Dinctorof 
«•   I  I    Ctrtnl 
»l*j|    IaiclU(Mcc 
Director  of  Central  Intelligence 
Directive  No.  1/14 
Minimum  Personnel  Security 
Standards  and  Procedures 
Governing  Eligibility 
for  Access  to 
Sensitive  Compartmented 
Information 
/  Srpttmhtr  I9g}
DIRECTOR  OF  CENTRAL  INTELLIGENCE 
DIRECTIVE  NO.  1/14 
(Effective  1  September  1983)
V 
DIRECTOR  OF  CENTRAL  \nTELUGENCE  DIRECTIVE  1/14  ' 
MINIMUM  PERSONNEL  SECURITY  STANDARDS  AND  PROCEDURES 
GOVERNING  ELIGIBILITY  FOR  ACCESS  TO 
SENSITIVE  COMPARTMENTED  INFORMATION 
(Effective  1  September  1983) 
Pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  Executive  Order  12333.  Section  102  of  the  National 
Security  Act  of  1947.  and  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  Directive  on  the 
Security  Committee,  the  following  minimum  personnel  security  standards,  proce- 
dures, and  continuing  security  programs  are  hereby  established  for  all  United  States 
Government  civilian  and  military  personnel,  consultants,  contractors,  employees  of 
contractors,  and  other  individuals  who  require  access  to  Sensitive  Compartmented 
Information  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  SCI).  The  standards,  procedures,  and  programs 
established  herein  are  minimum  and  the  departments  and  agencies  may  establish  such 
additional  security  steps  as  may  be  deemed  necessary  and  appropriate  to  ensure  that 
effective  security  is  maintained. 
1.  Definition* 
a.  Intelligence  Community — those  United  States  Government  organizations 
and  activities  identified  in  Eiecutive  Order  12333  or  successor  orders  as 
making  up  such  Community. 
b.  Sensitive  Compartmented  Information  (SCI) — all  information  and  materials 
requiring  special  Community  controls  indicating  restricted  handling  within 
present  and  future  Community  intelligence  collection  programs  and  their 
end  products.  These  special  Community  controls  are  formal  systems  of 
restricted  access  established  to  protect  the  sensitive  aspects  of  sources  and 
methods  and  analytical  procedures  of  foreign  intelligence  programs.  The 
term  does  not  include  Restricted  Date  as  defined  in  Section  II,  Public  Low 
585,  Atomic  Energy  Act  of  1954.  as  amended. 
c.  Senior  Officials  of  the  Intelligence  Community  (SOiCs) — for  the  purposes  of 
this  Directive.  SOICs  are  defined  as  the  heads  of  organizations  within  the  In- 
telligence Community,  as  defined  by  Executive  Order  12333.  or  their 
designated  representatives. 
2.  Purport 
The  purpose  of  this  Directive  is  to  enhance  the  security  protection  of  SCI  through 
the  application  of  minimum  security  standards,  procedures,  and  continuing  security 
programs,  and  to  facilitate  the  security  certification  process  among  Government 
departments  and  agencies. 
1  Thil  Directive  Mfxnnln  DCID  1/14  appravn)  13  May  1976
4.  AppUcmbOU* 
The  prcvUoos  of  this  DtractJv*  shall  apply  to  all  penom  (other  than  elected 
officials  of  the  United  State*  Coremnent,  federal  Judges,  and  thote  lndlvlduak  for 
whom  the  DCs  makes  a  specific  exception)  without  regard  to  civilian  or  military 
status,  form  of  employment,  official  rank  or  position,  or  length  of  service. 
4.  Cesser*!      '  >; 
a.  Individuals  who  do  not  meet  the  minimum  security  criteria  contained 
herein  and  who  are.  therefore,  denied  acceai  to  SCI  shall  not.  solely  for  this 
reaion.  be  considered  ineligible  for  acceai  to  other  classified  Information. 
Individuali  whote  acceai  to  SCI  ha*  been  authorized  at  an  exception  granted 
in  accordance  with  paragraph  6  below,  thai!  not,  solely  for  that  reason,  be 
considered  eligible  for  access  to  other  classified  information. 
b.  The  granting  of  acceai  to  SCI  shall  be  controlled  under  the  strictest 
application  of  the  "need-to-know"  principle,  and  In  accordance  with  the 
personnel  security  standards  and  procedures  art  forth  in  this  Directive.  In 
accordance  with  National  Security  Decision  Directive  Number  84  and  the 
DC!  Security  Policy  Manual  for  SCI  Control  Systems,  signature  of  a  DCI- 
authorized  non-disclosure  agreement  which  includes  a  provision  for  repub- 
lication review  is  a  condition  of  access  to  SCI. 
5.  Personnel  Security  Standards 
Criteria  for  security  approval  of  an  individual  on  a  need-to-know  basis  for  access 
to  SC!  are: 
a.  The  individual  shall  be  stable;  trustworthy;  reliable;  of  excellent  character, 
lodgment.  and  discretion;  and  of  unquestioned  loyalty  to  the  United  States. 
b.  Except  where  there  Is  a  compelling  need,  and  a  determination  has  been 
made  by  competent  authority  as  described  in  paragraph  6  below  that  every 
reasonable  assurance  has  been  obtained  that  under  the  circumstances  the 
security  risk  U  negligible: 
(1)  Both  the  individual  and  the  members  of  his  or  hrr  Immediate  family 
shall  be  U.S.  citizens.  For  these  purposes,  "immediate  family"  includes 
the  individual's  spouse,  parents,  brothers,  sisters,  and  children.* 
(2)  The  members  of  the  individual's  Immediate  family  and  persons  to  whom 
he  or  she  is  bound  by  affection  or  obligation  *  *  should  neither  be  subject 
to  physical,  mental,  or  other  forms  of  duress  by  a  foreign  power,  nor 
advocate  the  use  of  force  or  violence  to  overthrow  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  or  the  alteration  or  the  form  of  Government  of  the  United 
States  by  unconstitutional  means. 
9.  Exception*  to  Personnel  Security  Standard* 
The  exceptions  to  paragraph  5b(l )  or  (2)  above  may  be  granted  only  by  the  SOIC 
of  the  appropriate  organization  or  his  designee  jnless  such  authority  has  been 
*  TV  mmimncM  lor  U.  S  cMsrnlilp  Sn  Ihk)  DC1D  ab>  applfct  to  •  cohabitant 
'  *  Inctudina  •  cohat/tant
specifically  delegated  to  the  head  of  an  office  or  organization  as  set  forth  in 
interdepartmental  agreements.  All  exceptions  granted  will  be  common  sense  determi- 
nations based  on  aU  available  information,  and  shall  be  recorded  by  the  organization 
making  the  exception.  In  those  cases  in  which  the  individual  has  lived  outside  of  the 
Unityd  States  for  a  substantial  period  of  his  or  her  life,  a  thorough  assessment  of  the 
adequacy  of  the  investigation  in  terms  of  fulfillment  of  the  minimum  investigative 
requirements,  and  judicious  review  of  the  information  therein,  must  be  made  before 
an  exception  b  considered. 
7.  lnve»tigattt>e  Requirement* 
t.  The  investigation  conducted  on  an  individual  under  consideration  for  access 
to  SCI  will  be  thorough  and  shall  be  designed  to  develop  information  as  to 
whether  the  individual  clearly  meets  the  above  Personnel  Security 
Standards. 
b.  The  investigation  shall  be  accomplished  through  record  checks  and  personal 
interviews  of  various  sources  by  trained  investigative  personnel  in  order  to 
establish  affirmatively  to  the  adjudicating  agency  complete  continuity  of 
identity  to  include  birth,  residences,  education,  employment,  and  military 
service.  Where  the  circumstances  of  a  ca.se  indicate,  the  investigation  shall 
exceed  the  basic  requirements  set  out  below  to  ensure  that  these  responsible 
for  adjudicating  access  eligibility  have  in  their  possession  all  the  relevant 
facts  available. 
c.  The  individual  shall  furnish  a  signed  personal  history  statement,  lingerprints 
of  a  quality  acceptable  to  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  and  a  signed 
release,  as  necessary,  authorizing  custodians  of  police,  credit,  education,  and 
medical  records,  to  provide  record  information  to  the  investigative  agency. 
