EGNFIDENTIAL ei FM 30-17A FIELD MANUAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS (U) NAT SECURITY INFORM Unauthorjzee-bisclosure ject to Criminal Sarittiogs et HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT GF THE ARMY FEBRUARY 1973
CONFIDENTIAL — FM 30-17 Mien Manas! HEADQUARTERS . DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY No. 80-17A | Wasuincron, D.C., 28 February 1973 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS (VU) Cuarten 1. GENERAL Paragraphs VPage Seebron Do debroduetion }-1—I-3 I-1 Tb. Hastile Intelligence __ _. wee eee eee 1-4— 1-9 1-2 SUL. Pechnical Support. . . a 1-10-—4--42 I-2— I-35 IV. Planning and Reporting. tees lee 1-13, 1-14 1-3 V. Investigative Lends. 02220 oC .. sees 1-15, 1-16 1-3—1-4 Vi. Contrel and Supervision... _. - see ee 1-37, 1-38 1-4, Gaarren 2. COUNTERESPIONAGE ° Section I. General... 2.22228. tee eee eee 2-31—2-+-4 2~-1—2-38 Hl. Defensive Counterespionage.. 22.002... 2-4, 2-6 2-3—2-5 Vi. Offensive Counterespionage __. wees eee 2-7—2-10 2-5-—2- WV. Neutralization — - a ee ee 2-15, 2-32 2-8—2-0 Cuapten 3. COUNTERSUBVERSION Seetion I. General_... oo |. -. - eens $-1—3-3 3-1—3-4 TH. Conntersubversive Operational Concept 3-4, 3-5 3-4 HI. Techniques and Procedures...0 20.002) $-G— 3-10 3-4—3-8 IV. Terrorism. ...-....000222..00..22----2 eee 3-11, 3-12 3-8 Cnarten 4. COUNTERSABOTAGE o Seetion fb. General... oo... - . a 4-1—4-3 4~-1—4-2 Tl. Pypes of Sabotage..2220 002 ween 4-4—4-% 4-2—4-5 Ii. Neutralization. 02220000000, i 4-9, 4-10 4-4—4- 5 Crapten 5. CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES ane Section I. General... 22 ol. —— tI —S-3 +-1—5-2 Vi, Utilization and Disposition — Lobe eee 5-4—5-6 9 2—H-3 H Hil. Souree Administration. ....2.2.2.-...20..20-0-- 5-7—5-12 A-3—5-7 i Cuarten 6. UNDERCOVER . Seetion IT. Generale... ee ce eee 6-1—6-3 6-I—t-2 TT. Planning and Preparation... 2. - seen 6-4—6-10 6-2—6- ‘ VU. Conduct of Undercover Assignment coe ee.) GIES 6-R—6-9 . iV. Concluding an Undercover Assignment. ._...__. 6-14--6-17 6-9 —--10 ‘ CHaprer 7, SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN STABILITY OPERATIONS . Section I. Introduction.....0......0 0....2.0-. 2. eee eee 7-1 7~1—7-2 —~) Tl. Counterintelligence Operations....._-.-_ 2... 2. 7-2—7-5 7-2—7-4 \ III. Plans and Mstimates....2..2.22222--. ee. 7-6 7-4—7-5 Cuapten &. TACTICAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE— DATA BASE Section I. Files, Indices and Analyses.................--- %-1—K-5 = &- 1 — 8-26 ; Jd Il. Pattern Analysis.............02.-.-.-.2-.-.-- §-6—-1] 8-27—8-28 Areenpix AL REFERENCES. .20.00000000000 0222. eee eee ee A-} B. HOSTILE ESPIONAGE ORGANIZATION AND METHODS OF OPERATION ..00.................-.. B-1—B-10 C. CHECKLIST FOR TECHNICAL SURVEY__........-_.. C-1—C-4 DP. OFCO REPORTS_....2.2000220220 222200020. 02 eee )-1—D-2 FE. SURVEILLANCE RADIO COMMUNICATIONS-CODE.. Ie-1—k-5 F. POLITICAL ORGANIZATION SYMBOILS________.._.__. F-1—F-9 INDEX... ee eee Index~1 *This manval supersedes FM 30-4 7A, 28 February 1968, including all changes. —CONFIDENFIAL—
~GONFIDENTIAL— FM 20-178 CHAPTER 1 GENERAL Section J. INTRODUCTION 1-2, (U) Changes Users of this manual are encouraged to submit recommendations to improve its clarity or accuracy. Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph and line of the text in which the change is recommended. Reasons should be provided for each comment. to insure understanding and complete eval- uation. Comments should be prepared using DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications) and forwarded direct. to the Commanding Officer, US Army Combat Developments Command Intelli- gence Agency, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85615. Origi- nators of proposed changes which would constitute u significant modification of approved Army doctrine may send an information copy, through command channels, to the Commanding General, US Army Combat. Developments Command, Fort. Belvoir, Virginin 22060, to facilitate review and followup.
FM 30-17A Section Il. HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE 1-4. (U) Introduction The key to effective counterespionage, countersub- version, and countersabotage is to “know your enemy.” Newly assigned counterintelligence person- nel must. first familiarize themselves thoroughly with hostile intelligence activities, methods of operation, agencies, and personalities common to the area in which they must operate. With unlimited resources, funds, and professionally skilled ease officers or principal agents, counterintelligence special opera- Lions may become very sophisticated, using the latest technologien!| developments. Conversely, the methods nay be as simple as recruiting someone to observe the “enemy” and report on everything he sees or henrs. Methods nnd techniques are also modified to meet the requirements posed by the effectiveness of opposing counterintelligence forces. 1-5. (U) Characteristics of Hostile Intelligence Activities a. Predominant among the hostile intelligence services faced by US Forees nre those of the USSK. The services of satellite nations are either patterned after the Soviet intelligence services or operate ina similar nianner, Ao discussion of these methods is ineluded as appendix B. b. Insurgent movements will probably have an intelligence network patterned after the North Vietnamese apparatus particularly in newly develop- ing countries. FM 30-31 should be referred to in insurgency situations. 1-6. (U) Functions of Counterintelligence CounterinteHigence is that phase of intelligence covering all activity devoted to destroving the effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities. {t oalso protects information against espionage, personnel against. subversion, and installations and material against sabotage. Counterintellizence special operations are activities which have percetime and wartime applications since they are used to gain knowledge about enemy intentions before, during, and after hostilities. 3 1-8. (U) Countersubversion Countersubversion includes operations designed to detect, prevent, or neutralize the activities of sib- versive groups and) individtats. "Phe countersub- version mission may be limited to designated defen- sive and preventive measures within the confines of Army installations. Inoother enser it} may be oll encompassing, to include offensive mensures directed toward the ongin of hostile subversive plans and policies (chap 3). 1-9, (U) Countersabotage Countersabotage operations are the most dificult. of all counterintelligence special operations to mannge. This is due to the highly compartmentation of sabotage cells or teams; the bigh security required for saboteurs; and the fact that such operations normally stem from incidents mstead of personnel actions (ehap 4). Section Ill. TECHNICAL SUPPORT 1-10. (U) General In both defensive and offensive counterintelligence mensures described in this manual, technical methods or support may be employed within prescribed lamitations (AR 381-17). Technical speciniists should be included in operational briefings and planning so that they may give advice on available technien! support and make specific recommendations for the special operations concerned, Special equipment. can be acquired and must. be ncecounted for as prescribed by AR S81 143. 1-2 CONFIDENTIAL
FM 30-17A Section IV. TERRORISM 3-11. (U) General a. Terrorism is normally employed in’ an insur- wency asa part of the subversive arm of the revolu- Gon. Terrorisin is used as a tactical and/or strategic weapon whereby the populace is frightened into neutrality in the conflict, into cooperation with the insurgent, or inte joining the insurgent force, overtly or covertly. ‘Terrorism employed against an armed force can make it redeploy combat troops out of the fick! and into a security mission, exhaust its resources by alftempting to hunt down the terrorists, over- extend its fines of communication, and divert its energies into other directions. b. ‘Terrorism, in an insurgency, will tend to be less sophisticated than terrorisn in vn conventional con- flict, therefore, those portions of chapter 4 which pertiin to snbotage in rear areas during a conven- tional conflict, are ulsv applicable to terrorist tactics. c. ‘Terrorism ean be, and sometimes appears to be, a hit and miss, haphazard, seemingly patterntess series of acts. In most instances, however, terrorism campaigns are as fully organized and planned as are sabotage campaigns. Therefore, every effort must be made to analyze incklents of o potential terrorism nature to detect the pattern if one exists. One area to scrutinize is the terrorists route into and out of the direa. In addition, all people in the area should) be interviewed in order to establish methods of opern- tion, and descriptions of the terrorists. An indentikit can be most useful, particularly with illiterate in- dividuals. This infermation, MO and individual descriptions, must be widely disseminated among - sources and securily forces in order to counternet the terrorism. ; 3-8 -CONFIDENTIAL—
