secret - noforn-nocontract-orcon _. March 1979 israel | Foreign Intelligence end
This Foreign Intelligence aad Security Services survey 18 prepared and published by the Ceniral Intelligeace Agency Directorate of Opzrations Counterintelligence Staff and coordinated with the Defense Intelligence ; Agency. lt is the successor to the National Intelligence Survey, Section 56, Intelligence and Security and it will be revised and reissued 1 approsimately the same intervals as was the National Intelligence Survey, or as developments may warrant. Latitial deasemination or additional copies of this publication can be obtained through established channels from the Centra! Enteliigeace Agency. Werniag Notice intelligence Sources and Methods Involved (WNINTEL) e 8 . National Security Unauthorieed Disclosure {oformatica Subject to Criminat Sanctions Dleorminniion Canmel NOFORN (NF) "__ Not Releasable to Foresga Nationals Abbreviations NOCONTRACT (NC) Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor /Contatiasis FROPIN (PP) Caution-—Propriciary Information Involved NFIBONLY (NO) NFIB Departments Only ORCGN (CC) ~ Drasemination and Extrection of information ; Controlled by Originator REL... This information Has Boas Authorized for Release to... FG: Foreign Goverament information This publicaiion is available Derivative classification by 059910 . on rractofiche. Review 30 years from date 4 Te get a microfiche copy of thin = Derived from D%.1 ? : ‘ pablication cali 7177 (OCR/ Ya i BSB): for Future inenances in . \ . edéazion 9 or mn lien of X sO bard copies, call $203 {PPG/RD3). The Foreign Inielligence and Secarity Services survey i¢ Netionc} fatelligence and may not be released or chown to represcatatives of any foreign goverament or imerastional body except by specific authorization of the Director of Central Inteil:gence in accordance with the provisions of National Security Cowacil Intelligence Disective No. 1. 2 AR ansteriel on this page is Confidential.
secaet NOFOAN/NOCONTRACT/ORCOR TABLE OF CONTENTS A. Ganera! .. 2. aackgrourd © and development of services @ Obtectives and structure. & Political aspects .. 8. Relationship between the governmen? and the services - b. Relationship between the services ond the populace 4 Profesional standards... ao integrity . b Efficiency ce. Security .. d. Morale snd disciplinary methods. oo oe eee es 1. Functions .... = Organization a Training eels b. Funds end salaries 4. Methods of operation a. Relationship with other services b. Liaison with foreign services C. Shin Beth--Counterespionage and Internal Secunty Service 1, Functions .. 2 Organization ve x Administrative ‘practions & Methods of operation . 2 Organization . a Alr Force Intelligence b. Nava! Intelligence 0... 3. Administrative prectices... 4. Methods of operstion . 5S. Aelations with other services . ©. Research and Political Planning Center . F. The National Police . i] oo OVNABAUURO~ ~4 S@S SF SSSEESE F BE
SACRET NOBUS /NOICON TRACT IORCON Page $2 Comments on principal sources r) 1. Source materials @ 2 Supplementary overt publications. 40 FIGURES Page Fig 1 Soviet Agent dsac] Beer (photo) _ Fig 2 Organization of Usrseli Intelligence and Security ‘Secvices,_ 1977 (chant; ~. 9 Fig 38 Craanizstiqn of Monad, IGT? (chart) u Fie. 4 Ekiahu Ben Shgul Coben's treramitter on display in Damascus, 1983 (photo) iz Fig 5 = Johann Wolfgang Lots Mustrates the use e of ry transmitter during his trial tn Cairo, July-August 1968 (photo) |. . e 33 Fig. & Organization of Shin Beth, 1977 (chert) ee - |) Fig 7) Grganirzation of Military Intelligence. 1977 (chart) a >) Fig 8 Organization of Naval Intelligence, 1074 (chart) eee eee = OB Fig. 9 Organization of {fsracli Nationa! Police, 1977 (chart) 5...) ST Fig 10 Israeli National Patice headquarter, Jerusslem, November 1972 (photay. “38 tn tsrach Border Guard pret under, construction. at ‘Ketar ‘Resenwald (Zarit), June 1970 (photo) . Secret
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. SECRET NOFOAN, NOCONTRACT/ORCON ° Intelligence. and Security 7 . tareel's principal intelligence and security authority it the Va'adai Rashei Hasherutim (the Coramittee of the Heads of Services), generally known as Va'edat. It and to sustain the Palestion Jewish cocamunity, hes All information tn thie survey te classified Secret, Noforn, Nocontrect, Orcon. SECRET It has also served as a cover for Shey, which extended itt covert operations into Waters Europe aad the United States From i923 to 1048, Shay's objectives were te Sromote the establishment of an independent State of larasl; infiltrate Mandatory installations ta order to apprise Zionist leadership of British attitudes and proposed actions; collect political intelligence that could be used in Zionist propegande; penetrate Arab and ant!-Zionist factions in Palestine and peripheral nations, moniior and control all extremist and abroad; provide security ior the arms mnuggling end illegal immigration programs of the Haganeb; and finally collect informstion on Naz Germany © gussantes the security of the Jewish undergsound and excape channels througheut Europe before, during and after Wald War IL Shay consisted of the following components: Politi. cal Intelligence (Machlaki! Medinit), Counteresplo- fage and Internal Security (Sherus Bitechon Kish), Military Intelligence (Sharut Modia), Police Beanch of Military Intelligence (Sherui Modlin Shai Mate Artat), cad Naval Intelligence and Security (Sherut Modtin ve Betachon Kohot He Yam). These services worked independentiy on behalf of the different ministries to which they were individually responsible. This intelligence aad seourity cammunity was com- Petitive and frequently acted on its own, a product of the genera! postwar chaos which zequired the accom- paebment of many urgent tasks wherever and whenever they might arise. In some of the West European capitels ail enrvices were represented end competed for the same agents and sources. By April 1951, the Prime Minister and cabinet, seriously alarmed by the atmomhere of mutual fealousy and mistrust prevalent among the services at the increasing cort of their uncoordinated efforts in the field, decided to reorganize completely tho basic
SECRET structure of Israel's intelligence and security commu- nity The dynamic force bebund the pisa was the late fleuven Shiwen, who rourgenised the sri vices acourd- ing to functions and responsibilines asd established a mechanism to courdinete their actives Shilozh was chairman of tn auinonty, the Committee of the Heads of Services (va'edat hashel Haskerutsm, called Va'adat). re treegrsteu tne Naval intcigence and Securuy-Sereace and che embryonic ah mteileciae unit into Military Imeligence (Apaj Modun). The Political intelligence Service was made independent of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and reorganized as the Secret Intelligence Service (Monwed Letafladim Meyouciadirn or Momad;. Tae Minatna of Forcign Affairs retained Research Drvisioel (Markishet /ack- akev). Shin Beth remained sntact esceta for iucras! changes The Specie) casks Divaion im the Uwentiga- tion Deparanent of the police became a gurt of the few eppuralus Saudosh’s seorgenization of the imolii- gence and security saucture produced aa dilicient and well-coordinated community. The tsraeli intelligence and security services re tained this structure relatively unchsreed throughout the Arab-Isree] War in October-November 1956, the Six-Day War in June 1967 and the Yom Kippur War in October 1973 During the carly and mid-1960, however, the braces Goverpment hed considered changes in the structure and duties of the components of the intelligence and security comanunity. Despite Shiloah’s earlier reorgantzstion, much of whet hap pened in the Lsreeli services at this time depended on the personal relatioashires between Ben Gurion and the directors and chiefs. in earty 1963, jot before his retirement, Ber Gusion appointed « committee to review the situation He was concerned that the Intelligence and security zstablishment which, by virtue of his serving both as Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, usua'ly functioned satisfectorily, might deteriorate when he teft office. He also was reported to be cisatisfied with the lack of clarity in the com:nunity’s chain of cornmand and functions and asdezed the committee to define the subordination and tasks of these bodies. Io July 3963 the committee submitted its report to pew Prime Minister, the lete Levi Eshkol The committee stated that, while the functions of Prime Minister and Minister of Defense did not necessarily have tc be concentrated in the hands of one person, the Prrne Minister suust know about all the activities of the national intelligence and security services and + oe givcn olsective inteiligenct evaluations baleaced and /oased on different viewpuuts irom more thea one source. To accomplish inese gums (the comméttes recommended that the Minisity of Foreign Altun Research Divnion be strengthened so that 8 would be capable of pressing indeyouder polincl evane- thous, both un Middie East meues and other poliucal subjects, By upgrading the Reseach Divuion, the committee believed thet a certala belance would be created for security and politwal evaluetins, whack were handled almast solely by the MilRary leaclis- gence Production Department. The cotaaitter abe clactved that the eastence o: Momed, wiech controls aevret furesgh informatson gathering saou, fecilteted to sume cial the pomible lurnulabue of escther indepemicot evaluation wnk. Tee commnwe ole teyarded os @ mati: of vusl impurteace the sppoinimen: of « specul adver, subsedaate only to the Prime Minhier. He would be s penon of hugh caliber who would aid the Prime Minister in keeping in touch with end monitoring the activities of the intelligence and sscurmy services, The committee's orincipal recommendations were act unylemented at the tlme except for the estabiishmest of the adver position and the shift of responsibility for Shin Beth from the Minister of Defense to the Prime Minister. There was 0 brief interlude from September 1065 to July 1986 when Iser Harel, the former Chainnan of the Va‘adat and Director of Momed, served es a special adviser to Prime Minister Eshkol on ustelligence and security matters. Harel resigned as a result of interaal poticy disputes withia the community and he was cot replaced at the time Following the alleged “intelligsnoe failure” in the Yor Kippur War, the Lraeli Government established the Agranat Commisson in November 1973 to investigate matters relating to the hostilities and the performance of the intelligence and security services. The commission in its Partial Report in April 1974 proposed reactivating and strengtheaing the post of specisi adviser to the Prime Minister on ir ‘elligence ard security matters. The co>mission alo recom mended chenges in the intelligence and security forces through the establishment of 2 research and evaiuation unit in Mossad and the elevation of the Research Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The obiect SECRE?
