Weather  can  be  defined  as  the  conditions  of  the  atmosphere 
at  a  given  time  for  a  given  place  or  region.  Weather  can  be  stated  factually. 
Part  of  the  estimate  should  discuss  weather's  effect  on  the  enemy's 
capabilities.  When  day-to-day  intelligence  estimates  are  being  prepared,  they 
fit  readily  into  the  Enemy  Military  Situation  of  the  estimate.  If  the  estimate 
is  for  a  single  operation,  weather  during  only  the  period  of  that  mission  needs 
to  be  summarized. 
For  estimates  covering  a  general  situation  over  a  longer 
period  of  time,  a  long-range  forecast  based  on  a  general  climatology  study  of 
the  enemy  area  for  the  past  years  may  be  used.  Climate  is  defined  as  the 
statistical  collection  of  individual  conditions  of  weather  and  climatic  intelli- 
gence and  the  scientific  analysis  of '  climate  for  determining  its  useful 
application  to  intelligence.  This  intelligence  is  not  factual  in  the  same  sense 
as  a  weather  forecast.  It  is  general  and  broad  in  scope  and  is  not  as 
objectively  applied.  Were  climatic  intelligence  to  be  included  in  the  body  of 
the  intelligence  estimate,  it  would  go  in  the  Enemy  Situation.  However, 
because  of  its  general  and  bulky  nature,  its  integration  into  the  estimate 
normally  requires  more  space  than  should  be  allotted  to  it.  The  significance  of 
the  climatic  intelligence  element  does  not  warrant  greater  consideration  than 
other  factors  are  receiving.  Were  this  to  occur,  the  estimate  would  not  be  in 
balance  with  comparative  degrees  of  importance  for  each  contributing  ele- 
ment. It  is  better  to  place  climatic  intelligence  in  an  appendix  of  the 
estimate. 
No  weather  officer  is  assigned  to  the  intelligence  staff,  so 
the  intelligence  estimator  must  go  to  the  Air  Weather  Service  (AWS)  for  this 
information.  AWS  officers  can  be  assigned  to  any  level  of  command. 
"(2)  Transportation."  All  forms  of  civil  transportation  are  next 
described  in  the  estimate.  These  include  roads,  railways,  airways,  pipelines, 
and  inland  waterways.  The  following  should  be  described:  capacities,  surface 
conditions,  bridges,  amount  and  condition  of  rolling  stock,  motor  and  air 
transport,  barges,  freighters,  and  other  inland  waterways  craft.  Vulner- 
abilities are  discussed  in  as  much  detail  as  necessary  to  present  a  clear 
picture. 
"(3)  Telecommunications."  Telecommunications  are  described 
from  the  aspect  of  the  availability  and  condition  of  existing  systems  and 
equipment,  both  military  and  civil.  Critical  shortages  and  sensitive  bottle- 
necks are  indicated. 
"(*)  Politics."  The  political  as  well  as  the  economic,  sociolog- 
ical, and  scientific  and  technical  topics  which  follow  are  discussed  if  they  have 
a  bearing  on  enemy  capabilities  or  on  the  friendly  mission.  Generally 
speaking,  information  on  these  subjects  is  furnished  by  higher  authority  and 
only  incidentally  by  the  J-2's  intelligence  agencies.  The  discussion  of  the 
political  situation  should  include  a  description  of  the  political  organization  of 
the  area,  the  extent  of  civil  and  military  control  of  the  region,  the  amenability 
of  the  civilian  population  to  political  control,  the  political  organizations,  and 
the  key  political  figures. 
5-16
"(5)  Economics."  Economics  of  the  area  are  included  only  to  the 
extent  demanded  by  the  operations  to  be  conducted.  Certain  types  of 
information  will  be  invaluable  to  the  command  with  regard  to  resources  and 
facilities  in  the  area  available  to  the  enemy  or  which  may  be  available  to 
friendly  forces  when  occupying  or  passing  through  the  area.  Also  indicated  is 
the  lack  of  any  specific  economic  resources  which  may  be  necessary  for  the 
conduct  of  the  operations. 
"(6)  Sociology."  The  sociological  factor  deals  with  the  people  of 
the  area,  their  psychology,  social  customs,  characteristics,  religions,  the 
minority  or  dissident  groups,  allegiance  to  either  the  enemy  or  friendly  forces, 
and  other  items  which  may  indicate  military  government  requirements,  the 
necessity  for  troop  indoctrination,  etc. 
"(7)  Science  and  Technology."  Scientific  and  technical  topics 
are  discussed  as  a  basis  for  comparison  of  weapons  and  equipment  and  to 
consider  the  possibility  of  the  enemy's  employment  of  new  weapons, 
equipment,  and  techniques  during  the  course  of  the  operations. 
"b.  Enemy  Military  Situation."  The  second  subheading  and  a  major 
consideration  is  the  enemy  military  situation.  Here  are  described  the  enemy's 
military  and  paramilitary  forces,  facilities,  and  equipment  with  indications  of 
their  effect  on  enemy  capabilities  and  on  the  friendly  mission. 
"(1)  Strength."  This  subparagraph,  which  may  be  combined  with 
the  one  following,  should  include  a  statement  of  the  combat  strength  of  the. 
enemy  forces  in  terms  of  manpower  levels.  It  may  also  include  remarks  on  the 
state  of  training  and  morale,  although  the  Significant  Strengths  and  Weak- 
nesses subparagraph  which  follows  is  a  more  suitable  place  to  cover  the  latter 
two  factors. 
"(2)  Composition."  In  the  discussion  of  the  composition  of  the 
enemy  forces,  only  a  summary  of  the  enemy  order  of  battle  is  given.  Here  is 
included  the  identification  (when  known)  of  all  enemy  units  which  may  affect 
the  enemy's  capabilities  and  the  accomplishment  of  the  friendly  mission. 
Included  here  will  be  a  summary  of  the  enemy's  surface-to-air  missiles  (SAMs) 
and  antiaircraft  guns  and  (if  effective  against  our  forces)  automatic  weapons. 
If  enemy  air  defenses  are  of  paramount  importance  to  our  mission,  the  fighter 
interceptors  may  be  listed  along  with  the  antiaircraft  guns,  etc.,  and  a 
notation  made  in  the  enemy  air  order  of  battle  summary  that  the  interceptors 
are  listed  with  other  air  defense  weapons. 
"(3)  Location  and  Disposition."  The  location  and  disposition  of 
the  enemy's  forces  and  facilities  and  logistic  installations  can  best  be  shown  on 
a  map  or  overlay  with  a  brief  written  description  of  those  matters  not  subject 
to  visual  portrayal.  As  a  matter  of  technique  for  clarity  and  ease  of 
examination  the  overlay  should  have  on  it  all  pertinent  order  of  battle  and 
enemy  disposition  information  necessary  for  a  clear  picture  of  enemy 
capabilities.  Sound  knowledge  as  to  the  disposition  of  relatively  strong  and 
weak  units  might  be  the  basis  for  decisions  affecting  the  employment  of  our 
own  offensive  and  defensive  forces.  Again,  the  knowledge  might  indicate 
enemy  capabilities  for  future  moves.     For  example,   the   movement   into  a 
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ground  battle  area  of  highly  efficient  ground  support  units,  while  another 
sector  of  the  front  was  receiving  less  well-trained  units  of  the  same  category, 
might  indicate  enemy  plans  for  an  offensive  in  the  first  area.  The  known  and 
suspected  location  of  SAM  and  surface-to-surface  missile  (SSM)  sites  is 
included,  together  with  a  summary  of  missile  types  and  control  systems. 
Air  defenses  are  relatively  impotent  without  the  coordina- 
tion of  early  warning  and  control  radars;  therefore,  a  complete  intelligence 
estimate  will  contain  known  or  probable  sites,  with  a  summary  of  their 
probable  characteristics  and  employment.  Sometimes  the  communications 
staff  estimate  also  gives  the  enemy  electronic  situation  if  the  mission 
statement  has  indicated  to  the  communications  officer  that  he  needs  this  type 
of  information  in  his  estimate.  However,  that  does  not  eliminate  the  need  for 
it  in  the  intelligence  estimate. 
"CO  Availability  of  Reinforcement."  A  list  is  complied  of  all 
known  reinforcements  available  to  the  enemy.  Great  care  must  be  exercised 
in  the  preparation  of  this  list  to  ensure  that  the  problem  is  approached 
realistically.  The  enemy  cannot  be  expected  to  abandon  effort  on  one  front 
just  to  reinforce  another  front.  It  is  expected  that  friendly  forces  will 
continue  to  exert  pressure  on  all  fronts  in  order  to  prevent  such  an  enemy 
move. 
"(5)  Movements  and  Activities."  The  factor  of  movements  and 
activities  should  include  a  description  of  all  significant  enemy  movements 
which  may  affect  the  friendly  mission  and  enemy  capabilities  and  those 
activities  which  may  give  some  clue  to  the  relative  priority  of  adoption  of 
enemy  capabilities. 
"(6)  Logistics."  The  logistics  portion  of  the  estimate  should 
treat  all  elements  of  the  enemy's  logistic  system,  transportation,  storage, 
distribution,  levels  of  supply,  critical  shortages,  and  bottlenecks.  This 
paragraph  should  also  include  a  discussion  of  the  enemy  air  and  naval  facilities 
such  as  fuel  storage,  repair  facilities,  runways,  port  facilities,  etc.,  as  they 
may  affect  the  enemy  capabilities.  They  are  essential  factors  in  the 
consideration  of  the  enemy's  ability  to  maintain  ground  forces,  aircraft,  and 
naval  forces.  The  availability  of  air  facilities  will  control  the  disposition  of 
air  forces,  and  the  availability  of  naval  facilities  will  determine  the  capability 
of  supporting  naval  forces. 
"(7)  Operational  Capability  to  Launch  Missiles."  In  describing 
the  operational  capability  to  launch  missiles,  mention  should  be  made  of 
numbers  and  types  of  missiles;  guidance  systems;  ranges;  types  of  warheads; 
type  of  launching  sites  (if  fixed,  whether  hardened  or  not);  for  mobile 
launchers,  the  mobility,  rate  of  fire,  and  readiness  time;  whether  naval  surface 
or  submarine  launch  is  a  capability;  and  whether  air  launch  is  a  capability.  If 
their  kill  effectiveness  has  been  estimated,  it  should  be  included. 
"(8)      Serviceability  and  Operational  Rates  of  Aircraft" 
(a)  It  is  important  to  remember  in  the  discussion  of 
serviceability  and  operational  rates  of  aircraft  to  express  the  rates  in  terms  of 
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sorties  per  type  of  aircraft  per  stated  period  of  time.  For  example:  500 
fighter -bomber  sorties  per  day  in  the  initial  period,  or  300  medium  bomber 
sorties  per  day.  for  an  indefinite  period.  The  serviceability  rate  is  the 
percentage  of  aircraft  that  the  enemy  is  capable  of  maintaining  in  operation 
for  a  specific  period  of  time. 
(b)  Information  which  leads  to  estimates  on  the  service- 
ability factor  may  come  from  a  number  of  different  sources.  Indications  may 
be  had  from  detailed  study  of  photographs  of  enemy  airfields,  with  due 
attention  paid  to  partially  disassembled  aircraft,  indications  of  aircraft 
movement  on  the  ground  from  day  to  day,  or  signs  that  maintenance  is  being 
performed.  Valuable  information  may  be  derived  from  questioning  prisoners  of 
war  from  the  enemy  air  units.  Reports  dealing  with  enemy  reaction  to 
missions  by  our  forces  against  critical  enemy  targets  may  indicate  the 
approximate  numbers  of  defenders  available  for  a  maximum  strength  inter- 
ception. Friendly  radar  may  range  into  enemy  territory  and  give  valuable 
information  as  to  strength  and  activity  at  airfields  within  its  coverage. 
(c)  If  information  is  not  available  from  such  sources,  the 
intelligence  officer  may  relate  to  enemy  units  the  experience  of  friendly  units 
with  aircraft  of  generally  similar  types.  Probably  no  other  air  force  surpasses 
U.S.  in-commission  status  for  aircraft.  Applying  these  averages  to  enemy  air 
forces,  then,  is  likely  to  give  them  the  benefit  of  the  doubt.  Therefore,  the 
estimate  will  be  a  conservative  one. 
"(9)  Operational  Capabilities  of  Combatant  Vessels."  In 
describing  the  operational  capabilities  of  combatant  vessels  such  items  should 
be  discussed  as  vessels  by  type,  whether  modern  or  obsolescent,  armament, 
fire  control  systems,  armor,  speeds  and  cruising  radii,  underway  replenishment 
systems,  numbers  of  vessels  on  station,  aircraft  warning  and  control  systems, 
naval  aviation  cover  or  protection,  and  state  of  training  and  morale  of  crews. 
"(10)  Technical  Characteristics  of  Equipment."  The  discussion  of 
technical  characteristics  of  equipment  should  direct  attention  to  those  techni- 
cal aspects  of  weapons,  weapon  systems,  and  equipment  which  are  different 
from  those  of  the  friendly  forces.  Superiority  and  inferiority  of  those 
characteristics  should  be  clearly  stated. 
"(11)  Electronics  Intelligence."  This  paragraph  should  include  a 
discussion  of  the  enemy's  electronic  and  counterelectronic  potentials.  This 
concentrates  on  the  enemy's  electronic  equipment  and  methods  of  employment 
of  electronic  countermeasures. 
"(12)  Nuclear  and  CB  Weapons."  In  the  discussion  of  nuclear, 
chemical,  and  biological  weapons,  if  the  information  is  available,  these 
weapons  should  be  dealt  with  according  to  type,  yield,  numbers,  method  of 
delivery,  and  enemy  doctrine  concerning  their  use. 
"(13)  Significant  Strengths  and  Weaknesses"  (See  paragraph  (1) 
Strength.) 
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(a)  The  discussion  of  significant  strengths  and  weaknesses 
should  include  the  material  which  on  analysis  may  disclose  specific  enemy 
vulnerabilities.  It  should  also  describe  any  other  peculiarities  of  the  enemy 
situation  which  are  not  properly  presented  elsewhere  in  the  intelligence 
estimate  and  which  may  influence  the  friendly  commander's  choice  of  a  course 
of  action.  It  should  include  a  discussion  of  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  the 
enemy  situation  with  respect  to  personnel,  units,  state  of  training,  intelli- 
gence, operations,  logistics,  civil  affairs,  and  personalities. 
(b)  Information  on  the  relative  effectiveness  of  combat 
units  facing  a  commander  is  of  critical  importance  to  him.  It  would  be 
particularly  significant  in  a  large  area  of  operations  and  where  enemy  units 
vary  widely  in  their  efficiency. 
(c)  There  is  no  established  method  for  deriving  the  rela- 
tive efficiency  factor.  In  circumstances  where  it  is  desirable  to  estimate 
enemy  effectiveness  and  where  a  sufficient  quantity  of  intelligence  informa- 
tion is  available,  any  method  may  be  used  which  would  result  in  a  simple 
comparison  of  the  enemy  units  being  considered.  For  example,  knowledge  of 
the  number  of  assigned  enemy  aircraft  in  commission  from  day  to  day  is 
desirable,  because  the  availability  figure,  rather  than  the  table  of  organization 
figure,  is  highly  significant  in  estimating  the  enemy's  air  capabilities. 
"c.        Enemy  Unconventional  and  Psychological  Warfare  Situation" 
"(1)  Guerrilla."  In  considering  the  enemy's  unconventional  and 
psychological  warfare  situation  the  first  item  to  be  treated  is  the  enemy's 
experience  and  ability  to  organize  and  conduct  guerrilla  warfare  against  the 
friendly  forces  in  friendly  areas  or  areas  newly  seized  from  the  enemy.  This 
will  include  details  concerning  methods  of  organization,  control,  and  support 
of  guerrilla  forces.  Information  concerning  the  likelihood  of  the  native 
population's  participation  in  the  enemy's  guerrilla  movement  and  a  discussion 
of  the  areas  most  sensitive  to  guerrilla  warfare  should  also  be  included. 
"(2)  Psychological."  The  discussion  of  psychological  warfare 
should  deal  with  enemy  methods  and  facilities  for  the  conduct  of  propaganda, 
the  susceptibility  of  the  population  of  the  target  area,  and  the  major  or  main 
line  of  the  enemy's  psychological  warfare  effort. 
"(3)  Subversion."  The  treatment  of  the  enemy's  subversive 
warfare  effort  should  again  include  a  study  of  the  susceptibility  of  the  native 
population  to  subversion,  likely  targets  among  civilian  as  well  as  military 
personnel,  methods  employed  by  the  enemy,  and  successes  and  failures 
together  with  the  reasons  for  them. 
"(*)  Sabotage."  The  description  of  the  enemy's  sabotage  effort 
should  include  information  concerning  methods,  targets,  sensitive  targets  in 
the  area  of  operations,  and  successes  and  failures. 
"3.    ENEMY   CAPABILITIES."     This  paragraph   is  the  first  of  three  in  the 
intelligence  estimate  concerned  with   enemy   capabilities.      They   are   also 
5-20
considered  in  the  commander's  estimate  and  in  the  intelligence  annex.  Enemy 
capabilities  are  defined  as:  "Those  courses  of  action  of  which  the  enemy  is 
physically  capable  and  which,  if  adopted,  will  affect  the  accomplishment  of 
our  mission.  The  term  'capabilities'  includes  not  only  the  general  courses  of 
action  open  to  the  enemy,  such  as  attack,  defense,  or  withdrawal,  but  also  all 
the  particular  courses  of  action  possible  under  each  general  course  of  action. 
