J 
3  Kay  1943  • 
:C.:LU3-17:  TO:  Sidney  W.  Soucrs,  Executive  Secretary 
National  Security  Council 
i!essi,s-  Allen  W„  Dulles 
*  Kathias  F.  Correa 
•  ;      Y/illiaz:  H.  Jackson 
Interin  Report  J.ro„  1 
.-  Referring  to  your  memoranda  of  February  13 ,  1943  and  ISirch  17, 
1942  regarding  the  survey  of  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  and 
certain  ether  intelligence  ope  rations ,   ire  have  been- requested  to  con- 
sicer  certain  questions  "tfhich  have  arisen  between  the  Deportment  of 
State  ari  CIA  Tdth  resoect  to  the  . 
Yfe  have  revieved  the  correspondence  betvreen  the  State 
*  *  * 
Espirtr.ent  and  CIA  beginning  Kith  the  CIG  letter  to  Stat^  of  22  August 
":0/k    -*%•! 
;d  concluding  TriLth  State  fs  letter  "to  CIA  of  24  February  194S*     We  • 
*  • 
have  also  had  numerous  conferences  ~<7±th  officials  of  the  State  Department 
and  of  CIA 
The  issues'  narreir  derm"  to  those:  -  what  policy  should  govern 
^"»^  1  *~  <r  ^i  —  *    --  «■•      > 
trar.sj:r.*.cc.  into  torins  of 
prcccduro  should  be  follov/cd  in  the 
;  horr  should   this  policy  be 
and  v.hat 
•     S 
.  / 
« 
%
In  its  letter. of  22  August  194,6,   CIG  presented  Its  program  to  the 
* 
c»--^   ".'>-"»7"h".''*nt  and 
-2\x  &—^-l  prcgraa  outlined  in  the  CIG  letter  vms  accepted  by  the  State 
Department,  subject  to  certain  reservations  viiich,  in  substance-  irere 
agrsed  to  by  CIG*    TThile  this  agreement  did  not  bring  about  a  meeting  of 
*  * 
rdnis  as  to  all  questions  at  issue,   it  did  serve  as  a  basis  Tor  action, 
am 
—   < 
Ou  17  October  1947  CLi  forwarded  to  the  State  Ee- 
pe.rrzrz.t- a  revised 
Sub- 
sequently,  there  vrere  s  scries  of  conferences  between  representatives  of 
the  State  Department  and  of  CIA,  7/hicji  disclosed  a  serious  measure  of  dis- 
* 
agree-ent  between  the  tvro  offices  as  to  the  extent  to  rrhich  State  Depart* 
ne*-v 
the 
and  Trith  regard  to 
*• . 
In  the  course  of  these  conversations  CR  indicated  a 
ss  to 
The  natter  wus  brought  to  a  head  in  a  letter  addressed  to  the 
Secretery  of  State  by  Adniral  Killenkoetter  under  date  of  19  January  19/«S. 
te  rhich  the  State  Departcsnt  replied  in  a  letter  sent  to  Adiiiral  Hillon- 
Vrjr. 
fcoettcr  on  20  ftbrotr  194S< 
A    —
Tno  situation  at  Uie   tine  of  the  uritins  of  the  State  Department 
letter  ^s  as  follo.rs:  --The  State  Deoarfczent  had  '        * 
(This  ±3,  o£  course  y 
Appli-;c  tic r.s  v;ero  pending  before  the  State  Department  for 
A  r»  -5-?  on    + 
Action  to  had  in  nost  cases  been  held  up 
*  *  • 
.hy  the  Stato  Department  pending  a  dscision  of  principle  as  to  whether 
Ths  State  Department  letter  of  20 
February  1943  took  the  position  that 
Tho  State  Departaeat  further  suggested  that  ths 
and  that  there  should  be 
_     Thoi-o  is  no  simple  formula,  to  resolve  tliis  issue.     Similar  oointo 
o.C  cifi>ren-'je  have  arisen  bete'een  foreign  services  and  intelligence 
*       * 
•  *  * 
services  over  since  secret  foroien  intelligence  services  have  been  developed
The  test  that  one  can  do  is  to  work  cut  sons  practical  principles  to  meet 
an  existing  situation  and  to  provide  fcr  adjustments* as  conditions  change 
.   * 
Eofcro  submitting  our  recommendations,  ~q  y,ill  consent  en  certain 
joint's  brought  out  in  the  State  Department  latter  of  20  February  194:3  and 
!♦  Tha  Stats  Department  suggests  that  '*  ' 
Under  normal  conditions 
is  difficult,  however,  to  proceed 
*  *  •  * 
en  "cc-is  oasis  an 
Furthermore,  there  is  or-  phase  of  intelligence  ooeratioi 
H
) 
gencc  objective  of  the  U.  S. 
