mm Director of c Central latelligence Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 1/14 Minimum Personnel Security Standards and Procedures Governing Eligibility for Access to Sensitive Comparimented Information ASTUINTS FO2 RILEASE 1 September 1983
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/14 (Effective 1 September 1983)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL \NTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE 1/14! MINIMUM PERSONNEL SECURITY STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING ELIGIBILITY FOR ACCESS TO SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION (Effective 1 September 1923) Pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order 12333, Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, and the Director of Central Intelligence Directive on the Security Committee, the following minimum personnel security standards, proce- dures, and continuing security programs are hereby established for all United States Government civilian and military personnel, consultants, contractors, employees of contractors, and other individuals who require access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (hereinafter referred to as SCI). The standards, procedures, and programs established herein are minimum and the departments and agencies may establish such additional security steps as may be deemed necessary and appropriate to ensure that effective security is maintained. 1. Definitions a. Intelligence Communiiy—those United States Government organizations and activities identified in Executive Order 12333 or successor orders as making up such Community. s Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)—all information and materials requiring special Community controls indicating restricted handling within present and future Community intelligence collection programs and their end products. These special Community controls are formal systems of restricted access established to protect the sensitive aspects of sources and methods and analytical procedures of foreign intelligence programs. The term does not include Restricted Date as defined in Section I], Public Law 585, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. Senior Officials of the Intelligence Conmunity (SO!Cs)—for the purposes of this Directive, SOICs are defined as the heads of organizations within the In- telligence Community, as defined by Executive Order 12333, or their designated representatives. 2 2. Purpose The purpose of this Directive is to enhance the security protection of SCI through the application of minimum security standards, procedures, and continuing security programs, end to facilitate the security certification process among Government departments and agencies. ' This Directive supersedes DCID 1/14 approved 13 May 1976
3. Applicability : "The previsions of this Directive shall apply to all persone (other than elected offictals of the United States Government, federal jodges, and those individuals for whom the DCI makes a specific exception) without regard to civillen or military status, form of employment, official rank or position, or length of service. a. Individuals who do not meet the minimum security criteria contained herein and who are, therefore, denied access to SCI shall not, solely for this reason, be considered ineligible for access to other classified information. Individuais whose access to SCI has been authorized as an exception gran‘ed in accordance with paragraph 6 below, shall not, solely for that reason, be considered eligible for access to other classified information. b. The granting of access to SCI shall be controlled under the strictest application of the “need-to-know” principle, and in accordance with the personnel security standards and procedures set forth in this Directive. In "accordance with National Security Decision Directive Number 84 and the DCI Security Policy Manusl for SC! Control Systems, signature of a DCI- authorized non-disclosure agreement which includes # provision for prepub- lication review is a condition of access to SCI. 5. Personnel Security Standards Criteria for security approval of an individual on a need-to-know basis for access to SCI are: a. The individual shall be stable; trustworthy; reliable; of excellent character, judgment, and discretion; and of unquestioned loyalty to the United States. b. Except where tnere is a compelling need, and a determination has been mede by competent avihority as described in paragraph 6 below that every teasonable assurance has been obtained that under the circumstances the security risk ts negligible: (1) Both the individual and the members of his or her immediate family shall be U.S. citizens. For these purposes, “immediate family” includes the individual's spouse, parents, brothe:s, sisters, and children.° (2) The members of the individual's immediate family and persons to whom he or she is bound by affection or obligation ° * should neither be subject to physical, mental, or other forms of duress by a foreign power, nor advocate the use of force or violence to overthrow the Government of the United States or the alteration o° the form of Government of the United States by unconstitutional means. 6. Exceptions to Personnel Securtiy Standards The exceptions to paragraph 5.b.(1) of (2) above may be granted only by the SOIC of the appropriate organization or his designee nies such authority has been ° The requirement for U. $ citizenship in this DCID alan applies to « cohebitent ** Inchuding » coheb’tant.
