economic ties, Argentina has also offered Mex- 
ico special credits for the purchase of goods. 
However, President Perén’s efforts to win 
the support of Mexican labor leaders in any 
“third position” labor bloc have been fruitless. 
President Aleman has not shown any willing- 
ness to support such a move. 
In addition 
Perén himself is now shifting in his emphasis 
of the “third position” from the foreign to the 
Argentina has spent considerable sums of 
money in Mexico for propaganda purposes and 
has made strong efforts to align Mexico in a 
“Latin American” bloc. with political and eco- 
n 
afteray 
vital 
> land 
under 
of thea 
ional 
Asé 
ma 
* 
Vex 
nomic ties strong enough to resist US domi- 
‘tterd 
nation. 
Mexico, ever sensitive to appeals for 
cultural unity, has not openly repudiated these 
advances, but has. adroitly directed them to- 
ward the “Pan. American” and “continental 
solidarity” ideal. 
_ It is not believed that Mex- 
ico would accept any proposal that might con- 
flict with the Hemisphere solidarity and de- 
fense program. 
; 
note” 
laim 
| 
ince 
> 
> 
Jov- 
Mexico has never maintained diplomatic re- 
da 
lations with the Franco regime, although com- 
mercial and cultural relations have not been 
altogether severed. 
Shipping and commer- 
Clal air travel are receiving increased impetus 
| 
every day as is private business. 
Widespread 
thei 
trade between Spain and Mexico, however, will 
1er 
Probably not take place because Spain, lack- 
ing dollars, would prefer an exchange of goods 
and there is not a large enough demand in 
Mexico for the goods that Spain could supply. 
Cultural relations have been maintained 
primarily through the efforts of Mexican ad- 
mirers of Spanish culture as well as of sym- 
Peoples of Hispanic culture—has existed for 
many years in Mexico as in other Latin Amer- 
‘can 
countries. 
The: Franco 
Government, 
however, has capitalized on this ethnic affinity 
x 
1 se, 
‘0 Promote certain political and religious char- 
jin 
of its Latin American policy.. Dur- 
7" 
8 World War II, Franco carefully supervised 
= Promotion of a fascist political program for 
‘ispanic countries.through the Consejo de 
he 
Pathizers for Franco’s ideology. 
The cultural « 
ys 
concept of Hispanidad—the ties of blood, lan- 
rk § 
suage, and religion which bind together all 
Hispanidad, an official government depart- 
ment. 
The defeat of the fascist powers and 
- 
the inability to continue financing the pro- 
gram resulted in a change of tactics. 
The 
Consejo de Hispanidad was immediately sup- 
planted by the Instituto de Cultura Hispdnica. 
This organization fosters a program of cul- 
tural exchange, but, under the cloak of cul- 
tural activity, still maintains very much the 
same political program that was directed dur- 
ing the war by the Consejo de Hispanidad. 
Certain Catholic political elements in Mexico 
such as the PAN (Partido de Accién Nacional) 
and the UNS (Unidn Nacional Sinarquista) 
lend themselves willingly and are able to carry 
out the Institute’s program locally through a 
branch established in Mexico during the visit 
of the director of the Spanish Institute. 
The 
success of previous Falange activity in Mexico 
as well as the close connection between the 
UNS and the Falange are evidenced by the 
trip to Spain in 1948 of a former UNS National 
Chief for the purpose of studying Falange tac- 
‘| Mexicans who uphold the present official 
- position on the matter of recognition view with 
alarm every evidence of acceptance by any 
sector of the Mexican population of this Span- 
ish program. 
Consequently, the Mexican For- 
eign Office has often and pointedly reiterated 
its policy of non-recognition of Franco Spain 
and has opposed inclusion of Spain in the 
United Nations, ECA, or the North Atlantic 
Pact. On the other hand, the Mexican Gov- 
ernment does not frown on cultural or private 
business relations with Spain. 
Moreover, the 
concept of Hispanidad, in its purely cultural 
aspects, continues to bring Spain and Mexico 
together. 
Mexico accorded early recognition to the 
Spanish Government-in-exile and permitted 
the establishment of its official headquarters 
in Mexican territory. 
It also served as a 
haven for countless Republican refugees. 
Al- 
though Mexico has officially and unofficially 
favored this government, the Communistic or- 
ientation of many Spanish Republicans has 
dampened Mexican ardor especially now that 
the Mexican Government has shown a tend- 
ency to move to the right. This does not 
TRUMANS 
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mean, however, a reversal of Mexican policy 
"
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- 
on Spain; Mexico still favors the overthrow of 
the Franco regime. 
d. The USSR and Satellite Nations. 
Coincident with the promulgation of the 
Mexican Constitution of 1917, seeking to im- 
plement the aims and purposes of the Mex- 
ican Revolution, was the Russian Revolution, 
supposedly aimed at combatting the same po- 
litical and economic ills. 
Although relations 
were never particularly close or cordial, the 
two revolutionary governments maintained 
diplomatic relations until 1930 when Mexico 
outlawed the Communist Party and broke re- 
lations with the Soviet Union. 
These were not 
renewed 
until 
1942. 
Diplomatic 
relations 
with Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia 
have been continued even since these coun- 
tries have moved into the Soviet orbit of in- 
fluence. 
No diplomatic relations exist with Hungary, 
Rumania, or Bulgaria arid, as far as is known, 
no action is anticipated in that direction. 
In 
1948 Poland requested official authorization 
from the Mexican Government to represent 
Hungarian interests. 
Although it did express 
a willingness to recognize the good offices of 
the Polish Legation or any other mission in 
case any question should arise, the Mexican 
Foreign Office refused the request. 
Except for a recent expansion in military 
representation, the staff of the USSR Embassy 
in Mexico has been reduced since the death 
of Ambassador Constantin Oumansky in 1945. 
The embassy staff is withdrawing more and 
more from social functions, while the satellite 
legations are becoming increasingly active as 
instruments for propagnda and subversive ac- 
tivities. 
Both the Yugoslav and Polish Lega- 
tions have published bulletins patterned after 
the USSR Embassy organ and have been 
- Closely associated with the leftist Partido 
Popular and with delegates to Communist or 
Communist-front conferences and meetings. 
Outstanding for its activity is the Polish Lega- 
tion, headed by Jan Drohojowsky. 
Since he 
is accredited to other countries in Latin Amer- 
ica, extensive travel in that area as well as 
promotion of cultural exchange with Europe 
have served in establishing international con- 
tacts. Entertainments and cultural functions 
are conducted on a wide scale and have served 
AW 
to reach artistic and literary sectors of 
Mexigf 
can society as well as political 
and press lead@ 
Political propaganda is maintained by alg 
Communist diplomatic personnel under 
th@ 
guise of cultural and informational activity 
The main media are the various cultural 
insti 
tutes and information bulletins. 
Importangg 
also in the dissemination of printed props 
ganda are the outlets used by the 
Communis§ 
Party, by writers, and by front organizations 
For other propaganda purposes, Vicente 
Lom 
bardo Toledano has served as an excellent lig 
aison with labor and political groups, through 
his personal influence, control of groups and 
publications, and the Workers’ University# 
Close liaison is also maintained with foreigra 
Communist Parties and organizations. 
Not 
only is the activity limited to contact with esa§ 
tablished groups, but Communist diplomaticg 
representatives have also been instrumental™ 
in forming new groups. 
An example of 
is the Federacién Eslava (Slav Federation) 
Its creation was supervised directly by the § 
viet Embassy largely through Gita Sten, then 
in charge of cultural affairs for the Polish 
Le 
gation. 
Similarly, the Polish-Mexican Cul 
tural Institute was organized through the ef: 
forts of Beata Badad, also of the Polish 
Legs 
tion. 
A minimum of immigration barriers as \ 
as the existence of traditional cultural coal 
have normally made for cordial if not close 
ir 
ternational relations between 
the Central 
American nations and Mexico. 
Mexico hasm 
traditionally served as a haven for Central 
American political exiles. In keeping with the 
policy of asylum, Mexican hospitality has been 
accorded the late President Argiiello of Nicaraq 
agua, former President Arnulfo Arias of Pam 
nama, and former President and Vice Presi 
dent of Costa Rica, Teodoro and René Picado.«% 
In the past few years, however, Mexico has 
taken a strong stand against dictatorships 
tom 
the extent of«aiding revolutionary activity 
against these governments not through officiala® 
action but, and just as effectively, by failinga 
to prevent such activity within its borders#™ 
This activity ranges from arms smuggling tc 
the support of political groups such as 
ai. 
Union 
tral A 
activel 
Centré 
Rela 
suffere 
Mexicc 
meetin 
Territc 
ment a 
with G 
ish Ho. 
ence. 
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ation 
Hemist{ 
that it 
Belize 
change 
the cor 
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the Bos 
temala 
detenti 
destine: 
tionary 
Notw 
Mexico’ 
whole 
ficial. 
f. Gr 
Mexic 
followin 
erties bj 
at the k 
countrie 
progran 
have 
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tions ha 
a barter 
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Mexic 
threat ir 
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incident 
Britain, 
laration 
against 
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— 
Union Democrdtica Centro-Americana (Cen- 
tral American: Democratic Union), which is 
actively engaged in fomenting the idea of a 
Central American Confederation 
Relations: with Guatemala~-have recently 
suffered as a. result of the position taken by 
Mexico in the Belize question at the Havana 
meeting of: the’ Commission on Dependent 
Territories in 1948. 
The Guatemalan Govern- 
ment asked Mexico’s support in its controversy 
with Great Britain over the ownership of Brit- 
ish Honduras just before the Havana Confer- 
ence. 
Immediately 
preceding 
the Confer- 
ence, Mexico stated that it favored the liquid- 
ation of the colonial system in the Western 
Hemisphere by peaceful means. 
It also stated 
that it would reassert its claim to part of the 
Belize territory when and if any transfer or 
change in sovereignty should take place. 
At 
the conference Mexico. reiterated its position 
and stressed the limitations:on the commis- 
sion’s powers deriving fromr Resolution 32 of 
the Bogota Conference. 
Relations with Gua- 
temala have also been strained following the 
cetention in Yucatan of Guatemalan planes 
destined to take part in the attempted revolu- 
uonary invasion of the Dominican Republic. 
Notwithstanding these particular incidents, 
Mexico’s relations with Central America as a 
whole have been friendly and mutually bene- 
Scial. 
Fr,‘ 
f. Grdat Britain. 
_ Mexigan-British 
relations were severed 
‘Ollowing the expropriation of foreign oil prop- 
*rties 
by Mexico in 1938. 
These were renewed 
at the beginning of World War II when both 
‘ountries were committed to the same war 
program. 
Since then diplomatic relations 
have been cordial, and commercial 
rela- 
: 
have improved. 
Recent negotiations of 
hase agreement can be expected to result 
ereater commercial activity between the 
countries. 
Mexican-British relations faced a potential 
t in 1948 when Mexico supported Guate- 
in the controversy described above in-- 
8 ownership of British Honduras. 
The - 
Tather than impairing relations with. 
that no Mexican-Guatemalan action 
Great Britain was contemplated in. determining factor in its stand at these con- 
:\', 
» Save rise to an official Mexican dec- © 
view of the friendly relations existing between 
Mexico and Britain. 
- Since the time.of Maximilian, Mexico has 
not maintained formal diplomatic relations 
with the Vatican. 
According to latest infor- 
mation, Mexico is the only Latin American 
country which does not have such relations. 
The Constitution of 1857 contained provisions 
apparently objectionable to the Vatican, pro- 
visions which, however, were not rigidly en- 
forced until after the revolution of 1910. 
3. 
Participation in International Affairs. 
Mexico’s advocacy of Hemisphere policy on 
political, economic, and military matters based 
on international agreement, 
is well estab- 
lished. 
The unilateral interpretation of the 
. Monroe Doctrine, long held by the United 
States, had continuously given rise to sus- 
picion and anti-US sentiments in Latin Amer- 
ica. 
The gradual supplanting of this inter- 
pretation of the Doctrine by a Hemisphere 
solidarity and cooperation program agreed to, 
and carried out by, all the American States, 
has alleviated Latin American tension and 
made possible the attainment of a complex 
but workable framework of inter-American 
relations wherein all issues may be settled 
jointly. 
— 
~* Of importance in the development of the 
Inter-American System have been the use of 
arbitration and conciliation in the settlement 
of international disputes, the formulation of 
codes of public and private international law, 
the establishment of the policy of non-inter- 
vention, and the commitment by all to a pro- 
gram of continental solidarity in the face of 
outside pressures or aggressions. 
In the dis- 
cussion of these issues and the formulation 
of policy, Mexico has been consistently and 
strongly in support of these measures and has 
done much toward 
their incorporation 
in 
agreements, contentions, and pacts. 
In fact, 
the development of its own foreign policy has 
been largely determined by progress along 
these lines in the various inter-American con- 
ferences. 
The guarantee of sovereignty and 
security to each American nation has been of 
primary concern to Mexico and has been a 
x 
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ferences. 
Foremost among the contemporary 
Mexican spokesmen in Hemisphere matters is 
Ezequiel Padilla, former Foreign Minister who, 
by his brilliant championing of the cause of 
Hemisphere unity, contributed in great meas- 
ure to the success of the Mortis. of Foreign 
Ministers 
in 
1942.00 
In addition to its position of consequence in 
Latin America, Mexico has made rapid prog- 
ress in playing a significant role in world af- 
fairs. 
Basically, its active participation is 
rooted in the belief that only with a strong 
international body such as the United Nations 
can the small nation survive. 
Consequently, 
Mexico has been a strong supporter of the UN 
since its beginning and the contribution of 
its representative, Ezequiel Padilla, to the in- 
itial meeting held in San Francisco was of a 
high order. 
gs, 
Mexico tends to promote in the interna- 
tional field the same liberal program it has 
sought to carry out domestically. 
Through 
the Revolution of 1910 it sought to eradicate 
oppression and ignorance. 
Similarly, in the 
bodies. 
. 
oO 
The Office of Naval Intelligence dissents in certain aspects of the treatment of Mexican foreign aff: 
in Chapter IV. 
It is felt that too great an emphasis has been placed on official declarations of policy, whic 
are sometimes at variance with practice.’ It is believed that further analysis of underlying Mexican feel: 
ings and motives would lend perspective for the evaluation of Mexico’ s aeigeen future foreign seat 
_ 
ry 
conduct of international affairs, it suppo 
those organizations and programs which prc 
mote: universal 
freedom, 
maintenance 
o 
peace, and the advancement of educatio 
scientific, and cultural progress. 
The ou 
standing Mexican figure in the United Nag 
tions today is Dr. Jaime Torres Bodet, forme 
Minister of Education and of Foreign Affa 
now Director General of UNESCO. 
Mexice 
is also represented in the Trusteeship Councilf 
ECOSOC, and in the International Court a 
Justice. 
It has held office in ECLA and 
im 
other subcommittees and has on several oc@ 
casions played host to mternationel gather 
ings. 
The Mexican position in internethendl issues 
is basically similar 
to that of the United States i 
In the United Nations and in inter-Americz 
organizations, Mexican disagreement with the 
United States is, for the most part, on matterg§ 
of operational procedure rather than on pol@ 
icy. 
There is every reason to believe that 
Mexico would support any US proposal deg 
signed 
to strengthen 
these 
international 
> 
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at 
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1. 
Genesis 
Mexico’s 
1) 
given little oI 
fairs, nor to 0} 
has, instead, 
ward 
the m 
Until World \ 
against foreis 
pendence aga 
of 1836, the Vv 
the French i 
conducted on 
for the purpo 
mal 
order 
a 
periodic 
revc 
and threats a 
contributed t 
forces as basi 
Mexico would 
territory, it hi: 
sity to prepa 
cause of its i 
power to pro 
largely becar 
tions. 
The 
independence 
to power fron 
lution) and r 
Supported a 
the army to 
1884 until 1: 
used by a ser 
to effect pol 
army has bet 
tration, and 
Various top a 
cal position 2 
The policy 
(1946—-) 
and incompe 
to constitute 
sional milita 
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MILITARY SITUATION 
tary policy of recent origin is that of coopera- 
tion with the US in Hemisphere defense plans. 
Successful implementation of these policies 
would probably not affect the basic role of the 
army in maintenance of internal security. 
1. Genesis of Present Military Policies. 
Mexico’s 
traditional 
military 
policy has 
given little or no consideration to foreign af- 
fairs, nor to offensive or defensive warfare, but 
has, instead, directed attention mainly to- 
ward 
the maintenance 
of internal 
order. 
Until World War II, Mexico’s “armed conflicts 
2. 
War Potential. 
a. Manpower. 
| 
against foreign countries (the Wars of Inde- 
fee 
pendence against Spain, the Texas Revolution 
Mexico, with a population of over 25,000,000 
ang 
has 
5,900,000 
males of mili 
f whom 
|e si of 1836, the war with the US in 1846-48, and 2 
9,900,000 
males of military age, of who 
¥ o 
the French intervention in the 1860’s) were 
4,747,400 are presumed fit for service. 
It is 
ay ' conducted on Mexican soil and were primarily 
 °Stimated that Mexico has a potential mobi- 
res 
for the purpose of securing or restoring inter- 
lization capacity not in excess of 2 to 2% mil- 
: - 
nal order 
and national 
sovereignty. 
