a WB tay Is : b-1z Ei hivol Ths ou ey ~o ce vents socecl wives Ceocretes wal . TRON Vossrae flion .. Dulles Lathias le cornea ~ -: . HDiag le gachcon SULT“ § Intorha fopert Ko. 2¢ Felnidons botscen Seeret ’ Gagrations ond Useret Intalliizence b ‘ . ; Sn connection wits cur ctucy of tho intellipozea operations . ¥ of ths Cerornssnt, purticulariy those of CIA, vo have boon im o formed that a plan fer -evoloning corizin other coretét operations, Wows 3s boinz cussitted to tho NSC. fs ve welorstend Lt, such opavations Would £2 dirceted narticularjy tosards afferding ensourapement to tha Sresdoseloving clewnts in thasa ecuni triog | which have bean over run oy Coccunisca end Coward combating by covert means ths Gpcesd of Comumict influonis. “We wrlorstend that 26 Sg cu ssasted thet 2 Dircater of Boccia Girdies; to bs necinated Wy the Secrotary of ctato, and ap~oinind . . by the 155, vith o gtatt of wine seebers assipmd fron the Devartcont Of Stete, the G sarvicos ant CIA, ba given the responsibility ta Gavalos and give pemeral dirceticn to o proprém of corart cpevations £9 Sucicated atevt, Ancluding veri in the covsrt paycholomtcal £3. eld, waich uncer HSC f2 Fao alresa;y toen iniiias fod in cv . - tho quostion of polte;z invel ved $ 2n thece coasurcs ic not directly within our terns of relorsncce itorawet'y Visco projects hrve an depertent tearing on the futur? of the Antelligenco operations of CIA,
» eit, for this reason, 78 Tool ‘ges Stiibesy on n cosrenting on this passe Of tha subfcets . Kg exgieast; in porticelor, that further attention should b. firon ts tia rosa for ths carrying cue Gf the special couvationo cone ticpleted ant ths rolaticn botvean these operations erd ths preper A ~~ & FRAKITS «2. ccmlust of cocret intellisonca. > 4 cestrai plansing snd coordinating staff, as eronesod in the nev pitn, 26 ¢osential, bub tha cortreliacd es rol of cperctions La equally isvortante In this dolicste ficld, aet=21 control smst to morcissd ty iho Directory, vno chowld to in intieets toneh now only ehin plas él policics but Gise with tho datatle cf tha operations. fo do rot bolicva that these apes of onsr Lean boa “Lageed* out to variew existing egurcies af the Goveviment without jeorereicing thely efiectivansse end involving soxious scturite ricke. In partie cular, 1% would be canssreu3 to have severe] wrrolatved and uncorrelated (=> Olaniestire® cporaticong ciirsed ont in such censitivs areas: 23 Sheva would bo auplicatioa of elffart. crvgze ie : - Ang of wires dn tha use of clumlagtino agenta, emi corfous rist: Loz . the chains art cgonts used in tt ha reensetiva opsretions, In ow cpimion, the burectox end eiaff, 1£ recoved fos ectenl cnara ond, fs opzerentiy ceatezplatcd wider tho proposed NSO directive, would net be able to control this situather . Ja carrying out these cpscial operationa, tho Dirootor ani kis ciety chould hevo intivate knorleden of thet is teins dons dn (2:3 field of soc crab intolli gence and aecece to 61) the fecilities wich oy bo a .
Geils up Crouch a arcporly constituted sesret inicllisonce netvorte Servs onsrationa, particularly throuch suppert of resibianca proms A > Du a Ped provise ond of tha rm@t i-gertant sourcaa of cooret intoLii:cenco, ert tho inforsation getnrd froa ceecrot intelUirones oust incediately bo put to use in cuidirg ant directing secret oporations. In nary e casos it ds nsvose. U7 to cetarnine whotier a particulay asont o: chain shovld prinarily bo used fow secrat intellLicome or fer sesret aeste, ‘operation, because tha atiannt to prose both usea cay enlanmsx the eacurs4 of of CacNe _ , tno epecial cporaticns contomlated will require a otafll oporetinz ghroad both undoes . coves, ts in ths c2s9 of eecret intellicsma,. Unlasy 9 the w poreenal for toth ovarations is uncer ons Gverall contrel in vachiciten, oven theu_.16 meamime of insulation is provided in tha ficld, there is Litoly to be overlepaing ’ ‘of activitios and functdong-in eriticel areas which will imperil hs AD 4e2 spond sncG in the carrying ont of sesrat operations and sccret intollisence during tho dast wer hes pointed vp a close Felnticnship cl tha to cotivitian.s fi ior oxscple, sho ant 4 ie ° Ead comvate systess during the wer, hava nov com aroum to the vow that cocret intelliponca and seerct operat ons ehouid bg carriod out unicr a uingle Gporational head and heve reorganized theks services esconmiinglye
Ya rocemnands ; . Ze inant & Uiractor, eubioat te appropriate policy midanss a cuncesies ix ths proposed uG direct$ve, should be side mexponsible for thi Lerma cf covert sotirities, imtluiin: sceret intolifsencs, cecrot cpiratici:c, clancestina psycholozical werk amt such Otter Covert cperations co my ba essicmada to the ULrocter by ths ne Ce @o0 teat cach brunsh of those covert acizvitdos: showld bo under awe ot deere OB chic’ rencrting to tho idswetor. 3e thst tip Lisvoter Ghewld bo Z:sicdlately resvoncible to the we C2 fo the Circeotor of CIA cs tho NSC st cat catarninse wmode G¢ & ¢€ ° tha practical eficst of ths cscialos raachad unter point 3 would bo fo detoseicsa whether CLA chouwld coniiima ta be chiverd with ts rot intellicgoncsa, It vold, in Qt? CLES, continua ° yg 2 re ta ° r C? % Q to be tho recisiost of all intellicense coll Looted Ly the Tdrector of Special Statless, cri oven £f seerct intolitgence Were renoved from Zs control, CIA richt be used as & Peover acency for tho nev oparne " It had been ox tattontdon to reserve for ar ral repart cour recenzie miaticns aa to whother tha collec tion of soerst intellicenca shovwld or chowld 1st contimu to bs a Zuretion of the CIi, aa wo had wishat io comet ot Cur carvey of tha entire Sutollisence cotetip before Soaling with this ko questions ot 5 Hinvevery, Af tin MGC should now detensins that a procron af ecorat operations is to bg urdortaken, and cosires ary fur thes 2 Vien —
{ros vs a3 to how (his would wW ~~ voact the hacdliny of secret int we pili bo glad to subelt a raport on tits cubjeot. —~ ECAUILA oat w ee CONNCIT, HYLICH HWA [oh JS 20 bY AH BECEIAED