specifically delegated to the head of an office or organization as set fo:th in interdepertmental agreements. All exceptions granted will be common sense determi- nations based on all available information, and shall be recorded by the organization making the exception. In those cases in which the individual has lived outside of the United States for a substantial period of his or her life, a thorough assessment uf the adequacy of the investigation in terms of fulfillment of the minimum investigative requirements, and judicious review of the information therein, must be made before an exception fs considered. 7. Investigative Requirements The investigation conducted on an individual under consideration for access to SCI will be thorough and shall be designed to develop information as to whether the individual clearly meets the above Personnel Security Standards. The investigation shall be accomplished through record checks and personal interviews of various sources by trained investigative personnel in order to establish affirmatively to the adjudicating egency complete continuity of identity to include birth, residences, education, employment, and military service. Where the circumstances of a case indicate, the investigation shall exceed the basic requirements set out below to ensure that these responsible for adjuclicating access eligibility have in their possession all the relevant facts available. The individual shall furnish a signed personal history statement, fingerprints of a quality acceptable to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and a signed release. as necessary, authorizing custodians of police. credit, education, and medical records, to provide record information to the investigative agency. Photographs of the individual shall also be obtained where additional corroboration of identity is required. 8. Minimum standards for the investigation ore ae follotcs: b. a Verification of date and place of birth and citizenship Check of the subversive and criminal files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, including submission of fingerprint charts. and such other naticnal agencies as are appropriate to the individual's background. An additional check of Immigration and Naturalization Service records shal! be conducted on those members of the individual's immediate family who are United States citizens other than by birth or who are resident aliens. A check of appropriate police records covering all areas of the individual's residence, employment, and education in the U.S. throughout the most recent fifteen (15) years or since age eighteen, «hichever is the shorter period. . Verification of the individual's financial status and credit habits through checks of appropriate credit institutions or, if such checks are not produc- tive, through interviews with knowledgeable sources covering all areas of employment, residence, and education in the most recent seven (7) years.
e. Interviews with neighbors in the vicinity of all the individual's residences in excess of six (6) months throughout the most recent five (5) year period. This coverage shal] be expanded where the investigation suggests the existeace of some questionable behavioral pattern. ; f. Confirmation of all employment during the past fifteen (15) years or since age eighteen, whichever is the shorter period, but in any event the most recent two (2) years. Personal interviews with supervisors and coworkers at places of employment covering the past ten (10) years shall be accomplished. &. Verification of graduation or attendance at all institutions of higher learning within the past fifteen (15) years If the individual did not attend an institution of higher iearning, verification of graduation or attendance at last secondary school within the past ten (10) years. h. Review of appropriate military records. i. Interviews with a sufficient number of knowledgeable sources (s minimum of three developed during the course of the investigation) es necessary to provide a continuity co the extent practicable, of the individual's activities and behavioral patterns over the past fifteen (15) years. i. When employment, education, or residence has occurred in foreign coun- tries (except for periods of less than one yzar for personnel on U.S. Government assignment and less than ainety days for other purposes) during the past fifteen (15) years or since age eighteen, a check of the records will be made at the Department of State and/or other appropriate agencies. Efforts shall be made to develop sources, generally in the United States, who knew the individual overseas in order to cover significant employment, education or residence and to attempt to determine if any lasting foreign contacts or connections were established during this period. However, in all cases where an individual has worked or lived outside of the U.S. continu- ously for over one year, the investigation will be expanded to cover fully this period in his or her life through the use of such investigative assets and checks of record sources as may be available to the U.S. Government in the foreign country(ies) in which the individual resided. . When the individual has immediate family members or other persons. to whom the individual is bound by affection of obligation in any of the situations described in subparagraph 5.b.(2) above, the investigation will include an interview of the individual by trained security, investigative, or counterintelligence personnel to ascertain the facts as they may relate to the individual's access eligibility. . In all cases, the individual's spouse or cohabitant shall at a minimum be checked through the subversive and criminal files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other national egencies as appropriate. When conditions indicate, additional investigation shall be conducted on the spouse of the individual and members of the immediate family (or other persons to whom the individual is buund by affection or obligation) to the exter.t necessary to permit a determination by the adjudicating agency that the provisicns of paregraph 5 (Personnel Security Standards) above are met (See Annex A). | oe
