CS Historical Paper No. i CLANDESTINE SERVICES HISTORY THE BERLIN TUNNEL OPERATION \- 2956 os 7 : 30 Jal 77...-- Other copy held by: ] Controlled by: ; Date prepared: . 25 August 1967 Cepy No. 2 of 2 Date published: 24 June 1968 Written by:
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page PREFACE. * 2 . . i LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. . . .... 2... Lii INTRODUCTION. . . . PLANNING. . 2... 1 1 ee ee ee IMPLEMENTATION. 2... 1 1 we ee Vv. TERMINATION . . 2... 2. 1. ee eee 23 Vv. PRODUCTION. 2. 2. 1. 1 1 we ee ee ee 25 yi. AFTE RMATH 2. Lk kk ee ee 27 +) Analysis of the Reasons for the Discovery of the Tunnel Recapitulation of the Intelli-. gence Derived @ Typical American Press Comment German Press Comment Bast
PREFACE | (the Berlin Tunnel project) came into being sometime in| (the exact date cannot be established) and ceased as an active operation in the summer of 1956. The writer served as Headquarters case officer on the project from the winter of |. until the summer of | and then as the field case officer until| | » were intimately associated with the planning and implementation of the project at the policy level and very kindly offered suggestions for the preparation of this manuscript. Their comments have been incorporated and are greatly appreciated. Several other individuals, including ,» who were in a position to offer valuable advice were absent from Headquarters during the period the ~- paper was being prepared and thus unavailable to assist. When this voroject was first discussed with the then . Director of CIA, Mr. Allen Welsh Dulles, he ordered that, in the interests of security, as little as possible concerning the project would be reduced to writing. It is probable that few orders have been so conscientiously obeyed, and yet there 2 bee,
are a great many cubic feet of files connected with this pro- ject. These files mainly concern technical and administrative matters. Only those details which, in the opinion of the writer, are necessary to a broad understanding of the manner in which the project's objectives were accomplished have been included in this paper. Those interested in additional data may wish to consult the files. In addition to setting forth significant developments, the writer has attempted to provide insight into the reasons zor certain cour I es of action. At times this reauired a speculative approach. The judgments derived from such syacu- lation were shared by all those actively concerned in the management of the project, and it is the writer's hope that they are accurately expressed in the sollowing paper. Any error in this respect, however, is the sole responsibility of the writer. *,
I. INTRODUCTION . The exact moment when the idea emerged of digging a tunnel to intercept Soviet and East German communications is somewhat obscure. A number of factors must be considered, anong them the following: a. As early as 1948 U.S. Intelligence Officers became interested in the benefits to be derived from tapping Soviet and Satellite jandlines on a scale not previously considered necessary. The loss of certain oy | sources during this period created gaps in our intelli- 09 ence coverage which were particularly unfortunate during this veriod of Cold War escalation. It became evident that the tapping of certain selected landlines might pro- duce the information needed to fill a number of the gaps in our overall intelligence picture. b. In the late 1940's and early 1950's the U.S., through the briefings of "returnee” German scientists {those who were taken by the Soviets after World War II +o work in Russia) and other sources, became aware of a new
c. In the late 1940's the! . > in the course of its continuing efforts to provide secure communications for the Agency, became aware of a principle which, when applied to target communications, orfered certain possibilities. Plans to exploit this technique were immediately formulated. These factors then served as additional incentives (Cabave and beyord our normal collection requirenents) to focus atten- tion on Soviet landline targets, In mid-|_ exploratory discussions were held in Washington to plan the mounting of an attack on Soviet landlines in East Germany with special empha~ sis to be placed on the Berlin area, Vital information on the | -  ° technical details t of important Soviet and East German landlines | ,  : ve first became available | . Do
during the latter part of | » and by all of the pertinent technical material -had been assembled and sufficient- ly analyzed to permit the pinpointing of the most important Soviet circuits, | Subsequent events proved | this information to be completely correct. lod - Various methods of tapping these circuits were explored Af 7 ST and one sampling operation was run in the East Zone, unfortu- - nately with nesative results. By » however, the ] erfectiveness of | oe had become such that al. sample was obtained of the prime target circuit, | Svecial mention should be made of the fact that ‘ "4 4 it was necessary to maintain a 24-hour watch over al. month period on "our" end of the cable to record these “- a
Meantime collateral collection effort continued on the communications systems involved | At this point (mid ) we knew it could be done — the next steo was the problem of installing a: permanent tap on the Precisely at what point the idea of a tunnel for the purpose of tapping the target cables began to come into focus cannot be pinpointed.
i one bit While it should perhaps be possible to credit individual with the initial concept, it appears to be a difficult to do so. At any rate’, the idea of a tunnel to the target cables began to take definite shape. ad
if. PLANNING Inspection of all sites from which it might be possible to tunnel] . to the target cables served to narrow the choices to two spots: | \ | oo _. « The site actually used | \ | was selected after careful deliberation which included, but was not limited to, the following factors: a. bs The length of the tunnel was considered to be not impractical c, Land was available | {| - from which to begin the tunnel. Cc, Complete collateral information on the area was availabie, {
At this point the following major questions remained unanswered: a. Was it indeed possible to dig a tunnel of this magnitude | clandestinely, con- sidering the fact that the border at this point was heavily and constantly patrolled by the East Germans, and hit the targets? b. in such a remote area (this portion of Berlin was at that time a “sauattersville" of shacks and hovels constructed from rubble by refugees from the East German Zone)? ihm retrospect the first question, "Could the tunnel be cug?'"’, was never really a debatable one---those concerned more or less decided that given sufficient money and personnel the job could be Gone. (This judgment fortunately proved sound.) The sec i¢) = \ de nd question, | » haunted the minds of project personnel for many weeks and a great many ingenious ideas were brought forth and discarded for one rea- son or another until the suggestion was made / . # 4 . ' This in effect was the solution. /[ a ; : 7
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* emer planning for the project continued and in| of that year the Director of Central Intelligence approved the terms of reference which covered | the implemen- tation of the project. A series of conferences in late } and early | led to the following decisions: \ a. } (1) procure a site, | \ » and drive a tunnel to a voint beneath the target cables; (2) be responsible for the recording of.all signals produced | \ . . and ja tt fe) Ih et oy wo cr ( t (0 i (3) process in Washington a graphic material received hy ft om the vroject. b. | (1) drive a vertical shaft from the tunnel's 7 end to the targets;
Le er te rr, . (2) effect the cable taps and deliver a usable signal to the head of the tunnel for recording; and (3) provide for a| center | . to process the voice recordings from the site. Activity thus proceeded cn three fronts -~ in Berlin steps were taken to lease the necessary land and right-of-way ease-=- ments for the site