'Enemy  capabilities'  are  considered  in  the  light  of  all  known  factors  affecting 
military  operations  including  time,  space,  weather,  terrain,  and  the  strength 
and  disposition  of  enemy  forces  .  .  .  ."  (POD  Dictionary  of  Military  and 
Associated  Terms) 
The  intelligence  officer  must  carefully  distinguish  between  general 
courses  of  action,  e.g.,  attack,  defense,  and  withdrawal,  and  particular  courses 
of  action.  In  many  situations  an  intelligence  estimate  is  prepared  on  the  basis 
of  an  assumption  that  the  enemy  will  attack.  Hence,  in  such  situations  the 
general  course  of  action  (attack)  is  assumed— the  task  is  to  enumerate  the 
particular  courses  of  action  under  the  category  of  "attack."  However,  it 
should  be  noted  that  the  intelligence  officer  does  not  make  or  list  assumptions 
in  his  intelligence  estimate.  It  is  the  commander  who  assumes  that  the  enemy 
will  attack.  The  intelligence  officer  prepares  an  intelligence  estimate  for  the 
defensive  friendly  posture  the  commander  has  assumed. 
The  primary  and  ultimate  purpose  of  determining  and  stating  enemy  capa- 
bilities is  to  inform  the  commander  what  the  enemy  is  physically  capable  of 
doing  which  will  affect  the  accomplishment  of  the  friendly  mission.  In  the 
joint  planning  process  a  statement  of  enemy  capabilities  appears  in  the 
"Intelligence  Estimate"  and  the  "Commander's  Estimate." 
The  scope  of  enemy  capabilities  which  is  expressed  in  a  joint  estimate  will 
depend  on  the  level  of  command,  the  situation  (whether  formulated  before  the 
outbreak  of  hostilities  or  after),  and  the  intelligence  available. 
A  joint  estimate  at  the  3oint  Chiefs  of  Staff  level  considers  enemy 
capabilities  on  a  global  basis.  A  unified  command  considers  enemy  capabilities 
which  will  affect  the  mission  of  the  command— usually  on  a  theater  basis.  A 
joint  task  force  concerns  itself  with  those  capabilities  expected  in  its  area  of 
operations. 
Before  hostilities  begin  the  intelligence  available  to  estimate  enemy 
capabilities  will  be  in  less  detail  than  that  which  can  be  developed  during 
wartime.  After  war  has  begun,  sources  of  combat  intelligence  open  up  which 
facilitate  a  more  complete  and  definitive  statement  of  enemy  capabilities. 
The  term  "affecting  the  accomplishment  of  our  mission"  needs  discussing. 
An  enemy  course  of  action  may  either  favor  or  hinder  the  accomplishment  of 
the  friendly  mission.  This  concept  is  often  overlooked.  However,  listing  of 
enemy  capabilities  favoring  our  mission  must  be  done  realistically.  The 
statement  "he  can  surrender"  is  usually  unrealistic  and  not  amenable  to 
analysis.  But  the  enemy,  for  example,  might  withdraw  his  light  bombers  to 
support  operations  against  a  distant  ally  of  our  friendly  forces  and  make 
accomplishment  of  our  mission  easier. 
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Knowledge  of  a  possible  enemy  course  of  action  which  will  aid  the 
accomplishment  of  the  friendly  mission  may  prepare  the  commander  to  take 
advantage  of  a  weakness.  Such  knowledge  will  enable  him  to  save  men,  time, 
and  material.  He  also  may  gain  a  more  favorable  position  from  which  to 
continue  action  against  the  enemy.  The  intelligence  officer  must  be  alert  to 
situations  in  which  enemy  capabilities  favorable  to  friendly  forces  might  have 
an  important  bearing  on  the  action.  For  these  reasons,  enemy  capabilities 
favoring  the  accomplishment  of  the  friendly  mission  should  not  be  overlooked. 
In  stating  enemy  capabilities  the  following  considerations  are  applicable: 
Any  list  of  enemy  capabilities  must  be  focused  on  our  own  mission 
and  must  present  every  significant  line  of  enemy  action  which  will  produce  a 
significant  effect  on  the  accomplishment  of  our  mission. 
The  enumeration  of  enemy  capabilities  is  not  intended  as  an  end  in 
itself.  Instead,  this  enumeration  serves  as  a  starting  point  and  an  integral  part 
of  a  planning  process  which  enables  the  commander  to  weigh  the  result  of  each 
of  his  own  possible  future  courses  against  each  of  the  enemy's  in  order  to 
determine  which  of  his  own  lines  of  action  is  most  promising.  Therefore,  in 
the  intelligence  estimate,  enemy  capabilities  should  be  expressed  in  terms  of 
what  the  enemy  is  capable  of  doing  without  considering  action  on  our  part  to 
prevent  or  hinder  the  execution  of  that  capability.  {In  the  intelligence 
estimate  the  enemy  capabilities  are  described  without  considering  our  military 
opposition,  whereas  in  the  commander's  estimate  the  effect  of  that  opposition 
to  these  capabilities  is  considered.) 
A  theater  or  area  joint  commander  is  operationally  concerned  with 
a  series  of  operations  over  a  period  of  time  and  an  extended  area  (a  campaign) 
encompassing  related  operations  in  the  air,  on  the  land,  and  on  the  sea. 
Therefore,  he  needs  to  know  the  enemy's  total  capability  to  oppose  his 
operations  in  the  air,  on  the  land,  and  on  the  sea;  the  total  opposition  to  the 
land  campaign  in  particular  clearly  includes  combined  action  by  enemy  land 
and  air  forces  and  in  some  situations  by  sea  forces.  Also  needed  are  the 
enemy's  campaign  capabilities  by  logical  phases  over  the  entire  period  of  the 
campaign,  that  is,  from  D-day  to  the  ultimate  objective  of  the  campaign.  This 
concept  may  differ  somewhat  in  the  case  of  a  joint  task  force,  particularly  a 
smaller  one.  Here  the  JTF  commander  is  generally  concerned  with  a  single 
operation  (a  battle)  or  a  series  of  closely  related  operations  over  a  limited 
area.  Again,  being  a  joint  commander,  he  needs  to  know  the  enemy's  total 
(joint)  capability  against  his  operation,  but  he  is  not  so  concerned  with  this 
capability  over  an  extended  area  or  time.  Finally,  enemy  capabilities  must  be 
expressed  in  terms  of  total  force  in  air,  sea,  and  land  campaigns  and  must  be 
carried  through  to  the  ultimate  defensive  or  offensive  objective. 
However,  there  will  be  occasions  when  the  enemy  can  employ  one 
element  of  forces  in  a  separate  and  independent  action  that  would  have  a 
significant  effect  on  our  mission.  An  example  of  this  would  be  an  air  or 
submarine  campaign  with  or  without  concurrent  action  of  the  other  forces  at 
the  disposal  of  the  enemy.  In  these  and  similar  activities,  each  should  be 
considered  for  inclusion  as  a  separate  enemy  capability. 
5-22
In  the  campaign  the  commander  is  particularly  interested  in  how 
much  time  he  has  to  prepare  for  various  operations.  No  specific  plans  for 
operations  on  our  part  have  been  made;  therefore,  the  statement  of  enemy 
capabilities  cannot  reflect  the  effect  of  planned  action  against  him.  In 
determining  how  fast  the  enemy  can  move,  we  do  not  consider  how  long  it 
would  take  him  to  penetrate  a  certain  defensive  line;  on  the  other  hand,  we  do 
consider  that  he  is  moving  under  the  constant  threat  of  action  on  our  part. 
This  means  that,  with  respect  to  his  ground  forces,  determination  of  rate  of 
advance  must  consider  such  things  as  dispersion,  security,  and  consolidation  of 
gains,  capacity  of  lines  of  communication,  and  rear  area  security.  Occupation 
requirements  must  be  considered  in  determining  strengths  available.  "Unop- 
posed" means  unopposed  by  specific,  planned  action  by  our  forces  but  opposed 
by  the  threat  of  action  on  our  part. 
Statements  of  enemy  capabilities  should  be  objective.  There  is  already 
present  the  human  tendency  to  err— this  should  not  be  compounded  by  undue 
timidity,  undue  recklessness,  prejudices,  preconceived  notions,  or  least  of  all 
by  what  friendly  forces  would  be  capable  of  in  similar  circumstances. 
The  statements  of  capabilities  should  be  concise  and  to  the  point  with  no 
discussions  of  order  of  battle,  doctrine,  tactics,  or  strategy.  Each  capability, 
however,  must  contain  as  much  pertinent  information  as  is  necessary  to 
answer  the  following  five  questions: 
What  is  the  enemy  capability  that  will  affect  the  friendly  mission? 
If  the  estimate  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  the  enemy  will  attack,  then 
each  particular  course  of  action  under  the  category  of  "attack"  must  state 
"what," 
Where?  m  the  case  of  ground  forces,  if  the  action  is  extended  or 
continuous,  indicate  routes  to  probable  objective.  In  the  case  of  air  and  naval 
forces,  indicate  areas  which  could  be  brought  under  attack. 
In  what  strength?  In  the  case  of  ground  forces,  if  the  action  is 
extended  or  continuous,  indicate  strengths  or  reinforcements  at  key  inter- 
mediate stages.  For  air  forces,  initial  strike  and  monthly  sustained  sortie 
rates  by  type  of  aircraft  should  be  given.  For  naval  forces,  the  number  of 
combatant  vessels  on  station  should  be  given.  In  all  cases,  maximum  forces 
should  be  shown. 
When  can  the  enemy  execute  this  capability?  The  earliest  time  the 
enemy  can  initiate  each  capability  is  computed.  Time  calculations  for  the 
conduct  of  the  operations  are  considered  in  the  most  favorable  light  from  the 
enemy's  point  of  view  and  are  computed  so  as  to  determine  the  earliest  time 
by  which  the  given  capability  or  parts  of  it  can  be  effected. 
From  where  will  the  enemy  initiate  mis  capability?  For  example, 
"Will  attack  from  the  east  with  .  .  .  ."  Often  this  question  is  answered  by 
replies  to  queries  listed  above— What?  and  Where? 
In  determining  the  initial  list  of  capabilities,  the  following  proce- 
dures should  be  considered  as  a  guide. 
5-23
Consider  the  overall  enemy  and  strategic  situation.  Answer  such 
questions  as  "Is  the  enemy  committed  on  other  fronts?  Is  this  operation  a  part 
of  a  general  strategic  offensive  or  defensive?  Is  this  a  critical  area  from  the 
enemy's  standpoint?  Is  this  the  enemy's  major  effort?"  and  others  like  them 
to  gain  a  sound  understanding  of  the  significance  of  this  area  to  the  enemy. 
List  all  the  enemy  capabilities  which  will  affect  the  accomplish- 
ment of  the  friendly  mission  considering  the  availability  of  enemy  ground, 
naval,  and  air  forces.  For  each  separate  capability  compute  "what,  where,  in 
what  strength,  and  when"  for  each  component  force  of  the  capability.  This 
must  be  done  in  consideration  of  probable  enemy  objectives  which  affect  the 
accomplishment  of  the  friendly  mission. 
Eliminate  from  the  listing  the  capabilities  which  are  grossly 
disadvantageous,  insignificant,  or  entirely  unreasonable. 
Reevaluate  the  list  and  then  group  smaller  related  capabilities  and 
supporting  operations  into  the  major  capabilities,  indicating  possible  inter- 
mediate and  final  enemy  objectives  in  light  of  the  friendly  mission.  This 
reevaluation  is  extremely  important,  because  each  enemy  capability  must  be 
analyzed  against  each  friendly  course  of  action  in  the  commander's  estimate. 
Consequently,  as  a  practical  matter  the  number  of  enemy  capabilities  should 
be  limited  to  as  few  as  will  state  adequately  the  enemy's  combined  potential 
against  the  friendly  command.  Further,  the  possibility  of  duplication  and 
resultant  error  is  greatly  increased  when  a  large  number  of  capabilities  is 
considered. 
Reword  each  capability  until  it  is  clear  and  concise  but  still 
adequately  expresses  the  capability.  Certain  capabilities  may  be  expressed  in 
a  simple  sentence  or  two.  Some  of  the  joint  capabilities  may  require  three  or 
more  sentences  in  order  to  make  the  meaning  absolutely  clear.  Use  only 
enough  words,  phrases,  and  sentences  to  ensure  that  the  commander  is  left  in 
no  doubt  as  to  what  the  enemy  capability  is. 
Finally,  state  each  separate  capability  as  a  lettered  subparagraph 
of  paragraph  3  of  the  intelligence  estimate.  List  the  capabilities  either 
according  to  their  relative  importance  in  affecting  the  accomplishment  of  the 
friendly  mission  or  in  the  relative  chronological  order  of  their  initiation  by  the 
enemy. 
"4.  ANALYSIS  OF  ENEMY  CAPABILITIES."  In  this  paragraph  the  J-2 
analyzes  each  capability  separately.  He  makes  the  analysis  in  the  sequence  in 
which  the  capabilities  are  listed  in  paragraph  3.  Each  analysis  considers, 
where  appropriate,  the  effect  of  all  factors  discussed  under  the  various 
subheadings  of  paragraph  2. 
No  possible  course  of  action  will  be  eliminated  with  a  statement  of  "none" 
or  "has  no  capability."  If  there  is  nothing  to  discuss  about  a  listed  capability 
and  if  no  analysis  is  possible,  it  should  be  removed  from  paragraph  3.  Each 
capability  open  to  the  enemy  is  worthy  of  complete,  detailed  analysis. 
Whereas  paragraph  3  considers  broad  action,  paragraph  4  analyzes  details. 
5-24
Time  and  space  should  be  carefully  analyzed  to  determine  the  maximum 
enemy  strength  by  type  of  forces  during  each  period  or  phase  and  the 
reinforcement  potential  in  the  execution  of  the  capability  being  analyzed. 
The  enemy  should  be  given  the  benefit  of  the  doubt.  The  intelligence 
officer  must  always  assume,  in  the  absence  of  positive  facts  to  the  contrary, 
that  the  enemy  will  make  the  best  possible  tactical  decisions,  will  conduct  a 
maneuver  in  the  best  possible  way,  and  will  execute  movements  in  the  shortest 
possible  time.  Thus,  to  expect  the  worst  guards  against  surprise.  For 
example,  in  estimating  the  time  of  a  possible  enemy  attack,  the  major  interest 
from  the  intelligence  viewpoint  is  the  earliest  possible  time  of  attack.  If  our 
troops  can  be  prepared  to  resist  an  immediate  attack,  they  certainly  can  be 
ready  at  a  later  time.  Such  a  viewpoint  requires  a  difference,  in.  approach  by 
the  intelligence  officer  than  by  the  3-3,  whose  concern  is  the  capabilities  of 
our  own  troops. 
Throughout  this  analysis  the  3-2  should  be  alert  for  indications  that  the 
enemy  will  or  will  not  exercise  a  particular  capability.  He  should  also  pay 
particular  attention  to  the  effect  the  exercise  of  the  capability  will  have  on 
enemy  vulnerabilities,  that  is^  conditions  or  circumstances  of  the  enemy 
situation  which  render  the  enemy  especially  liable  to  damage,  deception,  or 
defeat.  Here  the  3-2  considers,  in  addition  to  those  factors  listed  in  the 
Significant  Strengths  and  Weaknesses  subparagraph,  such  items  as  character- 
istics of  the  area,  enemy  tactical  doctrine,  and  the  3-2's  own  background 
knowledge  of  the  enemy.  The  vulnerabilities  considered  should  be  actual  ones 
either  known  or  deduced. 
The  purposes  of  this  paragraph  then  are  to 
List  significant  known  facts  regarding  each  enemy  capability. 
Examine  those  facts  in  order  to  fully  understand  the  capability. 
Determine  whether  each  capability  listed  is  a  major  one  requiring 
separate  listing  or  should  be  grouped  with  others. 
Determine  which  auxiliary  capabilities  should  be  analyzed  in  con- 
nection with  each  major  one. 
Determine  the  effect  of  each  capability  on  the  friendly  mission. 
Point  up  evidence  which  indicates  the  relative  order  in  which  the 
enemy  might  adopt  the  capabilities  and  attempt  to  determine  and  give  reasons 
for  that  order.  However,  care  must  be  taken  that  relative  probability  is  stated 
only  when  it  can  be  justified  by  indications.  If  there  are  no  indications  to 
justify  the  selection  of  a  particular  enemy  capability  as  most  likely  to  be 
adopted,  the  intelligence  officer  should  so  state.  The  basis  for  determining 
the  relative  probability  must  be  sound  indications  and  known  facts,  and  not 
guesswork. 
"5.    CONCLUSIONS."     The  final  paragraph  of  the  intelligence  estimate  is  the 
statement  of  the  3-2's  interpretation  of  the  evaluated  information  which  has 
5-25
been  presented,  analyzed,  and  integrated  in  the  preceding  paragraphs.  It 
contains  the  statement  of  enemy  capabilities  which  the  evidence  indicates  the 
enemy  is  most  likely  to  adopt  listed  in  the  relative  order  of  priority  of 
adoption,  if  this  can  be  determined.  If  the  probability  cannot  be  determined, 
the  3-2  should  so  state.  The  paragraph  is,  in  effect,  a  statement  of  the 
conclusions  the  3-2  has  reached  through  a  comparative  study  of  the  preceding 
analysis  and  discussion  of  enemy  capabilities.  Since  this  determination  is 
based  on  interpretation  of  intelligence,  it  must  be  fully  justified  by  the 
analysis  and  discussion  of  the  enemy  capabilities  in  the  pertinent  paragraph  of 
the  estimate.  It  is  objective.  It  is  not  an  attempt  to  guess  what  the  enemy 
will  do.  It  is  an  attempt  to  decide  from  available  evidence  what  the  enemy  is 
most  likely  to  do.  Probable  capabilities  are  stated  in  this  paragraph  only 
insofar  as  available  evidence  justifies  the  statement.  If  the  enemy  is  capable 
of  implementing  two  or  more  capabilities  simultaneously,  that  fact  should  be 
plainly  indicated.  This  also  applies  to  any  combination  of  the  listed 
capabilities.  This  paragraph  should  also  include  when  possible  a  concise 
statement  of  the  effects  of  each  enemy  capability  on  the  accomplishment  of 
the  assigned  mission. 
Where  possible,  the  five  questions  should  be  answered  in  stating  these 
capabilities:  (1)  what  it  is;  (2)  where  (in  what  area)  it  can  occur?  (3)  in  what 
strength  it  can  be  accomplished;  (*)  when  it  can  occur;  (5)  from  where  it  can 
be  carried  out. 
