AIR ForRCE — DECEMBER 1954 
storm frequency varies from early afternoon in 
February and March to late afternoon in June, 
July, and August and that only from November 
through March 
are 
there 
any early morning 
storms. 
At Sao Luis, on the coast about 300 miles 
east of Belém, early morning storms are more 
likely to occur in February through April, with the 
afternoon 
being 
the most favorable 
time 
of 
day. 
From August through November there are 
few thunderstorms at Sao Luis. 
MILITARY 
GEOGRAPHY 
Vertically, thunderstorm turbulence extends to 
— 
at least 20,000 feet. 
Along the coast and in the 
extreme western portion, near the Andes, the tur- 
bulence exceeds this altitude. 
Over the interior in 
January, February, and March, a high-level ther- 
mal anticyclone tends to limit the turbulence to 
20,000 feet. 
Those thunderstorms associated with 
outbreaks of cooler air from the south also extend 
up to at least 20,000 feet. 
(3) Aircraft icing and upper-air tempera- 
tures — The average height of the freezing level 
over all except the extreme southern portion of 
Northwest Brazil is about 15,000 feet. 
In thunder- 
storms the freezing level may occur at slightly 
lower levels. 
Since icing generally occurs in cloud © 
areas where the temperature is 32° F. or less, it is 
evident that below 15,000 feet there is little danger 
of encountering this hazard. 
Outbreaks of cold air occasionally sweep north- 
ward across the southern portion of this NIS Geo- 
graphic Area. 
Temperatures in the moving air 
rarely fall below 32° F. 
After the flow stops, tem- 
SANTAREM 
IMPERATRIZ 
SAO BENTO 
ANN. 
AV. 
31 DAYS 
ANN. AV. 
DAYS 
ANN. AV 
26 DAYS 
YRS. REC 
YRS. REG 
YRS. REC 
| 
JFMAMJVASONODO 
JFMAMJJASOND 
BARRA DO CORDA 
YRS. REC. 
ANN. AV. 
33 DAYS 
~ 
JFMAMJJASOND 
JFMAMJJASOND 
PUERTO COBIJA 
| 
FORTALEZA 
ANN. 
AV. 
DAYS 
ANN. 
8 DaYS 
YRS. REC. 
YRS. 
REC 
—— 
— 
o—— 
JFMAMJJASOND 
\ 
JFMAMJJASOND 
CUIABA 
ANN. AV. 
45 DAYS 
- 
| 
oe 
9 DAYS 
YRS. REC. 11 
RE 
\ 
JFMAMJJASOND 
JFMAMJJASOND 
CACERES 
\ 
MAIRI 
ANN. AV. 
23 DAYS 
| 
ANN 
AV 
DAYS 
RES. 
YRS 
REC 
30°" 
\ 
\ 
JFMAMJJASOND 
| 
\ 
JFMAMJJASOND | 
CORUMBA 
PIRENOPOLIS 
FORMOSA 
ANN. 
AV. 
DAYS 
ANN 
AV. 
9 DAYS 
ANN 
AV 
16 DAYS 
YRS 
REC. 10 
YRS. REC 
YRS REC 
JFMAMJJASOND 
JFMAMJJASOND 
JFMAMJJASOND 
FiGuRE 23-6. MEAN NUMBER OF DAYS WITH THUNDERSTORMS. 
(For tabular data see FicurRE 23-20.) 
| 
¥
peratures occasionally go below freezing during 
the early morning. 
The cold air is generally lim- 
ited to a shallow layer near the ground, with 
warmer air above. 
Normally the freezing level is 
located near the 8,000-foot level in the extreme 
southern portion of the Area during winter. 
(4) Winds 
aloft—Data 
concerning 
the 
upper-air circulation over Northwest Brazil are 
scarce. 
At Belém, easterly winds prevail to at 
least 15,000 feet during all seasons. 
This flow 
seems to extend westward across the Amazon Ba- 
sin. 
Westerly winds, although rare, have been 
recorded in the Area during winter and spring. 
The region south of the Amazon Basin lies out- 
side of the easterly airflow. 
Data for Cuiaba, in 
the west central portion of the Area, indicate that 
winds with a northerly component are predomi- 
nant except above 10,000 feet where westerly winds 
prevail in winter and spring. 
The strength of the easterly winds is strongest 
near the coast. 
At Belém the speed increases from 
the surface to 6,000 or 7,000 feet where the average 
is about 20 m.p.h. in all seasons. 
Above these 
— 
levels, speeds again decrease to at least 16,000 feet. 
At Manaus, in the interior, the maximum speed of 
the easterly winds occurs at slightly lower levels, 
with the average close to 15 m.p.h. 
b. COMBINATIONS OF CLIMATIC FACTORS — For 
many operations conducted at high levels, the 
simultaneous occurrence below flight level of mini- 
mum cloud cover and maximum surface visibility 
might be desirable. 
Such operations might in- 
clude 
high-level 
visual 
bombing 
or 
high-level 
photographic reconnaissance. 
For specialized op- 
erations such as incendiary bombing from high 
levels, two additional features, surface wind and 
precipitation, need to be considered. 
Depending 
upon the needs of a specific mission, other widely 
varying climatic criteria may be defined. 
In general, high-level operations which require 
visual contact with the ground would be limited 
in Northwest Brazil. 
The most favorable time of 
the year generally coincides with the dry season. 
The best time of the day would be the morning, 
after the dissipation of any ground fog and before 
the formation of cumulus clouds. 
The formation 
of cumulus clouds often begins in midmorning, 
particularly in the Amazon Basin. 
In many in- 
stances, cloudiness at levels too low for high-level 
visual operations does not preclude low-level op- 
erations. 
PaGE 23-8 
2. Air-ground operations 
Weather in Northwest Brazil is frequently favor- 
able for air-ground operations during all seasons. 
Due to varying cloud amounts and cloud heights, 
the level at which visual operations can be carried 
out varies appreciably. 
Cloud bases below 1,000 
feet are generally associated with heavy afternoon 
showers. 
Fog and low stratus clouds occasionally 
restrict visibilities during the early morning. 
Op- 
erations requiring light wind and stable air should 
be planned for the early morning, while incendiary 
operations can be more favorably carried out dur- 
ing the afternoons of the dry season. 
Air support 
to ground operations can normally be given dur- 
ing all seasons, except that heavy showers may be 
a limiting factor locally. 
a. INDIVIDUAL CLIMATIC FACTORS 
(1) Low cloudiness — The amount of low 
cloud varies significantly not only from summer to 
winter but also from morning to afternoon. 
Mini- 
mum cloudiness occurs from June through August, 
when a relatively dry air mass occupies the entire 
Area. 
Cumulus clouds form during the morning, 
becoming 
towering 
masses 
by the 
afternoon. 
Only on those occasions when colder air reaches. 
the Area from the south do they culminate in 
thunderstorms. 
Under 
these 
conditions, 
cloud 
bases descend to 1,000 and even 500 feet; ordinarily 
bases range from 2,000 to 6,000 feet. 
Although 
cumulus clouds are predominant, stratus types are 
occasionally present. 
They are most likely to be 
in evidence during the first morning after the 
passage of a cold front from the south. 
Since the 
frequency of cold-front passage decreases north- 
ward, stratus clouds from this cause are rare north 
of the Amazon River. 
In contrast to that of winter, the predominant 
air mass over the Area in summer is quite humid 
and unstable. 
Cumulus clouds form during mid- 
morning and frequently culminate in thunder- 
storms by noon or early afternoon. Cloud bases 
are much lower in summer than in winter, rang- 
ing in height from 1,000 to 3,000 feet. 
Within ac- 
Note 
Air-ground operations are defined as those tak- 
ing place within the frictional influence of the 
surface terrain on the atmospheric circulation. 
Some of the special operations which may be 
included in this category are: aircraft landings 
or takeoffs, parachute drops, tactical support, 
low-level aerial reconnaissance, and air rescue. 
These operations are affected primarily by low- 
level meteorological phenomena. 
In some cases, 
meteorological conditions on the surface may be 
extremely important. 
Surface conditions that 
are treated in combination with low-level at- 
mospheric phenomena are discussed in this Sub- 
section; otherwise they are presented in the Sub- 
section on Ground Surface Operations. 
-
Force 
DECEMBER 1954 
tive shower areas, clould bases below 1,000 feet and 
even 500 feet are the rule. 
A limited amount of 
evidence indicates that, due to upslope air motion, 
low cloudiness is more frequent in the southern 
part of the Amazon Basin than in the north and 
central parts. 
Cumulus clouds are the predomi- 
nant daytime type, but stratus clouds are present, 
especially during the early morning. 
They are 
most likely to form after a day of heavy shower 
activity. 
| 
(2) Visibility 
— Data on air-to-ground visi- 
bilities are not available, and horizontal measure- 
ments are available for only a few points. 
How- 
evel, hourly observations taken at Belém and Sao 
Luis, on the Atlantic coast, show that at both 
points restricted visibilities are uncommon. 
FIGURE 23-7 presents graphically the frequency’ 
of visibilities less than 3 miles at each hour of the 
day at Belém. 
Such visibilities reach a maximum 
uring the periods 0600 through 0700 LST and 
1400 through 1700 LST. 
Restricted visibilities are 
about 
four times 
as frequent from December 
through May as during the remaining half year. 
Other data show that showers are the principal 
cause of the restriction during the afternoon, and 
fog or showers are the principal causes during the 
morning. 
| 
NUMBER 
OF DAYS 
on 
ev 
| 
5 JUNE 
THRU NOV 
DEC 
THRU MAY 
qT 
if 
if 
i 
} 
- 
i920 21°22 
23 24 
02'03'04 05 
06 07 
08 09 
12°13 
14 15 
17 18 
HOUR 
OF 
THE 
DAY 
‘ 
FIGURE 23—7. MEAN NUMBER OF DAYS WITH VISIBILITY <3 
MILES AT BELEM 
Data for Sao Luis show a seasonal and diurnal 
variation similar to that at Belém except that the 
overall frequency at Sao Luis is about one-third 
that at Belém. 
The few data available indicate that, along the 
Amazon River, fog is uncommon. 
FIGURE 23-8 
shows the frequency of fog at a number of points 
MILITARY 
GEOGRAPHY 
in the Area. 
Since it is unknown whether the 
fog is light or dense, comparison of fog frequency 
between stations is questionable. 
However, the 
indicated seasonal variation at individual stations 
is valid. 
Fog is rare at Manaus and Santarém, 
two stations on the river, where fog is reported to 
be less frequent than over the surrounding forest. 
Over the forest at treetop level, fog forms during 
the night, occasionally becoming dense by early 
morning only to dissipate an hour or two after 
sunrise. 
This type of fog occurs during all seasons 
in the Amazon Basin. 
_ 
Data for most other points in the Area show 
- definite seasonal trends. 
At Barra do Corda there 
are 63 days annually with fog, the frequency in- 
creasing 
during 
the 
rainy 
season (November 
through April) and reaching a maximum during 
May or June, the first two months of the dry season. 
A similar relationship between fog and rainfall ex- 
ists at Imperatriz. 
At Formosa (elevation 3,000 
feet) the fog persists into the dry season. 
Restrictions due to fog are mostly a morning 
phenomenon. 
In contrast, 
restricted 
visibilities 
due to heavy showers are an afternoon phenome- | 
non. 
Cloud bases extend downward beneath the 
heavy rain and produce fairly local areas of low 
cloudiness and restricted visibility. 
(3) Turbulence — Turbulent air is generally 
associated with afternoon thunderstorms (see Sub- 
section B, 1 a (2)). 
The turbulence associated 
with these storms affects the lower as well as the 
upper levels. 
Downdrafts of cold air near areas 
of heavy precipitation are particularly turbulent 
and extend down to the ground. 
Many points show two periods of maximum 
thunderstorm frequency—February through April 
and October through December. The least number 
of thunderstorms occurs in June, July, and August. 
Limited data indicate. that thunderstorms are less 
frequent along the immediate Atlantic coast than 
at points several miles inland. 
For example, there 
are 4 thunderstorm days annually at Sao Luis, 
while at Sao Bento, several miles inland, there are 
26 such days (FIGURE 23-6). 
_ Except under thunderstorm conditions, surface 
winds over the Amazon Basin are rarely strong 
enough to produce turbulence. 
Strong winds are 
occasionally present in the fringe area of the basin, 
particularly where the mountains or highlands are 
nearby. 
In the Territorio do Acre, gusty winds oc- 
casionally sweep down from the Peruvian Andes. 
Similarly, turbulent flow from the Guiana High- 
lands affects the northernmost portion of the 
Amazon Basin. 
| 
Over the southern portion of the NIS 94-II Area, 
turbulent flow generally accompanies the outbreak 
of cold air from the south in winter. Thunder- 
PaGE 23-9 
| 
| 
| 
| 
= 
| 
| 
|
MANAUS 
ANN. 
DAYS 
SANTAREM 
ANN. AV.O DAYS 
JFMAMJJASOND 
PORTO VELHO 
ANN. AVI® DAYS 
‘JFMAMJJASOND 
| 
JFMAMJJASOND 
CACERES 
ANN. 
AV 21 DAYS 
iy 
| 
| 
| 
| 
SAO 
LUIS 
| 
| 
ANN. 
DAYS 
<a 
‘ 
- 
! 
NE. 
JFMAMJJASOND. 
a! 
JFMAMJJASOND 
\ 
CUIABA 
ANN. AV.46 DAYS 
/ 
j 
/ 
‘ 
BELEM 
ANN. AV.| DAYS 
JFMAMJJASOND 
CATAL AGU 
ANN. 
DAYS 
FORMOSA 
ANN. AV97 DAYS 
BARRA DO CORDA 
ANN. AV. 63 
DAYS 
JFMAMJJASOND 
\ 
\ 
‘ATRIZ 
AV S52 
DAYS 
JFMAMJJASOND 
JFMAMJJASONO 
JFMAMJJASOND 
JFMAMJJASOND 
FIGURE 23-8. MEAN NUMBER OF DAYS WITH FOG 
storms are often present along the leading edge of 
this cold airflow. 
Unlike those of the Amazon 
Basin, frontal thunderstorms in the southern part 
of the Area are not limited to the afternoon and 
early evening. 
b. COMBINATIONS OF CLIMATIC FACTORS — For 
many operations within the friction layer, both 
maximum surface visibility and minimum 
low 
cloudiness are desirable features. 
Such operations 
include landing and takeoff, low-level visual bomb- 
ing, and tactical air support. 
In addition, these 
operations may be dependent on other surface 
weather phenomena. 
Low air densities necessitate 
long takeoff runs and therefore longer runways 
than normal. The runway length for jet aircraft is 
PaGE 23-10 
dependent, among other factors, on the tempera- 
ture at which a certain density exists. 
In general, weather favorable 
for air-ground 
operations is more frequent in this Area than in 
most areas of the Temperate Zone. 
Landings and 
takeoffs generally require cloud bases of 1,000 feet 
or more and visibility 1 mile or more. 
Trese con- 
ditions occur about 95% of the time over most 
sections of Northwest Brazil. 
Thunderstorms in 
which the cloud conditions and visibility are un- 
favorable restrict operations locally at times. 
Operation of aircraft from airffelds in the plateau 
region would be affected by lower air densities. 
At 
Luziania (elevation 3,143 feet) the air density is 
15% to 20% less than the standard sea-level atmos- 
phere. 
At lower elevations this effect is less pro- 
| 
\ 
\ 
lod 
| 
| 
\ 
( 
| 
|
- 
AIR FORCE — DECEMBER 1954 
nounced, with densities 5% to 10% below the 
standard. 
The cooler morning hours are least af- 
fected by this phenomenon. 
Low air density in- 
creases the length of the run required for aircraft 
takeoff. 
The preponderance of light winds in the 
region frequently magnifies this problem. 
3. Ground surface operations 
Weather factors affecting ground operations vary 
appreciably in time and space across this NIS 
Geographic Area. 
The seasonal variation in rain- 
fall is -r,onounced, with most sections having dis- 
tinct dry periods. 
The soil is then dry and firm, 
and most rivers can be forded. 
In contrast, the 
rainy season is decidedly unfavorable for operations 
over most of the Amazon Basin, with flooded rivers 
and soft ground conditions. 
Although tempera- 
tures are not excessively high in the Amazon Basin, 
the air remains relatively humid throughout the 
year. 
Many 
fabrics 
and materials 
deteriorate 
under these conditions. 
The southern portion of Northwest Brazil has 
greater variability of climatic elements, particu- 
larly temperature. 
J» addition to a distinct dry 
season, the Area h ; a period of moderate tem- 
perature. 
A port 
a of the southern section is 
composed of ele 
ed tableland, where the air is 
less humid arc 
.igh‘time temperatures are ap- 
reciably lov 
. unose of the day. 
a. 
CLIMATIC FACTORS 
| 
(1) Precipitation — The seasonal variation 
in precipitation is outstanding over much of this 
Area. 