Planning called for the completion of this work: on| For assistance in actually digging the tunnel it was Gecided to request help from the | and to this end the | were briefed on the project. The initial contact with | | was made personally by Mr. Allen Imilles to | | . Fortunately j, ok. > 2 trained engineer, had just been appointed|\ I~ From the first moment he learned of the operat on, was an enthusiastic supporter of the concent. ‘ selected; ‘ - (the only available member of the! with any experience in tunneling) to head the project. This proved to be an excellent choice for; | turned in an outstanding job. By mid-summer of | he had firmed up the engineering plans, selected a crew of engineering versonnel, and actually con- structed a mock-up tunnel some 150 yards long working under operational conditions at a high security base in .~ - 12
Some mention should be made of the actual method of construct~ ing the tunnel. | "13
\ . it was calculated (and subse-~ quently proven to be true) that this method of construction would not permit settling of the soil and detection of the tunnel from the surface. | Meantime | engineers constructed a mock- up of the tunnel's terminal end | | Availadle plans indicated that the cables were buried some| inches deep along the side of a heavily traveled highway. The top of the vertical shaft | then needed to be approximately | inches below the surface of the high- way in order to give the tapping crew room to work below the ceiling of the shaft, and the whole structure had to be capable of supporting the weight of heavy trucks since the tunnel and tap chamber lay directly beneath the highway. | Considerable care was devoted to insulating the t 4 14
3/ tap chamber to prevent its acting like a huge drum. — Considerable thought was given to the quantity and content of the material available from the target and the manner in which it was to be processed. 3/ in spite of the insulation, it was a weird sensation to b2 in the chamber when an iron-shod horse trotted across it. We also suffered some anxious moments one foggy morning when the microphone in the tap chamber gave forth with a continuous series of dull thuds. After the sun burned away the fog, visual observation showed that the East German police had set up a temporary automobile checkpoint directly over the chamber. The "thuds"” the microphohe picked up were caused by the police officer in charge stomping his feet on the road surface to keep warm. is
Iii, IMPLEMENTATION a . By | things were beginning to take shape and the situation was as follows: a, | b, All of the basic supplies, equipment, and , personnel were in Berlin ready to start construction on the tunnel. Cc. Space at Headauarters was secured and the had assembled a crew and was well under way in fabricating the unique equipment necessary to process the anticipated telegraohic traffic. d. Initial personnel had been selected and were _ being processed | ° ‘ * [ . oan . . ve :
een terres ee ea oe ne nt en A eee en eeremnnt ew att et A tn ee em ee It should be noted that personnel and equip- ment were programmed initially to exploit approximately | percent of the anticipated take. In retrospect, per- haps this could be considered overly cautious. In justification of this decision it should be said that no one had ever tunneled | under clandestine condi- tions with the expectation of hitting a target two inches in diameter and{ inches below a main German/Soviet highway. There were those wno manifested certain reser- vations on the feasibility of so doing, and it is greatly to the credit of those senior officials, | , that, in spite of these reservations, the roject was permitted to proceed. J I ——. ene a ee paneer —--
Careful visual observation was maintained and tunneling operations stopped each time the German guards walked over the tunnel on their regular patrols. Pumps were installed to take care of the excess water. Observation logs were maintained, and since the highway under observation was the main road from East Berlin to the Schoenfeld Airport, consid- erable Order of Battle information was obtained. It was also possible to estimate quite accurately the relative importance of individuals visiting East Berlin by observing the security precautions taken by the East Germans and the Soviets. [ Cool air was supplied to the face of the tunnel through duct~ work from an air conditioning unit | | . The tunnel was completed on[{[ . ', Construction orf the tap chamber commenced | . . _ and was completed, with the| target cables exposed, on | | J i To appreciate this accomplishment it is necessary toa renember that the tunnel was | eo Long | n
The lack of an adequate base line made the survey- ing problem especially qgifficult. The engineers decided at One point that an object of known size in the East Zone would be useful as a reference point, so a baseball game waS organ- ized with the objective of knocking a baseball as far into the East Zone as possible. This scheme was frustrated by the friendliness of the East German guards who kept returning the baseball. Nonetheless, the engineers expressed confidence that they knew their position when the tunnel was completed to a point which could be contained in a six-inch cube. They were correct. - . 3 Excess humidity is probably one of the greatest enemies of electronic equipment. To guard against this problem the section of the tunnel immediately adjacent to the tap chamber was insulated and sealed| , 7 i to form, in effect, a closed room, |. ; . Yapor barriers were erected and, in addition, a heavy "anti-personnel" door of steel and concrete was constructed to seal off the tunnel some 15 yards. from its terminal end. From the beginning it was realized that the duration of this operation was finite. Considerable thought was given to the vosture the U.S. Govern- ment would adopt upon the tunnel's discovery. and to those 20
measures which would be taken at the site. The following position was finally approved: b, | | c. The "anti-~-Dersonnel" door Gescribed above was 4/ installed, a. All equipment for isolating and preampli- fying the signals and passing them down the tunnel for record— ing was in place before each tap was made so that monitoring or each pair could begin as soon as it was tapved. \ Careful check was kept of the temperature and 4/this door bore the following inscription neatly lettered in German and Cyrillic: "Entry is forbidden by order of the Commanding General.” It was reasoned that this sign might give pause to Soviet and/or German officials and gain time. As a matter of fact, there were those Communist individuals whe considered the posting of this sign as one of the most auda~ cious aspects of the entire undertaking.
humidity in the tap chamber to prevent the possibility of the introduction of moisture into the target cables thus causing faults. The moisture in the air caused by the breathing and perspiration of the technicians doing the tapping operation forced the suspension of the operation several times to permit the air conditioning equipment to dehumidify the chamber. All the components in the electrical isolation net— works were individually selected and subjected to rigorous tests to insure maximum reliability, and the lead-away cables were constructed of the best available materials, sheathed in lead, and handled in accordance with the highest telephone company standards. The strictest possible visual vatch was maintained with the tap erev. In short, in this, as in all aspects of the operation, every effort was made to guarantee success even though in many instances it meant delay in achieving the objective. 22
ee IV. TERMINATION The tunnel was discovered | 21 April 1956, after | , of operation. A memorandum pre- pared on 15 August 1956 (reproduced in its entirety as Appendix A) examines in detail all evidence available as of that date on the reasons for the discovery. The.conclusion reached was that the loss of this source was purely the result of unfortunate circumstances beyond our control — a combina- . tion of the fact that one of the cables was in very poor physical condition (this was knewn from the beginning) and a long period of unusually heavy rainfall. It appeared that water entered the cable in sufficient quantity to make it inopera- tive, thus necessitating digging up Sections of the cable dud causing discovery of the tap.
