_ ~~ & Heedquarters Oepartment of the Army Washington, DC 1 June 1986 - x ee Regulation 380-381 Effective 1 June 1986 Security Special Access Programs (SAPs) (U) Summary. This regulation establishes policies and prescribes procedures for establishing, administratively controlling, and sup- porting Special Access Programs (SAPs) and SAPs with ‘‘carve- out’’ contracts. (U) Applicability. This regulation applies to the Active Army. It does not apply to the Army National Guard (ARNG) or U.S. Army Reserve (USAR). {U) impact on New Manning System. This regulation does Not contain information that affects the New Manning System. (U) Internal control systems. This regulation is not subject to the requirements of AR 11-2. It does not contain internal control provisions. (U) Committee continuance approval. The DA Committee Management Officer concurs in the continuance of the Special Ac- cess Programs Oversight Committee (SAPOC) which was estab- lished by AR 380-381 (C), 15 August 1983. (U) Supplementation. Supplementation of this regulation and establishment of forms other than DA Forms are prohibited, unless prior approval is obtained from HQDA(DACS-DMP), WASH DC 20310-0200. (U) Interim changes. Interim changes to this regulation are not Official unless they are authenticated by The Adjutant General. Users will destroy interim changes on their expiration dates unless sooner superseded or rescinded. (U) Suggested improvements. The proponent agency of this regulation is the Office of the Chief of Staff, Army. Users are in- vited to send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to HQDA(DACS-DMP), WASH DC 20310-0200. (U) Distribution restriction. This publication contains opera- tional information that is for official use only. Distribution is limited to U.S. Army agencies. Requests from outside the U.S. Army for release of this publication must be made to HQDA(DACS-DMP), WASH DC 20310-0200. ae ee eemeeel *This regulation supersedes AR 380-381 (S), 1 March 1985, and rescinds DA Form 5400, March 1985.
se ia aen 1 June 1986 AR 380-381 Contents (U) Paragraph Page Paragraph Page Purpose 220.2 e eect eee eeee 1 Policy... 6... ccc ee ccc ence ewe cence References ...-. 20.0... cece cece eee e ween 2 3 Responsibilities 2.20... 0. cee cece eee eee eeee 5 5 Explanation of abbreviations and terms ....... 3 3 Procedures 2.2.0... cece cece eee eee eeee 6 7 Appendix A. References ..... 22. ccc c cece eee eee e teens A-l E. Technology Management Office Responsibilities .... E-1 8B. Format for Reporting Special Access Programs ..... B-] F. Limited Special Access Program .............-665 F-1 C. Special Access Program Oversight G,. Format for Annual SAPOC Revalidation .......... G-1 Committee Charter... 2.22... cece eee cece eee C-I H. Special Access Program Disestablishment.......-.. H-1 D. Special Access Program Determination Criteria..... D-1 {. Information Systems Requirements Package ........ Il Cy Toy 2) 9 Glossary 1 1. (U) Purpose a. (U) This regulation establishes policies and prescribes procedures for establishing, administratively controlling, and supporting Special Access Programs (SAPs) and SAPs with ““carve-out’’ contracting. The following terms apply: (1) (QU) Special Access Program (SAP). Any program imposing a must ‘‘need-to-know’’ or access controls beyond those normally provided for access to CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET information under provisions -of AR 380-5. Such a program may include, but is not limited to, access clearance, adjudication or investigative require- ments, specia] designation of officials authorized to deter- mine a must ‘‘need-to-know,’’ or special lists of persons determined to have a must ‘‘need-to-know."* The justification for a SAP must establish that: (a) (U) Normal management and safeguarding pro- cedures are not sufficient to limit access; and " (b) (U) The number of persons who need access will be reasonably small and commensurate with the objective of providing extra protection for the information involved. (2) (U) Carve-Out. A classified contract issued in con- fection with an approved SAP in which the Defense In- vestigative Service (DIS) has been relieved of contractor security inspection responsibility in whole or in part under the Defense Industrial Security Program (DOD 5220.22-M). &. (U) The types of activities which may be governed by this regulation include: (1) (U) Research, development, and acquisition of systems, items or services. (2} (U) Modifications to existing systems in which a significant vulnerability has been discovered. (3) (U) Intelligence collection and exploitation. (4) (U) Foreign materiel procurement and exploitation. (5) (U) Strategic and tstical operational concepts and plans. (6) (U) Activities and organizations involved in the con- duct of covert or clandestine operations. . (U) References (U) Required and related publications and prescribed forms are listed at appendix A. 3. (U) Explanation of abbreviations and terms (U) Unless explained in the text of this regulation or cited references, abbreviations and special terms are defined in the glossary. 4. (U) Policy @. () The creation of SAPs and the utilization of *‘carve- ouv’’ contracts dictate that extraordinary management measures be applied to ensure: (1) (U) Strict compliance with the provisions of law and applicable regulations. (2) (U) Propriety in solicitation and awarding of con- tracts and purchase requests. (3) (U) Financial accountability. (4) (U) Involvement of appropriate authorities in the decisionmaking process. (5) (U) Security controls are established and enforced. 5. (U) It is the policy of the Department of the Army to use the security classification categories and the applicable sections of E.O. 12356, DOD Directive 5200.1-R and AR Regulation 380-5 to limit access to classified information. The ‘‘need-to-know’’ principle in the regular classification system will normally apply, so there will be no need to resort 3 UNCLASSIFIED
AR 380-381 to formal SAP provisions. The granting of SAP status, therefore, will not be a routine action. It must be specifi- cally demonstrated that: (1) (U) The proposed activity could not be accom- plished or would incur unacceptable security risks unless granted SAP status. (2) (U) The proposed activity is so sensitive that the cost, loss of advantage, or damage to national defense which would result from compromise is unacceptable. (3) (U) The provisions of the Army Information Secu- rity Program (AR 380-5) are not sufficient to ensure the necessary limitations on access to program information. (4) (U) The proponent is prepared to incur the addi- tional restrictions and costs inherent in a SAP. c. (U) While not all inclusive, the following conditions provide guidelines for determining what type activity or pro- xe considered for SAP approval. through the appropriate Army~‘Sta HQDA(DACS-DMP), WASH, DC 20310-0200, in accor- with appendix B. Requests will be: (1) (U) Accompanied by a security plan, classification guide, billet structure and information systems requirements package (app J). (2) (U) Coordinated by the requestor with the Army Staff and appropriate MACOMs. 1 June 1986 (4) (U) Forwarded by the TMO for Secretary of the Army approval and necessary reporting to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) [DUSD(P)}. e. (U) The use of a ‘‘carve-out’’ contract is prohibited unless such contract supports an approved SAP. The fact that a classified contract is a part of an approved SAP is not, of itself, sufficient justification for a ‘‘carve-out'’ contract. 2) (U) Requests for approval of a SAP with a ‘*carve- out’’ contract must include rationale for use of **carve-out"’ contracting and proposed ‘*carve-out"’ coniracting proce- dures. These procedures must comply with DOD 5220.22-M, AR 380-49, appendix B, and with Federal, Defense, and Army acquisition regulations. Program managers and proponents for SAPs must specify what acoanization is assuming the security responsibilities which are ‘‘carved-out’’ of DIS. (2) (U) Commanders or heads of DA activities spon- soring a SAP supported by a contractor will use DD Form 254 (Contract Security Classification Specification) when — establishing a ‘*carve-out’’ contract.
