MITIZED    COPY 
DCID  No.  J/3 
(New  Series) 
DIRECTOR  OF  CENTRAL  INTELLIGENCE  DIRECTIVE  NO.  T/31 
PRIORITY  NATIONAL  INTELLIGENCE  OBJECTIVES 
(Revised  23  December -1964) 
V  .   ..FOREWORD  .  .      . 
1.  Pursuant  to  NSCID  No.  1,  paragraph  3,  the  following-  list  of  Pri- 
ority National  Intelligence  Objectives  (PNIOs)  is  established  as  a  guide 
for  the  coordination  of  intelligence  production,  and  of  supporting"  re- 
search and  collection  activities.  This  list  replaces  that  contained  in. 
DCID  No.  1/3,  14  August  1963,  which  is  hereby  rescinded. 
2.  This  listing  of  priority  objectives  presupposes  that  the  bulk  of  the 
intelligence  required  for  the  formulation  and  execution  of  nation al 
security  policy  will  be  the  product  of  normal  intelligence  collection  and 
research  pursuant  to  DCID  No.  1/2.  The  present  Directive  identifies, 
for  priority  treatment,  certain  specific  critical  substantive  problems 
within  the  general  body  of  the  intelligence  required  for  policy  planning 
purposes.  In  this  context,  "priority"  means  preferment  in  the  alloca- 
tion of  research  and  collection  resources.  Such  preferment  does  not 
warrant  neglect  of  the  general  and  basic  intelligence  coverage  required 
byDCID"No;:l/2. 
•  :  3.  The  identification  of  ipecific  critical  substantive  problems  in.  this 
Directive  is  but  a  first  step  toward  determination  of  the  priority,  if  any, 
to  be  accorded  to  particular  collection  requirements  by  particular  sys- 
tems of  collection.  Not  every  bit  of  information  somehow  related  to 
a  priority  problem  will  be  required  with  equal  urgency;  some  may  be 
procurable  by  routine  means.  The  identification  of  priority  require- 
ments entails  further  analysis  by  research  personnel  to  determine  (a) 
the  elements  of  information  essential  to  the.  solution  of- the  problem 
indicated,  (b)  the  elements  already  available  or  readily  obtainable 
through  research,  (c)  the  additional  information  obtainable  through, 
routine  collection,  and  finally  (d)  the  residual  information  of  such,  criti- 
cal importance  as  to  warrant  .a  priority  collection  effort.  .      k 
4.  Even  when  a  priority  collection  requirement  has  been  thus  estab- 
lished, it  does  not  follow  that  it  should  be  treated  as  a  matter  of  priority 
by  every  collection  agency.  A  priority  requirement  appropriate  for  one 
system  of  .collection  may  be  of  no  priority  whatever  with  respect  to 
i  This  Directive  supersedes  DCID  No.  1/3  of  14  August  1963.
<< 
another,  because  unsuited  to  it.  Determinations  as  to  which  require- 
ments will  be  accorded  priority  by  particular  systems  of  collection  must 
be  made  by  responsible  collection  "authorities,  under  the  general  guid- 
ance of  the  PNIOs,  but  with  regard  for  operational  capabilities  and 
suitabilities. 
5.  The  present  Directive  is  intended  to  serve  as  a  stable-  basis  for 
long-term  intelligence  planning,  with  reference  to  the  development  of 
intelligence  resources  as  well  as  to  the  allocation  of  existing  resources. 
It  seeks  to  identify  the  critical  substantive  problems  likely  to  persist, 
or  to  develop,  during  the  next  five  years.  It  will  be  reviewed  and  revised 
annually.  It  will  also  be  supplemented  by  a  quarterly  listing  of  cur- 
rently critical  or  potentially  critical  situations.  This  supplement,  look- 
ing forward  for  six  months  or  so,  will  seek  to  anticipate  such  emergent 
changes  in  the  situation  as  might  warrant  some  shift  of  emphasis  in 
the  employment  of  research  and  collection  resources.  .   .  • 
. 
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'(: 
OBJECTIVES* 
REMAINDER   OF    TEXT    EXEMPT    FROM    DISCLOSURE 
C 
•While  this  list  of  objectives  is  not  Intended  to  have  internal  priority  arrange- 
ment, primary  emphasis  must  continue  to  be  given  to  those  objectives  which  are 
so  critical  as  to  pose  an  immediate  and  continuing  military  threat  to  the  security 
of  the  United  States.