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UNCLASSIFIED 
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DC1D  1/14-1 
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DIRECTOR  OF  CENTRAL  INTELLIGENCE  DIRECTIVE  1/14 
MINIMUM  PERSONNEL  SECURITY  STANDARDS  AND     10CEDURES 
GOVERNING  ELIGIBILITY  FOR  ACCESS  TO 
SENSITIVE  COMPARTMENTED  INFORMATION 
(Effective  14  Apr.!  1986) 
Pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  Section  102  of  the  National  Security  Act  of  1947,  and 
Executive  Order  12333,  the  following  minimum  personnel  security  standards,  procedures,  and 
continuing  security  programs  are  hereby  established  for  all  United  States  Government  civilian 
and  military  personnel,  consultants,  contractors,  employees  of  contractors,  and  other  individ- 
uals who  require  access  iO  Sensitive  Compartmented  Information  (hereinafter  referred  to  as 
SCI).  The  standards,  procedures,  and  programs  established  herein  are  minimum,  and  the 
departments  and  agencies  may  establish  such  additional  security  steps  as  may  be  deemed 
necessary  '  nd  appropriate  to  ensure  that  effective  security  is  maintained. 
1.  Definitions 
a.  Intelligence  Community — those  United  States  Government  organizations  and  activi- 
ties identified  in  Executive  Order  12333  or  successor  orders  as  making  up  such 
Community. 
b  Sensitive  Compartmented  Information  (SCI) — is  classified  information  concerning  or 
derived  from  intelligence  sources,  methods,  or  analytical  processes  that  is  required  to 
be  handled  exc!  .veiy  within  formal  access  control  systems  established  by  the  Director 
of  Central  Intelligence. 
c.  Senior  Officials  of  the  Intelligence  Community  (SOICs)— for  the  purpov*s  of  this 
directive,  SOICs  are  defined  as  the  head*  of  organizations  'within  the  Intelligence 
Community,  as  defined  by  Executive  Order  12333,  or  their  designated  representatives. 
2.  Purpose 
The  purpose  of  this  directive  is  to  enhance  the  security  protection  of  SCI  through  the  ap- 
plication of  minimum  security  standards,  procedures,  and  continuing  security  programs,  and  to 
facilitate  the  security  certification  process  among  Government  departments  and  agenc :ies 
o.    Applicability 
The  provisions  of  this  directive  shall  appiy  to  ail  persons  '.ether  than  elected  officials  of  the 
United  States  Government,  federal  judges  and  tho^e  individuals  for  u  hem  the  DC!  makes  a 
specific  evcvption)  without  regard  to  civilian  or  military  status,  form  of  employment,  official 
rank  or  p-z-itiori,  or  length  of  service 
4.    General 
a     Individuals  v.  ho  do  not  meet  the  minimum  security  criteria  contained  herein  and  \\\u 
are.   therefore,    denied   arc'^   to   SCi    sh 
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"2  ineligible  for 
been  authorized  as  an  exception  granted  in  accordance  with  paragraph  6  below,  shall 
not,  solely  for -that  reason,  be  considered  eligible  for  access  to  ether  classified 
information.  -   ~     *_';'"?  ." 
b.  The  granting  of  access  to  SCI  shall  be  controlled  under  the  strictest  application  of  the 
"need-to- know**  principle,  and  in  accordance  with  the  personnel  security  standards  and 
procedures  set  forth  in  this  directive  In  accordance  with  Nationai  Security  Decision 
Directive  Number  84  and  the  DCI  Security  Policy  Manual  for  SCI  Control  Systems, 
signature  of  a  DCI-authorized  Nondisclosure  Agreement  which  includes  a  provision  for 
prepublication  review  is  a  condition  of  access  to  SCI. 
■■„:-.  *V"-- 
5.  Personnel  Security  Standards 
Criteria  for  security  approval  of  an  individual  on  a  need-to-lcnow  basis  for  access  to  SCI 
ire: 
a.  The  individual  shall  be  stable;  trustworthy;  reliable,  of  excellent  character, 
judgment,  and  discretion;  and  of  unquestioned  loyally  to  the  United  States. 
b.  Except  where  there  is  a  compelling  need,  and  a  determination  has  been  made  by 
competent  authority  as  described  in  paragraph  6  below  that  every  reasonable 
assurance  has  been  obtained  that  under  the  circumstances  the  security  risk  is 
negligible: 
1)  Both  the  individual'  and  the  members  of  his  or  her  immediate  family  shall  be 
V.S  citizens.  For  these  purposes,  "immediate  family"  'ncludes  the  mdivi- 
duals  spouse,  parents,  brothers,  sisters,  and  children  ' 
2)  The  members  of  the  individual's  immediate  family  and  persons  to  whom  h'- 
or  she  is  bound   by  affection  or  obligation  :  should   neither   be   subject 
to 
physical,  mental,  or  other  forms  of  duress  by  a  foreign  power,  nor  advocate 
the  use  of  force  or  violence  to  overthrow  the  Government  of  *\v  United 
States  or  the  alteration  of  the  form  of  Government  of  the  United  Stao-s  b\ 
unconstitutional  means 
6.  Exceptions  to  Personnel  Security  Standards 
Exceptions  to  paragraph  5b  (1)  or  (2)  above  may  be  granted  only  by  the  SOIC  of  the  ap- 
propriate organization  or  his  designee  unless  such  authority  has  been  specifically  delegated  to 
the  head  of  an  office  or  organization  as  set  forth  in  interdepartmental  agreements.  All 
exceptions  granted  will  be  common  sense  determinations  based  on  ail  available  information, 
and  shall  be  recorded  by  the  organization  making  the  exception  In  those  cases  in  which  the  in- 
dividual has  lived  outside  of  the  United  States  for  a  substantial  period  of  his  or  her  life,  a  thor- 
ough assessment  of  the  adequacy  of  the  investigation  in  terms  of  fulfillment  of  the  minimum 
investigative  requirements,  and  judicious  review  of  the  infornnti'in  'herein,  m'rt  \r;  made 
before  an  exception  is  considered 
7.  Investigative  Repuirements 
a  The  investigation  conducted  on  an  individual  under  consideration  for  access  to  SCI  v.  ill 
be  thorough  and  shall  be  designed  to  develop  information  as  t<>  whether  the  individual 
clearly  meets  the  above  Personnel  Security  Standard 
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•;^^T  ,\-     --2 !;-—--.--   b.~Tne  investigation  shall  be  accomplished  through  record  checks  and  personal  interviews^. 
•    JCJ  "  -.-..•-  v  -  °*  various  sources  by  trained  investigative"  personnel  in  order  to  estaoiish  affirmatively  ^ 
•  ;  Jlv  •    -     ...   to  ^  adjudicating  agency  complete  continuity  of  identity  to  include  birth,  residences/  ' 
--V-*  education,' employment, -and  mUitary  service. .  Where  the  circumstances  of  a  case 
indicate,  the  investigation  -shall  exceed  the  basic  requirements  set  out  below  to  ensure 
-.  that  those  responsible  for  adjudicating  access  eligibility  have  in  their  possession  all  the 
relevant  facts  available. " 
c.  The  individual  shall  furnish  a  signed  personal  history  statement,  fingerprints  of  a 
quality  acceptable  to  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  and  a  signed  release,  as 
necessary,  authorizing  custodians  of  poiice,  credit,  education,  and  medical  records,  to 
provide  record  information  to  the  investigative  agency.  Photograph;  cf  the  individual 
shall  also  be  obtained  where  additional  corroboration  of  identity  is  required. 