1 June 1986 g. (U) The range of extraordinary security protections and access controls afforded to approved SAPs may not be ap- plied to other programs, even though such programs other- wise meet the definition of a SAP in paragraph ! of this regulation. Specifically, no collaterally classified programs other than an approved SAP may control access through signed nondisclosure statements or use ‘‘carve-out"’ contracting. h. (U) Requests for waivers to policy as set forth in this regulation may be submitted to HQDA(DACS-DMP). 5. (Uy Responsibilities -- - - & (U) The Secretary of the Army (SA) is responsible for all matters related to compartmented activities within the Department of the Army.The Secretary may delegate por- tions of those responsibilities to the Under Secretary of the Army, Assistant Secretaries of the Army. General Counsel, or others. b. (U) The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development, and Acquisition} [ASA(RDA)] is designated as the principal assistant to the Secretary and Under Secretary of the army for matters related to RDA compartmented ac- tivities, including those funded by RDTE or procurement ap- propriation funds. The Assistant Secretary shall assist in policy direction and oversight, unless specifically exempted by the Secretary of the Army or Under Secretary of the Azmy and be responsible for: (1) (U) Oversight of research and development, the technology base, and hardware systems issues, specifically including examination of technology feasibility, related to comipartmented programs. (2) (U) Oversight of compartmented systems acquisi- tion and related procurement procedures. (3) (U) Acquisition of systems, components, and modifications developed under a Special Access Program which must be protected by SAP procedures during procure- ment and fielding. (4) (U) Coordination with OACSI to ensure that technology transfer issues are addressed during development of technical programs. c. (U) The General Counsel (GC), will provide legal and policy advice on SAP matters. d. (U) The Chief of Staff, Army (CSA) will be responsi- ble for the development, coordination, review, and execu- tion of all compartmented activities within the Army. AR 380-381 e. (U) The Vice Chief of Staff, Army (VCSA) will be responsible for the management of compartmented programs and the implementation, through the SAPOC, of policies assigned in paragraph 4. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army responsibilities include: (6) (U) Institutes procedures To coordinate all actions related to SAPs. (3) (U) Serving as the chairman of the SAPOC (app C). f, (U) The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) will provide the necessary personnel management system for classified/compartmented programs and activities. g. (U) The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) will— (1) (U) Coordinate user review and analysis of can- didate SAPs, unless this responsibility is specifically assigned to another agency. (2) (U) Provide policy guidance and standards for operations security (OPSEC) measures appropriate for SAPs. h. (U) The Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Develop- ment, and Acquisition (DCSRDA) will: (1) (U) Provide SAP life cycle management policy and support. (2) (U) Coordinate with other DOD compon- ents/departments to ensure no duplication of efforts or dif- ferences in security protection for multi-service programs. (3) (U) Coordinate a technical review of candidate SAPs, unless this responsibility is specifically assigned to another agency. i. (U) The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) will: (1) (U) Provide SAP contracting and procurement policy and support. (2) (U) Ensure that appropriate Army management of the contracting function is in place and operative for all con- tracts in support of SAPs. (3) (U) Ensure the concept of Integrated Logistics Sup- port is included in all materiel development or materie! ac- quisition SAPs.
AR 380-381 je (U) The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI) will— (1) (U) Provide policy for intelligence and counter- intelligence support to SAPs, to include enemy threat and countermeasures, assessment of the foreign intelligence threat, assessments of the net security risk to SAPs, and counterintelligence support to the OPSEC process. (2) (U)} Provide preliminary intelligence assessments of candidate SAPs to support the decisionmaking process of the SAPOC. (3) (U) Maintain the capability to analyze and evaluate potential adversaries’ technologies. k. (U) The Assistant Chief of Staff for Information Management (ACSIM). The ACSIM will coordinate infor- mation systems aspects of SAP support. L. (U) Chief of Engineers (COE). In discharging respon- sibilities for military construction, the COE wili provide reimbursable construction support for secure facilities when requested by commanders of host commands having respon- sibility for providing those facilities. m. (U) Comptroller of the Army (COA). The COA will— (1) (U) Develop a system and implemen: procedures to provide financial and budgeting guidance, Army Staff sup- port and execution review for SAPs at an appropriation pro- gram level. (2) (U) Monitor Congressional reprogramming of SAP funds and ensure these actions receive review at the ap- propriate levels. ' (3) (U) Provide cost analysis/pricing support for selected SAPs. n. (U) The Inspector General (TIG). TIG wili provide in- spector general oversight of SAPs. o. (U) The Judge Advocate General (TJAG). TIAG will provide legal and policy advice on SAP maiters. . p. (U) Chief of Legislative Liaison (CLL). The CLL will coordinate Congressional interest in and briefings oa Army SAPs and ensure that appropriate committees are kept in- formed of SAP status. gq. (U) Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation Direc- torate (PAED). The Director, PAED, will— (1) (UU) Ensure that SAPs compete with other Army programs for resourcing in the POM deve:opment process. (2) (U) Notify the TMO of all approved SAP program and funding profiles. r. (U) Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (CG, TRADOC). The CG, TRADOC will— (1) (U) Institute procedures to ensure early identifica- tion and protection of combat developments, concepts, and systems with SAP potential. 1 June 1986 (2) (U) Support user review and analysis of candidate SAPs, unless this responsibility is specifically assigned to another agency. . s. (U) Commanding General, U.S. Army Materiel Com- mand (CG, AMC). The CG, AMC will— (1) (U) Institute procedures to ensure early identifica- tion and protection of any potential R&D breakthrough or significant vulnerability of an existing or proposed U.S. Army system with SAP potential. (2) (U) Support a technical review of candidate SAPs, unless this responsibility is specifically assigned to another agency. {. (U) Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces Com- mand (CG, FORSCOM). The CG, FORSCOM will institute procedures to ensure early identification and protection of activities, operational concepts, and combat developments requiring SAP status. u. (U) Commanding General, U.S. Army Information Systems Command (CG, USAISC). The CG, USAISC will coordinate information systems aspects of SAP support and provide technical support, as required, for SAPs that require secure information systems. The Commanding General, 7th Signal Command is designated as the executive agent respon- sible to the CG, USAISC. v. (U) Commanding General, U.S. Army Strategic Defense Command (CG, USASDC). The CG, USASDC, will institute procedures to ensure early identification and pro- tection of any R&D breakthrough of significant vulnerabil- ity of an existing or proposed U.S. Army effort within the Strategic Defense Initiative Program with SAP potential. w, (U) Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (CG, INSCOM). The CG, INSCOM will— (1) (U) Institute procedures to ensure early identifica tion and protection of sensitive intelligence activities and capabilities. - (3) () Provide counterinte ligence and security sup- port to commanders or heads of DA activities having pro- ponency for approved SAPs. (5) (U) Assist proponent agencies in preparing secur- ity classification guides and prescribe cover and passive counter-measures for approved SAPs and LSAPs. (6) (U) Maintain the capability to collect information relevant to potential adversaries’ technologies. (7) (U) Provide, in coordination with OACSI, HOIS
