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27  DEC  1360 
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Va  13  December  1960 
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NATIONAL    INTELLIGENCE     ESTIMATE 
NUMBER  13-2-60 
THE  CHINESE  COMMUNIST 
ATOMIC  ENERGY  PROGRAM 
SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS'00^*™0 
NO  CHANGE  IN  CLASS.   I 
•^^DECLASSIFIED 
CLASS.  CHANGED  TO:    TS    S 
NEXT  REVIEW  DATE:    
"  -.    .-  AUTH: 
Subt.;Uted  by  the  0ATE 
DIRECTOB  OF  CENTRAL  INTELLIGENCE 
The  following  intelligence  organizations  participated  in  the 
preparation  of  this  estimate:  The  Central  Intelligence  Agency, 
the  National  Security  Agency,  and  the  intelligence  organiza- 
tions of  the  Departments  of  State,  the  Army,  the  Navy,  the 
Air  Force,  The  Joint  Staff,  Defense,  and  the  Atomic  Xnergy 
Commission. 
Concurred  in  by  the 
UNITED  STATES  INTELLIGENCE  BOA&O 
on  13  December  1960.  Concurring  were  The  Director  of  Intel- 
ligence and  Research,  Department  of  State;  the  Assistant 
Chief  of  Staff  for  Intelligence,  Department  of  the  Army;  the 
Assistant  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  for  Intelligence,  Depart- 
ment of  the  Navy;  the  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  Intelligence, 
VSAF;  the  Director  for  Intelligence,  The  Joint  Staff;  the 
Assistant  to  the  Secretary  of  Defense,  Special  Operations; 
the  Atomic  Xnergy  Commission  Representative  to  the  USIB; 
and  the  Director  of  the  National  Security  Agency.  The  Assist- 
ant Director,  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation,  abstained,  the 
subject  being  outside  the  jurisdiction  of  his  Agency. 
E:  "f*f  J^/^VlSweR-rZlipfy 
APPROVED  FOR  HEIIASE    - 
DATE .      ^     JM  ]W&
THE  CHINESE  COMMUNIST  ATOMIC  ENERGY  PROGRAM 
THE  PROBLEM 
To  determine  the  current  status  and  the  probable  future  course  of  the  Chinese 
Communist  atomic  energy  program  to  mid- 1965 
SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS 
GENERAL 
1.  Communist  China  is  energetically  develop- 
ing her  native  capabilities  in  the  field  of 
atomic  energy.  Since  the  early  1950's  she 
has  been  making  a  concerted  effort  to  develop 
the  corps  of  scientists  and  technicians  and 
establish  the  research  facilities  essential  to 
the  exploitation  of  nuclear  energy.  The  over- 
all effort  has  progressed  steadily  since  1955 
with  the  benefit  of  a  substantial  amount  of 
Soviet  aid.  This  assistance  has  been  ob- 
tained by  the  Chinese  Communists  via  nego- 
tiated, fonnal  arrangements  under  which 
they  apparently  have  maintained  a  consid- 
erable degree  of  autonomy.  However,  we  be- 
lieve that  the  Soviets  have  provided  this  aid 
at  a  deliberate  pace,  hoping  to  postpone  the 
attainment  of  a  native  Chinese  nuclear 
weapons  capability  as  long  as  possible. 
ORGANIZATION 
2.  There  are  indications  that  the  control  of 
the  Chinese  Communist  military  atomic  en- 
ergy program  is  currently  vested  in  the  Sec- 
ond Ministry  of  Machine  Building.  The  func- 
tions of  this  ministry  have  never  been  made 
known,  unlike  other  Chinese  ministries,  and 
its  minister  Liu  Chieh,  is  known  to  have  cer- 
tain interests  in  the  Chinese  Communist 
atomic  energy  program.  We  believe  that  this 
ministry  may  be  patterned  after  the  Soviet 
Ministry  of  Medium  Machine  Building.  The 
peaceful  uses  aspects  of  the  program,  cover- 
ing nuclear  research,  training,  and  isotope 
applications,  are  largely  under  the  control 
of  the  Scientific  and  Technological  Commis- 
sion of  the  State  Council,  with  the  Institute 
of  Atomic  Energy  of  the  Academy  of  Sciences 
as  the  most  prominent  research  establish- 
ment. 
