FSf/^rtT^S 
AUGUST  1985 
PUB  5 
INTELLIGENCE  FOR  JOINT  FORCES 
FOR  INSTRUCTIONAL  PURPOSES  ONLY 
NATIONAL  DEFENSE  UNIVERSITY 
ARMED  FORCES  STAFF  COLLEGE 
7800  HAMPTON  BOULEVARD  •  NORFOLK.  VIRGINIA     23511-6097 
AUGUST  1985
TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 
CHAPTER  1 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
CHAPTER  2 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
2.5 
2.6 
CHAPTER  3 
3.1 
3.2 
3.3 
3.* 
3.5 
3.6 
3.7 
3.8 
CHAPTER  4 
4.1 
4.2 
Intelligence  Activities  in  Joint  Forces 
Introduction 
Joint  Intelligence  Organizations 
Factors  Affecting  the  Conduct  of  Intelligence  Operations 
The  National  Intelligence  Structure 
Introduction 
National  Security  Council 
Director  of  Central  Intelligence  (DCI) 
The  National  Foreign  Intelligence  Board  (NFIB) 
The  National  Foreign  Intelligence  Council.  (NFIC) 
Presidential  Oversight  Boards 
Intelligence  Organizations 
Introduction 
Central  Intelligence  Agency 
Department  of  Defense 
Department  of  State 
Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation 
Department  of  Energy 
Department  of  the  Treasury 
Drug  Enforcement  Administration 
Collection  of  Information  for  Joint  Forces 
Introduction 
Collection  Planning 
PAGE 
1-1 
1-1 
1-2 
1-6 
2-1 
2-1 
2-1 
2-2 
2-4 
2-4 
2-5 
3-1 
3-1 
3-1 
3-2 
3-i7 
3-17 
3-18 
3-i9 
3-19 
4-1 
4-1 
4-2 
August  1985 — The  faculty  member  responsible  for  this  edition  is  Lt  Col  Herbert  D.  Japs, 
USAF. 
in
4.3 
4.4 
4.5 
4.6 
4.7 
4.8 
CHAPTER  5 
5.1 
5.2 
5.3 
5.4 
5.5 
5.6 
CHAPTER  6 
6.1 
6.2 
6.3 
CHAPTER  7 
7.1 
7.2 
CHAPTER  8 
8.1 
8.2 
Typical  Intelligence  Requirements  for  Joint  Forces 
Sources  and  Collection  Agency  Terminology 
Typical  Sources  of  Information 
Military  Collection  Organizations  and  Capabilities 
The  Intelligence  Collection  Plan 
Intelligence  Storage  and  Retrieval 
Production  of  Intelligence  for  Joint  Forces 
Introduction 
Planning  to  Conduct  Intelligence  Operations 
Basic  Intelligence  Studies 
The  Intelligence  Estimate  of  the  Situation 
Intelligence  Inputs  Required  in  the  Joint  Operation 
Planning  System  (JOPS) 
The  Short-Range  Intelligence  Estimate  and  Future 
Planning 
Dissemination  of  Intelligence  by  Joint  Forces 
General 
Major  Requirements 
Defense  Intelligence  Reports 
The  Use  of  Computers  in  Intelligence 
Introduction 
Specific  Applications 
Counterintelligence  and  Special  Operations 
Counterintelligence 
Special  Activities 
PAGE 
4-5 
4-8 
4-9 
4-11 
4-13 
4-13 
5-1 
5-1 
5-2 
5-5 
5-6 
5-27 
5-35 
6-1 
6-1 
6-1 
6-3 
7-1 
7-1 
7-2 
8-1 
8-1 
8-4 
IV
APPENDIXES 
PAGE 
A      INTELLIGENCE  GLOSSARY  OF  TERMS  A-l 
D      INTELLIGENCE  SCHEDULE  OF  EVENTS  B-l 
C      AN  INTELLIGENCE  COLLECTION  PLAN  C-l 
D      BASIC  INTELLIGENCE  STUDY  FORMAT  D-l 
E      NATIONAL  SECURITY  COUNCIL  STRUCTURE  E-l 
F      INTELLIGENCE  COMMUNITY  STRUCTURE  F-l 
G      DEFENSE  INTELLIGENCE  AGENCY  G-l 
H      U.S.  PACIFIC  COMMAND  3-2  ORGANIZATION  CHART  H-l 
I       INTELLIGENCE  CENTER  PACIFIC  (IPAC)  ORGANIZATION  CHART  1-1 
3       U.S.  EUROPEAN  COMMAND  3-2  ORGANIZATION  CHART  3-1 
K      A  TYPICAL  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  INTELLIGENCE  DIVISION  OF 
A  30INT  TASK  FORCE  K"1 
L      BASIC  INTELLIGENCE  AND  COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  DOCUMENTS 
(BY  SOURCES  AND  AGENCIES)  L-l 
M      CURRENT  CLASSIFIED  PERIODICALS  AND  REPORTS  CURRENTLY 
RECEIVED  BY  AFSC  LIBRARY  M-l 
N      DEFENSE  INTELLIGENCE  AGENCY  MANUALS  N-l
PREFACE 
This  manual  has  been  prepared  for  instructional  use  at  the  Armed  Forces  Staff 
College.  Particular  emphasis  is  placed  on  those  portions  of  the  intelligence  process 
applicable  to  joint  forces  and  the  related  aspects  of  the  national  intelligence  process 
which  are  of  greatest  interest  to  officers  of  joint  staffs.  Other  items  have  been  treated 
briefly  or  omitted.  Readers  desiring  to  pursue  subjects  beyond  the  scope  of  this  manual 
may  refer  to  the  numerous  official  publications  available,  many  of  which  are  classified. 
Users  are  cautioned  that  the  material  presented  is  valid  only  as  of  the  publication  date. 
Material  contained  in  this  manual  conforms  to  existing  approved  joint  doctrine. 
Where  no  joint  doctrine  has  been  formally  approved,  the  manual  reflects  terminology, 
procedures,  and  policies  which  are  acceptable  to  the  Services  concerned. 
Users  of  this  manual  are  asked  to  submit  any  comments  or  recommendations  for 
improvement  to  LTC  Thomas  H.  Rhoads,  USA,  Armed  Forces  Staff  College. 
vu
CHAPTER  i 
INTELLIGENCE  ACTIVITIES  IN  JOINT  FORCES 
1.1  INTRODUCTION 
a.  Development.  World  War  II  marked  the  beginning  of  an  era  in 
which  joint  operations  became  the  normal  means  of  conducting  warfare.  The 
employment  of  land,  sea,  and  air  forces  in  concert  under  a  single  commander 
became  a  common,  rather  than  an  exceptional,  method  of  waging  war.  Since 
World  War  II  this  pattern  has  continued  and  U.S.  forces  have  planned  and 
conducted  many  types  of  joint  operations.  Intelligence,  as  a  major  responsibil- 
ity of  the  joint  commander,  followed  the  historical  development  of  joint 
operations.  Initially,  there  was  wide  disagreement  on  the  mission  of  intelli- 
gence in  joint  forces.  Much  of  this  disagreement  stemmed  from  the 
differences  in  the  roles  and  missions  of  the  respective  Services,  their  size  and 
composition,  and  their  relationships  to  one  another.  Once  these  differences 
were  resolved,  joint  intelligence  could  be  put  in  proper  perspective. 
b.  Intelligence  in  Joint  Forces  and  National  Intelligence.  When 
compared  with  national  and  departmental  intelligence,  joint  force  intelligence 
is  concerned  with  smaller  geographic  areas,  focused  on  only  a  part  of  the 
enemy  forces,  concerned  mainly  with  combat  intelligence,  and  primarily 
interested  only  in  that  strategic  intelligence  required  by  the  mission  of  the 
joint  force.  It  is  therefore  narrower  in  scope  than  national  intelligence, 
regardless  of  the  command  level  of  the  joint  force,  its  size,  or  the  extent  of 
the  area  in  which  it  operates.  However,  operational  intelligence  in  a  joint 
force  depends  to  a  great  extent  on  the  strategic,  technical,  area  studies,  and 
current  intelligence  produced  by  national  and  departmental  agencies.  Those 
agencies,  in  turn,  require  intelligence  collected  by  joint  forces  to  produce 
more  accurate  and  effective  intelligence  for  use  of  such  forces.  The 
intelligence  relationship  of  national  intelligence  agencies  and  joint  forces  is 
therefore  one  of  interdependence. 
c.  Responsibilities.  The  intelligence  responsibilities  of  any  joint  force 
commander  are  to 
(1)  Establish  plans,  policies,  and  overall  requirements  for  the 
intelligence  activities  of  his  command,  ensuring  that  his  policies  are  in 
accordance  with  national  and  DOD  intelligence  directives. 
(2)  Collect,  produce,  and  disseminate  on  time  the  intelligence 
needed  for  the  operations  of  his  mission,  including  that  needed  by  any 
subordinate  elements  of  the  command  to  which  a  mission  is  assigned. 
(3)  Initiate  and  direct  counterintelligence  measures  to  identify, 
neutralize,  or  destroy  enemy  agents  and  supporters  who  might  penetrate 
forces  of  the  command  for  espionage  or  sabotage  and  to  detect  evidence  of 
treason,  sedition,  or  subversive  activities. 
(4)  Discharge  special  intelligence  responsibilities  assigned  by 
higher  authority. 
1-1
d.  Tasks.     These  intelligence  responsibilities  are  met  by  doing  the 
following  five  traditional  intelligence  tasks. 
(1)  Collection — acquiring  information  on  a  given  intelligence 
problem 
(2)  Production — judging  the  credibility  of  collected  informa- 
tion, drawing  pertinent  inferences  from  its  analysis,  and  when  appropriate, 
interpreting  such  inferences  in  the  perspective  of  planning 
(3)  Dissemination — distributing  intelligence  to  agencies  needing 
it 
(*)  Counterintelligence — destroying  the  effectiveness  of  inim- 
ical foreign  intelligence  activities  and  protecting  information  against 
espionage,  personnel  against  subversion,  and  installations  or  material  against 
sabotage  (NOTE:  Counterintelligence  in  the  Air  Force  is  not  part  of  the 
intelligence  function.  The  Air  Force  Security  Policy/Office  of  Special 
Investigations  is  responsible  for  counterintelligence.) 
(5)  Special  Intelligence — discharging  special  intelligence  re- 
sponsibilities assigned  by  the  national-level  agencies 
JOINT  INTELLIGENCE  ORGANIZATIONS 
a.  Nature  and  Responsibilities.  There  are  certain  differences 
between  the  nature  and  responsibilities  of  a  unified  command  at  theater  level 
and  those  of  a  joint  task  force. 
(1)  The  unified  command  is  a  permanent,  long-term  organiza- 
tion, whereas  the  joint  task  force  is  temporary. 
(2)  The  area  where  a  unified  command  conducts  military  opera- 
tions and  supports  them  is  usually  much  larger  than  the  operating  area  of  the 
subordinate  joint  task  force. 
(3)  The  unified  command  is  concerned  with  a  campaign  or  series 
of  related  operations.  In  contrast,  the  joint  task  force  is  concerned  with  only 
one,  or  at  the  most  a  few,  closely  related  operations. 
W  The  commander  of  a  unified  command  must  not  only  plan 
for  joint  task  force  operations  and  supervise  their  execution  (sometimes  more 
than  one  such  operation  at  a  time),  but  also  plan  for  further  operations  to 
begin  after  his  presently  constituted  joint  task  forces  have  been  disbanded. 
1-2
Each  of  these  factors  affects  the  intelligence  organizations  of  the  unified 
command  and  the  joint  task  force  differently. 
b.  Typical  Joint  Intelligence  Organizational  Structures 
(1)  Unified  Command  Intelligence  Organization.  There  are  two 
types  of  unified  command  intelligence  organizations.  One  type,  shown  in  two 
versions  (Appendixes  H  and  J),  includes  all  the  staff  personnel  and  equipment 
required  for  planning,  policy  formulation,  management,  and  »  substantial 
capability  to  process  and  disseminate  intelligence.  It  is  a  Urge  organization. 
The  other  type  includes  only  a  small  number  of  personnel  and  a  limited  amount 
of  equipment  and  confines  itself  primarily  to  policy  formulation,  planning,  and 
management.  It  relies  on  the  intelligence  organizations  of  the  subordinate 
component  commands  of  the  theater  for  collecting  information  and  producing 
and  disseminating  intelligence. 
(2)  Typical  3oint  Task  Force  Intelligence  Organization.  Appen- 
dix K  portrays  a  typical  joint  task  force  intelligence  organization.  The 
division  consists  of  a  3-2  with  three  major  intelligence  groups:  an  administra- 
tive group,  an  intelligence  collections  and  plans  group,  and  an  operational 
intelligence  group.  In  a  joint  task  force,  the  size  and  type  of  organization  of 
the  intelligence  division  will  vary  greatly  according  to  the  scope  and  nature  of 
the  operation.  A  relatively  small  division  may  be  able  to  handle  the 
intelligence  load  during  the  actual  operations  phase,  but  the  division  must  be 
large  enough  to  prepare  the  detailed  plans  in  the  relatively  short  time  allowed 
for  such  planning.  Economy  in  the  use  of  personnel  is  required,  particularly  if 
two  or  more  joint  task  forces  are  making  concurrent  demands  on  unified 
command  headquarters  for  the  personnel  necessary  to  staff  their  divisions. 
The  size  of  the  division  will  depend  on  the  intelligence  workload  and  personnel 
resources  available.  The  workload  generally  will  result  from  the  factors  which 
influence  organization,  the  intelligence  requirements,  and  the  type  and  quan- 
tity of  intelligence  support  which  higher  headquarters  provides. 
c.  Organization  Principles.  To  ensure  that  the  intelligence  division  of 
a  joint  command  considers  information  on  the  enemy  in  its  entirety  and  not  in 
separate  air,  naval,  and  ground  force  aspects,  the  organization  of  the  division 
should  consider  the  following: 
(1)  Senior  Assistants.  The  director  of  the  intelligence  division 
should  have  a  senior  assistant  from  each  component  Service  other  than  his  own 
to  ensure  adequate  comprehension  of  particular  Service  operational  intelli- 
gence requirements. 
(2)  Staff  Composition.  The  joint  intelligence  staff  which  plans 
the  collection,  collation,  and  evaluation  of  enemy  information  should  be 
composed  of  qualified  personnel  from  each  of  the  participating  Services  to 
ensure  proper  representation  of  Service  interests. 
(3)  Needs.  The  joint  intelligence  staff  must  consider  the  needs 
for  intelligence  not  only  of  the  parent  command  and  its  subordinate  units  but 
also  of  higher  and  adjacent  headquarters.  In  addition,  the  full  spectrum  of 
intelligence  planning  must  be  taken  into  account,  including  such  sub-hostility 
1-3
operations  as  U.S.     citizen/property  protection,  evacuation  of  U.S.  citizens, 
disaster  relief,  humanitarian  assistance,  and  peacekeeping. 
(<0  Centralization.  The  joint  intelligence  staff  should  cen- 
tralize specialized  intelligence  techniques  to  best  benefit  all  elements  of  the 
command.  The  Joint  Operational  Intelligence  Agency  (JOIA)  is  one  means  of 
accomplishing  this.* 
(5)  Location.  Where  distance  or  special  operating  conditions 
would  cause  undersirable  delay  in  the  production  or  dissemination  of  intelli- 
gence, forward  agencies  of  the  division  may  be  established  to  prevent  them. 
d.  Avoidance  of  Duplication  of  Effort.  The  primary  function  of  the 
intelligence  division  (3-2)  is  to  assure  the  availability  and  dissemination  of 
intelligence.  Each  Service  component  in  a  joint  force  must  participate  in  the 
collection,  production,  and  dissemination  of  intelligence  needed  as  much  as  is 
compatible  with  the  requirements  of  their  commands.  Each  subordinate 
element  of  a  joint  force  thus  must  know  the  intelligence  requirements  of  other 
elements  of  the  force.  For  efficiency  and  economy,  the  joint  force  com- 
mander should  ensure  that  duplication  of  the  intelligence  effort  is  avoided.  It 
can  be  avoided  if,  on  establishment  of  the  joint  force,  the  commander  issues 
standing  operating  procedures  on  matters  that  lend  themselves  to  such 
procedures,  whose  scope  depends  on  the  nature  of  the  command,  the  type  of 
forces  in  it,  and  the  character  of  operations  to  be  conducted.  The  following 
types  of  procedures  should  be  considered  for  inclusion  in  intelligence  direc- 
tives by  the  joint  force  commander. 
(1)  Responsibilities  of  each  component  for  intelligence  collec- 
tion and  dissemination,  counterintelligence  operations,  and  the  production  of 
basic  intelligence 
(2)  Standard  procedures  for  intelligence  collection,  production, 
and  dissemination;  interrogation  of  prisoners  of  war;  intelligence  exploitation 
of  friendly  evaders  and  escapees  from  hostile  territory;  processing  of  docu- 
ments and  equipment  and  other  items  of  a. technical  intelligence  nature;  and 
the  collection  of  meteorological  data 
(3)  Standard  procedures  or  measures  to  control  subversion, 
prevent  sabotage  and  espionage,  maintain  secrecy  discipline,  and  maintain 
communication  security,  censorship,  and  control  of  personal  photography 
(*)  Standardization  of  intelligence  and  counterintelligence 
reports  and  channels  of  communications 
*JOIA  is  an  intelligence  agency  in  which  the  efforts  of  two  or  more  Services 
are  integrated  to  furnish  that  operational  intelligence  essential  to  the  com- 
mander of  a  joint  force  and  to  supplement  that  available  to  subordinate  forces 
of  his  command.  The  agency  may  or  may  not  be  part  of  such  joint  force 
commander's  staff. 
1-4
e-  Collection.    Within  the  scope  of  the  essential  elements  of  informa- 
tion (EEl),  the  intelligence  division  directs  the  effort  to  ensure  that  adequate 
information  is  available  when  needed.  Each  Service  identifies  its  intelligence 
needs,  and  available  assets  are  used  to  satisfy  these  requirements.  Each 
Service  will  ensure  the  free  exchange  of  such  information  with  the  other 
Service  components  concerned.  The  EEI  and  other  intelligence  requirements 
of  all  components  of  a  joint  force  determine  the  missions  for  the  various 
collecting  agencies  and  for  securing  proper  coordination  of  the  whole  effort. 
The  assignment  of  tasks  should  be  based  on  the  capability  of  the  collecting 
agency,  whatever  Service  it  is.  The  staff  division  responsible  for  planning 
must  be  fully  aware  of  the  intelligence  requirements  and  collecting  capabil- 
ities and  limitations  of  the  diverse  elements  of  a  joint  force,  which  requires 
close  liaison  with  the  intelligence  division. 
f.  Production.  It  is  essential  that  information  on  the  enemy  be 
considered  in  its  entirety  and  not  separately  in  its  air,  sea,  and  ground  force 
aspects.  Only  by  complete  integration  of  information  can  the  enemy  situation 
be  estimated  in  its  entirety.  Time  and  distance  from  the  national  and 
departmental  intelligence  agencies  may  make  it  desirable  for  the  joint  force 
to  perform  certain  intelligence  functions  normally  performed  by  those 
agencies.  Included  among  those  functions  might  be  publication  of 
(1)  Technical  intelligence  bulletins. 
(2)  General  orientation  intelligence. 
(3)  Other  intelligence  studies  and  documents  which  would  lose 
their  usefulness  if  delayed  in  transit  to  the  recipients. 
Whenever,  for  expedience  and  decentralization,  the  intelligence  division  of  a 
joint  force  undertakes  to  perform  any  of  those  functions,  it  must  so  advise  the 
higher  echelon  concerned.  It  should  also  ensure  that  such  action  does  not 
interrupt  the  flow  of  information  back  to  the  higher  echelon.  Such  actions  are 
subject  to  review  by  higher  authority  in  order  to  guard  against  unnecessary 
duplication. 
g.  Dissemination.  There  is  little  room  for  service  parochialism  in  the 
dissemination  of  intelligence  during  joint  task  force  operations.  Openly  shared 
information  serves  to  significantly  reduce  the  confusion  in  such  operations, 
increases  the  confidence  of  commanders  in  their  decisionmaking,  and  serves 
the  principle  of  economy  of  force. 
h.  Coordination.  The  many  facets  of  the  joint  intelligence  effort 
must  be  planned,  coordinated,  and  actively  supervised.  This  is  necessary  so 
that  the  Service  components  can  support  one  another  and  avoid  duplication  of 
effort.  Where  there  is  coordination  by  mutual  cooperation  of  commanders, 
intelligence  policies  should  be  enunciated  by  each  commander  for  his  own 
command.  The  respective  commanders  are  mutually  responsible  for  the 
standardization  of  intelligence  policies  of  mutual  interest. 
1-5
FACTORS  AFFECTING  THE  CONDUCT  OF  INTELLIGENCE  OPERATIONS 
a.  General.  Several  factors  affect  the  conduct  of  intelligence  opera- 
tions. Since  joint  forces  differ  considerably  in  missions,  organization,  and 
size,  the  effect  which  each  factor  will  have  when  applied  to  specific  joint 
forces  will  vary  in  weight  and  importance.  This  section  deals  with  some  of 
these  factors. 
b.  Level  of  Command  of  the  Joint  Force.  A  high-level  joint  force 
may  have  extensive  intelligence  responsibilities,  including  those  assigned  by 
higher  authority.  Among  these  responsibilities  might  be  the  conduct  of 
continuing  intelligence  iiaison  between  the  joint  force  and  other  U.S.  and 
foreign  governmental  representatives.  A  joint  force  at  a  lower  level  of 
command  might  have  no  such  responsibilities  assigned  and  thus  be  concerned 
only  with  the  intelligence  functioning  required  to  support  the  force  mission. 
c.  Nature  of  the  Mission.  The  conduct  of  intelligence  operations  on  a 
long-range,  permanent  basis  by  a  joint  force  may  involve  a  transition  from 
peace  to  war  and  perhaps  again  to  peace.  In  such  a  force  the  concept  of 
intelligence,  the  organization  for  intelligence,  and  even  its  conduct  must  each 
be  geared  to  adjust  rapidly  and  effectively  to  changing  conditions.  With  each 
change  in  conditions,  the  type  and  extent  of  intelligence  support  by  external 
sources,  the  volume  of  information  and  intelligence  to  be  processed,  the  force 
intelligence  requirements,  and  the  intelligence  capabilities  of  component 
commands  will  change.  In  contrast,  a  joint  force  activated  to  accomplish  a 
mission  limited  in  scope  usually  conducts  the  intelligence  functions  in 
accordance  with  that  single  consideration. 
d.  Participation  in  Combined  Operations.  To  ensure  an  adequate  flow 
of  required  intelligence  to  all  components  in  a  combined  operation,  arrange- 
ments must  be  made  for  this  exchange  early  in  the  intelligence  planning. 
Failure  to  complete  arrangements  may  drastically  affect  intelligence  func- 
tioning in  the  force  by  compartmenting  or  isolating  certain  functions,  limiting 
the  flow  of  intelligence  to  commands  which  require  it,  and  unnecessarily 
duplicating  one  or  more  intelligence  functions  in  the  force  by  establishing 
uninational  intelligence  divisions  or  agencies  within  the  force.  Further,  since 
the  intelligence  organizations,  techniques,  and  procedures  of  the  armed  forces 
of  countries  employed  in  a  combined  operation  differ  from  one  another,  their 
integration  into  a  joint  effort  often  is  accomplished  only  with  difficulty.  In 
recent  years,  however,  significant  strides  have  been  made  toward  increasing 
the  degree  of  standardization  required  to  overcome  many  of  these  difficulties. 
