Chile’s economic and climatic characteristics lend themselves to treatment along 
the lines of the east-west divisions set forth above. 
North Chile which consists entirely of the Atacama nitrate desert is one of the 
most distinct natural regions of South America. 
Here is to be found one of the few 
spots in the world where no rain has ever been recorded. 
The Atacama desert has only 
one river (the Loa) which crosses the desert, cuts through the coastal range and 
- 
reaches the sea. 
Within the mountain valleys a small but fairly dependable supply of 
© 
water can be tapped by digging ordinary wells, but in the desert, away from the moun- 
tains, the water table is too deep to be reached in this way. 
The coast has a more 
uniform temperature than the interior, where the range is. wider both as between seasons 
and as between night and day (the rapid loss of heat at night and in winter often brings 
the temperature close to the freezing point, and at such times low fog banks hang over 
the desert). 
Both the coast and the interior are bare of vegetation. 
North Chile has no harbors or protected anchorages. 
Most of the inhabited places 
in the area are port towns, built on the narrow shelves of the coastal escarpments. 
Ships lie offshore and transfer cargo by lighters, a hazardous undertaking even under 
the most favorable conditions. 
Some of the ports (Pisagua, Iquique, Tocopilla, Mejil- 
lones, Antofagasta, Taltal, and Caldera) are sizeable towns, and the larger ones have 
imposing buildings, paved streets, etc. Each, however, must draw the building materials 
it uses, the food it consumes, and much of the water it drinks, from distant sources. 
The core of the Chilean nation is the northern portion of Central Chile (between 
Copiapé and Concepcién). Here also the harbors, save where promontories give partial 
protection from the prevailing southerly winds (as at Valparaiso, Talcahuano, and 
Arauco), are fewin number. 
The winters here are mild and wet, the summers cool and 
dry. The range of temperature is within the limits regarded as offering optimum con- 
ditions forhuman comfort and energy. 
The summer growing season, when not entirely 
dry, has an average of less than half an inch of rain in the driest month, so that irriga- 
tion is necessary. 
There are few places in the world where a 
i 
iacoraarscan of — 
density depends upon irrigated lands. 
In the southern portion of Central Chile, where lies between diate and Puerto 
Montt, there are dense forests, supported by a heavy rainfall in all months of the year. 
This is the Chilean “lake district.” 
Good land for agriculture in the northern portion 
of Central Chile is land that can be moistened; good land in the southern portion is land 
that can be dried. 
South of Osorno the forest is so dense and wet that it cannot be 
levelled even by burning. 
Most of the farms in the area raise livestock. 
South Chile (Puerto Montt to Cape Horn) is the sole remaining Chilean frontier, 
and gives a home to only one per cent of Chile’s population. — Numerous isolated places 
in this vast stretch of country could be colonized, but ‘economic conditions there are 
such that it is unlikely that large numbers of people will settle there within the near 
- 
future. 
The glacial troughs are drowned along the coast; forming an intricate pattern 
of channels, flords, and islands. 
It is a land of high winds and driving rains. which 
reach 200 inches a year in some spots. 
It, ‘too, is 
wooded. 
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APPENDIX D 
POPULATION STATISTICS AND CHARACTERISTICS 
Chile has a fairly high proportion (about 25%) of people of pure European descent, 
mainly Spanish Basques. Mestizos (people of mixed Spanish and Indian blood) num- 
ber around 70%, but the white strain in these persons of mixed race is the dominant 
element and is said to be higher than in the other Latin American countries. 
Of the 
foreign population (about 105,000), the Germans are the most numerous (over 60,000) 
and the most widely important economically. 
: 
Through the past twenty years Chile’s birth rate has declined from over 40 per 
thousand to 33, its death rate from 31 to 19. The present natural increase is 14 per cent 
per decade, but infant mortality runs to 180 per thousand. 
Although this is a marked 
improvement over the rate a generation ago (265 per thousand), it is nevertheless one of 
the highest, recorded infant mortality rates in the world. 
_ 
- 
The three important classes in Chilean society roughly parallel the jaan three 
main geographical sections. 
In the north are the big mining properties, foreign-owned 
and managed; and the Chilean population in this region consists predominantly of the 
roto—the 
: “ragged laborer” brought by contract from the large estates of the central 
region where his ancestors were peons. 
Asa miner he receives higher wages, but his life 
in the desert is by no means pleasant. As a member of a union he now enjoys notably 
greater economic and political power than formerly. 
In central Chile the average employer and the average employee are soth Chileans. 
The typical form of wealth is the large estate, whose owner is one.of the “best” people 
and one of the country’s traditional leaders. 
His right to command is inherited, and 
he is therefore inclined to take it for: granted and to assert it with paternalistic severity. 
He is accustomed to vote his peons en masse in favor of those candidates who guarantee 
continuance of the old order. 
Because of tuberculosis, illiteracy, and aaa the 
peon stands condemned to a relatively early death. 
The southern’ third of the country is dominated by the German element. The 
latter’s presence has made for a rigid social structure. 
Reactionary Chilean nation- 
alists rely upon it for part of their support. 
A fourth group, drawn from all the others but increasingly saacate from them, 
is gradually spreading itself over the entire republic. 
It includes school teachers, social 
workers, government employees (particularly in the social security agencies), university 
students, writers, and labor leaders, ‘and it 
re 
of its 
to the con- 
1. 
POPULATION BY PROVINCES (as oF DECEMBER 31, 1944). 
| 
Province 
Population 
Density per Square Mile 
Tarapaca 
| 
100,000 
4.7 
Antofagasta 
152,000 
: 
3.1 
Coquimbo 
259,000 
616.8 
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HARRY S, 
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Lianquihue 
Chiloé 
Aysén 
Magallanes 
CHILE 
124,000 
472,000 
1,498,000 
204,000 
136,000 
85,000 
158,000 
63,000 
133,000 
222,000 
337,000 
74,000 
124,000 
149,000 
344,000 
192,000 
104,000 
120,000 
102,000 
18,000 
51,000 
5,315,000 
2. 
