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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
— 
COUNTRY 
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14222 
cuba 
NO. 
“00-3 3,187,419 
May 
do PAGES 
Isle of Pines Defenses i A Adin hus DATE DISTR. 
427 
Mey 1961 and karlter 
Isle of Pines; Apr60 - May 61 
— THIS is 
UNEVALUATED INEORWATION 
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DATE OF 
INFO. 
PACER 
SOUPCE 
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4% 
3. 
ears atop the occuparts ere dust 
by cllitia, 
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1. Prior to the invest en, there were 23 to 28 kast heavy-duty tsaks 
on the Isle of Pines. 
I unteraternt these tacks had been brought ‘to the 
felead at nizht on th? ferry. 
vere stat fon: 
en the Southeast sida 
of tka islend, 
There wer: ganersliy avout threr thousand wilitia stat 
on the 
when I Left on the 30ch of April. 
+ 
In the town of Nueva Gerona there wes en anti-aircraft gun übe on the 
top of the Customs building. 
It was always manned by three or four militis, 
There were nucerous zun enplacetects on the 
of the wountate alonzstde 
‘the Rio de las Cass3, 
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Tie Cuban 
gunk in the Approach to Nueva Gerona ts not an obstruction 
fz the chanel. 
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411 roa 4: 127125 to the Yodel Prison are blocked off one and two blocks 
fro. ths prissar, 
Nu oe ts allowe? to pass these blocked:s without spec! 
Loa. Thare @re shay atchinegun eaplacrzents 
the reisen. 
At aos road tntersecticos there are rozdbleckt of log’ 224 toarca, 
Whea the 
When US cithz-n8 vers 
stopped the militia did not speak acd by gr antes thas the heod sa 
de rafazd, the Crunk 
etc, 
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In crarly all favtances tha rflitts corrled nev auteratte 
or 
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In the bathroon of ene DIER B.adqurrters there wes 
‘Pile ef 
ote * Spr 
Rifles on the f! dor. 
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I believs these 
aod cllitis vere 
11 on the telend 
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SUBJECT 
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
thts 
fonnstion afecting 
ef the 
Laws, Tive 
18. 
the 
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of 
Banned 
perece ts prohit:ted 
lew. 
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COUNTRY 
Cuba 
REPORT NO. 
cs 75, 618 
SUBJECT 7 Situation in Cuba as cf 
DATE DISTR 
June 1961 
NNO. PAGES 
REFERENCES 
u 
INFO. 
Apri May 1951 
DATE ACO. 
„„ vay 1961 
FIELD REPORT NO. 
“3 7 
Tess 
OnE 
INFORMATION, SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE, APPRAISAL OF CONTENT 1S TENTATIVE. 
1. 
The undsrproun forces in uke have been beaten tut not destroved, 
In 
es ral tney have ger“ 
and are waiting for a favoratle time. 
do go into action. 
There vas sc terrorist activity in the fex days 
preceding 14 ay 1943. 
2. 
Apfarentiy as 8 result of the events in Cuba since 15 April, publie 
F. 
opinion is now possibly sixty por cent in favor of Fidei CASTRO. 
People 
a 
eat 
have stronel criticized sone of the captured invaters for having talked 
too mach. The behavior of sche has dern bitterty ce: tires. 
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' 3. Public opinion is largely ~ 
favorable to tht Ur 
States, which is 
cer.sidered' te have been the 
cause cf the defeat, 
Many pecpl: teliev3 
that the pesitisn of the Ur. 
States nas been weaxene2 and ridiculed 
by CASTRO and the Comanists. 
The Revelaticnary Ccurc 
headel ty 
. 
. 
Dr, ccse MiRO Ca: 
1s regz- at 
no fighting spirit an' a2 
being a cunpuete failure. 
Pe. 
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date 
07 APR 1976 
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REPORT NO. 
