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SECURITY CLASSISSCAUION OF THIS PAGE (When Deta Entered) oo ee me FEPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE 1, REPORT NUMBER ~ 2. GOVT ACCESSION hO. } . Ab -ye72 0% » TITLE (and Sudtidde) READ INSTRUCTIONS BRFORE COMPLETING FORM 3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMUER - TYPE GF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED or ee eee a tee AThe DCI's Role in Producing Strategic \ { Intellignece Estimates,, © © -- “~~~ Wine) Clk + a __ woe a anne 6. PERFORMING ONG. REPORT NUMBER 7. AUTHOR(s) vic oria S. Price} 9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME ANDO ADDRESS 8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(a) wooratdqe-m-7082 1G. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT, TASK oN UNIT RU ERS ) c 2 ~148- 15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this refozt) CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME ANDO ADDRESS Center for Advanced Research Naval War College VW, 14. MONITSRING AGENCY NAME & AooRESS(It different from Controtling Ort'ce) Unclassified DECL ASSIFICATION/ DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE Sa, a oe 16. DISTRIBUTION STATENENT (of thia Report) A ~ Unlimited. arr 17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, 1! different from Report) A - Unlimited. 16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse aide if necessery and identily by block number) Intelligence Strategic Estimates NIE A-Team/B-Team . cIA Intelligence Community Deatrnwen Of Crptese TOtece ye rcs DCI USIB ye z z . ABSTRACT Ce or Say SFTW SE sng national This paper examines the role of the \0C in shaping national inteLligence estimates. Seven possible roles are examinede ) two pertain to the mechanism @f the NIE drafting process, -ehree focus on the DCI's leadership posture during US iberations, anether involves the DCI's subjective input the draft NIEs, ana the last is the role the DCJs have played in promoting inde- pendent outside review of the estimates. The author concludes DD Santas 1473 cvrtion oF t Nov 65 ts OBSOLETE Lf CO 6” SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (Whan Data Entered) ele paoae meena Se ne me ce ce eee oe rt ee Se eae eee @ wt Boe at rl tated
tne were eS oot we SECURITY CLASSIFICA iON OF THIS PAGE(#en Data Entered} Od 20 (cont! ray Ynat Jehe approach of the DCIs to the strategic NIEs has been inconsidtent. Some DCIs have emphasized some roles, wnile others neglected them. These differences are summarized in the final chapter according to a DCI's individual background and concepts of his job, and in light of historical events. The author also examines potential conflicts between roles exercised by DCIs, addressing the question of whether a DCI can be effect- ively both ~manager and prephet™ for the strategic intelligence estimates. This examination is based on four principal sources. The first is government reports, primarily unclassified, examining aspects of the strategic estimative process. These include reor- ganization commission reports, recent work of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and internal CIA studies. Second are scholarly studies and journalistic accounts of the strategic NIEs themselves. These are used as a means by which to document his- torically the competing positions of dif ferent,agencies in, eriti- cal intelligence dehates, such as the famous “missile gap™ debate from 1957 to 1961. The third source is unclassified NIEs, mainly { non-strategic. Since these sources rarely foctsed on the activities of the DCIs, the major portion of this study relies on over 50 interviews conducted by the author in 1978 and 1979. Interviewees include past and present CIA officials, two former DCIs, Pentagon intelli- guece officials, and NSC and Corgressional staff.e tnterviewees are listed at the close of the study. Current CIA\ofiicials are not cited by name within the footnotes. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THT PAGE(When Late Entered)
THE DCI'S ROLE IN PRODUCING STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES By VICTORIA S. PRICE January, 1980 This decument is the final report of a study sponsored by the Center for Advanced Research, Naval “ar College, Newport, Rhode Island under Contract Number N00140-78-"N-7682 1 The views contained herein are those of the author and \ publication of this study by the Naval War Colleae does not constitute endorsement thereof by the Naval War College, the Department of the Navy, nor the U.S. Govern- ment. Further reproduction of this final report by agencies of the U.S. Government must be approved by the President, Naval War College. All rights to the reproduction of this final report outside of the U.S. Government reside with the author. Reproduction by nongovernmental agencies or individuais, without the written consent of the author, is prohibited. However, the content is open to citation and other reference in accordance with accepted academic research practice. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A; UNLIMITED
I. It, Iii. Iv. Vv. VI. TABLE OF CONTENTS OVERVIEW - Page 1 EVOLUTION OF THE STRATEGIC ESTIMATIVE PROCESS: 1947-1957 - Page 10 A. Deficiencies in the Original Concept of Coordinating NIEs ~ Page 10 Definition orf the DCI's and CIA's Role by General W. Betell Smith - Page 14 B. C. Allen Dulles and the Modern Strategic NIEs - Page 19 D. Trends Since 1957 - Page 26 THE DCI'S MANAGEMENT OF STRATEGIC NIES AT THE DRAFT STAGE -- Page <1 A. Management Direction to CIA Production - Page 33 B. Management Attention to Department of Defense Coordination - Page 50 SUBSTANTIVE INPUT OF DCIs TO THE DRAFT STRATEGIC NiEs - Page 60 THE DCI'S LEADERSHIP ROLES AT USIB OR NFISB - Page 73 A. Support of the CIA's Position - Page 74 B- Encouragement of Competitive Debate - Page 78 c Final Adjudication of Views - Page 86 we THE DCI'S ROLE IN PROMOTING INDEPENDENT REVIEW - Page 96 A. Allen Dulles, the Princeten Consultants and Strategic Advisory Panel - Page 96 B. The 1960s - Page 98 Cc. James Schlesinger and the Intelligence Community Staff ~- Page 100 PR. The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and the Pa +~ OO} 1376 A-B Team Experiment - Page 101 VII. ASSESSMENT OF THE RERPORMANCE OF DCIs - Page 106 A. Summary of Roles Played by DCIs - Page 106 B. Mutually Supporting and Conflicting Roles: Manager versus Prophet - Page 115 oT ve 1 ity io ioe jp cs ty oo o eine SS aq 2 C. Steps Not Taken by DCIs - Page 119 is :8 oom R - see 3 nee Ou o GEES] | eeu3e 0 2 2 Dw RF te oe > Pee 3 me on! pawns S oe: 9! * a oO; 3 1? | Oo
TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) LIST OF CHARTS CHART A: CIA Organization, 1372 ~ Page 28 CHART B: Individual Roles Assumed by DCIs for Production of Strategic NIEs - Pace 32 CHART C: National Foreign Assessment Center, 1979 ~ Page 48 CHART D: Broad Roles Emphasized by Seven DCIS for Strategic NIEs - Page 113 FOOT:IOTES LIST OF INTERVIEWEES
-l- I. OVERVIEW Since the position vf the Director of Centrai Intelligence (DCI) was created in 1946 and the CIA in 1947, a inajor responsibility has been to procuce coordinated estimates of the likely future capabilities and intentions of foreign countries. The most polished ana prestigious of the CIA's finished intelligence evaluations are the National Intelligence Zatimates, called NIEa. The NIEs have existed in their present form since 1950 when the CIA's Office of National Estimates and Board of Estimates were created. Drafted mainly by CIA staff, the NIEs include the input, judgements and dissents of intelligence officials from other agencies, primarily the Defense and State Departments. after coordinative meetings at the CIA with representatives from these agencies to discuss drafts, the NIEs are reviewed by the DCI and presented to the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), renamed the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) in 1977. Chaired by the DCI, NFIB consists of the heads of other intelligence agencies, and has broad responsibilities for coordinating t:he activities of the intellicence community.* After joint discussicn, the NIEs are approved bv the DCI and issued, in his name, to the President. *NFIB was called USIB from 1958 to 1977, and before that the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC). Chaired by the DCI, NFIB consists cf the Deputy Director of CIA (representing the CIA), directors of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence Research (INR), and the heads of the intelligence sections of the FBI, Treasury Department, and the former AEC. Since 1961, the heads of Army, Aix Force and Naval Intelligence have not been official members, but attend meetings, debate and may dissent from the NIEs.
The NIEs are intended to inform the President, National Security Council and other top-level officials about upcoming for- eign events, both short and long term, of national importance. Fer example, some NIEs predict political-economic trends in various trouble spots around the world. These are meant to lead to timely estimates, which may be termed "crisis prediction" NI=s, predictine major crises affecting US foreign policy, such as the outbreak of war, political coups or sudden oil shortages in foreign countries. Then, NIEs termed "operation evaluation" NIEs keep abreast of military and political events Curing conflict situations, such as during the Korean and Vietnam wars.+ Special National Intelligence Estimates, called SNIEs, are produced to respond to specific, short-term questions posed by the White House, such as curing the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. Another group of NIEs is what this author terms the "strategic NIEs." These are annually produced evaluations of Soviet, and now Chinese, military strength.* Strategic NIEs primarily address questions of military force structure, technology and new weapons for an upcoming five year period, of which analysis of strategic policy and intentions is an integral part. From a single, broad estimate on Soviet military capabilities and intentions in 1950, a series of separate estimates on Soviet military strength grew up in the late 1950s. Designated by the number "11", the Soviet *Phe author uses the term "strategic" for both intercontinental and intracontinental arms.
ra, NIE series has consisted of individual estimates on conventional arms, offensive nuclear weapons, defensive weapons, nucleéer tech- nology, strategic doctrine and other subjects. Presently, the most important Soviet strategic NIE is numbered 11-3-8, combining considerations of intercontinental offensive and defensive weaponry. The Soviet strategic NIEs are the focus of this study. Controversy About the Soviet Strategic NIEs. From the beginning, the Soviet strategic NIEs have been the object of considerable controversy within and outside the intelli- gence community. The debate has been heated, protracted and inter- departmental. In producing these NIE&, the CIA often has been pitted against tne Defense Department's intelligence agencies, such as the Defense Inteiligence Agency (DIA) created in 1961 and Army, Air Force and Naval Intelligence. The CIA is supposed to include these agencies in all phases of drafting and, compared to other NIEs ex- cept during wartime, the Pentagon's involvement has been heavy. Ultimately, the DCI is responsible for ensurinc thet the strategic NIEs represent a coordinated view, 1.e., thac all intelligence is considered and all opinions voiced, before formal approval at NFIB. More than other NIEs, the debate about the Strategic NIEs re- volves around the process of coordinated production, aspects of which various participants Claim have caused major, pre@ictive inaccuracies. For example, controversy has existed over the large rele of the CIA in collecting and analyzing purely Military
intelligence, and its domination over the @rafting process. Ques- tions are raised about how to involve the Pentagon agencies more in the early stages of drafting, and whether their dissents have been adequately heard and reflected in the final NIEs. Accusations — abound as to the biases involved in institutional judgements. For example, the tnree military services often have been charged with busing excessive estimates of Soviet weaponry on their own bud- getary priorities, a concern expressed by both Presidents Truman and Eisenhower about the NIEs.? Beginning with the Nixon Administration, CIA analysts have been criticized for a "liberal bias" which caused them to systematically underestimate Soviet strategic coals.° As one participant observed: The truth is that the DCI, since his auther- ity over the intelligence process is at leagt ambiguous, has an uphill struggle to make a sophisticated appreciation of a certain range of issue prevail in the national in- telligence product over against the parochial views and interests of departments.... In the early 1970s, such criticism led to a demind for review of the strategic NIEs by outeide experts, culminating in the A-B Team experiment in competitive analysis in 1976, described later. The central purpose of this study is to provide better under- standing of one element in the production of coordinated strategic intelligence estimates, namely, the role of the Director of Central Intelligence. How has the role of the DCI in producing the strate- gic NIEs historically evolved? How have different DCIs observed their functions? What involvement have DCIs had in drafting the
pkey strategic estimates, encouraging interdepartmental competition, and resolving debate at USIB or NFIB? Can a feasible and appropriate role for the DCI be prescribed fer the future? Compiexity in Defining the DCL’s Role The difficulty in defining the role of the DCI in producing the strategic NIxs is inherent.to the nature of this country's in- “telligence apparatus. As the Murphy Commission concluded in 1975: The United States set up what might be termed a 'mixec' system in an attempt to combine the best features of decentralization and centralization while avoiding the ou-vious weaknesees of each. The compromises involved in the establishment of a ‘mixed’ system have given risa to difficulties over the years. Our intelligence system is decentralized in the sensa that the CIA was never iatended to have (and never achieved) a monopoly over intelligence collection and analysis. Other agencies, pri- marily those of the Defense Department for strategic estimating, are supposed to make intelligence and evaluative inputs tc the NIEs as well. The advantages of decentralization are considered to be efficiency and improved analysis, if each egency specializes in collecting and analyzing intelligence within its own area of expertise, ana multiple advocacy and competition in estimating. ° . The system is centralized in the position of the DCi, who has three broad roles to play. He manages the CIA, including its covert activities; he acts as chief intelligence advisor to the President; and he coordinates the activities of the intelligence community. Over the years, the DCI's authorization 1
for coordinative tasks has expanéed steadily. In addition te approvine the NIEs, he is responsible for focusing the entire community on issues critical to the White House, efficiently dividing and overseeing collection tasks, and since 1971, re~ viewing and presenting a consclidated intelligence program budget to Congress. To help him, the DCI may devise whatever coordinative bodies he wishes within the CIA. However, the central coordinating institution of the intelligence community has been USIB and its subcommittees, and now NFIB. If intelligence coordination is represented in the person of the DCI and institutionally by USIB,* the NIEs are its substan- tive embodiment. The NIEs are meant to be the DCI's document. However, no other intelligence product so readily exemplifies the potential conflicts between the DCI's three jobs. For example, as manager of the CIA, is it not natural for the DCI tc expand its intelligence collection and analytical functions, even though such steps m.3ht. duplicate or weaken the programs of other agencies? As the man responsible for CIA morale and most familiar with its work, shcevld the DCI let the intelligence professionals work out their differences or mainly promote the CIA's position within the final NIES? As chief intelligence advisox to the President, should the DCI represent his own opinions in the d.caft or final NIEe, identify himself with a minority or, after encouraging dis- sent, resolve the debate by making inte ligence judgements. What happens if the DCI does not hzve the technical bazkground to ne ce *Since NF1S was called USIB for almost 20 years, the author uses the acronym USIB throughont most of this study, unless under a specific DCI it was called something else.
understand the strategic issues at hand? Age coordinator of the intelligence community, how should the DCI resolve what the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has identified as "the per- sistant conceptual dilemma...of consensus versus competition”! In the interest of presenting a timely, concise document to the President, how far should the DCI promote competition wixnin the NIES? Researcn Design and Methods 2 a rena pn A OSA TD This author contends that such questions historically have not been subject tc Presidential direction. Few Presidents have ad- dressed the judgemental issues facing the DCI in producing tne - NIES. In contrast, more Presidential attention has focused on the DCI's role in coordinating intelligence collection and, now, budgets. In an attempt to explore intelligence peoduction issves, in the following pages the actual roles assumed by successive DCIs for the strategic NIEs are described in depth. In Chapter II the evolution of the strategic NIE process under UCIs Acuniral Roscoe Hillenkoetter (1947-1950), General Walter Bedell Smith (1950-1952) and Allen W. Dulles (1953-1961) is traced. The author concludes that the rele of the DCI and CIA in the strategic estimative process was originally ill-defined and un- realistic, and that DCI's Smith and Dulles took the initiative in strengthening the DCI's personal role and the CIA's internal stratecic work. Then, trends since 1957 increasing the decision~ making burden on the DCI are described.
In Chapters III, IV, V and VI, the attitudes and behavior of six DCIs in preducins the strategic NIEs are compared systematically. The DCIs selected by the author for study are: Allen W. Dulles (1953-1961); John A. MeCone (1961-1965); Richard Helms (1966-1972); James R. Schlesinger (1973); William E, Colby (1973-1975); and Admiral Stansfield Turner (1977-present). Two DCIs not examined here are Admiral William Raborn (mid-1965 to mid-1966) ane George Bush (1976), primarily because of their short tenures.* Although James Schlesinger remained in office barely five months, he ie included because most interviewees reported that his influenca on the strategic estimative procers was large. In these chapters, seven possible roles of the DCI are ex- amined. Two pertain to the mechanisms of the NIE drafting process: management direction to CIA production, and management attention to coordination with the Dapartment of Dafeanse intelligence agencies. Another involves the DCI's personal, substantive input to the draft NIEsS. Three roles focus on a DCI's leadership posture during USIB @eliberations: support of the CIA's position; encovragement of competitive debate; and final adjudication of views. The last is the role DCIs played in promoting independent, outside review of the strategic NIEs. ‘The reader should bear in mind that the purpose of these chapters is descriptive not evaluative. The author concludes that the approach of DCIs to the strategic NIEs has been inconsistent. Some PCIs have emphasized eomea coles, while others neglected them. In Chapter VII, these differences *DCI George Bush's important rele in the 1976 A-B Team experiment in competitive analysis is raised briefly in Chapter VI.
are summarized according to a NCI’s individual background and concepts cf his job, and in light: of historical events. The author also examines potential conflicts between roles exercised by DCIs, addressing the question of whether a DCI can be effectively both "manager and prophet" for the scratecic intelligence estimatea.® This study is based on four principal scurces. The first is governmentai reports, primarily unclassified, examining aspects of the ctrategic estimative procees. These include reorganization commission reports, recent work of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and internal CIA studies. Secoae are scholarly studies and journalistic acccunts of the strategic NIEs themselves, These are used as a means by which to document historically the competing positions of different agencies in critical intelligence debates, such as the famous "missile gap" debate from 1957-1961. The third scurce is unclassified NIEs, mainly none-strategic. Since these sources rarely focused on the activities of DCis, the major portion of this study relies on over 50 interviews con- ducted by this author in 1978 and 1979. Interviewees include past and present CIA officials, two former DCIs, Pentagon intelligence officials, and NSC and Congressional staff. Interviewees are listed at the close of the study. Current CIA officials are not cited by name within the footnotes.
- 10 - II. EVOLUTION OF THEE STRATEGIC CSTIMATIVE PROCESS: 1947 = 1557 The National Security Act of 1947 creating the CIA directed it "to correlate and evaluata intelligence relating to the national security und to provide for ite appropriate dissemination." In his memoirs, President Truman wrete that he desired a national intelligence organization which had access to all information, headed by a Director who could speak authoritatively for the whole community.” He wanted to reduce the separate, sometimes conflicting and seemingly biased intelligence reports reaching his desk, and asked the DCI to produce one analytical, predictive document combining these.? Also created in 1947 was the Intelli-~ gence Advisory Committee (IAC), the predecessor of USIB and NFIS. Chaired by the DCI and consisting of all intellicence agency heads, IAC was meant to serve as a voordinating body for the entire intelligence community. A. Deficiencies in the Original Concept of Coordinating NIEs The task of producing coordinated estimates fell te Rear Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter, a former head of Naval Intelligence who served as DCI from 1947 to mid~1950, and the CIA's new Office of Research and Evaluation (ORE). In ratrospect, the original concept iof how they were to do this was highly unrealistic, in assigning a subordinate role to the Pentagon and prescribing a dominant role to the fledgling and ill-equipped CIA. In theory, the 1247 Act said that the “departments and other agencies of Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate and disseminate departmental intelligence,” to which
the CIA wes intended tc have complete access. Then, it became the task of a small team within ORE to examine this work, both raw intelligence and finished reports, and cenerate new predictions if necessary. Its analysis was summarized in special estimates called ORES, to which the concurrence or dissent of Defense Depart- ment agencies was sought. The CIA was authorized to carry out re- search ané@ anelysis "not presently performed" by other departmente, but this was not considered one of its primary estimative functions.” In short, the CiA was not designed to duplicate or supercede the: Pentacon's military intelligence collection, research and analytical functions. Rether, as Sherman Kent them wrote: "Its job is what might be called policing the professionel competence of the departmental outfits and continvally pushing departmental n6 In'1949, Kent did not frailties back into departmental laps. believe that the CIA even should do its own descriptive and evalua- tive studies of purely military subjects, since he argued that it could not compete effectively with the Pentagon. In fact, he worried that if attempted, the Pentagon soon would dominate the cra./ Immediately, the CIA's effort tc produce coordinate@a judge- ments was undercut by several factcrs. First, as the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence later noted, the Army, Navy, Air Force and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)* refused to provide the new agency with much raw intelligence since they feared encroach- 8 ment on their traditional estimative rele, Second, the CIA had *The Joint Chiefs of Staff's intelligence arm was called the Joint Intelligence Canmittee (JIC) or sometimes J~2. Its head was a mem- ber of IAC, and then USIB, until DIA was created in 1961.
