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on  which  will  depend  to  a  great  degree  the  permanence 
of  peace,  the  fate  of  our  country^nd  perhaps  even  the 
existence  of  human  civilization. 
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General  of  the  Arm, 
H.H.Arnold 
September,  1945 
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V. 
The  Foreign  Tschnology  Division  gives  recognition  this  year 
to  a  heritage  of  50  years  of  leadership  in  scientific  and  tech- 
nical intelligence.  Many  organizations  within  the  Department 
of  Defense  share  in  the  achievements  of  the  Foreign  Tech- 
nology Division.  The  Army,  Navy,  Air  Force,  and  the  De- 
fense Intelligence  Agency  have,  at  various  periods  throughout 
FTD's  history,  contributed  to  the  nourishment  and  growth  of 
this  ever  viable  organization. 
During  the  past  50  years,  the  growth  and  importance  of  sci- 
entific and  technical  intelligence  has  paralleled  the  growth 
of  science  and  technology  worldwide.  Science  and  technology 
have  provided  society  with  many  benefits:  miracle  drugs, 
efficient  transportation,  improved  housing,  power,  advances 
in  education,  and  worldwide  communications.  They  have  also 
provided  advanced  weapons:  supersonic  aircraft,  missiles, 
and  nuclear  warheads  -  instruments  which  can  destroy  a 
major  segment  of  our  world  population  or  assure  peace  and 
security. 
The  past  50  years  has  thus  seen  the  fruits  of  science  and 
technology  emerge  as  a  vital  force  in  the  establishment  of 
national  policies  and  in  international  relations. 
Ascendance  to  the  position  of  world  leadership  has  thrust 
the  US  into  competition  with  other  nations  for  technologi- 
cal supremacy.  Today,  Marxism-Leninism  continues  to  be 
militant.  The  countries  committed  to  Marxism- Leninism 
challenge  the  strength  of  our  system  of  government.  They 
threaten  our  position  of  primacy  in  science,  technology,  and 
the  attendant  production  of  superior  warfare  systems.  The 
challenge  must  be  met. 
Upon  its  50th  Anniversary,  the  Foreign  Technology  Division 
rededicates  itselt  to  supporting  our  Nation's  goals  and  ob- 
jectives. It  dedicates  its  professionalism,  its  technical  com- 
petence, and  its  personnel  to  the  principle  that  knowledge  of 
foreign  science  and  technology  and  its  product  -  advanced 
warfare  systems  -  will  assist  our  decision  makers  in  for- 
mulating and  executing  those  national  policies  which  will 
perpetuate  our  democratic  system. 
PER, /Colonel,  USAF
HERITAGE  OF  LEADERSHIP/ 
PAST  COMMANDERS 
I.      Genera!  (then  Colonel)  Donald  J.  Putt,  1945-1946 
2.     Col  Howard  M.  McCoy,  1946-1949 
3.     Col  Harold  E.  Watson,  1949-1951 
4.     Col  Frank  L.  Dunn,   1951-1952 
5.      Col  John  A.  O'Mara,    1952 
6.      B/Gen  Wm.  M.  Garland,   1952-1953 
7.      Col  George  Wertenbaker,  1953-1954 
8.      M/Gen  Harold  E.  Watson,   1954-1958 
9.     Col  John  G.  Eriksen,   1958 
10.     M/Gen  Charles  B.  Dougher,   1958-1961 
II.      B/Gen  Arthur  J.  Pierce,   1961-1964 
12.      B/Gen  Arthur  W.  Cruikshank,  Jr.,  1964-1966
MISSION 
QJne  mission  of  the 
ieign  Qjfecnnology  division  is  to 
plan,  manage,  and  ptoduce  Scientific 
and  tecnmlcgwat  intelligence  in  Support 
of  me  Qftir  (^force  WyStetnS  ^(jcmmand 
mission;  Support  me  intelligence  reauire** 
ments  of  the  g/lssistant  ^ief  of  
Wtaff 
Qxntelligence,  Woq.  ^United  WtoteS 
Qflir^rce^  tm  defense  (^Intelligence 
eney,  and  other  oiganizatwns  outride 
9  as  requited  &  ditededbu 
;  and  reduce  me 
possihimy  of  aeioSpace  technoiogicaf 
SulpliSe . 
AFSCR  23-27 
ORGANIZATION
!  
7Q]  ;rv(;V   \/    ^\r  ■     'S    DIRECTORATE 
Directs  the  use  of  human  resources  and  foreign  materiel  in  the  AFSC  collection  effort  to  acquire  for- 
eign aerospace  scientific  and  technical  information. 
FOREIGN  T^CTINGLOGV  REPORTING    DIRECTORATE 
Processes  and  disseminates  incoming  collateral  information,  intelligence  documents  and  data;  pro- 
vides for  research  services  and  translation;  and  controls  dissemination  of  foreign  technology  information 
nroducts. 
RADIATION  WARFARE  SUPPORT  DIRECTORATE 
Provides  analytical  services,  technical  support,  data  reduction  and  engineering  guidance  for  the  ac- 
quisition and  exploitation  of  scientific  and  technical  data  derived  from  or  acquired  through  the  use  of  phys- 
ical  sensors 
ENGINEERING  SUPPORT   DIRECTORATE 
Provides   engineering  analysis,   photo   exploitation,    graphics  and  automated  data-handling  systems. 
TECHNOLOGIES  &  SUB- SYSTEMS    DIRECTORATE 
Studies  and  evaluates  current  status  and  future  potential  of  foreign  technologies,  weapon  components 
and  subsystems.  Manages  the  Air  Force  unidentified  aerial  phenomena  program. 
AEROSPACE  WEAPON  SYSTEMS  DIRECTORATE 
Produces  current  reports  of  foreign  technology  activities,  studies  of  aerospace  systems,  integrated 
evaluations  of  foreign  aerospace  systems  and  assessments  of  their  technological  threats.
50  YEARS . . . 
FOREIGN  DATA  SECTION  (1917-1927) 
When  in  1917  the  Airplane  Engineering  Department  was 
established  atMcCook  Field  in  Dayton,  Ohio,  a  "Foreign  Data 
Section"  was  included  and  charged  with  the  responsibility  for 
copying  or  modifying  foreign  aircraft -primarily  the  British 
De  Haviliand  light  bomber  'DH-4).  From  this  modest  begin- 
ning air  technical  intelligence  evolved,  precipitated  by  the  ad- 
vances of  European  aviation  and  the  outbreak  of  war. 
BILLY  MITCHELL 
As  early  as  1912  Major  William  (Billy)  Mitchell,  Chief  of 
the  European  Intelligence  Section  of  the  War  Department,  en- 
visioned the  significance  of  air  technical  intelligence.  In  his 
post  he  found  that  most  of  the  interesting  information  cross- 
ing his  desk  involved  aviation  and  its  tactical  applications. 
During  the  Balkan  Wars,  for  example,  Bulgarian  and  Greek 
fliers  had  experimented  with  a  new  concept  in  warfare  - 
aerial  bombing.  But  only  Mitchell  and  a  few  other  military 
men  recognized  the  relatively  advanced  status  of  European 
aviation. 
He  was  convinced  that  the  US  would  go  to  war  against 
Germany  and  that  the  US  was  not  prepared,  especially  in  the 
air.  He  petitioned  his  superiors  until  he  was  issued  orders  on 
3  March  1917,  to  report  to  the  American  Ambassador  in 
Paris  for  "the  specific  purpose  of  observing  the  manufac- 
ture and  development  of  aircraft"  and  to  "report on  French 
methods  in  combat,  training,  and  organization  of  airmen." 
