c 
v 
l«£iQ?_\2^-,T>;  ?0H  7iS  DIRECTOR 
*  Subject:     CZA.  Authority  to  Fcrfcrrx  rropa-ar.cn  ard. 
"  •    Ccx^aar.do  Tyce  Functions  . 
^ 
1.     A  review'  o?  ths  rational  Security  Act  reveals  tno  provisions       . 
-..hies  night  03  construed  as.  authority  *>="  CjJ.  .to  er-aga  infbXaoV.  pro- 
-noludea-ra^er  and  cc.^ando  •  raids,  T»fcisd-ths-X5.nes  SaboteZ9,  and  sup- 
^-torfearrmararrare.]  Section  102  (d)   (t)  provides  fe&->  I*  scall 
i  ~c=  ths  duty  of  tis  Agency  "to  perior=  for  fns  banafit  of  s^exs^nz    .     _ 
U-t?lii""cs  agencies  sues  additional  sarvicas  oi  cossoa  concern  as  -c.is- 
•  National  Security  Council  deUrsirss  can  be  core  efficiently ■  accocplwl-i^ 
'.centrally.     Section  102  (d)    (5)  provides  that  ths  i5ency  shall  pe^ora     • 
>_  „■-■—  functions  and  duties  related  to  intelliqeaca  aX-ecnxng   use 
cit-h    nr..*1^ 
sunn  o 
•  yb>.^-»    secxrity  as   the  F3C  rxay  direct •     Taken  cu^  of  context  ar_> 
-nithout  V.r.<T*letl£3  of  its  history,   these  Sections  coeld  ^^  ^5u  ur  - 
rUrxited  interpretation,  oroviced  the  service  parf  drrxeii  coald  be  shcra    . 
to  be-  or  benefit  to  an  Intelligence  agency  or  related  to  natxona_  xn- 
*celxa=;enca~  ;•    •  »  - 
-  "     « •  -  '  •  '  .  ■ 
2       Thus*,  black  orocagarxla,  primarily  designed  Tor  subversion^ 
confusion  and  political  effect,   can  ca  shc^n  incidentally^  benefit 
Positive?  intelligence  as  a  r-aaas  of  checking  rali.abili.tj  ox  -jjuorr^ws, 
effectiveness  of  penetration,   and  so  forth.     Even  cercaxa  x^rns  ox  o*0- 
-o>->  could  be  held  to  benefit  intelligence  by  estaolxshnenc.  ox  i./v 
tsaas  in.  accessible  areas  and  b;<  opening  penetration  points  m  cor.- 
fusion  follc-.n.nK-^abc^ge  or  ric^   (jn  our  opinion     hoyaver,    eiuba-f     ^ 
:  activity  *onld  be  [in  urr^rranted  extension  of  the  f  unions  autr.02-r.asi 
;  «n  Sections  1<2   (dj"  <U)c=d  (5)-^  This  is  based  on  our  ur.dr.m -ar.dinS  <u 
f  the  intent  of  Corrrese  at  the  tine  thasa  provision:-  ^era  eraa^.-J        ^ 
"        .      •  •  •* 
1^1    3-     A  re^-ieJ  of  debates  indicates  that.  Congress  -as  prn^ari^j-      . 
-i-tarestad  la  an-asencrr  for  coorai.sira.Dg  lr.v8ujs.S5cx:3  . r^--rr^Srgriy 
Pi^l  sat  oro^¥i"^ny^brseas   coJ-iection  actiTitiea_for_CB.r  ^.-s^ 
anar£i|-k-6«^rc=is3,   Sections  102 Td)    (K)  Jis^^p)^^^^^^^^ 
^a'rriSd^tha" national  Sec^ty  CotHcii  to  catar^ne  the  exlan     ox  xha 
collection  T.ork  to  ha   cerfomed  b7  CIa3£jTe  do  no_c  belxe^  ohat   wto 
.^sw  any  tboc-ht  in  tho  oirds  of  Cor.-r=s£j:3irni3  ^^i^i£!fji4rSfr-^ 
V^^:^d|-£ '  thl£l%tboVi*t3r^ 
and  sibotr.-o/i  A  bittor  'debato  at  about  tha  -jzjid  ti-e  on  tn.e  State  lie- 
o^-Pt^^oroi-n  Broadcast  Service  t^rdn  to  ccnXixn  c-ar  opinxon. 
