UNITED  STATES  DISTRICT  COURT 
FOR  THE  DISTRICT  OF  COLUMBIA 
^■£0  fo-osas'o' 
CENTER  J FOR NATIONAL  SECURITY  ) 
STUDIES 
'  £1 
al.  ,             ) 
V • 
Plaintiff*,      ) 
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  AGENCY,  ) 
et  al. , 
Defendants.      ) 
Civil  Action  No.  80-1235 
AFFIDAVIT 
<      Leslie  C.  Dirks,  being  first  duly  sworn,  does  hereby 
!  depose  and  say: 
1.   I  am  the  Deputy  Director  for  Science  and  Technology 
of  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  ("CIA").   As  such,  I  am 
I  responsible  for  the  overall  management  and  supervision  of  the 
Directorate  of  Science  and  Technology  ("DS&T"),  one  of  the 
Agency's  four  Directorates.—'  In  this  role,  I  report 
J!  directly  to  the  Deputy  Director  or  to  the  Director  of  Central 
j;  Intelligence  ("DCI").   I  have  occupied  this  position  since 
•i  June  1,  1976.   The  statements  made  herein  are  based  upon  my 
ii 
c personal  knowledge,  upon  information  made  available  to  me  in  ray 
official  capacity,  and  upon  advice  and  counsel  of  the  Office 
of  General  Counsel. 
2.   As  the  Deputy  Director  for  Science  and  Technology,  and 
as  a  part  of  the  exercise  of  my  official  duties,  I  am  ultimately 
— '  The  other  three  directorates  of  the  CIA  are  the 
!  Directorate  of  Operations,  the  National  Foreign  Assessment 
Center,  and  the  Directorate  of  Administration-
responsible  for  the  review  of  information  which  is  held  by 
the  DStT  and  which  i«  the  subject  of  Freedom  of  Information 
Act.  ("FOIA")  and  Privacy  Act  requests  to  and  litigation 
against  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency.   As  part  of  such 
review,  I  am  responsible  for  insuring  that  the  determinations 
made  regarding  the  disposition  of  such  information  are  proper. 
3.   As  part  of  the  performance  of  my  official  duties, 
I  have  become  acquainted  with  the  twelve  FOIA  requests 
submitted  to  this  Agency  by  the  Plaintiffs  in  this  litigation. 
More  particularly,  I  have  become  acquainted  with  a  FOIA 
request  submitted  by  plaintiff  Andres — a  request  which  is 
described  in  Count  XII  of  plaintiffs'  complaint  (copy  attached). 
In  that  request,  plaintiff  Andres  sought,  on  behalf  of  the 
Center  for  National  Security  Studies,  the  following: 
. .  .  copies  of  any  photographs  of  the  United  States 
obtained  by  the  National  Reconnaissance  Office  or 
any  other  agency  component  of  the  Defense  Department 
of  the  CIA  through  any  method  of  overhead  reconnais- 
sance, including  satellite  surveillance,  during  the 
years  1966,  1968,  1969,  1978  and  1979. 
ii 
:!    Plaintiff  Andres   also   sought   copies   of  any   analyses   of   such 
i' 
i!    photographs   made  by   the  National  Photographic  Interpretation 
!;    Center  or   any  other   component   of   this  Agency. 
!' 
•:  4.      This  Affidavit   is    submitted   to   explain  my  determination 
l!  2/ 
j|  that  any  reconnaissance  photography-  and  related  analyses 
''  responsive  to  Plaintiff  Andres'  request  must  be  withheld  in 
their  entirety.   I  have,  made  this  determination  on  the  following 
grounds: 
— /  A  search  of  appropriate  records  indices  identified 
U-2  coverage  collected  during  five  missions  flown  by  the 
United  States  Air  Force  that  was  responsive  to  Plaintiff 
j-  Andres*  request.   This  photography  and  certain  analytical 
documents  has  been  referred  to  the  Air  Force  for  a  reply 
directly  to  Plaintiff.
(a)  because  such  photography  and  related  analyses 
an  currently  and  properly  classified  pursuant  to 
Executive  Order  12065  as  information  requiring  continued 
protection  against  unauthorized  disclosure  and,  as 
such,  are  exempt  from  release  pursuant  to  exemption 
(b) (1)  of  the  FOIA;  and 
(b)  because  such  photography  and  related  analyses 
constitute  intelligence  sources  and  methods  which 
the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  is  responsible 
for  protecting  against  unauthorized  disclosure  as  set 
forth  in  50  U.S.C.  403(d)(3)  and,  as  such,  are  exempt 
from  release  pursuant  to  FOIA  exemption  (b)(3). 
These  rationales  and  their  applicability  to  reconnaissance 
photographs  and  related  analytical  documents  will  be  set 
forth  below. 