Other  complicating  factors  which  may  affect  the  conduct  of  intelligence  when 
joint  forces  participate  in  combined  operations  include  differences  in  lan- 
guage, differences  in  the  evaluation  and  interpretation  of  intelligence  caused 
by  varying  national  interests  and  attitudes,  and  differences  in  national  military 
concepts  concerning  the  role  of  intelligence  and  its  application  in  planning. 
e.  Organization  of  the  Force.  The  internal  command  relationships 
and  the  relative  positions,  sizes,  and  capacities  of  the  intelligence  divisions  of 
each  staff  in  the  force  have  a  marked  effect  on  the  conduct  of  intelligence.  In 
the  larger  joint  forces  there  is  usually  a  large  capacity  for  the  conduct  of 
intelligence  operations  at  the  level  of   the  Service  component  commander. 
1-6
This  capacity,  particularly  in  intelligence  production,  often  is  greater  than 
that  at  the  higher  joint  force  command  level.  Usually  the  Service  component 
commander's  intelligence  organization  is  geared  primarily  to  produce  intelli- 
gence required  by  the  Service  component.  Such  intelligence  also  is  required 
for  integration  into  the  total  intelligence  needed  by  the  joint  force.  A  joint 
force  which  includes  Service  component  command  intelligence  organizations 
can  designate  those  organizations  as  primary  producers  for  the  joint  force  of 
certain  specified  types  of  intelligence  within  their  capabilities.  This  decen- 
tralization of  the  production  task  permits  a  smaller  intelligence  division  at  the 
joint  force  level  and  eliminates  duplication  in  intelligence  functions.  On  the 
other  hand,  more  centralized  control  can  be  retained  at  the  joint  staff  level 
through  the  establishment  of  a  joint  subordinate  operational  command  under 
the  staff  and  managerial  direction  of  the  director  of  intelligence  (3-2)  for  the 
timely  production  of  target  and  other  substantive  intelligence  production 
requirements.  The  August  197*  activation  of  the  Intelligence  Center  Pacific 
(IP AC)  created  an  example  of  this  type  of  organization,  designed  to  support  all 
Service  forces  in  the  Pacific  Command  area.  (See  Appendix  I  for  IPAC 
organization  and  mission.) 
f.  Areas  in  Which  Operations  are  Conducted.  The  characteristics  of 
areas  in  which  operations  are  planned  and  conducted  often  have  a  pronounced 
effect  on  intelligence  functioning.  Areas  of  great  size  often  overextend 
intelligence  collection  agencies  and  cause  communications  difficulties  in  the 
transmission  of  intelligence.  Conversely,  small  areas  may  impose  special 
requirements  for  intensive  intelligence  liaison  with  forces  in  adjacent  areas. 
Land  areas  reduce  the  requirements  for  naval  intelligence  collection  activities 
and  water  areas  increase  that  requirement.  Areas  in  which  there  is  a  large, 
potentially  hostile  population  require  an  extensive  counterintelligence  effort. 
Areas  devoid  of  civilian  inhabitants  reduce  the  requirement  for  extensive 
counterintelligence.  Areas  where  there  is  a  large  friendly  population  contain 
sources  of  possibly  valuable  information.  The  evaluation  of  such  information, 
however,  may  cause  a  very  heavy  production  workload.  Each  area  charac- 
teristic therefore  can  have  a  special  effect  on  the  conduct  of  intelligence 
operations  within  a  joint  force. 
g.  Type  of  Enemy  Threat.  If  the  enemy  forces  consist  of  air,  ground, 
and  naval  units,  intelligence  on  these  forces  in  their  entirety  must  be 
integrated  at  the  joint  force  level.  Proper  integration  is  accomplished  only  by 
the  combined,  coordinated  efforts  of  air,  ground,  and  naval  intelligence 
personnel.  If  the  enemy  threat  is  predominantly  posed  by  one  type  of  force 
(air,  ground,  or  naval),  there  usually  is  a  greater  requirement  for  intelligence 
personnel  familiar  with  assessing  that  type  of  force.  If  the  joint  force  is 
operating  against  enemy  forces  of  a  single  type  only,  which  rarely  happens,  the 
requirement  for  joint  integrated  intelligence  is  reduced.  Thus,  the  type  of 
enemy  threat  affects  both  intelligence  organization  and  functioning  in  a  joint 
force. 
h.  Intelligence  Requirements.  The  intelligence  requirements  of  each 
component  of  the  joint  force  and  the  requirements  imposed  by  higher  authority 
substantially  determine  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  intelligence  function  in 
the  force.  If  the  requirements  are  purely  military,  the  intelligence  function 
can  be  conducted  by  military  personnel  only.    If  there  are  also  requirements 
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for  production  of  economic,  political,  sociological,  or  scientific  intelligence, 
specialists  in  one  or  more  of  those  fields  may  be  required.  Further,  the 
amount  of  effort  required  to  satisfy  each  of  such  intelligence  requirements 
will,  in  general,  determine  the  nature  and  degree  of  emphasis  of  each 
intelligence  function  in  the  force.  In  every  case,  the  timeliness  of  the 
intelligence  required  is  of  the  utmost  importance  in  support  of  military 
operations.  Time  constraints  must  be  identified  as  early  as  possible  in  the 
process. 
i-  Intelligence  Available.    If  the  area  of  operations  and  the  enemy  in 
that  area  have  been  primary  targets  of  the  intelligence  effort  for  a  consider- 
able time,  the  information  already  available  will  assist  in  reducing  the 
collection  requirements.  If  the  information  already  available  has  previously 
been  refined  into  basic  encyclopedic  and  other  types  of  intelligence,  the 
intelligence  production  task  will  be  even  lighter.  The  amount  of  pertinent 
information  and  intelligence  available  at  the  time  operations  are  initiated  in 
the  area  will  therefore  directly  affect  the  extent  of  the  collection  and 
production  tasks  and  thus  greatly  influence  the  conduct  of  the  intelligence 
function.  Conversely,  if  the  area  in  which  operations  are  conducted  has  not 
been  a  primary  intelligence  target  until  very  recently,  or  the  enemy  strength, 
disposition,  and  activities  in  the  area  are  not  known  precisely,  or  have  changed 
very  recently,  both  the  collection  and  production  tasks  will  be  heavier.  For 
these  reasons,  the  scope  and  conduct  of  the  intelligence  effort,  particularly  in 
collection  and  production,  will  be  determined  in  part  by  the  required  intelli- 
gence available  both  when  operations  are  planned  and  when  they  are  con- 
ducted. 
j.  Intelligence  Support   from  Other   Agencies.      Because   the  type, 
nature,  currency,  frequency,  and  quality  of  the  intelligence  support  from  other 
agencies  are  such  important  considerations  in  the  conduct  of  intelligence 
operations  in  any  joint  force,  an  evaluation  of  this  support  must  be  made  early 
in  the  intelligence  planning  phase.  Thereafter,  assessment  of  this  support  is 
required  on  a  continuing  basis. 
k.  Location  of  Force  Headquarters.  If  the  joint  force  headquarters  is 
distant  from  supporting  intelligence  agencies,  provisions  for  the  extensive 
production  of  intelligence  within  the  headquarters  might  have  to  be  made. 
Likewise,  if  the  headquarters  is  permanently  located,  more  extensive  intel- 
ligence facilities  can  be  developed  than  in  situations  where  the  headquarters 
moves  frequently.  The  weight  and  value  of  each  of  these  factors  vary  among 
joint  forces.  Since  each  factor  has  a  different  weight  and  importance  to  each 
j°int  force,  the  organization,  policies,  procedures,  and  conduct  of  intelligence 
activities  in  joint  forces  vary  considerably.  Therefore,  directives  which 
prescribe  a  standardized  method  of  functioning  for  all  aspects  of  intelligence 
and  which  are  uniformly  applicable  to  any  joint  forces  are  meaningless. 
!•  Time  Available  for  Planning.     A  consideration  in  the  conduct  of 
intelligence  operations  is  the  time  available  for  planning.  Let  us  take  the  case 
of  a  joint  task  force  which  is  assembled  and  assigned  a  mission  120  days  before 
the  scheduled  target  date  of  the  operation.    The  intelligence  division  of  this 
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force  will  be  able  to  participate  in  much  of  the  initial  planning.  On  the  other 
hand,  take  the  case  of  a  joint  task  force  which  is  assembled  and  assigned  a 
mission  only  three  weeks  before  D-day.  Here  most  of  the  preliminary 
intelligence  planning  would  have  to  be  accomplished  by  outside  intelligence 
agencies.  Obviously,  the  organization  of  the  intelligence  division  of  these  two 
forces  would  be  affected  by  the  time  available. 
m.  Temporary  Nature  of  Joint  Task  Force.  Most  joint  task  forces  are 
organized  to  execute  a  single  operation  or  a  series  of  closely  related 
operations.  The  personnel  and  equipment  are  assigned  to  the  force  on  a 
temporary  basis.  Thus,  the  principle  of  economy  of  force,  both  in  personnel 
and  equipment,  must  be  observed  and  will  certainly  influence  the  intelligence 
organization. 
"•  Combined  Intelligence  Operations.  Operations  of  combined  forces 
will  necessitate  special  arrangements  for  the  exchange  of  intelligence. 
National  aims  generally  limit  the  free  exchange  of  intelligence.  These  limits 
apply  to  all  components  of  the  U.S.  Armed  Forces  involved  in  combined 
operations. 
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CHAPTER  2 
THE  NATIONAL  INTELLIGENCE  STRUCTURE 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
a*  The  national  foreign  intelligence  structure  consists  of  the  agencies 
and  organizations  of  the  federal  government  which  manage  and  conduct 
intelligence  activities  in  support  of  national  security.  All  of  these  are 
concerned  with  activities  in  foreign  areas  and  all  have  some  type  of  intel- 
ligence unit  supporting  the  operating  or  planning  interests  of  the  parent 
organization.  The  intelligence  unit  may  be  active  in  the  collection  of 
information,  the  processing  of  it,  or  both.  This  chapter  mentions  the  most 
important  of  these  organizations  and  describes  briefly  their  authorities, 
responsibilities,  and  relationships  in  the  field  of  intelligence. 
b.  The  history  of  the  national  intelligence  structure,  more  frequently 
called  the  Intelligence  Community,  dates  from  the  enactment  of  the  National 
Security  Act  of  19*7.  Before  that  act  certain  governmental  departments 
(notably  the  Departments  of  State,  War,  and  Navy)  carried  on  intelligence 
functions,  but  without  overall  national  coordination  and  integration.  The 
National  Security  Act  of  19*7  has  been  amplified  by  Presidential  orders. 
However,  it  remains  the  legal  foundation  for  the  national  intelligence  struc- 
ture. 
2.2  NATIONAL  SECURITY  COUNCIL 
a.  The  National  Security  Act  of  19*7  established  the  National  Secur- 
ity Council  (NSC)  as  an  advisory  council  to  the  President.  The  act  prescribed 
the  function  of  the  NSC  as  follows: 
To  advise  the  President  with  respect  to  the  integration  of  domestic, 
foreign,  and  military  policies  relating  to  the  national  security  so  as 
to  enable  the  military  services  and  other  departments  and  agencies 
of  the  Government  to  cooperate  more  effectively  in  matters  involv- 
ing the  National  Security. 
The  NSC  is  the  highest  executive  branch  entity  that  reviews,  guides,  and 
directs  the  conduct  of  all  national  foreign  intelligence  and  counterintelligence 
activities. 
b.  Council  Members.  By  statute  the  council  is  composed  of  the 
President,  the  Vice  President,  the  Secretary  of  State,  and  the  Secretary  of 
Defense.  The  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  and  CJCS,  as  appointed  by  the 
President,  are  advisors  to  the  NSC. 
c.  Senior  Interagency  Group-Intelligence  (SIG-I).  This  group  advises 
and  assists  the  NSC  in  exercising  its  authority  and  discharging  its  responsi- 
bilities for  intelligence  matters  and  policy.  The  SIG-I  consists  of  the  Director 
of  Central  Intelligence  (Chairman);  the  Assistant  to  the  President  for  National 
Security  Affairs;  the  Deputy  Secretary  of  State;  the  Deputy  Secretary  of 
Defense;    and    the    Chairman,    Joint    Chiefs    of   Staff.       Representatives    of 
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departments  and  agencies  attend  on  invitation  by  the  chairman  when  such 
departments  and  agencies  have  a  direct  interest  in  intelligence  activities 
under  consideration.  When  meeting  to  consider  sensitive  intelligence  collec- 
tion activities  referred  by  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence,  the  member- 
ship of  the  group  is  augmented,  as  necessary,  by  the  head  of  each  organization 
within  the  intelligence  community  directly  involved  in  the  activity  in  question. 
When  meeting  to  consider  counterintelligence  activities,  the  group  is  aug- 
mented by  the  Director,  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation,  and  the  Director, 
National  Security  Agency.  Interdepartmental  Groups  (IG)  are  working  groups 
of  the  SIG-I  and  are  responsible  for  deciding  issues  which  can  be  settled  at 
assistant  secretary  level,  including  implementation  of  NSC  decisions,  prepar- 
ing NSC  policy  papers,  and  preparing  contingency  papers  on  problem  areas  for 
SIG-I  review  and  eventual  submission  to  the  NSC  for  a  final  decision. 
d.  Intelligence  Directives.  In  addition  to  other  activities,  the  NSC 
has  issued  several  National  Security  Council  Intelligence  Directives  (NSCID). 
They  express  the  policy  by  which  the  national  intelligence  effort  is  guided  and 
coordinated  and  delineate  responsibilities  in  designated  fields  of  intelligence. 
National  intelligence  policy  calls  for  integration  of  all  departmental  intelli- 
gence relating  to  national  security  and  the  coordination  of  foreign  intelligence 
activities  by  the  Director,  Central  Intelligence.  Thus,  the  Director,  Central 
Intelligence,  is  the  senior  intelligence  advisor  to  the  council  and  the  President. 
The  National  Security  Council  structure  is  shown  in  Appendix  E. 
e.  NSC  Staff.  The  NSC  staff  includes  a  secretariat,  geographic 
groups,  and  functional  groups.  With  the  assistance  of  other  governmental 
agencies,  the  staff  produces  studies  for  policy  guidelines  and  background 
information  on  a  number  of  specific  problems;  reviews  and  evaluates  intel- 
ligence products;  and  produces  net  assessments  including  comparisons  of  the 
capabilities  of  U.S.  forces  and  those  of  potential  enemies. 
2.3  DIRECTOR  OF  CENTRAL  INTELLIGENCE  (DCI) 
a.  The  DCI,  pursuant  to  the  National  Security  Act  of  19*7,  is 
responsible  directly  to  the  NSC  and  the  President.  His  responsibilities  are  to 
(1)  Act  as  the  primary  advisor  to  the  President  and  the  NSC  on 
national  foreign  intelligence  and  furnish  the  President  and  other  officials  in 
the  executive  branch  with  national  foreign  intelligence; 
(2)  Develop  objectives  and  guidance  for  the  Intelligence  Com- 
munity to  enhance  capabilities  for  responding  to  future  needs  for  national 
foreign  intelligence; 
(3)  Promote  the  development  and  maintenance  of  services  of 
common  concern  by  designated  intelligence  organizations  on  behalf  of  the 
Intelligence  Community; 
(<0        Ensure  implementation  of  special  activities; 
(5)  Formulate  policies  concerning  foreign  intelligence  and 
counterintelligence    arrangements     with     foreign    governments,     coordinate 
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foreign  intelligence  and  counterintelligence  relationships  between  agencies  of 
the  Intelligence  Community  and  the  intelligence  or  internal  security  services 
of  foreign  governments,  and  establish  liaison  procedures  for  any  department  or 
agency  with  such  services  on  narcotics  activities; 
(6)  Participate  in  the  development  of  procedures  approved  by 
the  Attorney  General  governing  criminal  narcotics  intelligence  activities 
abroad  to  ensure  that  these  activities  are  consistent  with  foreign  intelligence 
programs; 
(7)  Ensure  the  establishment  by  the  Intelligence  Community  of 
common  security  and  access  standards  for  managing  and  handling  foreign 
intelligence  systems,  information,  and  products; 
(8)  Ensure  that  programs  are  developed  which  protect  intel- 
ligence sources,  methods,  and  analytical  procedures; 
(9)  Establish  uniform  criteria  for  the  determination  of  relative 
priorities  for  the  transmission  of  critical  national  foreign  intelligence,  and 
advise  the  Secretary  of  Defense  concerning  the  communications  requirements 
of  the  Intelligence  Community  for  the  transmission  of  such  intelligence; 
(10)  Establish  appropriate  staffs,  committees,  or  qther  advisory 
groups  to  assist  in  the  execution  of  the  director's  responsibilities; 
(11)  Have  full  responsibility  for  production  and  dissemination  of 
national  foreign  intelligence,  and  authority  to  levy  analytic  tasks  on  depart- 
mental intelligence  production  organizations,  in  consultation  with  those  orga- 
nizations, ensuring  that  appropriate  mechanisms  for  competitive  analysis  are 
developed  so  that  diverse  points  of  view  are  considered  fully  and  differences 
of  judgment  within  the  Intelligence  Community  are  brought  to  the  attention  of 
national  policymakers; 
(12)  Ensure  the  timely  exploitation  and  dissemination  of  data 
gathered  by  national  foreign  intelligence  collection  means,  and  ensure  that  the 
resulting  intelligence  is  disseminated  immediately  to  appropriate  government 
entities  and  military  commands; 
(13)  Establish  mechanisms  which  translate  national  foreign  intel- 
ligence objectives  and  priorities  approved  by  the  NSC  into  specific  guidance 
for  the  Intelligence  Community,  resolve  conflicts  in  tasking  priority,  task 
departments  and  agencies  having  information  collection  capabilities  that  are 
not  part  of  the  National  Foreign  Intelligence  Program  with  advisory  collection 
of  national  foreign  intelligence,  and  develop  plans  and  arrangements  for 
transfer  of  required  collection  tasking  authority  to  the  Secretary  of  Defense 
when  directed  by  the  President; 
(14)  Develop,  with  the  advice  of  the  program  managers  and 
departments  and  agencies  concerned,  the  consolidated  National  Foreign  Intell- 
igence Program  budget,  and  present  it  to  the  President  and  the  Congress; 
2-3
(15)  Review  and  approve  all  requests  for  reprogramming 
National  Foreign  Intelligence  Program  funds  in  accordance  with  guidelines 
established  by  the  Office  of  Management  and  Budget; 
(16)  Monitor  National  Foreign  Intelligence  Program  implem- 
entation and,  as  necessary,  conduct  program  and  performance  audits  and 
evaluations; 
(17)  Together  with  the  Secretary  of  Defense,  ensure  that  there  is 
no  unnecessary  overlap  between  national  foreign  intelligence  programs  and 
Department  of  Defense  intelligence  programs  consistent  with  the  requirement 
to  develop  competitive  analysis,  and  give  to  and  obtain  from  the  Secretary  of 
Defense  all  information  necessary  for  this  purpose; 
(IS)  In  accordance  with  law  and  relevant  procedures  approved  by 
the  Attorney  General  under  this  order,  give  the  heads  of  the  departments  and 
agencies  access  to  all  intelligence  developed  by  the  CIA  or  the  staff  elements 
of  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  relevant  to  the  national  intelligence 
needs  of  the  departments  and  agencies;  and 
(19)  Facilitate  the  use  of  national  foreign  intelligence  products 
by  Congress  in  a  secure  manner. 
b.  The  DCI  has  full  and  exclusive  authority  for  approval  of  the 
National  Foreign  Intelligence  Program  budget  submitted  to  the  President.  He 
reviews  and  evaluates  the  budget  submissions  of  the  various  national  programs 
and  develops  the  consolidated  National  Foreign  Intelligence  Program  budget 
and  presents  it  to  the  President  through  the  Office  of  Management  and 
Budget.  He  then  presents  and  justifies  the  National  Foreign  Intelligence 
Program  budget  to  the  Congress. 
c.  The  DCI  has  the  full  responsibility  for  production  and  dissemination 
of  national  foreign  intelligence  and  has  the  authority  to  levy  analytical  tasks 
on  departmental  intelligence  production  organizations. 
2A  THE  NATIONAL  FOREIGN  INTELLIGENCE  BOARD  (NFIB) 
The  NFIB  is  chaired  by  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  and  includes  as 
members  the  Deputy  Director  of  Central  Intelligence,  the  Directors  of  DIA, 
NSA  and  DOD  Reconnaissance,  and  the  directors  of  the  intelligence  elements 
of  the  Departments  of  State,  Treasury,  Energy,  and  the  FBI.  The  service 
intelligence  chiefs  sit  as  observers  on  the  NFIB. 
2.5  THE  NATIONAL  FOREIGN  INTELLIGENCE  COUNCIL  (NFIC) 
a.  The  NFIC  is  also  chaired  by  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence, 
but,  given  its  concerns,  has  a  somewhat  different  membership  than  does  the 
NFIB.  In  common  with  the  NFIB  is  the  presence  of  the  Directors  of  DIA,  NSA, 
DOD  Reconnaissance,  and  FBI  intelligence,  and  the  four  service  intelligence 
chiefs.  In  addition,  there  are  representatives  from  the  intelligence  policy 
divisions  of  the  Departments  of  State,  Defense,  Justice,  Treasury,  Energy,  and 
Commerce,  and  a  representative  of  the  Assistant  to  the  President  for  National 
Security  Affairs. 
2-Ur
b.  The  NFIC  assists  and  advises  the  DCI  on 
(1)  Priorities  for  national  foreign  intelligence; 
(2)  The  National  Foreign  Intelligence  Program  (NFIP)  budget; 
and 
(3)  Other  matters  as  the  DCI  may  direct. 
2.6                PRESIDENTIAL  OVERSIGHT  BOARDS 
a.         Intelligence  Oversight  Board  (IOB) 
(1)  The  IOB  is  a  legal  oversight  board  that  functions  within  the 
White  House  and  has  three  members  appointed  by  the  President.  The  members 
are  from  outside  the  government  and  are  qualified  on  the  basis  of  ability, 
knowledge,  diversity  of  background,  and  experience.  No  member  can  have  any 
personal  interest  in  any  contractual  relationship  with  any  agency  within  the 
Intelligence  Community.  One  member  is  designated  as  chairman,  and  this 
member  also  sits  on  the  President's  Foreign  Intelligence  Advisory  Board 
(PFIAB). 
(2)  The  duties  of  the  IOB  are  to 
(a)  Inform  the  President  of  intelligence  activities  believed 
to  be  in  violation  of  the  constitution,  laws,  orders,  or  directives; 
(b)  Forward  to  the  Attorney  General  reports  of  intelligence 
activities  believed  to  be  unlawful; 
(c)  Review  agency  guidelines  concerning  lawfulness  of 
intelligence  activities; 
(d)  Review  practices  and  procedures  of  inspectors  general 
and  general  counsels  for  reporting  unlawful  activities;  and 
(e)  Conduct  any  necessary  investigations. 
(3)  Corollary  Legal  Responsibility 
(a)  Inspectors  General  and  General  Counsels  with  respon- 
sibilities for  agencies  within  the  Intelligence  Community  are  required  to 
report  to  the  IOB  any  intelligence  activities  that  raise  questions  of  legality  or 
propriety. 
(b)  The  Attorney  General  receives  and  considers  reports  of 
impropriety  or  illegality  received  from  the  IOB  and  agencies  within  the 
Intelligence  Community  and  reports  to  the  President  and  the  IOB  decisions 
made  or  actions  taken  in  response  to  them. 
(c)  Congressional  Intelligence  Committees,  consisting  of 
the  House  Permanent  Select  Committee  on  Intelligence  and  the  Senate  Select 
2-5
Committee  on  Intelligence,  are  kept  fully  and  currently  informed  by  the  DCI 
concerning  intelligence  activities  that  are  illegal  or  improper  and  corrective 
actions  that  are  taken  or  planned. 
