- 118 - informed abcnt the boundaries of major analytical disputes, and listen to the arguments of dissenting Pentagon representatives about coordinative procedures. This "management" approach to drafting is exemplified by DCI Willian Colby, who then went on to manage highly technical, argumentative debate at USIB. On the other hand, Admiral Turner has taken all these steps, and more, and he is criticized for bias in being both personal ad- vocate and final adjudicator. In this author's opinicn, these accusations result, partly, from poor timing. Acmirval Turner pays too much attention to the drafting of the strategic NIZs compared to leadership at NFIB meetings. Because of an imbalance between his involvement at these two stages, DCI Turner not only opens himself to criticism but also deprives himself of the opportunity of hearing high-level, group debate. That Turner does not fully utilize NFIB ie an admission that, while brief, oral discussion at NFIB meetings between diverse intelligence chiefs with their own axes to grind may be a cumbersome and time-consuming way to complete complex | analytical work. i Admiral Turner's approach implies that a DCI's decisions might | appear less biased, or be less biased, if he reserves his adjudicator role until after open, competitive debate at NFIB, conducted jointly in the presence of all intelligence agencies. A DCI still might exer management direction over the drafting process and make personal, sub stantive input beforehand. For example, a DCI might read and edit successive drafts, re- shape the questions asked, offer his personal advice, advance his own opinions alongside others, discuss strategic issues with CIA and Pentagon estimators, and satisfy himself that all views are
~ 119 - incorporated. However, he could stop short of rewriting the NIEs to reflect his final judgements. This approach was executed successfully by DCI John McCone who, after initial hesitation, made substantive input to the @raft but was willing to charge the NIEs as a result of USIB Gdebate. In essence, McCone was both manager and prophet, and was not criticized at the time for exercising his prerogative to play these roles. C. Management Steps Not Taken by DCis In this author's view, systematic attention to management and coordination at the draft stage of the strategic NIEs is tha sine qua non of improved intelligence estimates. Throughout thie study, we have been interested primarily in whether a DCI devoted any attention to these issues, as opposed to evaluating reorganizations and other changes actually intitiated. Below, the author presents her conclusions about the strategic NIE process, derived from a year of study: These recommendations focus on mechanisms a DCI might devise to elicit a multiplicity of views before final invelli- gence judgements are made. Three criteria govern their selection: they must be easy to administer; they should reduce the likelihood of institutional or personal bias; and they must not pose, in the DCI's view, a security risk. All proposals build on changes authorized in recent years, rather than sharply reversing tnem.* (1) This author applauds the notion that the DCI appoint the CIA estimators, or NIOs. Since the DCI must work closely with them, he should select them and they, in turn, be responsible to him. *Since reorganization of the estimates function is ongoing in CIA, some of these proposals soon may be moot.
- 122 - (4) This author supports the continuance of a system whureby Pentagon intelligence officials, and sometimes consultants, prepare first drafts of selected chapters. By this time, sufficient expertise in writing should have been accumulated by non-CIA analysts to over- come earlier criticims on this score. On a periodic basis, the portion assigned to individual agencies, including the CIA, might be rotated. Rotation need not be annual, since such a move would in- crease the administrative burden on the NIO, who is ultimately responsible. Periodic rotation reflects another internal approach to competitive or parallel drafting. It createe both a precedent and history for mulitple advocacy. (5) In its day, the footnote system in the strategic NIZze was much abused. Both recent Presidents and DCis have preferred an NIE format which represents major differences of opinion as al-~ ternative positions, or parallel texts. The advantage of this format is that all participants are encouraged to express their objecticns clearly, advancing only those which reflect a significant, documentab] predictive uncectainty. Presently, there is more stylistic clarity and cohesion in the strategic NIEs than in the part. This new format also allows the DCI the option of advancing his personal opinion as an alternative separately, or alongside of, other views in the NIEs. However, exclusive reliance on this format has the Gisadvantage of eliminating altogether a view strongly held by one individual or a distinct minority, which readers might want to bear in mind. This author believes thz=t the NIGs should permit the uge of footnotes in occasional instances. The DCI and NFIB members might overrule footnotes later on a case-by-case basis, if they so chose. ‘
~ 123 - (6) Ongoing independent or outcide review of the strategic NIEs is a complex issue. Major difficulties are the administrative burden on the DCI and CIA staff, potential security leaks and, as the Senate Select Committee on Inteliigence noted, the possibility that reviewers are biased. However, because of the large impact of the 1976 A-B Team experiment on subsequent perceptions in the strategic NI£s, this author agrees with the former PFIAB's recommen- dation that external review once again be a part of the NIE process. Because of the immense security risk, external reviews should be authorized enly periodically, such as cnce every three years. Un- less otherwise directed by the President, the time, conditions end reviewers should be authorized by the DCI with the assistance of another governmental bodgy, such as the NSC or Presidential study group.
CHAPTER II: EVOLUTION OF THE STRATEGIC ESTIMATIVE PROCESS i. 16. ll. 12. 13. 14. National Security Act of 1947, Section 102(da), subparagraph (3). Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 58. SSCI, Final Report, Book I, op. cit., p. 73. * National Security Act of 1947, Section 102(d!}, subparagrpah (3). Presidential Directive, January 22, 1946, establishing the National Intelligence Authority, Central Intelligence Group and position of the DCI. See, SSCI, Book IV, "History of the CIA." by Anne Karalekas (henceforth referred to as "History") pp. 113-114. Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, Paperback Edition, 1966) pp. 64-66. This book was published first in 1949. Ibid., p. 101. SSCI, Book IV, "History," pp. 13 and 23. Military estimates work was done in ORE's Global Survey Division, mainly by three men. They were generalists in the sense of having little Soviet expertise. However, Ludwell Montague, an historian, had been the Army's Executive Secretary of the JCS' Joint Intelligence Committee, and DeForest Van Slyck, a lawyer, had WWII intelligence experience with the Air Ferce. Interview with DeForest Van Slyck, 5/2/78. See also: SSC., Book IV, “History,” p. 13; Ray S. Cline, Secrats, Spies and Scholars (Washington BC: Acropolis Books Ltd., Pp. 105. The Eberstadt Task Force on Military Intelligence, of The Hoover Commission, which reviewed both the Air Force's and CiA's es- timates in the spring of 1948. Quoted in The Washington Post, October 11, 1948. SSCI, Book IV, “History,” p. 13, and interview with DeForest Van Slyck, 5/2/78. Declassified Documents Reference System (Washington, DC: Carrollton Press, 1977 to present), which this author read in its entirety. See, for example, DDRS, #77-261C, ORE #27-48, "Possible Developments in China," Nov. 2, 1948. SSCI, Book IV, “History,” p. 25. Study on the CIA and National Organization for Intelligence, known as the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Survey, commissioned by the NSC in 1948 and completed in Jan. 1949. See, SSCI, Book IV, "History," p. 16.
