} 1Gk7, 8 {ATIONSL, SECURITY COUNCIL INTIELLIGERCH DIRECTIVE NO. 7 DOMESTIC EXPLOITATION Fobruery 12, 1448 ea to the proviniona of Sovtson 1C2 of tho Matijonal Security Act of hus wid fer othe pusveco cianeiated jm poragrapny (a) and (c) tnorcor, tho Matioa nel Sccursty Countil horeby autherisces and directs that: l. Tho Contrel Intolligenco Agency shall be roesponnitble fer tho exploitation, on a highly selective tasis, within the United States of business contcrns, other nen-governmsental organizations and individucls ug vourcen oF foreign intolligence information. 2. To implewent this undertaking, the Central Intolligence Agency ohall: ; Qa. Determinoa the foreign intelligence potential of sources 20 that the beet avatleble rey be uclected erpeditiously for cxploitc- tion upon the receipt of collecticn requests frem the intelligence agencicc. For this purvese, CIA will waintein ea centrel index of non-gorvermmental gources in the United States. b.  Fsteblich uniform preestures ani otentivds Por security clearence of ell centacts in thi ig fielé, and errense such clesreances. c. Ecteb..eh uniform preccéures to inawre thet the intereets cf orgunizations and individusls contacted will not de jeonardd diz ed. da. Collect throvsh the cotebiisnn ent of field offices witin tho United Stetes, Yoreign intelligence infermaticn reauireda in eee o {ntereste of the neticnal security or ps the individuel intelligence egencies. CG. frrange for dircct contact botween intelligence egency repr osentatives and non-government] sources within the United States whenever conditions require such | “ection cy wmon the requcot or o mebor agency to secure technical or other fereign intclligence fnfornation. f. Obtain the asrecment of renponsible policy-making of ficiala of fusorsean creaninetiongy having sfercign latelligence potential be- foro ontablishiing aml watntaining contacts within that crgsnization. fh Tnferm tho intolli¢ence asencied of the proapactive dopar- turo fren or return toe tho United States of belceted Amerienn citi- tens having a high ferefan datollilgence potential, so thet the aEeen- cienoiniy furnioh requirements or prevido spectaliutsy for briefing ar ae fnterrayst ion,
he foo Aine vue rape le reitete. .a5 nit feos bey tne duced ty ghetl be identified ca uach, unleaus the crigi- mild Geeney etipulat os to the contrary further to fuplemene thig undertaking, the intelligence agen- % de - cites shill: a. Asgien to duty in the Central Intelligence Agency Picld offices, if they co deaire and within thotr capebiliticu, reprencnt- ativen to nerve their intersste undoes the direslLion cf the CLA rin cuore. Mowber agenctien ruy, st their discretion, gtablich active working liaioon vetween thoir Regions) Offices aud CTA Ficid Orfice a. ency Lor ce b. Send direct}y to the Central Thtelligence f dection ail their reeuento for foreign Intelligence infermavicon v¢ be cbtained frou non-geverneental coarces within the Urited States. fey) os ~ : 0 vi ' fe ct c. Tremueit to the Centrai Tebel scence Asoncy Ter api aisscminition full inovttie en and report ui direct contacts by agency represcniai sources, identifying cuch sources by Cit cede nuwaber. a. Obtain, to the maxinun oxtent ments and ES ont the fcrefsn intellig dopartments and esencics have received a rolationsnip. with Gusireas concerns and other non-governmental or- Panicncsons ans fndiwieunis ti the United Staten in connection with non-intelligence ectivities, end trancuit to the maximum extent roa- sible, the informstion tothe Central Iniclitgse for caiting Ter gource security and for appropriate disscz e. Obtein, in no far as ig practicabl security reguiatiions, froma their departronts an ern : tions ond individuals tn ot ted Sustes hav gence potential, which the cepartinent Gr egency 7p c sequently acquires, and reke the information avullable to tune Central f. Nominnto represantatives te serve ona the chaireanshin of the Contral Intelligence Ateney, io mech nertodi- cally to consider mutual provlocgs and interest fot w this program : 3 oad , Furthor to  fisplement. this untortaking, the Eatforel Regources Bowed and tho compononus Of tha Malitery Noatabdts: than the cosiponsnte renrasented on the Chi, which nega the LO the maxficune oxtont hofg received an a by ning = cencerns and othaes non-goaveriy Siduesta fa United Status, pebion w i wT
I ta say el lee nl Ge eothtae fr thio ouressnm alerlb be falerereted Le nf leet Che entabljoued yrelublonuhip of tho Dopartinenta sad  fsienede: vith busainenn ertneernd, Gbher nenccuvermeutoad orguainitlean, and  fndividasls in the Dalfled Serle Tor purvosea olher Chen the protusement of feretion Intelli- Genes infecmtion. eeroohnll jue affect the never] faterchanea of dosu- seuta beteesn Librarfes of the depirtments and other Librartes, or the @avelepaint cf reseerch profects with individuals or nén-govermacnaty insticvulicona.
