)8  November   1970 
SUBJECT:  Report  on  CIA  Chilean  Task  Force  Activities, 
*      15 -September  to  3  November   1970 
-*  •    i .,. 
•      ^.^.:.      Tv-Xi^jto/v 
'*-'■  -•■^;kr!ii*2*-Z.x-.rM^.„  ^..    „  | 
1.       General 
»      ' 
a.     On  15  September  1970,    CIA  was  directed  to  try  to  prevent 
Marxist  Salvador  Allcndc's  assent  to  the  Chilean  presidency  on 
3  November.     This  effort  was  to  be  independent  of  concurrent  endeavors 
being  undertaken  through,   or  with  the  knowledge  of,   the  40  Committee, 
Department  of  State,    and  Ambassador  Korry, 
b.      Briefly,    the   situation  at  that  time  wis  the  following: 
Allende  had  attained  a  plurality  of  only  some  40,000   . 
in  the  Chilean  popular  vote  for  president.     Jorge 
Alessandri,    a  conservative  and  the  runner-up,    would 
face  Allcnde  in  a  Congressional  run-off  on  24  October, 
The  run-off  winner  would  be  invested  as  president  on 
» 
3  November.
-  2  - 
Allcndc's  designation  as  president  by  Congress  was 
very  probable  given  all  known  factors  in  the  Chilean 
political  equation. 
Given  the  dismal  prospects  of  apolitical  formula 
being  worked  out  to  prevent  Allende's  designation 
as. president  by  Congress,   remaining  alternatives 
centered  around  overcoming  the  apolitical,   constitu- 
tional-oriented inertia  of  the  Chilean-military. 
U.S.    Government  intentions  were  highly  suspect, 
particularly  in  Allcndc  and  certain  government 
sectors.     Suspicions  extended  to  all  Americans  in 
Chile  for  whatever  declared  purpose.     In  addition, 
the  Chilean  military  were  being  monitored  quite 
closely  by  the  Allcndc  forces  for  warning  signals 
of  any  interventionist  proclivities. 
2.       Special  Organization 
;  •    jl.     A  Chilean  Task  Force  was  assembled  and   functioning  three 
days  after  *CL\  was  assigned  the  mission.      It  was  headed  by 
and  highly-qualified  CIA 
recalled   from  their 
4137*
-  3  - 
osts  specifically  for  this,  purpose.     A  special  communi- 
cations channel  was  set  up  simultaneously  to  Santiago,    Chile,    and 
Buenos  Aires,   Argentina,  to  handle  sensitive  cable  traffic  for  the 
Task  Force. 
v..  '.■'*'.--':y.Y~~J:r-<'-'»-  M*-  ■_-?:>*••.■<•.— 
«  v-.*;:^. 
It  consisted  of  four  CIA  officers  with  the  appearance, 
language,   and  experience  to  sustain  the  fiction  of  various  foreign 
nationalities.     They  were  recalled  from  their  overseas  posts  to 
Washington,   briefed,   and  inserted  individually  into  Chile 
nationals.     In  Santiago,    their  only  U.S.    contact  was  a  CIA  officer  who 
had  resided  in  Santiago 
established  contact  with 
Chilean  intermediaries  or  principals  interested  in  promoting  a 
military  coup. 
Dc     By  a  special   (and  unique)  arrangement  requested  by  CIA, 
the  U.S.   Army  Attache  in  Santiago  was  placed  under  operational 
*       4 
direction  ot  the  CIA  Chief  of  Station  there.     His  assistance  and 
a 
J 
Chilean  military  contacts  were  invaluable  in  this  program.
-  4  - 
3.        The  Dual   Annroach:       Constitution;!!   and   Couo 
-  -    ■         ■  -   -  —  -  -»  ■ 
a.     Prospects  for  inducing  Congress  to  vote  for  Alessandri 
r 
rather  than'AUende  were  never  bright  and,   they  all  focused  on 
•  * 
inspiring  a  reluctant,    indecisive  President  Frci  to  assume  an  out- 
.- 
of-charactcr  role:      dynamic  leadership  within  his  own  party*  with 
the  "pcrsuadables"  in  Congress,    and  with  the  military.     Frei  was 
under  no  illusions  about  Chile's  fate  under  an  Allende  regime. 
