BY  THE  COMPTROLLER  GENERAL 
Report  To  Th 
OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 
Congressu 
SEGHET 
NO  FOREfGN  DIJSSfEMI NATION 
Need  For  Improving  Mapping, 
Charting,  And  Geodesy  Support 
Of  The  Strategic  Ballistic 
Missile  Submarine  Force 
"NATIONAL  SECURITY  INFORMATION- 
UNAUTHORIZED  DISCLOSURE  SUBJECT 
TO  CRIMINAL  SANCTIONS 
Classified  by  OASD-PA  Security  Review. 
Exempt  from  General  Declassification 
Schedule  of  Executive  Order  1 1652. 
Exemption  Category  3. 
Declassify  on  31  December  2008. 
Sanitized  by:  Manager,  Information  &  Personnel 
Security  Branch,  OSS 
Pursuant  to:  Letter  Dated  July  19/  1984  from 
Principal  Deputy  Under  Secretary 
of  Defense  for  Research  and 
Engineering 
^ccoui^ 
CED-78-142 
Julv    25,     1973
SSEMWATON 
COMPTROLLER  GENERAL  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 
WASHINGTON.  D.C.     205*1 
B-145099 
To  the  President  of  the  Senate  and  the 
Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representatives 
This  report  discusses  the  classified  aspects  of  our 
review  of  the  Nation's  cceanographic  assets.   A  draft  of 
the  report  was  reviewed  by  agency  officials  associated 
with  the  program.   Their  comments  are  incorporated  as 
appropriate. 
We  made  our  review  pursuant  to  the  Budget  and  Account- 
ing Act,  1921  (31  U.S.C.  53),  and  the  Accounting  and  Audit- 
ing Act  of  1950  (31  U.S.C.  67). 
We  are  sending  copies  of  this  report  to  the  Director, 
Office  of  Management  and  Budget;  the  Secretary  of  Defense; 
and  Members  of  Conoress. 
Jam  Ct 
ompcroxi 
&/(kj* 
er  General 
of  the  United  States 
Classified  by  OASD-PA  Security  Review. 
Exempt  from  General  Declassification 
Schedule  of  Executive  Order  11652. 
Exemption  Category  3. 
Declassify  on  31  December  2008. 
(This  page 
UNCLASSIFIED.
on  this 
IF1ED. 
COMPTROLLER  GENERAL'S 
REPORT  TO  THE  CONGRESS 
NEED  FOR  IMPROVING  HAPPING, 
CHARTING,  AND  GEODESY  SUPPORT 
OF  THE  STRATEGIC  BALLISTIC 
MISSILE  SUBMARINE  FORCE 
DIGEST 
Strategic  Eallistic  Missile  Submarines  |may 
not  be  as  effectively  deployed  as  possible 
to  carry  out  their  (-ftSCnE"1)  fslrategic  deter- 
rent missionl unless  there  is  an  improvement 
in  the  Mapping,  Charting,  and  Geodesy  support 
(JDGRBf)  iproviaed  by  the  Navy  ucean  Survey 
Program. 
As  part  of  the  Naval  Oceanographic  program, 
the  Ocean  Survey  Program  provides,  in  re- 
sponse to  priority  strategic  defense  require- 
ments, the  oceanographic  collection,  processing, 
and  analvsis  of  essential bathvmetric,  gravi- 
tmetric  and  magnetic  (GDGnO'?)  data  to  enhance 
the  effectiveness,  and  operational  flexibility 
of  the— -Polaris,  Poseidon,  Trident — strategic 
forces. 
Data  collected  by  the  Ocean  Survey  Program 
fleet  is  used  to  provide  Mapping,  Charting, 
and  Geodesy  products  for  the  navigational 
safety  of  the  submarine  forces,  strategic 
weapons  systems  accuracy,  secure  positioning, 
and  can  be  used  to  support  sonar  systems,  and 
to  increase  the  operational  effectiveness  of 
other  loceanographic  (-ODCIlDTi)  |surveillance  sys- 
tems. 
During  a  review  of  the  nation's  ocean  vessel/ 
survey  fleet,  GAO  found  that  the  Navy's 
oceanographic  program  is  fragmented,  uncoordi- 
nated, and  often  inefficient.   For  example, 
the  Navy,  because  of  budgetary  constraints, 
leased  six  oceanographic  vessels  to  foreign 
countries  at  no  cost  during  the  same  timeframe 
that  high  priority  strategic  submarine  Idata 
deficiencies  (GOCnD¥,fl  were  evolving. 
SEgrfET 
CED-78-142
GAO  believes  that  Ocean  Survey  Program 
deficiencies  are  due  in  large  part  to  frag- 
mented and  decentralized  resource  management 
of  the  Haw's  oceanoqraphic  assets,  and  GAP 
questions  thejability  of  the  U.S.  Navy  to  I 
(continue  to  support  (GDGnEim  strategic  bal- 
listic  missile  submarines  through  the  Ocean 
Survey  Program.  While  U.S.  strategic  submarine 
forces  are  being  modernized  through  Trident 
submarine  acqu is itiorrs-f-  several  of  the  Navy's 
unique  ocean  survey  program  vessels  are  now 
over  34  years  old,  and  their  operating  condi- 
tion was  such  that: 
— Support  of  the  strategic  ballistic  missile 
submarine  force|was  curtailed  due  to  the 
loss  of  over  590  Ocean  Survey  Program  ship 
operating  days  during  the  past  two  years; 
(■CCGPiDIU 
happina,  charting,  and  geodesy  products  may 
not  meet  scheduled  Trident  ballisticjnissile 
submarine  deployment  dates  and  fODOIlBDI  pro- 
vide  for  more  potentially  effective  Trident 
deployments; 
Strategic  ballistic  missile  submarine  opera- 
tions may  not  be  able  to  meet  changing  U.S. 
nuclear  weapons  deployment  policy  needs, 
because  of  the  lack  of  adequate  data  to 
operate  in  areas  that  were  not  surveyed. 
In  commenting  on  this  report,  the  Department 
of  Defense  concurred  that| the  age  of  Ocean 
Survey  Program  ships  may  contribute  to  the 
risk  that  data  may  not  be  provided  in  a 
timelv  manner  co  meet  ( iWMl'M^  Istrategic  sub- 
marine  requirements,  and  whilel Defense  is  tak- 
ing  actions  to  improve  this  support,  (CDGnSff) 
GAO  believes  that  this  problem  is  only  part  of 
the  larger  problem  of  having  the  naval  oceano- 
graphic  program  separated  in  several  Navy  com- 
mands . 