-~ 12 - little incependent capability to analyze military data even if forthcoming. For example, the small estimative team within ORE were generalists and the CIA had only one scientist to examine Soviet technical developments.” Thus, it often analyzed only finished reports from the Pentagon. For example, in 1948 the CIA evaluated an Air Force estimate discussing Soviet troop move- mMents in Germany, which suggested that the Soviets were prepared to go to war at any time. The CIA went over the document line by line, and reportedly labeled the estimate "mistaken. "9 The CIA said that it had evaluated the information differently. Third, the Pentagon intelligence agencies often refused to cooperate in drafting and reviewing the OREs, and sometimes with- held their final concurrence. The first estimate of Soviet military objectives and capabilities, intended to be an annual affair, took two years to complete in March, 1948, and ORE considered it Mainly a CIA document. ++ A sampling of the estimates prepared in the late 1940s indicates that some never were issued formally, since the Pentegon refused to coneur.** Further, IAC reportedly spent most time reviewing collection pregrams and intelligence requirements, rather than acting as a high-level deliberative and approval 13 body for the estimates. In 1949, one study group concluded: "The principle of the authoritative NIE does not yet have established acceptance in the government. Each jlepartment still depends more or less on its intelligence estimates and establishes its plans 24 and policies accordingly." By 1950, it was asserted that "ORE 15 and "90% of its 16 did little more than produce its own analyses" work" was current, non-~predictive intelligence.
-~ 13 - Finally, the CIA’s intended authority over tre strategic estimative process was not. advanced, 6r aggressively defined, by DCI Hillenkoetter. In theory, the DCI's only formal responsibility fer the coordinateé estimates was to approve anc istue them. Thus, he had considerable latitude to establish an active, personal role. However, although Admiral Hillenkoetter daily briefed President Truman, he did not have sufficient rark or stature within the military intelligence community to elicit their full cooperation.?? For example, a CZTA memorandum in 1950 stated that “the Intelligence Advisory Committee had assumed an advisory rele tc the NSC and functioned as a supervisory body for thse DCI--contrary te the initial intention. "28 DCI Hillenkoetter also seams to have been uncertain about how far the CIA should go in meking firm predictions of foreign Military intentions. For example, in the: aftermath of the North Korean attack on South Korea of June 10, 1950, Hillenkoetter staurchly defende@ the CIA by asserting that top-level officials were in possession of the pertinent data befora the invasion, ari the CIA subsequently was exonerated in this respect.?? However, he reportedly ergued that the CTA could not be responsible for the “evaluation” of enemy intent. 2° A year latex, he told Congress that the CIA similarly predicted the location and capabilities of Chinese troops ir Manchuria before their December 1956 invasicn, but that “to predict the intentions of the enemy, real] or potential, i you would neeé@ a crystal ball."* In contrast, Hillenkoatter
- 14 = wag accused in the press fcr "empire-buijilding" in current intelli- gence matters,“ and he frequently sent. President Truman personai + 25 memos summarizine “raw" CIA agents repcerts. B. Definition of the DCI's and CXA's Role by General W. Bedell Smith By 1950, five separate studies called for a greater "centraliza- tion of authority” in the DCI's hands for long-term, predictive estimates.*4 General Bedell Smith arrived as DCI in the late « 25 an a four- 1950s determined to assert his prerogative for this. star general, formerly Genera), Eisenhower's Chief cf Staff and Amhassader tc Russia, he was well-equipped to do so. DCI Smith took four steps. First, he created the Office of National Estimates (ONE) and Board of Estimates in CIA in 1950, whose so).e purpose was to produce speculative-evaluative NIEs. Second, he launched the CIA on the path of acquiring an independent capahility for analysis of military data. Thire, he forcefully elicited the cocperation cf the Pentagon in preparing NIEs on military subiects. Fourth, he considered the NIEs his estimates, which should reflect a clear-cut, hopefully unified opinion for the President, and his own views when they existed. For this purpose, he turned IAC intc a kody in which he supervised formal deliberations on the NIEs. The ONE was designed as an enalytical unit tc draft NIEs. To do this, General Smith asked historian William Lenger, ONE's firat director, to recruit the best talent available. The ONE deliberately was kept smali, ranging over the years from 30-75 professionals, Its role was to write the NIEs, relying entirely
~ 15 - on the vork generated hy other CIA components and other agencies to do so. The Board of Estimates was created to review the drafc NIEs, and consider the comments and criticisms of other agencies before submitting them to the DCI and IAC for fiaal ar-royval. The Board always consisted of about a dozen men, including retired military officers. The first nine included five historians, one lawyer, and three former military officers, of whom one formarly wags Eisenhower's G-3. An outside panel of experts, known ag the Princeton Consultants, was established tc assist the Board and DCI in reviewing the NIEs. General Smith initially believed that the three military ser~ vices should collect and review all military and atrategic cata, which ONE then should coordinate and evaluete as a basis for Grafting the NIEs. If inadequate. "his reaction was not to do it yourself, but to get others to do it. 026 in practice, a short- age of hard intelligence on Soviet trocps, bombers, airfields and military plans resulted in the Pentagon making large demands on the CIA's clandestine division, tha Directorate for ?.uns (DDP). As a former DDP Soviet specialist writes, from 1949-1954, the DppP “operated almost solely as an instrument cf the Department of Defense and its theater commands. Their need was great."*? Further, it soon became evident that for ONE to draft NIEs pre- dicting the capabilities of Russian heavy bombers, nuclear pro- duction, and eventually missiles and warheads, the CIA had to have its own capability for scientific, technical and ecenomic analysis.
Primarily, this was because General Smith became convinced that. the CIA could not rely on the Pentagon te generate and submit such intelligenzte analyees to it. 78 Smith thus waded a bureaucratic battle to estcklish the CIA's indepenfence in military énd eventually strategic research, For example, in an agreement. with the State Department in 1921, the CIA's newly formee Office of Research and Reports (ORF) was gzanted exclusive responsibility fer economic research on the Soviet bloc. 2? The Office of Scientific Intelligence (OST) established in 1349 moved slowly into weapons technology research, although an August. 1952 agreement with the Defense Department restricted it te basic scientific research and pilot projects. The Office of Current Intelligence (CCI) created in 1951 first specialize@ in political intelligence, but soon had a military division. In early 1952, these three units (ORR, OSI and OCI) were grouped together alorg with ONE in the CIA's Intelligence Directorate (DDI) . Through the strength of his professional rank and personality, General Smith induced the military services ane JCS to contribute. written, draft material. to ONE for consideration. After the role of the Pentagon was established as one: of regular, formal in- put te the draft NIEg, a second problem was to encourage officers of sufficient. rank 2nd knowledgeability to participate in the deliberations at CIA anc, third, to encourage them to elaborate 30 their positions. General Smith believed that considerations of Soviet military haréware should be accompanied by predictions of Soviet military strategy. "Almost immediately,. the military challenged ONE on the nature of the estimates, @Gemanding thet
-i17- they be factual and descriptive."?+ General Smith prevailed, and in s0 doing hoped to reduce the Pentagon's tendency co over- estimate Soviet weapons based on individual service budgetary priorities. > General Smith played a strong role in deciding what military issues should be the subjects of NIEs. -In theory, NIEs were produced following a specific request from the NSC, and the NSC was also supposed to have a hand in deciding the “terms of reference" of an NIE (i.e., the specific questions posed by an NIE}. However, from the beginning, General Smith and the CIA often took the initative. During Smith's tenure, the military-orientedad NIEs on ongoing operations in the Korean war and Soviet military actions in Eastern Europe took precedence over what this author has termed the Soviet strategic NIEs. Smith was keenly interested in the former, for which he posed specific questions -and wanted "quick and authoriative" answers.°> It was typical for Smith to phone his colleagues at the Pentagon and say something like: "'I want you to get over here and decide whether Russia is going to invade Poland.*"74 Prior to submitting the NIEs to IAC, he read them thoroughly and voiced any personal disagreements privately to ONE or Pentagon officials.?” Then, the NIES might be edited by ONE to more clearly refiect these. General Smith's “extensive contacts at the senior military level and his pervasive prestige” enabled him to turn IAC into a 36 deliberative body over which he firmly presided. In 1950, the CIA's General Counsel had told Smith that:
- 18 - IAC's inflated role had diminished the BDCi's ability to demand cepartmental cooperation fee the CIA's national estimates responsibility. Houston advised that the DCI would have to exert more specific direction over the depart~ mental agencies, if coordinated national intelligence production was to be achieved. Smith acted on Houston's advice and informed the members of IAC that he would not submit to their direction. Smith believed that by encouraging competitive discussion of the NIEs at IAC, the Pentagon's intelligence heads would take a more active interest in them. He directed the debate along lines of thinking he saw as most productive. No formal vote was taken on the NIEs, and it was up to him to open or close discussion ap he so chose. His approval of the NIEs was meant to be final. After IAC, "he insured chat they were presented to Truman without contrary briefings being given him by other agencies as 50 often had happened before.*78 Almost immediately, Genezal Smith a@éressed the issue of how much and what kind of military Gissent to permit, for example, in the NIEs on the Korean war. In theory the right to dissent from the main text of an NIE in a brief footnote existed from the beginning. The NIE was supposed to provide an "exposure of information and judgements, reflecting both the consensus and . the differences within the intelligence community."?? In practice, this did not pertain to the CIA, since the Board of Estimates worked to reach a unified position and a dissenting faction within the CIA was never permitted a footnote. Further, Smith was intol- erant of military dissent which appeared to him poorly reasoned or biased. Thus, one of his major aims before and during IAC
~ 19 - .meetings was tc encourage the Pentagon to state their dissents Clearly and precisely and, failing that, to overrule them, 49 In this sense, Smith played a role which this author later terms _as “adjudicatory." He decided whether a dissent. reflected a real predictive uncertainty, or was discrete and well-reasonad enough, to be representec in a final NIE. C. Allen Dulles and the Mcdern Strategic NIZs When Allen Dulles became the first civilian DCI in early 1953 under President Eisenhewer, the DCI had the license tc shape the NIEs as he saw fit. Regarded as his document, he might in- fluence what the NIEs examined, represent his personal opinion in them, or seek a consensus-oriented IIE or one reflecting dis- senting views. As chairman of IAC, he could act as leader of debate on NiEs, expanding or limiting discussion as he inclined. Final decisions at IAC were meant tc be authoritative ane bindinc. ‘However, compared to other NIEs, the Soviet strategic NIEs wer.: primitive and the DCI's role in this process had not taken shape. Primarily, this was because the DCI as yet did not have to preside over intense, intricate conflicts between the CIA ane. Pentagon reflected in the strategic estimates. Further, the drafting process was still evolving. In the first half of the 1950s, the Pentagon dominated estimating on Soviet strategic weapons, since the CIA's capability fer independent work was fledgling.
-~ 20 = By 1953, the C™A issued annually two major NIEs related te Soviet strategic strength. One NIE, numbered 11-2,* assesssed the Soviet's "gress capability” tc attack the: US and focused on Soviet nuclear development. What was te pecome the more contro- versial estimate was NIE 11-4, a comprehensive “soup to nuts” docu- ment addressing Seviet political, economic and military capabilities to pursue its coals throughout the world. NiE 11-4 included a military chapter, semetimes chapters, on Soviet. conventional arms and manpower, and medium and lcng~range delivery vehicles. In the late 1950s, separate NIEs were initiated to cover these and other tcpics. In drafting the military portions of NIE 11-4, ONE is said to heve relied chiefly on the Pentagon's written irput and judce-~ Mmerts on Soviet hardware. That is, until late 1956, the Army, Navy and Air Force were askeé tc draft individual, uncoordinated es- timates pertaining to their special expertise, e.g., the Air Force fer Soviet bombers and missiles. Then, ONE reviewed, edited and polished these intc a standard NIE form. Becauee the CIA's in- dependent research and analytic work was limited, ONE did not draft the stratecic estimates from scratch, as it did for other NIE&. In preparing these, one CIA analyst asserts: "The ONE *Henceforth in this study, specific NIEs for specifics years will be referred to by number, with the last twe digits referrins to the year of production, for example, NIE 11-4-58. **For example, arcund 19£5 a separate NJE, numbered 11-3, was in- itiated tc address Soviet air defense systems. In 1958, NIE 11-8 was created to cover Scviet strategic attack forces, and it is this NIE which became one.of che most significant and controversial. NIE ll-4 evolved into an: estimate .discussing Soviet strategic doctrine, “NIE“11/5¢focused..onSoviet miasile capacities and NIE li-15 addressed Sovietand:Warsaw Pact. conventional forces. In 1974, NIEs. 11-3 and‘ 11-8 were: combined. There never has been a complete NIE 11-1 to 11-15 series produced for any given year. Rather, the number assigned tc each tcpic persists, and some NZEs in the series are produced only occasio..<lly. .
-~ 21 ~ accepted fairly uncritically tne inputs made by the Pentagon. "4+ Ar, Army intelligence official reports: “The: CIA generélly took the Pentegon's viers in NIE 11-4,"42 The ONE analysts @id not favor this procedure. In the early 19£0s, ONE had experimented in writing its cwn first draft state- ment of Soviet strategic aims.4° In 1955, ONE 's chief urgee the staff to write an entire firet draft of the relevant military sections. "4 Further, not all ONE staff and Board members agreed with the Pentagen's figures. Differences existed, but have - been described as "similar cleavaces...to those existing through- out the defense establishment." as cpposed to a unified, inéerendeant 45 Nunethelese, the first half of the 1950s was CIA position. characterized by a slowly evolving CIA role in drafting, in which it could not match the resources and ckill of tre three military services. . This story is best illustrated by the now famous “bomber gap" overest.imates of Soviet long-range inanned bombers, presented in NIE 11-4 from the spring of 1955 to the fall of 1956. Basically, these predictions represented an Air Force judgement, unchallenged and thus supported by the CIA, and sharply contested by the Army and Navy. The “bomber gap” predictions were contained in the: main text of the NIEs, not in footnotes. As one author writes, the: NIEs of 1955 and 1956 "provided a range of possible production curves, the choice among them being largely a matter of in- 46 stitutioncl commitment and interest." For exampla, in NIE 11-4=55
-~ 22 - the CIA and Air Force predicted a range of 30-80 Bison bombers in place, and 509-300 Bisons by mid-1960,77 The Army and Navy ob jected, and their estimate later proved the most accurate. By 1961, the Russians had built only 180 long-range bombers, the majority of which were Bears, not Bisons. *® Alien Dulles upheld the "bomber gap" estimates in 1955 and 1956, even though "the input of strategic intelligence into the defense debate in 1955-1957 was extremely damaging to the Adminis- ‘ tration" whose stated goal was to hold the defense budget constant. *! As Dulles later wrote: In 1954...there was cvicence that the Soviet Union waS producing long-range intercontinental heavy bombers comparable to our B-528. At first, every indication...pointed to the conclusion that the Russians were adopting this weapon as a major element of their offense and planned to produce heavy bombers as fast as their economy and tech- nology permitted, 50 In comparison to Soviet bomber estimates, in January 1956 the USAF Strategic Air Command had only 41 B~52s in place, although 57 had been completed. °+ In response to the "gap" predictions, President Eisenhower authorized acceleration of the B-52 pro-~ auction rate to 12 a month in the spring of 1955, and in May 1956 the rates were accelerated twice again, first to 17 a month and then 20 a month. >? In predicting Soviet bombers and subsequently ICBMs, the Air Force did not dominate the NIEs for leng. By the end of 1956, the CIA emerged as a rival to Pentagon intelligence and engaged in its firat, heated debate with the Air Force over the bomber gap. When Dulles presented his annual testimony
- 23 - to Congress on the Soviet strategic threat, the comments offered by the Air Force officer, who traditionally accompanied the DCI to answer technical questions, were challenged by the CIA. Changes that CIA analysts wished te make in editing the officer's testimony were presented to Dulles, who was receptive.°? The CIA's position was reflected in its first independent draft of NIE 11-4 in the spring of 1956, in which its estimates of Soviet bombers began to slide. In response, President Eisenhower reduced the B-52 production rate to 15 a month. >4 Taking the August 1956 NIE as the baseline for estimates of Sc.. t heavy bomber development, the CIA reduced the estimates to 62.5% in the end of 1957, 25% by the end of 1958, and 19% by February 1960.°° The Air Force digsented from the CIA's view in brief footnotes. Thus, by 1957 the modern strategic NIE had evoived. The CIA indepesdently drafted its institutional position as the main text, and the Pentagon participants were relegated to footnoted @issents. This form was to prevail for the next two decades. ‘The CIA's claim to a dominant position within strategic NIEs resulted from three factors: the U-2 photo reconnaissance flights; the CIA's independent strategic research and analytic capability; and the personal decision of Allen Dulles. First, through the DDP side, the CIA developed, funded, managed and flew the U-2 plane which took its initial photographs over Soviet territory in June 1956.°° One of Dulles’ priority projects, as DCI he controlled the complex interagency decision- making mechanisms for U-2 flights subject to final Presidential
57 approval.” The CiA developed its own photo interpretation capacity. From one specialist in 1953, a special office was created under the DDI which promptly grew to 20 persons and eventually 1,200. °° By August 1956, Soviet factories building bombers had been located for the first time and bombers at the factories and on the airfields were counted. According to CIA analysts, these numbers did not suppert the “Lomber gap" theory.°” Second, on the DDI side, the CIA's economic, scientific and current military intelligence work provided ONE with independent analyses to use in drafting “ne strategic NIEs. The most sophis~ ticated, novel and prestigious reportedly was the Soviet economic yroup called the Economic Research Area (ERA). Based on its analysis of Soviet materials ard inéustrial capability, cRA develeped new methodologies fer estimating production xates, a speciality of the CIA's ever since . As the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence describes: By introducing economic proéuction capacities into assessments cf Soviet strategic capabilities, the Agency challenged the basic premises of the military's iudgements...Air Force intelligence based its estimates on knowledge of Soviet tech- nology and laboratory research, which by 1953 were weil advanced. ORR fof which ERA was. a part) based. its estimates of Soviet deployments on Soviet eco- nomic production capabilities, which were severely limited as a resuit of the war. ' Consequently, ORR's tethodolocy attributed lewer strategic deployments, i.e., longerange bombers «nd missiles, to the Russians, 60 . we.