The 
lion. 
Because of poor communications, wide- 
ceriodic revolutions, 
internal disturbances, 
 SPTead undernourishment, and other factors, 
“il 
and threats against the regime in power have 
however, it is believed that of the total man- 
‘M™ 
contributed to the development of the armed 
Power potential, not more than 100,000 could 
ifm 
‘orces as basically police agencies. 
Although 
 ¢ put in the fleld and maintained by Mexico 
| 
MJ. Mexico would be quick to defend its national 
one. With extensive US logistical aid, a 
territory, it has not developed a sense of neces- 
force of 500,000 men might be maintained in 
f sity to prepare for such an eventuality be- 
“he fleld for protracted periods. 
i 
ae 
Since the conscription program began in 
Cause of its implicit reliance on US military 
1942, there should now be seven classes of 
power to protect it from aggression. 
s, 
Military power has developed in Mexico 
‘argely because of basic political considera- 
“ons. 
The caudillos between the period of 
ndence and the era of Porfirio Diaz rose 
‘© power from the cuartelazos (barracks revo- 
lution) and remained in power until the army 
"pported a new leader. 
Porfirio Diaz used 
ve army to maintain his dictatorship from 
4 until 1910. 
After 1910, the army was 
about 12,000 each in the so-called First Re- 
serve of the Army; but not more than 60,000 
at best would be immediately available. 
The Mexican Army has had an. average 
strength of approximately 50,000 volunteers 
plus 11,000 or 12,000 conscripts annually from 
1943 to January 1949. 
At that time the con- 
scription system was revised to provide a 
basis for more complete mobilization of man- 
by a series of leaders and revolutionaries 
effect political change. Since 1930, the 
— has been used to support the adminis- 
tion, and in return for their support the 
os us top army officers have received politi- 
Policy of the Aleman administration 
i ene o has been to eliminate inefficient 
000 are participating in the program at pres- 
i. Competent officers from the army and__ 
ent. 
. They are not quartered or fed, are mea- 
it. into-a non-political, profes- .° gerly equipped, and receive only an introduc- 
military organization. ;"Another mili- 
tion to military training.. This Sunday train- 
power with a resultant decrease in regular 
army strength. 
Under the present system, no 
conscripts are inducted into the regular army, 
but instead the eligible 18-year-olds are re- 
. quired to report to reserve units organized 
’ 
near their homes for one year of training for 
four hours each Sunday. 
Approximately 80,- 
TS SECRETARY” FILE 
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tear 
ing is devoted to marching and drill, personal 
hygiene, and literacy classes. 
The strength 
of the regular army is maintained at approxi- 
mately 48,000, third largest in Latin America 
(Brazil and Argentina are first and second). 
Navy strength averages 4,000 officers and men, 
and air force strength averages 3,000 officers 
and men. The untrained portidn of the total 
mobilization. 
pool would be of little. military 
value. 
Likewise, a great portion of *the con- 
scripts would be of little immediate military 
value, since only a small portion of time and 
effort is devoted to tactical and other profes- 
sional training. 
b. Natural Resources. 
III, Section 2 b, pp. 26-33.) 
The Mexican munitions industry malles en- 
tirely on domestic raw materials with the ex- 
ception of sulphur and special steel from the 
US, nitrates from Chile, and copper from a 
US plant which refines Mexican ore. 
Further- 
more, Mexican mineral resources could sus- 
tain a substantial military industry. 
Limit- 
ing factors would be the lack of coal and elec- 
tric power (mow in the process of develop- 
ment), capital, wained manpower, and trans- 
Mexico is samaeietn self-sufficient in major 
food items with the exception of wheat, dairy 
products, and lard; also in cotton textiles, 
clothing and shoes, but it must aeaeee wool 
and rayon fibers... 
Most Mexican mines are relatively ivulner- 
able to ground, sea, or air attack, being in 
scattered locations in the interior mountain- 
ous regions. 
_The petroleum fields and refiner- 
ies are fairly vulnerable, the more important 
ones being located along the eastern seacoast. 
Both mining and petroleum are vulnerable 
to sabotage by enemy agents or native ele- 
unions. 
C, 
2 C, pp. 33-36.) 
| 
The production of light : 
arms and pascal 
tion, already adequate for the needs of the 
army, is currently being expanded. 
Produc- 
tion goal for rifles has been set at 30,000 per 
year by the Department of Military Industry. 
(See also Chapter I, Section 
_A survey conducted by a US arms manufac- 
turer at the request of the Mexican govern- 
(See: also ‘Chapter 
‘research. 
There are no private institution 
can students of science go abroad for study 
for example, the three outstanding Mexicaly 
ment indicates that an outlay of $200,000 fom 
drilling, broading and rifling machinery ang 
improvements in production techniques woulg 
raise rifle production capacity well over 30,00@ 
per year, the present production goal. 
The 
are only a few Mexican manufacturing indusg 
tries capable of converting to the productiomgg 
of military articles, and these only for the prag 
duction of minor items of equipment, althougy 
it is possible that the automobile assemb 
plants in the country could convert to the « 
sembly of military vehicles and aircraft. 
Mexico has sufficient textile-manufact 
and food-processing plants to supply its ow 
needs; and, in fact, most army clothing am 
food are domestically produced. 
Specialize 
engineering and signal equipment, fire-contre¢ 
equipment, artillery, vehicles, naval vesse 
aircraft and parts are now and probably wil 
continue to be imported. 
The concentration of military industry 
the vicinity of Mexico City would make tk 
area particularly vulnerable to airattack. 
In 
dustry is probably most vulnerable to sabotag¢ 
by foreign or native elements, although sucky 
acts are more likely to be aimed at crippling 
production of petroleum, minerals and metz 
which are important to the US military 
dustry, than at Mexican 
dustry. 
— 
d.. Science. . 
Mexico’s capabilities in the field of 
tific warfare are extremely limited. 
There am 
only two institutions of higher education offem™ 
ing advanced courses in some phase of science 
the National University of Mexico and thi 
Polytechnic Institute near Mexico City; hova™ 
ever, limitations in library and laboratory faa 
cilities preclude their utilization for origing 
conducting research in electronics, physica 
biological, or chemical warfare; and the Me 
ican Government has done little financially 
or otherwise to advance science. 
Most Mexia 
personalities engaged in nuclear physics rq 
search, Manuel Sandoval Vallarta, 
Nabor Calm 
rillo Flores, and Carlos Graef Fernandez, ai 
studied in the US.. Any Mexican scientifigg 
equipment will probably come from the Um 
or other ma) 
known to ha 
states, but s 
be of great i 
no attempts 
e. Finance 
Mexico’s fe 
1948 and 19: 
for military € 
Military Budg: 
Expenditures 
Army 
‘Conversion 
*Included in 
* Military inc 
available.) 
In view of 
lean Army, 
propriations 
. 
ever, the Me> 
would not p: 
tary expendi’ 
commitment 
that any av: 
channelled i) 
increasing tr 
tional securi 
power or sub 
mace in conr 
Cefense shou 
expenditures 
longed war 
economy nor 
outside. 
3. Basic Mil 
a. Mission 
In line 
wi 
ES) SECRETARY: 
= 
Navy 
Air 
Other 
| 
the Mexican 
. 
% 
wh.
Military Policies and Practices. 
the 
or other major industrial hations. 
Mexico is 
known to have deposits of uranium in several 
states, but.such deposits are not ibelieved to 
be of great. importance, and there have been 
no attempts at exploitation. 
e. Finance. 
Mexico’s federal budget of expenditures for 
1948 and 1949 made the following provision 
for military expenditures: 
) 
© 
‘Conversion rate: 1949: at 7.00 pesos=$1. 
1948: 
‘Included in army. 
‘Military industry. 
available.) 
» 
_ In view of the political influence of the Mex- 
‘can Army, it is not believed that army ap- 
Propriations will be severely curtailed. 
How- 
ever, the Mexican economic situation probably 
*ould not permit any great increase in mili- 
‘ary expenditures. 
Mexico has sufficient debt 
‘commitments and plans for industrialization 
‘Rat any available funds would probably be 
channelled in such directions rather than for 
“creasing the military force unless either na- 
ticnal security were threatened by a foreign 
power or subversive elements, or commitments 
mace in connection with plans for Hemisphere 
Sefense should necessitate increased military 
*xpenditures. 
Mexico could not wage a pro- 
sed war without disrupting the national 
*ronomy nor without financial assistance from 
OUtside. 
| 
In line with: the development of Mexican 
iw 
»4 
Fiscal Year Beginning 1 January 1949 
(Some military education may be included under Ministry of Education. 
Figures not 
% 
'Y Policies, discussed in Section 1 above, . 
€xican armed forces: may: be considered 
to have the following primary mission: 
(1) 
maintenance of internal order; (2) defense of 
national territories and waters against aggres- 
sion or encroachment by foreign powers; (3) 
cooperation with the American states in plans 
for Hemisphere defense. 
The military forces’ 
secondary mission is deemed to be: (1) the in- 
crease of literacy in rural and backward areas; 
(2) implementation of specified government 
Fiscal Year Beginning 1 January 1948 
Military Budget 
Millions 
of Equivalentin 
%of Govt. 
Pesos 
Equivalent in 
% of Govt. 
Expenditures 
Pesos 
USDollars* 
Expenditure 
Millions of 
US Dollars 
Expenditure 
Army 
262.0 
37.4 
10.3 
240.0 
42.1 
10.4 
Navy 
693 
=» 
9.9 
2.7 
70.5 
12.4 
3.1 
Air? 
| 
Other * 
18.2 
2.6 
0.7 
173 
3.0 
0.8 
349.5 
49.9 
13.7 
327.8 
57.5 
1420 
7 mo. at 4.86 pesos per dollar 
5 mo. at 6.88 pesos per dollar 
or 5.70 average. 
projects, such as the foot-and-mouth disease 
campaign and certain public works projects. 
b. Political Activities. 
The role of the army as a political pressure 
group antedates the Revolution of 1910 by a 
full century, during which time the leaders 
of the country were made or broken by mili- 
tary power. 
The ascendency of the army to 
genuine political consciousness, as opposed to 
the plots and intrigues of leaders during the 
nineteenth century, came with the Revolution 
of 1910, when the revolutionary army liberated 
the Mexican people from the dictator Diaz, 
and has considered that its duty since that 
time has been the implementation of revolu- 
tionary policies and ideals. 
President Ale- 
man, elected in 1946, is the first President of 
Mexico since 1910 who was not an active par- 
ticipant in the Revolution. The military has 
also been in control of some cabinet posts and 
other administrative positions in government, 
as well as of numerous seats in both houses of 
* 
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Congress, until the: present administration...
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E PRESIDER 
It is not believed that the army is calaie 
satisfied with the minor political role to which 
it has been relegated by the Aleman adminis- 
tration, and that it will engage in considerable 
political: maneuvering before ‘the election of 
1952 within and outside the PRI ip order to 
recoup its political losses. 
_ 
| 
c. General Military Organization. 
The President of Mexico is Commander in 
Chief of the armed forces. 
He exercises con- 
trol through the Secretary of National Defense 
and the Secretary of Navy (controlling the 
navy and merchant marine); both of whom 
are cabinet officers. 
The President in his 
capacity as Commander in Chief is assisted 
by a small body of officers known as the Estado 
Mayor Presidencial or Presidential General 
Staff. 
The Secretary of National Defense, a 
military man, commands the Army and Air 
Force directly with the assistance of a Gen- 
eral Staff, while the Secretary of Navy exer- 
cises control through a Director General. 
Since 1 January 1941 separate departments 
have been established, in which a Secretary of 
National Defense controls the army and air 
force, and a Secretary of the Navy controls 
the navy and merchant marine. 
As a result 
of the greater military responsibilities thrust 
upon the President during the war emergency, 
a Presidential General Staff was created on 
12 January 1942. 
In January 1943 the func- 
tions of the Estado Mayor General were greatly 
broadened, and the staff itself was reorganized 
and expanded. 
It thus became the General 
Staff of the Army, replacing almost Samet 
the old Direccién Técnica. 
Conscription has been in effect since by oh 
1943 under provision of the Military Service 
Law of 1942. 
The law makes one year of 
military service obligatory for all males who 
are physically fit, but it is not universally 
ony 
applied. 
Mexico from 1942 to January 1949 
. 
had annual conscription of between 11,000 and 
12,000 of the 250,000 men who reach military 
age annually. In January 1949 the conscrip- 
~ 
tion system was revised and those eligible are 
placed in reserve units and required to receive 
four hours: of military instruction each Sun- 
day for 50 Sundays.» Approximately 80,000 
of the class of 
are 
in- _ ceptive to instruction, his mechanical 
:é 
struction and approximately 60,000 were 
ing 
volved in 1949. 
| 
The law provides that, following training’ 
conscripts will form part of the First Reserveg 
until age 30, the Second Reserve until age 46 
and the National Guard until age 45. —_ 
ally the law has never been implemented, s 
that there is a very loosely organized reservé 
of some 75,000 officers and men but no ade 
quate system of refresher and reserve traing 
ing. The navy and air force consist entirely 
of volunteers who enlist for three-year terms@ 
The navy has no organized reserve of eithem 
officers or enlisted personnel. 
A reserve-offt™ 
cer pool of about 435 is provided by the mers 
chant marine. 
There is an air force reserva™ 
of approximately 75 pilots, most of whom ¢ 
employed on flying duty with commercial ¢ 
lines. 
e. Armed Forces Personnel. 
Until the reorganization of the Mexica % 
Army in 1920, officer personnel had little form 
mal education or technical professional traingg 
ing. 
Officers generally were products of 
tha 
revolution, most of them stemming fronm 
lower-class rural families and having riser 
to command purely through their rough bug 
effective qualities of leadership. 
In receng 
years, however, considerable improvement ha} 
been brought about by the re-establishmengy 
of schools and training centers and the setting 
of higher standards of professional attaing 
ment. Thus, there now exists a marked differam 
ence in degree of professional military spirig 
between the younger officers and the “ola@@ 
revolutionary generals.” 
The younger 
offi 
cers, on the whole, are alert, intelligent, wel 
trained, and favor a highly trained modermg 
army, free of political intrigues. 
The oldé 
revolutionary officers, although usually giving 
lip service to non-political military attitudes 
are nevertheless very active in politics ang 
favor.strong military influence in the gover 
ment and country. 
The enlisted men of the regular army § 
generally recruited from the lowest and ieass 
privileged classes of the country, except 
; 
the relatively few men of somewhat 
families inducted under obligatory militz 
service. Although the Mexican soldier 
technical a} 
deficiencies 
several red 
not always 
American 
and a patr 
stubborn fi; 
Their abilit 
physical dis 
on inadequi 
ably not st 
country. 
T 
field service 
troops 
are 
makes then 
and mount. 
thorough co 
deficiencies 
dier is impe 
plan govern 
seas operati 
Among th 
ican Navy | 
most of thei 
to service a 
vessels with 
whole, Mex 
better-than- 
life, many 
a rule, they 
a sincere ad 
Naval enlists 
erally of a 
factory work 
training is | 
tools given t 
their offic 
A large nu 
and mechan 
and would | 
cOmparison ° 
and mechar 
Personnel in 
intelligent, < 
age families. 
f. Trainin, 
Army trair 
the followin; 
tion of the in 
of discipline; 
government; 
> 
>t 
CCRETARY
+ 
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™ 
technical aptitudes arelow. 
Aside fromthese 
and (5) proper military education of officer 
| 
deficiencies, Mexican soldiers are possessed of 
personnel. 
Pre-induction 
training 
is con- 
| 
inf 
: 
several redeeming virtues of military value 
ducted in the secondary schools under admin- 
not always found among the other Latin 
istration of the Secretary of Education. 
All 
American .troops. Givén?proper leadership 
cavalry, infantry, and artillery units maintain 
and a patriotic cause, fhey 
are 
fearless and 
troop schools for illiterates as well as unit 
= 
/ 
stubborn fighters capable of 
staunch loyalty. 
schools for normal military training. 
The 
! 
Their ability to endure great hardships and 
Escuela Superior de Guerra is a combined 
physical discomfort over long periods of time 
Command and General Staff School and Army 
os 
: 
on inadequate rations is proverbial and prob- 
War College, offering a three-year course prep- 
mm 
mm. 
ably not surpassed by troops of any other 
 aratory for service in the General Staff Corps. 
. ormsie 
country. 
- These qualities, plus the extensive 
The Colegio Militar, in the Federal District, is 
: 
field service in rough terrain which Mexican 
the federally operated academy for prepara- 
= 
troops are constantly obliged to undergo, 
tion of second lieutenants in the Regular 
makes them ideally suited for rugged jungle 
Army. 
Military schools of communications, 
: 
and mountain warfare. 
It is believed that 
administration, male nurses, and medicine 
> 
| 
thorough consideration of these psychological 
offer specialized training. 
There is no pro- 
| 
ota 
deficiencies and strengths of the Mexican sol- 
_—vision for training the reserve component, al- 
dier is imperative in the formulation of any 
though conscripts are kept in reserve status 
plan governing Mexico’s participation in over- 
after their period of active duty. 
seas operations in a possible future war. 
Until recently, the Mexican Navy main- 
Among the high ranking officers of the Mex- _ tained two naval academies, one at Veracruz 
ican Navy there is not much naval ability, 
and the other at Mazatlan. 