5.   The  authority  of  a  CIA  official  to  classify  documents 
is  derived  from  a  succession  of  Executive  Orders,  the  most 
recent  of  which  is  Executive  Order  12065.   This  Order  governed 
the  review  of  classified  information  responsive  to  Plaintiff 
Andres'  request.   As  the  Deputy  Director  of  Science  and 
Technology  and  pursuant  to  a  written  delegation  of  authority 
from  the  DCI  under  sections  1-201,  1-204  and  3-303  of  E.O. 
12065,  I  hold  original  classification  authority  at  the  TOP 
SECRET  level  and,  therefore,  am  authorized  to  make  classifica- 
tion reviews.  With  regard  to  the  reconnaissance  photography 
and  analyses  which  are  responsive  to  Plaintiff's  request,  I
have  determined  that,  with  one  exception—  ,  ail  such 
materials  have  been  propariy  classified  and  that  these 
materials  retain  their  classified  status  at  the  SECRET  or  TOP 
SECRET  level  pursuant  to  Executive  Order  12065.   Theae 
material*  contain  information  which  falls  within  one  or  more 
of  the  following  general  categories  set  forth  in  section 
1-301  of  E.G.  12065  as  proper  subjects  for  classification: 
(a)  information  pertaining  to  intelligence  activities, 
sources  or  methods  (§l-301(c));  or 
(b)  information  pertaining  to  foreign  relations  or 
foreign  activities  of  the  United  States  { §1-301 (d))r  or 
(c)  Information  pertaining  to  scientific,  technological 
or  economic  matters  relating  to  the  national  security 
(§l-301(f)). 
6.   The  release  of  materials  responsive  to  Plaintiff's 
request  reasonably  can  be  expected  to  cause  either  serious 
or  exceptionally  grave  damage  to  the  national  security  in  the 
sense  that  this  term  is  used  in  §§1-1  and  6-1  of  E.O. 
12065.   Such  damage  to  the  national  defense  or  the  foreign 
relations  of  the  United  States  would  reasonably  be  expected 
to  occur  by: 
(a)   the  disclosure  of  performance  capabilities 
of  overhead  intelligence  collection  systems;  or 
3  / 
— '  A  small  quantity  of  domestic  overhead  photography 
was  obtained  to. assess  the  feasability  of  using  conventional 
technology  for  foreign  intelligence  collection.   I  have 
determined  that'  the  public  release  of  this  photography 
would  compromise  an  intelligence  method  and  is,  therefore, 
exempt  from  dislosure  on  the  authority  of  exemption  (b)(3)  of 
the  FOXA.   In  addition,  15  rolls  of  unclassified  domestic 
overhead  photography  were  obtained  from  the  U.S.  Geological 
Survey.   This  photography  ranges  in  date  from  1964  and  1978. 
Although  this  photography  is  not  within  the  scope  of  Plaintiff's 
request,  it  should  be  noted  that  copies  of  this  photography 
may  be  purchased  from  the  U.S.  Geological  Survey  or  may  be 
obtained  from  this  Agency  upon  payment  of  the  cost  of 
reproduction.
(b)  tha  discloaura  of  tha  fact  that  a  particular 
photo-raconnaiaaance  satailite  ayatam  vaa  operational  at 
a  particular  point  in  time;  or 
(c)  the  diaciosure  of  the  typea  of  targata  againat 
which  overhead  photo-reconnaiaaance  vat  directed;  or 
(d)  the  diacloaure  of  photo-reconnaiaaance  aatellite 
coverage  of  foreign  nations. 
These  disclosures  .-rould  occur  if  reconnaiaaance  photography 
of  the  United  States  was  provided  to  Plaintiff  in  response  to 
her  FOIA  request. 
7.  In  addition.  Executive  Order  12065,  at  section 
3-303,  provides  for  a  further  consideration  with  regard  to 
classification: 
...In  some  cass,  however,  the  need  to  protect 
such  information  may  be  outweighed  by  the  public 
interest  in  disclosure  of  the  information,  and  in 
these  cases  the  information  should  be  declassified. 
When  such  questions  arise,  they  shall  be  referred 
to. . .a  senior  agency  of ficial. . .or. . .an  official 
with  Top  Secret  classification  authority. . .That 
official  will  determine  whether  the  public  interest 
in  disclosure  outweighs  the  damage  to  national 
security  that  might  reasonably  be  expected  from 
disclosure.   [Emphasis  added.] 
In  accordance  with  this  section  of  the  Order,  I  have  also 
examined  my  determinations  in  Light  of  an  Agency  Regulation 
(see  Attachment  II)  which  implements  this  portion  of  the 
Executive  Order  and  which  was  predicated  upon  the  advisory 
letter  (see  Attachment-  III )  of  Mr.  Zbigniew  BrzezinsXi, 
Assistant  to  the  President  for  National  Security  Affairs. 
