~~^     ■       a-  AFOIN/6  Aug  52  ^  a*ciucr 
|0£~itk«fe*  MajGen  Samf  ord/km/55$i&8  CSr  USA? 
SECURITY  INFORMATION  ^t 
#*7  ***£*</  g  AUG  85. 
6  August  1952 
HEICRANDUM  FOR:  GSHEMt  TOOTING 
1.  This  1*  in  response  to  your  request  for  comments 
on  the  •Brownell"  report. 
2.  I  believe  the  first  comment  should  be  directed  to 
the  question  of  whether  tho  Joint  Chiefs  should  ro ply  sops* 
rately,  or  is  a  body,  to  Mr.  Levett.  I  believe  tho  Chiefs 
should  reply  ss  s  body.  X  understand  from  General  Boiling 
end  Admiral  Stout  that  they  will  so  advise  General  Collins 
and  Admiral  Fechteler. 
3*  I  believe  the  conclusions  of  the  report  are  in  major 
error  on  two  things.  The  first  major  error  in  its  conclu- 
sion a  is  that  strong  central  control  of  the  national  GOMXNT 
effort  is  desirable.  The  second  is  that  control  under  the 
Secretary  of  Dsfense's  office  rather  than  under  the  Joint 
Chiefs  is  desirable.  I  believe  that  all  other  recommends-       G 
tions  ^rm   of  minor  importance  in  comparison.  \ 
4.  Everywhere  about  us  there  are  proponents  of  two        2 
conflicting  ideas  of  management.  There  are  many  who  believe     £ 
coaplstely  in   the  virtues  of  tight  centralized  control. 
There  are  perhaps  more  who  believe  in  the  virtues  of  decen**      Q 
tralized  control.  X  believe  that  neither  one  of  these  attl* 
tudes  is  correct  for  COMXNT.  X  believe  the  OOaSMT  field  is 
Krticuiarly  vulnerable  to  danger  from  either  extreme*  The 
sic  recommendation  made  by  the  Browne  11  Committed  is  that 
the  CCMXNT  effort  of  the  nation  be  centralized  with  strong 
control  of  all  aspects  vested  in  ATSA.  Xf  this  happens,  we 
will  lose  valuable  progress  toward  the  proper  evolution  of 
this  activity.  We  will  have  to  return  eventually  to  #ur 
present  position  and  start  again.  X  believe  the  Srownell 
Committee  failed  to  recognize  that  the  OOSSINT  enterprise* 
requires  a  very  delicate  balance  between  centralization  and 
decentralization.  We  agree  that  the  present  organisation 
does  not  yet  have  the  correct  balance  but  we  are  in  e  posi® 
tion  to  seek  for  it  and  are  trying  to  find  it«  Xf  the  recom- 
mendations of  the  committee  are  accepted,  we  will  have  adopted 
an  extreme  which  is  a  retrogression.* 
5.  In  addition,  placement  of  this  activity 
Off ics  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense  rather  than  the  Joint 
Chiefs  will  aggravate  the  danger  fro®  strong  centralized  con*~ 
troi.  It  will  raise  the  level  of  centralized  control  to 
where  it  cannot  be  modified  without  great  effort.  Evolution 
and  any  hope  of  achieving  proper  balance  will  be  retarded. 
W-7:
6e  The  present  situation  in  which  COMZNT  it  gulped 
rather  than  controlled  and  in  which  all  interested  parties 
participate  in  thai,  guidance  is*  2  believe,  evidence  of  good 
evolution  so  far.  This  situation  was  developed  under  the 
Joint  Chiefs  and  illustrates  that  the  experience  of  the  Joint 
. 
Chiefs  of  Staff  in  these  a&ttars  if  bread.  Keeping  CQfiSXHI 
vnuteY  the  Joint  Chief's  would  not  only  praserv®  military  con* 
trol  over  soaethlng  that  la  vital  to  military  success  out 
would  likely  kaap  tha  activity  in  an  ataocpher*  of  proper 
evolution* 
7,  I  believe  tha  Assistant  6iief  of  Staff f  G»2,  h£S  aore 
detailed  objections  to  this  report.  Tha  Director  of  ftaval 
Intelligence  advocates  a  coaproaise  proposal  that  tha?  COHBH 
organization  be  set  up  as  a  •unified  coaaand*  under  the  Je&t 
Qiief  s,  to  follow  the  established  practises  for  unified 
coaaands, 
8,  Since  the  Secretary  of  Defense  indicates  his  general 
acceptance  already  of  the  eoaalttee  recoaaandations,  it  nay 
be  that  the  proposal  of  the  Direct*?  of  Havel  Intelligence  is 
the  best  possible  salvage  eperatlon«  I  believe 9   however,  that 
the  basic  requireasnt  is  to  oppose  the  principle  of  strong 
centralized  control.  We  aay  seea  inconsistent  in  this  because 
we  tend  to  centralise  AjrFerce  CSMXHT  activities  in  the  Air 
Force  Security  Service" 
This  causes  others  to  believe  that 
we  are  against  centralised  control  ever  us  but  eager  to  adopt 
it  /roffi.,.^ujE8elves  on  down.  In  answer  tothis ,  I  would  say 
that  there  ^t^   certain  features  and   areas  in  OOdCDIT  that 
should  be  central! zed t   to  what  degree  we  do  not  yet  know. 
No  doubt  one  aay  be  evercantraiixed  in  AFSS.  I  aa  firaly  eon* 
vlnced  of  only  one  thing,  which  is  that  strong  centralised 
control  of.-tftt.whoJif  will  bo  a  %ssv*  ai stake  which  we  will 
have  to  recover  froa  after  losing  a  great  eaount  of  t£aae 
energy,  and  diversified  GQtiXNT  suc®e$s, 
9,  If  it  &pp**TQ  iapoasibie  far  the  Joint  Chiefs  of 
Staff  to  take  a  strong  stand  against  any  strong  central  eon* 
trol  over  COftUNT,  I  suggest  that  the  Navy  proposal  of  a 
"unified  coaaand*  under  the  Joint  Chiefs  be  supported* 
/JOBi  A.  SAJffORD 
Mtjeff  GtiMfal,  USAF 
Director  «f  Intollig«DC» 
2  &/•*#'?