A'a.'i  ■■*— 
from  the:  vnrtlr-o  utructuro  of  tho  Office  of  fitif-t c^;l o  I'.orvlccil  In  which  Ciouo 
actlvjtioa  w;ro  conducted  in  separate  brandies.  It  In  aluo  di  ffcront  frosi 
rant-  foreign  servlcon,  which  have  separate  en].lc:ru;c  iuid  counter-e.'iplonr.go 
branches,  integrated  only  tlirough  thoir  chlofn.  I'o.'jolbly  becauac  of  this 
0r.2r.ni national  unification  counter-oaplonago  has  not  yet  been  adequately  ex- 
ploited co  a  nourcc  of  poaitivo  intelligence  information,  no  a  channel  for 
deception,  aa  a  means  of  protecting  espionage  opci'ationa  and  aa  a  baoin  for 
penetrating  fifth  colican  operations  abroad,  which  may  be  tiod  in  with  fifth 
column  ocerationa  here. 
The  technlq.uco  of  espionage  seem  somewhat  cianlcr  than  thoae  of  counter- 
espionage, and  the  former  generally  Is  assumed  to proaise  raore  decisive  results, 
iactors  such  aa  these  have  influenced . tho  concentration  of  the  Office  of  Special 
Operations  on  espionage  problems.  It  seems  apparent  that  tho  present  counter- 
espionage staff  'of  the  Office  of  Special  Operations  should  be  materially 
strengthened  and  more  intensive  counter-espionage  work  promoted. 
Owing  to  the  subordination  of  counter-espionage  to  espionage,  the  ex- 
ploitation by  the  Office  of  Special  Operations  of  counter-intelligence  oppor- 
tunities and  lt-3  general  approach  to  the  problems  of  counter-intelligence  have 
not  been  markedly  successful.  Its  liaison  arrangements  with  the  Federal  Bureau 
of  Investigation,  which  is  charged  with  all  counter-espionage  responsibilities 
in  the  United  States,  except  those  affecting  personnel  of  the  Armed  Services, 
have  "been  United  for  the  moat  part  to  exchange  of  Information  on  suopect 
individuals. 
Full  collaboration  on  counter-espionage     plans  and  operations  hao  not  yet 
been  achicvod,  and  ncithor  organization     is  fully  acquainted  with  tho  over-all 
'  123
J 
nro.y.in  of  tho  oLhyr.  f.Jnco  tho  ci-.tiyv.-r  of  foruJ;;n  ouj>lor..'r;o  and  tho  :::.:u-if:o  of 
fifth  col'-i'-'i  actlvitUm  tlctjii  not  ol.up  ox*  oturt  at  our  natlou'il  boiu.c!-.rJ  u.i,  It 
io  dc.il  rah  lo  tint,  tho  tvo  i-vcndou  ;;ont  concern^],  with  CGyiiter-ooplO'v.'.;'/!  nhould 
j.-a lr.tr: In  clouor  relatione  with  ouch  other.  Vfo  havo  already  pointer!  out  in 
Chapter  IV  the  oxtcnt  of  tho  roapor-cibility  of  tho  Central  Intollieonco  A^oncy 
to  inauro  coordination  of  certain  countor-intolligcncQ  activltioa  of  tho 
Govorrnent.  V.'o  can  only  obaorvo  hero  that  a  inajor  aopoct  of  auch  coordination 
Jo  a  cloao  verting  relationship  botvoon  tbo  Offico  of  Special  Oporationo  and 
t)i©  Fedoral  Bureau  of  Investigation. 
COWSJSICATIOJS  BffELLKffiKCE 
1U(, 
;rvv.'-';*
TilK  I!!"."!)  Ff«».  10L1CV   I'lKKCTIC::  Or   SILT^T   Il.'l^iJ.lOJ^Cl; 
To  bo  genuinely  effective,  neerot  Intel  13 ,-.■/..•  >;cc  ononil.lon:i  m.at  be  di rooted 
toward  the  intelligence  objectiven  of  Greatest  importance  to  the  Covenant. 
Today,  ao  ue  mentioned  above,  the  Office  of  Special  Operation;)  lacksi  the 
direction  vhich  It  needs  to  insure  the  maximum  relevancy  of  lto  operations  -to 
the  problems  of  foreign  and  military  policy.  It  in,  indeed,  a  fundamental 
failing  of  the  American  intelligence  cervices  that,  In  general,  they  arc  not 
advised  of  the  current  needs  of  policy-makers.  Unfortunately,  continuing  ef- 
fort io  rarely  made  by  intelligence  conouaero  to  guido  intelligence  activities 
tovard  the  most  meaningful  targets. 
The  formal  requirement  lists  of  tho  military  eervices  are  received  by  the 
Office  of  Special  Operationo;  generally  speaking,  theae  are  of  a  "opot",  short- 
term  nature.  They  are  often  transmitted  vith  the  implied  expectation  that  the 
deelrcd  an&vcrs  can  be  faecured  almost  iiffiudlatoly.  Adequate  guidance  from 
the  State  Department  is  lacking,  except  in  the  cases  of  a  few  officers  of  the 
Of fice  of  Special  Operations  vho  maintain  personal  contact  vith  policy  officers 
in  the  State  Department.  No  regular  cvaluatory  or  other  comments  are  received 
on  the  intelligence  reporto  put  out  by  the  Office  except  from  the  Office  of 
Reports  and  Estimates  vhich  is  not  necessarily  the  beet  source  for  such  Judg- 
ments. It  io  thuo  doprived  of  tho  guldanco  in  opecific  cases  vhich  Service 
agencies  and  the  State  Department  could  supply. 
Wo  bolievc  that  these  deficiencies  voulcl  be  rcmodiod,  at  least  in  part, 
by  tho  attachment  to  the  Offico  of  Special  Operations,  as  ouggootod  oarlior  in 
this  chapter,  of  representatives  from  tho  Department  of  Stato  and  the  Sorvicco 
and  by  tho  creation  of  a  mpro  direct  relationship  to  tho  Secretaries  of  Stato 
and  Do  Tonne.
In  appyjiJoins  tho  general  rcouUn  of  the  operations  of  the  Office  of 
SjiccJftl  Operations,  it  l.o  too  early  to  arrive  at  i!cf!  nltc  coneluuionn.  Certain 
opoi-ationa  Jio^  bcira  conducted,  hitherto  lacking  in  result?) ,  ray  prove  to  he 
of  the"  first  importance  at  oo:ac  tiwo  in  tho  future.  It  can  bo  said,  however, 
Hint  tho  Office-  has  boon  successful  in  securing  certain  categories  of  vuluablo 
Intelligence,  It  haa  aloo  established  or  mintained  rolationo  vith  the  in- 
telligence services  of  several  friendly  countries,  not  only  for  the  exchange 
of  inforration  but,  in  soir.e  caees,  for  tho  conduct  of  operations. 
Many  priority  targeto  of  oe'erot  intelligence  rc:oain  untouched.  Few  sig- 
nificant operations  have  been  conducted  within  thoSoviot  Union,  and  operational 
planning  for  others  remains  at  a  fairly  early  stage.  We  recognize  the  vast 
difficulties     of  this  typo  of    undertaking  and  the  need     for  estrone     caution. 
Throughout  tho  departnsntal  intelligence  Dorvice3,  a3  ve  have  remarked 
earlier,  there  exists  ageneral  feeling  that  tho  rooults  of  secret  intelligence 
operations  have  not  yet  attained  the  level  which  the  current  concentration  of 
personnel  and  funds  Ghould  warrant.  This,  we  believe,  is  in  part  duo  to  tho 
lack  of  sufficiently  intiuate  liaison  between  the  Office  of  Special  Operations, 
tho  Services  and  the  State  Department. 
In  thus  acaeaalng  achicvcciento,  it  cannot  bo  forgotten  that  tho  agency  is 
still  vory  young.  This  iu  the  reason  for  sono  of  tho  dofecto  which  hayc  boon 
pointed  out  in  tho  foregoing  diccuoalon.  Tho  organization  doso  have  tho  serv- 
ices of  ooino  highly  talontcd  and  exporiencod  pornonu,  both  in  hon&quartors  and 
in  tho  fiold.  Thoir  proaonco  givoo  proaiso  of  nyntc:catic  improvonont  for  thoir 
work  as  a  wholo. 
128
cd:ici.u3]o:.t.  and  ir&co^-.i^DATior.'S  •  *"" 
(1)  Tho  covert  o;-.oiv.L!.fjMO  of  tho  Officii  of  Spocl.-il  Ojk->m1.1o:ki  :l:u1  Office 
of  Policy  CoordJnatlc-.il  and  tho  nctlvltloii  of  tho  Coat-ict  Branch  of  tho  Off ico 
of  Operations  ohould  bo  integrated,  and  tho  throe  operations  should  bo  brought 
togothor  under  oinglo  ovor-ull  direction  (Operations  Division)  v lth In  tlv.- 
Contrnl  Intolllgcnco  Agoiicy.* 
(2)  Covort  intelligence  activltioo  conducted  by  tho  Control  Intelligence 
Agoncy  and  otbor  agencies  in  occupiod  areas  should  bo  roviowod  In  ordor  to  of- 
foct  close  coordination. 
(3)  Ho23uroa  ohould  bo  Inltiatod  within  tho  Central  Intelligence  Agency 
looking  toward  better  coordination  of  the  handling  of  defectors,  vhich  concerns 
American  intelligence  agencies  abroad  as  woll  ao  in  tho  continental  United  States. 
(1»)  The  Office  of  Special  Operations  (or  the  now  Operations  Division) 
must  give  priaary  attention  to  tho  buildlJig  up  of  a  corp3  of  trained  personnel 
for  operations  abroad. 
(5)  The  cover  policies  of  tho  Office  of  Special  Operations  in  tho  field 
should  bo  generally  ro viewed  and  tightened.  Continuous  and  careful  considera- 
tion ohould  be  given  to  increasing  the  U30  of  non-official  cover  at  the  same 
time  that  denando  for  diplomatic     or  military  cover  are     reduced  to  a  minimum. 
(6)  Tho  counter-espionage  activities  of  the  Off ico  of  Special  Operations 
should  bo  increased  In  scope  and  eraphanio,  and  closer  liaioon  in  thi3  field 
ohould  be  establiohod  with  the  Fodoral  Buroau  of  Investigation. 
(7)  Relations  with  departmental  agencies  should  be  brought  closer,  and 
tho  guidance  which  tho  Off  ico  of  Special  Operations  rocoivos  from  intelligence 
*    For  our  rcconrnondntlono  regarding     tho  Foreign  Broadcast  Information  Branch 
of  tho  Off  ico  of  Operations,  000  Chapter  VII. 
•      *  129
"TT-i.iu.-iro  r.Iiould  bo  ulrongUn.-nud.  Thki  Kii^'nt  ho  achieved  l>j'  incivility  ropro- 
fui:jUtlv«:i  of  Uic  Sorvlce  agent:  loa  and  the  GLuto  IV.-jart^nt  In  tho  Infon.vition 
Control  Section  of  the  Offlco  of  Special  Cporntior.:j. 
(8)  Tho  Director  ohoidd  asouro  hLrr.r.elf  that  tho  Offlco  of  Special  Opera- 
tiono  1«  receiving  adoquato  lnforrstion  on  tho  current  and  ctratcglc  Intelli- 
gence noodo  of  tho  Government.  Thio  might  bo  achioved  by  oatablinhine  clooor 
rclationo  with  the  Secretaries  of  State  and  Dofonoo. 
(9)  Tho  Office  of  Special  Oporationo  ohould  czorcico  a  greater  neaouro 
of  control  over  the  discoaination'  of  ltd  own  material. 
(10)  The' Uuclear  Energy  Group  chould  bo  laovod  fro:a  the  Offico  of  Special 
Operations  to  tho  proposed  Research  and  Reporto  Dlvioion  vhero  it  chould  be  a 
part  of  tho  general  ocientific  vork. 
(11)  The  Office  of  Special  Operations  6hould  have  access  to  co-KsvL-iicationa 
Intelligence  to  the  full  extent  required  for  guidance  in  directing  its  opora- 
tiono and  for  nore  effective  conduct  of  counter-espionage. 
130
CHAPTER  IX  _— ..^..- 
SERVICKS  OK  COMMON  CONCERN: 
T1JK  CONDUCT  OF  SECRET  OPERATIONS 
HELATIOX  L'STnT-lM'!  SIX  JILT  IIJTSLLIGEICE  AIJD  SECi'.':'.T  on:RATIO::S 
Tho  collection  of  oocrot  int-jlllgonco  io  cloooly  related  to  tho  conduct 
of  oocrot  oporationo  In  oupport  oi'  national  policy.  Those  operations,  includ- 
ing covert  poychologlcol  warfare,  clandestine  political  activity,  sabotage  and 
guerrilla  activity,  hevo  always  toon  tho  companions  of  occrot  intolligcnco.- 
The  two  activities  oupport  each  other  and  can  be  disassociated  only  to  tho 
detriment  of  both.  Effoctiv©  secret  intollig3nco  Id  a  preroquioite  to  oound 
oocrot  operations  and,  vhcro  oocurity  considerations  permit,  channelo  for 
oocret  intelligence  cay  also  servo  oecrot  operationD.  On  tho  other  hand,  al- 
though the  acquisition  of  intolligcnco  io  not  tho  immediate  objective  of  oecrot 
operations,  the  .latter  ray  prove  to  boanost  productive  oourco.  of  intelligence . 
It  vaa  because  of  our  viowo  on  tho  intiisate  relationship  between  these 
tvo  activities  that  we  submitted  our  Interim  Report  No.  2,  dated  May  13,  19!*S, 
"Relationo  Between  Secret  Operations  and  Secret  Intelligence,"  which  v.c  a 
comment  on  proposals,  then  boforo  tho  National  Security  Council,  for  the  ini- 
tiation of  a  program  of  Gecrot  operations.  In  that  roport  wo  inado  tho  follow- 
ing observations: 
"In  carrying  out  thooe  special  operations,  the  Director  /of  Secret 
Oporationo/  and  hio  staff  should  havo  intinato  knowlcdgo  of  what  in  being 
dono  in  the  field  of  oocrot  intelligence  and  accooo  to  all  tho  facilities 
which  r.'j\y  bo  built  up  through  a  proporly  constituted  occrot  intelligence 
network.  Socrot  operations,  particular] y  through  oupport  of  resistance 
gi'oupo,  provide  one  of  tho  coot  important  oourcoa  of  oocrot  lntolligonco, 
.  and  tho  ini'or;nation  gained  fron  oocrot  intelligence  muot  im::iodlatoly  bo 
put  to  uoo  in  guiding  and  directing  oocrot  oporationo.  In  many  caooo  It 
is  nocoooary  to  dotonnino  whothor  a  particular  agont  or  chain  should 
131 
^ 
\
l..-l:.--'s:-:Jy  t-o  »,,"a     r«l"  n'jcrot  intMlllfvumo  or   f->r     necrot  opor;iUo:\:i,    bo- 
cuuao  tho  att':i:';.t  to  pru;i,j  both  uses  i.-'iy   endniV*--"  the  uccurlty  of  inch. 
"Tho  Allied  experience  in  tho  currying  out  of  were!  operations  and 
nocrot  intelligence  durirg  the  last  war  lino  pointed  up  the  clone  relation- 
ship of  tho  tvo  activities.  Tho  British,  for  example,  vho  had  separate 
oysters  during  tho  war,  have  n.-./  co:oo  around  to  the  vie..'  that  secret  In- 
telligence and  r.ccrst  operations  ohould  bo  carried  out  under  a  dingle 
operational  head  end  have  reorganized   their  carvicco  accordingly." 
TH3!  OirlES  OP  POLICY  COORDINATION' 
The  National  Security  Council  in  creating  within  the  Central  Intelligence 
Agency,  in  accordance  •  with  Section  102  (d)  (5)  of  the  National  Security  Act, 
tho  Office  of  Special  Projects  (now  Jaiownos  the  Office  of  Policy  Coordination) 
recognized  thcoe"  views  to  tho  extent  that  both  secrot  intelligence  and  secret 
operations  were  included  within  tho  oaae  organization.  However,  this  action 
did  not  go  as  far  as  we  had  recommended,  with  tho  result  that  the  Office  of 
Policy  Coordination  (cecret  operations)  and  the  Office  of  Special  Operations 
(occrot  intelligence)  are  not  bound  together  by  any  opecial  relationship  and 
operate  as  entirely  oeparate  Officca. 
Although  it  is  too  early  to  appraise  the  acconplislmcnts  of  the  Office  of 
Policy  Coordination  which  has  been  in  existence  only  a  few  months,  experience 
has,  in  our  opinion,  already  shown  that  tho  organizational  relationship  bo- 
tveon  it  and  the  Office  of  Special  Operations  ohould  be  clooor.  Although  tho 
problo:;.n  vith  which  tho  two  Offices  aro  concorncd  nro  so  intimately  rolatcd, 
thoro  in  no  arrangement  for  coordinating  tlioir  operations  undor  coircnon  direc- 
tion excopt  insofar  as  thoy  aro  both  undor  tho  Director  of  Central  Intelligence.
Kvon  thJo  rolaLJojiohip  is  vo-.ikonod  by  tho  fact  that  I.'SC  10/2  which  created  the 
Office  of  Policy  Coord Jrr\ Lien  provides  that  "for  purposes  of  security  mid  of 
flexibility  of  operations  ruvJ  totho  mxiinun  degrco  consistent  ultb  officloncy, 
the  Offico  of  Special  Projects  shall  one  rate  independently  of  other  component:? 
of  Central  Intelligence  Agency."     Thus, complete  separation  was  made  mandatory. 
The  Offico  of  Tolicy  Coordination,  vhichiotho  only  Offico  in  tho  Central 
Intelligence  Agency  created  by  direct  order  of  the  national  Security  Council, 
Id  aloo  given  a  npeeial  position  in  that  its  charter  provider;  that  the  Direc- 
tor of  Central  Intolligeaco  ohall  ho  responsible  for  "insuring,  through  desig- 
nated representatives  of  the  Secretary  of  State  and  of  the  Secretary  of  Dofonae, 
that  covert  operationo  aro  planned  and  conducted  in  a  manner  conoiotent  vith 
United  Statsa  foreign  and  Military  policiea  and  with  overt  activities"  and 
that  disagreements  between  the  Director  and  these  representatives  shall  bo  re- 
ferred to  the  National  Security  Coxmcil  for  decision.  Furthermore,  the  Chief 
of  tho  Office  of  Policy  Coordination  can  be  appointed  only  upon  nomination  by 
the  Socretary  of  State  and  approval  by  the  National  Security  Council. 
In  practico,  tho  Offico  of  Policy  Coordination  enjoys  a  position  vhich 
gives  it  dlroct  tics  to  tho  Department  of  State  and  the  National  Military 
Eotabllohccnt  and  support  from  thorn  not  onjoyodby  the  Offico  of  Special  Opera- 
tiono. Conooqucntly,  the  two  activitios  which  should  be  closely  integrated 
aro  in  fact  operating  with  different  outside  guidance  and  support,  with  dis- 
olwilar  charters,  and  thoy  occupy  a  difforont  status  within  tho  Central  Intol- 
llgonco  Agency. 