EmpPpLoyMent Statistics (1946). 
Industry 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 
Extractive industries 
_ Processing industries 
Building and construction 
Transportation and communication 
Commerce 
- Hotels and personal service 
Public services 
Domestic servants 
Other 
| ToraL 
3. SianiricanTLy Larcr 
Nationality 
Spanish 
Italian 
British 
French 
German 
SECRET 
Auren Groups (1 
Employers 
159,945 
2,162 
90,425 
5,434 
946). 
Number 
23,700 
10,000 
7,000 
§,000 
30,000’ 
* Estimated total population, as of 1 January 1947, 5,466,014. 
* Plus 100,000 individuals of German descent resident in Chile. 
D-2 
Employees 
459,618 
93,928 
207,554 
92,836 
64,716 
64,350 
30,416 
174,033 
148,634 
4,171 
1,800,256 
1,768,721 
Total 
619,563 
96,090 
297,979 
58,270 
74,518 
162,308 
99,553 
221,178 
148,634 
30,628 
Paperg: of 
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| PRESIDENT'S SECRETARY FILES 
Aconcagua 
Valparaiso 
| 
253.6 
O’Higgins 
74.3 
Colchagua 
| 
42.0 
Curicé 
38.3 
Talca 
42.5 
Maule 
28.7 
Linares 
| 
33.0 
Nuble 
40.4 
Concepcién 
153.1 
Arauco 
33.4 
Bio-Bio 
28.5 
Malleco 
27.2 
Cautin 
51.3 
Valdivia 
| 
24.9 
| 
Osorno 
~ 
26.9 
16.8 
11.4 
| 
0.5 
| 
1.0 
18.6 
9,802 
97,958 
29,137 
47,145 
26,457
Papers of 
HARRY Ss, TR 
SECRET 
APPENDIX E 
BIOGRAPHICAL DATA 
1. 
GABRIEL GONZALEZ VIDELA. 
Age, approximately 47. 
Leader of Radical Party and President of Chile. 
He was 
born in La Serena (Coquimbo Province) of lower-middle-class parents. 
Between his 
graduation from the University of Santiago Law School in 1922 and 1929 he practiced 
law in La Serena; since then he has been continuously engaged in politics and business. 
He has served in both houses of Congress and in the Foreign Service. He has been 
engaged in numerous mining and industrial enterprises. 
In college, Gonzalez was a “fellow-traveler,” and led a Communist-influenced 
movement against Carlos Ibanez, whom he continually opposed later while in the House 
of Deputies. 
Gonzalez was formerly a member of the Chilean-Spanish Committee of 
_ 
Aid to the Spanish People and the Movement for Relation of Chile with the Soviet Union, 
both front organizations. 
He resigned from these organizations upon assuming the 
presidency. 
Gonzalez favors woman suffrage, increased immigration of Italians for Chilean 
farms, immigration of technical workers, and importation of foreign capital for 
industrialization. 
2. 
Ricardo Fonseca AGUAYO. 
Age 41. 
Leader of the younger elements in the Chilean Communist Party, he was 
recently elected Secretary-General of the Party. 
He was born in Puerto Saaverda of 
humble parents, and attended the normal school in Victoria. 
He was a school teacher 
until, during the Ibanez regime, he entered the Communist Party. 
In 1932 he served 
as one of the leaders in a teachers’ strike for better working conditions, and in 1936, 
he was elected regional secretary of the Party for Santiago. 
He was sentenced to prison 
in 1936 after being arrested as a delegate of the teachers to a conference to unify the 
trade unions. 
As Director of the Professors’ Union and Secretary-General of the Young 
Communists he attended the World Youth Peace Congress, held in 1938 in the United 
States. 
He has been a Communist Deputy and director of the newspaper El Siglo. 
The group that backs Fonseca is said to be extremist in mood, and committed to 
constant mass agitation as a political tactic. 
Reportedly on orders from the recently 
reactivated South American Bureau of the Third International in Buenos Aires, Fonseca 
is said to have insisted on an intensive anti-United States press campaign. 
His trips 
to Argentina during the past year have reportedly been for the purpose of organizing 
the Argentine Communists as well as for keeping in contact with the South American 
bureau. 
Fonseca claims to be pro-United Nations, but is markedly pro-Soviet where 
international issues are concerned. 
He is hostile to France, Argentina, and the United 
States. 
3. 
BERNARDO IBANEZ AGUILA. 
Age 44. 
He was Secretary-General of the Socialist Party and Socialist Party candi- 
date in the last presidential election. 
He was born in Bio-Bio Province and educated at 
the Normal School of the University of Chile, where he received a Primary School 
Teacher’s Degree in 1922. 
He was a school teacher from 1922 until 1932, when he was 
expelled from the profession for membership in the militant Communist Party and for 
his activities as an organizer for the teachers’ union. 
In 1936 he helped to found the 
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HARRY S. TRUMAN 
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SECRET 
Professors’ Union of Chile, and led it into the CTCH. In the same year he helped to 
_ 
found the Socialist Party, and was expelled from the Communist Party. 
In 1939 he was elected Secretary-General of the CTCH. From 1940 to 1944 he 
served as National Deputy from Valparaiso. 
That he possesses great gifts is indicated 
by his rapid rise in the ILO; he served as a member of the ILO Administrative Council 
at the Geneva Conference in 1947 despite the fact that the Chilean delegation included 
no Socialists. 
In 1942 he was a delegate to the Congress of Democracies in Montevideo, 
and in 1943 and again in 1947 he visited the United States (at the invitation of both 
the CIO andthe AFofL). 
In 1944 he was elected Vice-President of the Latin American 
Confederation of Labor. 
Particularly since the schism in the CTCH, Ibanez has been 
in direct and constant conflict with Vicente Lombardo Toledano, President of the — 
Latin American Confederation of Labor. 
During the war he successfully led the 
anti-Nazi movement among workers, students, and professors; and since the war he has 
denounced Communism vehemently, urging the retention of democracy in Chile. 