: Ve PRODUCTION . The following statistics may be of interest in evaluating the project: . : nn
d. A small processing unit was maintained at the Berlin, site to permit on-the-spot monitoring of engineering circuits for the protection of © the project and scanning of the more productive circuits for the "hot" intelligence. Daily reports of sufficient value tc warrant electrical transmission to Washington [ were produced. e. Processing of the backlogged material con- tinued until 30 September 1958 - | £ | ae The information from this material was disseminated in a closely controlled system Appendix B consists of a summary of the value of the material received together with typical customer comments.
vi. AFTERMATH As previously noted, cansiderable thought was given during the entire life of the project on the result its discovery would bring. In retrospect it is probably correct to say that, among those most actively concerned with the project's management, a consensus developed that the Soviets would orobably suppress knowledge of the tunnel's existence | ratner than admit to the world that Free World intelligence organs had the capability of successfully mounting an opera- tion of this magnitude. In other words, it was felt that fer the Soviets to admit that the U.S. had been reading their high level communications circuits would cause the Soviets to lose . ‘Perhaps fortunately, fate intervened, and as a possible Inn fa 13) c consequence the Soviet course of action was exactly contrary tO expectation, Toe Commandant of the Soviet Berlin Garrison, who would normally have controlled the handling of the situation when the tunnel was discovered, was absent from Berlin and the Acting Commandant, Colonel Ivan A. Kotsvuba, was in charge. There is some reason to believe that he (for wnatever reason) was forced to make a personal decision on & course of action so without benefit of advice from Moscew, At any rate his reaction was unexpected in that he invited the eatirc Serlia = 27
~—— press corps to a briefing and tour of the tunnel and its facilities. As a result the tunnel was undoubtedly the most highly publicized peacetime’espionage enterprise in modern times prior to the "U-2 incident." Worldwide reaction was out- standingly favorable in terms of enhancement of U.S. prestige. .Non-Soviet Bloc sentiment can be generally summarized as follows: a, There was universal admiration (and this included informed Soviets) on the technical excellence of the installation and the imaginative nature of the undertaking. b. The non-Communist world reacted with surprise and unconcealed delight to this indication that the U.S., almost universally regarded as a stumbling neophyte in espionage matters, was capable of a coup against the Soviet Union, which had long been the acknowledged master in such matters c. Coupled with regret that the Cold War necessi- tated such measures, thoughtful editorial comment applauded this indication that the U.S. was capable of fulfilling its role of Free World leadership in the struggle. ’ GQ Appendix C contains a sampling of typical U.S. vress accounts and editorial comment on the tunnel. Predictably the Communist press treated the tunnel as an outrage and an st 28
intolerable indecency. Appendix D consists of a Study of East German press reaction to the incident. . For their contributions to Project | awards were made to the following individuals: 2/ Distinguished Intelligence Medal Intelligence Medal of Merit Intelligence Medal of Merit Intelligence Medal of Merit Distinguished Intelligence Medal Intelligence Medal of Slerit Intelligence Medal of Merit Distinguished Intelligence Medal Intelligence Medal of Merit 5/unfortunately the writer has been unable to locate an exact record of those persons who received other recognition from the Agency for their participation in this project and any omissions are regretted. It should also be noted that approximately | people participated wittingly or unwittingly in this undertaking. In fact thereare very few, if any, of the elements of CIA that were not called upon for assistance, either directly or indirectly (such as providing manvower), during the life of the vroject. 29
APPENDIX A NOTE: Tnis assessment was prepared by the | staff immediately after the discovery of the tunnel and is based on pertinent information available. | — \ 15 August 1956 _DISCOVERY BY THE SOVIETS OF| _ Analysis of all available evidence - traffic passing on the target cables, conversations recorded from a micropnone installed in the tap chamber, and vital observations from the site ~ indicates that the Soviet discovery of | was purely fortuitous A descrip- tion of the events leading to these conclusions is contained in this paper.
. APPENDIX B. . . . 4 RECAPITULATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE DERIVED Set forth below are a recapitulation of intelligence derived from the| = material and some typical consumer comments,
WASHINGTON POST 1 May 1956 Tha Tunsel of Tove °° £52 £URNCL OF LOI! Tho United States Government has not yel made any ofiicial repty to, tha Soviet and East German allegstions and protests coacerning the 300-yard tunacl that American intelligenea operatives ara said to have built undeznesth the border between West and East Berlin for espionage purposes. Meanwhile, assuming the slory to be correct—we cannot help thinking the Communists have made a gricvous mistake to raise so much fuss about their discovery. They are even said to have conducted special propaganda tours through the tunnel and to have exhibited the wizelapping and olher record- ing apparatus that the Americans are supposed lo have installed inside it. . The probable result of ali this has been to give tha anti-Communist resistance in East Germany a good desi of amusement and encourszemenl Cer- tainiy it must hava served to strengthen tha -im- pression of American resourcefulness and thereby to restora somo measura of our prestige—which apparently had deen deteriorating since tha equivo~ cal attituds taken by the American aulborilics in the East German uprisings of June, 195¢—aniong the caplive population. Tha reactlon of their Kinsmen in West Germany js prohably a prelly good index to their own, © . In West Germany the story has been accepted at face value with astonishment and delight as an evidence that the tradition of Yankeo resource: fulness and ingenuity is not a myth after all. Espionaga is one game in which the Communists were deemed, even by their enemics, to be par- _ticularly expert and our own side {6 ba dismally inept. Very few Germans, as the Frankfurter Neue Presse cxuilantly observed, even suspected that the Americans “were capable ef so much cleverness”; and it would be even more devastating to Communist prestige if if wera disclosed that {ha espionage lunne! nad been in operation for some time befora the Communists became aware of it. Indeed, if the tunnel episode turns out lo hava heen the product of Yankeo ingenuily, there ts an interesling parallel in American history, During the siege of Petersburg in 1864, an enterprising Union officer from the Penasylvania coal fields conceived the jidca of miivag the Confederate positions from a tunnel under them. The tuanal was Cug and the mincs were Anally set off; and though the operation was a fiasco in part De: suse’ af the {aildre of Union commanders to eXccula arders, the boidness of the stroke has compelicd adrairation aver since, | Tes ae « C-2 ON Ne etm eee ee: me we ee ae
