° oot) 3 lay 1928 * a recutive Secretory " PeUTETGEL FO: Sidney W. Souers ouncil - Hation2l Sacurity Cc Poms . . Messrs. Allen W. Dulles : Wathias F. Correa Fe tt Wid dianm BE. Jackson STBICT: Interin Report No, 1 7 a Tm me ww ee fee eg 7 . : . . - oe 4 - oe : 7 : teferving to your memoranda of Februezry 13, 1948 and March 17, if4e regerding the survey of the Central Intelligence ‘Agens end ther intelligence operations, we have been-requested to con- oO a y fi a) \ te ; Qa - sider cortein questions which have arisen betreen the Departrent of owe wee wee | We have reviewed the correspondence between the Stete Donertceant and CLA beginnt ng with the CIG lettar to State of 22 Ausust 1945 and concluding with State's letter ‘to CLA of 24 February 1948. We _ Rave also hed numerous conferences with officials of the State Deparizen ut 2 ~- are aA Ea . * erm OL ulne ° * ws the issues marrew down to these: - ihet policy should govern i hoy shovld this policy be transictcd into terms of (9 7° 0 : and what iv] Focesdurs should be followed in tho oe : i '
' Tr, its letter of 22 August 1946, CIG presented its presram to the Stit2 Lopartcent and oo ° car program outlined in the CiG letter was accepted by the State ‘Department, sudject to certain reservetions «hich, in substance, were ee wee is egesd to by CLG. While this egreexent did not bring about 2 meeting of rircs 2s to all questions at issue, it did serve és a basis for acti on, . . - -——- -- e- ee - —- _ oo! . 4 _ ; ° . : Cn 17 October 19L7 CIA forwex exded to the State Ps- * Sub-~ Secusntiy, there were a series of conferences between representatives of ' tho Stste Devartneat end of Cla, which disclosed @ serious mzesure cf dcis~ agreszent tetreen the two offices as to the extent to which c2te Depar mene oo, - _, and with regerd to ooo. _.. In the course of these conversations CIA indicated a willinsness te _ 7 a wT - ; The netter was brought to é& head in a lettsr addressed to the Secrctasy of State by Adziral Hillenkoctier under date of 19 Janmvary 1948 s te rnich the Stata Department replied in a letter sent to Adniral Hillcn- keetter on 29 Ssbruary 1948. od
< sLtuation at the time of the writing of the State Department letler was as follazs: ~ The State Deoartzent hed ta -2. ¢ - ° an Seed Teeeeti ek Lee ~ oo . \This is, of course, . Leoplicctions Were pending before the State Doszrtment for a ietion to , 12¢ in most cases been held up bby the Stats Depertnent cending 2 cscision of principle as to whether ‘ Fetrusiy 1945 took the vositicn thas Tha State Department further suggested thet the “777 érd that there should be .. . taere is no simple formule to resolve this issue. Similar points of cificrence have exisen between foreizn services and intelligence : wee ww ce ome ee
\ ce ¢! to cr ip) 1 w . . # : ££ ° ts aae Eafcra § ations, we will comment cn certain moinys Creusht ovt in the Siate De © In wi oo "Tare 2 Und prior coniorx nt lstter of 20 February 1945 and —— . y Bee, fed rspvcsentanives, ) uy cr is difficult, h to proces’ <7 Furthernsore, there i of intellirence operations
om . me . Today, the major intelli- of the Nestern Eurosean pavers, Great “Tie Loreic ms¢@ services will not work 2. The State Department considers: that 7 . leer We agree. We consider, however, thit .
