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TOMORROW must make decisions degree the permanence and perhaps even the We MUST look to the future. on which will depend to a gre of peace, the fate of our country, existence of human civilization. General of the Arn H..Arnold September, 1945
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i a Vo yh 3 N. Se ote The Foreign Technology Division gives recognition this year to a heritage of 50 years of leadership in scientific and tech- nical intelligence. Many organizations within the Department of Defense share in the achievements of the Foreign Tech- nology Division. The Army, Navy, Air Force, and the De- fense Intelligence Agency have, at various pe riods throughout FTD's history, contributed tothe nourishment and growth of this ever viable organization. During the past 50 years, the growth and importance of sci- entific and technical intelligence has paralleled the growth of science and technology worldwide. Science and technology have provided society with many benefits: miracle drugs, efficient transportation, improved housing, power, advances in education, and worldwide communications. They have also provided advanced weapons: supersonic aircraft, missiles, and nuclear warheads - instruments which can destroy a major segment of our world population or assure peace and security. The past 50 years has thus seen the fruits of science and technology emerge as a vital force in the establishment of national policies and in international relations. Ascendance to the position of world leadership has thrust the US into competition with other nations for technologi- cal supremacy. Today, Marxism-Leninism continues to be militant. The countries committed to Marxism-Leninism challenge the strength of our system of government. They threaten our position of primacy in science, technology, and the attendant production of superior warfare systems. The challenge must be met. “BR , ~ oT gT N MANTYORS | / L \ | . PoP oy fy i ~~ wr. aw nee? eww ee soe. Upon its 50th Anniversary, the Foreign Technology Division rededicates itselt to supporting our Nation's goals and ob- jectives. It dedicates its professionalism, its technical com- petence, and its personnel to the principle that knowledge of foreign science and technology and its product - advanced warfare systerns - will assist our decision makers in for- mulating and executing those national policies which will perpetuate our democratic system. o/. RA Ds. PER ,Acolonel, USAF mander
HERITAGE OF LEADERSHIP} PAST COMMANDERS General (then Colonel) Donald J. Putt, 1945-1946 Col Howard M. McCoy, 1946-1949 Col Harold E. Watson, 1949-195} Coli Frank L. Dunn, 1951-1952 Col John A. O'Mara, 1952 B/Gen Wm. M. Garland, 1952-1953 Col George Wertenboker, 1953-1954 M/Gen Harold E. Watson, 1954-1958 Col John G. Eriksen, 1958 M/Gen Charles B. Dougher, 1958-1961 B/Gen Arthur J. Pierce, 1961-1964 B/Gen Arthur W. Cruikshank, Jr., 1964-1966
MISSION . CJhe mission of the Fen Geckwlyy Divin ise ORGANIZATION plan, manage, and produce serontiftc and technological intelligence in Suppo . of the othr Gjorce Systems Command misswns Support the intelligence require ments of the flsistant “Chief of Saf, Sutell 1gence, Hog. Vaited tales ofr Gjorce, the Defense Mntelligence Mgency, and other organizations oulsude AGFKE. 9 as requied ot disected by Hoy. AGEKE:; and reduce the possibilty of aerospace technological suiprise . COMMANDER AFSCR 23-27
POP TG AEE TS DIRECTORATE Directs the use of human resources and foreign materiel in the AFSC collection effort to acquire for- eign aerospace scientific and technical information. PORKBIGS TECHNO: OGY REPORT SG DIRECTORATE Processes and disseminates incoming collateral information, intelligence documents and data; pro- vides for research services and translation; and controls dissemination of foreign technology information products. RADLATION WARFARE SUPPORT DIRECTORATE Provides analytical services, technical support, data reduction and engineering guidance for the ac- quisition and exploitation of scientific and technical data derived from or acquired through the use of phys- ical sensors, ENGINEERING SUPPORT DIRECTORATE Provides engineering analysis, photo exploitation, graphics and automated data-handling systems. TECHNOLOGIES & SUB-SYSTEMS _ DIRECTORATE Studies and evaluates current status and future potential of foreign technologies, weapon components and subsystems. Manages the Air Force unidentified aerial phenomena program. AEROSPACE WEAPON SYSTEMS DIRECTORATE Produces current reports of fcreign technology activities, studies of aerospace systems, integrated evaluations of foreign aerospace systems and assessments of their technological threats.