of this modification was to avoid reh ing ex: lusively on Miltary intelligence for major estimates end amew- ments. The commision alo emphasized the need for better operations! coordination ta the field of cullec- tion between the services but & opposed the coordine- tion of their finished intelligence judgments. A full or final commision report, if there ever was one, was never made public. From 1974 to 1976 the recommendations of the Partiel Report of the Agranal Commiuion were implemented. The Prime Minister appointed Reserve Genera) Rehavam Zoevi as his imelligence adviser, a genition that wis purely advisory and carried no executive authority. Zeevi amumed this new job in addition to serving as the Prime Minister's adviser on cowmerterrorinn. Zeevi was also to be the Prime Minwaer's liakoa with the Director of Military intelligence and was aloo to keep the Prime Minister alerted to differences of views among the intelligence and security servioss. In October 1976, however, Zeevi resigned from this post and was replaced by Brigadier (Rev) Yebouhalst Harkabi, a former Director a Milmary intelligence. The Research and Political Planning Center of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs came into operation in Jenuery 1975. Changes in the A aew research and evaluation anit for sessing information was established within Momed. New appointees hed taken over in most of the intelligence and security comnponents Ip June 1977 the Israeli Government established a Ministerial Committee on Security Affairs. 2 Objectives and structure The principal targets cf the fsrseli intelligence and security services are. (2) the Amb states—their capabilities and intentions toward Isael, their rela- tiorg with the USSR end other powers, their official inmellations and representatives throughout the world, their leaders, internal and inter-Ara politics, morale, military preparedness and other order of battle, (2) collection of information on secret US policy or decisions, df any, concerning israel; (3) collection of scicmtific intelligence in the US and other developed woumries; (4) determination of government policy toward isree] in the USSR and East European nations and the probiem of Jewish emigration. from these areas, (5) cle monitoring of enti-Zimist sctivity SECRET SECRET throughout the world; and (6) collection of political, and economic intelligence in other areas uf interest to them, auch as Alrice. The Iueeli services alo make special efforts to counter Areb propaganda and t neviralize anti-Zionistt activity. Within recent yean the Israelis have devoted much operational activity to combating Areb terrovism, which has grown over the years from teolated cross-border raids by Paleninian Falayeen to daring and deadly attacks, often imerna- tional In scope, on Israeli personnel and property. The Israclis abo have undertaken widescale covert potiti- cal, economic and paramilitary ection programs--par- ticularly in Africs. Authorization for foreign intelligence and internal security organizations, while not defined by specific charter, is in Loracli legislation. Paragraph 29 of the Basic La:: aster: “The Government is authorized to carry out on bebalf of the State, in’ accordance with any law eny ect whose implementation is not lawfully entrusted to any other authority.” This implies that the government is entrusted with the manegement of intelligence and state security affairs since no other authority is empowered to ect in this sphere by any other law. Attempts have been made over ihe years by officials within the government and the community to have an act pamed defining the status of foreign intelligence and security organizations and their operations, but nothing has come of these efforts Internal security, on the other hand, is more clearly defined in law. The Defense (Emerzency) Regulations of 1945 (etablished during the British Mandate), the Military Law of 21 June 1955 and the Penal Revision (State Security) Law of 31 July 1957, the Isreeli equivalent of the British Official Secrets Act, all are concerned with internal security.. The Emergency Regulations of 1945 gave the military administration the power to arrest and deport troublesome elements and to designate certain locations as “closed areas,” thus requiring loca! inhsbitents to pomem treve! permits to transit such places. While the regulations ortginally applied to both Jews and Arabs in Peleztine. they ere now used largely to monitor the Arab community in Israel. Administration of the regulations was transferres from the military to the police in 1966. Internal security organs reportediy increased their agent ectivity to meet this responsibility. Israeli laws require severe punishment ranging from the death penalty or life imprisonment for treason or 9 pt
SECRET asistance to the “enemy.” to tern of incarceration from three to 15 years for espionage, contact with foreign agents, aiding and sbetling a crime against slate securizy and unauthorized disclosure of informs- tion by a public servant. There is no statute of limitations regarding the uneuthorized disclosure of classified information. The central body in Israel's intelligence and security community is the Va'adst, which has as its orimary function the coordination of all intelligence and security activities at home and abroad The Va‘adat conuias cf the Director of Mosed, the Director of Military Intelligence, the Director of Shin Beth, the Inspector General of Police, the Director General of the Ministry for Foreign Affair, the Director of the Research and Political Planning Center ol the Ministry for Foreign Affain. and the political, military. intelligence and antiterrorist advisers of the Prime Minister. The Head of the Special Tasks Division in the Investigations Departmen of the Police abo oceasionally attends the meetings with, or in place of, the Inipector General of Police. Meetings must be held biweekly but may be held more frequently At these meetings each dizector utually provides a briefing on the key aciivities of his service during the preceding two weeks The Director of Mossad chairs Va'adat and in this capacity is directly respomible to the Prime Minister. The members of Va‘edal are quasi-equal in status and the term memune referring to the Director of Mossad as chairman is designed to denote a concept of preeminence among equal. In actuality, however. the Disector cf Military intelligence now overshadows the Director cf Momad in power and importance. This deveicpment resulted from the continuing Israeli reliance on military preparedness for national survival. Mossad is charged with the collection of foreign intelligence and the conduct of covert action programs outrde fsrael Shin Beth is respomible for counterimelligence and internal securty. {1 functions as the governmenta! authonty on personnel security matters. it is siso tesponsibte for the personal safety of the Prime Minister and other high ranking fsrseli officials Shin Beth is in charge of physical security for ports, airperts and key military/industrial installations in Istaz! and for Uszaeli missions and E] Al operations outside Israel 10 Shin Beth does not have the power of arrest, this function being performed by the Special Tasks Division of the Investigations Department of the Police, which works in close collaboration with Shin Beth in Issael. Within the Administered Territories, which are controlled by the Israeli Defense Fosces, Shin Beth applies to the military to undertske arrests and searches. A special compon-ni under the Inspectoc General of Police is the Borcer Guard, whose mission is that of guarding the cea fire lines against Areb infiltsation and of detec:ing and running down Fedayeen terrorists In cecert years Border Cuard units have been used Increasingly to control and suppress riots and demonstrations In the West Bank ares. Military Intelligence, in eddition to its responsibility for strategic and tactical intelligence, prepares the nations! intelligence estimates and evaluates all informstion dealing with the Arabs It abo is recponsible for developing and protecting communiva- tion codes ard ciphers for all the services and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and for communications intelligence. The Research and Political Planning Center, which was formerly the Research Division of the Ministry for Foreign Affaizs, analyzes raw intelligence from various sources for officials on the oobcymaking level. Other Israeli Government organizations that pro- vide support to the intelligence and security commu: nity are the Ministries of Finance (Customs and Excise, Investment and Securities) and Tourism, the rational airline, El Al, and the national shipping line, Zim Unofficial Zionist oqanizations based ir Israel and Jewish communities throughout the world also give aid to Israel operations when needed. There are between 1,500 and 2.000 personne! in Mossad, of whom about 500 sre officers. Shin Beth has about 1,000 members of whom some 550 hold officer rank. In Military Intelligence these are about 7,000 personnel, of whem 450 are officers, the others being enlisted personnel and civilian clerks. The numter of officials in the Research and Political Planning Center af the Ministry for Foreign Affairs ranges between 75 and 100 The police number about (2,000 snd the Border Guards around 6.006. Since the financing of the intelligence and security services as a closely held secret, it is very difficult to SECRET
J get accurate information on the total amounts expended for these purposes. The funds are concealed in the defense budget, and known to the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, one or two of their top assistants, the Minister of Finance, the State Comptroller and his Defense Services Inspectorate. The Comptrolier dezls directly with the directors of the services, who request funds at the beginning of the fiscal year in April. The estimates of expemes by the directors, who have established reputations for honesty and integrily, are usually acceptable as a slerting point for budget negotiations The Ministry of Finance, however, does require s 1D-year peoiection of expend- ed financial needs {an imposible task which is not taken seriously). The Comptrotier holds a series of meetings with the various service directors and their staffs, reviewing thelr programs in detail. These sessiorz continee throughout May end reuk in 8 careful redefinition of the entire intelligence and security effort and its cont. By October, the determine- tion of specific budget needs is completed, based on the program analysis completed in May. This is then submnitted for highe: approval and the planning and budgeting cycle is, apon budget approval, completed rest in time to begin again Much of the administrative suppert for the services is handled by the Ministry for Defense. Various types of cover are provided for and funded by the Usraeli Deferne Forces UDF). There is clove profesional cooperation between the civilian intelligence and security services and military intelligence. These services, like all government offives, are subject to inspection by the State Comptrotler’s office. An Agaistant Director-General is in charge of inspecting the defense and security services, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and the police. The annua! inspection covets bookkeeping, financial management and han dling cf administration The Comptroller is required to see that the services are opezating economically, elficiently and with irreproechable morality. Israeli governmental offices and departments are continuously borrowing money. personnel, equipment and meteria! fram one another and salaries are peid by the office to which the individual is essinned. An intelligence officcr or a Ministry lor Forsign: Affairs official sisticned in New Yor! end assigned to the Jewish Agency is peid salary and allowances by the SECRET SECRET Agency but loses neither seniority nor retirement gtatus while serving in that capacity. 3. Political aspects a. AaLATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE COVERNMENT AND que scavicss—The intelligence and security commu- nity enjoys 2 strong position in the government, and their affairs are well integrated into mere general operaitons. Members of the generation which worked fot the estabishment of the state were companions of longstanding and joint veterans of such enterprises as illegal immigretion and arms-running. Many of the current leaders came up through the ranks of the militery in a series of wars with the Arabs and entered politics through affiliation with one of the maior politica) parties. All of them had some experience in clandestine matters and have been persomily con- vinced by stern lemons of the value of good intelligence and security. The intelligence and security services receive excellent support from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Many senior diplomats sre former intelligence officers and therefore convermnt with intelligence problems and operations Wrh thelr experienced chuervations end manifold talents, they serve as valuable susiliaries to their covert colleagues, whose diplomatic cover is diligently gunained by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Furthermore, almost every Israeli diplomst abroad hes good foreign language and area knowledge or some specialization which enables him to pursue a much brosder social life. with its resultant contacts, than fs the case in most foreign services. In many instances, embassy officers. including chiefs of diplomatic misions, were former citizens of the countries to which they are, accredited. Information developed by Israeli diplomats ts made available tc the intelligence and security community for immediate use of operational intelligence of inclusion in archives. As = final boon to covert — intelligence personnel, the vigor and variety of « normal Isrse!i diplomat's life outside his installation usually renders detection of intelligence cfficers by the host country extremely difficult. The same kind of effective support regarding operations fs given by the Ministry of Defense and the lewish Agency. The israeli intelligence and security services pley an important role throughout the government and private it