Britain  in  particular^ 
Today  j   the  r-ajor  intelH- 
of  the  r/ss.tcrn  European  powers.   Great 
Tkit.ticse  foreign  intelligence  services  7.111  only  **oric  effectively 
intelligence  cervices  7d.ll  not  vrori: 
2c     The  State  Department  considers -that 
tVe  agrees     «b  consider^  hovrever.    that 
..   I
•      «  * 
3o     inc  State  Department  suggests  that  as  a  gensral  Letter 
•  .•    -Tfc  recosnir.e  that  this  often  is  the  case,  but  it  dcos  not 
*  * 
•  *  * 
nocsssarily  fclloT-  that  *  .  -     .  -  -  -  "    As 
Indicated  aboTBj  iu.iiany  cases' 
'■•"^thcrj  iha  fact  that 
■|7e  understand  that  it  is  the 
•    This  is  a  vrise  precaution  arid  certainly  as  regard 
4*.   The  State  Dcparti^cnt  letter  refers  to 
mis  refers  particularly  to 
T,e  ccubt  thit  this  is  practical
iVc  believe   that  C 
This  of  course  is  ra/tho\it  prejudice  to 
5.     3he  State  Department  has  rightly  stressed  the  element  of  risk 
• 
ard.  the  danger  of 
*     *  —     • 
Every  effort  must  be  nade  to  miniraize  this  risk  and 
"^Ia  most  cases,  as  indicated  above. — 
j     tfaturally, 
scr.3  rick  is  inherent  in  the  very  nature  of 
Sericus,  as  this  is,  "wo  do  not  consider  that  it  is  more  serious  than  the 
darker,  inherent  in  the 
Hor/evcr,  rre  recognico   tint  the 
decision  of  tho  State  Department  r£st  be  final  as  to  the  measure  of  rick  to 
•  « 
r 
'    *<c
u'3     c--.*.-ii 
Under  ths  best  of  cenditi  ens 
l .-*o-;«revc:r>  the' 
•  r^  *•»  — --   J   ^       1^,#-5-^ 
*-    bub  shoiild  proceed  to 
<n  this  trc/  eni  through  ths 
#% 
«• 
<- 
L^t  or  the  tools  essential  to  tha 
X£  those  tools*  are  not 
or  ix  tiisy  ai-o 
o'—^j 
! 
As  a  practical  zn.-:ttcr,. 
\    KJU-LC    1:0 
iricasurec  can 
wholly  olvc  this  difficulty^  \?o  believe*  th.it  a  real  inprovecsnt  could  ho 
.  brought  cY  vjit  if  . 
•  . 
~'B 
r 
.3 
w^m    ^^-m-m
.-•»        * 
V     # 
2n  the  rccoaoaridations  which  follow.  v;c  are  not  passing  upon  the 
desirability  of  ir-aintairJLng 
V/e  c^ect  to  nalec  this  the  subject  of  a  subsequent 
rcoort*  I* c   seess  unnecessary  to  deal  with  the  question  at  this  time  since 
Further,  we   are  not  passi.^ 
*  vpon  the  adecuacy  or  cocDetenee  of 
t«e  recognize, 
however,  -that  \tnlcss  this  personnel  meets  a  high  standard  of  competency, 
*  t 
In  the  last  analysis  a 
•  *    • 
• .  * 
»     * 
•  « 
*    «  r  • 
»—  *       *  „  •  ^ 
\'a    '%,•i^^,'^"~T*,c»n/,,?*  •  *  " 
*     '     »       ■     i        i       i     m     m  .      ,. 