ow BERLIN Wonderful Tuanel Iterlin, city rubble, refugees. and aceasional patches of glitter, is an Alfred Mitcheock dream of subterfuce ane suspi- cion, Ja back streets, darkly mysterious’ honses his behind bigh wire fences sug restive darker and: more mysterious Moss wiihan Newsmen secently_¢ 27 aepatate agencies of Western “intel gente “known to be at work ia Berl —_— en . wet a Their wpcratives—some Slothed ii che grey shiunel of New York's Muaniisa: Avenue. sume with armpit hole asters Duets uiader blue sergy—srepurt to sdinetent headiuarters, and rarciv: know what ther collowsues are up to. Taal Berlin there ns better suned tu the Hitcheock schemne of chings than a res. semiedeeried Carnes knows an the US. side as Rudaw snd in the Russian zone, just over the war, as Alt is agen Giienivke, | Self-important ducks and chigkeas strat dike commissars in Alt- Ghenivie’s cobbled street. Uerlin’s only working owindnall farns daaily in the breeze neu by said close to the leundary separcting East and West stands a U.S. radar station. bending its reticular tar to the ay Bast) Berlin's Schoaeteld’ Airport. “Tuo rings of barhed BEECHES fashionably | Ve ‘ ? wire guatd the ‘luneiy radar post, an . - —————. behind taem a detachment of uniformed | Signal Coms men live a life as secret roy and jsolatcd as monks, -. ot = husy ; : yards from the radar station at 2 TIME MAGAZINE 7 May 1956 °°. Tho Sie Cotlcr, For rsany 2 month, the super-secrecy surrouading the con- sructioa and operation of Ruduw’s radar ~ station had fed the gossip of bared Amer- jeans in ihe occupied city. There were those wus remembered a civilian cnsincer hired to supervise the job; he had quit ia disgust because the bluepsiats secmed so craey. “Why build a celiar big enough to deve through with a dump “truck?” h asked. aud was iold to mind his own bush ness, Others recalled seeing friends whom they Knew ta_he_ engineers ‘suddenly pearing atthe station Wearing the insignia of The USO Amiy Signal Corps. Why? An amused Savi was the only answer ques- tioners ever gat—hut Jast week the Rus- sians Urought they had found a hetter one. - One night at 7 o'clock, an angry, shunky Sevict coloncl named Ivan Rutsi- uba celicd a press conference in East Bere ' ‘Tin, P umpase: to protest the building by- “American arganisations” of A. seeret tunn/)d antler ast German territary. with the criminal intent of spying.” Oiiered a chance to see for themselves, the W estern newsmen were taken to a site some 500° Rudow. - A Let of Money. Truckloads of Red army troops and squad cers crowded with Volkspulized stem by. Mobile Kenezalors were humimiog Ge provide lights far the oseasion, and at Che entrawe tea hale dog in the greand. a caianed of Che Rats. sin signal corps wis on Fad tee eygoktin at all. Ten feet below, its entrance a hote ens in the rool hy the Russians, hay the auinel itself: a cast-iron tube aheue six feet in dismeter and s90-b0oo yards Tony, cramuned with electronic cepuipiment, cae bles. tape recorders, ventilating apparates and punops of beth Brith and American make. .\t the East Geraan end. cates bed out of the main hedy of the Cannel ty a separate chamber where they weee Haked to tue Ext German cabies and a third used ly the Russians, Waat was at the Amesican ends The newstaen were net permitted to knew, As they crawled weet- ward. a sandbag barrier barred thy way, ils purpose emphasized li a sign reading in English and Germain “Yor ary new entering the Agierivay sector” “This tunnel.” said the Russian expert, with a note of admisation, “was built to last vears. “The party responsible must have hada det of meney.” Who was cespensibles Nebody, aeither the Pentagon. the Stale Department, nae the Central Iniciigence Agcney, was says inv. Yur as Jerlin’s' papers crupicd glee. fully with the news, one Berlin editor thd aorauhing US. eteid: ch dan’t! knew whether sour poopie dug uit winderful tuancl or not, but whoever it was, let me pay To uhisk it was too bad it wes found It’s the beot publicity the US. has had in Berlin for a Jong time.” 2 - . - se - 4 see
ye aie ‘ . BOSTON YOST Pay Ai Cire: m.f 267,872 : . : Sf 396,495 } i Feont tds Os.ce 5 : Pece Pdse Peco : ’ : p MAY LL E59 Par > on" . = on TTS ecg j * . Hope ft Is True’ i Sart Soviet: charges that American intelligence agents: > dus a tunnel in Serlin, tapped a telephone cable, andi irecorded conversations-over the Red communication net: ; Work, which the Reds made with considerable. fanfare. ‘and duving a conducted. tour of the spy tunnel for cor-, ‘respondents, gives us some faint hope. : Frankly, we didn't know that American me agents were that smart. In‘fact, we were beginning i think that what the Centrai Intelligence Agency, needed’ ‘WIS a Tew Tessas on the ‘fundamentals of espionace ‘fram“some defected d Russian’ agent. B But_now.ve take its hall i back. If 1 the Soviet charges are ‘true, Amcrican j intel-: Higence agents’ “have a actually, collected, some important! niorma ation | conceraing, sovieh sz maitary, operations and: installations in, East -Germany,, i “We "hope that American intelligence agents have’ lingltrated “the: Sovict department of foreign affairs,’ ‘planted westera’ sympathizers in the heart of the Soviet! ‘bureaucracy and started a stream of microfilmed cop! es ‘of important Scviet documents. towa: ods | ate CTA, br ! Washington . 3 . i Ve hope. ali this because that ; is precise ely what. the iSoviet spy network did and is probably doing rizat now ‘in the United States. This is not just tit for tat—but a stark 7 hecessity in ‘the world of cynical newer politics." |; ed ts} in “ oe wae eee scone ae ee cee
| | oo | , © = mt oe ete b STAMFOnD (teen) . sews ADVOCATE a : Cire: 23,165 Front Eke Othee Page Poe _ Page ee . ee sayy, Moncy Well Spent 3 There is only one agency‘in W ash) ington which docs not acconat-for tire! moncy it spends. The Contral Inte! ut . . : gence Agency, headed vy Alien W.) ° “tee jDultes, has never reporicd to Con-: “oress. A special committee, appointed! by the President, did make “a SUIVC7 ‘Jo? the agency's activities and was ap- : Pa rentiy satisGed that it was cMcient. : So secre. are the activities of this}. - 7 {group that even the amount of 4 yjmoncy if spends is unknown. Ac- “, scountants have estimated that there jis roughly $2 ‘bilion in budgets of jovher Ccpariments walen | fs diverted so the CLA, } Naturally enough, Cons ress worries tzom time to time that this money may not de well spent. Last week some ynews Came out of Gerlin whi en should peal such sears. : The Russians discovered that theiz jthree main. telephone cables from , jease eerlin to points cast were tapped. . . — ‘ : Cie tunnel from the westem zone, con- . } ¢nected with the tapped Nnes and, jwires, led to sancoags at the zone! ‘poundary. The Russians were greatiy; | ai isturoed. They claim tnat all mes- sages for several years have Been in- rerceniec. They diame this violation i privacy on Ames ican Intellizence. “Our cfAciais nave expressed h sorrore at the charge. They Haven't, they say, the slightest idea ‘of where the lines . Jead or by whom they were laid. Th Russians are just old meanies to claims We wire-tapped, * 3 West Berliners are laugaing. Good} for American Intelligence, they say. They hope, and so do we, that ther eae have only Giscovered one off i erie terenew: ‘ Leitve several taps. At least, the exposa!! shows thas some of the. money spenti . : by CIA may hava been, very well spent}, indeed, .: OS oh ite Tee, a? 4 h , ° . a . ~ . z way *: ve
