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SRH-123 
BROWNELL  COMMITTEE 
REPORT 
DECLASSIFIED  per  Sec.  3.  E.  O.  12055 
by  Director,  NSA/ChieJ.  CSS 
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.  R    Z     P    O    R    T   ^ 
to    the  ...".. 
••     SECRETARY    $?   STATS 
and    Urje 
SECR£T.-.Rr".OF    DEFENSE      •.-      " 
•*  *  V  " 
Co-jncnly    referred    to   as 
"BROV.is-ELL.  .COMMITTEE    REPORT*.' 
V-JC*? 
I 
Reviewed   4  August  ■■  1983,
-5  /  — 
G^ 
/faW/O 
ECRETASY  '  OF  STATE   • 
CEETAKY  OF  DEFENSE 
'Sy  n  special  cow  mi  dec  GDnowtc£pursiux>it  to  letter  of 
2ST)£Ctmbc,r<iB5i  '•  •    \   * 
Corpxjjin':  'Ihc  Director  of  Armed  Torccs  &'ctirihjAq£ 
^^^  Review^  4  -August 
corr  f-^TSiiC     __  "~7^  
pac: 
v. 
A
•  [Ml  I  3  i552 
REPORT  TO 
SECRETARY  OF  STATE 
and 
* 
SECRETARY  OF  DEFENSE 
'°y 
•  ♦  * 
COMMITTEE  APPOINTED  BY  LETTER  OF 
28  December  1951      • . 
* 
TO  SURVEY 
COMMUNICATIONS  INTELLIGENCE  ACTIVITIES 
OF  THE  GOVERNMENT 
>--«=.— "-s--~n? 
-=±?~~DOC  uP^StT  CC;NT  Ai5^"cT6l5i^VO^-T^XfL<IAL 
">hjs  document  contains  information  within  the  mear.5n=-.or"-^ 
?ubiKr~Lav  513  -  81st  Congress.    It  is  to  be  sefjj--<3fify  by 
US  PERSONNE-L.-esoecially  incoctrinstsd^na  authorized 
to  receive  Soeciai  L-TeiMgence.. information.-  The  security     * 
of  this  document  must  b^rniihtained  in  accordance  with 
SPECIAL  INTELLIGENCE  SEC URTTY---R-EGU LATION S. 
No  action  may -'be  taken  by  a~ny  person  on  the 'Spec: si  Intel- 
ligencefp'resc-nted  herein,  regardless  of  any  advantage 
..^'iilch  may  be  gained,  unless  such  action  is  first  apprbTedr 
"tl*  by  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence.  "  *** 
Reviewed  4  August  1981
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REPORT  TO 
■SECRETARY  OF  STATE 
SECRETARY  OF  DEFENSE 
by 
COMMITTEE  APPOINTED  BY  LETTER  OF 
23  December  1951 
TO  SURVEY  '      * 
COMMUNICATIONS  INTELLIGENCE  ACTIVITIES 
OF  THE  GOVERNMENT
REPORT    -   •'.-. 
to  the 
SECRETARY  OF  STATE 
ajid  the 
SECRETARY  OF  DEFENSE 
3y  a  special  committee  appointed 
pursuant  to  letter  of  2S  December  3951  from. 
•     the  Secretary  of  Slate  and  the  Secretary  of  Defense        * "    • 
,~T^r5$-D©e^^T'e©N¥^ 
i 
George  A.  Sro^'nell,  Chairman 
Charles  E.  Sobler. 
John  Ma^rucer,  Brig.  Gen.,  USA,  (Ret.) 
William  H.  Jackson 
COMMITTEE   ' 
Reviewed   4  August   1981 
~^0p-SEGRE3>-*^     ...     '
13  June  1952 
m 
§§*    .J 
'  Dear  Sirs:  *    •  
' 
In  your  letter  to  the  uadersigned.da.ted  28. December  1951,  "you  advised 
that  the  President  had  directed  you,  assisted. by  the  Director  cf  .Central  Intel- 
ligence,  to  have  the  communications  Intelligence  activities  of  the  Government  • 
surveyed,  with  the  view*  of  recommending  any„ corrective  measures  that  might  be    ._ 
required  to  insure  the  most  secure  and  effective  conduct  of  such  activities.    In 
your  letter  you  appointed  the  undersigned. as  a. Committee  to  make  a  survey  and 
submit  to  you  proposed  recommendations. for  your  consideration  on  two  general 
subjects,  which  may  be  summarized,  as  follows: 
Sfsl  (a)   The  needs  of  each  governmental  department  and  agency  for 
the  production  of  departmental  intelligence,  and  of  the  Director  of 
Central  Intelligence  for  the  production-,  of.  national  intelligence. 
(b)   The  allocation  of  responsibilities  and  .authorities  respecting 
communications  intelligence  activities  that  should  be.made  to  insure 
that  such  needs  are  .satisfied jcaost  effectively,  giving  due  regard  to 
the  requirements  of  security.    In  this  connection  the  Committee  was 
directed  to  give  consideration  to  the  extent  to  which  responsibility  for, 
and  authority  over,  the  interception  and  processing  of  communications 
intelligence  information,  or  any  other  aspect  of  such  activities,  may 
•    see  Exhibit  A  to  this  Report.
:  Wm 
and  should  be  assigned  for  performance  as  a  service  of  common  concern, 
and  to  which  department  or  agency  such  assignment  should  be  made. 
Since  its  appointment  the  Committee  has  held  hearings  on  14  days  at 
which  it  has  had  formal  interviews  with  43  witnesses."   In  addition  to  the  formal 
interviews,  individual. members  of  the  Committee  and  of  its  Staff  have  had  a 
* 
large  number  of  informal  conferences  with  certain  of  the  witnesses  and  other 
individuals  active  in  the  field  of  communications  intelligence,  and  the  Com- 
^'ittee  has  had  the  benefit  of  a  number  of  special  memoranda  prepared  for  it. 
Finally,  the  Committee  has  had  extensive  executive  sessions.   Cur  conclusions 
and  recommendations  are  contained  in  the  final  Report  submitted  herewith. 
It  was  necessary  for  the  Committee,  before  attempting  to  arrive  at  its 
"^Shciusions,  to  assemble  and  become  familiar  with  a  mass  of  information  and 
data  pertaining  to  the  history  of  communications  intelligence  in  the  United 
States,  the  past  and  present  forms  of  organization  of  the  units  engaged  in  that 
— tivity,  and  the  manner  in  which  the  present  organizations  are  operating. 
Having  assembled  this  material,  and  finding  it  to  be  important  background  for 
our  conclusions,  we  have  felt  that  it  should  be  summarized  in  the  Report  so 
that  you  may  have  before  you  the  same  information  in  evaluating  our  recom- 
mendations.  This  will,  we  hope,  explain  and  justify  the  length  of  the  first  four 
parts  of  the  Report.   Part  I  is  devoted  to  the  history  of  the  national  communi-    ■ 
cations  intelligence  effort  from  its  beginning  to  the  present  time;  it  is  believed 
see  Exhibit  3  to  this  Report.
I 
HI 
that  this  Is  the  first  time 'that  any  such  broad  historical  statement  has  been 
attempted.   Part  II  is  a  summary  of  the  Committee's  findings  as  to  the  impor-    • 
tance  of  communications  intelligence  to  the  Government  in  the  past  as  well  as 
at  the  present  time.   Part  EI  contains  a  description  of  the  manner  in  which  our 
D 
communications  "intelligence  activities  are  now  organized,  with  particular 
reference  to  the. statutory  authority  and  the  various  directives  of  be  National 
Security  Council,  the  Secretary  of  Defense  and  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  which 
t&fza  -    bear  on  that  subject.    Part  IV*  is  an  outline  of  the  manner  in  which  these  aCtiV- 
£?s*i        ities  are  now  actually  being  conducted,  with  a  rough  estimate  of  their  present 
»«       cos, 
-—  *  *         • 
"V!p9    Part  V  contains  the  Committee's  conclusions  and  recommendations  on    - 
the  two  subjects  set  forth  in  your  letter  of  23  December  1951.    In  addition,  we 
have  ventured  to  add  our  comments  on  certain  ancillary  and  miscellaneous 
Issues  raised  by  various  witnesses  in  the  course  of  our  survey.  We  have  not, 
_y  i.wwever,  attempted  to  extend  the  survey  to  include  other  subjects  not  assigned 
to  us  in  your  directive,  and  we  have  in  particular  not  attempted  to  make  any 
evaluation  of  the  efficiency  or  economy  of  th'e  expenditure  of 'funds  used  in  the 
overall  communications  intelligence  effort,  as  this  subject  is  not  only  outside 
your  directive  but  completely  beyond  the  capability  of  the  Committee  and  its 
•limited  staff. 
It  is  hoped  that  the  Report  will  accomplish  two  purposes.   The  first  is 
acquaint  the  National  Security  Council  and  other  interested  officials  with 
-  3  -
the  manner  in  which  our  communications' Intelligence  machinery  is  organized 
and  is  operating,  the  scope  and  importance  of  its  activities,  and  the  organi- 
zational and  other  problems  with  which  It  is  now  confronted.    The  second  is  to 
convey  to  the  same  individuals  the  recommendations  of  the  Committee,  based 
on  its  evaluation  of  the  testimony  presented  to  it,  for  improving  the  organi- 
zation and  its  present  product. 
^^       In  summary  and  greatly  condensed  form  our  major  findings  and  recom- 
mencaticns  are: 
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(a)   Communications  intelligence  (COMINT)  is  of  vital  importance 
to  the  National  Defense.    In  the  last  War  its  value  to  the  Armed  Services 
was  incalculable.    In  times  such  as  the  present,  the  information  which 
itproduces  is  needed  in  almost^  equal  degree  by  both  the  Services  and 
certain  of  the  civilian  agencies.  .  r' 
.ft)- 
The  added  difficulty  of  the  problenvunder 
"attack  places  a  greater  premium  than  ever  on  the  quantity  and  quality 
of  the  physical  and  intellectual  resources  available,  and  on  the  efficiency 
and  clarity  of  the  organization  charged  with  the'  task.   While  much  has.. 
recently  been  done  to  provide  adequate  physical  resources  for  the  job, 
the  Committee  is  convinced  that  the  present  organization  of  our  COMINT 
.    "        -4  -
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activities  seriously  impedes  the  efficiency  of  the  operation,  and  prevents    • 
us  from  attracting  and  retaining  as  much  top  quality  scientific  and  manage- 
ment manpower  as  this  country  ought  to.be  investing  in  so  important  a 
field.    It  is  highly  significant  to  the  Committee  that  the  return  of  many 
of  the,b«st  wartime  COMINT  brains  to  more  attractive  civilian  pursuits 
(c).»  In  place  of  the  two  COMINT  organizations  (Army  and  Navy)  that 
existed  during  the  War,  we  now  have  four  —  a  unit  in  each  of  the  three 
Ar.med.Services,  and  a. combined  organization  called  the  Armed  Forces 
jS<LCurjty_AgejicxlAFSA)_^^  and  under  Jhe  Joint  Chiefs 
of  Staff.    A F SA  has  no  authority  over  the  Service  units,  which  in  turn  are 
independent  of  each  other.    For  ail  practical  purposes  AFSAjLs  controlled 
by  AFSAC,  a  committee  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  consisting  of  repre- 
sentatives of  the  three  Services.  JThe  arrangement  is  -a-compromise, 
produced  in  1949  when  there  was  danger  of  the  establishment  of  three 
complete  Service  organizations,  each  paralleling  the  other.    It  is  not  well 
■  suited  in  this  intensely  specialized  field  to  the  elimination  of  duplications 
and  to  the  concentration  of  available  resources  and  funds  on  the  intensely 
difficult  problems  that  exist  and  in  fact  it  did  not  prevent  the  Air  Force 
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from  establishing  a  third  complete  and  virtually  autonomous  organization 
which  will  soon  be  larger  than  the  Army,  Navy  or  AFSA  units  and  is 
still  growing.  .In  addition,  it  results. for  all  practical  purposes  in  tri-  **  • 
service_military_contrbljo£_our_entire  COMINT  effort,  for  the  U.  S. 
Communications  Intelligence  Board  (on  which  the  State  Department,  the 
Central  Intelligence  Agency  and  the  Federal  Bureau  of. Investigation,  as 
well_as_  the -three  Services,  are  represented)_has  inadequate,  authority 
and. has  become  an. ineffective  organization.   The  COMINT  effort  of  the 
Government  today  has  too  many  of  the  aspects  of  a  loose  combination  of 
the  previous  military  organizations  and  too  few  of  a  true  unification  of 
the  COMDJT.  activities  and  interests  of  all  the  interested  departments 
•    and  agencies.  '  . 
(d)    For  the  foregoing  reasons,  and  for  others  set  forth  in  our  Report, 
* 
the  Committee  believes  and  recommends  that  a_  point  has  now  jbeenreached 
2^c.h_niakej5_i.t_es.sential.to„carry.  further  the  1949  reorganization.  Wfi_ 
believe  that  a  more  effective  centralization  of  certain  of  the  COMINT 
activities,  brought  about  bv  a  strengthening- of _AFSA  itself  and  an  increase 
.in_its  authority  over  the  Service  COMINT  units,  will  increase. its  effec- 
_  ^lv.eness_and;1.corr.e.c.t_deficienciesjwhich-have.become  apparent  since  1949. 
^L.alspj3elie_v.e  .that_a.  greater,  degr.ee.of.. policy  .control. over.  AFSA's 
operations  should  be.y.ested..in  .an  .interdepartmental  board,  on.which  the 
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interested  civil.ian.agencies  have  adequate  and  effective  representation, 
•  Our  recommendations  on  the  subject  of.  organization  Jpgically  fall 
into..thr_ee^ategoxies2_JlLthe_o_rga^izatipn_below  the  AFSA  level;  (2) 
the  organization  within  AFSA  itself;,  and J3)  the  organization  above  the 
AFSA  level. 
(e)  As  to_the_first,  the  Committee  recommends  that  AFSA_should  be 
made  the  keystone  of  the  COM^Tjarganization.  .Its. mission  shouldbe 
defined  by  Presidential_Memqrandumr  whjrh  ghn^iH  yatf^iHtsjTinctior. 
is_to_prpyide.  effective  unified  organization. and  control  of  the_COM£*T 
.activities  of. the  Government,__and  .tojjrovide Jpr .uitegrated  operational 
•.°°ilcJ.es  ^4  procedures  pertaining  there to^JThis  resppnsibill_ty_should 
not,  however,  affect  the  responsibility  and  authority  of  the  other  agencies 
££dAaP.artoej;te.(in£ludJn^^  in  respect  of  the 
evaluation  and  dissemination  of. the  COMINT  product  received  by  each 
°L^e.m  ^f?.111  AE*SA?  and_ their  synthesis  of  that  product  with  information 
available  to_them  f  romother  sources.,  To  the  extent  feasible  and  in 
consonance  wi.th_the_aims  of  maximum  overall  efficiency,  economy  .and 
effectiveness,  the  Director  should  centralize  or  consolidate  the  penorm- 
S5SS.?L?.P.MI?iT  functions  for  .which  he  is  responsible.    Although  the 
Memorandum  should  make  it  clear  that  the  Director  has  the  authority 
52-£2SiEPLalLPpllection.  and  processing  of  .COMINT,  it  should  also 
-  7  -
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provide  that)he  shall  have  due  re g ar d  f or_th e  cl o s e  su ppo r i_r eq uirernenls / 
ofjhe  Services;J^d_thatj^h_ere  necessary  lor  close  support  of  combat   / 
forces,  operational  control  of  COMENT  activities  a-^  to  be.  delegated  by 
.tne_pirectp_r_to  the  appropriate. Service  COMENT  units.      '•     •'• 
(f)   Within  AFSA  itself,  the. Director  should  serve  for  a  longer  term    • 
than  the  two-year  rotational  term  provided  for  at  present.    Ke  must  be 
a'  man  of  the  highest  competence..  Although  qualified  witnesses  have 
recommended  to  the  Committee  that  he  be  a  civilian,  ve  believe  that,  on 
balance,  the_position  should  be  held  for.  the  first  term  of  at  least  four 
years  by  a  career  military  officer  on  active  or  reactivated  cuty_status,      •  •. 
andJ&ayiejihj^djBojoY  at.least^Sj-star  rank  while  he.occupiesJ.be  office... 
He  should  have  a, civilian  deputy;  and  in  other  respects  (particularly  in    . ' 
thefi.eld_.of  research)  the  development  of  civilian  careers  should  be 
encouraged  to  a  much  greater  extent'than  at  present.    If,  as  things 
develop,  "it  should  later  appear  that  a  civilian  could  better  qualify  for 
the  position  of  Director,  we  recommend  that  no  sense  of  tradition  or 
vested  military  interest  be  allowed  to  stand  in  the  way  of  his  appointment.  • 
b  (g)-  As  to  the  organization  above  the  AFSA  level,  the  above-mentioned 
*  * 
Presidential  Memorandum  should  designate  the  Department  of  Defense 
r 
■y.-i. 
"  -    as_the.executive._sg5nt  of Jthe  Government  (under  a  Special  Committee  of 
the  Kational  Security.  Council  —  consisting  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense 
'       "  8  
" 
Reviewed    4  Aug   1981
%0: 
and  the  Secretary  of  State,  and  the  President,  as  circumstances  may 
Inquire,),  to.  manage  .for._the._six  interested  departments  and  agencies 
Jhe  production,  security  and  distribution  of.  communications  intelligence, 
.and __o_m.anufac.tur.ef. safeguard. and  distribute. the _r.atipn's.own_crypto- 
_grap.hic  systems..  We  are  advised  that  there  is  precedent  for  this  type 
of  organization  in  the  existing  structure  of  the  Atomic  Energy  Com- 
mission.     ■       *  ;*  " 
Wg^  recommend,  the  abolition  of  AFSAC  and  of  USC33  as  presently  con-    * 
gOf^  '       stunted.   We  believe  that  as  a  successor  .to  USCIB  there  should  be  anew^COMINT 
I 
»->  -•••■■  ' 
J       Board  consisting  of_(l)  a  representative  of  JheJSecretary.  of JDef ense,  J2)  .a  repre  - 
itative  of  the.  Secretary  of  State,.  (3)  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence, 
"(^taejChairman.ox  the  Joint  Intelligence  Committee,  (5)  a  representative  of 
the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation,  and  (6)  the  Director  of  the  Armed  Forces 
-  -       -       —  —  •-—•-•      -  .^  .  _..        _. 
Security  Agency.   The  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  should  be  the  chairman 
-4  .this  COMINT  Board. 
k 
It  should  be  the  duty  of  the  Board  to  advise  and  make  recommendations 
to  the  Secretary  of  Defense,  in  accordance  with  the  procedure  outlined  below, 
with  respect  to  any  matter  relating  to  communications  intelligence  which  falls 
within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Director  of  Ax  SA: 
(a)   The  Director  of  AFSA  should  be  required  to  make  reports  from 
time  to  time_to_the  COMINT  Board,  either  orally  or  in  writing  as  the 
-  9  - 
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Board  may  request,  and  should  bring  to.  the  attention  of  theBoard,  either 
in  such  reports  or  otherwise,  any  new  major  policies  or  programs  Irt 
advance  of  their  adoption  by  him.    In  addition,  he  should  be  required  to 
furnish  to  the  COMDsT  Board  such  information  as  the  Board  may  request 
with  respect  to  the  operations  of  AFSA.  '".  - 
(b)  The  Board  should  reach  its  decisions  by  a  majority  of  not  less    - 
thanJou-iL members. ,__Each  member  of  the  Board  shall  be  entitled  to  one 
JLOJSL. 
(c)  In  the  event  that  the  Board  votes  and  reaches  a  decision,  any 
dissenting  member  of  the  3oard  shall  have  the  right  of  appeal  from  such 
decision  within  7  days  to  the  above  mentioned  Special  Committee  of  the 
NSC.    In  the  event  that  the  Board  votes  but  fails  to  reach  a  majority 
decision,  any  member  of  xhe  Board  shall  have  a  similar  right  of  appeal 
to  the  Special  Committee.    In  either  event  the  Special  Committee  shall 
review  the  matter  and  its  determination  thereon  shall  be  final. 
(d)  If  any  matter  is  voted  on  by  the  Board  but  (1)  no  decision  is 
reached  and  any  member  files  an  appeal,  or  (2)  a  decision  is  reached 
in  which  the  representative  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense  does  not  concur 
and  such  representative,  files  an  appeal,  no  action  shall  be  taken  with 
respect  to  the  subject  matter  until  the  appeal  is  decided,  provided  that 
if  the  Secretary  of  Defense  determines,  after  consultation  with  the 
-  10  - 
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Secretory  of  State,  'that  the  subject  matter  presents  a  problem  of  an 
emergency  nature  and  requires  immediate  action,. his  decision  shall 
govern  pending  the  result  of  the  appeal.    In  such  emergency  situation 
the  appeal  may  be  taken  directly  to  the  President, 
(e)   Recommendations  of  the  Board  adopted  in  accordance  with 
* 
the  foregoing  procedure  shall  be  binding  on  the  Secretary  of  Defense. 
Except  on  matte'rs  which  have  been  voted  on  by  the  Board,  the  Director 
of  AFSA  shall  discharge  his  responsibilities  in  accordance  with  his 
own  judgment,  subject  to  the  direction  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense. 
The  Committee  realizes  that  the  above  machinery  is  more  complicated 
&__^-'||£^\n  one  would  desire,  although  it  is  less  involved  than  the  present  arrange- 
ments for  the  determination  and  control  of  AFSA  policies.    The  complication 
pcears  unavoidable  because  of  two  controlling  but  somewhat  conflicting 
j  
;' .factors:    (1)  all  of  the  interested  Services  and  agencies  must  have  a  voice  in 
§si§l    ^/determining  AFSA  policy  and  giving  it  guidance,  and  (2)  at  the. same  time,  in 
order  to  strengthen  AFSA  and  make  it  a  viable  organisation,  it  is  necessary 
that  for  administrative  purposes  it  be  placed  under  a  single  government 
department. 
fo_additipn.to.the  duties  qf_the_Board^ei_ating  tqAFSA,  it  shoul_d_also.be 
mm.- 
the  diity  of  the_Board:  (1)  to  coordinate  the  communications  intelligence  activ- 
ities of  all  departments  and  agencies_auteorizedJ_y^ 
"     -  11  -
*sg» 
"!     *5gjJJg5g3i^and^3j_to'consiQer  anc^  make_re_commendations  concerning  policies 
relating  to  communications  intelligence  of  the  common  interest  to  the  depart- 
inents  and  agencies,  including  security  .standards  and  practices.   Any  recom- 
therein;  (2)  to  initiate,  to  formulate  policies  concerning  and  to  supervise  all 
Igsy  J       mendation  of  the  Board  with  respect -to  these  matters  (as  distinct  from  those 
g£3  ""j^falling  within  the  jurisdiction  of  AFSA)  should  be  binding  on  all  departments 
iS^i  ^"*    and  agencies  of  the  Government  if  it  is  adopted- by  the  unanimous  vote  of  the 
members  of  the  Board.   Recommendations  approved  by  a  majority,  but  not  all, 
.J       of  the  members  of  the  Board  should  be  transmitted  by  it  to  the  Special  Com-  ' 
gutgittee  for  such  action  as  the  Special  Committee  may  see-fit  to  take. 
As  we  have  indicated  above,  Part  V  of  the  Report  contains  a  substantial 
elaboration  of  the  above  recommendations,  as  well  as  comments  on  certain 
*  * 
\ 
  ancillary  and  related  subjects  which  we  believe  appropriate  for  consideration 
j  oy  the  new  COMINT  Board. 
'The  Committee  has  been  assisted  by  an  able  staff  consisting  of  Messrs. 
Benjamin  R.  Shute,  Lloyd  N.  Cutler,  Harmon  Duncombe  and  Grant  C.  Manson, 
all  of  whom  have  had  previous  experience  with  the  subject.  We  take  this 
opportunity  of  expressing  our  grateful  appreciation  for  their  valuable  assist- 
ance.  We  also  wish  to  record  our  thanks  for  the  unrestricted  cooperation  which 
we  received  during  the  course  of  our  survey  from  each  of  the  Service  departments 
-  12  - 
n
3Ki 
£§3 
and  the  other  departments  and  agencies  involved,  and  particularly  from  the 
individual  members  thereof  who  either  appeared  before  us  as  witnesses  or 
who  otherwise  assisted  us  in  furnishing  information  and  other  material. 
If  after  examining  our  Report  you  find  that  there  are  any  parts  which 
call  for  further  discussion,  the  members  of  the  Committee  will  be  glad  to 
meet  with  you  at  any  time  at  your  convenience. 
•r^ 
! 
HP 
£§§ 
JsSsS 
&3S 
~s 
5*i©     • 
5^S 
The  Honorable 
.  The  Secretary  of  State 
Department  of  State 
Washington  25,  D.  C. 
The  Honorable  *  " 
The  Secretary  of  Defense 
Department  of  Defense 
Washington  25,  D.  C. 
r^ 
Respectfully  submitted, 
/7  Chairman 
/s/s£..J?^.  -S-  /^Z 
7     7 
f 
A/  o^.-  ,  2^r^JL^ 
/    /  / 
-  13  -
Parts 
~i 
J 
H 
n 
m 
ExDEX 
A  Brief  History  of  Communications 
Intelligence  in  the  United  States   
The  Value  of  Communications  Intelligence      .     .    . 
During  World  War   .   
Today  .....' 
The.  Present  Organization  of  United  States 
COMINT  Activities   
Producing  Agencies   
Consuming  .Agencies  ....           
uscm   
AFSA   
AFSAC   
How  the  Present  Organization  Operates    .      *   .     . 
Size  and  Cost       .     .     . 
Intercept      .    .     .     .       .    
 
Priorities   
Processing       . 
By  the  Military  Service  Units   
By  AFSA    .     .     .     " 
      . 
Dissemination  and  Use  of  Processed  Traffic . 
The  Military  Intelligence  Agencies  .     . 
State  Department  Intelligence   
Central  Intelligence  Agency    ....     .     . 
•Federal  Bureau  of  Investigaticn   
Alerting  Top  Officials   
Cryptography   
,  .  Security   
Conclusions  and  Recommendations          
.The  Importance  of  Communications 
Intelligence   
The  Organization  cf  Communications 
Intelligence  Activities      ."..,..      .     , 
-1  - 
Pase 
y:i 
110
ssi 
"1. 