(Page 1) 13 May 1948 MEMORANDUM TO: Sidney W. Souers, Executive Secretary National Security Council FROM: Messrs. Allen W. Dulles Mathias F. Correa William M. Jackson SUBJECT: Interim Report No. 2: Relations between Secret Operations and Secret Intelligence In connection with our study of the intelligence operations of the Government, particularly those of CIA, we have been in- formed that a plan for developing certain other covert operations is being submitted to the NSC. As we understand it, such operations would be directed particularly towards affording encouragement to the freedom-loving elements in those countries which have been over-run by Communism and toward combating by covert means the spread of Communist influence. We understand that it is suggested that a Director of Special Studies, to be nominated by the Secretary of State, and appointed by the NSC, with a staff of nine members assigned from the Department of State, the armed services and CIA, be given the responsibility to develop and give general direction to a program of covert operations as indicated above, including work in the covert psychological field, which under NSC 4a has already been initiated in CIA. The question of policy involved in these measures is not directly within our terms of reference. However, these projects have an important bearing on the future of the intelligence operations of CIA,
(Page 2) and, for this reason, we feel justified in commenting on this phase of the subject. We suggest, in particular, that further attention should be given to the means for the carrying out of the special operations con- templated and the relation between these operations and the proper conduct of secret intelligence. A central planning and coordinating staff, as proposed in the new plan, is essential, but the centralized control of operations is equally important. In this delicate field, actual control must be exercised by the Director, who should be in intimate touch not only with plans and policies but also with the details of the operations. We do not believe that these types of operation can be "farmed" out to various existing agencies of the Government without jeopardizing their effectiveness and involving serious security risks. In parti- cular, it would be dangerous to have several unrelated and uncorrelated clandestine operations carried out in such sensitive areas [Excised] [---.-.-...Excised........]There would be duplication of effort, cross- ing of wires in the use of clandestine agents, and serious risk for the chains and agents used in the respective operations. In our opinion, the Director and staff, if removed from actual operations, as apparently contemplated under the proposed NSC directive, would not be able to control this situation. In carrying out these special operations, the Director and his staff should have intimate knowledge of what is being done in the field of secret intelligence and access to all the facilities which may be
(Page 3) built up through a properly constituted secret intelligence network. Secret operations, particularly through support of resistance groups, provide one of the most important sources of secret intelligence, and the information gained from secret intelligence must immediately be put to use in guiding and directing secret operations. In many cases it is necessary to determine whether a particular agent or chain should be primarily used for secret intelligence or for secret operations, because the attempt to press both uses may endanger the security of each. The special operations contemplated will require a staff operating abroad both under [.....Excised............Jcover, as in the case of secret intelligence. Unless the personnel for both operations is under one overall control in Washington, even though a measure of insulation is provided in the field, there is likely to be overlapping of activities and functions in critical areas which will imperil security. The Allied experience in the carrying out of secret operations and secret intelligence during the last war has pointed up the close relationship of the two activities. [Excised] for example, who had separate systems during the war, have now come around to the view that secret intelligence and secret operations should be carried out under a single operational hand and have recrganized their services accordingly.
(Page 4) We recommend: 1. That a Director, subject to appropriate policy guidance as suggested in the proposed NSC directive, should be made responsible for all forms of covert activities, including secret intelligence, secret operations, clandestine psychological work and such other covert operations as may be assigned to the Director by the NSC. 2. That each branch of these covert activities should be under a chief reporting to the Director. 3. That the Director should be immediately responsible to the NSC or to the Director of CIA as the NSC might determine. * * * The practical effect of the decision reached under point 3 would be to determine whether CIA should continue to be charged with the collection of secret intelligence. It would, in any case, continue to be the recipient of all intelligence collected by the Director of Special Studies, and even if secret intelligence were removed from its control, CIA might be used as a "cover" agency for the new opera- tions. It had been our intention to reserve for our final report our recommendations as to whether the collection of secret intelligence should or should not continue to be a function of the CIA, as we had wished to complete our survey of the entire intelligence set-up before dealing with this key question. However, if the NSC should now determine that a program of secret operations is to be undertaken, and desires any further views
(Page 5) from us as to how this would affect the handling of secret intelligence, we shall be glad to submit a report on this subject.