*'■£■  ■• 
DECREE 
NATIONAL  SECURITY  AGENCY/CENTRAL  SECURITY  SERVICE 
Fort  George  G.  Meade,  Maryland 
20  October  1980 
UNITED  STATES  SIGHALS  INTELLIGENCE  DIRECTIVE  (USSID) 
s 
LIMITATION  AMD  PROCEDURES  IN  SIGNALS  INTELLIGENCE 
OPERATIONS  OF  THE  USSS   (U) 
LETTER  OF  PROMULGATION 
(U)  This  directive  prescribes  policies  and  procedures,   and  assigns 
responsibilities  to  ensure  that  the  missions  and  functions  of   the  United  States 
SIGINT  System  (USSS)  are  conducted  in  a  manner  that  safeguards  the 
constitutional  rights  and  privacy  of  U.S.  persons. 
* 
<U)  This  USSID  supersedes  USSID  IS,  dated  25  May  1976,   and  is  effective 
upon  receipt. 
I.  R.XINMAN. 
Vice  Admiral,  U.S.   Navy 
Director,  NSA/Chief,   CSS 
CLASSIFIED  BY'NSA/CSSM  123-2 
REVIEW  ON.  20  OCTOBER  2010, 
V  - 
•eeeRET-
-»-—■"■» 
OSSID  18 
20  October  1980 
SKCURITV  CLASSIFICATION 
CHANGE  REGISTER 
..CHANGE 
ENTERED 
NO. 
DATE 
authority  <ar«r  au/ora.  tt**i  copy  (hci.  ofscomo 
DATE 
BY 
1 0702052  A{ r  81       (para  5.1.b.(2)) 
9  Apr  81 
<gf»..-         • 
1  InQuJM, Uc 
siV* 
JL 
Dc&vr%< 
tfttfr  ^'^'S?'  3ofOS-?4k*s8 
7£>«/« 
wtF^ 
v^> 
- 
i 
* 
». 
*. 
.. 
*  . 
> 
* 
• 
■- 
— 
* 
« 
.» 
-V^  - 
. 
-.«.;--■- 
• 
FORM  l k7093  REV  AUG 76  (Supmcde*  A  7093  Nov  72  which  »  obsolete) 
ii 
SECURITY  CS-' kSSIFICATION
'*"tr  ■* 
DSSID  18 
20  October  1980 
TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 
SECTION  1  -  REFERENCES     .    PAGE 
SECTION  2  -  PURPOSE*  AND  APPLICABILITY        PAGE 
SECTION  3  -  DEFINITIONS         PAGE 
SECTION  4  -  POLICY    PAGE 
SECTION  5  -  COLLECTION        PAGE 
SECTION  6  -  PROCESSING        PAGE 
SECTION  7  -  STORAGE        PAGE 
SECTION  8  -  DISSEMINATION        PAGE 
SECTION  9  -  RESPONSIBILITIES        PAGE 
SECTION  10  -  ACCOUNTABILITY 
   PAGE 
ANNEX  A  -  PROCEDURES  IMPLEMENTING  THE  FOREIGN 
INTELLIGENCE  SURVEILLANCE  ACT  (U)  1/ 
ANNEX  B  -  OPERATIONAL  ASSISTANCE  TO  THE  FEDERAL 
.BUREAU  OF  INVESTIGATION  (U) 
ANNEX  C  -  SIGNALS  INTELLIGENCE  SUPPORT  TO  U.S.  AND 
ALLIED  MILITARY  EXERCISE  COMMAND 
AUTHORITIES  (U) 
ANNEX  D  -  TEST  AND  EVALUATION  OF  ELECTRONIC 
EQUIPMENT  (U) 
ANNEX  E  -  COMMUNICATIONS  SECURITY  (U) 
ANNEX  F  -  SEARCH  AND  DEVELOPMENT  OPERATIONS  (U) 
ANNEX  G 
ANNEX  H  -  TRAINING  OF  PERSONNEL  IN  THE  OPERATION  AND 
BSE  OF  ELECTRONIC  COMMUNICATIONS  AND  SIGINT 
COLLECTION  EQUIPMENT  (U) 
ANNEX  I  -  SAMPLE  CONSENT  FORMS  (U) 
1/  Issued. Separately  to  Selected  Recipients. 
~*?~ "    ■  *       *  iii
«"— - 
USSID  18 
20  October  1980 
LIMITATIONS  AND  PROCEDURES  IN  SIGNALS  INTELLIGENCE 
-  OPERATIONS  OFTHE  USSS  (FOUO) 
*„  :  SECTION  1- REFERENCES 
1.1.  (FOUO)  References 
a.  DoD  Regulation  5240.1  -R. 
b.  NSA/CSS  Directive  No.  10-30,  dated  24  March  1980. 
c.  Executive  Order  12036,  United  States  Intelligence  Activities,  24  January  1978. 
d.  50  U.S.C.  1801,  Foreign  Intelligence  Surveillance  Act  of  1978,  Public  Law  No.  95-511 
(see  Annex  A). 
SECTION  2  -  PURPOSE  AND  APPLICABILITY 
2.1.  (FOUO)  This  USSID  implements  the  provisions  of  DoD  Regulation  5240. 1-R  for  the  USSS. 
It  prescribes  general  policy  and  SIGINT  operating  policy,  and  provides  procedures  and  assigns 
responsibilities  to  ensure  that  the  SIGINT  mission  of  the  National  Security  Agency/Central  Security 
Service  is  conducted  in  a  manner  that  .guarantees  proper  safeguards  to  the  rights  and  privacy  of  U.S. 
persons  under  applicable  law,  executive  branch  directives,  internal  directives,  and  policy.  The 
annexes  to  USSID  18  contain  procedures  that  must  be  followed  for  the  specialized  SIGINT  operations 
and  targets  to  which  they  pertain.  The  other  policies  and  procedures  in  this  USSID  provide  guidance 
in  applying  specific  restrictions  in  SIGINT  operations  to  targeting,  collection,  selection,  storage,  and 
dissemination  of  information,  and  the  maintenance  of  data  bases  that  may  relate  to  U.S.  persons. 
The  policies  and  procedures  herein  apply  to  all  elements  of  the  USSS. 
(C2JULS6)
■V  ■  USSID18 
..*"■■  20  October  1980 
SECTION  3 -DEFINITIONS 
3.1.  ifl      ^4?nt  °*  a  *ore'9n  Power>  nieans> 
a.  Any  person,  other  than  a  U.S.  person,  who  - 
^  a      Anu  nor 
(1)  Acts  in  the  United  States  as  an  officer  or  employee  of  a  foreign  power,  or  as  a 
member  of  a  group  engaged  in  international  terrorism  or  activities  in  preparation  therefor; 
(2)  Acts  for,  or  on  behalf  of,  a  foreign  power  that  engages  in  clandestine  intelligence 
activities  in  the  United  States  contrary  to  the  interests  of  the  United  States,  when  the  circumstances 
of  such  person's  presence  in  the  United  States  indicate  that  such  person  may  engage  in  such  activities 
in  the  United  States,  or  when  such  person  knowingly  aids  or  abets  any  person  in  the  conduct  of  such 
activities  or  knowingly  conspires  with  any  person  to  engage  in  such  activities; 
b.  Any  person,  including  a  U.S.  person,  who  - 
(1)  Knowingly  engages  in  clandestine  intelligence  gathering  activities  for,  or  on 
behalf  of,  a  foreign  power,  which  activities  involve,  or  may  involve  a  violation  of  the  criminal 
statutes  of  the  United  States; 
(2)  Pursuant  to  the  direction  of  an  intelligence  service  or  network  of  a  foreign  power, 
knowingly  engages  in  any  other  clandestine  intelligence  activities  for,  or  on  behalf  of,  such  foreign 
power,  which  activities  involve  or  are  about  to  involve,  a  violation  of  the  criminal  statutes  of  the 
United  States; 
(3)  Knowingly  engages  in  sabotage  or  international  terrorism,  or  activities  that  are  in 
preparation  therefor,  for;  or  on  behalf  of,  a  foreign  power;  or 
(4)  Knowingly  aids  or  abets  any  person  in  the  conduct  of  activities  described  in 
"paragraphs  3.1.b.(1)",  3.1.b.(2).  or  3.1.b.(3)  or  knowingly  conspires  with  any  person  to  engage  in  such 
activities;  or 
c.  A  U.S.  person,  residing  abroad,  who  holds  an  official  position  in  a  foreign  government 
or  the  military  forces  of  a  foreign  nation  and  information  about  whose  activities  in  that  position 
would  constitute  foreign  intelligence. 
3.2.  (FOUO)  Available  publicly  means  information  that  has  been  published  or  broadcast  for 
general  public  consumption,  is  available  on  request  to  a  member  of  the  general  public,  has  been 
seen  or  heard  by  a  casual  observer,  or  is  made  available  at  a  meeting  open  to  the  general  public.  In 
this  context,  the  "general  public"  also  means  general  availability  to  persons  in  a  military  community 
even  though  the  military  community  is  not  open  to  the  civilian  general  public. 
3.3.  (FOUO)  Clandestine  intelligence  activity  means  an  activity  conducted  for  intelligence 
purposes  or  for  the  purpose  of  affecting  political  or  governmental  processes  by,  or  on  behalf  of.  a 
foreign  power  in  a  manner  designed  to  conceal  from  the  United  States  Government  the  nature  or 
fact  of  such  activity  or  the  role  of  such  foreign  power,  and  any  activity  conducted  in  support  of  such 
activity.  ^-'~ 
(C2JUL86)
.  -»V  -  USSID  18 
"  T 
' "  ■  20  October  1980 
3.4.  uflMw Collection  means  intentional  tasking  and/or  selection  of  identified  nonpublic 
communic^ions  for  subsequenrprocessing  aimed  at  reporting  or  retention  as  a  file  record. 
3.5.  (FOUOJ  Commercial  organization  means  an  organization  that  is  not  incorporated  and 
that  operates  or  holds  itself  out  as  a  business  enterprise  usually,  but  not  necessarily,  for  the  purpose 
of  making  a  profit  This  term  covers  business  partnerships,  companies,  associations,  and  s*ole 
proprietorships.  Organizations  that  use  the  word  "Co.,"  and  other  common  commercial 
designations,  may  be  treated  as  commercial  organizations  for  purposes  of  these  procedures.  Some 
charitable,  literary,  and  social  organizations  conduct  incidental  operations  for  profit,  but  are  not 
thereby  necessarily  commercial  organizations.  Not  every  activity  designed  to  make  a  profit  will 
qualify  an  entity  as  a  commercial  organization.  Nor  will  any  incidental  charitable,  literary,  or  social 
activity  remove  an  organization  from  that  category  of  commercial  organization.  The  determination 
is  made  by  assessing  the  predominate  nature  of  the  organization. 