Photographs  of  the  individual  shall  also  he  obtained  where  additional 
corroboration  of  identity  is  required. 
8.  Minimum  tUtndard*  for  the  ineeitigation  ore  on  follotci: 
a.  Verification  of  date  and  place  of  birth  and  citizenship 
b.  Check  of  the  subversive  and  criminal  files  of  the  Federal  Bureau  of 
Investigation,  including  submission  of  fingerprint  charts,  and  such  other 
national  agencies  as  are  appropriate  to  the  individual's  background.  An 
additional  check  of  Immigration  and  Naturalization  Service  records  shall  be 
conducted  on  those  members  of  the  individual's  immediate  family  who  are 
United  States  citizens  other  than  by  birth  or  who  are  resident  aliens. 
c.  A  check  of  appropriate  police  records  covering  all  areas  of  Ine  individual's 
residence,  employment,  and  education  in  the  U.S.  throughout  the  most 
recent  fifteen  (15)  years  or  since  age  eighteen,  whichever  is  the  shorter 
period. 
d.  Verification  of  the  individual's  financial  statu*  and  credit  habits  through 
checks  of  appropriate  credit  institutions  or,  if  such  checks  are  not  produc- 
tive, through  interviews  with  knowledgeable  sources  covering  all  areas  of 
employment,  residence,  and  education  in  the  most  recent  seven  (7)  years.
e.  Interview*  with  neighbor*  In  the  vicinity  of  all  the  individual's  residences  in 
excess  of  six  (6)  months  throughout  the  most  recent  five  (5)  year  period.  This 
coverage  shall  be  expanded  where  the  investigation  suggests  the  existence  of 
some  questionable  behavioral  pattern. 
f.  Confirmation  of  all  employment  during  the  past  fifteen  (15)  years  or  since 
age  eighteen,  whichever  is  the  shorter  period,  but  in  any  event  the  most 
recent  two  (2)  years.  Personal  interviews  with  supervisors  and  coworkers  at 
places  of  employment  covering  the  past  ten  (10)  years  shall  be  accomplished. 
g.  Verification  of  graduation  or  lttendance  at  all  institutions  of  higher  learning 
within  the  past  fifteen  (15)  year*.  If  the  individual  did  not  attend  an 
institution  of  higher  learning,  verification  of  graduation  or  attendance  at  but 
secondary  school  within  the  past  ten  (10)  years. 
h.  Review  of  appropriate  military  records. 
i.  Interviews  with  a  sufficient  number  of  knowledgeable  sources  (a  minimum 
of  three  developed  during  the  course  of  the  investigation)  as  necessary  to 
provide  a  continuity  co  the  extent  practicable,  of  the  individual's  activities 
and  behavioral  patterns  over  the  past  fifteen  (15)  years. 
i.  When  employment,  education,  or  residence  has  occurred  in  foreign  coun- 
tries (except  for  periods  of  less  than  one  yjar  for  personnel  on  U.S. 
Government  assignment  and  less  than  ninety  days  for  other  purposes)  during 
the  past  fifteen  (15)  years  or  since  age  eighteen,  a  check  of  the  records  will 
be  made  at  the  Department  of  State  and/or  other  appropriate  agencies. 
Efforts  shall  be  made  to  develop  sources,  generally  in  the  United  States,  who 
knew  the  individual  overseas  in  order  to  cover  significant  employment, 
education  or  residence  and  to  attempt  to  determine  if  any  lasting  foreign 
contacts  or  connections  were  established  during  this  period.  However,  in  all 
cases  where  an  individual  has  worked  or  lived  outside  of  the  U.S.  continu- 
ously for  over  one  year,  the  investigation  will  be  expanded  to  cover  fully  this 
period  in  his  or  her  life  through  the  use  of  such  investigative  assets  and 
checks  of  record  sources  as  may  be  available  to  the  U.S.  Government  in  the 
foreign  countries)  in  which  the  individual  resided. 
k.  When  the  individual  has  immediate  family  members  or  other  persons  to 
whom  the  individual  is  bound  by  affection  or  obligation  in  any  of  the 
situations  described  in  subparagraph  5.b.(2)  above,  the  Investigation  will 
include  an  interview  of  the  individual  by  trained  security,  investigative,  or 
counterintelligence  personnel  to  ascertain  the  facto  as  they  may  relate  to  the 
individual's  access  eligibility. 
I.  In  all  cases,  the  individual's  spouse  or  cohabitant  shall  at  a  minimum  be 
checked  through  the  subversive  and  criminal  files  of  the  Federal  Bureau  of 
Investigation  and  other  national  agencies  as  appropriate.  When  conditions 
indicate,  additional  investigation  shall  be  conducted  on  the  spouse  of  the 
individual  and  members  of  the  immediate  family  (or  other  persons  to  whom 
the  individual  is  bound  by  affection  or  obligation)  to  the  exter.t  necessary  to 
permit  a  determination  by  the  adjudicating  agency  that  the  provisions  of 
paragraph  5  (Personnel  Security  Standards)  above  are  met  (See  Annex  A).
a.  K  personal  interview  of  the  Individual  may  be  conducteJ  bv  mined 
security,  Investigative,  or  counterintelligence  penonnel  to  ensure  lull  inves- 
tigative coverage  A  peroral  interview  wtD  be  conducted  when  necessary  to 
resolve  any  significant  adverse  Information  and/or  inconsistencies  devel- 
oped during  the  investigation.  In  departments  or  agencies  with  policies 
sanctioning  the  use  of  (he  polygraph  for  personnel  security  purposes,  the 
personal  interview  may  Include  a  polygraph  examination,  conducted  by  a 
qualified  polygraph  examiner. 
9.  Exception*  to  lntx$tigaiioe  Requirement* 
a.  In  exceptional  cases,  the  SOIC  or  his  designee  may  determine  that  it  is 
necessary  or  advisable  In  the  national  interest  to  authorize  access  to  SCI 
prar  to  completion  of  the  fully  prescribed  inveitigatlon  noted  in  paragraph 
8  above.  In  this  situation,  such  investigative  checb  as  are  immediately 
possible  shall  be  made  at  once  and  shall  include  a  personal  interview  of  the 
individual  by  trained  security,  investigative,  or  counterintelligence  person- 
nel Access  in  such  cases  shall  be  strictly  controlled,  and  the  fully  prescribed 
investigation  am)  final  evaluation  snail  be  completed  at  the  earliest  practica- 
ble moment.  Certification  to  other  organizations  of  individuals  authorized 
access  in  such  cases  shall  Include  explicit  notification  of  the  exception. 
K  Where  a  previous  investigation  has  been  conducted  within  the  past  five  (5) 
yean  which  substantially  meets  the  above  r  linimum  standards,  it  may  serve 
as  a  busb  for  granting  access  approval  provided  a  review  of  the  personnel 
and  security  files  does  not  reveal  5ubslantive  changes  in  the  individual's 
security  eligibility.  If  a  previous  investigation  does  not  substantially  meet 
the  minimum  standarcU  • .  if  it  is  more  than  iive  (5)  years  old,  a  current  in- 
vestigation shall  be  required  but  may  be  limited  to  that  necessary  to  bring 
the  individual's  file  up  to  date  in  accordance  with  tite  inwstigativi' 
requirements  set  forth  in  paragraph  8  abo.e.  Should  new  information  be 
developed  during  the  current  investigation  which  bears  unfavorably  upon 
the  individual's  activities  covered  by  the  previous  Investigation,  the  current 
inquiries  shall  be  expanded  as  necessary  to  develop  full  details  of  this 
information. 