TECHNICAL  CAPABILITIES 
3.  The  Chinese  Communists  have  acquired  a 
small  but  highly  competent  cadre  of  Western- 
trained    Chinese    nuclear    specialists.    Their 
nuclear  research  effort  has  expanded  rapidly 
since  the  early  1950's  and  more  than  twenty 
nuclear  research  facilities  have  been  estab- 
lished at  institutes  and  universities.    In  addi- 
tion to  the  Soviet-supplied  research  reactor 
and  cyclotron,  there  are  a  variety  of  cyclo- 
trons and  other  accelerators,  most  of  which 
are   of   Chinese   manufacture.    The  Chinese 
have  access,  through  the  Joint  Institute  for 
Nuclear  Research,  to  the  large  Soviet  accelera- 
tors at  Dubna.     China's  share  of  the  financial 
costs  of  the  institute  is  20  percent,  a  share 
exceeded  only  by  that  of  the  Soviet  Union. 
We  believe  that  the  widespread  Chinese  train- 
ing and  research  effort  is  coordinated  to  the 
needs  of  the  military  atomic  energy  program. 
The  Chinese  Communists  are  now  capable  of 
comprehending  and  exploiting  the  large  body 
of   open   scientific   literature   in   the  nuclear 
sciences.     However,  the  present  shortage  of 
trained  scientists  and  engineers  will  probably 
persist   throughout   the  period   of   this   esti-
mate.  Thisflshortage  would  hamper  Chinese 
efforts  to  design,  construct,  and  operate  fa- 
cilities for  the  production  of  fissionable  ma- 
terials and  would  be  particularly  serious, 
should  the  Soviets  decide  to  reduce  or  termi- 
nate their  technical  aid. 
URANIUM  ORE  PRODUCTION 
4.  The  exploitation  of  native  uranium  re- 
sources has  been  underway,  with  Soviet  as- 
sistance, since  1950.  *  Over  10  deposits  are 
now  being  worked,  and  we  believe  that  ore 
with  a  uranium  metal  equivalent  of  several 
hundred  tons  is  being  mined  annually  and 
retained  in  China. 
URANIUM  METAL 
5.  The  Chinese  Communists  have  probably 
initiated  the  processing  of  uranium  ores  into 
metals. 
FISSIONABLE  MATERIALS 
6.  Chinese  development  of  uranium  resources 
and  their  probable  construction  of  ore  con- 
centration and  uranium  metal  plants  cer- 
tainly would  imply  an  intended  use  for  the 
uranium  in  plutonium  production.  Although 
uranium  metal  is  not  required  for  U-235  pro- 
duction, the  first  stages  of  the  process  could 
also  supply  feed  for  U-235  separation. 
7.  We  estimate  that  a  first  Chinese  produc- 
tion reactor  could  attain  criticality  in  late 
1961,  and  the  first  plutonium  might  become 
available  late  in  1962.1  Since  there  is  no  con- 
clusive evidence  for  the  date  of  the  uranium 
•  The  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff.  Intelligence,  De- 
partment of  the  Air  Force,  believes  that  the 
Chinese  will  probably  detonate  their  first  nuclear 
device  in  1962.  and  posssisly  as  early  as  late  1961. 
The  great  political,  psychological  and  military  ad- 
vantages to  be  gained  are  such  that  the  Chinese 
would  accord  top  national  priority  to  the  devel- 
opment of  a  nuclear  weapons  program.  He  in- 
terprets the  available  evidence  on  the  production 
schedule  of  uranium  me'-ai  and  fissionable  ma- 
terial to  indicate  that  in  1959  a  uranium  metal 
plant  started  producing  fuel  elements  for  the 
production  reactor  which  is  believed  to  have  gone 
critical  in  1960.  The  first  nuclear  device  will 
probabJy  use  plutonium  from  this  reactor.  Fi- 
nally, he  believes  that  after  late  1961  highly 
enriched  U-235  will  be  available  for  subsequent 
devices. 
plant  startup,  and  SUice  the  construction  of 
reactor  and  chemical  separation  facilities  has 
not  been  directly  established,  the  actual  start 
of  plutonium  production  could  be  a  year 
earlier  or  several  yeATs  later. 
