ty 
ent branches of the armed forces are beity tried 
simultaneously, in which case 
mixed tribunal is 
formed. 
The resolutions of military courts must 
be approved by the secretaries of the respective 
services, except when sentence involves the loss 
of right to wear uniform or use of mililary title, 
in which case the president of the nation must 
approve. 
3. Prison system 
a. ORGANIZATION 
-—— Argentina has long dem- 
onstrated a high level of interest it: penolory and 
in the rehabilitation of prisoners and has been 
among the first nations of the world to adopt ad- 
vanced principles of prisoner treatment. 
How- 
ever, actual practices often do not measure up to 
standards set forth in penal laws and regulations 
because of a chronic lack of funds and political and 
military disturbances. 
Argentine provinces have 
their own penal systems, as do the individual 
states in the United States but, excepting the sys- 
tems of the Provinces of Santa Fe and Buenos 
Aires, these are usually less effective than ‘those 
of the federal government. 
Prison expenditures of the federal government 
in 1961 amounted to 600 million pesos (apprcxi- 
mately US$7,228,900 at the then-current rate of 
83 pesos=US$1). 
Support of each prisoner in 
the same year cost 381 pesos daily (USS4.650), of 
which 140 pesos (US$1.67) was spent for food. 
All federal prisons in Argentina are adminis- 
tered by the General Directorate of Pena! Insti- 
tutions (Direccién General de Institutos Penales), 
a dependency of the Ministry of Justice. 
The 
Directorate consists of a director general and a 
four-man advisory council, composed of a profes- 
sor of penal law of the University of Buenos Aires, 
the director of the 
of 
Uw. 
victs 
(Patronat> de Libcrados), the director o! 
Psychiatric 
Services 
(Anezo Psiquiatrico), 
and 
the chief of the National Registry of Recidivicm 
and Criminal and Prison Statistics (Registro Nu 
cional de Reincidencia y Estadistica Criminal y 
Carceloria). 
This agency records vital data on 
every person receiving a condemnatory sentence 
from an Argentine court. 
The prison system of 
Buenos Aires Province is regulated by a yrovin- 
cial Law of 1950. 
The province's prisons and jail. 
are under the direction of a Directorate Genera! 
of Penal Establishments 
(Direccidén General de 
Establecimientos Penales), created in 1937, and 
similar establishments exist in other provinces. 
b, PENAL AND CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS — At 
the beginning of 1962 the total Argentine prison 
population was about 10,000 persons, 500 of whom 
were 
women. 
Roughly 
4,900 
prisoners 
were 
housed in 15 federal per.al institutions, listed in 
Ficurr 10, and the res. in provincial establish- 
ments. 
Most recent figures (1955) showing popu- 
lation of provincial penal establishments are con- 
tained in Ficure 11. The penal code provides for 
lodging provincial convicts in national prisons if 
the sentence is more than 5 years cr if provincial 
facilities are lacking, and federal prisoners may 
also be lodged in provincial prisons. 
Provincial prisons in 1956 numbered 55, distrib- 
uted among 14 provinces as follows: 8 in Buenos 
Aires; 6 in Cordoba; 5 in Santa Fe; 4 in San Luis; 
3 each in Tucuman and San Juan; 2 each in 
Santiago del Estero, Salta, Corrientes, Mendoza, 
Jujuy, and Catamarca, a single institution in La 
Rioia, and 13 in Entre Rios. 
Largest of the provin- 
cial prisons is the Olmos Prison in Buenos Aires 
10. ARGENTINE: FEDERAL PENAL INSTITUTIONS, 1962 
NAME OF INSTITUTION 
LOCATION 
OF 
REMARKS 
NUMBER 
| INMATES 
Instituto 
de 
Detencidn 
(Vi'la 
Buenos Aires........... 
2,048 
Capacity of 800. 
Devoto). 
Asilo de Correcci6n de Mujeres... 
111 
Capacity of 95; woovin's 
prison. 
La Colonia Santa Rosa.......... 
Prov. of Lau Pampw..... 
Prison farm. 
Penal de Rawson........... 
of Caubut.. 
224 
Carcel de Resistencia........... 
Prov. of Chaeo......... 
327 
Carcel de 
Prov. of Misiones....... 
208 
Careel Ge Neunuln... 
Prov. of Neuquén...... 
189 
CArcel de Formosa...... 
Prov. of Formosa....... 
38S 
Carcel Penal de General Roca.... 
105) 
Prison farm, 
Cirevl de Rio Gallegos. ....... 
Prov. of Santa Cruz. 
... 
Luis 
Total number of inmates. 
..... 
ewes 
‘ 
| 
| 
=
Indicted 
| 
Other 
Mon 
Women | Non 
Wornen | 
| 
| 
a. 
| oners* 
Santiozo del I’stero........... 
a 
146 
257 
169 
3,017 
125 
3,030 
205 
251 
7.446 
Province, which houses about 1,000 inmates, wuile 
most of Entre Rios’ 13 prisons house less than 
100 each. 
Locations 
of federal and provineial 
penal institutions are shown in Ficunre 142. 
No ,ccent nationwide statistics are availabic, 
but in the federal district’s three prisons as of 
January 1963, 2,254 of the 2,905 inmates had not 
been brought to trial. 
In addition. to sentenced 
and indicted persons, prisons commonly contain 
small numbers of persons convicted of violations 
and persons held at the disposition of the execu- 
tive power under state-of-siege provisions, 
Penal law calls for different types of penal in- 
stitutions for variuus categories of criminals, in- 
cluding penal colonies or farms, industrial jails, 
semi-open institutions, adult women’s jails, and a 
special institution for habituai criminals and in- 
corrigibles. 
Shortages of funds have prevented 
the implemeniation of this Jaw. 
Argentina’s fed- 
eral prison system was described in 1946 as the 
best in South America but, although still good 
by Latin American standards, it has since dete- 
ricrated. 
New construction has been minimal, 
resulting in overcrowding and inability to apply 
p‘ovisions for prisoner rehabilitation. 
A principal fault of Argentina’s prison system 
is the lack of separate institutions 
for those 
awaiting trial. 
Consequently hardened criminals 
are thrown together with first offenders. 
Facili- 
ties for women are inadequate; in certain cases 
women: convicts a8 well as women awaiting trial 
have been hoised in men’s institutions. 
Penal farms have been established.in the Santa 
Rosa Colony (Colonia Santa Rosa) ‘tnd the Gen- 
eral Roca Penal Jail (Cdrcel Penal de General 
‘lost probably held for investigation, or at dispositioa of 
executive power under state-of-siege provisions. 
hackground to these locations. 
Other prisons, of 
wie so-called industrial type, contain enterprises 
such as carpentry, shoemaking, and mechanical 
and tailor shops. 
Products are sold on the out- 
side. 
-Industrial shop facilities are insufficient 
and many inmates, particularly those awaiting 
trial, spend their time in idleness. 
The principal 
national institution for women is the Women’s 
Corrcclional 
Asylum 
(Asilo 
de Correccion 
de 
‘lujeres) in Buenos Aires. 
Managed by nuns of 
ihe Order of the Good Shepherd, it provides train- 
ing in sewing and bookbinding, and emnhasizes a 
program of religious seivices and guidance. 
Provincial prisons are of diverse types. 
Most 
fall below the standards of federal institutions. 
Many are overcrowded, dirty, poorly constructed, 
and lacking in facilities for renabilitation. 
A nota- 
ble exception is the Coronda Model Jail (Cdrcel 
Mod: to de Coronda) of Santa Fe Province, with a 
capacity for 800 prisoners. 
It houses a variety of 
well-cquipped shops and cells contain toilets and 
furniture. 
Other jails considered above average are 
the Olmos Jail of Buenos Aires Province and the 
Model Jail (Cdreei Modelo) of Saita Province. 
The Argentine armed forces penal institute, lo- 
cated im Magdalena, Province of Buenos Aires, 
houses not only officer and enlisted 
prisoners 
from the military services, but also any civilians 
who may be convicted 
under 
the CONINTES 
plan. 
Clean, well-lighted, and comfortable, and 
with only about half of its 400-man capacity in 
use, the Magdalena Penal Institute appears to be 
one of Argentina's best prisons. 
Prisoners are 
housea 
in individual 
cells; 
they manufacture 
wooden 
toys, brooms, 
tiles, and other 
articles 
which are sold commercially. 
Between 1958 and 
KEV 
Roca). 
Prisoners in these institutions grow their 
Own food and send the surplus to other prisons; 
1962 the number of civilian prisoners varied Le- 
4n attempt is made to send convicts witis a rural 
tween 30 and 90, 
Officers of high rank usually 
| 
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| 
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{ 
La 
a 
- 
Oimos 
NATIONAL PRISCNS 
General penal institution 
Ci Women’s penal institution 
£5 institution for indicted persons 
PROVINCIAL PRISOWS 
| 
General penal institution 
FALKLAND 
A Women’s penal institution 
(Cle med by A 
el 
& institution for indicted persons 
ty 
by 
4 va 
lg wed be Argentine end Chile) 
” 
infernatore!l Dour 
Internal 
atwe Dor rdary 
Matonal capite! 
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internal admunstrat 
tal 
care MOEN 
100 
Figure 12. LocaTION G¥ ARGENTINE FEOERAL AND PROVINCIAL PFNAL INSTITUTIONS 
A, 
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plan 
were released by atm- 
lo the resumption 
of. consti- 
government 
in October 
1963. 
Prior 
to 
July 
1963 
elections 
there 
were 
236 
such 
oucis beld in 19 national and 
pra 
one, 
jails, and lockups. 
The largest. number, 74, 
held in the Rio Bamba Prison of Cordoba 
“ 
ri, 
i 
’ 
are under way to conform 
Arpentina’s 
it fo the principles set forth in law. 
now penicentiary was begun in 
cuburb 
of 
Buenos 
Aires, 
in 
1962. 
for complction 
in 1964, it will house 
convicts 
in individual 
cells in a 20-story 
building and will have a speciai section for psy- 
chiattic observation of prisoners. 
Plans also call 
for construction of a prison with.a capacily for 
1,000 convicts in the area of Ezeiza, near Buc1os 
Aires. 
It will have maximum, medium, and mini- 
mum levels o. security, and will be divided info 
closed, semi-open, and open sections. A new prvison 
farm is also planned on the “open door” princi- 
ple, whicn does away with any ohstacles to ¢s- 
cape and relies on the acceptanc:® 
of discipline and 
responsibility by the prisoner. 
It will have a 
Slaughterhouse and dairy, as well as farming 
facilities. 
c. TREATMENT AND REHABILITATION OF PRISON- 
ERS — Much interest has been shown in Arvenvina 
in the problem of rehabilitavion of prisoners, and 
detailed provisions governing rehabilitation anc 
treatment of prisoners are established by law. 
A decree of December 1947 abolished the use of 
fetters while transporting prisoners and the wear- 
ing of the wide-striped prison uniform. 
Aithough 
Argentina has one of Latin America’s best records 
in prisoner rehabilitation, actual practices still 
fall short of legal provisions; for instance, the oniy 
institution now considered to be effectively segre- 
gating different categories 
of prisoners 
is the 
Model Jail of Coronda, Piovince of Santa Fe. 
The caliber of administrative personnel and 
guards in federal prisons is considered to be gen- 
erally satisfactory, and is mich above the gencral 
Latin American standard. 
Regulations for the 
treatment of prisoners are generally adhered to_ 
and there has been little evidence of prison brutal- 
ity since the Perén era. 
The federal prison sys- 
tem has attempted to instill a sense of profession- 
alism among its personnel, who are divided jnto 
nine Officer and eight enlisted grades, 
Salarics 
are comparable to those of the Federal Police and 
training is given all new personne) at the Fenal 
School (Escuela Penitencicria) located in Buenos 
Aires. 
That discipline may not be satisfactory, 
¥ 
» 
| 
z revenge 
for the murder of 9 of 
their number 
killed 16 ‘prisoners in their cells 
sie quality and capability 
o. administrative 
personnel and guards in provincial prisons, with 
the exception of those of Santa Fe, are generally 
much jow 
-r than those of federal prisons. 
In the 
Provinces of Jujuy and Catamarca successful jail 
breaks. 
were carried oul with the complicity of 
piicon 
personnel. 
Accusations 
brought agains 
prison 
of Cordoba Province of 
giving 
favorabieé treatment to arrested Peéronist terror- 
caused the temporary occupation of that prov- 
ince’s pri 
by miilitary forces in April 1960. 
selhvuine penal philosophy considers work as a 
means of 3 ehahi litation rather than as a punish- 
ment or an economic device. 
Although work facil- 
ities are considerably better in Argentina than in 
ovner Latin American nations, many pris- 
oners Spend their time in idleness. 
As.of January 
1963 am es timated 80% of the men awaiting trial 
‘im Villa Devoto Prison, who constituted 1,598 of 
the 2,045 inmates, were without work. 
Further- 
more, overcrowding has prevented the isolation of 
prisoners at night; at the time of the prison mu- 
tiny al this prison in December 1962, some 2,000 
inmates were lodged in spaces containing 800 beds. 
Discontent was 
also fostered by association 
of 
hardened criminals Wira novices and by bad sani- 
vary conditions resulting frorm insufficient bathing 
facilities. 
Prisoners receive a smail salary for work per- 
formed. 
In federal instivutions the pay is most 
commonly divided at the rate of 15% for indemni- 
fication of victims (if any), 25% for food costs, 
40% for jailing costs, and 20% for a savings fund to 
be given to the prisoner upom release. 
If no in- 
demnification or sood costs are required the per- 
centages vary, but 40% of the prisoner’s salary 
always goes for jailing costs. 
The doctrine of 
compensation for work accidents in prison has 
been legally enacted and established at a rate of 
20% of what an ordinary worker receives unless 
the prisoner 
is responsible through negligence, 
disobedience, 
or deliberate provocation. 
Work- 
accident incapacity is determined by prison doc- 
tors and neither the prisoner nor his family can 
challenge their findings. 
The basic law of 1933 | 
specifies five steps in 
prisoner rehabilitation: 1) observation; 2) intern- 
ment, consisting of work inside the prison; 3) ori- 
entation, <abidiatiie of work outside the prison; 
4) a tricl or test periud, served at farms or work 
‘amps perinitting semi-freedom; and 5) reintegra- 
tion, consisting of release or freedom on parole. 
Sis three and four are inapplicable because lit- 
tie work is now done outside the prisons and there 
me 
‘ 
| 
| 
|
— 
we 
rid 
ti 
cad 
edom 
to caoopeiative 
foderal 
pri 
ms. 
inn 
conduct eVCry SJ months according 
seven 
catfegories. 
