DCID  No.  1/14 
13  May  1976 
DIRECTOR  OF  CENTRAL  INTELLIGENCE  DIRECTIVE  NO.  1/14' 
MINIMUM  PERSONNEL  SECURITY  STANDARDS  AND  PROCEDURES. 
GOVERNING  ELIGIBILITY  FOR  ACCESS  TO  SENSITIVE 
COMPARTMENTED  INFORMATION 
(.Effective  13  May  1976) 
Pursuant  to  tiie  provisions  of  Executive  Order  1 1905,  Section  102  of  the  National 
Security  Act  of  1947  and  National  Security  Council  Directives,  the -following 
minimum  personnel  security  standards,  procedures  and  continuing  security  programs 
arc  hereby  established  for  all  United  States  Government  civilian  and  military 
personnel,  consultants,  contractors,  employees  of  contractors  and  other  individuals 
who  require  access  to  Sensitive  Compartmented  Information2  (hereinafter  referred  to 
as  SCI).  The  standards,  procedures  and  programs  established  herein  are  minimum  and 
the  departments  and  agencies  may  establish  such  additional  security  steps  as  may  be 
deemed  necessary  and  appropriate  toen>ure  that  effective  security  is  maintained. 
Purpose 
1.  The  purpose  of  this  Directive  is  to  enhance  the  security  protection  of  SCI 
through  the  application  of  minimum  security  standards,  procedures  and  continuing 
security  programs,  and  to  facilitate  the  security  certification  process  among 
Government  departments  and  agencies. 
Applicability 
2.  The  provisions  of  the  Directive  shall  apply  to  all  persons  (other  than  elected 
officials  of  the  United  States  Government,  federal  judges  and  those  individuals  for 
whom  the  DCl  makes  a  specific  exception)  without  regard  to  civilian  or  military  status, 
form  of  employment,  official  rank  or  position  or  length  of  service. 
3.  Individuals  who  do  not  tneet  the  minimum  security  criteria  contained  herein 
and  who  are,  therefore,  denied  access  to  SCI  shall  not,  solely,  for  this  reason,  be 
considered  ineligible  for  access  to  other  classified  information.  Individuals  whose 
access  to  SCI  has  been  authorized  as  an  exception  granted  in  accordance  with 
paragraph  7  below,  shall  not,  solely  for  that  reason,  be  considered  eligible  for  access  to 
other  classified  information. 
'This  directive  sii|>ersc<les  DC11)  1/14  approved  1  July  HJfiS. 
'"flip  term  "Sensitive  Compartmcutcd  Information"  as  used  ill  this  Directive  is  intended  to  include  all 
information  :i:ul  materials  hearing  special  community  controls  indicating  restricted  hnndline  within  present 
;ind  future  community  intelligence  collection  programs  and  their  end  products  for  which  community 
systems  of  couipartiiu-nLitinu  have  been  or  will  lie  formally  established  The  term  dues  not  include 
Itcstrictcd  Data  as  defined  in  Section  II,  Public  Laws  585,  Atomic  Knrrgy  Act  of  1934,  as  .intended.
General 
4.  The  granting  of  access  to  SCI  shall  be  controlled  under  the  strictest  application 
i»f  the  "nced-to-know"  principle  under  procedures  prescribed  in  the  several  existing 
authorities  which  govern  access  thereto,  and  in  accordance  with  the  personnel  security 
standards  and  procedures  set  fortli  in  this  Directive.  All  persons  accountable  under  the 
authority  of  this  Directive  and  given  access  to  information  (SCI)  containing  sources  or 
methods  of  intelligence  shall,  as  a  condition  of  obtaining  access,  sign  an  agreement 
that  they  will  not  disclose  that  information  to  persons  not  authorized  to  receive  it. 
Personnel  Security  Standards  "  <■ 
""•5.  Criteria  for  security  approval  of  an  individual  on  a  need-to-know  basis  for 
access  to  SCI  are  as  follows: 
a.  The  individual  shall  be  stable,  of  excellent  character  and  discretion  and  of 
unquestioned  loyalty  to  the  United  States. 
