DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  AIR  FORCE 
Headquarters  US  Air  Force 
Washington  DC  20330 
AF  REGULATION  200- 1 3 
17  April  1984 
Intelligence 
THREAT  SUPPORT  TO  THE  WEAPONS  SYSTEM  ACQUISITION  PROCESS 
This  regulation  states  Air  Force  policy  for  developing,  documenting,  and  validating  threat  information  used  in  support  of  the 
weapons  system  acquisition  process  and  the  planning,  programming,  and  budgeting  process.  These  policies  apply  to  the  life  cycle 
of  a  program,  from  identification  of  need  through  development  and  acquisition.  Validated  threat  documents  support  the  justifica- 
tion for  the  initiation  and  continuation  of  systems  and  equipment  development,  acquisition,  and  deployment.  This  regulation 
implements  portions  of  Department  of  Defense  (DOD)  Directive  5000.1,  29  March  1982;  and  DOD  Instruction  5000.2,  March 
1983,  and  supports  Defense  Intelligence  (DIA)  Regulation  55-3,  9  December  1983. 
1.  Related  Documents: 
a.  AFR  57-1,  "Statement  of  Operational  Need  (SON),"  12 
June  1979. 
b.  AFR  57-5,  "Quick  Reaction  Capability,"  5  August 
1981. 
c.  AFR  80-14,  "Test  and  Evaluation,"   12  September 
1980. 
d.  AFR  80-38,  "Management  of  the  Air  Force  Survivabil- 
ity Program,"  2  August  1982. 
e.  AFR  100-45,  Vol.  I,  "Communications  Security  Policy, 
Procedures,  and  Instructions,"  22  September  1980. 
f.  AFR  800-2,  "Acquisition  Program  Management,"  13 
August  1982. 
g.  AFR  800-3,  "Engineering  for  Defense  Systems,"  17 
June  1977. 
h.  HP  21-1,  "Department  of  the  Air  Force  Organization 
and  Functions  (Chartbook),"  31  December  1980. 
i.  DIAR  55-3,  "Threat  Support  for  Major  System  Acquisi- 
tions," 9  December  1983. 
2.  Policy  Statements: 
a.  Intelligence  support  to  the  Defense  Systems  Acquisition 
Review  Council/Air  Force  Systems  Acquisition  Review 
Council  (DSARC/AFSARC)  and  budget  process  must  be  ac- 
complished in  a  timely  and  effective  manner.  Therefore,  DIA, 
HQ  USAF/IN,  and  the  major  command  (MAJCOM),  and 
separate  operating  agency  (SOA)  intelligence  activities  must 
work  in  close  cooperation  during  the  entire  process. 
b.  Threat  producers  assess  and  quantify  the  likelihood  that 
particular  aspects  of  the  projected  threat  will  occur. 
c.  Assessments  are  produced  at  the  lowest  possible  classifi- 
cation consistent  with  user  needs  and  security  considerations. 
d.  Threat  assessments  are  long-range  estimates  covering  the 
expected  life  cycle  of  the  proposed  system.  They  are  produced 
to  support  the  weapons  system  acquisition,  planning,  pro- 
gramming, and  budgeting  process,  as  differentiated  from  data 
No.  of  Printed  Pages:  3 
OPR:  INEG  (Maj  N.  Gustafson) 
Approved  by:  Col  Richard  J.  O'Lear 
Writer-Editor:  Barbara  Carver 
Distribution:  F 
or  documents  used  to  support  current  peacetime  or  combat 
operational  requirements. 