50 YEARS... FOREIGN DATA SECTION (1917-1927) When in 1917 the Airplane Engineering Department was established at McCook Fieldin Dayton, Ohio, a‘‘Foreign Data Section’ was included and charged withthe responsibility for copying or modifying foreign aircraft - primarily the British De Havilland light bomber (‘NH-4). From this modest begin- ning air technical intelligence evolved, precipitated by the ad- vances of European aviation andthe outbreak of war. BILLY MITCHELL As early as 1912 Major Wiliiam (Billy) Mitchell, Chief of the European Intelligence Sectionofthe War Department, en- visioned the significance of air technical intelligence. Inhis post he found that most of the interesting information cross- ing his desk involved aviation and its tactical applications. During the Balkan Wars, for example, Bulgarian and Greek fliers had experimented with a new concept in warfare - aerial bombing. But only Mitchell and a few other military men recognized the relatively advanced status of European aviation, He was convinced that the US would go to war against Germany and that the US was not prepared, especially in the air. He petitioned his superiors until he was issued orders on 3 March 1917, to report to the American Ambassador in Paris for ‘‘the specific purpose of observing the manufac- ture and development of aircraft’? and to ‘‘reporton French methods in combat, training, and organization of airmen.”’ He was en route to Paris when America entered the war on 16 April 1917. Mitchell bombarded the War Department with sugges- tions to build or buy French planes - Spads, Breguets and Nieuports. He said, ‘‘I had been able to flounder around with the animated kites that we called airplanes in the United States, but when I laid my hand to the greyhounds of the air they had in Europe, which went twice as fast as ours, it was an entirely different matter.’’ Mitchell also learned much from the British. Inthe com- pany of Sir Hugh Trenchard, he watched night bombers take off for strikes behind enemy lines. Impressed by the effec- tiveness of massed bombers, he said, ‘‘This is the proper way to use air power, and I am Sure the future will see operations conducted in this way by thousands of airplanes.’’ THE BOLLING MISSION In July 1917, Major Reynal C. Bolling headed an air mis- sion to study British and French aviation, traina cadre, and return to form anorganization. The mission included several of the key officers who organized McCook Field later the same year. The Boiling mission resulted in the decision to build the British two-seater De Havilland light bomber in the US despite an objection by Mitchell, who conSidered the DH-4 inferior to the French pursuit planes he himself had recommended. Although the mission soon returned to the US, Major Bolling’s duties kept him in France, where he was killed in March 1918, near the front lines, defending himself with a pistol against a party of Germans. 1. EARLY ww.l “BOMBER” 3. PFALZ-D.VII AT McCOOK FIELD 2. PFALZ-OXV 4. LATE 0-V1B TESTED AT McCOOK
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McCOOK FIELD Shortly after the return of the Bolling mission in Octo- ber 1917, several existing aviation departments merged into the new Airplane Engineering Department under the Army Signal Corps. It was soon transferred from Washington to Dayton, Ohio, temporarily housed in the Lindsay Building inthe cen- ter of Dayton, and on 4 December 1917, settled in its new McCook Field quarters. This site had been Selected because it had been prepared and used for exhibition flights by the Wright Exhibition Company and because it was convenient to Midwest industrial centers, TECHNICAL DATA SECTION (1927-1942) WRIGHT FIELD By 1927 the McCook Field facilities had growntoo small and the Airplane Engineering operation moved to Wright Field (Area B). The air technical intelligence activities con- tinued. Individual engineering labs studied foreign develop- ments, a few European engineers and Scientists were recruited, and intelligence reports and translations dissem- inated. During the late thirties, intelligence reports from Col- onel A. W. Vanaman (Air Attaché in Berlin), Charles’ Lindbergh, and Al Williams warned of the buildup of Ger- man and Italian air power. ‘y:.> limited capability of the Technical Daia Section, however, handicapped their evalua- tion and the preparation of effective estimates and briefings for the policy makers in Washington. 10 FOREIGN AIR SUPREMACY Evidence that the US lagged inthe development of mili- tary aircraft was overwhelming. World records for speed, altitude, and distance were held by foreign nations. In 1939 Wright Field prepared an all-out assault to regain as many records aS possible. The Germans, however, evidently learned of the plans; for justafew days ahead of our sched- uled attempt, they smashed most of the existing records by such margins that the Wright Field program was cut back to only those events where special purpose aircraft suchas the Boeing B-15, Grumman Amphibian OA-9, and the Boeing B-17 could possibly establish records. In 1927 the USSR held the straight-line distance record, in 1938 the Japanese gained the distance record for a closed course and the Italians the altitude record; in 1939 the Ger- mans set the speed record (469.22 mph in a ME-109R). Further evidence of foreign prowess in aviation was plentiful. In 1937 Hanna Reitsch (aGerman woman pilot) flew Focke’s FW-61 in the first free fully-controlled helicopter flight. In August 1939 the Germans first flew the turbojet- powered Heinkel (HE-178). 5. ZERO UNDER EXAMINATION ME-110 SHOT DOWN IN ENGLAND AND ASSEMBLED IN US . SASEBO KT-00 PETE o . CAPTURED PHOTO OF V-2 ON LAUNCH PAD . ZERO-FLIGHT TESTING ©o &O& ws . JU-88 FLOWN TO US DURING WwW.-Il 11. J2M3 RAIDEN MODEL 21