FM 30-17A CHAPTER 4 COUNTERSABOTAGE I Section I. GENERAL 4-1. (U) Intreduction a. Subotage is any act with an intent to damage, interfere with, or obstruct by willfully damaging or destroying or attempting to damage or destroy material, premises or utilities, in the interests of a foreign power or subversive political organization. b. Countersabotage, then, is any action designed to destroy the effectiveness of foreign sabotage activities through, the process of identifying, pene- trating and manipulating, neutralizing or repressinye individuals, groups or organizations conducting or capable of conducting such activities. c. The crime of sebotage is discussed under Title tS, United States Code, chapter 105, sections 2151 2156 and is complex and not simply defined, This efime ean ocenr in peacetime or wartime; however, it is more common during war. Tn a peacetime environ- ment, any willful act or attempt of omission or commission committed with the specific intent to interfere with, damage, or destroy portions of the national defense effort and in the interest of oa foreign power or subversive group is sabotage. In wartime, the peacetime definition applies and, ndditionally, a willful act of omission or commission committed by oa persen who is deemed to have “renson to believe’! that his act may adversely affect. the warmaking petential can be convicted of sabotage. During wartime, and particularly during internal defense or ited war situations, care mitst be taken to distinguish those acts involving clandes- tine enemy agents or dissatisfied friendly personnel from overt acts ef war perpetrated by armed enemy tits. d. The use of subotage against military targets ean be expected to increase greatly prior to and during any future conflict in: which US forces are involved. Developments in technology have increased the destrnetive power of sabotage devices while miniaturizing the size of their component parts. e. Phe speeifie countersabotage responsibility as- signed to a unit varies with the area, militury situation, jorisdictional agreements, and directives. During and since World War IH, subetage has been directed mainly against material and facilities which support the military effort. Accordingly, the counter- sabotage role will be extensive in most cases and may require the employment of 2 significnnt portion of available counterintelligence resources in theaters of operations. f. To successfully fulfill countersabotage responsi- bilities, counterintelligence personnel must huve, in addition to complete understanding of installation and personnel security, a thorough knowledge of snbotage organizations, methods, capnbilities, and limitations. ‘They must be able to recognize an act. of sabotage, understand its relationship to hostile objectives, analyze patterns of sabotage activity, and engage in defensive and offensive openitions designed to prevent or neutralize sabotage activities, 4-2. (U) Sabotage Targets The planning and implementation of a counter- snbotage program: requires 2 thorough understanding of the procedures used by sabotage organizations i selecting sabotage targets, Major sabotage targets include natural resources, transportation, commuati- entions, power, fuel, industrial and military facilities, and equipment. All are susceplble to damage whieh could substantially impede their primary funetions and are considered highly Iwerntive to a saboteur because their destruction or incapncitation may have n serious effect on morale, strategic capability, or combat effectiveness. a. Target Selection Factors, +0 selecting no target, the sophisticated sabotage organization must consider several factors in relation to the capabilities of available snboteur personnel and the inherent risks requared) to perform the task ; however, no terrorist cell may only be concerned with (2) and (3), below: (1) Value. The strategic and tactient value mist be considered. For exnumple, the relative taectient value of disrupting the supply system or communica tions lines during: m combat engagement nory be weighed; or the strategic importance of destroving cither research of production facilities may be con- sidered. Related to the value of » target is Its capa- bility for recovery and the availability of other facilities to assume the mission or functions of the selected targat. ‘ -GONFIDEN-FIAL 1 % ee ee ae RT ere Lewes Wye
FM 30-17A (2) Accessibility. ‘The availubility of access de- pends chiefly upon the amount and type of security maintained and the geographic location. (3) Vulnerability. Nearly all materie! and facil- ities are vulnerable to sabotage. The degree of vulner- ability to destruction, however, varies and is an important factor im target selection. Some targets have an inherent capability to destroy themselves once a relatively small sabotage device is ignited. (4) Availability of sabotage materials. ‘The pro- curement, transportation, and storage of some types of explosives; and chemical, biological, or nuclear devices will present special problems for some types of snbotage activity. However, in most instances it can be anticipated that the sabotage organization will be able to provide the materials required for the particular means most suitable for a purticulur target. b. Special Target Vulnerabilities. Those targets particularly vulnerable to subotage, which are of sufficient importance Lo warrant sabotage considera- tion are discussed in FM 19-30. Additional targets are listed below: (1) Lund transportation systems: power sys tems; loading, transfer, and repair plants; and the roud nets. (a) Air transportation: aircraft, gasoline and lubricants, or runways. (b) Water transportation: destruction of many vitul components of the ship, piers, canal locks, blocking harbors, or navigational equipment and nits, (ec) Rail transportation: track system, tun- nels, bridges, switches, or signal can be reversed. (d) Bridges attacked by sabotage are normally limited to those with less than 12-inch girders. Split charges, on each side of the girder, one slightly above the other to give a scissor effect, are used. Railway bridges can be destroyed by the train detonating preset. charges. (e) Rolling stock: brake hoses, freight cars, guseline tankers; and locomotive cylinders, fireboxes, brakeshoes, connecting rods, or nif Compressors. (f) Railroad repuir and transfer points: round- house turntables, locomotive brakes, hydraulic or electric switches in marshalling yards, warehouses, and cranes. CONFIDENTIAL (2) Machinery is n vital clement in all trans- portation, communications, and power systems, #&s well as in manufacturing. Nearly all types can be readily sabotaged. The simplest means is to interfere with lubriention by draining oil, damaging nuto- matic fubricater and oil pipes, substituting improper viscosity oils, or by introducing abrasives into the system. Sensitive vital parts, particularly valves can be smashed or steel fragments can be dropped into moving parts or cylinders of engines. Explo- sives, too, are effective when placed in proximity to bearing pedestals, casi: iron surfaces, or vital com- ponents and inside closed spaces. (3) Fuel and power nre essential to all trans- portation, communication, und manufacturing. Con- sequently, they aro important sabotage targets. (a) Hydroelectric systems ure vulnerable to explosives at underwater parts of dams and sluice gates, turbines, governor gears, generators, pipelines, and valves. (b) Steam powerplants can be attacked with explosives at coal-loading crancs and winches, the motor, gears, und supports of cont: conveyers, cast iron links of stokers, bearing pedestals or iron casting surfaces of turbogencrators, feet and inspection doors of cast iron condensers, pumps, and water-cooling towers. (c) Gus plant production muy be stopped by damaging the retort stanchion supports for the distillation tubes, suction pumps, or the motor, gear- box, or supports for the conl conveyor. (4) Factories can be incupacitated by burning records and stores, stealing or smashing jigs and patterns, cutting off power, or destroying Joading und moving geur. 4-3. (U) Counterintelligence Responsibilities Counterintelligence elements will have varying de- grees of responsibilities for the detection, prevention, and neutralization of subotage activity. ‘The specific countersabotage responsibility assigned to a counter- intelligence element will depend on the arca, military situaticn, and jurisdictional or status-ol-forces ngrec- ments. ‘This role will be extensive in most cuses and muy require the employment of a significant portion of availuble resources in theaters of operation. Section Il. TYPES OF SABOTAGE 4-4. (U) Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear Sabotage Chemical und biological agents, as well us preposi- tioned nuclear devices, may be used “as means of committing sabotage in future wars or insurgency situations short of war. a. Chemical Agents. Chemical ugents can produce effects ranging from highly lethal to mildly incapaci- tating. Chemical compounds may be employed by saboteur to produce a deep sleep for hours; psycho- chemical agents which produce confusion and in- ability to carry out orders; poisons which enter the 12 —GONFIDENTIAL—
—GONMDENTIALC— body by absorption and are fethal; and drinking water can very easily be contaminated with chem- icals sufficiently potent to cause death. Initial delivery of chemical agents must be of a sufficient quantity to achieve the desired effect. Factors of dispersion and dilution will reduce the potency of the chemical agent. Therefore, to be effective, the agent must be delivered to the target in the necessary strength to accomplish what is desired before the agent dissipates. Aerosols, capsules, vials, special types of weapons, and spreading chemicals carried by the wind and dust are means of disseminating chemical agents. b. Biological Operations. Biological operations are the employment of biological agents to produce casualties in man or animals and damages to plants or materials. Biological agents, when employed by a trnined saboteur, have great sabotage potential. (1) Biological agents are microorganisms which cnuse disease in man, plants, or animals, or cause the deterioration of material. Such microorganisms, grown, cultivated and introduced by man, are a deadly weapon which can enter humans through inhalation or through eating, and cannot be readily detected by the five senses. Further, it may be days rather than hours before disease symptoms caused by the microorganisms become apparent. (2) ‘There are many devices for sprending: bio- logical agents. Use and methods of such devices are limited only by the ingenuity of the saboteur and the desired effect. The saboteur’s devices may consist of vials, capsules, various sizes of aerosol bombs, and specially designed devices with delaying mechn- nisms. Under favorable conditions microorganisms may be placed in old tin cans, bottles, and boxes around an aren from which the microorganisms may multiply and spread. An aerosol bomb placed in an air intake ventilation system is a quick and easy method of spreading the agents throughout an entire building. c. Naelear Denices. Prepositioned nuclear aevices may also be tools of the saboteur. Nuclear devices have preat destructive enpnhilities and will destroy lives, crops, property, industrial sites, material, and equipment. A hostile nation may plan the use of small nuclear devices to create panic and undermine the morale of the citizens. Additional information is contained in AR 380--150 and in FM 19-30. 