datamatters24/research-document-archive huggingface dataset:
~rooem _ RARLONAL SECURITY COUICIL DIRCORIVE + * DIRACTOR OF _CHAPRAL ITTELLIGEICE A 1. The National Security Council, taking cegnizanco of the vicious psychological cfforts of tho USSR, its satellite eountrics and Commaist groups to discredit and defeat the @ins ond activities of the United Statos and other Wester povers, has determined that, in the interasts of world pcccs end U. S. netionsl security, the foreipn information ectivi- _. ties of tho U. S. Government must be suppleszented by covert . psychological onoraticas. 2, The sinilerity of operational metnaods involved is covert psychological and intolligence ectivities ead the need to ensure their secrecy and cbvicte costly duplicevion ronders the Control Intelligence Agoncy the logical agency to conduct . such operations. Eonce, under. authority of Section 102(a)(5)° of tho Netional Security Act of 1957, tho National Security Council dircets the Director of Central Intell ate end conduct, vithin tho lintt of available funds, covert psycholocical oporations designed to countorect Sovict and Soviot-inspired octivitics which constitute a threat to vorld " poace ond security or cro designed to discredit and dotcat tho _ Unitod Statos in 1lts-caccavors to prometa vorld poece and sa- eurity. :
3. no Diroctor of Contral Intelligence is charged vith ensuring that such psychological operations ara’ consistent ‘with U0. S. forcign policy anc. overt foreign information ac- tivities, and that appropriate agencies of the U. S. Govern- ment, both at home and abroad (including diplomatic and mil- itary representatives in each area), are kept informed of such operetioas vhich vill directly cffect then. h, Nothing contained herein shall ba construed to re- - quire tho Central Intelligence Agency to discloses operational details concerning its secret techniques, scurces or contacts. oe . .
*m 
•  •  • 
NSC  4^A  _  '     •  /\-  IL         fiP9* 
r&TioriAL  SECUSiTir  council  DiircGTiVE 
•  •   •  DIRECTOR  07   Cl-CTKAL  irTnTLLIG^TTCS 
•  2»  .  The  national  Security  Council,  talcing  cognizance  or 
tho  vicious,  psychological  efforts  or  tho  USS2,  its  satellite 
countries  and  Ccn=zuaiot  groups  to  discredit  and  defeat  tho 
eins  and  activities  of  the  United  Statos  and  other  Western 
powers,  has  determined  that,  in  the  interests  of  -jorld  peace 
end  U.  S.  national  security,  the  foreign  information  activi- 
.  tios  of  the  U.  S.  Government  must  "be  supplemented  "by  covert 
psychological  operations ♦ 
2.  5*he  similarity  of  operational  methods  Involved  in 
covert  psychological  and  intelligence  activities  and  the  need 
to  ensure  their  secrecy  and  obviate  costly  duplication  renders 
the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  the  logical  agency  to  conduct 
.  such  operations,  Honce,  under,  authority  of  Section  102(d)(5) 
or  the  national  Security  Act  of  19^7,  tho  national  Security 
Council  directs  tho  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  to  initi- 
ate and  conduct,  vithin  tho  limit  of  available  funds,  covert 
psychological  operations  designed  to  counteract  Soviet  and 
Soviot- inspired  activities  vhich  constitute  a  threat  to  vorld 
"  poace  and  security  or  aro  designed  to  discredit  and  doicat'tho 
a 
Unitod  Statos  in  its •endeavors  to  promote  uorld  peace  and  se- 
curity. • 
-  1  -
3.  ^no  Director  of  Contral  Intelligence  ±a   charged  vith 
ensuring  that  such  psychological  operations  are'  consistent 
vith  U.  S.  foreign  policy  and  overt  foreign  information  ac- 
tivities., and  that  appropriate  agencies  of  the  U.  S.  Govern- 
ment, both  at  hozie  and  abroad  (including  diplcrsatic  and  mil- 
itary representatives  in  each  area),  are  kept  informed  of 
such  operations  vhich  vill  directly  affect  then.      .  •  ■ 
«**•  Nothing  contained  heroin  shall  be  construed  to  re- 
quire the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  to  disclose  operational 
details  concerning  its  secret  techniques,  sources  or  contacts. 
