REPORT BY THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE STUDY TEAM TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE REASSESSMENT OF DEFENSE AGENCIES AND DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES By Direction of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 {Public Law 99-433, October i, 1986) October 1987 Deputy AssiStant Secretary of Defense (Administration) Directorate for Organizational and Management Planning The Pentagon Washington, D.C. 20301
Appendix D DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA) I. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS Mission and Oversight l. That the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) retain the intelli- gence mission with added authority and resources. 2. That oversight of Department of Defense (DoD) Intelligence be assigned to a Single, senior Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) official responsible for all Defense intelligence policy, Plans, programs, and budgets. 3. That integrated Defense intelligence program management (with the exception of SIGINT) be vested in the Director of DIA with oversight arrangements as currently structured. 4. That the Director of DIA be given the authority to fulfill the expanded mission outlined for Combat Support Agencies in the Defense Reorganization Act. Combat Support Agency directors should participate in the PPBS process for those matters affecting their mission areas. Readiness and Responsiveness l. That DIA be given the authority and resources to fulfill more effectively its mission of satisfying Unified and Specified (U&S} Command intelligence requirements. OSD, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), and the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) should identify minimum requirements and initiate corrective action, as appropriate. 2. That DIA expand its efforts to develop joint intelligence doctrine. DIA should work closely in this regard with OJCS, the Us&S Commands, and the Military Departments. 3. That DIA in collaboration with the DCI, OSD, OJCS, U&S Commands, and Military Departments develop an achievable schedule and plan of action for development of an integrated Defense Intelli- gence Master Plan emphasizing intelligence support to the Combatant Commands. 4. That DIA work with the Defense Communications Agency (DCA), OJCS, the U&éS Commands, and the Military Departments to ensure that survivable, secure intelligence voice and data communications will exist to support DIA and UsS Command combat support require- ments. The communications, operations, and intelligence communi- ties should work together to document, validate, and translate these requirements into operational capability. D-1
5. That DIA be more responsive to UsS Command requirements and improve communication with consumers to ensure that users are aware of Agency Capabilities and Limitations. Organization and Functions l. That DIA determine the organizational changes required to support its wartime mission and document them in the Defense Intelligence Master Plan. 2. That DIA consider consolidation of those planning and manage- ment functions in direct support of U&sS Command requirements into a single organization. 3. That DIA be granted increased authority to fulfill its role in counterintelligence matters. OSE, OJCS, and DIA should determine the most appropriate way to ensure the J-2 can guide, review, and ensure the U&S Commands have adequate counter- intelligence capability. Efficiency, Economy, and Effectiveness That DIA explore with the J-2s of the U&S Commands possible wayS to rotate DIA civilian intelligence professionals through command activities. Manpower And Buddet 1. That DIA not be reduced by the general Agency and management sey headquarters reductions identified in Title VI of the Defense BETS Reorganization Act. 2. That requirements and budget constraints drive future manpower requests. 3. That the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and i Personnel) [ASD(FM&P)] and CJCS review the Combat Support Agency military manpower billets against Joint Duty Assignment criteria and, where appropriate, designate billets as joint duty asSignment positions. II. HISTORY Enactment of the 1958 Reorganization Act prompted Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates to ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to review the adequacy of Defense intelligence activities. Concurrently, White House concern about the management of all Government intelligence activities resulted in an interagency study chaired by Lyman Kirkpatrick, Jr., Inspecter General of the Central Intelligence Agency. In December 1960, the Joint Study Group reported a number of deficiencies in the military intelligence system, including duplication of requirements, collection activities, and D-2
publications. The Joint Study Group's recommendations to the National Security Council (NSC) included proposals for consoli- dating Defense intelligence efforts. In early 1961, Secretary McNamara asked the JCS to develop a concept and plan tc activate DIA. A compromise was developed that provided for an agency reporting to the Secretary through the JCS with overall responsibility for managing and controlling Defense intelligence resources, although the arrangement left a number of intelligence functions with the Military Departments. With DIA’s establishment, Secretary McNamara abolished the Assis- tant to the Secretary for Special Operations, his previous point of contact for coordination of Defense intelligence activities and for liaison with other Government intelligence organizations. Additionally, the JCS transferred their Joint Staff J-2 Direc- torate to DIA. In 1970, the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel reported that "The principai problems of the Defense Intelligence Agency can be summarized as too many jobs and too many masters." The panel believed that DIA's supervision of Military Department intelligence collection and processing, and fiscal control over Military Department intel- ligence programs was "largely impotent." In response, Secretary Melvin Laird eStablished an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence [{ASD(I)]. This new official was charged with exer- cising a greater degree of authority over resource allocation than DIA had been able to achieve. Despite the changes in oversight and a number of internal reorganizations during the early 1970s, DIA continued to operate under the charter Secretary McNamara issued. In February 1976, President Ford issued Executive Order i1905 to strengthen control and management of U.S. intelligence activities. Secretary Rumsfeld established an Inspector General for Intelli- gence and double-hatted the ASD(I) the Director of Defense Intelli- gence (DDI). The Director of DIA was instructed to report to the Secretary of Defense through the DDI and to the CJCS. Additionally, the Secretary directed further DIA reorganization to emphasize its production and managerial responsibilities. Under the the Carter Administration, staff supervision on policy matters was assigned to the Under Secretary for Policy [USD(P) } and staff supervision for resource allocation to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (ASD(C3I)]. Under present arrangements the Director DIA, reports to the Secretary of Defense and CJCS. Staff supervision is received from the ASD(C3I).