4-5. (U) Incendiary Sabotage Fire is a very destructive type of sabotage and is easily employed by even the untrained saboteur because the means are almost always available and almost all targets can be destroyed by fire. In addi- tion, fire is 2 natural hazard making it easier for the iN —- a FM 30-17A saboteur to camouflage his actions. The means of starting a fire are simple and, once the saboteur succeeds in igniting combustible matenal, time will dictate the amount of destruction achieved. a. Origin. Fires may be classified as natural or deliberate. (1) Natural fires include accidental fires as well as those caused by spontancous combustion, light- ning, electricity, and by sparks from other fires. (2) Deliberate fires started by saboteurs, dis- gruntled employees, or people with other personal motives are often disguised as natural fires. b. Materials. A saboteur may use the inherent combustible material of the target, or available within the target, ignited by a simple device, or he may use specifically prepared chemicals known as “hot in- cendiaries.’ When using “hot incendiaries” the snboteur usually prefers to select those meeting the following four requirements: (1) Burn with an intense heat. (2) Be easy to ignite. (3) Be difficult to extinguish. (4) Burn without leaving a residue or nt least. alter the external appearance of evidence at the scene of the fire. c. Components. Incendiary devices, as well ns explosives, used by a snboteur usually include three basie components. (1) A delay mechanism provides sufficient time for the safe withdrawal of the agent who pliees the device, provides a time discrepancy for the establish- ment of an alibi, and insures the ignition or detona- tion of the device at the most advantageous time. (2) An initiator insures the complete and ef- ficient initiation of the main charge. (3) ‘The main charge contains sufficient incen- diary or explosive material to ignite or demolish the target. d. Sanple Denices. Simple devices are those re- quiring little or no preparation and using materials rentily available to the saboteur. Their use muty be -preplanned or they may be used when taking advantage of a sabotage target of opportunity. An example would be a cigarette and mateh folder utilized by inserting the unlighted end of the cigarette into a rew of match heads in the folder. ‘The folder would then be placed on the combustible material. e. “ol? Devices. VE the simpler devices are not sufficiently effective to necomplish destruction of target, the snaboteur inay use “het” incendiaries. A few examples are us follows: so-catled (1) A mixture of three parts potassium chlorate and one part sugar by volume will Burn at oa very hich Camperntire. ow we ew -— aw
FM 30-17A {2) Dmpregnating a piece of paper with white phosphorus tis another elfective means of making a “hot” incendiary. The impregnated paper is carried inv vial filled with water; phosphorus will not burn in water, but. will ignite when it dries. (3) Another combinaion is sodium: and eaten carbide enapsules. Sodium is placed in’ one gelatine capsule and a quantity of caleium carbide is placed in another and dropped into water near combustible materials, When the capsules dissolve, the sodium will ignite on the water’s surface and, in turn, ignite the acetylene gas produced by enlcium carbide and water. The resulting acetylene flame will iznite any nearby combustible material. (4) Thermite, which burns at approximately 5,000° Fahrenheit: and is hot enough to melt iron and steel, is made by mixing one part of aluminum powder and three parts iron oxide by volume. As thermite is dificult. to extinguish, easily obtained, and produces such intense heat, it provides the type of an incendiary desired by the saboteur. However, it is difficult. to ignite and leaves a residue. J. Reference. Additional details regarding incen- diary sabotage may be found in FM 19-30. 4-6. (U) Explosive Sabotage Explosives include any chemical compounds or mechanical mixtures that, triggered by heat or shock, undergo sudden chemical change (decomposition) liberating, at high speed, heat and gas which cause tremendous pressures. a. Mmployment, Explosives are employed against targets that resist destruction by other means, when destruction must be accomplished instantaneously, or when targets are of such a nature that destruction reyuires x shearing or shattering force. They may also be used to kill, maim, or instill fear. The use of explosives hus many disadvantages and problems such as introducing the material into the target aren, the need for technical or specialized training in their employment, the almost certain investigation resulting from their use, and the consequent tighten- ing of security. b. Classification of Explosives. Explosives are classified according to rates of decomposition as high and low explosives. A high explosive is one in which chemical decomposition occurs within an extremely short period of timr; it is said to detonate. Low explosives are those in which the decomposition takes place as rapid burning; they are said to defla- Erate. Explosives are also classified according to their inherent sensitivity. An insensitive explosive i is one which requires only normal care in handling or storing. A sensitive explosive must be given special care in handling, storage, or use. Both high and low explosives may be either sensitive or insensitive. 4-4 GCONFIDENFIL CONFIDENTIAL ec. Common Explosive minterinis exist in different: physical states and forms. Nitroglycerine is aliquid high explosive, which is very sensitive to Types. shock. ‘Privitrotoluene (PNT) is high velocity, insensitive explosive either in block form or grann- lated. Nitrostareh ison high velocity, insensitive explosive and has the appenrance of ordinary powdered starch. Picrie acid is a very powerful high velocity, insensitive explosive and is a Jemon-yellow crystalline solid. Plastic explosives, such as Compo- sition C-series which have an appearance similar to that of putty, are the ideal all-around sabotage material. Black powder is a low explosive with extreme sensitivity to heat and friction. Nipolit is an insensitive high explosive, and is a plastic which can be pressed inte any desired shape, machined or east, or formed into a one-piece: bomb without casting. Additional details on explosive sabotage methods are included in FM 19-39. 4-7. (U) Mechanical Sabotage a. Most acts of physical sabotage which are not committed by means of explosive or incendiary materials fall within the category of mechanical sabotage. This type of sabotage is one of the most difficult, to prevent and the easiest. to perpetrate. Mechanical sabotage is used in military operations, but most atincks are directed against. transportation and industrial facilities. b. Mechanical sabotage can be grouped into the _ following basic classifications, a detuiled discussion | of which is found in FM 19-30. (1) Breakage can be directed against delice ate. ¢ equipment and machinery. | (2) Abrasives can be introduced into lubricants. and fuels to cause undue wear in motors, penerators, or moving parts. 3 (3) Acts of omission are those perpetrated. through willful failure to act, thereby causing damage: through neglect. (4) Substitution is performed by replucing good with faulty materials, changing direction of ship- ments, or altering important points of information. (5) Contamination is the introduction of sub- stances into materials for the purpose of rendering the materials impure or injurious. A relatively new process of contamination is metal embrittlement. Embrittlement occurs when » prepxred formula is placed or rubbed on the ferrous or nonferrous metal parts of the target item. When the metal part: is stressed under tension—usually by mechanical means—the pores in the metal are temporarily opened. The formula then seeps into the pores and begins a rapid disintegration of the internal struc- ture of the metal, resulting in extensive cracking anc eventual total breakage of the item.
oo 4-8, (U) Countersabotage Measures That part of the counterintelligence mission which directs “the detection, prevention, or neutralization” of sabotage requires 2 comprehensive program in- cluding defensive measures and aggressive offensive action. a. Detection of sabotage depends on thorough in- vestigation of individual and incident complaint cases in which saboinge is alleged or suspected. b. Prevention of sabotage is achieved through, rigorous epplication of personnel security procedures, FM 30-17A and establishment and enforcement of high standards of installation security. c. Neutralization of the saboteur or sabotage organization before sabotage is attempted is the most difficult part of countersabotage operations and depends on penetration of sabotage, partisan, or other dissident groups to determine sabotage plans and identify saboteurs, methods of operations, and specific targets. No single mensure or type of activity will provide adequate protection from the threat of sabotage. Ee CONFIDENTIAL as Fe Og eg ere ey ee ee er en ee
FM 30-17A GONFIDENFHL—- Section Il. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 7-2. (U) General Standard counterintelligence practices and proce- dures as set forth in FM 30-17 are applicable in conducting coumterintelligence activities for stability operations. Standard practices und procedures differ * only in degree and emphasis. Counterintelligence aspects of stability special operations are discussed in this section. 1 CONFIDENT ha
