Consider the overall enemy and strategic situation. Answer such questions as "Is the enemy committed on other fronts? Is this operation a part of a general strategic offensive or defensive? Is this a critical area from the enemy's standpoint? Is this the enemy's major effort?" and others like them to gain a sound understanding of the significance of this area to the enemy. List all the enemy capabilities which will affect the accomplish- ment of the friendly mission considering the availability of enemy ground, naval, and air forces. For each separate capability compute “what, where, in what strength, and when" for each component force of the capability. This must be done in consideration of probable enemy objectives which affect the accomplishment of the friendly mission. Eliminate from the listing the capabilities which are grossly disadvantageous, insignificant, or entirely unreasonable. Reevaluate the list and then group smaller related capabilities and supporting operations into the major capabilities, indicating possible inter- mediate and final enemy objectives in light of the friendly mission. This - reevaluation is extremely important, because each enemy capability must be analyzed against each friendly course of action in the commander's estimate. Consequently, as a practical matter the number of enemy capabilities should be limited to as few as will state adequately the enemy's combined potential against the friendly command. Further, the possibility of duplication and resultant error is greatly increased when a large number of capabilities is considered. Reword each capability until it is clear and concise but still adequately expresses the capability. Certain capabilities may be expressed in a simple sentence or two. Some of the joint capabilities may require three or more sentences in order to make the meaning absolutely clear. Use only enough words, phrases, and sentences to ensure that the commander is left in no doubt as to what the enemy capability is. Finally, state each separate capability as a lettered subparagraph of paragraph 3 of the intelligence estimate. List the capabilities either according to their relative importance in affecting the accomplishment of the friendly mission or in the relative chronological order of their initiation by the enemy. "a, ANALYSIS OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES." In this paragraph the J-2 analyzes each capability separately. He makes the analysis in the sequence in which the capabilities are listed in paragraph 3. Each analysis considers, where appropriate, the effect of all factors discussed under the various subheadings of paragraph 2. No possible course of action will be eliminated with a statement of "none" or “has no capability." If there is nothing to discuss about a listed capability and if no analysis is possible, it should be removed from paragraph 3. Each capability open to the enemy is worthy of complete, detailed analysis. Whereas paragraph 3 considers broad action, paragraph 4 analyzes details. 3-24
Time and space should be carefully analyzed to determine the maximum enemy strength by type of forces during each period or phase and the reinforcement potential in the execution of the capability being analyzed. The enemy should be given the benefit of the doubt. The intelligence officer must always assume, in the absence of positive facts to the contrary, that the enemy will make the best possible tactical decisions, will conduct a maneuver in the best possible way, and will execute movements in the shortest possible time. Thus, to expect the worst guards against surprise. For example, in estimating the time of a possible enemy attack, the major interest from the intelligence viewpoint is the earliest possible time of attack. If our troops can be prepared to resist an immediate attack, they certainly can be ready at a later time. Such a viewpoint requires.a difference in. approach by the intelligence officer than by the J-3, whose concern is the. capabilities of our own troops. Throughout this analysis the J-2 should be alert for indications that the enemy will or will not exercise a particular capability. He should also pay particular attention to the effect the exercise of the capability will have on enemy vulnerabilities, that is, conditions or circumstances of the enemy situation which render the enemy especially liable to damage, deception, or defeat. Here the J-2 considers, in addition to those factors listed in the Significant Strengths and Weaknesses subparagraph, such items as character- istics of the area, enemy tactical doctrine, and the J-2's own background knowledge of the enemy. The vulnerabilities considered should be actual ones either known or deduced. The purposes of this paragraph then are to List significant known facts regarding each enemy capability. Examine those facts in order to fully understand the capability. Determine whether each capability listed is a major one requiring separate listing or should be grouped with others. Determine which auxiliary capabilities should be analyzed in con- nection with each major one. Determine the effect of each capability on the friendly mission. Point up evidence which indicates the relative order in which the enemy might adopt the capabilities and attempt to determine and give reasons for that order. However, care must be taken that relative probability is stated only when it can be justified by indications. [If there are no indications to justify the selection of a particular enemy. capability as most likely to be adopted, the intelligence officer should so state. The basis for determining the relative probability must be sound indications and known facts, and not guesswork. "5. CONCLUSIONS." The final paragraph of the intelligence estimate is the statement of the J-2's interpretation of the evaluated information which has 3-25
been presented, analyzed, and integrated in the preceding paragraphs. It contains the statement of enemy capabilities which the evidence indicates the enemy is most likely to adopt listed in the relative order of pricrity of adoption, if this can be determined. If the probability cannoet be determined, the J-2 should so state. The paragraph is, in effect, a statement of the conclusions the J-2 has reached through a comparative study of the preceding analysis and discussion of enemy capabilities. Since this determination is based on interpretation of intelligence, it must be fully justified by the analysis and discussion of the enemy capabilities in the pertinent paragraph of the estimate. it is objective. It is not an attempt to guess what the enemy will do. It is an attempt to decide from available evidence what the enemy is most likely to do. Probable capabilities are stated in this paragraph only insofar as available evidence justifies the statement. If the enemy is capable of implementing two or more capabilities simultaneously, that fact should be plainly indicated. This also applies to any combination of the listed capabilities. This paragraph should also include when possible a concise statement of the effects of each enemy capability on the accomplishment of the assigned mission. Where possible, the five questions should be answered in stating these capabilities: (1) what it is; (2) where (in what area) it can occur; (3) in what strength it can be accomplished; (4) when it can occur; (5) from where it can be carried out. The final part of the last paragraph of the estimate should list exploitable vulnerabilities. The list is, in fact, a statement of conclusions reached through comparative study of the vulnerabilities discussed in the previous paragraph. The list is confined to vulnerabilities which may be exploited by friendly forces. In determining what should be listed, J-2 must necessarily give some consideration to the feasibility of exploitation by his own commander. However, the recommendation to the commander of courses of action to be adepted is not within the province of the J-2, but belongs to the J-3 after careful coordination and consultation with the J-2. Therefore, in the estimate, J-2 lists those vulnerabilities which may be exploited by the commander and makes no recommendation for specific exploitation. Oo. Recapitulation. With regard to the intelligence estimate the following precautions are emphasized: (1) State the mission clearly. (2) In paragraph 2 do not merely list facts but interpret these facts in the light of possible enemy operations and our own mission. (3) State enemy capabilities clearly, concisely, and completely. (4) Analyze enemy capabilities from the enemy's point of view and not from the point of view of what friendly forces would do in a similar Situation. 5-26
5.9 (5) In conciusion give the order of probable adoption only when sufficient evidence exists in the estimate to justify such a statement. Otherwise state that no order of adoption can be determined. (6) | Remember, the purpose of the estimate is to assist the commander in his analysis of opposing courses of action and help him to arrive at a sound decision. INTELLIGENCE INPUTS REQUIRED IN THE JOINT OPERATION PLANNING SYSTEM (JOPS) a General ‘(1) At _ each stage of the Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS), the intelligence staff officer performs specific tasks designed to assist the command in successful execution of the planning mission. The sperational planning task requires preparation of either an OPLAN or a CONPLAN. An OPLAN is an operations plan for the conduct of military operations which can be translated into an operation order with minimum alteration. Complete plans include deployment or employment phases. A CONPLAN is an opera- tions plan in concept, or abbreviated, format, which requires expansion into ‘OPLAN or OPORD before implementation. In either case, development of the basic plan requires intelligence input. (2) The intelligence input is designed to give all information about the enemy and area of operation which the commander needs to know to. successfully accomplish the mission; it disseminates known intelligence and identifies information needed but not yet available, and it gives necessary instructions and directions to ensure the full and proper functioning of the intelligence and counterintelligence aspects of the operation. (3) Within the text of the plan or order, intelligence input is required in two specific parts regardless of the type of plan. The environ- mental and enemy situations are set out briefly and concisely in paragraphs la and lb of the plan or order, and the detailed information along with the plan for intelligence aspects of the operation are included in the intelligence annex, which is an integral part of the directive or order. A discussion of both forms of input follows. . : b. Intelligence Input to OPLAN (1) Paragraph la: Generai Situation. This subparagraph describes the general political/military envirtSiment which would establish the probable preconditions for execution of the plan. The intelligence officer serves as a focal point for development of this input. Contents are developed through close coordination with the political advisor (POLAD), if assigned, civil affairs officer, and other interested divisions of the staff. (2) Paragraph Ib: Enemy Situation. This part identifies the forces that are expected to oppose the execution of the plan and appraises their general capabilities. The subparagraph should give the information essential to a clear understanding of the magnitude of the hostile threat. 3-27
