foioi 
© 
«rf 
I 
Ki        I.  ^         *  • 
THE  UNTIED  STATES  MVA 
I  ™ 
??AE  COLLEGE 
^ .NT  Of 
^;^ 
X. 
^ 
-J 
\ 
PUBLISHED  13Y 
P 
./ 
THE  NAYAL  WAE  COLLEGE 
TIE  FM  ABVMCSD  KESEAUSI 
«0   12  I5   -1
G~*li 
ZiZSittirt&Mteji&J*}.'''  J5& iM-W+iT*****.- ".  -+^ »*»>- *•• .   ■*-■  ■*>-*->--  ..* 
o 
!  CO 
■o 
I  II 
fi  Eff  M      V      I  V»  "?   »   '■♦  S  **    *"•  '■    tl    \-    .-■»  ■*%      ""^  -»  V   "y  ^  .      *  V 
r«  "V    ■?  •i^,'  Z1  ■*'!* 
&NT  OF75; 
/^>  >*''*-* 
f/ 
^ 
-i*.    y&LSfff   Ufa 
I 
<S' 
\ 
PMiSHEP  S¥ 
^ 
^ 
4^ 
5*T  "^ 
feu 
•ess 
s 
TOE  NAYAL  WAE  C3IIBG2 
C^TSE  FOR  ADVANCED  I 
grftA®8®*j!r" 
0  12  1 
5   188
SECURITY   CLASSIFICATION   OF    THIS  PAGE  fUrirn  Dun  Enlrrrd)^ 
fiirORT  DOCUMENTATION  PAGE 
cz 
J(  i  /Victoria   S. /Price] 
I.    Rt'POKT  NUMKCR 
J2.  GCVT    ACCESSION  NO. 
TITLE  fond  SuMltle) 
'/The   DCI's   Role    in   Producing   Strategic  )  sZ 
Intellignece  Estimates,,  •-     '  (/ 
7.     AUTHORf»; 
RICA!)  INSTRUCTIONS 
BF.FOKE  COMPLETING  FONM 
3.      f<tCIPIi;NT'b  CATALOG   NUWUEB 
5.     TYPE  OF  REPORT  &   PERIOD  COVERED 
'inal  *C?.f.'L*  J 
6.    FTRTT'lWIIJtTro'W;  ■REPOT  T  NUMBER 
8.    CONTRACT  OK  GRANT  NUHBtRfiJ 
N0014 
1C4?8-M- 
7082 
9.     PERFORMIHG  ORGANIZATION  NAME  AND  ADDRESS 
II.    CONTROLLING  OFFICE  NAME  AND  ADOrtESS 
Center  for  Advanced  Research 
Naval  War  College 
anrt;,  RI.Q234.Q. 
m 
«.    MONlTORINc'  AGENCY  NAME  ft  ADDRiSSftf  ditltrent  Itom  Controlling  Oit'ct) 
10.    PROGRAM  ELEMENT.  PROJECT.  TASK 
AREA  *  WORK  UNIT  NUMBERS 
(&U£Zl 
U^aEPOJtT  OAT4J'   
Jan 
13.    NUMBER  OF  PAGES 
-148- 
15.    SECURITY  CLASS,  (ol  th:i  report; 
Unclassified 
IS».     DECLASSIFICATION/ DOWNGRADING 
SCHEDULE 
16.    DISTRIBUTION  STATEMENT  (ol  rM«  Report; 
A  -  Unlinited. 
17.    DISTRIBUTION  STATEMENT  (ol  tho  abstract  entered  In  Block  SO,  It  dlllertnt  liom  Report; 
A  -  Unlimited. 
t6.    SUPPLEMENTARY  NOTES 
IS.    KEY  WORDS  (Conlfnuo  on  rcvee%m  tide  it  neceesmry  and  Identity  by  block  number) 
Intelligence   Strategic  Estimates 
NiE  A-Team/B-Team 
CIA     ,      intelligence  Community  t^^.^.  gf   Cr^tAc     J«  *'„*.«.  b^/jf* 
DC  I 
USIB 
20.    ABSTRACT  fCcnlfnut  on  r»ver»»  tide  II  n»ca«a*ry  and  Identity  by  block  dumber) 
',  y  This  paper  examines  the  role  of  the  VQ£^  in  shaping  national 
intelligence  estimates.   Seven  possible  roles  are  examined*) 
two  pertain  to  the  mechanism  d?f  the  NIE  drafting  procesg^rhree 
focus  on  the  DCI's  leadership  posture  during  USja-^elXberations , 
another  involves  the  DCI's  subjective  input^fecrthe  draft  NIEs, 
and  the  last  is  the  role  the  DCIs  have  plrfyed  in  promoting  inde- 
pendent outside  review  of  the  estimates.  <*» The  author  concludes  _^ 
BD    t  JAN  73    M73  EO'TIOM  OF  1  NOV  6S  IS  OBSOLETE 
4-/J03&? 
SECURITY  CLASSIFICATION  OF  THIS  PAGE  (When  Dmtm  Cnlend) 
-'-  r  .  ,t.~**4fi 
*e*)lt-U.e.t,ic*2Z£
SECURITY  CLASSIFICATION  OF    THIS  PACE^m  Dmtm  finJernrfj 
"""    '  "    "  !■■■■■"■  '■■    li  —  II...    -...■■■.  |  ,.       |  |    ■  ,|.    |    t|     .     .    |.  I  ,|  ■  |  ..    „rmmm     _ 
20  (cont'd)  thatjthe  approach  of  the  DCIs  to  the  strategic  NIEs 
has  been  inconsistent.   Some  DCI:j  have  emphasized  some  roles, 
while  others  neglected  them.   These  differences  are  summarized 
in  the  final  chapter  according  to  a  DCI's  individual  background 
and  concepts  of  his  job,  and  in  light  of  historical  events.   The 
author  also  examines  potential  conflicts  between  roles  exercised 
by  DCIs,  addressing  the  question  of  whether  a  DCI  can  be  effect- 
ively both  J*manager  and  prcphet^ror  the  strategic  intelligence 
estimates. 
This  examination  is  based  on  four  principal  sources.   The 
first  is  government  reports,  primarily  unclassified,  examining 
aspects  of  the  strategic  estimative  process.   These  include  reor- 
ganization commission  reports,  recent  work  of  the  Senate  Select 
Committee  on  Intelligence,  and  internal  CIA  studies.   Second  are 
scholarly  studies  a?id  journalistic  accounts  of  the  strategic  NIEs 
themselves.   These  are  used  as  a  means  by  which  to  document  his- 
torically the  competing  positions  of  different^agencies  in  criti- 
cal intelligence  debates,  such  as  the  famous -"missile  gap^debate 
from  1957  to  1961.   The  third  source  is  unclassified  NIEs,  mainly 
non-strategic. 
Since  these  sources  rarely  focused  on  the  activities  of  the 
DCIs,  the  major  portion  of  this  study  relies  on  over  50  interviews 
conducted  by  the  author  in  1978  and  1979.   Interviewees  include 
past  and  present  CIA  officials,  two  former  DCIs,  Pentagon  intelli- 
gence officials,  and  NSC  and  Corgressional  staff  .^  Tnterviewees 
are' listed  at  the  close  of  the  study.   Current  Cl7i\of i  icials  are 
not  cited  by  name  within  the  footnotes. 
SECURITY  CLASSIFICATION  OF  T1J,r  PAGEflWisn  Dmtm  Enl»r»d)
THE  DCI'S  ROLE  IN  PRODUCING 
STRATEGIC  INTELLIGENCE  ESTIMATES 
By 
VICTORIA  S.  PRICE 
January,  1980 
o 
This  document  is  the  final  report  of  a  study  sponsored  by 
the  Center  for  Advanced  Research,  Naval  War  College, 
Newport,  Rhode  Island  under  Contract  Number  N00140-78-M-7082 
The  views  contained  herein  are  those  of  the  author  and 
publication  of  this  study  by  the  Naval  War  Collage  does 
not  constitute  endorsement  thereof  by  the  Naval  War 
College,  the  Department  of  the  Navy,  nor  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment. 
Further  reproduction  of  this  final  report  by  agencies  of 
the  U.S.  Government  must  be  approved  by  the  President, 
Naval  War  College.   All  rights  to  the  reproduction  of  this 
final  report  outside  of  the  U.S.  Government  reside  with 
the  author.   Reproduction  by  nongovernmental  agencies  or 
individuals,  without  the  written  consent  of  the  author, 
is  prohibited.   However,  the  content  is  open  to  citation 
and  other  reference  in  accordance  with  accepted  academic 
research  practice. 
DISTRIBUTION  STATEMENT 
Af  UNLIMITED
TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 
I.  OVERVIEW  -  Page  1 
II.  EVOLUTION  OF  THE  STRATEGIC  ESTIMATIVE  PROCESS:   1947-1957  -  Page  10 
A.  Deficiencies  in  the  Original  Concept  of  Coordinating  NIEs  -  Page  3  0 
B.  Definition  of  the  DCI's  and  CIA's  Role  by  General  W.  Be  lell 
Smith  -  Page  14 
C.  Allen  Dulles  and  the  Modern  Strategic  NIEs  -  Page  19 
D.  Trends  Since  1957  -  Page  26 
III.  THE  DCI'S  MANAGEMENT  OF  STRATEGIC  NIES  AT  THE  DRAFT  STAGE  -  Page  11 
A.  Management  Direction  to  CIA  Production  -  Page  33 
B.  Management  Attention  to  Department  of  Defense  Coordination  -  Page  50 
IV.  SUBSTANTIVE  INPUT  OF  DCIs  TO  THE  DRAFT  STRATEGIC  NIEs  -  Page  60 
V.  THE  DCI'S  LEADERSHIP  ROLES  AT  USIB  OR  NFIB  -  Page  73 
A.   Support  of  the  CIA's  Position  -  Page  74 
B-   Encouragement  of  Competitive  Debate  -  Page  73 
C.  Final  Adjudication  of  Views  -  Page  86 
VI.  THE  DCI'S  ROLE  IN  PROMOTING  INDEPENDENT  REVIEW  -  Page  96 
A.  Allen  Dulles,  the  Princeton  Consultants  and  Strategic 
Advisory  Panel  -  Page  96 
B.  The  1960s  -  Page  98 
C.  James  Schlesinger  and  the  Intelligence  Community  Staff  -  Page  100 
D.  The  President's  Foreign  Intelligence  Advisory  Board  and  the 
1376  A-B  Team  Experiment  -  Page  101 
VII.  ASSESSMENT  OF  THE  PERFORMANCE  OF  DCIs  -  Page  106 
A.   Summary  of  Roles  Played  by  DCIs  -  Page  106 
B.  Mutually  Supporting  and  Conflicting  Roles :  Manager  versus 
Prophet  -  Page  115  J      e5  T 
C.  Steps  Not  Taken  by  DCIs  -  Page  119     )'>***'  "*  ;£  :'» 
  .  »-»  t 
^  £  w  « I  *. 
S3  ra«.I 
2  2  °>"  o 
S3  £  si 
<>  i 
aaj
TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 
(continued) 
LIST  OF  CHARTS 
CHART  A:   CIA  Organization,  1972  -  Page  28 
CHART  B:   Individual  Roles  Assumed  by  DCIs  for  Production  of 
Strategic  NIEs  -  Page  32 
CHART  C:  National  Foreign  Assessment  Center,  1979  -  Page  48 
CHART  Ds   Broad  Roles  Emphasized  by  Seven  DCIS  for  Strategic 
NIEs  -  Page  113 
FOOTJOTES 
LIST  OF  INTERVIEWEES
-  1  - 
I .   OVERVIEW 
Since  the  position  of  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  (DCI) 
was  created  in  1946  and  the  CIA  in  1947,  a  major  responsibility 
has  been  to  produce  coordinated  estimates  of  the  likely  future 
capabilities  and  intentions  of  foreign  countries.  The  most  polished 
and  prestigious  of  the  CIA's  finished  intelligence  evaluations  are 
the  National  Intelligence  Estimates,  called  NIEa-  The  NIEs  have 
existed  in  their  present  form  since  1950  when  the  CIA's  Office  of 
National  Estimates  and  Board  of  Estimates  were  created.  Drafted 
mainly  by  CIA  staff,  the  NIEs  include  the  input,  judgements  and 
dissents  of  intelligence  officials  from  other  agencies,  primarily 
the  Defense  and  State  Departments. 
After  coordinative  meetings  at  the  CIA  with  representatives 
from  these  agencies  to  discuss  drafts,  the  NIEs  are  reviewed  by 
the  DCI  and  presented  to  the  United  States  Intelligence  Board  (USIB) , 
renamed  the  National  Foreign  Intelligence  Board  (NFIB)  in  1977. 
Chaired  by  the  DCI,  NFIB  consists  of  the  heads  of  other  intelligence 
agencies,  and  has  broad  responsibilities  for  coordinating  the 
activities  of  the  intelligence  community.*  After  joint  discussion, 
the  NIEs  arc  approved  by  the  DCI  and  issued,  in  his  name,  to  the 
President. 
*NFIB  was  called  USIB  from  1958  to  1977,  and  before  that  the 
Intelligence  Advisory  Committee  (IAC) .  Chaired  by  the  DCI, 
NFIB  consists  of  the  Deputy  Director  of  CIA  (representing  the 
CIA) ,  directors  of  the  Defense  Intelligence  Agency  (DIA) ,  the 
National  Security  Agency  (NSA) ,  the  State  Department's  Bureau 
of  Intelligence  Research  (INR) ,  and  the  heads  of  the  intelligence 
sections  of  the  FBI,  Treasury  Department,  and  the  former  AEC. 
Since  1961,  the  heads  of  Army,  Air  Force  and  Naval  Intelligence 
have  not  been  official  members,  but  attend  meetings,  debate 
and  may  dissent  from  the  NIEs.
-  2  - 
The  NIEs  are  intended  to  inform  the  President,  National 
Security  Council  and  other  top-level  officials  about  upcoming  for- 
eign events,  both  short  and  lone  term,  of  national  importance. 
For  example,  some  NIEs  predict  political-economic  trends  in  various 
trouble  spots  around  the  world.  These  are  meant  to  lead  to  timely 
estimates,  which  may  be  termed  "crisis  prediction"  NISs,  predicting 
major  crises  affecting  US  foreign  policy,  such  as  the  outbreak  of 
war,  political  coups  or  sudden  oil  shortages  in  foreign  countries. 
Then,  NIEs  termed  "operation  evaluation"  NIEs  keep  abreast  of 
military  and  political  events  during  conflict  situations,  such  an 
during  the  Korean  and  Vietnam  wars.   Special  National  Intelligence 
Estimates,  called  SNIEs,  are  produced  to  respond  to  specific, 
short-term  questions  posed  by  the  White  House,  such  as  during  the 
Cuban  missile  crisis  in  1962. 
Another  group  of  NIEs  is  what  this  author  terms  the  "strategic 
NIEs."  These  are  annually  produced  evaluations  of  Soviet,  and  now 
Chinese,  military  strength.*  Strategic  NIEs  primarily  address 
questions  of  military  force  structure,  technology  and  new  weapons 
for  an  upcoming  five  year  period,  of  which  analysis  of  strategic 
policy  and  intentions  is  an  integral  part.  From  a  single,  broad 
estimate  on  Soviet  military  capabilities  and  intentions  in  1950, 
a  series  of  separate  estimates  on  Soviet  military  strength  grew 
up  in  the  late  1950s.  Designated  by  the  number  "11",  the  Soviet 
*The  author  uses  the  term  "strategic"  for  both  intercontinental 
and  intracontinental  arms.
3  - 
NIE  series  has  consisted  of  individual  estimates  on  conventional 
arms,  offensive  nuclear  weapons,  defensive  weapons,  nuclear  tech- 
nology, strategic  doctrine  and  other  subjects.   Presently,  the 
most  important  Soviet  strategic  NIE  is  numbered  11-3-8,  combining 
considerations  of  intercontinental  offensive  and  defensive  weaponry. 
The  Soviet  strategic  NIEe;  are  the  focus  of  this  study. 
Controversy  About  the  Soviet  Strategic  NIEs. 
Prom  the  beginning,  the  Soviet  strategic  NIEs  have  been  the 
object  of  considerable  controversy  within  and  outside  the  intelli- 
gence community.  The  debate  has  been  heated,  protracted  and  inter- 
departmental,  in  producing  these  NIEb,  the  CIA  often  has  been  pitted 
against  the  Defense  Department's  intelligence  agencies,  such  as  the 
Defense  Intelligence  Agency  (DIA)  created  in  1961  and  Army,  Air 
Force  and  Naval  Intelligence.  The  CIA  io  supposed  to  include  thes& 
agencies  in  all  phases  of  drafting  and,  compared  to  other  NIEs  ex- 
cept during  wartime,  the  Pentagon's  involvement  has  been  heavy. 
Ultimately,  the  DCI  is  responsible  for  ensurinc  thc.t  the  strategic 
NIEs  represent  a  coordinated  view,  i.e.,  than  all  intelligence  is 
considered  and  all  opinions  voiced,  before  formal  approval  at  NFIB. 
rfore  than  other  NIEs,  the  debate  about  the  strategic  NIEs  re- 
volves around  the  process  of  coordinated  production,  aspects  of 
which  various  participants  claim  have  caused  major,  predictive 
inaccuracies.   For  example,  controversy  has  existed  over  the  large 
role  of  the  CIA  in  collecting  and  analyzing  purely  military
4  - 
intelligence,  and  its  domination  over  the  drafting  process.   Ques- 
tions are  raised  about  how  to  involve  the  Pentagon  agencies  more 
in  the  early  stages  of  drafting,  and  whether  their  dissents  have 
been  adequately  heard  and  reflected  in  the  final  NIEs.  Accusations 
abound  as  to  the  biases  involved  in  institutional  judgements.   For 
example,  the  three  military  services  often  have  been  charged  with 
basing  excessive  estimates  of  Soviet  weaponry  on  their  own  bud- 
getary priorities,  a  concern  expressed  by  both  Presidents  Truman  and 
Eisenhower  about  the  NIEs.2  Beginning  with  the  Nixon  Administration, 
CIA  analysts  have  been  criticized  for  a  "liberal  bias"  which  caused 
them  to  systematically  underestimate  Soviet  strategic  goals.   As 
one  participant  observed: 
The  truth  is  that  th&  DCI,  since  his  author- 
ity over  the  intelligence  process  is  at  least 
ambiguous,  has  an  uphill  struggle  to  make 
a  sophisticated  appreciation  of  a  certain 
range  of  issue  prevail  in  the  national  in- 
telligence  product  over  against  the  parochial 
views  and  interests  of  departments.,..4 
In  the  early  1970s,  such  criticism  led  to  a  demand  for  review  of 
the  strategic  NIEs  by  outeide  s?iperts,  culminating  in  the  A-B  Team 
experiment  in  competitive  analysis  in  1976,  described  later. 
The  central  purpose  of  this  study  is  to  provide  better  under- 
standing of  one  element  in  the  production  of  coordinated  strategic 
intelligence  estimates,  namely,  the  role  of  the  Director  off  Central 
Intelligence.  How  has  the  role  of  the  DCI  in  producing  the  strate- 
gic NIEs  historically  evolved?  How  have  different  DCIs  observed 
their  functions?  What  involvement  have  DCIs  had  in  drafting  the
-  5  - 
strategic  estimates,  encouraging  interdepartmental  competition,  and 
resolving  debate  at  USIB  or  NFIB?  Can  a  feasible  and  appropriate 
role  for  the  DCI  be  prescribed  for  the  future? 
Complexity  in  Defining  the  PCX's  Role 
The  difficulty  in  defining  the  role  of  the  DCI  in  producing 
th&  strategic  Nit's  is  inherent. to  the  nature  of  this  country's  in- 
telligence apparatus.  As  the  Murphy  Commission  concluded  in  1975: 
The  United  States  set  up  what  might  be  termed  a 
•mixed*  system  in  an  attempt  to  combine  the  best 
features  of  decentralization  and  centralization 
while  avoiding  the  obvious  weaknesses  of  each. 
The  compromises  involved  in  the  establishment 
of  a  'mixed*  system  have  given  rise  to  difficulties 
over  the  years.5 
Our  intelligence  system  is  decentralized  in  the  sense  that  the 
CIA  was  never  intended  to  have  (and  never  achieved)  a  monopoly 
over  intelligence  collection  and  analysis.  Other  agencies,  pri- 
marily those  of  the  Defense  Department  for  strategic  estimating, 
are  supposed  to  make  intelligence  and  evaluative  inputs  tc  the 
NIEs  as  well.  The  advantages  of  decentralization  are  considered 
to  be  efficiency  and  improved  analysis,  if  each  e.gency  specializes 
in  collecting  and  analyzing  intelligence  within  its  own  area 
...    t.   t.   6 
of  expertise,  and  multiple  advocacy  and  competition  in  estimating, 
,  The  system  is  centralized  in  the  position  of  the  DCI,  who 
has  three  broad  roles  to  play.   Ht»  manages  the  CIA,  including 
its  covert  activities;  he  *cts  as  chief  intelligence  advisor 
to  the  President;  and  he  coordinates  the  activities  of  the 
intelligence  community.  Over  the  years,  the  DCI's  authorization
for  coordinative  tasks  has  expanded  steadily.   In  addition  tc 
approving  the  NIEs,  he  is  responsible  for  focusing  the  entire 
community  on  issues  critical  to  the  White  House,  efficiently 
dividing  and  overseeing  collection  tasks,  and  since  1971,  re- 
viewing and  presenting  a  consolidated  intelligence  program 
budget  to  Congress.   To  help  him,  the  DCI  may  devise  whatever 
coordinative  bodies  he  wisher,  within  the  CIA.   However,  the 
central  coordinating  institution  of  the  intelligence  community 
has  been  USIB  and  its  subcommittees,  and  now  NFIB. 
If  intelligence  coordination  is  represented  in  the  person 
of  the  DCI  and  institutionally  by  USIB,*  the  NIEs  are  its  substan- 
tive embodiment.   The  NIEs  are  meant  to  be  the  DCI's  document. 
However,  no  other  intelligence  product  so  readily  exemplifies  the 
potential  conflicts  between  the  DCI's  three  jobs.  For  example, 
as  manager  of  the  CIA,  is  it  not  natural  for' the  DCI  to  expand 
its  intelligence  collection  and  analytical  functions,  even  though 
such  steps  m."  ght  duplicate  or  weaken  the  programs  of  other  agencies? 
As  the  man  responsible  for  CIA  morale  and  most  familiar  with  its 
work,  should  the  DCI  let  the  intelligence  professionals  work  out 
their  differences  or  mainly  promote  the  CIA's  position  within  the 
final  NIEs?  As  chief  intelligence  advisor  to  the  President, 
should  the  DCI  represent  his  own  opinions  in  the  d..-aft  or  final 
NIEs,  identify  himself  with  a  minority  or,  after  encouraging  dis- 
sent, resolve  the  debate  by  making  intelligence  judgements.  What 
happens  if  the  DCI  does  not  have  the  technical  background  to 
♦Since  NFI3  was  called  USIB  for  almost  20  ye&rs,  the  author  uses 
the  acronym  USIB  throughout  most  of  this  study,  unless  under 
a  specific  DCI  it  was  called  something  else.
understand  the  strategic  issues  at  hand?  At-  coordinator  of  the 
inte]ligence  community,  how  should  the  DCI  resolve  what  the 
Senate  Select  Committee  on  Intelligence  has  identified  as  "the  per- 
sistant  conceptual  dilemma. . .of  consensus  versus  competition." 
In  the  interest  of  presenting  a  timely,  concise  document  to  the 
President,  how  far  should  the  DCI  promote  competition  wivi:in  the 
NIEs? 
Research  Design  and  Methods 
This  author  contends  that  such  questions  historically  he,ve  not 
been  subject  tc  Presidential  direction.  Ftsw  Presidents  have  ad- 
dressed the  judgemental  issues  facing  the  DCI  in  producing  tne  • 
NIEs.   In  contrast,  more  Presidential  attention  has  focused  on 
the  DCI's  role  in  coordinating  intelligence  collection  and,  now, 
budgets.   In  an  attempt  to  explore  intelligence  production  issues, 
in  the  following  pages  the  actual  roles  assumed  by  successive 
DCIs  for  the  strategic  NIEs  are  described  in  depth. 
In  Chapter  II  the  evolution  of  the  strategic  NIE  process 
under  DCIs  Admiral  Roscoe  Hillenkoetter  (1947-1950) ,  General  Walter 
Bedell  Smith  (1950-1952)  and  Allen  W.  Dulles  (1953-1961)  is  traced. 
The  author  concludes  that  the  rcle  of  the  DCI  and  CIA  in  the 
strategic  estimative  process  was  originally  ill-defined  and  un- 
realistic, and  that  DCI's  Smith  and  Dulles  took  the  initiative  in 
strengthening  the  DCI's  personal  role  and  the  CIA's  internal 
strategic  work.   Then,  trends  since  1957  increasing  the  decision- 
making burden  on  the  DCI  are  described.
In  Chapters  III,  IV,  V  and  VI,  the  attitudes  and  behavior  of 
six  DCIs  in  producing  the  strategic  NIEs  are  compared  systematically. 
The  DCIs  selected  by  the  author  for  study  are:   Allen  W.  Dulles 
(1953-1961);  John  A.  McCone  (1961-1965);  Richard  Helms  (1966-1972); 
James  R.  Schlesinger  (1973);  William  E.  Colby  (1973-1975);  and 
Admiral  Stansfield  Turner  (1977-present) .   Two  DCIs  not  examined 
here  are  Admiral  William  Raborn  (mid-1965  to  mid-1966)  an<*  George 
Bush  (1976)  ,  primarily  because  of  their  short  tenures.*  Although 
James  Schlesinger  remained  in  office  barely  five  months,  he  is 
included  because  most  interviewees  reported  that  his  influence  on 
the  strategic  estimative  process  was  large. 
In  these  chapters,  seven  possible  roles  of  the  DCI  are  ex- 
amined. Two  pertain  to  the  mechanisms  of  the  NIE  drafting  process: 
management  direction  to  CIA  production,  and  management  attention 
to  coordination  with  the  Dapartmemt  of  Defense  intelligence  agencies. 
Another  involves  the  DCI's  psrsonal,  substantive  input  to  the  draft 
NIEs.  Three  role3  focus  on  a  DCI's  leadership  posture  during  USIB 
deliberations:   support  of  the  CIA's  position;  encouragement  of 
competitive  debate;  and  final  adjudication  of  views.   The  last  is 
the  role  DCIs  played  in  promoting  independent,  outside  review  of 
the  strategic  NIEs.  The  reader  should  bear  in  mind  that  the  purpose 
of  these  chapters  is  descriptive  not  evaluative. 