(d)  Senior  Officials  of  the  Intelligence  Community  are 
expressly  directed  by  executive  order  to  ensure  that  all  activities  of  their 
agencies  are  carried  out  in  accordance  with  applicable  laws  and  executive 
orders  and  to  report  possible  violations  to  the  Attorney  General. 
b.         President's  Foreign  Intelligence  Advisory  Board  (PFIAB) 
(1)  The  PFIAB  reports  directly  to  the  President  and  advises  him 
concerning  the  objectives,  conduct,  management,  and  coordination  of  the 
various  activities  of  the  agencies  of  the  intelligence  community.  It  assesses 
the  quality,  quantity,  and  adequacy  of  intelligence  collection,  of  analysis  and 
estimates,  of  counterintelligence,  and  other  intelligence  activities;  has  the 
authority  to  continually  review  the  performance  of  all  agencies  of  the 
government  that  are  engaged  in  the  collection,  evaluation,  or  production  of 
intelligence  or  the  execution  of  intelligence  policy;  and,  is  further  authorized 
to  assess  the  adequacy  of  management,  personnel,  and  organization  of  the 
intelligence  agencies. 
(2)  The  memership  of  the  PFIAB  is  composed  of  some  20 
individuals  with  long  and  distinguished  service  to  the  government,  industry, 
and  academia.  Many  have  years  of  experience  in  the  military,  intelligence, 
and  as  senior  government  officials.  None  of  the  members  is  currently  a 
government  employee. 
(3)  The  duties  of  the  PFIAB  are  to 
(a)  Advise  on  measures  to  support  and  improve  the  intel- 
ligence community 
(b)  Advise  on  objectives,  conduct,  management  and 
coordination  of  national  intelligence  activities. 
(c)  Conduct  a  review  and  assessment  of  intelligence 
activities 
(d)  Receive,  consider  and  take  action  on  matters  identi- 
fied to  PFIAB  by  the  DCI,  departments  and  agencies,  and 
(e)  Report  findings  and  appraisals  to  the  President  and 
make  recommendations  to  achieve  increased  effectiveness. 
2-6
CHAPTER  3 
INTELLIGENCE  ORGANIZATIONS 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
a.  Goals.  There  are  currently  13  members  of  the  National  Foreign 
Intelligence  Community  (NFIC).  While  this  number  has  fluctuated  slightly 
since  passage  of  the  National  Security  Act  of  19*7,  the  primary  interest  of  the 
community  has  remained  constant:  to  give  to  the  government  and  its  officials 
information  and  services  necessary  to  insure  the  nation's  security  and  survival. 
Today,  the  community's  basic  goals  are  set  forth  in  President  Reagan's 
Executive  Order  12333,  United  States  Intelligence  Activities; 
"The  United  States  intelligence  effort  shall  provide  the  President  and  the 
National  Security  Council  with  the  necessary  information  on  which  to  base 
decisions  concerning  the  conduct  and  development  of  foreign,  defense  and 
economic  policy,  and  the  protection  of  United  States  national  interests  from 
foreign  security  threats." 
b.  Membership.  The  Intelligence  Community  includes  the  following 
agencies. and  organizations: 
(1)  The  Central  Intelligence  Agency  (CIA); 
(2)  The  National  Security  Agency  (NSA); 
(3)  The  Defense  Intelligence  Agency  (DIA); 
(*)  The  offices  within  the  Department  of  Defense  for  the 
collection  of  specialized  national  foreign  intelligence  through  reconnaissance 
programs; 
(5)  The  Bureau  of  Intelligence  and  Research  of  the  Department 
of  State; 
(6)  The  intelligence  elements  of  the  Army,  Navy,  Air  Force, 
and  Marine  Corps,  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation,  the  Department  of  the 
Treasury,  and  the  Department  of  Energy;  and 
(7)  The  staff  elements  of  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence. 
3.2  CENTRAL  INTELLIGENCE  AGENCY 
a.  Establishment.  The  National  Security  Act  of  19*7  also  established 
the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  (CIA).  The  CIA  was  placed  under  the  NSC, 
with  a  director  and  deputy  director  appointed  by  the  President  and  with  the 
advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate. 
b.  Functions.  For  the  purpose  of  coordinating  the  intelligence  activi- 
ties of  the  several  government  departments  and  agencies  in  the  interest  of 
national  security,  the  CIA 
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(1)  Collects  foreign  intelligence  information. 
(2)  Produces  and  disseminates  foreign  intelligence  relating  to 
the  national  security,  including  foreign  political,  economic,  scientific,  tech- 
nical, military,  sociological,  and  geographic  intelligence  to  meet  the  needs  of 
the  President,  the  NSC,  and  ether  elements  of  the  U.S.  Government. 
(3)  Develops  and  conducts  programs  to  collect  political,  eco- 
nomic, scientific,  technical,  military,  geographic,  and  sociological  informa- 
tion, not  otherwise  obtainable,  relating  to  foreign  intelligence,  in  accordance 
with  directives  of  the  NSC. 
(0)  Collects  and  produces  intelligence  on  foreign  aspects  of 
international  terrorist  activities  and  traffic  in  narcotics. 
(5)  Conducts  foreign  counterintelligence  activities  outside  the 
United  States  and,  when  inside  the  United  States,  in  coordination  with  the  FBI, 
subject  to  the  approval  of  the  Attorney  General. 
(6)  Carries  out  such  other  special  activities  in  support  of 
national  foreign  policy  objectives  as  may  be  directed  by  the  President  or  the 
NSC  and  which  are  within  the  limits  of  applicable  law. 
(7)  Conducts  for  the  Intelligence  Community  services  of  com- 
mon concern  as  directed  by  the  NSC,  such  as  monitoring  of  foreign  public 
radio  and  television  broadcasts  and  foreign  press  services,  collection  of  foreign 
intelligence  information  from  cooperating  sources  in  the  United  States, 
acquisition  and  translation  of  foreign  publications,  and  photographic  interpre- 
tation. 
(8)  Carries  out  or  contracts  for  research,  development,  and 
procurement  of  technical  systems  and  devices. 
(9)  Protects  the  security  of  its  installations,  activities,  infor- 
mation, and  personnel.  In  order  to  maintain  this  security,  the  CIA  conducts 
investigations  of  applicants,  employees,  and  other  persons  with  similar  asso- 
ciations with  the  CIA  as  necessary. 
(10)  Conducts  administrative,  techical,  and  support  activities  in 
the  United  States  or  abroad  as  may  be  necessary  to  perform  the  functions 
described. 
c.  Contributions  to  National  Intelligence.  The  CIA  has  primary 
responsibility  for  the  writing  and  coordination  of  The  National  Intelligence 
Estimate  (NIE),  Special  xNational  Intelligence  Estimate  (SNIE),  and  National 
Intelligence  Analytical  Memorandum  (NIAM).  The  NIE  is  an  estimate  produced 
by  complex  coordinating  machinery  representing  the  entire  national  Intel- 
ligence Community.  Dealing  with  appraisals  of  a  foreign  nation's  current  and 
future  capabilities  and  actions,  the  NIEs  are  regarded  as  vital  building  blocks 
of  national  security  policy.  They  are  classified  secret  or  higher  and  released 
on  a  "need  to  know"  basis. 
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3.3  DEPARTMENT  OF  DEFENSE 
a.  General.  Since  the  Department  of  Defense  (DOD)  performs  most 
U.S.  intelligence  collection  operations,  its  intelligence  resource  levels  and  the 
scope  and  direction  of  its  intelligence  efforts  take  into  account  national 
intelligence  needs,  defense  intelligence  needs  for  support  of  research,  develop- 
ment, and  planning,  and  the  needs  of  military  commanders  to  maintain 
intelligence  capabilities  and  assets  that  are  essential  to  operations. 
b.  The  DOD  is  responsible  for  overt  collection  outside  of  the  United 
States  of  foreign  military  and  military-related  information;  the  production  and 
dissemination  of  such  information;  conducting  counterintelligence  activities 
outside  the  United  States  in  coordination  with  the  CIA  and  within  the  United 
States  in  coordination  with  the  FBI;  directing,  operating,  monitoring,  and 
performing  fiscal  management  for  the  NSA  and  for  defense  and  military 
intelligence  and  national  reconnaissance  entities;  conducting  signals  intelli- 
gence and  communications  security  activities  except  as  otherwise  directed  by 
the  NSC;  monitoring  intelligence  programs;  and  carrying  out  or  contracting  for 
research,  development,  and  procurement  of  technical  systems  and  devices 
relating  to  authorized  intelligence  functions. 
Before  November  1971  the  five  major  intelligence  organizations  within 
the  DOD  were  the  NSA,  the  Defense  Intelligence  Agency  (DIA),  and  the 
offices  of  the  chiefs  of  intelligence  of  the  Departments  of  the  Army,  Navy, 
and  Air  Force.  Since  then  some  important  changes  in  intelligence  organization 
and  management  were  made  to  assure  that  the  Secretary  of  Defense  can 
better  meet  his  intelligence  responsibilities  and  ensure  better  management  of 
resources  within  the  DOD.  These  intelligence-related  changes  within  the  DOD 
include  the  establishment  of  the  Central  Security  Service,  the  Defense 
Investigative  Service,  and  the  position  of  Director  of  Net  Assessments. 
c  The  positions  of  Assistant  Secretary  of  Defense  (Intelligence)  and 
Director,  Telecommunications,  Command,  and  Control  Systems,  were 
abolished,  and  their  resource  management  and  systems  development  functions 
consolidated  under  an  Assistant  Secretary  of  Defense  (Communications, 
Command,  Control,  and  Intelligence). 
d.  A  Deputy  Under  Secretary  (Policy)  was  established  to  monitor  and 
develop  overall  intelligence  policy  for  DOD.  Separation  of  this  function  from 
the  hardware-oriented  reponsibilities  of  the  Deputy  Under  Secretary  of 
Defense  (Research  and  Engineering)  assured  that  full  consideration  is  given  to 
the  needs  of  product  users. 
e.  Roles  and  Responsibilities  of  Specialized  Services 
(1)        The  Defense  Investigative  Service 
The  establishment  of  the  Defense  Investigative  Service  centralized  in  one 
agency  control  of  all  personnel  security  investigations  and  some  related 
matters  within  DOD.  Before  1972  personnel  security  investigations  were 
conducted  by  investigative  agencies  in  each  of  the  military  departments.  The 
Defense  Investigative  Service  was  created  in  order  to  obtain  monetary  savings, 
3-3
managerial  efficiencies,  and  a  prompter  response  to  overall  defense  needs  for 
personnel  security  investigations,  as  well  as  a  more  uniform  product.  At  the 
same  time  it  is  another  management  tool  for  assuring  that  investigative 
activities  of  the  defense  establishment  are  conducted  with  due  respect  for  the 
rights  of  all  citizens.  The  Defense  Investigative  Service  operates  under  staff 
supervision  of  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  Defense  (Comptroller).  It  receives 
advice  and  counsel  from  the  Defense  Investigative  Review  Council,  thus 
enabling  top-level  civilian  leadership  to  establish  detailed  guidance  for  inves- 
tigative activities  and  to  assure  that  these  activities  are  consistent  with  law 
and  tradition  on  civil-military  relationships. 
(2)  The  Defense  Mapping  Agency 
On  I  January  1972,  DOD  was  directed  to  combine  the  three  Service 
mapping  organizations  for  optimum  efficiency  and  economy  in  production 
without  impairing  legitimate  requirements  of  the  separate  Services. 
Resources  and  personnel  were  transferred  from  the  Army,  Navy,  Air  Force, 
and  Defense  Intelligence  Agency  to  form  DMA.  The  agency  became  opera- 
tional on  1  July  1972.  The  mission  of  DMA  is  to  furnish  Mapping,  Charting, 
and  Geodetic  (MC&G)  support  and  services  to  the  Secretary  of  Defense,  the 
Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff,  the  military  departments  and  other  DOD  components 
through  tiie  production  and  worldwide  distribution  of  maps,  charts,  precise 
positioning  data,  and  digital  data  for  strategic  and  tactical  military  operations 
and  weapon  systems.  DMA  is  a  separate  agency  of  DOD  under  the  direction, 
authority,  and  control  of  the  Under  Secretary  of  Defense  (Research  and 
Engineering).  DMA  also  has  a  very  close  relationship  with  the  Joint  Chiefs  of 
Staff,  especially  in  the  requirements  approval  process.  It  has  the  responsi- 
bility for  validating  all  MC&G  product  or  service  requirements  (submitted  by 
the  Services  and  unified  and  specified  commands)  for  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff 
and  for  reporting  the  approved  requirements  to  the  Under  Secretary  of 
Defense  (Policy),  who  has  oversight  responsibility. 
(3)  National  Security  Agency  (NSA)/Central  Security  Service 
(CSS) 
(a)  NSA  was  established  in  1952  as  an  agency  within  the 
DOD. 
(b)  NSA's  reponsibilities  include 
1_.  Establishment  and  operation  of  an  effective  orga- 
nization for  signals  intelligence  (SIGINT)  activities; 
2.  Control  of  SIGINT  collection  and  processing 
activities; 
3.  Collection  of  SIGINT  information  both  for  the 
support  of  military  commanders  and  for  national  foreign  intelligence  purposes 
in  accordance  with  guidance  from  the  DCI; 
ff.  Processing  and  dissemination  of  SIGINT  informa- 
tion in  accordance  with  guidance  from  the  DCI; 
3-4
5.  Collection,  processing,  and  dissemination  of 
SIGINT  information  for  counterintelligence  purposes; 
6.  Conduct  of  research  and  development  to  meet  the 
needs  of  the  United  States  for  SIGINT  and  communications  security;  and 
7.  Prescribing,  within  its  field  of  authorized  opera- 
tions, security  regulations  covering  operating  practices,  including  the  trans- 
mission, handling,  and  distribution  of  SIGINT  and  communications  security 
material  within  and  among  the  elements  under  control  of  the  Director  of  the 
NSA. 
(c)  The  Central  Security  Service  was  established  in  1972 
under  the  Director,  NSA,  who  serves  concurrently  as  the  Chief,  CSS.  The 
purpose  of  this  organization  is  to  be  an  effective  structure  for  controlling  or 
guiding  operations  by  Service  Cryptologic  Elements  (SCE).  SCEs  include  all 
Service  resources  performing  SIGINT  activities,  fixed  and  mobile,  including 
integral  cryptologic  elements  of  tactical  or  combat  commands.  The  CSS 
supports  national  and  military  requirements.  Combined  cryptologic  program 
(CCP)  resources  primarily  support  national  requirements  in  peacetime,  while 
tactical  cryptologic  program  (TCP)  resources  support  military  operations.  In 
addition,  CCP  resources  also  support  military  operations  in  peacetime,  and 
portions  are  in  a  direct  support  mode  in  crises  and  war.  Military  departments 
retain  command,  administrative,  and  logistic  support  responsibilities." 
(*)        Defense  Intelligence  Agency  (DIA) 
(a)  General.  The  continuous  task  of  collecting, 
processing,  evaluating,  analyzing,  integrating,  producing,  and  disseminating 
military  intelligence  for  the  DOD  rests  with  the  DIA.  This  agency  was 
established  in  1961  to  improve  the  coordination  and  management  of  defense 
intelligence  collection  and  production  activities,  and  to  reduce  the  consider- 
able duplication  which  then  existed  among  the  Service  intelligence  organiza- 
tions. As  a  first  step,  the  Directorate  of  Intelligence  (3-2)  of  the  Joint  Staff 
(Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff)  was  disestablished  and  its  functions  assigned  to  the 
Director,  DIA. 
1.  DIA  consists  of  about  5,000  people  in  four  loca- 
tions in  the  Washington  area,  with  an  additional  900  people  abroad  in  the 
Defense  Attache  System  operating  in  92  foreign  countries. 
2.  The  Director,  DIA,  is  responsible  to  the 
Secretary  of  Defense  and  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Stef f. 
(b)  Mission.  The  DIA  Director's  mission  is  to  satisfy  the 
foreign  military  intelligence  requirements  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense,  Joint 
Chiefs  of  Staff,  and  major  components  of  the  Department  of  Defense.  This  is 
done  through  the  use  of  DIA's  own  assigned  resources,  through  the  manage- 
ment and  coordination  of  other  DOD  components,  or  through  cooperation  with 
other  intelligence  organizations  such  as  CIA.  Director,  DIA,  is  the  DOD 
spokesman  and  member  of  the  National  Foreign  Intelligence  Board  (NFIB),  and 
is  also  manager  of  the  General  Defense  Intelligence  Program  (GDIP)  part  of 
the  NFIB. 
3-5
(c)  Major  Functions.  DIA's  functional  responsibilities  are 
encompassed  within  the  broad  areas  of  collection,  production,  and  support. 
Although  production  is  not  the  initial  step  in  the  intelligence  process,  it 
occupies  most  of  DIA's  resources.  Four  general  categories  of  intelligence  are 
produced  by  DIA  and,  under  DIA  guidance,  by  the  military  departments  and  the 
unified  and  specified  commands. 
1.  The  first  production  category  is  basic  intelli- 
gence, which  forms  the  database  for  all  military  intelligence  studies,  esti- 
mates, and  short-term  assessments.  It  contains,  for  example,  basic  informa- 
tion on  strengths  and  capabilities  of  forces,  target  information,  and  biographic 
data  on  foreign  military  personalities. 
2.  The  second  category  is  time-sensitive  current 
intelligence,  which  reports  on  major  worldwide  happenings  and  evaluates  their 
significance.  To  support  this  function,  DIA  operates  the  National  Military 
Intelligence  Center  on  a  2*-hour  basis  to  identify  and  report  indications  of 
impending  foreign  developments  that  may  have  major  impact  on  DOD  respon- 
sibilities. 
3.  The  third  category  is  estimate  intelligence.  DIA 
furnishes  the  military  input  to  national  intelligence  estimates  prepared  by  the 
DCI  and  produces  DOD  estimates  for  departmental,  joint,  and  international 
use.  Both  types  include  estimates  of  foreign  capabilities,  vulnerabilites,  and 
probable  courses  of  action. 
4.  The  final  category  is  scientific  and  technical 
intelligence,  which  is  produced  by  DIA  and  by  the  military  departments  under 
the  overall  management  of  DIA.  Foreign  scientific  and  technical  intelligence 
includes  research  in  natural  and  applied  sciences,  applied  engineering  tech- 
niques, and  all  aspects  of  weapons  technology- 
5.  These  categories  are  supplemented  by 
specialized  production  units  operated  by  the  military  departments  and  unified 
and  specified  commands.  These  are  under  DIA's  management  and  include 
special  imagery,  electronics,  and  fleet  intelligence/ocean  surveillance 
analysis. 
6.  To  obtain  the  information  needed  by  U.S.  intel- 
ligence producers,  DIA~*coordinates  all  defense  intelligence  collection  and 
processing  activities.  The  Defense  Attache  System  is  the  only  collection 
activity  directly  controlled  by  DIA.  Other  intelligence  collection  resources, 
including  those  belonging  to  NSA  and  the  Services,  respond  to  DIA  collection 
requirements  together  with  the  requirements  of  other  non-defense  intelligence 
customers. 
7.  In  the  collection  process,  DIA  assembles,  inte- 
grates, validates,  and  assigns  relative  priorities  to  all  defense  intelligence 
requirements.  These  are  evaluated  to  determine  the  most  economical  means 
of  collection  and  to  avoid  unnecessary  duplication  in  tasking.  Collection 
results  are  routinely  checked  to  determine  whether  stated  requirements  are 
being  satisfied  and  whether  tasking  should  be  reassigned  or  terminated. 
3-6
8.  In  the  area  of  support,  DIA  operates  the  Defense 
Intelligence  College.  Here,  both  military  and  civilian  career  personnel  who 
are  selected  to  fill  key  intelligence  assignments  and  personnel  preparing  for 
foreign  duty  in  the  Defense  Attache  System  are  given  extensive  instruction. 
9.  Other  DIA  support  functions  include  broad  plan- 
ning and  managerial  efforts  to  ensure  proper  coordination  of  DIA  activities 
with  those  of  other  U.S.  entities  involved  in  foreign  intelligence;  control  and 
direction  of  DOD  general  intelligence  information  (ADP)  systems  and  asso- 
ciated communications;  counterintelligence  and  internal  security;  and  the 
usual  housekeeping  activities,  such  as  personnel  and  administration. 
(d)  Organization  and  Command  (See  Appendix  G).  The 
DIA  is  an  all-Service  agency  and  consists  of  a  director  and  such  elements, 
facilities,  and  activities  as  are  specifically  assigned  by  the  Secreatry  of 
Defense.  The  Director,  DIA,  reports  to  the  Secretary  of  Defense  through  the 
Deputy  Secretary  of  Defense.  However,  the  Director  reports  to  the  Joint 
Chiefs  of  Staff  and  is  under  their  operational  control  for  the  purposes  of 
obtaining  the  intelligence  support  required  to  perform  their  statutory  and 
assigned  responsibilities,  including  the  strategic  direction  of  the  unified  and 
specified  commands;  and  ensuring  that  adequate,  timely,  and  reliable  intel- 
ligence support  is  available  to  the  unified  and  specified  commands.  DIA  is 
organized  into  five  directorates— Management  and  Operations,  Foreign  Intel- 
ligence, Resources  and  Systems,  Intelligence  and  External  Affairs,  and  JCS 
Support.  Functionally,  these  directorates  handle  the  attache  system,  plans  and 
policy,  resources  and  support,  current  intelligence  estimates,  intelligence 
research,  and  scientific  and  technical  research.  Elements  of  these  direc- 
torates perform  the  following  tasks: 
h  Furnish  intelligence  and  intelligence  staff 
support  to  the  3oint  Chiefs  of  Staff  and  ensure  that  adequate,  timely,  and 
reliable  intelligence  is  available  to  the  unified  and  specified  commands. 
2.  Coordinate  the  operational  and  planning  aspects 
of  the  DOD  Indications  System  and  support  the  National  Military  Command 
System  through  the  National  Military  Intelligence  Center. 
3.  Validate,  prioritize,  register,  assign,  and  monitor 
the  satisfaction  of  DOD  collection  requirements. 
*.  Direct,  operate,  and  support  the  Defense 
Attache  System. 
5.  Participate  in  operation  of  the  National  Photo- 
graphic Interpretation  Center  and  the  Defense  Special  Missile  and 
Astronautics  Center. 
6.  Establish,  maintain,  and  operate  facilities  for 
DOD  imagery  indexing,  processing,  duplication,  evaluation,  exploitation,  and 
central  repository  services  in  support  of  DOD  and  other  authorized  recipients. 
3-7
7.  Supervise  a  DOD-wide  intelligence  dissemination 
program  and  furnish  centralized  dissemination  services  in  support  of  DOD  and 
other  authorized  recipients. 
8.  Furnish  intelligence  bibliography,  reference 
library,  and  research  services  as  required  to  fulfill  the  DIA  mission. 
9.  Establish  and  conduct  or  recommend  RDT&E 
programs  or  projects  required  to  fulfill  responsibilities  assigned. 
10.  Operate  the  Defense  Intelligence  College. 
11.  Recommend  priorities  for  military  intelligence 
production  and  collection. 
12.  In  coordination  with  other  intelligence  agencies 
concerned,  plan  for  intelligence  operations,  including  the  use  of  national 
intelligence  systems  to  support  military  operational  commanders;  as  directed, 
coordinate  the  execution  of  approved  intelligence  operations  plans. 
13.  Act  as  central  technical  and  management 
authority  for  all  DOD  intelligence  information  systems  except  those  systems 
dedicated  to  SIGINT  operations  and  support  functions;  plan  for  the  integration 
of  DOD  intelligence  information  systems  and  the  interfacing  and,  where 
appropriate,  the  interoperability  of  these  systems  with  command  and  control 
systems,  tactical  systems,  and  Intelligence  Community  information  systems. 
lfr.  In  conformance  with  policies  of  DOD  and  the 
Director  of  Central  Intelligence,  guide  DOD  components  concerning  the 
release  of  defense  intelligence  information  to  foreign  governments,  inter- 
national organizations,  and  the  public. 
15.  Administer  DOD  security  policies  and  programs 
to  protect  intelligence  and  intelligence  sources  and  methods,  and  direct  the 
Defense  Special  Security  System. 
16.  Adjudicate  clearance  eligibility  for  DIA  civilian 
personnel  and  eligibility  for  access  to  compartmented  intelligence  for  all 
personnel  assigned  to  Office  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense,  Office  of  the  Joint 
Chiefs  of  Staff, .  and  the  defense  agencies,  with  the  exception  of  NSA, 
including  contractors  and  consultants. 
