CO wer crtiar ~ DEC 1960, “7 523433 SoheRer ({ne 13~2-60 (fn December 1960 Cnmnae 0 ~ ~~ she NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE sie | NUMBER 13-2-60 nearest (Phe er ge er eee mere te a FeN awense Ne RAN EIT RS ot (bwin ha eo THE CHINESE COMMUNIST ~ ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM SUMMARY AND “CONCLUSIONSOCUNEN NO. oe NO CHANGE IN CLASS. | eee DECLASSIFIED 7 é CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C NEXT REVIEW DATE: - ; Subzctited by the DATE: ELE MY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE The following tntelligence organizations participated tn the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency, the Natlonal Security Agency, and the intelligence organiza- tons of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Afr Force, The Jotnt Staff, Defense, and the Atomic Energy Commission. Concurred tn by the UNITED 8TATES INTELLIGENCE BCARD on 13 December 1960. Concurring were The Director of Intel- Hgence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant CAlef of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Depart- ment of the Navy; the Asstatant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Dtrector jor Intelligence, The Joint Staff; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; the Atomtc Znergy Commission Representative to the USIiB; and the Director o} the National Security Agency. The Asstst- ant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subfect being outside the furtsdiction cf his Agency. APPROVED FOR RELEASE
+ cee mm mee THE CHINESE COMMUNIST ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM THE PROBLEM To determine the current status and the probable future course of the Chinese Communist atomic energy program to mid-1965 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS GENERAL 1. Communist China is energetically develop- ing her native capabilities in the field of atomic energy. Since the early 1950's she has been making a concerted effort to develop the corps of scientists and technicians and establish the research facilities essential to the exploitation of nuclear energy. The over- all effort hes progressed steadily since 1955 with the benefit of a substantial amount of Soviet aid. This assistance has been ob- - tained by the Chinese Communists via nego- tiated, fomnal arrangements under which they apparently nave maintained a consid- erable degree of autonomy. However, we be- lieve that the Soviets have provided this aid at a deliberate pace, hoping to postpone the attainment of a native Chinese nuclear weapons capability as long as possibie. ORGANIZATION 2. There are indications that the control of the Chinese Communist military atomic en- ergy program is currently vested in the Sec- ond Ministry of Machine Building. The func- tions of this ministry have never been made known, unlike other Chinese ministries, and its minister Liu Chieh, is known to have cer- tain interests in the Chinese Communist atomic energy program. We believe that this ministry may be patterned after the Soviet Ministry of Medium Machine Building. The peaceful uses aspects of the program, cover- ing nuclear research, training, and isotope applications, are largely under the control of the Scientific and Technological Commis- sion of the State Council, with the Institute of Atomic Energy of the Academy of Sciences as the most prominent research establish- ment. TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES 3. The Chinese Communists have acquired a smali but highly competent cadre of Western- trained Chinese nuclear specialists. Their nuclear research effort has expanded rapidly Since the early 1950's and more than twenty nuclear research facilities have been estab- lished at institutes and universities. In addi- tion to the Soviet-supplied research reactor and cyclotron, there are a variety of cyclo- trons and other accelerators, most of which are of Chinese manufacture. The Chinese have access, through the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research, to the large Soviet accelera- tors at Dubna. China's share of the financial costs of the institute is 20 percent, a share exceeded only by that of the Soviet Union. We believe that the widespread Chinese train- ing and research effort is coordinated to the needs of the military atomic energy program. The Chinese Communists are now capable of comprehending and exploiting the large body of open scientific literature in the nuclear sciences. However, the present shortage of trained scientists and engineers will probably persist throughout the period of this esti-