The  final  part  of  the  last  paragraph  of  the  estimate  should  list  exploitable 
vulnerabilities.  The  list  is,  in  fact,  a  statement  of  conclusions  reached  through 
comparative  study  of  the  vulnerabilities  discussed  in  the  previous  paragraph. 
The  list  is  confined  to  vulnerabilities  which  may  be  exploited  by  friendly 
forces.  In  determining  what  should  be  listed,  3-2  must  necessarily  give  some 
consideration  to  the  feasibility  of  exploitation  by  his  own  commander. 
However,  the  recommendation  to  the  commander  of  courses  of  action  to  be 
adopted  is  not  within  the  province  of  the  3-2,  but  belongs  to  the  3-3  after 
careful  coordination  and  consultation  with  the  3-2.  Therefore,  in  the 
estimate,  3-2  lists  those  vulnerabilities  which  may  be  exploited  by  the 
commander  and  makes  no  recommendation  for  specific  exploitation. 
o.  Recapitulation.  With  regard  to  the  intelligence  estimate  the 
following  precautions  are  emphasized: 
(1)  State  the  mission  clearly. 
(2)  In  paragraph  2  do  not  merely  list  facts  but  interpret  these 
facts  in  the  light  of  possible  enemy  operations  and  our  own  mission. 
(3)  State  enemy  capabilities  clearly,  concisely,  and  completely. 
(*)  Analyze  enemy  capabilities  from  the  enemy's  point  of  view 
and  not  from  the  point  of  view  of  what  friendly  forces  would  do  in  a  similar 
situation. 
5-26
(5)  In  conclusion  give  the  order  of  probable  adoption  only  when 
sufficient  evidence  exists  in  the  estimate  to  justify  such  a  statement. 
Otherwise  state  that  no  order  of  adoption  can  be  determined. 
(6)  Remember,  the  purpose  of  the  estimate  is  to  assist  the 
commander  in  his  analysis  of  opposing  courses  of  action  and  help  him  to  arrive 
at  a  sound  decision. 
5.5  INTELLIGENCE  INPUTS  REQUIRED  IN  THE  30INT  OPERATION  PLANNING 
SYSTEM  (30PS) 
a.  General 
(1)  At  each  stage  of  the  Joint  Operation  Planning  System 
(JOPS),  the  intelligence  staff  officer  performs  specific  tasks  designed  to  assist 
the  command  in  successful  execution  of  the  planning  mission.  The  operational 
planning  task  requires  preparation  of  either  an  OPLAN  or  a  CONPLAN.  An 
OPLAN  is  an  operations  plan  for  the  conduct  of  military  operations  which  can 
be  translated  into  an  operation  order  with  minimum  alteration.  Complete 
plans  include  deployment  or  employment  phases.  A  CONPLAN  is  an  opera- 
tions plan  in  concept,  or  abbreviated,  format,  which  requires  expansion  into 
OPLAN  or  OPORD  before  implementation.  In  either  case,  development  of  the 
basic  plan  requires  intelligence  input. 
(2)  The  intelligence  input  is  designed  to  give  all  information 
about  the  enemy  and  area  of  operation  which  the  commander  needs  to  know  to 
successfully  accomplish  the  mission;  it  disseminates  known  intelligence  and 
identifies  information  needed  but  not  yet  available,  and  it  gives  necessary 
instructions  and  directions  to  ensure  the  full  and  proper  functioning  of  the 
intelligence  and  counterintelligence  aspects  of  the  operation. 
(3)  Within  the  text  of  the  plan  or  order,  intelligence  input  is 
required  in  two  specific  parts  regardless  of  the  type  of  plan.  The  environ- 
mental and  enemy  situations  are  set  out  briefly  and  concisely  in  paragraphs  la 
and  lb  of  the  plan  or  order,  and  the  detailed  information  along  with  the  plan 
for  intelligence  aspects  of  the  operation  are  included  in  the  intelligence  annex, 
which  is  an  integral  part  of  the  directive  or  order.  A  discussion  of  both  forms 
of  input  follows. 
b.  Intelligence  Input  to  OPLAN 
(1)  Paragraph  la:  General  Situation.  This  subparagraph 
describes  the  general  political/military  environment  which  would  establish  the 
probable  preconditions  for  execution  of  the  plan.  The  intelligence  officer 
serves  as  a  focal  point  for  development  of  this  input.  Contents  are  developed 
through  close  coordination  with  the  political  advisor  (POLAD),  if  assigned, 
civil  affairs  officer,  and  other  interested  divisions  of  the  staff. 
(2)  Paragraph  lb:  Enemy  Situation.  This  part  identifies  the 
forces  that  are  expected  to  oppose  the  execution  of  the  plan  and  appraises 
their  general  capabilities.  The  subparagraph  should  give  the  information 
essential  to  a  clear  understanding  of  the  magnitude  of  the  hostile  threat. 
5-27
Generally,  the  significant  aspects  of  the  enemy  situation  and  the  area  of 
operations  that  affect  the  accomplishment  of  the  mission  are  included  in 
condensed  form.  The  location,  composition,  disposition,  strength,  recent 
significant  activities  and  capabilities  of  the  enemy  along  with  conclusions 
about  the  area  are  stated  briefly  and  concisely. 
c.         Intelligence  Annex 
(1)  Material  relating  to  intelligence  in  the  operation  plan  or 
order  is  placed  in  the  intelligence  annex  (Annex  B).  This  annex  is  an  integral 
part  of  the  commander's  directive,  a  means  for  disseminating  known  intelli- 
gence, and  the  plan  for  intelligence  collection,  production,  and  dissemination 
of  new  intelligence  to  support  the  directive.  It  is  used  by  the  commander  to 
control  and  coordinate  the  joint  force  intelligence  effort.  Annexes  are 
prepared  for  all  operations.  They  are  indispensable  in  operations  preceded  by 
long  periods  of  planning. 
(2)  The  intelligence  annex  has  occasionally  been  titled  "Intelli- 
gence Plan."  While  the  annex  contains  plans  for  the  conduct  of  intelligence 
activities,  the  term  "Plan"  is  not  sufficiently  specific.  An  intelligence  "plan" 
could  be  an  intelligence  collection  plan,  a  plan  containing  long-term 
generalized  intelligence  guidance,  or  a  plan  scheduling  beginning  and 
completion  dates  for  a  variety  of  intelligence  activities.  (See  Intelligence 
Schedule  of  Events,  Appendix  B,  the  intelligence  annex  to  an  operation  plan,  as 
discussed  here.)  The  missions  of  a  joint  force  commander  as  they  relate  to 
general,  limited,  and  contingency  war  situations  are  so  diverse  that  it  is 
impracticable  to  develop  a  comprehensive  intelligence  plan  supporting  all 
missions.  The  primary  vehicle  for  disseminating  specific  intelligence  and 
intelligence  planning  guidance  has  become  the  Intelligence  annex  to  operation 
plans  and  orders. 
(3)  Discussion  of  the  Form.  The  form  of  the  intelligence  annex 
should  be  simple,  yet  flexible  enough  to  be  adapted  to  the  situation.  It 
consists  of  three  major  parts:  the  heading,  the  body,  and  the  ending. 
Heading 
Included  in  the  heading  are  the  classification  and  title  of  the  annex,  the 
identification  number  of  plan  or  order  to  which  the  annex  pertains,  the  name 
and  location  of  the  headquarters  issuing  the  annex,  and  the  date  of  prepara- 
tion. Directly  below  are  references  to  the  maps,  charts,  and  documentation 
needed  for  understanding  the  annex.  Those  references  necessary  to  an 
understanding  of  the  intelligence  concerned  with  the  operation  such  as  special 
studies,  maps,  charts,  overlays,  or  photographs  may  also  be  cited  in  addition  to 
related  annexes  of  the  plan  or  order. 
5-28
Body 
There  are  five  main  paragraphs  in  the  body  of  the  annex.  In  the  first,  the 
mission  and  concept  of  the  intelligence  operations  are  stated.  In  the  second 
paragraph,  information  about  characteristics  of  the  area  of  operations,  the 
effects  of  weather  and  climate,  and  the  estimate  of  enemy  capabilities  which 
would  affect  the  execution  of  the  plan  and  accomplishment  of  the  mission  are 
set  forth.  Paragraph  3  contains  the  essentials  of  intelligence  activities  and 
tasks  which  identify  total  intelligence  resources  and  direct  the  intelligence 
effort  in  support  of  the  OPLAN  before  and  after  execution.  The  fourth 
paragraph  assigns  intelligence  tasks  to  meet  requirements  through  orders, 
requests,  and  coordinating  instructions.  The  fifth  paragraph  covers 
communications/electronics,  and  miscellaneous  instructions  are  in  a  sixth,  if 
needed. 
Ending 
The  third  and  final  part  of  the  annex  contains  the  signature  and 
authentication  blocks  and  lists  appendices.  It  may  also  give  distribution  and 
acknowledgement  instructions.  Formats  for  appendices  generally  follow  the 
model  of  the  annex.  They  contain  subsidiary  additions  to  the  annex  and  give 
details  that  are  essential  yet  too  bulky  or  numerous  to  include. 
(*)  Discussion  of  Content.  A  brief  discussion  of  the  contents  of 
each  paragraph  of  the  body  of  the  intelligence  annex  follows. 
PARAGRAPH  1 
* 
MISSION  AND  CONCEPT  OF  INTELLIGENCE  OPERATIONS 
Mission.  State  concisely  the  command  intelligence  mission  in 
support  of  the  command  mission.  Development  of  the  intelligence  mission 
requires  detailed  analysis  of  the  command  mission  to  determine  implied 
intelligence  tasks  required  for  its  accomplishment.  When  Annex  B  is 
distributed  separately,  state  the  command  mission.  This  is  necessary  since 
some  units  may  receive  the  intelligence  annex,  but  not  the  OPLAN  or  order. 
Concept  of  Intelligence  Operations.  Outline  the  purposes  of 
intelligence  operations  and  summarize  the  means  and  agencies  to  be  employed 
in  directing,  collecting,  processing,  producing,  and  disseminating  the  necessary 
intelligence  during  normal  and  crisis  periods  before  and  during  execution  of 
the  plan.  All  intelligence  tasks  defined  during  mission  analysis  must  be 
covered  with  adequate  redundancy  either  generally  in  the  concept  statement 
or  specifically  in  paragraph  4,  Assignment  of  Intelligence  Tasks. 
5-29
PARAGRAPH  2 
SITUATION 
Characteristics  of  the  Area.  This  paragraph  gives  pertinent 
intelligence  on  the  physical,  economic,  political,  medical,  social,  and 
psychological  aspects  and  conditions  of  the  area  of  operations  as  they  may 
influence  the  creation  of  the  plan.  Information  included  in  the  general 
situation  discussed  in  the  basic  plan  is  not  repeated.  Include  sufficient 
analysis  of  the  area  of  operations  to  permit  development  of  appropriate 
supporting  plans.  This  paragraph  may  include  complete  information  or 
preferably  reference  documents  which  contain  required  intelligence.  Such 
references  as  overlays,  maps,  charts,  and  specif  i  studies  pertinent  to  the  plan 
and  necessary  for  comprehension  are  cited.  It  may  also  reference  the  latest 
periodic  intelligence  report  or  periodic  intelligence  summary  of  the  situation. 
An  example  of  such  a  reference  is  "See  current  Periodic  Intelligence  Report 
No.  6,  1  August  19—,  this  headquarters." 
Weather  and  Terrain.  Summarize  prevailing  weather  patterns  and 
those  factors  of  terrain  which  may  influence  the  conduct  of  operations. 
Climatological  studies,  tide  tables,  and  other  special  studies  may  be 
referenced  or  extracts  prepared  from  them  for  the  time  frame  envisioned. 
These  may  be  included  or  attached  as  appendices.  Refer  to  Annex  H 
(Environmental  Services). 
Estimate  of  Enemy  Capabilities.  Using  detailed  characteristics 
previously  developed,  give  the  enemy  order  of  battle,  an  evaluation  of 
applicable  strategic  and  tactical  doctrine,  and  estimates  of  the  enemy 
capabilities  and  possible  courses  of  action  which  would  affect  the  execution  of 
the  plan  and  accomplishment  of  the  mission.  The  enemy's  capability  to  discern 
friendly  OPSEC  vulnerabilities  should  be  considered.  This  paragraph  may 
include  complete  information,  may  contain  a  summary  of  the  enemy  situation 
and  refer  to  a  complete  enemy  situation  appendix  to  this  annex,  or  may  refer 
to  documents  which  contain  the  required  intelligence.  This  is  the  most 
important  information  of  the  annex  and  generally  resembles  the  data  in 
paragraph  2  (Enemy  Situation)  and  paragraph  5  (Conclusion)  of  the  intelligence 
estimate  on  which  the  commander's  estimate  and  the  OPLAN  are  based, 
except  that  it  must  be  revised  and  brought  up-to-date  to  reflect  whatever  new 
intelligence  may  have  been  developed  after  to  the  original  estimate.  Here  the 
value  of  expressing  enemy  capabilities  in  specific  terms  of  what,  when,  where, 
in  what  strength,  and,  if  possible,  from  what  direction,  becomes  clear,  for  the 
annex  is  designed  primarily  to  guide  and  assist  subordinate  commanders.  From 
their  point  of  view  the  most  important  information  about  the  enemy  is  what  he 
is  capable  of  against  their  own  particular  force  plus  when,  where,  and  to  what 
extent  he  can  initiate  action.  As  in  the  intelligence  estimate,  enemy 
capabilities  should  not  be  merely  listed,  but  should  also  be  discussed  in  terms 
of  then  effect  on  the  accomplishment  of  friendly  forces'  mission  and  their 
relative  probability  of  adoption,  although  both  discussions  may  be  more 
condensed  than  they  were  in  the  intelligence  estimate. 
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PARAGRAPH  3 
INTELLIGENCE  ACTIVITIES 
This  paragraph  will  contain  the  essentials  of  intelligence  (activities  and 
tasks)  which  identify  intelligence  resources  and  intelligence  direction,  collec- 
tion, processing,  production,  and  dissemination  effort  required  to  support  the 
operation  plan.  A  major  part  of  the  intelligence  support  to  the  commander  of 
a  military  operation  is  rendered  before  the  operation  begins.  To  ensure  that 
the  commander  is  fully  prepared,  planning  identifies  the  required  intelligence 
effort,  proceeding  from  the  EEI  through  intelligence  operations  and 
capabilities/resources  planning  to  tasking  of  intelligence  elements.  The 
intelligence  operations  are  then  conducted  to  develop  the  information  required 
for  military  planning.  The  supporting  intelligence  plans  will  be  specifically 
identified.  Areas  to  be  covered  in  this  paragraph  include 
Direction.  Give  guidance  for  the  determination  of  intelligence 
requirements,  preparation  of  a  collection  plan,  issuance  ol  orders  and  requests 
to  information  collection  agencies,  and  checking  the  productivity  of  collection 
agencies. 
Essential  Elements  of  Information  (EEI).  List  in  order  of 
priority  those  critical  items  of  intelligence  (EEI)  and  other  intelligence 
requirements  (OIR)  which  are  not  already  available  but  are  needed'  to 
accomplish  the  mission.  Indicated  are  agencies  or  elements  having  primary 
and  secondary  collection  responsibilities.  The  EEI  and  OIR  are  included  in  the 
annex  primarily  to  focus  the  attention  of  commanders  of  lower  units  and 
others  to  whom  it  is  disseminated  on  items  of  intelligence  information  of 
special  interest  to  their  commander  for  this  specific  operation.  Units  and 
agencies  receiving  the  annex  extract  those  EEI  that  they  may  be  able  to 
answer  and  which  pertain  to  their  mission.  Using  the  collection  plan  (see 
Chapter  *),  the  intelligence  officer  compares  all  requirements  against 
available  information  and  establishes  priorities  as  a  means  of  directing  the 
efforts  of  collection  agencies  toward  those  most  critical  to  mission 
accomplishment.  Primary  and  secondary  responsibilities  are  assigned  to 
ensure  adequate  (intentional  redundancy)  coverage.  EEI  and  OIR  are  formed 
as  questions  and  may  be  broad  in  scope.  For  example,  "What  is  the  strength, 
organization,  and  disposition  of  enemy  air  defense  forces  in  the  vicinity  of 
Target  Zebra?"  and  "What  is  the  enemy's  minelaying  capability  in  the 
GASTONIAN  SEA?"  or  they  maybe  narrow.  For  example,  "Will  the  enemy 
move  his  armored  units  up  to  reinforce  Delta  Beach?"  Normally  EEIs  and  OIRs 
are  continuously  refined  during  the  joint  planning  process  and  become  less 
general  and  increasingly  specific,  as  "Does  the  enemy  have  guns  defensively 
positioned  in  the  caves  overlooking  Blue  Beach?"  If  publication  of  the  annex  is 
deferred,  the  EEI  and  other  intelligence  requirements  are  listed  in  the 
coordinating  instruction  of  the  basic  plan.  When  EEI  and  other  intelligence 
requirements  are  lengthy  and  detailed,  they  are  placed  in  Appendix  1  of  the 
annex. 
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New  requirements.  Give  specific  guidance  to  ensure  that 
new  intelligence  requirements  are  considered  both  before  and  during  execution 
of  the  OPLAN. 
Collection.  Give  guidance  for  the  systematic  collection  of 
information  in  support  of  identified  requirements.  The  intelligence  collection 
requirement  procedures  contained  in  DIAM  58-2  will  be  used  where  applicable. 
Give  guidance  for  establishing  collection  activities  not  otherwise  covered  by 
regulation  or  standing  operating  procedures,  including  reconnaissance,  ground 
sensors,  ELINT,  COMINT,  and  HUMINT.  Any  collection  plan  written  to  satisfy 
the  requirements  of  the  OPLAN  should  be  referenced  here. 
Signals  Intelligence.  Give  information  and  instructions  on 
the  assignment  and  coordination  of  COMINT  and  ELINT  resources. 