Generally, the significant aspects of the enemy situation and the area of operations that affect the accomplishment of the mission are included in condensed form. The location, composition, disposition, strength, recent significant activities and capabilities of the enemy along with conclusions about the area are stated briefly and concisely. rom Intelligence Annex (1) Material relating to intelligence in the operation plan or order is placed in the intelligence annex (Annex B). This annex is an integral part of the commander's directive, a means for disseminating known intelli- gence, and the plan for intelligence collection, production, and dissemination of new intelligence to support the directive. It is used by the commander to control and coordinate the joint force intelligence effort. Annexes are prepared for all operations. They are indispensable in operations preceded by long periods of planning. (2) The intelligence annex has occasionally been titled "Intelli- gence Plan." While the annex contains plans for the conduct of intelligence activities, the term “Plan” is not sufficiently specific. An intelligence "plan" could be an intelligence collection plan, a plan containing long-terny generalized intelligence guidance, or a plan scheduling beginning and completion dates for a variety of intelligence activities. (See intelligence Schedule of Events, Appendix B, the intelligence annex to an operation plan, as discussed here.) The missions of a joint force commander as they relate to general, limited, and contingency war situations are so diverse that it is impracticable to develop a comprehensive intelligence pian supporting all missions. The primary vehicle for disseminating specific intelligence and intelligence planning guidance has become the intelligence annex to operation plans and orders. (3) Discussion of the Form. The form of the intelligence annex should be simple, yet flexible enough to be adapted to the situation. It consists of three major parts: the heading, the body, and the ending. Heading Included in the heading are the classification and title of the annex, the identification number of plan or order to which the annex pertains, the name and location of the headquarters issuing the annex, and the date of prepara- tion. Directly below are references to the maps, charts, and documentation needed for understanding the annex. Those references necessary to an understanding of the intelligence concerned with the operation such as special Studies, maps, charts, overlays, or photographs may also be cited in addition to related annexes of the plan or order. 5-28
Body There are five main paragraphs in the body of the annex. In the first, the mission and concept of the intelligence operations are stated. In the second paragraph, information about characteristics of the area of operations, the effects of weather and climate, and the estimate of enemy capabilities which would affect the execution of the plan and accomplishment of the mission are set forth. Paragraph 3 contains the essentials of intelligence activities and tasks which identify total intelligence resources and direct the intelligence effort in support of the OPLAN before and after execution. The fourth paragraph assigns intelligence tasks to meet requirements through orders, requests, and coordinating instructions. The fifth paragraph covers communications/electronics, and miscellaneous instructions are in a sixth, if needed. : Ending The third and final part of the annex contains the signature and authentication blocks and lists appendices. It may also give distribution and acknowledgement instructions. Formats for appendices generally follow the model of the annex. They contain subsidiary additions to the annex and give details that are essential yet too bulky or numerous to include. (4) Discussion of Content. A brief discussion of the contents of each paragraph of the body of the intelligence annex follows. PARAGRAPH 1 MISSION AND CONCEPT OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS Mission. State concisely the command intelligence mission in support of the command mission. Development of the intelligence mission requires detailed analysis of the command mission to determine implied intelligence tasks required for its accomplishment. When Annex B is distributed separately, state the command mission. This is necessary since some units may receive the intelligence annex, but not the OPLAN or order. . Concept of Intelligence Operations. Outline the purposes of intelligence operations and summarize the means and agencies to be employed in directing, collecting, processing, producing, and disseminating the necessary intelligence during normal and crisis periods before and during execution of the plan. All intelligence tasks defined during mission analysis must be covered with adequate redundancy either generally in the concept statement or specifically in paragraph 4, Assignment of Intelligence Tasks. 5-29
PARAGRAPH 2 SITUATION Characteristics of the Area. This paragraph gives pertinent intelligence on the physical, economic, political, medical, social, and psychological aspects and conditions of the area of operations as they may influence the creation of the plan. Information included in the general situation discussed in the basic plan is not repeated. Include sufficient analysis of the area of operations to permit development of appropriate supporting plans. This paragraph may include complete information or preferably reference documents which contain required intelligence. Such references as overlays, maps, charts, and speci { studies pertinent to the plan and necessary for comprehension are cited. It may also reference the latest periodic intelligence report or periodic intelligence summary of the situation. An example of such a reference is "See current Periodic Intelligence Report No. 6, | August 19--, this headquarters." Weather and Terrain. Summarize prevailing weather patterns and those factors of terrain which may influence the conduct of operations. Climatological studies, tide tables, and other special studies may be referenced or extracts prepared from them for the time frame envisioned. These may be included or attached as appendices. Refer to Annex H (Environmental Services). Estimate of Enemy Capabilities. Using detailed characteristics previously developed, give the enemy order of battle, an evaluation of applicable strategic and tactical doctrine, and estimates of the enemy capabilities and possible courses of action which would affect the execution of the plan and accomplishment of the mission. The enemy's capability to discern friendly OPSEC vulnerabilities should be considered. This paragraph may include complete information, may contain a summary of the enemy situation and refer to a complete enemy situation appendix to this annex, or may refer to documents which contain the required intelligence. This is the most important information of the annex and generally resembles the data in paragraph 2 (Enemy Situation) and paragraph 5 (Conclusion) of the intelligence estimate on which the commander's estimate and the OPLAN are based, except that it must be revised and brought up-to-date to reflect whatever new. intelligence may have been developed after to the original estimate. Here the value of expressing enemy capabilities in specific terms of what, when, where, in what strength, and, if possible, from what direction, becomes clear, for the annex is designed primarily to guide and assist subordinate commanders. From their point of view the most important information about the enemy is what he is capable of against their own particular force plus when, where, and to what extent he can initiate action. As in the intelligence estimate, enemy capabilities should not be merely listed, but should also be discussed in terms of thei: 2ffect on the accomplishment of friendly forces' mission and their relative probability of adoption, although toth discussions may be more condensed than they were in the intelligence estimate. 5-30
PARAGRAPH 3 INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES This paragraph will contain the essentials of intelligence (activities and tasks) which identify intelligence resources and intelligence direction, collec- tion, processing, production, and dissemination effort required to support the operation plan. A major part of the intelligence support to the commander of a military operation is rendered before the operation begins. To ensure that the commander is fully prepared, planning identifies the required intelligence effort, proceeding from the EEI through intelligence operations and capabilities/resources planning to tasking of intelligence elements. The inteHigence operations are then conducted to develop the information required for military planning. The supporting intelligence plans will be specificaliy identified. Areas to be covered in this paragraph include Direction. Give guidance for the determination of intelligence requirements, preparation of a collection plan, issuance of orders and. requests to information collection agencies, and checking the productivity of collection agencies. , Essential Elements of Information (EEI). List in order of priority those critical items of intelligence (EEI) and other intelligence requirements (OIR) which are not already available but are needed to accomplish the mission. Indicated are agencies or elements having primary and secondary collection responsibilities. The EEI and OIR are included in the annex primarily to focus the attention of commanders of lower units and others to whom it is disseminated on items of intelligence’ information of special interest to their commander for this specific operation. Units and agencies receiving the annex extract those EEI that they may be able to answer and which pertain to their mission. Using -the collection plan (see Chapter 4), the intelligence officer compares all requirements against available information and establishes priorities. as a means of directing the efforts of collection agencies toward those most critical to mission accomplishment. - Primary and secondary responsibilities are assigned to ensure adequate (intentional redundancy) coverage. EEI and OIR are formed as questions and may be broad in scope. For example, "What is the strength, organization, and disposition of enemy air defense forces in the vicinity of Target Zebra?" and "What. is the enemy's minelaying capability in the GASTONIAN SEA?" or they maybe narrow. For example, "Will the enemy move his armored units up to reinforce Delta Beach?" Normally EEIs and OIRs are continuously refined during the joint planning process and become less general and increasingly specific, as "Does the enemy have guns defensively Positioned in the caves overlooking Blue Beach?" If publication of the annex is deferred, the EEI and other intelligence requirements are listed in the coordinating instruction of the basic plzn. When EEI and other intelligence requirements are lengthy and detailed, they are placed in Appendix 1 of the annex.