In  our  opinion,  thin  situation  is  unsound.  Tho  close  rolationcihip  botwoon 
thooo  two  activitios,  as  pointed  out  abovo,  needs  to    bo  rocognizod  along  with
■»M»f  ■■•* 
t!.«  fii'il  that  necrct  int/illlgencc  require:;  tho  i»ur.o  dcgruo  of  control  r.nd  (nip- 
port  fro:n  the  State  P'.:p»'.rt?.ent  and  Uio  Mllltai-y  Kotabl  InJun-jiit  no  nccrut  opc-ra- 
tiono.  Ao  recoCTcr.dod  in  Chapters  VII  and  VIII,  ye  propono  thcroforo  that 
thfc.'ic  two  actlvitien  bo  closely  integrated  (along  villi  parte  of  tlic  Office  or 
Operations)  In  a  oingle  Operationn  Dlviaion  vhich  would  enjoy  considerable  au- 
tonomy, in  accordance  with  our  ovor-all  roco:CT.cndationf.i  for  changoo  in  tho 
organization  of  the  Central  Intoll'.goneo  Agency. 
Ao  vo  have  etatod  abovo,  tho  operations  of  tho  Office  of  Policy  Coordina- 
tion have  been  bo  recently  initiated  that  it  in  premature  to  cotoaent  upon  them 
in  any  detail.  We  beliovo,  however,  that  tho  Assistant  Diroctor  in  charge  of 
■  the  Office  of  Policy  Coordination  io  proceeding  wisely  in  building  slowly  in 
this  most  difficult  field. 
CONCLUSIONS  A1JD  EKQMMEKDATICKS  .         . 
U )  The  close  relationship  between  coveit  intelligence  and  covert  opera- 
tions and  the  fact  that  the  latter  is  related  to  intelligence  affecting  tho 
national  cecurity  Justifies  the  placing  of  tho  Office  of  Policy  Coordination 
within  tho  Central  Intelligence  Agency. 
(2)  Tho  Office  of  Folicy  Coordination  ohould  be  integrated  with  the  othor 
covort  Offico  of  tho  Contral  Intolligonce  Agoncy,  namely, tlio  Office  of  Special 
Operations,  and  with  tho  Contact  Branch  of  the  Offico  of  Operations,  and  theoo 
throo  operations  ohould  bo  ;mdor  olnglo  ovor-all  direction  (Opcratlonu  Dlvl- 
oion)  within  tlio  Contral  Intelligence  Agency.* 
•ror  our  ror.or-nondatlonn  regiirdlny;  thn  Foreign  Broadcast  Information  Branch 
of  tho  Offico  of  Oporatlonu,  ooo  Chaptor  VII.
CHAPTER  X  — '* 
TJ1E  DIRECTION  OF  THE  CENTRAL  JNTELLICENCE  AGENCY 
CKi^RAL  Al'tt'UGAL 
Wo  liuvo  reserved  for  this  final  chapter  en  tho  Central  Intelligence  Agoncy 
tho  discussion  of  tho  post  of  Dix-octor.  An  appraisal  of  tho  qualif lcatlonr. 
and  achlovomonto  of  tho  dirocting  •  personnel  in  only  possible  In  light  of  tin 
oxanination  of  tho  ontiro  organization.  Vlthin  tho  ecopo  of  hlo  mandate  undor 
tho  JJational  Security  Act,  it  is  tho  Director  who  must  guide  the  organization 
to  tho  attainment  of  ita  objectives,  establish  its  operating  policies  and  vtn 
the  confidence  of  othor  branches  of  the  Government . 
Thie  is  not  an  easy  task.  Tlie  Central  Intelligence  Agency  has  a  diversi- 
fied and  difficult  cii33ion  to  perform.  Its  success  depends,  to  a  large  cxtont, 
on  the  support  It  rocoiv-es  from  othor  'agencies  which  may  be  ignorant  of  its 
problems  and  suapicious  of  its  prerogatives ;  It  has  peculiar  administrative., 
personnel  and  security  problems  and  has  to  handle  complicated  operating  situa- 
tions. Moreover,  the  pressure  to  build  rapidly  has  been  strong  and  there  has 
boon  little  time  in  vhich  to  demonstrate  substantial  accomplishments. 
We  beliovo  that  these  difficulties  cannot  alone  explain  tho  principal  de- 
ficiencies which  wo  have  discussed  in  previous  chapters.  The  directing  staff 
of  tho  Central  Intolligcnco  Agoncy  has  not  demonstrated  an  adequato  under- 
standing of  tho  sondato  of  tho  organization  or  the  ability  to  discharge  that 
mandato  offoctivoly. 
Tho  duties  of  tho     Central  Intolligcnco  Agoncy  in  regard  to  tho  coordina- 
Jtien  of  intolllgonco  activities     have  not  boon  fulfillod.       Tho  responsibility 
135 
\
for  l':.-:  cDi'rolation  of  national  lulcl.l J ,'•;■. -nco  Ij-io  not  boon  currlocl  out  In  uuch 
n  ir.'^ir.vr  an  to  provide  tho  polley-i.'.iy.cra  with  coord  Indent  national  intolllgonco 
oritir.'.-itoy.  Sc;r.o  activities  tiro  Loins  carried  out  by  t!io  Co:»ti*al  Intelligence 
Agency  which  largely  duplicate  tho  work  of  othor  departments  and  agencies,  and 
thoro  hf.s  been  no  adequate  attempt  to  coordinate  or  contralizo  othoro.  Gen- 
erally speaking,  satisfactory  working  relations  have  not  boon  outablicliod  with 
other  dopartrnonta  and  agencies.  Vithin  tho  Central  Intelligence  Agency  in- 
adoquato  guidance  as  to  tho  intelligence  rcq.uiroir.onta  oT  tho  Covorn:r.ont  la 
rocoived  frca  tho  Director,  These  deficiencies  exist  in  spite  of  a  "broad  stat- 
utory rcaniate,  reasonable  appropriation  and  support  fro»  tho  National  Socurity 
Council. 
Administrative  policies  within  the  Agency  coatributo  to  "this  [situation. 
Tho  internal  organization  does  not  reflect  an  appreciation  of  the  Agency 'a  sev- 
eral  distinctive  yet  inter-rolated  missions  under  tho  Kational  Security  Act  I 
la  fact,  the  ache=9  of  organization  tends  to  blur  and  tnpe&e  the  performance 
of  tho  organization's  essential  intelligence  functions  under  the  Act.  Tho 
Directorate  ha3  given  positions  of  pre-oninenco  to  officials  who  are  primarily 
administrators  yet  exert  policy  control  over  tho  intelligence  Officoo  without 
being  qualified  to  do  so.  Thoro  is  little  clooo  consultation  on  intolligonco 
and  policy  natters  botvoon  tho  various  stratified  levels.  Although  tho  heads 
Of  tho  several  Officoo  are  allovod  considerable  latitude  in  conducting  thoir 
roopoctivo  operations,  thoy  do  not  share  substantially  in  tho  determination  of 
ovor-all  policy. 
THE  QUH5TI0H  OF  CIVILIAN  DIRECTION 
Wo  have  also  conoldorod  tho  question  vhothor  tlio  Director  ought  to  bo  a 
clvlll.-ui.  Vhllo  vo  rocognlzo  that  tho  statute  provldon  that  lio  my  bo  olthor 
13<»
;ivJli"i>  or  rallltary  wo  have  roacliuA  tho  conclunlon  that  ho  ohoulcl  bo  u  civll- 
inn.  V/o  do  not  r-otui  to  ozcludo  tho  pofJniMUty  that  a  Oorvico  nsrui  raiy  ho  oo- 
loctod  for  llio  post,  hut  if  thla  in  tlono  ho  should  roolfin  from  active  military 
duty  and  thoroaftor  work  no  a  civilian.  In  nuch  a  oano  appropriate  provision 
ohould  h«  v:-Ao   oo  that  ho  do  on  not  loco  his  rotirnr/.-nt  bonoflto. 
Wo  liavo  reached  tho  conclusion  that  tho  Director  ohouM  ho  civilian  bo- 
cauoo  vo  aro  convinced  that  continuity  of  tonuro  io  oouontlal  and  ccmploto  in- 
dependence of  corvico  tioo  donirablo  for  carrying  out  tho  dutioo  of  tho  Diroc- 
tor.  Tho  post  cannot  properly  ho  filled  ao  a  mere  tour  of  duty  between  alli- 
tory  uuuJgiiaontD.  Uuloco.  there  io  ouch  continuity  of  corvico  and  casploto  in- 
dopondonco  of  action,  tho  Diroctor  will  not  ho  ahlo  to  build  up  tho  osprit  do 
corps,  tho  tochnlcal  efficiency,  tho  loyalty  of  hoiao  staff  and  field  workers, 
which  aro  033entinl  to  tho  ouccoss  of  tho  enterprise.  Vo  agroo  with  tho  latent 
of  the  provision'  of  tho  national  Security  Act  that  tho  Director  "shall  he  sub- 
Joct  to  no  euporvlGion,  control,  restriction,  or  prohibition  (nilitary  or  oth- 
erwise)" by  tho  Sorvice  departments,  but  do  not  foel  that  this  provision  can 
alono  offset  tho  disadvantages  to  vhich  wo  have  pointod. 
It  io  inevitable  that  thoro  should  bo  rotation  to  tho  Service  intolligouco 
ogoncion,  though  in  recent  yearn  that  rotation  has  boon  far  too  rapid  in  tho 
top  ranks.  However,  in  tho  Central  Intelligence  Asoncy  thoro  should  bo  sta- 
bility and  continuity  of  loadorshlp. 
Finally,  we  rocoraaond  a  civilian  Diroctor  because  wo  boliovo  that  in  work- 
ing out  a  woll  balancod  top  ocholon  concuittoo  (tho  reconstituted  Intolligonco 
Advisory  Coiiniittoo)  for  appraising  and  coordinating  Govornrwnt  intolligonco, 
tho  otrong,  aud  properly  oti'ong,  ropi-ooontation  of  tho  military  intolligonco 
137
T'ji-vJcofj  on  ouch     ft  body    nhould  bo     balanced  with     an  equally  strong  civilian 
roiiroaontatlon^ 
Vo  have  considered  tho  argument  that  tho  Diroctor  of  Central  Into]  .1 Igonco, 
noc!iu:io  of  tho  hi  all  nocurity  requirements  of  tho  post,  ohould  bo  u  i.vi:i  poit-.i- 
nontly  do voted  to  Government  sorvico,  awenablo  to  tho  disciplines  of  tho  Sorv- 
icuu  and  froo  of  political  ccabitiraau  or  entanglements.  Vo  boliovo  that  tho 
qualifications  of  tho  Director  of  Control  Intolligonco,  vhothor  hi  a  pact  ex- 
perience has  "boon  in  civilian  llfo  or  in  military  or  othor  Government  service, 
nhould  bo  on  co  high  a  lovol  that  there  -would  bo  no  lioro  doubt  a3  to  tho  loyalty 
and  responsibility  of  tho  Director  than  of  tho  Secretary  of  Stnto  or  tho  Sec- 
retary of  Defense.  In  appointing  tho  Director  of  Central  Intolliconco  with  the 
responsibilities  ho  must  carry  today,  va  must  select  a  isan  to  vhoia  vo  vould 
villingly  entrust  any  position  of  responsibility  vhatsoevor  in  our  Govemr^nt . 
CONCLUSIONS  AXD  22eoi-2-ENDATIONS 
(1)  The  dirocting  staff  of  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  has  not  dem- 
onstrated "an  adequate  understanding  of  tho  mandate  of  the  organization  or  tho 
ability  to  "discharge  that  mandate  effectively. 
(2)  Administrative  organization  and  policio3  tend  to  lizpode  tho  carrying 
out  of  tho  essential  intelligence  functions  of  tho  Central  Intelligence  Agoncy 
under  tho  Act. 
(3)  Continuity  of  oorvico  in  essential  for  tho  successful  carrying  out 
of  tho  dutios  of  Diroctor  of  Central  Intolligonco. 
(h)  An  tho  bont  hopo  for  continuity  of  sorvice  and  tho  groatost  assur- 
ance of  independence  of  action  a  civilian  ohould  bo  Diroctor  of  Central  In- 
telligence.      If  a  Sorvico  kkui  io  selected    for  tho  poot  ho  nhould  ronlgn  frora 
nctivo  military  duty. 
13» 
i
CHAPTEK  Xr 
THE  SERVICE  INTELLIGENCE  AGENCIES 
Tito  Survey  Croup  has  boon  primarily  concerned  with  examining  tho  struc- 
ture, administration,  activities  and  intor-agoncy  relationships  of  tho  Central 
•Intelligence  Agency.  In  tho  examination  of  tho  Service  intolllgenco  agencies, 
emphasis  has  boon  placod  on  thoir  contribution  to  national  into  Hi  gone  o  and 
thoir  relation  to  tbo  Contral  Intelligence  Agency.  On  tho  baoin  of  thio  study, 
tbo  Survey  Group  dooa  not  consider  itsolf  qualifiod  to  submit  rcco:r3iendationo 
regarding  oitber  tho  dotailo  of  tbo  internal  administration  of  tbo  Services  or 
of  thoir  methods  of  collecting  information  end  producing  intelligence. 
MISSIO!.*  ASD  EESPOIJSIBILjTISS 
Tho  National  Security  Act,  in  providing  for  tbo  systematic  coordination 
of  intelligence",  aloo  oafoguarded  tbo  rolo  of  tho  Sorviceo  In  intelligence  by 
providing  in  Section  102  (d)  (3)  that  "tbo  departments  and  other  agencica  of 
tho  Government  shall  continue  to  collect,  ovaluato,  correlate,  and  dissealnato 
departmental  intolllgenco."  Subsequently,  the  National  Security  Council  in 
Intolligcnco  Directive  Ho.  3  (See  Annex  No.  0)  defined  departmental  intolli- 
gonco  a3  "that  intolllgenco  noodod  by  a  Department  or  independent  Agency  of 
tbo  Federal  Government,  and  the  subordinate  units  thereof,  to  oxocuto  its  mis- 
sion and  to  dischargo  its  lawful  responsibilities." 
Tho  mission  of  tbo  military  services  involves  tho  onormour.  responsibility 
of  maintaining  tbo  aocurity  of  tho  Unitod  Ctatoo.   It  is  incumbent  upon  then 
to  produco  or  obtain  from  otbor  ngoncioo  tho  intolllgonco  nocooaary  to  assist 
thorn  in  fulfilling  tills  mission.   3h  tbo  past  thio  nood  for  intolllgenco  linn 
. boon  not  to  a  largo  oxtont  by  tbo  Survicoo  acting  independently  and  vlthout 
no
/ 
_  /     
• 
tho  Ltsi^iflt  of  nyiilosmUo  eoordliriUen.  Although  It  io  «o»  f.onorfilly  rccoK- 
„i7.«d  tl".:.t  ouch  coordination  i»  i>rgo:itly  needed,  there  io  ntill  a  tendency  on 
the  jjurt.  of  tho  Service"  to  otrivo  to  crmdu  tholr  own  oolf-contr.Inod  oyotom.i 
of  intelligence 
Thio  tendency  otorr.s  in  port  froa  tho  military  doctrino  that  "intolliganco 
i0  a  function  of  command,"  a  doctrino  which  him  boon  interpreted  to  require 
the  control  of  the  collection  end  production  of  oil  nocoaaary  intelligence  by 
tho  ot.aff  of  tho  compandor  requiring  it.  Tho  doctrino  go  construed  can  only 
rooult  in  en  obviously  unsatio factory  and  impractical  attempt  at  oclf-euffLclonoy. 
As  a  natter  of  fact,  at  all  otaff  levels  intelligence  muot  be  supplemented  by 
contributions  of  both  raw  information  and  f lniohod  intelligonco  from  other  do- 
partaents  and  agencies. 
The  general  definition  of  departmental  intelligence  must  therefore  be 
qualified  by  practical  limitations  and  eubject  to  tho  overriding  necessity  for 
coordination  of  tho  intelligonco  activities  of  all  Government  agencies,  pur- 
euant  to  ths  National  Security  Act.  Tho  need  for  limiting  the  tendency  toward 
oolf- sufficiency,  while  acknowledging  tho  broad  interooto  of  the  departments, 
io  formally  recognized  in  National  Security  Council  Intelligonco  Diroctivoo 
Moo.  2  and  3.  Thoao  diroctivoo  assign  to  tho  Departments  of  tho  Array,  Navy 
and  Air  Forco,  respectively,  dominant  interest  in  tho  collection  and  produc- 
tion of  Military,  naval  and  air  intolligonco.  Tho  diroctivoo  alno  rocogniso 
that  tho  coneorn  of  tho  Sorvicoo  in  intolligonco  is  broador  than  thoir  opocific 
arona  of  doainnnt  lnloroat.  Mroctlvo  No.  2,     concorning  intolligonco  collec- 
tion, provides: 
MO
"No  interpretation  of  l.hofm  out  nbl  l:i)uxl  ovor-nl.1  p;>].Jr.Wi:i  /mil  oti.Vc- 
tivcid  uh'ilJ.  irj|--iL'j  t.Jio  li'iiijr.  principle  t!i:it  nil  l><>part.::;Mnt'il  rnpro- 
rientntivon  iibro*:d  'srn  lniiv 'i«!u;tll %v  rt:."po:i:i  1  \>]o  Vnr  thi>  coLlooLluii 
and  for  U.o  appropritito  traM.iaJiinJoii  to  Lholr  Puj./Lrl.i loiiLu  of  mVI. 
Jritcll3{"«'!nco   l;>for:.i'ilio:i     porlincnt   to  thoir  lV:pwt-iunt:tl  nhmionri ." 
liliallar     nufoftuardu   ore   included     An  Directive*     No.    J   concurning     lntol  llf/mco 
production  which  providoa  that: 
"Each  intolliconco  agoncy  hao  tho  ultimate  rooponnihility  for  tho 
preparation  of  ouch  i:t:ii'f  intollif;onco  un  itn  own  Department  cJir.ll 
require  It  io  recognized  that  the  tariff  intelligence  of  ouch  of 
tho  I)op?irt:r.cnt.o  rant  bo  broador  in  ncopo  than  any  allocation  of 
collection  rcopOR3ibility  or  recognition  of  dominant  interest  C:ight 
indicate.  In  fact,  tho  full  foreign  intelligence  picture  la  of 
intoroct  in  varying  dogreeo  at  different  tiiuoa  to  each,  of  tho 
Dopartscnto." 
In  practico,  tho  Servico  dGpartmsnto,  vhilo  concentrating  on  thoir  respec- 
tive aroaB  of  doainant  intoreot,  colloct  and  produco  substantial  quantitieo  of 
information,  in  fieldo  with  which  they  are  not  primarily  concerned.  Ao  a  result, 
there  is  considerable  duplication  in  the  material  colloctod  and  producod  by 
thoa  and  by  other  agencloo. 
COORDINATION  OF  SERVICE  INTELLIGENCE  ACTIVITIES 
Intelligence  collection  by  tho  Sorvicea  is  an  important  part  of  our  intel- 
ligence eyctcia.  Thoro  aro,  for  crcmplo,  tho  intolligonco  cor.pononto  of  ovoracr.s 
coKmandG  in  Europo  and  tho  Fai*  Eaot,  and  attachco  ntaticnod  with  United  Statoo 
diplomatic  ponto  throughout  tho  world  who  aro  in  a  ponition  through  obaorva- 
tiono  and     official  linioon  to     colloct  valuablo     Information. 