ies 15. 1é. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. SSCI, Book IV, "History," p. 17. Ibid., p. 16. Ibid., p. 11, and interviews with Lawrence dcuston (3/22/78) and Walter Phorzheimer (4/13/78). Admiral Hillenkoetter's White House briefings occurred after 1949 and represented a victory for the CYA, since the State Department earlier had challenged its right to channel intelli- gence @Girectly to the President. Memorandum from CIA General Counsel, Lawrence Houston, to General W. Bedell Smitt, August 1959, quoted in SSCI, Book IV, "“Ristory," p. 18. Congress conducted full-scale hearings of the "surprise" invasions in mid-1951, and agreed that the intelligence data had been available, and circulated. See, for example, Richard K. Betts, “Analysis, War and Decision,” op. cit., p. 63. , Admiral Hillenkoetter testified to the Senate Foreign Appropriations Committee on the fcllowing day. (Interview with Walter Phorzheimer, 4/6/79, who helped prepare the testimony). The quote is drawn from the Norfolk Ledger Dispatch, May 25, 1951. Washington Evening Star, May 19, 1951, about Admiral Hillenkoetter's testimony to Congress of that day. Washington Pcst, October 1, 1950, p. 5. Declassified Documents Reference System, op. cit., #77-259C (Memo of June 25, 1946), 77-264D (memo of dune 39, 1948), 77-261¢ (Memo of Nov. 23, 1949), and 77-259E (Memo of Dec. 10, 1948). The memoy in- cluded reference to the CIA's grading of agent (source) and information reliability. Hillenkoetter hardly was the last DCI to do this. SSCI, Book IV, “History,” p. 18 and fmn11. "Centralizatrion of Authority’ was a term used frequently by Hanson Baldwin, who covered intelligence activities for the New York Times. See, for example, Hanson Baldwin, in Armeé Forces, October 16, 15947. senéral Smith reportedly asked President Truman to cail Langer, and he and other academicans were recrvited on the basis of Smith's concern that WWIII was “imminent.” (Interviews with Jack Maury, 2/9/73, and John Bross, 5/29/79}. When Smith arrived, he reportedly found no current, coordinated estimate on military operations in Korea, which precipitated one of his famous battles with Gen. Douglas MacArthur. (See, SSCI, Book IV, "History," p. 104). Washington Pust, Feb. 25, 1951. ‘Harry T. Rositzhe, The CIA's Secret Operations (N¥: Reader's Digest Press, 1977), p. 20, According to Rositzhe, the Pentagon's demands were specific and forcefully stated, and led to several of the ill- fated drops in the Ukraine.
28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 38. 39. 40. 4l. 42. 43. 44, 45. 46. 47. Interview with past and current CIA cfficial (B), 5/30/79. For this, gee, SSCI, Rook tiv, “History,” pp. 20-23. Cline, Secrets, Spies and Scholars, op cit., p. 120. Also inter- views with DeForest Van Slyck (5/72/78), Paul Borel (9/1/78), Ray Cline (8/20/78) and John Huizenga (9/13/78). The CIA did not want "professional meeting-goers." ©SCI, Book IV, “History,” p. 19. Interview with past and current CIA official (B), 5/30/79. Cline, Secrets, op. cit., pp. lll and 121. Interview with John Bross, 5/29/79. Ibid. SSCI, Book IV, "History," p. 18. Ibid. Cline, Secrets, op. cit., p- Ill. Quoted in Freedman, U.S. Intelligence and _ the Soviet Streategic Threat, ep. cit., p. 35. The press reports that: "In the 35 to 40 problems in which the CIA has had to furnish an estimate since General Smith arrived...there have been no dissents...." (See, Providence Bulletin, May 25, 1951). However, this author found a 3 page-Long dissent by the Air Force in NIE-12, "Consequences of the Early Employment of Chinese Nationalist Forces in Korea,” Dec. 27, 1950 (Secret, Declasaified Aug. 2, 1977). John Bross says that Smith’s main concern “was to get out the product." (Interview, 5/29/79). Hal Ford reported one instance in which Smith initially overruled a Navy dissent pertaining to the effects of a Naval blockade cf China during the Korean war, but reinstated the footrote following a complaint from CINCPAC. (Interview, 12/7/78). Interview with past and current CIA official (A), 5/30/79. Interview with Gen. Daniel Graham, 5/9/79. Cline, Secrets, op. cit., p. 123. Interview with past and current CIA official (A), 5/30/79. Freedman, Op. cit., p. 35. Colin &.Gray, ‘'Gap' Prediction and America's Defense; Arms and Race Behavior in the Eisenhower Years," Orbis, Vol XVI-1, Spring 1972, p. 263. Ibid., p. 261, and Freedman, op. cit.» P- 67.
48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 58. 59. 60. 6l. wey Freedman, op. cit., p. 67. Gray, cp. cit., p. 263. Alien W. Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence (NY: Harper and Row, 1963) p. 149. Gray, op. cit., p. 262. Ibid. Interview with past and current CIA official (A), 5/30/79. Gray, op. cit., p. 262. Stuart Symington, “Where the Missile Gap Went," The Reporter. Feb. een tere nee ee lenere manana tnene 15, 1962, p. 22. Symington earlier had conducted Senate hearings on the bomber ana missile gap predictions. Interviews with Richard Bissell (5/26/78), Jack Maury (2/9/79), and John Bross (5/29/79). See also, David Wise and Thomas Ross, The U-2 Affair (NY: Random House, 1964). Bross says that in the early 1950s, the Air Force rejected ene vlan which would have been imple- mented under its auspices, allegedly because it was too complicated to put a man in the aircraft. Interviewees agree that, subsequently, only a handful cf perscns outside cf the CIA knew about development plans, approved oy President Edseuhower in 1954. Because of the secrecy surrounding its development and use, the CIA provided the administrative framework for all aspects of the U-2. in the late 195Ge, coordination with the Azxy Force was informal, consisting of a emall Air Force contingent at CIA. Following review by a formal interagency task force under Dulles, all flights had to-be approved by President Eisenhower. Eisenhower gave only one blanket approval, for the first ten days. After that, individual flights were reviewed in a meeting at the White House con- sisting of the President, the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the JCS, Eisenhower's special advisor Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, the NSC Secretary, and Allen Dulles. Bissell suggests that John Foster Dulles also had a final veto power. (Interview with Richard Bissell, 5/26/78). See, Freedman, op. cit., pp. 32-33 (who cites a figure of 3,000); and Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA (NY: Alfred Knopf, 1979) p. 97 (who uses the 1,206 figure). The office is called the National Photographic Interpretation Center and remains a sub-unit of CIA. ‘ Freedman, op. cit., p. 67; Gray, op. cit., p. 260; and James C. Dick, “The Strategic Arms Race, 1957-1904 Who Opened a Missile Gap?" Journal of Politics, XXXIV (Nov. 1972), pp. 1067~9. ‘ SSCI, Book IV, "History," p. 56. Interview with past and current CIA official (A), 5/30/79.