8.  The  purpose  of  this  particular  aspect  of  my  classifi- 
cation review  of  the  categories  of  reconnaissance  photography 
and  related  documents  responsive  to  Plaintiff's  request  was 
to  determine  whether  circumstances  existed  which  required 
that  the  need  to  protect  properly  classified  information  be
balanced   against   the  public  benefits    of   disclosure.      Upon 
completion   of   my   review   of    the    categories    of    information 
responsive   to   Plaintiff  Andre* '    request,    I    determined   that 
the    requisite   circumstances    do   not    exist   and,    consequently, 
such    reconnaissance  photography   and  analyses    thereof   continues 
to  warrant  its    current   classified  status. 
9.      In  sua,    the  photography   and   documents   responsive 
to  Plaintiff's   FOIA  request    fall  within  categories   of   infor- 
mation  recognized  by  Executive  Order    12065   as  proper  subjects 
for   classification.      The  disclosure   of   these  materials   could 
reasonably  be   expected  to  cause   e'ither   serious   or  exceptionally 
grave   damage  to  the   national   security.      As   a   result,    I  have 
determined   that   all   overhead  photography   and   related   documents 
responsive  to  Plaintiff  Andres  *    request   in  the  aistody  of   the 
National  Photographic  Interpretation  Center,    except  to  the 
minor   extent  noted  above,    are  properly  classified  pursuant 
to  the  most  recent  Executive  Order   dealing  with  classification 
of  national  security  information.      This   information  is  properly 
withheld  in  its   entirety  pursuant   to  exemption   (b)(1)    of   the 
Freedom  of  Information  Act.      No  meaningful,    segregable 
portions   of  such  overhead  photography  may  be  released. 
10.      In  my  classification   review,    I   did  not  conduct  a 
photograph-by-photograph   examination  of   reconnaissance 
imagery  and  related  analytical  documents   responsive  to 
Plaintiff's   request.      In    ity  opinion,    no   such   review  was 
necessary  and  would,    if  it  was   conducted,    constitute  a 
sterile  exercise  in   light  of  the   subject  matter  of  Plaintiff's 
request— reconaissance  photography  taken  via  intelligence 
collection  systems.     Moreover,    such  a  photograph-by-photograph 
review  would  be  burdensome   to  undertake.
11.   As  the  Deputy  Director  of  Science  and  Technology, 
I  am  responsible.  Inter  alia,  for  the  development  and  opera- 
tion of  technical  intelligence  collection  program*  of  the 
Central  Intelligence  Agency.   Moreover,  I  have  personally 
participated  in  the  design  and  development  of  certain  tech- 
nical intelligence  collection  systems.   Because  of  my  personal 
knowledge  and  because  of  information  made  available  to  me  in 
my  official  capacity,  I  am  familiar  with  (1)  the  technical 
systems  which  produced  photography  responsive  to  Plaintiff's 
request  and  (2)  the  categories  of  photography  responsive  to 
this  request.   The  various  aspects  of  the  existence,  uses, 
technical  attributes,  dates  of  operation  and  performance 
characteristics  of  such  overhead  reconnaissance  systems 
constitute  information  properly  classifiable  under  the 
criteria  established  by  Executive  Order  12065.   The  products 
of  such  systems  also  constitute  classified  information  under 
that  Order.   For  the  reasons  stated,  no  photograph-by-photo- 
graph review  was  undertaken  because  of  the  obvious  sensitivity 
of  the  information  sought  by  Plaintiff  *nd   because  of  my 
familiarity  with  the  categories  of  reconnaissance  photographs 
and  related  analytical  documents  that  would  be  responsive 
to  her  request. 
12.   Proper  classification  of  national  security  infor- 
mation is  not  the  only  reason  for  withholding  reconnaissance 
photography  and  related  documents  responsive  to  Plaintiff's 
request.   3y  statute  (50  U.S.C.  403(d)(3)),  the  Director  of 
Central  Intelligence  is  charged  with  the  responsibility  of 
protecting  intelligence  sources  and  methods  from  unauthorized 
disclosure.   Intelligence  sources  and  methods  include 
information,  the  disclosure  of  which  could  reveal  the  details
surrounding  those  photo-reconnaissance  collection  systems  that 
hav«  been  designed  for  the  collection  of  foreign  intelligence. 
i 
Although    it   has   been   officially    acknowledged   that   the  United   Statei i 
government   employe    satellite   photo—  reconnaissance    for   certain  i 
purposes — purposes   associated  with    arms    limitation  treaties— 
the  other   details    surrounding   the    use   of   such   satellites  have 
net  been  disclosed  publicly.      Detailed   information  regarding 
the   capabilities   or   the   employment   of    such   satellite   systems 
or  their  products   could  be   of    significant   assistance   to 
hostile   foreign  powers   who  would  wish   to   frustrate   the 
information   collecting   capabilities    of   such   systems. 
