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COPY  NO, 
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NSC      5^12/2 
December  28,    1955 
NATIONAL  SECURITY  COUNCIL 
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NSC    5^12/2 
*    ** 
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DECLASSIFIED  y^    „ 
■Date' -<&*#"*  <*'?- 
ATTENTION 
THE  ENCLOSED  TOP  SECRET  CONTROL 
FORM  MUST  BE  COMPLETED  BY  EACH 
INDIVIDUAL  (1)  WHO  READS  -  THIS 
DOCUMENT  WHOLLY  OR  IN  PART  OR 
(2)  WHO  PERSONALLY  HANDLES  IT 
AND   HAS   ACCESS   TO   ITS   CONTENTS 
HATIOUAL  SECURITY  COUNCIL 
/  &  SJ  x/x  6  / ) 
Y/
UNULf-TO 
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v*3 
cesser  23,    1955 
ail'sL 
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NOTE  3Y  THE  EXECUTIVE  SECRETARY 
to  the 
NATIONAL  SECURITY  CCUNC 
on 
COVERT  0FERATI0N3 
References 
•  • 
B. 
C. 
NSC  5kl2/l 
Mexo  for  NSC  frcn  Executive 
Secretary,  subject:  "Report 
of  the  Planning  Coordination 
Group",  dated  Deceaber  20, 
1955 
NSC  Action  No.  1*97 
*■*   ~ 
<     -i   Vr  .  - 
„-«--  4 
7-ST-' 
•i** 
The  President  has  this  date  approved  the  amendment  of  para- 
graph T-a  of  NSC  5^12/i  as  submitted  to  and  approved  by  the  other 
statutory  reenters  of  the  National  Security  Council  by  Memorandum  Ap- 
proval in  response  to  the  reference  memorandum  of  December  20,  1955* 
The  President  and  the  other  statutory  members  of  the  Council  have 
also  approved  the  recommendatien  that  paragraphs  U-a  and  7-b  of 
NSC  5^12/1  be  amended  as  necessary  to  take  account  of  the  termina- 
tion of  the  Planning .  Coordination  Group  and  to  conform  to  the  sub- 
stance "of,  the^ language .in. paragraph  7ra  thereof- 
**^*   ■* -^  ■■-,.""""■- ",.  . ..   j  *— 
f"-  ■  vjX^':  According^  National  Security  Council  directive, 
:lncorpara*lng-'  the  abbve^meh^*oned  amendments  to^NSCL  5^12/1,:  is  "  trans- 
mit ted*Eerevith_  for  implementation  by  all  executive  departments  and  . 
"agencIes^Qf  -the,U.~  "S> Government  concerned*   as  indicated-there  in  •-  *.-    : 
7t 
■J- 
•-3" 
■-:-'    ./:>v-The.  ehclosed'-directive,  as  adopted  and  apnroyed/  supersedes 
'  nsc  5^12/1.        -  ■.-■"'  '  :    .-'""• 
;  It  is  reouested  that. special  security  precautions  be  observed 
In  the  hanAlia.-  of  the  enclosed  directive,  and  that  access  to  it  be  very 
strictly  liaited  on  an  absolute  need- to- know  basis. 
.  It  is  further  requested  that  all  copies  of  NSC  5^12/1  be  re- 
'  turned  to  this  office  for  destruction  upon  receipt  of  this  directive. 
DECLASSIFIED 
Auth:J&2p£%_ 
Date  r  M02L- 
By :  J£&UW£J$J2mS- 
NATIOJJAL  SECURITY  COUIICIL 
JAMES  S.   LAY,   JR. 
Executive  Secretary 
f 
Distribution ; 
The  President  (via  Mr.  Anderson) 
The  Secretary  of  State 
The  Secretary  of  Defense 
The.  Chairman,  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff 
The  Director  of  Central  Intelligence 
The  Executive  Officer,  Operations  Coordinating  Board 
NSC 5^12/2 
(.JU
UflCL&SS&IU 
NATIONAL  SECURITY  COUNCIL  DIRECTIVE 
en 
COVERT  OPERATIONS 
1*  The  National  Security  Council,  taking  cognizance  of  the  vicious 
covert  *  activities  of  the  USSR  and  Corrmunist  China  and:  the  governments, 
parties  and  groups  dominated  by  them  (hereinafter  collectively  referred 
to  a3  ''International  Communism'1)  to  discredit  and  defeat  the  aims  and 
activities  of  the  United  States  and  other  povers  of  the  free  world,  de- 
termined, as  set  forth  in  NSC  directives  10/ 2  and  10/5,  that,  in  the 
interests  of  vorld  peace  and  U.  S.  national  security,  the  overt  foreign 
activities  of  the  U.  5,  Government  should  he  supplemented  by  covert 
operations  * 
i 
i 
(  - 
2*  The  Central  Intelligence  Agency  had  already  been  charged  by  the 
National  Security  Council  with  conducting  espionage  and  counter-espionage 
operations  abroad.  It  therefore  seemed  desirable,  for  operational  reasons , 
not  to  create  a  new  agency  for  covert  operations,  but,  subject  to  direct- 
ives frca.the  NSC,  to  place  the  responsibility  for  them  on  the  Central 
£:::  Intelligence  Agency  and  correlate  them  with  espionage  and  counter- 
[  espionage  operations-  under  the  *_  over-all  control  of  the  Director  of  . 