£E?3 
s 
INDEX 
Parts  (Contd) 
V  -       Recommendations  as  to  Changes  in  the 
Organization   ...;........... 
Below  the  AFSA  Level     .......    .  .  ■ 
Within  AFSA  Itself   
•   
Above  the  AFSA  Level   
The  Security  of  Communications  Intelligence  . 
The  Cryptanal7tic  Effort   
..  The^Size  and  Expense  of  the  COMINT  Effort   . 
Exhibits 
A  Letter  to  the  Committee  dated  Dec.  28;  1951  . . 
B  List  cf  Persons  Interviewed   
C  NSCIDNo.  9  .  •   "    .     .     .     .    .'. 
D                   Letter  .to  Governor  Dewey  from  General  Marshall, 
September  25,  1944   
E  Chart  Showing  Percentage  cf  Overall  Intelli- 
gence Derived  from  COMINT^SSSBttSBBn 
F  Chart  Shewing  Percentage  of  Overall  Intelli- 
gence Derived  from  COMINT ^s&£33*    .   .  . 
G  Citation  for  1st  Radio  Souadron,  Mobile, 
USAF,  October  li,  1951   
H                  Directive  of.  Secretary  cf  Defense  Creating  AFSA, 
.— -   May.24,  1949   
I  ~  The  J'GONSIBO' * jgrobUnr  V-;.;  -.-;— . y  V    '."': '.* -'.:; 
J.  " USCE'Current  Intelligence  Reauirements/  "" 
•     "     List  No.  2-1,  March  15,  1952  ."  .     ..••... 
K   '               Proposed  Draft  Presidential  Memorandum  for    "  ? 
the  Sscretary  cf  State  and  the  Secretary  ci     -. 
Defense   
•.  .-  -*  .. 
Page 
121 
121 
124 
128 
135 
137 
140 
Tab  A 
Tab  B 
Tab  C 
Tab  D 
Tab  E 
Tab  F 
Tab  G 
Tab  K 
-.;\Tab  I 
Tab  J 
.   Tab  K 
5      ' 
CCR^? n 
-  2  -
'< 
PARTI  *:         .  •   ; 
A  3REEF  HISTORY  OF  COMMUNICATIONS  INTELLIGENCE 
■    IN  THE  UNITED  STATES 
!3TD5Cui^T-ee>s^s^cQij^^ 
"TOP     Si£-CBj£«T  Reviewed   4  August   19 J
Before  1917  United  States  activity  in  the  field  of  communications  intelli- 
gence was  sporadic,  and  there  is  little  record  of  it."    For  all  practical  purposes 
the  history  of  American  cryptanalysis  begins  with  our  entry  into  World  War  L 
At  that  time  codes  and  ciphers,  even  those  used  to  carry  the  most  sensitive 
iriormation,-were  naive  by  current  standards.    They  were  hand-constructed 
and- hand -applied  cipher  systems  usually  overlying  double-entry  code  books, 
the  attack  upon  which  required  skills  and  patience  but  not  the  elaborate  elec- 
tronic and  tabulating  devices  of  today.    Consequently,  the  cedes  which  this 
Government  "cracked"  from  1917  to  1919  were  handled  by  a  small  group  of 
lexicographers,. -mathematicians,  and  people  who  had  acquired  some  background 
n  what  was  .then  the  hobby  of  cipher  construction. 
The  War  Department  set  up  the  first  organized  cryptanalytic  office  in 
June  1517  under  Mr.  H.  O.  Yardiey,  an  ex-State  Department  telegrapher  who 
had  taken  some  interest  in  cryptography,  or  cipher-construction.   His  office 
at  first  consisted  of  .three  people.   It  grew  rapidly,  was  subdivided  into  func-    - 
ticnal  sections,  and  at  the  conclusion  of  the  War  had  a  table  of  organization 
!s5JrP». 
The  phrase  ''communications  intelligence",  abbreviated  for  the  sake  of  con- 
venience and  by  common  usage  to  "COMINT",  means  intelligence  produced 
by  the  study  of  foreign  communications,  including  breaking,  reading  and 
evaluating  enciphered  communications.   The  breaking  cf  ciphers  is  called 
"cryptanalysis."    The  construction  of  ciphers  is  called  "cryptography." 
The  entire  field,  including  both  cryptanalysis  and  cryptography  is  called 
"cryptology." 
-1-
■m^^^^^^3^^^^^m^^^^^^ 
r^-'fi 
of  some  150  persons  with  an  annual  budget  of  3100,000.  .Its  security  regulations 
were  primitive.   Ciphers  were  broken  and 'code  vaiues  were  recovered  entirely 
by  hand  process.   The  volume  of  traffic  handled  by  the  group  was.  nevertheless 
respectable,  and  the  results  of  its  work  on  the  military,  diplomatic  and  eco- 
nomic fronts  wislmportant  enough  to  impress  both  the  General  Staff  and  G-2. 
But  its  budget  for  fiscal  year  1921  ran  into  opposition,  and  during  the  next  decade 
was  gradually  cut  to  $25,000. 
During  most  of  the  1920's  what  .wis- left  cf  the  effort  appeared  to  be  of  •- 
interest  primarily  to  the  State"  Department.  The  group's  capacity  and  output 
dwindled  to  a  small  daily  "bulletin"  of  ^j^S^S^S^^^k  znd.  its  curtailed 
:^^)pcrt  came  largely  from  State  Department  appropriations.   Yardley  remained 
on  -  the  office  was  removed  to  New  York  for  "security  reasons",  and  the  whole 
endeavor  entered  into  the  era  which,  a'  the  result  cf  subsequent  notorious 
-publicity,  has  been  dubbed  the  "State  Department's  Black  Chamber."  No 
/  -esearch  was  carried  on;  there  were  no  training  activities,  no  intercept,  no 
direction-finding  studies.   The  personnel  had  fallen  to  six. 
There  was  another  factor,  aside  from  relaxed  pressure,  which  contributed 
to  this  stagnation.    The  entire  concept  of  "reading  other  people's  mail"  v/as  not 
only  unfamiliar  but  actually  distasteful  to  the  American  people  and  its  Govern- 
ment.  The  coup-de-grace  to  the  State  Department  activity  came  in  1S29,  aiew 
weeks  after  Mr.  Stimson  became  Secretary  of  State.   Current  copies  cf  the 
-2  - 
B*i?
fF-2? 
H 
IP 
Slack  Chamber"  bulletins,  containing  some  translations  of  Japanese  diplomatic 
messages  of  significance,  had  been.placed  upon. his.  desk.  .Mr.  Stimson  was 
astonished.  When  he  was.  told  how. the  material,  had  been  obtained,  he  dis- 
banded the  Yardiey  office  forthwith.  Yardley's  reaction  was  to  set  about 
writing  his  memoirs,  which  eventually  appeared  in  1931  under  the  title  "The 
>5r**5K 
S3 
_       American  Black  Chamber,"  and  which  destroyed  by  unprincipled  exposure 
&&  most  cf  the  gains  that  the  early  effort  had  made. 
Ill  H  " 
HH  -.T""*"  The  records  and  physical  possessions  of  the  New  York  office  fell  by 
^^  J       default  to  the  Signal  Corps  of  the  Army,  which  had  been  giving  minor  support 
to  the  effort.  At  a  later  date  it  was  decided  to  reconstitute  and  continue  the 
__vrork  under  Army  auspices.   Li  light  of  the  fact  that  Yardley's  memoirs  had 
x-N~g?aused  sucv  a  iuzore  and-had  thrown  the  entire  concept  of  cryptanalysis  and" 
J       cryptanalysts  into  such  disrepute  (embarrassing  this  .Government  not  only  vis- 
a-vis  those  countries  whose  .mail  we  had  read,  but  also 
   >  :it  was  surprising  that 
— •'       anything  at  all  was  salvaged. 
_j  The  period  from  1931  to  1935  was  one  of  revival.   The  first  job  was  to 
reassemble  former  personnel  and  enlist  new  recruits;  a  training  program  with 
instructional  literature  was  organized,  and  it  is  noteworthy  that  for  the  first 
time  a  complete  cryptographic  program  (the  construction  of  our  own  ciphers)  was 
envisaged.   There  was  still,  no  .intercept  service,  as  we  understand  it  today,  but 
'  -  3  - 
J
raw  material  was  clandestinely  obtained  through  "backdoor"  arrangements. 
The  secfecy'surrounding  the  work,  in  the  backwash  of  shock  following  the 
Stimscn  ultimatum,  precluded  showing  the  results  of  the  effort  to'  anybody  but 
the  Chief  Signal  Officer  --  even  G-2  was  proscribed.   In  those  depression  years 
funds  were  extremely  difficult  to  get,  especially  in  view  q[  the  nervous  secrecy 
engendered  by  the  Yardley  disclosures.   Perhaps  the  greatest  triumph  of  the 
Army  cryptanalytic  group  at  this  time  cf  stringency  and  uncertainty  was  the 
establishment  und»r  the  Signal  Intelligence -Service  cf  a  training  school  for 
officers,  which  grew. from  a  student  body  of  one  in  1931  to  about  a  dozen  ten 
years  later.  -*~ 
This  renewed  interest  in  cryptology  was  not  confined  to  the  Army.    The 
Navy  had  for  many  years  conducted  its  own  cryptograph!!  bureau  under  the 
:  I  '  ■ 
— '         Code  and  Signal  Section  of  the  Office  cf  Naval  Communications,  but  this  office 
—j 
\j  -'     had  concerned  itself  solely  with  the  manufacture  and  distribution  cf  the  Navy's 
**a  own  cedes.   A  "pinch"  of  a  photostatic  copy  cf  the  main  Japanese  Naval  c:de- 
book  in  1921  had  given  the  first  rudimentary  impetus  tc  a  Naval  counterpart  of 
the  Army's  cryptanalytic  endeavor,  and  the  ccdebcok  was  exploited  for  some 
time,  by  a  "Research  Desk"  within  the  Code  and  Signal  Secticn  established  in  . 
1924.   A  secret  fund  buried  in  the  budget  of  the  Director  c;  Naval  Intelligence 
was  made  available  for  the  week.   Although  this  fund  was  turned  back  in  1931 
by  some  fiscal  official  of  the  Navy  Department  who  may  have  been  influenced 
-  4  - 
n§  n
'•v^v.    --^^  the  Yardley  revelations,  the  work  somehow  went  on,  for  the  Navy  be^i  in 
Egg:  ~"      the  30's  to  build  in  earnest  a  cryptanalytic  organization  equal  to  and  in  some 
m 
ms 
Sp*  -  The  Navy's  cryptanalytic  group,  ILke  the  Army's,  first  came  into  being 
^gjpcic-r  the  aegis  of  the  communications  division.    The'Director  of  Naval  Inteili- 
& 
js.   , 
_j      respects  more  far-flung  than  the  Army's.   Its  task'was  ready-made,  for  the 
'""]      Japanese  Naval  Code  was  formally  changed  in  1930  and  this  time  had  to  be 
—      recovered  the  hard  way,  for  no  "pinch"  was  feasible.   Also,  for  the  first  time, 
^       . 
gl  the  codebook's.vaiues  wese  enciphered  by  a  more  complex  system     This 
s|j  _i      made  the  problem  much  more  difficult  and  foreshadowed  the  sophisticated 
*^    '?niphers  which  coru'roi;ted  the  Navyta  World  War  n.   Another  milestone  in  the 
3™^'   — r^-T   -    .—  -*...v..    .   .-.....-,..      ...      ... 
gg  —      art  o:  codebreakLng  was  the  adoption  by  the  Navy  of.  tabulating  machinery  to 
f&£  he  Id  in  the  attack. 
sSft 
«a 
&3* 
n 
genca  conceded  the  practical  advantages  of  conducting  under  the  Director  cf 
Naval  Communications  an  effort  which  was  related  to  communications  in  ■•• 
-^V^eneral.    Accordingly,  the  DNI  agreed  to  the  arrangement' in  return  for  an 
__.     assurance  that  resultant  intelligence,  which  the  -DNI  could  get  from  no  other 
-j     source,  would  always  be  available  to  him,  and  that  his  requirements  would  be 
_,     considered  Li  the  direction  of  the  effort.   That  arrangement  remains  in  effect 
ocay.    (The  Army  subsequently  reversed  its  position  and  transferred  its 
HH  J     activities  from  the  Signal  Corps  to  G-2).    The  Naval  cryptanalytic  organ- 
ization was  built  around  a  central  bureau  in  Washington  with  several  forward 
-  5  - 
•    «*     * 
N, 
•A2
*  J 
;.'J 
:->,       echelons  in  the  Pacific  area,  a  forerunner  of  the  eventual  world  'networks  v/nich 
:  *  : 
*.  '         modern  American  cryptanalysis  demands.    The  main  purpose  of  .-the'  Navy's     "    ' 
pfogram  was  coverage  of  the  movements  and  development  of  the  Japanese  Kayy, 
atfd  the, effort  was  marked  by  successful  attacks  upon  the  communications 
surrounding  its  great  periodic  maneuvers.    During  the  '30's,  success  built  upon 
success  in  this  coverage,  each  bringing  in  its  train  strengthened  conviction  on 
the  part  of  the  Naval  High  Command  of  the  indispensability  of  CCMINT,  with 
•^   vj.       esullant  increases  in  allotment  of  funds  aid  personnel.    By  1938  the  Naval 
^n  ■  '  •       • 
.'*_-•       crvotanalylic  grouo  v/as  in  a  flourismng  state,  and  had  branched  cct  Into  full- 
"\  ~1       fledged  intercept  and  such  latter-day  concepts  ci  the  art  as  traffic -analysis  and 
Xv^Mgh-frequency^direclion-finding.    A  seconcai-y  central  unit  in*  Hawaii  had  been 
■ v-  .established,  and  the  tradition  had  developed  of_  allowing  officers  to  specialize  in 
~l—l       the  field  of  cryptanalysis,  although  they  remained  nominally  "communications 
::  
"1       officers. "     .''".-  ".'""'"•        "   '     "  "' 
In  this  early  period  of  the  '20's  and. '30's,  the  most  glowing  success  Ln  the 
American  cryptar.alytic  field,  subsequently  highly  publicized/was  the  breaki 
=  Uj 
e.main  Japanese  Diplomatic  Codes,  so  that  practically  every  message  of 
Japanese  Foreign  Office  was  being  read. 
5,  J 
In 
■i. 
»« 
^1 
With  the  growth  of  the  Army  and  >Javy  communication  intelligence 
activities,  the  need  for  a  definite  division  of  effcrt  between  them  oezzme 
apparent.  -In  October  1931,  the  Director,  of  Naval  Communication's  took  action 
-  6  - 
Reviewe'd   4  August   1981
to  allocate  responsibilities  in  order  "to  preclude  duplication  of  effort,  to  keep 
down  to  a-minimum  the  expenditures  for  radio  intelligence  activities,  and  to 
build  up  a  policy  of  whole-hearted  cooperation  between  the  radio  intelligence 
activities  of  the  Army  and  Navy."   As  a  starting  point  he  proposed  that  the  Navy 
be  assigned  responsibility,  for  activities  relating  to  naval  affairs  of  maritime 
—       Army  be  assigned  responsibility  for  activities  relating  to  military  affairs  and 
other  than  those  assigned  to  the  Navy.    In 
addition,  he  recommended  that  there  be  free  exchange  of  information  and 
.      ^  
1       material  between  the  Army  and  Navy  radio  intelligence  organizations.   After 
riodic  attempts  to  arrive  at  an  acceptable  division  of  responsibility  along 
the  foregoing  lines,  a  joint  working-level  committee  finally  agreed  in  1933  to 
the  Navy's  proposal,  but  it  was  eventually  discarded  at  a  higher  level. 
J    ■       ,  Between  the  outbreak  of  World  War  n  and  the  entry  of  the  United  States  into 
j^  .ostilities,  the  volume  of  t 
available  for  decoding  and  translating  was  considerable,  and  neither  the  Navy 
nor  the  Army  group  could  individually  bear  the  burden   Efforts  were  then 
resumed  to  effect  a  mutually  agreeable  allocation  of  work,    in  1S40  collabo- 
ration becwean  the  Navy  and  Army  resulted  in  the  breaking  of  the  now  famous 
"Purple"  code,  the  chief  communications  medium  used  by  the  Japanese 
diplomatic  network  prior  to  and  at  the  time  of"  the  Pearl  Harbor  attack. 
] 
•  -  7  - 
I
.  ] 
r- 
Although  this  and  other  cry ptanaly  tic  .successes  had  been  brought  about  through 
1       pooled  effort,  the  inevitable  rivalry  between. the. Services  had  arisen..  Much  or 
the  work  on  military  ciphers  was  Jealously  guarded  by  whichever* Service  felt 
it  had  the  primary  interest,  and  the  problem  of  what  to  do  with  the  voluminous 
]       diplomatic  traffic  remained  unsolved. 
1  The  method  of  processing  and  disseminating  the  diplomatic  messages  that 
were  read  was  both  duplicative  and  unseemly.    For  example,  in  the  Japanese 
\j       plomatic  traffic  each  organization  had  ail  the  available  intercepts  and  in  some 
j       cases  all  the  means  for  breaking  into  them  -  whenever  an  important  message 
1       was  read,  each  Service  would  immediately  rush  to  the  White  House  a  copy  of 
r^e  translation,  in  an  effort  to  impress  the  Chief  Executive.   After  considerable 
• —icussion,  the  responsible  authorities  eventually  agreed  that  the' only  accept- 
j      able  and  workable  solution  was  for  the  Services  to  alternate  daily  in  reading 
]      the  traffic,  and  for  the  Navy  to  disseminate  results  to  the  President,  and  the 
.s*t      my  to  the  State  Department.    This  "odd-and-even  day"  arrangement  for 
processing  traffic  was  a  strange  one,  but  it  seemed  practical  for  the  reason 
1      that  the  traffic  could  be  readily  sorted  according  to  the  cryptographic  date. 
i      The  arrangement  remained  in  effect  until  the  middle  of  1942.    (Curiously 
-,      enough,  it  was  discovered  after  the  War  that  precisely  the  same  basis  for  divi- 
siori  of  effort  was  employed  among  the  German  cryptanalytlc  organizations, 
*      and  for  the  same  reason.)  '  .  '         - 
-  ■ ..  -  8  - 
]  - '  .      -     •
■J 
u 
j 
'a 
■a 
\u 
:   i 
] 
•1 
.1 
:..]■•■ 
American  COMINT  activity  in  the  years  1938-41  responded  to  the  stimulus 
of  the  second  World  War;  the  foreknowledge  of  our  almost  certain  participation 
in  it  intensified  the  effort  and  made  budgetary  and  logistical  support  compar- 
atively easy  to  get.    Just  before  and  after  the  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor,  it  was 
clearly  realized  that  COMINT's  immediate  target  was  tactical  military  traffic. 
The  job  was  at  hand  and  its  potentials  were  enormous.   Since  the  country's 
first  actual  military  engagements  were  oriented  towards  the  Pacific,  the  first 
cryptanalytic  task  was  the  problem  of  Japanese  naval  ciphers.   So  great  was 
the  challenge  and  so  great  the  volume  of  traffic  that  the  Navy  at  once  decided 
that  the  only  possible  solution  was  total  specialization.   By  a  hastily  concluded 
gentlemen's  agreement",  the  Naval  COMINT  group  transferred  to  the  Army 
its  entire  interest  and  capacity  in  all  cryptanalytic  fields  other  than  naval  and 
related  ciphers.   The  idea  was  that  the  Army  would  accept  stewardship  of  the 
Navy's  excess  cryptanalytic  cargo,  would  exploit  it  to  the  best  of  their  ability 
\ 
uring  the  War,  and  would  return  it,  presumably  enriched,  when  the  War  was 
over.  • 
With  expanded  facilities  now  available,  the  Army  turned  a  large  part  of 
its  effort  to  the  increasing  demand  for 
COMINT  pending  the  time  when  it  would  become  mora  fully  occupied  with 
enemy  military  traffic.   It  came  about  that  the  Army's  personnel  accretion 
was  largely  civilian,  while  the  Navy's  was  largely  military.    Henceforth,  the 
-  9  -    •
m  u 
^^"N^v^^'aval  endeavor  was  commanded  by  officers  with  a  communications  background" 
those  In  charge  on  the  Army  side  were  generally  civilians  with  appropriate 
technical  training  gained  in  private  or  academic  pursuits:  This  unpremed- 
itated  differentiation  in  staffing  was  to  become  an  important  element  in  the 
problem  of  post-war. unification  later  described. 
The  two  cryptanalytic  units  were  housed  at  the  time  of  Pearl  Harbor  in   ' 
wings  of  the  Old  Navy  Department  and  of  the  Munitions  Building,  where  working 
■P 
k||P  l /""-^conditions  were  Poor  ^d  where  adequate  security  was  almost  Impossible.   In 
ggg£  n       November,  1942,  and.  February,  1943,  respectively,  the  Army  unit  and  the  Navy 
i:5S3  _       unit  removed  to  private  grounds  in  suburban  Washington  —  the  Army  took  over 
the  former  girls'  schoolin  Arlington. County,  Virginia,  known  as  "Arlington 
^^^llpfall".,  and  the  Navy  took  over  the  former  girls'  school  on  Nebraska  Ave., 
n       N.  W.,  known  as  "Mt.  Vernon."   Between  the  two  was  several  miles  of  distance 
,-.      and  the  Potomac  River,  which  it  was  believed  at  the  height  of  the  lnter-service 
'•■•^rivalry  in  1944  would  never  be  bridged  for  cryptanalytic  intercourse. 
*-»"""  From  the  period  of  the  disruption  of  Yardley's  group  in  1929  down  to  the 
Q      early  days  of  World  War  n,  the  civilian  consumers  of  COMEST  (primarily  the 
Department  of  State)  were  serviced  by  the  Army  on  the  basis  of  its  own  best 
judgment  oi  what  they  needed.   The  actual  mechanics  of  such  servicing  con- 
sisted of  the  simple  device  of  sending  officers  from  the  Army'to  interested  and 
cleared  individuals.  Where  a  briefing  on  the  basis  of  current  COMINT  results 
-10-  . 
Q
&S3 
."IS 
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Q 
was  to  be  conducted,  it  was  entirely  oral  and  the  officer-courier  left  behind 
no  code -word  material  of  any  sort.   Until  after  World  War  n,  the  State  Depart- 
ment had  no  separate  "functional"  intelligence  office  of  its  own  and  no  secure 
arrangement  whereby  COMINT  could  be  kept  for  study  or  referenca  Essentially, 
this  method  of  servicing  the  State  Department  with  COMINT  remained  in  effect 
throughout  World  War  H. 
It  soon  became'apparent  that,  with  the  enormous  expansion  of  the  COMINT 
production,  a  corresponding  increase  in  the  over-all  intelligence  -consuming 
ability  of  the  Services  was  required  in  order  to  cope  with  the  flow  of  communir 
|H     y      cations  intelligence  other  than  that  which  was  strictly  tactical  or  strategic. 
Tor  this  reason,  both  the  Army  and  the  Navy-*developed  "special  intelligence" 
a 
Q 
i^S! 
H5 
2&4 
^   n 
S5^    U 
^^organizations.  Because  of  the  importance  of  the  non-military  traffic  which 
L 
the  Army  was  processing,  the  Army's  special  intelligence  group  (Special. 
[j      Branch,  G-2)  in  due  course  became  the  larger.    The  Navy's  special  intelli- 
f^_  -gence -consuming  interest  was  small  because  its  main  target,  cryptanalytlc 
'attack  on  enemy  naval  tactical  ciphers,  brought  results  which  were  evaluated 
and  acted  upon  largely  by  the  Navy's  forward  units  in  theaters  of  war.   For. 
this  and  other  reasons,  Special  Branch,  G-2,  eventually  assumed  an  importance 
within  G-2  equal  to  or  even  greater  than  that  of  the  parent  organization.   At  the 
end  of  1944,  G-2,  having  at  that  time  an  extremely  shrewd  and  energetic  attitude 
toward  COMINT  in  general,  acquired  control  of  the  Army  cryptanalytlc  effort 
Q 
Q 
n 
4^ 
-il    - 
a
Q 
01    s 
Q 
Q 
EH 
from  the  Signal  Corps,  thus  differentiating  the  organizational  status  of  COMINT 
in  the  Army  from  that  of  the  Navy,  where  COMINT  has  remained  under  the 
control  of  the  Director  of  Naval  Communications.* 
Some  reference  has  already  been  made  to  the  rivalries  and  jealousies 
that  developed  during  this  period,  despite  the  "gentlemen's  agreement."   They 
persisted  to  a  degree  that  became  disturbing  to  responsible  officials  in  both 
Services.   One  illustration  appears  in  the  history  of. 
Q 
D 
$3- 
:  D 
*    The  accomplishments  of  Special  Branch,  G-2,  in  World  War  n  are  a  direct 
testimony  to  two  factors  relevant  to  the  COMINT  problem  today:    (i)  the 
prime  importance  of  top-flight  personnel  in  leadership  and  at  the  working 
level;  'and(ii)  the  incalculable  advantage  of  top-side  civilian  andmilitary 
support  for  the  COMINT  effort 
-  12  -
m«. 
r-LT*f! 