SECRET sector. Many Seaders in both the civil wrvice and industry have at some time in their careers been directly of indirectly invoived with the intelligence community. Service ateignments ere pot regarded as the end of a career, a8 perzons with intelligence and security backgroands frequently are selected for other john in the government. Thus the services eve supplemented by persons who know and continue to relate their mistons to intelligence and security vespomsibilities, in senior posts in both the public and private sectors. Officially, the services are nonpolitical and members of the community are not encouraged to enroll in any party or engage in political activity. The Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee of Knesset is normally the government's point of discussion for the review and resolution of sensitive policies and activities. The Director of Mossad and the Director of Shin Beth are often present at sessions which are of concern to them. b. RELATIONSNIP SETWEEK TWE SERVICES AND THE poruscs—The current state of relations between the services and the populace is good as a result of the present potition of the services as protectors of the Lssacli state and peopie in the forefront of the struggle againat Asab terrorists and military forces. Most Lsraelis are acutely aware of this situation ard therefore support the services and their operations. The historical development of Isracl and the long continuing struggle against the Arabs have contributed to this barmomous atmosphere. Ai times in the pest a3 a result of political rivalries and disagreements on the kind of order that was to prevail in Isvael, there have been cceasional verbal and journalistic attacks against the services as instruments ol a police state. In several instances, service representatives had to appear in closed court sessions to defend the intelligence and security community against: accusstions of kidnapping, brutality and Wegality. Although debates in the Knesset occasionally have reflected probebly illegal practices or procedures by the services, the intelligence and security commu- nity i completely joyal and if the government requested the execution of a certain task, legal and iMegal, it would be accomplished. Confidence in the intelligence and security commu- nity abo received a boost after the Six-Day War in 2 1967 The part played by Military Intelligence Shia Beth and the police in contributing to the victory controlling the newly-occupied Arab areas taken by israel was followed by o plethora of praise in all Isvack media. The so-called “intelligence failure” in the You, Kippur War in 1973, however, weakened populgs trust in the services. The subsequent work of the Agsanat Commission, undertaken to evaluate the community and its shortcomings and to improve soaperation among iis members, contributed to a partial renewal of public confidence. The continuing battle by the services against terrorism has also kept Israelis loyal to the community. The Entebbe raid in July 1976, which resulted in the rescue of hijacked Ssracli hostages, was one action in recent years which fired the public imagination and served as an exemple ot a well-coordinated and well-executed Israeli opera- tion. This raid and its success buoyed up the moral of the Israelis as nothing else has in’ recent years and certainly showed the intelligence + - security commu- nity in s good light. 4. Professional standards a. Intecarry—The directors and senior staff mem- bers of the intelligence and security community conform to the highest professional standards of integrity and honesty and impuse these standards on the lower echelons. There is relatively little difference between the basic salery of a new employee and the stat! member who enjoys a top position The insignificant disparity has reealted in the granting of compensatory amenities and privileges such as expense accounts, purchasing of foreign goods that enter the country through devious tex-free channels, and “pro- , tektsta,” a magic word in Isree!, which means thet one can get items, housing or privileges at low cost through inilueniial governmentel connections. This is common practice throughout the government establishment, however. Because the intelligence and security ser- vices, especially Skin Beth, maintain a very tight cover within their own community, information on person- nel, budgets and accounts is closely held by a few top people in the government and not subjected to widespread bureaucratic perusal end contrul. The higher echelons scrutinize the expenditure of funds by the lower: ranks, and if financial dishonesty is discovered, the guilty individual receives very severe treatment. SECRET
b Evriciency—Isree!’s intelligence and security services are among the best in the world. Their expert personnel and sophisticated techniques have made them highly effective, and they have demonstzated outstanding sbility to organize, screen and evaluate information obtained trom recruited agents, Jewish communities, and other sources throughout the world. Israel's intelligence capsbilities give it a significant advaniage over the Arab states—an advantage which was an important fector in the 1967 war. Those members of the intelligence and security community who were identified with the Information Service and other components of the Haganah, before and during World War li, developed » high standard of efficiency and level of competence The organiza- tions succeeded in recruiting 2 core of capaits and highly-educated individuals from Europe and the Middle East whose equal hes been difficult to find, let alone attract, since the founding of the state. The corps of the “old guard,” for example, ts fluent in four or five languages, an accomplishment which alone raises their general average of efficiency. The younger generation has been given intensive training, including study abroad, to assist them in gaining these qualifica- tions. 11 is not uncommon for students to engage in clandestine operations while pursuing their course of studies. Israeli signal intelligence successes against the 4rabs in the past were of such high order that the Israelis had Jess need than at present for gond agent operations exainst the enemy. Part of this success was due to poor Arab communications security. The Israelis now face some problems since Arab communications security is gradually improving. The Yom Kippur War intelli- gence failure is an example of inadequacies in their communications Intelligence capability at that time. In recent years, as well, there also have been indications that Isrseli intelligence on the Arabs, other than communications intelligence, has been somewhat inadequate in quality and their agent operations iscking in success. One of the principal weaknesses of Isreeli’s intelli- gence and security system eppears to be that the production of most finished intelligence and the preparation of national estimates is done by Military Imediigence rather than by an independent service. Inherent in such an organizations! arrangement is the SECRET SECRET danger that the armed services will not be abjective in observing and reporting foreign developments and in, making national intelligence estimates—2 major prob- lem in the Yom Kippur War--and their vested interest in military operations will influence intelligence assessments. The Agrana? Commission has recognized this problem and recommended changes. ce. Secuarry—The physical security of the civilian and military intelligence and security headquarters in Tel Aviv is reported to be excellent. Two services—Momed and Military Intelligence—were formerly located within e general army compound in the heart of the city The buildings were protected by high wire fences and military guards Military Intelligence remains in this location but Mossad now occupies @ wing of a multistory commercial office Gutlding across the street from the compound. Shin. Beth, which was formerly located in a rundown building in Jaffa, occupied new quarters just north of Tel Aviv in June 1970. This new building, which was designed for their use, is fenced in and contains s technical laboratory as well as regular offices. Guards control the entrance and bedges bearing a photogreph of the employee are worn within the compound There is an elsborate protected government “guest house” for the training and eccommodation of visiting foreign iatelligence officers, foreign dignitaries and sensitive agents There are a little over 1.000 pezsons working as staff officers for Mowad and Shin Reth, ail of whom have been given a lang, therough security check. ff there is the shghtest doubt reised ovainst an individual. the application is rejected. Personnel with leftist back- grounds generally are not trusted by leading members of the intelligence and security services. This attitude did not always apply to former members of European Communist perties, some of whom were eminently Gaalified for clandestine service, especially if they had renounced their Communist ideology and affiliated with the Israeli Labor Party. This exemption, how- ever, has not applied since the exposure of several high-level espionage cases in governmental and political circles in the late 1850s and early 1960s The cases of Aharon Coben, a MAPAM perty expert on the Middle East, and Israel Beer (Figure 1), s Defense Min,stey contract employee and IDF Reserve lieuten- ant colonel, whe spied for the USSR, and Dr. Kurt 13
SECRET Figure 1. Soviet Agent trac! Beer Sitte. a Gentile professor of physics at Haifa Technion, who worked for the Czech Service, caused Shin Beth to reconsider its own security procedures while stimulating considerable doubt about the reliability of recanted Maraists The services have devised internal security systems to expose ideological weaklings by more thorough periodic security checks. The Israelis believe such individuals constitute a possible long-term security threat. Isrzeli citizens are subjected to stringent registration requirements and must carry identification papers. Within the intelligence and security community great peins are taken not to reveal the identities of personnel even to the average Israeli employed in the government at large. Compartments- tion ts strictly maintained between services with only designated individuals, usually members of the “hard- core.” crossing lines. Intelligence and security person: nel widely use and frequently change pseudonyms. The national practice of Hebraicizing European or Yiddish birth names also makes the identification of some Israelis difficult. Visiting foreign officials and agents never use the same car twice when meeting 14 clandestinely with Israeli officers within the country Certain unlisted official and personal telephone numbers sre known only to relatively few people. This type of professional demeanor at home provides excellent daily training for intelligence and security personnel before zeceiving foreign assignmenis. Classified information caay not be discussed over the telephone. Despite their relatively high standards of security, however, Israeli officials reportedly are accasionally careless in observing this restriciion. They also have “an old boy network” much like the British. Israelis in the “network” are willing to discuss classified subjects whether or not there isu need to know The Israelis also have problerns dealing with overseas Jewry whose support they need but whose security is questionable because of the possibility of divided loyalty. Installations and storage containgrs must conform to rigorous security standards. Classification terms Top Secret, Secret, Confidential and Restricted {compara- ble to For Official Use Only) are used. Top Secret and Secret documents are transmitted by courier only in double envelopes and two receipts are required—one for the package and one for the contents. These documents are logged in and out by date, document number, title or subject, and the office accepting responsibility for them. At least three periodic inventories are held each year. A registry produces a computer printout four times a year listing all Top Secret material for which each unit is responsible. Electrical communication is handled entirely by teleprinter and other communication security devices. A record is made of documents to be destroyed and security officers must witness the destruction of alt Top Secret and Secret matezial. All personnel! requiring a clearance must complete a personal history statement and undergo @ routine investigation. For higher clearances the investigations could include the applicant's entire family and a full field investigation. New immigrants from the USSR and East European countries sre normally denied access to classified information for e minimum of four or five years. This ruling is not always possible to enforce because of “protektsia.” Within the IDF security risks are reported to Shin Beth and are closely supervised by the unit security officer, who is required to tnake periodic reports on the individual's activities To stimulate and evaluate the security consciousness of SECRET
the HUF cadre. Field Secunty personnel circulate among the troops and attempt to elicit: military information d. Morace aND DISCIPLINARY meTHODs—Mosad and Shin Beth are components of the Israeli civil service structure and applicants must pess @ civil service examination. Those in their twenties with e university degree ase preferred, although other indivi- duals who have especially desirable qualifications are accepted. The intelligence and security services, in direct. competition with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the rzpidly expanding business commun- ity, ate at a disadvantage. Most young Isreclis do not like the anonymity of the secret service and prefer the more remunerative pay scales of the business world. Intelligence end security personne! who do not or eannot subscribe to the circumucribed life limited by security restrictions and operational considerations are either dropped or, if their actions should jeopardize the service or the state, are severely punished. To boost the morale of staff intelligence officers, the services in the early 1960s sought and secured from the Knesset a a Adviser on bisEigenre SECREY 30 percent annual bonus for their personnel to compensate for the risks and the anonymity involved (Figure 2). B. Mossad—Secret Intelligence Service i. Functions Mcasad ts responsible for foreign intelligence collec- tion, pclitical ection and counterterrorism. In carrying out its mission to collect positive intelligence, the principal function of Mossad is to conduct agent operations against the Arab nations and their official representatives and installations throughout the world, particularly in Western Europe and the United States, where the national interests of the Arabs in the Near Eas conflict with Israeli interest. Mossad collects information on the disposition, morale, armaments, equipment and state of leadership of every Arsb Army that could be called into sction in the case of another round of fighting; and all the information that iNuminates Arab internal politics and relationships among the principal Arab leadere and the diplomatic activity of all countries in the Arab world. Mound | -E rat met —f = Advieer cn Antieereren Advan on MBtary Matter, = <4 L_——_——-——~~—~—. Miriee of Ovhwes fersign Atiens Chiat af Salt | D 6 ‘ | bapecter-Gereral Diverter: Maced Owerter ‘ Ovrexter of i | “Newer Paice Chairman Ve'odet “ee Maney orenennen Chiat I bweetgation Mewed bem sadnery vteliqaee Rewsarch Pulticel od Oepertmens ae Special Diviien LEGEND, woe CHAIN OF COMMAND aoa as COORDINATION 618910 9-78 CA SECRET Figure 2. Orgonizetion of tsroet infefigence ond Security Services, 1977 - 15