IMPACT OF WORLD WAR If At the time of World War II, the US was again forced to catch up with our foes and allies alike. Some of our aircraft such as the B-17 had impressive performance records. But at the beginning of the war they were not capable of perform- ing their military mission, as early events proved, A ‘‘crash’’ program was begun. Modification Cente1s were quickly established; production lines introduced armor plate, self-sealing fuel tanks, and power gun turrets. Arma- ment changes were made andour aircraft began to approach, and, in some cases, exceed the effectiveness of their op- ponents. TECHNICAL DATA LABORATORY (1942-1945) In December 1942, the Technical Data Section was re- designated the Technical Data Laboratory andits operations expanded to include the evaluation of foreign aircraft and related equipment. Shipments of captured equipment in- creased and Technical Data soon occupied six buildings, a large outdoor iot on Wright Field’s hilltop area, and part of one of the flight-line hangars. Technical specialists from the various laboratories, assisted by design contractors, evalu- ated and exploited the captured equipment. V-2 MISSILE IDENTIFIED The impact of new enemy weapons of radical and ad- vanced design forced an appreciation of technical intelli- gence. The V-2 intelligence analysis is a case in point. Some months before the Germans launched the V-2 missiles against London, the Soviets observed a number of large blast craters on the Polish front. An Army Air Force intel- ligence team went to Poland, retrieved all the fragments, and returned to England. By assembling these fragments, a joint 12 British-American team was able to identify the weaponas a ballistic missile. Oncethe weapon had been identified, efforts could be made to estabiish effective countermeasures. CIOS As the war reached its climaxin Europe and the intelli- gence needs of the air operations deciined, the technical ex- ploitation mission expanded. In London during the summer of 1944, the British-American Combined Chiefs of Staff createc the Combined Objectives Subcommittee for the orderly ex- ploitation of German scientific and technical targets. Offi- cers, assisted by civilian scientists, were to closely follow the ground armies and exploit captured R&D centers within Germany. Wright Field provided the majority of officers and civilian scientists detailed to this operation. INTELLIGENCE T-2 (1945-1951) Meanwhile, important organizational changes were tak- ing place at Wright Field. In September 1944, the Air Mate- riel and Air Service Commands merged to form the Air Technical Service Command. The technical ‘‘T’’ staff in- cluded ‘‘T-2” Intelligence, with Colonel John M. Hayward (formerly Chief of the Technical Data Laboratory) as Acting Chief. He served in this capacity until 5 September 1945, when Colonel Donaid L, Putt was appointed Deputy Command- ing General, Intelligence T-2. The T-2 operation played a major role in the continued exploitation of captured materiel, documents, and manpower. quer enn PPO EF EP CTO PT APS EDS SSIES ESS TSS ST SIS SO IT ITE TOTO 12, ME-109F/2- ENGLAND 15. Fw-190 16. KAWANISHI H8K 13. ME-i109G 17. MARCHETTI-SM-79 14. KAWANISHI NIK2-J (GEORGE) 18. A7M2-PEPPY (SAM) *e
PROJECT LUSTY After a few weeks of field operations, CIOS procedures proved too cumbersome for the fast moving war, and Army Air Corps Project LUSTY was established for a rapid and concentrated exploitation of air technical intelligence tar- gets. On 27 April 1945, General Spaatz gave top pricrity orders to technical intelligence to complete their collection task and return the materiel and documents to the US as quickly as possible. Late model aircraft and engines were spotted all over the Reich, but their rernoval to the US pre- sented a major logistical problem. Most of the airplanes were either flyable or reparable but did not have sufficient range for flight to this country. Colonel Harold E. Watson of Wright Fieldorganized and trained pilots to fly out captured German aircraft, including the new jets. AS a conSequence, advanced design aircraft were recovered that otherwise might have been destroyed either by our own troops or the retreating Germans. The British advised Colonel Watson that H.M.S. Reaper (a small carrier) would be leaving Liverpool for New York in July 1945. Less than three weeks were left to assemble the aircraft at Cherbourg, France, for pickup by tne carrier. Colonel Watson took charge of flying out the aircraft, and Lt Colonel Malcolm D. Seashore took charge of readying the landing field at Cherbourg (too small for jet aircraft) and preparing the aircraft for overseas shipment. The priority collection items were jet planes. After locating an ME-262, Coionel Watson received a quick cockpit check from Willi Messerschmitt, circled the field, refueled, and delivered the prize to Melun, France. He returned ina beat-up C-47 and checked out other US pilots. Scarcity of jet fuel was another problem. On Several oc- casions German tractors were drainedof their diesel fuel so 14 that flights could be made. Heinz Braun, a Lutwaffe pilot who had been released from military prison for this project, briefed the Americans and they were away to Cherbourg. In this manner, 40 German pianes were delivered to Cherbourg within 20 days. A Heinkel 219, anArado 234, and Junkers 388-G were flown from Grove, Denmark. Two more AR-234’s came in from Stravenger in Norway. When deliver- ies stopped on 8 July 1945, 9 jet planes (including 6 different versions of the ME-262) and 30 unorthodox propeller types had been flown to the carrier at Cherbourg without a single pilot injury. The operation provided the US with a flyable model of every German combat plane, including the unique TA-152. Earlier this same year (6 May) Colonel Watson, learning that a German defector might deliver a Junkers 290 in Munich, was on hand to take possession. Within minutes after the plane landed, Colonel Watson and Captain Fred B. Mcintosh took off for Nurenberg and then to Orly, France. The plane was fitted with American radio equipment and readied for a flight to America. InJuly, Colonel Watson flew the plane to Wright Field. A thorough inspection at Wright Field revealed explosive charges under the main fuel tanks. For some reason they had not exploded. en a een eee eee 19. LUSTY TEAM 20. VOLKSJAEGER HE-162 BEING TRANSPORTED 21. VOLKSJAEGER HE- 162 22. ERDING AIR BASE, GERMANY 23. COL DORNAY, COL H. E. WATSON 24. DM-1 DELTA RESEARCH GLIDER (LIPPISCH) 25. HE-162 25A. ME-163 26. GERMAN GLIDE BOMB BV-246 27, ME-262 28. ME-262- COL WATSON, PILOT 29. ME-163 30. H.M.S. REAPER AT CHERBOURG, FRANCE, JULY 1945