The  author  concludes  that  the  approach  of  DCIs  to  the  strategic 
NIEs  has  been  inconsistent.   Some  DCIs  have  emphasized  pome  roles, 
while  others  neglected  them.   In  Chapter  VII,  these  differences 
*DCI  George  Bush's  important  role  in  the  1976  A-B  Team  experiment 
in  competitive  analysis  is  raised  briefly  in  Chapter  VI.
are  summarized  according  to  a  DCI's  individual  background  and 
concepts  of  his  job,  and  in  light:  of  hiatorical  events.  The 
author  also  examines  potential  conflicts  between  roles  exercised 
by  DCIs,  addressing  the  question  of  whether  a  DCI  can  be  effectively 
p 
both  "manager  and  prophet"  for  the  strategic  intelligence  estimates . 
This  study  is  based  on  four  principal  sources.   The  first  is 
governmental  reports,  primarily  unclassified,  examining  aspects 
of  the  "strategic  estimative  process.  These  include  reorganization 
commission  reports,  recent  work  of  the  Senate  Select  Committee  on 
Intelligence,  and  internal  CIA  studies.   Second  are  scholarly 
studies  and  journalistic  accounts  of  the  strategic  NIE3  themselves. 
These  are  used  as  a  means  by  which  to  document  historically  the 
competing  positions  of  different  agencies  in  critical  intelligence 
debates,  such  as  the  famous  "missile  gap"  debate  from  1957-1961. 
The  third  source  is  unclassified  NIEs,  mainly  non-strategic. 
Since  these  sources  rarely  focused  on  the  activities  of  DCIs, 
the  major  portion  of  this  study  relies  on  over  50  interviews  con- 
ducted by  this  author  in  1978  and  1979.   Interviewees  include  past 
and  present  CIA  officials,  two  former  DCIs,  Pentagon  intelligence 
officials,  and  NSC  and  Congressional  staff.   Interviewees  are 
listed  at  the  close  of  the  study.   Current  CIA  officials  are  not  cited 
by  name  within  the  footnotes.
II.   EVOLUTION  OF  THE  STRATEGIC  ESTIMATIVE 
PROCESS:   1947  -  1557 
The  National  Security  Act  of  1947  creating  the  CIA  directed 
it  "to  correlate  and  evaluate  intelligence  relating  to  the  national 
security  «nd  to  provide  for  its  appropriate  dissemination." 
In  his  memoirs,  President  Truman  wrote  that  he  desired  a  national 
intelligence  organization  which  had  access  to  all  information, 
headed  by  a  Director  who  could  speak  authoritatively  for  the 
whole  community.   He  wanted  to  reduce  the  separate,  sometimes 
conflicting  and  seemingly  biased  intelligence  reports  reaching 
his  desk,  and  asked  the  DCI  to  produce  one  analytical,  predictive 
document  combining  these.   Also  created  in  1947  was  the  Intelli- 
gence Advisory  Committee  (IAC) ,  the  predecessor  of  USIB  and  NFI3. 
Chaired  by  the  OCI  and  consisting  of  all  intelligence  agency 
heads,  IAC  was  meant  to  serve  as  a  coordinating  body  for  the 
entire  intelligence  community. 
A.   Deficiencies  in  the  Original  Concept  of  Coordinating  NIEs 
The  task  of  producing  coordinated  estimates  fell  to  Rear 
Admiral  Roscoe  Hillenkoetter,  a  former  head  of  Naval  Intelligence 
who  served  as  DCI  from  1947  to  m^d-1950,  and  the  CIA's  new  Office 
of  Research  and  Evaluation  (ORE) .   In  retrospect,  the  original 
concept  ■  of  how  they  were  to  do  this  was  highly  unrealistic,  in 
assigning  a  subordinate  role  to  the  Pentagon  and  prescribing  a 
dominant  role  to  the  fledgling  and  ill-equipped  CIA. 
In  theory,  the  1347  Act  said  that  the  "departments  and  other 
agencies  of  Government  shall  continue  to  collect,  evaluate, 
correlate  and  disseminate  departmental  intelligence,"  to  which
-  II  - 
the  CIA  was  intended  to  have  complete  access.   Then,  it  becsune 
the  task  of  a  small  team  within  ORE  to  examine  this  work,  both 
raw  intelligence  and  finished  reports,  and  generate  new  predictions 
if  necessary.   Its  analysis  was  summarized  in  special  estimates 
called  ORES ,  to  which  the  concurrence  or  dissent  of  Defense  Depart- 
ment agencies  was  sought.  The  CIA  ws3  authorized  to  carry  out.  re- 
search and  analysis  "not  presently  performed"  by  other  departments, 
but  this  was  not  considered  one  of  its  primary  estimative  functions. 
In  short,  the  CIA  was  not  designed  to  duplicate  or  supercede 
the  Pentagon's  military  intelligence  collection,  research  and 
analytical  functions.   Rather,  as  Sherman  Kent  then  wrote:   "It3 
job  is  whc.t  might  be  called  policing  the  professional  competence 
of  the  departmental  outfits  and  continually  pushing  departmental 
frailties  back  into  departmental  laps."   In '1949,  Kent  did  not 
believe  that  the  CIA  even  should  do  its  own  descriptive  and  evalua- 
tive studies  of  purely  military  subjects,  since  he  argued  that  it 
could  not  compete  effectively  with  the  Pentagon.   In  fact,  he  worried 
that  if  attempted,  the  Pentagon  soon  would  dominate  the  CIA. 
Immediately,  the  CIA's  effort  to  produce  coordinated  judge- 
ments was  undercut  by  several  factors.   First,  as  the  Senate 
Select  Committee  on  Intelligence  later  noted,  the  Army,  Navy,  Air 
Force  and  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  (JCS)*  refused  to  provide  the 
new  agency  with  much  raw  intelligence  since  they  feared  encroach- 
o 
ment  on  their  traditional  estimative  role.   Second,  the  CIA  had 
*The  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff's  intelligence  arm  was  called  the  Joint 
Intelligence  Committee  (JIC)  or  sometimes  J -2.   Its  head  was  a  mem- 
ber of  IAC,  and  then  USIB,  until  DIA  was  created  in  1961.
-  12  - 
little  independent  capability  to  analyze  military  data  even  if 
forthcoming.  For  example,  the  Email  estimative  team  within  ORE 
were  generalists  and  the  CIA  had  only  one  scientist  to  examine 
Soviet  technical  developments.   Thus,  it  often  analysed  only 
finished  reports  from  the  Pentagon.  For  example,  in  1948  the  CIA 
evaluated  an  Air  Force  estimate  discussing  Soviet  troop  move- 
ments in  Germany,  which  suggested  that  the  Soviets  were  prepared 
to  go  to  war  at  any  time.   The  CIA  went  over  the  document  line 
by  line,  and  reportedly  labeled  the  estimate  "mistaken."    The 
CIA  said  that  it  had  evaluated  the  information  differently. 
Third,  the  Pentagon  intelligence  agencies  often  refused  to 
cooperate  in  drafting  and  reviewing  the  OREs,  and  sometimes  with- 
held their  final  concurrence.   The  first  estimate  of  Soviet  military 
objectives  and  capabilities,  intended  to  be  an  annual  affair, 
took  tv.o  years  to  complete  in  March,  1948,  and  ORE  considered  it 
mainly  a  CIA  document.    A  sampling  of  the  estimates  prepared  in 
the  late  1940s  indicates  that  some  never  were  issued  formally,  since 
the  Pentagon  refused  to  concur.    Further,  IAC  reportedly  spent 
most  time  reviewing  collection  programs  and  intelligence  requirements, 
rather  than  acting  fxs   a  high-level  deliberative  and  approval 
body  for  the  estimates.    In  1949,  one  study  group  concluded: 
"The  principle  of  the  authoritative  NIE  does  not  yet  have  established 
acceptance  in  the  government.   Each  department  still  depends  more 
or  less  on  its  intelligence  estimates  and  establishes  its  plans 
and  policies  accordingly."    By  1950,  it  was  asserted  that  "ORE 
did  little  more  than  produce  its  own  analyses"   and  "90%  of  its 
work"  was  current,  non-prtdictive  intelligence.
-  13  - 
Finally,  the  CIA's  intended  authority  over  the  strategic 
ebtimative  process  was  not  advanced,  6r  aggressively  defined,  by 
DCI  Hillenkoetter.   In  theory,  the  DCI's  or;ly  formal  responsibility 
fcr  the  coordinated  estimate?  was  to  approve  and  isr.ue  them.   Thus, 
he  had  considerable  latitude  to  establish  an  active,  personal  role. 
However,  although  Admiral  Hillenkoetter  daily  briefed  President 
Truman,  he  did  not  h«ve  sufficient  rank  or  stature  within  the 
military  intelligence  community  to  elicit  their  full  cooperation.17 
For  example,  a  C^A  memorandum  in  1950  stated  that  "the  Intelligence 
Advisory  Conmittee  had  assumed  an  advisory  role  tc  the  NSC  and 
functioned  as  a  supervisory  body  for  the  DCI — contrary  to  the  initial 
intention." 
DCI  Hil.ienkoet.ter  also  seamc  to  have  been  uncertain  about 
how  far  the  CIA  should  go  in  making  firm  predictions  of  foreign 
military  intentions.   For  example,  in  the:  aftermath  of  the  North 
Korean  attack  on  South  Korea  of  June  10,  1950,  Hillenkoetter 
3taurihly  defended  the  CIA  by  asserting  that  top-level  officials 
were  in  possession  of  the  pertinent  data  before  the  invasion,  ari 
the  CIA  subsequently  was  exonerated  in  this  respect.    However, 
he  reportedly  argued  that  the  CTA  could  not  be  responsible  for 
the  "evaluation"  of  enemy  intent.    A  year  later,  he  told  Congress 
that  the  CIA  similarly  predicted  the  location  and  capabilities 
of  Chinese  troops  ir  Manchuria  before  their  December  1950  invasi.cn, 
but  that  "to  predict  the  intentions  of  the  enemy,  real  or  potential, 
you  would  need  a  crystal  ball."*1  in  contrast,  Hillenkoetter
14  - 
was  accused  in  the  prens  fcr  "empire-builrirng"  in  current  inteili- 
gence  matters,   and  he  frequently  9ent  President  Truman  personal 
memos  summarizing  "raw"  CIA  agents  reports.  J 
B.  Definition  of  the  DCI's  and  CSA's  Role  by  General  W.  Bedell  Smith 
By  1950,  five  separate  studies  called  for  a  greater  "centraliza- 
tion of  authority"  in  the  DCI's  hands  for  long-term,  predictive 
estimates.    General  Bedell  Smith  arrived  as  DCI  in  the  late 
1950s  determined  to  assert  his  prerogative  for  this.    An  a  four- 
star  general,  formerly  General  Eisenhower's  Chief  cf  Staff  and 
Ambassador  to  Russia,  he  was  well-equipped  to  do  so.  DCI  Smith 
took  four  steps.  First,  he  created  the:  Office  of  National  E&timates 
(ONE)  and  Board  of  Estimates  in  CIA  in  1950,  whose  sole  purpose 
was  to  produce  speculative-evaluative  NIEs.  Second,  he  launched 
the  CIA  on  the  path  of  acquiring  an  independent  capability  for 
analysis  of  military  data.  Third,  he  forcefully  elicited  the 
cooperation  cf  the  Pentagon  in  preparing  NIEs  on  military  subjects. 
Fourth,  he  considered  the  NIEe  his  estimates,  which  should  reflect 
a  clear-cut,  hopefully  unified  opinion  for  the  President,  and  his 
own  views  when  they  existed.   For  this  purpose,  he  turned  IAC  intc 
a  body  in  which  he  supervised  formal  deliberations  on  the  NIEs. 
The  ONE  was  designed  as  an  analytical  unit  to  draft  NIEs. 
To  do  this.  General  Smith  asked  historian  William  Lenger,  ONE's 
first  director,  to  recruit  the  best  talent  available.  The  ONE 
deliberately  was  kept  small,  ranging  over  the  years  from  30-75 
professionals.  Its  role  was  to  write  the  NIEs,  relying  entirely
15  - 
on  the  v;ork  generated  by  other  CIA  components  and  other  agencies 
to  do  so.  The  Board  of  Estimates  was  created  to  review  the  draft 
NIEs,  and  consider  the  comments  and  criticisms  of  other  agencies 
before  submitting  them  to  the  DCI  and  IAC  for  final  approval. 
The  Board  always  consisted  of  about  a  dozen  men,  including  retired 
military  officers.  The  first  nine  included  five  historians/  one 
lawyer,  and  three  former  military  officers,  of  whom  one  formerly 
wa9  Eisenhower's  G-3.  An  outside  panel  of  experts,  known  as 
the  Princeton  Consultants,  was  established  to  assist  the  Board  and 
DCI  in  reviewing  the  NIEs. 
General  Smith  initially  believed  that  the  three  military  ser- 
vices should  collect  and  review  all  military  and  strategic  data, 
which  ONE  then  should  coordinate  and  evaluate  as  a  basis  for 
drafting  the  NIEs.   If  inadequate,  "his  reaction  was  not  to  do 
2£ 
it  yourself,  but  to  get  others  to  do  it."    In  practice,  a  short- 
age of  hard  intelligence  on  Soviet  troops,  bombers,  airfields  and 
military  plans  resulted  in  the  Pentagon  making  large  demands  on 
the  CIA's  clandestine  division,  the  Directorate  for  ^lans  (DDP) . 
As  a  former  DDP  Soviet  specialist  writes,  from  1949-1954,  the  DDP 
"operated  almost  solely  as  an  instrument  cf  the  Department  of 
Defense  and  its  theater  commands.   Their  need  was  great." 
Further,  it  soon  became  evident  that  for  ONE  to  draft  NIEs  pre- 
dicting the  capabilities  of  Russian  heavy  bomber b,  nuclear  pro- 
duction, and  eventually  missiles  and  warheads,  the  CIA  had  to  have 
its  own  capability  for  scientific,  technical  and  economic  analysis.
-  16  - 
Primarily,  this  was  because  General  Smith  became  convinced  that 
the  CIA  could  not  rely  on  the  Pentagon  to  generate  and  submit 
such  intelligence  analyses  to  it. 
Smith  thus  waged  a  bureaucratic  battle  to  estcblish  the  CIA's 
independence  in  military  end  eventually  strategic  research. 
For  example,  in  an  agreement  with  the  State  Department  in  195.1,  the 
CIA's  newly  formed  Office  of  Research  and  Reports  (ORE.)  was  granted 
exclusive  responsibility  fcr  economic  research  on  the  Soviet  bloc. 
The  Office  of  Scientific  Intelligence  (OSI)  established  in  1349 
moved  slowly  into  weapons  technology  research,  although  an  Auyust. 
1952  agreement  with  the  Defense  Department  restricted  it  to  basic 
scientific  research  and  pilot  projects.  The  Office  of  Current 
Intelligence  (CCI)  created  in  1951  first  specialized  in  political 
intelligence,  but  soon  had  a  military  division.   In  early  1952, 
thesse  three  units  (ORR,  OSI  and  OCI)  were  grouped  together  along 
with  ONE  in  the  CIA's  Intelligence  Directorate  (DDI) . 
Through  the  strength  of  his  professional  rank  and  personality, 
General  Smith  induced  the  military  services  and  JCS  to  contribute 
written,  draft  material  to  ONE  for  consideration.  After  the 
role  of  the  Pentagon  was  established  as  one.   of  regular,  formal  in- 
put to  the  draft  NIEs,  a  second  problem  was  to  encourage  officers 
of  sufficient  rank  2nd  knowledgeability  to  participate  in 
the  deliberations  at  CIA  and,  third,  to  encourage  them  to  elaborate 
their  positions.    General  Smith  believed  that  considerations  of 
Soviet  military  hardware  should  be  accompanied  by  predictions  of 
Soviet  military  strategy.   "Almost  immediately,  the  military 
challenged  ONE  on  the  nature  of  the  estimates,  demanding  that
-  17  - 
they  be  factual  and  descriptive."    General  Smith  prevailed, 
and  in  so  doing  hoped  to  reduce  the  Pentagon's  tendency  co  over- 
estimate Soviet  weapons  based  on  individual  service  budgetary 
.   .,..    32 
priorities. 
General  Smith  played  a  strong  role  in  deciding  what  military 
issues  should  be  the  subjects  of  NIEs.  -In  theory,  NIEs  were 
produced  following  a  specific  request  from  the  NSC,  and  the  NSC 
was  also  supposed  to  have  a  hand  in  deciding  the  "term3  of  reference" 
of  an  NIE  (i.e.,  the  specific  questions  posed  by  an  NIE).  However, 
from  the  beginning,  General  Smith  and  the  CIA  often  took  the 
initative.   During  Smith's  tenure,  the  military-oriented  NIEs  on 
ongoing  operations  in  the  Korean  war  and  Soviet  military  actions 
in  Eastern  Europe  took  precedence  over  what  thi3  author  has  termed 
the  Soviet  strategic  rJIEs.   Smith  was  keenly  interested  in  the 
former,  for  which  he  posed  specific  questions  and  wanted  "quick 
and  authoriative"  answers.    It  was  typical  for  Smith  to  phone 
his  colleagues  at  the  Pentagon  and  say  something  like:   "'I  want 
you  to  get  over  here  and  decide  whether  Russia  is  going  to  invade 
Poland.'"    Prior  to  submitting  the  NIEs  to  IAC,  he  read  them 
thoroughly  and  voiced  any  personal  disagreements  privately  to 
ONE  or  Pentagon  officials.35  Then,  the  NIEs  might  be  edited  by  ONE 
to  more  clearly  reflect  these. 
General  Smith's  "extensive  contacts  at  the  senior  military 
level  and  his  pervasive  prestige"  enabled  him  to  turn  IAC  into  a 
deliberative  body  over  which  he  firmly  presided.    In  1950,  the 
CIA's  General  Counsel  had  told  Smith  that:
-  18  - 
IAC'a  inflated  role  had  diminished  the  DCI's 
ability  to  demand  departmental  cooperation  fcr 
the  CIA' 8  national  estimates  responsibility. 
Houston  advised  that  the  DCI  would  have  to 
exert  more  specific  direction  over  the  depart- 
mental agencies,  if  coordinated  national 
intelligence  production  was  to  be  achieved. 
Smith  acted  on  Houston's  advice  and  informed 
the  members  of  IAC  that  he  would  not  submit 
to  their  direction. 37 
Smith  believed  that  by  encouraging  competitive  discussion  of  the 
NIEs  at  IAC,  the  Pentagon's  intelligence  heads  would  take  a  more 
active  interest  in  them.  He  directed  the  debate  along  lines 
of  thinking  he  saw  as  most  productive.  No  formal  vote  was  taken 
on  the  NIEs,  and  it  was  up  to  him  to  open  or  close  discussion 
as  he  so  chose.  His  approval  of  the  NIEs  was  meant  to  be  final. 
After  IAC,  "he  insured  ;hat  they  were  presented  to  Truman  without 
contrary  briefing*  being  given  him  by  other  agencies  as  so  often 
had  happened  before." 
Almost  immediately,  General  Smith  addressed  the  issue  of 
how  much  and  what  kind  of  military  dissent  to  permit,  for  example, 
in  the  NIEs  on  the  Korean  war.  In  theory  the  right  to  dissent 
from  the  main  text  of  an  NIE  in  a  brief  footnote  existed  from 
the  beginning.  The  NI5  was  supposed  to  provide  an  "exposure  of 
information  and  judgements,  reflecting  both  the  consensus  and 
the  differences  within  the  intelligence  community."    In  practice, 
this  did  not  pertain  to  the  CIA,  since  the  Board  of  Estimates 
worked  to  reach  a  unified  position  and  a  dissenting  faction  within 
the  CIA  was  never  permitted  a  footnote.  Further,  Smith  was  intol- 
erant of  military  dissent  which  appeared  to  him  poorly  reasoned 
or  biased.  Thus,  one  of  his  major  aims  before  and  during  IAC
-  19 
meetings  was  tc  encourage  the  Pentagon  to  state  their  dissents 
clearly  and  precisely  and,  failing  that,  to  overrule  them. 
In  this  sense,  Smith  played  a  role  which  thie  author  later  terms 
as  "adjudicatory."  He  decided  whether  a  dissent:  reflected  a 
real  predictive  uncertainty,  or  was  discrete  and  well-reasoned 
enough,  to  be  represented  in  a  final  NIE. 
C.  Allen  Dulles  and  the  Modern  Strategic  NIEa 
When  Allen  Dulles  became  the  first  civilian  DCI  in  early 
1953  under  President  Eisenhcwer,  the  DCI  had  the  license  to  shape 
the  NIEs  as  he  saw  fit.  Regarded  as  his  document,  he  might  in- 
fluence what  the  NIEs  examined,  represent  his  personal  opinion 
in  them,  or  seek  a  consensus-oriented  l*IE  or  one  reflecting  dis- 
senting views.  As  chairman  of  IAC,  he  could  act  as  leader  of 
deb&te  on  NIEs,  expanding  or  limiting  discussion  as  he;  inclined. 
Final  decisions  at  IAC  were  meant  tc  be  authoritative  and  bindinr. 
However,  compared  to  other  NIEs,  the  Soviet  strategic  NIEs 
wer.t  primitive  and  the  DCI's  role  in  this  process  had  not  taken 
shape.  Primarily,  this  was  because  the  DCI  as  yet  did  not  have 
to  preside  over  intense,  intricate  conflicts  between  the  CIA  and 
Pentagon  reflected  in  the  strategic  estimates.  Further,  the  drafting 
process  was  still  evolving.  In  the  first  half  of  the  1950s,  the 
Pentagon  dominated  estimating  on  Soviet  strategic  weapons,  since 
the  CIA's  capability  for  independent  work  was  fledgling.
By  1952,  the  C~A  issued  annually  two  major  NIEs  related  to 
Soviet  strategic  strength.   One  NIE,  numbered  11-2,*  assesr.sed 
the  Soviet' 3  "gross  capability"  to  attack  the:  US  and  focused  on 
Soviet  nuclear  development.  What  was  to  become  the  mora  contro- 
versial estimate  was  NIE  11-4,  a  comprehensive  "soup  to  nuts"  docu- 
ment addressing  Soviet  political,  economic  and  military  capabilities 
to  pursue  its  goals  throughout  the  wo^ld.  NIE  11-4  included  a 
military  chapter,  sometimes  chapters,  on  Soviet,  conventional  arms 
and  manpower,  and  medium  and  lcng-range  delivery  vehicles.   In 
the  late  1950s,  separate  NIEs  were  initiated  to  cover  these  and 
other  topics. 
In  drafting  the  military  portions  of  NIE  11-4,  ONE  i3  said 
to  hcve  relied  chiefly  on  the  Pentagon's  written  input  and  judge- 
ments on  Soviet  heirdware.   That  is,  until  late  1956,  the  Army,  Navy 
and  Air  Force  were  atikec  tc  draft  individual,  uncoordinated  es- 
timates pertaining  to  their  special  expertise,  e.g.,  the  Air  Force 
for  Soviet  bombesrs  and  missiles.   Then,  ONE  reviewed,  edited  and 
polished  these  into  a  standard  NIE  form.  Because  the  CIA's  in- 
dependent research  and  analytic  work  was  limited,  ONE  did  not 
draft  the  strategic  estimates  from  scratch,  as  it  did  for  other 
NIEs.   In  preparing  these,  one  CIA  analyst  asserts:   "The  ONE 
*Henceforth  in  this  study,  specific  NIEs  for  specific  years  will 
bft  referred  to  by  number,  with  the  last  two  digits  referring  to 
the  year  of  production,  for  example,  NIE  11-4-58. 
**For  example,  arcund  1955  a  separate  NIE,  numbered  11-3,  was  in- 
itiated to  address  Soviet  air  defense  systems.  In  1958,  NIE  11-8 
was  created  to  cover  Soviet  strategic  attack  forces,  and  it  is  this 
NIE  which  became  one  of  the  most  significant  and  controversial. 
NIE  11-4  evolved  into* an  estimate. discussing  Soviet  strategic 
doctrine,  ;NIE^l£5|jf caused  on'-Soviet  missile  capacities  and 
NIE  11-15  addressed  Soviet  and  Warsaw  Pact  conventional  forces. 
In  1974,  NIEs  11-3  and  11-8  were  combined.  There  never  has  been 
a  complete  NIE  11-1  to  11-15  series  produced  for  any  given  year. 
Rather,  the  number  assigned  tc  each  tcpic  persists,  and  some 
NIEs  in  the  series  are  produced  only  occasionally.
-  21  - 
accepted  fairly  uncritically  the  inputs  made  by  the  Pentagon. 
At.  Army  intelligence  official  reports:   "The;  CIA  generally  took  the 
Pentagon's  vievs  in  NIE  11-4. " 
The  ONE  analysts  did  not  favor  this  procedure.   In  the  early 
1950s,  ONE  had  experimented  in  writing  its  own  first  draft  state- 
mf:nt  of  Soviet  strategic  aims.    In  1955.  ONE' a  chief  urged  the 
staff  to  write  an  entire  first  draft  of  the  relevant  military 
sections.    Further,  not  all  ONE  staff  and  Board  members  agreed 
with  the  Pentagon's  figures.   Differences  existed,  but  have 
been  described  as  "similar  cleavages. . .to  thoao  existing  through- 
out the  defense  establishment"  ar-  opposed  to  a  unified,  independent 
CIA  position.    nonetheless,  the  first  half  of  the  1950s  v/as 
characterized  by  a  slowly  evolving  CIA  role  in  drafting,  in  which 
it  could  not  match  the  resources  and  skill  of  the  three-  military 
services. 
This  story  is  best  illustrated  by  the*  now  famous  "bomber 
gap"  overestimates  of  Soviet  long-range  inanned  bombers,  presented 
in  NIE  11-4  from  the  spring  of  1955  to  the  fall  of  1956.  Basically, 
these  predictions  represented  an  Air  Force  judgement,  unchallenged 
and  thus  supported  by  the  CIA,  and  sharply  contested  by  the 
Army  and  Navy.  The  "bomber  gap"  predictions  were  contained  in 
the:  main  text  of  the  NT.Es,  not  in  footnotes.  As  one  author  writes, 
the  NIEs  of  1955  and  1956  "provided  a  range  of  possible  production 
curves,  the  choice  among  them  being  largely  a  matter  of  in- 
stitutioncl  commitment  and  interest."    For  example,  in  NIE  11-4-55
-  22  - 
the  CIA  and  Air  Force  predicted  a  range  of  30-80  Bison  bombers  in 
place,  and  500-300  Bisons  by  mid-1960.47  The  Army  and  Navy  ob- 
jected, and  their  estimate  later  proved  the  most  accurate.  By 
1961,  the  Russians  had  built  only  180  long-range  bombers,  the 
majority  of  which  were  Bears,  not  Bisons. 