MISSION, OVERSIGHT, AND ADDITLOUAL LEGISLAYION tre 4 ray Miss)o Tn accordance with its charter, DoD Directive 5105.21, DIA'S mission ig to satistry, or to ensure the satisfaction of, the foreign intelligence requirements of the Secretary of Defense, the CJCS, DoD Components, and other authorized recipients, and to provide the military intelligence contribution to national intel- ligence. The Director of DIA wears four hats. He is the Director of a Combat Support Agency, the J-2 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the senior military intelligence advisor to the Secretary of Defense, and the Program Manager of the General Defense Intelli- gence Program (GDIP). Mission Alignment Alternatives Alternative 1: Retain the present DIA mission. Although additional resources and authority are required to carry out the intelligence function, the mission should continue to be consolidated in a single agency. Further fragmentation of intelligence activities would reduce overall efficiency, economy, and effectiveness, and mitigate the benefits of consolidation. Alternative 2: Return the mission to the Military Departments. Returning the mission to the Military Departments would compromise efficiency, effectiveness, and economy; fragment resources; promote analytical duplication; and provide decision makers with uncoordi- nated intelligence data. Inherent in this alternative is the potential for manipuiation of intelligence assessments to Support weapon system choices. wt Alternative 3: Centralize in DIA all DOD-wide intelligence production, processing, and infrastructure activities that do not provide direct support to the U&sS Commands and their Component. Commands but are common to more than one Military Department. On the surface, this alternative appears to eliminate the frag- mentation of intelligence activities by merging intelligence production, processing, and infrastructure in a single agency. However, most interviewees believe it is neither politically feasible nor warranted. The largest Military Department production activities are the Scientific and Technical (S&T) Intelligence Centers. They support both national and Military Department specific requirements under the functional management of DIA and resource management of the Director of DIA as the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) Manager. DIA currently manages the S&T intelligence production that is shared among DIA and Military Department S&T Inteiligence Centers. Few efficiencies and many problems would resuit by D-4
RR consolidating this function iti DLA. Oversight DIA is under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. Staff supervision and policy giuiidance are provided by ASD(C3I). The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intel- ligence Oversight ensures that DIA’s activities are in compliance with existing law. The Director of DIA is under the operational control of the CJCS for the intelligence support required by the CJCS to perform his Statutory and other assigned responsibilities. As Program Manager of GDIP and as an activity in the Foreign Counterintelligence Program, further guidance and oversight is provided by DCI and the Jntelligence Community Staff. Although diffused among different officials and performed in different ways, the record of performance would indicate that oversight of DIA has been effective. However, fragmented oversight of the broader intelligence community is problematic due largely to the multiplicity of programs and proponents with frequently competing institutional interests. For example, within OSD, all programs are not centrally managed. Others, such as the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP), are largeiy outside the control of DOD. Although each impacts upon the others, they are frequently not integrated into a coherent planning and programming framework. Direct involvement in the DoD planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS) process is needed to ensure that the Combat Support Agencies are able to perform the increased responsibilities they were assigned in the Defense Reorganization Act. Currently, they do not have sufficient authority to carry out their expanded responsibility. Each Combat Support Agency director is responsible to both CJCS and the Secretary of Defense for advice concerning his Agency’s mission area, yet none has a direct role in the planning, pro- gramming, and budgeting decisions that effect other activities involved with their mission area. Each of these Agency directors is program manager for a mission area, but they cannot ensure complete mission performance. Each of the Combat Support Agency directors needs more direct planning and managerial oversight for those programs that affect his area of responsibility. Alternative 1: Leave Defense intelligence oversight as currently structured with ASD(C3T) pe Tforming.. DIA staff supervision and CJCS overseeing DIA as the J-2 This alternative would retain oversight of DIA and the Defense Intelligence Community as it exists today. Most U&S Command and Component Comnand interviewees noted the programming and budgeting problems inherent in this arrangement, especially the difficulty of working within separate program management guidance and time- D-5