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In June 1945, Colonel Watson with his ‘‘flying circus’’ of pilots, conducted an airshow at Melun (just outside Paris) to display the latest designed German aircraft. Colonel Watson himself flew the ME-262. The audience, which included many high ranking military and civilian officials, was impressed. Most of them, including Lt General Carl Spaatz, had never before observed a jet aircraft’s tremendous performance. This exhibition did much to gain the necessary priorities for the exploitation of the captured materiel and documents. LUSTY was a dangerous mission. Several of the teams operating on the ground were killed in action. A few were captured by the enemy, but the importance of their work justified the risks taken. The exploits of Colonel Watson, Captains McIntosh, Maxfield, Dahistron, Hillis, and Strobel, and Lieutenants Auspach, Brown, Haynes, and Holt gave the US the latest German aircraft at a crucial time in our R@D program. This exploitation, however, was not limited to aircraft. Colonel Howard McCoy concentrated on the capture, intact, of technical libraries and document repositories. Colonel Donald L, Putt negotiated for the release of key German scientists so that they could assist inthe war with Japan and participate in the research program at Wright Fie}d. Colonel Putt was also busy laying the groundwork for ihe ultimate erganization at Wright Field that was ts complete the ex- piositation phase of the project. Colonel Jack O’Mara, whe had been closely associated with British Intelligence, assisted in establishing technical targets and concentrated his efforts in the missile area. Lt Colonel Seashore worked closely with the field teams throughout Europe and later accepted responsibility for ship- ping the captured materiel to Wright Field. These are but a few of the operations and personnel who contributed to the success of Project LUSTY. 16 PROJECT OVERCAST In the fall of 1944, the British and American govern- ments took action which would impact the future of air tech- nical intelligence and our R&D program. With the defeat of the Third Reich assured, planning began for the identification and control of scientists and technicians who might materially contribute to a revival of a German war potential. Further- more, their technical and scientific council could benefit the US in its war with Japan. Two factors, which were not mentioned for security reasons, gave increased urgency to its implementation. First, there was concern about postwar relations with the Soviets, and the success they might have inusing such scien- tists. Second, the higher levels of intelligence were aware of our own atom bomb developments, and the intelligence avail- able at that time indicated German progress. It was about this time that the ALSOS MISSION, directed by General Leslie R. Groves, was giventhe responsibility for determining German progress in developing an atom bomb. Ironically, while the wisdom of evacuating German sci- entists was still being debated in America, Soviet intelligence was intensifying its efforts to lure scientists away from US control in Europe. 31. 32. JU-290 - COL WATSON AND CREW 33. DOCUMENT FLOW CHART 34. GERMAN RIBBON PARACHUTE 35. D¥-i DELTA GLIDER 36. WIND TUNNEL MODEL, LIPPISCH DM-1 GLIDER 37. HEAVY PRESS 38. AIR DOCUMENTS RESEARCH CENTER 39. HEAVY EQUIPMENT 4). GERMAN HEAVY PRESS 41. ANALYSTS EXAMINING EQUIPMENT 42. OETZTAL WIND TUNNEL 43. ROCKET MOTOR
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Colonel Donald L. Putt, Director of Technical Services, Air Technical Service Command, Europe, was convinced that the US needed the German scientistsinits R&D program. He gained the support of Major General Hugh J. Knerr, Colonel Huntington D. Sheldon, and Colonel Mark E. Bradley. Even- tually he gained approval for two scientists needed for a special project at Wright Field. Finally on 19 July 1945, a project named OVERCAST was approved as a short-term project. OVERCAST contracts with the scientists were for a 6-month period, during which time their capabilities, willingness to work, Nazi affiliation (if any), and other necessary information were determined. PROJECT PAPERCLIP On 13 March 1946, code name PAPERCLIP was substi- tuted for OVERCAST, With the short-term personal service contracts extended indefinitely, the scientists’ families were now eligibie to emigrate with them. German fear of the Soviets and dislike for the Soviet sys- tem were major factors in our success in luring leading sci- entists to America. While the Army PAPERCLIP operation concentrated on the Peenemunde rocket experts, the Army Air Force chose gifted individuals whose talents matched R&D requi-ements in a large number of fields. The exodus cf a large nun.ber of Scientists and their families from one country to another for disarmament purposes was unprecedented. Administrative and security problems had to be solved quickly. Further- more, Soviet recruitment of the scientists was also a threat. Most of the problems were solved and the first scientists arrived at Wright Field in the fall of 1945. Some of them came by way of England (where they had been located for preliminary exploitation) while others arrived directly from Germany. . 