-  2  -
| : April 1982 SHIFTING CIA PRODUCTION FROM TOPICAL TO A GEOGRAPHIC BASE (Conversion of the National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC) back to the CIA Directorate of Intelligence. (DDI) ) [Deputy Director | Spec.Asst. for Nuclear for Intelligence Special Asst. for Proliferation Intelligence D a Community Interests Arms Control Collection Requirements Intelligence Steff — ~ | anc Evaluation Staff dng __ _ ___ Management and Analysis zr Staff ! Support Staff Office. of Scientific and _ a —— Office of Current Operations Weapons Research * . Office of Imagery Analysis — Office of Central Reference Office of ‘Stritpete Hesearch — | —————-——0ffice of Soviet Analysis Office of Foltt} Analysis . 4 —Office of Eurcpean Analysis Office of East Asien Office at Eetapsic Tesearct __ - Analysis Office 6 ogresiiie end Cartogreob- esearch Office of Near Eastern and South Asien Analysis | Office of African and Latin American Analysis. Office of Global Issues ** { Includes chairman of: * Weapons and Space Systems Intelligence Committee Seientific end Technical Intelligence Committee Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee ** Economic Intelligence Committee
April  1982 
SHIFTING  tJIA  PRODUCTION  FROM 
TOPICAL  TO  A  GEOGRAPHIC  BASE 
(Conversion  of  the  Rational  Foreign  Assessment  Center 
(KFAC)  back  to  the  CIA  Directorate  of  Intelligence^  (DDI)  ) 
Spec. As st o  for  Nuclear   _ 
Proliferation  Intelligence 
Arms  Control 
Intelligence  Staff 
Deputy  Director 
for  Intelligence 
Staff 
Office,  of  Scientific  and 
Weapons  Research  * 
Office  of  Imagery  Analysis  - 
Office  of  Stra 
Office  of  Polite 
Office  of  Eco 
Office  o 
Cartogran 
Snecial  Asst.  for 
Community  Interests 
Collection  Requirements 
and  Evaluation  Staff 
Kanagement  and  Analysis 
Support  Staff 
Office  of  Current  Operations 
—  Office  of  Central  Reference 
Office  of  Soviet  Analysis 
■Office  of  European  Analysis 
Office  of  East  Asian 
Analysis 
Office  of  Near  Eastern  and 
South  Asian  Analysis 
Office  of  African  and  Latin 
American  Analysis 
Office  of  Global  Issues 
-*-* 
Includes  chairman  of: 
*  Weapons  and  S^ace  Systems  Intelligence  Comma ttee 
Scientific  and  Technical  Intelligence  Committee 
Joint  Atomic  Energy  Intelligence  Committee 
**  Economic  Intelligence  Committee
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER As of 1 October 1981 . Deputy Director for National Foreign Assassmont Director, NFAC Deputy Director, NFAC d a a Managnmant and Analysis Arms Control Support Stalf Intelligence Staff | | | | | Collection Requirements and Evaluation Staff ‘oe eqemmerwn aS Office of _ Office of Office of Office of Office of Afncan and East Asian Analysis European Analysis Near Eastern and Soviet Analysis Latin Amercan South Asian Analysis Analysis + Ceres rs rep ee: om ae f Office of , Olea of Glebal issues Imagery Analysis Office of Current Oporations Offica af Scientific and Weapons Rosearch Office of Contral _ Reference TiSad 1-0! aa qyortscs é iy Specia! Assistant for Nuclear Proliferation Intelliqance Special Assistant for Communily Interosts Senior Review Panel os ote ww o Economic Intelligence Commiltce Joint Alamic Energy inteliigence Committee a eee oe tee ee Scientific and Technical Intelligence Commitioe ; ccc 8 orem wee en ee “Technology Transfer intelliqanca Committee je ban cts — Be ee ee whe weet lat *, Weapon and Space Systems | Lee intelligence Committee
NATIONAL  FOREIGN  ASSESSMENT  CENTER 
As  of  1  October  1931 
Director,  NFAC 
Deputy  Diroctor,  NFAC     '' 
Deputy  Director  for 
National  Foreign 
Assessment 
Mnnagomn'M  and  Analysis 
Support  Staff 
OHico  of 
African  and 
latin  Amercer. 
Analysis 
Office  of 
Global  issues 
Arms  Control 
Intelligence  Staff 
*^  «NMt»l     1 
Collection  Requirements 
and  Evaluation  Staff 
I....  . 
Office  of 
East  Asian  Analysis 
Office  of 
European  Analysis 
I 
i 
Office  of 
Near  Eastern  and 
South  Asian 
Analysis 
T 
Office  of 
Imagery  Analysis 
r  r 
Office  of  Office  of 
Scientific  and  Contra! 
Weapons  Rosearch  '  Reference 
v. 