G 
a 
a 
r^ 
It  is  only  fair  to  say,  however,  that  because  o£  complications  arising 
during  the  «30*s  from  the  interest  of  other  agencies  than  the  Army  and  Navy, 
in  the  cryptanalytic  field,  some  corrective  measures  were  adopted.   In  July 
1942,  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff,  in  order  to  conserve  the  COMINT  resources 
available  for  the  prosecution  of  the  war  and  to  promote  security  and  efficiency, 
recommended  to  the  President  that  cryptanalytic  activities  be  limited  to  the 
Army,  Navy  and  the*  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation.  Following  a  Presidential 
IS 
*8  a 
V 
^       directive  to  this  effect,  a  standing  committee  was  established  for  coordinating 
the  work,  and  agreements  were  made  between- the  Army  and  Navy  defining 
spheres  of  responsibility.   As  the  War  progressed  the  need  for  even  closer 
elationship  became  apparent  and,  in  May  1944,'  an  informal  Army -Navy 
§§§i  coordinating  committee  (ANCICC)  was  established  at  the  Navy's  suggestion 
Jill  n 
**&*  to  improve  collaboration  and  to  deal  with  a  variety  of  operating  problems. 
U  -^         Until  the  War  was  nearly  over  ANCICC  continued  to  struggle  with  the 
problem.    Just  before  V-E  Day,  correspondence  between  the  Comraander-in- 
_r  Chief  of  the  Navy  and  the  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Army  set  in  train  a  series  of 
meetings  which,  with  acknowledgment  of  the  need  for  broader  cryptanalytic 
coordination  as  the  agenda,  resulted  in  the  establishment  of  the  Army -Navy 
Communications  Intelligence  Board  (ANCIB),  the  first  high-level  COMINT 
board.  It  began  operating  in  March,  1945,  on  which  occasion  it  absorbed 
ANCICC  and  reconstituted  it  as  the  Board's  working  committee.   The 
Q 
A 
zm D 
-  13  -
a 
to  the  centralized,  90HHHHBBIVNHHHMPHBv While  equally  zealous 
converts  existed  on  the  Navy  side,  their  proselyting  activities  were  hampered'   . 
by  the  conviction  of  the  then  COMINCH  and  the  then  Director  of  Naval  Communi- 
cations that  the  Navy  must  never  surrender  any  part  of  its  control  of  naval 
Q  "  foundation  of  ANCEB  was  a  somewhat  grudging  act,   A  ground-swell  had  begun 
n      to  gather  among  Army  specialists,  particularly  a  small  group  of  converts. 
Q 
Q 
Q 
COMINT.    It  was  made  known  that  "political"  Issues  and  forces  were  involved: 
V    -e->  *ne  °k*  conflict  between  the  Navy  and  the  Army  in  the  communications  field 
U     had  moved  up  a  notch  and  had  become  confused  with  other  matters  of  bitter 
disagreement  between  the  two  Services.    COMINCH  realized,  however,  that 
^ome  observance  of  the.  idea  of  COMINT  -collaboration  was  demanded,  and 
■'""'    decided  upon  a  limited  tactical  offensive.    Accordingly,  ANCIB  was  urged. into 
Li     being  for  the  purpose  of  "extending  and  improving  the  existing  arrangements* 
fl     for  collaboration  and  coordination  as  might  be  possible  in  connection  with  all 
natters  of  joint  interest,",  although  this  resolve  was  watered  down  by  the 
presentation  of  a  memorandum  from  COMINCH  stating  that  the.  Navy  considered 
it  "inadvisable  to  effect  any  actual  consolidation  of  the  physical,  technical 
Fl    facilities"  of  the  Navy  and  Army  COMINT  activities. 
n  Meanwhile,  a  new  functional  intelligence  division  had  bean  set  up  In  the 
Department  of  State  with  a- Special  Projects  Staff  to  service  the  Department 
D    - 
•    RICC,  and  also  ANCRAD  (Army-Navy  Communications  Research  and 
y:r\    Development).  • 
'  -  14  -      • 
I 
i  Q
s2s 
a 
a 
-with  COMINT.   This  radical  departure  meant  that  the  Department  would  hence- 
forward be  independent  of  G-2  as  a  consumer  of  COMINT  and  that  by  the  same 
token  iLwould  become  a  claimant  to  status  within  the  COMINT  family  equal  to 
that  of  the  old-line  members,  Army  and  Navy.    In  December,  1945,  ANCIB 
admitted  the  Department  of  State  to  membership  and  changed'its  name  accord- 
ingly to  STANCE  (State-Army -Navy  Communications  Intelligence  Board)  and 
the  name  of  its  subcommittee  to  STANCICC. 
m 
.  
[1       of  State  took  full  part  in  those  deliberations.  __ 
*  •         -    •  • 
In  the  first  half  of  1946  there  were  further  developments. 
The  Department 
pr->^KCTttSfiS=£"P 
3^?  wa'S"  referred  tothe"Fe"derat*3ureau  of  Investi- 
u  "    gation,  which  had  had  for  years  a  marginal  interest  in  COMINT.  .The  Bureau 
y       expressed  a  desire  to  become  more  actively  associated  with  the  regular 
T*-      COMINT  group,  a  trend  which  STANCIB  members  welcomed  and  approved.    ■•-• 
'  Also  in  1946.  the  President  directed  the  establishment  of  the  Central  Intelli- 
Q 
gence  Group,  forerunner. of  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  (CIA),  and  it  was 
U        at  once" recognized  that  this  Group  had  a  natural  claim  to  intelligence  from  the 
COMINT  source  and  a  place  in  the  coordinating  mechanism.   In  June,  1946, 
after  these  new  members  of  STANCIB  had  been  installed,  the  Board  voted  to 
call  itself  USCE3,  the  United  States  Communications  Intelligence  Board,  (Its 
present  name),  and  its  working  committee  became  USCICC. 
3*5
n 
^<s3aa.*^re?ara.re 
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tSStJiiS^stS 
^ 
Sir 
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BO 
Through  1946,  ANCIB-STANCIB-USCIB  had  no  formal  charter  other  than 
the  original  Presidential  mandate  given  to  the  Army. and  Navy  to  -work  out  and 
exploit  the  ^^^^^^^^S^^^^^^  Early  in  1947  the  State  Depart- 
p,      meat  representation  in  USCICC  pointed  out. that  not  only  were  the  latter-day 
tad  _-" 
members  without  legal  footing  in  the  COMINT  association  but  also  that  the 
association  was  attempting,  from  necessity  but  without  adequate  authority, 
to  impose  COMINT  security  regulations  and. limitation's  upon  the  entire 
u 
a 
sPH  fL—Zxecutive  Branch.   The  result  of  the  ensuing  discussions  was  the  present  USCI3 
■3*0,  WT  ■  *  • 
.-,      charter,  known  as  NSCID  No.  9,  promulgated  by  the  National  Security  Council 
S&2 
gs&s  as  an  intelligence  directive  through  the  special  channel  of  the  Central  Intelli- 
U      gence  Agency.*   This  directive  (more  fully  discussed  in  Part  m  of  this  Report) 
■ovided  for  the  establishment  of  USCIB  "to  effect  the  authoritative  coordi- 
to 
ft. 
.— ,      nation  of  communications  intelligence-  activities  of  the  Government  and  to 
Q 
advise  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  in  those  matters  in  the  field  of 
n 
SIM 
^communications  intelligence  for  which  he  is  responsible."   It  gave  member-   •-• 
fj—  ship  to  the  Services,  State,  CIA.  and  FBI,  required  unanimity  for  decisions, 
with  reference  to  the  National  Security  Council  in  the  event  of  disagreement, 
and  directed  all  departments  and  agencies  represented  on  or  subordinate  to 
the  National  Security  Council  (and  any  others  designated  by  the  President)  to 
implement  the  Board's  decisions  and  policies.   However,  it  left  "the  internal 
Q 
J      •   NSCID  No.  9  in  its  present  form  is.  attached  as  Exhibit  C,
m  d- 
administration  and  operation  of  communications  Intelligence  activities  to  the 
member  departments  or  agencies."  "  _  • 
.The  next  development  of  the  COMINT  structure  was  the  direct  result  of 
the  organization  within  the  National  Defense  Establishment  in  1947  of  a  separate 
Air  Force,  which  promptly  took  steps  tp  develop  its" own  unit  for  the  intercepting 
and  processing  of  foreign  radio  communications  of  special  application  to  its 
mission,  thereby  further  complicating  an  already  complex  problem  and  inten- 
sifying existing  frictions  in  the  COMINT  field.   Shortly  after  it  came  into  being, 
the  Air  Force  was  accorded  full  representation  in  the  USCIB  structure,  bringing 
jg|||    Fj      the  total  membership  to  six  departments. and  agencies,  where  It  stands  today. 
The  immediate  post-war  period  was  one.  of  adjustment  and  in  a  sense 
etrenchment  of  the  COMINT  effort.   In"  August,  1945,  its  business  shrank  from 
J      the^  swollen  proportions  of  wartime  to  the  normal  peacetime  volume,  largely 
y      political  rather  than  military  in  character.   Although  everyone  was  now  alert 
r*      to  toe  need  for  cryptanalytic  continuity.,  and  although  every  effort  was  made 
if 
to  avoid  the  disruption  of  the  COMINT  endeavor  which  had  followed  World  War 
§3^ 
« 
pp     u     I,  certain  drastic  cut-backs  in  personnel  and  funds  tcok  place.   The  COMINT 
Jj     structure  became  suddenly  top-heavy  in  management,  geared  to  high-speed 
t 
p.     production  but  with  a  scarcity  of  raw  materials  and  labor,  and  with  six  stock- 
M 
t 
holders  where  it  had  once,  in  the  days  of  its  greatest  productivity,  had  two. 
A  sense  of  frustration  and  anticlimax  was  felt  by  all  those  who  remained  in 
D- 
fe— *  -  17  - 
m  u 
M  0
G 
P 
Q 
^r 
Q 
the  business.   An  ebbing  of  morale,  which  later  became  one  of  the  most 
serious  Issues  in  the  COMINT  problem,  set  in  very  soon  after  V- J  Day. 
i       It  was  in  this  atmosphere  that  the  Navy  approached  the  Army  with  a  view 
to  re-examining  the  "gentlemen's  agreement"  and  repossessing  its  share 
°*  ^HWSBHHHBBBR  traffic.   Practically  speaking  the  Navy -COMINT 
unit  was  out  of  business  by  1946,  but  it  had  a  plant,  trained  personnel, 
"career"  officers,  and  a  vital  stake  in  cryptanalytic  continuity  which  could  not 
be  kept  going  on  imaginary  problems.    Live  traffic,  as  had  been  foreseen  in 
1942,  was  of  .the  essence.   The  Navy's  effort  to  reenter  the 
was  strongly  resisted  by  the  Army,  which  had  in  the  intervening  years  developed 
a  sense  of  ownership  in  place  of  the  trusteeship  that  was  originally  intended. 
It  was  considered  absurd  at  Arlington  Hall  that  a  shift  of  pieces  of  the £PHR». 
MflMHMttHV£ProbIem'  for  the  processing  of  which  effective  machinery 
existed,  should  be  seriously  proposed  merely  for  the  purpose  of  "giving  the 
Navy  something  to  do."   The  Navy,  on  the  other  hand,  could  not  afford  to-      ■ 
commit  cryptanalytic  suicide  for  the  sake  of  keeping  the  peace.  A  compromise 
transfer  program  was  eventually  adopted  and  dragged  out  its  painful  course  for 
[}       many  months. 
i  Q 
i 
-  18  -
'£*3t  [  
.,>     ~ 
Sw'At- least,  however," 
•ri  •  '    
" 
\J       the  experience  had  injected  into  the  effort  a  badly -needed  sense  of  fresh  pur- 
pose and  Incentive,  and  it  had  provided  a  new  basis  upon  which  to  build  sub- 
sequent plans  for  fuller  collaboration  within  the  America*  COMINT  structure. 
The  emergence  of  the  Air  Force  as  a  potent  factor  in  the  COMINT  story 
has  been  mentioned.    It  brought  into  sharper  focus  the  question  of  duplication 
n 
a 
a 
^■?    See  Part  IV,  pp.  105-107 
-  19 
■0
n    "  ;   ""   
'J      versus  amalgamation.    After  passage  of  the  National  Security  Act  of  1947 
n      there  were  not  two  but  three  vested  military  interests  actively  engaged  in 
:■  n      c?llectinS»  processing,  evaluating  and  disseminating  communications  intelli- 
gence.   Roughly,  the  position  among  the  Services  was  this:    the  Army,  with 
■■]■  Li      its  large  civilian  component,  the  most  inclusive  commitment,  and  the  greatest 
•'  Hj      experience  with  the  non-military  aspects  of  the  COMINT  complex,  was  gen- 
:  —      erally  in  favor  of  some  sort  of  consolidation  of  the  effort;  the  Navy   only  too 
■;■     v     veil  aware  of  the  indispensable  importance  of  COMINT.  to  the  success  of  naval 
•;  U      war,  and  reluctant  to  share  an  effective  COMINT  organization  that  had  become 
.  ;  
j/j      integrated  with  its  operating  forces,  stood  behind  its  top  command  to  a  man  in 
•^&T^he  refUSal  t0  surrender  COMINT  sovereignty;  the  Air  Force,  stimulated  by 
-its  new  freedom,  asked  only  to  be  left  alone  to  develop  its  Brooks  Field  and 
:   n 
'  "      other  COMINT  outposts. 
.  •  Q  In  August,4948,  the  Secretary  of  Defense  created  a  board  under  the  chair  - 
•  rf     aanship  of  Rear  Admiral  Earl  E.  Stone,  then  Director  of  Naval  Communi- 
cations,  to  study  the  COMINT  situation  within  the  Defense  Establishment  and 
to  recommend  some  final  solution.   The  Stone  Board  was  composed  of  repre- 
:  lj      sentatives  of  all  military  interests  in  the  COMINT  family.    In  December  it 
fj      submitted  a  split  paper  to  the  Secretary  of  Defense.   The  Navy  and  the  Air 
Force  both  opposed  consolidation,  while  the  Army  advocated  placing  respon- 
$ 
Q 
sibiiity   for  all  COMINT  tasks,  other  than  the  performance  of  intercept  and 
/•-*""->.  -20- 
a
n 
J      decentralized  field  processing,  within  a  single  organization.    After  reading  the 
n      paper  the  Secretary  called  in  General  McNarney  to  assist  in  resolving  the 
a 
D 
dilemma  by  directive,  since  the  more  democratic  method  had  failed  to  pro- 
duce a  workable  conclusion.    General  McNarney  "adopted  a  plan  which  in  part 
required  a  merger  but  in  part  left  the  three  Services  the  right  to  maintain. 
H  their  own  separate  COMINT  organizations,  and  in  due  course  this  type  of  organ- 
_  ization  was  ordered  into  effect  by  Mr.  Johnson.   Supplementary  directives 
>■  vhich  go  beyond  the  scope  of  the  Secretarial  directive,  were  later  issued  by 
n  ■ 
U  the  Jou;t  Chiefs  of  Staff.    The  resulting  and  existing  structure  is  described  in 
n  Part  III  of  this  Report. 
Fl 
a 
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-  21  -
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£25 
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THE  VALUE  OF  •  "  '~^M 
COMMUNICATIONS  INTELLIGENCE 
-\ 
,~?Kj-S*IX5Gl3l^fr"-tf^^ 
^p^p^.O.p/Iipv^C^^eViewed   4  August   1981
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Before  considering  the  present  COMMIT  organization,-  it  is  appropriate 
to  appraise  the  value  of  COMINT  in  the  recent  past  and  at  the  present  time 
as  a  measure  of  the  scale  of  effort  that  COMINT  deserves,  and  of  what  might 
be  expected  if  the  conduct  of  our  COMINT  activities  could  be  substantially 
R      improved.    ....  •  *  •       .  * 
In  World  War  n  COMINT  may  well  have  been  our  best  paying  invest- 
ment  Its  cost  cannot  be  accurately  computed,  but  an  informed  guess  would 
fg|j    ^   'be  perhaps  a  half  billion  dollars  annually  at  the  outside.   Admiral  Nimitz  rated 
SSI    0      its  vaiue  in  the  p*?mc  as  equivalent  to  another  whole  fleet;    General  Handy  is 
n      reported  to  have  said;  that  it  shortened  the  War  in  Europe  by  at  least  a  year. 
In  the  Pacific,  COMINT  located  the  Japanese  fleet  enroute  to  the  Coral 
--^oSea  and  again  enroute'to  Midway  in  1942,  enabling  us  to  mass  the  carriers  for 
jj      the  battles  which  are  -generally  regarded  as  the  turning  point  of  the  War  against 
n      Japan.-   In  1942  COMINT  also  told  us  of  the  critical  Japanese  decision  not  to 
join  the  Axis  war  on  Soviet  Russia.    In  1944,'it.helped  us  to  pick  the  soft  spots'"" 
for  our  island  advance,  often  showing  where  the  Japanese  expected  us  to 
attack  and  where  their  troops  were  massed. 
The  official  narrative  of  the  Joint  Combat  Intelligence  Center,  Pacific  Ocean 
Areas,  includes  the  following  comment  on  this  engagement:    "The  factors 
that  vitally  affected  the  battle  of  Midway  were  many  and  complex,  but  it  is 
undoubtedly  .true  that  without  radio  intelligence  it  would  have  been  impossible 
to  have  achieved  the  concentration  of  forces  and  the  tactical  surprise  that 
made  the  victory  possible." 
-  22 
&&3
Throughout  the  War,  COMINT  supplied  a  day-to-day  check  on  the  results 
of  our  submarine  and  air  campaign  against  Japanese  merchant  shipping.   It 
gave  us  detailed  knowledge  of  how  many  ships  Japan  had,  where  they  were, 
and  when  they  were  lost;  armed  with  this  intelligence,  we  planned  and  exe- 
cuted the  remarkably  efficient  and  effective  submarine,  direct  air  and  aerial 
mining  campaign  of  1944-45.    The  Strategic  Bombing  Survey  mission  which 
i1sg3   n      checked  on  Japanese  shipping  losses  after  the  surrender  discovered  that 
p£B  COMINT's  knowledge  of  the  size  and  location  of  the  Japanese  merchant  fleet 
^^   tJ      on  V-J.Day  had  been  more  exact  than  the  records  of  the  Japanese  Ministry  of   ' 
HI      Merchant  Marine.  • 
Finally,  COMINT  provided  us  with  our  only  reliable  measure  of  how  fast 
^ne  Japanese  were  losing  their  will  to  resist.   Our  leaders  had  a  thorough  and 
tea  n  ■  
■ 
^  immediate  record  of  the  peace  feelers  which  the  Japanese  asked  Ambassador 
y  Sato  in  Moscow  to  send  to  us  through  the  Russians,  and  of  the  explanations  to 
/ ^  .iim  of  how  decisions  were  being  reached  and  on  what  points  further  con- 
D 
n 
cessions  would  be  made.  •  (Some  of  these  feelers  were  not  passed  on  promptly 
by  the  Russians,  arid  our  only  knowledge  of  them  came  from  COMINT). 
|g|    jj     Throughout  1945,  from  Manila  through  Okinawa  and  Hiroshima  to  V-J  Day 
itself,  we  were  in  possession  cf  Japan's  instructions  to  her  principal  negoti- 
ator, often  before  the  Japanese  code  clerks  in.  Moscow  could  put  .the  message 
-  23  -  ■
<£dZ?i 
UJ  Before  Pearl  Harbor,  our  own  Japanese  COMINT  contributed  to  the  Allied 
tj       effortln  Europe  by  giving  advance  warning  of  the  German  decision  to  attack 
^-  Russia.    General  Oshima,  Japan's  Ambassador  in  Berlin,  was  a  veritable  mine 
b 
Q  
. 
of  information  to  more  governments  than  his  own,  as  he  faithfully  communi- 
cated to  Tokyo  what  was  confided  to  him  by  the  German  leaders.  <£252S3i&SB» 
fl       "   COMINT  intercepted,  decoded,  translated  and  delivered  some  of  these 
messages  to  "U.S.  consumers  while  the  Japanese  code  clerks  in  Moscow  were 
Rgg|    n  struggling  with  garbles  and  asking  Tokyo  for  repeats. 
0-- 
n 
Q 
-  24  -
'JtTjr^ 
JB  Q 
.  §8  i 
I.  and  equally  profitable  results  soon  followed.   Once  we  had  built  enough 
escort  vessels,  they  were  guided  by  COMINT  to  the  U-boats  which  habitually 
and  carefully  reported  their  positions  each  night  to  the  German  Admiralty. 
COMINT  also  Intercepted. German  reports  to. its  submarines  on  our  convoy 
movements,  and  our  Naval  orders  to  the  convoys  were  changed  accordingly. 
(This  was  represented**^  "the  Committee  as  another  well-kept  COMUfT  secret",. 
and  perhaps  one  of  the  most  sensitive  —  aptly  reinforced  by  results*  of  post- 
gss 
L/""^  war  investigations  of  captured. German  documents  showing  that  the  Nazis  con- 
n        tinued  to  blame  their  high  U-boat  losses  on  some  hypothecated  Allied  invention 
D 
for  direction-finding  the  source  of  U-boat  emissions.   The  Committee, 
however,  found  much_of  the  story  of  our  COMINT-based  anti-U-boat  campaign 
S3 
um 
3*> 
}^M  -^-^^spread  out  in  detail  in  the  May,  1952,  edition  of  "The  Reader's  Digest",  a 
|g|    U       publication  with  a  circulation  of  15,000,000.    The  Committee  could  not  avoid 
~       some  speculation  as  to  the  nature  of  other"  "well-kept  COMINT  secrets"  that 
/^•were  confided  to' it  in  camera.) 
»-»  In  the  war  on  land,  COMINT  did  even  better.   It  read  Rommel's  intentions 
^|§"    []      in  Africa  so  well  that  the  Desert  Fox  guessed  the  truth;  he  confided  his  sus- 
^E     n      Picions  to  Berlin,  only  to  be  told  by  the  German  High  Command  that  such  things 
■"g"sj    lJ  ". '  _    ■•  ■ 
were  not  possible. 
was*    U 
#*? 
U> 
-25  - 
ssyi*. 
j:H  Q
g@  Li 
m 
COMINT  also  helped  to  trace 
the  transfer- of  German  forces  between  the  Eastern  and  Western  Fronts  and 
to  and  from  the  South.' 
$>3s   n 
£*&    LI 
&i      •r^0^Periodic  appraisals  orthe  situation  for  the  High  Command,  showing  where  he 
m 
Before  D-Day  in 'France,  COMINT  furnished  several  of  Von  Rundstedt's 
£^5='  _  "^thcugh-t-  the  main  attack  would  come,  as  well  as  some  of  Berlin's  replies 
0&,    i"1        ignoring  Von  Rundstedt's  good  advice,  presumably  in  favor  of  Hitler  intuition. 
-  »£* 
CSfc   (J        COMIN'T  also  contributed  Ambassador  Oshima's  detailed  reports  to  Tokyo  on 
felt 
m 
Q 
Q 
fr^  .  his  pre-invasion  tour  of  the  Channel  defenses,  which  led,  the  Committee  has 
been,  told,  to  basic  revisions  in  our  landing  plans.   After  the  assault  was 
launched,  COMINT  supplied  a  large  quantity  of  battle  reports  and  battle  orders 
on  every  level  from  the  OKW  itself  down  to  the  various  divisions.    Throughout 
the  campaign  in  France  and  Germany,  our  estimates  of  enemy  troop  strengths, 
locations  and  intentions  were  based  more  on  COMINT  than  on  any  other  source. 
COMINT  was  also  the  principal  source  of  the  information  used  to  select 
.-  26  - 
-I  n
ID 
1Q 
strategic  and  tactical  bombing  targets  behind  German  lines;  and  it  helped  • 
us  to  identify  the  testing  of  advanced  weapons  (such  as  improved  torpedoes 
and  guided  airborne  missiles)  in  time  to  get  our  scientists  started  on  suitable 
counter-measures,  thus  greatly  reducing  the  ultimate  tactical  effectiveness 
of  the  enemy's  new  developments. 
Of  course  COMINT  was  not  always  a  perfect  mirror  of  enemy  intentions. 
We  did  not  intercept  all  important  enemy  messages,  and  we  could  not  always 
decrypt  the  messages  we  heard.   Even  when  we  did  intercept  and  could  read, 
our  COMINT  producers  sometimes  failed  to  tura  out  the  messages  in  time 
to  be  useful.   Several  significant  Japanese  messages  that  could  well  have 
made  the  difference  in  forewarning  us  of  an  impending  surprise  attach  on 
Pearl  Harbcr  were  Intercepted  from  November  24,  1941  through  December  6, 
1941,  and  might  have  been  but  were  net  in  fact  available  to  the  COMINT  con- 
sumers until  after  December  7.   At  times,  the  failure  to  make  effective  use 
of  COMINT  capabilities  was  chargeable  to  those  who  "consumed"  COMINT 
and  formed  intelligence-  conclusions  from  it.    The  Japanese  messages  dis- 
closing Japan's  decision  not  to  attack  Russia  in  1942  were  viewed  with  reserve 
by  our  military  planners  at  the  time;  those  with  the  responsibility  had  already   ^ 
formed  the  opposite  opinion  and  rejected  the  strong  COMINT  evidence  pre- . 
sented  by  G-2  on  the  ground  that  it  might  have  been  a  deliberate  Japanese 
attempt  to  deceive  us  with  false  messages.   Faulty  appreciation  of  COMINT 
-  27  -
fear.* 
W 
gjad  to  the  absurdity  of  assuming  that  the  Japanese  knew  we- were  reading 
their  highest  diplomatic  code  and  yet  were  continuing  to  use  it  throughout  the 
world. 
Perhaps  the  most- striking  tribute  to  COMINT's  value  in  World  War  II 
is  the  remarkable  letter  written  by  General  Marshall  to  Governor  Dewey  on 
September  23,  1944,  at  the  height  of  the  Presidential  election  campaign.   This 
.letter  was  written  without  the  knowledge  of  President  Roosevelt  or  Secretary 
Qr--Stimson  --  "without  the  knowledge  of  any  other  person  except  Admiral  King 
a 
a 
n 
B 
^Q 
(who  concurs)."    The  unprecedented  nature  of  this  step  by  a  professional 
30  , 
soldier  reflects  the  vital  importance  General  Marshall  attached  to  protecting 
the  security  of  COMINT  sources.   The  letter  is  attached  as  Exhibit  D  to  this 
^r-fiica 
is?* 
ESCsfe 
fig?    CT     taking  any  steps  in  the  campaign  that  might-disclose  or  force  the  disclosure  of 
m 
^J^^leport.    The  question  of  Administration  bungling  at  Pearl  Harbor  was  a. key 
pi     campaign  issue.   In  the  letter,  General  Marshall  urged  Governor  Dewey  against 
t 
D._, 
;our  ability  to  read  the  Japanese  codes.    This  plea  is  supported  by  a  detailed 
\y  recital  of  specific  examples  of  COMINT's  value  in  the  conduct  of  the  War  on  ' 
n     °otft  fronts,  and  of  the  tragic  consequences  if  the  Japanese  were  warned  to 
change  their  codes. 
