-  103  - 
Two  teams  were  set  up  to  prepare  separate  versions  of  NIE 
XX_3_8-76.   The  A  Team  was  composed  of  the  regular  CIA  analyot3, 
and  additional  consultants.   The  D  Team  conoisted  of  aoven  outside 
experts  and  past  qovornmont  officiala,  headod  by  Dr.  Richard  Pipes 
of  Harvard  University.   It  was  chosen  by  the  DCI  and  the  President's 
deputy  assistant  for  national  security.  A  CIA  analyst  was  desig- 
nated by  Bush  to  provide  the  B  Team  with  the  same  raw  material 
utilized  by  the  CIA  in  preparing  the  NIEs. 
According  to  the  New  York  Times,  both  teams  were  assigned 
thro*  tn^UiH  tor  intansa  study;  thir  accuracy  of  Soviet  guidod 
minaiips;  thp  penetrability  of  Soviet  air  defense  by  low-level 
bombers;  and  overall  Soviet  strategic  objectives.    On  security 
grounds,  the  Navy  eliminated  a  fourth  topic  from  consideration. 
As  related  by  members  of  both  teama,  this  atory  contended  that 
there  was  a  "stand-off  on  Soviat  missile  accuracy,  and  "both  teams 
influenced  -?ach  other"  regarding  Soviet  air  defense.    Greatest 
dispute  arose  over  the  assessment  of  Soviet  strategic  aims,  with  the 
B  Team  challenging  the  CIA's  view  that  the  Soviets  were  not  seeking 
strategic  superiority  over  the  US.  The  discussions  were  described 
by  one  participant  as  being  "absolutely  bloody"  with  the  B  Team 
accusing  the  CIA  of  dealing  in  "faulty  assumptions,  faulty  use  of 
intelligence  and  faulty  exploitation  of  available  intelligence." 
The  Einal  version  of  NIE  11-3-8-76  presented  to  President-elect 
! 
Carter  reportedly  was  influenced  by  the  pessimism  of  the  B  Team. 
According  to  the  same  New  York  Times  story,  DCI  George  Bush  spoke 
of  "changed  perceptions"  vithin  the  CIA  regarding  Soviet  behavior 
as  a  result  of  the  paralltl  analysis,  and  said  the  "worrisome 
signs  included  newly-developed  guided  missiles,  a  vast  program  of
-  104  - 
underground  shelters,  and  a  continuing  build-up  of  air  defenues." 
CIA  participants  referred  to  the  NIE  as  being  "'more  somber.' •* 
A  high-level  Pentagon  official  described  the  estimate  -*a   being 
"'more  than  somber — it  was  very  grim.   It  flatly  states  the  judge- 
ment that  the  Soviet  Union  is  seeking  superiority  over  United  States 
forces.   The  flat  judgement  that  that  is  the  aim  of  the  Soviet  Union 
is  a  majority  view  in  the  estimate.  The  questions  begin  on  when 
they  will  achieve  it."'    The  Senate  Select  Committee  on  Intelligence 
immediately  investigated  the  experiment,  after  which  one  member, 
Senator  Daniel  Moynihan,  wrote  that  the  B  Team' 3  notion  "that  the 
Soviets  intend  to  surpass  the  United  S bates  in  strategic  arms  and 
are  in  the  process  of  doing  so,  has  gone  from  heresy  to  respect- 
ability,  if  not  orthodoxy." 
In  early  1977,  PFIAB  proposed  that  the  entire  estimative 
procedure  be  revised  and  that  outsiders,  like  themselves,  be  brought 
into  the  process  once  again.    As  the  Senate  Select  Commxttea 
O'i  Intelligence  concluded,  the  concept  of  the  review  of  NISa  by 
outside  experts  was  a  "legitimate  one."  However,  its  value  in 
this  case  had  been  undercut  by  three  factors:   first,  the  B  Team 
"reflected  the  views  of  only  one  segment  cf  the  spectrum  of  opinion;" 
second,  it  "spent  much  of  its  effort  on  criticizing  much  earlier 
NIEs  rather  than. . .producing  alternative  estimates;"  third,  "de- 
tails concerning  these  highly  classified  questions  leaked  to  the 
press,  where  these  appeared  in  garbled  *nd  one-sided  form."    DCI 
George  Bush,  who  favored  the  experiment  at  the  outset,  concluded 
that  "never  again"  should  an  outside  review  be  attempted  in  the 
same  manner.
105  - 
By  the  end  of  1977,  President  Carter  had  abolished  PFIAB  and, 
under  DCI  StanBfield  Turner,  independent  review  of  the  NIEs  has 
not  been  sustained.   Rather,  Admiral  Turner  has  encouraged  increased 
input  by  consultants  to  the  drafting  of  the  strategic  NIEs.  For 
example,  one  consultant  to  the  NIO  for  Strategic  Intelliganca  is 
known  to  have  views  described  as  hard-line.    Admiral  Turner  also 
became  the  first  DCI  to  release  some  NIEs,  primarily  those  delaing 
with  energy  issues,  to  the  public  domain.  Admiral  Turner's  three- 
man  Senior  Review  Panel  now  assists  him  in  reviewing  the  NIEs. 
However,  this  group  is  employed  full-time  by  the  CIA  and  is  not 
meant  to  be  "independent"  by  this  author's  definition.
-  106  - 
VII.  ASSESSMENT  OF  THE  PERFORMANCE  OF  DCIS 
Is!  this  3tudy  has  demonstrated  nothing  else,  it  is  that  DCIu 
have  been  inconsistent  in  their  approach  to  producing  the  strate- 
gic NISs.   Soma  have  emphasized  some  roles,  and  others  neglected  them. 
Then,  what  kind  of  DCI  should  a  President  choose  if  he  desires 
changes  in  the  strategic  intelligence  estimative  process?  Which 
functions  are  "ideal?"  Can  a  DCI  appropriately  be  both  "manager 
and  prophet?"  What  tasks  have  not  been  performed? 
Below,  the  performance  of  seven  DCIs  in  producing  the 
strategic  NIEs  is  assessed.   In  addition  to  the  six  DCIs  selected 
by  this  author  for  extensive  study,  General  Bedell  Smith  is  in- 
cluded because  of  his  strong  role  in  the  estimative  process,  even 
though  the  modern  strategic  NIE  did  not  emerge  until  the  mid-1950s.* 
The  author  summarizes  the  roles  exercised  by  DCIs  according  to  two 
criteria:  their  individual  background,  interest,  and  concept  of 
the  DCI's  job;  and  historical  trends.   Then,  separate  functions  are 
pv*»mined  to  determine  which  are  mutually  supporting  and  which 
are  potentially  conflicting,  or  biasing.  Finally,  the  author 
presents  her  conclusions  about  roles  underemphasized  by  DCIs. 
A.  Summary  of  Roles  Played  by  DCIs 
Seven  isolated  roles  of  the  DCI  in  producing  the  strategic 
estimates  have  been  described  in  this  study.   Three  pertain  to  the 
NIE  drafting  process:   (1)  management  direction  to  CIA  production; 
I 
(2)  management  attention  to  Pentagon  coordination;  and  (3)  personal. 
"The  role  of  General  W.  Bedell  Smith  (1950-1952)  is  discussed  in 
Chapter  II.  The  other  DCIs  include:  Allen  W.  Dulles  (1953-1961); 
John  A.  McCone  (1961-1965) ;  Richard  Helms  (1966-1972) ;  James 
R.  Schlesinger  (1973);  William  E.  Colby  (1973-1975) ;  and  Admiral 
Stansf ield  Turner  (1977  to  present) .
-  107  - 
substantive  input.   Three  involve  leadership  at  the  United  Stotea 
Intelligence  Board  (US1D) ,  now  called  the  National  Foreign 
Intelligence  Board  (NFIB) :   (4)  support  of  the  CIA's  position;  (5) 
encouragement  of  competitive  debate;  and  (6)  final  adjudication  of 
view3.  The  last  role  is:   (7)  promotion  of  independent  review  of 
the  stratetgic  NIEs. 
Personal  Background  and  Concepts 
Looking  at  these  roles  as  a  function  of  a  DCI's  personal  back- 
ground and  interests,  the  following  observations  are  made.* 
(1)  Management  direction  to  the  CIA  estimates  team  was  exerted 
by  five  DCIs  with  diverse  backgrounds — General  Bedell  Smith,  John 
McCone,  James  Schlesinger,  William  Colby  and  Admiral  Stansfield  Turner. 
After  General  Smith  created  the  Board  of  Estimates  and  ONE  within 
CIA  in  late  1950,  no  charges  were  initiated  in  this  set-up  for  23 
years  and  two  DCIs  (Dulles  and  Helms)  with  a  combined  tenure  of  15 
years  devoted  little  attention  to  management;  The  first  director 
to  consider  management  reform  and  leadership  the  DCI's  primary  rolo 
wa3  William  Colby  in  1973,  an  "inside"  director  who  was  familiar 
with  a  range  of  CIA  programs.  Since  1973,  the  National  Intelligence 
Officer  (NIOs)  who  draft  the  NIEs  are  personally  selected  by  the  DCI . 
*The  "military"  directors  include  four-star  General  Bedell  Smith 
and  four-star  Admiral  Stansfield  Turner.  The  "inside"  directors 
are  William  Colby  and  Richard  Helms,  both  of  whom  had  risen  up 
through  the  ranks  of  the  clandestine,  or  DDP,  side  of  the 
CIA.  in  addition,  Colby  had  served  briefly  as  Executive  Director- 
Comptroller  of  CIA  and  as  DDP.  "Outside"  DCIs  include  John  McCone 
and  James  Schlesinger,  both  of  whom  had  previous  government  careers 
including  Chairman  of  the  AEC,  and  the  first  was  a  successful  private 
businessman  and  the  second  had  been  a  strategic  scholar  at  the  RAND 
Corporation.  For  lack  of  a  better  term,  Allen  Dulles  if  called  an 
"inside-outside"  DCI,  since  he  was  an  OSS  verteran  and  served  briefly 
as  DDP  ttnd  as  DDCI,  but  had  an  independent  professional  and  political 
base.  Not  examined  here  is  Admiral  William  Raborn  (mid-1965  to  mid-1966), 
a  "military"  DCI,  and  George  Bush  (1976),  an  "outside"  DCI.
-  106  - 
(2)  Management  attention  to  coordinating  the  draft  strategic 
NIEs  with  Pentagon  intelligence  agencies,  such  as  DIA  and  Army,  Air 
Force  and  Naval  Intelligence,  was  a  focus  of  only  three  DCIs — General 
Smith,  William  Colby  and  Admiral  Turner.  Two  are  "military"  directors 
with  previous,  high-ranking  careers,  who  both  designed  a  new  for- 
mat for  Pentagon  interaction  and  raised  estimative  issuas  directly 
with  individual  Pentagon  officials.   In  comparison,  William  Colby 
created  a  new  mechanism  for  increased  Pentagon  input  but,  while 
responsive,  did  not  take  initiative  in  seeking  Pentagon  comments  at 
the  draft  stage.  To  the  author,  this  suggests  that,  for  good  or  ill, 
"military"  DCIs  are  more  aggressive  in  eliciting  direct  Pentagon 
interaction. 
In  contrast,  Dulles  considered  it  inappropriate  for  the  DCI 
to  dictate  coordinating  procedures  to  the  Pentagon,  and  Helms  was 
passive  except  when  issues  were  raised  by  tho  White  House  or  Defansa 
Secretary.  Throughout  McCone's  tenure.  Defense  Secretary  KcNamara 
supported  ongoing  CIA  mechanisms  for  drafting  the  strategic  NIEs. 
(3)  Four  DCIs  made  personal,  substantive  input  to  the  draft 
strategic  NIEs,  by  assisting  the  CIA  team  in  designing  and  answering 
strategic  questions  and/or  presenting  their  personal  opinions  in 
the  draft.  All  four— General  Smith,  John  McCone,  James  Schlesinger 
and  Admiral  Turner— had  previous  professional  training,  technical 
familiarity  and  jobs  in  complex  strategic  issues.  In  contrast,  Allen 
Dulles  and  two  "inside"  directors  (Helms  and  Colby)  had  most  ex- 
perience in  the  DPP  or  clandestine  side  of  the  CIA  and,  admittedly 
in  Colby's  case,  little  technical  competency  in  strategic  matters.
-  109 
Instead,  these  three  nade  substantive  input  to  the  non-strategic  MIEs. 
Thin  suggests  that,  if  he  prefers  a  DCI  who  can  make  substantive 
contribution  to  the  draft  strategic  NIEs,  the  President  choose 
a  person  with  the  technical  background  to  do  so.* 
(4)  At  USIB,  now  NFIB,  the  leadership  concepts  of  DCIs  varied 
greatly.  Only  one  DCI,  Allen  Dulles,  considered  hi3  primary  role 
to  support  the  CIA's  view  in  the  strategic  NIE3.   This  resulted  from 
Dulles'  decision  in  the  mid-1950s  to  permit  the  CIA  to  prepare  an 
independent,  institutional  position  within  the  draft  strategic  es- 
timates, which  then  became  the  main  text  of  the  HIE.  His  decision 
was  made  within  an  historical  context  of  encouraging  competition  to 
the  Pentagon's  intelligence  estimates.  At  USIB,  Dulles  did  not 
aggressively  advocate  the  CIA's  views,  but  rather  presided  over 
final  deliberations  in  a  manner  which  reinforced  earlier  decisions 
made  in  the  draft. 