In 1948 these 
most of their experience having been confined _ schools were consolidated into one academy at 
to service aboard small naval and merchant 
Veracruz in order to maintain command unity 
vessels with antiquated equipment. 
On the 
and uniformity of instruction. 
A new cam- 
whole, Mexican naval officers represent @ 
pus for the consolidated naval academy is now 
better-than-average cross-section of Mexican 
under construction at Point Antén Lizardo, 
life, many coming from the best families. 
As 
near Veracruz. 
Cadets 
follow 
a five-year 
a rule, they are industrious, loyal, and have 
course at the naval school. 
Upon completion 
a sincere admiration for the US Navy. 
Most 
of this training, the midshipmen are commis- 
naval enlisted personnel are young and gen-__ 
sioned as ensigns. 
A special course for ma- 
erally of a good type, coming from families of 
rine corps officers was inaugurated at the 
factory workers and artisans. 
Their state of 
naval academy in 1943. 
The former naval 
training is poor, but they do well with the 
academy at Mazatlan is now the seamanship, 
tools given them and are believed to be loyal 
radio communications, and naval yard school 
to their officers... 
for enlisted personnel. 
The Fernando Siliceo 
A large number of Mexican Air Force pilots 
merchant‘ marine academy is located in Vera- 
and mechanics have been trained in the US’ 
cruz. 
The three-year course of study followed 
and would be rated “good” in efficiency in’ 
is the same as that in the naval school with 
comparison with other Latin American pilots 
the exception of courses in military subjects. 
| 
and mechanics. 
Both officers and enlisted 
Pp 
. 
personnel in the Mexican Air Force are young, 
ersonnel of the Mexican Air 
Force are 
— 
ane 
« trained under an adequate school system com- 
intelligent, and come from. better-than-aver- 
age families, 
z 
‘posed of the military aviation school for pilots, 
the military aviation mechanics school, and 
f. Training... 
Ty 
te, 
the military training’ center for transitional 
Army pecatoipay %e. 
now being aw 
toward _ training of pilots prior to their assignment to 
the following objectives: (1) general educa- 
Operational units. 
Very limited training is 
tion of the individual soldier; (2) development 
conducted in the naval aviation school in 
of discipline; (3) inculcation of loyalty tothe 
| Mexico City. No definite concept of aerial 
‘of instruction, 
warfare has been evolved, training is generally 
4g 
“ 
at 
‘ 
| 
| 
| 
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| 
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the 
rom 
isen 
but 
| 
ent 
| 
has 
ling 
; 
ain- 
| 
tter 
ary 
Te-+ 
ind 4
_ able US influence. 
The Mexican Navy has 
materiel and one warehouse for military clot® 
of a basic nature, and 
are 
experience 
during this varticipations 
Mexico C 
Until World War na but 
g. 
Gasoline 
World War I, the only foreign influence affect- 
The army’s mobilization plan calls for: (1} 
car lots or 
ing Mexican military thinking to any note- 
xnansion of the infantry division to 
wag 
27/24 br! 
worthy degree was that of the French. 
This 
strength, augmented by six tactical Air Forcall 
The arn 
influence paralleled a similar pronounced cul- 
squadrons; and (2) creation of three addi 
in Mexico 
tural leaning on the part of the educated ele- 
tional infantry divisions at war strength. 
Thé 
cilities fol 
ments of the Mexican — toward all 
Organic Law of 1926 provides for four categagyge 
maintenar 
things French. 
gories of reserves that may be called into servaggy 
'@cKs tral 
The French influence waned rapidly after 
ice, but the system of mobilizing has not beemmme 
‘Suffers frc 
_ the debacle of French arms in 1940, and, as 
announced. 
Mobilization of manpower woulgmme 
#4 heavy 
the superiority of American tactics and weap- 
— probably follow the course of voluntary enlista™ 
Army m 
ons became more and more obvious during 
ment 
supplemented 
by conscription. 
hae 
«=Cfair by US 
World War I, US influence 
in military 
Chief of the Naval Staff is charged with drawam 
civilian sta 
thought became increasingly pronounced. 
ing up organizational plans for mobilization 
evacuation 
Mexico has until recently followed a policy 
but there is no indication that such plans ex | no combat 
of not receiving foreign military missions,and 
ist. 
There is also no indication that Mexicgg™m 
visions, \ 
the Joint Mexican-United States Defense Com- 
has any plans for economic and industrial mogg 
personnel t 
mission has been the only agency in which 
 bilization. 
: 
s 
Most of 1 
cepted. 
o’s recent agreemen 
accep 
members of the US Air Force as liaison officers 
tun 
Nay 
alons 
will probably result in a greater influence of 
are their P 
ol 
estimate 
of 
peracid 
: 
ited on the 
US military tactics and doctrine on the Mex- 
repair shop 
jean armed forces. A number of Mexican 
(0 
ede within 
cruz, Vera 
Army and Navy students have been sent to 
d 
to 
ber 
me 
Dases at 
the US for training 
in the past few years. 
ae 
he 
Chamber 
@a® 
yards at V 
puties for approval. 
While theoretic: 
and naval 
Unit training in the Mexican Army islargely 
Congress exercises fiscal control over 
tim 
Guaymas 1 
devoted to physical training toimprove the fit- 
armed forces, in practice it is usually only¥ 
teniens ® 
ness of the individual, with emphasis being 
_rubber-stamp of presidential recommenda 
hades 
placed on obstacle 
courses. 
The physical 
tions. 
force 
training program has led to the near exclus- 
onic lack 
sion of tactical and technical training in 
air force 
smaller units. 
However, training in the In- 
Supplies for the Mexican nails 
are procu = 
and operate 
fantry: Division and ha Motor Mechanized 
by the Directorate of Intendencia on the bas 
Mexico City 
Brigade emphasizes US training and tactical 
of requirements submitted by the othes S 
| 
Rctent and a 
methods insofar as equipment and experience 
ectorates. 
ae 
Of lim 
- 
permit, and they are rated high in small unit 
Requisitions are sent through the appr opr 
tS maint 
training. 
No 
large-scale 
maneuvers 
have 
ate channels to each of the Directorates. 
.4 
The centes 
been held since 1947: however, the larger units 
The army has extremely limited facilitiggge 
©''Y. from \ 
in Mexico City occasionally using combined 
for storage of supplies, with no large generm™ 
with the US 
arms conduct exercises which reflect consider- 
depots and only four arsenals for ordnan@ge “"¢ commer 
never held maneuvers with the exception of 
ingand equipment in MexicoCity. 
The 
resumy 
those in September 1943, which were consid- 
is that items are usually procured only wh@ 
ered very elementary. 
The Mexican AirForce 
they are necessary for immediate use, 
a 
is the only branch of service with any combat 
_—ithere is a general absence of reserve suppl# 
experience in World WarII. 
However,itssub- 
for troop units away from the Federal D 
sequent training has neglected to emphasize 
Medical supplies are stored in limited qus 
and to improve upon the sessons learned and_itities in the Central Military Hospital 
WF 
—— 
| 
the poor sta! 
> 
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} 
Operations.“° 
Vulnerable, & 
i 
bridges, 
tie 
oR, 
se 
+
Mexico City, and other military hospitals 
maintain varying stocks of supplies locally. 
Gasoline and lubricants.are stored in tank- 
car lots only by divisions and the motor-mech- 
The arms factory and the artillery foundry 
in Mexico City maintain adequate repair fa- 
cilities for all classes of arms. 
Automotive 
maintenance is poor, since the Mexican Army 
lacks trained mechanics at every level and 
suffers from a complete absence of medium 
and heavy maintenance units. 
ee 
Army medical treatment is considered only 
fair by US standards, but good by Mexican 
civilian standards. 
The army has no field or 
evacuation hospitals and} so far as is known, 
no combat evacuation plan other than in the 
divisions, which do not have the necessary 
personnel to carry out the plan effectively. 
Most of the navy materiel and supplies are 
obtained from the US, and stocks of spare 
Darts are small. 
Fuel oil supplies are ade- 
quate along the east coast but extremely lim- 
‘ted on the west coast. 
The navy maintains 
‘epair shops at Manzanillo, Acapulco, Salina 
Cruz, Veracruz, Ciudad del Carmen; supply 
dases at Manzanillo, 
Isla Margarita; ship- 
yards at Veracruz, Acapulco, Coatzacoalcos; 
and naval stations, with limited facilities, at 
Guaymas, Tampico, Isla de las Mujeres, Coat- 
2acoalcos, Pichilinque,; and Progreso. 
Air force operations are handicapped by a 
“Aronic lack of parts and aviation gasoline. 
All air force supply installations are controlled 
4nd operated by the General Supply Depot, 
“lexico City. 
This system is considered ef- 
-Clent and adequate. 
Stockpiles are small be- 
-2use of limited funds, and squadron supply 
maintain low stocks. 
The center of the railroad network is Mexico 
‘ty, from which connections can be made 
“th the US, Guatemala, and principal ports 
“nd commercial centers of the country (see 
_ =ansportation map in Appendix). 
However, 
““€ Poor state of repair and shortage of both 
“tlve power and rolling stock hamper rail 
“trations, Furthermore, the railroads are 
a ewe to air attack or sabotage at many 
‘Ses, tunnels and.-fills: Mexico depends 
“lowing areas: west.coast from Tepic to Her-. 
Tely on railroads to’supply troops in the 
- 
_ Substantiation. 
The National Security Police 
ave 
mosillo and from Arriaga 
to Tapachula, 
Isthmus of Tehuantepec, and the States of 
Chihuahua and Sonora. 
Mexico has a fairly 
extensive’ road system 
(see transportation 
- Map), although almost all of the roads are 
limited to seasonal use. 
Automotive trans- 
portation is also generally in poor condition. 
Since Mexico has an inadequate fleet for 
coastwise transportation and lacks adequate 
coastal defense under current conditions, wa- 
ter transportation would be of limited signifi- 
cance. 
j. Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence. 
Intelligence activities of the Mexican armed 
forces have been sharply curtailed during the 
past two years. 
Early in 1949, the Mexican 
Ministry of National Defense recalled all mili- 
tary attaches abroad with the exception of the 
one in Washington, and it is reported that all 
military attaché posts will be closed with the 
exception of Washington, London, and Paris. 
Primarily an economy measure, it also indi- 
cates Mexico’s declining interest in military 
intelligence. 
Mexico has not previously main- 
tained naval attachés in any posts except 
Buenos Aires, Ottawa, Paris, London, and 
Washington, and the attaché in Ottawa has 
now been recalled. 
| 
~ Mexico has a number of internal intelli- 
gence and counter-intelligence organizations, 
most of which also perform police functions. 
These include: 
(1) the military intelligence 
section of the General Staff; (2) the secret 
service of the Federal District Police Force; 
(3) the investigative unit of the Office of the 
Attorney-General of the Federal District; (4) 
the investigative unit of the Office of the At- 
torney-General of the Republic; (5) the social 
and political investigative unit of the Ministry 
of Gobernacién; and (6) the National Secu- 
rity Police. The first five organizations are not 
well organized by US standards and are only 
moderately effective. 
‘The social and political 
investigative unit had the responsibility dur- 
ing World War 1 of investigating enemy aliens 
in Mexico, in which function it was frequently 
accused of serving as a clearing-house for lu- 
crative bribes which prevented the deportation 
of certain undesirable German aliens, a charge 
which: could undoubtedly find considerable 
nt 
ow 
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is a relatively new organization directly re- 
sponsible to the President. 
Its organization 
and methods are modeled along the lines of 
the FBI, and its personnel are considered com- 
petent and capable. 
It is relatively certain, 
however, that some of the ‘unscrupulous chiefs 
of this group have abused the ,considerable 
power vested in them by condoning and ac- 
tually conducting illegal activities such as 
narcotics smuggling. 
k. Non-military Activities. 
The more important non-military functions 
of the Mexican Army are in the reduction of 
illiteracy, construction of roads, and enforce- 
ment of the campaign against foot-and-mouth 
disease. 
The most important of these extra- 
military functions over the last ten years has 
been that of education. 
In many remote 
areas, 
the army has constructed 
modest 
schoolhouses and in many cases supplied the 
teachers to staff them. 
Teaching has been di- 
rected primarily at the reduction of illiteracy 
among children, but additional classes for il- 
literate adults are also conducted. 
The Mexican Navy is charged with a num- 
ber of non-military government services, in- 
cluding fisheries, 
lighthouse 
service, 
port 
works, and the merchant marine. 
During 
times of peace, the navy’s non-military func- 
tions are more significant than its nasal 
activities... 
4. 
Organization, Strength, and Disposition of 
the Armed Forces. 
a. Army. 
The Secretary of National elites is as- 
sisted by the General Staff, organized along 
conventional lines, and by a large number of 
directorates of the various arms and services. 
In practice, the directors of combatant arms 
are supervised by the Oficial Mayor (Executive - 
Officer) of the Secretariat of National De- 
fense, while directors of administrative and 
technical services are under the Sub-Secretary 
of National 
Defense. 
The Secretary com- 
mands: the division 
and one 
brigade 
di- 
rectly: and theoretically commands non-di- 
visional troops and garrisons through the 
zone commanders...In 
practice, 
however, 
his orders go pooper 
to — commanders 
The General Staff is preponderantly an ad-@ 
visory group. 
Authority is never delegated 
tom 
Assistant Chiefs of Staff to act for the Com-@ 
mander. 
The Sub-Chief of Staff directs ac 
tivities of personnel and administration, in 
telligence, organization, operations and train 
ing, procurement and supply, and sports and™ 
physical education. 
The directors of the fourm 
combatant arms (infantry, cavalry, artillery 
and aeronautics) have as their functions techag 
nical supervision in organization and traing® 
ing, supply, and control of troop units. 
Fomg 
administrative and tactical purposes, 
is divided into 32 military zones, boundaries o§ 
which usually coincide with state lines (seamy 
map in Appendix), each commanded by a gengm 
eral officer. 
| 
The peacetime organization of the Mexican 
Army emphasizes small units of battalion s 
The only larger tactical units are an infantry 
division, 
a motor-mechanized brigade, and ¢ 
brigade equivalent to the Presidential Guard 
unit. 
Thus the bulk of the Army consists om 
48 independent infantry battalions, and 20 
in 
dependent cavalry regiments, one of which 
mechanized. 
The only artillery units 
those organic to the infantry division 
< 
motor-mechanized 
brigade. 
The 
enginee™y 
corps comprises a construction unit and foum™ 
sapper battalions. 
It also officially includeg™ 
the signal service. 
The only medical 
unite 
are companies in the divisions. 
The authorized strength of the Mexicarm 
Army (exclusive of Air Force) on 1 January 
1950 was 52,174, of whom 616 are ground force 
officers. 
.Of the authorized strength, 23,556 
are infantry. 
Actual strength is estimated 
t . 
be 48,000. 
The Mexican Army is adequately equiprp a 
with small arms and ammunition, supply beq 
‘ing assured through domestic production 
Mexico plans to standardize to US small-arm 
calibre and ammunition. 
Sidearms, issuec 
only to officers, are mostly imported. 
AJ 
heavier equipment with the exception of 
thg 
Mosqueton rifle and the Mendoza maching 
gun, which are Mexican-made, were purchase@ 
before the war in Europe or were secured from 
the US on a lend-lease basis. 
Most 
arm 
equipment except that recently secured 
from 
the US is either obsolete or obsolescent. Therg 
Wits 
are no 
jaunch 
bers of 
in sho 
manuf. 
ceived 
The 
partict 
gic d 
agains 
as tau 
nizes 1 
a force 
and tk 
emplo’ 
ing act 
a first 
cernec 
points 
battal 
strong 
tral A: 
zil ani 
b. I 
Unc 
Gener 
the N 
Corps 
Advis: 
reau 
under 
istrat 
are si 
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| 
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ight 
eig 
at T: 
Isla } 
| 
Manz 
| 
dant; 
sels 
assio 
not 
: ut 
‘
are no guided missiles, rockets, or rocket 
jaunchers, little artillery, and limited num- 
bers of armored vehicles.’ Transport vehicles, 
in short supply, are almost entirely of US 
manufacture, the majority having been re- 
ceived under lend-lease. --- 
The Mexican military has not devoted any 
particular attention to formulation of strate- 
gic doctrines’ concerned 
with 
operations 
against a foreign enemy. 
The theory of war 
as taught in Mexican Army schools recog- 
nizes the army’s weakness when opposed by 
a force with modern equipment and training 
and thus emphasizes mobility and maneuver, 
employed in tactics of harassment and delay- 
ing actions. « Mexican defensive action against 
a first-class power would probably be con- 
cerned with rapid concentration at strategic 
points with particular employment of infantry 
battalions. 
The Mexican gsound forces are 
stronger than any or all of those of the Cen- 
tral American countries but rank behind Bra- 
zil and Argentina in all Latin America. 
Under the Secretary of Navy is the Director- 
General, who acts as Commander in Chief of 
the Navy and must belong to the General 
Corps. 
With the exception of the Technical 
Advisory Board, Inspector General, and Bu- 
reau of Naval Construction, which are directly 
under the Secretary of Navy, both the admin- 
istrative and tactical organization of the Navy 
are subordinate 
to the Naval General Staff. 