SECRET monitors Arab commercial activity, particularly in the field of aren purchasers in the West, and attempt: to counteract Arsb recruiting of military, economic and politica] experts. ts: this case the principal desire is to reccult these persons as intelligence agents, or failing thet, cither to dimunde them from aiding the Arabs o¢ to discover thelr precise functions Momsd ako is chereed wth incting disturbances calculated to create mvutval distrust among the Arabs and to draw Western sympathy away from the Arab cause, and monitoring and counteracting Arab propegande and detecting and coumering Arab terrorism. In the avee of counterter- rorismn, at times the Ysracks have carsied the fight to Arab terrorists by taking executive action against them, especiaily in parts of the Near East and Western Eurane In narticular. the fact thate Lebanon has a mixed Christian, Dr ~e and Moskem population has made that country altractive for intelligence prolects. The loreelis have covert amets and ran operations in their northern aeighbor. In the past they have mounted paramilitary and ezccutive action operations against Palestinian terrorist leaders, personnel end installations in Lebanon. They have also provided support to Christian sightists in the Lebanese civil war. In addition to running operations against the Arabs, Mossad collects political, economic and scientific intelligence in both the Eastern and Western worlds for the protection of the State of israel, Zionism and Jews generaily Their collection efforts are especially concentrated in the Soviet Union and she United States, as well ss at the United Nations, where policy decisions could have repercusons on tsrae! and Zionist gnals. Intelligence objectives in the USSR and East Europe consist of determining governmental policy toward Israel and the problem of Jewish emigration; recruit- ing persons sHrategically located in Soviet and East European bureaucracies who, motivated either by conviction oF corruption, are willing to assist Zionist action in those countries, and ascertaining the degree and quality of assistance made available to Nesr Eastern groups, whether in Lsrac! or the Arab nations, by Soviet and East European Governments. Objectives in Western countries are equaily impor- tant to the Israeli intelligence service. Mossad collects intelligence regarding Western, Vatican, and UN pelicies toward the Nesr East; promotes arms deals for 16 the henefit of the IDF; and acquire: data for use in silencing anti-Israel factions in the West. 2 Organization Momad has eight departments: (1) Operotional Planning and Coordination: (2) Collection; (3) Political Action and Lisison; (4) Manpower, Finance, Logistics and Security; (5) Training; (6) Research; (7) Technica! Operations, and (8) Technology (Figure 3). The Operational Planning and Coordination De partment is concerned with the management of Mcasad resources and responsible for interdirectorate operational and administrative coordination within the organization and interservice lisison within the Israeli Intelligence and security community. This department also deals with requirements and the development of overall collection plans. The Collection Department 'Is responsible for foreign covert operations and the Processing and Production of reporting from clandestine sources. This component ts the largest unit in Mossad. The department has offices abroad under Usraeli diplo- matic and nonofficial cover and is active mainly in Europe, where it concentretes on Arab targets through third-country operations. The Political Action and Liaison Directorate is in charge of political action and relations with friendly foreign services. This component also maintains contact with those nations and political groups with whom Israe! does not have normal diptomatic relations (that is, African countries, Lebanon and/or Lebanese Christian rightist fections and Indonesia). There is also s Psychological Warfare or Special Operations Division, probably in the Political Action and Liaison Directorate, which runs highly sensitive covert action operations against Arak terrorists and ex- Nazis, and sabotage, paramilitary and psycholcsical warfare projects, such as cheracter assessination and black propaganda. In the shsence of the Director of Mossad, the Director of the Operational Planning ered Coordina- tion Department now becomes acting Director, whereas in past years the Director of the Collection Department acted for the Director of Mossad With the drive for greater and improved coordination within the intelligence and security community, the SECRET
Syertiond Seperteenn | i Reginnal Sogions! Meld Conrabe Conger tel re $18799 9-78 Ga Trelsing Galt SECRET Sarety Holl Figure 2. Organization of Mood, 1977 Director of the Operational Manning an? Coordina- tion Department has sprerently take. precedence ever che Director of the Ca"setion Department. In headquarters, the derartment dirertors direct the variour area, functional, administrative, and financial controllers. The arez departments under the contro! of the Collection and Special Politic! Action and Liatson Depertmens are: (1) Central America, (2) South America, (3) Eastern Europe including the USSR, (4) Afrira, (5) Asia and Oceanis. (6) the Mediterranean ar? Near East areas, (7) Europe, and (8) North America Under each controller there are branches or detks which are responsible for one ar more countries. Positive [ntelligence and counterintelligence reports are sent hack ta Mostad headquarters in Tel Aviv, evaluated by the Research Department, and disemi- nated to various government offices Intelligence SECRET reports on the Arabs ere forwerded bw Meaed to the Research Department of the DMI while counterespio- nage reports sre sent through Mossad to Shin Beth, where they are given special processing by counterin- telligence investigative departments. - Massad controls israeli foreign intelligence activities except for operations launched from Israel against military objectives in peripheral areas of surrounding Arab countries, which are under the jurisdiction of DMI. Moaiad operations abzoad fall inio = wo principal categories: those in the Near East, as a first line of defense. and those elsewhere The Isreells have designated Egypt as the main terget area for establishing intelligence networks In 1970 the Isvaclis estimated that about 50 percent of their operstional effort was directed against Exypt The next priority ts Syria. Much of this ectivity against the Arabs in the Near East is based on deep cover operations by Israeli 17
Secaet iegais or the recruitment of Arabs in third countries followed by theirs dispatch ar normal rotation beck ome to an Arab area. Tero good examples of lorachi leep cover iegal operations are ihe Cohen and Lotz aees. Etdiahs Ben Shaul Cohen wes an Egyption-borr, Jew who was involved in ferackt sabotage operatiors against American and British installations ia Exyp’ in 1952. Cohen suceseded in arvceping detaction, when most members of the cag were arrested by the Egyptians, and went to lereel. Eventually? domed recruited Tohen for en tfegel cperstca daigned wo develo intelligence networks aad acquice political and mili- tary information im Syria. He received intensdve training, adopted the idanty of th late Kamil Amin Thabet, a Syrian-born seerchent, end emigrated to Argentina, where he bcome an active member of the Arab emigre commanity. Cohan eventually went te Syria, where he vas awisted by tev Arabs who hed orevious!y beer, recruited by the lereelia. From 196) umil 1965 Cohen was active os an ifiegal in Daraaces, where he suconsded in making numerous contacts with political and enilitery personalities in the Syrian establishonent. He made occasional trips to Europe and Iscaed for extensive debrielings. Eventually, in January 1965S, the Syrians did detec? aad locate Cohen while he was ts the act of tranamitting information to Te! Aviv One cause of his downfall was that he war using hand morse radio equipment aad hed bees on the air for an hour when de was cought (Figure 4). A Syrian court tried Cokes and found bic: geilty of copinnage. He was Qublicly hanged ie Damascus in May 1965. Johann Wolfgang Lots (ake known as Zoev Gur Arich), was an officer in Miltary Intelligence. In 1950 during 2 Va'adat mecting, Mowad announced ts need for a man to be a new illegal resident agent in Cairo under cover as a former Nazi officer. Lotz eccented the amgignment, which eras directed primarily agatnst special weapom activity by German scientists in Egypt. He received intensive training in. Iza, including equestrian iestruction, and in carly 1960 he went to Germany and surfaced as an East German sefugee and former African Gorys officer. Anthough Lote had a wife in lereel, be eventeclly married a German woman to develop Wis legend. In 1961 he went to Cairo, whare he opened a riding academy. Through his activities Lote made a variety of contacts tn the Germsn community in the Egyntian capital and 18s Figure 4. Elohy Ben Shou Cohen's trdnamitier on diplcy in Oommen, 19465 in time made the ecquaintance of a number of prominent and well-placed Egyptians. He made a number of trips from Egypt to Western Europe for debriefings. Finally, in 196¢ Lotz began to mail threatening letters to selected German experts in Egypt [n February !065, he wes arrested by the Egyptians, who tried and inprisoned him. Eventuslly he was released and returned to Israel in 1968. The Isractis have stated that the operation cost them about $250,000. They ‘rave also admitted that errors by Lotz fn handling his communications and his use in executive action operations may hsve led to his downfall. During his captivity Lotz was abo forced to reveal the whole operation (Figure 5). Mossad stations outside of the Arab ereas in the Near East are genezally under diplomatic cover within the embassies and consulates of Isvael. There ere Stations in the United States, moet of the European capitals, Turkey, Iran and sivetegic centers in Latin America, Africa and the Far East. Operations range from formal liaison exchanges with host services through unilateral projects to special executive actions directed against Acab terrorists. There are also smaller siations, which run mostly unilateral operations and handle loca! fisison on such matters as Arab terrorists. The Co:lection Directorate ard the Political Action and Lialson Directorate ere separate components of SECRET
Fags 5. Johane Wallgura lots Sree te we of © wonmmer dsing his fil in Coire, July-Augat 1965 Mossad and are carefully compertmented at bead- quarten. Collection and Political Action and Liaison maintain separate permanent staf!s outside Lerae! in larger stetiota. There are thus either two Momed Salis of two compartmented components tn each Stating in some countries—one for unilateral clandes tine collection and one for liaison. For example, st presen in Paria the iwaelis have an Embssy, Consulate General and Ministry of Defense Mission. Under embassy cover, Monad has « Collection Directorate regional controlier and a Political Action and Liston Dkrectocate regional controller in the French capital, which hes more or lew over the years remained the fulcrum of Isvacti intelligence activity on the continent of Europe. tn Switzerland the leraclis have an Embassy in Bern and a Consclate-Genera! in- Zurich which orovide cever for Collection Department officers involved in unilatzzal operations. These Isracli diplomatic instefle- tions eso maintain clase relations with the Swiss on a SECRET SECRET local level in regard to overt functions suck os physical security for lwaeli officie! and commercial installe- tons in the country and the protection of sal members and visiting Isveclis. There is also clue collaboration between the Leselise and Swiss on scientific and technical matters pertaining to intelli- gence end security operetions Swine officials have made frequent trips to Lsrael. There is a contiana! flow of lwacts to and through Switneriand. These visits, however, ara wuslly arranged through the Politica! Action and Liaison regional controller at the Embassy in Paris directly with the Swiss and act through the olficials im the Ienali Exbasy te Bern, akhough the letter are kept lelormed. tn Spais, on the other hand, there is ne known olficia! ov semicfficial isrecli installation. There have baen contacts, however, between Political Action and Liaisor: Directorate officials of Moued and the Spanish service for some time. The origins! menting aprer- ently occurred in Paris in the late 1080s, since then there have been contscts in Madrid and Paris. There is 8 possibility that Mossad may alo have a clandestine Collection Department station in Spain. In January 1973, Baruch Asher Coben, a Momed officer, was amasinated in Madrid by Arabs. Special operations ere sounted on an ad hoc: bese. Headquarters directs the effort from treed and employs Momad officers and agents on specie! temporary duty. la Jely 1073, en Israeli emnssinstion squad of 18 was involved in the murder of a Moroccas Arab in. Lillehammer, Norway. Norwegian authorities captured, tried and imprisoned siz of the group, the rest eacapad. It became clear in th: course ef the trial that the squed, which was composed of lsrastle, who were Mosed officers, and European Jews, who were recruited for the mimion, did much of fits preparatory work in Peris and entered Norway on a specific asignment—the elimination of Arab terrorists. After the murder, two of the squad sought refuge with an Israeli Embassy security officer. The Norwegians declared the officer personna non grate. although he apperently was not privy to the operstion. 3. Administrative practices The farach Price Mircister appoints the Director of Momad. The Prime Minister does not need the approval of the cabinet or the Knesset for this appointment. 19 J
SECRET Chick: of sation and thele aaffs are Monad career efticers tat they function abroad an behalf of all the ietelligence and security services. ff « momber of Shin Beth or the IDF is considered the mon qualified. jadividual in the community to de a narticalar foreign fob, he stifl belongs to his parent organization, but be is amigned to, and sublect ts the control of, Momad a: long os he cernsive outside the borders of Ureel. This cule dase: act appty, however, t miliary attaches (army, ale, asvy) who remala subordinate to the Director of Miltery latelligence * Mosed dass not have a logical career progression pragram. The orpenizstion promotes case officers who have been successful in the field to top managerial johe. The results of this arrangement are mized as 2. Taanmmc—The Momed triniag cycle encom: panes a Basic Operations coune for recruits and lower ranking personnel, and Operations course and a Field Operations course. All new officer candidate: are required to take the four-month Basic Operations course before actualy entering en duty. The entire training cycle tskes alenost two years and ts generally @iven to clamps of 12. Most of tha training tales place in the Tel Avis epee The jagractars tm thee Moenad eraarave are werkers on permaneet egigement, intelli- ere cifiver: an temoneery tours ef duty, ond heedvarter: permenel, inciyting the Director of feud sar] denertmre? ctvarter, wha give occasional tartwer on their spersePinn The three services rus a joint advanced school ia ferusaiem thet offers specielined courses of two te three months’ duration an world political affairs, Lrael's political and econemic objectives, new techni-_ ca! operational aids, and the letant information on foreign intelligence services. AW officers who are midway in thelr careers are required to attend this advanced school epon their return from a foreign amigninent. Ar many es 40 to SO students sre reported to have been enrciied im a single running of this course. The facuky is composed of rapresentatives of the three services and is directly subordinate to the Dissector cf Mound. The Prime Miniater of some other high official hes addressed greduating clases. Some younger Momed officers, who may be week in certain fields of higher education or languages, are 20 sent to universities abroad, where thels pursuit of an advanced degree simultaneously serves es cover for -their extracurricular operational activities. Ore of the - established goals of the intelligence and. security services is thst each officer be fluent in Arabic. A nine-month, intensive Arabic language cours: is given annually in the Tel Aviv area to students from each service. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs elo sends two or three officia’s to each course. Messed officers who ate going into Arab eperations take the same Arabic language trainfng as Shin Beth officers. As further . training, these Momed officers work in the Adminis- ; tered Territories for two years to sharpen their sanguage shills before being posted abroad. During this period they usually serve in the Sinai and often run Bedouin egents into Egypt fa conjunction with Military Intelligence. ‘ All Mossad officers ere trained ia the we of small arma and required to fire them et gagular intervals b. Funos ann satanras—The Director of Mossad is & civil service Clas 1 officer. He receives generous expense and entertainment allowances. There are feported to be several Class 2 and Class S$ officers in Mossad a2 well The monthly teke home pay of « tanking Meead officer, after tanes but including bonuses and crat-of-living and family allowances, is about 114,000 per month (US8460). They also receive expense ond entertsinment ailowances and ere pro- vided with @ car and gasnline allowance as weil. Higher academic degrees plece intelliver 72 officers in a higher pay, bracket, thus a directorate director with en sclvanced degree makes the same ss the Director. A mlddle-ranking officer with silowances for o large number of dependents would receive more than his seniors. In general, higher-grade civil service salaries are roughly comparable to those of higher-ranking military officers. The rather insignificant differential beiween grades is compensated by fairly impressive perquisites, esgeciaily in the senior ranks Officers abroad art given generous cost-of-living allowances that conform to the allotmer.ts @ the regular Foreign Affairs officers. For cover purposes these ere paid by the Foreign Affairs Ministry. If, however, an intelli- gence cfficer needs a larger apartment or house for representation, operational purposes, or family re- quirements, his service quietly peys the difference. Officers and their families usually travel tourist class on Israeli carriers whenever posible but the absence of SECRET