Allen  Dulles  upheld  the  "bomber  gap"  estimates  in  1955  and 
1956,  even  though  "the  input  of  strategic  intelligence  into  the 
defense  debate  in  1955-1957  was  extremely  damaging  to  the  Adminis- 
tration" whose  stated  goal  was  to  hold  the  defense  budget  constant.45 
As  Dulles  later  wrote: 
In  1954... there  waa  tvi^nce  that  the  Soviet  Union 
vas  producing  long-range  intercontinental  heavy 
bombers  comparable  to  our  B-52s.  At  first,  every 
indication. . .pointed  to  the  conclusion  that 
the  Russians  were  adopting  this  weapon  as  a  major 
element  of  their  offense  and  planned  to  produce 
heavy  bombers  as  fast  as  their  economy  and  tech- 
nology permitted.  50 
In  comparison  to  Soviet  bomber  estimates,  in  January  1956  the 
USAF  Strategic  Air  Command  had  only  41  B-52s  in  place,  although 
57  had  been  completed.    In  response  to  the  "gap"  predictions, 
President  Eisenhower  authorized  acceleration  of  the  B-52  pro- 
duction rate  to  !2  a  month  in  the  spring  of  1355,  and  in  May  1956 
the  rates  were  accelerated  twice  again,  first  to  17  a  month  and 
then  20  a  month. 
In  predicting  Soviet  bombers  and  subsequently  ICBMs,  the 
Air  Force  did  not  dominate  the  NIEa  for  long.   By  the  end  of 
1956,  the  CIA  emerged  as  a  rival  to  Pentagon  intelligence  and 
engaged  in  its  first,  heated  debate  with  the  Air  Force  over 
the  bomber  gap.  When  Dulles  presented  hie  annual  testimony
-  23  - 
to  Congress  on  the  Soviet  strategic  threat,  the  comments  offered 
by  the  Air  Force  officer,  who  traditionally  accompanied  the  DC1 
to  answer  technical  questions,  were  challenged  by  the  CIA. 
Changes  that  CIA  analysts  wished  to  make  in  editing  the  officer's 
testimony  were  presented  to  Dulles,  who  was  receptive.    Tne 
CIA's  position  was  reflected  in  its  first  independent  draft  of 
NIE  11-4  in  the  spring  of  1956,  in  which  its  estimates  of  Soviet 
boubers  began  to  slide.   In  response,  President  Eisenhower  reduced 
the  B-52  production  rate  to  15  a  month.    Taking  the  August 
1956  HIE  as  the  baseline  for  estimates  of  Sc - .  t  heavy  bomber 
development,  the  CIA  reduced  the  estimates  to  62.5%  in  the  end  of 
1957,  25%  by  the  end  of  1958,  and  19%  by  February  1960.    The 
Air  Force  dissented  from  the  CIA's  view  in  brief  footnotes. 
Thus,  by  1957  the  modern  strategic  NIE  had  evolved.  The 
CIA  independently  drafted  its  institutional  position  as  the 
main  text,  and  -tha   Pentagon  participants  were  relegated  to 
footnoted  dissents.  This  form  was  to  prevail  for  the  next  two 
decades.  The  CIA's  claim  to  a  dominant  position  within  strategic 
NIEs  resulted  from  three  factors:   the  U-2  photo  reconnaissance 
flights;  the  CIA's  independent  strategic  research  and  analytic 
capability;  and  the  personal  decision  of  Allen  Dulles. 
First,  through  the  DDP  side,  the  CIA  developed,  funded, 
managed  and  flew  the  U-2  plane  which  took  its  initial  photographs 
over  Soviet  territory  in  June  1956.    One  of  Dulles'  priority 
projects,  as  DCI  he  controlled  the  complex  interagency  decision- 
making mechanisms  for  U-2  flights  subject  to  final  Presidential
-  24 
approval.    The  CIA  developed  its  own  photo  interpretation 
capacity.  Prom  one  specialist  in  1953,  a  special  office  was 
created  under  the  DDI  which  promptly  grew  to  20  persons  and 
CO 
eventually  1,200.    By  August  1956,  Soviet  factories  building 
bombers  had  been  located  for  the  first  time  and  bombers  at  the 
factories  and  on  the  airfields  were  counted.  According  to  CIA 
analysts,  these  numbers  did  not  support  the  "bomber  gap"  theory. 
Second,  on  the  DDI  side,  the  CIA's  economic,  scientific  and 
current  military  intelligence  work  provided  ONE  with  independent 
analyses  to  use  in  drafting  *-'\e   strategic  NIEs.  The  most  sophis- 
ticated, novel  and  prestigious  reportedly  was  the  Soviet  economic 
group  called  the  Economic  Research  Area  (ERA) .  Based  on  its 
analysis  of  Soviet  materials  ard  industrial  capability,  &RA 
developed  new  methodologies  for  estimating  production  rates, 
a  speciality  of  the  CIA's  ever  since  .  As  the  Senate  Select  Committee 
on  Intelligence  describes: 
By  introducing  economic  production  capacities  into 
assessments  cf  Soviet  strategic  capabilities,  the 
Agency  challenged  the  basic  premises  of  the 
military's  judgements. . .Air  Force  intelligence 
based  its  estimates  on  knowledge  of  Soviet  tech- 
nology and  laboratory  research,  which  by  1953  were 
well  advanced.  ORR  £o£  which  ERA  was  a  part]  based 
its  estimates  of  Soviet  deployments  on  Soviet  eco- 
nomic production  capabilities,  which  were  severely 
limited  as  u  result  of  the  war.  '  Consequently,  ORR's 
methodology  attributed  lower  strategic  deployments, 
i.e.,  long-range  bombers  end  missiles,  to  the 
Russians. o°
-  25  - 
Third,  by  1957  Allen  Dulles  favored  a  document  in  which 
the  CIA  presented  its  independent  view  ao  the  main  text  and 
conclusion.  This  decision  he  is  said  to  have  "agonized  over"  for 
some  time  after.    An  OSS  hero,  Dulles  was  eager  to  establish  the 
CIA  as  the  chief  intelligence  arm  of  government.  Although  Dulles 
had  an  independent  base  in  the  Administration,  he  was  cautious 
about  advertising  the  institutional  growth  of  the  CIA,  lest  the 
Pentagon  become  alarmed  unduly.  Personally,  he  did  not  like  to 
preside  over  awkward  jurisdictional  disputes  between  the  CIS 
and  military.   By  the  mid-1950s,  the  CIA  already  was  engaged  in  a 
bitter  battle  with  the  Array  concerning  the  latter' s  clandestine 
operations  and  counterintelligence  roles,  at  the  direction 
of  the  NSC.    Dulles'  preferences  led  to  outside  criticise. 
For  example,  he  was  accused  of  failing  to  promptly  consolidate 
CIA's  military  research  components  "on  the  grounds  that  the 
services  might  interpret  such  a  move  as  a  unilateral  attempt  by 
the  Agency  to  assume  large  responsxbilities  in  their  fields  of 
primary  concern."63  Three  times  during  his  tenure  the  President's 
Foreign  Intelligence  Advisory  Board  (PFIAB)  and  its  predecessor 
called  for  the  DCI  to  assume  a  stronger  ccordinative  role  for 
the  entire  intelligence  community. 
Interestingly,  Dulles  was  not  firmly  convinced  that  "it  was 
in  the  best  national  interest"  to  pro -ant  competing  claims 
to  the  President  within  the  NIEa.55  Further,  he  personally  ques- 
tioned the  wisdom  of  allowing  a  civilian  agency  clearly  to  dominate
-  26  - 
the  military  agencies  in  the  final  strategic  estimate.   President 
Eisenhower  does  net  appear  to  have  helped  him  resolve  either  un- 
certainty. At  that  time,  it  was  Eisenhower's  known  preference 
to  have  disputes  ironed  out  prior  to  NSC  briefings.  Also, 
he  was  unsympathetic  with  "gap"  predictions,  reportedly  inventing 
the  term  "military  industrial  complex"  when  criticizing  the 
Pentagon's  tendency  to  presB  for  growth  of  defense  budget  items. 
Nonetheless,  these  indirect  signals  did  not  provide  the  DCI  clear 
guidance  on  how  to  handle  dissents,  how  far  to  advance  uncertainty, 
and  whether  to  remain  passive  or  choose  between  alternative  positions. 
Such  questions  became  critical  as  the  "bomber  gap"  grew  into 
the  "missile  gap"  NIEs  of  1957-1961.   Dulles'  initial  hesitancy 
about  the  CIA's  dominant  position  with  the  strittegic  NIEa  aptly 
reflects  the  controversy  surrounding  them  ever  since. 
D.  Trends  Since  1957 
Since  1957,  several  changes  in  the  strategic  estimative 
process  have  increased  the  management  and  decisionmaking  burden 
on  the  DCI.  First,  the  CIA's  internal  strategic  capability  has 
grown  steadily.   Ten  yearB  later,  the  DDI  alone  employed  hun- 
dreds of  persons  involved  in  strategic  work.   Of  these,  178 
were  engaged  in  strategic  research  primarily  related  to  the  NIEs, 
and  in  1967  were  grouped  together  in  the  Office  of  Strategic 
Research  (OSR) .  Plus  a  sophisticated  knowledge  of  advanced  tech- 
nology, one  of  OSR's  specialities  is  to  "cost  out"  Soviet  weapons 
production.  In  1979,  OSR  employed  260  persons,  and  also  studied
-  27  - 
Sino-Soviet  strategic  doctrine.    For  the  CIA's  total  strategic 
capability,  this  number  is  just  the  tip  of  the  iceberg.  For  ex- 
ample, the  huge  Directorate  of  Science  and  Technology  (DDSfiT) 
created  in  1965  is  involved  in  complex  research  *nd  technical 
programs  contributing  to  the  estimative  process.  Chart  A  on  the 
following  page  describes  the  CIA's  organization  in  1972  for  strategic 
programs. 
At  the  sane  time,  the  nomber  of  CIA  persons  drafting  and 
reviewing  the  strategic  NIEs  has  been  reduced.  Whereas  ONE  em- 
ployed a  small,  sometimes  rotating  drafting  staff,  when  it  was 
replaced  by  the  National  Intelligence  Officers  (NIO&)  in  1973, 
one  person  employing  two  assistants  was  responsible  for  drafting 
NIE  11-3-8.  Whereas  the  ONE  Btaff  was  assisted  by  the  twelve-mem- 
ber Board  of  Estimates  which  reviewed  the  NIE3,  when  abolished 
in  1973,  no  replacement  was  made  until  recently.   In  1979,  a 
three-member  Senior  Review  Panel  was  created  to  assume  some  of 
the  Board's  functions.   Finally,  ongoing  review  of  the  NIEs  by 
outside  experts  has  not  been  part  of  the  official  estimating 
process  since  the  early  1960s. 
A  third  change,  alluded  to  earlier,  was  the  emergence  of 
a  distinct  institutional  perspective  within  the  CIA  vis-a-vis  the 
Pentagon.  Often,1  the  ^TA  assumed  an  adversary  relationship  with 
the  military  agencies,  based  on  an  assumption  of  biased  military 
estimating.  As  described  subsequently,  the  iauxae  was  heightened 
following  the  entire  community's  "missile  gap"  overestimates 
from  1957  to  mid-1961.  To  quote  a  former  Chairman  of  the  Board
-   28    - 
CHART  A 
CM  ORGANIZATION  1972 
\ 
Source:  Senate  Selecte  Committee  on  Intelligence
-  29  - 
of  Estimates:   "...there  is  a  natural  thrust  in  military  intelli- 
gence to  maximize  threats  and  oversimplify  the  intentions  of 
potential  adversaries.-68  For  its  part,  the  Pentagon  intelligence 
agencies  grew  to  distrust  CIA  analysts,  who  they  argued  tended 
to  underestimate  the  Soviet  threat.   James  Schlesinger  summarised 
these  views  in  1376:   "In  fact,  the  [CIA's]  intelligence  directorate 
tends  to  make  a  particular  type  of  error  systematically  in  close 
harmony  with  the  prevailing  biases  in  the  intellectual  community... 
There  was  an  assumption  that  the  Soviet  has  the  same  kind  of  arms 
control  objectives  that  they  wished  to  ascribe  or  persuade 
American  leaders  to  adopt."69  Created  to  be  free  of  bias,  the 
CIA  thus  was  accused  of  perpetuating  one. 
A  fourth  change  was  .in  the  nature  of  the  issues  debated.  The 
advent  of  improved  satellite  reconnaissance  and  other  detection 
means  in  the  1960s  meant  that,  in  the  words  of  one  participant, 
the  world  was  no  longer  "opaque."70  However,  this  prevented 
neither  mistakes  nor  quarrels.  As  Albert  Wohlstetter  has 
documented,  both  civilian  and  military  estimators  "underestimated" 
Soviet  ICBM,  SLBM  and  heavy  bomber  build-up  in  the  mid  and  late 
196Cs.71  As  the  SALT  treaties  loomed  large;  both  the  DCI  and 
CIA  vere  drawn  into  a  qualitative  debate  about  overall  Soviet  strategic 
intentions.  As  DCI  George  Bush  argued  in  1978,  perhaps  prematurely: 
The  revolutionary  developments  in  the  technologi- 
cal means  of  intelligence  in  the  last  10  years 
take  care  of  many  loopholes  in  terms  of  the  pre- 
cision of  our  projects.  We  don't  debate  about 
a  minor  missile  gap  now.  There's  no  debate.  We 
measure  them,  we  count  them,  know  where  they're
-  30  - 
sitting,  we  look  at  them. .. .There  is  debate,  however, 
about  the  things  that  can't  show  on  a  photograph 
or  can't  be  picked  up  by  electronics:  political 
factions'  debates  behind  closed  doors  of  politburos, 
research  laboratories,  general  staffs.  These  things 
can't  be  learned  by  technology.72 
Finally,  the  format  of  the  strategic  NIEs  has  changed  markedly. 
From  a  document  presenting  a  dominant  consensus  and  brief  foot- 
noted dissents,  the  strategic  NIEs  in  the  1960s  became  highly 
complex  documents  riddled  with  many,  lengthy  footnotes  and 
appendices.   In  1969,  the  Nixon  Administration  found  this  confusing, 
and  subsequently  asked  the  DCI  to  experiment  with  means  of 
presenting  alternative  views  "up  front"  in  the  main  text  of  the 
strategic  NIE3.  Supported  by  the  DCI,  this  experiment  went  through 
successive  stages.  Now,  the  strategic  NIEs  may  present  what 
are  labelled  "true  alternatives"  to  the  President,  and  the  use 
of  footnotes  has  been  abandoned.    Thus,  the  current  defintion  of 
a  coordinated  NIE  is  the  opposite  of  what  originally  prevailed. 
In  terms  of  the  NIE's  format,  the  DCI's  role  has  changed  from 
one  of  consensus-seeking  to  presiding  over  competition.
-  31  - 
III.   THE  DCI's  MANAGEMENT  OF  STRATEGIC  NIES 
AT  THE  DRAFT  STAGE 
In  the  next  four  chapters,  the  roles  of  six  DCIe  since  1957 
in  producing  the  strategic  estimates  are  examined  in  depth.  The 
focus  is  on  the  personal  attitudes  and  leadership  postures  adopted 
by  successive  OCXs.  These  are  explored  within  an  informal  con- 
text; that  is,  in  the  absence  of  forma \   legislative  and  Presidential 
direction,  DCIs  have  had  the  liberty  to  assume  or  ignore  any  of 
the  roles  described.  The  author's  conclusions  for  six  DCIs  and 
seven  possible  roles  are  summarized  in  Chart  B  on  the  following 
page.  The  chart  is  referred  to  in  subsequent  chapters. 
These  chapters  are  written  from  the  DCI's  perspective  and 
are  mainly  descriptive.  The  author  is  interested  in  the  his- 
torical pattern  of  behavior,  establishing  what  six  men  have  done, 
or  not  done,  to  ensure  that  coordinated  NIEs  were  produced. 
Whether  these  actions  resulted  in  improved  NIEs  is  an  evaluative 
question,  raised  later  only  tangentially.  For  example,  a  DCI 
may  have  initiated  a  reorganization  which  was  later  criticized 
or  reversed.  Or,  a  DCI  may  have  inserted  hit.  personal  judgement 
or  sided  with  a  minority  view  within  an  NIE>  which  in  retrospect 
proved  inaccurate.  Rather  than  scoring  a  DCI  on  whether  he  was 
right  or  wrong,  we  seek  to  establish  whether  a  DCI  did  anything  at 
all.   How  did  DCIs  regard  the  strategic  NIEs,  what  roles  did 
they  believe  they  should  pursue,  what  tasks  did  they  find  difficult 
or  conflicting,  what  steps  were  ignored?
CHART  B 
INDIVIDUAL  ROLES  ASSUMED  BY  DCI3  FOR  PRODUCTION  OF  STRATEGIC  NXEs 
(X  -  played  a  rolej  XX  -  viewed  as  major  role  by  DCI;  0  -  played  littla  or  no  role) 
DCIS 
DRAFT 
STAGE 
OF 
NIES 
ROLE  IN  PRODUCTION 
1.  Management  Direction 
to  CIA  Production 
2.  Management  Attention 
to  DOD  Coordination 
3.   Persona],  Substantive 
Input  to  Draft 
DULLES 
(1953-61) 
McCONE 
(1961-65) 
X 
HELMS    SCHLESINGER 
(1966-72)    (1973) 
X 
X 
(W.H.  after  '69) 
0       XX 
COLBY      TURNER 
(1973-75)  (1977-   ) 
XX 
XX 
XX 
XX 
XX 
FINAL 
DELIBERA- 
TIONS AT 
4. 
Support  of  CIA's 
position 
(from 
X 
•57  on) 
US TB  OF 
5. 
Encouragement  of 
NFIB 
6. 
Competitive  Debate 
Final  Adjudication 
X 
X 
XX 
of  Views 
X 
X 
? 
(tenure  too 
brief) 
XX 
(but  mainly 
prior  to 
7. 
NFIB  in  3.) 
DRAFT  OR 
Promote  Independent 
FINAL 
(Outside)  Review 
X 
V 
NIES 
• 
(W.H. 
in  '75) 
Bush 
(1976) 
(XX) 
*W.H.  indicates  DCI  responsive  to  Presidential  or  White  House  preferences. 
„.CL...
-  33  - 
This  chapter  discusses  the  actions  of  DCIs  in  managing  the 
estimative  process  prior  to  USIB  consideration,  at  the  time  when 
the  NIEs  are  drafted  by  the  CIA  with  input  from  the  Pentagon. 
It  concerns  the  mechanics  of  the  drafting  process,  for  example, 
who  wrote  the  NIEs,  how  they  were  written,  and  how  the  Pentagon 
intelligence  agencies  contributed. 
A.  Management  Direction  to  CIA  Production 
The  CIA's  three  functional  Directorates  have  been  described 
in  this  manner:   "The  DDI  is  a  production  outfit  and  can  run 
itself,  the  DDS&T  spends  money,  but  the  DDP  always  involves  people 
problems."1  For  most  years  located  in  the  DDI,  the  Board  of 
Estimates  and  ONE  did  "run  itself."  After  the  policy  decisions 
of  DCIs  Smith  and  Dulles  previously  described,  their  leaders 
established  the  traditions  and  operational  steps  for  producing 
NIEs  which  persisted  until  1973.  Until  then,  DCIs  remained  in 
a  supportive  role. 
For  example,  DCIs  Allen  Dulles,  John  McCone  and  Richard  Helms 
did  net  review  or  initiate  organizational  innovations,  dictate  or 
modify  drafting  and  review  procedures,  or  personally  select  the 
drafting  team,  although  they  did  approve  Board  appointments.  Like- 
wise, these  DCIs  did  not  decide  when  the  strategic  NIEs  were 
drafted,  instigate  innovations  in  style  and  format,  or  review 
the  theoretical  underpinnings  of  earlier  concepts.   In  part,  this 
reflects  their  satisfaction  with  the  estimative  process  as  it 
was  being  run  and  their  attention  to  other  CIA  programs.  Even
-  34 
John  McCone  who,  compared  to  DCIo  Dulles  and  Helms,  was  keenly 
interested  in  management  questions,  reportedly  spent  "90%  of 
his  time  on  clandestine  (DDP)  programs."   However,  as  indicated 
in  Chart  B,  John  McCone  is  given  an  "X"  because  of  his  role  in 
a  breakthrough  relating  to  highly  classified,  US  strategic 
planning  data  available  to  CIA  estimators. 
Beginning  in  1973,  a  trend  was  established  for  a  more  active 
management  of  estimative  work  by  the  DCI.   DCTs  James  Schlesinger, 
Williman  Colby  and  Stansfield  Turner  believed  that  organizational  and 
drafting  innovations  were  needed,  and  that  management  was  a  prime 
function  of  the  DCI.  After  Colby  abolished  the  Board  of  Estimates 
and  ONE  in  1973,  both  he  and  Admiral  Turner  personally  hired 
the  National  Intelligence  Officers  (NIOs) ,  designed  new  drafting 
techniques,  and  monitored  the  NI'-s'  progress  by  reading  successive 
draft  NIEs. 
Some  observers  claim  that  it  is  inappropriate  for  the  DCI 
to  concentrate  the  power,  resources  and  intellect  of  his  office 
to  managing  a  handful  of  men  who  draft  the  strategic  NIEs.  Since 
these  persons  originally  were  intended  to  be  uniquely  independent 
but,  in  turn,  totally  dependent  on  external  staff  who  collect 
and  analyze  strategic  intelligence,  perhaps  the  DCI  should  turn 
his  attention  to  the  rest  of  the  CIA's  strategic  work.  For  example, 
which  strategic  functions  3hould  be  grouped  together  in  the 
DDO,*  DDS&T  and  DDI  and  what  are  the  optimal  means  by  which 
*The  clandestine  Deputy  Directorate  of  Plans  (DDP)  was  renamed  the 
Deputy  Directorate  of  Operations  (DDO)  in  1973. 
V
-  35  - 
the  three  Directorates  share  work  with  one  another?  What  is  the 
appropriate  balance  between  human  intelligence  gathering  (HUMIHT) , 
electronic  communications  and  signals  intelligence  collection 
(ELINT,  COMMINT  and  SIGINT) ,  and  the  political  analysis  of  all 
three.*   How  much  should  CIA  drafters  rely  on  CIA  as  opposed  to 
Pentagon  work  in  producing  the  strategic  NIEs? 
Because  of  the  enormity  of  these  questions  and  the  competing 
claims  of  different  functional  units,  this  author's  research  < 
has  focused  primarily  on  the  CIA's,  estimates  staff  and  its  coordina- 
tion with  the  Defense  Department  intelligence  agencies.  Un- 
less a  DCI  initiated  organizational  innovations  in  the  CIA's 
strategic  intelligence  work  primarily  for  the  short-term  impact 
on  the  NIEs  in  mind,  such  changes  are  not  discussed  in  this 
study.   Below,  the  DCI's  management  direction  to  CIA  estimative 
work  before  and  after  1973  are  described  separately. 
1.   Before  1973 
The  early  independence  of  the  Board  of  Estimates  and  OrlE 
staff  from  the  DCI  is  explained  by  the  uniqueness  of  their 
functions  and  the  aggressiveness,  small  number  and  stability  over 
time  of  the  individuals  involved.  The  Board  and  ONE  were  designed 
to  offer  the  DCI  an  independent,  collective  analytical  judgement 
for  his  final  review.  Elite  units  of  talented  professionals, 
♦Sometimes  analytical  work  also  is  referred  to  as  HUMINT.   In  the 
past  decade,  the  question  of  whether  the  CIA  is  long  on  technological 
collection  programs  and  technical  analysis,  and  short  on  political 
analysis,  has  been  raised  by  at  least  three  DCIs — Schlesingar, 
Colby  and  Bush.   It  continues  to  be  a  focus  of  outside  criticism.
-  35'  - 
they  were  supposed  to  be  isolated  from  the  daily  pressures  and 
competing  demands  of  other  CIA  units.  There  were  only  four 
Chairman  of  the  Board  and  one,  Sherman  Kent,  served  from  1952-1967. 
The  Board's  membership  of  approximately  twelve  was  meant  fco  be 
well-rounded,  and  include  one  or  more  retired  military  officers. 
The  total  ONE  typically  was  about  50  professionals,  variously 
organized  on  a  geographic  and  functional  basis.  The  Chief  of 
ONE  handled  most  administrative  mattors  for  the  estimates  staff, 
in  order  to  free  the  Board  members  for  substantive  ./ork.   In  the 
mid-1960s,  it  became  common  practice  for  ONE  staff  to  be  elevated 
to  Board  positions. 
The  Board  and  ONE  developed  the  format  for  the  NIEs.  For  ex- 
ample,  all  NIEs  consisted  of  an  opening,  brief  "Summary,"  followed 
by  tight  paragraphs  of  "Conclusions"  and  a  presentation  of  the 
background  and  evidence.   In  the  1950s  Sherman  Kent  developed 
a  lexicon  of  probabilities,  which  was.  a  "system  of  carefully 
..3 
graded  verbal  measures  of  certainty.   An  executive  summary  was 
prepared  according  to  a  President's  interest  or  request.  For 
example,  for  the  strategic  NIEs,  President  Johnson  requested  a 
special  ons-page  summary  and  President  Carter  is  said  to  read  up 
to  15  pages.4  The  Soviet  strategic  NIEs  included  a  carefully 
worded  statement  of  overall  Soviet  strategic  emphasis  and  inten- 
tions, which  beginning  in  1S69  was  included  in  the  executive 
summary,  and  since  1974  constitutes  a  separate  chapter  of  NIE  11-3-8.
-  37  - 
In  the  late  1950s,  separate  estimates  in  the  Soviet  "11"  series 
were  initiated  by  ONE,  reportedly  in  part  to  facilitate  the  input 
of  new  CIA  units  to  the  draft.   In  the  1960s,  the  strategic 
NIEs  expanded  from  30  to,  by  1970,  over  100  pages.  Presently, 
NIE  11-3-8  consists  of  an  executive  summary,  and  two  volumes 
of  about  125  pages  each.   The  first  is  a  summary  volume  and  the 
second  a  documentary  volume,  containing  detailed  supporting 
data,  charts,  graphs  and  tables. 