Mexican coastal waters are divided into 
eight naval zones, four on the Gulf Coast and 
four on the Pacific coast, with headquarters 
at Tampico, Veracruz, Ciudad del Carmen, 
Isla Margarita, Isla de las Mujeres, Guaymas, 
Manzanillo, and Acapulco. 
Zone comman- 
dants are directly ee to the Director 
General of the Navy. . 
Li? 
During World War I, Mexican naval ves- 
sels were organized into operational units and 
assigned definite patrol and convoy duties. 
Insofar as can be determined, operations were 
not bound by geographical limits of naval 
Zones. 
There are no actual fleet, force, or di- 
“sion commanders as such, regularly at sea, 
but when ships~are in company the senior 
‘Ommanding officer assumes command of the 
There is also a small Naval Air Arm which 
is an integral part of the Navy. 
It is equipped 
with twelve US World War IJ aircraft. 
Of 
these, six are listed as grounded indefinitely 
for lack of spare parts. 
Of the 69 became ov 
sonnel, 64 are pilots. 
“De 
The Mexican Marine Corps is exennieal into 
five rifle companies which act independently 
of each other and are subordinate to the Di- 
rector General of the Navy through the zone 
Commandants. 
There is no separate coast 
defense or coastal guard. 
There are six prin- 
cipal naval bases located. 
at Manzanillo, Aca- 
pulco, Isla Margarita, Salina Cruz, Ciudad del 
Carmen, and Veracruz. 
The largest and most 
important of these is Veracruz. 
Their main 
function is to refuel and repair vessels. There 
are also naval stations at Guaymas, Tampico, 
Isla de las Mujeres, Coatzacoalcos, Pichilinque, 
and Progreso, but facilities are extremely lim- 
ited. 
The navy dry docks are located at Vera- 
cruz and Salina Cruz. 
Total active naval personnel number 3 813, 
including 872 officers. 
Included in the total 
is the marine corps, with 72 officers and 472 
men. 
The navy has no organized reserve of 
either officers or enlisted men. 
Fire control on Mexican naval vessels is ele- 
mentary, owing mostly to inexperience. Naval 
gunnery would be ineffective against any but 
an inferior enemy because of lack of fire con- 
trol and slowness of loading. 
There is no in- 
dication that scientific research is being con- 
ducted with defense or war equipment. 
There 
' are coastal defenses at Tampico, Tuxpan, and 
Coatzacoalcos to protect petroleum installa- 
tions and defenses to protect naval bases at 
Puerto Cortés, Isla Margarita, and Salina 
Cruz. 
Defenses consist solely of permanently 
placed 7-inch guns and dug-in positions oc- 
cupied by very old 75-mm and 80-mm field 
artillery pieces with nocamouflage. 
The navy 
has two 57-mm mobile rifles and 3 machine 
guns at San Juan de Ulua, Veracruz to protect 
the harbor in an emergency. 
These would be 
effective only against small craft. 
The Mexican Navy is in effect a coast guard 
force capable of little more than routine peace- 
time coastal patrol duties and limited police 
action against internal disorders. 
It could 
assist the army by providing a measure of 
> 
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Page.
water transport along Mexico’s extensive coast 
line. 
Among Latin American navies it is ex- 
ceeded in effective strength by the naval serv- 
ices of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and the 
Dominican Republic. Considerable effort, out- 
side guidance, and material assistance would 
be required to raise it ta acceptable standards 
The Mexican Air Force is an integral part 
of the army and as such is under the Secretary 
of National Defense (see Section 4. a, Army). 
It is on a par with other directorates of com- 
batant arms.- The Chief of the Mexican Air 
Force is the Director of Aeronautics and has a 
staff divided into the following sections: per- 
sonnel and administrative, procurement and 
budget, airstaff functions, technical and in- 
dustrial, and bases and fields. 
The air force is theoretically divided into 
wings, which are subdivided into groups and 
the latter into squadrons. 
Tactical units of 
the air force are subordinate, except for broad 
directives and technical control, to the ground 
force zone commander of the military zone in 
which the air unit is stationed. 
The role of 
the air force in conjunction with ground forces 
is that of a national police force with its chief 
mission the maintenance of internal order 
through the suppression of peattpeger 
ac- 
The air force comprises four groups with an 
aggregate of eleven squadrons. 
The eleven 
squadrons include two attack bomber squad- 
rons, one- fighter: squadron, one transport 
squadron, one photo reconnaissance squad- 
ron, and six fighter squadrons used for re- 
connaissance. 
- A battalion of airborne troops 
is being organized, of which two companies, 
already in being, neve ‘Deer: 
to she 
presidential guards. 
The air force as of 1 July 1950 ra a total 
personnel of 3,298, including 747 officers. 
Of 
the officer personnel, 450 are pilots. 
The ma- 
— 
jority of the enlisted personnel are in engi- 
neering and maintenance. 
There are no air 
force conscripts.and.a very small reserve. 
Training of pilots is fair 
by US standards, but 
maintenance: efficiency: is poor. 
The 
Air 
Force has 278 planes; the majority of which 
are 
most of the 
are 
group, carried under 
the 
artillery 
corps 
air force units is in the Valley of Mexico, moa 
third of the combatant troops’ strength;am 
of recent US origin, a large percentage « 
non-operational = lack of maintenance anc 
parts. 
Mexico’s ground facilities are capable of ex 
pansion and improvement. 
There are only 14 
airfields with permanent surface runways a 
over 3,000 feet... There is a total of 136 air fa 
cilities in the country, about half of which are 
little more than cleared areas. 
Refueling? 
radio, and repair facilities, as well as hangs 
and parking areas, are found at only a sma 
number of the fields. 
The better airfields are 
concentrated around Mexico City. 
Mexican offensive air operations would 
be 
limited to the employment of 23 fighters, 
light bombers, and 19 dive bombers, with 
¢ 
approximate combat radius of 200 nantion 
miles. 
Operational efficiency would probably 
not be over 50 percent. 
Yet the Mexican 
Ai 
Force has undoubted supremacy over its 
tral American and Caribbean neighbors. 
Mexico’s air defenses are fair. 
Mexico has 
no early-warning system. 
However, it has 
fairly extensive system of radio aids to 
¢ 
navigation and of standard commercial com 
munications facilities. 
Of the total of seve 
“fighter” squadrons in the air force, six ¢ 
actually equipped only with reconnaissanc 
aircraft; and only one, the 201st, is equippe¢ 
with P-47 fighter planes. 
The anti-aircrag 
artillery defense consists of one machine-gug 
There are 56 searchlights, received under lend 
lease, but they are reported to be in storagé@ 
There are no passive defenses now in existencg 
d. Distribution of Forces. 
The principal concentration of army ant 
of the units being quartered in permanefr 
barracks located in the suburbs of the capité 
Numerous additional units are stationed ff 
cities outside of the Valley but within a fe} 
hours of the capital, the largest of these 
com 
centrations being in and around Puebla. 
| 
major combatant units in this area include th 
Ist 
(regular) infantry 
division, the mot@ 
mechanized brigade, the 12th (mechani 
cavalry regiment, eight independent infant 
battalions, and the lst and 2nd presidenti@ 
guards battalions. 
Thus, something over ong 
cluding 
trated w 
City. 
T 
towns al 
which f 
units to 
terior as 
of intert 
There 
the west 
bulk of 
Salina 
Veracru: 
The fc 
uted as 
gine) is 
the grou 
transpor 
squadro)} 
war-expt 
also atta 
der dire 
The Sec 
prising | 
and ser 
Oaxaca. 
Squadro 
service 
Californ 
ing grou 
their se) 
Quintan 
Beside 
service ¢ 
municip: 
at the a 
e. 
Excep 
der Inte 
only imy 
Mexico ji 
the agra 
these re: 
Cenas ac 
Mexico a 
‘in large 
peasants 
reserves 
Under tr 
Mander: 
Cally aid 
“7 
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|
cluding two major tactical units, is concen- 
trated within rapid support distance of Mexico 
City. 
The remaining units are stationed in 
towns and cities throughout the country, from 
which further detachments 
of subordinate 
units to the more remote districts in the in- 
terior assure promptness in the enforcement 
of internal law andorder. 
There were in September 1950 18 vessels on 
the west coast and 11 on the east coast. 
The 
bulk of those on the west coast are based at 
Salina Cruz and those on the east coast at 
Veracruz. 
The four groups of the air force are distrib- 
uted as follows: the First Air Group (twin en- 
gine) is located at Mexico City. 
It comprises 
the group staff, the 101st attack squadron, the 
transport squadron, the~photo reconnaissance 
squadron, and service units. 
Nominally, the 
war-experienced 20lst Fighter Squadron is 
also attached to this group, although it is un- 
der direct control of air force headquarters. 
The Second Air Group (single engine), com- 
prising group staff, Squadrons 205 and 207, 
and service units, is stationed at Ixtepec, 
Oaxaca. 
The Third Air Group, comprising 
Squadrons 202, 203, 204 and their respective 
service units, is located at Ensenada, Baja 
California. 
The Fourth Air Group, compris- 
ing group staff, Squadrons 206 and 209, and 
their service units, is stationed at Cozumel, 
Quintana Roo. 
Besides these four air force bases, small 
service detachments are stationed at various 
municipal fields throughout the country and 
at the air force flying school in Guadalajara. 
€. Quasi-Military Organizations. 
Except for police units, discussed above un- 
cer Intelligence and Counter-intelligence, the 
only important quasi-military organization in 
Mexico is the Defensas Rurales (also known as 
‘Ne agrarista or agrarian reserves). 
Units of 
‘hese reserves were organized under the Car- 
“enas administration in most rural regions of 
“lexico and, as the name implies, are composed 
‘1 large part of armed agraristas, or agrarian 
feasants. 
They operate under the director of 
eserves and, within prescribed directives, are 
“der the immediate control of the zone com- 
anders. 
Defensas Rurales units: theoreti- 
“ally aid the army in its internal police mission 
a 
7") 
ak 
- 
‘by furnishing intelligence in their areas and 
quelling outbreaks until the arrival of the 
army and police units. 
Actually, the Defen- 
sas Rurales are much more significant po- 
litically than militarily, as they have consti- 
tuted the “shock troops” of the communal 
peasantry in defense of their ejidos. 
They 
have frequently clashed with the hacendados 
(landholders) opposing the land distribution 
program and have “persuaded” recalcitrant 
peasants to accept the collectivist idea of 
ejidos. 
Bloody clashes occasionally took place 
between the Defensas Rurales and the Sinar- 
quistas during the Cardenas and Avila Ca- 
macho administrations, but the agrarian re- 
serves have not been particularly active un- 
der the present Aleman administration. 
Poor arms, non-existent logistical support, 
and scanty training would render these re- 
serves largely ineffective when acting alone 
against trained troops. 
However, in a major 
national emergency, these irregular forces, de- 
spite their deficiencies when compared with 
regular troops, would form a valuable adjunct 
to the army in any campaigns within Mexican 
territory. 
In this capacity, their thorough 
first-hand knowledge of the terrain in their 
respective regions, their tough character, and 
their inurement to desert and jungle hard- 
ships would make them very effective as aux- 
iliaries to the regular troops. 
5. 
General Estimate of Military Intentions and 
Capabilities. 
, 
Mexico at present has no warlike intentions 
toward any nation and is unlikely to modify 
this attitude unless there should be an inter- 
national crisis. 
As a member of the inter- 
American system and a signatory to the Inter- 
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 
Mexico is obliged to submit all international 
controversies to peaceful settlement and not 
to resort to the threat or use of force in any 
- manner inconsistent with the provisions of the 
United Nations Charter or the treaty. 
In the event of another world conflict in- 
volving the US, Mexico could be expected, un- 
der present political conditions, to use its war 
potential in favor of the US. 
Mexico's close 
cooperation with the US in World War I in 
_ Supplying raw materials, permitting construc- 
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ta
tion of air bases on its soil and the use of its 
ports by the US Navy, even sending an air 
squadron abroad to fight.alongside the US in 
the Pacific theatre; the:.continuance of the 
Joint 
US-Mexican 
Defense 
Commission 
(formed in 1942); and the continuation of 
good relations between the two governments, 
all tend to support this assumption. 
— 
| 
One of the primary purposes ofthe Mexican 
military establishment, and the one which it 
could be expected to perform most satisfac- 
torily, is to suppress internal rebellion and to 
maintain public order. 
In. case of attack by 
any American: or extra-Hemisphere 
power, 
Mexico’s defense strategy would presumably 
consist in using its limited forces to exact the 
utmost advantage from knowledge 
of its 
rugged terrain, thus gaining time for aid by 
joint action of the other American nations or 
by assistance from the-US 
alone. 
While 
Mexico is not capable of waging a successful 
offensive or defensive war with a strong na- 
tion or group of nations, it could, if the need 
arose, wage a successful offensive or defensive 
war against any or all of the Central Ameri- 
| 
can republics, unless the latter were given | 
substantial outside aid. 
With US assistance and under favorable po- 
litical conditions, Mexico in the event of war 
might be expected to: (1) place a maximum’ | 
of 125,000 men in the field; (2) maintain in- 
ternal security and order; (3) assist in aerial 4 
surface, and coastal patrol; 
(4) provide 
: 
bases, ports, and essential raw materials; (5) 
block the use of its territory as an enemy base? 
against the US; and (6) prevent the infiltra4 
tion of enemy agents into US territory from: 
across the Mexican border. 
a 
Further, assuming Mexico’s desire to ae 
pate in overseas operations, it is estimate 
that, considering only the availability of man 
power, one ground forces division and one ¢ 
group could feasibly be furnished. 
However; 
in any decision involving a choice betweeng 
ground troops participation or air force par~ 
ticipation, it is believed that thorough con 
sideration of the psychological deficiencies andg 
strengths of the Mexican soldier is imperative 
(see Section 3, para. e, “Armed Forces Per 
sonnel’). 
a 
In the ev 
tion in Mex 
preventing 
crossing th 
territory, 
ar 
trol. 
The ] 
of importan 
fense. 
On 
undevelopec 
an objective 
Isthmian 
r 
Isthmian tr 
supplement 
From the 
Mexico pres 
siderations. 
sites that m 
and air bas 
that Mexico 
tingent for 
Value of sux 
the psycholo 
countries of 
Mexico is 
Strategic 
m 
The Office 
contributions 
tors of a geog) 
Tehuantepec 3 
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; 
CHAPTER VI 
STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING US SECURITY 
In the event of war, a friendly administra- 
tion in Mexico could be of some assistance in 
preventing enemy agents or armed forces from 
crossing the long common frontier into US 
territory, and could aid the US in coastal pa- 
trol. 
The Isthmus of Tehuantepec could be 
of importance as a possible base for Canal de- 
fense. 
On the other hand, the Isthmus is 
undeveloped and unprotected and could be 
an objective for enemy forces. 
If the trans- 
Isthmian 
rail connections 
were 
improved, 
Isthmian transportation could be used as a 
supplement to the Panama Canal. 
From the strictly military point of view 
Mexico presents two important strategic con- 
siderations. 
First, Mexican territory includes 
sites that might be valuable for radar, naval, 
and air bases. 
The second consideration is 
that Mexico could contribute a military con- 
tingent for overseas operations. 
The chief 
value of such active participation would be 
the psychological effect produced on the other 
countries of Latin America. 
Mexico is an important source of various 
strategic 
minerals 
and metals. 
Although 
a, 
Mexico does not curréntiy produce large quan- 
tities of petroleum for export, it is considered 
to be an important potential source of oil for 
the US. 
The only foreseeable threat to US security 
in the Mexican economy is that from labor or 
saboteurs. 
Communists either direct or influ- 
ence Mexican labor in such key industries as 
mining, petroleum, and railroads. 
Trained 
saboteurs or Communist agents have been re- 
ported in Mexico and sabotage plans may have 
been worked out, although the major action 
from Mexican labor would be through strikes. 
President Aleman has been able in the past to 
use the army effectively to break strikes in the 
petroleum industry and national railroads. 
In the event of war between the US and USSR, 
the Mexican Government could probably break 
strikes in any strategic industry. 
The administration in Mexico is stable and 
in control of the political machinery. 
In the 
event of war, the present Mexican Govern- 
ment would cooperate wholeheartedly with 
the US in the interests of hemispheric defense 
and in support of the US war effort. 
The Office of Naval Intelligence concurs with this treatment only on the basis of maximum possible 
“ntributions from Mexico under the most favorable conditions. 
It believes that there are restrictive fac- 
‘ors of a geographic, political and economic nature which would limit the usefulness of the Isthmus of 
Tehuantepec and the possibility of a substantial military contingent for overseas — 
iz 
° 
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Place of Birth: 
Date of Birth: 
Mexico, LL.B. 1928. 
some 
Occupation: 
President of Mexico. 
Remarks: : 
- 
Alemin practiced law, was a member of the higher court of justice of 
. 
«the Federal District and territories, and was Senator from Veracruz, 
: 
y1986-1940. In 1940, he directed the presidential campaign of Manuel 
if 
*»Avila Camacho, for which he was rewarded with the cabinet post of 
“ “* Minister of Gobernacién, 1940-45. 
In 1946 he was elected to a six-year 
term as President of Mexico. 
at 
Bia ae Alem4n is am extremely clever politician who has brought his ad- 
successfully through periods of economic stress and 
“fz 
“threats to stability. 