62. 64. 65. 66. 67. €8. 69. 70. 71. An NSC Directive in 195] had directed the CIA to implement an “agreed activities” arrangement. with the Pentagon, whereby the Pentagon would turn over its peacetime covert operations to the CIA. In 1954, the Doolittle Commission concluded that both the CIA and Pentagon were “dragging their feet." See, Declessified Documents Reference System, op. cit., "Report on the Covert Activities of the CIA," ihe Doolittle Report, Sept. 4, 1954, #78-139C and 1408 (Top Secret, Declays. in 1976). SSCI, Pook IV, “History," p. 60. Dulles consolidated the ERA's fceur divisions into a Military Economic Branch in 1958, two years after it was proposed. Actually, the OSI continued to expand its work ints areas earlier restricted by an agreement wich DOD. In 1956, Dulles also created the interagency Guided Missiles Intelligence Committee under IAC, with the egreement of the Defense Secretary, but over the objection of the JCS ana services who wanted exclusive control. See, SSCI, Book IV, p. 61). Thus, some of the criticism is ill- -Founded. SSCI, Book IV, "History," pp. 62-63. interview with+past and current CIA official (A), 5/30/79. Interview with Gen. George Keegan, 2/10/79. Keegan also said that he was present at a meeting between President Eisenhower and President- elect Kennedy in which Eisenhower said: "You must never let the Pentagon ane military intelligence put your party at risk." The personnel figures were cited in an interview with past and current CIA official (B), 5/30/79. Actually, OSR's work has not expanded steadily in some areas. For example, after 1967 OSR commenced work on some “friendly” countries and also Net assessments, which McNamara approved but was opposed by the services. Helms reportedly was embarrassed, and asked OSR to stop. (Interview with Gen. Daniel Graham, 5/9/79). At least one author maintains that Colby restricted OSR to current intelligence work. (Paul W. Blackstock, “The Intelligence Community Under the Nixon Administration," Armed Forces and Society, Vol. I, No. 2 Feb. 1975, p. 239). John Huizenga, in testimony to the SSCI, 1/26/76, gvoted in sSscr, Book I, p. 76. All testimony of officials to the SSCI remains classified. James Schlesinger, testimony to the SSCI, 2/2/76, quoted in SSCI, Book I, p. 76. Interview with Andrew Marshall, 2/9/79. Albert Wohistetter originally published his findings in three articles in Foreign Policy, entitled: "is there a Strategic Arms Race?" (No. 15, Summer 1974); "Rivals, But No Race,” (No. 16, Fall 1974); and “How to Confuse Ourselves" (No. 20, Fall 1975). A more ex- tended version was published by the United States Strategic Institute, Legends of the Strategic Arms Race, USSI Report 75~—1. Wohlstetter did not use the Niles for his data, but rather relied on the predictions within the Annual Posture Statements, and Defense Program and Budget Statements, of the Secretary of Defense.
72. 73. See, "Bush, Cline Colby and Helms on the CIA," The Washington Quarterly: A Neview of Strategic and International Studies, Vol. 1 No. 4 (Autumn 1978), published by the Center sor Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, p. 28. Interview with past and current CIA official (A), 2/9/79. CHAPTER III: THE DCI'S MANAGEMENT OF STRATEGIC NIEs AT THE DRAFT STAGE 9. 10. ll. 12. 13. 14. 15. SSCI, Final Report, Bock IV, "History of the CIA," by Anne Karalekas, op. cit., p. 14, fn. 7. Ibid. This official was identified later to the author as Wait Eléers, McCone's executive assistant. Freedman, U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, op. cit., p. 74. Interview with William Hyland, 11/17/78 (on President Johnson); Inter- view with past and current CIA official (A), 2/9/79 (on President Carter). Interview with Anne Karalekas, 10/13/78. Por example, See Ray Cline, Secrets, Spies and Scholars, op. cit., pp. 140-144. As an ONE staff member, Cline participated in the first Net Assessment at the Pentagon, an undertaking reporting directly to a special NSC subcommittee. Under Kennedy and Johnson, Net Assessiients were done in the systems analysis shop under the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Under Nixon, there was a Net Assessment unit on the NSC staff, which later was moved back to OSD. SSCI, Book IV, "History," p. 80 and 81 (fn. 14). Interview with past ard current CIA official (A), 2/3/79, about Dulles’ briefings to Congress. Tales about Dulles' refusal to discuss policy implications at NSC, referring the questions to his brother, are legendary. Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets, op. cit., p. 162. Ibid. Ibid. See, for example, John D. Leacacos, "Kissinger's Apparat,” Foreign Policy 5 (Winter 1970), p. 22. Also: Interview with Andrew Marshall, 2/9/79; and Freedman, op. cit., pp. 46-47. Interview with past and current CIA official (A), 2/9/73. Ibid., 5/30/79. Freedman, op. cit., pp. 37-39. However, Sherman Kent told this author that, in the early 1950s, disagreements occasionally were carried forward to IAC. (Interview, 5/2/78).