Imagery  Intelligence.  Give  guidance  for  establishing  and 
conducting  photo,  radar,  and  infrared  intelligence  activities. 
Human  Intelligence  Resources.  Give  information  pertaining 
to  the  assignment  and  coordination  of  operations  using  human  resources. 
Measurement  and  Signature  Intelligence.  Give  guidance  on 
obtaining  intelligence  by  quantitative  and  qualitative  analysis  of  data  derived 
from  specific  technical  collection  sensors  (other  than  those  normally 
associated  with  SIGINT,  IMINT,  and  HUMINT). 
Other  collection  activities.  Give  guidance  for  collection  by 
other  specialized  means  that  may  be  required  to  support  plan  requirements, 
e.g.,  visual,  amphibious,  reconnaissance  means. 
Reporting.  Give  guidance  oh  reporting  of  collected  intelligence 
information  by  all  collection  sources  to  be  employed  in  support  of  the  plan. 
Reference  appropriate  regulations,  directives,  and  SOPs  that  specify  reporting 
procedures.  Include  communications  requirements.  Do  not  confuse  with 
intelligence  disseminating  reporting  described  hereafter. 
Processing.  List  appropriate  guidance  for  converting  intelligence 
information  into  usable  form.  Include  required  provisions  for  language  and 
document  translation;  imagery,  signals,  and  technical  sensor  processing  and 
interpretation;  and  other  pertinent  processing  activity. 
Production.  Identify  the  production  effort,  including  any  intelli- 
gence products,  required  to  support  the  operation  plan.  Include  pertinent 
provisions  indicated  below. 
Targeting 
Procedures:  Give  guidance  for  analyzing  and  devel- 
oping conventional  weaponeering,  as  required.  Aiso  list  information  on 
distribution   of   target  intelligence,  target   materials,   target   list(s),  control 
5-32
and  maintenance  of  target  lists,  and  issuance  of  target  materials.  This 
subparagraph  may  contain  all  the  intelligence  targeting  data  required,  or  it 
may  refer  to  materials  available  in  other  documents.  When  the  target 
selection  criteria  in  Annex  C  of  the  OPLAN  include  categories  of  fixed 
targets,  a  list  of  selected  fixed  targets  which  is  responsive  to  those  criteria  is 
required  and  will  be  in  Appendix  U  to  Annex  B.  However,  consolidation  of 
target  lists  for  different  operation  plans  is  permissible;  and,  with  appropriate 
references,  these  lists  may  be  contained  in  a  separate  document. 
Concept:  Summarize  the  guidelines  followed  in 
developing  or  preparing  to  develop  targets  (fixed/mobile)  which  are  responsive 
to  target  selection  criteria  contained  in  Annex  C  of  the  OPLAN.  Included  will 
be  geographic  areas,  categories,  and  constraints. 
Other.  Establish  procedures  by  which  assigned  elements  can 
produce,  or  nonorganic  agencies  can  furnish,  other  forms  of  intelligence 
required  to  support  the  operation.  If  production  capabilities  of  other  agencies 
are  to  be  exploited,  tasking  statements  and  formal  agreement  for  assumption 
of  such  responsibilities  should  be  completed.  Details  of  production  require- 
ments, schedules,  distribution,  etc.,  may  be  included  in  appendices.  Give 
consideration  to  indications  and  warning  intelligence,  current  or  operational 
intelligence,  estimative  intelligence,  basic  intelligence,  and  scientific  and 
technical  intelligence. 
Dissemination.  Furnish  necessary  guidance  for  the  conveyance  of 
intelligence  in  a  suitable  form  (oral,  graphic,  or  written)  to  appropriate 
agencies.  This  subparagraph  should  stipulate  the  requirements  for  submission 
of  intelligence  reports.  Procedures  will  be  established  in  this  annex  to  satisfy 
expanded  requirements  for  vertical  and  lateral  dissemination  of  finished 
intelligence  and  spot  reports  during  military  operations  under  all  conditions  of 
warfare.  Alternate  means  will  be  planned  to  ensure  that  required  intelligence 
will  be  giver:  to  combat  units  as  well  as  headquarters  during  crisis  and  combat 
operations.  Any  of  the  following  may  be  covered  by  this  subparagraph: 
Intelligence  Reports  required  from  units  (periods  covered, 
distribution,  and  time  of  distribution) 
Formats  for  intelligence  reports  (appendices  if  required) 
Distribution  of  intelligence  studies 
Counterintelligence.  Refer  to  Appendix  3  of  the  Intelligence 
Annex. 
5-33
PARAGRAPH  4 
ASSIGNMENT  OF  INTELLIGENCE  TASKS 
Orders  to  Subordinate  and  Attached  Units.  Use  separate  numbered 
subparagraphs  to  list  detailed  instructions  for  each  unit  performing  intelli- 
gence functions,  including  the  originating  headquarters,  component  commands, 
and  separate  intelligence  support  units. 
Requests  to  Higher  Adjacent  and  Cooperating  Units.  Use  separate 
numbered  subparagraphs  pertaining  to  each  unit  not  organic  or  attached  from 
which  intelligence  support  is  requested; 
Coordinating  Instructions.  List  any  instructions  necessary  for 
coordinating  the  efforts  of  collection  agencies.  Include  periodic  or  special 
conferences  for  intelligence  officers  and  intelligence  liaison,  when  indicated, 
with  adjacent  commands,  foreign  government  agencies,  and  host  countries. 
PARAGRAPH  5 
COMMUNICATIONS  AND  ELECTRONICS.  Summarize  those  communica- 
tions and  electronics  systems  and  procedures  to  be  used  to  carry  out  the 
intelligence  function  or  reference  the  appropriate  paragraphs  of  Annex  K. 
PARAGRAPH  6 
MISCELLANEOUS  INSTRUCTIONS.  Include  here  items  not  included 
above.  Examples  of  data  in  this  paragraph  are  SERE,  deception,  WISP, 
disclosure  of  intelligence,  public  relations,  use  of  specialized  intelligence 
personnel,  and  composition  of  the  J-2  staff. 
Command  Line 
The  annex  may  have  a  command  line  followed  by  the  name  of  the  chief  of 
staff. 
Appendices  and  Tabs 
Appendices  to  the  intelligence  annex  and  tabs  to  these  appendices  are 
listed  in  the  ending  of  the  form.  Material  which  does  not  concern  all  units 
receiving  the  annex  or  which  is  too  detailed  to  be  included  in  the  body  of  the 
annex  is  attached  as  appendices.  It  may  be  enemy  situation  maps,  intelligence 
summaries,  climatologic  studies,  tide  tables,  special  studies  of  the  area  of 
operations,  or  other  research  studies  or  detailed  plans.  An  appendix  may 
contain  any  intelligence  produced  for  the  operation  plan  or  the  operation 
order.  Under  no  circumstances  should  any  new  or  vital  facts  be  placed  in  an 
appendix  without  mention  in  the  body  of  the  annex. 
Distribution 
Following  the  list  of  appendices,  the  distribution  of  the  annex  is  shown. 
5-34
Authentication 
The  annex  may  be  authenticated  by  the  signature  of  the  intelligence 
officer  under  the  word  "Official,"  or  it  may  be  signed  by  the  commander 
himself.  The  procedure  for  authentication  is  determined  by  the  SOP  of  the 
headquarters  issuing  the  operation  plan  or  the  operation  order. 
5.6  THE  SHORT-RANGE  INTELLIGENCE  ESTIMATE  AND  FUTURE  PLANNING 
a.  General 
(1)  The  use  of  the  intelligence  estimate  in  the  joint  planning 
process  has  been  discussed.  As  was  indicated,  enemy  capabilities  listed  in  the 
intelligence  estimate  were  inserted  in  the  commander's  estimate  of  the 
situation.  Then  in  the  commander's  estimate  each  enemy  capability  is 
analyzed  against  each  practicable  friendly  course  of  action  to  determine  the 
probable  effect.  The  analysis  is  then  used  to  compare  the  advantages  and 
disadvantages  of  each  course  of  action.  Based  on  the  analysis  and  comparison, 
a  decision  is  made  as  to  which  course  of  action  has  the  best  chance  of  success 
and  will  be  adopted. 
(2)  The  accuracy  of  the  enemy  capabilities  listed  depends  on 
the  accuracy,  completeness,  and  timeliness  of  the  information  contained  in 
paragraph  2  (Situation)  of  the  intelligence  estimate.  If  the  Situation  paragraph 
is  accurate,  complete,  and  current,  the  Enemy  Capabilities  paragraph  should 
be  accurate,  complete,  and  current.  If  the  Situation  paragraph  is  inadequate 
in  any  of  those  respects,  the  Enemy  Capabilities  paragraph  will  probably  be 
inadequate  in  those  same  respects.  For  example,  enemy  capabilities  derived 
from  a  Situation  paragraph  that  contains  "old"  information  on  an  enemy 
situation  will  be  "oid"  enemy  capabilities.  Consequently,  in  the  commander's 
estimate,  the  analysis  of  "old"  enemy  capabilities  against  "future"  practicable 
friendly  courses  of  action  will  be  misleading,  and  possibly  will  cause  an 
improper  and  faulty  commander's  decision.  The  currency  of  both  the  enemy 
situation  and  the  enemy  capabilities  is  therefore  of  utmost  importance  in  the 
joint  planning  process. 
b.  Implications  When  Planning  For  Future  Operations 
(1)  From  the  foregoing  it  can  be  seen  that  current  intelligence 
on  the  enemy  situation  and  the  enemy  capabilities  is  required  for  the 
intelligence  estimate  and  its  associated  commander's  estimate.  But  what  are 
the  implications  when  planning  for  an  operation  to  take  place  many  months  in 
the  future?  Under  such  conditions  the  word  "current"  as  used  in  preceding 
paragraphs  is  misleading  and  should  be  replaced  by  a  term  indicating  that  the 
Situation  paragraph  must  depict  conditions  as  of  the  date  of  the  future 
operation.  A  good  word  is  "future."  (In  a  sense  any  intelligence  estimate 
covers  a  future  situation,  but  when  any  other  than  the  "immediate  future"  is 
concerned,  an  added  difficulty  is  introduced  into  the  planning  process.) 
(2)  For  example,  consider  circumstances  in  which  a  campaign 
plan  prepared  by  a  high-level  headquarters   lists  phased  operations  to  be 
5-35
conducted  during  the  next  two  years.  Subordinate  commands  under  that 
headquarters  must  prepare  their  plans,  and  among  those  plans  will  be  one  for 
Phase  II  of  the  campaign  plan,  scheduled  for  18  months  after  issue  of  the 
campaign  plan.  To  prepare  their  plans,  the  subordinate  commands  each  use 
the  planning  process  sequence— enemy  capabilities,  commander's  estimate 
(decision),  and  plan.  In  this  process,  assume  that  an  intelligence  estimate  has 
been  made  by  the  subordinate  command  using  the  current  situation  and  that 
the  enemy  capabilities  from  that  estimate  are  used  in  the  commander's 
estimate  in  the  conventional  manner.  What  happens?  The  enemy  capabilities, 
being  based  on  the  current  enemy  situation,  are  current  capabilities.  They  are 
not  necessarily  enemy  capabilities  for  Phase  III,  which  is  some  18  months  in 
the  future.  If  the  enemy  situation  changes  appreciably,  enemy  capabilities 
will  change  accordingly.  This  is  an  unsatisfactory  situation  for  the  com- 
mander. It  forces  him  to  decide  on  a  friendly  course  of  action  and  to  plan  that 
course  on  a  consideration  of  the  current  ratiter  than  the  future  enemy 
situation.  In  this  instance,  it  would  be  more  desirable  to  develop  a  "future" 
enemy  situation. 
(3)  Assumptions.  How  can  the  enemy  situation  18  months  in  the 
future  be  developed?  It  can  be  developed  only  by  the  use  of  assumptions. 
These  assumptions,  although  bridging  gaps  in  knowledge,  must  be  as  reasonable 
and  realistic  as  possible.  They  should  be  held  to  a  minimum  and  include  only 
the  assumptions  that  are  absolutely  essential  to  the  estimate,  for  an  estimate 
loses  its  usefulness  if  based  on  a  long  list  of  assumptions  covering  every 
conceivable  contingency.  The  assumptions  should  be  drawn  up  only  after  full 
consideration  of  all  factors  that  could  have  some  bearing  on  their  validity. 
The  assumptions  should  have  the  concurrence  of  the  3-2  and  3-3;  they  must 
have  the  approval  of  the  commander.  (''Assumption"  is  used  here  in  the 
broadest  sense,  and  the  single  word  encompasses  a  complex  process.  For 
example,  in  formulating  such  assumptions,  national  and  joint  intelligence 
estimates  are  a  basis  for  developing  an  estimate  projected  two  years  into  the 
future.) 
c.  Types  of  Essential  Assumptions.  The  types  of  assumptions  that  are 
essential  concern  the  assumed  results  of  friendly  operations  in  previous  phases 
and  the  effect  these  operations  will  have  had  on  the  enemy  situation. 
Examples  of  such  assumptions  might  include  that 
(1)  Air  and  naval  superiority  in  the  area  of  responsibility  has 
been  established  and  will  be  maintained. 
(2)  Pressure  on  other  fronts  will  prevent  substantial  enemy 
withdrawals  or  reinforcement  to  or  from  other  areas. 
(3)  The  enemy  nuclear  weapon  stockpile  and  production  level  is 
such  that  nuclear  warfare  potential  is  50  percent  of  that  held  at  the  beginning 
of  hostilities. 
(*)  Neither  side  will  resort  to  chemical,  biological,  or  radio- 
logical warfare. 
(5)  Though  the  enemy's  war-making  potential  has  been  seriously 
reduced  and  lines  of  communication  disrupted  in  many  areas,  he  is  still  capable 
5-36
of  maintaining  65  percent  of  original  strength,  equipment,  and  material  for 
ground,  naval,  and  air  forces  opposing  our  forces. 
(6)  Friendly  operations  will  have  reduced  enemy  ground  combat 
strength  by  20  percent  and  air  force  strength  by  25  percent. 
(7)  Enemy  naval  forces  must  operate  from  bases  over  a  thou- 
sand miles  from  the  area  of  Phase  III  operations. 
(8)  Enemy  exercise  of  governmental  functions  in  the  Phase  III 
area  of  operations  will  be  characterized  by  an  increasing  dependence  of  the 
central  government  on  the  independent,  emergency  functioning  and  decisions 
of  local  area  political  chieftains,  and  a  resulting  drastic  decrease  in  the 
currently  strong  centralized  governmental  control  of  those  areas. 
d.  Application  of  Assumptions.  After  the  assumptions  have  been 
developed  and  approved,  they  should  be  applied  against  the  current  intelli- 
gence estimate.  This  is  the  most  important  step  in  formulating  a  short-range 
estimate.  The  purpose  of  applying  these  assumptions  to  the  current  estimate 
is  to  determine  what  important  changes  will  develop.  In  effect,  the  short- 
range  estimate  deals  with,  and  places  emphasis  on,  these  changes.  It  will 
therefore  not  be  as  complete  or  detailed  as  an  estimate  of  the  current 
situation,  which  may  be  regarded  as  a  companion  document  to  be  referred  to 
for  details  not  repeated  in  the  short-range  estimate. 
e.  Form  and  Content.  The  content  and  form  for  the  short-range 
estimate  will  follow  that  of  the  intelligence  estimate  with  two  principal 
exceptions: 
(1)  The  assumptions  should  be  stated  after  the  mission  (relative 
to  the  future  operation). 
(2)  The  discussion  of  those  factors  included  under  Characteris- 
tics of  the  Area  of  Operations,  Enemy  Military  Situation,  and  Enemy  Uncon- 
ventional and  Psychological  Warfare  Situation  will  treat  only  the  important 
changes  that  can  be  expected  to  develop. 
f.  Other  Methods  of  Using  Intelligence  Assumptions.  The  foregoing  is 
one  way  of  estimating  which  will  take  into  account  changes  in  the  enemy 
situation  between  the  initiation  of  planning  and  the  initiation  of  the  operation. 
These  assumptions,  developed  by  the  coordinated  effort  of  the  J-2  and  J-3, 
must  be  approved  by  the  commander.  There  are  other  methods  of  using  the 
approved  assumptions  in  the  planning  process.  They  can  be  disseminated  to  all 
staff  divisions,  which  then  apply  them  to  the  staff  estimate  for  which  each 
division  is  responsible,  or  they  can  be  included  in  the  commander's  estimate 
only  along  with  the  other  assumptions  made  by  the  commander.  The  use  of  the 
short-range  intelligence  estimate  method  is  Dreferable. 
5-37
CHAPTER  6 
DISSEMINATION  OF  INTELLIGENCE  BY  30INT  FORCES 
6.1  GENERAL 
a.  Definition.  The  dissemination  step  of  the  intelligence  process  is 
defined  as  the  "timely  distribution  of  information  and/or  intelligence  in  the 
most  suitable  form  to  those  who  nejd  it."  (POD  Dictionary  of  Military  and 
Associated  Terms) 
b.  Importance  of  Timeliness.  Rapid  transmission  of  information  to 
both  higher  and  lower  echelons  is  of  utmost  importance.  Procedures  must  be 
established  to  ensure  that  information  received  by  all  echelons  is  current  so 
that  it  may  serve  a  useful  purpose.  Intelligence  must  be  timely,  particularly 
to  subordinate  units,  because  of  the  rapid  change  of  the  intelligence  picture. 
This  means  that  intelligence  information  should  be  placed  in  the  hands  of  the 
consumer  in  time  to  permit  evaluation  and  interpretation,  formulation  of 
plans,  and  initiation  of  action  under  the  existing  situation.  The  problem  is 
dissemination  to  lower  and  adjacent  units,  to  higher  headquarters,  and  within 
the  reporting  headquarters.  Dissemination  to  lower  and  adjacent  units  is 
usually  the  more  difficult  and  more  critical  task. 