New requirements. Give specific guidance to ensure that new intelligence requirements are considered both before and during execution of the OPLAN. Collection. Give guidance for the systematic collection of information in support of identified requirements. The inteiligence collection requirement procedures contained in DIAM 58-2 will be used where applicable. Give guidance for establishing collection activities not otherwise covered by regulation or standing operating procedures, including reconnaissance, ground sensors, ELINT, COMINT, and HUMINT. Any collection plan written to satisfy the requirements of the OPLAN should be referenced here. Signals Intelligence. Give information and instructions on the assignment and coordination of COMINT and ELINT resources. Imagery Intelligence. Give guidance for establishing and conducting photo, radar, and infrared intelligence activities. Human Intelligence Resources. Give information pertaining to the assignment and coordination of operations using human resources. Measurement and Signature Intelligence. Give guidance on obtaining intelligence by quantitative and qualitative analysis of data derived from specific technical collection sensors (other than those normally associated with SIGINT, IMINT, and HUMINT). Other collection activities. Give guidance for collection by other specialized means that may be required to support plan requirements, e.g., visual, amphibious, reconnaissance means. Reporting. Give guidance on reporting of collected intelligence information by all collection sources to be employed in support of the plan. Reference appropriate regulations, directives, and SOPs that specify reporting procedures. Include communications requirements. Do not confuse with inteliigence disseminating reporting described hereafter. Processing. List appropriate guidance for converting intelligence information into usable form. Include required provisions for language and document translation; imagery, signals, and technical sensor processing and interpretation; and other pertinent processing activity. Production. [dentify the production effort, including any intelli- gence products, required to support the operation plan. Include pertinent provisions indicated below. Targeting Procedures: Give guidance for analyzing and devel- oping conventional weaponeering, as required. Aiso list information on distribution of target intelligence, target materials, target list(s), control 5-32
and maintenance of target lists, and issuance of target materials. This subparagraph may contain all the intelligence targeting data required, or it may refer to materials available in other documents. When the target selection criteria in Annex C of the OPLAN include categories of fixed targets, a list of selected fixed targets which is responsive to those criteria is required and will be in Appendix 4 to Annex B. However, consolidation of target lists for different operation plans is permissible; and, with appropriate references, these lists may be contained in a separate document. Concept: Summarize the guidelines followed in developing or preparing to develop targets (fixed/mobile) which are responsive ‘to target selection criteria contained in Annex C of the OPLAN. Included will be geographic areas, categories, and constraints. Other. Establish procedures by which assigned elements can produce, or nonorganic agencies can furnish, other forms of intelligence required to support the operation. If production capabilities of other agencies are to be exploited, tasking statements and formal agreement for assumption of such responsibilities should be completed. Details of production require- ments, schedules, distribution, etc., may be included in appendices. Give consideration to indications and warning intelligence, current or operational intelligence, estimative intelligence, basic intelligence, and scientific and technical intelligence. Dissemination. Furnish necessary guidance for the conveyance of intelligence in a suitable form (oral, graphic, or written) to appropriate agencies. This subparagraph should stipulate the requirements for submission of intelligence reports. Procedures will be established in this annex to satisfy expanded requirements for vertical and lateral dissemination of finished intelligence and spot reports during military operations under all conditions of warfare. Alternate means will be planned to ensure that required intelligence will be giver. to combat units as well as headquarters during crisis and combat operations. Any of the following may be covered by this subparagraph: Intelligence Reports required from units (periods covered, distribution, and time of distribution) Formats for intelligence reports (appendices if required) Distribution of intelligence studies Counterintelligence. Refer to Appendix 3 of the Intelligence Annex. 9-33
PARAGRAPH 4 ASSIGNMENT OF INTELLIGENCE TASKS Orders to Subordinate and Attached Units. Use separate numbered subparagraphs to list detailed instructions for each unit performing intelli- gence functions, including the originating headquarters, component commands, and separate intelligence support units. Requests to Higher Adjacent and Cooperating Units. Use separate numbered subparagraphs pertaining to each unit not organic or attached from which intelligence support is requested. Coordinating Instructions. List any instructions necessary for coordinating the efforts of collection agencies. Include periodic or special conferences for intelligence officers and intelligence liaison, when indicated, with adjacent commands, foreign government agencies, and host countries. PARAGRAPH 5 COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS. Summarize those communica- tions and electronics systems and procedures to be used to carry out the intelligence function or reference the appropriate Paragraphs of Annex K. PARAGRAPH 6 MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUCTIONS. Include here items not included above. Examples of data in this paragraph are SERE, deception, WISP, disclosure of intelligence, public relations, use of specialized intelligence personnel, and composition of the 3-2 staff. , Command Line The annex may have a command Sine followed by the name of the chief of staff. Appendices and Tabs Appendices to the intelligence annex and tabs to these appendices are listed in the ending of the form. Material which does not concern all units receiving the annex or which is too detailed to be included in the body of the annex is attached as appendices. It may be enemy situation maps, intelligence summaries, climatologic studies, tide tables, special studies of the area of operations, or other research studies or detailed plans. An appendix may contain any intelligence produced for the operation plan or the operation order. Under no circumstances should any new or vital facts be placed in an appendix without mention in the body of the annex. Distribution Following the list of appendices, the distribution of the annex is shown. 5-34
5.6 Authentication The annex may be authenticated by the signature of the intelligence officer under the word "Official," or it may be signed by the commander himself. The procedure for authentication is determined by the SOP of the headquarters issuing the operation plan or the operation order. THE SHORT-RANGE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE AND FUTURE PLANNING a. General (1) The use of the intelligence estimate in the joint planning process has been discussed. As was indicated, enemy capabilities listed in the intelligence estimate were inserted in the commander's estimate of the situation. Then in the commander's estimate each enemy capability is analyzed against each practicable friendly course of action to determine the probable effect. ‘The analysis is then used to compare the advantages and disadvantages of each course of action. Based on the analysis and comparison, a decision is made as to which course of action has the best chance of success and will be adopted. (2) The accuracy of the enemy capabilities listed depends on the accuracy, completeness, and timeliness of the information contained in paragraph 2 (Situation) of the intelligence estimate. If the Situation paragraph is accurate, complete, and. current, the Enemy Capabilities paragraph should be accurate, complete, and current. If the Situation paragraph is inadequate in any of those respects, the Enemy Capabilities paragraph wili probably be inadequate in those same respects. For example, enemy capabilities derived from a Situation paragraph that contains “old" information on an enemy Situation will be "oid" enemy capabilities. Consequently, in the commander's estimate, the analysis of "old" enemy capabilities against "future" practicable friendly courses of action will be misleading, and possibly will cause an improper and faulty commander's decision. The currency of both the enemy situation and the enemy capabilities is therefore of utmost importance in the joint planning process. b. Implications When Planning For Future Operations (1) From the foregoing it can be seen that current intelligence on the enemy situation and. the enemy capabilities is required for the intelligence estimate and its associated commander's estimate. But what are the implications when planning for an operation to take place many months in the future? Under such conditions the word "current" as used in preceding paragraphs is misleading and should be replaced by a term indicating that the Situation paragraph must depict conditions as of the date of the future operation. A good word is “future." (In a sense any intelligence estimate covers a future situation, but when any other than the “immediate future® is concerned, an added difficulty is introduced into the planning process.) (2) For example, consider circumstances in which a campaign plan prepared by a high-level headquarters lists phased operations to be 5-35
conducted during the next two years. Subordinate commands under that headquarters must prepare their plans, and among those plans will be one for Phase Il of the campaign plan, scheduled for 18 months after issue of -the campaign plan. To prepare their plans, the subordinate commands each use the planning process sequence-enemy capabilities, commander's estimate (decision), and plan. In this process, assume that an intelligence estimate has been made by the subordinate command using the current situation and that the enemy capabilities from that estimate are used in the commander's estimate in the conventional manner. What happens? The enemy capabilities, being based on the current enemy situation, are current capabilities. They are not necessarily enemy capabilities for Phase Ill, which is some 18 months in the future. If the enemy situation changes appreciably, enemy capabilities will change accordingly. This is an unsatisfactory situation for the com- mander. It forces him to decide on a friendly course of action and to plan that course on a consideration of the current rather than the future enemy situation. In this instance, it would be more desirable to develop a "future" enemy situation. (3) Assumptions. How can the enemy situation 18 months in the future be developed? It can be developed only by the use of assumptions. These assumptions, aithough bridging gaps in knowledge, must be as reasonable and realistic as possible. They should be held to a minimum and include only the assumptions that are absolutely essential to the estimate, for an estimate loses its usefulness if based on a long list of assumptions covering every conceivable contingency. The assumptions should be drawn up only after full consideration of all factors that could have some bearing on their validity. The assumptions should have the concurrence of the J-2 and J-3; they must have the approval of the commander. . ("Assumption is used here in the broadest sense, and the single word encompasses a complex process. For example, in formulating such assumptions, national and joint intelligence estimates are a basis for developing an estimate projected two years into the future. Cc. Types of Essential Assumptions. The types of assumptions that are essential concern the assumed results of friendly operations in previous phases and the effect these operations will have had on the enemy situation. Examples of such assumptions might include that (1) Air and naval superiority in the area of responsibility has been established and will be maintained. (2) Pressure on other fronts will prevent substantial enemy withdrawals or reinforcement to or from other areas. (3) The enemy nuclear weapon stockpile and production level is such that nuclear warfare potential is 50 percent of that held at the beginning of hostilities. (4) Neither side will resort to chemical, biological, or radio- logical warfare. (5) Though the enemy's war-making potential has been seriously reduced and lines of communication disrupted in many areas, he is still capable 3-36