18 EVENTS IN THE PACIFIC Air technical intelligence operations in the Pacific actually preceded those in Europe. As the war progressed they received the full support of General MacArthur, who furnished the ATI personnel with personally signed letters authorizing them to ‘‘Take complete charge of all enemy crashed or capiwured aircraft or personnel as early as pos- Sible after the crash.’”’ The letters ordered armed forces in the area to provide necessary transportation and assis- tance to ATI personnel without further authorization from any headquarters. Early in 1942, a ‘‘Materiel Section’’ for air technical intelligence analysis puxposes was established at Mel- bourne, AuStralia. Captain Frank T. McCoy and TSgt Francis Williams (the latter now with FTD) were respon- Sible for its organization. Throughout the war, air technical intelligence opera- tions were effective in supporting the combat forces. Com- bat and performance characteristics of the various Japanese aircraft and weapons were prepared and distributed to the combat forces of ali services. Strategic support was also furnished. For example, during the island hopping campaign from Australia to the Philippines, Japanese aircraft were found abandoned on some of the islands. Examination indi- cated that the majority had suffered engine damage due to connecting rod failure. Earlier models of the same engine 44. 46. 4. 49. 5]. 53. 55. GERMAN TARGET MAP - NEW YORK CITY 45. OR. LEIDECKER GERMAN DOCUMENTS ARRIVE FROM LONDON 47. BUILDING 89 REAR ADM. PENNOYER, LT COL WALKER, COL M. D. SEASHORE CAPTURED MATERIEL 50. AIR DOCUMENTS PROCESSING - 1946 JAPANESE RITA 52. CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AT WRIGHT FIELD WASSERFALL GERMAN MISSILE 54. CAPTURED MATERiEL COLLECTION DIVISION, T-2 COL M. D. SEASHORE AND STAFF
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were checked and metallurgical analyses made. Engines of a certain series were found to have connecting rods with a deficiency of manganese. It was deduced that the Japanese suffered a shortage cf this metal and this information was passed to Targets. Bombing raids were set up to cover all known sources and stockpiles of manganese to guarantee that the shortage would continue. Pacific air technical intelligence solved many problems. One was the difficulty encountered in communications when identifying Japanese aircraft. Captain McCoy and TSgt Williams began assigning code names such as Frank, Betty, Francis, Zeke, and Nate - feminine names for bombers and masculine names for fighters and observation planes. These were derivatives of their own names and those of personal friends - Frank (Captain McCoy), Francis (TSgt Williams), Ray (Captain Ray W. McDuffey, formerly with ATIC), Nell (Mrs. McDuffey), etc. The procedure of as- signing proper names as code names was officially adopted, and is still being used to identify Soviet aircraft. TAIU IN CONTROL In October 1944, a Technical Air Intelligence Unit (TAIU) was formed and attached tothe Far East Air Forces. Frank McCoy, by then a Lt Colonel, was designated Officer- in-Charge. Under his direction, TAIU took possession and control of all captured Japanese aircraft and equipment in the Pacific theater. Earlier in the same year, a Technical Air Intelligence Center (TAIC) was officially established in Washington, D.C. (AnacoStia), as a joint Army-Navy organization with British participation. To this center was assigned the responsibility of collection, evaluation, and digsemination of all technical intelligence on the Japanese Air Forces. This center worked closely with TAIU in the field and absorbed part of its ex- perienced personnel. TAIC, during 1945 and 1946, also worked closely and harmoniously with Intelligence at Wright Field. When it was deactivated in the summer of 1946, some of its key personnel were assigned to technicai intelligence at Wright Field, along with those functions which pertained to the Air Corps. INDEXING A NATION’S AERONAUTICAL RESOURCES In Europe the problem of utilizing the tremendous mass of documents had to be solved. During the war, the various laboratories at Wright Field had participated in the intelligence activities by pre- paring ‘‘Black Lists’’ of wanted enemy equipment and had furnished technical personnel for Project LUSTY. This ex- perience, plus its already established T-2 Intelligence De- partment, resulted in Wright Field’s assignment to process and exploit the captured documents. The air documents story actually began at59 Weymouth Street, London, when General H. H. Arnoid directed that an ‘(Index Project’’ be initiated to process the millions of re- ports and documentary items that had been captured. Colonel McCoy was selected to head the Air Document Research Center in London. In December 1945, this operation was transferred to T-2, Wright Field. It culminated in one of the outstanding events in documentation history - the index- ing and abstracting of an entire nation’s aeronautical R&D literature. 56. DOBLHOFF HELICOPTER 57. JUMO 004 ENGINE 58. JAPANESE ENGINE 59. HELICOPTER KITE 60. JUMO 004 ENGINE 61. GERMAN V-1 62. SYMPOSIUM 63. NATTER 64. EXAMINATION OF JET ENGINE COMPONENT 65. BUILDING 263 66. ME-109 WITH U-88 DRONE (BEETHOVEN) 67. EQUIPMENT DISPLAY 68. ARADO 234, HE-162 69. ANALYSTS