As  the  format  and  timing  of  the  strategic  NIEs  became 
routinized,  there  was  little  need  for  the  DCI  to  dictate  in  ad- 
vance when  t.iey  should  be  written  and  what  topics  to  consider.* 
For  example,  the  "terms  of  reference"  of  the  strategic  NIEs  was 
circulated  by  ONE  in  late  winter,  a  first  draft  completed  in  late 
spring,  followed  by  lengthy  interagency  coordinative  meetings  at 
the  CIA,  which  hopefully  culminated  in  a  final  draft  in  Octoter  for 
DCI  and  US IB  approval.  This  schedule  anticipated  Presidential 
consideration  of  the  NIEs  in  preparing  his  defense  budget.  Generally 
each  strategic  NIE  updated  last  year's  predictions  and  inventoried 
new  weapons,  for  the  next  five  years.  As  described  later,  in  the 
1970s  DCIs  sometimes  decided  at  USIB  whether  to  include  new,  highly 
controversial  subjects  in  the 'current  or  next  year's  strategic 
NIEs. 
The  Board  of  Estimates  early  established  two  traditions  which 
have  persisted  with  the  DCI'  support.  First  is  to  draft  the  NIEs 
from  the  point  of  view  of  a  foreign  country,  with  no  specific 
*In  contrast,  DCIs  often  have  been  involved  in  the  "tasking"  and 
terms  of  reference  of  non-strategic  NIEs,  such  as  during  potential 
crisis  situations.
-  38  - 
reference  to  US  policy  options,  military  force  levels,  or  conflict 
scenarios.  This  practice  is  meant  to  free  estimators  from  bias 
that  might  result  if  they  are  drawn  into  debate  on  US  military 
programs,  and  thereby  also  increase  the  credibility  of  the  NXEs. 
Direct  comparisons  are  considered  a  "Net  Assessment"  rather  than  NIE 
function,  and  have  been  primarily  the  job  of  the  Defense  Department. 
Reportedly,  in  1962  CIA  estimators  were  so  concerned  with  preserving 
this  distinction  that  they  were  reluctant  to  gain  access  to  highly 
classified  US  strategic  planning  data,  lest  the  NISs  then  appear 
less  independently  written  or  unbiased. 
DCIs  have  reinforced  this  tradition.  For  example,  Allen  Dulles 
systematically  avoided  statements  that  gave  the  appearance  that 
the  CIT.  was  involved  in  foreign  policymaking.  His  colleagues  des- 
cribe how  he  refused  to  raise  even  the  implications  of  NlEa  for 
the  US  strategic  arsenal,  even  when  specifically  asked  by  Congressional 
and  NSC  members.8  Dulles  never  talked  publicly  about  "gaps."  "The 
q 
DCI's  job  was  to  provide  the  facts,  period."   John  McCone  is  said 
to  be  less  of  a  "neutralist"  or  "purist"  in  this  regard.    "Mine 
is  not  a  policy  job,"  he  once  -said  "but  when  asked  I'll  give  my 
opinion."11  In  1969,  National  Security  Advisor  Henry  Kissinger 
argued  that  rigid  adherence  to  this  tradition  decreased  the  NISs* 
policy  relevance.  However,  DCI  Richard  Helms  held  his  ground, 
and  resisted  the  White  House's  initial  proposal  for  involving 
CIA  estimators  in' SALT  I  verification  predictions.    The  agree- 
ment subsequently  established  remains  in  effect,  with  a  distinction 
drawn  between  predicting  Soviet  potential  to  violate  the  treaty 
and  verifying  a  substantial  violation,  which  Admiral  Turner  considers 
a  policy  matter.
However,  White  House  interest  in  direct  US-USSR  force  comparison; 
in  the  NIEs  has  continued.   In  the  19703,  the  strategic  NIEs  in- 
cluded a  brief  numerical  summary  of  current  and  predicted  US  force 
levels  in  an  appendix,  and  some  requests  were  made  for  US-USSR  conflii 
scenarios.   Recently,  rresident  Carter  asked  DCI  Turner  to  offer 
so-called  "red-blue"  comparisons  between  Soviet  ("red")  and  US 
("blue")  forces  in  the  main  text  of  the  NIBb.    One  CIA  analyst 
said  that  the  issue  of  how  to  best  present  these  "has  not  bee:. 
resolved."14 
A  second  practice  established  by  the  Board  of  Estimates  is 
to  reach  a  unified  CIA  position  within  draft  NIEs.  That  is,  a  f actio: 
within  the  CIA  does  not  have  the  option  of  taking  a  footnote. 
In  effect,  the  Board  and  not  the  DCI  monitored  disputes  between 
CIA  estimators.  One  Board  member  "chaired"  each  NIE  from  the 
beginning,  and  it  was  up  to  him  to  see  that  ail  CIA  viewpoints 
were  aired  before  reaching  a  conclusion.  Typically,  this  occurred 
before  the  Pentagon  agencies  were  called  in  to  discuss  the  draft. 
A  unified  CIA  opinion  is,  in  part,  inherent  in  the  nature  of  es- 
timative work.  As  one  author  notes,  there  is  also  a  bureaucratic 
imperative:  a  unified  view  reinforced  the  CIA's  draft  and  reduced 
the  likelihood  that  military  dissenters  would  seek  alliances  and 
gain  momentum. 
No  DCI  has  reversed  this  practice.   For  example,  DCIs  Dulles 
and  McCone  did  not  sit  in  on  Board  of  Estimates  meetings  or  monitor 
drafts  in  progress  to  observe  how  differences  were  handled.  Richard 
Helms  told  this  author  that  this  is  not  an  appropriate  function
-  40  - 
of  the  DCI,  since  it  might  reduce  his  authority  or  bias  his 
consideration  of  the  final  product.    Even  now,  when  the  NIOs  have 
been  given  the  license  by  Admiral  Turner  to  explore  all  alterna- 
tives, they  consider  it  "logical  for  the  CIA  to  pull  together 
at  some  point"  and  CIA  differences  that  might  persist  are  not 
formally  identified  within  the  strategic  NIEs.   a  Earlier,  several 
observers  argued  that  such  differences  occasionally  were  significant. 
For  example,  during  the  1957-1961  missile  gap  estimates  a  few 
ONE  staff  are  said  to  have  believed  that  the  Soviets  could  deploy 
few  ICBMs  by  the  early  1960s,  as  opposed  to  the  several  hundreds 
officially  predicted  in  the  NIEs.    In  the  1960s,  one  author  con- 
tends that  on  technical  issues  ONE  generally  took  the  position  of 
OSR  and  its  predecessors,  and  the  DDS&T.  However,  "on  questions 
involving  a  higher. . .political  content,  agreement  was  less  certain 
The  lack  of  management  direction  to  the  estimates  team  by 
DCIs  Allen  Dulles  and  John  McCone  reflects  not  only  its  aggressive- 
ness and  talent;  it  also  reflects  the  faith  these  DCIs  had  in  the 
original  set-up.  This  is  demonstrated  and  was  maintained  by  the 
strong  personal  relationships  between  the  DCIs  and  various  Board 
members.  Dulles  and  McCone  respected  the  Board,  invited  Sherman 
Kent  to  morning  staff  meetings,  discussed  estimates  individually 
with  analysts,  and  sometimes  proposed  new  Board  members.    The 
Board  and  ONE  enjoyed  a  certain  institutional  independence  from 
the  DDL  For  example,  they  hired  their  own  staff,  and  made 
personnel  transfers  from  other  DDI  units  without  the  DDI's  approval. 
.19
-  41  - 
Organizational  charts  show  that  in  the  mid-1960s  the  Board  waa 
elevated  out  of  the  DDI  into  a  staff  positon  to  the  DCI.    How- 
ever, Kent's  stature  was  equal  to  that  of  any  DDI  and  this  step 
was  significant  on  paper  only. 
John  McCone  initiated  several  functional  reorganizations 
within  CIA  which  were  heralded  as  appropriate  rationalizations 
of  the  CIA's  growing  strategic  work,  such  as  the  creation  of  the 
DDSsT  in  1965.*  However,  of  more  direct,  short-term  impact  on 
the  strategic  NIEs  was  a  breakthrough  McCone  precipitated  in 
gaining  CIA  access  to  highly  classified  US  strategic  planning  docu- 
ments generated  by  the  Pentagon.  KcCone  believed  that  "the  DCI 
had  to  be  informed  of  US  strategic  capabilities  in  order  to  give 
adequate  intelligence  support  to  the  President."    During  the  Cuban 
missile  crisis  in  October  1962,  McCone  acted  as  a  key  participant  in 
White  House  deliberations  and  the  3IA  estimators  were  asked  to 
draft  several  NIEs.  At  that  time,  Met  ne  obtained  the  data  he 
requested  on  US  force  dispositions. 
This  was  the  wedge  he  needed.  Following  the  crisis, 
with  encouragement  from  [Defense  Secretary]  McNamara, 
he  continued  to  make  the  requests.   By  the  mid-1960s, 
the  DDI  was  procuring  information  on  US  strategic 
planning  on  a  regular  basis.  Consistent  access  to 
this  data  increased  the  Agency's  information  base 
considerably  and  further  established  the  CIA's  claim 
to  strategic  research. 23 
♦Illustrative  of  the  continuing  competition  between  various  Directorates, 
in  1965  the  DDI  criticized  the  DDS&T's  taking  of  the  Office  of 
Scientific  Intelligence  (OSX)  on  that  grounds  of  weakening  the  DDI's 
estimative  work,  and  later  reclaimed  OSI.  Photo,  interpretation 
work  has  moved  back  and  forth  from  the  DDI  and  DDS6X.
-  42  - 
Actually,  the  CIA's  access  was  not  always  "consistent"  or  easy. 
For  example,  the  Navy  remained  hesitant  about  providing  the 
CIA  with  some  data.  In  the  early  1970s,  it  refused  to  provide 
CIA  analysts  with  some  requests.  Reportedly,  Richard  Helms  than 
intervened  on  their  behalf. 
Richard  Helms  long  tenure  as  DCI,  from  mid-1966  to  early  1973, 
was  characterized  by  passivity  vis-a-vi3  the  estimates  te-im.  CIA 
analysts  report  that  Helms  maintained  his  distance  from  the  Board 
of  Estimates,  developed  f=w  personal  relationships  there,  and  was 
little  interested  in  estimative  mechanics.    Helms'  DDIs  were 
forceful  personalities  who  exerted  a  stronger  administrative  in- 
fluence on  facets  of  that  Directorate's  work.  On  the  other  hand. 
Helms  defended  the  Board  and  ONE's  right  to  be  left  alone  to  do 
their  work.   "To  some  extent  the  Office  was  shielded  by  Richard 
Helms.  During  a  period  in  which  the  CIA  was  regularly  under  attack. 
Helms  found  that  the  prestige  and  credibility  of  his  analysts. .  .were 
-26 
great  assets.... 
Unfortunately,  during  Helms'  tenure  the  prestige  of  the  CIA 
estimators  declined.  As  the  Senate  Select  Committee  on  Intelligence 
repox ,s,  the  charge  frequently  was  echoed  that  the  Board  and  ONE 
had  become  "insulated"  and  in-bred,  and  that  Helms  did  not  infuse 
it  with  new  blood.   For  example,  the  Board  of  Estimates  gradually 
changed  from  a  broadly-based  group  in  which  individual  members 
had  considerable  stature  and  independent  outside  ties,  to  a  place 
of  tenure  for  ONE  staff.    The  last  two  Chairman  previously  had
-  43  - 
been  Board  member o  and  bafore  that  ONE  otaff.   Helms  reportedly  made 
one  Board  appointment  which  waB  regarded  as  politically  motivated, 
and  by  1973  there  was  no  military  representation  on  the  Board.29 
Pentagon  intelligence  staff  privately  argued  that  after  new  ONE 
staff  were  hired,  including  former  DIA  employees,  thay  aoor.  acquired 
a  "CIA  perspective."30 
Helmp'  role  in  creating  the  office  of  Strategic  Research  in 
1967  was  :.ti.-»imal.   Helms  approved  the  reorganization,  proposed  to 
him  by  the  DDI  with  the  backing  of  Defense  Secretary  Robert  McNamara.31 
The  consolidation  of  several  strategic  components  in  0SR  meant  that 
the  nie  staff  could  turn  to  one  place  within  the  CIA  for  finished 
strategic  analyses.  OSR's  stature  was  greatly  enhanced  by  the 
fact  that  Secretary  McNamara  immediately  began  to  solicit  its  advice, 
through  special  memoranda  and  reports  as  wall  as  the  NIEa.  As  one 
author  summarized: 
In  the  1960s,  a  period  of  disillusionment  with  military 
estimating  and  one  in  which  the  civilians  were 
ascendant  in  the  NIE  process,  the  NIEs  were  found  to 
be  useful  counterweights  to  the  excessive  claims  of 
the  military.   McNamara  started  off  expecting  to 
be  able  to  use  the  DIA  as  his  source  of  intelligence, 
but  he  became  increasingly  dissatisfied  with  it. 
As  a  consequence  he  turned  more  and  more  to  the  CIA 
for  estimates  on  the  Vietnam  War  and  Soviet  military 
capabilities.   ONE  did  a  number  of  papers  at  his 
personal  request,  and  McNamara  encouraged  the  forma- 
tion of  OS?.,  a  CIA  office  designed  to  compete  with 
the  military  on  military  estimates. .. .McNamara 
would  take  the  NIE  judgement  as  final,  and  would 
refuse  to  speculate  on  any  new  Soviet  capabilities 
until  they  had  been  properly  discussed  through 
the  NIE  process. 32 
According  to  the  same  author,  the  CIA  estimates  team  relied  in- 
creasingly on  OSR,  compared  to  other  sources,  in  preparing  the 
NIEs.  "*
-  44 
2.   Atter  1973 
Beginning  with  James  Schlesinger  in  1973,  DCIs  have  demonstrated 
more  interest  in  managing  the  estimates  function.  During  his  five 
month  tenure  as  DCI  in  early  1973,  Schlesinger  took  several  steps 
to  revitalize  the  NIE  process,  For  example,  he  examined  options 
for  reorganizing  the  estimates  staff,  debated  these  with  Board 
members  and  finally  determined  to  abolish  the  Board.    He  argued 
that  the  strategic  NIEs  had  become  cumbersome,  and  urged  stylistic 
34a 
codifications  to  reduce  their  length  and  complexity.     For  example, 
he  promoted  the  use  of  Interagency  Intelligence  Memorandum  (IIMs) , 
to  deal  in-depth  with  highly  technical  issues,  such  as  Soviet 
civil  defense  and  defense  spending.  The  IIMs  are  coordinated  in- 
formally with  the  Pentagon  and  do  not  require  USIB  approval.  Tfteir 
conclusions  then  may  be  summarized  in  the  strategic  NIEs. 
To  improve  estimative  work,  Schlesinger  arrived  as  DCI  with 
a  "mandate  for  change"  in  the  rest  of  CIA,  following  his  report 
in  1971,  as  Deputy  Director  of  the  Office  of  Management  an5  Budget, 
on  intelligence  community  reform's.   For  example,  in  the  report 
Schlesinger  had  challenged  the  notion  that  "our  hypotheses  about 
foreign  intentions,  capabilities,  and  activities  have  improved  com- 
mensurately  in  scope  and  quality  as  more  duta  comes  in  from  modern 
collection  methbds"  and  was  determined  to  upgrade  analvtical  work 
within  CIA.35  As  one  colleague  observed,  if  Schlesinger  had  re- 
mained as  DCI  "he  would  have  taken  the  place  apart." 
William  Colby  accomplished  the  first  reorganization  of  the  es- 
timates function  within  CIA  in  over  twenty  years,  and  then  assumed 
direct  responsibility  for  it.  Although  several  of  his  reforms  have
-  45 
been  criticized  ever  since,  DCI  Colby  is  given  a  "XX"  in  Chart 
B  for  his  personal  role  in  them.   Colby  replaced  the  Board  of 
Estimates  and  ONE  staff  with  11  National  Intelligence  Officers, 
called  NIOs.  Most  NIOs  had  geographic  responsibilities,  e.g.,  Latin 
America,  and  several  had  functional  tasks,  e.g.,  strategic  in- 
telligence and  world  economic  trends.* 
Colby  had  three  rationale  for  this  move.   First,  he  hoped 
to  improve  the  NIEs,  and  respond  to  outside  criticism,  by  creating 
a  drafting  system  which  relied  more  heavily  on  the  direct  input  of 
non-CIA  agencies.   To  accomplish  this,  the  NIOs  were  located  as  a 
staff  function  to  the  DCI  and  assigned  only  one  staff  assistant. 
In  theory,  anyone  could  contribute  draft  material  to  the  NIO,  who 
had  both  management  and  production  responsibilities.  That  is, 
the  NIO  was  responsible  for  seeing  that  a  draft  was  produced  but 
he  did  not  necessarily  have  to  write  it  himself.   Rather,  he 
"managed"  the  work  of  other  persons,  for  example,  in  DIA,  whom 
he  might  ask  to  write  first  drafts.   Changes  in  drafting  procedures 
which  resulted  are  discussed  below  in  Section  B. 
Second,  DCI  Colby  sought  to  sharpen  the  lines  of  responsibil- 
ity by  abolishing  the  Board  of  Estimates.  As  Colby  told  this 
author,  the  Board  tended  "to  isolate  the  DCI  from  the  true  believer. 
He  testified  to  the  Senate  Select  Committee  on  Intelligence: 
I  have  some  reservations  at  the  ivory  tower  kind  of 
problem  that  you  get  out  of  a  board,  which  is  too 
separated  from  the  rough  and  tumble  of  the  real 
world   I  think  there  is  a  tendency  to  be  in- 
stitutionally committed  to  an  approach  and  to  an 
•Presently,  there  are  additional  "functional"  NIOs  for  Warning, 
Nuclear  Proliferation  and  Arms  Control. 
.,37
-  46  - 
appraisal  of  a  situation  and  to  begin  to  interpret 
new  ever  L"  against  the  light  of  a  predetermined 
approach  toward  those  events. ..  I  like  the  idea  of  in- 
dividual total  responsibility,  and  then  you  don't 
get  any  fuzz  about  how  there  was  a  vote.... That 
really  is  my  nam  problem  with  the  Board,  that  it 
diffuses  responsibility....^8 
Colby's  third  rationale  pertained,  broadly,  to  the  CIA  as  a 
whole,  the  reorganization  of  which  Colby  said  he  had  "just  begun." 
The  NIOs  were  supposed  to  be  the  pinnacle  of  a  system  more  geograph- 
ically focused  to  provide  better  intelligence.   In  addition  to 
estimating,  the  NIOs  were  meant  to  be  the  DCI's  "eyes  and  ears  on 
the  world"  to  provide  him  with  prompt,  up-to-date  intelligence 
answers  and  survey  broad  intelligence  requirements.  u  To  aid  them, 
Colby  became  the  first  DCI  to  attempt  to  "force  the  DDO  to  interact 
with  other  elements  of  the  Agency, "  which  his  new  Management 
by  Objectives  system  was  supposed  to  facilitate.*  ^  kike  Schle3inger, 
Colby  sought  to  increase  the  CIA' a  capacity  to  analyze  foreign 
political  changes.   For  example,  he  created  the  first  Office  of 
Political  Research  (subsequently  ciboli3hed)  in  the  DDI  and  by 
firing  the  head  of  the  DDO's  Office  of  Counterintelligence,  Colby 
sought  to  refocus  the  DDO's  Soviet  work  on  Soviet  political  in- 
tentions.^ As  Colby  recently  said: 
We  used  to  go  through  a  great  deal  of  effort  to  dis- 
cover the  number  of  [military]  divisions  in  Eastern 
Europe,  but  we  now  get  this  information  without  the 
use  of  agents  or  defectors.  We  do  have  to  worry  about 
political  estimating,  a  political  judgement  of  the 
forces  at  work  in  countries  which  are  hidden  behind 
closed  doors. 4-* 
♦Traditionally,  the  contact  between  DDO  and  NIE  staff  was  limited 
to  rare  personal  visits  of  DDO  officials  to  the  Board  of  Estimates, 
and  circulation  of  covert  agents  reports  "graded"  in  terms  of  re- 
liability by  the  DDO.  The  Board  of  Estimates  housed  these  in  its 
"all-source"  reading  room.  Occasionally,  the  Board  and  ONE  received 
important  agents  reports  which  some  DDI  units  did  not  receive,  such 
as  those  of  Soviet  military  intelligence  officer  Oleg  Penkovsky  in 
1961.  Colby  told  this  author  that  he  once  brought  together  a  dozen 
CIA  country  specialists,  in  the  same  room,  to  discover  that  most 
never  had  met.
-  47  - 
William  Colby  assumed  an  active  relationship  with  his  NIOs. 
In  personally  hiring  each  one,  he  sought  to  bring  in  new  persona.* 
Of  the  first  eleven,  eight  were  new  to  the  estimates  process,  one 
was  from  ONE,  another  from  the  Board,  and  a  third  (the  NIO  for 
Strategic  Intelligence)  had  been  with  ONE  in  the  1950s  and  early 
1960s.   The  NIOs  were  elevated  to  a  staff  relationship  with  the 
DCI,  and  directly  responsible  to  him,  although  administratively 
supervised  by  a  "chief"  NIO.  Colby  met  frequently  with  individual 
NIOs,  read  successive  drafts,  listened  to  each  NIO'S  analytical 
problems,  and  tried  to  remain  informed  about  coordinative  difficulties.  ; 
In  addition,  he  turned  to  the  NIOs  for  their  views  on  broad  ques- 
tions, for  example:   "Are  we  collecting  enough?  Are  we  processing 
raw  data  properly?  Are  we  spending  too  much  money  on  it?  Are  we 
organized  right  to  do  the  job?"45 
When  Admiral  Stansfield  Turner  became  DCI  in  early  1977,  he 
sought  to  refine  Colby's  managerial  innovations  and  retair.3  a  keen 
interest  in  management  issues.  For  example,  to  reduce  the  intellect- 
ual burden  on  the  NIOs,  he  assigned  them  only  one  function,  to 
draft  NIEs.  To  reduce  the  administrative  responsibility  of  the 
PCI,  he  appointed  a  director  and  small  staff  to  oversee  the  NIOs  on 
a  full-time  basis.  After  several  organizational  experiments.  Turner 
relocat'ed  the  estimates  function  back  within  the  DDI,  which  was 
renamed  the  National  Foreign  Assessment  Center  (NFAC) .  The  first 
head  of  NFAC,  called  the  Director  of  National  Foreign  Assessment 
(D/NFA) ,  spent  most  of  his  time  on  estimative  work.  Chart  C  on  the 
following  page  describes  the  composition  of  NFAC  in  1979.   In  late      j 
i 
*The  NIO  who  wrote  the  NIE  on  Soviet  Bloc  conventional  forces  was       \ 
an  active  Admiral.  j
-   48   - 
Chart  C 
National  Foreign  Assessment  Center.  1979 
Senior 
Review  Panel 
Director 
Deputy  Director 
Associate  Director-Management 
Associate  Director-SufcstanSive  Support 
National  Intetligenco 
Officers 
Administrative 
Planning  Staffs 
Coordination 
Staff 
Current  Reporting 
Group 
Office  of 
Central 
Reference 
Office  of 
Imagery 
Analysis 
Office  of 
Economic 
Research 
Office  of 
Geographic  & 
Cartographic 
Research 
T 
CIA  Operations 
Center 
'.\«c.   '    •      %v^j>vf  >*'•'■ 
Pub&sstion?  6    - 
Presentations  Group 
Requirements  6 
Evaluation  Staff 
I 
Office  of 
Scientific 
intelligence 
Office  of 
Weapons 
intelligence 
Office  of 
Regional  6 
Political 
Analysis 
I 
Office  of 
Strategic 
Research
49  - 
1979,  the  newly  appointed  head  of  NFAC  was  asked  to  reevaluate 
the  NIO  set-up,  deciding  whether  further  organizational  innovations 
were  needed.   Reorganization  nov;  is  in  progress. 
In  early  1979,  Admiral  Turner  reconstituted  the  collective 
NIE  review  function  within  CIA,  a  step  advocated  by  several  govern- 
mental study  groups.   For  example,  in  1976  the  Senate  Select  Conunitte 
on  Intelligence  recommended  that  "the  Director  establish  a  board 
to  include  senior  outside  advisors  to  review  the  NIEs."4"  Turner 
hired  a  three-man  Senior  Review  Panel,  which  included  an  eminent 
academic  in  strategic  affairs,  a  former  Ambassador,  and  a  four- 
star  general.   The  Panel  serves  both  the  DCI  and  the  NIOs,  and 
reviews  IIMs  as  well  as  NIEs,  at  several  stages  during  the 
drafting  process.  However,  unlike  the  Board  of  Estimates,  the  Panel 
informally  advises  as  opposed  to  collectively  ajjprvving  the  NIEs. 
In  1979,  questions  were  raised  as  to  whether  the  Panel  had  either 
the  prestige  or  authority  to  function  effectively  within  CIA.4' 
Admiral  Turner  has  promoted  innovations  in  drafting  procedures. 
For  example,  each  NIO  has  a  list  of  expert  consultants  he  may 
use  in  drafting.  Several  years  ago,  a  consultant  was  hired  to 
write  the  entire  first  draft  of  NIE  11-4  on  Soviet  strategic  doc- 
trine, and  presently  this  NIE  is  drafted  by  the  NIO  for  Soviet  Bloc 
affairs.  Much  flevibility  and  diversity  prevails  in  the  drafting 
of  non-strategic  NIEs.   For  example,  each  NIO  follows  different 
I 
and  highly  individualistic  drafting  procedures,*  and  may  use 
varying  formats.4?  The  NIOs  are  encouraged  to  prepare  NIEs  when 
*For  example,  one  NIO  may  write  a  first  draft  himself  before  calling 
in  other  agencies  for  discussion;  another  may  ask  a  CIA  team  and/or 
other  agencies  to  draft  assigned  portions  of  an  NIE,  which  he  then 
edits;  and  a  third  might  solicit  "think"  papers  from  outsiders 
which  he  U3es  in  preparing  an  NIE  himself.
they  see  the  need  to  do  so,  as  opposed  to  routinely  addressing 
topics  on  an  annual  basis.   This  pertains  to  NiE  11-4  as  well. 