° o- 7.755, 2 
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ts, 
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DATE 
es June 
REFERENCES 
THIS 1S UNEVALUATED INFORMATION 
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bes p: te 
urcto- 
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te 
2951 kopin: tiat 
normality would cow: atc: It, 
first of the year (1961), ard 
conpl.t 1 
fatlurs of the April invastos 
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4. 
noa: raz 
7 restart 10 Hevace ur t 11 May 
822. @ 
to 
17 412 Kis 24 
sou-believors™ (antt-Cantre 
were 
: chi tan! u. 
titude by the Castro forces com.caocics iu 
BL, 
4, zun 
fer example, Cuban Negro women were assfgred to tra PUCSA avart. 
uullle 
ing in which 4 resided to seerck the tenants 
eo 
presiises, 
The purpos? of this wac to 
2 us. I heard ma“ Castro 
vantei to take over the Sulldirg to iouse 
and other _Comaniot countries, 
"Avortcan” 
vas treated (or Astra 
I found the Yoru Guard to Se zee e. 
tm olite 
militia wes tratge! to be polite (in a 
dae) a 
date 
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tad 20 
estering or Lloavliy 
the , 
long 
Red China 
Various 
a3 1 want 
vag spotted as an 
as such, oss: 
by cetbers 
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SUBIE 
Arasszzat of Ar*i-Castristas 
PLACER 
Tavace. 
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DAF A C 
TT. 
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CENTRAL 
LLIGELINCE 
AGI 
MEMORANDUM FOR: 
ZASHINGTON 25. 
5. c. 
OFFICE OF THE OLR ESTOR 
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SUBJECT 
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United 
REFERENCE 
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No. 
<5, 
Lu 
114 
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1. Coverage of Castro ac 
the primary responsibility ox 
supplement this coveraye, 
[ have 
through CIA facilities abvroud aru 
propram in the 
Stace: 
Federal Bureau of faverti: 
on, 
2. 
It is not articipated 
th 
entail recommendation. 
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Mr, Me ees Bundy 
IHG 
2 ssistant to the President 
lor National Security Affaire 
Co 
Castro Activities in the 
S#curity Action Memorandum 
cect as above, dated 
in the United States is 
of Justice, 
To 
imolementing actlon 
in the United States. 
22 bess coordinnted with the 
Our 
CIA implementation will 
LE] 
LULLES 
Director 
ine President's approval, 
1 HAR 1775 
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CENTRAL 
INT ELLIO 
(FFICE & N..TION 
3 Nove 
192 
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIAPCTOR 
SUSJECTs 
The Situation ond Prospects in Cuba 
Sunnary 
le 
The Castro reg ine has sufficicnt popular support and 
repressive capalilities to cope with any internal threat likely 
to devolop within tho foresecable future. 
The rogime faces 
serious, but not insurmountavle, cconomie difficulties. 
Tho 
ccntrast between its roscate promises md the grim actuality is 
producing disillusionment and spathy. 
Somo speciclly notivated 
elenents have recently dared to denonstrate their disapproval. 
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The bulk of the populotion, however still accepts the Castro 
recive, or is at least resigned to it, and substantial * 
still support it with enthusiosn. 
At the sane tivo, the regine's 
capabilities for repression are incrensing wore rapidly than are 
the ie for active resistance. 
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The Econooic Situntion and Prospects 
2. The Cuban econony is now feeling the inpact of three bf 
revolutionary changes: 
(a) the loss of nost of Sts experienced 
middle and upper level unnacerinl talent; (b) the icposi tion of 
elobdcrate state 
and (c) o drastte shift in the trod ing 
pattern, from pritory dependence on the US to pricary dependence 
on the Soviet Bloc. 
The US erbargo has produced sone econonic 
Gifficulties through the denial of spare parts for previously 
acquired equipment, almost oll of which was of US origin. 
Nevere- 
theless, the production of sugar, the principal export crop, has 
been increased, and the production of tobacco and tropical fruit, 
the other lending exports, has been mointained. 
Although Cuba's 
free world trade ond foreign exchange reserves have declined 
sharply, the Bloc is taking enough exports and returning enough 
consuner goods and mchinery to keep the econcto going. 
3. The donestic production of foodstuffs and other consumer 
goods, and the inports obtained from the Bloc and elsewhere, ore 
together not sufficient to compensate for the loss of forner in- 
ports from the US. 
Fersonal consumption has declined, especiolly 
in the cities, and nost drastically in the ense of the upper and 
middle classes, 
In sorte rural areas, however, especially in 
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centers of sugor production, living conditions have been sub- 
stantially 10 proved, particularly in terns of housing and sani - 
tation. 