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<k Within 28 months, some 1,500 tons of documents were screened by teams of technical intelligence analysts and German scientists and the important ones classified, cata-. logued, indexed, and published on microfilm. Included were details of the world’s first production jet engine fighter; the design, production, and test information needed to duplicate the V-1i and V-2 missiles; and literally thousands of German research projects, inventions, and discoveries. This operation selected some 560,000 documents for priority handling. This phase of the effort was monitored by Victor H. Bilek, who is still with FTD. GERMAN/ENGLISH DICTIONARY COMPILED During the document processing task, many side items were produced. One ofthese was a dictionary containing over 110,000 of the latest German aeronautical terms. Newtech- nological areas had been explored by the Germans in their development of jet engines and rockets under a cloak of military security. Hence, translations from German to English were difficult until after the compilation of a new German/English technical dictionary. This effort was the forerunner of similar actions in later years by FTD in- volving the Russian and Chinese languages. EXPLOITATION COMPLETED By the fall of 1947, T-2 had essentially completed the exploitation of the captured German and Japanese technology. Major General George C. McDonald, Assistant Chief of Air Staff A-2, recommended a reorganization of T-2. His report to the Army Air Force’s Chief of Staff included the axioms that: ‘‘Intelligence is a prerequisite to intelligent research and development and procurement: a knowledge of our own developments is a prerequisite to evaluation of foreign de- velopments’’; and ‘‘the security of our own informationis a prerequisite to technical superiority.”' 22 T-2 REORGANIZED General McDonald recommended that nonintelligence functions be removed from T-2, and that its total energies be directed toward meeting the air technical intelligence requirements of the Army Air Force. His recommendations were approved. Colonel Howard M. McCoy (then Deputy Commanding General, T-2) assisted in the details of reor- ganization. The nonintelligence portion of the Air Documents Divi- sion became the Central Air Documents Office (CADO), later the Armed Services Technical Information Agency (ASTIA), and is currently known as the Defense Documenta- tion Center (DDC). The Historical and Photographic Divi- sions, Air Technical Museum, Administration of German Scientists and other nonintelligence functions were trans- ferred at this time. REORIENTATION OF T-2 Following the reorganization of T-2, efforts to produce technical intelligence reports and estimates on foreign air weapons were intensified. Technical information was mea- ger in quantity and of indifferent quality. There was no ade- quate data base to confirm or deny information received. Contractors and consultants were employed, but they too were handicapped by inadequate background information on foreign scientific and technical progress. 70. 71. 73. V-2 - ONE OF MANY DISPLAYS BRIEFING SECRETARIES 72. HENSCHEL AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILE GERMAN “'ENZIAN’ SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE AT PEENEMUNDE . ME-163 75. JAPANESE KAMIKAZE 76. ME-163  HEDI LAMARR . CAMERA CREW 78. AMERICAN COPY OF V.1 79. BUILDING 39 . BUILDING 89 81. GERMAN FLETTNER HELICOPTER
<2 86 We Pan { “a BEGINNING OF DATA BASE 1967 In 1948, the Air Targets Division, Intelligence, Head- quarters USAF, initiated a project which exploited foreign published literature to determine eertain economic facts which might be utilized in the event of war. Previously there had been no systematic and continuing review of foreign pub- lished S&T literature. Lt Colonel Raymond S, Sleeper, present Commander of FTD, was project officer. Management of a major portion of the project was eventually turned over to Technical Intelli- gence at Wright Field. NEW DIMENSIONS IN INTELLIGENCE By 1950, new and more sophisticated methods of esti- mates were evolving. From available information, designers were able to predict that the MiG-15 would have certain performance limitations. One of our contractors was able to furnish estimates on the performance of the jet engine used in the MiG-15, and furnished information on manufac- turing techniques and precision manufacturing abilities. Information gained in the analysis of one weapon system gave insight on the probable performance of others. KOREA In anticipation of a crisis inthe Far East, Air Technical Liaison Officers (ATLOS) were sent to Japan. Within a few months after their arrival, North Korea attacked South Korea on 25 June 1950. President Truman ordered US armed in- tervention two days later. During the early days of hostilities, the ATLOs pro- vided guidance and council to the combat forces in air tech- nical intelligence. Captured enemy materiel and documents became available almost immediately. Information of combat significance was processed in Koreaor Japan when possible, 24 but large quantities of materiel and some documents were sent to WPAFE, The Korean conflict proved the value of possessing valid performance and characteristics estimates on enemy weapons - before the war. MiG-15 estimates stood up well. The MiG, as intelligence predicted, had certain limitations over certain speeds. An Associated Press dispatch, dated 1 March 1951, stated, ‘‘Most Sabrejet pilots believe their plane is of better aerodynamic design than the MiG, As evidence of this, they cite a number of instances in which an F-86 has dived away from a MiG or has pursued and caught a MiG when it went out of control.’”’ WANTED: ONE MiG Early in 1951, Colonel Watson and General Benjamin Chidlaw (Commanding General, Air Materiel Command) visited the Far East and personally requestedGeneralE. E. Partridge (AAF Commander in Korea) to make every effort to obtain a complete MiG-15 for analysis. ASa result of this request, a MiG that was shot down and crashed off Korea was retrieved within a short time. Parts of another MiG were recovered by helicopter. Technical intelligence personnel landed, ran up to the crashed plane, threw grenades into the MiG to separate assemblies small enough toe carry, and left under enemy fire. These parts were shipped with other captured materiel to WPAFB. 82. 84. EARLY DISPLAY 1946 83. OFFICE PARTY CAPTURED RESEARCH TOOLS 8&5. JAPANESE SHINDEN 86. SURPLUS CAPTURED EQUIPMENT GIVEN TO TECHNICAL SCHGOLS 87. ATIC CHAMPION BGWLING TEAM 88. GERMAN WIND TUNNEL MODEL 89. ATI CLASS