In  total,  the  number  of  NIEs  has  been  reduced  from  about  50  a 
year,  to  20-25  a  year.  Like  Colby,  Admiral  Turner  maintains  an 
ongoing,  personal  relationship  with  his  NIOs  throughout  the 
drafting  process,  reviewing  and  monitoring  their  work  during 
successive  stages. 
B .   Management  Attention  to  Department  of  Defense  Coordination 
This  section  explores  the  DCI's  role  in  the  mechanics  of 
coordinating  the  CI^  draft  with  Department  of  Defense  (DOD)  in- 
telligence agencies,  prior  to  USIB  consideration.  The  Pentagon 
agencies  discussed  are  Army,  Navy  and  Air  Force  Intelligence  and 
the  Defense  Intelligence  Agency  (DIA)  created  in  1961.* 
As  indicated  in  Chart  B,  rcost  DCas  focused  little  attention 
on  the  means  by  which  the  Pentagon  might  best  contribute  to  the 
draft  strategic  NIEs.   After  the  n?id-1950s,  the  Board  of  Estimates 
and  ONE  took  the  lead  in  defining  the  timetable  and  mechanisms 
for  the  ?entagon's  involvement.  The  three  military  services  and 
DIA  exercised  their  prerogative  in  deciding  whom  to  sen-j  to  CIA 
coordinative  meetings,  what  kind  of  internal  work  to  generate 
parallel  to  the  CIA's,  and  how  far  to  advance  disagreements  in 
the  CIA  draft.   Beginning  in  1969-  Presidents  urged  changes  in 
the  format  of  presenting  military  dissents  in  the  strategic  NIEs. 
With  the  DCI's  support,  the  CIA  estimates  staff  gradually  implemented 
*The  input  of  the  Natioaal  Security  Agency  (NSA)  is  not  discussed 
here.  Before  1961,  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  J-2  intelligence  arm 
participated  in  the  drafting  and  had  a  seat  on  USIB.   The  DIA  re- 
placed it.
-  51  - 
these  changes.   The  exceptions  to  this  pattern  of  traditional  non- 
involvement  of  DCIs  are  William  Colby  and  Stansfield  Turner.   By 
different  means,  both  sought  to  enhance  the  Pentagon's  direct 
input  and  improve  interagency  coordination  in  the  drafting  stage. 
Both  are  given  a  "XX"  in  Chart  3. 
1.  Before  1973 
As  described  earlier,  General  Bedell  Smith  was  the  first  DCI 
to  elicit  the  cooperation  of  the  Pentagon  in  drafting  NIEs.   Later, 
Allen  Dulles  gave  the  CIA  what  has  been  termed  the  "power  of  the 
draft"  for  strategic  estimates; ,  by  supporting  its  inclination  to 
prepare  independently  a  first  draft.49  However,  he  considered  it 
inappropriate  to  prescribe  optimal  coordinating  tactics  to  Defense 
Secretaries.  Thus,  the  Board  of  Estimates  and  ONE  adopted  a  pat- 
tern for  coordinating  the  Pentagon' 3  response  which, in  several 
respects,  remains  similar  today. 
First,  early  in  the  year  ONE  circulated  the  terms  of  rt'firence 
of  the  forthcoming  NIE,  and  invited  interagency  comments.   Then, 
it  continued  an  ongoing  survey  of  raw  intelligence  and  finished 
analyses  on  strategic  issues  from  different  CIA  and  DOD  units. 
It  often  solicited  additional  work  from  CIA,  DOD,  consultants, 
and  special  USIB  subcommittees.  These  subcommittes  are  interagency 
groups,  often  initiated  by  the  DCI,  assigned  specific  topics  for 
study.   For  example,  a  USIB  subcommittee  important  to  drafting 
NIE  11-8  was  the  Guided  Missiles  and  Astronautics  Intelligence 
Committee  (GMAIC) *  created  by  Allen  Dulles  in  1956,  to  "track  the 
*This  subcommittee  was  first  called  the  Guided  Missiles  Intelligence 
Committee  (GMIC) .  •
-  52  - 
rabbit  to  its  lair."5^  The  ONE  had  complete  freedom  to  decide  what 
work  to  collect,  consider  and  integrate  into  its  draft.   That 
is,  no  DCI  established  guidelines  to  assist  it  in  choosing,  re- 
jecting, or  balancing  different  sources.  ONE  then  completed  a 
first  draft,  submitted  it  to  the  Board  for  approval,  and  circulated 
it  within  the  Pentagon  and  other  agencies  for  review. 
The  next  stage  of  interagency  coordination  was,  and  is,  diffi- 
cult and  protracted.  Intelligence  agency  representatives  were  in- 
vited to  CIA  to  discuss  the  draft.  These  meetings  went  en  throughout 
the  summer  and  fail,  and  sometimes  were  reconvened  after  DCI  and 
USIB  review.   They  were  chaired  by  a  Board  member  and  Later  an 
NIO,  and  included  CIA  representatives  and  often  more  than  a  doz- 
en Pentagon  staff,  but  not  the  DCI.   Here  the  draft  strateqic  NIEs 
were  heatedly  debated,  and  here  the  CIA's  "power  of  the  draft"  was 
keenly  experienced  by  the  DOD  representatives.   The  purpose  was 
to  explore  and  redefine  all  areas  of  agreement  and,  failing  that, 
to  agree  on  how  to  disagree,  prior  to  submitting  the  final  draft 
to  the  DCI  and  then  USIB.   Since  the  CIA  was  well  prepared  with 
a  completed  document  in  hand,  the  Pentagon  representatives  were 
put  in  the  position  of  reacting  to,  or  effectively  challenging,  what 
already  was  written.   Further,  ONE  did  most  subsequent  redrafting. 
As  one  observer  notes:   "In  the  draft  ONE  would  resolve. . .ambiquity 
according  to  its' own  views,  using  style  and  structure  as  well  as 
argument.  "*1
-  53  - 
The  DOD  representatives  often  arrived  at  CIA  for  discussion 
ill-prepared  to  influence  ONE  or  make  concrete  rebuttals.   For 
example,  during  the  late  1950s  and  the  1960s,  they  did  not  come 
with  completed  analyses  parallel  or  competitive  to  ONE's,  which 
could  be  integrated  into  the  draft.   Rather,  the  representatives 
were  familiar  with  their  own  agencies  intelligence  studies,  esti- 
mates, budgetary  and  posture  statements,  the  parameters  and  time 
frames  of  which  might  differ  from  the  CIA's  draft. ^2   Thus,  they 
relied  on  verbal  means  to  influence  ONE  and,  from  time  to  time, 
called  in  different  intelligence  specialists  to  advance  technical 
arguments.  Traditional  interservice  rivalries  and  budget  competi- 
tion make  it  impossible  for  the  military  representatives  to  form 
stable  coalitions  to  use  as  bargaining  tools  with  ONE.   For  ex- 
ample, in  the  early  1960s  the  Array  and  Navy  typically  lined  up 
against  the  Air  Force  in  predicting  Soviet  ICBKs  in  NIE  11- 3  > 
but  the  Army  and  Navy  often  disagreed  on  Soviet  SLBMs  in  NIE  11-8; 
and  on  Soviet  ABM  potential  in  NIE  11-3. " 
The  creation  of  DIA  in  1961  did  no.  alter  this  seemingly  ran- 
dom approach  to  the  draft  strategic  estimates.   The  DIA  was  es- 
tablished, with  the  backing  of  President  Kennedy,  to  work  on 
strategic  intelligence  matters  pertaining  to  the  three  servicea' 
tactical  work,  and  speak  with  a  unified  voice  for  them.   However, 
the  DIA  was  not  "functionally  geared  to  the  production  of  con- 
vincing estimates. "54  Earlier,  Allen  Dulles  had  written:   "Two 
powerful  and  well-financed  agencies  such  as  DIA  and  CIA  will  become 
rivals  and  competitors.  Some  of  this  could  be   healthy;  too  much 
of  it  could  be  both  expensive  and  dangerous.""   Actually,  in  the
54  - 
beginning  DCI  John  McCone  worried  that  DIA  might  exert  too  much 
pressure  to  conform  on  the  three  military  services,  and  a  CIA 
group  set  about  reviewing  its  programs. ^6  However,  soon  McCone 
complained  to  McNamara  that  DIA's  work  was  "irrelevant  and  redundant" 
and  both  men  reportedly  lost  interest  in  ways  to  overcome  what 
raore  than  one  observer  has  called  DIA's  "inherent  bureaucratic 
weaknesses"  in  competing  with  the  military  service  intelligence 
CO 
agencies. 
If  the  CIA  had  the  "power  of  the  draft, "  the  three  military 
services  nad  the  "power  of  the  footnote."  Footnotes  represented 
these  issues  for  which  a  compromise  through  rewording  and  restructuring 
could  not  be  reached,  or  to  which  the  Pentagon  would  not  acquiesce. 
In  the  late  1950s  and  1960s,  they  typically  were  specific.   For 
example,  CIA  and  Air  Force  numerical  predictions  of  Soviet  1CBM 
deployment  over  the  next  five  years  might  differ  by  a  100  or  more, 
or  the  two  might  disagree  on  the  characteristics  of  a  Soviet  missile 
such  as  the  SS-9  versus  the  SS-11.  Then,  the  Air  Force  had  the  option 
of  taking  a  footnote  at  the  bottom  of  the  page,  saying:   "Air  Force 
Intelligence  disagrees — .It  believes. .. ."  Until  1969,  footnotes 
were  accepted  as  a  clear-cut,  useful  method  of  registering  dis- 
approval. The  CIA  did  not  deny  their  use,  and  no  DCI  or  other  top- 
level  official  sought  to  alter  the  system. 
The  most  clear  indication  of  tacit  acceptance  of  the  footnote 
system  was  its  pervasive  uae.  Throughout  the  1960s,  the  strategic 
NIEs  were  rife  with  numerous  and  complex  xcotnotes  to  the  main 
text,  which  was  supposed  to  represent  the  consensus.  For  example, 
various  Pentagon  agencies  disagreed  with  the  CIA's  position  on  a
-  55  - 
Soviet  ABM  system,  MIRV  capability,  and  other  aspects  of  new  delivery 
vehicles  and  warheads.   Sometimes,  a  majority  of  pages  had  foot- 
notes.  For  example,  in  NIE  11-3-65,  the  dissents  are  said  to  have 
been  larger  than  the  text  itself,  and  thus  the  evidence  for  dissents 
en 
eventually  was  presented  in  appendices  prepared  by  the  Pentagon.-" 
On  occasion,  DIA  took  an  independent  position  "contrary  to  the  view3 
of  all  the  service  agencies."60  For  example,  in  the  above-mentioned 
NIE,  an  upper  limit  of  Soviet  ICBMs  was  predicted  only  in  a  foot- 
note supported  by  the  three  military  services,  but  DIA  dissented 
from  the  footnote.61  After  reading  NIE  11-8-68,  Henry  Kissinger 
asserted  that  the  document  made  little  3ense,  3ince  the  text  was 
"bland,"  "inconclusive"  and  refuted  or  "taken  back"  in  footnotes.62 
By  *:he  early  1970s,  the  Pentagon  began  taking  footnotes  to  less 
specific  issues.  For  example,  in  the  opening  pages  of  the  NIE, 
it  might  footnote  what  ore  participant  called  "the  basic  tone" 
or  broad  implications  of  the  NIE.  3 
The  first  effort  to  rationalize  the  footnoting  system  came 
from  President  Nixon.   In  early  1970,  Dr.  Kissinger  requested  DCI 
Richard  Helms  to  experiment  with  new  means  of  presenting  dissent 
in  the  NIEs.   Kissinger  argued  that  a  fuller  sampling  of  alternative 
views  and  supporting  evidence  in  the  main  text  would  be  useful  to 
the  white  House.6*  As  in  a  lawyers  brief,  he  wanted  the  reasons 
for  rejecting  various  options  officially  recorded.   In  other  words, 
the  CIA  (and  by  implication  the  DCI)  was  not  required  to  reach 
a  dominant  consensus  on  highly  controversial  issues,  but  offer 
the  policymaker  "facts,  not  opinions"  which  he  then  might  arbitrate."
56  - 
Helms  agreed,  but  left  it  to  the  Board  of  Estimates  and  ONE  to 
implement  the  request.   In  NIE  11-8-70,  a  few  alternative  views 
were  presented  "up  front"  in  the  main  text,  although  footnotes 
were  still  used  for  some  time.  To  illustrate  the  stylistic  diffi- 
culty in  implementation,  this  N1E  was  over  100  pages,  which  was 
over  twice  as  long  as  its  predecessors,  and  one  footnote  was  a 
page  long  analysis.66  When  James  Schlesinger  became  DCI,  he  said 
he  wanted  alternative  positions  presented  even  if  the  estimators 
"had  to  cut  the  page  in  two."67 
The  White  House  also  offered  the  Pentagon  a  license  to  more 
systematically  compete  in  the  drafting  of  strategic  NIEs.   In  1970, 
a  special  Directorate  of  Estimates  (DE)  was  created  in  DIA,  headed 
by  the  highly  qualified  Army  General  Daniel  Graham.  Gr~ham  began 
producing  estimates  called  DIEs,  focusing  on  narrow  but  "the  more 
contentious  topics,"  such  as  Soviet  MIRVing  of  a  single  missile, 
which  were  important  to  the  NIE  debate.  "In  some  ways  the  DIEs  have 
served  as  a  dry  run  for  the  NIEs — used  to  create  a  more  rigorous 
DIA  position  on  controversial  issues."68  They  were  prepared  before 
the  NIE  coordinative  meetings  and,  importantly,  sent  to  the  White 
House.   Henry  Kissinger  also  stepped  outside  the  NIE  process  by 
urging  defense  intelligence  officials,  as  well  as  non-intelligence 
officials  such  as  the  Director  of  Defense  Research  and  Engineering 
(DDR&E),  to  help  draft  the  White  House's  more  policy-oriented 
National  Security  Study  Memorandum  (NSSMs) .   In  so  doing,  they 
could  incorporate  selectivt  material  from  the  NIEs.  Soon  DCI 
HeLns  found  himself  in  debate  with  the  DDP4E  at  the  White  House, 
in  which  NIE  conclusions  were  reopened.69
57  - 
After  1973 
William  Colby  was  the  first  DCI  to  take  the  lead  in  altering 
existing  patterns  of  DOD  coordination.   His  1973  NIO  reorganization 
was  meant  to  increase  the  direct  input  of  the  Pentagon  to  the 
first  draft.   He  told  his  NIOs  to  set  up  procedures  by  which 
this  might  be  accomplished.   The  following  year,  DIA  was  asked 
to  prepare  a  first  draft  of  one  out  of  five  chapters  of  the  com- 
bined NIE  11-3-8,  and  the  State  Department's  INR  was  given  the 
chapter  on  Soviet  strategic  doctrine.   In  1975,  D1A  drafted  two 
chapters,  including  the  one  on  Soviet  doctrine,  in  which  the 
Air  Force  assisted. ^  Reportedly,  DIA  officials  were  "delighted" 
with  this  opportunity.71  Presently,  DIA  still  drafts  at  least 
one  out  of  five  chapters  of  NIE  11-3-8. 
One  participant  described  this  new  technique  as  the  "bottom 
up"  approach  to  coordination. 7^  jjci  Colby  hoped  it  would  in- 
crease the  personal  stake  that  DIA,  and  the  services  if  they  par- 
ticipated, had  in  the  draft,  and  heighten  interest  and  skill  in 
sustained  estimative  work.  Further,  it  was  meant  to  introduce 
a  more  "competitive  element"  into* the  drafting,  by  removing  "a 
certainty  that  a  particular  agency  will  have  a  decisive  say  in 
a  particular  estimate."    However,  the  real  impact  of  this  inno- 
vation now  is  deboted.   First,  observers  note  that  the  outside 
contributions  were  weak  stylistically,  and  subsequently  edited 
or  rewritten  by  the  NIO  for  Strategic  Intelligence.74  Second, 
the  DIA' 8  interest  and  service  cooperation  may'  have  declined
58  - 
recently.75  Third,  NIE  11-3-8  still  is  written  mainly  by  one 
NIO,  including  its  executive  summary.   The  estimators  themselves 
assert  that  one  benefit  is  a  coranon  data  base  and  shared  knowledge. 
While  CIA  staff  have  acquired  specialized  knowledge  from  the 
military,  e.g.,  on  how  missiles  systems  are  operated,  military 
officials  have  broadened  their  grasp  on  a  range  of  topics. 
DCI  Colby  supported  his  innovations  by  assuming  a  personal, 
coordinative  role.   Primarily,  he  did  this  by  listening  to  Pentagon 
representatives  who  came  to  his  office  to  outline  their  grievances 
about  the  draft,  and  then  reporting  these  complaints  to  the  NIO. 
The  then  head  of  DIA,  General  Graham,  argues  that  Colby  was  "highly 
accessible"  to  requests  for  hearings,  and  that  coordination  in 
the  drafting  improved  during  his  tenure  as  DCI.77  Colby  also  ad- 
vanced the  presentation  of  alternative  views  in  the  main  text 
of  the  strategic  NIEs,  with  President  Ford's  support.  By  1976, 
italics  were  used  to  highlight  differences.   For  example,  one 
paragraph  might  present  the  majority  view,  followed  by  a  paragraph 
in  italics  representing  another  view.  Footnotes  were  used  for  less 
controversial,  discrete,  or  individual  dissents. 
Admiral  Turner  plays  an  even  stronger  personal  role  in  managing 
competition  during  the  drafting.   Like  DCIs  Schlesinger  and  Colby, 
he  supports  the  trend  of  incorporating  alternative  positions  in  an 
NXE's  main  text,  a  policy  for  which  President  Carter  indicated 
his  agreement.78  However,  Turner  has  extended  this  concept  by 
virtually  eliminating  the  use  of  footnotes.  He  directed  the 
head  of  the  National  Foreign  Assessment  Center  and  his  NIOs  to 
consider  all  alternative  views  "regardless  of  their  origin,"
-  59 
and  eventually  narrow  them  down  to  a  few.'   By  discarding  foot- 
notes, Turner  hope3  that  the  Pentagon  will  explore  and  delineate 
their  differences  more  concretely,  reaching  agreement  on  which 
are  the  most  significant.   The  implication  is  that  the  Pentagon 
should  weight  their  dissents  internally,  advancing  and  documenting 
those  which  reflect  a  major  predictive  uncertainty,  and  abandoning 
those  less  central  to  the  current  year's  strategic  arguments. 
Alternatives  are  presented  in  the  NIEs  as  "parallel  texts." 
That  is,  different  positions  are  alternatively  developed,  para- 
graph by  paragraph,  throughout  the  text. 
Like  General  Bedell  Smith  over  25  years  earlier.  Admiral 
Turner  personally  intervenes  to  assist  CIA  staff  in  eliciting 
from  the  Pentagon  well-reasoned,  agreed-upon,  objections.  He 
rigorously  examines  successive  drafts,  and  then  takes  the  initiative 
in  raising  strategic  topics  directly  with  military  officials. 
For  example,  if  he  believes  that  a  Pentagon  option  is  inadequately 
expressed  or  lacks  technical  documentation,  he  calls  up  the 
Pentagon  analyst  involved  and  says  so.80  If,  after  further  re- 
vision, Turner  still  has  questions  about  the  position  advanced, 
he  is  likely  to  bring  these  to  the  attention  of  the  relevant  in- 
telligence head,  for  example,  the  Director  of  the  Office  of  Naval 
Intelligence.  Often  this  occurs  during  regular  meetings  between 
all  the  intelligence  heads  in  the  DCI's  office.   If  he  still  has 
reservations  about  the  wording  or  logic  of  the  alternative,  he 
may  call  the  head  of  the  military  service  involved,  for  example, 
the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations.,  and  ask  his  opinion.  By  going  up 
the  chain  of  command.  Admiral  Turner  is  interested  in  discovering 
whether  the  dissenting  view  is  widely  shared  by  Navy  officials.
-  60  - 
IV.   SUBSTANTIVE  INPUT  OF  DCIs  TO 
THE  DRAFT  STRATEGIC  NIES 
This  chapter  explores  the  role  of  DCIs  in  contributing  sub- 
stantively to  the  draft  strategic  NIEs.   This  author  considers  "sub- 
stantive" any  personal  input  a  DCI  makes,  in  his  view,  to  improve 
the  content  or  increase  the  validity  of  a  specific  NIE.   Substantive 
inputs  occur  at  several  levels.   For  example,  a  DCI  may  edit 
successive  drafts  for  clarity,  offer  his  personal  views  to  es- 
timators, devise  new  ways  of  evaluating  technical  issues,  eliminate 
spurious  arguments,  or  represent  his  personal  judgements  in  the 
final  draft. 
For  strategic  NIEs,  the  substantive  input  of  DCIs  usually 
has  been  considered  a  function  of  their  technical  background 
and  interest  in  strategic  affairs.   As  the  Senate  Select  Committee 
on  Intelligence  reported,  before  1976  "only  three  DCIs  attempted 
to  address  their  primary  attention  to  the  quality  of  intelligence 
production:  Walter  Bedell  Smith,  John  McCone,  and  James 
Schlesinger."1  This  was,  in  part,  a  "function  of  their  background." 
Thi3  chapter  supports  this  conclusion.   As  indicated  in  Chart  B, 
out  of  six  DCIs,  the  three  who  did  make  substantive  input — John 
McCone,  James  Schlesinger  and  Admiral  Turner — had  previous  tech- 
nical training  and/or  familiarity  with  strategic  issues. 
This  chapter  also  examines  a  DCI  s  substantive  involvement 
as  a  function  of  his  personal  attitudes  and  administrative  style. 
Here,  all  six  DCIs  have  behaved  differently.   For  example,  John 
McCone  frequently  interacted  with  the  CIA  estimates  team,  by 
asking  questions,  debating  and  reviewing  its  work.  However,  on 
occasions  when  he  differed  sharply  with  it,  he  permitted  the
-  61  - 
staff  view  to  go  forward  to  USIB  before  reaching  a  final  decision. 
In  contrast,  Admiral  Turner  reads  and  edits  successive  drafts 
from  the  beginning,  and  at  times  plays  a  major  role  in  determining 
how  and  which  competitive  ideas  are  expressed  prior  to  NFIB  con- 
sideration. Fcr  this  reason,  DCI  Turner's  substantive  role  in 
drafting  is  what  the  author  later  describes  as  "adjudicatory," 
and  he  is  given  a  "XX"  for  this  function.  James  Schlesinger  is 
also  given  a  "XX"  for  his  unique  intellectual  contribution.  On 
the  following  pages,  the  six  DCIs  are  described  in  sequence  and 
occasional  differences  in  behavior  for  strategic  and  non-3tratagic 
NIE.s  are  noted. 
Allen  Dulles 
Like  Bedell  Smith,  Allen  Dulles  spoke  of  the  NIEs  as  "his" 
estimates.  As  chief  '.ntelligence  advisor  to  the  President,  Dulles 
considered  it  his  prerogative  to  insert  personal  judgements  into 
the  NIEs,  a  view  which  the  Board  of  Estimates  supported. 2  His 
attitude  of  possessiveness  was  heightened  by  his  personal  role 
in  briefing  President  Eisenhower,  his  brother  as  Secretary  of 
State,  and  other  top  officials,  on  the  NIEs.  During  the  Eisenhower 
years,  all  NIEs  were  linked  formally  to  the  NSC  process.  For  ex- 
ample, NIEs  appeared  on  the  weekly  agenda,  and  were  utilized  and 
appended  to  policy  papers  prepared  by  the  NSC's  Planning  Board. 
Regular  NSC  tveetings  were  opened  by  the  DCI's  briefing  on  major 
intelligence  issues,  including  new  NIEs,  which  one  participant 
said  "was  never  less  than  15  minutes  long."   In  retrospect,  one 
Pentagon  official  argue3  that  Dulles'  briefings  represented  the 
"most  effective  and  timely""  means  of  reaching  policymakers. ^
-  62  - 
'.However,  in  practice  Dulles'  substantive  input  to  strategic 
and  non-strategic  NIEs  was  limited  by  the  fact  that  he  paid 
little  attention  to  the  text  of  the 'draft  NIEs.   Rather.  Dulles 
relied  on  informal  and  verbal  means  to  influence  the  CIA  es- 
timates team.  For  example,  during  the  year  estimators  were  kept 
informed  of  his  concerns  in  the  course  of  meetings  not  primarily 
devoted  to  the  NIEs,  such  as  the  DCI's  morning  staff  meetings  and 
current  intelligence  briefings.  Sometimes,  Dulles  called  junior 
analysts  in  ONE,  to  offer  his  own  view  or  highlight  new  intelligence. 
Then,  the  Board  and  ONE  were  left  alone  to  do  their  work.   Allen 
Dulles  did  not  read  successive  drafts,  and  his  first  formal  review 
of  NIEs  occurred  when  the  final  draft  wa3  completed. J  Then,  he  was 
briefed  on  the  draft  by  Board  members  just  prior  to  NSC  or  USIB 
meetings.  At  this  time,  Dulles  focused  primarily  on  the  sumr.ary 
and  conclusiop.3  of  the  NIE. 
His  concern  here  was  threefold.   First,  his  colleagues  re- 
port that  he  was  intolerant  of  what  he  considered  wordy,  imprecise 
or  pedantic  sentences,  and  night  make  editorial  changes  to  en- 
hance their  concreteness.6  Second,  he  listened  and  queried  the 
estimators,  until  he  felt  comfortable  in  presenting  the  NIEs  to 
the  NSC  or  USI3  '"he  following  day.   Typically,  a  staff  member 
then  was  selected  to  accompany  him  to  meetings.   Third,  for 
non-strategic  NIEs,  Dulles  occasionally  modified  the  conclusions 
to  reflect  new  intelligence  to  which  he  was  privy.  Estimators 
report  that,  in  several  instances,  they  were  saved  from  embarass- 
ment  by  the  DCI's  intervention  at  the  last  minute.7  However,  they 
reported  no  instances  in  which  the  content  of  strategic  NIEs  was 
so  altered.