#  b.  Except  where  there  is  a  compelling  need. and  a  determination  har  been 
made  by  competent  authority  as  described  in  paragraph  7  below  that  every 
reasonable  assurance  has  been  obtained  that  under  the  circumstances  the  security 
risk  is  negligible: 
(1)  Both  the  individual  and  the  members  of  his  or  her  immediate  family 
shall  be  US  citizens.  For  these  purposes  "immediate  family"  is  defined  as 
including  the  individual's  spouse,  parents,  brothers,  sisters  and  children. 
(2)  The  members  of  the  individual's  immediate  family  and  persons  to 
whom  he  is  bound  by  affection  or  obligation  should  neither  be  subject  to 
physical,  mental  or  other  forms  of  duress  by  a  foreign  power,  nor  advocate 
.  thc.jj.sc.of  force  or  violence  to  overthrow  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
or  the  alteration  of  the  form  of  Government  of  the  United  States  by 
unconstitutional  means. 
6.  In  exceptional  cases,  the  Senior  Intelligence  Officer  (SIO)  of  the  Intelligence 
Community  organization,  or  his  designee,  may  determine  that  it  is  necessary  or 
advisable  in  the  National  interest  to  authorize  access  to  SCI  prior  to  completion  of  the 
fully  prescribed  investigation.  In  this  situation  such  investigative  checks  as  are 
immediately  possible  shall  be  made  at  once,  and  should  include  a  personal  interview 
by  trained  security  or  counterintelligence  personnel.  Access  in  such  cases  shall  be 
strictly  controlled,  and  the  fully  prescribed  investigation  and  final  evaluation  shall  be 
completed  at  the  earliest  practicable  moment. 
Exceptions 
7.  The  exceptions  to  paragraph  5.b.(l)(2)  above  may  be  granted  only  by  the  SIO 
or  his  designee,  unless  such  authority  has  been  specifically  delegated  to  the  he-ad  of  an 
office  of  organization  as  set  forth  in  inter-departmental  agreements.  All  exceptions 
grunted  will  be  common  sense  determinations  based  on  all  available  information,  and 
shall  be  recorded  by  the  agency  making  the  exception.  In  those  cases  in  which  the 
individual  has  lived  outside  of  the  United  States  for  a  substantial  period  of  his  life,  a 
thorough  assessment  of  the  adequacy  of  the  investigation  in  terms  of  fulfillment  of  the
minimum  investigative  requirements,  anc!  judicious  review  of  the  information  therein 
must  be  made  before  an  exception  is  considered. 
Investigative  Requirements 
8.  The  investigation  conducted  on  an  individual  under  consideration  for  access  to 
SGI  will  be  thorough  and  shall  be  designed  to  develop  information  as  to  whether  the 
individual  clearly  meets  the  above  Personnel  Security  Standards. 
9.  The  investigation  shall  be  accomplished  through  record  checks  and  personal* 
interviews  of  various  sources  by  trained  investigative  personnel  in  order  to  establish 
affirmatively  to  the  adjudicating  agency  complete  continuity  of  identity  to  include 
birth,  residences,  education,  employments  and  military  service.  Where  the 
circumstances  of  a  case  indicate,  the  investigation  shall  exceed  the  basic  requirements 
set  out  below  to  ensure  that  those  responsible  for  adjudicating  access  eligibility  have  in 
their  possession  all  the  relevant  facts  available. 
10.  The  individual  shall  furnish  a  signed  personal  history  statement,  fingerprints 
of  a  quality  acceptable  to  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  and  a  signed  release,  as 
necessary,  authorizing  custodians  of  police,  credit,  education  and  medical  records,  to 
provide  record  information  to  the  investigative  agency.  Photographs  of  the  individual 
shall  also  be  obtained  where  additional  corroboration  of  identity  is  required. 