Many stations having monthly amounts of 
10 inches or more during the rainy season have 
almost negligible amounts during the dry season. 
Of the 57 stations listed in Figure 23-15, 25 have 
1 or more months with precipitation amounts of 1 
inch or less. 
Over the southern two-thirds of the Area, June, 
| 
July, and August are the least rainy months. 
Pro- 
ceeding northward across the northern third, the 
dry season occurs at an increasingly later date. 
Along the Equator, including most of the Atlantic 
coastal strip, the dry season occurs in September, 
October, and November, while in the extreme north- 
ern portion the dry season, or more exactly the 
Note 
Planning of ground surface operations includés 
consideration 
of such items as mobility, per- 
sonnel comfort, clothing, supplies and storage, 
shelter, 
engineering 
construction, 
mechanical 
maintenance, observation, communications, 
lo- 
gistics, and camouflage. 
Ground surface opera- 
tions are affected, either directly or indirectly, 
by many meteorological elements; however, pre- 
cipitation, temperature, and relative humidity 
are the most important factors. 
Other perti- 
nent factors are surface winds and visibility. 
‘ 
MILITARY 
GEOGRAPHY 
ou 
less rainy period, is delayed until 
January, Febru- 
ary, and March. 
The extreme northwestern part of the Area is 
— 
somewhat of an exception in that rainfall amounts 
are fairly heavy even during the dry season. 
At 
many points the average of the driest month is 
about 5 inches, while the average of the wettest 
month exceeds 10 inches. 
Many features of the 
rainfall pattern can be seen in FicurE 23-9. 
The 
complete reversal of seasonal trends is strikingly 
obvious if we compare the profile at Boa Vista with 
that of many of the other stations. 
Although the dry and wet seasons are fairly well 
defined over most of the Area, there is some varia- 
tion in rainfall amounts from year to year. 
Data 
for Cuiaba show that the average for July is 0.4 
inch, yet as much as 3.6 inches have been recorded. 
Similarily, the mean in January is 8.7 inches but 
as little as 2.6 inches have been recorded. 
Similar 
variations occur at most other stations in the Area. 
Rainfall is mostly of the shower type. 
Steady 
rains are infrequent and confined more or less to 
the southern portion. 
FiGurE 23-21 gives tabu- 
larly the maximum 24-hour precipitation. 
Heavy 
showers occasionally occur even during the dry 
season. 
At Taguatinga the monthly average in 
July is 0.2 inch but as much as 1.7 inches have oc- 
curred during a 24-hour period. 
During those 
months when 
the monthly average exceeds 3 
inches, 24-hour amounts rarely exceed the monthly 
average. 
The foregoing suggests that during some years 
the rainfall in a given month of the dry season 
may be received on a few days. 
This is true only 
occasionally during the rainy season, as indicated 
by the data in FiGuRE 23-22 which shows the aver- 
age number of days with precipitation. 
At most 
stations precipitation occurs on one-half to two- 
thirds of the days during the rainy season, while 
during the dry season, particularly in those regions 
where the average monthly precipitation is less 
than 1 inch, the total precipitation may occur on 1 
or 2 daysina given month. 
FiGure 23-10 presents 
graphically the average number of days with pre- 
cipitation. 
(2) Temperature and relative humidity — 
Except for the extreme southern tip, the NIS 94-II 
Area lies within the Tropics. 
Across the vast 
Amazon Basin the air is hot and humid throughout 
the year, and ground operations would suffer be- 
cause of the adverse weather effects on personnel. 
In addition, the hot, humid air hastens the deteri- 
oration of many fabrics and metals. 
Even during 
the rainless 
period the 
air remains 
relatively 
humid, a condition not without some beneficial 
economic effects in that the forests do not become 
PaGE 23-11 
| 
||
UAUPES 
BOA VISTA 
ANN. AV. 116 IN 
ANN. AV. 
60IN. 
YRS. REC. 
15-16 
YRS. REC. 
ELEV. 
276 
FT. 
. 182 
FT. 
oo 
MANAUS 
SANTAREM 
ANN.AV. 
78 IN. 
ANN. AV. 
78 IN. 
YRS.REC. 
YRS.REC. 
142 
FT. 
ELEV. 
66 FT. 
ELEY 
2F 
JFMAMJJASOND 
JFMAMJJASOND 
BENJAMIN CONSTANT 
ANN.AV. 
110 IN. 
ANN. AV. 
122 
IN. 
YRS.REC. 
12-13 
YRS. REC. 
Te) 
42 FT. 
ELEV. 
735 FT. 
aT 
S 
Wy Ars 
JFMAMJJASOND 
i! 
| 
| 
Luis 
A 
ANN. AV. 
82 IN. 
PORTO VELHO 
mel 
«YRS. REC. 16-20 
ANN. AV. 
99 IN. 
\ 
ELEV 
66_ FT. 
YRS.REC. 
ELEV. 
249 FT 
j 
| 
JFMAMJJASOND 
| 
IMPERATRIZ 
| 
. 
ANN. AV. 
55 IN. 
| 
\ 
\ 
YRS.REC. 
| 
ELEV 
312 FT. 
/ 
| 
CUIABA 
ANN. AV. 
55 IN. 
30° 
YRS.REC. 
ELEV. 
541 FT. 
\ 
| 
\ 
JFMAMJJASOND 
JFMAMJJASOND 
Pa 
AQUIDAUANA 
GOIAS 
CATALKO 
PARANA 
ANN.AV. 
57. IN. 
ANN. AV. 
69 IN. 
ANN. AV 
68 IN. 
ANN. AV 
60 IN. 
YRS. REC. 
YRS.REC 
-YRS.REC. 
10-13 
YRS REC 25 
ELEV. 
$96 FT. 
ELEV. 
706 FT. 
ELEV 
2805 FT. 
ELEV. 
853 
FT. 
— 
— 
10 — 
10 — 
JFMAMJJASOND 
JFMAMJJASOND 
JFMAMJWASOND 
FIGURE 
23-9. MEAN MONTHLY PRECIPITATION 
(INCHES). 
(For tabular data 
see 
Ficure 23-15.) 
dry and therefore susceptible to fire. 
The differ- 
ence in mean temperature between the warmest 
and coolest months is only about 4° F. over the 
northern and western sections of the Area. 
This 
difference increases southward across the southern 
third of the Area, where it reaches a high of 14° F. 
Outbreaks of cooler air occasionally sweep north- 
ward across Northwest Brazil during winter. 
The 
effects of these outbreaks are more noticeable in 
the south. 
The lowest observed temperatures are 
presented graphically in Figure 23-11 for 14 se- 
lected stations. 
It should be noted that, at some 
PAGE 23-12 
> 
of the southernmost stations, freezing or near 
freezing temperatures have been recorded. 
This 
cooler air is, however, greatly modified by the time 
it reaches the Tropics. 
In the western portion of 
the Area, temperatures occasionally 
fall below 
60° F., a condition which is said to cause the natives 
much distress. 
Diurnal variations over the tropical portions of 
Northwest Brazil, although small, are appreciably 
greater than the seasonal variations. 
While the 
difference between the average temperature of the 
coolest and warmest month is only 4° F., the aver- 
| 
pe 
| 
JFMAMJJASONO 
JFMAMJJASOND 
JFMAMJJASOND 
a. 
{
> 
Air Force 
DECEMBER 1954 
MILITARY GEOGRAPHY 
uauPés 
BOA VISTA 
SANTAREM 
ANN. AV. 219 DAYS 
ANN. AV.113 DAYS 
ANN. AV. 205 DAYS 
MANAUS 
ANN. AV.167 
DAYS 
JFMAMJJASOND 
JFMAMJJASOND 
BENJAMIN CONSTANT 
| 
ANN. AV.I74 DAYS 
JFMAMJJASOND 
PORTO VELHO 
ANN. AV.153 DAYS 
JFMAMJJASOND 
CUIABA 
ANN. AV.137 DAYS 
JFMAMJJASOND 
BELEM 
ANN. AV.250 DAYS 
JFMAMJJASOND 
Luis 
| 
ANN. AV.15O DAYS 
JFMS 
JASOND 
IMPERATRIZ 
ANN AV 126 
DAYS 
JFMAMJJASOND 
GOIAS 
| 
ANN. AV.92 DAYS 
AQUIDAUANA 
ANN. AV 82 
DAYS 
JFMAMJJASOND 
JFMAMUVASOND 
CATALAO 
ANN AV 104 DAYS 
PARANA 
ANN AV 8B DAYS 
JFMAMJJASOND 
JFMAMJJASOND 
FiGuRE 23-10. MEAN NUMBER OF DAYS WITH PRECIPITATION $50.01 INCH. 
age difference between the warmest and coolest 
part of the day is close to 16° F., except along the 
immediate coast where due to the influence of the 
ocean the variation is closer to 12° F. 
Over the 
southern portion the daily variation is more pro- 
nounced, ranging, on the average, from slightly 
less than 20° F. in summer to close to 30° F. in 
winter. 
FiGurRE 
23-12 presents graphically the 
daily temperature variation at 13 selected points. 
The greatest daily temperature variation at most 
stations occurs during the Southern Hemisphere 
winter and early spring. 
This is the dry season, 
when air from the subtropical high-pressure cell 
‘ 
(For tabular data see F1icurE 23-22.) 
flows 
northwestward 
across 
Northwest 
Brazil. 
The air being less humid allows greater warming 
during the day and cooling at night. 
This association of temperature variability with 
humidity becomes evident if we compare FIGuRE 
23-12, which shows daily temperature fluctuation 
by months, with Figure 23-13, which gives the 
average monthly humidities. 
We see that lowest 
humidity and highest temperature variability oc- 
cur over the southern portion of this Area in winter. 
Over the Amazon Basin, humidities are high and 
there is little seasonal variation, while the tempera- 
ture variability is small. 
Here too, the daily tem- 
PAGE 23-13 
P™ ee... 
— 
JFMAMJJASOND 
JFMAMJVASOND 
$0 
|| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
/ 
| 
— 
= 
| 
20: 
| 
| 
— 
o— 
| 
| 
/ 
| 
| 
= 
eee
perature fluctuation is least during the more humid 
months. 
| 
Excessively high temperatures such as are ob- 
. served in summer in Saudi Arabia, India, Australia, 
the Sahara, and southwestern United States are 
unknown in this Area. 
The effectiveness of humid 
air with its attendant cloudiness in screening out 
the sun’s heat is again demonstrated. 
Thus, high- 
est temperatures are not recorded over the humid 
Amazon Basin, but over the drier steppe area in 
the south where temperatures above 100° F. are 
much more frequent than near the Equator. 
Fic- 
URE 23-23 gives in tabular form the highest and 
lowest observed temperatures, while F1icuRE 23-24 
gives averages of the highest and lowest tempera- 
tures observed each day. 
The highest temperature 
observed in Northwest Brazil is 108° F. (Ficure 
23-23), recorded at Bela Vista near 22°S. in Novem- 
ber, while the highest average is 97° F. (Figure 23- 
24), recorded at both Carolina near 8°S. and Pérto 
Nacional near 10°S. in August and September, re- 
spectively. 
Thus, while highest individual read- 
ings occur in the extreme southern portion of the 
Area, highest averages occur in the east-central 
portion. 
| 
(3) Surface winds — Two predominant air- 
flow patterns can be discerned in the free atmos- 
phere over Brazil. 
The first of these occurs during 
‘SANTAREM 
IMPERATRIZ 
BELEM 
ELEV. 66 FT. 
ELEV. 312 FT. 
ELEV. 42 FT. 
YRS. REG. 21-22 
YRS. REG. 7 
YRS. REC. 11-13 
UPES 
SAO LUIS 
ELEV. 
FT 
ELEV. 66 FT. 
YRS. REC. 13-16 
FMAM 
J JA 
YRS. REC. 15-20 
JFMAMJJASOND 
MANAUS 
ELEV. 142 FT. 
YRS. REC. 12-13 
SFM 
AM 
SIOIN'D 
BARRA DO CORDA 
ELEV. 267 FT. 
YRS. REC. 8 
70~— 
JA SOND 
JFMAMJJ'A 
So. 
| 
PORTO VELHO 
| 
PARANA 
ELEV. 249 FT. 
| 
: 
ELEV. 853 FT. 
YRS. REC. 14 
| 
YRS. REC. 18-19 
70-— 
| 
of 
| 
| 
30") FMA Md J 
A 
SACERES 
~ 
| 
| 
/ 
LUZIANIA 
ELEV. 387 FT. 
| 
| 
ELEV. 3,143 FT 
YRS. REG. 8 
| 
j 
| 
YRS. REC. 16-18 
707 
| 
| 
CORUMBA 
AQUIDAUANA 
CATALAO 
ELEV. 
361 FT 
ELEV. 
598 FT. 
ELEV. 2,805 FT. 
A STON 
YRS. REC. 18-19 
YRS. REC, 11-14 
YRS. REC. 8 
70-——-— 
JS FMAM 
S'iOiIN'O 
FIGURE 23~11. LOWEST OBSERVED TEMPERATURE (°F .). 
Pace 23-14 
(For tabular data see FIGURE 23-23.) 
| 
| 
| 
le) 
| 
| 
|| 
| 
‘ 
| 
| 
___-____ 
—
AIR FORCE 
—- DECEMBER 1954 
MILITARY GEOGRAPHY 
UAUPES 
SANTAREM 
BELEM 
sho Luis 
-ELEV. 
276FT. 
ELEV 66FT 
ELEV. 42FT. 
ELEV. 66FT. 
JFMAMIJVASOND 
JFMAMJJASOND 
MANAUS 
BARRA DO CORDA 
ELEV. 142 FT. 
ELEV. 267 FT 
| 
JFMAMJJASOND | ° 
| 
| 
\ 
{ 
| 
PARANA 
| 
JFMAMJJASOND 
| 
CACERES 
| 
ELEV 387FT 
| 
| 
\ 
| 
LUZIANIA 
| 
FT. 
JFMAMJJASOND 
ELEV 
3,143 
CORUMBA 
AQUIDAUANA 
. 
CATALAO 
ELEV. 38) FT 
ELEV. 598FT 
ELEV. 2,805 FT 
JFMAMJJASOND 
JFMAMJJASOND 
FIGURE 23-12. DAILY TEMPERATURE VARIATION 
the South American summer, when lower pressures 
are present over Brazil, particularly the southern 
portion. 
In response to this pressure gradient, 
moist air from the tropical Atlantic periodically 
flows westward into the Amazon Basin, then south- 
ward across the highlands of the Mato Grosso. 
The second airflow pattern is present during the 
South American winter, when higher pressures 
over Brazil discourage the flow of moist air into 
the interior from the tropical Atlantic. 
The center 
of lower pressure 
is displaced toward extreme 
(°F.). 
(For tabular data see Ficure 23-24.) 
northern Brazil, while the South Atlantic high- 
pressure 
cell frequently extends eastward 
into 
Brazil. 
This pressure alinement produces a rela- 
tively weak flow of air from the southeast across 
all but the southern third of Brazil. 
The latter 
region is frequently affected by migratory low- 
pressure centers, and the winds are more variable, 
with northerly winds predominating in some sec- 
tions. 
Local topography, of course, plays an important 
role in deflecting or masking the two major airflow 
PAGE 23-15 
JFMAMJJASOND 
JFMAMJJASOND 
JFMAMJJASOND 
JFMAMJJASOND 
| 
— 
a 
Sy 
| 
{
MANAUS 
142 FT. 
SANTAREM 
100 
ELEV 66 FT. 
CAROLINA 
ELEV. 306 FT 
SAO LUIS 
100 
100 
ELEV. 66 FT. 
OT 
JAS OND 
UAUPES 
ELEV. 276 FT. 
TERESINA 
ELEV. 259 
FT. 
~ 
OTS FMAM 
J JASON 
SENA MADUREIRA 
ELEV. 443 FT. 
100 
MATO GROSSO 
ELEV. 843 FT. 
100 
PARANA 
ELEV. 853 FT. 
100 
TAGUATINGA 
ELEV.1,996FT 
A 
HERCULANIA 
ELEV. 85! FT. 
BELA VISTA 
ELEV 525 FT 
100 
100 
\ 40 
TRES LAGOAS 
ELEV1.026 FT 
LUZIANIA 
100 
100 
ELEV. 3,143 FT. 
J FMAM’ 
A'S'O'N'D 
OTE 
MAM 
JAS OND 
Pace 23-16 
FIGURE 23-13. MEAN RELATIVE HUMIDITY 
- 
patterns. 
The following paragraphs are devoted to 
the surface winds at a number of locations in this 
Area. 
At Aquidauana, in the extreme southern portion 
of the Area, the flow is primarily from the south 
in winter and from the north in summer. 
The 
southerly winds of winter are due, in part, to the 
flow of cooler air from the Temperate Zone. 
The 
frequency of calm wind conditions is quite high 
during most months at Aquidauana. 
Ficure 23- 
25 shows that at Aquidauana calm winds are pres- 
ent on one-third to one-half of the ~ at 0900 
| LST during most months. 