He  was  en  route  to  Paris  when  America  entered  the  war  on 
16  April  1917. 
Mitchell  bombarded  the  War  Department  with  sugges- 
tions to  build  or  buy  French  planes  -  Spads,  Breguets  and 
Nieuports.  He  said,  "I  had  been  able  to  flounder  around  with 
the  animated  kites  that  we  called  airplanes  in  the  United 
States,  but  when  I  laid  my  hand  to  the  greyhounds  of  the  air 
they  had  in  Europe,  which  went  twice  as  fast  as  ours,  it  was 
an  entirely  different  matter." 
Mitchell  also  learned  much  from  the  British.  In  the  com- 
pany of  Sir  Hugh  Trenchard,  he  watched  night  bombers  take 
off  for  strikes  behind  enemy  lines.  Impressed  by  the  effec- 
tiveness of  massed  bombers,  he  said,  "This  is  the  proper 
way  to  use  air  power,  and  I  am  sure  the  future  will  see 
operations  conducted  in  this  way  by  thousands  of  airplanes." 
THE  BOLLING  MISSION 
In  July  1917,  Major  ReynalC.  Boiling  headed  an  air  mis- 
sion to  study  British  and  French  aviation,  train  a  cadre,  and 
return  to  form  an  organization.  The  mission  included  several 
of  the  key  officers  who  organized  McCook  Field  later  the 
same  year.  The  Boiling  mission  resulted  in  the  decision  to 
build  the  British  two-seater  De  Haviliand  light  bomber  in 
the  US  despite  an  objection  by  Mitchell,  who  considered  the 
DH-4  inferior  to  the  French  pursuit  planes  he  himself  had 
recommended.  Although  the  mission  soon  returned  to  the 
US,  Major  Boiling's  duties  kept  him  in  France,  where  he 
was  killed  in  March  1918,  near  the  front  lines,  defending 
himself  with  a  pistol  against  a  party  of  Germans. 
J.    EARLY  WWW  "BOMBER' 
2.    PFALZ-DXV 
3.  PFALZ'D.VIII  AT  McCOOK  FIELD 
4.  LATE  D-VW  TESTED  AT  McCOOK
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1917  \@j&\ 19671 \ 
McCQOK  FIELD 
Shortly  after  the  return  of  the  Boiling  mission  in  Octo- 
ber 1917,  several  existing  aviation  departments  merged  into 
the  new  Airplane  Engineering  Department  under  the  Army 
Signal  Corps. 
It  was  soon  transferred  from  Washington  to  Dayton, 
Ohio,  temporarily  housed  in  the  Lindsay  Building  in  the  cen- 
ter of  Dayton,  and  on  4  December  1917,  settled  in  its  new 
McCook  Field  quarters.  This  site  had  been  selected  because 
it  had  been  prepared  and  used  for  exhibition  flights  by  the 
Wright  Exhibition  Company  and  because  it  was  convenient 
to  Midwest  industrial  centers. 
TECHNICAL  DATA  SECTION  (1927-1942) 
WRIGHT  FIELD 
By  1927  the  McCook  Field  facilities  had  grown  too  small 
and  the  Airplane  Engineering  operation  moved  to  Wright 
Field  (Area  B).  The  air  technical  intelligence  activities  con- 
tinued. Individual  engineering  labs  studied  foreign  develop- 
ments, a  few  European  engineers  and  scientists  were 
recruited,  and  intelligence  reports  and  translations  dissem- 
inated. 
During  the  late  thirties,  intelligence  reports  from  Col- 
onel A.  W.  Vanaman  (Air  Attache  in  Berlin),  Charles 
Lindbergh,  and  Al  Williams  warned  of  the  buildup  of  Ger- 
man and  Italian  air  power.  T..:  limited  capability  of  the 
Technical  Data  Section,  however,  handicapped  their  evalua- 
tion and  the  preparation  of  effective  estimates  and  briefings 
for  the  policy  makers  in  Washington. 
FOREIGN  AIR  SUPREMACY 
Evidence  that  the  US  lagged  in  the  development  of  mili- 
tary aircraft  was  overwhelming.  World  records  for  speed, 
altitude,  and  distance  were  held  by  foreign  nations.  In  1939 
Wright  Field  prepared  an  all-out  assault  to  regain  as  many 
records  as  possible.  The  Germans,  however,  evidently 
learned  of  the  plans;  for  just  a  few  days  ahead  of  our  sched- 
uled attempt,  they  smashed  most  of  the  existing  records  by 
such  margins  that  the  Wright  Field  program  was  cut  back  to 
only  those  events  where  special  purpose  aircraft  such  as  the 
Boeing  B-15,  Grumman  Amphibian OA-9,  and  the  Boeing  B-17 
could  possibly  establish  records. 
In  1937  the  USSR  held  the  straight-line  distance  record; 
in  1938  the  Japanese  gained  the  distance  record  for  a  closed 
course  and  the  Italians  the  altitude  record;  in  1939  the  Ger- 
mans set  the  speed  record  (469.22  mph  in  a  ME-109R). 
Further  evidence  of  foreign  prowess  in  aviation  was 
plentiful.  In  1937  Hanna  Reitsch  (a  German  woman  pilot)  flew 
Focke's  FW-61  in  the  first  free  fully-controlled  helicopter 
flight.  In  August  1939  the  Germans  first  flew  the  turbojet- 
powered  Heinkel  (HE -178). 
5.  ZERO  UNDER  EXAMINATION 
6.  M&110  SHOT  DOWN  IN  ENGLAND  AND  ASSEMBLED  IN  US 
7.  SASEBO  KT-00  PETE 
8.  CAPTURED  PHOTO  OF  V-2  ON  LAUNCH  PAD 
9.  ZERO-FLIGHT  TESTING 
10.  JU-88  FLOWN  TO  US  DURING  V/W-ll 
11.  J2M3  RAIDEN  MODEL  21
)U967 Z 
IMPACT  OF  WORLD  WAR  n 
At  the  time  of  World  War  n,  the  US  was  again  forced  to 
catch  up  with  our  foes  and  allies  alike.  Some  of  our  aircraft 
such  as  the  B-17  had  impressive  performance  records.  But 
at  the  beginning  of  the  war  they  were  not  capable  of  perform- 
ing their  military  mission,  as  early  events  proved. 
A  "crash"  program  was  begun.  Modification  Centei  s 
were  quickly  established;  production  lines  introduced  armor 
plate,  self-sealing  fuel  tanks,  and  power  gun  turrets.  Arma- 
ment changes  were  made  and  our  aire  raft  began  to  approach, 
and,  in  some  cases,  exceed  the  effectiveness  of  their  op- 
ponents. 
TECHNICAL  DATA  LABORATORY  (1942-1945) 
In  December  1942,  the  Technical  Data  Section  was  re- 
designated the  Technical  Data  Laboratory  and  its  operations 
expanded  to  include  the  evaluation  of  foreign  aircraft  and 
related  equipment.  Shipments  of  captured  equipment  in- 
creased and  Technical  Data  soon  occupied  six  buildings,  a 
large  outdoor  lot  on  Wright  Field's  hilltop  area,  and  part  of 
one  of  the  flight-line  hangars.  Technical  specialists  from  the 
various  laboratories,  assisted  by  design  contractors,  evalu- 
ated and  exploited  the  captured  equipment. 
V-2  MISSILE  IDENTIFIED 
The  impact  of  new  enemy  weapons  of  radical  and  ad- 
vanced design  forced  an  appreciation  of  technical  intelli- 
gence. The  V-2  intelligence  analysis  is  a  case  in  point. 