(5)  All  o*:her  DCIs  have  assumed  other  roles  at  USIB.  Four  DCIs 
with  diverse  backgrounds — General  Smith,  John  McCone,  James 
Schlesinger  and  William  Colby— actively  encouraged  competitive  de- 
bate at  USIB,  or  the  Intelligence  Advisory  Committee  (IAC)  in  Smith's 
case.   Under  these  four,  debate  was  lively  and  intense,  and  USIB  was 
considered  an  appropriate,  higher  level  forum  for  the  reopening  of 
old  dissents  or  presentation  of  new  ideas.   In  the  case  of  the 
"military"  director  (General  Smith) ,  debate  was  viewed  as  a  means 
of  promoting  Pentagon  involvement  in  the  NIE  process.  The  two 
"outside"  DCIs  (McCone  and  Schlesinger)  were  interested  in  hearing 
a  multiplicity  of  opinion.  However,  competitive  debate  at  USIB  was 
♦There  has  never  been  an  "inside"  DCI  selected  from  the  CIA's 
DDS&T  or  DDI  directorates.
110 
encouraged,  most  consistently  and  at  length  on  strategic  issues, 
by  William  Colby,  who  argued  that  hie  prijua  y  roie  at  U3IB  wea  to 
manage  competition.   This  suggests  that  an  "in3ide"  DCI  can  rise 
above  internal  CIA  demands  and  politics  to  assume  a  higher,  coordina- 
tive  role  at  USIB. 
In  contrast,  two  very  different  DCIo — Richard  Helms  and  Admiral 
Turner — did  not  promote  competitive  debate  at  USIB,  or  NFIB  in  Turner's 
case.   Neither  enjoyed  lengthy  discussion  or  found  it  useful.  They 
Lelieved  that  issues  of  dicsent  should  be  ironed  out  beforehand. 
Consequently,  final  deliberations  were  short.  However,  the  similiarity 
ends  here.   The  "inside"  DCI  (Helms)  did  not  personally  intervene 
at  most  levels  of  the  draft  sta^e.  The  "military"  director  (Admiral 
Turner)  is  heavily  involved  in  drafting,  and  encourages  competition 
by  attempting  to  increase  coordination  with  the  Pentagon  through- 
out the  drafting  process. 
(6)  Four  DCI3  of  diverse  backgrounds — General  Smith,  John  McCone, 
Richard  Helms,  and  Admiral  Turner—acted  as  final  adjudicators  of 
conflicting  views  and  a  fifth — James  Schlesinger — probably  would  have 
if  he  had  remained  longer  in  office.  According  to  this  author's 
definition,  adjudication  implies  <    final  choice  between  competing 
positions  which  results  in  a  new  position  gaining  dominance,  or 
some  views  being  eliminated   Primarily,  this  occurs  when  a  DCI 
represents  his  own  opinion  as  the  final  text,  overrules  the  CIA's 
view  in  favor  of  a  Pentagon  view,  or  eliminates  a  Pentagon  dissent 
from  the  NIK.  This  author  found  instances,  albeit  rare,  of  each. 
With  the  exception  of  Helms,  the  other  four  DCls  (if  Schlesinger 
is  included)  appear  to  have  considered  adjudication  a  natural  means 
to  resolve  conflict.  All  four  previously  had  devoted  management 
attention  to  drafting  procedures  and  made  substantive  input  to
-  Ill  - 
draft  NIEs.   Three,  with  the  exception  of  Turner,  made  adjudicatory 
decisions  after  hearing  extensive  debate  at  "JSIB.   In  contrast 
Turner's  adjudicatory  role  id  exercised  primarily  at  tha  drafc 
stage  just  prior  to  NFIB  meetings. 
This  suggests  a  natural  flow,  or  escalating  pattern,  to  tho 
DCI's  involvement  in  producing  the  strategic  NIEs.   If  a  DCI  makes 
management  decisis  .13  regarding  drafting  procedures,  and  has  the 
technical  background  to  make  substantive  input  t3  the  draft,  he 
also  may  encourage  competition  and  end  up  making  final,  intelligence 
judgements  in  the  NIEs.   That  is,  some  resolution  of  conflict  is 
sought . 
That  DCI  Colby  did  not  make  adjudicatory  decisions  on  strategic 
matters  at  USIB,  but  rather  resolved  "onflict  through  compromise 
by  adding  footnoted  dissents  to  the  NIE,  bears  out  this  hypothesis. 
Colby,  an  '•"inside"  DCI  without  strategic  background,  was;  mainly  a 
manager  and  not  substantively  involved  in  drafting.   Richard  Helms 
is  an  exception.   Helms  occasionally  made  adjudicatory  decisions  at 
USIB,  partly  in  hopes  of  keeping  the  strategic  NIEs  on  a  timely 
schedule,  without  previously  having  been  involved  in  management 
or  substance.  Moreover,  Helms'  single  role  is  difficult  to  ex- 
plain, since  he  typically  is  described  by  observers  as  being  a  strong, 
thoroughly  professional  leader  of  the  CIA  bureaucracy.  Thi'j  suggests 
that  for  strategic  matters,  Helms  tried  to  adhere  to  a   philosophy 
of  allowing  the  professional  analysts  to  argue  out  their  differences. 
Finally,  this  author  found  no  evidence  that  either  "inside" 
director  (Helms  or  Colby)  or  the  "inside-outaide"  director  (Dulles) 
ever  overruled  the  CIA,  whereas  there  iB  evidence  that  one  "outside" 
DCI  (McCone)  and  one  "military"  DCI  (Admiral  Turner)  did  so.  This
112 
suggests  that,  bureaucratically,  it  is  easier  for  a  non-insider  to 
make  adjudicatory  cecisions  against  the  CIA,  at  least  on  {strategic 
issues.* 
(7)  The  last  role,  promoting  independent  review  of  the  strategic 
NIEs,  was  performed  by  only  three  DCIs  examined — General  Smith,  Allen 
Dulles  and  Janes  Schlesinger.   Essentially,  there  wa3  no  independent 
review  of  the  strategic  NIEs  by  outside  experts  not  employed  by 
the  CIA  from  1961-1973,  and  1977  to  the  present.   If  one  includes 
an  "outside"  director  not  studied  here,  DCI  George  Bush,  who  guided 
the  1976  A-B  Team  experiment  in  competitive  analysis  to  conclusion, 
it  appears  that  "non-inside"  directors  are  most  enthusiastic  about 
the  no*.io«.  of  independent  review. 
These  observations  are  summarized  in  Chart  D  on  the  following 
page.   In  addition,  Chart  D  outlines  the  functions  of  DCIs  in  pro- 
ducing strategic  NIEs  according  to  concepts  of  the  three  broad  jobs 
authorized  for  the  DCI:  manager  of  the  CIA?  coordinator  of  intelli- 
gence community  affairs;  and  chief  intelligence  advisor  to  the 
President.  This  chart  is  based  on  an  assumption  that  separate  NTE 
production  roles,  e.g.,  encouraging  competitive  debate,  can  be 
readily  classified  as  demonstrating  emphasis  on  one  of  three  over- 
all assignments  of  the  DCI,  e.g.,  coordinator  of  the  intelligence 
community.  As  Chart  D  indicates,  a  majority  of  DCIs  emphasised  at 
least  two  broad  roles  of  the  DCI  in  producing  specific  NIEs.  Four 
DCIs — General  Bedell  Smith,  John  McCone,  James  Schlesinger  and 
Admiral  Stansfield  Turner — played  all  three  roles. 
•As  documented  xn  this  study,  Dulles,  Helms  and  Colby  were  more 
aggressive  in  criticizing  CIA  work  in  the  non-strategic  NIEs. 
,  », .....«.,..  nt  i, *i~me<tiii\  -Wiifcifcitf  Hi' rlrifcjfcMl
o 
-  113  - 
CHART  D 
BROAD  ROLES  EMPHASIZED  BY  SEVEN  DC I 3  FOR  STRATEGIC  NIES 
OVERALL  ROLE  AS  DC I 
SEPARATE  PRODUCTION  ROLES' 
7  DCIS 
BACKGROUND*  * 
A.   Manager  of  CIA 
1.  Management  Direction  to  CIA 
Drafting 
4 .   Support  of  CIA  Position 
at  USIB 
Smith,  McCone, 
Schlesinger,  Colby 
&  Turner  (5) 
Dulle3  (1) 
Diverse 
(2  military,  2  out- 
side, 1  inside) 
One  PCI 
( " inBide-outside" ) 
B.   Coordinator  of  In- 
telligence Community 
Management  Attention  to  DOD 
Coordination  in  Drafting 
Encouragement  of  Competi- 
tive Debate  at  USIB 
Smith,  Colby 
&  Turner  (3) 
Smith,  KcCone, 
Schlesinger,  6 
Colby   (4) 
Mainly  Military 
(1  military,  t   1 
inside) 
Diverse 
1  military,  2  outaide 
&  1  inside) 
C.   Chief  Intelligence 
Advisor  to  President 
3.   Personal,  Substantive 
Input  to  Draft 
6.   Pinal  Adjudication  of  views 
(prior  to  or  at  USIB  or 
NFIB)  
"*" 
Smith,  McCone 
Schlesinger,  & 
Turner  (4) 
Smith,  McCone, 
Helms,  probably_ 
Schlesingor  & 
Turner  (4-5) 
All  with  technical 
background,  no  Inside 
(2  military,  &  2  out- 
side) 
Same  as  above 
(plus  1  inside) 
7.   Promotion  of  Independent 
Review 
Smith,  Dulles, 
and  Schlesinger 
(3)  (if  include" 
Bush  as  8th  DCIi 
(4) 
Diverse 
(if  include  Bush, 
mainly  outside:  2  out- 
side, 1  " inside-out- 
side," S 1  military 
*The  seven  production  roles  are  numbered  according  to  the  order  in  which  they  were  discussed  earlier  in 
this  study. 
**An  "inside''  DCI  had  a  previous  CIA  career;  and  "outside"  DCI  had  a  previous  private  business,  academic, 
or  government  career;  a  "military"  DCI  is  a  military  officer.  Allen  Dulles  is  considered  an  "inside- 
outside"  DCI.
-  114  - 
Historical  Trends 
The  activities  of  DCIs  also  may  be  assessed  in  light  of  his- 
torical hindsight.  As  indicated  in  Chart  B  earlier,  the  last  three 
DCIs  examined  in  this  study — James  Schlesinger,  William  Colby  and 
Stansfield  Turner — have  been  involved  more  actively  in  the  strategic 
NIEs  than  their  predecessors.  For  example,  compared  to  the  long 
tenures  of  Allen  Dulles  and  Richard  Helms,  recent  DCIa  exercised  more 
control  over  different  phases  of  production.  Compared  to  John  McCona, 
there  ha3  been  more  theorizing  and  follow- through  of  late,  concerning 
the  appropriate  leadership  role  of  the  PCI.  This  is  indicated  by 
the  number  of  "XX"  in  Chart  B,  beginning  in  1973. 
To  this  author,  the  recent  trend  towards  increased  DCI  inter- 
vention in  the  production  process  is  one  response  to  outside  criticism 
of  the  quality  and  validity  of  the  strategic  NIEb.  In  1969,  National 
Security  Advisor  Henry  Kissinger  and  Defense  Secretary  Laird  were 
not  the  fir3t  top-level  officials  to  criticize  the  strategic  NIEs. 
President  Eisenhower  himself  was  known  to  doubt  the  accuracy  of 
"gap"  predictions  in  the  1950s.  As  documented  in  this  study,  what 
is  different  about  the  criticism  of  the  first  half  of  the  1970s  is 
that  it  gathered  momentum,  supported  by  dissident  Pentagon  officials  an 
outside  groups  such  as  the  Presidents  Foreign  Intelligence  Advisory 
Board  (PFIAB) ,  and  was  directed  mainly  against  CIA  estimators.   It 
culminated  in  the  A-B  Team  competitive  review  in  1976.   Richard  Helms 
did  not  respond  by  exercising  more  leadership  over  different  phases 
of  production,  although  he  frequently  directed  the  CIA  estimates 
team  to  incorporate  dissenting  views  in  the  strategic  NIEs.  For
115  - 
the  most  part.  Helms'  tenure  as  DCI  was  characterized  by  passivity 
towards  the  strategic  estimative  process.   Whon  he  did  intervene  at 
the  last  moment,  his  decisions  sometimes  wore  criticized  by  individual 
Pentagon  officials  as  "arbitrary." 
Beginning  with  James  Schlesinger  in  1973,  resent  DCIs  fait  the 
need  to  play  a  stronger  role  during  the  drafting  sf.ge.  The  one 
trait  they  share  is  increased  management  direction  over  the  CIA  es- 
timates team.   Indeed,  they  overhauled  it  completely.   In  choosing 
the  NIO  system  for  drafting  NIEs,  they  then  assumed  more  direct 
responsibility  for  it.   In  the  absence  of  the  collective  review 
and  supervisory  functions  formerly  exercised  by  the  3oard  of  Estimates, 
DCIs  now  handpick  the  MIOs,  and  personally  monitor  and  review  their 
work.   In  addition,  two  DCIs  examined  since  1973 — William  Colby  and 
Admiral  Turner — have  devoted  more  attention  to  means  they  believe 
will  improve  coordination  with  the  Pentagon  intelligence  agoncios 
during  the  drafting  stage.  They  became  the  first  DCIs  to  do  so 
since  General  Bedell  Smith  in  1950. 
