O-*  «.R*t.  3-46 -?«)  W 
CN3S  LIBRARY 
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TRANSMIT  VIA:  Airtel 
CLASSIFICATION:   '  BATE:        3/17/83 
/ 
PA^K&T    Director,   FBI  "         ~~ 
%$^< 
TO:        All  SACs 
All  LEGATS 
ATTORNEY  GENERAL'S  GUIDELINES  FOR  THE 
CONDUCT  OF  DOMESTIC  SECURITY/TERRORISM 
INVESTIGATIONS,  EFFECTIVE  MARCH  21,  1983 
Reference  teletype  to  all  SACs  dated  3/7/83,  captioned 
as  above. 
Enclosed  for  each  recipient  is  a  copy  of  the  new  Attorney 
General's  Guidelines  governing  the  conduct  of  FBI  investigations 
concerning  domestic  security/terrorism  (DS/T)  matters.   These 
Guidelines  will  become  effective  on  3/21/83. 
With  the  exception  of  some  modifications  noted  below, 
instructions  regarding  implementation  of  the  provisions  governing 
general  crimes  investigations  and  racketeering  enterprise  investi- 
gations set  forth  in  Memorandum  to  All  Special  Agents  dated 
12/30/80  are  still  applicable.   Some  of  the  more  significant 
features  of  the  new  rules  governing  domestic  security/terrorism 
investigations  are  described  below. 
These  Guidelines  change  the  way  the  FBI  conducts  inves- 
tigations and  administratively  manages  DS/T  cases.  These  cases 
are  now  governed  by  the  rules  set  forth  in  Part  III  of  the  Guide- 
lines and  are  considered  another  form  of  criminal  .intelligence 
investigation.  As  the  Guidelines  indicate,  criminal  intelligence 
investigations  differ  from  general  crimes  investigations  in  several 
important  respects.  As  a  general  rule,  an  investigation  of  a 
completed  criminal  act  is  normally  confined  to  determining  who 
committed  that  act  and  with  securing  evidence  to  establish  the 
elements  of  the  particular  offense.  An  intelligence  investigation 
of  an  ongoing  criminal  enterprise,  on  the  other  hand,  must  deter- 
mine the  size  and  composition  of  the  group  involved,  its  geographic 
dimensions,  its  past  acts  and  intended  criminal  goals,  and  its 
capacity  for  harm.  While  a  standard  criminal  investigation
Airtei  to  All  SACs  and  LEGATs 
Re:  Attorney  General's  Guidelines  for  the 
Conduct  of  Domestic  Security/Terrorism 
Investigations,  Effective  March  21,  1983 
terminates  with  the  decision  to  prosecute  or  not  to  prosecute,  the 
investigation  of  a  criminal  enterprise  does  not  necessarily  end, 
even  though  one  or  more  of  the  participants  may  have  been  prose- 
cuted.  Thus  the  new  Guidelines  reaffirm  the  need  for  criminal 
intelligence  in  domestic  security/terrorism  matters  and  treat  these 
investigations  as  an  integral  part  of  the  FBI's  general  law  enforce- 
ment responsibilities. 
Criminal  Enterprise  Concept 
The  new  rules  governing  domestic  security/terrorism 
investigations  employ  the  "criminal  enterprise"  concepts  so  success- 
fully used  in  organized  crime  cases.   This  allows  the  FBI  to  cross 
organizational  lines  in  a  domestic  security/terrorism  investigation 
without  regard  to  what  a  particular,  group  or  element  of  an  organiza- 
tion might  call  itself.   It  should  enable  the  Bureau  to  deal  more 
effectively  with  groups  who  knowingly  act  in  furtherance  of  the 
criminal  objectives  of  the  enterprise.   Thus  persons  who  provide 
safehouses,  money,  weapons  or  otherwise  knowingly  support  the 
criminal  activities  of  the  terrorist  enterprise  can  be  investigated 
as  part  of  the  same  criminal  enterprise.   It  will  no  longer  be 
necessary  to  open  a  separate  investigation  of  such  groups  with  a 
separate  justification. 