Some  months  before  the  Germans  launched  the  V-2  missiles 
against  London,  the  Soviets  observed  a  number  of  large 
blast  craters  on  the  Polish  front.  An  Army  Air  Force  intel- 
ligence team  went  to  Poland,  retrieved  all  the  fragments,  and 
returned  to  England.  By  assembling  these  fragments,  a  joint 
British-American  team  was"  able  to  identify  the  weapon  as  a 
ballistic  missile.  Oncetiie  weapon  had  been  identified,  efforts 
could  be  made  to  establish  effective  counter  measures. 
CIOS 
As  the  war  reached  its  climax  in  Europe  and  the  intelli- 
gence needs  of  the  air  operations  declined,  the  technical  ex- 
ploitation mission  expanded.  In  London  during  the  summer  of 
1944,  the  British-American  Combined  Chiefs  of  Staff  created 
the  Combined  Objectives  Subcommittee  for  the  orderly  ex- 
ploitation of  German  scientific  and  technical  targets.  Offi- 
cers, assisted  by  civilian  scientists,  were  to  closely  follow 
the  ground  armies  and  exploit  captured  R&D  centers  within 
Germany.  Wright  Field  provided  the  majority  of  officers 
and  civilian  scientists  detailed  to  this  operation. 
INTELLIGENCE  T-2  (1945-1951) 
Meanwhile,  important  organizational  changes  were  tak- 
ing place  at  Wright  Field.  In  September  1944,  the  Air  Mate- 
riel and  Air  Service  Commands  merged  to  form  the  Air 
Technical  Service  Command.  The  technical  "T"  staff  in- 
cluded "T-2"  Intelligence,  with  Colonel  John  M.  Hayward 
(formerly  Chief  of  the  Technical  Data  Laboratory)  as  Acting 
Chief.  He  served  in  this  capacity  until  5  September  1945, 
when  Colonel  Donald  L.  Putt  was  appointed  Deputy  Command- 
ing General,  Intelligence  T-2. 
The  T-2  operation  played  a  major  role  in  the  continued 
exploitation  of  captured  materiel,  documents,  and  manpower. 
12.  ME-109F/2  ■  ENGLAND        IS.   FW-190 
13.  ME-109G 
14.  KAWANISHI  N1K2-J  (GEORGE) 
16.  KAWANISHI  H8K 
17.  MARCHETTI-SM-79 
18.  A7M2.PEPPY  (SAM)
1967 J 
PROJECT  LUSTY 
After  a  few  weeks  of  field  operations,  CIOS  procedures 
proved  too  cumbersome  for  the  fast  moving  war,  and  Army 
Air  Corps  Project  LUSTY  was  established  for  a  rapid  and 
concentrated  exploitation  of  air  technical  intelligence  tar- 
gets. 
On  27  April  1945,  General  Spaatz  gave  top  priority 
orders  to  technical  intelligence  to  complete  their  collection 
task  and  return  the  materiel  and  documents  to  the  US  as 
quickly  as  possible.  Late  model  aircraft  and  engines  were 
spotted  all  over  the  Reich,  but  their  removal  to  the  US  pre- 
sented a  major  logistical  problem.  Most  of  the  airplanes 
were  either  flyable  or  reparable  but  did  not  have  sufficient 
range  for  flight  to  this  country. 
Colonel  Harold  E.  Watson  of  Wright  Field  organized  and 
trained  pilots  to  fly  out  captured  German  aircraft,  including 
the  new  jets.  As  a  consequence,  advanced  design  aircraft 
were  recovered  that  otherwise  might  have  been  destroyed 
either  by  our  own  troops  or  the  retreating  Germans. 
The  British  advised  Colonel  Watson  that  H.M.S.  Reaper 
(a  small  carrier)  would  be  leaving  Liverpool  for  New  York 
in  July  1945.  Less  than  three  weeks  were  left  to  assemble 
the  aircraft  at  Cherbourg,  France,  for  pickup  by  the  carrier. 
Colonel  Watson  took  charge  of  flying  out  the  aircraft,  and 
Lt  Colonel  Malcolm  D.  Seashore  took  charge  of  readying  the 
landing  field  at  Cherbourg  (too  small  for  jet  aircraft)  and 
preparing  the  aircraft  for  overseas  shipment. 
The  priority  collection  items  were  jet  planes.  After 
locating  an  ME -262,  Colonel  Watson  received  a  quick  cockpit 
check  from  Willi  Messerschmitt,  circled  the  field,  refueled, 
and  delivered  the  prize  to  Melun,  France.  He  returned  in  a 
beat-up  C-47  and  checked  out  other  US  pilots. 
Scarcity  of  jet  fuel  was  another  problem.  On  several  oc- 
casions German  tractors  were  drained  of  their  diesel  fuel  so 
that  flights  could  be  made.  Heinz Braun,  a Lut waff e  pilot  who 
had  been  released  from  military  prison  for  this  project, 
briefed  the  Americans  and  they  were  away  to  Cherbourg. 
In  this  manner,  40  German  planes  were  delivered  to 
Cherbourg  within  20  days.  A  Heinkel  219,  anArado  234,  and 
Junkers  388-G  were  flown  from  Grove,  Denmark.  Two  more 
AR-234's  came  in  from  Stravenger  in  Norway.  Whendeliver- 
ies  stopped  on  8  July  1945,  9  jet  planes  (including  6  different 
versions  of  the  ME-262)  and  30  unorthodox  propeller  types 
had  been  flown  to  the  carrier  at  Cherbourg  without  a  single 
pilot  injury.  The  operation  provided  the  US  with  a  flyable 
model  of  every  German  combat  plane,  including  the  unique 
TA-152. 
Earlier  this  same  year  (6  May)  Colonel  Watson,  learning 
that  a  German  defector  might  deliver  a  Junkers  290  in 
Munich,  was  on  hand  to  take  possession.  Within  minutes  after 
the  plane  landed,  Colonel  Watson  and  Captain  Fred  B. 
Mcintosh  took  off  for  Nurenberg  and  then  to  Orly,  France. 
The  plane  was  fitted  with  American  radio  equipment  and 
readied  for  a  flight  to  America.  In  July,  Colonel  Watson  flew 
the  plane  to  Wright  Field. 
A  thorough  inspection  at  Wright  Field  revealed  explosive 
charges  under  the  main  fuel  tanks.  For  some  reason  they  had 
not  exploded. 
19.  LUSTY  TEAM  20.  VOLKSJAEGER  HE-162  BEiNG  TRANSPORTED 
21.    VOLKSJAEGER  HE-162  22.    ERDING  AIR  BASE,  GERMANY 
23.  COL  DORNAY,  COL  H.  E.  WATSON 
24.  DM-1  DELTA  RESEARCH  GLIDER  (LIPPISCH) 
25.  HE-162  25 A.  ME- 763  26  GERMAN  GLIDE  80MB  BV-246 
27.  ME-262  28.  ME-262  •  COL  WATSON,  PILOT  29.  ME- 163 
30.   H.M.S.  REAPER  AT  CHERBOURG,  FRANCE,  JULY  1945
Hog hese BE Ks wale ee a ince. a Se. a] Cinna yr’ —— ios . ee Fe 15
i 1917 
1967 
^ 
In  June  1945,  Colonel  Watson  with  his  "flying  circus"  of 
pilots,  conducted  an  airshow  at  Melun  (just  outside  Paris)  to 
display  the  latest  designed  German  aircraft.  Colonel  Watson 
himself  flew  the  ME-262.  The  audience,  which  included  many 
high  ranking  military  and  civilian  officials,  was  impressed. 
Most  of  them,  including  Lt  General  Carl  Spaatz,  had  never 
before  observed  a  jet  aircraft's  tremendous  performance. 
This  exhibition  did  much  to  gain  the  necessary  priorities  for 
the  exploitation  of  the  captured  materiel  and  documents. 