lines. Most frequently cited was the program and budget sub- missions of the NFIP, the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities Program (TIARA), and the Tactical Cryptologic Program (TCP). All U&S Command intelligence Capability iS Spread among these programs, yet each program is built and reviewed in isolation. Alternative 2: Leave DIA oversight by ASD(C3I CJCS, and DcI as currently structured. Select a single senior OSD official to be responsible for all Defense intelligence policy, plans, programs, budget, and oversight. Assign to DIA responsibility for development of integrated Defense intelligence plans, programs, and budgets. There was substantial agreement among interviewees that a senior OSD official should be in charge of all DoD intelligence policy. The advantages of this arrangement include integrating ali Defense intelligence, providing a unified thrust to policy and resource programs, and establishing a single spokesman for Defense intelli- gence. DIA performs substantive and functional management for much of Defense intelligence and validates, recommends priorities for, and monitors satisfaction of collection requirements. The Director is the Program Manager of GDIP. With additional authorities and resources, the Director of DIA is the most logical candidate to be the Defense Intelligence Program Manager responsible for inte- grated Defense intelligence plans, programs, and budgets, with the exception of SIGINT. As a related issue, some officials believe that the oversight performed by the ASD(C3I) is less than effective and that the command, control, and communications side of C3I is too big and detracts attention from intelligence; emphasizes data collection without determining user needs adequately; and overemphasizes equipment acquisition at the expense of non-hardware aspects of intelligence requirements. Many proposed that there should be a separate Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. A large part of this issue rests with the knowledge and experience of the ASD(C31I). This official must be equally knowledgeable of both command, control, and communications activities and intelli- gence. If these qualifications cannot be found in one individual, then consideration should be given to separating intelligence under a new Assistant Secretary of Defense or a Director of Defense Intelligence. Conclusions 1. DIA provides products and services common to more than one Military Department. Although some are unique to a single Military Department, no transfer of DIA functions would result in increased efficiency, economy, and effectiveness. 2. Eliminating centralized management of the intelligence ae function would promote duplication and provide decision makers D-6
with uncoordinated intelligence data. Decentralization of production, processing, and infrastructure would not improve overall efficiency, economy, and effectiveness. 3. Further consolidation of Military Department intelligence production, processing, and infrastructure activities is neither politically feasible nor warranted. Such a consolidation would not improve overall efficiency, economy, and effectiveness. 4. DIA does not have the requisite resources and authorities to fulfill its mission. 5. Although oversight of DIA is diffused, it appears to work effectively. 6. Oversight of the Defense Intelligence Community, at large, is fragmented, causing program disconnects for the U&S Commands and their components, the Military Departments, and other Defense Agencies. 7. The directors of Combat Support Agencies do not have the authority to coordinate and approve plans for, and ensure interoperability and connectivity among, the wholesale and retail, strategic and tactical, and long-haul and tactical portions of their combat support mission areas. Changes are needed to ensure that the Combat Support Agencies have the authority and resources to perform the expanded responsibilities they were assigned in the Defense Reorganization Act. Recommendations 1. That DIA retain its present mission with added authority and resources. 2. That oversight of all DoD intelligence be assigned to a single, senior OSD official responsible for intelligence policy, plans, programs, and budgets. 3. That integrated Defense intelligence program management (with the exception of SIGINT) be vested in the Director of DIA with oversight arrangements as currently structured. 4. That the Director of DIA be given the authority to fulfill the expanded mission outlined for Combat Support Agencies in the Defense Reorganization Act. Combat Support Agency directors should participate in the PPBS process for those matters affecting their mission areas. IV. READINESS AND RESPONSIVENESS Readiness Although DIA is working aggressively with the Combatant Commands and Military Departments, joint intelligence doctrine continues D-7