8.   Minimum  standards  for  the  investigation  are  as  follows: 
a.  Verification  of  date  and  place  of  birth  and  citizenship. 
b.  Check  of  the  subversive  and  criminal  files  of  the  Federal  Bureau  ct  Investigation, 
including  submission  of  fingerprint  charts,  and  such  other  national  agencies  as  are 
appropriate  to  the  individual's  background-  An  additional  check  of  Immigration  and 
Naturalization  Service  records  shall  be  conducted  on  those  members  of  the  individual's 
immediate  family  who  are  United  States  citizens  other  than  by  birth  or  who  are 
resident  aliens 
c.  A  check  of  appropriate  police  records  covering  all  areas  of  the  individual's  residence, 
employment,  and  education  in  the  U.S.  throughout  the  most  recent  fifteen  (15)  years  cr 
since  age  eighteen,  whichever  is  the  shorter  period. 
d.  Verification  of  the  individual's  financial  status  and  credit  habits  through  checks  of 
appropriate  credit  institutions  01,  if  such  checks  are  net  productive,  through  interview;, 
n*. ith  knowledgeable  sources  covering  all  areas  cf  employment,  residence,  and  educa- 
tion in  the  most  recent  seven  (7)  years 
e.  Interviews  with  neighbors  in  the  vicinity  of  all  the  individual's  residences  in  excess  of 
six  (6)  months  throughout  the  most  recent  five  (5)  year  period.  This  coverage  shall  be  ex- 
panded where  the  investigation  suggests  the  existence  ot  some  questionable  behaviorai 
pattern. 
f.  Confirmation  of  all  employment  during  the  past  fifteen  (15)  years  or  since  age  eighteen, 
w  '  ichever  is  the  shorter  period,  but  in  any  event  the  most  recent  two  (2)  \ears  Personal 
interviews  with  supervisors  and  cow  -rkers  at  places  of  employment  covering  the  past 
ten  (!0)  years  shall  be  accomplished 
g.  Verification  of  graduation  or  attendance  at  ail  institutions  cf  higher  learning  within  the 
past  fifteen  (15)vears.  If  the  individual  did  not  attend  an  mst  tution  cf  higher  learning, 
verification  o(  graduation  or  attendance  at  Ic-st  seconiiarv  school  within  the  past  ten  (10; 
years. 
h     Review  oi  appropriate  militar,  records 
i  Interviews  wiih  a  sufficient  number  of  knowledgeable  sources  (a  minimum  of  three 
developed  during  the  course  c.;  ;.';e  investigation)  as  necessary  to  provide  continuity  to 
the  extent  practicable,  of  the  individual's  activities  and  behavioral  patterns  over  the  past 
fifteen  (15)  years 
j  When  ernpl'i',  ment,  education  or  residence  has  occurred  in  foreign  countries  (except 
for  per i< -tis  of  ley-  than  oik    year  for  personnel  on  L  S   Government  j^i^nment  and  le^ 
UNCLASSIFIED
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^*"       -      '    -  -  -   -    tj^n  nmcty  <jays  for  other  purposes)  during  the  past  tnteen  (15/  years  or  since  age  eigh-if-cv^S-ra^jB-w 
teen,  a  check  of  the  recoroVwil]  be  made  at  the  Department  of  State  and/or  other  ar> "*"  ~'-^v"^-^*?^ 
propriaie  agencies.  Efforts  shall  be  made  to  develop  sources,  generaJly  in  the  United 
States,  who  knew  the  individual  overseas  in  order  to  cover  signiScant  employment, 
education  or  residence  and  to  attempt  to  determine  if  any  lasting  foreign  contacts 'or 
connections  were  established  during  this  penod.  However,  in  all  cases  where  an 
individual  has  worked  or  lived  outside  of  the  US  continuously  for  over  one  year,  the 
;n  ?stigation  will  be  expanded- to  cover  fully  this  period  in  his  or  her  life  through  the 
use    f  such  investigative  assets  and  checks  of  record  sources  as  may  be  available  to  the 
U.S.  Lovernment  in  the  foreign  country(ies,  in  which  the  individual  resided. 
k.  When  •  1  c  individual  has  immediate  family  members  or  other  persons  to  whom  the  in- 
oividual  L  bound  by  affection  or  obligation  in  any  of  the  situations  described  in 
subparagrao  i  5b.(2)  above,  the  investigation  will  include  an  interview  of  the  individual 
by  trained  security,  investigative,  or  counterintelligence  personnel  to  ascertain  the  facts 
as  they  may  rela'e  to  the  individual's  access  eligibility 
1.  In  all  cases,  the  individuals  spouse  or  cohabitant  shall  at  a  minimum  be  checked 
through  the  subversive  and  criminal  files  of  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  and 
other  national  agencies  as  appropriate.  When  conditions  indicate,  additional  investiga- 
tion shall  be  conducted  on  the  spcuse  ci  the  individual  and  members  of  the  immediate 
family  (or  other  persons  to  whom  the  individual  is  bound  by  affection  or  obligation)  to 
the  extent  necessary  t  o  permit  a  determination  by  the  adjudicating  agency  that  the 
provisions  of  paragraph.  5  (Personnel  Security  Standards)  above  are  met  (see  Annex  A). 
m.  A  personal  interview  r  *  the  ,  hvidual  may  be  conducted  by  trained  security, 
investigative,  or  -ounterio'eiiigen  •*  personnel  to  ensure  full  investigative  coverage.  A 
personal  interview  will  bee  induce  \  when  necessary  to  resolve  any  significant  adverse 
information  and/or  Jnccnsis'^ncie^  -eloped  during  the  investigation.  In  departments 
or  agencies  with  poh  ::e:  sa-  -ticnm-  he  use  of  the  p-d.rraph  for  personnel  security 
purposes,  the  personal  mt-  -\.  sw  ma  ncluci  a  polygraph  examination,  conducted  by 
a  qualified  polygraph  r\  -mo'cr. 
9.   Excretions  io  Investigative  /V  c/ro>em<  at 
a.  'a  exceptional  ■...-.  vs.  the  SOI-  ■■'■'  I'.:*-  d-  ■  .'•<-:  mas  dt-teomme  to  u  :;  v  :.•  'essarv  or  ad 
visable  in  th"  national  inten  t  u>  au'hvozt.  •cross  P>  SCI  prior  to  o:mpk-\cn  of  .he  fullv 
prescribed  investigation  noted  in  par-.oar  "i  above  In  tm's  situation,  such  investitive 
checks  as  are  immediate!/  p  ..-.si hie  shall  •  made  at  once  and  shall  include  a  personal 
interview  of  the  individual  by  ■  r ainvd  -  curity,  investigative,  or  counterintelligence 
personnel  Access  in  su<A  a  >"S  ■".hall  ;-  >trictl v  controlled,  ano  the  fu;;>  preo-nt>-u 
investigation  and  final  •  .aluati<  n  sh.l  be  completed  -it  lie  cul'icO  practicable 
moment  Certiheati  .a  *  j  other  o:?ar.:.sanons  of  individuals  authorized  a'.-,  ess  :n  oich 
cas-r-  shall  include  expiice  r.otihc:.-t"vr,   A  the  exception. 
b  Where  a  previous  invest:  ati^r  hoe  I  een  conducted  within  the  pa-t  fave  ;5j  vears  which 
substantially  meets  the  a.-ove  mc-.imum  standards,  it  ni.e,  v.-rw/  as  a  basis  for  granting 
access  approval  pro--.de*  a  re.'iew  of  the  personnel  and  securi'v  files  6r»  s  not  reveal 
substantive  changes  in  oie  individual's  security  rli/.ibihtv  if  a  previous  mvesti^atior. 
does  not  substantially  r.ieef  the  minimum  standard*-  or  if  it  is  rn-re  ttijn  t've  fo,  > ears 
old.  a  current  investigation  shall  he  recjuired  but  mav  U-  limited  to  that  necessary  to 
bring  the  individual's  hie  up  to  date  tn  accordance  with  th.e  investigative  requuemerit 
set  forth  in  paragraph  S  above  Should  new  infcrruaii'M  \<-  d-velop»:d  dur:n,'  the 
curreni  investigation  which  bears  unfavorjbly  up^on  the  individual  s  activities  covered 
bv.  the  previous  investigation,  the  curren!  .rio'iiries  s!,j!:  •'.-•  exp.ir>d'-d  a«-  n>-t  >-:.:>•:>,  0.. 
de.e.'op  lull  details  of  t.h.    u. form. Or  ■■:■< 
UNCLASSIFIED 
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• -_    .:-     M'"r»  .  •       --.*-   .    -•*—■  ..    --.-     _ju--  j—  .--ci*v-*EV"'"-*."?».^rc»-??<»=bji-— iin».*--,r'fc**:«r%  — - ..»-.    ^*-  .— .  *  w  ~*^m^.-r  r-iabc  :*nr*3~*'.  r-*. 