These examples of the tangible benefits received by sone 
kcep olive the hopes of tan) others. 
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4, In addition to trade, the Bloc bas extended to cuba sone 
$357 million in credits for industrial developuent. 
However, only 
a few of these deve loprent projects are yet underway, nor is ouch 
likely to be accomplished for another year or wore. 
5. 
In general, the Cuban econony is characterized by major 
shortazes and o hich decree of disorganization. 
This state of 
affairs will continue for sone tine to come, and day indeed get 
soricwhat worse. 
In view of the availability of Bloc assistance, 
however, we do not believe that the econony will deteriorate so 
for as to bring about Castro's overthrow, or foree hin to make 
basic changes in his policy. On the contrary, the situation will 
probably begin to iuprove within a year or 80, as the new 
Communist-type 
organization takes hold, managerial experience 
increases, and foreign trade is nijusted to new channels. 
— 
Popular Acceptance of the Recipe 
6. Initially, almost o11 Cubans hailed the triumph of the 
Revolution with enthusinu, 
Disillusitonvent, however, came quickly 
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to the urban niddle class, urban organized labor, and the londed 
Gentry. 
It hos since spread to stall peasant proprietors ani 
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even to bunbler folk, who are beginning to appear in significart — 
purbers 
the flow of refugtes 
ua. 
tr by 
wilt 
7. The severe internal repression which occompanied the de- 
feat of the April invesion stilled, for a tine, oll nenifestations 
of opposition within the country. 
By Septender, however, this effect 
had worn off sufficiently for Cotholic eros in Havana and other 
cities to dare to defy the regine's prohibition of certain public 
religious observances. 
This was the first occasion on which the 
recine hac been forced to use gunfire to disperse hostile public 
Ceronstrations, 
It was therefore indicative of a significant 
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change in the psychological situation. 
8. There have also been some increase in stil- scale guerrilla 
and sabotage activity am a considerable increase in such passive 
forns of resistance as absentceisn. 
However, wost disaffected * 
Cubans now think primrily in terms of escape. 
In nid-Septenber, 
sche 15,000 had completed legal orrangenents to leave the country 
which were then caneclled by the government, and sche 500 were in 
asylun in the several Latin Aperican etbassſes in Havana. 
Illegal 
departures occur alnost caily. 
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bulk of the populotion still accepts the refine and substantial 
9. Despite these manifestations of disaffection, the great 
nurbers still support it with enthusicosn. 
The sprawling revolu- 
tionary bureaucracy now enbodies a new elass with a very definite 
personal stake in the reine. 
Costroist Folitical Organization 
10. The regine is now in the process of a ecuplete reorgari- 
gation of the forn of goverrrent in Cuba, and of the organization 
of a new totalitarian political party to operate and control it. 
The Cormmnist nodel is apparent in both instances. 
11. The traditional provincial and dune 
t pal covernrents are 
being replaced by juctss (sovicts) for “coordination, execution, 
and inspection" (JUCEI). Already established in each province of 
Cuba, the JUCEI's consists of o "provincial congress," representa- 
tive of oll mjor econornic entities in the territory, which neets 
occasionally; : “plenun" of the congress, which vects every few 
bonths; and several smiller bodies which beet frequently and 
actually cirect the provinciol cduinistration. 
The prinory funce- 
tion of all JUCEI is the local drglevonteten of plans reccived fron 
higher authority. 
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12, 
The new totalitarian political mochine 4s to be the 
" ‘United Party of the Oben Socialist Revolution, a berger of the 
anorphous 26 of July Movevent (cr what is left of it) with the 
well organized met Party. 
Although Castro is of course 
: 
to be the suprene bead of this party, the monn who is pushing the 
project is Blas Roca, the Communist Secretary General. 
Party 
membership is to be linited to the elite of the revolutionary 
strugcle and prerequisite to appointnent to any important polit- 
ical or econonic position. 
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13. A significant arn of the Castroist political organization 
is the poranilitary hescoieti.cn of Rebel Youth (AJR), derived fron 
the previous Cor) youth organization, 
These teenagers, of the 
type that would be found in juvenile gangs, are a terror to their 
porents, their schoolmates, ard the general public. 