32 The State Department suggests that es a seneral metier { ( -We recognize that this often is the case, bu rnecess2rily follow taat ° “so a A3 Zz az — = at ~ o «2 indicated above, in any cases wt. th Papnk trons So sees os ee - Furtzer, the fect that - St oe . os me urmderstind that it is the | This is 2 wise precaution and certainly as regards partment letter refers to = + Q 2 wy © this refers particularly to We doubt that this is practical. . e . oo _— . . cs e ~s - > . . . . ete mee ee ee
. . We belicve that t 7 Tuis of cowrsa is without prejudice to 7 - , \ . 5. Tre State Department has rightly stressed the element of risk ara the danger of eo eee . . ae ° ““" ‘Every effort must be made to minimize this risk and _ “TIn most cases, as indicated sbove,— ; ° j Saturelly, sone risk is inherent in the very mature of Sericus, as this is, we do not consider that it is more serious than tha Cinger. inherent in the - However, we recognise that the wah Gecisicn of ths Stato Department mist be finel as te the measure of rick to
nd a te 2) ‘vi ons n best of co er the Una l Moe DCAM ALLS aa a wOD Ana CS|any a Varennes . es y lates as nneaestA nat - CAIUS Noe Cz: : aA + the : 4 2 i} 3 oO My 3 J ' 3 iY) ry ~ “ eo ot ¢ . a 8 cj ct ‘ ° 1) i?) iy] ri 4 is} be Q a) “ri 0) Oied uw (3) 8 es “ $4 ' fey ' CA) Hn. <5 ‘ i} | t a . ms ‘ . ro) 1 ag nm Fae —_— i! ‘ H 4 i ' ' { 4 rad ~ nrovecsns could | -, -~%4% . a real im mee - fe} Wi 49 cul one aad i ' ‘
. . . . we . : - aad w ° . ° . . in the recommendations which follow, we are not passing unon the @ expect to rake this the svdject of 2 subsequens report. It seess wnnecessary to deal with the cuestion at this tie since - Upon the edecuscy or competence of - : o Ve recognize, hocever, that unless this personnel mect . iL Sa high sta ndara of competency, - - os . + + ret - - _ _ In the lest analysis a ° a « - -~ - on co e 7 . . - . a e - . te ci .3 Dey . “8 aon we . _ We recommends : 2, a = : se cm a - ° e e a -2e That ths State Departzent reconsicer tha . . . 2, That the State Department reviey on their merits 74
Tat in the future, 2 wo ae] zo! A @ i) . 4 v ’ 6) a . P.M oa ny a) wc! a od Q nt J . bh UV . ") a $a p co 9° . ps G 4 t 2 cl ' 5! . ae vs “y 1 ¥ \ 2 a 9 Ra) . x . . rv GY \ & ° a ' . ( “ YO G ‘ t Son t . i. “ re) { | G4 “4 37 yay rs) _ ft ' Q . \ ‘3 -s fx id 45 it) °o ’ ¢) ¢ . Q ‘3 ‘ oo a - | ! . 1 2 ; 3 ’ 5 ' toe 1 L. Q te} . faxd vu) Ww a] eel ost woe ot a a 6% ie 4 ' a is . eB) coe 5 4 n | ty qa , Le 32 3 ‘ o <a io) fry 49 ‘ g, . ° ey ‘ t] ay ! Pe | " . h \ ' o° . . 9 : ~ . mS) Ww . A . ' ‘ “cd 42 : : wp hk ‘ Of os att i
tal orn fic 4 u artment nm LQ 12 State De . ; These men, tnzt is U h5 Pers 4 eZfisera ot Devartient. 2 to 2legat G w ically sf .dor Cit, should also ccnsi Tena d- Pad Eivector of a CLs as: cLoms -, —_ 2 S age -ra - long 3G ergoun3 Lor st Syat en alot yeh wenelel ese GLY Worn g s ¥ enn e-) ne . ~ % sade we yh testes 4 ot ve Sa ty eplisa Ze 4 ssary ¢ 1 for provisio aS < e €. 4 ta £ any cr handline c cant -TGZ0e (5)
(Page 1) 3 May 1948 MEMORANDUM TO: Sidney W. Souers, Executive Secretary National Security Council FROM: Messrs. Allen W. Dulles Mathias F. Correa William H. Jackson SUBJECT: Interim Report No. 1 Referring to your memoranda of February 13, 1948 and March 17, 1948 regarding the survey of the Central Intelligence Agency and certain other intelligence operations, we have been requested to con- sider certain questions which have arisen between the Department of State and CIA with respect to the We have reviewed the correspondence between the State Department and CIA beginning with the CIG letter to State of 22 August 1946 and concluding with State’s letter to CIA of 24 February 1948. We have also had numerous conferences with officials of the State Department and of CIA. The issues narrow down to these: - What policy should govern ; how should this policy be translated into terms of and what procedure should be followed in the
(Page 2) In its letter of 22 August 1946, CIG presented its program to the State Department and The general program outlined in the CIG letter was accepted by the State Department, subject to certain reservations which, in substance, were agreed to by CIG. While this meeting did not bring about a meeting of minds as to all questions at issue, it did serve as a basis for action, and On 17 October 1947 CIA forwarded to the State De- partment a revised Sub- sequently, there were a series of conferences between representatives of the State Department and of CIA, which disclosed a serious measure of dis- agreement between the two offices as to the extent to which State Depart- ment and with regard to the In the course of these conversations CIA indicated a willingness to The matter was brought to a head in a letter addressed to the Secretary of State by Admiral Hillenkoetter under date of 19 January 1948, to which the State Department replied in a letter sent to Admiral Hillen- koetter on 20 February 1948.