10.  Periodic  Reinvettigetion* 
a.  Programs  shall  be  instituted  requiring  the  periodic  reinvestigation  of 
personnel  provided  access  to  SCI.  These  reinvestigations  shall  be  conducted 
on  a  five  (5)  year  recurrent  basis,  but  on -a  more  frequent  basis  where  the  in- 
dividual has  shown  some  questionable  behavioral  pattern,  his  or  her 
activities  are  otherwise  '.uspect,  or  when  deemed  necessary  by  the  SOIC 
concerned. 
b.  The  scope  of  reinvestigations  shall  be  determined  by  the  SOIC  concerned 
based  on  such  consideratioM  as  the  potential  damage  that  might  result  from 
the  individual's  defection  or  willful  compromise  of  SCI  and  the  availability 
and  probable  effectiveness  of  other  means  to  evaluate  continually  factors 
related  to  the  Individual's  suitability  for  continued  access.  The  individual 
shall  furnish  an  up-to-date,  signed  personal  history  statement  and  signed
releases  at  necemry.  In  «B  cases,  the  reinvestigatten  shall  Include,  u  a  minimum, 
appropriate  national  agency  checks,  local  agency  darks,  overseas  checks  where 
appropriate,  credit  checks,  and  a  personal  Interview  with  the  individual  by 
trained  investigative,  security,  or  counterintelligence  personnel  when  necessarv 
to  resolve  significant  adverse  Information  and/or  inconsistencies.  When  condi- 
tions so  indicate,  additional  investigation  may  be  conducted  as  determined  by 
Ike  SOIC  or  his  designee. 
j;.  Determination  of  Acceu  Eligibility 
The  evaluation  of  the  Information  developed  by  investigation  on  an  individual's 
loyalty  and  suitability  shall  be  accomplished  under  tL;  cognizance  of  the  SOIC 
concerned  by  analysts  of  broad  knowledge,  good  judgment,  and  wide  experience  in 
personnel  security  and/or  counterintelligence.  When  all  other  information  developed 
on  an  indl/idual  is  favorable,  a  minor  Investigative  requirement  which  has  not  been 
met  should  not  preclude  favorable  adjudication.  In  *!1  evaluations  the  protection  of  the 
national  interest  Is  paramount.  Any  doubt  concerning  personnel  having  access  to  SCI 
should  be  resolved  in  favor  of  the  national  security  and  the  access  should  be  denied  or 
revoked.  The  ultimate  determination  of  whether  the  granting  of  access  is  clearly 
consistent  with  the  interest  of  national  security  shall  b;  an  overall  common  sense 
determination  based  on  all  available  information. 
It.  Appeal*  Procedure* 
Annex  B  prescribes  common  appeals  procedures  to  be  '.llowed  when  an 
individual's  SCI  access  has  been  denied  or  revoked. 
13.  Continuing  Security  Program* 
a.  In  order  to  facilitate  attainment  of  the  highest  standard  of  personnel 
security  and  to  augment  both  the  access  approval  criteria  and  the  investiga- 
tive requirements  established  by  this  Directive,  member  department*  and 
agencies  shall  institute  continuing  security  programs  for  all  individuals 
having  access  to  SCI.  In  addition  to  security  indoctrinations  (See  Annex  C, 
"Minimum  Standards  for  SCI  Security  Awareness  Programs  in  the  U.S. 
Intelligence  Community'7,  these  (.-rograms  shall  be  t-ilnred  to  create 
mutually  supporting  procedures  under  which  no  issue  will  escape  notice  or 
be  left  unresolved  which  brings  ••*»  question  an  individual's  loyalty  and 
integrity  or  suggests  the  possibility  of  his  or  her  being  subject  to  undue 
influence  or  duress  through  foreign  relationship*  or  exploitable  personal 
conduct.  When  an  Individual  is  assigned  to  perform  sensitive  compartment- 
ed  work  requiring  access  to  SCI,  the  SOIC  for  the  department,  agency,  or 
Government  program  to  which  the  individual  is  assigned  shall  assume 
security  supervision  of  that  individual  throughout  the  period  of  his  or  her 
assignment. 
b.  The  continuing  security  programs  shall  include: 
(1)  Individuals  are  required  to  inform  the  department  or  agency  which 
granted  their  SCI  access  about  any  personal  problem  or  situation  which
may  have  a  possible  bearing  on  ihtf  digibility  for  continued  accai  to  SCI 
and  to  seek  appropriate  guidance  and  assistance  Security  counseling  sKould 
be  made  available  This  counseling  should  be  conducted  by  individuab 
having  extensive  background  and  experience  regarding  the  nature  and 
special  vulnerabilities  of  the  particular  type  of  compartmented  information 
involved. 
(2)  SCI  security  education  programs  of  the  member  departments  and 
agencies  shall  be  established  and  n-jintained  pursuant  to  the  require- 
ments of  Annex  C 
(3)  Security  supervisory  programs  shall  be  established  and  maintained  to 
ensure  that  supervisory  personnel  recognize  and  discharge  their  fprcial 
responsibility  to  safeguard  SCI.  including  the  need  to  assess  continued 
eligibility  for  SCI  access.  These  programs  shall  provide  practical  guidance 
on  indicators  which  may  signal  matters  of  security  concern.  Specific 
'instructions  concerning  reporting  procedures  shall  be  disseminated  to 
triable  the  appropriate  authority  to  take  timely  corrective  action  to 
safeguard  the  security  «>f  t!«  United  States  as  well  as  to  provide  all 
necessary  help  to  the  individual  concerned  to  neutralize  his  or  her 
vulnerability. 
(t)  Security  review  programs  to  en'ure  that  appropriate  security  authorities 
always  receive  and  exchange,  in  a  timelv  manner,  all  information 
bearing  on  the  security  posture  of  persons  having  access  to  SCI.  Personal 
history  information  shall  be  kept  current.  Security  and  related  files  shall 
be  kept  under  continuing  review. 
Whenever  adverse  or  derogatory  information  is  discovered  or  inconsistencies  arise 
which  could  impact  upon  an  individual's  security  status,  appropriate  investigation 
shall  be  conducted  on  a  timely  basis.  The  investigation  shall  be  ok"  sufficient  scope  nec- 
essary to  resolve  the  specific  adverse  or  derogatory  information  or  incouislcncy  in 
question  so  that  *  determination  can  be  made  as  to  whether  the  individual's  continued 
utilization  in  activities  requiring  SCI  is  clearl)  consistent  >'ith  the  interest  of  the 
national  security. 
14.  StKuritv  Violation* 
Individuals  determined  to  have  disclosed  classified  information  to  any  person  not 
officially  authorized  to  receive  it  may  be  considered  ineliijble  for  initial  or  continued 
SCI  access.  Determination  will  be  based  on  an  evaluation  of  all  available  information, 
including  whether  the  disclosure  was  knowing,  willful,  negligent,  or  inadvertent.  A 
determination  of  ineligibility  for  individuals  who  currently  hold  SCI  access  shall  result 
in  immediate  debriefing  and  termination  of  access  for  cause. 
15.  fmpfcmentefiofl 
Existing  directives,  regulations,  agreements,  and  other  guidance  governing  access 
to  SCI  as  defined  herein  shall  be  revised  accordingly. 
William  J.  Casey 
Director  of  Centr.il  Intelligence 
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^ ■;"'  v> Each  cut  mi*  bt  Judged  on  its  own merits  and  fliwl  determination  remalm  the 
toSa«h«BbeiHeivedtef»vorofthei»HoB«JsecMritr. 
I  \  \  ite  nhuMte  detennimttoii  of  whether  the  trantmg  of  SO  accesi  b  cleer»y 
^  'gi  conftei*  with  the  tetereits  of  national  security  shall  be  an  overall  common  sr*e 
£.    *  >■ ■■  determbitkio i  based  on  «0  available  brfcnMtioa  In  wrhrta*  et »  bVcWoo  conastent 
%  ;  wlU>  the  fore***  tie adjudicator  nnst  give  careful  scrotlny  lothefollowlnf  matters: 
1  a.  LoysJty  ::  .;.:..-■  '' 
bTOose'rektives  and  aaociates 
■  :,*.   :>  e.  Honoseiual conduct and samel perversion 
.; .  d.  Cooabitation 
1,;.^^  ^*,ltod^atfalikChiTact«Trato 
%s££fek-  '^atlll^drovmdnsB  abuse,. 