of maintaining 65 percent of original strength, equipment, and material for ground, naval, and air forces opposing our forces. (6) Friendly operations will have reduced enemy ground combat strength by 20 percent and air force strength by 25 percent. (7) Enemy naval forces must operate from bases over a thou- sand miles from the area of Phase II operations. (8) Enemy exercise of governmental functions in the Phase III area of operations will be characterized by an increasing dependence of the central government on the independent, emergency functioning and decisions of local area political chieftains, and a resulting drastic decrease in the currently strong centralized governmental control of those areas. d. Application of Assumptions. After. the assumptions have been developed and approved, they should be applied against the current intelli- gence estimate. This is the most important step in formulating a short-range estimate. The purpose of applying these assumptions to the current estimate is to determine what important changes will develop. In effect, the short- range estimate deals with, and piaces emphasis on, these changes. It will therefore not be as complete or detailed as an estimate of the current Situation, which may be regarded as a companion document to be referred to for details not repeated in the short-range estimate. e. Form_and Content. The content and form for the short-range estimate will fcllow that of the intelligence estimate with two principal exceptions: (1) The assumptions should be-stated after the mission (relative » to the future operation). (2 The discussion of those factors included under Characteris- tics of the Area of Operations, Enemy Military Situation, and. Enemy Uncon- ventional and Psychological Warfare Situation will treat only the important changes that can be expected to develop. f. Other Methods of Using Intelligence Assumptions. The foregoing is one way of estimating which will take into account changes in the enemy situation between the initiation of planning and the initiation of the operation. These assumptions, developed by the coordinated effort of the J-2 and J-3, must be approved by the commander. There are other methods of using the approved assumptions in the planning process. They can be disseminated to all staff divisions, which then apply them to the staff estimate for which each division is responsible, or they can be included in the commander's estimate only along with the other assumptions made by the commander. The use of the short-range intelligence estimate method is preferable. 5-37
6.1 6.2 CHAPTER 6 DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE BY JOINT FORCES GENERAL a. Definition. The dissemination step of the intelligence process is defined as the "timely distribution of information and/or intelligence in the most suitable form to those who need it." (DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms) b. Importance of Timeliness. Rapid transmission of information to both higher and lower echelons is of utmost importance. Procedures must be established to ensure that information received by all echelons is current so that it may serve a useful purpose. Intelligence must be timely, particularly to subordinate units, because of the rapid change of the intelligence picture. This means that intelligence information should be placed in the hands of the consumer in time to permit evaluation and interpretation, formulation ot plans, and initiation of action under the existing situation. The problem is ‘dissemination to lower and adjacent units, to higher headquarters, and within the reporting headquarters. Dissemination to lower and adjacent units is usually the more difficult and more critical task, MAJOR REQUIREMENTS a Efficient dissemination has three major requirements: to get the information to the agencies and individuals who need it, to get it to them promptly, and to get it to them in usable form. b. Determination of Recipients. Since dissemination is properly a responsibility of command, the distribution list. will normally follow the chain of command. This applies to those for higher echelons as well as those drawn up for and approved by the commander of the joint force. In the exercise of this dissemination responsibility, the commander will normally delegate the responsibility to his intelligence staff. These distribution lists are important in getting the information to the place where it is needed and in preventing its indiscriminate circulation to an extent which might endanger security. They must be prepared with care and adhered to scrupulously except in certain emergencies, but they should never be allowed to become an encumbrance. In time of war, rigid restrictions, limited dissemination lists, and overclassifi- cation of intelligence will impede the accomplishment of the intelligence mission. It is a responsibility of the intelligence staff to understand and supply the intelligence needs of all forces and agencies subordinate to or cooperating _ with the force commander. Information does not become intelligence until it is evaluated; it does not become useful intelligence until it has reached the user wno needs it. Cc. Timely Delivery (1) Promptness, or timeliness, of information cannot be over- emphasized. This is a problem of means, and the determining factor in the selection of the means of transmitting intelligence should be the immediate 6-1
urgency of the item to be sent. If the item is not urgent, such as background material or certain strategic information desirable for future planning, the means of transmission selected should be the most expeditious and economical medium available which completely satisfies the requirements of security. (2) Intelligence information for dissemination is first classified as either intelligence which must be passed on without delay or intelligence which can wait for periodic publication. If the item is extremely urgent, the most secure means of transmission consonant with the desired speed should be selected. There will be emergencies when a plain language dispatch is preferred, for the sake of speed, to an encrypted one. There will also be emergencies, perhaps frequently in combat situations, when intelligence must be transmitted by voice radio. The intelligence staff must always endeavor to ensure that security is observed, but the staff must also advise communica- tions operators when the urgency of the information precludes certain norma! precautions. Considerations of timeliness require not only that needed intelligence be transmitted promptly, but that all information be as up-to-dat«: as pessible. Obsolete information may be as dangerous to the command ::s none at all. d. Means of Delivery. The nature, importance, and priority of intelligence should be carefully considered when selecting a method for dissemination so as to ensure timely delivery and a minimum of interference with other communications traffic. The means of transmission include wire, radio, courier messenger, liaison officer, facsimile, televison, and mail. e. Selection of Proper Form. The third major requirement of dissemination is that intelligence reach the commands requiring it in the most usable form. Uniformity in the arrangement of routine intelligence reports and publications is a great aid to the usability of the material and assists in locating specific types of intelligence. There are three genera! forms for disseminating intelligence: written, graphic, and oral. (1) Written. One of the jobs of an intelligence staff officer is to be able to write in clear, straightforward, readable language. The move common methods of written dissemination are (a) Intelligence summaries (INTSUM). (b) Intelligence annexes (plans). - {c) Intelligence estimates. {d) Technical intelligence bulletins and summaries. (e) Dispatches. (f) Letters. (g) Studies (weather, terrain, area, etc.). (h) Order of battle books and pamphlets. (i) Intelligence coverage in operation plans and orders. , (j} Spot reports (SPIREP--See JCS Pub 6 and paragraph 6.3. ({k) Defense Intelligence Notice (DIN—See JCS Pub 6 and paragraph 6.3.) (i) Periodic Intelligence reports (PERINTREP). (m) Prisoner of war interrogation reports. 6-2
6.3 (n) Imagery interpretation reports. (0) Special reports. In addition to using a clear and readable writing style, written material must also be prepared with due regard to legibility and arrangement on the printed page. (2) Graphic. Graphic presentation should be clear, in propor- tion, unified in purpose, consistent in the use of symbols, and legible in details. Nothing contributes more to the clarity of any graphic presentation than unity of purpose. Intelligence charts should be prepared for a specific purpose, each item of information useful for this purpose should appear, and all other items should be omitted. Accepted military symbols should be used on charts and overlays with a legible key in the margin. Graphic presentation, like any other form of dissemination, should be convincing and attractive as well as Clear. Some of the principal methods of graphic dissemination of intelligence are (a) Situation maps, overlays, photos. (b) Air target materials. (c) Motion pictures. (d) Posters. (e) Weather reports, forecasts, maps. (f) Slides. (3) Oral. Intelligence is disseminated orally by (a) Lecture. (b) Briefing. (c) Conference. . (d) Telephone conversation. (e) Radio conversation. (f) Closed circuit TV. DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE REPORTS The Joint Reporting System in Volume II, Part 10, JCS Pub 6, contains four intelligence reports. A brief description of each report is presented below. a. Defense Intelligence Notice (DIN). The purpose of the DIN is to give the Joints Chiefs of Staff, the unified and specified commands, the ' Services, and selected agencies timely intelligence on events that could have a significant effect on future planning and operations. This narrative report is submitted by DIA and normally covers a single development, situation, event, or activity. The primary objective is to report an event, to explain why the event occurred, and to make an assessment of what impact the event could haye on the United States. b. Spot Intelligence Report (SPIREP). The purpose of the SPIREP is to give the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Military Intelligence Center, the unified and specified commands, the Services, and selected agencies timely intelligence on events that could have an immediate and significant 6-3
effect on current planning and operations. Unified and specified commands, Services, and military units of divisional level submit this narrative report whenever a critical development appears imminent or is of unusually high interest to U.S. decisionmakers. The SPIREP is due out as soon as possible, but not later than one hour after the information is received. Further, the report will not be delayed pending verification or the collection of more detail. Amplification or clarification should be sent in a followup SPIREP. C Daily Intelligence Summary (DISUM). The purpose of the Daily Intelligence Summary (DISUM) is to give the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC), and unified and specified commands, the Services, and selected agencies a daily analysis of an actual or simulated (training exercise) crisis situation and a summary of related intelligence of significance produced during the preceding 24-hour period. d. DIA Periodic Intelligence Summary (DIA INTSUM). The purpose of the DIA Periodic Intelligence Summary (DIA INTSUM) is to give the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the unified and specified commands, the Services, military commanders worldwide, and selected nonmilitary agencies timely periodic intelligence summaries on either actual or simulated (training exercise) foreign crisis situations that could have an immediate actual (or simulated) effect on U.S. plans and operations. 6-4
7.1 CHAPTER 7 THE USE OF COMPUTERS IN INTELLIGENCE INTRODUCTION a. Mata Storage and Retrieval. The use of computers in intelligence has been motivated by two fundamenta! factors: convenience and necessity. Foremost is the advantage of the computer to perform routine clerical tasks rapidly. The computer has the capability to reduce significantly the time required to perform numerous intelligence functions. The computer's ability to perform complex functions rapidly and accurately has found many intelli- gence applications, such as in target analysis, wargaming, weapons allocations, damage assessment, and transportation capacity projections. The discovery via automated file searching of a new target of tactical opportunity, for example, may affect an entire war plan with impact on all the existing data bases mentioned. To update and calculate the changes in these data files manually would be impractical and prohibitively time consuminy. The computer performs these updating changes in seconds or minutes. b. Necessity of Computer Support. Necessity is the second motivat- ing force in computer applications to intelligence. As Communist security measures have tightened during the past 20 years, the United States Int-ili- gence Community has been forced to rely more and more on mass collection equipment: electronic (e.g., radar), photographic, acoustic, multisensor, and many other technologically advanced raw information gathering systems. The tremendous volume and complex nature of the raw data thus obtained has made it imperative to employ more and more automatic data processing equip- ment. In fact, without the use of computers to manipulate these data inputs into humanly meaningful outputs, the processing of these collection data would be impossible; manual processing techniques would be so slow that the final analysis would be produced months or years after the raw information carried any meaningful current value. The computer gives currency to these types of data, making them use ful for instant command decisions. Cc. Intelligence Application. The increase in the volume of data collected and the new computer data processing technology have brought into the forefront the need to apply new methods in intelligence analysis processes. In 1962 the Department of Defense authorized a new name for this man- machine intelligence processing cycle, the Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS), defined by JCS Pub 1 as follows: An information system which processes and manipulates raw infor- mation and intelligence data as required. It is characterized by the application of general purpose computers, peripheral equipment, and automated storage and retrieval equipment for documents and photographs. While automation is a distinguishing characteristic of the Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS), individual system components may be either automated or manually operated.