His inaugural address included a program of 
Be 
. agricultural expansion and industrial development, which has been at 
Ch, 
sileast partially implemented during his administration with US finan- 
“Wh: 
& 
Chal and technical assistance. 
His domestic policies are considered to 
on middle-of-the-road. 
His foreign policy includes friendship toward 
wind 
alk countries and 
in 
organizations. 
AVILA Camacho, Manuel . 
Place of Birth: 
“Teziutlén, Puebla 
Date of Birth: 
24 April1897 
Education: 
Graduated as accountant, Liceo Teziuteco, 1912. 
Occupation: © 
_‘ Retired Army General; ex-President of Mexico 
Remarks: 
Avila Camacho joinéd the revolutionary forces in 1914, subsequently 
holding various military assignments, including that of Commander 
of the 29th Military Zone in Tehuantepec in 1932. 
He was Executive 
Officer and Under-Secretary of War and Navy under Abelardo Rod- 
riguez, and became Minister of National Defense in 1938-39 under 
C&rdenas. 
A protege of Cardenas, he was President of Mexico in the 
period 1940-1946. 
‘Avila Camacho rose to political prominence as a result of his close 
following of Cardenas since revolutionary days, and is believed to have 
“4. 
/ initiated no programs as President except those stemming indirectly 
bapa 
- from Cardenas. 
He was, however, more conservative in his political 
““ 
“actions than Cardenas had been. He is generally credited with having 
(°° begun modernization of the Mexican Army. Although he has been = 
officially inactive in both political and military affairs since 1946, 
ined 
th 
“Camacho is reported to have participated.in various secret sessions of 
nature with military and oppositionist labor leaders. 
He 
APPENDIX A 
BIOGRAPHICAL DATA 
Sayula, Veracruz 
September 1902 
Elementary and secondary schools in Orizaba; 
err 
id 
= 
~*~ 
i, 
a’, 
National University of 
: 
= 
¢ 
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= 
ALEMAN, Miguel 
: 
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A 
an 
:
BASSOLS, Narciso 
Place of Birth: 
Tenango del Valle, México 
Date of Birth: 
1898 
Education: 
LL.B, National University of Mexico. 
Speaks French. 
Occupation: 
Lawyer 
Remarks: 
Bassols has had a varied career, serving at various times as ee ee 
of 
: 
_. Jaw-and director of the faculty of law at the National University, 
Min 
ister of Public Education, of Gobernacién, and of Finance, Ministe 
to Great Britain and France, delegate to the League of Nations, and. 
Ambassador.to the USSR. 
He is one of the outstanding leftists in‘ 
Mexico, having held membership in a number of Communist-front; 
and Marxist organizations. 
He was one of the founders of the Society@ 
of Friends of Wallace and was an organizer and Vice-President until 
recently of Partido Popular. 
Because of his intelligence and national 
_ prominence, coupled with his Communist views, a is one of 
anti-US influences in Mexico. 
CARDEN 
Place o 
Date of 
Educat: 
Occupa 
BERMUDEZ, Antonio J.° 
Place of Birth: 
Chihuahua 
: 
Date of Birth: 
13 June 1893 
| 
Education: 
Primary only. 
Speaks English, some French. 
Occupation: 
Senator, Director-General, Petrdleos Mexicanos (Pemex) 
Remarks: 
Bermudez’ political activity is of fairly recent date, starting as mayor} 
“ 
of Ciudad Juarez, 1941-1944; State Treasurer of Chihuahua, 1944-467 
ee 
and Senator from Chihuahua and Director-General of Pemex sinces 
1946. 
He is described as intelligent, resourceful, and of noted moré 
integrity. 
Bermudez has used his business experience to good ad 
. vantage in straightening out the chaotic financial and labor situations 
in Pemex and in improving the efficiency and operations of the oral 
ization. 
_ 
Bermudez is personally popular in Mexico, and the political signifia 
cance of his position as head of the expropriated oil industry is impor4 
tant. 
He has been mentioned in the Mexican press as a likely presi4 
dential candidate in 1952, with possible Partido Popular backing. 
Hej 
_is not believed to be a member of PP, however, but to be a loyal mem4 
Remark 
BETETA, Ramén 
Place of Birth: 
México, D. F. 
Date of Birth: 
7 October 1901 
Education: 
: 
1923, B.A., University of Texas (Phi Beta Kappa); 1926, LL.B., University 
of Mexico: 1934, Ph.D. 
Speaks English and French. 
Occupation: 
Minister of Finance 
Bes 
Remarks: 
Beteta in 1924 and 1925 was a professor of law and social sciences in thel 
= 
_ University of Mexico, and in the period 1925-1928 taught in the Na# 
4. 
tional Preparatory School. 
Since 1926 he has occupied a number of 
) 
important government posts, the most recent of which had been tha 
Mi 
. of Minister of Finance since 1946. 
He has been decorated by a num4 
| 
+ 
per of countries, and is the author of numerous works in the field of 
) 
| 
| 
economics. 
He has also served as Mexican delegate to various interg 
- national conferences. 
LOMBARDI 
Place of : 
Date of B 
Educatior 
Occupatio 
© 
a 
B 
* 
’ 
-~
-_ 4° 
Beteta is married to an American, but has been reported as basically 
“<< gnti-US. 
However, both during and since Aleman’s presidential cam- 
» #2: paign, he has given every indication of cooperating with the US Gov- 
« ¥emmment. 
Beteta is considered to be'a person of great intellectual 
capacity, extremely affable, charming, and a lively conversationalist. 
‘3.4% si) He is a member of PRI, with left-wing tendencies, and is considered 
eee 
Ty, fie a clever politician. 
His astuteness has been demonstrated by his 
wo 25 handling of the difficult financial situation during the past two years. 
| 4OR ' Beteta is believed to aspire to the presidency of Mexico, and is men- 
' tioned prominently as a potential candidate for the 1952 election. 
~Beeause he has been a scapegoat for part of the economic difficulties 
| “af the ye ne ob 
however, his chances of nomination would appear slim. 
Place of Birth: 
“Jiquilpan de i 
Michoacan, Mexico 
Date of Birth: 
2T May 1895 
Education: 
— 
* Educated by the Salesian Fathers in Morelia 
Occupation: ~~ 
| Executive Director of the Tepalcatepec Commission. 
Retired General 
ic 
“in Mexican Army; former President of the Republic. 
Remarks::"" 
‘Cardenas in 1913 joined the revolutionary forces and rose rapidly to the 
Bo 
At « rank of Brigadier General in 1924. 
During the period 1915-1924, he 
- participated in numerous revolutionary campaigns. 
He served as 
" Governor of Michoacan, Minister of Gobernacién and Minister of War 
and Navy.- During the period 1934-1940 he was President of Mexico. 
~ “In 1942 he was Commander of all Mexican forces on the Pacific Coast, 
and in 1942-1945 was Minister of National Defense. 
Since 1945 he 
_ 
«has been General of Division, Mexican Army, on inactive duty, and 
© 7 gince 1947 has been Director of the Commission to develop the valley 
“Fe of the Tepalcatepec River in Michoacan. 
i 
wy C4rdenas, during his term as President of the Republic, inaugurated 
- 
|" 
"gq 6-year plan to distribute land to peasants, organized cooperative 
* farms, and set up a credit system. 
During his administration, oil 
eGroperties were nationalized, the National Railways were expropriated, 
“education was extended and secularized. 
“ C&rdenas is considered to be one of the most powerful political fig- 
“ures in Mexico. He has a strong following among the peasantry, 
‘labor and the army. 
His political philosophy is socialistic, and his 
extreme nationalism has,-in connection with his social doctrine, 
‘placed him in the category:of the Number 1 patriot in the eyes of 
most Mexicans. 
He is tolerant of all views and political beliefs, fears 
the “imperialism” of US business interests, but might be expected to 
support the US in preference to the USSR, if he felt that Mexico’s 
interests would be served oY RE in a world conflict. 
od 
ae 
LOMBARDO Toledano, Vicente 
Place of Birth: 
Teziutlan, Puebla 
Education: “2. » 
Escuela Nacional Seoneantentil LL. B., National University of Mexico, 
“1919; M.A.,.;1920;. 
1933. ‘Speaks 
Italian and some 
; 
| 
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oty 
ne 
| 
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‘ 
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2d- 
| 
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| 
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Remarks: 
. Lombardo Toledano is not only the outstanding Mexican labor leader, 
well-known international labor leader, but has also been promi 
in Mexican political and educational circles. 
From 1918 
tc 
oo 
74... 
1983, he was professor of law and philosophy at the National Uni 
-. 
«fee. versity of Mexico.. 
During the same period he also held other posi4 
eS tions, including Secretary of Gobernacién of the Federal District, Dis 
Pector of the National Preparatory School, Governor of the State o 
RODRIGU 
Bueblal and Federal Deputy. 
In 1933 he withdrew from the 
Place of 
federacién. Regional de Obreros Mexicanos (CROM) and founded 
¢ 
Date of 
“sy eg) mew labor organization which, with Cardenas’ blessing, he reorganizec 
Educatic 
ye. into the dominant Confederacién de Trabajadores de México (CTM} 
Occupat 
.. 
they 4ee. in.1936.. 
Also in 1936 he founded and has since directed the Universi 
Remarks 
| 
: 
_ 
«-s dad Obrera, in 1938 the Confederacién de Trabajadores de (la) América 
- 
= 
Latina, in 1939 the newspaper EI Popular, and in 1944 the Liga So: 
Ctalista Mexicana.. From 1944 until 1948 he was a member of the 
.. 
ILO Administrative Council. 
In 1945 he was one of the founders o 
. 
~~ WFTU and has been a Vice-President since that date. 
In 1947 h¢ 
| 
ft 
oe started organizing Partido Popular, and is now its President. 
He we 
| 
@maong the principal directors of the Latin American Petroleum 
<) 
apes fey ers: Congress held in Tampico in September 1948, and was behind the 
organization of the Unién General de Obreros y Campesinos de 
| 
(UGOCM), new left-wing labor central. 
__.. 
Lombardo, believed not to be a card-holding member of the Com 
Bebe 
scapes ri munist Party, is an avowed Marxist and has preached Marxian prim 
ciples since fairly-early in his career. 
He is simultaneously a natiors 
alistic Mexican. 
He has traveled extensively through both La 
SERRANO 
4» 
eo America and Europe in connection with international labor activities 
Place of E 
se, 
.\ 
4e-and has during his trips maintained contact with the leading Com 
Date of Bi 
re ~ prunists of all countries, including the USSR and satellite states 
Education 
| fu 
, 
.) Having been a close collaborator with the Mexican Government d 
Occupation 
act 
ing the Cardenas and Avila Camacho administrations, Lombardo hg 
Remarks: 
eet mn 
-been one-of the major oppositionist leaders during the Aleman ¢ 
et 
aot 
ministration... Because of the strong control of the government ovel 
Mexican political life, Lombardo’s prestige and power have suffered 
as a result of his disaffection with the government political and labaj 
{os 
“.groups.: He has given indication more recently of changing his 
te 
gi 
-tics to friendly criticism or actual collaboration in an attempt to - 
fin 
> 
> 
© 
ORIVE DE ALBA. Adolfo 
zi 
| 
Place of Birth: 
.. 
México, D. F. 
| 
Occupation: 
© 
Minister of Hydraulic Resources 
We 
= 
Remarks: 
Orive de Alba, an engineer by profession, was employed oe 
‘the Deps d 
_ ment of Agriculture of Mexico to direct irrigation projects, and at 
th 
_time of his appointment to the Cabinet was executive member of 
National Irrigation Commission. 
He has been described as a brillié 
“sand capable engineer, a hard worker, and a man of integrity. 
has been mentioned as a former close collaborator of Lazaro Cardeng 
-and. a friend of Vicente Lombardo Toledano, 
he is. nots bg 
~ 
‘ 
4° 
sn 
Sk 
| 
r 
{ 
‘ 
; 
ok 
ay 
Place 
4% 
" 
! 
ww? 
y 
ia 
\ 
‘ 
a
leved to have Communist tendencies, being inclined toward socialism. 
, 
He is married to an American. 
Orive de Alba has been mentioned as a person of potential political 
prominence because of his deere ability and his — back- 
| ing. 
Place of Birth: 
San José de Guaymas, Sonora | 
Date of Birth: 
12 May 1889 
Education: 
Primary education. 
Speaks fluent English. 
Occupation: 
_ President, Teléfonos de Mézico, S.A. 
Retired Army General 
Remarks:.,. 
Rodriguez Jeft school to work in the copper mines in Cananea, Sonora, 
subsequently joining the Revolutionary Army. 
He had a strictly mili- 
tary career until 1931, when he held two Cabinet posts as Secretary of 
Industry, Commerce and Labor and Secretary of War and Navy. 
During the period of 1932-34 he was Provisional President of Mexico. 
. 
He held no political office from 1934 to 1943, when he became Gover- 
~ 
nor of Sonora. 
In 1948 he resigned from the Governorship to become 
“President of Teléfonos de Mézico, S.A. 
- 
. Rodriguez is wealthy, owning and controlling a large portion of the 
, land and industry of Sonora. 
He is extremely anti-Communist and 
anti-Partido Popular. 
He had his personal representatives in the 
cabinets of Cardenas and Avila Camacho, but has no such represen- 
tation in the Aleman Cabinet. 
He has publicly expressed his approval 
of the Aleman administration. 
SERRANO, Carlos I. (Colonel) 
a 
Place of Birth: 
Sinaloa, Mexico 
Date of Birth: 
| 
Occupation: 
Army Colonel; Senator; Presidential times 
Remarks: 
ae Colonel Serrano is considered one of the important persons behind the 
'< 
“* geenes in the Aleman regime. 
He was head of the State Police when 
| ~ Aleman was Governor of Veracruz and during the latter’s campaign 
‘ for the Presidency was responsible for his personal safety. 
He has 
- organized and controls the Direccién Federal de Seguridad, a political 
police organization. 
As unofficial head of the National Security Po- 
“lice and as President of the Permanent Commission of Congress, he 
wields considerable influence. 
He has been active in undercover di- 
' rection of the anti-Communist campaign, particularly in the labor 
field. 
_ 
Serrano, an unscrupulous man, is actively engaged in various illegal 
enterprises, such as the narcotics traffic. 
He is considered astute, 
‘intelligent, and personable, although his methods of operating violate 
every principle of established government administration. 
He is said 
to aspire to the Presidency of the Republic. 
| 
TELLO, Manuel J. 
Place of Birth: 
Zacatecas, Zacatecas 
AN 
ny 
Date of Birth: 
November 1899 
| 
| 
Education: 
. 
Cientifico (Zacatecas) ; 
Lidre de Derecho; 
de 
_ Altos Estudios (Mexico City).. 
Occupation: 
« 
Acting Minister of 
Affairs: 
re 
RODRIGUEZ, AbelardoL. 
A,, 
er, 
ni 
\si- 
| 
| 
am 
St- 
cam 
ne 
of 
jes 
as 
‘ke 
Ae 
n- 
in 
| 
2S,4 
~* 
‘ 
| 
| 
“org 
71%. 
* 
| 
»
Tello is a career diplomat, having served eight years as Vice Consul in 
Antwerp, and periods as Consul in Geneva, unofficial Mexican repre 
sentative at the League of Nations and ILO, and Director of political 
o 
affairs and the diplomatic service. 
In 1944 he was appointed Under 
“¥ 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs. 
Tello occupied the latter post until : 
1948, when he became Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
He also | 
represented Mexico in the Inter-American Conference on Problems 
of War and Peace and the United Nations Conference on International | 
Organization in 1945. 
* 
_ 
.Pellovhas been described as the outstanding type of Mexican careen 
t-°~ 
diplomat, having a broad concept of international problems. 
Highlyae 
intelligent and completely honest in his personal and official life, he , 
- 
enjoys an excellent reputation among all classes of Mexicans. 
He 
is® 
* believed to have no political aspirations. 
TORRES Bodet, Jaime 
Place of Birth: 
México, D. F. 
Date of Birth: 
17 April 1902 
Primary School; Normal School; Bocusla Nacional Preparatoria; law 
Education: 
| 
_.,..’ 
studies, National University of Mexico. 
Honorary degrees, University 
of New Mexico and University of Southern California. 
Speaks fluen’ 
Frencit 
and fair English. 
Occupation: 
Director-General, UNESCO 
Remarks: 
*“*- Torres Bodet enjoys high prestige in Mexico as a scholar, poet, novelist 
t 
and successful administrator, and is one of the leading Latin Americar 
# 
’ 
statesmen. 
After his early years (1920-1928) as a professor and of™ 
ficial in the Ministry of Education, he started a diplomatic careem 
which included posts in Madrid, Paris, The Hague, Buenos Aires, 
-- 
meva, and Brussels. 
In 1940 he was appointed Assistant Secretary om 
«Foreign Affairs and in 1943-46 he was Minister of Education unde 
,.... Avila Camacho.. In the Aleman cabinet (1946-) he was Minister a 
_ Foreign Affairs, resigning in 1948 to soney the post of Director-Geg 
ate .. Torres Bodet made a distinguished record for himself as Minist 
, 
- of Education and has enhanced his prestige through his outstanc 
participation in postwar international organizations. 
He has followeé 
» wa a policy of close cooperation with the US without being subservient t 
US interests. 