3.  Mission  Area  Analysis  (MAA): 
a.  The  US  Air  Force  uses  the  Air  Force- Wide  Mission  Area 
Analysis  (AFWMAA)  to  help  make  resource  allocation  deci- 
sions, using  long-range  planning  and  need  identification,  in 
accordance  with  the  Congressional  Budget  Act  of  1974.  The 
major  goal  of  AFWMAA  is  to  provide  a  visible,  traceable, 
analytic  thread  from  mission  capability  needs  through  to  the 
enacted  Air  Force  budget,  which  is  displayed  and  defended  by 
mission  areas. 
b.  AFWMAA  methodology  categorizes  US  Air  Force  func- 
tions and  responsibilities  by  mission  area,  the  importance  of 
each  mission  area,  and  US  Air  Force's  ability  to  perform  it. 
c.  AFWMAA  results  are  summarized  in  the  Air  Force  Plan- 
ning Guide  (AFPG)  which  documents  US  Air  Force  needs  in 
terms  of  national  and  mission  objectives,  as  well  as  US  Air 
Force  characteristics,  functions,  tasks,  and  projected  enemy 
threat  trends. 
d.  AFWMAA  results  form  the  basis  for  the  weapons  system 
acquisition  process.  These  results  may  provide  rationale  for 
associated  documents,  such  as  Statements  of  Operational  Need 
(SONs)  and  Justifications  for  Major  System  New  Start 
(JMSNS). 
4.  HQ  USAF/IN  Support  to  AFWMAA: 
a.  HQ  USAF/IN  provides  threat  data  used  to  assess  US  Air 
Force's  capabilities  to  perform  its  assigned  missions.  The 
threat  impacts  on  the  importance  assigned  to  the  functions  and 
tasks  within  each  mission  area.  AFWMAA  conclusions  iden- 
tify and  set  priorities  for  mission  capabilities  which  require 
maintenance  or  enhancement. 
b.  HQ  USAF/IN  has  these  responsibilities  in  providing 
threat  data: 
(1)  Review  and  comment  on  HQ  USAF/XOX-proposed 
scenarios  which  are  based  on  the  Defense  Guidance,  the  Joint 
Strategic  Planning  Document,  the  Joint  Strategic  Capabilities 
Plan,  and  other  relevant  planning  considerations. 
(2)  Provide  intelligence  on  the  quality  and  extent  of 
enemy  capabilities  that  support  agreed  on  scenarios.  Enemy 
trends  are  highlighted  at  5-year  intervals  out  to  15  years  be- 
yond the  program  year  that  the  AFWMAA  cycle  supports.
AFR  200-13         17  April  1984 
(3)  Ensure  (he  proper  application  of  threat  information 
within  mission  logic  trees. 
c.  In  supporting  HQ  USAF/XOX  generation  of  AFWMAA 
scenarios.  HQ  USAF/IN  provides: 
(1)  Enemy  doctrine  and  objectives; 
(2)  Enemy  force  structure  and  order  of  battle  likely  to  be 
involved; 
(3)  Likely  enemy  strategy  and  employment  tactics. 
5.  Need- Identification  Stage  Process: 
a.  The  MAJCOM  or  SO  A  analyzes  its  assigned  missions  to 
determine  its  ability  to  successfully  perform  the  tasks  and 
functions  required  to  achieve  mission  objectives.  Deficiencies 
are  identified  in  the  form  of  SONs  and  Quick  Reaction 
Capabilities  (QRCs). 
( 1)  A  SON  identifies  a  specific  perceived  operational  de- 
ficiency or  need,  ordinarily  is  originated  by  a  MAJCOM  or 
SOA,  and  is  submitted  per  AFR  57-1 .  Occasionally,  a  SON  is 
developed  by  HQ  USAF.  at  which  time  HQ  USAF/INEG  pro- 
vides threat  rationale  or  constraints  if  required. 
(2)  A  QRC  is  similar  to  a  SON,  but  stresses  the  necessity 
of  expeditious,  threat-driven  change. 
b.  Defining  the  Threat 
( 1 )  Threat  matters  are  addressed  and  structured  per  AFR 
57-1 .  If  threat  is  the  basis  of  need  of  the  SON,  a  brief  descrip- 
tion is  included. 
(2)  Additionally,  a  description  of  the  threat  environment 
in  which  the  resulting  or  solution  system  is  likely  to  operate  (to 
include  the  projected  threat  for  the  entire  life  cycle  of  the 
system)  is  required.  AFR  57-5  provides  guidance  for  QRC 
threat  preparation. 