3.6.  (FOUO)  Communicant  means  the  originator  or  intended  recipient  of  a  communication. 
3.7.  (FOUO)  Communications  concerning  a  U.S.  person  are  those  in  which  the  U.S.  person  is 
identified  in  the  communication.  A  U.S.  person  is  identified  when  the  person's  name,  unique  title, 
address,  or  other  personal  identifier  is  revealed  in  the  communication  in  the  context  of  activities 
conducted  by  that  person  or  activities  conducted  by  others  and  related  to  that  person.  A  reference 
to  a  product  by  brand  name  or  manufacturer's  name,  or  the  use  of  a  name  in  a  descriptive  sense,  for 
example,  "Monroe  Doctrine,"  "Boeing  707,"  is  not  an  identification  of  a  U.S.  person. 
3.8.  JNjflfeEonsent  is  the  agreement  by  a  person  or  organization  to  permit  the  USSS  to  take 
particular  actions  that  affect  the  person  or  organization.  An  agreement  by  an  organization  with  the 
National  Security  Agency  to  permit  collection  of  information  shall  be  deemed  valid  consent  if  given 
on  behalf  of  such  organization  by  an  official  or  governing  body,  determined  by  the  General  Counsel, 
National  Security  Agency,  to  have  actual  or  apparent  authority  to  make  such  an  agreement. 
3.9.  (FOUO)  Corporation  means  an  organization  incorporated  in  the  United  States  under 
federal,  state,  or  local  law.  As  regards  the  corporation's  status  as  a  U.S.  person,  the  fact  and  place  of 
incorporation  is  determinative.  Entirely  foreign  ownership  does  not  disqualify  an  organization  for 
treatment  as  a  U.S.  person  under  these  procedures.  Use  of  the  words  "Inc.,"  or  "Corp.,"  in  the  title 
of  an  organization  is  sufficient  for  it  to  be  treated  as  a  corporation  for  purposes  of  these  procedures. 
3.10.  (FOUO)  Counterintelligence  means  information  gathered  and  activities  conducted  to 
protect  against  espionage  and  other  clandestine  intelligence  activities,  sabotage,  international 
terrorist  activities,  or  assassinations  conducted  for,  or  on  behalf  of,  foreign  powers,  organizations,  or 
persons,  but  not  including  personnel,  physical,  document,  or  communications  security  programs. 
3.11.  (FOUO)  Counterintelligence  investigation  includes  inquiries  and  other  activities 
undertaken  to  determine  whether  a  particular  U.S.  person  is  acting  for,  or  on  behalf  of,  a  foreign 
power  for  purposes  of  conducting  espionage  and  other  clandestine  intelligence  activities,  sabotage, 
international  terrorist  .activities,  or  assassinations  and  to  neutralize  such  acts.  A  counterintelligence 
investigation,  for  purposes  of  these  procedures,  does  not  include  counterespionage  operations 
undertaken  against  foreign  powers. 
3  (C2JUL86)
SECRET" 
r--^  ■ 
USSID  18 
20  October  1980 
3.12.  (FOUO)  Electronic  .surveillance  means  acquisition  of  a  nonpublic  communication  by 
electronic  means  without  the  consent  of  a  person  who  is  a  party  to  an  electronic  communication  or, 
in  the  case  of  a  nonelectrpnic  communication,' without  the  consent  of  a  person  who  is  visibly  present 
at  the  place  of  communication,  but  not  including  the  use  of  radio  direction  finding  equipment  solely 
to  determine  the  location  of  a  transmitter. 
*  "1 
3.13.  (FOUO)  foreign  communication  means  a  communication  that  has  at  least'  one 
communicant  outside  of  the  United  States,  or  that  is  entirely  amoncAoreign  powers  or  between  a 
foreign  power  and  officials* of  a  foreign  power  (but  not  including  communications  intercepted  by 
electronic  surveillance  directed  at  premises  used  predominantly  for  residential  purposes). 
3.14.  (FOUO)  Foreign  intelligence  means  information  relating  to  the  capabilities,  intentions, 
and  activities  of  foreign  powers,  organizations,  or  persons,  but  not  including  counterintelligence 
except  for  information  on  international  terrorist  activities,  sabotage,  and  assassinations  for,  or  on 
behalf  of.  foreign  powers. 
3.15.  (FOUO)  Foreign  power  means  any  foreign  government  (regardless  of  whether 
recognized  by  the  United  States),  foreign-based  political  party  (or  faction  thereof),  foreign  military 
force,  foreign-based  terrorist  group,  or  any  organization  composed,  in  major  part,  of  any  such  entity 
or  entities.  (Annex  A,  paragraph  2.2.  defines  "foreign  power"  for  situations  under  the  Foreign 
Intelligence  Surveillance  Act  (FISA). .  Portions  of  that  definition  should  also  be  used  in  certain 
situations  as  noted  in  paragraphs  6.1.b.  and  8.1.e.(1).) 
3. 1 7.   (FOUO)  For  the  purposes  of  this  USSID.  the  Intelligence  Community  refers  to: 
a.  The  Central  Intelligence  Agency; 
b.  The  National  Security  Agency; 
c.  The  Defense  Intelligence  Agency; 
d.  The  offices  within  the  Department  of  Defense  for  the  collection  of  specialized 
national  foreign  intelligence  through  reconnaissance  programs; 
e.  The  Bureau  of  Intelligence  and  Research  of  the  Department  of  State; 
f.  The  intelligence  elements  of  the  military  services; 
g.  The  staffelements  of  the  Office  of  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence; 
h.  The  intelligence  elements  of  the  Department  of  Treasury  and  the  Department  of 
Energy. 
The  intelligence  elements  of  the  Federal  Bureau  of  investigation  (FBI);  and 
(C2JUL86)
USSID  18 
■  J.'  -  •  20  October  1980 
j.  The  intelligence  elements  of  the  Drug  Enforcement  Administration  (DEA). 
3.18.  (FOUO)  Interception  means  the  acquisition  by  the  USSS  through  electronic  means  of  a 
nonpublic  communication  to  which  it  is  hot  an  intended  party,  and  the  processing  of  the  contents  of 
that  communication  into  an  intelligible  form,  but  not  including  the  display  of  signals  on  visual 
display  devices  intended  to  permit  the  examination  of  the  technical  characteristics  of  the  signals 
without  reference  to  the  information  content  carried  by  the  signal. 
3. 1 9.  (FOUO)  International  terrorist  activities  mean  any  activity  or  activities  that: 
a.  Involve  killing,  causing  serious  bodily  harm,  kidnapping  or  violent  destruction  of 
property,  or  an  attempt  or  credible  threat  to  commit  such  acts; 
b.  Appear  intended  to  endanger  a  protectee  of  the  Secret  Service  or  the  Department  of 
State  or  to  further  political,  social,  or  economic  goals  by  intimidating  or  coercing  a  civilian 
population  or  any  segment  thereof,  influencing  the  policy  of  a  government  or  international 
organization  by  intimidation  or  coercion,  or  obtaining  widespread  publicity  for  a  group  or  its  cause; 
and 
c.  Transcend  national  boundaries  in  terms  of  the  means  by  which  it  is  accomplished;  the 
civilian  population,  government,  or  international  organization  it  appears  intended  to  coerce  or 
intimidate;  or  the  locale  in  which  its  perpetrators  operate  or  seek  asylum. 
3.20.  (FOUO)  Law  enforcement  means  detecting  violations  of  criminal  law  and  identifying  or 
apprehending  persons  who  have  violated  the  criminal  law  so  that  they  may  be  prosecuted.   In  this     V 
context,  the  criminal  law  includes  federal  statutes,  federal  regulations,  and  the  Uniform  Code  of    "^ 
Military  Justice. 
3.21.  (FOUO)  Law-enforcement  authorities  include  military  police,  local  police,  state  police, 
the  FBI,  the  Executive  Protective  Service,  and  special  police  employed  by  federal,  state,  and  local 
government  agencies.  The. Army  Intelligence  and  Security  Command,  the  Naval  Investigative  Service, 
and  the  Air  Force  Office-of  Special  Investigations  have  counterintelligence  responsibilities  and  law 
enforcement  responsibilities  under  the  Uniform  Code  of  Military  Justice.  When  engaged  in  law 
enforcement  responsibilities,  these  components  are  law  enforcement  authorities.  Components  that 
■supervise  these  military  investigative  authorities,  when  they  are  engaged  in  law  enforcement 
responsibilities,  are  also  law  enforcement  authorities. 
3.22.  (FOUO)  Narcotics  production  or  trafficking  means  activities  outside  the  United  States  to 
produce  or  deal  in  narcotics  or  other  substances  controlled  under  the  Controlled  Substances  Act  of 
1970. 
3.23.  (FOUO)  Personnel  security  means  the  protection  resulting  from  measures  designed  to 
ensure  that  persons  employed  in  sensitive  positions  of  trust  are  suitable  for  such  employment  with 
respect  to  loyalty,  character,  emotional  stability,  and  reliability  and  that  such  employment  is  clearly 
consistent  with  the  interests  of  the  national  security.  It  includes  measures  designed  to  ensure  that 
persons  granted  access  t6  classified  information  remain  suitable  for  such  access  and  that  access  is 
consistent  with  the  interests  of  national  security. 
(C2JUL86)
r_. .  USSID  18 
■.*"   '  20  October  1980 
3.24.  (FOUO)  Physical  security  means  the  protection  resulting  from  physical  measures 
designed  to  safeguard* personnel;  to  prevent  unauthorized  access  to  equipment,  facilities,  material, 
and  documents;  and  to  safeguard  against  espionage,  sabotage,  damage,  and  theft. 
3.25.  (FOUO)  Reasonable  belief.  A  reasonable  belief  arises  when  the  facts  and  circumstances 
are  such  that  a  reasonable  person  would  hold  the  belief.  Reasonable  belief  must  rest  on  facts  and 
circumstances  that  can  be  articulated;  "hunches"  or  intuitions  are  not  sufficient.  Reasonable  belief 
can  be  based  on  experience,  training,  and  knowledge  in  foreign  intelligence  or  counterintelligence 
work  applied  to  facts-and  circumstances  at  hand,  so  that  a  trained  and  experienced  "reasonable 
person"  might  hold  a  reasonable  belief  sufficient  to  satisfy  this  criterion  when  someone  unfamiliar 
with  foreign  intelligence  or  counterintelligence  work  might  not.  Reasonable  belief  also  depends  on 
the  circumstances  in  which  it  is  formed.  In  emergency  situations,  a  reasonable  belief  can  be 
supported  by  the  facts  at  hand  and  the  need  to  take  action  immediately  to  avoid  imminent  harm. 