Seah cate mate. Thisgshortage would hamper Chinese efforts to design, construct, and operate fa- cilities for the production of fissionable ma- terials and would be particularly serious, should the Soviets decide to reduce or termi!- nate their technical aid. URANIUM ORE PRODUCTION 4. The exploitation of native uranium re- sources has been underway, with Soviet as- sistance, since 1950.° Over 10 deposits are now being worked, and we believe that ore with a uranium metal equivalent of several hundred tons is being mined annually and retained in China. URANIUM METAL 5. The Chinese Communists have probably initiated the processing of uranium ores into metals. FISSIONABLE MATERIALS 6. Chinese development of uranium resources and their probable construction of ore con- centration and uranium metal plants cer- tainly would imply an intended use for the uranium in plutonium production. Although uranium metal is not required for U-235 pro- duction, the first stages of the process could also supply feed for U-235 separation. 7. We estimate that a first Chinese produc- tion reactor could attain criticality in late 1961, and the first plutonium might become available late in 1962.1 Since there is no con- clusive evidence for the date of the uranium 1The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, De- partment of the Air Force, believes that the Chinese will probably detonate their first nuclear device in 1962, and posssibly as early as late 1961. The great political, psychological and military ad- vantages to be gained are such that the Chinese would accord top nationa! priority to the devel- opment of a nuclear weapons program. He in- terprets the available evidence on the production schedule of uranium me:za! and fissionable ma- terial to indicate that fr, 1959 a uranium metal plant started producing fuel elements for the production reactor which ts believed to have gone critical in 1960. The first nuclear device will probably use plutonium from this reactor. Fi- nally, he belfeves that after late 1961 highly enriched U-235 will be available for subsequent devices. to plant startup, and 4ince the construction of reactor and chemical separation facilities has not been directly established, the actual start of plutonium production could be a year earlier or several yeAss later. 8. It is possible that a U-235 plant is now under construction. Considering the mag- nitude of the devejopmenta! work and indus- trial support required for the construction of a gaseous diffusion plant, however, it is im- probable that the Chinese could produce highly enriched U~235 earlier than late 1962.? NUCLEAR WEAPONS 9. On the basis of al! available evidence, we now believe that the most probable date at which the Chinese Communists could det- onate a first nucjeat device is sometime in 1963, though it might be as late as 1964, or as early as 1962, depending upon the actual degree of Soviet assistance.'* If the Soviets provide fissionable materials, and assist in the design and fabrication of a nuclear device, the Chinese could produce a nuclear detona- tion in China at almost any time in the im- mediate future. On the other hand, if there were a lessening of Soviet assistance in the nuclear field as a result of current Sino-Soviet dissensions, progress Would be substantially retarded. 10. While the expjosion of a nuclear device would give the Chinése Communists politicai and propaganda rewards, they wouid almost ? The Assistant Chief ot Naval Operations (Intell- gence), Department of the Navy, believes that {information on the Nature and extent of Soviet aid to Communist Cnina fs as yet insufficient for a reliable estimate of the year in which the Chi- nese Communists could detonate & nuclear device. He considers, howevér. tha! certain basic infor- mation should have Decume available to us by this time {f the Chinese Communists were pro- gressing toward detonation of a domestically produced nuclear device very much before the final stages of this Uve-year estimate. In the absence of what he Considers to be any evidence pertaining to or indJcative of the production of fissionable materials in Communist China and in the Nght of the relaUvely elementary state of known nuclear rese@rch facilities, he ts unable to accept the time schedule for nuclear weapons as given in this paper.
wed T 3 certainly proceed to create un operational nu- clear capability as quickly as feasible. How- ever, at least two years would probably be required after the explosion of a nuclear device to produce a small number of elementary weapons. NUCLEAR POWER 11. Based on known Chinese Communist de- sire to become a nuclear power, we believe that production reactors would be given precedence over reactors designed for nuclear power. Further, we do not believe that the Chinese would complicate the design of their first production reactors in an effort to extract by-product power. We estimate that the Chi- nese will not construct nuclear power sta- tions in the 1960-1965 period. SOVIET ASSISTANCE 12. Soviet assistance has been an important factor in the Chinese atomic energy program. Under an agreement for cooperation con- cluded in 1955, the Soviets have provided to the Chinese a research reactor, cyclotron, technical assistance and training. A Sino- Soviet Scientific and Technical Agreement for the years 1958-1962 was concluded in 1958. Other known Soviet aid has been largely con- cerned with uranfum prospecting. We have no firm evidence of Soviet assistance in de- signing or constructing fissionable materials production facilities or in supplying the ma- terials or equipment needed for such pro- duction. 13. There is some evidence that Soviet aid may have been curtailed, based on reports that a general withdrawal of Soviet techni- cians from China took place in mid-1960. Such diminution of aid in the Chinese Com- munists’ atomic energy program would sub- stantially retard China's progress in becoming a nuclear power.