Since 
the Communists formed a separate labor group he has headed the Socialist sector of 
the CTCH, and has refused to relinquish his post as Secretary-General under Communist 
pressure (the Communists denounce him as a traitor and call him an “agent of the 
United States”). 
4. 
Gustavo Ross Santa Maria. 
Age 68. 
Leader of the conservative faction of the Liberal 
1 Party. He was born in 
Valparaiso, of well-to-do parents. 
After finishing his schooling, he acquired extensive 
mining interests, which he sold out prior to 1920 to enter the stock market. 
His trans- 
actions and manipulations there earned him a reputation as a financial “wizard.” 
He 
was defeated for the Senate in 1924, and was deported by Carlos Ibanez in 1927, in part, 
it seems, because of his close friendship with Alessandri. 
Ross was recalled by Ales- 
sandri to take the position of Minister of Finance in 1932, at which time he became a 
Director of the Central Bank and the organizer and first president of the Nitrate and 
Iodine Sales Corporation. 
In the recent cabinet change he was boosted by the Liberals to head the combined 
Ministries of Finance and Economy and Commerce. 
Openly sarcastic remarks he had 
made about Gonzalez Videla and his “left-wing” supporters precluded Ross’ appoint- 
ment. 
Although he is still ambitious politically, it is reported that his major concern 
at the moment is to go to Europe representing Chilean nitrates and copper. — 
Gustavo Ross, though now accounted pro-US, is said to have been strongly anti- 
US in the 1920’s and 1930’s. 
He is also said to be pro-French, pro-British, strongly 
anti-Russian, and anti-Communist. 
He is president of the aristocratic, arch-conserva- 
tive Union Club. 
He favors close collaboration between the Liberal Party and the 
Conservative Party. 
| 
5. 
Epuarpo Cruz CoKE LASSABE. 
Age 48. An industrialist, physician, and a Senator, he is the outstanding member 
of the Conservative Party. 
Born in Valparaiso (of Chilean-French extraction), he 
holds a degree from the University of Chile Medical School. 
Following a brief period 
Of private medical practice (1921-1925), he was named Director of Sanitas, a United 
States-owned chemical and pharmaceutical corporation. 
While employed in that 
capacity, he practiced medicine at the San Juan de Dios Hospital and taught psycho- 
logical and pathological chemistry at the University of Chile. 
: 
Cruz Coke entered politics in 1936, when he was appointed Minister of Health, a 
position which he resigned in 1939 following a disagreement with Alessandri. 
In 1941 
he was elected Senator for Santiago on a Conservative Party ticket, and became Vice- 
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President of the Conservative Party. In 1942 he supported the Radical candidate Rios 
for the presidency. 
By the middle of 1943, it had become evident that Cruz Coke was 
one of Chile’s outstanding anti-Fascist leaders and one of its most sincere spokesmen 
for the cause of the United States and the United Nations. 
Since that time his speeches 
in the Senate, his numerous magazine articles, and his lectures have all emphasized 
his belief that Chile’s best interests lie with the United States. 
He was among the few 
Conservatives who took part in the popular mass demonstration in favor of Chile’s 
rupture of relations with the Axis in November 1942. 
Cruze Coke is a devout Catholic, but represents the modern so-called “liberal” 
tendency discernible in some quarters of the Roman Church. 
For that reason, some 
-pro-Communists reportedly say that but for Conservative backing he would be the finest 
presidential timber. 
His record suggests that he follows what he considers to be good 
policy without regard to political expediency. 
6. 
FERNANDO ALESSANDRI RODRIGUEZ. 
Age 50. Senator from Tarapaca and Antofagasta, an eminent lawyer and professor, 
and the son of Arturo Alessandri Palma, ex-President of Chile. 
Fernando Alessandri 
was born in Santiago, and was educated at the National Institute in Santiago and at 
the University of Chile Law School, from which he graduated in 1919. 
Since 1925, he 
has been a faculty member in the University of Chile Law School. 
His popularity with 
students and ex-students caused Aguirre Cerda to retain him at a time when numerous 
academic leaders were being removed from their posts in connection with the 1940 
shake-up. 
He has to some extent inherited his father’s position in the Liberal Party. 
LIBRARY 
Papers of 
| 
HARRY S, TRUMAN 
PRESIDENT! 
SECRETAR Y FILE 
| 
E-3 
SECRET
| 
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
FILED 
| 
President 
orrival in the US on 12 
a. tiie when bis slichtl: left-of-covter cozlition govern- 
went 
faces serious econo:tic probleis wich cowld develop into a 
political crisis within the next sow 
Chile's economic situction declined 
after 
Yorld 
“or TIT until mid-1O4Ss3 since tion tne drop in tho world nrice 
of comer 
seriously Gieruptced tue country's economy, 
Govern 
sent revenues are lover, 
nas inereased, c:morts 
and i:morts heve ccelined, and tac cost of living has risen 
toly 20 
econonie det ordoratiion nag 
accounenica ly increasing ctrain between Lebor and nanagcinent 
Smad 
well os between the 
end 
the neopke dn general, 
Propos od 
vo strengchen tho couticy's 
} 
counters notestial 
tntoctriel und 
hs been 
lack of funds, 
sovroover, 
Ord 
the 
necessary to 
even 
program have so inercased popular unrest, 
; 
Sobrunry 1950 
emiris bad alreniv resulicd in 
for enercetic 
ci covelonuent weoice’ 
‘ 
PAPERS OF HARRY 
5S. TRUMAN 
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» 
¥ 
+ 
XX, 
| 
Reonomian 
in Chile 
| 
é 
|
‘ 
pre 
esent situation is becoting more “Sauvorable for exploitation 
‘yr Chile! g Cormuiist Pe ty, now nymbering 
25,000. 
The eddition of leftists to the coalition has: 
(1) provided 
she 
with more friends in the Gabinot and Congress; 
and (2) increased pressure for sdonsings neasures which would five 
relief to 
people but would not strenzthen the nation's 
over-all economic situatcon. 