LUSTY  was  a  dangerous  mission.  Several  of  the  teams 
operating  on  the  ground  were  killed  in  action.  A  few  were 
captured  by  the  enemy,  but  the  importance  of  their  work 
justified  the  risks  taken.  The  exploits  of  Colonel  Watson, 
Captains  Mcintosh,  Maxfield,  Dahlstron,  Hillis,  andStrobel, 
and  Lieutenants  Auspach,  Brown,  Haynes,  and  Holt  gave  the 
US  the  latest  German  aircraft  at  a  crucial  time  in  our  R&D 
program. 
This  exploitation,  however,  was  not  limited  to  aircraft. 
Colonel  Howard  McCoy  concentrated  on  the  capture,  intact, 
of  technical  libraries  and  document  repositories.  Colonel 
Donald  L.  Putt  negotiated  for  the  release  of  key  German 
scientists  so  that  they  could  assist  in  the  war  with  Japan  and 
participate  in  the  research  program  at  Wright  FieJd.  Colonel 
Putt  was  also  busy  laying  the  groundwork  for  the  ultimate 
organization  at  Wright  Field  that  was  to  complete  the  ex- 
ploitation phase  of  the  project. 
Colonel  Jack  O'Mara,  who  had  been  closely  associated 
with  British  Intelligence,  assisted  in  establishing  technical 
targets  and  concentrated  his  efforts  in  the  missile  area.  Lt 
Colonel  Seashore  worked  closely  with  the  field  teams 
throughout  Europe  and  later  accepted  responsibility  for  ship- 
ping the  captured  materiel  to  Wright  Field.  These  are  but  a 
few  of  the  operations  and  personnel  who  contributed  to  the 
success  of  Project  LUSTY. 
PROJECT  OVERCAST 
In  the  fall  of  1944,  the  British  and  American  govern- 
ments took  action  which  would  impact  the  future  of  air  tech- 
nical intelligence  and  our  R&D  program.  With  the  defeat  of 
the  Third  Reich  assured,  planning  began  for  the  identification 
and  control  of  scientists  and  technicians  who  might  materially 
contribute  to  a  revival  of  a  German  war  potential.  Further- 
more, their  technical  and  scientific  council  could  benefit  the 
US  in  its  war  with  Japan. 
Two  factors,  which  were  not  mentioned  for  security 
reasons,  gave  increased  urgency  to  its  implementation. 
First,  there  was  concern  about  postwar  relations  with  the 
Soviets,  and  the  success  they  might  have  in  using  such  scien- 
tists. Second,  the  higher  levels  of  intelligence  were  aware  of 
our  own  atom  bomb  developments,  and  the  intelligence  avail- 
able at  that  time  indicated  German  progress.  It  was  about  this 
time  that  the  ALSOS  MISSION,  directed  by  General  Leslie  R. 
Groves,  was  given  the  responsibility  for  determining  German 
progress  in  developing  an  atom  bomb. 
Ironically,  while  the  wisdom  of  evacuating  German  sci- 
entists was  still  being  debated  in  America,  Soviet  intelligence 
was  intensifying  its  efforts  to  lure  scientists  away  from  US 
control  in  Europe. 
31.  32.  JU-290  ■  COL  WATSON  AND  CREW  33.   DOCUMENT  FLOW  CHART 
34.   GERMAN  RIBBON  PARACHUTE  35.    DM-1  DELTA  GLIDER 
36.   WIND  TUNNEL  MODEL,  LIPPISCH  DM-1  GLIDER   37.    HEAVY  PRESS 
38.   AIR  DOCUMENTS  RESEARCH  CENTER  39.   HEAVY  EQUIPMENT 
40.   GERMAN  HEAVY  PRESS       41.    ANALYSTS  EXAMINING  EQUIPMENT 
42.   OETZTAL  WIND  TUNNEL  43.   ROCKET  MOTOR
fap” of SACINEAC EN Eigyes A Mats ce . a) ee . —. SN on ' ca * . * ko feN oN Zz ave 1 ope wa “fo ‘ \ ‘ . fy "MAA ty 6, aye x i at .8 WEYMOUTH ST, LONDON.WI hea 17
i 1917 
1967 \s 
Colonel  Donald  L.  Putt,  Director  of  Technical  Services, 
Air  Technical  Service  Command,  Europe,  was  convinced  that 
the  US  needed  the  German  scientists  in  its  R&D  program.  He 
gained  the  support  of  Major  General  Hugh  J.Knerr,  Colonel 
Huntington  D.  Sheldon,  and  Colonel  Mark  E.  Bradley.  Even- 
tually he  gained  approval  for  two  scientists  needed  for  a 
special  project  at  Wright  Field. 
Finally  on  19  July  1945,  a  project  named  OVERCAST 
was  approved  as  a  short-term  project.  OVERCAST  contracts 
with  the  scientists  were  for  a  6-month  period,  during  which 
time  their  capabilities,  willingness  to  work,  Nazi  affiliation 
(if  any),  and  other  necessary  information  were  determined. 
PROJECT  PAPERCLIP 
On  13  March  1946,  code  name  PAPERCLIP  was  substi- 
tuted for  OVERCAST.  With  the  short-term  personal  service 
contracts  extended  indefinitely,  the  scientists' families  were 
now  eligible  to  emigrate  with  them. 
German  fear  of  the  Soviets  and  dislike  for  the  Soviet  sys- 
tem were  major  factors  in  our  success  in  luring  leading  sci- 
entists to  America. 
While  the  Army  PAPERCLIP  operation  concentrated  on 
the  Peenemunde  rocket  experts,  the  Army  Air  Force  chose 
gifted  individuals  whose  talents  matched  R&D  requirements 
in  a  large  number  of  fields.  The  exodus  of  a  large  number  of 
scientists  and  their  families  from  one  country  to  another  for 
disarmament  purposes  was  unprecedented.  Administrative 
and  security  problems  had  to  be  solved  quickly.  Further- 
more, Soviet  recruitment  of  the  scientists  was  also  a  threat. 
Most  of  the  problems  we  re  solved  and  the  first  scientists 
arrived  at  Wright  Field  in  the  fall  of  1945.  Some  of  them 
came  by  way  of  England  (where  they  had  been  located  for 
preliminary  exploitation)  while  others  arrived  directly  from 
Germany. 
EVENTS  IN  THE  PACIFIC 
Air  technical  intelligence  operations  in  the  Pacific 
actually  preceded  those  in  Europe.  As  the  war  progressed 
they  received  the  full  support  of  General  MacArthur,  who 
furnished  the  ATI  personnel  with  personally  signed  letters 
authorizing  them  to  "Take  complete  charge  of  all  enemy 
crashed  or  captured  aircraft  or  personnel  as  early  as  pos- 
sible after  the  crash."  The  letters  ordered  armed  forces 
in  the  area  to  provide  necessary  transportation  and  assis- 
tance to  ATI  personnel  without  further  authorization  from 
any  headquarters. 
Early  in  1942,  a  "Materiel  Section"  for  air  technical 
intelligence  analysis  purposes  was  established  at  Mel- 
bourne, Australia.  Captain  Frank  T.  McCoy  and  TSgt 
Francis  Williams  (the  latter  now  with  FTD)  were  respon- 
sible for  its  organization. 