A breakdown 
of 
1,807 praded 
duriom the third quar*er of 1955 indicates that 
most prisoners are cousidered well behaved, 
The 
conduct of only 32 was adjudged bad (7nala) and 
25 very bad (peésinta); 51 were average (regular), 
good 
(buena), 
and 
405 
very 
good 
buena); the largest number, 991 were declared ex- 
eroplary (ejemplar), the next-to-highest grade, 
and 
“1 received the top grade of optimum (optima). 
d. ParoLe system — The Argentine 
paroie 
system. 
is better 
developed 
than 
that of most 
other Latin American nations. 
The four condi- 
tions that must be met to be granted paroie are: 
1) fixed residence; 2) observance of ruics of in- 
spection, especially abstinence from aicohol; 
3) 
adoption of a means of livelihood in the absence of 
private means: and 4) submission to the authority 
cf a parole board indicated by the proper au- 
thorities. 
The conditions are to be observed until 
the end of a temporarv sentence or until 5 years 
after the day parole begins in the case of a life 
sentence. 
Paroie is revoked if the parolee com- 
mits a new crime or violates the condition of 
residence. 
Prisoners with sentences of over 3 years may 
apply for parole after serving two-thirds of the 
term, while those with less than 3 years may ap- 
ply after 1 year if sentenced to reviusion, or 8 
months if sentenced to prison. 
Habitual crimi- 
nals, however, must serve either 10 or 5 years of 
their sentence, depending on its severity and on 
previous convictions. 
Parole is generally granted 
by the director of the penal instituti.n in which 
the prisoner is lodged, with the advice of a branch 
of the General Directorate of Penal Instituvuns. 
In the case of recidivists parole is awarded by the 
sentencing court, with the advice of the authori- 
ties of the prison. 
It has been estimated that 
80% of those serving less than 10 years do not 
serve the full sentence; however, the percentage 
considerably in the cases of two-time offend- 
ers and those serving more than 10 
years. 
Functions equivalent to a parole board are as- 
sumed by a local Protectorate of Freed Convicts 
(Patronato de Liberados), composed of private 
citizens who meet and discuss the cases of re- 
leased convicts under their jurisdiction. 
Parolecs 
are required to report. to and be questioned by 
renresenteth 
we 
j 
apenc! 
convury in Argentina. 
A small “ov 
dy 1s paid to individual protectorates bul htt 
control 
is exercised. 
These protectorates opere 
ait an bradequate level, with most parolees recciv- 
ing littie or no supervision. 
Ixeept for the pro 
Lcctorates, no agency aids parolees in acquiring 
jODs. 
A parole organization in Buenos Aires Province, 
known as.the Protectorate of Parolees and Porn: r 
Convicts (Patronato de Liberados u Excarcelados), 
functidns under the supervision of the Institute 
of 
Criminological 
Investigations 
and Teachinr. 
The Protectorate. cperates a home for ex-convicts 
receotly freed and attempts to obtain work for 
them.- It tries to secure a family base for tic 
prisoner by urging him to legalize any common- 
law marriage and leyitimize his offspring. 
Funds 
eccumulated by ‘the former convict from prison 
work 
are managed by the Protectorate. 
The 
Buenos Aires Province parole system a .pears to 
onerate somewhat more effectively than does the 
national system. 
Other provinciai parole systems, 
however, are commonly wexker than the national 
system. 
4. Appraisai of penal system 
Argentina’s penal practices are not up to the 
level of the provisions of the law. 
In the field of 
legislation a need exists for a modern code of oral 
trual procedure to replace the antiquated written 
procedure. 
This substitution would provide more 
equitable and speedy trials and tend to reduce the 
nuinber of persons jailed while awaiting 
trial, 
thereby easing prison overcrowding. 
While the 
criminal code has many omissions and is not 
abreast of the latest theories of criminology, its 
replacement is not considered urgent by Argentine 
legal experts. 
A prison construction program 
is necded 
to 
eliminate overcrowding and provide work facilities 
for prisoners. 
Recommended by Argentine penol- 
ogists are “open door” institutions to inspire sclf- 
disciniine in prisoners, and special jails or rehabili- 
tation institutes for homosexuals, alcoholics, vag- 
abonds, and beggars. 
Care and guidance need to 
be given the families of inmates, who are at present 
thrown on their own resources. 
Argentina’s pa- 
role system needs to be overhauled and suppie- 
mented by the creation of some agency to assist 
released prisoners in finding jobs. 
|
(BLANK). 
> 
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— 
“p. 
Comments on principal sources 
1. Evaluation 
Although data available for the preparation of 
this Section are reasonably accurate, they are 
not current and in many cases are inadequate. 
Recent statistical information is lacking because 
of slowness of the Argentine Government in proc- 
essing statistical information. 
With some exccp- 
tions, regular reporting un public order and saiety 
in Argentina by US. officials has been scanty 
since about 194f. 
There is no AID police mission 
in Argentina. 
. 
ae 
Source 2 gives excellent recent information on 
the organization and regulations of the Argentine 
Federal Police, while Source 10, written by a chief 
of the force, gives a good exposition of Federal 
Police problems and deficiencies. 
Recent informa- 
tion on Federal Police operations against ordinary 
crime and their cffectiveness is lacking, however. 
Most data on the Buenos Aires Provincial Police 
are contained in that agency’s publications; be- 
cause these have not been issued recently, accu- 
rate current information is lacking. 
On other pro- 
vincial police forces recent data are almost totally 
lacking. 
Accurate and comprehensive though not 
detailed information on the National Geudarmerie 
and National Maritime Prefecture was obtained 
from U.S, Government reports and articles ap- 
pearing in Argentine periodicals. 
Similar sources 
were also helpful with regard to Argentine pro- 
viicial police forces. 
Information for portions of the Subsection deal- 
ing with criminal law is contained in Sources 4 
and 6, while the historical background of Arven- 
tine criminal codes is in Source 5. 
However, no 
source provides reliable current information on 
actual practices and the applicability of Argentine 
‘ 
codes. 
Aiso, 
little information 
is available on 
Argentine procedural codes except the codes vhem- 
Selves. 
Source 8 provides an excellent evaluation 
of the Argentine procedural system but supplics 
littic information about the mechanics of its op- 
eration. 
General observations on incidence of 
crime are found in Source 1 while the latest avail- 
able statistical data are taken from Source 3. 
In- 
formation on current conditions and practices in 
Argentine prisons is deficient as are data on pris- 
oner rehabilitation. 
Research on this Section was 
substantially completed by September 1965. 
2. List of sources 
1. Arratién, Enarque R. La Delincuencia en Argentina. 
Buenos Aires: Imprenta de la Universidad. 
1955. 
2. Ancintrna. 
Codigo Penal. 
Buenos Aires. 
1960. 
3. 
. 
Manual de Instruccion. 
para el Personal Sub- 
alterno de la Policia Federal Argentina. 
Bucnos 
Aires: Biblioteca Political. 
1962, 
4. ARGENTINA. 
MINISTRY 
OF 
EDUCATION 
AND 
JJSTICE. 
Revista Penal y Penitenciaria, 
January-December, 
1958. 
Buenos Alres. 
5. Coquinus, Juan Emitto. 
Codigo de Justicia Militar. 
Buenos 
Aires: 
Editorial 
Bibliografica 
Argentina. 
1957, 
6. Jiménez pe Asva, LUIS, AND ZaACARES, Francisco Carst. 
Codigos Penales Iberoamericanos. 
Caracas: 
Edi- 
torial Andrés Bello. 
1946. 
7. Luper, Itrato A. 
Los “studios Criminoldgicos. 
La 
Plata: 
Instituto 
de {Investigaciones 
y Docencia 
Crimincldégicas. 
1962, 
8. Lyncm, Juan 
Cartos. 
“La Mayorla 
Quiere 
Juicio 
Oral” (‘The Majority Wants Oral Trial), Vea y Lea 
(See and Read). 
No. 411, 25 April 1963. 
Buenos 
Aires. 
9. Mancera, 
Nicotdés. 
“El Pavoroso Problema 
de las 
Carceles Argentinas” 
(The 
Terrible 
Problem 
of 
Argentine Prisons), Vea y Lea. 
No. 404, 17 January 
1953. 
Buenos Aires. 
10. VAzquL.z, 
Policia, 
Problema 
Urgente. 
Buenos Aires: Editorial Guillermo Kraft. 
1962. 
| 
; 
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COUNTRY ARGENTINA 
PRESSURE ON THE GENERAL CONFEOCRATION OF Labor 
| ARGENTINA BY COMMUNIST LABOR GROUP TO CARRY 
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. 
“ON 
APRIL 1964 AT A MEETING oF 
REPRESENTATIVES oF THE 
— 
GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF LABOR (CGT) OF ARGENTINA, AND ‘OF THE 
ORGANIZATIONS(PERONIST LABOR BLOC. WITHIN THE cet), RICARDO VINCELLI,” 
- LEADER OF THE MOVEMENT FOR TRADE, UNION UNITY. AND CO-ORDINATION 
- 
ee. 
(ies 
COMMUN ST-DOMINATED LABOR GROUP WITHIN" THE cet), SAID 
IT WAS THEN KNOWN THAT ‘PRESIDENT ILLIA ‘WOULD, NOT MENT JON 
HIS SPEECH To CONGRESS ON "MAY. ANYTHING CONCRETE To RELIEVE 
“THE” SER 10US SITUATION OF THE ARGENT INE PEOPLE. “ON THE. CONTRARY, 
WAS” EXPECTED. To INCREASE THE REPRESSION OF: COMMUNISTS AND 
PERONSTS;. *VINCELL THEREFORE RECOMMENDED, ‘70 THOSE PRESENT AT 
ts 
| 
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OF THIS CAMPAIGN’ 1S THE CURRENT VISIT BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE 
| 
‘THE MEETING, WHICH WAS HELD IN THE OFFICES OF THE MUCS AT i 
| 
our THE SECOND STEP OF THE ATTACK PLN (PLAN DE ‘LUCHA) OF THE car. ay 
2. “EXAMPLES OF THE ‘TYPE OF PROPAGANDA PREPARED BY THE 
AND 
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF ARGENTINA (Pca) ITSELF FOR, IMMEDIATE DISTRI= 
BUTION WERE SHOWN AT THE MEETING. ALTHOUGH “SOME OF THE PROPAGANDA 
Ws 0 
over’ “A MONTH OLD, WAS OF A NATURE CALCULATED TO CREATE - 
chinate FAVORABLE T 
10 VIOLENCE. VINCELLI PROPOSED 
=D AN EARLY... 
MEETING “OF THE: CENTRAL ¢ 
COMM| TTEE OF THE cer TO PREPARE CHARGES 
“AGAINST. THE GOVERNMENT WHICH ‘WOULD JUSTIFY CARRYING OUT’ THE PROGRAM 
PRESS REPORTED THAT THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CG WOULD MEET THAT aed lll 
TO CONSIDER WAYS OF APPLY 
THE ATTACK PLAN UNTIL 18. May, WHEN 
ke 
"IN ACCORD with AN. ‘EARLIER RESOLUTION OF THE CENTRAL, COMMITTEE,. 
Se 
3.7 
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"MAY_THE. PCA. AND THE PARTIDO 
| OBRERO. TROTSKISTA PLAN TO ‘LAUNCH A JOINT CAMPA GN AGAINST LABOR 
"PENETRATION BY “YANKEE IMPERIALISTS" IN "ARGENT INA, THE FOCAL POINT 
ov,” 
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“AFL-C10 AND THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR FREE LABOR DEVELOPMENT. 
"HELIA, 1s TO BE CRITIC IZED FOR HAVING PERMITTED THe 
MINISTER OF 
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HEADQUARTERS OF THE CGT, THAT. IMMEDIATE STEPS BE TAKEN TO CARRY 
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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS 
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CLASS.FICATON 
DISSEMINATION CONTRCLS 
LABOR TO MAKE DEALS WITH THE "REPRESENTATIVES OF IMPERIAL 1Sis" ON 
| MATTERS. WHICH SHOULD BE SETTLED BY THE ARGENT INE LABOR MOVEMENT 
. 
FIELD 
STATE, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, CINCLANT, CINCSO, 
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SUPPORTED BY THE COMMUN! ST PARTY. OF ARGENTINA. WITH 
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
pricaitss 
I ntelligence J nformation Cable 
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POSSIBLE CRISIS 
IN ARGENTINA AS RESULT OF EXPECTED 
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IMPLEMENTATION OF 24-nouR worK STOPPAGES BY THE 
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“IN THE ‘COURSE OF A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ARTURC 
a’ ON 1% JUNE 1964, GENERAL IGNACIO AVALOS, SECRETARY oF 
WAR, TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT THE MILITARY. ARE CONVINC CED THAT’ 
PLAN DE LUCHA OF THE GENERAL CONFEDERATION "OF ‘LABOR 
—JAEN 
DEVERS IVE MOVEMENT DIRECTED 
PERONIST! 
LEADERS 
OBJECTIVE OF Bi 
BRINGING. 
THE OVERTHRO». 
| “THe "GOVERNMENT: 
AVALOS IMPRESSED UPON. THE PRESIDENT THE GRAVITY oF THE SITUATION 
Be 
CONF RONT ING THE GOVERNMENT AND URGED THE PRES! DENT TO TAKE 
ae 
"STERN MEASURES IN THE EVENT, THE CGT IMPLEMENTS THE FINAL 
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CLASSFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTAOLS 
_ AVALOS: TOLO THE PRESIDENT THAT THE MILITARY yup SUPPORT 
sa 
(SOURCE COMMENT: ALTHOUGH ‘THE 
ORIGINALLY PLANNED 
24-HOUR WORK STOPPAGES SIMJL TANEOUSLY “THROUSHOUT 
THE COUNTRY, itt 
HAS ‘ANNOUNCED A PLAN 0 EFFEGT THESE WORK 
STOPPAGES BY PROVINCE OR ZONE, 
. 