Here  the  similarities  end.   In  1973,  William  Colby  became  "the 
man  for  his  time"  by  extending  competitive  debate  to  the  open  forum 
of  USIB,  considering  USIB  as  a  court  of  last  resort  and  sounding 
board  for  dissenting  members.   In  1977,  Admiral  Turner  reversed  thi3 
trend.  Turner's  actions  have  led  to  outside  criticism  that  he  has 
"personalized"  the  decisionmaking  process,  making  adjudicatory  decisions 
in  a  less  open,  or  more  private,  atmosphere. 
B.  Mutually  Supporting  and  Conflicting  Roles i     Manager  versus  Prophet 
A  useful  way  to  approach  the  question  of  the  "ideal"  role  or 
roles  of  the  DCI  in  producing  strategic  intelligence  estimates  is  to 
ask  which  functions  are  mutually  supporting  and  which  potentially
-  116  -  5 
are  conflicting,  or  Liasing.   Assuming  that  a  President  prefers         '-. 
« 
a  DCI  who  can  help  resolve  conflict  in  the  strategic  NlEs,  which 
roles  best  ensure  that  a  DCI's  intervention  will  not  load  to  es- 
timates biased  by  his  personal  view  or  one  institutional  view?         | 
Should  a  DCI  be  bo^h  "manager  and  prophet?" 
In  this  author's  opinion,  it  is  impossible  to  eliminate  potential 
bias  altogether  if  a  DCI  is  expressly  selected  on  the  basis  cf  playing 
a  strong  substantive  and  adjudicatory,  or  "prophet"  role.  Hcw&ver, 
some  functions  are  potentially  more  biasing  than  others,  some  are 
conceivably  mutually  supportive,  and  in  both  cases  it  is  partly  a 
matter  of  how  decisions  appear  to  others.   Mutually  supporting  roles 
are  those  in  which  the  performance  of  one  enhances  performance  at 
the  next  stage,  or  those  in  which  a  balance  is  struck,  for  example, 
between  drafting  functions  and  leadership  at  USIB. 
Most  questions  of  personal  or  institutional  bias  on  the  DCI's 
part  are  more  complex  than  simply  advocating  the  CIA's  institutional 
viewpoint.   Allen  Dulles  played  this  role  at  OSIB;  but  this  auto- 
matically precluded  him  from  exercising  other  roles,  and  all  other 
DCIs  avoided  this  pitfall.  Usually,  the  subject  of  bias  is  raised 
by  critics  when  and  if  a  DCI  personally  selects  the  CIA  drafters, 
argues  his  own  views  before  them,  individually  reviews  and  approves 
their  work,  and  inserts  his  personal  opinions  in  the  draft  or  makes 
other  adjudicatory  decisior.3.   Stated  simp.Listically,  how  can  a 
DCI  both  advocate  one  view  in  the  draft  NIE  and  also  act  impartially 
as  an  adjudicator  at  USIB?  Because  of  potential  conflicts  along 
the  way,  should  a  DCI  concentrate  on  designing  an  "optimal"  manage- 
ment structure  for  writing,  coordinating  and  reviewing  the  draft 
NIEs  and  then  adopt  a  "hands-off "  policy  until  final  USIB  deliberations 
— ~   .,,■■-.■■:-:    :.....-   ,.   .■   ... — ,.  ...-.-^^■:i.\tK.^Uff^i'lfy..^fJijff
-  117  - 
Two  extremes  of  administrative  behavior  have  been  described 
in  this  study — that  of  DCIs  Richard  Helms  and  Admiral  Turner. 
On  the  one  hand,  Helms  contends  that  the  DCI  should  be  little  in- 
volved in  drafting  lest  this  "bias"  his  final  decisions  at  USIB.   If 
the  DCI  becomes  an  advocate  too  early,  this  will  limit  his  freedom 
later.   Instead,  the  CIA  should  be  left  alone  to  do  its  work,  and 
the  DCI  intervene  only  in  the  final  phase  as  deemed  necessary.   The 
difficulty  with  Helms'  approach  is  that  hie  adjudicatory  role  at 
USIB  appeared  to  some  ill-informed  and  accomplished  in  a  substantive 
vacumn, and  often  eliminated  Pentagon  dissents.  When  Helms  did 
not  "adjudicate,"  he  sent  the  draft  NIE  back  to  the  CIA  drafters 
to  represent  more  strongly  the  Pentagon's  alternatives.  Neither 
action  necessarily  resulted  in  an  unbiased  resolution  of  conflict. 
Critics  also  complained  that,  by  inaction,  Helms  allowed  the  member- 
ship quality  of  the  Board  of  Estimates  to  deteriorate. 
DCI  Helms'  approach  is  almost  a  case  of  approach-avoidance. 
This  suggests  that  a  DCI' 8  involvement  in  drafting  is  supportive  of, 
or  consistent  with,  execution  of  subsequent  roles  at  NFIB.  Drafting 
the  strategic  NIEs  takes  at  least  six  months,  while  formal  USIB  or 
NFIB  debate  is  a  matter  of  hours,  or  at  most  days,  and  under  Helms 
was  less.  Once  a  draft  is  written,  it  becomes  difficult  to  change. 
In  order  to  be  sufficiently  informed  about  competitive  strategic 
debate  at  NFIB,  a  DCI  cannot  ignore  what  goes  on  during  the  lengthy 
drafting  sessions. 
For  example,  at  a  minimum,  a  DCI  might  review  the  CIA's  organi- 
zational set-up  for  estimative  work  to  ascertain  if  it  is  operating 
as  intended,  appoint  an  estimates  team  with  which  ha  can  work 
comfortably,  monitor  and  review  successive  drafts  so  that  he  is
-  118 
informed  about  the  boundaries  of  major  analytical  disputes,  and 
listen  to  the  arguments  of  dissenting  Pentagon  representatives 
about  coordinative  procedures.   This  "management1'  approach  to  draftinc 
is  exemplified  by  DCI  William  Colby,  who  then  went  on  to  manage 
highly  technical,  argumentative  debate  at  USIB. 
On  the  other  hand,  Admiral  Turner  has  taken  all  these  steps, 
and  more,  and  he  is  criticized  for  bias  in  being  both  personal  ad- 
vocate and  final  adjudicator.   In  this  author's  opinion,  these 
accusations  result,  partly,  from  poor  timing.  Admiral  Turner  pays 
too  much  attention  to  the  drafting  of  the  strategic  NI3s  compared 
to  leadership  at  NFIB  meetings.  Because  of  an  imbalance  between  his 
involvement  at  these  two  stages,  DCI  Turner  not  only  opens  himself 
to  criticism  but  also  deprives  himself  of  the  opportunity  of  hearing 
high-level,  group  debate.  That  Turner  does  not  fully  utilize  NFIB 
is  an  admission  that,  while  brief,  oral  discussion  at  NPIB  meetings 
between  diverse  intelligence  chiefs  with  their  own  axes  to  grind 
may  be  a  cumbersome  and  time-consuming  way  to  complete  complex 
analytical  work. 
Admiral  Turner's  approach  implies  that  a  DCI's  decisions  might 
appear  less  biased,  or  be  less  biased,  if  he  reserves  his  adjudicator 
role  until  after  open,  competitive  debate  at  NFIB,  conducted  jointly 
in  the  presence  of  all  intelligence  agencies.  A  DCI  still  might  exer 
management  direction  over  the  drafting  process  and  make  personal,  sub 
stantive  input  beforehand. 
For  example,  a  DCI  might  read  and  edit  successive  drafts,  re- 
shape the  questions  asked,  offer  his  personal  advice,  advance  his 
own  opinions  alongside  others,  discuss  strategic  issues  with  CIA 
and  Pentagon  estimators,  and  satisfy  himself  that  all  views  are
-  119  - 
incorporated.   However,  he  could  stop  short  of  rewriting  the  HIEb 
to  reflect  his  final  judgements.   This  approach  was  executed 
successfully  by  DCI  John  McCone  who,  after  initial  hesitation,  made 
substantive  input  to  the  draft  but  was  willing  to  change  the  NIEs 
as  a  result  of  USIB  debate.   In  essence,  McCone  was  both  manager 
and  prophet,  and  was  not  criticized  at  the  time  for  exercising  his 
prerogative  to  play  these  roles. 
C.  Management  Steps  Not  Taken  by  DCI3 
In  this  author's  view,  systematic  attention  to  management  and 
coordination  at  the  draft  stage  of  the  strategic  NIEs  is  the  sine 
qua  non  of  improved  intelligence  estimates.   Throughout  this  study, 
we  have  been  interested  primarily  in  whether  a  DCI  devoted  any 
attention  to  these  issues,  as  opposed  to  evaluating  reorganizations 
and  other  changes  actually  intitiated.  Below,  the  author  presents 
her  conclusions  about  the  strategic  NIE  process,  derived  from  a 
year  of  study:  These  recommendations  focus  on  mechanisms  a  DCI 
might  devise  to  elicit  a  multiplicity  of  views  before  final  intelli- 
gence judgements  are  made.  Three  criteria  govern  their  selection: 
they  must  be  easy  to  administer;  they  should  reduce  the  likelihood 
of  institutional  or  personal  bias;  and  they  must  not  pose,  in  the 
DCI's  view,  a  security  risk.  All  proposals  build  on  changes  authorized 
in  recent  years,  rather  than  sharply  reversing  tnem.* 
(1)  This  author  applauds  the  notion  that  the  DCI  appoint  the 
CIA  estimators,  or  NIOs.  Since  the  DCI  must  work  closely  with  them, 
he  should  select  them  and  they,  in  turn,  be  responsible  to  him. 
* Since  reorganization  of  the  estimates  function  is  ongoing  in  CIA, 
some  of  these  proposals  soon  may  be  moot.
-  122  - 
(4)  This  author  supports  the  continuance  of  a  system  whoreby 
Pentagon  intelligence  officials,  and  sonietiir.es  consultants,  prepare 
first  drafts  of  selected  chapters.   By  this  time,  sufficient  expertise 
in  writing  should  have  been  accumulated  by  non-CIA  analysts  to  over- 
come earlier  criticims  on  this  score.  On  a  periodic  basis,  the 
portion  assigned  to  individual  agencies,  including  the  CIA,  might  be 
rotated.  Rotation  need  not  be  annual,  since  such  a  move  would  in- 
crease the  administrative  burden  on  the  NIO,  who  is  ultimately 
responsible.  Periodic  rotation  reflects  another  internal  approach 
to  competitive  or  parallel  drafting.  It  creates  both  a  precedent 
and  history  for  mulitple  advocacy. 
(5)  In  its  day,  the  footnote  system  in  the  strategic  Niss  was 
much  abused.  Both  recent  Presidents  and  DCIs  have  preferred  an 
NIE  format  which  represents  major  differences  of  opinion  as  al- 
ternative positions,  or  parallel  texts.  The  advantage  of  this  format 
is  that  all  participants  are  encouraged  to  express  their  objections 
clearly,  advancing  only  those  which  reflect  a  significant,  documentabl 
predictive  uncertainty.  Presently,  there  is  more  stylistic  clarity 
and  cohesion  in  the  strategic  NIEs  than  in  the  past.  This  new 
format  also  allows  the  DCI  the  option  of  advancing  his  personal 
opinion  as  an  alternative  separately,  or  alongside  of,  other  views 
in  the  NIEs.  However,  exclusive  reliance  on  this  format  has  the 
disadvantage  of  eliminating  altogether  a  view  strongly  held  by  one 
individual  or  a  distinct  minority,  which  readers  might  want  to 
bear  in  mind.  This  author  believes  thrt  the  NICs  should  permit 
the  use  of  footnotes  in  occasional  instances.  The  DCI  and  NFIB 
members  might  overrule  footnotes  later  on  a  caue-by-case  basis,  if 
they  so  chose.
-  123 
(6)  Ongoing  independent  or  outside  review  of  the  strategic 
NIEs  is  a  complex  is3ue.   Major  difficulties  are  the  administrative 
burden  on  the  DCI  and  CIA  staff,  potential  security  leak3  and, 
as  the  Senate  Select  Committee  on  Intelligence  noted,  the  possibility 
that  reviewers  are  biased.  However,  because  of  the  large  impact 
of  the  1976  A-B  Team  experiment  on  subsequent  perceptions  in  the 
strategic  HIEs,  this  author  agrees  with  the  former  PFIAB's  recommen- 
dation that  external  review  once  again  be  a  part  of  the  NIK  process. 
Because  of  the  immense  security  risk,  external  reviews  should  be 
authorized  only  periodically,  such  as  once  every  three  years.  Un- 
less otherwise  directed  by  the  President,  the  time,  conditions  and 
reviewers  should  be  authorized  by  the  DCI  with  the  assistance  of 
another  governmental  body,  such  as  the  NSC  or  Presidential  study 
group.
