ox. "3 : Nsc__ 9412/2 December 28, 1955 SELASSIE rare COPYNO. AS oF 42 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL NSC 5412/2 if | ee ’ - | rom - ° - * 7 ATTENTION I THE ENCLOSED TOP SECRET CONTROL a " FORM MUST BE COMPLETED BY EACH | PEs INDIVIDUAL (1) WHO READS.. THIS | i : DOCUMENT WHOLLY OR IN PART OR i (2) WHO PERSONALLY HANDLES IT | ; AND HAS ACCESS TO ITS CONTENTS - DECLASSIPIED | Spate: SET BS: ae HAE Lt) KILI _ NATIOWAL SECURITY COUNCIL a : ANSGAR FO ee . Fa RTP RO te "4 " 12 sh 2/261) ¥/
~~" we t i ‘ace aes! ( Secember 28, 1955 NOTE BY THE reeeeala SECRETARY the NATIONAL SECURITY ¢ COUNCIL on COVERT OFERATIONS References: A. NSC 5412/1 : B. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Report of the Planning Coordination Group", dated December 20, 1955 C. NSC Action No. 1497 The President has this date approved the amendment of pere- graph T-a of HSC 5412/1 as submitted to end approved by the other statutory members of the National Security Council by Memorandum Azn~ proval in response to the reference memorandum of Decemter 20, 1955. The President and the other statutory members of the Council have also approved the recommencetien that paragrephs hoa and 7T-d er NSC 5412/1 te amended as necessary to take account of the tezmina- . tion of the Planning. Coordination Group and to conform to the sud- : ; Stance of the. language. in. paragraza 7-2 thereof. Ls ‘Aecordingly the. enclosed National Securivy Council aizéctive; “Ancorgotating the abovementioned nendments to_ NSC pein ‘is trans- aa She enclosed“ aainective, as | adopted and e approved, ‘supersedes’ SC s412/2. a oe 2 It is reouested that. stecial security precautions be observed “in the handling of the enclosed directive, and that access to it be very —— eee strictly limited on an absolute need-to-know basis. It is further requested that all copies of NSC 5412/1 be re- ‘turned to this effice for destruction uron receipt of this directive. DECLASSIFIED Auth: LO UGS By +e enna O. Ralls . JAMES S, LAY, UR. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL Executive Secretary Distribution; The President (via Mr. Anderson) The Secretary of State Tre Secretary of Defense Tne. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director of Central Intelligence The Executive Officer, Operations Coordinating Board af 1A NSC 5h12/2 EA na Bras Gr ° oJ Ld UF oad dt
tes yucZa * ys j tC az j UNSLAS NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVE eon COVERT OFSRATIONS 1. The National Security Council, taking cognizance of the vicicus ' covert’activities of the USSR and Communist China and the governments, |. Farties and groups dominated by them (hereinafter collectively referred to as “International Communism") to discredit and defeat the aims and activities of the United States and other powers of the free world, de- termined, as set forth in NSC directives 10/2 and 10/5, that, in the interests of world peace and U. S. national security, the overt foreign activities of the U. S. Government skould ce supplemented by covert operations. 2. The Central Intelligence Agency had already teen charged by the National Security Council with conducting espionage and counter-espionage _ operations abroad. It therefore seemed desirable, for orerational reasons, ‘not to create a new agency for covert operations, tut, subject to direct- : ives frem the NSC, to place the responsibility for them on tke Central ‘: Intelligence Agency and correlate them with espionage and counter- espionage operations. under the - over-all control of the Director of . , Central Intelligence. See ent he eee Ss. <3 the’ NSC. ‘has “determined “that such covert operations shall to the greatest. extent. ‘practicable, “in the light of U. 5S. and Soviet carabilities - : and. 1 taking into. account. whe risk of.war, te designed to: poe ae - Create and. exploit’t roublesome problems for International Com- munism, impair relations between the USSR and Communist China and te- ‘tween them and their satellites, complicate control within the USSR, Communist China and their sateilites, and retard the growth of the military and economic potential of the Soviet ‘bloc. b. Discredit the prestige and ideology of International Communisz, and reduce the strength of its parties and other elements. ee Counter any threat of a party or individuals directly or indi- rectly” responsive to Communist control to achieve deminant power in a free world country. a. Reduce International Communist. control over-any areas of the e. Strengthen the orientation toward the United States of the peoples and nations of the free world, accentuate, wherever possible, the identity of interest between such peoples end nations and the United States as well as favoring, where appropriate, those groups . Lye TEA AS SEE i ease SEER Ht we