a firm cule permits them to travel on any air or steamship line ot thelr discretion Clerical} empicyess travel tourit clas. Each station abroad is granted fends for operational and enterisinment expenses. Reworsible individuals do nol emertsia any more than bs necemary but when they do, ui is done levishly. Efforts to extend hospitality wmatintingly are made at headquarters in fsraci when favored agents or ranking foreign intelli- gence officers are guests 4. Methods of eperation Momed over the years hes enjoved 2 goree rapport -whth high!y-piaced parsons and government offices in every country of izaportance to lasek. Within Jewish commuriiize ja almost every country of the world, there are Zionists and other sympathisers, who render strong. scpport to the Israeli intelligence effort. Such contects sre carefully nurtured and serve as channels for information, deception material, propaganda and other purposes. Momed directs clandestine operations * throughout Europe, including the USSR end Ean European countries; North and South America; the Near Eas: Africa; ond the Fer Ean, including South Ean Asia. Momad activities are generally conducted through Israeli official and semiofficial establishments: deep cover enterpriess in the form of firms and organizations, some especially created for, or adapt: able to, 9 specific objective; and penetrations effected within nor-Zionist netional and international Jewish organizations. The function of intelligence officers under cover of diplomatic establishments is to arrange information exchanges with officials of focal services, manage communications, serve as secommodstion addresses and funding channels, and direct agénts toward targets of interest. Official organizations used fcr cover are: {sracli Purchasing Missions and Israel] Government \ Tourlm, £2 Ai and Zim offices. Israeli: construction - fiems, industrial groups and international trade organt- zations also provide nonofficial cover. individuals working under deep or illegal cover are normally charged with penetrating objectives that require a long-range, more subtle approech, or with activities in which the israeli Government can never admit complicity. Many israelis have come from Arzb countries where they were born and educated and appear more Arab SECRET Secret than lereeli fs speech, demeanor, and etitude. By forging pasports and identity decuments of Arab and western countries snd providing sound beckground begends and cover, Mosad has successfully sent into Egypt and other Arab countries Iscaslis disguised and documented as Arabs of citizens of Europesa There sre numerous persone ia larae! whe have a thorough area and language knowledge of any area of interest to the Intelligence services. These area experts can rende: extremely valuable assistance in analyzing intelligence information and formulating country requirements, thus contributing to the (otal opera: tlonal potential since they enadle lerecti intelligence ollicers to estimate repidiy the efficiency and reliability of their egents aad informants .. These ‘ persons are eleo useful for their ability to pas completely for « citizen of the nation in question. The Israeli talent for counterfeiting tor forging pemporte and documents ably supports the agent's authenticity. The Israeli intelligence service depends heavils on the various Jewish communities and organizations abroad for reczuiting agents and eliciting general information The sggtessively ideokyicel nature of Jionisin, which emyphasicn that ail Jews belong to israel and must rcturn to lueel, had bed its drawbacks in enlisting suppcet for intelligence operations, how: ever, since thete is cossideselae opposition to Zionism arnong Jews thiuvughout the world. Aware of this fact. Issaeli. intelligence reprceentatives usually operate discreetly within Jewish cumsaunities and ase under instructions to handle their missions with utasst tect to evoid embarrasment to Israel. They also atternpt to peneirate anti-Zionin elements in order to neutralize the opposition. Despite such prevautions, the lieelis frequently esperience setbacks and there have been several cases where attempted tecruilments of Ameti- cans of the Jewish faith have been rejected and reperted to US authorities israel's program for accelerating its technulgicel. scientific and military development as rapidly as possible has been enhanced by exploiting scientific exchange programs. Mossad plays a key sole in this endeavor. In addition to the large-scale sequisition of published scientific papers and technical journals frum all over the world through overt channels, the tsreelis devote a considerable portion of their covert aper- ations to obtaining scientific and technical intelligence. 21
SECRET This had included sttempts to penetrate certain classified defense provects in the United States and othe: Western nations. The United Nations is a major target for Mosssd penetration because it is # major spomor of inlerna- tional excharges in ali fields and because of its importance in settling disputes between {srael and the Arab states. israeli agents operste at the UN under diplomatic and journalistic cover. Mossad recruitment, training and conirol of agents varies widely, depending upon the target, area of opezation and the desk in headquarters. While there is a certain amount of standardization in the handling of operations, {sraeli intefligence officers appear to have considerable freedom in running operetions. There is no hard sule requiring specific headquarters’ approval prior to the recruitment of gn agent except in the case of Communist countries. Name traces are requested of headquarter’s voluminous files but this is not ae consistent routine Contcmplated operations against the USSR and the Ean European countries, however. are approached very cautiously, and entail a great deal of headquarters planning and control and a special branch ccnpused of area experts is responsible for authorizing and directing this activity. Mossad is especially interestod im early warning regarding such developments as the dispatch of Soviet military units from the USSR to the Near East. There also exists within, or affiliated with, Momed a small unit whose sole objective is to remind the Soviets through ‘ propagands and contacts about the Jewish question at any point throughout the world. All sorts of people, even Cyrus Eaton, have been stimulated to saise the subject. israeli efforts must at times be effective because the Soviets often attack the Lsraeli service in their propaganda with detailed revelations of Israeli plots against sllegedly innocent Soviet citizens. The Issaelis select their agents salmon exclusively from persons of Jewish origin. However, there ere security hazards involved in cases of divided alle- giance between dedication to the Zions State of Issac! and foyaty to s homeland. The recruitment of Gentiles is comperstively rare. Many Arabs, especially walk-ins, have directly or inc:rectly helped the services, usually at a result of monetery inducements, but the Israelis do not consider these Arabs good sources of reliable information. More 22 often, they recruit Palestinians over whom they may have more contre! because of bank assets frozen in Israel since the war in 1948. In certain cases these bank sssets have been released for intelligence services sendered. The Israelis are prepcred to capitalize on nearly every kind of agent motivation. A substantial effort is made to sppeal to Jewish racial or religious psocliv- ites, pro-Zionism, dishke of anti-Semitism, anti-Soviet feelings (if applicable) and humanitasian instincts Bisckmail is alse used. Other recruiting techziques include the profler of money, business oppcrtunities, ot release {rom prison Among the Arabs, money has been especially effective. Appeals have clso been made successfully to cher Arab vulnerabilities such as jealousy, rivalry, fear and political dissension. The Israelis have used false-flag recruitment pitches extensively and successfully. In geveral cases they approsched citizens of Western European nations under the cover of a national NATO intelligence organization for operations in Arab target countries. While intelligeace officers in the field recognize the importance of security, they tend to be careless. Although otherwise well trained, Israeli intelligence officers occasionally have been las in their use of the telephone abroad. Also, they often have given away 8 considerable amount of informaiion by confiding in agents end contacts with whom they have had only a slight relationship. Nonetheless, they periodically recall the basic principles of their profession, and ior awhile comylicate ihe lives of their agents with a welter of security regulations that they themselves eventually trancgress Occasionally a sendezvous ar- ranged between an offices ard an agent, is countersur- veilled by two or more officers, both to spot possible surveillance of the meeting and to grotect the officer In the recruiting process, the officer genezally uses a fictitious name, executes a secrecy agreement with the prospective agent, and provides him with » pseudo- nym or alias. Whenever money cr other gratuity is given to ai agent, an attempt fs made to secure @ signed receipt in the agent's handwriting. Although an agent occasionally may be sent to Israel for special training, this course of action is neither easy nor inexpensive to accomplish. Therefore, the intelli- gence cfficer himself is usually responsible for training the sgent in the fundamentais of tradecraft, security SECRET
messures, and the use of radio and code communica- tions If the excgencies of the situation demand special training, the Israelis rent an apartment for this purpose in places ike Paris and New York. Agents who have been so trained were taught to mix and use secret ink, conceal documents and letters on the perwon, deliver information to secure hiding places, ard to com- menicate otherwise with the case olficer and/or hezdaquarters. The methods of communication vary greatly de- pending on locations and circumstances Personal meehngs between the agent and his case officer are arranged by secret eziting, epen mail, or oral message by couriers. The cities or towns to be used have code names and the meeting places are at specified times with alternative times and places. In case of emergen- cy, the agent can alert the intelligence officer by use of @ presteenged open code in cables o¢ letters, or if time germmus, by secret writing or courier. The leraclis place ennsidcrable emphesis on pervonal relationzhips with their agents. They have been known tu be exceedingly generous in granting personal concesions and monetary amistance to keep their agents happy. One such individual, a journalist in Paris who recruited French officials and elicited informa- tion from aitting and unwitting informants in the French political world, was paid the equivalent of US$1,000 per month. After years of steady employ- ment and a succession of isrseli case officers. his services were gently but peremptorily terminsted Saziame pay was calculated at the rate cf one month's salary for each year of service to assuage sny hard feelings. Gn the other hand, the Israelis can be alsolutely ruthless to both the intelligence officer and the agent if the latter's disaffection or treachery should threaten a sersitive operation or endanger the security of the stsle. There are several cases of Jews in Europe who, while or alter working for the Israeli service. trafficked with the Egyptians for substantial sums of money, These Jews were enticed into traveling to Israel of abducted, tried in camera, and given stiff prison terms of 10 to 14 years. Monad headquarters controls the acquisition, flow and dissemination of reports in a rigid manner, which contrasts with the considerable [reedom allowed in running operations. An Israeli intelligence officer abroad must accept al] information reporied by an agent and may mt change a singte word. The SECRET SECRET imelligence officer receives detailed, orepared ques- tions from headquarters and is eflowed little leeway in terms of what he subsnits. In a meeting with an agent, many of whom are low-level, the intelligence officer debriefs him on the basis of headquarters questions. The intelligence officer must then forward all the agent says, even overt information. The intelligence officer may if he wishes add his own remarks to the report Mowad headquarters does not diseminate agents’ reports to all customer agencies: The cverwhelming buik of the reports goes to one specific enalytical unit, for example, usually reposts on Arab affairs are sent to Military Intelligence, counterintelligence reports to Shin Beth. However, an exceptional agent report is disseminated to lsraeli policymekern The Momed intelligence officer ebrosd does not show copies of his reports to the leeli Ambassador! but sends them only to Mosad headquarters in Tel Aviv. The Israeli services have e very keen interest in the use and development of tecknical equipmen. As far back as 1947-1948, the Informstion Service conducted technical surveillance operations against Arab and British delegates to the UN. Mossad, with asistance from Shin Beth, has provided technical training to the Turkish and Ghanaian security and intelligence services Exchanges of technical equipment and infurmation heve also been carried out with the Japanese intelligence end security services Mossad receives support in external technical operations from Shin Beth and Military Intelligence The technical capabilities of the Israeli services are adequate for norma! demands. Moreover, the very close coordina- tion existing between the services and the industrial concerns of the country ensure that teehnical equip- ment to support continuing audio operations is supplied and developed as needed. The existence of a limited research program, cousled with high Isvacli competence in technical matters, indicates that the Israclis intend to remain abreast of advances in autiasurveillance and countermeasures a. ReLationswe with ornen sravicts-Momed has good relationships with Shin Beth, Military Intelligence, the Research and Political Planning Center of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and the Special Tasks Division of the police. Succemes like the Entebie reid are illustrative of well-coordinated 23