They have 
eharce of indoctrination in the schools and have been active in 
the foruation of the Cormittees for the Defense of the Revolution 
(see paragraph a5}. Active participation in the AJR is to be 
prerequisite to educational end eventually political advancenent,. 
The Costroist Security Apparatus 
14, 
The forces now availobdle to the regive to suppress 
. 
insurrection or repel invasion ore: 
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The Rebel Arny (32,000) 
b. 
The Rurcl Police (9,600) 
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The Rebel Air Force (2,000) 
d. 
The Navy (2,000) 
e. 
The Militia (250,000, including 83,000 wonen) 
t. 
The Rebel Youth (150,000, ineluding 10,000 girls) 
6. The Notional Police (9,000) 
d. 
The Moritiue Police 
15. 
The odvinistrative and command structure of these forces 
is extrerely loose; the improvisation of ad hoc comuancs including 
disparate elements is the comon practice. 
Confusion and lock of 
coordination are therefore likely in any emergency gituotion. 
16. 
The art * been strengtbhened by the receipt of Bloc 
arus ond is being instructed in their use by Bice personnel, 
However, it has had little or no combined arves or field training. 
It displayed great tactical ineptitude at the tine of the April 
landing. 
17. 
About a fifth of the art ore veterans of Castro's 
guerrilla struggle against Batista. 
The remainder are early od- 
herents. 
In tine, however, Castro cane to doubt, with reosm, 
their loyalty to the course the Revolution bad taken on achieving 
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power. The wilitia were therefore established as an alternative 
arted support for the regine. 
The original units were ecuposed 
of Castro's nost ardent followers. 
In tine, however, the militia 
wos 80 greatly expanded by recruitment under pressure thot its 
revolutionary zeal was considerably diluted. 
Castro has there- 
fore transferred his favor and relionce to the newly organized 
Rebel Youth, who are now his nost faratical followers. 
18. 
In general, the militia and the Rebel Youth, both part- 
tive forces, have only light arns which are issued to then only on 
occasion, 
They are not capable of sustained conbat, but are ef- 
fective for controlling and coercing the general public. 
In 
addition, sone selected units of the militia ard the Rebel Youth 
are specially armed. and trained and are, in effect, ar units 
epeciolly dedicated to Fidel Castro. 
19. The capabilities of the air force have beer greatly 
enhanced by the acquisition of MIG aircraft and the return of 
personnel fron training in the Bloc. 
There are now about 35 
MIG-15's ond MiG-19's operational in Cuba. 
20. 
The navy is unreliable and distrusted; vost of its 
perscrrel were taken into custody at the tine of the fpril 
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landing. 
Mutinies, defections, and purges have left it few profes- 
Bionolly trained and technically qualiffed ten. 
21. 
Recently, the professtoral security agencies of the 
covernpent -- Army G-2 (the Sccret police), the National Police, 
and the Moritine Police -- were transferred fron the Ministry of 
the Arved Forces to a newly created Ministry of the Inter iar. This 
chance is likely to enhance their effectiveness. It does not in- 
dicate a reduction of Raul Castro's power, since Raniro Valdes, 
the new Minister of the Interior, is one of his close associates. 
Valdes is o Ccrmmunist, formerly head of Aruy G-2. 
22. 
A network of Committees for the Defense of the Revolution 
is being established to provide an ndditional agency for political 
surveillance and control. 
What these coruittees lack in professional 
conpetence, they mke up for in pervasiveness and seal. 
The Rebel 
: 
Youth” have been particularly active in provoting their formtion. 
The announced go is 100,000 connittees with over a million nen- 
bers covering every community in Cuba. 
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If Castro Were to Die 
23. 
Fidel 8 personal prestige and popularity vere 
to the regie in the earlier stages of its developuent. 
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None of his lieutenants could have inherited the personal authority 
which he then exercised, 
His loss now, by ossassination or by 
natural causes, would certainly have an unsettling effect, but 
would probably not prove fatal. 
The Revolution is by now well 
institutionalized; the regiue has firn control of the country; 
its principol surviving leaders would probably rally together in 
the face of a common danger. 