17.  Be  represented  on  national  and  international 
intelligence  committees,  boards,  and  working  groups,  as  appropriate. 
18.  Act  as  the  DOD  focal  point  for  non -SIGINT 
relationships  with  foreign  intelligence  services. 
19.  Prepare  and  submit  to  the  Director  of  Central 
Intelligence  the  DIA  and  Services'  intelligence  programs  and  budgets. 
20.  Ensure  that  all  DIA  policies,  plans,  programs, 
and  activities  are  carried  out  in  accordance  with  law  and  the  provisions  of 
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executive    orders   and   other    directives    from   higher    authority    establishing 
oversight  controls  on  foreign  intelligence  activities. 
21.     Report   to    the   Inspector   General   for   Defense 
Intelligence  any  activities  that  raise  questions  of  legality  or  propriety. 
(e)  Relationships.  In  the  accomplishment  of  its  mission, 
the  DIA,  under  its  director  coordinates  actions  with  DOD  components  and 
governmental  agencies  having  collateral  or  related  functions  in  the  field  of  its 
assigned  responsibilities  and  maintains  liaison  for  the  exchange  of  information 
and  advice  with  them.  The  military  departments  and  other  DOD  components 
support  and  assist  the  DIA  as  necessary. 
(5)        Department  of  the  Army 
(a)  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff  for  Intelligence  (ACSI).  The 
ACSI  is  responsible  to  the  Chief  of  Staff  for  overall  coordination  of  the 
intelligence  and  counterintelligence  activities  of  the  U.S.  Army.  He  has 
general  staff  responsibility  for  U.S.  Army  intelligence;  counterintelligence; 
censorship;  cryptologic,  personnel,  and  information  security;  threat  analysis; 
foreign  liaison;  IMINT/HUMINT/SIGINT/electro-optical  collection;  and 
meteorologic  and  topographic  activities.  The  ACSI  participates  in  the 
preparation  of  national  intelligence  and  also  serves  as  Chairman  of  the  Army 
Information  Security  Review  Board,  Army  Representative  to  the  Military 
intelligence  Board,  Army  Alternate  Member  to  the  Defense  Intelligence,  Board, 
and  Army  Principal  to  the  National  Foreign  Intelligence  Board.  He  is  Director 
for  Army  Budget  Program  3  (Intelligence)  and  Functional  Chief  of  the  Civilian 
Intelligence  Career  Development  Program.  The  ACSI  is  responsible  for 
monitoring  Army  intelligence  training,  force  structure,  organizations,  and 
readiness,  and  supervises  and  controls  some  intelligence  elements  of  U.S. 
Army  field  activities.  His  relationship  to  the  Chief  of  Staff  U.S.  Army 
corresponds  to  that  of  a  deputy  chief  of  staff. 
(b)  The  Office  of  the  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff  for  Intelli- 
gence is  functionally  organized  as  follows: 
Plans,  Program,  and  Budget  Office 
Management  Support  Office 
Foreign  Liaison  Directorate 
Foreign  Intelligence  Directorate 
Counterintelligence  Directorate 
Intelligence  Systems  Directorate 
Intelligence  Automation  Management  Office 
These  directorates  and  offices  have  the  following  responsibilities: 
I.  Serve  as  the  official  point  of  contact  and 
channel  of  communication  between  Department  of  the  Army  and  foreign 
military  and  civilian  representatives  in  the  United  States  and  act  as  represen- 
tative at  functions  hosted  by  foreign  embassy  personnel. 
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2.  Fulfill  Department  of  the  Army  and  certain 
major  command  requirements  for  substantive  intelligence  support  and  manage 
the  Army's  general  and  scientific  and  technical  intelligence  production 
programs. 
3.  Perform  counterintelligence  analysis  for  the 
Army  staff;  exercise  operational  control  of  the  U.S.  Army  Intelligence 
Operations  Detachment;  and  act  as  Program  Element  Director  for  Human 
Resources  Intelligence  and  Counterintelligence  and  Investigative  Activities. 
ft.  Formulate  and  justify  Army  intelligence 
resource  requirements. 
5.  Develop  and  coordinate  intelligence  aspects  of 
tactical  Army  intelligence,  including  tactical  and  strategic  command  and 
control  in  support  of  the  Army  in  the  field. 
(c)      The  following  are  General  Staff  responsibilities: 
L.  Formulate  and  justify  the  Army's  portion  of  the 
National  Foreign  Intelligence  Program  that  includes  the  Consolidated 
Cryptologic  Program,  General  Defense  Intelligence  Program,  the  Foreign 
Counterintelligence  Program,  and  the  Army  Security  and  Investigative 
Activities  Program. 
2.  Formulate,  justify,  and  supervise,  within  overall 
guidance  and  policies  developed  by  the  Comptroller  of  the  Army,  the  Army 
Budget  for  Program  38  Intelligence  Activities. 
3.  Develop  policy  on  intelligence  organization, 
force  structure,  and  installations;  develop  and  coordinate  intelligence  aspects 
of  strategy  applications  in  joint  and  Army  plans. 
ft.  Formulate  policy  for  the  Army's  cryptologic 
effort. 
5.  Exercise  general  staff  responsibility  for  intelli- 
gence doctrine  and  assist  DCSOPS  and  DCSPERS  in  the  development  of  policy 
and  in  other  matters  of  intelligence  training  and  readiness  of  intelligence 
units. 
6.  Formulate  Army  policy  on  intelligence  aspects 
of  organization  and  operations  concepts  to  support  the  Army  in  the  field, 
including  standardizing  office  intelligence  activities  relating  to  reconnaissance 
and  surveillance;  act  as  the  Army  Staff  point  of  contact  for  environmental 
services  (excluding  environmental  protection  and  pollution  control  programs); 
make  program  and  budget  recommendations  and  justification  to  the  DCSOPS 
for  intelligence  units  in  Program  2. 
7.  Develop  policy,  act  as  national  level  liaison,  and 
coordinate  within  DOD  and  other  federal  agencies  on  counterintelligence  (CI), 
special  investigations,  operations,  and  related  matters  Army-wide. 
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8.  Formulate  Army  personnel  and  information 
security  policy  and  plans  and  perform  program  development  and  resource 
utilization  of  CI  elements  as  they  pertain  to  the  DOD  Personnel  and 
Information  Security  Program. 
9.  Formulate  Army  policy  for  foreign  disclosure 
and  for  censorship,  give  associated  guidance  and  Army  General  Staff 
supervision,  and  review  material  to  ensure  proper  level  of  classification. 
10.  Formulate  Army  policy  for  human  resource 
intelligence  (HUMINT)  collection  activities  and  take  general  staff  responsi- 
bility for  U.S.  Army  attache  matters  within  the  Defense  Attache  System  and 
for  intelligence  on  U.S.  Army  prisoners  of  war  and  members  missing  in  action. 
11.  Exercise  general  staff  responsibility  and  act  as 
the  Army  Staff  point  of  contact  for  reconnaissance  and  surveillance  imagery 
collection,  exploitation,  security  policy,  and  research  and  development;  joint 
reconnaissance  matters;  Special  Activities  Office  (SAO)  policy;  mapping, 
charting,  and  geodesy  (MC&G),  and  military  geographic  information  (MGI);  and 
Signal  Intelligence  (SIGINT)  collection  requirements. 
12.  Give  intelligence  support  to  the  Army  Staff  and 
CONUS  major  Army  commands  and  activities  by  interpreting  and  adapting 
finished  intelligence;  contribute  to  formulation  of  departmental,  joint,  and 
national  Intelligence  through  participating  in  national-  and  DOD-level  boards, 
committees,  and  working  groups;  furnish  current  intelligence  assessments  for 
Headquarters,  Department  of  the  Army,  elements. 
13.  Produce  scientific  and  technical  intelligence  and 
related  matters,  relying  on  the  Army  Intelligence  Agency  (Provisional)  and  the 
Armed  Forces  Medical  Intelligence  Center. 
14.  Formulate  policy  and  supervise  the  implementa- 
tion of  foreign  liaison. 
15.  Formulate  policy  for  the  use  of  intelligence 
contingency  funds;  program  and  budget  for  these  funds;  and  through  the 
Intelligence  Inspector  General  conduct  inspections  to  verify  their  proper  use. 
16.  Manage  and  coordinate  Army  technology 
transfer. 
(d)  The  U.S.  Army  Intelligence  Agency  (Provisional)  is  a 
field  operating  agency  of  the  Office  of  the  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff  for 
Intelligence  (OACSI).  Its  mission  is  to  manage  and  produce  general  and 
scientific  and  technical  intelligence  to  support  strategic  planners,  force  and 
material  developers,  and  tactical  commanders.  Its  major  subordinate  elements 
are  the  Missile  Intelligence  Agency,  the  Foreign  Science  and  Technology 
Center,  and  the  Intelligence  and  Threat  Analysis  Center. 
(e)  The  U.S.  Army  Intelligence  and  Security  Command 
(INSCOM)  has  the  mission  to  perform  nontactical  intelligence  operations  above 
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corps  level;  conduct  counterintelligence  investigations  and  operations;  give 
Army-wide  all-source,  multidiscipline  operational  security  (OPSEC)  and  intel- 
ligence support;  and  furnish  technical  advice  and  operational  assistance  as 
required  to  help  other  functional  and  operating  major  Army  commands  in  the 
discharge  of  their  electronic  warfare,  intelligence,  and  security  responsi- 
bilities. 
(6)        Department  of  the  Navy 
(a)  The  Director  of  Naval  Intelligence  (DNI),  as  Chief  of 
Naval  Operation's  intelligence  executive,  exercises  overall  authority 
throughout  the  Department  of  the  Navy  in  matters  pertaining  to  intelligence 
and  security  and  maintains  liaison  with  all  federal  intelligence  and  counter- 
intelligence agencies.  The  person  in  this  position  is  also  the  Commander  of 
the  Naval  Intelligence  Command.  The  DNI 
1.  Reviews  all  interdepartmental  and  DOD  direc- 
tives and  plans  on  matters  related  to  his  mission  for  impact  on  the  require- 
ments and  responsibilities  of  the  Department  of  the  Navy  and  recommends 
actions  to  be  taken  thereon  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  and  Chief  of  Naval 
Operations. 
2.  Represents  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  and  Chief 
of  Naval  Operations  at  NFIB  meetings  and  on  duly  established  interdepart- 
mental and  DOD  committees  for  the  consideration  of  matters  related  to  his 
mission  and  maintains  liaison  with  intelligence  and  security  agencies,  foreign 
and  domestic,  to  ensure  coordination  of  Navy  participation  in  or  support  to 
activities  conducted  by  those  agencies. 
3.  Directs  the  development,  coordination,  and 
issuance  of  guidance  and  directives  to  implement  within  the  Department  of 
the  Navy  approved  policies,  plans,  programs,*  and  procedures  on  matters 
related  to  his  mission. 
k.  Directs  the  development  and  coordination  of 
mid-  and  long-range  intelligence  and  security  policies  and  objectives  and 
sponsors  the  related  requirements  of  manpower,  equipment,  facilities,  and 
services  within  the  framework  of  the  Navy  Planning  and  Programming  System 
and  the  DOD  Programming  System. 
5.  Coordinates,  publishes,  and  monitors  compliance 
with  criteria  and  standards  to  ensure  that  training,  readiness,  effectiveness, 
and  responsiveness  of  intelligence  and  security  personnel  and  activities  are 
adequate  to  meet  the  current  and  mobilization  requirements  of  the  Navy. 
6.  Acts  as  a  point  of  contact  for  liaison  with 
foreign  officials  accredited  to  the  Department  of  the  Navy  and  advises  and 
assists  on  protocol  matters. 
7.  Sponsors  requirements  for  research,  develop- 
ment, testing,  and  evaluation  of  new  and  improved  equipment  and  techniques 
related  to  his  mission  and  collaborates  on  actions  to  fill  these  requirements. 
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(b)  Commander  Naval  Intelligence  Command  directs  and 
manages  the  activities  of  the  Naval  Intelligence  Command  to  ensure  the 
fulfillment  of  the  intelligence  and  security  requirements  and  responsiblities  of 
the  Department  of  the  Navy  as  directed  by  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations. 
JU-  ~Task^  Force  168  was  established  to  give  more 
responsive. intelligence  support,  to  the  fleet.  Acquiring  additional  duties  over 
the  ^years,  this  organization  now  serves  as  the  Naval  intelligence  collection 
manager.  The,  Task  Force  is  composed  of  a  headquarters  in  Washington  and 
units  at  nine  locations  around  the  world.  Forward  Area  Support  Teams  support 
major  fleet  commands  to  facilitate  operational  responsiveness,  and  TF  168 
personnel  often  deploy  aboard  ships  and  aircraft.  Scientific  and  technical 
intelligence  groups  also  carry  out  essential  collection  functions  at  major 
theater  locations.  The  Commander,  Task  Force  168,  also  serves  as  Assistant 
COMNAVINTCOM  for  Operations. 
2.  Naval  Intelligence  Processing  System  Support 
Activity  supports  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations,  Secretary  of  the  Navy, 
Secretary  of  Defense,  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff,  and  commanders  of  major 
commands  in  the  development  and  implementation  of  naval  intelligence- 
sponsored  automatic  data  processing  systems  for  incorporation  into  the  Navy 
Command  and  Control  Systems,  the  National  Military  Command  System,  and 
the  Worldwide  Military  Command  and  Control  System. 
3.  Navy  Operational  Intelligence  Center  (NAVO- 
PINTCEN)  produces  finished  operational  intelligence,  including  indications  and 
warning,  ocean  surveillance  information,  merchant  shipping  analysis,  applied 
special  naval  support,  and  in-depth  analysis  of  Soviet  strategy,  doctrine, 
tactics,  and  readiness  in  response  to  requirements  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff, 
Department  of  the  Navy,  Defense  Intelligence  Agency,  and  joint  commands, 
and  disseminates  the  intelligence  in  time  to  support  planning  and  execution  of 
military  and  naval  operations.  It  also  operates  the  Naval  Ocean  Surveillance 
Information  Center  (NOSIC),  one  of  six  nodes  of  the  Navy's  Ocean  Surveillance 
Information  System  (OSIS). 
k.  Naval  Intelligence  Support  Center  (NISC) 
produces  scientific  and  technical  intelligence  of  naval  interest  as  directed  by 
the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  and  the  Director,  DIA;  gives  scientific  and 
technical  intelligence  support  to  the  Navy  establishment;  and  maintains  close 
scientific  and  technical  relationships  with  the  U.S.  Government  research  and 
development  community.  It  also  operates  facilities  for  image  interpretation 
and  merchant  marine  intelligence  support  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Chief 
of  Naval  Operations,  and  DIA:  gives  S&T  intelligence  support  to  the  NSIC; 
produces  image-derived  information  in  support  of  the  National  Tasking  Plan 
for  the  Exploitation  of  Wultisensor  Imagery;  furnishes  miniaturized  and 
automated  intelligence  data  bases  and  intelligence  production  support  to  the 
operating  forces  of  the  Navy;  gives  targeting  intelligence  support,  including 
Single  Integrated  Operating  Plan,  to  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations, 
Commander,  Naval  Intelligence  Command,  Navy  Planning  Staffs,  and  Fleet 
Commanders;  and  conducts  research,  development,  testing,  and  evaluation  of 
image  exploitation  equipment,  materials,  and  techniques. 
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(c)  Naval  Investigative  Service  under  the  DNI  and  the 
centralized  control  of  the  Defense  Investigative  Service  operates  a  worldwide 
organization  to  fulfill  the  investigative  and  counterintelligence  responsibilities 
of  the  Department  of  the  Navy  (less  those  combat-related  counterintelligence 
.natters  within  the  functional  responsibilities  of  the  Marine  Corps). 
(d)  The  Naval  Security  Group  (NSG)  performs  specialized 
technical  functions  relating  to  national  security.  NSG  is  managed  and 
controlled  by  the  Central  Security  Service,  while. the  Department  of  the  Navy 
retains  administrative  and  logistic  support  responsibilities. 
(e)  The  Director  of  Intelligence  U.S.  Marine  Corps  is 
responsible  for  the  formulation  of  flans  and  policies  pertaining  to  intelligence, 
counterintelligence,  signals  intelligence,  and  electronic  warfare.  Functions 
include  connection  with  intelligence  estimates,  plans,  reports,  and  studies. 
The  Director 
JL  Discharges  Marine  Corps  responsibilities  in 
connection  with  intelligence  estimates,  plans,  reports,  and  studies. 
2.  Handles  the  analysis  and  dissemination  of 
pertinent  intelligence  to  the  Commandant  and  the  staff  of  Headquarters 
Marine  Corps. 
3.  Develops,  in  coordination  with  appropriate  staff 
agencies,  plans,  policies,  operational  concepts,  doctrine,  and  responsibilities  in 
intelligence,  counterintelligence,  signals  intelligence,  and  electronic  warfare. 
U.  Formulates,  in  coordination  with  appropriate 
staff  agencies,  researched  development  requirements  in  combat  intelligence, 
signals  intelligence,  and  electronic  warfare;  monitors  progress  on  R&D 
projects  in  response  to  those  requirements. 
5.  Analyzes  JCS  papers  which  are  of  Intelligence 
Division  cognizance  and  recommends  positions  for  approval  and  use  by  the 
Commandant  at  meetings  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff. 
6.  Monitors  the  actions  of  other  U.S.  intelligence 
agencies  concerning  intelligence  and  counterintelligence  matters  of  interest  to 
the  Marine  Corps. 
7.  Monitors  Marine  Corps  participation  in  the  naval 
attache  system. 
(7)         Department  of  the  Air  Force 
(a)  The  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  Intelligence  (ACS/I), 
supervises  the  overall  execution  of  departmental  intelligence  responsibilities 
to  develop,  maintain,  and  monitor  a  coherent  intelligence  program  which  will 
ensure  the  proper  application  of  intelligence  in  ail  Air  Force  activities,  and 
furnishes  adequate,  timely,  and  reliable  departmental  intelligence  for  use 
within    DOD.      The   specific    responsibilities   of    the    ACS/I    fall    into    three 
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categories:     substantive  intelligence;  intelligence  management  and  systems 
development;  and  administration,  representation,  and  supervision. 
_1.  Substantive  Intelligence.  The  ACS/I  is  responsible 
for  giving  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Air  Force,  the  Chief  of  Staff,  the  Air  Staff, 
and,  as  required,  Air  Force  commands  and  the  3oint  Staff  substantive 
intelligence  support  regarding  threats,  including  capabilities  and  physical 
composition,  to  the  security  of  the  United  States  and  allies  which  affect  the 
U.S.  Air  Force.  This  responsibility  includes 
a.  Furnishing  current  all-source  intelligence 
affecting,  or  potentially  affecting,  U.S.  Air  Force  policies,  resources, 
missions,  or  force  deployments  and  employments. 
b.  Participating  in  preparation  of  joint  and 
national  intelligence  estimates. 
c.  Adapting  and  formatting  substantive 
intelligence  for  Air  Force  use  and  assuring  its  appropriate  inclusion  in 
departmental,  joint,  and  unified/specified  commands'  planning,  programming, 
and  operational  documentation. 
d.  Evaluating  all-source  aerospace-related 
intelligence  to  determine  capabilities  of  foreign  aerospace  forces  and 
associated  military,  political,  economic,  and  psychosocial  strengths  and 
vulnerabilities. 
e.  Determining  substantive  all-source  intellig- 
ence voids  and  initiating  appropriate  requirement  satisfaction  actions. 
f;  Performing  intelligence  research  and 
analytical,  gaming,  and  assessment  support  for  Air  Staff,  3oint  Staff,  and 
Office,  Secretary  of  Defense,  and  OSD  study  groups. 
g.  Furnishing  staff  guidance  and  review  services 
for  intelligence  aspects  of  mapping,  charting,  geodesy,  target  materials,  and 
scientific  and  technical  intelligence  activities. 
h.  Assisting  in  satisfying  substantive  intellig- 
ence support  responsibilities  to  the  USAF  Contingency  Planning  Staff,  the  Air 
Force  Emergency  Operations  Center,  and  USAF  Alternate  Headquarters. 
2.  Intelligence  Management  and  Systems 
Development.  The  ACS7i  gives  the  Secretary  of  the  Air  Force,  Chief  of  Staff, 
and  the  Air  Staff  advice,  technical  evaluations,  and  recommendations  for 
developing,  planning,  programming,  funding,  and  managing  intelligence 
personnel,  equipment,  and  systems.  This  responsibility  includes 
a.  Formulating  policy  and  staff  guidance  for 
developing,  managing,  and  operating  U.S.  Air  Force  intelligence  collection, 
processing  production,  data  handling,  and  dissemination  systems. 
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b.  Monitoring  development  and  acquisition  of 
advanced  systems. 
c.  Furnishing  staff  guidance  on  concerning  U.S. 
Air  Force  intelligence  collection  and  exploitation  activities. 
d.  Collaborating  in  the  generation  of 
substantive  intelligence  requirements. 
e.  Developing  and  reviewing  intelligence 
aspects  of  concepts,  doctrine,  policy,  plans,  and  programs. 
f.  Issuing  guidance  and  exercising,  in 
coordination  with  affected  Air  Staff  offices,  primary  staff  direction  for 
submitting  the  USAF  General  Defense  Intelligence  Program  and  the 
Consolidated  Cryptologic  Program. 
g.  Assisting  with  intelligence  systems  and 
management  information  support  for  USAF  Contingency  Planning  Staif,  the 
Air  Force  Emergency  Operations  Center,  and  USAF  Alternate  Headquarters. 
3.     Administrative,  Representational,  and  Supervisory 
Responsibilities.  These  responsibilities  include 
a.  Interpreting  and  implementing  U.S.  National 
Disclosure  Policy  and  other  applicable  instructions  concerning  security  and  use 
of  compartmented  intelligence. 
b.  Sitting  on  the  National  Foreign  Intelligence 
Board,  the  National  Military  Information  Disclosure  Policy  Committee,  and 
the  Military  Intelligence  Board. 
c.  Directing  the  activities  of  the  Air  Force 
Special  Activities  Center  (AFSAC),  which  conducts  worldwide  human 
resources  intelligence  (HUMINT)  collection  and  coordinates  and  gives  staff, 
policy,  and  special  support  to  ACS/I  and  other  USAF  elements  on  HUMINT 
matters. 
(b)  The  Inspector  General,  USAF,  handles  the  functions  of 
security  and  counterintelligence.  Within  that  office,  the  responsibilities  for 
physical  security,  law  enforcement,  and  security  police  have  been  delegated  to 
the  Director  of  Security  Police,  who  directs  base  chiefs  of  security  police. 
The  responsibilities  of  the  Inspector  General  for  counterintelligence  operations 
and  activities  within  the  Air  Force  are  assigned  to  the  Air  Force  Office  of 
Special  Investigations  (AFOSI).  AFOSI  is  a  separate  operating  agency  which 
conducts  criminal,  counterintelligence,  and  special  investigative  services  for 
all  Air  Force  activities.  It  collects,  analyzes,  and  disseminates  information  of 
investigative  and  counterintelligence  significance  and  collects  and  reports 
information  for  base  security  available  from  human  sources  near  overseas  U.S. 
Air  Force  installations.  As  the  commander  of  AFOSI,  the  Director  of  AFOSI 
acts  for  the  Chief  of  Staff  and  for  the  Inspector  General  in  conducting 
investigative  and  counterintelligence  programs  through  subordinate  districts, 
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detachments,  and  other  operating  locations  throughout  the  Air  Force.  This 
includes  the  investigation  of  treason,  sedition,  subversion,  security  violations, 
disaffection,  and  espionage  and  sabotage  activities  and  threats  which  affect 
the  Air  Force  and  are  within  AFOSI  jurisdictional  authority. 