1 June 1986 threat information to organizations and installations support- ing SAPs. (8) (U) Provide comments in each case on the feasibility of using ‘‘carve-out’’ contracts for specific SAPs. x. (U) All Department of Army Staff elements, MACOM commanders, and Special Access Program proponents will, for the SAPs for which they have proponency: (1) (U) Designate a single point of contact for SAPs. This POC will serve as the central point for initial inquiries and responses on SAPs. (2) (U) Manage the planning, programming, budgeting, accountability, and execution of SAPs. (3) (U) Coordinate with OACSI for intelligence and counterintelligence support to OPSEC and threat support necessary for execution of SAPs. (4) (U) Coordinate with ODCSRDA and AMC for RDA SAPs. (6) (U) Maintain a file of security plans. classification guides and billet structures on SAPs for which they have the lead. (7) (U) Assist in the discharge of responsibilities for SAPs and adherence to the policies stated in this regulation. (8) (U} Coordinate with USAISC for secure com- munications advice and support. (9) (U) Nominate activities, systems, concepts, or operations, as described in paragraphs 1 and 4 of this regula- tion, for SAP approval. (10) (U) Notify the TMO and all effected agencies upon program termination. Insure no funds are expended on pro- grams after their termination. 6. (U) Procedures (U) It is essential that candidate Special Access Programs be identified as early as possible and that they be given special protection from concept through a point where a determina- tion is consciously made that special protection is no longer warranted. Special protective procedures include: a. (U) Security. Security is the responsibility of the pro- gram manager or proponent, who must provide the required personnel and financial resources to support the security plan for the SAP. Sound and continuous security planning is essen- tial to successful execution of a SAP. Program managers and proponents should recognize that special security provisions generally have resource implications for their program and should pian accordingly. Program managers or proponents are encouraged to request CG, INSCOM to provide advice AR 380-381 and assistance in planning for these special provisions. Tix SAPOC will evaluate Special security provisions and overal security planning in conjunction with the processes of initia approval and annual revalidation of SAPs. Enhanced security measures incorporated into security planning and procedure: for a SAP include: (1) (U) Only those persons essential to the conduct 0! the program to include those involved in management anc oversight will be granted access te program information. That | information will be segregated by levels with individuals | read-on to the level justified by a must need-to-know criteria only. (2) (U) As a minimum a SECRET clearance with a favorable National Agency Check is required for access to Amny SAP information. This may be supplemented with local agency checks, credit checks, and letters to past and present employers. a . (4) (U) A billet structure for each Army SAP will be established by the proponent or program manager and ap- proved by the SAPOC. SAP proponents or program managers will manage access to their SAPs within the ap- proved billet constraints. The billet structure will identify the access control authorities and access approval authorities necessary for the accomplishment of required SAP briefings and debriefings. The billet structure will be briefed in the annual SAF revalidation and may be adjusted at that time, as necessary. Based on urgent need, requests to grant addi- tional access beyond the number authorized for a SAP will be submitted to HQDA(DACS-DMP) for approval by the SAPOC or by the Vice Chief of Staff, Army. The billet struc- ture will consist of those positions identified Sy the program manager/proponent necessary for the successful execution of the SAP and those identified in the Army SAP baseline. The Army SAP baseline includes those positions at all com- mand levels necessary to manage and oversee SAPs. The Army SAP baseline will be provided to program managers/proponents by HQDA(DACS-DMP) and the per- sonnel on this baseline will be briefed on the SAP when it 7
UNCLASSIFIED AR 380-381 is approved. The program manager/proponent will determine when other personnel in the SAP billet structure will be briefed and provide access approval authorities with SAP briefing materials. (5) (U) Voluntary acceptance in writing of specific ad- ministrative restrictions and liability for unauthorized disclosure is required as a prerequisite for receiving access. DA Form Form 5399-R (Special Access Program Initial Security Briefing) will be used for SAP indoctrinations. DA Form 5399-R will be reproduced locally on 8% X 11 inch paper. A copy for reproduction purposes is located at the back of this regulation. (6) (U) Operations security (OPSEC) constitutes a key factor in management of SAPs and is the responsibility of the program manager or proponent of a SAP. Security pro- cedures established for each program in a security plan and classification guide will be followed. One copy of the plan and guide will be provided to the TMO with the initial re- quest for SAP approval and will be evaluated by the TMO and staffed to ACSI and INSCOM for review and comment. Individuals approving classification guides must have original TOP SECRET classification authority. Program security pro- visions to include proposed billet structure will be briefed to and approved by the SAPOC. Security classification guides for programs where DIS has contractor security inspection sesponsibility will be provided to appropriately accessed DIS personnel. AR 380-5, appendix E, contains guidance on the preparation of a security classification guide. (7) (U) Information systems security is a critical con- sideration. Provisions and requirements for secure informa- tion systems will be identified and described in each SAP request (app I). Acquisition of secure information systems equipment is a program manager or proponent responsibil- ity. The ACSIM and CG, USAISC will provide advice and assistance, as necessary, to meet this requirement. (8) (U) An aggressive program will be maintained to terminate accesses upon completing the work for which those accesses were originally granted using DA Form 5401-R (Special Access Program Security Termination Guide). Generally, the larger the number of persons with access, the greater the risk of program compromise. The number of per- sons with access will be one of the principal program issues reviewed in the annual SAP revalidation process. DA Form 5401-R will be reproduced locally on 8'4 x 11 inch paper. z. copy for reproduction purposes is located at the back of this regulation. (9) (U) SAP proponents or program managers are responsible for ensuring that all prime contractor and sub- contractor facilities are inspected by U.S. Army