••Chile  has  a  very  short  future,"  he  said,    "and  after  4  November  it 
will  only  have  a  past.  " 
b.     Initially,    Frci  was  willing  to  consider  and  even  advocate  a 
constitutional  solution:      the  so-called  Frei  re-election  gambit.     The 
question  was  whether  he  would  be  willing  to  commit  his  prestige 
completely  in  following  through  on  such  a  difficult  political  maneuver 
with  the  outcome,    at  best,    unassured.     The  basic  gambit  consisted 
of  marshalling  enough  Congressional  votes  to  elect  Alessandri  over 
Allende  with  the  understanding  Alessandri  would  resign  immediately 
after  inauguration  and  pave  thc-way  for  a  special  election  in  which 
Frci  could  legally  become  a-candidatc.     As  a  preliminary  step,    Frci 
coordinated  Alessandri' s-  post-election  statement  that  if  he  were
c 
-  5  - 
selected  for  the  presidency  by  Congress,    he  (Alcssandri)  would 
r 
resign,  •  The  thrust  of  CIA's  endeavors,  then,  was  to  use  every 
plausible  pressure  combined  with  inducements  to  move  Frci  down 
-»*.a«ni.A*N^C  A^>--^j;»vV^>S!(A**.-j.tt.--.y(f*;,  .'-V- . 
,--^.  - ■'jii+n-ri.-.ix'iizryaiZmt*  ,r4^&&*'^^-uUiJ>*£*r~Jt.txf,\  ■„> 
.  this  path.     To  this  end,   virtually  overnight  CIA  mobilized  an  inter- 
locking political  action  and  propaganda*  campaign  designed  both  to 
goad  and  entice  Frei  into  following  through  on  the  re-election 
gambit. 
•  c„     At  the  same  time,    recognizing  the  fallibilities  of  Frci,    CIA 
r 
focused  on  provoking  a  military  coup.     This  undertaking  was  scgrc- 
gated  from  that  of  the  Frci  f  e-clcction  gambit  with  the  intention  that 
it  be  pursued  independently  of  Frei  if  necessary,   but  with  his  acqui- 
escence if  possible. 
4.       Propaganda  Campaign 
'  *.. 
a.     The  propaganda  campaign  was  tailored  to  generating  concern 
•  •  •  . 
afeout  Chile's  future  in  terms  which  would  condition  the  thinking  and 
actio,  s  of  the  three  key  elements  in  the  Clwloan  political  equation:
-  6  -  > 
Frci  himsclft  the  Chilean  political  elite,   and  the  Chilean  military 
m 
(the  latter  two  of  which  could  well  bring  collateral  influence  to  bear 
on  Frei).     Each  of  these  elements  had  hastened  to  rationalize  its 
acceptance  of  an  Allcndc  presidency..    Their  palliative  was  the  built- 
in  checks  and  balance  of  Chile's  demonstrated  reverence  for  democ- 
racy  and  constitutionality,    sweetened  by  Allcndc's  promise  to  honor 
•  * 
these  traditions. 
b.     After  the  4  September  popular  vote,    Ihe  world  press  had 
tended  to  treat  the  prospect  of  witnessing  the  first  freely-elected 
Marxist  head  of  state  take  office  as  a  curious  aberration  of  democ- 
« 
racy  rather  than  a  politically  significant  event.      Press  interest  and 
coverage  was  relatively  light  until  the  Alicnde  forces  fortuitously 
provided  an  attractive  i6sue  which  could  be  exploited.      By 
15  September,    it  became  apparent  that  Allendc  was  conducting  a 
rather  blatant  campaign  to  intimidate  the  Chilean  information  media 
through  threats  of  assassination  and  violence,   takeovers  by  so-called 
worker  organizations,    and  ultimatums  to  the  management  of  news- 
» 
papers  and. radio  stations.      Allcndc's  purpose  was  to   smother  any 
opposition  to  his  election  by  C6ngrcss  and  to  take  advantage  of  that  , 
»
-  7  - 
peculiarly  Latin,  and  pronounced  Chilean,  propensity  to  jump  on  an 
accelerating^bandwagon  --  ideals  and  the  country's  welfare  to  the 
^^f^con^a^PPA^major  target  of  Allcnde|was^,El'MercurioMf  the  most 
prestigious  newspaper  in  Chile  and  the  major  opposition  voice  to 
v'-v^/Tri-v^*-.^*?!  «->..'•  •• 
Allendc  up  to  that  time.     CIA  mounted  a  propaganda  campaign 
centered  arovaid  "El  Mercurio'1  and  the  issue  of  Allendc  brazenly 
/  ... 
taking  his  first  step  in  "communizing"  Chile  by  attacking  freedom 
of  the  press  and,  worse,  with  the  election  still  unsettled.     Covert 
.  action  resources  were  used  to  launch: 
Cables  of  support/protest  from  leading  newspapers 
throughout  Latin  America  to  "El  Mercurio". 