6.2  MAJOR  REQUIREMENTS 
a.  Efficient  dissemination  has  three  major  requirements:  to  get  the 
information  to  the  agencies  and  individuals  who  need  it,  to  get  it  to  them 
promptly,  and  to  get  it  to  them  in  usable  form. 
b.  Determination  of  Recipients.  Since  dissemination  is  properly  a 
responsibility  of  command,  the  distribution  list  will  normally  follow  the  chain 
of  command.  This  applies  to  those  for  higher  echelons  as  well  as  those  drawn 
up  for  and  approved  by  the  commander  of  the  joint  force.  In  the  exercise  of 
this  dissemination  responsibility,  the  commander  will  normally  delegate  the 
responsibility  to  his  intelligence  staff.  These  distribution  lists  are  important 
in  getting  the  information  to  the  place  where  it  is  needed  and  in  preventing  its 
indiscriminate  circulation  to  an  extent  which  might  endanger  security.  They 
must  be  prepared  with  care  and  adhered  to  scrupulously  except  in  certain 
emergencies,  but  they  should  never  be  allowed  to  become  an  encumbrance.  In 
time  of  war,  rigid  restrictions,  limited  dissemination  lists,  and  overclassifi- 
cation  of  intelligence  will  impede  the  accomplishment  of  the  intelligence 
mission.  It  is  a  responsibility  of  the  intelligence  staff  to  understand  and  supply 
the  intelligence  needs  of  all  forces  and  agencies  subordinate  to  or  cooperating 
with  the  force  commander.  Information  does  not  become  intelligence  until  it 
is  evaluated;  it  does  not  become  useful  intelligence  until  it  has  reached  the 
user  who  needs  it. 
c.  Timely  Delivery 
(1)  Promptness,  or  timeliness,  of  information  cannot  be  over- 
emphasized. This  is  a  problem  of  means,  and  the  determining  factor  in  the 
selection  of  the  means  of  transmitting  intelligence  should  be  the  immediate 
6-1
urgency  of  the  item  to  be  sent.  If  the  item  is  not  urgent,  such  as  background 
material  or  certain  strategic  information  desirable  for  future  planning,  the 
means  of  transmission  selected  should  be  the  most  expeditious  and  economical 
medium  available  which  completely  satisfies  the  requirements  of  security. 
(2)  Intelligence  information  for  dissemination  is  first  classified 
as  either  intelligence  which  must  be  passed  on  without  delay  or  intelligence 
which  can  wait  for  periodic  publication.  If  the  item  is  extremely  urgent,  the 
most  secure  means  of  transmission  consonant  with  the  desired  speed  should  be 
selected.  There  will  be  emergencies  when  a  plain  language  dispatch  is 
preferred,  for  the  sake  of  speed,  to  an  encrypted  one.  There  will  also  be 
emergencies,  perhaps  frequently  in  combat  situations,  when  intelligence  must 
be  transmitted  by  voice  radio.  The  intelligence  staff  must  always  endeavor  to 
ensure  that  security  is  observed,  but  the  staff  must  also  advise  communica- 
tions operators  when  the  urgency  of  the  information  precludes  certain  normal 
precautions.  Considerations  of  timeliness  require  not  only  that  needed 
intelligence  be  transmitted  promptly,  but  that  all  information  be  as  up-to-dat*; 
as  possible.  Obsolete  information  may  be  as  dangerous  to  the  command  ;:s 
none  at  all. 
d*.  Means   of   Delivery.      The   nature,    importance,    and   priority    of 
intelligence  should  be  carefully  considered  when  selecting  a  method  for 
dissemination  so  as  to  ensure  timely  delivery  arid  a  minimum  of  interference 
with  other  communications  traffic.  The  means  of  transmission  include  wire, 
radio,  courier  messenger,  liaison  officer,  facsimile,  televison,  and  mail. 
e.  Selection  of  Proper  Form.  The  third  major  requirement  of 
dissemination  is  that  intelligence  reach  the  commands  requiring  it  in  the  most 
usable  form.  Uniformity  in  the  arrangement  of  routine  intelligence  reports 
and  publications  is  a  great  aid  to  the  usability  of  the  material  and  assists  in 
locating  specific  types  of  intelligence.  There  are  three  general  forms  for 
disseminating  intelligence:  written,  graphic,  and  oral. 
(1)  Written.  One  of  the  jobs  of  an  intelligence  staff  officer  is 
to  be  able  to  write  in  clear,  straightforward,  readable  language.  The  mere 
common  methods  of  written  dissemination  are 
(a)  Intelligence  summaries  (INTSUM). 
(b)  Intelligence  annexes  (plans). 
(c)  Intelligence  estimates. 
(d)  Technical  intelligence  bulletins  and  summaries. 
(e)  Dispatches. 
(f)  Letters. 
(g)  Studies  (weather,  terrain,  area,  etc.). 
(h)  Order  of  battle  books  and  pamphlets, 
(i)  Intelligence  coverage  in  operation  plans  and  orders, 
(j)  Spot  reports  (SPIREP— See  3CS  Pub  6  and  paragraph 
6.3.) 
paragraph  6.3.) 
(k)      Defense  Intelligence  Notice  (DIN— See  3CS  Pub  6  and 
(I)       Periodic  Intelligence  reports  (PERINTREP). 
(m)     Prisoner  of  war  interrogation  reports. 
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(n)      Imagery  interpretation  reports, 
(o)      Special  reports. 
In  addition  to  using  a  clear  and  readable  writing  style,  written  material  must 
also  be  prepared  with  due  regard  to  legibility  and  arrangement  on.  the  printed 
page. 
(2)  Graphic.  Graphic  presentation  should  be  clear,  in  propor- 
tion, unified  in  purpose,  consistent  in  the  use  of  symbols,  and  legible  in  details. 
Nothing  contributes  more  to  the  clarity  of  any  graphic  presentation  than  unity 
of  purpose.  Intelligence  charts  should  be  prepared  for  a  specific  purpose,  each 
item  of  information  useful  for  this  purpose  should  appear,  and  all  other  items 
should  be  omitted.  Accepted  military  symbols  should  be  used  on  charts  and 
overlays  with  a  legible  key  in  the  margin.  Graphic  presentation,  like  any  other 
form  of  dissemination,  should  be  convincing  and  attractive  as  well  as  clear. 
Some  of  the  principal  methods  of  graphic  dissemination  of  intelligence  are 
(a)  Situation  maps,  overlays,  photos. 
(b)  Air  target  materials. 
(c)  Motion  pictures. 
(d)  Posters. 
(e)  Weather  reports,  forecasts,  maps. 
(f)  Slides. 
(3)  Oral.   Intelligence  is  disseminated  orally  by 
(a)  Lecture. 
(b)  Briefing. 
(c)  Conference. 
(d)  Telephone  conversation. 
(e)  Radio  conversation. 
(f)  Closed  circuit  TV. 
6.3  DEFENSE  INTELLIGENCE  REPORTS 
The  Joint  Reporting  System  in  Volume  II,  Part  10,  JCS  Pub  6,  contains  four 
intelligence  reports.  A  brief  description  of  each  report  is  presented  below. 
a.  Defense  Intelligence  Notice  (DIN).  The  purpose  of  the  DIN  is  to 
give  the  Joints  Chiefs  of  Staff,  the  unified  and  specified  commands,  the 
Services,  and  selected  agencies  timely  intelligence  on  events  that  could  have  a 
significant  effect  on  future  planning  and  operations.  This  narrative  report  is 
submitted  by  DIA  and  normally  covers  a  single  development,  situation,  event, 
or  activity.  The  primary  objective  is  to  report  an  event,  to  explain  why  the 
event  occurred,  and  to  make  an  assessment  of  what  impact  the  event  could 
have  on  the  United  States. 
b.  Spot  Intelligence  Report  (SPIREP).  The  purpose  of  the  SPIREP  is 
to  give  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff,  the  National  Military  Intelligence  Center, 
the  unified  and  specified  commands,  the  Services,  and  selected  agencies 
timely  intelligence  on  events  that  could  have  an  immediate  and  significant 
6-3
effect  on  current  planning  and  operations.  Unified  and  specified  commands, 
Services,  and  military  units  of  divisional  level  submit  this  narrative  report 
whenever  a  critical  development  appears  imminent  or  is  of  unusually  high 
interest  to  U.S.  decisionmakers.  The  SPIREP  is  due  out  as  soon  as  possible, 
but  not  later  than  one  hour  after  the  information  is  received.  Further,  the 
report  will  not  be  delayed  pending  verification  or  the  collection  of  more 
detail.   Amplification  or  clarification  should  be  sent  in  a  followup  SPIREP. 
c.  Daily  Intelligence  Summary  (DISUM).  The  purpose  of  the  Daily 
Intelligence  Summary  (DISUM)  is  to  give  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff,  the 
National  Military  Intelligence  Center  (NMIC),  and  unified  and  specified 
commands,  the  Services,  and  selected  agencies  a  daily  analysis  of  an  actual  or 
simulated  (training  exercise)  crisis  situation  and  a  summary  of  related 
intelligence  of  significance  produced  during  the  preceding  24-hour  period. 
d.  DIA  Periodic  Intelligence  Summary  (DIA  INTSUM).  The  purpose  of 
the  DIA  Periodic  Intelligence  Summary  (DIA  INTSUM)  is  to  give  the  Joint 
Chiefs  of  Staff,  the  unified  and  specified  commands,  the  Services,  military 
commanders  worldwide,  and  selected  nonmilitary  agencies  timely  periodic 
intelligence  summaries  on  either  actual  or  simulated  (training  exercise) 
foreign  crisis  situations  that  could  have  an  immediate  actual  (or  simulated) 
effect  on  U.S.  plans  and  operations. 
6-4
CHAPTER  7 
THE  USE  OF  COMPUTERS  IN  INTELLIGENCE 
7.1  INTRODUCTION 
a.  Data  Storage  and  Retrieval.  The  use  of  computers  in  intelligence 
has  been  motivated  by  two  fundamental  factors:  convenience  and  necessity. 
Foremost  is  the  advantage  of  the  computer  to  perform  routine  clerical  tasks 
rapidly.  The  computer  has  the  capability  to  reduce  significantly  the  time 
required  to  perform  numerous  intelligence  functions.  The  computer's  ability 
to  perform  complex  functions  rapidly  and  accurately  has  found  many  intelli- 
gence applications,  such  as  in  target  analysis,  wargaming,  weapons  allocations, 
damage  assessment,  and  transportation  capacity  projections.  The  discovery 
via  automated  file  searching  of  a  new  target  of  tactical  opportunity,  for 
example,  may  affect  an  entire  war  plan  with  impact  on  all  the  existing  data 
bases  mentioned.  To  update  and  calculate  the  changes  in  these  data  files 
manually  would  be  impractical  and  prohibitively  time  consuming.  The 
computer  performs  these  updating  changes  in  seconds  or  minutes. 
b.  Necessity  of  Computer  Support.  Necessity  is  the  second  motivat- 
ing force  in  computer  applications  to  intelligence.  As  Communist  securk> 
measures  have  tightened  during  the  past  20  years,  the  United  States  Intelli- 
gence Community  has  been  forced  to  rely  more  and  more  on  mass  collection 
equipment:  electronic  (e.g.,  radar),  photographic,  acoustic,  multisensor,  -and 
many  other  technologically  advanced  raw  information  gathering  systems.  The 
tremendous  volume  and  complex  nature  of  the  raw  data  thus  obtained  has 
made  it  imperative  to  employ  more  and  more  automatic  data  processing  equip- 
ment. In  fact,  without  the  use  of  computers  to  manipulate  these  data  inputs 
into  humanly  meaningful  outputs,  the  processing  of  these  collection  data  would 
be  impossible;  manual  processing  techniques  would  be  so  slow  that  the  final 
analysis  would  be  produced  months  or  years  after  the  raw  information  carried 
any  meaningful  current  value.  The  computer  gives  currency  to  these  types  of 
data,  making  them  useful  for  instant  command  decisions. 
c.  Intelligence  Application.  The  increase  in  the  volume  of  data 
collected  and  the  new  computer  data  processing  technology  have  brought  into 
the  forefront  the  need  to  apply  new  methods  in  intelligence  analysis  processes. 
In  1962  the  Department  of  Defense  authorized  a  new  name  for  this  man- 
machine  intelligence  processing  cycle,  the  Intelligence  Data  Handling  System 
(IDHS),  defined  by  JCS  Pub  1  as  follows: 
An  information  system  which  processes  and  manipulates  raw  infor- 
mation and  intelligence  data  as  required.  It  is  characterized  by  the 
application  of  general  purpose  computers,  peripheral  equipment, 
and  automated  storage  and  retrieval  equipment  for  documents  and 
photographs.  While  automation  is  a  distinguishing  characteristic  of 
the  Intelligence  Data  Handling  System  (IDHS),  individual  system 
components  may  be  either  automated  or  manually  operated. 
7-1
d.  Intelligence  Community  Computer  Management 
(1)  The  Department  of  Defense  Intelligence  Information  System 
(DODUS)  management  structure  was  established  in  the  Defense  Intelligence 
Agency  (DIA)  in  1977  to  handle  the  long-range  planning  and  management  of 
the  IDHS  computers  and  associated  telecommunications  (IDHSC)  assets. 
DODIIS  component  elements  consist  of  the  telecommunications  networks  and 
the  ADP  systems  developed  and  managed  by  DIA — the  military  Service 
intelligence  commands,  staffs  and  activities  and  the  unified  and  specified 
commands  and  their  component  commands.  They  range  in  size  from  the  major 
systems  at  the  Strategic  Air  Command  and  Defense  Intelligence  Agency  to  a 
small  remote  terminal  facility  supporting  the  Headquarters,  Fifth  Air  Force, 
Japan. 
(2)  The  basic  goal  of  the  DODIIS  is 
"To  provide  an  integrated  information  handling  capability 
responsive  to  the  intelligence  requirements  of  the  National 
Command  Authorities,  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff,  Military  Services, 
Unified  and  Specified  Commands,  subordinate  joint  and  Service 
components,  field  activities  and  the  United  States  Intelligence 
Community." 
To  achieve  this  goal  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  Defense  (Communications, 
Command,  Control  and  Intelligence)  and  the  Director,  DIA,*  jointly  agreed 
that  the  system  must  be  able 
-To  give  better  and  more  timeiy  support  to  commanders  of  our  combat 
forces.- 
-To  improve  the  quality  and  timeliness  of  the  intelligence  input  to  the 
decisionmaking  process. 
7.2  SPECIFIC  APPLICATIONS 
a.  ELINT.  ELINT  is  the  acronym  for  Electronic  Intelligence.  ADP 
applications  for  ELINT  include  information  storage  and  retrieval,  automatic 
report  printing,  cathode-ray-tube  (CRT)  presentations,  simple  measurements, 
and  comparisons  to  complicated  mathematical  manipulations,  or  any  number 
of  other  analytical  requirements—as  long  as  the  software  is  av?ilable  for  the 
required  data-manipulation  capability.  Its  importance  as  a  source  of  informa- 
tion is  well  attested  to  by  the  presence  of  Soviet  fishing  vessels  in  coastal 
waters  of  North  America,  all  visibly  equipped  with  elaborate  electronic 
sensors.  Computer  systems  reduce  the  collected  electronic  signals  to  intelli- 
gible information  and  determine  the  type  and  location  of  the  transmitters. 
The  importance  of  computers  in  processing  the  analysis  cycle  of  ELINT 
information  has  already  been  mentioned. 
♦Memorandum,    12  September   1977,   for  the  Secretaries  of  the  Military   Departments; 
Chairman,  JCS;  Director,  NSA;  Director,  DCA. 
7-2
b«  Photointclligence.     Photoreconnaissance  has  been  used  ever  lince 
the  Civil  War  as  a  means  of  visually  identifying  enemy  positions  and  targets, 
but  its  modern  counterpart  has  assumed  a  key  position  in  the  collection  and 
exploitation  of  information  for  a  variety  of  purposes,  e.g.,  identification  of 
enemy  targets  (actual  and  potential),  troop  movements,  logistic  supply 
concentrations  and  transfers,  munitions  factories,  and  mapping  and  charting. 
In  many  cases  the  effective  exploitation  of  photointelligence  would  be 
virtually  impossible  without  the  use  of  a  computer  because  of  the  mass 
database  of  photoframes.  The  computer  performs  three  essential  support 
functions:  (1)  collection  management;  (2)  indexing  of  photographs;  and  (3) 
direct  ADP  support  to  photointerpreters. 
c.  Message  and  Hard  Copy  Intelligence  Reports.  The  identification 
and  retrieval  of  hard  copy  reports  are  other  applications  of  automation 
techniques  that  reduce  the  time  for  retrieval.  Computer  systems  being 
developed  today  will  give  the  intelligence  analyst/manager  the  ability  to 
screen  incoming  material  from  all  sources,  correlate  it  with  information  held 
in  personal,  branch,  or  other  computer  data  repositories,  and  produce 
intelligence  documents  in  both  hard  copy  and  message  form. 
d.  Foreign  Scientific  and  Technical  (S&T)  Intelligence.  A  specialized 
field  of  intelligence  involves  the  analysis  of  foreign  trend  patterns  in  science 
and  technology*  The  identification  of  foreign  weapon  systems  and  analysis  of 
their  characteristics,  performance,  and  capabilities  are  the  major  aspects  of 
military  S&T  intelligence.  Modern  technology  permits  the  analyst  to 
communicate  directly  with  the  computer  in  calculating/estimating  weapon 
systems'  capabilities  and  other  technical  problem-solving  applications  as  well 
as  in  information  searches  to  identify  documents  pertinent  to  analysis. 