/ 
/ 
All  of  thooo  chunnolo  aro  uood  to  moot  tho  colloct ion  i 
'"\  Ml 
i \ 
\ 
i 
\
^^Zi  of  tho  Sorvicoa  at,  Proudly  lnti.iTruLod  by  th,:»,  «u>  voll  no  :icmo 
of  uo  collection  roqulr^c-ntn  of  otter  dor'-rt^-ntn  iui-1  aCcnci,n  which  »io 
uno  of  Service  collection  fucilltlo.i. 
0o:,o  duplication  and  overlap  io  Inherent  Hi  th.  oxietonco  of  uovcrul  lii- 
depond**  Service  collection  acpndco  operating  l:x  all  parta  of  tho  vorld.  An' 
pointed  out  in  Chapter  IT,  there  tea  boon  no  continues  coordination  of  their 
efforts   The  only  forcil  limitation a  vhich  havo  been  Jcpoaod  by  diroctivon 
BonoraHy  prohibit  cortain  rotfcodi)  of  intelligence  collection,  nuch  cu  oopio- 
nago  ond  tho  r-onitorins  of  foreign  tooadcacto,  vhich  have  Loon  aligned  to  tho 
Central  Intelligence  Agency  as  oer»iccs  of  coaron  concern.  More  effective  co- 
ordination of  collection  io  a  receded  nocesoity  and  chould  he  performed  in 
accordance,  vith  the  recordations  outlined  in  Chapter  17.   in  addition,  co- 
ordination con  he  improved  vithin  the  Services  either  upon  their  ovn  initiative 
or  upon  that  of  tho  Secretary  of  Dofenoo. 
Tho  production  of  intelligence  by  tho  Service  agoncieB  generally  falls 
into  tho  throo  catogorica  of  current,  baaic  and  etaff  intelligence  (including 
ootlnatoo). 
Current  intelligence  is  propped  by  each  of  tho  Sorvicoa  in  tho  form  of 
daily,  vcokly  or  nontbly  ovosaarioo,  briofingo  and  digoeto  aorivod  from  varied 
oourcoo.  Much  of  thio  product,  particularly  that  dealing  with  general  military 
mid  political  development^  io  duplicative  and  of  ouch  connion  interact  that 
ooao  consolidation  of  effort  io  acoirablo  and  ohould  bo  poooihlo.  Wo  recommend 
that  thiu  oituation  bo  roviovod  in  ordor  to  determine  vhat  effort  may  bo  prop- 
erly dlopomod  with,  vhat  concolldntion  io  poooiblo,  tuid  vhat  comoon  oorvicoo 
tho  Central  Intolligonco  Agency  night  rondcr  In  thin  rogord.  (Ceo  Chaptor  VI) . 
i«  '     r~~    '" 
'  t*f  \«*—^(  »*w
In  addition  to  biuilc  utudlou  in  thoir  runpoctivo  f  Jold:i  of  domln-uit  J.n- 
ton.at,  including  ouch  ta:j:::i  uu  dotomlnlng  tho  amount  j-ot.ont.lul  and  ordor 
of  hattlo  of  vr.riouo  coimtrlofj,  each  Corvicc  acco:npl.lnh<;n  a  largo  ni::ou:it  of 
research,  compilation  of  data  and  roportlng  in  tho  fiuldn  of  economic,  ncicn- 
tific  and  political  intelligence  vith  which  they  all  havo  noino  concern.  In 
our  oxcalnation  of  tho  Contral  IntoHi-gcnco  Agency  and  the  intelligence  egencioo 
of  tho  Departments  of  State,  Amy,  Envy  and  Air  I'orr.o,  vo  havo  found  that  thoro 
io  overlapping  of  intorcot  and  duplication  of  offort  in  intelligence  rccoarch 
and  pix>duction  in  ouch  f  ioldo  ao  pctroloiaa  rooourcoo,  corcauni cat lone,  induatrial 
production,  guidod  minoiloo  and  "biological  warfare.  Eotahlluhcd  procodureo 
for  coordination  in  these  and  related  BubJocts  aro  lacking. 
If  io  in  ordor  to  inprove  this  oituation  that  vo  have  rocoicnonded  in 
Chapter  VI  the  creation,  vithin  tho  Central  Intelligence  Agency,  of  a  Research 
and  Reports  Division  vhlch  vould  perform  research  and  production  of  intelli- 
gence in  fields  of  coaaon  concern  on  "behalf  of  all  of  the  interested  agencies, 
and  vould  coordinate  thoir  offorto  in  theoo  fields  vhen  centralization  va3  un- 
dcoirahle.  This  office.,  vhich  should  operate  in  clooo  relationship  vith  the 
Cervices  and  "bo  otaffod  in  part  vith  Service  pcrsonnol,  should  perfom  nuch  of 
the  work  now  Doing  dono  in  tho  f iolds  of  economic,  ocicntif  ic  and  technological 
intelligence.  Thero  will,  of  course,  ho  specialized  matters  for  vhich  tho  inr 
dividual  Corvieoo  iuuot  continuo  to  ho  ultir-itoly  responsible,  hut  thero  io  a 
vast  area  of  couaon  intercut  from  vhlch  they  con  all  drav. 
Eotiinatus,  pro  pared  to  moot  tho  requirement o  of  tho  departments  and  tho 
Joint  Chief  a  of  Staff,  nro  tho  inont  important  typo  of  staff  intelligence  pro- 
duced hy  tho  f.orvicoo.      Tlio  proonnt  j>oi>ition  vith  roopoct  to  thoir  production 
143 
A 
\
-  -  -  -  ■  »  idft  ■  1 1 1  J<  - 
1:,  ,/■>'.  lU'.tln-'V.ctory.  Each  r.urvlca  producer  J.l-ri  «;.')Umtoo  in  accordance  vith 
i,r::ui:.r.'i-ion!ii  nt^viardn  mid  methods  of  its  ovn  nol.rcticm,  end  gives  to  thorn  tho 
ncor.o  it  dusirca,  not  nccesoarlly  limiting  thois  to  its  om  field  of  interest. 
D-jpcr  tmontal  plur.s  and  policies  may  bo  bused  on  such  independently  produced 
oaUm'-tes,  regardless  of  tho  divorgont  and  oven  contradictory  estimates  of 
other  departments. 
Ab  pointed  out  in  Chapter  V,  tho  Central  Intel ligence  Agency  hao  not  on 
yot  adequately  exercised  its  function  to  coordinate  those  and  other  estimates, 
for  cxcaplo  those. of  tho  State  Department,  for  tho  purposo  of  preparing  na- 
tional ootimatos.  The  Joint  Intelligence  Committee  perform  this  taok  to  oome 
extent  in  tho  lailitary  sphere,  "but.  arrangements  are  lacking  for  regularly  in- 
curing  that  assumptions  are  comparable,   analytical  methods  valid,  and  tho  final 
» 
estimates  as  sound  aa  possible.       In  our  opinion,  an  important  step  toward  im- 
proving this  oituation    vould  "be    takon     if  the     ro commendations  submitted     in 
Chapter  V  regarding  tho  production  of  national  ectlmates  voro  adopted. 
Those  stops,  togothor  vlth  tho  creation  of  tho  Kocoarch  and  Reports  Divi- 
sion in  areas  of  common  interest,  vould  have  tho  effect  of  "bolstering  tho  Joint 
Intolligonco  Committee  in  ito  special  rolo  and  promoting  the  coordination  of 
Sorvico  estimates  in  both  broad  and  limited  fields.  It  io  important  that  the 
fltrictly  military  estimates  of  tho  Joint  Intelligence  Commit too  and  the  national 
estimates  produced  by  tho  Central  Intelligence  Agency  and  tho  Intolligonco 
Advioory  Committee,  partly  on  baoio  of  tho  oamo  material,   should  bo  in  harmony. 
In  tho  general    f iold  of  counter-intelligence,   the  Servicoo  havo     uoually 
placed  primary  emphasis  on  protect ivo  uocurity     activities  vhich  do  not  nccoo- 
"arily  havo  intolligonco  as  their  primary  aim  and  havo  ofton  boon  performed  by 
11 1
non-liit.eJl!£'Jnco  personnel.*  T!:o  r.:oro  npccialixed  counLor-onplon.-.go  function, 
vMch  )'''•')  '--'  ity  procliio  objective  thn  i  dent  incut  J  on  end  thwarting  of  tin.; 
j.orMonnol,  r.ethodn  onl  alma  of  unfriendly  foreign  intolligcncu  norvlcoo,  In  a 
U-uo  fiocret  intelligence  nct.1vi.ty.  Kxclunivo  roopouaibility  Tor  itn  conduct 
abroad  haa  boon  properly  eruiignod  to  tho  Central  Intolligonco  Agoncy,  oxcopt 
for  tho  countor-intolllgonco  activitioo  of  tho  Service  noconaory  for  tholr 
own  cccurity.  (Soo  Chaptor  VIII).  In  tho  areno  of  Unitsd  Staton  military  oc- 
cupation, thlft  exception  hen  boon  broadly  interpreted  and,  in  particular,  tho 
Counter  Intelligence  Corpo,  both  in  Gormuny  and  Japan,  hen  devoted  considerable 
effort  to  countor-onpionago,  including  tho  use  of  intelligence  notworko  extend- 
ing boyond  the  actual  oreao  of  occupation. 
There  has  not  beon  adoquute  recognition  of  the  need  for  coordination  of 
those  activities  with  tho  broader  reoponsibiiitiea  of  the  Central  Intelligence 
Agency.  The  dieoipation  of  trained  peroonnel,  failure  to  centralize  informa- 
tion concerning  countor-intclligonce  targeto,  tho  rioka  inherent  in  the  unco- 
ordinated conduct  of  ngont  operation/^  all  tend  to  weaken  our  proopecta  of  ouc- 
ceoo  in  counter- cop ionago. 
This  need  for  coordination  of  tho  counter-intelligence  effort  also  exists 
in  tho  Unitod  Statoa  where  the  responsibilities  of  tho  Services  arc  lisited  in 
rolntlon  to  thooe  of  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation.** 
*  Tho  Air  Forco  hno  recognized  thi3  emphnoio  by  transferring  practically  all 
counter- intolligonco  functiono  from  tho  Director  of  Air  Intelligence  to  tho 
Inspector  General. 
•♦Coordination  in  thi3  field  la  carried  out  in  accordance  with  tho  Providential 
mo:r;orandu:a  of  Juno  26,  1959,  which  .stipulated  that  the  Mar  Department,  Wavy 
Popsirliuent  and  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  would  bo  tho  only  ngoncleri  of 
tlio  C.overnnent  to  conduct  lnvoatigntion;!  into  matters  involving  capionngo, 
coutUor-enpionngo,  cr  anbolago.  Tho  principal  function  of  tho  Interdepart- 
mental Intel ligencn  Conference  not  up  no  a  rcaultof  thin  memorandu-'U  hun  been 
to  delimit  tho  ronjK'Ctive  invoatlgativo  rcaponnibilitico  of  tlio  three  agon- 
cion   in  tho  Unitod  Statoa. 
m:
/ 
"""""wo  huvo  neon  t!mt  within  tho  Military  Knt!ilillM)i::wiiL  thoro  in  no  goncrnl 
mchii.ory  for  Ji.u-llicoi.co  coordination.  Tho  nonrotary  of  l)uf«.i..'if,  at  pronoiit 
)ium  no  ii tuff  for  Ufid  i>ur]icno  or  to  do  moro  thun  oxorcJno  vor.v  goi.ornl  fiuper- 
vloloii  and  control.  Ho  lo  ublo  to  lnitiutu  particular  projocto  for  coordina- 
tion and  ban,  infect,  dono  no  with  renpocl  to  the  production  of  co::i".unicntionrj 
intelligence  and  the  attache  nyotomo.  Ho  can  ftlco  rooolvo  particular  contro- 
voroioo  which  cannot  bo  oottlod  at  a  lovor  lovol in  tho  Military  Eotubliolmont. 
Other  oxraploo  within  tlio  Military  Eotnbllnluuont  of  coordination  in  limited 
fiolda  are  tho  Joint  Intelligence  Cor^itteo'u  rooponolbility  for  ootisatoo  ro- 
quirod  by  the  Joint  Chlofo  of  Staff,  urrango:/.cnto  for  tho  production  of  coauau- 
nicationa  intolliscnco,  and  tho  oxiotenco  of  tho  Air  Intelligence  Division  for 
the  production  of  air  intelligence  by  the  Air  Force  and  Navy. 
Although  coordination  haa  boon  attempted  or  accompliohed  by  tho  Sorvicoe, 
oithor  on  their  own  initiative  or  at  the  instigation  of  tho  Secretary  of  De- 
fonoo,  in  Halted  aroao  ouch  do  thoao  mentioned  above,  effective  coordination 
of  tho  Service  intelligenco  agenciea  required  tho  over-all  coordination  of  tho 
activities  of  all  lntolligonco  ugoncioe  in  the  Govornscnt .  Thi3  io  a  duty  aa- 
oignod  to  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  in  consultation  with  the  Intelligence 
Advioory  Coxaittoe .  In  Chap tor  IV  ve  have 'rocomraondod  that  the  Intelligence 
Advioory  Coanittoo,  on  which  tho  Sorvlcco  are  represented,  ohould  participate 
moro  activoly  with  tho  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  in  tho  continuing  co- 
ordination of  lntolligonco  activities.  To  a  vory  conoidorablo  oxtont,  responsi- 
bility for  .tho  ouccooaful  oporution  of  thio  machinery  rooto  with  tho  r.orvicoo. 
TIE  JiTATWJ  Or  IKTELUCbNCE  III  THE  SERVICES 
Recognition  of  tho  important  rolo  of  lntolligonco  in  tho  dotormlnatlon  of 
"ation:i.\  policy  and  of  tho  major  roaponolbllity  which  tlio  Gorvicoa  liavo^in 
M6  r~"""
JuloUJ--',o:ico  roquiroo  tli.it  tho  Cm-vice  ngnnclou  on  Joy  in  Uiolr  dopurtnontu  u 
ponHion  coKip.urab]  o  to  tho  filr.o  of  tho  tuck  ensigncd  to  thorn.  In  ardor  to  bo 
ublo  to  carry  out  thoir  renpor.uibilitiorj  to  tholr  dopartir.c-nto  and  to  make  rn 
effective  contribution  tovurd  ft  coordinated  ii.atioii.ul  intelligence:  eyeton,  th..< 
Service  cwoncicft  u-uoL  vork  cloooly  villi  tho  planning  and  operational  staff c  and 
bo  fully  informed  regarding  departmental  piano  and.  policies . 
To  meet  adequately  thoir  vital  responsibilities  and  to  maintain  thoir 
proper  po.<;ition  in  tho  departmental  structure,  tho  Sorvico  Intelligence  agen- 
cico  must  bo  staff od  vith  qualifiod  personnel.  This  van  too  littlo  recognized 
prior  to  tho  last  var,  and  upon  tho  outbroak  of  hostilities  vo  found  that  ve 
vere  seriously  doficiont  in  numbers  and  quality  of  intelligence  officers.  Vo 
did  attest  to  tako  stops  to  corroct  thia  eituatipn  in  tho  various  intelligence 
schools  and  by  acquiring  personnel  from  civilian  life  to  be  trained  as  intel- 
ligence officers.  Recently,  the  importance  of  intelligence  training  has  boon 
moro  fully  realised,  and  the  ServlcoQ  have  taken  otopa  to  provide  adoquste 
schools.  In  conooquence,  tho  quality  of  both  the  intelligence  officers  and  tho 
attachos  lias  improved  in  rocont  yoars. 
The  theory  of  rotation  in  tho  Services  has  been  a  handicap  to  sound  intel- 
ligence vork  in  that  it  militates  against  experience  and  continuity.  An 
asoigmcont  to  intolligonco  vill  probably  last  not  n:oro  than  four  years,  and 
ucually  a  shortor  time.  This  not  only  moans  that  tho  individual  officer  has 
difficulty  in  boccming  proficient  in  intolligonco,  but  that  tho  Service  intol- 
ligonco agency  ic  in  danger  of  oufforing  from  a  lack  of  continuity  of  loader- 
ehlp  trainod  in  intolligonco.  For  oxamplo,  the  Army  Intolligonco  Division  has 
had     oovon    chief o  in     oovon  yoaro,     and  tho     rocontly     formod     Directorate  of 
Intolligonco,  Air  Fcrco,  lino  nlxoady  had  tvo  diroctorn. 
147
^/ 
It  if)  nut  our  pm-iio.Mi  to  o«f«urit  onc«  wore  tho  often  dlncuriMcd  poc.nibi  1.1  ty 
of  ,..n  intolMgcr.co  corpn,  hut  vo  do  holiovo  that,  if  the  corp-  theory  it.  un- 
1,C(;(I),V,1,).«,,  i.o:oa  altomtUvo  r.othod  should  ho  dm-ulopod  vhorohy  of fi corn,  al- 
though taJtlr*:  »^»  occa»Jo»..U.  tour  of  duty  in  co^ud,  opr.-rr.Uono  or  other  ntaff 
):.or.ltH-no,  vlll  fool  tliat  intelligence  in  thoir  pcr:vuiont  interoot  and  concc-n- 
trato  in  it  over  tho  major  portion  of  thoir  careers. 
In  tho  r-aot,  cr.pr.Dlo  officers  Jmo  not  hoon  attracted  to  intelligent  vork 
duo  to  thoir  hoiief  that  intelligence  vuo  a  hac^-atcr,  might  delay  promotion, 
and  in  any  event  vould  not  further  their  careers.  This  tendency  must  ho  ovor- 
•  coaso  arxd  officers  made  to  fool  that  their  opportunities  for  advancement  vill 
not  ho  impaired  hy  an  assignment  to  intelligence  duty.  IntolliSenco  must  ho 
Given  prestige,  and  it  must  he  rado  sufficiently  attractive  do  that  an  officer 
vill  coek  an  intelligence  assignment  as  ho  vould  one  to  command  or  operations. 
In  addition  to  making  a  caroor  in  intelligence  core  attractive  in  tho 
Services,  it  io  important  to  provide  for  tho  training  and  availability  of  ro- 
eervo  officoro.  There  are  thousands  of  such  officers  today  vho,  during  the 
last  var,  vore  in  various  intelligence  agencies  or  at  overseas  commands,  and 
many  proved  of  incotimahlo  value  Thoir  talents  end  thoir  villingnoss  to  serve 
must  net  ho  lost. 
In  conclusion,  vo  vich  to  noto  that  a  measure  of  progrooc  lias  hoon  mado 
in  that  tho  Sorvico  intelligent  agencies  havo  manifested  an  increased  interest 
in  intolligcncc  and  an  attitudo  conducive  to  accomplishing  its  offectivo  co- 
ord ln-ticn.  Tho  Sorvicoo  nro  concciouo  of  thoir  gravo  responsibility  for  help- 
ing to  avert  tho  danger  of  a  national  military  cntaotropho,  croatod  hy  modern 
nethod.'j  of  vr.rforo.   They  havo  como  to  rocognir.o  tho  nood  for  offectivo 
MA  r
coord h:at 5 on  to  tho  ond  th.-.t  tho  Intolligonco  upon  vh.lc.h  tho  n-itionul  pol.1c.y- 
f-Xorn  n-.:rit  act  i.kall  bo  tho  very  bont  obtalnublo  froia  ovory  nv.-iilnblo  uourco. 