Py 
THE WORK STOPPAGES WiLL START. WT Is BELIEVED 
THAT 
OF THE 
WILL BE 
IN A PROVINCE IN THE 
INFERIOR 
CounTRY RATHER THAN’ 
THE FEDERAL CARLTAL OF THE pROVINCE 
BUENOS AIRES.” 
consi DERED POSSIBLE THAT THe 
STOPPAGES 
START ON'18 JUNE, ) 
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THERE is 
| INFORMATION 
AVAILABLE CONCERNING in WHICH PROVINCE ‘QR ZONE, C3 ‘tne Countay 
“Ane: 
we 
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Bra 
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“ 
GOVERNMENT HAS MADE THE. 
sion THAT WITH THE IMPLE~ 
MENTATION OF THE WORK STOPPAGES,, “THE POLICE WILL, TAKE: 
& 
ACTION TO EVICT THE WORKERS, FROM, Tne | 
FACTORIES 
WALTING FOR ANY JUDICIAL AUTHOR 
Tolact IN 
EVENT THE POLICE MEET ‘RESISTANCE iv, 
‘ACTION 
AND ARE UNABLE TO CONTROL THE SITUATION, “THE PRESIDENT 
ORDER THE NAT.IONAL GENDARMER L-E..TO 
ST THE: POLICE. ~ 
ARMED FORCES WILL BE ORDERED. TO PART ICIPATE ONLY IF A MAJOR 
"DISTURBANCES RESULTS WHICH CANNOT BE CONTROLLED: BY. THE 
COMBINED ACTION OF "hE POLICE AND. THE 
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CONCURRENT WITH THE EVICTION ACTION BY THE POLICE, 
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THERE iS LITTLE HOPE THAT SUCH A MEETING WILL RESULT 
LAST MINUTE. MEET ING ‘BY THE PRESIDENT WITH car LEADERS. 
CANCELLATION By THE CGT OF 
PLAN TO IMPLEMENT 24-HOUR 
6. FIELD 
‘STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCLANT CINCSO, 
LRMAT 
“Re SULTS 
wiki Be DISSEMINATED onty. iF ‘THEY MATERIALLY, arreer THE ‘SENSE oF. 
THis REPORT. 
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_ CONTINUATION 
OF 
INFORMATION 
"COPY = 
| 
- 
. 
|. THE GOVERNMENT WILL ORDER THE ARREST AND INCARCERAT ION oF THE 
SIGNIFICANT COT LEADERS, THE GOVERNMENT REALIZES THAT THIS. 
ACTION MIGHT RESULT iN A CALL BY THE CGT FOR A NATION-WIDE 
STRIKE, WHICH, IF EFFECTIVE, 
CREATE A CRITICAL 
“SITUATION, (SOURCE COMMENT. 
CONFRONTED WITH SUCH A” 
DEVELOPMENT, 
1S HIGHLY LIKELY THAT THE PRESIDENT 
; | 
DECLARE A STATE OF SIEGE OR REINSTITUTE THE 
SOURCE COMMENT: IT 1S CONSIDERED POSS | BLE THERE MAY 
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JL September 1934 
SC No. 
00536/64R 
Copy 
No.,- 
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ENCE ‘AGENCY 
ae, 
PRERY 
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——
> 
ll September 
1964 
ARGENTINA POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 
The unrest 
now besetting 
the l]-month-old 
Illia 
government will intensify with 
the provocative Teronist 
campaign 
to bring back ex-dictator 
Juan Peron. 
This 
campaign seems aimed more 
at promoting revolution 
than 
peaceful Peronist political goals. 
The hard-line Peron- 
ists, 
who are in the minority, 
appear 
fearful 
that 
in 
the March congressional elections soft-line Peronists 
will succumb 
to the coalition 
bids 
of other partics. 
Both the Peronists and the other parties are critically 
fragmented. 
Organized labor remains 
the Peronists’ 
‘strongest political weapon. 
They are using it to press 
their campaign 
and to fan widespread discontent 
over 
economic conditions. 
The armed forces and the majority 
of Argentines are adamantly opposed to Peron'’s return. 
Ostensibly, 
the Peronist political offensive 
is 
aimed at demanding participation 
in the March elections 
and legality for 
a Peron-directed movement, 
apart from 
the various neo-Peronist parties which are already 
recognized, 
Leaders of most parties consider these elec- 
tions, 
for half 
the 
national Chamber of Deputies, unusu- 
ally important 
as 2 possible indication of new and 
stronger political 2lignments. 
At present, 
political 
fragmentation is one of Argentina's key problems. 
Since Peron was overthrown 
in September 
1955, 
the 
regulations. governing elections have, 
in general, 
per- 
_mitted-the participation of neo-Peronist parties which 
are independently directed but barred those which pro- 
_fess to be directed by Peron. 
There have been variations 
periodically in these rerulations, 
particularly in the 
provinces, where each provincial electoral board decides 
independently which parties 
to recognize within its elec- 
fi 
toral=district. 
For example; 
in several past provincial 
elections the Communist Party as well 
as the Peron-di- 
rected Justicialist Party ran candidates, 
despite the 
federal ban on these parties. 
This month the Nationai Congress, 
which already in- 
cludes a neo-Peronistminority, is to debate 
a new statute 
on political parties which will affect 
the Peronists' 
electoral role. . Illia’s People’s Radical Civic Union 
party (UCRP) 
feels committed by its campaign platform to 
lift “all political proscriptions." 
To most people, 
this 
means legality for the Peronist 
and Communist 
parties, 
Technically, 
it could also mean legality 
for )‘various ex- 
tremist groups now outlawed, such as the extreme national- 
ist, anti-Semitic Tacuara organization, :““Hard-line Peron- 
ists are stressing that it 2lso must mean freedom for 
; 
Peron to return to Argentina. 
- 
| 
> 
| 
‘ 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
ya 
ay 
‘
< 
= 
‘ 
Peron 
trenson charge with 
the comment 
a 
eee 
that 
they did not want 
to con- 
Peron, 
now 6S and 
liviny 
| 
cern 
themselves with political 
in luxury 
in Madrid, -has just 
matters. 
Throughconfidential 
sent 
new tape recordings 
to Ar- 
| official channels, 
however, mili- 
gentina reassuring his Support- 
| tary leacers have expressed con- 
ers 
that 
he will return before 
cern over 
the government's failure 
the cnd 
of 1954 despite all ob- 
| tomake 
a clear statement. 
Ac- 
Stacles. 
Such statements 
by 
| cording to a usually reliable 
him and his supporters, 
who of~ 
j| source, 
the commander of the 
ten travel 
to Madrid, 
have been 
| largest army installation 
in the 
more 
frequent 
since 
the oegin- 
| Buenos Aires area cormented 
to 
ning of the year, 
Last weck 
| the defense minister 
in late Au- 
the Peronists announced 
pians 
' gust 
that 
"If the day should 
for 
a national 
committee 
to for- 
| come when 
I have 
to arrest Peron 
malize preparations 
for Peron's 
| because 
he has disembarked here, 
return, 
' I would first arrest 
Illia and 
/his government." 
He added his 
The chief obstacles 
to 
| belief that the:aim of the Peron- 
Peron's return include 
a morals 
| ists' campaign was to throw the 
charge based 
on his having kept 
| country into disorder. 
‘ 
a teen-age mistress, 
a treason 
| 
charge, 
and the opposition 
of 
| 
The Peronists are well 
_ the armed forces, 
One of 
© 
' aware 
of such feeling among 
Peron's 
lawyers citing the stat- 
{| civilians 
as well as military 
ute 
of 
limitations, 
has asked 
, officials and know that high- 
° 
the court 
to dismiss 
the morals 
| lighting Peron's return preju- 
charge. 
Government spokesmen 
' diees their chances 
for a legal 
have turned aside queries re- 
party. 
Such emphasis, 
therefore, 
garding the treason charge with 
| casts strong s 
suspicion on their, 
the reply that Peron wili be 
'‘nmotives. 
—~ 
sd 
subject 
to the same 
laws as any 
| 
; 
: 
‘ 
other citizen if he returns 
io 
| 
The extent of the appre- 
Argentina. 
hension regarding current Peron- 
|} ist tactics and the depth of 
that” Peron*would 
not have the 
nerve’ to return, non-Peronists 
are uneasy over 
the 
vagueness in the face of the 
tensifying Peronist campaign. 
This vagueness apparently stems 
from a wish 
to avoid 
a direct 
confrontation with the Peron- 
ists which might increase sym- 
pathy for Peron, 
Military liecaders have 
turned aside queries ox the 
‘ 
i 
‘ 
government's 
-
appreciated 
only against 
the 
backround 
of the Peron era, 
which 
began nearly 
two decades 
ago. 
In seeking 
a monolithic 
state, 
the Peron:-reyime 
gagge 
the pr ess 
and political opposi- 
tion; jailed, 
exiled, 
or 
fi- 
nancially ruined 
persis tent 
op- 
nonents; 
and purged professors 
from Aruecntina’s 
once exceilent 
school system, 
His extensive 
controls discriminated against 
agricultural production, 
the 
backbone 
of the economy, 
and 
nearly'drove the country 
to 
bankruptcy. 
He purged 
the mili- 
tary, dominated 
the Congress, 
and took over and expanced 
or- 
ganized 
labor, 
A Peronist 
Party 
card was required 
for a govern- 
ment job-.or a pension. . He used 
the General Confederation. of 
Labor 
(CGT) 
in the roles 
of co- 
government and chief organ 
political action similar 
to those 
it is trying to promote today. 
His policies aiso preju- 
diced economic development 
not 
only 
by wasting Argentine re- 
sources 
but also by discourag- 
ing foreign capital and tech- 
niques and by failing to train 
the new technicians needed 
to_ 
develop a modern society. 
are still-leaving. 
The lag in 
development was important 
in 
undermining his regime as weil 
as in creating problems 
for 
those who succeeded 
him, 
Political Fragmentation 
The decline 
in Peron's 
popularity was evident more than 
a year. before the. 1959 revolu-_ 
Ts 
« 
— 
Con~ 
sequently,* many young profes= 
sionals-left. the country and 
_the churches, 
‘his image that: his fight with the 
* ~ 
>. 
> 
| 
PERON;: 
"I'd rather fight in Modrid." 
~ El Mercurio, 22 August 1964 
tion. 
Economic difficulties 
were causing the workers 
to 
complain and prompting Peron to 
inake overtures 
to business and 
to the US--incidentally author-= 
izing pro-US propaganda 
in Ar- 
sentina for the first time in 
mn generation, 
- His burning of 
“however, so damaged 
church was chosen as the ve--° 
r 
hicle for the multiparty 
rev- 
olution. 
Subsequent election 
results confirm a decline 
in 
his personal influence and a 
cisorganization among his fol- 
lowers which could not be attri- 
buted merely to official re- 
strictions on Peronist activ- 
ity. 
j 
LYNDON BAINES IOHNSAN 
| 
} 
| 
| 
| 
t 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| | 
|
A 
The UCKP, 
The Gover nent Party 
Were 
it not 
for the 
ftrag- 
mentation of the non-Peronist 
parties and their 
Jack of en- 
lightened 
leadership, 
thelr 
pere- 
| 
Sistent fear of a Peronist 
poll- 
‘hen the majority of po- 
ing 
power 
varying 
from 
io 
no 
| 
Liticas 
parties--including 
sone 
neo-Peronists--cast 
their elec- 
toral votes for Illia 
in the 
summer of 1963, 
they thought 
that 
they were ‘entering on a 
period 
in which 
a national 
con- 
sensus might be developed 
in 
certain areas of government pol- 
icy. 
Tllia was inaugurated 
in 
October with an exceptional meas- 
1963. 
The plurality of [llia's 
ure of good will, but much of 
UCRP in the July 1963 elections 
this has now been replaced by 
was only roughly one quarter of 
| 
criticism of the government's 
the total vote, while his near- 
economic policies. 
Business 
est competitors approximated 
circles are alarmed over such 
and 13 percent. 
| 
| measures 
as the minimum wage 
bill, 
the limited exchange con-~ 
trols,and price controls over 
various 
items of primary necess- 
ity, such as beef and other food-~ 
Stutfs. 
The government remains 
under pressure from labor because 
of the continued rise in living 
costs despite these measures. 
more 
than SO percent 
of 
the 
electorate would 
be inexplicable, 
They have been unable 
to main- 
tain party unity, 
much 
less at- 
tract 
large Semnaents Of the for- 
mer Peronist 
voile. 
For example, 
more 
than 60 political parties 
participated'in each of the na- 
tional elections 
in 1962 and 
‘The composition of the Na- 
tional Congress exempiifics this 
fragmentation: 
there are 
23 par- 
Cham 
f Deputies and 
12 in the 
46-member Senate. 
The neo-Peron- 
ists are also split 
into diiferent 
parties and have two blocs 
in the 
The exceptional wheat harvest . 
Chamber 
of Deputies. 
Ex-President 
has provided some improvement 
ai 
Frondizi 
now has a separate In- 
in the economy. 
Unemployment 
transigent Radical iiovement 
(MIR), | persists, however, 
and price. 
splitting 
the large congressional 
| controls have prompted black 
-. 
* 
bloc of his former Intransigent 
| warkets, making food more expen- 
: 
| 
"i. 
». Radical Civic Union 
(UCRi). 
He 
-| sive and scarce than the official 
lost control 
of the UCRI last 
records indicate. 
July, after he had backed Peron's 
call for a blank vote, and is now 
| 
Illiats aeanaxty supporters 
; 
seeking support among the neo-~ 
in the electoral college expected 
: 
Peronists and reportediy other 
him to appoint qualified men 
! 
more conservative parties. 
from other parties to responsible 
positions, 
as he indicated that 
i 
This underlines 
the fact 
he would. 
Instead, 
the UCRP has 
i 
that Argentine political stability 
acted like a majority party and 
will require the consolidation of 
maintained 
a tight grip on deci- 
democratic forces as well as the 
sion-making and all cabinet posi- 
peaceful reintegration of pro- 
.. 
| tions. 
The UCRP's main conces~ 
. 
_ Peronist elements into the body 
sions to 
nonparty elements have 
politic.. 
been ambassadorial appointments 
eK 
} 
RAINES 
LaRR ARV 
Ay 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
Wey 
| 
|
and consultation 
in the Chanber 
cal year ending 3) October 
: 
of Deputies, 
where 
it lacks 
nay reach SOO million compared 
even 
the slim majority 
it has 
to a deficit 
of $590 million 
in the Senate, 
| last year, 
The gross national 
product dropped about 
five per- 
‘he 
UCRP, which did not 
cent 
tn 1963, following a de- 
, expect 
to win the July election, 
cline of four percent 
in 1962, 
lacked 
a well-developed 
prograin 
The government's hasty cancel- 
and experienced, 
cuonpetent 
; lation last November of the pe- 
talent, 
[llia, 
a country doc- 
troleum contracts with 13 firms 
tor, attracted 
votes 
on 
the 
basis 
of his reputation 
for 
honesty and concern 
for 
the lit- 
tle man, 
UCRP leaders 
had been 
.s 
in the opposition since 
its par- 
ent party, 
the Radical Civic 
| 
Union 
(UCR) was ousted from 
| 
power 
in 1930. 