Farther  confix-atlon  in  fonrd.  in  the  briaf  and  of f-t^-rcc;ora  beavir^s 
on  appropriations  for_-CIA.»J
1$  September  19U7 
r-T\ 
As  Ida  frcn  the  discussions  of  nonnal  departmental  eyrpensss  for_ 
a  v;bo!e7   approval  vras  Given  tc  the  unvouchered  funds  requested 
Director  of  Central.  Intelligence  cainlr  for  the  specific  parpos3 
of  conducting  clandestine  intelligence  operations  outside  the  Units! 
States..  fTfo  believe  that  there  rras  no  intent  to  use  either  the  vouchsred 
cr  unvouchered  runda  Tor  li.O-  or  S.O.  trork*     Either  of  these  activities  • 
T/ouId  reoufjre'establdsrcnent,  of  2.  ne?r  branch  of  office/  enplovnent  of 
considarcibS^sroOR-S^  tG3~procura.qa?*h  °£  hug s~a nan  ti ties  of  all  types 
cr  goode  and  raaterials*   and  large  suns  for  expenses  of  edninistratire 
inferring  Congress  and  obtaining. Its japcrpval j?f_t>3_*:u7;ctions_^id_; 
exp^.r.dlture  of  fiuade  Tor  those_oiffposes..~""j  *        .  .    -*.  '*"""*•. 
''    5-     There  is^   ha.-rever^  ona  function  nevr  beiijg  pr^p^rlyj^rfcr^d 
bv\CIi  Trhich  is  scTclo'saly  feX£ted~t°  "^  .-at'T^rs".ciscussed_abov3„asrtc- 
be  mentioned  in  connection.  therev-dth.-     Ail  icpqrtant_  b7-product_of_tbs. 
<rtnr7cestih'erin^  icq;LiVition  of  eztensive  Iiv-d. 
formation  on  plir_s  in  western  £uro;pa'  for  nstabilshear.t^of  resistance  • 
•covenants  in  the  event "of  further  extension  of  Ccianurdst  controls  ._.,    , 
XThese  plans  Include  *  training  of  agents  and_w/T?s^   organising-  groups,     *  . 
providing  outside  contacts,,   and  every  other  fom  of  resistance.     It  is 
on  such  grcuns  that'lI-O,.  and,   oarticulnrlj-,  S*0-  T/ould  depend*  for.  nbst 
efficient  function-  •*  * 
6.  "  It  is  felt  that  this  body  of  info  mat  ion  night,  be  the;  basis      .'. 
ff or  consideration  by  tha  >Iatlonal  Security  Council,   or  a  sub-^cc-nittee 
insrecf,   5n  order  "to  fom  a  basic  policy  of  cooperation.  -with  planned 
o-  actual,  resistance  movements  and  to  assign  the  In^lenentaticn  of  sucb. 
noldcy  to  the  proper  "agoncy  cr  body*.     If  such  implementation  ^re  then 
Assigned  to  Cli,   it  vrc-uld,  ma  feel,   still  l^e  necessary  to  go  to  Congress 
^Tor  authority  and  f  cruder  „'   •  -.  •       # 
General.-  Comnel 
V
(Page  1) 
25  September  1947 
MEMORANDUM  FOR  THE  DIRECTOR 
Subject:    CIA  Authority  to  Perforin  Propaganda  and 
Commando  Type  Functions 
1.  A  review  of  the  National  Security  Act  reveals  two  provisions 
which  might  be  construed  as  authority  for  CIA  to  engage  in  black  pro- 
paganda or  the  type  of  activity  known  during  the  war  as  S.O.,  which 
included  ranger  and  commando  raids,  behind-the-lines  sabotage, and  sup- 
port of  guerrilla  warfare.   Section  102  (d)  (4)  provides  that  it  shall 
be  the  duty  of  the  Agency  to  perform  for  the  benefit  of  existing 
intelligence  agencies  such  additional  services  of  common  concern  as  the 
National  Security  Council  determines  can  be  more  efficiently  accomplished 
centrally.   Section  102  (d)  (5)  provides  that  the  Agency  shall  perform 
such  other  functions  and  duties  related  too  intelligence  affecting  the 
national  security  as  the  NSC  may  direct.   Taken  out  of  context  and 
without  knowledge  of  its  history,  these  Sections  could  bear  almost  un- 
limited interpretation,  provided  the  service  performed  could  be  shown 
to  be  of  benefit  to  an  intelligence  agency  or  related  to  national  in- 
telligence. 