AIR TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER (1951-1961) On 23 January 1950, the Air Research and Development Command (ARDC) had been formedina major realignment of ATSC functions, and in May 1951, the Air Technicai Intelli- gence Center (ATIC) was designated the 1125th Field Activi- ties Group under A-2 Headquarters, USAF. ATIC for the first time became a fully recognized member of the intelli- gence community. ATIC was thus able to mesh its produc- tion schedules more efficiently with the overall intelligence effort. Colonel Frank L. Dunn replaced Colonel Watson as Com- mander in June 1951. He served until August 1952, when ae was detailed to flying duties and was replaced by Colonel Jack O’Mara, a veteran intelligence officer, who served as Acting Commander until the arrival of Brigadier General W. M. Garland. General Garland had been former Chief of Air Targets in Washington. His experience inthe Washington intelligence community helped ATIC open many doors. He was also in- strumental in bringing ATIC products into better alignment with the overall estimates being produced in Washington. Genera} Garland’s health failed and in 1953 he was replaced by Colonel George Wertenbaker, former Air Attache in Sweden. DEFECTOR DELIVERS MiG-15 In 1953 a defector from North Korea flew a MiG-15 to Kimpo Air Field in South Korea. Although ATIC felt that it knew all about the MiG, this was anopportunity once and for all to check the accuracy of its estimates. it was also a 26 chance to fly the MiG against our bombers and other weapons to test their vulnerability. The MiG was flown to Okinawa and flight-tested by US pilots, including General Al Boyd. Later it was flown at Eglin and Wright-Patterson. Technical intelligence had provedits ability to support Research, Development, Test and Evalua- tion (RDT&E) and combat operations effectively. DATA BASE DEVELOPED Colonel Wertenbaker was reassigned in February 1954, and Watson, now a Brigadier General, again assumed com- mand. During 1954 and 1955, the emphasis on documentation and use of contractors increased. An impressive file of in- formation waS now accumulated, It was organized in such a manner that retrieval of information could be accomplished quickly and efficiently. The quality and frequency of publi- cation of technical intelligence products increased impres- sively. Contractors were brought into certain analysis opera- tions. This provided expertise in the evaluation of data and in return gave the contractor first-hand information on the environment in which the weapon system he was responsible for would be required to operate. In many instances, con- tractors were able to gain insights from the foreign data which stimulated new ideas in their design offices. err en LE TT TCC TO LO 90. COL H. E. WATSON AND FRIEND 91. BUILDING 287 92. SOVIET EQUIPMENT 93. LAI? 94. SOVIET ARMAMENT 95. BUILDING 263 96. NORTH KOREAN MiG-15 97. BUILDING 259 98. COL H. E. WATSON 99. YAK-9 100. TU-2 BOMBER 101. IL-10 ca
FACILITIES EXPANDED Early in 1958 Colonel John G. Eriksen, who had served as Vice Commander under General Watson, was appointed Commander. During Colonel Eriksen’s command Building 828 (the presert FTD Headquarters) was completed. Major General Charles B, Dougher, formerly Command- er, 8th Air Force, Westover AFB, assumed command late in 1958. During his tenure significant increases in technical equipment, including a computer, expanded FTD’s produc- tion, and construction plans for Building 829 were approved. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY DIVISION 1961-1367 In September 1959, in recognition of emerging foreign aerospace programs, the Air Technical Intelligence Center was redesignated the Aerospace Technical Intelligence Cen- ter. In April 1960, a major realignment of Air Force func- tions transformed the ARDC into the Air Force Systems Command (AFSC), and on 1 July 1961, the Aerospace Tech- nical Intelligence Center was assigned to AFSC, The name was changed to Foreign Technology Division (FTD) to cor- respond to the division structure of AFSC, and Brigadier General Arthur J. Pierce became the new Commander. Although assigned to AFSC, FTDretained responsibility for production of Air Technical Intelligence for the USAF. Playing a dual role, FTD now provided support to R&D in addition to its responsibility for meeting national require- ments for aerospace technical intelligence. The depth, breadth and interdisciplinary nature of new technical and scientific advances required that additional resources be involved in the role of foreign technology. 28 DEPUTIES ESTABLISHED Deputies for Foreign Technology (DFTs) were estab- lished in the AFSC Divisions and Centers with FTD as Lead Division. Each DFT acts as an interface between his Divi- sion and Center and FTD on matters pertaining to R&D sup- port or the production of air technical intelligence. Thus, the entire intellectual resources of AFSC and its contractors can be brought to bear on the solution or study of a signifi- cant problem. Furthermore, the DFT facilitates effective dissemination of foreign technology information. COMPUTER CAPABILITY The orbiting of Sputnik, ballistic missile threats paraded by the Kremlin, Tushino Air Show flybys, the Cuban missile crisis, Chinese nuclear tests, and increasing evidence of an expanding Soviet aerospace R&D program have given anur- gency to FTD production. This increased urgency, plus the sophistication of modern weapon systems, required numer- ous refinements in the internal and procedural aspects of FTD. FTD pioneered the use of computers in intelligence anal- ysis. Increased competency in the application of machine methods for the reduction of data is an important factor in the current operations. The present FTD Computer Complex includes an IBM 7094 system supplemented by an IBM 1401 system which provides high-speed input/output to the main computer. A 102. 103. 104. GROUND BREAKING BUILDING 828 . JULY 1956 105. SAFE DRIVER AWARD 106. BUILDING 828 UNDER CONSTRUCTION 107. BUILDING 219 108. LEONA DOWNS AND HUNTER WATSON 109. GENERAL W. M. GARLAND AND COLONEL FRANK L. DUNN 110. COLONEL FRANK L. DUNN AND GENERAL W. M. GARLAND 111. FRIENDS 112. ENTRANCE TO BUILDING 828