to be a major weakness. Integrated intelligence plans must be structured around coherent joint doctrine. DIA needs to ensure that the intelligence capabilities of the CJCS and the U&SS Commands and their components are mission capable. Interviewees cited significant disconnects between tactical and national~Capabilities. _DIA should lead the planning necessary to guarantee that a war- ' ready intelligence system exists to support the Combatant Commands. The Defense Reorganization Act requirement for strategy-based plans underscores the need for more effective joint intelligence doctrine development and integrated planning efforts. [In this regard, DIA is currently working with the U&éS Commands and the Military Departments to ensure that achievabie plans are developed and that interoperability and connectivity issues are addressed. It is also actively working with the program managers of the national and tactical intelligence programs to make sure funds are available and programmed to cover execution of architecture and planning requirements. With more authority, DIA would be able to integrate the various efforts more effectively and ensure that the appropriate capabilities are programmed and approved. DIA should work with the Us&S Commands, Component Commands, and the Military Departments to develop a Defense Intelligence Master Plan. The plan should be based on a realistic, achievable set of requirements and capabilities to document where U.S. Intel- ligence is new, where it needs to be to support the strategy- based operational plans, and how to get there. Intelligence data bases are not complete. Much additional data is needed to realistically plan for both contingencies and war. DIA worked with intelligence producers and consumers to develop The Fundamental Intelligence Data Base to describe the minimum essential elements of intelligence required for all countries. These data elements are being compared with the the results of the Data Base Adequacy Study to identify the gaps in intelligence data. DIA is using these efforts to better define priorities for intelligence collection and analysis. The ongoing Warfighting Data Base Modernization effort will attempt to correct the remaining shortfalls. Command interviewees believe these initiatives must continue. The DoD intelligence structure must be linked by an effective, survivable communications structure. Exercises and crises are replete with examples of delays in the delivery of high precedence traffic to tactical commanders. Important messages are not received. Operational forces are unable to communicate with each other. The near term solution for data communications is the installation of the DIA-managed DoD Intelligence Information System (DoDIIS). This network will provide the U&S Commands a more survivable and secure data switching system. This network will permit intelii- gence analysts in over 50 separate DoD organizations, throughout the world, to perform a variety of sophisticated analytical tasks D-8
and to exchange sensitive, classified information using some 300 computers of various types, Capacities, and ages. The Tactical DODTTS Extension could add over 150 additional users to the network. The long term search for solutions to the intelligence communica- tions problem rests with the DIA-managed Intelligence Communica- tiong Architecture (INCA) project. INCA was established to improve the timely flow of intelligence to tactical commanders. The project, centering on the early 1990s time frame, addresses comnuni- cations hardware shortfalls as well as procedural, policy, and organizational issues that affect the intelligence process and the flow of intelligence to operational users. Command interviewees cite problems with secure, survivable commun i- cations, both for voice and data transmission. DIA should continue working with OSD, OJCS, DCA, the U&S Commands, and the Military Departments to ensure that survivable, redundant voice and data communications capabilities exist to support validated requirements. Discussions with Combatant Command communication planners raise the concern that intelligence requirements are frequently unconstrained and in many cases unnecessary. The intelligence, communications, and operations communities must work together to review requirements and validate those that are essential to support warfighting needs. Requirements should be carefully documented and translated into operational capabilities. Crisis Support DIA'’s crisis support is rated good. However, it was noted that Support is generally provided by shifting resources. Sustaining this support over a long period of time may degrade analytical work in other important areas. Some interviewees suggest that DIA needs a dedicated crisis support team, but recognize that the manpower to create this capability is not likeiy to be provided. Responsiveness In generai, interviewees believe DIA is responsive within existing resources and that both DIA-produced and managed production is good, but often not tailored to meet command-unique requirements. They want more command-focused analysis and filtered reports to avoid re-reporting information that is already in the intelligence traffic and to eliminate extraneous information. A number of officials expressed the view that DIA would be more responsive to Combatant Command requirements if it were more of a corporate manager. They believe DIA should lead the Defense intelligence Community to ensure that duplicate ca7 hilities are not developed, especially those that ultimately wi: t be inter- operable with Combatant Command equipment. DIA shoulda institute measures to improve communications and work more closely with its consumers and producers to identify and D-9