13.  Information   regarding   the   products   or  performance 
of   photo-reconnaissance   systems    relates-  directly  to   intel- 
ligence  sources   and   methods.      This    is    so  because  photo- 
reconnaissance   is   an  important  method  through  which  the 
United  States  -acquires    intelligence   information.      In  many 
cases,    such   information  is   not    readily  obtainable  by  other 
means.    While  the   statutory  phrase    "intelligence  sources   and 
j     methods"    is   frequently  applied   to  human  'collection  activities 
and  clandestine  CIA  operations,    this   phrase   is   also  applicable 
to  the   collection  of   intelligence    information  by  photo- 
reconnaissance.      Reconnaissance   photography   is    clearly  a 
valuable   source  of   intelligence    information  and  one  deserving 
protection  comparable  to  that   accorded  sensitive  human 
collection  programs   or   sensitive    special  activities  under- 
taken by  CIA, 
14.  Satellite  photography  obtained  for   intelligence 
purposes   constitutes  an  especially  important  source  of 
information  regarding  the  activities   of  foreign  powers.      The 
specific  capabilities  of   such   satellite  systems,   their 
existence  and  fact  of  operation  at   specific  points   in  time,
their   targets    and   operational   uses   can  be    surmised    front  the 
photography   that    is    responsiv©   to  Plaintiff*    raquaat. 
Accordingly,    such    reconnaissance   photography    and   analyses 
thereof   is   also   not    subject   to   disclosure   on   the   authority  of 
exemption    (b)(3)    of   the   POIA  on   the   ground   it    is    specifically 
protected  by   the    statutory  proviaion  the  Director   of  Central 
Intelligence   shall   be   responsible   for   safeguarding    intelligence 
sources   and  methods. 
15.  The   remainder   of   this  Affidavit  will   set    forth   the 
rationale   which    justifies    (1)    the  withholding  of   overhead 
photography   and   related   documents   responsive   to  Plaintiff's 
request,    and    (2)    the    nondisclosure  of   a  variety   of   matters 
associated  with    such    sensitive   documents.      While   these 
reasons  may  not  be   set   forth    fully  in  an  unclassified  affidavit, 
a   number  of  pertinent   rationales   and   justifications  may  be 
provided,    in   general   terms,    without  disclosing  classified 
information  and  without   compromising  intelligence   sources   and 
4/ 
methods.— 
16.  By  referring  in  her   request  to   "overhead   reconnaissance 
"satellite  surveillance,"  and    "analysis   cf   such  photographs," 
Plaintiff  Andres   indicates    she  is   seeking  photographs   and 
related  documents    associated  with  imagery  obtained   via  overhead 
reconnaissance  methods.      Until  relatively  recently,    the  mere 
fact  the  United  States   conducted  satellite  photo-reconnaissance 
had  not  been  acknowledged  and  had  constituted   classified 
information.      On  October  2,    1978,   President  Carter,    during 
remarks  made   as   part  of  a  Congressional  Space  Medals   awards 
-'    If  an  additional  and  more  detailed  explanation  is 
required  by  the  Court,    I  would  be  prepared,    upon  request,    to 
submit  a  classified  affidavit  for  the  Court's   in  camera 
review.
ceremony  at.  the  Kennedy  Space  Center,  made  the  following 
announcement : 
Photo-reconnaissance  satellites  have 
become  an  important  itabilizing  factor 
in  world  affair*  in  the  monitoring  of 
arms  control  agreements.   They  make  an 
immense  contribution  to  the  security 
to  all  nations.   We  shall  continue  to 
develop  them. 
As  a  result  of  this  Presidential  declaration,  agencies 
and  departments  of  the  federal  government  are  now  permitted 
to  acknowledge  that  the  United  States  does  conduct  satellite 
photo-reconnaissance  and  that  such  photo-reconnaissance 
has  been  used  as  a  means  to  verify  compliance  with  the  SALT 
agreement.   No  additional  official  acknowledgment  or  disclosures, 
however,  have  been  made  with  reference-  to  the  use  of  satellite 
photo-reconnaissance  for  intelligence  purposes. 
17.  While  the  fact  photo- reconnaissance  satellites  are  used 
by  the  United  States  as  a  means  of  obtaining  arms  control 
information  has  been  acknowledged  in  very  general  terms, 
virtually  none  of  the  "details"  regarding  the  use  or  cababilities 
of  such  photo- re connaissance  satellites  have  been  disclosed. 