Thin  ton-lone;,'  on  thoir  part  in  in  luorlcod  and  cncowiir;)^  coni.r.-ir.t.  to  tho  r..itu~ 
ntion  v.hlcli  prevailed  not  only  i!";odJf.toly  prior  to  our  entry  intu  World  War  IT, 
but  ovon  in  tho  early  dayc  of  that  conflict  ltuolf.  Wo  boliovo  that,  c,Ivca 
effective  loadorohip,  tho  fall  cooperation  of  Iho  Sorvico  agr.,?cio3  in  tho 
ncliiovcsont  of  genuine  coordination  can  "bo  obtained. 
co::cLU3io::s  aio)  K'/joj-'ieidatioiis 
(1)  Tho  Service  intolligonco  agencioa  havo  ELanifootod  an  increaood  in- 
toroat  in  intolligonco  and  an  nttitudo  conducivo  to  acconrpliehing  ito  effectivo 
coordination. 
(2)  In  order  to  jsset  adequately  their  vital  responsibilities  and  zcain- 
tain  their  proper  pooition  in  tho  departmental  etructuro,  the  Service  intelli- 
gence Kgencieo  ahoulti  ho  otaffed  vith  qualified  poreonnol  vho  concontrato  in 
intelligence  ovor  tho  aajor  portion  of  their  career s. 
(3)  In  accordance  vith  a  program  of  coordination  initiated  and  guided  by 
tho  Contral  Intelligence  Agency,  tho  SorYicc  intelligence  agencioa  chould  con- 
fine thensolveo  principally  to  thooo  fields  of  intelligence  in  vhich.  they  havo 
tho  prlnary  intcreot. 
(It)  A  ffioro  active  progrtus  of  coordination  by  the  Central  Intelligence 
Agency  vould  rooult  in  a  highor  dogroo  of  centralization  and  coordination  of 
intolligonco  production  in  floldo  vhcro  tho  Sorvlcoo  have  a  cois.T.on  intoroot. 
(5)  Thoro  should  bo  offoctivo  coordination  botvocn  tho  vori:  of  tho  Joint 
Intolligonco  Cou=:iittoo  in  tho  f  iold  of  military  oatiaatoa  and  that  of  tlio 
Central  Intolligonco  Agency  and  Intolligonco  Adviuory  Conciittoo  in  tho  fiold 
of  national  oot.iia.itoo. 
*  """"J  149 
I 
|    THERE   IS  NO  PAGE   150.
CHAPTER  XII 
THE  JKTELI/iCEECE  J-'UNCTIOK-S  OF  THE  )))■  PARTmEOT  OF  STATE 
Tho  State  Pt.j)'ii'l.n-)Ht  in  uijaicnod  dccilivuit  intoroat  in  th<>  collodion  .'Ui;i 
production  of  politJ  Cil,  cultural,  and  nocJolosicnl  intolliuonco  by  tho  II.al.'.o:ial 
Security  Council.  It  nococnarily  follow  frcn  thio  allocation  that  it  la  tho 
agency  to  vhich  tho  Central  IntoUlgonco  Afiency  and  tho  military  acrvlcoa 
ohould  turn  to  aociro  tho  reports  mid  ootiratoo  thoy  nay  reguiro  In  thono 
fioldu  of  intoUisonco. 
rosoibly  vo  can  boat  orplain  our  idoaa  of  tho  State  Dcpar  Ir.ont  •  a  rolo  by 
a  concrete  but  hypothetical  illustration.  Wo  shall  aoouas,  for  exanplo,  that 
tho  Socrotary  of  the  Kavy,  to  proparo  hinsolf  to  viest  his  responcibilitioa  In 
connection  vith  a  violt  of  naval  unito  to  the  yoot'orn  Mediterranean,  dssirea  a 
roport  on  political  conditiona  In  Spain.  To  securo  it,  ho  would  turn  to  his 
Chiof  of  Kaval  IntelllGcnco.  Tho  latter  in  turn  should  soek  tho  dooired  tn- 
formtion  fron  the  State  Dopartnont,  either  directly  or  through  the  Central 
Intolllsonco  Aeoncy.  He  should  not  try  to  got  it  frca  his  own  latollieonco 
analyote,  any  core  than  ho  vould  expect  the  State  Department  to  famish  fi'ca 
ita  ovn  roGourcos  an  ostinate  of  tho  strength  of  tho  Spanish  Navy.  Tho  reason 
io  obviouo.  Tho  State  Department  io  tho  nwin  repository  of  political  informa- 
tion about  Spain.  It  io  also  tho  final  arbiter  of  our  attitudo  vith  roupoct 
to  Spain.  For  tho  Navy,  our  policy  in  this  situation  ia  a  fact,  and  a  vital 
fact,  to  bo  talcon  into  account. 
If,  tc  tako  another  hypothetical  cano,  tho  National  Socurity  Council  folt 
tbo  nood  for  an  over-all  oati.-nato  of  tho  Spanioh  .oituation  --  an  ootlnato  that 
vould  include  not  only  political  informtion  from  tho  Stato  Dopartraont  but 
]  .  ir>i 
i 
\
jjlitury  and  otruU^lc  olor.ontn  au  voll  --  thun,  no  indic.--.tod  ^oro  fully  in 
Cl5uj)lor  V,  a  mtion.il  outolo  ahoidd  bo  ju-ojwrod  in  tho  Contra!  IntoUlgonco 
Agoncy  for  rovlov  arid,  uj.provi-1  by  the  InU.llJgonco  Advisory  Cc:~-iUoo.  Iloro 
vould  b<.  brought  tcgothor  tho  intolligonco  rouom-coo  of  Stato,  of  tho  rdlltury 
corrlcoo,  of  tho  Central  Intelligence  Agency,  and  of  ox*  other  agency  equipped 
to  cafco  a  wal  contribution  on  tho  uubjoct.  Tho  Stato  Dopartnont  roprooonta- 
tlvo  on  tho  Intolligonco  Advinory  Conaittoo  vould,  of  course,  shore  in  tho 
rosponolbllity  for  tho  final  ootlnato. 
Bocauoo  of  tho  intelligence  contribution  vhich  tho  Stato  Department  should 
ho  propped  to  rake  to  tho    National  Security  Council    and  to  othor  Government 
agencies,     deluding  tho  Central  Intelligence  Agency,  tho  Department  io  called 
upon  to  aosune  an  important  rolo  in  the.  field  of  intelligence,   oven  apart  from 
Its  task  of  supplying  the  Information  required  by  its  ovm  policy  officers.     Vo 
havo  oxaalned  the  intolliGor.cc  functions  of  the'  Stato  Department,  and  particu- 
•  larly  the  intellisenco     organization  of  the  Department,     known  as  tho  Research 
Intelligence  staff,     solely  to  determine  how  offoctivoly  the     State  Department 
is  organized  to  meet  these  outside  intelligence  requiromonta,  particularly  thou* 
of  tho  Control  Intolligonco  Agoncy. 
T1DD  RESEARCH  AID  IKTELLIGSI.'CE  STUFF 
Tho  Research  and  Intolligonco  staff  io  unique  among  the  departmental  in- 
telligence cgoncios  for  at  loaot  two  roaapna.  In  tho  firat  place,  it  io  an 
intolligonco  agency  vlthixi  mi  intolligonco  ugoncy,  sinco  tho  collection  and 
interpretation  of  all  information  boaring  on  our  foroign  rolationu  io  a  primary 
objective  of  tho  Department  uu  a  vholo  and  of  ito  officoro  in  tho  fiold.  In 
tho  oocond  ylaco,  tho  Roooarch  and  Intolligonco  otaff  was  not  oetublluhod  *y 
15?
tho  ])<jp'irLr..ont.  In  ru«po:irio  to  l'.oon.ly  folt  inLomal  n-x'tln.  It  vun  tho  result 
of  tho  trwiiifsr  to  tho  Dojiarli-wnt  in  19'i'jj  of  tho  Kouuarch  suul  AiialyHio  aiul 
t)io  Prcuicmtationu  l"!ru:ich'>fj  ol'  tho  Office-  of  Str:-.togic  Survicun. 
At  tho  head  or  tho  Rofioai-oh  and  Intolligcnco  iitnff  io  o  Special  Assistant 
to  tho  Secretary.  Tho  ota.1T  In  divided  Into  thrco  units:  tho  Offico  of  tho 
Special  Acsiotant,  casprisins  sovoral  poreonsl  assistants  and  a  rathor  oub- 
otantial  unit  conducting  rosoarch  in  special  source  natoria.1;  an  Offico  of 
Librurioo  and  Intelligence  Acquisition,  and  en  Offices  of  Intolligcnco  Rosoarch 
vhich  io  the  intolligcnco  producing  branch  of  tho  organization. 
Tho  research  analysts  in  tho  Offico  of  Intelligence  Kesoarch  uro  for  tho 
most  part  porsons  of  acadenlc  background,  and  nany  of  thea.  aro  of  high  quality. 
In  gonoral,  hovovor,  tho  recruitment  of  first-rato  intelligence  analysts  and 
other  specialists  has  becono  increasingly  difficult  as  the  future  cf  tho  Ea- 
Boarch  and  Intolligcnco  staff  became  roro  and  :aoro  uncortain. 
Tho  functions  of  tho  Research  and  IntolliGor.co  staff,  as  officially  do- 
finod,  aro  to  dovolop  and  isplcnont  a  "comprehensive  and  coordinated  intolli- 
gonco  program  for  tho  United  Statos;"  and  to  dovolop  and  irploasnt  a  sinilar 
coordinated  prolan  for  "positive  foreign  intolligcnco"  for  tho  Department, 
including  procuronont  of  information  and  tlio  production  of  intelligence  studios 
and  opot  intolligonco.  In  addition,  Rosoarch  tind  Intolligcnco  io  authorized 
to  initiate  instructions  to  Dopar-inont  officers  abroad  and  to  dotornino  vhat 
involution  flowing  into  tho  Department  iu  roquirod  for  tho  production  of 
"tiisoly  intolligonco." 
Thio  definition  of     functions  and  responsibilities  does  not     indlcato  tho
.if 
~"l>'trL1C5i].-.r  i:.tnl  oi'  "pror.rwa  for  jio.illlvo  foroJ",!>  Intel  UiY/'ncu"     vhich  liouourch 
and  Inti!.U.!,';-.>r:co  will  duvulop.  Jn  particular,  it  doou  not  dourly  dlnljj^uiuh 
botvoon  factual  studies  juvI  intoiLUgonco  out:!!'.-.l..'0,  and  it  dooo  not  givo  tho 
nlaff  any  cyolrj.  authority  or  responsibility  Jn  produeir,;.;  intolligtjnco,  fjuch 
as  tho  .Ir.tonigor.co  ngor.cloo  of  tho  military  services  enjoy  in  their  ronpoc- 
tivo  doparU^vrito.  Tho  chartor  is  broad  and  vnguo,  and  invitoo  a  variety  of 
inlarprottt.':  0:10. 
Tho  intelligence  reports  vhich  ftcsoarch  sr.i  Intolligcnco  proparoa  and 
circulates  vithin  tho  Dopartnont  arc  of  several  different  Linda.     Thoy  includo 
intolligor.ee  jsonoranda,  vhich  comprise  a  "brief  analysis  of  inforaation  on 
current  subjects;  inforcation  notes,  vhich  are  factual  reports  involving  little 
interpretation  or  estimating;  Office  of  Intelligence"  Research  studies,  vhich 
aro  exhaustive  summaries  of  availablo  infoncation  on  subjects  of  particular 
.significance;  periodical  reports,  vhich  are  confined  to  factual  reporting  on 
subjects  of  continuing  intereot;  and  situation  reports,  vhich  co^>ri30  revievo 
of  tho  political,  economic  and  social  situations  in  foreign  countries. 
With  the  exception  of  situation  and  periodical  reports,  the  studios  of 
tho  Offico  of  Intelligence  Research  are  prepared,  at  least  in  theory,  at  the 
refloat  of  policy  or  other  officors  of  tho  dopartnont.  Actually,  nany  of  thorn 
»ro  vritton  en  tho  initiative  of  tho  Offico  itsolf .  A  majority  are  in  princi- 
plu  roquoutcd  by  other  offices  in  tho  Department,  hut  generally  rooult  frora 
proposals  vhich  tho  Offico  of  Intolligonco  Roooarch  has  made  and  vhich  havo 
elicited  an  indication  of  interest  vhich  can  oorvo  as  a  "ro^uost . "  Tho  situ- 
ation reports  havo  ordinarily  not  boon  prepared  in  rooponao  to  rcquonts,  but 
ttro  now  integrated  vith  tho  national  Inlolligonco  Survey  progr-an  (000  Chapter 
VI)  in  vhich  Research  and  Inlolligonco  iu  oxtonoivoly  participating. 
lr.t
Tho  quality  of  lii'jiifi  cUffoivnl;  ruporto  varJo.'i  greatly.  Tho  i.vsin  crltl- 
cJh-tjj  oi'  lh'.<:i  tiro  that  t)n.-y  turn!  to  bo  a  cat!  <;:.-)  I  c,  are  unnvlatud.  lo  J:.rj.:tUato 
policy  probloiia,  and  j-.ro  of  Ion  too  Ifiiv'thy  and  dotailod  to  jnl'luonco  buny 
policy  officoro.  IL  ban  been  obrinrved  that  P.ycoarch  and  Inlolligonco  pjvducon 
"Ph.D.  intolligonco,"  ncbolar.McH.lly  add  re  bio,  but  of  cor^ovhat  IL'uitod  uao  In 
tho  day-to-day  forsrj.Lition  of  policy. 
Tho  Policy  Planning  Staff  and  tho  political  (geographical)  dookn  and  eco- 
nomic affaira  officoa  of  tho  DopartEont  aro  tho  principal  rocipic-nto  and  ucorc 
of  Buch  roporta.  Ah  indicated  oarlior,  thoco  officos  roquoi:t  a  relatively 
Halted  nirabor  of  roporta  en  thoir  own  initiative,  and  for  -tho  moot  part  do  not 
conaidor  thou  oasontial  to  thoir  work. 
It  io  opon  to  question  vhothor  Research  and  Intolligonco  occupies  a  posi- 
tion in  the  Ctato  Dopart=snt  which  psrrdtG  it  to  play  en  offoctivo  tnd  r.ccos- 
nory  rolo  in  tho  over-all  intellisonco  picturo  of  tho  Government.  Ao  vo  have 
Btatod,  Boooarch  and  Intelligence  vas,  in  offoct,  grafted  upon  tho  oziotins 
oi'ganization  of  tho  Department.  Thoro  wao  no  largo  body  of  opinion  within  tho 
Departssnt  or  tho  Foroign  Sorvico  which  keenly  tmpportod  tho  contribaticr.3 
vhioh  an  intelligence  staff  could  cake  to  policy  decisions.  In  fact  thoro  was 
nubotantial  foolins  that  tho  functions  callod  "intolligonco"  wore  at  loaat 
parollol  to,  if  not  inclusive  of,  rsany  of  thooo  already  porf  or;syd  by  tho  policy 
off! coo.  For  thoco  roatjon/3  rany  nonboro  of  tho  Dopartrxa.it  wore  originally 
roluctant  to  mko  uoo  of  tho  phynicaLly  ooparato  intolligonco  utaff . 
Thiu  aloof nooo  iu  conflruod  by  tho  failuro  to  bring  the  intolligonco  or- 
ganisation into  iisportant  policy  councilo.  In  viov  of  tho  rjpocial  naturo  of 
tho  Dopartmnt'o  work,     throughout  which  intolligonco     and  policy  aro     clonoly 
"J  155 
i 
J
„„v 
JoIj.jI,  I). in  lu  u:)duml;iTi'].ublo.  In  any  ov«ij,t,  tho  ol'iWt,  lu  to  ofii.'.'.blJnh  tho 
Jji«o]]i{;u;K'i  utaff  not  uo  tho  no.V>  oourco  of  JnlollJ;v.:r:co  aivilydiii,  but  j:ioro3y 
r.n  ono  )>o:j.'jjb3.o  nourcu  vhlch  could  bo  o;-,:p.loy!id  if  tho  poll cy  author.!  ties  00 
dotilrul.  T)io  IntoU.igonc-o  utaff,  Jn  th-j  opinion  of  r.:;iy  policy  officers,  h'.iu 
not  yoor.vl  Vj  off  ex*  tho  ])oparti.-.ont  any  mvlqu-jiy  signific.uit  contributions  which 
would  Justify  its  regular  and  intensive  c-jvloyj-iont , 
Tho  prociso  function  of  Rosor.rch  and  Intolligonco  in  producing  intelligence 
reports  has  r.ovor  boon  adequately  defined.  It  has  not  boon  nado  clour  whether 
Eosoarch  and  Intelligence  chould  ljj:iit  its  activities  to  preparing  exclusively 
factual  studios  at  tho  reouoot  of  polio;-  officers,  or  chould  produce  intelli- 
gence estinatos. 
Whatever  tho  designs!  ocope  of  ito  functions,  Research  and  Intolligcnco 
haa  Eovod  increasingly  during  tho  part  year  in  tho  direct i or.  of  intelligence 
.estimating.  In  thia  respect  it  has  sought  to  assume-  a  responsibility  long 
accepted  by  tho  other  departmental  intelligence  agoncios.  But  its  novensnt  in 
thiB  direction  has  brought  it  into  conflict  with  the  policy  officers  of  its 
own  Dopartnont  who  consider  it  thoir  own  function  to  bo  the  analysts  of  current 
problora  as  voll  as  the  foraulators  of  our  policies. 
Accordingly,  Roooarch  and  Intolligonco  ontors  tho  field  of  tho  policy 
officors  vhon  it  proaonts  ootinates  of  ito  own,  which  appear  to  analyze  tho 
policy  implications  of  a  glvon  problo:a.  Tho  conflict  over  this  aopoct  of  tho 
Eoooarch  and  Intelligence  l'olo  io  moot  ovldont  in  rogcu\l  to  intolligonco 
Memoranda  proparod  by  tho  organization  on  more  or  Ions  cm-ront  dovolopnonto. 
Although  such  reports  my  rgprooont  a  Mgh  dogroo  of  analytic  skill,  thoy  aro 
likoly  to  bo  rogardod  by  tho  policy  officor  as  a  -unolona  ropotition  of 
156
j...Y.rr,,Uon  villi     vhich  ho  In  ulroady     f miliar,      or  an  itnvunv.nt.jd  nt.t.,.::-.rL  to 
t..,]j   bin  v!rit  b»  should  think  ubout.  »•-  problem  undor  hin  connldomtion. 
■ 
l'orhipa  tho  most  tolling  ovidonco  of  tho  Dop-a-l.j.ent1  n  ntlHu-)o  tovr.rd  Uio 
i>j3C,arch  icyI  Ir.l0lli3er.c0  rc-porto  In  tho  lino  vhich  £H'c«  1"  U»°  I^'^d 
bonding  of  oach:  "Tho  conclusions  nx.proo.ooi  herein  are  baeod  upon  rom.arch 
end  analysis  by  tho  Intelligence  Organization,  and  do  not  Jioccnsarily  represent 
the-  viovo  of  other  off  icon  of  tho  Department  of  State." 