-  2  - 
CHAPTER  II:   EVOLUTION  OF  THE  STFATEGIC  ESTIMATIVE  PROCESS 
1.  National  Security  Act  of  1947,  Section  102(d),  subparagraph  (3). 
2.  Harry  S.  Truman,  Memoirs,  Vol.  II,  op.  ci.t.,  p.  58. 
3.  SSCI,  Final  Report,  Book  I,  op.  cit.,  p.  73. 
4.'  National  Security  Act  of  1947,  Section  102(d),  subparagrpah  (3). 
5.  Presidential  Directive,  January  22,  1946,  establishing  the  National 
Intelligence  Authority,  Central  Intelligence  Group  and  position  of 
the  DCI.  See,  SSCI,  Book  IV,  "History  of  the  CIA."  by  Anne  Karalekas 
(henceforth  referred  to  as  "History")  pp.  113-114. 
6.  Sherman  Kent,  Strategic  Intelligence  for  American  World  Policy 
(Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press,  Paperback  Edition,  1966) 
pp.  64-66.  This  book  was  published  first  in  1949. 
V.   Ibid. ,  p.  101. 
8.  SSCI,  Book  IV,  "History,"  pp.  13  and  24. 
9.  Military  estimates  work  was  done  in  ORE'S  Global  Survey  Division,  mainly 
by  three  men.  They  were  generalists  in  the  sense  of  having  little 
Soviet  expertise.   However,  Ludwell  Montague,  an  historian,  had  been 
the  Army's  Executive  Secretary  of  the  JCS'  Joint.  Intelligence  Committee, 
and  DeForest  Van  Slyck,  a  lawyer,  had  WWII  intelligence  experience 
with  the  Air  F^rce.   Interview  with  DeForest  Van  Slyck,  5/2/78. 
See  also:  SSC'J,  Book  IV,  "History,"  p.  13;  Ray  S.  Cline,  Secrets , 
Spies  and  Scholars  (Washington  DC:   Acropolis  Books  Ltd.,  1976') 
p.  105. 
10.  The  Eberstadt  Task  Force  on  Military  Intelligence,  of  The  Hoover 
Commission,  which  reviewed  both  the  Air  Force's  and  CIA' a  es- 
timates in  the  spring  of  1948.  Quoted  in  The  Washington  Post, 
October  11,  1948. 
11.  SSCI,  Book  IV,  "history,"  p.  13,  and  interview  with  DeForest  Van  Slyck, 
5/2/78. 
12.  Declassified  Documents  Reference  System  (Washington,  DC:  Carrollton 
Press,  1977  to  present) ,  which  this  author  read  in  its  entirety. 
See,  for  example,  DDRS,  #77-261C,  ORE  #27-48,  "Possible  Developments 
in  China,"  Nov.  2,  1948. 
13.  SSCI,  Book  IV,  "History,"  p.  25. 
14.  Study  on  the  CIA  and  National  Organization  for  Intelligence,  known  as 
the  Dulles-Jackson-Correa  Survey,  commissioned  by  the  NSC  in  1948 
and  completed  in  Jan.  1949.  See,  SSCI,  Book  IV,  "History,"  p.  16.
-  3  - 
15.  SSCI,  Book  IV,  "History,"  p.  17. 
16.  Ibid. ,  p.  16. 
17.  Ibid. ,  p.  11,  and  interviews  with  Lawrence  Houaton  (3/22/78)  and  Walter 
Phorzheimer  (4/13/78).  Admiral  Hillenkoetter'a  White  House  briefings 
occurred  after  1949  and  represented  a  victory  for  the  CT.A,  since  the 
State  Department  earlier  had  challenqed  its  right  to  channel  intelli- 
gence directly  to  the  President. 
18.  Memorandum  from  CIA  General  Counsel,  Lawrence  Houston,  to  General  W. 
Bedell  Smi>.h,  August  1959,  quoted  in  SSCI,  Book  IV,  "History," 
p.  18. 
19.  Congress  conducted  full-scale  hearings  of  the  "surprise"  invasions  in 
mid-1951,  and  agreed  that  the  intelligence  data  had  been  available, 
and  circulated.  See,  for  example,  Richard  K.  Detts,  "Analysis,  War 
and  Decision,"  op.  cit. ,  p.  63. 
20.  Admiral  Hillenkoetter  testified  to  the  Senate  Foreign  Appropriations 
Committee  on  the  following  day.   (Interview  with  Walter  Phorzheimer, 
4/6/79,  who  helped  prepare  the  testimony) .   The  quote  is  drawn  from 
the  Norfolk  Ledger  Dispatch,  May  25,  1951. 
21.  Washington  Evening  Star,  May  19,  1951,  about  Admiral  Hillenkoetter'a 
testimony  to  Congress  of  that  day. 
22.  Washington  Pest,  October  1,  1950,  p.  5. 
23.  Declassified  Documents  Reference  System,  op.  cit. ,  377-259C  (Memo  of 
June  25,  1946),'  V7-264D  (Memo  of  June  30,  1948) ,  77-261C  (Memo  of 
Nov.  23,  1949),  and  77-259E  (Memo  of  Dec.  10,  1948).   The  memos  in- 
cluded reference  to  the  CIA's  grading  of  agent  (source)  and  information 
reliability.  Hillenkoetter  hardly  was  the  last  DCI  to  do  this. 
24.  SSCI,  Book  IV,  "History,"  p.  18  and  fn.  11.   "Centralization  of  Authority' 
was  a  term  used  frequently  by  Hanson  Baldwin,  who  covered  intelligence 
activities  for  the  New  York  Times.  See,  for  example,  Hanson  Baldwin, 
in  Armed  Forces,  October  18,  1947. 
25.  General  Smith  reportedly  asked  President  Truman  to  call  Langer,  and 
he  and  other  academicans  were  recruited  on  the  basis  of  Smith's 
concern  that  WWJ.II  was  -'imminent."   (Interviews  with  Jack  Maury, 
2/9/73,  and  John  Bross,  5/29/79} .  When  Smith  arrived,  he  reportedly 
found  no  current,  coordinated  estimate  on  military  operations  in 
Korea,  which  precipitated  one  of  his  famous  battles  with  Gen.  Douglas 
MacArthur.   (See,  SSCI,  Book  IV,  "History,"  p.  104). 
26.  Washington  Post,  Feb.  25,  1951. 
27.  Harry  T.  Rositzhe,  The  CIA's  Secret  Operations  (NY:   Reader's  Digest 
Press,  1977),  p.  20f  According  to  Rositzhe,  the  Pentagon's  demands 
were  specific  and  forcefully  stated,  and  led  to  several  of  the  ill- 
fated  drops  in  the  Ukraine.
28, 
Interview  with  past  and  current  CIA  official  (B) ,  5/30/79. 
29.   For  thia,  see,  SSCI.  Rook  IV,  '"History, "  pp.  20-23. 
30   Cline,  Secrets,  Spies  and  Scholars,  op.  cit. ,  p.  120.  M30  inter- 
views with  DeFore"st"Van  Slyck  T572/78)  ,  Paul  Borel  (9/1/78),  Ray 
Cline  (8/20/78)  and  John  Huizenga  (9/13/78).   The  CIA  did  not  want 
"professional  meeting-goers." 
31.  CSCI,  Book  IV,  "History,"  p.  19. 
32.  Interview  with  past  and  current  CIA  official  (B) ,  5/30/79. 
33.  Cline,  Secrets,  op.  cit.,  pp.  Ill  and  121. 
34.  Interview  with  John  Broas,  5/29/79. 
35.  Ibid. 
36.  SSCI,  Book  IV,  "History,"  p.  18. 
37.  Ibid. 
38.  Cline,  Secrets,  op.  cit.,  p.  111. 
39.  Quoted  in  Freedmar,,  U.S.  Intelligence  and  the  Soviet  Streategic  Threat, 
op.  cit.,  p.  35. 
40.  The  press  reports  that:   "In  the  35  to  40  problems  in  which  the  CIA 
has  had  to  furnish  an  estimate  since  General  Smith  arrived. .  .there 
have  been  no  dissents   "   (See,  Providence  Bulletin,  May  25,  1951). 
However,  this  author  found  a  3  page- long  dissent  ay  the  Air  Force 
in  NIE-12,  "Consequences  of  the  Early  Employment  of  Chinese  Nationalist 
Forces  in  Korea,"  Dec.  27,  1950  (Secret,  Declassified  Aug.  2,  1977).   ^ 
John  Bross  says  that  Smith's  main  concern  "was  to  get  out  the  product. 
(Interview,  5/29/79).  Hal  Ford  reported  one  instance  in  which  Smith 
initially  overruled  a  Navy  dissent  pertaining  to  the  effects  of  a 
Naval  blockade  cf  China  during  the  Korean  war,  but  reinstated  the 
footnote  following  a  complaint  from  CINCPAC  (Interview,  12/7/78) . 
41.  Interview  with  past  and  current  CIA  official  (A),  5/30/79. 
42.  Interview  with  Gen.  Daniel  Graham,  5/9/79. 
43.  Cline,  Secrets,  op.  cit.,  p.  123. 
44.  Interview  with  past  and  current  CIA  official  (A),  5/30/79. 
45.  Freedman,  op.  cit.,  p.  35. 
46.  Colin  S.Gray,  "'Gap'  Prediction  and  America's  Defenses  Arms  and 
Race  Behavior  in  the  Eisenhower  Years,"  Orbis,  Vol  XVI-1,  Spring 
1972,  p.  263. 
47.  Ibid.,  p.  261,  and  Freedman,  op.  cit.,  p.  67.
-  5  - 
48.  Freedman,  op.  cit. ,  p.  67. 
49.  Gray,  cp.  cit.,   p.  263. 
50.  Alien  W.  Dulles,  The  Craft  of  Intelligence  (NY:   Harper  and  Row,  1963} 
p.  149. 
51.  Gray,  op.  cit. ,  p.  262. 
52.  Ibid. 
53.  Interview  with  past  and  current  CIA  official    (A),    5/30/79. 
54.  Gray,    op.    cit.,    p.    262. 
55.  Stuart  Symington,  "Where  the  Missile  Gap  Went,"  The  Reporter.  Feb. 
15,  1962,  p.  22.   Symington  earlier  had  conducted  Senate  hearings 
on  the  bomber  and  missile  gap  predictions. 
56.  Interviews  with  Richard  Bissell  (5/26/78),  Jack  Maury  (2/9/79),  and 
John  Bross  (5/29/79).   See  also,  David  Wise  and  Thomas  Ross,  The 
U-2  Affair  (NY:   Random  House,  1964) .   Bross  says  that  in  the  early 
1950s,  the  Air  Force  rejected  cr.<=  plan  which  would  have  been  imple- 
mented under  it3  auspices,  allegedly  because  it  was  too  complicated 
to  put  a  man  in  thfi  aircraft.   Intecviewees  agree  that,  subsequently, 
only  a  handful  cf  peirsor.a  outside  of  the  CIA  knew  about  development 
plans,  approved  by  President  Eisenhower  in  1954.   Because  of  the 
secrecy  surrounding  its  development  and  use,  the  CIA  provided  the 
administrative  framework  for  all  aspects  of  the  U-2.   In  the  late 
195Ce,  coordination  with  the  Air  Force  was  informal,  consisting  of 
a  small  Air  Force  contingent  at  CIA. 
57.  Following  review  by  a  formal  interagency  task  force  under  Dulles, 
all  flights  had  to-be  approved  by  President  Eisenhower.  Eisenhower 
gave  only  one  blanket  approval,  for  the  first  ten  days.  After  that, 
individual  flights  were  reviewed  in  a  meeting  at  the  White  House  con- 
sisting of  the  President,  the  Secretary  of  State,  the  Chairman  of  the 
JCS,  Eisenhower's  special  advisor  Gen.  Andrew  Goodpaster,  the  NSC 
Secretary,  and  Allen  Dulles.   Bissell  suggests  that  John  Foster 
Dulles  also  had  a  final  veto  power.   (Interview  with  Richard  3issell, 
5/26/73). 
58.  See,  Freedman,  op.  cit.,  pp.  32-33  (who  cite3  a  f'gure  of  3,000);  and 
Thomas  Powers,  The  Man  Who  Kept  the  Secrets:   Richard  Helms  and  the 
CIA  (NY:  Alfred  Knopf,  1979)  p.  97  (who  uses  the  1,200  figure). 
The  office  is  called  the  National  Photographic  Interpretation  Center 
and  remains  a  sub-unit  of  CIA. 
59.  Freedman,  op.  cit.,  p.  67;  Gray,  op.  cit.,  p.  260;  and  James  C.  Dick, 
"The  Strategic  Arms  Race,  1957-1961!  wKb  Opened  a  Missile  Gap?" 
Journal  of  Politics,  XXXIV  (Nov.  1972),  pp.  1067-9. 