3:26.  (FOUO)  Sabotage  meansany  activity  that  involves  a  violation  of  Chapter  105  of  Title  18, 
United  States  Code,  or  that  would  involve  such  a  violation  if  committed  against  the  United  States. 
3.29.  (FOUO)  Technical  data  base  means  information  retained  for  cryptanalytic  or  traffic 
analytic  purposes.  "- 
3.30.  (FOUO)  United  States,  when  used  to  describe  a  place,  includes  the  terrorities  of  the 
United  States. 
.  jMK  tt-U.S,  person  means  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  an  alien  lawfully  admitted  for 
t^sidence, 
3.31.  _ 
permanent^sidence,  an  unincorporated  association  organized  in  the  United  States  or  substantially 
composed  of  United  §tates  citizens  or  aliens  admitted  for  permanent  residence,  or  a  corporation 
incorporated  in  the  United  States. 
a.  The  term  "U.S.  person"  includes  U.S.  flag,  nongovernmental  aircraft  or  vessels.  The 
term  does  not  include  a  corporation  incorporated  in  the  United  States  that  is  openly  acknowledged 
by  a  foreign  government  or  governments  to  be  directed  and  controlled  by  such  foreign  government 
or  governments. 
b.  For  purposes  of  intentionally  collecting  the  communications  of.  a  particular  person, 
the  term  "U.S.  person"  also  includes  any  alien  known  to  be  presently  in  the  United  States,  any  group 
of  such  aliens  or  American  citizens,  any  corporation,  corporate  subsidiary,  or  other  legal  entity 
having  its  principal  place  of  business  in  the  United  States,  and  U.S.  flag,  nongovernmental  aircraft  or 
vessels;  provided,  however,  that  it  shall  not  include: 
(C2JULS6)
•;*=V  USSID18 
._*■-■"  20  October  1980 
-  (1)  Any  alien  (other  than  an  alien  lawfully  admitted  for  permanent  residence)  who, 
on  the  basis  of  available,  reliable  information,  is  reasonably  believed  to  be  an  officer,  employee,  or 
accredited  representative  of  a  foreign  power; 
(2)  Any  group  of  such  aliens;  or 
(3)  An/corporation,  corporate  subsidiary,  or  other  legal  entity  which  on  the  basis  of 
available,  reliable  information,  is  reasonably  believed  to  be  owned  or  controlled,  directly  or 
indirectly,  by  a  foreign  power. 
c.  The  following  guidelines  will  apply  in  determining  whether  a  person  is  a  U.S.  person: 
(1)  A  person  known  to  be  currently  in  the  United  States  will  be  treated  as  a  U.S. 
person  unless  that  person  is  positively  identified  as  an  alien  who  has  not  been  admitted  for 
permanent  residence  or  if  the  nature  of  the  person's  communications  or  other  indicia  in  the  contents 
or  circumstances  of  such  communications  give  rise  to  a  reasonable  belief  that  such  person  is  not  a 
U.S.  person. 
(2)  A  person  known  to  be  currently  outside  the  United  States,  or  whose  location  is 
not  known,  will  not  be  treated  as  a  U.S.  person  unless  such  person  can  be  identified  positively  as  such 
or  the  nature  of  the  person's  communications  or  other  indicia  in  the  contents  or  circumstances  of 
such  communications  give  rise  to  a  reasonable  belief  that  such  person  is  a  U.S.  person. 
(3)  A  person  known  to  be  an  alien  admitted  for  permanent  residence  may  be 
assumed  to  have  lost  status  as  a  U.S.  person  if  the  person  leaves  the  United  States  and  it  is  known 
that  the  person  is  not  in  complianrs  with  the  administrative  formalities  provided  by  law  that  enable 
such  person  to  reenter  the  United  States  without  regard  to  the  provisions  of  law  that  would 
otherwise  restrict  an. alien's  entry  into  the  United  States.  The  failure  to  follow  the  statutory 
procedures  provides  .a  "reasonable  basis  to  conclude  that  such  alien  has  abandoned  any  intention  of 
maintaining  status  as  a  permanent  resident  alien. 
(4)  An  unincorporated  association  whose  headquarters  are  located  outside  the 
United  States  may  be  presumed  not  to  be  a  U.S.  person  unless  the  USSS  has  information  indicating 
that  a  substantiaLnumber  of  members  are  citizens  of  the  United  States  or  aliens  lawfully  admitted 
for  permanent  residence. 
3.32.  (FOUO)  USSS  means  the  unified  organization  for  signals  intelligence  activities  under 
the  direction  of  the  Director,  National  Security  Agency/Chief,  Central  Security  Service,  comprised  of 
the  National  Security  Agency,  the  Central  Security  Service,  the  components  of  the  military  services 
authorized  to  conduct  signals  intelligence  and  such  other  entities  (other  than  the  FBI)  as  are 
authorized  by  the  National  Security  Council  or  the  Secretary  of  Defense  to  conduct  SIGINT. 
(C2  JUL  S6)
OEOREf 
W^  USSID 18 
--*""-  20  October  1980 
SECTION  4  -POLICY 
4.1.  ^^M^The  SIGINT  mission  of  the  USSS  includes  the  collection,  processing,  storage,  aftd 
disseminatren  of  foreign-communications  (plaintext  and  encrypted)  passed  by  radio,  wire,  or  other, 
electromagnetic  means.  It  is  the  policy  of  the  USSS  to  target  or  collect  foreign  communications.  The 
USSS  will  not  intentionally  collect  the  communications  of  U.S.  persons  or  communications  that  refer 
to  U.S.  persons  except-as  authorized  pursuant  to  the  procedures  contained  in  this  USSID  or  its 
annexes.  The  USSS  will  only  process  and  disseminate  communications  of  U.S.  persons,  or  that  refer  to 
U.S.  persons,  as  provided  for  in  this  USSID. 
SECTION  5 -COLLECTION 
5.1.  /sMMfeThe  Director,  NSA,  will  consider  requests  to  collect  the  communications  of  U.S. 
persons,  or  communications  that  refer  to  U.S.  persons,  only  if  one  of  the  following  criteria  is 
satisfied: 
a.  The  U.S.  person  has  given  consent  and  has  executed  the  consent  form  as  set  forth  in 
Annex  I.  Once  the  consent  form  has  been  executed,  the  Director,  NSA,  may  authorize  the  collection. 
The  Director,  NSA,  shall  notify  the  Attorney  General  of  each  consensual  collection. 
b.  The  U.S.  person  is  a  foreign  power  or  an  agent  of  a  foreign  power.  The  purpose  of  the 
collection  must  be  the  acquisition  of  foreign  intelligence  or  counterintelligence.  It  is  also  necessary 
that  the  information  be-unobtainablejsy  less  intrusive  techniques.  In  this  case,  the  Director,  NSA, 
may: 
(1)  Submit  an  application  for  the  collection  in  accordance  with  the  FISA  when  the  U.S. 
person  is  in  the  United  States  and  the  communications  sought  are  those  of  that  U.S.  person  (see 
Annex  A). 
(2)  Request  the  Attorney  General  to  authorize  collection  when  the  U.S.  person  is 
outside  the  United  States,  when  the  U.S.  person  is  in  the  United  States  and  only  communications  that 
refer  to  that  person  are  sought,  or  when  a  U.S.  person  as  defined  in  Section  3.31. b.  is  in  the  United 
States. 
(3)  Authorize  the  collection  if  an  emergency  situation  exists  and  the  U.S.  person  is 
outside  the  United  States. 
5.2.  iMtffeln  emergency  situations,  the  Director,  NSA,  may  approve  for  foreign  intelligence 
or  counterintelligence  purposes  the  collection  of  communications  of  U.S.  persons,  or 
communications  that  refer  to  U.S.  persons,  when  such  persons  are  outside  the  United  States  and 
when  securing  the  prior  approval  of  the  Attorney  General  is  not  practical. 
.* 
a.  An  emergency  situation  exists  when: 
(C2JUL86)
Is*-  .-:  USSID18 
■  ■*rf."  20 October  1980 
(1)  The  time  required  to  secure  Attorney  General  approval  would  cause  failure  or 
delay  in  obtaining  significant  foreign  intelligence  or  counterintelligence  and  such  failure  or  delay 
would  result  in  substantial  harm  to  the  national  security; 
(2)  Any" person's  life  or  physical  safety  is  reasonably  believed  to  be  in  immediate 
danger;  or 
(3)  The" physical  security  of  a  Defense  installation  or  government  property  is 
reasonably  believed  to  be  in  immediate  danger. 
b.  The  Director,  NSA,  shall  notify  the  DoD  General  Counsel  and  the  Attorney  Genera!  as 
soon  as  possible  of  thenature  of  the  collection,  the  circumstances  surrounding  its  authorization,  and 
the  results  thereof. 
c  Such  collection  may  not  continue  longer  than  the  time  required  for  a  decision  by  the 
Attorney  General  and  in  no  event  longer  than  72  hours. 
SECTION  6 -PROCESSING 
6.1.  Ip^tti  Foreign  communications  of,  or  concerning,  U.S.  persons  must  be  processed  in 
accordance  with  the  following  limitations:
USSID1S 
20  October  1980 
6.3.  JR|p  Except  as  approved  under  this  USSID  and  its  annexes,  no  collection  may  be 
directed  that  brings  about  the  intentional  interception  and  recording  ,<>j[„ co*niriuni^.ation§jKalfily 
between  U.S.  persons^ 
>  Those  noh-Toresgn  communications  that  may  indicatethreat  of  death  or  serious 
potential  vulnerability  to  United  States  Communications  Security,  should  be  forwarded  to  NSA/CSS. 
(C2JULS6)
"*=-'* 
USSID  18 
20  October  1980 
SECTION  7- STORAGE 
7.1.  jsAt/0^ore\gn  communications  of,  or  concerning,  U.S.  persons  that  are  .intercepted  by 
the  USSS  nraybe  retatoe'd  in  their  original  form  or  as  transcribed: 
b.   If  dissemination  of  such  communications  without  elimination  of  references  to  such 
U.S.  persons  would  be  permitted  under  Section  8,  below. 
7.2.  (FOUO)  Where  practicable  and  when  recognizable,  information  acquired  as  a  part  of,  or 
incidentaljto^authorized  collection  activities  wherein  the  identification  of  a  U.S.  person  is  not 
necessary  ^pHtta  jMjj0H^0MhMBMNHNH|NMIl^,'or  dissemination  under  Section  8,  the 
U.S.  person's  identity  shall  be  deleted'and  replaced  by  a  generic  term. 