SECRET planning end esecction—s teminamal to grod rela- ens among the servicer Th. The Agranat Commusion advocated greater courd:- natin Letween the services end revived the posi of intelligence adviser to moritos interduectorate dss- putes The exchangss between Mos:d and the othe: setirces Uhiewxh the cundineling nuchanism of the Valedat and the use oJ ad hor commuters, howeses, ecniiee to ensure coordination ang oooperatinn between the services b Liasow wire rormen sthwcns~—Mosad has faison selationships with many of intelligence and security services ibroughout the wogld Wah a few ercepien, the Directorate @ Foreign Liaison and Pctitical Action és responsible for relktions with mou fere:gn organizetions In most instances the point of contect is abroad in foreign capitals, although some foreign services insist on Haison in fssael AG present Mowed, tn coordination with Shin Beh, mainurns haison with doreiga intelligence and security serces through membership in the Kilowatt group. an oorgetugtion which os concerned aah Aral terrors 8s compried of Wes Cerrreany, Belgicrn, itty, che Ulrated Kingdom, Lusembourg, Netherignds, Switzerland, Denmark, France, Canada ireland Sweden, Norway and israel. The Israels alo have adorns) connections regarding terronsm with cther Lutopesn nations, including Suain, Portugal and Actima The lersclscheve over the years made eftorts to break the Arab ring encirchng Israel by invelvement wath nso-Arab Moslern nations in the Near East A farenal trilateral fiasson called the Trident organization ass estahiched by Mosed with Turkey's Natinnal Security Servire {TNSS) and Iran's Natinnal Organiza- tecn fer D@etigence and Seconts ISAVAK) in late 1938 Since the origins) agreement there fas bee an adlecen to Mossrd’s bileteral relatanship with each seqecce The Trident crgamration invalees cuntunving atielhgence exchange plus semiannual meetigs at the ehict vf servire devel eng The genera) terms of the criginal agreement with ihe Turks, ande from legitiniging Isreeh hasan with Tunkey, teied thal Mossad would furmsh infermatien an ter geal of Sovet agents in Turkey and thine wcrkacg against Tothey throughout the Maldle East lay setamn. ine Turks agreed te supply Israel with 4 red infermation on the political intentions of the Arab countries which could affect the security of Lrael, and : the activity and identifications of UAR agents wothing against fsrael The Usraeli service has also given the Turks counterespionage and technical training \y The main purpose of the Israeli relationhip with Iran was the development of @ oroleel eal aug. Arab policy on the part of Iranian official, Mossad nag engaged in pint operations with SAVAK over the years since the late 19508 Messed cided SAVAR ectivities and supported the Kurds in lrag The Lyacts also regularly transmitted to the Iraniers intelligence reports cn Eaypt’s activities in the Arab countries, tends and develonments in iraq, end Communig activities affecting fran \ isracti liauscn in Afeics has varied considerably from country to country, depending on the esigencies of the situation. Israeli intelligence activities in Africe have usually been carried out under the cover of military aad police training, arms sales to national militsry forces, and aid end development programs The Arab nations, ta censunction with the Organization of Alzican Unity, have brought great pressure to bear on mest Aleican nations to break all formal ties with Israel Despite the break in diplomatic relations between Israel and many of the African natiors, the Israchs still maintain good intelligence tisison with certain African services. Tne Israelis also heve telaticns with the Kenyan Service. In Central Alfrice the Israels are stil! active in Zaire. In West Africe the Israchs tcained the Liberian Security Service and police They also helped esteblish the Ghanus Military Intelligence Service. In southern Africa the Israelis have e relationship with the South Africas intelligence and security services The fsraeiss have been very active in Lstin Amence over the years One of the greatest intelligence coum the caplure ef Aduigh Erchmann, the former Nan leader. occurred in Argentina Recently, much of thew hasan activity in Latin America has centered on trang and antitertarist operations The raeh Consulate in Hio de Janeizo, for example, providrs cover for a Mussad regiunal station responsible ia Rrazil, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay Officers fruen this pust have gone to Buenos Aires tu give trasning to the Argentines, in the cours of these contacts ite Isrechs recommended greater involvement in sont antiterranst operations The Israehs also mainte secact
fra with security services cd Meso, Nicaragua. Casta Rita, afd Panama, the Dominican Republic. arnerotla, Colenbia, Ecunder, and Peru Caracas is the Regional Center for ncrth and western Latin america and Central Amesicz The isselis have eperated for sometime in East vA ‘aaa They have provided intelligence traning to the Cneroment of the Republic of Chins and macctain tein with it The Israels atso have relations with the A saparese, Thal, Indonesian, and South Korean serwites. qereaally on terrorist matters The macs Mosud pacomal center 19 Egst Asip cain Singapore The Israeti aauion eniel dhere frequently travels throughout the area ated conducts business with senaces the oecehboring nations indonesia 43 8 Moslem nation ches not have formal diplomatic ties with Israel The insad- Indonesian telationship, therelore, is vesy aaeree! The Mousd representative in Singapore 1s arcredited to the Indonesian service There sre alio Afinaad olficers in Jekarta under commercial cover The primary reason for the tndonesian liaisan is te gai aid sn countertero7ist effons The iwaels. on the catwe hand, are not only ergeyueg antlers eqetatiors but also have an oppertamty te collect adforenanen and engage in polizcal actnn in amaher Atelem powel C. Shin Beth—Counterespionsge and Inter- nal Security Service ¥. Functions Stina Reth has the reponsibllity in {szael for qectererpisnage and internal security and the service a hastaly internally orienied Shin Beth o primarily arywenible for collecting information on foregn srtviigence orgatuzmuvans, both hostile and friendly. and their acioaies, protecting the security ef Israeh afinagls ang anstallaiions abroad, and investigating ail hate af ¢obversion dhrected by esther internal oF evieiual foroes, encludare sabotage aad terronsm 1m deer ert] abrrwd Shin Beth evaluates all mnfermation ahacleped ootlates ol with other metesial routinely atel mnrwih, availab’e Irom both Esrach and foreign wares and submits evaluated reports to the apsrcarr- air gusernmenl agencies for actin Shin Beth operates ta gombal two main adversanes the Arabs and the tenart ard Eastern European intelgeare and security wie ies SECRET SECRET Shin Beth at one_ticae engazed in poectwe intelle- gence operations and immigration affaurs on the Ratkan countries, particularly in Romania, Bulgaria. Yugoslavia, and in Hungary, but no longer does Shin Beth is the government's authority on personnel and physica! security matters, 3 responsible for the personal security of the President, the Prime Minister. and the Minister of Defense Shin Beth does net have the power of srren, which is the right only of the Special Tasks Division of the Investegations Department of the lsrach Police, 0 naticral force with headquarters in Jerualem When an azrett is desired, Shin Beth submits 2 detatled repert on the case plus & request for an errest warrant to the Miniary of Justice The Legal Department transenits the request to the Specta! Tasks Division, which issues the warrant and makes the arrest, When more expeditious hsndling i, justified. ‘Shin Beth dizectly notifies the Special Tesks Division, which is empowered to take the suspect into temporary custody pending ceceipt of the warrant On occasion @ Shin Beth officer will ait in court with the prosecution neff a: 8 specie! contullant 2 Grgsrizeticn Shin Beth & organized into eight operational and functions} departments (1) Arab Affairs, (2) Non- Arab Affairs, (3) Protective Security: (4) Operational Support, (5) Technology. (6) Intezrogation and Legal Counse!, (77 Coosdination and Planning; and (8) Ad:ninistration Regrorsl departments in the field are located in the Caza/Sinai area with headquarters in Ashgelon, the Nocthern ares with headquarters in Haifa. and the West Bank eres with headquarters in ferusalem. A unit within Shin Beth national headqust- ters in Tel Aviv serves as the fourth regional department. These regional depertments are broker down into subdivisions identical to but smuller then those of the parent organization (Figure 6). The Arab Affeirs Department is responsible for counterespionage, antiterzorist operations, control of political subversion, research and the maintenance ofa counterintelligence index on Arats. The components handling these activities are organized into offensive and defensive sections This depertment operates through field offices controlled by segional officers. These officers report to the regional commanders but rely on the Arab Affairs Department for guidance and 25
L261 WOE UNS 40 vouDTERBID -g andy pee won towen) femaipy)
support, which imeludes aid in connterespicnage. ceuntersabotage and surveillance as well as sesearch and recerds support. The overall headquarters func- tion is that of determining doctrine, tystematizing work and supervising. The Non-Arab Department handies counterintelli- gence operations dealing with all other countries, countersubversion {one component dealing with Com- munis subversion, the other with non-Communit New Left subversion), foreign liaison and research. Each unii dealing with these activities has offensive and defensive sections, The Nor-Arab Department investigates and counters espronage activity by foseign powers, both hostile and friendly, by all known methods, including the penetration of their intelli- gence services and diplomatic installaticas in israel. Operations against foreign missions within Isree! were formerly conducted by Military Intelligence, but with the evolution towards greater centralization and profesiona! specistization since the reorganization of 2951, this function has been the responsibility of Shin Beth. The Non-Arab Afiairs Department engsses in the penetration of extremist political parties such as MAKI (the Communist Party of Israel}, RAKAH (the New Communist List), a largely Arab-supported splinter group; SIAH ithe New Israel Left}, and enti-Zionist and extreme mghtia organizations The Department also investigates counterfeiting, biackmarketing, the smuggling of moncy snd goods in and out of the countzy, and vistations of the economic contro! laws. It is sesponsibie for tapping telephone lines and inter- cepting domestic and diplomatic telephone conversa- thors. , The Nor-Arab Affairs Department is responsible for foreign linison and handles all correspondence by Shin Beth with other foreign intelligence and security services, The interrogation of immigrants from the USSR and Eastern European nations is also undertaken by this department. The Protective Security Department is responsible Sor the protection of Israeli Government buildings and embassies, E] Al and Zim installations and craft, defense industries and scientific establishments, and leading personalities This department is elso charged with the security of ali importent industrial plants, especially those of actual or potential militery value, SECRET SECRET and is engaged in the prevention of leakage of industrial secrets such 23 patents, processes, statistics. etc. It also carries on liaison with security officers throughout the Israeli Covernmem. Although guards and security officers are paid by the institutions to which they ere assigned, their recruitment, training, and control ic a Shin Beth responsibility. The Protective Security Department conirois the security of internal communications end the secrecy of information, A smal! unit within the depertmeni, for example, handies ef] matters conceming espionage with the Office of Mat! and Telegraph Censorship The Protective Security Department directs Shin Beth security sctivities overseas including the protec tion of Israeli personnel, diplomatic and transport offices, facilites and equipment. Although Momad has responsibility for unilateral operations snd lisison on itelligence matters and Military, Intelligence controls the attache systema and military Hatton, Shin Beth handles protective security end lisison with local security services abroad to safeguard Israeli personnel and property. For instance, there is a regional Protective Security office in Pariz which is concerned primarily with 21 Al, and Zim security. Bw a The Opetitions! Support Department is responsible for estisting the operational departments with survell- lance, observaiion, alrport security, censorship, [isten- ing devices, special tasks a%.d counteraudio supp-*t. This department hes tectical components, which eid in counterintelligence opesations, VIP protection and telephone taps. The D«pastment provides support in running a highly developed intercept operation from s switchboard installer’ in Shin Beth offices. This enables the service to avoid, having to make tape either ecroms pairs in a local bes or even in the teleshone centrale under the juriediction of the Ministry of Communica- tions Telephone Services; and also avoids any ponible compromise by leftist employees of the Telephone Services. The Technology Department lends support to the operating departments in electronics, mechanics, and chemistry. It provides technical support to operations in the following areas: audio end visual surveillance, communications, photography, surreptitious entry, telephone taps, mail censorship, security devices, etc. The Interrogation and Lega! Coume! Depertmert handles all counterintelligence and security interrogs- 27