m. A pezsonal interview of the individual may be conducted by trained security, investigative, or counterintelligence personnel to ensure ‘ull inves- tigative coverage. A pereonal interview will be conducted when necessary to resolve any significant adverse information and/or inconsistencies devel- oped during the investigation. In departments or agencies with policies sanctioning the use of the polygraph for personnel security purposes, the - personal interview may include a polygraph examination, conducted by a qualified polygraph examiner. 9. Exceptions to Investigative Requiremen’s a. In exceptional cases, the SOIC or his designee may determine that it is necessary nr advisable in the national intezest to authorize access to SCI pz:28 to completion of the fully prescribed investigation noted in paragraph 8 above. In this situation, such investigative checks as are immediately possible shall be made at once and shall include » personal interview of the individual by trained security, investigative, or counterinteliigence person- nel. Access in such cases shall be strictly controlled, and the fully prescribed investigation ard final evaluation snall be completed at the earliest practica- ble moment. Certification to other organizations of individuals authorized access in such cases shall include explicit notification of the exception. \. Where a previous investigation has been conducted within the pest five (5) years which substantially meets the above rsinimum standards, it may serve as « besis for granting access approval provided a review of the persunne! and security files does not reveal substantive changes in the individual's security eligibility. If a previous investigation does not substantially meet the minimum standards «. if it s more than sive (5) years old, a current ir- vestigation shall be required but may be limited to that necessary to bring the individual's file up to date in acrerdance with the investigative requirements set forth in paragraph 8 above. Should new information be developed during the current investigation which bears unfavorably upon the individual's activities covered Ly the previous investigation, the current inquiries shall be expanded as necessary to develop full details of this information. 19. Periodic Retnvestigatione @. Programs shall be instituted requiring the periodic reinvestigation of personne! provided access to SCI. These reinvestigations shall be conducted on a five (5) year recurrent besis, but on-a more frequent basis where the in- dividual has shown some questionable behavioral pettern, his or her activities are otherwise «uspect, or when deemed necessary by the SOIC concerned. b. The scope of reinvestigations shall be determined by the SOIC cuncerned based on such considerations as the potential damage that might result from the individuai's defection or willful comsromise of SCI and the availability and probeble effectiveness of cther means to evaluate continually factors telated to the individual's suitability for continued access. The individual shall furnish an up-to-date, signed personal history statemert and signed
relrases as necessary. In all cases, the reinvestigaticn shall include, as a minimun, appropriate national agency checks, local agency cisseks, overseas checks where appropriate, credit checks, and a personal interview with the individual by trained investigative, security, or counterintelligence personrel when necessarv to resolve significant adverse information and/or inconsistencies. When condi- tions so indicate, additional investigation may be conducted as determined by the SOIC or his designee. - : 12. Determination of Access Eligibility The evaluation of the information developed by investigation on an individual's loyalty and suitability shall be accomplished under Uh: cognizance of the SOIC concerned by analysts of broad knowledge, good judgment, and wide experience in personnel security and/or counterintelligence. When all other informztion developed on an indi idual is fevoratie, a minur investigative requirement which has not been met should not preclude favorable adjudication. In cil evaluations the protection of the national interest is paramount. Any doubt concerning personne! having access to SCI should be resolved in favor of the national security and the access should be denied or revoked. The ultimate determination of whether the gcanting of access is clearly consis:ent with the interest of national security shall b> an overall common sense determination based on al} available information. 12. Appeals Procedures Annex B prescribes common appeals procedures to be ‘sllowed when an individual's SC! access has been denied or revoked. 13. Continuing Security Programs a. In order to facilitate attainment of the highest standard of personnel security and to augment both the access aporoval criteria and the investiga- tive requirements established by this Directive, member departments and agencies shall institute continuing security programs for all individuals having access to SCI. In addition to security indoctrinations (See Annex C, “Minimum Standards for SCI Security Awareness Prograins in the U.S. Intelligence Community”), these programs shall be t:‘lored to create mutually supporting procedures under which no issue will escepe notice or be left unresolved which brings into question an individual's loyalty and integrity or suggests the possibility of his or her being subject to undue influence or duress through foreign relationships or exploitable personal conduct. When an individual is assigned to perform sensitive compartment- ed work requiring access to SCI, the SOIC for the department, agency, or Government program to which the individual is assigned shall assure security supervision of that individual throughout the period of his or her assignment. b. The continuing security progiams shall include: (1) Individuals are required to inform the department cr agency which granted their SCI access about sny personal problem or situation which
may have a posible bearing on thei: sligibility for continued access to SCI and to seek appropriate guidance and assistance. Security counseling should be made available. This counseling should be conducted by individuals having extensive background and experience regarding the nature and special vulnerabilities of the particular type of compartmented information involved. (2) SCI security education programs of the member departments and agencies shail be established and maintained pursuant to the require- ments of Annex C. (8) Security supervisory programs shall be established and maintained to ensure that supervisory personne] recognize and discharge their special responsibility to safeguard SCI, including the need to assess continued eligibility for SCI access. These programs shall provide practical guidance on indicators which may signal matters uf security concern. Specific ‘astructions concerning reporting procedures shall be disseminated to enable the appropriate authority to take timely corrective action to safeguard the security of the United States as well as to provide ail necessary help to the individual concerned to reutralize his or her vulnerability. : (i) Security review programs to en-ure that appropriate security authtcities always receive and exchange, in a timely manner, all information bearing on the security posture cf ‘persons having access to SCI. Personal history information shall be kept current. Security and related files shall be kept under continuing review. Whenever adverse or derogatory information is discovered or inconsistencies arise which could impact upon an individual's security status, appropriate investigation shall te conducted on a timely basis. The investigation shall be of sufficient scope nec- essary to resolve the specific adverse or derogatory informativn or incor.sistency in question so that « determination can be made as to whether the individual's continued utilization ir. activities requiring SCI is clearly consistent »ith the interest of the national security. 