7.3.  (FOUO)  Storage  systems  shall  be  reasonably  designed  to  limit  access  to  information 
about  U.S.  persons  to  those  with  a  need  to  know. 
7.4.  (FOUO)  Intelligence  reports  based  on  foreign  communications  must  be  stored  in 
accordance  with  the  Privacy  Act.  Although  Section  8  permits  the  dissemination  of  information 
containing  the  names  of  U.S.  persons,  such  names^will  be  deleted  prior  to  permanent_storage  of 
intelligence  reports  in  name  retrievable  files,^ 
7.S.  (FOUO)  Information  about  U.S.  persons  other  than  that  covered  by  this  section  shall  be 
stored  only  for  purposes  of  reporting  such  collection  for  oversight  purposes  and  for  any  subsequent 
proceedings  that  may  be  necessary. 
(C2JULS6)
yrt*  USSID 18 
20  October  IS80 
SfECTION  8  -  DISSEMINATION 
-     / 
8.1.  m^tQ   Dissemination  of  information  derived  from  foreign  communications  that 
includes  ariroentification'of  a  U.S.  person  may  be  made  only  if  one  of  the  following  criteria  is  met: 
a.  The  U.S.  person  has  consented  to  the  use  of  communications  of,  or  concerning,  him  or 
her  and  has  executed  trie  applicable  consent  form  (see  Annex  I). 
b.  The  information  is  available  publicly;  for  example,  the  information  is  derived  from 
unclassified  collateral  information  available  to  the  general  public. 
C.  The  identity  of  the  U.S.  person  is  necessary  to  understand  foreign  intelligence 
information  or  assess  its  importance;  for  example,  the  identity  of  a  senior  official  in  the  Executive 
Branch.  Such  officials,  when  identified,  will  be  identified  only  by  their  official  titles;  for  example, 
"President  of  the  United  States." 
d.  The  communication  or  information  indicates  that  the  U.S.  person  may  be  an  agent  of 
a  foreign  power. 
e.  The  communication  or  information  that  is  being  disseminated  indicates  that  the  U.S. 
person  may  be: 
(1)  A  foreign  power  as  defined  in  Annex  A,  2.2.d.  and  f.; 
(2)  Residing  outside  the  United  States  and  holding  an  official  position  in  the 
government  or  military  forces  of  a  foreign  power  such  that  information  about  his  activities  would 
constitute  foreign  intelligence; 
(3)  A  corporation  or  other  entity  that  is  owned  or  controlled  directly  or  indirectly  by  a 
foreign  power;  or 
(4)  Acting  in  collaboration  with  an  intelligence  or  security  service  of  a  foreign  power, 
and  the  U.S.  person  has,  or  has  had,  access  to  information  or  material  classified  by  the  United  States; 
f.  The  communication  or  information  indicates  that  the  U.S.  person  may  be  the  target  of 
intelligence  activities  of  a  foreign  power. 
g.  The  communication  or  information  indicates  that  the  U.S.  person  is  engaged  in  the 
unauthorized  disclosure  of  classified  national  security  information,  but  only  after  the  agency  that 
originated  the  information  certifies  that  it  is  properly  classified. 
h.  The  communication  or  information  indicates  that  the  U.S.  person  may  be  engaging  in 
international  terrorist  activities. 
i.  The  interception  of  the  U.S.  person's  communication  was  authorized  by  a  court  order 
issued  pursuant  to  Section  105  of  the  FISA  and  the  communication  may  relate  to  the  foreign 
intelligence  purpose  of  the  surveillance.  (See  Annex  A.) 
(C2JUL86)
>v  * 
USSID  18 
20  October  1980 
j.  The  communication  or  information  is  evidence  that  a  crime  has  been,  is  being,  or  is     Jt 
about  to  be  committed,  provided  that  dissemination  is  for  law  enforcement  purposes;  for  example, 
the  communication  or  information  indicates  a  possible  threat  to  the  me  or  physical  safety  of  any 
person.  '     fc   • 
8.5.iflf-5BP*  Any  proposed  report  or  translation  based  on.  relating  to,  or  relaying  the 
contents  oTa  privileoed  communication,  for  example,  attorney-client,  doctor-patient,  involving  a 
U.S.  person,  including  for  this  purpose,  the  U.S.  Government,  must  be  referred  ^Por  review 
prior  to  publication. 
8.5.  (FOUO)  Dissemination  other  than  that  described  in  this  section  must  be  approved  by  the 
General  Counsel  to  ensure  compliance  with  applicable  laws,  executive  orders,  and  regulations. 
SECTION  9  -  RESPONSIBILITIES 
9  1  (FOUO)  Insoector  General  -  The  Inspector  General  is  assigned  overall  sta."  responsibility 
for  overseeing  NSA/CSS  compliance  with  this  USSID.  In  carrying  out  this  responsibility,  the  Inspector 
General: 
a.  Annually  conducts  a  detailed  inspection  of  NSA/CSS  activities  to  ensure  compliance 
with  this  USSID. 
b.  Reports'to  the  Director.  NSA.  annually  (1  October)  concerning  NSA/CSS  compliance 
with  this  USSID. 
c.  Establishes  procedures  for  reporting  by  Key  Component  and  Field  Chiefs  of  their 
activities  and  practices  to  the  Inspector  General. 
(C2JULS6)
tiJ&'ClELT   "" 
"»V  * 
USSID  18 
20  October  1980 
d.  Reports  quarterly  with  the  Director  and  General  Counsel  to  the  Intelligence  Oversight 
Board  through  the  Inspector  General  for  Defense  intelligence. 
9.2.  (FOUO)  The  General  Counsel: 
a.  Actively  assists  the  Inspector  General  in  the  annual  inspection  of  NSA/CSS  activities,  as 
required.  .   ; 
b  At  the  request  of  the  Director.  Deputy  Director.  Key  Components  Chiefs,  or  the 
Inspector  General,  reviews  and  assesses  for  legal  implications  new  major  requirements  levied  on  the 
NSA/CSS  or  internal  initiatives  that  may  involve  the  rights  of  U.S.  persons. 
c.  Reviews  and  obtains  from  the  Attorney  General  necessary  approval  of  new 
procedures. 
d.  Advises  the  Director  and  senior  staff.  NSA/CSS.  of  new  legislation  and/or  case  laws  that 
may  impact  on  NSA/CSS  missions,  functions,  operations,  activities,  and  practices. 
e.  Reports,  as  required,  to  the  Intelligence  Oversight  Board  and  provides  copies  of  such 
reports  to  the  Director  and  affected  agency  elements. 
(C2JULS6)
"*V  * 
USSID  18 
20  October  1980 
9.4.  (FOUO)  All  Elements  of  the  USSS: 
a.  Imple'ment  this  directive  upon  receipt    Ensure  adherence  to  the  provisions  of  this 
USSID  and  appropriate'annexes  in  the  conduct  of  SIGINT  operations. 
b.  Amend  and  supplement  existing  formal  publications  and  informal  operating 
instructions  to  conform' with  this  USSID. 
c  Prepare  new  procedures  as  required  to  ensure  adherence  to  this  USSID.  A  copy  of  such 
procedures  shall  be  forwarded  to  NSA/CSS,  Attn:tf| 
d.  Immediately  inform  the  DDO  of  any  tasking  received  that  appears  to  require  actions 
at  variance  with  this  USSID. 
SECTION  10  -ACCOUNTABILITY 
(C2JULS6)
1rir  * 
SSGBES- 
'"■  NATIONAL  SECURITY  AGENCY/CENTRAL  SECURITY  SERVICE 
Fort  George  6*  Meade,  Maryland 
222 
20  October  1980 
...UNITED  STATES  SIGNALS  INTELLIGENCE  DIRECTIVE  (USSID) 
ANNEX  A 
PROCEDURES  IMPLEMENTING  THE  FOREIGN  INTELLIGENCE 
SURVEILLANCE  ACT  (U) 
LETTER  OF  PROMULGATION 
(U)  This  annex  is  issued  separately  for  use  by  elements  of   the  USSS  only 
when  conducting  electronic  surveillance  pursuant  to  the  Foreign  Intelligence 
Surveillance  Act  (FISA).  Such  surveillance  will  be  conducted  only  upon 
notification  by  NSA/CSS. 
'B.  R.  INMAN 
Vice  Admiral,   U.S.  Navy 
Director,  NSA/Chief,  CSS 
CLASSIFIED  BY  NSA/CSSM  123-2 
REVIEW  ON  20  OCTOBER  2010 
J 
.:*-'•
DSSID  18,  ANNEX  A 
20  October  1980 
Tr* 
SECURITY  CLASSIFICATION 
CHANGE  REGISTER 
CHANGE 
ENTERED 
NO. 
DATE 
,  AUTHORITY  (Utf  CtU/DTG.  Hard  Con  (HO.  OKCOMM) 
DATE 
BY 
..  * 
•  - 
' 
- 
. 
- 
.* 
. 
V-- 
FORM  A 17093  REV  AUG ■76fSuptr*dtt  A70S3  Noo  72  which  u  obtoUU) 
SECURITY  CI-> OSSIFICATION
USSID  18 
20  October  1980 
ANNEX  A 
PROCEDURES  IMPLEMENTING  THE  FOREIGN  INTELLIGENCE  SURVEILLANCE  ACT    (U) 
"  
' '  INTELLIGENCE  SURVEILLANCE  ACT   (U) 
SECTION   1  -  PURPOSE  AND  APPLICABILITY 
1.1.  (U)  The  Foreign  Intelligence  Surveillance  Act    (FISA)   governs   the 
conduct  of  certain  electronic  surveillance  activities  within  the  United  States 
to  collect  foreign  intelligence  information.  These  electronic  surveillance 
activities  involve  either  the  acquisition  of  wire  communications  by  direct 
access  in  the  United  States,   the  acquisition  of  radio  communications  where  all 
parties  to  that  communication  are  located  in  the  United  States,    the  intentional 
collection  of  the  communications  of  a  particular,  known  U.S.   person  who  is   in 
the  United  States,   or  the  acquisition  of  information  within  the  United  States 
from  other  than  wire  or  radio  communications. 
1.2.  (U)  These  procedures  apply  to  the  collection,  processing,  storage,  and 
dissemination  of  communications  collected  by  electronic  surveillance  authorized 
pursuant  to  FISA,  Public  Law  95-511  ("the  Act").  The  procedures  also  apply  to 
the  acquisition  of  technical  intelligence,  other  than  the  spoken  communications 
of  individuals,  conducted  under  certification  of  the  Attorney  General,  pursuant 
to  Section  102(a) (1) (A)  (ii)  of   the  Act. 
