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THE  CENTRAL  INTELLIGENCE  AGENCY 
arid  -    . 
NATIONAL  ORGANIZATION  FOR  INTELLIGENCE 
/         A  REPORT  TO  THE  NATIONAL  SECURITY  COUNCIL 
'.  by 
Allen  \V.  Dulles,  Chairman 
William  K.  Jackson 
Mathias  F.  Correa 
1    January    1949
THIS  DOCUMENT  CONTAINS  INFORMATION 
AFFECTING  THE  NATIONAL  DEFENSE  OF 
THE  UNITED  STATES  WITHIN  THE  MEAN- 
ING OF  THE  ESPIONAGE  ACT,  50  U.S.C.,  31 
AND  32  AS  AMENDED.  ITS  TRANSMISSION 
OR  THE  REVELATION  OF  ITS  CONTENTS 
IN  ANY  MANNER  TO  AN  UNAUTHORIZED 
PERSON  IS  PROHIBITED  DY  LAV/.
\ 
TAD LIC  OF  CONTENTS 
<>•<■»»  M.1-* 
•  Pago 
letter  of  Trawnsittal 
Smcnary           1 
Chapter  I    Introduction:  Tho  Intelligence  Probloia  in  tho 
United  Statoo    15 
Chapter  II   national  Intelligence  and  tho  national  Socurity 
Act  of  19»i7    21 
Tho  Duties  of  tho  Central  Intelligence 
Agency  under  tho  national  Security  Act  ....  21 
Control  over  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  2h 
The  General  Mission  of  the  Central  Intelligence 
Agency    26 
Conclusions  and  Beconmcndations    '27 
Chapter  III      The  Organization  and  Administration  of  the 
Central  Intelligence  Agency    29 
Organization  .  ' 
 •  29 
Administration    32 
Budget    55 
Security   
.    51* 
Tottmy 
Personnel.    360Ec6Te4 
Conclusions  and  Reconaacndations .   .......  38 
Chapter  IV       Tho  Responsibility  of  -the  Central  Intelligence 
Agoncy  for  tho  Coordination  of  Intelligence 
Activities.   .         lH 
The  Statutory  Provisions         kl 
Tho  Organization  and  Operation  of  the  Machinory 
for  Coordination  .'         Ifjj 
Intelligence  Advisory  Ccraaittoo.   .......      U5 
•\i  ... 
vii
Page 
Interdepartmental  Coordinating  and  Planning 
Staff    •  •  • 
Offico  of  Collection  and  Dlsoc:;:lnation 
National  Security  Council  Intelligence 
Directives!     ........ 
Tho  Degree  of  Coordination  Achieved. 
Scientific  Intelligence   
Domestic  Intelligence  and  Counter-intelligence 
Affecting  tho  National  Security   
Communications  Intelligence   
Proposals  for  Improved  Coordination. 
Conclusions  and  Becommendatlons.  .  . 
Chapter  V 
The  Responsibility  of  tho  Central  Intelligence 
Agency  for  National  Intelligence  Estimates.  .  - 
The  Mandate  under  the  National  Security 
Act  and  the  Directives   
The  Concept  of  National  Intelligence  Estimates 
The  Organization  and  Activities  of  the  Central 
Intelligence  Agency  for  the  Production  of  Na- 
tional Intelligence   '   
Proposals  for  Improving  the  Production  of  Na- 
tional Estimates   
Conclusions  and  Recommendations. 
Chapter  VI  Sorvicos  of  Cossnon  Concern:  Intelligence  Research 
end  Reports   
Proposed  Research  and  Roports  Division 
Periodical  Suscnarlos   
Mioccllanooua  Reports  and  Memoranda.  . 
Tho  National  Intolllgonce  Survey  .  .  . 
U6 
UQ 
6k 
vlii 
!fJ5l«W!Jir»«|i»il"l.l  II 1M
Pago 
Kconoailc,  ficicnUfic  and  Ti.chnolo'-'.lcni 
Intelligence     08 
Conclusions  and  Kocoraxondatlonu     91 
Chapter  VII   Sorvicco  of  Common  Concern:  Tho  Collection  of 
Overt  Intelligence  .......     ...  93 
Contact  Brunch    .  .  93 
Foreign  Broadcust  Information  Branch    101 
Foreign  Documents  Branch  .  .  .  '.    10J 
Conclusions  and  Recommendations    10U 
Chapter  VIII  Services  of  Common  Concern:  The  Collection  of 
Secret  Intelligence   
' 
  107 
Bio  Charter  of  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency 
to  Conduct  Secret  Intelligence  Activities  .  .  .  108 
Organization  of  the  Office  of.  Special 
Operations   ••"...   
i  .  .  .  110 
»      Field  Activities  of  Covert  Intelligence  ....  117 
Security  of  Secret  Intelligence  Activities  .  .  .  122 
Counter-Espionage.    •  12U 
Communications  Intelligence    126 
!Bie  Meed  for  Policy  Direction  of  Secret 
Intelligence  .  .  .  • 
  127 
General  Appraisal.    128 
Conclusions  and  Recommendations    129 
Chapter  EC   Services  of  Common  Concom:  Tho  Conduct  of 
Secret  Operations  ........     ....  131 
Relations  ootwoen  Secret  Intelligence  and 
Secret  Operations    131 
Tho  Off ico  of.  Policy  Coordination    1J2 
&AW*^™i-r:#'Wmi&                Conclusions  and  Rocommendatlons    .  I3U 
IX
r«eo 
Chapter  X    The  Direction  of  the  Central  luteal  Ikciico  Agoncy  .  135 
General  Appraisal     135 
Tha  Question  of  Civilian  Direction    136 
Conclusions  and  Recommendations    13° 
Chapter  XI   The  Service  Intelligence  Agencies  ........  139 
Hiooion  end  Responsibilities    139 
Coordination  of  Service  Intelligence  Agencies  .  l'fl 
The  Status  of  Intelligence  in  the  Services  .  .  l!»6 
Conclusions  and  Recommendations  ........  1^9 
Chapter  XII   The  Intelligence  Functions  of  the  Department 
of  State  .......     ........  151 
The  Research  and  Intelligence  Staff  .."....  152 
■Intelligence  Relations  Vstween  the  State 
*  Department  and  Outside  Agencies  .    157 
Conclusions  end  Recommendations  ........  l6l 
Chapter  XIH  Conclusion    163 
j?W  .1  "»*PU  .U.MU  .■■■',,&,  ITI.|».,.I,<IJ
ANNEXES  t  .■■•■^.ti-v,-^ 
Page 
•1.  Survey  Croup  Tonaa  of  ltoforonoo  (l):  Mcraornndun  datod 
Fobruary  13,  19'iO,  front  Sidney  W.  Soucro,  Exocutivo 
Secretary,  National  Socurity  Council      165 
2.  Survey  Cro:ip  Tanas  of  Roforonco  (II):  Mcasorandua  dated 
March  17,  19»s8,  from  Sidnoy  V.  Sonera,  Executivo  Secre- 
tory, national  Security  Council  .....'      167 
3.  Presidential  letter  dated  January  22,  19'i6,  creating  the 
Central  Intelligence  Group.  .  .'.   •    *-»9 
1».  Section  102  of  the  National  Security  Act  of  I9H7      *-71 
5.  Chart:  Central  Intelligence  Agency  Organization  as  of 
January  1,  2&9      173 
6.  Table:  Personnel  Strength  of  Central  Intelligence  Agency, 
as  of  December  2k,   I9U8     .  17% 
7.  National  Security  Council  Intelligence  Directive  No.  1: 
"Duties  and  Sesponsibili ties"   .-.      175 
8.  Rational  Security  Council  Intelligence  Directive  No.  2: 
"Coordination  of  Collection  Activities  Abroad"      178 
9.  National  Security  Council  Intelligence  Directive  No.  3: 
"Coordination  of  Intelligence  Production      180 
*t 
10.  National  Security  Council  Intelligence  Directive  No.  U: 
"National  Intelligence  Objectives"      18U 
11.  National  Security  Council  Intelligence  Directive  No.  5: 
"Espionage  and  Countcr-Sspionago  Operations"      185 
12.  National  Security  Council  Intelligence  Directive  No.  6: 
"Foroign  Wireless  and  Badio  Monitoring"  .........    186 
13.  National  Security  Council  Intelligence  Directive  No.  7: 
"Domestic  Exploitation"     ......:....    187 
ll».  National  Security  Council  Intelligence  Dircctivo  No.  8:      ( 
"Biographical  Data 
   .    190 
15.  Kntional  Security  Council  Intolllgonco  Diroctivo  Ho.  9: 
"Coasuunicationo  Intolllgonco    * 
    191 
"'"■'■m'itj&T 
xi
LETTER  OF  TRANSMITTAL 
January  1?,    19'' 9 
I.'.itlonal  Security  Council 
Wcahinglon,  D.  C. 
Attention:     Mr.  Sidney  W.  Souora 
Exccutivo  Secretary 
Ccntloscn: 
In  accordance  vith  the  terms  of  tho  memorandum  to  the  under- 
slgnod  from  Kr.  Sidney  W.  Souers,  Executive  Secretary  of  tho  National 
Socurity  Council,  dated  February  13,  ^^S,  as-  supplemented  by  his 
memorandum  of  March  17,  I9U8,*  we  submit  herewith  our  report  on  "The 
Central  Intelligence  Agency  and  Rational  Organisation  for  Intelligence." 
On  January  13,  19*»8,  tho  National  Security  Council  recommended  to 
the  Preoldont  that  a  group  comprising,  individuals  not  in  Government 
service  should  make  a  "comprehensive,  impartial,  and  objective  survey  of 
tho  organization,  activities,  and  personnel  of  the  Central  Intelligence 
Agency."  The  group  wee  asked  to  report  to  the  Council  its  findings  and 
recommendations  on  the  following  matters: 
"(a)  The  adequacy  end  effectiveness  of  the  present  organi- 
zational structure  of  CIA. 
"(b)  The  value  and  efficiency  of  existing  CIA  activities. 
"(c)  Tho  relationship  of  these  activities  to  thoso  of  other 
Departments  and- Agencies. 
*(d)  The  utilization  and  qualifications  of  CIA  personnel." 
As  a  result  of  this  action,  tho  prooont  Survey  Group  was  created  and 
the  undersigned  appointod  by  tho  National  Security  Council  with  the  approval 
*  Soo  Annoxcs  No.  1  and  2  for  tho  toxta  of  thoso  two  momornnda  which 
constitute  the  toras  of  roforonco  for  thlo  survey. 
'ii![.'"«i:ij.i!"ii,iijhi»( 
ill
of  the  President .  Tho  tcrao  of  tho  roiiolution  upproved  by  tho  National 
Security  Council  woro  co:o;sunicutcd  to  tho  Group  on  Fobruary  13,  19'»8. 
Following  discussions  vlth  tho  undersigned  regarding  the  ocopo  of 
tho  survoy,  tho  Exocutivo  Socrotary  of  the  National  Security  Council, 
with  tho  approval  of  tho  Secretaries  of  Stato,  Dofonse,  Army,  Navy  and 
Air  Forco,  sent  to  tho  Survey  Group  on  March  17,  I9U8,  a  second  memo- 
randum which  constituted  an  extension  of  tho  scope  of  tho  survey  as 
originally  set  forth  by  the  National  Security  Council.  In  particular, 
this  meaorandua  included  tho  following  provisions: 
"The  survey  will  coaprise  primarily  a  thorough  and  compre- 
hensive examination  of  the  structure,  administration,  activities 
end  inter-agency  relationships  of  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency 
as  outlined  in  the  resolution  of  the  National  Security  Council. 
It  will  also  Include  an  examination  of  such  intelligence  activi- 
ties of  other  Government  Departments  and  Agencies  as  relate  to 
the  national  security,  in  order  to  make  recommendations  for  their 
effective  operation  and  over-all  coordination,  subject  to  the 
understanding  that  the  Group  vill  not  engage  in  an  actual  physical 
examination  of  departmental  intelligence  operations  (a)  outside 
of  Washington  or  (b)  in  the  collection  of  communications  intelli- 
gence. On  behalf  of  the  National  Security  Council,  I  vill  under- 
take to  seek  the  cooperation  in  this  survey  of  those  Government 
Departments  and  Agencies  not  represented  on  the  Council  vhich  have 
an  interest  in  intelligence  as  relates  to  national  security. 
"It  should  be  understood  that  the  Survey  of  the  Central 
Intelligence  Agency  and  its  relationship  to  other'  Departments  and 
Agencies  vill  bo  done  for  and  with  the  authority  of  the  National 
Security  Council.  The  survey  of  the  intelligence  activities  of 
tho  Departments  of  State,  Army,  the  Navy,  and  tho  Air  Force, 
however,  will  be  for  and  with  the  authority  of  the  rospectivc 
heads  of  thooo  Departments." 
It  was  also  provided  that  tho  Survey  Group  should  submit  from  time 
to  time  recommendations  on- individualo  problems,  and  that  problems  con- 
* 
corning  tho  Control.  Intolllgonco  Agoncy  ohould  bo  glvon  priority  ovor 
thooo  involving  othor  agencies. 
•ft**
~  ~*   'UTTrfi  if   i 
The  Survey  Croup  h:m  submitted  tvo  spec  I'd  rcportn  to  tho  IlttUurtul 
Security  Council,  cscli  one  In  coiuiocllon  wltli  particular  problem.')  boin^ 
conoidoroJl  by  tho  Council  and  ito  luornborn.  / 
Tho  occond  interim  roport,  dated  Kay  13,    19'"8,   doalt   /    / 
with  tho  "Relatione  Between  Secret  Operation  and  Secret  Intelligence." 
Tho  preaent  report  is  baoed  on  on  examination  and  appraisal  of  our 
national  intelligence  structuro  and  opcratior.3  as  created  by  the  National 
Security  Act  of  19^7  and  developed  in  tho  Central  Intelligence  Agency  and 
tho  individual  departments  and  agoncies  concerned  with  national  security. 
In  accordance  with  tho  directive  from  the  National  Security  Council, 
emphasis  has  been  placed  upon  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency,  but  there 
has  also  been  an  examination  of  the  principal  departmental   intelligence 
agencies  in  .order  to  determine  their  scope  in  the  field  of  intelligence, 
and  their  relations  to  each  other  and  to  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency. 
Our  examination  has  been  confined  almost  entirely  to  the  over-all  intelli- 
gence organization  and  activities  in  the  Waohington  headquarters  of  tho 
Central  Intelligence  Agency  and  the  Departaonts  of  State,  Army,  Navy  and 
Air  Force. 
Wo  have  met  with  members  of  tho  directorate  and  personnol  of  the 
Central  Intelligence  Agency  and  with  representatives  of  other  agencies. 
With  the  assistance  of  our  staff,  wo  have  conoultod  approximately  300 
persons  who  by  virtuo  of  their  proocnt  position  or  paat  oxperionco  aro 
familiar  with  intelligence  problems.     In  addition,  a  series  of  confor- 
* 
oncoa  wox-o  hold  at  which  officials  of  all  of  tho  intelligence  ngoncloo 
woro  invited  to  submit  thoir.roconuncndotiono  and  suggestions  and  discuss
-JS* 
U.v.t.  vith  tho  Ci*o«p.  Thoao  conforoncoo  voro 'nttondod  by  ropro«oiitatlvoo 
frora  the  Depsrtxonto  of  State,  Army,  Navy  and  Air  Forco,  tho  Joint  Stuff, 
Rcocorch  and  Devolopracnt  Board  and  Atonic  Energy  Coisaiaslon. 
In  concluoion,  wo  deslro  to  record  our  approciation  for  tlio  effoctlvo 
work  of  tho  staff  aoabors  of  tho  Survey  Group,  Robert  Blum,  Joooph  Larocquo, 
Jr.,  Wallace  A.  Sprogue  and  Edward  X.  Soxo,  in  assembling  data  vith  regard 
to  our  national  intelligence  organization  and  in  oosistlng  tho  members  of 
tho  Survey  Group  in  carrying  out  the  examination  of  our  intelligence 
» 
structure  on  which  thio  report  la  based. 
Faithfully  yours, 
Allen  V.  Dulles,  Chairman 
*  ■  •  Kathias  F.  Correa  •  • 
•       ■ 
•  Wllliom  H.  Jackson 
'rr*m***m'W'!<!**'&X
SUMMAUY 
I 
Tfni  iT  i-  r   ""    "'* 
Tho  primary  objoct  of  thlo  ourvoy  hao  boon  tho  Central  Intolllgonco  Agency, 
« 
ito  organization  and  activltloo,  and  tho  relationship  of  thouo  activities  to 
tho  intolllgonce  vork  of  other  Government  agoncioa.  Examination  hao  boon  mado 
of  those  othor  intolllgonco  agoncioo  only  to  tho  extent  that  their  activitioo 
bosr  upon  tho  carrying  out  by  tho  Central  Intelligence  Agoncy  of  ito  aosignod 
functiono. 
Section  102  ^  <fco  National  Security  Act  of  19>*7    croatos  the  Central 
Intelligence  Agency  ao  on  independent  agoncy  under  tho  diroction  of  the  National 
Security  Council. .  It  given  to  the  Council  broad  powers  in  tho  assignment  of 
functions  to  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  and  creates  a  franevork  upon  vhich 
a  sound  intelligence  system  can  be  built.  The-  Central  Intelligence  Agency  has 
.been  properly  placed  under  'the  National  Security  Council  for  the  effective 
carrying  out  of  its  assigned  function.  It  should,  however,  be  empowered  and 
encouraged  to  establish,  through  its  Director,  closer  liaison  .  vita  the  two 
members  of  the  national  Security  Council  on  whoa  it  chiefly  depends  and  who 
should  bo  the  nain  recipients  of  Its  product--the  Socretary  of  State  and  the 
Secretary  of  Defense. 
The  National  Security  Act,  as  implemented    by  directives    of  the  National 
Security  Council,  imposes  upon  tho  Central  Intelligence  Agency    responsibility 
for  carrying  put  tlsrdeeoSantial  functiono: 
i    (X)    Wie  coordination  of  intelligence  activities; 
(2)  The  correlation  and  evaluation  of  intolllgonco  rolating  to  tho  na- 
tional soeurlty, which  has  boon  intorprotod  by  dlroctlve  as  moaning  the  produc- 
tion of  national  intolllgonco;
******  (?)    Tho  porfonnsnco  coni.iT.lly  of  certain  intolligenco  oorvicoa  of  common 
concern.  Thoiio  lncludo  oorvicoo  of  a  otalic  naturo,  ouch  oo  roooarch  in  f  ioldo 
of  cozrson  uoofulncoo,  and  operational  oorvicoo  uuch  ao  tho  collection  through 
tho  central  agency  of  oocrot  iniolllgonco. 
Thooothroo  functions  constitute  tho  basis  of  on  Integrated  oyotom  of  in- 
telligence end  they  havo  boon  uaod  cs  the  frame  of  reference  for  tho  exomlna- 
.tion  of  tho  Control  lntolligonco  Agency  and  the  related  activities  of  other  ln- 
tolligonco agencies  of  the  Government  represented  on  the  Rational  Security 
Council,  particularly  the  Department  of  State  and  the  Departments  in  the  Na- 
tional Military  Establishment. 
Ho  amendment  to  the  provision  of  the  Act    rolating  to--<  lntelliBra&e\iB/rev- 
' ojulx&at  tbi*  titans..  What  is  needed  is  action  to  give. effect  to  its  true  Intent. 
TEE  KESPOKSIBILin  OF  THE  CEOTRAL  IRHELLIGEITCE  AGEHCY  70S  COOHDIKATIKG  lOTEL- 
LBEHCE  ACTI7ITISS 
Under  the  statute,  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  has  "broad  responsibility 
.  to  coordinate  Intelligence  activities  relating  to  the  national  security.  In 
the  discharge  of  this  responsibility,  tho  Central  Intelligence  Agency  should 
reriov  the  intelligence  field  and  ascertain  where  there  are : gaps  or  overlaps. 
The  agency  best  oqulppod  to  do  a  particular  Job  should  fill  any  gaps.  Where 
tvo  or  ^ro-  ogoncioa  aro  doing  oirailar  work,  the  ono  host  equippbd  ought  to  V 
carry  on the  Job  and  tho  othorb  drop  out  or  thoir  efforts  be  coordinated. 
'.".•:'■■.:■'-.:."■-  :'.    '-    ■'.-■.■  '■■        ..♦':'.:'■■/'■:.'..    -..-■:  ■''■■■       .'■■:.  ■'■'■•     '.■"■;:    "    \  ■''■'•   ""'■■-■   '.■■■■'  ■"'.:.-•.''■     .'.■'•  '.'•,■;.. .     :..-,,.';-.-''■:    ,:■    -'..'.    '■.  \'-'r-  -.'-:.■..■■  '■■''.-': 
■  "'..:'.:"  :.'.':.  '■'■"■■  ■-."'  .  "'-■  ■      ■  .     ''.'"■.'■.■'■■   :'  '■■'•■■■'■  ■'.  '■■'■/■•.  ''"■'■'  ■,"-'-  ■  '"' ,;"  ':■■'  "  '  :v ,  -■'--'.  :  ''■    ■       **  .        •  •"',■•'"  '■■    '  ■'
This  vitally  important  responsibility  ;f or  coordination  is  to  bo  oxcrciood 
by  rocoKaonding  dlroctivoo  for  approval  by  tho  Jfationnl  Security  Council.  Tho 
Contral  Dttolllgtmco  Agency  hao  the  duty  of  planning  for  coordination  and,  iA
L 
consultation  with  tho  other  intelligence  tigonclcn,  of  taking  tho  inltlutlvo  in 
cooking  directives  to  of  feet  it.  Today  thlo  coordinating  function  of  tho 
Contra!  Intelligence  Agoncy  io  not  being  adequately  cxerclocd. 
To  assist  it  lii  carrying  out  thlo  task  tho  Central  Intolligonco  Agency 
haa  available  tho  Intelligence  Advisory  Conmittoo.  Thlo  group  Includes  tho 
Director  of  Central  Intelligence  as  chairman,  the  tho  heads  of  tho  Intolligonco 
staff  o  of  tho  Departments  of  State j  Army,  Havy  and  Air  Force,  tho  Atomic  Energy 
Cotsnission  and  the  Joint  Intolligonco  Group  of  tho  Joint  Staff . 
'  A  number  of  formal  directives  for  the  coordination  of  intelligence  activi- 
ties have  been  issued  by  the  Rational  Security  Council  upon  tho  recommendation 
of  .the    Central  Intelligence  Agency    end  the    Intelligence  Advisory  Committee. 
■  *  ■-''.'        .■■''.'■■■..''*"''■".'...  ■  •    '  ' 
Those  directives,  except  those  specifically  assigning  to  the  Central  Ihtelli- 
gonce  Agency  the  .carrying  out  of  certain  coaaon  services  described  below,  have 
not  gone  far  enough  in  defining  the  scope  and  limits  of  departmental  intelli- 
gence activities.  Those  activities  continue  to  present  many  of  the  sane  Juris- 
dictional conflicts  and  duplication  which  tho National  Security  Act  was  in- 
tended to  eliminate.  Consequently,  the  absence  of  coordinated  intelligence 
planning,  as  between  tho  Central  Intelligence  Agoncy,  the  Service  agencies  and 
the  State  Department,  remains  serious.  Vhat  is  needed  is  continuing  and  effec- 
tive coordinating  action  under  oxlotlng  directives  and  also  dlroctivoo  estab- 
lishing  moro  precisely  the  responsibility  of  the  various  intolligonco  agencies. 
Tho  fiold  of  scientific  and  technological  intelligence  is  an  oxomplo  of 
lack  of  coordination.  Booponsibilitioo  ore  scattered,  collection  offorts 
are  uncoordinated,    atomic  onorgy    intelligence    io  divorced    from    scientific
J? 
lnlcUJe,o:jco  Generally,  mid  there  io  no  rocoeoUod  procedure  for  arriving  at 
authoritative  IntoUlganco  ; csticatcn  in  the  nclontiflc  field, with  tho  pooalblo 
exception  of  atonic  energy  wattoro . 
Another  important  oxniaplc  of  lock  of  coordination  is  in  the  field  of  do- 
Mootic  intelligence  and  counter- intoliigohco  relating  to  the  national security. 
Jurlodiction  over  countor- intelligence  and  countor-oopionngo  cctivitios  is  as- 
signed to  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  In  tho  Unltod  States  and  the  Cen- 
tral Intelligence  Agoncy  abroad.  Eowver,  fifth  colusin  activitioc  and  oopionago 
do  not  begin  or  ond  at  our  geographical  frontiers, and  our  intelligence  to  coun- 
ter then  cannot  he  sharply  divided  on  any  such  geographical  basis*  In  order 
to  meet  the  specific  problen  presented  by  the  need  for  coordination  of  activ- 
ities in  the  field  of  donostic  intelligence  and  counter-intelligence  relating 
to  the  national  security,  it  is rocon^nded  that  the  Director  of  the Inderal 
Bureau  of  Investigation  be  node  a  jpernonent  aeabor  of  the  Intelligence  Advisory 
Comad. ttee «  '■'/   ..-.'■ 
Ilhe  Intelligence  Advisory  Comnitteo  so  far  has  had  little  icpact  on  the 
solution  of  the  problem  of  coordination,  except  in  foraally  approving  proposed 
directives.-  It  should  be  re-activated  and  colled  upon  to  play  an  iaportant 
role. 
So  assist  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  in:  carrying,  out  his  duties 
to  plan  for  the  coordination  of  intelligence,  the  staff  iiv  the  Central  Intel- 
ligence Agency  known  as  the  Intordopartaontal Coordinating  and  Plonnlns  Staff 
should  bo  reconotitutod  and  otrongthenod.  It  ahould  bo  eovpoood  df  poroonnel 
definitely  assignod  to,  and  responsible  to,  tho  Director  of  Control  Ihtolli- 
Hsnco  and  charged,  on  n  f ull-tlao  basis,  :  with  carrying on  continuous  planning 
ijl
for  tho 'coordination,  of  opoclfic  intelligence  activltl.co.  lliio  aU-tff,  vhieh 
nie)it  Vo  culled  tho  "Coordination  Diviaion,"  uhould  oupport  tho  Director  in 
fulfilling  ono  of  hie  moot  important  and  difficult  dutioo  uhdor  tho  Kotiona.1 
Security  Act. 
In  concluding  tho  consideration  of  thio  moot  vital  problom  of  coordination 
of  intelligence  activities,  It  ohould  "bo  omphanizod  that  coordination  can  moot 
off octivoly  bo  achieved  by  mutual  agreement  anong  tho  various  agencioo.  With 
tho  right  moacuro  of  leadership  on  tho  part  of  tho  Control  Intelligence  Agency, 
a  major  dogroo  of  coordination  can  ho  accompli chod  in  that  manner. 
the  msporsiziusr  a?  tes  czmfiL  ikesiltcekce  agewcytos  the  pacaJucrioi?  gf 
IHTELLIGEKCE  HEIATBG  TO  1^  KOTIOIfllL  SECUPITY 
A  long-felt  need  for  the  coordination,  on  the  highest  level,  of  intelli- 
gence opinion  relating  to  "broad  aspects  of  national  policy  and  national  security 
vas  probably  the  principal  noring  factor  in  bringing  aoout  the  creation  of  the 
Central  Intelligence  Agency.  The  lack  of  aaj  provision  for  the  prompt  produc- 
tion of  coordinated  national  intelligence  of  this  kind  vaa  one  of  the  moat 
eignif leant  causes  of  the  Pearl  Earhor  intelligence  failure. 
thio  type  of  national  inteliigfjnc&,  expressed  in  the  form  of  coordinated 
national  estimates,  transcends  in  seopo  and  hreadth  the  interest  and  cocpe- 
tencoof  any  single  intoUlgonce  agency* .  Bonce,  ouch  ootlmatos  ohould  he  fully 
partlclpatod  in  by  all  of  tho  principal  intelllgonco  agoncioo.  All  Jointly 
should  share  in  tho  responsibility  for  them. 