SECRET ment cortrcd of irseli naval attache activities abroad, small boat coastal operations, COMINT, ELINT and actis] reconnsimance in cooperstion with Aur Force InteUigence, and a merchant marine program. The post-World War 1) Taracli endeavor in clandestine arms procuremem and illegal immigration developed important commercial and shipping contacts, some of which may stil! be handled by or at least coordinated - with Naval Intelligence. The Targeting Department, with about 20 persoa- nel, ig divided into two divisions: Syria/Lebance snd Egypt/North Afrioe, These divisions are seapoosible for: (22 preparing cousta] studies for aaval gunfire minions, (2) preparing beach stedies for amphiblow ageeutts; (2) preparing special target studies to suppoe? commando operations amd (4) preparing and mala- taining target folder om Lebanese, Syrian and Egyp- tan ports The Departinent hes acces to all sources of information available to the DML Ie addition to levying requirements for collection om the Military Intelligence Collection Department, the Director of Naval Intelligencer ia om regular distribution for information obtained. by the DMI related to oxval aflain. The Production Department, with a staff of about 40, is the largest component of Naval iniclligence. This unit is divided into two diviabons: (1) Arab Navies; and (2) the Soviet Navy. The Production Department handles reseesch, gpalysia, production and disemina- on of information on all mobile forcas amociated with Arab Navies and the Soviet Navy in the Mediterra- neen. This component is the orimary weer of all source material which flows into Naval headquarters, expe- cially SIGINT information The work of this depert- wert & mainly ix support of units operating out of the four navn! bases and the commando unit in scuthern Sinai, Production i Umited largely to studies on enemy order of battle and special weepone Those studies and othars, including target folders, ilentifica- Goo manuals and enemy tactics outlines, are disse! nated to operational commanders and crews through the base intelligence officers The base intelligence oflicer dimeminates such information by briefing crews or cpdating a ahip’s intelligence Library through additions, updates and changes. The Security Department, which bes e staff cf about 12, performs a Wmieed counterinelligence iuaction within Navy beadquarters et all neval bases. 33 Security Departmen? personnel are asvy officers and enlisted men who have beer. specislly trained by the Field Security Deparcnent of Military Intelligence. They perform hesie courtersubversion and couner- sabotage tasks at headquarters and at subordinate bases. They do not, however, carry out base security o« personnel investigations, which ete done by Military Intelligence Field Security units The Organization and Administration Department arith shout siz: personnel assigned, provides secretarial support for the Director of Naval Intelligence. These personne! handle routine administrative dutien Naval tatelligenoe, although small, is e well-trained and evidently highly efficient service. Recruiting of peronacs into Naval Intelligence ts done by mears of a very efficiemt, informal sytem which identifies individuals and matches them to the needs of the Directors of Naval Iqtelligence., (This system is apparently in forca throughout lsrseli military intelli- gence organizations) Nava! Intellirence officer per- sonnel are recruited Unrough several different chan- nela Most younger junior officers enter directly from the universities while others transfer within tha Navy from naval operations units to the intelligence service. A third source is enlisted personel who have displayed the necemary qualities esd bave indicated an interest in following e career in naval intelligence. Once identified, such people are sent to a university at Navy expense. Upon completion of theis training they ere commissioned and pursue careers in Naval Inteliigence. Israeli Navy enlisted personnel, both male and female, are mostly volunteers who have been screened by the Director of Naval loietligence. The Naval Intelligence women serve 20 months, while the men verve 36 months Thero ere 00 special naval intelligence schoots in Lerael, and naval intelligence officers and key enlisted personnel are treined at the Military inteiligence School. In genezal women receive only on-the-job training, however, if a woman shows an interest in e naval intelligence carees, she will be enrolled in the enlisted course of the Military Intelligence School. Noval Intelligence enlisted men attend an abbreviated course, enrollment in an expended course depending on motivation and Intended utilization. There appears to be very little problem with the retention of naval intelligence personnel. The primary constraint on the Directors of Noval Intelligence is the total number SECRET
wemmynn ass (officer and enlisted) of slots amigned. The centralized er combined with grimary ares of intelligence interest lends itself sary wail to the Naval Intelligence - gerscnnal structure. The close knit support svstern ako works wel] considering the lock of integral collection enets Intelligence, prior to and during the Yor Kippur War, was received in the Operations Center at Naval headquarters. During the war, the Director of Navel Intelligence worked very closely with the Officer Commanding the Navy in the Center during ongoing operstion. Information from SIGINT aad other sources wat received is the Center as caw date. Correlation of all information was then done on the spot by the Chief of Naval Intelligence and passed on to the Officer Cammmanding the Navy. The laforma- tor, was cimeminated in the form of orders oF reports to operational commanden and usit. Procesing end rasta, err mbebr tinker umeietabar eeaihener a highly profemion! manne with no major ceteioncies @ Arab naval surpries in the Yor Kippw War. Naval Intelligence alo reveeled « built-in flexibility when the service shifted quickly _ to @ bot war stivation and handled support for active neval operations including shore bomberdment missions. One major area where Neval Intelligence has problems is the Limited number of personnel. in case of continuous operations, similar to the You Kippur War, quality saval intelligence work “would erctably desenerete efter & month sf sedy operations. 2. Administrative grectioes of the Dirsetorate of Military Tatelligonce There ers approximately 450 efficers plus « larger sumber of NCOs enlisted personnel and civilian erica! penonmel ls the DMI. The service has priority - tn che selection of qualified military personnel for inteLigence amsignments Miltary Intelligence prefers to bring individuals into intelligence work while they ate young and move them upwards as they acquire experience and can assume greater responsibility. Recruiter: seek promising young people who are studying foreign languages or other subjects of interest to the service in secondary school. Prior to graduation, Military Intelligence officers contect selected young - Rudesis—males and femaico—and offer them pasi- tions as interpreters during the two years of compul- SECRET SECRET sory military service which follows 1 the completion of secondary education. Those who ecoept are anigned to Military Iotaliigaacs when they jola the IDF Promising young srmy perscunel are than seni to the Militasy Inteligonce School, following which they sasy be comminioned and amigosd os amistents to intelligence officers ip the field. When they attain the zank of captain, having served ss intelligence officers, some ere asigned to an aren command headquarters on to the Dirgctorste of Military Intelligence to expand their experience and qualify them for more tesponel- bility end eventual promotion to higher rank. Thus, many of the officers sow saving with Miltary latelligence entered as young men and moved up through the ranks Most Military fntelligence personne! ere regulars, got reservists becawan the IDF require coreer intelligence officers. All personel, inchuding sczipta, join Military Intelligence voluntarily. Fenaie enlisted member, who often serve as translator, usually serve only 20 months whereas male enlisted personne! serve 346 months. Military Intelligence training ts profemione! and extensive. Officers ead analysts are well-trained and competent in their fields. The Military Intelligeace School is ioceted north of Tel Aviv on the road to ‘ide Dov airport. This school trains both offices and aoncommisioned officers. Approximately 150 instruc- tors and 96 suppert personnel train between 2,000 and §,000 students annually. The school’s usual course mins from September through February. This arrangement has beer, made to take advantage of new groups of hizh school graduates. This center is a relatively aew facility which wes established in the late 1060s. it was formerly pert of the LDF Infantry School The commander of the Military Intelligence School is responsible to the DMI for intelligence Instruction and to the Intelligence Corps for training in general. Course content ts the responsibility of the DMI. The taining staff supervises training aids and Instruction methods. A Combet intelligence Branch provide instruction for operational! personnel and a General Subjects Branch trains specialiste. The General Subjects Branch, for exampls, teaches courses in field security, censorship, military drafting, photo Inmerpretation, research for order of bettle analysis, collection, and eerie) observation. Other special courses are taught as needed. Field Security counterintefligence personnel, . . 39
SECRET Air Force and Navy students also take courses at the Miliary Intelligence School and Militery intelligence instructors are responsible to the DMI for intelligence training at the schools of other IDF branches They sre charged by the DMI for auslity of intelligence teaching. These instructors usually heve wartime assignments with tactical units Military Intelligence personne! staff intelligence positions down through brigade level; Hue officers with intelligence training at the Infantry School staff the lower echelons. Field Security personnel are selected on the basis of girict criteria regarding personal security atd loyalty to Zionisen and the fgacti Rate. They are trained by Shin Beth. . In genersi, Military Intelligence, although tt has « good training program and tric to offer career inducements, has dilliculty in retaining competent personnel because of Sow wages and slim opportunities jor advancement. & Methods af operation Militery Intelligence is responsible for cross-border operations into the acighboring Arab sates Its operations rely heavily om the exploitation of: Arabs within Israel and the Administered Tertltorles, Arab students, who though residents of Israel, attend universities In the Arb nations; Arab travelers and visitors; Arabs in Lwaeli prisons; and Arab enilitary deserters, defectors, Bedoulna and smugglers political and economic subjects ss well es military information end uses the information acquired both for policymaking purposes and as basic intelligence. Military Intelligence is also active In collecting information from sources outside Israeli terrorist and subversive organizations and activities Although SIGINT scurces acquire some information on these subtects, Military Intelligence officers believe that oniy agen. sources can really obtain the date needed on various terrorist groupe’ policies and plans, methods of operation, equipment, taining and relations with other groups. Primary Yawraeli interest in terrorism is to obtain early warning of impending operations. in cach regional area of Lsrael, local citizens, in some cases Araba, who are Inrseli agents, act «3 spotters for Military Intelligence. Most of these spotters heve long worked far Military Intelligence, which alerts them to 40 the type of sources desired. Once a spotter has reported a potential source. he steps aside and leaves the rest to Military Intelligence cfficers Military Intelligence contacts the potential source, assesses hic and, if appropriate, attempts to ceervit him as an agent. This is described as the “direct method” of recruiting agents for Military Intelligence. The “indi- rect method” refers to recruiting sources by or through agents outside Lsreel Both Field Security and the police investigate the backgrounds of potential agents for Military Intelligence. The rootives of the spotters and loca! support people are either monetary or a desire for services in the form of aid in ceuniting families of representation on behalf of the spotter in some problem with the lsracti Government. The basic agent motivation is generally economic gain in the form of sslaries, loans (which are seldom repaid), and gifts. Another common incentive is @ wish to move to levee! and réjoin relatives who reside there. In some cases the egent may be a Pelestinian refugee, who believes that he still has a claim to property in Esrae} and wants either recom- pense or a guarantee of the eventual return of his property. Other agents are members of Arab minority groups or opponents of Arab regimes. Military Intelligence officers do have problems in handling Arab agents, who tend fo exaggerate and often feil to report accurete details Therefore, the Military Intelligence officers encourage their Areb agents to provide photographs, maps, and aher corroborating documents. Military Inielligence officers also croas-check reports often by using other agents in the some region Despite Israeli warnings during training, Arab sgents tend to tell other members of their family sbout their association with Military Intelligence. Occasionally an Arab sgent may recruit all the members cf his immediate family es subsgents and try to get his case officer to psy them salaries. The Israelis cefer to these family subagents es “nonfune- tionalist.” These subagents sometimes compromise 2 whole operation as a result of bousting ebout their activities. Occasionally the Military Intelligence case officer will order these unwanted “nonfunctionals” across the border into Israel for security briefings but Mititary Intelligence has not solved this problem completely. Military Intelligence trains its agents in tradecraft, sollection methods, security and reporting procedures. SECRET
Military Intelligence runs its agents in networks or as singletoms; the latter are referred to a3 “lone wolves.” For security reasona, Military Intelligence prefers that anagem with good acces remain 2 “lone woll.” Agent networks const of a orimary source and subsources. Military Intelligence does not refer to sources a3 such, instead calling both primary and subsource “agents” Military Intelligence officers try to meet and train each agent personally on the Israeli side of the border. Networks usually include a radio operator and in some When posible, Military Intelligence cas officers prefer direct meetings with all agents inside Lsvac! in order to receive thelr reports personally, to check tequirement and to formulate future plans One aspect of the relationship between Miltary Iatelli- gence officers and agents 2 unique when compared to the techniques employed by other services. In many operations Military Intelligence headquarters analysts accompeny case officers to personal agent meetings, in order to clarify certain details of the agent's reports and give him guidance on certain points or problems These meetings are usually held in afehouses with both the case officer and the analyst presen? but if an agent 43 presed for time, the case officer and analyst ensy meet him during derkness at a prearranged apet along the border. Military Istelligence also communicates with its agents by 5,"W letters posted in third countries, by agent radio and by desddreps Military Intelligence operations have been marked by Pezibility, economy in the use of assets and by responsiveness to require ments, the system worked well price to the Yom Kippur War in October 1973. Agents reposted early warning information which, in retrospect, contained retiable indications cf a coming Arb attack. Direct communication with agents, however, virtually ceased during bostilities and what littl agent ceporting there wa13 dusing the war was of limited value io Israeli Military headquarters and field commanders The principe! problem faced by Military Intelligence in the acquisition and reporting of inelligence by agents is the lack of modern equipment. Although many of the agents have radios {mainly receivers) and cameras, and are familiar with secret writing, the sophistication level of techniques and equipment ts low. This adversely affects the quality, sscurity and timelines of collection SECRET Secret operations Military Intelligence employs a SICINT system that is modern, sophisticated and effective. The DMI is responsible foe providing technica support to other directorates, but the technical services of the various military Intelligence directorates are inferior to the technical groups of Shin Beth The DMI's technica! equipment, such as thet weed in audio surveillance or that employed in work agent support is generally high although it ts lem good in some specia! fields such as miniaturization. In the use end application of infrared devices, however, the DMI capability ts usually good. Military Intelligence personnel are capable of making ed hoc modifications of existing equipment and are up to date on technics) advances concerning remote control and activation of tranamitters, and in the field of low-light photography. Military Ictelligence telles heavily on serail rsconnaimence and SIGINT for timely ocde: of battle tnforiastion, Aerial reconnais: sance is apparently @ peimary instrument for locating fedsyeen groups, although such organizations are well penetrated by field agent Military Intelligence ts capable of providing timely end detsiled information on Israel's primary neighbor: ing enemies through agent operations that ere weil planned and highly imeginative The msin purpose of Military Intelligence Field Security units is to control the focal Arab populetion in” the Adminixered Terrorities end to minimize their Derticipation in terrorism. In this endeavor, Field Security of the Administered Territories works closely with Shin Beth and the Border Guard. Residents are required te carry ID cards, curfews have been imposed, suspected resistors have been detained, and the houses in the area of persons presumed to know of terrorist activities have been demolished, even though the inhabitants were not dizectly (nvolved. In the early 1970s it was estimated that the Issaclis had some 900 residents of the Administered Territories under administrative detention. Personnel of Field Security units have carried out sweepe in searches for terrorists and arms caches through areas in the West Benk where terrorisen has occurred. On some occasions Israeli operations have taken place at night, apparently intended at least in part to intimidate the populace. In December 1969 the Deferse Minister announced that 516 buildings hed been demolished in the occupied territories since the 1967 war—265 tp the 41