-  63  - 
If  Dulles  influenced  the  estimates  team  by  informal  means, 
they,  in  turn,  had  to  systematically  convince  him  of  the  appro- 
priateness of  their  strategic  predictions.   This  took  place 
throughout  the  year.  One  Board  member  argues  that  Allen  Dulles 
"worried  ov«r  each  strategic  estimate."   One  of  ONE'S  directors 
asserts  that  "language  describing  qualifying  and  accurately 
quantifying  the  Soviet  threat  came  from  CIA  draftsmen,  and  had 
to  be  fought  through  up  tc  the  DDI  and  DCI  decision  levels. "(J 
In  the  late  1950s,  the  CIA's  internal  research  on  Soviet  production 
capabilities  was  vitally  important  to  its  prediction  of  an  on- 
going Soviet  ICBM  build-up,  since  little  hard  data  from  the  Soviet 
Union  was  available.  For  example,  the  press  reported  that  the 
2 CO  U-2  flights  over  the  USSR  up  to  May  1960  detected  only  two 
operational  ICBM  launchers  in  Soviet  territory.   ■ 
John  McCone 
John  McCone* s  attitudes  about  the  strategic  NIEs  were  curiously 
mixed.   Board  of  Estimates  roen.ber3  say  that  he  initially  did  not 
regard  the  NIEs  as  "his"  estimates.  Rather,  he  considered  them 
a  product  of  good  staff  work  for  which  the  DCI  should  adopt  a 
"har.ds-off"  policy.11   Further,  McCone  was  highly  critical  of  the 
quality  of  pas^  NIEs.  When  McCone  arrived  as  DCI  in  late  1961, 
he  privately  rebuked  both  the  CIA  and  Air  Force  for  their  roles 
in  promoting  the  missile  gap  theory  over  the  last  four  years.12 
He  then  witnessed  the  rapid  explosion  of  this  myth,  following 
the  first  satellite  reconnaissance  evaluated  in  August  1961.
-  64  - 
For  example,  between  late  1960  and  late  1S61  the  CIA  halved  its 
predictions  of  Soviet  ICBMs  for  mid-1963,  fron  400  to  200  ICBMs.13 
Actually,  by  mid-1963  it  was  estimated  that  the  Soviets  had  built 
only  100  ICBMs.14 
Nonetheless,  once  che  drafting  process  was  in  motion,  .".cCone 
found  it  difficult  to  stay  on  the  sidelines,  and  Board  of  Estimate 
members  contend  that  they  consistently  urged  him  to  become  more 
involved.  As  the  former  Chairman  of  the  AEC,  an  engineer  and 
successful  corporate  executive,  McCone  was  well-equipped  to  do 
so.*  As  one  colleague  reports,  he  wanted  the  NIEs  to  be  "right" 
and  so  utilized  in  policymaking,15  He  had  "the  inquiring,  skeptical 
turn  ot  mind  of  the  good  intelligence  officer"  and  found  technical 
intelligence  "endlessly  fascinating."1** 
McCone* s  subsequent  involvement  in  drafting  has  been  de- 
scribed as  "enterprenaurial,"  although  he  was  not  consistently 
or  equally  aggressive  for  each  NIE.17  Throughout  the  year,  McCone 
kept  up-to-date  on  new  intelligence,  analytical  problems  and 
coirarunity-wide  disagreements  by  demanding  "instant,  full  briefings 
on  anything  that  caught  his  attention."18  He  frequently  called 
up  Board  members  to  ask  questions,  give  advice  and,  occasionally, 
argue  his  viewpoint.  When  the  final  draft  reached  hi3  desk,  he 
examined  it  thoroughly,  in  the  words  of  one  aide,  "going  ever 
each  line  as  if  it  were  a  corporate  mortgage."19  Then,  it  was 
not  surprising  for  him  to  call  Sherman  Kent  at  home,  early  in 
the  morning,  and  say  something  like:  "'On  page  20,  you  say  this.... 
Can  you  prove  it.'"20  McCone  was  impatient  with  what  he  considered 
imprecise  and  ambiguous  sts.tments,  and  sometimes  edited  the  draft 
himself. 
*Less  remembered  is  the  fact  that  McCone' s  own  engineering  firm  was 
involved  in  shipbuilding  and  aircraft  production  in  WWII,  and  after 
that  he  became  Under  Secretary  of  the  Air  Force. 
._J
-  65  - 
On  a  few  occasions,  DCI  McCone  differed  sharply  with  the  CIA 
draft.   He  then  had  a  choice:   either  let  the  NIE  go'  forward  to 
USIB,  v::.ere  it  could  be  reviewed  again;  or  change  the  NIE  to  re- 
flect his  view.*  McCone  found  the  first  option  most  appropriate, 
and  stopped  short  of  inserting  his  vie*-/  to  the  draft  prior  to 
USIB  debate.  The  best  example  of  this  is  his  behavior  during  the 
now  infamous  NIE,  in  September  1962,  on  the  likelihood  that  USSR 
might  place  offensive  nuclear  weapons  in  Cuba.  Although  this  NIE 
was  not  part  of  the  "11"  strategic  series,  it  partly  hinged  on  an 
ongoinq  debate  about  Soviet  difficulties  in  perfecting  their  ICBM 
guidance  system.21  In  a  rare  community-wide  agreement,  this  NIE 
predicted  that  "it  would  be  incompatible  with  Soviet  policy  to 
introduce  strategic  missiles  in  Cuba."22 
For  some  tire,  McCone  had  believed  otherwise.  Following  in- 
telxigence  reports  on  an  increased  Soviet  presence  in  Cuba  over 
the  summer  of  1952,  McCone  warned  President  Kennedy  in  August  that 
"something  new  and  different"  was  going  on.23  Before  leaving  on 
his  honeymoon  trip  to  France  in  early  September,  McCone  privately 
said  that  he  wci  "very  worried"  and  requested  an  NIE.  *     The 
first  draft  did  not  support  McCone* s  hunch.  While  abroad,  McCone 
supplied  the  Board  with  a  barrage  of  cables  pressing  his  claims, 
and  asked  that  the  draft  be  reconsidered.  With  no  dissents,  it  again 
concluded  that  "the  Soviets  simply  would  not  do  anything  so  un- 
characteristic, provocative  and  unrewarding,"  but  Sherman  Kent 
advised  McCone  to  alter  the  NIE  if  he  wished.25  KcCone  did  not, 
believing  that  the  NIE's  arguments  were  sufficiently  well-reasoned 
to  remain  inviolable.  A  U-2  flight  over  Cuba  on  October  14  proved 
that  McCone1 s  prediction  was  correct. 
*At  that  time,  a  third  option  later  employed  by  William  Colby  and 
Admiral  Turner,  to  present  the  DCI's  opinion  separately  in  the 
NIE,  was  not  considered  compatible  with  the  NIE  process.
flic hard  Helms 
Richard  Helms'  concept  of  the  DCI's  role  in  the  drafting  process 
was  well-defined.   Helms  told  this  author  that  the  DCI  should  dis- 
tance himself  from  the  drafting,  lest  early  association  with  differ- 
ent viewpoints  bias*  him  in  favor  of  one  or  another.26  The  DCI 
should  preserve  his  freedom  to  make  final,  substantive  decisions 
just  before  or  at  USIB,  by  not  becoming  an  advocate  too  early. 
Helms  considered  the  NIEs  "the  Director's  piece  of  paper"  and  thus 
the  DCI  "had  the  right  to  intervene  or  change  them"  if  deemed 
necessary.27 
DCI  Helms  did  not  exercise  this  option  for  the  draft  strategic 
NIEs.   Helms  had  risen  up  through  the  ranks  of  the  DDP  in  CIA,  and 
his  primary  interest  was  political  intelligence.  When  he  arrived 
as  DCI  in  mid-1966,  a  unique  technical  competency  was  required 
of  the  DCI.  For  example,  one  controversy  concerned  the  "mysterious 
footprints" of  Soviet  MIRVs,  evidence  which  the  entire  intelligence 
community  interpreted  differently.28  Some  participants  questioned 
Helms'  basic  interest  in  strategic  matters,  and  one  Pentagon 
official  described  Helms,  compared  to  other  DCIs,  as  "the  most 
dilatory  in  terms  of.  substance."29  Helms  himself  has  said  that 
many  of  the  issues  at  hand  ultimately  were  "unknowable"  and  his 
instincts  came  into  play  only  in  "the  final  phase  of  production."30 
Helms  did  review  the  final  drafts  of  the  strategic  NIEs,  with 
two  concerns  in  mind.   First,  he  tried  to  keep  the  process  moving 
in  an  orderly,  timely  fashion,  and  second,  he  preferred  to  have 
interagency  disputs  resolved  prior  to  USIB  consideration.  Thus,
he  reviewed  drafts  for  internal  consistency  and  clarity,  and  if 
he  ascertained  that  an  NIE  was  so  deficient  or  that  the  consensus 
offered  masked  real  divisions,  he  promptly  sent  it  back  to  ONE 
for  revision.31  After  1969,  the  Board  and  ONE  were  left  alone  to 
administer  changes  in  the  presentation  of  dissent;  in  the  strategic 
NIEs,  mandated  by  the  White  House.   Thereafter,  the  DCI  experienced 
more  difficulty  in  sending  them  to  USIB  on  time.   Sometimes,  Helms 
had  to  make  the  decision  to  go  forward  with  the  NIE  as  it  was. 
The  only  documented  instance  in  which  Helms  personally  inter- 
vened in  a  strategic  draft  before  USIB  followed  a  request  from 
Defense  Secretary  Melvin  Laird.   In  NIE  11-S~69,  the  CIA  included 
a  summary  paragraph  which  read:   "We  consider  it  highly  unlikely 
that  they  [the  Soviet  Union!  will  attempt  within  the  period  of 
this  estimate  to  achieve  a  firot  3trike  capability..."32  Just  be- 
fore the  scheduled  USIB  meeting,  one  of  Laird's  assistants  asked 
Helms  to  revise  the  controversial  statement  since  it  "contradicted 
the  public  position  of  the  Secretary."33  Helms  deleted  the  entire 
paragraph,  although  the  State  Department's  representative  on  USIB 
reintroduced  it  as  a  footnoted  dissent. 
James  Schlesinger 
During  his  brief  tenure  as  DCI  in  the  beginning  of  1973,  James 
Schlesinger  was  involved  intimately  in  drafting  the  strategic  NIEs, 
primarily  on  substantive  grounds.  A  highly  trained  economist,  former 
strategic  analyst  at  the  RAND  Corporation  and  former  AEC  Chairman, 
Schlesinger  was  qualified  to  address  complex  strategic  issues. 
Earlier,  he  had  criticized  the  CIA  for  possible  "bias"  in  assessing
-  68  - 
the  Soviet  threat,  and  as  DCI  appeared  willing  to  take  on  CIA  analysts 
on  their  own  ground.34  For  example,  the  then  Chairman  of  the  Board 
of  Estimates  reports  that  Schlesinger  frequently  debated  past 
NIEs  with  him,  pointing  out  sentences  and  phrasings  that,  in  the 
DCI's  view,  were  misleading  or  inaccurate.35  As  the  Senate  Select 
Committee  on  Intelligence  concluded:   "Schlesinger' s  overall  ob- 
jectives were  to  maximize  his  role  as  Director  of  Central  Intelli- 
gence rather  than  as  head  of  the  Agency  and  to  improve  the  quality 
of  the  intelligence  product."36 
One  of  Schlesinger* s  major  contributions  was  in  strategic 
methodology.  CIA  analysts  explain  that  he  was  highly  creative 
and  helpful,  for  example,  in  devising  new  methods  by  which  to 
count  Soviet  MIRV9  and  techniques  to  ascertain  the  characteristics 
of  new  Soviet  cruise  missiles.37  Schlesinger  enjoyed  reading 
early  drafts,  and  then  often  summoned  analysts  to  hio  office  to 
draw  charts  or  demonstrate  how  a  problem  might  be  approached  mathe- 
matically.  Describing  Schlesinger,  William  Colby  said  that  he 
was  "the  one  DCI"  who  grasped  the  strategic  debate  intuitively, 
and  would  have  elevated  the  current  state  of  art  of  strategic 
analysis.38 
Will  Lam  Colby 
William  Colby  also  involved  himself  deeply  in  the  draft  process 
but,  for  the  strategic  NIEs,  not  on  a  substantive  basis.   Like 
Richard  ?.ielms,  Colby  rose  up  through  the  ranks  of  the  CIA  and  had 
little  specific  expertise  in  strategic  topics.  Colby  told  this 
author  that  he  did  not  have  the  technical  knowledgeability  to  make
personal  input  to  the  draft.  Pother,  he  saw  the  primary  role 
of  the  DCI  as  effectively  managing  the  competitive  process,  the 
chief  virtues  of  which  were  thoroughness,  patience,  and  open-minded- 
ness  as  opposed  to  intervention  or  arbitration.  Colby  presided 
over  the  strategic  NIEs  at  a  time  when,  in  the  words  of  one  CIA 
analyst,  the  "consensus  had  fallen  apart."40  He  hoped  to  improve 
the  quality  of  the  NIEs  by  increasing  their  representativeness. 
Like  McCone,  DCI  Colby  viewed  the  draft  as  a  prelude  to  USIB 
debate  and  endorsement.  Colby  read  successive  drafts  with  the 
hope  of  better  grasping  the  strategic  debate  and  ensuring  that 
minority  views  were  considered  by  his  NIOs.  As  described  earlier. 
Pentagon  officials  were  granted  individual  hearings  with  the  DCI 
during  the  drafting,  after  which  Colby  raised  their  complaints  with 
the  relevant  NIO.   For  example,  DIA  officials  argued  their  new  es- 
timates in  his  office  and  Air  Force  intelligence  chief  Major 
General  George  Keegan  presented  him  with  numerous,  documented 
dissents,  as  outlined  in  the  next  chapter  of  this  study.   At  the 
drafting  st.\ge,  Colby  was  observed  to  be  more  aggressive  in  offering 
advice  and  editing  the  non-strategic,  compared  to  strategic  NIEs.41 
However,  when  he  disagreed  with  the  draft,  Colby  typically  waited 
until  USIB  to  register  his  views. 
Admiral  Stansfiel^  Turner 
Admiral  Turner  systematically  makes  substantive  input  to  the 
strategic  NIEs.  Like  McCone  and  Schlesinger,  his  Naval  training 
provides  a  technical  background  in  strategic  issues  to  make  him
useful  in  critiquing  NIEs.   As  DCI,  he  was  "highly  dissatisfied 
with  a  large  number  of  national  intelligent  estimates"  and  ex- 
ercised his  mandate  to  play  a  role  in  irij-rr 'ing  them.^2  This  role 
is  well-defined  and  highly  personal.   As  Admiral  Turner  recently 
argued,  the  NIE  process  is  ultimately  a  one-man  system.  After  an 
eptimate  is  prepared  by  the  community,  "the  one-man  system  comes 
in,  because  I  decide,  I  sign  for  it,  I  vouch  for  it." 
Admiral  Turner  takes  the  time  to  stay  in  close  touch  through- 
out the  drafting  process,  primarily  by  demoting  attention  to  each 
successive  draft.   As  one  aide  reports.  Turner  is  involved  in 
the  draft  strategic  estimates  "from  beginning  to  end,"  from  the 
first  one  prepared  by  the  NIO  and  Pentagon  to  successive  redrafts 
after  interagency  coordinative  meetings.   His  "critiques  occur  all 
throughout  the  process"  and  his  approach  is  "sccratic.   4  Turner 
carefully  examines  the  drafts  in  his  office,  underlines  the  parts 
he  believes  need  improvement,  and  suggests  ways  of  doing  so.  For 
example,  he  may  ask  whether  a  line  of  reasoning  is  relevant,  out- 
line alternative  ways  of  handling  a  point  of  ambiguity,  or  state 
how  he  disagrees.   The  draft  is  sent  back  to  the  NIO  and  a  dialogue 
begins.   This  frequently  entails  discussions  between  the  DCI  and 
junior  analysts  as  well,  and,  as  examined  earlier,  between  the  DCI 
and  Pentagon  officials.  Turner  then  reads  the  next  draft  to  ascertain 
if  the  changes  make  any  difference.  .  If  he  considers  these  in- 
adequate, he  may  redraft  paragraphs  or  entire  sections  himself.
-  71 
Admiral  Turner  is  given  a  "XX"  in  Chart  B  for  another  reason. 
This  is  the  personal  role  he  sometimes  play3  in  deciding  which 
views  are  advanced  as  major  alternatives  in  the  text,  decisions 
which  occur  prior  to  NF1B  review.  The  author  describes  these 
decisions  as  adjudicatory,  and  Turner  is  not  the  first  DCI  who  has 
personally  arbitrated  between  view3.  However,  unlike  other  DCIs, 
Turner  does  not  use  NFIB  as  a  final  debating  forum  and  discourages 
the  use  of  footnotes  as  the  ultimate  recourse  of  dissenters.  Thus, 
hi3  choices  at  this  time  may  determine  the  final  content  of  the 
NIEs. 
Two  examples  illustrate  Admiral  Turner's  different  handling 
of  alternative  views  within  draft  NIEs.   Recently,  alternative 
positions  were  expressed  in  a  draft  of  NIE  11-4,  on  how  the  Soviets 
might  view  US  behavior  in  a  particular  conflict  scenario.45  The 
disagreement  was  explicit  and  intricate,  based  on  interpretations 
of  recent  Soviet  publications  on  strategic  doctrine.  Admiral 
Turner  reviewed  the  evidence  or.  both  sides,  and  finally  agreed  to 
go  forward  with  the  CIA's  view.   This  he  slightly  modified,  re- 
placing the  phasing  "Soviet  intentions"  with  "Soviet  expectations." 
On  the  other  hand,  Admiral  Turner  upheld  this  presentation  of 
alternative  positions  in  a  recent  NIE  11-3-8.  At  issue  was  the 
strategic  implications  of  the  Soviet  Backfire  bomber.  The  CIA 
and  Air  Force  disagreed  on  the  potential  range  of  the  aircraft  by 
at  least  1,000  miles.46  Both  had  examined  the  question  at  some 
length,  hiring  professional  contractors  to  construct  experiments
-  72 
to  test  the  aircraft's  potential  range.   The  evidence  on  both 
sides  appeared  adequate  and,  therefore,  the  dispute  was  not  re- 
solved within  the  NIE.   Instead,  the  NIE  went  forward  with  the 
two  opinions  intact. 
A  third  option  employed  by  Admiral  Turner  was  first  used  by 
William  Colby.   In  cases  where  the  DCI  disagrees  v:ith  both  sides 
or  strongly  endorses  one  view,  Turner  may  attach  a  covering  memo 
to  the  NIE  or  insert  a  statement  into  the  NIE,  which  explains  this. 
That  is,  the  DCI  separately  states  his  opinion  in  a  letter  or 
paragraph  to  effect  that  "The  DCI  thinks..."  Turner  also  uaea 
this  technique  to  explain  how  decisions  were  reached  within  the 
NIE.   The  author  does  not  regard  this  as  adjudicatory.
-  73  - 
V.  THE  DCI's  LEADERSHIP  ROLES  AT 
USIB  OR  NFIB 
This  chapter  examines  the  varying  approaches  of  DCIs  to  the 
strategic  NIEs  during  the  final  phase  of  endorsement  by  the  USIB, 
or  now  NFIB.  Here  again,  a  DCI's  posture  during  USIB  deliberations 
reveals  his  attitudes  about  the  NIEs,  his  role  as  CIA  director 
versus  coordinator  of  the  intelligence  community,  and  what  kind 
of  document  best  serves  the  President.  Three  possible  roles  are 
discussed;   first,  support  or  advocacy  of  the  CIA's  position;  second 
encouragement  of  competitive  debate  and  a  multiplicity  of  views; 
and  third,  final  adjudication  of  alternative  views,  i.e.,  personal 
decisions  which  resolve  conflict  or  otherwise  change  the  NIE's  sub- 
stantive content. 
A3  indicated  in  Chart  B,  the  author  concludes  that  the  first 
role  wa3  emphasized  by  Allen  Dulles,  within  an  historical  context 
that  excluded  other  roles  on  his  part.   Competitive  debate  at  USIB 
was  encouraged  by  DCIs  John  McCone,  James  Schlesinger  and  William 
Colby.  Final  adjudication  was  a  role  exercised  occasionally  by 
DCIs  John  McCone  and  Richard  Helms.  As  just  described,  DCI 
Stansfield  Turner  also  acts  as  an  adjudicator,  but  primarily  out- 
side the  context  of  NFIB. 
This  chapter  focuses  on  USIB  because,  since  IAC  in  General 
Bedell  Smith's  time,  it  was  meant  to  be  a  high  level  forum  for  NIE 
debate  and  final  endorsement.   Composed  of  the  heads  of  the  in- 
telligence agencies,  USIB  is  intended  to  have  the  flexibility  to 
reexamine  disagreements  and  the  decisionmaking  authority  to  resolve 
them  once  and  for  all.  As  Chairman,  the  DCX  is  supposed  to  play  a
-  74  - 
community-wide  coordinative  role,  as  highlighted  in  the  late  1960s 
by  the  appointment  to  USI3  of  the  Deputy  Director  of  CIA  (the  DDCI) 
to  formally  represent  the  CIA's  views.  However,  the  DCI  and  USIB 
members  frequently  have  been  criticized  for  acting  only  as  a  rubber 
stamp  for  the  draft  NIEs.   For  example,  one  opinion  is  that  "most 
DCIs  have  been  reluctant  to  engage  in  confrontation  with  members 
of  the  USIB  over  substantive  findings."1  Another  is  that  USIB 
members  lack  specific  expertise  and  "were  reluctant  to  quibble. . .with 
the  preparatory  work  done  by  its. staff."2 
This  study's  findings  do  not  support  the  view  that  mcst  DCIs 
and  USIB  members  have  been  passive  during  USIB  meetings.   Historically, 
USIB  often  has  been  a  major  debating  ground  for  the  strategic  NIEs. 
USIB  discussion  sometimes  has  been  lengthy  and  intense,  and  on 
occasion  the  content  of  the  NIEs  altered  as  a  result.  Most  critical 
to  this  study,  some  DCIs  have  exerted  individual  leadership  over 
the  process.  Contrary  to  the  opinion  that  "the  power  balance  of 
the  USIB  did  not  vary  greatly  from  that  involved  in  the  inter-agency 
review,"  the  intervention  of  some  DCIs  upset  this  balance.3 
A.   Support  of  the  CIA's  Position 
Only  one  DCI  examined  here,  Allen  Dulles,  saw  his  primary  role 
at  USIB  as  personally  supporting  the  CIA's  position  within  the  stra- 
tegic NIEs.  Dulles'  role  in  promoting  the  CIA's  view  must  be  placed 
within  the  context  of  the  missile  gap  debate  of  1957-1961.  Dulles' 
earlier  decision  to  permit  the  CIA  to  draft  the  strategic  NIEs 
according  to  its  independent  view  was  a  policy  decision  which
subsequently  elevated  the  CIA's  role  in  the  estimative  process. 
It  also  reflected  an  interest  in  enhanced  competition  within  the 
NIEs,  since  the  CIA's  view  was  presented  in  addition  to  what  it 
considered  exaggerated  and  offsetting  claims  of  the  three  military 
services.   In  the  late  1950s,  Dulles  recognized  that  he  thaireby 
was  lending  support  to  NIEs  which  offered  competing  claims  to  . 
President  Eisenhower,  a  concern  which  continued  to  plague  him.         i 
"When  asked  to  answer  the  single  most  important  intelligence  ques-     ! 
tion  of  the  period,  the  intelligence  community  provided  a  series 
of  contradictory  estimates  and  g3ve  the  impression  that  the  Soviet     , 
ICBM  programme  was  far  more  expeditious  and  productive  than  it  in 
fact  v-urned  out  to  be."5  j
The  missile  gap  estimates  thus  became  the  classic  case  of 
disunity  within  the  intelligence  community.   The  only  point  of 
agreement  was  that  there  might  be  a  "gap."  For  example,  in 
NIE  11-8-60  the  CIA  predicted  that  the  Soviets  would  build  400 
ICBMs  by  mid-1963;  in  footnotes,  the  Army  and  Navy  predicted  200 
ICBMs,  and  the  Air  Force  700  ICBMs,  by  mid-1963;  the  State  Depart-     I 
ment  and  JCS  were  in-between  the  CIA  and  Air  Force. b  To  some  ;
observers,  the  CIA's  position  represented  an  attempt  for  institutional 
compromise  rather  than  a  logical  extension  of  concrete  analysis. 
As  General  Daniel  Graham  later  wrote  of  the  missile  gap  years: 
"Curiously,... the  CIA  position  was  generally—and  sometimes  precisely- 
halfway  between  the  Army-Navy  view  and  the  Air  Force  view.  To  the 
military  analysts  this  smacked  of  a  political  rather  than  a  care- 
fully reasoned,  objective  position."'
Nonetheless,  once  having  decided  to  assert  the  CIA's  individual 
perspective  within  the  strategic  NIEs,  Allen  Dulles'  instinct 
was  to  support  "his"  analysts  publicly.   Dulles  reasoned  that  pre- 
USIB  debate  on  the  draft  gave  sufficient  hearing  to  all  parties 
and,  after  this,  the  institutional  independence,  prestige  and 
morale  cf  the  CIA  was  on  the  line.   Personally,  Dulles  was  dis- 
inclined to  participate  in  prolonged  debate  at  USIB,  and  he  did  not 
vigorously  advocate  the  CIA's  position  during  the  oral  discussion. 
Rather,  he  promoted  the  position  of  CIA  analysts  by  presiding  over 
USIB  deliberations  in  a  manner  which  did  not  permit  reopening  of 
previous  decisions.  Further,  he  personally  briefed  the  President 
on  the  final  NIEs  and,  in  one  instance,  attached  a  memorandum 
to  NIE  11-8  personally  endorsing  the  CIA' a  position.   Parenthetically, 
Dulles'  colleagues  report  that  as  the  missile  gap  debate  intensified, 
the  CIA  drafters  had  to  work  hard  to  convince  him  of  their  position 
and  that  the  U-2  flights  were  targeted  to  close  the  CIA's  un- 
certainty." 