SECTION  2  -  DEFINITIONS 
2.1.  (U)  In  addition  to  the  definitions  in  Section  3  of  USSID   18,    the 
following  definitions  shall  apply  to  this  annex.  If  a  term  is  defined  in 
Section  3  of  USSID  18  and  in  this  annex,   only  the  definition  in  this  annex 
shall  be  used  for  surveillance  activities  conducted  pursuant  to   the  Act. 
2.2.  (U)  "Foreign  power"  means  - 
a.  A  foreign  government  or  any  component  thereof,  whether  or  not 
recognized  by  the  United  States; 
PAGE
USSID  18,  ANNEX  A 
20  October  1980 
b.  A  faction  of  a  foreign  nation,  or  nations,  not  substantially 
composed  of  U.S.  persons; 
c.  An  entity  that  is  openly  acknowledged  by  a  foreign  government  or 
governments  to  be  directed  and  controlled  by  such  foreign  government  or 
governments ;    '..  .  _ 
d.  A  group  engaged  in  international  terrorism  or  activities  in 
preparation  therefor; 
e.  A  foreign-based  political  organization,  not  substantially  composed 
of  U.S.  persons;  or 
f.  An  entity  that  is  directed  and  controlled  by  a  foreign  government 
or  governments. 
2.3.  (U)  "Foreign  intelligence  information"  means  - 
a.  Information  that  relates  to,  and  if  concerning  a  U.S.  person,  is 
necessary  to,  the  ability  of  the  United  States  to  protect  against  - 
(1)  Actual  or  potential  attack  or  other  grave  hostile  acts  of  a 
foreign  power  or  an  agent  of  a  foreign  power; 
(2)  Sabotage  or  international  terrorism  by  a  foreign  power  or  an 
agent  of  a  foreign  power;  or 
(3)  Clandestine  intelligence  activities  by  an  intelligence  service 
or  network  of  a  foreign  power  or  by  an  agent  of  a  foreign  power;  or 
b.  Information  with  respect  to  a  foreign  power  or  foreign  territory 
that  relates  to,  and  if  concerning  a  U.S.  person,  is  necessary  to  - 
(1)  The  national  defense  or  the  security  of  the  United  States;  or 
(2)  The  conduct  of  the  foreign  affairs  of  the  United  States. 
2.4.  (U)  "Contents,"  when  used  with  respect  to  a  communication,  include  any 
information  concerning  the  identity  of  the  parties  to  such  communication  or  the 
existence,  substance,  purport,  or  meaning  of  that  communication. 
2.5.  (U)  "Electronic  surveillance"  means  - 
a.  TheVacquisition  by  an  electronic,  mechanical,  or  other  surveillance 
device  of  the  contents  of  any  wire  or  radio  communication  sent  by,  or  intended 
to  be  received'by,  a  particular,  known  U.S.  person  who  is  in  the  United  States, 
PAGE    2
?~* 
USSID   18,  ANNEX  A 
20  October  1980 
if  the  contents  are  acquired  by  intentionally  targeting  that  U.S.  person,  under 
circumstances  in  .which  a  person  has  a  reasonable  expectation  of  privacy  and  a 
warrant  would  be' required  for  law  enforcement  purposes; 
b.  The  acquisition  by  an  electronic,  mechanical,  or  other  surveillance 
device  of  "the  contents  of  any  wire  communication  to  or  from  a  person  in  the 
United  States,  without  the  consent  of  any  party  thereto,   if  such  acquisition 
occurs  in  the  United  States; 
c.  The  intentional  acquisition  by  an  electronic,   mechanical,   or  other 
surveillance  device  of  the  contents  of  any  radio  communication,   under 
circumstances  in  which  a  person  has  a  reasonable  expectation  of  privacy  and  a 
warrant  would  be  required  for  law  enforcement  purposes,   and  if  both  the  sender 
and  all  intended  recipients  are  located  within  the  United  States;  or 
d.  The  installation  or  use  of  an  electronic,   mechanical,   or  other 
surveillance  device  in  the  United  States  for  monitoring  to  acquire  information, 
other  than  from  a  wire  or  radio  communication,  under  circumstances   in  which  a 
person  has  a  reasonable  expectation  of  privacy  and  a  warrant  would  be  required 
for  law  enforcement  purposes. 
NOTE:  Communication  intercept  activity  that  does  not  fall  within 
the  above  definition  and  that  results  in  the  incidental  acquisition  of 
communications  sent  from,  or  intended  for,  receipt  within  the  United  States 
does  not  thereby  become  electronic  surveillance  within  the  meaning  of   this 
definition. 
2.6.  (U)   "U.S.  person"  means  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,    an  alien 
lawfully  admitted  for  permanent  residence  (as  defined  in  Section   101  (a)  (20)    of 
the  Immigration  and  Nationality  Act),  an  unincorporated  association,   a 
substantial  number  of  members  of  which  are  citizens  of   the  United  States,   or 
aliens  lawfully  admitted  for  permanent  residence,  or  a  corporation  which  is 
incorporated  in  the  United  States,  but  does  not  include  a  corporation  or  an 
association  which  is  a  foreign  power,  as  defined  in  subsections  2.2a,  b,   or  c. 
2.7.  (U)  "Wire  communication"  means  any  communication  while  it  is  being 
carried  by  a  wire,  cable,  or  other  like  connection,   furnished  or  operated  by 
any  person  engaged  as  a  common  carrier  in  providing  or  operating  such 
facilities,   for  the  transmission  of  interstate  or  foreign  communications. 
PAGE 
>K---    .
USSID  18,  ANNEX  A 
20  October  1980 
SECTION  3  -  GENERAL 
3.1.  (U)  Collection  of  foreign  intelligence  information  by  electronic 
surveillance  as  defined  in  paragraph  2.5  shall  be  accomplished  only  in 
accordance  with  an  order  of  the  United  States  Foreign  Intelligence  Surveillance 
Court  (USFISC)  or  a  certification  of  the  Attorney  General.  In  any  case  in  which 
it  is  necessary  for  the  USSS  to  conduct  electronic  surveillance,  a  request  to 
secure  a  court  order  or  Attorney  General  certification  will  be  forwarded  by  the 
appropriate  Key  Component  through  the  General  Counsel  to  the  Director.  Only 
targets  that  meet  the  definition  of  either  agent  of  a  foreign  power  or  foreign 
power  may  be  considered  for  approval  pursuant  to  the  Act. 
SECTION  A  -  MINIMIZATION  PROCEDURES 
4.1.  (U)  Each  surveillance  authorized  pursuant  to  the  Act  must  be  conducted 
pursuant  to  the  minimization  procedures  approved  by  the  USFISC  or  the  Attorney 
General  for  that  particular  surveillance.  Minimization  procedures  will  be 
attached  to  each  court  order  or  Attorney  General  certification  that  is  issued 
and  will  regulate  the  collection,  processing,  storage,  and  dissemination  of 
information  concerning  unconsenting  U.S.  persons  consistent  with  the  need  of 
the  United  States  to  obtain, -produce,  and  disseminata  foreign  intelligence 
information. 
A. 2.    (Jo  The  Attorney  General  has  approved  standard  minimization  procedures 
applicable  to  electronic  surveillance  activities  pursuant  to  the  Act.  These 
minimization  procedures  apply  to  electronic  surveillances  authorized  by  the 
USFISC  or  the  Attorney  General  pursuant  to  the  Act,  except  as  provided  in 
subsection  A. A  of  this  annex. 
MINIMIZATION  PROCEDURES 
Pursuant  to  Section  101(h)  of  the  Foreign 
Intelligence  Surveillance  Act  of  1978,  the  following 
procedures  have  been  adopted  by  the  Attorney  General, 
and  shall  be  followed  by  the  National  Security  Agency 
in  implementing  this  electronic  surveillance""  as  ordered 
by  the  Court:  jd)
SOT&r1 
y-^-t 
USSID  18,  ANNEX  A 
20  October  1980 
See.  1  -  Applicability  and  Scope. 
Sec.  2.  Definitions. 
In  addition  to  the  definitions  in  Section  2  of  this 
annex,  the  following  definitions  shall  apply  to  these 
procedures: 
(a)  Acquisition  means  the  interception  by  the 
Rational  Security  Agency  through  electronic  means  of  a 
communication  to  which  it  is  not  an  intended  party  and  the 
processing  of  the  contents  of  that  communication  into  an 
intelligible  form  intended  for  human  inspection.  (U) 
(b)  Available  publicly  means  information 
that  a  member  of  the  public  could  obtain  on  request,  by 
research  in  public  sources,  or  that  has  been  obtained 
by  casual  observation.  (U) 
(c)  Consent  is  the  agreement  by  a  person  or 
organization  to  permit  the  USSS  to  take  particular  actions 
that  affect  the  person  or  organization.  An  agreement  by  an 
organization  with  the  National  Security  Agency  to  permit^ 
collection  of  information  shall  be  deemed  valid  consent  if 
given  on  behalf  of  such  organization  by  an  official  or 
governing  body,  determined  by  the  General  Counsel,  National 
Security  Agency,  to  have  actual  or  apparent  authority  to  make 
such. an  agreement. 
(d)  Identification  of  a  United  States  person  means 
the  name,  unique  title,  address  or  other  personal  identifier 
of  a  U.S.  person  in  the  context  of  activities  conducted  by 
that  person  or  activities  conducted  by  others  and  related 
that  person.  A  reference  to  a  product  by  brand  name,  or 
manufacturer's  name  or  the  use  of  a  name  in  a  descriptive 
sense;  for  example,  "Monroe  Doctrine,"  is  not  an 
identification  of  a  U.S.  person.  (U) 
to 
^.r- 
SECR^ 
PAGE
USSID  18,  ANNEX  A 
'20  October  1930 
(e)  Technical  data  base  means  information  retained 
for  cryptaoalytic  or  traffic  analytic  purposes. 
.  (f)  U.S.  person.  The  following  guidelines  will 
apply  in  determining  whether  a  person  is  a  U.S.  person: 
(1)  A  person  known  to  be  currently  in  the 
United  States  will  be  treated  as  a  U.S.  person  unless  that 
person  is  positively  identified  as  an  alien  who  has  not 
been  admitted  for  permanent  residence  or  if  the  nature  of 
the  person's  communications  or  other  indicia  in  the  contents 
or  circumstances  of  such  communications  give  rise  to  a 
reasonable  belief  that  such  person  is  not  a  U.S.  person. 
(2)  A  person  known  to  be  currently  outside  the 
United  States,  or  whose  location  is  not  known,  will  not 
be  treated  as  a  U.S.  person  unless  such  person  can  be 
identified  positively  as  such  or  the  nature  of  the  person's 
communications  or  other  indicia  in  the  contents  or 
circumstances  of  such  communications  give  rise  to  a 
reasonable  belief  that  such  person  is  a  U.S.  person. 