lo.     That  ins  State  Department  reconsider  the 
2*     That  the  State  Department  review  en  their  cierits 
-•?- 
•    « 
I>uo 
u
^7ei~ht  should  bo  civen  In 
«     • 
That  in  the  future  ^ 
should  be  assursd  in  tlie  absence  of  contrary  notification  by  the  State 
E'rpzrfoc-r.t — and  such  notification  should  only  02  £ir^a  for  due  cause  and 
It 
W  < 
f 
C2 
Stothcsrj  in  crdar  to 
4c  .  That  the  liaison  betvrccn  the  State  Department  and  CIA.  b3  p*at 
-/£ 
f*~« 
.*-      _      «■  Ml^     «         p   ■   ■■
officers  o-  tho  Depsrfcrant*     These  men,   thzt  is  the  State  Department  official 
and  the  Director  of  CIA.,   should  also  consider,   or  specifically  delegate  to 
•  ^ 
^cir,t  vrorking  rrouM -for  study  and  report,   such  Ion£-ra;i£e  problems  as: 
r a) 
(2)     The 
.—• 
(5)    l-vc\dziico  of  wnccessary  duplication 
.  i— .  » 
(.')     Ti^elr  provision,  for 
(:»")    Prompt  handling  of  any  critical  situations  which  sav  a*-i«:« 
t-U 
-     .     J- 
* 
/ 
•'  • 
/  
. 
-    I  .
(Page  1) 
3  May  1948 
MEMORANDUM  TO:  Sidney  W.  Souers,  Executive  Secretary 
National  Security  Council 
FROM: 
SUBJECT: 
Messrs. 
Allen  W.  Dulles 
Mathias  F.  Correa 
William  H.  Jackson 
Interim  Report  No.  1 
Referring  to  your  memoranda  of  February  13,  1948  and  March  17, 
1948  regarding  the  survey  of  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  and 
certain  other  intelligence  operations,  we  have  been  requested  to  con- 
sider certain  questions  which  have  arisen  between  the  Department  of 
State  and  CIA  with  respect  to  the 
We  have  reviewed  the  correspondence  between  the  State 
Department  and  CIA  beginning  with  the  CIG  letter  to  State  of  22  August 
1946  and  concluding  with  State's  letter  to  CIA  of  24  February  1948.  We 
have  also  had  numerous  conferences  with  officials  of  the  State  Department 
and  of  CIA. 
The  issues  narrow  down  to  these:  -  What  policy  should  govern 
translated  into  terms  of 
procedure  should  be  followed  in  the 
;  how  should  this  policy  be 
and  what
(Page  2) 
In  its  letter  of  22  August  1946 ,  CIG  presented  its  program  to  the 
State  Department  and 
The  general  program  outlined  in  the  CIG  letter  was  accepted  by  the  State 
Department,  subject  to  certain  reservations  which,  in  substance,  were 
agreed  to  by  CIG.  While  this  meeting  did  not  bring  about  a  meeting  of 
minds  as  to  all  questions  at  issue,  it  did  serve  as  a  basis  for  action, 
and 
On  17  October  1947  CIA  forwarded  to  the  State  De- 
partment a  revised 
Sub- 
sequently, there  were  a  series  of  conferences  between  representatives  
of 
the  State  Department  and  of  CIA,  which  disclosed  a  serious  measure  of  dis- 
agreement between  the  two  offices  as  to  the  extent  to  which  State  Depart- 
ment and  with  regard  to 
the 
In  the  course  of  these  conversations  CIA  indicated  a 
willingness  to 
The  matter  was  brought  to  a  head  in  a  letter  addressed  to  the 
Secretary  of  State  by  Admiral  Hillenkoetter  under  date  of  19  January  1948, 
to  which  the  State  Department  replied  in  a  letter  sent  to  Admiral  Hillen- 
koetter on  20  February  1948.
(Page  3) 
The  situation  at  the  time  of  the  writing  of  the  State  Department 
letter  was  as  follows:  -  The  State  Department  had 
(This  is,  of  course , 
Applications  were  pending  before  the  State  Department  for 
Action  to  had  in  most  cases  been  held  up 
by  the  State  Department  pending  a  decision  of  principle  as  to  whether 
The  State  Department  letter  of  20 
February  1948  took  the  position  that 
The  State  Department  further  suggested  that  the 
and  that  there  should  be 
There  is  no  simple  formula  to  resolve  this  issue.  Similar  points 
of  difference  have  arisen  between  foreign  services  and  intelligence 
services  ever  since  secret  foreign  intelligence  services  have  been  developed.