14. Security Violations Individuals determined to have disclosed classified information to any person not officially authorized to receive it may be considered ineli,ible for initial or continued SCI access. Determination will be based on an evaluation of all available information, including whether the disclosure was knowing, willful, negligent. or inadvertent. A determination of ineligibility for individuals who currently hold SCI access shall result in immediste debriefing and termination of access for cause. 15. Implementation Existing directives, regulations, agreements, and other guidance governing access to SCI as defined herein shall be revised accordingly. William J. Casey Director of Centzal Intelligence 7 PACE F BLAVK
Tha sdiudiestive proce ne chnorime yobs p: wiek - later. SCI access adjudication is the careful sdjedicalin aan ee masrontaity of the penon et the te cetaln act or violeiions were committed as well as any repetition or continuation of such conduct. ' Each case mint be judged on its owa merits and final determination remains the "responsiblity of the individual SOIC. Any doubt concerning personnel having access _,t0 SCI shall be resolved in favor of the national security. * ‘The ultimate determinetion of whether the eranting of SCI sccest is clearly ‘consistent with the interests of national security shell be an overall common se~se eee Sara eet mt cv cal rt othe lowing mater rst te eestor ra ee ne sera tthe forme mae
en eae eatecas of ha Usted sates oe thes oye or affection le to 2 * -: foreign rower, or they are subject to ‘amy form of duress by a foreign power, or they . ™ ,edivocata the violent overthrow of unconstitutional sterstion of of the Government of "the United States. - Lo 4 tha cdjodicator must szsew carefully the degree of actual and poteotial influence thet such persons may exercise on the individual based on an examination of the _ Frequency and satore of personal contact and eorepondenes with and the palticl A recommendation for escise daopproval le appropriate if there is an tedtcation thet such sclstives or ancelites are coenected with any foreign intelligence service. When there is a “compelling need” for SCI access for an individual whose family member is @ non-U.S. citizen and the background investigation indicates that the security risk is neglizible, an exception to paregraph 5b(1) or (2) of DCID 1/14 may be Io some circumstances, mariage of an individual holding SCI access approval could present an unacceytable security risk. Such individuals are required to fils intent-tu-marry statements It is the responsibility of the SOIC to advise the ’ individuals of the possible security consequences. If the individual marries a non-U.S. _ citizen, SCI: access will be suspended until the case is readjudicated unless an appropriate investigation of the spouse, as required by Paragraph 8! of DCID 1/14, was conducted with favorable resulta. In readjudicating such caces, the same fudgments and critesie as are reflected in this section apply. HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT AND SEXUAL PERVERSION DCID 1/14 requires that, w bo eligible for SCI socens, tcividuds must be ashie of excellent character and discretion, and not subject to undue influence or duress ~ through exploitable personal conduct. Sexual conduct can be # relevant condderation in circumstances in which the conduct indicates a personality disorder or could rerult in exposing the individual to direct or indirect pressure because of cusceptibility to blackmail or coercion as a result of the deviant serual behavior. Such behavior includes: bestiality, fetishism, exhibi- tioniem, necrophilia, symphomanis or satyriasis, masochism, sedism, peduphilis, _. transvestiom, and voyeurism. Homosexual conduct fs also to be considered as a factor in determining an individual's stability and susceptibility to undue influence or duress.
Fane ON saneg SavOrvin _, UNDESIRABLE CHARACTER TRAITS | - ws cxnphcitod that an indiiduas'ietye a examined ony nan effort to d- , termine whether a pattern of behavior exists which indicates that granting SCI access -could pose a risk to national security. In cases where allegations have been reported which reflect unfavorably on the reputation of an individual, it is incumbent upon the SCI adjudicator to distinguish fact from opinion and to determine which negative ". characteristics are real and pestinent to an evaluation of the individual's character and ° which ‘are unsubstantiated or irrelevant. Relevant negative characteristics are those " which, in the adjudicator's informed opinion, indicate that an individual is not willing, able, or likely to protect SCI information. The sdjudicator's personal likes or dislikes mit net be peerssted to alert the determinate . Examples off specific concern ta determining whether as individual has undesir be character traits are eny substantive, credible, derogatory comments by asociates, , _, thle Seametet Uhborn ead other soguetatances; any Hugation inaituted agalnat the individual by such penons as a result of the individual's actions; or allegations of violations of law. A recommendation, for disapproval would be appropriate for an individual who cannot be relied upon to obey rules and regulations. : In examining the circumstances of cases involving incidents of untruthfulness, the . 4 judicator must weigh all factors with particular emphasis on establishing the intent of the individual. Where an individual has tried to obscure pertinent oe significant facts by falsifying data, Le., on the Personal History Statement by either omission or false entry, such action should be weighed heavily against recommending acces. Failure to disckee derogatory personal information, such as a court martial or serious crime, would appear to be intentional and, coneequently, woid warrant a recommen- dation for disepproval.