- 25 - Third, by 1957 Allen Dulles favored a document in which the CIA presented its independent view as the main text and conclusion. Thig decision he is said to have “agonized over" for some time after. °* An OSS hero, Dulles was eager to establish the CIA as the chief inteiligence arm of government. Althouch Dulles had an indepenéent base in the Administration, he was cautious about advertising the institutional growth of the CIA, lest the Pentagon become alarmed unduly. Personally, he did not like to preside over awkward jurisdictional disputss between the Ci2. and military. By the mid-1950s6, the CIA already was engaged in a bitter battle with the Army concerning the latter's clandestine operations and counterintelligence roles, at the direction of the nse. ©? Dulles' preferences led to outside criticism. For example, he was accused of failing to promptly consolidare CIA's military research components "on the grounds that the services might intecpret such a move as a unilateral attempt by the Agency to assume large responsibilities in their fields of primary concern.*° Three times during his tenure the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) and its predecessor called for the DCI to assume a stronger ccordinative role for the entire intelligence community. 4 Interestingly, Dulles was not firmly convinced that "it was in the best national interest" to prezent competing claims 65 to the President within the NIEs. Further, he personzily ques- tioned the wisdom of allowing a civilian agency clearly to dominate
the military agencies in the final ctrategic estimate. President Eisenhower does nct appear to have helped him resolve either un- certainty. At that time, it was Eisenhower's known preference to have disputes ironed out prior to NSC briefings. Also, he was unsympathetic with "gap" predictions, reportedly invanting the term “military industrial complex" when criticizing the Pentagon's tendency to press for growth of defense budget iseme 66 Nonetheless, these indirect signals did not provide the DCI clear guidance on how to handle dissents, how far to advance uncertainty, and whether to remain passive or choose between alternative positions. Such questions became critical as the "komber gap" grew into : the "missile gap" NIEs of 1957-1961. Dulles’ initial hesitancy about the CIA's dominant position with the strategic NIEs aptly reflects the controversy surrounding them ever since. D. Trends Since 1957 Since 1957, several changes in the strategic estimative process have increased the management and decisionmaking burden on the DCI. First, the CIA's internal strategic capability has _ grown steadily. Ten years later, the DDI alone employed hun- dreds of persons involved in strategic work. Of these, 178 were engaged in strategic research primarily related to the NIEs, and in 1967 were grouped together in the Office cf Strategic Research (OSR). Plus a sophisticated knowledge of advanced tech- nology, one of OSR's specialities is to “cost out" Soviet weapons production. In 1979, OSR employed 260 persons, and also studied
-~ 27 - Sino~Soviet strategic doctrine. ©” For the CIA's total strategic ‘capability, this number is just the cip of the iceberg. For ex- ample, the huge Directorate of Science and Technology (DDS&T) created in 1965 is involved in complex research and technical pregrams contributing to the estimative process. Chart A on the following page describes the CIA's organization in 1972 for strategic programs. At the same time, the number of CIA persons drafting and reviewing the stratecic NiEs has been reduced. Whereae ONE em- ployed a small, sometimes rotating drafting staff, when it was replaced by the National Intelligence Officers (NIOs) in 1973, one person employing two assistants was responsible for drafting NIE 11-3-8. Whereas the CNE staff was assisted by the tvelve-men- ber Board of Estimates which reviewed the NIEs, when abolished in 1973, no replacement was made until recently. In 1979, a three-member Senior Review Panel was created to assume some of the Board's functions. Finally, ongoing review of the NIEs by outside experts has not been part of the official estimating process since the early 1960s. A third change, alluded to earlier, was the emergence of a distinct institutional perspective within the CIA vis~a-vis the Pentagon. Often; the CTA assumed an adversary relationship with the military agencies, based on an assumption of biased military estimating. As described subsequently, the imaqe was heightened following the entire community's "miggile gap" overestimates from 1957 to mid-1961. To quote a former Chairman cf the Board
r - 28 - CHART A CLA ONGANEATION 1972 [| ATOWAS etCumITY COUNCH nd CORD AMD OFF CE Cunt ToR OF GEPUTY TO Tog CoMECTOR FW] 00 marromas corecates CENTRAL mTELC CENCE OF CENTRAL ATH L URE NCE, . SITELULCANn? COMMRTATY CArUTY CRECTOR Of CEMTAAL UTEL CENCE Txcunve OMECTOR sal AE a Sowa 00 guOCET ES _ - OfPUTV GUAECTOR Ofuty DIAC TOR O4PUTT OWMECTOR FOR OtPUTY DIRECTOR COR OPT aL Lroeere FCA Made WIE AD TECHROLOOY FOR BPPOAT FICK OF eartnanct save | eusnoncume by " { DELETED J COMPUTEN UEVCES amowarmencts | CONTACT BE nVICE BI OGA APEC MITELLBENCE, Pe mem ww wow maw CFP KE CP treet ammicate te wae oem: = ; . PORK WROACCAST Osrac oF O#rece OF Re aRCH (FORMAT .Cm HERVE CORARAT eNTELLIORNCE ‘nO CAVE. CPME NT —~ — WPOAMATION Ovect ce Orrice oF MEQUIA Ca TE Btars GC CCUCARE RESEARCH WwECIAL ACTIVITES orres on Ovnice oF eneurivn Cousnan sTRATIOV axrraacn WATELAICANCS MATION PHOT OURS FORGO MRL 8 AND WeetZ aPRE TATION CEKTEA D) SPACe ANAL TEN CLUTEA i ‘OFFICE OF TRAMANS Guctay : oretcy oF ase es MCE wecuay PRAT QPFICE OF PARE Source: Senate Selecte Committee on Irtelligence
=~ 29 - of Estimates: “...there is a natural thruet in military intelli- gence to maximize threats and oversimplify the intentions of potential adversaries."°* For its part, the Pentagon intelligence agencies grew to distrust CIA analysts, who they argued tended to underestimate the Soviet threat. James Schlesinger summarized these views in 1976: "In fact, the {CIA's] intelligence directorate tends to make a particular type of error systematically in close harmony with the prevailing biases in the intellectual community... There was an assumption that the Soviet has the same kind of arms control objectives that they wished to ascribe or persuade 69 American leaders to adopt.” Created to be free of bias, the CIA thus was accuseé of perpetuating one. A fourth change was in the nature of the issues debated. The advent of improved satellite reconnaiasance ang other detection means in the 1960s meant that, in the words of one participant, 70 the world was no longer "opaque." However, this prevented neither mistakes nor quarrels. As Albert Wohlstetter has documented, both civilian and military estimators “underestimated” Soviet ICBM, SLBM and heavy bomber build-up in the mid and iate 196¢s./+ as the SALT treaties loomed large; both the DCI and CIA vere drawn into a qualitative debate about everall Soviet strategic intentions. As DCI George Bush argued in 1978, perhaps prematurely: The revolutionary Gevelopments in the technologi-~ cal means of intelligerce in the last 10 yeare take care of many loopholes in terms of the pre- cision of our projects. We don't debate about a minor missile gap now. There's no debate. We measure them, we count them, know where they're
~30- sitting, we look at them....There is debate, however, about the things that can't show on a photcgraph or can't be picked up by electronics: political factions’ debates behind closed doors of politburos, research laboratories, general staffs. These things can't be learned by technology. 72 Finally, the format of the strategic NIEs has changed markediy. From a document presenting a dominant consensus and brief foot- noted dissents, the strategic NIEs in the 1960s became highly complex documents riddled with many, lengthy footnotes and appendices. In 1969, the Nixon Administration found this confusing, and subsequently asked the DCI to experiment with means of presenting alternative views “up front" in the main text of the strategic NIEs. Supported by the DCI, this experiment went through successive stages. Now, the strategic NIEs may present what are labelled "true alternatives” to the President, and the use of footnotes has been abandoned. 7? Thus, the current defintion of a coordinated NIE is the opposite of what criginally prevailed. In terms of the NIE's format, the DCI‘'s role has changed from one of consensus-seeking to presiding over competition. wee eee
III. HE DCI's MANAGEMENT OF STPATEGIC NIES AT THE DRAFT STAGE In the next four chapters, the roles of six DCie since 1957 in producing the strategic estimates are examined in depth. The focus is on the personal attitudes and leadership postures adopted by successive DCIs. These are explored within an informal con- text; that is, in the absence of forma’ legislative and Presidential direction, DCIs have had the liberty to assume or ignore any of the rolee described. The author's concluzions for six DCIs and seven possible roles are summarized in Chart B on the following page. The chart is referred to in subsequent chapters. These chapters are written from the DCI's perspective and are mainly descriptive. The author is interested in the his- torical pattern of behavior, establishing what six men have done, or not done, to ensure that coordinated NIEs were produced. Whether these actions resulted in improved NIEs is an evaluative question, raised later only tangentially. For example, a DCI may have initiated a reorganization which was later criticized or reversed. Or, a DCI may have inserted his parsonal judgement or sided with a minority view within an NIE, which in retrospect proved inaccurate. Rather than scoring a DCI on whether he was right or wrong, we seek to establish whether a DCI did arything at all. How aid DCIs regard the strategic NIEs, what roles did they believe they should pursue, what tasks did they find difficult or conflicting, what steps were ignored?
CHART B INDIVIDUAL KOLES ASSUMED BY DCIs FOR PRODUCTION OF STRATEGIC NIEs (X = played a role; XX - viewed as major role by DCI; O - played littla or no role) DCIs DULLES McCONE HELMS SCHLESINGER COLBY TURNER ROLE IN PRODUCTION (1953-61) {1961-65) (1966-72) (13973) (1973-75) (1977- )} 1. Management Direction to CIA Production i] x 0 xX XX XX DRAFT 2. Management Attention STAGE to DOD Cooréination 0 0 0 0 XX XX “OF fter '69)" NIEs (W.H. after '69) 3. Personal, Substantive ‘ , Input to Draft 0 x 0 XX 0 xX : 4. Support of CIA's ae CRAY position x 0 Q 0 0 0 el BEAR (from '57 on) TIONS AT USIB OF 5. Encouragement of NFIB Competitive Debate 0 x 0 X XX 9 6. Final Adjudication of Views ) x x ? 0 XX (tenure too (but mainly brief) prior to NFIB in 3.) DRAFTOR 7. Promote Independent FINAL (Outside) Review x 0 0 x 0 0 NIEs (W.H. Bush —S— in '75) (1976) (XX) *WlH. indicates DCI responsive to Presidential or White House preferences. eee ATES OU MEMES mre) lew et eee te ge.
This chapter discusses the acticns of DCIs in managing the estimative process prior to USIB consideration, at the time when the NIEs are drafted by the CIA with input from the Pentagon. It concerns the mechanics of the drafting process, for example, who wrote the NIEs, how they were written, and how the Pentagon intelligence agencies contributed. A. Management Direction to CIA Production The CIA's three functional Directcrates have been described in this manner: "The DDI is a production outfit and can run itself, the DDS&T spends money, but the DDP always involves people problems."+ For most years located in the DDI, the Board of Estimates and ONE did "run itself." After the policy decisions of DCIs Smith and Dulles previously described, their leaders established the traditions and operational steps for producing NIEs which persisted until 1973. Until then, DCis remained in a supportive role. For example, DCIs Allen Dulles, John McCone and Richard Helms did nct review or initiate organizational innovations, dictate or modify drafting and review procedures, ox personally select the drafting team, although they did approve Board appointments. Like- wise, these DCIs did not decide when the strategic NIEs were - drafted, instigate innovations in style and format, or review the thecretical underpinnings of earlier concepts. In part, this reflects their satisfaction with the estimative process as it was being run and their attention to other CIA programs. Even he.
- 34 - John McCone who, compared to DCis Dulles and Helms, was keenly interested in management questions, reportedly spent "90% of his time on clzndestine (DDP) programs." However, as indicated in Chart B, John McCone is given an “X" because of his role in a breakthrough relating to highly classified, US strategic planning data available to CIA estimators. Beginning in 1973, a trend was establisned for a more active management of estimative work by the DCI. DCIs James Schlesinger, Wiliiman Colby and Stansfield Turner believed that organizational and drafting innovations were needed, and that manegement was a prime function of the DCI. After Colby abolished the Board of Estimates and ONE in 1973, both he end Admiral Turner personally hired the National Intelligence Officers (NIOs), designed new drafting techniques, and monitored the NI.s’ progress by reading successive draft NIEs. Some observers claim that it is inappropriate for the DCI to concentrate the power, resources and intellect of his office to managing a handful of men who draft the strategic NIEs. Since these persons originally were intended to be uniquely independent but, in turn, totally dependent on external staff who collect and analyze strategic intelligence, perhaps the DCI should turn his attention to the rest of the CIA's strategic work. For example, which strategic functions should be grouped together in the DDO,* DDS&T and DDI and what are the optimal means by which *The clandestine Deputy Directorate of Plans (DDP) was renamed the Deputy Directorate of Operations (DDO) in 1973. : t ‘S Sr eh ;
- ook = 35 - the three Directorates share work with one another? What is the appropriate balance between human intelligence gathering (HUMINT), electronic, communications and signals intelligence collection {(ELINT, COMMINT and SIGINT), and the political analysis of all three.* How much should CIA drafters rely on CIA as opposed to Pentagon work in producing the strategic NIEs? Because of the enormity of these questions and the competing Claims of different functional units, this author's research has focused primarily on the CIA's, estimates staff and its coordina~ tion with the Defense Department intelligence agencies. Un- less a DCI initiated organizational innovations in the CIA's strategic intelligence work primarily for the short-term impact on the NIEs in mind, such changes are not discussed in this study. Below, the DCI's management direction to CIA estimative work before and after 1973 are described separetely. 1. Before 1973 The early independence of the Board of Estimates and CHE staff from the DCI is explained by the uniqueness of their functions and the aggressiveness, small umber and stability over | time of the individuals involved. The Board and ONE were designed to offer the DCI an independent, collective analytical judgement for his final review. Elite units of talented professionals, | *Sometimes analytical work also is referred to as HUMINT. In the past decade, the question of whether the CIA is long on technological collection programs and technical analysis, and short on politica: analysis, has been raised by at least three DCIs--Schlesinger, Colby and Bush. It continues to be a focus of outside criticism. wat eran en meete eaten Sedna namaelh
~ 36'- they were supposed to be isolated from the daily pressurer and competing demands of other CIA units. There were cnly four Chairman of the Board and one, Sherman Kent, served from 1952-1967. The Board's membership of approximateiy twelve was meant to be well-rounded, and include one or more retired military officers. The total ONE typically was about 50 professionals, varicusgly erganized on a geographic and functional basis. The Chief of ONE handled most edministrative mattors for the estimates ataff, in order to free the Board members. for substentive .ork. In the mid-1960s, it became common practice for ONE staff to be élevated to Board positions. fhe Board and ONE develoned the format for the NIEs. For ex- ample, all NIEs consisted of an opening, brie! “Summary,” followed by tight paragraphs of "Conclusions" and a presentation of the background and evidence. In the 1959s Sherman Kent developed a lexicon of probabilities, which wat a “system of carefully graded verbal measures of certainty."” An executive summary was prepared according to a President's interest or request. For example, for the strategic NIEs, President Johnson requested a special one-page summary and President Carter is said to read up to 15 pages.* The Soviet strategic NIEs included a carefully worded statezent of overall Soviet strategic emphasis and inten- tions, which beginning in 1$69 was included in the executive summary, and since 1974 constitutes a separate chapter of NIE 11-3-8.
- 27 - In the late 1950s, separate estimates in the Soviet "ll" series were initiated by ONE, reportedly in part to facilitate the input of new CIA units to the draft.” In the 1960s, the strategic NIEs expanded from 30 te, by 1970, over 100 pages. Presently, NIE 11-3-8 consists of an executive summary, and two volumes of about 125 pages each. The first is a summary volume and the second a documentary volume, containing detailed supporting data, charts, graphs and tables. As the format and timing of the strategic NIEs became routinized, there was little need for the DCI to dictate in ad- vance when tiuey should be written and what topics to consider.* For example, the "terms of reference” of the strategic NIEs was circulated by ONE in late winter, a first draft completed in late spring, followed by lengthy interagency coordinative meetings at the CIA, which hopefully culminated in a final draft in Octoter for DCI and USIB approval. This schedule anticipated Presidential consideration of the NIEs in preparing his defense budget. Generally each strategic NIE updated last year's predicticns and inventoried new weapons, for the next five years. As described later, in the 19708 DCIs sometimes decided at USIB whether to include new, highly controversial subjects in the‘current or next year's strategic NIEs. The Board of Estimates early established two traditions which have persisted with the DCI” support. First is to draft the NIEs from the point of view of a foreign country, with no specific *In contrast, DCis often have been involved in the "tasking" and terms of reference of non-strategic NIEs, such as curing potentiai crisis situations.
- 38 - reference to US policy options, military force levels, or conflict scenarios. This practice is meant to free estimators from bias that might result if they are drawn into debate on US military programs, and thereby also increase the credibility of the NIEs. Direct comparisons are considered a "Net Assessment” rather thar. NIE function, and have been primarily the job of the Defense Department.° Reportediy, in 1962 CIA estimators were so concerned with preserving this distinction that they were reluctant to gain access to highly classified US strategic planning data, lest the NIEs then appear less independently written or unbiased.” DCIs have reinforced this tradition. For example, Allen Dulles systematically avoided statements that gave the anpearance that the CL. was invoived in foreign policymaking. His colleagues des~ cribe how he refused to raise even the implications of NIEs for the US strategic arsenal, even when specifically asked by Congresaionai and NSC members .° Dulles never talked publicly about "gaps." "The 9 John McCone is said 10 DCI's job was to provide the facts, period." to be less of a “neutralist" or "purist” in this regard. "Mine is not a policy job," he once taid "but when asked I'll give my epinion."?4 In 1969, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger argued that rigid adherence to this tradition decreased the NIEs' policy relevance. However, DCI Richard Helms held his ground, and resisted the White House's initial proposal for involving CIA estimators in’ SALT I verification predictions. -? The egree- ment subsequently established remains in effect, with a distinction drawn between predicting Soviet potential to violate the treaty and verifying a substantial viclation, which Admiral Turner considers a policy matter.
- 39 - However, White House interest in direct US-USSR force comparison in the NIEs has continued. In the 1970s, the strategic NIEs in- cluded a brief numerical summary of current and predicted US force levels in an appendix, and some requests were made for US-USSR conflis scenarios. Recently, Fresident Carter asked DCI Turner to offer so-called "red-blue" comparisons between Soviet (“red") and US 13 ("blue") forces in the main text of the NIEs. One CIA analyst said that the issue of how to best present these "has not bee:. resoivea."14 A second practice established by the Board of Estimates is to reach a unified CIA position within draft NIEs. That is, a factior within the CIA does not have the option of taking a footnote. In effect, the Board and nox. the DCI monitored disputes hetween CIA estimators. One Board member "chaired" each NIE from the beginning, and it was up to him to see that ail CIA viewpoints were aired before reaching a conclusion. Typically, this occurred before the Pentagon agencies were called in to discuss the araft.+5 A unified CIA opinion is, in part, inherent in the nature of es- timative work. AS one author notes, there is also a bureaucratic imperative: a unified view reinforced the CIA's draft and reduced the likelihosd that military dissenters would seak alliances and gain momentum. 2® No DCI has reversed this practice. For example, DCIs Dulles and McCone d2d not sit in on Board of Estimates meetings or monitor drafts in progress to observe how differences were handled. Richard Helms tolé this author that this is not an appropriate function
- 40 ~ ef the DCI, since it might reduce his authority or bias his consideration of the final product? Even now, when the Nios have been given the license by Admiral Turner to explore all alterna- tives, they consider it “logical for the CIA to pull together at some point" and CIA differences that might persist are not formally identified within the strategic nies. 178 Earlier, several observers argued that such differences occasionally were significant. For example, during the 1957-1961 missile gap estimates a few ONE staff are said te have believed that the Soviets could deploy few ICBMs by the early 1960s, as opposed to the several hundreds officially predicted in the nres.2 In the 1960s, one author con- tends that on technical issues ONE generally tcok the position of OSR and its predecesgors, and the DDS&T. However, "on questions involving a Ligher...political content, agreement was less certain.) The lack of management direction to the estimates team by DCIa Allen Dulles and John McCone reflecte not only its aggressive- ness and talent; it also reflects the faith these DCIs had in the original set-up. This is demonstrated and waa maintained by the strong personal relationships between the DCIs and various Board members. Dulles and McCone respected the Board, invited Sherman Kent to morning staff meetings, discussed estimates individually 20 The with analysts, and sometimes proposed new Board members. Board and ONE enjoyed a certain institutional independence from the DDI. For example, they hired their own staff, and made personnel transferg from other DDI units without the DDI‘'s approval.
- 41 - Organizational charts showthat in the mid-1960s the Board was elevated out of the DDI into a staff positon to the per. 24 How- ever, Kent's stature was equal to that of any DDI and this step was Significant on paper only. John McCone initiated several functional reorganizations within CIA which were heralded as appropriate rationalizations ; of the CIA's growing strategic work, such as the creation of the DDS&T in 1965.* However, of more direct, short-term impact on the strategic NIEs was a breakthrough McCone precipitated in gaining CIA access to highly Classified US strategic planning docu- ments generated by the Pentagon. McCone believed that “the DCI had to be informed of US strategic capabilities in order to give adequate intellijence support to the president."2" During the Cuban missile crisis in Cctober 1962, McCone acted as a key participant in White House celiberaticns and the CIA estimators were asked to draft several NIEs. At that time, McC ne obtained the data he requested on US force dispositions. This was the wedge he needed. Following the crisis, with encouragement from [Defense Secretary] McNamara, he continued to make the requests. By the mid-1960s, the DDI was procuring information on US strategic Planning on a regular basis. Consistent access to this data increased the Agency’s information base consideratly and further established the CIA‘s claim to stratcyic research. 23 *Tliustrative of the continuing competition between various Directorates, in 1965 the DDI criticized the DDS&T's taking of the Office of Scientific Fntelligence (OSI) on that grounds of weakening the DDI's estimative work, and later reclaimedOSI. ' Photo. interpretation work has moved back and forth from the DDI and DDS&T. ne eaetaeereee © eens deere mere Smee cme cinrem mamma sane a tm inne cern Te: ewe tenes tbe iat mnt. am!