--     A  protest  statement  from  the  International  Press 
Associatio 
"Freedom  of  the  press  in  Chile  is  being 
strangled  by  Communist  and  Marxist  forces  and 
<  their  allies.  ") 
-  * 
World  press  coverage  of  the  International  Press 
Association  protr.st  and  on  the  details  of  the
-  8  - 
Communist  efforts  to  seize  control  of  the  Chilean  ~ 
\ 
*  •  •  • 
-,  '    press. 
—   .A  program  of  journalists  --  actual  agents  and  other- 
# 
wise  —  travelling  to  Chile  for  on-thc-sccnc  reporting-**1 
^>.w^-c^.-v^     --  #(By 'jg "September,   CIA.  had  in  place  in,  or  enroute  to, 
Chile. IS  journalist  agents  from  10  different  countries. 
+*-   *.-•. 
This  eadre  was  supplemented  by  8  more  journalists 
--    '•■  '  t  '  ' 
from  5  countries  under  the  direction  of  high  level 
•  •  •    * 
agents  who  were,   for  the  most  part,   in  managerial 
# 
capacities  in  the  media  field. ) 
As  a  result  of  the  ensuing  furore,   Allcnde  --  sensitive  to  world 
-opinion  and  attempting  to  project  the  image  of  a  moderate,   non- 
dogmatic  socialist  --  decided  to  become  more  circumspect.     By 
•  * 
25  September,   heavy-handed  intimidation  of  the  press  had  virtually 
ceased. 
-c»     Allcnde1  s  show  of  strength  had  made  its  point:  however;    the 
.■* 
Chilean  press,   including  M£i  Mcrcuno",   never  did  regain  its 
resiliency  and  remained  thoroughly  muted  from  thereon  out.     JLack- 
ing  the  usual  forums  for  spontaneous  generation  and  replay  of 
41-330
-  9  - 
propaganda.  ;insidc  Chile,    CIA  had  to  rely  increasingly  on  its  own 
resources: 
Vs*'  \-*-*ii"-\  rt ■'zt'Cn-.'J-.l*/* 
■:X\i'i&  - 
— "    an  underground* press  dependent  upon  direct  mail 
distribution;  ^ 
—  placement  of  individual  news  items  through  agents 
""  against  the  resistance  of  a  cowed  management;   " 
*%3§&$&ss$^^^>~—>'* -financing  of  a  new,  albeit  srnall^newspapcr;  ^ 
—  subsidy  of  an  anti-Allcnde  political  group  and  its 
-  • 
--'*'-.*  radio  programs,  political  advertisements,   and 
political  rallies;    and, 
« 
--      direct  mailing  of  foreign  news  articles  to  Presi- 
dent Frei,  Mrs.    Frei,    selected  military  leaders, 
»  __ 
and  the  Chilean  domestic  press. 
This  effort  did  not,   and  could  not,   replace  a  Chilean  press,   fully 
operative  and  free  of  restraint,     Virtually  alone,   it  did  keep  the 
vo;.ce  of  public  opposition  alive  inside  Chile  for  coup  purposes 
during  the  final  weeks  of  this  period, 
d.     The  magnitude  of  the  propaganda  campaign  mounted  during 
this  sbc  week  period  in  the  Latin  American  and  European  media  -- 
4±c81
-  10  - 
aside  from  the  U.S.,    t^hc  two  "outside"  Areas  with,    by  far,    the 
greatest  influence  on  Chile  --  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  only 
partial  returns  show  726  articles,  broadcasts,  editorials,   and 
similar  items  as  a  direct  result  of  agent  activity.     Just  how  many 
*M^o£  these  itcrrHf were  replayed  is  not  known 
fNor,  has  CIA  any  idea  of  the  scope  of  the 
immeasurable  multiplier  effect  —  that  is,  how  much  its  "induced" 
•        • 
news  focused  media  interest  on  the  Chilean  issues  and  stimulated 
•    .  •---„ 
additional  coverage  --  except  that,   even  by  conservative  standards, 
this  contribution  must  have  been  both  substantial  and  significant. 