If  in  fast,  Ttosonrch  and  Intelligence  doo3  proparo  estimates,   thr-ro  is 
tho  possibility  that  on  certain  natters  tvo  or  aoro  separate  studios  or  esti- 
mates covoring  tho  some  subject  my  oxist  simultaneously  in  tho  Department. 
Tho  Policy  Planning  Staff  or  tho  geographical  doako,  for  example,  aro  accus- 
tomed to  draft  their  ovn  estimates  oolite  independently  of  Research  and  Intel- 
ligence.  Yet  Itoasareh  and  Intelligence,  knowing  that  a  particular  ratter  ia 
ono  of  gonoral  concorn  to  policy  officials,  my  prepare  an  estimate  of  its  ovn. 
So  Ions  ao  theoo  regain  in  the  State  Department  no  direct  ham  ray  result, 
although  tho  duplication  of  offort  erA   the  oxiston.ee  of  unreconciled  pointo  of 
viov  on  tho  oamo  subject  ray  be  undesirable.   If,  hovovor,  ao  nay  wH  occjr, 
tho  separate  estimates  aro  used  out  si  do  the  Department  in  satisfying  tho  needs 
of  tho  National  Socurlty  Council,  tho  Contral  Intelligence  Agency,  or  tho 
Services,  tho  possibility  of  confusion  la  obvious. 
IW'EIIIGH.'CJ  KRLrYTIOIlS  DErWEEII  THE  STATE  DETAKri-5!KT  AKD  OUTSIDE  AGENCIES 
In  tho  future  —  particularly  if  action  is  takon  on  our  rocommondationa 
for  tho  elimination  of  much  of  tho  miscellaneous  political  intolligonco  vork 
»ov  done  outside  of  tho  State  Department  —  tho  lattor  will  bo  called  upon 
More  and  more  to  roako  intelligence  contributions  to  tho  Services,   to  tho 
)
._/ 
Ccntnil  Intelligence  Agency  and  to  national  Intelligence  cntlmaten.  111011  it 
will  be  doubly  important  Unit  tho  rcnpor.iilbJlity  for  tho  .State  Department  'n 
conirJl.utlc-;i  be  );iorc  clearly  fixed  within  t)io  Depurtnont. 
One  pormiblo  uolution  might  bo  to  limit  the  Koocurch  find  Intelligence 
otoff  to  factual  reporting  und  to  place  on  the  policy  officers  of  the  Depart- 
ment the  rocponoibility  *<>*'  passing  upon  any  political  intelligence  estimates 
uccd  outside  of  the  Department.  Alternatively  thece  eotlmatoo  might  be  prepared 
by  Research  and  Intelligence  and  then  paused  upon  by  the  appropriate  policy 
officers  of  the  Department  before  they  go  to  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency 
or  to  other  Government  deportmenta .  A  third  eoluticn  might  be  to  allocate  the 
personnel  of  Research  and  Intelligence  among  the  policy  off iceo  (geographical 
dcoko)  of  the  Department  or  attach  them  to  the  Policy  Planning  Staff  and  then 
place  on  the  policy  officers  cr  Planning  Staff  the  responsibility  for  State 
Department  estimates  for  tho  Central  Intelligence  Agency  or  for  other  outside 
Government  agencies. 
The  State  Department  6hould,  of  course,  be  protected  from  bxirdensome  and 
unreasonable  demands  for  political  eatimateo  from  other  agencies.  If  ouch  call 
ohorld  create  a  problem,  tho  Intelligence  Advisory  Committee,  on  vhich  the 
Department  vlll  be  represented,  ohould  exorcise  ito  coordinating  function  to 
reduce  the  demanda  to  manageable  proportions. 
Furthermore,  the  Department  has  a  primary  rcaponolbility  to  exercise  its 
intelligence  functions  for  the  purpose  of  formulating  ito  own  policies.  It 
miot  adopt  tlie  iuetliod3  and  techniques  vhich  vlll  boot  meet  thio  primary  roopon- 
"Ibllity.  now  this  lo  done  As  not  within  our  competence.  However,  in  working 
°»»t  Hr.  own  internal     procedure,    it  io  important  to  the     over- nil  intelligence
aot-up  t-.\-A  part]  cul',.)\]y  to  tho  projuu*  functjonjjig  °f  ^5°  Contral*  Intu.UJt'.oneo 
Agoncy,  vith  which  thJn  roport  in  irjvidinto.l.v  canconvjil,  that  tho  Gt.ato  Dupai'L- 
Eiont  uhould  equip  iti.oif  to  rioot  tho  legitimate  roqu'.-ot  for  political  inti-lli- 
ptonco  fiuraittod  by  tku  Contrni  Inlolllgonco  Aguncy  or  olhor  Oovorm:r/nt  intol- 
ligonco fcgcnciou  and  to  oi'i'uct  tlio  closer  Hal  ton  vH.li  tho  Contral  Intel!:!  gonco 
Agoncy  vhich  vo  have  roco.r..;yndcd  in  thia  report. 
To  lcoot  thooo  roqul  ror^nto  vo  roca-.r.3nd.  that  tho  Stato  Dopai'taont  givo 
conoidox*atlon  to  aonigning  to  occso  Benlor  officor  of  tho  Dopar Lucent  tho  Amo- 
tions of  Intolligonco  Officer.*  Such  officor  obould  havo  tho  proviso,  the 
authority,  and  tho  uccoca  to  opsrational  and  policy  nattora  which  vould  equip 
hin  to  guido  tho  production  and  control  tho  dia£jo:ilnution  of  Stato  Department 
intolligonco  estlratos.  Tho  Special  Asnistant  for  Research  and  Intelligence 
and  hio  etaff  do  not  today  have  such  povors  or  position.  Whether,  in  a  given 
caee,  the  intelligence!  catiziatoa  vould  enanato  froci  tho  Policy  Planning  Staff, 
tho  political  offices  (geographical  dosko),  or  frca  a  combination  of  tho  two, 
.pluo  tho  Roscarch  and  Intolligonco  otaff,  is  a  matter  for  internal  Stato  De- 
partment determination. 
Tho  appointnont  of  an  Intolligonco  Officor,  vith  tho  powers  and  functions 
vo  have  indicated,  and  vith  a  crall  but  highly  trainod  staff,  in  our  opinion, 
vould  rocult  in  a  rcoro  efficient  tiyoten  whereby  tho  Dopartcent  could  moot  any 
.logit  irate  noods  of  tho  Contral  Intolligonco  Agency  and  of  othor  Govorrciant 
pgoncio3  for  political  intolligonco.  In  thia  vay  tho  Dopartjiont  could  alao 
offoct  clooor    liaicon  vith  tho    Central  Intolligonco  Agency     and  tho     Service 
*  Wo  have  used  the  torn  "Ijito3J.igcnco  Officer"  ■  hero  for  roaoonra  of  clurity 
only.  An  a  practical  matter  aivl  for  occurity  roaoona  oono  othor  and  moro 
innocuouo  title  would  bo  dooirablu. 
7  159 
> 
t 
I
huuv.cIom.  Tliio  Intelligence  Officer  would  norvo  rui  tho  Popart-mit*  u  rupro- 
aonluljvu  on  tho  ruconatilulod  Intollljjuncu  Advisory  Co—dttc-o,  doiicribod  in 
Chuplor  TV.        Ho  would  also  act  an  tho  Dup-ir  tint's  principal     lialnon  of  Hear 
i 
for  oV.y.ir  r-attorr:  concerning  the  Central  Into.Ulgonco  Agonoy,  including  Hainan 
with  tho  Offlco  of  Policy  Cooi'dlnation  an  provided  toy  tho  Kutlcn-a  Gccurlly 
Council  and  wltli  oUior  covert  activities  of  tho  Control  Intelligence  Agency  c:o 
ouscoKtod  in  thio  report.  This  Intolligor.co  Officor  would  conbino  tho  func- 
tions now  being  handled  by  novorul  departmental  off  3.  cor  a  or  not  toeing  handled 
at  nil.  Ho  ohould  not,  howovor,  ntand  between  othor  department  officers  and 
tho  appropriate  officials  of  tho  Contral  Intelligence  Agency,  but,  ho  should 
coordinate  tboso  relationships.  For  oxanplo,  tho  various  desks  in  tho  opor- 
ating  end  ostirating  unitB  of  tho  Contral  Intelligence  Agency  should  dovolop 
close  vorking  relationships  with  tho  corresponding  geographical  desks  or  othor 
policy  officers  of  the  Departaont. 
Wo  recognize  that  in  recoaaondiag  that  tho  political  intelligence  reports 
and  ostinatoa  be  passed  upon  by  the  policy  officers  of  th*  Department,  there 
is  tho  risk,  which  ve  discussed  above  in  tho  chapter  on  national  estimates, 
that  those  reports  will  bo  colored,  possibly  oven  distorted,  by  the  policy 
prejudices  of  those  vho  proparo  then.  As  botvoon  this  danger  and  that  of  having 
tho  roports  proparod  by  a  group  which  is  not  thoroughly  acquainted  with  tho 
operational  and  policy  decisions  of  tho  Department,  wo  chooso  tho  forar,  Wo 
do  so  in  tho  hopo  that  if  the  Central  Intelligence  Agoncy,  and  particularly,  its 
Eotinatos  Division,  and  tho  Intolligonco  Advisory  Co^-iittoo  function  as  vo  bo- 
liovo  thoy  should,  on  opportunity  will  bo  afforded  to  challongo  departmental 
outiratoo  and  to  appmiso  thorn  in  tho  light  of  roporto  available  to  rcomboro  of 
tho  Intolligonco  Advisory  Co:caittoo  fro:n  othor  sourcuu.  (See  Chapter  V).  Hero 
](>() 
m  i)    ■      niijii.mjuiju  -"  '  ' !'    '
•    ■         \  •■■■■■■■■  -^ 
lttVlyln  poooiMo  to  correct  or.L^too  or  ^  ,1^  ^-l^'tonl  th«.t  hnvo 
firtMJ  «cr/orto:ir«l"  for  a  jm-Uculw  policy  lino  vhich  fro:n  n  bro.dur  view  of 
available  facta  isay  bo  uhovn  to  bo  unaour.d. 
co;:cr.U3io:;r;  axd  skcc^jdatio-l; 
(1)  The  Stato  Bir-artisunt,  to  vhlch  tho  National  Security  Council  huo 
aligned  dominant  intcrcot  in  tho  collection  and  production  of  political, 
cultural  find  nociological  intelligence,  ohould  equip  itnolf  more  adequately  to 
noot  the  iegitiuato  rcquiror-ento  of  the  Central  Intelligence  Agoncy'  and  of 
other  Government  intelligence  agencieo  for  audi  intelligence. 
(2)  The  specialized  intelligence  ntaff  in  tho  Stato  Dspartasnt,  the 
Research  and  Intelligent  staff,  dooo  not  nov  have  sufficient  current  knowledge 
of  departmental  operations  and  policies  to  furnish,  on  behalf  of  the  Depart- 
ment, the  basic  catirateo  vhlch  say  bo  required  by  tho  Central  Intelligence 
Agency  and  the  Service  intelligence  agencieo. 
(5)  The  liaioon  between  the  State  Department  and  the  Central  Intelligence 
Agency  should  be  closer  and  put  on  a  continuing,  effective  baeia. 
(U)  To  inset  the  forcgoins  requirement a,  conaidcration  ohould  he  given  by 
the  Department  to  designating  a  high  officer  of  the  DepartsBnt,  who  has  full 
acccao  to  operational  and  policy  natters,  to  act  as  intelligence  officer.  This 
officer,  with  a  osall  staff,  ohould  process  requests  for  departmental  intclll- 
gonco  received  from  tho  Central  Intelligence  Agency  and  othor  agendo  o  and  nee 
that  logUinato  rcquontn  aro  mot  through  tho  preparation  of  tho  requisite  in- 
tolllgonco  roporto  or  ostiuutos  by  tho  appropriate  departmental  of fi core.  Ho 
ohould  aluo  act  no  continuing  Intelligence  liainon  officer  vltli  tho  Central 
Inlolilgynco  Agency  and  tho  Sorvlco  intolligonco  agonclen. 
..■.- 
\ 
i 
\     THERE  IS  NO  PAGE   162. 
\
CUAS'TiCRIl'IlI 
CONCLUSION 
At  the  on  Lac  t  of  thin  report  \,\:  gave  a  brief  surjwiry  of  our  mirv..-y  and 
findings,  and  at.  the  various  chapter  endings  wo  havu  added  those  conclusions 
and  rcconix'-irlatlons  which  were  applicable  to  tho  subject  naUorof  the  chapter. 
Ve  have  been  critical  of  tho  direction  and  achaini  strati  on  of  the  Central 
Intelligence  .Agency  where  ve  felt  that  there  had  been  failures  to  carry  out 
ita  bacic  charter.  Ve  have  also  pointed  out  what  we  have  Judged  to  be  in- 
adequacies in  administration  and  lack  of  over-all  policy  guidance  within  tho 
organization.  At  no  tirce,  however,  have  we  overlooked  the  great  difficulties 
facing  a  relatively  new  and  untried,  organization  which  ha3  been  viewed  with 
noise  suspicion  and  distrust  even  by  those  whom  it  should  serve.  We  believe 
that  some  measure  of  this  suspicion  and  distrust  i3  being  dissipated  and  that 
what  is  needed  today  is  for  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  to  prove  that  it 
caii  and  will  carry  out  its  assigned  duties.  Wo  have  proposed  specific  steps 
which  can  be  taken  toward  this  objective. 
The  progress  of  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  should  be  continuously 
tested  by  the  national  Security  Council  against  the  nccompliahrccnt  of  the  pur- 
poses of  Sec.  102  of  the  National  Security  Act.  That  is  to  say,  the  Central 
Intelligence  Asency  should  be  prepared  to  show  what  is  being  accomplished:. 
(1)  To  coordinate  the  intelligence  activities  of  the  Government; 
(2)  To  provide,  in  close  collaboration  with  other  governmental  intelli- 
tvneo  ngi'ncien,  for  the  central  correlation  of  intelligence  relating  to  the 
iintioMal  security;  and 
163 
\ 
\
f 
(3)     To  ]»vr''on:i  t:ic     lnU.1l  i^ence  /md  JvJatcd     norviccn  of  common  concern 
n.'iiiij-'.iKd   to  it  \>y   th-j  national   Security  Council. 
In  thct'.c  fleld.'i  the  Central.  In  loll  .•".(.•once  Agmc;/  han  Lho  duty  to  act.  It 
linn  Vc-n  eivon,  both  by  Inv  end  by  Nat Jonnl  Security  Council  directive,  wide 
authority,  and  it  )i;i«  the  open  invitation  to  uc-el:  f'ren  the  National  Security 
Council  any  additional  authority  which  inny  ho  eoocntlal.  It  icuot  not  wait  to 
have  authority  thrunt  upon  It.  Itn  basic  mandate  in  clear.  Ve  rccc»nize  that 
it  will  rcquiro  initiative*  and  vioion  to  carry  it  out.  If  thic  i.a  dono,  ve 
will  have  i.:udc  a  oatiofactory  otart  toward  achieving  ono  of  our  Koist  essential 
defennc  requlrescnto,   an  adequate  intelligence  service. 
1(4
■»■■  i  ii  ii  ■  iMij-n»i'ri  ■ 
ANNEX  1     . 
SURVEY  GROUP  TERMS  OF  REFERENCE  I 
NATIONAL  SECURITY  COUMCIL 
VASHIIJGTOil 
February  15,  19'«8 
MK-lOHAirjyJli  F03:  Mr.  Allen  W.  Dullea 
Mr.  Kathico  F.  Corroa 
Mr.  William  H.  Jackson 
SUBJECT:       Survey  of  tho  Contra!  Intelligence  Agency 
Thie  i3  to  confirm  our  understanding  that  you  vill 
eorvo  as  the  group  to  make  a  survey  of  the  Central  Intelligence 
Agoncy,  in  accordance  with  tho  enclosed  resolution  approved  by  tho 
National  Security  Council. 
This  memorandum  io  your  authorization  to  proceed 
vith  this  survey  and,  upon  presentation  by  you,  will  constitute  a 
directive  to  tho  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  and  tho  Intelli- 
gence Chiefs  of  the  Dopartaenta  represented  on  tho  Council,  to  fur- 
nish you  necessary  information  and  facilitioa  as  indicated  in  the 
second  paragraph  of  tho  enclosed  resolution. 
Your  villingness  to  participate  in  this  vitally 
important  survey  is  sinccroly  appreciated  by  all  members  of  the 
National  Security  Council. 
SIDNEY  W.  SOUERS 
Executive  Socrotary 
Incl 
National  Security  Council  Uonolution 
■ 
165
NATIONAL  SKCUHITT  COUNCIL  }<&>OLUl'10;i 
January  13,  19JiO 
The  National  Security  Council  haci  agreed  that  a  Group  of 
tvo  or  throo  npoclally  qualified  Individuals  not  in  tho  Government 
oorvicc  should  uudro  a  cciaprehonaivo,  impartial,  and  objective  pur- 
vey of  the  organization,  activities,  and  personnel  of  the  Contral 
Intelligence  Agency.  Ao  a  result  of  thia  survey,  t):ls  group  oliould 
roport  to  the  Council  ito  findings  und  rocassaendationa  on  tho  fol- 
lowing Batter  a: 
a.  Tho  adequacy  and  effoctiveneaa  of  tho  prosont  or- 
ganisational Btructure  of  CIA. 
b.  Tho  value  and  efficiency  of  exiating  CIA  activi- 
tiooT 
c.  The  relationship  of  those  activities  to  thoao  of 
other  Departments  and  Agencies. 
d.  The  utilization  and  qualifications  of  CIA  personnel. 
The  National  Security  Council  also  authorized  and  directed 
tho  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  and  the  Intelligence  Chiefs  of 
tho  Departments  represented  on  the  Council  to  give  the  above  group 
access  to  all  information  and  facilities  required  for  thoir  survey, 
except  details  concerning  intelligence  sources  and  methods . 
Uifi 
"«i.i«,iiii  inn  ,n  I"
ANNEX 3 
PRESIDENTIAL  LETTER  CREATING  THE  CENTRAL 
INTELLIGENCE  GROUP 
tie  wnra  hod.-::-: 
VASIIIUGTOI/ 
January  22,  19h6 
To  The  Secretary  of  Stato 
Tho  Socrotcry  of  Vex,  and 
Tho  Secretary  of  the  Kavy  .  . 
1.  It  1b  iny  dosiro,  and  I  hereby  direct,  that  all  Foderal  foreign  intolli- 
gonco  activities  ho  planned,  developed  and  coordinated  so  ao  to  assuro  the 
E03t  offective  acccapliGhnent  of  tho  intelligence  mission  related  to  tho 
national  security.     I  hereby  designate  you,  tcsethor  with  another  person  to 
be  naaed  by  so  a3  lay  personal  representative,  as  tho  national  Intelligence 
Authority  to  accomplish  this  purpose. 