The eovernnont's collity ta resist this pressure denends 
larroly on its ebilisy to raice 
Lunds for an investzent 
propre. 
h drastic vevision 
of the country's tax structure vould 
not oils: fail to nrovide tre nececcsry funds 
would have adverse 
e-fects on the strate. 
conror industry as well as 
on owicr US interests in sac country. 
im Chile thus depends 
an 
forei¢n aid, 
There is little 
16% 
prosnees what the Chilean Government vill obtain the full 
it consicers necessary. 
steccinus of linived foreign aid, however, 
be svilielens te 
fovermiant to ease political and 
cconortie tensions uitiows 
Cetrimont to its 
developnents] procran 
Witnous such aid, tne “overiricnt is 
likely to be able 
to rosict 
ollevintion of econonic 
oistcnee tO euch metetrcs weve 
result in the fornetion 
of & store 
ens, 
could mot 
ta mirsue 
site poli eics G2 
by tne present covern: rent, 
particulariy with re 
renting full supoort to the US 
in the cold. 
(2) packine democrat 
uGioeratic forces throughout Latin 
Americas and (3) 
closer econonic tics with the US, 
4. HILLENKOETTER 
REAR AOQMIRAL, 
USN 
OR 
OF CENTRAL 
INTELLIGENCE 
f 
™ 
s 
a 
HARRY 
S, PRUMAN LIDRARY 
PAPERS 
OF HARRY 5. TRUM... 
bg 
; 
a 
“pee 
Survival of 
tho nz 
/ 
of
| 
| 
! 
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
WASHINGTON 23, D.C, 
a 
17 SEP 1962 
Mr. Ralph A. Dungen 
Special Assistant to the President 
The White House 
| 
Dear Ralphs 
Attached is s nemcvendun containing some observations 
on the Chilean Christion Danocratie posture during the recent 
Chilean labor conpres2. 
This is forwarded as a result of 
your inquiry to Mr. Herbert at a recent Latin-American Policy 
} 
| 
Conmittee meeting. 
Sincerely yours, 
Richard Helms 
Deputy Director (Plans) 
Attachment 
CLASSIFICATIC: LEVIE. 
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IMPDET CL BY 29% 577 | 
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MEMORANDUM 
SUBJECT: 
Chilean Christian Democratic Posture During 
the Recent CUTCh Congress in Santiago, Chile 
(1-5 August 1962) 
a 
Prior to the Third National Congress of the 
Chilean Central 
Labor Confederation (CUTCh), Communists 
effectively controlled CUTCH, whose estimated 375,000 
membership makes it by far the largest single labor 
organization in Chile. 
The four top officers included 
two Communists and two members.of the Socialist Party-- 
’ 
‘the sixth strongest political grouping in Chile. 
The 
21 mar CUTCh Directive Council was made up of 12 
Communists, 
8 Socialists and one Independent. 
Christian 
| 
labor groups had been repeatedly offered positions on 
the Council in the past, but consistently declined, 
correctly concluding that, since they were a distinct 
minority and had small resources in contrast with the 
well-funded Communists, 
their presence would only 
serve the CUTCh claim that it represents all Chilean 
labor. 
2. 
The Christian Democratic Party has grown 
appreciably since the Inst CUTCh Congress in 1959, 
however; and, there were reasons to believe that 
Christian laborites stood a chance--although a 6lim 
one--of contesting Communist domination of the CUTCh 
at the Third Congress, by being represented in large 
numbers and by gaining support of some Socialist delegates, 
Strategy was to wrest control of the CUTCh from the 
CLASSIFICATION 
soneucted Cn 
Wary 14 78 
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IMPOIT CL PY 0553771 
-SEGRET
Commurists or failing that, to stage a properly-timed 
protest walk-out, 
thus demonstrating clearly that 
CUTCh, in its present political orientation does not 
speak for all Chilean labor. 
It was recognized at 
— 
the outset, that Christian laborites, reflecting the 
attitudes of the parent political group, were naive 
in comparison with the seasoned, astute Cummunist- 
Socialist bloc, over-confident of their strength and 
ability to maneuver, and poorly organized, 
| 
| 
3. 
About 450 Christian laborites and some 
| 
133 Radical laborites attended the Congress, 
These 
| 
groups voted as a bloc. 
Arrayed against them were 
751 Communists and 686 Socialist delegates. 
As the 
| 
Congress progressed, 
it wes clear that the Christian 
| 
labor delegates could not carry the day. ° Instead of 
walking out, however, a political decision was made 
to remain: 
the decision probebly rested on a 
judgement that Christian labor elements could more 
effectively break Communist control of CUTCh by 
working from within CUTCh rather than from outside 
and, additionally, 
they could proselyte for political 
Support among CUTCh member unions. 
In view of the 
| 
Christian labor decision to remain in the Congress, 
— 
the Communist-Socialist bloc, recognizing a means 
| 
to bolster the CUTCh claim of representing all Chilean 
labor, saw to it that the Christian labor groups 
received three seats on the now 15-man Council, 
compared with 6 for the Communists and 5 for the 
Socialists; Radical Party laborites received one 
seat. 
Christian laborites got two of the five top 
positions (second vice-president'‘and assistant 
| 
secretary-general), 
a Sociaziist became CUTCh president, 
: 
a Radical first vice-president, while the Communists 
took the all-important secretary-general position. 
4. 
Net results of the Congress, then, was that 
Christian labor whose importance had been minimal 
on the national scale gained recognition in upper 
CUTCh echelons and is.now in position where some 
influence from within can be exerted. 
Additionally, 
for the first time Christian and Radical delegates 
| 
collaborated--an 
event of importance since it is 
| 
intended to bring the two parent Parties together for the 
| 
1964 Presidential elections. 
On the debit side, are the 
& 
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considerations that the CUTCh claim of speaking for 
all Chilean labor hes been bolstered. 
Christian 
labor’s CUTCh membership is an exploitable propaganda 
and political item and unless shown otherwise, CUTCh 
can claim Christian labor's implicit acquiesence in the 
Congress’ pro-Cuba resolution and decision to support 
establishment of a leftist regional labor organization 
in South America, 
5, 
It might be argued that had the Inter-American 
Regional Workers Organization (ORIT) participated actively 
in the CUTCh Congress, the outcome would have been a 
bit more favorable. 
