_.       rJ-T*' 
DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  ARMY 
U.S.  ARMY  MEDiCAL.  INTCLJLIGCNCC  AND  INFORMATION  AGENCV 
WASHINGTON.  O.C.    20JW 
The  Beginnings  of  Medical  Intelligence 
A  comprehensive  United  States  medical  intelligence  program  had  its 
beginning  in  May  1940  when  The  Surgeon  General  was  requested  to  con- 
tribute to  a  field  manual  on  military  government  being  prepared  by 
the  Judge  Advocate  General's  Office.   The.  Chief,  Preventive  Medicine 
Subdivision,  OTSG  respendc-d  to  the  task  and  focused  attention  on  the 
need  for  civil  public  health  planning  in  occupied  areas.   As  a  con- 
sequence A  Tlan  for  the  Military  Administration  of  Public  Health  in 
Occupied  Territory  was  developed  in  June  1940  with  the  Preventive 
Medicine  Subdivision  assuming  the  task  of  collecting  the  supporting 
documentary  information.   As  the  entry  of  the  United  States  into 
World  War  II  approached,  Preventive  Medicine  was  called  upon  to  pro- 
duce sanitary  surveys  of  proposed  military  bases  in  Newfoundland, 
Central  ar»d  South  Anerica,  and  the  West  Indies.   The  effort  required 
in  producing  these  surveys  indicated  the  necessity  for  a  full  time 
itai'f  Lo  collect  and  assimilate  the  raw  material  to  sustain  efforts 
of  this  type.   Accordingly,  Planning  continued  for  the  expansion  of 
the  Preventive  Medicine  Subdivision.  * 
The  Preventive  Medicine  Division,  OTSG  was  established  on  18  April  19*1 
having  ar.ong  its  functions  that  of  medical  intelligence.   The  Medical 
Intelligence  Subdivision  did  not  begin  to  function  as  a  separate  admin- 
istrative unit  until  June  1941.   When  finally  established,  the  unit  con- 
sisted of  CPT  Ton  F.  Wnayne,  MC,  and  a  clerk.   An  additional  officer  was 
assigned  later. 
Medical  Intelligence  was  totally  unprepared  for  the  outbreak  of  rar  in 
December  1941.   The  intelligence  program  was  at  least  two  years  behind 
the  point  it  should  have  been  to  be  of  maximum  value.   Still,  in  1942 
contributions  to  96  strategic  surveys  were  prepared  by  the  two  officers 
assisted  later  by  a  third.   The  surveys  of  1943  were  produced  on  a 
slower  schedule  with  a  larger  staff.   As  a  consequence  they  were  more 
comprehensive  and  included  bibliographies  and  maps.   Beginning  in  July 
1943  tl\2  Joint  Army  and  Navy  Intelligence  Study  (JANIS)  replaced  the 
War  Department  Strategic  Surveys.   Staff  continued  t<^  increase  and  by 
the  end  of  1943  had  reached  II  officers  and  six  civilians. 
With  augmented  staff  came  the  need  for  a  new  form  of  internal  organi- 
zation.  The  Preventive  Medicine  Division  was  organized  1  January  1944 
as  a  separate  service  and  Medical  Intelligence  was  elevated  to  Division 
status.   Internally  to  the  Medical  Intelligence  Division  three  branches 
f
were  formed:   Collection  Branch,  Analysis  Branch,  and  Dissemination 
Branch.   Intelligence  production  was  heavy.   The  former  strategic 
surveys  were  incorporated  into  the  TB  VW.D   series  thus  enlarging  th-* 
distribution  potential.   Copy  for  30  JAMS  and  54  TU  IIKD's  were  pre- 
pared during  1944.   This  program  continued  unaltered  until  thcjlefcat 
of  Japan.   By  14  August  194 S,  copy  for  seven  JAN I 5  and  19  TB  Ulu-  s 
had  been  prepared. 
The  end  of  Vcrld  War  II  witnessed  a  rupid  decline  of  medical  intelli- 
gence from  12  officers  and  21  civilians  in  April  1945  to  five  officers 
and  10  civilians  in  October  ]9'.5.   SiudJ^s  in  progress  were  completed 
but  wiihin  three  months  of   the  «.  nd  of  the  war,  pro.iucticn  and  dissem- 
ination had  reverted  to  1941-42  levels.   The  medical  intelligence 
program  shifted  into  an  atter.pt  to  achieve  an  orderly  transition  from 
war  to  peace  in  the  hope  that,  \*hen  the  decision  was  ultimately  ::.ade 
as  to  the  postwar  peacetime  status  of  radical  intelligence,  the  lessons 
learned  during  the  war  would  not  havt-  to  he  repeated,  the  labor  expended 
would  not  have  to  be  respent,  and  the  data  assembled  would  not  have  to 
be  gathered  anew.   It  remains  for  history  to  determine  whether  that 
objective  was  achieved. 
*J  ^  w  •  <wL 
Chapter -V,  Medical  Djpartrcnt  United  States  Arr.y  in  World  War  II,
Medical  Intelligence  Directors 
CPT  Tom  F.  Wheynr,  MC,  USA 
April,  1941  to  27  March  1943 
LTC  Caylord  Wv  Anderson,  MC,  AUS 
28  March  1943  to  24  June  1946 
MAJ  Saul  Jarcho,  MC,  AUS 
25  June  1946  to  24  August  1946 
Arthur  R.  Turner,  MD 
25  August  1946  to  13  January  1955 
31  October  1955  to  10  January  1956 
20  January  1959  to  22  March  1959 
20  June  1960  to  30  November  1965 
COL  Philip  W.  Mallory,  MC,  USA 
14  January  1955  to  30  October  1955 
COL  Thomas  E.  Patten,  Jr.,  MC,  USA 
11  Jar.uar>  1956  to  19  January  1959 
LTC  Jon  P.  Evans  MC,  USA 
23  March  1959  to  19  June  1960 
COL  Robert  E.  Van  Gilder,  MSC 
December  1965  -  June  1968 
COL  William  E.  O'Neill,  MFC 
10  June  1968  -  27  June  1971 
COL  Reginald  C.  Thomas,  MSC 
28  June  1971  to  23  May  1972 
MAJ  William  C.  Miller,  III,  MSC 
24  May  1972  to  1  July  1972 
LTC  Kenneth  Stuart,  MSC 
2  July  1972  to  August  1975 
LTC  James  S.  Kennan,  MSC 
August  1975  to  August  1978 
LTC  William  C.  Miller,  III,  MSC 
Aiu-'ist  1978  to