-,'_  Central  ^intelligence  •  ...*";; 
t.  _  .  "„  .    •  ->  *>   ■— . .     _     » .  .   ~"     ^"  __•--. 
ZZf~:^-    i3"^T-Die".  NSC  has.  determined  "that  such  covert  operations  shall  to  the 
^gjeat^t  extent , practicable,  "in  the  light  of  U.  S.  and  Soviet  capabilities  • 
^  and  tak^ng_inta. account  the  risk  of .  war,  be  designed  to: 
^^jt.^.Create  and  exploit" "trouble soids  problems  for  International  Com- 
munism, "impair  relations  between  the  USSR  and  Communist  China  and  be- 
.  tween* them  and  their  satellites, T  complicate  control  within  the  USSR, 
Communist  China  and  their  satellites,  and  retard  the  growth  of  the 
military  and  economic  potential  of  the  Soviet  bloc « 
b.  Discredit  the  prestige  and  ideology  of  International  Communism, 
and  reduce  the  strength  of  its  parties  and  other  elements. 
c«  Counter  any  threat  of  a  party  or  individuals  directly  or  indi- 
rectly responsive  to  Comnunist  control  to  achieve  dominant  power  in  a 
free  world  country* 
cL  Reduce  International  Cornnunist.  control  over -any  areas  of  the  • 
world* 
£.  Strengthen  the  orientation  toward  the  United  States  of  the 
peoples  and  nations  of  the  free  vorld,  accentuate,  wherever  possible, 
the  identity  of  interest  between  such  peoples  and  nations  and  the 
United  States  as   well  as  favoring,  where  appropriate,  those  groups 
-**  -*-  H8PJJ&S&HE1 
fivl^t^a'i^^J
genuinely  advocating  or  believing  in  the  advancement  cf  such  mutual  i: 
terests,  and  increase  the  capacity  and  will  of  such  peoples  and  natic: 
to  resist  International  Communism. 
X  * 
In  accordance  with  established  policies  and  to  the  ex±ent  prac 
ticable  in  areas  dominated  or  threatened  by   International  Communism, 
develop  underground  resistance  and  facilitate  covert  and  guerrilla  op- 
erations and  ensure  availability  of  these  forces  in  the  event  of  war, 
including  wherever  practicable  prevision  cf  a  base  upon  which  the  mil- 
itary may  expand  these  forces  in  tine  of  war  t/ithia  active  theaters  of 
operations  as  well  as  provision  for  stay-behind  assets  and  escape  and 
evasion  facilities ♦ 
h.     Under  the  authority  of  Section  102(d)(5)  of  the  National  Security 
Act  of  19^7*  the  National  Security  Council  hereby  directs  that  the  Director 
of ,  Central  Intelligence  shall  be  responsible  for: 
a.  Ensuring,  through  designated  representatives  of  the  Secretary 
of  State  and  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense,  that  covert  operations  are 
planned  and  conducted  in  j.   manner  consistent  with  United  States  for- 
eign and  military  policies  and  with  overt  activities,  and  consulting 
vith  and  obtaining  advice  frcm[the  Operations  Coordinating  Hoard  and? 
other  departments  or  agencies  as  appropriate ♦ 
b.  Informing,  through  appropriate  channels  and  on  a  need-to-knov 
basis;  agencies  of  the  U.  S.  Government,  both  at  home  and  abroad  (in- 
cluding diplomatic  and  military  representatives),  of  such  operations 
as  vill  affect  then, 
-    ^      -_   _      -  •  —^ 
•     .  *   ■**,.-■--   ...     •  . . 
. 
5.  _Ia  addition,  to  the  provisions  of  paragraph  K,   the  following  provi- 
sions, shall  apply  to  wartime  covert  operations: 
a ♦  "Plans  for  covert' operations  to  be  conducted  in  active  theaters 
of  war  and  any  other  areas.. in  which  U.  S.  forces  are  engaged  in  combat 
operations  will  be  drawn  up  with  the  assistance  of  the  Department  of 
Defense  and. vill  be  in  consonan.ee  with  and  complementary  to  approved 
var  plans  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff. 
t  *>* 
b.  Covert  operations  in  active  theaters  of  war  and  any  other  areas 
in  which  U#  S.  forces  are  engaged  in  combat  operations  vtH  be  conducted 
under  such  command  and  control  relationships  as  have  been  or  may  in  the 
future  be  approved  by  the  Department  of  Defense* 
6.  As. used  in  this  directive,  "covert  operations'1  shall  be  understood 
to  be  all  activities  conducted  pursuant  to  this  directive  which  are  so 
planned  and  executed  that  any  U.  S.  Government  responsibility  for  them 
is  not  evident  to  unauthorized  persons  and  that  if-  uncovered  the  U.  S. 