(Page  4) 
The  best  that  one  can  do  is  to  work  out  some  practical  principles  to  meet 
an  existing  situation  and  to  provide  for  adjustments  as  conditions  change 
Before  submitting  our  recommendations,  we  will  comment  on  certain 
points  brought  out  in  the  State  Department  letter  of  20  February  1948  and 
in  the  prior  conferences  between  State  and  CIA  representatives, 
1.   The  State  Department  suggests  that 
Under  normal  conditions 
is  difficult,  however,  to  proceed 
on  this  basis  in 
Furthermore,  there  is  one  phase  of  intelligence  operations
(Page  5) 
gence  objective  of  the  U.  S 
Britain  in  particular, 
Today,  the  major  intelli- 
of  the  Western  European  powers,  Great 
But  these  foreign  intelligence  services  will  only  work  effectively 
The  foreign 
intelligence  services  will  not  work 
2.    The  State  Department  considers  that 
We  agree.  We  consider,  however,  that
(Page  6) 
3.    The  State  Department  suggests  that  as  a  general  matter 
necessarily  follow  that 
indicated  above,  in  many  cases 
We  recognize  that  this  often  is  the  case,  but  it  does  not 
As 
Further,  the  fact  that 
We  understand  that  it  is  the 
This  is  a  wise  precaution  and  certainly  as  regards 
4.   The  State  Department  letter  refers  to 
This  refers  particularly  to 
We  doubt  that  this  is  practical •
(Page  7) 
We  believe  that 
This  is  of  course  without  prejudice  to 
5.   The  State  Department  has  rightly  stressed  the  element  of  risk 
and  the  danger  of 
Every  effort  must  be  made  to  minimize  this  risk  and 
In  most  cases,  as  indicated  above , 
Naturally, 
some  risk  is  inherent  in  the  very  nature  of 
Serious  as  this  is,  we  do  not  consider  that  it  is  more  serious  than  the 
danger  inherent  in  the 
However,  we  recognize  that  the 
decision  of  the  State  Department  must  be  final  as  to  the  measure  of  risk  to
(Page  8) 
be  taken 
Under  the  best  of  conditions 
This  time  should  be  allowed  and  meanwhile 
CIA  should  not 
but  should  proceed  to 
in  this  way  and  through  the 
Most  of  the  tools  essential  to  the 
If  these  tools  are  not 
only 
these 
However ,  the 
or  if  they  are 
As  a  practical  matter, 
While  no 
measures  can 
wholly  solve  this  difficulty,  we  believe  that  a  real  improvement  could  be 
brought  about  if
(Page  9) 
In  the  recommendations  which  follow,  we  are  not  passing  upon  the 
desirability  of  maintaining 
We  expect  to  make  this  the  subject  of  a  subsequent 
report.  It  seems  unnecessary  to  deal  with  the  question  at  this  time  since 
Further,  we  are  not  passing 
upon  the  adequacy  or  competence  of 
We  recognize, 
however,  that  unless  this  personnel  meets  a  high  standard  of  competency, 
In  the  last  analysis  a 
We  recommend: 
1.    That  the  State  Department  reconsider  the 
2.   That  the  State  Department  review  on  their  merits 
Due
(Page  10) 
weight  should  be  given  in 
That  in  the  future, 
It 
should  be  assumed  in  the  absence  of  contrary  notification  by  the  State 
Department-and  such  notification  should  only  be  given  for  due  cause  and 
after 
Further,  in  order  to 
4.    That  the  liaison  between  the  State  Department  and  CIA  be  put 
on
(Page  11) 
officers  of  the  Department.  These  men,  that  is  the  State  Department  official 
and  the  Director  of  CIA,  should  also  consider,  or  specifically  delegate  to 
joint  working  groups  for  study  and  report,  such  long-range  problems  as: 
(1) 
(2)   The 
(3)   Avoidance  of  unnecessary  duplication 
(4)   Timely  provision  for 
(5)   Prompt  handling  of  any  critical  situations  which  may  arise