Torres Bodet has stressed the need of hemispheril 
ge. joint efforts to maintain peace and advance mutual economic and 
p¢ 
litical interests. 
| 
ge... Torres Bodet is not known to have any ambitions in Mexican po 
j A tics, but his stature and prestige would carry him far should he bd 
ae come a political Fn Aig His more — role is that of an internatior 1a 
1519 
1535 
1810 
1821 
1824 
1835 
1846 
1848 
1859 
1862 
1864 
1867 
1876 
to 
1911 
1910 
1911 
1913 
1914 
1915 
1916 
1917 
1918 
1920 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1932 
1934 
1935 
1938 
1940 
1942 
Begin 
Vicerc 
Hidals 
Mexici 
First ] 
Texas 
War w 
Treaty 
Juarez 
French 
Maxim 
French 
Porfiri 
Madero 
Madero 
Madero 
US mar: 
Carranz 
Pershin; 
New Cor 
Impositi 
Carranz: 
US form 
Calles be 
Conflict 
Morrow < 
Obregén 
Escobar 1 
Ortiz Rut 
Ortiz Rut 
Lazaro Cé 
First Six 
Expropria 
Avila Carr 
Mexico de 
Aleman be 
> 
U 
‘ 
; 
4r 
1946 
«
‘ 
; 
> 
\ 
f 
RANE 
Se 
} 4 
ys 
APPENDIX B 
; 
> 
* 
1519 
1535 
1810 
1821 
1824 
1835 
1846 
1848 
1859 
1862 
1864 
1867 
1876 
to 
1911 
1910 
1911 
1913 
1914 
1915 
1916 
1917 
1918 
1920 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1932 
1934 
1938 
1940 
1942 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
Beginning of the Conquest of Mexico by Cortés. 
Viceroyalty of New Spain established. 
Hidalgo began independence movement. 
Mexico won independence from Spain under Iturbide. 
First Republic Constitution proclaimed. 
Texas rebellion.’ 
War with US over annexation of Texas. 
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo ended war with the US. 
Juarez passed Reform laws. 
French intervention.pbegan inauspiciously with 5th of May Mexican victory. 
Maximilian crowned emperor. 
French 
executed. 
is 
Porfirio Diaz elected for successive terms except 1880-84. 
Re 
Madero began 
movement. 
| 
Madero elected President. 
Madero assassinated—Huerta became President. 
US marines landed in Veracruz after “Tampico incident”—Huerta resigned. 
Carranza recognized by US as de facto President of Mexico. 
Pershing expedition into Mexico. 
New Constitution adopted—Carranza declared neutrality in World War I. 
Imposition of confiscatory taxes by Carranza government started oil ee: 
Carranza killed by Obregén forces. 
US formally recognized Obregén. 
Calles became President. 
Conflict with Church began. 
Morrow appointed Ambassador to Mexico to settle difficulties. 
Obregon elected for second term—killed before inauguration. 
Escobar rebellion broke out, was quickly put cows. 
Ortiz Rubio became President. 
Ortiz Rubio resigned. 
Lazaro Cardenas became President. 
er 
Ie 
First Six Year Plan put into effect. 
Expropriation of foreign oil company popes by Cardenas. 
Avila Camacho became President. 
Mexico declared war against the Axis. 
$ 
Aleman became President. 
Negotiations begun for return of American oil cmmre to work = Mexico. 
Truman- 
Aleman exchanged visits. 
Torres Bodet became Director General of UNESCO. 
Peso stabilized at 8.65 per US dollar. 
ne 
ae 
a 
i 
&. 
| 
| 
| 
> 
| 
| 
| 
i». 
a 
a
POPULATION 
CHARACTERISTICS AND STATISTICS 
Composition. 
A heterogenous nti te of unequal dis- 
tribution characterizes Mexico’s population of 
24,602,313 inhabitants. 
Of these some 30 per- 
cent are Indian, 15 percent European, and 55 
percent mestizo (Indian and European). 
Within the Indian population there are some 
50-odd different groups each with its own lan- 
guage, traditions, and cultural characteristics. 
Thus the Indian constitutes one of the major 
problems confronting the Mexican Govern- 
ment. 
Until he. is integrated into Mexican 
society, political, economic, or cultural prob- 
lems will remain partly unsolved. 
A tremendous educational problem origi- 
nates from the high percentage of illiteracy 
(51.6 in 1940) and from the need for incorpo- 
rating these linguistically separate groups into 
the national life. 
Perhaps this second aspect 
of the problem is the greater of the two. 
Its 
magnitude can be appreciated by the fact that 
in 1930, 16 percent of the total population over 
five years of age were divided into 54 lingual 
groups. 
Notwithstanding a reduction in this 
percentage, according to 1940 census figures, 
1,237,018 persons over five years of age living 
in Mexico (1 out of every 14) still speak only 
indigenous languages. 
The same census re- 
ports that 1,253,891 inhabitants speak Spanish 
as well as the indigenous languages, but for 
educational purposes, this superficial knowl- 
edge of Spanish can almost be totally dis- 
counted since frequently it is no more than 
familiarity with a few words. 
Teaching to read and write Spanish, there- 
fore, is not the only solution to the problem of 
education in rural Mexico. 
It involves as well 
the teaching of spoken Spanish to serve as an 
First half 19th century.:.........<..... 
Second half 19th century.......... eee 
: Anuario 
> 
Estadistico, 1940-Direccién General de Estadistica. 
instrument 
of communication within and 
among the Indian communities. 
Even more important than the incorpora- 
tion of these people in the Spanish-speaking 
population are the teaching of the rudiments 
of sanitation and health practices, the raising 
of housing standards within their own physi- 
cal and economic environment, and the de- 
velopment of communication facilities in or- 
der that literacy may be of greater use. 
Liter- 
ate Indians must be encouraged to stay in 
their communities to help in the rehabilitation 
program. 
As early as 1923 “cultural missions” were 
organized by the government in an effort to 
reach the Indians in the isolated regions where 
they lived. 
Their personnel consisted of a di- 
rector and an instructor in the fields of soap- 
making, tanning, health and physical educa- 
tion, agriculture, and music. 
This program 
failed because of the lack of trained person- 
nel to see it through. 
Largely through the ef- 
forts of 
Jaime Torres Bodet, then Minister of 
Education, President Manuel Avila Camacho 
launched a nation-wide program in 1944 to 
combat illiteracy. 
At the end of 1% years, 
1,500,000 illiterates between the ages of 6 and 
40 had been reached of whom 708,657 passed 
a reading test. 
Small as this figure may be, 
it marks a new beginning of this great en- 
deavor to integrate widely distinct sectors of 
the population into the life of the nation. 
2. 
Growth. 
With the exception of Brazil, RES a hes 
the largest population of any Latin American 
country. 
The following table shows the trend 
in growth through the years: 
1 million every 25 years” 
& 
| 
| 
| 
i 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
f 
| 
| 
‘ 
> 
| 
“ 
é 
‘¢e 
* 
ai. 
F 
ay
These figures show that until recently the 
population of Mexico has increased slowly. 
Mexico has had no waves of immigration; * in 
fact, it has actually lost population at times 
through emigration. Population has also been 
lost through revolutions and through loss of 
territory to the United States. 
Furthermore, 
Mexico has one of the highest death rates 
among the Latin American cou. 
SRE, 
cially infant mortality.*” 
There have been two periods of a ea 
tively rapid growth—the first from 1885 to 
1910, during the Diaz dictatorship, and from 
1921 to date (end of military aspect of Revo- 
lution of 1910). ‘The greatest increase ever 
recorded for a ten-year period took place from 
1930 to 1940. The increase, slow as it may 
have been, has been mainly the result of high 
birth rate. 
In 1941 it was 43.5 per thousand 
as compared with 18.9 in the US. The excess 
number of births over deaths is greater than 
is found in most countries of Latin America.* 
a. Geographicakh 
** 
A glance at the following ES 
will FR 
reveal the unequal geographical distribution 
of the Mexican population: The North Pacific 
area comprising 21 percent of the total na- 
tional area holds only 6 percent of the total 
population. 
The arid North area has 40 per- 
. 
cent of the national territory and 19 percent of 
the population. 
The Gulf Coast, and the 
South Pacific region each holds 12 percent of 
the total population and covers 12 and 14 per- 
— 
cent of the national area, respectively. In con- 
trast to these figures are those applicable to 
the Central Region. 
Here 14 percent, or one- 
sixth of the Mexican territory, contains 48.6 
percent 
of the total Mexican 
population. 
These Central Region figures also represent 15 
percent of all the agricultural land, 45 percent 
of the total number of farmers. 
The present 
heavy concentration of population in the cen- 
tral highlands is further 
the 
*In the 1930’s there pan 
@ program 
re- 
patriation of Mexicans from the US and this num- 
ber did exceed the emigration figures of that decade, 
but this was not the major contributing factor to 
the increase in population. 
| 
. 
*James, p. 598. 
* Whetten, p. 26. 
| 
_ habitants; forty of the ninety-seven cities hav 
_ ‘Much more densely populated than Mexico. 
ad 
fact that in this area are located six of the 
thirteen cities having more than 50,000 in- 
ing a population of more than 10,000 inhabi 
ants; 42.9 percent of the 12,757,711 inhabit-4 
ants living in rural areas of less than 2,500 in 
habitants. 
Most of the major industries othe 
than petroleum are also located in this regions 
This centralization of population is evident 
not only on a national scale but also in 
each 
distinct 
population 
district. 
The 
Centra 
area, therefore, is composed of various clusters 
of population each with its own urban nucleus@ 
and separated from neighboring clusters by 
nm 
thinly populated territory. 
~ 
Total density of Mexico’s population is 
25.9 
inhabitants per square mile as compared with 
44.2 in the US. 
This figure is greater, how4 
ever, than that found in the larger countriesg 
of Latin America,’ and ranges from a density@ 
of less than one inhabitant per square kilo® 
meter in the Territory of Quintana Roo to that 
of more than 115 per square kilometer in the 
Federal District. 
Conforming to the above 
pattern, Mexico City has by far the greatest 
population of all Mexican cities. — 
population figures are as follows: 
City 
1940 
1948 (est. 
Guadalajara, Jal......... 
229,235 
282, 
‘Monterrey, N.L........... 
186,092 
252,638 
Pues... 
138,491 
159,70 
Tampico, 
Tamps........... 
82,475 
106,874@ 
San Luis Potosi,SLP..... 
77,161 
97,4168 
Leon, Gto......... 
74,155 
93,75 
Saltillo, Coah......... 
49,430 
65,355 
Cd. Juarez, Chih....... 
48,811 
61,0605 
Most heavily populated states and terriorig 
are: 
1949 (est 
b= 
1940 
as of 30 
Federal District 
..... 
1,757,530 
2,107,362 
Michoacan 
.......:.. 
1,182,003 
1,484,258 
Guanajuato 
1,046,490 
1,361,786.4 
*Some of the small Latin American countries: 
— 
The ineq 
may be atti 
that the Sp 
of colonizat 
population 
present figu 
in the cent. 
shown 
gre: 
other areas. 
veloped in 1 
sion in the T 
sons to cros 
and from the 
eventually be 
4. 
Rural-Urt 
The Mexic 
Of the total r 
cent live in. 
percent live j 
rural inhabit 
more in six 
. 
central Mexic 
as Many as el. 
is the proporti 
are the 
in the central 
and the North 
in the Northw 
The rapid g 
however, is ta) 
The proportion 
ants living in tt 
from 23.5 perc 
> 
’ 
| 
| 
| 
| 
Nat: 
Tote 
Spa 
US 
> 
Gua 
| 
Canz 
S 
| 
Gern 
Britis 
Polis] 
Frenc 
Russi 
| 
Japar 
Italia 
: 
| 
.
. 
The inequality of geographical distribution 
1940. 
While the largest proportionate 
in- 
may be attributed in great measure tothe fact 
crease in population for the country as a 
that the Spaniard followe@ 
the Indian pattern 
whole is found in the cities, the largest actual 
of colonization and. settled: : 
‘the Indian 
_ 
increase remains in the smaller localities since 
population was... already 
.. dense; Although 
the number of persons living there is so much 
present figures. still shaw the greatest. density 
Greater. 
i 
aL 
in the central region, the recent years have 
‘The growth in Mexico City, Guadalaja: 
ara, 
shown greater proportionate 
increases 
in 
and Monterrey is almost phenomenal, suburbs 
other areas. The agrarian programs being de- 
springing into existence almost overnight. 
veloped in Mexico and the economic depres- 
One of the reasons for this urbanization is the 
sion in the US in the 1930’s caused many per- 
social unrest pursuant to the agrarian pro- 
sons to cross the-frontiers from Guatemala 
gram. 
Many of the investors in urban real 
and from the US along the border states,many 
estate and commercial and industrial con- 
eventually napemeng permanent residents. 
cerns are former landowners who have moved 
_ 
to the city. 
Rural-Urban Distributicg. 
5. Occupational 
Distribution 
(See Chapter 
The Mexican population is basically rural. 
[TI, Section 1.c.) 
Of the total population, approximately 68 per- 
aid 
cent live in small communities and only 32 
9. Significant Foreign Elements. 
percent live in the cities. The proportion of 
Mexico has a very low proportion of foreign- 
rural inhabitants has reached 80 percent or 
born among its population. 
Less than 1 per- 
more in six states located in southern and 
cent of the total population living in Mexico 
central Mexico, and from 70 to 80 percent in 
in 1940 were born outside its national borders 
as many as eleven states. 
In only fourstates 
as compared with 8.8 percent in the United 
is the proportion less than 50 percent. 
These 
States. 
The foreign-born population is lo- 
.. 
= 
@. 
are the Federal District and Aguascalientes 
cated principally in the cities. 
. 
in the central area, Coahuila in the northern, 
Foreign nationalities (individuals living in 
; 
and the Northern District of Lower California : RY Mexico who are citizens of a foreign country 
in the Northwestern areas; 
those living in Mexico who have been citi- 
¢ 
The rapid growth in Mexico’s Bis cots 
zens of a foreign country before taking Mexi- 
iS 
however, is taking place in the urban areas. 
can citizenship) 
total 105,350 persons. 
Of 
: 
The proportion of the total number of inhabit- _ these, one-fourth are Spaniards (27.9 percent). 
F 
ants living in the larger communities increased 
Complete statistics, according to the 1940 Cen- 
from 23.5 percent in 
to 27.5 
in 
SuS,,are as 
POPULATION OF FOREIGN NATIONALS LIVING IN MEXIco. 
Total Foreign 
Citizens of Foreign 
Have Become 
105,350 (4100.0 
67,548 1000, 37,802 
100.0 
20,344 
27.9 
21,023... 
31.2 
33.0 
| 
10,47? 
"18.5 
9,585. 
...142 
9,892 
26.2 
1.7 
~ 
} 
| 
va 
| 
i- 
= 
y* 
‘ 
| 
| 
; 
| 
; 
| 
| 
| | 
f 
wh 
cy
Other Pertinent Data: 
Slightly more than 1/3 (35.9 percent) of 
foreign-nationality groups have become Mexi- 
can citizens, while nearly 2/3 (64.1 percent) 
have retained their foreign citizenship. 
Per- 
sons from the US and Guatemala now residing 
in Mexico. have shown a greater tendency to 
become citizens of Mexico than have either 
Spaniards or Chinese. 
. Of those from the US, 
about half have become Mexican citizens, as 
compared with only 28.4 percent of the Span- 
iards. 
Many of those from the US who have 
become citizens are probably descendants of 
former Mexicans who have been living in the 
‘ 
mA 
f 1 
nt 
~~ 
“ie. 
. 
; 
iyi 
| 
consisting 
| 
level lowlar 
(4) The | 
| 
fornia—a r 
Places inter 
by the Gulf 
Peninsula, a 
€xico do n 
| 
Semiarid st 
tsi 
Res 
US but who have now returned to Mexico. 
The comparatively small proportion of Span- 
iards who have become citizens is probably} 
due to the large number who entered as refu 
gees from Spain during the late 1930’s 
who either expected to return to Spain or hag 
not been in Mexico long enough to have 
bes 
come citizens at the time the census was taker 
in 1940. 
Throughout the years the Spaniarc 
have shown greater tendency to become ci 
zens than has 
other foreign 
‘ 
*Whetten, p. 61. 
‘ 
pare 
i 
- 
j 
; 
t 
ty 
“> 
-* 
‘eal 
Wd 
>. 
Mexi 
ranks t 
publics. 
terrain 
(1) 7 
icana or 
of irregy 
western 
to the vc 
of Mexic 
teau con. 
flat-bottc 
increase 
plateau 
mountair 
(2) Mc 
teau—ma 
J 
; 
| 
| 
a
Mexico, with an area of 758,258 square miles, 
ranks third’ among the*Latin American Re- 
publics. 
It may be divided into four —— 
terrain regions. 
These are: 
(1) The Mexican Plateau (Ailtiplanicie 
icana on the accompanying map)— an area 
of irregular relief extending from the south- 
western part of the United States southward 
to the volcanic range that borders the Valley 
of Mexico. 
The northern portion of the pla- 
teau consists of mountain blocks rising above 
flat-bottomed valleys. 
Elevations gradually 
increase to the south, where a series of high 
plateau basins are 
separated by 
mountains. 