UCRP leaders 
| --including 
9 US companies-- 
| 
walked out of the, UCR to form 
| 
is ceterring new foreign in- 
vestment. 
The government 
con- 
tinues 
to give assurances 
that 
a Satisfactory settlement will 
be negotiated, 
and thus far the 
companies believe time is on 
their side, 
The government 
is probably 
in its greatest quandary about 
; 
how to meet the increasing pres-. - 
sure of the Peronists and the 
CGT without jeopardizing its 
| 
chances 
for attracting Peronist 
Support 
in the March elections. 
their own party in 1957, 
be- 
cause 
of their strong disiixke 
for Arturo Frondizi, who had 
just won controi of the UCR, 
The UCRP, 
iike other par- 
ties, suffers 
from factionaiisn, 
| 
It includes elements rangiag 
: 
from left 
of center 
to the mod- 
| 
Organized Labor 
erate right. 
Dr. Ricardo Bal- 
| 
bin, UCRP president, who heads 
The conciliatory gestures 
an important faction within the 
of the last three governments 
UCRP, advocates more nationaiis- 
|! 
toward 
‘the Peronists in or- — 
+ 
tic, 
outmoded views on economic 
| ganized labor have met with 
| 
pra. 
policy than those held by [1- 
| 
both setbacks and some success, 
lia, Wany government decisions 
An increasing number of Peron- 
appear..to be reached through de- 
ists have been won over to ther: 
bate among the factions, 
and 
“idea that. the CGT should con-" 
- 
- this tends to hinder flexibility 
fine itself strictly to labor™:: 
executive decisions. 
affairs, 
but the leaders of the 
Peronist unions--known as the 
; 
The UCRP is well-inten- 
"62 bloc"~-persist in using the 
: 
: 
tioned and seeks to promote 
CGT as a political weapon, 
. 
| 
, 
economic development, 
but its 
: 
lack of experience has slowed 
In January 1963 the CGT 
| 
| 
: 
' 
its attack on the enormous eco- 
was formally reconstituted with 
; 
; 
nomic problems 
it inherited and 
half of the six positions on the 
: 
: 
has compounded some of then, 
: executive committee allotted to 
; 
As an example of these probiems, 
{| the "62" bloc and half to the 
| 
‘the budget deficit for the fis- 
"independent" dloc, which 
| 
’ 
at 
| 
ll 
‘ 
‘ 
vel
t~ 
- 
Sih 
a Mbik 1964 
CHAIASER OF DEPUTIES 
ifte,: ed 
rots 
Potent! res) 
tet Liocs. 
je 
ow! 
(70) 
Brewed pi 
le 
(20) 
Cun; ised of 
Popetar Uv 
9) 
Theme Flas, (er 
(2) 
Tete Part, 
of the 
Bers 
? 
(2) 
Peatiorc! tober Port, 
>) 
2) 
| 
Nevaver Poowlar 
ovethen 
2. 
Luis Pup te 
Aston 
(i) 
Sociol Jost co (Tocumon) 
Un: on of the Argent 
Peope (WOLLPA) 
1S 
(1S) 
Proyiessive 
(PD?) 
(12) 
Nutiene! Federeton of Canter Purties it tse 
('2) 
Competed of; Comervctive Democrat 
(Fedeal Copitel) 
Co 
Union [Sc enas Aires) 
. 
United Democrat (Late Rios) 
. 
- 
Liverel Democrot 
Luis) 
Asgan'.oe Seciolist (PSA) 
.. 
(6) 
Demwtiatic Socialist (PSD) 
(5) 
‘ 
Conlederotion of Portics of the Inievior 
Composed of: Delesse of tre Prdviecio!l White 
i 
| 
| 
(Seine) 
ore 
| 
Civic Union for the Eenovating 
| 
SINAN 
Wrate Por y wf the Workers 
% 
latronsigent Radical Civic Union 
Christion Democrat 
. 
Bederation of Centar Portion: 
‘ 
: 
Autonomous Party of Corrientes 
Comervotive Pacy of the Checo 
CLASSIFIED MATERIAL ON REVERSE OF PAGE 
j 
7) 
| 
‘ 
|
.. 
~ 
| 
‘ 
includes neo-Peronists, 
The 
The political motives be- 
| 
Secretary ceneralship 
fell 
to 
nind 
the plan finally became 
rs 
the PeronistsS 
aud 
the assistant 
| 
obvious 
to the independents 
secretary general was 
an 
inde- 
when 
the Peronist 
labor leaders 
pendent, 
insisted 
on carrylng out the 
24-hour sit-down strikes after 
| 
Peronist 
leaders have ale 
ways recognized 
the 
im; portance 
of the CGT in meeting stra eric 
| 
needs. 
The CGT fulfills 
an or- 
ganizational 
lack, 
since 
it has 
with 
the government. 
Lack of 
in all provinces affiliates 
enthusiasm on the part of the 
which are more coheSive and 
ex- 
| 
workers 
as well as restraint 
tensive 
than 
the Peronists 
have 
on the part of management and 
been able to organize. 
Secondly, 
the gvvernment prevented serious 
the Peronists 
have expioited 
or- 
violence, 
Some incidents did 
ganized labor's economic griev- 
occur, 
however, 
and generally 
the government 
had met 
the ma- 
jor CGT economic demands, 
The 
Peronists also rejected over- 
tures 
for conciliatory talks 
ances 
to further 
partisan 
Peron- 
the maneuver 
served 
to damage 
‘ 
ist demands. 
The CGT aiso of- 
| worker discipline and relations 
fers protection since 
the gov- 
| 
with employers. 
ernment authorities 
are hesitant 
-to crack down on labor. 
The architect of this plan 
- 
was August Vandor, 
leader of 
ay 
Such Peronist exploitation 
| the "62"' bloc. 
He calculated 
) 
is apparent in the “battle plan" 
|§ that this action would win over 
which the CGT launched eariy 
| some supporters of Andres 
this year. 
It included 
inten- 
| Framini, 
his chief competitor 
propaganda and sit-cowns 
| in Peronist labor'and political 
ie 
‘se 
in factories in May and June, 
| 
circles, 
When Vandor did de- 
| 
; 
The "independent" labor leaders 
feat Framini 
in the July race... 
themselves endorsed the pian in 
for head of the Justicialist 
... 
the beliei.the sit-downs would 
Party in Buenos Aires Province, 
 .-.... 
; 
.mot be carried out. 
Their goal. 
Framini protested that Vandor 
.....: -... 
to press-for government ac-. 
| was promoting .""Peronism without 
tion on such-worker complaints | 
Peron," 
Framini announced that 
as high living costs and unen- 
he was forming a "Peronist Rev-- 
ployment, 
‘The demands included 
olutionary Group" to promote 
not only price controis anc 
Peron's return, 
On the other 
steps to counter the industrial 
hand, Vandor has just returned 
=. 
. 
recession, but also two politi- 
from a meeting in Madrid with 
eal riders favorabie to the 
Peron, who placed him in charge 
: 
Peronists and the Communists. 
of organizing plans for "the 
| 
These sought "full political 
return." 
Some usually reliable 
} 
amnesty" and the removal of ail 
sources, however, believe that 
| 
politicai proscriptions, 
The 
Peron may be preparing to under- 
.Peronists and the CG? are now 
cut Vandor, possibly: 
.. 
giving priority to both. 
hia for 
in these ‘plans. 
| 
= 
| 
**# 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
|
Peron's dtsavowal 
of 
Framini's “revolutionary group" 
well 
as another one con- 
nected with Hector Viilalon, 
a pro-Cuban extremist--is prob- 
: 
ably an insincere attempt 
to 
tidy up the Justicialist Party's 
reputation 
in a bid. 
for. legal 
status. 
Framini's 
"group" 
is 
new and nay have been announced 
Specifically 
for purposes 
of 
denial, 
an appearance 
of “democratic 
structure 
the Justicialist 
Party held 
an organizing con- 
vention on 26 July, 
Nost 
of 
the officials are little known, 
in accordance with the Peron 
dictum for choosing party lead- 
‘ers and presidential candidates. 
‘ 
Neither during nor since his 
regime has Per 
Peronists 
to develop a nationai 
- 
standing which might become. 
a 
challenge 
to his leadership. 
Vandor thus 
far has otiered the 
greatest challenge. 
Peron's 
assignment 
of his future 
cal action plans to the "62" 
group indicates further his 
| 
¥% 
- 
primary position and the lesser 
| 
ences 
importance of his Justiciaiist 
In an effort 
to present 
nm permitted 
other 
politi- 
CGT cormuniqué 
issued 
on 2 
for example, 
says 
that 
there 
is no work, 
that 
teéd is searce, 
and that 
tn- 
dustrial 
firms are closing 
their doors. 
It also denies 
csovernment statements 
that 
full 
freedom exists 
in Argentina, 
The CGT will highlight 
this 
phase with 
a massive rally 
in 
{front 
of the presidential palace 
on 
17 October, 
the chief Peron- 
ist holiday honoring Peron, 
A second project, announced 
on 2 September, 
is the forma- 
tion of a “National Committee 
for the Return of General 
Peron" 
to organize subcommittees 
throughout Argentina within 
days. 
The "62" labor bloc is 
in charge 
of the committee, 
which will include members of 
the Peronist political organiza-— 
tions, 
A third plan is to try to 
turn the celebration of Presi- 
cent 
De Gaulle‘’s visit 
to Ar- 
gentina from 3 to 6 October 
into 
a simultaneous demonstra- 
tion for Peron, 
The French 
ambassador 
in Buenos Aires has 
“Ets, 
ls aware of such intentions 
and is planning De Gaulle’s 
schedule ina way to minimize 
opportunities 
for Peronist ex- 
ploitation, 
The Peronists 
like 
to portray De Gaulle as the 
leader of a third force which 
is similar to Peron's concept 
of a third position between 
capitalism and Communisna, 
—_— 
e 
oes 
« 
whe Peronists plan three 
c?mpaigns to promote their po- 
-. 
litical aims. 
One already in 
progress 
is the so-called “third 
stage" of the CGT battle plan. 
This consists of rallies 
in 
: 
front of provincial government 
houses,and propaganda through 
various media, 
to condemn cur- 
| 
rent economic conditions. 
A 
Speculation concerning 
Peron's intentions ranges from 
- 
“COPY 
iIVNIAOM DAINCS? 
| 
| 
| 
; 
. 
¥ 
A
a secret 
deal with 
the 
Illia 
part of Peronist 
plans 1o pro- 
government--which military 
disorders, 
Extremist 
Per- 
? 
leaders deny--to plans 
to 
y»yro- 
| onists 
have also been reported 
mote 
a revolution, 
One strategy. 
| to be engaged 
in revolutionary 
included 
in a document circu- 
| plotting along with other left- 
lated 
in Peronist circles early 
ist elements, 
but 
there has been 
this year was 
to provoke 
the 
no report of a group with dis- 
armed 
forces 
into carrying out 
| 
ruptive capabilities 
equal 
to 
a coup, 
because 
the miltary 
_ 
those of the CGT. 
Whatever 
the 
leaders would 
then have 
to turn 
Peronists' 
strateyy, 
their new 
‘to the Peronists 
for a base of 
campaigns will add 
to unrest 
popular support. 
The document 
and complicate 
the process 
of 
also stated 
that actions such 
national conciliation, 
(SECRET 
as the CGT battle plan were 
NO FOREIGN DISSEM) 
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SANITIZ7ED COPY 
Content UNCLASSIFIED 
COUNTRY ARGENTINA 
TOCS 
‘DATEOF 
NOVEMBER 1961 
dato - _ 
3 NOVEMBER 296k, 
PLAN BY 
TERRORIST GROUP 
ABDUCT 
AMERICAN OFFICIAL IN 
‘ 
= TERRORIST 
OF THE 
PARTY oP 
‘ARGENTINA (Pca) 
PINPODNTED THE HOMES OF ALL UNITED STATES cOVERNENT PERSONNEL IN CORDOBA © 
PROPAGANDA, 3 
REASONS. 
DOES ior BELIEVE THAT 
GROUP PLANS | 
THE OFFISTAL, ‘BUR ADDS. THAT 
WILL BE ARKED AND IF THE. 
(HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS ALTHOUGH THIS 1S, UNCONPIRIGD INFORMATION 
goptains “Informatl: 
Sectinr.-"he 
Nations’, Deter-2 of 
State 
$i, 
(FIELD 
REPORTED. ‘THAT ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT KNOW 
meaning of the, 
Taw, 
| 
| 
Intelligence Inform jation Cable 
ADMIRAL TAYLOR; ALR FORCE AFCIN, GENERAL THOMAS 
_ EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CARROLL 
“To STATE: 
DISTRIBUTION EXCEPT TO 
THOMAS 
HUGHES | 
‘ARD.Is PLANNING 
‘ABDUCT AN. DAPORTANT OFFI SIAL LIVING IN, aN ISOLATED AREA 
THE GROUP PLANS. 10 HOLD 
OFFICTAL ‘ABOUT 48 HOURS 
-WHAT THE PARTY'S PURPOSE, 
KB. BELIEVED. 
ABDUCTION ‘MOULD, BE FOR, 
i 
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CLALSIICATION — DISS *INATION CONIFOLS 
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INFORMATION CN COMMUNIST INVOLVEVENT IN QUERRILLA 
| 
ACTIVITY CONDUCTED IN THE PROVINTE OF CORDOBA AND IN NORTHERN 
| 
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® 
DON BAINES JOH"
CENTRAL’ INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
e ROUTIIS 
Intelligence Information Cable. 
DATEOF 
1 DECEMPER 
29 NOV 
1964 
SUBJECT 
BY COMMUNIST TERRORIST. GROUP TO ARDUCT 
AMERICAN CONSUL IN CORDOBA 
COUNTRY ARGENTINA 
|. 
c 
PLACE® 
|. 
- 
TO ARMY 
EXCLUSIVE FOR ACSI, CHYSRAL DOLEMAN; NAVY DNI, 
Ha 
ADMIRAL TAYLOR; AIR FORCE AFCIN, GENZRAL THOMAS: 
70DIA 
EXCWUSIVE FOR GENERAL CARROLL 
70 STATE. 
 # NO DISTRIBUTION EXCEPT TO }R. THOMAS Le HUGHES 
le ‘(HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: 
3 NOVEMEER 96h,” 
REPORTED THAT A TERRORIST. GROUP OF 
COMMUNIST ‘PARTY OF ARGENT DA. (PCA) 
PINPOINTED THE HOMES OF ALL UNITED “STATES 
FERSONEL IN 
— 
“CORDOBA _AND WAS 
ING TO ABDUCT “AN. TMPORTANT : OFFICIAL LIVING. TN AN 
beg, 
“THE TARGET FOR ABDUCTION BY 
GROUP Is THE AMERICAN. 