2.  Within  tho  liiaitG  of  available  appropriations,  you  shall  each  from,  tiino 
to  tino  assign  persons  and  facilities  froia  your  respective  D&pertosuto,  which 
porsons  shall  collect ivoly  form  a  Central  Intelligence  Group  and  shall,  under 
tho  direction  of  a  Director  of  Central  Intelligence,  assist  the  National  In- 
telligence Authority.  The  Director  of  Contral  Intelligence  shall  be  desig- 
nated by  :zi9,  shall  bo  responsible  to  the  National  Intelligence  Authority,  and 
shall  sit  as  a  non- voting  jceahor  thoroof . 
3.  Subject  to  tho  existing  lav,  and  to.  tho  direction  and  control  of  the 
National  Intelligence  Authority,   the  Director  of  Contra!  Intelligence  shall: 
a.  Accomplish  tho  correlation  and  evaluation  of  intelligence  rolating 
to  tho  national  oocurity,  end  tho  appropriate  dissemination  within  tho 
Government  of  tho  resulting  strategic  and  national  policy  intelligence. 
In  so  doing,  full  use  shall  bo  ar-ado  of  tho  staff  and  facilities  of  tho 
intelligence  agoncio3  of  your  Dopartsionts. 
b.  Plan  for  tho  coordination  of  such  of  tho  activities  of  tho  intol- 
•    ligenco  agencies  of  your  Deporteonts  ao  rolato  to  tho  national  security 
and  roco-Eiond  to  tho  Rational  Iirjolllgonco  Authority  tho  outablisluiont 
of  ouch  OA'or-all  policlos  and  ob.Kictivos  as  vill  assure  tho  most  of- 
foctivo  accoxpliotoent  of  tho  national  intelligence  mission. 
o.  Forform,   for  tho  bonofit  of  suid  into21igonco  agoncios,   such  norvlcoa 
of  cos'josi  concern  an  tho  National  Intelligence  Authority  dotonairioo  can  bo 
more  efficiently  accomplished  centrally . 
169
fl.   Perform  such  other 'functionu  mid  duliu.'i  rolutod  to   lutolllgunco  nf- 
foctlR.*-;  tho  nation's!  nocurlty  u:>   tho  President  and  tho  i.':itlo:ial   Jntolli- 
gfsico  Authority  >'.-»;."  frca  timo  to  time  dli'oct. 
Is.  Y.o  ju'llco,  law  onforcorjjnt  or  internal  security  functions  shall  bo  ex- 
orcised under  thlo  directive. 
5.  Such  Intelligence  received  by  tho  intolligonco  agencies  of  your  Depart- 
ments as  isay  bo  def.iJ;:n.v.tcd  by  tho  national  Intolligonco  Authority  shall  bo 
freely  available  to  tho  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  for  correlation, 
evaluation  or  dinscialn&tJon.     To  tho  extent  approved  by  tho  national  Intel- 
ligence Authority,  tho  operations  of  said  intoiljguP.ee  cgencieo  ohall  bo  open 
to  inspection  by  tho  Diroctor  of  Central  Intollige.ico  in  connection  with 
planning  functions. 
6.  Tho  oxictir-s  IntolliGonco  agoncics  of  your  Departments  cliall  continuo 
to  collect,  ovaluato,  correlate  and  disseminate  departmental  intelligence. 
7.  The  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  oliall  bo  advieed  by  an  Intelligence 
Advisory  Board  consisting  of  tho  heads  (or  their  roprooentativoo)  of  tho 
principal  military  and  civilian  intelligence  agencies  of  the  Government  having 
functions  related  to  national  security,  aa  determined  by  tho  National 
Intelligence  Authority. 
8.  Within  the  scope  of  existing  law  and  Presidential  directives,  other  de- 
partments and  agencies  of  the  exocutive  branch  of  the  Federal  Govomcent 
chall  furnish  such  intelligence  information  relating  to  the  national  security 
as  ie  in  thoir  possession,  and  as  the  Director  of.  Central  Intelligence  cay 
from  time  to  time  request  pursuant  to  regulations  of  the  National  Intelligence 
Authority. 
9.  Kothing  herein  ohall  be  construed  to  authorize  the  making  of  investiga- 
tions inside  the  continental  limits  of  tho  United  States  and  its  possess  ior.3, 
except  as  provided  by  law  and  Presidential  directives. 
10.  In  the  conduct  of  thoir  activities  the  national  Intelligence  Authority 
and  tho  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  shall  be  responsible  for  fully 
protecting  intelligence  sources  and  motfcodo. 
Sincerely  yotirs 
/a/  Harry  Truman 
170
ANNEX   2 
SURVEY  GROUP  TERMS  OF  REFERENCE  II 
NATIONAL  3ECUKJTY  COUNCIL 
WASlilHCTOH 
L 
March  17,  l^ 
MEKOPAIIDUM  FOR:     Mr.  Allen  W.  Dulleo 
Mr.  1-jathina  F.  Correa 
Mr.  Willloa  H.  Jackson 
SUBJECT:  Survey  of  the  Centi'al  Intelligence  Agoncy 
1.     I  have  already  sent  you  a  icsiaorandua  vith  the  terms 
of  the  resolution  of  the  National  Security  Council  providing  that  a 
Gurvoy  should  ho  made  of  the  activities  of  the  Central  Intelligence 
Agency  and  its  relationship  to  other  Departments  and  Agencies. 
•■    2.     As  a  result  of  our  further  discussions  en  this  sub- 
ject, it  nay.  bo  helpful  If  I  set  forth  my  understanding  regarding  the 
scope  of  the  surrey  and  the  procedures  to  he  followed.  ' 
3.     The  survey  vill  comprise  primarily  a  thorough  and 
comprehensive  examination  of  the  structure,  administration,  activities 
and  inter-agoncy  relationships  of  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  an 
outlined  in  the  resolution  of  the  National  Security.  Council.     It  will 
also  include  an  examination  of  such  intelligence  activities  of  other 
Government  Departments  and  Agencies  ae  relate  to  the  national  secur- 
ity,  in  order  to  make  rocommciidations  for  their  effective  operation 
and  ovor-all  coordination,  oubjoct  to  the  undor standing  that  the  group 
will  not  engage  in  an  actual  physical  examination  of  departmental  in- 
telligence operations  (a)  outoido  of  Washington  or  (b)   in  tho  collec- 
tion of  comaunicatiens  intelligence.     On  behalf  of  the  national  Secur- 
ity Council  I  will  undortaho  to  eeek.  the  cooperation  in  this  survey  of 
thoeo  Government  Departments  and  Agencies  not  represented  on  the  Coun- 
cil,vhich  have  an  interest  in  intolligcnco  as  rolatos  to  national 
socurity. 
h.     It  should  bo  understood  that  tho  uurvoy  of  tho  Central 
Intelligence  Agency  and  its  relationship  to  other  Deportments  and  Agen- 
cies vill  bo  done  for  and  with  tho  authority  of  the  national  Security 
Council.     Tho  nurvoy  of  tho  intelligence  activities  of  tho  Departments 
of  Slate,   tho  Ar;:iy,  tho  l.'avy,  and  tlio  Air  Force,   however,   will  bo  for 
and  vith  tho  authority  of  tho  roopoctivo  hoado  of  thooo  Doparticontn . 
"^wwum 
\ 
\ 
167
5.  'Ilio  fi-.n-voy  f.i-cup  vlll  :ju*:::ilt  fro:a  ti»no  to  Uj:io  rncosi- 
icon-laUonr.  on  !niivM;i:iJ.  prcl- !»>::!:•  which  r.c-f-A  to  bo  brought  to  tho  nt- 
U-atltn  of  tho  CUv.jiv:  1 1  or  t).;.  iK-Us  of  tho  r<;:.pootJvo  D<:i.-irt.i::o:af.i  arid 
Aj.-or.clu3  con5.-rr.cl.  I  "rob  3  r.-:.  n  ccricorjslivi  CIA  vlli  ho   given  priori iy 
over  those  lnvoJvJ::g  cthor  Avj:;cluo.   Tt  is  contemplated  tlr.it  tho  sur- 
vey vlll  bo  cor-y.!.ot.t.d  and  final  report  unfitted  on  or  before  January  1, 
6.  It  io  ny  understanding  th.it  at  your  request  Mr.  For- 
rostul  hos  agreed  to  lend  to  tho  investigating  group  tho  services  of 
Mr.  itobert  Blua  to  load  tho  staff  vox*.  I  vould  appreciate  tho 
group's  tidvlco  *';3  to  additional  staff  itosibora  it  jaiy  roquiro  in  order 
tliat  I  nay  clear  thca  for  thie  vorfc.  Tho  csa.ibcr.0  of  tho  staff,  vhsn 
cloarcd  by  tho  hoods  of  the  Agencies  concerned,  vill  bo  Given  access 
to  information  and  facilities  roquired  for  tho  survey  in  tho  ca™e 
canncr  as  provided  for  your  group  in  tho  Council's  resolution. 
J.     Compensation  and  expenses  for  tho  members  of  the  in- 
vestigating group  and  its  staff  vill  bo  paid  for  out  of  funds  avail- 
able to  the  Rational  Security  Council  and  tho  Control  Intelligence 
Agency.  .  .     . 
8.  I  vill  bo  pleased  to  render  so  far  as  practicable 
any  further  assistance  vhich  you  nay  require  in  conducting  your 
survey. 
SIDNEY  V.  SOUERS 
Executive  Secretary 
I  fttt
ANNKX  4 
NATIONAL  SISCUKITY  ACT  OF  10-17 
(PUBLIC  LAW  253  -  00th  CONGRESS) 
CENTRAL  IirPELLICIuJCE  ACK'iCY 
Soc.  102.  (a)  Thcro  is  hereby  established  undor  tho  National  Socurity 
Council  a  Central  Intelligonco  Agency  vith  a  Director  of  Central  Intelligonso, 
vho  shall  bo  tho  head  thereof.  Tho  Diroctor  ohall  bo  appointed  by  tho  Presi- 
dent, by  and  vith  tho  advico  and  consent  of  tho  Sonutc,  from  nrcong  tho  com- 
missioned officers  of  the  armed  oorvicos  or  fro  among  individuals  in  civilian 
life.     The  Director  ohe.ll  recoivo  caaponeation  at  tho    rate  of  $1^,000  a  year. 
(b)  (l)  If  a  commissioned  officor  of  the  armed  sorvicos  io  appoiatod  no 
Diroctor  then— 
(A)  in  tho  perf ormance  of  hio  duties  as  Director,  ho  shall  bo  oubjoct 
tonooupervi3ion,  control,  restriction,  orprohibition  (military  or  other- 
vise)  other  than  would  bo  operative  %rith  respect  to  hia  if  ho  voro  a  ci- 
vilian in  no  vay  connected  vith  tho  Department  of  the  Army,  the  Depart- 
ment of  the  Navy,  the  Department  of  tho  Air  Force,  or  the  arr.od  services 
or  any  component  thereof;  and 
(B)  he  ohall  not  po36ess  or  exercise  any  supervision,  control,  powers, 
or  functions  (other  than  ouch  ao  ho  possesses,  or  is  authorized  or  direct- 
ed to  exorcise,  ao  Director)  with  respect  to  tho  armed  services  or  any 
component  thoroof,  the  Department  of  tho  Array,  tho  Department  of  the  Navy, 
or  tho  Department  of  the  Air  Force,  or  any  branch,  bureau,  unit  or  divi- 
oion  thereof,  or  vith  rospoct  to  any  of  tho  personnel  (military  or  civil- 
ian) of  any  of  th9  foregoing. 
(2)  Except  as  provided  in  paragraph  (l) ,  tho  appointment  to  tho  office 
of  Director  of  a  cenmiasionod  of f  icor  of  the  arced  oervicoo,  and  hio  acceptance 
of  and  service  in  such  office,  ohall  in  no  vay  affect  any  status,  office,  rar±, 
or  grade  ho  nay  occupy  or  hold  in  tho  armed  oorvicos,  or  any  emolument,  per- 
quisite, right,  privilege,  or  benefit  incident  to  or  arising  out  of  any  auch 
status,  office,  rank,  or  grade.  Any  oxich  ccmuinsionod  off  icor  shall,  vhllo 
serving  in  the. office  of  Diroctor,  recoivo  tho  military  pay  and  allowances 
(active  or  retired,  ao  tho  cooo  miay  bo)  payable  to  a  contaluoionod  officor  of 
hio  grade  and  length  of  norvice  and  shall  bo  paid,  from  any  fundo  available  to 
dofrny  tho  expenses  of  tho  Agency,  annual  compensation  at  a  rate  equal  to  tho 
amount  by  which  $lJi,000  oxcoodo  tho  amount  of  hlu  annual  military  pay  and 
allowances. 
(c)  Notwithstanding  tho  provisions  *f  ooctlon  6  of  tho  Act  of  August  2^, 
1912  (37  Gtat.  !>!>5)  ,  or  tho  provisions  of  any  other  law,  tho  Director  of 
Contra!  Intolllgonao  my,  in  his  diocrotlon,  toir.il na to  tho  employment  of  any 
officor  or  employee  of  tho  Agency  whonovor  ho  shall  deem  ouch  termination 
nocviisary    or    advioablo     in  tho     intorouto     of  the    United  States,     but     ouch 
171
l,.rr.i:i':tlo:i  nh'-ll  not  affect  t.!io  rJr.ht  of  nwzh  orficor  or  orr.ployo  to  i:<m1:  or 
U/""f-'>t  c-":;.lo;,:r.v:it  Sn  fuiy  other  c!i.p>;.ri.:i.<-iit  or  c:;«:acy  of  tho  Govwir::«-)it  II* 
d"«ai.rol  c]  It'll/lu  for  ouch  employment  !•;.-   th.j  United     SUttuo  Civil  iiorvlcu  Ccm- 
(d)  For  tho  purpooo  of  conrdlnritlsvr,  tho  intoll igencc  activities  or  tho 
or.-.«j-al  G;<v.:rr,r.v:it  dt.-^-.vtr-ntn  and  «g.:.-i:cios  In  tho  intoroat  of  national  nucu- 
rity,  it.  uiJiU   t-o  the  duty  of  tho  Agency,   undor  the     direction  of  tho  National 
Socuvlt;/  Council--  ■  AJ 
(1)  to  advise  tho  Nntior.il  Security  Council  In  ratters  concerning 
ouch  intelligence  activities  of  tho  Government  doparlsauntn  mid  agencies 
en  rolato  to  national  security; 
(2)  to  esiL-o  roccranondatlona  to  tho  National  Socurity  Council  xor 
tho  coordination  of  ouch  intelligence  activities  of  tho  departments  and 
agcncJoo  of  the  Government  aa  roluto  to  the  national  socurity; 
(3)  to  correlate  and  evaluate  intelligence  relating  to  tho  national 
socurity,  and  provide  for  tho  appropriate  dincosiuation  of  such  intel- 
ligence vithin  the  Government  using  where  appropriate  existing  agencies 
and.  facilities:  Provided,  That  tho  Agency  shall  have  no  police,  subpoena, 
low-onf crccLVj.it  peworo,  or  internal-security  functions:  Fr^d^furtV^r, 
That  tho  departments  and  other  agencies  of  tho  Covcriruont  ahv.ll  continue 
to  collect,  evaluate,  correlate,     and  disseminate     departmental     intolli- 
.  gonse:  And  provided  further,  That  tho  Director  of  Central  Intelligence 
ohaii  bo  responsible  for  protect  Ins  intelligence  oources  and  methods 
froa  unauthorised  disclosure; 
(1*)  to  perform,  for  the  benefit  of  the  existing  intelligence  agen- 
cieo,  ouch  additional  cervices  of  coiaon  concern  as  the  National  Security 
Council  dotcrcsincs  can  bo  isoro  efficiently  accomplished  centrally; 
(5)  to  perform  such  other  functions  and  duties  related  to  intelli- 
gence affect ins  tho  national  security  a3  the  National  Socurity  Council 
may  froa  tine  to  tice  dii'bct. 
(o)  To  the  extent  recorraonded  by  tho  rational  Security  Council  and  ap- 
proved by  tho  President,  such  intelligence  of  the  departments  and  agencies 
of  tho  Government,  oxcont  as  hereinafter  provided,  rolating  to  the  national 
security  shall  bo  open  to  tho  inspection  of  tho  Director  of  Central  Intelli- 
gence, and  such  intelligence  as  relates  to  tho  national  security  and  is  poscossea 
tho  vritton  request  of  tho  Director  of  Central  Intelligence, 
the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  shall  cake  available  to  tho  Director  of 
Central  Intelligence  ouch  infoi-raation  for  correlation,  oval  nation,  and  dis- 
semination as  ray  bo  essential  to  the  rational  security. 
(f)     Effoctivo  when  tho  Director  first  appolntod  under  subsection  (a)  has 
taken  off  ico— 
•      .  (l)     tho  National     Intelligence    Authority  (ll  Fed.  Reg.  1337;  1339, 
Fobrunvy  5,  IP^u)   shall  cease  to  exist;  imd 
(2)     the  personnel,  property,  and  records  of  tho  Contral  Intelligence 
Group  aro  transferred  to  tho  Contral     Intelligence  Agency,  and  ouch  Cro\ip 
shall  cease  to  oxist.     Any  unexpended  balances  of  appropriations,  alloca- 
•    tions,  or  other  funds     available  or     author  i/.ed  to  bo     ma  do  availublo  for 
oucli  Group  shall  bo  available  and  shall  bo  authorised  tobo  undo  uvuilublo 
In  liko  winner  for  expenditure  by  tho  Aguncy. 
172
—a  l~.-4         fc...~«  i—. 
■  «  •-        • 
i 
ti'if         I 
I  tf»t.  e< 
T 
tmtts. 
:l[".    It;     JsOT.    if 
I      put    |    I  III  !»•« 
£7  A    Organization 
yantfi 
DlC 
I'.XUOl.    til 
l»'c;in 
t»«»en 
I 
I        t-ui 
mem 
IIIIKI 
•»««:•:       »iii».!i     inttitl     j(.nvti!   )i»fif:«    !    ■„:■•    ;  :  1 1 1 .  >  •  •  t 
imtit  J      cmicci       »»icn|   [>«.:;?.  s..|   j      it.        1      ),.      J  
i      ,,. 
> 
!       n?»i»t 
»i?«i*t    ' 
•  l!ri:i    M.."- 
US-»:tt 
I     s»i»#iti 
Jsniury  l*:3 
/I
ANNEX  0 
CENTRAL  INTELLIGENCE  AGENCY 
PERSONNEL  STRENGTH  AS  OF  2<i  DECEMBER  1948 
171
ANN1CX  7 
NATIONAL  SKCUKITY  COUNCIL  INTELLIGENCE  DIRECTIVE  NO.  1 
DUTIES  AND  RESPONSIBILITIES 
December  12,   19''7 
Purouant  to  the  provisions  of  Section  102  of  the  national  Security  Act  of 
loll'/,  and  for  the  purposes  cnunciatod  In  paragraphs  (d)  and  (o)  thereof,  the 
National  Security  Couiicil  hereby  authorizes  and  dirccto  that: 
1.  To  maintain  the  relationship  casontial  to  coordination  between 
the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  and  the  intelligence  organ Izationo,  an 
Intelligence  Advisory  Cocssittco  consisting  of  the  respective  intelliGor.ee 
chief o  from  the  Btwxrtaantn  of  State,  Aroy,  Navy,  Mid  Air  Force,  and  fron 
the  Joint  Staff  (JCS),  and  the    Atoreic  Energy  Cc=icoion,   or  their  repre- 
•  sentatives,  ob«ill  be  establir.-hed  to  advice  the  Director  of  Central  Intel- 
ligence. The  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  vill  invite  the  chief,  or 
hio  representative,  of  any  other  lntcllicence  Agency  having  functions  re- 
lated to  the  national  security  to  ait  vith  the  Intelligence  Advisory  Com- 
mittee vhenever  matters  within  the  purview  of  hiB  Agency  ore  to  he 
discussed. 