5 enclose cr ote SC eli, 7 . ; Sranting SCI access to an individual with overly expensive tastes and habits or Hving “ "Wy recommendation for ‘disapproval Is appropriate when there is a pattern of = "ous ‘effort to satisfy creditors. In such cases, the adjudicator should determine : whether ‘the individual had been notified about the debts and whether they were 2 .. levally valid or ultimately satisfied. * When the financial irresponsibility alone is not of such magnitude to warrant disapproval, it may contribute to recommendation for denial of SCI access when there ‘Is other evidence of irresponsibility. ".. ALCOHOL ABUSE - «$0 Tihe SCI adjudicator should eamine any information developed relative to an individual's use of alcoholic beverages to determine the extent to which such use would adversely affect the ability of the individual to exercise the care, judgment, and discretion necessary to protect SCI information. The adjudicator should determine whether a pattern of impropriety exists, although one incident caused by alcoho! abuse may be of such magnitude te warrart a recommendation for disapproval. In determining the security impact of a person’s pattern of elcohol use, the adjudicator should consider the circumstances, amount and rate of consumption, the time and place of consumption, and the physiological and behavioral effect such drinking has on the individual. For example, does the individual's drinking result in absences from work or careless work habits? Does the individual become talkative, abusive, or manifest other undesirable characteristics? Does the individual drink until intoxicated? Has the individual been arrested for any acts resulting srom the influence of alcohol? In the absence of conclusive evidence, additional insight may be available from appropriate medical authorities. If the individual acknowledges having an alcohol abuse problem and fs seeking help, it may be appropriate to defer access determina- tion and monitor the individual's progress for a year or so. If, after considering the nature and sources of the infuzmation, the adjudicator determines that an individual's drinking ts not serious enogh to warrant a recommen- dation for disapproval of SCI access, it may be appropriate to recommend approval with a warning at the time of indoctrination that future incidents of alcohol abuse may result in SCI denial. The adjudicator may also recommend a reinvestigation of the in- dividual’s use of alcoho! after an appropriate period of time has passed. ILLEGAL DRUGS AND DRUG ABUSE The SCI adjudicator should examine all allegations of an individual's use, transport, transfer, sale, cultivation, processing and manufacturing of hallucinogens, narcotics, drugs and other materials and chemical compounds identified and listed in 12 * financial irresporsibility and it appears thet an individual has not mrde a conscien-
970, as” amended. F any of these vities is of direct concern to the SCI adjudicator in or- :fodgment 1 required to protect SCI infor: . “inn, The use of these substances may lead to ari incall acter pet *ag} dependence as well as having & deleterious effect on an individual's mental x. 2 and ability to function. Persons involved ia drug trafficking, Le., the commercial cuitivation, processing, , anufctring purchase, ola of rch ubtance sould normally be recommended Be * $i eases involving the use of drugs, the adjudicator must consider the nature of aa the substance used and whether the we is experimenal of ana ee eae he ey: thal toad “hand duos or hallucinogens such os beroin, cocaine, or LSD? Has the individual used drugs regularly oc only on occasion? Does the individual currently use drugs? Does the individual regularly purchase drugs or participate merely when offered drugs by others? Has the individual's behavior been affected by the use of drugs and, if s0, to what extent? Once the judgment is made that an individual is a habitual user of any controlled substance (multiple use beyond the point of mere experimentation), a recommenda- tion for disapproval is appropriate. Moreover, even experimental use of hard drugs or hallucinogens, such as LSD, could warrant a recommendation for disapproval. “ EMOTIONAL AND MENTAL DISORDERS DCID 1/14 requires that persons considered for access to SCI be stable, trustworthy, reliable, and of excellent character, judgment and discretion. Emotional and mental disorders which interfere with an individual's perception of reality or reliability 2:2 of serious concem to the SCI adjudicator in determining whether an in- dividual ts able or willing to protect SCI information. It is essential to obtain as muck information as possible when an allegation has been made in this area. If feasible, the individus! should be interviewed to obtain ad- ditional detail. When appropriate, government psychological and psychiatric person- nel should be consulted so that psychiatric ¢ psychological data may be properly evaluat If a current emotional instability appears to be a temporary condition (for example, caused by a death, illness, or marital breakup), it may be advisable to recommend postponing finel action and rechecking the situation at a later date. This precludes a security disapproval for what may be a temporary condition which, when cured, would have no security implications. Military and civilian personnel who decline to take medical/psychistric tests when so directed by competent authority should not be recommended foi SCT access. RECORD OF LAW VIOLATIONS in determining whether an individual is stable; trustworthy; and of excellent character, judgment, and discretion as required by DCID 1/14 for access to SCI, the adjudicator must weigh carefully any record of law violations by the individual. 13