In  this  regard,  this  Agency  has  acknowledged  it  has  custody 
of  classified  satellite  and  other  reconnaissance  photography. 
The  scope  and  extent  of  this  disclosure  has  been  limited  and 
did  not  involve  a  recitation  of  any  of  the  "details"  regarding 
the  performance  characteristics  of  U.S.  photo— reconnaissance 
satellites  or  other  reconnaissance  systems. 
18.  In  light  of  the  subject  matter  of  Plaintiff  Andres* 
request,  I  have  determined  that  the  Central  Intelligence 
Agency  cannot  disclose  in  any  public  document  (1)  the 
overall  number  of  potentially  responsive  photographs  and 
analyses  thereof  in  the  custody  of  the  National  Photographic
Interpretation  Center?  (2)  the  specific  geographic  area  or 
areas  within  the  United  States  which  have  been  subject  to 
ov«rhead  photo-reconnaiasancer—   (3)  the  satellite  photo- 
reconnaissance  system  which  produced  the  responsive  photography; 
or  (4)  the  specific  timeframe  during  which  satellite  photo- 
reconnaissance  of  a  particular  geographic  area  occurred  or 
the  specific  number  of  photographs  obtained  during  such 
periods.   I  have  also  determined  that  no  particular 
classified  reconnaissance  photograph,  or  analyses  or 
interpretation  thereof  that  may  be  responsive  to  Plaintiff's 
request  may  be  released  or  described  in  specific  detail  in 
any  public  document.   Any  disclosure  of  these  categories  of 
information  could,  in  my  opinion,  reasonably  be  expected 
to  cause  either  serious  or  exceptionally  grave  damage  to 
the  national  security  as  this  concept  is  defined  in  section 
6-104  of  Executive  Order  12065 .   Disclosure  of  the  categories 
of  information  noted  above,  in  any  public  forum,  would  (1) 
result  in  the  unauthorized  release  of  information  that  has 
been  duly  classified  at  the  SECRET  and  TOP  SECRET  clas- 
sification designations  or  (2)  would  result  in  the  compromise 
5/ 
— '  Reconnaissance  photography  of  locations  in  the 
United  States  has  been  taken  for  a  variety  of  purposes,  most 
of  which  fall  into  two  general  categories."  First,  reconnais- 
sance photography  is  taken  of  targets  in  the  United  States 
the  foreign  counterparts  of  which  are  of  substantive  intel- 
ligence interest  %  By  "comparing  overhead  photographs  of  known 
U.S.  targets  with  their  foreign  counterparts,  this  Agency  is 
able  to  make  sophisticated  and  knowledgeable  determinations 
regarding  foreign  targets.   Second,  reconnaissance  photography 
is  taken  of  domestic  locations  in  order  to  determine  the 
performance  parameters  of  collection  systems.   By  analyzing 
such  photography,  this  Agency  is  able  to  calculate  the 
resolution  of  photographs  generated  by  a  system  and  to  assess 
other  performance  parameters.  These  performance  character- 
istics constitute  information  which  is  both  classified 
pursuant  to  E.O.  12065  and  which  relates  directly  to  intel- 
ligence sources  and  methods.
of  information  relating  directly  to  intelligence  tourctt  and 
method* — information  the  Congress  hat  charged  the  Director 
of  Central  Intelligence,  by  statute,  with  the  responsibility 
for  protecting  from  unauthorized  disclosure  (50  U.S.C.  403 
(d)(3)). 
19.   My  determination  this  Agency  cannot  make  detailed 
public  disclosures  regarding  satellite  photography  and 
related  documents  that  are  potentially  responsive  to  Plaintiff 
Andres'  request  hinges  upon  an  understanding  of  the  extent 
to  which  the  United  States  Government  has  officially 
acknowledged  its  role  with  regard  to  such  overhead  photo- 
reconnaissance.   While  the  existence  of  satellite  photo- 
reconnaissance  intelligence  collection  systems  have  been 
acknowledged  by  the  United  States,  their  operational 
attributes,  or  other  technical  information  regarding  their 
reconnaissance  capabilities  or  their  imagery  products  have 
not  been  disclosed.   Disclosures  regarding  the  technical 
attributes  of  overhead  reconnaissance  systems  or  associated 
products,  such  as  actual  photographs  or  analyses  thereof, 
would  cause  serious  damage  to  the  national  security  of  the 
United  States.   Public  disclosure  of  any  specific  data 
regarding  such  overhead  reconnaissance — including  the 
release  of  a  single  photograph  taken — for  intelligence 
purposes — would  permit,  through  the  application  of  sophisticated 
analytical  techniques,  a  knowledgeable  photo-scientist,  foreign 
power  or  hostile  intelligence  service  to  estimate  performance 
characteristics  of  the  originating  photo-reconnaissance  system.