The  enterprise  concept  will  also  permit  the  FBI  to  focus 
its  investigation' upon  violent  factions  of  a  larger  group,  without 
investigating  the  entire  group.   The  new  approach  recognizes  that 
terrorist  groups  today  have  a  fluid  membership  and  often  lack 
organizational,  structure,  yet  function  as  a  single  enterprise 
directed  toward  a  common  goal. 
Preliminary  Inquiries 
Preliminary  investigations  and  limited  investigations 
have  been  deleted  from  the  Domestic  Security/Terrorism  Guidelines. 
There  is  only  one  form  of  domestic  security/terrorism  investigation 
under  the  current  Guidelines.   You  must  rely  on  the  authority  under 
general  crimes  preliminary  inquiries  to  meet  investigative  needs 
in  domestic  security/terrorism  matters. 
A  preliminary  general  crimes  inquiry  is  more  limited  in 
scope  and  purpose  than  the  preliminary  investigation  formerly 
authorized  under  the  Domestic  Security  Guidelines.   However,  they 
C
Airtel  to  All  SACs  and  LEGATs 
Re:  Attorney  General's  Guidelines  for  the 
Conduct  of  Domestic  Security/Terrorism 
Investigations,  Effective  March  21,  1983 
permit  greater  latitude  in  the  use  of  investigative  techniques 
particularly  where  informants  are  involved.   The  only  investigative 
techniques  that  are  unavailable  during  a  preliminary  inquiry  are 
those  which  require  probable  cause:  mail  covers,  search  and 
seizure  and  electronic  surveillance.   At  the  same  time,  the 
Attorney  General's  Guidelines  caution  that  Agents  consider  whether 
the  information  sought  could  be  obtained  by  means  which  involve 
less  intrusion  on  the  subject's  privacy.   As  an  example,  if  a 
discreet  inquiry  to  local  law  enforcement  officials  would  produce 
the  necessary  information,  it  might  be  inappropriate  to  question 
neighbors . 
Subject  to  this  general  guidance  on  intrusiveness, 
Agents  require  no  special  prior  authorization  to  check  FBI  files, 
public  records  or  sources,  governmental  records,  established 
informants  or  confidential  sources,  to  interview  subjects,  com- 
plainants or  others  having  knowledge  of  the  facts  or  to  conduct 
surveillances.   Prior  authorization  of  a  Supervisory  Agent  is 
required  before  employers  or  coworkers  may  be  interviewed,  pretext 
interviews  are  conducted  or  new  informants  are  developed.   Other 
more  intrusive  techniques,  such  as  the  use  of  consensual  monitoring, 
may  be  employed  only  in  compelling  circumstances  and  when  other 
investigative  means  are  not  likely  to  be  successful.   "Compelling 
circumstances "  are  circumstances  requiring  the  use  of  such 
techniques  to  determine  the  validity  of  information  or  allegations 
concerning  possible  serious  criminal  activity  such  as  a  threat  to 
life  or  substantial  property  interests,  the  destruction  or 
alteration  of  evidence,  or  the  serious  impairment  or  hindrance  of 
an  investigation. 
Preliminary  inquiries  may  be  authorized  by  field  super- 
visors, but  in  all  situations,  the  inquiry  shall  be  completed 
within  90  days  after  initiation  of  the  first  investigative  step, 
unless  authorized  by  the  Bureau.   Subsequent  authorizations  for 
extensions  are  limited  to  30-day  periods  and  will  be  based  upon 
a  written  request  from  the  field  division  including  a  statement 
of  reasons  justifying  further  "inquiry"  when  there  is  no  "reason- 
able indication"  which  would  allow  a  full  investigation. 