§ ag0 it occurred, whether it was an isolated offense or a re- # offender's age at the time, social conditions which may .: ca ate cued yer or nrc wh 2 etn of ‘compromising security: However, the record of an individual responsible for multiple . violations should be scrutinized. The individual's current attitude toward ; ~ . security should be confirmed with his/her supervisor. A pattern of violations may be ae “sufficient ground for & recommendation for disapproval. Individuals responsible for eae. prt unauthorised disclosure of classified information may be denied initial or continued
Wess autdesed for kalal oe contioned acces to SCI pursuant to the provisions f DCID 1/14 shall, to the extent provided below, be afforded an opportunity to appeal the denial ‘or revocation ‘of such access. This annex supenedes any and all other practices and procedures for the appeal of the denial or revocation of SCI acozss. This ~ ‘gnnex shell not be construed to require the disclosure of classified information or information concerning Intelligence sources and methods, nor shall it be construed to _ | afford an opportunity to appeal prior to the actual denial or revocation of SCI access. ae In addition, the previsions of DCID 1/14, this annex, or any other document or > +" peeviston of law shall not be construed to create property interest of any kind in the “:.” ..> secess of any person to SCL Further, since the denial or revocation of access to SCI oo - cannot by the terms of DCID 1/14 render a perion ineligible for access to other :'. . pursuant to the provisions of DCID 1/14 and this annex shall not be construed to cre- ate a liberty interest of any kind. . ‘APPLICABILITY 1 “This anes applies to all United States Government civilian and military "personnel, as well as any other individuals, including contractors and employees of ae : contractors, who are considered for initial or continued access to SCL This annex does " “pot apply to decisions regarding employment and shall not be construed to affect or - :fmpate Public Law 88-200 or the authority of any entity to effect applicant or _ personnel actions purment to Public Law 88-200, Public Law 86-36, or other . applicable law. , ot '""" sen Access DETERMINATION AUTHORITY . Adjudications for access to SCI shall be made in accordance with DCID 1/14 by a Determination Authority designated by the Senior Official of the Intelligence "+ Community (SOIC) of each entity. Access to SCI shall be denied or revoked whenever it s determined that a person does not meet the security standards provided for in
cyto appeal vhssons tho Determination Athy : . ‘extity; im the exercise of his or her discretion, deems such action in... cay elvan can to be clearly coneitent withthe interests of the oatonal 2.’ Any porno ole ba gven 0 ifeation and afforded an osportualty to appeal to paragraph 1. above may, within 45 days of the date un which such person “fs Botified of the reasons for denial or revocation of SCI access, submit a written ap- al of that denial or revocation to the Determination Authority. The written material submitted for consideration may include any information which the person believes will axist the Determination Authority in reviewing the case. 3. ‘After a further review of the case in the light of the written appeal, the person be notified of the decision of the Determination Authority, os oe "4. If the Determination Authority reaffirms a denial or revocation of access, the person may, within S0-days of the date on which such person is notified of the Determination Authority's reaffirmation, request a final review of the case. In that * event, the SOIC, or his or her designee, shall personally review the case and exercise a his or ber discretion pursuant to the provisions of DCID 1/14, and shall inform the Ms * person of his or ber decision, which shall be final and unreviewable.
jeniity, in t y exercise of his or ber dis- be clearly consinent with the interests ation and afforded an opportunity to appeal on of SCI access, submit a written ap- Authority. The written material notified of the declsca of the Determination Authority. 4. ‘If the Determination Authority reaffirms a denial or revocation of access, the " person’ may, within 90 days of the date on which such person is notified of the ¢ Determination Authority's reaffirmation, request « final review of the case. In that :. event, the SOIC, or his or her designee, shall personally review the case and exercise > his or her discretion pursuant to the provisions of DCID 1/14, and shall inform the <. * person off his or her decision; which shall be final and unreviewable.