60.  SSCI,  Book  IV,  "History,"  p.  56. 
61.  Interview  with  past  and  current  CIA  official  (A),  5/30/79.
-  6  - 
62.  An  NSC  Directive  in  1951  had  directed  the  CIA  to  impl&ment  ar.  "agreed 
activities"  arrangement  with  the  Pentagon,  whereby  the  Pentagon  would 
turn  over  i.ta  peacetime  covert  operations  to  the  CIA.  In  1954,  the 
Doolittle  Commission  concluded  that  both  the  CIA  and  Pentagon  were 
"dragging  their  feet."  See,  Declassified  Documents  Reference  System, 
op.  cit.,  "Report  on  the  Covert  Activities  of  the  CIA,"  TKe  DooTTttTe 
Report,  Sept.  4,  1954,  S78-139C  and  140B  (Top  Secret,  Declaus.  in  1976) . 
63.  SSCI,  Pook  IV,  "History,"  p.  60.   Dulles  consolidated  the  ERA's  four 
divisions  into  a  Military  Economic  Branch  in  1958,  two  years  after 
it  was  proposed.   Actually,  the  CSI  continued  to  expend  its  work 
into  area3  earlier  restricted  by  an  agreement  wich  DOD.   In  1956,  Dulles 
also  created  the  interagency  Guided  Missiles  Intelligence  Committee 
under  IAC,  with  the  agreement  of  the  Defense  Secretary,  but  over  the 
objection  of  the  JCS  and  services  who  wanted  exclusive  control. 
See,  SSCI,  Book  IV,  p.  61) .  Thus,  some  of  the  criticism  is  ill- 
f-ounded. 
64.  SSCI,  Book  IV,  "History,"  dp.  62-63. 
65.  Interview  with«past  and  current  CIA  official  (A),  5/30/79. 
66.  Interview  with  Gen.  George  Keegan,  2/1J/79.   Keegan  also  said  that 
he  was  present  at  a  meeting  between  President  Eisenhower  and  President- 
elect Kennedy  in  which  Eisenhower  said:   "You  must  never  let  the 
Pentagon  and  military  intelligence  put  your  party  at  risk." 
67.  The  personnel  figures  were  cited  in  an  interview  with  past  and  current 
CIA  official  (B) ,  5/30/79.   Actually,  OSR's  work  has  not  expanded 
steadily  in  some  areas.   For  example,  after  1967  OSR  commenced  work 
on  some  "friendly"  countries  and  al30  Net  assessments,  which  McNamara 
approved  but  was  opposed  by  the  services.   Helms  reportedly  was 
embarrassed,  and  asked  OSR  to  stop.   (Interview  with  Gen.  D3niel 
Graham,  5/9/79).  At  least  one  author  maintains  that  Colby  restricted 
OSR  to  current  intelligence  work.   (Paul  W.  Blackstock,  "The 
Intelligence  Community  Under  the  Nixon  Administration,"  Armed  Forces 
and  Society,  Vol.  I,  No.  2  Feb.  1975,  p.  239) . 
68.  John  Huizenga,  in  testimony  to  the  SSCI,  1/26/76,  qvoted  in  SSCI, 
Book  I,  p.  76.   All  testimony  of  officials  to  the  SSCI  remains 
classified. 
69.  James  Schlesinger,  testimony  to  the  SSCI,  2/2/76,  quoted  in  SSCI, 
Book  I,  p.  76. 
70.  Interview  with  Andrew  Marshall,  2/9/79. 
71.  Albert  Wohlstetter  originally  published  his  findings  in  three  articles 
in  Foreign  Policy,  entitled:   "Is  there  a  Strategic  Arms  Race?" 
(No.  15,  Summer  1974);   "Rivals,  But  No  Race,"  (No.  16,  Fall  1974); 
and  "How  to  Confuse  Ourselves"  (No.  20,  Fall  1975) .  A  more  ex- 
tended version  was  published  by  the  United  States  Strategic 
Institute,  Legends  of  the  Strategic  Arms  Race,  USSI  Report  75-1. 
Wohlstetter  did  not  use  the  KIEs  for  his  data,  but  rather  relied  on 
the  predictions  within  the  Annual  Posture  Statements,  and  Defense 
Program  and  Budget  Statements,  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense.
72.  See,  "Bush,  Cline  Colby  and  Helms  on  the  CIA,"  The  Washington 
Quarterly;   A  Review  of  strategic  and  International  Studies,  Vol.  1 
No.  4  jAutumn  1978),  published  by  the  Center  for  Strategic  and 
International  Studies,  Georgetown  University,  p.  28. 
73.  Interview  with  past  and  current  CIA  official  (A),  2/9/79. 
CHAPTER  III:   THE  DCI'S  MANAGEMENT  OF  STRATEGIC  NIEs  AT  THE  DRAFT  STAGE 
^-    SSCI,  Final  Report,  Book  IV,  "History  of  the  CIA,"  by  Anne  Karalekas, 
op.  cit. ,  p.  74,  fn.  7. 
2.  Ibid.  This  official  was  identified  later  to  the  author  as  Walt  Elders, 
McCone's  executive  assistant. 
3.  Freedman,  U.S.  Intelligence  and  the  Soviet  Strategic  Threat,  op.  cit., 
p.  74. 
4.  Interview  with  William  Hyland,  11/17/73  (on  President  Johnson) ;  Inter- 
view with  past  and  current  CIA  official  (A) ,  2/9/79  (on  President 
Carter) . 
5.  Interview  with  Anne  Karalekas,  10/13/78. 
6.  For  example,  See  Ray  Cline,  Secrets,  Spies  and  Scholars,  op.  cit., 
pp.  140-144.   As  an  ONE  staff  member,  Cline  participated  in  the 
first  Net  Assessment  at  the  Pentagon,  an  undertaking  reporting 
directly  to  a  special  NSC  subcommittee.   Under  Kennedy  and  Johnson, 
Net  Assessments  were  done  in  the  systems  analysis  shop  under  the 
Office  o£  the  Secretary  of  Defense.   Under  Nixon,  there  was  a  Net 
Assessment  unit  on  the  NSC  staff,  which  later  was  moved  back  to  OSD. 
?.   SSCI,  Book  IV,  "History,"  p.  80  and  81  (fn.  14). 
8.  Interview  with  past  and  current  CIA  official  (A),  2/9/79,  about  Dulles* 
briefings  to  Congress.  Tales  about  Dulles'  refusal  to  discuss 
policy  implications  at  NSC,  referring  the  questions  to  his  brother, 
are  legendary. 
9.  Powers,  The  Man  Who  Kept  the  Secrets,  op.  cit.,  p.  162. 
10.  Ibid. 
11.  Ibid. 
12.  See,  for  example,  John  D.  Leacacos,  "Kissinger's  Apparat,"  Foreign 
Policy  5  (Winter  1970),  p.  22.   Also:   Interview  with  Andrew 
Marshall,  2/9/79;  and  Freedman,  op.  cit.,  pp.  46-47. 
13.  Interview  with  past  and  current  CIA  official  (A),  2/9/79. 
14 •   ^id.,  5/30/79. 
15.   Freedman,  op.  cit.,  pp.  37-39.   However,  Sherman  Kent  told  this  author 
that,  in  the  early  1950s,  disagreements  occasionallv  were  carried 
forward  to  IAC.   (Interview,  5/2/79) .
-  8  - 
16.  FreedMan,  op.  cit.,  p.  38. 
17.  Interview  with  Richard  Helms,  6/7/79. 
17a.  Interview  with  past  and  current  CIA  official  (A),  5/30/79. 
13.   Interview  with  Andrew  Marshall,'  2/9/79. 
19.  Freednan,  op.  cit.,  p.  36. 
20.  For  example,  interviews  with  Ray  Cline  (5/2/78),  Robert  Araory  (9/13/78), 
John  Huizenga  (10/26/78),  and  Williard  Matthias  (10/25/78).  However 
they  agree  that  there  was  a  quantitative  difference  in  the  two  DCIs' 
relationship  with  the  Board.  Dulles  is  described  as  "enjoying"  Board 
members,  whereas  McCone  "respected"  them.  Under  McCone,  the  relation- 
ship was  more  formal  and  sometimes  characterized  by  mutual  distance. 
21.  There  is  some  disagreement  about  when  and  if  this  occurred.  Cline 
wrote  that  it  occurred  under  McCone,  and  may  have  weakened  estimative 
work.   (Cline,  Secrets,  op.  cit.,  p.  2C0) .   Later,  Cline  said  that 
the  transfer  did  not  occur  until  after  he  left  as  DDI,  and  Kent 
persuaded  Helms  that  the  move  was  a  good  thing,  3ince  Kent  might  have 
more  independence .   (Interview  with  Ray  Cline,  8/20/7 8 i .   John 
Huizenga  denies  that  this  move  ever  took  place  (Interview,  10/26/78) . 
22.  SSCI,  Book  IV,  "History,"  p.  81. 
23.  Ibid. 
24.  Interview  with  past  and  current  CIA  official  (E) ,  5/30/79,  snd  con- 
firmed by  Gen.  Daniel  Graham,  interview  of  12/7/78.   The  SSCI  also 
concluded  that  the  Pentagon  had  not  always  provided  the  CIA  with 
access  to  US  strategic  planning  data.   (See,  SSCI,  Final  Report, 
Book  I,  op.  cit.,  p.  26G) . 
25.  For  this  and  the  following,  interview  with  R.  Jack  Smith  (the  then 
.  DDI),  9/20/78.  Also,  interview  with  past  and  current  CIA  official 
(C),  12/15/78. 
26.  Freedman,  op.  cit.,  p.  52. 
27.  SSCI,  Book  IV,  "History,"  p.  86.  Also,  interviews  with  Keith  Clark 
(9/19/78)  and  Jack  Smith  (9/20/78) ,  and  undenied  by  other  Board 
members.  Clark  maintains  that  ONE  was  not  as  in-bred  as  the  Board 
in  the  early  1970s. 
I 
28.  Interview  with  Keith  Clark,  9/19/78,  regarding  the  one  Board  appointee, 
who  was  an  Admiral.  By  1973,  there  were  several  vacancies  on  the 
Board,  in  part  because  Schlesinger's  intended  reorganisation  w.is 
known . 
29.  Interview  with  Keith  Clark  (9/19/78)  and  Hal  Ford  (12/7/78). 
30.  Interview  with  Tom  Lattimer,  5/10/79. 
31.  Interview  with  past  and  current  CIA  o'riciai  (B) ,  5/30/79.
-  9  - 
32.  Freedman,  op.  cit.  ,  p.  43.  McN<ynara's  requests  for  work  front  ONE, 
OSR  and  OER~  iurtTce  of  Economic  Research,  which  did  bomb  damage 
assessments  during  the  Vietnam  war)  have  been  well  documented. 
(See,  for  example,  SSCI,  Book  IV,  "History,"  pp.  60-81). 
33.  Freedman,  op.  cit.,  p.  36.  Also  interview  with  Fritz  Ermath,  10/26/78, 
who  later  joined  OSR,  first  as  a  RAND  consultant.   R«y  Cline  gees 
even  further,  and  criticizes  the  creation,  of  the  DDS&T  as  well. 
Cline  maintains,  thereby,  "that  CIA  advocacy  of  its  own  scientific 
collection  techniques  became  mixed  up  with  its  objective  analysis 
of  all  scientific  and  technical  developments.  The  appearance  of 
objectivity  was  hard  to  maintain  when  analysis  and  collection  were 
supervised  by  the  same  staff."   (Cline,  Secrets,  op.  cit.,  p.  200). 
34.  Interview  with  John  Huizenga  (9/13/78)  and  Keith  Clark  (9/19/78). 
Colby  often  is  regarded  as  the  "executor  of  Schlesinger 's  will." 
However,  both  interviewees  confirmed  that  Schlesinger  had  not  made 
up  his  mind  about  the  precise  form  of  reorganization. 
34a.  Interviews  with  Keith  Clark  (11/3/78),  John  Huizenga  (10/26/78), 
William  Hyland  (11/17/78)  and  Hal  Ford  (12/7/78).   Clark  said  that 
Schlesinger  wanted  the  NIEs  short  enough  "to  make  any  NSC  member 
ashamed  of  not  having  read  them."  Actually,  Schlesinger's  approach 
clashed  with  that  of  Henry  Kissinger  who,  in  effect,  wanted  longer 
NIES. 
35.  Office  of  Management  and  Budget,  "A  Review  of  the  Intelligence  Community, 
March  10,  1971,  known  as  the  Schletiinger  Report,  p.  10a.  See  also, 
Blackstock,  "The  Intelligence  Community  Under'  the  Nixon  Administration," 
op.  cit. ,  p.  232. 
36.  Interview  with  Daniel  Graham,  5/9/79. 
37.  Interview  with  William  Colby,  5/29/79. 
33.   William  Colby,  testimony  to  SSCI,  12/11/75,  cited  in  SSCI,  Book  I,  p. 
75,  fn.  17.  Earlier, diffusion  of  responsibility  wa3  viewed  as 
an  advantage,  protecting  individuals  from  outside  pressure. 
39.  Interview  with  William  Colby,  5/29/79. 
40.  Interviews  with  John  Huizenga  (9/13/78)  and  Sam  Hooskinson  (11/9/78). 
As  Colby  told  Keith  Clark,  "I  want  to  multiply  myself  by  twelve." 
(Interview  with  Clark,  9/19/78). 
41.  SSCI,  Book  IV,  "History,"  p.  86.  Admiral  Turner  has  continued  the 
MBO  system,  although  its  impact  on  DDO  and  DDI  interaction  remains 
limited.   (Interview,  current  CIA  official  (H) ,  9/25/79) . 