CONSUL IN CORDOBA, THE PURPOSE 1S 70 AGIPATE PUBLIC ‘OPINION. TES 
“wa Nor TAKE PLACE “SOON, AND THE ORDER Nor T0 COMMIT “VIOLENCE § STILL STANDS, 
| 
contains infnrmation affecting the Natto- 
Defensa of tbe Talted, “ates wl 
wit 
wad 
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ARMY/ACSI 
NAVY 
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| 
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| 
TOCSD3-315/01586-l; 
| | 
Be ACCORDIIG. TO THE PLAN, THE CO:SUL IS TO BE ABDUCTED, THE PRESS WILL 
" 
BE IWFORMED, AND THE CONSUL WILL THEN SE es IN HIS UNDERPANTS. _ PROPAGANDA 
FLIES ARE 70 BE DISTRIBUTED EXPLATS ING THAT THE ABDUCTION WAS CARRIED our 70 
"REPUDIATE YANKEE Actions ACATNS? CUBA AID OTHER FREE NATIONS." 
he INFORFATION ON THE ‘LAYOUr oF 
THE co? 
ISUL'S HOME Is 70 ‘SUPPLIED 
>: 
EIS 
| GARDENER, OR FORIER 
WHO IS A 
OF THE PCA, 
Se ‘THE SECOND TARGET OF THE 
WILL THE COCA-COLA ‘PLANT, WHICH 
BS SABOTAGED AS ‘A SIGN ar PROTEST "AFTER TER UNITED STATES INTERVENES 
FIELD DISSEM: STATE 
BUENOS 
s Ars), 
‘CINCSO 
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| 
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“iG 
Cur 
| 
Intelligence Information Cable 
DATEOF 
18-19 HAY 1965 
1976 
INFO. 
suguecr 
PCSTPONEVENT OF PLANED COUP 
_ DISTR 20 AY 1965 
DATE ACQ. 
/ 
pppratsats | 
A ‘COUP ATTEMPT. “PLANNED BY GENERALS ENRIQUE RAUCH AND CARLOS JORGE 
“ROSAS FOR, 
rout’ or oR 
1965 WAS POSTPONED AT 
LAST MINUTE 
|_BECAUSE oF A "LACK OF COCRDINATION, 
PLAN 1 
FAS Nor. [BEEN 
(HEADQUARTERS COMENT. "RAUCH, WHO WAS OF RETIRED STATUS AT 
OF THE 
COMED. HE WAS 
ARED wan 
AND “AN ORDER FOR 
A SERIES OF “LETTERS inom 
(OF Dorm 
AND 
OFFICERS | 
HIS ARREST WAS ISSUED. 
DECEVSER ROSAS was RELOVED 
HIS POST AS 
thin 
the ‘meaning of th 
‘ 
= 
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STATE/INR 
"ARAY/ACSI “NAVY AIR Jes 
NSA NIC AID USIA. OCI ONE
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0-44 490) 
72:33 
@ 
| | 
PAGE 2 
baad 
CGSANDER Of THE SECOND ARHY CCRPS, AT ROSARIO, FOLIA: 
e 
WITH RAUCH, 
ROSAS WAS ASSIGNED TO THE WAR SECRETARIAT, IN BUENOS AIRES.) 
wes 
: 
ISSEM: 
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. 
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= 
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Ty OF THE. “PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF ARGENT INA TO MAKE DECISIONS, 
fe TIME HAS. COME TO ABANDON THE ROAD OF LEGAL POLITICAL ACTION, 
AND TO ‘SEEK THE "NECESSARY CHANGES BY MEANS OF A CIVIL 
MILITARY COUP’ ALONG THE LINES OF THE BRAZILIAN COUP WHICH 
°° 
: 
ation’ 
Of which in any manner to an 
person is 
STATEIINR, “DIA, “ARMYIACSL NAVY 
AIR 
JCS 
SECDEF. “NSA NIC AID “USIA OCI ONE 
OCR 
ORR 
OO 
AD/CI 2 
CIA/NMCC 
EXO 
- 
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY 
o 
ROUTINE 
Intelligence Information Cable 
Content UNCLASSIFIED 
_. 
TDCS-314/07551-65 
INFO. 
MID-MAY 1965 
| 
| 
SUZJECT 
GENERAL (RET) PEDRO ARAM3URU'S ASSUMPTION OF "GOLPISTA" 
~ 
-- 
POSITION 
| 
| 
| 
| 
> 
¢ 
|
“4 
> 
THE ARMY, AND JULIO ALSOGARAY, COMMANDER OF THE NATIONAL 
— 
\ 
IN 78659 
TDCS-314/07551-65 PAGE 2 
AUSO FOLLOW THE BRAZILIAN EXAMPLE IN COMBATING INFLATION. THE 
PRESENT ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT 1S HAMSTRUNG BETWEEN THE PRESSURES 
! 
CF POLITICS AND THE NECESSITIES OF GOVERNMENT. 
THUS, EVEN 
| 
THOUGH HE MAY PUBLICLY CALL FOR LEGAL POLITICAL ACTION, ARAMBURU 
‘HAS BECOME CONVINCED THAT SUCH ACTION "ONLY FAVORS THE DEMAGOGUES 
INA DISORGANIZED DEMOCRACY" SUCH AS EXISTS IN ARGENTINA TODAY. 
"ARAMBURU HAS TOLD HIS. PRIVATE SECRETARY THAT THE LATTER WILL 
HAVE: TO "PREPARE. HIMSELF FOR A DIFFERENT TYPE oF 
2, | ARAMBURU RECENTLY DISCUSSED THE CURRENT SITUATION IN cy 
ARGENT INA WITH GENERALS JUAN CARLOS ONGANIA, COMMANDER IN CHIEF 
> 
GENDARMERY. ALL THREE ARE AGREED THAT THE VACILLATING ATTITUDE 
OF THE GOVERNMENT IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS 1S. 
shanths 
PLACING THE ARMED FORCES IN A IEF ICULT. SITUATION. (SOURCE. 
ONGANIA, "COMMANDS THE RESPECT ‘AND. SUPPORT OF - 
“THE 
TTY OF. 
= THE MILITARY, AND HE, STILL PREFERS. TO. 
PATH, OF LEGALATY.., _, HOWEVER, HIS PATIENCE. 1S. WEARING THIN, 
GOVERNMENT VACILLAT ION ON THE. DOMINICAN: “REPULSIC ISSUE 
HAS TRIED IT SORELY. HIS ATTITUDE iS BOUND TO BE AFFECTED BY 
_ 
_ARAMBURU'S "GOLP1STA” _POSITION. | 
IF ONGANIA AND. ALSO GARAY. WERE 
TO JOIN FORCES WITH ARAMBURU, SUCH A COMBINATION WOULD OVERTHROW 
THE GOVERNMENT WITH EASE.) 
Be. IN RECENT WEEKS ARAMBURU HAS ALSO HAD A “SERIES OF 
= CONFERENCES WITH GENERAL (RET. 
LUIS BUSCAGLIA, WHO HAS 
3-44 
| 
} 
ope 
| 
| 
| 
| 
|
-¢ 
BEEN ARAMSURU'S CONTACT MAN WITH FIVE UNIDENTIFIED CHIEFS OF 
. 
THE ARMED FORCES. 
: 
| 
4, ARAMBURU SAYS THAT AT THE MOMENT THERE ARE AT LEAST 
ee 
THREE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS IN FORMATION: 
ONE LED BY 
on 
GENERAL (RET.) ENRIQUE RAUCH; ONE LED By ADMIRAL (RET.) 
ISSAAC ROJAS AND GENERAL (RET.) TORANZEO MONTERO (WHETHER 
sei 
. 
, CARLOS OR FEDERICO TORANZO MONTERO WAS NOT SPECIFIED) 5 AND A 
st THIRD BY GENERAL CARLOS Je ROSAS, WHICH PLANS ON USING VICE me 
PRESIDENT CARLOS He PERETTE, TO REPLACE A: "SICK" .PRESIDENT ARTURO 
AND THUS GIVE THE ILLUSION OF JURIDICAL CONTINUITY. 
IN 
“THE, FACE OF THESE, MOVEMENTS, ARAMSURU STATED: 
"WE MUST GET | 
“THERE FIRST." (SOURCE COMMENT : WHILE THE ARMY AND AIR 
| 
ads 
! FORCE CONTINUE TO STICK WITH ONGANIA, THE NAVY IS INCLINED 10 
* 
THROW, IN ITS LOT 
EITHER T THE ROSAS OR ROJAS GROUPS. RAUCH 
1S NOT LIKELY. To FIND MUCH _SUPPORT 
THE, EVENT. oF. AN ONGAN TA, 
ALSOGARAY-ARAMBURU COALITION, | HE WOULD FINO. HIMSELF ‘ON THE 
“OUTSIDE LOOKING 
PERETTE” SERIOUSLY Be 
cLIEVES THAT HE 
COULD 
“SURVIVE. COUP; AND “BE “INSTALLED 7 AS PRESIDENT, BUT-THIS IS 
COMPLETELY UNREALISTIC DREAM. 
IF THE GOVERNMENT FALLS, HE 
GO WITH 
IT.) 
| 
5. 
FIELD DISSEM: 
‘STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCLANT CINCSO. 
\ 
END OF MESSAGE 
| 
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| 
| 
| 
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- 
4l 
| 
CENTRAL 
INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY 
ROJTINE 
Intelligence Information Cable 
PAGE 1 OF G PACIS 
STATC/INK 
DIA 
ARMY 
WAVY 
AIR 
JCS 
SECOEF 
NSA 
NIC 
AID USIA $90 
ONE 
OCR 
OCS 
Cos 
? 
THIS 15 AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE, 
12: 
TOCDB-315/01570-66 
por.’ 22-28 MAY. 1966 
dota 
SUBJECT 
REMARKS OF GENERAL JULIO ALSOGARAY ON MILITARY 
PLANS FOR ‘TAKEOVER OF ILLIA GOVERNMENT IN JULY 1966 
ron 
ee ‘DURING THE WEEK OF 22 MAY 1966 GENERAL JULIO ALSOGARAY, 
ot: COMMANDER OF THE FIRST ARMY CORPS, STATED THAT THE _HIGH-RANKING 
ARGENTINE, MILITARY OFFICERS,’ INVOLVED 
THE “PLANNING OF. 
MYLITARY-COUP IN ARGENTINA, HAVE DECIDED TO TMPLEMENT THEIR. 
PLAN FOR. THE REMOVAL OF PRESIDENT ILLIA: 
JULY 1966. 
its 
JULY TARGET DATE DOES NOT. _PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THEY. “MAY. 
— 
t 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
|
Tocs DB-315,/01570-6G6 
PAGE 2 OF G PACKS 
{ela :rification) 
(dissem controls) 
ACT SOONER SHOULD A MAJOR CRISIS ARISE, 
2. 
THE PRINCIPAL OFFICERS INVOLVED IN THE PLANNING OF 
THE COUP ARE: 
GENERAL JUAN CARLOS ONGANIA, FORMER COMMANDER JN 
CHIEF OF THE ARMY GENERAL PASCUAL ANGEL PISTARINI, COMMANDER 
= 
IN CHIEF OF THE ARMY; GENERAL SULIO ALSOGARAY, COMMANDER OF 
THE FIRST ARMY CORPS; GENERAL ALEJANDRO LANUSSE, ‘CHIEF OF 
| OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF; AND GENERAL OSIRIS VILLEGAS, 
COMMANDER OF FIFTH ARMY CORPS IN BAHIA BLANCA .- 
HAVE. 
CONCLUDED THERE IS. NO. ALTERNATIVE TO THE REMOVAL OF THE PRESENT 
GOVERNMENT BECAUSE, 
‘THE GOVERNMENT'S COMPLETE PATLURE To SOLVE. 
te 
THE ECONOMIC PROBLEIS FACING THE COUNTRY, “ITs FAILURE TO COMBAT 
| 
"INCREASED Commun ST SUBVERSION AND INFILTRATION, “AND” BECAUSE OF. 
as Faris TO ARRIVE AT AN ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT WITH THE 
| 
war Ci WILL UNDOUBTEDLY RESULT 
‘A victory FOR 
| 
| 
| 
“PERONIST CANDIDATES IN THE MARCH 1967 ELECTIONS. ‘THEY DO NOT 
WANT THEIR TAKING OVER OF THE GOVERNMENT TO BE CONSTRUED AS “AN 
ANTI-PERONIST ACTION. _ THEY REALIZE THE NECESSITY TO 
| 
THE “INTEGRATION OF ‘ThE PiRowrsts iw THE POLITICAL LIFE 
Re 
THE COUNTRY AND THEY, INTEND TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT. TO REACH 
ACCEPTABLE WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE. PERONISTS . 
‘ON BAINES 
Ler 
| 
; 
pow 
> 
“ 
|
— 
a 
« 
=. 
- 
IN 
TOCS DB-315/01570-66 
PAGE 3 OF G PAGES 
f 
3. 
FOR THIS REASON THEY HAVE HELD CONVERSATIONS WITH LEADING 
PERONIST PERSONALITIES IN ARGENTINA / 
| 
THEY HAVE ATTEMPTED TO OBTAIN THEIR ASSURANCES THAT THEY WILL 
REFRAIN FROM CAUSING DIFFICULTIES FOR THE NEW GOVERNWENT BY 
NOT CALLING STRIKES AND INSTIGATING OTHER DISRUPTIVE ACTIONS, 
ae 
IN ORDER TO. GIVE THE NEW GOVERNMENT A REASONABLE PERIOD OF 
EMISSARY WAS SENT TO JUAN PERON ‘IN MADRID IN AN EFFORT 
OBTAIN HIS ASSURANCE HE WOULD Nor ORDER HIS FOLLOWERS “IN 
BE “PROVIDED WITH AN ARGENTINE PASSPORT WHICH 
“THERE WOULD BE NO PERSECUTION OF THE WORKING CLASS” 
CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN FOR HIS RETURN "TO ARGENTINA 
SOME -TIME -IN THE: FUTURE 
“GENERAL AUSOGARAY SAID THERE SHOULD BE 
NO 
IN 
te 
(classification) 
{dissem controls) 
> 
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| 
| 
‘ 
‘ 
| 
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| 
| 
‘ 
‘ 
‘ 
.
tocsDB-315/01570-G6 
PAGE 4 OFG 
PAGES 
(claatification) 
(dissem controls) 
THE NEW GOVERNMENT TO RESTORING ‘PERON' s RANK OF GENERAL} THE NEW 
GOVERNNENT HAS NO INTENTION OF PERSECUTING THE WORKING CLASS, SINCE 
IT IS HOPED THE NEW ECONOMIC PROGRAM ¥ TLL BE OF DIRECT BENEFIT TO 
THE WORKING CLASS; ‘AND THE MILITARY LEADERS Do yor ann. 