TS) CONFIDENTIAL FM 30-17A CHAPTER 8 TACTICAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE—DATA BASE Section |. FILES, INDICES AND ANALYSES g-1. (U) General a. Effective counterintelligence operations are frequently dependent on the quality and complete- ness of files, indices, and the analyses of these files and indices. This chapter discusses files, indices and analyses at the tacti-al level during an Insurgency; however, with slight modification, this information is applicable tal! layels of command, and in all intensities of warfare. b. Files and indices, after proper analysis, should yield insurgent indicators (FM 30-5 and FM 30-31), and generate a useful data base from which target recommendations, populace and resources control measures, base camp securily recommendations, and counterintelligence special operations, can be made, ce. Counterintelligence files provide the counterin- tellizence clement with an expedient. reference data buse from which can be drawn accurate, timely information for use in both short- and long-range counterintelligence operations. Additionally, these files will provide a measure of continuity of opern- tions and eliminate the possibility that element per- sonnel will waste time and effort on activities and methods atlempted or rejected dhiring previous operations. They will also provide a menns for quickly orienting newly assigned personnel, One warning, however, must be borne constantly in mind. Too much information is often as confusing as too little. Good files are continuously screened in order to eliminate obsolete or irrelevant, material, d. From this data base, the counterintelligence clement enn recommend tactical interception, cordon. and search eperntions, raids and searches, popula- tion and resources control measures, border security measures, and other tactical operations to the commander. 8-1
FM 30-17A CONFIDENTIAL— 2 8-3. (U) Cross-Referencing rapidly into subdivision A while the subdivision Figure 8-19 graphically shows the cross-referenciny, troops in B will be forced to stop at boundary AB. of files. Hf the information contained ina file cannot ‘The insurgents, since they are still in their own sub- be found, then the file is worthless. This figure only division, will be near familiar caches and rest areas. suggests 1 cross-referencing, system for each eckelon The solution would be close cooperation between the and ench combat. environment must devise Hs own two subdivisions A and Bas long as the insurgent system to fit its own needs. chooses Lo maintain subdivision C. In addition, the insurgents subdivisional boundaries reflect his needs 8-4. (U) Use of Files and capabilities, and where he feels strongest. This Coun terinteiligence files have many vaned uses as information could be vital in an analysis of adminis- depicted in figure ¥-20. Basically, these files are an Lrntive and pacification roies to be taken by the host aid to further collection and/or to tacticel exploita- "government. tion for support of the tactical commander and in b. Enemy Control. The host government's pres support of the unitts mission, ‘To fully Hustrate the ence, of lack of it, is an indicator as to how much use of the foregoing files, the following examples are control the host government exercises in an aren, furnished: The absence of host government tax offices, schools, a, Hnemy Boundaries. Tnsurgents frequently have police departments, hospitals, and elections in areas different political and jurisdictional boundaries than iz indicative of insurgent control. This informawon the host. government. A data base that does not in- can be obtained from a poliient SITMAP where diente these different boundaries will be incompicte insurgent and host country agencies are Map plotted. thus allowing lasurgent exploitation of the bounda- c. Enemy Initiated Incidents. The political SIT ries, und a distortion of the insurgent infrastructure MAP can form a nucleus for analysis of enciny ini- is crented. One advantage to the insurgent could tiated incidents. Ench abduction, bombing, ASSASSINS be tactical if the host yovernment employs regional tion or other such action should) be plotted. “Phe military forces in fixed AOs. For example, the host analyst, however, should not jump to conclusions government has hwo subdivisions A and BR as de- but should analyze such activity carefully. The Jack picted in figure §-21) while the insurgent subdivision of such netivity could mean the insurgent is strongly C overlaps the two. In this instance, the Insurgents in control or it could mean he has noe conweh Cone ean attack a target in subdivision Bo and move versely, a high incident rate may indicnie that the: (CLASSIFICATION) AY THE END OF A 30-DAY PERIOD, REPORTS ARE TRANSFERRED TOA FILE FOLDER WHICH IS STORED 1m CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER wWiTH OTHER FOLDERS COVERING PREVIOUS PERIODS. Figure 8-17 (U). Incident files (U). 8-18 CONFIDENTIAL SNP ANTNANML ANNTRARAR RANA As: Atri SRA Nan yen cons ney Sure ges rece re tater eee 39
a) s TIO DAC meses ree enppseees sceapepers ame GONFIDEA-FIAL FM 30-174 (CLASSIFICATici) PAGE NO NO OF PAGES 2 2 DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG PERIOD COVERED (AR 220-3465 & FM 107-S) FROM TO WOUR pare HOUR Gate loco | LF ay €4 | 2400 |1E tay &4 | INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS. ETc. Md Tm A vie radio: Radio station vic UT G2, Ca Notified. [Lav 365402 sezrched. 12 lbs docts uncovered, FY Four guards posted, | 27 [2320 2045 | FM Div G2 via L/L: 52, Ist Bde reported arml m D instr to LAV | | ed civ captured en route to Ful cage. { proceed to IWC. | 28 2355 Fu Tm B via radio: Circle Trigon Party Tm F ordered to official disclosed loc of concealed enomy site to resove records in cave at UTM 370621. docts to CP & LOCATION PHILGERIA ORGANIZATION OR tNSTALLATION CI S=CTICN, 2332 MI DsT 207TH DIVISION TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL On Duty Lucius A. Valliant, S/A, 2322 MI Det DA : FORM | 1 5 94 PREVIOUS Eoition 2F THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE, us covrenment POINTING OFFICE 1862 O—e4a150 (CLASSIFICATICN) Figure 8 18 CU). CT journal (Hs).
FM 30-17A a Insurgest ts employing terrorisin to consolidate his control over contested areas. Basically, incidents do have n meaning. ‘The key is interpretation. d. Organizational Files. Organizational files, to include dine and block charts, are useful analytical establishing enemy subordination and strength. A well-developed, complicated Jine and block chart. allows the analyst to draw certain con- clusions about the insurgent, for example, his or- and munerienl strength, particularly Hitary and political activity. New organizations might reflect a change in mission or’ ndditional nsissions ussiened to Uhat subdivision. Deletions of old organizations, and consolidations of existing organizations could mean the insurgent is being hurt, either in this subdivision or in others, or eamlining these organizations lyzing who is subor- tools for yanizntional in arenas of dow mp i. econld mean he is sth for n new mission. By also ana dinate to whom, it will be ensier to establish priorities for turgeting aguinst the organization or individuals within it. O_o OL re ' e. Other Uses. Money and food are portant bo the insurgent. Map plots of taxation points or food drops may indicate exploitable patte activity. The use of the data base, therefore, is limited only by the person making the analysis of the information contained therein. rhs of insurgent 8-22 -CONFIDENTIAL
FM 30-17A Section Il. PATTERN ANALYSIS 8-6. (U) General Because human beings have certain needs and habits, the insurgent’s activities, movement and locations, may be analyzed through pattern analysis. Counter- intelligence personnel should be aware of these methods in case of employment in support of stability operations. 8-7. (U) Area of Operations An analysis of the insurgent should first begin with the “aren-of-operation” study. This study should yield descriptive facts about the area, a discussion on how they influence certain factors selected for their importance in developing courses of actions, and conslusions on how the influenced factors affect possible courses of action. agn- 493 GF - TTA 8-9. (U) Terrain Analysis In effect, the above analysis leads into a parallel analysis which can be furnished to the tactical commander. Terrain needs to be factually deseribed for its effect. on insurgent and on counterinsurgent. If certain terrain features are best suited for insurgent. basing areas, then the countennsurgent. should consider all terrain of this type as key terrain, ‘Phe same principle applies to avenues of approach which are logically, in an insurgency, avenues of movement since an insurgent band tends to retrace its previous movement. 8-27
jon itv ent ned ing in ork ort tics the ble ort. AY nly nts ‘ers nts APPENDIX A REFERENCES FM 30-17A AR 380-series AR 381-series AR 405-10 AR 710-2 DA Pam 310-series DA Pam 381-series ce: DIAT 58-19 , (8) DIAL 58-21 (8) DIAM 58-1 (8) DIAM 58-11 FM 19-30 FM 19-40 FM 21-76 FM 30-15 FM 30-16 FM 30-17 (S) FM 30-18 FM 30-31 FM 31-73 (C) FM 32-5 FM 33-1 FM 100-series FM 101-series TB (PMG series) TC 3-16 TOE 30-series Military Security. Military Intelligence. - Acquisition of Real Property and Interest Therein. Materiel Management for Using Units, Support Units, and Installations. Indices, as appropriate. Intelligence, Security, and Related Subjects. Defense Intelligence Agency Instructions (U). Defense Intelligence Agency Instructions, Intelligence Acquisition (ISR) (U). Defense Intelligence Acquisition Manual (UV). Defense Human Resources Intelligence Collection Management Manual (U). Vol I, Human Resources Collection System Management. Vol IT, Controlled HUMINT Collection Operational Planning and Tradecraft. Physical Security. Enemy Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees. Survival, Evasion, and Escape. Intelligence Interrogation. Technical Intelligence. Counterintelligence Operations. Intelligence Collection Operations Intelligence Corps, WSA (U). Stability Operations-Intelligence. Advisor Handbook for Stability Operations. Signal Security (SIGSEC) (U). Psychological Operations—US Army Doctrine. Field Service Regulations. Staff Officers. Provost Marshal General. Employment of Riot Control Agents, Flame, Smoke, Plant Agents, and Personnel Detectors in Counterguernilla Operations. Military Intelligence. Note, For additional references, see FM 30-17.