Vita  one  or  two  slgolf leant  oxcoptionu,  tfooao  occurrence  vao  largoly  for- 
tuitouo,  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  has  not  ao  yot  offoctlvoly  earrlod 
out  this  most,  Important  function. 
S
'ilio  Office  of  Roporlii  and  Eotiiwiton  in  tlio  Ccmtral  Iiitcllico^co  A^oncy 
vno  gtvort  rooponaibllity fox*  production  of  national  iutolllgenco.  It  line, 
hovpyor,  boon  coacornod  vltii  a  vidb  yiirloty  of  activltloo  and  with  tho  produc- 
tla*»  of  jaiocollanoouo  rcporto  and  ousraarioa  vhicn  l>y  no  ot^ptch  of  tlie  imgi- 
natlon  could  bo  conoiderod  national  eotisiates. 
Vhore  tho  Offico  of  Hoporto  and  Eotlaaton  produces  oBtlssatoo,  it  usually 
d  oo  on  tho  baeio  of  ito  own  recearch  and  analysis  and  offoro  Its  product 
ao  coaipBtltlvo  vita  tho  eiailar  product  of  othor  agencioB,  rather  than  oe  tho 
coordinated  roaultof  tho  hoot  intelligence  product  "which  each  of  tho  interootod 
egenc   la  eblo  to  contribute* 
The  failure  of  tola  type  of  intelligence  product  to  neot  the  requiressnta 
of  a  coordinated  national  ostiuato  lc  net  Qubatanti&lly  mitigated  by  tho  exist- 
ing procedure  thereby  the  Office  of  Beporte  and  Xotiaatos  eirculatee  ito  oeti- 
i  to  the  intelligence  agenclM  of  State,  Arsy,  ltery  and  Air  Force  and  ob- 
tains a  forml  notation  of  dleeent  or  concurrence.  Voder  this  procedure,  nono 
of  tho  agencies  regards  Itself  as  a  full  participant  contributing  to  a  truly 
national  eatlnate  and  aooeptlng  a  share  in  tho  responsibility  for  it. 
It  is  helierod  that  this  situation  can  he  remedied  if  the  Central  Intel- 
ligence Agency  recognizee  tho  responsibility  vhichithas  under  the  statuto  and 
an  the  leadership  in  orgeniaing  its  own  work  and  in  drawing  upon  that  of  the 
other  intelligonoe  egonclos  of  Oorornsjent  for  tho  production  of  eoordinoted  intel- 
ligence; lima,  within  ite  ovn  organization,  the  Central  intelligence  Agency 
should  hare,  in  lie*  of  the  prooont  Offico  of  Beporto  and  Eatlwitoo,  a  onall 
groep  of  epeoialioto.  which  night  apftfopriatolyho  called  TCetiwiUo  DiYloion. 
^.  
.. 
/-  -•  •&  -  <-*  **,  *
I 
It  vould  bo  tko.tiuj}:  of  thio  group  to  rev iov  tlio  IntollJgcnco -products  of  oihor 
lutclll .gehec  agcriclos  roid  of  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency,  end  to  prcpnro 
drafts  of  national  intelligence  ootlr-'itcm  for  conoldoi'atlon  by  the  Intelligence 
Advljiory  Coroittoo. 
The  t iiisX  process  of  coordination  ohould  toko  place  In  tho  Intelligence 
Advisory  COnaittoe  vhich  vould  review  end  discuss  the  proposed  estimates.  Tho 
finished  eatitato  ohould  bo  clearly  established  as  the  product  of  all  of  the 
contributing  agencies  In  vhich  all  share  and  for  vhich  all  tako  responsibility. 
It  should  bo  recognized  a3  the  most  authoritatlvo  estlxaato  available  to  tho 
jolicy^aeiero.  ' 
^■V^Y^Witfr*  particular  scientific  or technical  intelligence  nattors  are  Involved, 
the  Intelligence  Mviaory  Cotsaittee  should  socuro  the  vievo  of  the  best  quell- 
fled  technical  exports  available  to  thenv  including  experts  froa  the  Research 
•ad  Bevelotoant  Board  and  the  Atccdc  BnorgV  Cocsaission. 
There  should  also  be  provision  for  the  prompt  handling  of  najor  eaergency 
situations  so  that,  as  a  nattor  of  course,  vhon  quick  ostitates  aro  required, 
there  is  laaediato  consultation  and  collective  appraisal  by  tho  Intelligence 
Advisory  Coeaittoo  on  the  basio  of  all  avallablo  lnforaation. 
The  inclttoion  of  tho  Foderal  Bureau  of  Investigation  as  a  permanent  nentbor 
should  assuro  that  intelligence  estimates  vill  be  nado  In  the  light  of  doaoetic 
as  vol!  as  foreign  intolHgoHco.    Frovloion  should  bo  isado  for  tho  rcprooonta- 
:.'?$*?* :&£;  ,**&.'  latolligoiico  Advisory  Comlttoo  of  other  agcnclos  of  the  Covornnont 
»h«H  Eattora  vlthln  thoir  coapotenco  aro  under  dlocueolon.
J 
IKKKOhMAKCK  CKitfKAI.IA'  OK  i^tvid^  01^  CO:"X)5J  COIXKIUI 
Under  the  National  Security  Act,  tlio  Central ' Xutoll 1  goncc  Agency  should 
perforin,  for  t)w  benefit  of  tlio  oxistlng.  intelligence  ogoncicc,  ouch  oorvicoo 
of  cocaon  concern  so  may  bo  assigned  to  It  by  tlio  National  Security  Council. 
Theco  scrvicea,  cc  now  being  perforjaod  by  tho.  Control  Intelligence  Agency, 
can  bo  broken  down  Into  (1)  static  3orvicoo,  consisting  of  Intelligence  rooearch 
and  production  en  certain  aasigned  subjects  vhichdonot  fall  exclusively  within 
tho  function  of  any  one  existing  intelligence  agency,  and  (2)  operating  oorv- 
icoo, conoictlng  of  certain  type3  of  jbatolligonco  collection  end  rolated  aocrct 
operations. 
■  *    "  ■••'-.■  ■  .  
■ 
. 
STATIC  SERVICES  OF  GOt&ON  COHCERH 
At  the  present  tls»  the  static  services  of  Intelligence  research  and  re- 
porting are  carried' out  In  the  Off  ice i  of  Beports  and Estimatea.  If  the  duties 
of  this  Off  ice  la  relation  to  the.  production  of  national  intelligence  are  as- 
signed to  a  newly  constituted  Itota^ 
functions  presently  carried  out  by  the  Off  ice  of  Bepprta  and  Estinatea  and  % 
part  at  least  of  the  personnel  engaged  In  then  could  be  reconstituted  as  the 
nucleus  of  a  Boparate  division  of  tho  Central  Intelligence  Agency  to  be  known 
as  the  "Beaearch  and  Reports  Dirision."  This  Dirision  would  also  Include  the 
Foreign  Docunsmts  Branch  of  tho  Of f ico  of  Operations  and  the  various  inference 
and  library  functions  nowcarrlodon  In  "the"  Office  of  follbction  and  Dlooomljuitipn* 
Tho  oconooic,  scientific  and  tochnological  fioldo  aro  oneo  In  which  all  of 
our  intelligence  agonclos  havo  rarylngr  dogrooo  of  Intoroot.  At  the  proaont 
tine  thoro  is  serious    duplication  in  those  fields  of  ccsaon  concern.     Contral
'  rflfc ■'«■>»/ wfc*  •  —  «. 
V 
jii-odUcfcloii  and  cbor<lJmition  by  tho  proposed  Kononrch  and  Kojiortu  JJlvlnlon, 
would  rcoult  in -grout'  ocono:ny  of  offer t  mid  Jeiprovcnismt .  of  tho  product.  For 
oxmnplo,  tho  organization  within  tlilo  dlviolon  of  a  acicntific  brunch,'  atuffod 
by  highly  qualified  pcmonnol  and  oinpouored  to  draw  upon  tho  ocicntific  per- 
sonnel of  ouch  organizations  of  Covornsiont  ae  tho  Roooarch  and  Development 
Board  and  tho  Atomic  Energy  CoEaioaion  for  tho  purpose  of  dealing  with  spe- 
cialized scientific  problcns,  is  a  projoct  which  shoxild  have  tho  hlghoot 
priority. 
#  "  .  ■ 
*         *  • 
This  division  of  tho  Central  Intelligence  Agency  ahould  he  otaffod  in  part 
by  rcprooontatlvesof  tho  dopartaontal  intelligence  services  so  that  the  reports 
produced  would  represent authoritative  and  coordinated  opinion  and  he  accoptod 
"•  '•■■■■  *'        "  « 
as  ouch  by  "Hie  various  consumer  agencies.   '     .  "     ' 
•  .  *■  * 
•The  Director* 0  planning  staff  for  coordination  of  activities,  the  proposed 
Coordination  Division,  should  reVie*  tho  question  as  to  what  subjects  night 
appropriately  bo  assiguod  to  the  now Research  and-  Roports  Division  for  contral 
research  and  report  and  what  services  now  centrally  performed  in  the  Cen+ral 
Intelligence  Agc»Ky  vight  be  elialnatefl.  The  latelllgenco  Advisory  Cojcsnitteo 
would  bo  tho  agency  to  dotoralno  tho  allocation  of  work,  and  in  case  of  any 
failure  to  agree  tho  matter would bo  rof orrod  to  tho National  Security  Council. 
OTERATIK3  SERVICES  OF  0063X81  COHCERN 
'"*'*■■■.':     ■;.  J  ■':'•:     '■■; -"v  .-"..'■  ~.  '.  :  .'-■'-".'-"'-  ■''■  "■  ;v ';.<■.    ''.'.■-  ''"""'.  '■:''•;   ':" -':'■''■:"•":  -'/  ;.■''■■'  '""         '    *    "  -■"  •    - 
'':  •-.■-'',- ::  ■  --■'.'■  '•,  '.:■■:.■■  .'  .*'■•'        ".'  :  ' '"'.  ■'*'■!    .'■!,'    ■  .'..     ":'■  ■■'■''  '•".'%  :'""■-",'■■'-  ''■';■.■    '    ■  ■'. -  '  -*'  .*-.    '     "..  ■'"'-■■';■  .■  ■/  ;:.■*"■'"'■■'■     '., ..'•    .'".    .... ''■■'■  .^     ■■■  ■'/'.■'.' ■  '  ■■  -''.■'• 
Tho  oporating  oorvlcos  of  cowaoa  concern  prouontly  perf  oraodby  tho  Central 
Intelligence  Agency  consist  of  tlio  collection,  through  tho  Of  f  lco  of  Operations , 
of  certain  types  of  intelligence  in  tho  United  states  ~  i.o. ,  intolligonco  from 
private  individuals, firwo,  cducatiotial  and  scientific  tosUtutiono^etCi;  tho
collection  of  eecrct  Intelligence  ahroad  through  the  Off Ico  of  Special  Opcra- 
tlonn;  end  tho  conduct  of  soci'Qt  oporatlonn  abroad  .through  tho  Off  Ico  of  Policy 
Coord  lnation. 
All  of  those  ocrvlcoo  aro  appropriately  allocated  to  tho  Central  Intelli- 
gence Agency.  Thooo  operating  functions  are  no  intbr-related  and  Inter- 
dependent  that  they  should  hare  cenmon  direction  at  uoao  point  holov  tho  Dlroc- 
tor"  of  Central  Jxttolligenco.  i 
3h  its  oocrot  intelligence  vork,  tho  Off ico  of  gpoclal  Operations  roquiros 
*  cloror  lini  son  vSttv  tho  other  lntolllgonco  agencies,  ospocially  those  -  of  tlic- 
wlUjtary  eerYlcce    and  of  the    State  DopartMont  vhlch    are  its  chief  conouwore 
■  i.i.n  .iw  n  imii  ■jim
L 
and  vl.Jch  should  ho  able  to  guido  lt.'j  colloctlou  effortu  moro  olTcfctiVfily  than 
^th^V  do  at  present.  Vlio  counter-intelligence  function  of  tho  OffJco  of  Spociul 
Operations  requires  noro  cwphaoio  and  thoro  ia  need  for  hotter  coordination  of 
all  its  activities  with  tho  military,  particularly  la  tho  occupied  urcaa. 
THE  OSS*liJZATIOM  AID  DIRECTION  OF  THE  CEHTRAL  BfflELLIGEilCS  ACESICY 
The  principal  dofoct  of  tho  CoDtral  Intelligence  Agoncy  io  that  itn  direc- 
tion, administrative  organisation  and  performance  do  not  show  sufficient  ap- 
prociation  of  tho  Agency1  o  assigned  functions,  particularly  in  the  fields  of 
intelligence  coordination  and  the  production  of  intelligence  estimates.  Tho 
result  has  hocn  that  tho  Central  Intelligence  Agency  has  tendod  to  hocoae  Just 
one  more  intelligence  agency  producing  intelligence  in  ccsaetition  vlth  oldor 
ostahlished  agencies  of  the  Co^ernBent  departments,    -,-, 
.'■'■■'.'■'•:,.'■.'       '  •  ■ .    ■  •  ■'■-'",;'  *  .  '? 
Sinco  it  is  the  task  of  tiio  Director  to  see  that  the  Agoncy  carries  out 
Its  aosignod  functions,  •  the  failure  to  do    so  is  necessarily  a    reflection  of 
inadequacies  of  direction. 
; .'  ■  '       *■..''  ■  • 
Thoro  io  one  over-all  point  to  he  made  with  roopoct  to  tho  adninistratica. 
of  tho  Central  Intelligence  Agency.      Tho  organization  is  oYer-adainiotorod  in 
tho  oenso  that    adodnlotratiYO  considerations  have  hoen  allowed    to  guido .and, 
on  occaoion,  OYcn  control  intelligence    policy  to  the  dotriocnt  of  tho  latter. 
Vndor  the  arrangexonts  proposed  in  this  report,  tho  hoado  of  tho  novly  conoti- 
tutod  Coordination,  Sstlmtoo,  Itoooarch  and  Hopprto, ,  and  Operations  Divisions 
would  ho    included    in  the  iaetediate    staff  of  tho  Director.       In  this  way  tho 
;.-■"   Director',    who  at  present    relioo  chiefly    on  his  administrative  staff ,     would 
W  hrought  into  intlratoconUict  with  tho   day- to-'day   oporutlono  of  his  agoncy 
and  ho  ahle  to  givo  policy  guidance  to  tliom.. 
....  •      •     •  j,
In' Resenting  on  afliaiiiiotrat'lon,  the  question  of  occur  J  ty  :-.houlti  aloo  bo 
atrconcd.  The  Director  io  charged  under  the-  lnw  with  protecting  intelligence 
oources  ;-xd  methods  fron  unuuthorized  disclosure.  Ono  of  the  bent  methods  of 
achieving  thlo  Is  to  corroct  tho  present  yitnatlon  vherc  the  Agency  1g  viewed 
end  generally  publicized  as  the  collector  of  occrct  Intelligence  and  to  bury 
its  cocret  functions  within  a  Central  Ihtolllgcnco  Agency  whose  chief  recog- 
nized cctivitios  are  the  coordination  of  intelligence  and  the  production  of 
intelligence  estimates.  .'./.. 
In  reviewing  the  work  of  the  directorate,  consideration  has  been  given  to 
the  question  whether  or  not  the  Director  should  be  a  civilian.  The  work  of 
the  Agency,  from  its  very  nature,  requires  continuity  in  that  office  which  is 
not  likely  to  be  achieved  if  a  military  man  holds  the  post  on  a  "tour  of  duty" 
basis.  For  this  reason,  no  well  as  becauoo  freedom  from  Service  ties  is  de- 
sirable, the  Director  should  be  a  civilian.  This  reccasnendation  does  not  ex- 
dude  tho  possibility  that  the  post  might  be  held  by  a  military  man  who  has 
severed  his  connection  with  the  Service  by  retirement. 
THE  SERVICE  HHSLLIBEKCE  ACEKCIES  AMD  22R  1M3EUJGEKCE  FqJHCTIOKS  OF  TEE  STATE 
DETARTKEmT 
>   The  Service  intelligence .  ogencieo  and .■'tho  intelligence  organization  of 
■"■■'■■  .'■■'  /•  -l ,:  ■  
■ .  ■  ■  ■  '■■"■  ■     •■ 
tho  Stato  Department  hate  been  reviewed  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  over-all 
coordination  of  intelligence  and  of  the  contribution  which  xheso  agencies 
should  mnko to  the  aoscmbly  and  production  of  national  intelligence. 
•   As  regards  tlio  Sorvlco  lntolllgcnco  agoncloa,  the  active  oxorcloo  by  tho 
Central  Intolllgonco  Agoncy  of  i^  o 
moro  of  f  icicnt  allocation  of  of  fort  than  is  presently  .tho*  case .   Tho  Service 
■1*»  ,HI|  H   I  t  II    II  . ..*" 
r
i  'mil  dm'r    '  '* 
agpiicJaa  should  coi:com  llicmclvon  priiicijiully  with  military  Jnlolllguuco 
quoallonn,  leaving  tho  Central  Inlulllgonco  /tfcricy  to  perform  ngraod  central 
oorvlceo  of  consjon  Jjitoroot.  In  addition,  continuing  rouponaibility  of  tliu 
Central  Intolllgonco  Agoncy  for  coordination  nhould  bo  oxorciood  villi  roupoct 
to  corlaln  Sorvlco  activities,  for  oxamplo,  ooplonago  and  countor-oupionago  in 
occupiod  aroas.  Tho  Joint  Sitolligonco  Coaaitteo  vould  contlnuo  to  operato 
with  its  membership  unchanged  and  would  concern  itself  exclusively  with  mili- 
tary and  strategic  questions  as  directed  by  the  Joint  Chief  s  of  Staff.  The 
Services  vould  participate  In  the  formulation  of  national  intelligence  esti- 
mates through  their  membership  3n  tho  Intelligence  Advisory  Coooittco  and  would 
eharo  in  the  collective  responsibility  for  these  estimates. 
In  the  case  of  the  Besearch  end  Intelligence  ataff  cf  the  Stato  Department, 
the  concluaion  has  boon  reached  that  this  ataff,  as  at  present  constituted,  is 
not  sufficiently  clooo  to  operation  and  policy  natters  In  the  Dopartaoat  to 
furnish  the  necessary  liaison  or  the  political  intelligence  estimates  required 
by  the  Central  Uktelligenco  Agency  for  the  preparation  of  national  estimates. 
Accordingly,  It  is  desirable  that  a  high  official  of  the  Stato  Department  be 
aosigaated  as  its  Intelligence  Off iccr  to  coordinate  these  activities,  to  act 
as  the  Department's  roprosbhtativo  on  the  2htollieonce  Advisory  Cosaittoo  and. 
in.  general,  to  act  as  liaison  with  the  Central  Intelligence  Agoncy  with  respect 
tothe  intelligence  and  relatod  activities  of  the  two  agoncios  and  to  devolop 
closo  working  relations  botvoon  them. 
CfcKCIJSIOH        ■;■•.'■'.'  ' 
V^  can  novor  replace  individual  initiative  and 
jiblllty,  tho  Control  Intolllgonco  Agency,  roorganizott  along  tho  fwictional
lln-jii  Indicated  In  thin  rcj.ort,  nhould  Lo  ul/lo  rcoro  offccUvo.ly  to  carry  out 
tho  dutiou  nanl&v.-A  it  by  Jaw  and  thu:-.  hring  our  ovw-all  JntoHlgonco  nytitc;a 
clooor  to  Uytt  point  of  efficiency  which  tho  national   iiocurity  donundo. 
Tho  foregoing  ourcr.iry  io  only  a  brief  outline  of  tho  wain  pointo  of  the 
roport  end  dooo  not  tako  tho  place  of  the  detailed  diacuBaion  In  tho  report 
end  tho  varlouo  concluciono  and  reconunondationB  at  tho  clooo  of  tho  roopoctive 
chaptoro. 
jrgfm.  <*  mn,wmftry*i^*>im\<jf  *.»<*•*.  '■!*y/jm?.iw
CHAPTER  I 
INTRODUCTION 
THE  INTELLIGENCE  PROBLEM  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES 
Ecforo  considering  tho  adequacy  and  effectiveness  of  tho  work  of  -tho 
Central  Intelligence  Agoncy  and  lto  rolations  to  our  other  intolligonco  agon- 
cico,  a  brief  word  of  background  may  bo  holpful. 
Although  the  Central  Intolligonco  Agoncy  Is  largely  on  outgrowth  of  our 
experience  in  World  War  II,  it  would  be  wrong  to  proceed  from  the  premise  that 
prior  to  the  war  our  Government  had  operated  without  intelligence  as  to  tho 
capabilities  and  intentions  of  possible  eneaioe  or  prospective  alli.es.  The 
Department  of  State  had  long  maintained  a  widespread  information  -  gathering 
service.  The  Army,  the  L'avy  and  certain  other  departments  of  the  Government 
had  maintained  their  own  systems  of  collecting  information  and  producing 
intelligence.  ' 
Prior  to  World  War  II,  however,  we  had  no  integrated  secret  intelligence 
service.  Wo  had  not  adequately  exploited  the  available  sourcos  of  overt  in- 
telligence. We  had  no  central  agency  to  coordinate  intelligence  collection 
and  production,  and  to  assemble  tho  beet  availablo  intelligence  for  expression 
in  national  estimates  to  guide  in  tho  formulation  of  foreign  policy  and  the 
preparation  of  our  defense  plans. 
In  World  Wars  I  and  II  our  Europoan  Allioo,  Groat  Britain  in  particular, 
had  placed  tho  product  of  thoir  intolligonco  sorvicoo  largoly  at  our  disposal. 
Whilo  vo  can  cxpoct  in  tho  future  aoointanco  from  tho  intolligonco  services  of 
frlondo     and  alllos,     vo  havo  rightly     concluded  that  wo  ohould     not  depend  on 
.  15
s  . 
y 
tl:o::i  for  our  5iitoUU;ouco  to  llio  oxtont  wo  voi-o  fovcod  to  do  in  World  War  I 
and  during  thy  early  dnys  of  \.'o:-ld  War  II. 
It  was  World  W:ir  II  which  ohowod  both  our  deficiencies  in  Intelligence 
and  nloo  what  wo  could  accomplish  undor  pressure.  T)ux>ugh  tho  expansion  of. 
fho  facilities  of  tlio  Stato  Deportment  and  tho  military  oorvicoo,  through  tho 
Off lco  of  Strategic  Sorvlcoa  —  our  f lrat  move  towards  a  control  intelligence 
agency  —  through  onlisting  tho  heat  pornonnol  that  could,  ho  found,  In  and  out 
of  Covensaont  service,  •  vo  wcro  turning  out  a  vory  crodltahlo  performance  In 
many  phases  of  intelligence  work  veil  before  tho  end  of  Vuc   war. 
Vo  nov  recognizo  that  if  wo  are  to  have  adoquato  intolligonco  la  tines  of 
oriole,  vo  must  prepare  la  tlno  of  peace,  and  we  hare  seriously  turned  to  tho 
task  of  building  up  a  central  intelligence  organization.  The  country  has  now- 
accepted  the  verdict,  oven  if  somewhat  reluctantly,  that  peace-tine  intelli- 
gence is  essential  to  security  and,  as  many  of  our  military  leaders  have  said, 
our  first  line  of  defense.  It  took  us  c  long  time  to  reac'i  this  conclusion, 
and  ve  are  only  now  gradually  getting  over  our  suspicions  of  intelligence  a*.i 
our  tendency  to  confuse  it  with  mere  Intrigue  and  tho  more  lurid  side  of  es- 
pionage. Ve  aro  beginning  to  accept  it  as  serious  and  honorable  work  and  essen- 
tial to  our  dofon3e. 
It  is  voll  to  recognize,  however,  that  an  efficient  Intelligence  organiza- 
tion cannot  bo  built  ovomlght. 
It  will  roquiro  years  of  pationt  work  to  provido  aklllod  personnel  to  do 
tho  Job.  Blueprints  and  organization  charto,  oven  logio3.ation  and  triple  appro- 
priations will  not  take  tho  place  of  competent  and  highly  trained  men  and 
,■■■  mnr
vomen.  Without  lho;n  ve  tth.ilJ  Jinvc  nolUu-v  effective:  lntelllgriroo  oi>r;y.-»tlo;:a 
nor  sound  intelligence  c;ti;.i:tc.'i.  Unfortunately,  in  tlio  difficult  org.-inl:wi- 
tlonal  period  nince  the  vr.v,  tho  future  of  intclJ.Jf.:.-iicc  as  u  career  hay  needed 
no  uncertain  that  r.iny  war-trained  and  competent  jr.cn  have-  left  the  oorvice, 
end  it  Jia3  been  particularly  difficult  to  find  rccruito  to  tako  thoir  place. 
Finally,  occur ity  for  our  intelligence  activities  is  not  alvayo  easy  to 
achieve  here  in  the  United  States.  It  io  not  only  the  penetration  of  fifth 
colunnisto  which  we  have  to  Guard  against.  We  have  the  general  problem  r loins 
out  of  our  tradition  that  all  of  the  affairs  of  the  Government  ohall  bo  con- 
ducted in  the  open.  Sometimes  wo  tend  to  carry  thin  over  even  as  regardo  the 
publication  of  the  intimate  details  of  intelligence  operations.  In  peacetime, 
particularly,  it  io  not  always  easy  to  reconcile  our  vital  interest  in  pro- 
tecting the  freedom  of  the  press  with  the  need  for  silence  on  certain  phases 
of  intelligence.  .  • 
As  agains't  these  debit  items,  we  could  cite  a  long  list  of  highly  favorable 
factors.  America  has  the  potential  resources,  human  and  material,  for  the 
best  intelligence  service  in  the  world.  V/ithin  our  borders  we  have  every  race 
and  nationality,  loyal  eons  speaking  every  language,  travelling  and  resident 
in  ©very  foreign  country.  Wo  have  a  wide  geographical  base  for  the  development 
of  intelligence  work.  We  have  the  greatest  reoervoir  of  scientific  and  tech- 
nical okllla.  We  haye  important  allies  abroad  who  are  ready  to  join  their 
knowledge  to  ours  and  to  givo  us  the  benefit  of  their  years  of  oxperionco  in 
intolligcnco.  And  last,  and  poooibly  most  important  of  all,  in  the  field  of 
intelligence  work, we  can  develop  the  individual  initiative,  skill  and  ingenuity 
of  a  free  pooplo,  and,  in  dealing  witn  our  main  intelligence  antagonists,  oven 
Jtliois-h  thoy  oporato  with  the  iron  diociplino  imposed  by  the  Kremlin,  wo  can 
*  .   .  17
show  tint  free  won  can  bo  vastly  jr.oro  efficient  Hum  thouo  working  for  a 
nlr-.ve  nyntcn;. 
Thoso  are  oorao  of  our  great  asaotn;  our  problem  io  to  mobilize  thc^i. 
Ihcroarorcal  olcacnto  of  urgency  in  seeing  that  this  taok  is  accomplished.  * 
(1)  .America  today,  as  never  before  in  tine  of  peaco,  is  vulnerable  to 
sudden  and  possibly  devastating  attack.  To  rccet  an  initial  attack,  there  are 
no  sure  military  weapons  of  defense  and  it  nay  veil  bo  that  our  best  protec- 
tion lies  in  adequate  advance  knowledge  of  the  character  and  timing  of  the 
danger. 
(2)  A  vast  area  of  the  world  stretching  froa  the  Elbe  Elver  In  Gersaay 
to  the  Yangtse  in  China  is  largely  behind  an  iron  curtain  whore  the  normal 
sources  of  information  are  partially  or  wholly  lacking.  The  techniques  of  an 
intelligence  service  ought  to  be  one  of  the  important  means  of  penetrating 
this  barrier.  - 
(3)  A  whole  new  area  of  knowledge  in  the  field  of  science  has  becorso 
vital  for  our  defonse.  This  field  cuts  across  the  functions  of  various  Govern- 
ment departments  and  presents  new  problems  froa  the  viewpoint  of  intelligence 
collection  and  coordination. 