16. 17. 17a. 13. 19. 20. 22. 23. 24, 25. 26, 27. 28. 29. 30. -g8- Freeduan, op. cit., p. 38. Interview with Richard Helms, 6/7/79. Interview with past and current CIA official (A), 5/30/79. Interview with Andcew Marshall, 2/9/79. Freedman, op. cit., p. 36. Fur example, interviews with Ray Cline (5/2/78), Robert Amory (9/13/78), John Huizenga (10/26/78), and Williard Matthias (10/25/78). However they agree that there was a qualititative difference in the two DCIs' relationship with the Board. Dulles is described as “enjoying” Board members, whereas McCone "respected" them. Under McCone, the relation- ship was more fermal and sometimes characterized by mutual distance. There is some disagreement abcut when and if this occurred. Cline wrote that it occurred under McCone, and may have weakened estimative work. (Cline, Secrets, op. cit., p. 2C0). Later, Cline said that the transfer did not occur until after he left as DDI, and Kent persuaded Helms that the move was a good thing, since Kent might have more independence. (Interview with Ray Cline, 8/20/78,. John Huizenga denies that this move ever took place (Interview, 10/26/78). SSCI, Book IV, “History,” p. 81. Ibid. Interview with past and current CIA official (B), 5/30/79, and con- firmed by Gen. Daniel Graham, interview of 12/7/78. The SSCI aiso concluded that the Pentagon had not always provided the CIA with access to US strategic planning data. (See, SSCI, Final Report, Book I, op. cit., p. 266). For this and the following, interview with R. Jack Smith (the then DDI), 9/20/78. Also, interview with pasc and current CIA official (C), 12/15/78. Freedman, op. cit., p. 52. SSCI, Book IV, "History," p. 86. Also, interviews with Keith Clark (9/19/78) and Jack Smith (9/25/78), and undenied by other Board members. Clark maintains that ONE was not as in-bred as the Board in the early 1970s. | Interview with Keith Clark, 9/19/78, reaarding the one Board appointee, who was an Admiral. By 1973, there were several vacancies on the Board, in part because Schlesinger's intended reorganization was known. Interview with Keith Clark (9/19/78) snd Hal Ford (12/7/78). Interview with Tom Lattimer, 5/10/79. Interview with past and current CIA o”ticlal (B), 5/30/79.
32. 33. 34. 34a. 35. 36. 37. 28. 33. 40. 41. 42. - 9- Freedman, op. cit., p. 43. McNamara's requests for work from ONE, OSR and OEX (Orfice of Economic Research, which did pomb damage assessments during the Vietnam war) have been well documentec. (See, for example, SSCI, Book IV, "History," pp. 680-81). Freedman, op. cit., p. 36. Also interview with Fritz Ermath, 10/26/78, who later joined OSR, first as a RAND consultant. Ray Cline gcses even further, and criticizes the creation of the DDS&T as well. Cline maintains, thereby, "that CIA advocacy of its own scientific collection techniques became mixed up with its objective analysis of all scientific and technical developments. The appearance of objectivity was hard to maintain when analysis and collection were supervised by the same staff." (Cline, Secrets, op. cit., p. 200). Interview with John Huizenga (9/13/78) and Keith Clark (9/19/78). Colby often is regarded as the “executor of Schlesinger's will.” However, both interviewees confirmed that Schlesinger had not made up his mind about the precise form of reorganization. Interviews with Keith Clark (11/3/78), John Huizenga (10/26/78), William Hyland (11/17/78) and Hal Ford (12/7/78). Clark said that Schlesinger wanted the NIEs short enough “to make any NSC member ashamed of nct having read them.” Actually, Schlesinger's approach clashed with that of Henry Kissinger who, in effect, wanted longer NIEs. Office of Management and Budget, "A Review of the Intelligence Community, March 10, 1971, known as the Schlesinger Report, p- 10a. See also, Blackstock, “The Intelligence Community Under the Nixon Administration,” op. cit., p. 232. Interview witn Daniel Graham, 5/9/79. Interview with William Colby, 5/29/79. William Colby, testimony to SSCI, 12/11/75, cited in SSCI, Book I, p. 75, fn. 17. Earlier,diffusion of responsibility was viewed as an advantage, protecting individuals from outside pressure. Interview with William Colby, 5/29/79. Interviews with John Huizenga (9/13/78) and Sam Hooskinson (11/9/78). As Colby told Keith Clark, "I want to multiply myself by twelve." (Interview with Clark, 9/19/78). SSCI, Book IV, “History," p. 86. Admiral Turner has continued the MBO system, although its impact on DDO and DDI interaction remains simited. (Interview, current CIA official (H), 9/25/79). Interview with William Colby (11/17/78) and Jack Maury (8/24/78). See also, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA {N¥: Simon and Schuster, 1978) pp. 364- Colby belived that Angleton’s suspicions about the DDO’s Soviet desk sources were inhibiting effective political intelligence gathering.
Retrwen so ern ingens or acammeciememuinatine qmme sactent & ten 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49, 50. Sl. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. - 10 - See, "Bush, Cline, Colby and Helms on the CIA,” The Washington Quarterly, Autumn 1978, op. cit., p. 29. Interview with past and current CIA officials (A) (2/9/78) and {(C) (2/15/78). They agree that aa the pace of the Senate investigations of the CIA increased, the attenticn Colby could devote to each NIE declined. U.S. Congress, Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee, Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China-1975 (Washington, be: GPO, 1976), po. 54. SSCI, Book I, p. 434. Interviews with Tom Lattimer (5/10/79), Sam Hooskinson (11/9/78) and Richard Betts (5/3/79). Reportediy, one Panel member said that he didn't have enough to do. Interview with current CIA officials (D) and (J), 12/15/78. Interview with Ray Cline, 11/8/78. Interview with past and current CIA official (A), 5/30/72. Freedman, op. cit., p. 37. The Pentagon, always has prepared severai Soviet strategic estimates relating to different, U.S. joint defense planning parameters. For example, in the 1960s these included the National Intelligence Projections for Planning (NIPP), a ten-year projection, to which McNamara encouraged CIA input. The JCS annually produced several estimates ranging from 2-15 years. Under McNamara, the Pentagon also prepared a separate “worst-case” Soviet estimate, based on his interest in keeping this kind of estimating out of the strategic NIEs. This was called the "Greater Than Expected Threat” estimate. As excellent summary of the problem is provided by Gen. Daniel Graham, "Estimating the Threat: A Soldier's Job," Army, April 1973, pp. 14-18. Several interviews suggested that alliances were more or less "automatic" to provide offsetting predictions. For example, inter- views with Helmut Sonuenfeldt (11/30/78), Williard Matthias (10/28/78) and William Hyland (11/17/78). Freedman, op. cit., p. 25. Allen Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence, op. cit., p. 52. This was accomplished in McCona's new office, for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation, established in 1963 to improve interaction between components of the intelligence community. See, Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept The Secrets, op. cit., p. 160. Ibid. wie