(2) Mountain Borders of the Mexican Pla- 
teau—massive 
barriers 
of communication, 
consisting of the Sierra Madre Oriental on the 
east; the extremely rough Sierra Madre Oc- 
cidental on the west; and a wide southern 
border beginning with the range of volcanic 
mountains (shown on the map as the Cordil- 
lera Neo-Volcanica) and extending southward 
to the Pacific Coast. 
ae 
(3) The East Coast of Mezico and the Yuca- 
tan Peninsula—the largest continuous 
¢ area of 
level lowland in Mexico. 
— 
ad 
(4) The West Coast of Mexico and Baja Cali- 
fornia—a relatively isolated coastal area. 
On 
the mainland, the Sierra Madre Occidental 
and the mountains of southern Mexico in some 
Places interrupt narrow coastal lowland. — 
The long, narrow peninsula of Baja Cali- 
fornia is isolated from the mainland of Mexico 
by the Gulf of California. 
Uplands bisect the 
beninsula, and most of the lowland lies along 
the western coast. 
The climatic regions of 
Mexico do not coincide with the four terrain 
tegions outlined above. In some cases, similar 
Climatic conditions occur 
seperated 
areas, 
Semiarid 
climate 
in (1) most 
| of the northern section 
the 
Pla- 
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nil (2) the west coast mainland bordering 
the southern part of the Gulf of California; 
(3) the southeastern tip of Baja California; 
and (4) the northwestern tip of Yucatan. 
Desert climate extends over (1) the north- 
western section of the Mexican Plateau; (2) 
the west coast mainland bordering the north- 
ern part of the Gulf of California; and (3) 
practically all of Baja California. 
Tropical savanna climate, with distinct wet 
and dry seasons, occurs in (1) most of the 
coastal lowland portion of the state of Vera- 
cruz; (2) most of the northern part of the 
Yucatan Peninsula; and (3) the west coast 
from slightly south of the Tropic of Cancer 
to beyond the Guatemalan frontier. 
A pronounced tropical rainy climate extends 
from the northern part of the Isthmus of 
Tehuantepec across the southern part of the 
Yucatan Peninsula. 
_ The subhumid tropical highland climate oc- 
curs throughout most of the nee south 
of she Tropic of Cancer. 
. The Mexican Plateau. 
@.Terrain.. 
- Mountain blocks ine above relatively flat- 
bottomed basins and valleys form the typical 
landscape of the northern portion of the Mexi- 
can Plateau. 
This terrain is a southward con- 
tinuatiort of similar-landforms found in west- 
ern Texas and the southern part of 
New Mex- 
ico and extends into the northern parts of 
the states of Durango, Zacatecas, and San Luis 
Potosi. 
The mountain blocks cross the area in a 
northwest 
to 
southeast 
direction. 
Their 
steep, rocky slopes often rise 3,000 feet above 
the basin floors to heights of 7,000 to 8,000 
feet above sea level. Salt-encrusted flats oc- 
cupy the lowest parts of many of the basins. 
The edges of the 
are covered 
accu- 
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be
mulations of sand and gravel washed down 
from the mountain blocks. 
The northern section of the plateau has in- 
terior drainage. 
The river basins of the Rio 
Grande and its southern tributary, the Rio 
Conchos, are the chief exceptions. 
The Rio 
Grande drains the northern and’eastern areas, 
and the Rio Conchos taps the drainage from 
the Sierra Madre Occidental. 
Most of the 
other streams evaporate in the arid surround- 
ings, and consequently the land surface has 
not been deeply dissected by stream action. 
The southern section of the plateau 
is 
higher and more mountainous. 
The transi- 
tion begins gradually in the states of Durango, 
Zacatecas, and San Luis Potosi. 
Southward 
the general elevation becomes increasingly 
higher. 
Here the floors of the basins and val- 
leys are 7,000 to 8,000 feet above sea level. 
Mountains in the volcanic rang® that extends 
from the state of Jalisco, along the southern 
margin of the plateau and into the state of 
Puebla, reach heights of 15,000 feet and higher, 
particularly east of Mexico City. 
With the ex- 
ception of the “Valley of Mexico,” all of the 
southern basins are drained to the Gulf of 
Mexico or the Pacific Ocean. 
As in the north, 
the land is not deeply 
by 
action. 
The major basins of the 
plateau 
are: (1) the “Valley of Mexico”; (2) the Basin 
of Puebla; (3) the Basin of Toluca; (4) the 
Basin of Guanajuato; (5) the Basin of Jalisco; 
and (6) the Valley of Aguascalientes. 
Each 
basin contains a major city and a cluster of 
smaller centers..; Mexico City, the capital, lo- 
_ 
Cated in the “Valley of Mexico” at approxi- 
| 
Mately 7,500 feet above sea level, is the prin- 
| 
cipal political, commercial, manufacturing, 
and cultural center of the Nation. 
Three types of climate occur on the Mexi- 
can Plateau: (1) steppe; (2) desert; and (3) 
tropical highland. 
is semiarid having a steppe climate. 
The 
mean annual rainfall varies from approxi- 
mately 20 to less than 40 inches, the amount. 
| 
increasing to the south. 
The rainy period is 
} 
brief, usually occurring in the summer. 
The 
annual range of temperature is small, but diur- 
fi, 
-. short distance north of Monterrey. 
In no 
Most of the northern section of the Plateau 
Trey, the north-south ranges rise to elevatiox 
” 
+ 
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nal range is large, especially in the dry season. 4 
The northwestern part of this northern sec- 
tion of the plateau, however, has a desert cli- 
mate. 
Rainfall is highly irregular, and even 
entire years may be rainless. 
The percent- 
age of sunshine is high, and relative humidity§ 
is very low. 
Both the annual and aurnal 
ranges of temperature are large. 
In general, the southern part of the plateau, | 
together with the surrounding mountains, has. 
a tropical highland climate. 
Rainfall aver-g 
ages 20 to 40 inches a year and is unevenly 
distributed throughout the area, the heaviest¢ 
rainfall occurring along the southern margin: 
Here, as in most of the areas farther north 
the annual range in temperature is small and 
the diurnal range large. 
2. 
Mountain Borders of the Mexican 
n 
Plateau 
| 
a. Terrain. 
Bordering the Mexican Plateau are series o , 
rough, dissected mountain ranges sloping out 
ward toward the Gulf of Mexico or the Pacifiga 
Ocean. 
The deep valleys of both the Sierrg 
Madre Oriental on the east and the Sierra 
Madre Occidental on the west are oriented 
for the most part, in a north-south directiong™ 
The southern border of the Mexican Plateay 
differs from both the eastern and western bom 
ders; it is a much wider zone including moun 
tain ranges, the Balsas Valley, and the digim 
sected plateau in the states of Oaxaca | she 
Guerrero. 
The Sierra Madre Oriental is less of a t ad 
rier to transportation than the Sierra Madam 
Occidental; nevertheless, comparatively fe 
breaches occur in the Sierra Madre Oriental 
The city of Monterrey is situated near 
ti 
most important gap in the north. 
Here 
t@ 
main axis of the mountain turns from 
tim 
north-south 
alinement 
that 
predominal™ 
farther 
south 
to an 
east-west 
alinemeg 
There are several other accessible passes 
ern Coahuila, the ranges again extend 
ingam 
north and south direction. 
South of Mon 
of 6,000 to 12,000 feet and are interrupted.@ 
many flat-bottomed valleys and basins. 
: 
atively few passes open to the Gulf of Me 
the two major routes being those le 
| 
adings 
the citie: 
Gulf of 
The Si 
gradually 
and basin 
the south, 
ingly rug; 
escarpmen 
deep cany: 
ing mount 
sharply ri 
gorges. 
The volc 
canica on t) 
of the Me; 
continue to 
the Rio Bals 
Valley is nea 
of the Balsa: 
and Oaxaca 
6,000 to 8,00 
have cut a se) 
and very litt 
ridge tops am 
are a few se! 
area is still 
with a steep 
of Tehuantepe 
b. Climate. 
The northe: 
Oriental 
has a 
of most of the 
| 
| 
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| 
Sierra 
: 
Souther 
the 
extrema 
- 
. 
Madre 
| 
for the nome 
pera tures 
merge 
| 
|
— 
the cities of Tampico and Veracruz on _ 
The Sierra. Madre occidental. rises rather 
gradually from the region of mountain blocks 
and basins in Chihuahua 
and Durango. 
To 
the south, the eastern slope becomes increas- 
ingly rugged... Along the Pacific slope, the 
escarpment is steeper and is interrupted by 
deep canyons cut by streams. 
The interven- 
ing mountain area is extremely rugged, with 
sharply rising. 
cut. by 
gorges. 
The volcanic ranges ( Cordillera Neo-Vol- 
canica on the map) mark the southern border 
of the Mexican Plateau. “fhese mountains 
continue to the south as far as the valleys of 
the Rio Balsas and its tributaries. The Balsas 
Valley is nearly enclosed by mountains. South 
of the Balsas Valley, in the states of Guerrero 
and Oaxaca, is a rugged, dissected plateau 
6,000 to 8,000 feet above sea level. 
Streams 
have cut a series of deep valleys in this plateau, 
and very little-flat land is left. 
Only where 
ridge tops and valley bottoms are wide enough 
are a few settlements found. 
Much of this 
area is still unexplored. 
The plateau ends 
with a steep escarpment facing the Isthmus 
of Tehuantepec and 
Pacific 
b. Climate.= te 
The northern “part of the Sierra Madre 
Oriental has a steppe climate similar to that 
of most of the northern part of the Mexican 
Plateau. 
To the~south the climate of the 
Sierra Madre Oriental changes to a tropical 
highland climate similar to that found in the 
southern parts. of the Mexican Plateau. 
In 
the extreme south-southeast, the Sierra Madre 
Oriental is more humid. 
Reliable data on the aie of ‘a Sierra 
Madre Occidental are lacking, particularly 
for the northern part. 
This northern section 
is Subject to extreme diurnal ranges in tem- 
. 
erature. 
The low eastern-facing slopes that 
merge with the Mexican Plateau have a steppe 
Climate, as have:the lower Pacific-facing 
| 
‘Slopes. 
Southern parts of the Sierra Madre . 
- 
Orcidental have a 
climate. 
part of the lowland arc. 
_ few surface streams in the western part of the 
Let 
3. “The East Coast of Mexico and the anoraae 
Peninsula. 
| 
The arc-shaped lowland bordering the Gulf 
of Mexico is the largest continuous area of level 
land in Mexico. 
The lower slopes of the Sierra 
Madre Oriental approach the coast north of 
Tampico and nearly bisect the lowland in the 
middle part of the state of Veracruz. 
In the 
southern section of the lowland arc, the Sierra 
Madre de Oaxaca, the eastern portion of the 
Sierra Madre del Sur, and the Sierra Madre 
de Chiapas form the inner margin of the plain. 
Large sections of the land adjacent to the 
coast are swampy. 
From Veracruz to the 
south shore of the Bahia de Campeche settle- 
ments are few. 
Most of the population is con- 
centrated on the lower slopes of the adjacent 
mountainous regions. 
The Yucatan Peninsula .forms the eastern 
Although there are 
peninsula lowland, the land surface, unlike 
that of most of the region, is not smooth or 
uniform. 
Limestone underlies the area and 
-karst erosion in many places has stipe the 
landscape a rough 
Four types of climate are found on the east 
coast of Mexico and the Yucatan Peninsula. 
The northern sector of the coast and the ex- 
treme northwestern tip of the peninsula have 
a steppe climate similar to that occurring in 
most of the northern areas of the Mexican 
Plateau. 
In general, south of the Tropic of 
Cancer the steppe climate gives way %0 a 
tropical savanna type. . 
The tropical 
climate 
extends 
southward from the Tropic of Cancer for ap- 
proximately 300 miles along the east coast in 
the state of Veracruz, then merges gradually 
into a rainy tropical climate. 
The tropical 
savanna Climate is transitional between the 
arid zone to the north and the humid region 
. 
to the south. 
Distinct wet and dry seasons 
are characteristic of this transitional zone. 
The dry season occurs during the winter and 
-lasts from two to four months. 
At the north- 
ern limits of the tropical savanna zone along 
‘ 
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perial Valley occupies part of this northern 
a-year. 
To the south, the rainfall siiekeiiiet 
increases. 
The area that extends from the southwest 
coast of the Bahia de Campeche across the 
southern part of the Yucatan Peninsula to the 
Gulf of Honduras has a rainy tropical climate, 
with heavier rainfall than farther north. 
Eastward along the coast bordering the Bahia 
de Campeche, the amount of rainfall increases 
from about 40 to nearly 100 inches, butithere 
is a sharp decrease in rainfall in Yucatan, 
where the tropical savanna climate again oc- 
curs. 
The Sierra Madre de Chiapas and the 
eastern part of the Sierra Madre del Sur, 
which border the coastal plain on the south, 
have greater diversity in both rainfall and 
4. 
The West’ Coast of Mexico and Bc 
California. 
a. Terrain. 
This region may be divided into three sec- 
tions: (1) Baja California; (2) the coastal area 
from the United States boundary to Cabo Cor- 
rientes; and 
the area from Cabo 
south to the Guatemalan boundary. 
Baja California is a narrow peninsula ap- 
proximately 760 miles long between the Gulf 
of California and the Pacific Ocean. 
A short 
distance inland from the Pacific Coast, the 
land rises in steplike terraces. 
Uplands bisect 
the peninsula in a north-south direction and 
occasional peaks rise to over 5,000 feet. 
The 
most continuous stretch of high mountains is 
in the northern part of the peninsula north 
of 30°N latitude; one peak is slightly more 
than 10,000 feet above sea level.’ The terrace 
surfaces are dry and in many places are inter- 
rupted by steep-sided, gravel-filled valleys. 
The Gulf of California occupies a large part 
of a rift depression, the extreme northern end 
of which is no longer submerged. 
The Im- 
area of the depression. 
The Colorado River 
% 
enters the depression below Yuma, Arizona, 
§ 
and flows to the Gulf of California. 
North of Cabo Corrientes on the mainland, 
the coastal lowland is interrupted in many * 
places by spurs of the Sierra Madre Occidental. 
Streams originating in these mountains cut 4 
across the dry terraces and the lava flows,4 
through which they descend on their way to™ 
the gulf. 
Several flat-bottomed valleys ex-¢ 
tend eastward into the highlands. 
The coastal area south of Cabo Corrientes: | 
is also interrupted by a series of spurs from; 
the upland area, which in many places ex- 
tend to the coast; the Sierra Madre del Sug 
at some points extends to the coast, forming 
abrupt cliffs. 
Between these spurs, the low 4 
land is extremely narrow. 
In general, 
few west coast harbors are isolated from theg® 
R 
interior, and most are silt-laden and too shal 
low for navigation. 
The Rio Balsas is the 
largest river flowing into the Pacific Oceam 
along this stretch of the Mexican coast; 
| 
gether with its tributaries it drains a largeg 
area of the southern Mexican mountains. 
¥ 
The coastal strip along the Gulf of Teh 
tepec is continuous but narrow. 
b. Climate. 
The climate of the west coast of Mexico k 
comes progressively more humid from 
no 
to south. 
Practically all of Baja Californiz 
and of the west coast mainland bordering 
northern part of the Gulf of California has 
§ 
desert climate similar to that of the no 
western section of the Mexican Plateau. 
southeastern tip of Baja California and 
opposite west coast of the mainland haves 
steppe climate like that of most of the no 
ern part of the Mexican Plateau. 
The remainder of the west coast of Mexicd 
from slightly south of the Tropic of Canceg™ 
to the Guatemalan boundary, has a tropicé 
savanna climate similar to that occurring @ 
the east coast in the state of Veracruz. 
| 
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FROM: 
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2. SUBJECT RE? 18 G2 
ALVARADO UGARTE NEMERR uP 
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“WICARAGUAN EXILB REVOLUTIONARY GROUP 
is CUBAN SUPPORTED AND COMMUNIST DOMINATED. | 
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for FOIA Review oa 
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COORDINATING OFFICERS 
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REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE 4S PROHIBITED, 
Sony No. 
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’ BELIEVE FOLL INFO. WHICH SUPPLEMENTAL REF C REPORT WORTHWHILE IN 
INCLUSION Has PRESENTATION: 
THE UNIDENTIFIED SOV OF REF 
WHO MET 
\ 
senate NIKOLAYEVICH ANTONOV (CHIEF LATIN AMERICAN DEPT 
HAS NOW 
foe 
PRC Oncerned activities of Sergey Nikolayevich Antonov in 
for FOIA Review ‘on MAY 1678. 
| 
US “COPY 
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REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE !S PROHIBITED 
Copy No. 
PPP 
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TION: 
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| 
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2 145 
REF | 
* 
1. 
FOLL SOLIS REPLY PARA 
1 REF: 
Ae 
HAD NOT RECEIVED TYO LETTERS RECENTLY FROM VILLANUEVA. 
WOMD FORWARD AS-REQITESTED ANY “OTESOOK THAT TURNED UP, 
Ce ‘BEST RECOLLECTION VILLANUEVA ARRIVED COZUMEL VERY EARLY 
guy, $3, LEFT ON 4 
63 ON FERRY SOAT ALBERTO FOR PUERIO JUAREZ. 
SOLIS RECEIVED THREE. LETTERS, SINCE BURNED, FROM VILLANUSVA 
IN GUAD- 
ALAJARA IN MONTHS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING VILLANUEVA DEPARTURE FROM 
COZUMEL. 