e.     Special  intelligence  and  "inside"  briefings  were  given  to 
U.S.  journalists  in  deference  to  the  international  influence  of  the 
U.S.  media.     Particularly  noteworthy  in  this  connection  was  the 
to  m 
Time  cover  story  which  owed  a  great  deal  to  written  materials  and 
briefings  provided  by  CIA.     The  Time  correspondent  in  Chile  who 
was  provit^ng  much  of  theback^round  material  for  the  story 
apparently -accepted  Allcndc's  protestations  of  moderation  and 
constitutionality  at  face  value.  .  CIA  briefings  in  V/ashingto 
4±*T8.3
-  11  - 
changed  the 
*\««fr-^v'-^v7.,S"-"'-'''.-':y: 
basic  thrust  of  the  story  in  the  final  stages  according  to  another 
^Timfe  correspondent*  .It  prbvokcd%Allendc:to  complain  on 
,.,-r-X3  October,   V\Vc  arc  suffering  the  most  brutal  and  horrible  prcs- 
,«f.7*.'  -r-r 
&£}& sure,  both  domestic  and  international,  H  singling  out  Time  in 
,r?-^r-  .,\ 
--•w.;^-  ~:' 
^■^3^^eii^^^^^^^ . ..--.  - 
...         H,,-!'^,*..    .     ,n-+^, 
particular  as  having  "openly  called"  "for  an  invasion  of  Chile. 
5.       Political  Action 
-    "si—  .'.■"*  «\.-.:«i««|«» 
a.     The  political  action  program  had  only  one  purpose:     to 
•  *  • 
induce  President  Frci  to  prevent  Alicnde's  election  by  the  Congress 
on  24  October  and,    failing  that,   to  support  --  by  benevolent  neutrality 
at  the  least  «.;d  conspiratorial  benediction  at  the  most  —  a  military 
*  coup  which  would  prevent  Ailende  from  taking  office  on  3  November. 
Realistically,   the  task  was  one  of  Attempting  to  recast  Frci,   as  a 
political  personality,   in  a  role  demanding  decisiveness  and 
*.  "machismo"  to  a  degree  that,  thus  far,  had  eluded  him.     Pressures 
« 
frdim  those  whose  opinion  and/or  approval  he  valued  --  in  combination 
with  adequate  propaganda  orchestrations  --  represented  the  only  hope 
of  converting  Frci. 
i/'  .
-  12  - 
tJErfiilJ"*  'jr^^igfe1,  '*t^*3»-*r~"  '■' 
<£.-.  ; _ ~y-£-;A**S'*^M*<**frji&9i^ i^e^^^^^i^^:^ -♦■ 
r-      Allcndc  as  president  would  be  an  unparalleled 
*&$f~~?:'£t^X?r^ 
disaster  for  Chile  (Frci  agreed). 
--      Frei  had  both  the  power  and  obligation  to  prevent 
this. 
-  ?  '  <  S**.' VT-r-»-  .—  -m-ii^ 
in  the  event  jfrci's  re-election  gambit,  succeeded, 
the  U.  S.   Government  would  be  prepared  to  provide 
8 ubstantial  support  for  Frci' s  presidential  campaign. 
41^8-;
•  13  - 
^-.•t'*x%tu<~,j>ifStfMa*  j>  '^#^j^^£l>^^^^r*•i•^^^ >^rr  r~  '■'■r--'-^-  ••■—;*-■ 
•*i  •&*■  ^rC^r^tH 
<&<g*z&&&8i&i&i& 
$f£j*&:.  "-*•'<  -'"-  ^ '^'^"  ^^^^'',^^.if;?^4^^?-^^^*fJi5;->", 
c*     In  Europe  and  l*atin  America,  prominent  and  influential 
members  of  the  Christian  Democratic  movement  as  well  as  th^ 
Catholic  Church  were  prompted  to  visit  Frci  or  send  personal 
messages  to  him  urging  that  he  save  Chile.     Some  cf  these  endeavors 
were  the  following:
The  West  Ccrman  Christian  Democratic  Party  -- 
-  -which  enjoyed  special  equities  Nvith  Frci  by  virtue 
of  generous  support  to  the  Christian  Democrats  in 
^^^^Chile  over  a  range  of  many_years  —  dispatched  • 
-■•••■--•  .  « 
several  top-level  emissaries  to  Child    They  con- 
— -*s> 
tactcd  Frci  and  other  Christian  Democratic  leaders 
-vsi*  :>  '•*<•*• 
^JlLChil 
41286
-  15  - 
f 
'*<s'----—  - 
one  of  the  international  figures 
in  Catholicism  most  respected  by  Frci,    sent  a 
personal  message  indicating  that  Frci  and  his 
party  must  oppose  Marxism, 
*'.^-».';ii',f»«*Vv*  *—  '•'  '-^4'-.* 
i-  ■.•■ 
| 
of. the  I tal i an .^-ft^^^--ff^ 
Christian  Democratic  Party  —  which  hi^.  good  . 
fraternal  relations  with  Frci  and  his  party  — 
refused  to  Intervene,     (Kc  said  it  was  a  hopeless 
situation  and  he  saw  no  point  in  risking  his  rcputa- 
tion  in  a  lost  cause.) 