COMD^T's  value  today  is  more  difficult  to  measure.   In  time  of  peace  - 
even  what  we  now  call  peace  -  day  to  day  knowledge  of  specific  enemy  strength 
k^j   El     and  s?eciiic  enemy  intentions  is  still  ot  the  greatest  importance,  but  COMINT 
•-  28  -
• '  
n      ■    .  -  •     ^^^^^^^^^  s  V    ^c  Ho^ 
v —  •  ■  * 
•  ).•■•  •  ■  •  ■ 
»•..*  .        •  .  •  -  •• 
y  n  '"*"  *  '       ■ 
'  in  these  fields  cannot  be  of  the  same  spectacular  service  as  COMINT  in  time 
•  •  ■  * 
m  •  •       • 
]     \\        of  war.    Of  course,  COMINT  could  do  nothing  more  valuable  llran  to  forewarn 
■         •  *•  / 
■     n    ffIof  a  Soviet  surprise  attack  on  the  free  world,  but  its  capabilities  on  this  point    * 
;        U 
remain  to  be  fully  tested/JCOMINT  failed  to  warn  us  of  the  attack  on  South, 
•)■-.•.*■••■'  ^ 
Korea  for  a  variety  of  reasons  on  which  we  comment  later.  7*       , 
Another  problem  for  COMIKT  in  time  of  peace  is  the  relative  security  of 
r\        communications  In  a  peaceful  w o r  1  d5^3£^^3^5£SS5J2^®5SS'5^S5 
f         S  J  ^^__   S*  •*     *   *      "  •  «w-5i— -    ■ .-  — ■ 
 —•«-•'      ~  -V. 
•;Mililary  forces  j-emain  at  thejr  bases,  where  they  often  are  able  to  communical 
on  interior  land  lines,  and  cannot  be  heard.    There- is  less  pressure  on  the       -  . 
•- 
communications  
network:  
the  ooerators 
-make  
fewer  
mistakes,  
and  COMIKT 
[J    •    has  a  much  harder  time  decrypting  what  there  is  to  hear.    As  a  result,  the 
f  >"    intelligence  consumers  also  have  much  greater  difficulty  in  fitting  together 
into'a  coherent  story  the  scattered  bits*  and  pieces  they  receive-from  the  COMI 
producers.  -  •" 
Kevertheless,  the  witnesses  before  our  Committee  have  been  unanimous 
■  • 
in  testifying-  that  COMINT' ranks  as  our  most  important  single  source  of  intelli- 
gence  today.    The  attached  charts  (Exhibits  £  and  F)  show  the  estimates  of      . 
the  intelligence  agencies  as  to  how  much  COMINT  contributes"  to  our  overall 
^h     '  '  '       '  -  29  -       .  . . 
I  p--r  '    ■      ._.  _  .  Reviewed   4  August   1981 
Q 
Q" 
n
^        these  charts,  the  Committee  stresses  that  they  have  been  furnished  to.  it  as 
t~i  ■..«.. 
(J        estimates  only,  and  any  accurate  percentage  allocation  is  obviously  impossible. 
"r^^vAlS0  l^c  ^act  ^at  ^  some  fields  a  high  percentage  of  our  total  information  comes 
from  COMINT  must  carry  the  qualification  that  the  total  information  in  that  field 
m 
*km 
.Q 
may  be  very  small.   Nevertheless,  the  charts  serve  to  indicate  in  a  general  way 
(J       the  importance  which  the  using  agencies  ascribe  to  COMINT  sources. 
'v^^ggig^  •T#'"*^^fV?^rC^^jft*y|^cL* 
BJSEPffj^ 
Hi  ^«=^^^S^^ 
-  30  - 
P  Q
'     Even  these  limited  and  largely  low-level  sources-provide  much  valuable 
intelligence.   The.COMINT  consumers  have  given  the  following  recenCexamples:
e te ht —_—1 <> 2S Poe 25 ~ a amt St YY — ~ = ! ¥ B = welt | Smet Om AT a & > ; < Set menoe a Be nS) cer -S Sana Sh tn te cde act Eat = . a eee Son SEE rts 5 we my a : 4 4 n,
[ 288 | Ui U f=) 1 - — Cc (=) (— eiteatccers nea RTE! ew cad Ve CST vet —
a 
can  usually  be  gathered  in'peacetime  from  a  variety  of  open  sources 
such  as  traveling  businessmen  and  tourists,,  American  engineers 
technicians  engaged  in  particular  foreign  assignments,  technical 
magazines,  railroad  timetables,  and  similar  data.   But  in  the  case  of 
the  Soviet  Union  these  sources  are  now  virtually  ncn-available. 
:es,  r 
and"  £ 
^3* 
a 
i&f  n
8s« 
p  "  gence  conclusions  based  on  such  material  contain  ample  margins-  of  error; 
unless  processed  carefully,  they  can  become  ultimate  assumptions  piled  on  a 
Mistakes  can  be  and  often  are  made  en  any  of  these  points,  particularly 
by  analysts  who  lack  a  background  of  long  COMINT  experience.   In  battle,  the 
t&M    -2        mistakes  can  often  be  corrected  by  collateral  evidence  such  as  ground  contact, 
pi  --ft  '^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^s^mm^L^
fa 
:J       air  reconnaissance  and  prisoners.;  JJ^^g^sagSB^g^^^^^f^g^ffc. 
Whether  the  margin  of  error  is  small  or  large  today,  it  is  apt  to  increase 
geometrically  as  time  passes,  until" something  more  solid  than: 
comes  along  as  a  check  on  our  mounting  accumulation 
egg?  ■  —  4M!&£^gZg2^*«wx* 
-  37  -
But  a  steady  and 
patient  watch  over  these  sources  can  produce  three  results  of  enormous  value 
upca- the  approach  of  general  war.  .  .  '
do 
n 
COMINT  was  mined  fromTa  rich  ore  in  World  War  n.   Today,  the  ore 
i?t?M  '*-'       oeiag  processed  is  of  far  lower  grade.    Large'volumes  of  materials  are  being 
f^^  {"]    .  handled,  and  the  refining  orocess  is  complicated  in  the  extreme.   Costs -of 
£B&  n       operation  are  high.  New  veins  of  ore  need  to  be  unearthed,  and  the  costs  of 
3p|  **       exploration  are  also  high.   If  the  new  veins  are  to  be  opened  up,  part  of  the 
S.  :JfA.  -,.     ■  -  39  -
m  n 
IBS 
88  0 
r-s U 
present  operation  may  have  to  be  sacrificed.  Whether  richer  ore  will  be 
discovered,  and  whether  the  operation  can  keep  in  the  black  meanwhile,  depend 
primarily  on  the  skill  and  efficiency  of  the  management. 
J
T 
D 
Q 
I 
m 
IIP 
»«5 
D 
CL 
E?~ 
n    
• 
n u 
Q 
n 
40  -
, — sKCiiaiiXJNF^p.y^T-ieN^* 
<? 
,    7 
part,  in 
THE  PRESENT  ORGANIZATION  OF 
UNITED  STATES  COMJNT  ACTIV1TES  •      .       ■  &* 
is? 
-£= 
..^JK^MGUMEN^CO^AEtfS*^^ 
,.*«*:  5>?,c 
>   . 
,-,  ^_~__  ^— ^-~~. —,   ,  Reviewed   4  August  1981
■SS? 
??£?: 
««!■.« 
**-._-ts 
a 
D 
m  sV-^- 
il 
fr^ 
Wei 
r-±3*3 
i^SH 
The  present  organization  of  U.  S.  COMINT  activities  includes  lour 
principal  producing  agencies,  sbc  principal  consuming  agencies  and  two  prin- 
cipal coordinating  bodies.  All  of  the  four  principal  COMINT  producing  agencies 
are  within  the  Department  of  Defense.   These  agencies,  and  their  positions 
within  the  Department,  are  as  fellows: 
1.  Within  the  Army,  the  Army  Security  Agency  (ASA),  the 
commanding  officer  of  which  is  responsible  to  the  Assistant  Chief 
.  of  Staff,  G-2,  who  is  the  principal  intelligence  staff  officer  of  the 
Chief  of  Staff,  IJ;  S.  Army. 
2^'Within-the  Navy  Department,  the  Naval  Security  Group,  '  
. 
.         the  chief  of  which  is  responsible  to  the  Director  of  Naval  Communi- 
cations, who  in -turn  is  responsible  to  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations. 
3.  Within   the  Department  of  the  Air  Force,  the  Air  Forces 
Security  Services  (AFSS),  the  commanding  officer  of  which  is 
responsible  to  the  Chief  of  Staff,  USAF.     . 
,  4.  Within  the  Defense  Department,  the  Armed  Forces  Security 
Agency  (AFSA),  the  commanding  officer.of  which  is  directly  respon- 
sible  to  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff. 
-41  - 
SSSS^SSSSSSsE^S^i^^^^^ 
m
PP 
m 
Hal 
n 
n 
PD 
*=§^i 
C=rfcr= 
Eft 
*iSi£i  (/\7~  Communications  Intelligence  Board  (USCIB)  and  the  Armed  Forces  Security 
The  six  principal  COMINT  consuming  agencies  are  the  Military  Intelli- 
gence Division  of  the  Army,  the  Office  of  Naval  Intelligence  within  the  Navy, 
the  Air  Force  Intelligence  Division,  the  Office  of  Research  and  Intelligence 
of  the  State  Department,  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency,  and  the  Federal  Bureau 
'         of  Investigation.   All -of  these  agencies  receive  COMINT  material  from  the  .  . 
COMINT  producing  agen:ies  and  themselves  collate  and  evaluate  such  material. 
'tr^k  The  customers  of  these  six  intelligence  producing  agencies  receive  their  prod-— 
uct,  which  in  some  cUses  consists  of  or  contains  COMINT  and  in  other  cases 
has  been  prepared  against  the  background  of  COMINT.  •  •         . 
Q  The  two  principal  COMINT  coordinating  bodies  are  the  United  States 
n 
feM  n 
Agency  Council  (AFSAC).   From  the  point  of -view  of  organizational  position 
within  the  Executive  3ranch  of  the  Government,  USCIB  is  the  highest  U.  S. 
COMINT  body.   As  indicated  in  Part  I,  USCIB  was  the  outgrowth  of  a  long 
historical  development  in  the  coordination  of  COMINT  activities  and  now  exists 
under  National  Security.  Council  Intelligence  Directive  No.  9,  issued  on  July  I, 
1S48  (in  its  present  form  attached  as  Exhibit  C).   That  directive  establishes 
-  -12  -
B8-- 
m 
§58 
m 
u 
u 
Q 
n 
B9  u 
the  Board,  to  be  composed  of  "not  to  exceed"  two  members  each  from  the 
Departments  of  State,  the  .Army,  the  Navy,  the  Air  Force,  the  Central  Intelli- 
gence Agency,  and  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation.    (FBI  was  added  in 
March,  1950).   The  Board  may  act  only  unanimously;  when  it  fails  to  reach  a 
decision,  it  is  required  to  refer  the  matter  to  the  National  Security  Council, 
provided  that  if  unanimity  is  not  reached  among  the  military  departments  of  the 
Department  of  Defense,  the  Board  shall  first  present  the  problenvto  the  Sec- 
retary of  Defense. 
The  functions  of  the  Board  are  stated  in  paragraph  1  of  the  Directive  as 
%3=4  U       follows: 
r-.;C=3    i    i 
rs*5^ 
l_UV 
(1)  "to  effect  the  authoritative  coordination  of  Communications      "       ,~ 
Intelligence  activities  of  the  Government"  and, 
(2)  "to  advise  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  in  those  matters 
in  the  field  of  Communications  Intelligence  for  which  he  is  responsible." 
This  is  weak  and  unsatisfactory  language.  With  respect  to  the  first 
function,  the  word  "coordinate"  ordinarily  means  to  bring  into  common  action 
or  harmonize,  but  the  preceding  word  "authoritative"  appears  to  indicate  some 
greater  power.   Yet  the  requirement  of  unanimity  precludes  any  greater  power. 
With  respect  to  the  second  function,  although  the  Board  is  charged  with  the  duty 
of  advising  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  in  those  matters  in  the  field  of 
communications  intelligence  "for  which  he  is  responsible"  there  is  ao  statement
..ft 
D 
^  n 
a 
as  to  what  are  the  matters  in  that  field  for  which  he  is  responsible,  and  para- 
graph 6  of  the  Directive  expressly  provides  that  all  other  orders,  directives, 
policies  or  recommendations  of  the  Executive  Branch  relating  to  intelligence 
shall  be  inapplicable  to  communications  intelligence.    Accordingly,  the  second 
function  can- at  the  most  mean  that  the  Board  is  to_  advise  the  Director  of  Central 
intelligence  on  those  COMINT  matters  concerning  which  he  in  turn  is  respon-- 
jysia  rU_  sibl'e  under  the  National  Security  Act  for  advising  and  making  recommendations 
II 
,_.        to  the  National  Security  Council. 
In  the  final  analysis,  therefore,  the  only  functions  given  to  the  Board  axe 
to  attempt  to  coordinate,  with  unanimous  agreement,  the  communications  intelli- 
..'     ggnce  activities  of  the  member  agencies.    Even  these  functions  are  limited  by 
ft     
• 
-J  ^  paragraph  10  of  the  Directive  which  provides  that  the  Board  "shall  leave  the' 
\j-'     internal  administration  and  operation  of  Communications  Intelligence  activities 
n        to  the  member  departments  or  agencies."    This  limitation  seems  designed  to 
insure  that 'in  the  field  of  actual  oroduction  of  COMINT  (i.e.,  interception, 
o    •  
• 
*-*  decoding,  translating  and  preparation  of  COMINT  reports),  the  3oard  shall  not 
J  •  have  even  the  coordinating  and  advisory  functions  set  forth  in  paragraph  I  of 
f]  the  Directive.   Thus,  the  proposed  move  cf  AFSA  to  Fort  Knox,  Kentucky  was"  • 
n  apparently  considered  by  the  military  a  question  solely  for  decision  by  the 
ft  "**•
■J  -'f_»    M'U.11^.  1  ■  _■  — -* 
''    -~: 
^1 
|§p5 
£•££ 
H 
Li      Department  of  Defense  and  beyond  the  province  of  USCE3. 
H  The  Board  has  twelve  members.   Each  military  service  is  represented 
«      by  its  chief  intelligence  officer  and  by  the  chief  of  its  COMINT  producing  agency, 
the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  by  its  Director  and  an  Assistant  Director,  the 
n  •         • 
5-1      State  Department  by  the  Special  Assistant  for  lntelliger.ee  and  his  principal 
M      COMINT  assistant,  and  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  by  two  represent- 
H      atives  of  the  Director.    The  Director  cf  AFSA  is  not  a  member  cf  "the  Beard,  but 
Irs 
acts  as  its  "Coordinator,"  or  executive  agent.   The  chairmanshio  is  rotated 
P  *  • 
-'      annually.   The  Beard  holds  regular  monthly  meetings  and  interim  meetings  when 
n  '-" 
•j     requested  by  any  member.   At  its  meetings  there  are  usually  present,  in  addition 
^a'tha  thirteen  Board  members  or  persons  acting  for  them,  twenty  or  more  other 
representatives  of  the*  member  agencies,  so  that  the  total  attendance  is  between 
^      thirty  and  forty  persons.    The  Board  as  such  has  no  office,  staff  or  secretariat, 
y  ^Jind  AFSA  provides  secretarial  service.    In  addition  to  the  Board  itself,  an  aggre- 
f*  j— "efate  of  thirty  representatives  of  the  member  agencies  are  members  of  the  three 
standing  committees  described  below,  each  cf  which  meets  at  least  once  a  month, 
n 
but  none  cf  which  has  any  staff  or  secretariat  cf  its  own. 
' V 
JS3"H 
J  Other  than  for  .liaise?,  purposes  abroad,  the  entire  USCE3  organization 
j  i     apparently  provides  nc  personnel,  either  member  or  staff  or  secretariat,  whose 
n     sole  or  primary  duty  is  to  consider  or  act  upon  COMINT  matters  from  the  national 
jj 
point  cf  view,  and  it  appears  that  all  cf  the  members  cf  USCIB  and  its  committees 
[U  \  •
W&$] 
re-'*"*** 
sssas 
fea«ss 
w 
PSs 
LJ     as  well  as  its  "Coordinator,"  are  persons  holding  full  time  positions  ct  heavy 
n     responsibility  in  their  respective  organizations.  - 
C.  The  Board  has  issued*  eight  directives,  which  deal  only  with  its  own  organ- 
J 
izaticr,  and  COMINT  security  standards.   It  has  three  standing  committees,  one 
n  •         "  
■ 
*-J     for  "intelligence,"  one  for  "security,"  one  for  "collateral  information,"  and  an 
||     ad  hoc  "technical"  committee  appointed  for  a  particular  current  problem.   Since 
«-s     the  issuance  of  NSCID  No.  9,  the  Board  has  held  approximately  sixty  meetings. 
A  review  ci  the  minutes  cf  those  meetings  indicates  that  its  activities  have  been 
Q 
confined  principally  to -matters  relating  to  ea 
M  0 
ts&*$ 
E&sa   u  • 
Q^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^S^  general  security  problems  and  to  a"      ' 
mited  extent  the  coordination  of  evaluation  and  dissemination  of  COMINT  intelli- 
gence. No  matters  have  been  referred  to  the  National  Security  Council  for  failure 
to  reach  unanimity.      "^  • 
(j  Thus,  the  actual  operation  of  USCIB  confirms  the  very  limited  scope  of  its 
r.—  *uncticn  as  prescribed  by  its  charter  acri  Interpreted  by  its  members.   USCIB  and 
its  subcommittees  undoubtedly  perform  valuable  and  necessary  coordinating 
D 
functions  in  limited  fields,  but  it  is  evident  that  USCIB  does  not  have  or  exercise 
fggi  LI  any  power  comparable  with  its  position  at  a  high  level  in  the  organization  of  the 
«$& 
iggs  fj  Executive  Branch.   It  has  been  made  cle-ar  to  the  Committee  by  a  number  of 
&£*M  _  witnesses  that ,  exceot  perhaps^ 
n 
tmsm&m USCIB  a3  presently  conceived  and  functioning  is  an  ineffective 
-46  - 
f 
!  1 
n
AiSactaMM 
gaa%si ^^ivriTSi^rV- 
•.•i3:r, 
V^lOknd  inefficient  body.               •.*■.''•.••*"•.                       ~  i
^              AFSA  was  established  by  Secretary  of  Defense  Johnson,  by  a  memorandum  T== 
[]      dated  20  May  1949  and  a  Directive  (JCS  2010)  attached  as  Exhibit  H,  which  " 
n      placed  AFSA  "under  the  direction  and  control  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff." 
Its  stated  purpose  was  "to  provide  for  the  placing  under  one  authority  the 
U 
9  -»^~: 
conduct  of  communications  intelligence  and  communications  security  activ- 
U       ities  ,  .  .  within  the  National  Military  Establishment,  except  those  which  are 
pw    to  be  conducted  individually  by  the  Departments  of  the  Army,  Navy  and  Air 
Force."   The  Directive  enumerates  15  specific  functions  of  the  Director, 
R  "  ": 
w       Armed  Forces  Security  Agency,  of  which  the  most  significant  for  present 
HD 
&££ 
purposes  appear  to  be  (1)  "operational  control  of  all  AFSA  facilities,  units  and 
||kniii:ary   personnel;  and  operational  and  administrative  control  of  all  AFSA 
p       civilian  personnel,"  .(2)  production  cf  COMINT  and  conduct  of  all  operations 
*""       necessary  to  such  production,  "except  those  operations  which  .  ,  .  are  to  be 
P  " 
Ll       conducted  individually  by  the  Army,  Navy  or  Air  Force"  and  (3)  accounting 
fr-    for,  and  preparation,  production,  storage  and  distribution  of  all  crypto- 
materiai  for  the  Armed  Forces. 
Under  the  Directive,  AFSA  consists  of  such  facilities,  units  and  military 
ana  civilian  personnel,  including  the  headquarters,  Army  Security  Agency,  the 
jj       Communications  Supplementary  Activity  (of  the  Navy),  and  any  comparable 
n       organisations  of  the  Air  Force,  and  "such  ether  facilities,  units  and  personnel 
^       as  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  may  determine  as  necessary  to  fulfill  the  functions 
-  47  - 
Q 
i  : 
heroin  assigned." 
n 
*«*•-
<v: 
!/*>£ 
^••s 
S5I 
Thus,  as  far  as  COMINT  is  concerned,  the  functions  of  AFSA  are  defined, 
^     not  affirmatively,  but  in  terms  of  what  is  nct_  performed  by  the  Army,  Navy  and 
|J     Air  Force.   The  Directive  affirmatively  assigns  six  missions  to  the  Army,  Navy 
n     and  Air  Force,  including  (1)  assigning  facilities  and  personnel  to  AFSA,  (2)  pro- 
vicing  "fixed  intercept  installations"  to  be  "manned  and  administered"  by  the 
n 
Services  but  to  be  "operationally  directed"  by  AFSA,  (3)  providing  "mobile 
^b    Li      intercept  facilities"  for  the  Services',  to  be  "manned,  administered,  and  oper- 
3%S 
s<^' 
ationally  controlled"  by  the  individual  Services  but  which  "may  also  be  used  to 
S3 
Cjpj 
£§«§    «-.      perform  special  missions  for  AFSA,"  (4)  providing  communications  facilities 
111    M 
|§if    """      required  by  AFSA  ancr(5)  to  "continue  to  be  responsible  for  all  such  crypto-    . 
§113   U      logic  activities  as  are  required  by  intra-service  or  joint  needs  .  .  .  and  are 
^l&'termined  by  the  Joint  Chiefs  cf  Staff  not  to  be  the  sote  responsibility  of  AFSA." 
The  Directive  also  created  the  Armed  Forces  Security  Agency  Council 
S?s 
%3S 
(AFSAC)  (with  ten  members,  all  of  whom  are  military  officers  within  the 
rj  * 
^-.--Department  of  Defense).    The  Directive  gave  AFSAC  certain  duties  to  make 
jj*""  recommendations  to  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  in  respect  of  COMINT  and  to  "deter- 
a 
u 
mine  "and  coordinate  joint  cryptologic  military  requirements."  Under  the  Direc- 
tive itself,  AFSAC  is  given  no  actual  control  ever  AFSA  or  the  Director  of  AFSA, 
except  for  the  determination  of  requirements. 
In  July  1949,  AFSAC  submitted  to  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  two  further 
detailed  directives  with  respect  to  the  functions  of  AFSA,  AFSAC,  and  the 
-48-  _.  .  •
fen      fBliirector  of  AFSA,  st; 
r 
iting  that  they  were  submitted  "pursuant  to  the"directive 
—     by  the  Secretary  of  Defense  in  the  appendix  to  JCS  2010,  to  prepare  for  approval 
Ll     °y  the  Joizt  Ch»e*s  °*  statf  "  U)  a  draft  charter  for  the  Armed  Forces  Communi- 
p     cations  Intelligence  Advisory  Council  (AFCIAC);  and  (2)  a  draft  directive  to  the 
-
i  i Director,  Armed  Forces  Security  Agency  (AFSA)."   While  it  is  not  readily 
apparent  why  "such  documents  were  prepared  for  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  except 
n 
Ll     perhaps  the  necessity  to  amplify  the  directive  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense,  the 
^H    {Lresults  unquestionably  altered  the  arrangements  set  forth  in  that  directive,  spec- 
tra    V^ 
—     ifically  with  respect  to  the  authority  of  the  Director  of  AFSA  vis-a-vis  the  Service 
agencies  and  AFSAC."""' 
I—! 
•J  The  draft  charter  for  AFSA  and  the  draft  directive  to  the  Director  of  AFSA 
L,  "'f^la-ere  approved  by  the-'Jcint  Chiefs  of  Staff  on  1  September  1949.   The  charter  for 
e;^    n     AFSAC  designates  thai  body  as  "the  agency  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  charged  • 
I  i 
D 
with  insuring  the  most  effective  operation"  of  AFSA  and  gives  AFSAC  the 
§§j    *->  ^functions  to  "determine  policies,  operating  plans  and  doctrines"  for  AFSA  in 
g     ij-   its  production  of  COMDJT;  to  "coordinate  and  review"  the  Service-operated 
n     COMDs'T  facilities;  to  recommend  to  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  the  facilities, 
personnel,  and  fiscal  and  logistic  support  to  be  provided  by  the  Services  to  AFSA 
WtM    ^     °r"  ':-1S  3SJ3i^.0'  requirements  determined  by  the  Director  of  AFSA/  and  to  forward 
Kg^     L?     t0  tiie  Director 'of  AFSA  "for  implementation,  without  reference  to  the  Joint  Chiefs 
gHH    (~j     of  Staff,  its  unanimous  decisions  on  matters  which  it  determines  not  to  involve 
-  49  -
"SSS1 
n 
L 
ng^Tj     tefgp'.anges  in  major  policies  ..."    It  will  be  seen  that  for  all  practical  purposes 
r 
fc2*«£    w     the  directive  made  AFSAC  (which  Is  nothing  except  a  committee  made  up  of 
the  three  Services)  the  boss  cf  AFSA,  which  in  turn  is  completely  dependent  upon 
pa  0 
i|gj3   H     the  three  Service  organizations  for  all  its  communications  and  practically  all  of 
"  *  ^  its  collection  of  COJ/KNT.   The  pattern  was  not  unification  under  a  single  control, 
m  n 
6s53  but  rather  a  combination  of  limited  functions  under  the  three-headed  control  of 
jrsj    u     the  combining  agencies. 
gig '  fU-s         The  directive  of  the  Jcint  Chiefs  cf  Staff  to  the  Director,  AFSA,  complements 
&%i    p     the  charter  of  AFSAC  by  providing  that  the  Director  of  AFSA  will  implement, 
u=*sa  without  reference  to  the  Jcint  Chiefs  of  Staff,  unanimous  recommendations  of 
n 
U     AFSAC  which  are  determined  by  AFSAC  not  to  involve  changes  in  major  policies. 
l^j-  "j|pi|'n&  directive  further  provides  that  all  AFSA  COMJNT  activities  of  unique  or. 
&&£ 
I    *— ^that  AFSA  will  provide  for  a  full-time  Deputy  Director  from  each  Service. 
^    [J—  The  directive  further  restates  the  responsibilities  of  the  Director,  AFSA,  and 
n 
principal  interest  to  any  one  service  will,  insofar  as  practicable,  be  carried  out 
under  the  immediate  direction  of  AFSA  personnel  of  the  Service  concerned,  and 
^j/^n   j-|  .  of  the  Services  at  great  length,  with  repeated  emphasis  upon  the  position  of  AFSAC. 