S^-^'f^       .■..<:*.:...";■•  j,.,"   -      ':.l-    . 
v.'.v'.'i;"''       ,L  Enmocwandnktiitaldbonien 
■^a:'*'\f^|L''^U^'e<kwr«rt«Dn»^  • 
^'•'■••J      -         L  Sectirlty viobUeos     ".        '
.    '  vv. 
•  *  / 
tOTALm 
rjgjss*^ ■'^^-^ft :POB>'l/M  'i<iS«iwicfcwm»h>tlo«  by  the  SO  adNiaicrtpr  when  members  of 
J^Mib^aaasdr^^ 
or  obKtatiM  an  not  cMtMM'bf  the  United  Slain,  or  theto  loyalty  or  affection  to  to  a 
foreign  power,  or  they  art  subject  to any  form  of  duress  by  a  torefcn  power,  or  they 
advocate  the  violent  overthrow  or  mscoasttturJonel  alteration  of  the  Government  of 
the  United  States.  ■ 
The  adjudicator  must  ma  carefully  the  degree  of  actual  and  potential  influence 
that  inch  penoot  may  CMtctoa  on  the  Individual  bated  on  an  examination  of  the 
frequency  and  nature  of  personal  contact  and  conespoiidcace  wtdi  and  the  poBtkad 
sophistics**  and  general  maturity  of  the  individuaL 
A  teconuneodation  f  or  access  disapproval  to  appropriate  if  there  is  an  tedlcation 
that  mcb  relatives  or  associates  are  connected  with  any  foreign  Intelligence  service 
When  there  to  a  "compelling  need*  for  SO  aeceat  for  an  individual  whom  family 
member  to  a  non-US.  dtJaen  and  the  background  Investigation  Indicatei  that  the 
lecwity  risk  to  negnjible.  an  exception  to  paragraph  5b(l)or(2)of  DCIDl/Umaybe 
In  mne  circumstances,  marriage  of  an  individual  holding  SCI  acorn  approval 
could  present  an  unecceytable  tecurity  risk.  Such  indivlduab  are  required  to  file 
tatent-tu-marry  statements.  It  to  the  responsibility  of  the  SOIC  to  advtoe  the 
indivlduab  of  the  possible  tecurity  conseottences.  If  the  individual  marries  a  non-U.S. 
cWaen.  SCI  access  wlD  be  suspended  until  the  case  to  readjodicated  unless  an 
appropriate  investigation  of  the  spouse,  as  required  by  Faragraph  81  of  DCID  1/14. 
was  conducted  with  favorable  results.  In  readjudlcating  such  case*,  the  same 
judgments  and  criteria  aa  am  reflected  tn  this  section  apply. 
HOMOSEXUAL  CONDUCT  AND  SEXUAL  TERVEKSION 
DC1D 1/14  requires  that,  «o  be  eligible  for  SCI  access,  faK&viduab  must  be  stable. 
of  esceOent  character  and  discretion,  and  not  subject  to  undue  Influence  or  duress 
through  exploitable  personal  conduct 
Sexual  conduct  can  be  a  relevant  coruhkratioa  in  circumstances  in  which  the 
cmsducttnAcatm  a  personality  dtoo 
direct  or  indirect  pressure  became  of  rnsceptiblmy  to  bbchnad  or  coercion  as  a  result 
of  the  deviant  sexual  behavior.  Such  behavior  includes:  bestiality,  fetbhfam,  exhibt- 
tiontom.  necrophilia,  nymphomania  or  satyriasis,  masochism,  sadism,  pedophilia, 
banrvesttem,  and  voyeurism.  Homosexual  conduct  to  also  to  be  considered  as  a  factor 
in  determining  an  individual's  stability  and  suswptlblllty  to  imduetafluencem  duress. 
7*     «*•-«.   .*•."*■-_-    ■  •*=■.* 
■A.TV. 
-,«»■
:C-x£.rJ::£ii 
■;\J.^:r;: 
rcr-^; 
i%t^, 
C'?5^»;«<5*£*JE 
COffAWTM 
fl|^«^S&4ra*:  Cohabttatio.  blind  of  lb* dc«mt preclude  SO  access  approva 
5$g%£^  >  ;■?■  n.  idea***  ncohastai*S«*^ iaceiUlned  aid  a  determli 
RIB 
. ,  .IVMMUU,  K  n 
.SSSMMany  other  dr- 
■*^t*  €*»*•*  A 
K.n..»«'d  available  evidence 
access  approval. 
determination  made  if 
on  the  seme  criteria  as 
m 
'  
juch  MHoclaXtaa  constitutes  aa      „   
gp^S^to  Waection^'XJoto-rleStr^^  an  alien,  for 
§|l^'£^f£f" example,  WQoires  ^atm^ieiB^^'nurlattto  an  alien.  Extra-marital  aeiual 
''nhtions"a»^a]mcfle^ 
Br$$£$ii^ 
&■? 
-** 
r-'.v.,    . 
^>      " 
UNDESIRABLE  CHARACTER  TRAITS 
'  Rlsemplsiriwlthatanlirflvldualsw^ 
terrain*  whether  a  patten  of  behavior  exMs  which  Indicate*  that  granting  SCI  access 
could  pose  a  risk  to  national  security.  In  cases  when  allegations  have  been  reported 
which  reflect  unfavorably  on  the  reputation  of  an  individual,  tt  is  incumbent  upon  the 
SCI  adjudicator  to  <*t*!*rr*&  fact  from  opinion  and  to  determine  which  negative 
characteristics  are  real  and  pertinent  to  an  evaluatkin  of  the  Individual's  character  and 
which  ar»  unsubstantiated  or  Irrelevant  Relevant  negative  characteristics  are  those 
which,  to  the  adjudicator's  Informed  opinion.  Indicate  that  an  individual  to  not  willing. 
able,  or  likely  to  protect  SCI  tnformaUon.  The  adjudicator's  personal  likes  or  dislikes 
must  not  be  permitted  to  affect  the  determination. 
Examples  of  specific  concern  to  determining  whether  an  tao!ivi^iial  hw  ui»^ 
able  character  trails  are  any  substantive,  credible,  derontory  comments  by  associates, 
employer*,  neighbors,  and  other  acquaintances;  any  litigation  Instituted  against  the 
individual  by  such  persons  at  a  result  of  the  individual's  actions:  or  allegations  of 
"violations  of  law.  A  rectnmendatJon  for  disapproval  would  be  appropriate  for  an 
Individual  who  cannot  be  relied  upon  to  obey  rules  and  regulations. 
In  examining  the  drcumstances  of  case*  Involving  tncldento  of  untruthfulness,  the 
a  indicator  must  weigh  all  f  acton  with  particular  emphasb  c«  establishing  the  intent 
of  the  Individual.  Where  an  Individual  ha*  tried  to  obscure  pertinent  or  significant 
facts  by  falsifying  data,  L&.on  the  Personal  History  Statement  by  either  omission  or 
false  entry,  such  action  should  be  weighed  heavily  against  recommending  access. 
Failure  to  dbeke*  derogatory  personal  information,  such  as  a  court  martial  or  serious 
crime,  would  appear  to  be  intentional  and.  eorsjeo^smtly,  wvJd  warrant  a  recommen- 
dation for  disapproval.
p^PfiPf;:^l«^ 
^-WSSM—iV-l-l 
.Vji  ._---»-l-.wyw__>-..,';w!preientt  a  serious  concern  to  the  SCI  adjudicator.  : 
'.Persons  who  haWengfcied  In  espionage  for  monetary  gain  demonstrate  the  hazard  of 
...  .....,.,.- .    granting  SCI  access  to  an  individual  with  overly  expensive  tastes  and  habits  or  living 
r'.%r'iv*    under  the  pressure  of  serious  debt 
'■*■;■  -V'^.'^v'A  recommendation  for  disapproval  is  appropriate  when  there  is  a  pattern  of  •■' 
■'•'" / \ 
■;"••;.?*  financial  irresponsibility  and  it  appears  that  an  individual  has  not  mode  a  conscien- 
.;/;.:Vtious  effort  to  satisfy  creditors.  In  such  cases,  the  adjudicator  should  determine 
■V.  V     whether  the  individual  had  been  notified  about  the  debts  and  whether  they  were 
let^yvaM 
;,  ■  When  the  financial  irresponsibility  alone  is  not  of  such  magnitude  to  warrant 
disapproval,  it  may  contribute  to  recommendation  for  denial  of  SCI  access  when  there 
is  other  evidence  of  irresponsibility. 