Throughout  the  war,  air  technical  intelligence  opera- 
tions were  effective  in  supporting  the  combat  forces.  Com- 
bat and  performance  characteristics  of  the  various  Japanese 
aircraft  and  weapons  were  prepared  and  distributed  to  the 
combat  forces  of  ail  services.  Strategic  support  was  also 
furnished.  For  example,  during  the  island  hopping  campaign 
from  Australia  to  the  Philippines,  Japanese  aircraft  were 
found  abandoned  on  some  of  the  islands.  Examination  indi- 
cated that  the  majority  had  suffered  engine  damage  due  to 
connecting  rod  failure.  Earlier  models  of  the  same  engine 
44.    GERMAN  TARGET  MAP  -  NEW  YORK  CITY     45.    DR.  LEIDECKER 
46.    GERMAN  DOCUMENTS  ARRIVE  FROM  LONDON      47.    BUILDING  89 
48.  REAR  ADM.  PENNOYER,  LT  COL  WALKER,  COL  M.  D.  SEASHORE 
49.  CAPTURED  MATERIEL  SO.  AIR  DOCUMENTS  PROCESSING  -  1946 
51.  JAPANESE  RITA  52.  CAPTURED  DOCUMENTS  AT  WRIGHT  FIELD 
S3.   WASSERFALL  GERMAN  MISSILE      54.    CAPTURED  MATERIEL 
55.   COLLECT/ON  DIVISION,  T-2  COL  M.  D.  SEASHORE  AND  STAFF
are, - =~ ‘ac™ . ow. ee SE: ve . toe pm % ae a ¥ nr = 7 aN 19
£ 1917 
1967 
were  checked  and  metallurgical  analyses  made.  Engines  of 
a  certain  series  were  found  to  have  connecting  rods  with  a 
deficiency  of  manganese.  It  was  deduced  that  the  Japanese 
suffered  a  shortage  of  this  metal  and  this  information  was 
passed  to  Targets.  Bombing  raids  were  set  up  to  cover  all 
known  sources  and  stockpiles  of  manganese  to  guarantee 
that  the  shortage  would  continue. 
Pacific  air  technical  intelligence  solved  many  problems. 
One  was  the  difficulty  encountered  in  communications  when 
identifying  Japanese  aircraft.  Captain  McCoy  and  TSgt 
Williams  began  assigning  code  names  such  as  Frank,  Betty, 
Francis,  Zeke,  and  Nate  -  feminine  names  for  bombers 
and  masculine  names  for  fighters  and  observation  planes. 
These  were  derivatives  of  their  own  names  and  those  of 
personal  friends  -  Frank  (Captain  McCoy),  Francis  (TSgt 
Williams),  Ray  (Captain  Ray  W.  McDuffey,  formerly  with 
ATIC),  Nell  (Mrs.  McDuffey),  etc.  The  procedure  of  as- 
signing proper  names  as  code  names  was  officially  adopted, 
and  is  still  being  used  to  identify  Soviet  aircraft. 
TAIU  IN  CONTROL 
In  October  1944,  a  Technical  Air  Intelligence  Unit 
(TAIU)  was  formed  and  attached  to  the  Far  East  Air  Forces. 
Frank  McCoy,  by  then  a  Lt  Colonel,  was  designated  Officer- 
in-Charge.  Under  his  direction,  TAIU  took  possession  and 
control  of  all  captured  Japanese  aircraft  and  equipment  in 
the  Pacific  theater. 
Earlier  in  the  same  year,  a  Technical  Air  Intelligence 
Center  (TAIC)  was  officially  established  in  Washington,  D.C. 
(Anacostia),  as  a  joint  Army-Navy  organization  with  British 
participation.  To  this  center  was  assigned  the  responsibility 
of  collection,  evaluation,  and  dissemination  of  all  technical 
intelligence  on  the  Japanese  Air  Forces.  This  center  worked 
closely  with  TAIU  in  the  field  and  absorbed  part  of  its  ex- 
perienced personnel.  TAIC,  during  1945  and  1946,  also 
worked  closely  and  harmoniously  with  Intelligence  at  Wright 
Field.  When  it  was  deactivated  in  the  summer  of  1946,  some 
of  its  key  personnel  were  assigned  to  technical  intelligence 
at  Wright  Field,  along  with  those  functions  which  pertained 
to  the  Air  Corps. 
INDEXING  A  NATION'S  AERONAUTICAL  RESOURCES 
In  Europe  the  problem  of  utilizing  the  tremendous  mass 
of  documents  had  to  be  solved. 
During  the  war,  the  various  laboratories  at  Wright 
Field  had  participated  in  the  intelligence  activities  by  pre- 
paring "Black  Lists"  of  wanted  enemy  equipment  and  had 
furnished  technical  personnel  for  Project  LUSTY.  This  ex- 
perience, plus  its  already  established  T-2  Intelligence  De- 
partment, resulted  in  Wright  Field's  assignment  to  process 
and  exploit  the  captured  documents. 
The  air  documents  story  actually  began  at  59  Weymouth 
Street,  London,  when  General  H.  H.  Arnold  directed  that  an 
"Index  Project"  be  initiated  to  process  the  millions  of  re- 
ports and  documentary  items  that  had  been  captured.  Colonel 
McCoy  was  selected  to  head  the  Air  Document  Research 
Center  in  London.  In  December  1945,  this  operation  was 
transferred  to  T-2,  Wright  Field.  It  culminated  in  one  of 
the  outstanding  events  in  documentation  history  -  the  index- 
ing and  abstracting  of  an  entire  nation' s  aeronautical  R&D 
literature. 
56.   DOBLHOFF  HELICOPTER  57.   JUMO  004  ENGINE 
58.   JAPANESE  ENGINE  59.    HELICOPTER  KITE 
60.  JUMO  004  ENGINE  61.   GERMAN  V-  J  62.   SYMPOSIUM 
63.    NATTER  64.    EXAMINATION  OF  JET  ENGINE  COMPONENT 
65.    BUILDING  263  66.   ME- 109  WITH  U-88  DRONE  (BEETHOVEN) 
67.    EQUIPMENT  DISPLAY    68.    AR ADO  234,  HE- 162  69.    ANALYSTS
MITSUBISHI JAPANESE Tree Oates oat COOL wit M2 MOOD tates ad wT ey bl “ wens sve tee aremere chO (gig TAT 465m Cit, ee ee Tey |} CORERET EON GEV EON APR Te ee F oe eee ere ee ee 21
£ 1917 
1967 \i 
Within  28  months,  some  1,500  tons  of  documents  were 
screened  by  teams  of  technical  intelligence  analysts  and 
German  scientists  and  the  important  ones  classified,  cata- 
logued, indexed,  and  published  on  microfilm-  Included  were 
details  of  the  worlds  first  production  jet  engine  fighter;  the 
design,  production,  and  test  information  needed  to  duplicate 
the  V-l  and  V-2  missiles;  and  literally  thousands  of  German 
research  projects,  inventions,  and  discoveries. 
This  operation  selected  some  500,000  documents  for 
priority  handling.  This  phase  of  the  effort  was  monitored  by 
Victor  H.  Bilek,  who  is  still  with  FTD. 
GERMAN/ENGLISH  DICTIONARY  COMPILED 
During  the  document  processing  task,  many  side  items 
#ere  produced.  One  of  these  was  a  dictionary  containing  over 
110,000  of  the  latest  German  aeronautical  terms.  New  tech- 
nological areas  had  been  explored  by  the  Germans  in  their 
development  of  jet  engines  and  rockets  under  a  cloak  of 
military  security.  Hence,  translations  from  German  to 
English  were  difficult  until  after  the  compilation  of  a  new 
German/English  technical  dictionary.  This  effort  was  the 
forerunner  of  similar  actions  in  later  years  by  FTD  in- 
volving the  Russian  and  Chinese  languages. 
EXPLOITATION  COMPLETED 
By  the  fall  of  1947,  T-2  had  essentially  completed  the 
exploitation  of  the  captured  German  and  Japanese  technology. 