ee Lay ehntincd fig tle SC¥ toi’ obucaton . eran designed to enhance the security awareness of U.S. Government civilian and ‘personnel and private contractors working in the U.S. Intelligence Commun!- -pliance with these standards is required for all departments/agencies within” telligence Community. Exist ag security awareness programs shall be modified to conform with these standards, Devartments/agencies will esteblish » documented Drogram to ensure that training has been presented to all personnel. ~ og The security awareaes requirements set forth berefa ere divided into three phases. Phase 1 concerns the initial indoctrination of individuals which is normally administered prior to access to SCL Phase 2 concerns the continuing security —" awareness program required to maintain and increase security awareness throughout af the peried of access, Phase 3 sets forth the final guidelines and instructions when - Meee to SCI bs termiaated, rn.” 3) Initial Indoctrination—As soon as practicable after being approved for access = to SCI, personnel shall receive an initial security indoctrination which shall include: _ @. The need for and purpose of SCI, and the adverse effect on the national se- curity that could result from unauthorized disclosure. b. The intelligence mission of the department/agency to Include the reasons why intelligence informaticn is sensitive. * ¢ The administrative, personnel, physical and other procedural security - gequirements of the department/agency and those requirements pecullas to specific duty assignments ; d. Individual classification management responsibilities as set forth in appro- © _",,’ ; Delate directives and regulations to include classification /declasification “oa «The deftnitoos and criminal penalties for esplonege, including harboring or concealing persons; gathering, transmitting, or losing defense information; : "7 gathering or delivering defense information to aid foreign governments; ‘photographing and sketching defense installations; unauthorized disclosure of classified information (Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 792 through 785, 787 and 798), the Internal Security Act of 1950 (Title 50, U.S.C, Section 783) and, when appropriate, the Atomic Energy Act, Sections 224 through 227). f. The administrative sanctions for violation or disregard of security
emia me as persons to obtain national security | y information, p + (wilful ylation of ssarty regulations, ee " (2) unexplained affluence or excentve indebtednes, + (©) serious unlawful acts, _ (2) spparent mental or emotional problems, . @ coercion or herassanent attempts, and or . 8) Identificaiton "of the ‘elements in the Gepastment/agency to which matters of security interest are to be referred. _& Periodic Awareness Enhancement—Each department agency shall establish a os... continuing security awazeness program which will provide for frequent exposure of a personnel to security awareness material. Implersentation of a continuing program : may include live briefings, audio-visual presentations (e.g., video tapes, films and slide/tape programs), printed material (e.g., posters, memoranda, pamphlets, fliers), or a combitiation. thereof, It ts exentia] that current Information and materials be ~ “+. ha he mets for thls progam shal lcd, bot are not ited tn, “ay, The foreign Intelligence threat 7 (2) The technical threat. @) Administrative, persocne, physical, and procedural security. - (4) Individual claxification management responsibility.
es (8). When ssh sBal ano atictpte,cootat with representatives of ; *- eommunist-controlied countries. ~ Wien any thr stunt ares or which a pecan eben _ is required by the department/agency. : oo pcifine--When a depaitinent/agency has determined that acces to SCI is ‘ tio oneetreauted ial instracion and guldlins wil be provided tothe individual As a minimum these shall include: a. A requirement that the individual read appropriate sections of Titles 18 and 50, U.S. Code, and that the intent and criminal sanctions of these laws relative to espionage and unauthorized disclosure be clarified. b She continuing obligation, under the prepublication and other provisions of the nondisclosure agreement for SCI, never to divulge, publish, or reveal by ’ writing, word, conduct or otherwise, to any unauthorized persons any SCI, without the written consent of appropriate department/agency officials. | @ ‘Am acknowledgement thet the Individual will report without delay to the aa Federal Bureau of Investigation, or the department/agency, any attempt by an unauthorized person to solicit national security information. d. A declaration thet the individual no longer possesses any documents or material containing SCL e. A reminder of the risks associated with foreign travel and certain hazardous _—_ . activities as defined in the DCI policy document entitled “Security Policy —— Concerning Travel and Assignment of Personne! with Access to Sensitive
(Page 9) ANNEX A DCID 1/14 ADJUDICATION GUIDELINES PURPOSE This annex is designed to ensure that a common approach is followed by Intelligence Community departments and agencies in applying the standards of DCID 1/14. These guidelines apply to the adjudication of cases involving persons being considered for first-time access to Sensitive Compartmented information (SCI) as well as those cases of persons being readjudicated for continued SCI access. ADJUDICATIVE PROCESS
(Page 10) Adjudicative actions concerning the foregoing items are examined in greater detail below. LOYALTY DCID 1/14 establishes the catagorical requirement that, to be eligible for SCI access, an individual must be of unquestioned loyalty to the United States. CLOSE RELATIVES AND ASSOCIATES 10
(Page 11) In examining cases involving acts of homosexual conduct or sexual perversion, it is relevant to consider the age of the person, the voluntariness, and the frequency of such activities, the public nature and the recency of the conduct, as well as any other circumstances which may serve to aggravate the nature or the character of the conduct. A recommendation for disapproval is appropriate when, in view of all available evidence concerning the individual’s history of sexual behavior, it appears that access to SCI could pose a risk to the national security. COHABITATION Cohabitation in and of itself does not preclude SCI access approval. The identity of a cohabitant must be ascertained and a determination made if such association constitutes an unacceptable security risk based on the same criteria as in the section, "Close Relatives and Associates." Cohabitation with an alien, for example, requires the same scrutiny as marriage to an alien. Extra-marital sexual relations are alsc of legitimate concern to the SCI adjudicator when the potential for undue influence or duress exists. UNDESTRABLE CHARACTER TRAITS 11