GAO  believes  that  the  Naval  Oceanographic  com- 
munity has  much  to  offer  to  the  safer  and  more 
efficient  accomplishment  of  the  strategic 
deterrent  mission.   However,  GAO  noted  that, 
SECRET
E7 
Thm  blockt 
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wathmr  i 
pag*  is  UNCLASi 
despite  the  Ocean  Survey  Program  relationship 
to  high  priority  defense  objectives,  there  has 
been  a  lack  of.  resource  emphasis  of  the  poten- 
tial contributions  of  ( JtiLRgf1)!  Mapping .  Chart- 
\ 
ing,  and  Geodesy) data  necessary  ( O'SCnDlfr) f  to 
both  strategic  ballistic  missile  submarine 
operational  effectiveness,  and  to  maintaining 
the  overall  U.S. -Soviet  strategic  deterrent 
balance. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
GAP  recommends  that  the  Secretary  of  Defense 
evaluate  the  support  ('ODOnPfpT) provided  by  the 
Ocean  Survey  Program  to  strategic  ballistic 
missile  submarines,  in  order  to' precludel any 
deterioration  in  the  U.S.  ability  to  maintain 
and  support  strategic  forces  in  a  high  state 
of  readiness.   (  a*e^BfW»  I  Actions  taken  should 
include: 
— reviewing  all  ballistic  missile  submarine 
mission  requirements jthat  may  require  Ocean 
Survey  Program  or  other  oceanographic  support; 
(^jELRi.T')  |  and        * 
— assessing  the  capability  of  the  the  Ocean 
Survey  Program  to  support  strategic  ballistic 
missile  submarine  mission  requirements  in  a 
timely  fashion. 
(ODonnov) 
Further,  GAO  reaffirms  the  recommendation  con- 
tained in  its  June  16,  1978,  report  to  the 
Congress  entitled  "Need  For  Improving  Manage- 
ment of  U.S.  Oceanographic  Assets"  (CED  78-125) 
which  stated  that: 
— The  Secretary  of  Defense  direct  the  Secretary 
of  the  Navy  to  reorganize  and  consolidate 
management  of  all  Navy  oceanographic  activi- 
ties under  the  Oceanographer  of  the  Navy  or 
another  designated  single  manager,  and  to 
assist  and  improve  coordination  with  the 
designated  civilian  manager  to  maximize  use 
of  all  U.S.  oceanographic  vessels. 
mk 
ii 
SEORET
DIGEST 
CHAPTER 
APPENDIX 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
S^HET 
Contents 
INTRODUCTION 
U.S.  Nuclear  Weapons  Strategy 
Relationship  of  MC&G  Data  to  Weapons 
System  Characteristics 
OSP  provides  vital  support 
Scope  of  review 
OSP  MC&G  DATA  NOT  {SUFFICIENT  {■eOOIlD'F") 
TO  SUPPORT  SSBN  MISSION  REQUIREMENTS 
Oceanographic  Satellite  Operations 
May  Help 
SEASAT-A  improvements  (-ODCRgr) 
in 
satellite  data  collection 
CONCLUSIONS  AND  EECOMMENDATIONS 
Conclusions 
DOD  comments  and  <jur  evaluation 
Recommendations 
Illustration  depicting  an  SSBN  missile 
launching  system 
Illustration  depicting  vertical  deflect- 
tion 
Illustration  depicting  SSBN  missile  data 
reauireraents 
Description  of  Naval  ocean  survey  program 
operations    * 
 
Letter  dated  February  8,  1978  from  the 
Principle  Deputy,  Undersecretary  of 
Defense  for  Research  and  Engineering 
Pape 
SECRET
BNC 
BOSS 
DMA 
DOD 
FBM 
GAO 
JCS 
MC&G 
NASA 
NAVSAT 
OSP 
PBNZC 
SALT 
SINS 
SSBN 
SEGpEi 
ABBREVIATIONS 
-  Bathymetric  Navigational  Chart 
Defense  Mapping  Agency 
Department  of  Defense 
Fleet  Ballistic  Missile 
General  Accounting  Office 
Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff 
Mapping,  Charting,  and  Geodesy 
National  Aeronautical  and  Space  Administration 
Navy  Navigational  Satellite 
Ocean  Suvey  Program 
Precise  Bathymetric  Navigational  Zone  Chart 
Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks 
Ships  Inertial  Navigation  System 
Strategic  Ballistic  Missile  Submarine 
SEzm
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CHAPTER  1 
INTRODUCTION 
On  June  16,  1978,  we  issued  to  the  Congress  an  unclass- 
ified report  entitled  "Need  for  Improving  Management  of  U.S. 
Oceanographic  Assets."   (CED  78-125)  This  report  pointed 
out  that  even  though  the  Oceanographer  of  the  Navy  was 
designated  as  the  central  manager  for  all  Navy  oceanographic 
vessels  and  resources,  the  Navy's  oceanogrpahic  program  was 
fragmented  and  uncoordinated.  As  a  result,  we  found  there 
is  inefficient  and  uncoordinated  program  and  resource  man- 
agement. 
In  this  report,  we  address  the  classified  aspects  of 
our  findings,  and  describe  the  serious  impact  of  the  Navy's 
oceanographic  management  problems  on  its  highest  priority 
strategic  support  program. 
The  principal  U.S.  policy  objective  of  the  Department 
of  Defense  (DOD)  policy  guidance  for  the  existence  of  U.S. 
nuclear  weapons  is  strategic  deterrence.   To  the  extent 
that  deterrence  should  fail,  the  major  objectives  are  to 
assure  a  U.S.  position  of  power  and  influence  and  to  limit 
any  conflict  through  control  of. enemy  escalation,  which 
includes: 
Defense  strategists  consider  secure  second-strike  sys- 
tems, such  ad  submarinea,  the  most  viable  and  effective 
mean's  of  deterring  an  opponent's  preemptive  attack.  This 
consideration  is  based  on  the  belief  that  the  strategic 
nuclear  submarines  provide  a  covert  mobile  launching  base 
SEORET
UNCLASSIFIED 
with  minimum  vulnerability  to  enemy  detection  and 
countermeasures,  and  that  an  actual  strike  against  a  sub- 
marine force  would  have  to  be  directed  against  -the  entire 
force  more  or  less  simultaneously  to  eliminate  the  de- 
terrence factor.  Accordingly,  DOD,  in  addition  to  maintain- 
ing land  based  strategic  missiles  and  aircraft,  deploys  41 
nuclear  powered  Polaris/Poseidon  Strategic  Ballistic  Missile 
Submarines  (SSBNs)  and  is  currently  continuing  development 
and  procurement  of  an  advanced  Trident  missile  and  submarine" 
to  eventually  replace  the  Polaris  submarine  and  update  the 
Poseidon  force. 