Indeed, a dead Cartro, inccpable 
of iupulsive personcl interventions in the orderly adrunistraticn 
of affairs, uicht be wore valuable to then as a tur tyr than he is 
DOW. 
24, 
The fact remains that Costro has had to control tensions, 
jJealousies, and corflicts cf interest and purpose avnong his prin- 
cipal lieutenants: aul Castro, the head of the arned forces; 
"Che" Guevara, the director of industrial developuent; Nunez 
Jiuenez, the director of agrarian reforn. 
There could be o falling 
out anong then at Castro's funeral. 
There would albost certainly 
be a struggle for power anong then afterward, 
which ti 
qt break 
into the open. 
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25. A coordinated estimte of the Cuban gi tuation and 
* prospects, NIE 65-62, "The Situation in Cuba, is echedulec 
for um consideration in Januory. 
“FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES: 
SHERMAN KENT 
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Chairnan 
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UNITED STATES co D. 
Memorandum 
vm 
File 
DATE:. 
24 April 1962 
PROM; 
Chi 
Alien Affairs Staff 
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DPOB! 12 January 1918 - Holguin, Oriente, Cuba 
ey have a report that subject characterized as "a 
leading Cuban gangster is holding fund raising meetings in 
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New York City with his 1 being, 
A rifle for 0. 
requested to check for any data this Agency might have. 
3. 
advised that all recent data in his files has come 
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from the Bureau, 
Subject heads an or, known as One 
ö 
fle“ with headquarters in New Jersey. 
so advised. 
Dw. See. 
Dep. Dir, See. 
Executive 
OS/AAS/HJM:es 
24 Apr 62 
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On 24 April 1962, 
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE 
22 August 1962 
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM 
SUBJECT: 
Recent Soviet Military Aid to Cuba 
1. 
Intelligence on recent Soviet military 
assistance to Cuba indicates that an unusually large 
number of Soviet ships have delivered wilitary cargoes 
to Cuba since late July and that some form of military 
construction is underway at several locations in Cuba 
by Soviet bloc personnel who arrived on some of these 
ships and are utilizing material delivered by the 
vessels, 
Dur ing the period at least 1, 500 passengers 
shave debarked from four ships under security conditions 
suggesting that their mission is related to the con- 
struction and military activity; another 1,500 arrived 
during the period and were greeted with considérable 
publicity as economic specialists and students, 
Some | 
still unconfirmed reports suggest that recently arrived 
Soviet bloc personnel number as many as 5,000, 
The 
speed and magnitude of this influx of bloc personnel 
and equipment into a non-bloc country is unprecedented 
in Soviet military aid activities; clearly something 
new and different is taking place, 
As yet limited 
evidence suggests that present activities may include 
the augmentation of Cuba's air defense system, possibly 
including the establishment of surface-to-air missile 
sites or the setting up of facilities for electronic 
and communications intelligence, 
2. 
As wany as 20 Soviet vessels may have already 
arrived in Cuba since late July with military cargoes. 
Five more Soviet vessels have left Black Sea ports under 
conditions suggesting that they are en route to Cuba 
with additional wilitary equipment, 
Most reports on 
these shipments have referred to large quantities of 
transportation, electronic, and construction equipment, 
such as communications and radar vans, trucks of wany 
sified by 2221 
Doclas 
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varieties, mobile generator units, tracked 
and wheeled 
prime movers, cranes, trailers, and fuel tanks, 
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Eyewitnesses who saw the material being transported 
from the port areas report that much of the transpor ta- 
tion was done at night and even that town street lights 
were turned off as the convoys passed through, 
3. 
Personnel who arrived on the four Soviet 
passenger vessels--cach of which has a normal passenger 
capacity of 340, though one of them declared 365 passen- 
ger when leaving the Black Sea--have been described 
variously by Cybans who have seen them, 
Most agree 
that they were obviously non-Cuban in appearance and 
were dressed in civilian clothing, 
A number of independ- 
ent sources report that the foreign personnel were 
dressed in dirty, dusty, slept-in, red-checkered shirts 
and faded blue trousers, 
The foreign personnel unloaded 
the vessels themselves; usually Cuban militiamen have 
been charged with this work even when it was a military 
cargo, 
There is no hard evidence that any of these 
people are in combat,military units, 
There is strong 
evidence hat their mission is relatéd‘to unidentified 
military construction, 
4. 