.  10.  Periodic  KemvettizaUon9_.^    v:  ^ ;,  ;:,- ,  ^.y  v%,;^^, .^i^^|^^^>/«^.* v^.^  ^.  ■}^!?&32&»& 
a.  Programs  shall   be   instituted   requiring   the  periodic"  reinvestigation  of  personnel       '~:'r ^'■\r '^";5."    ;
provided  access  to  SCI.  These  reinvestigations  shall  be  conducted  on  a  five  (5)  year  re- 
current basis,  but  on  a  more  frequent  basis  where  the  individual  has  shown  sorne 
questionable  behavioral  pattern,  his  or  her  activities  are  otherwise  suspect,  or  when 
deemed  necessary  by  the  SOIC  concerned.  -■"-•  j    '"*■    - 
b.  The  scope  of  reinvestigations  ilull  be  determined  by  the  SOIC  concerned  based  on 
such  considerations  as  the  potential  damage  that  might  result  from  the  individual's 
defection  or  willful  compromise  of  SCI  and  the  availability  and  probable  effectiveness 
of  other  means  to  evaluate  continually  factors  related  to  the  individual's  suitability  for 
continued  access.  The  individual  shall  furnish  an  up-to-date,  signed  personal  history 
statement  and  signed  releases  as  necessary.  In  all  cases,  the  reinvestigation  shall  include, 
as  a  minimum,  appropriate  national  agency  checks,  local  agency  checks,  overseas 
checks  where  appropriate,  credit  checks,  and  a  persona!  interview-  with  the  individual 
by  trained  investigative,  security,  or  counterintelligence  personnel  when  necessary  to 
resoive  significant  adverse  information  and/or  inconsistencies.  When  conditions  so 
indicate,  additional  investigation  may  be  conducted  as  determined  by  the  SOIC  or  his 
designee. 
72.  Outside  Activities 
Individuals  who  hold,  or  are  being  considered  for,  SCI  access  approval  shall  have  made 
available  to  them  for  reading  the  second  and  third  paragraphs  of  the  "Outside  Activit.es" 
section  of  Annex  A  to  DCID  1/14.  and  shall  be  instructed  to  report  in  writing  to  their  securitv 
officer  any  existing  or  contemplated  outside  employment  or  activity  that  appears  to  meet  the 
criteria  of  those  paragraphs.  Written  reports  must  be  submitted  before  beginning  any  outside 
employment  or  activity  as  defined  in  Annex  A  to  DCID  1/14.  In  addition,  initial  or  updated 
personal  history  statements  must  include  details  of  outside  employment  or  activities  (as  defined 
in  Annex  A  to  DCID  1/14).  Investigation  must  cover  the  renoned  outside  employment  or 
activities.  Information  concerning  actual  or  planned  outside  employment  or  activities  that 
would  create  a  potential  risk  to  the  security  of  SCI  shall  be  evaluated  in  accordance  with  the 
faciors  speeihed  in  Annex  A  to  determine  whether  the  circumstances  create  an  unacceptable 
risk  of  unauthorized  disclosure. 
12.  Determination  of  Access  Eligibility 
The  evaluation  of  the  information  developed  by  investigation  on  en  individual's  loyalty 
and  suitability  sh:.il  be  accomplished  under  the  cognizance  of  the  SOIC  concerned  by  analysts 
of  broad  knowledge,  good  judgment,  and  wide  experience  in  personnel  security  and/or 
counterintelligence.  When  all  other  information  developed  on  an  individual  is  favorable,  a 
minor  investigative  requirement  which  has  not  been  met  should  not  preclude  favorable 
adjudication  In  all  evaluations  the  protection  of  the  national  interest  is  paramount.  Any  doubt 
concerning  personnel  having  access  to  SCI  should  be  resolved  in  favor  of  fhe  national  security 
and  the  access  should  be  denied  or  revoked  The  ultimate  determination  of  w!  ether  the 
granting  of  access  is  eiearl\  consistent  with  the  interest  of  national  security  shall  be  an  overall 
common  sense  determinat'on  based  on  all  available  information 
13.  Appeals  Procedures 
Annex  B  prescribes  common  appeals  procedures  to  be  followed  when  an  individual  s  SCI 
access  has  been  denied  or  revoked. 
/-/.    Continuing  Security  Programs 
a     In  order  t<i  facilitate  attainment  of  the  highest  standard  of  personnel  security  and  to 
augment    b'i:h  the  acres*-  app."»\a!  criteria   and  tin-  investigative  requirements  e<tab- 
UNCLASSIF1ED
-f.  -.UNCLASSIFIED  --  .      .-;-.-.  DC1D  J/14-6    - 
lished  by  this  directive,  member  departments  and  agencies  shall  institute  continuing  '£*.%+, 
security  programs  for  all  individuals  having  access  to  SCL  In  addition  to  security    :,  _ 
indoctrinations  (see  Annex  C,  "Minimum  Standards  for  SCI  Security  Awareness  .< 
Programs  in  the  VS.  Intelligence  Community "X  these  programs  shall  be  tailored  to .;?  
■ 
create  mutually  supporting proceduresunder  which  no  issue  will  escape'notice  or  be 
left  unresolved  which  brings  into  question  an  individual's  loyalty  and  integrity  or 
suggests  the  possibility  of  his  or  her  being  subject  to  undue  influence  or  duress  through 
foreign  relationships  or  exploitable  personal  conduct  When  an  individual  is  assigned  to 
perform  sensitive  work  requiring  access  to  SCI,  the  SOIC  fcr  the  department,  agency, 
or  Government  program  to  which  the  individual  is  assigned  shall  assume  security 
supervision  of  that  individual  throughout  the  period  of  his  or  her  assignment 
b.  The  continuing  security  programs  shall  include  the  following. 
(1)  Individuals  are  required  to  inform  the  department  or  agency  which  granted  their 
SCI  access  about  any  personal  problem  or  situation  which  may  have  a  possible 
bearing  on  their  eligibility  for  continued  access  to  SCI  and  to  seek  appropriate 
guidance  and  assistance.  Security  counseling  should  be  made  available.  This 
counseling  should  be  conducted  by  individuals  having  extensive  background  and 
experience  regarding  the  nature  and  special  vulnerabilities  of  the  particular  type 
of  cornpartmented  information  involved 
(2)  SCI  security  education  programs  of  the  member  departments  and  agencies  shall 
be  established  and  maintained  pursuant  to  the  requirements  of  Annex  C. 
(3)  Security  supervisory  programs  shall  be  established  and  maintained  to  ensure  that 
supervisory  personnel  recognize  and  discharge  their  special  responsibility  to 
safeguard  SCI.  including  the  need  to  assess  continued  eligibility  for  SCI  access. 
These  programs  shall  provide  practical  guidance  on  indicators  which  may  signal 
mattds  of  security  concern.  Specific  instructions  concerning  reporting  procedures 
shall  be  disseminated  to  enable  the  appropriate  authority  to  take  timely  corrective 
action  to  safeguard  the  security  of  the  United  States  as  well  as  to  provide  ail  neces- 
sary help  to  the  individual  concerned  to  neutralize  his  or  her  vulnerability. 
■  A;  Security  review  programs  to  ensure  that  appropriate  security  authorities  always 
receive  and  exchange,  in  a  timely  manner,  all  information  bearing  on  the  security 
posture  of  persons  having  access  to  SCI.  Personal  histon  information  shall  be  kept 
current.  Security  and  related  files  shall  be  kept  under  continuing  review. 