d. Intellige.ce Community Computer Management (1) The Nepartment of Defense Intelligence Information Systein (MODUS) management structure was established in the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in 1977 to handle the long-range planning and management of the IDHS computers and associated telecommunications (IDHSC) assets. DODIIS compenent elements consist of the telecommunications networks and the ADP systems developed and managed by DIA--the military Service intelligence commands, staffs and activities and the unified and specified commands and their component commands. They range in size from the major systems at the Strategic Air Command and Defense Intelligence Agency to a small remote terminal facility supporting the Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, Japan. (2) The basic goal of the DODIIS is "To provide an integrated information handling capability responsive to the intelligence requirements of the National Command Authorities, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Military Services, Unified: and Specified Commands, subordinate joint and Service components, field activities and the United States Intelligence Community." To achieve this goal the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Communications, Command, Control and Intelligence) and the Director, DIA,* jointly agreed that the system must be able -To give better and more timely support to commanders of our combat forces. -To improve the quality and timeliness of the intelligence input to the decisionmaking process. 7.2 SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS a. -ELINT. ELINT is the acronym for Electronic Intelligence. ADP applications for ELINT include information storage and retrieval, automatic report printing, cathode-ray-tube (CRT) presentations, simple measurements, and comparisons to complicated mathematical manipulations, or any number of other analytical requirements--as long as the software is available for the required data-manipulation capability. Its importance as a source of informa- tion is well attested to by the presence of Soviet fishing vessels in coastal! waters of North America, all visibly equipped with elaborate electronic sensors. Computer systems reduce the collected electronic signals to intelli- gible information and determine the type and location of the transmitters. The importance of computers in processing the analysis cycle of ELINT information has already been mentioned. *Memorandum, 12 September 1977, for the Secretaries of the Military Departments; Chairman, JCS; Director, NSA; Director, DCA, 7-2
b. Photointelligence. Photoreconnaissance has been used ever since the Civil War as a means of visually identifying enemy positions and targets, but its modern counterpart has assumed a key position in the collection and exploitation of information for a variety of purposes, e.g., identification of enemy targets (actual and potential), troop movements, logistic supply concentrations and transfers, munitions factories, and mapping and charting. In many cases the effective exploitation of photointelligence would be virtually impossible without the use of a computer because of the mass database of photoframes. The computer performs three essential! support functions: (1) collection management; (2) indexing of photographs; and (3) direct ADP support to photointerpreters. c. Message and Hard Copy Intelligence Reports. The identification and retrieval of hard copy reports are other applications of automation techniques that reduce the time for retrieval. Computer systems being developed today will give the intelligence analyst/manager the ability to screen incoming material from all sources, correlate it with information held in personal, branch, or other computer data repositories, and produce intelligence documents in both hard copy and message form. d. Foreign Scientific and Technical (S&T) Intelligence. A specialized field of intelligence involves the analysis of foreign trend patterns in science and technology. The identification of foreign weapon systems and analy sis of their characteristics, performance, and capabilities are the major aspects of military S&T intelligence. Modern technology permits the analyst to communicate directly with the computer in calculating/estimating weapon systems' capabilities and other technical problem-solving applications as well as in information searches to identify documents pertinent to anaiysis. Extensive use is made of computer-indexed microform files for document storage, retrieval, and display. Machine translation of foreign languages plays a significant role in the analysis of S&T intelligence, and current developments emphasize new ideas for electromagnetic sensor data and integrated event analysis. e. Targeting. Because of the central importance of target intelli- gence in modern weapon systems and wargaming, automation of intelligence began with targeting, starting with a simple punch card operation in the 1940s, progressing by stages in the !950s and 1960s through successively larger and more sophisticated computers. This field of study still forms a major part of the total intelligence effort, and the Automated Installation Intelligence File (AIIF) forms a central file from which many other files are derived. The Target Data Inventory (TDI) is just one of many products of AIIF. The updating of this file daily and weekiy and the transfer of updated items to derivative files would be impossible without computer support. f. Ocean Surveillance. Ocean surveillance information is defined as information derived from the systematic observation of sea areas primarily for the purpose of locating, identifying, and determining the movements of friendly and nonfriendly targets proceeding on, under, or above the surface of the world's seas and oceans. The Ocean Surveillance Information System (OSIS};- managed by the Naval Intelligence Command, is an integrated naval 7-3
intelligence automatic data handling system which processes, stores, retrieves, and disseminates worldwide ocean surveillance information in support of command elements at all levels. This OSIS encompasses ADP equipment and software, communications, displays, and machine-processable databases. Adoption of modern third-generation ADP hardware and software will make possible high volume data filtering, track correlation, and comparison of historical and current information in an operationally responsive environment for analysts and decisionmakers regarding movements of naval interest. g- Tactical interface. The preceding paragraph points to the feasibil- ity of a future extension of the on-line system to the IDHS elements of unified and specified commands and through them to tactical field units. With U.S. forces deployed over such widespread areas of the world, timely exchange of all types of intelligence data has become an ever-increasing need as well as a problem. The increasing complexity of the interface between IDHS and tactical intelligence ADP systems is due, in part, to the widespread introduc- tion of “tactical sensors" into our combat forces. An example of tactical interface requirements is the JCS-directed program, Joint Interoperability for Tactical Command and Control Systems (JINTACCS). Within this program, the military Services are coordinating information exchange requirements for interfacing, as well as operational information exchange requirements. The tactical intelligence systems involved in the interface program are (1) —— Naval Intelligence Processing System (NIPS). (2) Marine Air/Ground Intelligence System (MAGIS). (3) Enemy Situation Correlation Element (ENSCE) (Air Force). (4) All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) (Army). i. Military Geographic Information and Documentation (MGID). Military geographic information is that information concerning physical aspects, resources, and artificial features which is necessary for planning and operations. Documentation is that military geographic information which has been evaluated, processed, summarized, and published. Historically, MGID has been portrayed principally on maps, but maintenance of current and accurate products became unfeasible and costly. The logical next step was to put such information in a computer. Among the files available are those on lines of communication, ports, landing beaches, urban area studies, and helicopter landing/drop zones.
8. CHAPTER 8 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS COUNTERINTELLIGENCE a. Mission. The mission of counterintelligence (CI) is to detect, evaluate, counteract, or prevent hostile intelligence collection, subversion, sabotage, international terrorism, or assassination conducted by or on behalf of any foreign power, organization, or person operating to the detriment of U.S. Military Forces. It includes the identification of hostile muitidisciplined (HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT) intelligence threat, and the recommendation and evaluation of security measures to defeat that threat. Within jurisdictional areas these activities include safeguarding defense information; protection of those Service functions and property having defense contracts or facilities that have been designated as key defense installations; conducting personne! security investigations for Service personnel and contractor employees under the Defense Industrial Security Program; and conducting counterintelligence surveys, services, and inspections. Counterintelligence operations may be divided into three categories: Counterintelligence Investigations, Counter- inteiligence Services, and Counterintelligence Special Operations. b. Jurisdiction and Scope. The jurisdiction and scope of authorized investigative techniques in counterintelligence operations will vary according to legal considerations, operational circumstances, and areas of operations. Limiting directives that may restrict the jurisdiction of counterintelligence elements and preclude or inhibit employment of certain investigative tech- niques and procedures are (1) Delimitations Agreement, which prescribes the Services' counterintelligence investigative jurisdiction and coordinating responsibilities with respect to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Justice. (2) National Security Directives, which prescribe operation limitations and coordinating responsibilities for U.S. agencies conducting security investigations or intelligence operations in foreign areas. These are set forth in classified policy directives issued by the National Security Council. (3) Status of Forces Agreements between the United States and foreign nations in which U.S. forces are stationed normally will include clauses delimiting the jurisdiction and scope of activities of counterintelligence agencies. (4) DOD Directive 5200.27, which is a restatement of the limits applied to military counterintelligence activities, including those persons or organizations affiliated with the DOD. b. Objective. The objective of counterintelligence is to destroy or minimize the effectiveness of the enemy's intelligence system and to furnish operational security (OPSEC) information about friendly capabilities and 8-1
intentions by identifying, controlling, and protecting indicators associated with planning and conducting military operations and other activities. CI supports OPSEC by focusing on the hostile intelligence threat and assisting in developing methods of defeating that threat. This requires the establishment and maintenance of an extensive database on both enemy intelligence capabilities and friendly force indicators, signatures, patterns, and profiles. Countermeasures are then developed to counter the enemy intelligence threat in HUMINT, SIGINT, and IMINT. This is accomplished by denying information to the enemy through security measures, camouflage, and concealment; giving false or misleading information to the enemy by means of ruses, demonstra- tions, and displays; and countering the enemy's sabotage, propaganda, or other subversive activity designed to interfere with the attainment of our established missions. It consists of measures taken by our forces to surprise the enemy through security and deception and includes all the passive and active measures designed to thwart the enemy's intelligence by defeating his efforts to gather information. Counterintelligence is essential to the success of any military operation. The element of surprise in military operations depends not only on reliable intelligence and rapid movement but also on efficient counterintelligence. Also, by denying information to the enemy and thereby decreasing his ability to use combat power effectively, counterintelli- gence aids in reducing the risks of a command. d. Measures. Counterintelligence measures, -adopted to destroy or neutralize the effectiveness of actual or potential hostile intelligence and subversive activities, include the following broad general measures, each of which includes many other specific detailed measures. (1) Security. Counterintelligence security operations are clas- sified generally as operations pertaining to military security; civil security; and port, frontier, and travel security. (a) Military security counterintelligence operations include both passive and active counterintelligence measures taken by a command to protect itself from espionage, enemy observation, subversion, sabotage, or surprise. Typical measures encompass not only those steps taken to prevent disclosure of military information to-unfriendly forces, but also those steps taken to insure the physical security of installations. Security of information is ensured by establishing adequate safeguards and by training personnel to observe precautions such as discretion in their talk, care while preparing plans and orders, and withholding information when captured. Control of both assignment to sensitive duties and access to classified military information is another important defensive counterintelligence measure. This control is supported by thorough and timely personnel security investigations of those individuals being considered for such access or assignment. This permits the selective granting of security clearances to only those personnel who have shown themselves loyal, reliable, and otherwise suitable. A related safeguard is the principle that access to particular classified informa- 8-2