Extensive  use  is  made  of  computer-indexed  microform  files  for  document 
storage,  retrieval,  and  display.  Machine  translation  of  foreign  languages  plays 
a  significant  role  in  the  analysis  of  S&T  intelligence,  and  current  developments 
emphasize  new  ideas  for  electromagnetic  sensor  data  and  integrated  event 
analysis. 
e.  Targeting.  Because  of  the  central  importance  of  target  intelli- 
gence in  modern  weapon  systems  and  wargaming,  automation  of  intelligence 
began  with  targeting,  starting  with  a  simple  punch  card  operation  in  the  19^0s, 
progressing  by  stages  in  the  1950s  and  1960s  through  successively  larger  and 
more  sophisticated  computers.  This  field  of  study  still  forms  a  major  part  of 
the  total  intelligence  effort,  and  the  Automated  Installation  Intelligence  File 
(AIIF)  forms  a  central  file  from  which  many  other  files  are  derived.  The 
Target  Data  Inventory  (TDI)  is  just  one  of  many  products  of  AIIF.  The 
updating  of  this  file  daily  and  weekly  and  the  transfer  of  updated  items  to 
derivative  files  would  be  Impossible  without  computer  support. 
f.  Ocean  Surveillance.  Ocean  surveillance  information  is  defined  as 
information  derived  from  the  systematic  observation  of  sea  areas  primarily  for 
the  purpose  of  locating,  identifying,  and  determining  the  movements  of 
friendly  and  nonfriendly  targets  proceeding  on,  under,  or  above  the  surface  of 
the  world's  seas  and  oceans.  The  Ocean  Surveillance  Information  System 
(OSIS),  managed  by  the  Naval  Intelligence  Command,  is  an  integrated  naval 
7-3
intelligence  automatic  data  handling  system  which  processes,  stores,  retrieves, 
and  disseminates  worldwide  ocean  surveillance  information  in  support  of 
command  elements  at  all  levels.  This  OSIS  encompasses  ADP  equipment  and 
software,  communications,  displays,  and  machine-processable  databases. 
Adoption  of  modern  third-generation  ADP  hardware  and  software  will  make 
possible  high  volume  data  filtering,  track  correlation,  and  comparison  of 
historical  and  current  information  in  an  operationally  responsive  environment 
for  analysts  and  decisionmakers  regarding  movements  of  naval  interest. 
g-  Tactical  interface.  The  preceding  paragraph  points  to  the  feasibil- 
ity of  a  future  extension  of  the  on-line  system  to  the  IDHS  elements  of  unified 
and  specified  commands  and  through  them  to  tactical  field  units.  With  U.S. 
forces  deployed  over  such  widespread  areas  of  the  world,  timely  exchange  of 
all  types  of  intelligence  data  has  become  an  ever-increasing  need  as  well  as  a 
problem.  The  increasing  complexity  of  the  interface  between  IDHS  and 
tactical  intelligence  ADP  systems  is  due,  in  part,  to  the  widespread  introduc- 
tion of  "tactical  sensors"  into  our  combat  forces.  An  example  of  tactical 
interface  requirements  is  the  JCS-directed  program,  Joint  Interoperability  for 
Tactical  Command  and  Control  Systems  (3INTACCS).  Within  this  program, 
the  military  Services  are  coordinating  information  exchange  requirements  for 
interfacing,  as  well  as  operational  information  exchange  requirements.  The 
tactical  intelligence  systems  involved  in  the  interface  program  are 
(1)  Naval  Intelligence  Processing  System  (NIPS). 
(2)  Marine  Air/Ground  Intelligence  System  (MAGIS). 
(3)  Enemy  Situation  Correlation  Element  (ENSCE)  (Air  Force). 
(*)  All-Source  Analysis  System  (ASAS)  (Army). 
i-  Military    Geographic    Information    and    Documentation    (MGID). 
Military  geographic  information  is  that  information  concerning  physical 
aspects,  resources,  and  artificial  features  which  is  necessary  for  planning  and 
operations.  Documentation  is  that  military  geographic  information  which  has 
been  evaluated,  processed,  summarized,  and  published.  Historically,  MGID  has 
been  portrayed  principally  on  maps,  but  maintenance  of  current  and  accurate 
products  became  unfeasible  and  costly.  The  logical  next  step  was  to  put  such 
information  in  a  computer.  Among  the  files  available  are  those  on  lines  of 
communication,  ports,  landing  beaches,  urban  area  studies,  and  helicopter 
landing/drop  zones. 
7-k
CHAPTER  8 
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  AND  SPECIAL  OPERATIONS 
8.1  COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 
a.  Mission.  The  mission  of  counterintelligence  (CI)  is  to  detect, 
evaluate,  counteract,  or  prevent  hostile  intelligence  collection,  subversion, 
sabotage,  international  terrorism,  or  assassination  conducted  by  or  on  behalf 
of  any  foreign  power,  organization,  or  person  operating  to  the  detriment  of 
U.S.  Military  Forces.  It  includes  the  identification  of  hostile  muitidisciplined 
(HUMINT,  SIGINT,  IMINT)  intelligence  threat,  and  the  recommendation  and 
evaluation  of  security  measures  to  defeat  that  threat.  Within  jurisdictional 
areas  these  activities  include  safeguarding  defense  information;  protection  of 
those  Service  functions  and  property  having  defense  contracts  or  facilities 
that  have  been  designated  as  key  defense  installations;  conducting  personnel 
security  investigations  for  Service  personnel  and  contractor  employees  under 
the  Defense  Industrial  Security  Program;  and  conducting  counterintelligence 
surveys,  services,  and  inspections.  Counterintelligence  operations  may  be 
divided  into  three  categories:  Counterintelligence  Investigations,  Counter- 
intelligence Services,  and  Counterintelligence  Special  Operations. 
b.  Jurisdiction  and  Scope.  The  jurisdiction  and  scope  of  authorized 
investigative  techniques  in  counterintelligence  operations  will  vary  according 
to  legal  considerations,  operational  circumstances,  and  areas  of  operations. 
Limiting  directives  that  may  restrict  the  jurisdiction  of  counterintelligence 
elements  and  preclude  or  inhibit  employment  of  certain  investigative  tech- 
niques and  procedures  are 
(1)  Delimitations  Agreement,  which  prescribes  the  Services' 
counterintelligence  investigative  jurisdiction  and  coordinating  responsibilities 
with  respect  to  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  and  the  Department  of 
Justice. 
(2)  National  Security  Directives,  which  prescribe  operation 
limitations  and  coordinating  responsibilities  for  U.S.  agencies  conducting 
security  investigations  or  intelligence  operations  in  foreign  areas.  These  are 
set  forth  in  classified  policy  directives  issued  by  the  National  Security 
Council. 
(3)  Status  of  Forces  Agreements  between  the  United  States  and 
foreign  nations  in  which  U.S.  forces  are  stationed  normally  will  include  clauses 
delimiting  the  jurisdiction  and  scope  of  activities  of  counterintelligence 
agencies. 
W  DOD  Directive  5200.27,  which  is  a  restatement  of  the  limits 
applied  to  military  counterintelligence  activities,  including  those  persons  or 
organizations  affiliated  with  the  DOD. 
b.  Objective.     The  objective  of  counterintelligence  is  to  destroy  or 
minimize  the  effectiveness  of  the  enemy's  intelligence  system  and  to  furnish 
operational    security    (OPSEC)    information    about    friendly    capabilities    and 
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intentions  by  identifying,  controlling,  and  protecting  indicators  associated  with 
planning  and  conducting  military  operations  and  other  activities.  CI  supports 
OPSEC  by  focusing  on  the  hostile  intelligence  threat  and  assisting  in 
developing  methods  of  defeating  that  threat.  This  requires  the  establishment 
and  maintenance  of  an  extensive  database  on  both  enemy  intelligence 
capabilities  and  friendly  force  indicators,  signatures,  patterns,  and  profiles. 
Countermeasures  are  then  developed  to  counter  the  enemy  intelligence  threat 
in  HUMINT,  SIGINT,  and  IMINT.  This  is  accomplished  by  denying  information 
to  the  enemy  through  security  measures,  camouflage,  and  concealment;  giving 
false  or  misleading  information  to  the  enemy  by  means  of  ruses,  demonstra- 
tions, and  displays;  and  countering  the  enemy's  sabotage,  propaganda,  or  other 
subversive  activity  designed  to  interfere  with  the  attainment  of  our 
established  missions.  It  consists  of  measures  taken  by  our  forces  to  surprise 
the  enemy  through  security  and  deception  and  includes  all  the  passive  and 
active  measures  designed  to  thwart  the  enemy's  intelligence  by  defeating  his 
efforts  to  gather  information.  Counterintelligence  is  essential  to  the  success 
of  any  military  operation.  The  element  of  surprise  in  military  operations 
depends  not  only  on  reliable  intelligence  and  rapid  movement  but  also  on 
efficient  counterintelligence.  Also,  by  denying  information  to  the  enemy  and 
thereby  decreasing  his  ability  to  use  combat  power  effectively,  counterintelli- 
gence aids  in  reducing  the  risks  of  a  command. 
d.  Measures.  Counterintelligence  measures,  adopted  to  destroy  or 
neutralize  the  effectiveness  of  actual  or  potential  hostile  intelligence  and 
subversive  activities,  include  the  following  broad  general  measures,  each  of 
which  includes  many  other  specific  detailed  measures. 
(1)  Security.  Counterintelligence  security  operations  are  clas- 
sified generally  as  operations  pertaining  to  military  security;  civil  security; 
and  port,  frontier,  and  travel  security. 
(a)  Military  security  counterintelligence  operations 
include  both  passive  and  active  counterintelligence  measures  taken  by  a 
command  to  protect  itself  from  espionage,  enemy  observation,  subversion, 
sabotage,  or  surprise.  Typical  measures  encompass  not  only  those  steps  taken 
to  prevent  disclosure  of  military  information  to  unfriendly  forces,  but  also 
those  steps  taken  to  insure  the  physical  security  of  installations.  Security  of 
information  is  ensured  by  establishing  adequate  safeguards  and  by  training 
personnel  to  observe  precautions  such  as  discretion  in  their  talk,  care  while 
preparing  plans  and  orders,  and  withholding  information  when  captured. 
Control  of  both  assignment  to  sensitive  duties  and  access  to  classified  military 
information  is  another  important  defensive  counterintelligence  measure.  This 
control  is  supported  by  thorough  and  timely  personnel  security  investigations 
of  those  individuals  being  considered  for  such  access  or  assignment.  This 
permits  the  selective  granting  of  security  clearances  to  only  those  personnel 
who  have  shown  themselves  loyal,  reliable,  and  otherwise  suitable.  A  related 
safeguard    is    the    principle    that    access    to    particular    classified    informa- 
8-2
tion  be  limited  not  just  to  personnel  with  appropriate  clearances,  but  also  to 
those  who  clearly  require  the  information  for  the  performance  of  their  duties. 
The  detection  of  disaffection,  treason,  and  sedition  within  military  ranks  and 
civilian  employees  is  also  an  important  aspect  of  security.  Physical  security 
of  installations  is  ensured  by  furnishing  guard  forces  to  assist  in  protecting 
them  against  dangers  resulting  from  mutinies,  riots,  strikes,  sabotage, 
espionage,  and  treason.  Additional  steps  include  neutralization  of  counter- 
intelligence targets  in  tactical  operations,  use  of  passwords,  and  special 
handling  of  evaders  and  escapees. 
(b)  Civil  security  counterintelligence  operations  include 
all  the  counterintelligence  activities  affecting  the  civilian  population  of  the 
area.  These  operations  are  extensive  in  commands  with  large  territorial 
responsibilities,  in  heavily  populated  areas,  and  in  countries  faced  with 
insurgency.  Typical  civil  security  counterintelligence  measures  are  control  of 
circulation  of  personnel,  censorship,  security  screening  of  civilian  labor, 
monitoring  of  suspect  political  groups,  and  industrial  plant  protection. 
(c)  Port,  frontier,  and  travel  security  counterintelligence 
operations  consist  of  the  special  application  of  military  and  civil  counter- 
intelligence measures  to  the  control  of  airports,  seaports,  land  and  sea 
frontiers,  international  air  boundaries,  and  all  nonmilitary  travel  into  and  out 
of  an  area  of  operations.  Typical  of  such  operations  are  military  travel  permit 
systems,  sea  and  land  frontier  patrols,  and  security  screening  and  control  of 
legal  daily  frontier  crossers. 
(2)  Concealment.  This  consists  of  employing  means  to  hide  or 
disguise  personnel,  equipment,  and  installations  from  the  enemy.  They  include 
use  of  natural  co* ■•«.  r,  camouflage,  darkness,  and  smoke. 
(3)  Censorship.  This  involves  a  host  of  well-known  activities 
such  as  prescribing  authorized  channels  for  private  communications,  suppress- 
ing information  which  might  aid  the  enemy,  and  examining  the  private 
correspondence  of  military  personnel.  This  method  is  useful  also  as  an 
instrument  for  collecting  information  of  value  to  the  enemy. 
(*)  Special  Operations.  Special  operations  include  the  special- 
ized employment  of  active  and  deceptive  counterintelligence  techniques  and 
procedures  in  the  conduct  of  secret  operations  against  hostile  and  unfriendly 
intelligence  organizations  and  activities.  Examples  of  special  operations  are 
(a)  Counterespionage— a  category  of  counterintelligence 
the  objective  of  which  is  the  detection  and  neutralization  of  foreign  espionage. 
(b)  Countersabotage—  action  designed  to  destroy  the 
effectiveness  of  foreign  sabotage  activities  through  the  process  of  identifying, 
penetrating  and  manipulating,  neutralizing  or  repressing  individuals,  groups,  or 
organizations  conducting  or  capable  of  conducting  such  activities.. 
(c)  Countersubversion— that  part  of  counterintelligence 
which  is  devoted  to  destroying  the  effectiveness  of  inimical  subversion 
activities    through    the    detection,    identification,    exploitation,    penetration, 
8-3
manipulation,  deception  and  repression  of  individuals,  groups,  or  organizations 
conducting  or  capable  of  conducting  such  activities. 
(d)  Counterreconnaissance — all  measures  taken  to  prevent 
hostile  observation  of  a  force,  area,  or  place. 
(e)  Counterguerrilla- -operations  and  activities  conducted 
by  armed  forces,  paramilitary  forces,  or  nonmilitary  agencies  of  a  government 
against  guerrillas. 
(f)  Counterinsurgency— those  military,  paramilitary, 
political,  economic,  psychological,  and  other  actions  taken  by  a  government  to 
defeat  subversive  insurgency. 
d.         Planning 
(1)  The  counterintelligence  effort  is  directed  towards 
safeguarding  information  and  material  from  enemy  agents,  and  detecting 
agents  attempting  to  transmit  information  or  moving  to  or  from  areas  in  which 
sabotage,  subversion,  or  espionage  can  be  committed.  Counterintelligence 
planning,  therefore,  is  directed  to  developing  appropriate  measures  to  counter 
the  enemy  threat. 
(2)  Planning  the  counterintelligence  measures  for,  and  support 
of,  any  operation  is  concurrent  with  the  planning  and  conduct  of  the  operation. 
It  begins  with  the  inception  of  the  operation  plan  and  continues  until  the 
operation  is  completed.  An  excellent  procedure  for  developing  a  counter- 
intelligence plan,  contained  in  FM  30-5,  Combat  Intelligence,  consists  of  the 
following  three  phases. 
(a)  An  evaluation  is  made  of  the  enemy's  intelligence, 
sabotage,  and  subversion  capabilities  to  determine  the  relative  probability  of 
enemy  adoption  of  these  capablities. 
(b)  The  effect  of  these  enemy  capabilities  on  friendly 
courses  of  action  is  estimated  and  the  effectiveness  of  existing  counter- 
intelligence measures  in  countering  enemy  capabilities  is  considered. 
(c)  Based  on  conclusions  reached  in  the  counterintelli- 
gence plan,  the  worksheet  is  a  systematic  listing  of  all  the  counterintelligence 
measures  to  be  carried  out  by  a  command,  indicating  the  agencies  responsible 
for  the  execution  of  each  task.  When  completed,  it  either  becomes  an 
appendix  to  the  intelligence  annex  or  is  incorporated  into  the  annex  as 
paragraph  7. 
8.2  SPECIAL  ACTIVITIES 
a.  General.  There  are  a  number  of  activities,  not  discussed  elsewhere 
in  this  publication,  which  may  concern  the  intelligence  officer.  The  typical  J- 
2  organization  may  have  a  Special  Activities  Office.  In  some  organizations, 
this  office  might  have  a  different  name.  Some  joint  organizations  might  have 
no  need  for  any  of  its  functions. 
8-4
b.  Functions.   The  Special  Activities  Offices  are  normally  responsible 
for  the  security  and  dissemination  of  Sensitive  Compartmented  Information 
(SCO-comprising  Special  Intelligence  (SI)  and  Special  Activities  Office  (SAO) 
material — within  the  joint  headquarters. 
8-5
APPENDIX  A 
INTELLIGENCE  GLOSSARY  OF  TERMS 
Here  are  listed  definitions  of  intelligence  terms  frequently  used  in  this  publication,  or 
likely  to  be  needed  in  the  study  of  other  intelligence  works.  All  except  those  designated 
by  an  asterisk  (*)  are  adapted  from  JCS  Pub  1,  POD  Dictionary  of  Military  and  Associated 
Terms.  The  others  are  from  unclassified  Service  publications.  Those  requiring  specific 
definitions  in  areas  of  classified  intelligence  are  advised  to  refer  to  DIAM  58-1, 
Intelligence  Acquisition  Manual. 
1.  air  mission  intelligence  report— a  detailed  report  of  the  results  of  an  air  mission, 
including  a  complete  intelligence  account  of  the  mission. 
2.  armed  forces  intelligence—the  integrated  study  of  the  organized  land,  sea,  and  air 
forces,  both  actual  and  potential,  of  foreign  nations. 
3.  basic  intelligence— general  reference  material  for  use  in  planning,  concerning 
enemies  or  potential  enemies,  which  pertains  to  capabilities,  resources,  or  potential 
theater  of  operations. 
*.  biographical  intelligence— the  study  of  individual  foreign  personalities  of  actual  or 
potential  importance.  People  are  studied  collectively  under  the  sociological  and  political 
components  of  strategic  intelligence,  and  to .  a  lesser  degree  under  economic,  armed 
forces,  and  scientific  intelligence. 
5»  capability— the  ability  to  execute  a  specified  course  of  action,  (a  capability  may  or 
may  hot  be  accompanied  by  an  intention.) 