Facts do not bear cut this contention: 
a) ORIT's adamant policy of non-collaboration 
with Communist labor made its participation 
in 
the Congress impossible xs a matter of basic 
posture. 
b) Communist control of the Credentials 
.Committee and awareness of Christian labor's 
intention to attend in strength would probably 
_ have made them refrain from permitting CNT delegates 
to attend in large numbers in any case. 
c) Even if the ORIT affiliated confederations, 
National Workers (CNI) and Maritime Workers (COMACH) 
whose total membership is about 55,000, had been 
allowed to send as many delegates as Christian 
labor groups, 
the combined total of Chris. ian, 
Radical, CNT, and COMACH delegates would have 
fallen short of the Communist-Soclalist Bloc total 
and they would not have acted in as united a fashion 
as the latter, 
d) Christian laborites refused an ORIT 
invitaticn to join with CNT to work a strategy 
Similar to that noted above against the 
Communist-Socialist bloc. 
The Christians explained 
that their political planning for 1964 called for 
them to enter CUTCh and not walk out even if their 
program to gain contrel evaporated, 
Thus while 
a small. CNT delegation would probably have been 
relied upon to walk out, the end result--1.e., 
Communist/Socialist domination of the organization-- 
would have been’ the Sane, 
| 
6. 
To sum up: 
The decision of the Christian 
Labor Democrats to remain in the Congress was a political 
| 
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‘ 
e 
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Par 
oon 
one, made by Senator FREI MWontalva, 
the probable 
Christian Democratic Party presidential nominee in 
1964 who fe) t that his party's plans for the 
1964 Presidential election could best be served 
py the presence of Christian labor groups within 
cl 
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1 September 1964 
Chilean Eloction 
lL. 
Tne total of registered voters for the 4 Seotenber 
1934 @lection is 2,915, 009, 45.7% ox whom are women. 
An 
estimated 33% turnout is exnected amounting to aporoximately 
rivers 000 voters going to the polls. 
2. We have on nand three distinct sets of éleetina 
predictions: 
a. 
The Christian Democrats computation of 
11 August 1964. 
b. 
Tne FRAP projection of 22 August 1964. 
Polls undertaken on behalf of the Agency 
fone undertaken in lay 
all of Chile, and 
one conducted in August 1964 in the cities of 
Santiago and Valvaraiso and "a tke provi-ses of 
Antofagasta, Coquimdo, Nuble, Concepcion and Cautin.) 
The findings of these estinates are listed below. 
The 
last parag: ranh of this memorandum gives our own forecast, 
The PDC Zlection Prediction: 
Frei. 
56 .4% 
“D778, 000 votes 
Allende 
40.2% 
- 
983,000 votes 
_ 
Duran 
3.4% 
- 
82,000 votes 
Thus, according to the PDC estimate, Frei would win by a 
margin of 395,000 votes or 16.2% over Allende; he would have 
the majority of the votes cast 
(see attachment 1 for breakdown 
by individual provinces). 
Declassified 
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4, 
The FRAP Torecast; 
This estimate gives Allonde a majority of 51.4% of 
the votes cz2st and an edge of 217,000 votes or 9% over Troi: 
Frei 
42.4% 
~ 
1,017 , 900 votes 
Allende 
51.4% 
- 
1,235,500 votes 
Duran 
6 .2% 
- 
150,000 votes 
(See attachnent 1 for breakdown by individual provinces, ) 
Arency 
a. 
The Agency's May 1964 National Sample shows: 
Frei 
52% 
o 
1,258,000 votes 
Allende 
36% 
- 
871,000 votes 
Duran 
1% 
- 
169,000 votes 
Undecided 
5% 
120,000 votes 
This would give Frei a snall majority of the vot es cast with 
2 margin of "387, 000 or 15% over Aliende. 
| 
August 1964 sazplin 
of the important areas 
of Santiago and Valparaiso shows Frei ahead 
by 20.2% over 
Allende in these cities: 
rrei 
54.4% 
Allende 
34.2% 
Duran 
6.9% 
Undecided 
4.5% 
(Jor an examination of details as well as regional polling 
cata in five provinces, please see attachments 2 and 3.) 
Copy 
Mattes 
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Pre,
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6. 
Divisional Estimate: 
a. 
\e do not believe that it is possible to predict 
shis election with any great cegree of accuracy, 
tha 
is to say, 
wivhin one to two percent. 
For one thing, polling must “be 
relatively inexact in view of the fact that exvected voters this 
year oxetaud by nore tisn one 
ths numabor of voters in the 
past nonresidential election. 
(This greatly increased expected 
vote ~S due mainly to laws passed curing the Aessandri Fegine 
macing voting mandatory.) 
‘4s a consequence, pollsters do not 
nase available the type of district bench marks which are used 
SO exc insively in polling in the United States. 
The enormously 
iacressed registration and exnected vote can be assumed, however, 
to be of distinct advantage to the Christian Democrats in view 
of the fact that new registration 
will be heavily weigated among 
wornén wio by and large favor Zrei by more than two-thirds. 
b. 
Some general regional observations are of interest, 
The northern provinces have traditionally been communist and 
sxcical strongholds. 
The PDO has worked hard to change this 
and Allende ssems to have ony 2 Slightly favorable margin there, 
In the central urban area with its high number of women 
° 
recistzants Frei should win Santiago and Valparaiso by a 
suostancial margin. 
In the central rural area Allende nay 
carry Aconcagua and Talca with the vote being close all the 
way down to ilalleco. 
The PDC seens to do not badiy anong the 
campesinos in Curico, Talca and Chillan. 
In the race in 
Concencion, traditionally radical and marxist, Frei has a 
50-50 chance. 
c. 
From recent volls it would appear that the 
undecided vote as of the middle of August is about 5 percent. 