75. 76. 77. 78. 73. 80. - 12 - Interview with Andrew Marshall (2/9/79) and Tom Lattimer (5/10/79) who says "DIA's interest goes up and down." Interview with past and current CIA official (A) (2/9/79 and 5/30/79), and Andrew Marshall (2/3/79), who both agree as well that this method helps eliminate “red herrings" and serves as a means tc check minor arithmetic errors. Interview with Gen. Daniel Graham, 5/9/79. Also, Graham, "US Intelliyence at the Crossroads," op. cit., p. ll. Interview with past and current CIA official (A), 5/30/79. Ibid. Also, interview with past and current CIA official (C), 12/15/78. This paragraph is derived from interview with current CIA official (BE), 9/25/79. CHAPTER IV: SUBSTANTIVE INPUT OF DCIs TO THE DRAFT STRATEGIC NIEs* SSCI, Final Report, Book I, op. cit., Pp. 258. For example, interviews with Ray Cline, 5/1/78 and 11/8/78. Although DCI's review was considered vart of the process, Cline also said that it worried Sherman Kent, lest this link the NIEs too closely to policy considerations. Interview with Bromley Smith, 9/12/78. ‘Also, interview with Robert Amory, 9/13/78, who as Dulles' DDI was a member of the NSC's Planning Board. Interview with John Bross, 5/29/79, who was quoting Ernie May, later a member of The Murphy Commission. While interviewees agree on this point, they vary in describing how much of the NIE Dulles might read at this time. To this author, this suggests inconsistent attention to different NIEs by the DCI. For example, one interviewee said that Dulles "flipped through the pages" (Jack Smith, 9/20/78}; but Sherman Kent said that "he knew what was in every estimate. The important ones he studied very carefully. He never talked about one which he hadn't read." (Interview 5/2/78). Stories of how Dulles kept Kent waiting into the early evening and, then, sometimes became distracted during the NIE discussions, are legendary. ‘Se following analysis is derived from multiple interviewees. Unless there is a difference of opinion, oniy the principal source or sources is cited.
9. 16. ll. 12. 13. 14. 18. -~13- Interviews with Ray Cline (5/1/78), and Keith Clark (9/19/78 and 11/3/78). Cline said that, in his heart, Dulles preferred using his own words in the NIEs and, at this time, might dictate a new sentence or paragraph to Kent. If there was quibbling among Board members over words, Dulles might say: "I'm the boss” and insist on his own wording. Clark said that Dulles believed that the NIEs should offer firm predictions and/or give odds on the likelihocd of occurrence "“*tyoutre paid to estimate,'" he once told the Board. Interviews with Ray Cline (5/1/78), Paul Borel (9/1/78) and Sherman Kent (5/2/78). Kent said that Dulles could be "genially bull-headed@” about a non-strategic NIE and, on occasion, insisted that his judge~ ment be represented. Cline concurs. ‘erel said that once Dulles rewrote an entire SNIE and the Board Cissented from it. Interview with Deforest Van Slyck, 5/2/78. Clir:, Secrets, Spies and Scholars, op. cit., p. 143. Hanson Baldwin, New York Times, May 6, 1970. Interview with Ray Cline, 11/8/78. Cline says that McCone did not want to say: "This is my estimate." He believed that "the NIE system was bigger than he was,” and would have preferred to take a feotnote himself. - Interviews with Gen. Daniel Graham (12/7/78) and William Hyland (11/17/78). Graham says that McCone once told General LeMay at a cock- tail party: "'Aiz Force Intelligence is the laughing stock of Washington.'" As AEC Chairman, McCone had been on the low side of the missile way predictions, basing this on the AzC's estimate of Soviet fissiuneble material. Freedman, U.$. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, op- cit., pp. 75-77. Since the CIA's estimates kept changing in different Grafts during this period, these figures merely provide one indica- tion of downward revision. Ibid., p. 101. Interview with John Bross, 5/29/79. Cline, Secrets, op. cit., p. 192. Interview with John Bross, 5/29/79. Interviewees disagree on McCone's level of involvement, which to this author indicates inconsistent attention to different NIES, and McCone's preference for keeping his personal views out of the draft. Most interviewees indicated a high degree of serious interest on McCone’s part. However, three said that McCone's policy was "not to get involved" (Sam Hooskinson, 11/9/78), that he "never interfered with the process," (Williard Matthias, 10/25/78, and that "he was not very interested" (William Hyland, 11/17/78). Cline, Secrets, op. cit., pp. 192-193.
35. 36. 37. 38. 35. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. CHAPTER V: THE DCI'S LEADERSHIP ROLES AT USIB OR NFIB. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Interview with Sam Hooskinson, 11/39/78, who was present. SSCI, Lock IV, “History,” op. cit., p. 85. Interview with William Colby (5/29/79) and Sam Hooskinson (11/9/78). Hooskinson also called Schlesinger a “redrafter." Interview with William Colby, 5/29/79. Ibid. Interview with past and current CIA official (C), 12/15/78. Interview with William Colby, 5/29/79. One interviewee said that Colby believed that the NIOs were there "to advise him on his views" (Sam Hooskinson, 11/9/78). David Binder, quoting a Pentagon intelligence official, in “CIA Head Accused of Tailoring Estimates to Policy; He Denies it," New York Times, Monday, November 6, 1978. Binder said that he based tnis 35799) on interviews with five CIA officials and the PCI. (Intervie 2/9/79). Binder, NYT, Nov. 6, 1978, quoting Admiral Turner. Interview with current CIA official (E), 9/25/79. This paragyaph is derived entirely from interview with past and current CIA official (A), 5/30/79. Ibid. SSCI, Final Report, op. cit., p. 76. Freedman, U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, op. cit., p. 40. Ibid., p. 39. Interview with past and current CIA official (A), 5/36/79. ‘ Freedman, op. cit., pp. 66-67. Stuart Symington, “Where the Missile Gap Went," The Reporter, Feb. 15, 3962, p. 25. Daniel Graham, “The Intelligence Mythology of Washington, Strategic Review, op. cit. p. 61. Interview with Gen. Daniel Graham, 5/7/79. Graham said that Army Intelligence wanted to target U-2 flights on medium-range missile site but the CIA kept searching for ICBM sites. He said this was true in the case of the ill-fated Gary Powers flight of May 1, 1960 about which the Army had argued: "You won't find anything.” See also, Everett Allen, “Lack of Information led US to Overestimate Missile Lag St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan. 27, 1965.
