November  1,  19  8  5 
COUMTERINTELLIGENCE/COUNTERMEASURE  IMPLEMENTATION- 
TASK  FORCE   (U) 
Intelligence  collection  by  foreign  intelligence  officers  and 
agents  operating  in  the  United  States  presents  the  greatest 
counterintelligence  (CI)  threat  confronting  the  United  States. 
Under  cover  of  diplomatic  establishments,  foreign-owned  commer- 
cial entities  and  exchange  student  programs,  the  Soviet,  Soviet' 
Bloc,  Peoples  Republic  of  China  and  other  criteria  countries 
have  emplaced  large  numbers  of  professional  intelligence 
officers  and  other  intelligence  collectors  (economic,  scientific 
and  technical,  and  military)  in  the  United  States.   The  numbers 
of  foreign  intelligence  officers  far  surpass  the  counterintelli- 
gence assets  the  US  Government  has  been  able  to  deploy  against 
them,  and  the  number  has  been  increasing  over  the  years.   This 
issue  has  been  studied  extensively  by  the  Interagency  Group  on 
Counterintelligence  (IG/CI)  and  a  series  of  recommendations 
were  forwarded  to  and  endorsed  by  the  Senior  Interagency  Group 
for  Intelligence  (SIG/I) .   These  recommendations  were  reviewed 
and  endorsed  by  the  National  Security  Planning  Group  (NSPG)  on 
August  7,  1985.   I  have  decided  it  is  in  the  national  interest 
to  implement  each  of  these  proposals.   (U) 
The  NSPG  also  recommended  that  the  US  Government  adopt,  in 
principle,  the  use  of  aperiodic,  non-life  style,  Cl-type 
polygraph  examinations  for  all  individuals  with  access  to 
US  Government  Sensitive  Compartment  Information  (SCI) , 
Communications  Security  Information  (COMSEC)  and  other  special 
access  program  classified  information.   I  have  decided  this 
policy  should  be  established.   (U) 
In  order  to  facilitate  the  implementation  of  these  decisions,  I 
am  directing  the  establishment  of  a  task  force  to  develop  the 
time  table,  procedures  and  method  to  implement  this  Decision 
Directive.   This  implementation  task  force  will  be  chaired  by  a 
representative  of  the  Assistant  to  the  President  for  National 
Security  Affairs.   The  task  force  will  be  composed  of  a  repre- 
sentative of  each  NSPG  principal:   Secretary  of  State,  Secretary 
of  Defense,  Attorney  General,  Director  of  Central  Intelligence, 
and  Chairman,  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff.   In  addition,  the  task 
force  will  include  a  representative  of  the  Director  of  the 
Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  and  a  representative  from 
Department  of  State/Office  of  Foreign  Missions  (OFM) .   (U) 
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5ecur::v  Service  (Department  of  State)  ,  Office  of  Foreign 
Missions  (Department  of  State),  Department  of  the  Treasury, 
Department  of  Commerce,  US  Army  Intelligence  and  Security 
Command,  Naval  Intelligence  Command,  CS  Air  Force  Office  of 
Special  Investigations,  National  Security  Agency,  and  the 
Immigration  and  Naturalization  Service.   (U) 
The  Intelligence  Community  Staff  Secretariat  will  provide 
necessary  administrative  support.   (U) 
The  purpose  of  this  task  force  will  be  to  make  recommendations 
on  the  method,  timing  and  procedures  to  implement  the  SIG(I) 
options;  establish  implementation  policy  for  the  national 
polygraph  program  and  implement  other  counterintelligence  and 
countermeasures  improvements  which  have  appropriate  national 
policy  level  implications.   Final  implementation  decisions  will 
be  made  by  the  President.   (U) 
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THE  WHITE  HOUSE 
Office  of  the  Press  Secretar 
NEWS  CONFERENCE 
BY 
THE  PRESIDENT 
January  7,  1986 
The  East  Room 
8:00  P.M.  EST 
Extract  from  Pages  6-7  Regarding 
Lie  Detector  Tests 
Sam? 
Q    Mr.  President,  you  signed  a  directive  which  would 
require  a  great  number  of  government  employees  to  take  lie  detector 
tests  for  security  purposes.   But  when  Secretary  Shultz  publicly 
complained,  you  changed  your  mind  and  cut  back  on  that  directive. 
And  one  of  your  aides  said  to  reporters  that  you  really  hadn't 
understood  what  was  in  it  when  you  signed  it.   My  question  is,  did 
you  understand  it  when  you  signed  it  originally,  and  if  so,  why  did 
you  change  your  mind? 
THE  PRESIDENT:   If  there  was  an  aide  that  said  anything 
of  that  kind,  he  wasn't  an  aide.   (Laughter.) 
Q    He  won't  be  tomorrow. 
THE  PRESIDENT:   No.   No,  when  Secretary  Shultz  came  back, 
he  had  been  accosted  by  the  press  in  Europe  and  they  were  leading  to 
believe  that  I  had  okayed  virtually  carte  blanche  the  two  and  a  half 
million  federal  employees  subject  to  lie  detector  tests  and  they 
would  be  tested  based  on  their  personalities 
or  their  own  personal  lives  and  so  forth.   None  of  this  was  true. 
And  the  document  I  signed  was  not  changed  nor  did  I  change  my  mind. 
I  was  able  when  the  Secretary  and  I  had  a  chance  to  talk  when  he  came 
back  to  point  out  that  what  I  had  signed  was  a  directive  that  was 
creating  an  investigative  poiicy  that  we  were  —  I  did  not  create  it 
—  in  that  I  asked  for  and  was  proposing  that  we  come  together  on  a 
policy  for  heading  off  espionage.   And  therefore,  out  of  the 
thousands  and  thousands  of  employees,  there  is  a  very  limited  number 
that  actually  deal  with  classified  material  or  could  possibly  be 
involved  in  this.   And  I  recommended,  among  other  things,  that  this 
be  included  as  an  investigatory  tool  in  such  investigations  and  it 
would  be  limited  to  what  we  were  trying  to  find  out  --  espionage  and 
whether  to  head  it  off  or  not.   So,  whoever  was  telling  that  —  and 
I've  seen  it  and  heard  it  and  so  forth.   And  I've  sat  there  fidgeting 
in  my  chair  because  it  wasn't  true.   That's  what  I  signed  and  that's 
what  is  still  signed. 
Q    Sir,  Secretary  Shultz  made  the  point  that  he  doesn't 
believe  lie  detector  tests  are  accurate  —  that  often  they  catch 
people  who  are  not  guilty,  and  even  let  people  who  are  guilty  go.   I 
take  it  you  think  they  are  accurate. 
THE  PRESIDENT:   I  think  that  it's  a  useful  tool.   I  know 
that  he  does  not  have  too  high  an  opinion  of  them  and  I  think  that  he 
was  thinking  also  if  you're  going  to  have  one  of  those  in  which  you 
get  into  people's  personal  lives  and  so  forth  —  but  al3o,  there  are 
others  who  have  a  greater  confidence  in  them  in  such  an    investigation 
where  you  are  directly  going  after  a  subject.   One  of  the  things  that 
they've  done  and  the  record  of  polygraph  tests  throughout  our  land 
has  proven,  that  they  have  oeen  responsible  for  more  confessions  than 
anything  actually  proven  there  —  that  the  very  nature  of  the  test 
has  led  to  a  multitude  of  confessions  of  various  crimes  and  so  forth.