There is sone indication that this undecided vote comes 
principally from Allende's senmi-deZectors; 
logically, one 
would expect it to be composed also of radicals who find it 
difficult to choose between a far leftist and a catholic candidate, 
ad, 
We believe that Frei will win by a clear majority. 
From the point of view of U.S. interests a clear majority fos. 
rrei would be highly satisfactory and therefore we believe that 
this is the important point rather than trying to predict the 
exact percentage. 
Such a majority would mean that the election 
COPY 
Lyndow 
Toles son Libeury 
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would not have to be thrown to congress and therefore that 
the uncertainties surrounding thas process, including tase 
nossibility of rioting, would be climinated. 
Furthermore, 
wita a clear majority Frei would net nave to make any 
political deals with other parties. 
Torced to predict, 
however, wo would givo tho following: 
Frei 
= 53 percont; 
Allende - 41 percent; Duran - 6 percent. 
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ie 
Lyndon 
Johnson Libr ry 
the 
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' the United Nations as un investic¢ator of the Hungarian revolt. 
(Pronounced: 
 YAKE-Ess) 
COLOMBIA 
BxeTPresident 
of whe Republic 
Mected President by an overwheluine majority in May 1958, and thus 
eceding the fiveeman Military Junta which hod governed Colombia on an 
in torim basis sinee the downfall of the Rojas vices in May 1957, Alberto 
j.eras 
is one of Latin America's most ourstanding and respected states- 
mon, 
Noted for his moderation, intellect and personal integrity. he has 
achieved ccntiderable success 
im journalism, pol. 
diplomacy and 
government, 
In a comprehensive 
messare delivered 
during July 1961, he defended his Netionzi. Front, a coalition of the 
majority wings. 
of the Conservative and Liberal Parties gave it credit 
for eliminating past political ADUSOG (such as voting frauds), and 
declared that continued narty coalition was 
essential to Colombia's future. 
In the same message Lleras, a staunc h antennas of collective action, 
charged that the United Stutes was primarily responsible for the presence 
of a socialist regime in Cuba because of een unilateral. approach to tie 
issue, but arrecd that the Lavin American countries 
did not initially 
recognize the dangers presented by the Castro government, 
Lleras further 
stated that ail countries, especiuliy Cuba, should be asked to reaffirm 
their ties to the inter-American system and that the Organization of 
American States (OAS) must take anpsrpriate measures to meet the threat 
arising from 
the present situation. 
Alberto Lleras Camargo was born on 3 July 1906, in Bogota, into a 
soor family of distinguished linease. 
After studying briefly at the 
Sehool of Law and Politica? Science of the National University in Bogota, 
; 
he left at the age of 17 to become 4 journalist, 
In the course of his 
; 
career on various newspapers and muge2zines in Bogota and Buenos Aires, 
and as a European correspondent, Lleras demonstrated singular ability. 
In 1930 he became editor-in-chief of the Bovolu deily, El Tiempo, one 
of Colombia's oldest and most influential. newspapers, thus establishing 
a continental reputation before he reached the age of 30, 
His political 
| 
career also began in 1930, fuhen he was elected to the National Chamber 
Pe 
of Deputies from Bogota, 
Lleras' subscaquent positions have included the 
following: 
Minister of Government (1935-28, and 1943-45); Minister of 
Foreic¢n Affairs (1945); Ambassador to the United States (1943); President 
of Colombia (1945-46); Secretary General of the OAS (19'.7-54); and President 
of the University of tle Andes (1954-56), 
During 1957 Llevas served 
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PLERAS Camargo, Alberto (continued) 
COLOMBIA 
As Fresident, Lleras’ outstanding success hus hé¢en his unpopular and 
e stabilization prorram, which his wrought solvency out of financial 
3. 
Some progress has been achieved 
.in reducing civil: strife and 
ving sub-standard 
Living conditions, ‘but Lleras fully recognizes 
‘the 
jinence and reality of Coymunism's threat to exploit Colombia's enormous 
socin] 
imbalance, 
Me feels that land devcelonment and reform, which would 
include better roads, medical aid, and schceols 
for rural areas, constitute 
Colombia's most crucia). longerange socicl. and economic 
needs, and has 
sucrested that US financial aid be franted 
to Colombia so that other Latin 
stetes may see how agrarien reforn. 
cen be achieved through Inoderate 
and evolutionary means, 
An erudite man, with a wide range of interests, Albert. Lleras is 
serious, strongly self-disciplined, and a hard worker, 
He is ucknow- 
ledged to be a talented writer and an cloquent public speaker; as well as 
& consummate political straterist, whose actions trsrk him as a courageous 
realist and somewhat belie his frail physicuc. 
Although 
he did not complete 
his formai education, he holds several honorary degrees, including one 
conferred by the University of Californi2z. 
President Lleras married 
Chizean-born Berta Puga, whom 
he met while her futher was serving as 
Chilean Minister in Bogota, 
The couple has four children; 
two married 
daughters; 
a son, Alberto, who in 1960 was studying agriculture at a 
Texas university; and a younger daughter, Marcella, who accompanied her 
parents when they last visited this country 
in the spring of 1960. 
Lleras 
speaks French and English, 
| 
un @ peaceful clection in May 1962, Lleras was succeeded by Dr. Guillem 
Leon Valencia, 
Since relinquishing his office as President, Lieras has spent 
his time traveling with his wife in the United States and Europe. 