(k)  Tho  far-flung  activities  of  the  fifth  column,  both  here  and  abroad, 
prosent  a  nov  typo  of  throat  to  our  socurity,  and  we  roquire  a  concerted  in- 
telligence program  to  countor  this  dangor. 
Those  aro  only  a  few  of  tho  developments  which  give  to  intelligence  on 
importance  ln  our  dofonoc  system  which  it  has  novcr  had  in  tho  past  in  time  of 
peace.  Fortunately,  theno  facto  m*o  now  bocoaing  woll  undorntood,  and  tho
/WlmlniulrnUon,  Urn  Coii,'.;ivnn  and  l.lm  people  nh.-irc  wJUi  du:id]y  nurloiuinnnn  tht> 
dolonnlnaUon  V.-.nt  the  Unlto<l  GluUru  )ioro  mid.  now  lih.'ill  ImlM  Uio  boot.  InlcJll- 
genco  ccrvlcc   Unit  our  nulioniil     (jonluo  and  our  profit     ro.'jourcoo   can     provide: . 
tti-*ftWS,l  MM  JL  llfl^JWlPBMJI,  j^jiy 
THERE  IS  NO  PAGE  20.
CHAPTER  II    
NATIONAL  INTELLIGENCE  AND  THE 
NATIONAL  SECUKiTY  ACT  OF  1947 
Beginning  aa  ourly  an  19'tH  preparations  "oro  undor  way  for  tho  transition 
f roa  var-tice  into3JLigonco  to  a  porraanont  intelligence  organization  ouitod*  to 
our  poat-var  nseda. 
In  a  aorloo  of  dlecuaoions  acong  the  intoroetod  Govorocont  agoncioa  as  to 
how  tho  country  could  nost  offoctivoly  organize  its  porcanont,  long-range,, 
poaco-tico  lntolligonco  thore  was  general  ogroonent  on  oono  fora  of  a  central 
agency.  There  vas,  hovevor,  a  sharp  divorgonce  of  views  a3  to  tho  scope  of  the 
activities  of  auch  an. agency,  the  authority  it  ohould  enjoy,  tho  manner  in 
vhich  it  should  be  administered  and  controlled  and  vhero  in  the  Govemnont  it 
should  be  located.  These  iosues  vers  resolved  at  that  tJ.ce.  through  tho  crea- 
tion by  Presidential  letter  (See  Annex  No.  3)  of  the  Contral  Intelligence  Group, 
and  then  Eore  definitoly  determined  through  tho  establishment  of  the  Central 
Intelligence  Agency  by  Congress  in  Section  102  of  tho  National  Security  Act  of 
19^7.  (See  Annex  No.  k). 
TEE  DUTIES  OF  THE  CKvTRAL  IHTELLIGEKCE  AGENCY  UNDER  TIE  NATIONAL  SECURITY  ACT 
Section  102  (d)  of  this  Act  defines  tho  duties  of  tho  Central  lntolli- 
gonco Agency  as  follows:  - 
"(d)  For  tho  purpose  of  coordinating  tho  lntolligonco  activities  of  tho 
oovoral  Covomaont  departments  and  agencies  in  tho  intoroat  of  national  secu- 
rity, it. shall  bo  tho  duty  of  tho  Agoncy,  under  tho  diroction  of  tho  Rational 
Socurity  Council  — 
« 
"(l)  to  advise  tho  National  Socurity  Council  In  isattoro  concerning 
ouch  lntolligonco  activities  of  .tho  Government  departments  and  agoncioo 
ao  rolato  to  national  security;
r— 
"(2)  to  make  recommendations  to  the  National  Security  Council  for 
the  coordination  of  such  intelligence  activities  of  the  department  and 
agencies  of  the  Government  ae  relate  to  the  national  security; 
"(3)  to  correlate  and  evaluate  intelligence  relating  to  the  national 
aecurlty,  and  provide  for  the  appropriate  dissemination  of  such  intelli- 
gence within  the  Government  using  where  appropriate  existing  agencies  and 
facilities:  Provided,  That  the  Agency  shall  have  no  police,  aubP°ena/ 
Jau-enf oroeme-nt-powers, or  Internal- security  functions:  Provided  further ,, 
That  the  departments  and  other  agencies  of  the  Government  shall  continue 
to  collect,  «v*luate,  correlate,  and  disseminate  departmental  intelli- 
gence: Ana  provided  further,  That  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence 
shall  he  responsible  for  protecting  Intelligence  sources  and  methods. from 
unauthorized  disclosure; 
"(U)  to  perform,  for  the  benefit  of  the  existing  intelligence  agen- 
cies such  additional  services  of  common  concern  as  the  Eational  Security 
Council  determines  can  be  more  efficiently  accomplished  centrally; 
"(5)  to  perform  such  other  functions  and  duties  lelated  to  intelli- 
gence affecting  the  national^securlty  as  the  National  Security  Council 
may  from  time  to  time  direct." 
In  these  provisions  the  -authors  of  the  National  Security  Act  shoved  a 
sound  understanding  Of  our  basic  intelligence  needs  by  assigning  to  the  Central 
Intelligence  Agency  three  broad  duties  which  had  never  before  been  adequately 
covered  in  our  national  Intelligence  structure.   These  duties  are:  (l)  to 
advise  the  National  Security  Council  regarding  the  Intelligence  activities  of 
the  government  and  "»>»  recommendations  for  their  coordination;  (2)  to  pro- 
vide for  the  central  correlation,  evaluation  and  dissemination  of  intelligence 
relating  to  the  national  security;  and  (3)  to  assure  the  performance,  cen- 
trally, subject  to  National  Security  Council  direction,  of  certain  intelligence 
and  related  functions  of  common  concern  to  various  departments  of  the 
Government.         ...•._■>-.   ••  • 
The  powers  given  to  the  National  Security  Council  and  the  Central  Intel- 
ligence Agency  under  Section  102  of  the  Act  establish,  in  our  opinion,  the 
framework  for  a  sound  intelligence  service  for  this  country.  Accordingly,  we
do  not  ouggont  any  aEon<)!tf;nto  to  the  Act  and  boliovo  it  would  bj  ur.wjuo  to 
tamper  with  thio  legislation  until  wo  havo  had  further  oxporlonco  In  oper- 
ating uiidor  It.  Throughout  our  report  wo  otronn  tho  vital  importance  of 
eivlng  offoct  to  tho  real  legislative  intent  through  tho  effective  oxorcioo 
by. tho  Central  Intelligence  Agency  of  those  functions  assigned  to  It  by 
tho  Act..  Wo  rofer  particularly  to  tho  responsibility  of  tho  Control  Intel- 
ligence Agoncy  for  tho  coordination  of  intolligonco  activition  and  tho  co- 
ordination of  intelligence  opinion  In  tho  f orm  .  of  national  intelligence 
ootiinatoo. 
In  providing  for  a  seni-autonomouo  highly  centralized  agency  vlth  a  broad 
variety  of  intelligence  responsibilities  affecting  various  Government  agencies, 
ve  have  departed  froa  the  general  pattern  followed  by  othor  countries.  Thoro 
the  tendency  in  noct  phases  of  intelligence  has  been  to  avoid  such  a  degree  of 
centralization.'  Under  the  conditions  oxieting  in  tho  United  States  ve  believe 
that  the  degree  of  centralization  proposed  under  the  National  Security  Act  can 
be  Justified,  provided  that  the  distinctive  functions  of  the  Central  Intelli- 
gence Agoncy  are  handled  according  to  their  special  roiulrononta.
COi.TKOL  0VE8  THE  CENTBAI  -D1TELLEGEKCE  AGENCY  • 
Wo  do  not  asroo  vith  tho  argioont,  of  ton  advanced,  that  tho  Central  Inlol- 
llgonco  Agency,  or  at  loaot  lto  operating  aorvicou,  ohould  bo  placod  undor  tho 
diroct  control  of  ono  of  tbo  oxocutivo  dopartEonto  of  tho  Govomsont,  ouch  aa 
tho  Department  of  Stato  or  tho  National  Military  EntablloJiaont.  Tho  actlvitioo 
of  tho  Contral  Intolllgonco  Agency  do  not  concorn  oithor  of  thouo  dopartaonto
oxclu.ilvo.ly.  Mor«.ovor.  tho  iMlwini  »t.rnU  vo  nn-p.iv.iswi1.fi  of  thu.v.  d«.].-irl.:r,.i.l..i 
oro  not  vcill  r,;d  U«l  to  tho  conduct  of  oxtrnnlv,.  nocrot.  roroH;»  inl...U1,-...r.co 
opcmtlono.  Tlio  fact  that  in  tiina  of  war  nocrut  iictivHIun  p.ru  prlsiarUy  of 
concern  to  the  military  iu  not,  In  our  opinion,  uufflclcnt  jutitiflciaion  for 
placing  then  under  nllittry  control  in  tine  of  peace.  The  National  Occur ity 
Act  io  flexible  enough  and  the  authority  of  the  Notional  Security  Council 
oufflciontly  bread  to  poralt  any  nocoaoary  adjustments  within  tho  Control  In- 
tolligonce  Asoncy  oo  that  thooo  qporationo  vill  bo  rooponolvo  to  tho  noodo  of 
tho  pollcy-ra'jdnB  ^iL  operating  dopartaente  of  tho  Govornrmnt,  without  oub- 
ordinatin3  then  directly  to  thooo  depj-.rtmonto. 
Wo  havo  aloo  conoidorod  tho  question  whether  tho  Central  Intelligence 
Agency  as  a  whole  is  propoi-ly  placed  in  our  governmental  otructuro  undor  tho 
IbtKnal  Security  Council.  When  the  National  Security  Act  was  being  drafted 
doubts  were  expressed  vbethor  a  coaaittee  Buch  eotho  National  Socurity  Council 
would  bo  able  to  give  effective  direction  to  tho  Central  Intelligence  Agency. 
It  was  argued  that  the  national  Security  Council  was  too  largo  a  body,  would 
bo  preoccupied  with  high  policy  sattoro,  and  would  ceet  too  infrequently  to  bo 
able  to  give  sufficient  attention  to  the  proper  functioning  of  the  Contral  In- 
tolligonco  Agency. 
Thoro  io  force  to  tho  criticioa  that  a  cossittco,  no  rattor  how  auguot, 
io  rarely  an  offoctivo  body  for  tho  diroction  of  tho  current  operations  of 
anothor  agency.  It  io  true  that  tho  National  Socurity  Council  cannot  effec- 
tively anour-a  tho  taok  of  directing  ouch  curront  oporationo,  and  ohould  not 
attonpt  to  do  oo,  oxcopt  to  tho  oxtont  of  aoouring  ltoolf  of  cccmlianco  with 
ita  dlroctivoo.  Hovovor,  tho  Council,  whooo  chairman  io  tho  Pi-ooldont  and 
whono  r.ewborah.lp  co-n?riooa  tho  highont  authority  in  tho  intorootod  dopartawnto
of  the  G.)V(r:i::_Mit,  c.ixn  rcrAcr  cl'i'ocLlvf  r.crvir.c  In  tic Lci.ul iilnt.*.  the  ivit.urc  and 
ncr.po  of  U:"  uctlvltlco  of  the  Contra!  .Intelligence  Agency  wlUiln  the  f r-'vi;o - 
vor):  of  the  ?;;illo;n].  Socurlty  Act. 
Wc  rcco:;:.;ic:rJ,  however,  that.  proviolon  oliould  be  r.atie  for  cloucr  linlvon 
between  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  and  the  two  te-'iil-crn  of  the  National 
Security  Council  on  whora  it  chiefly  depend:;:  namely,  t)ic  Secretary  of  State  mid 
the  Secretary  of  Defennc.  Y/e  suggest  that 'the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence 
he  encouraged  to  seek  current  advice  end  continuing  guidance  fron  these  tv:o 
members  of  the  National  Security  Council  on  cittern  which  ia.",y  not  properly  be 
the  (subject  of  its  formal  directlveo,  or  vhlch  liave  not  reached  the  point  of 
requiring  such  directlveo.  Such  close  association  would  help  counteract  what 
ve  feel  is  a  growing  tendency  for  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  to  become  a 
separate  and  independent  agency  of  Government  working  to  soce  extent  in  com- 
petition with,  rather  than  for  the  Dene-fit  of,  those  departments  of  Government 
vhich  are  the  prinary  ueere  of  what  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  should 
produce . 
THE  CEKERAL  MISSION  OF  THE  CENTRAL  IKTELLIGEHCE  AGEKCY 
Unless  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  performs  an  essential  service  for 
each  of  these  departments  and  coordinates  their  intelligence  activities  it 
will  fall  in  its  elusion.  The  Central  Intelligence  Agency  should  not  be  mere- 
ly another  intelligence  agency  duplicating  and  rivalling  the  existing  agencies 
of  State,  Arsy,  Navy  and  Air  Force.  It  should  not  be  a  competitor  of  thcee 
agencies,  but  a  contributor  to  then  and  ohould  help  to  coordinato  their 
intelligence  activities.  It  must  make  maximum  use  of  the  resourced  of  exist- 
ing agencies;  it  nuot  not  duplicate  their  work  but  help  to  put  mi  end  to
cxlntln.",  duplication  by  ore  Ins  to  It  Unit  Uu-  bci;t  quail  I'U-A  .'V.onoy  In  each 
phaoe  of  the  Jntc.U5r.ci.-e  ricld  should  <uu«use  iu»d  carry  out  It:,  juivt.lcu.lttr 
responsibility. 
In  the  succeeding  chapter:)  of  thin  report  wo  will  indent  concrete  ntcpu 
for  giving  effect  to  these  geiK-rnl  principle:..  In  dolus  no  ve  will  otart  from 
the  premise  which  vc  have  stated  above  that  the  existing  legislation  affords  a 
good  basis  or.  vhlch  to  build  a  central  intelligence  service.  Furthermore,  an 
tlic  uoat  practical  method  of  approach,  we  will  examine  what  hao  been  acconi- 
pllohed  through  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  under  thlo  legislation  and 
suggest  as  we  go  along  the  opeciflc  and,  in  oome  canoo,  fundamental  change o 
which  we  consider  desirable.  In-  this  way  we  will  build  upon  what  we  now  have 
rather  than  attempt  to  start  anew  and  build  from  the  ground  up. 
CONCLUSIONS  A!.T>  RECOK-SENDATIONS 
(1)  Section  102  of  the  National  Security  Act  of  19^7  establishes  a 
framework  for  a  sound  intelligence  system  end  no  amendments  to  this  Section  of 
the  Act  ore  deemed  necessary  at  this  time. 
(2)  The  Central  Intelligence  Agency  is  properly  placed  in  our  gcem- 
icentol  structure  under  the  Notional  Security  Council. 
(3)  The  Central  Intelligence  Agency  should  be  empowered  and  encouraged 
to  establish  through  its  Director  closer  liaison  with  the  two  members  of  the 
National  Security  Council  on  whom  it  chiefly  dependo.  namely,  the _ Secretaries 
of  State  and  Defense. 
il. i .  .w^.im  jiii  .^«««V'^','»wMi'i.itHV"iW.ijj| 
THERE  IS  NO  PAGE  28. 
•  "*?*"■••   T«."  »■•■*"■  »*1-"""*"' J *V«-",.,-."*">^*-*«.**»J  V—
CHAPTER  HI 
L 
THE  ORGANIZATION  AND  ADMINISTRATION  OF 
THE  CENTRAL  1NTE LLIGENCE  AGENCY 
oncAJ.'i^i'i'o:!  i 
Tho  national  Security  Act  of  l()h'{  doou  not  wiko  dotiillod  provision  for 
tho  organi  ration  of  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency.  It  provision  that  the 
Agency  shall  bo  headed  bya  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  and  that  ho  "aball 
he  appointed  by  tho  Prcoidcnt,  by  and  with  the  advico  and  concent  of  the  Sen- 
ate, from  among  tho  corscinelonod  offlcero  of  tho  Armed  Servicer,  or  fro;a  fwsong 
individuals  in  civilian  lifo". 
With  ono  exception,  noted  bolov,  the  Director  is  fros  to  organizo  the 
Central  Intelligence  Agency  as  he  chooses  and  to  appoint  to  pooitions  within 
the  organisation  poraona  of  hio  own  selection,  as  veil  no  to  torminato  their 
employment  without  regard  for  nonsal  Civil  Scrvico  procedures. 
In  this  chapter  we  discuss  the  administrative  organization  of  the  Central 
Intelligence  Agency,  leaving"  for  Chapter  X,  when  we  havo  comploted  our  exami- 
nation of  the  various  activities  of  tho  Agency,  an  apprainal  of  tho  ovor-all 
direction  of  the  organization  in  relation  to  its  assigned  mission. 
In  carrying  out  his  task  of  organizing  the  Contral  Intelligence  Agency, 
tho  Director  has  designated  as  hio  immediate  subordinates  a  Deputy  Director 
and  an  Exocutive  Director*.  Anointing  this  directing  group  in  u  staff  capacity 
aro  tho  Interdepartmental  Coordinating  and  Planning  Staff  (ICAPS);  tho  General 
*  General  Order  Ho.  11  of  tho  Central  Intolligonco  Agency,  dated  September  lU, 
19'lG,  which  la  to  become  offectivo  shortly,  abollohon  tho  poot  of  Executive 
Director. 
\
r 
Cownr.-jl     vho  h:i:rllon  till   W;;a     and  lc><;i  nl.ul.lvo  wv):; 
t»io  KxocuUvu  for  Adv!li>5  nlruUo:>  un-.i  Kuna&owent,  in  charge  of 
fUv.nolui  J-'jtl  buJg'jtary  Kvatloro,  aduiiiiliiU-utiYo  corvlcou,  w.yvly  and  fi0JK«rul 
houijoix-oplns,  perconnol.  and  jcanageaicnl  advice  unci  ijurrcyu;  unci  the  Exoculivo 
for  Inopcction  and  Security,  rcoponnibLo  for  internal  oocurity  policioo  und 
invc»tl£utlona,  physical  oocurity  nrrangomsnta,  iiuipoctionn  and  uudito.  (For 
Orguni zaticn  Chart  ao  of   January  1,  19'i9,  oce  Annex  Ho.   5). 
Tho  Interdepartmental  Coordinating  and  Planning  Staff  (ICATS),  conspriolna 
perconc  noainatod  "by  the  Dopartaonta  of  Stato,  Arny,  Navy  and  Atr  Force,  haa 
the  px*icary  rcoponaibility  for  aosiating  the  Director  and  the  Intelligence 
AdYicory  Coscittce  with  respect  to  the  coordination  of  intelligence  activities. 
(Soo  Chapter  IT). 
The  other  functiono  of  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  are  perforce d  in 
five  OfficeB*,  each  headed  by  an  Assistant  Director.  These  are  the  Office  of 
Reports  and  Eoticates  (CKB),  Office  of  Special  Oporatlonn  (0S0),  Office  of 
Policy  Coordination  (OFC),  Offico  of  Oporationo  (00),  and  Office  of  Collection 
and  Disaecination  (OCD).  A  chart  shoving  the  poraonnol  Btrongth  of  the  various 
parte  of  tho  Agonc,"  ao  of  Doconbor  2U,  19^8  io  glYon  in  Annex  Ko.   6. 
Tho  responsibility  of  tho  Contral  Intolligonco  Agency  to  "corrolato  and 
OYaluato  intolligenco  rolating  to  tho  national  nocurity"  iu  aaoignod  to  tho 
Offico  of  TvOpcrtD  and  Entlnatcn  (ORE).  Howovor,  ao  vo  vill  point  out  lator, 
(Soo  Chaptoro  Y  and  VI),  a  cloar  dictinctlon    has  novor  boon    nado  vithin    tho 
*  Vv  undnrotand     l!:nt  nlnco  thin  report    van  written  stops  aro  being     taken  to 
crcato  a  noparato  Offico  of  Scientific  Intelligence. 
&
\ 
Officii  of  Koportn  and  J'(illi::-.Ur:i  botvoun  tho  duty  of  corrolatl  ny.  mtlim.-.l  ln- 
to1Ufc«-'»cc  anl  p<:rfori.-..liig  other  ulncollannouy  roper  tiny,  ar.tl  vit.io.'i  vhlch  r.ro 
rioro  l.n  tho  nature  of  "static"  cc.^.on  iiorvJco  functlonu. 
The  "opcnitina"  services  of  coxnon  concern  vhlch  liavu  soon  assigned  to 
tho  Central  Intelligence  Agency  oro  carried  out  by  three  Offices.  Tho  Office 
of  Sixscinl  Operations  in  responsible  for  foreign  oapior.Mgo and  counter-espionage 
(Sco  Chapter  '/III).  Tlio  Office  of  Oporationo  lo  clmrgod  vith  tlio  exploitation 
6f  dcacstic  contacts  for  foreign  intelligence,  the  monitoring  of  foreign  broad - 
caeta  and  the  exploitation  of  intelligence  Information  found  in  foreign  docu- 
ments, press  and  other  publications  (Sco  Chapter  YII).  The  Offico  of  Policy 
Coordination  io  charged  vith  conducting  oecref  operations  abroad  under  a.  spo- 
cial  Eandatc  from  the  Rational  Security  Council  vhlch  ntipulated  that  the  As- 
-sistont    Director,  Office     of  Policy  Coordination,  nust     he  nominated    by     the 
"Secretary  of  State,  and  that  hi  a  appointment  by  the  Director  io  sublet  to 
approval  by  the  National  Security  Council.  This  is  the  only  case,  ao  mentioned 
above,  in  vhich  the  national  Security  Council  has  prescribed  internal  arrange - 
nento  vithln  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  or  United  the  appointive  author- 
ity of  the  Dlroctor.     (See  Chapter  IX). 
The  Of fico  of  Collection  and  Dissemination  combines  a  variety  of  functions, 
each  aoncuhat  differently  rolnted  to  the  over-all  raiouion  of  the  Central  In- 
telligence Agency.  It  perfonau  static  services  of  common  concorn  in  that  it 
compiles  and  nalntainu  certain  biographical,  library  and  other  reference  rate- 
vials.  It  also  porforrcs  a  coordinating  function  in  handling  lntclligonco  col- 
lection requests  of  tlio  Central  Intoiligbncc  Agency  and  the  other  departments. 
Finally,  it     performs  ndnlni otratlvo  functions  ouch  as     t)io  rocoption  and  dis- 
dpiiljrvtion  of  documents  and  reports.-    (Soo  Chapter  IV).
BUISE? D  ' 
Tho  Central  Intelligence  Agoncy  oppcaro  to  have  no  nsriouo  budgetary 
probicin  and  iu  favorod  by  odequato  Congrci;oj.or.al  oupport.  The  "budget  proposal n, 
ao  approved  by  the  Piroctor,  aro  Dubnilttod  each  year  vith  tic  authorization  of 
tho  National  Security  Council  to  tho  Bureau  of  the  Budgot  vhcro  thoy  arc 
handled  by  ono  official  vho  hao  full  cccurity  clearance.  Then  the  budget  ia 
oupportcd  beforo  upocial  oub-cosiniittee a  of  th9  Appropriation  Co^nlttee  of  the 
tvo  Eouoog  of  Congress.  After  approval,  arrangonientH  are  cade  vith  tho  Bureau 
of  tho  Budget  so  that  rarloua  part3  of  the  "budget  are  appropriated  to  other 
departments.  Thus,  thoro  is  no  official  appropriation  to  the  Central  Intelli- 
gence Agency,  but  there  arc  a  number  of  oeparate  blanlrot  and  unidentified  ap- 
propriationD  to    other  dopartEicnto,  •which  act  ao  the  vehicles  for  trauasitting 
tho  funds  io  tho  Central  Intelligence  Agency. 
Both  Congronu  and  tho  Bureau  of  the  Budgot  havo  refrained  fron  oraiilni  ng 
in  dotn.il  tho  internal  vorlrlnga  of  tho  Central  Intolligonco  Agency  in  order  to 
dotonaino  the  Juntifi cation  for  tho  budget.  It  iu  important  that  ouch  dio- 
crotion  and  oocurity  bo  continued  and  that  npccial  troatzent  bo  necordod. 
llovovor,  in  order  to  juotify  thin,  it  io  nccoonai'y  that  tho  National  Security 
Council  continuouoly  aoouro  itfjolf  ao  to     tho  propor  n-vangonont  and  oporationa 
of  tlio    Central  3'ntolligonco  Agoncy,   norving     an  tho  infonr.od     nponuor  of     t)io 
_Agonc\-  airl  ao  tho  protector  of  itti  uocuvlty.
}n  t\\v-wivy  vt»  1/cOJovo  tin  I  tho  prt«io?it  nn-iinv/--'"^'*!!  for  )vmtU  li^.;  tho 
cliff  iXTSL-t  quoutUo  of  tljo  bu:l(>ot  for  tho  Contrnl  jnloH  J/.'.oncu  A/-c;icy  uro  fioimd 
mid  th-a  tho  Ao'-nc.N  ):.-io  not  boon  humporod  lu  carrying  out  Un  profjont  ronpon- 
oibillllt-fj  by  luck  of  fimdo. 
SECURITY
Loot  further  incidenta     of  thio  character     occur,  ovory  offort     ohould  ho 
mado  to  provent  the  public     dioclocuro  of  oocrot     inforization    rolnting  to  the 
operations  of    the  Central     Intelligence  Agency.      Undor.the  National  Security 
_Acp  (boction  102   (d)    (3)),     the  Director  of     Central  Intelligence     is  made  ro- 
opcnoihlc  for  protecting  Intolligence  nourcos  and  rcothoda  from  unauthorised 
diocloaure.  Thio  mandate  appoaro  to  give  tho  Director  authority  to  rosiest 
proooxiro  for  dlnclosuro  of  cecrot  information. 
If,  hovovcr,  in  hia  relationa  with  Congrcno  or  with  other  Government  ^o- 
partaontt:,  tho  diocloaure  of  secret  infonaation.  ia  nought  fron  tho  Diroctor, 
and  if  he  haa  any  doubt,  us  tovhothor  ho  ohould  cenply,  it  should  he  ootahliohed 
practice  for  hira  to  rofor  tho  question  to  tho  National  Socurlty  Council  in 
ordor  ■  that  it  may  dotonnino  vhother*  or  not  diocloouro  io  In  tho  public  lntoroot. 
Vo  boliovo  that  othoi*     otopo  can  nloo    ho  takon  toward  au     iini)rovomont  of 
oocurity.      Tboro  ohould  ho  groatcr     flexibility  in    tho  Contral     Intolligonco 
Agency 'u    organization  by    difitinguiching    botvoen  thoao     functional     which  uro 
vrlttou  ir>',c  tho  otatuto  and  honco     aro  public  and  thoao     vhooo  oxiotonco,  and 
•         '  35
J* 
coi'L'iliO.v  whono  operutloi:n,   nhould  rcv-iln  noerut.        Tho  two  nhould  1m  iidmljiln- 
tmtlvol.v  and  f.;:.ct  J  evilly     Nojviratud,  and     appropriate  cu:ico:ilmont     nliould  bo 
f    ^  pi vcn  to  tho  r.vcrcl  acl.lv Jtlo.'j  an  dlncaaaod  below.      (l3oo  p'ig':    3.16). 
At  tlio  t;i:no  tjjno,  a  oeriouii  endeavor  ohould  bo  ir.'ido  to  rovoroo  tiio  proa- 
ont  unfortiuvito  trend  vhoroin  tlio  Contral  Intoillgoncc  Agency  findn  ltuolf 
advorti«c>3  aliaoat  oxcluuivoly  no  a  oocrct  ocrvieo  organization.  It  ohould  bo 
prcnontod  Jnototd  to  tho  public  ao  tho  centralized  coordinator  of  intelligence. 
Thio  vould  holp  to  cover  rather  than  uncover  its  oecrot  operation.').  Even  vith 
theoo  upocific  oteps,  in  tho  long  run  only  organizational  diociplino  and  por- 
oonal  diocroticQ  will  inouro  oocurity.