U.S.  NUCLEAR  WEAPONS  STRATEGY 
In  time  of  war,  should  escalation  become  uncontrollable, 
the  U.S.  objective  is  to  maximize  the  resultant  political, 
economic,  and  military  power  of  the  United  States  relative 
to  an  enemy  in  a  post-war  period,  in  order  to  preclude  enemy 
political  domination.   This  would  be  accomplished  by: 
— targeting  concepts  that  would  ensure  destruction  of 
the  enemy's  critical  political,  economic,  and  military 
resources  which  would  preclude  them  from  recovering 
as  a  post-war  major  power; 
— limiting  the  damage  to  the  U.S.  and  its  allies  through 
counterforce  operations;  and 
— maintaining  a  strategic  force,  in  reserve,  such  as 
SSBNs,  for  protection  of  the  United  States  and  coer- 
cion of  the  enemy  during  and  after  a  war. 
Since  the  full  range  of  political-military  conditions 
cannot  be  anticipated  prior  to  a  conflict,  U.S.  nuclear  em- 
ployment plans  are  designed  to  allow  for  flexible  adapta- 
tion as  events  would  unfold  prior  to  a  war,  and  as  hedges 
against  unforseen  developments.   This  is  accomplished  by 
pre-planning  nuclear  weapons  employment  options,  and  se- 
lecting targets  to  the  extent  that  they  would  enhance  the 
flexibility,  efficiency,  and  effectiveness  of  the  forces 
or  weapons  systems  utilized. 
•  In  this  regard,  the  Naval  oceanographic  program,  under 
the  direction  of  the  Oceanographer  of  the  Navy,  carries 
UNCLASSIFIED
stttin 
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rial  on  this 
UNCLASSIFIED. 
on  a  broad  spectrum  of  oceanographic  and  hydrographic  survey 
operations  that  include  strategic  priority  Mapping,  Charting 
and  Geodesy  (MC&G)  support  of  the  SSBN  forces— Polaris, 
Poseidon,  Trident — and  anti-submarine  warfare  programs. 
RELATIONSHIP  OF  MC&G  DATA  TO 
WEAPONS  SYSTEM  CHARACTERISTICS 
U.S.  SSBNs  are  all  weather  weapons  systems  capable  of 
delivering  ballistic  missiles  to  targets  within  a  specified 
range.   The  missile  system,  as  depicted  in  Appendix  I,  is 
housed  aboard  a  strategic  nuclear  submarine  which  provides 
a  mobile  launching  base  with  minimum  vulnerability  to  enemy 
detection  and  anti-submarine  countermeasures. 
However,  because  of  fire  control  and  navigation  problems 
|th"r-  a^Q  r.*r+*,n   gpnphysicai  factors  that  require  precise  j 
bathvmetric  and  gravity  data  uodate-s  («ca»)|to  enaoie  tne 
SSBN  to  operate  critical  weapons  systems  components  such  as 
the: 
— submarine  inertial  navigation  system, 
— submarine  strategic  fire. control  system,  and 
Fire  Control  and  Inertial 
Navigation  Problems 
Navigation  is  defined  as  the  art  or  science  of  conduct- 
ing a  vehicle  from  one  position  on  the  earth  to  another  posi- 
tion.  The  primary  problems  of  submarine  navigation  are 
— how  to  identify  position  while  submerged, 
— how  to  determine  the  direction  necessary  to  proceed 
from  one  position  to  another, 
* 
— how  to  measure  the  progress  made  while  advancing 
toward  the  desired  position,  and 
—how  to  maintain  the  accuracy  of  the  SSBN  ballistic 
missiles-,  while  operating  in  the  deep  ocean. 
SECRET
SEpRET 
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UNCI -AOT©£D. 
The  SSBN  navigation  subsystem  performs  the  task  of  st 
navigation! 
The  heart  of  the  navigational  subsystem  on  the  SSBN  is 
known  as  the  Ship  Inertial  Navigation  System  (SINS).  I  The 
SINS  continuously  supplies  accurate  ship  velocity,  attitude, 
and  position  output  data  to  the  fire  control  subsystem  and 
the  missile  via  the  central  navigational  computer.  This 
data  is  gathered  by  the  SINS  inertial  sensors  measuring  the 
forces  of  gravity  and  the  motion  of  the  ship  as  it.  travels, 
through  the  oceans  QSHillLl)  land  would  be  used  by  the  fire 
control  system  to  accurately  fire  the  ballistic  missiles 
on  selected  targets  at  any  given  time.  .  Accordingly,  effec- 
tive deployment  of  the  strategic  submarine  weapons  system 
depends  upon  the  ability  of  the  SINS  to  provide  the  fire 
control  subsystem  with  accurate  positions  to  establish  the 
location  of  the  SSBN  in  relationship  to  its  target. 
SINS  Errors  and 
Vertical  Deflections 
Due  to  inherent  imperfections  in  the  SINS  inertial 
sensors,  the  SINS  develops  erro'rs  that  increase  with  the 
time  the  SSBN  spends  without  SINS  update  during  deployment, 
and  after  an  extended  period  on  patrol,  the  SINS  data  may 
no  longer  be  sufficiently  accurate,  if  left  uncorrected 
or  uncompensated  for  fire  control  purposes  and  consequently 
degrade  the  potential  accuracy  of  the  ballistic  missiles. 
The  SINS  calculations  on  the  SSBN  are  performed  in 
respect  to  the  reference  of  a  perfect  ellipsoid  because  of 
its  geometric  approximation  to  the  shape,  of  the  earth. 
But,  due  to  variations  in  the  earth's  gravity  field,  an 
error  called  vertical  deflection  is  introduced  in  the  cal- 
culations.' Vertical  deflection,  as  depicted  in  Appendix  II, 
is  the  difference  (angle)  between  true  vertical  as  measured 
from  an  ellipsoid  and  the  real  local  vertical  as  measured 
by  the  direction  of  the  gravitational  pull  at  a  particular 
location  lof  the  SSBH.   ffiDCnpir^  I  As  the  ship  travels  through 
the  oceans,  the  SINS  tends  to  align  with  the  local  vertical 
and,  as  depicted  in  Appendix  III,  various  geoid  information
SECRET 
h.  bike 
A/f  off>«£/»at«ria/  on  this 
must  be  included  in  the  calculations  of  the  missile 
trajectories  to  maintain  the  accuracy  of  the  weapons  sys- 
tem. 