(Page 14) Although a pattern of repeated minor traffic violations could be significant, the adjudicatcr is principally concerned with more serious criminal violations or court actions reflecting adversely upon the individual’s reliability or trustworthyness. Each case involving convictions for criminal offenses must be considered from the standpoint of the nature and seriousness of the offense, the circumstances under which it occured, how long ago it occured, whether it was an isolated offense or a repeated violation of the law, the offender’s age at the time, social conditions which may have a bearing on the individuai’s actions, and any evidence of rehabilitation. Any conviction for a felony will normally suppert a recommendation for disapproval. If the offense was committed many years prior, the individual has shown evidence of rehabilitation, and the investigation shows no other derogatory information, an approval may be considered. A large number of minor offenses, however, could indicate irresponsibility and may support an adverse recommendation. SECURITY VIOLATIGNS Most security violations are caused by carelessness or ignorance with no intention of compromising security. However, the record of an individual responsible for multiple violations should be scrutinized. The individual’s current attitude toward security should be confirmed with his/her supervisor. A pattern of violations may be sufficent ground for a recommendation for disapproval. Individuals responsible for unauthorized disclosure of classified information may be denied initial or continued SCI access. 14
(Page 16) PROCEDURES 1. Persons shall be: a. notified of the denial or revocation of SCI access; b. notified that they may request to be provided the reasons for such denial or revocation; and/or c. afforded an opportunity to appeal, whenever the Determination Authority of any entity, in \:che exercise of his or her discretion, deems such action in any given case to be clearly consistent with the interests of the national security. 2. Any person who is given notification and is afforded an opportunity to appeal pursuant to paragraph 1. above may, within 45 days of the date on which such person is notified of the reasons for denial or revocation of SCI access, submit a written appeal of that denial or revocation to the Determination Authority. The written material submitted for consideration may include any information which the person believes will assist the Determination Authority in reviewing the case. 3. After a further review of the case in the light of the written appeal, the person will be notified of the decision of the Determination Authority. 16
(Page 16, corrected) PROCEDURES 1. The person shall be: a. notified of the denial or revocation of SCI access; b. notified that they may request to be provided the reasons for such denial or revocation;, and/or c. afforded an opportunity to appeal, whenever the Determination Authority of any entity, in the exercise of his or her discretion, deems such action in any given case to be consistent with the interests of the national security. 2. Any person who is given notification and afforded an opportunity to appeal pursuant to paragraph 1. above may, within 45 days of the date on which such person is notified of the reasons for denial or revocation of SCI access, submit a written appeal of that denial or revocation to the Determination Authority. The written material submitted for consideration may include any information which the person believes will assist the Determination Authority in reviewing the case. 3. After a further review of the case in the light of the written appeal, the persen will be notified of the decision of the Determination Authority. 4. If the Determination Authority reaffirms a denial or revocation of access, the person may, within 30 days of the date on which such person is notified of the Determination Authority’s reaffirmation, request a final review of the case. In that event, the SOIC, or his or her designee, shall personally review the case and exercise his or her discretion pursuant to the provisions of DCID 1/14, and shall inform the person of his or her decision, which shall be final and unreviewable. 16
(Page 18) g. A review of the techniques employed by foreign intelligence organizations in attempting to obtain national security information. h. Individual security responsibilities including: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) The prohibition against discussing SCI in a nonsecure area, over a nonsecure telephone, or in any other manner that permits access by unauthorized persons. The need to determine, prior to disseminating SCI, that the prospective recipient has the proper security access approval, that the SCI is needed in order to perform official duties, and that the recipient can properly protect the information. Administrative reporting requirements such as foreign travel, contacts with foreign nationals, attempts by un- authorized persons to obtain national security information, pysical security deficiencies, and loss or possible compro- mise of of SCI material. Obligation to report to proper authorities any information which could reflect on the trustworthiness of an individual who has access to SCI, such as: (a) willful violation of security regulations. (b) unexplained affluence or excessive indebtedness, (c) serious unlawful acts, (ad) apparent mental or emotional problems, (e) coercion or harassment attempts, and or (£) blackmail attempts. Identification of the elements in the department/agency to which matters of security interest are to be referred. 18
(Page 19) (5) Criminal penalties and administrative sanctions. (6) Individual security responsibilities. (7) A review of other appropriate department/agency requirements Special security briefings/debriefings are required to supple- ment the existing security awareness programs in the following situations: (1) When an individual is designated as a courier. (2) When an individual travels, officially or unofficially, to or through communist countries, or areas of high risk. (3) When an individual has, or anticipates, contact with rep- resentatives of communist-controlled countries. 19