,»m^.  if  !**•*'-*--•'"»*■■ 
ENTIRE  PAGE  DELETED. 
i«5U.i,«-iT,",ii'.'7?"ir 
tmmff  ii  t^mt\  '  ■!  'TT"
(Soo  Chapter  X) . 
cokclusicks  ai.*d  recommendations 
(1)  Tho  control  i-.at  ion  of  oil  aduiiniutrntion  in  ono  off  ico  loundoolrablo 
oincooocrot  oporntiono  roquii-o  thoir  own  aoporato  adiainiotration. 
(2)  Tho  prooont  arransanonta  for  handling     tho  difficult  budgetary  quoo- 
tiona  of  tho  Control  Intolliconco  A  coney  aro  noundly  concoivod,  ar.d  tho  Agoncy 
h*io  not.  l)oon  hwporod  in  carryi»3  out  ltn  prouoiit    ro»poncjiMlit.loo  hy  lock  of 
fmnlo. 
wwaeaww  »il'jic
X 
UjC.  l- 
(3)  To  anoint,  tho  Mroctor  in  carrying  out  hio  utntutory  dul.y  of  j^u 
Ina  lntollifconco  nourcoo  and  molhodn  ho  iihould,  In  canon  vht.ro  tho  dine]  om:ro 
of  oocrot  inforwillon  i»  nought  fro:n  him  and  ho  t:un  doubt  an  to  vln.thor  ho 
ohould  comply,  rofor  tho  quontJon  to  tho  National  Security  Council  in  orrtor 
that  iticfty  dotonsino-   vhothor  or  not     dlodoouro  in  in     tho  public     intoront. 
(k)  In  tho  lntoroot  of  nocurity,  tho  Control  Intollifconco  Agency  o'nould 
lncrcaninely  enphauizo  ita  dutioo  aa  tho  coordinator  of  intolllconco  rather 
than  lto  oocrot  intolligcnco  activition  in  ordor  to  rovoroo  tho  proaont  vn- 
fartirato  trond  vhoro  it  findo  itaolf  advortiood  almost  exclusively  aa a oocrot 
oorvico  oremizaticn.  In  thlo  vay  it  emi  holp  to  covor  up  rather  than  to  un- 
oovor  tho  cocrct  oporationg  entrusted  to  it. 
THERE    IS    NO  PAflE  LP .
chai»ti-;k.iv 
THE  K1T.P0NSU31UTY  OF  THE  CENTRAL  IETELL1GEKCE  AGENCY 
FOR  THE  CCOKDJh'ATION  OF  INTELLIGENCE  ACTIVITIES 
Tho  coordination  of  tho  intelligence  activities  of  tho  ouvorul  dopurtwontu 
ond  Rfloncico  concerned  with  notional  oocurlty  vuo  c  primary  rcaoon  for  ootali- 
liohing  tho  Control  TntolliGenco  Agency.  Thio  in  clear  fro=i  tho  early  diccun- 
ol  con  conccrnins  tho  cr  oat  ion  of  a  central  a3oncy  and  frc:,i  tho  langr-ago  of 
Section  102  of  tho  national  Socurity  Act. 
THE  STATUTORY  PROVISIONS 
To  achiovo  this  purposo,  tho  Control  iatollifienco  Agency  vao  acoigncd  tho 
duty  of  advising  tho  National  Socurity  Council  in  nattora  concerning  ouch  in- 
telligence activities  as  relate  to  tho  national  oocurity  and  of  sating  recca- 
nondationo  to  tho  National  Socurity  Council  for  thoir  coordination.  The  Act 
dooo  not  give  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  independent  authority  to  coordi- 
nate intolllgonce  activitieo.  Final  reoponoihility  to  ostahlich  policies  ia 
voctod  in  tho  national  Socurity  Council, 
This  duty  of  advising  the  National  Security  Council,  together  vith  tho 
tvo  other  principal  duties  of  correlating  national  Intelligence  and  porfonrLng 
ooxnon  ocrvicoo  ao  determined  hy  tho  National  Socurity  Council,  all  corvo  tho 
gonoral  purpoco  of  coordination.  In  fact,  thooo  throo  basic  dutico  of  tho 
Contrul  IntolliQonco  Agency ,_  although  distinct  in  thctaDolveo,  are  necessarily 
intor-rolatod  und  tho  porfomanco  of  ono  function  may  involve  another. 
For  oxanplo,  in  performing  ito  duty  of  advioing  on  tho  coordination  of 
intelligence  actlvitioo,  tho  Control  Intolligonce  Agency  way  rccoamiond  to  tho 
National  Security  Council  tho  means  to  ho  onployod.  in  tlio  nooonihly  of  roporto 
"1  41 
\
wid  oia:::.-.U-.'J  ro<;uli!lU:  J'or  thu  p<.rfcm:vuico  by  <■»»«'  Aguncy  "1'  lt(1  '^<--<-"'»i  a"x-'J, 
tho  correlation  of  nation-;].  IntolllgviicK.  Ao  /-.nether  ox'iivplo,  tho  C":itr.-il.  J.n- 
tolllgo:i'jo  f.yncy  v.v\y  rvzo~~t-.iv\t  j-.i  i!ccord:\no.o  vHh  Ho  duty  to  n-.iV.o  i'n--«::n:i- 
<lntlo:m  fcr  tho  coordhi;Uo:i  of  IntuUlGonco  nolivltic-n,  th.-it  u  parUcwI.'ir  in- 
tcllIcf'»co  function  bo  performed  henceforth  by  the  Agency  itoolf  under  itn 
third  duty  of  providing  r.orvlcoo  of  cordon  concern  moro  efficiently  accom- 
plished centrally. 
Tho  statutory  limitations  upon  tho  authority  of  tho  Central  Intolligenco 
Agency  to  coordinate  intollieonco  activities  vithout  tho  approval  of  tho  Na- 
tional Security  Council  voro  obviously  doeignod  to  protect  tho  autonomy  and 
internal  arrangements  of  the  variouo  departments  and  agencies  porfoming  in- 
telligence functions.  The  Socrotario3  of  departments  vho  are  nembors  of  tho 
National  Security  Council  are  in  a  position  to  roviev  recarm^ndatiens  of  tho 
Central  Intelligence  Agency  concerning  their  ovn  departments,  and  provision  is 
made  that  othor  departmental  heads  may  he  invited  to  attend  meetings  of  tho 
National  Security  Council  vhen  matters  portainixig  to  their  activities  are  under 
consideration.  In  spite  of  these  calculated  limitations  on  the  authority  of 
tho  Contral  Intelligence  Agency,  it  is  clear  that  the  Agency  vas  expected  to 
provido  tho  initiative  and  leadership  in  developing  &  coordinated  intelligence 
system.  In  practice,  tho  National  Security  Council  hac,  almost  vithout  oxcop- 
tion,  approved  the  recommendations  submitted  to  it  by  tho  Central  Intelligence 
Agoncy  for  tho  coordination  of  intolligonco  activitioa.  • 
Tho  National  Socurity  Act    doos  not  dofino  tho     "intolligonco  activities" 
vhich  arotobo  coordinated  under  tho  diroctlon  of  tho  National  fiocurlty  Council, 
or  specify    tlio    departments    vhooo  uctivitios     aro  covorod.       Presumably    all 
•12
Intel}. V/nou  itctlvitloi)  rulntlng  to  tho  national  oc-cnr.l  ty  ore  .Incluriod,  from 
col}<:c;Un<:  lji'"c.i-j::'itloii  in  tho  Hrril  inr»linico  to  t)io  prop-iral-lon  and  cUnr.iomlnn- 
1,1cm  oJ'  S'ivAiihiid     lnto.1  Ugunuo  rcpurtn     mid  outk-viton.       The  criterion,   a  vc-ry 
broad  0:10 ,   in     "uuch  Jnlolligonco  activities     no  1-0  In  to  to     11 10  national 
nocurlty"  and  not  tho  identity  of  tho  dopart:r.onto  concornod  or  tho  nnturo  or 
Xoc.'tlo  of  tho  Intolligonco  activity.  Thuo,  practically  no  1  tail  tat  J  on  n  aro  oct 
upon  tho  ncopo  of  t)jo  intelligence)  activities  vith  vhich  tho  Central"  Intolli- 
gonco /tgoncy  in  to  concern  ituolf . 
THE  OXOANIZATIOH  Jdd)  OKKATIGW  OF  "THE  MACEE.TRY  FOE  COORDINATION 
Throo  organizations  assist  tho  Director  of  Contral  Intelligence  in  dio- 
churging  hio  reoponcibilities  respecting  tho  coordination  of  intolligonco  ac- 
tivitico: tho  Intelligence  Advisory  Cexoaittoo  (lAC),  vlth  ito  Standing  Coa- 
nittooj  the  Interdepartmental  Coordinating  and  Planning  Staff  (l.CAPS)  cf  the 
Central  Intolligenco  Agency  end  the  Office  of  Collection  and  DioocDiination 
(OCD),  aloo  in  the  Central  IntolliEcnco  Agency. 
nsmxicsKCE  advisory  committee 
Tlio  ncsbcrnhip  of  thlo  Cccnaittoo,  created  by  National  Security  Counci) 
Intolligonco  Diroctivo  No.  1  of  Dacombor  12,  19Vf  (Soe  Annox  No.  7)/  includo3 
tho  Director  of  Central  Intelligence,  ao  chairmn,  tlio  hcado  of  tho  intolligonco 
otaffn  of  tho  Dapartmontu  of  Gtato,  Array,  Navy  and  Air  Forco,  tho  head  of  tho 
Joint  Intelligence)  Croup  of  tho  Joint  Staff  and  tlio  Diroctor  of  Intolligonco 
of  tlio  Ataaic  Energy  Cosmiiualon.  It  io  tho  direct  ouccoooor  to  tho  Intolligonco 
Advioory  Board  vhich  vao  creatod  by  Prooldont  Trian.au  in  bin  Icttoraf  January  22, 
I?!i6  (tottin,;  »\i»  tho  Central  Intolligonco  Group  (Soo  Annox  No.   3).
i]o/',*;i.M!;i:*,  v.!  tli  tlio  dir.'.vi.it)lo::n  th-it  iir-.-ccri.-rt  Die  cr«j»tlo:i  of  tlio  Coiiri'.ttuo 
I.Jioio  h'j'.'o  l.uc/)  tvo  dli'J'orcnt.  coiioj'Ui  mi  to  At.it  ;. roper  n1niilo:».  Or.  Urn  ono 
liMiid  w;io  t'.o  vlov,  hold  in  tho  varloun  dopjLrtiii-jntu,  that  t)-n  Con.,r.lttoo  nkuuM, 
in  a  ucnuo,  bo  a  "govcrnir.g  board"  for  tho  Coat.r.".!.  Intelligence  /.('oncy.  On 
tho  other  hand,  it  van  arc;:c:!  that  Con^ronn  hud  not  up  tho  /.gency  nutonor.onf.sly 
mid  that  OJ17  interdepartmental  coranlttoo  (should  r.oi'vo  nornly  in  mi  advJcory 
capacity  at  tho  diccrotion  of  tho  Director.  T)ic  solution  cctahlinhod  in  Intel- 
ligence Dircctivo  Wo.  1  lion  botvoon  thouo  vlovti. 
In  practice,  the  rolo  of  the  Coiraittoo  hau  not  "boon  oignif leant,  and  in 
our  opinion,  thio  hao  been  ono  of  tho  roasono  for  tho  voaknoGG  of  the  prooont 
arrangements  for  the  coordination  of  intelligence.  In  thio  chapter  ana  tho 
next  vo  will  cuhnit  our  rocoirtandationo  for  increasing  tho  rooponraibility  of 
tho  Intelligence-  Advisory  Conaittco,  "both  with  rccpect  to  tho  coordination  of 
intelligence  activities  and  tho  preparation  of  intelligence  oatircatoa. 
Tho  moabera  of  the  Intelligence  A&viBory  Coniltteo  aro  authorized  to  paca 
upon  rocoznondationo  of  tho  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  to  tho  National 
Socurity  Council  tad  upon  dircctiveo  propoood  "by  tho  Dir  octor  in  iiiplemontati  on 
of  National  Socurity  Council  Intolligcnco  Directives.  Although  it  ia  incuRbent 
upon  tho  Director  to  trancnit  to  tho  National  Socurity  Council  dlcDontfj  of 
ffionhora  of  tho  Conssittoo  to  hla  rocosaondatlono,  tho  Coamittoo  nay  not  provont 
the  Director  fro:u  making  hio  rocoranendationo  to  t)io  National  Socurity  Council 
roguvdlooo  of  diooonto.  Y.*horo  unaninity  io  not  oblnlnod  on  a  propoood  diroc- 
tlvo  auso:ig  tho  military  department  luousboro  of  tlio  Co:'.raittoo,  t?jo  Director  lo 
ro^ulrrd  to  refer  tlio  problem  to  tho  Soorotary  of  Dofonoo  before  procontinjj  it 
to  tho  National  Socurity  Council.    .  ,JM
Tho  ocLlvltloo  of  tho  Int.ol.l.lf.i'nr.o  AdvJ  nory  Ccwmlttco  havo  boon  lnrgoly 
confined  to  taking  fora-il  action,  urmally  by  voting  olipn,  upon  dlroctivon 
proposed  by  Uio  Director  of  Contrul  Intolllg'.-noo  "lo  1>0  submitted  to  tho  National 
Security  Council  or  upon  huplcEiontiiv;  diroctivca.  Those  uctiono  nro  pruptirod 
for  tho  Conuittoo  by  tho  Interdepartmental  Coordinating  end  I'lannljig  Staff  and 
tho  Ccranittoo's  ova  Standing  Corjalttoo  of  departmental  roprorjontativoe.  Tho 
Camiittoo  has  root  only  Infrequently  nnd  hno  had  littlo  to  do  vith  tho  continu- 
ing coordination  of  intolligonco  activities  or  vith  tho  propai-ation  of  coordi- 
nated intelligence  ostlnatos.*  This  situation  i o probably  duo  to  a  combination 
of  circumstances,  including  the  failuro  of  tho  Diroctor  to  approciato  tho 
responsibility  of  the  Central  Intolligonco  Agency  for  bringing  about  coordina- 
tion, lack  of  mutual  confidence  anions  t^e  departments  and  tho  Central  Intelli- 
gence Agency  anda  genoral  failuro  to  understand  hov  a  coordinated  intelligence 
system,  can  bo  brought  about. 
The  conception  of  the  Intelligence  Advisory  Cosrnittoo  is  sound.  It  is 
sound  because  interdepartmental  coordination  in  such  a  complicated  field  as 
intelligence  cannot  be  achievod  eololy  by  directives  and  vithout  tho  fullest 
cooperation  of  tho  Interested  departments.  It  requiroo  frequont  consultation 
and  continuing  collaboration  on  all  important  quostionn.  Tho  Intelligence 
AdvlGory  Committee  should  bo  tho  medium  for  accomplishing  this,  but  it  vill 
not  succood  if  it  contlnuos  to  moot  only  irifroquontly,  and  avoids  sorious 
grappling  with  Intolligonco  problems  and  continuous  consultation  on  questions 
of  common  intoroot. 
♦On  thiu  mibjoct,   ooo  Chapter  Y  and  particularly  pngo  75  vhoro  thoro  is  a  diu- 
ciumlcn  of  tlio  nd_  hoc  cosalttoo  sot  up  in  March,   19J*0.
ij^;:u!:::;7.k;:;;;::;i'AL  cookdj;;at3»c;  akd  I'Ltjji; j;^.:  ;:takf  (icwr.) 
Tlilu  van  not  up  an  a     iiLulT  unit  of  U:<>  DlrocLor  of  Cf.-nt-nil  Into]  Uj/.or.co 
to  notiJta  him  la  hiri  roapcciijlbilitloe  for  t.ho  courdJiuitJcn  of  inU<.lU(v-';>co  uc- 
tiYltlon.  Ito  ir.o:abortt  ai'o     ropronontafclviMi  nnnilmtcd  by  tho  Intelligence  or- 
Cfml-.'.&lloa.o  of  tho  SLato,  Anuy,  1,'nvy  mid  Air  Korco  DopartEontu;   tho  ocnior  • 
Stato  Department  ropronontatlvo  lo  tho  Chalrisxm  of  tho  group. 
Tho  auoigned  taok  of  IC/i?3  ic  to  rovlow  tho  intelligence  uctivitico  of 
tho  Covornnont,  and  aooiot  tho  Diroctor  in  initiating  Jr.oacuroo  of  coordination 
for  rocccrcondation  to  tho  National  Security  Council.  In  ordor  to  accoapliah 
thiD  niooiaa  effectively,  it  chould  hcvo  intimto  knovlodgo  of  the  orguniza- 
tiona,  reoponcibilitioa,  activitioo  and  prioritiea  of  tho  varioua  intelligence 
agoncioQ.  Actually,  ito  tichiovcnentg  rofloct  iaudooviate  laaovlodgo  of  thoao 
eubjocta  and  failuro  to  appreciate  tho  "breadth  of  tho  responsibility  of  tho 
Central  Intelligence  Agency  for  coordination  of  intelligence  activitioa. 
ICAPS  has  "been  largely  concerned  vith  tho  coordination  of  intolligonco 
activitioo  by  asoioting  in  tho  preparation  of  tho  nino  National  Security  Council 
Intolligonco  Directiveo  and  tho  four  isplaionting  directives  of  tho  Director 
of  Central  Intolligonco. 
It  vaa  originally  oipocted  that  ICAPS  would  act  as  tho  oecrotariat 
or  working  otaff  for  tho  Intolligonco  Advioory  Cosoittoo,  but  oving  in  part  to 
tho  infrequent  mootingo  of  tho  Coainittoo,  this  baa  not  liapponod.   Moroovor, 
thoro  hao  beon  confuoion  botvoon  tho  functions  of  ICAPS  and  thooo  of  tho 
Standing  Co=2ittoo  conipriaing  roprooontntivoo  fron  tho  otaffo  of  tho  momboro 
of  tho  Intolligonco  Advioory  Co:jnittoo,  vith  tho  ronult  that  royponolbilitioo 
oi'o  dividod  and  uncloar.  Moroovor,  tho  otatun  of  tho  isouiboru  of  ICAVS  han  boon
nart.lguouf.  Wnw.o  it  Iwiu  uov,r  boon  onUroly  clov.r  viioUior  tho  ,;ro»p  v,m  prl- 
nr.rUy  a  staff  of  liio  Wroctov  of  Contrul  Jjitolligonco  or  a  coraittco  ro?vo- 
nontJng  tho  i.:yrf..»r  ««oiic loo.  Thin  han  .loft  tho  group  viih  ''•Ivluutl  loy^tioo 
and  uncertainty  as  to  itn  av.n:iato. 
The  position  of ICAPS  ten  hoon  rendered  moro  difficult  hoc'iuco  itn  isesiuoro 
hnvo  1)00.1  given    operating  responsibilities    vhich  are     not  only     unrooted  to 
their  prlrary  tank  of  ncsiutiag  to  formulate  plane  for  tho  coordinating  of  in- 
telligence, -but  are  responsibilities  vhicli  coem  to  bolong  roro  properly  to  tho 
oporatl»s  hrunchoo     of  tho    Central  Intelligence  Agency.       Thus,    one  member  of 
tho  otaff  serves  ao  tho  full-time  liaison    officer  with  tho  Joint  Intelligence 
Group  of  tho  Joint  Staff.     This  ia  purely  an  intelligence  research  and  report- 
ing function  in  vhich  the  Office  of  Reports  and  Esticatea  ha3  almost  exclusive 
interoot.    Itoroovcr,  tho  official  liaison  officor  from  the  Contral  Intelligence 
Agoncy  to  the  National  Security  Council     staff  is  tho  Chairman  of  ICAPS.     This 
function  also  concerns  Batters    affecting  primarily  tho    Office  of  Reports  and 
Estimates  and,   in  fact,     a  representative  from  that  Office  now  also  works  vlth 
tho  national  Socurity  Council  staff. 
In  these  and  other  ways  ICAPS  has  acquired  operating  rather  than  planning 
functiono  and  lias  hocoiao,  to  soao  cxtont,  a  "buffer  between  the  oporating  parts 
of  tho  Contral  Iutolligonco  Agency  and  outoido  agencioo.  In  carrying  out  hoth 
its  planning  and  operating  functions,  it  is  not  in  clooo  touch  vlth  tho  intel- 
ligence branchoe  of  tho  Contral  Intelligence  Agency.  Thore  are  numerous  con- 
pluinto  that  it  is  not  only  failing  to  carry  out  its  own  mission  properly,  hut  is 
aotually  Impeding  tho  othor  parto  of  tho  Contral  Intolllgonco  Agoncy  in  carry- 
ing out  thoira.
Jji  gonorul,  vo  ,1'lV0  fc,l,'»''  that  1CA?.';.,  ntalTud  by  individa-iiu  vliono  oxpor- 
Icncu  vIl.Ji  j!i-ul)!.:i(:i  of  Jntull  igor.co  OL\;-Mir.nlion  in  not  ox  tons! vo,  and  lucking 
a  clc-.r  c-.id  flriii  i:.-.:n.l!ilo,  bar.  fulled  to  undertake  a  broad  and  effective  pro- 
irrn'M  of  coordination  oi*  Jntolligunco  activities.  It  has  boon  /i]  loved  to  dlu- 
olp-to  Ha  ont-rflJun  in  uctivltico  for  vhich  it  in  not  nulled  and  to  neglect  its 
prirury  nicoion.  It  has  not  Given  tiio  iaprcnoion  vithin  tho  Central  Intolli- 
gonco  Agency  or  outsido  that  it  grasps  tho  naturo  of  tho  responsibility  for 
coordination  of  intelligence  activities  which  is  imposed  upon  tlio  Contral 
Intolligenco  Agency  by  tho  National  Security  Act. 
OFFICE  0?  COLLECTION  ALU  MSSS-ffiiATIOIJ 
Tho  Office  of  Collection  and  Diaeenlnaticn  coioblnoB  three  functions,  only 
ono  of  vhich  is  diroctly  relatod  to  the  task  of  coordinating  livtoiligonco 
activities. 
In  the  first  placo.  it  acts  as  a  aorvico  organization  for  tho  other  Of- 
fices of  tho  Central  Intolligonco  Agency  by  procuring  intelligence  data  fron 
othor  agencies  andby  diooominating  to  thooo  agencies  tho  intelligence  collected 
or  producod  by  those  Officos.  Its  second  task  is  the  provision  of  certain 
oorviccs  of  costaon  concern  for  tho  benefit  of  tho  Contx-al  Intolligenco  Agency 
and  othor  agoncios.  Thoso  includo  tho  maintenance  of  on  intolligonco  library 
and  of  certain  central  rogiotors  and  indicos. 
Finally,  tho  Office  of  Collection  and  Dissoaiination  porforna  certain  co- 
ordinating funotious  vith  roopact  to  tho  collocticn  of  intolligonco.  It  proc- 
oouoo  all  intolligenco     ro^uoutu  rocoivod  by  tho     Central  Intolligonco  Agoncy, 
whether  thono  call  woroly  for  documentary  material  or  roqulro  flo.l.d  collection.
jt   &-mv:iiiJJ«j:i  Uvj  coM.u-.tion  can-ili!  llUn:i  el"  t.hy  Atf-jney  ixu:\   nil  other  up..ro;.rl:»l.y 
fi3onclc:i   in  order  to  dotumJnu  Jicw     bcr.t   to  muot   Uiur.c   roquo.tn.      T)n:n,    If   tho 
OffJe-)  or  I.'aval   IntolliKonco  nhou^   roquoHl  of   Uio  Central  I:,t«.-n  !;;  -mco  ^.;:»oy 
infoiwiUon  on  tho     potrolcra  nroduclns  cupv.M.lltion     of  varloun  foreign  coun- 
tries,  tbo  Office  of  Collection  Mid  Die-urination  would   determine  tho   intelli- 
gence reoourcoo  vhich  ohould  bo  tapped  in  order  to  cat icfy  the  requoct.     If  tho 
roqucat  cannot  bo  catinficd  within  tho  Central  Intolligcnco  Agones  it  vlll  de- 
termine vhat  outcldo     agency  io  capable  of  procuring  nocoanory  information  and 
vill  bo  responsible  for  forward  Jus  the  request  to  ouch  agency.   In  tho  courr.c  of 
this  action,  tho  Office  of  Collection  and  Dicsemination  vill  attempt  to  discover 
whothor  any  othor  agency  has  a  similar  requirement  for  information  which  might 
to  combined  with     the  original  request.       In  this  cannor  the  Office  assists  in 
coordinating  tho  requirements  and  collection  requests  received  from  within  the 
Central  Intelligence  Agency  and  from  outoido  ugonciea. 
It  io  obvious  that  this  function  of  coordination  io  designed  to  meet  cur- 
rent requests  and  does  not  involve  a  "broad  responsibility  continuouoly  to  mon- 
itor and  coordinate  tho  collection  procoduros  and  requirements  of'  tho  various 
Intelligence  agoncioo,  including  tho  Central  Intelligence  Agency.  Such  a  re- 
sponsibility would  force  the  Offico  of  Collection  and  Disocmination  into  tho 
pooitioa  of  a  central  cloarinS  house  for  all  collection  roqulromonto  and  re- 
quests of  all  agoncioo.  It  vould  ho  Unpractical  to  have  jmch  an  arrangement 
'duo  to  tho  mass  of  adminictrativo  detail  involved  and  tho  rooulting  dolay  in 
tho  catiofaction  of  tho  roquoata.  In  practico,  direct  intor-cgoncy  roquoots, 
not  roqulring  coordination,  my  by-pnoa  tho  Control  Intolligonco  Agency 
comnlololy. 
ij^wrw-n  "—-'HI  Ai\ 
\   
 ::
M]fATio:.7ii.  H'.'Curity  cou::c.u.  nri'EM/rc:::;cK  ])im:crrv;::j. 
Tho  fon.vil  «cco"i)llfil:r.w)t  of  ovor-nll  coordination  is  represented  nviinly 
by  nine  Intelligence  Directives  uj-provod  l>y  tho  National  r/iocurity  Council  upon 
roco:rn:on'J/:llou  of  Uio  Director  of  Central  Intolligonco  i«  consultation  vith 
tho  Intelligence  Advisory  Cc:f-iilUeo,  and  four  inploi-icnUjng  diroctivos  vhich 
need  not  bo  discussed  horo. 
Tho  National  Sosurity  Council  Intelligence  Directives*  provide  for  tho 
coordination  of  intelligence  activities  in  various  vnyn.  Tho  basic  Diroctivoo, 
Woo.  1  2,  3  find  h  seek  to  achiovo  coordination  of  intelligence  activities  by 
allocation  of  general  areas  of  responsibility  to  tho  several  departments  and 
to  tho  Central  Intolligonco  Agency. 
DiroctiTO  No.  .1,  no  vo  have  pointed  out,  establishes  tho  genercl  arrange- 
ments for  such  coordination.  It  sots  up  tho  Intelligence  Advisory  Cosalttco, 
diocuoood  above,  to  advise  tho  Director  of  Contral  Intclllgonco,  specif ios  tho 
procedures  for  tho  issuance  of  Intolligonco  Diroctivoo  and  definea  tho  duty  of 
tho  Contral  Intelligence  Agency  vith  roopect  to  the  production  of  "national 
intolligonco."  Insofar  as  practicable,  tho  Contral  Intelligence  Agency  "Dhall 
not  duplicato  tho  intelligence  activitioo  and  research  of  tho  variouo  Depart- 
jnonts  and  Agcncieo,  but  shall  im!:o  uoo  of  existing  intelligence  facilltioo." 
Tho  Directivo  provldou  for  oxchanso  of  infaraation  bctvocn  tho  Contral  Intol- 
ligonco Agoncy  and  tho  departmental  agencion,  and  authorizes  tlio  assignment  of 
offlcoro  to  tho  Contral  Intolligonco  Agoncy  by  tho  departmental  organizations. 
It  also  Jncludos  provision  for  tho  Contral  Intolligenco  Agoncy  to  roquoct  au- 
thority to  inspect  intolligonco  reatorial  in  agoncion  of  tho  Covornicont. 