Therefore,  the  SINS  must  be  supplemented  with 
marine's  position  and  gravity  (SEOIlBfrSl  data  from  other  navi- 
gational  aids  so  that  the  SINS  errors  may  be  corrected.   
Jple 
forces  the 
effects  of 
nec- 
gravity 
The  OcearfSurvey  Program  supplies  the  SSBN 
essary  data  to  compensate  the  SINS  for  the 
or  vertical  deflection.   (See  Appendix  IV). 
QSP  PROVIDES  VITAL  SUPPORT 
OSP  objectives  are  to  provide  for  SSBN  force  needs  in 
secure  positioning  and  weapons  system  accuracy.  As  depicted 
in  Appendix  IV,  bathymetric  and  geodetic  data  is  collected 
worldwide  in  the  deep  ocean  to  provide  for  the  safe  navi- 
gation of  the  strategic  submarine  forces  and  to  maintain  the 
SSBNs  ballistic  missile  accuracies  while  on  patrol,  as  well 
as  increasing  the  operational  effectiveness  of  other  ocean 
surveillance  systems.   Data  collected  by  OSP  oceanographic 
operations  is  provided  to  the  Defense  Mapping  Agency  (DMA) 
for  publication  and  distribution  to  the  submarine  fleets  in 
the  form  of  OSP  products.   A  portion  of  the  data  collected 
by  OSP  is  sanitized  and  made  available  for  dissemination 
by  DMA  to  civilian  maritime  vessels  to  provide  for  safe  sur- 
face navigation. 
OSP  Products 
OSP  operations  collect,  process  and  analyze  the  essen- 
tial bathymetric,  gravimetric  and  magnetic  data  to  support 
the  operational  effectiveness  of  the  SSBN  strategic  forces. 
The  geophysical  information  derived  from  OSP  survey  activi- 
ties result  in  processed: 
— bathvmetr  ic  data 
..r 
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SEPHET 
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From  the  collected  geophysical  data,  OSP  products  are  pro- 
duced to  provide  the  SSBNs  with: 
— P r ec ise  bathvmetric  n 
required  for  deflection  computations  necessary  tor 
correction  of  the  submarine's  inertial  navigational 
system;  and 
-Magnetic  anomaly  detection  (MAD)  ooerationaj^ef fective- 
ness  charts! 
Correcting  SINS  Errors 
Because  the  characteristics  of  SINS  errors  are  known, 
this  knowledge,  coupled  with  OSP  products  and  a  navigational 
position  fix,  is  utilized  to  correct  the  errors.  The  process 
of  entering  corrections  into  the  SINS  to  enable  the  SSBN  to 
maintain  system  accuracy  and  navigate  safely  is  referred  to 
as  SINS  reset. 
Resetting  the  SINS  requires  that  the  submarine's  posi- 
tion data  be  derived  from  a  navigational  fix  to  complete 
the  reset  process.   Currently,  SSBN  navigational  fixes  are 
accomplished  by  using: 
6.. 
SECRET
sjefer 
— land  based  LORAN-C  transmitting  stations, 
— Navy  navigational  satellite  (NAVSAT)  transmissions, 
and 
and  effec- 
tive means  in  relationship  to  the  mission  and  security  of 
the  SSBNs.   This  raitonale  is  based  on  the  fact  that  to 
complete  the  navigational  fix: 
— LORAN-C  requires  the  submarine  to  place  an  antenna 
on  the  ocean  surface  to  receive  LORAN-C  signal 
transmissions  from  stations  which  are  limited  in 
geographical  coverage,  expensive  to  extend,  and  vul- 
nerable to  hostile  action; 
— NAVSAT  requires  that  the  submarines  operate  at  per- 
iscope depth,  and  place  an  exposed  antenna  above  the 
ocean  surface  to  receive  satellite  navigational 
signals,  and  is  dependent  upon  U.S.  satellite  sur- 
vivability while; 
Also,  .the  time  requirements  for  SINS  reset  and  necessary 
navigational  fixes  vary,  depending  on  the  SSBN  class.  F 
example,  the: 
For 
-Polaris  SSBNs,  the  first  U.S.  strategic  submarine 
class,  require  that  the  SINS  reset  process  be  ac- 
complished  everyj  8  to  15  hours  of  ship  operation; 
(■o  dc  new: 
-Poseidon  SSBNs   rpouire  a  SINS   reset  at   intervals 
of  every^  ,  of  operation;    and
I  
. 
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A//  other  material  an  this 
po-j.  i*  UNCLASSIFIED. 
-Trident  SSBNs,  because  of  inertial  system  improvements, 
•liiil  norinit  i;p|jg^L.intervals  of  approximately  every 
Accordingly,  determination  and  elimination  of  inherent  SINS 
errors  are  a  major  operational  consideration  in  the  naviga- 
tional subsystem  and  fire  control  system  of  SSBNs  because 
the  ballistic  missile's  accuracy  is  dependent  on  accurate  na- 
vigational data  and,  until  inertial  systems  technology 
reaches  the  state  where  SINS  reset  procedures  can  be  elimi- 
nated, SSBNs  will  continue  to  rely  upon  OSP  data  as  an  im- 
portant means  to  correct  SINS  errors.  Additionally,  while 
the  time .intervals  for  SINS  reset  requirements  will  be 
1 e "rig  t  h ened  with  Trident  deployments,  the  use  of  OSP  produced 
P3NZCs  Ifor  covert  bottom  contour  position  fixes  will  continue 
to  prove  important  in  avoiding  potential  advanced  anti- 
submarine detection  techniaues.   fr63gftfl^—»   
OSP  Data  Sources 
  [collection  sources  of  OSP  data  exist  for 
SSBN  support.   Tliese  include: 
— Two  specially  equipped  survey  ships  which  collect 
bathymetry,  magnetic,  and  gravity  data; 
._^-.--\-\V  Specific  appropriations  allocated  to  the  OSP  deep  ocean 
bathymetric  surveys" effort  for  fiscal  years  1974  through  1977 
are  .as  follows:
SECRET 
Thm  blockmd  material  is 
clas*ifiod*$s  indicated. 
All  athmr  material  on  ti.it 
pogm  ^UNCLASSIFIED. 
1974 
Fiscal  Year 
1975          1976 
  (mill  ions )  
■  
1977 
$14.2         $16.8         $19.9       a/$16.9 
a/does  not  include  $13.8  million  for  conversion  of  USNS  HESS. 
OSP  Survey  Ship  Operations 
The  following  table  depicts  the  OSP  fleet. 