SOLIS ANSWERED ALL THREE. 
IN LAST OF THREE REPLIES SOLIS 
ASYED VILLANIIEVA REPAY 5849 PESO JOAN. 
SOLIS NEVER HEARD FROM 
| 
9/61 
Kar 
UO 
40} 
VILLANUEVA AFTER THAT. 
VILLANIIEVA 
IN ONE OF THREE LETTERS ASKED IF 
SOLIS MOILD LIKE TO BE “SECRET POLICE AGENT” ON COZUBEL. 
SOLIS WAD YO FIRTHER INFO ON POSSIBLE CONTACTS. VILLANUEVA WITH CUBANS 
OR AMERICANS 
ON COZIMEL. 
TVILLAMIEVA, 
NOT WORKING ALPANIL, SPENT HIS TIME AT SOLIS: 
(WEEDING, CITTING ARUSH) AND USUALLY IN HAMMOCK BY 
2°30 YOIRS, 
SOLIS AND VILLANUEVA SOMETIMES VISITED MAYALUM-NIGHTCLUB 
TOGETUER, VILLA™IEVA 
Be ‘MICH OF A DRINKER. 
| 
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE !S PROHIBITED 
| 
Copy No, | 
| 
| 
| 
|
VILLANIHEVA 
ARP TVED COZUMEL WITH SERGEANT 
| 2. 
SOLIS ALSO SAID: 
SECOND CLASS. “POLO” (NICUNAME) 
WAS ARRIVING ON NEW. ASSIGNMENT 
TO, CO7NMEL MILITARY 
VILLaMUEYA SAID HAD MET POLO IN MEXICO CITY: 
CAME APON"D SOLTS HOUSE TWICE 
VILLANUEVA DEPARTURE LOOKING 
FOR VILLAMNEVA. 
BE TELLING STRAIGHT FOWARD STORY» SOLIS DAUGHTER, APPARENTLY 
UNPRIZED, CONFIRMED BURNING OF LETTERS FROM VILLANUEVA., 
‘Comment: 
put to Daniel Solis. 
CONCUR SOLIS. 
*Forwarded additional questiens which Legal Attache wished to have 7 
? 
| 
| 
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
LS 
COUNTRY MEXICO 
TOCS ~3/57%,290 
DATE OF 
22, 23, 
and 26 
DISTR, 
1964 
' 
PLANS FOR PEASANT UPRISING IN LINARES, 
KLEIR 
DATE ACQ. . 
(22, 28 April 1964) 
ree 
SMITH, 
87296 
BB com 
1; ON 22 APRIL 1964 JULIO CAMPOS PENA, MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL 
| 
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE CENTRAL CAMPESINA INDEPENDIENTE 
(CCI - 
. 
"INDEPENDENT PEASANTS' CENTRAL, WHO IS IN CHARGE OF ALL ACTIVITIES 
| % 
DEALING WITH ARMS BOUGET BY THE CCI, SAID THAT IT WAS NECESSARY 
oo ae EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO RAISE MONEY TO PAY FOR ONE THOUSAND 
-MACHINE-GUNS NOW IN RIO BRAVO, TAMAULIPAS, WHICH CANE FROM THE 
| 
UNETED STATES AND MUST BE PAID FOR QUICKLY, 
THE FOLLOWING DAY 
| 
‘CAMPOS REVEAED THAT JUAN DURAN, ADMINISTRATIVE HEAD OF THE 
ets 
MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE OP ‘THE CCI IN RIO BRAVO, IS ENTRUSTED WITH THE 
(CONTINUED) 
 SANITIZHD CoPy 
22 MAR 1876 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
} 
| 
| 
| 
|
CLASSIFICATION = DISSEMINnsION CONTROLS 
TDCS-3/579 , 290 
‘ RECEIPT AND STORAGE OF THE ARMS, 
(FIELD COMMENT: 
DURAN IS PROBABLY 
| 
‘IDENTICAL WITH JUAN DURAN PEREZ, REPORTED IN CS-3/545,610 AS 
LEADER OF THE BRANCH OF THE CCI LOCATED IN THE VENUSTIANO CARRANZA 
COLONY IN RIO BRAVO.) 
| 
| 
cae. 
2. ON 22 APRIL CAMPOS ALSO SAID THAT MEMBERS OF THE CCI MUST BE | 
|. READY TO GO INTO THE MOINTAINS AT A MOMENT?S NOTICE AND THAT MILITANT 
.* ACTION WOULD BEGIN IN LINARES, NUEVO LEON, BEFORE 10 MAY 1964. 
. ACCORDING TO CAMPOS, ONCE THE BATTLE IS STARTED, THE CCI EXPECTS 
|’ PEASANTS FROM OTHER STATES TO TAKE UP ARMS IN SUPPORT OF THE 
| . LINARES GROUP 
ON 23 APRIL HE INDICATED THAT THE FACTION OF THE CCI 
. SYMPATHETIC TO BRAULIO MALDONADO SANDEZ, PRO-COMMUNIST FORMER 
|. GOVERNOR OF BAJA CALIFORNIA, IS READY TO START MILITANT ACTION EVEN 
_. IF OTHER LEADERS OF THE CCI DO NOT AGREE BECAUSE OF PREVIOUS 
/ y+. 8° ON 26 APRIL SERAPIO CASAS, LEADER OF THE CCI IN LINARES, SAID 
: ; THAT THE GROUP STILL NEEDED 20,000 PESOS ($US 1600) TO PAY FOR 
! 
THE ARMS SHIPMENT IN RIO BRAVO. 
be 
| 
ON THE SAME DAY RAMON DANZOS PALOMINO, ‘AXDIDATE FOR 
| 
|». PRESIDENT OF MEXICO OF THE FRENTE ELECTORAL DEL PUEBLO (FEP - 
| 
: 
_| 
PEOPLE'S ELECTORAL FRONT), SINGLE, UNITED FRONT OF MEXICAN LEFTISTS 
AND COMIUNISTS, TOLD CASAS THAT THE LINARES GROUP SHOULD WAIT 
- 
UNTIL AFTER THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS BEFORE TAKING UP ARMS. 
| 
(CONTINUED) 
| 
| 
| 
| | 
|
aa 
CASAS REPLIED THAT THEY WOULD NOT WAIT, BUT WOULD BEGIN AS SOON AS THE 
_ ARMS WERE RECEIVED. 
DANZOS THEN TOLD CASAS THAT THEY MUST FOLLOW 
| 
"AGREED, BUT THE PEOPLE DID NOT. 
HE SAID THAT THE PEOPLE IN 
TAMAULIPAS, NUEVO LEON, AND CHIHUAHUA ARE READY AND DO NOT WANT 
_ 
ORDERS FROM NATIONAL LEADERS OF THE CCI. 
WAIT. 
5. FIELD DISSEY: 
starz, FBI 
CASAS SAID THAT HE 
A 
x 
CLASSIFICATION 
DISSEMINATnwd CONTROLS 
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| 
CENTRAL 
INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY 
| 
7 April 1966 
: 
SUBJECT: 
SNIE 61-66: 
SECURITY CONDITIONS IN MEXICO 
| 
THE 
To estimate the likelihood of tncidents which would endanger or 
embarrass Mrs. Johnson and Secretary Rusk during their visit to Mexico 
City. 
CONCTUSTION 
The political situation in Mexico 15 considerably more stable than 
in most Latin American countries. 
The Institutional Revolutionary Party 
(PRI) maintains a virtual monopoly over national and local politics. 
The 
| 
security forces in Mexico City ere experienced and effective in controlling 
| 
demonstrations. 
In recent years the Mexican Government hns cooperated 
willingly with the US in eliminsting certain longstanding issues in US- 
| 
Mexican relations and in controlling cthers. 
Nevertheless ,» there are 
| 
| 
| 
| 
ae 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
Py 
‘th
» 
Mate 
d 
anti-US elements in Mexico which might attempt to create incidents designed 
to disrupt US-Mexican relations. 
While there can be no absolute guarantee 
egainst such an incident, we believe that the Mexican Government will take 
security precautions which will be adequate to protect Mrs. Johnson, 
Secretary Rusk, and their party. 
DISCUSSION 
The Political Situation 
1. 
The political situsation in Mexico is considerably more steble 
than in most Latin American countries. 
The official party, the PRI, has 
dominated Mexican politics for nearly four decades. 
It encompasses groups 
ranging fron the far left to the extreme right and exercises a virtual 
monopoly over political offices from national to local levels. 
While 
President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz has followed a course to the right of his 
predecessor's, there is no substantin. opposition to his administration. 
2. 
Confident of its ability to control the situation, the Mexican 
Government has permitted Mexico City to become a haven for political exiles 
from other countries, mostly Communists and other leftist extremists, but 
including also anti-Castro Cubans. 
Mexico City is a major center for 
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Communist activities in Latin America. 
The Mexican Government, however, 
maintains some surveillance over the activities of these various extremist 
end exile groups. 
Even before the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, moderate 
and conservative elements in the PRE were exerting pressure to restrict 
the influence of Castroites, Communists, and other extremists. 
3. 
The Mexican Government ctill maintaing diplomatic relations with 
Cuba and the USSR, but it has shorply limited pro-Castroite and other anti- 
US activities. 
There ere still some Commm‘sts and other anti-US elements 
in the bureaucracy, the educational system, peasant groups, and labor 
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unions, but their ability to create disturbances has been curtailed by the 
administration's coercion and harassment. 
The orthodox Mexican Communist 
Party (PCM), the Marxist Popular Socialist Party (PPS) led by Lombardo 
Toledano, and other extremist movements exist only on official sufferance 
and have only a very limited ability to rouse public support. 
The once- 
touted Movement of National Liberation (MLN), an anti-US and pro-Cuban 
mass organization founded in 1961, has lost mich of its early support and 
has been weakened by disagreement among its leaders. 
The recent efforts 
of the PCM and PPS to stage anti-US demonstrations in support of the 
North Vietnamese were an almost complete failure. 
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The Mexican Government's Position on the Visit 
4. 
President Diaz Ordaz, who has placed special emphasis on Mexico's 
foreign relations, will be concerned to prevent any incident that would 
impair his government's presitge cbrond. 
Tis administretion also is aware 
that it needs outside ald in corrying out economic and social reform in 
rural Mexico, where nenrly half the populstion is receiving few, if eny, 
tangible benefits from the Mexican Revolution. 
The US, by committing funds 
under the Alliance for Prorress, has already indicated its willingness to 
essist the Mexican Covernment's efforts in this field. 
5. 
We believe that the Mexican Covernment will take effective 
security precautions, in cooperation with US officiels, to prevent or 
control any hostile demonstrations during the visit of Mrs. Johnson and 
Secretary Rusk. 
While Minister of Governnent (1958-1964), President Diaz 
Ordaz increased the capabilities of the various civil police organizations 
in the Federal District; he denonstrated his ability to control would-be 
troublemakers during President Kennedy's visit in June 1962. 
The Federal 
District police, which number ebvout 19,000 men, are experienced in detecting 
and detaining subversives and extremists. 
They have been effective in 
controlling demonstrations in the Federal District. 
If needed, there are 
also at least 11,000 well-trained end reliable army troops quartered in 
Mexico City and the immediate vicinity. 
The army and police forces are 
anti-Communist and fully responsive to the orders of the Diaz Ordaz 
administration. 
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6. 
Mexico's extremist elexents Imov that the government would crack 
down hard on any organized agitation auring the visit of Mrs. Johnson and 
Secretary Rusk. 
The major Commmist croups would also feel that eny serious 
incident would bring to an en? the freedom they have enjoyed for their 
propaganda end other overt activities. 
The most likely source of such an 
incident would be the radical student groups at the National University, 
where there is already considerable unrest reflected in a student strike. 
The approaching anniversary of the US intervention in the Dominican Republic 
would provide a likely theme for a student demonstration. 
However, Mexican 
authorities customarily use detention, coercion, end other warnings to keep 
such potential troublemakers in line. 
Prospects 
T. 
We believe that the Mexican Government will take security pre- 
cautions which will be adequate to protect Mrs. Johnson, Secretary Rusk 
and their party from manheandling by an angry mob and to minimize the 
possibility of a seriously embarrassing cemonstration. 
However, the 
possibility of an assassination ettempt by an individual can never be 
excluded. 
The Mexican Government might be less able to ensure security 
outside of Mexico City. 
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CENTRAL 
INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY 
12 October 1967 
) 
SUBJECT: 
SNIE 81-67: 
SECURITY CUNDITIONS IN MEXICO 
THE PROBLEM 
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To estimate the 1ixelihood of incidents which would endanger President 
Johnson during his visit to Ciudad Juérez on 28 October 1967. 
CONCLUSION 
We believe that the Mexican | securit cy services will manage to keep 
untoward incidents to a minimum end that the risks entailed in President 
possibility of an assassination attempt by a 2 psychopath or fanatic. 
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Johnson's brief 
visit will bo emall. One may not, however, rule out the 
GROUP 
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DISCUSSION 
1. 
Relations between the Mexican and US governments are extremely 
friendly, and President Johnson is personally popular in Mexico. 
The oc- 
casion for this visit is, moreover, propitious. 
The ceremonies in which 
President Johnson and President Diaz Ordaz will take part mark the amicable 
settlement of the long-standing Chamizal border dispute -- a settlement 
which returns to Mexico certain territory in the Ciudad Judérez-El Paso area. 
2. 
The political situation in Mexico is considerably more stable than 
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that in most Latin Americen countries. 
The Institutional Revolutionary 
Party (PRI) maintains ea virtual monopoly over national and local politics. 
Not only is the PRI effective in maintaining stability generally, but it 
is also an important means for facilitating security for visiting foreign 
dignitaries, and for President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz during his public ap- 
pearances in various parts of the country. 
At such times, the party 
organizes en appropriate populer reception; when travel by motorcade is 
involved, it lines the streets with its members and those of its youth 
wing. 
3. The Mexican security forces are tough end reasonably competent. 
The Presidential Guard, the unit responsible for seeing to the safety of 
. the Mexican President anywhere in the country, is a crack outfit. 
Moreover, 
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SELORT 
Mexican legal procedures do not inhibit the police from detaining es many 
known or suspected trouble-makers as they consider necessary to maintain 
adequate safeguards. 
During President Johnson's visit to Mexico City in 
April 1966, the planning of the top Mexicen security officials and the con- 
bination of measures carried out by the security forces were well devised 
and impressive. 
President piaz Ordaz himself was responsible for such 
arrangements when he was Minister of Interior (1958-1964), and he continues 
to take an active interest in security matters. 
4. There are, of course, a number of anti-US elements in Mexico. 
Mexico City has long been a haven for political exiles from other countries, 
mostly Communists and leftist extremists but also including anti-Castro 
Cubans. 
The Mexican Government is confident of its eoility to control such 
extremist groups, and maintains surveillance over the activities of some of 
them. 
There is the possibility, however, particularly since the Mexican 
press has already carried stories about President Johnson's planned visit, 
that a few of these people will go to Ciudad Juérez to try to create dis- 
turbances or other incidents. 
5. 
Ciudad Juérez itself, a wide-open border town of several hundred 
thousand poeple 2! contains ea number of anti-Yankee groups. 
These are amall, 
1/ The most recent Mexican census (1960) gave the population as 262,000. 
ee since grown rapidly, and present estimates vary from 379,000 to 
,000. 
SEGRET 
com 
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however, and not notably aggressive. 
Among them are the local unit of the 
Mexican Communist Party, which probably has no more than 30 active members, 
ea chapter of the Popular Socialist Party, which has fewer, and the Civic 
Democratic Alliance, a minuscule front group which has joined them in pro- 
testing against the US role in Vietnam. 
The leftists most likely to attempt 
agitation or demonstrations are a minority group among the students at the 
School of Agriculture. 
6. The local authorities know the identities of the leaders of all 
these groups; most will likely be detained or warned before the visit. The 
Ciudad Judrez police force is not of the same quality as that in Mexico City P 
but it has leftist elements cowed, is accustamed to dealing with rough 
customers of whatever stripe, end usually has a line on any local citizens 
who might be dangerous. 
Some 350 of the uniformed police have been assigned 
special duty for the time of the visit, end plainclothesmen will be min- 
Bling with the crowd. 
7. Mexico's Minister of Defense is in overall command of all security 
forces during President Johnson's visit; the Federal Security Police are in 
charge of the security preparations. 
Army units will play a major part. 
The military unit normally assigned to Ciudad Judérez is the First Infantry 
Battalion, some 600 strong. 
A battalion of the Presidential Guard has al- 
ready been dispatched to supplement this force, and an additionel infantry 
battation from Mexico City is to move in soon. 
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8. We therefore anticipate that a substential force of security 
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personnel will be provided, and that the security arrangements will be 
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effective as they apply to controlling groups and organized ectivities. 
One may not, of course, rule out the possibility of an assassination 
attempt by some individual -- perhaps a psychopath or 4 fanatic, who 
could be Mexican, American, or any other mationality. 
This possibility 
is of particular concern because of the physical circumstances in which 
the President will be exposed to crowds while driving in an open car down 
relatively narrow streets of a border town. 
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