- 42 - Actually, the CIA's access was not always “consistent” or easy. For example, the Navy remained hesitant about providing the CIA with some data. In the early 19708, it refused to provide CIA analysts with some requests. Reportedly, Richard Helms then intervened on their behalf. 74 Richard Helms long tenure as DCI, from mid~1966 to early 1973, was characterizet by passivity vis-a-vis the estimates team. CIA analysts report that Helms maintained his distance from the Board of Estimates, developed few personal relationships there, and was little interested in estimative mechanics.*> Helms’ DDIs were forceful personalities who exerted a stronger administrative in- fluence on facets of that Directorate's work. On the other hand, Helms defended the Board and ONE's right to be left alone to do their work. "To some extent the Cffice was shielded by Richard Helms. During a period in which the CIA was regularly under attack, Helms found that the prestige and credibility of his analyste...weze great assets...."° Unfortunately, during Helms" tenure the prestige of the CIA estimators declined. As the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence repor -s, the charge frequently was echoed that the Board and ONE had become “insulated” and in-bred, and that Helme did not infuse 27 it with new blocd. For example, the Board of Estimates gradually changed from a broadly-based group in which individual members had considerable stature and independent outside ties, to a place 8 of tenure for ONE staff.” The last two Chairman previously had
~ 43 - been Board membsurs and bafore that ONE staff. Helms reportedly made one Board appointment which was regarded as politically motivated, ana by 1973 there was no military representation on the Board.” Pentagon intelligence staff privately argued that after new ONE staff were hired, including former DIA employees, they soos. acquired a "CIA perspective,"79 Helme' role in creating the Office of Strategic Research in 1967 was wisimal. Helms approved the reorganization, proposed to him by the DDI with the backing of Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. >= The consclidation of several strategic components in OSR meant that the NIE staff could turn to ene place within the CIA for finished strategic analyses. OSR's stature was yreatly enhanced by the fact that Secretary McNamara immediately began to solicit its advice, through special memoranda and reports as well aa the NIEs. As one author summarized: In the 1560s, a pericd of disillusionment with militaxy estimating and one in which the civilians wera ascendant in the NIE process, the NIEs were found to be useful counterweights to the excessive clains of the military. McNamara started off expecting to be able to use the DIA as his source of inteiligence, but he became increasingly dissatisfied with it. AS @ consequence he turned more and more to the CIA for estimates on the Vietnam War and Soviet military Capabilities. ONE did a number of papers at his personal request, and McNamara encouraged the forma- tion of OSR, a CIA office designed to compete with the military on military estimates....McNamara would take the NIE judgement as final, and would refuse to speculate on any new Soviet capabilities until they had been properly discussed through the NIE process.3 According to the same author, the CIA estimates team relied in- creasingly on OSP., compared to other sources, in preparing the NIEs.?> tate ah em,
- $4 - 2. Atter 1973 Beginning with James Schlesinger in 1973, DCIs rave demonatrated more interest in managing the estimates function. During his five month tenure as DCI in early 1973, Schlesinger took several steps to revitalize the NIE process, ‘for example, he examined options for reorganizing the estimates staff, debated these with Board 34 members and finally determined to abolish the Board. He argued that the strategic NIEs had become cumbersome, and urged stylistic nodifications to reduce their length and complexity. ?44 For example, he promoted the use of Intecagency Intelligence Memorancum (IIMs), to deal in-depth with highly technical issues, such as Soviet civil defense and defense spending. The IIMs are coordinated in- formally with the Pentagon and do not require USIB approval. Their conclusions then may be summarized in the strategic NiEs. "To improve estimative work, Schlesinger arrived as DCI with a “mandate for change” in the rest of CIA, following his report in 1971,as Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget, on intelligence community reforms. For example, in the report Schlesinger had challenged the notion that “our hypotheses about foreign intentions, capabilities, and activities have improvad com- mensurately in scope and quality as more data comes in from modern ‘collection methods" and was determined to upgrade analvtical work 35 within CIA. As one colleague observed, if Schlesinger had re- mained as DCI "he would have taken the place apart.“76 William Colby accomplished the first reorganization of thea es- timates function within CIA in over twenty years, and then assumed direct responsibility for it. Although several of his reforms have
- 65 - been criticized ever since, DCI Colby is given a "XX" in Chart B for his personal role in them. Colby replaced the Board of Sstimates and ONE staff with 11 National Intelligence Officers, called NIOs. Most NIOs had geographic reaponsibilities, e.g., Latin America, and several had functional tasks, e.g., strategic in- telligence and world economic trends.* Colby had three rationale for this move. First, he hoped to improve the NIEs, and respond to outside criticism, by creating a drafting system which relied more heavily on the direct input of non-CIA agencies. To accomplish this, the NIOs were located as a staff function to the DCI and assigned cnly one staff assistant. In theory, anyone could contribute draft material to the NIO, who had both management and production responsibilities. That is, the NIO was responsibie for seeing that 4 draft was produccd but he did not necessarily have to write it himself. Rather, he "managed" the work of other persons, for example, in DIA, whom he might ask to write first drafts. Changes in drafting procedures which resulted are discussed below in Section B. Second, DCI Colby sought to sharpen the jines of responsibil- ity by abolishing the Board of Estimates. As Colby told this author, the Board tended "to isolate the DCI from the true believer. He testified to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: I have some reservations at the ivory tower kind of problem that you get ovt of a board, which is tso separated from the rough and tumble of the real world....I think there is a tendency to be in- stitutionally committed to an approach and to an *Presently, there are additionai "functional" NIOs for Warning, Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control. 37 tte see eee ee epee nn we mere cee
- 46 - appraisal of a situation and to begin to interpret new eve; cn: against the light of a predetermined approach toward those events..I like the idea of in- dividual total responsibility, and then you don't get any fuzz about how there was a vote....That really is my main problem with the Board, that it diffuses responsibility....° Colby's third rationale pertained, broadly, to the CIA as a whole, the reorganization of which Colby said he had "just begun. "29 The NIOs were supposed to be the pinnacle of a system more geograph- ically focused to provide better intelligence. In addition to estimating, the NIOs were meant to be the DCi's “eyes and ears on the world" to provide him with prompt, up-to-date intelligence answers and survey broad intelligence requirements. 49 To aid them, Colby became the first BCI to attempt to "force the DBO to interact with other elements of the Agency," which his new Management 241 by Objectives system was supposed to facilitate. Like Schlesinger, Colby sought to increase the CIA's capacity to analyze foreign political changes. For example, he created the first Office of Political Research (subsequently abolished) in the DDI and by firing the head cf the DDO's Office of Counterintelligence, Colby sought to refocus the DDO's Soviet work on Soviet political in- tentions.42 As Colby recently said: We used to go through a great deal of effort to dis- cover the number of [military] divisions in Eastern Europe, but we now get this information without the use of agents or defectors. We do have to worry about political estimating, a political judgement of the forces at workin countries which are hidden behind closed doors. SEEN” Wh InP War lenebonppennt ee" teepuaienemneeron rund Traditionally, the contact between DDO and NIE staff was limited to rare personal visits of DDO officials to the Board of Estimates, and circulation of covert agents reports "graded" in terms of re- liability by the DDO. ‘The Board of Estimates housed these in its "all-source" reading room. Occasionally, the Board and ONE received important agents reports which some DDI units did not receive, such as those of Soviet military intelligence officer Oleg Penkovsky in 1961. Colby told this author that he once brought together a dozen CIA country specialists, in the same room, to discover that most never had met.
- 47 - _ William Colby assumed an active relationship with his NIOs. In personally hiring each one, he sought to bring in new pexsons.* Of the first eleven, eight were new to the estimates process, one was from ONE, another from the Board, and a third (the NIO for Strategic Intelligence) had been with ONE in the 1950s and early 1960s. The NIOs were elevated to a staff relationship with the DCI, and directly responsible to him, although administratively supervised by a "chief" NIO. Colby met frequently with individual NIOs, read successive drafts, Listened to each NIO‘s analytical problems, and tried to remain informed about coordinative difficulties. In addition, he turned to the NIOs for their views on broad ques- tions, for example: "Are we collecting enough? Are we processing raw data properly? Are we spending too much money on it? Are we organized right to do the job?"45 When Admiral Stansfield Turner became DCI in early 1977, he sought to refine Colby's managerial innovations and retains a keen interest in management issues. For example, tu reduce the intellect~ val burden on the NIOs, he assigned them only one function, to draft NIEs. To reduce the administrative responsibility of the rer, he appointed a director and small staff to oversee the. NIQs. on a full-time basis. After geveral organizational experiments, Turner relocated the estimates function back within the DDI, which was renamed the National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC). The first head of NFAC, called the Director of National Foreign Assessment (D/NFA), spent most cf his time on estimative work. Chart C on the following page describes the composition of NFAC in 1979. In late *The NIO who wrote the NIE on Soviet Bloc conventional forces was an active Admiral. ry eee en ee
~ 48 ~ Ghart_¢ : Director Deputy Director Review Panel Associate Director~Management National Intelligence “_ Assosiate Director-Substantive Support Officers Administrative CiA Operations Requirements & Planning Staffs Center Evaluation Steff Curr - ont Reporting Publications & Group Presentations Group: Office of Cifice of tice of Cifice of Central lmegery Scicstifie Weapons Reference Analysis irieligence intelligence ‘ Office of Office of Cijica of Office of Economic Geographic & Regisnal & Sustegic Research Cartograpiic Political Research Research Anaiysis €0 1005 wo, eet
-~ 49 - 1979, the newly appointed head of NFAC was asked to reevaluate the NIO set-up, deciding whether further organizational innovations were needed. Reorganization now is in progress. In early 1979, Admiral Turner reconstituted the collective NIE review function within CIA, a step advocated by several govern~ mental study groups. For example, in 1976 the Senate Select Comaitte on Intelligence recommended that "the Director establish a board to include senior outside advisors to review the NIEs."46 Turner hired a three-man Senior Review Panel, which included an eminent academic in strategic affairs, a former Ambassador, and a four= Star general. The Panel serves both the DCI and the NIOs, and reviews IIMs as well as NIEs, at several stages during the drafting process. However, unlike the Board of Estimates, the Panel informally advises as opposed to collectively approving the NIEs. In 1979, questions were raised as to whether the Panel had either the prestige or authority to function effectively witnin cra.4? Admiral Turner has promoted innovations in drafting procedures. For example, each NIO has a list of expert consultants he may use in drafting. Several years ago, a consultant was hired to write the entire first draft of NIE 11-4 on Soviet strategic doc- trine, and presently this NIE is drafted by the NIC for Soviet Bloc affairs. Much flevibility and diversity prevails in the drafting of non-strategic NIEs. For example, each NIO follows different and highly individualistic drafting procedures,* and may use varying formats.48 ‘The NIOs are encouraged to prepare NIEs when *For example, one NIO may write a first draft himself before calling in other agencies for discussion; another may ask a CIA team and/or other agencies to draft assigned portions of an NIE, which he then edits; and a third might solicit "think" papers from outsiders which he uses in preparing an NIE himself.
- 50 - they see the need toe do sc, as opposed to routinely addressing topics on an annual basis. This pertains to NiE 11-4 as well. In total, the number of NIEs has been reduced from about 50 a year, to 20-25 a year. Like Coiby, Admiral Turner maintains an ongoing, personal relationship with his NIOs throughout the drafting process, reviewing and monitoring their work during successive stages. B. Management Attention to Department of Defense Coordination This section explores the DCI's role in the mechanics of coordinating the CIA draft with Department of Defense (DOD) in- telligence agencies, prior to USIB consideration. The Pentagon agencies discussed are Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) created in 1961." As indicated in Chart B, most DCis focused little attention on the means ky which the Pentagon might best contribute to the draft strategic NIEs. After the mid-19508, the Board of Estimates and ONE took the lead in defining the timetable and mechanisms for the Pentagon's involvement. The three military servicee and DIA exercised their prerogative in deciding whom to senu to CIA coordinative meetings, what kind of internal work to generate parellel to the CIA's, and how far to advance disagreements in the CIA draft. Beginning in 1969. Presidents urged changes in the format of pregenting military dissents in the strategic NIEs. With the DCI's support, the CIA estimates staff gradually implemented *fThe input of the National Security Agency (NSA) is not discussed here. Before 1561, the Joint Chiefs of Staff J-2 intelligence arm participated in the drafting and had a seat on USIB. The DIA re- placed it. Re Sn hee a
- 51 - these changes. The exceptions to this pattern of traditional non- involvement of DCIs are William Colby and Stansfield Turner. By different means, both sought to enhance the Pentagon's direct input and improve interagency coordination in the drafting stage. Both are given a "XX" in Chart 3B. 1. Before 1973 As described earlier, General Bedell Smith was the first DCI to elicit the cooperation of the Pentagon in drafting NIEs. Later, Allen Dulles gave the CIA what has been termed the "power of the draft" for strategic estimates, by supporting its inclination to prepare independently a first draft.?? However, he considered it inappropriate to prescribe optimal coordinating tactics to Defense Secretaries. Thus, the Board of Estimates and ONE adopted a pat- tern for coordinating the Pentagon's response which,in several respects, remains similar today. Pirst, early in the year ONE circulated the terms of reiarence of the forthcoming NIE, and invited interagency comments. Then, it continued an ongoing survey of raw intelligence and finished analyses on strategic issues from different CIA. and DOD units. It often solicited additional work from CIA, DOD, consultants, and special USIB subcommittees. These subcommittes are interagency groups, often initiated by the DCI, assigned specific topics for study. For example, a USIB subcommittee important to drafting NIE 11-8 was the Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC)* created by Allen Dulles in 1956, to "track the *This subcommittee was first called the Guided Missiles Intelligence Committee (GHMIC). - t
- 52 - rabbit to its lair."29 ‘The ONE had complete freedom to decide what work to collect, consider and integrate into its draft. That is, no DCI established guidelines to assist it in choosing, re- jecting, or balancing different sources. ONE then completed a first draft, submitted it to the Board for approval, and circulated it within the Pentagon and other agencies for review. The next stage of interagency coordination was, and is, diffi- cult and protracted. Intelligence agency represertatives were in- vited to CIA to discuss the draft. These meetings went cn throughout the summer and fall, and sometimes were reconvened after DCI and USIB review. They were chaired by a Board member and Later an NIO, and included CIA representatives and often more than a doz- en Pentagon staff, but not the DCI. Here the draft strateqic NIEs were heatedly debated, and here the CIA's “power of the draft" was keenly experienced by the DOD representatives. The purpose was to explore and redefine all areas of agreement and, failing that, to agree on how to disagree, prior to submitting the final draft to the DCI and then USIB. Since the CIA was well prepared with a completed document in hand, the Pentagon representatives were put in the position of reacting to, or effectively challenging, what already was written. Further, ONE did most subsequent redrafting. As one observer notes: “In the draft ONE would resolve...ambiquity according to its’ own views, vsing style and structure as well as argument. "51
~ 53 = The DOD representatives often arrived at CIA fer discussion ill-prepared to influence ONE or make concrete rebuttals. For example, during the late 1950s and the 1960s, they did not come with completed analyses parallel or competitive to ONE's, which could be integrated into the draft. Rather, the representatives were familiar with their own agencies intelligence studies, esti~ nates, budgetary and posture statements, the parameters and time frames of which might differ from the CIA's draft.°2 Thus, they relied on verbal means to influence ONE and, from time to time, called in different intelligence specialists to advance technical arguments. Traditional interservice rivalries and budget competi- tion make it impossible for the military representatives to form stable coalitions to use as bargaining tools with ONE. For ex~ ample, in the early 1960s the Army and Navy typically lined up against the Air Force in predicting Soviet ICBMs in NIE 11-3, but the Army and Navy often disagreed on Soviet SLBMs in NIE 11-8; and on Soviet ABM potential in NIE 11-3.53 The creation of DIA in 1961 did nu. alter this seemingly ran- dom approach to the draft strategic estimates. The DIA was es- tablished, with the backing of President Kennedy, to work on strategic intelligence matters pertaining to the three services' tactical work, and speak with a unified voice for them. However, the DIA was not "functionally geared to the production of con- vineing estimates."54 Earlier, Allen Dulles had written: “Two powerful and well-financed agencies such as DIA and CIA will become rivals and competitors. Some of this could he healthy: too much 355 of it could be both expensive and dangerous. Actually, in the
- 54 - beginning DCI John McCone worried that DIA might exert too much pressure to conform on the three military services, and a CIA group set about reviewing its programs.>6 However, soon McCone complained to McNamara that DIA's work was “irrelevant and redundant" ?/ and both men reportedly lost interest in ways to overcome what more than one observer has called DIA's "inherent bureaucratic weaknesses" in competing with the military service intelligence agencies.°8 If the CIA had the "power of the draft,” the three military services nad the "power of the footnote.” Footnotes represented these issues for which a compromise through rewording and restructuring could not be reached, or to which the Pentagon would not acquiesce. In the late 1950s and 1960s, they typically were specific. For example, CIA and Air Force numerical predictions of Soviet ICBM deployment over the next five years might differ by a 100 or more, or the two might disagree on the characteristics of a Soviet missile such as the SS-9 versus the SS-ll. Then, the Air Force had the option of taking a footnote at the bottom of the page, saying: "Air Force Intelligence disagrees....It believes...." Until 1969, footnotes were accepted as a clear-cut, useful method of registering dis- approval. The CIA did not deny their use, and no DCI or other top- level official sought to alter the system. The most clear indication of tacit acceptance of the footnote system was its pervasive use. Throughout the 1960s, the strategic NIEs were rife with numerous and complex i:otnotes to the main text, which was supposed to represent the consensus. For example, various Pentagon agencies disagreed with the CIA's position on a
- 55 - Soviet ABM system, MIRV capability, and other aspects of new delivery vehicles and warheads. Sometimes, a majority of pages had foot- notes. For example, in NIE 11-8-65, the dissents are said to have been larger than the text itself, and thus the evidence for dissents eventually was presented in appendices prepared by the Pentagon. 9? On occasion, DIA took an independent position "contrary to the views of all the service agencies."©9 For example, in the above-mentioned NIE, an upper limit of Soviet ICBMs was predicted only in a foot- note supported by the three military services, but DIA dissented from the footnote. ©! After reading NIE 11-8-68, Henry Kissinger asserted that the document made little sense, since the text was "bland," "inconclusive" and refuted or "taken back" in footnotes. © By the early 1970s, the Pentagon began taking footnotes to less specific issues. For example, in the opening pages of the NIE, it might footnote what ore participant called "the basic tone" or broad implications of the NIE. ®3 The first effort to rationalize the footnoting system came from President Nixon. In early 1970, Dr. Kissinger requested DCI Richard Helms to experiment with new means of presenting dissent in the NIEs. Kissinger argued that a fuller sampling of alternative views and supporting evidence in the main text would be useful to the White House.64 as ina lawyers brief, he wanted.the reasons for rejecting various options officially recorded. In other words, the CIA (and by implication the DCI) was not required to reach a dominant consensus on highly controversial issues, but offer the policymaker "facts, not opinions" which he then might arbitrate. 65 ein ate ste meee aetee atte Hane
- 56 - Helms agreed, but left it to the Board of Estimates and ONE to implement the request. In NIE 11-8-70, a few alternative views were presented "up front” in the main text, although footnotes were still used for some time. To illustrate the stylistic aiffi- culty in implementation, this NIE was over 100 pages, which was over twice as long as its predecessors, and one ‘ootnote was a pege long analysis. 66 When James Schlesinger became DCI, he said he wanted alternative positions presented even if the estimators “had to cut the page in two. "67 The White House alse offered the Pentagon a license to more systematically compete in the drafting of strategic NIES. In 1970, a special Directorate of Estimates (DE) was created in DIA, headed by the highly qualified Army General Daniel Graham. Gr7ham began producing estimates called DIEs, focusing on narrow but “the more contentious topics," such as Soviet MIRVing of a single missile, which were important to the NIE debate. "In some ways the DIEs have served as a dry run for the NIEs--used to create a more rigorous DIA position on controversial issues."68 They were prepared before the NIE coordinative meetings and, importantly, sent to the White House. Henry Kissinger also stepped cutside the NIE process by urging defense intelligence officials, as well as non-intelligence officials such ag the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E), to help draft the White House's more policy-oriented National Security Study Memorandum (NSSMs). In so doing, they could incorporate selective material from the NIEs. Soon DCI Hels found himself in debate with the DDR&SE at the White House, in which NIE conclusions were reopened. 69