a —__ FM 30-17A APPENDIX B (2) HOSTILE ESPIONAGE ORGANIZATION AND METHODS OF OPERATION a . Introduction . YRasie methods of espionage have not varied significantly in’ the past except as technological developments have permitted the sophistication and modification of these methods. Regardless of the sponsoring country, certain factors or principles hnve contribfed to successful espionage operations. ‘The purpose of this appendix is to amplify the doc- trine on espionage contained in chapter 2 by present- ine additional information on espionage erganiza- tions noel fundamental methods of operation. oLountries with many years of experience in worldwide espionage have achieved a high degree of professionalism in their intelligence personnel. Staff and operational personnel are carefully selected: after thorough investigation with maximum emphasis on political loyalty. Intelligence may be a lifetime pro- fession, barring purges, and there is a grent deal of specintization. Intelligence personnel are well ac- quainted with the longuage, history, economics, and polities of their target. countries. Frequently, they spend time in the target. country for area familiariza- Lion prior to engnging in espionage operations. AUAInited States constitutional hberties have been studied in detail, and hostile intelligence organiza- lions take full advantage of our freedoms of speech, press, and religion; tho right. of assembly and meei- ings, democratic elections, the legal existence of more than one political party, our judicial systems, our self-chosen pursuits of education and professions, the freedom of internal and external travel, and the absence of censership of communications. B-2. Operational Controls (Q)in operations in the field, three fundamental epera- tional control procedures are usually exercised by hostile intelligence organizations. ‘Phese controls emphasize the concern for operational security. -CONPIDENFIAL oo
FM 30-17 A CONFIDENTIAL ‘ B-3. Types of Operations GHostile intelligence operations abroad may be referred to as either legal or Hlogal. This distinction has nothing to do with tho legality of espionage; rather it refers to the statustof the personnel involved in such operations. (a{UPhe logal operation makes use of logul representations such as an embassy, consulate, trade or cultural mission, exchange group, or economic organization as cover for the hostile intelligence porsonnel. As a member of such a legal representation, ono is in the target country with official status, sunctioned by the host government. (ayn a legal operation, hostile intelligence personnel may enjoy the privilege of diplomatic im- munity; they are not subject to search, arrest, or prosecution for their unlawful activities. At best, they can be declared persona non grata and asked to leave the country. (BYOPhe legal operation, particularly when controlled from diplomatic representations, has rela- tively secure communications with the headquarters in tho home country through use of the diplomatic pouch, Communications is a prime problem for agents and this method offers a good solution. (e Up he legal ayeney ean also paurlicipate, to a large extent, in overt collection, Hi. has been stated by several defectors from hostile intelligence Uhat as high as 90 percent of their intelligence requirements against the US ean be fulfilled through the collection of material openly available. we CONFIDENTIAL
| an a ng gp a aadedihidettheteteieha deme nehene ae rise ee B-4. Types of Agents and Agent Systems Lyn conducting espionage operations, hostile intel- ligence uses several types of agents and agent systems: aft ‘he individual agent system involves the in- tellizence collection efforts of one person. The intel- ligence collector operates nlone, with direct elan- destine communication with imtclligenee in the home country (vin radio, courier, er personnal contnet). Ile may have support agents such as radio operntors or courier system, or hoth; however, only one per- son does the collecting. An individual agent may be any one of the several categories of agents, as follows: (1fuPenetration agents. These agents hnve direct access ‘to information of a military, political, eco- nomic, scientific, or counterintelligence nature. (20\Mass recruited ayents. Mass recruited agents are low-level, poorly trained agents who are infiltrated into target countries in large numbers whenever favorable opportunities exist. Thev are infiltrated among refugee streams, repatriated prison- crs of war, displaced persons, and linecrossers. They are ussiened low-level missions, such as the coller- tion of military unit identification, movements of military equipment and Weapons, and troop mnneu- ver activities. The hostile intelligence services hive litte diMeculty in recruiting them. The conypromise of a few does not really constitute much of an operational Joss since quantity, rather than quality, is A Major consideration in these operations, caf unfusion and provocation ayents, Sone con- fusion agents are instructed to fabricate lone and detailed stories of contact with hostile intelligence. The hope is to lure target country connterintelligence into recruiting these agents or dissipating its efforts in uscless investigation, Others may carry fabriented documesits containing seemingly important data concerning the home country for the purpose of deceiving ana toisdirecting countorinicligence, Proy- eeation agents are used te provoke target country counterintelligence agencies into some course of ae- tion which will be to their disadvantage and to the ndvantage of the sponsoring country. Por example, mnoagent may be instructed to contact vn target. country intelligence agency and denounce a public official as being an informant of hostile intelligence. A false denuneintion of this type could result in lengthy investigation of the official concerned and possibly organizational upheavals, (4)V leeper agenta, Sleeper agents may bo in- fitlrnted into the target country or recruited from among local residents. They remain inactive until the sponsoring intelligence servies has a specific mission for them to perform. Sleeper agents, for the greater part, cost. litte or nothing, and some have the — atl, FM 30-17A potential of developing into high-level, well-concealed ngents, B-3
FM 30-17A B-5. Multiple Coverage aU More than one espionage system from the same or different intelligence agencies may be used concurrently to operate against the same Larget or project. “They may opernte independently of exch other and may not know of each other’s existence, OMultiple coverage increases Ube possibility that thesdesired information will be obtained. Further- more, information obtained from the different nets ~ can be compared in order to submit » more complete ” nnd accurste evaluation, as well as to reorient the effort when necessary. B-6. Agent Recruitment J\Espionage practices normally include at Jeasb a three-phase recruitment. ‘These phases are spotting, analysis or study, and the approxch. Ul ostile intelligence must locate individuals who canbe induced or coerced into accepting recruitment. Emphasis is naturally placed on persons who have access to information soughi, or on persons who might Jater be inserted into positions of access. Higher-level professional persons ure sought— soverninenk officials, scientists, Inanager, educators, military officers, medical doctors, and others. How- ever, the unschooled, the somiskilled, and the lower military ranks, ¢.., messengers, communication center personnel, are jncrative sources and also serve useful purposes as espionage agents, Asecrelury, typist, or a message center clerk may have access to highly sensitive information which would make him an extremely valuable agent. p4 ~GONFIDENTHAL
B-7. Agent Motivation \ There are many motivations used in recruiting agents. Of these, three are exploited most frequently by hostile intelligence agencies: a Veteokogy. Preference is given to the ideological recruit; that is, the one favornbly disposed toward home country or its national theories. This type of person generally is the most reliable, for he works with political conviction, zeal, perseverance, and complete adherence to policies and instructions; he 1s frequently willing Lo make many personal sacrifices, Remuneration. Vostile intelligence has recruited many individuals on the basis of mercenary tendencies. Some mercenaries offer to sell information to the hostile service, and others are recruited after having been spotted by hostile intelligence repre- sentatives in the target country. (i Walk-ins” may have large. gambling debts; they may have wild spending proclivities; or they may be motivated simply by greed. Generally, their intentions are to sell information to the hostile intelligence service or to any buyer on a short-term hasis. Hostile intelligence may be quick to tke advantage of these exploitation opportunities; and as soon as possible they develop leverage factors to force the informants’? continued cooperation, (2j9}lostile intelligence is continuously on the lookout for individiudls with financial difficulties or other personal preblems. [excessive cumblers, aleo- holies, and irresponsible spenders in the Army are among the favored recruitment targets. Attractive females are often used to induce soldiers to spend money freely and excessively. Sometimes females are successful in’ persuading the soldiers lo provide information for money, an “easy” means for them to continue their indulgences. Initink requests are sometimes camouflaged by false claims that the desired information is. for seme national cause, research institute, or friendly country. The innocent requests then develop into demands, with the revelation that hostile intelligence has been the re of information already provided. *ressure. ‘Nhe instances in which hostile intelh- gence services have recruited by pressure treties FM 30-174. are innumerable. Despite the fact that many indi-. viduals have reported pressure recruitment »p- proaches and actual involvement in espionage, pressure. tactics have been used with a great deal of success. The tactics may take numerous forms, and their effectiveness depends upon the extent to which various types of acts have been tolerated in the target countries. (1 Wrhreote to expose past or current criminal activities which have not come to the attention of employers or lax enforcement agencies. The criminal acts may involve anything from black-marketing to theft, smuggling, extortion, dope peddling, sexual crimes, and even murder. Tn some cases, hostile intelligence has induced individuals to commit or participate in criminal acts, the sole purpose being to develop pressure points which can be applied im forcing vem to engage in espionage. (2¥exploitation of character weaknesses aru indiscretions. ‘These frailties might involve nlco- holism, drug addiction, adultery, or sexunl perver- sion. Female agents are used to lure soldiers Imto illicit. sexual affairs, and homosexual agents are placed in contact with Army homosexuals, The soldiers are then confronted with photographs of the acts, with threats to send prints to wives, superior officers, or government officials, unless they agree to cooperate. Beenuse of the many control problems presented by drug users, hostile intelligence services are not expected to exploit a drug addict except on a one-time-basis proposition, (3 )erpluitation of prisoners and prisoners of war. ‘There have been cases where political prisoners were offered enrly release, provided they sign agreements to work as agents. The same is true of prisoners of war, who are offered enrly repatriation or who are threatened with nonrepatriation, the condition being that they work as agents after relense. Another technique is to threnten the prisoner of war with torture or death unless they hecome informers. Once they cooperate, levers cin be applied to force their cooperation after repatrintion,. . cal Crploitation of family ties, Active agents ure persunded or pressured into recruiting their close relatives. This can be done with considernble impunity, because the relatives are often reluctant to expose the recruiter-relative to the authorities, Many agents have been recruited through tbrenats to first degres relatives living in the home country of the hostile intelligence service. ‘Threats muy entail confiscation of property, imprisenment, in- carceration in slave labor camps, torture, and even death. A variation is the promise to allow relatives lo emigrate to the West, provided that the subject agrees. to cooperate. Pressura reernithents through GONFIDENTIAL B-5