Sew eer ne wet ae : ney . sae RATIORAL NOGA S lane veces fies bs iV | ”~ . . . CIA HAY HAVE ORDERED W TRETAP 4 TUNEL ~~ DREIER : Alex Dreier at 6:00 P.M. over WMAQ (chicago) ana the NEC . Radio Network: —lgreet-sniveli nasivh sta ae Srogman-say wine “turned out to ba-not . so_sucngsgfel in kt swsecre’ mee eanireasi at epee We have a z] xv) the Light of . day, as you probably know, a “short while ago. Voli, our NBC corraspondant, good friend and colleague, (Frank Burkholizer)' has investigated the story of tha wiretap tunnel ays there's just one conclusion -~ it's ours. Wa cug it, ved it with clectronic equipment to listen in on communist 7 ' ' | t Nand now uncer the heading, special report, part one. j i} / rman conversations for a whole year befora they found.us oute -| «< “ uD-esumably we should be embarrassed out novedy in Barlin is. . In fact, there is a hint of Azarican and West German pride in know- ing that we pulied orf an espionage trick on the Reds for a change. of course, the East Cermans are making @ good thing of it by con-- ducting tours through the tunnel to impress their people with ths - Gasvtardliness of the American spies, but that may vackiire on tham because the East Cerrmans are not Dayond getting a quiet chuckle at this outwitting of their communist rulers. . ‘Yurkholicer tells us that the United States is stamsed all : over “h:3 listening post tunnel. Now, the tunnel is on the outskirts | of town with our end being located under a so-called exoerinental ; radar station besida a garbage dump. It runs straight under a plowed | . flela that has white border marxing posts asove it. The Russians . have made three openings for the tourists. Cne is near the wiratap, | another at a point about 150 yards ont in the field, When anvcne asks an American wi here isn't any radar at the experimental radar j ‘ station, the usual answer, according to Surkholzer, is, we said it i was experimental, didn't wa? Want to make something of it?” . NNaturally the army and the goverment in Washington arentt 4 . going to admit anytning unless they hava to. No one tslils who , ordered the eavesdropping tunnel built or who paid for it or who cic the listening and the digging. Perhass it was the work of a i local Berlin outfit, just a curious bunch of boys. Or perhaps it was done secretly on orders direct from ths Pentagon or the CENTRAL - TNTSLLICESCe AGENCY. Amyway, it was dona wall because Lt wasnt? discovered for a year and now the Russians may ba wondering how i much we learned from recording all the phone valxs, possibly SOCAN | cvaryening vhat went througn the switchboard of tho nearby Soviet airfielc. So thinks for tha information, lrank Surkholser, and now wa hava a question for you. Wry don't wa open a tourist entrance av our end of tha tunnel and cash in on tha puolicity? Step up, oma and all. Only a quartor. Sea moderna espionage im alectroenic ; fora and all uncerground, end whe knows? Porhang you will m3et an occasional communist tourist." : rn 4 - ~
° ” we ctmcarenne canna etana hen set | tine hanmett mbes mandy +e aMammbncleast 9d oe pee ee teat eis etd (aetna enacted AD at beta d te waren sadtere b+ ees ate ae ee Auman eteieth Marte Dar stinmgnirtin BH peace Orne ean Pee eee ee rey e wereeee . ' . eeneral A : . ~ =) ~. Ape: sos Aw —— o~ wnt, 24) ‘ S hag aaaJUNY 23 al oil es U.S oihJ/s ry Ji ERD ee ee een TN {mwa Ry Gaston Coblents i ‘ Ba Wireless fo thedicra: a Trias sme 1-0) 1956.54. ¥. Meracd Te: wattendant said, ERGIN, Ata 26-0: ne ws oe veatest Sinbts of the cord; Fem the castern entrance, o was a the “American EY twas; {visitor can waik westward for ale oes « lewalt® focrhans 340 yares past the point eee on cxnibition 2 an =3 “where ted tianel croanen under Nin . ihe sector border. Then a sance| The $00-yard tunnel reare- $ ; $ neounter sents a venture of extraordinary 123% barricace ts cneountered,’ . * . : 4 oO oo oF ak" nv aucacity—the stuf of which Ger ae ‘ee calls out “h i : thi Ith ue 1 ~ - . a “er nes are mace, mtelti| «Jt is clear that 4f the visitor. was 1 of og y American ante Covld con stinue westward past ence forces—and that fs me (se barricade he would emerze. assumption—it is a wtyikuuz example of their Sandvaz vcenae. - “We have no fault w..atsoever tne Ine, 0 fing with the technique,” onc, iw Anierican dull with » . [nave nt a low but promincnt rere radar capacity for daring undertakings. Seidoin has an intelucgences. scquipment on the roof. The: oullding ts surrounded by barbed! [Nire ond guarded constantly by; ry 5} ‘ ry + ‘ aoe ‘ Sailiur cand amiculs ones avon american soldiers. Signs in Ger ‘than that accomplished by ° eee man warnt “Entry ‘ “tuanel's dixsers: the he LADR: nq_of forbiddéen.” try most s snetly ovzanizalion executed & merc: wre te tee Complex Equipment Beyond the door js a compart- “Tons GISLARCC] mer& seven feet 239 Communist A study of the area sug sest: lonz housings ‘srSuad in oe parently included some sur anin ing to Soviet sateNire suate in oasi- icicaione lines YURANS Unters ing possibility other than Thnticoes ENE nes Ape. ‘the radar building encioses the awestera end of the tunnel. tament to maintain certain! temperature and hu-? ‘The Communists saryt was necessa. y to protects ievcis of mists; Deedee ie Euroma, as well as Soviet; tay THauled Anay \goticnte ecuipmens in the other=i Army circuits in Germany. + The men who dug tie tunnclwise dagx and cold tunnel. : p Snack B35 Serurives --"shviously Inuored cader twel Finauy. there is the compiex, ~~ tae pane wane nt 8 6. ~. ivhe imajor handicaps. Cominunisis A month ano and tection, and taey mow the main signtsecing at- caway searetiy the -tyvaction in Berlin, can Se visuted tons af clay they dug by making a twenty-cuante bir pi had to haul T ao thousands of-boosters to carry the ous, since! ve: “sation oack to the western tes of earth near the seciorfend o” the tunnel and also to Taey had wojtasping equipment, all of Ainevie=t The tunnel, discovered by the Work very sliently .o avoid de-can British manufacture. includes cinht racks oO anped con ar Gis Greve fram the center of Bertin to the southeasi, corer city. border would iaave alerted the'help prevent detection ob they of the Communisss. ‘saps, : | } Anpparentiy the excavated, There are then power-contol AL mobile snack bar ts doing, cay th was hauled awny in closed‘units near twa long racks of a laviving business “near the ant meet Loucks brou fnto the raday Veculpment fata wine the 239 ! . castern ene of cae funnel: catcr=!" puildiag. Possisly the lines Nag lo {acinnations prouaht :o sce e * work of ; tier ‘the factory wo cast. Germs factory TATLOFICIN inspecting canes ss Lae rhers record thet: wher ialists. turn al eat  néicnatian” in a visitors’ coox book contains the signa 1 tures of foreigners on both sides: be the Tron Curtain. Even al tsecrecy ™ pIUCKS bousht in the sections o ‘corrugated fron tubing which Hne the tunnel The -winiost have been used tol wawoid stirring up local talk, The Communists estinate that his part of the work took sev- eral moalhs, With the tunnel completed same Communist flay syinres main Jeng frem ables. Tfere the in- jaivicust “monitoring taps aret Inage.* Along the oaposice wali of ine tunnel isn caw of penches,! with fMucrescant lichtng oer fhead. “The comnmariment tain: c@ a batviesra gray. Considered Great Experts r . woe . - . ' zy w Sudanese offielal is sted, there came the jou of fastalhagd At tne very end of the eastern: - The tunnel, SIX sect in_s dimeter and wit: @, Wis its 100% twelver narently fect below the surface ebay hie giithe monitoring coulpiment. Ap. ;Comearinient were is arathes ' this Bad to be donegsttel dour, On the caster otet o@ Sibsh ty ba porlan ata ‘nefore the Communist: hues sf it ts ane more mporione emt ee! jcould br tanpe)d, because part of a pot 200 yards i Ithis AKAN Ulita- sensitive cnlercohonel “American sector of in, it mins castware st sector. france Les ina “sparsely-> West, Zo ne fequipment uioment had the primary’ tnsn “Or preventing detection of way Jlainstakinaciy « whieh would have ras, any soried any: let viny by the Communists at! > 300 yards Inside the Rus- ye phone taps, The mass Of the point where their western ene, tapped. Any act ines were: © abet nopu- dragged through the avait ty taers would! tunnel nave meant that th & the tu anel had! lated Jocality call ed Rudcow. /pione two wooden ralls and-ycoen discovered, Only the eastern cad of tunnel is onen for cetacament’ af People’s Paiice and 32 com . the toused 4 ima special nincty-foot- mut: ld visitors. A [one comparement at the casier@tansing must Communi isy or sale LuAne Thi is compartment begins with =, Tne men who did the aAcHIAL ithe Great experts in t raney didi an orem have been «mone. - chtions expert are on hand toi thick steel coor at ils Western wince, 2 of OPK. cagigin every detail. They readily ceerance. Oa the door—Bae ar thea pr aject's DUNS eras, ie we eee met e ess thely admiration for the, ithe tunnel’s nicest touches —i7.44: “he Commuatsts sav the Vtagt 2lu0On sparentiy tods isvitten in Rusdan and Getdroe coyeral woes 5 eprsacd mant “lontry forbidden by or Cel otccovered “There Is “ no oceans os the Commanding Generau” “toa of now tt ras det coud, i ieee Te ee a a oe ll ce eee ee ae