8.  It  is  possible  mat  a  TJ-235  plant  is  now 
under  construction.  Considering  the  mag- 
nitude of  the  developmental  work  and  indus- 
trial support  required  for  the  construction  of 
a  gaseous  diffusion  plant,  however,  it  is  im- 
probable that  the  Chinese  could  produce 
highly  enriched  U-235  earlier  than  late  1962. > 
NUCLEAR  WEAPONS 
9.  On  the  basis  of  a-U  available  evidence,  we 
now  believe  that  th£  most  probable  date  at 
which  the  Chinese  Communists  could  det- 
onate a  first  nuclear  device  is  sometime  in 
1963,  though  it  might  b^  as  late  as  1964,  or 
as  early  as  1962,  depending  upon  the  actual 
degree  of  Soviet  assistance.1 2  If  the  Soviets 
provide  fissionable  materials,  and  assist  in  the 
design  and  fabrication  of  a  nuclear  device, 
the  Chinese  could  produce  a  nuclear  detona- 
tion in  China  at  almost  any  time  in  the  im- 
mediate future.  On  the  other  hand,  if  there 
were  a  lessening  of  Soviet  assistance  in  the 
nuclear  field  as  a  result  of  current  Sino-Soviet 
dissensions,  progress  ^'ould  be  substantially 
retarded. 
10.  While  the  explosion  of  a  nuclear  device 
would  give  the  Chinese  Communists  political 
and  propaganda  rewards,  they  would  almost 
■  The  Assistant  Chief  ct  Naval  Operations  (Intelli- 
gence). Department  0*  the  Navy,  believes  that 
Information  on  the  nature  and  extent  of  Soviet 
aid  to  Communist  Cnina  i5  as  yet  Insufficient  for 
a  reliable  estimate:  of  the  year  in  which  the  Chi- 
nese Communists  couW  detonate  a  nuclear  device. 
He  considers,  however.  Uiat  certain  basic  infor- 
mation should  have  Pec^tne  available  to  us  by 
this  time  if  the  Chinese  Communists  were  pro- 
gressing toward  detonation  of  a  domestically 
produced  nuclear  device  very  much  before  the 
final  stages  of  this  five-year  estimate.  In  the 
absence  of  what  he  Considers  to  be  any  evidence 
pertaining  to  or  Indicative  of  the  production  of 
fissionable  materials  Jn  Communist  China  and 
in  the  light  of  the  restively  elementary  state  of 
known  nuclear  rej>e*rch  facilities,  he  is  unable 
to  accept  the  time  schedule  for  nuclear  weapons 
as  given  in  this  pape?.
certainly  proceed  to  create  an  operational  nu- 
clear capability  as  quickly  as  feasible.  How- 
ever, at  least  two  years  would  probably  be 
required  after  the  explosion  of  a  nuclear  device 
to  produce  a  small  number  of  elementary 
weapons. 
NUCLEAR   POWER 
11.  Based  on  known  Chinese  Communist  de- 
sire to  become  a  nuclear  power,  we  believe  that 
production  reactors  would  be  given  precedence 
over  reactors  designed  for  nuclear  power. 
Further,  we  do  not  believe  that  the  Chinese 
would  complicate  the  design  of  their  first 
production  reactors  in  an  effort  to  extract 
by-product  power.  We  estimate  that  the  Chi- 
nese will  not  construct  nuclear  power  sta- 
tions in  the  1960-1965  period. 
SOYIET  ASSISTANCE 
12.  Soviet  assistance  has  been  an  important 
factor  in  the  Chinese  atomic  energy  program. 
Under  an  agreement  for  cooperation  con- 
cluded in  1955,  the  Soviets  have  provided  to 
the  Chinese  a  research  reactor,  cyclotron, 
technical  assistance  and  training-  A  Sino- 
Soviet  Scientific  and  Technical  Agreement  for 
the  years  1958-1062  was  concluded  in  1958. 
Other  known  Soviet  aid  has  been  largely  con- 
cerned with  uranium  prospecting.  We  have 
no  firm  evidence  of  Soviet  assistance  in  de- 
signing or  constructing  fissionable  materials 
production  facilities  or  in  supplying  the  ma- 
terials or  equipment  needed  for  such  pro- 
duction. 
13.  "there  is  some  evidence  that  Soviet  aid 
may  have  been  curtailed,  based  on  reports 
that  a  general  withdrawal  of  Soviet  techni- 
cians from  China  took  place  in  mid-1960. 
Such  diminution  of  aid  in  the  Chinese  Com- 
munists' atomic  energy  program  would  sub- 
stantially retard  China's  progress  in  becoming 
a  nuclear  power.