Major  General  George  C.  McDonald,  Assistant  Chief  of  Air 
Staff  A-2,  recommended  a  reorganization  of  T-2.  His  report 
to  the  Army  Air  Force's  Chief  of  Staff  included  the  axioms 
that:  "Intelligence  is  a  prerequisite  to  intelligent  research 
and  development  and  procurement:  a  knowledge  of  our  own 
developments  is  a  prerequisite  to  evaluation  of  foreign  de- 
velopments"; and  '-'the  security  of  our  own  information  is  a 
prerequisite  to  technical  superiority." 
T-2  REORGANIZED 
General  McDonald  recommended  that  nonintelligence 
functions  be  removed  from  T-2,  and  that  its  total  energies 
be  directed  toward  meeting  the  air  technical  intelligence 
requirements  of  the  Army  Air  Force.  His  recommendations 
were  approved.  Colonel  Howard  M„  McCoy  (then  Deputy 
Commanding  General,  T-2)  assisted  in  the  details  of  reor- 
ganization. 
The  nonintelligence  portion  of  the  Air  Documents  Divi- 
sion became  the  Central  Air  Documents  Office  (CADO), 
later  the  Armed  Services  Technical  Information  Agency 
(ASTIA),  and  is  currently  known  as  the  Defense  Documenta- 
tion Center  (DDC).  The  Historical  and  Photographic  Divi- 
sions, Air  Technical  Museum,  Administration  of  German 
Scientists  and  other  nonintelligence  functions  were  trans- 
ferred at  this  time. 
REORIENTATION  OF  T-2 
Following  the  reorganization  of  T-2,  efforts  to  produce 
technical  intelligence  reports  and  estimates  on  foreign  air 
weapons  were  intensified.  Technical  information  was  mea- 
ger in  quantity  and  of  indifferent  quality.  There  was  no  ade- 
quate data  base  to  confirm  or  deny  information  received. 
Contractors  and  consultants  were  employed,  but  they  too 
were  handicapped  by  inadequate  background  information  on 
foreign  scientific  and  technical  progress. 
70.  V-2  ■  ONE  OF  MANY  DISPLAYS 
71.  BRIEFING  SECRETARIES    72.    HENSCHEL  AIR-TO  SURFACE  MISSILE 
73.  GERMAN  "ENZIAN'    SURFACE-TO-AIR  MISSILE  AT  PEENEMUNDE 
74.  ME-163  75.  JAPANESE  KAMIKAZE  76.  ME163  HEDI  LAMARR 
77.  CAMERA  CREW  78.  AMERICAN  COPY  OF  VI  79.  BUILDING  89 
80.  BUILDING  89         81.    GERMAN  FLETTNER  HELICOPTER 
*
7: 08 Wee ntti eee, = ae NETL es eevee 23
/^"-t.  .  «Y 
rf  1917  @)  1967J7 
7  Sr^   ^^   ^r^  \ 
BEGINNING  OF  DATA  BASE 
In  1948,  the  Air  Targets  Division,  Intelligence,  Head- 
quarters USAF,  initiated  a  project  which  exploited  foreign 
published  literature  to  determine  certain  economic  facts 
which  might  be  utilized  in  the  event  of  war.  Previously  there 
had  been  no  systematic  and  continuing  review  of  foreign  pub- 
lished S&T  literature. 
Lt  Colonel  Raymond  S.  Sleeper,  present  Commander  of 
FTD,  was  project  officer.  Management  of  a  major  portion  of 
the  project  was  eventually  turned  over  to  Technical  Intelli- 
gence at  Wright  Field. 
NEW  DIMENSIONS  IN  INTELLIGENCE 
By  1950,  new  and  more  sophisticated  methods  of  esti- 
mates were  evolving.  From  available  information,  designers 
were  able  to  predict  that  the  MiG-15  would  have  certain 
performance  limitations.  One  of  our  contractors  was  able 
to  furnish  estimates  on  the  performance  of  the  jet  engine 
used  in  the  MiG-15,  and  furnished  information  on  manufac- 
turing techniques  and  precision  manufacturing  abilities. 
Information  gained  in  the  analysis  of  one  weapon  system 
gave  insight  on  the  probable  performance  of  others. 
KOREA 
In  anticipation  of  a  crisis  in  the  Far  East,  Air  Technical 
Liaison  Officers  (ATLOs)  were  sent  to  Japan,  Within  a  few 
months  after  their  arrival,  North  Korea  attacked  South  Korea 
on  25  June  1950.  President  Truman  ordered  US  armed  in- 
tervention two  days  later. 
During  the  early  days  of  hostilities,  the  ATLOs  pro- 
vided guidance  and  council  to  the  combat  forces  in  air  tech- 
nical intelligence.  Captured  enemy  materiel  and  documents 
became  available  almost  immediately.  Information  of  combat 
significance  was  processed  in  Korea  or  Japan  when  possible, 
but  large  quantities  of  materiel  and  some  documents  were 
sent  to  WPAFB, 
The  Korean  conflict  proved  the  value  of  possessing 
valid  performance  and  characteristics  estimates  on  enemy 
weapons  -  before  the  war.  MiG-15  estimates  stood  up  well. 
The  MiG,  as  intelligence  predicted,  had  certain  limitations 
over  certain  speeds.  An  Associated  Press  dispatch,  dated 
1  March  1951,  stated,  "Most  Sabrejet  pilots  believe  their 
plane  is  of  better  aerodynamic  design  than  the  MiG.  As 
evidence  of  this,  they  cite  a  number  of  instances  in  which  an 
F-86  has  dived  away  from  a  MiG  or  has  pursued  and  caught 
a  MiG  when  it  went  out  of  control." 
WANTED:  ONE  MiG 
Early  in  1951,  Colonel  Watson  and  General  Benjamin 
Chidlaw  (Commanding  General,  Air  Materiel  Command) 
visited  the  Far  East  and  personally  requestedGeneralE.  E. 
Partridge  (AAF  Commander  in  Korea)  to  make  every  effort 
to  obtain  a  complete  MiG-15  for  analysis.  Asa  result  of  this 
request,  a  MiG  that  was  shot  down  and  crashed  off  Korea 
was  retrieved  within  a  short  time. 
Parts  of  another  MiG  were  recovered  by  helicopter, 
Technical  intelligence  personnel  landed,  ran  up  to  the  crashed 
plane,  threw  grenades  into  the  MiG  to  separate  assemblies 
small  enough  to  carry,  and  left  under  enemy  fire.  These 
parts  were  shipped  with  other  captured  materiel  to  WPAFB. 
82.    EARLY  DISPLAY  1946        83.   OFFICE  PARTY 
84.    CAPTURED  RESEARCH  TOOLS      85.    JAPANESE  SHINDEN 
86.  SURPLUS  CAPTURED  EQUIPMENT  GIVEN  TO  TECHNICAL  SCHOOLS 
87.  ATIC  CHAMPION  BOWLING  TEAM 
88.  GERMAN  WIND  TUNNEL  MODEL       89.    ATI  CLASS 
-■a*
£ 1917 
1967 
AIR  TECHNICAL  INTELLIGENCE  CENTER  (1951-1961) 
On  23  January  1950,  the  Air  Research  and  Development 
Command  (ARDC)  had  been  formed  in  a  major  realignment  of 
ATSC  functions,  and  in  May  1951,  the  Air  Technical  Intelli- 
gence Center  (ATIC)  was  designated  the  1125th  Field  Activi- 
ties Group  under  A-2  Headquarters,  USAF.  ATIC  for  the 
first  time  became  a  fully  recognized  member  of  the  intelli- 
gence community.  ATIC  was  thus  able  to  mesh  its  produc- 
tion schedules  more  efficiently  with  the  overall  intelligence 
effort. 