§§  li 
Under  the  above  directives  the  COMINT  functions  of  AFSA  are  defined  only 
in  terms  of  what  the  Services  are  not  to  do,  and  the  COMINT  functions-of  the 
g|    ij     Services,  other  than  intercept,  are  not  defined  but  left  to  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff 
||||f    p|     to  determine.   As  more  fully  explained  in  Part  IV  of  this  Report,  the  Joint  Chiefs 
n  ...      --50 
A u 
i§£    Li
jffc-."      pP^f  stif-  *n-ve  not  made  any  clear-cut  or  definitive  determination,  and  the  actual 
ESS*  ff^  .  ' 
'-1       division  c£  responsibilities  has  been  ar.d  continues  to  be  reached  through  nego- 
ft  n 
P  n 
Si 
«  n 
(J        tiations  among  the  various  Service  organizations  and  AFSA. 
AFSAC  consists  of  the  Director  of  AFSA  as  permanent  chairman,  the  two 
USCEJ  members  from  each  of  the  Services,  and  one  additional  member  from  each 
Service,  or  a  total  membership  of  ten.   Attendance  at  meetings  usually  approx- 
imates 30  persons.   It  has  two  standing  committees,  one  of  which  coordinates^ 
technical  COMINT  matters  among  the-  member  agencies  and  the  o'ther  of  which 
r^ 
g;^    —        coordinates  the  Intelligence  requirements  of  the  Military  Services  for  COMINT. 
*2f£   sj  r 
~^~  Like  USC3  it  has  no  staff  or  secretariat  of  its  own,  and  all  of  its  members 
wsc&j   ij  •  *    * 
1?^   Li        have  full  time  "military  positions  of  heavy  responsibility  in  their  respective 
5>art'    /ggjiorganizaticns. 
$  — ^gsp 
A  review  of  the  minutes  cf  the  thirty -five  meetings  of  AFSAC  from  its 
£@g 
m    'J^intothr 
cS* 
i    j  •— '    and  divisions  of  responsibility  between  AFSA  and  the  three  Service  COMINT 
era  u 
si  n 
organization  in  July,  1949  until  the  end  of  1951  indicates  that  its  activities  fall 
ee  principal  categories:    the  logistic  support  for  AFSA,  the  relations 
m  n 
cu 
i; 
organizations,  and  a  variety  of  matters  involving  communications  security  and 
COMINT  production  problems  cf  a  technical  nature.   The  activities  of  AFSAC 
thus  are  cf  a  different  scope  and  nature  than  the  activities  cf  USCI3. 
The  negotiations  among  the 'Services  and  AFSA  with  respect  to  the  divi- 
sion c:  responsibilities  among  the  three  Service  COMINT  producing  agencies 
.-  31  - 
*  • 
a
§£gk.-d  AFSA  involve  the  basic  issue  of  degree  cf  central  control  by  AFSA  versus 
£££    Li        operational  autonomy  of  the  individual'  Service  organizations  and  relate  to 
m 
^a 
^ 
I! 
pi  «-f 
181  n 
111 
Hi  u 
1  0- 
•  three  principal  matters:    (1)  intercept,  (2)  processing  of  intercepted  traffic 
(i.e.,  cryptanalysis,  traffic-analysis,  decoding,  translation),  and  (3)  the  relations 
among  the  Services  and  AFSA  in  theaters  of  operations.   The  present  division 
of  responsibility  with  respect  to  each  of  these  fields  is  the  result  of  protracted 
negotiations  over  the  period  of  "more  than  two  and  a  hatf  years  since  AFSA  was 
established.  Such  negotiations  have  absorbed  a  substantial  portion  of  the  time 
fc?^  and  energies  of  the  principal  officials  of  the  four  producing  agencies. 
tvvn    v—  These  and  other. 'a*spects  of  the  actual  working-out  in  practice  of  the  USCE3 
Q        Charter  (NSC3D  No.  9).  and  the  AFSA  Charters  (JCS  2010  and  2010/6)  are  de,- 
*s  (j 
S»2 
m 
IP 
m 
^^scribed  in  the  succeeding  Part  IV  cf  this  Report. 
••  --J-'^i,.^.;   1-L.:.. 
Q 
n 
n 
u 
&... 
-  52  -
Zt 
i-\' 
a 
-{>N 
-  n. 
.  j. 
rv 
a  -. 
o 
PART  IV 
HOW  THE  PRESENT  ORGANIZATION  OPERATES 
-  \ 
V
Baa 
us 
Ira 
m 
.  In  Part  in,  we  have  outlined  the  communications  intelligence  organi- 
zation as  it  was  created  by  the  USCB  Charter  and  JCS  2010. /That  outline 
is  in  part  a  skeleton;  a  useful  picture  of  the  flesh  and  blood  organization 
requires  a  statement  as"  to  how  its  normal  daily  operations  are  being  con- 
ducted.  Only  by  following  the  "production-line"  of  COM3NT  down  to  the 
*  • 
delivery  of  the  finished  product  can  we  learn  how  this  paper  organization  has 
^         functioned  in  fact,  and  understand  the  organizational  and  operating  problems.  ' 
•  'T-n  v  * 
-v  In  this  Part  IV,  we  attempt  to  show  hew  the  COMINT  organization  created 
a 
J  by  the  USCIB  Charter  and  JCS  2010  actually  operates  in  the  fields  of  inter- 
j$|!  fl  cept,  priorities,  processing,  dissemination  to  consumer  agencies  and  use  Li 
I        _^_;s»jCreatins  intelligence,..cryptography,  and  security.    '• 
Xj^^size  and  Cost  _.; 
H  -  ":  -"     ~~ 
.^  'J  The  Committee  has  felt  that  it  would  be  helpful  to  these  reading  this 
•  .•  • 
fj  
.      Report  to  have  a  rough  estimate-  of  the  amount  that  the  Government  is  spend- 
ing annually  in  the  production  of  communications- intelligence.   However,  we 
have  found  that  it  is  impossible  to  give  any  completely  accurate  figures. 
This'results  from  the  fact  that  great  masses  of  the*  personnel  involved  belong 
to  the  three  Services,  and  that  a  large  amount  of  the  work  and  eff  ortwhich    " 
goes  into  the  production  of  .communications  intelligence  is  the  product  of 
Service  personnel  and. equipment  which  are  also  engaged  in  other  duties  and 
functions.  ."" - 
m 
■  r* 
n 
«... 
®  J 
-53  -
(^     ,"  ,  _  The  Committee  has,  however,  obtained  from  AFSA  and  other  sources 
J 
certain  estimates  and  data  which  it  believes  are  sufficiently  informative  to 
J         merit  reproduction  here,  even  though  some  of  them  may  be  only  little  better 
n        than  informed  guesses.   A  breakdown  of  this  material  by  major  categories 
.— ,        appears  on  the  following  pages.   Many  of  the  expense  figures  are  necessarily 
only  estimates  of  the  proper  allocation  of  various  indirect  support  costs, 
n 
-»        such  as  military  pay  and  maintenance  and  the  very  considerable  cost  of 
n   
•  "p-s  passing  raw  COMINT  traffic  through  cur  military  communications  networks. 
p        The  Committee  emphasizes  that  it  has  not  attempted  to  make  anything  re- 
sembling  a  cost  accounting  analysis.    It  believes  that  the  summary  given 
furnishes  a  reasonable  approximation  of  the  amount  that  we  are  spending  to 
..cquire  and  process  communications  intelligence.    The  summary  does  not 
Ci 
H       include  any  estimate  of  the  amounts  expended  by  the  various  departments  and 
agencies  in  analyzing,  utilizing  and  distributing  the  intelligence  summaries 
^t^iynich  are  based  in  whole  or  in  part  on  COMIN.T. 
'yj       Intercept 
.  Q  Under  the  1949  directive  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense  referred  to  above 
•  -,       (JCS  2010),  each  of  the  Services  is  responsible  for  providing  intercept 
~       facilities  for  its  own  use  and  to  serve  AFSA.    The  only  criterion  provided 
—       in  the  directive  for  the  allocation  of  intercept  facilities  between  the  Service 
;  Q      organizations  and  AFSA  is  that  "fixed  intercept  installations  will  be  manned 
■   i-j  •    •     •  /Text  resumed  on  page  5?7 
C_  /''^  -54- 
rv,    • 
A.     '-J
ESTIMATED ANNUAL MANPOWER AND EXPENDITURES FOR COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE, 1952 , . (all figures are rounded) ° MANPOWER —- ax arenas pelea sees iies eer) we leee A — a i ‘ Te ny IEP Chen 7 Se 2 ee ty Ses gD yg a a yg ee BLESS ee eke en Soe Aaa (ren aes wo: cS ane Se Sette . SR ep ey oe Oe SG on TO et, S: a5 a ete Sok he "i Sons a a ar og aS SS Se 7 eee pn oh 4 " Mh { nN Pas iwreniose wn ~~, Sy ee OW Ty ae ace : te eee Ra Te = << i ‘Cle — ae race. *: ‘ ooo = “$", scp “» . se. Ee TED me < ong # 77 . Sete 2A 5D - Bag Soy eeiat Sia ke = . - = . =} ‘ y fe) h 4
Q 
x<*"s 
Cr 
ESffeS' D 
HI 
IP G 
n U 
3C?**5r 
£S2i 
n U 
n is 
-  56  - 
G
m 
**§ 
S5g 
?*> 1] 
and  administered  by  the  Service  providing  them"  but  will  be  "operationally 
directed"  by  AFSA,  and  that  "mobile  intercept  facilities"  required  by  the 
respective  Services  will  be  "manned,  administered  and  operationally  con- 
trolled" by  the  individual  Service  but  "may'also  be  used  to  perform  special 
J  missions  for  AFSA  as  requested  by  the  Director  thereof." 
-j  The  subsequent  directive  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  establishing  AFSA 
_^  did  not  further  define  the  responsibilities  for  intercept,  but  merely  stated, 
-s_-        "L-.tercept  -  as  indicated  in  JCS  2010w"..rThe  first  relevant  Joint  Chiefs  of 
J  Staff  directive  (JCS  2010/10,  dated  25  October  1949),  stated  that  "operational 
~]  control"  o;  ^g^^^^^^^^^^^^^fLxed  intercept  stations  should  be 
— 'guested  in  the  Director  of  AFSA.   The  accompanying  psipers  emphasized  that 
~*~^^this  was  an  "initial"  allocation  of  units  "engaged  primarily  in  support  of  the 
j  functions  of  AFSA,"  but  did  hot  state  the  functions  of  AFSA  except  by  refer- 
~j  ence  to  the  previous  directives,  -which  had  not  defined  the  functions  of  AFSA. 
-'~~  The,. theory  of  JCS  2010  seems  to  have  been  that  "fixed"  interceot  factl- 
i 
ities  are  most  suitable  for  performance  of  AFSA's  undefined  mission -and 
that  "mobile"  facilities  are  most  suitable  for  the  performance  of  the  unde- 
fined Service  missions.    It  appears,  however,  that  In  most  cases  the  actual 
physical  nature  of  an  intercept  facility  as  being  "i'bied"  or  "mobile"  has 
little  relation  to  the  adaptability  of  that  facility  to  perform  missions  for  AFSA 
or  for  a  Service.   The  test  set  up  in  the  directive  is  also  impractical  because 
-  57  - 
•■-A-  «x 
mi
SSSL  ,^^7-rt  the  diiiicuity  of  determining  whether  any  given  intercept  facilities  arc  in 
fact  fixed  or  mobile.   F or  example,  the  Air  Force  designates  all  of  Its  inter  - 
cept  facilities  as  "mobile"  although,  we  are  informed,  many  of  such  facilities 
are  as  physically  fixed  in  location  as  facilities  of  the  Army  and  Navy  which  are 
designated  by  them  as  fixed.        ; 
V"    ■  , 
As  of  April  10,  1952, -the  three. Services  had  in  operation  an  aggregate  of* 
S^g 
intercept  sta- 
jco  some  extent  under  the  operational 
(~V— scontrol  c:  AFSA.   The  Army's  intercept  facilities  includec 
tions  at  locations  throughout  the  world. having  a  total  of  g*j^l"liaegg*gjgfr  and 
intercepi-units*  (called. Radio  Reconnaissance  Companies)  having  a  total  of 
The  Navy  had 
jS^iiobile  units  with 
intercept  stations  with 
The  Air  Force  had 
p       Mobile  and  other  intercept  units  with  an  aggregate  of 
plus 
Radio  Squadrons 
As  of  that 
intercept  stations  of  the  Army 
n 
,*-^rj_and  Navy  ("'^diag  all  of  the  Army  positions)  were  under  the  operational 
[j-"  direction  of  AFSA. 
twere  uncer 
p      Navy  control  for  direction  finding,  pursuant  to  JCS  2010/10  (see  para  3-);  in  addi- 
k>f  the  Army  were  assigned  to  perform 
of  the  Air  Force  were 
missions  directed  by  AFSA,  an 
••V3r
!  I 
.0 
'Q 
.;:Q 
■•a 
•  assigned  to  the  operational  direction  of  AFSA  pursuant  to  an  agreement  be- 
tween AFSA  and  the  Air  Force  Security  Service  (AFSS)  entered  into  on 
^  November  16,  1951,  providing  that  AFSA  and  AFSS  "will  each  have  exclusive 
Itaslc  assignments  on  50%  of  all  AFSS  intercept  positions."    However,  under 
the  agreement  AFSA  may  now  assign  "non-Air  missions"  to  a  maximum  of 
two  positions.   The  agreement  provides  that  this  maximum  will  be  increased 
by  mutual  agreement  as  the  total  number  of  Air  Force  positions  increase.    It 
, '.'    !^/*~^  should  be  noted  tha.t  all  arrangements  between  AFSA  and  any  of  the  Service 
':    n         COMCsT  organizations  in  the  allocation  of  positions  not  designated  by  the 
^        Service  as  "fixed"  have  had  to  be  effected  by  negotiated  "agreements."  An 
-  '•     (J  ■ important  aspect  of  the  process  of  operating  through  long  and  painful  nego- 
(     -~^> 
V__j.  -  --•tiations  is  that,  should  a^negotiated  arrangement  prove  wrong  or  unworkable, 
i     f~j        or  should  circumstances  change,  further  negotiations  are  required  to  annul  ; 
U 
f  I 
it  and  then  to  make  a  fresh  start. 
Each  of  the  Services  is  now  carrying  forward  a  program  of  expansion 
t    LI        of  its  intercept  facilities  under  authorization  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff 
•    H        ( JCS  2010/45,  dated  6  November  1951),  pursuant  to  which ' 
n 
Q 
;•! 
o 
Within  each  Service,  all  intercept  facilities  have  been  kept  subject  to 
the  command  of  the  Service  C'OMINT  organization,  rather  than  being  assigned 
-  59  - 
!>■• 
■•  U 
^5—  Wt      Ul  US' M'l—*
sate 
IP 
SSS 
J  wo  theater  or  tactical  commands.   The  Army  Security  Agency  (ASA)  has  two 
.-»  principal  overseas  headquarters,  ASA,  Europe,  and  ASA,  Pacific,  each  of 
^  which  commands  all  fixed  and  mobile  intercept  facilities  of  the  Army  within 
n 
-  its  geograpmc  area  but  has  working  relations  with  the  theater  commander  to 
ij  supply  his  local  COMEJT  needs.  All  of  the  Navy  intercept  faculties  are  under 
HI   p      the  direct  command  of  the  Washington  headquarters  of  the  Naval  Security 
Group.   Air  Force  intercept  facilities  are  under  the  direct  command  of  the 
•     Jroofcs  Field,  Texas,  headquarters  of  the  Air  Force  Security  Service  and  its 
subordinate  Security  Groups.  "  *     •      •  ' 
gp  f|  No  intercept  facilities  are  "assigned"  to  AFSA  for  "command,"  but ' 
gch  Service  has  worked  wt  with  AFSA  an  agreement  as  to' how  the  command 
Unction  of  that  Service  over  its  intercept  faculties  shali'be  reconciled  with 
n  -  .  * 
'J     "operational  direction' '"By  AFSA.   Extensive  negotiations  have  been  held' 
^  ^between  AFSA  and  the  respective  Services  as  to  whether  AFSA's  operational 
j-CT"irection  of  Service  intercept  facilities  will  be  exercised  through  general 
intercept  requirements  transmitted  to  the  headquarters  of  the  Service  organ- 
ic    ization,  or  through  detailed  assignments  so  transmitted,  or  by  directions  sent 
IS  J     by  AFSA'  either  -n  its  naine  or  ^  na^e  oi  the  Service  CGMEST  commander, 
H|  H     directly  to  ^e  Percept  station.   It  would  serve  no  useful  purpose  la  this 
2Rs3  '  •  • 
Report  to  detail  the  negotiations  on  this  matter  and  its  present  status,  but  the 
1 1 
-     great  amount  of  time  absorbed  by  and  significance  attached  to  such  arrange - 
'  U-^enis  are  noted  as  a  commentary  upon  the  present  COMINT  organization! 
-  60  - 
S2£ n
-i  ^-^lss^         n  should  be  helpful,  at  this  stage,  to  illustrate  how  the  exemption  of 
particular  Service  intercept  facilities  from  AFSA's  "operational  direction" 
.  .  .  '    ** 
has  affected  the  employment  of  our  total,  intercept  capabilities. 
D
w 
~*^TWr 
:u 
an  impressive  increase  in  total  effort,  the  division  of  "operational  direction" 
anions  the  Services  and  AFSA  led  to  a  number  of  wasteful  and  inefficient 
Q(  it                 .  ■ 
practices.    The  Array  (ASAPAC)  and  Air  Force.  (AFSS)  units  in  the  theater 
*         ■    
~  *  i  ~  Vr  *"*     .1^ 
^^^f^^^^^^^^^^^^^SDiiB  the  urrent  recommendations  of  an  AFSA 
io 
'team  (which  visited  the  theater  at  the  invitation  of  General  MacArthur's.  .  •"  .  ■ 
headquarters)  that  ASAPAC  and  AFSS  divide  and  coordinate  their  efforts  by 
•  *  ••  •  •  ■ '       *         *  -  '  ■   ■■      . 
agreement,  the  duplication  continued  for  an  additional  year  until  ASAPAC 
•  
{■.:■■. 
voluntarily  discontinued  its  own  efforts /on  both  problems  \tn  March  of  1952.    r  ^- 
•  ^T      ■'■      '■  — "   '— ■        —     ■    i  ■       ■    Lm  .."     ■       *  '    "  i.  i     ii     ■  ■'■■      i^-  » 
"^Similarly,  AFSA  recommended  in  the  Spring  of  195^^^^*?^^?^^ 
i  r /-^r^-^T^T^hat  were  urgently  needed  and  could  not  be  achieved  with  the  limited 
i  '»-J         facilities  possessed  by  any  one  Service.    The  Committee  is  advised  that  this 
m.  •  •_  —  ~~    ~       '  —  * 
}    r-}  •  ■  *  •  ■ 
:  ;  j         single  and  obvious  step  was  not  adopted  until  this  Spring,  more  than  a  year 
_  after  the  original  recommendation  was  made.    And  today,  despite,. 
•■=;^-"-  r'rri^V  :?"--fv '<^  ■t-.-^,ji;;::<y'''y'.  ^sr^^S 
'xr\  the  Western  Pacific, 
■  Y~         ^e  Pro?°~tion  under  AFSA  operational  direction  has  actually  declined, 
.     •      * 
-  62  - 
Reviewed  4'Augirst   1981
n 
The  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff's  recent  authorization  for  ah  increase  of 
tSTK^asy^ggj^fgg^fc*^  mak-ps  no  provision  as  to  -whether  such 
facilities  shall  be  fixed  or  mobile  or  shall  be  subject  to  AFSA  or  Service 
operational  direction.   The  Committee  is  informed  that,  in  negotiations  among 
AFSA  and  the  Services  leading  to  suih  authorization,  the  understanding  was 
i_  ,;*        ....".  ■    -  * 
n  '       reached  by  at  least  some  of  the  negotiators  that  a  certain  number  of  the  total 
authorized  positions  would  be  deemed  to  be  reserved  to  the  Services  for  the 
—J"^  "direct  support  of  combat  commanders"  and  that  the  remainder  would  be 
ij         deemed  available  for '.AFSA  requirements.    However,  the  JCS  authorization 
isfs  n         contains  nothing  which  prescribes  this  allocation,  and  it  appears  difficult" if 
ga 
sl3 
       not  impossible  to  -malte  any  allocaticn  on  the  basis  cf  what  Is  and  what  is  not 
—  \j^j|jf.n  "direct  support  of-.^combat  commanders."    Accordingly,  under  the  present 
M  _.    directives,,  the  future- .allocaticn  of  intercept  facilities" as  between  AFSA  and 
Fj— —  the  Service  organizations  appears  to  depend  upon  what  portion  of  such  facil- 
■  ities  shall,  be  fixed  or  mobile  in  the  case  of  the  Army  and  the  Navy  and  what 
portion  shall  be  allocated  to  AFSA  by  voluntary  agreement  in  the  case  of  the 
Air  Force.   Also  it  appears  that  the  manner  cf  exercise  of  operational  direc- 
tion by  AFSA  cf  such  facilities  as  may  be  at  its  disposal  will  probably  continue 
to  be  the  subject  c:  dispute  a^d  protracted  negotiations. 
The  foregoing  detailed  description  of  the  intercept  situation  illustrates 
one  cf  the  complex  problems  which  occupies  an  inordinate  amount  of  the  time 
-63-
i§S3  j~££S?and  energy  of  the  COMINT  organizations.'  An  effectively  controlled  COMINT 
organization  would  permit  complete  flexibility  in  the  use  of  intercept  facil- 
Q. 
ities,  having  in  mind  at  any  time  the  available  traffic,  the  intelligence  require-' 
U         ments  of  military  and  civilian  consumers,  the  nature  of  the  processing  re- 
quired, the  need  for  speed  in  a  given  situation,  the -ability  to  identify  targets, 
and  other  pertinent  factors.    These  various  factors  may  change  rapidly, 
particularly  in  time  of  war,  and  the  desired  flexibility  cannot  be  achieved 
,  by  application  of  the  present  arbitrary  standards  of  allocation  or  through 
"negotiations"  among  separate  COMINT  organizations. 
Priorities  -  ., 
«--  Although  throughout  the" CGMINT  process  the  interrelationship  of  pro- 
g        ' — 2Si  ■  ■  • 
— CppSdusers  and  users  is  continuous,  the  consumers  first  enter  at  the  point  where 
!  j        they  make  their  COMINT  needs  known  to  the  producers  —  a  periodic  act  of 
n         instruction  known  as  the  "determination  "of -orior  ities." 
u- 
*f^  .It  is  obviously  impossible,  as  well  as  impractical,  to  intercept,  ana- 
'— '        lyze  and  disseminate  to  all  interested  agencies  each  of  the  hundreds  of 
ij      •  thousands  of  radio  messages  traveling. daily  through  the  air  and  theoret- 
f~j        icaily  available  for  study.   It  is  necessary,  therefore,  that  machinery  exist 
for  determining  the  particular  channels  for  carticular  subjects  to  which 
D'  ' 
*~        attention  is  to  be  primarily  directed.   Two  committees  meet  monthly  to 
address  themselves  to  the  question  of  determining  the  national  COMINT 
,  !  -  -  64  -    .
Ii22-i£=-o 
^^^^^^^^^^'     '-       '• 
Requirements  for  any  given  period. 
ig~« -^  First,  the  USCE3  Intelligence  Committee  has  formal  responsibility 
f»i^3  for  USCIB  COMINT  priorities.   The  Intelligence  Committee  has  repre- 
'  —      sentatives  from  all  member  departments  and  agencies  of  USCIB:   i.e.,  ONI, 
'.  I      G-2,  A-2,  State,  CIA.  and  F3I,'with  the  chairmanship  rotating  among  these 
~\      representatives.   Voting  is  done  on  chart-like  forms  divided  by  countries, 
J 
and  under  each  country  there  is  a  list  of  topics  previously  drafted  and  agreed 
~-*-      pon  by  the  Committee  from  time  to  time.   The  interests  in  these  topics  are 
'J      expressed  in  terms  of  the  numerals  1  through  5,  with  5  the  highest.    The 
§£S  —1      results  of  this  preferential  voting  are  forwarded  directly  to  DIRAFSA  (the  " 
Hrector  of  the  Armed  Forces' Security  Agency).   There  is  appended  as  Exhibit 
^t*3  —"HrS^  characteristic  sample  of  USCIB'intelligence  requirements  for  the  month  of 
§H  'J     15  January  to  14  February  1952.    It  will  be  seen  that  these  requirements  are 
ggSJ  H     broadly -phrased,  subject-matter  interests  of  the  USCIB  intelligence  con- 
_/**"    imers,  which  do  not  attempt  to  pinpoint  the  type  of  information  desired 
J 
either  by  nationality  of  traffic  or  by  links  or  frequencies.  We  believe  that  in 
2SS;  J     most  cases  these  priorities  are  so  broadly  expressed  as  to  be  of  little  value 
fe  H     to  AFSA. 
fcg*J;    — 
-.•  The  weaknesses  of  this  method  of  exoressing  consumer  priorities  art 
j|||?  well  illustrated  by  the  USCIB  Priority  Lists  furnished  to  AFSA  during  the 
pill  '—    seven  months'  period  December  1949  -  June  1950,  immediately  Dreceding  the 
Ef        _-*>.  -  65  - 
-rfcys; 
\  \
j 
■  
Q 
Q  
. 
D 
■  
a 
..nvasion  of  South  Korea.    As  shown  below,  the  various  Intelligence  agencies 
were  becoming  increasingly  concerned  during  this  period  about  the  possi- 
bility o£  a  Soviet  move  against  South  Korea,  and  yet  this  concern  was  never 
Hirectly  communicated  to  AFSA  through  the  mechanism  of  the  USCD3  Intelli- 
gence Requirements  Lists:  .  ." 
Committee  was  the  predecessor  of  the  present  official  inter- 
agency Watch  Committee  presided  over  by  G-2).   The  Com- 
mittee had  10  members,  2  each  from  Army,  Navy,  Air  Force, 
State  and  CIA.   The  Committee  operated  at  the  COMINT  level; 
3  of  the  10  members  had  their  offices  in  the  consumer  beach- 
•  heads  at  AFSA  which  are  described  below. 