.     ALCOHOL  ABUSE 
The  SCI  adjudicator  should  examine  any  information  developed  relative  to  an 
individual's  use  of  alcoholic  beverages  to  determine  the  extent  to  which  such  use 
would  adversely  affect  the  ability  of  the  individual  to  exercise  the  care,  judgment,  and 
discretion  necessary  to  protect  SCI  information.  The  adjudicator  should  determine 
whether  a  pattern  of  impropriety  exists,  although  one  incident  caused  by  alcohol  abuse 
may  be  of  such  magnitude  to  warrant  a  recommendation  for  disapproval. 
In  determining  the  security  impact  of  a  person's  pattern  of  alcohol  use,  the 
adjudicator  should  consider  the  circumstances,  amount  and  rate  of  consumption,  the 
time  and  place  of  consumption,  and  the  physiological  and  behavioral  effect  such 
drinking  has  on  the  individual  For  example,  does  the  individual's  drinking  result  In 
absences  from  work  or  careless  work  habits?  Does  the  individual  become  talkative, 
abusive,  or  manifest  other  undesirable  characteristics?  Does  the  Individual  drink  until 
intoxicated?  Has  the  individual  been  arrested  for  any  acis  resulting  irom  the  influence 
of  alcohol? 
In  the  absence  of  conclusive  evidence,  additional  insight  may  be  available  from 
appropriate  medical  authorities.  If  the  individual  acknowledges  having  an  alcohol 
abuse  problem  and  is  seeking  help,  it  may  be  appropriate  to  defer  access  determina- 
tion and  monitor  the  individual's  progress  for  a  year  or  so. 
If,  after  considering  the  nature  and  sources  of  the  Information,  the  adjudicator 
determines  that  an  individual's  drinking  is  not  serious  enough  to  warrant  a  recommen- 
dation for  disapproval  of  SCI  access,  it  may  be  appropriate  to  recommend  approval 
with  a  warning  at  the  time  of  indoctrination  that  future  incidents  of  alcohol  abuse  may 
result  in  SCI  denial  The  adjudicator  may  also  recommend  a  reinvestigation  of  the  in- 
dividual's use  of  alcohol  after  an  appropriate  period  of  time  has  passed. 
ILLEGAL  DRUGS  AND  DBUG  ABUSE 
The  SCI  adjudicator  should  examine  all  allegations  of  an  individual's  use, 
transport,  transfer,  sale,  cultivation,  processing  and  manufacturing  of  hallucinogens, 
narcotics,  drugs  and  other  materials  and  chemical  compounds  Identified  and  listed  in
i*^^a&*,;v       .<■-  ■.- 
R^^fivolwawrt  Wm*  of  tbwe  activities  bcTdire*  concern  to  the  Sa  adjudicator  to  or- 
,f^der  to  (letenruW !^  exercbt  tlw  care*  discretion,  end 
g%SiooWrtn«ubed  to  protect  Satofor.-  Hnn.  The  use  of  there  substances  may  lead  to 
^%"v»iyto« degrees  -of  phytic*!  or,ptyclK<»..''»l  dependence  u  weO  as  having  a 
;^/r  J  
deleterious  effect  on  an  tod^iid^s  mental  sw  e  and  ability  to  function. 
..;  Persons  involved  in  drat  traffkilng,  le.,  the  commercial  cultivation,  processing. 
\; -^.v  manufacturing,  purchase,  or  sale  of  such  substances  should  normally  be  recommended 
.' .  -J'  for  disapproval..'  T;  "■■'■%,  ■' y.-'^y ^ 
. -I  ±'>'< 
'-A  In  cases  Involving  the  use  of  drugs,  the  adjudicator  must  corm^  tl«  luture  of 
the  substance  used  and  whether  the  use  is  experimental  or  habitual.  The  frequency, 
TtfTTvry.  f  ~t  ^r^.mrf.wrx  nitiwHwUnf  —id  iim  are  key  elements.  For  example,  hat 
the  Individual  used  "hard"  drugs  or  halhicinogfm  such  as  heroin,  cocaine,  or  LSD? 
Has  the  individual  used  drugs  regularly  or  only  on  occasion?  Does  the  individual 
currently  use  drugs?  Does  the  individual  regularly  purchase  drugs  or  participate 
merely  when  offered  drugs  by  others?  Has  the  individual's  behavior  been  affected  by 
the  use  of  drugs  and,  if  so,  to  what  extent? 
Once  die  judgment  b  made  that  an  Individual  is  a  habitual  user  of  any  controlled 
substance  (multiple  use  beyond  the  point  of  mere  experimentation),  a  recommenda- 
tion for  disapproval  is  appropriate.  Moreover,  even  experimental  use  of  hard  dross  or 
hallucinogens,  such  as  LSD,  could  warrant  a  recommendation  for  disapproval. 
EMOTIONAL  AND  MENTAL  DISORDERS 
DCID  1/14  requires  that  persons  considered  for  access  to  SCI  be  stable, 
trustworthy,  reliable,  and  of  excellent  character.  Judgment  and  discretion.  Emotional 
and  mental  disorders  which  interfere  with  an  individual 's  perception  of  reality  or 
reliability  ere  of  serious  concern  to  the  SCI  adjudicator  in  determining  whether  an  In- 
dividual U  able  or  willing  to  protect  SCI  information. 
It  is  essential  to  obtain  as  muck  information  as  possible  when  an  allegation  has 
been  made  ?n  this  area.  If  feasible,  the  Individual  should  be  interviewed  to  obtain  ad- 
ditional detail  When  appropriate,  government  psychological  and  psychiatric  person- 
nel should  be  consulted  so  that  psychiatric  r  psychological  data  may  be  properly 
evaluated. 
If  a  current  emotional  Instability  appears  to  be  a  temporary  condition  (for 
example,  caused  by  a  death.  Illness,  or  marital  breakupX  It  may  be  advisable  to 
recommend  postponing  final  action  and  rechecking  the  situation  at  a  later  date.  This 
precludes  a  security  disapproval  for  what  may  be  a  temporary  condition  which,  when 
cured,  would  have  no  security  implications. 
Military  and  civilian  personnel  who  destine  to  take  medical/psychiatric  tests 
when  so  directed  by  competent  autisority  should  not  be  recommended  foi  SCI  access. 
RECORD  OF  LAW  VIOLATIONS 
In  determining  whether  an  individual  b  stable;  trustworthy;  and  of  excellent 
character,  judgment,  and  discretion  as  required  by  DCID  1/14  for  access  to  SCI.  the 
adjudicator  must  weigh  carefully  any  record  of  law  violations  by  the  Individual. 
■!■•*?■    I*     -:
r»>vt.S' 
*^i*i,I"--  '".••^v*   •■••   v  ■■•■ 
n^'ti^;«lobtkiH,veouU  be  significant,  the 
.cowerDed^wkh  more  serious  criminal  violations  or  court 
*^So th? mdrviduals  reliability  or  trustworthiness. 
i^j^lmSilS^ovtoloii  for  crim&al  offetuWmurtVconsldered  from 
f^standpofetfof  the  na^luid  terlcusneet  of  the  offense,  the  circumstances  under 
'which  tt'cccurlcd,  knv  Wago  It  occurred,  whether  it  was  an  belated  offense  or  a  re- 
^  rwrted  violaticcj  cf  the  kw,  the  offender's  ate  at  the  time,  social  conditions  which  may 
f  J»ve§teeri^on^^ 
■^''VAny-convId^  normally  support  a  recommendation  for 
".'  disapproval.  If  the  offense  jras  committed  many  years  prior,  the  individual  has  shown 
evidence  of  rehabilibltioo^and  the  investigation  shows  no  other  derogatory  Informa* 
■r tioa,  an  approval  iMy:  be  considered  A  lane  number  of  minor  offenses,  however, 
rJ  could  indicate  irresponsibility  and  inay  support  an  advene  recommendation. 