OSP  Oceanographic  Vessels 
Year 
Vessel 
FY79 
Shin 
built 
length 
-feet- 
cost  per  dav 
USNS  Bowditch 
1944 
454 
$18,305 
USNS  Dutton 
1944 
454 
$18,135 
USNS  Michelson 
1/ 
1944 
454 
— 
USNS  Wyman  2/ 
1971 
286 
$8,175 
USNS  Hess  3/ 
1965 
564 
$17,745 
1/Decommissior.ed  April  15,  1975. 
2/Special  purpose  ship  used  for  developing  prototype  system 
for  advancing  deep  ocean  precise  bottom  surveys  and  col- 
lecting gravity  data,j but  not  yet  fully  operational  be- 
cause of  survey  array  problems  KSDCIIDQ>E   
VConverted  for  OSP  use  at  a  cost  of  $13.8  million.   The 
US-NS  Hess  began  OSP  operations  during  FY78. 
9  s 
spffir 
%
UNCLASSIFIED 
SCOPE  OF  REVIEW 
Our  review  was  performed  primarily  at  the  Defense 
Mapping  Agency  Headquarters,  Offices  of  Oceanographer  of  the 
^ISSViS1^!^® -N?va*  0cean°9raPnic  Office.  We  also  visited 
tf^NitiWfl  "Security  Council,  Department  of  the  Navy, 
Central  Intelligence  Agency,  Naval  Intelligence  Command, 
National  Aeronautics  and  Space  Agency,  and  National  Oceanic 
and  Atmospheric  Administration. 
The  information  presented  herein  was  obtained  by  re- 
viewing plans,  reports,  correspondence,  and  other  documents 
and  by  discussions  with  various  officials  and  military  of- 
ficers. 
ia»'.*.:' 
UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET ?£  - — v     ~ 
The    WocK«ji  majerial    is 
classified  a+^pidicaled. 
AC  orncr  i^afcnat^on  this 
po9e  ivONCLASSffj/ED 
_*£_   ■  ~- 
CHAPTER    2 
OSP  MC&G  DATA  NOT  SUFFICIENT 
TO  SUPPORT  SSBN  MISSION  REQUIREMENTS 
Despite  significant  technological  improvements  in  sub- 
marines, SSBN's  inertial  navigation  and  fire  control  systems 
are  still  dependent  on  oceanographic  MC&G  data  and  OSP  products 
to  support  their  effective  deployments  and  operations.  While 
the  U.S.  strategic  submarine  forces  are  being  modernized 
through  Trident  acquisitions,  we  question | the  ability  of  the" 
[Navy's  MC&G  program  to  continue  to  support  (OCeRDT)j poten- 
tially more  effective  ssbn  operations. 
Only  a  small  portion  of  the  earth's  oceans  have  been  OSP 
surveyed  for  submarine  operations,  (SflSiWMfr)  I despite  greater 
increases  in  ballistic  missile  ranges,  larger  operating  areas, 
and  the  potential  U.S.  requirement  for  increased  SSBN  deploy- 
ment and  area  coverage.   As  of  July  1977,  we  were  informed  by 
Navv  officials  that  in  potential  SSBK  operating  areas  lonly  the 
Mediterranean  Sea,  less  than  half  of  the  Atlantic  and  approxi- 
mately 5  percent  of  the  Pacific  Ocean  requirements  have  been 
OSP  surveyed  for  SSBN  operations.   (gBeno?) 
Significantly,  while  the  defense  modernization  programs 
for  strategic  weapons  systems  have  resulted  in  notable  ad- 
vances in  submarine  and  ballistic  missile  technology,  the  MC&G 
support  for  the  Fleet  Ballistic  Missile  (FBM)  program  has  not 
kept  space  and  will  require  over  (2.8  million  (ODOnoi^ntrack 
miles  of  OSP  work  [extending  into  the  year  1993,  (■&eeftfig»)  |as- 
suming  the  current  OSP  fleet  of  three  vessels  is  maintained. 
Depending  on  the  outcome  of  Strategic  Arms  Limitation 
Talks  (SALT),  we  were  informed  by  Defense  Mapping  Agency  of- 
ficials, that  other  potential  operating  areas: 
may  require! over  5  million  (SDOilBg*)  | 
track  miles  c£  OSP  survey  effort [extending  into  the  year 
2020  («D0nog"H  and  could  be  needed  to  more  effectively  deploy 
SSBN  forces. 
Beginning  in  1959,  three  OSP  vessels,  the  USNS  Bowditch, 
USNS  Dutton,  and  the  USNS  Michelson,  leouiooed  with  unique 
survey  arrays,  (QECnDg*)  began  survey  operations  in  support 
of  the  Polaris  FBM  program.  Since  that  time,  changes  in 
11  .-* 
SEEfeET 
<
SEpHET 
7"ft«  blocked  m'qtKrial  is 
classified  os  indtcatcd. 
AM 'Srf»«-  marerio/  on  This 
/fSog*  i*  UNCLASSIFIED'' 
the  global  extent  of  U.S. 
created  greater  geographi 
support  FBM  operation's, 
of  the  deployment  of  the 
velopment  and  production 
systems.  The  Poseidon/Tr 
deploy  will  have  greater 
following  table,  and,  con 
in  larger  ocean  ateas  tha 
submarine  deployment  and 
strategic  deterrant  operations  has 
cal  demand  for  OSP  products  to 
This  increased  demand  is  the  result 
Poseidon  forces  and  the  current  de- 
of  the  advanced  Trident  weapons 
ident  SSBNs  and  the  weapons  they 
missile  ranges  as  depicted  in  the 
sequently,!  will  be  able  to  operate 
t  were  not  previously  surveyed  for 
operations.   (ODORUm) 
SSEN 
Trident' 
Type  of 
missile 
C-4 
Maximum 
missile  range 
to  targets 
(nautical  miles) 
Area 
deployed 
Atlantic 
Pacific 
Poseidon  (31  de- 
ployed) 2/C-3 
Polaris  (10  deployed)    A-3 
2500 
2500 
Atlantic 
Pacific 
1/Range  depends  on  total  missile  payload. 
2/Some  will  be  backfitted  with  Trident  I (C-4)  missiles. 
However,  the  three  original  survey  vessels  equipped  to 
support  priority  strategic  deterrant  SSBN  systems  are  now 
over  34'  years  old  and  their  operating  condition  was  such  that 
— The  USNS  Michelson  was  decommissioned  during  April 
1975  and,  despite  the  forthcoming  Trident  MC&G  re- 
quirements, three  years  will  have  elapsed  before  its 
replacement,  the  USNS  Hess,  becomes  fully  operational; 
— almost  $4  million  was  expended  to  accomplish  over- 
hauls of  the  USNS  Bowditch  and  Dutton  in  an  attempt 
to  continue  their  operational  usefulness,  despite 
their  ages; 
— less  than  one  year  following  overhaul,  the  USNS 
Dutton  experienced  failure  of  major  strength  members 
indicated  by  cracks  found  during  ship  hull  inspections; 
V 
12/* 
SJSRET
SECRET 
■because  of  the  degrading  conditions  of 
vessels,  a  total  of  592  ship  operating 
lost  during  the  period  of  June  1975  to 
and  due  to  these  problems , 
■d  material  is 
'/^.indicated. 