42.  Interview  with  William  Colby  (11/17/78)  and  Jack  Maury  (8/24/78).  See 
also,  Honorable  Men;  My  Life  in  the  CIA  (NY:  Simon  and  Schuster,  1978) 
pp.  364-365.   Colby  bellved  that  Angleton's  suspicions  about  the  DDO's 
Soviet  desk  sources  were  inhibiting  effective  political  intelligence 
gathering.  '
-  10  - 
43.  See,  "Bush,  Cline,  Colby  and  Helms  on  the  CIA,"  The  Washington 
Quarterly,  Autumn  1978,  op.  cit. ,  p.  29. 
44.  Interview  with  past  and  current  CIA  officials  (A)  (2/9/78)  and  (C) 
(2/15/78).   They  agree  that  as  the  pace  of  the  Senate  investigations 
of  the  CIA  increased,  the  attention  Colby  could  devote  to  each  NIE 
declined. 
45.  U.S.  Congress,  Subcommittee  on  Priorities  and  Economy  in  Government 
of  the  Joint  Economic  Committee,  Allocation  of  Resources  in  the 
Soviet  Union  and  China-1975  (Washington,  DC:   GPO,  1976),  p.  54. 
46.  SSCI,  Book  I,  p.  434. 
47.  Interviews  with  Tom  Lattimer  (5/10/79),  Sam  Hooskinson  (11/9/78) 
and  Richard  Betts  (5/3/79) .  Reportedly,  one  Panel  member  said 
that  he  didn't  have  enough  to  do. 
48.  Interview  with  current  CIA  officials  (D)  and  (J),  12/15/78. 
49.  Interview  with  Ray  Cline,  11/8/78. 
50.  Interview  with  past  and  current  CIA  official  (A),  5/30/7 J. 
51.  Freedman,  op.  cit. ,  p.  37. 
52.  The  Pentagon  always  has  prepared  several  Soviet  strategic  estimates 
relating  to  different,  U.S.  joint  defense  planning  parameters.  For 
example,  in  the  1960s  these  included  the  National  Intelligence 
Projections  for  Planning  (NIPP) ,  a  ten-year  projection,  to  which 
KcNamara  encouraged  CIA  input.   The  JCS  annually  produced  several 
estimates  ranging  from  2-15  years.  Under  McNamara,  the  Pentagon 
also  prepared  a  separate  "worst-case"  Soviet  estimate,  based  on 
his  interest  in  keeping  this  kind  of  estimating  out  of  the  strategic 
NIEs.  This  was  called  the  "Greater  Than  Expected  Threat"  estimate. 
As  excellent  summary  of  the  problem  is  provided  by  Gen.  Daniel  Graham, 
"Estimating  the  Threat:  A  Soldier' a   Job,"  Army,  April  1973,  pp.  14-18. 
53.  Several  interviews  suggested  that  alliances  were  more  or  less 
"automatic"  to  provide  offsetting  predictions.  For  example,  inter- 
views with  Helmut  Son;.enfeldt  (11/30/78),  Williard  Matthias  (10/28/78) 
and  William  Hyland  (11/17/78). 
54.  Freedman,  op.  cit.f  p.  25. 
55.  Allen  Dulles,  The  Craft  of  Intelligence,  op.  cit.,  p.  52. 
56.  This  was  accomplished  in  McCone's  new  office,  for  National  Intelligence 
Programs  Evaluation,  established  in  1963  to  improve  interaction 
between  components  of  the  intelligence  community.  See,  Thomas  Powers, 
The  Man  who  Kept  The  Secrets,  op.  cit.,  p.  160. 
57.  Ibid.
-  12  - 
75.  Interview  with  Andrew  Marshall  (2/9/79)  and  Tom  Lattimer  J5/10/79) 
who  says  "DIA's  interest  goes  up  and  down." 
76.  Interview  with  past  and  current  CIA  official  (A)  (2/9/79  and  5/30/79), 
and  Andrew  Marshall  (2/9/79),  who  both  agree  as  well  that  this  method 
helps  eliminate  "red  herrings"  and  serves  as  a  means  tc  check  minor 
arithmetic  errors. 
77.  Interview  with  Gen.  Daniel  Graham,  5/9/79.   Also,  Graham,  "US 
Intelligence  at  the  Crossroads,"  op.  cit. ,  p.  11. 
78.  Interview  with  past  and  current  CIA  official  (A),  5/30/79. 
79-    Ibid.   Also,  interview  with  past  and  current  CIA  official  (C) ,  12/15/78. 
80.    This  paragraph  is  derived  from  interview  with  current  CIA  official 
(E),  9/25/79. 
CHAPTER  IV:   SUBSTANTIVE  INPUT  OF  DCIs  TO  THE  DRAFT  STRATEGIC  NIEs* 
1.  SSCI,  Final  Report,  Book  I,  op.  cit. ,  p.  258. 
2.  For  example,  interviews  with  Ray  Cline,  5/1/78  and  11/8/78.  Although 
DCI's  reviev;  was  considered  oart  of  the  process,  Cline  also  said  that 
it  worried  Sherman  Kent,  lest  this  link  the  NIEs  too  closely  to 
policy  considerations. 
3.  Interview  with  Bromley  Smith,  9/12/78.  Also,  interview  with  Robert 
Amory,  9/13/78,  who  as  Dulles'  DDI  was  a  member  of  the  NSC's  Planning 
Board . 
4.  Interview  with  John  Bross,  5/29/79,  who  was  quoting  Ernie  May,  later 
a  member  of  The  Murphy  Commission. 
5.  While  interviewees  agree  on  this  point,  they  vary  in  describing  how 
much  of  the  NIE  Dulles  might  read  at  this  time.  To  this  author,  this 
suggests  inconsistent  attention  to  different  NIEs  by  the  DCI.   For 
example,  one  interviewee  said  that  Dulles  "flipped  through  the  pages'* 
(Jack  Smith,  9/20/78);  but  Sherman  Kent  said  that  "he  knew  what  was 
in  every  estimate.  The  important  ones  he  studied  very  carefully. 
He  never  talked  about  one  which  he  hadn't  read."   (Interview  5/2/78). 
Stories  of  how  Dulles  kept  Kent  waiting  into  the  early  evening  and, 
then,  sometimes  became  distracted  during  the  NIE  discussions, are 
legendary. 
;The  following  analysis  is  derived  from  multiple  interviewees.  Unless 
there  is  a  difference  of  opinion,  only  the  principal  source  or  sources 
is  cited.
-  13  - 
6.  Interviews  with  Ray  Cline  (5/1/78),  and  Keith  Clark  (9/19/78  and 
11/3/78).   Cline  said  that,  in  his  heart,  Dv.lles  preferred  using  his 
own  words  in  the  NIEs  and,  at  this  time,  might  dictate  a  new  sentence 
or  paragraph  to  Kent.   If  there  was  quibbling  among  Board  members 
over  words,  Dulles  might  say:   "I'm  the  boss"  and  insist  on  his 
own  wording.   Clark  said  that  Dulles  believed  that  the  NIEs  should 
offer  firm  predictions  and/or  give  odds  on  the  likelihood  of  occurrence 
"•You're  paid  to  estimate,'"  he  once  told  the  Board. 
7.  Interviews  with  Ray  Cline  (5/1/78),  Paul  Borel  (9/1/78)  and  Sherman 
Kent  (5/2/78).   Kent  said  that  Dulles  could  be  "genially  bull-headed" 
about  a  non-strategic  NIE  and,  on  occasion,  insisted  that  his  judge- 
ment be  represented.   Cline  concurs,   "iorel  said  that  once  Dulles 
rewrote  an  entire  SNIE  and  the  Board  dissented  from  it. 
8.  Interview  with  Deforest  Van  Slyck,  5/2/78. 
9.  Clir.*,  Secrets,  Spies  and  Scholars,  op.  cit. ,  p.  143. 
10.  Hanson  Baldwin,  New  York  Times,  May  6,  1970. 
11.  Interview  with  Ray  Cline,  11/8/78.   Cline  says  that  McCone  did  not 
want  to  say:   "This  is  my  estimate."  He  believed  that  "the  NIE 
system  was  bigger  than  he  was,"  and  would  have  preferred  to  take  a 
footnote  himself. 
12.  Interviews  with  Gen.  Daniel  Graham  (12/7/78)  and  William  Hyland 
(11/17/78) .   Graham  says  that  McCone  once  told  General  LeMay  at  a  cock- 
tail party:   "'Air  Force  Intelligence  is  the  laughing  stock  of 
Washington. ' "  As  AEC  Chairman,  McCone  had  been  on  the  low  side  of 
the  missile  nau  predictions,  basing  this  on  the  A2C's  estimate  of 
Soviet  fissionable  material. 
13.  Freedman,  U.i'.  Intelliaence  and  the  Soviet  Strategic  Threat ,  op.  cit., 
pp.  75-77.   Since  the  CIA's  estimates  kept  changing  in  different 
drafts  during  this  period,  these  figures  merely  provide  one  indica- 
tion of  downward  revision. 
14.  Ibid.,  p.  101. 
15.  Interview  with  John  Bross,  5/29/79. 
16.  Cline,  Secrets,  op.  cit.,  p.  192.. 
17.  Interview  with  John  Bross,  5/29/79.   Interviewees  disagree  on  McCone" s 
level  of  involvement,  which  to  this  author  indicates  inconsistent 
attention  to  different  NIEs,  and  McCone' s  preference  for  keeping  his 
personal  views  out  of  the  draft.   Most  interviewees  indicated  a  high 
degree  of  serious  interest  on  McCone* s  part.   However,  three  said 
that  McCone*  s  policy  was  ''not  to  get  involved"  (Sara  Hooskinson, 
11/9/78),  that  he  "never  interfered  with  the  process,"  (Williard 
Matthias,  10/25/78,  and  that  "he  wa3  not  very  interested"  (William 
Hyland,  11/17/78). 
18.  Cline,  Secrets,  op.  cit. ,  pp.  192-193.
35.  Interview  with  Sara  Hooskinson,  11/9/78,  who  was  present. 
36.  SSCI,  Eock  IV,  "History,"  op.  cit. ,  p.  85. 
37.  Interview  with  William  Colby  (5/29/79)  and  Sam  Hooskinson  (11/9/78). 
Hooskinson  also  called  Schlesinger  a  "redrafter." 
38.  Interview  with  William  Colby,  5/29/79. 
39.  Ibid. 
40.  Interview  with  past  and  current  CIA  official  (C) ,  12/15/78. 
41.  Interview  with  William  Colby,  5/29/79.   One  interviewee  said  that 
Colby  believed  that  the  NIOs  were  there  "to  advise  him  on  his  views" 
(Sam  Hooskinson,  11/9/78). 
42.  David  Binder,  quoting  a  Pentagon  intelligence  official,  in  "CIA  Head 
Accused  of  Tailoring  Estimatas  to  Policy;  He  Denies  It,"  New  York 
Times,  Monday,  November  6,  1978.  Binder  said  that  he  based  this 
article  on  interviews  with  five  CIA  officials  and  the  DCI.   (Intervie 
2/9/79). 
43.  Binder,  NYT,  Nov.  6,  1978,  quoting  Admiral  Turner. 
44.  Interview  with  current  CIA  official  (E) ,  9/25/79. 
45.  This  paragraph  is  derived  entirely  from  interview  with  past  and 
current  CIA  official  (A),  5/30/79. 
46.  Ibid. 
CHAPTER  V:   THE  DCI'S  LEADERSHIP  ROLES  AT  USIB  OR  NFIB. 
1.  SSCI,  Final  Report,  op.  cit.,  p.-  76. 
2.  Freedman,  U.S.  Intelligence  and  the  Soviet  Strategic  Threat,  cp.  cit., 
p.  40. 
3.  Ibid.,  p.  39. 
4.  Interview  with  past  and  current  CIA  official    (A),    5/30/79. 
5.  Freedman,  op.   cit.,   pp.   66-67. 
6.  Stuart  Symington,  "Where  the  Missile  Gap  Went,"  The  Reporter,  Feb.  15, 
1962,  p.  25. 
7.  Daniel  Graham,  "The  Intelligence  Mythology  of  Washington,  Strategic 
Review,  op.  cit.  p.  61. 
8.  Interview  with  Gen.  Daniel  Graham,  5/7/79.  Graham  said  that  Army 
Intelligence  wanted  to  target  U-2  flights  on  medium-range  missile  site 
but  the  CIA  kept  searching  for  ICBM  sites.  He  said  this  was  true  in 
the  case  of  the  ill-fated  Gary  Powers  flight  of  May  1,  1960  about 
which  the  Army  had  argued:   "You  won't  find  anything."  See  also, 
Everett  Allen,  "Lack  of  Information  led  US  to  Overestimate  Missile  Lag 
St.  Louis  Post-Dispatch,  Jan.  27,  1965.