tion be limited not just to personnel with appropriate clearances, but also to those who clearly require the information for the performance of their duties. The detection of disaffection, treason, and sedition within military ranks and civilian employees is also an important aspect of security. Physical security of installations is ensured by furnishing guard forces to assist in protecting them against dangers resulting from tnutinies, riots, strikes, sabotage, espionage, and treason. Additional steps include neutralization of counter- intelligence targets in tactical operations, use of passwords, and special handling of evaders and escapees. (b) Civil security counterintelligence operations include all the counterintelligence activities affecting the civilian population of the area. These operations are extensive in commands with large territorial responsibilities, in heavily populated areas, and in countries faced with insurgency. Typical civil security counterintelligence measures are contro! of circulation of personnel, censorship, security screening of civilian labor, monitoring of suspect political groups, and industrial plant protection. (c) Port, frontier, and travel security counterintelligence operations consist of the special application of military and civil counter- intelligence measures to the control of airports, seaports, land and sea frontiers, international air boundaries, and all nonmilitary travel into and out of an area of operations. Typical of such operations are military travel permit systems, sea and land frontier patrols, and security screening and control of legal daily frontier crossers. (2) Concealment. This consists of employing means to hide or disguise personnel, equipment, and installations from the enemy. They include use of natural co’: r, camouflage, darkness, and smoke. (3) Censorship. This involves a host of well-known activities such as prescribing authorized channels for private communications, suppress- ing information which might aid the enemy, and examining the private correspondence of military personnel. This method is useful also as an instrument for collecting information of value to the enemy. (4) Special Operations. Special operations include the special- ized employment of active and deceptive counterintelligence techniques and procedures in the conduct of secret operations against hostile and unfriendly intelligence organizations and activities. Examples of special operations are (a) Counterespionage--a category of counterintelligence the objective of which is the detection and neutralization of foreign espionage. (b) Countersabotage--action designed to destroy the effectiveness of foreign sabotage activities through the process of identifying, penetrating and manipulating, neutralizing or repressing individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or capable of conducting such activities. (c) Countersubversion--that part of counterintelligence which is devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical subversion activities through the detection, identification, exploitation, penetration, 8-3
—_—_—_—_———_———_ te. 8.2 manipulation, deception and repression of individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or capable of conducting such activities. (d) Counterreconnaissance--all measures taken to prevent hostile observation of a force, area, or place. (e) Counterguerrilla--operations and activities conducted by armed forces, paramilitary forces, or nonmilitary agencies of a government against guerrillas. (f) | Counterinsurgency--those _ military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and other actions taken by a government to defeat subversive insurgency. d. Planning (1) The counterintelligence effort -is directed towards Safeguarding information and material from enemy agents, and detecting agents attempting to transmit information or moving to or from areas in which sabotage, subversion, or espionage can be committed. Counterintelligence planning, therefore, is directed to developing appropriate measures to counter the enemy threat. (2) Planning the counterintelligence measures for, and support of, any operation is concurrent with the planning and conduct of the operation. It begins with the inception of the operation plan and continues until the operation is completed. An excellent procedure for developing a counter- intelligence plan, contained in FM 30-5, Combat Intelligence, consists of the following three phases. (a) An evaluation is made of the enemy's intelligence, sabotage, and subversion capabilities to determine the relative probability of enemy adoption of these capablities. (b) The effect of these enemy capabilities on friendly courses of action is estimated and the effectiveness of existing counter- intelligence measures in countering enemy capabilities is considered. (c) Based on conclusions reached in the counterintelli- gence plan, the worksheet is a systematic listing of all the counterintelligence measures to be carried out by a command, indicating the agencies responsible for the execution of each task. When completed, it either becomes an appendix to the intelligence annex or is incorporated into the annex as paragraph 7. SPECIAL ACTIVITIES a. General. There are a number of activities, not discussed elsewhere in this publication, which may concern the intelligence officer. The typical J- 2 organization may have a Special Activities Office. In some organizations, this office might have a different name. Some joint organizations might have no need for any of its functions. 8-4
b. Functions. The Special Activities Offices are normally responsible for the security and dissemination of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCl)—comprising Special Intelligence (SI) and Special Activities Office (SAO) material--within the joint headquarters. 8-5
APPENDIX A -INTELLIGENCE GLOSSARY OF TERMS Here are listed definitions of intelligence terms frequently used in this publication, or likely. to be needed in the study of other intelligence \ works. All except those designated by an asterisk (*) are adapted from JCS Pub !, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. The others are from unclassified Service publications. Those requiring specific definitions in areas of classified intelligence are advised to refer to DIAM 58-1, Intelligence Acquisition Manual. I. air mission intelligence report--a detailed report of the results of an air mission, including a complete intelligence account of the mission. . 2. armed forces intelligence--the integrated study of the organized land, sea, and air forces, both actual and potential, of foreign nations. 3. basic intelligence--general reference material for use in planning, concerning enemies or potential enemies, which pertains to capabilities, resources, oF potential theater of operations. &, biographical. intelligence—the study 0 of individual foreign personalities of actual or potential importance. People are studied collectively under the sociological and politica! components: of strategic intelligence, and. to. a ‘lesser degree. under economic, armed forces, and scientific intelligence. - de capability—thé ability: to execute a specified course of action. (a capability may or may not be accompanied by an intention.) 7 6. clandestine ‘operation—activities . to: accomplish intelligence,. counterintelligence, and other similar activities sponsored or. conducted by governmental departments or agencies, in such a way as to assure secrecy or: concealment. 7. collection plan--see intelligence collection plan. 8. combat intelligence--that knowledge - of | “the enemy, weather, and geographical features required by a commander in the planning and conduct of tactical operations. 9. counterespionage--a category of counterintelligence the ‘objective of which is the detection and neutralization of foreign espionage. 10. counterintelligence--that aspect of intelligence activity | which is. devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign. intelligence — activities: and to the protection of information against espionage, individuals against subversion, and instal- lation or material against sabotage. i. countersabotage--action designed to destroy the effectiveness of foreign sabotage activities through the process of identifying, penetrating, and manipulating, neutralizing, or repressing individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or capable of conducting such activities.
12. countersign--a secret challenge and its reply. 13. countersubversion--that part of counterintelligence which is devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical subversive activities through the detection, identification, exploitation, penetration, manipulation, deception, and repression of individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or capable of conducting such activities. 14. course of action—I. any sequence of activities “which an individual or a unit may follow; 2. a possible plan open to an individual or command which. would accomplish or is related to the accomplishment of his mission; 3. the scheme adopted to accomplish a job or mission; 4. a line of conduct in an engagement. 15. covert operations--operations which are so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. They differ from clandestine operations in that emphasis is placed on concealment of identity of sponsor rather than on concealment of the operation. 16. dissemination (intelligence)--the timely distribution of information and/or intelli- gence in the most suitable form to those who need it. 17. economic intelligence-intelligence which deals with. the extent and use of the natural and human resources andthe economic = potential of nations. 18. enemy capabilities-those courses of ‘action of which the enemy is physically capable and which, if. adopted, will affect- the accomplishment of our mission. The term "capabilities" includes not only the general courses of action open-to the enemy, such as attack; défense, or withdrawal, but also all the particular courses of action possible under each general course of action. “Enemy capabilities" are considered in the light of all known factors affecting military operations, including time, space, weather, terrain, and the strength and disposition of enemy forces. 19.  espionage--overt, covert, or clandestine activity. designed to obtain information relating to the national defense with intent or reason to believe that it will be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign.nation. For espionage crimes, see Chapter 37 of Title 18, United States Code. This definition was one of many established by the Defense Investigative Review Council in its Study Report No. 9, dated 5 May 1971, and is to be used by all DOD activities within the purview of DOD Directive 5200.26,. subject: Defense Investigative Program, and DOD Directive 5200.27, subject: Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations not Affiliated with the Department of Defense. 20. essential elements of information (EEI)--the critical items of information regarding the enemy and his environment needed by the commander by a particular time, to relate with other available information and intelligence in order to assist him in reaching a logical decision. 21. guidance--policy, direction, decision, or instruction having the effect of an order when issued by a higher echelon. 22. indications (intelligence)--information in various degrees of evaluation, all of which bears on the intention of a potential enemy to adopt or reject a course of action. A-2
23. information (intelligence)--unevaluated material of every description including that derived from observations, reports, rumors, photographs, and other sources, which, when analyzed, produces intelligence. 24.  intelligence--the product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, inte- gration, and interpretation of all available information which concerns one or more aspects of foreign nations or of areas of operations and which is immediately or potentially significant to military planning and operations. 25. intelligence annex—The intelligence annex (sometimes called intelligence plan) is a document appended to an operation plan, order, or other document for the purpose of furnishing the intelligence needed to support the basic document and ior transmitting intelligence orders, requests, and instructions. 26. intelligence collection plan—a plan for gathering information from all available sources to meet an intelligence requirement; specifically, a logical plan for transforming the essential elements of information into orders or requests to sources within a required time limit. See also intelligence process. 27. intelligence collection requirement (ICR)--formerly referred to as Specific Collec- tion Requirement (SICR) was revised by DIAM 58-2, Voi 2, Part 2, October 197z. Ail references to SICRs should be changed to read ICRs. . 28. intelligence cycle--the steps by which information is converted into intelligence and made available to users. There are five steps in the cycle: a. Planning and direction--determination of intelligence requirements, prepara- tion of a collection plan, issuance of orders and requests to information collection agencies, and a continuous check on the productivity of collection agencies. b. Collection--acquisition of information and the giving cf this information to processing and/or production elements. c. Processing--conversion of collected information into a form suitable to the production of intelligence. d. Production--conversion of information into intelligence through the inte- gration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of all source data and the preparation of inteliigence products in support of known or anticipated user requirements. e. Dissemination--conveyance of intelligence to users in a suitable form. 29. intelligence estimate of the situation--an appraisal of the elements of intelligence relating to a specific situation or condition with a view to determining the courses of action open to the enemy or potential enemy and the probable order of their adoption. (NATO term is "intelligence estimate.") 30. intelligence plan--See intelligence annex. 31. intelligence process--See intelligence cycle.