or Defense 8 1 June 1986 Investigative Service personnel at least twice a year. Prime contractor inspections of their subcontractors for compliance with SAP security requirements are not authorized. (10) (U) Security violations, compromises, vulner- abilities, and weaknesses detected by whomever will be reported to the SAP program manager or proponent and the SAP security manager. The report will include recommended corrective action. The program manager and SAP security manager will evaluate the recommendation and take prompt action to resolve the reported security problern per AR 380-5 or DOD 5220.22-M. Significant security violations of com- promises will be expeditiously reported by the program manager or proponent through appropriately accessed per- sonnel] in the chain of command to HQDA(DAMI-C)), WASH DC 20310-1054, who will notify the TMO. The in- itial report will include alJ known details of the violation or compromise, to include investigative or cottective action taken to date. An interim damage assessment will be ex- peditiously forwarded. Failure to resolve the security pro- blem will be reported through the SAP proponent's chain of command to the TMO by the supporting INSCOM ele- ment. Significant or recurring security problems which result in a SAP security compromise will be an issue for SAPOC review. (11) (U) DA Pamphlet 380-381, Security for Special Access Programs, provides additional guidance and infor- mation on the security provisions appropriate for SAPs. b. (U) Information. Dissemination of information pertain- ing to specific SAPs will be handled case-by-case. The originating control specified in paragraph 6a(3) retains authority for approving access to SAPs. (1) (U) No SAP may be openly identified in DA press releases or Congressional budget data or reports. However, appropriate authorities will be briefed in sufficient detail to satisfy all legal and program review requirements. These authorities will be added to access control rosters. Informa- tion (vocal or written) concerning specific SAPs will be pro- vided to the Congress through the Chief, Legislative Liaison (CLL). Congressional staff members will be given a pro- gram security briefing, execute an initial security briefing statement, and be added to the program billet structure and access roster. All briefings of Members of Congress or their staffs on SAPs will be reported to the TMO for inclusion in the Congressional data book. (2) (U) Strict security requirements of SAPs and ‘‘carve-out”’ contracts will be written into standard pro- cedures for Army agencies, contractors, and test ranges engaged in these programs. ; UNCLASSIFIED
1 June 1986 (3) (U) SAP information shall be stored, as a minimum, in a GSA approved safe-type steel file container having a built-in, three position, dial-type, GSA approved combina- tion lock or a Class A vault or vault type room that meets the standards established by the head of the DOD Compo- nent concerned. See AR 380-5 for the standards applied to DA agencies and DOD 5220.22-M, Industrial Security Manual, for contractor requirements. c. (U) Limited Special Access Program. The nature of certain projects, programs, and activities requires special pro- tection be established expeditiously to avoid compromise. This means that these programs require SAP security con- trols before they are actually approved as SAPs. In these in- stances MACOM commanders and Department of the Army Deputy and Assistant Chiefs of Staff are authorized to apply for a Limited Special Access Program (LSAP) for a period not to exceed 6 months. The procedures governing LSAPs are discussed in appendix F. d. (U) SAP Approval Process. The processing of SAP ap- proval requests will be expedited to the greatest degree possi- ble. Figure | depicts the approval process flow. (1) (U) In general. the steps in the approval process are: AR 380-381 (d.) (U) Brief tc SAPOC. The proposed SAP and the results of the detailed evaluation will be briefed to the work- ing SAPOC, which will make an interim recommendation on SAP approval. The SAPOC will be briefed and will make the final recommendation on SAP approval. The functions and members of the SAPOC and working SAPOC are at ap- pendix C. (e.) (U) Routing and Review. The SAPOC recom- mendation and SAP request package are routed te ine Under Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Stafs of the Army, in turn. Questions that arise will be staffed by the TMO for resolution. The Secretary of the Army will then consider the request and approve or disapprove the action. (£) (U) Official Notification. If the Secretary of the Army approves the request, the TMO registers the SAP with ODUSD(P) and notifies the submitting agency, OACSI, and INSCOM. (2) (U) Administration (a.) (3) . for disestablishment by the proponent or program manager when SAP security controls are no longer required. The SAPOC may also recommend a SAP be disestablished at the annual revalidation or at other times. Disestablishment does not mean the program will be cancelled. It only means that the program will be transitioned to the security controls of AR 380-5 and SAP security controls will no longer be ap- plied. Guidance on SAP disestablishment is found at appen- dix H. 9
AR 380-381 e. (U) Nicknames and codewords. All LSAPs and ap- proved SAPs will be assigned an unclassified nickname. The request for a nickname will be forwarded to HQDA(DACS- DMP), WASH DC 20310-0200. When OPSEC requires the use of a codeword, the request procedure is the same as for a nickname. f. (WU) Funding. Funds associated with the execution of SAPs are to be managed and accounted for by the Army Staff proponent, MACOM commander, or program manager for the respective SAP and monitored by the TMO, unless ex- empted by the Secretary of the Army. The sponsoring agency will provide appropriate program and budgetary input to COA and PAED dedicated POCs to assure that funds are programmed and budgeted each FY. Funds will be accounted for in accardance with established finance and accounting procedures or as determined by the COA. Each Army Staff proponent, MACOM commander, or program manager will establish an internal review and inspection plan, submit the proposed plan with the request for SAP approval and pro- vide the TMO a copy of the work plan with the annual revalidation. g. (U) Contracting. (1) (U) Contracting in a secure environment will re- quire special procedures. The requirements of the Federal, Defense, and Army acquisition regulations cannot be waived in some cases and in other cases may be waived with the specific approval of authorized contracting officials and with substitution of adequate safeguards. 10 1 June 1986 (3) (U) Contract planning will be included in the re- quest for SAP approval and subscqucnt approval briefing. h, (U) Special Security Provisions. Special Access Pro- grams are individually unique and may require special secur- ity provisions. The use of the Special Finance and Account- ing Office, the requirement for a secure facility/vault. the application of a two-man control rule, and project informa- tion access procedures are examples of special provisions. Each of these has resource implications for the program manager or proponent and for other agencies within the Department of the Army. Program managers or proponcnts must determine whether these special provisions have ap- plicability. The CG. INSCOM may be requested to provide advice and assistance in making this determination. Special provisions for the protection of program information will be evaluated in the SAP approval process and will be briefed to the SAPOC. The SAPOC may recommend these special provisions in part or in total to the Secretary of the Army.