Whenever  adverse  or  derogatory  information  is  discovered  or  inconsistencies  arise  which 
could  impact  upon  an  individual's  security  status,  appropriate  investigation  shall  be  conducted 
on  a  timeiy  basis.  The  investigation  shall  be  of  sufficient  scope  necessary  to  resolve  the  specific 
adverse  or  derogatory  information  or  inconsistency  in  question  so  that  a  determination  can  be 
made  as  to  whether  the  individual's  continued  utilization  in  activities  requiring  SCI  is  clearly 
consistent  with  the  interest  of  the  national  security 
15.  Security  Violations 
Individuals  determined  to  have  disclosed  classified  information  to  an>  person  not 
officiallv  authorized  to  receive  it  may  be  considered  ineligible  for  initial  or  continued  SCI  ac- 
cess Determination  vul!  be  based  on  an  evaluation  of  ail  available  information,  including 
whether  the  disclosure  was  knowing,  willful,  negligent,  or  inadvertent  A  determination  of 
ineligibility  for  individuals  w  ho  currently  hold  SCI  access  shall  result  in  immediate  debriefing 
and  termination  of  access  for  cause 
16.  Jmp/fmcnfc/ion 
Existing  directives,  regulations,  agreements,  and  other  guidance  F.overnmg  access  to  SCI  a^ 
defined  ht  rem  shall  be  revised  accordingly 
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED...^.,    .    .  DCID  1/14-7 
-.   ANNEX  A        y.  -  --:.  .2T&22C3? 
ADJUDICATION  GUIDELINES  '■      -^ 
PURPOSE 
This  annex  is  designed  to  ensure  that  a  common  approach  is  followed  by  Intelligence 
Community  departments  and  agencies  in  applying  the  standards  of  DCID  1/14.  These 
guidelines  apply  to  the  adjudication  of  cases  involving  persons  being  considered  for  first-time 
access  to  Sensitive  Compartmented  Information  (SCI)  as  well  as  those  cases  of  persons  being 
readjudicated  for  continued  SCI  access. 
ADJUDICATIVE  PROCESS 
The  adjudicative  process  entails  the  examination  of  a  sufficient  period  of  a  person's  life  to 
make  a  determination  that  the  person  is  not  now  or  is  not  likely  to  become  an  unacceptable  se- 
curity risk  later.  SCI  access  adjudication  is  the  careful  weighing  of  a  number  of  variables 
known  as  the  "whole  person"  concept.  The  recency  of  occurrence  of  any  adverse  incident,  to- 
gether with  circumstances  pertaining  thereto,  is  central  to  a  fair  and  uniform  evaluation.  Key 
factors  to  be  considered  in  adjudication  are  the  maturity  and  responsibility  of  the  person  at  the 
time  certain  acts  or  violations  were  committed  as  v. ell  as  any  repetition  or  continuation  of  such 
conduct.  Each  case  must  be  judged  on  its  own  merits  and  final  determination  remains  the  re- 
sponsibility of  the  individual  SOIC.  Any  doubt  concerning  personnel  having  access  to  SCI  shall 
be  resolved  in  favor  of  the  national  security. 
The  ultimate  determination  of  whether  the  granting  of  SCI  access  is  clearly  consistent 
with  the  interests  of  national  security  shall  be  an  overall  common  sense  determination  based  on 
all  available  information.  In  arriving  at  a  decision  consistent  with  the  foregoing,  the  adjudicator 
must  give  careful  scrutiny  to  the  following  matters: 
a.  Loyalty 
b.  Close  relatives  and  associates 
c.  Sexual  considerations 
d.  Cohabitation 
e.  Undesirable  character  traits 
f.  Financial  irresponsibility 
g.  Alcohol  abuse 
h.    Illegal  drugs  and  drug  abuse 
i.    Emotional  and  mental  disorders 
i.   Record  of  law  violations 
k    Security  violations 
1    Involvement  in  outside  activities 
Adjudicative  actions  concerning  the  foregoing  items  are  examined  in  greater  detail  belo^ 
LOYALTY 
DCID  1/14  establishes  the  categorical  requirement  that,  to  "oe  eligible  for  SCI  access,  an 
individual  must  be  of  unquestioned  Ioyalt\  to  the  Tinted  States 
UNCLASSIFIED
.iTTPT^rr  TTrr-^r^i.  ^7 ^sjr^pva^.^-  i  . 
S^S^:^&UNCLASS!F!ED  •  
J^  ■;.: ;  -^  ; ."..SSEPCIO  l/J.4-8. . 
DCID  1/14  requires  dose -examination  by  the  SCI  adjudicator  when  members  of  an 
individuals  immediate  family  and  persons  to  whom  he/she  is  bound  by  affection  or  obligation  are 
not  citizens  of  the  United  States,"  or  their  loyalty  or  affection  is  to  a  foreign  power,  or  they  are  sub- 
ject to  any  form  of  duress  by  a  foreign  power,  or  they  advocate  the  violent  overthrow  or 
unconstitutional  alteration  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States. 
Sharing  living  quarters  with  a  person  or  persons,  regardless  of  their  citizenship  status,  may  be 
indicative  of  a  close  relationship,  whether  or  not  it  is  considered  intimate.  The  potential  for  adverse 
influence  or  for  duress  should  be  considered  in  any  close  or  long-term  relationship  between  the 
subject  and  another  individual 
The  adjudicator  must  assess  carefully  the  degree  of  actual  and  potential  influence  that  such 
persons  may  exercise  on  the  individual  based  on  an  examination  of  the  frequency  and  nature  of 
personal  contact  and  correspondence  with  and  the  political  sophistication  and  general  maturity  of 
the  individual. 
A  recommendation  for  access  disapproval  is  appropriate  if  there  is  an  indication  that  such  rel- 
atives or  associates  are  connected  with  any  foreign  intelligence  service. 
When  there  is  a  "compelling  need"  for  SCI  access  for  an  individual  whose  family  member  is  a 
non-U.S.  citizen  and  the  background  investigation  indicates  that  the  security  risk  is  negligible,  an 
exception  to  paragraph  5.b.(l)  or  (2)  of  DCID  1/14  may  be  recommended. 
In  some  circumstances,  marriage  of  an  individual  holding  SCI  access  approval  could  present 
an  unacceptable  security  risk.  Such  individuals  are  required  to  hie  intent-to-marry  statements.  It  is 
the  responsibility  of  the  SOIC  to  advise  the  individuals  cf  the  possible  security  consequences.  If  the 
individual  marries  a  non-U.S.  citizen,  SCI  access  will  be  suspended  until  the  case  is  readjudicated 
unless  an  appropriate  investigation  of  the  spouse,  as  required  by  Paragraph  S.L  of  DCID  1/14,  was 
conducted  with  favorable  results.  In  readjudicating  such  cases,  the  same  judgments  and  criteria  as 
3rt  reflected  in  this  section  apply. 
SEXUAL  CONSIDERATIONS 
DCID  1/14  requires  that,  to  be  eligible  for  SCI  access,  individuals  must  be  stable,  of  excellent 
character  and  discretion,  and  not  subject  to  undue  influence  or  duress  through  exploitable  personal 
conduct. 
Sexual  promiscuity,  prostitution,  and  extramarital  relations  are  of  leg.timate  concern  to  the 
SCI  adjudicator  where  such  conduct  reflects  a  lack  of  judgment  and  discretion  or  when  the  conduct 
offers  the  potential  for  undue  influence,  duress  or  exploitation  by  a  foreign  intelligence  service 
Deviant  sexual  behavior  can  be  a  relevant  consideration  in  circumstances  in  which  it  indicates 
flawed  judgment  or  a  personality  disorder,  or  could  result  in  exposing  the  individual  to  direct  or  in- 
direct pressure  because  of  susceptibility  to  blackmail  or  coercion  as  a  result  of  the  deviant  sexual 
behavior.  Such  behavior  includes,  but  is  not  limited  to.  bestiality,  fetishism,  exhibitionism, 
necrophilia,  nymphomania  or  satyriasis,  masochism,  sadism,  pedophilia,  transvestism,  and  voveur- 
ism.  Homosexual  conduct  is  also  to  be  considered  as  a  factor  in  determining  an  individual  s 
judgment,  discretion,  stability  and  susceptibility  to  undue  influence  or  duress 
!n  examining  cases  involving  sexual  conduct  of  security  significance,  such  as  those  described 
above,  it  is  relevant  to  consider  the  age  of  the  person,  the  voluntariness,  and  the  frequency  of  such 
activities,  the  public  nature  and  the  recency  of  the  conduct,  as  well  as  any  other  circumstances 
which  may  serve  to  aggravate  or  mitigate  the  nature  or  charactei  of  the  conduct  A  recommenda- 
tion for  disapproval  is  appropriate  when,  in  view  of  ail  available  evidence  concerning  the 
individual's  history  of  sexual  behavior,  it  appears  that  access  to  SCI  could  pose  a  risk  to  the  national 
security. 