FM 30-17A relatives frequently are accompanied by financial inducements? cither directly to the subject or to relatives kept as hostages. B-8. Cover alas may be assumed, hostile intelligence spends aovrent dent of time phunning and developing cover for espionage agents. Jn the “egal” operation, the agency may spend severnl month. or even a vear learning his job to support his cover story in the West. In the “Gllegal’? operation, cover must be constructed to permit the agent to disappear into the population of the target country. To this end, the tremendous files available at the headquarters proyide the necessary background information. if ienerally, hostile intelligence cateyorizes cover ns either “natural” or “artificial.” QPNatural cover takes the form of legal resi- dence or Jegal entry into a country, the use of true Hames dy mest instances, authentic documentation, and a normal or legal occupation. The best examples of agents using gatural cover are natives of # target country with legitimate occupations and no connec- lions whatsoever with the bome country. Other ex- amples are persons ceeruited from among repatriates and refugees, and hostile intelligence officers serving aboard jn diplomatic and other official representations, of) ruifieial cover involves the fabrication of an agent’s background and status, and falsification of documents, passports, and other identifiention documents in such a manner as to match the agent’s fabricated background and cover story. Sometimes certain parts of the cover story must be backstopped so that if officinls check parts of the story against official records, Ue records will support and verify the false parts of the cover sterv. Home country nationality and all connections with it are concealed. c.Obviously, artificial cover is much more difficult to establish and maintain than natural cover. A great deal of planning and preparation must precede the use of artificial cover, tuking into consideration the agents Hnguistic ability, accent, habits, clothing, education, professional training, and familiarity with the customs and characteristics of pertinent geo- graphic arens. The training and preparation for an assigninent may take years. B-9. Training VU) Agent training begins with the recruitment. Hostile intelligence gives agents two types of training— political and technical. The training usually con- tinues as long as the agent is active. PWrtitint fadocirination. Agents who are trained in the home country or who meet. their handlers there, “CONFIDERNFHA— regardless of their motivations, are yvenernly sub- jected to a great deal of political indoctrination. Indoctrination is administered at meetings beiveen the handler and the ugent, and it comprises a large portion of the curriculum if the agent attends an intelligence oor espionage school, The national theories are expounded upon, as well as the advance- ments of the home country. At Uhe same dine, the United States is painted as a decadent, corrupt, and warmongering capitalistic society. The objective is to convert the agent completely, thereby strengthening his. political reliability and ideological convictions. Agents inct ia the West. generally receive a mininiin of political indoctrination in order to keep mectings between xgents and agent handlers as brief as pessible. bPY echnical Training. (1yuyCadre workers (staff officer agents) of hostile Intelligence are well qualified for espionage work, and their intelligence training is specifie and detailed. Espionage agents in the field are pre- dominantly of a nationality other than the home country. These agents are given espionage training to the exient necessary to complete their assigned “Missions, to include contact and identification are rangements, detection of surveillance, sclection and use of letter drops, concealment of information for transmittal, and perhaps simple techniques of photog- raphy, codes, and seeret writing. Higher level agents are given additional and mere refined train- ing in espionage tradescraft, which might inchide instruction in advanced photography, microphotog- raphy, intricate codes and secret writing systems, and clandestine radio assembly and operation. Where necessary, some are also trained in an occupation which will serve as effective cover and facilitate the development of natural access to the target. (2 Most agents receive espionage training fram their handlers rather than from formal intelligence schools. A few highly competent agents are sent to home country headquarters for more specialized and formal intelligence training when such training is: deemed exsentinl. A few of these individuals muy eventually reach the stature of ‘allegal’’ resident net directors abroad. These agents, of course, must be of demonstrated reliability and motivation. B-10. Operations Security U)Successful espionage requires a high level of opera- tions security. In no other uspect of operations is this concern for security more oppurent than in the conduct of meetings. Certain techniques have come ts be standard procedure for hostile intelligence in this concern for security. B-6 -GONFIDENFIAL
B-11. Communications NN) lostile intelliyence, in its worldwide operations, must rely on sound, secure communications. Generally, couriers are preferred as the sost secure and having the eapnbility of transmitting Ue largest amount of material. The next. preference is radio, the fastest but least secure method. It appears that hostile intelligence may reserve radio for imminent reporting and wartime operations, although there is evidence that agents in the US may be able to use offshore . trawlers or submarines as relay stations. In some countries, commercial cable iines are used to exchange eneiphered messages. of Wourier Communications. Widespread use is made of couriers who enter and leave target countries, both legally nnd Megaily. Examples of Jegal courier systems are embassies, consulates, and military attaches whe make extensive uso of diplomatic pouch for espionage communications. IHegzal courier systems involve the use of iegal and nondiplomatic legal travelers. examples are egal border crossers, seamen, tourists, and intelligence officers assigned to cultural exchange groups and certain international trade organizations. , CoA Duley documents are usuntly reduced to microfilm, which is carried through courier systems, Often, the films are carried undeveloped so that in the imminence of search or arrest, the courier cat expose them to light and ‘destroy the evidence of espionage. Even when the diplomatic pouch is used, information is transmitted on undeveloped microfilm. (3f0n somo cases, soft film is used. ‘The hard acointd backing is removed from film negatives, making them thin and pliable so that they can be rolled up and hidden in small concealment devices. Still another technique is the use of microdots. ‘This technique consists of the reduction of a film negative to the size of a pinhead, which can be concealed in any one of numerous places on 2 person’s body, in his clothing, or in luggage or other articles which are carried. Unless a person is suspected of carrying microdots and is subjected to 1 meticulous search, their Ore is almost impossible to detect. (af Ut the information is not photographed, it can be written in code or in sceret writing, or a combination of both. In view of their vulnerability to arrest, couriers generally are not permitted to know the code and secret writing systems used in the communications they carry. Courier communi- cations ure used most extensively und with greatest affectivencss during peacetime, because it is then that international travel and border restrictions are at a minimum. -~GONFIDENFHAE
(s)G/T he transmission of information by courier, although the most secure, presents a problem for the courier. Therefore, hostile intelligence agencies use concealment devices of numerous types to transmit and store espionage messages. These devices are such articles as hollowed-out coins, buttons, screws, bolts, cufflinks, rings, pencils, secret compartments in suitcases, briefcases, handbags, toilet afticles, shoes and others. These devices make it easier for espionage operatives to conceal microdots, microfilm, and thin sheaves of paper. Considerable effort and money is devoted to development and manufacture of such devices, (6 In addition to the transmission information, the esplonage agent or even the director may have need for a storage place for information or equipment. Such caches reccive considerable attention from hostile intelligence. (OMe Communications. (1)(Jnformation is transmitted through the mails, biaking use of codes, secret writing, simple coded phrases, anil microdots. Code messages are usually reduced to secret writing, and coded phrases are used throughout. the visible text of the letter to transmit short messages. Microdots can be concealed on typewritten texts of a letter, under the flap or postage stamp, Or in the case of post cards between the fibers or on the face of the ecard. of) spionage communications are often trans- mitted through neutral or third countries. Circuitous routing slows down communications, but it increases the effectiveness of security. Espionage communi- cations through international mails aro vulnerable to detection during wartime when censorship is widely imposed. ce. Rabin Coramunications. (Radios are used overtly by embnssies and consultates. Enciphered messages are transmitted and received over high-powered wireless radio sets which are legally authorized. (2yuU}f'wo types of clandestine radio communica- tion wilich are commonly used by hostile intelligence are the one-way system and the two-way system. When the one-way system is used, coded messages” are transmitted over powerful commercial radio networks from the home country, generally by shortwave. Using an ordinary home radio set with a shortwave band, the agent in the target country listens to transmissions at designated times, trans- cribes the messages intended for him and deciphers them. A disndvantage of this system is that the agent does not have a rapid method of communicating with the intelligence service in the home country. When the two-way system is usod the agent has a transceiver radio, compact in size and designed for clandestine operations. FM 30-17A (3) (ipipher systems are used with both radio systems ‘to translate open text material into groups of usually five numbers. In deciphering the messages, an agent uses a code devised for his exclusive use. Some cipher systems are based on a one-time-pad system. The sender and recipient both have identical code pads. The sender uses one or more sheets for a message, and the recipient uses the corresponding identical sheets te decipher the message. Both parties then destroy the used sheets and take up the next one. If the code used in any one message is broken, succeeding messages cannot be deciphered. (4)0)Clandestine radio communications are vul- nerable to interception and direction-finding opera- tions, especially when transmissions are lengthy. These hazards have been partially overcome by the development of magnetic tape recordings. The entire message is recorded on magnetic tape and then transmitted at high speed (burst transmission) so that the entire length of time the transmission is on the air is reduced to seconds. (5)\UpPhe use of clandestine radio remains largely n device for wartime operations for use by stay- behind nets in enemy Tear areas since other means of communication are generally more secure afunrbnagz peacetime. In wartime, radio is often the most prac- tical method of communication. It should be borne in mind that hostile intelligence agencies establish numerous clandestine radio communication systems in target countries so that they will be available for use in the event of war. B-12. Finances )Hostiie intelligence finunces its espionage opern- tiohs, wherever possible, in the currency of the area of operation, so‘that agents will not be picked up with large amounts of currency foreign to the coun- tries in which they are operating. (VAlmost unlimited funds for espionage operations may come from the national budget of the home country of the intelligence service. Other sources of funds are businesses and cover organizations estab- lished for that purpose. Some vgents are directed to engage in egal activities to raise funds and ts obtain local currencies by such means as extortion, blackmarket activity, and counterfeiting. Some agents are given saleable articles such as gold, jewelry, narcotics, and scarce medicines for conver- sion to money. Others are trained in professions which will enable self-support in the target arca and add weight to the cover story. t ands are transmitted into target countries and to espionage agents by diplomatic pouch, by other official representatives in the target country, by clandestine couriers such as merehant seamen, and by agents themselves when entering target countries.