TOTALLY THE ‘POSSIBILITY OF PERON' RETURN 
TINE IN THE FUTURE. 
ALSOGARAY 
THAT AS ‘THE RESULT oF THE. ‘CONVERSATION WITH 
PERONIST LEADERS’ IN’ ARG 
RGENTINA ‘AND PERON, “THE MILITARY, PLANNERS 
SHAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THE ‘PERONISTS 
CREATE ‘ANY IMEDTATR 
pRoADEN an STRENGTHEN RELATIONS WITH THE ‘UNITED | 
“IMPLEMENT EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO RESTORE NATIONAL 
GF REORGANIZE THE POLITICAL PARTIES. 
| 
| 
> 
‘ 
>
THE NEW GOVERNMENT PLANS TO DISSOLVE ALL POLITICAL PARTIES AND 
: 
TO ‘SUBSEQUENTLY DRAW UP SPECIFIC REGULATIONS FOR THE FORMATION 
| eae 
OF 
PoLITicaL PARTIES. THE REGULATIONS WILL BE DESIGNED TO 
E 
PREVENT THE FORMATION OF A MULTIPLICITY OF PARTIES AND TO 3 ieee. oa 
PREVENT 
FORMATION OF ANY UNDEMOCRATIC pOLITICAL BARTIES. 
OF THE PLAN FOR REMOVAL OF PRESIDENT 
| 
win BE ‘CARRIED OUT AS FOLLOWS: THE ‘THREE 
CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES; WHO ARE IN COMPLETE, AGREEMENT 
| 
WITH THE PLAN, WILL ADVISE ILLIA HE IS BEING REMOVED “ko 
“1, 
re 
T0CS DB-315/'01570-66 
PAGE 
5 OF G PAGES 
6. WITH RECARD TO THE REORGANIZATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES, 
ONLY THOSE | 
GOVERN ‘ENT ‘POS ITIONS “NORMALLY A ASSIGNED: 
70” 
THE MILITARY, 
CONSIDERED TO BE EXPERTS IN THE’ 
FIELDS OF ECONOMICS, “FINANCE, 
MINING'AND PUBLIC 
WORKS WILL BE NAMED TO THE CABINET.* THE PLANNERS DO NOT. 
ANTICIPATE, ANY.EFFECTIVE OPPOSITION.- -THEY.HAVE-.NO- REASON 
BELIEVE, ANY COMMAND GROUP WITHIN: THE ‘ARMED FORCES WILL 
OPPOSE THEIR MOVE. THEY DO CONSIDER IT POSSIBLE 
* 
$ 
= 
| 
| 
z
feloseification) 
| 
(dissem controls) 
GENERAL EDUARDO CASTRO SANCHEZ, THE SECRETARY OF WAR, MAY TRY TO 
RALLY SOME SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT ILLIA FROM WITHIN THE ARMY, 
: 
BUT THEY ARE CONFIDENT CASTRO WILL NOT BE ABLE TO GENERATE ANY 
SIGNIFICANT RESPONSE, 
NEITHER CASTRO NOR THE SECRETARIES OF 
THE NAVY. ‘AND THE ‘AIR FORCE ARE AWARE OF THE coup TIMING. 
SAID MEMBERS OF THE PLANNING GROUP ARE’ 
OF T 
THE TREMENDOUS RESPONSIBILITY THEY WILL BE : 
“ASSUMING IN 
OVER THE GOVERNMENT. ‘THEY SINCERELY 
BELIEVE THAT IF THE ILLIA GOVERNMENT WERE PERMITTED TO" 
. 
REMAIN IN. POWER, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ‘CHAOS WOULD BE” 
- 
THOROUGHLY AND WITHA, SERIOUSNESS ‘OF PURPOSE ‘AND’ 
CAPABLE OF DEALING ‘EFFECTIVELY WITH THE ‘SERIOUS 
| 
| 
PROBLEM FACING “THE NATION AT THIS TIME. 
“FIELD DISSEM: 
CINCSO, CINCLANT | 
3° 
TOCS DB-315/01570-66 
FAGE G OF G PACES 
| 
> 
! 
- 
| 
| 
| 
> 
wr
CENTRAL INTEL 
“LLIGENCE 
AGENCY 
ROUTINE 
Intelligence Information Cable 
31010 
wr 
PAGE 
OF J, 1PAGTS _ 
STATE/INA 
DIA 
AHMY 
NAVY 
JCS 
SECOEF 
NSA 
Nic 
AID 
USIA 
500 
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CGS 
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THIS 1S AN INFORMATION REPORY, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGE 
Content Uo! CLASS 
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sumect 
INCREASED TENSION IN RELATION TO A POSSIBLE COUP ATTEMPT 
| 
war 
THE, ‘ARGENTINE MILITARY: 
TUATION APPR 
Ag or. 
pe 
BASED ‘ON INFORMATION AVAILABLE 
Tn TIME OF ITS 
PREPARATION. 
PREPARED FOR INTERNAL USE AS A GUIDE -TO THE OPERA- 
TIONAL ENVIRONMENT, ‘THIS COMMENTARY IS DISSEMINATED 
IN THE BELIEF 
Rare 
THAT 
MAY BE USEFUL TO OTHER 
AGENCIES IN ASSESSING THE SITUATION -- ---~ 
2. 
FOLLOWING THE 29 MAY 
DAY ‘SPEECH OF THE COMMANDER 
IN ‘CHIEF OF THE ARGENTINE ARM 
LT, GENERAL PASCUAL 
TARINT: 
(classification) 
(dissem controls) 
| 
LIN 
‘ 
| 
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‘ 
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— 
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IN 
31010 
-314/07034-G66 
fetasstfication) 
fdissem controte) 
| 
PAGE 2 OF 11 PAGES 
| 
| 
| 
WHICH MANY OBSERVERS CONSIDER TO BE A. DIRECT CONFRONTATION BETWEEN 
THE ARMY AND THE CIVIL GOVERNMENT, TENSION AND. RUMORS HAVE REACHED - 
AN UNPRECEDENTED PEAK IN BUENOS 
SINCE. .PISTARINI'S S. SPEECH, 
; MANY NEWSPAPER HEADLINES HAVE STRESSED THE. CONFRONTATION BETWEEN 
“ 
THE ARMY, At AND. THE ADMINISTRATION OF PRESIDENT. ILL GAs, RESPONS! Bt 
‘AND CONSERVATIVE JOURNALS. ARE REPORTING IN DEPTH ON-ALL INCIDENTS 
WHICH MIGHT REFLECT UPON MILITARY COVERNME NT REL ATIONS 
ENCED POLITICAL. OBSERVERS WHO HAVE UNTIL 
W “MAINTAINE CONS IDER- 
ABLE SKEPTICISM, BELIEVE JHAT THE PROCESS HICH WILE 
*+e- 
e . MILITARY TAKEOVER OF 
GOVERNS 
NOW 
IN MOTION. AND. THAT 
COUP COULD: STAKE: PLACE aT 
“ANY MOM, ENT 
OF POSSIBLE 
- 
MILITARY, “COUP HAVE, BEEN WIDESPREAD INTHE PAST», AT. THE. “PRESENT. TIME 
| 
THERE, APPEARS 10, BE) 
CONS IDERABL E. 
A 
A ‘REAL “AND MARKED, £ 
3. 
MONTH, OF; "APRIL. BEGAN RATHER QUIETLY WITH THE LEGALIST 
“COMMUN IQUE OF THE SECRETARY OF WA? 
CASTRO SANCHEZ© 
| 
DEFENSE” MINISTER’ LEOPOLDO” SUAREZ, 
TENS 
AND WERE “FOLLOWED 
UNOFFICIAL "TRUCE". BETWEEN THE OVERNMENT AND THE ARMED... 
FORCES “IN” ORDER 
“ALLOW THE ADMIN: STRAT ION” 
“RESOLVE” 
. 
NINES 
| 
» 
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——_—----4 
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‘ 
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ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS WHICH THE ARMED FORCES DEMANDED BE 
a 
THE ‘TRUCE, HOWEVER, WAS SHORT=LIVED. 
ALTHOUCH THE GOVERN- 
MENT APPEARED TO BE CONSIDERING CABINET AND POLICY CHANGES, ILLIA 
| 
FAILED TO MAKE ANY. SIGNIFICANT. CHANGES. 
5. DURING THIS. SAME 
TIME PERIOD; THERE WERE RECURRING RUMORS 
_ AND SENSAT |ONAL IST. PRESS, COMMENTARY WHICH IND! CATED. AN ALLEGED 
"EXISTENCE OF. A PLAN ON THE PART OF THE COVERNMENT TO ATTEMPT TO 
COUNTER THE PRESSURE 
OF THE ARMED FORCES BY OIVIDING THE, VARIOUS 
GROUPS WITHIN THE MILITARY... SUPPOSEDLY, THESE PLANS INCLUDED 
AN. ATTEMPT 19 FORCE THE REMOVAL 
GEN 
ARING. “ARMY. ‘LEADERS’ 
= WERE’ "REPORTEDLY. VERY_IRRITATED AT, THIS ALLE? 
PLAN, "STRESSING 
“THE. SAME TIME, MILITARY. LEADERS pet EVED. THAT CASTRO 
SANCHEZ, | wHo} HAS. BEEN. ATTEMPTING. 79 ACT ASA PEACE JAKER aN THE 
CIVIL-MILITARY CONFRONTATION, WAS. INVOLVED 
THE 
ADI INISTRATION'S 
| 
PLAN JO FORCE. THE REMOVAL OF PJSTARIN] WHILE POSING_AS THE ARMY'S 
AN THE OPINION OF MILITARY. LEADERS, THE. SACRED RESERVE 
| of THE MILITARY INSTITUTION WAS FURTH ER 
in. THE RECENT 
(classification) 
(dissem* controls) 
AS 
e 
“NDON BAINES JOURSON LIBRARY | 
| 
| 
. 
y 
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321010 
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PAGE 4 OF LIPAGES 
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‘4 
(clessificetion) 
(dissem controls) 
CASE OF THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN DEFENSE MINISTER LEOPOLDO SUAREZ 
AND AIR FORCE GENERAL HUGO MARTINEZ ZUVIRIA, THE FORMER DIRECTOR 
_ OF THE NATIONAL WAR: COLLEGE, OVER THE_USE OF AN ALLEGED ANTI= 
GOVERNMENT. PAMPHLET. AS_AN EXAMPLE OF PROPAGANDA IN ONE OF. THE, 
_SCHOOL'S 
-- 
8. _THUS, 
‘GOVERNMENT! S_ FAILURE TO. CHANGE COU 
FIRM WARNING 
IN 4. FURTHER, REFINEMENT. BY THE ARMED. FORCES OF A 
 TINGENCY, PLAN FOR A POSSIBLE OVERTHROW OF THE COVERNMENT 
“ADDITION, THE. FAILURE OF THE PRES!IDENT-TO 
rH SUGSESTIONS 
= 
GOVERNMENT. WOULD NEVER IMPROVE 
NOR 
THOSE CONDITIONS, 
THE 'ARMED. FORCES FELT. WERE 
THE NAT TON. 18.1 
10: 
"SEVERAL OCCURENCES DUR 
SIRST WEEK: OF: ‘JUNE, HAVE 
ADDED. TO. THE PRESENT ATMOSPHE ERE OF TENSION. 
PERHAPS THE MOST 
IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT WAS THE 29 MAY, ARMY DAY. SPEECH ‘OF. PISTARINI. 
THIS SPEECH WAS MADE-IN THE VERY-PRESENCE 
OF ILLIA AND HAS BEEN.— 
? 
© 
| 
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4,
31010 
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PAGE 
3 OF LIPAGES 
_ WIDELY INTERPRETED AS BEING BOTH CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT AND 
POSSIBLY A PROVOCATION TO LURE THE ADMINISTRATION INTO A PUBLIC” 
POLEMIC. 
THE SPEECH ITSELF WAS CERTAINLY INTENDED TO DISPEL ANY 
: 
AS 
THE ARMY'S POS! TION AND TO 1TS DESIRE TO HANDLE THOSE, 
“MATTERS WHICH IT CONSIDERS JO FALL 
173 OWN MANDATES PIs- 
SPEECH MAY WELL. “HAVE, BEEN A 
PUSL WARNING To THE 
FOR. Is PART, THE 
ERLY REPLIED TO PISTAR-, 
INI'S ‘SPEECH THROUGH DEFENSE M} NISTER SUAREZ ¥HO. 
POINTED. ouT THAT 
THE ARMY COMMANDER'S ADDRESS WAS IN 
PLETE ACCORD WITH THE 
OF THE 
THIS STATE MENT MOST=LIKELY CAUGHT 
= THE. "MILITARY, OF: 
UARD AND 
ATED: ANY, ATTEMPT. TO.. 
PISTARIN 
SPEECH 
POSS 
VE FOR, ‘ACTION AGAINST. — 
SPEECH :1S 
‘PARTICULAR INTEREST 
THAT MOST OB SERVERS FELT. THAT 
THE GENERAL WAS DIRECTLY CRITICIZINS THD CO JERNMENT. 
AN ADDITIONAL FACTOR ‘IN THE: PRES NT 
TUATION 
SHOULD BE TARE ANTO. ACCOUNT: 1S--THE-REMOVAL OF -ZUVIRIA MENTIONED... 
IN PARA, SIX ABOVE. AIR FORCE OFFICERS HAVE PUBLICLY. STATED TRAT__ 
"THEY “STAND SOLIDLY BEHIND. ZUVIRIA AND WIL REQUEST THAT HE SE 
. 
RAINES Jon ong 
-* 
tan 
ve 
.
PAGE 6 OF 1)PAGES 
| 
(classification) 
(dissem controls) 
REINSTATED. 
(THE ZUVIRIA CASE SEGAN DURING M!D-MAY AND REACHED 
A CRISIS. WHEN ZUVIRIA WROTE A STRONG LETTER TO THE DEFENSE MINISTER 
_CRITICIZING CERTAIN POLICIES OF. THE !LL1A ADMINISTRATION. THE 
“TIMING 
THE REMOVAL OF ZUVIRIA HAS SERVED AS ANOTHER REMINDES 
THE MILITARY OF 
POLITICAL MANEUVER 
ING OF THE PRESENT, GOVERN 
"MENT AND oF 
"AN 
ENCROACHMENT UPON JHE MILITARY. 