/<.^'y?.<^.-C;*  ■:?'-"#;f1f*'V'^'  ■  '.■-■■   •• 
security VIOLATIONS  %■'■'";  ;■■ 
•    f  
l*3rt  security  violations  are  caused  by  carelessness  or  Ignorance  with  no  intention 
of  compromising  security/ However,  the  record  of  an  individual  responsible  for 
multiple  .violations  should  be  scrutinized.  The  individual's  current  attitude  toward 
-  .security  should  be  confirmed  with  his/her  supervisor.  A  pattern  of  violations  may  be 
-sufficient  ground  for  a  recommendation  for  disapproval  Individuals  responsible  for 
~  unauthorized  disclosure  of  classified  information  may  be  denied  initial  or  continued 
SCI  access.  • 
iiNfcWt  ■  '->*-         --   ■-  •' 
■'.vJSfcr
:ii^vy.  'rt-.* 
-,,  v...,.,.,  >.  -.^  ^,. !»««.»»—   appeals procedure*  for the  denial  or  revocation  of 
^m"*0***xmji>  Sensitive  Oxoparrmented  Information  (SO)  by  entitle*  of  the  Intelligence 
£%#*  '^^ComiBDai^ after adjudication pursuant to the provisions of DOD 1/14. TbJs annex b 
fTWtv  ^Promulgated pursuer*  to  Executive  Older  1*338,  Executive  Older  12350  and  Section 
;|£££fe.-.-  102  « the  Rational  Security  Act  of  lM7.For  the  purpose  of  thb  annex.  aD  reference* 
^j^-V^  to  DCID 1/14  facrode  the  basic  document  and  all  of  Its  annexe*.  Any  penon  who  has 
h&W*/0  beettcGOskfered  for  Initial  or  contiaued  access  to  SCI  pursuant  to  the  provUons  of 
*?:>;  '0%?  DOD  1/14  shaD.  to  tiw  extent  provided  below,  be  afforded  an  opportunity  to  appeal 
X$V0£%zti*  enial  or  revocation  of  such  access.  This,  annex  supersedes  any  and  aD  other 
'"'"-'-"      '^pficticesjtnd  procedures  fcr 
annex  shall  not  be  construed  to  require  the  disclosure  of  classified  information  or 
information  concerning  intelligence  sources  and  methods,  nor  shall  it  be  construed  to 
afford  an  opportunity  to  appeal  prior  to  the  actual  denial  or  revocation  of  SCI  access. 
;  In  addition,  the  previsions  of  DOD  1/14,  this  annex,  or  any  other  document  or 
provision  of  law  shall  not  be  construed  to  create  a  property  interest  of  any  kind  in  the 
•  access  of  any  person  to  SCL  Further,  since  the  denial  or  revocation  of  access  to  SCI 
cannot  by  the  terms  of  DOD  1/14  render  a  person  ineligible  for  access  to  other 
classified  information  solely  for  that  reason,  the  denial  or  revocation  of  SCI  access 
pursuant  to  tbe  provisions  of  DCID  1/14  and  this  annex  shall  not  be  construed  to  cre- 
ate a  liberty  Interest  of  any  kind. 
<**« 
AFrUCABIUTY 
This  annex  applies  to  aD  United  States  Government  civilian  and  military 
personnel,  as  well  as  any  other  individuals,  including  contractors  and  employees  of 
contractors,  who  are  considered  for  initial  or  continued  access  to  SCL  This  annex  does 
not  apply  to  decisions  regarding  employment  and  shall  not  be  construed  to  affect  or 
impair  Public  Law  88-290  or  the  authority  of  any  entity  to  effect  applicant  or 
personnel  actions  pursuant  to  Public  Law  88-290,  Public  Law  88-36,  or  other 
applicable  law. 
SO  ACCESS  DETERMINATION  AUTHOJUTY 
Adjudications  for  access  to  SCI  shall  be  made  in  accordance  with  DOD  1/14  by  a 
Determination  Authority  designated  by  the  Senior  Official  of  the  Intelligence 
Community  (SOIQ  cf  each  entity.  Access  to  SCI  shall  be  denied  or  revoked  whenever 
it  b  determined  that  a  person  does  not  meet  the  security  standards  provided  for  in 
DOD  1/14. 
&•***£.-
^!'.r.**:vN*> 
..m^.?^ 
>:-5t:;V.- 
|i  St*.  -*!*■**  >■  .--'-.  '.    *       -    —■ 
\L-2v-?>f  :-.  .'-  -,.:.  :■  ■     :;*~ 
"iespvj'ife  ■■»•  •■    .     ■••■•■   ■  ■•■■  -•  ■-  i 
of  the  diftfOT  invocation  of  SCI  aco»;.,,:/:; 
ttjarynayreo^^ 
fe^^ifwati^md/w^^  .  ;''£'  ,\ -/;\T-.'-\'- «••■■■->''     "■■ 
'^l^iiMuwpnta^  to appeal,  whenever  the  Determination  Authority 
'-  ^-^   :cY  «W  «*ttyi  *»  thi  exerdM  of  hit  or  her  discretion,  deems  such  action  in 
dearly  consistent  with  the  Interests  of  the  nrtfcnal 
t»*  .:^$plM?el"  any  •»*»£  hi  the  e* 
*lM&;&x/Any.  person who  k  given  n  4iffc»tton  and  afforded  an  o^wtunity  to  appeal 
S*®?jfe^  pursuant  to  paragraph  1.  above  may,  within  45  days  of  the  date  en  vUch  sorb  person 
life 
i!  b  notified  of  the  reaaona  for  denial  or  revocation  of  SCI  access,  submit  a  written  ap- 
^f^^^p^rpeat  of  that  denial  or  revocation  to  the  Determination  Authority.  The  written  material 
^#^^^;sobmltted  for  consideration  may  include  any  information  which  the  person  believes 
§|iyN>l§tll *"!  •"** ■*■  Determination  Authority  in  reviewing  the  case. 
^fe^^E^*^*'  -After  a  further  review  of  the  case  in  the  light  of  the  written  appeal,  the  person 
^w^vS&CV;  wfll  be  notified  of  the  decision  of  the  Determination  Authority. 
s?'i';  ,:"  ;/';  "  . !  ~»  4."  If  the  Determination  Authority  reaffirms  a  denial  or  revocation  of  access,  the 
' '  •£  '  person  may,  within  SO  days  of  the  date  on  which  such  person  Is  notified  of  the 
._.-."      /■-:■      Determination  Authority's  reaffirmation,  request  a  final  review  of  the  case.  In  that 
>..."'    ":,    '   event,  the  SOIC.  or  his  or  her  designee,  shall  personally  review  the  case  and  exercise 
his  or  her  discretion  pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  DCID  1/14,  and  shall  inform  the 
person  of  his  or  her  decision,  which  shall  be  final  and  unreviewable. 
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I^FjSbmMed  for  rwanderittnai  may  tododa  any  iafonnation  which  the  penon  believes 
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DetermiaetfcM  Authority's  reaffirmation,  request  a  final  review  of  the  case.  In  that 
event,  the  SOIQ or  hh  or  her  designee,  shall  personally  review  the  case  and  eiercbe 
his  or  her  discretion  pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  DOD  1/14.  and  shall  inform  the 
penon  of  his  or  her  decUoa, which  shall  be  final  and  unreviewable. 