*r 
Coo  Atuioxuu  No.  '(-V)  for  tlio  toxts  of  tho  Directives;
Directive  No.  2  allocatoo  rcoponulbllity  for  the  collection  abroad  of 
overt  intelligence  amon«  the  Departments  of  State,  Army,  Navy  and  Air  Forco  by 
eotablianuog  "certain  broad  categories  of  agency  rooponaibillty."  Political, 
cultural  and  sociological  intelligence  are  assigned  to  the  State  Department. 
Military,  naval  and  air  Intelligence  are  assigned  to  the  respective  Services. 
The  collection  of  economic,  scientific  and  technological  intelligence  Is  allo- 
cated to  each  agency  "In  accordance  -with  its  respective  heeds."  The  Directive 
provides  far  coordination  of  these  collection  activities  in  the  field  by  the 
senior  United  States  representative. 
Directive  No.  3  is  an  elaborate  definition  of  categories  of  Intelligence 
production,  i.e.,  basic,  current,  staff,  departmental  and  national  intelligence, 
and  it  assigns  the  responsibilities  of  the  departmental  agencies  and  the  Central 
Intelligence  Agency  in  Intelligence  production.  The  same  areas  of  "dominant 
Interest"  are  specified  as  for  intelligence  collection,  and  the  production  of 
"national  intelligence"  is  reserved  to  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency.  How- 
ever, the  terms  of  the  various  definitions  are  broadly  drawn,  the  exceptions 
are  numerous,  and  confusion  of  intelligence  functions  has  continued  despite 
the  effort  to  eliminate  it  by  definition. 
Directive  No.  k  provides  that  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  shall  take 
the  lead  In  preparing  a  comprehensive  outline  of  national  Intelligence  objec- 
tives, and  from  time  to  time  nW*  Indicate  the  priorities  attaching  to  these 
objectives.
,  r 
A: 
\ 
Four  of  tho  Directives,  Kos,  5,  6,  7  and  8,  annign  certain  "eervicen  of 
comon  concern"  to  tho  Control  Intelligence  Agency  under  the  authority  granted 
in tho national  Sscurity  Act  (Section  102  (a)).  Those  aro  coordinating  actiono 
in  tho  soneo  that,  "by  conaon  agroemont,  they  aoBign  to  tho  Contral  Intolli^cnco 
Agency  primary  or  ozcluoivo  rosponoihility  for  conducting  certain  intelligence 
activitioo  of  ccsanon  concern.  Directive  No.  5  provides  tliat  tho  Contral  In- 
telligence Agency  vill  conduct  all  oopionago  and  countor-oopicnc:go  oporationa 
abroad  oxcopt  for  cortain  ogrood  activitioo  and.it  aloo  provider  tliat  tho  Cen- 
tral' Intelligence  Agoncy  vill  coordinate  covort  and  overt  collection  activitioo. 
(Soo  Chapter  YIII) . 
Directive*  Ko.  6  givoo  tho  Contral  Intelligence  Agency  authority  to  conduct 
all  federal  ronitoring  of  foreign  proori  and  propaganda  hroadeneto,  and  dlrocto
tho  Ag«-"»cy  to  dJ.uiior.ilji.ilo   tho   inforir.-iUon  thus     rocolvod   to  Jntorontod  ilopnvt- 
ir.sntal  ii/jt:icloi).      (Doe  Chapter  VI  l) . 
•  Dii-octlvo  Ko.  7  gives  tlic  Central  Intelligence  Agency  authority  for  tho 
oxploit'itJoa  of  doncntlc  oourcon  of  foreign  intolligcnco,  and  provides  for  "Uio 
participation  of     departmental  agencloo   In  this  activity.        (Sco  Chapter  YI.T). 
"These  Intelligence  Directives  allocate  responsibilities  to  the  Central 
Intelligence  Agency  in  f  ieldo  vhich  have  been  conceded  to  he  those  of  cocoon 
concern  vhere  vork  can  boot  be  done  centrally.  This  is  also  true  of  the  allo- 
cation to  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  of  responsibility  for  the  conduct  of 
oecret    operations  (other    than  intelligence)  abroad    by  the  Office     cf  Policy 
Coordination    vhich  vas  acccapliehed  by  direct  National  Security  Council  action 
(KSC  10/2)  and  not  by  Intelligence  Directive  nubndttod  through  the  Intelligence 
Advisory  Consul ttoo.     (See  Chapter  IX).     In  all  of  these  cases  vhere  particular 
functions  of  coamon    concern  havo  boon  assigned,     the  allocation     of  functions 
has  boon  generally  accoptod  as  sound. 
THE  DEGKEJ5  OF  COOKDEJATIOII  ACHIEVED 
In  cpito  of  thoso  formal  diroctivos     for'  tho  coordination  of  intolllgonco 
activities,  it  io  probably    corroct  to  say  that  departmental     intelligence  ac- 
tivities aro     substantially  unaffected  by  this     program  of  coordination  excopt 
vhere  tho  Central  Intelligence  Agency  has  been  givon    exclusive  responsibility 
•  for  certain  activities. 
S3
jji  j'Ciicral,    thoro   in  an  ::bnencu  of  offuctJvt-   cuordlu.-ition  t;ndur    the   lo.nl- 
eroJilp  of  tho  Central  Intelligence  Agency  and  there  i»  vlrtu.-il  ly  no  ouporv)  clon 
of  the  v.-jyti  in  vhich  tho  various  dlrt-cl  Jvoa  nro  cirrlod  out,  oxcopt  tint  tho 
Central  Intelligence  Agency  controlo  those  common  corvico  activities  assigned 
to  it.       Confllcta  of  Jurisdiction    and  duplication  of     activities  r  can  hi.     In 
many  cases  they  have  not  only  been  unresolved, vhich  in  hardly  surprising  after 
such  a  short  time,  but  they  rsmain  unrecognized  and  unac/siowlcdgcd . 
Despite  tlio  provisions  of  Directives  Kos.  2  and  3  in  rcg'.ird  to  the  allo- 
cation of  dominant  interest,  each  department  collccto  and  producoo  tho  intel- 
ligence it  chooses  according  to  priorities  it  establishes.  The  very  large 
loopholes  in  these  directives  and  the  absence  of  any  continuously  effective 
monitoring  of  their  implementation  makes  this  poesible.  Tho  Central  Intelli- 
gence Agency  itself  has  becon9  a  competitive  producer  of  intelligence  on  sub- 
jects of  its  own  choosing  vhich  can  by  no  stretch  of  the  imagination  bo  called 
national  intelligence.  (See  Chapters  V  and  VI).  The  amount  of  undesirable 
duplication  among  intelligence  agencies  is  considerable  and  the  absence  of  co- 
ordinated intelligence  collection  and  production  is  serious. 
In  our  opinion,  certain  essentials  for  tho  improvement  of  this  situation 
vould  includo:  continuous  examination  on  tho  initiative  of  tho  Central  Intel- 
ligence Agency  of  instances  of  duplication  and  failuro  of  coordination;  direc- 
tives vhich  ostabliah  more  precisely  the  responsibilities  of  the  various  de- 
partments; and  tho  offectivo  carrying  out  of  plans  tltrough  closo  intor -depart- 
mental consultation  at  all  lovole.  To  n  groatcr  or  losnor  degroo,  all  of  thooo 
essentials  are  lacking  at  tho  prosent  tlino.
MM  -*jt-. •*  —  * 
Clearly,  an  pointed  out  i.1.ovc,  tho  .minority  of  Lho  Cont.rnl  .TnU>UJ^,u-.o 
Af.cr,oy  to  coordinate  intell JConco  uctiviUoa  in  oul.joct  to  directive,  of  U.o 
Kat.l«vxl  Socurlty  Council.  However,  tho  rcponniWllty  tondvJ  r.o  tho  Katlonul 
Security  Council  uidtoicuko  roco^ondationo  for  coordination  la  i-qmroly  placed 
on  tho  Central  Intelligence  Agency.  Therefore,  lack  of  authority  in  a  opociflc 
oituatlon  ohould  not  deter  tho  Central  Intelligence  /.goncy  from  oxorcioing  ltd 
rofiponoibility  to  oulimit  rocoaaendationo  no  that  proper  coordination  vill  ro- 
Bult.  If  thoro  arc  doubto  natohov  tlio  coordination  ohould  to  affected,  it  Id 
tto  duty  of  tho  Agency  to  '  nok  tho  National  Security  Council     to  rooolro  the*. 
Tho  coordination  of  intelligence  actlvitico  today  ie  particularly  important 
in  throo  fioldo  illustrative  of  tho  goncral  prohlca-,  namely  -  ocicntific  in- 
tellieonco,  domestic  intelligence  and  counter-intelligence  affecting  tho  na- 
tional oecurity,  end  cosaunications  intelligence. 
SCIENTIFIC  ITiTELLIGEIICE* 
The  field  of  ocientific  and  technological  intelligence  io  obviously  ono 
vhich  may  overohadov  all  others  in  importance.  At  tho  proocnt  time  there  ie 
no  propor  coordination  of  effort  in  this  field,  vhich  ie  ono  in  vhich  there  io 
a  oread  area  of  cocoon  intoreot.  In  fact,  thio  diffusion  of  rooponoiMlity  io 
confirmed  in  National  Security  Council  Intelligence  Diroctivoo  Nos.  2  and  3 
vhich  allocato  collection  and  production  rosponolhilitieo  for  ocicntific  and 
toclinolosical  intolligonco  to  "each  agency  in  accordance  vlth  ito  roopoctlvo 
nooaG:"    •  . 
«Slnco  thio  report  vaa  written,    ntepn  are  "being  taken  to  create  in  tho  Contval 
•  Xntolllfonco  A»*,cncy  u  ooparnto  Offico  of  Scientific  Intelligence!  nnd  to  trann- 
for  to  it  the  "liticloar  Kiiurgy  Croup     now  in  tho     Offico  of  Spoclal  Oporatlono.
"kucIi  of  tho  ullilary  3tirvlcoo     colloctn  iiciontiflc     una  technological   In- 
to] UEonco  Ui  accordance     vith  Ho  own  pror.nw  «>^  P»-ouucoo  oucli  roporti.  au   it. 
chooncn.     Tlio  Central  Intelligence  Agency  perform,     certain  central  co) lectins 
oorv icon  through     lto  Offlco  of     Oporoilono  and  Office  of     Special  Operations 
The  Offlco  of  Special  Operation  nloo  houuuu  tho  Uucloar  EnorCy  Croup  vhicJi  in 
tho  central    govcrwuental  unit    for  interpreting    atonic  energy     totolllGonco.  - 
Separate  fires  it  lo  ft  Scientific  Branch  In  tho  Office  of  Koporto  and  Eotlcaton 
vhich  van  expected  totocaao  tho  central  group  for  ntloulating  and  coordinating 
ooiontlfio  lntolllsenco.       It  hao  not  yet  filled  tide  role.       Tho  Boacarcb  and 
Devolop^nt  Board    dooa  not  itcolf  actively  0115030     to  nciontiflc  intolliEeaco 
hut  hao  en    important  intoroot     to  tho  field.       ltd  noode  ohould     therefore  ho 
givon  isajor  conoidoration.to  plans  and  arrangements  for  coordination. 
to.BUsaary,  roeponaihilitico  are  scattered,  collection  efforts  are  unco- 
ordinated, otoaic  cnorcy  intelligence  io  divorced  fron  ocicntific  totolligcaco 
•Generally,  and  thoro  io  no  recognised  procedure  for  arriving  at  authoritative 
lntolllsenco  oattoateo  to  tho  ociontific  field,  with  tho  poEsihlo  oxecption  of 
atccaic  energy.  Here  ic  a  oituation  vhich  smot  have  priority  in  coordination  of 
Intelligence  activition.  3n  Chapter  VT  ve  propose  certain  otops  vhich  cose 
vithto  tho  acopo  of  this  ourvcy.  • 
DOMESTIC  H0SLLKEX3S  AED  COUKTEH-IKEELLICEiCE  ifflFBCTHS}  THE  KWTIOIIAL  SECURITY 
•  Anothor  hroad  field  requiring  coordination  io  that  of  foroign  intoiliGonco 
dorivod  fron  doaiootic  oourcoo  nnd  the  allied  fioldof  doiaontic  counter.- intolli- 
Gonco. Thio  tocindoo  tho  exploitation  of  intolligonco  froa  Unitod  Statoo  huol- 
nooo  flrco,  travollorn,  otc,  exploitation  of  tho  lntolligonco  poooihilitieo 
of  groupo  caid  todividualo  of  foreign. nationality  in  tho  Unitod  Statoo,  tho 
56  ■  ."•
roluilBS  of  dosoutlc  coualor-iiitclliGonco  to  foreign  intolligenco  ivxiil  tho 
coordination  of  dcaonllc  ccunloi-eopioivigo  with  cour.tor-ofipicmgo  nhroad.  ]•:*> 
copt  for  tho  exploitation  of  private  uoiircoa  of  foreign  intelligence  in  tho 
United  Slatoo  vhich  in  centralized  In  the  Office  of  Operation*  of  tho  Central 
Intelligence  Agency  (oeo  Chapter  VII),  roeponoibility  for  the  other  activities 
io  ocattorod  anong  tho  State  Department,  thoAraod  Sorvicoo,  tho  Federal  Bureau 
of  Investigation  end  tho  Control  Intelligence  Agency.  Tho.ro  io  little  offoc- 
tivo  coord iaaticnx  among  thorn,  oxcopt  on  a  cacc  basin. 
The  Federal  Bureau  of  Invoctigation,  vhich  has  primarily  oecurity  and  3av 
'      enforcement  reoponsibilitloo,     is  concerned  in  fact    vith  an  important  area  of 
intolligenco.    This  includes  domestic     countor-ospionage  and  countar-eabotogo, 
\       control  of  connwnist  and  other  oubveroive  activitioo  and  Gurroillanco  of  alien 
^       individualD  and  grostps.    All  of  thoeo  functions  are  closely  related  to  the  cca- 
parablo  activitioo    abroad  of  tho  Central  Intelligence  Agency.       Thoy  all  havo 
on  important    intolligenco  aapoct,    particularly  today  vhsn  intolligonce    from 
domestic  and  foroiga  sources  io  bo  closely  rolatod.     Tho  fact  that  tho  Federal 
Bureau  of  Investigation  is"  primarily    concerned  vith  eociu-ity  and.  lav  enforce- 
ment my  rooult    in  a  failure  to    exploit  tho  intelligence    possibilities  of  a 
situation  and  Kay  creato  difficulties  in  reconciling  tho  intelligence  vith  tho 
oocurity  intorootn. 
Tho.  Fodoral  Boroau  of  Investigation  .  io  not  part  of  tho  oxiating  ma- 
chinery for  coordination  of  intolligonce  through  tho  Intolligenco  Advloory 
Cciralttoo  or  ottiorvloo.  Thcro  is  no  continuing  Banner  vhoroby  domestic  intol- 
ligenco and  countor-intolligenco  aro  rolatod  to  ovor-all  national  Intolligenco 
in  order  to  nerve     tho  gonoral  purpooo  oot  forth     in  tho  National  Socurity  Aot
"'"of  coordinating  tho   .1n!.(illig.;r.co  iictivlliou  of  tho  oovor:il  GovoniK'.uit,  dopart- 
icc-ntti  and  ugenclcn   in  tho   Intercut  of  n.ation\il  nocurity. " 
In  our  opinion,  tho  Central  IntoUigonco  Agnncy  lino  the  duty  under  tho  Act 
to  coiicom  ltcolf  vlth  tho  problem  of  coordinating  tfoono  phauoo  of  dosoutlc 
intolligonce  taad  countcr-intolHgonco  which  rolato  to  tho  national  oocurity 
and  chould  oulalt  rocexnondutiona  on  this  oubjoct  to  tho  National  Security 
Council.  Thioioiiot  incontiiotcnt  vith  tho  otipulatioa  of  tho  national  Socurity 
Act  that  tho  Central  Intolligonco  Agoncy  "ehall  havo  no  polico,  subpoona/  lav- 
onforcoment  povoro,  or  internal  security  functions."  It  vould  in  fact  servo  to 
carry  out  tho  program  of  coordination  set  forth  in  tho  Act  in  a  broad  f iold 
which,  has  hlthorto  boon  largely  nogloctod. 
A  BtJop  toward  "bringing  about  the  coordination  vo  recoacsad  vould  be  to 
provide  for  closer  association  of  tho  Fodoral  Buroau  of  Investigation  with  the 
iiitolligonce  agencies  by  leaking  it  a  mombor  of  the  Intelligence  Advioory 
Coicaittoe. 
C0I-MJKICATI0I3  EITSLLICEIJCE 
c 
r.n
*«o  unAcrotena  that,  at  fho  direction  of  tho  Secretary  «™™'l?Z% ^ 
emprlolns  rmrooontativoo  of  tho  throo  Sorvicoa  io  complotl^  a  otouy  ol  tho 
q««otJ<m  of  TOitlng  a  Joint  avmlsatloa  for  tho  production  ol  comunicationo 
lntolllgonco. 
vr ......  >.!» ii>»j.w,' " ".  "v, " '-^g
•pEOPOSAIS  FOR  E«J?EOVED  COOiSJDJ/iTIOK         •   • 
.  In  order  to  remedy  tho  existing  cituation  in  roapect  of  coordination  of 
activitieo,  oovoral  otepo  oro  noccaeary.  The  Director  _6f  Central  Intelligence 
must  ohov  a  nuch. greater  concern  than  hithorto  vith  the  goncral  prohlcn  of  co- 
ordination of  intelligence  activities  vhich  io  cno  of  his  eocontial  otatutory 
dutioo.  Hie  io  a  responsibility  to  all  of  the  departments  concerned  vith  na- 
tional security;  it  can  "be  properly  discharged  "by  leaderehip,  imagination, 
initiative  and  a  realization  that  only  a  Joining  of  efforts  can  achieve  th<=> 
dosired  results. 
The  other  neiribors  of  tho  Intelligence  Advisory  Conadttoo  rcaot  aloo  share 
in  tho  gonoral  rooponoibility  for  carrying  out  tho  intont  of  tho  National  So- 
curity  Aot  hy  quickoning  thoir  intorost  and  exhibiting  a  spirit  of  uctivo  co-  ' 
operation.  Ko  aaondmont  to  tho  Cczmittoo  •  a   cliartor  no  aot  forth  in  Intolligonco 
Iroctivo  Ho.  1  appoaro  nocoonary  to  bring  about  thin  iisproYosiont, 
In  tho  noxt  chaptor  vhoro  vo  deal  vith  tho  onontlon  of  national  intolli- 
gonco ootlmtoo  vo  propooo  that  tho  Intolligonco  Advinory  Cosailttoo  a  not"""  Q
more  r.ctlvo  rolo  In  producing  thunn  cntlwntcn.  In  our  opinion,  this  vould  not 
on]  .  in;n-ovo  tho  rclovanco  mid  qu/illty  of  tho  ootiwitoii  but  vould  givo 
tho  CanmitLro  Uio  Impetus  and  the  L-iclrground  it  noodo  to  deal  effoctivoly  with 
tho  coordination  of  intelligence  activitioo.  More  than  any  other  otagc  .In  tho 
Intelligence  process,  tho  consideration  of  estimates  ohould  revoal  tho  defi- 
cicncleo  end  overlapo  ao  veil  ao  tho  accomplishments  in  intelligence 
Wo  believe,     ao  stated  above,     that  the    Federal  Bureau    of  Investigation 
ohould  bo  added  to  the     permanent  membership  of  tho  Intclllsonco  Advisory  Com- 
mittee.   We  aloo  believe  that  the  Atomic  Energy  Ccscnicsion  and  the  Joint  Staff 
might  be  dropped  from    tho  regular  membership.       The  rolo  of  the  Atomic  Energy 
Commission  in  intelligence  is  a  limited  ono  and  confined  to  a  highly  specialised 
field.      The  representation    of  the  Joint  Staff,  upon  tho  Intelligence  Advisory 
Committee  appears  to  be  largely  duplicative  in  viev  of  the  predominantly  Serv- 
■  ice  membership  of  the  Committee.  However,  they,  together  with  other  interested 
agencies  such  as  the  Departments  of  Treasury  and  Commerce,  tho  Research  and  De- 
velopment Board  and  the  National  Security  Resources  Board,   should  attend  meet- 
ings vhenever  matters  of  direct  concern  to  them  are  being  considered. 
Within  tho  internal  organization  of  tho  Central  Intelligence  Agency  the 
Interdepartmental  Coordinating  and  Planning  Staff  (ICAPS)  should  bo  set  up 
clearly  as  ail  integral  part  of  tho  Agoncy,  charged  vith  the  task  of  Booking 
out,  studying  and  developing,  in  consultation  with  tho  other  parts  of  tho 
Central  Intelligence  Agoncy  and  outoido  agoncioo,  plans  for  tho  coordination 
of  intelligence  activitioo.  It  ohould  havo  no  responsibility  for  current  opor- 
ationo,  except  that  certain  current  tanks  of  coordination  (nuch  as  como  of 
thoco  now  performed  by     tho  Office  of     Collection  and     Dir.ncmlnation)  might  be 
I   <   H       »        I  .„   in,,.    , 
  .  •  ..
/ 
curried  out  undor  lLn  di ruction.  Tho  rocoisuUtulod  ICAiT.  vhlch  nH-.ht  appro- 
priately bo  called  "Coord  inn  lion  Dlvlnion"  nhould  be  infill.  llo  inc-wborn  should 
bo  persons  lnlcrcMt'jd  in,  and-  qualified  to  deal  vlUi,  prob]fi:iu  of  intelligence 
organization.  Finally,  and  pcrhupa  ir.out  important  of  till,  tho  Director  must 
look  upon  this  reorganized  and  strengthened  group  so  hin  major  support  in  ful- 
f illin3  one  of  bio  moot  difficult  assignments  undor  the  National  Security  Act, 
that  of  advioing  tho  National  Security  Council  on  the  intelligence  activitica 
of  the  Government  and  ranking  rcconsrjndations  for  their  coordination. 
It  is  our  bollef  that  the  relationship  bctvecn  certain  of  the  functions 
precontly  performed  by  ICAP5  and  the  Office  of  Collection  and  Dissemination 
ohould  be  considerably  closer.  ICAP3  is  responsible  for  the  promulgation  of 
plana  and  policy  In  relation  to  the  coordination  of  collection  activities.  As 
one  of  its  tasks,  the  Office  of  Collection  and  Disseminat ion  coordinates  actual 
collection  and  diosemination  and  in  some  respects  is  in  a  position  to  implement 
the  general  plans  and  policies  for  coordination.  Constantly  dealing  vith  the 
day-to-day  "working  level"  problems  of  collection,  the  Office  of  Collection  and 
Dissemination  is  in  a  good  position  to  make  recommendations  in  rogard  to  the 
improvement  of  collection  procedures  and  the  '  coordination  of  collection 
activitica. 
'  'Vo,  therofore,  recommend  that  tho  collection  and  diosemination  functions 
of  thin  Off ico  be  placed  under  the  new  Coordination  Division,  subject  to  future 
rtotomination  of  tho  extent  to  vhich  individual  Officoa  may  conduct  thoir  own 
dissemination.  (See  Conclusions  to  Chapters  VII  and  VIII ).  Vc  further  recom- 
mend that  all  of  tho  library,  index  and  register  functiono  be  separated  from 
tho  Offico  of  Collection  and  Dissemination  and  bo  placed  in  a  contralizod  Rc- 
"onrch  and  Keporto  Division  aa  doner ibod  in  Chapter  VI-  inr.,..,..!  .j  .,  ..^^^m.rr 
<>2
L 
■   ».r{  ■  "•"-- 
co:.'ci.u::io:i:j  ::,;u  )x\-:ca":v:xxno:is 
(1)  TJio  responsibility  of  Urn  Central  InloLUgcnco  Agency  unilor  tlio  na- 
tional Security  Act  villi  rcM.poct  l/M.he  coordination  or  InlelUgsuco  activities, 
vhlch  la  one  of  tho  most  iir.porl:mt  onoo  assigned  to  tho  Central  Intelligence 
Agency,  haa  not  "been  fully  discharged. 
(2)  One  of  tho  important  arena  vhcro  more  active  offorta  at  coordination- 
arc  noedod  io  tho  field  of  scientific  intelligence/     (Soo  Chapter  71 ). 
(3)  Another  important  area  is  that  of  domestic  tatolligcncc  and  countcr- 
intolllscnce  insofar  ao  thoy  rolato  to  tho  national  security.       To  Improve  co-  ^ 
ordination  in  thio  area    and  botvocn  it  and  tho     entire  intelligence  field,  vo  I 
rocassend  that  tho  Federal  Bureau  of  Invcotigatlon  ohould    ho  made  a  member  of «' 
the  Intelligence  Advioory  Con-sittee. 
(5)  The  Intelligence  Advisory  Coaziittec  la  ooundly  conceived,  hut  it 
ohould  participate  norc  actively  vith  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  in 
tho  continuing  coordination  of  intelligence  activities. 
(6)  Tho  Intelligence  Advioory  Coasaitteo  ohould  consist  of  the  Director  of 
Central  Intelligence  and  representatives  of  tho  Departments  of  Stato,  Amy, 
Kavy  and  Air  Force  and  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Invest igat ion.  Other  departments 
and  agoncico  wuld  ait  as  ad  hoc  members  vhen  appropriate. 
•       (7)    The  Interdepartmental  Coordinating  aniPlonning  Staff  ohould  he  recon- 
stituted ao  a  staff  *  responsible  only  to  tho  Director  of  Central  Intelligence, 
It 
*ln  thio  chapter  vo  have  called  thin  new  stuff  "Coordination  Division.  It 
should  ho  noted  that  this  name  and  other  names  vo  have  given  to  proposed 
branches  of  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  aro  only  for  purposes  of  illuslia- 
tlon  and  simplification  and  not  given  un  a  formal  recommendation.
./ 
with     tJi'j     triak     of  developing     i>lumi  for     tho     coordination     of     intclUgcnco 
ftctivlticn. 
(8)  The  rciiponaiMlHleo  of  the;  Office  of  Collection  and  Dio:icmir)ution 
vlth  rccpect  to  the  coord 1 nation  of  collection  r-jquircnentn  mid  rcqucotn  cud 
the  dio»cainr.tlon  of  lntelliaenco  ohould  lie  carried  out  under  tho  now  Coordi- 
nation Diviolon.  Thio  io  ouhject  to  future  detoraination  of  the  extent  to 
vhich  individual. Of ficos  may  conduct  their  ovn  dioocaiinatiOD. 
W 
t—  •**■**.  <*  ««>■*;
CHAPTER  V 
.     THE  NKSPONSIE-IUTY  OF  THE  CENTRAL  INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY  FOR  NATIONAL  INTELLIGENCE  ESTIMATES 
the  mmjDiVis  iwaan  the  national  secujiity  act  a:.t)  tjie  directives 
One  of  tho  principal  dutioa  assigned  to  tho  Control  Intolligonco  Agency 
"for  tho  purpose  of  coordinating  tho  intelligence  activities  of  the  several 
GovorniMnt  dopartaanto  and  egoncies  in.  tho  intorost  of  national  eocurity"  13 
"to  corrolato  and  evaluate . intelligence  relating  to  the  national  security,   and 
provide  for  /it s/  appropriate  dissemination."  Tho  Central  InteHigonco  Agency 
ia  thus  given  the  responsibility  of  cooing  to  it  that  the  United  Statoc  haa 
adequate  central  aachinory  for  tho  exaiainaticn  and  interpretation  of  intelli- 
gence ao  that  the  national  aecurity  will  not  he  jeopardized  hy  failure  to  co- 
ordinate the  best  Intelligence  opinion  in  the  country,  baaed  on  all  available 
inf  orssation. 
In  our  opinion,  thio  responsibility  has  not  boen  adequatoly  discharged, 
and  remedial  ineacuroe  are  necessary.  There  is  confusion  as  to  the  proper  role 
of  tho  Central  Intelligence  Agency  in  tho  preparation  of  intelligence  reports 
and  ooticat  ?s.  This  confusion  has  roeulted  fron  incorrect  interpretation  mv) 
lack  of  propor  inplerentation  of  tho  otatuto  and  tho  directives.  The  reasons 
for  this  go  to  the  heart  of  the  national  intelligence  probion  and  need  to  be 
oxaninod  in  occio  detail  in  ordor  to  discover  hov  tho  necessary  ianprovoEont  can 
bo  mado. 