(3)  Intelligence  data  approved  by  HQ  USAF/IN,  DIA, 
and  other  members  of  the  national  levei  Intelligence  Commu- 
nity is  used.  Incorporation  of  original  analysis  and  conclusions 
and  acquisition  of  information  from  other  sources  is  not  dis- 
couraged; however,  HQ  USAF/IN  review  and  validation  still 
is  required. 
(a)  When  threat  data  is  either  the  basis  of  need  or  de- 
scribed as  a  constraint.  Intelligence  Community  addressees  (as 
specified  in  AFR  57-1)  review  the  draft  SON  and  respond  to 
the  originator  within  30  calendar  days  of  receipt  of  the  SON. 
HQ  US  AF/INE  reviews  and  consolidates  appropriate  Air  Staff 
comments  and  responds  to  the  originator  within  45  calendar 
days  of  receipt  of  the  initial  draft  SON.  To  determine  if  the 
threat  assessment  has  been  appropriately  tailored  to  the  per- 
ceived need,  the  draft  or  final  SON,  in  its  entirety  only,  is 
accepted  for  review. 
(b)  Every  effort  is  made  to  provide  the  threat  data  at 
the  lowest  possible  security  level  consistent  with  user  needs.  If 
inclusion  of  sensitive  compartmented  information  (SCI)  is 
warranted  for  assessment  of  the  threat,  the  document  is  hand- 
led per  US  AFINTEL  201- 1. 
6.  Need-Evaluation  Stage  Process: 
a.  HQ  USAF/RDQM,  as  the  air  staff  OPR  for  final  SON 
validation,  distributes  copies  to  action  addressees  on  the  Air 
Staff.  HQ  USAF/INEG  reviews,  coordinates,  and  validates 
threat  sections  of  the  SON.  The  final  response  is  provided  tr 
the  originator  within  60  calendar  days  of  receipt  (with  a  copy  U 
HQ  USAF/RDQM). 
b.  Once  the  final  SON  is  presented  for  validation,  the  HQ 
USAF/INEG  representative  reevaluates  it.  affirming  its  ade- 
quacy from  the  threat  perspective.  If  it  has  been  determined  the 
threat  section  of  the  document  is  inadequate  for  any  reason,  it 
is  reaccomplished  by  the  originator  in  close  coordination  with 
HQ  USAF/INEG. 
c.  If  a  solution  for  a  validated  need  indicates  a  major  system 
acquisition  program  or  Air  Force  Designated  Acquisition  Pro- 
gram (AFDAP)  may  result,  a  JMSNS  is  prepared.  HQ 
USAF/INEG  provides  a  threat  assessment  summary  if  re- 
quired. The  Air  Force  OPR  then  forwards  a  "for  comment" 
draft  of  the  JMSNS.  including  the  threat  assessment,  to  DIA 
for  comment  before  the  Program  Objective  Memorandum 
(POM)  submission  in  sufficient  time  to  allow  for  validation. 
d.  Once  a  final  SON/QRC  is  validated  by  the  Requirements 
Review  Group  (RRG),  it  is  authorized  to  compete  for  funding. 
e.  After  funds  are  identified,  the  Program  Element  Monitor 
(PEM)  issues  a  Program  Management  Directive  (PMD)  to  the 
implementing  operating,  test  and  evaluation,  and  other  par- 
ticipating commands.  The  PMD  establishes  specific  responsi- 
bility for  the  development  of  a  system  solution  to  the  SON  and 
begins  the  conceptual  phase.  It  provides  direction  regarding 
responsibility  and  timeliness  of  threat-assessment  preparation, 
and  establishes  procedures  for  threat  support  which  make 
maximum  use  of  available  resources  and  is  responsive  to  user 
needs.  During  the  PMD  preparation  process  the  PEM  is  re- 
quired to  coordinate  the  draft  with  HQ  USAF/INEG  to  ensure 
the  implementing  command  (usually  Air  Force  Systems  Com- 
mand (AFSC))  is  properly  tasked  to  provide  threat  documenta- 
tion to  support  the  program. 
