. -~ AFOIN/6 Aug 52 4UF OGUNET GE -SELNE! MajGen Samfozd/km/S5@kiy CS, Usar SECURITY INFORMATION REI) Errts uy 8 Sue ae Bi iy. f- 29400 & 2-ddySy f 6 August 1982 - REMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL TWINING l. This is in response to your request for coments on the "Brownell? report. 2. I believe the first comment should be directed to the question of whether the Joint Chiefs should reply sepa wately, or as a body, to Me, Lovett. I believe the efs should reply as a « I understand from General Bo and Admiral Stout that they will so advise General Collins and Admiral Fechteler. 3, I believe the conclusions of the report are in asjor error on two things. The first sejor ersor in its conclu» gions is that strong central control of the national COMINT effort is desirable, The second is that control under the Secretary of Defense's office rather than under the Jeint Chiefs is desirable, I believe that ali other recomenda- tions are of ainer importance in comparison. 7 4, Everywhere about us there are proponents of twe conflicting ideas of management. There are many who believe completely in the virtues ef tight.centralized control. There are perhaps more who believe in the virtuss 3f decene tralized control, I believe that neither one ef these attic tudes is correct fer COMINT. I believe the COMINT field is rticularly vulnirable to danger from either extreme, The basic recommendation made by the Brownell Comaitted ic that the COMINT effort of the nation be centralized with strong centrel of all aspects vested in AFSA, If this happens, we will lose valuable progress toward the proper evolution of this activity. We will have to return eventuslly to our esent position and start egain., I believe the Browneli ttee failed te recognize that the COMINT ente requires a very delicate balance between ceatrali on and decentralization, We agree that the present organizstion does not yet have the correct balance but we are in s posio tion to seek for it and are-trying to find it. If the reccae mendations of the committee are sccepted, we will have adopted an extreme which is a retrogressicn,~ - §, In addition, placement of this activity unde? the Office of the Secretary of Defense rather than the Jeint Chiefs will egaravate the danger from strong centralized cone- trol, It will raise the level ef centralized control toe where it cannot be aodified without great effort. Evelution and any hope of achieving proper balance will be retarded. AD aiid Ifa
under the Joint Chiefs would net only serve €. The preeent cituation in which COMINT is guided rather than centrolled and in which a11 interested parties participate in that guidance is, I believe, evidence sf good evolution ee far, Thies eituation was developed under the Joint.Chieis end illustrates thet the experience ef the Joint . Chiefs of Staff in these satters ff bread. Keeping CCHINT Cone trol over something that ida vital to military succeesg would tikely keep the sctivity in an ataesphere ef proper evolution, 7. I believa the Assistant Giief of Staff, G2, has mors detailed objections to this report. The Director of Naval Intelligence advocates & compromise proposal that the COMINT organization be set up ag a Sunified command® under the Jent efs, to follow the established practices for unified commands, 8, Since the Secretary of Defense indicates his. general acceptance already of the committee recommendations, it may be thet the proposal of the Director of Naval Intelligence is the best possible salvage epsratien, YY believe, however, that the basic requirement is te oppose the principle ef strong centralized control, We may seem inconsistent in this because we tend to centralize COMINT activities in the Air Ferce Security Service, causes others to beileve that we are against centralised contzol sy but eager to adopt pom curselves on down. In angwez to 4s, I would say that there are certain featuree and areas in COMINT that should be centralized; to what degree we do not yet know. No doubt one may be overcentralized in AFSS. I am firmly con= vinced of enly one thing which 48 that strong centralized control will be a grave misteke wiich we will have to recover from after lesing a great amount of time, energy, and diversified COMINT suczecs, ; 9, If it appears impossible far the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take a strong stand sgeinst eny strong centrél con= trol over COMINT, I suggest that the Navy proposal of 2 . *unified cammand* under the Joint Chiefs be supported, / | ¢ O~ / JGR A. SAMFORD Major General, USAF Director of Intelligence | TOP SECRET 47!