As  Chairman  of  USIB,  Allen  Dulles  is  said  to  have  been  firmly 
in  charge  of  its  proceedings.  VThile  his  attitude  about  discussion 
was  more  permissive  than  DCI  Smith's  before  him,  to  the  Pentagon 
participants  the  outcome  was  a  foregone  conclusion.9  By  the  end 
of  1960,  one  Presidential  study  group  complained  that  USIB  had 
become  primarily  a  "deliberative  body"  neglecting  its  broader 
tasks  of  intelligence  community  coordination.10  Still,  deliberations 
followed  a  certain  format.   The  DCI  summarized  the  NIE,  and  then 
each  military  service  and  the  JCS  representative  presented  their
77  - 
dissenta,  for  example,  the  Army  argued  its  case  for  Soviet  emphasis 
on  medium-range  ballistic  missiles  and  inadequacies  in  ICBM  trans- 
portation facilities. 1^  Generally,  individual  positions  were  well- 
entrenched,   /'jr  example,  when  the  Soviets  ceased  ICBM  testing  from 
April  1958  to  March  1959,  the  CIA  aryr.ed  that  this  indicated 
performance  trouble  while  the  Air  Fores  maintained  precisely  the 
opposite.  *  After  listening  to  each  side,  Dulles  patiently  re- 
stated his  affirmation  of  the  draft  NIE  and  closed  the  meeting.  No 
redrafting  was  done.   Dulles  then  scheduled  a  meeting  with  President 
Eisenho'-cr  to  brief  him  on  the  NIS.  One  Pentagon  official 
said  that  Dulles'  briefings  effectively  foreclosed  any  end-running 
to  the  White  House.13 
The  missile  gap  predictions  advanced  by  Allen  Dul3.es  to 
President  Eisenhower  were  anything  but  popular  with  the  Administration, 
One  observer  wrote  that  Eisenhower  considered  these  NIEs  "probably 
invalid"  and  he  did  not  respond  as  promptly  as  he  had  during  the 
bomber  gap  debate.1'*  For  example,  Eisenhower  deferred  authoriza- 
tion of  increases  in  first  generation  Atlas  and  Titan  missiles 
until  the  first  Polaris  and  second  generation  Minuteman  missiles 
were  available  and  evaluated.   During  Kennedy's  successful  presiden- 
tial campaign  on  a  strategic  gap  platform,  the  DCI  was  repeatedly 
pressed  by  journalists  to  give  his  personal  opinion.   Dulles  up- 
held the  NIEs  as  valid  intelligence  projections  in  a  case  where 
sufficient  doubt  existed.  When  NIE  11-8-60  was  presented  to 
President-elect  Kennedy,  Dulles  attached  a  personal  memorandum 
explicity  stating  his  support  of  the  CIA's  position  in  the  main 
text  of  the  NIE.15
-  78  - 
That  subsequent  DCIs  did  not  see  their  primary  role  at  USI3  to 
promote  the  CIA's  position  resulted,  in  part,  from  the  missile  gap 
experience.   In  mid-1363,  it  was  estimated  chat  the  Soviets  had 
constructed  only  100  ICBMs,  proving  that  the  entire  intelligence 
community  earlier  had  been  wrong.   However,  by  this  time  the  CIA's 
position  within  the  strategic  NIEs  was  no  longer  on  the  ascen- 
dant, but  was  dominant.  Moreover,  a  distinct  institutional  perspective 
vis-a-vis  the  Pentagon  had  emerged  following  the  missile  gap  over- 
estimates. As  General  Graham  later  wrote:   "To  put  it  bluntly, 
there  is  a  considerable  body  of  opinion.. .which  regard  threat 
estimates  prepared  by  the  military  as  being  self-serving,  budget- 
oriented  and  generally  inflated. .. .It  stemmed  from  a  series 
of  bad  overestimates  fwhichj  have  hung  like  albatrossess  around 
'the  necks  of  military  intelligence  officers  ever  since. "*6  Since 
the  DCI  did  not  have  to   throw  his  weight  consistently  on  the 
side  of  the  CIA  in  order  to  protect  its  institutional  view  and 
independence,  he  has  been  free  to  assume  other  roles  at  USIB. 
B.   Encouragement  of  Competitive  Debate 
Of  the  five  subsequent  CCIs  examined  here,  three — DCIs  John 
McCone,  James  Schlesinger  and  William  Colby — actively  promoted 
competitive  debate  on  the  final  draft  of  the  strategic  NIEs.  All 
three  considered  USIB  as  an  appropriate,  higher-level  sounding 
board  or  second  stage  for  the  presentation  of  new  ideas  and  a 
reopening  of  old  dissents.  They  personally  participated  in  debate 
and  acted  as  a  court  of  last  resort  for  intelligence  officials
dissatisfied  with  the  draft.   Under  McCone  and  Colby,  USIB  meetings 
were  lengthy  and  intense.   Doth  DCIs  reserved  their  judgement  and 
were  willing  to  alter  the  strategic  NIEs  as  a  result.  Although 
Schlesinger's  tenure  was  brief,  interviewees  describe  his  attitudes 
i
as  being  similar  to  Mccone's.  For  his  philosophy  of  supporting  con-    j
siatent  debate  at  USIB,  Colby  is  given  an  "XX"  in  Chart  B.   In        j
comparison,  the  inclination  of  DCIs  Richard  Helms  and  Stansfield       • 
Turner  has  been  not  to  use  USIB  (or  NFIB  in  Turner's  case)  as  a 
forum  for  debate.  As  documented  earlier,  Admiral  Turner  encourages 
competition  within  the  final  NIEs  chiefly  by  efforts  to  improve 
coordination  at  the  draft  stage.   Below,  these  five  DCIs  are  described 
in  sequence. 
John  McCone 
In  response  to  criticism  about  Allen  Dulles'  inattention  to 
community-wide  coordination.  President  Eisenhower  once  said:   "I'd 
rather  have  Allen  as  my  chief  intelligence  officer  with  his  limita- 
tions than  anyone  else  I  know."17  In  contrast,  President  Kennedy 
explicitly  directed  John  McCone  to  strongly  assert  his  role  as  in- 
telligence community  coordinator.18  McCone  accomplished  this,  in 
part,  through  USIB. 
DCI  McCone  believed  that  USIB  should  serve  as  a  prominent 
debating  field  in  which  the  full  multiplicity  of.   views  could  be 
expressed,  within  the  context  of  seeking  his  approval  of  the  NIEs. 
One  of  the  first  battles  McCone  waged  to  support  this  view  was 
with  Defense  Secretary  McHamara,  over  the  composition  of  USIB  after 
1961.  As  one  observer  noted:  "The  intention  of  the  Administration
-  80  - 
had  beer  to  charge  the  DIA  with  the  resolution  of  conflicting 
service  estimates  and  to  make  it£  presentation  to  the  United  States 
Intelligence  Board  (USIB)  stand  as  the  final  judgement  of  the 
Pentagon. "^  After  DIA  was  created,  McNamara  proposed  that  it  re- 
place not  only  the  JCS  representative  but  also  the  heads  of  Army, 
Air  Porce  and  Naval  Intelligence  on  USIB.  They,  and  the  DC!  com- 
plained. John  McCone  reportedly  argued  with  McNamara  that  this 
step  might  weaken  the  DCI's  ability  to  hear  multiple,  conflicting 
views,  and  lead  to  "watered  down"  estimates.20  Thus,  a  compromise 
was  arranged  whereby  the  three  military  service  intelligence  chiefs 
were  invited  to  USIB  meeting*.  While  they  lost  their  official  me-nber- 
ship  or  "vote,"  they  retained  an  equal  right  to  argue  and  dissent. 
In  effect,  each  service  had  a  "right  to  appeal  past  the  DIA"  to 
USIB  and  its  Chairman.21 
McCone  demonstrated  an  interest  in  listening  to  these  appeals, 
if  well-reasoned  and  thoughtfully  presented.  Significantly,  McCone 
became  the  first  modern  DCI  to  be  willing  to  support  a  service 
position  over  that  of  the  CIA's.  As  one  author  wrote:   "McCone 
shoved  that  he  could  be  convinced  by  good  arguments,  and  gained  a 
reputation  for  objectivity  by  being  ready  to  overrule  the  CIA  on 
the  United  States  Intelligence  Board."22  According  to  CIA  es- 
timators, this  happened  in  the  case  of  several  NIEs  assessing  progress 
during  the  Vietnam  war,  for  which  McCone  was  known  to  be  "havkish" 
in  disputing  the  effectiveness  of  a  gradualistic  approach  to  bombing 
of  North  Vietnam.23  During  USIB  debate  on  one  such  NIE,  McCone  told 
CIA  analysts  to  redraft  the  estimate  after  talking  to  military 
commanders  "who  know  what  is  going  on.  *
-  81  - 
A  critical  example  of  McCone's  support  of  competition  with- 
in the  strategic  NIEs  is  NIB  11-3-63,  regarding  the  possibility 
that  the  Soviets  were  deploying  an  ABM  system  around  the  so-called 
Tallin  Line.  The  potentiality  of  an  "ABM  gap"  was  one  of  the  most 
hotly  contested  strategic  issues  in  the  first  half  of  the  1960s. 
In  1963,  a  major  division  existed  between  the  CIA,  supported  by 
the  Navy  and  State  Department,  and  the  Army,  supported  by  the  Air 
Force  and  DIA.  The  CIA  maintained  that  the  observed  installations 
around  the  Tallin  Line  did  not  represent  an  early  ABM  system,  but 
rather  were  reJegated  to  anti-aircraft  defense.  The  opposite  view 
was  a  more  pessimistic  or  "hard  assessment"  which  viewed  the  new 
installations  as  the  beginning  of  a  full-fledged  anti-missile  system.25 
At  US IB,  McCone  was  impressed  by  the  Army's  line  of  reasoning.26 
After  the  Army's  initial  presentation,  McCone  scheduled  another  meeting 
for  elaboration.  As  described  in  the  following  section,  McCone  then 
assumed  an  adjudicatory  role  and  officially  sided  with  the  Army's 
view,  as  the  final  text  of  NIE  11-3-63.    After  this,  he  hired  the 
Army  general  delivering  the  presentation,  who  later  became  head  of 
the  CIA's  new  DDS&T. 
McCone  was  impatient  with  debate  at  US IB  that  he  considered 
repetitious,  once  he  had  made  up  his  mind.  For  example,  in  the 
early  1960s  he  is  said  to  have  been  .rr.tolerant  of  the  Air  Force's 
views  on  Soviet  ICBM  delployment  and  often  cut  short  debate  on  NIE 
11-8.   In  1963,  he  sided  with  the  CIA's  prediction  of  300-600 
ICBMs  by  mid-1967  and  considered  the  Air  Force's  predicted  level 
of  700-800  by  that  date  much  too  high.28  Albert  Wohlstetter  documented 
how,  in  the  succeeding  years,  the  Air  Force  estimates  gradually  con- 
verged with  those  of  the  CIA*,...  "In  1965  and  1966  {convergence!  was
-  82  - 
complete  in  the  near  term  and  in  1967  it  became  complete  for  all 
years. "2^  In  1974,  Wohlstetter  wrote  that  for  the  years  of  his 
study,  1962-1969,  the  intelligence  community  had  "systematically 
underestimated"  Soviet  heavy  bomber,  ICBM  and  SLBM  deplc /ment. 30 
Richard  Helms 
Richard  Helms'  tenure  as  DCI  was  divided  in  two  parts:   from 
1966  to  1968  he  served  under  President  Johnson  and  from  1969  to  1972 
he  3erved  under  President  Nixon.   Helms*  inclinations  were  the 
same  in  both  periods.  He  believed  that  drafting  strategic  NIEs 
was  the  job  of  professional  analysts,  who  should  be  able  to  reach 
agreement  prior  to  USIB.   Helms  did  not  enjoy  listening  to  debate 
on  highly  technical  issues,  and  argued  that  USIB  was  not  the  proper 
place  to  reopen  past  grievances.31  Rather,  USIB  meetings  should 
lead  to  timely  approval.   President  Johnson  asked  that  the  strategic 
NIEs  be  reduced  to  a  one-page  executive  summary,  which  does  not 
suggest  much  encouragement  to  the  expression  of  competitive  views. 
In  his  Administration,  USIB  meetings  reportedly  were  some  of  the 
shortest  in  length  hitherto,  typically  lasting  only  forty-five 
minutes. 
During  the  Nixon  Administration,  competition  gradually  in- 
creased. As  the  SALT  I  treaty  loomed  large.  Pentagon  dissenters 
were  less  willing  to  relinquish  their  arguments  without  a  fight, 
and  both  the  White  House  and  Defense  Secretary  Laird  indirectly 
encouraged  competition  by  criticizing  the  strategic  NIEs.   Helms 
thus  was  faced  with  potentially  long  and  angry  USIB  meetings.  Es- 
pecially irritating  was  to  be  assured  that  disagreements  had  been
-  83  - 
resolved,  only  to  have  them  "pop  right  back  at  USI3."33  Helms  told 
this  author  that  he  favored  enhanced  competition  within  the  NIEs, 
that  estimating  was  a  "give  and  take"  process  in  which  it  was 
conceivable  that  different  parties  might  exaggerate  their  claims 
in  order  to  emphasize  a  point,  and  that  CIA  estimators  sometimes 
regarded  him  as  too  'hard  line."34 
However,  his  handling  of  competition  was  simple.   He  listened 
to  competing  argument  only  long  enough  to  determine  that  it  had 
not  been  resolved.  Then,  he  closed  the  meeting,  and  typically  sent 
the  NIE  back  to  ONE  for  redrafting.   Participants  say  that  he 
signaled  the  end  of  the  meeting  by  removing  his  glasses."  After 
1970,  successive  redrafting  sessions,  followed  by  USIB  meetings, 
were  required.   As  a  consequence,  several  strategic  NIEs  were  not 
officially  approved  until  the  spring  of  the  following  year.  6 
Jame3  Schlesinger 
DCI  Schlesinger  enjoyed  competitive  debate  at  USIB  and  actively 
participated  in  it.   He  considered  USIB  a  place  where  intelligence 
chiefs  with  broad  responsibilities  and  interests  could  meet  in  an 
informal  atmosphere.   His  colleagues  describe  how  he  sat  back  in 
his  chair,  puffed  on  his  pipe,  and  listened.   Then,  he  might  in- 
itiate a  lengthy  dialectic  with  the  intelligence  chiefs,  during 
which  new  options  might  be  considered.3' 
Like  McCone,  Schlesinger  was  impatient  with  assertions 
I 
but  respected  stimulating  and  documencable  analysis.  As  described 
earlier,  one  of  his  major  concerns  was  to  keep  competition  in 
manageable  proportions.   For  example,  he  layered  the  strategic 
estimating  process  by  making  some  issues,  such  as  Soviet  civil
-  84  - 
defense,  the  subject  of  IIMs,  then  summarized  in  the  NIEs.   Much 
discussion  concerned  how  to  best  present  major  alternative  positions, 
and  stylistically  control  the  complexity  of  the  strategic  NIEs. 
During  Schelsinger's  tenure,  raw  data  was  contained  mostly  in  appendices. 
William  Colby 
William  Colby  utilized  USIB  as  3   court  of  last  resort,  where 
appeals  to  the  draft  NIE  from  the  Pentagon  could  be  heard.   Colby 
considered  himself  primarily  a  manager  of  competitive  debate.   In 
the  words  of  one  aide,  he  preferred  open,  group  discussion  at  USIB 
as  a  means  of  hearing  dissent,  rather  than  private  meetings,  and 
believed  that  USIB  was  a  place  where  all  could  actively  participate 
in  endorsing  the  draft.  8 
During  Colby's  tenure,  different  Pentagon  officials  challenged 
the  CIA's  basic  assumptions  about  Soviet  behavior  within  the 
strategic  NIEs.   Notably  under  attack  was  the  CIA's  premise, 
summarized  in  a  paragraph  of  the  executive  summary,  that  the  USSR 
was  not  seeking  strategic  superiority,  or  a  first  strike  capability, 
vis-a-vis  the  United  Ctates.   For  example,  General  Daniel  Graham 
as  head  of  DIA  called  this  "the  pablum  statement"  and,  as  noted 
earlier,  began  footnoting  "the  basic  tone"  of  the  NIEs.38a  Ob- 
jections also  were  offered  to  the  CIA's  format  for  handling  dissent. 
For  example,  as  head  of  Air  Force  Intelligence,  General  George 
Keegan  objected  to  placing  some  dissent  in  footnotes  rather  than 
in  the  main  text,  the  presentation  of  supporting  evidence  in 
appendices,  the  exclusion  of  critical  dissents  from  the  executive 
summary,  and  the  elimination  of  pivotal  issues,  such  as  Soviet 
defense  spending,  from  NIEs.
35  - 
At  USIB,  Colby  listened  to  several  hour3  of  debate  on  one  sec- 
tion of  an  NIE,  and  scheduled  other  meetings  to  continue.   To 
follow-up  meetings,  Colby  invited  the  Pentagon  intelligence  chiefs 
to  bring  along  staff  and  written  documentation.   General  George 
Keegan  now  came  to  USIB  meetings  armed  with  new  Air  Force  trans- 
lations of  Soviet  strategic  writings  in  order  to  demonstrate  that 
CIA  estimators  had  misinterpreted  evidence  about  Soviet  inten- 
tions.   To  support  his  claims  that  the  Soviets  rapidly  were 
deploying  new  missiles  and  undertaking  a  massive  civil  defense 
effort,  Keegan  brought  along  satellite  photos,  engineering  reports 
and  Air  Force  estimates  of  Soviet  defense  costs.  They  were  passed 
around  the  table.  According  to  General  Graham,  Colby  gave  Keegan, 
"who  tends  to  round  things  off  to  the  nearest  million,"  every 
opportunity  to  present  his  case.    For  each  major  argument,   this 
never  took  less  than  one-half  hour.  Then,  Colby  often  authorised 
marginal  changes  at  USIB.  For  example,  Keegan  was  permitted  to 
take  additional  footnotes,  rewrite  existing  footnotes,  present  new 
evidence  in  an  appendix,  or  substitute  wording  in  the  text. 
By  1975,  Pentagon  criticism  of  the  CIA  draft  NIS  11-3-8  had 
reached  such  a  pitch  that  the  DCI  took  an  unprecedented  step.   Prior 
to  the  scheduled  USIB  meeting,  Colby  held  a  special  conference 
of  all  intelligence  agency  heads  and  staff  "to  ensure  that  they 
were  informed  of  all  difference  of  opinion"  prior  to  reviewing 
the  draft  itself.     This  meeting  was  the  first,  acknowledged  con- 
cession to  military  officials  who  complained  that  it  was  difficult 
to  comprehensively  express  their  divergences  from  the  CIA  draft.
-  86  - 
while  at  the  same  time  having  to  "chop  up,  edit  and  revise"  the 
text.43  This  meeting  reportedly  lasted  over  six  hours,  and  the 
DCI  was  present  the  entire  time. 
Admiral  Stansfleld  Turner 
Admiral  Turner's  attitude  about  competitive  debate  at  NFIB 
is  similar  to  that  of  Richard  Helms,  although  unlike  Helms,  he 
spends  considerable  time  on  competitive  issues  at  the  draft  stage. 
In  the  words  of  ore  aide.  Admiral  Turner  prefers  to  "work  text"  in 
his  office  rather  than  subjecting  the  draft  to  lengthy  oral  debate. 
Turner  believes  that  most  issues  of  dissent  successfully  can  be  re- 
solved during  the  drafting  process-  At  NFIB,  the  heads  of  the 
intelligence  agencies  then  should  be  in  a  position  to  discuss  and 
work  over  the  NIE3'  conclusions,  rather  than  the  entire  text.   Re- 
portedly, NFIB  meetings  for  both  strategic  and  non-strategic  NIEo 
now  take  place  approximately  once  a  month,  and  last  from  one  to  one- 
and-a-half  hours.  After  the  meetings,  Turnei-  is  said  to  spend  more 
time  than  past  DCIs  in  reviewing,  editing  and  polishing  the  final 
documents. 
C.   Final  Adjudication  of  Views 
The  extent  to  which  DCIs  have  inserted  their  personal  judge- 
ments in  the  final  strategic  NIEs  now  has  become  a  subject  of 
controversy.  For  example,  the  Senate  Select  Committee  on  Intelligence 
chose  several  cases  to  investigate  regarding  DCI  Richard  Helms' 
alleged  role  in  altering  final  NIEs,  to  illustrate  what  it  labels
87  - 
"the  constant  tension. . .between  the  DCI...and  the  agenciea." 
Presently,  Admiral  Turner's  critics  maintain  that  he  "tinkers"  with 
the  estimates  and  "has  been  more  demanding  and  more  pre-emptive 
than  asy  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  in  recent  times." 
The  author  regards  as  "adjudicatory,"  decisions  made  at  the 
time  of  USIB  which  involve  a  choice  between  existing  options  and, 
consequently,  alter  what  the  draft  NIE  says.  For  example,  a  DCI 
may  arbitrate  between  competing  views  by  deciding  that  a  new  one 
should  dominate  or  existing  one  be  eliminated;  or,  a  DCI  may  find  all 
views  insufficient  and  draw  up  a  new  solution  reflecting  hie  personal 
judgements.  The  author  does  not  regard  as  adjudicatory,  actions  in 
which  a  DCI  permits  additional  footnotes,  inserts  his  own  view 
separately  in  the  final  NIEs,  or  assists  all  parties  in  reaching  a 
conclusion  by  offering  his  personal  opinions.  Likewise,  upholding 
the  CIA's  position  is  not  considered  here  as  adjudicatory,  unless 
there  is  evidence  that  the  DCI  judged  all  alternatives  equally  and 
impartially,  and/or  modified  the  CIA  text. 
An  adjudicatory  role  for  the  DCI  was  implied  in  the  original 
concept  of  the  NIEs  and  USIB's  predecessor  body.   The  IAC,  and  then 
USIB,  has  been  called  the  "Supreme  Court"  or  "Board  of  Directors" 
of  the  intelligence  community,  although  there  was  never  any  formal 
vote-taking.48  As  Chairman,  the  DCI  was  more  equal  than  the  other 
members  in  his  right  to  participate.  General  Bedell  Smith  made 
it  clear  that,  as  part  of  the  DCI's  role  in  coordinating  and  approving 
the  NIEs,  he  was  free  to  select  or  eliminate  views,  or  present  his 
own  judgements  in  the  final  NIEs.  No  President  explicitly  ruled 
out  this  role  for  the  DCI  although,  an  described  earlier  in  the
-  88 
Nixon  Administration,  Henry  Kissinger  implied  that  ha  himself 
should  act  as  chief  intelligence  advisor  and  coordinator  in  ad- 
judicating competing  claims. 
Nonetheless,  ntoBt  DCIs  since  General  Smith  have  approached  this 
role  for  the  strategic  NIEs  with  caution  and  exercised  it  on  rare 
occasions.  As  seen,  it  ran  against  DCI  Dulles'  personal  and  po- 
litical inclinations  to  act  aggressively  as  a  public  advocate  for 
one  or  another  view.  Further,  he  did  not  separate  himself  from 
the  CIA  as  an  institution  on  strategic  matters  and  defended  it  as 
necessary.*  Of  the  five  subsequent  DCIs  examined  here,  one,  William 
Colby,  argues  that  adjudication  i3  not  an  appropriate  role  for  the 
DCI  to  play.  As  indicated  in  Chart  B,  three  DCIs — John  McCone, 
Richard  Helms  and  Stansfield  Turner — on  occasion  made  adjudicatory 
decisions,  but  their  approach  has  varied.**  Moreover,  Richard 
Helms  told  this  author  that  he  did  not  consider  himself  an  adjudica- 
tor and,  in  describing  Admiral  Turner's  role,  one  aide  said  that 
"he  would  not  call  himself  that."    Below,  occasional  differences 
in  approach  to  the  non-strategic  NIEs  are  noted. 
John  McCone 
Initially,  DCI  John  McCone  did  not  believe  that  the  DCI's 
role  should  be  adjudicative,  but  regarded  the  NIEs  as  a  product  of 
good  staff  work.   In  the  case  of  the  1962  Cuban  missile  estimate, 
*As  noted  earlier,  Allen  Dulles  was  more  aggressive  in  presenting 
his  personal  views  in  the  non-strategic  NIEs. 
♦♦Because  of  Schlesinger's  brief  tenure  as  DCI,  it  is  impossible  to 
determine  whether  he  played  an  adjudicative  role  at  US IB.  The 
reader  should  bear  in  mind  that  Admiral  Turner's  adjudicatory  decisions 
primarily  are  made  prior  to  NFIB  meetings.
-  89 
he.  criticized  and  conjoled  estimators  to  no  avail  and  thon  per- 
mitted the  ;IIE  to  go  forward  as  it  was.   However,  in  this  case, 
McCone's  personal  relationship  and  accessibility  to  President 
Kennedy  were  secure  and  he  expressed  his  personal  vie'-?s  directly 
to  the  President. 
When  McCone  did  play  an  adjudicatory  role,  he  was  careful  to 
exercise  it  within  the  context  of  USIB.  Adjudication  is  precisely 
what  occurred  in  1963  during  the  USIB  debate  on  potential  Soviet 
ABM  capability.  McCone  listened  intently  to  each  side's  views  on 
the  question  of  whether  the  Tallin  Line  installations  represented 
the  beginnings  of  an  ar.ti-missiie  or  anti-aircraft  system.  He 
called  for  an  elaboration  of  the  Army's  view  of  the  former  possibility, 
and  eventually  sided  with  it.   The  text  of  NIS  11-3-63  then  was 
rewritten  to  present  the  Army's  predictions  that  the  Soviet  intent 
was  to  deploy  an  ABM  system  around  the  Tallin  Line.   Since  there 
was  no  provision  for  the  CIA  to  take  footnotes  to  an  NIS,  CIA 
analysts  say  that,  in  th.i3  instance,  "the  specificity  of  their  view 
was  lost."*    The  less  pessimistic  assessment,  which  regarded  the 
new  installations  for  bomber  defease,  was  represented  in  footnotes 
taken  by  the  Navy  and  State  Department. 
This  case  is  the  most  clear-cut  example  of  adjudication  at 
USIB  that  this  author  could  find.   It  is  interesting  that,  at  the 
time,  McCone's  action  was  not  challenged  by  CIA  estimators  on  the 
I 
grounds  of  being  inappropriate  or  heavy-handed.   One  can  speculate 
that  this  is  because  McCone's  USIB  decision  was  highly  visible  and 
seemingly  deliberative.   In  retrospect,  for  the  time  frame  of  NIE 
11-3-63,  McCone's  view  proved  inaccurate.    In  the  following  year.
-  90 
CIA  convinced  him  that  he  had  been  wrong  and  its  position  in  the 
"ABM  gap"  debate  once  again  assumed  the  text  of  NIE  11-3.   McCone'e 
1963  decision  opened  Pandora's  box,  howev&r,  and  subsequently  "some 
i 
of  the  technical  panels  serving  the  Ui  IB  felt  3o  deeply  thet  the 
CIA  was  dangerously  underestimating  tae  ABM  danger  that  they  took 
their  views  directly  to  the  White  House." 