11.  Minimum  standards  for  the  investigation  are  as  follows: 
a.  Verification  of  date  and  place  of  birth  and  citizenship. 
b.  ('heck  of  the  subversive  and  criminal  files  of  the  Federal  bureau  of 
Investigation,  including  submission  of  fingerprint  charts,  and  such  other  National 
agencies  as  are  appropriate  to  the  individual's  background.  An  additional  check 
of  Immigration  and  Naturalization  Service  records  shall  be  conducted  on  those 
members  of  the  individual's  immediate  family  who  are  United  States  citizens 
other  than  by  birth  or  who  are  resident  aliens. 
c.  A  check  of  appropriate  police  records  covering  all  areas  where  the 
individual  has  resided  in  the  US  throughout  the  most  recent  fifteen  (15)  years  or 
since  age  eighteen,  whichever  is  the  shorter  period. 
d.  Verification  of  the  individual's  financial  status  and  credit  habits  through 
checks  of  appropriate  credit  institutions  and  interviews  with  knowledgeable 
sources  covering  the  most  recent  five  (5)  years. 
c.  Interviews  with  neighbors  in  the  vicinity  of  all  the  individual's  residences 
in  excess  of  six  (fi)  months  throughout  the  most  recent  five  (5)  year  period.  This 
coverage  shall  be  expanded  where  the  investigation  suggests  the  existence  of  sxime 
questionable  behavioral  pattern. 
f.  Confirmation  of  all  employment  during  the  past  fifteen  (15)  years  or  since 
age  eighteen,  whichever  is  the  shorter  period  but  in  any  event  the  most  recent  two 
years.  Personal  interviews  with  supervisors  and  co-workers  at  places  of 
employment  covering  the  past  ten  (10)  years  shall  be  accomplished.
g.  Verification  of  attendance  at  institutes  of  higher  learning  in  all  instances 
and  at  the  last  secondary  school- attended  within  the  past  fifteen  (15)  years. 
Attendance  at  secondary  schools  may  be  verified  through  qualified  collateral 
sources.  If  attendance  at  educational  institutions  occurred  within  the  most  recent 
fivc(5)years,  personal  interviews  with  faculty  members  or  other  persons  who  were 
acquainted  with  the  individual  during  his  attendance  shall  be  accomplished. 
h.  Review  of  appropriate  military  records. 
i.  Interviews  with  u  sufficient  number  of  knowledgeable  acquaintances  (a 
minimum  of  three  developed  during  the  course  of  the  investigation)  as  necessary. 
to  provide  a  continuity  to  the  extent  practicable,  of  the  individual's  activities  and 
v»  behavioral  patterns  over  the  past  fifteen  years  with  particular  emphasis  on  the 
most  recent  five  years. 
j.  When  employment,  education  or  residence,  has  occurred  overseas  (except 
for  periods  of  less  than  five  (5)  years  for  personnel  on  US  Government  assignment 
and  less  than  ninety  days  for  other  purposes)  during  the  past  fifteen  years  or  since 
age  eighteen,  a  check  of  the  records  will  be  made  at  the  Department  of  State  and 
other  appropriate  agencies.  Kfforts  shall  be  made  to  develop  sources,  generally  in 
the  United  States,  who  knew  the  individual  overseas  in  order  to  cover  significant 
employment,  education  or  residence  and  to  attempt  to  determine  if  any  lasting 
foreign  contacts  or  connections  were  established  during  this  period.  However,  in 
all  cases  where  an  individual  has  worked  or  lived  outside  of  the  US  continuously 
for  over  five  years,  the  investigation  will  be  expanded  to  cover  fully  this  period  in 
his  life  through  the  use  of  such  investigative  assets  and  checks  of  record  sources  as 
may  be  available  to  the  US  Government  in  the  foreign  country(ies)  in  which  the 
individual  resided. 
k.  In  those  instances  in  which  the  individual  has  immediate  family  members 
or  other  persons  with -whom  he  is  bonded  by  affection  or  obligation  in  any  of  the 
situations  described  in  subparagraph  5b.(2).  above,  the  investigation  will  include 
an  interview  of  the  individual  by  trained  security,  investigative  or  counter- 
intelligence personnel  to  ascertain  the  facts  as  they  may  relate  to  the  individual's 
access  eligibility. 