After 1973 William Colby was the first DCI to take the lead in altering existing patterns of DOD coordination. His 1973 NIO reorganization was meant to increase the direct input of the Pentagon to the first draft. He told his NIOs to set. up procedures by which this might be accomplished. The following year, DIA was asked to prepare a first draft of one out of five chapters of the com- bined NIE 11-3-8, and the State Department's INR was given the chapter on Soviet strategic doctrine. In 1975, DIA drafted two chapters, including the one on Soviet doctrine, in which the Air Force assisted. 7° Reportedly, DIA officials were "delighted” with this opportunity. 72 Presently, DIA still drafts at least one out of five chapters of NIE 11-3-8. One participant described this new technique as the "bottom up" approach to coordination.’2 per Colby hoped it would in- crease the personal stake that DIA, and the services if they par- ticipated, had in the draft, and heighten interest and skill in sustained estimative work. Further, it was meant to introduce a more "competitive element” into. the drafting, by removing "a certainty that a particular agency will have a decisive say in a particular estimate."7? However, the real impact of this inno- vation now is debeted. First, observers note that the outside contributions were weak stylistically, and subsequently edited or rewritten by the NIO for Strategic Intelligence. ”4 Second, the DIA's interest and service cooperation may have declined
~ 58 - 5 recently.’ Third, NIE 11-3-8 still is written mainly by one NIO, including its executive summary. The estimators themselves assert that one benefit is a common data base and shared knowledge. 7© While CIA staff have acquired specialized knowledge from the military, e.g., on how missiles systems are operated, military officials have broadened their grasp on a range of topics. DCI Colby supported his innovations by assuming 4 personal, coordinative role. Primarily, he did this by listening to Pentagon representatives who came to his office to outline their grievances about the draft, and then reporting these complaints to the NIO. The then head of DIA, General Graham, argues that Colby was "highly accessible" to requests for hearings, and that coordination in the drafting improved during his tenure as per. 77 Colby also ad- vanced the presentation of alternative views in the main text of the strategic NIEs, with President Ford's support. By 1976, italics were used to highlight differences. For example, one paragraph might present the majority view, followed by a paragraph in italics representing another view. Footnotes were used for less controversial, discrete, or individual dissents. Admiral Turner plays an even stronger personal role in managing competition during the drafting. Like DCIs Schlesinger and Colby, he supports the trend of incorporating alternative positions in an NiE’s main text, a policy for which President Carter indicated his agreement. 78 However, Turner has extended this conceot by virtuelly eliminating the use of footnotes. He directed the head of the National Foreign Assessment Center and his NIOs to consider all alternative views “regardless of their origin,"
- 59 - and eventually narrow them down to a few. 7? By discarding foot- netes, Turner hopes that the Pentagon will explore and delineate their differences more concretely, reaching agreement on which are the most significant. The implication is that the Pentagon should weight their dissents internally, advancing and documenting those which reflect a major predictive uncertainty, and abandoning those less central to the current year's strategic arguments. Alternatives are presented in the NIEs as "parallel texts." That is, different positions are alternatively developed, para- graph by paragraph, throughout the text. Like General Bedell Smith over 25 years earlier, Admiral Turner personally intervenes to assist CIA staff in eliciting from the Pentagon well-reasoned, agreed-upon, objections. He rigorously examines successive drafts, and then takes the initiative in raising strategic topics directly with military officials. For example, if he believes that a Pentagon option is inadequately expressed or lacks technical documentation, he calls up the Pentagon analyst involved and says so.80 df, after further re- vision, Turner still has questions about the position advanced, he is likely tc bring these to the attention of the relevant in- telligence head, for example, the Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence. Often this cccurs during xegular meetings between all the intelligence heads in the DCI's office. If he still has reservations about the wording or logic of the alternative, he May cali the head of the military service involved, for example, the Chief of Naval Operations, and ask his opinion. By going up the chain of command, Admiral Turner is interested in discovering whether the dissenting view is widely shared by Navy officials. de Rect eet ee natin ht Ben he mee etanee) ome ne mmaner onan e © vw ae tet cate mated 1 Pnay eae Keema ianene Aa mo
om, - 60 - IV. SUBSTANTIVE INPUT OF DCIs TO THE DRAFT STRATEGIC NIES This chapter explores the role of DCIs in contributing sub- stantively to the draft strategic NIEs. This author considers "sub- stantive" any personal input a DCI makes, in his view, to improve the content or increase the validity of a specific NIE. Substantive inputs occur at several levels. For example, a DCI may edit successive @rafts for clarity, offer his personal views to es- timators, devise new ways of evaluating technical issues, eliminate spurious arguments, or represent his personal judgements in the final draft. For strategic NIEs, the substantive input cf DCIs usually has been considered a function of their technical background and interest in strategic affairs. As the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reported, before 1976 "only three DCIs atteinpted to address their primary attention to the qualiry of intelligence production: Walter Bedell Smith, John McCone, and James Schlesinger."* This was, in part, a "function of their background.” This chapter supports this conclusion. As indicated in Chart B, out of six DCIs, the three who did make substantive input--John McCone, James Schlesinger and Admiral Turner--had previous tech- nical training and/or familiarity with strategic issues. This chapter also examines a DCl s substantive involvement as a function of his personal attitudes and administrative style. Here, all six DCIs have behaved differently. For example, John McCone frequently interacted with the CIA estimates team, by asking questions, dé..ating and reviewing its work. However, on occasions when he aiffered sharply with it, he permitted the
- 61 - staff view to go forward to USIB before reaching a final decision. In contrast, Admiral Turner reads and edits successive drafts from the beginning, and at times plays a major role in determining how and which competitive ideas are expressed prior to NFIB con- sideration. Fer this reason, DCI Turner's substantive role in drafting is what the author later describes as “adjudicatory," and he is given a "XX" for this function. James Schlesinger is also given a "XX" for nis unique intellectual contribution. On the following pages, the six DCIs are described in sequence and occasional differences in behavior tor strategic and non-strategic NIEs are noted. Allen Dulles Like Bedell Smith, Allen Dulles spoke of the NIEs as "his" estimates. As chief intelligence advisor to the President, Dulles considered it his prerogative to insert personal judgements into the NIEs, a view which the Board of Estimates supported.2 His attitude of possessiveness was heightened by his personal role in briefing President Eisenhower, his brother as Secretary of State, and other top officials, on the NIEs. During the Eisenhower years, ail NIEs were linked formally to the NSC process. For ex~ ample, NIEsS appeared on the weekly agenda, und were utilized and appended to policy papers prepared by the NSC's Planning Board. Regular NSC meetings were cpened by the DCI's briefing on major intelligence issues, including new NIEs, which one participant said "was never less than 15 minutes long."? In retrospect, one Pentagon official argues that Dulles' briefinge represented the "most effective and timely” means of reaching policymakers. 4
~ 62 = ‘towever, in practice Dulles’ substantive input to strategic and non=-strategic NIEs was limited by the fact that he paid little attention to the text of the ‘draft NIEs. Rather. Dulles relied on informal and verbal means to influence the CIA es- timates team. For example, during the year estimators were kept informed of his concerns in the course of meetings not primarily devoted to the NIEs, such as the DCI's morning staff meetings and current intelligence briefings. Sometimes, Dulles called junior analysts in ONE, to offer his own view or highlignt new intelligence. Then, the Board and ONE were left alone to do their work. Allen Dulles did not reaé successive drafts, and his first formal review of NIEs occurred when the final draft was complexed.” Then, he was briefed on the draft by Board members just prior to NSC or USIB meetings. At this time, Dulles focused primarily on the summary and conclusions cf. the NIE. Hie concern here was threefold. First, his colleagues re- port that he waS intolerant of what he considered wordy, imprecise or pedantic sentences, and night make editorial changes to en- hance their concreteness. ® Second, he listened and queried the estimators, until he felt comfortable in presenting the NIEs to the NSC or USIB “he following day. Typically, a staff member then was selected to accompany hin to meetings. Third, for non-strategic NIEs, Dulles occasionally modified the conclusions to reflect new intelligence to which he was privy. Estimators report that, in several instances, they were saved from embarass-~- ment by the DCI's intervention at the last minute.’ However, they reported no instances in which the content of strategic NIEs was so altered.
If Dulles influenced the estimates team by informal means, they, in turn, had to systematically convince him of the appro- priateness of their strategic predictions. This took place throughout the year. One Board member argues that Allen Dulles "worried over each strategic estimate. "® One of ONE's directors asgerts thet “language describing qualifying and accurately quantifying the Soviet threat came from CIA draftsmen, and had to be fought through up tc the ODI and DCI gecision levels."? In the late 1950s, the CIA's internal research on Soviet production capabilities was vitally important to its prediction of an on- going Soviet ICBM build-up, since little hard data from the Soviet Union was available. For example, the press reported that the 200 U-2 flights over the USSR up to May 1960 detected only two operational ICBM launchers in Soviet territory.?°. John McCone John McCone's attitudes about the strategic NIEs were curiously mixed. Board of Estimates menbers say that he initially did not regard the NIEs as "his" estimates. Rather, he considered them & product of good staff work for which the DCI should adopt a "hands-off" policy. 11 Further, McCone was highly critical of the quality of past NIEs. When McCone arrived as DCI in late 1961, he privately rebuked both the CIA and Air Force for their roles in promoting the missile gap theory over the last four years. 1? He then witnessed the rapid explosion of this myth, following the first satellite reconnaissance evaluated in August 1961. i ee
- 64 + For example, between late 1960 and late 1561 the CIA halved its predictions of Soviet ICBMs for mid-1963, from 400 to 200 rcBMs.23 Actually, by mid-1963 it was estimated that the Soviets nad built only 100 1cBMs.24 Nonetheless, once che drafting process was in mcetion, “cCone found it difficult to stay on the sidelines, and Board of Estimate members contend that they consistently urged nim to become more involved. As the former Chairman of the AEC, an engineer and successful corporate executive, McCone was well-equipped to do so.* As one colleague reports, he wanted the NIEs to be "right" and so utilized in policymaking.15 He had "the inquiring, skeptical turn of mind ef the good intelligence officer" and found technical inielligence “endlessly fascinating. "16 McCone's subsequent involvement in drafting has been de- scribed as "enterprenaurial,” although he was not consistently or equally aggressive for each Niz.17 Throughout the year, McCone kept up-to-date on new intelligence, analytical problems and community-wide disagreements by demanding "instant, full briefings on anything that caught his attention."28 He frequently called up Board members to ask questions, give edvice and, occasionally, argue his viewpoint. When the final draft reached his desk, he examined it thoroughly, in the words of one aide, “going cover each line as if it were a corporate mortgage."19 Then, it was not surprising for him to call Sherman Kent at home, early in the morning, and Say something like: "ton page 20, you say this.... Can you prove it.'"20 necone was impatient with what he considered imprecise and ambiguous stitments, and sometimes edited the draft himself. *Less remembered is the fact that McCone's own engineering firm was involved in shipbuilding and aircraft production in WWII, and after that he became Under Secretary of the Air Force. a
- 65 - On 2 few occasions, DCI McCone differed sharply with the CIA Graft. He then had a choice: either let the NIE go forward to USIB, where it could be reviewed again; or change the NIE to re- flect his view.* McCune found the first option most appropriate, and stopped short of inserting his view to the draft prior to USIB debate. The best example of this is his behavicr during the now infamous NIE, in September 1962, on the lixelihood that USSR Might place offensive nuclear weapons in Cuba. Although this NIE was not part of the "11" strategic series, it partly hinged on an ongoing debate about Soviet difficulties in perfecting their ICBM guidance system. 21 In a rare community-wide agreement, this NIE predicted that "it would be incompatible with Soviet policy te introduce strategic missiles in Cuba. "22 For some tire, McCone had believed otherwise. Following in- telusigence reports on an inereased Soviet presence in Cuba over the summer of 1952, McCone warned President Kennedy in August that “something new and @ifferent"™ was goirg on.*3 Before leaving on his honeymoon trip to France in early September, McCone privately said that he we: “very worried" and requested an nrE.74 The first draft did not support McCone's hunch. While abroad, McCone supplied the Board with a barrage of cables pressing his claims, and asked that the draft be reconsidered. “With no @issents, it again conciuded that “the Soviets simply would not do anything so un- characteristic, provocative and unrewarding," but Sherman Kent advised McCone to alter the NIE if he wished.25 MeCone did not, believing that the NIE's arguments were sufficiently well-reasoned to remain inviolable. A U=-2 flight over Cuba on October 14 proved that McCone's prediction was correct. *At that time, a third option later employed by William Colby and Admiral Turner, to present the DCI's opinion separately in the NIE, was not considered compatible with the NIE process.
- 66 - Richard Helms Richard Helms’ concept of the DCI's role in the Grafting process was well-defined. Helms told this author that the DCI should dis- tance himself from the drafting, lest early association with differ- ent viewpoints bias’ him in favor of one or another.26 The DCI should preserve his freedom to make final, substantive decisions just before or at USIB, by not becoming an advocate too early. Helms considered the NIEs "the Director's piece of paper” and thus the DCI "had the right to intervene or change them” if deemed necessary.7 DCI Helms did not exercise this option for the draft strategic NIEs. Helms had risen up through the ranks of the DDP in CIA, and his primary interest was political intelligence. When he arrived as DCI in mid-1966, a unique technical competency was required of the DCI. For example, one controversy concerned the “mysterious footprints"of Soviet MIRVs, evidence which the entire intelligence community interpreted differently. 2% Some participants questioned Helms' basic interest in strategic matters, and one Pentagon official described Helms, compared to other DCIs, as "the most dilatory in terms of. substance."292 Helms himself has said that many of the issues at hand ultimately were “unknowable” and his instincts came into play only in "the final phase of production. "39 Helms did review the final drafts of the strategic NIEs, with two concerns in mind. First, he tried to keep the process moving in an orderly, timely fashion, and second, he preferred to have interagency disputs resolved prior to USIB consideration. Thus,
- 67 ~ he reviewed drafts for internal consistency and clarity, and if he ascertained that an NIE was se deficient or that the consensus offered masked real divisions, he promptly sent it back to ONE for revision. 22 After 1969, the Board and ONE were left alone to administer changes in the presentation of dissent in the strategic NIEs, mandated by the White House. Thereafter, the DCI experienced more difficulty in sending them to USIB on time. Sometimes, Helms had to make the decision to go forward with the NIE as it was. The only documented instance in which Helms personally inter- vened in a strategic draft before USIS followed a request from Defense Secretary Melvin Laird. _In NIE 11-8~69, the CIA included a summary paragraph which read: "We consider it highly uniikely that they [the Soviet Union] will attempt within the period of this estimate to achieve a first strixe capability..."32 Just be- fore the scheduled USIB meeting, one of Laird's assistants asked Helms to revise the controversial statement since it “contradicted the public position of the Secretary."33 Helms deieted the entire paragraph, although the State Department's representative on USIB reintroduced it as a footnoted dissent. James Schlesinger During his brief tenure as DCI in the beginning of 1973, James Schlesinger was involved intimately in drafting the strategic NIEs, primarily on substantive grounds. A highly trained economist, former strategic analyst at the RAND Corporation and former AEC Chairman, Schlesinger was qualified to address complex strategic issues. Earlier, he had criticized the CIA for possible “bias” in assessing
- 68 = the Soviet threat, and as DCI appeared willing to take on CIA analysts on their own ground. 34 For example, the then Chairman of the Board of Estimates reports that Schlesinger frequently debated past NIEs with him, pointing out sentences and phrasings that, in the ECI's view, were misleading or inaccurate.2>9 Ag the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence concluded: "Schlesinger's overall ob- jectives were to maximize his role as Director of Central Intelli- gence rather than as head of the Agency and to improve the quality of the intelligence product. "36 One of Schlesinger's major contributions was in strategic methodology. CIA analysts explain that he was highly creative and helpful, for example, in devising new methods by which to count Soviet MIRVs and techniques to ascertain the characteristics of new Soviet cruise missiles. °/ Schlesinger enjoyed reading early drafts, an@ then often summoned analysts to his office to draw charts or demonstrate how a problem might be approached mathe- matically. Describing Schlesinger, William Colby said that he was "the one DCI" who grasped the strategic debate intuitively, and would have elevated the current state of art of strategic analysis. 38 Will.am Colby Walliam Colby also involved himself deeply in the draft procees but, for the strategic NIEs, not on a substantive basis. Like Richard "elms, Colby rose up through the ranks of the CIA and had little specific expertise in strategic topics. Colby told this author that he Gid not have the technical knowledgeability to make
- 69 - personal input to the draft. 3" Pather, he saw the primary role of the DCI as effectively managing the competitiv.: process, the chief virtues of which were thoroughness, patience, an? open~minded- ness as opposed to intervention or arbitration. Colby presided over the strategic NIEs at a time when, in the words of one CIA analyst, the “consensus had fallen apart. "40 He hoped to improve the quality of the NIEs by increasing their representativeness. Like McCone, DCI Colby viewed the draft as a prelvde to USIB debate and endorsement. Colby read successive drafts with the hope of better grasping the strategic debate and ensuring that minority views were considered by his NIOs. As described earlier, Pentagon officials were granted individual hearings with the DCI during the drafting, after which Colby raised their complaints with the relevant NIO. For example, DIA officials argued their new es- timates in his office and Air Force inteiligence chief Major General George Keegan presented him with numerous, documented dissents, as outlined in the next chapter of this study. At the drafting st.ge, Colby was observed to be mre aggressive in offering advice and editing the non-stratesic, compared to strategic NIEs.41 However, when he disagreed with the draft, Colby typically waited until USIB to register his views. Admiral Stansfield Turner Admiral Turner systematically makes substantive input to the strategic NIEs. Like McCone and Schlesinger, his Naval training provides a technical background in strategic issues to make him
- 70 - useful in critiquing NIEs. As DCI, he was “highly dissatisfied with a large number of national intellixenc2? estimates" and ex- ercised his mandate to play a role in impor ring them.42 This role is well-defined and highly personal. As Admiral Turner recently argi.ed, the NIE process is ultimately a one-man system. After an estimate is prepared by the community, "the one-man system comes in, because I decide, I sign for it, I vouch for it.°43 Admiral Turner takes the time to stay in close touch through- out the drafting process, primarily by devoting attention to each successive draft. As one aide reports, Turner is involved in the draft strategic estimates "from beginning to end," from the first one prepared by the NIO and Pentagon to successive redrafts after interagency coordinative meetings. His “critiques occur all throughout the process” and his approach is "sceratic."44 turner carefully examines the drafts in his office, underlines the parts he believes need improvement, and suggests ways of doing so. For example, he may ask whether a line of reasoning is relevant, out- line alternative ways of handling a point of ambiguity, or state how he disagrees. The draft is sent back to the NIO and a dialogue begins. This frequently entails discussions between the DCI and junior analysts as well, and, as examined earlier, between the DCI and Pentagon officials. Turner then reads the next draft to ascertain if the changes make any difference. If he considers these in- adequate, he may redraft paragraphs or entire sections himself.
-~ 7 - Admiral Turner is given a "XX" in Chart B for another reason. This is the personal role he sometimes plays in deciding which views are advanced as major alternatives in the text, decisions which occur prior to NFIB review. The author describes these decisions as adjudicatory, and Turner is not the first DCI who has personally arbitrated between views. However, unlike other DCIs, Turner does not use NFIB as a final debating forum and discourages the use of footnotes as the ultimate recourse of dissenters. Thus, his choices at this time may determine the final content of the NIEs. Two examples illustrate Admiral Turner's different handling of alternative views within @raft NIEs. Recently, alternative positions were expressed in a draft of NIE 11-4, on how the Soviete might view US behavior ia a particular conflict scenario.45 The disagreement was explicit and intricate, based on interpretations of recent Soviet publications on strategic doctrine. Admiral Turner reviewed the evidence or both sides, and finally agreed to go forward with the CIA's view. This he slightly modified, re- placing the phasing "Soviet intentions" with "Soviet expectations.” On.the other hand, Admiral Turner upheld the presentation of alternative positions in a recent NIE 11-3-8. At issue was the strategic implications of the Soviet Backfire bomber. The CIA and Air Force disagree@ on the potential range of the aircraft by at least 1,000 miles, 46 Both had examined the question at some length, hiring professional contractors to construct experiments
-72- to test the aircraft's potential range. The evidence on both sides appeared adequate and, therefore, the Gispute was not re- Bolved within the NIE. Instead, the NIE went forward with the two opinions intact. A third option employed by Admiral Turner was first used by William Colby. In cases where the DCI disagrees vith both sides or strongly endorses one view, Turner may attach a covering memo to the NIE or insert a statement into the NIE, which explains this. That is, the DCI separately states his opinion in a letter or paragraph to effect that "The DCI thinks...” Turner also uses this technique to explain how decisions were reached within the NIE. The author does not regard this as adjudicatory.