(b)   The  Watch  Committee  did  not  deal  with  COMINT  exclu-  . 
sively,  but  examined  evidence  from  all  sources  so  as  to  select 
and  identify  every  available  means  of  warning  that  might  indicate 
a  Soviet  move  against  the  non-Soviet  world.   The  Committee's 
.     _      minutes  for  its  meeting  of  April  12,  1950  record  only  six  items 
of  evidence  on  Soviet  intentions.    The  sixth  item  was  the  fol- 
lowing collateral  report: 
"A  report  relayed  by  CinCFE  stated  that  the  North 
Korean  Peoples'  Army  will  invade  South  Korea -in 
..'  -  63  -
G 
a 
a 
r 
a 
a 
a 
June  of  1950.    Representatives  of  the  Department  of  the 
Army  undertook  to  ask  for  further  information  on  this 
subject."  .  r 
(c)   This  particular  report  is  .not  mentioned  again  in  the  minutes 
until  the  meeting  held  July  31,  1950,  five  weeks  after  the  invasion, 
when  the  Department  of  the  Army  stated  that  the  report  "had 
emanated  from  an  Air  Force  source  whose  reports  were  nbt  given 
much  reliability  by  the  Air  Force."    But  meanwhile,  Korea  had  con- 
tinued  to  hold  the  attention  of  the  Watch  Committee,  along  with  a 
number  of  other  areas  the  Committee  regarded  as  sensitive.   In  the 
minutes  of  the  meeting  held  on  June  14,  1950,  the  following  appears: 
"A  list  of  sensitive  areas  for  consideration  by  the  Watch 
Committee  as  potential  sources  of  conflict  with  the  USSR 
was  presented  by  the  Chairman  (a  CIA  man).   These  areas, 
arranged  in  the  Chairman's  estimate  of  the  order  of  their 
explosiver.ess  in  the  near  future  (six  months  to  one  year) 
are:   Indo-China,  Berlin  and  West  Germany,  Iran,  Yugo- 
slavia, South  Korea,  the  Philippines  and  Japan.    Members 
of  the  Watch  Committee  v/ere  asked  to  present  alternative 
lists  or  rearrangements  cf  this  list  at  the  next  meeting, 
28  June  1950."   /The  invasion  occurred  on  the  25th,  and 
subsequent  minutes  do  not  indicate  that  the  alternative 
lists  were  ever  prepared./ 
The  above  quoted  minutes  of  the  Watch  Committee  indicate  that  the 
consumer  agencies  had  South  Korea  on  their  minds,  and  that  at  least 
the  CIA  representative  regarded  South  Korea  a3  the  5th  most  poten- 
tial source  of  conflict  with  the  USSR  throughout  the  entire _world.   But 
thi3  degree  of  concern  over  Kcrea'was  never  specifically  indicated 
'•  -  67  -
u 
fL 
D 
Q    \ 
.-0 
o 
a 
a 
Q 
^  .^ 
in  the  USCIB  Intelligence  Priorities  List. 
(d)"  The  table  on  the  following  page  shows  the  number  of  priority 
requests  by  consumer  agencies.for.  traffic,  relating  to  particular  areas 
of  the  world  during  the  period  December  1949  -  June  1950.    (During 
•these  7  months,  9  separate  lists  of  intelligence  requirements  were  sub- 
mitted by  the  USCIB  members).  On  the  highest  priority  list  (List  A), 
Korea  is  mentioned  only  once  out  of  124  separate  specific  priority 
items,  and  ranks  12th  and  last. in  frequency  of.  mention  among  the  areas 
of  the  world.   On  the  .2nd  priority,  list  (List  B),  Korea  is  mentioned  only 
5  times  out  of  277  separate  items,  and  ranks  15th  of  18  areas  in  fre- 
quency of  mention.   On  the  3rd  priority  list  (List  C),  Korea  is  mentioned 
once  out  of  90  separate  items,  and  is  tied  fox.  13th  and  last  place  in  fre- 
quency  of  mention..  As  a  comparative  measure  of  the  importance 
.  evidently  assigned  to  coverage  of  traffic  on  Korea  by  the  intelligence 
agencies,  Latin  America,  while  never  mentioned  In  List  A,  received  15 
#  mentions  on  List  B  and  25  mentions  on  List  C  during  the  same  period, 
(e)   The  above  evidence  suggests  the  possibility  that  the  USCIB 
Intelligence  Requirements  Lists  do  not  accurately  reflect  the  views  or 
the  intelligence  agencies  themselves  as  to  comparative  priorities,  and 
it  is  not  surprising  that  the  Lists  are  of  such  little  assistance  to  AFSA, 
/TText  resumed- on  page  7p7 
-  68  -
^ 
1*3 
fesf 
a 
o 
o 
§81  ru 
e 
Q 
FREQUENCIES  OF  USCIB  CONSUMER  REQUESTS 
FOR  TRAFFIC  ON  KOREA  AS  SHOWN  BY 
USCIB  INTELLIGENCE  REQUIREMENTS  LISTS 
(December  1949  -  June  1950) 
List  A  includes  those  individual  subjects  considered  to  be  of  greatest 
concern  to  U.  S.  policy  or  security. 
List  B  includes  those  individual,  subjects  considered  to  be  of  high 
importance. 
List  C  includes  those  individual  subjects  considered  to  be  of  considerable 
.  interest  but  of  less  immediate  concern. 
Under  each  List  is  shown  the  number  of  priority  requests  by  consumer 
agencies  for  traffic"  relating  to  each  area  during  the  period  December  1949  - 
June  1950:  .  •  .    . 
ListB 
ListC
<& 
t.^  ** 
D 
Q 
Since  ihe  intelligence  agencies  themselves  failed  lo  communicate  lo 
*  •  *  * 
AFSA  Ihe  extent  of  their  "growing  interest  in  the  Korean  problem,  it      •  ,-,,, 
•  »     *      '       * 
   ^ 
is  small  wonder  that  AFSA /was  so  poorly  prepared  to  handle'  Korean 
traific  when  the  invasion  occjjrred_onJ!une_25,_195D,— - — -x        ■•  •  *"*    °~Q 
'  AFSA's  own  dissatisfaction  with  the  USCL9  Intelligence  Requirements 
Lists,  illustrated  by  the  Korean  episode  described  above,  led  the  Director  of 
AFSA  lo  protest  lo  AFSAC  on  August  38,"  1950  that  he  was  in  a  position  of  having 
Sf^.0  direct  the  intercept  a^d  processing  efforts  of  AFSA  without  formal  inte-     • 
U        grated  guidance  from  the  Services  as  to  their  intelligence  requirements.    On 
Q        October  2,  1950,  AFSAC  agreed  to  establish  a  special  Intelligence  Require- 
w>^^penls  Committee  consisting  of  members  of  ONI,  G-2,  A-2  and  AFSA.    Since 
%  .  .    .  .  ..........       :•'...- 
_.  •       •  • 
V*"  "je  creilion  cf  this  Committee,  it  ha.s  assumed  tbe  responsibility  for  -making 
Li        intelligence  priority-  recommendations  2s  to  military  traffic,  and  the  USCEB     • 
H        Intelligence  Committee  has  confined  ilseli  primarilylo  non-military  traffic. 
"7         The  partof  the  total  "COMEs'T  pie"  available  to  the  USCIB  Intelligence 
Committee  for  .the  expression  of  its  priorities  is  what  is  known  a.s  "Joint." 
It  is  primarily'  non- military  traffic  in  which,  however,  the  intelligence  divi- 
sions of  ihe  Service  components  cf  USCIB  have  an  interest.    For  this  reason, 
they  participate  in  the- expression  of  USCI5  priorities.    The  part  of  the  pie 
dealt  with  by  ihe  AFSAC  Intelligence  Committee  is  composed  entirely  of 
military  tralflc  in  which  in  the  main  the  civilian  comoonents  cf  uSCIB  have 
rU.    •..  :•   "■•  -70- 
;0 
in 
Reviewed" 4  August   1981
•■%M  J" 
nly  a  secondary  Interest,  other  than  to  be  kept  advised  of  the  highlights  of 
the  resulting  intelligence. 
When  the.  recommendations  of  the  two  intelligence  committees  reach 
DIRAFSA,  they  are  acted.upon  by  the  Intercept  Priorities  Board.  (IPB),  of 
AFSA-02  (the  processing  center  of  AFSA).   As  in. the  case  of  the  intelligence 
committees,  IPB  meets  monthly.   Its  voting  members,  are  the  heads  of  the 
branches  of  AFSA-02;  its  chairman,  is.  always  the  Chief  of.  AFSA-02.    The 
■.civilian  components  oLUSCIB  have  no.voting  members  in  IPB  but  have  the 
right  to  station  observers  at  its  meetings  and  customarily  do  so. 
The  IPB,  in  tum,;has  about  ten  SIPG's  (Special  Intercept  Priorities 
Groups)  set  up  within  the  various  branches  of  AFSA-02.   In  advance  of  the 
-•^p0nthly  meetinS  oi  Ipi:;.the.SIP.G's  prepare  and  submit  their  own  recommen- 
H       dations  based  upon  the  Interests  and.needs  oi  the  processing  units.   As  in  the 
case  of  the  IPB,  the  civilian  agencies  participate  in  the  SIPG's  through  non- 
.^-'•voting  observers. 
On  the  basis  of  the  priority  recommendations  received  from  the  two 
Intelligence  committees  ancf  the  various  SIPG's,  IPB  lays  out  the  actual  inter- 
cept plan  for  the  coming  month.   At  this  time  the  total  COMINT  intercept  capa- 
bilities necessarily  exercise  a  limiting  influence.   It  will  be  remembered  that 
AFSA  has  operational  control  over  oaly^^^^^^resentiy  existing  inter- 
cept positions.  Accordingly  IPB  Is  in  fact  able  to  apply  the  priorities 
.'  -71-    •  •  •:'.■.' 
10_
ecommendations  received  from  the  consuming  agencies  only  in  laying 
out  the  intercept.plan  for  .approximately  two-thirds  of.  the  available  intercept 
positions.   The  remaining  intercept  positions  follow  .the  priorities  laid  down 
for  them  by  the  three  military  Services. 
It  will  thus  be  seen  that  each  of  the  three,  military  Services  has.  abso- 
lute control  over  priorities  for  its  own  reserved  intercept  facilities,  and  that   * 
it- is  also  authorized  to  make  recommendations  to.  AFSA  as.  to  priorities  for 
^^   Ppr^the  intercept  facilities  under  AFSA  control.  Within  AFSA  the  military  Services 
fe«5?   O       nave  an  effective  voice,  if  not  absolute  control,  over  the  actual  intercept  plan 
WgfS  J  -r- 
lald  out  by  the  IPB  for  the  AFSA  control  stations,  through  military  personnel 
^  assigned  to  AFSA  who  happen  to. serve  as. members  oi  IPB. 
The  civilian  consumer  agencies  are  therefore  at  a  substantial  disad- 
Qr... 
vantage  in  determining  Intercept  priorities.   With  respect  to  the  one-third  of 
the  total  intercept  capability  reserved  by  the  three  military  Service;.,- the 
^rjwCivilian  agencies  have  no  right  evento-make  priority  recommendations.  With 
Lf    respect  to  the  "Joint"  (but  not  the  military)  portion  of  the  remaining  two- 
thirds  of  the  intercept  more  or.  less  controlled  by  AFSA,  the  civilian  agencies 
are  permitted  to  make  priority  recommendations,  in  conjunction  with  the 
Services,  but,  since  they  do  not  assign  personnel  to  serve  under  AFSA  command 
(as  the  military  Services  do),  they  do  not  sit  on  the  AFSA  Beard  (IPB)  which 
considers  the  various  reeQmmendations»anji  whiclTmakes  the  decisions.  ' 
•     -  72  - 
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It  Is  a  natural  consequence  of  this  arrangement  that.  In  the  opinion  of 
the  civilian  agencies,  an  Intercept  Priorities  Board  composed  wholly  of 
employees  of  the  Department  of  Defense  tends  to  place  undue  emphasis  on 
priority  recommendations  made  by  the  military  Services,  as  compared  to 
those  made  by  the  civilian  consumers.  Thus  the  State  Department  represen- 
tatives have  advised  this  Committee  that  M^M 
..Against  a  100% 
Hfl    j-,  .     increase  in  the  number  of  intercept  positions  available  to  AFSA,  both  the. 
D 
^JL.  percentage  and  the  absolute  number  of  position 
SaSS  v^^pSE^Fhave  declined,  sharply.   These  figures,  moreover,  leave  entirely  out  of 
reserved  for  and  operated  by  the 
.**  -*■ 
consideration  the, 
military  Services,  rather  than  AFSA. 
is^     jcr—  Once  the  actual  priorities  for  a  given  month  are  set  in  terms  of  sub- 
"  & 
m 
stantive  requirements,  it  is  necessary  to  translate  them  into  the  "profes- 
a  []-•      sional'*termsrequlred  by  intercept  station  practices.
m 
K 
^ 
§1: 
n   «§^^^^^^^The  interpretation  of  the  COMINT  substantive  requirements 
for  the  benefit  of  intercept  operators  is.  done  by  AFSA-28,  the  Intercept 
U       .Division  of  the  Collection  Group  of  AFSA.    As  a  result  cf  this  translation  into 
£j        professional  terms,  g2jjfig*||s 
^ 
assigned  along  with  that  number  which  is  preferred,  because  of  ionospheric 
5ss 
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■  and  other  technical  complications  which  may  make  it  necessar^S^ 
Processing 
.    After  the  raw*  material  is  intercepted,  it  is  returned  to  AFSA'  and  to  the 
ecrypting  units  of  the  three  Services  according  to  current  instructions,  which 
vary  with  the  type  of  traffic.  „■• 
a.   Processing  as  between  the  Service  units-  and  AFSA 
The  allocation  of  responsibility  for  processing  traffic  as 
^  between  the  Service  units  and  AFSA  has  proved  as  controversial 
and  difficult  as  the  parallel  problem  cf  intercept  already  men- 
tioned.  The  1949  directive  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense  provided 
no  criterion  for  allocation  of  responsibility  for  processing.   The 
directive  of  the  JCS  to  AFSA  states  that  the  Services  shall  be 
responsible  for  processing  "as  needed  for  intercept  control  and 
-  74  -
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P  o 
combat  intelligence,"  but  that  "Exploitation  by  each  Service 
applies  only  to  material  of  operational  interest  to  that  Service" 
and  ""will  not  entail  undesirable  duplication."    The  "initial 
composition"  of  AFSA  prescribed  by  JCS  2010/10  placed  under 
the  direction  of  AFSA  portions  of  the  Army  and  Navy  processing 
organizations,  but  did  not  limit  the  right  of  the  Ser7ices  to  engage 
in  processing  with  any  retained  or  new  personnel. 
At  present  neither  the  Army  or  the  Navy  maintains  any  pro-" 
<  cessing  unit  in  the  continental  United  States,  butthe  Air  Force 
-  maintains  a  processing  unit  at  Brooks  Field,  Texas,  -£82g£jia3g£g£j«» 
It  is  clear  that-S 
musLalwaySvb.e.done.in.  the. 
field  processing  centers,  because  of 'the  time  element,  because  of 
special  direct  support  requirements  for  certain  military  operations, 
■sndrbe*c2trs'e,t2ny"eifort-to-concentrate-all  processing-  at-AFSAwould 
produce  such  overcrowding  of  telecommunications  circuits  as  to  be 
unworkable.   The  processing  at  the  Service  centers  consists  mostly 
■  f  ■ 
-75.-
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Li 
•But  despite  agreement  on  this  general  principle,  AFSA 
and  the  Services  have  had  a  good  deal  of  difficulty  reaching  an 
understanding  as  to  where  the  line  of  processing  responsibility 
should  be  drawn  between  them  and  between  the  Services  themselves. 
As  between  AFSA  and  the  Air  Force,  the  debate  continued  for 
more  than  two  years.-  Eventually,  the  division  of  responsibility  for 
processing  was  set  forth  in  a  so-called  "reporting  agreement" 
dated  December  13,  1951  and  accepted  by  AFSA  on  February  8,  1952, 
which  contemplates  three  levels  of  processing,  first  at  the  point  of 
intercept,  second  at  the  theater  level  and  third  by  AFSA  and  AFSS. 
Although  the  wording  of  this  agreement  is  In  some  respects  ambig- 
uous and  its  actual  application  has  not  yet  been  tested,  the- principle 
of  allocation  appears  to  be  that  processing  which  can  be  accomplished 
effectively  within  twenty-four  hours  after  intercept  shall  hi  done  at 
'-  76  - 
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the  point  of  intercept  within  the  theater,  that  further  processing 
which  can  be  done  within  forty-eight  hours  shall  be  done  at  the 
theater  level,  and  that  all  other  processing  shall  normally  be  done 
within  the  continental  United  States,  with  AFSA  performing  the 
CGMINT  processing  and  AFSS  performing  certain  reporting  and 
"unique  technical  support"  functions,  the  exact  nature  of  which  is 
*'/ 
not  entirely  cB6ar.   This  agreement  thus  appears  to  reflect  to  some 
extent  a  recognition  that  the  processing  of  intercepted  traffic  shall 
be  accomDlished  at  the  most  forward  locations  at  which  the  desired 
speed  can  be  achieved  and'shall  otherwise  be  performed  by  AFSA 
rather  than  a  Service  organization. 
As  between  AFSA  and  the  Army  and  the  Navy,  no  written  agree- 
ment exists  as  to  the  allocation  of  processing  responsibility.   Neither 
the  Army  nor  the  Navy  has  at  any  time  since  the  organization  of  AFSA 
undertaken  to  establish  processing  units  within  the  United  States,  but 
the  Army  has  on  various  occasions  strongly  asserted  its  right  to  do 
so.   The  division  of  processing  responsibility  between  AFSA  and  the   . 
Army  and  the  Navy  field  processing  units  has,  we  understand,  involved 
less  controversy  than,  the  relations  with  the  Air  Force,  and  has  been 
reached  through  freo.uent  liaison  and  close  cooperation.* 
•    For  example,  Navy  processing  afe<§§K335§ris  currently  under  the 
operational  direction  of  AFSA. 
-  77  -
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In  general,  the  Army  and  the  Navy  field  units  have  performed  such 
processing  as  can  be  done  with  speed  and  efficiency  within  the  theater 
to  provide  information  for  the  theater  commander  on  the  "basis  of 
technical  assistance  provided  by  AFSA. 
As  in  the  case  of  intercept,  however,  there  has  been  a  certain 
amount  of  duplication  of  processing  effort  between  the  military  Services 
themselves,  best  illustrated  by  the  previously  mentioned  duplication 
of  effort  between  the  Army  and  Air  Force  units  4H|        BHBfeVhfe 
(with  the  result  that  neither  unit 
was  able  to  accomplish  complete  analysis  en  either  problem.   An  AFSA 
team  was  invited  to  study  this  problem  and  concluded  that  a  much 
greater  degree  of  success  could  be  achieved  en' 
Mf  the  Army  and  Air  Force  units  would  divide  and  coor- 
dinate their  efforts  by  agreement.  Despite  such  a  recommendation  by 
AFSA  in  the  Spring  of  1951,  duplication  continued  until  March,  1952, 
when  the  Army  unit  voluntarily  abandoned  the  entire  field  to  the  Air 
Force. 
As  in  the  case  of  intercept,  the  general  principle  has  been 
followed  in  processing  that  each  Service  organization  is  concerned 
primarily  "with  the  traffic  of  the  same  Service  of  the  "enemy"  nation. 
The  soundness  cf  this  fundamental  premise  depends  upen-  the  particular 
-  78  -
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nature  of  the  "enemy"  traffic  and  also  upon  the  organization  of  our 
own  military  forces  for  operations.   Although  no  serious  .difficulty 
appears  to  have  arisen  to  date,  it  may  be  questioned  whether  enemy 
military  traffic  can  always  be  divided  effectively  on  the  basis  of 
three  Service  organizations,  whether  for  the  purpose  of  intercept, 
or  for  the  processing  purposes  of  traffic  analysis  and  cryptanalysis. 
Also,  under  our  own  present  concept  of  unified  commands  in  theaters 
of  operations,,  the  premise  that  any  U.  S.  military  Service  has  a  pe- 
culiar command  responsibility  for  deriving  COMINT  from  the  traffic 
of  its  "enemy"  counterpart  Service  appears  of  doubtful  validity. 
Considerations  such  as  these  have  led  to  extensive  negoti- 
ations among  the  Services  components  of  AFSA  with  a  view  to  the 
establishment  of  a  so-called  "global  COMINT  organization."    In 
general,  it  has  been  the  position  of  AFSA  in  such  negotiations  that 
COMINT  activities  require  coordination  within  any  theater' similar 
to  the  coordination  within  the  continental  United  States  through  AFSA. 
In  general  again,  the  Services  have  opposed  any  such  concept  as  incon- 
sistent with  normal  command  relationships  and  with  the  responsibility 
of  each  Service  to  provide  combat-  intelligence  for  its  own  operations. 
The  only  tangible  outcome  to  date  of  the  extensive  negotiations  with 
regard  to  the  so-called  "global  COMINT  organization"  has  been  the 
1  -79-
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establishment  of 
land  provide  technical  support  to  service  COM1NT 
activities  within  the  area.    Each  of  the  three  Service  COMINT  organ- 
izations, however,  continues  to  maintain  its  own  COMINT  organ- 
ization within  the  theater. 
Although  the  Services  have  tended  to  cppose  the  establish- 
ment of  any  AFSA  field  activity  as  being  inconsistent  with  normal 
command  relationships,  we  understand  that  each  Service  has 
utilized  a  vertical  command  organization  for  its  own  COMINT 
activities,  regardless  of  the  fact  that  such  organization  likewise 
appears  inconsistent  with  normal  command  relationships  in  theaters 
of  operation  and  results  in  the  presence  in  each  theater  of  two  or 
three  separate  COMINT  agencies  reporting  directly  to  their  respec- 
tive Service  COMINT  organizations  in  the  continental  United  States. 
b.    Processing  within  AFSA 
AFSA  eventually  receives,  either  by  telecommunication  or 
'  -  80  -
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by  pouch  according  to  urgency,  one  copy  at  least  of  every  item  of    ' 
raw  traffic  intercepted  anywhere.  While  the  Services  and  AFSA 
are  often  in  disagreement  as  to  the  division  of  processing  respon- 
sibilities, there  is  considerable  team-work  in  the  matter  of  sending 
raw  traffic  around.   Service  communications-  networks  are  currently 
handling  AFSA's  raw  traffic  requirements  in  the  following  proportion: 
•Army  44%,' Navy  38%,. and  Air  Force  18%.   These  are  largely  the     " 
same  networks  upon  which  the  Services  must  rely  not  only  for  the 
passing  of  their -own  COMINT  traffic  but  also  for  their  overall 
communications  of  a  general  nature 
-8i- 
0.
= Pk we) ON AT Oo Pe NS te tt Ee ed et 6 n eee Paine ae) ews 3 Ooi > Wes oe
How  to-  divide  AFSA's  re- 
sources between  such  speculative  research  and  current  produc« 
tlon  is  a  problem  that  is  more  perplexing  in  the  COMINT  field 
\    than  is  the  comparable  issue  so  frequently  found  in  private 
industry.   To  add  to  the  difficulty,  AFSA's  manpower  potential 
It  is  estimated  that  there  remain  only  ten  or  fifteen  top-flight 
-83  - 
i.T?l
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J 
mathematicians  and  technicians  to  provide  the  necessary  guidance     • 
and  incentive,  as  compared  to  three  or  four  times  that  number  during 
World  War  H.    Low  pay  and  "too  many  military  bosses"  are  the 
reasons  usually  cited  for  this  distressing  attrition.   AFSA,  as  a 
military  organization,  is  operated  largely  with*  military  officers 
as  heads  of  its  various  departments  and  units,  and  with  the  rotation 
policy  now  employed  at  least  by  the  Army  and  Air  Force,  the  officers 
in  charge  often  appear  greatly  inferior  in  skill  and  experience  to  the 
civilian  professionals  under  their  command.    Day-to-day  operating  f 
frustrations  and  the  difficulty  of  advancement  under  these  conditions- 
are  cited  by  a  number  of  our  better  World  War  II  cryptanalysts  as 
.primary  factors  in  AFSA' s  inability  to  retain  the  best  men,  while 
the  Government  pay  scale  and  the  problems  involved  in  original 
•  -  ■  **. 
security  clearances  have  seriously  impeded  AFSA's  efforts  to  recruit 
and  train  qualified  young  replacements. 
It  should  be  recognized  that  many  of  these  baffling  personnel 
problems  exist  despite  AFSA's  management,  and  not  because  of  it. 
AFSA  was  not  spared  the  general  budget  restrictions  prevalent 
throughout  the  military  establishment  from  the  date  of  AFSA's  creation, 
through  June,  1950.   Perhaps  because  of  AFSA's  role  as  the  first 
"combined"  functional  military  operation  not  directly  under  the 
'-84-
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control  of  a  single  military  Service,  it  began  existence  by  adopting  the 
principle  of  awarding  proper  billets  to  the  officers  of  all  three  Services,  too 
often  at  the  expense  of  a  deserving  civilian  professional  better  qualified  for 
a  particular  task.    The  present  Director  of  AFSA  is  well  aware  of  this  pro- 
blem, and  has  taicen  a^  number  of  significant  steps  in  the' direction  of  higher 
pay  and  greater  responsibility  for  his  civilian  professionals.' 
So  much  for  the  processing  of' 
l-Q 
I 
1  a 
which  is  that. aspect  of  AFSA's  assignment  that  engages  popular  imagi- 
nation  (unfortunately  stimulated  by  too  frequent  publicity) 
At  the  other  extreme  is  the  bulky  flow  of*g£g^g|s|g§jggi 
SSS^SSjgi
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It  is  performed  by  low-grade  personnel 
n       with  little  or  no  knowledge  of  the  language,  or,  indeed,  of  what  ultimate  purpose 
r"~'  
their  work  serves,  who  are  trained  to  recognize  merely  as  patterns  the  appear- 
ance of  these  words  wherever  they  may  occur  in  the  message,  and  then  by 
y       reflex  to  file  the  message  in  the  corresponding  bin.   So  far,  no  other  more 
n       humane  or  less  haphazard  method  of  reducing  the  millions  of  bits  of  paper  to 
usable  and  workable  proportions  has  been  developed. 