10. li. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 16. 19. 20. 21. “el ~ 16 - Dulles" posture at USIB was described in interviews with John Huizenga (9/13/78 and 10/26/78), Jack Smith (9/20/78), Gen. Daniel Graham (12/7/78), Ray Cline (8/20/78), Hal Ford (12/7/78) and past and current CIA official (C) (12/15/78). Interviews agree thet Dulles listened to lengthy debate but sometimes grew impatient towards the end. They agree that Dulles' “heart was in favor of an unspoken compromise" and he defended the.CIA view only as necessary. How- ever, on non-strategic NIEs he cccasionally was impatient with the CIA as well, and sometimes encouraged the Pentagon to express its views. For example, this happened in the case of a SNIE during the 1956 Suez crisis. (Interview with John Bross, 4/14/78). The Joint Study Group Report on Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Government, known as the Kirkpatrick Report, Dec er ’ + Pe . 6see, Declassified Documents Rererence System, op. cit., #77-270D. @he report also asserts that Pentagon members on USIB were not permitted to appeal its decisions without the approval of the Defense Secretary. Interview with Gen. Daniel Graham, 5/9/79. Freedman, op. cit., p- 70. Interview with Bromley Smith, 9/12/78, who was quoting Generai Andrew Gooipaster, Eisenhewer's Chief of Staff. Colin Gray, "*'Gap’ Predictions and America's Defense," Orbis, op. cit. p. 269. Interview with past and current CIA official (A), 5/30/79. This was confirmed in an interview with Charles V. Muczphy, who also said that during the campaign Nixon was “ups2t" and asked Dulles for his views. Graham, “Estimating the Threat,” Army, op. cit., p. 15. Several in-~ terviewees said that, subsequently, CIA officials blamed the Air Force for influencing the CIA's positions during the missile gap period. See, for example, Allen Dulles, Harper's Magazine, April 1963, in which he writes that the CIA responded to “great pressure” from the Defense Department. See also, Edgar M. Bottome, The Missile 2 : = 2 ry eee Oe eine e-ame Gap: A Study of the Formulation cf Military and Political Policy (New Jersey: Fairieign Dickinson University Press, 197i). Quoted in SSCI, Final Report, Book IV, “History,” op. cit., p. 62. The time and original source of Eisenhower's comment 1s unclear. Letter from P--asident John F. Kennedy to John McCone, Jan. 16, 1962, quoted in SSCI, Bock IV, “History,” p. 73. Freedman, op. cit., pp. 22-23. Interviews with Gen. Daniel Graham (12/7/78), Gen. George Keegan (2/10/79), and John Huizenga (9/13/78). McNamara privately criticized McCone for interfering in internal DOD matters, and resented his requests for help. Freedman, op. cit, p. 23.
~ 18 = 38a. Interview with Gen. Daniel Grahan, 12/7/78. 39. Interview with Gen. George Keegan, 2/10/79 and 10/11/79. Keegan then considered Schlesinger's reforms "non-competitive." 40. Ibid. See also, William T. Lee, Understanding the Soviet Military Threat: How CIA Estimates Went Astray (N¥: Natizonal Strategy Information Center, Agenda Paper Nov. 6, 1977) p. 3*. Lee says that in the early 1970s Air Force Intelligence translated nine basic books on Soviet military and strategic doctrine. Previously, the only translated Soviet book on this subject was that cf the late Marsnal Sokolovskiy, Military Strategy. In the mid-1960s, Keegan had challenged McNamara’s reliance on one translation of this bock (by Thomas Wolfe of the RAND Corporation), claiming what it was full of inaccuracies. (Interview, 2/10/79). 41. Interview with Gen. Daniel Graham, 5/9/79. 42. Interview with Gen. George Keegan, 2/10/79. Neither Colby nor Keegan were particularly satisfied with this methed of resolving dissent. One interviewee said that Colby worried about excessive footnoting. (Sam Hooskinson, 11/9/78). 42a. Interview with past and current CIA official (A}, 5/30/79. 43. Ibid. 44. Ibid. 45. Ibid. 45. SSCI, Book I, p. 79. 47. David Binder, quoting a Pentagon intelligence official, NYT, Nov. 6, 1978. 48. See, Blackstock, "The Intelligence Community Under the Nixon Admin-~ istration,” op. cit., p. 236, and The Murphy Commission Report, op. cit., Volume 7, A ndix U, pp. 11 and 44. Although the DCI carries more weight than Ene other USIB members, one author concludes here that "the DCI's chief tool is persuasion, and the normai outcome when disputes occur is often no more than a partially satisfactory comprco- mise.” (William J. Barnds, p. 12). 49. Interview with Richard Helms (6/7/73) and past and current CIA official (A) (5/30/79). 50. There is some dispute about whether McCone presented his views to Kennedy from Europe. Ray Cline says that McCone told Kent that he would write a memo to Kennedy, but never did so. Rather, McCone's DDCI went to see Kennedy. (Interview, 11/8/78). Another interviewee said that McCone "went tc the White House more than once with his own views” on other NIEs. (William Hyland, 11/17/78). 51. Interview with past and current CIA official (A), 5/30/79. He also . Said that McCone “felt strongly" about the Soviet's ABM potential and “sharply modified" the CIA text. (Interview, 2/9/79).
52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 73. 74, 75. -~ 19 - For example, see Freedman, op. cit., p. 93. poid. Interview with William Colby, 5/29/79. Bowever, on other matters Colby wrote: "Helms had far too exquisite a sense of political realities to get into a fight he knew he couldn't win, and which could hurt both CIA and himself." (See, Colby, Honorable Men, op. cit., p- 330). SSCI, Book I, p. 80, fn. 29. Interview with CIA official (I), 9/25/79. Powers, The Man Who Kept The Secrets, op. cit., p. 177. See, for example, SSCI, Book I, p. 77 and Laurence Lynn in The Murphy Commission Report, op. cit., Volume 7, Appendix U, p- 48. SSCI, Book I, p. 78 and fn. 25. Interview with Gen. George Keegan, 10/11/79. Interview with Hal Ford, 12/7/78, pertaining to the National Security Agency. Interview with Gen. Daniel Graham (5/9/79) and Dick Anderson (5/10/79). Interview with Gen. Daniel Graham, 5/9/79. Interview with William Colby, 5/29/79. Interview with Gen. Daniel Graham (5/9/7%) and John Bross (5/29/79). Interview with William Colby (5/29/79) and Gen. Daniel Graham (5/9/79). Interview with William Colby, 5/29/79. Interview with Gen. Daniel Graham, 5/9/79. David Binder, NYT, Nov. 6, 1978. Ibid., in an interview with Admiral Turner. Binder, draft of NYT article (provided to the author), prepared Oct. 12, 1978. Binder, NYT, Nov. 6, 1978. Interviews with current CIA official (£) (9/25/79) and past and current CIA official (A) (5/30/79). , Ibid.