(3)  A  person  known  to  be  an  alien  admitted  for 
permanent  residence  may  be  assumed  to  have  lost  status  as  a 
U.S.  person  if  the  person  leaves  the  United  States  and  it 
is  known  that  the  person  is  not  in  compliance  with  the 
administrative  formalities  provided  by  law  that  enable  such 
person  to  reenter  the  United  States  without  regard  to  the 
provisions  of  law  that  would  otherwise  restrict  an  alien's 
entry  into  the  United  States.  The  failure  to  follow  the 
statutory  procedures  provides  a  reasonable  basis  to  conclude 
that  such  alien  has  abandoned  any  intention  of  maintaining 
status  as  a  permanent  resident  alien. 
(A)  An  unincorporated  association  whose 
headquarters  are  located  outside  the  United  States  may  be 
presumed  not  to  be  a  U.S.  person  unless  the  USSS  has 
information  indicating  that  a  substantial  number  of  members 
are  citizens  of  the  United  States  or  aliens  lawfully  admitted 
for  permanent  residence. 
PAGE
-*-—■> 
OSSID   18,   ANNEX  A 
20  October  1980 
Sec.  3*  Acquisition. 
The  collection  o£  information  by  electronic 
surveillance  subject  to  these  procedures  shall  be 
accomplished  in  accordance  with  the  certification 
of  the  Attorney  General  or  the  court  order  authorizing 
such  'surveillance  and  will  be  conducted  by  technical 
means,  and  in  a  manner  designed  to  minimize  to  the 
greatest  extent  reasonably  feasible  the  acquisition 
of  information  which  is  not  relevant  to.  the  authorized 
purpose  of  the  surveillance.  Collection  personnel  will 
monitor  the  collection  of  raw  data  at  regular  intervals 
to  verify  that  the  surveillance  is  not  avoidably 
acquiring  communications  of  U.S.  persons  outside  the 
authorized  scope  of  the  surveillance  or  information 
concerning  U.S.  persons  not  related  to  the  purpose  of 
the  surveillance.  Personnel  who  process  intercepted 
data  into  an  intelligible  form  intended  for  inspection 
by  analysts  will  discard  inadvertently  acquired 
communications  of,  or  information  concerning,   U.S. 
persons  at  the  earliest  practicable  point  in  the 
processing  cycle  at  which  such  communication  or 
information  can  be  identified  as  clearly  not 
relevant  to  the  authorized  purpose  of  the 
surveillance.  Communications  of,  or  information 
concerning,  U.S.  persons  which  may  be  related 
to  the  purpose  of  the  surveillance  may  be  forwarded 
to  analytic  personnel  who  are  responsible  for 
producing  intelligence  information  from  the 
collected  data.  Any  such  communication  or 
information  acquired  in  the  course  of  an  authorized 
surveillance  may  be  retained  and  disseminated  only 
in  accordance  with  Sections  4  and  5  of  these 
procedures.   (M)
USSIO  18,  ANNEX  A 
20  October  1980 
Sec.  5.  Dissemination. 
(a)  Dissemination  of  intelligence  reports  or 
translations  that  include  an  identification  of  a  U.S. 
person  may  be  made  only  if  one  of  the  following  criteria 
is  met: 
The  U.S.  person  has  consented  to   the  use  of 
communications  of,   or  concerning,  him  or  her  and  has 
executed  the  applicable  consent  form  (see  Annex  I). 
The  information  is  available  publicly;   for 
example,   the  information  is  derived  from  unclassified 
collateral  information  available  to  the  general  public. 
The  identity  of  the  U.S.  person  is  necessary  to 
understand  foreign  intelligence  information  or  assess  its 
importance;   for  example,  the  identity  of  a  senior  official 
:*:- 
SJ^RET 
PAGE         8
i.    -  SBpRETl 
USSID  18,  AiWEX  A 
20  October  1980 
in  the  Executive  Branch.  Such  officials,  when  identified, 
will  be  identified  only  by  their  official  titles;  for 
example,  "President  of  the  United  States*" 
The  cooDunication  or  information  indicates  that 
the  U.S.  person  may  be  an  agent  of  a  foreign  power. 
The  communication  or  information  that  is  being 
disseminated  indicates  that  the  U.S.  person  may  be: 
A  foreign  power  as  defined  in  this  annex, 
paragraph  2. 2d  and  f; 
Residing  outside  the  United  States  and 
holding  an  official  position  in  the  government  or  military 
forces  of  a  foreign  power  such  that  information  about 
his  activities  would  constitute  foreign  intelligence; 
A  corporation  or  other  entity  that  is  owned 
or  controlled  directly  or  indirectly  by  a  foreign  power;   or, 
Acting  in  collaboration  with  an  intelligence 
or  security  service' of  a  foreign  power,  and  the  U.S.  person 
has,  or  has  had,  access  to  information  or  material  classified 
by  the  United  States; 
The  communication  or  information  indicates  that 
the  U.S.  person  may  be  the  target  of  intelligence  activities 
of  a  foreign  power. 
The  communication  or  information  indicates  that 
the  U.S.  person  is  engaged  in  the  unauthorized  disclosure 
of  classified  national  security  information,  but  only  after 
the  agency  that  originated  the  information  certifies  that  it 
is  properly  classified* 
The  communication  or  information  indicates   that 
the  U.S.  person  may  be  engaging  in  international  terrorist 
activities* 
The  interception  of  the  U.S.  person's 
communication  was  authorized  by  a  court  order  issued  pursuant. 
to  Section  105  of  the  Act  and  the  communication  may  relate 
to  the  foreign  intelligence  purpose  of  the  surveillance. 
The  communication  or  information  is  evidence  that 
a  crime  has  been,  is  being,  oris  about  to  be  cor.=itted, 
provided  that  dissemination  is  for  law  enforcement  purposes; 
>ra^T|i 
PAGE
v^  s 
USSID  .18,  ANNEX  A 
20  October  1980 
for  example,  the  communication  or  information  indicates 
a  possible  threat  to  the  life  or  physical  safety  of  any 
person. 
(b)  A  report  based  on  a  communication  of,  or 
information  concerning,  an  unconsenting  U.S.  person  that 
is  not  publicly  available  may  be  disseminated  without 
regard  to-  the  limitations  in  (a)  above  if  the  identity  of 
the  U.S.  person  is  deleted  and  a  generic  term  or  symbol  is 
substituted  so  that  the  information  in  the  context  of  the 
communication  cannot  reasonably.be  connected  with  an 
identifiable  U.S.  person.   (U) 
(c)  Reports  based  on  the  communications  of,  or 
containing  information  concerning,   an  identified  unconsenting 
U.S.   person  may  only  be  disseminated  to  a  recipient  requiring 
the  identity  of  such  person  in  the  performance  of  official 
duties.    (U) 
(d)  Upon  recognition  that  a  radio  communication  to 
which  all  parties  are  in  the  United  States  has  been  uninten- 
tionally acquired  under  circumstances  in  which  a  person  has 
a  reasonable  expectation  of  privacy  and  a  warrant  would  be 
required  for  law  enforcement  purposes,  such  communication 
shall  be  destroyed  promptly  unless  the  Attorney  General 
determines  that  the  .contents  indicate  a  threat  of  death 
or  serious  bodily  harm  to  any  person.   (U) 
A. 3.    (fnli,  during  the  course  of  electronic  surveillance  authorized  by 
Attorney  General  certification,   the  contents  of  any  communication  to  which  a 
U.S.  person  is  a  party  are  acquired,  that  communication  shall  not  be  disclosed, 
disseminated,  or  used  for  any  purpose  or  retained  for  longer  than  24  hours 
after  recognition  unless  a  court  order  is  obtained  or  unless  the  Attorney 
General  determines  that  the  information  indicates  a  threat  of  death  or  serious 
bodily  harm  to  any  person. 
4.4.    (fl^ While  the  minimization  procedures  set  forth  in  4.2  and  4.3  are  the 
standard  ^jjJrocedures  used  for  surveillance  activities  conducted  by  NSA  pursuant 
to  the  Act,   it  may  be  necessary  to  develop  special  procedures  on  a  case-by-case 
basis.  Those  procedures  will  be  provided  directly  to  the  personnel  responsible 
for  collecting,  processing,  storing,  and  disseminating  the  information 
collected  by  that  particular  electronic  surveillance. 
PAGE       10
DSSID  18,  ANNEX  A 
20  October  1980 
SECTION  5  -  SESFONSIBILITIES 
5.2.  (U)  The  General  Counsel  will  review  requests  to  conduct  electronic 
surveillance  pursuant  to  the  Act  and  will  prepare  applications  for  securing 
court  orders  and  requests  for  Attorney  General  certifications. 
■  
JSlJ—   . 
PAGE       11
If,     for  official  use  only 
USSIO  18 
20  October  1980 
ANNEX  B 
OPERATIONAL  ASSISTANCE  TO  THE  FEDERAL  BUREAU  OF  INVESTIGATION  (U) 
SECTION  1  -  GENERAL 
1.1.  (U)  In  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  Section  2-309(c)  of  E.O. 
12036,  the  National  Security  Agency  nay  provide  specialized  equipment  and 
technical  knowledge  to  the  FBI  to  assist  the  Bureau  in  the  conduct  of  its 
lawful  functions.  When  requesting  such  assistance,  the  FBI  shall  certify  to  the 
General  Counsel  of  NSA  that  such  equipaent  or  technical  knowledge  is  necessary 
to  the  accomplishment  of  one  or  more  of  the  Bureau's  lawful  functions. 
1.2.  (U)  NSA  nay  also  provide  expert  personnel  to  assist  Bureau  personnel 
in  the  operation  or  installation  of  specialized  equipaent  when  that  equipment 
is  to  be  employed  to  collect  foreign  intelligence  or  counterintelligence.  When 
requesting  the  assistance  of  expert  personnel,  the  FBI  shall  certify  to  the 
General  Counsel  that  such  assistance  is  necessary  to  collect  foreign 
intelligence  or  counterintelligence  and  that  the  approval  of  the  Attorney 
General  (and.  when  necessary,  a  warrant  from  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction) 
has  been  obtained. 
SECTION  2  -  CONTROL 
2.1  (U)  No  operational  assistance  as  discussed  in  Section  1  shall  be 
provided  without  the  express  permission  of  the  Director,  NSA/Chief,  CSS. 