For  example,  from  a  single  frame  of  photography  produced  by 
a  satellite  photo-reconnaissance  system,  it  is  possible  to 
calculate,  with  reasonable  confidence,  important  performance 
characteristics  and  capabilities  of  the  satellite  system 
that  produced  it.   For  this  reason,  no  single  frame  of 
classified  satellite  photography  relevant  to  plaintiffs 
request  may  be  released,  or  described  in  detail. 
20.   Public  disclosure  of  a  single  frame  of  photography 
produced  by  a  classified  overhead  reconnaissance  system 
would  result  in  the  compromise  of  the  following  categories 
of  information  regarding  the  originating  overhead  system. 
(1)  format  and  parameters  of  the  Imagery;  or 
(2)  the  potential  uses  of  information  obtained 
from  satellite  photo-reconnaissance; 
(3)  the  uses  made  of  a  specific  photo- 
reconnaissance  system;  or 
(4)  the  "fact  that"  a  particular  satellite  photo- 
reconnaissance  system  was  operational  at  a 
particular  time  or  the  "fact  that"  a  particular 
type  of  satellite  is  used  for  foreign  intelli- 
gence photo- reconnaissance;  or 
(5)  operational  capabilities  of  photo-reconnaissance 
satellite  systems. 
rhese  categories  of  information  constitute  "details"  of  overhead 
reconnaissance  systems.   It  is  my  considered  judgment  that 
if  these  details  were  disclosed  publicly,  either  directly  or 
indirectly  through  the  release  of  reconnaissance  photography 
in  response  to  Plaintiff's  request  the  system  to  which  such 
lisclosed  information  related  would  be  compromised.
21.   In  order  to  enhance  the  security  surrounding  a 
reconnaissance  eystsm,  a  variety  of  categories  of  information 
associated  with  such  systems  have  been  duly  classified. 
These  categories  include  information  which  would  indicate, 
acknowledge  or  tend  to  acknowledge: 
(1)  the  fact  that  a  particular  satellite  waa 
operational  and  engaged  in  the  collection 
of  information  for  intelligence  purposes;  or 
(2)  the  fact  that  a  particular  level  of  photo- 
reconnaissance  technology  was  in  use  at  a 
specific  time;  or 
(3)  the  quality  and  quantity  of  the  photographs 
produced  or  their  geographic  distribution;  or 
(4)  applications  made  of  reconnaisance 
satellites;  or 
(5)  assessments  of  the  performance  of  reconnaissance 
satellites;  or 
(6)  support  data  associated  with  reconnaissance 
collection;  or 
(7)  specific  performance  capabilities  and  technical 
characteristics  of  an  identifiable 
reconnaissance  system. 
The  classified  categories  of  information  noted  above  could 
be  compromised  by  release  of  reconnaissance  photographs  and 
associated  analytical  documents  that  are  responsive  to 
Plaintiff  Andres'  POIA  request.   Intelligence  sources 
and  methods  would  also  be  compromised  by  such  a  release  of 
information.
22.      Since    Plaintiff  Andres*    request   feefcs   photographs 
produced  by    reconnaissance    system*,    the   capabilities    of 
« 
which  art  prop«rly  cia**ified  in  accordance  with  the  criteria 
•at  forth  in  E.O.  12065,  and  which  relate  to  intelligence 
■ourcej  and  methods ,  it  logically  follow*  that  any  information 
regarding  the  product*  of  such  *y*tema  cannot  be  disclosed. 
Any  responsive  reconnaissance  photographs  and  associated 
analytical  documents  constitutes  properly  classified  information 
and  also  constitutes  information  directly  related  to  intelligenc 
sources  and  methods.   This  is  so  because  reconnaissance 
photography  of  specific  areas  within  the  United  States  has 
been  obtained  to  facilitate  intelligence  .research  of  analogous 
features  in  foreign  areas  or  to  determine  the  performance 
of  the  collection  system.—'  The  selection  and  specific 
character  of  such  areas  reflects  substantive  intelligence 
interest  or  system  capabilities.   This  information  must  be 
safeguarded. 