~ 20 - CHAPTER VI. THE DCI'S ROLE IN PROMOTING INDEPENDENT REVIEW 1. SSCI, Final Report, Book Iv, "History," op. cit., p. 19. 2. Interviews with Klaus Knorr (5/30/79), Hal Ford (12/7/78), Paul Borel (9/1/78) and Gen. Daniel Graham (12/7/79). 3. Interview with Klaus Knorr, 5/30/75. 4. Ibid. 5. Freedman, U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, op. cit., p. 40. . “6. Ibid. 7. %<nterview with Klaus Knorr (5/30/79) and Ray Cline (5/2/78). 3. Freedman, op. cit., p. 40. 9. SSCI, Book I, testimony of Ed Proctor (former DBI) of 3/1/76, p. 276, fn. 46. These studies were self-initiated and remain classified. Also, interviews with Ray Cline (8/20/78) and current CIA official (K) 5/39/79). 10. See, for example, Blackstock, "The Intelligence Co.munity Under the Nixon Administration,” op. cit., p. 241. 11. Interview with George Keegan, 10/11/79. Other subcommittee chairman are automatically appointed by the Defense Secretary, such as for _GMIC's successor. 12. Freedman, op. cit., p. 50. See also, John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973) 7 13. SSCI, Book I, p. 276. 14. SSCI, Book IV, "History,” p. 85. 15. SSCI, Book I, p. 271. 16. Ibid. 17. Lee, Understanding The Soviet BiLetary Threat, op. cit., in a Foreword by Eugene ¥V. Rostow, p. Ll. This iS also referréd to as "mirror imaging." | . 18. Interview with anonymous past CIA official, 4/5/79. See also, The Murphy Commission Report, op. cit., Vol. 7, Appendix U, p. 75, and interview with william Casey (PFIAB member in Fate 1376), 3/7/79. 19. SSCI, Subcommittee on Collection, Production, and Quality, The National Intelligence Estimates A-B Team Episode Concerning Soviet Strategic Capability and Objectives (Washington, DC: GPO; Feb. 16,1978), Pp. e 4 20. Interview with Wiliiam Colby, 5/29/79.
21. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. v7) we ° dad poy , 35. 36. - 21 - Interview with Gen. Daniel Graham, 5/7/79. Graham said that, throughout 1975, PFIAB asked Colby several times to authorize an outside review, Lit Coiby hesitated on security grounds. Interview with Gen. George Feeqan, 2/10/79. SSCI, The National Intelligence Estimates A-B Teim Episode, op. cit., p. 2. fbid. Interview with William Colby (5/29/79 and Fritz Ermath (10/26/79). However, the experiment soon became an administrative nightmare and the effort to preserve secrecy failed. William Casey described Bush's attitude at the end of the year as "not too positive." Interview, 5/7/79. David Binder, “New CIA Estimate Finds Soviet Seeks Superiority in Arms," NYT, Dec, 26, 1976. The article is reproduced in Lee, Understanding the Soviet Military Threat, op. cit., p. 53-69. Apparently, it is this article which later caused controversy. David Binder, draft of NYT article (provided to the author), prepared Dec. 23, 197€. Binder based hie story on interviews with Bush and othec participants. Ibid. (draft). Binder, NYT, Dec. 26, 1976. Ibid. {tbid. SSCI, The Na*ional Intelligence Estimates A-B Team Episode, op. cit., "Separate Views of Senator Daniel P. Moyninan,”™ p. 9. Binder, NYT, Dec. 26, 1976. SSCl, The National Intelligence Estimates A-8 Team Episode, op. cit., p. 2. The Senate also reported that the press account of the experiment's results "appeared in garbled and one-sided form." (p. 2.). Interview with Keith Clark, 11/3/78. Also, interviews with William Casey (5/7/79) and Gen. Daniel Graham /5/9/79). Interview with current CIA official (F), 9/25/79.
Robert Amory Richard Anderson William Bader Richard Betts David Binder _ Richard Bissell Paul Borel James Billington John Bross William Bundy William Casey Bruce Clark I LIST OF INTERVIEWEES* Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI), CIA, 1951-1961 (9/13/78) Staff, Office of Strategic Research, CIA, 1974:-1977; Staff, House Committee on Intelligence, 1978=-present -(5/10/79) Task Force Leader, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 1974-1977; Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1978: Staff Director, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1979~-present (12/5/78) Staff, Nationa Security Council and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 1975-1977 (9/29/78, 11/9/78, and 5/3/79) Editor, New York Times, Washington office, writer on Soviet bloc and Strategic affairs (2/9/79 and 5/29/7! Special Assistant to the DCI, 1953-1954; Director, Development Projects Cffice, CIA , (for the U-2), 1954-1958; Deputy Director for Plans (DDP), 1958 to early 1962 (5/26/78) Office of Research and Evaluation, CIA, 1947-1550; Director of Administration, Office of National Estimates, CYA, 1959-1962; Assistant to the Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA, 1962-1966 (2/1/78) Staff, Office of National Estimates, CIA, 1954-1957 (10/13/78) Eastern Europe Division, Directorate for Plans, CIA, 1950s; Comptroller, CIA, 1962-1964; Deputy to the DCI for intelligence community coordination (head of National Intelligence Programs Evaluation), 1964-1971 (2/14/78 and 5/29/79) Staff, Office of National Estimates and National Security Council liaison, CIA, 1950-1961 (10/11/78) Under-Secretary of State, 1973-1974; Member, Murphy .Commission, 1974-1975; Member, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 1976-1977 (5/7/79) Staff, Basic Intelligence Division of the Office of ‘Research and Reports, CIA, 1950s; Chief, Military Intelligence Branch, Office of Current Intelligence, and Military Intelligence vivision, CIA, 1969-1967; Director, Office of Stratecic Research, CIA, 1967- 1973; Director, National Foreign Assessment Center (D/NFA), CIA, late 1979 to present *The author lists mainly former pcsitions held relevart to the Strategic NIE process. Date(s) of interview is provided for all interviewees except current CIA officials. page. For them, dates are cited in the footnotes and on a separate ee ke