RECENT’ REPORTING HAS INDICATE ED A IDENING BREACH BETWEEN 
ONLY. THE: GOVERNMENT. AND THE MILITARY, BUT. AL SO BETWEEN CASTRO 
ad 
~ 
SANCHEZ: AND ARMY. LEADERS. 
PISTARIN| SPEECH, COUPLED \ 
WITH 
DISMISSAL OF ZUVIRIA 
WELL HAVE 
ADDED 
TO TRE SO!_ IDITY OF. THE 
* 
MILITARY. VIS-A-VIS. 
‘CIVIL 
N MEN 
iTS EARLIER. REFORT ING FROM. 
HAS. 
THAT THE AIR. FORCE HAS, PROMI SED. 
THERE HAVE, BEEN CONTACTS BETWEEN THE, 
AND 
PERONIST. MOVEMENT: AND IT APPEARS LIKELY THAT THE: PERONIST._ LABOR. 
SECTOR WHICH FOLLOWS.-AUGUSTO- VANDOR HAS AGREED NOT.TO..RES!IST_OR _ 
OPPOSE. A’ 
‘coup. PERONIST PARTY 
“HAVE ANNOUNCED THEIR, IN- 
TO 
FOR THE IMPEACHMENT OF THE: PRESIDENT. 
> 
‘ 
> 
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> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
°, 
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> 
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A: "REASON, FOR A. couP 
FOLLOWING” THIS. LINE, 
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PAGE 7 OF }]] PAGES 
14, 
IT 1S APPARENT THAT FIELD GRADE ARMY OFFICERS BELIEVE — 
THAT THE NATION ‘JS PASSING THROUGH A PERIOD OF DETERIORATION WHICH 
| 
THE PRESENT, GOVERNMENT iS INCAPADLE OF STOPPING. 
VERY LITTLE iS 
"HEARD ABOUT THE ARMY'S FEAR OF ASSUMING THE DIRECTION OF THE | 
| 
GOVERNMENT, WHICH AT ONE TIME MARKED 
TARY'S RELUCTANCE. 
EVEN TO ATTEMPT A COUP: AT APPE, ARS AS IF. THE ‘MOUNT ING FRUSTRAS 
{THON HAS BEEN STIRRED By’ THe RECENT EVENTS REPORTED ‘ABOVE WHICH. 
HAVE GEEN FURTHER. IRRITATED BY SUCH FACTORS AS THE PERON| ST vice 
TORY IN CATAMARCA PROVINCE, THE NeW DEVALUATION OF THE PESO, “AND, 
CONTINUED FAILURE TO VOTE ON A_ NATIONAL BUDGET. . 
“= "POSS IBLE: THAT MILITARY “OFFICERS Hi 
HAVE: 
UP 
HOPE. OF SERIOUS 
ICY: “CHANGES BY THE ADMINISTRA TION. AND HAVE” REACHED. THE 
_STAGE 
ATTEMPT ING Jo. PROVOKE THE, GOVER NM ENT INTO. PROVIDING THE ARMY... 
BEEN REPORTED. AND CONF IRMED THAT IF THE, GOVERNMENT, SHOULD ATTEMPT 
‘ 
REMOVE, PISTARINI, ThE MILITARY WILL OUST ILLIA. 
4S, : THE GOVERNMENT OBVIOUSLY 
ECOGNIZED. PiSTARINI'S SPEECH 
AS’ A PROVOCATION. AND WAS | 
REAS 
SONABLY SATISF LED WITH ITS DEFT - 
"RESPONSE, THE PRESIDENT ‘FEELS THAT RE STILL Is iN FULL, CONTROL~. 
aw 
| 
THE’ SITUATION. HE RECENI LY 
ED NOT TO MAKE ANY, 
CABINET 
" 
: 
‘ 
> 
| 
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é 
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= 
IN 
31010 
CS ~-314/07034-66 
PAGES 
OF ]] PAGES 
(classification) 
(dissem controls) 
CHANGES AS REQUESTED EARLIER SY THE MILITARY.’ HE HAS SAID THAT 
‘HE WOULD ONLY GIVE IN TO MILITARY PRESSURE _IF.HE WAS CONVINCED IT 
WAS’ THE ONLY CHANCE, 70 SAVE HiS ADMINISTRATION... AT THE “PRESENT, 
TIME, 
JS:NOT, KNOWN 
ILLIA WOULD RATHER GO DOWN FIGHT ING FOR 
| HIS PARTY. LAND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS 
OR WOULD GIVE, To JHE. 
| 
an MILI TARY: DEMANDS, AR: 
[APPEARS HAT GIVEN THE | 
PRESENT 
CIRCUMSTANCES, ; THE PRESIDE} 
MOULD NOT MAKE AN AGRESSIVE STAND 
AGA INST. THE ARMY’ WHICH MIGHT PROVIDE A MOTIVE.FOR A COUP. 
THOUGH 
INITIALLY. APPEARED . 
AS, THOUGH, THE: ADMINISTRATION 
NOT, 
ANY SIGNS OF PANIC. 
PRESIDENT FOUND iT NECESSARY ON THE 
BY, STATING. SHAT. 
AS POSITIVE. GOALS“ WHICH ARE 
AT. BENEF 
NATION. 17: WAS_A" 
“SPEECH 
EFFORT. ON: THE: | 
THE: MILITARY: JO: ‘CARRY. our: cour. AS WELL 
A. RESPONSE 
“THe, 
REPORTS OF UNREST. AMONG. THE ARMED": 
~26., AT. THIS -TIME,--THE ODDS APPEAR ~T0-FAVOR-THE POSSIBIL I 
OF-.A MILITARY, TAKEOVER 
-IN “THE NEAR FUTURE. THE “GOVERNMENT. | 
THAMNY PROBLEMS THAT HAVE ACCUMULATED OVER, THE PAST 
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON 
| 
> 
*
tocs -314/07034-66 
FAGED 
OF 
(clacrificrtion) 
(dissem controls) 
. 
YEARS THAT MAJOR CONCESSIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE AND PROBABLY 
NOTHING SHORT OF A MAJOR OVERHAUL WOULD HAVE ANYTHING MORE THAN 
| 
A DELAYING EFFECT. 
IN ADDITION 
THE ACUTE MILITARY CRISIS, THE. 
GOVERNMENT .FACES, A 
GENERAL STRIKE ON, 1 JUNE 
IT HAS NO BUDGET,. 
A, SOLUTION TO "AVOID, A 
PERONIST. NICTORY 
“THE UNIVERSITY SITUATION 1S BECOMING SERIOUS, AND 
ADMINISTRA 
THE MARCH 
ELECTIONS. 
_ TION HAS NOT, YET ARRIVED (ATA S 
| 
THE MILITARY CRISIS, 
ONLY PETRACT FROM, THE GOVERNMENT. 
EFFORTS 
DEVOTE-AS MUCH ENERGY AS 1T WOULD LIKE TO) SOLVE THE, 
MANY IMPORTANT. CONDI 
For A Wit TARY. TAKEOVER, HAVE... 
BEEN. MET. 10 A GREAT FY TENT.“ 17. HAS "BEEN, REPORTED’ 
“LTE. GENERAL” ONGANTA Now SUPPORTS THE ARMY'S: DESIRE: FORA: ‘couP AND» 
4S. CONVINCED OF. THE. 
‘DESIRABIL | iY OR AT LEAST THE. ANEVITABILITY | OF 
‘A CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT .- THE, QUESTION OF A MOTIVE..FOR'A COUP STILL 
REMAINS UNSETTLED, ALTHOUGH, ME ANY OFFICERS BC LIEVE THAT THE SIMPLE 
LACK OF “AUTHORITY THE PART OF “THE- 
GOVERNMENT -1S- REASON 
ENOUGH 
ove: -A ‘WOT IVE” COULD” DEVELOP AT ANY. TIME.AS A RESULT... 
oF A RESPONSE TO A MILITARY PROVOCATION OR OVER AN INSTITUTIONAL 
; 
_felassification) 
controls ) 
4 ‘ 
‘ ‘ 4 
4 ‘ ‘ 4 
‘ 4 
4 > 
4 4 4 4 
4 4 4 
;
DELAY..AN 
ANY; posi TIVE: ACTION, BY_ TH HEARD MED. FO 
FORCES | 
SINCE ‘Te MOULDS 
FACT»; APPEASE-P STARING. O 
“ON TH 
HAND. 
COULD ALSO. LEAD. 
JO; 
0, GREATER OJ 
FEICULTIES, By: 
Ay 
TH AT THE GOVERNMENT: IS, 
MOST. REPORT ING: HAS POINTED TO THE+PERIOD_ OF, 6-25 JUNE” 
| 
AS THE MOST-LIKELY.-PER1OD FOR 
OVERTHROW. 
SPECIAL ATTENTION 
HAS BEEN GIVEN TO 2g JUNE, “ARG ENTINE FLAG 
AND, LT, HAS BEEN 
REPORTED THAT ARMY COMMANDERS WILE MAKE. STRONG AND, "PROVOCATIVE 
2% 
¥ 
TOCS -314/97034-66 
PAGE 10 OF1O PAGES 
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felassifiration) 
(disscm confro!s) 
QUESTION SUCH AS THE REMOVAL OF ZUVIRIA. IF NO SINGLE MOTIVE... 
. 
DEVELOPS IN THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS, iT 1S POSSIBLE THAT THE... 
- 
MILITARY WOULD. CONSIDER THAT THE GENERAL SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC. 
i 
DETERJORATION HAD REACHED THE POINT Wal! CRE THEY, WOULD SIMPLY, STEP 
IN AND. TAKE: OVER WITH THE JUST 
qT 
To FOLLOW. JHE EVENT. 
THE GOVERNMENT. 
CONCEIVAS LY, PULL’ 
BY IMMEDIATELY 
JING CHANGES. IN THE, CAB NET AND PROVIDING A REASONABLE SOLUTION 
TO THE, 1967. ELECTION PROBLEM IN: HE PROYINCE. OF BUENOS, AIRES. 
IT is ALSO POSSIBLE-- 
NOT. 
ELY-> THAT: ILLIA, _WHO HAS ADEPTLY 
"MET. MANY, CHALLENGES, iN. THE PAST COULD. MANEUVER HIS, MAY 
SLTVATION«: FOR: EXAMPLE, THE, RESIGNATION. 
“SANCHEZ. 
HAS: BEEN "RUMORED => SUCH. A, "RESIGNATIO ON: 
POSSIBLY FURTHER. 
{ f | 
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON 
> 
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11PAGES 
(classification) 
(dissem_controls) 
SPEECHES TO THEIR TROOPS ON THAT DAY. 
20. IN ADDITION, IT WOULD SEEM THAT THE MILITARY WOULD LIKE 
. 
_.. 
TO HAVE GAINED POWER AND CONSOLIDATED THEIR. POSITION FAR ENOUCH 
A TAKEOVER 
| 
| 
oe DELAYED MUCH BEYOND 20 JUNE, 
IT WOULD PROBABLY BE POSTPOYED et 
le wi 
IN ADVANCE OF THE 9 JULY NATIONAL CELEBRATION 
* 
“ UNTIL SEPTEMBER. 
Is EXPECTSD 1 TUAT EVEN: IF IT 
‘Is POSTPONED, 
THE TENSE SITUATION WILL CONTINUE UNLESS ILLIA is ABLE TO TAKE 
21. FIELD DISSEM: 
STATE, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, CINcso, 
~- 
| 
| 
a 
At 4 
= > <. 
ew 
i 
tye
CENTRAL 
INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY 
| 
ROUTINE 
Intelligence Information Cable 
i 
PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES 
STATE/INR 
DIA ARMY 
WAVY 
AIR 
JCS 
SECOEF 
NSA 
NIC 
AID 
USIA 
SOO 
ONE 
OCR 
ORR 
OCS 
CCS 
CIA/NMCE 
__ 
EXO 
| 
Sf? 
copy 
THIS 1S AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE, 
ae 
Content 
| 
"DIST 29 JUNE 1966 
“SUBJECT 
oP i108 OF 
COMMANDER OF THE FIRST ARMY CORPS, 
| 
COPY 
| 
| 
J
“IN 
tocs 
-31%/6838)-4%6 
PAGE 
2 OF ' PACES 
| 
fciassi fication; 
(dissem controls) 
wo 
1. “ALVARO ALSOGARY, MINISTER OF ECONOMICS IN THE ADMINISTRATION 
: 
-. OF FORMER PRESIDENT ARTURO FRONDIZI, SAID ON 28 JUNE THAT. HE AND HIS 
BROTHER, ina JOR GENERAL AULIO ALSOGARAY, WERE NOT ENTIRELY SATISFIED. with 
“THE WAY THE OVERT HROW OF [HE ILLIA GOVERNMENT ORIGINATED. ALVARO | 
“ALSOGARAY SAID THEY. BELIEVED. THAT IF THE ARMED FORCES HAS. WAITED 
LITTLE LOWGER 
COULD_ HAVE BEEN. CARR 
OUT, WITH LESS. OF Tie: 
APPEARANCE OF A classic 
AMERICAN. MILITARY T AKE=OVER. 
| 
ALVARO ALSOSARY. SAID. HE WILL. MEET. WITH PRES! DENT 
ONGANIA SOON AFTER ONGANIA HAD BEEN SWORN IN AS PRESIDENT’. THE 
“FORMER REQUESTED, THE MEETING, TO DISCUSS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 
(SOURCE 
“CONMENT::* ALVARO, ACSOGARY SAID HE WAS “AFRAID 
ENSURE 
THES DOES NOT cone ABoUT.) 
ALAR ALSOGAAY 
THAT: iF 
FOLLOWS “THE “PLAN 
ONGANIA APPROVED SOME TIME’ AGO, THERE WILL BE. ONLY FOUR GOVERNMENT 
“MINISTRIES: ECONOMICS AND LAEOR FOREIGN RELATIONS 
INTERIOR; 
| 
| 
. 