32. intelligence requirements--any subject, general or specific, about which there is a need for the collection of information or the production of intelligence. See also essential elements of information. 33. intention--an aim or design (as distinct from capability) to execute a specified course of action. *34, joint inteiligence-—-integrated military departmental intelligence which is of concern to more than one military department and which transcends the exclusive competence of a single military department. 35. joint operational intelligence agency--an intelligence agency in which the efforts of two or more Services are integrated to furnish that operational intelligence essential to the commander of a joint force and to supplement that available to subordinate forces of his command. The agency may or may not be part of such joint force commander's staff. 36. military geographic information--comprises the information concerning physical aspects, resources, and artificial features which is necessary for planning and operations. 37. national intelligence--integrated departmental intelligence that covers the broad aspects of national policy and national security, is of concern to more than one department or agency, and transcends the exclusive competence of a single department or agency. 38. operational intelligence--intelligence required by operational commanders. for plan- ning and executing all types of operations. 39. order of battle--the identification, strength, command structure, and disposition of personnel, units, and equipment of military forces. *40. probable courses of action--those courses of action most likely to be followed by an enemy commander or a nation in the accomplishment of its national objectives. *41. scientific intelligence--intelligence or intelligence information regarding scientific research and development in foreign countries. 42. strategic intelligence—intelligence which is required for the formation of policy and military plans at national and international levels. Strategic intelligence and tactical intelligence differ primarily in level of application but may also vary in terms of scope and detail. 43. technical intelligence--intelligence concerning foreign. technological developments, performance, and operational capabilities of foreign materiel, which have now, or may eventually have, a practical application for military purposes. It is the end product resulting from the processing and collation of technical information. *44. vulnerabilities-- a. enemy vulnerability--any condition or circumstance of the enemy situation or the area of operations which makes the enemy especially liable to damage, deception, or defeat, A-4
b. national vulnerabilities--those susceptibilities of a nation to any action, by any means, in peace or war, through which its war potential may be reduced or its will to fight diminished.
I-d INTELLIGENCE SCHEDULE OF EVENTS 2 © Fg 9 7 < ACTIVITY éé&éeéedéé & PRIOR TO RECEIPT OF SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL MISSION — PRE 0-60 Study mission, or letters of guidance of instruction creating the joint force reed | of Uf} UE EU “Study ail intelligence policies and SOPs which apply to this joint force and intelligence section _- [= 2 eq | a Interview intelligence section personnel _ bese fof | Organize J-2 section (or study organization ; Requisition J~2 section supplies _ Establish liaison with other intelligence organizations Prepare secutity SOP for J-2 section Prepare security plan for headquarters Submit personnel cequisitions Prepate intelligence schedule of events Prepare intelligence joumal Issue passwords and countersigns _Request counterintelligence reports from existing agencies Supetvise security training Prepare counterintelligence estimate Request climatological studies Request intelligence publications Attange for periodic but irregular security checks of headquarters Augment counterintelligence coverage in your area Determine intelligence and counterintefliconce fund requirements Submit intefligence and counterintelligence fund requirements Prepare counterintelligence plan Prepare war soom for staff intelligence briefings Establish dissemination SOP . Disseminate intelligenc® publications received from higher and adjacent headquarters Establish message center : Prepare message center SOP .. ° » ° nn ie Tee ta rn os Prepare reproduction SOP Establish central files Prepare central files SOP Prepare and disseminate pericdic intelligence reports _ Plan_and supervise intelligence training a A) » S no 2 > > bc) sy % v a x » Ms ; 66 6s 6 Py @ XIQN3ddV
c-a SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL MISSION RECEIVED Prepate preliminary intelligence estimate a es || ‘Revise counleiiatelligence estimate ___ dd |_| |__| Briel intelligence section chiefs on specific operational mission and commander's planning guidance P| | | Complete intelligence estimate _. . a Solicit special intelligence requirements of other staff sections Determine EEI and other intelligence requirements Prepare collection plan _. . __ Prepare continuing (running) estimate and revise tiodicall Revise collection plan Prepate SOP for maintaining and revising intelligence collection plan _ Requisition planning maps _ Rearrange wat toom to accommodate area of operations for new specific operational misston Prepare intelligence funds disbursing and accounting SOP Prepare otder of battle overlays and files Prepate transportation net overlays Prepare invasion beach overlays = ___ _ __ Prepare terrain overtays _ __ __ | Requisition weather and climate studies Requisition terrain models Requisition aerial photography Requisition submarine photography _ Requisition and draw intelligence funds _ _ Brief section chiefs on intelligence plans, needs, and progress __. Prepare list of targets for ait and naval gunfire strikes _ Prepate fot participation in joint target conference _ _ oe eee eet ceet te ne an, HH | | | | Han Issue intelligence and counterintelligence funds ssue planning maps . isit and check subordinate intelligence unit Prepare to assist in establishing tactical operations center Atrange for teceiving and administering intelligence liaison personnel COMMANDER'S DECIS! [ Assist in establishing tactical operations center _ os Sans ee aes See Des Prepare intelligence annex to operation plan or order __ apes ee beeee & vei Disseminate overlays, models, photography, and weather and climatological studies eee eee Establish enemy documents center paeen canis Bete Sere rn Be Establish interrogation center Fes eee es eas
1. Will the en empl nuclear weapons? If so, where and by what delivery sys- tem? APPENDIX C AN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PLAN INDICATIONS 2. Movement into 1. Type and num- | 1. bers of weapons available. area of special- ized diver eqp. . Sudden change in troop dis- position along line of contact. 4. Imposition of special sec: measures in specific areas. 5. Const of spec stor facilities. &. Mvmt special- ized units or personnal into area. . Rpt arrival _ missile ships. SPECIFIC ORDERS Req type and number of weap- ons available for employment in this area. . Rpt. mvmt hvy X arty within area. . Rpt mvmt GM X Ichr into area. x | | Dx | | special types aircraft or . . Rpt by fastest X ‘means any sud- den withdrawals ' of troops now in contact. . Rpt by fastest X means adoption | any special pro- tective means. TO BE . COMPLETED AGENCIES cou) 4] [AF [er| 27 | Suvre x xX xX | X x x | x | x meet (| | Pp x | x x x x
APPENDIX D BASIC INTELLIGENCE STUDY FORMAT . INTRODUCTION a. Purpose of the Study b. Table of Contents . SIGNIFICANCE OF AREA (Summary of the significant strategic and tactical aspects of the area.) . MILITARY GEOGRAPHY Geographic Character Military Geographic Regions Hydrography and Landing Beaches Strategic Areas Internal Routes Approaches Urban Areas Climate and Weather | TRA me a op . TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS a. Railways Highways Iniand Waterways Petroleum Pipelines Ports and Naval Facilities Merchant Marine Civil Air (including civil air facilities) Telecommunications remo aos . SOCIOLOGICAL a. General Population and Manpower ~ Structure and Characteristics of the Society Health and Sanitation Social. Problems .and Public Welfare Cultural Expression (Language, Religion, Education, Art, Public Information Media) > moan - POLITICAL General Structure and Functioning of Government Political Dynamics National Politics Police and Intelligence Services Subversion Propaganda Foreign [ntelligence TRMmMs AO ST p
L-3 APPENDIX E NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STRUCTURE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STATUTORY MEMBERS PRESIDENT VICE-PRESIDENT SECRETARY OF STATE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ADVISORY MEMBERS DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE CHAIRMAN, JCS SENIOR. INTERAGENCY GROUP INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE a ASST TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS Bg DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE a DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF OTHERS, AS REQUIRED
APPE.. 1X F INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STRUCTURE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD Meek pak ns PRESIDENT NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL _. DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE PRESIDENT’S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD SENIOR INTERAGENCY GROUP INTELLIGENCE wey Aye. ” NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL pany eb eg gieg? Yew ® ica Docket ees INTELLIGENCE pci | NATIONAL CENTRAL } COMMUNITY INTELLIGENCE INTELLIGENCE STAFF COMMITTEES | COUNCIL J * : i _ { 1 et PER r cae e-5 PSEEF { i _L tow —_ —es eee eee DEFENSE DEPARTMENT INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ENTITIES {NSA/ SPEC RECON/DIA/ARMY | NAVY/AIR FORCE/USMC | | ho rn | OTHER INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ENTITIES fF | (STATE/FBI/TREASURY/ ENERGY}