/ 
At points in the eastern highlands of Northwest 
Brazil, topographic effects such as the blocking 
action of hills and ridges and the channeling effects 
of valleys generally mask the overall flow patterns. 
At Luziania, for example, downslope or winds from 
the east prevail throughout the year, while calm 
air conditions are relatively infrequent. 
The ex- 
pected flow from the northeast in summer occurs 
infrequently. 
The surface airflow at ‘Many other 
points is due primarily to local topographic effects. 
Strong winds are uncommon in Northwest Brazil. 
In the Amazon Basin they are most likely to occur 
during thunderstorm conditions. 
A downward 
= 
= 
OTS 
MAM J JAS OND 
OT 
Tw AM J JAS ONO 
OTe 
AM 
JAS OND 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
~ 
| 
ij 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
= 
| 
SA) 
| 
= 
A 
| 
| 
| 
JFMAMJJASOND 
| 
FMAM 
J JAS OND 
| 
| 
30r- 
\ 
| 
\ 
j 
/ 
| 
JF MAM J JAS OND 
| 
| 
; 
OTE MAM J JAS OND 
OTE TM AM J JAS OND 
é 
| 
| 
| 
jj 
| 
|
e 
FORCE — DECEMBER 1954 
rush of air is created by the falling rain, which 
gives rise to gusty local winds. 
In forested areas 
the energy of the wind is dissipated at treetop level 
and the air remains relatively calm at ground level. 
Over the extreme southern portion, wind speeds 
occasionally exceed 20 m.p.h. during outbreaks of 
cooler air from the south. 
Along the coast a brisk 
sea breeze is present during the afternoon. 
This 
flow decreases inland due to convective activity 
which disperses the energy upward through a 
greater mass of air. 
(4) Visibility — Visibilities 
are 
generally \ tabulated in Figure 23-14 have been computed on 
\ the basis of mean monthly temperatures, as fol- 
lows: 
warm 
weather, 
above 
68° F 
good over Northwest Brazil. 
Fog and rain are the 
principal restrictions. 
Fog occurs mostly during 
the morning but dissipates within an hour or two 
after sunrise. 
Restricted visibilities due to showers 
are more likely to be encountered during the after- 
noon. 
In hilly country the attendant low cloudi- 
ness occasionally sweeps across at treetop level and’ 
effectively limits visual observation. . 
(5) Flood conditions —Two 
factors com- 
bine to make the Amazon Basin susceptible to 
annual flooding. 
The first is heavy precipitation, 
and the other, sluggish runoff due to the flatness 
of the basin. 
The average annual precipitation in 
the upper Amazon ranges from 80 to 140 inches. 
In the central Amazon Basin the rains which 
eventually lead to prolonged flood conditions com- 
mence in Novemiber. 
The area of precipitation in- 
tensifies and extends toward the headwaters during 
December and January and continues through 
February and March. 
During the latter months 
the level of the Amazon gradually rises. 
At Pérto Velho, high water is present during 
March, April, and May, begins to fall in June, and 
reaches the lowest levels during August through 
December. 
At Manaus, about halfway up the 
basin, the river begins to rise in December and 
reaches highest levels in May through August; 
during September and October the river falls and 
reaches the lowest readings in November. 
It is 
evident that at Manaus the high water continues 
well into the dry season. 
This slow fall is due to 
the flatness of the basin, which at the end of the 
rainy season resembles a series of swamplike lakes 
which require several months to drain. 
b. OVERALL EFFECT OF SURFACE WEATHER PHE- 
NOMENA ON CLOTHING, STORAGE, AND SHELTER 
(1) Clothing 
(a) MAJOR 
INFLUENCES — Clothing 
re- 
quirements for Northwest Brazil are influenced 
most significantly by temperature, humidity, and 
precipitation. 
Because of its tropical location and low elevation, 
the climatic variation affecting clothing require- 
ments issmall. 
Only at moderate elevations in the 
MILITARY 
GEOGRAPHY 
southern part of the Area is the climatic variation 
great enough to require seasonal changes in cloth- 
ing requirements. 
Some special items are required 
because of the prevalence of insects and pests. 
(b) REGIONAL 
REQUIREMENTS — The 
NIS 
94-II Area can be divided into two regions, the 
Amazon Lowlands and the Southwestern Interior, 
each of which has distinctive clothing require- 
ments. 
Ficure 23-14 indicates the clothing as- 
sembly most desirable for each region during each 
month of the year. The clothing requirements 
and 
cool 
weather, between 50° and 68° F. 
For planning purposes, the components of the 
clothing assemblies* are described in general terms. 
The warm-weather assembly is a cotton outfit 
(visored cap, shirt, trousers, and underwear). 
It 
also includes a lightweight, woolen knit shirt, pri- 
| 
marily for night wear; a sun helmet; and light- 
weight, high-top canvas boots. 
A single woolen 
blanket is adequate sleeping equipment for use 
with this assembly. 
In the cool-weather clothing assembly, flannel or 
woolen items are substituted for the cotton shirt 
and trousers; high-top leather boots for the canvas 
boots; and a high-necked, !ung-sleeved sweater for 
the woolen knit shirt. A hooded, water-repellent, 
wind-resistant 
jacket and 
leather 
gloves 
with 
woolen inserts are included also. 
A woolen sleep- 
ing bag with a water-repellent case is adequate 
sleeping equipment for use with this assembly. 
A lightweight poncho is desirable with each as- 
sembly for protection against rain. 
(C) EXCEPTIONS AND ADDITIONS FOR INDI- 
VIDUALS IN A PROTECTED ENVIRONMENT — The cloth- 
ing assemblies described in the previous paragraphs 
have been computed on the assumption that the 
individuals wearing them will be living in the open 
for 24 hours a day. 
Requirements for individuals 
in permanent installations may differ somewhat; 
for instance, a raincoat may be more practical than 
the poncho, and the service-type shoes, with one 
pair of mediumweight woolen socks, and a pair of 
overshoes might be more desirable than either the 
high-top canvas or leather boots. 
(d) SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS — Insects and 
pests, such as mosquitoes, flies, fleas, ticks, lice, 
scorpions, and centipedes, and poisonous. snakes 
make special items necessary. 
For example, re- 
_ 
pellents, insect bars, headnets, mosquito gloves,_ 
and similar items afford some protcction against 
insects and pests, and high-top boots or leggings 
* 
Appropriate 
service 
regulations 
list 
the 
exact 
nomenclature and the basis for issue of the various 
components of the clothing assemblies. 
PAGE 23-17 
+ 
. 
> 
t 
a 
) 
. 
‘ 
¥ 
i.
afford some protection against snakes. 
In addi- 
tion, blood-sucking vampire bats and vicious pir- 
_ anha fish are native to the Amazon Lowlands. 
Their presence requires that some form of pro- 
tection be provided against them. 
Swampy conditions and periodic floods along the 
main river valleys, particularly in the Amazon Low- 
lands, may require some type of waterproofed foot- 
wear. 
In contrast, the frequent occurrence 
of 
blowing dust and sand during the dry season in 
the scrub-covered 
sections, particularly 
in the 
Southwestern Interior, suggests the need for some 
type of face or neck shield. 
Normal clothing attrition is increased, particu- 
larly in the Southwestern Interior, where excessive 
damage to clothing items can be anticipated in the 
large sections covered with thorny scrub and bare 
rock. 
High humidities cause rapid deterioration 
of untreated cloth or leather items throughout the 
year in the Amazon Lowlands and during the sum- 
mer in the Southwestern Interior. 
Tinted glasses should be worn throughout the 
Area for protection against the brilliant sunshine 
and sunglare. 
(2) Storage—Extremes 
of 
temperature, 
precipitation, and high humidities are the main 
environmental factors to be considered for the pro- 
tection of open-stored items in this Area. 
| 
Open-stored subsistence supplies suffer damage 
| 
from high temperatures. 
Such damage can be 
anticipated in the south except during winter and 
in the remainder of the Area throughout the vear. 
Possible damage from alternate freezing and thaw- 
ing in the extreme southern part of the Area can 
be expected. 
| 
Protection of open-stored items against rain is 
desirable all year throughout Northwest Brazil. 
Maximum dunnage would be required on river 
floodplains and in the many marshes and swamps. 
Wood for dunnage is available in these sections. 
Because of the high humidities, stored items © 
would be subject to damage from rust and mildew 
all year throughout most of Northwest Brazil. 
Ex- 
over 40% of the time. 
ceptions are parts of 
the Southwestern Interior 
during winter. 
(3) Shelter — Shelter is needed throughout 
the year to provide shade and for protection against 
rain and occasionally low temperatures. 
Tents 
similar to the U.S. Army squad and wall tent would 
provide adequate protection throughout the Area. 
Heat may be desirable only at higher elevations in 
the south during winter. 
The prevalence of in- 
sects and pests throughout the Area makes screen- 
ing and flooring of tents desirable. 
Timber for the construction of improvised shelter 
and for the flooring of tents is available throughout 
most of Northwest Brazil but may be in short 
supply in the scrub sections of the Southwestern 
Interior. 
4. Amphibious operations 
Weather and sea conditions would not preclude 
amphibious operation in any month in this NIS 
Geographic Area. 
However, the wet season (Jan- 
uary through June) is less favorable than the dry 
season (July through December), particularly for 
personnel and equipment. 
North of the Equator, 
. 
landings would be hampered during January and 
February by heavy or confused swell which occurs 
High air temperature and 
relative humidity and high water temperature are 
unfavorable features throughout the year. 
a. WET SEASON — During the wet season the 
weather is controlled by the doldrum belt. 
Dur- 
ing this season, calms are prevalent along the 
coast, particularly in sheltered bays, occurring as 
much as 40% to 60% of the time with maximum 
Note 
Amphibious operations include all phases of op- 
erations involving the movement of troops and 
equipment onto a beach and the associated pro- 
tective 
measures. 
The 
discussion 
of 
coastal 
weather covers such pertinent elements as sur- 
face winds, cloudiness, precipitation, visibility, 
and temperature. 
A more detailed considera- 
tion of these elements individually and in com- 
bination may be found in the Subsections on 
Air, Air-ground, and Ground Surface Operations. 
FiaurE 23-14. CLOTHING REQUIREMENTS 
REGIONS 
san | FEB | MAR | ApR | May | sun | 
| ava | 
sep | oct | Nov | 
Amazon Lowlands........ 
W 
W 
Southwestern Interior: 
Northern portion: 
W 
W 
WwW 
W 
Ww 
W 
W 
W 
W 
WwW 
W 
W 
W 
W 
W 
W 
WwW 
W 
W 
W 
WwW 
W 
Ww 
C 
C 
W 
W 
W 
W 
W 
WwW 
W 
C 
C 
C 
C 
WwW 
W 
Southern portion: 
: 
W 
W 
W 
W 
W 
W 
W 
W 
W 
W 
W 
W 
W 
W 
W 
C 
C 
C 
C 
W 
w 
WwW 
W 
Te 
ee 
W 
W 
W 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
W 
W—warm-weather clothing assembly; C—cool-weather clothing assembly. 
PaGcE 23-18 
| 
| 
| 
; 
}
Of the time. 
AiR FORCE 
DECEMBER 1954 
frequency in March. 
During the remainer of the 
season, light, unsteady winds blow from northeast 
to east, usually as sea (onshore) breezes during the 
afternoon. 
Occasionally 
a weak 
southwesterly 
land (offshore) breeze develops for a few hours dur- 
ing the night. 
Gates (wind speed over 32 m.p.h.) 
are uncommon and occur in less than 1% of the 
observations. 
| 
| 
Swells and seas from the northeast quadrant are 
predominant north of the Equator, with slight to 
moderate intensity occurring over 80% to 90% of 
the time except in January and February when 
heavy or confused swells and rough seas occur over 
Off the mouth of the Amazon 
> 
River and south of the Equator, swells and seas 
from the northeast quadrant prevail 70% to 90% 
of the time, with slight to moderate intensity re- 
ported 80% to 90% and heavy or confused swells 
and rough seas occurring in less than 20% of the 
observations. 
Mean cloudiness during the wet season averages 
60% to 80% and is almost double that of the dry 
season. 
Cloud cover reaches a maximum in March, 
with 74% reported at Belém and 82% at Sao Luis. 
Ceilings less than 1,000 feet are reported on 8 days 
per month during March and Apri] and on 3 to 6 
days per month during the remainder of the wet 
season. 
Rain falls on 18 to 24 days a month; the rainiest 
months, February through May, receive monthly 
| 
amounts of 10 to 18 inches. 
Thunderstorms and 
heavy showers are frequent during these months. 
At Belém there are 37 thunderstorm days from 
January through June, an average of 1 every 4 or 
§ days. 
Sao Luis has 14 thunderstorm days, with 
an average of 2 to 3 days pez month. 
Visivility is unlimited over 90% of the time. 
‘Heavy rains are the only cause of ser ‘ously reduced 
visibility, sometimes to less than a mile, but thse 
are of short duration. 
Dense fog is very uncom- 
mon, averaging les: than 1 day during this period. 
In the temperature regime there is no significant 
seasonal 
variation. 
Monthly means 
hold near 
80° F. 
Daily maximum temprratures average 85° 
to 88° F. and rarely go above 90° F., while daily 
minima are 71° to 75° F. 
Relative humidity aver- 
ages 85% to 95%. 
Sea-watcr temperatures aver- 
age 80° to 82° F. except north of the Equator dur- 
ing the month of January when the temperature 
is 78° F. 
| 
b. Dry srason—JIn the dry season the dol- 
drum belt lies north of this NIS Geographic Area, 
and east.to southeast trades prevail 85% of the 
time scuth of the Equator. 
North of the Equator, 
local influences tend to craw the wind flow onshore 
from the northeast. 
From July through Septem- 
ber these winds occur over 70% of the time, while 
MILITARY GEOGRAPHY 
southeast winds strong enough to resist local in- 
fluences are reported 15% to 20% of the time. 
Mean wind speed is 6 to.9 m.p.h. 
The trades are 
strengthened by a sea breeze during the day; a 
weak land breeze may develop for a few hours dur- 
ing the night. 
Gaies (wind speed over 32 m.p.h.) 
occur in less than 1% of the observations. 
Swells and sees are from the northeast 50% to 
80% of the time north of the Equator. 
Their in- 
tensity is slight to moderate over 90% of the time 
except in June when heavy or confused swells and 
rough seas are observed 25% of the time. 
Off the 
mouth of the Amazon River, swells and seas from 
the northeast quadrant occur over 50% to 60% of 
the time except in August and September when the 
direction swings to the southeast. 
Swells and seas 
of slight to moderate intensity are observed 80% to 
90% of the time, while frequency of heavy or con- 
fused swells and rough seas ranges from 15% in 
© 
June to less than 10% in the remainder of the 
moiths. 
South of the Equator, the frequency of 
Swells and seas from the northeast quadrant is 
60% to90%. 
Swells and seas of slight to moderate 
intensity are reported over 80% of the time. Heavy 
or confused swells and rough seas are experienced 
less than 7% of the time. 
| 
The mean cloudiness averages 35% to 55%. 
Ceilings lower than 1,000 feet occur only 1 day per 
month. 
Rain fails on an average of 7 to 15 days 
a month during this season. 
The average monthly 
precipitation is 3 to 6 inches, while during t'« 
driest months 
(September through November), 
only 1 inch or less of rain is reported. 
Thunder- 
storms occur on an average of 4 to 5 days per month 
| 
at Belém; Sao Lufs has 1 to 2 thunderstorm days 
per month, increasing to 4 days per month in Oc- 
tober and November. 
| 
Visibility is good during this season. 
Absence of 
| 
fog, except in inland valleys, is characteristic. 
Rain showers are the usual limitations on visibility. 
There is a continuation of the evenly high tem- 
peratures—monthly means 
near 
80° F.; daily 
maxima, 86° to 92° F.; and daily minima, 71° to 
75° F. 
Relative humidity averages 75% to 90%. 
Sea-water temperatures average 80° to 81° F. 
-D. Climatic data tables 
The various climatic data tables referred to in 
Subsections A and B are contained in this Sub- 
section. 
Stations listed in the tables are arranged 
alphabetically. 
Climatic data for nearby stations 
outside the geographic boundaries of NIS 94-I] are 
ncluded, in the absence of satisfactory records 
or parts of the designated NIS Geographic Area. 
vloud height and visibility data of value were 
parse. 
A map of station locations, with an accompany- 
ng list giving latitude, longitude, and elevation of 
| 
|
YRS REC 
11-12 
ANN 
61.6 
74.1 
123.9 
75.2 | 
110.4. 