1 June 1986 ° UNCLASSIFIED AR 330-381 en a anatemnenn een anne anemmnenmmnaeneeaenn enna By Order of the Secretary of the Army: JOHN A. WICKHAM, JR. General, United States Army Chief of Staff Official: R. L. DILWORTH Brigadier General, United States Army The Adjutans General oer ALS LR, DISTRIBUTION: To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-9B, requirements for AR, Security. Active Arnny—B; ARNG and USAR—None. UNCLASSIFIED
- UNCLASSIFIED CLASSIFY WHEN COMPLETED (If required) SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAM INITIAL SECURITY BRIEFING For usa of this form, swe 2M 380-281: the proponent agency is OCSA. I, the undersigned, certify that I have received a security brief- ing concerning the below listed Special Access Program(s). I am aware that willfull disclosure of classified Government information to any un- authorized person may be punishable under Federal Criminal Statutes. I realize that the safeguarding of classified information or material is of the utmost importance and that loss or compromise of this information or material could be detrimental to the interests or national security. Program (s) (Nickname/or code word) I understand that .specific.classification-guidance exists for this project and is available for reference. I have been instructed in the nature of this classified information and the procedures governing its safeguarding. I understand that willfull violation or disregard of security regulations may cause the loss of my access authorization and security clearance. I agree that I will never divulge, publish, or reveal (either by word, conduct, or other means) any classified Government information or knowledge concerning the above Special Access Program(s) except in the performance of my official duties in accordance with the laws of the United States. I understand that no change in my relationship and/or my organiza- tion's relationship will relieve me of my obligation under this agree- ment. I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. I understand that signing this document: constitutes agreement to undergo a counterintelligence polygraph examination, if requested by proper authority, to determine my suitability for re- ceiving and/or maintaining access to program information. WITNESS: (signature) (date) —Ysignature). (date) (printed name) "printed name) —~—CS— ——————sny)t—CStS ~Tposition and organization) — (organization, telephone #, position) ee a ee ee a me a we a ew ee wee wwe PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT The authority for obtaining the personal information is Title 10, USC 30i2. The principal use of this information is for identification for granting access to this project's information. No other use of this information will be made. Disclosure of the information is voluntary; however, failure to provide the data may delay or preclude access to this project's information. DA FORM 5399-R, JUN 86 EDITION OF MAR B5 IS OBSOLETE. . CLASSIFY WHEN COMPLETED (If required) PtAIae BAA emN
« : UNCLASSIFIED CLASSIFY WHEN COMPLETED (If required) . See eee ne ee crmtrsssnenmnnemnsmtinstenenentemmestnetaeetienat etienetetie tn emeresetiataanette tinea arses aaaaaaaaaaasaaaasaaaaaaaaaaaascaaissaaaaaaaaassaaaae SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAM SECURITY TERMINATION GUIDE For use of this form, see AR 380-281; the proponent agency is OCSA. nn eee EEN n ayn RSE mmr ennnennene sien dinensnsmeenmesneamemsamnes tamara sare saa aaaaaaaasaaasasaasaaaaaaaaaaa fully realize the importance to the National Security of I, the undersigned, Lassified defense information. In the requirement for the safeguarding of ¢ the fulfillment of this obligation, I certify that: a. lL understand the appropriate provisions of the espionage laws and Federal criminal statutes applicable to the safeguarding of classified defense informacion or material. o wR . b. I have been advised that direct or indirect unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized retention, or negligent handling of che designated information by me could cause irreparable injury to the United States and be used to advantage for a foreign nation. c. 1 have surrendered and no longer have in my possession, custody, or control any information or material concerning d. I shall not communicate or transmit any classified defense information concerning , orally or in writing, to any unauthorized person ——— or in writing, to any unauthorized person or agency. e. lL shall report to my Program Security (OPSEC) Manager, his authorized representative, a local Federal Bureau of Investigation office, or an authorized official as delineated in the any incident wherein an attempt is made by anu information concerning this subject. LOI, without delay, nauthorized person to solicit f. lL have received an oral debriefing. WITNESS: (signature) (date) (signature) (date) —_—— (printed name) (printed: name) ‘Xposition/organization) Corganization/telephone #/position) ; _ (SSN) nner ee PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT. The authority for obtaining the personal information is Title 10 USC 3012. The principal use of this information is for identification in connection with limited access program information. No other use of chis information will be made. OA FORM 5401-R, JUN 86 ECITION OF MAR B65 [S OBSOLETE. CLASSIFY WHEN COMPLETED (If required) LINC! ASCIFIEN
1 June 1986 Appendix A References (U) Section | Required Publications (U) AR 70-9 (U) AR 380-5 (U) AR 380-49 Section Il Related Publications (U) AR 37-64 -(U) AR 70-1 (U) AR 70-10 (U) AR 71-3 (U) AR 71-9 (VU) AR 381-10 (U) AR 381-11 Section tl! Prescribed Forms (U) DA Form 5399-R Section IV Referenced Form (U) DD Form 254 UNCLASSIFIED ae (Army Research Information Systems and Reports). Cited in appendix H, paragraph H-3d(3). (nformation Security Pro- gram). Cited in paragraphs 1a(1), 46, 6a(6), 6a(10), 65(3), and 6d(3). ! (industrial Security Program). Cited in paragraphs 4e, and 6a(10). (Special Mission Funds (U)). (Systems Acquisition Policy and Procedure). (Test and Evaluation During Development and Acquisition of Materiel). (User Testing). (Materiel Objectives and Requirements). — Antelligence Activities). (Threat Support). (Special Access Program Initial Security Briefing). (Department of Defense Con- tract Security Classification Specification). (C) AR 715-30 (U) DA Pam 380-381 (U) DOD 5200.1-R (U) DOD 5220.22-M (S) AR 381-102 (C) AR 381-141 (WU) AR 530-1 (U) AR 604-5 (U) AR 1000-1 (UV) DOD 5200.2-R ' (U) DA Form 5401-R UNCLASSIFIED AR 380-381 (Secure Environment Contrac- ting (U)). Cited in paragraph 6g(2). (Security for Special Access Programs). Cited in paragraph 6a(11). (information Security Pro- gram). Cited in paragraphs 4b and 6f(2)(a). (Industrial Security Program). Cited in paragraphs 1a(2), 4e, 6a(10), and 65(3). (intelligence Operational Sup- port Activities (U)). Antelligence Contingency Funds (U)). (Operations Security). (Personnel Security Program). (Basic Policies for Systems Acquisition). (Personnel Security Program). (Special Access Program Security Termination Guide}. A-1