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MACHINE TRANSLATION Additionally, FTD possesses machine translaticn capa- bility which augments the human translation department in making available to the intelligence community significant foreign documents. In May 1956, an R&D contract was written with IBM for the production of a photoscopic memory disc tobe used with a special purpose computer. This action resulted inthe pro- duction of the Mark I Translating Device, which produced its first machine translation in January 1959. The Mark I was service-tested and refined, and, in October 1963, the Mark II was built and installed at FTD. With a present capacity of well over 100,000 words a day, its potential is practically limitless. BUILDING 829 In 1964 work started on Building 829, which provided additional space for data reduction purposes. Mr. L Herman was responsible for providing the technical andadministra- tive knowledge in gaining approval for this facility, which was completed early this year. Plans for further enlarge- ment of the 828-829 complex are under consideration. 113. COLONEL GEORGE WERTENBAKER 114. aTI CLASS 115. ANALYSTS 116. PHOTOGRAPHIC SCHOOL STAFF 117. CHARLES ZIMMERMAN AND COLONEL JACK O’MARA 118. FRANCIS ARCIER, MRS. IVY MAMMOLITE, MAS GENERAL WATSON 119. COLONEL JOHN G. ERIKSEN 120. COMPUTER ROOM 121. ANALYST 122, LIBRARY BUILDING 828 123. ELECTRONIC DATA REDUCTION EQUIPMENT 124. ANALYST 125. ANALYSTS 126. BRIGADIER GENERAL ARTHUR J. PIERCE 127. REPRODUCTICN DEPARTMENT 128. GRAPHICS DEPARTMENT 129. GRAPHICS DEPARTMENT 130. GROUND BREAKING BUILDING 829 30
CHANGES IN COMMAND In July 1964, Colonel Arthur W. Cruikshank, Jr., became Commander of FTD. Prior to this appointment, he had served as Commander of the Research and Technology Division’s Systems Engineering Group at WPAFB with additional duty as Deputy Commander of the Research and Technology Divi- sion. Colonel Cruikshank was promoted to Brigadier General on 1 November 1964. Colonel Raymond S. Sleeper succeeded General Cruikshank as Commander on 9 August 1966. Previously Colonel Sleeper had served as Deputy Chief of Staff for Foreign Technology, Headquarters, Air Force Systems Com- mand. THE FTD MISSION From its formal inception as Intelligence, T-2 in 1945, FTD has been the only national source devoted exclusively to providing information on foreign aerospace developments. The assigned mission of the Divisionisto plan, manage, and execute the AFSC foreign technology program in order to achieve the following objectives: 1. Reduce the possibility of technological surprise. 2. Provide valid, logical, andtimely foreign technology support to US and R&D activities. 3. Assist and support the US effort in obtaining maxi- mum effectiveness of aerospace power. FTD is directly responsible to Headquarters, AFSC, for accomplishing these objectives by: 1. Acquiring, evaluating, and analyzing foreign scien- tific and technical information and equipment; and producing 32 and disseminating reports, studies, technical evaluations, and related contributions on the current and potential status of foreign technology. 2. Applying advanced domestic technology to the pre- ceding functions. 3. Disseminating foreign technological data to US and Free World R&D and intelligence communities. 4. Developing and maintaining the technological threat picture - tasking AFSC organizations as necessary aS the Lead Division. The established validity of technical intelligence meth- odology, the continued buildup of talented R&D personnel, and the contributions of private industry to air technical intelligence are insurance that FTD will not again be faced with conditions as General Mitchell knew them 50 years ago. To attempt to maintain national security without adequate knowledge of foreign developments would be prohibitively expensive even if we were successful; it would be catastroph- ic if we were not. eae ani anE anne esmemmeenmenemmmenntenentanenanemnannaniaaaes 131. 132. COLONEL CARLISLE, MR. DALIN'S RETIREMENT CEREMONY MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES 8B. DOUGHER RECEIVING COMMANDERS TROPHY FROM COLONEL T. H. BALDWIN, WPAFB MACHINE TRANSLATION 134, SECRETARIES BRIGADIER GENERAL A. W. CRUIKSHANK GROUND BREAKING BUILDING 829 137. ANALYSTS PUBLICATIONS EDITORS AT WORK GENERAL CRUIKSHANK PRESENTING AWARD ARMY LIAISON OFFICE 133. 135. 136. 138. 139. 14]. 140. ANALYSTS 142. MACHINE TRANSL ATION
al 149. 150. 152. 154. . COLONEL SLEEPER PRESENTING AWARD 144. 145. 147. ‘2 148. COL R. S. SLEEPER AND FRIENDS MORNING BRIEFING 146. CONFERENCE CONG. C. WHALEN VISITING FTD COLONEL F. HOLM (PRESENTING AWARD «o> TO OUTSTANDING PROFESSIONAL _ ENGINEER NICK KARMELE COL SLEEPER AND ADMIRAL R. TAYLOR OFFICERS “DINING IN" 151. DAG MEETING SOCIAL FUNCTION 153. PHOTO LAB NCO “DINING IN" 155. NCO “DINING IN 156. HONOR GUARD 35
28. » - WE, wa - Pe. cas . we ee ow 4 157. SOVIET FLIPPER 158. SAVAGE MISSILE 159. SOVIET PARADE = 160. MiG-21 161. “MiG-21 (AS SEEN BY GUN CAMERA) 162. BADGER BOMBER 163. Mi-6 HELICOPTER (SOVIET) - 164. SA-2 SOVIET MISSILE 165. VOSTOK : 166. AN-22 (SOVIET) 157. LUNA 9, LUNA 10 (SOVIET) 168. TU-104 (SOVIET) 169. FTD BUILDING 37