.  ...Of  .the  remainder  thus  produced,  expert  linguists  in  eleven  separate 
ppD    Li       reading  panels  make  the  second  sort,  .reducing  the  bulk  again  by  some 
[U  -86- 
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i  ~
u 
25%,  and  cross-filing  the  retained  material  in  about  ninety  general  cate- 
_.      gories.   It  is  these  readers  who  alio  select  those  Individual  texts  which  are 
translated  verbatim  and  disseminated  to  consumers,  a  final. distillation  of 
Li      less  than  1*3.  *&£&&$#s&s&*iga2fi^a9iB^-   However,  nothing  that  results  from 
f]      the  second  sort  is  destroyed,  and  these  messages  are  available  for  further 
rt      study  or  for  subsequent  traasiatioVas  required.   Just  as  an  example  of  the 
u  ■       "       '  ;   •    
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actual  totals  handled; 
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-  87  -
urn 
P  Before  we  turn  to  the  final  steps  of  the  actual"  dissemination  to  con- 
g||    „       sumers  of  the.COMINT  product  and  the  use  they  make  of  it,  something  should  ' 
be  said  of  the  so-called,  "beachheads"  at  AFSA.   These  axe  groups  of  intellir 
sT^gence  analysts  and  liaison  personnel  stationed  at  AFSA  by  the  six  consumers: 
fj       ONI,  G-2,  AFSS,  State,  CIA  and  the  FBL.  While. varying  considerably  from 
*q~Si   r\       consumer  to  consumer;-  the  main  purpose  cf.the  beachheads  is  to  study  com- 
PI 
sf 
f       ___^-jnunications  intelligence  in  its  unpublished  state  .both  for  the  sake  of  speed  and 
for  reauction  where  possible  of  the  quantity  of. finished  COMIN'T  to  be  dis- 
^  n 
k>--=s    l-.       serainated.   The  beachheads  also  serve  as  .a  valuable. device  whereby  con- — _ 
sumers  and  users  of  COMINT  can.keep  abreast  of  each  ether  and  understand 
§g?      r— :more  completely  the  requirements  on.cne.haad  and. the  capabilities  on  the 
asaJl  other;   The  beachhead  principle  is  not  entirely  without  its  opponents,  however. 
The  beachheads- are  physically  within  the  AFSA  compound;  thty  have  full  access 
to  all  levels  of  the  AFSA  operation;  yet  they  are  cot  under  AFSA  control.    It 
has  been  suggested  with  much  force  that  beachhead  personnel  should  be,  for 
the  sake  of  efficient  management,  under  the  operational  control  of  AFSA  pro- 
duction chiefs,  even  though  they  continue,  as  now,  to  influence  AFSA's  effort 
-  88  -
£5; 
iffi 
U 
Q 
0- 
Q 
in  the  direction  which  individual  customers  desire. 
Dissemination  and  Use  of  Processed  Traffic 
To  complete  the  picture. of  how  the  present.COMINT  organization 
operates  we  next  come  to  the  arrangements,  f.or..disseminating  processed         _ 
traffic  to  the  intelligence  consumers,  and  the  methods  employed  by  the  con-' 
sumers  in  producing  intelligence  from  this  traffic.   Any  reorganization  of  our 
COMDiT  efforts  should  be  based  on  an  understanding  of  how  the  processed 
gjj   S^-    traffic  is  supplied  to  the  intelligence  agencies  and  used  by  them.   A  knowl- 
edge of  the  methods  of  the  intelligence  agencies  is  also  an  essential  element 
in  considering  the  adequacy  of  present  COMINT  security  procedures,  dis- 
cussed at  a  later  point  in  this  Part  IV,  and  the  merits  of  the  "CONS1DO"    ' 
~§HP  debate." 
Q  It  will  be  recalled  that  the  sis  consumer  agencies  each  have  sovereign 
powers,  over  the  internal  administration  and  operation  cf  their  COMINT  activ- 
mm 
J^    '  *— -   "ies,  recognized  and  confirmed  by  paragraph  10  of  the  USCI3  charter.   The 
M    LP*' 
(do 
rag[] 
D 
methods  and  habits  of  the  six  consumer  agencies  in  evaluating  the  bulk  COMINT 
that  they  receive  and  in  disseminating  the  resultant  intelligence  are  thus 
.allowed  to  vary  considerably,  and  they  do.   Some  of  the  differences  stem  from 
basic  divergencies  in  the  intelligence  requirements  of  particular  agencies, 
but  whatever  the  reasons,  the  differences  exist,  and  it  is  therefore  necessary 
See  the  Committee's,  observations  on  the  CONSIDO  problem,  attached 
hereto  as  Exhibit  I. 
-  89  -
-ff 
Rf<S; 
M  Q 
G 
0- 
§3§§    t/^ 
to  describe  the  procedure  of  each  agency  in  turn,  although  a  few  general- 
izations apply  to  all  three,  of  the. military  intelligence  Services  as  a  group. 
Military  Intelligence 
. 
The  three  military  Services  use  the  COMINT  product  as  a  major 
source  of  "tactical"  order-of -battle  and  operational  intelligence 
i  Q 
i 
■siiS 
i£g?       W\i/r-fa 
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IT 
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~^^^» 
Each  Service  concentrates  on  its  opposite 
enemy  number,  &ut  keeps  abreast  of  developments  in  all  branches 
of  the  enemy  forces  under  study.  .The  COMINT  needed  for  tactical 
purposes  is  largely  interceptedand  processed  by  the_Service  inter- 
cept facilities  in  the  combat  theater,  "and  immediate  tactical  intelli- 
*  .••  -  - 
'*• 
gence  is  produced  by  the  Service  intelligence  unit  stationed  there. 
Both  the  theater-processed  traffic  and  any  resultant  intelligence 
estimates  are  returned  by  each. Service  .in  the  theater  to  its  own 
headquarters  in  the  United  States  (as  well  as  to  AFSA).    On  arrival 
here,  these  estimates  are  used  by  the  Service  intelligence  units  to 
brief  military  and  civilian  officials  on  tactical  developments  in  the 
theater,  as  well  as  to  produce  additional  intelligence  (primarily 
order-of -battle)  which  is  of  interest  to  the  theater  commanders  and 
is  transmitted  back  to  them. 
-  90  -
either  at  AFSA  or  at  the  Air  Force  unit  at  Brooks  Field,  and  the   " 
resulting  product  Is  turned  into  useful  intelligence  by  the  Service  chief 
of  intelligence  or  units  under  his  command.    Again,  each  Service 
In  Washington,  the  three  Services  follow  substantially  the  same 
procedures,  with  minor  variations.   Each  of  the  three  maintains  a 
beachhead  at  AFSA  not  only  to  perform  liaison  functions,  but  also  to 
produce  intelligence  from  the  bulk  traffic  delivered  by  AFSA.  Each 
maintains  its  intelligence  analysts  at  AFSA  and  prepares  intelligence 
summaries  there^thus  avoiding  the  security  risk  involved  in  deliv-" 
ering  bulk  trafficjautside  the  physical  confines  of  AFSA's  production 
center  at  Arlington  Hall  Station."        - 
The  Army  and  Air  Force  units  at  AFSA  prepare  only  working 
intelligence  papers  which  are  edited,  published  and  distributed  among 
their  top  Washington  commanders  by  the  parent  G-2  or  A-2  staffs  in 
the  Pentagon.   G-2  in  the  Pentagon  then  cables  important  items  to-the 
Army  field  commands  throughout  the  world,  while  in  the  Air  Force 
•  The  Navy,  however,  sends  a  full  set  of  AFSA's  "take"  to  CBJCPAC 
at  Hawaii,  where  a  separate  intelligence  staff  maintains  a  complete 
and  permanent  message  file  for  Pacific  naval  operations. 
-91-
u 
this  role  is  performed  by  the  AFSS  Command  at  Brooks  Field  In 
Texas,  to  which  the  Air  Force  beachhead  at  AFSA  has  recently  been 
subordinated.*    The  Navy  Director  of  Intelligence,  on  the  other  hand, 
has  delegated  full  COMINT  responsibility  to  the  ONI  party  (Y-l)  at 
AFSA.   Y-l  not  only  prepares  intelligence  summaries  from  COMINT, 
but  also  edits  and  publishes  the  weekly  Navy  Special  Intelligence  Brier     " 
and  other  reports,  and  services  Navy  commands  throughout  the  world 
with  cables,  COMINT  summaries  and  urgent  operational  flashes  as 
occasion  requires.  Army  G-2  has  also  authorized  its  AFSA  beach- 
head to  pr'iginate'cables  to  the  theater  whenever  the  beachhead  develops 
operational  intelligence  on  the  Korean  campaign. 
The  production  of  intelligence  at  the  AFSA  beachhead  serves 
military  needs  iii  a  number  of. ways.    It  is  obviously  the  fastest  method    . 
of  developing  operational  intelligence  and  getting  it  back  to  the  theater, 
In  the  frequent  cases  where  hours  and  minutes  count.   The  tricky  nature 
of  order-of -battle  Intelligence  and  of  tactical  military  intelligence  . 
(particularly  when,  as  in  Korea,  we  reU 
places  an  enormous 
M£  .—  I~-"^premium:bnr-clbsjCT^  the -intelligence  analysts, 
AFSS,  in  turn,  is  subordinate  to  the  Chief  of  Staff  rather  than  the 
Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  A-2. 
'    -  92  -
U 
traffic  analysts,  and  cryptanaiysts..  Each  type  cf  specialist  can  and 
Q 
Q 
often  does  save  the  other,  from  critical  mistakes.  Working  jointly, 
they  are  far. more  effective  than  when  they  work  separately.  If  the 
intelligence  analysts  remained  at  a  physically  separate  location,  - 
joint  work  of  this  sort  would  be  far  less  effective.   Another  important    *    ' 
advantage  of  the  "beachhead"  arrangement  is  that  it  not  only  facilitates 
cooperation  between  the  Service  groups  and  .APS  A  but  has  greatly 
improved  cooperation  among  the  Service  groups  themselves.   Finally, 
the  physical  concentration  at  AFSA,  reducing  as  it  does  the  shipment 
and  storage  of  ra>>  traffic  throughout  the  city,  undoubtedly  contributes 
to  the  security  of  .the  COMINT  source-  .Partly  because  of  this  concen- 
r-'""-  tration,  theServices  are  also  able  to  hold  down  the  number  of  intelli- 
.  
U.._....,   gence  personnel  cleared  for  COMINT.  Each  Service  manages  with  an     ■_ 
H  .  AFSA  beachhead  cf  100  or  less,  and  with  no  more  than  about  300  to 
400  cleared  intelligence -producing  personnel  oa  duty  with  each  Service 
in  the  Washington  area.   Only  a  small  percentage  cf  the  Service  intelli- 
gence staffs  in  Washington  are  cleared  for  COMINT  (except  that  in 
fields  ^^^^^^^^^j^afc^^^  where  COMINT  is  virtually  the 
only  source,  the  entire  group  must  necessarily  be  cleared  to  do  J.  ':   * 
effective  work). 
-93  - 
U 
ft".
.-JO 
St.-te  Department  Intelligence 
The  State  Department  does  not  carry  on  any  part  of.  its  intelligence-  ' 
producing  function  at.AFSA,.and.limits  its  beachhead. to. liaison  duties. 
2F?5£ 
m 
■ms 
A 
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aS56^es&*&* 
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a 
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a 
a  
■ 
a 
a 
f9: 
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-  95  -
* eee NT ee RT POEL PP ES neh aI I hee Role epee ater) " is Woo ara Se hee rae SEES I IS RAE RS SW ae eo Tag eg ene ee mere Sree SON 9 wel Oa lg Fee eres tone ee oar) acer ZS He a Pee Ts me, ih as HA a PCAC S-™ Sorte ey ge A eS ED heated ~~ eee RRS cutee
■    Q 
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Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation 
The  Federal  Bureau  of  .Investigation  carries  on  a  smaller  COMINT 
-97  -
J 
I      - 
J 
•i 
a 
a 
a 
LP 
a 
effort  than  any  of  the  other  consumer  agencies. 
On  the  basis  of  these 
lists,  AFSA  picks  out  traffic  cf  possible  interest  to  the  FBI,  running  to 
some  7000  items  a  month,  or  about  half  of  the  total  AFSA  product.    One 
set  of  this  culled  traffic  is  delivered  to  the  FBI  headquarters  in  the  De- 
partment cf  Justice. 
H      Alar  tin?  Top  Officials 
-,  •  Something  should  be  said  of  the  existing  machinery  whereby  COMINT 
'  J 
-..messages  of  crucial  importance  are  immediately  furnished  to  topmost  officials 
§ji^.  -98- 
Q 
i  —
L      _ .  of  the  Executive  Branch.    The  Pearl  Harbor  investigation  shed  a  hard  and 
relentless  light  on  the  necessity  for  such  machinery,  and  for  .keeping  it  in 
perfect  working  order.
^^^P^^TTwnT 
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ft 
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'•Ha- 
vac 
M*.*lik     i   I       II    MlH    11^         .w      *'C*.«W*ij 
[It  I    •     **      4*     •*• 
„.„   ._  V.:« >..-*+".'.'. 
■.:»'.•? ■£■£**  '•    ••'-■•»v"'.'i;*Sr- •\T"r**ii*^ii  ■ 
lW£ 
IBS.  - '  ^^^^fr1^ 
There  is  another  aspect  of  the  present  communications  intelligence  organ-   "V 
kzSL" 
and  the  distribution  of  the  Nation's  own  code  and  cipher  syste'rus."  While   ''' "'"""'^y- ' 
cryptography  is  of  itself  an  advanced,  complicated,'  and  important  s*cier.ce,  it      '-'-.z. '..
has  not  been  beset  by  rivalry  and  strife  to  nearly  the  same  degree  as  has  the    "i.*.. 
cryptnnalytic  effort;  for  this  reason,  the  cryptographic  picture  is  a  relatively 
serene  one.   The  inevitable  relationship  between  cryptography  and  cryptanalysis   _ 
^*W^^^i7-v£.Z
1^    ^ 
mm  [] 
(for  the.  combination  of  whichiwo  aciivittes.the^pecial.aU-embracing  syn-  " 
thetic  word  ycryptology"  Jjas-beeiuMlaed)  iia&>LonS.be3a.xecaSaire£L.^^, 
D 
si 
m 
¥$ 
.'  '  \—  •    -  . 
When  AFSA  was  created,  the  cryptographic  activities  of.  both, Army  and    -  • 
Navy  were  transferred  by  the. Services  to  AFSA.   At  the  time,  the.  Air  Force 
had  no  independent  cryptographic,  unit  of.  its  own|  and  no  such  unit  has  since 
been  created.   The.  State  Department  ancLother.  government  agencies  had. 
already  adopted.the  practice  of  relying.upon..tha_LIiUtary  Services'^  crypto- 
graphic service  and  they,  have  continued. to. rely  upon  AFSA.  As  a  result? 
true  unification  and  centralization^ .  this.Government's..crj-ptographic  activ-    ' 
ities  was  achieved  by  the  creation  of  .AFSA..  So  far  as.  the  Committee  has 
been  able  to  determine,  our  cryptographic  activities  have  been  performed    > 
efficiently  by  AFSA  without  significant  jurisdictional  conflict,  and  without  any 
of  the  various  unfortunate  consequences  which  the  Services  have  often  pre-      •• 
dieted  would  follow  from  a  unification  of  ocher  phases  of  our  COMZNT  operations. 
-  102  - 
mm 
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L^c<  r^i  Security  •    X^  >.*-.•; 
§3  ■ 
U         brings  into  focus  the  numerous  problems" of  security  which  plague  and  are"  ...--^m 
§ggs     ]        -inherent  In  the  CO  MINT  world  by  its.very  nature/  The  delicacy 'of  COMINT  ''&?£** 
T*o -principles  of  COMINT  security 'have  grown  up  arid  become* b'aiicV  v\ ;  "?®"i 
!«S« 
**J 
compartmentation  is  primarily  to  localize  the  dangers  and  effects  "of  con- 
j^^   .J         promise.    The  maintenance  of  this  balance  lies  at  the  very  root  of  the  COMINT     "'■ 
IPJ  „  -'  -^-V  .  ■-■        .  .    ■  
•  -±t-:V    •.-..,■    ■-  .::v.v.--  •:•.         -v  .     — 
**M   ;  I         security  problem.    It  becomes  particularly  difficult  as  the  size  of  the  COMINT    :  .'.
£-«?•■:  v-103  -■■■':'-:: 
•. .-        "  .Z  i  '."— V^T  -'
^i":-----.:V?:^^':^W:----3  ,--->' 
1£ 
— v.     ./"••','     '  *      "" 
r^rrTrVr-C>>*"«  -• 
""*>  world  increases.    COMIKT  security  was  relatively  simple  irk  the  days  when 
-  NV>the  total  number  of  people  with  established  need-io-k.oow  amounted  to  no  more 
'        •  lhan\200,or  300? but,  with  the  growth  of  importance  of  COMIKT  as  a  source  ^ 
I     »?  of  national  intelligence  and  with  the  increasing  complexity  of  the  cryptana- 
l  
*¥     lytic  effort  whereby  COMIKT  is  produced,  that  number  has  grown  from^^N    ' 
Cfew  hundreds  lo.soni^^g^including  the  consumer  agencies).    And  in 
I  '      •     •  *       •  •  '  '     .  * 
spite  of  the  two  principles  mentioned  above,  it  must  be  taken  for  granted  that 
7^    indoctrination,  even  though  dissemination  be  compartmentalized  and  restricted 
1  to  the  narrowest  scope,  involves  -full  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  the  com- 
munications intelligence  endeavor  and  peripheral  knowledge  of  \.h.e  general 
i    •.         ■•  •  •  ■■.•■•■••"■ 
means  and  techniques  of  its  production.    Thus,  it  can  be  seen  that  people 
'■■.--•  engaged  in  the'  COMIKT  effort,  whether  their  positions  within  that  effortfbe 
':     7  .  .  '  .  *  *  ,  "  « 
humble  or  exalted,  are  all  by  definition  oossessed  with  information  of  a  most 
'•  ■  "     .  •  ...'*."•  •     •  .    •         . 
sensitive  nature."  This  necessitates,  in:turn,  that  every  member  of  the  COMIK 
rr-rv    world  be  screened  before  indoctrination  and  be  periodically  scrutinized  there- 
1  : 
I  after.    Enormous  problems  of  investigation  and  clearance  are  unavoidably 
brought  into  play  as  the  result  of  this  aspect  of  COMIKT  security. 
,'  At  present,  COMIKT  security  is  the  sovereign  province  of  each  COMIKT 
agency,  so  far  as  concerns  that  agency's  own  practices  and  personnel.    There 
i  - 
1    *    #is  a  USCS  Security  Committee  at  which  the  sovereign  agencies  meet  and 
J        '  negotiate  agreement  on  general  security  standards,  but  the  amplication  of 
I"  •'  /.     '  -104-       "  ;  .: 
Reviewed   4  August   1981 
:Y*
Li 
[^ 
p    .  ./chese  standards  within  each  agency  is  for  the  agency  itself  to  determine.  Even 
(J 
the  original  clearance  of  COiMINT  personnel  is  handled  by  different  investi- 
gators in  each  agency,  and  the  FBI,  which  for  a  time  carried-aiarge  share  of 
jj       the  general  burden,  has  recently  ceased  screening  AFSA's  own  personnel, 
j~|       because  of  the  pressure  of  other  duties.   As  a  result,  one  of  the  most  sensi-   _ 
__       tive  agencies  of  the  Government,  AFSA,  has  lost  the  services  of  our  most 
professional  screening  organization. 
L/^        Among  the  unfortunate  results  of  the  sovereignty  enjoyed  by  each  COMINT 
pj       agency  over  its  own  security  affairs  is  the  tendency  of  each  CQMINT  agency 
•_,       to  suspect  and  criticize  the  security  practices  prevailing  in  other  agencies, 
_       without  being  able  to  learn  the  true  facts  or  do  anything  about  them.    The 
w      -  .oramittee  has  been  struck  by  the  frequency  with  which  representatives  of 
Q      particular  COMINT  agencies  have  pointed  to  poor  security  practices  in  other 
q      COMINT  agencies,  practically  on  a  round-robin  or  pot  and  kettle  basis.   AFSA 
/£L23vorries  over  the  security  practices  of  the  consumer  agencies,  the  consumer 
J      agencies  worry  about  AFSA  and  about  each  other;  yet  so  far  as  the  Committee 
(J      has  been  able  to  determine,  no  COMINT  agency,  and  no  Individual  in  the  COM- 
fl      I*H'T  worid'  has  su**ictent  information  about  security  practices  outside  his  own 
L      ^mediate  field  of  COMINT  activity  to  form  a  sound  opinion  one  way  or  the 
j»      other. 
•  1  '  "  ■ 
,  A  good  example  of  this  weakness  of  the  present  system  is  the  reaction 
L^ 
-  i ; 
-105  -
-^5    pj^as^o:  the 
?**«W3S*VtoK 
various  COiiINT  igencies^ 
was  created,  but  ralatiag  to  secuxit>'..prai:tices.wMjcIi.the  -creation  of  AFS 
did  not  disturb.  ^^^^f^^^^^^^^^^-~"-           
rsA 
i        P*l 
s    5*5;
It  also  seems  worth  noting  that  the.USCIB  Board  considered  the  problem 
Kand  made  the  following 
r  e  c  o  m  m  e  ndatio  ns : 
l'A-. 
S  i  I 
»**£*»        I 
(c)   The  following  counter  measures  are  required: 
•   -  107  - 
• «»
S$    !  1 
m  u 
to 
(2)  A  thorough  review  of  present  dissemination  lists  and  dis- 
semination practices,  by  each  of  the  consumer  agencies  with    • 
'  a  view  to  insuring  that:  •  .  • 
•  * 
;a.---*Ehtr-"need-to-knowM  principle  is  rigidly  adhered  to.' 
b.  That  the  producing  agencies  are  required  to  furnish  only 
  those  COMINT  items  which  the  application  of  the  "need-    - 
'.  ^~        to-khow."  principle  reveals  are  actually  required  by  a 
consumer  agency. 
'  * 
c.  Only  th^e"  minimum  number  of  copies  of  individual  COMINT 
,..'._-...^,-.-;.i:te:ms.5s^entiai  to  tiie  accomplishment  of  the  dissemination 
program  be  requested  from  the  producing"  agencies,  and 
Od.    Proper  measures  for  handling,  custody  and  stowage  are 
being  practiced.'' 
fj-  -■■■So  far  as  the  Committee  has  been  able  to  learn,  very  little  has  been  done  by_ 
USCB  to  carry  out  these  recommendations.   The  general  tenor  of  the  testis 
mony  before  the  Committee  was,  that,  in  the  opinion  of  each  witness,  security 
(  I        •"       .        .    ,  . 
;_!       practices  in  his  own  agency  are  excellent  but  that  security  practices  in  other 
Q — branches.. of.  the  U.  S.  COMINT  effort  are  poor,  with  no  observation  of  any  • 
>  The  Committee  is  unable  to  express  an  opinion  on    ' 
the  accuracy  of  these  statements,  but  it  is  convinced  that  under  our  present 
improvement 
-  108  -
pc?n    .ifssp  form  cf  COMIN7  organization,  no  one  COMINT  official  has  acquired,  or  has 
m  ex 
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pa  u 
£8 
m®  Q 
88  0 
m  n 
the  authority  or  ability  to  acquire,  sufficient  information  about  actual  security  ■*
practices  in  all  agencies  to  reach  any  sound  conclusions  on  this  subject.        \ 
@«l       P 
SI    1'J 
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sail   Q 
3S 
ii  n 
-  109  -
( t 
-?=S£eXj?3rY>  INFOErMATJ  ON*5' --*• 
PARTY 
CONCLUSIONS  AND  RECOMMENDATIONS 
•;:?>TsrD'deb^'!SNT>:GOk^fe 
TQP"S2i€gSa 
Reviewed  4.  August  1981
The  first  four  parts  of  this  Report  do  not  purport  to  be  a  complete 
summary  of  all  of  the  evidence  presented  to  the.  Committee,  or  of  the  numerous 
and  varying  opinions  which  have  been  received  from.the  witnesses  listed  in 
Exhibi*.  B  and  from  other  individuals  with  whoin  members  of  the  Committee  '    ~ 
and  lis  staff  have  held  infor.mal.discussions.:  On  the  other  hand,  they  are  more 
fi.-rter.sive  thsa  would  have  been  necessary  if  the  Committee  had  limited  its 
report  to  specific  replies  to  the  two  main  questions  submitted  to'  it.  In  order 
to  put  itself  in  a  position  to  answer  these  questions,  however,  it  was  essential 
for  the  Committee  to. acquire,  the  background  information  which  these  four 
fgjj    |    .     parts  contain,  and  iLwas-decided  that,  since'-the  material  had  been  collected, 
it  might  be  equally  helpful  to.  the  officials  to  whom  the. Report  is  addressed 
-'  -.'*..  . 
to  have  this  same  background.  ' 
Our  conclusions'  are  necessarily  matters  of  opinion  and  judgment,  based 
on  the  evidence  we  have.received..  They  have  been,  arrived  at  unanimously. 
In  addition  to  those  submitted. in  response  to  the  two  main  questions  raised 
in  our  directive,  we  have  added  certain  others,  of  an  ancillary  nature  on  three 
or  four  other  subjects  necessarily  encountered  in  the  course  of  our  survey. 
We  have  not,  however,  attempted  to  extend  the  survey  to  include  consideration 
of  the  efficiency  of  the  expenditure  of  funds  used  in  the  overall  COMQJT  effort, 
nor  to  evaluate  the  methods  or  machinery  used  by  the  various  departments 
and  agencies  in  utilizing  the  CQMlNy  information  currently  being  made 
-U0  - 
/%
p 
5^< 
n 
Q 
u 
available  to  them,  as  these  subjects  are.  completely  outside  our  terms  of 
reference.     -  -   -...-.'  .     . 