UNCLASSIFIED 1 June 1986 Appendix B AR 380-381 Format for Reporting Special Access Programs (U) (U) Requests for establishing SAPs will be submitted through appropnaie Army Staff elements to HQDA(DACS- DMP), WASH DC 20310-0200 in the suggested format shown below. a. (U) Agency. b. (U) Unclassified name or short title of program. c. (U) Date established as a Limited Special Access Program. d. (Uj Relationship, if any, to other programs in DOD or other Government agency. e. (U) Rationale for establishment of the SAP. (Why nor- maj management and safeguarding procedures for classified information are inadequate must be explained.) Include a brief description of project and the specific requirement for the project with known or anticipated threat. f. (U) Detailed draft billet structure which incorporates the Army baseline billet structure for SAPs, identifies billets by position, and estimates the number of persons to be granted access. Access control authorities and access ap- proval authorities will be identified. g. (U) Draft program security plan, classification guide and information systems requirements package (app I). h. (U) Identify the program security manager, access con- trol authority, and total resources dedicated to OPSEC. i. (U) Proposed contracting/acquisition plan including recommended contracting office and location. Format in ac- cordance with Federal Acquisition Regulation and Sup- plements, subpart 7.1. If ““carve-out’’ contracting is pro- posed, provide rationale. j. WU) Anticipated cost and proposed funding profile. In- clude internal audit controls which will be established. k. (U) Agency POC (position or title, address, and telephone number). B-1 UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED 1 June 1986 Appendix C AR 380-381 ~~ Special Access Programs Oversight Committee (SAPOC) (U) C-1. (U) Purpose (U) The SAPOC will provide oversight for the establish- ment, management, and support of SAPs within DA and maintain an awareness of all sensitive compartmented activities within DA. C-2. (U) Composition a. (U) The SAPOC will be chaired by the Vice Chief of Staff, Army (VCSA). In the absence of the VCSA, the Direc- tor of the Army Staff will chair the SAPOC. Standing members of the SAPOC will be the GC, ACSI,-and TIAG. The remaining members of the SAPOC will be determined on a must ‘‘need-to-know”’ basis from the agenda for each specific meeting and may include: (i) (U) The ASA (RDA). (2) (U) The DCSLOG. (3) (U) The DCSOPS. (4) (U) The DCSPER. (5) (U) The DCSRDA. (6) (U) The ACSIM. (7) (U) The COA. (8) (U) The COE. (9) (U) The Dir, PAED, OCSA. (10) (U) The CLL. (11) (U) Representative from TIG. (12) (U) Others as needed and appropriate. b. (U) Army Staff principals will ordinarily attend SAPOC meetings unless the principal has delegated SAP mat- ters to an assistant or deputy. In this case the assistant or deputy will be considered the principal for SAPs and the SAPOC Executive Secretary notified accordingly. Only the Army Staff principal or the designated principal for SAPs may attend SAPOC meetings. c. (U) The Chief, Technology Management Office, will be the Executive Secretary of the Committee. C-3. (U)} Functions a. (U) The SAPOC will— (1) (U) Review requests for the establishment of SAPs and forward these requests with appropriate recommenda- tions through the Under Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff, Army to the Secretary of the Army for approval. (2) (U) Review, assess, and rewalidate existing pro- grams annually to determine effectiveness and need for continuation. — (3) (U) Review and recommend policy for management of SAPs. b. (U) The committee is authorized to request informa- tion from HQDA agencies and MACOMS in connection with its fuactions. ~ C-4. (U) Direction and contrat The committee will meet at the call of the chairperson, who will determine the frequency of meetings. After each meeting, minutes will be prepared and submitted to all members of the committee. c~-5. (U) Administrative support a. (U) The Office of the Chief of Staff, Army is respon- sible for administrative support of the SAPOC. b. (U) Funds for travel, per diem, and overtime of members, if required, will be provided by the organization to which the committee member is assigned. C-6. (U) Correspondence All communication to the SAPOC will be addressed to HQDA(DACS-DMP), WASH DC 26310-0200. C~7. (U) Working SAPOC a. (U) The working SAPOC will be composed on a must “‘need-to-know’’ basis from those staff agencies identified in paragraph C-2. The Chief, Technology Management Of- fice, will serve as the chairman of the working SAPOC. Members will be those staff agency representatives who have working knowledge of SAPs and are the dedicated SAP POC within their respective agency. These representatives must possess a final TOP SECRET clearance with current Special Background Investigation. b. (U) The purpose, functions, direction,and control for the working SAPOC will be the same as for the SAPOC. However, in those instances where the working SAPOC has convened and recommended action, the action will be briefed to the VCSA or the full SAPOC for final approval. UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED 1 June 1986 Appendix D ‘\ AR 380-381 % ~ Special Access Program Determination Criteria (U) D-1. (U) Criteria for Special Access Program Status (U) The criteria discussed below will be used to screen can- didates for special access program status. Following each criterion, a series of questions relevant to that criterion is listed to aid in reaching a decision. D-2. (U) Criteria a. (U) Normal management and safeguarding procedures could be insufficient to protect information from compro- mise. . (1) (U) Would transmission of program documents through normal administrative channels adequately restrict the numbers of people gaining access to the information? (2) (U) Is the sensitivity of the program such that in- advertent disclosure would endanger a major strategic, tac- tical, or technological advantage? (3) (U) Would inadvertent disclosure permit a poten- tial adversary to develop a countermeasure or counter- countermeasure so quickly as to negate operational benefit? (4) (U) Is the proposed activity or program politically sensitive due to foreign policy considerations? (5) (U) Will the disclosure of our knowledge of a foreign technology compromise sources? (6) (U) Will the disclosure of information on a specific program have an adverse effect on other SAP protected programs? (7) (U) Is there an existing vulnerability in the U.S. system the disclosure of which would give an adversary a significant advantage? (8) (U) Would acquisition of the technology, system, or information by hostile elements endanger the military capability of U.S. forces or create a threat to national security? b. (U) The numbers of persons requiring access must be reasonably smal and comm nsurate with the objective of pro- viding extra protection for the information involved. (1) (U) Is it feasible to limit the number of people both within any one organization and in total who have access to the information? (2) (U) Is the potential loss in efficiency caused by com- partmentation acceptable? (3) (U) Has the proposed activity