Qchy Geoert auaniiea, et. |e Feiated §=Press “bureau chiel.} “Barbed wire surrounéed the! j #station and its permancat type huildiags. , Walched by Yanks Americaa soldiers in’ sentry -Boxes watched us, thru field: glasses’ as we sauntered tor . e ward the clearly marked com-! Q munist border, down a dirt rt Let 3 U. S. Reaar (ers road, bordering an open field. ’ ; We could s¢e knots of Vonos: C’ . « ae ate . . “four Eerie 8 OOF@ | around mounds of casth exca-| r . vated to reveal two sections rele + BY JOHN E. Tit03: :PSON | : the tunnel. tChtare Drapene ro Service! SExLIN, May 25 — Tiree. | Americsn’ aewsme: m tecay, 2 * svcd 20 reat underground inj; B2St =neR ane women Wading ts Re sh esed * Americsn spy} {6 Loum ine tun el after Watcnr| unnel,” Durrowed 326 yords 1433 3 communist Movie Of its: Taa —— = under Berlin’s litle iron Cur-jSissovery. Tae commander: “tain, and peered into the (Cx2mMined Our passports, . nail ‘gloom of the American seciog 8m miled, and Iced us down 3 =e over the shoulders of twvalilight of dirt stairs into the ,German communist tommy tunnel. : “gunners. - -{  Eneased‘in steel and con- 5 Our host-in as ceric a set-| Cucte Was the alleged-wire tan. a Feng as"was ever devised by af. /8orstory,” directly undera Sraystery* writer, was a jacks; Paved road Ieacing from Ber- “booted officer of ihe Ezst]lit to the Russian air base at 7 > German communist police, she och coenteld. The commander, i" Vopas; or Vorkspotizet. WhO ceciin ree) give nis. Our tour was the third per Tame, said that 216 tciephone t* OC “mitted western repor ters sine g Hines in thice big cables we ere Acvess the border, Vores!2 ‘the nignt of Apr il 23 when tapped. ‘ithe Russisn high comand: Plugs escent hi zhting_j ae here announced ‘discovery oy minated a°switchboard, banks the tunnel and equipment it" of current boosters, ampli- ‘said was used for wire tap- . fiers, and cables, “AU. _iastruc ‘ping. if * Since then the ‘spy tunnel,” ons on the cquipment were’ : $0 Jabeled by the Russians and] in English. Som ve items bore. ‘ East Germans, has been visa the labels of British, or Ameri.’ Fined by more than 15,000 Zast can manufactureres, : ‘German worker delezations, Reds Man Guos *" { *the Communists said.- «| Pumps sent hot and cold. (Germ rans Admire Feat Weter to an air conditioning? ‘Situated in line with an ex} unit. Other tong pipes held! “perimental _Amecicaa army | oil Or air. The tunnel was: radar station, (the Russians; Md of bolted sections of cor-! “say itis a dummy}, _ owner.) Fursted steel, lined on the, ‘ship of the tunnel has ‘not, siaes with sandoags. ibeen officially acmisied by i Walking back 300 yards, we: the American command “here Feacke ed the east-west border! “or in Washinzton, jBReres” behind sandoags two: en est Berliners are eon. YOUNES Vopos crouched with ‘the tunnel, equipped it with: S¢afcnucht, aimed up the tun?! “expensive apparatus, and then HCl under the American sec? ‘Tistened in on Red army tel: 10. _ . i -ephone corversations . since] Outside ‘again,_ ‘the * coms ‘the summer of 1934. *- imander asked us “what would! To them, it was an esto: engl ve ine’ reaction in the United ing feat, which“has grectly - States if the Canadisns or SHOX ‘enhanced American prestige, 2A8 Grove such a “say ‘ =n :The oolcacss of burrawiag Weed” ise An oan horaers. “Gis der the Russisn noses, sad [°C Seta sac Amermans would iis “teehical sccomplishment, be unnapay” about it 3 ETE IIE ES EBLE OLA IE Ne errr cries eet Bettchntier Bilan tat viaiPncieareaines «amar, Ethene Bs wth Me tered apttalitetes 1380 > 8 08 Pest tenets 4 + tee ed - ignt. cal “Have captured the imazinatign | 1S it Tighter wrong ell . ‘ of many Germans Americaas “to do this under seen «No one expected 3 a signt of oo * ithe turael tocs ww “aca Ws . weet : . wwag ‘yvinced the Amevicsas built theilm guns and a powerful: . MC Dee Ch eee rere rss demiocr atic republic?” he; Yen a Thank You - Our answez, in halting Ger- mar, explaiact that ov-aes- ship of the tunnel has nat’ been established, but that in: a time of “tension,” the rizht- ;MCSs Or wroagness depended upon the side of: the fence from which the operation was viewed. Jie showed us a book in —— ich tunnel: visitors were, asezibe ‘their Opin; x S32 o se 5 3 . ‘tock us fo their commander 2° 8,3 Ssyrung it neld Sghae. sures of Chinese, | Koresi rariion, Americans, .aad othe crs, chd asxcd us to. SiZ25 Justi te keen the record: Siratzht, in case the East Ger mans at scmpet to use out: statements for propaganda, wel Wr oie, in my handwriting: ‘We wish to thank the ‘volkspolizei very much. for -dDeing Kind enough to show us. the tunndi?. soe, Chicago Trilbuna 22 lay 55 ! ' | | | a a tn ee re ee ie ee ee ees een er a
Pd APPENDIX D NOTE: This analysis was prepared by the | Staff as part of the wrap-up of the operation. ROUND-UP OF EAST GERMAN PRESS REACTION TO THE DISCOVERY OF THE WIRETAP TUNNEL AT THE BERLIN SECTOR BORDER {Sources as Indicated) The following is an analysis of the East German press reaction to the discovery of the wiretap tunnel at the sector border between ' West and East Berlin. During the veriod under review - 24 to 26 April 1956 - a total of 31 dailies per day and four weeklies were available fo ¥y u) erutiny; nowever, only the dailies reported and commented on the incident. Mostly concerned with reporting and commenting on the incident were the East Berlin papers which, in some instances, cevoted full pages of their local sections to rep. <s and pic- cures on the tunnel in addition to their front-paze or second~ page accounts of developments. The provincial press gave front— ‘page treatment to the matter only in few instances, generally refrained from large articles or commentaries, and often carried pictorial material with only brief explanations. The least coverage was noted in the provincial press of other
é than SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands - Communist Party Germany) affiliation; none of these papers published any commentary, or any cartoon of their own, on the subject up to 26 April, in fact. * Describing the tunnel as inspected by the journalists after the Soviet press conference, the papers pointed out that the installation was well designed and constructed, that. the installation was costly and equivalent to a modern tele= phone exchange, and that the material - of British and Ameri- can origin - used in the installation was of such quality as to guarantee long service. The East Berlin papers, which were leading p ~ the reports on the issue, treated the matter as a "bitterly serious inci- dent" which represents an "international scandal" and a i "breach of the norms of international law." The papers, in yas their commentaries, addressed the West Berlin Senat, demand—- ing an all-Berlin understanding and stressing the necessity for united action, and insinuated that Berlin is being kept divided merely for the purpose of providing the espionage centers in West Berlin with a base for launching orovocations against the GDR. Other commentaries by central and provircial pavers contained calls for vigilance and for defense prepared-— ness. Only one paper printed an editorial on the incident. In commenting on the incident the press did not draw a lize € 2 |.