Richard  Helms 
DCI  Helms  is  described  by  hi3  contemporaries  as  acting  as  a 
strong  adjudicator  at  USIB.   For  example,  in  discussing  Helms' 
handling  of  the  non-strategic  NIEs,  William  Colby  said  that  it  W3s 
typical  for  Helms  to  listen  and  then  say:   "'I  disagree;  I  think  we 
should  say  this   • "    Then,  the  NIE  would  be  sent  back  to  ONE 
for  rewriting  to  incorporate  the  DCI' a  opinion.  R.'.chard  Helms  once 
said  of  an  NIE  on  Cambodia:   "...in  the  end,  I  want  a  good  paper  • 
on  the  subject  even  if  I  have  to  make  the  controversial"  judge- 
ments  myself."    To  others,  Richard  Helms  had  judicial  qualities. 
For  example,  one  a.*.de  said  that  he  was  the  last  DCI  for  whom  all 
USIB  members  rose  to  their  feet  when  he  entered  the  room  or  closed 
the  meeting.    He  gave  the  appearance  of  being  beyond  the  fray  and, 
above  all,  decisive.  One  author  describes  helms'  handling  of  the 
Vietnam  NIEs  in  this  manner:   "Throughout  the  paper  wars,  Helms 
was  a  bureaucratic  general." 
On  the  other  hand.  Helms  r^-ely  was  involvad  in  substantive 
debate  on  strategic  matters,  and  this  author  could  find  no  in- 
stances in  ,'hich  Helms  overruled  the  CIA  at  USIB    strategic  matters. 
On  the  contrary,  if  he  ascertained  that  USIB  debate  was  inconclusive,
-  91  - 
he  typically  Bent  the  NIE  back  to  ONE  for  redrafing  to  incorporate 
a  Pentagon  view,   ho  was  reluctant  to  redraft  himself  and  did  not 
permit  any  Pentagon  participant  to  do  ao.   The  best  example  of  this 
is  his  handling  of  NIE  11-8-68.   Following  USIB  approval  in  June 
1969,  Dr.  Kissinger  "asked  that  [the  NIE]  be  rewritten  to  provide 
more  evidence  supporting  the  DCI's  judgement"  that  the  Soviet  MIRVing 
of  the  SS-9  was  not  imminent,  a  conclusion  with  which  Kissinger  wa3 
known  to  disagree.    The  Board  of  Estimates  rewrote  the  NIE,  pro- 
viding additional  argument  that  the  "triplet"  under  discussion 
was  not  a  MIRV.   In  investigating  thxs  case  history,  the  Senate 
Select  Committee  or.  Intelligence  concluded  that  Helms  had  not  at- 
tempted  to  influence  the  outcome. 
However,  this  author  concludes  that  Helms  did  act,  at  times,  in 
an  adjudicatory  capacity,  which  differed  from  the  approach  of  either 
DCIs  McCone  or  Turner.  Helms'  adjudicatory  role  was  management- 
oriented,  exemplified  by  decisiveness  and  brevity  in  handling 
the  strategic  NIEs,  and  motivated  by  an  interest  to  produce  the 
NIEs  on  time.  If  the  DCI  determined  that  the  discussion  was  going 
to  be  protracted  and  ultimately  irresolvable  by  more  ONE  redrafting, 
he  "approved"  the  existing  version  and  sent  it  to  the  White  House. 
This  led  to  complaints  of  arbitrary  behavior.  For  example,  one 
Pentagon  official  said  that  the  status  of  dissents  "was  left 
hanging  in  the  air"  and  that  he  was  uncertain  about  the  content 
of  NIEs  until  receiving  the  final,  printed  version. 
Another  official  complained  that  Helms  sometimes  resolved 
debate  by  eliminating  a  heatedly  contested  point  from  the  NIE 
altogether,  i.e.,  overruling  a  dissent.    For  example,  General
-  92  - 
Keegan  wa3  not  allowed  to  include  his  views  on  Soviet  civil  de- 
fense measures  in  the  summary  of  NJ.E  Ii-3  until  the  early  1970s. 
In  1970,  DIA  completed  a  study,  prese-ntod  at  USIB,  of  a  new  approach 
to  estimating  the  3ize  of  the  Soviet  defense  budget.   Reportedly, 
this  study  was  aimed  at  demonstrating  the  CIA  was  grossly  under- 
estimating the  size  of  the  Soviet  commitment  to  new  strategic  weapons. 
At  USIB,  the  DCI  agreed  that  the  report  wa3  interesting  and  worth- 
while,  but  asked  DIA  to  publish  its  view3  outside  che  current  NIE. 
James  Schlesinger 
Because  of  Schlesinger "s  brief  tenure,  it  was  impossible  for 
this  author  to  determine  whether  he  played  an  adjudicatory  role, 
as  indicated  in  Chart  B.   If  he  had  remained  as  DCI,  it  is  highly 
probable  that  he  would  have  so  intervened.  This  speculation  flows 
from  his  heavy  substantive  involvement  in  drafting,  encouragement 
of  debate  at  USIB,  open  mind  about  the  credibility  of  CIA  work,  and 
impetus  tc  keep  competition  within  reasonable  bounds  in  order  to 
present  a  stylistically  coherent  docuaent  to  the  policymaker.  Ad- 
judication visually  is  considered  the  strongest  role  a  DCI  might 
play  in  producing  the  strategic  NIEs.  In  this  author's  view,  DCI 
Schlesinger  would  nave  found  this  role  intellectually  challenging 
and  necessary  to  resolve  issues  of  sustained  competition  in  the 
strategic  NIEs. 
r 
William  Colby 
William  Colby  told  this  author  that  it  was  not  the  DCI'*  job 
to  arbitrate  between  conflicting  views  in  the  strategic  NIEs. 
Two  convictions  seem  to  underlie  this  concept:  first,  that  the
-  93 
DCI's  main  role  is  to  open  competitive  debate  at  USIB,  which 
during  ColLy's  tenure  reached  itc  highest  pitch;  second,  that  the 
subject  matter  was  technically  too  complex  for  the  DCI  to  effectively 
intervene,  without  appearing  to  be  arbitrarily  choosing  sides.  A3 
one  observer  noted,  Colby's  political  instincts  were  on  the  "humanist 
left"  but  he  did  not  impoje  these  on  USIB  members. 
That  is  not  to  say  that  Colby  was  passive  during  USIB  delibera- 
tions. As  documented  earlier,  he  often  requested  that  additional 
evidence  be  presented  to  shed  light  on  a  difficult  iseue.  '  After 
listening  to  extensive  debate,  Colby  sometimes  summed  up  the 
discussion  by  offering  broad,  even  philosophical  observations  of 
his  own,  without  dictating  their  inclusion  in  the  NIE.  For  example, 
Colby  believed  that  conventional  "theater  balance"  considerations 
tended  to  be  lost  in  the  shuffle  of  complex  Soviet  strategic  pro- 
grams, and  that  Soviet  technological  gains  might  have  a  political 
impact  on  less  developed  countries.    Colby's  willingness  to 
marshall  diverse  evidence  at  USIB  gave  the  appearance  of  impartiality 
in  weighing  arguments,  even  if  the  draft  NIE  remained  unchanged. 
For  example,  in  the  case  of  the  "Particle  X"  debate,  Colby  heard 
extensive  argument  before  siding  with  the  prevailing  scientific 
(and  CIA)  viewpoint,  after  which  General  Keegan  was  permitted  to 
take  a  footnote.    Unlike  Helms,  Colby  did  not  refer  all  re- 
drafting back  to  the  CIA.  Also,  he  did  not  redraft  himself.  As 
described  earlier,  Colby  typically  resolved  debate  by  authorizing 
marginal  changes  or  additions  to  the  draft  NIE  at  USIB,  such  as  a 
new  footnote,  which  then  was  written  by  the  dissenting  member. 
A
-  94  - 
DCI  Colby  behaved  more  aggressively  during  USIB  debate  on 
the  non-otrategic  NIEs,  for  which  he  sometimaB  held  views  distinct 
from  the  CIA's  or  a  Pentagon  aggncy.   In  such  casos,  Colby  rapresantad 
these  separately  in  the  text  of  the  NIE,  following  USIB  deliberations. 
That  is,  he  added  his  own  opinion  in  a  separate  sentence  or  para- 
graph, rather  than  redrafting  the  NIE  to  reflect  this.   For  example, 
in  one  NIE  on  Latin  America,  Colby  took  one  position,  CIA  and  the 
State  Department's  INR  another,  and  DIA  and  one  military  service 
a  third.68  During  Colby's  tenure,  the  Deputy  Director  of  CIA, 
General  Vernon  Walters,  also  employed  this  option  in  instances  when 
he  sided  with  the  Pentagon.  For  example,  in  one  NIE  on  Italy,  the 
DDCI  sided  with  DIA  during  USIB  debate.  Colby  sent  the  estimate 
back  to  hia  NIO  for  drafting  to  incorporate  a  joint  DDCI-DIA  alterna- 
tive. 
Stansfield  Turner 
This  author  credits  Admiral  Turner  with  having  played  the 
strongest  adjudicatory  role  of  any  DCI.  The  difference  between  DCI 
Turner  and  other  DCIs  ie  a  matter  or  degree  and  timing.  As  the  New 
York  Times  reported,  "what  has  changed,  it  appears,  is  Admiral  Turner's 
involvement  in  what  he  describes  as  restructuring  and  redrafting" 
prior  to  NFIB  meetings.    Turner  says:   "'I  am  not  bashful  about 
that.   I  end  up  telling  them  this  section  has  to  be  redrafted.  You 
won't  find  roa.y  sentences  I  personally  penned.  Mostly  it  is  be- 
cause they  didn't  bring  out  two  views  strongly.  Another  way,  I  look 
at  the  outline,  the  concept  at  the  beginning,  and  I  restructure 
that,  saying,  You  are  asking  the  Question  wrong.'"
-  95 
One  intelligence  official  describes  DCI  Turner's  adjudicatory 
role  as  highly  "personalized."72  After  reviewing  succescive  drafts, 
Turner  may  make  one  of  four  decisions  about  what  an  NIE  says. 
First,  he  may  "support"  the  CIA's  view  by  rejecting  an  alternative 
proposed  by  a  Pentagon  agency,  eventually  eliminating  it  from  the 
draft.  As  documented  earlier,  this  happened  in  a  recent  NIE  11-4. 
Second,  Turner  may  -overrule-  the  CIA  by  agreeing  that  a  Pentagon 
alternative  is  of  sufficient  merit  to  warrant  equal  status  to 
that  of  the  CIA's,  for  example,  in  the  case  of  the  Soviet  Backfire 
bomber  already  described. 
Third,  Admiral  Turner  may  reject  all  options  and  draw  up  a 
new  one.  For  example,  the  above-mentioned  Mew  York  Time 3  article 
reported  that  this  happened  in  a  1977  NIE  on  the  balance  of  strength 
between  North  and  South  Korea  following  withdrawal  of  US  troop3  in 
the  South.   "Admiral  Turner  concluded,  contrary  to  the  original 
estimate,  that  withdrawal  would  substantially  diminish  the  deterrent 
balance  on  the  peninsula."73  Fourth,  Turner  may  insert  his  personal 
view  separately,  or  alongside  of  other,  within  the  NISs. 
Admiral  Turner  ha3  been  criticized  for  not  using  the  joint, 
high-level  forum  of  NFIB  for  final  deliberations.   Because  he  prefers 
dealing  with  Pentagon  officials  individually  throughout  the  draft 
stage,  his  role  is  less  visible  than  that  of  DCIs  McCone  or  Colby 
and  critics  advance  charges  of  political  motivation.  As  one  in- 
telligence community  official  complains:   "Turner  has  'asked  the 
community  to  redo  the  estimates  or  has  rewritten  them  and  sent 
them  on  without  further  reference  to  the  National  Foreign  Intelligence 
Board,  or  he  has  sent  them  back  to  convince,  cajole  or  bully  the 
other  participants  into  alternative  estimates.*"
-  96  - 
VI.   THE  DCI'S  HOLE  IN  PROMOTING 
INDEPENDENT  REVIEW 
Independent  review  of  the  final  atrategic  HIEs  is  discussed 
here  for  three  reasons.   First,  outside  review  of  the  NIEs  originally 
was  considered  a  wholesome  ingredient  of  the  process.   Second, 
some  DCIs  actively  promoted  such  review.  Third,  the  independent, 
parallel  analysis  of  the  outBide  "B  Team"  to  the  inside  "A  Team's" 
NIE  11-3-8-76  reportedly  had  a  sizeable  impact  on  that  and  Bub- 
sequent  strategic  NIEs,  as  described  below. 
By  "independent"  review,  this  author  means  review  by  any 
group  which  does  not  play  an  official  part  in  drafting  the  NIEs 
and  is  not  employed  directly  by  the  CIA.  Review  of  the  strategic 
NIEs  may  occur  at  the  draft  stage,  or  just  before  or  after  USIB 
endorsement.  It  may  be  systematic,  e.g.,  each  year's  NIE  11-3-8, 
or  periodic.  As  indicated  in  Chart  B,  only  two  DCIs— Allen  Dulles 
and  James  Schlesinger— are  regarded  by  this  author  as  having  en- 
couraged independent  review  of  the  atrategic  NIEs.  William  Colby 
is  a  borderline  example  since,  with  reservations,  he  agreed  to 
the  concept  of  competitive  review  before  leaving  the  office.  How- 
ever, it  was  DCI  George  Bush  who  guided  the  1976  A-B  Team  experiment, 
with  initial  enthusiasm,  to  conclusion.   In  contrast,  DCIs  John 
McCone,  Richard  Helms,  and  Stansfield  Turner  demonstrated  little 
interest  in  establishing  ongoing  mechanisms  for  independent  review. 
A.  Allen  Dulles,  the  Princeton  Consultants  and  Strategic  Advisory 
Panel 
Almost  from  day  one  of  the  NIEs  under  General  Bedell  Smith,  a 
group  of  Vstinguished  outsiders  known  as  the  Princeton  consultants 
met  near  Princeton  University  to  examine  the  estimates.  Originally,
-  97  - 
the  panel  was  self-supporting  and  composed  largely  of  men  with 
wide,  practical  experience  in  public  affairs  "as  a  corrective 
to  what  [the  DDCI]  regarded  as  the  disproportionate  number  of 
academics  on  the  Board  [of  Estimates]."   The  consultants  firat 
met  at  the  home  of  the  DDCI,  William  Jackson,  and  then  other 
locations  around  Princeton.   Throughout  the  1950s,  they  gathered 
regularly  for  two  full  days,  four  times  a  year.  An  additional  half 
day  prior  to  formal  meetings  was  spent  at  Princeton  reading  the 
NIEs.   Typically,  the  consultants  reviewed  NIEs  just  prior  to  IkC 
or  USIB  meetings,  although  earlier  drafts  sometimes  were  examined. 
The  primary  way  in  which  Allen  Dulles  promoted  the  involvement 
of  the  Princeton  consultants  was  by  his  presence.  As  DDCI  in  1952, 
Dulles  attended  every  meeting  of  the  panel  and  was  instrumental 
in  proposing  new  members.   Throughout  his  tenure  as  DCI,  Dulles 
continued  this  practice,  often  leaving  busy  meetings  at  the  CIA 
to  fly  up  to  Princeton.2  Dulles  was  accompanied  by  several  Beard 
of  Estimates  members  and  ONE  staff.   The  discussion  was  lively  and 
intense,  and  Dulles  is  described  by  one  panel  member  as  being  "keenly 
interested  and  always  eager  to  learn."   Face-to-faca  contact  be- 
tween CIA  officials  and  outside  experts  was  considered  natural 
and  invaluable  during  the  1950s  and,  since  the  Princeton  consul- 
tants issued  no  formal  reports,  constituted  its  chief  means  of 
communicating  with  the  CIA. 
Although  the  Princeton  consultants  spent  the  majority  of 
time  on  non-strategic  NIEs,  they  contributed  to  the  strategic 
NIEs  as  well.  Panel  members  were  useful  in  devising  precise  lan- 
guage by  which  to  communicate  the  Soviet  threat.  Individuals 
occasionally  took  it  upon  themselves  to  examine  Pentagon  numerical
predictions  in  depth.   For  example,  one  member  said  that  he  looked 
into  figures  on  Soviet  coastal  artillery  which  had  appeared  con- 
sistently in  each  NIE,  and  discovered  that  they  were  the  a awe  ones 
utilized  during  WWII.4  Nonetbeless,  by  the  second  half  of  the 
decade,  questions  about  Soviet  technology  became  so  complex  that 
other  mechanisms  were  devised  to  review  these-  NIEs. 
In  the  late  1950a,  Allen  Dulles  established  the  Strategic 
Advisory  Panel  "as  a  device  for  resolving  some  of  the  competing 
claims  on  Soviet  missile  activity."*   Composed  of  ten  members,  the 
panel  included  CIA  consultants  and  recognized  aerospace  technology 
experts,  and  was  regarded  as  independent  of  the  CIA.   It  met  twice 
a  year  for  several  days,  after  having  been  briefed  on  the  strategic 
NIEs  by  experts  involved  in  drafting,  usually  just  before  the 
NIEs  were  issued.   The  panel  then  formed  its  own  judgements,  which 
it  presented  separately  to  the  DCI  and  the  President's  security 
advisers.  During  "the  'missile  gap*  days  the  panel's  expertise  had 
been  found  useful  in  sorting  out  a  lot  of  technical  arguments  and 
removing  much  of  the  excess  speculation." 
B.   The  19603 
Neither  DCIs  John  McCone  nor  Richard  Helms  actively  promoted 
independent  review  of  the  strategic  NIEs.  During  the  early  1960s, 
the  Princeton  consultants  and  the  Strategic  Advisory  Panel  fell 
into  disuse.   In  both  cases,  insidars  contended  that  their  own 
growing  expertise  in  the  technical  aspects  of  strategic  estimating 
*The  Strategic  Advisory  Panel  originally  was  known  as  the  Hyland 
Panel  for  its  first  chairman,  a  Vice  President  of  Hughes  Aircraft.
made  the  contribution  of  outsiders  less  insightful.   In  the  be- 
ginning of  Mccone's  tenure,  the  Princeton  consultants  mat  twice 
a  year  at  a  retreat  in  Virginia,  but  the  DC I  was  not  present  and 
work  centered  primarily  on  the  non-strategic  NIEs.7  Eventually,  the 
group  dissolved.   CIA  analysts  came  to  believe  that  the  Strategic 
Advisory  Panel  had  become  too  "hawkish"  and  its  intervention  "ir- 
ritating."8 Tt  was  disbanded  in  the  early  1960s,  and  its  re- 
constitution  in  1967  was  ignored  by  Helns  and  intelligence  pro- 
fessionals. 
During  most  of  the  1960s,  review  of  the  strategic  NIEs  was 
conducted  entirely  by  those  persons  who  wrote  then.  For  example, 
from  time  to  time  indi  ridual  Board  of  Estimates  members  initiated 
post-mortems  on  critical  NIEs  or  groups  of  NIEs,  for  internal 
circulation.9  Growth  took  place  in  the  influence  and  competency 
of  USIB's  many  subcommittees,  which  some  observers  consider  the 
real,  working-level  heart  of  the  USIB  process.10  Of  the  fifteen 
subcommittees  eventually  created,  at  least  half  concerned  themselves 
exclusively  with  strategic  matters,  such  as  the  Joint  Atomic  Energy 
Intelligence  Committee  and  the  Committee  on  Imagery  Requirements 
and  Exploitation.  Composed  of  CIA  and  Pentagon  specialists/  th*y 
contributed  substantively  to  drafting  of  the  strategic  NIEb.  One 
Pentagon  official  complained  that  both  DCIa  McCone  and  Helms  "stacked 
the  deck"  in  appointing  CIA  officials  to  chair  these  subcommittees. 
During  the  Nixon  Administration,  National  Security  Advisor 
Henry  Kissinger  utilized  the  NSC  to  review  the  strategic  NIEb.  After 
registering  dissatisfaction  with  the  conclusions  reached  in  NIE  11-8-68 
predicting  delays  in  the  Soviet  MIRVing  program,  Kissinger  created 
a  "MIRV  Panel"  under  the  NSC  to  study  the  question  in  depth.  Conducted
-  100  - 
in  the  spring  of  1963,  this  interagency  review  included  CIA  and 
Pentagon  DDR&E  officials,  who  scon  became  the  chief  combatants.   It 
involved  "a  stream  of  intensely  focussed  studies"  on  Soviet  MIRV 
capabilities,  "reached  no  conclusions,  but  exhaustively  laid  out 
data  and  identified  areas  of  disagreements."    Subsequently,  Kissinger 
created  an  NSC  "Verification  Panel"  to  study  issues  related  to  SALT 
verification,  which  immediately  expanded  beyond  a  focus  on  the 
strategic  NIEs.   When  Kissinger  became  Secretary  of  State  in 
1973,  the  NSC' a  review  of  specific  NIEs  ceased. 
C .  James  Schlesinger  and  thf  Intelligence  Community  Staff 
DCI  Schlesinger' s  contribution  to  an  independent  review  in- 
volved the  Intelligence  Community  (IC)  Staff,  which  now  serves 
the  DCI.   Since  the  IC  Staff  is  funded  out  of  a  budget  separate  from 
the  CIA' a,  it  qualifies  in  this  author's  definition  of  "independent" 
even  though  personnel  are  drawn  from  the  CIA  and  Pentagon.   Since 
1971,  the  IC  Staff  assisted  the  ECI  in  administrative  housekeeping 
tasks  related  to  his  role  as  coordinator  of  the  intelligence  community. 
In  late  1972,  a  Product  Review  Division  (PRD)  was  created.  The 
PRD  was  supposed  to  regularly  appraise  intelligence  studies  and  es- 
timates, "testing  them  for  objectivity,  balance,  and  responsiveness." 
Schlesinger  was  the  fir3t  DCI  to  provide  the  IC  Staff  with 
muscle,  by  emphasizing  its  responsibility  for  community-wide 
budgeting,  authorised  by  President  Nixon  in  1971.   In  encouraging 
the  PRD's  independent  work,  "Schlesinger  altered  the  corapoaition 
of  the  IC  Staff  by  increasing  the  number  of  non-Agency  personnel. 
In  this  way,  he  hoped  to  facilitate  the  Staff's  contacts  with  the 
other  components  of  the  community."    The  PRD  commenced  in-depth, 
case  studies  of  past  NIEs,  choosing  several  recent  "crisis  prediction"
NIEs  for  special  emphasis--*. g. ,  NIEs  on  the  1973  Middle  East 
war,  the  Cyprus  crisis  of  197-1,  the  Indian  nuclear  de\.jnation,  and 
the  Mayaguez  incident.   Its  conclusions  had  implications  for 
the  intensifying  strategic  debate.   For  example,  cne  study  con- 
tended that,  in  1973,  the  "intelligence  community  was  disposed  to 
believe  that  the  Arabs  were  unlikely  to  resort  to  war  against 
Israel  because  to  do  so  would  be  'irrational,'  in  light  of  relative 
Arab-Israeli  military  capability."15   In  evaluating  the  1974 
Cyprus  crisis,  the  FRD  argued  that  CIA  analysts  again  were  prey  to 
"the  perhaps  subsconsciou3  conviction  (and  hope)  that,  ultimately, 
reason  and  rationality  will  prevail,  that  apparently  irrational 
moves  (the  Arab  attack,  the  Greek- sponsored  coup)  will  not  be  made 
by  essentially  rational  men."16  Precisely  this  complaint  was 
echoed  by  individuals  charging  CIA  analysts  with  a  "bias  of  systematic 
,..  •    ..17 
optimism. 
D.   Thft  President's  Foreign  Intelligence  Advisory  Board  and 
the  197  >  A-B  Tean  Experiment 
Among  its  several  functions,  PFIAB  historically  has  demon- 
strated a  strong  interest  in  the  strategic  NIEs.  Chief  among  its 
assets  as  an  outside,  independent  reviewer  has  been  the  prestige 
and  experience  of  its  members,  and  it*  inclination  to  look  at  issues 
from  what  has  been  termed  the  "grass  roots  level."18  Up  to  the 
time  it  was  abolished  in  1977,  PFIAB  frequently  called  intelligence 
professionals,  including  DDP  personnel,  junior  analysts  and  dissident 
officials,  to  testify  before  it.  PFIAB  also  solicited  raw  intelligence 
reports  and  drafts  of  finished  products  to  evaluate.  Although  PFIAB 
had  no  staff  of  its  own,  it  assembled  special  panels  of  members 
and  consultants  to  examine  selected  issues,  reporting  directly  to 
the  President.
-  102 
The  1976  A-B  Tean  "axperiuont  in  conpetiti.ve  analysis  stemmed 
from  PFIAB's  opinion  that  the  NIEs  had  boon  underestimating  the 
process  of  Soviet  strategic  weapons."    Individual  PFIftB  member a 
gradually  had  arrived  at  this  concluoion  after  examining  strategic 
NIEs  of  the  past  decade  and  listening  to  the  testimony  of  dissenting 
Pentagon  officials,  such  as  G.-nerals  Daniel  Graham  ana  George  Keec.an. 
In  early  1975,  several  PFIAB  members  complained  to  DCI  Colby  about 
the  suggestion,  in  NIE  11-3-8-74,  that  the  Soviets  were  seeking 
only  "rough  parity"  with  the  US.  They  presented  Colby  with  their 
own  draft  statement  of  Soviet  policy  and  asked  him  to  initiate  an 
outside  review.20  Colby  listened,  but  defended  the  NIE  on  the 
grounds  that  it  represented  the  beat  combined  judgement  of  the 
intelligence  community,  and  appeared  reluctant  to  go  further. 
At  the  sama  time,  President  Ford  requested  PFIAB  to  ascertain  why 
the  strategic  NIEs  presented  such  a  isturbing  number  of  dissents. 
In  mid-197  5,  General  Keegan  was  invited  to  the  White  House  to 
make  his  case,  before  President  Ford  and  PFIAB,  concerning  the 
significance  of  Soviet  civil  defense  measures  and  new  guided  missiles. 
Other  Pentagon  officials  also  testified  at  this  meeting.   In  August 
1975,  PFIAB's  Chairman  proposed  that  the  President  authorize  the 
USC  to  implement  a  "competitive  analysis."    HCI  Colby  responded 
with  a  proposal  that  the  PFIAB  first  examine  an  "applicable  NIE  then 
underway  and  thereafter  determine  what  specific  course  of  action 
to  take.  The  PFIAB  found  weaknesses  in  that  NIE  and,  after  having 
made  further  investigations  of  its  own,  again  proposed  fin  April 
1976]  an  experiment  in  'competitive  analysis.'"    In  June  1976, 
President  Ford  asked  DCI  George  Bush  to  carry  out  the  experirmt. 
Bush  is  described  as  being  initially  "enthusiastic"  and  considered 
an  effective  review  one  of  his  main  tasks  as  DCI.