For  administrative  purposes,  all  preliminary  inquiries 
under  the  General  Crimes  Section  of  the  Guidelines  that  relate  to 
domestic  security/terrorism  matters  will  be  reported  in  the  100 
classification •
7   - 
Airtel  to  All  £ACs  and  LEGATs 
Re:  Attorney  General's  Guidelines  for  the 
Conduct  of  Domestic  Security/Terrorism   ' 
Investigations,  Effective  March  21,  1983 
Domestic  Security/Terrorism  Investigations 
A  domestic  security/terrorism  investigation  may  be  initi- 
ated when  "facts  or  circumstances  reasonably  indicate  that  two  or 
more  persons,  are  engaged  in  an  enterprise  for  the  purpose  of  furthering 
political  or  social  goals  wholly  or  in  part  through  activities  that 
involve  force  or  violence  and  a  violation  of  the  criminal  laws  of  the 
United  States."   This  parallels  the  standard  now  followed  in  racke- 
teering enterprise  investigations  and  should  eliminate  any  perceptions 
that  actual  or  imminent  coTtunission  of  a  violent  crime  is  a  prerequisite 
to  investigation.   It  is  sufficient  if  the  facts  or  circumstances  indi- 
cate that  the  enterprise  seeks  to  accomplish  its  political  or  social 
objectives  through  violence.   The  standard  requires  a  valid  factual 
predicate  and  law  enforcement  purpose,  but  it  is  substantially  lower 
than  the  "probable  cause"  threshold  required  for  arrest. 
Separate  domestic  security/terrorism  investigations  will 
not  be  authorized  for  individual  members  of  the  criminal  enterprise. 
The  investigation  of  the  enterprise  itself  will  encompass  the  activ- 
ities of  the  individual  participants.   For  administrative  purposes, 
a  series  of  sub-files  on  individual  members  can  be  utilized. 
Full  investigations  will  be  authorized  by  the  Director  or 
the  Assistant  Director,  Criminal  Investigative  Division,  based  upon 
a  written  communication  from  the  requesting  field  division  setting 
forth  the  facts  or  circumstances  reasonably  indicating  the  existence 
of  an  enterprise,  the  goals  of  which  were  described  above.   This 
authorization  will  be  valid  for  180  days.   Subsequently,  an  investi- 
gation may  be  continued  for  180-day  periods  based  upon  renewed 
authorization  from  FBIHQ  obtained  prior  to  the  expiration  of  the 
previously  authorized  extension. 
In  order  to  comply  with  the  Department  of  Justice  (DOJ) 
requirements,  the  office  of  origin  will  submit  a  letterhead  memo- 
randum (LHM)  along  with  the  first  request  for  an  extension  of  the 
full  DS/T  investigation.   Thereafter,  an  annual  LHM  reflecting 
progress  in  the  "enterprise"  investigation  will  be  prepared  for 
dissemination  to  DOJ  on  all  pending  investigations. 
FBIHQ  will  be  advised  of  the  closing  of  all  full  DS/T  inves- 
tigations as  well  as  any  preliminary  inquiries  which  were  reported 
to  the  Bureau. 
Continuation  of  Investigations 
There  has  be"  a  tendency  in  the  past  *  o  close  domestic 
security  investigations  and  termi  ate  informant  <  >verage  when  the 
violent  activity  of  the  group  has  been  dormant  fcr  a  period  cf
/'  '  •   « 
Airtel  to  All  SACs  and  LEGATs 
Re:  Attorney  General's  Guidelines  for  the 
Conduct  of  Domestic  Security/Terrorism 
Investigations,  Effective  March  21,  1983 
» 
time.   If  the  organization  became  active  again,  it  was  often  a 
difficult  and  time-consuming  process  to  redevelop  informant 
coverage.  The  new  Guidelines  permit  the  FBI  to  monitor  organiza- 
tions who  may  be  temporarily  inactive,  but  whose  prior  record  or 
stated  objectives  indicate  a  need  for  continuing  federal  interest, 
so  long  as  the  threshold  standard  for  investigation  is  satisfied. 
Under  those  circumstances,  the  investigation  may  be  placed  in  a 
pending  status  but  informant  coverage  can  be  maintained  to  the 
extent  necessary  to  determine  whether  there  is  any  change  in  the 
criminal  objectives  of  the  enterprise. 