genuinely advocating or believing in ie advancenent of such mutual in- terests, and increase the capacity and eel of such recples and cations to resist International Comzmunisn. f. In accordance with established rolicies and to the extent prac- ticable in areas dominated or threatened vy Internaticnal Cermunisa, develop underground resistance and facilitate covert and guerrilla on- erations and ensure availability oF those forces in the event of war, inciuding wherever practicable provision cf a base uvcn which the mii- itary may expand these forces in tine of war within active theaters of operations as well as provision for stay-cehind assets and escape ard evasion facilities 4, Under the authority of Section 102(a)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council hereby directs that the Director f£,Central Intelligence shall be resrorsibdle for: a. Ensuring, through designated representatives of the Secretary of State and of the Secretary of Defense, that covert operations are plenned and conducted iz « manner consistent with United States for- eign and military policies: and yith overt activities, and consulting with and obtaining advice fremjthe Crerations Coordinating Roard and other departments or agencies as appropriate. b.. Informing, through appropriate channels and on a need-to-mow basis; agencies of the U. S. Government, toth at home anc abroad (in- cluding diplomatic and military representatives), of such operations as. will affect Shem. a 5, tn ‘addition to the provisions of rperagrarh by the following provi- — sions. sball apply to wartime covert cperations: . ae “Plans for covert’ operaticns to be conducted in active theaters of war and any other areas in which U. S. forces are engaged in comkat operations will be drawn up with the assistance of the Department of Defense and will be in consonance with and complementary to approved war plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. ; < a 7 4 b. Covert operations in active theaters of war and any other areas in which U. 5. forces are engaged in combat operations will te conducte under such command and control relationships as have been or may in the future be approved. by the Department of Defense. 6, As used in this directive, “covert operations” shall be understoad d to be all activities conducted pursuant to this directive which are so planned and executed that any U. S. Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if. uncovered the U. S. Government can plausibly disclaim ahy responsibility for them. Specific-- ally, such operations shall include any covert activities related to: propaganda, political action; economic warfare; preventive direct action, NSC shi2/2 “a De gFY QA A
including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition; escape and evasion and evacu- | ation measures; subversion against hostile states cr grours inciuding eassist- . ance to uncerground resistance movements, guerrillas anc refugee liberation | groups; support of indigenous and anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world; decevtion plans and operations; and all activ- | ities compatible with this directive necessary to acccemplish the foregoing. Such operations shall not include: armed conflict by recognized nilitary _ forces, espionage and counter-espionage, nor cover and deception for mili- - tary operations. Te Except as the President otherwise directs, designated representa- ‘tives of the Secretary of State and of the Seeretary of Defense of the rank of Assistant Secretary or above, and 2 revresentative of the President des- | ignated for this purpose, shall hereafter be advised in advance of rajor | eovert programs initiated by CIA tmder this policy or as otherwise directed, and shall be the normal channel for giving policy approval for such programs as well as for securing coordination of support therefor among the Depart~ ments of State and Defense and the CIA. 8, This directive supersedes and rescinds NSC 10/2, NSsc 10/5, NSC 5412, NSC 5412/1, and subzaragraphs "a" and "b* under the heading | "Additional Functions of the Operations Coordinating Board" on page 1 ' Of the Fresident's memorandum for the Executive Secretary, National Se- | curity Council, supplementing Executive Order 10483, ee ne Ns 5412/2 oO -3- gar
Tt > a QI id i ees te - COPY NO. 19 OF 15 COPIES ANNEX TO NSC 5412/2 Standard Procedures for Insuring Implerentation of Paragraph 7 of NSC 5412/2 (1) With respect to a covert program to be recommended by CIA for policy approval, the NSC 5412/2 Group may decide at any meeting whether to proceed at such meeting to consider and act uron an oral presentation of such covert vro- | Gram or. to tase such consideration on a detailed rarer to te circulated to the {| Group members in advance of a subsequent meeting. Any perer so circulated will i be handled on a “read-and-return" basis in order to avoid duplicate files, thereby enhancing the security of the information contained in such raper. (2) At a meeting held to discuss a detailed paper circulated pursuant to (1) above, the Group members will decide in each instance on the procedures to 7, be followed to provide coordinated consideration prior to the Group | S giving ©)! pina. Policy epproval and to provide ccordinated suptrort after such approval. a Gy CIA will keep the State and Defense Departments advised on a need- to-know: and” secure basis” of developments rertaining to the implementaticn of :Programs, to-which-poltcy | approval has teen given by the Group. | - (ee Jey “In accordance: with the ‘exception provided for in paragraph 7 ef é FS NSc | Shio/2, the ‘standard ‘procedure set forth atove shall not apply to tke pie case ofa particularly: sensitive project which relates exclusively to U. S. ‘ . foreign policy and which does not involve military implications. In such case, approvel of such project by the Secretary of State shall constitute voth sufficient authorization for initiation of the project by the Director of Centraz <Intelligence and policy aprroval therefor. The Director of Cen- ' § tral Intelligence shall report any such exception (without identification) * to the NSC 5412/2 Group.* * In approving the atove recommendations, the President directed that when- ever the Secretary of State takes acticn under this paragraph, he shall inform the President. ANNEX to ! n nv? Bw ie é Deak: Ze Ley 3 hee Vie [21 lteeg a] hoe i te ee en ee, ~ - ta eee eee ere er