I.  In  all  cases  the  individual's  spouse  shall  at  a  minimum  be  checked  through 
the  subversive  files  of  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  and  other  National 
agencies  as  appropriate.  When  conditions  indicate,  additional  investigation  shall 
be  conducted  on  the  spouse  of  the  individual  and  members  of  the  immediate 
family  to  the  extent  necessary  to  permit  a  determination  by  the  adjudicating 
agency  that  the  provisions  of  paragraph  5,  Personnel  Security  Standards,  above, 
arc  met. 
in.  A  personal  interview  of  the  individual  will  be  conducted  by  trained 
Security,  investigative  or  counterintelligence  personnel  when  necessary  to  resolve 
any  significant  adverse  information  and/or  inconsistencies  developed  during  the 
investigation. 
12.  Where  a  previous  investigation  has  been  conducted  within  the  past  five  years 
which  substantially  meets  the  above  minimum  standards,  it  may  serve  as  a  basis  for
grunting  access  approval  provided  a  review  of  (lie  personnel  and  security  files  does  not 
reveal  substantive  changes  in  the  individual's  security  eligibility.  If  a  previous 
investigation  does  not  substantially  meet  the  minimum  standards  or  if  it  is  more  than 
five  years  old,  a  current  investigation  shall  be  required  hut  may  he  limited  to  that 
necessary  to  bring  the  individual's  file  up-to-date  in  accordance  with  the  investigative 
requirements  set  forth  in  paragraph  1 1  above.  Should  new  information  be  developed 
during  the  current  investigation  which  hears  unfavorably  upon  the  individual's 
activities  covered  by  the  previous  investigation,  the  current  inquiries  shall  be  expanded 
us  necessary  to  develop  full   'etails  of  this  new  information.  ,   ' 
13.  Programs  shall  be  instituted  requiring  the  periodic  reinvestigation  of 
personnel  provided  access  to  SCI.  These  reinvestigations  will  be  conducted  on  a  five- 
year  recurrent  basis,  but  on  a  more  frequent  basis  where  the  individual  has  shown  some 
questionable  behavioral  pattern,  his  activities  are  otherwise  suspect,  or  when  deemed 
necessary  by  the  SIO  concerned.3 
14.  The  scope  of  reinvestigations  shall  be  determined  by  the  SIO  concerned  based 
on  such  considerations  as  the  potential  damage  that  might  result  from  the  individual's 
defection  or  willful  compromise  of  SCI  and  the  availability  and  probable  effectiveness 
of  other  means  to  continually  evaluate  factors  related  to  the  individual's  suitability  for 
continued  access.  In  all  cases,  the  reinvestigation  shall  include,  as  a  minimum, 
appropriate  National  agency  checks,  local  agency  (including  overseas  checks  where 
appropriate),  credit  checks  and  a  personal  discussion  with  the  individual  by  trained 
investigative,  security  or  counterintelligence  personnel  when  necessary  to  resolve 
significant  adverse  information  or  inconsistencies. 
15.  The  evaluation  of  the  information  developed  by  investigation  on  an 
individual's  loyalty  and  suitability  shall  be  accomplished  under  the  cognizance  of  the 
SIO  concerned  by  analysts  of  broad  knowledge,  good  judgment  .and  wide  experience  in 
personnel  security  and/or  counterintelligence.  When  all  other  information  developed 
on  an  individual  is  favorable,  a  minor  investigative  requirement  which  has  not  been 
met  should  not  preclude  favorable  adjudication.  Jn  all  evaluations  the  protection  of 
the  national  interest  is  paramount.  Any  doubt  concerning  personnel  having  access  to 
SCI  shall  be  resolved  in  favor  of  the  national  security.  The  ultimate  determination  of 
whether  the  granting  of  access  is  clv-arly  consistent  with  the  interests  of  national 
security  shall  be  an  overall  common  sense  determination  based  on  all  available 
information. 