At least a dozen refugees from the area of 
Matanzas have reported independently on military con- 
struction at two sites near that north coast city. 
Two and possibly more ships arrived in the pert of 
Matanzas and unloaded cargoes under tight security pre- 
cautions, 
Cargoes were taken to at least twa general 
areas where construction is underway, 
Initial con- 
struction, according to one of the eyewitnesses, 
In- 
volved the grading and leveling of a naturally level 
portion of the western slope of a hill by Soviet personnel 
using heavy equipment, 
This was taking place 
at a site 
just east of Matanzas at a place called El Bongo, 
Other 
sources confirmed that material was leaving the docks 
in the direction of El Bongo, 
Another source, who left 
Cuba more recently, reported that by 4 August foreign 
personnel were assembling what appeared t. Le a pre- 
fabricated curved-roofed structure at El Bongo,. The 
other site of construction activity near Matanzas is 
apparently just across the provincial border in Havana 
province at Santa Cruz del Norte, near the former 
Hershey sugar will. 
In this place, 
too, construction 
activity initially involved the leveling of a portion 
of a bill near the coast. 
Cuban residents had been 
cleared from the area, 
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There are as yet no confirmed report of 
construction activity. underway in other parts of Cuba, 
However, there is considerable reason to presume that 
such activity is underway or is to be initiated shortly 
in a number of other locations in Cuba, ranging from 
Oriente province in the east to Pinar del Rio in the 
west. 
A refugee from the port of Antilla 
in Oriente 
province reported that a Soviet ship unloaded 
in late 
July at nearby Nicaro, 
The material unloaded, 
in- 
cluding electronic vans, tracked prime movers, and 
trailers, was moved through Antilla toward the Peninsula 
de Ramon, an area where be reported construction work 
had been underway for some tie. 
Another ship is re- 
ported to have discharged a similar cargo as well as 
foreign personnel in the port of Casilda, 
in soythern 
Las Villas province, 
In northern Las Villas, Cayo 
. 
Esquivel, an island off the coast, bas reportedly been 
evacuated, 
In the area just south of Havana city, we 
have numerous independent reports that a number of 
farms bave been evacuated and that the boys’ reformatory 
at nearby Torrens has been converted for living quarters 
for numbers of foreign personnel, 
Information from 
individuals who live near the reformatory indicate that 
the numerous Soviet personnel who moved in early this 
month wore "casual, dirty, civilian clothes." 
Other 
reports indicate that quantities of tequipwent such as 
has been reported elsewhere have been seen on the com 
—— 
fiscated farms near the reformatory. 
Other reports 
from other parts of the island indicate that Cuban 
families have been evacuated from an island near Mariel, 
the port in Pinar del Rio province where much of the 
equipment was unlozded, and from a farming area near 
Guatana, Pinar del Rio province, 
6, 
What the construction activity involves is 
not. yet known, 
The activity in the Matanzas area 
sould be the initial phases of construction of a SAM. 
equipped air defense system, erection of electronic and 
communications intelligence facilities aimed at Canaveral 
and other US installations, 
or sn ECM system aimed at 
US space, missile, and/or other operational electronic 
systems, 
The kinds of equipment described could fit 
with any of these objectives; the evidence thus far, 
as well as Soviet practice in other countries receiving 
bloc military assistance, would suggest, at leest tent- 
atively, construction of an air defense system based 
on the GUIDELINE missile, 
Information to confirm or 
refute this should become av2zileble within a week. 
SECRET 
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3 « 
SEORIGE 
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a 
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7. 
The step-up in military shipments and the 
construction activity once again provide strong evidence 
* 
of the wagnitude of the USSR's support for the Castro 
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regime, 
Together with the extraordinary Soviet bloc 
economic commitments made to Cuba in recent months, 
these developments amount to the most extensive campaign 
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' 
to bolster a non-bloc country ever undertaken by the 
USSR, 
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b 
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: 
SHCREF 
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