FRA 30-174 Through International currency transactions, bank balanees may De established in the target country on the name of a suppert agent. Checks are Uhen sent, as required, to the espionage agent under seme pretext. B-13. Disposition of Agents lostile intelligence apparently makes same dis- Linction between staff officers and agents in consider- ing dispositions. Reported disposition Inclade, the following: Lechniques OWhon learning that ngents were compromised - and in danger of arrest, hostile intelligence warned them to wo inte hiding or ta make their way to the” home or friendly country. ‘This resulted dn the termination of their services, or their identities and covers were changed for operation elsewhere in the target country. When hostile intelligence learned that agents were intelligence swindiers or had been doubled by target country counterintelligence, it directed their return when possible to a friendly country on some apparently innocent pretext. Swindlers frequently have been imprisoned. Doubled agents have been imprisoned or sent to slave lnbor camps, or they have been resoubled. (sPlintelligence stuf officers whose missions were completed in » target country were recalled to the home country, and a number of them later appeared in the same or different countries, (4 resident type’ espionage agents whose specific’ missions were completed were transferred Lo other targets in the same, country, or they tempo- rarily became dormant. , (sfO]n cases where intelligence staff officers tlefected to the West, efforts were made to locate them and persuade them to return to the home country with promises that they would not be prosecuted. The fate for such individuals was death, or at best, life imprisonment. - When hostile intel- B-10 —o /' lizence hid reasun to believe that sdf officers were contemplating defection, they were directed to re- turn immediately to Use home country or they were inken into physical custody and forcibly returned. These individuais were never heave of again. On the major espionage services operate in a similar manner with deviations to meet local con-, ditions. In attempting to counter the activities of hostile intelligence services, it ix wise to remember that most of the key intelligence officers are well trained and experienced. Ain conclusion, it should be noted that, even though the organization and methods of operation are extremely professional and well conceived, men ure required to muke thess orgunizations und techniques effective. This is the busic weakness of all esplonage—man. -GONFIBDENTIAL
Pegs 1 of 3 Popes DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BIOGRAPHIC REPORT CEMERAL INFORMATION DATE OF Inf ONMATION rae der) 3B. OATE OF BEPORT (Fr, we @ar) a wAeL e FULL MAME (Give wil nomen Ramon tottets, 1a motrwel ertet. end with mahal capttefisetion. Undertne eurneme, of, ff known by nomefe) ether than surname, uniorlins same, Give prewell’ pramumcistion of name oe aperepstote be —— ® wanes OM AMES OY Ble ImDIVIDUAL PREP ERS TO OE ADORESSEO C1) om OF FICIAL CORRESPONDENCE: (2) OMALLY AT CPFICIAL GATMERINGS: FULE MAME im ATIVE Pre ry as VARIANTS, ALIASES, DN WIL EHAMES 7. PORTION & DATE ASSUBED FOSITION eo. PRESENT POSITION (Year, menth, a7) DATE OF MANE (TF. HH eer) ELEPRONE HO 12. PROTO susuttEd CI ves yao 1a. RELIGION (C) emacticnc (OE) mommnacricins TITLES and RMOWORIFICS (Prete. Dect: 7. makita gvatus Lijwanmeco Lj swc.e ( Yorworces {7 ] mooeso Pursical DESCRIPTION 19, BEARD wUSTACHE ivest peo El ve: Tise gh, PROMINENT cure, birthmerbe, ere} COLOR EVES 23. COLOR walk 2s. B4L0 2% MEIGMT zh. WEIGHT Ul) res C3 eo pe BY. GENERAL state oF wmEactH mt mANOZD {7) Lent wanceo a. Ces RARD OF NEARING wanth, Cory | CIty EDUCATION (List pehnale, Incatton(on malar ceurete segroefe). henere, ond jnclvsiva dates (Voor, LamGUAGE PROSTIENCY (inc bade dlatects, degree of fuente, one adititp te act ae trae beter /incerpeeic’ be we TaaAveEL (Leet counties, ad purpose je DD vuane? 1396 - | portion OF | WOW 62 1S OBSOLETE. Figure D-2 ( U). Biographic report (U).
37. miLiTamy SERVICE (2- fa. Lint 3a. EMPLOYERERT . Leet msistary coro ote OT MER Team MICH T AMY str WEMAE REMY I ORGAMIZETIONS Pope 7 of 3 Pogne or te chromotagicel ore bb ond position bela; tee waite o0rPe eumarng ony unvewel ewares ethos with Chrtee ewards ond Cac erntiene wr see dates (Yoo. abetie, tocactone, and ine tvs VILE CE tet empinp ese. MOOT ee chat, etliterrs { Professions, goITion OF 1 4OV &3, 1t OBSOLETE Figure 2 2 (E)- Continued uy). FM 30-17A month, dar de
FM 30-17A petten of relatives, damit ttan or etsy, ecquainsanese/ro ary of ether U.S. affte yainTasCes and MELATIVES fe fus tude U.S. ortginment, cports, hobbies.) 4). PREFERENCES ( Peregne! prefeseace dn Send, Erink, rebacte, 42. PUBLISHED WORKS (Tete of 22. FULL SAME OF SPOUSE 4%. MAIDEN NAME OF SPOUSE 4d. DATE (Yeor, manth, do7) AND PACE OF BIRTH aa. FELIGION (TF paacticins [7] womPaacticinG a7, RACE 4b. WATIOWALITY (sndicote dual cottgenahip whore wapticebia) ce tn feed and értnks Rebbdios: projersnce in entertainment, epsciat {ntereotes CE decotion; le14ense ote! eianat woctetios., dentin, militery service.) 30. CMILDREW (Names, ova, egve, matites statue ethar Heme af intersat Such as och oy & COWERAMENT PRBTENC CHTICE UST O - 20-8 EDITION OF 1 MOV a3, 18 OBSOLETE. Figure D-2£ (U)—Continued (U).
GONFIDENFIAL- FM 30-17A WARNING NOTICE: SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED 1, born on _____——————— at a presently residing at ———_-__—____—_— een acknowledge that I have voluntarily cooperated with US (Army) Intelligence in a classified activity at (geographic Jocation) — during the period —= —————_______-_—__ to___** ed ne T have received in full all remunerations and allowances due me. All promises made to me have been discharged and there are no other outstanding obligations of any kind due me. I have no further claim against US (Army) Intelligence or the US Government. : *Pate of Recruitment or Initial Activity of Souree **Pate of Termination (Witness) (Signature) Is (Date) (Classified When Completed) (For Non-US Nationals—Termination) Figure D-2 (U), Severance statement (U). SECURITY CERTIFICATE 1, (Name, DPOB, SSAN) certify that T have on this date been entrusted with information concerning a sensitive classified intelligence operation/imvestigation, and agree Lo perform finetions assigned in eonjinetion therewith. f rentize that the operation/in vestigation is classified within the meaning of national defense security regulations and Panderstand the importance to national security to protect the sensitive information which PE have received or may gain as n result. of ny activities in this project. 1 recognize that the Uniform Code of Military Justice and Title 1S of the United States Code apply and that Tam obligated to withhold all information relating to this project from all other persons and agencies, except as may be specifically authorized by US Army Intelligence. (Date) (Signature) (Classified when completed) (For US National Source Only, When Recruited) Figure D-16 (U). Security certificate (U).
FM 30-17A GONFIDENFAL SECURITY CERTIFICATE WARNING NOTICE: SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED 1, , certify that | have been informed by Mr. . — . . . an authorized representative of the United States Army Intelligence, that disclosure of the nature, sources, or even the existence of counterintelligence activities, lo which P have become party, are not to be disclosed to any persons without the express approval of the United States Army Intelligence. I further certify that Pam aware of the provisions of AR 480-5, and that any unauthorized disclosure of the counterintelligence information discussed with me by the above-named representative of the United States Army Intelligence, will be considered » violation of AK 380-5, and will subject me to appropriate disciphuar action. (Date) (Signature) a (Classified When Completed) (Por US Military Source—Termination) Figure D-11 (U). Security certificate (U). SECURITY CERTIFICATE , acknowledze this date that | have voluntarily coopera a sensitive classified security operation/investigation during the peri _ 1 have received all remunerations and allowan gations. 1 rentize that the operation is classified within ¢ sensitive information which | have received. } recogni igated to withhold all information relating rimy past participati 1, ————__-__ with intelligence officials in . we eee ee «10 dae me and there are no other outstanding obhi meaning of national defense security to protect the that ‘Title IS of the United Siates Code applies and that Iam obl this project from all other persons and agencies and may not publicize, reveal, or infe in such operation/investigation. (Date) (Signature) (Witness (Case Officer)) (Classified When Completed) (For US National Sources— Termination) Figure D-12 (U). Security certificate (U): D-22 ~CONFIDER-FAE.