23.   If  this  Agency  was  required  to  release  a  single 
satellite  reconnaissance  photograph  taken  on  a  specific 
date — e.g.,  an  overhead  photograph  of  a  U.S.  naval  installation 
in  Hawaii — important  capabilities  of  the  satellite  system 
involved  would  be  compromised.   Since  the  satellites  passing 
within  sight  of  the  target  at  the  time  of  coverage  can  be 
— '  Such  performance  testing  includes  the  measurement 
and  analysis  of  the  capabilities  of  the  system's  camera  and 
film  and  the  manner  in  which  they  are  influenced  by  lighting 
and  atmospheric  conditions.
determined,  release  of  even  a  single  photograph  could  permit 
a  hoat.il*  intelligence  service  or  trained  photo-«cienti«t 
to  reach  the  following  conclusions: 
that  a  particular  satellite  was  used 
for  intelligence  purposes  and  that  this  satellite 
was  operational  at  the  time  of  collection; 
that  this  particular  satellite  was  capable  of 
providing  an  identifiable  level  of  detail  about 
activities  on  the  ground; 
—  that  this  satellite  probably  would  be  targeted 
against  other  similar  facilities  elsewhere  in 
the  world;  and 
—  that  this  satellite  possessed  or  lacked  certain 
capabilities  for  collecting  intelligence 
information. 
24.   Disclosure  of  these  categories  of  information  could 
reasonably  be  expected  to  result  in  serious  or  exceptionally 
grave  damage  to  the  national  security  of  the  United  States 
and  would  also  constitute  a  compromise  of  intelligence  sources 
and  methods.   If  a  hostile  foreign  power  became  aware  of  the 
performance  characteristics  and  technical  attributes  of  a 
particular  overhead  satellite  reconnaissance  system,  it 
might  be  able  to  develop  appropriate  counter-measures  to 
nullify  the  effectiveness  of  the  system  against  intelligence 
targets  within  its  territory.   The  disclosure  of  such  informatioi 
would  also  permit  a  hostile  foreign  power  to  estimate  the 
extent  of  technological  development  of  a  particular  operational
photo-reconnaissance  system,  the  classes  of  targets  the 
system  was  directed  against,  and  areas  of  substantive 
intelligence  interest  to  the  United  States  Government. 
25.  Disclosure  of  the  categories  of  information  noted 
in  paragraph  24  above  would  also  be  detrimental  to  the 
foreign  relations  of  the  United  States.   This  is  so  because 
foreign  nations  have  only  tacitly  accepted  the  use  of 
satellite  photo-reconnaissance  systems  as  a  verification 
tool  for  treaty  monitoring.   Accordingly,  there  is  a  potential 
that  any  disclosure  of  the  specifics  of  a  satellite  system 
used  to  obtain  photo— reconnaissance  for  intelligence  purposes 
could  produce  a  strain  in  relations  between  the  United 
States  and  other  countries . 
26.  It  is  also  important  to  note  that  the  release  of 
a  single  frame  of  reconnaissance  photography  in  response 
to  Plaintiff's  request  may  result  in  the  compromise  of 
several  layers  of  secrecy.   The  first  level  involves  the 
secrecy  of  the  very  existence  of  a  particular  intelligence 
collection  technique.   Por  many  intelligence  methods  such 
secrecy  is  critical  since  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  a 
particular  technical  means  of  intelligence  collection 
or  of  the  details  of  the  activity  may  permit  hostile  forces 
to  undertake  countermeasures  and,  accordingly,  diminish  if 
not  eliminate  the  utility  of  the  collection  effort.   A 
classic  example  of  such  a  disclosure  concerns  the  vessel 
known  as  the  Glomar  Explorer  whose  usefulness  as  part  of  a 
technical  intelligence  collection  program  was  impaired  upon 
disclosure  of  its  true  status.
27.       The    second    level    of    secrecy   potentially    subject 
to   compromise   by   the   public   release   of   particular   satellite 
reconnaissance   photographs    of   a   particular   place    at   a 
specific   time    involves    two   discrete    factors.      The    first 
factor   concern©   disclosure   of   a   substantive    area   of    intelligence 
interest:    e.g.,    naval    intelligence    in   the  hypothetical 
situation   noted   above.      The   second   factor    involves    operational 
characteristics    of   the  particular   reconnaissance   system. 
While   the    fact    a   specific   satellite   photo-reconniassance 
system   is    operational   and  used   for   foreign   intelligence 
purposes    demands   protection,    a   more   particularized   disclosure 
could   compromise   of   operational   characteristics    of   the 
system.      The   nature   of   such   a   compromise    is   highlighted 
below. 
28.      If,    in   the   example   noted   in  paragraph   23   above,    a 
single  photograph   of   a   naval   facility   in  Hawaii  was   revealed, 
a   number   of   characteristics   of   the   reconnaissance   system  that 
produced   this    imagery   could  be    surmised.      A   review   of   a 
particular   satellite  photograph  would  permit   a  Knowledgeable 
photo-scientist   to   estimate   the   performance    capabilities   of 
the   overall    imagery    system  that  produced    it.      An  analysis    of 
a   single   photograph  would   result    in   compromise   of   the 
following: 
(1)  the    resolution  of   the   system; 
(2)  other   technical   characteristics    of   the      • 
system; 
(3)  the   conditions   under  which   such   system  could 
operate;    or
(4)   special  capabilities  and  features  of  the 
system  might  posses. 