Office  of 
Soviet  Analysis 
I  
. 
Office  of 
Current  Operations 
ni 
Special  Assistant  for 
Nuclear  Proliferation 
Intelligence 
Special  Assistant  for 
Community  tnlerosts 
Senior  Review  Panel 
Economic  Intelligence 
p«   Committee  ' 
Join!  Atomic  Energy 
j.—   intelligence  Committee 
Scientific  and  Technical 
U«    Intelligence  Committoc 
Technology  Transfer 
I.,    intelligence  Committee 
l  .**«•    M«VfcJL>*4ik 
1    ~t  Weapon  and  Space  Systems,1 
»-•  Intelligence  Committee 
•\    pur. 
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en CeCe Tcreny , Dou ty 2 O GO rey tote Mod ce Tt oO ary aw) Ve 3 pee ee POOR ON Rene EEE ete Bae LT OEE fete bee tet C} {.) a aoa t a erect ’ or n ane) yo TON wee, oe at ‘ 4 wt ad aan a omy) o wou ent cso) an a aa Lee ee See Te Te eet ed ter ee eee ee) VIA er tree mete n Declassified by William E. Nelso 22 April 1975
(Page 1) SECRET [Excised] ORGANIZATION 11 February 1963 ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS DOMESTIC OPERATIONS DIVISION AND STATION 1. MISSION The mission of the Domestic Operations Division and Station (DODS) is to exercise centralized responsibility for the direction, support, and coordination of clandestine operational activities of the Clandestine Services conducted within the United States against foreign targets in response to established operational requirements. Note: Nothing in this instruction shall be construed to vest in DODS responsibility for the ccnduct of clandestine internal security or counterintelligence operations in the United States, former IO activities now assigned to CA staff, or other catagories of special activities designated by the Deputy Director (Plans) from time to time. 2. ORGANIZATION Although DODS combines the aspects of both a division and a station, primary emphasis is placed on its station functions and the essential relationship of DODS to divisions and staffs parallels that of a foreign field station. The future establishment of subordinate bases is envisioned. 3. FUNCTIONS Declassified by William E. Nelson 22 April 1975
as 
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'.CONIZATION 
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ONGANiZATiON  AND  cUNOTION5 
DOMESTIC  OrTKATIONS  DIVISION  AND  STATION 
1.    ML33ZON 
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Declassified  by  William  E.    Nelsop 
22  April  1975  \
(Page  1) 
SECRET 
[Excised]  ORGANIZATION 
11  February  1963 
ORGANIZATION  AND  FUNCTIONS 
DOMESTIC  OPERATIONS  DIVISION  AND  STATION 
1.  MISSION 
The  mission  of  the  Domestic  Operations  Division  and  Station  (DODS)  is 
to  exercise  centralized  responsibility  for  the  direction,  support  and 
coordination  of  clandestine  operational  activities  of  the  Clandestine 
Services  conducted  within  the  United  States  against  foreign  targets  in 
response  to  established  operational  requirements. 
Note:     Nothing  in  this  instruction  shall  be  construed  to  vest  in 
DODS  responsibility  for  the  conduct  of  clandestine  internal 
security  or  counterintelligence  operations  in  the  United 
States,  former  10  activities  now  assigned  to  CA  staff,  or 
other  catagories  of  special  activities  designated  by  the 
Deputy  Director  (Plans)  from  time  to  time. 
2.  ORGANIZATION 
Although  DODS  combines  the  aspects  of  both  a  division  and  a  station, 
primary  emphasis  is  placed  on  its  station  functions  and  the  essential 
relationship  of  DODS  to  divisions  and  staffs  parallels  that  of  a 
foreign  field  station.  The  future  establishment  of  subordinate 
bases  is  envisioned. 