resolve responsiveness issues. In additien, DIA should explore with OSD and OJCS wayS to Clarify DIA authorities. Exercise Participation DIA participates extensively in OJCS exercises and USS Command sponsored exercises. DIA Support includes scenaric development assistance, scripting Support, and control cell augmentation with on-site DIA analysts and collection managers. In CJCS-sponsored command exercises, DIA coordinates U&S Command participation. Interviewees believe that DIA is an effective Participant in the exercise program and that Participation increases its combat readiness. Conclusions 1. DIA is responsible for ensuring that the UsS Commands have adequate, timely, and reliable intelligence support, but cannot Satisfy this requirement as effectively as it might because of resource constraints. 2. Although DIA is aggressively working with the Combatent Commands and Military Departments, joint intelligence doctrine is not fully developed. 3. Intelligence planning is fragmented. Interoperability and connectivity issues are frequently not addressed or, because the various intelligence plans are not linked, they are not identified. 4. More detailed, specific intelligence threat information is required by U.S. planners to develop strategy-based operational and contingency plans that are realistic and achievable. DIA is working to provide this additional information, but there are significant gaps in the quality, accuracy, and completeness of intelligence holdings needed to Satisfy this requirement fully. 5. Secure, Survivable intelligence voice and data communications are a fundamental requirement. Near and long term solutions are being worked to correct shortfalls. 6. Although DIA's crisis support is generally rated good, there iS some concern regarding its sustainability since crisis teams are created by shifting manpower from their normal tasks. 7. DIA is responsive within existing resources; however, Command representatives cited the need for more tailored, tactical intel- ligence focused more specifically on Command mission and geographic area of responsibility. 8. DIA has a consumer relations problem. The Commands are not certain why DIA can or cannot perform certain functions on their behalf, why products are late or cannot be produced, and why additional guidance is not available. D-10
9. DIA participation in OJCS and USS Command exercises is ettective Interviewees suagdgested that some peacetime emercises should be rachively involved designed to use the same personnei that would be ¢ im an actual crisis or war situation. Recommendations Ll. That DIA be given the authority and resources to fulfill more effectively its mission of Satisfying U&S Command intelligence requirements. OSD, OJCS, and DCI should identify minimum require- ments and initiate corrective action, aS appropriate. 2. That DIA expand its efforts to develop joint intelligence doctrine. DIA should work closely in this regard with OJCS, Uss Commands, and the Military Departments. 3. That DIA in collaboration with OSB, OJCS, U&S Commands, Military Departments and DCI develop an achievable plan of action for development of an integrated Defense Intelligence Master Plan emphasizing support to the Combatant Commands. 4, That DIA continue working with OJCS, the U&sS Commands, the Military Departments and DCA to ensure that survivable, secure intelligence voice and data communications exist to support DIA and the USS Commands combat support requirements. The commu- nications, operations, and intelligence commuriities should work together to document, validate, and translate these requirements into operational capability. 5. That DIA be more responsive to U&S Command requirements and improve communication with consumers to ensure that users are aware of Agency capabilities and limitations. V. ORGANIZATION, FUNCTIONS, EFFICIENCY, ECONOMY AND EFFECTIVENESS Organization DIA’S organizational Structure, displayed at enclosure 1, is responsive to its misSion. Organizational changes required tc support the wartime mission should be documented in the Defense Inteliigence Master Plan discussed in Section IV of this report. Most interviewees were satisfied with DIA’s organizational struc- ture, but Suggested that DIA consolidate those pianning and manage- ment functions in direct support of U&S Command requirements into a Single organization. This would provide 4a focal point for Uss Command related activity and allow interoperability issues to be worked more coherently. Many noted a requirement for DIA to strengthen its performance of the J-2 function. A separate Organization that dealt solely with Combatant Command issues might help reinforce DIA'’s J-2 role.
