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TOP   SECRET 
ESTAB LISHMENT   OF  A    SPECIAL   SERVICES   UNIT 
IK   THE   CENTRAL    INTELLIGENCE   AGENCY 
Further    consideration   of    t  he    problem  of   developing   our    ac t i 
itirs    In    the    field    .if    covert    political    warfare    leads    c:j   the    f  ci  lu-Si.,: 
p.>Jnts    wiii^h,    it    is    sugi'-sted,    should    serve   as    a    basis    for    tht     furrier 
.•i.usi derat  1  ons   uf    this    problem   by    the    National    Security   Coun    11. 
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TOP  SECR£T 
These  considerations  lead  to  the  following  general 'conclusions 
and  recommendations: 
(1)  Reapoasibllity  for  both  aecret  Intelligence  and  se- 
cret operations,  including  covert  psychological  activities, 
should  be  placed  in  a  new  Special  Services  unit  to  be  created   . 
in  CIA. 
(2)  This  unit  should  have  a  considerable  measure  of  au- 
tonomy within  CIA  and  its  director  should  be  authorised  to  ap- 
peal directly  to  the  National  Security  Council  in  cane  of  dif- 
ferences arising  between  hin  and  the  Director  of  Central  In- 
telligence. 
(3)  A  highly  qualified  person  recruited  from  outside  the 
present  ranks  of  CIA  and  approved  by  the  National  Security  Coun- 
cil should  be  appointed  to  head  the  new  son  it  in  CLA. 
(4)  Provision  should  be  aade  so  that  the  chief  of  the 
newly  created  unit  has  access  to  and  receives  policy  guidance 
from  the  Department  of  State  and  the  Military  Establishment. 
(5)  It  is  understood  that  this  is  a  provisional  arrange- 
ment subject  to  review  at  a  later  dace. 
The  following  actions  should  be  taken  if  the  National  Security 
Council  approves  in  principle  the  foregoing  points: 
(a)  The  Department  of  State,  the  National  Military  Estab- 
lishment, and  CIA  should  Jointly  request  funds  for  the  proposed 
\ 
operation. 
(b)  The  Executive  Secretary,  National  Security  Council, 
should  be  directed  to  prepare  a  detailed  directive  covering 
the  above  points  for. approval  by  the  Council. 
"J__  TOP  SECRET 
RETYPE 
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(Page  1) 
NATIONAL  SECURITY  COUNCIL 
WASHINGTON 
June  2,  1948 
MEMORANDUM  FOR  THE  NATIONAL  SECURITY  COUNCIL 
SUBJECT:    Establishment  of  a  Special  Services  Unit  in  CIA 
REFERENCE:  NSC  10 
The  enclosed  proposal  on  the  above  subject,  which 
[ . . . suggests . . . ]  alternate  [ . . . conclusions . . . ] 
NSC  10  represents  the  results  of  an  informal  discussion  be- 
tween the  Secretary  of  Defense,  the  Under  Secretary  of 
State,  and  Mr.  Allen  W.  Dulles. 
At  their  request  the  enclosure  is  submitted  here 
[illegible]  for  consideration  by  the  National  Security 
Council  in  connection  with  NSC  10,  which  is  scheduled  as 
Item  1  on  the  agenda  for  NSC  12th  Meeting  on  Thursday, 
June  3 . 
SIDNEY  W.  SOUERS 
Executive  Secretary
(Page  2) 
CIA  provides  the  legal  structure  within  which  covert  poli- 
tical activities  can  be  conducted  and  it  is  already  charged  under  NSC 
4 -A  with  the  conduct  of  covert  psychological  operations  abroad.   In 
addition,  CIA  is  already  charged  by  National  Security  Council  Direct- 
ive No.  5  with  conducting  espionage  and  counter-espionage  operations 
abroad,  which  operations  are  by  their  nature  very  closely  related  to 
covert  political  activities  as  contemplated  in  NSC  10.   It,  therefore, 
seems  desirable  for  legal,  as  well  as  operational  reasons,  not  to  cre- 
ate a  new  agency  for  covert  political  activities,  but  to  place  the  re- 
sponsibility for  this  work  within  the  legal  structure  of  the  Central 
Intelligence  Agency  and  closely  relate  it  to  secret  intelligence. 
The  principal  objection  to  the  proposal  arises  out  of  doubt 
as  whether  CIA  is  presently  so  constituted  that  it  can  effectively 
handle  this  problem  which  is  so  different  from  CIA's  primary  task  of 
coordinating  intelligence  activities  and  correlating  and  evaluating 
intelligence  relating  to  national  security.   There  is  also  fear 
lest  covert  operations  develop  in  a  manner  inconsistent  with  our  for- 
eign and  military  policies.