already received a degree of public or internal military exposure that would be infeasible to overcome? (4) (U) Is it possible to develop, produce, or field the system without a large number of people gaining access? c. (U) Special access controls must be needed to protect the information when balanced against the requirement to disseminate for use that same information and the additional cost of special access controls. (1) (U) Would the proposed activity conceal technology or only a discrete application? - - (2) (U) How would the proposed activity interface with related developments? (3) (U) Is the proposed activity of multi-service in- terest? If so, how are similar projects in those services being handled? D-~3. (U) impact of Special Access Program Status (U) A decision to make an activity a special access program will result in some combination of the following actions, which will be restrictive as well as protective in nature. a. (U) Central contro! will be exercised over access to information. Generally, more stringent security clearance re- quirements will be imposed on participants. are b. (U) The following information will be concealed from those not authorized access: ~ Let . (1) (U) The fact and purpose of the undertaking; (2) (U) The’ resources allocated to, and the organiza- tions involved in, the undertaking; and =~ ..07 (3) (U) The characteristics, capabilities, and effec- tiveness of the product developed by the undertaking. c. (U) Operations security measures will be applied. UNCLASSIFIED
1 June 1986 Appendix E Technology Management Office (U) (U) The Technology Management Offic2 (TMO) has been established within the Office of the Chief of Staff, Army and reports directly to the Vice Chief of Staff, Army. The TMO charter includes the following responsibilities: a. (U) Serve as the central point of contact for all initial inquiries and correspondence concerning Army sponsored Pr SAP). Program Oversight Committee (Chief, TMO). e. (U) Monitor audit review, analysis, and oversight of planning, programming, budgeting, and execution of SAPs. f. (U) Coordinate requirements for and monitor all Con- gressional SAP briefings. d. (WU) Provide Executive Secretary of Special Access AR 380-381 g. WU) Coordinate and assist in the development of models for resourcing and financing SAPs. h. (U) Monitor ail program and budget elements and financing associated with SAPs, unless exempted by the Under Secretary of the Arm Serve as POC to DUSD(®P) for all Army initiated and supported SAPs and ‘‘carve-out’” contracts. L. (U) Serve as proponent for AR 380-381(C).
UNCLASSIFIED 1 June 1986 Appendix F Limited Special Access Program (U) F~1. (U) Limited Special Access Programs (LSAP) may be applied for by a MACOM commander or Department of the Army Deputy or Assistant Chief of Staff for a period not to exceed 6 months. Application is made to the Technology Management Office (TMO). The TMO will notify the SAPOC at the first meeting after an LSAP is registered for SAPOC approval to continue as an LSAP and to begin SAP evaluations. a. (U) The LSAP request consists of no more than a two- page description outlining the proposed program, estimated schedule, estimated funding, reason for compartmentation, and any other relevant issues. b. (U) Until the LSAP is approved, funds may be ex- pended just as for any other non-compartmented program. Funds may not be expended for a program operated in ac- cordance with compartmented procedures in this regulation unless approved as an LSAP or SAP. c. (U) Ifthe SAPOC approves continuation of an LSAP, the TMQ will notify the Under Secretary of the Army. The LSAP proponent will then prepare SAP evaluation documents required by appendix B. F-2. (U) The criteria for an LSAP are the same as for a SAP and are discussed in paragraphs | and 4 and appendix D of this regulation. The key factor in determining whether or not to establish an LSAP is the potential for and damage resulting from compromise. F~3. (U) During the 6-month period authorized for an LSAP, the program should be evaluated for approval as 2 SAP. If at the end of 6 months the program has not been formally submitted, the LSAP will be terminated, and no AR 380-3: further resources will be committed to or used for wo related to making that program 2 SAP. F-4. (U) MACOM commanders and Department of t Arny Deputy and Assistant Chiefs of Staff must publish pr gram management guidance, security plans and classific tion guides, and initial billet structures for the establishme of LSAPs, and this guidance must be filed with d Technology Management Office. - F~5. (U) Authorities granted in approval of an LSA include: a. (U) Appointment of access approval authorities. b. (U) Access limitation based on a must need-to-know c. (U) Maintenance of knowledgeability lists. d. (U) Preparation of draft security plan, classificatio guide, and billet structure with identified access contrc | authorities and access approval authorities. €. (U) Use of approved special markings along with nor mal security classification. f. (U) Initial coordination with INSCOM for counter intelligence support and cover support. g. (U) Use of a DA approved nickname. F-6. (U) The following authorities are withheld pending final approval of an LSAP as a SAP. a. (U) Use of signed initial security briefing statements. b. (U) The use of ‘‘carve-out’’ contracts. F~7. (U) Request for waivers on LSAP requirements will be submitted to HQDA (DACS-DMP). UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED 1 June 1986 Appendix G Format for Annual SAPOC Revalidation (U) (Classify when completed) G~1. (U) Codeword (S) and nickname (U). G-2. (U) State of threat and enemy technology. G-3. (U) Access and security status. (U) Total number with access. (U) Compromises (actual/potential) to date. (U) HOIS threat. (U) OPSEC support to date (description and cost). (U) Special security provisions. (U) ‘*Carve-out’’ contract provisions and an alternate security inspection plan. “ARO SS G-4. (U) Description of Program. a. (U) Requirement. b. (U) How it works. c. (U> Potential value (tactical and technical lead). G-5. (U) Program schedule with key milestones. a. (U) Status at last review. - &. (U) Response to actions direcied by SAPOC. c. (U) Status now. AR 380-381 G-6. (U) Funding Profile. a. (U) Indicate what is already programmed (amount and how funded—by PE, through lab, reprogramming, etc.). b. (U) Show requirements, if different from programmed funding. Se c. (J) SMF status. G-7. (U) Contracting Procedures. a. (U) Contracting officer and location. b. (U) ‘‘Carve-out’’ contracting procedures. c. (U) Contract and its schedule and performance. G-8. (VU) Issues/Problems. (U) Technical. (U) Programmatic. . (WU) Funding. (U) Legal. (VU) Contracting. NAO SA G-9. (U) Required Decisions. a. (U) Options. b. (U) Recommendations. Feceree UNCLASSIFIED