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^-.^/MlrtlMUM  STANDARDS  FOR  SCI  SECURITY  AWARENESS 
^^IWPROGRAMS  IN  THE  U.&  INTELIIGENCE  COMMUNITY 
■•>«»•■ 
^feMWmun>"k»DsUrd«  «•  hereby  established  for  the  SCI  security  education 
l&S  programs  designed  to  erjhance  the  lecurity  awareness  of  VS.  Government  civilian  and 
'^nittMyY'""*"    *     *    '    "     ■■■'*   ■--«-■— ^-«- -■«•«— «•   «-  «- 
mun^  personnel  end  private  contractors  woridnt  In  the  U&  Intelligence  Cmununi- 
SSfP^W 'C&ssbBinw  With  these  standards  Is  required  for  aB  departments/ageDdes  within 
J0k£€ the  nteOigence  Community.  ExbtLsg  security  awareness  programs  shall  be  modified 
.■-It^ltoMnform  with  these  standards.  Departaents/ageDcles  will  establish  a  documented 
WZ$Si3®s'k-  program  to  ensure  that  training  has  been  presented  to  all  personnel  ■-. 
IMfew  i  •  ;?^?*  ybg  (riwnity  awareness  requlieinents  set  forth  hereto  are  divided  Into  three 
'phases.  Phase  1  concerns  the  Initial  indoctrination  of  Individuals  which  b  normally 
administered  prior  to  access  to  SCL  Phase  2  concents  the  continuing  security 
awareness  program  required  to  maintain  and  increase  security  awareness  throughout 
the  period  of  access.  Phase  3  sets  forth  the  final  guidelines  and  instructions  when 
to  SCI  b  terminated. 
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1.  Initial  Indoctrination— As  soon  as  practicable  after  being  approved  for  access 
toSCI,  personnel  shall  receive  an  Initial  security  indoctrination  which  shall  include: 
.  ■    a.  The  need  for  and  purpose  of  SO,  andtbe  adverse  effect  on  the  Mtfontl  se- 
curity that  could  result  from  unauthorized  disclosure. 
b.  The  intelligence  mbrJon  of  the  department/agency  to  Include  the  reasons 
why  intelligence  information  b  sensitive. 
e.  The  administrative,  personnel,  physical  and  other  procedural  security 
requirements  of  the  department/agency  and  those  requirements  peculiar  to 
specific  duty  assignments. 
d.  individual  classification  nianagement  respomlbffltles  as  set  forth  In  appro- 
priate directives  and  regulations  to  Include  classification/classification 
■ .  guidelines  and  marking  requirements. 
.    e.  The  definitions  and  criminal  penalties  for  esi*>r*ge.lixJudmglMuborlngor 
concealing  persons;  gathering,  transmitting  or  losing  defers  liuWa^ 
gathering  or  delivering  defense  Information  to  aid  foreign  governments: 
.     pliotomr^ung  aid  slwtchlng  defense  ir*»^^ 
of  classified  information  (Title  181  US.C.  Sections  792  through  795,  787 
and  798X  the  Internal  Security  Act  of  1950  (Title  50.  U.S.C,  Section  783) 
and,  when  appropriate,  the  Atomic  Energy  Act,  Sections  224  through  227). 
f.  The  adminbtrative 
.  procedures^ 
sanctions  for   violation  or  disregard  of  security
approval,  that  the  SO 
!  that  the  recipient  can 
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"  possible  compromise  of  SCI  material. . .  ■ 
(4)  Obligation  to  report  »o  proper  authorities  any  information  which  could 
JJ  reflect  da  the  tnatwcethineai  of  an  individual  who  has  access  to  SCI, 
.;.:.  such  as:  ;:,/.■.  :*.>..-  '~-<?'V''.- '  ■     ■  '"■  ' 
/  (a)  willful  violation  of  security  regulations, 
(b)  unexplained  affluence  or  excestive  Indebtedness. 
(c)  serious  unlawful  acts, 
(d)  apparent  mental  or  emotional  problems, 
(e)  coercion  or  harassment  attempts,  and  or 
(f)  blackmail  attempts. 
(5)  Identification  of  the  elements  in  the  department/agency  to  which 
matters  of  security  interest  are  to  be  referred. 
i.  Periodic  Awareneai  Enhancement— Each  department/agency  shall  establish  a 
continuing  security  awareness  program  which  wiO  provide  for  frequent  exposure  of 
personnel  to  security  awareneai  material  Implementation  of  a  continuing  program 
may  Include  live  briefings,  audio-visual  presentations  (eg.,  video  tapes,  films  and 
slide/tape  programsX  printed  material  (eg,  posters,  memoranda,  pamphlets,  fliers),  or 
a  combination  thereof.  It  Is  essential  that  current  information  and  materials  be 
utilized;  Programs  should  be  designed,  to  meet  the  particular  needs  of  the 
.  department/agency.    "V 
"'■*;  a.  The  basic  elements  for  this  program  shall  include,  bat  are  not  limited  to, 
-"*■"•'''  *'' the  following:'  \- 
.  (1)  .The  foreign  intelligence  threat 
(S)  The  technical  threat 
...  ••  (3)  Adirunbtrative,  personnel,  physical  and  procedural  security. 
(4)  Individuai  classification  management  responsibility. 
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(3)  When  an  Individual  has.  or  anticipates,  contact  with  representatives  of 
;•.;.,           communist^ootrcOed  countries. 
(4)  When  any  other  situation  arises  f or  which  a  medal  briefing/debriefing 
,  b  required  by  the  department/agency. 
3  '  &  Debriefing-- When  •  cVpartmei*/agency  lias  detenniis^ 
•  no  looter  required,  final  Inkrucboos  and  fuloVUneiwin  be  provloVd  to  the  individual 
At  a  minimum  there  shall  include: 
a.  A  requirement  that  the  individual  read  appropriate  tectum  of  Tides  18 
and  50,  VS.  Code,  and  that  the  Intent  and  criminal  Mnctkra  of  thetelawi 
relative  to  espionage  and  unauthorized  disclosure  be  clarified 
b.  The  continuing  obligation,  under  the  prepublicstioa  ami  other  provisions  of 
the  nondiscloMire  agreement  for  SCI,  never  to  divulge,  puMuh.  or  reveal  by 
writing,  word,  conduct  or  otherwise,  to  any  unauthorised  perrons  any  SCI. 
without  the  written  content  of  appropriate  department/agency  of ftcUb. 
c.  An  acknowledgement  that  the  Individual  will  report  without  delay  to  the 
Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation,  or  the  department/agency,  any  attempt  by 
an  unauthorized  perron  to  solicit  national  security  information. 
d.  A  declaration  that  the  individual  no  longer  possesses  any  documents  or 
material  containing  SCL 
e.  A  reminder  of  the  risks  astoclated  with  foreign  travel  and  certain  hazardous 
activities  as  defined  la  the  DO  policy  document  entitled  "Security  Policy 
Concerning  Travel  and  Assignment  of  Personnel  with  Accea  to  Sensitive 
Compartmented  InfonnatJoo,"  and  department/agency  reporting  require- 
ments as  applicable. 
«r 
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■<  -  ■  •  ,-■■■
(Page  9) 
ANNEX  A 
DCID  1/14  ADJUDICATION  GUIDELINES 
PURPOSE 
This  annex  is  designed  to  ensure  that  a  common  approach  is  followed  by 
Intelligence  Community  departments  and  agencies  in  applying  the  standards  of 
DCID  1/14.  These  guidelines  apply  to  the  adjudication  of  cases  involving 
persons  being  considered  for  first-time  access  to  Sensitive  Compartmented 
Information  (SCI)  as  well  as  those  cases  of  persons  being  readjudicated  for 
continued  SCI  access. 
ADJUDICATIVE  PROCESS
(Page  10) 
Adjudicative  actions  concerning  the  foregoing  items  are  examined  in 
greater  detail  below. 
LOYALTY 
DCID  1/14  establishes  the  catagorical  requirement  that,  to  be  eligible  for 
SCI  access,  an  individual  must  be  of  unquestioned  loyalty  to  the  United  States. 
CLOSE  RELATIVES  AND  ASSOCIATES
(Page  11) 
In  examining  cases  involving  acts  of  homosexual  conduct  or  sexual 
perversion,  it  is  relevant  to  consider  the  age  of  the  person,  the 
voluntariness,  and  the  frequency  of  such  activities,  the  public  nature  and  the 
recency  of  the  conduct,  as  well  as  any  other  circumstances  which  may  serve  to 
aggravate  the  nature  or  the  character  of  the  conduct.  A  recommendation  for 
disapproval  is  appropriate  when,  in  view  of  all  available  evidence  concerning 
the  individual's  history  of  sexual  behavior,  it  appears  that  access  to  SCI 
could  pose  a  risk  to  the  national  security. 