Keith Clark Ray Cline William Colby John DesPres Fritz Ermath Hal Ford Alan Goouman Lieut. Gen. Daniel Graham Richard Helms Sam Hooskinson Lawrence Houston Staff, office of National Estimates, CIA, 1950-1963; Member, Board of Estimates, CIA, 1963-1973; National Intelligence Officer (Western Europe), CIA, 1973-1976 (9/19/78 and 11/2/78) Staff Director and other assignments in the Office of National Estimates, CIA, 1950s; Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA, 1962-1966; Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, State Department, 1969-1973 (5/1/78, 8/20/78 and 11/8/78) Station Chief, Deputy Director of Pacification, Directcr of Phoenix Program, ir Vietnam, CIA, 19539-1972; Executive Director-Comptroller of CIA, 1972; Deputy Director for Plans (DDP), early 1973; Director of CIA, officially from September 4, 1973 to January 30, 1976 (11/17/78 and 5/29/79) National Intelligence Officer (Nuclear Proliferation), CIA, at present RAND Consultant and Staff, Office of Strategic Research, CIA, 1973-1976; Intelligence Community Staff and B Team liaison, 1976~1977; Staff, Nationai Security Council, 1978 to present (10/26/78) Staff, Office of National Estimates, CIA, 1950-1973; Senior Staff, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 1973 to present (12/7/78) Special Assistant to the Director of the National Foreign Assessment Center, CIA, 1977-1979; Assistant to the DCI, at present Army intelligence officer, 1950s; Staff, Office of National Estimates, CIA, 1955-1965; Director, Defense Estimates, Defense Intelligence Agency, 1970-1973; Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence, 1973; Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, 1973-1978 (12/7/78 and 5/3/79) Chief of Operations, Directorate for Plans (DDP), CIA, 1952-1961; Deputy Director for Plans (DDP), 1962-1965; Deputy Director of CIA, mid-1965 to mid-1966; Direc- tor of CIA, cfficially from June 30, 1966 to February 2, 1973 (6/7/79) National Intelligences Officer (Middle East) CIA, 1974-1977; Director, Intelligence Subcommittee, National Security Council, 1978-1979 (11/9/78) General Counsel of CIA (and its predecessor body), 1945-1973 (3/22/78)
John Huizenga Art Hulnick William Hyland Anne Karalekas Maj - Gen. George Keegan Sherman Kent James King Klaus Knorr Tnomas Lattimer Richard Leyman Andrew Marshall Williard Matthias ' Staff, Office of National Estimates, CIA, 1952-1964; Member, Board of Estimates, 1364-1966; Deputy Chairman, Board of Estimates, 1967-1971; Chairman, Board of Estimates, 1971-1973 (9/13/78 and 10/26/78) Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA, at presen Staff, Office of National Estimates, CIA, 1960-1968; Deputy Assistant for Naticnal Security Affairs, White House, 1969-1973; Director, Bureau of intelli- gence and Research, 1973-1978 (11/17/78) State Dept., Staff, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 1974-1977 (10/13/78) Air Force Intelligence officer, 1950s and 1966s; Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Air Force, 1972-1977, (2/10/79 and telephone con- versation 10/11/79) Deputy Chairman, Board of Estimates, CIA, 1950-1951; Chairman, Board of Estimates, CIA, 1952-1967 (5/2/78 Assistant to the Director of the National Foreign Assessment Center (for academic Liaison), CIA, 1977 to present Member, Princeton Consultants, 1950-early 1960s; Member, Senior Review Panel, National Foreign Assess ment Center, CIA, 1979 to present Staff, Office of Current Inteliigence, CIA, 1958-197 Staff, National Security Council, 1970-1975; Princip Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of Intelligence (and head of DIA), Department of Defense, 1975-1977; Staff Director, House Intelligence Committee, 1977 to present (5/16/79) Intelligence staff, CIA, since 1950; Director, Offic of Current Intelligence in 1570s and deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence, 1976-1977; presently, Geputy to the Director cf the National Foreign Asses ment Center, and National Intelligence Officer (for Warning), CIA National Security Council staff and head of NSC Net Assessment, 1369-1973; Director, Office of Het Assessment, Office of Secretary of Defense, 1973 to present (2/9/79) Staff, Office of Research and Evaluation, CIA, 1947- 1950; Staff, Office of National Estimates, CIA, 1950-1963, Member, Board of Estimates, 1963-1973 (10/25/78)
Jack Maury Charles Murphy William Parmeutter Walter Phorzheimer Vincent Puritano Helmut Sonnenfeidt Huntington Sheldon Bromley Smith R. Jack Smith Howard Stoertz DeForest Van Slyck Staff, Office of National Estimates, CIA, 1950-1951; Chief, Soviet Division, Directorate for Plans, CIA, 1954-1962; Assistant to the Defense Secretary, and the Navy Secretary, 1974-present (8/24/78 and 2/9/79) Former Air Force Intelligence officer, journalist and author on strategic affairs (5/3/78) National Intelligence Officer (Africa), CIA, 1972 to present Legislative Counsel, CIA (and its predecessor body) 1945-1955; Curator, Historical Intelligence (CIA) Collection, 1956-1974 (4/14/78 and 4/16/79). The author gcatefully acknowledges the use cf Walter Phorzheimer's personal clipping files in preparing this study Assistant to the Deputy Director of CIA, at present Defense and State Department analyst. , 1960s; Staff National Security Council, 1969-1977 (10/25/78 ‘" and 11/30/78) Director, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, 1953-1961 (8/8/78) National Security Council staff, 1954-1956, and Executive Secretary, Operations Coordinating Board, 1957-1961; Executive Secretary, National Security Council, 1961-1968 (3/9/78 and 9/12/78) Staff, Office of National Estimates, CIA, 1950-1959; Member, Board of Estimates, 1959-1962; Director, Office of Current Intelligence, 1962-1966; Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA, 1966-1972 (9/20/78) Staff, Office of National Estimates, CIA, 1952-1965; Chief, Photo Interpretation Section, the Office of Strategic Research, SALT delegation representative and special assistant to the DCI on SALT verifica- tion, CIA, 1965~1973; National Intelligence Officer (Strategic Intelligence), CIA, 1973-present Staff, Office of Research and Evaluation, CIA, 1947-1950; Member, Board of Estimates, CIA, 1950- 1960 (5/2/78) ,