(1)  The  following  statement,  or  one  similar  to  it,  should 
be  included  in  PMDs  for  major  systems  under  program  direc- 
tion, to  the  implementing  command: 
Intelligence/Threat  Estimate: 
Provide  threat  data  for  this  program  as  required  by  AFR  200-13.  The  imple- 
menting command  will  complete,  cr  update,  a  System  Threat  Assessment 
Report,  or  other  threat  documentation,  and  obtain  HQ  USAF/IN  approval  in 
advance  of  each  program  milestone. 
NOTE:  Those  systems  not  threat-driven  or  not  programmed  to 
operate  in  a  threat  environment  require  no  threat  description. 
(2)  The  implementing  command  may  establish  a  threat 
working  group  to  act  as  an  advisory  body  on  threat  matters. 
This  group  should  include  the  required  expertise  from  Intelli- 
gence Community  organizations  and  representatives  from  the 
operating,  participating,  and  supporting  commands. 
(3)  The  implementing  command  may  establish  an  ad  hoc 
steering  group  as  defined  in  DIAR  55-3  for  joint  service  pro- 
grams or  for  programs  requiring  extraordinarily  complex  or 
urgent  threat-assessment  development. 
7.  Program  Milestone  Review.  Throughout  the  entire  system 
development  and  testing  process  intelligence  support  must  be
AFR  200-13         17  April  1984 
provided  as  requested  by  individual  System  Program  Offices. 
Informal  support  is  further  enhanced  by  formal  products. 
a.  System  Threat  Assessment  Report  (STAR): 
( 1 )  A  STAR  is  prepared  and  updated  as  necessary  in  ad- 
vance of  each  program  milestone  for  a  DSARC  program.  It  is 
prepared  by  the  implementing  command  according  to  formats 
and  descriptions  outlined  in  DIAR  55-3. 
(2)  The  STAR  describes  threat  systems  against  which  the 
proposed  US  system  will  operate,  and  the  hostile  lethal  and 
nonlethal  threat  environment  in  which  it  will  operate.  Threat 
information  is  projected  for  threat  at  Initial  Operational  Capa- 
bility (IOC)  and  IOC+  10  years.  Integration  of  data  on  pro- 
jected force  levels,  technical  characteristics,  and  capabilities  of 
individual  systems  and  their  tactics  are  required.  Threat  data 
must  be  current  to  I  year  of  each  milestone. 
(3)  During  the  review  and  validation  of  each  iteration  of 
the  STAR,  the  originating  office  forwards  copies  to  its  parent 
organization.  AFSC  Foreign  Technology  Division  (FTD),  and 
other  agencies  if  required,  for  review  and  comment.  Two  in- 
formation copies  are  sent  to  HQ  USAF/INEG.  Within  30  cal- 
endar days  of  receipt,  the  parent  organization  consolidates 
comments  and  forwards  them  and  three  additional  copies  of  the 
STAR  to  HQ  USAF/INEG.  This  office  consolidates  Air  Staff 
and  sister  Service  comments  on  the  document  and  responds  to 
the  originator  through  its  parent  organization  within  45  calen- 
dar days  of  receipt  of  parent  organization-consolidated  com- 
ments. 
(4)  When  comments  are  incorporated  into  the  document 
by  the  originator,  a  second  revision  of  the  STAR  is  forwarded 
through  the  review  cycle  again.  Once  it  has  been  determined 
the  changes  have  been  incorporated,  HQ  USAF/INEG  for- 
wards the  STAR  in  four  copies  to  DIA  for  validation.  Any  DI A 
comments  are  forwarded  to  the  originator  for  inclusion. 
(5)  Once  DIA  validation  has  been  secured,  the  office 
originating  the  document  inserts  the  validation  statement  in  the 
preface  of  the  document  according  to  DIAR  55-3. 