t-D APPENDIX . DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY COMMAND ELEMENT : DIRECTOR OEPUTY DIRECTOR * (00) _ CHIEF OF STAFF (Cs) SENIOR ENLISTED ADVISOR (SEN) OEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL DEFENSE OFFICE OF SECURITY ADVISORY COMMITTEE INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS assistant cerurvomecton ff | INSPECTOR GENERAL GENERAL COUNSEL SECRETARIAT {OS} (ac) STAFF (D/GDIP) ot (IG) (GC) OLPvTs OvECTOR FOR O€PuTY DIRECTOR FOR aanscnan e OPERA NOme FOREIGN Ws TELLIGENCE a] ce ASSISTART GEPUTY OIRECTOR ASSISTANT DEPUTY OMMECTOR OfFENSE FOR COLLECTION MANAGEMENT FOR ATTACHES AND TRAWONG INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS 100) wan (080) T CTOR ASSISTANT DEPUTY CARECTOR ASSISTANT DEPUTY OWRECTOR ASSISTANT DEPUTY Ost DE) FOR SCHNTIAC & TECHNICAL SEARCH INTELLIGENCE (01) ne ping St CEPUTY CIRECTOR FOR RESOURCES AND SYSTEMS (AS) CEPUTY DIRECTOR +08 MITELLIGENCE ANO EXTEANAL AFFAURS (01)
=z Br 4221 INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT (INFORMATION DIVISION SYSTEMS SUPPAT DIVISION J2! 210 PLANS. PROGRAMS TARGEIS PROOUCTION & EXERCISE BRANCH MANAGEMENT MANAGEMENT BRANCH RANCH 22) 4223 APPENDIX H t'.S. PACIFIC COMMAND J-2 DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE J2 200 COLLECTION MANAGEMENT DIVISION 322 230 ADVANCED IMAGERY SIGNAL _ HUMAN SYSTEMS BRANCH INTELLIGENCE INTELLIGENCE WTELLIGENCE BRANCH BRANCH @RANCH Pye) 231 4232 3232 a3 ik aetna £5 Syne. nnnnenneen neal | INTELLIGENCE CENTER PACIFIC (IPAC) ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION J201 201 SPECIAL SECURITY DIVISION 324 [—-— po Sen SPECIAL 4 OEFENSE SPECIAL SECURITY SECURITY BRANCH | COMMUNICATIONS j BRANCH 4242 242 sat SPECIAL ACTIVITIES BRANCH szad
tr : or Pali >. APPENDIX 3 . U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND J-2 ORGANIZATION CHART INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE a. EXECUTIVE OFFICE USEUCOM DEFENSE ANALYSIS CENTER (EUDAC) SPECIAL SECURITY AND SPECIAL ACTIVITIES OFFICE COLLECTION DIVISION YSTEMS APPLICATIONS ELEMENT TARGETS DIVISION WARNING AND ANALYSIS DIVISION PLANS DIVISION IMAGERY SIGINT a | HUMINT-COUNTERINTELLIGENCE RZ CURRENT REQUIREMENTS : <u Mee EP Bo ks ee a “ INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS _COLLECTION i NG RANGE PLANS | JOINT TACTICAL FUSION IN O.TIONS & WARNING ANALYSIS & PRODUCTION : BRIEFINGS AND GIAPHICS TR + SEM bates,
APPENDIX K A TYPICAL ORGANIZATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION OF A JOINT TASK FORCE INTELLIGENCE a INTELLIGENCE ADMINISTRATION . AND PLANS
U.S. U.S. APPENDIX L BASIC INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DOCUMENTS (BY SOURCES AND AGENCIES) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Biographic Handbooks Central Intelligence Bulletin (CIB-Daily) Weekly Summaries National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIE) National Intelligence Analytical Memorandum (NIAM) Special Operations Intelligence Handbooks Defense Intelligence Agency: (DIA) Defense Intelligence Estimate for Joint Planning (DIEIP) Joint Intelligence Estimates for Planning (JIEP) . Joint Long-Range Estimative Intelligence Document (JLREID) Defense Intelligence Projections for Planning (DIPP) Defense Intelligence Estimates (DIEs) Special Defense Intelligence Estimates (SDIEs) Defense Intelligence Estimates Memoranda (DIEMs) DIA Defense Intelligence Summaries (DINSUM) (restricted to D.C. area) Weekly Summaries (INSUM) | Air Force Intelligence Studies (AFIS) Aircraft Handbooks (Characteristics.and Perf ormance) Communist Countries Soviet/European/Asiatic Communist Aircraft Order of Battle Books Airfields and Seaplane Stations of the World Attache Reports and Debriefings Biographic Data Books
DIA Fact Books LOC Studies Military Intelligence Summaries (MIS) — Soviet Missile Order of Battle Books Naval Forces Intelligence Studies National Security Agency (NSA) Daily Special Inteiligence Items SIGINT Summaries Special Research Detachment (SRD Reports) National Photo Interpretation Center (NPIC) © Photo Interpretation Reports Department of State, Intelligence and Research (INR) Embassy Cables Special Reports Weekly Summaries (Country Team) Military Services, Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence (acs) 7 Intelligence Summaries (INSUM) Weekly Intelligence Estimate Update (wizu)’ . MAGG/MILGP Debriefings 7 Military Services, Counterintelligence Publications Strategic Reconnaissance Reports. Scientific and Technical Intelligence Reports Tacticai Units Patrol Reports Long-Range Patrol Reports (LRPS) Ranger Reports Prisoner and Rallier Interrogation Reports Clandestine Agent Reports/Debriefings L-2
Document Exploitation Reports Material Exploitation Reports Sensor Readouts Radar (Ground) Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR) Reports Infra-Red Readouts Visual Reconnaissance Reports Radio Research Company Reports Open Sources Area Handbooks Basic/Special Reference Works Newspapers Radio Broadcasts Tourists/Commercial Travelers L-3
CALL NO. 00 Period. 00 Period. 00 4C525 C.7G7 00 Period. No., Date 00 Period. 00 U393 -J72 0 Period. 00 Period 00 UALS -U7 00 ’ UB251 -U5U3 06 V40 -U29 0 Period 00 Period, 00 Period TITLE Evaluators Newsletter. U.S. Navy. Air Test and Evaluation Squadron Four. (irr) CONFIDENTIAL. Gt. Brit. Air Intelligence Review. (Irr) SECRET. Gt. Brit. Army Technica! Intelligence Digest. (Irr) SECRET. Gt. Brit. Army Weapons. Intelligence Review. (Q) SECRET. Gt. Brit. N.I.R. (Naval Intelligence Report). (Q) SECRET. | Jui nal of Defense Research. Battelle Columbus Lab. (Q) SECRET. Maritime Warfare Bulletin. Canadian Forces Maritime Warfare School. (Q) CONFIDENTIAL. MIJI QUARTERLY. | U.S S Joint Electronic Warfare Center. (Q) SECRET. NOFORN. } . Military Intelli ence Summar (MIS). U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency. World coverage in 8 volumes. (S-a) SECRET. . Monthly y Intelligence Production. U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency. (Q} .SECRET. Naval Forces 5 Intellig ence Study (NFIS). U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency. Survey by individual ‘countries, multi-volumes. (A) SECRET. The Naval Intelligence: Newsletter. U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence. (Q) SECRET. NOFORN. Naval intelligence Quarter: U. s. Office of Naval Intelligence. (Q): SECRET. Navy Scientific and Technical Intelligence Review. U.S. Naval Intelligence Command. (M) SECRET M-2
APPENDIX M CURRENT CLASSIFIED PERIODICALS AND REPORTS CURRENTLY LEGEND: D Ww Bi-W RECEIVED BY AFSC LIBRARY Daily M Monthly S-M  SemiMonthly Weekly Bi-M BiMonthly Irr Irregular Biweekly Q Quarterly A Annual S-A  Semiannual NOTE: Security classification of periodical follows the citation. CALL NO. 00 UG630 oU35 0a UG630 -U56 00 UG630 -U422 00 Period. 00 Period. 00 Period. 00 Period. 00 Period. 00 UG485 -U387 00 UG&35 -U371 TITLE Air Force Foreign Technology Bulletin. U.S. Air Force. Foreign Technology Division. (M) SECRET. Air Force Intelligence Study (AFIS). U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency. Survey by individual country, multi-volumes. (A) SECRET. Air Order of Battle. U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency- World Coverage in 8 volumes. (A-a) SECRET. Arm Scientific and Technical Intelligence Bulletin. U.S. Dept. of the Army, (f (mM) SECRET. __ Australia. Joint Intelligence Organization (319) Service Intelligence Bulletin. (W) SECRET. Canada. Intelligence Quarterly - (Q) SECRET. Cockpit Intelligence. U.S. Air Forces in Europe. (Q) SECRET. Current Foreign Relations. U.S. Dept. of State. (W) SECRET. Electronic Warfare Analysis Report. U.S. Air Force Electronic Warfare Center. (S-m) SECRET. NOFORN. . ” Electronic Warfare Evaluation and Education Quarterly. U.S. Air Force Electronic Warfare Center. (QO) SECRET.
CALL NO. 00 UB250 18 00 V214 -U526 00 Period. 00 UF835 -R9U4 00 VA4&0 98 00 Period. 00 Period. 0 Period. 00 Period. 00 Period. TITLE Periodic Intelligence Resume! . Inter- American Defense Board. (irr) SECRET. Pioneers Progress. U.S. Navy, Air Test and Evaluation Squadron One. (Irr) SECRET. Scientific Intelligence Weekly Review. (W) SECRET. Soviet and E. European: Communist Missile Order of Battle. U.S. Air Forces in Europe. (S-A) SECRET. Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, Supplementary Intelligence Report. (M) SECRET. TAC Intelligence Digest. U.S. Air Force, Tactical Air Command. (M) SECRET. Tactical Analysis Bulletin. U.S. Air Force Tactical Fighter Weapons Center. (irr) SECRET. oe Tactics Newsletter. US. Atlantic Fleet, Naval Surface Force. (Q) CONFIDENTIAL , U.S... Der t. of State. Bureau of Intelligence and Research Report... (irr) SECRET. - _ ; . — . Weekly intelligence Summarys U. S. Defense Intelligence Agency. (W) SECRET.
APPENDIX N DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY MANUALS The DIAM 58 Series of Manuals is in the process of ‘being renumbered and some titles are being changed. The following is a listing of the new numbers and titles cross-referenced _ to the old manual numbers where applicable. Number Title M58-i Defense Intelligence Collection (U) SECRET/NOFORN M58-2 Time-Sensitive Multi-Source Requirements (U) SECRET/NOFORN (formerly DIAM 58-2 Part Il - never published) M58-3 Multi-Source Requirements (General) (U) SECRET/NOFORN (formerly DIAM 58-2 Part 1) M58~-5 Imagery Requirements (U) SECRET (formerly DIAM 58-2 Part VI) SAO Supplement (available through SAO Channels Only) M58-7 Signal Intelligence { (SIGINT) Requirements (U) (available through Sl Channels Only) (formerly DIAM 58-2 Parts VII and VIII) M58-8 Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) Requirements (formerly DIAM 58-2 Part X) M58-9 National Collection Systems (U) TOP SECRET (available through SAO Channels Only) (formerly DIAM 58-3) ~ M58-11 Defense Human Resources Intelligence Collection Management Manual (U) SECRET/NOFORN | . M58-12 | Defense Human Resources ‘Intelligence Collection Management - Manual (U) SECRET/NOFORN (formerly. DIAM 58-4) M58-13 Defense Human Resources intelligence Collection Procedures Manual (U) SECRET/NOFORN (formerly DIAM 58-2 Parts Ill, IV, V, IX)