The  Importance  of  Communications  Intelligence.  - 
It.  our  directive..oi-28.December.  19*51. we..waEe.asked.first  to.  consider 
"the  legitimate  Communications.Intelligence. needs..ol each  governmental  de- 
partment and  agency  for.  the-production.  aJLdepartaentallntelligeace,  and  of.  the 
n        Director  of  Central  Intelligence. for. the. production. oLnafionaL  intelligence."    Our 
reply  to  this  question  is.in-large.part  contained,  in.the  material  set  forth  in  Part   . 
g||   »-        n  and  in  pages  89-102. of  Pazt.iy....The..Committee.canadvise.without  qualification 
*£s-«  :J        that  communications  .intelligence ±as.been-in.£ha.past,_and.still.ls,.o£.vital  i 
e7  *  ■  * 
m- 
P    U 
in 
m 
w 
..ppl&ortance  to  the  Government.  ..There  .was.  a.  tendency...on.the  part -of.  certain  wit-      ^ 
nesses  from  the  three-.Services..ta.emphasiza.that.its.  primary., importance  Js  ~T 
military",  and  that  the..primary- justification. for.  our. grea.t  COMINT  effort  should 
be  to  furnish  the  three  Services  with  ..intelligence  which  is  necessary  in  non- 
-     nection  with  the  conduct  of  a.  war  and.  in  preparing  to  meet  attack-.lf-a.iwar  starts. 
When  one  considers  the  fact  that/in  the  past  most  of  the  spectacular,  examples  — 
of  its  success  have  been  directly  connected  with  our  military. effort,  this  view  is 
no:  surprising.    On  the  other  hand,  there,  is  no.  question  in  the  Committee's  mind,  . 
that  a:  this  stage  of  our  country's  historyvcommunications.intelligence  is.  also  of 
primary  importance  to  the  successful,  operations. oLcertnin, of. the.  civilian,  agencies,'  • 
particularly  the  State  Department,  the.Central  Intelligence  Agency  and  the  Federal 
-  Ill  - 
n 
n.
Bureau  of  Investigation.   These  civilian  agencies  today  play  a  vital  part  Li 
-i 
the  national  security  of  the  United  States,  and.  It  is  apparent  to  us  that  COMINT 
e  -i 
has  an  essential  part  in  our  entire  effort  to  protect  that  security  and  not  only  J 
'  in  that  largo  part  of  the  effort  -which  is  the  direct  responsibility  of  the  Military 
Services.    This  principle  should  govern  our  COMINT  organization  to  a  greater  .       A 
•extent  in  the  future  than  it  has  in  the  past.  '  "J^ 
_^-^   •    ♦• 
 v 
 . 
Information  obtained  through  COMINT  is  of  importance  in  a  number  of 
•^         ^»  ,,     ,   ^..  .       -       * 
«.vv 
ways,  but  it  is  not  too  much  of  an  oversimplification  to  divide  its  importance 
into  two  main  categories.    The  first  of  these  relates  to  the  direct  support  of 
our  military  units  in  the  field  through  communications  intelligence  pertaining 
mm 
Lie** 
ISP 
psi 
IZs 
esss 
^SS^°  order<'*°aUle'  movements  of  the  enemy,  enemy  plans  and  intentions,  and  so  ? 
.,  forth.  The  second  includes  the  longer-range  military  information,. 
n 
—  ^  Wnile  the  two  interlock,  the  former  is  unquestionably  of  primary  importance        , 
/*T  '         ■ 
  ■■  —   
.    ' 
 : 
 ■■  ■  ~ 
to  the  Services  and  is  indispensable  to  them.'  The  latter  is  of  importance  to 
I 
the  Services  and  the  civilian  agencies  alike.   The  two-fold  characteristic  of  /    _ 
the  finished  product  is  the  source  of  one  of  the  difficulties  in  the  organization  \ 
  , 
 : 
 _ — _   :   •, 
of  a  central  communications  intelligence  effort.    The  difficulty  is  compounded  \ 
by  the  fact  that,  although  it  is  possible  to  separate  to  the  extent  indicated  the 
use  of  the  finished  product,  it  is  not  at  all  possible  to  segregate  to  an  equal 
extent  the  functions  of  collecting  and  processing  the  material  which  is  the
... .  •  - 
source  of  the  information.. . Some..inf orxra'tion. in  tbe-firs-t  category  csn  be  " 
•  *     -       • 
obUined  directly  at  a.forv.'axd  intercept  s!ation...OUjer.su£h.Inj_ormation,  very 
"probably  of  even  greater.5nnporlancej.can  be  obtained  only  by  compiling  at    '     • 
t .  i      .  .   _ 
 ■  — —  — ■ 
AF5A.  itself  all  the  bits  and  pieces  derived  Jtrom  all.COMINT  souxcestfandby,. 
(S 
using  tne  complicated  cryptanaiytic  rn?rbia£r7Aoxa.U^d^.tlAFS/w/"Thls  is  but 
one  of  the  factors  that  leads  us  to  the  conclusion. that  COMINT  is  a  national  re- 
•  sponsibility  (as  distinct  from  the  responsibility  c£  any.  particular  Service,  de- 
partment or  agency)  and  that  as  a.  consequence  the  activity  must  be  so  managed 
and  organized  as  to  exploit  all  available  intelligence  resources  in  the  partici- 
pating  departments  and  agencies  in  order,  to  obtain  the  optimum  results  for-    •• 
each  and  for  the..Government"as  a  whole. 
Our  conclusions 'as  Lo  the  .importance  ol  the..COMIKT.  eifort  are  .not  v.-eak-*' 
.<^n— — r5  '  ■  ~    ..  _ , '*f?.'rcritJZiZ~}r+  •-»'»;-'iS~^«r>r   —  .  ~ 
 ■ — * 
ened  by  the  lac^that^^^^^^^^^^^^^U^^g^^S^^^^JS^ 
•  -  ■*  *-    £m  ■""_?»*  ,-  fc     i— .  ■  "■  T  •»-"  •  •  m.  a  •*    i^— "  f~~  ^*f^  y<r^»  • 
-  113  - 
^ 
Reviewed   4  August  1981 
■■••  -.-•  '^j* 
»•/.***»  »*
S?5« 
sax 
522       , 
ton 
&S_-   ' 
Ml 
efficient  COMINT  organization  is  maintained,  it.  may  at  any  moment  reward 
  .   ^^^^^^y^.^^^,.^^^ 
IgpJ     ««fe 
informed,  perhaps  because  of  our  own  disclosures,  of  the  importance  of  com- 
munications intelligence  to  this  Government,  we  may  never  see  a  return  of 
the  great  successes  and  victories  attributable  to  COMINT  during  the  course 
ess _/ 
*^*  j  of  World  War  II.   Nevertheless,  the  art  is  one  which  will  be  of  such  impor- 
i        ~~ 
_fe 
fe_ 
11  ■-■*_■_-« 
n 
^gtance  to  the  defense  of  our  country  in  the  foreseeable  future  that  we  must 
maintain  our  efforts  aggressively  and  efficiently  so  that.(l)  we  may  employ 
*_ 
this  source  of  intelligence  during  the  present  critical  period  and  (2)  we  will 
_]  have  in  existence  a  skilled  organization  that  can  furnish  the  communications 
;  f  intelligence  that  will  be.  of  even  greater  importance  in  .the  event  of  a  general 
-,         war.- 
The  Organization  of  Communications  Intelligence  Activities 
— -.  — — ^    ______ 
— '  The  second  of  the  two  general  subjects  which  our  Committee  was  re- 
quested to  survey  relate-to  the  organization  of  the*  Government's  communi- 
cations intelligence  activities.    This  organizational  problem  has  besxi  by  far 
the  most  difficult  part  of  the  Committee's  assignment.  .  . 
-  114  - 
fcf-'-s
R3£ 
m 
££* 
.  pSJgj/        The  1949  reorganization  and  the  creation  of  AFSA  was  a  compromise. 
It  did  not  bring  into- one  organization,  all  oi  the  functions  which  at  the  time 
were  being  performed  separately  by  the,  Army  and.the  Navy  and. which  the 
Air  Force  was  beginning  to  put  into  operation  for  itself.   The  two  previous 
COMINT  organizations  were  each  vertically  organized,  each  largely  self- 
sufficient,  and  each  relied  on  "coordination"  and  "liaison"  for  reduction  of 
duplication.   Since, 1949  we  have  had  four  COMINT  organizations;  besides  AFSA 
iHI  L /^  itself,  each  of  the  three  Services  has  its  own,  ASA  (Army),  C3A  (Navy),  AFSS 
f]        (Air  Force).    As  explained  in  Parts  III  and  IV  cf  this  Report,  each  of  these 
three  is  independent,^ each  is  subject  to  the  command  control  of  its  partic- 
n 
n 
Q 
Q 
e$ss 
t u 
ular  Service  and  performs  certain  functions  for  that  Service,  and  each  col-: 
i 
—Vg|>?Lects  COMINT  traffic  and  furnishes  it  to  AFSA,  receiving  in  return  finished 
.— » 
iS*3  U        niateriai  from  AFSA..  Each  of  the  Service  units,  processes  certain  categories 
n        of  the  material  which  it  collects,  and  distributes  the  results  both  downward 
HI 
,-  -p. 
^ 
^ 
^ULto  its  own  field  commands  and  upward  to. AFSA.   AFSA  L,  dependent  on  the 
*    *      •  ■ 
if 
—        Service  units  for  all  of  its  direct  interception  of. COMINT  (^SS^^^^^ 
(J  ir^^^^^^^t^^^^^^^^^^^^   and  on  Service  communications 
f"j        agencies  for  all  of  its  communication  channels.    However,  none  of  the  three 
Service  units  is  subject  to  AFSA  control,  except  for  the  intercept  positions 
IJ 
  ...  Placed  under  AFSA's. '/operational  direction'.'  by  negotiated  agreements,  and 
Li       AFSA  has  no  power  to  compel  elimination  of  duplication  between  them,  or  to 
ru  -.us.
K^*'   -J 
RSI**    -J 
P3§ 
e2£ 
n 
-1§ 
restrain  them  from  engaging  in  activities  that  could  better  be  centralized  in 
AFSA  itself,  or  to  observe  interception  priorities  established  by  AFSA. 
Stated  as  baldly  as  this,  it  may  appear  that  the  creation  of  AFSA  was 
a  step  backward.  As  a  practical  matter,  however,  it  was  preferable  to  the 
only  two  alternatives  that  were  considered  at  the  time. 
The  first  of  these  would  have  been  the  creation  or  continuance  of  a 
complete  COMINT  organization  for  each  of  the  three  Services,  and  con- 
ceivably  a  fourth  to  serve  the  civilian  agencies.    Obviously  this  would  have 
been  ridiculous  duplication,  and  undesirable  for  many  reasons  in  addition  to 
fj  the  extravagant  expense  that  would  have  been  involved.   Although  at  the  time 
such  separate  setups' were  urged  by  the  Navy  and  the  Air  Force,  the  Com- 
mittee has  been  told  that  today  none  of  the  Services  or  agencies  would  re-  • 
commend  this  plan.  "- 
;  I  The  second  alternative  would  have  been  to  concentrate  in  AFSA  all  COM- 
-         INT  activities,  top  to  bottom,  of  all  the  Services  and  civilian  agencies.  This 
a
'  Centralization  to  this  extent  would  not  be  practical  in  the  case  of  the 
United  States  at  this  time.   As  has  been  explained  at  length  in  earlier  parts 
ggj  -1  of  this  Report,  our  organizations  for  COMINT  in  the*  field.  are"<^|£||g||g5Sp 
t^l&s^^.&^m  canned'  and  operated  by  the  three  Service 
H'Q 
r      _—   •  ...   . 
*k       ■•   ^£§a,cOMEvJT  units.   In  addition,  the  essential  communications  networks  are  ir.te- 
f^M  '    fc""®^  ...  .  • 
gral  parts  of  the  military  organizations.  While  as  indicated  below  we  believe 
*  *  * 
that  AFSA  should  be  given  authority  to  determine  the** scope  of  the  activity  of 
{J  ^    these  Service  units,  and  to  control  them. in. certain  other  respects,  we  would 
I r,— '      not  go  so  far  as  to  recommend  that  they  be  incorporated  organizationally  into 
AFSA  itself. 
Although  we  feel  that  the  organization  created  in  1949  was  preferable  to 
>ese  alternative^  we  have  concluded,  on  the  basis  of  all  the  testimony  presented 
-117  -
a 
n 
Li 
r^ 
IP 
i 
to  us,  that  the  experience  of  the  past  two  years  has  demonstrated  that  the 
1949  reorganization  should  be  regarded  as  a  first  step,  and  that  a  point  has 
now  been  reached  which  makes  it  essential  to  carry  it  further.  We  believe 
that  a  more  effective  centralization  of  certain  of  the  COMINT  activities,  ~ 
brought  about  by  a  strengthening  of  AFSA  itself  and  an  increase  in  its  authority 
over  the  Service  COMINT  units,  will  increase  its  effectiveness  and  correct 
deficiencies  which  have  become  apparent  since  1949.   Before  turning  to  the 
organizational  changes  that  we  wish  to  suggest,  it  is'  appropriate  to  enumerate 
v  -  . 
certain  of  the  reasons  which  prompt  them. 
1.    The  COMINT  effort  of.  the  Government  today  has  too  many  of' 
the  aspects  of. a  loose  combination  of  the  previous  military  organi- 
zations and.toc'few  of  a  true  unification  of  .the.COMINT  activities  of 
all  the  interested  departments  and  agencies..  This  is  easily  understood 
when  one  considers  the  historical. development,  but  does  not  justify 
the  continuation  of  the  present  setup.   It  is  not  well  suited  in  this 
•  intensely  specialized  field  to  the  elimination  of  duplications,  the 
intense  concentration  of  available  funds  and  the  flexible  assignment 
of  resources  to  the  solution  of  a  problem  that  must  be  treated  as  a 
whole.   AFSA.  must  be  the  keystone.   The  success  or  failure  of  the 
national  effort  depends  on  AFSA's  strength  or  weakness-.  And  today 
its  success  is  of  vital  importance  to  every  department  and  agency 
,U 
-118  -
J 
n 
s~\ 
n 
0   \ 
Q 
n 
d 
a 
[/■■ 
o 
participating:  in  the  national  defense.. 
2.  la  theory  the  Joint  Chiefs  .of  ..Staff  .exercise,  direction  over  AFSA       \ 
In  practice  this  direction  Ls  taken  .over,  almost  entirely  by  their  agency  *'■ 
AFSAC,  which  is  an  interser.vice.  committee  acting  under  the  rule  of 
unanimity.   Its  members  devote  much  of  their  time  in  frustrating .  _ 
detail  to  safeguarding  individual  Service  autonomies.   The  Director  of 
AFSA  is  obliged  to  spend  much  of  his  energy  on  cajolery,  negotiation 
and  compromise  in  an  atmosphere  of  interservice.  competition. .  He  has 
no  degree  of  control,  except  by.  making  use  of  such  techniques,  over  the 
three  COMINT.  units  operaied  by  the.  Services..  Jn.fact,.he  is  under  the   • 
control  of  the  three  Service  units,  through  their. representation  on  AFSAC. 
His  only  appeal  is  to  the  same  .three  Services  sitting  as  the  Joint  Chiefs 
of  Staff. 
3.  These  difficulties  ha.va.not  been. corrected.by.USCIB.  As  shown 
in  some  detail  in  Part  HI  of  this  Report,  its  charter  powers  are  vague 
and  its  jurisdiction  is  limited,..and it.has,  itself  jio. authority,  to  exercise 
policy  direction  or  control. .  Despite  this,  the.Committee  feels  that,  if 
USCIB  had  from  its  inception  been  no.re.aggressiva  and  alert,  it  could 
have  made  Its  weight  felt  in  bringing  about.needed reforms.. 
4.  Inside  AFSA  itself  the  organization  reflects  the  comments  made 
above.  By  direction  of  the  Joint  Chief s  the  Director  has  a*  two-year  term, 
-  119  -
s?>2 
pa 
pis* 
£Si 
n 
/\- 
n 
ar.d  the  position  is  rotated  among  the  Services.  .Ee  is  required  to 
have  a  deputy  from  each  Service.   There  is  inadequate  attention  to 
the  development  of  career  officers  and  inadequate  opportunity  for 
that  advancement  of  civilians  which  is  necessary  to  the  building  up " 
of  a  strong  and  permanent  civilian' staff .   The  increasing  complexity 
of  the  task  before  AFSA  demands  the  continuity  which  will  result  if 
more  of  its  key  personnel  are  career  experts. 
5.    The  evidence  shows  that  as  a  result  of  all  these  factors,  AFSA 
si" 
has  had  
a  high  
fcjrnover  
of  personnel,  
has  
lost  
too  many  
valuable 
men,  and  its  general  morale  has  been  low.    Presumably  these  are 
■    among  the  conditions  that  prompted  the  appointment  of  this  Committee. 
The  Committee-* found  no  evidence  that  they  are  due  to  the  lack  of 
effort  of  the  present  Director  or  of  his  predecessor.   The  major 
diif icultics  stem  from  the  current  organizational  structure.   Lack 
of  success  in  certain  important  fields  is  undoubtedly,  due-. in. part 
t 
.  to  the  extreme  difficulty  of  the  problems  that  exist  today  as  com- 
pared with  those  of  World  War  II,  but  qualified  witnesses  have  con- 
vinced the  Committee  that  there  is  sufficient  hope  of  their  eventual 
solution  to  justify  a  major  effort  to  correct  the  situation  we  have 
described.  This  effort  will  r.ct  be  effective  without  a  further  reor- 
•/  gar.izaiicn  of  the  COMINT  structure. 
-  120  -
n  n 
*i* 
3< 
M  n 
CX 
Our  recommendations  or-  the  subject  of  organization  logically  fall  into 
throe  categories:   (I)  the  organization  below  the  AFSA  level;  (2)  the  organi- 
zation within  AFSA  itself;  and  (3)  the  organization  above  the  AFSA  level. 
Recommendations  as  to  changes  in  the  organization  below  the  AFSA  level. 
The  Committee  suspects  that  the  present  ASA,  CSA  and  AFSS  have  grown 
tc  greater  proportions,  and  have  assumed  more  autonomous  functions,  than 
was  intended  by  Secretary  Johnson's  1949  directive  which  created  AFSAl   It 
is  hard  to  avoid  the  conclusion  that  the  three.  Services,  instead  of  exerting 
88!  n 
'j5||  —         themselves  to  the  greatest  extent  possible  to  bring  about  a  maximum  unifi- 
Eg&    '  '         cation  of  COMINT  activities  in  a  strong  AFSA,  have  put  their  emphasis  on 
jj 
p-pj^  developing  their  own-COMIMT  units  at  least  to  the  limit  permitted  by  the  Sec- 
^^^retary's  directive  and  have  relegated  a  minimum  of  functions  of  common  con- 
u 
n 
cern  to  an  AFSA  organization  that.for  all  practical  purposes  was  kept  subject 
:<J         to  their  joint  control.  We  believe  that  in  order  best  to  exploit  the  available 
j  
..  .-    resources  in  all  departments  and  agencies,  to  obtain  the  proper  coordination 
^         of  the  three  Service  units  into  the  national  COMINT  structure,  and  to  insure    • 
we  elimination  of  unnecessary  duplication,  it  is  essential  that  AFSA  be  given 
J         a  substantial  degree  cf  authority  over  those  three  organizations.   At  present 
the  Director  can  theoretically  exercise  control  by  obtaining  action  through 
the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff,  which  in  practice  means  persuading  AFSAC  —  really 
the  three  Services  themselves  —  to  take,  the  action  he  destres.   This  is  not      • 
effective.  •   - 
-  121  -
■J^rlg 
^  n 
es. 
itm% 
ea 
With  very  few  exceptions,  all  of  the  witnesses  who  appeared  before  the 
Committee  agreed  that  the  authority  .and  power  cf  the  Director  cf  AFSA  should 
be  increased.   This  was  true  whether  the  particular  individual  came  from  one 
of  the  Services,  cr  one  of  the  interested  civilian  agencies,  or  AFSA  itself.        ~ 
The  only  differcr.ee  bore  en  the  extent  to  which  this  increase  should  go. 
-We  recommend  that  the  mission  cf  AFSA  should  be  defined  by  Presi- 
dential Memorandum  (referred  to  more  specifically  below),  .which  should  state 
that  its  function  is  to  provide  effective,  unified  organization  and  control  of  the 
COMDsT  activities- of  the  Government  conducted  against  foreign  governments, 
as  these  activities  sere  'defined  in  Public  Law  513,  and  to  provide  for  integrated 
operational  policies/and  procedures  pertaining  thereto;   This- memorandum 
should  provide  that/subject  to- the  top  policy  control  described  belcw,  the 
Director  cf  AFSA  is*  responsible  f.or  accomplishing  the  niission  of  AFSA,  and 
that  for  this  purpose  all  COMINT'  collection  and, technical  processing  resources 
of  the  United  States  are  placed  under  his  operational  control  and  technical 
control.   This  authority  should  net,  however,  affect  the  responsibility  of  other 
agencies  and  departments  in  respect  of  the  evaluation  and  dissemination  of 
the  COMINT  product  received  by  each  of  them  from  AFSA,  and  their  synthesis 
of  that  preductwith  information  available  to  them  from  other  sources.. 
To  the  extent  feasible  and  in  consonance  with  the  aims  of  maximum  over- 
all efficiency,  economy,  and  effectiveness,  the  Director  should  centralize  or 
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m  y 
^Unconsolidate  the  performance  of  .COMEn* .functions  for  which  he  is  responsible. 
Although  the  Presidential  .Memorandum  should  make  it  clear  that  the  Director 
has  the  authority  to  control  all  collection  and  processing  of  COMINTj  it  should 
also  provide  that  where  necessary  for  close  support  of  forces  in  the  field, 
operational  control  of  COMDJT  activities  necessary  for  such  support  are  to  be  . 
delegated  by  the  Director,  during  such  periods  and  for  such  tasks  as  are  deter- 
mined  by  him,  to  the  appropriate  unit,    . 
There  should  be  direct  access  and  direct  communication  between  the  Direc- 
tor and  any  Government  COMINT  activity.    The  Director  should  be  authorised 
to  obtain  such  information  and  materials  pertaining  thereto  as  may  be  required 
by  him.  '•-       •       ■  -.  -        • 
The  memorandum  should. further  provide  that  the  Director  shall  exercise 
"j  -     such  administrative  ^control  over  COMINT  activities  as  he  finds  essential  to     - 
„       the  effective  performance  of  his  mission.:  Gtherwise,  administrative  control 
u 
JZL.  of  personnel  and  facilities  will  remain  with  the  departments  and  agencies  pro- 
rr 
LS       viding  them. 
rj  If  the  authority  of  AFSA  and  its  Director  is*  expanded  in  the  manner  above 
r-f  '  .recommenced,  we  will  still  have  other  units  besides  AFSA  engaged  in  COMINT 
!  j 
""*       collecting  and  processing  activities,  but  only  to  the  extent  that  the  Director 
n 
L-       determines  that  such  separate  operations  should,  in  the  overall  national 
f"|       interest,  be  separately  conducted.   We  appreciate  that  this  will  involve  draw- 
n^    in3  a  li«e  between  the  powers  to  be  employed  by  any  one  of  the  Services  or  a 
:-"  -  123  -
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field  commander  and  the  functional  director  in  Washington.   However,  the 
problem  is  by  no  means  a  new  one  in  the.  Armed  Services,  and  it  has  been 
solved'  in  other  fields,  although  any  such  solution  necessarily  involves  sincere 
and  intelligent  cooperation  between  the  commanders  involved. 
Recommendations  as  to  organization  within  AFSA  itself. 
The  Committee  received  much  testimony  from  both  .military  and  civilian 
sources  very  critical  of  the  situation  that  exists,  today  .within  the  AFSA  organ- 
ization.   This  criticism  was.  directed  against,  the  present  organizational  struc- 
ture  cf  AFSA  and  not  against  the  capability. or  efficiency  of  any  individual 
occupying  a  responsible  position. 
At  present  the  directorship  cf  .AFSA  is  rotated  among  the  Services,  each 
incumbent  holding  the  position  for  -two-years.   There  was.nota  .single  individ- 
ual whom  the  Committee  questioned_.on  this. point.who.did.not  express  the 
opinion  that  this  term  was  too  short.   ^^nrr]mo^nHnn<;  v-.yi*A  fmrri  three" 
years  to  an  indefinite  or  "career"  pericd.._£^eryone  agreed  that  under  the 
present  setup  it  took  a.year  for*  the  Director  to  get  hisJeet  under  him  and 
that  he  really  only  became  well  trained  to  perform  his  difficult  task  shortly 
before  his  term  of  office  expired.    The  Committee  recommends  strongly  that 
AFSA  should  bo  administered  by  a  director  with  a  substantially  longer  term 
of  office.  .         . 
The  witnesses  differed  in  their  opinion  as  to  whether  the  director  should 
-124-
too' 
Kffi  J 
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be  an  officer  or  a  civilian.   These  differences  by  no  means  followed  the 
status  of  the  particular  witnesses;  one  of  our  senior  generals  stated  flatly 
that  he  should  be  a  civilian,  and  seme  other  officers  said  that  they  did  not 
think  it  made  great  difference  whether  he  was  a  civilian  or  not.   The  majority^ 
both  military  and  civilian,,  expressed  the  strong  view  that,  rightly  or  wrongly, 
a  civilian  wculd  have  a  harder  road,  and  greater  difficulties  to  overcome, 
JSsg  — 5          unless  by  chance  he  was  a  retired  officer  with  good  military  experience  behind 
fe  !  ">-v          — —   -           _::  -   ""*    
r^ 
him.    This  question  would  of  course  depend  in  any  particular  case  on  the 
particular  personality  involved.    The  primary  qualification  which  should  deter- 
mine the  selection  of 'the  director  is  competence,  and  the  thoroughly  competent 
^W      • — 7555*  individual  may  be  found  in  any  field  of  endeavor.   Nevertheless,  on  balance, 
the  Committee  feels  that  initially  the  position  should  be  held  by  a  career 
military  officer  on  active  or  reactivated  duty  status,  enjoying  at  least  three- 
n 
Li 
star  rank  during  the  period  of  his  incumbency.    He  should  be  appointed  pre- 
ferably for  a  term  of  6  years,  but  not  less  than  4  years.    H,  as  things  develop, 
it  should  ultimately  appear  that  a  civilian  could  better  qualify  for  the  position, 
it  is  strongly  recommended  that  no  sense  cf  tradition  or  vested  military 
interest  be  allowed  to  stand  in  the  way  cf  his  appointment.    If  the  director  is 
an  officer,  ho  should  have  as  his  deputy  a  career  civilian.    The  Director  should 
be  designated  by  the  President  en  the  nomination  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense. 
Below  the  directorate  level,  senior  positions  should  be  filled  by  individ- 
^  uals,  whether  officer  cr  civilian,  who  have  a  career  interest  in  the  field  of 
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