Continuing  Security  Programs 
16.  In  order  to  facilitate  the  attainment  of  the  highest  standard  of  personnel 
security  and  to  augment  both  the  access  approval  criteria  and  the  investigative 
requirements  established  by  this  Directive,  member  departments  and  agencies  shall 
institute  continuing  security  programs  for  all  individuals  having  access  to  SCI.  In 
addition  to  security  indoctrinations,  these  programs  shall  be  tailored  to  create  mutually 
supporting  procedures  under  which  no  issue  will  escape  notice  or  be  left  unresolved 
which  brings  into  question  an  individual's  loyalty  a»-.i!  integrity  or  suggests  the 
possibility   of   his   being   subject   to  undue   influence  or  duress  through    foreign 
3In  Dot),  an  SIO  may  rei|iiest.  with  the  approval  nf  the  Secretary  of  Defence  or  his  designee,  more 
frequent  reinvestigations  under  special  circumstance*.
relationship!)  or  exploitable  personal  conduct.  When  an  individual  is  assigned  to 
perform  sensitive  compartniented  work-  requiring  access  to  SCI.  the  SIO  for  the 
department,  agency  or  Covcrnment  program  to  which  the  individual  is  assigned  shall 
assume  security  supervision  of  that  individual  throughout  the  period  of  his  assignment. 
17.  The  continuing  security  programs  shall  include  the  followings: 
a.  Security  education  programs  to  ensure  that  individuals  who  are  granted 
access  to  SCI  tire  initially  indoctrinated  and  periodically  thereafter  instructed  as 
to  its  unique  sensitivity  and  that  they  understand  their  personal  responsibility  for 
its  protection.  The  individual  should  be  instructed  that  the  ultimate  responsibility^ 
for  maintaining  eligibility  for  continued  access  to  SCJ  rests  with  the  individual. 
""Therefore,  the  individual  is  encouraged  to  seek  appropriate  guidance  and 
assistance  on  any  personal  problem  or  situation  which  may  have  a  possible 
bearing  on  his  eligibility  for  continued  access  to  SCI,  and  security  counseling 
should  be  made  available.  These  instructions  should  be  conducted  by  individuals 
having  extensive  background  and  experience  regarding  the  nature  and  special 
vulnerabilities  of  the  particular  type  of  compartniented  information  involved. 
b.  Security  supervisory  programs  to  ensure  that  supervisory  personnel 
recognize  and  discharge  their  special  responsibility  in  matters  pertaining  to  the 
security  of  SCI,  including  the  eligibility  for  SCI  access.  Such  programs  shall 
provide  practical  guidance  as  to  indicators  which  may  signal  matters  of  security 
concern.  Specific  instructions  concerning  reporting  procedures  shall  be 
disseminated  to  enable  the  appropriate  authority  to  take  timely  corrective  action 
to  safeguard  the  security  of  the  United  States  as  well  as  to  provide  all  necessary 
help  to  the  individual  concerned  to  neutralize  his  vulnerability. 
c.  Security  Review  Programs  to  ensure  that  appropriate  security  authorities 
invariably  receive  and  exchange,  in  a  timely  manner,  all  information  bearing  on 
the  security  posture  of  persons  having  access  to  sensitive  information.  Personnel 
history  information  shall  be  kept  current.  Security  and  related  files  shall  be  kept 
under  continuing  review. 
18.  Whenever  adverse  or  derogatory  information  is  discovered  or  inconsistencies 
arise  which  could  impact  upon  an  individual's  security  status,  appropriate 
investigations  shall  be  conducted  on  a  timely  basis.  The  investigation  shall  be  of 
sufficient  scope  necessary  to  resolve  the  specific  adverse  or  derogatory  information,  or 
inconsistency,  in  question  so  that  a  determination  can  be  made  as  to  whether  the 
individual's  continued  utilization  in  activities  requiring  SCI  is  clearly  consistent  with 
the  interests  of  the  national  security.
Effective  Date 
19.  This  Directive  supersedes  DCID  1/14,  1  July  1968/  Existing  directives.4 
regulations,  agreements  and  such  other  references  governing  access  to  SCI  as  defined 
herein  shall  he  revised  accordingly. 
•These  include  pertinent  provisions  of  the  Clearance  Standards  and  Investigation  and  Evaluation  sections 
of  the  Communications  Intelligence  Security  Regulations. 
GEORGE  BUSH-    ' 
-     Director  of  Central  Intelligence