(Page 1) NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 7 DOMESTIC EXPLOITATION February 12, 1948 Pursuant to the provisions of section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, and for the purpose enunciated in paragraphs (d) and (e) thereof, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that: 1. The Central Intelligence Agency shall be responsible for the exploitation, on a highly selective basis, within the United States of business concerns, other non-governmental organizations and individuals as sources of foreign intelligence information. 2. To implement this undertaking, the Central Intelligence Agency shall: a. Determine the foreign intelligence potential of sources so that the best available may be selected expeditiously for exploita- tion upon the receipt of collection requests from the intelligence agencies. For this purpose, CIA will maintain a central index of non-governmental sources in the United States. b. Establish uniform procedures and standards for security clearance of all contacts in this field, and arrange such clearances. Cc. Establish uniform prccedures to insure that the interests of organizations and individuals contacted will not be jeopardized. d. Collect through the establishment of field offices within the United States, foreign intelligence information required in the interest of national security or by the individual intelligence agencies. e. Arrange for direct contact between intelligence agency representatives and non-governmental sources within the United States whenever conditions require such action or upon the request of a member agency to secure technical or other foreign intelligence information. f. Obtain the agreement of responsible policy-making officials of American organizations having a foreign intelligence potential be- fore establis:ing and maintaining contacts within that organization. a. Inform the inteiligence agencies of the prospective depar- ture from or return to the United States of selected American citi- zens having a high foreign intelligence potential, so that the agen- cies may furnish requirements or provide specialists for briefing or interrogation.
(Page 2) cies h. Disseminate to the appropriate agencies all foreign in- telligence information obtained through this program. Reports pro- duced by the agencies shall be identified as such, unless the origi- nating agency stipulates to the contrary. 3. Further to implement this undertaking, the intelligence agen- shall: a. Assign to duty in the Central Intelligence Agency field offices, if they so desire and within their capabilities, represent- atives to serve their interests under the direction of the CIA man- agers. Member agencies may, at their discretion, establish active working liaison between their Regional Offices and CIA Field Offices. b. Send directly to the Central Intelligence Agency for col- lection all their requests for foreign intelligence information to be obtained from non-governmental sources within the United States. Cc. Transmit to the Central Intelligence Agency for appropriate dissemination full information and reports resulting from approved direct contacts by agency representatives with non-governmental sources, identifying such sources by CIA code number. d. Obtain, to the maximum extent possible, from their depart- ments and agencies the foreign intelligence information which the departments and agencies have received as a by-product of the normal relationship with business concerns and other non-governmental or- ganizations and individuals in the United States in connection with intelligence activities, and transmit to the maximum extent pos- sible, the information to the Central Intelligence Agency for editing for source security and for appropriate dissemination. e. Obtain, in so far as is practicable and within existing security regulations, from their departments and agencies information concerning business concerns and other non-governmental organiza- tions and individuals in the United States having foreign intelli- gence potential, which the department or agency possesses or sub- sequently acquires, and make the information available to the Central Intelligence Agency. f£. Nominate representatives to serve on a committee, under the chairmanship of the Central Intelligence Agency, to meet periodi- cally to consider mutual problems and interests in connection with this program. 4. Further to implement this undertaking, the National Security Resources Board and the components of the Military Establishment, other than the components represented on the IAC, shall furnish directly to the CIA, to the maximum extent possible, all foreign intelligence information which is received as a by-product of their normal relationship with busi- ness concerns and other non-governmental organizations and individuals in the United States, in connection with intelligence activities.
(Page 3) 5. Nothing in this program shall be interpreted to affect the established relationship of the Departments and Agencies with business concerns, other non-governmental organizations, and individuals in the United States for purposes other than the procurement of foreign intell- gence information. Nor shall it affect the normal interchange of docu- ments between libraries of the departments and other libraries, or the development of research projects with individuals or non-governmental institutions.