Decenber 1961 
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COUNTRY COSTA RICA/OUBA 
REPORT No, 
3/539, 
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sussecr 
OF CUBAN REVOU) TIONARY GROUP 
BATE bist “7 MARCH 1963 
COLLECTING STRATEGIC INFORMATION ABOUT 
| 
fe 
SAN JOZE, COSTA RICA 
PRECEDENCE ROU TINE 
DATEOR 18 JAN 1963 
BANITIZED 
@ REFERENCES 
| 
THIS 
UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEF inivive. KPPRATSAL OF CONTENT 
. 
| 
| 
ON 18 JANUARY 
CALDERON 
SECRETARY oF. THE 
OF FRIEWDS OF | 
| 
THE CUBAN REVOU) TION, 
(SARC), ORDERED JORGE CARATON, GILBERT AGUILAR, EDGAR 
| 
| 
CAFMIOL, AND OLVIE BENAVIDES, MEMBERS OF SARC, 70 OBTALI THE FOLLOWING: 
A, PHOTOGIAPHS OF THE GASOLINE STORAGE TANKS: LOCATED. IN 
CITY OF SAN JCSEy 
PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE POTABLE WATER RESERVOIRS TAT SUFPLY THE CITY OF SAN 
| 
gos3s 
| 
TUFORIATION OW HE 
OF THE cos RECAN PUBLIC Forces, 
“CLUDING DATA on ANS AND WWE ‘LOCATION OF STRATROIC POINTS IN THE CITY OF SAN JOSE, 
a 
COMMENTS 
ON WE DATE OF 
ORLER WE PRESIDENT OF SARC WAS 
CUDA, 
FAY RAPLATH 
SUCH AN ORDER 
THROUGH HE SECRETARY, _CALDERON, 
CARRTO:, 
OF 
HAVE BREN IN CUBA, WERE. PREVIOUSLY REPORTED ACTIVE 
CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS 
w 
TREASURY JENS 
SECRET SFRVICR (WHITE 
TAIL) 
peor — 
re 
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CLASSITICATION = DISSEMINATION CONTKOLS 
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3. FIELD DISSE: 
STATE ARMY CINCLANT CINCARTB 
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY | 
this matesat contains 
‘sation affecting the National Defense et the United States within’ the 
cnase Leos, 
the 
CLASSIFICATION 
DISSEMINATION CONTROLS 
COUNTRY COSTA, RICA/OJPA/LATIN ARERI 
CA 
REPORT NO, 
- 
689 
PLANUS FOR GJERRILLA VARTARE TRAINING 
pate piste, 
MARCH 1963 
COSTA RICA; ALLEGED SINO-SOVIFT AID IN 
| 
OVEATHROW OF 
AMERICAN GOVELMNIENTS 
precepence 
ROI TINE 
DATE OF 
ARY i963 
IN ALL16 
| 
THis 1s UNE VAL. 
Din OFMATION, SOURCE GRADINGS ARC DEFINITIVE, APPRAISAL OF CONTENTIS TENTATIVE, 
| 
1. ARNOLDO FERRET 
SECRETARY OF ORGANIZAITON OF THE COSTA RICAW 
COUMINIST PARTY, RYCENTLY TOLD COMRADES THAT AN OLD TRAINT No CAMP IN SAN CARLOS WOULD . 
RE RECONDITIONED AND TUT 
SERVICE FOR 
TRAT WED Ins THCTORS IN COTRRY LLA 
FARES 
COMMENT: 
TR NE WRN 
OF cos Th 
RICANS VHO 
BEEN TUINND AS INSTHCIORS IN GI FRRILLA 
FERRETO WAS IN 
JANUARY AND 
REFOATED 10 BE IN THE SAN CARLOS AREA BY ANOTHER SO) 
AN 
JAN WHO RECENTLY MFT 
COS TA RICEN COMI UNISTS KEPCHK TED 
| 
TH 
OVA HOW OF CAPITALISM IN LATIN 
GE! 
Content UNCLASS IFIED 
pc 
END oF ESS ACR 
SEP (977 
OMSOLKVE PREVIOUS EDITIONS, 
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FORMAT ION REPORT] iii 
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NAL 
ACEMCY 
2 / 
COSTA 
CA 
COPY. 
: 
REFORT NO, - ‘Toes-3/581,%90 
Ye 
COMMUNIST PARTY PLANS’ TO. EXPOSE ALLEGED : 
DISTR, . 10 ocToeER 
PLOT AGAINST PRESIOENT ORLICH 
JERANDE 
1s UNEVE LUATED INFOREATION, URCE GRADINGS AR 
VIVE. 
© 
OF C 
IS 
SOUSCE | 
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TEIN 
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~ 
SCHLESING? 
Lis 
SIBAJA, A LEADER OF. THE 
VANGUARDTA'IH, WH. 
POPULAR (PVP-- COSTA RICAN COMMUNIST PARTY), 
SPEAK’ OVER RADIO 
STATION LA VOZ DEL TROP 1CO( (8975 ‘KCS) ON THE EVENING OF ig OCTOBER, 
"EXPOSING". PLANNED ACTIVITY AGAINST THE cOVERNMENT OF ‘COSTA RICA, 
THE PvP HAS. A REPORT OF ACTIVITY BEING. PLANNED BY “FRANK "VARSHALL 
"JIMENEZ, FORMER, Minister OF. PUBLIC ‘SECURITY,’ 
BY THE THIRD 
COMPANY OF THE. 
{COMMENTS THE: 
IS 
THE RESERVE FORCE ‘OF THE CIVIL GUARDY FOR Use” ‘IN CAs OF. 
VIOLENCE WHICH CANNOT BE HANDLED BY OTHER UNITS OF : THE PUBL IC FORCES, . 
~ THE AUTHORIZED STRENGTH oF 
THE THIRD COMPANY, Is. 2p MEN; THEY ARE 
053% 
[ova 
i] navy | aia | 
usa | wic | ato 
Lesa 
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cts. 
Ovi 
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EXO 
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eet. 
SEPARATELY FROM OTHER 
PAN 
INA FORTRESS JN CENTRAL. 