(6)  As  the  description  of  the  projected  US  system  be- 
comes more  detailed,  so  the  threat  description  must  be  corre- 
spondingly refined. 
b.  Threat  Assessment  Report  (TAR).  Identical  to  a  STAR 
in  content  and  format,  the  TAR  is  required  for  AFSARC  pro- 
grams and  is  reviewed  and  validated  up  through  HQ  USAF/ 
INEG. 
c.  System  Concept  Paper  (SCP).  The  SCP  summarizes  the 
results  of  the  exploration  phase  to  Milestone  I.  The  threat 
assessment  section  is  prepared  by  HQ  USAF/INEG  per  AFR 
800-2  and  forwarded  to  DIA  for  validation. 
BY  ORDER  OF  THE  SECRETARY  OF  THE  AIR  FORCE 
d.  Decision  Coordinating  Paper/Integrafed   Program 
Summary  (DCP/I  PS): 
(1)  The  DCP/IPS  is  updated  to  reflect  changes  since 
Milestone  II  if  Milestone  III  is  required,  and  provides  different 
levels  of  detail  for  consideration  by  the  DSARC. 
(2)  The  DCP  is  a  top-level  summary  document  identify- 
ing alternatives  and  thresholds. 
(3)  The  IPS  provides  more  specific  information  with  re- 
spect to  the  program  when  it  has  been  determined  the  DCP 
contains  insufficient  information  on  which  to  base  the  requisite 
decision  and  contains  basic  threat  documentation. 
(4)  HQ  USAF/INEG  prepares  and  forwards  IPS  threat 
section  to  DIA  for  validation. 
e.  Threat  Planning  Document  (TPD).  For  those  programs 
not  qualifying  as  major  (AFSARC  or  DSARC),  but  requiring 
threat  support,  a  TPD  is  prepared  by  the  implementing  com- 
mand. The  TPD  describes  the  intelligence  provided  to  support 
the  program.  When  existing  intelligence  does  not  meet  the 
program  needs,  the  TPD  expands  those  elements  of  the  Threat 
Environment  Description  (TED)  which  are  peculiar  to  the  par- 
ticular system  (for  example,  known  threat).  This  document 
may  include  reactive  threat  and  Critical  Intelligence  Paramet- 
ers (CIPs).  The  TPD  is  accomplished  within  1  year  of  the 
publication  date  of  the  PMD. 
f.  Threat  Environment  Description  (TED).  A  TED  is  a 
baseline  reference  document  for  further  development  of  threat 
data  in  support  of  specific  weapon  systems  and  acquisition  of 
generic  technologies  or  systems.  It  encompasses  a  broad  area 
of  concern,  such  as  space,  tactical  or  strategic  systems,  or 
electromagnetic  combat. 
( 1 )  TEDs  are  used  to  develop: 
(a)  STARs/TARs. 
(b)  Inputs  to  the  MA  A. 
(c)  Threat  scenarios. 
(d)  Threat  summaries  for  SONs. 
(e)  TPDs. 
(2)  AFSC  produces  TEDs  and  establishes  a  schedule  for 
their  update. 
After  Program  Management  Responsibility  Transfer  (PMRT), 
and  for  the  remainder  of  the  life  cycle  of  the  system,  the 
responsibility  for  providing  updated  threat  data  belongs  to  the 
operating  command.  However,  parametric  data  from  certain 
electromagnetic  data  bases  (such  as  the  Electronic  Warfare 
Integrated  Reprogrammable  (EWIR))  must  continue  to  be  pro- 
vided after  PMRT  to  Air  Force  Logistics  Command  for  dis- 
tribution to  its  air  logistics  centers.  MAJCOMs  and  SOAs  are 
authorized  to  request  this  data  from  HQ  USAF/INW,  with  a 
copy  of  the  request  to  AFSC/FTD(TQIV). 
OFFICIAL 
CHARLES  A.  GABRIEL.  General,  USAF 
Chief  of  Staff 
JAMES  H.  DELANEY,  Colonel,  USAF 
Director  of  Administration 
•U.S.   OOTEHBCBIT  MOTHS  0TT1CZ  t  1984  0-420-958/251