Colonel  Frank  L.  Dunn  replaced  Colonel  Watson  as  Com- 
mander in  June  1951.  He  served  until  August  1952,  when  ne 
was  detailed  to  flying  duties  and  was  replaced  by  Colonel 
Jack  O'Mara,  a  veteran  intelligence  officer,  who  served  as 
Acting  Commander  until  the  arrival  of  Brigadier  General 
W.  M.  Garland. 
General  Garland  had  been  former  Chief  of  Air  Targets 
in  Washington.  His  experience  in  the  Washington  intelligence 
community  helped  ATIC  open  many  doors.  He  was  also  in- 
strumental in  bringing  ATIC  products  into  better  alignment 
with  the  overall  estimates  being  produced  in  Washington. 
General  Garland's  health  failed  and  in  1953  he  was  replaced 
by  Colonel  George  Wertenbaker,  former  Air  Attache  in 
Sweden. 
chance  to  fly  the  MiG  against  our  bombers  and  other  weapons 
to  test  their  vulnerability. 
The  MiG  was  flown  to  Okinawa  and  flight-tested  by  US 
pilots,  including  General  AlBoyd.  Later  it  was  flown  at  Eglin 
and  Wright-Patterson.  Technical  intelligence  had  proved  its 
ability  to  support  Research,  Development,  Test  and  Evalua- 
tion (RDT&E)  and  combat  operations  effectively. 
DATA  BASE  DEVELOPED 
Colonel  Wertenbaker  was  reassigned  in  February  1954, 
and  Watson,  now  a  Brigadier  General,  again  assumed  com- 
mand. During  1954  and  1955,  the  emphasis  on  documentation 
and  use  of  contractors  increased.  An  impressive  file  of  in- 
formation was  now  accumulated.  It  was  organized  in  such  a 
manner  that  retrieval  of  information  could  be  accomplished 
quickly  and  efficiently.  The  quality  and  frequency  of  publi- 
cation of  technical  intelligence  products  increased  impres- 
sively. 
Contractors  were  brought  into  certain  analysis  opera- 
tions. This  provided  expertise  in  the  evaluation  of  data  and 
in  return  gave  the  contractor  first-hand  information  on  the 
environment  in  which  the  weapon  system  he  was  responsible 
for  would  be  required  to  operate.  In  many  instances,  con- 
tractors were  able  to  gain  insights  from  the  foreign  data 
which  stimulated  new  ideas  in  their  design  offices. 
DEFECTOR  DELIVERS  MiG- 15 
In  1953  a  defector  from  North  Korea  flew  a  MiG- 15  to 
Kimpo  Air  Field  in  South  Korea.  Although  ATIC  felt  that  it 
knew  all  about  the  MiG,  this  was  an  opportunity  once  and  for 
all   to  check   the  accuracy  of  its  estimates.  It  was  also  a 
90.    COL  H.  E.  V/ATSON  AND  FRIEND      91.    BUILDING  287 
92.   SOVIET  EQUIPMENT      93.    LA-H      94.    SOVIET  ARMAMENT 
95.    BUILDING  263         96.   NORTH  KOREAN  M.G-15     97.    BUILDING  259 
98.    COL  H.  E.  WATSON        99.   YAK-9     WO.    TU-2  BOMBER     101.   /L-IO
1917 
1967 VSL 
FACILITIES  EXPANDED 
Early  in  1958  Colonel  John  G.  Eriksen,  who  had  served 
as  Vice  Commander  under  General  Watson,  was  appointed 
Commander.  During  Colonel  Eriksen's  command  Building 
828  (the  present  FTD  Headquarters)  was  completed. 
Major  General  Charles  B.  Dougher,  formerly  Command- 
er, 8th  Air  Force,  Westover  A  FB,  assumed  command  late  in 
1958.  During  his  tenure  significant  increases  in  technical 
equipment,  including  a  computer,  expanded  FTD's  produc- 
tion, and  construction  plans  for  Building  829  were  approved. 
FOREIGN  TECHNOLOGY  DIVISION  1961-1967 
In  September  1959,  in  recognition  of  emerging  foreign 
aerospace  programs,  the  Air  Technical  Intelligence  Center 
was  redesignated  the  Aerospace  Technical  Intelligence  Cen- 
ter. 
In  April  1960,  a  major  realignment  of  Air  Force  func- 
tions transformed  the  ARDC  into  the  Air  Force  Systems 
Command  (AFSC),  and  on  1  July  1961,  the  Aerospace  Tech- 
nical Intelligence  Center  was  assigned  to  AFSC.  The  name 
was  changed  to  Foreign  Technology  Division  (FTD)  to  cor- 
respond to  the  division  structure  of  AFSC,  and  Brigadier 
General   Arthur   J.    Pierce   became   the  new  Commander, 
Although  assigned  to  AFSC,  FTD  retained  responsibility 
for  production  of  Air  Technical  Intelligence  for  the  USAF, 
Playing  a  dual  role,  FTD  now  provided  support  to  R&D  in 
addition  to  its  responsibility  for  meeting  national  require- 
ments for  aerospace  technical  intelligence.  The  depth, 
breadth  and  interdisciplinary  nature  of  new  technical  and 
scientific  advances  required  that  additional  resources  be 
involved  in  the  role  of  foreign  technology. 
DEPUTIES  ESTABLISHED 
Deputies  for  Foreign  Technology  (DFTs)  were  estab- 
lished in  the  AFSC  Divisions  and  Centers  with  FTD  as  Lead 
Division.  Each  DFT  acts  as  an  interface  between  his  Divi- 
sion and  Center  and  FTD  on  matters  pertaining  to  R&D  sup- 
port or  the  production  of  air  technical  intelligence.  Thus, 
the  entire  intellectual  resources  of  AFSC  and  its  contractors 
can  be  brought  to  bear  on  the  solution  or  study  of  a  signifi- 
cant problem.  Furthermore,  the  DFT  facilitates  effective 
dissemination  of  foreign  technology  information. 
COMPUTER  CAPABILITY 
The  orbiting  of  Sputnik,  ballistic  missile  threats  paraded 
by  the  Kremlin,  Tushino  Air  Show  flybys,  the  Cuban  missile 
crisis,  Chinese  nuclear  tests,  and  increasing  evidence  of  an 
expanding  Soviet  aerospace  R&D  program  have  given  an  ur- 
gency to  FTD  production.  This  increased  urgency,  plus  the 
sophistication  of  modern  weapon  systems,  required  numer- 
ous refinements  in  the  internal  and  procedural  aspects  of 
FTD. 
FTD  pioneered  the  use  of  computers  in  intelligence  anal- 
ysis. Increased  competency  in  the  application  of  machine 
methods  for  the  reduction  of  data  is  an  important  factor  in 
the  current  operations.  The  present  FTD  Computer  Complex 
includes  an  IBM  7094  system  supplemented  by  an  IBM  1401 
system  which  provides  high-speed  input/output  to  the  main 
computer. 
102.    103.    104.    GROUND  BREAKING  BUILDING  828     JULY  7956 
105.   SAFE  DRIVER  AWARD   106.    BUILDING  828  UNDER  CONSTRUCTION 
107.    BUILDING  219     108.   LEONA  DOWNS  AND  HUNTER  WATSON 
109.  GENERAL  W.  M.  GARLAND  AND  COLONEL  FRANK  L.  DUNN 
110.  COLONEL  FRANK  L.  DUNN  AND  GENERAL  W.  M.  GARLAND 
111.  FRIENDS      112.    ENTRANCE  TO  BUILDING  828
wear be ia > 1 {n a. Py mamnidian stds ~ AT a ee i Merl dup pe t pa \e x tee her ta alia wot f é BLDG ELAR vip TECHNICAL INTELLIOE NEB a. a ~ ened ny Ao CENTER —: . bethaet tf is] a) 47S usa FELD MLFOTES CF oo . : ~ .. hee - : 2 or ~ nm ee TT LOEMT RCE OC t ‘ uu [i . {Te a
MACHINE  TRANSLATION 
Additionally,  FTD  possesses  machine  translation  capa- 
bility which  augments  the  human  translation  department  in 
making  available  to  the  intelligence  community  significant 
foreign  documents. 