(Page 3) The situation at the time of the writing of the State Department letter was as follows: - The State Department had (This is, of course, Applications were pending before the State Department for Action to had in most cases been held up by the State Department pending a decision of principle as to whether The State Department letter of 20 February 1948 took the position that The State Department further suggested that the and that there should be There is no simple formula to resolve this issue. Similar points of difference have arisen between foreign services and intelligence services ever since secret foreign intelligence services have been developed.
(Page 4) The best that one can do is to work out some practical principles to meet an existing situation and to provide for adjustments as conditions change. * * * * Before submitting our recommendations, we will comment on certain points brought out in the State Department letter of 20 February 1948 and in the prior conferences between State and CIA representatives. 1. The State Department suggests that Under normal conditions is difficult, however, to proceed on this basis in Furthermore, there is one phase of intelligence operations
(Page 5) Today, the major intelli- gence objective of the U. Ss. of the Western European powers, Great Britain in particular, But these foreign intelligence services will only work effectively The foreign intelligence services will not work 2. The State Department considers that We agree. We consider, however, that
(Page 6) 3. The State Department suggests that as a general matter We recognize that this often is the case, but it does not necessarily follow that As indicated above, in many cases Further, the fact that We understand that it is the This is a wise precaution and certainly as regards 4. The State Department letter refers to This refers particularly to We doubt that this is practical.
(Page 7) We believe that This is of course without prejudice to 5. The State Department has rightly stressed the element of risk and the danger of Every effort must be made to minimize this risk and In most cases, as indicated above, Naturally, some risk is inherent in the very nature of Serious as this is, we do not consider that it is more serious than the danger inherent in the However, we recognize that the decision of the State Department must be final as to the measure of risk to
(Page 8) be taken Under the best of conditions This time should be allowed and meanwhile However, the CIA should not but should proceed to in this way and through the * * * * Most of the tools essential to the If these tools are not or if they are only As a practical matter, these While no measures can wholly solve this difficulty, we believe that a real improvement could be brought about if
(Page 9) In the recommendations which follow, we are not passing upon the desirability of maintaining We expect to make this the subject of a subsequent report. It seems unnecessary to deal with the question at this time since Further, we are not passing upon the adequacy or competence of We recognize, however, that unless this personnel meets a high standard of competency, In the last analysis a * * * We recommend: 1. That the State Department reconsider the 2. That the State Department review on their merits Due
(Page 10) weight should be given in 3. That in the future, should be assumed in the absence of contrary notification by the State Department-and such nctification should only be given for due cause and after Further, in crder to 4. That the liaison between the State Department and CIA be put on It
(Page 11) officers of the Department. These men, that is the State Department official and the Director of CIA, should also consider, or specifically delegate to joint working groups for study and report, such long-range problems as: (1) (2) The (3) Avoidance of unnecessary duplication (4) Timely provision for (5) Prompt handling of any critical situations which may arise