PAGE       1 
FOR  OFFICIAL  USE  ONLY
USSIO  18 
20  October  1980 
ANNEX  C 
SIGNALS  INTELLIGENCE  SUPPORT  TO  U.S.  AND  ALLIED  MILITARY  EXERCISE 
COMMAND  AUTHORITIES  (U) 
SECTION  1  -  POLICY 
1.1.  4t)  Signals  intelligence  support  to  U.S.  and  Allied  military  exercise 
command  authorities  is  provided  for  in  USSID  56  and  DoD  Directive  5200.17 
(M-2).  JCS  Secretary's  Memorandum  485-73,  annexed  to  USSID  4,   establishes 
doctrine  and  procedures  for  providing  signals  intelligence  support  to  military 
commanders.  The  procedures  in  this  annex  provide  policy  guidelines  for 
safeguarding  the  rights  of  U.S.  persons  in  the  conduct  of  Exercise  SIGINT 
support  activities. 
SECTION  2  -  DEFINITIONS 
2.1.  (U)  Military  Tactical  Communications  mean  United  States  and  Allied 
military  exercise  communications,  within  the  United  States  and  abroad,  that  are 
necessary  for  the  production  of  simulated  foreign  intelligence  and 
counterintelligence  or  to  permit  an  analysis  of  communications  security. 
SECTION  3  •-  PROCEDURES 
3.1. 
tactical 
persons. 
(&)$/)  The  USSS  say  collect,,  process,  store,  and  disseminate  military 
communications  that  are  also  communications  of,  or  concerning,  U.S. 
a.  Collection  efforts  will  be  conducted  in  such  a  manner  as  to  avoid, 
to  the  extent  feasible,  the  intercept  of  non-exercise-related  communications. 
PAGE       1 
rflfifrfriJoiiEMiif
COflfflJHTWt 
USSID  18.  ANNEX  C 
20  October  1980 
b.  Military  tactical  communications  iay  be  stored  and  processed 
without  deletion  of  references  to  U.S.  persons  if  the  naiies  and  couunications 
of  the  U.S.  persons  who  are  exercise  participants,  whether  ailitary, 
government,  or  contractor,  are  contained  in.  or  such  coMunications  constitute, 
exercise-related  couunications  or  fictitious  couunications  or  information 
prepared  for  the  exercise. 
c.  Couunications  of  U.S.  persons  not  participating  in  the  exercise 
that  are  inadvertently  intercepted^  during  the  exercise  s_naJi  be_  J*?^°ygl as 
soon  as  feasiblej 
d.  Dissemination  of  military  exercise  communications,  exercise 
reports,  or  information  files  derived  from  such  couunications  shall  be  limited 
to  those  authoritiies  and  persons  participating  in,  or  conducting,  reviews  and 
critiques  thereof.
USSID  18 
20  October  1980 
ANNEX  D 
TEST  AND  EVALUATION  OF  ELECTRONIC  EQUIPMENT  (U) 
SECTION  1  -  PURPOSE  AND  APPLICABILITY 
1.1.  (U)  This  annex  applies  to  the  testing  (including  calibration)  and 
evaluation  of  electronic  equipment  that  has  the  capability  to  intercept 
communications.  Testing  and  evaluations  of  such  electronic  equipment  will  be 
conducted,  to  the  maximum  extent  that  is  practical,  without  interception  of  the 
communications  of  U.S.  persons. 
SECTION  2  -  PROCEDURES 
2.1.  (U)  The  USSS  may  test  electronic  equipment  that  has  the  capability  to 
intercept  communications  subject  to  the  following  limitations: 
a.  To  the  maximum  extent  that  is  practical,  the  following  should  be 
used  — 
(1)  Laboratory-generated  signals; 
(2)  Department  of  Defense  official  agency  communications  with 
consent  from  an  appropriate  DoD  official; 
(3)  Official  government  agency  communications  with  consent  from  an 
appropriate  official  of  the  originating  agency; 
(4)  Individual  government  employee  communications  with  consent  from 
the  employee;  or  . 
(5)  Communications  transmitted  between  terminals  located  outside 
the  United  States  not  used  by  any  known  U.S.  person. 
b.  Where  it  is  not  practical  to  test  electronic  equipment  solely 
against  signals  described  in  paragraph  2.1a.  above,  testing  may  be  conducted, 
provided  — 
PAGE   1 
IsUlM'lULIIJlHL.
^
USSIO  18.  ANNEX  D 
20  October  1980 
(1)  It  is  limited  in  scope  and  duration  to  that  necessary  to 
determine  the  capability  of  the  equipment; 
(2)  No  particular  U.S.  person  is  targeted  intentionally  without 
consent  and  it  is  not  reasonable  to  obtain  the  consent  of  the  persons 
incidentally  subjected  to  the  surveillance;  and 
(3)  The  test  does  not  exceed  90  calendar  days. 
c.  Where  the  test  involves  communications  other  than  those  identified 
in  2  la  and  a  test  period  longer  than  90  days  is  required,  a  test  proposal  and 
plan  shall  be  submitted  to  the  Attorney  General  for  approval.  Such  proposals 
and  plans  shall  be  submitted  to  the  Director.  NSA.  through  the  General  Counsel. 
NSA.  for  transmission  to  the  Attorney  General.  The  test  proposal  shall  state 
the  requirement  for  an  extended  test  involving  such  communications,  the  nature 
of  the  test,  the  organization  that  will  conduct  the  test,  and  the  proposed 
disposition  of  any  signals  or  communications  acquired  during  the  test. 
2.2.  (U)  The  content  of  any  communication  acquired  during  a  test  and 
evaluation  shall  be: 
a.  Retained  only  for  the  purpose  of  determining  the  capability  of  the 
electronic  equipment; 
b.  Disclosed  only  to  persons  conducting  or  evaluating  the  test;  and 
c.  Destroyed  upon  completion  of  the  testing. 
2.3.  (U)  The  technical  parameters  of  a  communication,  such  as  frequency, 
modulation,  and  time  of  activity  of  acquired  electronic  signals,  may  be 
retained  and  used  for  test  reporting  or  collection-avoidance  purposes.  Such 
parameters  may  be  disseminated  to  other  DoD  intelligence  components  and  other 
entities  authorized  to  conduct  electronic  surveillance,  provided  such 
dissemination  and  use  are  limited  to  testing,  evaluation,  or 
collection-avoidance  purposes.  No  content  of  any  communication  may  be  retained 
or  used. 
PAGE 
PfltilfiTflErft'ifll '
USSIO  18 
20  October. 1980 
ANNEX  E 
COMMUNICATIONS  SECURITY  (U) 
SECTION  1  -  PURPOSE 
1.1.  (U)  This  annex  is  provided  for  inforaation  purposes  only  since  USSID 
are  not  directive  for  Communications  Security  (COHSEC)  operations. 
Implementation  of  COHSEC  surveillance  policy  and  procedures  is  in  National 
COMSEC  Instruction  (NACSI)  4000. 
SECTION  2  -  DEFINITIONS 
2.1.  (U)  Communications  security  is  the  protective  measures  taken  to  deny 
unauthorized  persons  information  derived  from  telecommunications  of  the  U.S. 
Government  related  to  the  national  security  and  to  ensure  the  authenticity  of 
such  telecommunications.  Communications  security  also  includes  the  protection 
of  communications  containing  government-derived  unclassified  information  that 
relates  to  the  national  security.-  It  includes  the  protection  of 
telecommunications  of  organizations  holding  classified  Defense  contracts  or 
otherwise  involved  in  the  industrial  security  program.  It  also  includes  the 
assessment  of  the  vulnerability  of  United  States  communications  to  foreign 
electronic  surveillance. 
2.2.  (U)  Communications  security  entity  means  each  entity  subject  to  the 
guidance  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense,  acting  as  the  executive  agent  of  the 
United  States  Government,  and  the  Director,  NSA,  acting  for  the  Secretary  in 
executing  responsibilities  as  executive  agent,  that  carries  out  any  of  the 
communications  security  activities  of  the  United  States  Government. 
2.3.  (U)  Hearability  survey  means  monitoring  radio  communications  to 
determine  whether  a  particular  radio  signal  can  be  received  at  one  or  more 
locations  and,  if  reception  is  possible,  to  determine  the  quality  of  reception 
over  time. 
PAGE   1
UOWrlULHIlML1 
USSIO  18.  ANNEX  E 
20  October  1980 
SECTION  3  -  PROCEDURES 
3.1.  (U)  Communications  security  ■onitoring  say  be  directed  against  the 
communications  of  U.S.  persons  only: 
a.  With  the  consent  of  one  of  the  parties  to  the  communication; 
b.  As  a  part  of  a  communication  vulnerability  survey  (see  paragraph 
3.2);  or 
c.  As  part  of  a  hearability  survey. 
3.2.  (U)  NSA  nay  survey  or  authorize  the  survey  by  other  communications 
security  entities  of  the  transmission  facilities  of  communications  common 
carriers,  other  private  commercial  entities,  or  the  federal  government  to 
determine  the  potential  vulnerability  of  those  facilities  to  surveillance 
activities  conducted  by  foreign  powers. 
a.  No  communication  vulnerability  survey  may  be  conducted  without  the 
prior  written  approval  of  the  Deputy  Director  for  Communications  Security,  NSA. 
b.  Information  collected  during  a  communications  vulnerability  survey 
aust  be  stored  and  processed  as  follows: 
(1)  No  transmission  may  be  acquired  aurally. 
(2)  No  transmission  may  be  demultiplexed  or  demodulated  for  any 
purpose  except  to  detect  by  a  visual  display  device  a  test  tone  placed  on  the 
transmission  by  the  owner  or  operator  of  the  facility. 
(3)  No  content  may  be  acquired  and  no  transmission  nay  be  recorded. 
(4)  Reports  and  logs  may  be  compiled  and  retained,  provided  that  no 
report  or  log  may  identify  any  person  or  entity  except  to  the  extent  of 
identifying  those  transmission  facilities  that  are  vulnerable  to  surveillance 
by  foreign  powers.  If  the  identities  of  the  users  of  such  facilities  are  not 
identical  with  the  identities  of  the  owners  of  the  facilities,  and  their 
identities  are  relevant  to  the  national  security  in  light  of  the  vulnerability 
of  the  facilities,  the  identity  of  such  users  may  be  obtained,  provided  such 
identities  may  riot  be  obtained  from  the  content  of  the  transmissions 
themselves.  The  reports  may  be  disseminated.  Logs  may  be  disseminated  only  if 
required  to  verify  results  contained  in  reports. 
3.3.  (U)  NSA  may  conduct,  or  may  authorize  the  conduct  of.  hearability 
surveys  of  telecommunications  that  are  transmitted  in  the  United  States. 