COHABITATION 
The  identity  of  a  cohabitant  and  the  extent  and  nature  of  aiiual  or  inertia!  infiu'-nce  u;kw 
the   subject    should    !>e   ascertained     Based    upon   th»-  criteria    in   the   yet  ion   en   Close   Relaiiws 
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED  wr  DCID  1/14-9  r---^^" 
•  .-     .. j. ;  :  *, 
-:&ssociates,Ta  determination  must,  be  made'' whether  such  an  association  constitutes  an  "  ' 
r5?>  unacceptable  security  risk.'     -;--  --T^y-^i  >*ii:  -^*f-^- "-.   ^       —v.v.-'-     -  '-'■■■  \  .:  ;^':tt'l 
.  S^^fcrf^fr:'  Cohabitation,  per  se,  does  not  preclude  SCI  access  approval  OtheT  f acton  could  affect  the  rJ?:h.   **** 
L "'S-* :  -*  ?:  if' ."  -""  access  determination  Cohabitation  with  an  alien,  for  example,  requires  the  same  scrutiny  as":;  -'':^£c:* 
marriage  to  an  alien.  ~  ~ 
UNDESIRABLE  CHARACTER  TRAITS  .....       "/ 
It  is  emphasized  that  an  individual's  lifestyle  is  examined  only  in  an  effort  to  determine 
whether  a  pattern  of  behavior  exists  which  indicates  that  granting  SCI  access  could  pose  a  risk 
to  national  security.  In  cases  where  allegations  have  been  reported  which  reflect  unfavorably 
on  the  reputation  of  an  individual  it  is  incumbent  upon  the  SCI  adjudicator  to  distinguish  fact 
from  opinion  and  to  determine  which  negative  characteristics  are  real  and  pertinent  to  an  eval- 
uation of  the  individual's  character  and  which  are  unsubstantiated  or  irrelevant  Relevant 
negative  characteristics  are  those  which,  in  the  adjudicator's  informed  opinion,  indicate  that  an 
individual  is  not  willing,  able,  or  likely  to  protect  SCI  information.  The  adjudicator's  personal 
likes  or  dislikes  must  not  be  permitted  to  affect  the  determination. 
Examples  of  specific  concern  in  determining  whether  an  individual  has  undesirable 
character  traits  are  any  substantive,  credible,  derogatory  comments  by  associates,  employers, 
neighbors,  and  other  acquaintances;  any  litigation  instituted  against  the  individual  by  such 
persons  as  a  result  of  the  individual's  actions;  or  allegations  of  violations  of  law.  A 
recommendation  for  disapproval  would  be  appropriate  for  an  individual  who  cannot  be  relied 
upon  to  obey  rules  and  regulations. 
In  examining  the  circumstances  of  cases  involving  incidents  of  untruthfulness,  the 
adjudicator  must  weigh  all  factors  with  particular  emphasis  on  establishing  the  intent  of  the  in- 
dividual. Where  an  individual  has  tried  to  obscure  pertinent  or  significant  facts  by  falsifying 
data,  e.g.,  on  the  Personal  History  Statement  by  either  omission  or  false  entry,  such  action 
should  be  weighed  heavily  against  recommending  access.  Failure  to  disclose  derogatory 
personal  information,  such  as  a  court  martial  or  serious  crime,  would  appear  to  be  intentional 
and,  consequently,  would  warrant  a  recommendation  for  disapproval. 
FINANCIAL  IRRESPONSIBILITY 
Financial  irresponsibility  represents  a  serious  concern  to  the  SC1  adjudicator.  Persons  who 
have  engaged  in  espionage  for  monetary  gain  demonstrate  the  hazard  of  granting  SCI  access  to 
an  individual  with  overly  expensive  tastes  and  habits  or  living  under  the  pressure  of  serious 
debt. 
A  recommendation  for  disapproval  is  appropriate  when  there  is  a  pattern  of  financial 
irresponsibility  and  it  appears  that  an  individual  has  not  made  a  conscientious  effort  to  satisfy 
creditois.  In  such  cases,  the  adjudicator  should  determine  whether  the  individual  had  been  no- 
tified about  the  debts  and  whether  they  were  legally  valid  or  ultimately  satisfied. 
When  the  financial  irresponsibility  alone  is  not  of  such  magnitude  to  warrant  disapproval, 
it  may  contribute  to  recommendation  for  denial  of  SC!  access  when  there  is  other  evidence  of 
irresponsibility. 
ALCOHOL  ABUSE 
The  SCI  adjudicator  should  examine  any  information  developed  relative  to  an  individual  s 
use  of  alcoholic  beverages  to  determine  the  extent  to  which  such  use  wouid  adversely  affect  the 
ability  of  the  individual  to  exercise  the  care,  judgment,  and  discretion  necessary  to  protect  SCI 
information.  The  adjudicator  should  determine  whether  a  pattern  of  impropriety  exists, 
although  one  incident  caused  by  alcohol  abuse  may  be  of  such  magnitude  to  warrant  a 
recommendation  for  disapproval. 
In  determining  the  security  impact  of  a  person's  pattern  of  alcohol  u<<-  the  adjudicator 
should  consider  the  circumstances,  amount  and  rate  of  consumption,  the  timr  and  place  of  con- 
sumption  and  the  ph\  siological  and  Ixdiavioral  effect  such  drinking  has  on  the  individual    For 
UNCLASSIFIED 
sr-« 
j<«^<
-.,...„.-..:.  ..,..  ^^.^r.^^.^^^...:  -UNCLASSIFIED  -     .   --         ^<rD9!P,1/14:10.  --."."  C         r 
-j|£>    .-:--_-.-      -     example,  does  the~individuaTs  drinking  result  in  absences  from  work  or  careless  work  habits.  t .-i^^jr/.^i^Ja 
i"-1*^     ^ 
Does  the  individual  become  talkative,  abusive,  or  manifest  other  undesirable  characteristics? 
Does  th*  individual  drink  until  intoxicated?  Has  the  individual  been  arrested  for  any  acts  re- 
sulting from  the  influence  of  alcohol? :      ."'."-/  u       '•'"'";-.'     V.^     ^    J  .  ^ 
In  the  absence  of  conclusive  evidence,  additionaJ  insight  may  be  available  from 
appropriate  medical  authorities.  If  the  individual  acknowledges  having  an  alcohol  abuse 
problem  and  is  seeking  help,  it  may  be  appropriate  to  defer  access  determination  and  monitor 
the  individual's  progress  for  a  year  or  so. 
If,  after  considering  the  nature  and  sources  of  the  information,  the  adjudicator  determines 
that  an  individual's  drinking  is  not  serious  enough  to  warrant  a  recommendation  for 
disapproval  of  SCI  access,  it  may  be  appropriate  to  recommend  approval  with  a  warning  at  the 
time  of  indoctrination  that  future  incidents  of  alcohol  abuse  may  result  in  SCI  denial.  The  ad- 
judicator may  also  recommend  a  reinvestigation  of  the  individual's  use  of  alcohol  after  an  ap- 
propriate period  of  time  has  passed. 
ILLEGAL  DRUGS  AND  DRUG  ABUSE 
The  SCI  adjudicator  should  examine  all  allegations  of  an  individual's  use,  transport, 
transfer,  sale,  cultivation,  processing  and  manufacturing  of  hallucinogens,  narcotics,  drugs  and 
other  materials  and  chemical  compounds  identified  and  listed  in  the  Controlled  Substance  Act 
of  1970,  as  amended.  Consequently,  an  individual's  involvement  in  any  of  these  activities  is  of 
direct  concern  to  the  SCI  adjudicator  in  order  to  determine  the  individual's  capability  to 
exercise  the  care,  discretion,  and  judgment  required  to  protect  SCI  information.  The  use  of 
these  substances  may  lead  to  varying  degrees  of  physical  or  psychological  dependence  as  weil 
as  having  a  deleterious  effect  on  an  individual's  mental  state  and  ability  to  function. 