•  •  • 
Collateral  efforts,  w«»rc  made  to  influence  Frci  or  those  close  to 
Frci,   such  r  zi 
«. 
m 
--      Influential  lay  Catholics  sent  messages  to  or 
visited  the  Vatican, 
hrough  a  scries  of  lay 
>  and  clerical  pressures  from  other  countries,   was 
~*     dissuaded  from  ceding  an  Allcndc  victory  prio^  to 
his  Congressional  election  actually  taking  place. 
Telegrams  were  s,cnt  Mrs,    Frci  from  women's, 
-groups  in  other  I~at!n  American  countries.    .' 
». . 
415S7
-  56  - 
Foreign  press  items  were:  mailed  directly  to  Frci, 
r 
Mrs.    Frci,   and  Christian  Democratic  Congressmen 
•-•-in  Chile.  .  •■"     -■/-—-'■?- 
Intelligence  was  surfaced  indicating  that,  once  in 
...j ... .   s.    -  -  ...  •      -        • 
power,  the  Communists  intended  to  denigrate  Frci 
as  the  first  step  in  the  dissolution  of  his  party. 
'        
 
■      .      ..  --  •        ...  -.-v-w^^/^^/.;^^ 
d."    In  spite  of  everything,   Frci  never  asserted  himself*     Indeed, 
•    * 
he  failed  to  attend  or  to  influence  otherwise  the  3-4  October  Congress 
of  his  party  at  which  time  it  was  decided  by  a  substantial  margin  to 
make  a  deal  with  Allcndc.     With  that  decision,  the  Frei  re-election 
gambit  died  nr.d  constitutional  alternatives  had  been  exhausted.     Sub- 
sequently,  Frci  did  manage  to  confide  to  several  top-ranking  military 
officers  that  he  would  not  oppose  a  coup,  with  a  guarded  implication 
he  might  even  welcome  one.     Yet,  when  a  coup  opportunity  and 
.  situation  presented  itself  upon  the  assassination  of  Army  Commander 
in  Chief  Schneider,   Frci  moved  quickly  away  from  it. 
6.       Militarv  Covin 
-    - 
&'<&     After  early  October  —  absent  any  evidence  .that  Frci  was 
responding,   politically  speaking,   to  artificial  respiration  --  a 
41x368
-  17  - 
military  coup  increasingly  suggested  itse*!f  as  the  only  possible 
solution  to  the  Allcndc  problem.     Anti-Allcndc  currents  did  exist 
in  the  military  and  the  Carabincros.  but  were  immobilized  by: 
—  -,■'  f»     ■'.  .w* 
--     the  tradition  of  military  reipefctiforjthe*  Constitution; 
" -^     ^e  public  and  private' stance  of  General  Schneider,--1*:  ^ 
.-••  •  *'■■;•■    '■■■  ■•^■fr    ■;:■'•  •  ^  .  .;'.'-;-  -  - 
Commander  in  Chief  of. the  Army,  who  advocated   .......... 
strict  adherence  to  the'  Constitution; 
—     fear  of  the  reaction  of  non-commissioned  officers 
who  tended  to  harbor  pro-Allende  sympathies;    and, 
a  strong  propensity  to  accept  Allcndc  blandishments 
to  the  effect  that  the  military  had  little  to  fear  from 
him. 
*    Although  individual  officers  among  the  top  leadership  of  the  military 
a 
and  Carabincros  were  pre-disposcd  to -take  action,  they  felt  the  Army 
was  central  to  a  successful  coup,   and,   as  long  as  General  Schneider 
remained  the  head  of  the  Army,   the  Arm^  could  not  be  counted  upon. 
•  *    •  •        • 
General  Schneider's  attitude  could  only  be  changed  through  the 
personal  intervention  and  forceful  advocacy  of  a  coup  by  President 
Prci;    something,   it  became  obvious,  the  latter  was  most  unlikely  to 
*  • 
bring  himself  to  do.