2.  Thus,  black  propaganda,  primarily  designed  for  subversion, 
confusion,  and  political  effect,  can  be  shown  incidentally  to  benefit 
positive  intelligence  as  a  means  of  checking  reliability  of  informants, 
effectiveness  of  penetration,  and  so  forth.   Even  certain  forms  of  S.O. 
work  could  be  held  to  benefit  intelligence  by  establishment  of  [W/I?] 
teams  in  accessible  areas  and  by  opening  penetration  points  in  con- 
fusion following  sabotage  or  riot.   In  our  opinion,  however,  either 
activity  would  be  an  unwarranted  extension  of  the  functions  authorized 
in  sections  102  (d)  (4)  and  (5).   This  is  based  on  our  understanding  of 
the  intent  of  Congress  at  the  time  these  provisions  were  enacted. 
3.  A  review  of  debates  indicates  that  Congress  was  primarily 
interested  in  an  agency  for  coordinating  intelligence  and  originally 
did  not  propose  any  overseas  collection  activities  for  CIA.   The  strong 
move  to  provide  specifically  for  such  collection  overseas  was  defeated 
and,  as  a  compromise,  Sections  102  (d)  (4)  and  (5)  were  enacted,  which 
permitted  the  National  Security  Council  to  determine  the  extent  of  the 
collection  work  to  be  performed  by  CIA.   We  do  not  believe  that  there  was 
any  thought  in  the  minds  of  Congress  that  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency 
under  this  authority  would  take  positive  action  for  subversion  and 
sabotage.   A  bitter  debate  at  about  the  same  time  on  the  state  De- 
partment's Foreign  Broadcast  Service  tends  to  confirm  our  opinion. 
Further  confirmation  is  found  in  the  brief  and  of f-the-record  hearings 
on  appropriations  for  CIA.
(Page  2) 
25  September  1947 
4.  Aside  from  the  discussions  of  normal  departmental  expenses  for 
CIA  as  a  whole,  approval  was  given  to  the  unvouchered  funds  requested 
by  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  mainly  for  specific  purpose 
of  conducting  clandestine  intelligence  operations  outside  the  United 
States.   We  believe  that  there  was  no  intent  to  use  either  the  vouchered 
or  unvouchered  funds  for  M.O.  or  S.O.  work.   Either  of  these  activities 
would  require  establishment  of  a  new  branch  of  office,  employment  of 
considerable  personnel,  the  procurement  of  huge  quantitites  of  all  types 
of  goods  and  materials,  and  large  sums  for  expenses  of  administrative 
support  and  incidentals.   We  believe  this  would  be  an  unauthorized  use 
of  the  funds  made  available  to  CIA.   It  is  our  conclusion,  therefore, 
that  neither  M.O.  ncr  S.O.  should  be  undertaken  by  CIA  without  previously 
informing  Congress  and  obtaining  its  approval  of  the  functions  and  the 
expenditure  of  funds  for  those  purposes. 
5.  There  is,  however,  one  function  now  being  properly  performed  by 
CIA  which  is  so  closely  related  to  the  matters  discussed  above  as  to 
be  mentoned  in  connection  therewith.   An  important  by  product  of  the 
clandestine  intelligence  function  is  the  acquisition  of  extensive  in- 
formation on  plans  in  Western  Euope  for  establishment  of  resistance 
movements  in  the  event  of  further  extension  of  Communist:  control. 
These  plans  include  training  of  agents  and  W/T's,  organizing  groups, 
providing  outside  contacts,  and  every  other  form  of  resistance.   It  is  on 
such  group  that  M.O.  and,  particularly,  S.O.  would  depend  for  most 
efficient  function. 
6.  It  is  felt  that  this  body  of  information  might  be  the  basis 
for  consideration  by  the  National  Security  Council,  or  a  sub-committee 
thereof,  in  order  to  form  a  basic  policy  of  cooperation  with  planned 
or  actual  resistance  movements  and  to  assign  the  implementation  of  such 
policy  to  the  proper  agency  or  body.  If  such  implementation  were  then 
assigned  to  CIA,  it  would,  we  feel,  still  be  necessary  to  go  to  Congress 
for  authority  and  funds. 
LAWRENCE  R.  HOUSTON 
General  Counsel 
LRN:mbt