3 .  FUNCTIONS 
Declassified  by  William  E.  Nelson 
22  April  1975
; - “ct vue sre por rl ZATe CA =, at re) 26 Janua Tv Neem Aso: Wee weet Fal ‘ on Le Sete Leet Fae Kan ied ented onrcer POT i VIO “ orl a) i) 1) wet ut} vel nt oe) oO v 44 yt 2] Fane fo) .o, termarate vos ne} oy een ato TY rmnses selon aa bros 200 ma] moo) nay , rm) ae) is "adola at to vis sot Aiobs Oo cs a) qe ogy Be bes a oct vio$a Oo od a? nM 4? vet oad feof nf yoy At Gt (2 be > fa OQ fy wy 1 NE fd tic w AA YU =. ay) rt ur tm of faa 22 April 1975 war
Richard Hetms Deputy Direct ctor (Plans) « "ye 3 Declassified. by William E. Nelson 22 April 1975 SPrCKET
(Page 1) (This Notice Expires 28 February 1972) ORGANIZATION 28 January 1972 REDESIGNATION OF COMPONENT Effective this date the Domestic Operations Division (DO) is redesignated the Foreign Resources Division (FR). Symbols for elements of the Division are changed by substitution of "FR" for "DO" wherever the latter appears. In the cable addresses of the Division bases, "FR" is substituted for "DO" Thomas H. Karamessines Deputy Director for Plans SECRET
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q~ca:;izatio:: 
28  January   1972 
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Derutv   Director    for   Plans 
I  GO'-'?    i 
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Declassified  by  Wi.ili.arn   r^.  Kelson. 
21  AprLl  197  5
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Richard  Helms 
Deputy  Director  (Plans) 
> 
Declassified,  by  William  E.    Nelson 
22  April  1975 
liUT-rvi,  i
(Page  1) 
(This  Notice  Expires  28  February  1972) 
ORGANIZATION 
28  January  1972 
REDESIGNATION  OF  COMPONENT 
Effective  this  date  the  Domestic  Operations  Division  (DO)  is 
redesignated  the  Foreign  Resources  Division  (FR) .  Symbols  for 
elements  of  the  Division  are  changed  by  substitution  of  "FR"  for 
"DO"  wherever  the  latter  appears.  In  the  cable  addresises  of  the 
Division  bases,  "FR"  is  substituted  for  "DO" 
Thomas  H.  Karamessines 
Deputy  Director  for  Plans 
SECRET
RESTRICTS OPERATIONS-CENERAL 4 Septe:nber 1973 ONS ON OPERATIONAL USE OF CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF UIDIVIDUALS
4. RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONAL USE a. (1) Cperziionc! Use is Prohibited (a) Mernbers and treinees of ACTION; (b) Fulbright gyantees; to
| | | | i. Members of Educatiunal or Private Voluntary Organizations (1) It is U.S. Government policy that no federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation’s educational or private voluntary organizations. This policy applies to all foreign as well as domestic activities of such organiza- tions. In compliance with the above proscription, DDO policy requires the most careful scrutiny of all cases involving operational contact with U.S. educational or private voluntary organizzticns including trade and professional organizations. The operational use of any em plo vee, staff tneinber or official of such an organization requires prior appi the Depuiy Director for Operations. The Deputy Director fot Ce ra- tions will determine whether or not to seek extra-Agency appr tbe conduct of such operations. ¢ Vy
-  /    .  ./   » 
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OPF-RATJOXS-CENEJUL 
4  Septc.-nbsr   1973 
RESTRICTIONS  ON  OPERATIONAL  USE  OF  CERTAIN 
CATEGORIES  OF  LNDIVLDUALS 
*  ^^ . 
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4.  RESTRICTIONS  ON  OPERATIONAL  USE 
a. 
(i)    Gpc:ziior.cl  Use  is  Prohibited 
(a)  .Members  and  trainees  of  ACTION: 
(b)  Fi:!brigbt  grantees:
i.  Members  of  Educational  cr  Private  Voluntary  Organizations 
(1)  It  is  U.S.  Government  policy  that  no  federal  agency  shall  provide  any 
covert  financial  assistance  or  support,  direct  or  indirect,  to  any  of  the 
nation's  educational  or  private  voluntary  organizations.  This  policy 
applies  to  all  foreign  as  well  as  domestic  activities  of  such  organiza- 
tions. In  compliance  with  the  above  proscription,  DDO  policy  requires 
the  most  careful  scrutiny  of  all  cases  involving  operational  contact  with 
U.S.  educational  or  private  voluntary  organizations  including  irxde  and 
professional  organizations.  The  operational  use  of  any  employee,  staff 
member  or  official  of  such  an  organization  requires  prior  approval  by 
trie  Deputy  Director  for  Operations.  The  Deputy  Director  for  Opera- 
tions will  determine  whether  or  not  to  seek  extra-Agency  approval  for 
the  conduct  of  such  operations. 