6.  clandestine  operation— activities  to  accomplish  intelligence, .  counterintelligence, 
and  other  similar  activities  sponsored  or  conducted  by  governmental  departments  or 
agencies,  in  such  a  way  as  to  assure  secrecy  on  concealment. . 
7.  collection  plan— see  intelligence  collection  plan. 
8.  combat  intelligence— that  knowledge  of  the  enemy,  weather,  and  geographical 
features  required  by  a  commander  in  the  planning  and  conduct  of  tactical  operations. 
9.  counterespionage— a  category  of  counterintelligence  the  objective  of  which  is  the 
detection  and  neutralization  of  foreign  espionage. 
10.  counterintelligence— that  aspect  of  intelligence  activity  which  is  devoted  to 
destroying  the  effectiveness  of  inimical  foreign  intelligence  activities  and  to  the 
protection  of  information  against  espionage,  individuals  against  subversion,  and  instal- 
lation or  material  against  sabotage. 
11.  countersabotage— action  designed  to  destroy  the  effectiveness  of  foreign  sabotage 
activities  through  the  process  of  identifying,  penetrating,  and  manipulating,  neutralizing, 
or  repressing  individuals,  groups,  or  organizations  conducting  or  capable  of  conducting 
such  activities. 
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1 2.     countersign—a  secret  challenge  and  its  reply. 
countersubversion— that  part  of  counterintelligence  which  is  devoted  to  destroying 
effectiveness  of  inimical  subversive  activities  through  the  detection,  identification, 
13. 
exploitation,  penetration,  manipulation,  deception,  and  repression  of  individuals,  groups, 
or  organizations  conducting  or  capable  of  conducting  such  activities. 
14.  course  of  action— 1.  any  sequence  of  activities  which  an  individual  or  a  unit  may 
follow;  2.  a  possible  plan  open  to  an  individual  or  command  which  would  accomplish  or  is 
related  to  the  accomplishment  of  his  mission;  3.  the  scheme  adopted  to  accomplish  a  job 
or  mission;  4.  a  line  of  conduct  in  an  engagement. 
15.  covert  operations—operations  which  are  so  planned  and  executed  as  to  conceal  the 
identity  of  or  permit  plausible  denial  by  the  sponsor.  They  differ  from  clandestine 
operations  in  that  emphasis  is  placed  on  concealment  of  identity  of  sponsor  rather  than  on 
concealment  of  the  operation. 
16.  dissemination  (intelUgence)-the  timely  distribution  of  information  and/or  intelli- 
gence in  the  most  suitable  form  to  those  who  need  it. 
17.  economic  intelligence— intelligence  which  deals  with  the  extent  and  use  of  the 
natural  and  human  resources  and  the  economic  potential  of  nations. 
18.  enemy  capabilities---those  courses  of  action  of  which  the  enemy  is  physically  capable 
and  which,  if  adopted,  will  affect-  the  accomplishment  of  our  mission.  The  term 
"capabilities"  includes  not  only  the  general  courses  of  action  open  to  the  enemy,  such  as 
attack,  defense,  or  withdrawal,  but  also  all  the  particular  courses  of  action  possible  under 
each  general  course  of  action.  "Enemy  capabilities"  are  considered  in  the  light  of  all 
known  factors  affecting  military  operations,  including  time,  space,  weather,  terrain,  and 
the  strength  and  disposition  of  enemy  forces. 
19.  espionage— overt,  covert,  or  clandestine  activity  designed  to  obtain  information 
relating  to  the  national  defense  with  intent  or  reason  to  believe  that  it  will  be  used  to  the 
injury  of  the  United  States  or  to  the  advantage  of  a  foreign. nation.  For  espionage  crimes, 
see  Chapter  37  of  Title  18,  United  States  Code.  This  definition  was  one  of  many 
established  by  the  Defense  Investigative  Review  Council  in  its  Study  Report  No.  9,  dated 
5  May  1971,  and  is  to  be  used  by  all  DOD  activities  within  the  purview  of  DOD  Directive 
5200.26,  subject:  Defense  Investigative  Program,  and  DOD  Directive  5200.27,  subject: 
Acquisition  of  Information  Concerning  Persons  and  Organizations  not  Affiliated  with  the 
Department  of  Defense. 
20.  essential  elements  of  information  (EED— the  critical  items  of  information  regarding 
the  enemy  and  his  environment  needed  by  the  commander  by  a  particular  time,  to  relate 
with  other  available  information  and  intelligence  in  order  to  assist  him  in  reaching  a 
logical  decision. 
21.  guidance— policy,  direction,  decision,  or  instruction  having  the  effect  of  an  order 
when  issued  by  a  higher  echelon. 
22.  indications  (intelligence)— information  in  various  degrees  of  evaluation,  all  of  which 
bears  on  the  intention  of  a  potential  enemy  to  adopt  or  reject  a  course  of  action. 
A-2
23.  information  (intelligence)—  unevaiuated  material  of  every  description  including  that 
derived  from  observations,  reports,  rumors,  photographs,  and  other  sources,  which,  when 
analyzed,  produces  intelligence. 
2*.  intelligence— the  product  resulting  from  the  collection,  evaluation,  analysis,  inte- 
gration, and  interpretation  of  all  available  information  which  concerns  one  or  more 
aspects  of  foreign  nations  or  of  areas  of  operations  and  which  is  immediately  or 
potentially  significant  to  military  planning  and  operations. 
25.  intelligence  annex— The  intelligence  annex  (sometimes  called  intelligence  plan)  is  a 
document  appended  to  an  operation  plan,  order,  or  other  document  for  the  purpose  of 
furnishing  the  intelligence  needed  to  support  the  basic  document  and  for  transmitting 
intelligence  orders,  requests,  and  instructions. 
26.  intelligence  collection  plan— a  plan  for  gathering  information  from  all  available 
sources  to  meet  an  intelligence  requirement;  specifically,  a  logical  plan  for  transforming 
the  essential  elements  of  information  into  orders  or  requests  to  sources  within  a  required 
time  limit.  See  also  intelligence  process. 
27.  intelligence  collection  requirement  (ICR)--formerly  referred  to  as  Specific  Collec- 
tion Requirement  (SICR)  was  revised  by  DIAM  58-2,  Vol  2,  Part  2,  October  1972.  All 
references  to  SICRs  should  be  changed  to  read  ICRs. 
28.  intelligence  cycle— the  steps  by  which  information  is  converted  into  intelligence  and 
made  available  to  users.  There  are  five  steps  in  the  cycle: 
a.  Planning  and  direction—determination  of  intelligence  requirements,  prepara- 
tion of  a  collection  plan,  issuance  of  orders  and  requests  to  information  collection 
agencies,  and  a  continuous  check  on  the  productivity  of  collection  agencies. 
b.  Collection — acquisition  of  information  and  the  giving  of  this  information  to 
processing  and/or  production  elements. 
c.  Processing — conversion  of  collected  information  into  a  form  suitable  to  the 
production  of  intelligence. 
d.  Production — conversion  of  information  into  intelligence  through  the  inte- 
gration, analysis,  evaluation,  and  interpretation  of  all  source  data  and  the  preparation  of 
intelligence  products  in  support  of  known  or  anticipated  user  requirements. 
e.  Dissemination — conveyance  of  intelligence  to  users  in  a  suitable  form. 
29.  intelligence  estimate  of  the  situation— an  appraisal  of  the  elements  of  intelligence 
relating  to  a  specific  situation  or  condition  with  a  view  to  determining  the  courses  of 
action  open  to  the  enemy  or  potential  enemy  and  the  probable  order  of  their  adoption. 
(NATO  term  is  "intelligence  estimate.") 
30.  intelligence  plan— See  intelligence  annex. 
31.  intelligence  process—See  intelligence  cycle. 
A-3
32.  intelligence  requirements— any  subject,  general  or  specific,  about  which  there  is  a 
need  for  the  collection  of  information  or  the  production  of  intelligence.  See  also  essential 
elements  of  information. 
33.  intention— an  aim  or  design  (as  distinct  from  capability)  to  execute  a  specified 
course  of  action. 
*3*.  joint  intelligence— integrated  military  departmental  intelligence  which  is  of  concern 
to  more  than  one  military  department  and  which  transcends  the  exclusive  competence  of 
a  single  military  department. 
35.  joint  operational  intelligence  agency— an  intelligence  agency  in  which  the  efforts  of 
two  or  more  Services  are  integrated  to  furnish  that  operational  intelligence  essential  to 
the  commander  of  a  joint  force  and  to  supplement  that  available  to  subordinate  forces  of 
his  command.  The  agency  may  or  may  not  be  part  of  such  joint  force  commander's  staff. 
36.  military  geographic  information— comprises  the  information  concerning  physical 
aspects,  resources,  and  artificial  features  which  is  necessary  for  planning  and  operations. 
37.  national  intelligence— integrated  departmental  intelligence  that  covers  the  broad 
aspects  of  national  policy  and  national  security,  is  of  concern  to  more  than  one 
department  or  agency,  and  transcends  the  exclusive  competence  of  a  single  department  or 
agency. 
38.  operational  intelligence— intelligence  required  by  operational  commanders  for  plan- 
ning and  executing  all  types  of  operations. 
39.  order  of  battle— the  identification,  strength,  command  structure,  and  disposition  of 
personnel,  units,  and  equipment  of  military  forces. 
*40.  probable  courses  of  action— those  courses  of  action  most  likely  to  be  followed  by  an 
enemy  commander  or  a  nation  in  the  accomplishment  of  its  national  objectives. 
**1.  scientific  intelligence— intelligence  or  intelligence  information  regarding  scientific 
research  and  development  in  foreign  countries. 
*2.  strategic  intelligence— intelligence  which  is  required  for  the  formation  of  policy  and 
military  plans  at  national  and  international  levels.  Strategic  intelligence  and  tactical 
intelligence  differ  primarily  in  level  of  application  but  may  also  vary  in  terms  of  scope 
and  detail. 
*3.  technical  intelligence— intelligence  concerning  foreign  technological  developments, 
performance,  and  operational  capabilities  of  foreign  materiel,  which  have  now,  or  may 
eventually  have,  a  practical  application  for  military  purposes.  It  is  the  end  product 
resulting  from  the  processing  and  collation  of  technical  information. 
*kk.     vulnerabilities— 
a.  enemy  vulnerability— any  condition  or  circumstance  of  the  enemy  situation  or 
the  area  of  operations  which  makes  the  enemy  especially  liable  to  damage,  deception,  or 
defeat, 
A-4
b.  national  vulnerabilities—those  susceptibilities  of  a  nation  to  any  action,  by  any 
means,  in  peace  or  war,  through  which  its  war  potential  may  be  reduced  or  its  will  to  fight 
diminished. 
A-5
INTELLIGENCE  SCHEDULE  OF  EVENTS 
ACTIVITY 
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PRIOR  TO  RECEIPT  OF  SPECIFIC  OPERATIONAL  MISSION  -  PRE  0-40 
Study  mission,  or  letters  of  guidance  or  instruction  creating  the  joint  force 
i 
"Study  ail  intelligence  policies  and  SOPs  which  apply  to  this  joint  force  and  intelligence  section        K&& 
Interview  intelligence  section  personnel 
rYM'< 
Organize  Jr2  section  (or  study  organization) 
Requisition  J-2  section  supplies 
-"*•"•';•"•.■*.' 
Establish  liaison  with  other  intelligence  organizations 
Prepare  security  SQP  for  J-2  section 
£#)';.•:"•; 
Prepare  security  plan  for  headquarters 
Submit  personnel  requisitions 
Prepare  intelligence  schedule  of  events 
*L*"::/*r 
Prepare  intelligence  journal 
Issue  passwords  and  countersigns 
V*v  *.  ";":*• 
:•?:•'£• 
$r& 
•."ft: 
•*:;.•-"-..' 
Request  counterintelligence  reports  from  existing  agencies 
',*"«*"••;* 
Supervise  security  training 
?::■':"■£' 
■."-*:  ?*:'.': 
'£'•':•?• 
'***.!*-.""-' 
::  "•/•■.'' 
;;>>:■:; 
Prepare  counterintelligence  estimate 
■■w 
m 
Request  climatological  studies 
:.:;*•;    . 
z 
l 
Request  intelligence  publications 
o 
*^ 
Arrange  for  periodic  but  irregular  security  checks  of  headquarters 
£&■;' 
X 
Augment  counterintelligence  coverage  in  your  area 
;':•■::•:■•: 
<S*:::: 
'.•:t"v- 
!-*v":V-'*. 
Determine  intelligence  and  counterintelligence  furxt  requirements 
Submit  intelligence  and  counterintelligence  fund  requirements 
£;••//;•:. 
Prepare  counterintelligence  plan 
;>'-i^y 
Prepare  war  room  for  staff  intelligence  briefings 
Establish  dissemination  SOP 
:-::>VV'; 
Disseminate  intelligence  publications  received  from  higher  and  adjacent  headquarters 
•£::!'x 
'"•.'!■''.•'' 
•'.'}/.'•• 
".**"'■■  .-A 
&;£: 
x'H-H 
Establish  message  center 
Prepare  message  center  SOP                                                                                    
Assemble  information  for  a  general  intelligence  estimate  based  on  broad  general  joint  force  mission 
Establish  reproduction  facility  or  liaison  to  such  a  facility 
*/.:J  *.■."*■' 
Prepare  reproduction  SOP 
;*:"•*; 
••!>.*•:."/ 
Establish  central  files 
W?% 
Prepare  central  files  SOP                                                                                   — .  . 
;'■*".'.'>  •'*■' 
Prepare  and  disseminate  periodic  intelligence  reports 
i'*;*.-::.;V  "• 
?::& 
Vr,'*.'-- 
* .  .'.\> . 
'.■■."'!» 
ftV> 
Plan  and  supervise  intelligence  training 
&•?■".•>  "■i'v  V- 
•■■•''■•'•'■:tl'.£'iJL. 
■'•■'•■.':■  :■ 
&$ 
■?:  ■'■'■,•■ 
*»#&£
SPECIFIC  OPERATIONAL  MISSION  RECEIVED 
Ptepate  preliminary  intelligence  estimate 
Revise  counterintelligence  estimate 
Brief  intelligence  section  chiefs  on  specific  operational  mission  and  commander's  planning  guidance 
: j 
 
. 
Complete  intelligence  estimate                                       .  . 
Solicit  special  intelligence  requirements  of  other  stalf  sections 
,»  —  ■  . 
' 
'*■*' 
■ 
npiprmmp  ppi  and  other  intelligence  reouirements 
Prepare  collection  plan 
"■'.  ■""'•.".* 
Prepare  continuing  (running)  estimate  and  revise  periodically 
Rpykp  rnllprtinn  nlan 
■  ■■ 
Dioniro  <np  inj  mainlaininp  and  revising  intelligence  collection  plan 
Rpriiiisilinn  nlanntnp  mans 
:viw 
RMftanpp  war  room  to  acr nmmnrtate  area  of  operations  for  new  specific  ooerational  mission 
'■'■''."'.* 
prnintn  mtrllippnrp  funds  rikhmsinp  and  accounting  SOP 
.-.•- 
Ptpnarp  nrder  of  battle  overlays  and  files 
Z&h 
Prm-Mf"  trancnnrlatiftfl  npt  flVRflftVS 
Dranoro  inuacinn  hp^fh  OVOflrlVS                                                                                                                          .      , 
i::.V;i-V; 
fe/^v: 
Dcnmcitinn  wAAthpr  and  flimMp  studies 
CP 
N> 
:-: 
Rfipf  «prtiftn  rhipfs  on  intelligence  olans.  needs,  and  oroeress 
■••• 
::.•.*.'•;: 
:-'*."it 
■J  
■','>•'.'■■'; 
■'•'•■"  '.;'.•' 
Ir 
w;*;i  <int\  rhark  ctihArHinatP  intpllippncft  units 
W — 
,    _ 
Prenare  to  assist  in  establishing  tactical  operations  center 
''•'\':'i 
Atranpe  for  receiving  and  administering  intelligence  liaison  personnel 
COMMANDER'S  DECISK  N  ANNOU  <CEI 
Assist  in  establishing  tactical  operations  center 
?3*fe 
,  Hri'r  .■■■*  T- 
Pratara  intaiiioanra  annex  to  operation  olso  or  order 
■  '.*.".•  ;V 
■  ••!'•*.*.* 
;     IfjS/;. 
b  I".".-': 
niceaminaia  nuariauc  models  ohotoeraohv  and  weather  and  climatologtcal  studies 
; 
:            .: 
:«-JS 
Establish  enemy  documents  center 
S   :1'/!V 
Establish  interrogation  center 
.      _ 
i*   *'"•' ii? 
'.    '.V'Vi'I 
T  '■''''■ 
.*■  #*& 
:  &&%
APPENDIX    C 
AN  INTELLIGENCE  COLLECTION  PLAN 
AGENCIES 
EEI 
INDICATIONS 
SPECIFIC           UNI 
ORDERS           COMO A N AF 
Ml 
DET 
JTF 
JUWTF 
1.  Will  the  en  empl 
1.  Type  and  num- 
1. Req  type  and 
X 
X 
X 
nuclear  weapons? 
bers  of  weapons 
number  of  weap- 
If so,  where  and  by 
available. 
ons  available 
what  delivery  sys- 
for employment 
tem? 
in  this  area. 
2.  Movement  into 
1 .  Rpt  mvmt  hvy 
X 
X 
X 
X 
area  of  special- 
arty within  area. 
ized  dlvr  eqp. 
2.  Rpt  mvmt  GM 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Ichr  into  area. 
3.  Rpt  arrival 
X 
X 
X 
X 
special  types 
aircraft  or 
• 
missile  ships. 
' 
! 
3.  Sudden  change 
in  troop  dis- 
position along 
1.  Rpt  by  fastest 
means  any  sud- 
den withdrawals 
X 
X 
X 
line  of  contact.  1       of  troops  now 
in  contact. 
2.  Rpt  by  fastest 
X 
X 
X 
X 
means  adoption 
any  special  pro- 
tective means. 