82.2 
7.0 
9.5 
11.9 
5.7 
6.2 
7.1 
12.6 
4.8 
7.8 
5.7 
10.4 
6.2 
6.4 
4.6 
3.4 
4d 
10.5 
4.9 
3.9 
4.2 
4.8 
2.3 
10.2 
3.7 
5.2 
1.8 
3.6 
1.8 
9.7 
0.7 
5.4 
2.5 
2.1 
12.0 
8.3 
0.4 
4.6 
6.8 
2.8 
2.9 
12.5 
13.3 
0.3 
7.4 
7.6 
3.8 
2.2 
4.8 
6.5 
13.2 
12.0 
13.1 
6.2 
18.3 
20.3 
13.3 
4.6 
18.0 
13.1 
7.0 
7.5 
10.2 
7.9 
14.5 
11.0 
10.7 
10.4 
12.3 
12.1 
13.1 
6.0 
8.9 
9.4 
5.1 
4.5 
8.8 
11.8 
10.5 
11.8 
11.5_ 
15.7 
9.6 
8.8 
12.8 
10.8 
13.1 
16.5 
15.7 
13.7 
10.9 
11.7 
11.8 
15.0 
4.4 
fx) 
Re 
= 
] 
4.9 
10.9 
17.3 
10.6 
11.0 
13.3 
10.1 
5.0 
5.9 
13.3 
10.4 
13.6 
8.3 
14.2 
9.6 
15.7 
13.1 
12.0 
9.4 
11.8 
11.9 
13.5 
10.2 
11. 
Figure 23-15. MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES) 
10.2 
9.3 
JAN | FEB | MAR | APR | MAY | gun | suL | ava | ser | ocr | nov | pec 
13.9 
11.7 
10.3 
8.6 
14.2 
11.7 
8.3 
8.3 
15.2 
10.1 
11.8 
13.2 
10.2 
16.2 
15.8 
16.9 
10.8 
10.0 
8.1 
12.1 
14.6 
11.8 
13.2 
17.7 
12.0 
co 
or 
STATION 
AIR FORCE — DECEMBER 1954 
Presidente Murtinho......... 
Pérto Nacional..... 
Poste Ge Mos... 
Misséo do Cururu........... 
Manaus......... 
Manicoré.......... 
Oiapoque...... 
Floriano Peixoto............. 
Fonte Boa..... 
Humaité....... 
Conceicaéo do Araguaia....... 
CAceres.... 
Benjamin Constant......... 
Almeirim........ 
15-17 
15-16 
< 
69.6 
88.8 
51.6 
116.4 
1.9 
8.3 
7.4 
10.9 
6.5 
0.5 
5.2 
8.1 
3.8 
0.2 
4.5 
6.3 
1.3 
1.3 
2.9 
7.0 
4.3 
1.5 
0.8 
7.6 
1.0 
9.9 
0.2 
7.0 
0.8 
7.4 
2.2 
10.1 
4.3 
13.2 
3.2 
13.1 
11.8 
12.0 
9.4 
8.6 
16.8 
4.1 
10.3 
F 
12.8 
10.2 
14.5 
5.3 
11.7 
10.2 
11.3 
10.6 
11.8 
12.6 
6.6 
14.5 
8.0 
6.3 
11.2 
12.9 
Near but outside NIS 94-II Area. 
<0.05 inch. 
Trés Lagoas....... 
Tracuateua.......... 
Paulo de Olivenca....... 
Sena Madureira.... 
i 
| 16-20
aw 
va 
a4 
4440 
VEULIVIDEN 
all 
Figure 23-16. HIGHEST, LOWEST, AND MEAN ANNUAL 
PRECIPITATION (INCHES) FOR THE 
PERIOD 1914 THROUGH 1938 
STATION 
HIGHEST | LOWEST 
MEAN 
125.9 
48.8 
87.3 
Misséo do Cururu............ 
150.8 
74.4 
109.0 
153.0 
103.7 
128.6 
Trés Lagoas 
95.9 
|: 
28.9 
51.6 
* 
Near but outside NIS 94-II Area. 
Fiaure 23-17. MEAN NUMBER OF CLOUDY DAYS (CLOUD COVER =8-TENTHS) 
STATION 
JAN | FEB | MAR| APR | May | guN | suL | auc | sep | oct | Nov | pEc | ANN 
l 
l 
l 
l 
l 
‘47 
134 
114 
105 
| 
EE 
errr eaten nee 
174 
Catalfo....... 
l 
105 
Conceicéo do Araguaia............... 
l 
| 
111 
SS 
ETT! 
PE 
A 
181 
pa 
i 
111 
l 
127 
Se 
Ore ae rere, ce: 
100 
Imperatriz*...... 
| 
l 
. 
102 
l 
I 
ak 
Se lt 
+ 
l 
l 
l 
120 
EE EE 
Ee 
24 | 
204 
OS 
ne 
rrr 
Presidente Murtinho...........:..... 
fae 
Seo 
109 
al 
3. 
174 
| 
Note 
Period of record: unknown. 
* 
Near but outside NIS 94-II Area. 
PaGE 23-22 
* 
= 
| 
, 
t 
-
AIR FORCE 
— DECEMBER 
1954 
MILITARY 
GEOGRAPHY 
FiaurRE 23-18. MEAN NUMBER OF CLEAR DAYS (CLOUD COVER =2-TENTHS) 
STATION 
JAN | FEB | MAR| APR | MAY | gun | suL | auc | sep | oct | Nov | pec | ANN 
a 
eyes ea 
eee 
we 
] 
(42 
] 
] 
l 
he 
aay 
1] 
] 
Conceicio do 
6. 
] 
] 
] 
4. 
] 
1] 
142 
] 
] 
] 
] 
] 
] 
15: 
1] 
] 
l 
] 
1] 
] 
1] 
115 
ra 
ee ate ahs 
l 
Se 
Note 
Period of record: 7 years for Imperatriz; unknown for all other stations. 
* 
Near but outside NIS 94-II Area. 
Figure 23-19. MEAN NUMBER OF DAYS WITH TOTAL CLOUD COVER =2-TENTHS AT SPECIFIED HOURS 
| 
STATION 
ri JAN | FEB | MAR | APR | MAY | JUN | JUL | AUG | SEP | ocT 
Nov | 
DEC | ANN 
eee 
c.g 
ee 
0900 
1] 
115 
2100 
| 
Data not available 
| 
0900 
] 
] 
] 
2100 
] 
* 
ty 
0900 
2100 
148 
0900 
133 
2100 
_ 
189 
0900 
124 
2100 
146 
0900 
146 
2100 
Data not available 
EEE 
IL REPELS 
Oe 0900 
* 
l 
] 
] 
] 
2100 
l 
»] 
] 
Notre 
Period of record: unknown. 
* 
<0.5 day. 
i 
| 
‘ 
| 
- 
|
Figure 23-20. MEAN NUMBER OF DAYS WITH THUNDERSTORMS 
oo 
rl 
. 
| 
SLA 
= 
a 
O 
LPL NNN N 
HK 
— 
= 
< 
Ay 
‘ 
‘ 
‘ 
|
AIR FORCE —- DECEMBER 
1954 
MILITARY GEOGRAPHY 
Figure 23-22. MEAN NUMBER OF DAYS WITH PRECIPITATION >9.01 INCH 
STATION 
JAN | FEB | MAR | APR | MAY | JUN | JuL | auc | sep | oct | Nov | pec | ANN_|YRs REC 
Alto Araguaia.......... ceo 
8-9 
14-17 
19-21 
12-13 
Benjamin Constant.......... 
6° 
-w0ChCUTB 
Seas 
oe ees 
ae 
5 . 
9-12 
] 
] 
] 
1] 
Conceicéo do Araguaia....... 
See 
23-24 
1-3 
11-14 
4-6 
] 
] 
17-18 
1] 
16. 
13-14 
13 . 
- 
] 
18-19 
Ne era 
] 
1] 
8-10 
Porte ational... 
] 
18-20 
3-4 
Presidente Murtinho.:....... 
11-12 
1] 
1] 
] 
22-23 
en Sun 
ae 
16-20 
Sena Madureira............. 
g 
18-20 
2. 
15-17 
Trés Lagoas........ 
13. 
ee 
14-20 
ESE 
ea 
15. 
‘19 
15-16 
* 
Near but outside NIS 94—-II Area. 
4. 
| 
| 
PaGE 23-25 
y
Fiaure 23-23. ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM AND MINIMUM TEMPERATURES (°F.) 
STATION 
yan | FEB | MAR| aPR| May | suN | suL | ava | sep | oct | Nov | pEc | ANN | YRs REC 
Aquidauana............ 
Max| 
100 
101 
101 
100 
#96 
1083 
«#108 
«#4104 
103° 
103 | 108 | 12-14 
Max] 
105 
104 
101 
101 
#«©98 
101 
105 
103 
108 
106 | 108 | 18-20 
Conceigéo do Araguaia..| 
Max| 
#=$99 
101 
101 
| 101 | 10-11 
Max] 
101. 
101 
100 
#£=94 
101 
«104 
«#105 
«104 
104 | 105 | 18-19 
Masi 
00... 100. 
06... 
101.. 
104 
104 
108 
101. 
|.104 
Maxi 
100 
oF 
8. 
100 
104 
108. 
104 
102° 1 104 
2-25 
Pérto Nacional......... 
Max 
100. 
100. 
100.103 
.101 
104. 
102 
104. 
105. 
101 
101 
| 
106 | 17-20 
Pérto Velho............ 
Masi 
06. 
-06 
06: 
06: 
#100° 
100° 
104 
O8 - OF 
Presidente Murtinho....| 
Max| 
#=94 
#100 
«#101 
«#101 
©97 
| 101 | 11-12 
Sena Madureira.........| 
Max| 
99 ° 499 
#99 
#99 
100 
99 100 
| 
100 | 15-18 
100 
102 
100. 
00:1 
102 1 16-90 
Trés Lagoas............ 
Maxi 
104 
102 
102 
#102 
#102: 
#08 
$$ 
106 
103 
108° 
106 
108 1 
| 
14-18 
* 
Near but outside NIS 94-II Area. 
| 
>
AIR FORCE - DECEMBER 1954 
Figure 23-24. MEAN DAILY MAXIMUM AND MINIMUM TEMPERATURES (°F.) 
MILITARY GEOGRAPHY 
STATION 
JAN | FEB | MAR| APR | MAY | JUN | JUL | ava | BEP | oct | Nov | DEC | ANN | YR8 REC 
Alto Araguaia.......... 
Max | 85 
8-9 
Min | 67 
~=—s 67 
oe 
GF 
8-9 
Aquidauana............ 
Max 
88 | 12-14 
: 
Min 
Se 2 
11-14 
Barra do Corda*..... ...| 
Max | 89 
9-11 
Min 
ae 
#65 
9-11 
Bela Vista......:.:...:.) 
Mag i Gl 
386 91 
85 | 18-20 
Min 
|: 67 
60 | 17-21 
Max 
89 | 11-13 
, 
Min 
11-13 
Max 
92... 
9-12 
Min 
< 
9-12 
Max | 88 
9-10 
Min 
#69 
#62 
9-10 
Max | 81 
9-14 
| 
Min | 65 
Q-14 
Conceic&éo do Araguaia. .| Max 
#990 
91 | 11-11 
| 
Min 
§ 64 
1G11 
Max | 91 
87 | 18-19 
Min 
> 
eae S| 
18-19 
ees 
Max | 88 
9) 
#89 
8Y 
Min 
ee 
Te 
Max 
1-3 
Max | 86 
90 | 11-12 
Min 
3-6 
Fenperateie? 
Max 
Min 
i ee 
Max | 82 
83 | 16-18 
Min 
16-18 
SEE SE 
Max 
| 
ee 
£92 
9] 
11-13 
Min 
| 
12-13 
Mato Grosso........... 
Max | 87 
6-8 
Min | 72 
NE 
6-8 
| 
Min 
69 | 12-14 
Sete 
rar cise 
Max 
17-19 
Min | 58 
55 | 18-19 
Pirenépolis............. 
Max} 
82 } 83 
Ss 
.@...2% 
8-10 
Min | 65 
8-10 
Pérto Nacional......... 
Max | 89 
17-20 
| 
Min | 70 
~—s(<67 
68 | 18-20 
Pérto Velho............ 
Max | 85 
Min | 76 
76 = 76 
Presidente Murtinho....| 
Max 
@§=6. 85 
11-12 
| 
Min 
53. 
+49 
#64 
iis Cie oii 
Max | 85 
87 | 22-23 
Min | 69 
65 | 21-33 
Max | 86 
18-19 
Min 
73 =| 21-22 
Max | 85 
Min 
Sena Madureira...... 
Masi 
@ 
@. 
9) 
= See 
ee 
92 | 15-18 
Min | 69 
68 | 15-18 
Taguatinga 
Max | 87 
a 
2. 
eS 
88 . | 18-20 
Min | 70 # 70 
aa 
Baie 
70 | 10-12 
Tocantinépolis.......... 
Max | 88 
&11 
Min | 70 
70. 
Trés Lagoas............ 
Max] 
90 } 90 
#89 
87 | 14-19 
Min | 71 
64 | 14-18 
Max] 
| 
| 
13-14 
| 
Min | 72 
Me: 
71 | 13-16 
* 
Near but outside NIS 94-II Area. 
PaGE 23-27 
‘ 
| 
|
— 
Fiaure 23-25. MEAN NUMBER DAYS WITH CALM AT 0900 LST 
STATION 
JAN | FEB | MAR| APR | MAY | JUN | guL | auc | sep | oct | Nov | pec | 
| YR8 REC 
pO 
er 
eres 
120 
5-8 
342 
2-4 
Campo Grande......... 
4-5 
273 
1-3 
li 
100 
7-8 
150 
§-9 
189 
3-6 
| 
203 
1-2 
Presidente Murtinho......... 
166 
2-3 
1-2 
2-3 
2° 
2-3 
* 
Near but outside NIS 94-II Area. 
23-28 
| 
, 
‘ 
| 
<x... 
a “>
LIST OF STATIONS 
STATION 
LATI- 
LONGI- 
ELEVA- 
STATION 
LATI- 
LONGI- 
ELEVA- 
TUDE* 
TUDE* 
TION 
TUDE* 
TUDE* 
MON 
52 34.%.. 
3 088. | 60 01 W 
142 
Alto 
17 19S. 
1a 
t 2,000 
15 OOS. 
59 57 W 
843 
22 OOS 
56. 22. W. 
525 
23685. | 56 44 W 
Benjamin Constant... 0.55... 
4-21 
1.40 10 
8... 4 82.13 
a0 2: 
S4 
MW. 
1,84) 
Presidente Murtinho........ 
15 398. | 538 54 W. | 2,052 
1.205, | 47.34 
306 
407 8. | 68 08 W 
135 
do 
8 158. 
0:12“; 
525 
Mio 
9 58S. | 67 48 W 
446 
18 59 8:. | 57 39 W. 
38 | 
Salindpolis....... 
1:08:39 8 
47 23 W 
15 36 5..| 
56 06 W. 
541 
4-265 
54 42 W 
Ponte 
2 3258 
66 10 W, 
Siio Paulo de Olivenca......... 
3 288 
68 57 W. 
302 
15:32: 8 
47 18 W. 
2,999 
Q OAS 
68 39 W. 
443 
16 4158. 
49 17 W. 
2,402 
16 398 
48 50 W 
na 
15 588 
50 04 W. | 1,706 
12 268 
46 38 W. | 1,996 
24 0558 
64°52 W. 
722 
0 048 
68 14 W. 
325 
18 295 
54.46 W. 
851 
3 225 
64 41 W. 
174 
419§ 
55 35 W. 
148 
+. 
4 08.8 
47 10 W. 
118 
018 N 
68 54 W. 
400 
20 47 5S. 
51 42 W...1:1,026 
16 15. 5. |} 47 56 W. 1 3,143 1) UdaritY. 
3.038. 
1.363 
11 458 
40 05 W. | 2,283 
i2 44.8. 
| 
na 
na 
Data not available. 
* 
** 
Near but outside NIS 94-II Area. 
Coordinates give locations of weather stations and do not correspond necessarily to those for populated places. 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| | 
|
FLORIANO PEIXOTO 
RIO BRANCO 
f 
RIO|BRANCO. 
| 
Xapuri® 
/ 
, 
LONGI- 
ELEVA- 
TION 
: 
feel 
60 01 W. 
142 
. 
/ 
61 18 W. 
59 51 W. 
843 
Cusco 
t 
57 30 W. 
325 
~ 
55 31 W. 
_ 
GLOSSARY 
51.50 W. | 207 
sland 
oundories 
are not necessarily th 
ye 
recognized by the U.S. Governm: 
48 20 W 
778 
| 
63 53 W. 
244 
53:54 
1 2.052 
| 
30 W. | 492 
NORTHWEST BRAZIL 
63 08 W. 
3: 
) 
52 45 W 
ies 
| 
54 42 \W 
44 50 W. 
| 
@ 
METEOROLOGICAL STATION 
44 16 W. 
| 
68 57 W. 
()2 
Locations are shown only for stations for 
68 39 W 
48 50 W. 
na 
46 38 W. | .996 
68 14 W. 
325 
| 
48 33. W 
: 
: 
which data are presented in text or tables. 
| 42 40 W 
259 
| 
147 10%. 