Advocacy  of  Crime 
There  has  been  some  confusion  about  whether  advocacy  of 
crime,  without  specific  conduct,  can  provide  the  bases  for  an 
investigation.   The  new  Guidelines  make  it  clear  that  advocacy 
of  crime  is  not  immune  from  investigation.   When  statements 
advocate  criminal  activity  or  indicate  an  apparent  intent  to  engage 
in  crime,  particularly  crimes  of  violence,  an  investigation  may  be 
warranted  unless  it  is  apparent,  from  the  circumstances  or  the 
context  in  which  the  statements  are  made,  that  there  is  no  prospect 
of  harm. 
The  point  to  remember  with  respect  to  implementation  of 
the  advocacy  provision  is  that  the  basis  for  initiating  an  inquiry 
or  investigation  is  not  the  advocacy  itself,  but  rather  that  the   \ 
statement  of  advocacy  taken  in  context  presents  a  credible  threat 
of  harm.   To  the  extent  possible,  all  such  matters  should  be      ' 
resolved  through  preliminary  inquiries-   During  the  implementation 
stage  of  these  Guidelines,  any  further  inquiries  based  on  statements 
of  advocacy  should  be  reported  promptly  to  FBI  Headquarters 
(Terrorism  Section)  for  review. 
Publicly  Available  Information 
The  new  Guidelines  explicitly  authorize  the  collection  of 
publicly  available  information  consistent  with  the  Privacy  Act, 
FBI  Headquarters  is  currently  consulting  with  the  DOJ  concerning 
interpretation  of  this  provision  in  an  effort  to  ascertain  the 
bounds  of  this  collection  effort  and  to  determine  administrative  v^ 
procedures  for  processing  the  information  collected.  All  field 
offices  are  instructed  to  limit  their_ collection  of  publicly  avail- 
aBTe  information  to  cases~Under~  preliminary'  inquiry  or  "full  inves-^/ 
tigation  in  accordance  with  thp  Guidelines.   Further  instructions 
with  regards  to  implementation  it   this  provision  v  11  be  forthcoming.
-/ 
Airtel  to  All  SACs  and  LEGATs 
Re:  Attorney  General's  Guidelines  for  the 
Conduct  of  Domestic  Security /Terrorism 
Investigations,  Effective  March  21,  1983 
As  is  noted  above,  some  minor  modifications  have  been 
made  in  those  portions  of  the  Guidelines  governing  general  crimes 
investigatibns  and  racketeering  enterprise  investigations.   Yo^i 
should  be  particularly  alert  to  the  following  changes: 
(1)  Preliminary  inquiries  have  been  extended 
from  60  to  90  days; 
(2)  a  dissemination  provision  has  been  added 
in  Part  V  which  governs  the  dissemination 
of  information  acquired  from  any  investi- 
gation conducted  pursuant  to  the 
Guidelines; 
(3)  cooperation  with  Secret  Service  —  in 
(   some  cases  where  investigations  have 
been  closed  which  meet  the  threshold 
requirements  for  a  preliminary  inquiry 
or  full  investigation,  the  FBI  may  conduct 
an  inquiry  or  investigation  at  the  request 
of  the  Secret  Service  consistent  with 
the  investigative  priorities  of  the  field 
office,  See  Part  VI; 
(4)  narcotics  violations  have  been  added  to 
the  list  of  offenses  that  may  trigger 
a  racketeering  enterprise  investigation; 
(5)  undisclosed  participation  in  the  activ-   ] 
ities  of  organizations  —  this  provision 
does  not  grant  authority  to  influence 
rights  protected  by  the  First  Amendment. 
It  is  intended  to  be  a  safeguard  to 
insure  that  our  investigations  do  not 
unintentionally  influence  the  exercise 
of  those  rights,  See  IV  B(3); 
(6)'.  specific  reporting  rules  concerning  the 
use  of  consensual  electronic  monitoring 
techniques  have  been  deleted.  Until 
notified  otherwise,  you  should  continue 
to  follow  current  reporting  requirements 
as  set  forth  in  U.  S.  Attorney's  Manual 
9-7.013.