-  16  - 
9.  Dulles'  posture  at  USIB  was  described  in  interviews  with  John  Huizenga 
(9/13/78  and  10/26/78),  Jack  Smith  (9/20/7P),  Gen.  Daniel  Graham 
(12/7/78),  Ray  Cline  (8/20/78),  Hal  Ford  (12/7/78)  and  past  and 
current  CIA  official  (C)  (12/15/73).   Interviews  agree  thet  Dulles 
listened  to  lengthy  debate  but  sometimes  grew  impatient  towards  the 
end.   They  agree  that  Dulles'  "heart  was  in  favor  of  an  unspoken 
compromise"  and  he  defended  the  CIA  view  only  as  necessary.  How- 
ever, on  non-strategic  NIEs  he  occasionally  was  impatient  with  the 
CIA  as  well,  and  sometimes  encouraged  the  Pentagon  to  express  its 
views.   For  example,  this  happened  in  the  case  of  a  SNIE  during  the 
.1956  Suez  crisig.   (Interview  with  John  Bross,  4/14/78). 
10.  The  Joint  Study  Group  Report  on  Foreign  Intelligence  Activities  of 
tHa  United  States  Government,  known  as  the  Kirkpa trick  Report, 
December  15,  1960,  p.  14.   See,  Declassified  Documents  Rersrence 
System,  op.  cit. ,  S77-270D.   The  report  also  asserts  that  Pentagon 
members  on  USIB  were  not  permitted  to  appeal  its  decisions  without 
the  approval  of  the  Defense  Secretary. 
11.  Interview  with  Gen,  Daniel  Graham,  5/9/79. 
12.  Freedman,  op.  cit.,  p.  70. 
13.  Interview  vith  Bromley  Smith,  9/12/7e,  who  was  qvioting  General 
Andrew  Goodpaster,  Eisenhower's  Chief  of  Staff. 
14.  Colin  Gray,  "'Gap'  Predictions  and  America's  Defense,"  Orbis,  op.  cit. 
p.  269. 
15.  Interview  with  past  and  current  CIA  official  (A),  5/30/79.  This  was 
confirmed  in  an  interview  with  Charles  V.  Murphy,  who  also  said  that 
during  the  campaign  Nixon  was  "upsit"  and  asked  Dulles  for  his  views. 
16.  Graham,  "Estimating  the  Threat,"  Army,  op.  cit.,  p.  15.   Several  in- 
terviewees said  that,  subsequently,  CIA  officials  blamed  the  Air 
Force  for  influencing  the  CIA's  positions  during  the  missile  gap 
period.   See,  for  example,  Allen  Dulles,  Harper* 3  Magazine,  April 
1963,  in  which  he  writes  that  the  CIA  responded  to  "great  pressure" 
from  the  Defense  Department.  See  also,  Edgar  M.  Bottome,  The  Missile 
Gap:   A  Study  of  the  Formulation  of  Military  and  Political  Policy  (New 
Jersey:  Fairieigh  Dickinson  University  Press,  1971). 
17. 
Quoted  in  SSCI,  Final  Report,  Book  IV,  "History,"  op. 
The  time  and  original  source  of  Eisenhower's  comment  is  unclear. 
cit. ,  p.  62, 
18.  Letter  from  P-.-esident  John  F.  Kennedy  to  John  McCone,  Jan.  16,  1962, 
quoted  in  SSCI,  Book  IV,  "History,"  p.  73. 
19.  Freedman,  op.  cit. ,  pp.  22-23. 
20.  Interviews  with  Gen.  Daniel  Graham  (12/7/78) ,  Gen.  George  Keegan 
(2/10/79) ,  and  Jt>hn  Huizenga  (9/13/78) .  McNamara  privately  criticized 
McCone  for  interfering  in  internal  DOD  matters,  and  resented  his 
requests  for  help. 
21.  Freedman,  op.  cit,  p.  23.
-  18  - 
38a.   Interview  with  Gen.  Daniel  Grahan,  12/7/78. 
39.  Interview  with  Gen.  George  Keegan,  2/10/79  and  10/11/79.   Keegan 
then  considered  Schlesinger's  reforms  "non-competitive." 
40.  Ibid.  See  also,  William  T.  Lee,  Understanding  the  Soviet  Military 
Threat:  How  CIA  Estimates  Went  Astray  {NY:   National  Strategy 
Information  Center,  Agenda  Paper  Nov.  6,  1977)  p.  3f .   Lee  says  that 
in  the  early  1970s  Air  Force  Intelligence  translated  nine  basic  books 
on  Soviet  military  and  strategic  doctrine.   Previously,  the  only 
translated  Soviet  book  on  this  subject  was  that  of  the  late  Marshal 
Sokolovskiy,  Military  Strategy.   In  the  mid-19603,  Keegan  had 
challenged  McNamara's  reliance  on  one  translation  of  this  bock  (by 
Thomas  Wolfe  of  the  RAND  Corporation) ,  claiming  -hat  it  wa3  full  of 
inaccuracies.  (Interview,  2/10/79). 
41.  Interview  with  Gen.  Daniel  Graham,  5/9/79. 
42.  Interview  with  Gen.  Georcje  Keegan,  2/10/79.  Neither  Colby  nor  Keegan 
were  particularly  satisfied  with  this  method  of  resolving  dissent. 
One  interviewee  said  that  Colby  worried  about  excessive  footnoting. 
(Sam  Hooskinson,  11/9/78)  . 
42a.  Interview  with  past  and  current  CIA  official  (A),  5/30/79. 
43.  Ibid. 
44.  Ibid.  ; 
45.  Ibid. 
4 S.   SSCI,  Book  I,  p.  79. 
47.  David  Binder,  quoting  a  Pentagon  inte]ligence  official,  MYT,  Nov.  6, 
1978. 
48.  See,  Blackstock,  "The  Intelligence  Community  Under  the  Nixon  Admin- 
istration, "  op.  cit.,  p.  236,  and  The  Murphy  Commission  Report,  op.  cit.. 
Volume  7,  Appendix  U,  pp.  11  and  44k  Although  the  DCI  carries  more 
weight  than  the  other  USIB  members,  one  author  concludes  here  that 
"the  DCI's  chief  tool  is  persuasion,  and  the  normal  outcome  when 
disputes  occur  is  often  no  more  than  a  partially  satisfactory  compro- 
mise."  (William  J.  Barnds,  p.  12). 
49.  Interview  with  Richard  Helms  (6/7/79)  and  past  and  current  CIA  official 
(A)  (5/30/79). 
50.  There  is  some  dispute  about  whether  McCone  presented  his  views  to 
Kennedy  from  Europe.  Ray  Cline  says  that  McCone  told  Kent  that  he 
would  write  a  memo  to  Kennedy,  but  never  did  so.  Rather,  McCone* s  DDCI 
went  to  see  Kennedy.   (Interview,  11/8/78).   Another  interviewee  3aid 
that  McCone  "went  tc  the  White  House  more  than  once  with  his  own  views" 
on  other  NIEs.   (William  Hyland,  11/17/78) . 
51.  Interview  with  past  and  current  CIA  official  (A),  5/30/79.  He  also 
said  that  McCone  "felt  strongly"  about  the  Soviet's  ABM  potential  and 
"sharply  modified"  the  CIA  text.   (Interview,  2/9/79) .
-  19  - 
52.  For  example,  see  Freedman,  op.  cit.,  p.  93. 
53.  ioid. 
54.  Interview  with  William  Colby,  5/29/79.  However,  on  other  matters 
Colby  wrote:   "Helms  had  far  too  exquisite  a  sense  of  political 
realities  to  get  into  a  fight  he  knew  he  couldn't  win,  and  which 
could  hurt  both  CIA  and  himself."   (See,  Colby,  Honorable  Men,  op.  cit. , 
p.  330). 
55.  SSCI,  Book  I,  p.  80,  fn.  29. 
56.  Interview  with  CIA  official  (I),  9/25/79. 
57.  Powers,  The  Man  Who  Kept  The  Secrets,  op.  cit.,  p.  177. 
58.  See,  for  example,  SSCI,  Book  I,  p.  77  and  Laurence  Lynn  in  The  Murphy 
Commission  Report,  op.  cit.,  Volume  7,  Appendix  U,  p.  48. 
59.  SSCI,  Book  I,  p.  78  and  fn.  25. 
60.  Interview  with  Gen.  George  Keegan,  10/11/79. 
61.  Interview  with  Hal  Ford,  12/7/78,  pertaining  to  the  National  Security 
Agency. 
62.  Interview  with  Gen.  Daniel  Graham  (5/9/79)  and  Dick  Anderson  (5/10/79). 
63.  Interview  with  Gen.  Daniel  Graham,  5/9/79. 
64.  Interview  with  William  Colby,  5/29/79. 
6o.  Interview  with  Gen.  Daniel  Graham  (5/9/7?) and  John  Bross  (5/29/79). 
66.  Interview  with  William  Colby  (5/29/79)  and  Gen.  Daniel  Graham  (5/9/79). 
67.  Interview  with  William  Colby,  5/29/79. 
68.  Ibid. 
69.  Interview  with  Gen.  Daniel  Graham,  5/9/79. 
70.  David  Binder,  NYT,  Nov.  6,  1978. 
71.  Ibid.,  in  an  interview  with  Admiral  Turner. 
72.  Binder,  draft  of  NYT  article  (provided  to  the  author),  prepared 
Oct.  12,  1978. 
73.  Binder,  NYT,  Nov.  6,  1978. 
74.  Interviews  with  current  CIA  official  (E)  (9/25/79)  and  past  and  current 
CIA  official  (A)  (5/30/79). 
75.  Ibid. 
J
-  20 
CHAPTER  VI.  THE  DCI'S  ROLE  IN  PROMOTING  INDEPENDENT  REVIEW 
1.  SSCI,  Final  Report,  Book  IV,  "History,"  op.  cit.,  p.  19. 
2.  Interviews  with  Klaus  Knorr  (5/30/79),  Hal  Ford  (12/7/73),  Paul 
Borel  (9/1/78)  and  Gen.  Daniel  Graham  (12/7/79). 
3.  Interview  with  Klaus  Knorr,  5/30/75. 
4.  Ibid. 
5.  Freedman,  U.S.  Intelligence  and  the  Soviet  Strategic  Threat,  op.  cit., 
p.  40. 
~6.   Ibid. 
7.   Interview  with  Klaus  Knorr  (5/30/79)  and  Ray  Cline  (5/2/78). 
3.  Freedman,  op.  cit.,  p.  40. 
9.  SSCI,  Book  I,  testimony  of  Ed  Proctor  (former  DDI)  of  3/1/76,  p.  276, 
fn.  46.  These  studies  were  self-initiated  and  remain  classified.  Also, 
interviews  with  Ray  Cline  (8/20/78)  and  current  CIA  official  (K)  5/30/79) 
10.  See,  for  example,  Blackstock,  "The  Intelligence  Cc.nnunity  Under  the 
Nixon  Administration,"  op.  cit.,  p.  241. 
11.  Interview  with  George  Keegan,  10/11/79.  Other  subcommittee  chairman 
are  automatically  appointed  by  the  Defense  Secretary,  such  as  for 
GMIC's  successor. 
12.  Freedman,  op.  cit.,  p.  50.  See  also,  John  Newhouse,  Cold  Dawn:   The 
Story  of  SALT  (NY:  Holt,  Rinehart  and  Winston,  1973) . 
13.  SSCI,  Book  I,  p.  276. 
14.  SSCI,  Book  IV,  "History,"  p.  85. 
15.  SSCI,  Book  I,  p.  271. 
16.  Ibid. 
Lee,  Understanding  The  Soviet  Military  Threat,  op.  cit.,  in  a 
by  Eugene  V.  Rostow,  p.  1.  This  is  also  referred  to  as  "mirx 
17.  Lee,  Understanding  The  Soviet  Military  Threat,  op.  cit.,  in  a  Foreword 
:ror  imaging. 
18.  Interview  with  anonymous  past  CIA  official,  4/5/79.  See  also,  The 
Murphy  Commission  Report,  op.  cit. ,  Vol .  7 .  Appendix  U,  p.  75,  and" 
interview  with  William  Casey  (PFIAB  member  in  late  1976) ,  5/7/79. 
19.  SSCI,  Subcommittee  on  Collection,  Production,  and  Quality,  The 
National  Intelligence  Estimates  A-B  Team  Episode  Concerning  Soviet 
Strategic  Capability  and  Objectives  (Washington,  DC:  GPO,  Feb.  16,1978), 
p.  2.  ( 
20.  Interview  with  William  Colby,  5/29/79.
21  - 
21.  Interview  with  Gen.  Daniel  Graham,  5/7/79.   Graham  said   that,  throughout 
1975,  PFIA3  asked  Colby  several  tines  to  authorize  an  outside  review, 
but  Colby  hesitated  on  security  grounds. 
22.  Interview  with  Gen.  George  Keej^n,  2/10/79. 
23.  SSCI,  The  National  Intelligence  Estimates  A-B  Tecjn  Episode,  op.  cit. , 
p.  2. 
24.  Ibid. 
25.  Interview  with  William  Colby  (5/29/79  and  Fritz  Erraath  (10/26/79)  . 
However,  the  experiment  soon  became  an  administrative  nightmare  and 
the  effort  to  preserve  secrecy  failed.  William  Casey  described  Bush's 
attitude  at  the  end  of  the  year  as  "not  too  positive."   Interview, 
5/7/79. 