4.  Imposition  of 
■ 
X 
special  sec         j 
measures  in 
specific  areas.  ! 
5.  Const  of  spec     j            T0    BE 
stor  facilities.    ! 
6.  Mvmt  special-    j       COMpLETED 
ized  units  or       1 
I 
personnel  into    i 
t 
i 
area. 
i 
i 
i 
C-I
APPENDIX  D 
BASIC  INTELLIGENCE  STUDY  FORMAT 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
a.  Purpose  of  the  Study 
b.  Table  of  Contents 
2.  SIGNIFICANCE  OF  AREA  (Summary  of  the  significant  strategic  and  tactical  aspects  of  the 
area.) 
3.  MILITARY  GEOGRAPHY 
a.  Geographic  Character 
b.  Military  Geographic  Regions 
c.  Hydrography  and  Landing  Beaches 
d.  Strategic  Areas 
e.  Internal  Routes 
f.  Approaches 
g.  Urban  Areas 
h.    Climate  and  Weather 
4.  TRANSPORTATION  AND  TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
a.  Railways 
b.  Highways 
c.  Inland  Waterways 
d.  Petroleum  Pipelines 
e.  Ports  and  Naval  Facilities 
f.  Merchant  Marine 
g.  Civil  Air  (including  civil  air  facilities) 
h.  Telecommunications 
5.  SOCIOLOGICAL 
a.  General 
b.  Population  and  Manpower 
c.  Structure  and  Characteristics  of  the  Society 
d.  Health  and  Sanitation 
e.  Social  Problems  and  Public  Welfare 
f.  Cultural  Expression  (Language.  Religion.  Education,  Art,  Public  Information  Media) 
6.  POLITICAL 
a.  General 
b.  Structure  and  Functioning  of  Government 
c    Political  Dynamics 
d.  National  Politics 
e.  Police  and  Intelligence  Services 
f.  Subversion 
g.  Propaganda 
h.     Foreign  Intelligence 
D-l
APPENDIX  E 
NATIONAL  SECURITY  COUNCIL  STRUCTURE 
NATIONAL  SECURITY  COUNCIL 
STATUTORY  MEMBERS 
PRESIDENT 
VICE-PRESIDENT 
SECRETARY  OF  STATE 
SECRETARY  OF  DEFENSE 
m 
SENIOR  INTERAGENCY  GROUP 
INTELLIGENCE 
DIRECTOR  OF  CENTRAL  INTELLIGENCE 
ASST  TO  THE  PRESIDENT  FOR  NATIONAL  SECURITY  AFFAIRS] 
DEPUTY  SECRETARY  OF  STATE 
DEPUTY  SECRETARY  OF  DEFENSE 
CHAIRMAN,  JOINT  CHIEFS  OF  STAFF 
OTHERS,  AS  REQUIRED
APPEi*^IX  F 
INTELLIGENCE  COMMUNITY  STRUCTURE 
OFFICE  OF  MANAGEMENT 
ANO  BUDGET 
PRESIDENT 
NATIONAL  SECURITY  COUNCIL 
-n 
NATIONAL  FOREIGN 
INTELLIGENCE  BOARD 
SENIOR  INTERAGENCY  GROUP 
INTELLIGENCE 
mtmaaamammmmaaam \ 
DIRECTOR  OF 
CENTRAL  INTELLIGENCE 
NATIONAL  FOREIGN 
INTELLIGENCE  COUNCIL 
INTELLIGENCE  I 
COMMUNITY 
STAFF 
DCI 
COMMITTEES 
NATIONAL 
INTELLIGENCE! 
COUNCIL 
CENTRAL 
INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY 
-1 
I 
^  DEFENSE  DEPARTMENT  INTELLIGENCE 
|  COMMUNITY  ENTITIES 
j  {NSA/SPEC  RECON/DIA/ARMY 
NAVY/AIR  FORCE/USMC  « 
I 
, 
 _i-   
I  OTHER  INTELLIGENCE  COMMUNITY  ENTITIES 
|  (STATE/FBI/TREASURY/ENERGY)
APPENDIX  . 
DEFENSE  INTELLIGENCE  AGENCY 
COMMAND  ELEMENT 
DIRECTOR 
DEPUTY  DIRECTOR 
((00) 
CHIEF  OF  STAFF 
(CS| 
SENIOR  ENLISTED  ADVISOR 
(SEN) 
DEPUTY  CHIEF  OF  STAFF 
SECRETARIAT 
OFFICE  OF  SECURITY 
(OS) 
ADVISORY  COMMITTEE 
(AC) 
a 
MiunatKinHM 
ASsisiAiit  ceputy  Oifttcton 
F0«  COLUCnOM  UAHACEMENI 
IDCI 
AU4IUT  Mrurt  DaCCTfM 
fGNHA^MOPOUCT 
ASSISTANT  OEPUTY  OWECTOP. 
fOU  ATTACHES  AMD  THAWING 
1AT) 
DEFENSE 
AnACME  OFFICES 
GENERAL  DEFENSE        I 
INTELLIGENCE  PROGRAMS 
STAFF  (D/GOlP) 
ASSISTANT  DEPUTY  DIRECTOR 
KRFWAMANO  POLICY 
INSPECTOR  GENERAL 
(IG) 
GENERAL  COUNSEL 
(GC| 
DEPUTY  DIRECTOR  FOR 
FOREIGN  INTELLIGENCE 
(V»l 
DEFENSE 
MTELUGENCt  OFFICERS 
(DtOI 
ASSISTANT  DEPUTY  DIRECTOR 
FOX  ESTIMATES 
IDE) 
UAISON 
DCTACHMENTS 
ASSISTANT  DEPUTY  DIRECTOR 
FOR  SCIEMTIFIC  A  TECHNICAL 
INTELUGENCE  IDT) 
ASSISTANT  OEPUTY  DIRECTOR 
FOR  RESEARCH 
tm ] 
OEPUTY  DIRECTOR  FOP. 
RESOURCES  AND  SYSTEMS 
IMS) 
DEPUTY  DIRECTOR  IOR 
HTELLKSENCE  AMI 
EXTEHNAL  AFFAIRS  ID<| 
DtAflY  DIRECTOR  FOR 
JCS  SUPPORT 
USI 
HMUUaHMiei
APPENDIX  H 
VS.  PACIFIC  COMMAND  J-2 
DIRECTOR  FORI 
INTELLIGENCE 
IMAGERY 
I 
INTELLIGENCE        I 
BRANCH  I 
Jill  131         I 
WUNMBHUSm 
signal 
inteujgence 
BRANCH 
J212  Ul 
HUMAN  | 
mraiJC-ENCE    I 
■RANCH  I 
SPECIAL 
SECURITY 
BRANCH 
DEFENSE  SPECIAL 
|         SECURITY 
I  COMMUNICATIONS  ' 
I  BRANCH 
i     jxi  JM 
SPECIAL  I 
ACTIVITIES  I 
BRANCH  I 
J2<>  141  I
APPENDIX  K 
A  TYPICAL  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE 
INTELLIGENCE  DIVISION  OF  A  JOINT  TASK  FORCE 
.J 
INTELLIGENCE 
AND  PLANS 
K-1
APPENDIX  L 
BASIC  INTELLIGENCE  AND  COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  DOCUMENTS 
(BY  SOURCES  AND  AGENCIES) 
U.S.    Central  Intelligence  Agency  (CIA) 
Biographic  Handbooks 
Central  Intelligence  Bulletin  (CIB-Daily) 
Weekly  Summaries 
National  Intelligence  Estimates  (NIE) 
Special  National  Intelligence  Estimates  (SNIE) 
National  Intelligence  Analytical  Memorandum  (NIAM) 
Special  Operations  Intelligence  Handbooks 
U.S.    Defense  Intelligence  Agency  (DIA) 
Defense  Intelligence  Estimate  for  Joint  Planning  (DIEJP) 
Joint  Intelligence  Estimates  for  Planning  (JIEP) 
Joint  Long-Range  Estimative  Intelligence  Document  (JLREID) 
Defense  Intelligence  Projections  for  Planning  (DIPP) 
Defense  Intelligence  Estimates  (DIEs) 
Special  Defense  Intelligence  Estimates  (SDlEs) 
Defense  Intelligence  Estimates  Memoranda  (DIEMs) 
DIA  Defense  Intelligence  Summaries  (DINSUM)  (restricted  to  D.C.  area) 
Weekly  Summaries  (INSUM) 
Air  Force  Intelligence  Studies  (AFIS) 
Aircraft  Handbooks  (Characteristicsand  Performance) 
Communist  Countries 
Soviet/European/Asiatic  Communist  Aircraft  Order  of  Battle  Books 
Airfields  and  Seaplane  Stations  of  the  World 
Attache  Reports  and  Debriefings 
Biographic  Data  Books 
L-l
DIA  Fact  Books 
LOC  Studies 
Military  Intelligence  Summaries  (MIS) 
Soviet  Missile  Order  of  Battle  Books 
Naval  Forces  Intelligence  Studies 
National  Security  Agency  (NSA) 
Daily  Special  Intelligence  Items 
SIGINT  Summaries 
Special  Research  Detachment  (SRD  Reports) 
National  Photo  Interpretation  Center  (NPIC) 
Photo  Interpretation  Reports 
Department  of  State,  Intelligence  and  Research  (INR) 
Embassy  Cables 
Special  Reports 
Weekly  Summaries  (Country  Team) 
Military  Services,  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff  Intelligence  (ACSI) 
Intelligence  Summaries  (INSUM) 
Weekly  Intelligence  Estimate  Update  (WlEU) 
MAGG/MILGP  Debriefings  ' 
Military  Services,  Counterintelligence  Publications 
Strategic  Reconnaissance  Reports 
Scientific  and  Technical  Intelligence  Reports 
Tactical  Units 
Patrol  Reports 
Long-Range  Patrol  Reports  (LRPS) 
Ranger  Reports 
Prisoner  and  Rallier  Interrogation  Reports 
Clandestine  Agent  Reports/Debriefings 
L-2
Document  Exploitation  Reports 
Material  Exploitation  Reports 
Sensor  Readouts 
Radar  (Ground) 
Side  Looking  Airborne  Radar  (SLAR)  Reports 
Infra-Red  Readouts 
Visual  Reconnaissance  Reports 
Radio  Research  Company  Reports 
Open  Sources 
Area  Handbooks 
Basic/Special  Reference  Works 
Newspapers 
Radio  Broadcasts 
Tourists/Commercial  Travelers 
L-3
CALL  NO. 
TITLE 
Period. 
Evaiuators  Newsletter.   U.S.  Navy.   Air  Test  and  Evaluation  Squadron 
Four.  (Irr)  CONFIDENTIAL. 
Period. 
Gt.  Brit.   Air  Intelligence  Review.  (Irr)  SECRET. 
^C525 
C.7G7 
Gt.  Brit.  Army  Technical  Intelligence  Digest.  (Irr)  SECRET. 
Period. 
No.,  Date 
Gt.  Brit.   Army  Weapons  Intelligence  Review.  (Q)  SECRET. 
Period. 
Gt.  Brit.   N.I.R.  (Naval  Intelligence  Report).  (Q)  SECRET. 
U393 
.372 
3  am  nal  of  Defense  Research.   Battelle  Columbus  Lab.  (Q)  SECRET. 
Period. 
Maritime  Warfare  Bulletin.  Canadian  Forces  Maritime  Warfare 
School.  (Q)  CONFIDENTIAL. 
Period 
MI3I  QUARTERLY.   U.S.  3oint  Electronic  Warfare  Center.  (Q)  SECRET. 
NOFORN. 
UA15 
.U7 
Military  Intelligence  Summary  (MIS).  U.S.  Defense  Intelligence  Agency. 
World  coverage  in  8  volumes.  (S-a)  SECRET. 
UB251 
.U5U3 
Monthly  Intelligence  Production.  U.S.  Defense  Intelligence  Agency. 
(Q)  SECRET. 
V40 
.U29 
Naval  Forces  Intelligence  Study  (NFIS).  U.S.  Defense  Intelligence 
Agency.  Survey  by  individual  countries,  multi-volumes.  (A)  SECRET. 
Period 
The  Naval  Intelligence  Newsletter.  U.S.  Office  of  Naval  Intelligence. 
(Q)  SECRET.  NOFORN. 
Period. 
Naval  Intelligence  Quarterly.   U.S.  Office  of  Naval  Intelligence. 
(Q)  SECRET. 
Period 
Navy  Scientific  and  Technical  Intelligence  Review.   U.S.  Naval  Intelligence 
Command.  (M)  SECRET 
M-2
APPENDIX  M 
CURRENT  CLASSIFIED  PERIODICALS  AND  REPORTS  CURRENTLY 
RECEIVED  BY  AFSC  LIBRARY 
LEGEND: 
D 
W 
Bi-W 
Daily 
Weekly 
Biweekly 
M 
Bi-M 
Q 
Monthly 
BiMonthly 
Quarterly 
S-M      SemiMonthly 
Irr        Irregular 
A         Annual 
NOTE: 
CALL  NO. 
UG630 
.U35 
S-A      Semiannual 
Security  classification  of  periodical  follows  the  citation. 
TITLE 
Air  Force  Foreign  Technology  Bulletin.   U.S.  Air  Force.  Foreign 
Technology  Division.  (M)  SECRET. 
UG630 
.U56 
Air  Force  Intelligence  Study  (AFIS).   U.S.  Defense  Intelligence  Agency. 
Survey  by  individual  country,  multi-volumes.  (A)  SECRET. 
UG630 
.U422 
Air  Order  of  Battle.  U.S.  Defense  Intelligence  Agency.  World  Coverage 
in  8  volumes.  (A-a)  SECRET. 
Period. 
Army  Scientific  and  Technical  Intelligence  Bulletin.  U.S.  Dept. 
of  the  Army,  (M)  SECRET.  ' 
Period. 
Period. 
Australia.  Joint  Intelligence  Organization  (3IO)  Service  Intelligence 
Bulletin.  (W)  SECRET. 
Canada.  Intelligence  Quarterly.  (Q)  SECRET. 
Period. 
Cockpit  Intelligence.  U.S.  Air  Forces  in  Europe.  (Q)  SECRET. 
Period. 
Current  Foreign  Relations.  U.S.  Dept.  of  State.  (W)  SECRET. 
UG485 
.U387 
UG485 
.U371 
Electronic  Warfare  Analysis  Report.  U.S.  Air  Force  Electronic  Warfare 
Center.  (S-m)  SECRET.   NOFORN. 
Electronic  Warfare  Evaluation  and  Education  Quarterly.  U.S.  Air 
Force  Electronic  Warfare  Center.  (Q)  SECRET. 
M-l
CALL  NO. 
UB250 
.18 
V214 
.U526 
Period. 
UF885 
•R9U4 
VAfO 
•S8 
Period. 
Period. 
Period. 
Period. 
Period. 
TITLE 
Periodic  Intelligence  Resume'.   Inter-American  Defense  Board. 
(Irr)  SECRET. 
Pioneers  Progress.   U.S.  Navy,  Air  Test  and  Evaluation  Squadron 
One.  (Irr)  SECRET. 
Scientific  Intelligence  Weekly  Review.  (W)  SECRET. 
Soviet  and  E.  European  Communist  Missile  Order  of  Battle.  U.S. 
Air  Forces  in  Europe.  (S-A)  SECRET. 
Supreme  Allied  Commander  Atlantic,  Supplementary  Intelligence 
Report.  (M)  SECRET. 
TAC  Intelligence  Digest.  U.S.  Air  Force,  Tactical  Air  Command. 
(M)  SECRET. 
Tactical  Analysis  Bulletin.  U.S.  Air  Force  Tactical  Fighter  Weapons 
Center.  (Irr)  SECRET. 
Tactics  Newsletter.  U.S.  Atlantic  Fleet,  Naval  Surface  Force.  (Q) 
CONFIDENTIAL 
U.S.  Dept.  of  State.,  Bureau  of  Intelligence  and  Research  Report... 
(Irr)  SECRET: 
Weekly  Intelligence  Summary."  U.S.  Defense  Intelligence  Agency. 
(W)  SECRET. 
M-3
APPENDIX  N 
DEFENSE  INTELLIGENCE  AGENCY  MANUALS 
The  DIAM  58  Series  of  Manuals  is  in  the  process  of  being  renumbered  and  some  titles  are 
being  changed.  The  following  is  a  listing  of  the  new  numbers  and  titles  cross-referenced 
to  the  old  manual  numbers  where  applicable. 
Number  Title 
M58-1  Defense  Intelligence  Collection  (U)  SECRET/NOFORN 
M58-2  Time-Sensitive  Multi-Source  Requirements  (U)  SECRET/NOFORN 
(formerly  DIAM  58-2  Part  II  -  never  published) 
M58-3  Multi-Source  Requirements  (General)  (U)  SECRET/NOFORN 
(formerly  DIAM  58-2  Part  0 
M58-5  Imagery  Requirements  (U)  SECRET  (formerly  DIAM  58-2  Part  VI) 
SAO  Supplement  (available  through  SAO  Channels  Only) 
M58-7  Signal  Intelligence  (SIGINT)  Requirements  (U)  (available  through  Si 
Channels  Only)  (formerly  DIAM  58-2  Parts  VII  and  VIII) 
M58-8  Measurement  and  Signature  Intelligence  (MASINT)  Requirements 
(formerly  DIAM  58-2  Part  X) 
M58-9  National  Collection  Systems  (U)  TOP  SECRET  (available  through 
SAO  Channels  Only)  (formerly  DIAM  58-3) 
M58-11  Defense  Human  Resources  Intelligence  Collection  Management 
Manual  (U)  SECRET/NOFORN 
M58-12  Defense  Human  Resources  Intelligence  Collection  Management 
Manual  (U)  SECRET/NOFORN  (formerly  DIAM  58-*) 
M58- 1 3  Defense  Human  Resources  Intelligence  Collection  Procedures 
Manual  (U)  SECRET/NOFORN  (formerly  DIAM  58-2  Parts  HI,  IV, 
V,  IX) 
N-l