Itch.  Corporation  DRAFT--4/24/59 
Political  Action  and  Satellite  Reconnaissance 
Reconnaissance  information  from  overflights  of  the  U.S.S.R.    is 
now  vital  for  U.   S.    security—to  insure  adequate  order  of  battle, 
economic  data,   warnings  of  surprise,    and  the  like. 
Satellites  programs -in -being  and  planned  can  substantially  provide 
this  information --in  preliminary  form  during  1959,    and  in  major  detail 
in  1961  and  thereafter  . 
THE  PROBLEM 
The  problem  is  not  a  problem  of  technology.     It  is  not  a  problem 
of  vulnerability  to  Soviet  military  measures.     The  problem  is  one  of  the 
political  vulnerability  of  current  reconnaissance  satellite  programs. 
For  many  years  the  U.    S.   has  had  overflight  capabilities   (aircraft 
and  balloons)  which  have  been  substantially  invulnerable  to  Soviet 
military  countermeasures,   but  very  vulnerable  politically.     Already       ^___ . 
the  Communists   (East  Germany)  have  attacked  Discoverer  I  as  an 
espionage  activity,    and  we  can  anticipate  powerful  Soviet  political 
countermeasures  to  the  Discoverer /Sentry  series. 
The  programs  are  now  cast  in  attempted  "black"  or  "top  secret" 
contexts  which  are  impractical  to  maintain  except  perhaps  initially. 
The  accuracy  of  press  reporting  of  current  activities  is  ample  evidence 
of  this  problem. 
Such  an  "espionage"  context  is  the  worst  possible  from  the 
view-point  of  political  vulnerability.     Covert  satellites,   being  impractical 
of  hiding  for  long,   are  virtually  as  vulnerable  to  Soviet  political  counter- 
measures  as  a/c  and  balloons  have  been. 
Satellites  are  our  last  chance.     Should  reconnaissance  satellites 
be  "politically  shot-down",    no  scientific  or  technological  opportunity 
can  be  foreseen  to  obtain  this   security  information  during  the  forth- 
coming critical  years. 
THE  APPROACH  TO  A  SOLUTION 
What  is  needed  is  a  program  to  put  reconnaissance  satellites   "in 
the  white"  through  early  and  vigorous  political  action  designed  to:
-  ">    _ 
1.  blunt  in  advance  Soviet  political  countermeasures; 
2.  gain  world  acceptance  for  the  notion  that  surveillance 
satellites  are  powerful  servants  of  world  peace  and 
security,    and  are  not  illegitimate  instruments  of  espionage; 
3.  regain  the  political  initiative  of  the  "open  skies" 
proposal . 
OPPORTUNITIES 
Many  opportunities  for  such  political  action  lie  in: 
negotiations  for  control  and  freedom  of  space; 
weather,  geodetic,  and  communication  satellites 
gradually  establishing  the  freedom  of  space  as  a 
matter  of  common  law; 
negotiations  for  suspension  of  atmospheric  nuclear 
tests  because  they  can  be  detected  by  ground  stations, 
peripheral  air  sampling,    and  satellite  detection; 
negotiations  for  control  systems  to  warn  of  surprise; 
minimizing  direct  political  linking  of  surveillance 
satellites  to  targeting  intelligence  and  alleged  first- 
strike  opportunism  by  operating  reconnaissance 
satellites  through  an  agency  other  than  SAC; 
measures  to  make  evident  to  the  world  public  that 
the  Russians,    to  insure  the  accuracy  of  their  IRBM 
and  ICBM's,    could  well  be  photographing  the  rest  of 
the  world  now  with  their  Sputniks; 
an  offer  to  make  the  results  of  satellite  surveillance 
available  to  nations  through  the  U.   N;  and 
possibly  a  dramatic  "atoms -for -peace"  type  proposal 
to  build  and  operate  peaceful  surveillance  satellites 
in  behalf  of  the  U.   N.
-  3  - 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The  governmental  action  immediately  needed  is  establishing  a 
small  group  to  develop  and  put  into  effect  a  coherent,    imaginative 
political  action  program  phased  closely  with  programmed  satellite 
activities.     This  probably  should  be  organized  under  the  NSC,   v/ith 
strong  participation  by  key,   knowledgeable  personnel  from  State,  CIA, 
DOD  (USAF)  and  the  Killian  office. 
R.   S.    L. 
4-24-59 
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