Covez-nment  can  plausibly  disclaim  any  responsibility  for  them*  Specific- 
ally, such  operations  shall  include  any  covert  activities  related  to: 
propac^nda,  political  action;  economic  warfare;  preventive  direct  action, 
NSC  5^12/2 
-  2-
including  sabotage,  ant  I- sabotage,  demolition;  escape  and  evasion  and  evacu- 
ation measures;  subversion  against  hostile  states  cr  groups  including  assist- 
ance to  underground  resistance  movements ,   guerrillas  and  refugee  liberation 
groups;  support  of   indigenous  and  ant i- communist  elements  in  threatened 
countries  of  the  free  world;  deception  plans  and  operations;  and  all  activ- 
ities compatible  vith  this  directive  necessary  to  accomplish  the  foregoing. 
Such  operations  shall  not  include:  armed  conflict  by  recognized  military 
forces $   espionage  and  counter-espionage,  nor  cover  and  deception  for  mili- 
tary operations. 
7#  Except  as  the  President  otherwise  directs,  designated  representa- 
tives of  the  Secretary  of  State  and  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense  of  the  rank 
of  Assistant  Secretary  or  above,  and  a  representative  of  the  President  des- 
ignated  for  this  purpose f   shall  hereafter  be  advised  in  advance  of  major 
covert  programs  initiated  by  CIA  under  this  policy  or  as  otherwise  directed, 
and  shall  be  the  normal  channel  for  giving  policy  approval  for  such  programs 
as  veil  as  for  securing  coordination  of  support  therefor  among  the  Depart- 
ments of  State  and  Defense  and  the  CIA# 
8*  :  This  directive  supersedes  and  rescinds  NSC  10/2/  NSC  10/ 5, 
NSC  5^12,  NSC  5^12/1,  and  subparagraphs  "a11  and  "Vs  under  the  heading 
"Additional.  Functions  of  the  Operations  Coordinating  3oardf:  on  page  1 
of  the  President's  memorandum  for  the  Executive  Secretary,  National  Se 
j   curity  Council,  supplementing  Executive  Order  10^83* 
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y  a  %j  i»  f&&*&*^  " 
COPY  NO. 
OF  15  COPIES 
ANNEX  TO  NSC  5^12/2 
Standard-  Procedures  for  Insuring  Implementation 
  of  Paragraph  7  of  NSC  5^12/2   
Q 
(1)  With  respect  to  a  covert  program  to  be  recommended  by  CIA  for  policy 
approval,  the  NSC  5^12/2  Group  may  decide  at  any  meeting  -whether  to  proceed  at 
such  meeting  to  consider  and  act  upon  an  oral  presentation  of  such  covert  pro- 
gram or-  to  base  such  consideration  on  a  detailed  paper  to  be  circulated  to  the 
(  Group  members  in  advance  of  a  subsequent  meeting*  Any  paper  so  circulated  will 
I  be  handled  on  a  "read-and**  retain"  basis  in  order  to  avoid  duplicate  files, 
thereby  enhancing  the  security  of  the  information  contained  in  such  paper. 
(2)  At  a  meeting  held  to  discuss  a  detailed  paper  circulated  pursuant  to 
(l)  above,  the  Group  members  will  decide  in  each  instance  on  the  procedures  to 
.be  folloved  to  provide- coordinated  consideration  prior  to  the  Group *s  giving 
IV  final  policy  approval  and  to  provide  coordinated  support  after  such  approval. 
j?"j  '    .(3)^ CIA  will  keep  the  State  and  Defense  Departments  advised  on  a  need- 
^'^to-know: jKid  secure_basis*  of  developments  pertaining  to  the  implementation  of 
;^programs^  tc^ vhick-policy  approval  has  been  given  by  the  Group,       - 
'— —  -  H 
7 ttt'~~  ..  :.Ct):  :lQ ^accordance-  with  the  exception  provided  for  in  paragraph  7  of 
fi.^NSC  5^12/2,  the~  standard  procedure  set  forth  above  shall  not  apply  to  the 
..-;  case  of  a  particularly; sensitive- project  wjaich  relates  exclusively  tcvU.  S. 
r  :  fore iga  policy  and  which  does"  not  involve  military  implications.   In  such 
\      case,  approval  of  such  project  by  the  Secretary  of  State  shall  constitute 
j.  both  sufficient  authorization  for  initiation  of  the  project  by  the  Director 
t"  of  Central  ^Intelligence  and  policy  approval  therefor .     The   Director  of  Gen- 
?   tral  Intelligence  shall  report  any  such  exception  (without  identification) 
r   to  the  NSC  5^12/2  Group,* 
.  _ 
*  In  approving  the  above  recommendations,  the  President  directed  that  when- 
ever the  Secretary  of  State  takes  action  under  this  paragraph,  he  shall 
inform  the  President. 
ANNEX  to 
NSC  5^12/2 
''l~a.k:'£t      €c</     3/26 /rp  j«.t6 
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