1 June 1986 AR 380-381 Appendix H Special Access Program Disestablishment (U) H-1. (U) General (U) This appendix provides policy and procedures for plan- ning and implementing disestablishment of Special Access Programs (SAP). H-2. (C) Rationale ao " b. (U) The tactical or strategic impact or value of the system. operation. or activity has significantly lessened. d. (U) The resources required for continued enhanced security procedures are excessive compared to the benefits achieved by she SAP process. e. (U) Similar technology and application is being developed openty by other services or foreign nations or being developed without equivalent levels of protection. f. (U) Acompromise has occurred that obviates the pro- tection achieved by continued enhanced security. g. (U) The tactical or strategic mission of the system, Operation or activity has been accomplished and there is no further mission requirement. h. (U) The system has been fieided and operational use at the tactical or strategic levels precludes compartmentation. made regarding term (i) (U) Basis/rationale for disestablishment. eo reemerae AR eS (2) (U) Contro! of information relating to disestab- ° lishment. (3) (U) Fiscal controls. (4) (U) Recommended disposition of information and access knowledgeability lists or rosters. (5) (U) Disposition of hardware resulting from RDT&E to date. (6) (U) Recommendation whether the program should continue as a classified program, be downgraded to an unclassified program, cease entirely or be held in abeyance pending future technological advances. (7) (U) Legal considerations. (8) (U) Verification that similar technology, develop- ment or application is not underway elsewhere within DOD and receiving special access security protection. (9) (U) Review of all contracts and recommendations ination, transfer or continuation. oe ere eee at oS
AR 380-381 (1) (U) A letter of instruction (LOI) must be prepared which: (a) (U) Establishes administrative and operational criteria to be effected during disestablishment. (b) (U) Establishes new criteria for administrative and operational protection of the program or activity. (2) (U) A new classification guide must be prepared. (3) (U) Proponents must consider the inclusion of pro- gram technical data in Army research information systems and repo sts in accordance with AR 70-9 (i May 81). 1 June 1986 (5) (U) Contractual documents may require modifica- tion or renegotiation. Modification must include the ap- plicable DD Form 254 for revised security requirements. In- tegral to this consideration are the return or reallocation of government furnished equipment (GFE), (e.g., secure com- munications equipment) and the cancellation of the require- ment for 2 closed work area. (6) (U) Reprogramming of project funds and the cancellation of letters of authorization (LOA) and expenditure authorization documents (EAD) pertaining to special mis- sion funds (SMF). e. (U) Once disestablishment has been effected, the TMO will be notified by record correspondence.
UNCLASSIFIED 1 June 1986 AR 380-38" Appendix | Information Systems Requirements Package (U) (U) Early identification of secure information requirements Package, will assist in providing these services in a secur is essential to provide adequate and reliable point to point and timely manner. The format and information to be in secure voice line, data and facsimile transmission. Inclusion cluded in an Information Systems Requirements Package i: of the data outlined in the Information Systems Requirements shown at figure I-1. ; Format for an Information Systems Requirements Package (U) 1. (U) General. a. (U) Name of project proponent. b. (U) Project participants (agency name, address, point of contact and secure/nonsecure telephone numbers). c. (U) Unclassified name or short tide of program. 2. (U) Scope of Requirement. 3. (U) Urgency. a. (U) Priority of need. b. (U) Implementation: (1) (U) Date of initial operational capability required. (2) (U) Date final operational capability required. (3) (U) Impact if service is not provided. 4. (U) Capability. a. (U) Show the common user or dedicated communication electronic capabilities that presently exist or are available to proponent and participants. . eas . b. (U) Indicate how these capabilities satisfy any portion of this requirement in their present or modified state. 5. (U) Security Management. a. (U) Name of security manager. b. (U) Provide a copy of the program security plan and classification guide. 6. (U) Financial. (U) Identify funding type, source, and control for information systems. 7. (U) Procurement. (U) Identify unique security or OPSEC requirements. cee Loh 8. (U) Accountability. ; (U) Describe the desired or planned concept for property accountability. 9. (U) Technical. a. (U) Show type of service required (Secure and/or nonsecure data, voice, facsimile, radio, satellite, AUTOVON, or AUTODIN). 6. (U) Describe type of traffic to be transported. (Text or narrative, magnetic tape, punched card, graphic, maps, im- agery, drawings, photographic). c. (U) Identify interfaces with existing systems, networks, or equipment. d. (U) Describe any different capabilities required for different phases of the project. Figure I-1. (U) UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED AR 380-381 1 June 1886 Format for an information Systems Requirements Package (Continued) (U) 10. (U) Operations and Security. a. (U) Operational concept (fixed, transportable, or mobile). b. (U) Identify service points or end user locations (covert, clandestine or classified). c. (U) Determine if there is a requirement for a Sensitive Comparumented Information Facility (SCIF). d. (U) Identify the program security and OPSEC parameters or restrictions. e. (U) Classification level of information to be passed. f- (U) Operating hours. g. (U) Operators. h. (U) Determine if redundant systems are required. i. (U) Identify the network control facility (if needed). 11. (UU) Maintenance. a. (U) Identify unique security or OPSEC requirements for maintenance. 6. (U) Identify organic maintenance support capability. c. -(U) Determine the response time needed to restore telecommunications and meet mission requirements. Figure 1-1 (Continued) (U) UNCLASSIFIED
AR 380-381 (U) Covert operations (U) Operations that are so planned and executed as to con- ceal the identify of or permit plausible denial by the spon- sor. They differ from clandestine operations in that the em- phasis is placed on concealment of identity of sponsor rather than on concealment of the operation. (U) Intelligence (U) The product resulting from collection, processing, in- tergration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas, particularly its technology and weapon systems. Glossary 2 1 Jume 1986 (U) Operations security (OPSEC) (U) The process of denying adversaries information about friendly capabilities and intentions by identifying, control- ling, and protecting indicators associated with planning and conducting military operations and other activities. (U) Threat (U) Capability of a potential enemy to limit or negate mis- sion accomplishment, or to neutralize or reduce the effec- tiveness of a current or projected organization or material item. Two types of threat information are required, as shown below. a. (U) Intelligence collection threat (efforts by HOIS to gain information on U.S weapon systems). b. (U) Combat capability threat (hostile forces’ weapon systems the U.S. Army will face on the battlefield).