(c)  The  Foreign  Technology  Division  (FTD)  is  a 
subordinate  field  activity  of  Air  Force  Systems  Command  (AFSC).  Its  mission 
is  to  produce  scientific  and  technical  intelligence  in  response  to  tasks  that  are 
levied  by  the  DIA  on  the  Department  of  the  Air  Force  or  that  originate  within 
the  Department  of  the  Air  Force,  FTD  collaborates  with  other  AFSC 
subordinate  elements  to  increase  and  improve  use  of  foreign  technology  and 
intelligence  in  AFSC  research,  development,  test,  and  evaluation  programs, 
systems  projects,  and  studies.  Overall  management  control  and  general  staff 
supervision  of  scientific  and  technical  intelligence  production  in  the  Air  Force 
is  accomplished  by  the  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  Intelligence,  under  the  general 
guidance  of  and  tasking  from  DIA. 
3.*  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 
The  Department  of  State  is  charged  with  the  following  Intelligence  missions: 
a.  Overtly  collect  foreign  political,  political-military,  sociologica' 
economic,  scientific,  technical,  and  associated  biographic  information. 
b.  Produce  and  disseminate  foreign  intelligence  relating  to  U.S. 
foreign  policy  as  required  for  the  execution  of  State  Department  responsi- 
bilities and  in  support  of  policymakers  involved  in  foreign  relations  within  the 
U.S.  Government. 
...  °.  Disseminate  within  the  U.S.  Government  reports  received  from 
U.S.  diplomatic  missions  abroad. 
d.  Coordinate  with  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  to  ensure  that 
U.S.  intelligence  activities  and  programs  are  useful  for  and  consistent  with 
U.S.  foreign  policy. 
e-  Transmit  reporting  requirements  of  the' Intelligence  Community  to 
U.S.  chiefs  of  missions  abroad  and  guide  their  collection  efforts. 
f.  Support  chiefs  of  missions  in  discharging  their  responsibilities  to 
direct  and  coordinate  the  activities  of  all  elements  of  their  missions. 
3.5  FEDERAL  BUREAU  OF  INVESTIGATION 
Under  the  supervision  of  the  Attorney  General  and  pursuant  to  such  regula- 
tions as  the  Attorney  General  may  establish,  the  FBI  is  responsible  for  the 
following: 
a.  Detecting  and  preventing  espionage,  sabotage,  subversion,  and 
other  unlawful  activities  by  or  on  behalf  of  foreign  powers  through  lawful 
counterintelligence  operations  within  the  United  States. 
3-17
b.  Conducting  within  the  United  States  and  its  territories,  when 
requested  by  officials  of  the  Intelligence  Community  designated  by  the 
President,  those  lawful  activities,  including  electronic  surveillance,  authorized 
by  the  President  and  specifically  approved  by  the  Attorney  General,  to  be 
undertaken  in  support  of  foreign  intelligence  collection  requirements  of  other 
intelligence  agencies. 
c-  Collecting  foreign  intelligence  by  lawful  means  within  the  United 
States  and  its  territories  when  requested  by  officials  of  the  Intelligence 
Community  designated  by  the  President  to  make  such  requests. 
d.  Disseminating,  as  appropriate,  foreign  intelligence  and  counter- 
intelligence information  which  it  acquires  to  appropriate  federal  agencies, 
state  and  local  law  enforcement  agencies,  and  cooperating  foreign  govern- 
ments. 
e.  Coordination  and  Dissemination  of  Security  Data.  The  FBI  has  the 
responsibility  of  referring  matters  under  the  jurisdiction  of  any  other  federal 
agencies  in  these  fields  to  the  appropriate  sources.  During  the  course  of  the 
bureau's  investigations,  particular  attention  is  given  at  all  times  to  informa- 
tion indicating  any  Soviet  communist  hostile  action.  As  a  part  of  this  overall 
program,  the  FBI  makes  name  checks  of  its  files  for  the  various  agencies  of 
the  government. 
f.  Specialized  Security  Programs.  Executive  Order  10*50,  27  May 
1953,  assigned  the  FBI  responsibilities  concerned  with  various  sensitive  types 
of  applicant  and  employee  investigations.  This  order,  which  established  the 
security  procedure  covering  "all  persons  seeking  the  privilege  of  employment 
or  privileged  to  be  employed  in  the  departments  and  agencies  of  the 
government,"  directs  that  all  investigations  conducted  by  any  other  agencies 
which  develop  adverse  information  involving  loyalty  or  information  showing 
coercion  of  an  employee  to  act  contrary  to  the  interests  of  the  national 
security  should  be  referred  promptly  to  the  FBI  for  a  full  field  investigation. 
Other  legislative  enactments  and  Presidential  directives  require  the  FBI  to 
ascertain  facts  pertinent  to  the  loyalty  and  security  risks  of  certain  employees 
and  applicants  for  positions  in  the  government  service  or  in  activities  incident 
to  which  the  government  has  an  official  interest. 
3.6  DEPARTMENT  OF  ENERGY 
The  Department  of  Energy  is  represented  on  the  National  Foreign  Intelligence 
Board  and 
a.  Participates  with  the  Department  of  State  in  overtly  collecting 
political,  economic,  and  technical  information  about  foreign  energy  matters. 
b.  Produces  and  disseminates  foreign  intelligence  necessary  for  the 
secretary's  responsibilities. 
c.  Participates  in  formulating  intelligence  collection  and  analysis 
requirements  where  the  special  expert  capability  of  the  department  can 
contribute. 
3-18
d.  Gives  expert  technical,  analytical,  and  research  capability  to  other 
agencies  within  the  intelligence  community. 
3.7  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  TREASURY 
The    Secretary    of    the    Treasury    is    represented    on    the    National    Foreign 
Intelligence  Board  and 
a.  Overtly  collects  foreign  financial  and  monetary  information. 
b.  Participates  with  the  Department  of  State  in  the  overt  collection 
of  general  foreign  economic  information. 
c  Produces  intelligence  required  for  the  execution  of  the  secretary's 
interdepartmental  responsibilities  and  the  mission  of  the  Department  of  the 
Treasury. 
d.  Contributes  intelligence  and  guidance  required  for  the  development 
of  national  intelligence. 
e.  Disseminates  within  the  U.S.  Government  foreign  intelligence 
information  acquired. 
3.8  DRUG  ENFORCEMENT  ADMINISTRATION 
Under  the  supervision  of  the  Attorney  General  and  pursuant  to  such  regula- 
tions as  the  Attorney  General  may  establish,  the  administrator  of  DEA 
a.  Collects,  produces,  and  disseminates  intelligence  on  the  foreign 
and  domestic  aspects  of  narcotics  production  and  trafficking  in  coordination 
with  other  intelligence  agencies. 
b.  Participates  with  the  Department  of  State  in  the  overt  collection 
of  general  foreign  political,  economic,  and  agricultural  information  on 
narcotics  production  and  trafficking. 
c  Coordinates  with  the  DCI  to  ensure  that  the  foreign  narcotics 
intelligence  activities  of  DEA  are  consistent  with  other  foreign  intelligence 
programs. 
3-19
CHAPTER  * 
COLLECTION  OF  INFORMATION  FOR  JOINT  FORCES 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
a.  Significance  of  Collection  Function.  Since  earliest  recorded  time, 
the  collection  of  information*  about  other  lands  and  peoples  has  had  great 
political,  economic,  and  military  significance.  The  oldest  military  treatise 
known,  written  by  the  Chinese  leader  Sun  Tzu  about  500  B.C.,  sets  forth  some 
clear  notions  about  the  importance  of  collecting  information.  Sun  Tzu  said, 
"To  remain  in  ignorance  of  the  enemy's  condition  is  the  height  of 
inhumanity. . .  .What  enables  the  good  general  to  strike  and  conquer  and 
achieve  things  beyond  the  reach  of  ordinary  men  is  foreknowledge."  The  Duke 
of  Wellington  once  remarked  that  he  had  spent  half  his  military  career 
wondering  what  was  "on  the  other  side  of  the  hill."  In  brief,  the  vital  necessity 
of  obtaining  information  about  an  actual  or  potential  enemy  has  been 
recognized  down  through  the  ages. 
b.  Definition.  Any  undertaking  to  collect  information,  whether  it  be 
on  a  small  or  large  scale,  must  be  carefully  guided,  for  any  weakness  in  the 
collection  phase  is  reflected  in  the  intelligence  effort  as  a  whole.  Information 
should  contribute  to  the  production  of  accurate  and  timely  intelligence  and  be 
applicable  to  the  intelligence  mission  of  the  command.  Hence,  collection  may 
be  defined  as  "the  procurement  and  selection  of  information  pertinent  to  a 
given  intelligence  problem"  (POD  Dictionary  of  Military  and  Associated 
Terms). 
c.  Difficulties  in  Collection.  Many  difficulties  are  involved  in  obtain- 
ing helpful  information  and  using  it  to  arrive  at  reliable  conclusions.  These 
difficulties  are  due  principally  to  the  efforts  of  the  actual  or  potential  enemy 
to  foil  attempts  made  to  gain  valuable  information.  Enemies  will  enforce 
strict  censorship  and  -  communication  security  measures  to  prevent  leads  of 
useful  information.  They  may  distribute  false  information  and  institute  other 
measures  to  deceive  or  mislead  collecting  agencies.  They  will  sometimes 
adopt  a  course  of  action  that  may  appear  illogical.  The  opposition  of  enemy 
interests  to  our  own,  as  well  as  their  independence  of  will,  makes  collection  of 
information  difficult. 
d.  Collection  Responsibilities.  The  broad  collection  responsibilities  of 
the  various  departments  of  the  U.S.  Government  are  established  by  the 
National  Security  Council  (NSC).  The  collection  effort  is  broad,  intensive,  and 
continuing,  as  it  is  a  vital  element  of  national  security.  A  description  of  the 
general  responsibilities  of  the  respective  departments  is  contained  in  Chapter 
3  of  this  publication. 
e.  Assisting  Departments  and  Agencies.  Governmental  departments 
and  agencies,  other  than  purely  intelligence  oriented  organizations,  assist  in 
the  collection  of  information.    For  example,  the  Library  of  Congress  acquires 
*  Also  called  "intelligence  acquisition." 
*-l
books,  newspapers,  and  magazines  from  all  over  the  world  on  nearly  all 
subjects  and  is  probably  the  best  governmental  source  for  general  information. 
The  Treasury  Department  and  the  Departments  of  Justice,  Interior,  Agricul- 
ture, Labor,  and  Commerce  all  participate  in  the  overall  U.S.  collection 
effort.  These  agencies  compile  worldwide  statistics  and  other  types  of 
information  which  are  pertinent  to  their  respective  fields  of  endeavor.  Such 
information  has  a  continuing  intelligence  value. 
f.  Defense  Instructions  for  Collection.  Within  the  Department  of 
Defense,  collection  is  undertaken  in  accordance  with  the  Defense  Intelligence 
Agency  Manual  (DI AM  58-1)  and  corollary  Service  and  unified  and  specified 
command  instructions.  These  publications  furnish  direction  and  guidance  for 
the  planning,  coordination,  and  employment  of  Department  of  Defense  (DOD) 
resources  in  the  collection  and  reporting  of  intelligence  information  for  DOD 
missions. 
g.  Collection  in  a  Unified  Command.  In  a  unified  command,  the 
commander  is  responsible  for  the  coordination  of  all  normal  collection 
activities  in  his  area.  In  practice  the  joint  intelligence  organization  at  unified 
command  level  coordinates  collection  activities  and  formulates  policy  for  the 
collection  of  information.  This  organization  generally  does  not  engage  in  the 
immediate  control,  direction,  or  supervision  of  collecting  agencies.  The  latter 
functions  are  usually  handled  by  the  component  commanders  of  the  unified  or 
specified  command.  In  wartime,  geographical  locations,  means  of  communica- 
tions, and  economy  of  resources  may  dictate  that  the  direct  control  and 
supervision  of  collecting  agencies  be  vested  in  the  unified  and/or  joint  force 
commander.  In  other  circumstances  the  collection  agencies  may,  as  in 
peacetime,  come  under  the  direct  supervision  and  control  of  the  component 
commands.  In  any  event  the  collection  effort  in  peace  or  war  must  be 
responsive  to  the  intelligence  requirements  of  the  unified  command  as  well  as 
the  component  commands.  These  requirements  are  set  forth  in  a  collection 
plan,  which,  is  prepared  by  the  unified  command  and  by  all  subordinate 
commands.  (See  paragraph  4.2c.) 
*.2  COLLECTION  PLANNING 
a.  General.  The  mission  of  the  joint  command  establishes  the 
guidelines  for  the  intelligence  collection  requirements.  Thus  the  first  step  by 
the  intelligence  organization  of  a  joint  force  is  to  determine  what  types  of 
information  (military,  political,  economic,  scientific,  sociological)  and  in  what 
detail  are  required  to  support  the  mission.  This  first  step  should  be  done  in 
consultation  with  the  commander  to  obtain  his  views  on  the  intelligence 
aspects  of  the  mission.  This  initial  consultation  may  generate  some  specific 
collection  requirements  in  areas  which  will  initially  receive  sufficient  infor- 
mation from  higher  authority  to  prepare  a  preliminary  intelligence  estimate. 
The  intelligence  estimate  should  include  all  pertinent  intelligence  currently 
available. 
4-2
b.  Essential  Elements  of  Information  (EEI)  and  Intelligence  Collection 
Tasks 
(1)  EEI  are  "the  critical  items  of  information  regarding  the 
enemy  and  his  environment  needed  by  the  commander  by  a  particular  time,  to 
relate  with  other  available  information  and  intelligence  in  order  to  assist  him 
in  reaching  a  logical  decision"  (POD  Dictionary  of  Military  and  Associated 
Terms).  For  example,  an  element  could  be  "Will  the  enemy  forces  facing  the 
command  launch  an  early  attack  on  our  forces?"  EEI  are  usually  enunciated  in 
the  form  of  questions  posed  to  focus  the  attention  and  activities  of  all 
collection  agencies  on  the  high-priority  information  which  is  needed  at  a 
particular  time. 
(2)  The  assignment  of  collection  tasks  is  predicated  on  the 
availability  and  capability  of  the  collecting  agencies  to  accomplish  them,  with 
due  consideration  being  given  to  the  time  required  for  collection  and  trans- 
mission of  the  raw  intelligence  information  to  the  requesting  headquarters. 
(3)  Origin.  Intelligence  is  designed  not  to  control,  but  to 
contribute  to  the  operation  or  the  planning.  For  this  reason  the  commander, 
as  well  as  the  operational  staff  of  a  joint  command,  should  participate  in  the 
final  formulation  of  the  essential  elements  of  information.  In  short,  although 
the  intelligence  staff  prepares  and  proposes  the  EEI,  they  emanate  from  the 
commander  and  his  staff.  However,  the  commander  may  have  other  EEI  to 
satisfy.  (See  *.2b  (5).) 
00  Dissemination.  The  EEI  may  be  disseminated  to  the  com- 
mand in  an  operation  order,  in  the  intelligence  annex  to  the  operation  order,  or 
as  a  separate  communication. 
(5)  Scope.  The  EEI  for  a  given  situation  will  not  be  the  same  at 
all  echelons  composing  a  unified  command.  At  each  lower  echelon  the  EEI  will 
change  in  character  to  meet  the  needs  of  that  particular  command.  There- 
fore, EEI  which  are  announced  by  a  higher  headquarters  are  not  copied 
verbatim,  although  some  may  be  the  same.  Generally  speaking,  the  EEI  of  a 
higher  headquarters  will  tend  to  be  broader,  while  those  of  the  lower  echelons 
will  tend  to  be  narrower.  Often  the  indications  of  the  higher  headquarters  are 
considered  and  treated  as  EEI  by  the  lower,  which  may  prepare  more  specific 
indications  for  it.  (See  para.  4.2d.) 
(6)  In  addition  to  the  EEI  generated  by  the  commander,  the 
intelligence  officer  may  have  others  to  satisfy.  These  would  be  specifically 
requested  of  him  by  other  staff  officers  or  higher  headquarters  as  well  as 
lower  and  neighboring  units.  The  Intelligence  Collection  Requirements 
Manuals  (DIAM  58  series)  are  the  basic  documents  in  the  DOD  collection 
requirements  program.  They  cover  in  general  terms  the  subjects  of  worldwide 
collection  interest  to  all  DOD  agencies  having  requirements  for  intelligence. 
They  are  intended  for  use  by  all  elements  of  the  DOD  intelligence  structure. 
In  the  field,  DOD  collection  agencies  are  expected  to  plan  and  accomplish 
tasks  in  accordance  with  DIAM  58  series  and  related  requirements. 
4-3
c.  Collection  Plan.     In  order  to  direct  a  systematic  search  for  the 
desired  information,  a  plan  of  action  must  be  devised.  (For  an  example,  see 
Appendix  C)  This  plan,  generally  referred  to  as  an  intelligence  collection  plan, 
may  be  a  work  sheet  solely  for  the  use  of  the  intelligence  staff,  or  it  may  be  a 
more  formal  document.  It  is  not  normally  disseminated  in  its  entirety.  It 
should  include  a  statement  of  what  information  is  wanted,  when  it  is  needed, 
and  who  is  to  get  it.  The  plan  is  designed  to  eliminate  conflict,  omissions, 
duplication,  and  confusion  by 
missions. 
cies. 
(1)  Analyzing  and  transforming  elements  of  information  into 
(2)  Assigning  the  missions  (collection  tasks)  to  collecting  agen- 
(3)  Designating  the  method  of  reporting. 
00       Setting  the  time  when  the  information  is  due. 
The  plan,  when  completed,  forms  the  basis  for  orders  governing  the  search  for 
information  by  the  agencies  available  and  for  requests  to  higher  agencies  for 
information  that  cannot  be  obtained  otherwise. 
d.         Indications 
(1)  Description.  An  essential  element  of  information  question 
can  seldom  be  answered  by  a  single  item.  To  answer  the  broad  EEI  question,  it 
is  first  broken  down  in  terms  of  indications  or  related  component  questions 
which  are  actually  lesser  questions  arising  from  the  same  problem.  Indications 
are  clues,  tokens,  signs,  or  symptoms  that  reveal  all  or  part  of  the  answer  to 
the  EEI  question.  Before  the  enemy  can  implement  a  particular  line  of  action, 
he  must  make  some  preparations.  For  example,  with  an  EEI  question  about 
enemy  attack,  one  of  the  indications  may  have  to  do.  with  reinforcement, 
another  with  redeployment,  and  another  with  unusual  activities.  An  increased 
number  of  deserters  coming  into  friendly  lines,  issuance  of  combat  rations,  and 
frontal  deployment  of  artillery  or  bridging  equipment  are  all  indications  of 
impending  attack.  The  development  of  indications  requires  imagination  and  a 
searching  analysis  for  clues  to  the  enemy's  capabilities  and  adoption  of 
specific  courses  of  action. 
(2)  Criteria.  Indication  questions  should 
(a)  Confirm  each  other  without  unnecessary  duplication. 
(b)  Be  specific. 
(c)  Relate  to  essential  items  only. 
(d)  Identify  the  broad  areas  of  collection  action  required. 
*-k
e.  Formulation  of  Orders  and  Requests 
(1)  After  analyzing  the  EEI  and  other  intelligence  requirements 
and  recording  the  indications  corresponding  to  each,  the  actual  orders  or 
requests  for  information  are  then  prepared  from  fragmentary  notes  contained 
in  the  collection  plan.  Although  in  fragmentary  form  in  the  collection  plan, 
these  notes  should  be  in  sufficient  detail  to  permit  the  formulation  of  orders 
or  requests  for  information  which,  when  met,  will  completely  satisfy  the  need 
without  additional  collection  action.  However,  partial  satisfaction  may  be 
expected  and  is  acceptable.  These  orders  and  requests  may  be  issued 
separately  or  combined  into  an  intelligence  plan. 
(2)  The  intelligence  officer's  collection  plan  includes  instruc- 
tions for  reporting.  It  states  the  degree  of  urgency  of  the  request,  the  date 
when  the  information  is  desired,  and  any  instructions  necessary.  This 
information  is  included  in  the  written  requests  (or  orders)  for  information 
when  they  are  sent  to  the  selected  collection  agencies.  In  determining  the 
time  of  reporting,  the  intelligence  officer  is  guided  by  the  fact  that  informa- 
tion arriving  too  late  is  of  no  value  and  information  arriving  before  needed  is 
likely  to  be  out  of  date  and  inaccurate  when  projected  operations  are 
undertaken.  Consideration  must  also  be  given  to  the  time  factor  for  issuing 
orders  in  ai»  echelons  of  command  involved  in  the  mission,  the  time  required  to 
execute  the  collection  mission,  and  the  time  to  report  its  results. 
f.  Summary.  In  summary,  the  EEI  and  other  intelligence  require- 
ments constitute  the  general  missions  for  the  various  collecting  agencies  of  all 
forces  in  the  unified  command  and  form  the  basis  of  the  unified  collection 
plan.  The  preparation  of  a  collection  plan  is  a  systematic  approach  for 
directing  a  search  for  information.  It  is  an  essential  step  in  determining  the 
tasks  of  the  various  collecting  agencies  and  in  effecting  proper  coordination  of 
effort  of  all  forces  in  the  command.  When  completed,  the  plan  forms  the  basis 
for  orders  governing  the  search  for  information  by  the  agencies  available,  and 
for  requests  to  higher  and  adjacent  headquarters  for  information  that  cannot 
be  obtained  by  means  available  to  the  commander  of  the  unified  command. 
4.3  TYPICAL  INTELLIGENCE  REQUIREMENTS  FOR  JOINT  FORCES 
a.  The  total  intelligence  required  by  a  joint  task  force  is  the 
intelligence  needed  by  all  components  of  the  force.  The  following  are  typical 
intelligence  requirements  or  essential  elements  of  information. 
b.  Intelligence  for  Air  Force  Units.  The  intelligence  requirements  of 
air  units  in  a  joint  task  force  are,  with  few  exceptions,  the  same  as  the 
requirements  of  air  forces  in  any  other  type  of  operation.  They  are 
(1)  Complete  order  of  battle  information  on  the  enemy  force  in 
order  to  plan  properly  an  air  operation  in  hostile  territory,  including 
characteristics  and  performance  data  on  aircraft,  the  location  of  air  base 
complexes,  combat  tactics  and  doctrine,  and  the  status  of  training  of  units. 
(2)  Information  on  ground  and  naval  targets  in  the  area  and 
detailed  information  on  the  terrain  over  which  close  air  support  for  surface 
forces  will  operate.     For  interdiction  missions,  information  on  enemy  lines 
4-5
of  communication  with  particular  emphasis  on  terminals  or  bottlenecks  will  be 
required. 
(3)  Photographs  of  drop  zones  and  landing  zones  plus  detailed 
information  on  existing  defense  facilities  in  order  to  conduct  airborne  opera- 
tions. 
(*)  Intelligence  supporting  survival,  escape,  resistance  and 
evasion  (SERE).  Such  information  is  essential  for  aircrews  and  will  include 
such  items  as  safe  area  intelligence  descriptions,  climatological  and  demo- 
graphic information,  and  basic  guidance  on  resistance  to  interrogation.  An 
important  by-product  of  an  effective  escape  and  evasion  system,  often 
supported  by  special  operations  forces,  is  the  valuable  information  evaders  and 
escapers  can  often  bring  back  to  friendly  lines. 
(5)  The  nature  and  extent  of  the  enemy  air  defense  system. 
This  should  include  the  location  and  characteristics  of  surveillance  radar  plus 
information  on  antiaircraft  artillery,  missiles,  and  interceptor  force. 
(6)  Climatology  studies  and  accurate  day-to-day  weather  infor- 
mation in  the  proposed  area  of  operations.  This  information  is  mandatory  for 
successful  air  operations  and  is,  of  course,  of  great  importance  to  all  elements 
of  the  task  force. 
(7)  Enemy  nuclear  threat.  This  is  possibly  the  most  significant 
item  of  intelligence  required,  including  all  possible  information  on  the  enemy 
capability,  such  as  weapons,  storage  sites,  and  delivery  systems,  as  well  as 
their  intent  and  willingness  to  use  such  weapons. 
c.  Intelligence  for  Naval  Units.  The  intelligence  requirements  of 
naval  units  in  a  joint  task  force  vary  with  the  type  of  units  assigned  and  their 
missions  and  tasks.  Naval  forces  need  to  know 
(1)  Firsthand  knowledge  of  the  enemy  naval  order  of  battle. 