118 
| 
GENERAL BASIC INFORMATION 
1,263 
=== 
Internal administrative boundary 
5. 
na 
National capital 
| 
MANAUS 
Internal administrative capital 
places. 
| 
Selected railroad 
Swamp 
100 
200 
300 
400 
Statute Miles 
100 
200 
300 
400 
500 
Kilometers 
Geographic Area boundary 
18645 AWS 
/ 
j 
| 
VA 
P 
| 
Bed 
YY 
i 
? 
Tod My 
} 
| 
PUCATY 
\ 
Up 
t 
|
PEIXOTO 
ransportation shown on thes map is 
ed and for orientation purpases only. 
idaries ore not necessarily those 
gnized by the U.S. Government. 
~ 
paaasoo 
{ 
PACAAS NOVOS 
Bs 
ae 
i 
| 
‘ 
Mite 
SSS 
A 
~ 
AZIL 
NS 
Ww 
| 
“Sy, S20 José 
Rio Tague 
5. 
Herculania 
= 
/ 
‘ 
i LAQUIDAUAN 
ary 
quidauana 
| 
| 
e 
. 
i 
Porto Murtinho 
} 
EL 
Maraca 
TA 
Ponta Pora 
: 
400 
500 
‘ 
500 
‘ 
| 
\ 
( 
"Gp, \ 
\ 
A 
Riberatte 
\ 
) 
— 
\. 
\ 
+ 
/ 
Uy 
J 
| 
/ 
/ 
/ 
| 
| 
| 
| 
= 
/ 
a 
| 
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| 
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ih 
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Poxoréu 
Goias® 
PIRENOPOLIS +7 
j 
\ 
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} 
} 
} 
\ 
| 
(PORTO NACIONAL, 
| 
igs 
\ 
(.) 
( 
\ 
“SFORMOSAY 
\ 
\SANTA GRUZ“ 
/ 
/ 
\ 
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Bt UAPAR 
GOIANIA7GOIANIA 
4 16 
P 
t 
\ 
} 
f 
Paracatu 
Pirapora 
\ 
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} 
- 
* 
\ 
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{ \ | 
/Kquidauana 
/CAMPO GRANDE 
“TRES 
Franca 
| 
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| 
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\. 
Rio Claro 
re. 
Itajub4 
f 
~. Ourinho 
\ 
André 
A 
AY 
A \ 
Juquia 
Core 
AN 
: 
STATION LOCATIONS 
FIGURE 23-26 
- 
‘ 
) 
| 
| 
j 
‘ 
UE 
fy 
= 
| 
( 
| 
| 
| 
|
- 
AIR FoRCE — DECEMBER 1954 
BOGOTA 
COL 
\ 
IUARETE 
Cruzeiro do 
BENJAMIN 
TARACUA 
SRO PAULO 
yf 
DE OLIVENCA 
< 
) 
| 
TARACUA, |’ 
\ 
DO SUL 
| 
Eirunepeé 
‘ 
| 
FLORI 
SSENA MADUREIRA 
pO 
R 
BRANCO 
10 SRANCO 
| 
f 
| 
| 
| 
| 
Mh 
| 
\ 
/ 
| 
| 
Yj 
| 
| 
| 
4 | 
MM 
| 
| 
| 
yj 
| 
|
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/ 
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BOA VISTA. 
BOA VISTA y 
IAUPES 
BARCELOS 
XS 
Brarintins 
RINTINS 
| 
/ 
 @ CARAUARI 
/ 
JIMANICORE 
MISSAO DO GURL 
out 
At 
iCO 
ANCO 
) PORTO VELHO 
one 
\\ 
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FLORIANO | 
| 
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| 
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| 
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\ 
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| 
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\ | 
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| 
| 
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| 
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MARAIO_ 
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—— 
“BELEN 
TRACUATEUA 
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AWN 
| 
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\ 
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PORTO NACIONAL 
ij 
Dam 
| 
FRENC 
| 
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= 
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\¢ 
Soure 
| 
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} 
A! 
| RIM* 
> 
( 2 
£
— 
~ 
Di. 
KEGISTER 
‘ 
GOULART, Jouo Bolchior Marques 
BRAZUL 
Goulart, a relatively wealthy Insyer and rancher, commonly 
known by his nickname "Jango". 
Vice 
or. Brazil. since 
| 
31 Junuary 1956, he was re-clected to that yp cpenaae on 3 October 1960, 
and 
June 1952 he has been national 
mon of the Left-of-center 
Labor Party: (Part Ado 
Trent 
Active in 
natlonal polities for only a Litile over 
a decade, Goulart owes his rapid 
rise to his status as a protege of the Uite President Vargas from boynood 
until Vargas! death. 
He receivec most of his volitical. training from 
Vargat, was one of his most intimate and influeatial savisers, and nas 
pought to use the Vargas "mystigue' to Als on political advantage 
by 
identifying himself with the people through demazogic appeals. 
Although 
not considered ultra-nationallscic, Goulart sccepts support from ultra- 
nationalists, shifts his positioa according to the ne.ds ox vhe moment, 
ond has been referred to as a shrewd politiclen whose most significant 
political trait is that of opportunien. 
attitude 
the United States 
visited in 
1956, has been as opportunistic and 
that exhibited. 
‘elsewhere throughout his career. 
In a Nay 1961 
au. 5. 
official, 
he stated that the Cuban invasion had cost the United States 
conriderable prestige and added thet the Russians knew how to do these 
th 
Coulart was born 12 March 1918 at S20 Borja, Rio Grande do Sul, into 
a well-to-do ranching family 
of Portuguese and French descent, and after 
obtaining a law degree from the University of Rio Grande do Sul at 
Porto Alcgre in 1939, 
he is believed to have practiced law for some :rears. 
In 1945 he was elected to the State Legislative Apsembly of Rlo Grande 
do Bul and in that year he helped Vargas found the powerful, leftist 
r[B. 
He entered national politics Jn 1956 through election from 
Rio Grande do Bull as a national deputy on the PIB ticket. 
Im January 1951. 
he returned to Rio Grande do Sul. to become provincial Secretary of the 
Joterlor, and uring this post an a vehicle, he rose rapidly within the 
party. 
After Goulart became national chairman of the PIB in June 1952, 
he worked successfully for ene ycar to unscat Minister of Labor) 
José de Segadas Vianna,’ 
who strongly objezted to Goulart's backing of 
dissident elements. 
His labors were rewarded, and in dune 1953 Vargas 
‘appointed him Minister of labor. 
Attempting to gain control of the trade 
unions by courting elements of? all. sorts, Goulart's tenure wap marked 
by 
& growth of Communist strength in the labor movement, and his generally 
leftist und demagogic activities aroused the lre of thn military, who 
eventually forced his 
in February 1954. 
Declassified by PE 
Ae, 
’ 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| | 
|
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
NCY 
Orr ICE 
CENTR 
‘RENCE 
WIOGRAPHIC RE 
‘ 
ay 
| 
‘ 
GOULART, JOUO Belchtor Marques (Cont. ) 
BRAZIL 
Juscelino Kubitschek accepted Coulart oo a runmiing mate in the 1955 
elections in return for PIB support, and he was elected by a large margin. 
An a weice for supporting: Kiuwbitschek's Social Democratic yovernment, 
Goulart was given the prerogative of naming and controlling top appointees 
to the Ministries of Labor and Agriculture. 
In attempts to head off his 
rivals within the Labor Party and the labor movement, 
he dealt extensively 
with Communist unions. 
:-In December 1959 ke publicly supported.a 2t-hour 
"general strike" in S0'Paulo, which. Kubitschek had denounced, end reports 
indicate that his actions had been cleared beforchand with War Minister 
Marshal Lott. 
Goulart reportedly told labox leaders at that time that the 
strike had marked the beginning of a revolutionary movement in Brazil and 
enid that he would see that arms would be furnished as soon es violence 
flared up. 
| 
In July 1960 Goulart was accused by Dante Pellacani, secretary general 
! 
of the S%o Paulo State Trade Union Council, 
of bottling up legislation, 
| 
Which, if passed, would have made a unified social security system possible. 
Goulart publicly advocated the passage of the legislation, buc in reality 
he did all in his power to prevent its enactment in order to retain his 
, 
control. 
Late in 1960 Quadros apparently hoped to split the Labor Party 
: 
enough to unseat Goulart as chairman and to break his influence in lebor 
and agriculture, both as a matter of principle and to free the patronage 
controls for his own purposes, but Goulart moved to head this off by 
trying to "pack" various social agencies vith four-year appointees. 
Quadros made derogatory allegations in presidential investigative reports 
and rejected a letter written to him by Goulart, who complained that he 
! 
hed been implicated without an opportunity to defend himself. 
Congress 
bsequently authorized CGoulert to absent himself from the country, thus 
opening the way for him to visit Red Chins in July 1961, and efter he -had 
declined Quadros’ offer to make the visi« official, he was authorized 
instead to negotiate comnercial and payment acreenents. 
TNR/CS/BR 
| 
25 August 1961 
a 
i 
| 
|
PP ESF 
TO WHITE HOUSE 
. 
. 
PASS PRESIDENTIAL PARTY AT HYANNISPORT, ATTENTION COL. MC HUGH, 
_ FOR DELIVERY TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY 
= 
CONF IDENTI 
ALL 
| 
FOLLOWING MEMORANDUM ON QUADROS' RESIGNATION PREPARED BY 
1, 
QUADROS' ATTENTIONS TO THE CHE GUEVARA AND GAGARIN, 
AND 
NORE GENERALLY HIS MANIFEST TENDENCIES TO DRAW CLOSER TO THE 
BLOC, HAVE AROUSED STRONG EXPRESSIONS OF DISAPPROVAL FROM THE 
ARMY AND FROM CONSERVATIVE ELEMENTS IN BRAZIL.» 
WE THINK IT 
| 
LIKELY THAT HE RESIGNED IN THE EXPECTATION OF PROVOKING A STRONG 
MANIFESTATION OF POPULAR SUPPORT, IN RESPONSE TO WHICH HE WOULD 
RETURN TO OFFICE JN A BETTER POSITION AGAINST HIS OPPONENTS. 
(FIDEL CASTRO RESIGNED ONCE FOR THIS PURPOSE, AND PERON MORE THAN 
ONCE)» 
ALTHOUGH THE HIGHER RANKS OF THE ARMY DISLIKE QUADROS, 
THEY WOULD FROBABLY NOT BLOCK HIS. RETURN IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCESs 
2. 
IF QUADROS DOES NOT COME BACK, WE BELIEVE THAT THE NEXT 
GOVERNMENT WILL FOLLOW CONSERVATIVE THOUGH NATIONALIST POLICIES, 
' BECAUSE THE ARMY WILL NOT TOLERATE ANYTHING ELSE. 
3. 
VICE PRESIDENT GOULART, THE CONSTITUTIONAL SUCCESSOR, HAD 
_ JUST LEFT BY SEA FROM COMMUNIST | CHINA, AND WILL NOT BE ON HAND FOR 
AT LEAST A FEW DAYSe 
HE IS STRONGLY LEFTIST, AND THE ARMY WOULD 
BE UNLIKELY TO ALLOW HIM TO EXERT REAL CONTROL OF BRAZILIAN POLICY. 
4, 
THE POSSIBILITY OF TROUBLE IN BRAZIL, DUE TO QUADROS' 
FLIRTATION WITH THE BLOC AND HIS TENDENCY TO HASTY AND DRAMATIC 
ACTION, HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED FOR SOME TIME; USIB DREW ATTENTION 
TO IT ON 2h AUGUST, IN A "SURVEY OF COLD WAR CRISIS SITUATIONS", 
AND IN A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON & AUGUST. 
: 
3812 1812 
29/25952 AUG 
LED 
Declassified ry OF 8375 
date TAN 
1976: 
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“A 
INTHLLIGSNCH AGENCY 
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OFFICE Ol 
BLOGRAPHIC KEGISTUR 
qs, 
DANTAS, Francisco Clementino de Santigyo 
BRAZIL 
Paermanont Reprosontativo to ths United Nations 
One of Brazil's most prominont jurists, and the ideolorical advisor 
of 
Vico President Joo Goulart as well as the Partido frabalhista Brasileiro 
(Brazilian Labor Party--PIB), Santiago Dantas was named in August 196). 
as 
| Brazil's Permanent Representative to tho United Nations. 
Dantas entered 
politics relatively late in his careor, having first established a lucrative 
practice as a corporation Lawyer and a solid academic reputation as a member. 
of tha faculty 
of the University 
of Brazil, but he is now considered to be a 
villiant political theoretician. 
| 
Born on 30 October 1911 in Rio do Janeiro, Dantas graduated from the 
Law School of the University 
of Brazil and later served on the University 
faculty 
as a professor of civil law and (for a short time) as director of the 
School. of Philosophye 
In 1951, as economic adviser to the Brazilian delepztion 
to tho OAS Foreign Ministers! Conferenco in Washington, he visibly influenced 
his 
own doleration and impressed U.S. representatives ag a competent and 
dilicent workor. 
Tn 1955 Dantas was appointed the Brazilian member of the 
-‘Inter-tnerican Juridical Comnittes, 
was subsequently elected chairman of the 
Committee 
and in 1957 ho was re~elected to the position. 
When the Jus. elino 
rubitschsk administration was inaugurated 
in January 1956 it was rumored that 
Dantas was in lina for ths Foreign Ministry portfolio, but his comparative 
youth apparently discouraged the President from offering him this cabinet: 
position. 
Later that year he was chosen Shear Han of a committes to study 
constitutional reforms, and in 1957 Dantas 
essumed the directorship of the 
ve nerablo, conservative Jornal. do Com: rele, @ venture which increased his 
.prestige but proved to be a consideradlc iinancial drain; he was forced to 
relinguish tho post two years later. 
In October’1958, when still a relative nowcomar to the ranks of tho Pip, 
Dantes won a decisivo electoral victory in the race for a seat ag national 
from Minny Gerais. 
Who 
record as a suceessful corporation 
Lawyer, his close identification with foreign business interests, and his 
formar connection with the fascist Inteprelist Party oppareatly did not, 
Ciccouraze Dantas frém moving inte labor and soclalist circles vhen these 
to bo pol 
most profitable. 
Retiable sowreces reposted ab this 
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Sora 
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
OFFICE OF CaNTRAD 
BIOGRAPHIC 
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~DANTAS, Francisco Clemontino 
do Santiaso 
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BRAZIL 
time that it Was believad Dantas intended 
to use the PTB as tho channel 
oither to the Presidency itself or to a position from which he could effec- 
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tively influence the incumbent of tho presidential office. 
Chosen in 1959 
as secretary peneral of the PTB's Minas Gerais provincial council and as third 
vico presidont 
of the national party, in March of that year Dantas delivored 
an intellectual justification of tha party program which won for him both 
‘recopnition as the party's outstanding intellectual and tho personal support 
of Vice President Goulart. 
Jt is felt that Dantas will support Goulart until 
tha moment when ho (Dantas) calculates that his next step 
up the political 
Ladder ig opportune. 
In April 1961 Dantas was doscribed as one of tho PTB 
monbvers of « three-party coalition commission organized to study the legalin 
gation of the Brazilian Commnist Party, end his worl on the commission 
is 
believed to havo had Goulart's full approval. 
A civil Jaw specialist 
with a brilliant legal mind, Dantas has been — 
deseribsd as broad-minded, 
an original thinker and receptive to new and 
different approaches to piven problems. 
Jcccrding to responsible U.S sources, — 
he appears to have a better understanding of Brazilian economic and political 
issues than that which is generally fcund among PTB leaders. 
In 1956 Dantas 
was described 
as "wall-disposed" toward the United Statea, but somawhat 
vnfamiliary with United States policy objectives, 
Dantas who is of Porturguose 
extraction, speaks both English and French flucntlye 
TNR/CS/BR 
26 August 1961 
Jad 
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CENTRAL MELLICENCE AGENCY 
OLFICE OF CENTRAL REFERENCE 
BIOGRAPHIC REGICT&R 
KUBITSCHEK de Oliverira, Juscelino 
re 
Senator trom Geias 
Jusezlino Kubitschek, President of Brazil from 1956 to 1961, 
captured the Senate seat from the State of Ceias in June 1961 with 
on astounding electoral victory which eave him almost ninety percent 
the: votes cast. 