-73- Vv. TRE DCI's LEADERSHIP ROLES AT USIB OR NFIB This chapter examines the varying approaches of DCIs to the strategic NIEs during the final phase of endorsement by the USIB, or now NFIB. Here again, a DCI's posture during USIB deliberations reveals his attitudes about the NIEs, his role as CIA director versus coordinator of the intelligence community, and what kind of document best serves the President. Three possibie roles are discussed; first, support or advocacy of the CIA's position; second encouragement of competitive debate and a multiplicity of views; and third, final adjudication of alternative views, i.e., personal @ecisions which resolve conflict or otherwise change the NIE’s sub- stantive content. As indicated in Chart B, the author concludes that the first role was emphasized by Allen Dulles, ‘within an historical context that excluded other roles on his part. Ccmpetitive debate at USIB was encouraged by DCIs John MeCone, James Schlesinger and William Colby. Final adjudication was a role exercised occasionally by DCIs John McCone and Richard Helms. As just described, DCT Stansfield Turner also acts as an adjudicator, but primarily out- side the context of NFIB. This chapter focuses on USIB because, since IAC in General Bedell Smith's time, it was meant to be a high level forum for NIE debate and final endorsement. Composed of the heads of the in- telligence agencies, USIB is intended to have the flexibility to reexamine disagreements and the decisionmaking authority to resolve them once and for all. As Chairman, the DCI is supposed to play a
- 74 = community-wide coordinative role, as highlighted in the late 1960s by the appointment to USIB of the Deputy Director of CIA (the DDCi) to formally represent the CIA's views. However, the DCI and USIB members frequently have been criticized for acting only as a rukber stamp for the draft NIEs. For example, one opinion is that "most DCIs have been reluctant to engage in confrontation with members of the USIB over substantive findings."2 Another is that USIB members lack specific expertise and "were reluctant to quibble...with the preparatory work done by its staff."2 This study's findings do not support the view that mest DCIs and USIB members have been passive during USIB meetings. Historically, USIB often has been a major Gebating ground for the strategic NIEs. USIB discussion sometimes has been lengthy and intense, and on occasion the content of the NIEs altered as a result. Most critical to this study, some DCIs have exerted individual leadership over the process. Contrary to the opinion that "the power balance of the USIB did not vary greatly from that involved in the inter-agency review," the intervention of some DCIs upset this balance.3 A. Support of the CIA's Position Only one DCI examined here, Allen Dulles, saw his primary role at USIB as personally supporting the CIA's position within the stra- tegic NIEs. Dulles' role in promoting the CIA's view must be placed within the context of the missile gap debate of 1957-1961. Dulles’ earlier decision to permit the CIA to draft the strategic NIiZze according to its independent view was a policy decisicn which
7 tee. subsequently elevated the CIA's role in the estimative process. It also reflected an interest in enhanced competition within the NLEs, since the CIA's view wae presented in addition to what it considered exaggerated and offsetting claims of the three military services. In the late 1950s, Dulles recognized that he theresy was lending support to NIEs which offered competing claims ‘to \ President Eisenhower, a concern which continued to plague him.4 "When askea to answer the single most important intelligence gues- tion of the period, the intelligence community provided a series of contradictory estimates and gave the impression that the Soviet ICBM programme was far more expeditious and productive than it in fact curned out to be."9 The missile gap estimates thus became the classic case of disunity within the intelligence community. The only point of agreement was that there might be a "gap." For example, in NIE 11-8-60 the CIA predicted that the Soviets would build 400 ICBMs by mid-1963; in footnotes, the Army and Navy predicted 200 ICBMs, and the Air Force 700 ICBMs, by mid-1963; the State Depart~ 6 ment and JCS were in-between the CIA and Air Force. To some » observers, the CIA's position represented an attempt for institutional compromise rather than a logical extension of concrete analysis. As General Daniel Graham later wrote of the missile gap years: ae "Curiously,...the CIA position was generally--and sometimes precisely-- . halfway between the Army-Navy view and the Air Force view. To the military analysts this smacked of a political rather than a care- fully reasoned, objective position."/
Nonetheless, once having decided to assert the CIA's individual perspective within the strategic NIEs, Allen Dulles’ instinct. was to support "his" analysts publicly. Dulles reasoned that pre- USIB debate on the draft gave sufficient hearing tc all parties and, after this, the institutional independence, prest-ge and morale ef the CIA was on the line. Personally, Dulles was dis- inclined to participate in prolonged debate at USIB, and he did not vigorously advocate the CIA's position during the oral discussion. Rather, he promoted the position of CIA analysts by presiding over USIB deliberations in a manner which did not permit reopening of previous decisions. Further, he personally briefed the President on the final NIEs and, in one instance, attached a memorandum to NIE 11-8 personally endorsing the CIA's position. Parenthetically, Dulles’ colleagues report that as the missile gap debate intensified, the CIA drafters had to work hard to convince him of their position and that the U-2 flights were targeted to close the CIA's un- certainty.8 As Chairman of USIB, Allen Dulles is said to have been firmly in charge of its proceedings. While his attitude about discussion was more permissive than DCI Smith's before him, to the Pentagon participant:s the outcome was a foregone conclusion. ? By the end of 1966, one Presidential study group complained that USIB had become primarily a "deliberative body” neglecting its broader tasks of intelligence community coordination.2® sili, del.berations followed a certain format. The DCI summarized the NIE, and then each military service and the JCS representative presented their
ciasenty, for example, the Army argued its case for Soviet emphasis on medium-range ballistic missiles and inadequacies in ICBM trans- portation facilities} Generally, individual positions were well-~ entrenched, vr example, when the Soviets ceased ICBM testing from ‘April 1958 to March 1959, the CIA aryred that this ind.cated performance trouble while the Air Force maintained precisely the opposite.+¢ After listening to each side, Dulles patiently re- stated his affirmation of the draft NIE and closed the meeting. No _vedrafting was done. Dulles then scheduled a meeting with President Eisenhowsr to brief him on the NIE. One Pentagon official said thet Dulles' briefings effectively foreclosed any end-running to the White House.}3 The missile gap predictions advanced by Allen Dulles to President Eisenhower were anything but popular with the Administration. One observer wrote that Fisenhower considered these NIiEs "probably ' invalid" and he did not respond as promptly as he had during the bomber gap debate.14 For example, Eisenhower deferred authoriza- tion of increases in first generation Atlas and Titan missiles until the first Polaris and second generation Minuteman missiles were available and evaluated. During Kennedy's successful presiden- tial campaign on a strategic gap platform, the DCI was repeatedly pressed by journalists to give his personal opinion. Dulles up- held the NIEs as valid intelligence projections in a case where ' sufficient doubt existed. When NIE 11-8-60 was presented to President-elect Kennedy, Dulles attached a personal memorandum explicity stating his support of the CIA's position in the main text of the NIE.15
- 78 - That subsequent CPCIs did not see their primary role at USIB to promote the CIA's position resulted, in part, from the missile gap experience. In mid-1263, it was estimated chat the Soviets had constructed only 190 ICBMs, proving that the entire intelligence community earlier had been wrong. However, by this time the CIA's position within the strategic NIEs was no longer on the ascen- dant, but was dominant. Moreover, a distinct institutional perspective vis-a-vis the Pentagon had emerged following the missile gap over- estimates. As General Graham later wrote: "To put it bluntly, there is a considerable body of opinion...which regard threat estimates prepared by the military as being self-serving, budget- oriented and generally inflated....It stemmed from a series of bad overestimates [which] have hung like albatrossess around ‘tthe necks of military intelligence officers ever since."16 Since the DCI did not have so throw his weight consistently on the side of the CIA in order to protect its institutional view and independence, he has been free to assume other roles at USIB. B. Encouragement of Competitive Debate Of the five subsequent LCIs examined here, three--DCIs John McCone, James Schlesinger and William Colby--actively promoted competitive debate on the final draft of the strategic NIEs. Ail three considered USIB ag an appropriate, higher-level sounding board or second stage for the presentation cf new ideas and a reopening of old dissents. They personally participated in debate and acted as a court of last regort fer intelligence officials
- 79 « dissatisfied with the draft. Under McCone and Colby, USIB meetings were lengthy and intense. Both DCIs reserved their judgement and were willing to alter the strategic NIEs as a result. Although Schlesinger's tenure was brief, interviewees describe his attitudes as being similar to McCone's. For his philosophy of supporting con- sistent debate at USIS, Colby is given an "XX" in Chart B. In comparison, the inclination of DCIs Richard Helms and Stansfield Turner has been not to use USIB (or NFIB in Turner's case) as a forum for debate. As documented earlier, Admiral Turner encourages competition within the final NIEs chiefly by efforts to improve coordination at the draft stage. Below, these five DCIs are described in sequence. John MeCone In response to criticism about Allen Dulles’ inattention to community-wide coordination, President Eisenhower ence said: “I'd rather have Allen as my chief inteLligence officer with his limita- tions than anyone else I know."27 > In contrast, President Kennedy explicitly directed John McCone to strongly assert his role as in telligence community coordinator.28 McCone accomplished this, in part, chrough USIB. . DCI MeCone believed that USIB should serve as a prominent debating field in which the full multiplicity of views could be expressed, within the context of seeking his approval of the NIEs. One of the first battles McCone waged to support this view ‘vas with Defense Secretary McNamara, over the composition of USI3 after 1961. As one observer noted: "The intention of the Administration
= 86 - had beer to charge the DIA with the resolution of conflicting service estimates and to make its presentation to the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) stand as the final juégement of the Pentagon. "29 After DIA was created, McNamara proposed that it re- place not only the JCS representative but algo the heads of Army, Air Force and Naval Intelligence on USIB. They, and the DCX com- plained. John McCone reportedly argued with McNamara that this step might weaken the DCI’s ability to hear multiple, conflicting views, and lead to “watered down” estimates. 2° Thus, a compromise was arranged whereby the three military service intelligence chiefs were invited to USIB meetings. While they lost their official member~ ship or "vote," they retained an equal right to argue and dissent. In effect, each service had a “right to appeal past the DIA” to USIB and its Chairman. 21 McCone demonstrated an interest in listening to these appeals, if well-reasoned and thoughtfully presented. Significantly, McCone became the first modern DCI to be willing to support a service position over that of the CIA's. As one author wrote: "McCone showed that he could be convinced by good arguments, and gained a reputation for objectivity by being ready to overrule the CIA on the United States Intelligence Board."22 According to CIA es- timators, this happened in the case of several NIEs assessing progress during the Vietnam war, for which McCone was known to be “hawkish" in disputing the effectiveness of a gradualistic approach to bembing of North Vietnam. 23 During USIB debate on one such NIE, McCone told CIA analysts to redraft the estimate after talking to military commanders “who know what is going on. "24
- 81 - A critical example of McCone's support of competition with- in the strategic NIEs is NIE 11-3-63, regarding the possibility that the Soviets were deplcying an ABM system around the so-called Tallin Line. The potentiality of an “ABM gap" was one of the most hotly contested strategic issues in the first half of the 1960s. in 1963, a major division existed between the CIA, supperted hy the Navy and State Department, and the Army, supported by the Air Force and DIA. The CIA maintained that the observed installations around the Tallin Line did not represent an early ABM system, but rather were relegated to anti-aircraft defense. The opposite view was a more pessimistic or "hard assessment” which viewed the new installations as the beginning of a full-fledged anti~missile system.25_ At USIB, McCone was impressed by the Army's line of reasoning.26 After the Army's initial presentation, McCone scheduled another meeting — for elaboration. As described in the following section, McCone then assumed an adjudicatory role and officially sided with the Army's view, as the final text of NIE 11-3-63.27 After this, he hired the Army general delivering the presentation, who later became head of the CIA's new DDS&T. McCone was impatient with debate at USIB that he considered repetitious, once he had made up his mind. For example, in the early 1966s he is said to have been intolerant of the Air Force's views on Soviet ICBM delployment and often cut short debate on NIE 11-8. In 1963, he sided with the CIA's prediction of 300-600 ICBMs by mid-1967 and considered the Air Force's predicted level of 700-800 by that date much too high. 28 ‘Albert Wohlstetter documented ; how, in the succeeding years, the Air Force estimates gradually con- verged with those of the CIAg...."In 1965 and 1966 {convergence} was ectes C2 Gere fe ORE Oi atin et ded sweet
~ 82 - complete in the near term and in 1967 it became complete for all years."23 In 1974, Wehlstetter wrote that for the years of his study, 1962-1969, the intelligence community had "systematically underestimated" Soviet heavy bomber, ICBM and SLBM deple pment. 30 Richard Helms Richard Helms’ tenure as DCI was divided in two parts: from 1966 to 1968 he served under President Johnson and from 1969 to 1972 he served under President Nixon. Helms' inclinations were the same in both periods. He believed that drafting strategic NIEs was the job cf professional analysts, who should be able to reach agreement prior to USIB. Helms did not enjoy listening to debate on highly technical issues, and argued that USIB was not the proper place to reopen past grievances.31 Rather, USIB meetings should lead to timely approval. President Johnson asked that the strategic NIEs be reduced to a one-page executive summary, which does not suggest much encouragement to the expression of competitive views. In his Administration, USIB meetings reportedly were some of the shortest in length hitherto, typically lasting only forty-five minutes. . During the Nixon Administration, competition gradually in-~ creased. As the SALT I treaty loomed large, Pentagon dissenters were less willing to relinquish their arguments withcut a fight, and both the White House and Defense Secretary Laird indirectly encouraged competition by criticizing the strategic NIEs. Helms thus was faced with potentially long and angry USIB meetings. Es- pecially irritating was to be assured that disagreements had been
- 83 - resolved, only to have them “pop right back at us13."23 Helms told this author that he favored enhanced competition within the NIEs, that estimating was a “give and take" process in which it was conceivable that different parties might exaggerate their claims in order to emphasize a point, and that CIA estimators sometimes regarded him as too ‘hard line. "34 However, his handiing of competition was simple. He listened to competing argument only long enought to determine that it had not been resolved. Then, he closed the meeting, and typically sent the NIE back to ONE for redrafting. Participants say that he Signaled the end of the meeting by removing his glasses .35 After 1970, successive redrafting sessions, followed by USIB meetings, were required. As a consequence, several strategic NIEs were not officially approved until the spring of the following year. 36 James Schlesinger DCI Schiesinger enjoyed competitive debate at USIB and actively Participated in it. He considered USIB a place where intelligence chiefs with broad responsibilities and interests could meet in an informal atmosphere. His colleagues Gescribe how he sat back in his chair, puffed on his pipe, and listened. Then, he might in- itiate a lengthy dialectic with the intelligence chiefs, during which new options might be considered. 3? Like McCone, Sciilesinger was impatient with assertions but sespected stimulating and documerntable analysis. As described earlier, one of his major concerns was to keep competition in Manageable proportions. For example, he layered the strategic estimating process by making some issues, such as Soviet civil
- 84 - defense, the subject of IIMs, then summarized in the NIEs. Much discussion concerned how to best present major alternative positicas, and stylistically control the complexity of the strategic NIEs. During Schelsinger's tenure, raw data was contained mostly in appendices. William Colby William Colby utilized USIB as @ court of last resort, where appeals to the draft NIE from the Pentagon could be heard. Colby considered himself primarily a manager of competitive debate. In the words of one aide, he preferred open, group discussion at USIB as a means of hearing dissent, rather than private meetings, and believed that USIB was a place where all could actively participate in endorsing the draft. 38 During Colby's tenure, different Pentagon officials challenged the CIA's basic assumptions about Soviet behavior within the strategic NIEs. Notably under attack was the CIA's premise, summarized in a paragraph of the executive summary, that the USSR was not seeking strategic superiority, or a first strike capability, vis-a-vis the United Zrates. For example, General Daniel Graham as head of DIA called this “the pablum statement" and, as noted earlier, began footnoting “the basic tone" of the NIEs. 388 ob- jections also were offered to the CIA's format for handling dissent. For example, as head of Air Force Intelligence, General George Keegan objected to placing some dissent in footnotes rather than in the main text, the presentation of supporting evidence in appendices, the exclusion of critical dissents from the executive summary, and the elimination of pivotal issues, such as Soviet defense spending, from NIEs. 2? ws
- 85 - At USIB, Colby listened to several hours of debate on one sec- tion of an NIE, and scheduled other meetings to continue. To follow-up meetings, Colby invited the Pentagon intelligence chiefs to bring along staff and written documentation. General George Keegan now came to USIB meetings axmed with new Air Force trans~ lations of Soviet strategic writings in order to denonstrate that CIA estimators had misinterpreted evidence about Soviet inten- tions. 49 To support his claims that the Soviets rapidly were deploying new missiles and undertaking a massive civil defense effort, Keegan brought along satellite photoes, engineering reports and ir Force estimates of Soviet defense costs. They were passed around the table. According to General Graham, Colby gave Keegan, “who tends to round things off to the nearest million,” every opportunity to present his case.* Por each major argument, this never took less than cne-half hour. Then, Colby often authorized Marginal changes at USIB. For example, Keegan was permitted to take additional footnotes, rewrite existing footnotes, present new evidence in an appendix, or substitute wording in the text. /? By 1975, Pentagon criticism of the CIA draft NIE 11-23-8 had reached such a pitch that the DCI took an unprecedented step. Prior to the scheduled USIB meeting, Colby held a special conference of all intelligence agency heads and staff "to ensure that they were informed of all difference of opinion" prior to reviewing the draft itse1f.474 This meeting was the first, acknowledged con- cession to military officials who complained that it was difficult to comprehensively express their divergences from the CIA draft,
- 86 - while at the same time having to "chop up, edit and revise” the text. 43 This meeting reportedly lasted over six hours, and the DCI was present the entire time. Admiral Stansfield Turner Admiral Turner's attitude about comperutive debate at NFIB is similar to that of Richard Helms, although unlike Helms, he spends considerable time on competitive jesues at the Graft stage. In the words of ore aide, Admiral Turner prefers to “work text" in his office rather than subjecting the draft to lengthy orai debate. *4 Turner believes that most issues of dissent successfully can be re- solvec during the drafting process. At NFIB, the heada of the intelligence agencies then should be in a position to discuss and work over the NIEs’ conclusions, rather than the entire text. Re- portedly, NFIB meetings for both strategic and non-strategic NIEs now take place approximately once a month, and last from one to one- and-a-half hours. After the meetings, Turnez is said to spand more time than past DCIs in reviewing, editing and polishing the final documents. 4> Cc. Final Adjudication of Views | The extent to which DCIs have inserted their personal judge- ments in the final strategic NIEs now has become a subject of controversy. For example, the Senate Seiect Committee on Intelligence chose several cases to investigate regarding DCI Richard Helms’ alleged role in altering final NIEs, to illustrate what it labela
- 82 - "the constant tension...between the DCI...and the agencies." *® Presently, Admiral Turner's critics maintain that he “tinkers" with the estimates and "has been more demanding and more pre-emptive than asy Director of Central Intelligence in recent timea."47 The author regards as “adjudicatory,” decisions made at the time of USIB which involve a choice between existing options and, consequently, alter what the draft NIE says. For example, a DCI may arbitrate between competing views by deciding that a new one should dominate or existing one be eliminated; or, a DCI may find all views insufficient and draw up a new solution reflecting his personal judgements. The author does not regard as adjudicatory, actions in which a DCI permits additional footnotes, inserts his own view separately in the final NIEs, or assists all parties in reaching a conclusion by offering his personal opinions. Likewise, upholding the CIA's position is not considered nere as adjudicatory, unless there is evidence that the DCI judged all alternatives equally and impartially, and/or modified the CIA text. An adjudicatory role fer the DCI was implied in the original concept of the NIEs and USIB's predecessor body. The IAC, and then USIB, has been called the "Supreme Court" or "Board of Directors" of the intelligence community, although there was never any formal vote-taking. 48 As Chairman, the DCI was more equal than the other members in his right to participate. General Bedell Smith made it clear that, as part of the DCI's role in coordinating and approving the NIEs, he was free to select or eliminate views, or present his own judgements in the final NIEs. No President explicitly ruled out this role for the DCI although, as described earlier in the
- 88 = Nixon Administration, Henry Kissinger implied that he himself should act as chief intelligence advisor and coordinator in ad- judicating competing claims. Nonetheless, most DCIs aince General Smith have approached this role for the strategic NIEs with caution and exercised it on rare occasions. As seen, it ran against DCI Dulles' personal and po- litical inclinations to act aggressively as a public advocate for one or another view. Further, he did not separate himself from the CIA as an institution on strategic matters and defanded it as necessary.* Of the five subsequent DCIs examined here, one, William Colby, argues that adjudication is not an appropriate role for the DCI to play. As indicated in Chart B, three DCIs--John McCone, Richard Helms and Stansfield Turner--on occasion mada adjudicatory decisions, but their approach has varied.** Moreover, Richard Helms told this author that he did not consider himself an adjudica- tor and, in describing Admiral Turner's role, one aide said that 49 "he would not call himself that." Below, occasional differences in approach to the non-strategic NIEs are noted. John McCone Initially, DCI John McCone did not believe that the DCI's role should be adjudicative, but regarded the NIEs as a product of good staff work. In the case of the 1962 Cuban missile estimate, *As noted earlier, Allen Dulles was more aggressive in presenting hia personal views in the non-strategic NIEs. **Because of Schlesinger's brief tenure as DCI, it is impossible to determine whether he played an adjudicative role at USIB. The reader should bear in mind that Admiral Turner's adjudicatory decisions primarily are made prior to NFIB meetings.