•r  maTCT&j/ on  this 
UNCLAS&F1ED. 
the  two  OSP 
days  were 
June  1977; 
-Trident  OSP  products  nay  not  be  produced  in  time  for 
effective  Trident  SSBN  deployments.   frgeSHD*1)    
While  the  addition  of  the  OSNS  Hess  will  provide  addi- 
tional OSP  vessel  support,  we  believe  that  the  dependability 
and  reliability  factors  associated  with  the  OSNS  Bowditch 
and  Dutton  raise  serious  doubts  as  to  their  long-time  avail- 
ability as  Ocean  Survey  Program  vessels.  According  to  the 
Joint  Strategic  Capabilities  Plan  and  other  Defense  documents 
we  reviewed,  continued  dependence  on  these  vessels  has  and   
could  continue  to  jeopardize  the  collection  of  vital  datalto 
support  SSBN  deployments  and,  therefore,  impair  the  U.S. 
ability  to  maintain  the  adequacy  of  the  U.S.  strategic  deter- 
rence mission,  particularly  if  the  mission  posture  would 
necessitate  changes  in  submarine  deployment  areas  and  tar- 
gets.   JglflnPfP) 
 
OCEANOGRAPEIC  SATELLITE 
OPERATIONS  MAY  HELP 
Because  knowledge  of  the  effects  of  vertical  deflection 
is  critical  to  the  accurate  and  reliable  operation  of  the 
SSBN  weapons  system,  mathematical  techniques  for  improving 
measurements  of  the  earth "S  gravity  field  were  developed  by 
the  Naval  Oceanographic  Office.   A  simplified  procedure  was 
created  to  combine  satellite  derived  altimetry  measurements 
of  geoid  undulations  with  ship-collected  detailed  surface 
gravity  measurements. 
This  technology  represents 
nt  procedure 
SfflflET 
P
UNCLASSIFIED. 
SEASAT-A  IMPROVEMENTS  IN 
SATELLITE  DATA  COLLECTION 
Since  the  GEOS-3  launching,  satellite  research  applica- 
tions have  led  to  further  development  of  improved  ocean  sen- 
sors, and  NASA,  in  cooperation  with  DOD  and  NOAA,  is  tenta- 
tively scheduled  to  launch  SEASAT-A  during  June  1978. 
SEASAT-A  is  an  ocean  dynamics  satellite  that  will  carry  five 
sensors  to  measure  various  key  features  of  the  oceans.   In- 
cluded in  the  instruments  package  is  a  radar  altimeter  that 
promises  to  derive  more  accurate  geoid  measurements  and  de- 
tection of  sea  mounts. 
Coupled  with  the  new  technique  for  combining  OSP  col- 
lected gravity  data,  SEASAT-A  will  mean  significant  eco- 
nomies and  efficiency  in  OSP  program  efforts  to  support  the 
SSBN  forces,  because  it  will  collect  data  from  95  percent 
of  the  earth's  oceans.   However,  because 
De  a  continuing 
neea  r 
data,
SECRET 
/ 
TheO?q.CK«o  mafepoMi  j 
A//  oth«r  motoric/  on  »f»u 
pog*  isJ^NCLASS/RED. 
_,£   
CHAPTER  3  / 
CONCLUSIONS  AND  RECOMMENDATIONS 
CONCLUSIONS 
Despite  the  fact  that  OSP  supports  the  Navy's  highest 
priority  defense  objectives,  there  has  been  a  lack  of  re- 
source emphasis  of  the  potential  contributions  that  Mapping, 
Charting,  and  Geodesy  data  can  make  to  improving  the  opera- 
tional effectiveness  and  security  of  SSBNs,  and  to  the  over- 
all credibility  of  the  U.S.  strategic  deterrant  posture. 
We  believe  that  the  OSP  support  deficiencies  found  dur- 
ing our  review  are  a  result  of  having  a  fragmented  and  decen- 
tralized naval  oceanographic  program. 
In  1975,  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  issued  a  directive 
to  consolidate  the  Navy's  oceanographic  program  resources 
under  a  single  manager  to  improve  its  effectiveness.  This 
directive,  however,  has  never  been  fully  implemented  and 
allocation  of  Naval  oceanographic  resources  remain  separated 
throughout  several  Navy  commands.   As  a  result,  we  find  that 
resources  are  still  allocated  fpr  low  priority  programs  at 
the  same  time  resources  are  needed  to  maintain  strategic 
high  priority  OSP  support  of  SSBN  forces.  We  believe  this 
fragmented  and  decentralized  use  of  the  Navy's  oceanographic 
resources  has  created  a  lack  of  overall  management  control 
and  that  all  naval  oceanographic  functions  should  be  conso- 
lidated under  a  single  manager. 
POD  COMMENTS  AND 
OUR  EVALUATION 
In  response  to  our  request  for  DOD  to  review  and  com- 
ment on  this  report,  the  Under  Secretary  of  Defense  for 
Research  and  Engineering  concurred  in  our  assessment!  that 
the  age  of  OSP  ships  may  contribute  to  the  risk  that  MC&G 
data  may  not  be  provided  in  a  timely  manner  to  meet  SSBN 
operational  requirements.   (-SECRfly)  I  (See  Appendix  V). 
He  further  stated  thatl  steps  were  being  taken  to  provide  an 
alternative  means  for  MC&G  data  collection  by  activating  - 
hewer  ships  with  more  dependable  operational  characteristics, 
intensifying  efforts  for  backup  survey  capability  and  im- 
proving OSP  management  procedures  to  provide  early  indica- 
tionof  production  schedule  problems.   (• 
SEQfiET 
S
SE 
Epfir 
wd  material  is 
cloa*if(ccF'o%indica1ed. 
MtjSthmr  matePlai^on  this 
is  UNCLASSl'ftED. 
AtL&h 
abq*  is 
We  aaree  that  these  a c tions  will  help  in  preventing 
f uturej SSBN  force  support  problems.  However,  we  were  in- 
formed by  Navy  officials  that  OSP  survey  backup  vessels 
will  not  have  the  same  unique  survey  capability  as  the 
current  OSP  ships  because  there  are  no  other  ships  in 
 
existence  with  that  unique  capability/  (<6*ewgf)l  and  that  no 
plans  exist  for . replacing  the  two  olaer  use   vessels . 