Although  tho  Act  provides  that  "tho  dopartaonto  and  othor  agencies  of  tho 
Ctovornsant  shall  continuo  to  co.Uoct,  evaluate,  corrolato,  and  diasominato  do- 
rarlKontal  intolllgonco,"  tho  statute*  dooo  not  limit  tho  dutioo  of  tho  Control
luUa.lliju.'ico  Agoncy  to  corrolulo  and  evaluate  intolligonco,  oxcopt  by  tho 
otuiM'irJ  of  "natiou'jl  oocurity."  Interpretation  of  thooo  otatutory  provioiona 
vtio  W.do  by  tho  National  Security  Council  in  Intelligence  DIroctivon  No.  1  and 
Jlo.  3. 
Intolligonco  Diroctivo  J.'o.  1  (floo  Annox  Uo.  7)  provides  that  tho  Director 
of  Control  Intelligence  shall  produce*  intolligonco  relating  to  tho  national 
oocurity,  called  national  intelligence,  and  that  "in  oo  for  aa  practicable,  ho 
'shall  not  duplicate  the  intolligonco  activities  and  rosoaroh  of  tho  various 
Dopartaionta  and  Agoncios  hut  shall  sake  use  of  existing  intelligence  facilities 
and  shall  utilizo  departmental  intolligonco  for  such  production,  purposon." 
Tho  diroctivo  alco  stipulates  that  national  intelligence  dissoninatod  by  the 
Csntral  Intelligence  Agency  "ohall  be  officially  concurred  in  by  tho  Intelli- 
gence Agoncios  or  ohall  carry  an  agreed  otatensent  of  oubstantial  dlGsent." 
•  Theso  provioiona  are  to  somo  oxtont  clarified  in  Intelligence  Directive 
Mo.  3  (Soo  Annoz  Ko.  9)  vhich  defines  national  intolUgonco  aa  "integrated  do- 
parteaontal  intelligonco  that  covers  the  broad  aspects  of  national  policy  and 
national  security,  is  of  ooncorn  to  jsoro  than  one  Dopartnent  or  Agency,  and 
tranacondc  the  oxcluoivo  ccarpotonco  of  a  single  Department  or  Agoncy  or  tho 
Military  Eotablichnent." 
Diroctivo  Ho.  3    thon  placoo  on  tho    Central  Intelligonco  Agoncy    tho  ro- 
•  oponoibility  for    tho  production  and    dissoninatlon  of    national  Intolligonco . 
Such  intolligonco  io  to  bo    dovolopod  and  aoaonblod  in  coordination  vith  othor 
depart  stent  a  and  agoncicn  in  ordor    to  obtain  intolligonco  dovolopod  vj.thin  tho 
*  Tho  turn  "produco,"    an  ucod  hero,  iwano  tho  preparation,  and  issuance  of  aa- 
ocsEblod  awl  intorprotod  Intolligonco  lvportu.  and  outluutoo. 
f  f  |IW'  I".'»,IIW'*1»""?»PPK'-",*J*^*"' 
=..-_,.  ^.A.-.^-.-     -«*■,**   --  ■•~.~/—>  —
■-*   m-1*-*"-**  '■  —'-  - 
ocopo  of  tliolr  roopuctivo  ui  no ions  vhluh  will  aaoiut  ii\  tho  production  ox*  ccca- 
ploraaot  tho  uosocbly  of  jr.itIor..il  intolligonco.  TJio  dJLrDctivo  oluo  instructo 
nil  ogoncloa  to  Maintain  ou.rfIcJ.ont  roooarch  facilities  to  moot  tliolr  individ- 
ual noodu  oi»i  to  assist  in  satisfying  tho  rcqLUlrononta  of  otlior  ngonclos. 
Aroas  of  "dominant  intcroot, "  a  torn  vhlch  is  not  upocif  ically  dofinod, 
aro  allocated  by  tho  dirocttYe  to  tho  various  departments  as  follovn:  political, 
cultural  and  sociological  intolligonco  to  tho  Department  of  State;  military 
intelligence  to  tho  Army,  naval  intelligence  to  tho  Navy,  air  intolligonco  to 
tho  Air  Forco;  and  economic,  scientific  and  technological  intelligence  io  "each 
agency  in  accordance  vith  itc  respective  needs."  Upon  this  framouork  iG  "built 
the  fount  1  program  of  intelligence  production  hy  the  dopartmontal  agoncies  and 
the  Central  Intelligence  Agency. 
The  significant  provision  of  Directive  No.  3  for  the  Control  Intelligence 
Agency  i3  the  -definition  of  national  intelligence,  for  vhich  tho  Agency  ic 
given  ezcluoive  responoihility,  although  it  is  recognized  as  having  rights  and 
responsibilities  vith  respect  to  other  f onus  of  intelligence  as  voll.  In  ef- 
fect tho  directive  interprets  tho  vague  provision  of  the  National  Socuri+y  Act 
on  "intelHgonco  relating  to  tho  national  security"  to  cover  a  particular  typo 
of  intolligonco  reasonably  distinct  from  departmental  intoUigonco  and  con- 
forming to  admittodly  broad  but  generally  comprehensible  specifications. 
Tho  purport  of  tho  National  Security  Act  as  oupploisonted  by  tho  directive 
in  regard  to  tho  production  of  national  intelligence  can  bo  understood  and 
Justified  in  tho  light  of  tho  hictory  and  gonoral  objoctivoo  of  tlio  Act.  Bo- 
hind  tho  concopt  of  a  Central  IntoUigonco  Agoncy  lay  tbo  nocoooity  not  only 
for  tho  cocaiUn&tlon  of  diversified  intolligonco  activities    (Soo  Chaptor  IT), 
tUlA  for,t!^L  lwrfoi1S£inco  ty  tbo  control  agency    itcolf  of  cortain    oorvicoo  of
caaon  uuofulneoa  (Soo  Chaptorc  YI-IX),  but  ulco  for  tho  coordination  of  in- 
toUlConco  opinion  in  the  forn  of  roporto  or  ooUmtoo  af footing  generally  tho 
national  cucurity  as  a  vholo. 
Although  tho  Act  and  the    Intolligonco  Diroctivoo  givo  tho  Control  Intol- 
lisonco  Agency  tho  independent  right  of  producing  national  intollisor.ee, ,  Direc- 
tive Mo.  1  stipulates  that  ouch  intelligence    shall  bo  officially  concurrod  in 
by  tho  intelligence  agencies  or  shall  carry  statement    of  substantial  dlooont. 
Ao  a  practical  natter,  ouch  estimtoo     can  bo  written  only  with  the  collabora- 
tion   of  ozports  in  many  fields    of  intolligonco    and  with  tho    cooperation  of 
Dovoral    doportaento  and    agencies  of    Government.      A    national    intolligonco 
report    or  ostUcato  .as  assembled    and"  producod  by    the    Central  Intolligonco 
Agency    ahould    reflect    the  coordination    of  tho    host  intelligence    opinion,  • 
•  based    on  all    available    information.       It  should    deaLvith    topics  of    vide 
scope  relevant    to  tho  determination  of  basic  policy,     such  as  the    aoaoqssenb 
of  a  country's  var  potential,  its  preparedness  for  var,   its  strategic  capabil- 
ities and  intentions,     its  vulnerability  to  various  foms  of    direct  attack  or 
indirect  pressures.      An  intelligence  estimate  of  such  scope  inevitably  "tran- 
scends tho  excluaive  cospotence  of  a    single  Department  or  Agency  or  the  Mili- 
tary Establiehzsnt."    A  najor  objoctive,  then,  in  establishing  the  Central  In- 
telligence Agoncy  was  to  provide  the    adxainiotrative  jcachinory  for  the  coordi- 
nation of    intelligence  opinion,     for  its  assembly  and  review,  objoctivoly  and 
inrpartlally.  and  for  its  oxprooaion  in  tho  forzi  of  ootiiauton  of  national  scopo 
and  importance, 
TIE  COJKSEf  OF  KAXICWAL  IHIEHIGEKCE  ESTHETES 
Tho  concept  of  national  intolligonco  ostimtoo  underlying  tho  otattito  and 
the  diroctivoo  icthat    of  an  author itativo  interpretation    and  appraisal  tJuvfc   
^■■■■.11   ■   mwm.  W.f^WPMW.1  "|W1 
68  *        .'■"'
*  ' 
   -I*,    j    7|- 1—   
W,U  „orvo  nn  n  firm    fi.il.lo  to  poliny-ia-Aora  and  planner-.,.        A  national  .Lntol- 
Hfionco  oaUrato     should  reflect     tho     coordination  of     the  boat     lntollifi«noo 
opinion.     It  should  bo  1,,-aod  en  all  available  infarction  nnd  bo  proved  with 
full  tabwloin-  of  our  ovn  piano  end  intlio  light  cf  our  ovn  policy  roaulrasonto. 
Thoouti^to     ohould  bo  called     and  assembled     centrally  by  nn     agency  vlioa a 
objectivity    and    disinterestedness     ore  not    open  to  question.       Itn  ultimate 
approval  obould  root  upon  the  collective  responsibility  of  the  highest  officials 
in  the  various  intelligence  aSencios.       Finally,   it  should  command  reception 
and  respect  throughout  the  Government  an  the  bent  available  and  presumably  the 
moot  uuthorltativo  intelligence  estimate. 
The  production  of  national  intelligence  estimates  by  the  Central  Intelli- 
gence Agency  falls  far    short  of  such  a  concept,   in  port  for  reasons  vhich  the 
Central  Intelligence    Agency  doss  not  control.       The  principle  of  the  authori- 
tative national  intelligence  estimate  docs  not  yet  have  established  acceptance 
in  the  Government.  Each  department  still  depends  moro  or  lens  on  its  ovn  intel- 
ligence estimates  and  establishes  its  plana    and  policies  -accordingly.     In  tho 
Military  Establishment  there  is  some     coordination  through  the  Joint  Chiefs  of 
Staff  vho  rely  upon    the  advice  of  the  Joint  Intelligence     Committee  vhich,   in 
turn,  rests  primarily  upon  the  contribution    qf  the  three  Service  departments . 
Neither  the  Central  Intelliscnce    Agency  nor  the  State  Department  participates 
directly  in  these  procedures  in  tho  Military  Establishment,     and  tho  estimates 
of  the  Joint  Intelligence  Conmittoe  are  in  moot  caoec  moro  restricted  in  scope 
than  a  national  intelligence  estimate.  Within  tho  State  Department  tho  policy- 
makers oro,  for  the  moot  part,  their  ovn  intelligence  advisors.     Finally,   thcro 
is  no  systematic  vay  of  tupping  that     domootic  intelligence  information,  vhich 
nhould  be  chiefly  in  tho  hands  of  the     Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation,  having
'uliwTrins  c:>  broador  julclllgcncc  if.ouoo.  At  the  National  Security  Council 
lcvol  tho  Jntelligoncu  estimato  vhich  lo  applied  to  policy  papers  iu  brought 
to  bear  through  tho  individual  departmental  rcprcaentativor  and  the  Independ- 
ently produscd  contributions  of  tho  Central  Intelligence  Agency . 
Although  tho  taok  ia  reado  rcoro  difficult  hy  a  lack  of  general  acceptance 
of  tho  concept  of' national  intelligence  estimates  in  tho  Government,  it  is, 
nevcrtholcna,  tho  clear  duty  of  the  Central  Intelligent  Agency  under  the 
otatuto  and  tho  directives  to  assemble  and  produce  cuch  coordinated  and  authori- 
tative estimates. 
THE  ORGANIZATION  AMD  ACTIVITIES  OF  TEE  CENTRAL  3BTELLEGOCE  AGENCY  FOR  TEE 
PRODUCTION  0?  KATIOKAL  urmiXCESGE 
Unfortunately,  the  attention  of  tho  Central  Intelligence  Agency  has  been 
largely  diverted  frost  the  objective  of  producing  national  intelligence .  tfe 
find  in  examining  its  organization  and  activities,  that  major  Giaphasis  ia  not 
placed  on  the  unique  national  intelligence  function  of  the  Central  Intelligence 
Agoney  but  that  this  function  is  largely  diffused  and  dispersed  in  an  organiza- 
tion which  concerns  itself  vith  a  variety  of  intelligence -producing  activities. 
Thoso  include  summaries  of  current  developments,  political  reports,  background 
studios  on  countrios  and  areas,  economic  roporto,  etc.  (See  Chap tor  Vl) . 
In  tho  original  Contral  Intelligence  Group  it  vao  conceived  that  thero 
vould  bo  a  small  organisation  of  highly  qualifiod  individualo  vhich  vould  limit 
itoolf  strictly  to  national  intelligence  problems  and  baao  its  vork  -primarily 
on  tho  opocinlized  roporto  and  estimates  producod  by  tho  dopartnentu  rather 
than  employ  a  largo  ronoarch  and  analysis  organisation  .of  lt»  own.  However, 
70  '  '""*"
■        "rimt— i  . 
tho  character  of  tho  orc-'iuisutlon  changed,  mid  tho  Offico  of  lioportu  and  K;jtl- 
natcn,  vhich  nov  carrioo  out  tho  renporwlbility  of  tho  Contral  Intolliflencu 
Aijoncj  for  Intelligence  reporting,  diochargoa  a  largo  nuabor  of  intolligojico- 
producing  functions.  Thooo  include,  to  a  linitod  cxtont,  tlio  production  and 
coordination  of  national  intelligence  but  also  other  function*!,  to  bo  doecrib- 
od  in  Chapter  VI.  Some  of  tho  lattor  functiona  duplicate  those  carriod  on  in 
othor  dopartaentn,  nnd  nose  are  moro  in  tho  natu.ro  of  c  canon  cervices  on  "be- 
half of  tho  othor  agencico,  although  thoy  are  not  alvays  recognized  ae  ouch.
Tho  lnlolllgunco  output  of  ihla  organization  which  can  bo  properly  tonnod 
"national  intollJgnnco"  la  not  teprooolvo.  Tho  oubjcctu  aro  normally  ooloctod 
on  tho  Initiative  of  tho  utaff  ltoolf  or  ao  tho  rooult  of  dlocunniono  in  tho 
National  Security  Council  staff,  vhoro  a  juombor  of  tho  utaff  of  tho  Offlco  of 
Reports  and  EotJjritoo  gonorally  participates.  In  producing  theao  rcporta  tho 
Offlco  usually  employs  tho  roooarch  of  ito  ovn  ctaff  inatoad  of  drawing  to- 
gothor  and  coordinating  contributions  from  departmental  agoncioa  Such  depart- 
mental contributions  aro  available  to  the  Office  of  Boports  and  Eat iraatos  undor 
tho  tcroo  of  National  Security  Council  Intolligsnco  Directive  Ko.  5  as  inter- 
preted in  Ko.  3/l  ("Standard  Oporating  Procedure  for  the  Production  of  Staff 
IntolliGenceH)  "but  lai  f act  only  a  small  number  of  the  reports  aro  actually 
-derived  from  departmental  contributions.  Tho  customary  Tproceduro  hao  been  for 
the  Offico  of  Eeports  and  Estimates  to  prepare  a  basic  draft  vhich  is  then 
circulated  to  tho  Departments  of  State,  Army,  Navy  and  Air  Force  for  their 
comments  and  concurrence  or  dissent.  .Thin  procedure  has  proved  to  bo  ineffec- 
tive as  a  means  of  producing  coordinated  national  intelligence.  Tho  depart- 
ments participate  more  aa  outsiders  rovioving  the  material  of  another  agoncy 
than  as  collaborators  oharing  reoponsiblllty  in  on  enterprise  of  oqxuxl  concern 
to  all. 
•  • 
In  spito  of  tho  uoe  of    tho  oyotoa  of     concurroncen  for    certain  typoa  of 
roporta,    tho  position  today  of  tho    Central  Intelligence  Agoncy  ia  that  of  an 
indopondent  producor  of  national  intolligonco,  tho  quality  of  vhooo  product  io 
Variable  and  tho  influonco  of  vhich  io  quootionablo.      Tlio  tondoncy  vithin  tho 
Contrul  Intelligence  Agoncy    )ia3  boon  to  omphanizo  tho  indopondont     production 
of  intelligence  and  this  oiupluiola  hao  lod  to  tvo  rooulto. 
72  •    .
**  ill  rwiilfcw'^n  iiii  >  < '.* 
]h  tho  flrot  placo,  the  intolllgonco  producod  by  the  Control  Xutollltfjnco 
A,c;oncj  ban  not  always  boon  relevant  to  policy  requirements  and  has  lacked  oiToc- 
ti'voDoao.  In  tho  oocond  placo,  thoro  has  boon  a  failure  to  dovolop  coordinated 
national  lntolligonco  which  would  ouporaodo  lndopondont  departmental  offortc 
to  produco  ovor-all  lntolllgcnco. 
It  io  perhaps  tmo  that  tho  efforts  of  tho  Central  lntollieonco  Agoncy 
have  boon  criticized  partly  bocauoo  tho  opinions  oxproaaoa  by  tho  Agency  wore 
occaoionally  at  variance  vith  tho  opiniono  hold  in  tho  dopartmenta;  but  there 
havo  boon  other  roasono.  Tho  independent  intelligence  eatimato  la  folt  to  be 
useful  but  novor  docioiYo  inasmuch  as  tho  Central  Intelligence  Agency  cannot 
and  does  not  by  itsolf  have  all  tho  specialized  oualif  ications  needed  to  pro- 
duco national  intelligence,  and  ia  not,  aa  an  independent  agency,  in  conatam, 
and  intimate  aasociation  vith  the  policy-makers  end  planners,  a  knowledge  of 
vhoso  vork  and  intentiono  is  indispenalble  to  sound  intelligence. 
There  ia  also  criticism  that  the  product  of  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency, 
regardless  of  its  quality  or  importance,  gets  formal  circulation  at  the  highest 
levels  in  the  Government  even  though  its  content  may  not  coincide  vli;h  tho 
viova  of  departmental  officials  whoso  ovn  information  may  bo  more  reliable  and 
complete.  Thoro  is  in  fact  a  serious  danger  that  the  product  of  tho  Contral 
Ihtolllgonco  Agency  may  bo  looked  upon  as  coordinated  national  intelligence, 
vhich  it  usually  is  not. 
■What  hao  happonod  io  that  the  creation  in  tho  Central  Intelligence  Agency 
of  a  largo  Offico  of  Roporta  and  Eotlnato3  performing,  aa  will  bo  omphanizod 
in  tho  next  chaptor,  a  varioty  of  functions  that  aro  not  truly  rolatod  to  tho 
.coordination  of  national  intelligence  ostlmaton,  nocoooarily  moano  that  concorn
vith  National  Intolllgcnco  problca-j;  lo  diminluhn;!,  tJnt  the  urea  of  coicpotition 
vlih  tho  departmental  agoncleo  ia  enlarged  and  that  tho  Control  Intolligcnco 
Agency  concentrates  moro  on  tho  independent  production  of  Intolligcnco  than  on 
its  coordination. 
Administrative  arrangements  within  tho  Central  Intelligence  Agoncy  and 
botvocn  tho  Agency  and  tho  other  departments  and  agonclos  havo  contrihuted  to 
thio  aituation.  Peroonnel  in  tho  Office  of  Itoports  and  Estimates  vho  aro 
responsible  for  national  intelligence  (and  this  includes  almost  everybody  in 
part,  inasmuch  as  national  intelligence  functiono  are  acattcrod  throughout  all 
parts  of  tho  Office)  receive  little  guidance  as  to  vhat  they  ohould  report  on. 
To  a  large  extent  they  celoct  their  owa  subjects  and  eatahlioh  their  ovn  priori- 
ties, and  this  practice  only  increases  tho  criticism  from  vbich  much  of  the 
product  suffers.  Finally,  tho  liaison  relationships  vith  outside  agencies  aro 
unsatisfactory  although  this  situation  is  largely  thcresult  of  the  lack  of  a 
cloar  conception  of  the  proper  mission  of  the  Central  liatolliger.ee  Agency  in 
the  coordination" of  intelligence  opinion  in  the  form  of  national  estimates* 
v. 
'-/ 
L' 
n
r  r„„..-..-...--  ■-■-■«--■- 
r  -   '  ■»-■■■—  !"■»■»■  ■  Hi"  i  "■•  i     ■■■«'■'- 
ENTIRE  PAGE  DELETED. 
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M 
y
Ill  fact,  cno  of  tho  iroot  important  rocoir-cendationo  of  thi»  report  io  that 
a  reconstituted     Iutolligcr.co  Advisory  Cosrcalttoo  should  porform  thlu  function. 
In  at  least  ono  othor  situation  requiring  immediate  intolligonco  intor- 
protatlon  there  van  onco  again  only  fortuitous  coordination.  Tula  cooo  vao  tho 
roonlt  of  lntolligonco  rocolvcd  by  tho  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  and 
distributed  by  it.  Tho  Control  Intolligonco  Agoncy  porformod  only  a  socondary 
rolo  and  thoro  vao  no  formal  intelligence  estimate.  This  furthor  illustrated 
tho  fact  that,  under  prooont  arrangements,  rocognlzod  and  prompt  proceduroo 
are  lacking  for  tho  authoritativo  coordination  of  intelligence  viovs  in  an 
emergency  situation.  In  addition,  it  vao  soon  that  thoro  io  no  regular  and 
agreed  arrangement  for  participation  by  tho  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation 
and  for  the  uso  of  intelligence  from  domestic  sources  in  a  national  estimate. 
Hjopoaiis  for  n-5Pjbyii;G  the  production  of  hatxooal  estimates 
In  order  to  remedy  tho  present  unsatisfactory  arrangements  for  the  pro- 
duction of  national  intelligence  estimates  and  provido  for  the  coordination  of 
intelligence  opinion  at  times  of  crisis  and  for  long  term  planning,  as  contem- 
plated in  tho  National  Socurity  Act,  there  noods-to  he  a  revision  of  tho  pres- 
ent arrangeaents.  Insofar  as  tho  Central  Ihtolligenco  Agency  is  concerned  it 
is  necessary,  in  tho  first  placo,  to  moire  a  clear  dlotinction  botvoen  tho 
function  of  correlating  national  intolligonco  opinion  to  assist  pious  and 
polioy  formulation  on  tho  highest  level  and  thooo  intolligonco  reporting 
activities  vhich.  may  ho  assigned  to  tho  Control  Intolligoiico  Agoncy  as  a  cen- 
tral oorvlco  of  common  concorn. 
Tho  miooion  vlth  roopoct  to  tho  production  of  national  intolligonco  cannot 
ho  fulfillod  solely  through  a  largo  staff  such  au  tho  prooont  Offico  of  Eoportn 
p*'" '  '  ' . yj.ii m-.tm.**-  !**«*tp"
and  Ro'tJjsatoa  vhooo  work     in  dlructod  moro  to     tho  production  of  nincollonooua 
reports     than  to  tho    coordination  of     national  intelligence  opinion.       In  our 
opinion  tho  present  Office  of  Reports  and  Kutiisatoo  should  do  replaced  and  for 
it  oubatitutod  two  offices  ono  of  which,     to  bo  doacrlbcd  in  tho  next  chapter, 
will  not    bo  involved    with  tho  production    of  national     intelligence  but  will 
perform  intollieonco  research    und  reporting  oorvicoo  of  cannon  concern.       Tho 
other  offlco,     an  "Estimates  Division,"  would  costpflso  a  small  group  of  highly 
oolocted    individuals    whoso    took    It    would    he  to  draw    upon  and  review  tho 
opocialiaed  lntellisor.ee  product  of  the  departmental  agencies  in  order  to  pro- 
pare,  for  final  discussion  and  approval  by  tho  Intelligence  Advisory  Committee, 
a  finiohod  national    intelligence  estimate.      This  small  group  would  rely  pri- 
.     marily  upon  the  intolUgence    reports  of  tho    Individual  agencies  hut  it  would 
have  access  to    such  source  material  as  it  requires  in  order  to  review  depart- 
mental contributions    and  prepare  consolidated    estimates  for    final  action  by 
the  Intelligence  Advisory  Committee. 
National  intslligsnce  estimates,  in  order  to  bo  authoritative,  must  be 
fully  participated  in  by  all  of  tho  principal  intelligence  agoncios  in  order 
that  the  best  advice  may  be  tapped  and  responsibility  shared  for  those  major 
estimates  on  which  high  policy  decisions  depend.  Therefore,  the  Intelligence 
Advisory  Ccnmitteo,  under,  tho  leadership  of  tho  Diroctor  of  .Central  Intel- 
ligence, should  actively  assist  in  establishing  and  supervising  the  national 
intelligence  production  program  as  woll  as  discuss  and  roviav  the  proposed 
ostimatos  submitted  to  it  for  approval.  Tho  Conmittoo  would,  at  tho  same 
time,  concom  itsoLT  raoro  actively  than  at  prosont  with  tho  coordination 
of  tho  othor  intolligouco  activitioo  of  tho  various  dopartmonts  and  agoncioo, 
ao  diocuoaod  in  Chaptor  IV.     In  fact,  by  assuming  an  active  responsibility  for
thy  reconciliation  of  intolljguiico  ootiwatoo  tho  Counlttoo  vould  almoot  uuto- 
nall cully  bo  able  to  auaint  Ujo  Director  noro  offocllvcly  in  coordinating  in- 
telligence requirements  and  doYolopIng  oound  arrangements  for  tho  coordination 
of  intelligence  generally. 
Tho  membership  of  tho  Intolligonco  Advioory  Cormittoo,  no  vo  havo  pointed 
out  In  Chaptor  IV,  would  includo  tho  Director  of  Central  Intolliecnco  ao  chair- 
man, and  representatives  from  tho  Departments  of  State,*  Army,  Navy  and  Air 
Forco  and  tho  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation.  M  il2£.  membership  should  ho 
given  to  other  Agencies,  such  ao  tho  Atonic  Enorgy  Commission,  Joint  Staff  and 
Research  and  Development  Board,  vhenover  appropriate. 
Those  revlsod  arrangements  should  make  adequate  provision  for  the  handling 
of  E3jor  emergency  situations  so  that  there  is  automatic  consultation  and 
collective  responsibility  vhen  quick  estimates  are  requirod.  We  have  seen  that 
In  tho  past  such  consultation  has  been  largely  fortuitous  and  could  not  bo 
rolled  upon  to  operate  promptly. 
His  proposal  would  not  affect  tho  responsibility  of  tho  Joint  Intolligenco 
Committee  to  prepare  strictly  military  estimates  for  the  Joint  Chiefs  of 
Staff  and  perform  such  other  military  dtitios  as  tho  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  might 
assign.  Through  tho  membership  of  the  Sorvlco  intollisonce  chiefs  on  the  In- 
telligence Advioory  Committeo  and  tlirough  close  liaison  between  tho  Joint 
Intelligence  Group  .  and  tho  now  Eotiiaatos  Division  In  the  Central  Intelligence 
Agency,  ovory  effort  should  bo  rcado  to  inouro  tho  consistency  of  the  Joint 
*  Coo  bolov,  pngo  159,  for  a  diacuoolon  of  tho  status  of  tho  Stato  Dopartmont 
roprooontativo.  •  .
"""—"  IT    _l  -.    fM-*"-*- 
Intolligenco  Conscittoo'o  military  appraifjulo  undtho  broador  national  o:itlni"iton 
of  tho  Central     Intolligenco  Agency    and  tho  Intelligence     Advisory  Coismlttoo. 