- 89 - he, criticized and conjoled estimators to no avail and then per- mitted the JIE to go forward as it wes. However, in this case, McCone's personal relationship and accessibility to President Kennedy were secure and he exprewsed his personal vies directly to the President. °° When McCone did play an adjudicatory role, he was carefui to exercise it within the context of USIB. Adjudication is precisely what occurred in 1963 during the USIB debate on potential Soviet ABM capability. McCone listened intently to each side's views on the question of whether the Tallin Line installations represented the beginnings of an anti-missile or anti-aircraft system. He called for an elaboration of the Army's view of the former possibility, and eventually sided with it. The text of NIE 11-23-63 then was rewritten to present the Army's predictions that the Soviet intent was to deploy an ABM system around the Tallin Line. Since there was no provision for the CIA to take footnotes to an NIE, CIA analysts say that, in this instance, “the specificity of their view was lost." The less pessimistic assessment, which regarded the new installations for bomber defe.wse, was represented in footnotes taken by the Navy and State Depactment. This case is the most clear-cut example of adjudication at USIB that this author could find. It is interesting that, at the time, McCone's action was not challenged by CIA estimators on the grounds ot being inappropriate or heavy-handed. One can speculate that this is because McCone's USIB decision was highly visible and seemingly deliberative. In retrospect, for the time frame of NIE c 11-3-63, McCone's view proved inaccurate.77 in the following year,
- 90 - CIA convinced him that he had been wrong and its position in the "ABM gap" debate once again assumed the text of NIE 1l1--3. McCone’e 1963 decision opened Pandora's box, however, and subsequently "some of the technical panels serving the U!IB felt so desply thet the CIA was dangerously underestimating tue ABM danger that they took their views directly to the White House."°? Richare Helms DCI Helms is described by his contemporaries as acting ag a strong adjudicator at USIB. For example, in discussing Helms' handling of the non-strategic NIEs, William Colby said that it was typical for Helms to listen and then say: "'I disagree; I think we 54 Then, the NIE would be gent back to ONE should say this....°" for rewriting to incorporate the DCI‘'s opinion. Richard Helms once said of an NIE on Cambodia: "...in the end, I want a good paper ' on the subject even if I have to make the controversia’ judge- 35 To others, Richard Helms had judicial qualities. ments myself.” For example, one aide said that he was the Last DCI for whom all USIB members rose to their feet when he entered the room or ciosed the meeting. © He gave the appearance of being beyond the fray and, above all, dec-sive. One author describas helms’ handling of the . Vietnam NIEs in this manner: "Throughcut the paper ware, Helms was a bureaucratic general.">” On the other hand, Helms revely was involvad in substantive debate on strategic matters, and this author could find so in- stances in shich itelms overruled the CIA at USIR. strategic matters. On the contrary, if he ascertained that USIB debate was inconzlusive,
- 91 - he typically sent the NIE back to ONE for redrafing to incerporate a Pentagon view. ie was reluctant to redraft himself and did not permit any Pentagon participant to do so. The best example of thia is his handling of NIE 11-8~-68. Fellowing USIB approval in June 1969, Dr. Kissinger "asked that [the NIE] be rewritten to provide more evidence supporting the DCI's judgement" that the Soviet MIRVing of the SS-9 was not imminent, a conclusion with which Kissinger was known to disagree. °° The Board of Estimates rewrote the NIE, pro- viding additional argument that the "triplet" under discussion was not a MIRV. In investigating this case history, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence concluded that Helms had not at- tempted to influence the outcome.” However, this author concludes that Helms @id act, at times, in an adjudicatory capacity, which differed from the approach of either DCIs McCone or Turner. dJelms' adjudicatoxy role was manasgement- oriented, exemplified by decisiveness and brevity in handling the strategic NIEs, and motivated by an interest to produce the NIEs on time. If the DCI determined that the discussion was going to be protracted and ultimately irresolvabie by more ONE redrafting, he "approved" the existing version and sent it to the White House. This led to complaints of arbitrary behavior. For example, one Pentagon official said that the status of dissents "was left hanging in the air" and that he was uncertain about the content of NIEs until receiving the final, printed version.°° Another official complained that Helms sometimes resolved debate by eliminating a heatedly contested point from the NIE altogether, i.e., overruling a dissent. + For example, General
-~ 92 - Keegan was not allowed to include his views on Soviet civil de- fense measures in the summary of NIE ii-3 untii the early 1970s, ©? In 1976, DIA completed a study, presented at USIB, of a new approach to estimating the size of the Scviet defenge budget. Reportedly, this study was aimed at demonstrating the CIA was grossly under- estimating the size of the Soviet commitment to new strategic weapons. At USIB, the DCI agreed that the report was interasting and worth- 63 ‘ while, but asked DIA to publish its views outside che current NIE. James Schlesinger Because of Schlesinger's brief tenure, it was imcossible for this author to determine whether he played an adjudicatory role, as indicated in Chart B. If he had remained as DCI, it is highly probable that he would have so intervened. This speculation flows from his heavy substantive involvement in drafting, encouragement of debate at USIB, open mind about the credibility of CIA work, and impetus tc keep competition within reagonable boundgz in order to present a stylistically coherent document to the policymaxer. Ad- judication usually is considered the strongest role a DCI might play in producing the strategic NIEs. In this author's view, DCI Schlesinger would nave found this role intellectually challenging and necessary to resolve issues of suatained competition in the strategic NIEs. William Colby William Colby told this author that it was not the DCI's job to arbitrate between conflicting views in the strategic nrEe.°4 Two convictions seem to underlie this concept: first, that the i
= 93 - DCI's main role is to open competitive debate at USIB, which during Coliy's tenure reached its highest pitch; second, that the subject matter was technically too complex for the DCI to etfectively intervene, without appearing to be arbitrarily choosing sides. As one observer noted, Colby's political instincts were on the “humanist left" but he did not impose these on USIB members . °° That is not to say that Colby was passive during USIB delibera- tions. As documented earlier, ne often requested that additional evidence be presented to shed light on a difficult iseue. After listening to extensive debate, Colby sometimes summed up the Giscussion by offering broad, even philosophical observations of his own, without dictating their inclusion in the NIE. For example, Colby believed that conventional "theater balance" considerations tended to be lost in the shuffle of complex Soviet strategic pro- gramg, and that Soviet technological gains might have a political impact on less developed countries. °© Colby's willingness to marshall diverse evidence at USIB gave the appearance of impartiality in weighing arguments, even if the draft NI remained unchanged, For example, in the case of the “Particle X" debate, Colby heard extensive argument before siding with the prevailing scientific (and CIA) viewpoint, after which General Keegan wag permitted to take a footnote. ©? Unlike Helms, Colby did not refer all re- | drafting back to the CIA. Also, he did not redyvaft himself. As described earlier, Colby typically resolved debate by authorizing | Marginal changes or additions to the draft NIE at USIB, such as a | new footnote, which then was written by the dissenting member. ree enE AN stmt nae ane 2 seems Me 9 Natit sh areas! tthe Attn 0 cP Lint silt Rasiamnny Sy et Riaale ta ae jt mi tf: tor, Dadabocie st Ret, tem J pet tit sxitn. om nné-doe ate
-~ 94 - DCI Colby behaved more aggressivaly during USIB debate on the non-strategic NIEs, for which he sometimes held views distinct from the CIA's or a Pentagon agancy. In such casas, Colby rapressnted these separately in the text of the NIE, following USIB deliberations. That is, he added his own opinion in a separate sentence or para- graph, rather than redrafting the NIE to reflect this. For example, in one NIE on Latin America, Colby took one position, CIA and the State Department's INR another, and DIA and one military service a thira.©8 During Colby's tenura, the Deputy Director of CIA, General Vernon Walters, also employed this option in instances when he sided with the Pentagon. For example, in one NIE on Italy, the DDCI sided with DIA during USIB debate. Colby sent the estimate back to his NIO for drafting to incorporate a joint DDCI-DIA alterna~ tive.°? Stansfield Turner This author credits Admiral Turner with having played the strongest adjudicatory rele of any DCI. The difference between DCI Turner and other DCIs ie a matter or degree and timing. As the New York Times reported, “what has changed, it appears, is Admiral Turner's involvement in what he @escribes as restructuring and redrafting” prior to NFIB meetings. 7? Turner says: ®*Y am not bashful about that. I end uv telling them this section has to be redrafted. You won't find may sentences I personally penned. Mostly it is be- cause they didn't bring out two views stxongly. Another way, I look at the outline, the concept at the beginning, and I restructure that, saying, You are asking the question wrong.'"7?
- 95 - One intelligence official describes DCI Turner's adjudicatory 72 After reviewing successive drafts, role as highly "personalized." Turner may make one of four decisions about what an NIE gays. First, he may "support" the CIA's view by rejecting an alternative proposed by a Fentagon agency, eventually eliminating it from the draft. As documented earlier, this happened in a recent NIE 11-4. Second, Turner may “overrule” the CIA by agreeing that a Pentagon alternative is of sufficient merit to warrant equal status to that of the CIA's, for example, in the case of the Soviet Backfire bomber already described. Third, Adiral Turner may reject all options and draw up a new one. For example, the above-mentioned New York Time3 article reported that this happened in a 1977 NIE on the balance of strength between North and South Korea following withdrawal of US troops in the South. “Admiral Turner concluded, contrary to the original estimate, that withdrawal would substantially diminish the deterrent 073 Fourth, Turner may insert his personal 74 balance on the peninsula. view separately, or alongside of other, within the Ni&ze. Admiral Turner has been criticized for not using the joint, high-level forum of NFIB for final deliberavions. Because he prefers dealing with Pentagon officials individually throughout the draft stage, his role is less visible than that of DCIs McCone or Colby and critics advance charges of political motivation. As one in- telligence community official complains: "Turner has ‘asked the community to redo the estimates or has rewritten them and sent them on without further reference to the National Poreign Intelligence Board, or he has sent them back to convince, cajole or bully the other participants into alternative estimates.'"75
- 96 - VI. THE DC's ROLE IN PROMOTING INDEPENDENT REVIEW Independent review of the final atrategic NIEs is discussed here for three reasons. First, ovtside review of the NIEs originally was considered a wholesome ingredient of the process. Second, gome DCIs actively promoted such review. Third, the independent, parallel analysis of the outside "B Team" to the inside "A Team's" NIE 11-3-8-76 reportedly nad a sizeable impact on that and sub- sequent strategic NIEs, as described below. By “independent” review, this author means review by any group which does not play an official part in drafting the NIEs and is not employed directly by the CIA. Review of the strategic NIEs may occur at the draft stage, or just before or after USIB endorsement. It may be systematic, e.g., each year's NIE 11-3-8, or periodic. As indicated in Chart B, only two DCIs--Allen Dulles and James Schlesinger--are regarded by this author as having en- couraged independent review of the atrategic NIEs. William Colby is a borderline example since, with reservations, he agreed to the concept of competitive review before leaving the office. How- ever, it was DCI George Bush who guided the 1976 A-B Team experiment, with initial enthusiasm, to conclusion. In contrast, DCis John McCone, Pichard Helms, and Stansfield Turner demonstrated little intereet in establishing ongoing mechanisms for independent review. A. Allen Dulles, the Princeton Consultants and Strate ic Advisor Pane Almost from day one of the NIEs under General Bedell Smith, + group of 3*stinguished outsiders known as the Princeton consultants met near Princeton University te examine the estimates. Originally,
- 97 - the panel was self-supporting anc composed largely of men with wide, practical experience in public affairs “as a corrective to what [the DDCI] regarded as the disproportionate number of acaden.ics on the Bosrd fof Estimates] ."* The consultants firat met at the home of the DDCI, William Jackson, and then other locations around Princeton. Throughout the 1950s, they gathered regularly for two full days, four times a year. An additicnal half day prior to formal meetings was spent at Princeton reading the NIEs. Typically, the consultants reviewed NIEs just priox to IAC or USIB meetings, although earlier drafts sometimes were examined. The primary way in which Allen Dulles promoted the involvement of the Princeton consultants was by his presence. As DDCI in 1952, Dulles attended every meeting of the panel and was instrumental in proposing new members. Throughout his tenure ag DCI, Dulles continued this practice, often leaving busy meetings at the CIA to fly up to Princeton. Dulles was accompanied by several Beard of Estimates members and ONE staff. The discussion was lively and intense, and Dulles is described by one panel member as being "keenly intereated and always eager to learn."? Face-to~face contact be- tween CIA officials and outside experts was considered natural and invaluable during the 1950s and, since the Princeton consul- tants issued no formal reports, constituted its chief means of communicating with the CIA. Although the Princeton consultants spent the majority of time on non-strategic NIEs, they contributed to the strategic NIEs as well. Panel members were useful in devising precise lan- guage by which to communicate the Soviet threat. Individuals occasionally took it upon themse:ves to examine Pentagon numerical
- 98 - predictions in depth. For example, one member said that he looked into figures on Soviet coastal artillery which had appeared con- gistently in each NIE, and discovered that they were the saine ones utilized during wwi1r.4 Nonetreless, by the second half of the decade, questions about Soviet technology became so compiex that other mechanisms were devised to review these NIEs. In the late 1950s, Allen Dulles established the Strategic Advisory Panel "as a device for resolving some of the competing claims on Soviet missile activity."*> Composed of ten members, the pane] included CIA consultants and recognized aerospace tachnology experts, and was regarded as independent of the CIA. It met twice a year for several days, after having been briefed on the strategic NIEs by experts involve@ in drafting, usually just before the NIEs were issued. The panel then formed its own judgements, which it presented separately to the DCI and the President'a security advisers. During "the 'missile gap’ days the panel's expertise had been found useful in sorting out a let sf technical arguments and removing much of the excess speculation."® B. The 19608 Neither DCIs John McCone nor Richard Helms actively promoted independent review of the strategic NIEs. During the early 1960s, the Princeton consultants and the Strategic Advisory Panel fell into, disuse. In both cases, insidars contended that their own growing expertise in the technical aspects of strategic estimating *The Strategic Advisory Panel originally was known as the Hyland Panel for its first chairman, a Vice President of Hughes Aircraft.
~ 99 - made the contribution of outsiders less insightful. In the be- ginning of MeCone’s tenure, the Princeton consultants met twice a year at a retreat in Virginia, but the DCI was not present and work centered primarily on the non~strategic nies. Eventually, the group dissolved. CIA analysts came to believe that the Strategic Advisory Panel had become too "hawkish" ana its intervention "“ir- ritating."2 Jt was disbanded in the early 1960s, and its re- coastitution in 1967 was ignored by Helis and intelligence pro- fessionals. During most of the 1960s, review of the strategic NIEs was conducted entirely by those persons who wrote them. For example, from time to time indi ridual Board of Estimates members initiated post-mortems on critical NIEs or groups of NIEs, for internal circulation.” Grewth took place in the influence and competency of USIB's many subcommittees, which some observers consider the real, working-level heart of the USIB provess.2° of the fifteen subcommittees eventually created, at least half concerned themselves exclusively with strategic matters, such as the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee ana the Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation. Composed of CIA and Pentayon specialists, they contributed substantively to drafting of the strategic NIEB. One Pentagon official complained that both DCIa McCone and Helms “stacked the deck" in appointing CIA officials to chair these subcommittees.!+ During the Nixon Administration, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger utilized the NSC to review the strategic NIEs. After registering dissatisfaction with the conclusions reached in NIE 11-8-68 predicting delays in the Soviet MIKVing program, Kissinger created a "MIRV Panel" under the NSC to study the question in depth. Conducted
- 160 - in the spring of 19635, this interagency review included CIA and Pentagon DDR&E officials, who scon became the chief combatants. It involved “a stream of intensely focussed studies" on Soviet MIRV capabilities, "reached no conclusions, but exhaustivaly laid out data and identified areas of disagreements." Subsequently, Kissinger created an NSC "Verification Panel" to study issues related to SALT verification, which immediately expanded beyond a focus on the strategic NIEs. When Kissinger became Secretary of State in 1973, the NSC's review of specific NIEs ceased. Cc. James Schlesinger and the Intelligence Community Staff DCI Schlesinger's contribution to an independent review in- volved the Intelligence Community (IC) Staff, which now serves the DCI. Since the IC Staff is funded out of a budget separate from the CIA’s, it qualifies in this author's definition of "independent" even though personnel are drawn from the CIA and Pentagon. Since 1971, the IC Staff assisted the DCI in administrative housekeeping tasks related to his role as coordinator of the intelligence community. In late 1972, a Product Review Division (PRD) was created. The PRD was supposed to regularly appraise intelligence studies and es- timates, "testing them for objectivity, balance, and responsivencsa."2? Schlesinger was the first DCI to provide the IC Staff with muscle, by emphasizing its responsibility for community-wide budgeting, authorized by President Nixon in 1971. In encouraging the PRD's independent work, "Schlesinger altered the composition of the IC Staff by increasing the number of non~Agency personnel. In this way, he hoped to facilitate the Staff's contacts with the ether components of the community. The PRD commenced in-depth, case studies of past NIE8, choosing several recent "crisis prediction®
am AVS” NIEs for special emphagis--e.g., NIl€s on the 1973 Middle Eaat war, the Cyprus crisis of 1974, the Indian nuclear devonation, and the Mayaguez incident. Its conclusions had implications fer the intensifying strategic debate. For example, cGne study con- tended that, in 1973, the “intelligence community was GQisposed to believe that the Arabs were unlikely to resort to war against Israel because to do so would be ‘irrational,’ in light of relative Arab~Israeli military capability."*° In evaluating the 1974 Cyprus crisis, the FRD argued that CIA analysts again were prey to "the perhaps subsconscious conviction (and hope) that, ultimately, reason and rationality will prevail, that apparently irrational moves (the Arab attack, the Greek-sponsored coup) will not be made by essentially rational men.” Precisely this complaint was echoed by individuals charging CIA analysts with a "bias of systematic optimism. ">? D.. The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and the 197» A-B Team Experiment Among its several functions, PFIAB historically has demon- strated a gtrong interest in the stretegic NIEs. Chief among its assets as an outside, independert reviewer has been the presticse and experience of its members, and its inclination to look at issues from what has been termed the "grass roots reve." Up to the time it was abolished in 1977, PFIAB frequently called intelligence professionals, including DDP personnel, junior analysts and dissident officials, to testify before it. PFIAB also solicited raw intelligence reports and drafts of finished products to evaluate. Although PFIAB had no staff of its own, it assembled special panels of members and consultants to examine selected issues, reporting directly to ‘the President.
The 1976 A-B Team "experiment in competitive analysis stemnad from PFIAB'’s opinion that the NIEs had been underoBiimating thea 19 Individual PPIAB members procesa of Soviet strategic weapons." gradually had arrived at thia conclusion after examining etrategic NIEs of the past decade and liatening to the testimony of dissenting Pentagon officials, such as Grnerals Daniel Graham ana George Keegan. In early 1975, several PFIAB members complained to DCI Colby about the suggestion, in NIE 11-3-8-74, that the Soviets were seeking only “rough parity” with the US. They pregerred Colby with their own draft statement of Soviet policy and asked him to initiate an outside review.79 Colby listened, but defended the NIE on the grounds that it represented the best combined judgement of the intelligence community, and appeared reluctant to go further 7+ At the same tame, President Ford requested PFIAB to ascertain why the strategic NIES presented such a ‘isturbing number of dissents. In mid-1975, Goneral Keagan was invited to the White House to make his case, before President Ford and PFIAB, concerning the significance of soviet civil defense measures and new guided missiles. “* Other Pentagon officials also testified at this meeting. In August 1975, PFIAB's Chairman propesed that the President authorize the NSC to implement a “competitive analysis."*° NCI Colby responded with a proposal that the PFIAB first examine an "applicable NIE then underway and thereafter determine what specific course of action to take. The PFIAB found weaknesses in that NIE and, after having made further investigations of its own, again proposed fin April 1976] an experiment in ‘competitive analysis.'’*4 In June 1976, President Ford asked DCI George Bush to carry out the experi wnt. Bush is described as being initially “enthusiastic” and considered an effective review one of his main tasks as pex.*5
- 103 - Two teams were set up to prepare separate versions of NIE 11-3-8-76. The A Team was composed of the regular CIA analysts, and additional consultants. The B Team consisted of seven outside experts and past government officials, headed by Dr. Richard Pipes of Harvard University. It wag chosen by the DCI and the President's deputy assistant for national security. A CIA analyst was Gesig- nated by Bush to provide the B Team with the same raw material utilized by the CIA in preparing the NIEs. According to the New York Times, both teams were assigned three topicn for intense atudy: the accuracy of Soviet guided mingiiea; the penetrability of Soviet air defense by low-lavel bombers; and overall Soviet strategic objectives. 7° On security grounds, the Navy eliminated a fourth topic from consideration. As related by members of both teama, this story contended that there was a "stand-off" on Soviat missile accuracy, and “both teams influenced cach other" regarding soviet air defense.?/ Greatest dispute arose over the assessment of Soviet strategic aims. with the B Team challenging the CIA’s view that the Soviets were not seeking Strategic superiority over the US. The discussions were described by one participant as being "absolutely blocdy" with the B Team accusing the CIA of dealing in “faulty assumptions, faulty use of intelligence and faulty exploitation of available inteliigence."”° The rinal version of NIE 11~3-8-76 presented to President-elect Carter reportedly was influenced by the pessimiem of the B Team. According to the same New York Times story, DCI George Bush speke of “changed perceptions” within the CIA regarding Soviet behavior -as a result of the parallel analysis, and said the “yorrisome signs inciuded newly-developed guided missiles, @ vast program of
- 104 - uncerground shelters, and a continuing build-up of air defenues."*? CIA participants referred to the NIE as being "'more somber. +729 A high-level Pentagon official described the estimate 18 being "'more than somber--it was very grim. It flatly states the judge- ment that the Soviet Union is seeking superiority over United States forcés. The flat judgement that that is the aim of the Soviet Union is a majority view in the estimate. The questions begin on when they will achieve it.'"7) The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence immediately investigated the experiment, after which one member, Senator Daniel Moynihan, wrote that the B Team's notion "that the Seviets intend to surpass the United States in strategic arms and are in the process of doing so, has gone from heresy to respect- ability, if not orthodoxy."?7 In early 1977, PFIAB proposed that the entire estimative procedure be revised and that outsiders, like themselves, be brought into the process once again. ?? As the Senate Select Committee ou Intelligence concluded, the concept of the review of NIEs by ' outside experts was a "legitimate one." However, its value in this case had been undercut by three factors: first, the B Team “reflected the views of only one segment cf the spectrum of opinion;" second, it “spent much of its effert on criticizing much earlier NIEs rather than...producing alternative estimates;" third, "de- tails concerning these highly classified questions leaked to the 34 press, where these appeared in garbled and one-sided form." DCL George Bush, who favored the experiment at the outset, concluded that “never again” should an outside review be attempted in the same manner. 35
- 105 - By the end of 1977, Prasidsnt Carter had abolished PFIAB and, under DCI Stansfield Turner, independent review of the NIEg has not been sustained. Rather, Admiral Turner has encouraged increased input by consultants to the drafting of the strategic NIEs. For. example, one consultant to the NIO for Strategic Intelligance ie 36 Admiral Turner also known to have views described as hard-line. became the first DCI to release some NIEs, primarily those delaing with energy issueg, to the public domain. Admiral Turner's three- man Senior Review Panel now assists him in reviewing the NIEs. However, this group is employed full-time by the CIA and is not meant to be “independent” by this author's definition.