Durins his own president tiol term (1956-61) Kubitschek displayed 
"rent 
and consuming interest i 
a | 
n Brazil's economic development, 
laboring (somewhat recklessly, perhaps, 
in view of Brazil's economic 
straits) to implement an extensive program of national development, 
His principal project, and chat of which he is most proud, 
was the 
new capital of Brasilia, but his last days in office were studded 
with inaugurations of impressive, grandiose, and incomplete develop- 
ment projects, 
Kubitschek's preoccupation with economic progress 
torether with his belief that Brazil 
should be recognized as a 
runking member of the nations of the Western Hemisphere led him to 
support an imafinative and ambitious fgreicn policy, 
the chief 
manifestation of which was "Operntion Pan America" 
(OPA), 2 broad 
proposal for economic development in Latin Americc, 
His initial 
senatorial oration was primarily a défense of his administration 
which, he declared has provided a "developmental revolution” bring- 
ing Brazil to “economic sovereirnty", 
His speech was interlarded 
with rebukes for the allered parsimony.or the United States, circuie 
Lous attacks on nis suceessor's economic conservatism, and praise 
tor OPA, which he 
termed "a plan 
so 
OPVMOPr Vane 
chat 
the United States 
had to adopt 
it even though under the name 
‘Alliance for Progress"”, 
He has been very criticsl of the "“cumbersomencss"” 
of the Alliance for 
Propress, 
porn. 
on 
lz 
pepte) 
OP 
Diamantine 
Minis 
Gerais 
impoverished 
Tanily, 
wis only 
two years old whe 
and he hac always used. his mother's aiden 
which As of 
UNLVeYsity OL 
pinas Ger2is 
in 
ana 
the 
Tollowinre vear he borrove 
Fra more’ 
to 
ao. 
work 
ir 
Paris 
and 
in 
Kubitschek 
reported 
OOK 
Mire 
in 
the Ocvober 
revolution 
T 
Tathner 
a
KUBITSCHEK de Oliverira, Juscelino (continued) 
BRAZIL 
which brought the late Getulio Vargas to power, 
His political ascent 
vegan in 1933, when he became secretary to Benedito Valladares, then 
the governor of Minas Gerias, and after having held various political 
and appointive offices in his home state he quickly attained the top 
rung of the political ladder, 
In 1951 Kubitschek was elected governor 
of Minas Gerais, and five years later he was inaugurated as President 
of Brasil, 
ident Goulart's quest for a 
ae He will very probably 
e would appear a likely 
Kubitschek has supported 
Presi 
return to the presidential system in = 
27, 
run for President in 19605 and at this 
Quick-witted and intellircent, Juscelino Kubitschek is a man of 
considerable personal charm, extraordinary enersy, boundless optimism, 
and an excellant sense of humor, 
Astute as a politician, and cifted 
and effective as 2 public speaker, he has always shown himself to his 
best advantage in the field of public relations, and although he was 
relatively obscure on the national political stage at the time he 
became President the reception he has received at his recent public 
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appearances and his impressive electoral victory demonstrate that he 
offers sincere appexl for the Brazilian 
votes. 
‘This appeal has been 
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well-described by Don Jaine Camara, Cardinal of Rio de Janeiro, who 
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has characterized Kubitschek as the last ard createst of the Brazilian 
banisirantes, 
a term connotung @ courageous and swashbuckling pionecr, 
Kubitschek is married to Ssrah Lemos de Kubitschek and is the 
| 
father of two teen-age daughters, Marcia and Maristela, the latter 
of whom 1s adopted. 
He speaks French and hes some knowledge of Spanish 
and Hnglish. 
oy 
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE 
27 September 1961 
g 
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM 
SUBJECT; 
Communist Inroads in the Brazilian Government 
1, 
President Joao Goulart has a long history of 
working with Communists in an effort to increase his 
political strength, particularly in labor groups. 
Since Goulart's inauguration there have been rep. rts that 
the Communists ane:having considerable success in obtain- 
ing jobs in the federal government. 
However, the inad- 
equacy of information on names and jobs thus far allows 
only an incomplete appraisal of the extent of Communist 
inroads. 
2. 
On 25 September 
the American Embassy stated that 
it is concerned over the emerging pattern of Goulart ap- 
pointments "which appears so far significantly weighted 
in favor of the Communists."' 
The embassy noted that it 
was still too early to draw conclusioas but that it was 
"difficult entirely to exclude the possibility that we 
may be witnessing the early stages of an attempted slow- 
motion coup in which Goulart, wittingly or unwittingly, 
is 
paving the way for effective Communist infiltration de- 
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signed as a prelude to an eventual takeover." 
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3. 
Raul Riff, a Communist party member, has been 
appointed private secretary to Goulart. 
Evandro Lins, 
who accompanied Goulart on his visit to Communist China 
this summer, 
has becn appointed attorney general. 
Lins 
has a long history of supporting Communist causes al- 
though his most recent reported activity prior to the 
trip to China was five years ago. 
Declassified by © 
date 
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4, 
Other reports state that Colonel Carlos 
Catroli, a pro-Communist, 
has been appointed chief of 
police in Brasilia arc that, as of 23 September, 
it was 
very likely that General Oromar Osorio, the highest- 
ranking Communist fellow-traveler in the armed forces, 
would be appointed as commander of the strategic Vila 
Militar army garrison in Rio de Janeiro. 
Beth Cajroli 
and Osorio have been reported several times in recent 
years as pro-Communist. 
The reports of their appoint- 
ments have not been confirmed. 
General Osorio was dis- 
missed from 
a key post in March 1960 by President Kubit- 
schek in a general movsz to oust pro-Communists and ultra- 
nationalists frco= ney commands. 
5. 
The appointments of Cairoli and Osorio would 
be particularly serious because Communist penetration 
of the Brazilian army, while slight, 
is greater than in 
other Latin Americin military establishments. 
The divi- 
sion is not clear-out, 
but Communists, pro-Communists 
and ultra-nationalists in the Brazilian army have tended 
since Getulio Vargas’ election campaign in 1950 to belong 
to the faction which supported Vargas and has since sup- 
ported those consi dered his heirs, such as Kubitschek, 
Goulart and Neves. 
6. 
Some reports of Communist appointments have 
proved to be erroneous. 
Pompeu de Souza, reported as a 
Communist who was appointed press secretary, belongs to 
the Social Democratic party cf former President Kubitschek 
and has been associated from 1953 at least until 1960 
with Diario Carioca, 
an anti-Communist newspaper. 
In 
1960 Pompeu was director of Diario Carioca. 
Hermes Lima, 
who was appointed chief of the civil household, 
a post: 
usually occupied by the president's political "fixer," 
was reported to be pro-Communist. 
Ke has been reported 
critical of the US econonic system. 
Lima does not ap- 
pear to be pro-Comsunist however, 
and has stated that he 
felt that the American system was belng modified ina di- 
rection he thought favorable. 
Politically, 
Lima commented, 
Brazil had no choice but to align itself with the United 
States. 
In 1955 Lima was described in a Communist catia 
meeting as "an enemy of the party.” 
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7. 
Uncertainty .»s to the orientation of the new 
government is accentuated by ambiguity in the relation- 
ship between President Goulart and Primo Minister Neves 
and by the opportunistic character 
of many of the men- 
bers of the Council of Ministers. 
in accordance with 
the constitutional amendment of 2 September which es- 
tablished a parliamentary system of government, 
Neves 
should be Brazil's chief executive and Goulart should 
be divested of almcst all power. 
Evidence now avail- 
able, while not conclusive, 
suggests that. in:fact Goulart 
is acting as chief executive and that Neves may be help- 
ing him rather than competing for power. 
8. 
The members of the Council of Ministers are 
characterized by the entvassy as “political opportunists 
of the old school.” 
Never 
is said to be regarded by his 
associates in Minas Gerais as anti-Communist, 
but he ac- 
cepted Communist support in his political campaign for 
governor of the state in 1960. 
He has an equivocal record 
ia the field of public finance. 
The labor minister seems 
to ko a “neutralist" both in international affairs and in 
such domestic affairs as the struggle between Communists 
and non-Communists for contro) of the labor movement, 
The minister of industry is described by the embassy as 
"a sometime ultranationalist whose politics seem to be 
as changeable as his socks." 
The ministers of mines and 
of health are both ultranationsalists and the foreign 
minister is a former fascist now known as a key intellectual 
leader of the left. 
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7 December 1961 
SECRET 
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RECEIVED 
‘Dec 
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ae 
NUMBER 93-2- i. 
SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS FOR BRAZIL 
‘UND! 
COUT MART 
Submitted by the 
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
The following intelligence organizations participated in the 
preparation of tiris estimate: The 
@entral Intelligence Agency 
and the intelligence org entzitong of the Departments of 
State, Defense, the Army, the 
Navy, the Air Force, The 
| 
Joint Siaz, and NSA. 
Concurred in by the 
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD 
on 7 December 1961. 
Concurring were The Director of Intel- 
ligence and Research, Denarimeni of State; Director, Defense 
Intelligence Agency; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intel- 
ligence, Depariment of the Army; the Assistant Chief of 
Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy; 
the Assistant Chief of Stay, Intelligence, USAF; the Director 
Jor Intelligence, Joint Stcaxj; and the Director of the National 
Security Agency. 
The Atomic Energy Commission Repre- 
- 
sentative to the USIB, and the Assistant Director, Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside 
of their jurisdiction. 
Declassified by 
date 
2 MAY 
wo 
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
DISSEMINATION NOTICE 
1, This estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence honey: This copy 
is for the information and use of the recipient and of persons under his jurisdiction on 
need to know basis, 
Additional essential dissemination may. be authorized 
| 
following officials within their respective departments, 
a. Director of Intelligence and Research, for the Department of State 
b. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency 
| 
c. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army 
da. Assistant Chief of Naval — for Intelligence, for the Department of hein 
Navy 
| 
e. Director of Intelligenice, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force 
_f. Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for The Joint Staff 
g. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission 
h. Assistant Director, FBI, for the Fedcral Bureau of Investigation 
4. Director of NSA, for the National Security Agency 
| 
j. Assistant Director for Central Reference, CIA, for any other Department or 
Agency.’ 
2, This copy may be retained or destroyed by burning tn accordance with applicable 
| 
security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrangement with 
the Office of Central Reference, CIA. 
3. When an estimate Is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipfents may retain it 
for a perlod not in excess of one year, 
At the end of this period, the estimate should 
cither be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be requested 
of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953, 
4, The title of this estimate when used separately from the text, should be classified: 
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 
DISTRIBUTION: 
WARNING 
This materia) coxtains 
affecting 
the National 
Defease 
of the United States 
within the meaning “ef the espionage 
laws, 
Title 18, USC, Secs. TOKo 
and 794, the trans- 
mission or revelation 
ef wh ‘ich in any manner 
to an unauthorized 
son 
by law. 
White House 
National Security Council 
Department of State 
Department of Defense 
Atomic Energy Commission 
Federal Bureau of Investigation 
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SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS FOR BRAZIL UNDER GOULART 
THE PROBLEM 
To estimate the outlook for Brazil up to the October 1962 elections, with special 
reference to the orientation and ‘Prospects of the Goulart government. 
CONCL 
\ 
1, The constitutional compromise which 
enabled Goulart to succeed to the Presi- 
dency after Quadros’ resignation in Au- 
gust 1961 has left a confused atmosphere 
in which the locus of executive power is 
uncertain, 
Nevertheless, 
Goulart 
has 
emerged as considerably more than a fig- 
urehead President and his principal con- 
cern will be to maintain and, if possible, 
to increase the prestige and power of the 
Presidency and of his Brazilian Labor 
Party (PTB). 
To this end, he will exploit 
his influence in labor and leftist circies 
while seeking to avoid undue offense to 
conservative elements, particularly the 
military, who continue to view him with 
suspicion because of his long record of col- 
laboration with the Commuiutists. 
Mean- 
while, the various political forces will be 
jockeying for control of the executive 
power and for victory in the October 1962 
elections. 
(Paras. 5-11, 15-16, 19, 23-24) 
2. In these circumstances the short- 
' 
range prospects for the growth of Com- 
munist influence in Brazil are favorable. 
The Communists will benefit by the toler- 
SIONS 
ance not only of Goulart but of many 
ovher Brazilian political leaders. 
They 
will probably encounter little effective 
competition or governmental restriction 
in their efforts to entrench themselves in 
areas where agrarian and social unrest is 
most acute and will also benefit to some 
extent by the entry of additional party 
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members or sympathizers into the bu- 
reaucracy. However, it is unlikely that 
Communist infiltration of the govern- 
ment will go so far as to give the Commu- 
nist Party a significant influence on the 
formulation and execution of policy with- 
in the period of this estimate. 
(Paras. 
12, 18, 25-26) 
3. The initial indecisiveness of the new 
government and the blow to national con- 
fidence engendered by the succession 
crisis have caused a new decline in Brazil’s 
economic and financial situation. 
Never- 
theless, given the continued disburse- 
ment of the credits called for in the May 
1961 aid package, the government can 
probably keep going financially until the 
fall of 1962, though no substantial im- 
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provement in the basic causes of the 
country’s financial 
disequilibrium _ is 
likely. 
Although legislation on the re- 
forms promised by Quadros and espoused 
by the current administration will prob- 
ably be enacted, it is not likely to be sumM- 
cient 
to assuage popular 
discontent. 
Thus the regime is likely to be plagued by 
recurring political crises and possibly by 
breakdowns in public order. 
On balance, 
however, we believe that Goulart and the 
present constitutional system will prob- 
ably survive up to the October 1962 clec- 
tions. 
It is less likely that the present 
~ Council of Ministers will last that long. 
(Paras. 20-22, 27-29) 
4. The present government will continue 
to emphasize the “independent” charac- 
ter of its foreign policy, but the need for 
US financing, as well as domestic political 
considerations, will probably render it less 
truculent toward the US than was the 
Quadros administration. 
Although Bra- 
zil has already re-established diplomatic 
‘relations with the USSR, development of 
diplomatic and economic ties with Bloc 
countries will probably not go much be- 
yond the existing framework. 
Brazil will 
aimost certainly continue to oppose sanc- 
tions against Castro, though if most ma- 
jor Latin American states were disposed 
to take some limited action, it would prob- 
ably go along. 
(Para, 31) 
DISCUSSION 
INTRODUCTION 
5, The sudden resignation of President Janio 
Quadros on 25 August 1961 plunged Brazil 
into a constitutional crisis. 
Although Brazil- 
jans take considerable pride in the fact that 
the crisis was resolved without bloocshed, 
Brazil did suffer a serious national setback, 
the effects of which will be felt for some time 
to come. 
Abroad, Brazil’s ability to enlarge 
its role in international affairs has been re- 
duced, at least for the time being, and inside 
Brazil the prestige of the armed forces—the 
truditional 
guarantors 
of 
constitutional 
order-—has been diminished. 
The political 
crisis occasioned a loss of public confidence 
Which undermined steps taken by Quadros 
toward 
greater financial stability through 
budget cuts, climination of import subsidies, 
and 
similar 
short-run 
reforms. 
Occupied 
since it came to office principally with adjust- 
ment to a new form of government and a re- 
‘alignment of power groups, the present ad- 
has not moved decisively regard- 
g the array of basic reforms which Quadros 
promised but was unable to implement. 
In- 
flation is again on the increase and political 
tensions are rife, 
6. Quadros’ 
résignation 
after 
only 
seven 
months in office appears to have been the re- 
action of an unstable personality, ambitious 
for power, but frustrated by the difficulties of 
coping effectively with Brazil’s chronic prob- 
lems. 
Some of his reforms had damaged in- 
fluential special interests; Congress and poli- 
ticians of all stripes had become disturbed 
over his growing tendency to centralize power 
in his own hands; and the normally easy going 
Brazilians began to resent his efforts to apply 
Stricter moral standards to many aspects of 
public 
life. 
He came 
under 
increasingly 
heavy fire from the military and other con- 
servatives over what they regarded as his 
© 
partiality for tne Bloc and Cuba. 
‘Thus, al- 
though Quadros had come to office with a 
popular mandate and great hopes, he found 
himself laboring in an atmosphere of criticism 
and 
obstruction. 
Always 
emotional 
and 
sensitive, Quadros quit, probably counting on 
being recalled immediately with strengthened 
powers. 
However, to his apparent great sur- 
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prise, Congress quickly accepted his resigna- 
tion. 
7. In the ensuing political struggle between 
those who favored constitutional succession 
and those opposed to Vice President Joao 
(“Jango”) Goulart, civil conflict seemed near. 
The Ministers of War, Navy, and Air strongly 
opposed Goulart because of his long record of 
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collaboration with the Communists in labor 
and politics. Most of the armed forces re- 
mained loyal to their ministers. 
A major ex- 
ception was the powcrful Third Army in Rio 
Grande do Sul, which supported Governor 
Leonel Brizola’s' campaign on Goulait’s be- 
half. 
Additionally, there were manifestations 
of indiscipline in other military elcments. 
Over several days it became apparent that 
both public and congressional opinion backed 
a solution along constitutional 
lincs, even 
though Goulart himself was not notably popu- 
lar, 
These pressures, combined with divisions 
within the military, forced the military leaders 
to accept a comproinise. 
8. This compromise was embodied in a hastily 
drawn coustitutional amendment which estab- 
lished a parliamentary form of government, 
patterned along European lines, in piace of the 
traditional Brazilian system in which the 
Presidency 
has been predominant. 
Presi- 
dential powers were drastically curtailed and 
exccutive power was placed in the hands of a 
Council 
of Ministers 
responsible 
to 
the 
‘Chamber of Deputies. 