26.  David  Binder,  "New  CIA  Estimate  Finds  Soviet  Seeks  Superiority  in  Arms," 
NYT,  Dec.  26,  1976.  The  article  is  reproduced  in  Lee,  Understanding 
tHe  Soviet  Military  Threat,  op.  cit.,  p.  53-69.   Apparently,  it  is 
this  article  which  later  caused  controversy . 
27.  David  Binder,  draft  of  NYT  article  (provided  to  the  author),  prepared 
Dec.  23,  1976.   Binder  based  hi?  story  on  interviews  with  Bush  and 
other  participants. 
28.  Ibid.   (draft). 
29.  Binder,  NYT,  Dec.  26,  1976. 
30.  Ibid. 
31.  Ibid. 
32.  SSCI,  The  National  Intelligence  Estimates  A-B  Team  Episode,  op.  cit. , 
" Separate  Views  of  Senator  Daniel  P.  Moynihan,"  p.  9. 
33.  Binder,  NYT,  Dec.  26,  1976. 
34.  SSCI,  The  National  Intelligence  Estimates  A-3  Team  Episode,  op.  cit., 
p.  2.   The  Senate  also  reported  that  the  press  account  of  the  experiment's 
results  "appeared  in  garbled  and  one-sided  form."   (p.  2.). 
35.  Interview  with  Keith  Clark,  11/3/78.   Also,  interviews  with  William 
Casey  (5/7/79)  and  Gen.  Daniel  Graham  '5/9/79). 
36.  Interview  with  current  CIA  official  (F) ,  9/25/79.
LIST  OF   INTERVIEWEES* 
Robert  Amory 
Richard   Anderson 
William  Bader 
Richard  Betts 
David  Binder 
Richard  Bissell 
Paul  Borel 
James  Billington 
John  Bross 
William  Bundy 
William  Casey 
Bruce  Clark 
Deputy  Director  for  Intelligence  (DDI) ,  CIA, 
1951-1961  (9/13/78) 
Staff,  Office  of  Strategic  Research,  CIA,  1974-1977; 
Staff,  House  Committee  on  Intelligence,  1978-present 
(5/10/79) 
Task  Force  Leader,  Senate  Select  Committee  on 
Intelligence,  1974-1977;  Office  of  the  Secretary  of 
Defense,  1978:  Staff  Director,  Senate  Foreign 
Relations  Comnittee,  1979-present  (12/5/78) 
Staff,  Nationa'.  Security  Council  and  Senate  Select 
Committee  on  Intelligence,  1975-1977  (9/29/78, 
11/9/78,  and  5/3/79) 
Editor,  New  York  Times,  Washington  office,  writer  on 
Soviet  bloc  and  strategic  affairs  (2/9/79  and  5/29/7* 
Special  Assistant  to  the  DCI,  1953-1954;  Director, 
Development  Projects  Office,  CIA  ,  (for  the  U-2) , 
1954-1958;  Deputy  Director  for  Plans  (DDP) ,  1958  to 
early  1962  (5/26/78) 
Office  of  Research  and  Evaluation,  CIA,  1947-1950; 
Director  of  Administration,  Office  of  National 
Estimates,  CIA,  1950-1962;  Assistant  to  the  Deputy 
Director  for  Intelligence,  CIA,  1962-1966  (9/1/78) 
Staff,  Office  of  National  Estimates,  CIA,  1954-1957 
(10/13/78) 
Eastern  Europe  Division,  Directorate  for  Plans,  CIA, 
1950s;  Comptroller,  CIA,  1962-1964;  Deputy  to  the 
DCI  for  intelligence  community  coordination  (head 
of  National  Intelligence  Programs  Evaluation) , 
1964-1971  (2/14/78  and  5/29/79) 
Staff,  Office  of  National  Estimates  and  National 
Security  Council  liaison,  CIA,  1950-1961  (10/11/78) 
Under-Secretary  of  State,  1973-1974;  Member,  Murphy 
Commission,  1974-1975;  Member,  President's  Foreign 
Intelligence  Advisory  Board,  1976-1977  (5/7/79) 
Staff,  Basic  Intelligence  Division  of  the  Office  of 
Research  and  Reports,  CIA,  1950s;  Chief,  Military 
Intelligence  Branch,  Office  of  Current  Intelligence, 
and  Military  Intelligence  division,  CIA,  1960-1967; 
Director,  Office  of  Strategic  Research,  CIA,  1967- 
1973;  Director,  National  Foreign  Assessment  Center 
(D/NFA) ,  CIA,  late  1979  to  present 
»The  author  lists  mainly  former  positions  held  relevant  to  the  strategic  NIE 
process.   Date(s)  of  interview  is  provided  for  all  interviewees  except  current 
p*Jc°fflc:Lals-   For  them'  dates  are  cited  in  the  footnotes  and  on  a  separate
Keith  Clark 
Ray  Cline 
William  Colby 
John  Desires 
Fritz  Ermath 
Hal  Ford 
Alan  Goooman 
Lieut.  Gen. 
Daniel  Graham 
Richard  Helms 
Sam  Hooskinson 
Lawrence  Houston 
Staff,  Office  of  Notional  Estimates,  CIA,  1950-1963; 
Member,  Board  of  Estimates,  CIA,  1963-1973;  National 
Intelligence  Officer  (Western  Europe),  CIA,  1973-1976 
(9/19/78  and  ll/J/78) 
Staff  Director  and  other  assignments  in  the  Office 
of  National  Estimates,  CIA,  1950s;  Deputy  Director 
for  Intelligence,  CIA,  1962-1966;  Director,  Bureau 
of  Intelligence  and  Research,  State  Department, 
1969-1973  (5/1/78,  8/20/78  and  11/8/78) 
Station  Chief,  Deputy  Director  of  Pacification, 
Director  of  Phoenix  Program,  in  Vietnam,  CIA, 
1959-1972;  Executive  Director-Comptroller  of  CIA, 
1972;  Deputy  Director  for  Plans  (DDP) ,  early  1973; 
Director  of  CIA,  officially  from  September  4,  1973 
to  January  30,  1976  (11/17/78  and  5/29/79) 
National  Intelligence  Officer  (Nuclear  Proliferation) , 
CIA,  at  present 
RAND  Consultant  and  Staff,  Office  of  Strategic 
Research,  CIA,  1973-1976;  Intelligence  Community 
Staff  and  B  Team  liaison,  1976-1977;  Staff,  National 
Security  Council,  1978  to  present  (10/26/78) 
Staff,  Office  of  National  Estimates,  CIA,  1950-197  3; 
Senior  Staff,  Senate  Select  Committee  on  Intelligence, 
1973  to  present  (12/7/78) 
Special  Assistant  to  the  Director  of  the  National 
Foreign  Assessment  Center,  CIA,  1977-1979;  Assistant 
to  the  DCI,  at  present 
Array  intelligence  officer,  1950s;  Staff,  Office  of 
National  Estimates,  CIA,  19S3-1965;  Director,  Defense 
Estimates,  Defense  Intelligence  Agency,  1970-1973; 
Assistant  to  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence, 
1973;  Director,  Defense  Intelligence  Agency,  1973-1978 
(12/7/78  and  5/9/79) 
Chief  of  Operations,  Directorate  for  Plans  (DDP) ,  CIA, 
1952-1961;  Deputy  Director  for  Plans  (DDP),  1962-1965; 
Deputy  Director  of  CIA,  mid-1965  to  mid-1966;  Direc- 
tor of  CIA,  officially  from  June  30,  1966  to 
February  2,  1973   (6/7/79) 
National  Intelligence  Officer  (Middle  East)  CIA, 
1974-1977;  Director,  Intelligence  Subcommittee, 
National  Security  Council,  1978-1979  (11/9/78) 
General  Counsel  of  CIA  (and  its  predecessor  body) , 
1945-1973  (3/22/78)
-  3  - 
John  Huizenga 
Art  Hulnick 
William  Hyland 
Anne  Karalekas 
Ma j .  Gen . 
George  Keegan 
Sherman  Kent 
James  King 
Klaus  Knorr 
Thomas  Lattimer 
Richard  Leyman 
Andrew  Marshall 
Williard  Matthias 
Staff,  Office  of  National  Estimates,  CIA,  1952-1964; 
Member,  Board  of  Estimates,  1364-1966;  Deputy 
Chairman,  Board  of  Estimates,  1967-1971;  Chairman, 
Board  of  Estimates,  1971-1973  (9/13/78  and  10/26/78) 
Center  for  the  Study  of  Intelligence,  CIA,  at  presen 
Staff,  Office  of  National  Estimates,  CIA,  1960-1968; 
Deputy  Assistant  for  National  Security  Affairs, 
White  House,  1969-1973;  Director,  Bureau  of  Intelli- 
gence and  Research,  1973-1978  (11/17/78) 
State  Dept. , 
Staff,  Senate  Select  Committee  on  Intelligence, 
1974-1977  (10/13/78) 
Air  Force  Intelligence  officer,  1950s  and  1960s; 
Assistant  Chief  of  Staff  for  Intelligence,  Air 
Force,  1972-1977.   (2/10/79  and  teleDhone  con- 
versation 10/11/79) 
Deputy  Chairman,  Board  of  Estimates,  CIA,  1950-1951; 
Chairman,  Board  of  Estimates.  CIA,  1952-1967  (5/2/78 
Assistant  to  the  Director  of  the  National  Foreign 
Assessment  Center  (for  academic  liaison),  CIA, 
1977  to  present 
Member,  Princeton  Consultants,  1950-early  1960s; 
Member,  Senior  Review  Panel,  national  Foreign  Assess 
ment  Center,  CIA,  1979  to  present 
Staff,  Office  of  Current  Intelligence,  CIA,  1958-197 
Staff,  National  Security  Council,  1970-1975;  Princip 
Deputy  to  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  Intelligence 
(and  head  of  DIA) ,  Department  of  Defense,  1975-1977; 
Staff  Director,  House  Intelligence  Costmittee,  1977 
to  present  (5/10/79) 
Intelligence  staff,  CIA,  since  1950;  Director,  Offic 
of  Current  Intelligence  in  1970s  and  deputy  to  the 
DCI  for  National  Intelligence,  1976-1977;  presently, 
deputy  to  the  Director  of  the  National  Foreign  Asses 
ment  Center,  and  National  Intelligence  Officer  (for 
Warning) ,  CIA 
National  Security  Council  staff  and  head  of  NSC  Net 
Assessment,  1*69-1973;  Director,  Office  of  Net 
Assessment,  Office  of  Secretary  of  Defense,  1973 
to  present  (2/9/79) 
Staff,  Office  of  Research  and  Evaluation,  CIA,  1947- 
1950;  Staff,  Office  of  National  Estimates,  CIA, 
1950-1963,  Member,  Board  of  Estimates,  1963-1973 
(10/25/78)
-  4 
Jack  Maury 
Charles  Murphy 
William  Parmeutter 
Walter  Phorzheimer 
Vincent  Puritano 
Helmut  Sonnenfeldt 
Staff,  Office  of  National  Estimates,  CIA,  1950-1951; 
Chief,  Soviet  Division,  Directorate  for  Plans, 
CIA,  1554-1962?  Assistant  to  the  Defense  Secretary, 
and  the  Navy  Secretary,  1974-oresent  (8/24/78  and 
2/9/79) 
Former  Air  Force  Intelligence  officer,  journalist 
and  author  on  strategic  affairs  (5/3/78) 
National  Intelligence  Officer   (Africa),  CIA,  1973 
to  present 
Legislative  Counsel,  CIA  (and  its  predecessor  body) 
1945-1955;  Curator,  Historical  Intelligence  (CIA) 
Collection,  1956-1974  (4/14/78  and  4/16/79).   The 
author  gratefully  acknowledges  the  use  of  Walter 
Phorzheimer' s  personal  clipping  files  in  preparing 
this  study 
Assistant  to  the  Deputy  Director  of  CIA,  at  present 
Defense  and  State  Department  analyst.  ,  1960s;  Staff 
National  Security  Council,  1969-1977  (10/25/78 
and  11/30/78) 
Huntington  Sheldon 
Director,  Office  of  Current  Intelligence,  CIA, 
1953-1961  (8/8/78) 
Bromley  Smith 
R.  Jack  Smith 
Howard  Stoertz 
DeForest  Van  Slyck 
National  Security  Council  staff,  1954-1956,  and 
Executive  Secretary,  Operations  Coordinating  Board, 
1957-1961;  Executive  Secretary,  National  Security 
Council,  1961-1968  (3/9/78  and  9/12/78) 
Staff,  Office  of  National  Estimates,  CIA,  1950-1959; 
Member,  Board  of  Estimates,  1959-1962;  Director, 
Office  of  Current  Intelligence,  1962-1966;  Deputy 
Director  for  Intelligence,  CIA,  1966-1972  (9/20/78) 
Staff,  Office  of  National  Estimates,  CIA,  1952-1965; 
Chief,  Photo  Interpretation  Section,  the  Office  of 
Strategic  Research,  SALT  delegation  representative 
and  special  assistant  to  the  DCI  on  SALT  verifica- 
tion, CIA,  1965-1973;  National  Intelligence  Officer 
(Strategic  Intelligence) ,  CIA,  1973-present 
Staff,  Office  of  Research  and  Evaluation,  CIA, 
1947-1950;  Member,  Board  of  Estimates,  CIA,  1950- 
1960  (5/2/78)