The Director, DIA advises the Secretary ot Detense on intelligence MALtersS and iS the program manager for GDIP. Under his direction and controi, UfA: -- Supports DoD, national level planners, decision makers, and operational elements by producing, Or "anaging finished basic military intelligence, scientific and technical intelligence, and all DOD intelligence estimates and DoD contributions to National Intelligence Estimates (NIEsS). ~- Serves as the J-2 of the OJCS and provides the intelligence Staff support required by the CJCS to perform his assigned respon- sibilities. -~ Supervises the DoD Indications and Warning System. -- Manages and operates the National Military Inteliigence Center (NMIC). registers, and recommends priorities for, and -- Validates, staction of, all DoD intelligence coilection monitors Sati equirements. -- ~Iixercises DoD-wide Human Source Intelligence {‘HUMINT) program management authority, issues policy and planning guidance, and monitors operations. DIA also conducts DoD HUMINT collection activities, and manages and operates the Defense Attache System. -- Provides counterintelligence staff support to the OSD, OJCS, and the U&S Commands. -- Manages and operates the DoD central repository for all intelligence imagery, the National Area Coverage Data File, the DOD Imagery Standards Laboratory, and the DIA photographic laboratories. -- Provides DoD intelligence elements with a specia: ized intelligence reference library and inteliigence document distri- bution, dissemination, and translation services. -~ Manages and operates the Defense Intelligence College. -~- ActS aS management authority for all DoD intelligence information systems, except those dedicated to signais intelligence operations and support functions. -- Provides guidance, in conformance with policies of DoD and DCI, to DoD Components concerning the release of Defense intelligence information to foreign governments, international organizations, and the public.
1 -- Administers DoD security policies and programs to protect intelligence and intelligence sources and methods. -~ Adjudicates clearance eligibility for DIA civilian personnel and eligibility for access to compartmented intelligence for all personnel assigned to OSD, OJCS, and the Defense Agencies, with the exception of NSA, including contractors and consultants. A number of interviewees expressed concern with respect to DIA's ability to fulfill its counterintelligence (CI) responsibilities. Although DIA is the CI staff of the OJCS and a participant in the CSD-managed Foreign Counterinteliligence Program (FCIP), it dees not have effective means to ensure the U&S Commands have adequate CI capabilities. In view of this deficiency, consideration should be given to granting increased responsibility to DIA for the review and approval of Military Department programs to ensure adequate CI support to the Combatant Commands. Conciusions 1. DIA’sS arganizational structure is suited to its peacetime and crisis functions; nowever, it will require modification to support itsS wartime mission effectively. 2. Although generally satisfied with DIA’s crganizaticnal Structure, many interviewees believe DIA needs a focal point for U&S Command related activity to foster improved consideration cf interoperability issues and to strengthen its performance of the J-2 function. 3. Although DIA is a participant in the OSD-managed Foreign Counterintelligence Program (FCIP), it does not have a way to ensure the U&S Commands have adequate CI capabilities. In the meantime, Combatant Command requirements are not being addressed adequately. Recommendations 1. That DIA determine the organizational changes required to support itS wartime mission and document them in the Defense Intelligence Master Plan. 2 That DIA consider consolidation of those planning and manage- ae ment functions in direct support of U&sS Command requirements into a single organization. 3. That DIA be granted increased authority to fulfill its role in counterintelligence matters. OSD, OJCS, and DIA should determine the most appropriate way to ensure the J-2 can guide, review, and ensure tne UsS Commands have adequate counterintelligence capabil- itv.