Goulart accepted this 
arrangement, and was installed on 8 Sep- 
tember 1961 to serve until 31 January 1966. 
Tancredo Neves, a member of ex-President 
Kubitschek's 
Social Democratic 
Party, be- 
came President of a Council of Ministers in 
which all major parties were represented in 
proportion to their strength in Congress.? 
'Goulart’s brother-in-law and Governor of Gou- 
lart’s home state of Rio Grande do Sul. 
Brizola— 
heretofore unimportant as a national figure—has 
long been a supporter of leftist and ultranationalist 
causes, 
‘Brazil's three principal partics are the Social 
Democratic Party (PSD), the National Democratic 
Union (UDN), and the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB). 
These parties are hetcrogencous in makeup and 
ideology, 
and party discipline is notably Jacking in 
each. 
i. THE CURRENT SITUATION 
A. General 
9. In the first two months after Goulart as- 
sumed office, the Council of Ministers and the 
Congress were occupied with adapting to un- 
familiar roles, and the President was explor- 
ing the reorganized system of relationships 
among 
the 
various 
governmental 
powers. 
During this dificult period of adjustment, the 
new administration as a whole was faced by 
the same 
political and economic obstacles 
which 
had frustrated Quadros’ 
efforts 
to 
tackle basic social and economic reforms. 
In 
addition, it was handicapped by Jess popular 
confidence and less clear lines of authoritv 
than the preceding administration. 
The re- 
sulting Jack of action has contributed to a 
pervasive atmosphere of political uncertainty 
with particularly adverse effects on the eco- 
nomic situation. 
However, during the past 
month there have been some indications that 
ine Council of Ministers may be coming to 
evips with the most critical immediate prob- 
lems, notably inflation. 
8. President Goulart 
10. Goulart 
has emerged 
e5 
considerably 
more than a figurehead President. 
His ability 
to use his appointive power has been rein- 
forced by his position as head of the Brazilian 
Labor Party (PTB). 
He has been aided by 
the fact that Prime Minister Tancredo Neves 
has not chosen to engage in open dispute on 
the issue of executive powers. 
Neves is a 
relatively colorless example of an old-line op- 
portunistic Brazilian politician. 
11. There are significant personal as well as 
constitutional and political limits to Goulart’s 
influence ani freedom of action. 
In part 
these restrictions stem from his character and 
reputation. 
/\ confirmed opportunist even by 
Brazilian standards, the wealthy Goulart has 
yet to reveal any strongly-held political or 
economic philosophy, and has been frequently 
© 
linked with corruption. 
He owes much of his 
rapid political rise to former dictator Getulio 
Vargas, who permitted him to build a personal 
following in the important PTB by the use 
of government funds and patronage. 
Even 
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though Goulart stil! :eads the PTB and 
~ 
been vocal on behalf of ultranationalist and 
, popular reform issues, some leftist elements 
_ continue to suspect his motives. 
“12. Goulart is not known to be a Communist, 
‘but he has a long history of seeking and re- 
ceiving Communist suppert, and has given 
the Communists considerable freedom of ac- 
| tion within the labor movement in return for 
electoral backing. 
His recent appointments, 
although designed principally to entrench 
himself and his party, have included a num- 
ver of other figures frequently associated with 
pro-Communist fronts or causes. 
He has ap- 
pointed 
as his own private cecrelary an 
avowed Communist, Raul Ryff. 
In the cycs 
of conservatives and most of the military, 
these appointments justify the deep distrust 
with which they view Goulart, and reinforce 
their conviction that they -must kccp a close 
watch on him. 
13. Despite these limitations, however, Gou- 
lart has over many years demonstrated a 
capacity fur political survival, shrewd Jjudg- 
ment, and expedient action, motivated by 
strong personal ambition—formidable asscts 
_in the arena of Brazilian politics. 
Political Considerations 
M4. Any Brazilian administration confronts a 
wide varicty of entrenched interests working 
at cross-purposes on both the national and 
state levels. 
‘Thirtcen heterogeneous political 
partics, as well as powerful agricultural, com- 
mercial, 
industrial, 
labor, 
military, 
and 
Church interests, compete for power and in- 
Mucence. 
The situation is further complicated 
by the existence of strong regional interests 
and loyaltics which often conflict, notably as 
between the backward agricultural north and 
the modern industrialized south. 
Under the 
jaterest 
15. Conditioned to Brazil's former system of a 
strong Presidency along US lines, Congress 
has not yet established 
the implementing 
machinery for parliamentary government en- 
visaged in the hastily devised constitutional 
amendment. 
Nor have Neves and the Council 
of Ministers as yet taken any major initiative 
in the exercise of their newly won executive 
power. 
The Council was selected to provide a 
broad representation of the political parties in 
Congress, and has thus far shown little ability 
to undertake strong action on its own initia- 
tive. 
In these 
circumstances, 
neither 
the 
Congress nor the Council of Ministers appears 
eager at this time for an open test of strength 
with the President, 
16. The constitutional amendment of Sep- 
tember does not clearly spell out the lines of 
© 
executive authority and this has intensified 
jockeying along traditional party and special 
lines. 
Even were the locus of author- 
ity clear, the administration would be unatie 
to count on a stable parliamentary majority.® 
For the moment, an arrangement between the 
PSD, 
of which Neves is a member, and the 
UDN provides the required majority. 
How- 
ever, strong conscrvative elements in these 
_ two parties are particularly unhapp: about 
Neves’ apparent submissiveness to Goulart. 
Meanwhile, the more leftist PTB, apparently 
taking its cue from the President, has reserved 
its position toward the Neves cabinet 
(al- 
though supplying two ministers) in order to 
escape blame for current difficulties, 
17, With the approach of the campaign for 
the October 1962 election, the government has 
come under increased political sniping from 
*PRESENT COMPOSITION OF THE BRAZILIAN 
CONGRESS 
(Party discipline is poor and changes in party aMilia- 
tion are frequent during parliamentary sessions.) 
CHAMBER OF 
Brazilian federal system, considerable power 
Party 
Deputies 
SENATE 
remains in the hands of the State Govern-' 
Social Democrats (PSD) 
....... 
114 
ments. 
The controversial pe.sonality of the 
Vemocratic National Union (UDN) 
tdent has 
tended to e 
ata th 
Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) ..... 
new President 
has 
te 
xacerba 
€ 
Social Progressive Party (PSP).... 
friction with these powerful intcrest groups 
Minor Parties .................... 
and to restrict Goulart’s authority. 
ee 
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‘all sides. 
The entire lower house of the legis- 
lature, two-thirds of the Senate, and half the 
State Governors are to be clected. 
Already, 
ultranationalists and confirmed leftists, led 
by Brizola, Governor Borges Teixera of Goias, 
and the Communist Mayor of Reeife, Miguel 
Arraes, have formed the extremist National 
Liberation Front to unite the forces of radical 
nationalism behind a program for immediate 
and far-reaching social and economic reforms 
in an effort to win control of Congress. Mean- 
while, former President Janio Quadros awaits 
an opportune time to return to national po- 
litical 
life, possibly in alliance with these 
leftist forces. 
18. The present situation offers increased P 
portunities for Communist advances. 
In a 
sociation with the National Liberation Fr ont 
and the Peasant Leagues of the northeast, the 
PCB is in good position to exploit popular dis- 
content 
over current economic hardships. 
Meanwhile, the PCB is moving ahead with its 
campaign to re-establish itself as a legal party. 
The PCB has attacked Goulart 
in terms 
similar 
to 
those 
used 
against 
Quadros 
(“entreguista,” or one who hands over the 
national patrimony to foreigners). 
D, The Armed Forces 
19. The armed forces remain an important 
political factor despite serious internal divi- 
sions and loss of prestige as a result of their 
leaders’ abortive effort to bar Goulart from 
office. 
The military leaders have accepted 
Goulart as the President, but they still mis- 
trust him, and he knows it. 
Thus, they con- 
stitute a major check on any Goulart disposi- 
tion to swing Brazil significantly to the left in 
domestic or foreign affairs. 
Goulart has been 
careful to refrain from antagonizing the mili- 
tary. 
Although he has removed officers hos- 
tile to him, he has been careful to replace 
SCRE T™ 
E. Economic 
20. The serious economic and financial diffi- 
culties which had been building up in Brazil 
over the last few years were abated to some ex- 
tent 
in mid-1961, 
primarily 
through 
the 
negotiation of a $1.3 billion foreign aid and 
devt extension package in May. 
However, 
the political crisis precipitated by Quadros’ 
resignation led to a new decline. 
Inflationary 
pressures, reflected in cost-of-living increases 
of 39 and 30 percent in 1959 and 1960, respec- 
tively, have sharply revived. 
Over the past 12 
months price indexes have risen by 35 percent. 
Prices on some staples have risen as much as 
3S percent since late August, partly in expec- 
vaiion of increases in the minimum wage, 
which were approved in October. 
Workers 
already receiving above the minimum wage 
— 
have meanwhile struck for commensurate in- 
creases to maintain their relative incomes. 
In the wake of a flight of capital during the 
crisis, a gold-buying spree, and continuing 
speculative pressure, the cruzeiro has dropped 
from 260 to about 350 to the US dollar. 
The 
cruzciro remains under pressure despite im- 
provement in the basic trade position and the 
inflow of financial aid under the May 1961 
agreement, 
21, Neves and the capable Minister of Finance, 
Moreira Salles, are encountering substantial 
political obstacles in their efforts to control 
inflation, 
They have felt impelled to grant a 
40 percent increase in the minimum wage, 
but even this may not suffice to hold down 
labor demands. 
Curbs on easy bank credit 
are politically difficult to impose and enforce, 
The monctary authorities have taken some 
steps to jimit money issuance until the end of 
the year, and new exchange regulations have 
them, in almost every case, with competent 
_ 
professional officers acceptable to their pcers. 
Nevertheless, military foes of Goulart, includ- 
ing the recently resigned Ministers of Air and 
Navy, are actively plotting against him and 
arc sccking civilian backing. 
» 
been issued to curb financial speculation and 
the depreciation of the currency. 
However, 
the modification of the free-exchange system 
Which Quadros had instituted may open the 
door to a return of the costly import subsidies 
which are popular with the public at large. 
In addition Lo keeping credit expansion under 
contro) and restraining speculation, the gov- 
ernment 
is secking to reduce the budget 
deficit. 
It is also pressing for continuation of 
external assistance under the May 1961 agree- 
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ment—principally from the US. 
The situa- 
' 
tion is complicated by the fact that since June 
Brazil has not met some of the conditions laid 
down by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) in connection with this agreement. 
22. It is still too early to assess the effective- 
ness of the government’s emergency measures. 
There is a continuing threat of strikes for 
higher wages, and public dissatisfaction over 
the current high rate of inflation persists. 
Meanwhile, 
ambitious 
plans 
for 
putting 
through agrarian, tax and banking reforms, 
antitrust and banking legislation, and other 
mieasures designed 
to correct basic weak- 
nesses in the Brazilian economic and jnancial 
structure have bogged down as a result of the 
political 
preoccupations 
and 
uncertainvics 
which have followed Quadros’ resignation. 
On the other hand, the government is press- 
ing Congress to enact a new tax program and 
js making progress on a constructive cofice 
policy. 
The task of remedying traditionally — 
inflationary credit practices, annual budget 
imbalances, and yearly trade and balance of 
payments deficits is so large as to presage a 
long period of continuing economic diMicuities. 
ll, THE OUTLOOK 
23. President Goulart is a shrewd and flexible — 
politician who is intent on remaining in office 
and would like to expand his authority. 
Al- 
though his tendency to rely on political agility 
as a sulstitute for policy is likely to handicap 
him, he can marshal an impressive array of 
assets, 
His long identification with organized 
— 
lubor will continue to make him highly ac- 
ceptable to the left gencrally—and will also 
provide him with some leverage in dealing 
with labor demands. 
The ultranationalist 
stand he has taken on such issues as public 
ownership of key industries and utilities is 
well-known and popular. 
He has been largely 
successful 
in disclaiming responsibility 
for 
Brazil's current difficulties and will benefit 
from the widespread desire of most Brazilians 
to avoid another national crisis, 
24. Goulart’s reputation for leftward proclivi- 
tics is a liability both in many influential 
circles and in his relations with other coun- 
trics important to Brazil, notably the US. 
However, he is well aware of this impression 
ard is making some efforts to dispel it. 
Al- 
though the armed forces will continue to 
watch him closely, the military, for the most 
part, appear ready to permit Goulart to re- 
main in office so long as he respects the 
present constitutional limitations on his ex- 
ecutive powers and avoids extreme leftist in- 
trigues and alliances. 
25. Goulart will probably avoid asscciations 
with the Communists or other ultraleftists of 
a kind likely to stir up strong opposition on 
the part of the military. 
By the same token, 
inowever, he is unlikely to have any qualms 
about cooperating with the Communists or 
(heir sympathizers when it appears to serve 
his purpose. 
His appointments will probably 
continue to include some individuals who have 
records of sympathy with the Communists. 
Despite the criticism now being leveled at him 
by PCB spokesmen, he will probably continue 
to take a generally tolerant position toward 
the party and, where 
local circumstances 
justify it, his PTB will continue to work with 
the Communists in particular elections and 
on various issues. 
On occasion, Goulart is 
likely to advocate policies also endorsed by the 
Communists, arguing that they should not be 
allowed to assume leadership of the reform 
movement by default. 
26. Thus the short-range prospects for the 
growth of Communist influence in Brazil are 
favorable. 
The Communists wil] benefit by 
the tolerance not only of Goulart but of many 
other Brazilian political leaders. 
They will 
probably encounter little effective competition 
or governmental restriction in their efforts to 
entrench themselves in areas where agrarian 
and social unrest is most acute and will also 
benefit to some extent by the entry of addi- 
tional party members or sympathizers into 
the bureaucracy. 
However, it is unlikely that 
Communist infiltration of the government will 
go so far as to give them a Significant influence 
on the formulation and execution of policy 
within the period of this estimate. 
Moreover, 
the PCB still labors under the handicap of not 
being a legal party, and though efforts are 
being made to secure official recognition, it is 
unlikely that the legal obstacles can be over- 
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‘ome in time for the Communists openly to 
their own candidates in the 1962 eclec- 
Jjons. 
They will offset this handicap, as in 
he past, by some infiltration of the slates of 
egal parties and by political bargains with 
ypportunist non-Communist elements. 
The 
-Sommunists have probably achieved some 
yenetration of the armed forces, principally at 
the noncommissioned officer level, and this 
night prove to be a useful asset under con- 
Jitions of major civil disturbance. 
27. In view of the central importance of the 
rconomic situation in influencing popular af- 
situdes, much will depend on how much suc- 
sess the government has in obtaining crcdits, 
3- velopment capital, debt postponements, and 
sther forms of external assistance for Brazil. 
Siven the continued disbursement 
of the 
ercdits called for in the May 1961 aid package, 
the government can probably keep golug 
financially until the fall of 1962, though no 
substantial improvement in the basic causes 
of the country’s financial disequilibrium is 
likely. 
28. Although 
Iegislation 
on 
the 
reforms 
promised by Quadros and espouscd by the cur- 
rent administration will probably be enacted, 
it is not likely to be sufficient to assuage popu- 
discontent. 
Powerful 
special 
intercst 
groups will oppose significant reforms or any 
far-reaching attack on the root causes of 
Thus we be- 
. 
Brazil's economic difficulties. 
lieve that the regime is likely to be plagued 
by recurring political crises and possibly by 
breakdowns in public order. 
29. In such crisis situations, Goulart’s actions 
would be of major importance. 
His first in- 
clination would be to ride out the storm, tak- 
ing no action that would jeopardize the elec- 
toral chances of his partisans. 
If he felt 
compclicd to take affirmative action, he would 
probably be disposed to press for increasingly 
Ieftist solutions and to seek greater Presi- 
dential powers. 
He would nevertheless, prob- 
ably attcmpt to work out with the military 
Jeaders some 
sort of agreed action, thus 
minimizing the risk of a military takeover. 
He might, though we consider it unlikely, re- 
sign, castigating conservative opposition and 
Congressional inaction. 
On balance, we be- 
lieve that Goulart and the present constitu- 
tional system will probably survive up to the 
October 1962 elections. 
It is less likely that 
the present Council of Ministers will last that 
long. 
30. The present regime will face its first elec- 
toral test in the October 1962 elections for 
Congress and for State Governors. 
Given the 
multiplicity of political parties and interests 
in Brazil, the results are likely to be incon- 
clusive. It is possible that the elections may 
provide opportunity for a political comeback 
by ex-President Quadros, who could legally 
because Prime Minister if his supporters con- 
trol the new Congress. 
Despite the bad taste 
left in many mouths by his sudden resigna- 
“ion, Quadros has apparently not completely 
iost the magnetic appeal which swept him into 
cince inearly 1961, 
Ex-President Kubitschek, 
who has retained his personal popularity, is 
now a Senator and seems to have his eye on 
the Presidency in 1965 with restoration of full 
powers. 
