dinectives. Among his specifica responsibilities, the ASD(T)/D01 would: a. Serve as the Defense representative on the United States Intelkigence Board, and appotnt, with approval of the Deputy Secretary for Operations, nepresentatives to other government-wide intelligence committees and boards. b. Direct and control alk DOD intelligence activities not specifically designated by the Deputy Secretary for Operations as organic to combatant forces. c. Have the authority to delegate operation cf any of these activities which he deems necessary to assure maximun expLoitatian of DOD azesources. d. Review all propcsed anteLLigence prograns, monitor and evaluate al on-going inteklLigence activities and make nxecommendations to the Deputy Secretary for Operations with nreqard to alfocatzon of Aesources. e. Establish procedures to review and validate nequinements for éntelLkigence production and ceflection and evaluate the product against the requtrenent. f. Establish procedures for and pertodically conduct a systematic evaluation of the tntelligence process in the Defense intefligence community. This evaluation Anculd inceLude an asscssment of the utékity af the suteffcgence pro- ducts provided to consumers outside the Degense antellLigencae community. 47
Soap, ee ee te been eee et 4 gq. Revrow and caomsek: Athe Reaucnenients Lor 2 a ° - cr .- . . naosceveh and developuend te suppert of orfedtsacnce eediudites, h. Devetuop pollo tes avd preceduaes foe énsane the protectcon of cnlellcacnee and of Crlelhegeuee seunices and metneds grom ancatherczed disceke sure. i 3. Establish under the ASD(T)/D01: a. A Defense Securtiv Command (OSECC) to be compesed af the present Service Cayptologie Agencies and afk other Desense sntellLiagence colfecticn actsurcLi cs those which have been specifically designated by Secretary for Operations as organte to combatanz forces. The DSECC should perform these processing activities which are most efsictently associated with collection facklitles. Among his Apectif{ie nesponsstoizities, the Commander, DSECC would, unden the dinection cf the DDI: except Aan the Deputy (1) Command alk those designated Degense AntekLigence collection and associated processing and neporting activities, with authority to dekegate administrative management on operational contacl as he deems necessary. (2) Seave as Derectorn, Natéonel Securrty Agency.
(3) [nsurze the most fudictous ursce of common SLaLfh elements between fats BSECC and KSA, (4) Insune the timely dtssemsnatzon of¢ intelligence tngeramation to att approprcate Vepaninenzs, Agencies, Commands on Gpereting ants. (5) Prepare the Defense Security PaAogren for those activities fon which he 44 nesponstb£e, and neview ant coordinate the programs of intelligence collection acttvi- ties organic to the combatant forces to insure maxdmum explotta- tion of AeSGURCES. b. A Degense Intelligence Production Agency | (DIPA), to xepface the Defense Intelligence Agency, whose Dinectonr would be nesponsible for Defense Intelligence pro- duction except fcr those production activities spectfically assigned to the combatant forces by the Deputy Secretary fOr Operations. Among his specific xesponsibilitics, the Dinectonr, DIPA would: (1) Dinect those intelligence production activities which have been placed under his purview, with the autherity to delegate administrative management ok operational control as he deems necessary. (2} Provide current intelligence to designate: dndividuals and organizations. {3} Paovide threat assessments for alk eLemen. of DOD, as requined. (4) Provide {intshed intefligence to appro- priate eLements of the Department in response to expressed needs. (5) Provide alf 29D tnteLligence estimates and inputs to netionak estimates as dinected by the DDI. (6) Manage alk Degense tntekLigence produc- tion information systems, dnckuding thase of the intef&lL«agencee activities organic to the combatant forces, to tnsure inter- openabikity and optimized intelligence glow Lo and fiom all echelons of DOD.
(7) PAaepane the Dehense fiteflfacres Paogitan gor those aeltvilecs under ass direction, and review and coordinate the proqgiams og trteflicgence production activi- Lies organic fo combatant ferxces te tnsure maxtnun exnleLtation Of ACSOUNCES, BERRA AP RAM RRR ERE EE RRR RRR RRR SRE R RR ER RERRREEE RE SRR EEK RR 4. Expand the responsibsLities of the National Seeurtty Agency to inckude the processing, data base main- tenance and neporting of all AntelLitgence information ar dinected by the DDI. RRR TKR KKRRA RS KREKR RRR RKARER RRR KRA RRR RRR RRR RE RRR RE RR ERR EERE 5. Establesh within the OSECC a unified Defense Investigative Service nespanstble for alk personnel security Anvestigations within the DOD and its contractors. “ 0
aN orb » 6. Combine the Anmy Tepogrephic Command, the Navel Oceanographice Office and the Acnosauticeak Chart and Tnfcama- tion Center into a unified Defense Nap Service reporting to the Secretary of Desense through tre Deputy Secretary o§ Defense (Management of Resources). SRR RRS ERE EER EERE SER ERR RRR RRR RRR EE RRR RRR RE RRR RR ER RAE REE ERE RR 7. Take the actions necessary (a) to extend to the entine Defense intelligence community the authority that tne National Security Ageney presently has to develop a professional caneen senvice, and (b) to establish an intelkhigence career senvice for military officers. 51