- 106 - VII. ASSESSMENT OF THE PERFORMANCE OF DCIs Ig this study has demonstrated nothing else, it ia that DCIn have been inconsistent in their approach to producing the strate- gic NI=s. Some have emphasized some roles, and others neglected them, Then, what kind of DCI should a President chocse if he desires changes in the strategic intelligence estimative process? Which functions are "ideal?" Can a DCI appropriately be both "manager and prophet?” What tasks have not been performed? Below, the performance of seven DCIs in producing the strategic NIEs is assessed. In addition to the six DCIs selected by this author for extensive study, General Bedell Smith is in- cluded because of his strong role in the estimative process, even though the modern strategic NIE aid not emerge until the mid~1950s.* The author summarizes the roles exercised by DCIs according to two criteria: their individual background, interest, and concept of the DCI's job; and historical trends. Then, separate functions are evamined to determine which are mutually supporting and which are potentially conflicting, or biasing. Finally, the author presents her conclusions about roles underemphasized by DCIs, A. Summary of Roles Played by DCIs Seven isolated roles of the DCI in producing the strategic estimates have been described in this study. Three pertain to the NIE drafting process: (1) management direction to CIA production; { (2) management attention to Pentagon coordination; and (3) personal, *The role of General W. Bedell Smith (1950-1952) is discussed in Chapter II. The other DCIs include: Allen W. Dulles (1953-1961); John A. McCone (1961-1965); Richard Helms (1966-1972); James R. Schlesinger (1973); William E. Colby (1973-1975); and Admiral Stansfield Turner (1977 to present).
- 107 - substantive input. Three involve leadership at the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), now called the Nationai Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB): (4) support of the CIA's vosition; (5) encouragement of competitive debate; and (6) final adjudication of views. The last role is: (7) promotion of independent review of the stratetgic NIEs. Personal Background and Concepts Looking at these roles ag a function of a DCI's personal back- ground and interests, the following observations are made.* (1) Management direction to the CIA estimates team was exarted by five DCIs with diverse backgrounds--General Bedell Smith, John McCone, James Schlesinger, William Colby and Admiral Stansfield Turner. After General Smith created the Board of Estimates and ONE within CIA in late 1950, no charges were initiated in this set~up for 23 years and two DCIs (Dulles and Helms) with a combined tenure of 15 years devoted little attention to management. The first director to consider management reform and leadership the DCI's primary role wa3 William Colby in 1973, an "inside" director who was familiar with a range of CIA programs. Since 1973, the National Intelligence Officer (NIOs) who draft the NIEs are personally selected by the DCI. *The "miditary’ directors include four-star General Bedell Smith and four-star Admiral Stansfield Turner. The “inside" directors are William Colby and Richard Helms, both of whom had risen up through the ranks of the clandestine, ox DDP, side of tha CIA. Zn addition, Colby had served briefly as Executiva Director- Comptroller of CIA and as DDP. “Outside” DCIs include John McCone and James Schlesinger, both of whom had previous government careers including Chairman of the AEC, and the first was a successful private businessman and the second had been a strategic scholar at the RAND Corporation. For lack of a better term, Allen Dulles ig called an "inside-outside" DCI, since he was an OSS verteran and served briefly as DDP and as DDCI, but had an independent professional and political base. Not examined here is Admiral William Raborn (mid~1965 to mid-1966), a "military" DCI, and George Bush (1976), an "outside" DCI. ,
(2) Management attention to coordinating the draft strategic NIEs with Pentagon intelligence agencies, such as DIA and Army, Aic Force and Naval Intelligence, was a focus of only three DCIs-~-General Smith, William Colby and Admiral Turner. Two ave "military" directors with previous, high-ranking careers, who both desiqned a new for- mat for Pentagon interaction and raised estimative issues directly with individual Pentagon officials, In comparison, William Colby created a new mechanism for increased Pentagon input but, while responsive, did not take initiative in seeking Pentagon comments at the draft stage. To the author, this suggests that, for good or ill, "military" DCIs are more aggressive in eliciting direct Pentagon interaction. In contrast, Dulles considered it inappropriate for the DCI to dictate coordinating procedures to the Pentagon, and Helms wag pasSive except when issues were raised by ths White House or Defense Secretary. Throughout McCone's tenure, Defense Secretary McNamara supported ongoing CIA mechanisms for drafting the strategic NIEs. (3) Four DCIs made personal, substantive input to the draft strategic NIEs, by assisting the CIA team in designing and answering strategic questiors and/or presenting their personal opinions in the draft. All four--General Smith, John McCone, Jamas Schlesinger and Admiral Turner--had previous professicnal training, technical familiarity and jobs in complex strategic issues. In contrast, Allen Dulles and two “inside” directors (Helms and Colby) had most ex- perience in the DPP or clandestine side of the CIA and, admittedly in Colby's case, little technical competency in strategic matters.
- 109 - Instead, these three made substantive input to the non-atrategic Nifs. This suggests that, if he prefers 2 DCI who can make substantive contribution to the draft strategic NIEs, the President choose a person with the technical background to do so.* (4) At USI3, now NFIB, the leadership concepts of DCIs varied greatly. Only one DCI, Allen Dulles, considered his primary role to support the CIA's view in the strategic NIEs. This reeulted from Dulles' decision in the mid-1950s to permit the CIA to prepare an ‘ independent, institutional position within the draft strategic es- timates, which then became the main text of the NIE. His decision _was made within an historical context of encouraging competition to the Pentagon's intelligence estimates. At USIB, Dulles did not aggressiveiy advocate the CIA's views, but rather presided over final deliberations in a manner which reinforced earlier decisions made in the draft. (5) All other DCIs have assumed other roles at USIB. Four DCIs with diverse backgrounds~-General Smith, John McCone, James Schlesinger and William Colky--actively encouraged competitive de- bate at USIB, or the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) in Smith's case. Under these four, debate was lively and intense, and USIB was considered an appropriate, higher level forum for the reopening of old dissents or presentation of new ideas. In the case of the "military" director (General Smith), debate was viewed as a means of promoting Pentagon involvement in the NIE process. The two “outside” DCIs (McCone ané Schlesinger) were interestea in hearing a multiplicity of opinion. However, competitive debate at USTB was TE *There has never been an “inside” DCI selected from the CIA's DDS&ET or DDI directcrates.
- 110 - encouraged, most consistently and at lencth on etrategic issues, by William Colby, who argued that hie prina y roie at USIB wap to manage competition. This sugyests that an “inside” OCI can rise above internal CIA demands and pclitics t. agsume a higher, coordina- tive role at USIB. In contrast, two very different DCIs--Richard Helms and Admirai Turner~-did not pzomote competitive debate at USIB, or NFIB in Turner's case, Neither enjoyed lengthy discussion or found it useful. They Lelieved that issues of dicsent should be ironed out beforehand. Consequently, final deliberatisis were short. However, the similiarity ends here. The “inside” DCI (Helms) did not personally intervene at most levels of the draft stage. The “military” director (Admiral Turner) is heavily involved in dzafting, and encourages competition by attempting to increase coordination with the Pentagon through- out the drafting process. (6) Four DCI3 of diverse backgrounds--General Smith, John McCone, Richard Helms, and Admiral Turner-~acted as final adjudicators of conflicting views and a fifth--James Schlesinger-~-probably would have if he had remained longer in office. According to this author's definition, adjudication implies ¢ final choica between competing positions which results in a new position gaining dominance, or some views being eliminated Primarily, this occurs when a DCI represents hia own opinion as the final text, overrulea the CIA's view in favor of a Pantagon view, or eliminates a Pentagon dissent from the NIE. This autnor found instances, albeit rare, of each. With the exception of Helms, the other four DCis (if Schlesinger ie included) appear to have considered adjudication a natural means to resolve conflict. All four previously had devoted management attention to drafting procedures and made substantive input to
-~ lll - draft NIEs. Three, with the exception of Turner, made adjudicatory decisions after hearing extensive debate at JSIB. In contraat. Turner's adjudicatory role is exercised primarily at tha drafec stage just prior to NFIB meetings. This suggests a natural flow, or escalating pattern, to the DCI’s involvement in producing the strategic NIEs, If a DCI makes management decisic 18 regarding drafting procedures, and has the technical background to make substantive input to the draft, he aiso may encourage competition and end up making tinal, intelligence ‘judgements in che NIEs. That is, some resolution of conflict is sought. That DCI Colby did not make adjudicatory decisions on strategic matters at USIB, but rather resolved conflict through compromise by adding footnotec dissents to the NIE, bears out this hypothesis. Colby, arn "inside" DCI without strategic background, was mainly a manager and not substantively involved in drafting. Richard Helna is an exception. Helms occasionally made adjudicatory decisions at USIB, partly in hopes of keeping the strategic NIEs on a tiinely schedule, without previously having been involved in management or substance. Moreover, Helms' single role is difficult to ex- plain, since he typically is described by observers as being a strong, thoroughly professional leader of the CIA bureaucracy. This suggests that for strategic matters, Helms tried to adhere to « philovophy of allowing tle professional analysts to argue out their differences. Finally, this author found no evidence that either “inside” director (Helms or Colby) or the “inside-outside” director (Dulles) ever overruled the CIA, whereas there is evidence that one "outside" DCI (McCone) and one "military" DcI (Admiral Turner) did so. This
Fe et rene Ne ee ee ~ 112 - suggests that, bureaucratically, it is easier for a non-insider to make adijudicatory cecisions against the CIA, at least on strategic -issues.* (7) The last role, promoting independent review of the strategic NIEsS, was performed by only three DCIs examined--General Smith, Allen Dulles and James Schlesinger. — Essentially, there was no independent review of the strategic NIEs by outside experts not employed by the CIA from 1961-1973, and 1977 to the present. If one includes an “outside* dizector not studied here, DCI George Bush, who guided the 1976 A-B Team experiment in competitive analysis to conclusion, it appears that “non-inside“ directors are most enthusiastic about the nutios. of independent review. These observations are summarized in Chart D on the following page. in ad@ition, Chart D outlines the functions of DCIs in pro- ducing strategic NIEs according to concepts of the three broad jobs authorized for the DCI: manager of the CIA; coordinator of intelli- gence community affairs; and chief intelligence advisor to the President. This chart is based on an assumption that separate NIc production roles, e.g., encouraging competitive debate, can be readily classified as demonstrating emphasis on one of three over- all aseignments of the DCI, ¢.g., cocrdinator of the intelligence community. As Chart D indicates, a majority of DCIs emphasized at least two broad roles of the DCI in producing specific NIEs. Four pcts--General Bedell Smith, John McCone, James Schlesinger ard Admiral Stansfield Turner--played all three roles. —————— *As documented in this study, Dulles, Helms and Colby were more aggressive in criticizing CIA work in the non-strategic NIEs.
- 113 - CHART D BRCAD ROLES EMPHASIZED BY SEVEN DCIs FOR STRATEGIC NIES OVERALL ROLE AS DCI SEPARATE PRODUCTION ROLES* 7 ociIs BACKGROUND® * l. Management Direction to CIA Smith, McCone, Diverse Drafting Schlesinger, Colby (2 military, 2 out- & Turner (5) side, 1 inside) A. Manager of CIA 4. Support of CIA Positicn Dulleg@ (1) One DCI at USIB _ ("inside-cutside") 2. Management Attention to DOD Smith, Colby Mainly Hilitary Coordination in Drafting & Turner (3) (l military, & 1 inside) B. Coordinator of In~ | telligence Community i 5. Encouragement of Competi- Smith, McCone, Diverse H tive Debate at USIB Schlesinger, & 1 military, 2 outvide Colby {4) & 1 inside) | 3. Personal, Substantiva Smith, McCone All with technical Input to Draft Schlesinger, & background, no inside Turner (4) (2 nti teary, & 2 out- i side) c. Chief Intelligence Advisor to President 6. Final Adjudication of views Smith, McCone, Same as above i (prior to or at USIB or Helms, probably (pilus T inside) i NFIB) Schlasinger & { Turner (4-5) ! 7. Promotion of Independent Smith, Dulles, Diverse Review and Schlesinger (4£ include Bush, : (3) (i£ include mainly outside: 2 out- | Bush as 8th DCI: side, "inside-out- ; (4) side," &1 military “the ‘seven production roles are numbered according to the order in which they were discussed earlier in this study. “An “inside” DCI had a previous CIA career; and “outside” DCI had a previous private business, academic, or government career; a "military" DCI is a military officer. Allen oulles is considered an "“inside- outside” DCI.
eee ~ 114 - Historical Trends The activities of LDCIs also may be assessed in light of his- torical hindsight. As indicated in Chart B earlier, the last three DCIs examined in this study--James Schlesinger, William Colby and Stangfield Turner--have been involved more actively in the strategic NIES than their predecessors. For example, compared to the long tenures of Allen Dulles and Richard Helms, recent DCIs exercised more control over different phasea of production. Compared to John McCona, there has been more theorizing and follow-through of late, concarning the appropriate leadership role of the NCI. This is indicated by the number of "XX" in Chart B, beginning in 1973. To this author, the xecent trend towards increased DCI inter- vention in the production process is one response to cutside criticism nf the quality and validity of the strategic NIEs. In 1969, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger end Defense Secretary Laird were net the first top-level officials to criticize the strategic NIEs. President Eisenhower himself was known to Goubt the accuracy of “gap” predictions in the 1950s. As documentec in this study, what ig different about the criticism of the first half of the 1970s is that it gathered momentum, supported by dissident Pentagon officials an outside groups such as the Presidents Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), and wage directed mainly against CIA estimators. It culminated in the A-B Team competitive review in 1976. Richard Helms Gid not respond by exercising more leadership over different phases of production, although he frequently directed the CIA estimates team to incorporate diasenting views in the strategic NIEs. For
the most part, Helms* tenure aS DCI was characterized by nasgivity tewards the strategic estimative process. Whaun he did intervena at the last’ moment, his decisiong sometimes were criticized by individual Pentagon officials as “arbitrary.” Beginning with James Schlesinger in 1973, recent DCIs felt the need to play a stronger rcle during the drafting st'.ge. The one trait they share is increased management direction over the CIA es- timates team. Indeed, they overhauled it completely. In cheosing the NIO system for drafting NIES, they then assumed more direct responsibility for it. In the absence of the collective review and supervisory functions formerly exercised by the Board of Estimates, PCIs now handpick the NIOs, and personsily monitor and review their work. In addition, two DCIs examined since 1973--William Colby and Admiral Turner--have devoted more attention to means they believe will improve coordination with the Pentagon intelligence agancias auring the drafting stage. They became the first DCIs to do sa since General Bedell Smith in 1950. Here the similarities end. In 1973, William Colby became "the man for his time" by extending competitive debate to the open forum of USIB, congidering USIB as a court of last resort and sounding board for aissenting members. In 1977, Admiral Turner revarsed this trend. Turner's actions have led to outside criticism that he has “personalized” the decisionmaking process, makin; adjudicatory decisions I in a less open, or more private, atmosphere. B. Mutually Supporting and Conflicting Roles: Manager versus Prophet A useful way to approach the question of the “ideal” role or roles of the DCI in producing strategic intelligence eatimates ig to ask which functions are mutually supporting and which potentially
- 116 - are conflicting, or Liasing. Assuming that a President prefers a DCI who can help resolve conflict in the strategic NIEs, which roles best ensure that a DCI's intervention will not lead to es- timates biased by his personal view or one institutional view? Should a DCI be both "manager and prophet?" In thig author's opinion, it is impossible to eliminate potential bias altogether if a DCI is expressly selected on the basis ct playing a strong substantive and adjudicatory, or “prophet” role. Hewever, gome functions are potentially more biasing tha, others, some are conceivably mutually supportive, and in both cases it is partly a matter of how decisions epvear to others. Mutually supporting roles are those in which the performance of one enhances performance at the next stage, or those in which a balance is struck, for example, petween drafting functions and leadership at USIB. Most questions of personal or inetitutional bias en the DCI's pact are more complex than simply advocating the CIA's institutional viewpoint. Allen Dulles played this role at USIB; but this auto- matically precluded him from exercising other roles, and all other DCIs avoided this pitfall. Usually, the subject of bias is raised by critics when and if a DCI personally selects the CIA drafters, argues his own views before them, individually reviews and approves their work, and inserts his personal opinions in the draft or makes other adjiudicatory decisions. Stated simplistically, how can a DCI both advocate one view in the draft NIE and also act impartially as an adjudicator at USIB? Because of potential conflicts along the way, should a DCI concentrate on designing an "optimal" manage- ment structure for writing, coordinating anda reviewing the draft NIEs and then adopt a "hands-off" policy until final USIB deliberations —. —_ ees P iat! : x nn UE ee NET Ne PO Ln ee eI Tenet Tee eat
~ 117 - Two extremes of administrative behavior have heen deserihed in this study--that of DCIs Richard Helms and Admiral Turner. On the one hand, Helms contends that the DCI should be little in~ volved in drafting lest this "bias" his final decisions at USIB. If the DCI becomes an advocate too early, this will limit his freedom later. Instead, the CIA should be left alone to do its work, and the DCI intervene only in the final phase as deemed necessary. The difficulty with Helms’ approach is that his adjudicatory role at USIB appeared to some ill-informed and accomplished in a substantive vacumn, and often eliminated Pentagon dissents. When Helms did not "adjudicate," he sent the draft NIE back to the CIA drafters to represent more strongly the Pentagon's alternatives. Neither action necessarily resulted in an unbiased regoluticn cf conflict. Critics also complained that, by inaction, Helms allowed the menber- ship quality of the Board of Estimates to deteriorate. DCI Helms' approach is almost a case of approach~avoidance. This suggests that a DCI's involvement in drafting is supportive of, or consistent with, execution of subsequent roles at NFIB. Drafting the strategic NIEs takes at least six months, while formal USIB or NFIB debate is a matter of hours, or at most days, and under Helms was less. Once a draft is written, it becomes dadifficult to change. In order to be sufficiently informed about competitive strategic debate at NFIB, a DCI cannot ignore what goes on during the lengthy drafting sessions. For example, at a minimum, a DCI might review the CIA's organi- zational set-up for estimative work to ascertain if it is operating as intended, appoint an estimates team with which he can work comfortably, monitor and review succeseive drafts eo that he is