Efficiency, Economy and Effectiveness DIA has led intelligence Community procurement actions that have created significant dollar savings. Cross-community management ertorts, especially in the DoDIIS community, have ameliorated the costs aSsociated with each activity independently developing and procuring its own intelligence processing, production, and dissemination hardware and software. DODIIS management saves funds, and ensures improved interoperability across the DoDIIS community. DIA has automated many intelligence processing and dissemination functions to Streamline the analytical precess. New tecnnology and methods are used to the maximum extent possible. Examples of improved efficiency include: - Photographic processing (1977 toa 1986) -- 50 percent increase in prints produced. -- 60 percent increase in aerial reconnaissance film processed 265 percent briefing aids (1977-1986) 133 percent increase in publications: produced (1977-1986) - 25 percent increase in intelligence reports processed (1977-1986) - 135 percent increase in students trained by the Defense Intelligence College (1977-1986) - 114 percent increase in hardcopy special intelligence products processed (1981-19386) - 88 percent increase in AUTODIN messages processed (1984-1986) With the exception of students trained, the other increases were achieved through a combination of equipment improvements, better training and use of personnel, and streamlining of workflow. Student training increases were accomplished by initiating new educational approaches such as course revisions and mobile training teams. Mobile training teams are particularly cost effective since they allow students to be trained at their job site, thus reducing travel and transportation costs and time away from their jobs. Several interviewees suggested that rotating DIA civilian intelli- gence professionals through U&sS Command intelligence activities would increase overall efficiency, economy, and effectiveness. Since many DIA civilians have not had military experience, they would gain a better appreciation of Combatant Command requirements and other important military experience. It would also help to D-14
improve DIA's readiness since these analysts would bring this knowledge back to DIA. At the same time, command personnel would gain an appreciation for DIA’s capabilities and limitations. Conclusions 1. DIA has improved its efficiencv, economy, and effectiveness Le to keep pace with the expansion of intelligence requirements. 2. Rotating DIA civilian intelligence professionals through Uss Command intelligence activities would provide DIA personnel a better appreciation of Command requirements and improve readiness. Command personnel would gain a better understanding of DIA'’s capabilities and limitations. Recommendations That DIA explore with the J-2s of the U&SS Commands possible ways to rotate DIA civilian intelligence professionals through Command activities. VI. BUDGET AND MANPCWER The Defense Reorganization Act reduction would cut over one thousand billets from DIA. The Agency cannot absorb a reduction of this magnitude, perform its mission adequately, and be combat ready. DIA'ts manpower levels have changed dramatically over the past twenty years. Between FY 1968 and FY 1979, DIA was reduced by over 2,300 billets. This Situation was reversed in the early 1960s, partially in response to systemic problems and partially because of increased emphasis on Third World intelligence require- ments. DIA’sS manpower growth between FY 1979 and FY 1986 was almost 1,400 billets, a partial replacement of the total reductions taken in the mid-1970s, but primarily authorized for new Defense inteliigence requirements. If implemented, the Goldwater-Nichols Act reductions would significantly exacerbate Agency manpower Shortfalls. Intelligence requirements have grown in complexity and volume. For example, technology transfer was not recognized as 4a problem when DIA was created. Now it requires scarce manpower to exploit foreign materiel and identify how U.S. technologies may be used to help the Soviet Union and its Bloc Allies ciose the U.S./ Soviet technology gap. Terrorism has also become a significant problem. Terrorist plans and intentions are the easiest requirements to articulate, but the most difficult and most manpower intensive to satisfy. The U.S. military presence in Third World areas has increased requirements for inteliigence. Adequate information has never D-15
existed for some ot these areas and collection is 2 Continuing problem. Contingency plans must be based on detailed, specific threat information. This threat must be based on accurate, timely, and complete orders of battle, installations information, and xnowledge of available equipment. Planners need to know what equipment is in foreign inventories and whether the weapon is an export version of Soviet, U.S., French, or another military exporter countr; including weapon vulnerabilities and necessary countermeasures. AS @ practical matter, the world has changed; the missile U.S. Forces face on the battlefield may be U.S. manufactured or a copy reverse-engineered by the Soviets. Target Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) devices will not recognize a U.S. or Allied weapon unless these devices are properly programmed. The information and programming comes from intelligence sources. Such other areas as intelligence