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20 April 1S51 
INTELLIGENCE. AGENCY 
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE 
date 
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7 APR 1976 
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outspoken critics of the Castro 
Anti-Castro fighters on 
19 April virtually ended their 
organized resistance in the 
beachhead area as the Castro 
_yegime, under strong air cover, 
deployed its tanks and artillery 
against them. 
The survivors 
dispersed into the countryside 
later the same day. 
The extent. 
of the casualties and damages > 
suffered by. the Castro govern- 
ment remains unclear. 
‘No general internal uprising 
against Castro materialized, and 
the tightened police controls 
and.systematic terrorism against 
‘anti-Castro elements have for 
the present significantly 
strengthened the regime's domes- 
tic position. The number of an- 
nounced arrests and executions 
of “counterrevolutionaries" 
| 
markedly increased following 17 
April. 
On 18 April the Cuban na- 
tional radio network announced 
the arrest of the Roman Catholic 
auxiliary bishop of Havana Prov~ 
ince, long one of the church's 
regime, Also announced the same 
of other priests and the capture 
of anti-Castro leader Humberto 
Sori Marin, Castro's first min- 
ister of agriculture, who re- 
- portedly was wounded while try- 
ing to evade arrest. Sori Marin 
was one of those executed by 
the government on 19 April. 
| Free World Reactions 
Communist parties in 
other Latin American countries 
20 Apr 61 
OM 
WEEKLY REVIFW 
day were the arrests of a number 
social 
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 
engaged in a general effort in 
coordination with pro-Castro 
groups--and in some cases with 
Cuban Embassy personnel--to exert 
as much pressure on the govern- 
ments as possible by means of 
public demo:s:rations and work 
stoppages ii: support of Castro, 
Most 
of the anti-US demonstra- 
tions were effectively controlled 
by local security forces. 
Some 
pro-Castro demonstrations were 
still continuing on 20 April. 
The Argentine public re- 
action generally accented past 
contrasts between the increas-~ 
ingly frequent criticism of 
Castro in the responsible press | 
and the anti-US demonstrations 
by Argentine youths, who have 
been extensively cultivated by | 
Cuban and Communist propaganda, 
The Brazilian Government. 
stated on 17 April 
its “most 
profound apprehension concerning 
developments in Cuba'and 
reiterated 
ite adherence to the principal 
of self-determination. 
Comnu- 
nist-influenced peasant leagues 
in Recife and students in Rio 
de Janeiro stage non-violent 
protest demonstrationg,. 
.. 
Mexico adopted a strict 
hands-off policy 
in 
regard 
to... 
in... 
CUBR. 
while it observed 
in 
an 
offi- 
cial 
statement 
that Cuban 
“aspirations of 
economic 
and 
improvement have 
found 
| 
highly 
favorable 
echo 
in. 
the 
conscience 
of 
the 
peo-_ 
ples 
of 
America." 
Ex-Presi- 
dent 
Jazaro 
Cardenas 
was 
not allowed to fly to Cuba to 
| 
make his much-heralded stand of 
Para 4 of 27 
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Apr 61 
‘golidarity with Castro, and 
the most important Mexican news-~ 
papers--all responsive to gov- 
ernment policy--said that Cas- 
tro's sellout of the Cuban 
_ 
revolution to Communism was re- 
sponsible for the outbreak, 
Bditorial comment on the 
Cuban fighting was generally . 
sympathetic to the anti- Castro 
cause in many Latin American 
newspapers, including the major- 
ity of cnuose of Venezuela, 
Colombia, Panama, El Salvador, 
and Costa Rica, 
Anti-Castro 
groups in Guatemala and Peru 
~ Called 
on their governments to 
recognize the "provisional Cuban 
government of Miro Cardona, and 
Costa Rican student groups de- 
manded that relations with Cas- 
tro's Cuba be broken, 
Reaction to Cuban 
ments among the Afro-Asian coun- 
tries was marked by several pro-_ 
test demonstrations against 
“American imperialism," such as 
those of 17 and 18 Anril in 
Tokyo and Cairo, 
Indian Prime 
Minister Nehru reportedly de- 
scribed the Cuban situation as 
“very distressing," both in 
terms of itself and of its 
broader repercussions, 
Nasir 
sent a special message of sup- 
port to Fidel Castro in which 
he described the anti-Castro 
action as "a crime against world 
| 
peace and against the free con- 
science of mankind," 
'Sino-Soviet Bloc Reaction 
Moscow's reaction to the 
landings in Cuba produced the 
strongest and most direct crit- 
icism of over-all US rolicy 
Since 20 January, 
In his let- 
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 
ter to President Kennedy on 18 
April, Khrushchev accused the- 
US of having armed and equipped 
: 
the rebel forces and charged 
that the aircraft which bombed 
Cuban targets on 16 April "he- 
long to the USA." 