Persons  involved  in  drug  trafficking,  i.e..  the  commercial  cultivation,  processing,  manufac- 
turing, purchase,  or  sale  of  such  substances  should  normally  be  recommended  for  disapproval. 
In  cases  involving  the  use  of  drugs,  the  adjudicator  must  consider  the  nature  of  the 
substance  used  and  whether  the  use  is  experimental  or  habitual.  The  frequency,  recency,  and 
circumstances  surrounding  said  use  are  key  elements  For  example,  has  the  individual  used 
"hard"  drugs  or  hallucinogens  such  a.\  heroin,  cocaine,  or  LSDD  Has  the  individual  used  drugs 
regularly  or  only  on  occasion?  Does  the  individual  currently  use  drugs?  Does  the  individual 
regularly  purchase  drugs  or  participate  merely  when  offered  drugs  by  others5  Has  the 
individual's  behavior  been  affected  by  the  use  of  drugs  and.  if  so,  to  what  extend 
Once  the  judgment  is  made  that  an  individual  is  a  habitual  user  of  any  controlled 
substance  (multiple  use  beyond  the  point  of  mere  experimentation),  a  recommendation  for 
disapproval  is  appropriate.  Moreover,  even  experimental  use  of  hard  drugs  or  hallucinogens, 
such  as  LSD,  could  warrant  a  recommendation  for  disapproval 
EMOTIONAL  AND  MENTAL  DISORDERS 
DC1D  1/14  requires  that  persons  considered  for  access  to  SCI  be  stable,  trustworthy, 
reliable,  and  of  excellent  character,  judgment  and  discretion.  Emotional  and  mental  disorders 
which  interfere  with  an  individual's  perception  of  reaiity  or  reliability  are  of  serious  concern  to 
the  SCI  adjudicator  in  determining  whether  an  individual  is  able  or  willing  to  protect  SCI 
information. 
It  is  essential  to  obtain  as  much  information  as  possible  when  an  allegation  has  been  rn;de 
in  this  area.  If  feasible,  the  individual  should  be  interviewed  to  obtain  additional  detail  V\  nen 
appropriate,  gcernment  psychological  and  psychiatric  personnel  should  be  consulted  so  that 
psychiatric  or  psychological  data  may  be  properly  evaluated 
UNCLASSIFIED 
--'-*  .w-  -*t
■"St- 
r 
^    J    i.   <T   .', 
r  UNCLASSIFIED 
•".        -■-*  *r  vyw  v-» 
DCID  1/14-11 
.  „ .,  -  -iM> 
If a  c 
uiTent  emotional  instability  appears  to  be  a  temporary 'condition  (tor  example,  ^^<?~ 
caused  by  a  death,  illness,  or  marital  breakup),  it  may  be  advisable  to  recommend  postponing 
Snal  action  and  rechecking  the  situation  at  a  later  date.  This  precludes  a  security  disapproval 
for  what  may  be  a  temporary  condition  which,  when  cured,  would  have  no  security 
implications.  .    :  '  ■_    ?    :~'2--'~ ;  "  -' 
'' - """"  r-  • 
Military  and  civilian  personnel  who  decline  to  take  medical /psychiatric  tests  when  so 
directed  by  competent  authority  should  not  be  recommended  for  SCI  access. 
RECORD  OF  LAW  VIOLATIONS 
In  determining  whether  an  individual  is  stable,  trustworthy,  and  of  excellent  character, 
judgment,  and  discretion  as  required  by  DCID  1/14  for  access  to  SCI,  the  adjudicator  must 
weigh  carefully  any  record  of  law  violations  by  the  individual.  Although  a  pattern  of  repeated 
minor  traffic  violations  could  be  significant,  the  adjudicator  is  principally  concerned  with  more 
serious  criminal  violations  or  court  actions  reflecting  adversely  upon  the  individual's  reliability 
or  trustworthiness. 
Each  case  involving  convictions  for  criminal  offenses  must  be  considered  from  the 
standpoint  of  the  nature  and  seriousness  of  the  offense,  the  circumstances  under  which  it 
occurred,  how  long  ago  it  occurred,  whether  it  was  an  isolated  offense  or  a  repeated  violation 
of  the  law,  the  offender's  age  at  the  time,  social  conditions  which  may  have  a  bearing  on  the  in- 
dividual's actions,  and  any  evidence  of  rehabilitation. 
Any  conviction  for  a  felony  will  normally  support  a  recommendation  for  disapproval.  If 
the  offense  was  committed  many  years  prior,  the  individual  has  shown  evidence  of 
rehabilitation,  and  the  investigation  shows  no  other  derogatory  information,  an  approval  may- 
be considered.  A  large  number  of  minor  offenses,  however,  could  indicate  irresponsibility  and 
may  support  an  adverse  recommendation. 
SECURITY  MOLATIOSS 
Most  security  violations  are  caused  by  carelessness  or  ignorance  vwth  no  intention  oi 
compromising  security.  However,  the  record  of  an  individual  responsible  for  multiple 
violations  should  be  scrutinized.  The  individual's  current  attitude  toward  security  should  be 
confirmed  with  his/her  supervisor.  A  pattern  of  violations  may  be  sufficient  ground  for  a 
recommendation  for  disapproval.  Individuals  responsible  for  unauthorized  disclosure  of 
classified  information  may  be  denied  initial  or  continued  SCI  access. 
OUTSIDE  ACTTWTIES 
Involvement  in  non-US  Government  employment  or  activities  that  raise  potential  conflicts 
with  an  individual's  responsibility  to  protect  classified  information  is  of  security  concern  and 
must  be  evaluated  by  a  security  officer  to  determine  whether  the  conflict  is  of  such  a  nature 
that  SCI  access  should  be  denied  or  revoked. 
Employment  that  must  be  reported  includes  compensated  or  volunteer  service  with  any 
foreign  national,  with  a  representative  of  any  foreign  interest,  or  with  any  foreign,  domestic,  or 
international  organization  or  person  engaged  in  analysis,  discussion,  or  publication  of  material 
on  intelligence,  defense,  or  foreign  affairs 
Activities  that  must  be  reported  include  association  with  nationals  of  Communist  countries 
or  countries  hostile  to  the  United  States  membership  in  organizations  which  have  as  members 
nationals  of  Communist  countries  or  countries  hostile  to  the  United  States  when  the 
membership  involves  contact  with  those  nationals,  and  sponsorship  of  the  entry  of  aliens  into 
the  United  States 
Adjudicators  of  new  SCI  access  evaluations  shall  curefuily  consider  whether  an  indivi- 
dual's outside  employment  or  activities  mav  pose  a  conflict  with  his  or  her  security 
responsibilities  that  could  result  in  his  or  her  disclosing  classified  information  to  unauthorized 
t  *+.  ^«ct,-^r.-t 
UNCLASSIFIED
":.>■■"'■■•';■"••>'.      ± •XZ^pgpJ^-C^;- --V.  UNCLASSIFIED  _:       DCID  1/14-12 
1":>  ~      -  -'•'•""     persons.^.  Any^.doubt^as'-- to 'an  individual's  willingness  or  ability,  to .  safeguard   classified 
information  sriall  be  resoived  by  denying  SO  access.  -    "/      •. 
Reports  from"  individuals  approved  for  SCI  access  or  from  other  sources  concerning 
outside  employment  or  activities  o£  security  concern  shall  be  evaluated  by  security  officials  to 
determine  if  SCI  access  should  be  continued.  When  an  individual's  outside  employment  or  ac- 
tivity raises  doubts  as  to  individual's  willingness  or  ability  to  safeguard  classified  information, 
he  or  she  shall  be  advised  that  continuing  that  employment  or  activity  may  result  in 
withdrawal  of  SCI  access,  and  be  given  an  opportunity  to  discontinue  If  the  individual 
terminates  the  outside  employment  or  activity  of  security  concern,  his  or  her  SCI  access 
approval(s)  may  be  continued,  provided  that  this  is  otherwise  consistent  with  national  security 
requirements. 