This  would  include  information  on  which  ships  can  interfere  or  oppose  the 
approach,  the  landing,  the  resupply,  and  the  withdrawal. 
(2)  The  enemy  submarine  threat  en  route  to  and  in  the  objective 
area. 
(3)  The  location  and  character  of  enemy  minefields  and  mine 
warfare  capabilities. 
(*)  Data  on  coast  and  landing  beaches.  Hydrographic  informa- 
tion on  vaters  off  potential  landing  beaches  must  be  supplied.  This  must 
include  very  detailed  information  on  the  beaches  themselves,  as  well  as  such 
items  as  location  and  types  of  underwater  obstacles,  character  of  the  beaches, 
identifying  marks,  tides,  and  currents. 
(5)  Weather  and  climate  information,  visibility,  temperatures, 
wind  storms,  etc. 
4-6
(6)  Location  and  types  of  coastal  defense  artillery  in  order  to 
take  proper  counter  measures.  In  this  connection,  information  as  to  contours 
at  and  beyond  the  beaches  in  order  to  properly  control  and  deliver  naval 
gunfire  on  shore  targets  is  required.  This  contour  information  is  also  useful  in 
predicting  and  interpreting  radar  presentations. 
(7)  The  location  of  enemy  troop  concentrations  and  coastal 
lines  of  communication.  This  data  is  needed  to  permit  advantageous  use  of 
naval  gunfire  in  support  of  troops. 
(8)  Air  intelligence.  This  is  needed  for  naval  air  operations  and 
is  essentially  the  same  as  that  required  by  the  Air  Force  units  involved. 
(9)  Extent  of  the  enemy  nuclear  threat.  The  Navy,  like  the 
other  Services,  must  know  the  extent  of  the  enemy  nuclear  threat. 
d.  Intelligence  for  Army  and  Marine  Corps  Ground  Units.  Ground 
force  units  in  a  joint  task  force  operation  do  not  normally  have  the  variety  of 
missions  and  tasks  which  air  and  naval  units  are  assigned.  However,  the 
intelligence  they  require  is  considerable,  and  the  major  requirements  are  listed 
below. 
(1)  Characteristics  of  the  Area.  Intelligence  required  by  ground 
units  is  included  in  the  frequently  used  term  "characteristics  of  the  area." 
Ground  forces,  since  they  use  the  terrain  foot  by  foot,  need  to  know 
practically  everything  about  the  topography  of  the  land  occupied  by  the  enemy 
over  which  they  will  advance.  Examples  of  necessary  information  are  data  on 
where  the  soil  and  vegetation  will  permit  infantry  units  to  advance  most  easily 
and  where  these  characteristics  will  hinder  foot  movement;  where  the  terrain 
is  trafficable  to  wheeled  and  tracked  vehicles  and  where  it  is  not;  and  what 
terrain  is  most  suitable  to  the  enemy  for  their  operations  and  where  it 
restricts  and  limits  their  movements. 
(2)  Hydrography.  Amphibious  operations  require  very  detailed 
and  explicit  information  on  the  hydrography  off  landing  beaches  to  properly 
employ  landing  craft  and  amphibious  vehicles. 
(3)  Beaches.  The  best  information  possible  is  required,  for  both 
tactical  and  logistic  purposes,  on  the  nature  of  the  beaches  themselves  and  the 
routes  inland  from  such  beaches.  These  affect  the  scheme  of  maneuver  and 
the  type  and  amount  of  supplies  and  equipment  to  be  made  available. 
(ft)  Landing  Areas.  A  great  deal  of  information  on  the  landing 
areas  is  required  for  airborne  operations.-  This  includes  details  on  drop  zones, 
enemy  troop  dispositions,  and  activities  in  the  drop  area,  particularly  on 
enemy  armor,  the  greatest  threat  to  airborne  operations  during  the  early 
stages. 
(5)  The  Enemy  Ground  Order  of  Battle.  All  ground  forces  need 
information  on  the  enemy  ground  order  of  battle.  This  includes  knowledge  of 
the    strength,    organization,    equipment,    identity,    location,   disposition,   and 
4-7
combat  efficiency  of  the  enemy  forces,  as  well  as  the  means  and  manner  of 
moving  and  supplying  these  forces.  This  information,  plus  the  details  of 
defensive  installations,  will  furnish  what  is  called  the  enemy's  "organization  of 
the  area  for  defense." 
(6)  Air  Intelligence.  Like  the  air  and  naval  forces  involved,  the 
ground  forces  need  some  air  intelligence.  Sufficient  details  must  be  made 
available  on  the  enemy  planes  and  their  characteristics  to  take  effective 
active  and  passive  defensive  measures  against  air  attack,  including  nuclear 
attack. 
e.  Climate,  Weather,  and  Biographic  Information.  The  military 
commander,  regardless  of  environment,  must  consider  the  effects  of  climate 
and  weather  when  he  plans  for  and  executes  his  mission.  Biographic 
information  is  important  as  an  aid  to  identifying  enemy  units  and  in  some 
cases  predicting  the  course  of  action  the  enemy  will  take. 
f.  SUMMARY.  No  single  organization  can  be  devised  which  will  meet 
the  requirements  for  all  situations.  Variations  in  organizations  will  be 
dictated  by  such  considerations  as  strategic  requirements,  amount  and  type  of 
initial  intelligence  available,  the  degree  to  which  the  separate  Services  are 
involved,  the  scope  of  the  mission,  the  characteristics  of  the  area,  the  training 
and  experience  of  the  commander  and  his  staff,  and  the  time  available  for 
planning. 
t*A  SOURCES  AND  COLLECTION  AGENCY  TERMINOLOGY 
a.  Definitions.  The  following  definitions  of  the  terms  "source"  and 
"collection"  are  accepted  DOD  intelligence  teems,  as  defined  in  DIAM  58-1. 
The  definition  of  "collection  agency"  is  the  one  agreed  on  for  NATO. 
(1)  Source — a  person,  thing,  or  activity  from  which  intelligence 
information  is  obtained. 
(2)  Collection — the  exploitation  of  sources  of  information  by 
the  collection  agencies  and  the  delivery  of  this  information  to  the  proper 
intelligence  processing  unit  for  use  in  the  production  of  finished  intelligence. 
(3)  Collection  Agency — any  individual  or  specialized 
organization  used  in  collecting  or  processing  intelligence  information. 
b.  Categories  of  Sources.  Sources  of  intelligence  information  are 
best  considered  under  three  major  categories:  human,  documentary,  and 
material.  While  collection  opportunity  varies  in  scope  according  to  the 
political,  climatic,  sociological,  and  economic  circumstances  that  prevail, 
these  three  basic  sources  are  always  present.  No  collection  plan  is  complete 
until  the  potential  of  these  three  sources  is  considered  in  the  light  of  military 
intelligence  requirements. 
c.  Evaluation  of  Information.  Information  can  be  evaluated  only  if 
there   is   knowledge   of.  the   accuracy   and    reliability   of    the    source,    the 
*-8
circumstances  under  which  the  information  was  obtained,  and  the  relationship 
of  the  source  and  collection. 
d.  Determination  of  Sources  to  be  Exploited.  In  determining  which 
sources  of  information  to  exploit,  the  following  questions  must  be  considered: 
(1)  What  type  of  information  is  required? 
(2)  Of  the  available  sources,  which  are  the  most  reliable? 
(3)  Will  the  appropriate  collectors  be  able  to  exploit  the  sources 
in  time? 
e.  Assignment  of  Collection  Tasks.  The  capabilities  and  limitations 
of  collectors  must  be  kept  in  mind  in  assigning  collection  tasks.  Effectiveness 
of  the  collectors  is  impaired  if  they  are  given  too  many  tasks.  Duplication  of 
tasks  is  warranted  only  if  it  is  designed  to  lead  to  confirming  information  or  if 
it  increases  the  likelihood  of  obtaining  the  information  needed. 
4.5  TYPICAL  SOURCES  OF  INFORMATION 
a.  Aerial  Surveillance.  Aerial  reconnaissance  and  surveillance  give 
bo*  strategic  and  tactical  intelligence.  Accurate  and  timely  intelligence  for 
the  commander  can  be  obtained  by  visual,  photographic,  or  electronic  means. 
Aerial  imagery  (photography,  radar,  and  infrared)  is  a  prime  source  of 
information  for  land,  sea,  and  air  targets  development;  mapping  and  charting; 
terrain  studies;  and  battle  damage  assessment.  It  can  amplify  or  substantiate 
other  sources. 
b.  Captured  Enemy  Documents.  A  document  is  any  recorded  informa- 
tion, regardless  of  its  physical  form  or  characteristics;  This  includes,  but  is 
not  limited  to,  written  material;  printed,  drawn,  or  engraved  material;  sound 
or  voice  recordings;  photographs  and  exposed  film;  and  reproductions  of  any  of 
these. 
c  Captured  Enemy  Material.  Technological  advances  and  weaknesses 
of  an  enemy  are  often  reflected  in  material  production.  Careful  scrutiny  of 
actual  equipment,  including  its  factory  markings  and  related  data,  can  give  a 
reasonably  accurate  estimate  of  the  enemy's  ability  to  wage  offensive  and/or 
defensive  war.  Samples  or  photographs  of  "hardware"  give  researchers  an 
insight  into  the  enemy's  technical  achievements  and  trends. 
d.  Weather  Forecasts  and  Studies.  The  most  effective  employment  of 
military  forces  requires  consideration  of  the  influence  of  weather  from  the 
inception  of  a  plan  through  its  final  execution.  Accurate  interpretation  of  the 
effects  of  weather  increases  the  probability  of  success  in  operations  and  helps 
deduce  probable  enemy  courses  of  action.  Weather  reconnaissance  aircraft 
furnish  valuable  forecasts  of  weather  immediately  ahead.  Often  this  is  the 
only  method  of  learning  about  weather  fronts  and  changes  over  enemy 
territory. 
*-9
e.  Enemy  Press,  Radio,  and  TV.  The  information  that  a  nation 
releases  to  its  public,  even  in  time  of  war,  often  contains  items  of  value  in 
completing  the  overall  intelligence  picture.  Enemy  news  media  are  sources  of 
information  on  enemy  organization,  assignment  of  important  military  and 
political  matters,  status  of  the  national  economy,  psychological  reactions  of 
the  enemy  population,  and  casualty  data. 
f-  Signals  Intelligence  (SIGINT).  SIGINT  comprises  both  electronics 
intelligence  (ELINT)  and  communications  intelligence  (COMINT).  Ground 
stations,  ships,  and  aircraft  are  employed  to  intercept  and  record  enemy 
communications,  early  warning,  antiaircraft,  and  ground-controlled  intercept 
signals.  By  analyzing  the  type,  volume,  and  direction  of  radiations  from 
enemy  electronic  equipment,  it  is  possible  to  obtain  much  information  about 
the  enemy.  Electronic  reconnaissance  is  particularly  valuable  in  helping  to 
determine  tine  location  of  enemy  radar  and  high  frequency  radio  circuits, 
which  have  relatively  short  transmission  ranges.  If  enemy  communications  are 
intercepted  and  decrypted,  valuable  specific  information  is  gained  about  the 
strength,  disposition,  movement,  and  projected  operations  of  enemy  forces. 
SIGINT  is  the  single  most  reliable  source  of  intelligence  and  is  particularly 
useful  in  confirming  information  received  from  other  sources. 
g-  Prisoners  of  War.  Prisoners  of  war  divulge  information,  advert- 
ently or  inadvertently,  through  interrogation;  Maximum  information  is 
obtained  only  through  continued  skillful  handling  from  time  of  capture 
throughout  all  interrogations.  Information  obtainable  includes  data  on  unit 
identifications,  troop  dispositions,  contemplated  movements,  state  of  morale, 
fortifications,  and  effects  of  psychological  warfare  operations. 
h.  Deserters.  Deserters  are  handled  as  prisoners  of  war.  They  may 
exhibit  ideas  and  attitudes  which  are  not  typical  of  the  bulk  of  opposing  forces 
and  may  include  false  deserters. 
i*  Refugees.  Refugees  and  civilian  escapees  are  ordinarily  not 
trained  in  noting  things  of  military  significance.  However,  with  proper 
interrogation  much  valuable  information  may  be  obtained. 
J.  Evadees.    Evadees  can  supply  considerable  information  if  they  are 
equipped  with  maps  or  have  a  good  knowledge  of  the  enemy  terrain. 
k.  Aircrews.  Aircrews  can  furnish  valuable  combat  information  about 
the  enemy's  concentrations,  tactics,  order  of  battle,  and  statistical  data.  The 
report  of  visual  observations  is  highly  valuable  as  a  source  of  information  on 
new  targets—fleeting  or  stationary. 
**  Military  Attaches.  -Military  attaches  represent  the  armed  Services 
of  the  United  States  in  foreign  countries.  It  is  their  duty  to  collect 
information  which  is  of  interest  to  the  United  States.  In  addition,  they  are 
members  of  the  ambassador's  or  minister's  diplomatic  family. 
m.  Allied  Forces.  Just  like  U.S.  Armed  Forces,  the  intelligence 
collecting  agencies  and  sources  of  allies  can  furnish  much  information  and 
intelligence.    The  problems  involved  in  establishing  and  conducting  exchanges 
4-10
of  intelligence  with  allies  vary  greatly  and  their  successful  solution  requires 
wisdom,  tact,  careful  planning,  and  consistent  effort. 
n.  Underground  Forces.  Intelligence  information  collected  by  under- 
ground forces  has  limitations  similar  to  that  collected  by  clandestine  means. 
In  addition,  it  has  the  added  disadvantage  that  the  reliability  of  underground 
agents  must  always  be  carefully  evaluated. 
o.  Civilian  Sources.  Fortunately  for  military  intelligence,  a  great 
many  organizations,  both  governmental  and  private,  collect  data  from  industry 
for  their  own  needs.  In  many  instances  the  military  Services  can  take  this 
data  and  reorganize  it  to  fit  their  own  needs,  thus  saving  time  and  effort  in 
collecting  information.  Larger  companies  and  industries  compile  data  for 
trade  groups  that  buy  from  them.  Other  sources  are  banks,  international 
trading  companies,  transportation  companies,  book  companies,  and  the  film 
industry.  Films  are  valuable  sources  of  intelligence  information,  as  are  widely 
traveled,  intelligent  tourists.  There  are,  however,  legal  constraints  on  U.S. 
intelligence  activities  collecting  information  from  United  States  citizens. 
p.  The  Library  of  Congress  maintains  a  comprehensive  research 
section  to  prepare  studies  requested  by  specially  authorized  personnel. 
q.  The  Department  of  State  obtains  information  from  its  embassies 
and  consular  offices  all  over  the  world.  The  Treasury  Department  and  the 
Departments  of  Justice,  Interior,  Agriculture,  Labor,  and  Commerce  also 
furnish  valuable  intelligence  information. 
r.  Miscellaneous  governmental  agencies,  such  as  the  Federal  Trade 
Commission,  the  Smithsonian  Institution,  and  the  U.S.  Tariff  Commission,  are 
sources  of  various  kinds  of  information. 
4.6  MILITARY  COLLECTION  ORGANIZATIONS  AND  CAPABILITIES 
a.  General.  In  addition  to  the  many  agencies  at  national  level 
concerned  with  the  collection  of  information,  the  military  commanders  in  the 
field  have  their  own  organic  units  to  assist  in  this  effort.  It  is. also  customary 
to  enhance  a  command's  collection  capabilities  by  the  attachment  of  special- 
ized units  and  personnel  as  the  need  arises.  Air  reconnaissance  units,  ground 
combat  patrols,  and  surface  and  submarine  naval  forces  are  but  a  few 
examples  of  the  diverse  units  mat  gamer  information  in  the  combat  areas. 
b.  Air.  Air  reconnaissance  units  obtain  military  information,  includ- 
ing weather,  by  photographic,  visual,  and  electronic  methods  from  aircraft 
normally  belonging  to  the  reconnaissance  elements  of  the  Air  Force,  Navy,  and 
Army.  Air  reconnaissance  is  an  effective  and  reliable  collection  means 
capable  of  penetrating  more  deeply  into  enenny  territory  titan  other  overt 
agencies  and  giving  more  detailed  information  than  is  otherwise  available. 
c.  Ground.  Normally  mis  type  of  reconnaissance  should  be  by  stealth 
and   observation  of   the  enemy   and   should   be   conducted   without   enemy 
4-11
knowledge.  Combat  should  be  resorted  to  only  when  necessary  to  save  the 
reconnaissance  force  from  annihilation  or  capture  or  when  the  mission  requires 
that  the  enemy  be  forced  to  reveal  dispositions  through  combat.  Ground 
reconnaissance  agencies  consist  of  personnel  manning  observation  posts, 
reconnaissance  patrols,  and  parties  of  any  size  from  all  arms  and  Services. 
Reconnaissance  patrols  can  obtain  a  wide  range  of  information  on  strength  and 
disposition  of  enemy  units;  conditions  of  roads,  rails,  and  bridges;  enemy 
traffic;  effects  of  friendly  gunfire  and  bombing;  enemy  casualties;  and  terrain. 
To  carry  out  this  type  of  reconnaissance  the  Army  uses  units  from  infantry 
squad  up  to  armored  cavalry  regiments.  The  Marine  Corps  has  similar  units  up 
to  company  size  and  specializes  in  amphibious  reconnaissance. 
d.  Sea 
(1)  Surface  Forces.  Practically  all  of  the  surface  naval  recon- 
naissance effort  is  carried  out  by  units  tailored  for  the  particular  mission  by 
drawing  on  the  various  type  commands  for  material  and  personnel.  Exceptions 
to  this  general  rule  are  underwater  demolition  teams,  landing  parties,  and 
small  boat  groups. 
(2)  Submarines.  In  addition  to  surface  forces,  submarines  are 
dispatched  on  independent  patrols.  The  need  for  certain  information  on 
channels,  depths,  currents,  landfalls,  and  enemy  minefields  requires  both 
surface  and  subsurface  reconnaissance.  Submarines  can  also  assist  in  filling 
gaps  in  electronic  reconnaissance  conducted  by  long-range  aircraft. 
e.  Human  Resource  Intelligence  (HUMINT)  Collection.  People  are 
among  the  intelligence  collector's  most  valuable  sources  of  information. 
Whether  their  attitude  is  friendly,  hostile,  or  indifferent,  those  who  have 
knowledge  of,  or  access  to,  information  of  intelligence  interest  can  possibly  be 
exploited  for  intelligence  purposes.  Such  exploitation  gives  intelligence  which 
normally  is  not  obtainable  through  other  means,  and  it  complements  and  backs 
up  other  collection  methods.  HUMINT  collection  operations  are  conducted  in 
peace  and  war  by  component  commands  having  organic  HUMINT  collection 
elements.  Collection  support  also  is  given  by  departmentally  controlled 
HUMINT  collection  units.  In  a  combat  environment,  interrogation  centers  may 
be  established  for  joint  or  combined- exploitation  of  prisoners  of  war  and  other 
non-U.S.  detainees.  Interrogation  of  such  sources  is  not  only  the  most 
important  means  of  obtaining  information  concerning  enemy  intentions,  but  is 
also  the  primary  means  of  obtaining  order  of  battle  information  beyond  unit 
type  and  subordination.  In  tactical  applications,  interrogation  information 
supports  the  planning  of  military  operations  by  identifying  potential  targets 
for  airstrikes  and  ground  sweeps. 
f.  Communications  Intelligence  (COMINT).  There  are  facilities 
designed  to  intercept  foreign  radio  communications  and  to  acquire  information 
on  the  location  and  identification  of  enemy  radio  communications  facilities. 
These  units  perform  field  cryptoanalysis  and  traffic  analysis  of  intercepted 
communications.  There  are  also  facilities  engaged  in  the  monitoring  of 
foreign  electronics  emissions  to  determine  locations,  types,  and  capabilities  of 
equipment. 
4-12
g.  Technical   intelligence   Teams.      The   bits  of   information   used   in 
piecing  together  the  whole  picture  of  enemy  war  potential  are  collected  by 
technical  liaison  officers  and  technical  intelligence  teams  trained  to  collect 
items  of  enemy  equipment  in  theaters  of  war.  In  the  U.S.  Air  Force, 
technical  exploitation  teams  manned  by  officers,  civilians,  and  airmen  of  the 
Foreign  Technology  Division  of  the  Systems  Command  are  specifically  trained 
for  this  duty.  In  the  U.S.  Army  technical  intelligence  detachments  collect  and 
report  information  obtained  from  the  study  of  enemy  or  other  foreign 
material.  In  the  U.S.  Navy  the  technical  intelligence  function  is  integrated 
into  the  overall  intelligence  effort. 
h.  Counterintelligence  Agencies.  A  counterintelligence  agency  is  any 
unit,  office,  organization,  group,  or  individual  that  contributes  to  the 
successful  accomplishment  of  the  counterintelligence  mission.  Some  agencies 
have  specialized  counterintelligence  functions  arising  from  the  nature  of  their 
mission.  These  include  U.S.  Army  Military  Intelligence  Units,  the  Office  of 
Special  Investigations  (USAF),  the  Naval  Investigative  Service,  the  Coast 
Guard's  Intelligence  Division,  the  State  Department,  the  Treasury  Department, 
and  the  Justice  Department.  In  addition,  when  U.S.  Forces  are  deployed  in 
overseas  areas,  close  and  continued  liaison  must  be  established  with  counter- 
intelligence agencies  of  allied  nations. 
H.7  THE  INTELLIGENCE  COLLECTION  PLAN 
a.  Appendix  C  is  a  reproduced  page  from  an  intelligence  collection 
plan.  Such  a  plan  would  have  a  number  of  pages  roughly  equivalent  to  the 
number  of  EEI  it  contained.  For  convenience  in  maintaining  the  plan  in 
current  status,  usually  only  one  element  is  listed  per  page  or  on  several  pages. 
Thus,  as  EEI  are  fulfilled  and  no  longer  required  in  the  plan,  orders  are  sent  to 
the  units  to  remove  the  page  or  pages  and  destroy  them. 
b.  In  the  example  listed,  only  one  element  is  shown  with  six 
indications.  There  might  be  more.  The  specific  orders  to  the  collection 
agencies  are  typical.  Probably  many  more  collection  agencies  would  be 
contained  in  the  real  plan.  Note  that  our  example  does  not  show  the  specific 
orders  and  the  collection  agencies  for  the  last  three  indications. 
*.8  INTELLIGENCE  STORAGE  AND  RETRIEVAL 
a.  One  problem  that  is  frequently  given  inadequate  or  belated  atten- 
tion is  storage  of  and  access  to  the  collected  information.  As  the  quantity  of 
information  collected  increases,  so  does  the  problem  of  rapid  retrieval.  There 
is  a  growing  effort  to  standardize  storage  formats*  particularly  in  those 
collection  organizations  that  support  computer-served  intelligence  efforts. 
b.  Since  semiautomated  or  automated  retrieval  systems  are  costly, 
the  intelligence  officer  of  a  joint  or  unified  command  should  coordinate 
closely  with  adjacent  commands  and  with  component  intelligence  units  within 
his  command  to  achieve  maximum  standardization  of  information  storage  and 
retrieval.  Command  support  is  usually  assured  if  commanders  can  be  shown 
that  faster  and  more  complete  exchange  of  information  will  result. 
4-13
CHAPTER  5 
PRODUCTION  OF  INTELLIGENCE  FOR  JOINT  FORCES 
5.1  INTRODUCTION 
a.  Definition  of  Intelligence  Production.  Intelligence  production  is 
the  logical  process  of  judging  the  credibility  of  collected  information,  drawing 
pertinent  inferences  from  an  analysis  of  it,  and,  when  appropriate,  interpreting 
such  inferences  in  the  perspective  of  planning.  The  production  phase  is 
complete  when  the  previous  analytic  efforts  have  been  applied  to  the 
preparation  of  the  appropriate  intelligence  product.  The  major  joint  force 
production  effort,  particularly  in  time  of  war,  centers  on  the  production  of 
operational  and  combat  intelligence.  This  chapter  emphasizes  these  areas. 
b.  Scope  of  Intelligence  Production.  The  functions  conducted  to 
produce  intelligence  include 
(1)  Research  on  the  availability  of  appropriate  information  and 
intelligence. 