—= between the different developments, such as the press confer= ence, the Soviet protest, the GDR Government protest, etc., but, as a rule, the commentaries dealt with the incident as a whole. Later, when the first reaction of the West Berlin press was available, the central press swooped down upon the West Berlin press for attempting to belittle the incident and to divert attention from the "seriousness of the matter." The rew caricatures published by the pavers were designed to slander the Americans. Day by Day Reaction ts On 24 Arril 1556 six Eas ct ive) ra) 'y i a fe rs ie) 5] 'g wv yj in printed tne ADN (Allegemeines Deutsches Nachrichten Bureau - General German News Office) release of individual reports on the Soviet press ion ead on the inspection of the tunnel by the cr econterence, r 0) te) or journalists, and carried excerpts from General Zarenke's letter oz protest (1 - 6). DER MORGEN and BERLINER ZEITUNG (5 and 6) orinted only the abbreviated version of the ADN release. Six < provincial SED pavers (7 - 12) carried announcements of the discovery, brief reports on the press conference, and merely an announcement to the effect that a letter of protest has been sent to the American Chief of Staff. Only NEUER TAG, Fraukfurt/Oder, printed the long version of the ADN release(12).
‘Provincial papers of other party affiliations carried no reports. | 25 April 1956 Loo, On 25 April 22 provincial papers came out with the ADN version of the report on the discovery of the tunnel (13 - 24); the six provincial SED pavers which had carried a brief announce ment the day before follcowed.up their reports by more extensive accounts of the press conference, the letter of protest, and the inspection of the tunnel (13 - =8). Papers of other party affiliations joined in the reporting campaign on this day. Only MAERKISCHE YOLKSSTIMME, of all provincial papers, vublished an "eye-witness" report containing @ description oz: the tunnel and quoting individuals who had voiced their "outrage at such . a thing" which produces new material for conflicts in fore ign policy (16). SCHWERINER VOLKSZEITUNG, which priated the iong version of the ADN release, reproduced the first picture of the tunnel (22). Meanwhile the central press, in addition to supplementary reports on the cdiscovery of the tunnel, descriptions of the tunnel, and pictorial material showing sections of tne tunnel sucn as the amplifier station, etc., came out with the first commentaries, A total of five commentaries appeared on this day. The press treated the matter as a "bitterly serious aifair" which represents an "international scandal" and a -
‘ "breach of the norms of international law," pointing out that the United States violated the Buenos Aires Treaty on Telecon- munications on the one hand and the GDR's sovereignty on the other hand (35 - 39). NEUES DEUTSCHLAND Spoke of a new, hitherto unsurpassed "gangster act" of the U.S. secret service (35), NATIONAL ZEITUNG termed the incident as a "sensational international scandal" (36) , NEUE ZEIT stressed that there is ho word "strong enough to brand such wickedness" (28), and SUNGE WELT declared that "this had to happen just to:those who always babble about Communist infiltration but can never prove it" (39). All commentaries were addressed to the West Berlin Senat, demanding an all-Berlin understanding for the purpose of discontinuing the "stubborn adherence to NATO rt policy," achieving the withdrawal of the "cold war experts of all shades," dissolving the espionage centers in the "frontier city," and achieving a "normalization in the situation in Berlin." Three papers reported on a meeting held by the National Front at Alt-Glienicke, at which the povulation adopted | a resolution protesting against this “provocation.” Franz Fischer, First Secretary of the Kreis Treptow SED Executive Board, was reported to have said at the meeting that the peoole of West Germany and West Berlin have to vay for tnis installation through the occupation costs and to nave termed the tunnel as "an appendix of the cold war" (38, 40, and 41). -
TRIBUENE, moreover, referred to a report by the HAMBURGER ANZEIGER to underscore the fact that the installations in the tunnel were not of provisional nature but designed for long service (40). DER MORGEN, describing the tunnel, added that West German correspondents who inspected the tunnel noted with satisfaction the declaration of the Sovie Lieutenant Colonel that "quite obviously, German quarters have no part ia this" - (41), while NATIONAL ZEITUNG briefly referred to an anaounce-= ment made at the Alt-Glienicke meeting to the effect that the tunnel was open for public inspection (36). NEUES DEUTSCHLAND reproduced the first caricature on the issue. The cartoon showed a garden which is divided into two parts by a sign indicating the "Democratic Sector" - full of flowers, and the opposite side - a barren piece of land with a molehill topped by a flag with the dollar sign. A strong arm is pulling out of a hole in the Democratic Sector a mole wearing "U.S."-marked earphones, some sort ‘of Army trousers with plugs and pliers showing from the pocket, and a U.S. Army cap bearing the legend "Espionage." The cartoon is captioned, "Do Not Burrow in Other People’s Yards" (35). 25 April 1956 On 26 Avril 27 papers continued reporting on the issue (42 - 58). In 17 instances the reports were supovlemented with pictures as outlined above. A total of 15 papers o 9
- printed the text of, or large excerpts from, the press release on the GDR Government protest (42 - 56). Six papers reported on the inspection of the tunnel by the population, the press, and representatives of the diplomatic corps (42, 49, 59, 60, ‘65, and 67). Four papers referred to a report carried by the West Berlin TAGESSPIEGEL according to which Western journalists were prohibited from inspecting the mouth of the tunnel on the Western side (42, 43, 51, and 58), and four pavers referred to FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE which had spoken of an "eloquent Silence’ about the affair on the part of the Americans (42, 51, S5, and 58). A total of four pasers reported on the Ait- Giienicke meeting (51, 60, 61, and 57). NEUES DEUTSCHLAND gave excerpts from:Fisher's speech, quoting him to the effect that the people of West Berlin, in particular the S?D members, will be invited to fae 3 ul ‘od (49) ¢) tr ce a ia) > G og ry ( bo nny fei) }- ee art nr KH a 2 oapers re- produced caricatures (51, 52, and 56), six papers carried commentaries (51, 52, 53, 54, 57, and 58), and one paper came out with an editorial (55). Three East Berlin papers, through a) their commentaries, swooped down upon the West Berlin press for its attitude toward the incident. NEVES DEUTSCHLAND + oad accused the West Berlin vavers of attemoting to belittle the incident and of lauding the efficiency of the American "Zoblins,"” adding that the West Berlin nress is thus making vain attempts vO divert attention from the Seriousness of the matter (57). - c