2.  To  the  extent  authorized  by  Section  102  (e)  of  the  National 
Socurity  Act  of  19V?,  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence,  or  represen- 
tatives' designated  by  hin,  by  arrangement  vith  the  head  of  the  department 
or  agency  concerned,  shall  nalce  ouch  surveyo  and  inspections  of  depart- 
mental intelligence  rcaterial  of  the  various  Federal  Departments  and  Agen- 
cies relating  to  the  national  cecurity  an  he  may  deea  necessary  in  con- 
nection vith  his  duty  to  advice  the  NSC  and  to  nakc  recouaendationB  for 
the  coordination  of  intelligence 'activities. 
3.  Coordination  of  intelligence  activities  should  be  designed  pri- 
marily to  strengthen  the  over-all  governmental  intelligence  structure. 
Primary  departmental  requirements  shall  be  recognized  and  shall  receive 
the  cooperation  nr.d  support  of  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency.     * 
a.  The  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  shall,  in  making  rcc- 
oranendati03i3  or  giving  advico  to  the  National  Socurity  Council  per- 
taining to  the.  intelligence  activities  of  the  various  Departments 
and  Agencies,  transmit  therewith  a  statement  indicating  the  concur- 
rence or  non-concurrence  of  the  members  of  tho  Intelligence  Advisory 
Conmlttee;  provided  that,,  when  unnnlmity  is  not  obtained  acong  tlic 
Deportment  heads  of  the  National  Military  Establishment, tho  Director 
of  Central  Intelligence  shall  refer  tho  problcn  to  tho  Secretary  of 
Defense  before  presenting  it  to  the  National  Security  Council. 
b.  Kccoraicndations     of  the  Director  of     Central     Intolligonco 
■•-  —   ^.       shall,  vhon     approved  by     the  National     Security     Council,    isouo     an 
}      Council  Directives     to  the     Director     of   Central      IntollJgcnce,      The
y         respective     Intolligonco  chiofu     shall    bo     responsible     Tor   l7ii?urJnj; 
y  that  sich  orders     or  dlroctlvoo,      vJn.-n    applicable,     arc   inplaumtod 
viUiln  their  intelligence  organisations. 
c.  Tlio  Director  of  Control  Intelligence  shall  net  for  tho 
Natlor-al  r.r.curity  Cou::cl).  to  insure  full  and  proper  lcnlc!:r.m<.atlon 
of  Council  directives  by  issuing  uuch  supplementary  DCI  directives 
an  my  bo  required.  Such  inplcrionU  r.g  directives  In  which  tho  In- 
telligence Advimry  CcwraiUoo  concurs  unanimously  shall  be  iomwd  by 
tho  Director  of  Central  Intolllg:sneo,  and  ohall  bo  implemented  with- 
in tho  Departments  and  /..gone too  tin' provided  in  paragraph  b.  Whoro 
dlOKgrccinont  arioeu  between  tho  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  And 
ono  or  rcoro  Weinberg  of  the  Intelligence  Advisory  Cor-aittoo  over  ouch 
direct! tco,  tho  propocod  diroctivo,  together  with  otatcnentu  of  non- 
concurrence,  ohall  bo  i'orvardod  to  tho  KSQ  for  dociclon  no  provided 
in  paragraph  a. 
h.  The  Director  of  Central  Intollif-.cr.co  shall  produce  intelligence 
relating  to  the  national  security,  hereafter  referred  to  no  national  in- 
telligence. In  oo  far  qo  practicable,  he  ohall  not  duplicate  the  intel- 
ligence activities  and  research  of  the  various  Department o  and  Agcncieo 
but  ohall  cake  use  of  ©rioting  intelligence  facilities  and  ohall  utilize 
.  departasntal  intelligence  for  ouch  production  purposes .  For  definitions 
aoo  KSCID  No.  3.  . 
5.  '  Tho  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  shall  dioasslnato  National 
Intelligence  to  the  Prcoident,  to  "esfoero  of  tho  National  Socurity  Coun- 
cil, to  the  Intelligence  Chiefo  of  the  IAC  Agencies,  and  to  ouch  C-o-rern- 
insntal  Departments  and  Agencies  as  the  National  Security  Council  fron 
tine  to  tiae  may  designate     Intelligence     so  diooeialnated  shall  be  offi- 
'    cially  concurred  in  by  tho  Intelligence  Agencies  or  shall  carry  an  agreed 
statement  of  substantial  dissent . 
6.  Vhen  Security  Begulntions  of  tho  originating  Agency  perait,  tho 
Director  of  Central  Intelligence  ohall  disseminate  to  the  Federal  Bureau 
of  Investigation  and  other  Departments  or  Agencies  intelligence  or  intol- 
liGcnce  information  which  he  May  posoeo3  vhen  he  docrao  ouch  dicocuination 
appropriate  to  their  functions  relating  to. tho  national  security. 
7.  Tho  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  shall  perform  for  the  bone- 
fit  of  tho  existing  intelligence  Agencies  ouch  cervices  of  coercion  concern 
to  theso  Agencies  no  tlio  National  Security  Council  dotormines  can  bo  more 
efficiently  accomplished  contrally. 
8.  Tho  Intelligence  organizations  in  oach  of  tho  Departments  and 
Agencies  ohall  maintain  with  tho  Central  Intelligence  Agency  and  with 
each  other,  as  appropriate  to  tholr  ro:ipoctivo  responsibilities,  a  con- 
tinuing interchange  of  intelligence  inforiiiatiou  and  intelligence  ovallablo 
to  then. 
9.  Tho  intelligence  filoo  in  oach  intelligence  organization,  in- 
cluding t5io  CIA,  shall  bo  made  available  under  security  regulations  of 
tho  Department  or  Agency  concernod  to  tho  othuro  for  consultation. 
176  ~
10.  T.'io  intcllJr.rmco  or^-inli-.ationn  vlthin  tho  llmito  of  their  capu- 
bllJUon  ninll  provl'Is,  or  proc\:ro,  ouch  Intelligence  mi  way  bo  reqw.otod 
by  tho  Director  of  Ccjitrnl  Intelligence  or  by  ono  of  tho  othor  Depart - 
isontti  or  /.gone leu. 
11.  T)io  Director  of  Central  IntollJ£cnco  nhall  mako  arraii£c:r.:cntQ 
vith  tho  reepoctlvo  Dopartir.o'.itu  and  %oncle»  to  auoign  to  tho  Control  In- 
tolll£0:ioo  Afjoncy  trnzh  experienced  and  qualified  officcro  and  wewbero  aa 
uay  bo  of  advantage  for  tidvicory,  operational,  or  othor  purpor.cn,  in  ad- 
dition to  nucb  pcmonnol  au  tho  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  may  di- 
rectly employ.  In  each  case,  ouch  departmental  pernonnel  will  bo  oubjoct 
to  tho  risceooary  pcrconnel  proceduro3  of  cash  Department. 
\ \  177 
I 
l
ANMKX  8 
NATIONAL  SECURITY  COUNCIL  1HTI5L-LIGEKC3  DIRECTIVE  HO.  2 
coordination  or  COLLECTION  activities  abroad 
Junu&ry  13,  l^Q 
The  follo»ir.g  over-all  pollcloo  and  objectives  aro  established  "by  tho 
National  Security  Council  for  the  interdepartmental  coordination  of  foreign 
jjilcll»f.:ncc  collection  activitica,  eo  that  Koauurea  may  ho  taken  promptly  to 
effect  sound  and  efficiont  utilization  of  tho  variouo  departmental  collecting 
and  reporting  facilities  abroad: 
1.  There  chall  ho  an  allocation  within  certain  broad  categories  of 
agency  responsibility  for  collection  abroad,  p.3  follows: 
Political   Department  of  State 
Cultural  ......  Department  of  Stato 
Sociological  ....  Department  of  State 
Military   Department  of  tho  Army 
Naval   Department  of  the  Kavy 
Air.   Departnont  of  the  Air  Force 
Economic  ) 
Scientific         ).   .    •  Each  agency  in  accordance 
.  Technological  )  with  ito  l'ospective  needs 
2.  All  available  intelligence  information,  no  mattor  by  whoa  col- 
lected, shall,  vhorevor  possible,  be  troncmittod  immediately  to  tho  field 
representative  of  the  agency  most  concerned.  However,  the  collector  may 
also  aend  copies  to  or  otherwise  lnfom  his  own  agency. 
3.  The  senior  US  roprooentativo  in  each  foreign  area  vhero  tho 
United  States  maintains  a  foreign  pout  shall,  within  tho  spirit  of  the 
pinricples  cnucciatod  herein,  be  responsible  for  the  coordination  of  all 
normal  collection  activities  in  his  area. 
h.  Tho  collecting  and  reporting  iablliticn  of  each  of  the  agencies 
ohall  bo  utilized  so  as  to  avoid  unproductive  duplication  and  uncoordi- 
nated overlap  and  to  insuro  within  budgetary  limitations  that  full  flow 
of  intelligence  information  vhich  is  tho  major  ncod  of  all  departments  and 
agencies  for  the  accomplishment  of  thoir  roopoctive  missions. 
5.  Full  utilization  shall  bo  made  of  tho  individual  initiative  ana 
favorable  cor. tacts  of  ngoncy  ropronontativon . 
6.  Ho  interpretation  of  tliono  ootabliohod  ovcr-nll  policioo  and 
objoctivoo  rOrill  nogato  tho  basic  principlo  th:it  all  departmental  rcpro- 
ncntativcr.  airmail  aro  individually  ronpor.oiblc  J"or  the  collection  and  for 
tho  aiipro'pri.-.to  trniinmijuilon  to  thoir  dopartimmtn  of  all  intelligence  in- 
fovr-uvtion  povtintint  to  thoir  dopart:::ontal  miimionn. 
17K
\ 
7.       Thero  oir'0.1  Vo  free  nnd  iir.rtu«trlc1.?:d  J.nt.ordoTwirt.\".ontiil  oxnimnejc 
of  Jntolllf/.-nco     Infor^-Volon  to    moot  tho     recognized     iiocondrj-y  nc-cdo  of 
cbc'i  dopr-.rt-fir.t  and  cgency '  for  Intel!,  l^onco     unu&lly  obtained  or  propurod 
by  oUjcr  d&pjirlawntu  or  ugonuibij. 
179
/ 
/ 
s 
ANNEX  9  •  • 
NATIONAL  SECURITY  COUNCIL  INTELLIGENCE  DIRECTIVE  NO.  3 
COORDINATION  OF  INTELLIGENCE  PRODUCTION 
January  1J,  19!i8 
Pursuant  to  tho  provisions  of  Section  102  of  tho  national  Security  Act  of 
19'jY,  and  for  the  purposes  enunciated  in  paregryphs  (d)  and  (c)  thereof,  the 
li-.tlonnl  Security  Council  hereby  authorized  and  dJrecto  that  tlio  following 
ovcr-cll  policiec  and  objectives  are  established  for  the  coordination  of  tho 
production  of  intelligence: 
1.  In  order  that  all  facilities  cf  tho  Government  ray  "be  utilized  to 
thoir  capacity  and  the  responsibilities  of  each  agency  aiy  be  clearly  de- 
fined in* accordance  vith  its  Mission,  dominant  interest,  and  capabilities, 
the  vhole  field  of  intelligence  production  is  divided  into  the  following 
categories,  and  responsibilities  are  allocated  as  indicated: 
»•     Basic  Intelligence 
(1)  Basic  intelligence  is  that  factual  intelligence  vhich 
results  frcn  the  collation  of  encyclopedic  information  of  a  nore 
or  less  permanent  cr  static  nature  and  general  interest  vhich,  as 
a  result  of  evaluation  and  interpretation,  is  determined  to  be 
the  best  available. 
(2)  An  outline  of  all  basic  intelligence  required  by  the 
Government  shall  be  prepared  by  the  CIA  in  collaboration  vith  the 
appropriate  agencies.  This  outline  shall  bo  broken  devn  into 
chapters,  sections,  and  nxib-cections  vhich  shall  bo  allocated  as 
production  and  rcainter-anco  responsibilities  to  CIA  and  those 
agencies  of  the  Govermaant  vhich  are  host  qualified  by  reason  of 
their  intelligence  requireconts ,  production  capabilities,  and 
dominant  interest  to  assune  tho  production  and  naintcnance 
responsibility. 
(3)  Viion  completed,  this  outline  and  tentative  allocations 
of  production  and  maintenance  responsibilities  shall  be  sub- 
mitted for  NSC  approval  and  issued  as  an  implementation  of  thi3 
Directive.  It  is  oxpoctcd  that  as  the -result  of  constant  con- 
sultation vith  the  agencies  by  the  Director  of  Central  Intelli- 
gence, both  tho  out  11  no  and  tho  allocutions  vill  be  revised  from 
tinio  to  tliao  to  insuru  tho  production  of  the  ba:iic  intelligence 
roquirod  by  tho  agencies  and  tlio  fullest  possible  uco  of  current 
ngoncy  capabilities.  Changes  in  the  outlino  or  allocations  shall 
bo  effected  by  ugreeraont  hotwoon  the  Director  of  Contrul  Intelli- 
gence iiud  tho  ngonoios  concornod. 
wsa 
ir.o
(»i)  This  binic  JntollUvnoo  shall  I*,-  c<  =i«it«1  3ort  ivid  continuous- 
ly imlntalncrt  In  ;;-\t!?n:il  intcllJrcenr.o  Zuvvt-jii  to  cowr  fort-l;.;n 
cout.trlcfi,  .'d't.'in,  or  Ircad  special  nu'.'Jfsetn  !-.:i  apprupr late.  *J*lio 
liitloaal  liilc21!|Vun::t.'  C'.irvt-yn  will  ":.<:  dI;i:n:ir.!n:tU;d  In  "inch  ffria 
an  shall  bo  delcrnincd  by  tho  Director  of  Central  Intelligence 
•       and  tho  egencieu  .concerned. 
(5)  Tho  Director  cf  Central  Intelligence  ohnll  be  respon- 
sible for  coordlTjatlng  production  n::d  maintenance  and  for  accom- 
plishing tho  editing,  publication,  end  dissemination  of  these 
National  Intelligence  Surveys  and  shall  cafco  Guch  requests  on  tho 
agencies  on  «rc  necessary  for  thoir  proper  development  and 
maintenance . 
(6)  Dopartrccnto  or  agencies  to  bo  called  on  for  contribu- 
tions to  thio  undertaking  nay  include  agencies  other  than  thooe 
rcprooontcd  permanently  in  the  IAC. 
b.  Current  Intelligence 
(1)  Current  intelligence  io  tliat  spot  information  or  intel- 
ligonco  of 'all  types  and  ferns  of  ircaodiate  intorcot  and  valuo 
to  operating  or. policy  staffs,  vhich  is  used  by  thera  usually 
without  tho  delays  incident  to  complete,  evaluation  or  interpre- 
tation.* 
(2)  '  The  CIA  and  the  several  agencies  ohall  produce  and 
disecrninate  such  current  intelligence  cc  nsay  be  neceosary  to  Eeet 
their  own  internal  requircEents  or  external  responsibilities. 
(3)  Interagency  dissenination  of  current  intelligence  shall 
be  based  on  interagency  egreeraent  including  I.'SC  Intelligence 
Directive  Ko.  1  and  the  principle  of  informing  all  who  need  to 
knew. 
c.  Staff  Intelligence 
(1)  Staff  intelligence  io  thac  intelligence  prepared  by  any 
departrcent  or  agency  tJircugh  tho  correlation  and  interpretation 
of  all  intelligence  ' Materials  available  to  it  in  order  to  moot 
its  specific  requirements  and  responsibilities. 
(2)  Each  intelligence  agency  has  the  ultimate  responsibility 
for  tho  preparation  of  such  staff  intelligence  an  its  o-.,ni  depart- 
ment shall  require.  It  Is  recognized  tint  the  staff  intelligence 
of  each  of  tho  departments  must  be  broader  in  scope  than  any 
allocation  of  collection  responsibility  or  recognition  of  domi- 
nant interest  jr.lght  indicate.   In  fact,  tho  full  foreign  intol- 
|    llgcnco  picture  io  of  Interest  in  varying  degrees  at  different 
J     tlmoo  to  ouch  of  tlio  departments . 
!  1«I
(J)  Any  1nl.oDUKor.co  agency,  either  through  tho  Director  of 
Central  IntolUg-mco  or  dJrootly,ir.:!y  cull  upon  oLhor  appropriate 
ngoncien  for  intellJ;;o:r.y  which  dr.on  not  fall  within  itn  own 
field  of  dominant  interest.  Such  requests  oh: -.11  ho  made  upon 
tho  agencies  in  accordance  with  thoir  production  capabilities  and 
dominant  interest. 
(h)  Ao  n  part  of  tho  coordination  program,  tho  Director  of 
Central  Intelligence  will  nook  tho  assistance  of  tho  IAC  intel- 
ligence agencies  in  lainiaisiiss  '&<>  nocesaity  for  any  ngoncy  to 
dovolop  intelligence    in  fiolda  outsido     its  dominant  intoroots. 
(5)  Tho  CIA  and  tho  cgonoioo  nhall,  for  pnrpoaea  of  coordi- 
nation, exchango  information  on  projecto  and  plans  for  tho  pro- 
duction of  staff  intelligence. 
(6)  It  shall  ho  normal  practice  that  staff  intelligence  of 
on©  nsoncy  io  available- to  tho  other  intelligence  agencies  perca- 
nontly  represented  on  the  IAC. 
&.     Dopartaentftl  Intelligence 
(1)  Departmental  intolligenco  is  that  intelligence  including 
basic,  current,  and  otaff  intelligence  needed  "b£  a  Department  or 
independent  Agency  of  tho  Federal  Government,  and  the  subordinate 
units  thereof,  to  execute  its  mission  and  to  discharge  its  lawful 
responsibilities. 
e_.     National  Intelligence 
(1)  National  intelligence  is  integrated  departmental  intel- 
ligence that  covers  the  broad  aspects  'of  national  policy  and 
national  security,  io  of  concern  to  more  than  one  Department  or 
Agency,  and  transconds  tho  exclusive  competence  of  a  single 
Deportment  or  Agency  or  the  .Military  Establishment. 
(2)  Tho  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  shall  produce  and 
disseminate  national  intelligence. 
(j)  The  Director  of  Central  Intolligenco  shall  plan  and 
dovolop  tho  production  of  national  intolligenco  in  coordination 
vith  tho  IAC  Agoncios  in  crdor  that  ho  way  obtain  frons  then 
vitliin  tho  limits  of  thoir  capabilities  the  departmental  intol- 
ligenco which  vill -assist  him  in  the  production  of  national 
intolligenco. 