PLAN THERE WOULD BE MORE. SECRET ARIES RESPONSIBLE TO THE _MINISTERS THAN 
GOVERNMENT THE “THREE “COMMANDERS: 
CHIEF” “OF THE A 
ARMED 
FORCES WOULD ALSO PERFORM THE FUNCTIONS OF THE SECRETARIES 
THE 
| 
SERVICES, THUS OBVIATING THE POSSIBILITY OF “THE, XINDS OF CONFLICTS” 
| 
> 
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¢ 
® 
> 
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IN 
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PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES 
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(eiassfication) 
fdissem controls) 
| 
THAT HAVE ARISEN BETWEEN THE TWO KINDS OF OFFICES IN THE ILLIA 
GOVERNMENT. 
ABOVE THE CABINET MINISTERS THERE WOULD BE A DELIBERAT ING 
BODY, CALLED A COUNCIL OF STATE. THERE WILL ALSO BE AN ECONOMIC 
.AND SOCIAL COUNCIL. (FIELD COMMENT 7: ANOTHER SOURCE WHO HAS REPORTED 
“ACCURATELY SA ID. on 28 JUNE THERE WOULD. BE_ ONLY. THREE. 
RIES: 
AFFAIRS$ “INTERIOR 
DEFENSE ; AND. ECONOMICS AND LABOR. ) 
ALVARO, ‘ALSOGARAY SAID HE WAS. NOT..CONF IDENT THAT ONGANIA® 
PROBABLE. CHOICE FOR MINISTER .OF ECONOMICS, J.M. SALIMEL, HAS THE 
“ABILITY, OR EXPERIENCE FOR THE JOB. (SOURCE COMMENT: 
HE DESCRIBED 
SAL IME! AS: AN IND USTR IALIST AND FINANCIER, WITHOUT, EXPERIENCE IN A. 
PUBLIC. Post. 
ADMINISTRATIVE POSIT 10%. HE, SAID 
WAS. 
AIS” PROTEGE, AND: AN ECONOMIST OF 
(ALSOGARAY? $) ~SOCIAL. “MARKET 
: 
- 
ee 
SESS 
AND’ THAT. SOON AFTER ONGANTA Kao 
PROPOSED. THE, “MINISTRY 
. 
THE LATTER, VISITED ALSOGARAY AND ASKED, “FOR. HELP. IN THE 
FUTURES ALSOGARAY, SAID. SAL IMEI APPEARED. TO FEAR. ‘THE RESPONSIBILITY 
OF THE_ POST ») (FIELD COMMENT THE, SOURCE, SAID 
THOUSHT ALSOGARAY 
WANTED. THE POST BADLY HIMSELF AND Is. UPSET THAT. HE 
CHOSEN. 
ALSOGARAY SAID. THAT SALIMEI DOES, HOWEVER, REPRESENT THE TYPE OF. PERSON 
 ONGANTA’ WANTS AN TOP POSITIONS IN HIS GOVERNMENT: YOUNG, RELATIVELY 
“DON BAINES 
LIBRAP 
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OF 
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-3)4%/08581 -66 
RE GARD ING LABOR, ALSOGAR AY SAID THAT “ACCORDING TO THE PREVIOUSLY. 
COMMANDERS 
CHIEF. OF Te ARMED FORCES WOULD NOT BE DISSOLVED 
_.BUT- WOULD. BE. DISS=- . 
WHEN ONGANIA. “ASSUMES THE: PRESIDENCY ON 29. JUNE» BUT: 
OLVED, LATER WHEN. A_ NEW CABINET. HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED 
‘FIELD -DISSEM: 
STATE ARMY: ‘NAVY, ‘AIR: 
-CINCSO. 
APPROVED. PLAN, 
GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF LABOR 
NOT BE DISSOLVED BUT WILL BE CAREFULLY OBSERVED. 
, AND CONTROLLED» 
_ 
BE. TAKEN AGAINST LABOR BY, THE NEW GOVERNMENT), 
(CGT) WILL 
SOURCE. (OF THE, FIELD COMMENT IN PARAGRAPH THREE, ABOVE;- 
RE PORTED ESSENTIALLY THIS. SAME INFORMATION, ADDING. THAT LABOR HAD. 
AGREED, THROUGH 
-VAND OR. AS SPOKESMAN, TO TWO. YEARS. WITHOUT. 
LABOR TROUBLES IN EXCHANGE FOR A. GUARANTEE. THAT’ WO FORCEFUL, MEASURES 
A 
« 
67 ALSOGARAY SAID THE ‘PROVISIONAL. JUNTA FORMED BY THE THREE 
oF 
‘YN DON BAINES 
LiBRARY 
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| 
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RNoportedly appointed Provistonal President or 
following a wilitary coup 
against 
GF 
President Artwro Lilia on 28 June 
me i955 , Ls, Cen, 
(ret. ) Juan Carlos Unganfa wes consiéered the strong- 
| 
est 
most influen isl militsry figure in hegentind 
at the time of his wnexyccted retirerant 96 cou- 
| 
} 
maniex in chief of the 
on 24 
1905. 
| 
} 
BOGRARHIC 
; 
& 
REGISTER 
| 
| 
Xnown to be opposed to the policies 
of 
the Illia government, he apparently confined hiwself to verbal onposi- 
prior to the coup. 
| 
With 
to international affeirs, 
Ls 
enti- 
| 
Convaunist and pro-United States. 
In 
the Cuden missile crisis of 
. 
F 
October 1962 and the 1945 Nominican Republic insurgency, he dacked the 
; 
) 
uctions of the US Covernnent fully. 
<A longtime advocate of an inter 
 Amerdean security force, he was apparently aeeply chegrinad when the Are 
gentine-Government refused to perticipate in the Inter-Anericai Peace Pore 
(TAPP) sent to the Dominican Republic, 
During 
duly 1965 
to Zur ope 
he vas. repou tedly somewhat awayed by the “Think Wi ora" 
gubsequent trip to Brazil, he wes seid to have ebandoned these décas. 
Wndle-dn Brazil he was reported in the press to have negotiate? a pect 
‘the Brazilian rilitery esteblishwent 
they and the Argentine sve: 
Porces, 
to intervene in Uruguoy 
the event. of 0, Conmunist tekeoves 
that nation, “(He later denied the existence of such a psct.) | 
‘ 
, 
Forr, 17 March 1924 in Marces Paz, Buenos Aires Province, Juen Carlos 
Ongania is of Basque heritage. 
A Gre_uate of the National Militery Acadany 
(193 1-34), the Superior War School (1945) ami the Cavalry School (16h5), vac: 
- 
45. %%. 
Gerved ‘varLously with both the cavalry anj_ermored branches of the 
e5-director general of remount end veterinory services 
eomanding geners of the First srmored Division_(1962), end cormangin 
ohm 
wnt 
he 
« 
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. 
> 
philosophy, wut af 
i 
C 
| 
| 
| 
|
| 
| 
| 
Juan Carlos ONGANIA 
(cont, ) 
uenorel of the Cavalry Corns ( 1962), 
ves 
led the "azul” faction of the ermy, which wanted ros 
conctitutionel yoverament, egainst the "colorado" Zaction, 
rule, 
Described as a reserved, mocest, sustere Individusl 
pointed 
in, chie? 
by Interim President Joxd 
Guido in 
1952 
hed 
»yration of 
92.134 
| 
Onganfa lacked the sperkle end lustre of fellow staff officers 
a: acing 
his. active military career but reportedly gained theii respect by his energetic 
| 
. 
handling of his commands and his common sense approach to problems. 
fSonewhst 
' 
Gifficult to engage in conversation, he is slow to enger but nepuvedly hes & 
_ 
trong temper once aroused. 
A Scotch ort nker and herd-driving polo pleyer, he 
. 
is said to enjoy living the life of an Eaglish cowntry squire. 
Married to tne 
8% 
former Merfa Emilia Green, he ie the father of three Cayghters and two sons 
- 
for, nonmilitazy careers, 
Ee is not known to speak any foreign 
os 
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HARRY S 
_ HARRY S, TRUMAN 
| PRESIDENT'S SECRETARY FILE 
OPE 
December 1946 
| 
cory no. 
J] 
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP 
FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS IN BOLIVIA * 
The Bolivian Junta de Gobierno, which assumed power following the 
angry popular revolt against the Villarroel regime on 21 July of this 
yea>, 
now regards as accomplished its self-imposed mission to restore 
constitutional democracy in Bolivia. 
It has, accordingly, scheduled a 
general election for 5 January, and given assurances of its intention 
to step aside, 
as soon as the votes are counted, 
in favor of a popularly 
chosen president, vice-president, 
and congress. 
The achievements of the 
Junta caretaker government and the issues in the elections are discussed 
in the Enclosure hereto. 
Junta President Tomas Monje Gutierrez, a respected member of Bolivia's 
judiciary, 
has pledged that the 5 January elections will be the freest in 
Bolivia's history. 
We believe that this pledge will be kept. 
This is 
_incicated by the success of Monje Gutierrez' drive to eliminate Villar- 
roel sympathizers from all strategic posts in the armed forces and the 
civil service, by the fact that he is not himself a candidate in the elec- 
tions, and by the energy and impartiality 
with which he and his colleagues 
have maintained the indispensable electoral freedoms of expression and as- 
semdly throughout the campaign. 
Moreover, 
it is highly improbable that 
any disaffected elements will attempt to prevent the elections by an ap- 
peal to arms, 
since the “Monje Gutierrez caretaker government today en- 
joys the support of all the important organized groups in Bolivia save 
the Miners’ Federation. 
While a detailed forecast of the voting pattern is complicated by 
the fact that the strength of Bolivia's political parties has not been 
tested in a fwir election for many years and by the elimination of a 
major political party (the Movimento Nacional Revolucionario, 
which sup- 
ported the Villarroel dictatorship), 
we believe that: 
(a) 
The predominantly non-Communist left-wing PIR (Partido 
de Izquierda Revolucionaria) commands a notably larger popular 
| 
following than any other party participating in the elections, and 
will therefore win at least a considerable plurality oft the seats 
in the lower house 
of Congress. 
(Under Bolivia's electoral law, 
no single party can win a top-heavy plurality in the Senate.) 
(bo) For the Presidency, ex-Ambassador to Washington Louis 
Guachalla, supported by a loose four-party coalition organized by 
the PIR, will defeat ex-MMinister of Labor Jose Enrique Hertzog, 
wno is supported by a three-party conservative coalition. 
This report 
has the concurrence of the intelligence agencies of the War 
and Navy Departments and the Army Air Forces. 
State Department comment 
is not yet available; substantial 
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(c) 
Guachalla will not be assured of easy control of Congress 
because, although his coalition will probably win a majority of the 
seats in both houses, each party therein is presenting and will 
control its own congressional candidates. 
(4) 
Bolfvta's 40,000 organized miners, who insist that the 
elections are being keld prematurely, 
may yet decide to run their 
own candidate or, failing that, to support neither Guachalla nor 
Hertzog.* 
Their decision, however, 
is not likely to exert a deci- 
_Sive influence on the electoral results, since they account for 
less than 10% of the electorate. 
4, 
While the resultant government will, because of Bolivia's depen- 
gence on Argentina for essential food supplies be under great pressure 
to join Peron's projected economic bloc (Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, 
Urusvey, Bolivia, Peru), it will resist this pressure to the utmost and 
show 2 marked preference for a pro-US economic orientation. 
The US, in 
view 
of its interest in a hemisphere source of tin, will derive great long- 
rin benefits from™“any increase in tin production, 
and any improvement in 
reletions between capital and labor in the tin industry, that the new 
government may be able to achieve on the basis of a moderately leftist 
approach to the nation's economic problems. 
__ 
Re as Embassy La P 
Paz, by “telegram dated 24 December 1946, reported that 
ot 
ahs Partido Obrero Democratico Boliviano has nominated for President 
ex-General Felix Tabera, said to we associated with the leader of 
the Miners’ Federation. 
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| PRESIDENT'S SECRETARY 
Achievements of the caretaker government. 
The Bolivian economy 
is 
3 chronically "sick" economy, because of (a) the cumulatively disadvan- 
tageous position of Bolivian tin in the world tin market, 
(b) inadequate 
ard ill-distributed natural resources, 
(c) a capital famine which ren- 
ders impossible the development of the country's transportation system, 
ena (d) the constant pressure of population upon an insufficient food 
supply. 
Besides these continuing problems, the Monje Gutierrez Junta in- 
herited from the Villarroel dictatorship a monetary inflation, 
a for- 
eign policy whose Orientation towards Argentina 
had caused many of the 
country's neighbors 
to withhold recognition from its government, 
and a 
tenss internal economic and political situation which had been aggra- 
vated ty more than two years of police-state exploitation and oppression. 
The moretary inflation remains a problem; but when the newly elected 
Fresiient takes over next month, Monje Gutierrez will be able to point 
to such solid accomplishments as 
(a) the at least temporar} withdrawal 
of Bolivia from the orbit of Argentine political influence, 
({b) the achieve- 
ment of diplomatic recognition by all the American Republics, 
(c) a series 
of modest but long-overdue economic readjustments that have stemmed the 
rising tide of discontent among the masses of the population, and (d) the 
return of control over Bolivia's destinies to its 80,000 qualified voters. 
The issues in the elections. 
Both candidates for the presidency 
heve pledged themselves to carry out the program of reconstruction, de- 
mocratization, 
and social reform which the Monje Gutierrez caretaker 
government has initiated during its five-month tenure of power. 
This 
program includes as minima a wide measure of government intervention in 
economic affairs, “progressive” labor and educational policies, and pop- 
ular control over government. 
Adoption of these objectives by the new 
government 
is to be expected no matter 
who wins the election. 
Bolivia 
must therefore be added to the growing list of South American countries 
-- 
Argentina, Colombia, Chile, Venezuela -- in which the traditionally 
conservative elements have evidently found themxelves without their pop- 
uiar following. 
This does not mean, however, that there are no issues at 
stake in the election. 
Hertgog, while he makes his appeal for votes in the 
name of "moderate socialism", 
has avoided specific and detailed promises of 
rapid change, while the PIR, mentioned above as the largest of the par- 
‘i¢és supporting Guachalla, promises the Bolivian masses higher living 
stencards, 
a less "regressive" tax system, 
a generous social welfare and 
public health program, 
and redistribution of land ownership. 
The other 
large party in the Guachalla coalition, the Liberal Farty, while support- 
ing some of the PIR proposals, stresses its faith in free individual en- 
terprise, and can, if Guachalla wins, be counted upon to exercise a mod- 
c~eting influence on PIR extremists ih Congress. 
Both the PIR and the 
Lioerel, Party direct attention to the crisis in the tin industry as a 
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major Bolivian economic problem, promising "modernization" of production 
methods to offset the difficulties attendant upon 
(a) the inferior qual- 
ity of Bolivian ore, and (b) the fect that the mine owners have already — 
"creamed off" the country's richest deposits. 
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