Goulart might also emerge in a sig- 
nificantly strengthened 
position, especially 
| 
since the growth of pressure for social and 
economic change might result in election of 
a new Congress considerably more leftist in 
orientation than the present one. 
31. During the period of this estimate Brazil- 
jan foreign policy will probably be less ven- 
turcsome 
than 
it promised 
to be under 
Quadros. 
At least until the October 1962 
elections, the need for large-scale US financial 
assistance will pose some restraint on Brazi)- 
jan policy. 
For this reason, and because of 
domestic political considerations, the present 
government will probably not have as trucu- 
lent an attitude toward the US as did Quadros. 
Although Brazil has already re-established 
diplomatic relations with the USSR, develop- 
ment of diplomatic and economic ties with 
Bloc countries will probably not go much be- 
yond the existing framework. 
Brazil's aspira- 
tions to great power status have obviously 
been set back, at least for the present, and 
the problem of getting along with Brazil's 
Latin American neighbors will loom larger in 
Brazilian thinking. 
Nevertheless, Brazil will 
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wobably continue to emphasize the “inde- 
vendent” character of its foreign policy. 
For 
hese reasons it will almost certainly continue 
© oppose sanctions against Castro, although 
An 
it would probably agree to some kind of 
- 
limited action if it seemed certain that most of 
the major Latin American states were dis- 
posed to take such steps. 
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i
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE 
30 March 1962 — 
| 
ocr No. 1260/62 
Copy No. 
& 
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM 
SUBJECT; Brazilian President Joao Goulart 
he 
Inaugurated President on 7 beptenber 1961 follow- 
ing the resignation of Janio Quadros, Joxo Goulart is a rich 
and energetic landholder and lawyer, 
Despite considerable 
apparent training for the presidency as political protégé of 
former President Getulio Vargas and vice president under both 
Juscelino Kubitschek and Quadros, Goulart apparently assumed 
the office with no clear ideas on national policy, 
He has con- 
ciliated much of the strong opposition to him which threatened 
Brazil with civil war immediately prior to his inauguration, 
In recent months he has largely allayed the fears aroused by 
his past political associations with the Communists, although 
he has not taken any decisive =teps against them, 
Goulart has 
not, however, made his domestic policies clear, 
In foreign 
‘affairs, he is following the "independent" line initiated by 
Quadros,although his regime has not indulged in Quadros' petty 
harassment of US officials, 
| 
2. 
Goulart, who is 
known by his nickname 
was born 12 March 1918 at Sao Borja, Rio Grande do Sul, into a 
well-to-do ranching family of Portuguese and French descent. 
He obtained 
a law degree from the University of Rio Grande do 
Sul in 1939 but did not emerge 
on the political scene until 
1945 when he was elected 
to the State Legislative Assembly of 
Rio Grande do Sul, 
Jp the same year he helped Vargas found 
the leftist Brazilian Labor Party, now one of the country's 
three most powerful parties, 
Goulart became national chairman 
of the party in 1952, and in 1953 became Minister of Labor un-- 
der Vargas, 
Goulart's tenure was marked by a growth of Com- 
munist strength in the labor movement. 
This growth and an ef- 
fort by Goulart to change the relationship between labor's min- 
imum wage and the pay of army enlisted men in favor of labor 
aroused the military who forced his ouster from the c 
cabinet in 
February 
1954, 
Declassitied by 
SECRET 
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3. 
Juscelino Kubitschek accepted Goulart as a running 
mate in the 1955 elections 
in return for support from the La- 
bor Party which Goulart has continued to control, 
Despite 
their success 
in the election, relations between the two men: 
did not become close, 
During the Kubitschek regime, however, 
Goulart was allowed to exercise government influence in the 
labor movement in his own behalf, and he dealt extensively with 
Communist labor leaders, 
| 
. 
4, 
Goulart ran for the vice presidency in 1960 on 
ticket which ostensibly opposed the presidential naaaienss of 
Janio Quadros, 
There was considerable cooperation between the 
two candidates, however, 
and both were elected under the Bra- 
zilian system which permits election of a president and vice 
president from opposing tickets, 
After the election, Quadros 
made derogatory allegations against Goulart in presidential in- 
vestigative reports aid considerable hostility developed be- 
tween the two, 
In the last weeks of the Quadros regime, Goulart 
visited Poland, the USSR, and Communist China where he went out 
of his way to praise the Successes of Mao Tse-tung and the Chi- 
— 
nese Communists, 
Ds 
Goulart’ s attitude toward the United States, which 
he visited in 1356, has been changeable, 
He is usually more 
willing to make friendly remarks about the United States in 
private conversation than in public, 
In a May 1961 conversa~ 
tion with a US official, however, 
he stated that the Cuban in- 
vasion had cost the United States considerable prestige and 
added that the Russians knew how to do these things, 
6, 
Goulart is marricd to Maria Teresa Fontela, 
They 
have a five-year-old son, Jono Vicente, and a three-year-old 
daughter, Denise, 
Goulart's sister 
is the wife of Rio Grande 
do Sul Governor Leonel Brizola. 
Goulart is fluent in Spanish 
as well as Portuguese but is reported to speak no English, 
i 
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a 
Prem...
This material contains Information offecting the Natlonal Dofanse of the United States withla the mening of the 
lows, Title 18, 
Secs. 
- 
793 and 794, the transmission or aaleten of which In any monner to oo vnauthortred person Is prohibited 
by low 
| 
: 
CLAS SIFICATION 
— DISSEMINATION CONTROLS 
| 
UBJECT STATEMENTS OF FINANCE MINISTER 
RET RA DATEDISTR. 
29 may 1962 
SALLES CONCERNING POSSIBLE 
“BRAZILIAN NATIONAL LEADERSHI2 
PRECEDENCE 
ROUTINE 
REFERENCES 
IN: 
. 
Toes=3/511,595 
1ACE 
er 
MAY 1962) 
AL 
 PPRAISAL 2 (REPORTORIAL accuracy) 
FIELD REPORT NO. 
| 
ts UNEVALUATED 
GRADINGS ARG DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT 
‘ource 
| 
1, DURING LATE MAY 1962, FINANCE MINISTER WALTER MOREIRA SALLES 
SAID THAT 
IN MID-MAY PRES JOAO GOULART HAO DEFINITELY DECIDED.TO RE- 
SIGN BUT HAD APPARENTLY CHANGED HIS MIND, 
SALLES BELIEVED IF GOULART 
REQUESTED AND WAS GRANTED A LEAVE OF ABSENCE BECAUSE OF HIS HEART 
| 
CONDITION, THE PRESIDENT_PRO TEMPORE MAY BE SUBJECT TO STRONG IN- 
FLUENCE FROM THE MILITARY, 
HE SAID THAT, IN HIS OPINION, IF PRIME 
: 
MINISTER TANCREDO NEVES LEFT HIS POST, NEVES WOULD BE REPLACED BY A 
| 
MEMBER OF THE MILITARY, 
SALLES SAID GOULART HAD OFFERED HIM PRIME 
MINISTERSHIP AND, ALTHOUGH HE HAD NOT REFUSED POSITION, HE BELIEVED 
IT-UNLIKELY THAT HE WOULD BE ABLE TO ASSUME THIS POST BECAUSE OF 
POLITICAL OPPOSITION, 
SALLES ADDED THERE WAS A-POSSIBILITY THAT IF 
STATE | ARMY/ACSI 
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AIR | Jcs | SECDEF | NSA | NIC 
| USIA | OC! — J OCR | ORR | CO TDIA | 
LELEGRA 
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ff 
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EXO 
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ToCS ~3/512,257 
(When Filled In) 
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS CONTINUED TO WORSEN, THERE WOULD 
BE NO ELECTIONS IN OCTOBER 1962. 
HE QUALIFIED THIS STATEMENT BE ADD= 
ING IF GOULART REMAINED. AS PRESIDENT, “AND IF THE CABINET WERE RE- 
ORGANIZED AND STAFFED WITH COMPETENT INDIVIDUALS, THE CHANCES WERE 
GOOD ELECTIONS WOULD BE HELD AS SCHEDULED. 
2. FIELD DISSEM: STATE CINCLANT CINCARIB. 
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END OF MESSAGE. 
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ah. 
GR 
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
This material contains 
Information affecting the Notional Defense of the United States within the 
of the 
lows, Tit 
793 ond 794, the ‘trassmtsston or 
revelation of which In any manner fo an uncuthovized peron Is prohibited by low 
VAM: IX JRMATION REP 
‘COUNTRY BRAZIL 
REPORTNO. 
TDCS~3/515,678 
SUBJECT PLANS OF BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT 70 CANCEL... 
DATEDISTR: 3 JULY 1962 f LF 
CONCESSION OF HANNA CORPORATION AS FIRST 
+ STEP IN EXPROPRIATING ITS LAND AND PHYSICAL 
PRECEDENCE PRIORITY 
SOETS 
(28 JUNE 62) 
FIELD REPORTNO./ 
TIMING TO BE DETERMINED BY GOULART. | 
aes 
1, Oly 28-JUNE 62 A BUSINESS ASSOCIATE OF PRESIDENT JOAO a 
THIS 1s U 
UNEVALUATED 
DEFINITIVE, APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TEN TIVE 
GOULART SAID THAT ON 25 JUNE GOULART HAD SIGNED A DECREE CAN-—ycopmerat 
CELLING THE MINERAL CONCESSION OF THE HANNA CORPORATION IN ect oe 
THE DECREE 1S EXPECTED TO BE ISSUED WITHIN TWO WEEKS, THE, EXACT 
patie 
ACCORDING TO 
GOULART'S BUSINESS ASSOCIATE, THIS ACTION ON THE PART OF THE 
FEDERAL GOVT WAS bs BE FOLLOWED BY A SIMILAR /PORTION GARBLED - 
EAL 
ARMY/ACS! 
| NAVY| AIR | JCS | SECDEF 
| NSA | NIC 
ORR | 
TOY, EXY, SHORET SERVICE 7. 
REC 
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INFO... 28 JUNE 1962 
PLACE & 
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INFORMATION REPORT
— 
CLASSIFICATION~ 
.SSEMINATION CONTROLS 
21169 
TDCS-3/515,678 
‘pe 
TO BRAZIL, THUS LEAVING IT OPEN TO BE CONSTRUED AS A CALCULATED. 
’ 
ATTEMPT TO CAUSE THE CANCELLATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S visit, 
COMMENTS THE DIARIO OFFICIAL PUBL I SHED A "DESPACHO", 
SIGNED BY THE LATE MINISTER OF MINES AND ENERGY GABRIEL PASSOS ON 
1 JUNE 6%, CANCELLING IRREGULARLY-REGISTERED 
MINING. RIGHTS AND 
PROVIDING FOR OPERATION OF PROPERTIES BY GOVERNMENT=CONTROL“ED 
ENTERPRISES, IT 1S POSSIBLE THAT THE ABOVE REPORT 1S BASED ON 
THIS 
DISSEMS STATE ARMY NAVY AIR FBI. 
¥HEADQUARTERS COMMENT? MISSING. PORTION WILL BE DISSEMINATED ONLY.UF 
UT 
| 
MATERIALLY AFFECTS THE SENSE OF THIS REPORT. 
__END OF MESSAGE 
(When putes In) 
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BEING SERVICED/ INSPIRED BY POLITICAL 
THE “ACT ION 
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SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE JUST BEFORE THE V!SIT OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY 
CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS 
* 
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; 
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Sy 
Pen...
i 
This matertat 
alec! 
National Defense of the United Statos within the meaning of the Esplonage Laws, 
18, U.S.C, Seem 
793 and 
the 
oF revelation of which fa aay mennere to an unauthorized pervon Is prokibited by law, 
-BRAZTL 
-REPORTNO, TDCS -3/519,7h5 
 HESITANCY OF PRESINENT GOULAN T¢- 
DATEDISTR, 
avonsT 1962 
TAKE ACTION IN PRESENT CRISIS 
| 
YRECEDENCE 
noe 
DESTROY - 
‘ATE ACQ. 
| 
WUNEVALUATED 
SOURCE 
DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF 
1. IN EAMLY AUGUST PRESIDENT GOULANT WAS NOT 
“NT HIS NEXT MOVE 
WOULD BE IN HIS MANEUVERINGS WITH THE FEDER"L CONGRESS, HE BELIEVED THAT, 
| 
_- BY GRANTING POLITAL FAVORS WITHIN THE CONGRESS, HE COULD WIN ENOUGH VOTES 
TO INSURE THE GRANTING OF SPECIAL POWERS TO PRIME MDVISTER BROCHADO DA ROCHA 
AND TO HAVE AN EARLY DATE SET FOR THE PLEBISCITE TO RETURN TO THE PRESINENTIAL 
SYSTEM. HOWEVER, SINCE HE FELT THAT FOR POLITICAL REASONS HE COWLD NOT ENTER INTO 
NEGOTIATIONS WITH AMARAL PEIKOTO, 
OF THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST 
PARTY (PSD), HE HESTTATED TO TO 
THIS. (SOURCE SOMENT: “HAT THE POLITICAL 
REASONS MENPTONED ANE IS UNKNOWN. SINCE THERE IS NO QNESTION THAT GOLAN 
TURCHASE THE VOTES OF MANY MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITION BY GRANTTNG POLITICAL FATO"S, 
| 
THE REASONS TOR HIS HESITANCY ANS UNCLEAR. POSSIBLY HE NOES NOT WANT TO TTP HIS 
CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS 
STATE | 
[Navy] air | Jcs | SECOEF | NSA 
Nic | 
Oc! | ONE | OCR | ORR| 
O 
**e* 
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| LIKEWISE HE HESITATE D 70 USE THE MILITARY TO SUPPORT HIS POSTTTON 
ON 
SLEBISCITS AND THE DELEGATION OF SPECIAL 
TO 
MINISTER, 
ALTHOUGH HE FELT: THAT HE He) THE MILITARY LEADERS UNTER HIS CONTROL. 
(Sourcg COOENT: MILITARY TEADSRS IN BRASILIA no NOT GIVE THE IMPRESSION 
TAT PRESIDENT GOULART HAS THE 
OF MILITARY SUPPORT WHICH FE 
; 
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: 
* 
* 
‘ 
CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS 
* 
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“th material contatas talermation affecting the 
Cefense ef to Untied Shales 
the 
the 
and 
the 
revelation ef which | 
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Barton. 
bled. 
lew, 
. 
“PRESIDENT .COULART'S PLAN FOR IMPROV tha 
are DISTR, 
JANUARY 1963 
| 
APPRAISAL’. 
"FIELD REPORTNO, 
=” 
UNEVAL VATED INFORMATION. SOURCE 
CIADINGS ARE 
RE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE, 
22° DECEMBER” RO! SERTO POMPEU be SOUZA, PRESS SECRETARY 
OF THE COUNCIL ‘OF MINIST ERS, SAIQ THAT. PRESIDENT 
 GOULART. PLANS TO USE. SAN TH 
F AMER, FOREIGN, 
MINISTER, ROBERTO CAM 
BRAZILIAN -AMBS ASSADOR TO Th 
| 
UNITED “STATES, 
AMER CAL 
MOASSAQCR 
IN COL N GOR 
AS: 
+~FORRESTALs 
BASIS FOR AMP ROVING RELAY O'S WITH THE. 
ITED, STATES, MOICHNSON 
"ORDER: TO GET THE NEEDED. FINANCIAL, 
TAS, CAMPOS, 
“AND ‘AMBAS. SADOR GORDON “ARE TO GET THE OFF FICIAL, BACKING OF ROWER. 
“ACCORDING To Souza, CRITIC! Sit, OF 
UNITED 
JCS 
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A 
TINE MATION REPORTE 
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Loews, 
18 U.S.¢ 
| 
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“TO BE MAGE ay JUSCELINO 
FORMER “PRESIDENT OF 
is A MEMBER OF A Tio. VAN TEAM INVITED BY PRESIDENT. 
"KENNEDY To REVIEW THE PROGR AMS, OF THE ALLIANCE FOR . 
-* — 
PROGRESS, -KUBITSCHEK WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT. THE, IDEA: 
THAT THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS MUST 
A TOOL 
No AN ARM TO FIGHT 
PROBLEMS. 
(SAID THAT GOULART HAS. REPORTS 
ALBERTO LLERAS CAMARGO, 
FORMER PRESIDENT OF 
THE TEAM, WILL, ACT IN THD SAVE 
» 
~LLERAS CAVARGOs PLANNED 
R10 DE JANEIRO ON 
HE EXPECTED TO 
ASSISTANCE TO KUBITSCHEX. 
(FIELO COMMENT: 
1S. 
"THE: OTHER MEMBER OF 
SPEND A MONTH IN BRAZIL GIVING 
& 
| 
>, 
PS 
STATE. ARMY NAVY AiR 
CINCAR!8 _CINCLAN 
FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NA\ 
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END OF MESSAGE 
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