<A Soviet 
government statement, also is- 
sued on 18 April, denounced 
Washington for “pursuing the 
reactionary imperialist policy 
of Dulles and Eisenhower which 
has been condemned by the va- 
tions," 
Khrushchev's letter, more- 
over, contained a thirly veiled 
charge of bad faith on the part 
of the US, 
After recalling the 
recent exchanges between Amer- 
ican and Soviet officiesls con- 
cerning the "mutual wish of 
the parties to exert jcint ef- 
forts directed toward the im- 
provement of relations between 
our countries and the prevention 
of a danger of war," he asked, 
"how are we to understand what 
is really being done by the US 
now that the attack on Cuda has 
become a fact?" 
| 
Although the USSR moved 
vigorously to mobilize world 
opinion against the US and gen- 
| erate alarm over events in Cuba, 
Soviet pronouncements carefully 
avoided any commitments 
specific counteraction, 
shchev's letter fell far short 
of his "rocket threat" of iast 
July, 
No mention was mace of 
that statement or subsequent 
warnings, and the only allusion 
was a reference to the "military 
techniques" which make it pos- 
Sible for any "so-called 
small war" to produce a chain 
reaction, 
Page 
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casts to the subject, 
_ 
using the Cuban crisis to under- 
protest meetings throughout the 
ySSR. 
Crowds of students and 
workers ranging in size up to 
several thousand demonstrated 
in front of the US tUmbassy in 
Moscow on 18 April. 
Police 
and security forces, however, 
maintained close control over 
the demonstrators, restricting 
the size of the crowd by forc- 
ing delegations to move on be- 
fore permitting new groups to 
| 
arrive. 
The embassy commented. 
that the demonstration appeared 
to have more real political 
| 
content and posed 
more 
real 
concern sor the government than 
the demonstration against the. 
US landing in Lebanon in 1958, 
which was handled by a rela- 
tively small Security force. 
Demonstrations were also 
staged in all the European Gat~ 
ellite capitals. 
Peiping's propaganda cov- 
erage of the Cuban situation 
has been massive--the regime is 
staging large protest rallies 
in Chinese cities and devoting 
up to 75 percent of its broad- 
score a favorite thesis, that. 
the Kennedy administration is 
“even more aggressive" than 
the Eisenhower administration. 
An official Chinese Communist 
Statement on 20 April said the 
Cuban attack exposes the "hypo- 
critical US peace talks" in re- 
gard to Laos. 
The statement also linked 
the Cuban situation to tensions 
in the Taiwan Strait, citing. 
US “occupation” of Taiwan and 
Other cases “f "US aggression" 
in the area, and said the Chi- 
nese stand "on the same battle 
front" as the Cuban people. The 
Statment then- pledged "all | 
necessary measures 
in every 
field" to support Cuba, but 
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY == 
{ aid not. 
fy any reaction Pei- 
ping might take. 
At the UN 
members, pacticularly those 
the Afro-Asian bloc, 
the reb 
landing caused a sharp deteriora~ 
tion in support for the US on 
| 
Cuba's charges of US "aggressive 
actions" pending since last Sep- 
| 
tember and reiterated several 
times 
by Foreign Minister Roa 
from 15 April on. 
A member or 
the delegation of the Central 
African Republic probably summed 
up the generally prevailing mood 
when he told the US delegation | 
that his government was follow- 
ing charges and countercharges 
closely, “waiting 
to see which 
side proved to be right." 
The 
Senegalese delegate commented 
that even moral approval of 
the attacking group in Cuba 
| 
"threatened Cuba's independence 
and suggested condonation of 
nonofficial aid.” 
bitter debate is ex- 
pected 
to continue for some time. 
Four draft resolutions have beer 
presented--two by the Soviet 
bloc and one by Mexico, 
in addi- 
tion to the US-supported resolu- 
| 
| tion sponsored by seven Latin 
American countries--and other 
drafts are reportedly in prep-~ 
aration. Mexico--without notify~ 
ing other Latin American states 
in advance--submitted on 18 
April a draft resolution urging 
2ll1 states "to ensure that their 
territories and resources are 
not used to promote the civil 
war in Cuba," 
The Venezuelan 
and Argentine UN 
delegates, 
Sharply critical of the Mexican 
move, believed 
that 
while 
the Mexican draft would 
not 
have much effect on the Latin 
Americans, 
it would draw the 
of Afro-Asian members, 
20 Apr 61 
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