(2)  Assembly  of  that  information. 
(3)  Reading,  review,  and  discussion  of  the  information. 
«0        Assessing  the  credibility  of  the  information. 
(5)        Comparison    of    the    various    parts    or    elements    of    the 
information. 
lgence. 
planning. 
(6)  Integration  of  the  elements  into  new  information  and  intell- 
(7)  Drawing  pertinent  inferences  from  the  information. 
(8)  Interpretation   of    such   inferences   in   the  perspective  of 
(9)  Grouping  the  result  into  complete  and  finished  intelligence. 
(10)      Determination  of  the  specific  additional  information  and 
intelligence  required. 
c.  Production  as  Related  to  Levels  of  Command.  These  production 
functions  are  listed  in  the  chronological  sequence  in  which  they  usually  are 
performed.  The  sequence,  however,  is  subject  to  alteration  as  special 
considerations  may  dictate.  Further,  not  every  function  listed  is  always 
performed  at  every  level  of  command.  Higher  echelons  often  perform  certain 
production  functions  as  part  of  the  intelligence  support  for  their  subordinates. 
For  example,  the  production  function  which  involves  grouping  the  result  into 
complete  and  finished  intelligence  may  be  performed  at  national  or  depart- 
mental level,  or  at  other  echelons  higher  than  the  joint  force.    3oint  forces 
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often  have  a  very  limited  capacity  to  produce  political,  economic,  socio- 
logical, and  scientific  intelligence  and,  consequently,  depend  almost 
completely  on  external  sources  for  the  production  of  such  intelligence.  Joint 
forces  also  often  depend  on  external  sources  for  the  production  of  certain 
types  of  military  intelligence,  such  as  strategic,  basic,  and  technical  intelli- 
gence. 
d.  Production  Responsibilities  Assigned  by  Higher  Authority.  Certain 
joint  forces,  in  particular  those  which  operate  at  high  levels  in  the  chain  of 
command,  may  be  assigned  responsibility  to  produce  specific  intelligence. 
They  may  have  particular  production  capabilities  or  special  access  to  informa- 
tion which  is  only  available  locally.  For  example,  the  production  of  finished 
intelligence  for  a  study  of  an  area  in  which  a  joint  force  is  located  or  an  area 
which  is  of  great  intelligence  interest  to  a  joint  force  may  be  assigned  as  an 
intelligence  responsibility  by  higher  authority.  On  the  other  hand,  joint  forces 
operating  at  a  comparatively  low  level  of  command  only  occasionally  are  given 
production  responsibilities  by  higher  authority.  An  amphibious  task  force 
operating  as  a  component  of  a  joint  force,  for  example,  may  be  assigned  the 
responsibility  for  producing  certain  intelligence  on  coasts  and  landing  beaches 
when  the  force  contains  within  its  Intelligence  structure  the  specially  qualified 
personnel  to  produce  such  intelligence. 
e.  Production  to  Support  the  Force  Mission.  The  major  intelligence 
production  effort  in  any  joint  force  is  devoted  to  producing  the  intelligence 
required  to  support  the  force  mission.  This  effort  consists  of  (1)  routine  daily 
production  required  to  furnish  all  elements  of  the  force  with  the  current 
intelligence  needed  to  accomplish  their  tasks,  (2)  background  intelligence  on 
an  area,  and  (3)  estimates  of  the  enemy  situation.  The  most  effective  means 
of  exploring  the  intelligence  production  effort  of  a  joint  force  is  to  examine 
two  documents  which  represent  the  results  of  intelligence  production:  the 
area  study  described  in  paragraph  5.3  and  the  intelligence  estimate,  described 
in  paragraph  5.4. 
PLANNING  TO  CONDUCT  INTELLIGENCE  OPERATIONS 
a.         Coordination 
(1)  An  intelligence  staff  section,  like  the  other  staffs,  plans  all 
the  activities  for  which  it  is  responsible.  Intelligence  planning  must  begin 
before  the  planning  of  other  staff  sections.  Until  an  intelligence  estimate  is 
available,  detailed  operations  planning  cannot  be  completed,  as  parts  of  the 
other  staff  estimates  will  require  certain  intelligence  data.  Intelligence 
planning  provides  for  identifying  and  securing  the  information  required  for  the 
other  staff  sections  to  begin  and  to  complete  their  planning.  The  intelligence 
officer  also  must  be  ready  to  estimate  the  next  operation  and  to  revise  the 
current  one  to  meet  changed  operational  conditions. 
(2)  As  other  staff  officers  need  intelligence  data,  so  does  the 
intelligence  officer  need  their  help.  Only  rarely  can  he  conclude  his  actions  by 
himself.    Almost  invariably,  any  plans  he  proposes,  orders  he  recommends,  or 
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actions  he  takes  require  coordination  with  one  or  more  general  or  special  staff 
sections.  The  importance  of  coordination  is  strongly  emphasized.  An 
intelligence  officer  who  fails  to  recognize  where  coordination  is  necessary 
may  cause  confusion  and  delay  in  his  headquarters,  with  subsequent  confusion 
and  delay  in  operations. 
(3)  The  following  list  shows  some  of  the  areas  in  which  staff 
coordination  is  necessary  in  intelligence  planning  and  the  officers  with  whom 
the  coordination  is  made. 
AREA 
Prisoner  of  War 
Censorship 
Operations 
Use  of  comhat  personnel  for 
intelligence  missions 
Escort,  supervision,  and 
briefing  of  visitors 
Location  and  construction  of 
observation  posts 
Examination  of  captured  equipment 
Need  for  maps,  photos,  and  studies 
Map  procurement,  storage,  and 
distribution 
OFFICER 
3-1,     provost     marshal,     security 
officer,  3-*,  and  surgeon 
3-1  and  public  affairs  officer 
All 
3-3 
3-1,  3-3,  public  affairs  officer,  and 
headquarters  commandant 
3-3,  engineer,  and  artillery  officer 
3-* 
All 
3-3  and  support  command 
commander 
Air  reconnaissance,  imagery, 
and  visual 
Invasion  beach  reconnaissance 
Ground  reconnaissance 
Civilian  internees 
Intelligence  training 
Procurement  and  replacement  of 
intelligence  specialists 
Procurement  of  weather  data 
3-3,  air  liaison  officer,  and 
artillery  officer 
3-3,  Navy  liaison  officer 
3-3,  artillery  officer 
3-1,     provost     marshal,     security 
officer,  and  3-5 
3-3 
3-1 
Commander,  weather  detachment 
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b.  Scheduling  Intelligence  Planning  Activities.  Intelligence  planning 
is  a  continuing  process.  The  sequence  of  intelligence  activities  concerned  with 
the  joint  planning  process  is  generally  as  follows: 
(1)  Before  the  completion  of  a  current  operation  and  before  the 
commander  receives  any  directives  or  orders  for  further  action,  his  staff 
considers  what  this  further  action  is  likely  to  be..  This  applies  particularly  to 
the  intelligence  officer,  for  when  the  commander  receives  a  directive  or 
warning  for  further  action,  the  intelligence  officer  must  have  sufficient 
information  immediately  available  for  the  commander  to  analyze  the  assigned 
or  deduced  mission  and  issue  preliminary  planning  guidance.  A  similar 
situation  may  exist  when  a  headquarters  is  activated  or  at  the  beginning  of  any 
war,  campaign,  or  operation. 
(2)  When  a  unit  receives  a  new  mission,  information  on  the 
enemy  and  the  area  of  operations  is  furnished  to  the  commander  and  the  staff 
so  that  definite  operational,  administrative,  and  logistical  planning  may  be 
initiated.  The  security  measures  contained  in  the  unit  SOP  are  reviewed  to 
determine  whether  they  are  adequate  for  the  security  of  the  planning  and  the 
operation.  Additional  information  is  presented  at  the  initial  staff  conference 
to  assist  the  commander  in  analyzing  the  mission  and  giving  definite  planning 
guidance. 
(3)  Next  is  a  planning  period  which  features  the  concurrent 
preparation  of  various  plans  and  studies.  The  most  important  from  the 
intelligence  viewpoint  are 
(a)  Determination  and  recommendation  of  the  essential 
elements  of  information  (EEI)  and  other  intelligence  requirements  to  complete 
the  planning  phase. 
(b)  Preparation  of  a  counterintelligence  plan  for  the 
security  of  the  operation  (including  couhtersurveillance). 
(c)  Completion  of  plans  to  obtain  all  necessary  informa- 
tion not  immediately  available. 
(d)  Preparation  of  a  plan  for  security  and  distributing 
intelligence  aids.  These  aids  include  material  such  as  charts  and  models  of  the 
area  of  operations,  maps,  photos  and  mosaics,  photointerpretation  reports, 
sketches  and  diagrams,  hydrographic  charts,  and  intelligence  reports. 
(e)  Revision  of  the  intelligence  estimate  after  evaluation 
and  interpretation  of  all  available  information.  The  estimate,  which  is  based 
on  initial  and  subsequent  assumptions  and  changes  in  the  known  enemy  and 
friendly  situations,  is  constantly  revised  throughout  the  planning  phase. 
(f)  Revision  and  recommendations  of  EEI  and  other  intel- 
ligence requirements,  including  those  prepared  earlier  that  are  still  applicable 
and  those  that  concern  the  operational  phase. 
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(g)  Preparation  of  a  collection  plan,  based  on  the  EEI  that 
were  approved  by  the  commander  and  on  other  intelligence  requirements.  This 
plan  is  used  by  the  intelligence  section  to  develop  collection  missions.  The 
collection  plan  is  altered  as  the  situation  develops  so  as  to  reflect  current 
intelligence  needs. 
(h)  Preparation  of  an  intelligence  annex  to  the  operation 
plan.  This  intelligence  annex  is  sometimes  called  an  intelligence  plan. 
Intelligence  planning  during  the  operational  phase  results  from  implementing 
the  operation  plan  or  order,  arranges. for  collecting  and  reporting  information 
as  obtained,  and  disseminates  intelligence  produced  from  this  information. 
Existing  intelligence  is  revised  continuously  as  new  intelligence  is  developed. 
Finally,  preliminary  planning  continues  in  order  to  anticipate  some  other 
future  action.  The  planning  periods  for  prospective  operations  may  vary  from 
hours  to  years.  Time  permitting  during  this  period,  an  Intelligence  Planning 
Schedule  of  Events  should  be  prepared  (See  Appendix  B)  which  depicts  the 
intelligence  tasks  to  be  performed,  along  with  the  dates  the  tasks  are  begun 
and  finished.  While  it  is  impossible  in  an  academic  publication  such  as  this  to 
list  all  intelligence  activities  in  which  an  intelligence  section  will  be  engaged 
in  all  situations,  it  is  possible  to  prepare  a  typical  list  in  abbreviated  form. 
These  activities  are  not  always  pursued  in  the  sequence  shown,  do  not  always 
begin  on  dates  indicated,  nor  do  they  always  require  the  same  length  of  time 
to  complete.  However,  the  list  should  prove  helpful  to  J-2s  in  establishing 
their  Intelligence  sections  and  recognizing  their  workloads.  Several  of  the 
first  few  items  listed  pertain  only  to  newly  formed  or  partially  formed 
intelligence  sections.  The  specific  mission  directive  is  received  on  D-60  in 
this  example.  The  fact  that  this  example  is  cut  off  at  D-day  does  not  mean 
that  such  a  calendar  or  schedule  could  not  be  maintained  into  the  operating 
period. 
c.  Intelligence  Documents  Used  in  Planning.  Not  all  the  intelligence 
steps  or  activities  listed  above  are  listed  fully  or  accurately  in  any  single 
document  or  series  of  documents  in  a  joint  force.  Documents  which  list  these 
steps  may  be  divided  into  two  categories:  (1)  nonintelligence  documents  and 
(2)  intelligence  planning  documents.  The  nonintelligence  documents  are  those 
directives  from  higher  authority  and  the  joint  force  commander  which 
specifically  affect  the  intelligence  function.  They  include  directives  on  the 
force  mission,  functions,  and  tasks;  orders,  requests,  and  information  papers 
from  sources  outside  the  force;  standing  operating  instructions;  and  force 
organization  and  command  relationship  charts.  The  intelligence  planning 
documents  which  are  in  common  use  in  nearly  all  joint  forces  and  which 
reflect  the  conduct  of  the  force  intelligence  function  include  the  intelligence 
collection  plan,  the  intelligence  estimate,  and  the  intelligence  annex  to  the 
operation  plan  or  order. 
5.3  BASIC  INTELLIGENCE  STUDIES 
a.  -  Definition,  Purpose,  and  Scope.  Basic  intelligence  studies  are 
documents  which  contain  the  basic  background  or  encyclopedic  information  on 
a  country,  group  of  countries,  or  geographical  area  of  strategic  or  tactical 
significance.  The  purpose  of  these  studies  is  to  give  planners  the  information 
and  intelligence  required  to  conduct  initial  strategic  or  operational  planning. 
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The  scope  and  content  of  basic  intelligence  studies  vary  with  the  purposes  for 
which  they  are  specifically  prepared,  the  degree  of  detail  required  to 
accomplish  the  purposes,  the  relative  military  importance  of  the  various 
characteristics  in  the  area  covered,  and  the  requirements  of  the  types  of 
forces  which  will  use  the  study. 
b.  Contents  of  Basic  Intelligence  Studies.  Although  the  contents  of 
these  studies  vary  with  the  considerations  mentioned,  most  studies  include 
treatment  of  the  land,  the  people,  their  political  organization^  their  means  of 
making  a  living,  their  religions,  and  their  armed  forces. 
c.  Format  of  Basic  Intelligence  Studies.  Formats  vary  with  the 
purposes  of  the  studies.  See  Appendix  D  for  a  format  acceptable  for  most 
area  studies  and  to  most  U.S.  agencies  and  military  forces. 
d.  Production  of  Basic  Intelligence  Studies.  Since  a  basic  intelligence 
study  prepared  at  any  level  of  command  is  extensive  in  scope,  it  represents  a 
large  undertaking  which,  in  terms  of  man-hours  expended,  usually  exceeds  that 
spent  on  any  other  type  of  intelligence  document.  Further,  since  the  scope  of 
basic  intelligence  includes  so  many  different  subjects,  the  collection  of 
information  for  use  of  such  a  study  also  is  a  very  large  undertaking.  In 
addition,  since  most  area  studies  include  military,  political,  economic,  and 
sociological  intelligence,  specialists  are  required  to  produce  the  intelligence 
for  such  studies.  These  considerations  limit  the  ability  of  the  intelligence 
division  at  any  level  of  command  to  produce  more  than  a  limited  number  of 
products  and  require  a  major  intelligence  production  effort  to  maintain  such 
studies  in  a  current  status. 
e.  Availability  of  Basic  Intelligence  Studies.  The  Register  of  Intelli- 
gence Publications  (RIP)  is  published  semi-annually  by  the  Defense  Intelli- 
gence Agency.  The  RIP  lists  citations,  including  brief  abstracts,  for  intelli- 
gence products  available  in  the  DIA  library. 
5.*  THE  INTELLIGENCE  ESTIMATE  OF  THE  SITUATION 
a.         General 
(1)  The  Intelligence  Estimate  of  the  Situation  is  usually 
referred  to  simply  as  The  Intelligence  Estimate."  It  may  be  in  many  forms 
and  prepared  at  any  level.  It  may  be  presented  to  the  commander  formally  or 
informally  and  may  be  written  or  oral,  detailed  or  summarized.  It  may  be  of 
scope  sufficiently  great  to  cover  the  entire  situation  of  a  large  area  or  so 
narrow  as  to  estimate  only  those  factors  concerning  a  special  operation  or 
series  of  related  operations.  In  combat  operations  the  varied  forms  of 
estimates  may' run  from  the  simple  intelligence  briefing  given  to  the  personnel 
about  to  undertake  a  bombing  mission,  beach  reconnaissance,  or  scouting 
patrol  to  the  elaborate  presentation  of  detailed  data  to  an  area  commander 
whose  assigned  mission  is  the  neutralization  of  the  enemy's  industrial  potential 
and  the  destruction  of  military  forces.  Because  sufficient  time  is  normally 
available  during  the  planning  phase  of  an  operation,  the  intelligence  estimate 
should  be  a  written  document.     In  addition,   for  large  operations,   there  is 
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usually  such  a  vast  amount  of  material  available  to  the  intelligence  officer 
that  it  is  almost  mandatory  that  the  estimate  be  written  so  all  of  the 
necessary  and  important  material  may  be  presented  to  the  commander  in  a 
clear,  concise  form. 
(2)  On  the  other  hand,  the  subsequent  continuing  or  running 
estimates  made  as  the  operation  progresses  are  generally  called  for  on  such 
short  notice  and  normally  based  on  such  a  small  amount  of  new  material  that 
these  estimates  are  presented  orally,  supported  perhaps  by  a  situation  map  and 
hurriedly  compiled  notes.  However,  these  changes  must  be  incorporated  into 
the  basic  estimate  as  soon  as  time  permits. 
(3)  Of  primary  concern  in  this  publication  are  those  intelligence 
estimates  made  at  national,  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff,  departmental,  unified 
command,  component  command,  and  joint  force  level.  The  requirements  of 
each  command  level  for  an  intelligence  estimate  determine  the  scope,  form, 
and  substance  of  the  estimate.  These  requirements  are  based  on  a  considera- 
tion of  the  following: 
(a)  Purpose  for  which  the  estimate  is  made. 
(b)  Ultimate  uses  of  the  estimate. 
(c)  Degree  of  guidance  in  the  estimate  required  by  sub- 
ordinate and  adjacent  commands. 
(d)  Desires  of   the  commander  whose  intelligence  staff 
division  prepares  the  estimate. 
Since  the  requirements  are  different,  there  are  differences  in  the  types  of 
intelligence  estimates  prepared  at  the  national  and  the  joint  force  level. 
b.  National  Level.  The  estimate  prepared  at  national  level  may  have 
any  one  of  a  variety  of  purposes:  to  determine  the  war  potential  of  a  country 
or  group  of  countries;  to  estimate  the  political,  economic,  and  military  courses 
of  action  a  potential  enemy  can  take  in  furtherance  of  a  national  policy;  to 
assess  the  significance  of  enemy  technological  development  in  a  given 
productive  field;  or  to  estimate  total  enemy  military  capabilities  in  limited  or 
peripheral  war  or  in  event  of  a  general  war.  Such  estimates,  prepared  on  all 
countries,  serve  to 
(1)  Furnish    information   and   intelligence   as  a  basis  for  the 
formulation  of  national  policy  and  planning. 
(2)  Guide   governmental   agencies,    including   the   military,   at 
lower  levels. 
c.  Joint  Force  Level.  The  intelligence  estimate  prepared  by  a  joint 
force,  on  the  other  hand,  is  specifically  intended  to  give  the  commander  and 
his  subordinates  a  basis  for  planning  the  conduct  of  military  operations. 
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d.  Purposes  of  the  Intelligence  Estimate 
(1)  The  intelligence  estimate  is  designed  to  bring  together 
significant  aspects  of  the  area  of  operations  and  the  enemy's  situation,  present 
the  enemy's  capabilities,  analyze  them  in  relation  to  one  another,  and  consider 
each  capability  in  its  relation  to  the  friendly  mission.  With  the  intelligence 
estimate,  the  commander  can  balance  enemy  capabilities  against  his  own 
courses  of  action  and  choose  the  most  favorable  course  of  action. 
(2)  The  primary  purpose  of  the  Joint  force  intelligence  estimate 
is  to  determine  the  courses  of  action  open  to  the  enemy  or  potential  enemy 
and,  if  possible,  the  probable  order  of  their  adoption.  Secondary  purposes 
include  the  following: 
(a)  To  disseminate  information  and  intelligence  on  the 
possible  area  of  operations  and  the  enemy  military  situation  to  the  comman- 
der, the  staff,  and  interested  superior,  subordinate,  and  adjacent  commands 
(b)  To  disseminate  to  intelligence  officers  of  subordinate 
commands  the  intelligence  officer's  assessment  of  the  identification,  strength, 
and  disposition  of  enemy  forces  which  might  be  employed  against  each  such 
subordinate  command 
(d)  To  determine  the  essential  elements  of  information  on 
the  possible  area  of  operations  and  enemy  forces  which  must  be  collected 
before  or  during  operations 
e.  Responsibility 
(1)  The  intelligence  staff  officer  has  the  responsibility  of 
assisting  the  commander  in  making  sound  and  timely  decisions  and  assisting 
other  staff  members  in  meeting  their  responsibilities.  The  intelligence  officer 
does  so  by  preparing  an  estimate  of  the  enemy  situation.  But  his  duties  are 
not  finished  with  writing  only  one  estimate,  because  intelligence  estimating  is 
a  continuing  process.  As  the  factors  with  which  it  is  concerned  change,  the 
estimate  must  be  revised.  Preparation  of  estimates  is  a  constant  and  basic 
responsiblity  of  the  intelligence  officer. 
(2)  An  estimate  of  the  situation  will  be  furnished  to  the 
commander  by  the  intelligence  officer,  either  on  his  own  initiative  when 
warranted  by  developments  in  the  situation  or  when  required  by  the  comman- 
der. It  will  summarize  the  enemy  situation  and  capabilities.  Although  the 
intelligence  officer  will  usually  be  able  to  anticipate  the  need  for  such  an 
estimate,  he  must  be  prepared  to  furnish  it  to  his  commander  when  required. 
f.  Continuing  Intelligence  Estimate 
(1)  The  commander  must  know  immediately  of  any  significant 
changes  in  enemy  capabilities.  To  keep  him  apprised  of  such  changes,  the 
intelligence  officer  must  maintain  in  current  status  a  continuing  intelligence 
estimate.  This  estimate—sometimes  called  a  running  intelligence  estimate — 
continually  recomputes  enemy  strength,  reappraises  the  enemy  situation,  and 
performs    new    analyses  of   enemy   capabilities.       Outdated    and    irrelevant 
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intelligence  is  eliminated  and  new  or  newly  appropriate  material  is  added.  The 
last  formal  estimate  is  only  as  current  as  the  date  and  hour  of  its  completion. 
It  is  constantly  overtaken  by  new  events  and  newly  acquired  intelligence. 
Whenever  and  wherever  an  intelligence  item  bears  on  the  capability  of  the 
enemy  to  affect  chances  for  success  in  the  planned  operation,  -mere  is  a  very 
probable  need  for  a  new  intelligence  estimate. 
(2)  The  continuing  estimate  performs  the  same  function  as  all 
other  estimates:  it  analyzes  enemy  capabilities.  But  frequently  it  also  reveals 
the  need  for  specific  friendly  action  caused  by  specific  and  new  enemy 
circumstances.  Occasionally,  it  is  concerned  with  the  overall  enemy  situation; 
but  if  the  intelligence  officer  has  been  thorough  in  his  previous  estimates,  the 
continuing  estimate  will  illuminate  some  particular  enemy  capability  of 
immediate  concern. 
(3)  The  continuing  estimate  is  usually  contained  in  a  loose-leaf 
binder  so  that  new  material  can  quickly  and  easily  be  inserted  without 
destroying  the  entire  document.  It  must  allow  for  new  intelligence  constantly 
being  obtained  and  for  operations  continually  changing.  Maximum  use  is  made 
of  overlays,  plots,  and  short  summaries,  as  these  media  increase  the  flexibility 
of  the  estimate  and  make  it  easier  to  revise. 
(4)  Accuracy  in  determining  the  most  probable  enemy  courses 
of  action  is  particularly  important  in  preparing  the  continuing  intelligence 
estimate,,  since  its  effect  on  a  command's  own  tactics  is  immediate. 