Revslation  of  this  information  might  permit  a  hostile  foreign 
country  to  determine  the  precise  type  of  countermeasures 
necessary  to  frustrate  the  operation  of  the  system  and  the 
geographic  areas  in  which  such  countermeasures  should  be 
taken.   For  example,  the  precise  resolution  of  satellite 
reconnaissance  photography  taXen  for  intelligence  purposes 
is  closely  guarded.   This  is  so  because  the  resolution— that 
is,  the  size  of  an  object  on  the  ground  that  may  be  identified 
by  imagery  produced  from  a  particular  system — is  a  critical 
parameter  providing  clues  as  to  the  uses  of  the  system 
and  the  countermeasures  necessary  to  impair  its  usefulness. 
The  resolution  obtained  by  a  particular  satellite-reconnaissance 
system  can  be  estimated  from  an  examination  of  a  photograph 
produced  by  the  system.   Similarly,  the  area  coverage 
capabilities  of  a  particular  system  might  also  be  disclosed 
by  release  of  a  single  photograph.   This  type  of  information 
is  of  critical  intelligence  value  to  a  hostile  power  intent 
upon  frustrating  the  intelligence  gathering  capabilities  of 
a  particular  satellite  system.   This  is  so  because  these 
capabilities,  if  disclosed,  would  allow  a  hostile  power  to 
estimate  important  collection  capabilities  of  a  particular 
satellite  and  the  extent  to  which  countermeasures  could  be 
expected  to  be  successful. 
29.   Revelation  of  a  single  photograph,  under  certain 
conditions,  might  also  permit  an  informed  analyst,  foreign
government  or  hoatila  intelligence  aervica  to  iuraiaa  the 
limiting  lighting  and  atmospheric  condition*  under  which  a 
photo-raconneisaance  syatara  could  oparata.   The  fact  that  a 
particular  system  could  continua  or  not  continua  to  obtain 
imagery  under  such  limiting  conditiona  could  be  tubstantial 
intelligence  value. 
30.   For  all  of  the  raasona  atated  above,  I  have  concluded 
that  none  of  the  "details"  aurrounding  the  uae  of  photo- 
reconnaissance  may  be  publicly 'revealed  through  the  release 
of  photography  and  analysis  thereof  in  response  to  Plaintiff's 
request.   All  of  the  details  surrounding  these  reconnaissance 
systems  constitute  properly  classified  information.   Such 
information  cannot  be  disclosed  without  seriously  impairing 
the  national  defense  efforts  of  the  United  States  and  the 
intelligence  gathering  activities  of  this  Agency.   Accordingly, 
any  photographs  and  analyses  thereof  that  are  responsive  to 
Plaintiff  Andres '  request  and  any  more  specific  information 
related  thereto  constitute  classified  information  that  must 
not  be  disclosed.  .  For  these  same  reasons,  such  information 
also  constitutes  an  intelligence  source  and  an  intelligence 
method  that  are  statutorily  protected  and  coextensively 
exempt  for  disclosure  under  the  FOIA.   Accordingly,  this 
information  is  coextensively  exempt  from  disclosure  pursuant 
to  exemptions  (b)'(l)  and  (b)(3)  of  the  Freedom  of  Information 
Act.  and  on  the  authority  of  50  U.S.C.  §403 (d)(3).   No  meaningful 
segregable  portions  of  these  responsive  documents  may  be 
released.
31.   Th«  sensitivity  of  th«  information  sought  by  Plaintiff 
Andres  cannot  be  ov«r-emphasired«   A  full  explication  of  the 
rationales  and  justifications  underlying  my  determination 
that  this  Agency  cannot  disclose  even  a  single  reconnaissance 
photograph  that  is  potentially  responsiv*  to  her  request 
cannot  be  recited  in  an  unclassified  affidavit.   I  have, 
however,  outlined  this  rational*  to  the  extent  possible  in 
an  unclassified  submission.   In  my  opinion,  a  more  detailed 
explication  of  this  rational  cannot  be  made  in  an  unclassified 
affidavit  in  a  manner  that  is  consistent  with  the  classified 
nature  of  the  information  at  issue  and  consistent  with  the 
responsibility  of  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  to 
protect  intelligence  sources  ard  methods  from  unauthorized 
disclosure. 
21M- 
Leslie  C.  Dirks 
COMMONWEALTH  OF  VIRGINIA  ) 
) 
COUNTY  OF  FAIRFAX  ) 
\  1--1- 
Subscribed  and   sworn   to  before  me   this     1  1       day  of 
September  1980. 
Notary  Publijc 
My  commission   expires:     lM   -\-QSZx\    H>v^L