\  -•-; 
J  --•  -    UNITED   STATEIS   ARMS    CONTROL    AND    DISARMAMENT   AGENCY 
'  WASHINGTON 
ML  6    1962 
OFFICE    OF 
THC    DIRECTOR 
meh:>ra\"dum  for  the  president 
SUBJECT:   Anns  Control  Aspects  of  Proposed  Satellite 
Reconnaissance  Policy 
Recommendations  18  and  19  of  the  "Report  on  Political 
and  Informational  Aspects  of  Satellite  Reconnaissance 
Policy"  call  attention  to  two  issues  on  which  the  agencies 
concerned  Have  been  unable  to  reach  agreement.   The  views 
of  the  Arms  Control  and  Disarmament  Agency  are  summarized 
below. 
Advance  Notification  of  Launchings 
The  Geneva  Conference  has  agreed  to  discuss  separate 
measures  to  reduce  the  risk  of  war  through  accident,  mis- 
calculation or  failure  of  communication.   The  purpose  of 
such  measures  would  be  to  provide  reassurance  among  states 
'and  to  hold  to  the  minimum  the  hazards  that  might  arise 
from  misinterpretation  of  abrupt  acts  of  a  military  but 
non-belligerent  character.   Measures  designed  for  this 
purpose  might  involve  arrangements  for  advance  notiiication 
of  certain  types  of  military  movements  and  maneuvers, 
including  advance  notification  of  missile  leunchii^gs,  a 
measure  already  suggested  by  the  Swedish  Delegation,  and 
possibly  advance  notification  of  space  vehicle  launchings 
as  well. 
Recommendation  18  of  the  Satellite  Reconnaissance 
Report  would  preclude  the  United  States  from  making  or 
endorsing  proposals  for  advance  notification  of  missile 
and  space  vehicle  launchings.   In  the  case  of  space 
vehicle  launchings,  the  recommendation  is  based  on  the 
contention  that  advance  notification  would  facilitate 
passive  and  active  counter-measures  against  reconnaissance 
satellites.   Advance  notification  of  missile  launching 
is  presumably  ruled  out  because  space  vehicle  launchin 
might  become  a  collateral  issue. 
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-  2 
ACDA  does  not  wish  to  underestimate  the  counter- 
measures  problem,  but  we  have  difficulty  in  assigning  it 
over-riding  significance.   Past  and  continuing  publicity 
respecting  reconnaissance  satellites  is  sufficient  to  have 
aroused  Soviet  interest  in  the  possibility  of  countermeasures 
If  passive  countermeasures  are  practical,  it  is  not  unreason- 
able to  suppose  that  the  Soviet  Union  cn-ay  undertake  them 
vhether  or  not  advance  notification  is  provided.   In  so  far 
as  active  countenr-aasures  are  concerned,  it  is  not  evident 
that  advance  notification  need  be  so  precise  as  to  result 
in  the  pin-pointing  of  targets  in  outer  space.   To  the 
extent  that  such  notification  might  servej_    
^  such  maneuvers  as 
launching  schedules  might  be  employed 
7ith  a  view  to  effecting  some  attrition 
measure  to  reduce  the  risk  ot  war  in  order  to  oestroy  or   *" — 
neutralize  a  peaceful  United  States  satellite,  a  variety 
of  responses  would  be  available,  including  a  strengthened 
basis  for  United  States  political  opposition  to  such  acts. 
We  may  not,  in  fact,  be  able  to  reach  agreement  with 
the  Soviet  Union  on  any  type  of  advance  notification. 
However,  an  affirmative  United  States  position  would  be 
consistent  with  our  view  that  the  objects  we  place  in  orbit 
represent  legitimate  uses  of  outer  space  1   By  carrying  our 
concern  regarding  our  space  vehicles  to  the  point  where 
we  are  unwilling  to  discuss  advance  notification  of  missile 
launchings,  we  ma}r  encourage  the  conclusion  that  we  are 
attempting  to  shield  activities  which  we  ourselves  regard 
as  suspect.   It  is  difficult  to  see  how  such  an  approach 
could  contribute  to  the  political  and  legal  defense  of 
satellite  reconnaissance. 
Furthermore,  a  separate  measure  for  advance  notifica- 
tions of  missile  and  space  launchings,  if  agreed  to  by  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union,  would  constitute  an 
important  step  in  the  arms  control  field.   First,  it  would 
give  greater  assurance  that  a  surprise  missile  attack  could 
not  take  place  in  a  way  that  would  catch  the  U.S.  off  guard. 