UNCLASSIFIED
^UNCLASSIFIED...-.,^;.'.  ^.DOD.1/1403.  ,^~<^i*~ 
s  --  •.".-""■•:■:  -jr."  ~."~f-       ^>r-  >"i .  T-rf&b&T' 
ANNEX  B   *  -  "  ."•:'•■:.- :r~  -'".-  ^ '    -^ --'"< :«~S=S 
•:  .-<. 
APPEALS 
POLICY 
This  annex  establishes  common  appeals  procedures  for  the  denial  or  revocation  of  access 
to  Sensitive  Compartmented  Information  (SCI)  by  entities  of  the  Intelligence  Community  after 
adjudication  pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  DCID  1/14.  This  annex  is  promulgated  pursuant  to 
Executive  Order  12333,  Executive  Order  12356  and  Section  102  of  the  National  Security  Act  of 
1947.  For  the  purpose  of  this  annex,  all  references  to  DCID*  1/14  include  the  basic  document 
and  all  of  its  annexes.  Any  person  who  has  been  considered  for  initial  or  continued  access  to 
SCI  pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  DCID  1/14  shall,  to  the  extent  provided  below,  be  afforded 
an  opportunity  to  appeal  the  denial  or  revocation  of  such  access.  This  annex  supersedes  any  and 
all  other  practices  and  procedures  for  the  appeal  of  the  denial  or  revocation  of  SCI  access.  This 
annex  shall  not  be  construed  to  require  the  disclosure  of  classified  information  or  information 
concerning  intelligence  sources  and  methods,  nor  shall  it  be  construed  to  afford  an  opportunity 
to  appeal  prior  to  the  actual  denial  or  revocation  of  SCI  access.  In  addition,  the  provisions  of 
DCID  1/14,  this  annex,  or  any  other  document  or  provision  of  law  shall  not  be  construed  to 
create  a  property  interest  of  any  kind  in  the  access  of  any  person  to  SCI.  Further,  since  the  de- 
nial or  revocation  of  access  to  SCI  cannot  by  the  terms  of  DCID  1/14  render  a  person  ineiigible 
for  access  to  other  classified  information  solely  for  that  reason,  the  denial  or  revocation  of  SCI 
access  pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  DCID  1/14  and  this  annex  shall  not  be  construed  to  create 
a  liberty  interest  of  any  kind. 
APPLICABILITY 
This  annex  applies  to  all  United  States  Government  civilian  and  military  personnel,  as  well 
as  any  other  individuals,  including  contractors  and  employees  of  contractors,  who  are 
cons'deied  for  initial  or  continued  access  to  SCI.  This  annex  does  not  apply  to  decisions 
regarding  employment  and  shall  not  be  construed  to  affect  or  impair  Public  Law  SS-290  or  the 
authority  of  any  entity  to  effect  applicant  or  personnel  actions  pursrant  to  Public  Law  SS-290. 
Public  Law  S6-36.  or  other  applicable  law. 
SCI  ACCESS  DETERMINATION  AUTHORITY 
Adjudications  for  access  to  SCI  shall  be  made  in  accordance  with  DCID  1/14  by  a 
Determination  Authority  designated  by  the  Senior  Official  of  the  Intelligence  Community 
(SOIC)  of  each  entity.  Access  to  SCI  shall  be  denied  or  revoked  \\hene\er  it  is  determined  that 
a  person  does  not  meet  the  security  standards  provided  for  in  DCID  1/1-4. 
PROCEDURES 
1.    Persons  shall  be: 
a     notified  of  the  denial  or  revocation  of  SCI  access. 
b    notified   that   thev    may  request   to  be   provided   the   reasons  for   such   denial  or 
revocation,  and/or 
c.   afforded  an  opportunity  to  appeal, 
whenever  the  Determination  Authority  of  any  entity,  in  the  exorcise  of  lus  or  her  discretion, 
deems  Mich  action  in  any  £i\en  casp  to  be  clearly  consistent  with  the  interest1-  of  the  national 
securi!  v 
UNCLASSIFIED
-  —  - .-  .  -.-.--       -         ■  -..*•■«•»  .     ..  ■'•%'^i't'i.J 
UNCLASSIFIED  DCID  1/14-14 
=*.'$*?^V. tJ?2^~V:2.*Any,pVrsori  who  is'given  notification  and  afforded  an  opportunity  to  appeal  pursuant  to  -:  i^^^^^f^' 
.-   A". 
-"'  . .  r^   •   -^  -  *  paragraph  ir*bove  may,  within  45  days  of  the  date  on  which  such  person  is  notified  of  the  rea-     ^~-?:':'-**/"" 
sons  for  denial  or  revocation  of  SC3  access,  submit  a  written  appeal  of  that  denial  or  revocation    ^     ^Av? 
-    .-  to  the  Determination  Authority.  The  written  material  submitted  for  consideration  may  include  -       ^2;    '_ 
any  information  which  the  person  believes  will  assist  the  Determination  Authority  in  reviewing     -      '  _-V 
the  case.  . 
3.  After  a  further  review  of  the  case  in  the  light  of  the  written  appeal,  the  person  will  be 
notified  of  the  decision  of  the  Determination  Authority. 
4.  If  the  Determination  Authority  reaffirms  a  denial  or  revocation  of  access,  the  person 
may,  within  30  days  of  the  date  on  which  such  person  is  notified  of  the  Determination 
Authority's  reaffirmation,  request  a  final  review  of  the  case.  In  that  event,  the  SOIC,  or  his  or 
her  designee,  shall  personall/  review  the  case  and  exercise  his  or  her  discretion  pursuant  to  the 
provisions  of  DCID  1/14.  and  shall  inform  the  person  of  his  or  her  decision,  which  shall  be  fi- 
nal and  unreviewable. 
UNCLASSIFIED
*     •  -  UNCLASSIFIED  DCID  1/14-15 
-    -         .   .■-.    .j-.-      •.-!.„.  ..i-.- j;   v  ■<^-.»-U»^yj..fy^Ur'-~-    *  «-  <-*?  *  ""-<•   ~     •         '-         •  ■•  ■  J_"-  -»J*  '''-•'»-^*-Jrwt4«J^a■>J»^i- 
v.-- '  „"ir^>v<M,  vr^,rt~-'-5^>%s**-*^^5W-  r^Ds-tfc*  »  •7-A.-_v' ~.     _-■.-  >-..■-.  »vH  **~i£  jitiSs 
'.-&*?«><.•  ■-■--:.■  ->-•..     .         «i    .  T  • ...  •    -'-vft-^^^-i-^awt^ 
ANNEX  C      -_"       -^     J  .         -f|^- 
f  _ 
MINIMUM  STANDARDS  FOR  SCI  SECURITY  AWARENESS 
PROGRAMS  IN  THE  U.S.  INTELLIGENCE  COMMUNITY   - 
Minimum  standards  are  hereby  established  for  the  SCI  security  education  programs 
designed  to  enhance  the  security  awareness  of  U.S.  Government  civilian  and  military  personnel 
and  private  contractors  working  in  the  U.S.  Intelligence  Community.  Compliance  with  these 
standards  is  required  for  ail  departments/agencies  within  the  Intelligence  Community. 
Existing  security  awareness  programs  shall  be  modified  to  conform  with  these  standards 
Departments/agencies  will  establish  a  documented  program  to  ensure  that  training  has  been 
presented  to  all  personnel. 
All  individuals  nominated  for  or  holding  SCI  access  approval  shall  be  notified  initially  and 
annually  thereafter  of  their  responsibility  to  report  to  their  cognizant  security  officers  any 
outside  employment  or  activities  (described  in  DCID  1/14,  Annex  A)  that  could  conflict  with 
their  duty  to  protect  classified  information  from  unauthorized  disclosure.  Any  other  outside 
employment  or  activities  which  could  create  real  or  apparent  conflicts  with  their  responsibility 
to  protect  classified  information  also  must  be  reported.  Individuals  granted  SCI  access 
approvals  shall  be  advised: 
•  whom  they  may  consult  to  determine  if  particular  outside  employment  or  activity  might 
be  of  security  concern; 
•  of  the  need  to  exercise  security  caution  in  their  activities  as  members  of  professional, 
commercial,  scholarly,  or  advocacy  organizations  that  publish  or  discuss  information  on 
intelligence,  defense,  or  foreign  affairs,  and 
•  of  their  continuing  obligation  to  submit  for  review  any  planned  articles,  books,  speeches, 
or  public  statements  that  contain  :  r  purport  to  contain  SCI  or  information  relating  to  or 
derived  from  SCI,  as  specified  by  the  nondisclosure  agreements  that  are  a  prerequisite 
for  access  to  SCI. 