•Vhatovor  arrangement  Id  docidod  upon,  thoro  aro  cortain  gonoral  condi- 
tions which  jnuat  bo  obaorved,  if  intelligence  ostinatoa  aro  to  bo  cound  and 
tiraoly.  All  information,  vhothor  it  originates  fron  iritolligenco  courcoo  or 
vhother  it  ccmos  from  othor  sources  including  oporations,  must  be  available 
to  tho  intelligence  poqp3.o  who  by  putting  together  and  studying  all  of  tho 
hits  of  information  must  provido  tho  overall  interpretation.  Thore  ia  always 
a  dangerous  tendency,  particularly  in  tine  of  crisis,  when  it  can  bo  moat 
oorious,  for  vital  information  to  be  withhold  on  tho  grounds  t'hat  tho  intel- 
ligence peraonnel  should  not  soo  it  because  it  concerns  operations  or  for 
alleged  socurity  reasons.  In  othor  instances  tho  disseminatiqn  of  vital  but 
sensitive  material  is  restricted  to  a  very  few  people  at  the  top  levels  with 
the  result  that  those  individuals  who  ore  most  competent  to  analyze  a  particu- 
lar situation  aro  left  out  of  the  picture  entirely.  It  is  therefore  neces- 
sary that  intelligence  estimates  be  made  in  full  light  of  our  own  policies  and 
operations.  Tho  preparation  of  such  estimates  should  not  be  impeded  by  any 
barriers  arisins  from  socurity  considerations  or  othorwise,  which  may  Jeop- 
ardize   tho  soundness  of  the  intelligence  product. 
Finally,  any  discussion  of  the  preparation  of  national  estimates  would  be  in- 
adequate without  two  caveats .  The  first  app.Uc3to  thoso  who  prepare  the  estimates  ; 
tho  socond  to  thoao  who  way  uae  thorn.  Prejudice  in  the  form  of  stubborn  adlicr- 
enco  to  prcconcoived  ideas  is  likely  to  bo  tho  gravest  danger  to  sound  intelli- 
gence. Estimates  are  oubjocttotho  risk  of  being  colorod  and  twistod  to  roflect 
tho  pro  Judicoa  of  thoao  who  prcparo  thorn.     This  can  boat  bo  countorod  by  providing 
aCjjs
ro.'iHo;r.i!iio  chocks,  and  balances  no  vo  have  ondoavorod  to  do  In  tho  composition 
<ind  rusponsibilltioa  of  tho  Intolligonco  Advisory  Conraittoo.  If,  for  oxowplo, 
tbo  State  Department,  which  Kay  bo  wedded  to  a  particular  policy,  prosonto  tho 
fnctu  distorted  by  faulty  proconcoptlono,  tbo  final  product,  as  rofloctod  in 
an  intelligence  estimato,  vill  be  dofoctivo.  It  ia  hoped  that  in  euch  a  case 
tlio  now  Estimates  Group  of  tho  Central  Intolligonco  Agency  vill  supply  an  ini- 
tial corroctivo  and  that  tho  non-Stuto  Department  Eembcrs  of  tho  Intolligonco 
Advisory  Committee  will  havo  sufficient  breadth  of  knowledge  to  challcngo  tho 
State  Department  estimate.  Likewise,  military  estimates  should  be  submitted 
to  scrutiny  so  that  thoy  are  compatible  with  each  other  and  avoid  the  error, 
however  unconscious,  of  magnifying  the  needs  of  tho ir  ova  branch  of  tho  Service. 
• 
The  Intelligence  Advisory  Committee,  if  it  functions  properly,  and  is  as- 
sisted by  tho  disintorostod  work  of  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  is  the  body 
vhoro  such  distortions  should  bo  caught  and  corrected  and  tho  prejudices  of 
one  mind  challenged  by  the  thinking  of  a  mind  vhich  at  least  dooo  not  suffer 
from,  tho  soma  prejudices. 
2h  turn,  prejudice  on  the  part  of  tho  policy-maker 3  may  render  them  blind 
ovon  to  brilliant  achievements  of  an  intolligonco  service.  They  iaay  Just  re- 
fuso  to  listen  to  what  thoy  do  not  like.  Hence,  nothing  would  bo  more  dan- 
gerous than  to  boliovo  that  if  we  once  had  an  effective  intolligonco  service 
and  an  off  iciont  intolligonco  ootimating  body,  wo  would  bo  immune  to  a  dioastor 
liko  Pearl  Harbor. 
This  doos  not  lend  to  tho  conclusion  that  intolligonco  ia  futllo.  It 
merely  shows  its  limitations.  If  tho  intolligonco  npprainor  can  koop  from 
twiiiUng  and  coloring  tho  data  lie  receives     and  if  tho  policy-mnkor  can  koop  a
ii«n  i  i'ii  i  i  111  '  W'»i'" — 
relatively  open  mind  and  bo  prepared  for  continual  re-evaluation  of  the  aoouny- 
tionn  on  vhlch  he  ic  relying,  tlicn  oound  '  intelligence  estimates  can  be  a 
pillar  of  strength  for  our  national  security. 
conclusions  and  nxa&issMrions 
(1)  In  the  Confcral  Intelligence  Agency  thero  hao  been  confualon  between 
the  responsibility  of  producing  coordinated  national  intelligence  estimates 
and  reaponoibility  for  miscellaneous  research  and  reporting  activitiea. 
(2)  The  provisions  of  the  national  Security  Act  for  tbo  production  of 
national  intelligence  estimates,,  as  interpreted  by  the  national  Security 
Council  Intelligence  Directives,  are  sound  but  have  not  been  effectively 
carried  out.  , 
(3)  There  should  be  created  in  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  a  small 
Estisatc3  Division  vhich  vould  draw  upon  and  review  the  specialized  intelli- 
gence product  of  the  departmental  agencies  in  order  to  prepare  coordinated 
national  intelligence  estimates. 
* 
CO  Under  the  leadership  of  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence,  these 
estimates  should  be  submitted  for  discussion  and  approval  by  the  reconstituted 
Intelligence  Advisory  Committee  whose  members  should  assume  collective  respon- 
sibility  for  them. 
(5)  Provision  should  bo  mado  in  those  arrangements  for  the  handling  of 
crisis  oituationowhon  coordinated  estimatoa  aro  required  vithout  delay. 
(6)  Coordinated  intolllgcnco  ootimatco  producod  in  this  way  must,  in 
ordor  to  bo  offoctivo,  bo  rocognlzod  no  tho  moot  authoritative  estimates  avail- 
able to  tho  policy  makoro. 
IE  82.
CHAPTER  VI 
SERVICES  OF  COMMON  CONCERN: 
INTELLIGENCE  RESEARCH  AND  REPORTS 
PROPCSZD  RESEARCH  AKD  REPORTS  DIVISION 
We  have  rccorrjcoiidod  in  tho  preceding  chapter  that  there  be  created  a 
OEBlli  high-level  JJstireatos  Division  to  cancorn  itself  primarily  with  the  cor- 
relation of  national  intelligence,  .  oubjoct  to  final  approval  by  tho  Intel- 
ligence Adviaory  Coasaitteo.  If  the  reaponaibllity  of  tho  Central  Intelligence 
Agency  for  tho  production  of  national  intelligence  io  assumed  by  this  Eoti- 
matos  Division,  there  will  regain  cortain  research  and  intelligence  reporting 
function  now  being  performed  by  the  Office  of  Reports  and  Estimates  which _ 
might  properly  bo  carried  out  as  a  service  of  contnon  concern  by  a  newly  con- 
stituted "Research  and  Reports  Division".  Other  activities  of  tho  Office  of 
Reports  and  Estimates  should  be  discarded  as  being  superfluous  or  competitive 
with  tho  proper  activities  of  departmental  intelligence. 
There  is  presently  within  the    Office  of  Reports    and  Estimates  a  nucleus 
for  the  proposed    Research  and    Reports  Division    in  fields  of  cczmon  concern. 
To  these 
thoro  should  be  added  tho  Foreign  Docuacnto  Branch  of  tho  Offico  of  Operations 
(Soe  below, page  10j)  and  the  library,  biographical  and  other  registers  and  in- 
dicon  prcsontly  maintained  b,v  tho  Office  of  Collection  and  Dissemination. 
Generally  speaking,     this  Division    will  bo  responsible  for   authoritative 
research  and  reports  in  economic,     scientific  und  technological     intelligence, 
Jl
7hi>  ssalnVJivMiCo  of  central  reference  facilities,  anl  ouch  otlior  nattoro  as  aro 
docr-ed  of  cordon  concern.  To  tho  oxtont  necessary,  it  will  aloo  coordinate  tho 
rctlvltlea  of  tho  othor  agoncios  in  thcoo  flclda.  Ita  otaff  should  include  In 
impropriate  cases  adoquato  representation  from  tho  Stato  Department  and  Sorv- 
icoo  no  that,  subject  to  policy  guidanco  from  tho  principal  councaora,  its 
products  will  rcprosont  tho  coordinated  opinion  of  tho  best  available  talont 
nnd  ohould  be  fully  rooponoivc  to  tho  requirements  of  tho  consumer  agonclea. 
In  this  chapter  wo  suggest  the  typo  of  activity  which  should  bo  discon- 
tinued as  unossential  or  duplicative,  tho  type  of  activity  which  ahould  be 
jrotainedosa  conaon  service  and  same  activities,  not  presently  carried  out  la 
tho  Office  of  Reports  and  Estimates,  which  should  be  performed  by  the  proposed 
Research  and  Reports  Division  as  services  of  common  concernr  It  would  be  the 
ronponsibility  of  tho  National  Security  Council,  act  ins  ca  the  advice  of  the 
Director  of  Central  Intelligence  and  the  Intelligence  Advisory  Committee,  to 
dotormino  which  of  those  central  services  might  properly  be  performed,  and  we 
boliove  that  the  Coordination  Division  Ore constituted  Interdepartmental  Co- 
ordinatins  and  Planning  Staff)  should  examine  this  problem  and  prepare  the 
nocoscary  plans. 
PERIODICAL  SUMMARIES 
Tho  Of  f  ico  of  Reports  and  Estimates  presently  producos  current  intelligence 
in  two  principal  forms:  a  top  secret  Daily  Summary  and  a  socrot  Weekly  Summary. 
Tho  former    comprioos    abstracts     of  a  small    numbor  of     incoming  and  outgoing 
cables  rocoivod  during     tho  preceding  twonty-four  hours.    •  Approximately  ninety 
por  cont  of  tho  contents  of  tho  Daily  Sunaeary  is  dorivod  from  Stato  Dopnrtraont 
uourcoo,  Including  both  oporational  aa  well  ao     intolligoncd  material.       Thoro 
  I       rT— — ■■'^'*l
nro  occasional  coecncnta  by  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency    on  portions  of  tho 
Sui-ary,  but  those, for  tho  laoat  part,  appear  gratuitous  and  lend  little  weight 
to  tho  material  itoolf .       Tho  ro:.ult  la  a  frngnentury     publication  which  deals 
with  operations  no  well  as  Intelligence,  without  neccsoarily  being  based  on  tho 
moot  significant  materials  in  eitlior  category.  In  a  summary  of  thio  typo,   cir- 
culated to  tho  Prooidont  and  the  highest  officials  of  tho  Government,  thcro  io 
en  inherent  danger  that  it  will  be  riislcading  to  ito  consumers.  Thiols  bocauoe 
it  io  baaed  largely  on  abstracts  of  State  Department  materials,  not  in  histor- 
ical perspective,  lacking  a  full  knowledge  of  the  background  or  policy  involved 
and  with  little  previous  consultation  between  tho    Central  Intelligence  Agency 
and  the  State  Dspartmont.  Moreover,  it  io  incomplete  because  it  is  not  based  on 
all  tho  most  important  materials. 
Tho  Weekly  Summary  is  more  widely  circulated  than  the  Daily  Smmary,  but 
also  represents  primarily  political  reporting  and  competes  for  attention  with 
several  departmental  weekly  summaries,  particularly  those  of  tho  State  Depart- 
ment and  tho  Department  of  the  Army. 
Still  another  periodical  publication  is  tho  monthly  "Review  of  the  Vorld 
Situation." 
Those  suanaries,  particularly  the  Daily,  ore  the  subject  of  considerable 
controversy  and  are  recoivod  with  expressions  ranging  from  moderate  interest 
to  strong  criticism.  The  Wookly  and  tho  Daily  aro,  to  a  cortain  oxtcnt,  duplica- 
tive in  that  tho  Stato  Department,  to  which  political  intelligence  has  been 
naaignod  as  on  area  of  dominant  interost,also  dlusominatos  its  own  operational 
and  intelligence  oummarioo  on  tho  highest  IoyoIs.  As  both  Summaries  consumo 
an  inordinate  amount  of  time  and  effort  and  appoar  to  be  outsido  of  tho  domain 
its
of  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency,  vc  bo3Jovo  that  tho  ttaily,  and  pooulbly 
tho 'Weekly i  Sia-r.nfy  should  bo  discontinued  in  tholr  proaont  form.  Yta  do,  how- 
ever, appreciate  tho  fact  that,  to  oono  extent,  thcro  may  he  a  nocd  for  ouch 
summaries,,  «»d  ve  suggest  that  tho  nevly  constituted  Coordination  Dlvioion  ox- 
oraino  tho  situation  to  dotormine  vhothor  thero  is  ouch  a  need  ajid  how  it  can 
boot  bo  not. 
mscEixAiascys  reports  akl  memora20>a 
Tho  Office  of  Reports  and  Estimates  also  produces  a  varioty  of  other  re- 
ports, otudies  and  summaries..  Sane  of  these  aro  strategic  and  basic  studies 
on  foreign  countries  or  areas,  presenting  the  political,  economic  and  military 
oituation.  Others  aro  intended  to  be  estimates  of  current  international  prob- 
lems. These  are  formal  r oporto, dealing  vith  a  variety  of  subjects  ranging  from 
"rcnoiblo  Developments  in  China"  to  "Opposition  to  the  ECA".  These  estimate- 
typo  roports  are  circulated  throughout  the  various*  agencies  for  tho  purpose  of 
obtaining  concurrence  or  dissent.  But  tho  fact  that  thoy  are  so  circulated  in 
no  way  means  that  they  are  properly  coordinated  estimates  which  represent  tho 
boot  thinking  on  the  subject  under  review.  They  often  deal  with  topics  which 
are  not  particularly  rolovant  to  departmental  problems  or  national  iBoues, 
with  tho  result  that  tho  various  agencioo  often  feol  that  it  io  an  imposition 
to  bo  burdened  with  the  responsibility  for  roviowing  those  documents,  making 
appropriate  coanents  and  noting  concurrence  or  dissont.  .  ■•    • 
Tho  Off ico  of  Koports  and  Eotimatoo  also  initiatoB  moro  informal  reports 
oy  moons  of  intelligence  memoranda  produced  spontaneously  or  in  answer  to  spe- 
cific voquosts.  Those  ore  not  coordinated  by  circulation  through  tho  other 
n&oncloa.  Subjects  again  diffor  widely  and  includo  ouch  topics  no  "Soviot 
Vlnnnclng  of  tho  French  Coal  Ctviko"  and  "Tangnton  in  South-  Korea" . 
116 
n
Much  of  this  production  in  academic,  tone's  to  duplicate  work  in  other  do- 
partaontn,  has  littlo  relation  to  national  intelligence,  and  in  not  produced 
an  a  rocognlzod  oorvico  of  caraon  concox-n.  On  tho  otlior  hwnd,  oomo  of  thin 
prediction  wight,  oubjoct  to  General  agreement,  bo  performed  aa  a  central  com- 
mon sorvico.  la  our  opinion,  tho  nowly  constituted  Koocarch  and  Reports  Divi- 
sion ohould  rofrain  from  tho  production  of  ooscntially  political  studies  and 
miscellaneous  reports  and  should  concentrato  its  effort  upon  tho  production  of 
roporta  in  thoao  fiolds  clearly  assignod  to  it  as  recognized  services  of  cara- 
mon concern. 
THE  HATI0HAL  INTELLIGENCE  SURVEY  "    
. 
Under  National  Socurity  Council  Intelligence  Directive  No.  3,  the  Central 
intelligence  Agency  is  charged  with  preparing  an  outline  for  the  national  In- 
telligence Survey  ~  on  oxtensive  oeriea  of  basic  studies  on  all  countries  and 
areas  of  the  world  —  and  with  coordinating  the  necessary  depertaontal  contribu- 
tions. This  study  ha3  been  assigned  to  the  Office  of  Reports  and  Estimates,  not 
as  the  producer,  but  rather  as  coordinator  of  the  program, under  specifications 
and  priorities  approved  by  the  Joint  Intelligence  Committee.  This  coordination 
is  achieved  through  the  allocation  of  topics  for  research  and  production  for 
tho  particular  purpooo  of  the  Survey  sories,but  there  is  no  provision  for  cen- 
tralization or  coordination  of  current  production  in  thoao  fields. 
Undor  this  series,  various  chapters  and  ooction3  have  boon  farmed  out  to 
tho  Stato  Department, tho  Servicoo,  and  othor  qualified  agoncloo.  For  inotanco, 
tho  Army  has  boon  assigned  tho  responsibility  for  tho  sections  on  tranaportati  on 
and  conmunications.  Tho  assignment  of  thoao  sections  docs  not  moan  that  Army 
is  recognized  ao  having  olthor  primary  interest  in,  or  continuing  responsibility
for,  lntollleonco  with  ronpcct  to  transportation  mid  coicmunicutlonrj .  For  tho 
pui-poao  only  of  tho  handbooks, tho  national  Intolligonco  Survey  ulininatoo  dup- 
lication of  production  in  certain  fields  end  provide*  temporary  oditoriul 
coordination  of  basic  intelligence  through  tho  allocation  of  topics.  It  dooo 
not  solve  tho  problem  of  centralizing  or  coordinating  continuing  rooearch  and 
production  in  tho  f  ioldn  of  coinaon  intoroot. 
ECONOMIC,  SCIEKTmC  AMD  TECHNOLOGICAL  INTELLIGENCE 
Tho  Office  of  Reports  and  Estimates  appoaroto  have  Ends  no  aorious  attempt 
to  produce  coordinated  estisatos  or  authoritative  intelligence  in  the  f iolds 
of  economic,  technological  and  oclentific  intelligence,  in  which  no  department 
•  is  recognized  as  having  a  dominant  interest.  The  six  Geographic  Branches,  the 
Sciontific  Branch  and  a  number  of  the  Consultant  Panels  are  variously  interested 
in  these  fields  but  .have  seldom  produced  authoritative  Intelligence  contribu- 
tions therein.  We  have  found  in  our  examination  of  the  Central  Intelligence 
Agency,  State  Department  and  the  three  Service  Intelligence  agencies  that  there 
is  much  duplication  and  little  coordination  of  production  on  those  subjects. 
Although  often  along  parallel  lines,  studies  are  independently  produced  by  the 
various  agencies  and  do  not,  therefore,  represent  tho  best  available  coordinated 
opinion. 
There  has  been  an  attempt  in  National  Security  Council  Intelligence  Direc- 
i. 
•  tiYO  no.  3  to  guide  the  of  fort  of  tho  various  agencios  into  coordinated  chan- 
nels by  tho  allocation  of  certain  fiolds  of  dominant  interest,  but  in  tho 
fields  of  oconomic,  sciontific  and  technological  intelligence,  each  agoncy  is 
authorized  to  produce  in  accordauco  with  its  noods.  Thus,  it  is  in  those 
jf'ioldo,  loft  open  to  all  agoncioo  and  for  which  responsibility  is  now 
8fl  *  Bin  IM. HII, *  .11  „.,  .xJf^MMfKjgf
ml  itili— liil«i-*frfc«-' 
divided  and  diffused,  tlvifc  the  propocod  P.oooarch  and  Koports  Division  could 
perform  u  vuluablo  oorvlco  of  conson  intoroot  by  contrail zing  or  coordinating 
roooorch  and  intelligence  production. 
It  io  doubtful  vhether  such  a  high  degree  of  centralization  in  those  fields, 
including  ease  essentially  military  intelligence, ic  desirable  in  this  country. 
Our  Sorvico  intelligence  agencies  have  been  assigned  fields  of  dominant  intorost, 
and  they  vill  continue  to  produce  nilitary  intelligence  vithin  these  areas.. 
Hovovor,  ovon  if  each  intelligence  ogoncy  confines  itsolf  almost  entirely  to 
the  production  of  intelligence  within  its  field  of  dominant  intorost,  thore 
remains  a  vast  area  of  cosaaon  intorost  in  such  nocosoary  supporting  fields  as 
oconcaic,  ociontiflc  and  toclinologlcol  intelligence. 
Tbo  economic  flold  could  include,  for  oxomplo, industrial  production,  eco- 
nomic roooiu'coo,  no talluvgy,  fuels,  povor,.coraiuni cations  and  tolocommuni cations.
Thoao  ore  ooino  of  tho  'subjects  vhoro  thcro  is  proncnt  duplication  "among  our 
ftgonclcii  and  in  which  a  groat  econoroy  of  effort  and  improvement  of  product 
vould  rooult  if  intelligence  wero  produced  centrally.  To  provide  an  offoctivo 
contribution,  tho  contrally  produced  reports  en  economic  and  induatrial  mattoro 
must  roprooont  tho  cost  nuthoritativo  coordinated  opinion  on  tho  oubjoct  and 
must  bo  accopted  an  ouch  by  tho  consumer  agencios.  •  A  principal  new  consumer 
vould  bo  tho  EotiEateo  Divioion,  rocommonded  in  tho  precoding  chapter.  Ve 
also  recognize  that  tho  requirement o  of  tho  various  agoncies  in  those  natters 
of  common  concern  vill  differ,  and  that  each  agency  vill  need  to  adapt  to  its 
own  particular  problems  tho  intelligence  produced  in  those  fiolds. 
Few  subjects  of  intelligence  are  more  important  than  scionco  and  tech- 
nology, and  yet  little  success  -has  been  achieved  in  this  country  toward  coor- 
dinating intelligence  'collection  and  production  in  those  fields.  Among  tho 
agencies  vhich  are  interested  and  in  a  position  to  contribute  are  not  only  the 
Cdntral  Intelligence  Agency,  the  State  Department  and  tho  three  Services,  but 
also  the  Atomic  Energy  Commission  and  the  Research  and  Development  Board.*
To  fulfill  its  responsibilities  as  the  chiof  analytical  and.  evaluating 
unit  for  scientific  intelligence,  and  consequently  as  the  principal  guide  for 
collection,  the  Branch  would  have  to  he  staffed  hy  scientists  of  the  highest 
qualifications.  We  appreciate  that  in  such  a  Branch  it  would  he  impossible  to 
obtain  a  leading  scientist  for  each  of  the  many  segments  of  scientific  and  tech- 
nological intelligence,  hut  we  holieve  that  a  staff  of  moderate  size  and  of 
high  quility  can  cope  with  the  normal  research  and  evaluation, co-opting,  where 
necessary,  personnel  from  such  organizations  as  the  Research  and  Development 
Board  and  the  Atomic  Energy  Cosaission. 
COHCUUSIOKS  AND  RECtt2®IDATI0:XS 
(1)  In  addition  to  the  Eotimatos  Division  rocommondod  in  the  previous 
Chapter,  thoro  should  he  created  out  of  the  prosont  Off ico  of  Reports  and  Es- 
timates a  Research  and  Reports  Division  to  accomplish  central  research  in,  and  co- 
ordinated production  of,  intolligonce  in  fields  of  common  interest.  The  staff
of  tJilo  Ulvifjlon  ohould  includo  sufficient  ropronontatlon  frcra  tho  SUito  Do- 
Ti.'irt."cnt  and  tho  Scrvicon  to  insuro  that  thoir  noe<fcj  aro  adoquatoly  mot. 
(2)  Tho  Coordination  Division  (roconotitutcd  Intcrd.cpartEionta.1  Coor- 
dinating end  Planning  Staff)  ohould  ho  givon  tho  rooponaibility  for  studying 
tho  actual  ocope  of  tho  Foccarch  and  Bcporto  Divio  ion  and  for  rocosmonding 
thooo  oorvicea  of  corraon  concorn  which  ohould  bo  porformod  contrally. 
(5)  Tho  propriety  of  the  preparation  by  tho  Control  Intelligence  .Agency 
of  ooaontially  political  eunEarioo  ohould  ho  reviewed*  taking  into  considera- 
tion tho  need  for  such  suicaaries,  tho  existence  of  a  nunber  of  duplicating 
ouEttaries  and  tho  particular  capabilities  of  tho  individual  departments  to 
prepare  then. 
(k)  Tho  various  reports,  studies  end  summaries  which  are  not  national 
intelligence  or  recognized  services  of  cenmon  concern  should  be  discontinued.
CHAPTER  VII 
SERVICES  OF  COI/.WON  CONCERN: 
THE  COLLECTION  OF  OVERT  INTELLIGENCE 
 i, 
Tho  Office  of  Operations,  undor  on  Assistant  Director,  porfoi-vj  a  central 
coicson  oorvico  through  tho  collection  of  ovort  intelligence  by  throo  essentially 
distinct  moans:  tho  Contact  Branch  is  responsible  for  tho  exploitation  of 
buainos3  concorns  and  othor  non-governmental  organizations  and  individuals  In 
tho  United  Statco  ao  oourceo  of  foreign  intelligence  information;  tho  Foreign 
Broadcast  Information  Brench  is  responsible  for  all  federal  monitoring  of 
foreign  propaganda  and  press  broadcasts;  and  tho  Foreign  Documents  Branch  ex- 
ploits foreign  language  documents  and  foreign  periodicals  and  press  for  intel- 
ligence purposes. 
CORTACT  BRA1ICH 
•  National'  Security  Council  Intelligence  Directive  No.  7  (See  Annex  Ho.  Ij) 
provides  that  "Tho  Csntral  Intelligence  Agency  shall  he  responsible  for  tho 
exploitation,  on  a  highly  selective  basis,  vithin  the  United  States  of  business 
concerns,  othor  non-governmental  organizations  and  individuals  as  sources  of 
foreign  intelligence  information".  The  directive  also  establishes  the  general 
rulos  undor  vhich  those  activities  are  to  be  conducted  and  provides  for  tho 
vays  in  vhich  tho  needs  of  the  other  intelligence  agencies  are  to  bo  mot.  This 
roprooents  an  important  step  forward  toward  tapping  a  valuablo  source  of  in- 
telligence and .  overcoaing  tho  difficulties  encountored  during  World  Mar  II, 
vhon  procoduros  for  this  purpose  had  to  bo  improviced  and  the  ovorlupy£4j23_jji=_ 
toroots  of  a  number  of  agoncioo  roconcilod.
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100
FOltKlGIi  K'-OADC/wT   UiKOIKSXlO:'  I'i'JttCIi  ~~ 
Uii'l'.T  KuiloiviL  Security  Coiuicll  Intolll^nco  Directive  Ko.  6  ('-co  Annex 
Ho.'  12),  t»'.o  Contral  lntolligonr.0  A  coney  lo  unsigned  tho  mission  of  monitoring 
oil  foreign  propaganda  and  prose  broadcasts  and  disseminating  tho  resulting 
lntolligoace.  Thooo  dutloo  aro  carried  out  "by  tho  Foreign  Broadcast  Inforavi- 
tlon  Branch  (F3EB)  of  tho  Off  ico  of  Operationo  which  conducto  actual  monitoring 
operations  through  two  stations  locatod  in  this  country  (on  tho  East  and  Vest 
coaota  respectively),  ono  otation  in  Cairo  ("being  moved  to  Cyprus);  ono  in 
Tokyo  and  ono  in  Havaii  (being  coved  to  Okinava). 
Approxiaatoly  2,000,000  vordo  are  aonitored  daily  "by  these  stations,  of 
which  150,000  are  cabled  to  this  country  after  local  oditing.  Upon  receipt 
here,  this  aaterial  is  ro-editod  and  published  as  a  daily  summary  of  approxi- 
mately 90,000  vords.  In  addition,  weekly  summaries  and  special  digests  on 
particular  topics  aro  propared.  A  considerable  amount  of  data  is  produced  for 
tho  "Voice  of  America"  activity  of  the  State  Deportment.  Most  of  thi3  moni- 
toring vork  is  routine,  but  tho  Branch  also  receives  from  various  agoncioo 
statements  of  thoir  continuing  requirements,  as  yell  as  opocific  roq'aeota. 