Secondly,  by  having  advance  notifications  of  such  launchings, 
each  party  to  the  agreement  would  have  a  good  record  of  the 
other  party's  planned  programs  in  the  space  and  missile 
fields,  including  both  test  programs  and  possible  programs 
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-  3  - 
for  the  further  deployment  of  missiles.   Third,  advance 
notifications  of  missile  and  space  launching6  would'dec: __ 
tension  that  is  bound  to  come  as  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union,  and  possibly  other  countries  as  well,  increase 
the  number  of  missiles  at  their  disposal.   The  more  informa- 
tion that  can  be  obtained  about  the  intentions  of  potentially 
hostile  parties,  as  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 
increase  their  dependence  on  missiles  for  military  purposes, 
the  less  likely  it  will  be  that  one  or  the  other  party  will 
miscalculate  and  possibly  start  or  escalate  a  war  with  missiles 
There  are  issues  of  greater  consequence  than  measures 
"to  reduce  the  risk  of  war."   Hovever,  other  things  being 
equal,  it  would  seem  desirable  that  the  United  States  seek 
limited  gains  in  the  arms  control  field  a.s   well  s.e    major  ones. 
ACDA  is  not  convinced  that  the  arguments  supporting  Recom- 
mendation 18  outweigh  these  against  it,  and  recommends  that 
it  be  disapproved. 
Prohibition  of  Bombs  in  Orbit 
The  Canadian  Foreign  Minister  has  pressed  at  Geneva 
for  consideration  of  a  separate  measure  to  prohibit  the 
placing  in  orbit  of  veepons  of  mass  destruction  (it  is 
perhaps  worth  noting  that  the  United  Stat.es  is  currently 
pressing  for  a  tracking  station'         _J  to  support 
military  space  programs).   The  United  States  has  expressed 
willingness  to  discuss  the  possibility  of  such  a  separate 
measure,  provided  that  it  take  the  rorir  of  an  agreement 
which  would  be  subject  to  inspection.   To  date,  the  Soviet 
Union  has:  opposed  consideration  of  the  matter  except  in 
connection  with  general  and  complete  disarmament.   Recom- 
mendation 19  of  the  Satellite  Reconnaissance  Report  raises 
a  question  as  to  whether  we  should  continue  to  pursue  our 
present  course. 
ACDA  believes  that  if  an  agreement  could  be  reached 
to  prohibit  the  placing  in  orbit  of  weapons  of  mass  de- 
struction, such  an  agreement  would  be'  in  the  interest  of 
the  national  security.   To  prevent  extension  of  the  arms 
race  to  outer  space  should  be  an  important  objective  of 
arms  control,  and  hence  national  security  policy.   This 
conclusion  appears  valid  even  if  such  an  agreement  were 
fully  effective  only  against  very  large  and  hence  very 
high  yield  weapons  such  as  those  tested  by  the  Soviet         ^ 
Union  in  its  last  test  series.   The  fact  that  the  Soviet
-  k  - 
Union  would  gain  increased  knowledge  of  our  satellite 
reconnaissance  capabilities  does  not  seem  a  compelling 
argument  against  our  acceptance  of  inspection  procedures, 
particularly  in  view  of  the  present  Soviet  ability  to 
estimate  these  capabilities  with  a  substantial  degree  of 
accuracy,  a  fact  that  is  noted  in  the  Satellite  Recon- 
naissance Report. 
The  basic  objection  to  the  present  United  States 
position  of  willingness  to  consider  a  separate  outer  space 
agreement  appeajrs  to  rest  primarily  on  the  argument  that 
discussion  of  a  separate  agreement  might  involve  the 
United  States,  to  its  tactical  disadvantage,  in  a  public 
airing  of  the  satellite  reconnaissance  issue. 
The  Soviet  Union  has,  of  course,  already  raised  this 
issue  not  only  in  its  propaganda  output  but  elso  in  private 
conversations  with  the  United  States  and  in  discussions  in 
the  context  of  the  United  Nations  Outer  Space  Committee. 
Ambassador  Stevenson  is  concerned  that  the  issue  may  be 
raised  in  the  General  Assembly.   There  is  good  reason  for 
such  concern  since  the  public  record  affords  ample  "evidence" 
to  support  a  strong  political  attack.   Under  these  circum- 
stances, the  question  may  be  where,  not  whether,  the 
United  States  may  have  to  debate  the  matter. 
\OX~ 
We  may  not  be  able  to  prevent  the  Soviet  Union  from 
speaking  out  in  the  forum  of  its  choice,  but  if  we  continue 
to  maintain  that  limitations  on  military  uses  of  outer  space 
are  arms  control  matters  and  that  Geneva  is  the  proper  place 
to  discuss  them,  we  will  have  a  reasonable  tactical  basis 
for  declining  to  join  issue  in  the  Outer  Space  Committee 
or  the  General  Assembly.   We  will  also  have  reasonable 
procedural  grounds  for  ignoring,  if  not  defeating,  con- 
demnatory principles  of  space  law  or  hortatory  resolutions 
which  might  embarrass  the  satellite  reconnaissance  program. 
In  view  of  the  foregoing  considerations,  ACDA  strongly 
urges  that  approval  be  given  to  an  effort  on  the  part  of 
the  United  States  to  seek  a  separate  agreement  to  prohibit 
the  placing  in  orbit  of  weapons  of  mass  destruction. 
William  C.  Foster