In  this  regard  subsequent  to  DOD's  February  8,  comments 
(see  p.  23)  which  statedl  that  OSP  operations  were  tow  on 
schedule,  we  were  informed  by  Navy  officials  that  the  USNS 
Dutton,  in  addition  to  having  a  cracked  sonar  dome,  had  sus- 
tained potentially  serious  major  hull  damage  to  the  extent 
that  the  ship  was  abandoned  during  dry  dock  procedures  for 
safety  reasons,  and  that  during  June,  1978,  the_  Bowditch   
had  encountered  major  boiler  problems.   («#gffW^  |  Consec- 
quently,  these  same  officials  statedfthat  continued  reliance 
on  these  ships  could  seriously  jeopardize  SSBN  support, 
and  that  as  of  June  22,  1978,  OSP  was  not  on  schedule. 
  (SECRET) 
We  believe  that  the  new  methods  for  combining  SEASAT-A 
gravity  data  with  ship  derived  gravity  data  will!  help  erase"" 
one  data  deficiency.   («*«M^~|-  But,  because  there  are  no 
otherl  alternative  tecnnologies,  and  since  satellites  cannot 
collect  bathymetry  or  short-wave  length  gravity  the  Navy 
will  continue  to  have  a  long  term  need  for  ship  survey  capa- 
bility that  could  become  a  serious  problem  if  additional 
SSBN  operational  areas  are  necessary 
»)  | to  continue 
to  maintain  a  U.S. -Soviet  balance  in  strategic  nuclear 
deterrence. 
We  recognize  that  OSP  support  should  be  provided  as 
economically  and  efficiently  as  possible,  but  we  found  that 
the  OSP  deficiencies  («ftSfiiHMjgjare  due  in  large  part  to 
fragmented  and  decentralized  resource  management  of  the 
Navy's  oceanographic  assets.   For  example,  we  pointed,  out 
in  our  June  16,  1978,  report  that  because  of  budgetary 
constraints,  from  1970-76  Navy  officials  leased  eight 
ocean  research  vessels  to  six  foreign  countries,  one  Federal 
agency  and  one  U.S.  university  rather  than  place  capable 
vessels  in  mothballs.   These  ships  and  their  recipients  are 
shown  below. 
/ 
16.
Hi.  block* 
slassified  as>\ 
All  othmrjg&Zrtai.  on  this 
pa^l^ONCLASSiFJED. 
ShiD 
■I     IH     ■!     * 
Gill is  (T-AGOR-4) 
Davis  (T-AGOR-5) 
El tan in  (T-AGOR-8) 
Keathley  (T-AGS-35) 
Kellar  (T-AGS-25) 
Sands  (T-AGOR-6) 
Lee  (T-AGS-31) 
Gibbs  (T-AGOR-1) 
Recipient 
University  of  Miami 
New  Zealand 
Argentina 
Taiwan 
Portugal 
Brazil 
USGS 
Greece 
While  all  of  these  vessels  were  not  capable  of  perform- 
ing OSP  related  tasks,  we  believe  that  a  single  manager 
could  have  planned  for  long  range  programming  of  oceano- 
graphic  resources  on  a  priority  basis  and  avoided  giving  up 
resources  at  a  time  whenl  high  priority  SSBN  data  deficien- 
cies  were  evolvina.   «B«1WP) 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
We  recommend  that  the  Secretary  of  Defense  evaluate 
the  support  provided  by  the  Ocean  Survey  Program  to  strategic 
ballistic  missile  submarines  in  order  to  preclude  any  de- 
terioration in  the  U.S.  ability  to  maintain  and  support 
strategic  defense  forces  in  a  high  state  of  readiness.   Ac- 
tions taken  should  include: 
I 
— reviewing  all  SSBN  mission  requirements! thatmay  re- 
quire OSP  or  other  oceanographic  support;    &eQ8B&) 
a  no 
— assessing  the  capability  of  the  Ocean  Survey  Program 
to  support  SSBN  mission  requirements  in  a  1  timely 
fashion.   («9gWlggM 
Further,  we  reaffirm  the  recommendation  contained  in 
our  June  16,  1978,  report  to  the  Congress  entitled  "Need 
for  Improving  Management  of  U.S.  Oceanographic  Assets" 
(CED-78-125)  which  stated  that:
UNCLASSIFIED 
-The  Secretary  of  Defense  direct  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy  to  reorganize  and  consolidate  management  of  all 
Navy  oceanograDhic  activities  under  the  Oceanographer 
of  the  Navy' or  another  designated  single  manager,  and 
to  assist  and  improve  coordination  with  the  designated 
civilian  manager  to  maximize  use  of  all  U.S.  oceano- 
graphic  vessels. 
IB 
UNCLASSIFIED
M|S5*.£  LAUNCHING  SUTCM 
IKiSSKl  WWIIIMI 
PI 
S2 
O 
M 
M 
1       U155IU   l£Jt  »h0 
MAOWtSS  £  Output  Nt 
lUtlifcC  CCJttlMOL  C[hl{*l 
% 
«.pn 
fine  CMTRM. 
SVSUM 
iwimi  cwimi  cinii«i 
MISSILE  . 
IU.5JA.C   lOM"»f«>HI 
DATA  MCOADINO  S»SU» 
IMlSHt  CONIXOI    CCnlCHI 
> 
C
APPENDIX  II 
SECRfT 
APPENDIX  II 
•The  difference  in  direction  between  the  normal  to  the  geoid  and  the'normal 
to  the  ellipsoid  is  the  deflection  of  the  vertical;   Leveling  processes 
or  inertial  navigation  equipment  align'missile  guidance  platforms  along 
the  normal  to  the  geoid.  The  missile  will  miss  the  target  if  corrections 
are  not  made  for  the  deflection  of  the  vertical. 
SECRET 
y  >
APPENDIX  III 
S 
APPENDIX   III 
Th.fctetj ;«/  matpjKI  is 
clasaific <f_tfffaieofe<£ 
Alt  athmt ininwon  fh/s 
pag^rl 
jnclaSSI&ed. 
■■— ^ 
i..:-#=Z 
INERTlAl  NAVIGATION 
/ 
/ 
f[  PIATFORM 
ORIENTATION 
GRAVITY 
ANOMALY 
\ 
— Geoid  heights  Co  determine  missile  launch  altitude 
-Gravity  anomalies]  to  determine  disturbances  in  missile  flight 
due  to  earth's  gravity  field.   