3h  gonornl,  it  can  bo  said  that  tho  Foroign  Broadcast  Information  Branch 
pox-forms  a  non-controvoroial  common  oorvico  vhlch  is  voll  rocoivod  by  tho  con- 
oumor  agencioo.     If  there  is  any  reservation  ao  'to  tho  usofulnooo  of  its  work, 
it  is  th.it  tho  natorial  io  not  analyzed    or  ovnluatod  prior    to  dlosoralnntion; 
-— — _  .  •       •  •  101    •
/ 
"~~'~~   ,.v-  co::i»ilod  and  yruoontod  factually.  Iloyovor,  till"  ooonii  to  ho  a 
,.,.,<-  nrrcj>3csttnt  although  thoro  ohould  bo  appropriate  luachlnory  outoido  tho 
nrwich  for  tatins  tlio  monitoring  •  roporto  and  interpreting  thcra  in  light  of 
other  related  intolllGfrnco.  Thio  vould  nocav  to  bo  a  proper  function  of  tho 
appraiooro  and  producora  of  intolli3onco,  although  tho  Faroien  Broadcact  In- 
fomitlon  Branch,  poecoooins  ao  «  &>ou  *»»  full  covoraso,  could  coutinuo  to* 
ittfeo  Buscerloo  of  tho  traffic  It  menitoro.  If,  ao  vao  ouGgootod  in  Chapter  VI, 
a  Koooarch  and  Eoporto  Divioion  ic  croatod  for  research  on  quootione  of  ccsnon 
interest,  thio  EiBht  he  tho  proper  place  vhere  thio  rcatorial  could  ho  further 
analyzed  and  appropriate  studieo  prepared,  Tho  political  analysis,  however, 
ohould  ho  done  in  the  State  Departaent. 
Wo  have  experienced  scao  difficulty  in  arriving  at  a  rocaasondstion  ao  to 
vhoro  tho  Foreign  Brcadcaot  Infornation  Branch  ohould  ho  placod  in  view  of  our 
roco=sondations  for  tho  dioporoal  of  tho  other"  functions  of  tho  Office  of 
Operations.  While  tho  work  of  tho  Branch  io  oooontially  an  operating  function, 
it  io  alao  a  purely  overt  ono,  and  thio  mllitatoa  oanowhat  asainot  placing  it 
in  tho  propoood  Cporationo  Divioion  which  vould  ho  concerned  almost  oxclunivoly 
vith  covort  operations.  On  tho  other  hand,  tho  fact  that  tho  Branch  io 
■j>.i  n'juwi  ■.'  miiii  iju  wm;,m,iui,i.  u 
102  •  F
operational  urguon  agulnal  placing  It  In  Uio  proposed  Konoarch  mid  lfc.-j.orlu  !H- 
vlnlon  which  vould  bo  engaged  in  poi-rormanco  of  purely  utatic  functions.  On 
balance,  vo  incline  to  tho  view  that,  an  botvuen  the  two,  tho  Operations  Blvi- 
nion,  with  its  greater  fucllitloa  for  handling  cozaainleatJon  oporutlonu  in 
gonoral,  in  tho  preferablo  place  vithin  tho  Central  Intelligence  Agency.  Fur- 
ther, it  io  conceivable  thatf  tho  focilitioo  of  tho  Foroiga  Broadcaot  Informa- 
tion Branch  nay,  at  none  futuro  tiico,  prove  uaoful  to  the  propouod  Oporatlono 
Bivieion  in  its  covort  activitioo.  Of  couroo,  the  product  of  tho  Branch  should 
bo  teaediatoly  available  to' tho  new  Bosearch  and  Reports  Division  for  analysis. 
FOHEIGH  BOCUMENTS  BBAKCH 
The  third  Branch  of  tho  Office  of  Operations  is  the  Foreign  Documents 
Branch  which  has  the  responsibility  for  exploiting  foreiga  language  documents 
end  foreiga  periodicals  and  press  for  intelligence  purposes.  Unlike  the  Foreign 
Broadcast  Information  Branch  and  the  Contact  Branch,  which  operate  by  virtue 
of  charters  accorded  the  Central  intelligence  Agency  by  National  Security 
Council  Intelligence  Birective  Dos.  6  and  7,  respectively,  the  Foreiga  Docu- 
ments Branch  has  no  such  charter  ana  io,  therofore,  not  rocognized  officially . 
as  a  unique  common  service  Tho  other  departments  and  agencies  do  some  of 
their  own  tranolationo  of  foroiga  language  documents,  etc. ,  but  also  rely  on 
tho  Foroiga  Bocumento  Branch. 
Tho  Foreign  Documents  Branch  io  ongagod  in  completing  its  exploitation  of 
largo  quantities  of  materials  captured  taring  tho  recent  war.  In  addition,  it 
xaonitoro  current  proea  and  periodical  publication  and  booidoo  thooo  routino 
translations  it  occasionally  tranolatoa  opocific  docuoonto  upon  roquoot.  It 
nloo  maintains  for  tho  variouo  conaumor  agoncloo  a  continuing  program  of 
•Wi  I   'JPfclBii.y— 
^-^— 'mji>  vnjg
/ 
(iliiitrr.c'-Jr.-:  from  periodical  pnblJcallonu  njioclfic  mtorinlii  in  ouch     fields  ixn 
olcctronlco,   IniHuportrUlon,  otic. 
There  io  a  constant  and  largo  flov  of  production  from  tho  Foroign  Docu- 
ments Branch  in  tho  f ora  of  oxtractu  from  tho  foroign  proao;  current  periodical 
abstracts,  "both  general  and  technical,  doaliji3  vitli  itoma  of  intolligonco  valuo 
contalnod  in  Soviot  and  other  foroign  periodicals;  an  Industrial  card  file  rec- 
ord for  incluoion  in  tho  Foreign  Industrial  Register  of  tho  Office  of  Collec- 
tion and  Dieecmination;  biographical  intolligonco  reports;  a  bibliography  of 
Russian  poriodicala,  opocial  accoosion  lists  and  variouo  tranolatione  of  cur- 
ront  material  to  moot  continuing  requirements. 
Inasmuch  as  it  is  virtually  -  impossible  to  havo  a  large  pool  of  orpert 
translators  vho  are  at  the  same  time  specialists  -in  various  fields.  It  -is  most 
important  that  tho  vorJc  of  an  agoncy  such  as  the  Foreign  Documents  Branch  be 
porforzed  in  close  relationship  to  and  under  the  constant  guidance  of  the  con- 
sumer agencies.  It  vould,  therefore,  ooom  that  Instead  of  being  associated  in 
tho  Office  of  Operations  vith  the  Contact  Branch  end  tho  Foroign  Broadcast  In- 
formation Branch,  vith  vhich  it  has  little  In  common,  it  vould  be  preferable 
for  tho  Foroign  Documents  Branch  to  be  a  part  of  tho  proposed  Research  and 
Roports  Division  suggested  in  Chapter  VT. 
CONCLUSIONS  AMD  RECO^-ffiStDAIIOSS 
(1)  Tho  Offico  of  Oporationo  consists  of  throe  diotinctivo  activities, 
vhich  rppreoont  useful  and  recognized  functiono  in  thoir  ovn  f iold  but  have  no 
particular  relation  to  oach  othor. 
(2)  Tho  Contact  Branch  should  bo  intogratod  vith  tho  Offico  of  Spocial 
Oporationo  and  Offico  of  Policy  Coordination  undor  singlo  ovor-all  dlroction 
(Oporationo  Division)  vithln  tho  Central  Intolligonco  Agoncy.
•    nil  *    I  J  1 1  if    • 
(})  h'nro  active  oJTortn  nliould  bo  jr/ido  to  oaplolt  iiitolll(>-nco  frora 
foreign  ntiLJ&jnllty  croupe  end  foreign  indivlduale  In  tho  United  SUiton,  and 
utopn  nhould  bo  takon  by  tho  director  of  Central  Intulllgonco  and  tho   Intolll- 
gonce  Advlnory  Cosalttoo  to  coordinate  tbo  activitica  of  iho  variouo  ngoncieo 
in  thlo  fiold. 
(1»)  Tho  Foreign  Docnusento  Branch  ohould  bo  made  part  of  tho  proposed 
Xoscarch  and  Ecportn  Diviclon  If  one  is  created. 
(5)  If  the  Foreign  Broadcast  Inforaation  Eranch  roi-aiae  a  part  of  tho 
Central  Ihtolligonco  Agency,     it  nhould  probably    ho  administered    hy  tho    nev 
t 
Operations  Division,  hut  its  product  should  ho  currontly  available  for  analysis 
in  the  new  ftooearch  and  Reports  Division. 
105 
/ 
/   THERE  IS  NO  PAGE  106.
CHAPTER  VIII 
SERVICES  OF  COMMON  CONCERN: 
THE  COLLECTION  OF  SECRET  I K  TEL  LICENCE 
Under  norral  peacetime  conditions,  the  bulk  of  the  Information  on  vhlcli 
a  government  bauco  itn  action  in  tho  intomation.il  field  io  obtainable  by  overt 
means  —  that  10  to  Gay,  through  diplomatic  and  military  establishments, 
through  tho  pronn,  scientific  end  tochnical  publications  and  the  normal  chan- 
nels of  trade  and  international  intercourse.  With  these  facilities  available, 
the  colloction  of  intelligence  in  peacetime  through  oecrot  msana  assumes  rela- 
tircly  oecondary  importance.  In  fact,  an  mentioned  above,  inoofar  as  our  ovn 
Govornsant  io  concerned,  covert  collection  of  intelligence  vas  a  negligible 
factor  prior  to  World  Var  II. 
Today  it  is  an  understatement  to  describe  conditions  aG  merely  abnormal. 
Thoy  are  uniquely  difficult  from  tlie  viovpoint  of  intelligence.  Where  Com- 
munist regimes    are  in    control    the  ordinary    moans    of  securing    information 
are  generally  lacking.  In  those  areas,  it  io  true-,  we  have  a  few  diplo- 
matic missions  and  hero  and  there  some  consular  establishments.  Thoir  staffs, 
howover,  aro  so  restricted  and  spied  upon  that  thoy  cannot  perform  their  usual 
information  gathering  functions.  Evon  tho  type  of  information  that  io 
available  for  the  aoking  hero  in  tho  United  Statos  io  unobtainable  there. 
In  this  vholo  groat  aroa  of  communist  domination  it  io  not  only  military 
information  which  is  kopt  oocrot,  but  it  ia  hard  to  got  ovon  simple  and 
ooomingly  innocuous  details  relating  to  tho  oconomic,  financial  and  polit- 
ical dovolopaonto  vhich  may  furninh  vital  cluoo  to  political  and  military 
trends . 
7  •       •  107 
/
Al.rjo,  the  lucthodo  of  fifth  colu::;ji  penetration  practiced  by  the  Conirunilran 
follcj  r.  unique'  pattern  in  varloun  foreign  countries  and  In  tho  United  St-ntes 
vhich  enliu     for  tho  bent  that     wo  htwo  in  tho  field  of     countor-intclligonr.o. 
Ao  a  rocnlt  of  thln,thoro  io  an  urgont  call  upon  our  skill  and  ingenuity 
to  find  oothodn  of  informing  ourooivoa  about  Iron  Curtain  countrioo-  An  vo 
cannot  do  It  adoquatoly  by  orthodox  inothodo,  an  increasingly  heavy  burden  in 
placed  on~our  cocrct  intelligence  and  couutor-intolllgcmce  and  honco  they  havo 
today  a  higher  priority  in  our  over-all  intelligence  picture  than  in  tho  pact. 
tbe  chaster  0?  tee  central  ikeeliigerce  agkkcy  to  conduct  secret  intelligence 
activities 
Tho  rooponsibilities  of  tho  Central  Intelligence  Agency  for  the  collection 
of  covert  intelligence  abroad  are  performed  as  a  "service  of  coaaon  concern" 
in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  National  Security  Council  Intelligence  Direc- 
tive Ko.  5  of  Decenber  12,  19^7.  (See  Annex  Ho.  11).  Unlike  the  collection 
of  overt  intelligence,  whore  tho  mission  of  tho  Central  Intelligence  Agoncy  is 
a  limited  one,  tho  collection  of  practically  all  covert  foreign  intelligence 
io  no3igned  to  the  Agency. 
.     Intelligence  Directive  No.  5  gives  to  tho  Central  Intelligonco  Agoncy  the 
following  dutioo: 
a.  To  conduct    all  organized  federal  ooplonngo     opai'ationo    abroad, 
oxcopt  for  ogi-oed  activitioc  by  othor  departments  and  agoncioa. 
b.  To     conduct  all  organized  fodoral  countcr-oopionago    abroad,   in- 
cluding occupiod  areas. 
c.  To    coordinate  covert  and  ovort  intolligonco     collection,  and  to 
coordinate  tho  nctivltlon  of  carnial  ngontn  employed  on  covort  nilnulnnn  -by 
Kir,
otlior     doj.-»rtr-'jntfj  and     agonclou,   mo-nuora  of     tho      Intull .lf/jaco     A<lvJ  miry 
Coaanlttoo. 
d.     To     dlonOMin-.to   tho     Intolligonco     tlma  obUilnr.-d    to  tho     varioua 
dopartmonto  and  agendo  a  having  an  authorized  iutoroct  in  It. 
Covort  collection  thun  includoii  onplonago  and  countor-oupicnago  abroad, 
l.o.,  tbo  clandestine  oolloction  of  infoi'aation  and  countor-action  agalnot 
foreign  oocrot  intelligence  actlvitloo.  It  dooa  not  include  Intolligonco  col- 
lection by  eecrot  "but  onccntially  technical  moans,  ouch  aa  communication:; 
intelligence. 
National  Socurity  Council  Intolligonco  Directive  Ko.  2  cota  forth  tho 
reopective  responsibilities  of  tho  departmental  agenciec  for  collection  of 
certain  catogorieo  of  foroign  intelligence  information.  Tho  Army  vao  thus 
given  primary  responsibility  for  collecting  foreign  military  information,  the 
Navy  naval  inforcation,  tho  State  Department  poLitical,  cultural,  and  socio- 
logical information,  etc.  The  effect  of  Directive  Ko.  5,  however,  is  to  limit 
theoe  responsibilities  to  overt  collection,  and  set  aoide  tho  entire  field  of 
covert  intelligence  operations  (with  a  few  exceptions)  as  tho  domain  of  tho 
Contral  Intelligence  Agency.  Furthor,  the  Agency  is  "reapenaibio  for  coordi- 
nating covert  and  overt  intolligonco  collection  activities,"  and  is  also 
charged  with  coordinating  the  activities  of  casual  covert  agents  employed  by 
other  agencies  with  its  own  "organized  covert  activities." 
It  lo    important  to  noto,  in  this  connection,   that  tho    Rational  Security 
Council  has  rejected,  and  wo  bolieve  rightly,  tho  concopt  that  oopionago  might 
bo     conducted  "by  oevcral     agencies,  each    independent     of  the  other,  and     oach 
authorized     to  opera  to  in     the  name  arean    with  roughly  the     name     objoctiven. 
Multiple  caplojngo  of  thin  kind  has     occasionally  hcon  advocated  ao  a  n.oanu  of 
109
Ti-o^'l":^  «ocurity.  It  lu  art;^d  thai  tho  penetration  of  a  centralized 
onj.Ior.ur-  agency  rJ.^ht  destroy  its  entire  router  of  agents,  leaving  the  nation 
without  <-.a  orfoctivu  oocrot  ii;toUieonco  norvico  in  tto  of  crisis,  vhorons 
por.otrat.loa  of  one  of  several  oopionago  units  night  doutroy  ita  notvorku,  but 
vould  louvo  thoao  of  tho  others  untouchod. 
•  Wo  consider  this  view  to  bo  largoly  thoorotical,  provided  ospionaco  is 
properly  conducted  to  koop  tho  identity  of  chains  ontiroly  soparato  and  if 
proper  security  is  maintained  in  tho  central  office.  In  any  event,  we  foel 
that  this  danger  is  lose  serious  than  tho  confusion  and  overlapping  in  tho 
field  of  eopionage  vhich  vould  result  if  several  sorvicos  wore  engaged  in  it. 
Adoption  of  a  centralized  espionage  structuro  has  rceant  that,  except  for  cor- 
.  tain  operations  in  occupied  areas,  the  foreign  covert  operations  of  other 
agencies  of  the  Government  have  boon  dissolved  or  turned  ovor  to  the  Centra.*. 
Intelligence  Agency.    * 
OKJAKIZATIOK  OF  THS  OFFICE  OF  SPECIAL  OPERATIONS 
The  Central  Intelligence  Agency    does  not    enter  the     intricate  field    of 
foreign  espionage  and  counter-espionage  without  ooiae  background  of  experience. 
The  coYort    operations  unit,  known  as  the  Offico  of  Special  Operations     (OSO), 
is  in  offoct    tho  logatoe     of  tho  operating  exporionco,     tho  records,  and  many 
of  the  poroonnol  of  tho  oocrot  intelligence   (Si)     and  countor-oopionago     (X-2) 
branchos     of  tho  fonsor    Offico  of  Strategic  Sorviceo    and  Stratogic     Sorvicoa 
Unit,     V&r  Doparfcsont.       It  also  inhorito     tho  valuable  relationships  built  up    • 
by  thoeo     organizations    with  certain  foreign     intelligence  oorvicoo, 
In  nucarous  instances  tho  Offico  of  Spocial  Oporatlons  hao  naintainod 
imp; ■■»■•»"»"■  ■"    '  '  
-■ 
no  *  r
-  li  -'■H'lif  ■  "■  ■<• 
field  utalions  orifiSnally  opoised  by  tho  Office  of  StratcGlc  Services  i»nd 
oaintfiincd  by  tho  Strategic  Gcrvlcco  Unit.  la  its  hoiidquartorn  structure  it 
han  dravn  heavily  upon  tho  previous  oxpnrlonco  of  tlicoo  orchil autlono  In 
conducting  war  and  poet-war  operations. 
Adninistrntlvcly,  the  Off ico  of  Special  Operations  is  on  tho  oace  level 
oo  tho  four  other  Officoo  of  the  Control  Intelligence  Agency.  Contact  with 
tho  Director  is  maintained  olziont  oxclusivoly  hy  ito  chief,  tho  Assistant 
Dlroctor  for  Special  Operationc,  and  hie  deputy.  The  Assistant  Director's 
personal  staff  also  includes  on  Executive  Secretary,  whose  duties  are  ap- 
proximately that  of  an  executive  officer,  and  several  consultants  and  advisers 
vho  deal  with  particular  aspects  of  aflent  opsrationo,  archives,  budget  and 
the  like. . 
Under  the  ■  Assistant  Director,  the  organization  is  divided  into  three  major 
operating  groups. 
Ill
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112 
,•
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113
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lit
Boforo  concluding  our  ourvoy  of  tho  hoadquartora  organization  of  tho 
Office  of  Special  Oporationa^  vo  wish  to  add  a  roconanondatlon  to  •which  vo 
attach  particular  Importanco  and  which  affecta  tho  rolationnhip  of  thin  Offico 
to  othor  covorfc  activitica  of  tho  Control  IntolliKonco  Agency . 
*  SJoo  ubovo,  Ciuiptor  VI.  Sinco  thio  report  van  draf  lod,  wo  uncloratancl  that 
otopo  Imvo  hot'n  takon  to  tranofor  tho  Nuclear  Knor^y  Croup  to  a  now  Offico 
of  Scientific  Intolligonco. 
115
In  Chapters  VII  i  '.<)  IX  ve  ln-lcfly  consider  the  iili.nll.'irlty  of  the  opei-a- 
tlonu  and  ai:J::l:j trail vc  probleirj  faced  by  11)'.'  Office  of  Gjoolul  Opc-iwMonn, 
the  Office  of  Policy  Coordination  and  tlio  Co:i tract  Branch  of  the  Offlco  of 
Operations.  All  throo  offlcos  carry  on  activities  of  n  highly  confidential 
nature  Thcuo  activities  aro  Inter- rola ted  and  roquiro  clor;o  coordination. 
In  addition  thsy  aro  ablo  Mutually  to  sorvico  each  other.  This  ia  particularly 
true  of  tho  overseas  opnrationo  of  the  Offico  of  Gpocial  Operations  and  tho 
Offlco  of  Policy  Coordination.  Wo  rocqanend  that  tho  throo  activities  he 
placed  under  the  co.'raaon  control  of  a  single  directing  head  vho  v;ould  bo  one 
of  tho  chief  ooeiotants  of  the  Director..  The  three  OfficeG  night  he  sot  up  as 
ooparate  branches  of  a  coasaon  service  of  secret  activities  vhich  should  onloy 
large  autonomy  vithin  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  and  )aight  appropriately 
be  called  Operations  Division.  V/hsther  eventually  a  closer  merger  of  the 
three  activities  should  be  effected  can  best  be  determined  in  tho  light  of 
experience. 
As  a  part  of  such  a  central  organization  devoted  to  covert  operations, 
centralized  administrative  services  should  be  established  under  the  single 
chief  of  covert  activities,  and  should  not  be  identified  vlth  or  combined  vith 
the  administrative  arrangenente  made  for  the  balunce  of  the  Central  Intelligence 
Agency.  The  covert  organisation  thus  established  should,  in  particular,  under- 
take its  ovn  personnel  recruitment,  using  the  facilities  of  the  personnel 
section  of  tho  Central  Intelligence  Agency  only  insofar  a3  thoy  appoor  to  servo 
tho  purpose  of  tho  covort  organization. 
In  making  this  recoiranendation,  ve  appreciate  that  the  Office  of  Policy 
Coordination  under  NSC  10/2  has  a  special  relationship  to  the  Secretary  of 
116
.Slutu  «:«l  tho  ^ucrol.ary  of  D<>ro:iru>.  V.'o  Inljovo  Lli-it-  (iuhnl.;i)il. l::.l.  hunui'lla 
voiild  iiccruo  Jn  hftv.liiy  tlilu  i;.«;!.mm  ral.".lioi::il:lji  ouUiblliihod,  Lliron/:".li  tlio  ho-ul  of 
tho  OjH»rai.loan  Mviuio.-i,  with  both  of  tho  oocrot  ovoruo.'UJ  activities  of  tho 
Control  Jiitolligonco  Af.oncy,  asuimLiis  tlmt  thoy  mid  tho  Contact  Brruich  arc 
hrouflbt  to^jothor  in  tho  j:snnor  vo  roco^noiid  abovo. 
In  this  rocoMuondatlon  wo  havo  alao  had  in  ruind  tho  desirability  of  quickly 
establishing  a  partiaslarly  clono  relationship  botvoon  tho  eocrot  activltioo 
of  tlio  Central  Intelligence  Agency,  tho  Military  Establishment  and  tho  Joint 
Chiofo  of  Staff  in  caco  of  var.  If  tho  moaouro  of  autonory  vo  suggest  for 
those  eorvicoa  is  achieved,  thoy  could  bo  attached,  without  dolay,  to  the 
Socretary  of  Defonse  or  to  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff,  if  tho  National  Security 
Council  should  consider  this  advisable. 
Subject  to  tho  foregoing  recommendation,  vo  believe  that  the  headquarters 
organization  of  tho  Office  of  Special  Operations  is  eotindly  concoived  and  has 
rado  a  satisfactory  start  tovard  sotting  up  our  socrot  intelligence  work. 
117
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llil
L 
In  uo:si>  countries,  cont.nct  !iiu  boon  «iil.!:l>llulu:d  wJUi  loiv.tl  jio.Uuo,  Jji- 
tolllgunco,  or  cour.'cor-intnlJJgonco  oorvicoM.  TJioco  n>].".Uo:i«  aru  oft  cm  >:.o;it 
uuoful,  a;id  thulr  potontlJulJ.t1.on  for  thw  future  uro  p.  rent.  T)i«»  r:.v.il  fjuc.cotinl'ul 
oxarsilo     la  tho  continuing     liaison  ulth 
•         -     
/  
/ 
In  cortaln  friendly  but  throatonod  countrioo,  tho  Office  of  Spocial 
Operations  hao  bogun  arranging  with  thooo  sorricos  for  tho  installation,  of 
otay-bobind  agents  to  bo  uced  in  tho  ovor.t  of  a  Eiilltary  emergency.  In  moat 
instances  independent    netvbrko  are  aloo    being  built  up. 
Tho  agent  operations  of  the  Office  of  Special  Operations  abroad  have  boon 
criticized  ao  being  too  freauontly  directed  against  fairly  obvious,  short-tor^ 
objectives,  and  ao  having  overlooked  or  failed  to  exploit  strategic  tar-got s. 
Tho  Office  is  also  socetlE3s  criticized  in  the  departmental  agencies  and  in  tho 
Office  of  Roporto  and  E3tlrsates  for  producing  quantity  rather  than  quality.  It 
can  in  part  answer  ouch,  criticiom  by  showing  that  it  has  not  rocoivod  adequafco 
directives  fron  the  policy-caters.    Tliio  serious  failure     should  bo     remedied. 
119
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120
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121
^ 
*i'l.c  cr.cGur::&c::'.;:nt  of  defection  of  uLratc^lcn.)  .1  v  placed  pcrooune.l  in 
.Soviet  iw-A  fifiU-llite  govcrn^-.Mit  jiervlccit  nhould  be  another  niajor  objective  of 
the  field  operations  of  the  Office  of  Special  Operations  and  to  no.-no  extent  of 
the  Office  of  l'olicy  Coordination.  A  fc\;  ouccenaco  have  been  achieved  In  such 
activities,  tut  thus  far  moot  Soviet  defections  have  been  largely  fortuitous. 
In  our  opinion,  neither  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  nor  the  Arzy  has  fully 
exploited  the  intelligence  possibilities  of  numerous  individuals  v/ho  have 
filtered  into  the  An>erlca;i  soneo  of  Cerwiny  and  Austria.  Often  interrogations 
have  been  eo  delayed  or  oo  conducted  a3  to  he  virtually  fruitless. 
There  is  also  a  domestic  phase  of  this  problen  both  in  the  case  of  defec- 
tors in  the  United  States  and  inthe  handling  of  those  vho  nay  be  brought  here. 
The  entire  question,  both  at  home  and  abroad,  clearly  involves  the  coordination 
of  intelligence  activities  and  is  on  important  one  vith  vhich  the  Central  In- 
telligence Agency  should  deal.  Here  it  should  asBUse  its  responsibilities  to 
vork  out  a  core  effective  procedure  to  coordinate  the  activities  of  the  various 
agencies  involved.     (See  Chapter  TV) . 
SECURITY  OF  SECRET  INTELLIGENCE  ACTIVITIES 
12;
Boforo  turning  ?re-ri  the  question  of  operational  security,  it  my  'do  ob- 
served that  the  hoadauartora  oocurity  of  the  Offico  of  Special  Operations  ia 
not  impeccable.  (See  above,  page  3IO.  It  occupies  a  oeparate  building  readily 
idontifiablo  aa  belonging  to  tho  Central  Intelligence  Agency.  Socret  opera- 
tions of  thie  nature  should  preferably  bo  located  in  a  building  bavins  ao  niny 
eorvicoo  and  vioitoro  that  tho  identification  of  a  oocrot  staff  and  thoir- 
vioitora  vould  bo  ronderod  difficult.  Furthor,  tho  staff  could  novo  oaaily 
covor  tho  explanation  of  ita  vorX  by  giving  a  voll-biown  and  relatively  in- 
nocuouu  addrooo. 
—    ,__^  123
The  Central  Intelligence  Agency  should  then  endeavor  to  reverao  the 
prcpont  unfortun&to  trend  whore  it  flndo  Itself  advertised  aIco3t  exclusively 
ao  a  oocrot  eorvico  organization  and  becoino  to  the  public  tho  centralisor  and 
coordinator  of  intelligence,  not  tho  eccret  gathoror.  If  tho  changes  wo  are 
roconniondlng  are  offocted,  they  would  furnish  a  good  point  of  doparturo  for 
tlio  Control  lntcOJLigonco  Agency  to  do  this. 
couifrLTs-ssnwMCE 
Espionage  and  countor-oapionago  liavo  boon  unified  in  tho  Oporationa  Group 
of  tho  Offico  of  Spocial  Operations.      Thlo  arrangtraciit  ropi-ooonts  a  doparturo 
121