JUNGE WELT lashed out at the West Berlin DER TAG, saying that, by its opinion, the West Berlin paper manifests its total loss of any sense of decency, Besides, DER TAG is not in the least disturbed about the violation also of West Berlin's territory (52). NATIONAL ZEITUNG held that DER TAG now admitted what it has been denying at ali times, namely that West ‘Berlin is a de facto part of NATO, adding that DER '-AG now regards as "customary" the military espionage of the United States on GDR territory in addition to the "customary ‘grontier-city licy," the "customary" partition, and the "custemary" diversionist activities of the KGU and other underworld organizations. The paper stressed that all Berliners fully agree with the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINS which said that the people must demand the discontinuation of "such things" (58). NEUE ZEIT, carrying the only editorial, said that the wire- tapping post is a feature of West Eerlin's misuse as a NATO base. The paver emphasized that GDR policy will continue to Serve all-German understanding and relaxation of international tecsions, "But it must be kept in mind that the success of this policy will not only depend on the volume of the apveal for peace but also on our preparedness to defend our homeland 2s well as on our vigilance regarding the prevention of daz- gers resulting from the fact that one part of Berlin has be- cone a frontier city against neace," the paver added. "What
‘we need are contact points above the ground and in full Light, namely all-German talks, and not underground trenches in the cold war" (55). : The first commentaries carried by provincial papers dealt with the incident as an example of proof for East German press reports on hostile espionage. VOLKSSTIMME, Karl-Marx-Stadt, pointed out that the tunnel represents "a document” which is , quite apt to dispel all doubts of those who have hitherto been inclined to regard East German press reports about the underground activities of Western e 9) pionage services as Nexaggerated" (57). MAERKISCHE VOLKSSTIMME quoted several workers who voiced their indignation over "such a vileness" which makes German unity more difficult to demonstrate that tt, the "Western side” is just as quiet about this "unvleasant aizair™ as the population is outraged (53). And LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG stressed that anyone reading about the discovery of the tunnel will inevitably weigh the Soviet attempts at maintaining peace against the efforts made by the U.S. espio- nage service, adding that this “breach of international law" Ww iso places the West Berlin administration "in a veculiar ~ gg ight." The paper reminded its readers that war preparation, which ‘formerly marched on Prussian Army boots," is now marching on "American rubber soles, chewing gum, and tapping . televhone lines" (54),
NSUES DEUTSCHLAND's caricature showed an American soldier try- ing in vain to "milk" a disconnected, oversized telephone re- ceiver into a bucket marked "CIC" while another soldier is thoughtfully standing by (51). JUNGE WELT reproduced a car- toon showing a mole wearing a U.S. Army cap on its head and a telephone receiver on its back halting before a sign which warns that "spies are now facing danger." The cartoon is a captioned, "The Underworld that Shuns the Light," and foot- noted, "Damned, we did not put up that sign" (52). FREIES WORT Showed rats wearing U.S. Army caps being disturbed by a Russian soldier in the operation of wnat looks like a communication center. Two rats are shown facing the soldier in surpris®, another stauding with arms raised, and still another escaping through an opening in the wall. The caricature is entitled, "Unpleasant Surprise," and foctnoted, "It is an £Eifrontery of the Russians to Disturb Us ian Our _CSurrowing) Work" (55).
cae ON GN OM AWN I SOURCES NEUES DEUTSCHLAND NEUE ZEIT TRIBUENE NATIONAL ZEITUNG DER MORGEN BERLINER ZEITUNG FREIHEIT SAECHSISCHE ZEITUNG VOLKSSTIMME, Karl-Marx-Stadt MAERKISCHE VOLKSSTiIMME LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG NEVER TAG FREITHEIT SAECHSISCHE ZEITUNG VCGLKSSTIMME, Karl-Marx-Stiadt MAERXISCHE VOLKSSTIMME LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEILTUNG NEVER TAG LAUSITZER RUNDSCHAU VOLKSSTINME, Magdeburg DAS VOLK, Erfurt SCHWERINER VOLKSZEITUNG FREIE ERDE OSTSZE ZEITUNG VOLKXSWACHT FREIES WORT SAECHSICHES TAGEBLATT DIE UNION NORDDEUTSCHE NEUESTE NACHRICHTEN MAERKISCHE UNION BRANDENBURGISCHE NEUESTE NABBR,. BAUERN ECHO DER NEUE WEG LIBERAL DEMOKRATISCHE ZEITUNG NEUES DEUTSCHLAND NATIONAL ZEITUNG BERLINER ZEITUNG NEUE ZEIT JUNGE WELT TRIBUSNE DER MORGEN 1956 29 ro 25 Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Aor . Apr © Aor Apr Apr Aor Aor Apr Apr > Apr Apr Aor Apr Apr Apr Avr aor Apr Apr Apr Apr Aor Apr Apr Aor Apr Apr Apr ‘Apr Ari Aor Apr Apr
+ ee cect er ae BERLINER ZEITUNG SAECHSISCHE ZEITUNG DAS VOLK, Erfurt NEUER TAG FREILHEIT DER MORGEN TRIBUENE BAUERN ECHO DER NEUE WEG NEUES DEUTSCHLAND JUNGE WELT MAERKISCHE VOLKSSTIMME LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEI TUNG NEVE ZEIT FREIES WORT VOLKSSTIMME, Karl-Marx-Stadt NATIONAL ZEITUNG VOLKSSTIMME, Magdenurg MAERKISCHE UNION FRETE ERDE | — LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG VOLKSWACHT SAECHSISCHES TAGCEBLATT OSTSEE ZEITUNG LAUSITZER RUNDSCHAU DIE UNION SCHYERINER YOLKSZEITUNG 12 rose &S pr A,or Ap.c Apr. Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr. Apr — Apr Apr Apr Apr Avr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apxr Apr Apr Aor Apr Apr