—Deflections  of  the  vertical  and  their  effects  on 
—missile  platform  erection  determined  by  inertial 
navigatiou, 
—ship's  position  and  velocity  determined  by  inertial 
navigation.
APPENDIX   V 
SEC8ET 
/ 
APPENDIX   V 
90Gn<il  is 
THE  UNDER  SECRETARY  OF  DEFENSE 
WASHINGTON,  D.C.  20301 
Thm  Otpckwd  mq 
e/o*si\ed  J^indicat^d. 
All  ath<£gfliatmrial  on  Hit's 
poqm^     u>4£LASSIFt  ED. 
RESEARCH  AND 
*  ENGiNEERtNG 
8  FEB  1978 
Mr.  It.  W.  Gutman 
Procurement  and  Systems  Acquisition  Division 
United  States  General  Accounting  Office 
Washington,  D.  C.  20548 
Dear  Mr.  Gutznan: 
y 
(D)  This  is  in  response  to  your  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  Defense 
dated  3  .November  1977  requesting  review  and  comments  concerning  your 
draft  report,  "Need  for  Improving  Mapping,  Charting  and  Geodesy  Support 
of  the  Strategic  Ballistic  Missile  Submarine  Forces."  (GAO  Code  14201, 
GAO  Cns&   #4753) 
J^f^The  main  thrust  of  the  report  is  that  the  Strategic  Ballistic 
Missile  Submarines  may  not  be  deployed  as  effectively  as  possible  to 
carry  out  their  strategic  mission  unless  there  is  an  improvement  in  the 
Mapping,  Charting  and  Geodesy  (MC&G)  support  provided  by  the  Navy  Ocean 
Survey  Program  (OSP).  The  report  states  that  there  has  been  a  lack  of 
emphasis  and  an  inadequate  appreciation  for  the  potential  contribution 
MC&G  can  make  to  strategic  force  readiness.  The  Department  of  Defense 
concurs  in  the  assessment  that  the  age  of  OSP  ships  may  contribute  to  the 
risk  that  MC&G  data  may  not  be  provided  in  a  timely  manner  to  meet 
operational  requirements.  This  risk  is  recognized  and  the  Department  of 
Defense  is  taking  steps  to  provide  the  means  for  alternative  MC&G  data 
collection.  Further,  the  design  of  the  Trident  navigation  system  is  less 
dependent  on  external  navigation  aids  than  were  earlier  systems. 
J#)  With  respect  to  the  GAO  recommendations  concerning  the  MC&G  support 
for  the  Fleet  Ballistic  Missile  Submarine  Force,  the  following  comments 
are  provided: 
 
Classified  by  USDRE. 
Exempt  from  General  Declassification 
Schedule  of  Executive  Order  11652. 
Exemption  Category  3. 
Declassify  on  31  December  2008. 
syjm
APPENDIX   V    "_  S-    -  AFPENDIXJ^ 
:      (U)     Recommendation:     "...  strengthen  the  policy  and  operational 
effectiveness  for  Naval  MC&G  support  of  major  weapons  systems,  such  as 
SSBN's,   In  order  to  preclua*  any  deterioration  in  the  U.S.  ability  to 
maintain  and  support  strategic  defense  forces  in  a  high  state  of    . 
readiness." 
.    JOf    Comment:     The  Naval  MC&G  support  to  weapons  systems  should  be 
such  as  to  insure  maximum  operational  effectiveness  of  the  weapons  systems. 
However,  this  support  must  be.  provided  as  economically  and  efficient^  as 
possible.     Whereas  the  high  risk  of  OS?  due  to  aging  ships  is  rec *&**■* 
oW  has  to  date  been  able  to  meet  the  actual  requirement..    Steps  are  also 
beii*  taken  to  reduce  the  operational  risk.     Steps  Include  activation  of 
newer  -ships  with  more  dependable  operational  characteristics,  Intensified 
S  to  complete  developments  that  will  allow  additional  survey  and 
backup  capability,  and  new  management  procedures  that  provide  early 
indications  of  problems  related  to  meeting  production  schedules. 
GAO  note:     The  deleted  material  relates  to  matters 
omitted  from  this  final  report. 
CO)'    Recommendation:     "-assess  the  vessel  capability . for.  the  Ocean 
Survey  Program  to  insure  that  MC&G  data  necessary  to  support  the  Do?           - 
requirements  for  effective  SSBN  mission  operations  can  be  proyxded  in  a 
timely  fashion;"    ._^__ 
 
.    Jgf    Comment:     The  concern  expressed  by  GAO  in  Navy  being  unable  to 
contihuVto  IGfiSZ  SSBN  deployments  on  time  is  understandable  xn  view  of 
the  fact  that  over  590  OS?  ship  survey  days  have  been  lost  due  to 
un^cnSulerrepairs  in  the  past  two  years.     A  review  ^SBN  prxori^es  and 
requirements  has  been  conducted  by  all  concerned  (appropriate  Untied,  an d 
Specified  Commanders,  Navy,   and  DMA),  and  adjustments  have  been  made  to 
me^h  OS?  survey  plans  witn  planned  SSBN  deployments.     The  contribution  of 
satei?Se"2Sed^aar  altLetry  data  and  an  accelerated  gravity  proces- 
sSfprograa  developed  by  the  Naval  Oceauographic  Office  enabled  a  data 
dSLIency,    in  thiTease  caused  by  the  loss  of  survey  shin  tome,   to  be 
eras~ea.
APPENDIX  V 
r 
l_W*Ji.J 
APPENDIX   V 
Thm  block 
clg/^tt^h/ro^s  indicated. 
All  amar  material  on  this 
pafris  UNCLASSIFIED. 
#f: 
The  NavyTs  MC&G  program  .in  support  of  SSBN  operations  is  now  on 
schedule.  Various  ship  and  alternate  technologies  are  under  review  to 
Improve  the  marginal  satisfactory  nature  of  the  present  program  assets. 
The  Navy  will  continue  to.  review  the  balance  of  assets  and  requirements 
and  will  take  steps  necessary  to  insure  the  requirements  are  met. 
GAO  note:  The  deleted  material  relates  to  matters 
omitted  from  this  final  report.
APPENDIX   V  OCbKCl  APPENDIX   V 
NO    FOREIGN'' DISSEMINATION 
T 
GAD  note:  The  deleted  material  relates  to  matters 
omitted  from  this  fiaal  report. 
(14201) 
sO&lojlJL  t*Z7*a 
&•&&  E.  Dtanwrt 
principal  Deputy 
NO    FORELtfN   DISSEMINATION 
(This   caRje    in   UNCLASSIFIED.