In  May  1956,  an  R&D  contract  was  written  with  IBM  for 
the  production  of  a  photoscopic  memory  disc  to  be  used  with 
a  special  purpose  computer.  This  action  resulted  in  the  pro- 
duction of  the  Mark  I  Translating  Device,  which  produced  its 
first  machine  translation  in  January  1959. 
The  Mark  I  was  service-tested  and  refined,  and,  in 
October  1963,  the  Mark  II  was  built  and  installed  at  FTD. 
With  a  present  capacity  of  well  over  100,000  words  a  day, 
its  potential  is  practically  limitless. 
BUILDING  829 
In  1964  work  started  on  Building  829,  which  provided 
additional  space  for  data  reduction  purposes.  Mr.  L  Herman 
was  responsible  for  providing  the  technical  and  administra- 
tive knowledge  in  gaining  approval  for  this  facility,  which 
was  completed  early  this  year.  Plans  for  further  enlarge- 
ment of  the  828-829  complex  are  under  consideration. 
M3.  COLONEL  GEORGE  WERTENBAKER      114.    mT I  CLASS 
US.  ANALYSTS      116.  PHOTOGRAPHIC  SCHOOL  STAFF 
117.  CHARLES  ZIMMERMAN  AND  COLONEL  JACK  O'MARA 
1 18.  FRANCIS  ARCIER.  MRS.  IVY  MAMMOLITE,  MAJ  GENERAL  WATSON 
119.  COLONEL  JOHN  G.  ERIKSEN        120.   COMPUTER  ROOM 
121.  ANALYST      122.   LIBRARY  BUILDING  828 
123.  ELECTRONIC  DATA  REDUCTION  EQUIPMENT     124.   ANALYST 
125.  ANALYSTS    126.  BRIGADIER  GENERAL  ARTHUR  J.  PIERCE 
127.  REPRODUCTION  DEPARTMENT    128.   GRAPHICS  DEPARTMENT 
129.  GRAPHICS  DEPARTMENT      130.  GROUND  BREAKING  BUILDING  829
1917 
■/»&(  1967 
^ 
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CHANGES  IN  COMMAND 
In  July  1964,  Colonel  Arthur  W.  Cruikshank,  Jr.,  became 
Commander  of  FTD.  Prior  to  this  appointment,  he  had  served 
as  Commander  of  the  Research  and  Technology  Division's 
Systems  Engineering  Group  at  WPAFB  with  additional  duty 
as  Deputy  Commander  of  the  Research  and  Technology  Divi- 
sion. Colonel  Cruikshank  was  promoted  to  Brigadier  General 
on  1  November  1964. 
Colonel  Raymond  S.  Sleeper  succeeded  General 
Cruikshank  as  Commander  on  9  August  1966.  Previously 
Colonel  Sleeper  had  served  as  Deputy  Chief  of  Staff  for 
Foreign  Technology,  Headquarters,  Air  Force  Systems  Com- 
mand. 
THE  FTD  MISSION 
From  its  formal  inception  as  Intelligence,  T-2  in  1945, 
FTD  has  been  the  only  national  source  devoted  exclusively 
to  providing  information  on  foreign  aerospace  developments. 
The  assigned  mission  of  the  Division  is  to  plan,  manage, 
and  execute  the  AFSC  foreign  technology  program  in  order 
to  achieve  the  following  objectives: 
1.  Reduce   the   possibility  of  technological  surprise. 
2.  Provide  valid,  logical,  and  timely  foreign  technology 
support  to  US  and  R&D  activities. 
3.  Assist  and  support  the  US  effort  in  obtaining  maxi- 
mum effectiveness  of  aerospace  power. 
FTD  is  directly  responsible  to  Headquarters,  AFSC,  for 
accomplishing  these  objectives  by: 
1.  Acquiring,  evaluating,  and  analyzing  foreign  scien- 
tific and  technical  information  and  equipment;  and  producing 
and  disseminating  reports,  studies,  technical  evaluations, 
and  related  contributions  on  the  current  and  potential  status 
of  foreign  technology. 
2.  Applying  advanced  domestic  technology  to  the  pre- 
ceding functions. 
3.  Disseminating  foreign  technological  data  to  US  and 
Free  World  R&D  and  intelligence  communities. 
4.  Developing  and  maintaining  the  technological  threat 
picture  -  tasking  AFSC  organizations  as  necessary  as  the 
Lead  Division. 
The  established  validity  of  technical  intelligence  meth- 
odology, the  continued  buildup  of  talented  R&D  personnel, 
and  the  contributions  of  private  industry  to  air  technical 
intelligence  are  insurance  that  FTD  will  not  again  be  faced 
with  conditions  as  General  Mitchell  knew  them  50  years  ago. 
To  attempt  to  maintain  national  security  without  adequate 
knowledge  of  foreign  developments  would  be  prohibitively 
expensive  even  if  we  we  re  successful;  it  would  be  catastroph- 
ic if  we  were  not. 
131.  COLONEL  CARLISLE,  MR.  DALIN'S  RETIREMENT  CEREMONY 
132.  MAJOR  GENERAL  CHARLES  B.  DOUGHER  RECEIVING  COMMANDERS 
TROPHY  FROM  COLONEL  T.  H.  BALDWIN,  WPAFB 
133.  MACHINE  TRANSLATION  134.  SECRETARIES 
?35.    BRIGADIER  GENERAL  A.  W.  CRUIKSHANK 
136.    GROUND  BREAKING  BUILDING  829     137.    ANALYSTS 
1 38.  PUBLICATIONS  EDITORS  AT  WORK 
139.  GENERAL  CRUIKSHANK  PRESENTING  AWARD      140.  ANALYSTS 
141.    ARMY  LIAISON  OFFICE     142.  MACHINE  TRANSLATION
143.  COLONEL  SLEEPER  PRESENTING  AWARD 
144.  COL  R.  S.  SLEEPER  AND  FRIENDS 
145.  MORNING  BRIEFING    746.   CONFERENCE 
147.  CONG.  C.  WHALEN  VISITING  FTD 
148.  COLONEL  F.  HOLM  (PRESENTING  AWARD 
TO  OUTSTANDING  PROFESSIONAL 
ENGINEER  NICK  KARMELE 
149.  COL  SLEEPER  AND  ADMIRAL  R.  TAYLOR 
150.  OFFICERS  "DINING  IN"  757.  DAG  MEETING" 
752.    SOCIAL  FUNCTION    753.    PHOTO  LAB 
154.   NCO  "DINING  IN"    755.   NCO  "DINING  IN"    756.  HONOR  GUARD
157.   SOVIET  FLIPPER     158.  SAVAGE  MISSILE 
159.    SOVIET  PARADE      160.  MiG-21 
161.  MiG-21  (AS  SEEN  BY  GUN  CAMERA) 
162.  BADGER  SOMBER   163.   MI-6  HELICOPTER  (SOVIET) 
164.    SA-2  SOVIET  MISSILE     165.   VOSTOK 
166.    AN-22  (SOVIET)    167.   LUNA  9,  LUNA  10  (SOVIET) 
J  68.    TU-104  (SOVIET)    169.  FTD  BUILDING 
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