n
ween ome een ek ee eb eT ee ba eB a RS ATS gd yO CIA TP 29772,“ ,ky . Copy Now Lo Mt. Ey CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ~ 5 a ly te, 2 WASHINGTON 2%. 0. C. a z OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR _ BEC 10 195} LEORAUMUM FOR: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SUBJECT: Proposed Survey of Cormmmications Intelligence Activities vie 1. In view of the duties and responsibilities imposed upon the Director ef Central Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency by Section 102(d) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the DCI herewith advises the National Security Council that he is gravely concerned . as te the security and effectiveness with wifth the Comminications Intel gence activities of the Government are being conducted. oa 2. It 4s believed that existing means of contrel over, and coordina- tion of, the collection end precessing of Commmicaticns Intelligence have oroved ineffective to assess and reconcile the Commmicatiens Intelligence reswuirenents of the various interested Departments and Agencies and, as well, the national intelligence requirements in this field. 3. It is further believed that the system of divided suthorities and cultipls respensibilities which rrevails with respect to Commnications Intellipence will, if uncorrected, preclude the developrent of the con- gistent., firmly adninistered security program which 4s required in order to preserve this invaluable intelligence sovree. In recent years a number of losses have occurred which it is difficult to attribute to coincidence. lh. Because of the unique valve of Communications Intelligerce, this matter directly affects the national seewrity. Any cervrective reasures to - > 7 bo taken should be based upon a thereugh investignticn of the facts and sheld give due regard to the needs of the National Security Fstablishnent -and those of the various Departments and Agencies concerned. S. Accordingly, it is recemmended that the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, assisted by the Director cf Central Intelligence, te asked to heve the Cormmnications Intelligence ectivitics cf the Covern- ment surveyed, with the view of reconmending any ccrrective reasures that mzy te required to insure the mest secure and effective conduct of such activities. foie cog e Directer TIXRRY S. TRUMAN LIPRARY Papers ‘tHiST President's vecretary's File (PSE)
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cn  ts#  29771 
Copj  No.   1 
CENTRAL  INTELLIGENCE  AGENCY 
WASHINGTON  2"V  O.  C. 
OFFICE  OF  Tt1£  OfRPCTOR 
DEC  10  195! 
"•".' 
*     -.f.}*rt->- 
i5::,o?-\TDL7y  for:    EXEctrrnrs  szcp-ttaht 
NATIONAL  SZCURITT  COUNCIL 
SU3J2ST: 
Proposed  Survey  of  Communications  Intelligence  Activities 
1.  In  view  of  the  duties  and  responsibilities  Imposed  upon  the 
Director  cf  Central  Intelligence  and  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  by 
Section  102(d)  of  the  National  Security  Act  of  1?U7,  as  amended,  the  DCI 
herewith  advises  the  National  Security  Council  that  he  is  gravely  concerned  ^, 
as  to  the  security  and  effectiveness  with  watch  the  Communications  Intelli- 
gence activities  of  the  Government  are  being  conducted. 
2.  It  is  believed  that  existing  means  of  control  armr,   and  coordina- 
tion of,  the  collection  end  processing  of  Cofnnunicaticns  Intelligence  have 
proved  ineffective  to  assess  and  reconcile  the  Conmunlcaticns  Intelligence 
requirements  of  the  various  interested  Departments  and  Agencies  and,  as 
well,  the  national  intelligence  requirements  in  this  field. 
3.  It  is  further  believed  that  the  system  of  divided  authorities  and 
multiple  responsibilities  which  prevails  with  respect  to  Communications 
Intelligence  will,  if  uncorrected,  preclude  the  development  of  the  con- 
sistent, firmly  administered  security  program  which  is  required  in  order 
to  preserve  thin  invaluable  intelligence  source.  In  recent  years  a  number 
of  losses  have  occurred  which  it  is  difficult  to  attribute  to  coincidence. 
h.  Because  of  the  unique  valve  of  Communications  Intelligence,  this 
matter  directly  affects  the  national  security.   Any  corrective  measures  to  - 
hr>  talc  or.  should  be  based  upon  a  thorough  investigation  of  the  facts  and 
should  give  due  regard  to  the  needs  of  the  National  Security  Establishment 
?nd   those  of  the  various  Departments  and  Agencies  concerned. 
5.  Accordingly,  it  is  recemmended  that  the  Secretary  of  State  and 
the  Secretary  of  Defense,  assisted  by  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence, 
be  asked  to  have  the  Communications  Intelligence  activities  cf  the  Govern- 
ment surveyed,  with  the  view  of  recommending  any  corrective  measures  that 
may  be  required  to  insure  the  most  secure  and  effective  conduct  of  such 
activities. 
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'M.RRV   S.    TRUMAN  LIPRARY 
f^pers  r  f  UST  President's 
•"ocrctiry's  File  (PSF)