COHABITATION 
Cohabitation  in  and  of  itself  does  not  preclude  SCI  access  approval. 
The  identity  of  a  cohabitant  must  be  ascertained  and  a  determination  made 
if  such  association  constitutes  an  unacceptable  security  risk  based  on  the  same 
criteria  as  in  the  section,  "Close  Relatives  and  Associates."  Cohabitation  with 
an  alien,  for  example,  requires  the  same  scrutiny  as  marriage  to  an  alien. 
Extra-marital  sexual  relations  are  also  of  legitimate  concern  to  the  SCI 
adjudicator  when  the  potential  for  undue  influence  or  duress  exists. 
UNDESIRABLE  CHARACTER  TRAITS
(Page  14) 
Although  a  pattern  of  repeated  minor  traffic  violations  could  be  significant, 
the  adjudicator  is  principally  concerned  with  more  serious  criminal  violations 
or  court  actions  reflecting  adversely  upon  the  individual's  reliability  or 
trustworthyness . 
Each  case  involving  convictions  for  criminal  offenses  must  be  considered 
from  the  standpoint  of  the  nature  and  seriousness  of  the  offense,  the 
circumstances  under  which  it  occured,  how  long  ago  it  occured,  whether  it  was 
an  isolated  offense  or  a  repeated  violation  of  the  law,  the  offender's  age  at 
the  time,  social  conditions  which  may  have  a  bearing  on  the  individual's 
actions,  and  any  evidence  of  rehabilitation. 
Any  conviction  for  a  felony  will  normally  support  a  recommendation  for 
disapproval.  If  the  offense  was  committed  many  years  prior,  the  individual  has 
shown  evidence  of  rehabilitation,  and  the  investigation  shows  no  other 
derogatory  information,  an  approval  may  be  considered.  A  large  number  of  minor 
offenses,  however,  could  indicate  irresponsibility  and  may  support  an  adverse 
recommendation. 
SECURITY  VIOLATIONS 
Most  security  violations  are  caused  by  carelessness  or  ignorance  with  no 
intention  of  compromising  security.  However,  the  record  of  an  individual 
responsible  for  multiple  violations  should  be  scrutinized.  The  individual's 
current  attitude  toward  security  should  be  confirmed  with  his/her  supervisor.  A 
pattern  of  violations  may  be  sufficent  ground  for  a  recommendation  for 
disapproval.  Individuals  responsible  for  unauthorized  disclosure  of  classified 
information  may  be  denied  initial  or  continued  SCI  access.
(Page  16) 
PROCEDURES 
1.  Persons  shall  be: 
a.  notified  of  the  denial  or  revocation  of  SCI  access; 
b.  notified  that  they  may  request  to  be  provided  the  reasons  for  such 
denial  or  revocation;  and/or 
c.  afforded  an  opportunity  to  appeal,  whenever  the  Determination 
Authority  of  any  entity,  in  i.he  exercise  of  his  or  her  discretion,  deems  such 
action  in  any  given  case  to  be  clearly  consistent  with  the  interests  of  the 
national  security. 
2.  Any  person  who  is  given  notification  and  is  afforded  an  opportunity  to 
appeal  pursuant  to  paragraph  1.  above  may,  within  45  days  of  the  date  on  which 
such  person  is  notified  of  the  reasons  for  denial  or  revocation  of  SCI  access, 
submit  a  written  appeal  of  that  denial  or  revocation  to  the  Determination 
Authority.  The  written  material  submitted  for  consideration  may  include  any 
information  which  the  person  believes  will  assist  the  Determination  Authority 
in  reviewing  the  case. 
3.  After  a  further  review  of  the  case  in  the  light  of  the  written  appeal, 
the  person  will  be  notified  of  the  decision  of  the  Determination  Authority.
(Page  16,  corrected) 
PROCEDURES 
1.  The  person  shall  be: 
a.  notified  of  the  denial  or  revocation  of  SCI  access; 
b.  notified  that  they  may  request  to  be  provided  the  reasons  for  such 
denial  or  revocation;,  and/or 
c.  afforded  an  opportunity  to  appeal, 
whenever  the  Determination  Authority  of  any  entity,  in  the  exercise  of  his  or 
her  discretion,  deems  such  action  in  any  given  case  to  be  consistent  with  the 
interests  of  the  national  security. 
2.  Any  person  who  is  given  notification  and  afforded  an  opportunity  to 
appeal  pursuant  to  paragraph  1.  above  may,  within  45  days  of  the  date  on  which 
such  person  is  notified  of  the  reasons  for  denial  or  revocation  of  SCI  access, 
submit  a  written  appeal  of  that  denial  or  revocation  to  the  Determination 
Authority.  The  written  material  submitted  for  consideration  may  include  any 
information  which  the  person  believes  will  assist  the  Determination  Authority 
in  reviewing  the  case. 
3.  After  a  further  review  of  the  case  in  the  light  of  the  written  appeal, 
the  person  will  be  notified  of  the  decision  of  the  Determination  Authority. 
4.  If  the  Determination  Authority  reaffirms  a  denial  or  revocation  of 
access,  the  person  may,  within  30  days  of  the  date  on  which  such  person  is 
notified  of  the  Determination  Authority's  reaffirmation,  request  a  final  review 
of  the  case.  In  that  event,  the  SOIC,  or  his  or  her  designee,  shall  personally 
review  the  case  and  exercise  his  or  her  discretion  pursuant  to  the  provisions 
of  DCID  1/14,  and  shall  inform  the  person  of  his  or  her  decision,  which  shall 
be  final  and  unreviewable.
(Page  18) 
g.  A  review  of  the  techniques  employed  by  foreign  intelligence 
organizations  in  attempting  to  obtain  national  security 
information. 
h.  Individual  security  responsibilities  including: 
(1)  The  prohibition  against  discussing  SCI  in  a  nonsecure  area, 
over  a  nonsecure  telephone,  or  in  any  other  manner 
that  permits  access  by  unauthorized  persons. 
(2)  The  need  to  determine,  prior  to  disseminating  SCI,  that  the 
prospective  recipient  has  the  proper  security  access 
approval,  that  the  SCI  is  needed  in  order  to  perform 
official  duties,  and  that  the  recipient  can  properly 
protect  the  information. 
(3)  Administrative  reporting  requirements  such  as  foreign 
travel,  contacts  with  foreign  nationals,  attempts  by  un- 
authorized persons  to  obtain  national  security  information, 
pysical  security  deficiencies,  and  loss  or  possible  compro- 
mise of  of  SCI  material. 
(4)  Obligation  to  report  to  proper  authorities  any  information 
which  could  reflect  on  the  trustworthiness  of  an  individual 
who  has  access  to  SCI,  such  as: 
(a)  willful  violation  of  security  regulations. 
(b)  unexplained  affluence  or  excessive  indebtedness, 
(c)  serious  unlawful  acts, 
(d)  apparent  mental  or  emotional  problems, 
(e)  coercion  or  harassment  attempts,  and  or 
(f)  blackmail  attempts. 
(5)  Identification  of  the  elements  in  the  department/agency  to 
which  matters  of  security  interest  are  to  be  referred.
(Page  19) 
(5)  Criminal  penalties  and  administrative  sanctions. 
(6)  Individual  security  responsibilities. 
(7)  A  review  of  other  appropriate  department/agency 
requirements 
b.  Special  security  briefings/debrief ings  are  required  to  supple- 
ment the  existing  security  awareness  programs  in  the  following 
situations: 
(1)  When  an  individual  is  designated  as  a  courier. 
(2)  When  an  individual  travels,  officially  or  unofficially,  to 
or  through  communist  countries,  or  areas  of  high  risk. 
(3)  When  an  individual  has,  or  anticipates,  contact  with  rep- 
resentatives of  communist-controlled  countries.