SECRET West Bank, 227 in Gaza and 24 ta Joremiem. While these Israeli policies end actions have setimidated many Arabs who might otherwise have engaged in resistance activities or ie terroriem, ia many cases they have been ccunterproductive ia thet they have aroused deep and widespread reseatment among the resident: of the Gecupied Torrfories In areas where buildings have been destroyed, an atmosphere of persona! anger and resentment has been added to the natural bitterness of a defested people, particularly among the younger Arsbe. S Relations with other services There appears at the preset time to.be 2 very harmonious relationship between Military Intelligence and the other israchi intelligence and seckelty services. Meat isreck tntelligeacs and security peronael, especially on the policy and coardinatios level, realize that their very sations] existence depends on an cilective and smcothly functioniag intelligence snd security community. Ie addition, officers at the department chief and even ware so at the division chief level afl have knowa aach other ervonaily for e long period of time. These relationships have been forged during troubled times ssidom experienced by any other nation and now provide a framework for cooperative teamwork and coordination among the services. Lisison between lareeli Miltary Intelligence and foreign organizations have varied over the years from good to peor, depending om the exigencies of the situation and the demands of policy. In recent years the Lsraclis heve provided military and security cid and training to variam African mations, including Ethiopia, Uganda and Zaire. They have sho engeged in military and security training and equipment exchanges with Latin American and Adan services The Lsrachs have maintained good relations with Turkey and Iran is military and security matiers While the Lrae!ss do act have fell diplomatic relations with Iran; they heve an overt official mission whose members have diplomatic titles, inchuding that of military attache. E. Research and Politica! Planning Center The Research and Political Planning Center, for- mesiy the Reseacch Division in the Ministry for 42 Foreign Affairs, oveperes analysis based on raw intelligence for government policymakers. its office is located in # scpsrate fenced compound within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs complex in Jerusalem. A guard at the compound gate prevents unsuthorized entrance into the Center, and photo ID cards are fequired for admittence. The Center presently employs fewer than 100 peopte. both analysts and support staff, who were recruited from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Israeli universities. The Center has six divisions: North Africa; the Fertile Crescent; the Arabian Peninsula; other Geographic Regions, Economic; and Strategic. Some 70 percent of the Center's personne! sre employed in the three Arab units The Center prepares its analyses 0.2 the basis of raw intelligence deta availeble to the Israeli intelligence community. The Center produces short pepers on current intelli- gence and longer anzlytical membranda, as required. The Center's products are disseminated to all minis- tries of the government. , The Foreign Minister uses the Center as his personal braintrus to give him an independent means of judging the products of Military Intelligence and Mossad. Ahhough {ts analyses are sent to [sreel’s top decisionmakers, the Center's role in the [sracli intelligence and security community probably is still a modest one. The Center reportedly has few problems arising from competition within the community, probably because of a lack of status in comparison with the established and larger intelligence and security organizations. F. The National Police The lsrseli Police Force 4s a national orgenization headed by an Inspector General sesponsible to the Minister of the Interior. The national headquarters moved in mid-1969 from Tel Aviv-Yafo to Jerusalem. The force ts comprised of the following departments: (1) Admintstration, which is responsible for transport, supplies, communications, property anc finances; (2) Investigations, which ts concerned with criminal and fraud investigations and specis! tasks in support of the intelligence and security community: and (3) Opev- aticns, which is in charge of training, patrols and traffic. There ere also personnel, research, planning and development offices. The Prison Services and the Civil Guard are also pert of the Police (Figure 2). SECRET
SECRET The force i divided territoriafly into districts, subdistricts, somes, police stations, and posts. The three police districts are: Northern, including Haifs, Tel Aviv, and Southern, including Jerussiem. Attached to the Haifa subdistrict is a small coast guard of marine police force, which is based in the port of Haile and gatrow the whole coastline to prevent smuggling, infiltration, and illegal fishing. This unit also has patrol craft on Lake Tiberias and at Elat on the Gulf of Agata. The Southesm District includes a special unit at Ben Gurion (Lod) airport (Figures 10 and 11). A special component of the nations) police force is the Border Guard, whose missions are to guard the ceasefire lines agaitat Arab infiltration and detecting and runing down tecroriits. It works closely with the Army and petrols che Admisistered Territories and the border areas. The Border Guard alec trains seitlers in defense meararss against infihtsators, and schedules guard duty in border villages. Military conscripts who elect to folfill their term of service by joining the Border Guard are the principal sources of new recruits for this component. The Bordez Guard, which number about 6,000, is integrated into the Army in time of war. The effective strength of the police force {not including the Border Guard) reached about 12,000 at the end of 1969. Roughly 3.106 of the police, including 7188 Arabs, were employed in the Administered Territories tn 1969. Over half the police force are Jews of Oriental background and, in fact, the police force is a branch of government to which the assignment of Oriental Jews has been particularly encouraged. The police force fs capatle of maintaining public order and safety under norma! cizcumstances. it has, however, been troubled by a manpower shortage caused by resignations resulting from low pay, overwork and the attraction of higher peying jobs elsewhere. Despite the persistent shortage of mannow- er, police discipline is generally satisfactory and, in the case of the Border Guard, excellent. The public attitude toward the potice has improved since the I Sean! ged eee ably wih ry bee Ede Figure 10. troali National Police headquarters, Jeruiclem, frontal-side view, Movember 1972 44 SECRET
J Rent a oun: fe. KE Sa gere Adee phe wee wat. “a vs eas aed sw iso coor 7. Tog Bod ENP LOD AT TAL ei at ae Lorre: “aye ie wore Fare; = 4. we 4! ae = Paved gis ms be ae i SECRET oy gee mek Ka ~ FS am. eG et re Lh swinn cm : tiaras mes UE! + Mast Yi $i: Ma: cial + Ne = 347° aye “gala ae gga aoe ner? Th. eae, % fh S s: P42 Sau Sa waidda aitawsce > Figure 11. Hroel border Guard post under consiruction ot Kefar Revemwald (Zarit), June 1970 early days of statehood, despite scandsis involving smuggling and the acceptance of bribes. The police force has worked hard to overcome the traditional Jewish fear of police authority stemming from the historic oppression of Jews The Israeli Police Force tn effect acts 23 a very important ausiliary to Shin Beth in the preservation of interna! security throughout the country. The police support Shin Beth in investiga- tions, by providing cover and making errests. G. Key officials Ll Achi-Tev, Avraham Achi-Tav became Director of Shin Beth in the summer of 1974. He is a career security officer. His reputation was ewablished as chief of Shin Beth's Arab Altairs Departmen, where he was responsible for conducting operations in the Administered Terzitories and within the Arab community in Israel. He served briefly as Deputy Director of Shin Beth prior to his &Dpointnent a3 Director. Achi-Tuv is of German background. He ts married and hes a daughter. He earned a law degree at the University of Tel Aviv in the early 1970s while serving in Shin Beth He is extremely bright, hard-working, ambitious and thor- SECRET ough. He is also known to be headstrong, abrasive and S arrogar. Hoffi, Yitzhak Major General (Ret.) Yitzak Hoffi became Director of Mosad on 1 September 1974. He was born in Tel ws £ ~ e~ ae 45
SECRET Aviv on 25 January 1997. He joined the Haganah in 1944 and cormmanded a company ia the Arab-lsseli War in 1948 He continued to serve in the teraeli Defense Forces im a variety of command, staff end training posts, inchsding the command of the Para- troop Brigede. Holfi was Acting Chied of Steff for a brief period in April 1974, but retired from the IDF at thet time, apparently beceuse be waz not sppointed Chie! of Staff. Holfi attended the US Army Command and Genere] Staff College ta the mid-1960.. He has abo visited the US om many occasions In 1968 he inspecte? police units end participated In army exerciess in Uganda Me waveled as a tourist to Hawaii, Japan, Hong Kone, Bangkek and Tehran in 1970 and went to Singapore ‘on undisclosed business. He inspected Lerecli sdvisory efforts in Exhiopia in 1972 and abo went to other parts of Africa. Although not an intelligence officer by background or training, Hoffi apparently demonstrated his Nair for intelli- gence analysis os Commander of the Norhern Command in the deys preceding the Yom Kippur War Vj in October 2973 by sessing the impending Syrian atteck and requesting the Defense Minister to reinforce the Golan Heights with an armored brigade. Holfi reportedly has expanded Mosad's role in the colinction of intelligence on Arab capabilities and the interpretation of such information. Holfi is reserved and qaiet but can be werm and genial among friends He is married and has two daughters. He speaks English Neither a3 flashy nor as imaginative as some of his predecesmors in Momad, he is reported to be meticolos and somewhat dour. Sagi, Yebousun General Yehouhea Sagi, bora 27 September 1033, Jerumiem, Palestine (lerezi), estered the lwacli De- ferse Force (IDF) in 1951 and was commissioned in 1883. From 19553 to 1984 he served in the Southern Command, fulfilins field duties During the Sina! Campaign de served as intelligence officer of the Armored Corps and 23 commander of a reconnais- sance unit. Follewing the 1956 war, he served as an intelligence officer with the 7th Brigade and later as 4h amistani intelligence officer, Southern Command. In 1965 he graduated from the IDF Command and Staff College. Following his graduation he served as commander of an Intelligence Officer Training Course, and as an intelligence officer with the 46 Scuthern Command before returning in 1971 as an instructor with the Commsnd and Staff College In 1972 he became commander of the Intelligence Schoo! ! but leit in 1973 to become intelligence officer with the Armored Division, Southern Command. On 19 May 1974 Sagi was appointed Deputy Director, Military intelligence, Production and Estimates. On 2 February 1879 he assumed the Directorship of Military Intelli- gence. Sagi is soft-spoken, direct and has a no-nonsense outlook. He considers himself an Arab expert. He is married and has three daughters. He speaks English. H. Comments on principal sources 1. Seurce materials Mot of the information in this publication has been Gerived from a variety of sources including covert auets of the Central intelligence ». Dublications of the rae Government and srepared by the United States Department of Defense. Research was basically completed in December 1678. & Supplementary evert publications a. Aldouby, Zwy and Ballinger, Jerrold. The Shattered Silence: the EH Cohen Affetr. New York Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, 1971. b. Arendt, Hannah. Eichmann tr jerusalem. New York: Viking Pres, 1063. c Bar-Zobar, Michel. The Avengers. London: Arthur Barker, 1968. @ Bar-Zobar, Michel Spier in the Promised Land; leer Herel and the Israeli Secret Service. Beston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972. e Ben-Hanae, Eli, Our Men tn Damescus, New York: Crown Publishers, 1062. f. Ben-Porat, Y. (Dan, Uri). Secret War. New York: Sabre Books, 1970. @. Ben-Porat, Y. (Dan, Usi}. Spy from Isreei. New York: Tower Publications, 1969. h. El-Ad, Avzi and Creech Ill, James. Decline of Honor. Chicagu: Henry Regnery, 1976. i. Eytan, Steve. Repeated Triumphs Scored by israel Spy System. Washington: Joint Publications Research Service, 1970. SECRET
i Hazel, isser The House on Corthalds Street; tke Cagtuse of Adolf Eichmann. Londea A Deutsch. 4975. k. Israel] Government Year Bock §735-6 (1975- 1978). Jerusalern, 1975. 1 Lotz, Johann Wolfgang. The Champagne Spy. New York: Manor Books, 1973. m. Pearlman, Moshe. The Capture of Adolf Eichmann. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1961 n. Pickalkiewicz, Janusz. fera Ts Loager Arm. Frankfurt (Main). Goverts, 2975. SECRET U SECRET ©. Rebin, Jacob. Elie Cohen, L'ezspton de Damas. Paris: Flammarion, 10967. p. Shisim, Avi. Fetlures tn Netional intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War. Princeton: World Politics, April 1976. q. Tadmar, Joshua. The Silent Werrtors. Edited and translated by Raphael Rothstein. Toronto. Mac- Millan, 1969. r. Tinnin, David B. and Christensen, Dag. The Hit Team. Boston: Lite Brown, 1976. s Whoe Who tn israel, 1976. Tel Aviv: Bronf- man and Cohen, 1976 47