The  security  awareness  requirements  set  forth  herein  are  divided  into  three  phases  Pha.se 
1  concerns  the  initial  indoctrination  of  individuals  which  is  normally  administered  prior  to  ac- 
cess to  SCI.  Phase  2  concerns  the  continuing  security  awareness  program  required  to  maintain 
and  increase  security  awareness  throughout  the  period  of  access.  Phase  3  sets  forth  the  final 
guidelines  and  instructions  when  access  to  SCI  is  terminated. 
1.  Initial  Indoctrination — As  soon  as  practicable  after  being  approved  for  access  to  SCI, 
personnel  shall  receive  an  initial  security  indoctrination  which  shall  include 
a.  The  need  fcr  and  purpose  of  SCI,  and  the  adverse  effect  on  the  national  security 
that  could  result  from  unauthorized  disclosure. 
b  The  intelligence  mission  oi  trie  department /agency  to  include  the  reasons  win 
intelligence  information  is  sensitive 
c.  The  administrative,  personnel,  physical  and  other  procedural  security  require- 
ments of  the  department/agency  and  those  requirements  peculiar  to  specific  duty 
assignments 
d.  Individual  classification  management  responsibilities  as  set  forth  in  appropriate 
directives  and  regulations  to  include  classification  declassification  guidelines  and 
marking  requirements 
UNCLASSIFIED 
-    '  *  w  +  ;-  '  -
UNCLASSIFIED  ""     DCID  1/14-16    "  ':' 
*~?-r-;:v ■■'.. '-.- .-*_• ':Vc- "-     >^Vr'rc"TThe'3efiniUomVlaiKi ''criminal  penalties  for  "espionage/  including  harboring  or-  -;'*7 
•    ".       -■■•'  concealing  persons;  gathering,  transmitting,  or  losing  defense  information;  gathe/- 
-  ing  or  delivering  defense  information  to  aid  foreign  governments;  photographing 
-■'"'-       «     ~         •  and  sketching  defense  installations;  unauthorized  disclosure  of  classified  inferma- 
tion  (Title  18,  U.S.C.,  Sections  792  through  795.  797  and  798),  the  Internal  Security 
Act  of  1950  (Title  50.  U-S.C.  Section  783)  and,  when  appropriate,  the  Atomic 
Energy  Act.  Sections  224  through  227).  . 
f.  The  administrative  sanctions  for  violation  or  disregard  of  security  procedures. 
g.  A  review  of  the  techniques  employed  by  foreign  intelligence  organizations  in 
attempting  to  obtain  national  security  information. 
h.   Individual  security  responsibilities  including: 
(1)  The  prohibition  against  discussing  SCI  in  a  nonsecure  area,  over  a  nonsecure 
telephone,  or  in  any  other  manner  that  permits  access  by  unauthorized 
persons. 
•2)  The  need  to  determine,  prior  to  disseminating  SCI,  that  the  prospective 
recipient  has  the  proper  security  access  approval,  that  the  SCI  is  needed  in 
order  to  perform  official  duties,  and  that  the  recipient  can  properly  protect 
the  information. 
(3)  Administrative  reporting  requirements  such  as  foreign  travel,  contacts  with 
foreign  nationals,  attempts  by  unauthorized  persom  to  obtain  national 
security  information,  physical  security  deficiencies,  and  loss  or  possible 
compromise  of  SCI  material. 
(4)  Obligation  to  report  to  proper  authorities  any  information  which  could 
reflect  on  the  trustworthiness  of  an  individual  who  has  access  to  SCI,  such  as. 
(a)  willful  violation  of  security  regulations, 
(b)  unexplained  affluence  or  excessive  indebtedness, 
c;  serious  unlaw! ul  acts, 
(d)  apparent  mental  or  emotional  problems, 
(e)  coercion  or  harassment  attempts,  and  or 
(f)  blackmail  attempts. 
(5)  Identification  of  the  elements  in  the  department/agency  to  which  matters  of 
security  interest  are  to  be  referred. 
2.  Periodic  Awareness  Enhancement — Each  department/agency  shall  establish  a  continu- 
ing security  awareness  program  which  will  provide  for  frequent  exposure  of  personnel  to 
security  awareness  material.  Implementation  of  a  continuing  program  ma\  include  ii\  • 
briefings,  audio-visual  presentations  (e.g.,  video  tapes,  films  and  slide/tap*'  programs;,  printed 
materia!  (e.g.,  posters,  memoranda,  pamphlets,  fliers),  or  a  combination  thereof  It  is  esvntia! 
that  current  information  and  materials  be  utilized.  Programs  should  be  designed  to  meet  th'- 
particular  needs  of  the  department/agency. 
a     The  basic  elements  for  this  program  shall   include,  but   are   not   limited   to.   the 
following: 
(1)  The  foreign  intelligence  fhreat 
(2)  The  technical  threat 
Administrative,  personnel,  physical,  and  procedural  v-rmitv 
:-\  i 
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED^  DCID  1/14-17 
,n-.^livw.'^^iSWr«A*!«  :v*?g^3# (4)  Individual  classification  management  responsibility.  :r-"   -i '  -   -.-?.,*. -^  .- 
-\?~  ■  *  -*  •  - 
^..  -:'       (5)  Criminal  penalties  and  administrative  sanctions.     -    -  ."    ::"r". 
(6)  Individual  security  responsibilities.  r-^_  _.-.... 
(7)  A  review  of  other  appropriate  department/agency  requirements. 
b.  Special  security  briefings/debriefings  are  "required  to  supplement  the  existing 
security  awareness  programs  in  the  following  situations:  ? 
(1)  When  an  individual  is  designated  as  a  courier. 
(2)  When  an  individual  travels,  officially  or  unofficially,  to  or  through  Commu- 
nist countries,  or  areas  of  high  risL 
(3)  When  an   individual  has.   or  anticipates,   contact   with   representatives  of 
Communist-controlled  countries. 
(4)  When  any  other  situation  arises  for  which  a  special  briefing/debriefing  is 
required  by  the  department/agency. 
3.  Debriefing — When  a  department /agency  has  determined  that  access  to  SCI  is  no 
longer  required,  final  instructions  and  guidelines  wii!  be  provided  to  the  individual.  As  a 
minimum  these  shall  include. 
a.  A  requirement  that  the  individual  read  appropriate  sections  of  Titles  18  and  50. 
U.S.  Code,  and  that  the  intent  and  criminal  sanctions  of  these  laws  relative  to  espi- 
onage and  unauthorized  disclosure  be  clarified. 
b.  The  continuing  obligation,  under  the  prepublication  and  other  provisions  of  the 
nondisclosure  agreement  for  SCI,  never  to  divulge,  publish,  or  reveal  by  writing, 
word,  conduct  or  otherwise,  to  any  unauthorized  persons  any  SCI,  without  the 
written  consent  of  appropriate  department/agency  officials. 
c.  An  acknowledgement  that  the  individual  will  report  without  delay  to  the  Federal 
Bureau  of  Investigation,  or  the  department/agency,  any  attempt  by  an  unautho- 
rized person  to  solicit  national  security  information. 
d.  A  declaration  that  the  individual  no  longer  possesses  any  documents  or  material 
containing  SCI. 
e.  A  reminder  of  the  risks  associated  with  foreign  travel  and  certain  'Hazardous 
activities  as  defined  in  DCI  Directive  1/20,  Security  Policy  Concerning  Trat-cl 
and  Assignment  of  Personnel  with  Access  to  Sensitiv-e  Comnartmented  informa- 
tion, and  department/agency  reporting  requirements  as  applicable 
UNCLASSIFIED