('»)     Tho  Director  of  Central  Intolligenco  shall,  by  agreement 
'  vith  tho  pertinent  Agency  or     Agencies,  request  and  receive  ouch 
opocinl    estimatun,  reports,  and     periodic     briefs     or  ciurercirion 
proparei  by  tho   individual  Departments  or  Agencies   in  thoir  fields 
of  dominant  "  interest     or  in    accordance     with     thoir  production
ctipaMlitio.'i  mi  my  lio     noconnary  In  tlio     production  of  iiitolll- 
gonco  roportn  or  cotlui'ton  undorta):.<in  mutually. 
2.  Tho  rooearch  facilities  ron Hired  hy  any  agency  to  procoun  itu 
own  current  «r.d  ot.uff  inlollisonco  nhnll  1>«  adoqu'ito  to  natinfy  ito  Indi- 
vidual noo'ia  nftor  taking  full  cc^nlxanco  ci'  tlio  faclllbion  cf  tho  oLhor 
ogencico.  Kach  agoncy  ahall  endeavorto  Maintain  adomrito  roiJtuirch  facili- 
tloa,  not  only  to  acccsplicli  tho  Intolligonco  production  t.-iaJ:.';  allocated 
to  it  diroctly  under  tlio  foregoing  provlsior.fi  hut  cloo  to  provide  nuch 
additional  intelligence  roporto  or  ontisatcn  within  itc  fiold  of  .dominant 
intorcnt  co  say  ho  noccaaary  to  outiofy  tho  roqulrcuentn  of  tho  cthor 
agencioo  urdor  ouch  allocations. 
3-  For  tho  purponoo  of  Intelligence  production,  tho  following  divi- 
oion  of  Intercuts,  ouhjoct  to  refinement  through  a  continuous  program  of 
coordination  by  tho  Diroctcr  of  Central  Intelligence,  ahall  aorvo  ao  a 
general  dolin&atlon  of  dominant  intorootn: 
.    Political,  Cultural, 
Sociological  Intelligence.. Department  of  Stato 
Military  Intelligence.   Department  of  the  Amy 
Naval  Intelligence. ...«...'. . .Departcont  of  tho  Navy 
Air  Intelligence   Departeont  of '  the  Air  Force 
Economic,  Scientific,  and        Each  agency  in  accord- 
Technological                          "anco  vitU  ite  recpoctivo 
Intolllgenco   needo 
"1 
\  1U3
ANNEX  10 
NATIONAL  SECURITY  COUNCIL  INTELLIGENCE  DJKECTIYE  NO.  4 
NATIONAL  INTELLIGENCE  OBJECTIVES 
December  12,  19J<7 
purmtc!!t  to  the  provlciono  of  Section  102  (d)  (5)  of  tho  National  Security 
Act  of  .19'<7  and  for  tho  purpooo  of  providing?  intelligence  nupport  for  the 
preparation  of  otudico  required  by  the  National  Security  Council  in  the  ful- 
fillment of  itc  duties,  it  in  directed  that: 
1.  The  Director  of  Central  Intelligence,  in  collf.borr.tion  vith  tho 
other  agenciea  concerned*  ohs.ll  preparo  a  corsprehonoive  outline  of  national 
intellieer.ee  objectives  applicable  to  fore ign  countriea  and  areas  to  oervo 
ae  ix  guide  for  tho  coordinated  collection  and  production  of  national 
Intel licence. 
2.  The  Director  of  Central  Intelligence,  in  collaboration  vith  the 
other  agencieo  concerned,  and  under  the  guidance  of  the  NSC  Staff*  ahall 
select  froa  tine  to  tine  and  on  a  current  basis  sections  and  item3  of  such 
outline  vhich  have  a  priority  interest.  These  selections  vill  be  issued 
by  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  to  supply  the  deoircd  priority 
guidance  for  the  production  of  National  Intelligence  by  the  Central  In- 
telligence Agency  and  for  the  contributions  to  ouch  production  by  other 
agencies  concerned. 
*  Vor  thin  n-.moso,  the  NSC  Staff  chall  conn 1st  of  the  Erocutlve  Secretary  and 
tho  D.'jv'.rtr;ent:>l  reyironentutiveo  designated  by  Coiuie.il  member  a  to  advice  and 
ausiir-t  the  Executive  Secretary.  Any  c:ieen  of  diriignvcuncnt  within  thiu  group 
vill  bo  lvfenvd  to  the  K.-itlonal  Security  Council  for  decioion. 
ini
y / 
ANNEX  12 
S        NATIONAL  SECURITY  COUNCIL  INT12LL1GKKCJ2  I/JXilCTIVIS  MO.  G 
FOREIGN  WIRELESS  AND  ll/'J^O  MOKIVGIUHG 
Dc*ce&bcr  12,   19'«7 
pursuant  to  tho  yro'/inlcnc  of  Section  102  of  the  national  Security  Act  of 
V)\"i,  and  for  the  rwrronco  enunciated  in  paragraph  a  (d)  and  (o)  thorcof,  tho 
National  Security  Council  hereby  authorizoc  and  directs  that: 
1.  The  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  ohall  conduct  all  Federal 
monitoring  of  foreign  propaganda  and  press  broadcasts  required  for  the 
collection  of  intelligence  information  to  nc-ct  the  needs  of  all  Depart- 
iscntu  and  agencico  in  connection  with  the  National  Security. 
2.  The  Director  of  Central  Intelligence'  ohall  disceraiDatc  cuch  in- 
telligence information  to  the  various  Departments  and  Agencies  vbich  hare 
an  authorized  intcrcot  therein. 
1R6
ANNEX  11  ""-- 
NATIONAL  SECURITY  COUNCIL  INTELLIGENCE  DIRECTIVE  NO.  5 
ESPIONAGE  AND  COUNTERESPIONAGE  OPERATIONS 
December  12,  19>«7 
Pursuant  to  the  provl.«j"onn  of  Section  102  (d)  of  the  National  Security 
Act  of  19}*7jp  the  national  Security  Council  hereby  authorizes  and  dirccto  that: 
1.  The  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  nha.ll  conduct  all  organized 
Federal  csi'ionnge  operations  outside  the  United  States  nnd  ita  possessions 
for  the  collection  of  foreign  intelligence  inforraition  required  to  sieot 
the  needs  of  all  Departments  nnd  Agencieo  concerned,  in  connection  vitli 
the  national  occur ity,  except  for  certain  agreed  activities  by  other 
Depnrtaienta  and  Agencies. 
2.  The  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  shall  conduct  all  organized 
Federal  counter-espionage  operations  outGidc  the  United  States  and  ito 
possessions  and  in  occupied  areas,  provided  that  this  authority  shall  not 
be  conotrucd  to  preclude  the  countei'-intellige.nce  activities  of  any  anny, 
navy  or  air  cormand  or  installation  and  certain  agreed  activities  by  De- 
partEeuto  and  Agencies  necessary  for  the  security  of  such  organizations. 
3-  The  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  shall  be  responsible  for 
coordinating  covert  and  overt  intelligence  collection  activities. 
U.  Vhen  casual  agents  are  employed  or  otherwise  utilized  by  an  IAC 
Department  or  Agency  in  other  than  an  overt  capacity,  the  Director  of 
Contral  Intelligence  shall  coordinate  their  activities  vith  the  organized 
covert  activities. 
5-  The  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  shall  disseminate  such  in- 
telligence information  to  the  various  Deparfcaentn  and  Agencies  vhich  have 
an  authorized  interest  therein. 
6.  All  other  National  Security  Council  Intelligence  Directives  or 
implementing  supplements  shall  be  construed  to  apply  colely  to  overt  in- 
telligence activities  unless  otherwise  specified.
ANNEX  J3 
NATIONAL  SECURITY  COUNCIL  INTELLIGENCE  DinECTlVE  NO.  7 
DOMESTIC  EXPLOITATION 
February  12,  19'i3 
Pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  Soction  1C-2  of  tho  National  Security  Act  of 
I9H7,  and  for  the  purpcoo  enunciated  in  paragraphs  (d)  nnd  (e)  thereof,  tho 
national  Security  Council  hereby  uuthoriy.cn  end  directs  tint: 
1.  Tho  Control  Intelligence  Agency  shall  be  responsible  for  tho 
exploitation,  on  a  highly  selective  basis,  vithin  tho  United  States  of 
business  concerr.3,  other  non-govorsiKerital  organizations  and  individuals 
as  sources  of  foreign  intelligence  inforistion. 
2.  To  inplejcent  this  undertaking,  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency 
ohall: 
a.  Determine  the  foreign  intelligence  potential  of  sources  so 
that  the  bent  available  may  be  selected  expeditiously  for  cxploita- 
tion  upon  the  receipt  of  collection  requests  frcn  the  intelligence 
agencice.  For  thi3  purpose,  CIA  vill  imintain  a  central  index  of 
non-governmental  sources  in  the  United  States. 
b.  Establish  uniform  procedures  ar/1  standards  for  cccurity 
clearonce  of  all  contacts  in  thio  f icJd,  and  arrange  such  clearances. 
£.  Establish  uniform  procedures  to  insure  that  the  Interests 
of  organizations  and  individuals    contacted  vill  not  be  Jeopardized. 
d.  Collect  through  the  establishment  of  field  offices  vithin 
tho  Unitod  Statoo,  foreign  intelligence  information  required  in  the 
interests  of  the  national  security  or  by  the  individual  intelligence 
agencies. 
©.  Arrange  for  direct  contact  botveen  intelligence  agency 
representatives  and  non-governricntal  oourceo  vithin  the  United  States 
vhenovcr  conditions  require  such  ccticn  or  upon  tho  request  of  a 
njeicbor  agency  to  secure  technical  or  other  foreign  intelligence 
information. 
f.  Obtain  tho  agreement  of  responsible  policy-making  officials 
of  Amoricnn  organizations  having  a  foreign  intelligence  potential  be- 
foro  establishing  and  Maintaining  contacts  within  that  organization. 
g.  Inform  tho  intolllgenco  ugonclcs  or  tho  prospective  depar- 
ture from  or  return  to  tho  United  States  of  oolected  touric-'.n  citi- 
zens having  a  high  fcn;ign  lnlolllg'.-r.co  potential,  00  tli.nt  tho  agen- 
cies iMiv   furnish  requirements   or  provldo  opuciuliutu  for  briefing  or 
  ,         i  ntorr  ega  t  i  on . 
i;;v
h  •Di:iroi!»lr.--a.-!  to  the  -rnvr^prl-.te  Ji;.:cn«:io:j  all.  foreign  i"- 
tel)lF''ii-:ft  l:Sro."snU<.:»  cb!.::  Ji,..:.j"  Uircns:.;::  UUh  prc^r^i.  tt.povU.  F'O- 
du"<.d  by  the  nroucicn  wii-tll  be  i  &;:>'.  ifRd  ca  auc-.1i,  unify?)  the  ir^i- 
ifflti:^  agency  istipuLiUn  to  the  contrary 
5.       yurthor  to  iiqploBant     thio  undertaking,   the     intelligence  agen- 
cies shall: 
q  Aaau-a  to  duty  in  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  field 
©Tl'-co,  If  thl'y  co  deoiro  and  within  their  cap-/hi.litiou,  represent- 
atives to  servo  their  ir.terento  under  the  direction  cf  the  CIA  mn- 
CHftro.  Merger  agencies  say,  at  their  discretion,  establish  active 
vorhing  llaloon  between  t):oir  Kcgioual  Off iceo  and  CIA  *i<ud  Offices. 
1).  Send  di-octly  to  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  for  col- 
lection all  th«ir  reoucHto  for  forelen  intelligence  infonnavion  to 
be  obtained  froa  non-govcnuaental     oourcca  within  the  United  Stages. 
c.  Transit  to  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  for  appropriate 
dioseairation  full  information  and  reports  result  ins  trcsa  opprcvec. 
direct  contacts  by  agency  representatives  with  non-govo2-«w3iital 
oourceo,  identifying  such  sources  by  CIA  code  nuiaber. 
d.  Obtain,  to  the  Esxiicuai  extent  possible,  frcn  their  depart- 
E5nto~and  agencies  the  foreign  intelligence  Inf ornatioa  vhich  the 
departments  and  agencies  have  received  as  a  by-product  of  the  normal 
relationship  with  business  concerns  and  other  ncn-governn-.cnt.?.l  or- 
ganizations and.  individuals  in  the  United  States  in  connection  with 
non- intelligence  activities  and  transmit  to  the  Boxizua  extent;  pos- 
sible, the  information  to  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  for  oditing 
for  oource  oecurity  and  for  appropriate  dissemination. 
o.  Obtain,  in  bo  far  ao  ia  practicable  and  within  existing 
security  regulations,  froa  their  departnents  and  agencies  iirf  creation 
concerning  business  concerno  and  other  ncn-governnontal  orgzniza- 
tiono  and  individual*  in  the  United  States  having  foreign  intclli- 
gonco  potential,  vhich  the  department  or  agency  possesses  cr  sub- 
cequently  acquires,  and  cake  the  information  available  to  the  Central 
Intolligonce  Agency. 
f .  Norainato  representatives  to  serve  on  a  consaittoo,  under 
the  chairmanship  of  tho  Central  Intolligc-nco  Agency,  to  n;eot  periodi- 
cally to  consider  mutual  problems  and  intoroata  in  connection  vlth 
thio  pi'cgram. 
h.  Further  to  taplcnont  thia  undertaking,  tho  K:itio:v>l  Security 
Roaourcoa  r<o-.u-d  and  tho  component.'-,  of  tho  Military  Eotabllsh:::-.uit,  other 
tlmn  tho  cociponoiito  reprosontod  on  tho  IAC,  sh-ill  furnish  directly  to  tho 
CL\,.  to  tho  r;.ixi:ui>iu  oxtcnt  ponalbli>,  nil  foroi;-"i  intelligence)  information 
vhich  ia  rocoivod  no  a  by-product  of  their  nar.-vil  relationship  with  busi- 
ness concerns  and  oth-.ir  non-govorn:::!.int:il  org:iui;:atlcnti  and  individuals  in 
the  United  States,    in  coanoction  with  non-lutulligoneo  activities. 
ir.3
cj.  J.'olhliip,  In  thin  \v\'?:m  uli-.ll  1,u  J:iU.-ri.'-..U:d  l.o  •••ff--ot.  thf; 
(..Tl-il>n»"i';.'l  rc-l-it.Jfjr.:;':.lp  c>f  tho  ])<>j>.»rtii;-Mit:i  -sici  Aac:n:if::;  vji.h  1>u:u»i::i.-i 
c'i.f:..-:-!.n,  <A.':-.-;r  nc:.-';:>V(:ri:t.:  .i.l.ii  or(::iiii:vii:o;j::,  :uvi  JiuUvichi.-J.:)  in  the- 
U.iM'.d  '.:i'-:.'s.\  Tor  iwyrw.-u  o'-As.-r  tlrm  the  jir'.-:-urc«onl.  of  l'wcl;.;n  ii:ti\11i.- 
f/j:»cy  Jnf'.nritJon.  ;>r  .::k'ill  It  affect  the  w.i-!t:1  l.itcro!:;.!'^;  of  dot:u- 
I'/jiit.'i  br:tvt.in  lil-rai-ioa  of  t'ny  dejnrtii.enlj;  rind  other  libraries,  or  tho 
dyvo.1  c-p..r:i:t  cf  reooerch  projecta  with  Individuals  or  ncn-GOver  mental 
ir..'itiLuticr.a. 
SC9
~"~  ANNEX  M 
1,'ATIOMAL  SECURITY  COUNCIL  HiTELLJCENCE  DIRECTIVE  NO.  8 
BIOGRAPHICAL  DATA  ON  3rO"EIGN 
SCIENTIFIC  AJ-iD  TECHNOLOGICAL  PERSONALITIES 
Kay  25,  19'<6 
Pursuant  to  tho  provision:)  of  Section  102  of  tho  national  Security  Act 
of  39'»7  ond  -or  the  purpose  enunciated  in  paragraph  d()»)  thereof,  the  primary 
rcnsonnibility  for  tho  naintenanco  of  Mographicai  Data  on  Foreign  Scientific 
mid  Technological  Personalities  io  assigned  to  tho  Central  Intelligence  Agency. 
1.     To     implement  thio    undertaking,  the    follov;ing    procedures     are 
established: 
a.  Departmental  intelligence  agencies  nhall  continue  to  collect, 
analyze*  and  abstract  biographical  data  on  foreign  scientific  and 
technological  personalities,  in  uccordancc  with  their  need.1; . 
b.  Departmental  intelligence  agencies  shall  forvrard  to  the 
Central  Intelligence  Agency,  in-  tho  manner  most  satijjfactory  to  the 
Department  concerned,  all  biographical  data  or-iginatir.g  within  their 
respective  DepartrventG ,  or  complete  docu.~sr.tary  references  thereto, 
on  foreign  scientific  and  technological  personalities. 
c.  The  Central  Intelligence  Agency  shall  codify  and  index  all 
such  data  received,  including  such  data  as  cay  bo  received  frcra  all 
sources,  and  shall  incorporate  tho  actual  catcrial  received  in  its 
files. 
d.  All  biographical  data  on  foreign  scientific  and  technological 
personalities  Maintained  by  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  shall  bo 
readily  available  to  the  participating  Deportments  and  Agencies. 
ISO
■ 
: 
]                              ENTIRE  PAGE  DELETED. 
> 
■ 
; 
LVl
K      "Co^v.unilc.-i^ionn   T^U-P^onco "   iu     lntcOJiconcc     produced   by 
tlio  t\l\u\y  of""i:ori"i«--ii  (:o:iU!:unJcat.U>:-i:;.      IjiU.-lllf.eiu-.u     kujed   in  vi.olc  or 
In  ivtrt  on     Cc::suuuJc:iUoii:j  JntellJf.cnco     nourccu  nlmll  bo     considered 
]•;-
■»         ■        ■■!-— <-i1ltl 
C  .:.::.:.'.':■'■'  '.'"-•*  .I:i ---:1 !.  J./.v*ii*:v  :t.«j  porta  In.".      t-;  «.]-.«;  authority  .-nvl  renr-on - 
.-.:,.,:)'.y  o;*  -'..'so  U.'iU-ju  i>L«-.ttjrn  Cuicnun I cit Icj.ir.  I:>Lclli(j-:iic-v  Board. 
r..  "Co:.*.:-:in :<:•;'.; ;n»R  Intol 1  ««.y.-:ic»  act,; v;  t  >j'j-."  c:):r.;iri.-.c  all  :>roc- 
<<au'.'.\  -nvolv  ■»:  Ju  V.v:  coiirtclion  for  1«toJ.2.'.f.;c!)';tj  prrro^o."*,  of  for.-ign 
c:.:vr.iri'.c:»!o:i.->  thy  .".reduction  cf  i'lfor-ation  :-r:.n  such  ccvjaunlcuUcn:;, 
thv  •j!fi:.':air/*t.,:»:j  oJ'  that  Information,  avl  tho  control  of  the  pro- 
tect Ic:i  of  that  lnfornution  and  tlie  occur lly  of  Ito  e.-ourcen. 
193 
«P-  I  I  13