Occasionally,  it  produces  intelligence  of  so  drastic  a  nature  as  to  change 
completely  the  commander's  decision.  In  these  circumstances,  the  continuing 
estimate  would  be  a  valuable  basis  for  the  new  formal  intelligence  estimate  of 
the  situation. 
g.         Form  and  Scope 
(1)  The  form  and  scope  of  the  intelligence  estimate  are 
designed  specifically  for  the  primary  purpose  of  determining  enemy 
capabilities  against  the  command  preparing  the  estimate.  They  are  not 
particularly,  suitable  for  accomplishing  the  secondary  purposes  listed  in  para- 
graph 5.4d.  In  accomplishing  its  primary  purpose,  the  intelligence  estimate 
serves  as  an  initial  essential  step  in  the  process  by  which  the  commander 
evaluates  and  compares  the  enemy  and  friendly  situations,  decides  on  a  course 
of  action  in  light  of  these  situations,  and  plans  the  conduct  of  that  course. 
C2)  The  degree  to  which  the  intelligence  estimate  accomplishes 
its  secondary  purposes  is  limited.  The  estimate  can  never  include  ail  the 
information  and  intelligence  required  by  other  staff  divisions  and  subordinate 
commands.  Such  an  estimate  would  be  too  lengthy  and  unwieldy.  Likewise,  it 
cannot  always  suffice  for  determining  all  the  essential  elements  of  informa- 
tion required.  Some  essential  elements  of  information  often  are  not 
determined  until  the  commander's  estimate  of  the  situation,  or  perhaps  the 
operation  plan,  is  being  prepared.     For  these  reasons,  it  is  essential  during 
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preparation  of  the  intelligence  estimate  that  its  form,  scope,  and  content  be 
geared  to  its  primary  rather  than  secondary  purposes.  After  all,  there  are 
other  intelligence  vehicles  specifically  designed  to  accomplish  the  secondary 
purposes.  When  there  Is  difficulty  and  conflict  in  preparing  an  estimate 
intended  to  accomplish  both  the  primary  and  secondary  purposes,  the  primary 
purpose  of  determining  enemy  capabilities  receives  overriding  consideration. 
(3)  The  intelligence  estimating  process  contributes  signific- 
antly, however,  to  the  intelligence  collection  plan.  The  glaring  gaps  in  the 
estimator's  knowledge  of  the  enemy  may  frustrate  even  the  seasoned  intelli- 
gence officer.  Never  does  one  have  sufficient  information  on  the  enemy.  It  is 
easy  to  see  why  this  can  occur  when  one  recalls  that  even  the  operations 
officer  seldom  has  all  the  information  he  wants  on  his  own  friendly  forces,  but 
for  him  the  information  is  relatively  easy  to  obtain.  However,  the  enemy  has 
an  extensive  security  program  designed  to  prevent  disclosure  of  information 
concerning  his  own  forces.  As  the  intelligence  estimate  is  prepared,  these 
gaps  in  the  knowledge  of  the  enemy  are  phrased  into  questions  (EEI)  to  be 
answered  by  the  intelligence  collector.  When  the  questions  are. answered,  the 
new  information  will  probably  change  the  estimate.  As  the  estimate  is 
revised,  new  questions  will  be  indicated  by  new  gaps  in  known  information,  so 
that  a  new  series  of  EEI  is  formed.  Thus,  a  cycle  of  estimating,  collecting, 
and  other  intelligence  activities  is  formed. 
h.  Intelligence  Estimate  Forms.  Many  forms  or  outline  guides  for  the 
preparation  of  the  intelligence  estimate  have  been  prepared  and  published. 
They  differ  according  to  the  purpose  for  which  the  estimate  is  prepared  and 
the  nature  of  the  Service  or  agency  preparing  the  estimate.  The  differences 
can  be  appreciated  when  a  comparison  is  made  between  the  requirements  of  an 
intelligence  estimate  for  the  Strategic  Air  Command  and  those  for  an  Army 
corps.  However,  in  spite  of  the  differences  in  requirements,  there  is 
considerable  uniformity  in  all  intelligence  estimates  made  by  military  organi- 
zations. They  include  a  statement  of  the  mission,  intelligence  on  the  enemy 
and  the  area,  and  enemy  capabilities.  Forms  for  intelligence  estimates  in 
current  use  are 
(1)  The  form  for  an  "Intelligence  Estimate  of  the  Situation"  in 
Unified  Action  Armed  Forces  (UNAAF).  This  is  the  basis  for  the  expanded 
version  of  the  form  used  in  the  Joint  Staff  Officer's  Guide  (AFSC  Pub  1). 
(2)  The  form  for  an  "Intelligence  Estimate"  in  the  3oint  Landing 
Force  Manual. 
i.  Relation  to  Problem  Solution.    Intelligence  estimating,  like  esti- 
mating in  other  staff  sections,  is  basically  problem  solving,  and  all  staffs  use 
the  problem  solution  process.  However,  an  intelligence  estimate  is  unique  in 
that  it  cannot  be  based  on  the  wealth  of  firm  facts  which  are  available  to 
other  staff  members  for  estimates  of  their  own  forces.  The  intelligence 
estimate  can  never  be  any  better  than  the  basic  intelligence  which  goes  into 
it.  If  tfiat  is  unreliable,  inaccurate,  or  incomplete,  these  deficiencies  will  be 
reflected  in  the  estimate. 
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j.  Form  for  Joint  Force  Level.    Although  any  of  these  forms  can  be 
used  for  a  joint  force  intelligence  estimate,  the  "Intelligence  Estimate  of  the 
Situation"  forms  in  UNAAF  and  AFSC  Pub  I  are  considered  most  adaptable  for 
use  at  the  joint  force  level.  This  form  is  specifically  designed  to  list  enemy 
capabilities  in  such  detail  and  scope  that  they  can  be  inserted  without  change 
in  other  planning  documents.  However,  this  is  not  meant  to  imply  that 
unnecessary  detail  is  included.  The  form  can  be  used  effectively  by  a  large 
unified  command  as  the  intelligence  basis  for  a  joint  capabilities  plan  or  by  a 
smaller  joint  force  to  determine  enemy  capabilities  for  insertion  in  the 
commander's  estimate. 
k.         Use  of  the  Form 
(1)  The  appropriate  treatment  of  any  topic  included  in  the 
outline  which  follows  is  determined  by  the  sense  in  which,  and  the  extent  to 
which,  that  topic  applies  to  the  particular  operation  and  possible  area  of 
operations  under  consideration.  When  cogent  reasons  exist,  the  estimate  may 
be  modified  or  supplemented  to  permit  appropriate  treatment  of  any  topic.  If 
the  discussion  of  any  topic  is  not  pertinent  nor  applicable  to  the  specific 
estimate,  the  discussion  is  omitted  and  so  noted  in  the  estimate. 
(2)  Keep  the  intelligence  estimate  concise,  clear,  and  brief.  An 
estimate  is  not  encyclopedic.  Coverage  must  be  adequate,  but  must  also  be 
distinctly  limited  to  the  specific  mission  at  hand..  Briefness  is  not  necessarily 
a  virtue,  but  it  makes  the  intelligence  estimate  a  more  efficient  document  for 
other  members  of  the  staff  to  use.  Normally,  reference  to  other  intelligence 
documents  in  the  intelligence  estimate  should  be  avoided.  The  estimate  should 
be  a  complete  document  in  itself.  Persons  reading  the  estimate  should  not  be 
forced  to  search  other  documents  to  find  details  pertinent  to  the  estimate. 
However,  annexes  may  be  used,  and  order  of  battle  overlays  may  be  attached 
to  the  estimate  to  graphically  portray  enemy  dispositions. 
I.  Distribution 
(1)  The  entire  intelligence  estimate  should  be  distributed  to  the 
other  staff  sections  because  paragraph  2  contains  information  which  is  useful 
in  keeping  them  informed  on  the  enemy  forces.  This  information  has  a  bearing 
on  the  accomplishment  of  the  friendly  mission.  Distribution  of  the  entire 
estimate  also  enables  other  staff  sections  to  understand  the  ."why"  of  the 
enemy  situation  as  well  as  the  enemy's  possible  actions.  If  only  the 
conclusions  of  the  estimate  are  distributed,  the  other  staff  sections  do  not 
receive  the  value  derived  from  understanding  the  reasoning  of  the  intelligence 
officer.  Staff  members  have  greater  confidence  in  the  conclusions  of  the 
intelligence  officer  if  his  reasoning  is  made  known  to  them.  It  is  also  desirable 
that  other  staff  officers  be  aware  of  less  likely  enemy  capabilities  and  the 
reasons  why  they  are  not  listed  as  probable.  Also,  distribution  of  the  entire 
intelligence  estimate  helps  other  staff  members  keep  fully  informed  on  all 
aspects  of  the  enemy  situation,  thus  reducing  speculation  and  rumor. 
(2)  If  the  commander  disseminates  his  commander's  estimate  to 
higher  echelons  for  approval  or  adjacent  ones  for  coordination  or  information, 
he  does  not  normally  accompany  it  with  the  intelligence  estimate.  This  is 
because  the  commander's  estimate  already  contains  the  paragraphs  listed. 
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(3)  A  numbered  air  force,  a  field  army,  or  a  naval  task  force, 
for  example,  might  reproduce  its  intelligence  estimate  in  its  periodical 
intelligence  publication.  That  command  might  think  its  monthly  intelligence 
publication  a  proper  dissemination  medium  for  the  entire  intelligence 
estimate.  More  likely,  however,  only  the  paragraphs  dealing  with  capabilities 
would  be  reproduced. 
(4)  In  other  instances,  the  estimate  might  be  included  as  an 
appendix  to  the  intelligence  annex  (see  page  21)  which  is  disseminated  with  the 
operation  plan  or  order.  This  is  not  standard  procedure,  however,  for  that 
portion  of  the  intelligence  annex  dealing  with  the  enemy  situation  and 
capabilities  is  extracted  from  the  estimate.  This  is  seldom  justification  for 
furnishing  all  of  the  estimate  to  those  lower  units  who  receive  the  annex.  The 
entire  estimate  would  be  included  only  if  the  officer  preparing  the  estimate 
thought  the  recipients  needed  more  intelligence  than  was  contained  in  thf> 
annex. 
m.        Relationship  to  Commander's  Estimate 
(1)  There  is  a  close  relationship  between  the  commander's 
estimate  and  the  intelligence  estimate.  In  the  sequence  of  the  joint  or 
combined  planning  process,  the  staff  members  write  their  specialized  esti- 
mates and  submit  them  to  their  commander.  He,  in  turn,  prepares,  or  has 
prepared  for  him,  his  commander's  estimate  on  which  his  decision  is  based. 
Like  the  intelligence  estimate,  the  commander's  estimate  may  or  may  not  be  a 
formal  written  document.  However,  if  it  is  written,  the  intelligence  estimate 
and  the  commander's  estimate  are  closely  integrated.  The  intelligence 
estimate  furnishes  much  of  paragraph  2  of  the  commander's  estimate,  "The 
Situation  and  Courses  of  Action."  This  comes  from  paragraph  2,  "Enemy 
Situation,"  and  paragraph  3,  "Enemy  Capabilities,"  of  the  intelligence 
estimate.  Normally,  these  paragraphs  can  be  lifted  verbatim  and  inserted  into 
the  applicable  portions  of  the  commander's  estimate. 
(2)  Also,  most  of  the  intelligence  estimate's  paragraph  *, 
"Analysis  of  Enemy  Capabilities,"  finds  itself  integrated  into  paragraph  3  of 
the  commander's  estimate,  "Analysis  of  Opposing  Courses  of  Action."  The 
other  intelligence  estimate  paragraphs  are  important  to  the  commander 
because  they  assure  him  that  a  sound,  orderly  thinking  process  was  employed 
by  his  intelligence  officer.  (See  AFSC  Pub  1  for  details  concerning  the 
commander's  estimate.) 
n."  Discussion  of  Sample  Form.  The  following  is  a  detailed  discussion 
of  the  contents  of  each  of  the  paragraphs  of  the  intelligence  estimate  shown  in 
the  Joint  Staff  Officer's  Guide  (AFSC  Pub  1). 
Heading.  The  heading  and  ending  are  important  parts  of  a  written 
estimate,  because  they  tell  when  and  where  the  estimate  was  prepared,  its 
classification,  and  its  author.  (For  an  oral  estimate,  such  information  is 
automatically  supplied  by  the  circumstances  which  exist  at  the  time  the 
estimate  is  given.)  The  heading  includes  the  name  of  the  office  preparing  the 
estimate,  the  headquarters  in  which  the  estimate  is  prepared,  the  name  of  the 
place    (or    APO/FPO   Number)    where   the   headquarters   is    located,    and   a 
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date-time  group  with  the  name  of  the  month  spelled  completely.  The  hour 
might  not  be  included  in  this  date-time  group  if  the  termination  of  the 
estimating  process  cannot  be  determined  precisely  or  is  considered  unimpor- 
tant. However,  the  date  is  always  important,  because  it  indicates  to  the 
reader  the  day  the  estimating  process  ceased  (the  estimator  can  always 
determine  the  day). 
The  date  is  followed  by  the  title  "INTELLIGENCE  ESTIMATE"  and 
its  numerical  designation.  Next,  all  the  maps  necessary  for  an  understanding 
of  the  situation  described  in  the  estimate  are  listed.  Enough  information 
about  each  map  should  be  included  to  identify  it  so  that  others  using  the 
estimate  can  procure  the  correct  maps.  The  scale  of-  each  map  is  included. 
The  number  and  designations  of  pertinent  photography,  special  charts,  etc., 
used  in  the  estimating  process  and  needed  for  a  complete  understanding  of  the 
estimate  are  included. 
"1.  MISSION."  In  the  preparation  of  an  intelligence  estimate  it  is  necessary 
to  proceed  step  by  step  in  an  orderly  and  logical  fashion.  In  paragraph  1  the 
mission  is  stated  concisely.  It  may  be  either  that  directed  by  higher  authority 
or  that  deduced  by  the  commander.  Since  the  principal  purpose  of  the 
intelligence  estimate  is  to  determine  the  enemy  capabilities  which  are  used  by 
the  commander  in  his  estimate  of  the  situation,  the  repetition  of  the  mission 
here  serves  to  focus  the  attention  of  ail  concerned  on  it  and  show  the 
relationship  of  tfie  remainder  of  the  estimate  to  the  mission.  It  is  placed  in 
the  estimate  to  ensure  that  the  officer  preparing  the  estimate  understands  the 
mission  and  'that  the  reader  understands  the  mission  for  which  the  estimate 
was  prepared  and  the  problem  confronting  the  command  at  the  time  it  was 
prepared.  If  the  intelligence  officer  does  not  have  the  mission  correctly  and 
firmly  in  mind  when  preparing  his  estimate,  he  may  obtain  a  wonderful 
solution -to  the  wrong  problem.  If  the  mission  involves  the  accomplishment  of 
several  tasks,  all  are  stated.  If  priorities  have  been  .assigned,  they  are 
indicated.  The  reason,  or  reasons,  for  assignment  of  the  mission  to  the 
command  is  indicated,  if  known. 
"2„  ENEMY  SITUATION.*'  Next  the  intelligence  officer  (3-2)  must  describe 
and  discuss  the  situation  under  three  main  subheadings:  Characteristics  of  the 
Area  of  Operations;  Enemy  Military  Situation;  Enemy  Unconventional  and 
Psychological  Warfare  Situation.  The  3-2  must  consider  the  amount  of 
information  available  to  him  and  whether  the  factor  under  consideration  is 
important  enough  to  the  commander  to  require  detailed  treatment.  The 
degree  of  detail  included  in  the  intelligence  estimate  will  depend  on  the 
operating  situation  in  which  it  is  written.  When  a  staff  has  been  working 
together  for  a  considerable  length  of  time  in  an  operating  situation,  its 
members  normally  will  know  quite  a  bit  about  the  current  enemy  situation  as  a 
result  of  staff  meetings,  conferences,  daily  intelligence  briefings,  weekly 
intelligence  summaries,  and  other  intelligence  dissemination  devices  used  in 
the  headquarters.  When  this  situation  exists,  the  intelligence  officer  need  not 
include  extensive  detail  in  his  intelligence  estimate  to  bring  the  staff  up  to 
date.  For  example,  if  a  command  has  been  operating  against  MIG-21s  for  6  to 
8  months  and  their  characteristics  are  known  to  the  staff,  it  should  not  be 
necessary  to  include  those  characteristics  in  the  intelligence  estimate.  On  the 
other  hand,  when  the  staff  is  newly  organized,  has  many  new  members  and  a 
5-13
new  commander,  or  when  the  situation  has  undergone  a  great  change,  usually 
it  will  be  necessary  to  include  more  detail.  The  estimate  should  include  under 
Enemy  Situation  all  of  the  data  used  later  in  the  Analysis  of  Enemy 
Capabilities.  A  full  list  of  pertinent  facts  must  be  made  so  that  a  solution  to 
the  problem  may  be  developed.  Sufficient  data  must  be  presented  to  indicate 
all  general  capabilities  of  the  enemy  to  affect  the  mission.  (This  is  necessary 
to  determine  possible  enemy  courses  of  action.)  However,  if  it  is  obvious  when 
listing  facts  in  Enemy  Situation  that  these  same  facts  must  be  repeated  in 
detail  in  the  Analysis  of  Enemy  Capabilities  which  follows  and  if  exclusion  of 
these  facts  does  not  eliminate  certain  capabilities,  then  it  is  permissible  to 
place  such  facts  in  the  analysis  rather  than  in  the  situation.  In  this  way, 
conciseness  is  aided  and  clarity  is  not  sacrificed.  But,  as  a  general  rule,  no 
new  intelligence  data  is  inserted  after  "Situation." 
"a.  Characteristics  of  the  Area  of  Operations."  The  determination  of 
what  characteristics  will  be  included  in  the  estimate  is  based  on  a  considera- 
tion of  the  purpose  for  which  the  estimate  is  intended  and  the  degree  to  which 
the  characteristic  will  affect  enemy  capabilities  or  the  friendly  mission.  If 
one  of  the  purposes  of  the  estimate  is  to  disseminate  intelligence  on  the  area 
of  operations  (remember,  this  is,  at  best,  only  a  secondary  purpose),  character- 
istics which  will  have  no  effect  on  enemy  capabilities  or  the  friendly  mission 
may  be  included.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  only  purpose  is  to  derive  enemy 
capabilities,  characteristics  which  will  have  no  effect  are  omitted  or,  if  listed, 
are  followed  by  a  short  negative  statement,  for  example,  "Hydrography.  No 
effect  on  enemy  capabilities  or  the  friendly  mission."  Normally,  however, 
since  the  dissemination  function  of  the  estimate  is  of  relatively  less 
importance,  only  those  characteristics  which  will  affect  enemy  capabilities  or 
the  friendly  mission  are  listed  and  discussed.  The  determination  of  what 
characteristics  to  include  in  the  estimate  will  depend  also  on  whether  the 
particular  characteristic  is  pertinent  or  whether  it  exists  in  the  area  of 
operations.  If  any  characteristic  is  not  applicable  or  does  not  exist  in  the 
situation,  it  should  be  omitted  or,  if  listed,  it  should  be  followed  by  a  short 
negative  statement  such  as  "not  applicable."  For  example,  there  is  no 
requirement  for  including  a  discussion  of  sociology  if  the  area  of  operations 
has  no  inhabitants.  -If  the  mission  is  to  maintain  open  sea  routes  between  two 
land  areas,  the  ground  forces  are  not  likely  to  affect  the  sea  lanes.  On  the 
other  hand,  sociology  may  be  a  characteristic  of  vital  importance  if  the  area 
of  operations  is  densely  populated.  Similarly,  hydrography  and  landing  beaches 
would  be  important  in  a  situation  of  ground  forces  facing  an  amphibious 
landing. 
The  decision  as  to  the  scope  and  length  of  discussion  to  be  devoted  to  any 
particular  characteristic  will  depend  primarily  on  the  degree  to  which  that 
characteristic  is  expected  to  affect  enemy  capabilities  or  the  friendly  mission, 
and  to  a  lesser  extent,  on  the  purpose  of  the  estimate.  For  instance,  ciimate 
and  weather  always  affect  enemy  capabilities  and  the  friendly  mission. 
However,  while  their  effect  in  an  arctic  region  or  in  a  tropical  zone  may  be  of 
critical  importance,  their  effect  in  a  more  temperate  area  may  be  much  less 
important.  Hence,  an  estimate  in  preparation  for  operations  in  the  areas 
affected  more  by  the  climate  and  weather  would  devote  more  space  to  this 
characteristic  than  would  an  estimate  in  preparation  for  operation  in  a 
temperate  zone. 
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Each  significant  "Characteristic  of  the  Area  of  Operations"  as  it  is 
expected  to  exist  during  the  conduct  of  the  operations  required  by  the  mission 
should  be  described.  Included  should  be  the  effects  of  each  characteristic  on 
possible  enemy  operations  and  on  the  mission  of  the  friendly  command.  If 
appropriate,  a  discussion  of  the  effects  of  these  characteristics  (for  example: 
mountainous  terrain)  on  the  employment  of  nuclear  and  CB  weapons  should  be 
included. 
The  discussion  of  the  effects  of  each  characteristic  of  the  area  on 
possible  enemy  operations  normally  includes  consideration  of  the  effects  on 
the  enemy's  ability  to  attack,  defend,  and  withdraw.  It  may  also  include 
consideration  of  other  possible  operations  and  of  possible  enemy  employment 
of  particular  weapons,  methods,  techniques,  or  forces.  The  extent  of  the 
discussion  of  the  effects  of  each  characteristic  on  the  friendly  mission  is 
limited  by  the  nature  of  the  mission.  Thus,  when  the  mission  is  offensive,  the 
discussion  does  not  include  the  effects  of  the. characteristic  on  the  friendly 
defense. 
Lengthy  discussion  should  be  avoided,  if  possible.  Maximum  use  should  be 
made  of  maps,  charts,  graphics,  and  pictorial  presentations.  To  prevent  undue 
bulk  and  in  the  interest  of  brevity,  it  may  be  advisable  in  certain  instances  to 
summarize  the  main  points  of  the  situation  for  inclusion  in  paragraph  2  of  the 
intelligence  estimate  and  append  detailed  studies  as  addenda  to  the  estimate. 
Additional  brevity  often  can  be  obtained  when  finishing  the  estimate  by 
eliminating  duplication  of  analyses.  Frequently,  an  extensive  analysis  in 
paragraph  2  of  the  estimate  is  repeated  in  paragraph  ^,  Analysis  of  Enemy 
Capabilities.  One  of  the  two  can  be  an  abbreviation  of  the  other. 
"(1)  Military  Geography."  Terrain  features  or  other  factors  of 
military  geography  in  the  area  of  operation  almost  certainly  will  affect 
accomplishment  of  the  mission;  therefore,  the  estimate  should  describe  them. 
If  this  portion  of  the  estimate  is  bulky,  it  may  be  treated  separately  and 
attached  as  an  appendix. 
When  other  staff  members  require  geographic  studies  of  friendly 
territory,  the  intelligence  officer  should  prepare  or  obtain  them.  These  are 
presented  to  the  staff  in  a  form  other  than  the  intelligence  estimate  of  the 
situation,  since  the  intelligence  estimate  is  a  study  of  the  enemy  and  not  of 
friendly  territory.  Further,  the  estimate  format  is  not  suitable  for  terrain 
studies* 
Military  geography  has  been  divided  into  three  subtopics:  Topo- 
graphy (terrain),  Hydrography  and  Landing  Beaches,  and  Climate  and  Weather. 
"(a)  Topography."  When  discussing  topography,  include  all 
possible  information  concerning  the  military  characteristics  of  the  area,  such 
as  critical  terrain  features,  obstacles,  avenues  of  approach,  rivers,  streams, 
lakes,  and  any  other  natural  or  man-made  features  which  may  have  an  effect 
on  military  operations  within  the  area.  Specific  mention  should  be  made  of 
the  effects  on  the  employment  of  nuclear  and  CB  weapons. 
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