support for the Strategic Defense Initiative reflect new requirements, representing technologies that did not exist when DIA was created. Intelligence support is required for all new high technology weapons such as mobile missiles, especially for onboard computer data bases. Requirements for such data are increasing with each weapon developed and for each operational scenario. If DIA’sS manpower is reduced, requirements wiil not decrease. The Military Departments, UsS Commands, and their components already share collection, processing, production, and infra- structure responsibility with DIA. They face che same intelli- n gence requirements/resources available gap as DIA, and could not . apsorb the additional workload generated by a manpower reduction of DIA. Joint Duty Assignments One of the most important contributors to Defense Agency efficiency and effectiveness is the quality of its manpower. The Combat Support Agencies must Know what the forces need, understand tactics and doctrine, and must be able to determine when and why require- ments are more or less important. The military officers assigned to these agencies must translate these demands into war required Capability both in the Defense Agencies and at the commands. This translation is critical and depends on quality and weil trained military personnel. The features of the Goldwater-Nichols Act prescribed for Joint Duty Assignments should fulfill these require- ments. However, the current allocation of Joint Duty Assignment billets presents a problem. About 50 percent of the Defense Agency mili- tary officer billets (0-4 and above) have been designated Joint Duty Assignments. This creates a “have" and "have not" situation that is already affecting morale. Additionally, Defense Agency military are traditionally criticized as being lower in quality than those kept in the Military Departments. The "SO percent D-16
ule" will e Q Ma i top quelity officers will be ass cerbate rhis problem because it 1S uniikely that lqned to the non-Joint assianments. Conclusions 1. DIA’s ability to satisfy the intelligence requirements of the Secretary of Defense, CJCS, U&S Commands, Component Commards, the Military Departments and others depends on adequate manpower ; current assets are not sufficient. 2. Title VI generai manpower reductions would further exacerbate the already sicnificant gap between available manpower and satis- faction of requirements. This gap translates to large deficiencies in U.S. force readiness. 3. Added Combat Support Agency responsibilities in the Defense Reorganization Act demand more management, oversight, and dedicated planning support. Management headquarters reductions will prevent DIA and the other Combat Support Agencies from fulfilling their expanded roles. 4, Compat Support Agencies must provide operational expertise, know what the forces need, understand tactics and doctrine, and be able to determine when and why requirements are more or less important. The military officers assigned to these Agencies play a role in each Agency’s ability to trenslate requirements into operational capability both in the Defense Agency and at the Combatant Commands. This translation demands the quality of personnel and training required by the Defense Reorganization Act provisions regarding Joint © .cy Assignments. Recommendations 1. That DIA not be reduced by the general Agency and management headquarters reductions identified in Titie VI of the Defense Reorganization Act. 2. That requirements and budget constraints drive future manpower requests. 3. That the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel) and the CJCS review Combat Support Agency military manpower biliets against Joint Duty Assignment criteria and, where appropriate, designate billets as Joint Duty Assignment positions.
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY _( DIA) | COMMAND ELEMENT | _— DIRECTOR | GENERAL | DEPUTY DIRECTOR |__ DEFENSE ENCLOSURE 1 fo | INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS | EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR | | [_ STAFE __ | SENIOR ENLISTED ADVISOR | t a a SS SECRETARIAT 1 ASSISTANT DEPUTY | SCIENTIFIC = TOR|| DEFENSE | GENERAL | DEPUTY CENTRAL ACTIONS DIRECTOR FOR ADVISGRY COMMITTEE | _GENERAL _} | INTELLIGENCE! | COUNSEL | | DIRECTOR OFFICE | SECURITY AND |__ OFFICERS 'FOR OPERATIONS. EXECUTIVE SUPPORT! | COUNTERINTELLLIGENCE | AND ATTACHES © OFFICE | | STAFF PROTOCOL OFFICE i DEFENSE: | ATTACHE. | DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR | | [CES | | OPERATIONS, PLANS | : _ DEPUTY DIRECTOR AND TRAINING | FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE | ne ee | LIASON ‘ASSISTANT DEPUTY! | ASSISTANT | ‘ DETACHMENTS | i DIRECTOR FOR ' | |DEPUTY DIRECTOR! | | COLLECTION | ; |! FOR PLANS & | l (MANAGEMENT oo! || POLICY f | ASSISTANT DEPUTY| !ASSISTANT DEPUTY’ ASSISTANT | | DIRECTOR FOR | | DIRECTOR FOR © DEPUTY | j_ ESTIMATES | | SCIENTIFIC AND | DIRECTOR | TECHNICAL :|  F |__ INTELLIGENCE | RESEAR cH _ DEFENSE | ASSISTANT DEPUTY | INTELLIGENCE | | DIRECTOR . __ COLLEGE |__FOR TRAINING | ASSISTANT DEPUTY _ ee DIRECTOR |” DEPUTY DZRECTOR | | DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR , | DEPUTY DIRECTOR 70R. |DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR. FOR FOR RESOURCES | EXTERNAL RELAT: INS | |__ JCS SUPPORT IMAGER, - INFORMATION SYSTE sys | XPLOIT ) d DEIR }