SAN JOSE: "MOST ARMS AND, 
tow, ‘ekcePt THOSE FOR THE PRESIDENTJAL 
“GUARD, “ARE CONTROLLED BY THE THIRD COMPANY.) ACCORDING TO THE REPORT 
° 
MEMBERS OF THE THIRO 
ANY HAVE BEEN. ROUNDING UP FORMER MEMBERS 
+ OF THEIR COMPANY ‘WHO HAVE HAD TRAINING IN THE CANAL ZONE AND AS SKING 
THEM To PARTICIPATE, “MARSHALL ALE 
S6 HAS THE BACKING OF THE MOVIM,ENTO 
COSTA "RICA LIBRE (MILITARY TRAINED ANTE 
ST ORGAN IZATION) 
OTHERS INVOLVED 
THE PLAN AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT, 
i 
ESQUIVEL, CARLOS LARA’ JAEN 
RCVD HAEN),“ROSERTO 
Luowié STARKE JIMENEZ, THE SOMOZA BROTHERS, ANTI- CASTRO CUBANS, 
AND POLITICAL ENEMIES OF ORL ICH, 
‘coment: TEODORO PICADO Is 
NOW JAILED IN CUBA, AFTER A'FORCED LARDING THERE; AND IS REPORTEDLY 
BEING HELD: FOR, | 
RANSOM OF ONE HALF MJLUION DOLLARS. TO PAID BY THE ey 
SOMOZAS, 
is "ACCUSED OF COMPL ICI TY, IN ATTACKS AGAINST CUBA, ) 
THE: PENTAGON IS ALSO ACCUSED OF BEING INVOLVED IN THE PLAN, 
“THis PLOT ALLEGEDLY INVOLVES ‘BANKRUPT ING THE NATIONAL TREASUR 
: 
THROUGH ‘INTENSIFICATION OF CONTRABAND ACTIVITIES; 
IN OROCR TO STOP 
CONTRABAND TRAF F 
IC, THE GOCR WILL HAVE TO REDUCE DUTIES ON THE 
COMMOD! TIES. “INVOLVEDs ‘THIS,: LIN TURN, WILL.-INDUGE NATIONAL: BANKRUPTCY, 
THE - ‘LEADERS OF THE PLAN WILL THEN ACCUSE THE GOVERNMENT OF BEING 
INCAPABLE 
TAKE overt! 
THE. 
sligceeos, COSTA RICA WILL 
BE TURNED “INTO A BASE TO ) ATTAC 
OK CUBA, 
‘ 
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FRANCISCO ORLICH BOLMARCICH ARE MIGUEL RUIZ HERRERO, 
TEODORO PITADO 
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~- | DISSEMINATION CONTROLS 
fy 
'3,° FALLAS' RADIO SPEECH WILL CONTAIN A PRONOUNCEMENT ‘THAT THE 
PVP 1S AGAINST MILITARY TAKEOVERS; THAT THE PARTY SUPPORTS THE. | 
GOVERNMENT BECAUSE IT WAS ELECTED CONSTITUTIONALLY, EVEN THOUGH THE 
PVP 1S NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE POLICIES OF ORLICH AND HIS PARTY; 
AND THAT THE PVP AT ALL TIMES DEFENDS THE CONSTJTUTJON AND PEACE- 
AND MUST FIGHT AGAINST MILITARISM, 
iy, ON 4 OCTOBER EDUARDO MORA VALVERDE, PVP LEADER, APPROACHED 
FOREIGN MINISTER DANIEL ODUBER QUIROS IN AN ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE 
IF A“PLOT AGAINST THE ORLICH GOVERNMENT 1S IN THE WIND, MORA 
— 
RECEIVED WORD FROM ODUBER THAT THE GOVERNMENT 1S TAKING MEASURES to 
PREVENT ANY. POSS | BLE OVERTHROW, EVEN T0 THE EXTENT OF DISCHARGING 
MILITARY PERSONNEL WHO ARE NOT COMPLETELY LOYAL TO ORLICH, \ 
COMMENT: SINCE THE OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENTS IN THE DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC AND HONDURAS, THERE ° HAS. BEEN A RASH OF RUMORS ABOUT SIMILAR 
PLOTTING IN COSTA RICA, ‘THE PREOCCUPATION OF PRESIDENT ORLICH AND 
_ OTHER LEADERS OF HIS ADMINISTRATION CAME TO PUBLIC LIGHT ON 9 OCTOBER 
WHEN IT BECAME KNOWN THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD MET WITH THE MINISTER 
OF PUBL1C SECURITY AND SEVERAL: OTHER MILITARY LEADERS TO DISCUSS THE. 
"COORDINATION OF THe TRAFFIC ANO TREASURY POLICE WITH OTHER UNITS 
OF THE PUBLIC FORCES, IN ORDER TO PRODUCE A MORE EFFECTIVE SERVICE, 
_ ON THIS SAME DATE FOUR OFFICERS OF THE CIVIL GUARD, CONSIDERED LOYAL 
TO FORMER SECURITY MINISTER FRANK MARSHALL, WERE RELIEVED OF THEIR: 
_ POSITIONS: LEUTENENT COLONEL. EDUARDO 
ARANA WEBB, MAJOR 
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[esos 
RODRIGO PANIAGUA, SALAZAR, AND TO OTHER OFFICERS OF LOWER GRADE.) 
 §, JN THE MEETING OF THE PVP POLITICAL COMMISSION ON 7 OCTOZER, 
MORA PROPOSED THAT THE PVP ATTEMPT TO GET CLOSER TO THE PARTIDO 
)BERACION NACIONAL (PLN=-ADMINISTRATION PARTY OF ORLICH). ESPECIALLY 
. THE LEFTIST FACTION, PVP LEADERS FEEL IT 1S OPPOR TUNE TO LENO 
SUPPORT TO ORL ICH, BELIEVING THAT AN OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT 
WOULD BE THE WORST THING THAT COULD HAPPEN TO COSTA RICA AT THIS 
TIME, FRANCISCO GAMBOA GUZMAN REPORTED TO THE POLITICAL, COYMISSION - 
THAT HE HAD ALREADY TALKED TO RODOLFO SOLANO ORF 
ILA AND FERNANDO 
| 
SALAZAR NAVARRETE; PLN DEPUTIES, ON THE POSSIBILITY OF THROWING 
ed 
SUPPORT OF THE PVP TO THE PLN; THESE DEPUTIES RESPONDED 
THAT THEY 
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WOULD INVESTIGATE THE REACTION AMONG OTHER PLN DEPUTIES, 
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6. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY CINCLANT CINCSQ, 
END OF MESSAGE 
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