PAGE   2
USSID  18,  ANNEX  E 
20  October  1980 
a.  Where  practicable,  consent  will  be  secured  froa  the  owner  or  user 
of  the  facility  against  which  the  hearability  survey  is  to  be  conducted  prior 
to  the  coaaenceaent  of  the  survey. 
b.  Information  collected  during  a  hearability  survey  mist  be  processed 
and  stored  as  follows: 
(1)  The  content  of  the  coaaunication  aay  not  be  recorded  nor 
included  in  any  report. 
(2)  No  aicrowave  transaission  aay  be  demultiplexed  or  demodulated 
for  any  purpose. 
(3)  No  report  or  log  aay  identify  any  person  or  entity  except  to 
the  extent  of  identifying  the  transaission  facility  that  can  be  intercepted 
froa  the  intercept  site.  If  the  identities  of  the  users  of  such  facilities  are 
not  identical  with  the  identities  of  the  owners  of  the  facilities,  and  their 
identities  are  relevant  to  the  purpose  for  which  the  hearability  surveys  has 
been  conducted,  the  identity  of  such  users  aay  be  obtained,  provided  such 
identity  aay  not  be  obtained  froa  the  content  of  the  transaission  themselves. 
c.  Reports  aay  be  disseminated  only  within  the  United  States 
Governaent.  Logs  aay  not  be  disseainated  unless  they  are  required  to  verify 
results  contained  in  the  reports^ 
PAGE
USSIO  18 
20  October  1980 
ANNEX  F 
SEARCH  AND  DEVELOPMENT  OPERATIONS  (U) 
SECTION  1  -  GENERAL 
1.1.  (dT This  annex  provides  the  procedures  for  safeguarding  the  rights  of 
U.S.  persefs  when  conducting  SI6INT  search  and  development  activities. 
b.  Communications  originated  or  intended  for  receipt  in  the  United 
States  or  originated  or  intended  for  receipt  by  U.S.  persons ..shalljw, processed 
in  accordancewJJfchJSection  6  of  USSID  18, 
c.  Information  necessary  for  cataloging  the  constituent  elenents  of 
the  signal  environment  may  be  disseminated  to  the  extent, such  information  does 
not  identify  U.S.  persons,  provided  that  communications' equipment  nomenclature 
may  be  disseminated.  Information  that  reveals  a  vulnerability  to  United  States 
communications  security  may  be  disseminated  to  the  appropriate  communications 
security  authorities. 
PAGE       1
USSID  18.  ANNEX  F 
20  October  1980 
d.  All  information  obtained  in  the  process  of  search  and  developaent 
that  appears  to  be  of  foreign  intelligence  value  iay  be  forwarded  to  the  proper 
analytic  office  within  NSA  for  processing  and  dissemination  in  accordance  with 
relevant  portions  of  USSID  18. 
SECTION  2  -  CONTROL 
2.1.  (U)  The  000  shall  ensure  compliance  with  these  procedures. 
PAGE
FOR  OFFICIAL  USE  ONLY 
USSID  18 ' 
20  October  1980 
ANNEX  H 
TRAINING  OF  PERSONNEL  IN  THE  OPERATION  AND  USE  OF  ELECTRONIC 
COMMUNICATIONS  AND  SIGINT  COLLECTION  EQUIPMENT  (U)_ 
SECTION  1  -  APPLICABILITY 
1.1.  (U)  This  annex  applies  to  the  training  of  personnel  by  USSS  components 
in  the  operation  and  use  of  SIGINT  collection  equipment.  This  annex  does  not 
apply  to  the  interception  of  conunications  with  the  consent  of  one  of  the 
parties  to  the  communication. 
SECTION  2  -  DEFINITION 
2.1.  (U)  Electronic  coHunications  equipment  means  electronic  equipment 
capable  of  undetected  interception  of  electronic  or  oral  communications.  It 
does  not  include  equipment  designed  for  use  only  in  the  transmission  of 
communications.  It  does  not  include  equipment  designed  to  determine  the 
direction  and  location  of  radio  transmitters,  such  as  radio  direction  finding 
equipment. 
SECTION  3  -  POLICY 
3.1.  (U)  Training  of  USSS  personnel  in  the  operation  and  use  of  SIGINT 
collection  equipment  is  conducted,  to  the  maximum  extent  that  is  practical, 
without  interception  of  the  communications  of  U.S.  persons  who  have  not  given 
consent. 
PAGE       1 
FOR  OFFICIAL  USE  ONLY
FOR  OFFICIAL  USE  ONLY 
USSID  18.  ANNEX  H 
20  October  1980 
SECTION  4  -  PROCEDURES 
4.1.  (U)  The  training  of  USSS  personnel  in  the  operation  and  use  of  SIGINT 
collection  equi patent  shall  include  guidance  concerning  the  requirements  and 
restrictions  of  the  FISA.  Executive  Order  12036,  and  USSIO  18  with  respect  to 
the  unauthorized  acquisition,  storage,  and  dissemination  of  the  content  of 
communications  of  U.S.persons. 
4.2.  (U)  The  use  of  SIGINT  collection  equipment  for  training  purposes  is 
subject  to  the  following  limitations: 
a.  To  the  maximum  extent  that  is  practical,  use  of  such  equipment  for 
training  purposes  shall  be  directed  against  intelligence  targets  otherwise 
authorized; 
b.  The  contents  of  private  communications  of  nonconsenting  U.S. 
persons  may  not  be  acquired  aurally  unless  the  person  is  an  authorized  target 
of  electronic  surveillance;  and 
c.  The  electronic  surveillance  will  be  limited  in  extent  and  duration 
to  that  necessary  to  train  personnel  in  the  use  of  the  equipment. 
4.3.  (U)  The  limitations  in  paragraph  4.2  do  not  apply  in  the  following 
instances: 
a.  Public  broadcasts,  distress  signals,  or  official  United  States 
Government  communications  may  be  monitored,  provided  that,  where  government 
agency  communications  are  monitored,  the  consent  of  an  appropriate  official  is 
obtained. 
b.  Minimal  acquisition  of  information  is  permitted  as  required  for 
calibration  purposes. 
4.4.  (U)  Information  collected  during  training  that  involves  authorized 
intelligence  targets  may  be  stored  in  accordance  with  Section  7  of  USSID  18  and 
disseminated  in  accordance  with  Section  8  of  USSID  18.  Information  other  than 
distress  signals  collected  during  training  that  does  not  involve  authorized 
intelligence  targets  or  that  is  acquired  inadvertently  shall  be  destroyed  as 
soon  as  practical  or  upon  completion  of  the  training  and  may  not  be 
disseminated  outside  the  USSS  for  any  purpose.  Distress  signals  should  be 
referred  to  the  DDO. 
PAGE   2 
FOR  OFFICIAL  USE  ONLY
FOR  OFFICIAL  USE  ONLY 
USSID  18 
20  October  1980 
ANNEX  I 
SAMPLE  CONSENT  FORMS  (U) 
SECTION  1  -  PURPOSE 
1.1.  (U)  The  consent  foras.  shown  herein,  are  samples  of  those  used  to 
record  an  agreement  betweeen  the  U.S.  person  and  NSA  concerning  the  collection 
and  dissemination  of  foreign  coaaunications  by  or  about  the  U.S.  person. 
1.2.  (U)  The  first  saaple  fora  is  for  consent  to  collect  and  disseminate  a 
U.S.  person's  coaaunications  and  references  to  that  person  in  foreign 
coanunications.  The  second  sample  fora  is  for  consent  to  collect  and 
disseainate  only  references  to  the  U.S.  person  in  foreign  coaaunications. 
PAGE   1 
FOR  OFFICIAL  USE  ONLY
FOR  OFFICIAL  USE  ONLY 
USSID  18,  ANNEX  I 
20  October  1980 
EXECUTIVE  ORDER, 
CONSENT  AGREEMENT 
SIGNALS  INTELLIGENCE  COVERAGE 
I.  
 (full  name)   ,  
 (tfrtleT 
  ,  hereby 
consent  to  the  National  Security  Agency  undertaking^^  sAk  and  disseminate 
communications  to  or  froo  or  referencing  me  in  foreignfcrommunlcations  for  the 
purpose  of         ,  ^|k    /   . 
This  consent  applies  to  administrativgyaesmses  allrting  elements  of  the 
United  States  Signals  Intelligence  Syst£m"^mthS_:on_ent ,  as  well  as  to  any 
signals  intelligence  reports  that  mayHfclate/to  tft^purpose  stated  above. 
Except  as  otherwise  provided  b^fcjcecutt^Order  12036  procedures,   this 
consent  covers  only  information  that^Wlate^to  the  purpose  stated  above 
and  is  effective  for  the  pes^Nt^       YdakeY  to   (date)   . 
Signals  intelligence  reports^  confining  information  derived  from 
communications  to  or  ff^___e  may  Imly  be  disseminated  to  me  and  to 
..     Signals  intelligence  reports  containing 
information  dertvod,  from^ommpBications  referencing  me  may  only  be 
disseminated  to  me  and 
except  as  otheVj^^^tmj££_ed  by  procedures  under  Executive  Order  12036. 
(SIGNATURE) 
(TITLE)  (DATE) 
PAGE    2 
FOR  OFFICIAL  USE  ONLY
FOR  OFFICIAL  DSE  ONLT 
DSSID  18,  ANNEX  I 
20  October  1980 
EXECUTIVE  ORDER 
CONSENT  AGREEMENT 
SIGNALS  INTELLIGENCE  COVERAGE 
I,   (full  name)   ,   (tttleV^*-   ,  hereby 
consent  to  Che  National  Security  Agency  undertaking  to  ^eek  'sand  disseminate 
references  to  ae  in  foreign  communications  for  the  purpc 
except  as  otherwise  BfltmitteH/jy  procedures  under  Executive  Order  12036. 
This  consent  applies  to  administrative  messAes  alert.Yng'elements  of  the 
United  States  Signals  Intelligence  System  to^iis^onsent)  as  well  as  to  any 
signals  intelligence  reports  that  may  relate  ttkthe%urpose  stated  above. 
Except  as  otherwise  provided  by  Exrfcuti^^frder  12036  procedures,  this 
consent  covers  only  references  to  me  iDKpreif^cpmaunications  and  information 
derived  therefrom  that  relate  to  the  purpwe  st^fed  above.  This  consent 
is  effective  for  the  period  ___^4|^^te) jLjLfco     (date)   • 
Signals  intelligence  reports  cohtainng  information  derived  from 
communications  referencing  l^^nd  related  to  the  purpose  stated  above 
may  only  be  disseminated  toNm^fcitp' 
(SIGNATURE) 
(TITLE)      (DATE) 
PAGE   3 
FOR  OFFICIAL  USE  ONLY