CONFIDENTIAL FM 30-17A SECURITY AGREE MENT a 1, — ee; presently residing at, as ' have, on this date, been entrusted with information concerning Sensitive intelligence operation and have ngreed to perform netivity in behalf of US Army Intelligence (or US Intelligence) 37 conjunction therewith. 1 realize that the existence itself of the operation, its objectives, and any other information copcerming it of which I am or may become knowledgeable, 3s confidential in nature and cannot be imparted to any individual exeept under the guidance, and upon the specific approval, of a duly identified and authonzed member of Us Army Intelligence (or US Intelligence). 1 realize that any failure on my part to maintain strict confidence conceming ANY and nlf aspects of the operation of which ] am or may become knowledgeable may case me to become liable to prosecution under provisions of i rn and vnder such other |nws oF ordinances BS MAY be applicable in the caseé- *Insert identification of applicable aection/paragraph of the Jegal code under which individual may be proseented. (Witness) an (Signature) (Date) (Classified when completed) v4 (For non-US nationals only, when recruited) Figure D-18 (U). Security certificate (U). CONFIDENFHE p-23
Oc TRVE GONFIDENFHAL- APPENDIX E (C) FM 30-17A RLANCE RADIO COMMUNICATION-CODES (U) 4--3. (U) Police 410-Series Pe standard police 10-series is 1s follows: 10-1 Receiving Poorly 10-2 Receiving Well 10.2 Stop Transmitting 10-4 OK, Message Received 10-5 Relny Message 10-6 Busy, Stand By 10 7 Out of Service, Leaving Air 10-8 In Service, Subject To Call 10 9 Repent. Message 10-10 Transmission Completed, Standing By t GONFIDEN TIAL Et
FM 30-17A E-2 10-11 a Talking Poo Karpadly 10-12 Visitors Present bO-15 10-16 10-17 10-18 1039 10-20 10-21 10 22 10-23 10-24 Ww 25 10-26 10-27 10-28 10-29 10-30 10-32 10-33 10-34 10-35 HE3h 10-37 10-38 10-39 10-43 10-42 10-453 10-44 10-45 10-50 10-60 10-62 10-63 10-64 10-65 10-67 10-70 10-71 10-73 10-75 10-77 10-38} 10-82 10-84 10-85 10-89 10-90 16-91 10-92 10-93 10-94 10-95 Advise Weather/ Road Conditions Make Pick Up At Urgent Business Anything For Us? Nothing For You, Return To Base My Location ]x __- ——- —-- Call By Telephone Report. Jy Person Yo ..2 .-—— Stand By Completed Last Assignment Can You Contact 2 Disregard Last Information J Am Moving ‘To Channel —————-- --- Identify Your Station Time Is Up For Contact Does Not. Conform To FCC Rules 1 Will Give You A Radio Check Emergency Traffic At This Station Trouble At This Statica, Help Needed Confidential Information Correct. Time Is ___—_ Wrecker Needed At _———-_—_— Ambulance Needed At —————_—_ Your Message Deliv ered Please ‘Tune Po Channel -...-— -- - Traffic Accident At ————-—--~ Vrafic Ticup At ———_——~ 1] Lave A Message For You (Or -_——) All Units Within Range Please Report Break Channel —_———_—— What Is Next Message Number? Unable To Copy, Use Phone Net Directed To ———_—_——_ Net Clear Awaiting Your Next M essage/Assignment All Units Comply Fire At ——— Proceed With Transmission In Sequence Speed Trap At —————— You Are Causing Interference Negative Contact Reserve Hotel Room For ———_—_--_—_- Keserve Koom For _ My Telephone Number Is ——————— My Address Is —_———— Radio Repairman Needed At ———_—_——_ } Have TVI Talk Closer To Mike Your Transmitter Is Out of Adjustment Check My Frequency On This Channel Please Give Me A Long, Count ‘Transmit Dead Carrer For 5 Seconds CONFIDENT 10-99 Mission Completed, AM Units Secure 10 2000 Police Needed Al Note. Any 10-Code signal may be reverscd by stating it ie a question. For example, 10-20? would mcan “What is your lecation?” or 10-367, What is the correct time?”’.
¢ _ I ED GONFIDEN FAL FM 30-17A Arens are divided into points or routes. The move- ment of subject. can be followed using these grid or route numbers. When discussing the subject’s move- ments over rudio or telephone communications, bo insure message security, an approved operations or specially designed code system should be used. E-5. (U) Example of Transmission The contre) point (Bull Durham) and an operating team (Satan) are in communication: Bull Durham, this is Satan OVER Satan, this is Bull Durham OVER Buli Purham, this is Satan SIERRA 53 OVER Satan, this is Bult Durham CHARLIE 20 CHARLIE 26 OVER Bull Durham, this is Satan ROGER OUT E-6. (U) Use of Radio Code in Conjunction with a Town Plan or Area Map Figures E-1 and E-2 Hlustrate a simple numerical cat le to show the location and movement of subject. SRS ry We7 yi, ESraSEa aa raf e TN Figure H-2 (U). Grid system code (UU).
FM 30-17A wy + ad ve & est ’ 7 x “*2 es rey Yess < % Figure E-# (U). Poini and route system code (UV). E-4
CONFIDENTIAE- £-8. (U) Keyword Code A simpler point and route system code cnn be devised using keywords which are ensily identifiable and memory associated to aid the surveillants. The fol- lowing are examples: a. Palace—Mayor’s office or similar high official’s or subject’s home. b. Hawaii—Route #50 c. Texas—Supermarket d. Phillip’s— Route #66 FM 30-17A e. Phillip’s and Hawaii—Intersection of routes 50 and 66. f. California—West q. Georgia—South h. Georgia Calif ornia—Southwest E-5
“CONP IDEN FHL. FM 30-174 By Order of the Secretary of the Army: CREIGHTON W. ABRAMS General, United States Army Official : Chief of Staff VERNE 1. BOWLERS Major General, Tinited States Army The Adjutant General Distribution: To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-11 requirements for Counterintelligence Operations, Intelligence Corps, US Ariny (U). whos GOVERNMENT VRINTING Ores Bb: BG74 C3» 49n- anh
FM 30-18 The following pages have been deleted due to | classification (Exemption (b)(1)): 1-1 thru 1-2 2-1 thru 2-8 2-11 thru 2-15 1 thru 3-8 1 thru 4-4 5-1 thru 5-13 6-1 thru 6-9 7-1 thru 7-3 8-1 thru 8-9 9-1 thru 9-5 10-1 thru 10-4 11-1 thru 11-4 12-1 thru 12-8 13-1 thru 13-2 14-1 thru 14-5 15-1 thru 15-4 16-1 thru 16-2 17-1 thru 17-8 18-1 thru 18-2 19-1 thru 19-11 B-l thru B-29 C-1 thru C-10 D-1 thru D-3 E-1 thru E-3 F-1 thru F-4 J-1l thru J-23 (minus J-3) K-1 Index-l thru Index-8
v FM 36-18 FIELD MANUAL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION OPERATIONS (U) NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION | Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions. HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY NOVEMBER 1973 -SEGRET- CLASSIFIED BY: DIAM S8-11(S), 30 June 1965 GEFENSE HUMAN RESOURCES INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION MANAGEMENT MANUAL (U) EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY: 2 DECLASSIFY ON: CANNOT BE DETERMINED
Kissa APve.s Nee Tae ysN PART £. Cheveriat ft. 2 Section fF. ii. wei. Carverear 3. PART Uf. Cravrrnts 4. ot f. 7. %, . it. PART U1. Causprren 12, rm, 14. ie Mm. PART IV. Cavseret, 37. ts, 14), Areenpin A. ys. «, $), 2 SPOTTERS GUEDE “OPERATIONAL PLAN + MINIMUM . INTE SOE RCH WasiinxnGton, INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION OPERATIONS GENERAL POLICY GUIDANCE GENERAL. 0 ooo ee eee ee ee ee ne ee ee eee ORGANIZATION OF COL LECTION UNITS tisenmeral. oo oe ee ee ee ee ce ee ee ee ee eee ee eee eee Internal Functional Organization Collection Organization and FPunefions. 200000020. .-.020-- THE CASE OFFICER AND THIS AGENTS OPERATIONAL PLANNING PLANNING. 0002 oe ee eee ee ee ee ee wee ee eee eee ee THE OPERATIONAL CYCLE 020 0 Loo eee eee ee eee eee eee . INFILTRATION AND EXFILTRAT ION wn ee ee eee en ne wen eee ee ee ene SPECIAL OPERATIONS. 92.00 L200. 0 020. 0 eee ee ee ene ee ee ee eee STABELVPY OPERATIONS  COLRLECSPION SECEERDTY AND OPERATIONAL ORSTACLIES COVER REPORTERS TRADECRAFT AND TECHNICAL COL LECTION MEANS SECRET WRITING : CONCHALMEN’S Dt VICES AND AGENT I FLAPS AND SEALS TECINIQUES pOCUM ENTATI aN OPERATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHY. een CACHING, 0 ooo coe ee eee ee eee oe ew eee CLANDIESTINIG COMMUNICATIONS NONTECIUNICAL MEANS OF COMMUNICATION ._ CRYPPTOGRAPIDY. 00000 2 ee ee ee eee ee ee ee ee ene eee CLANDESTINE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS REP BEIEN CES CLOSSARY OF INTELLIGENCE TER MPENOLOGY OPERATIONAL REPORTS BASIC SOHRGH PATTA/ESEO MISE ATION On NAME IAG ii REQU mr WMQUEREME NTS FOR INPELLIGE NC BE OPERATIONAL PROPOSALS (000000 Lee wo eee ee ee eee - MENIMUM REQUIREMENTS FORK OVERT PROJECT OR PROPOSAL. __- MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR SENSITIVE PROJECT OR PROPOSAL, - SLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORTS DATA CHEANGUE. ~~ CLANDESTINE (U) wi x Paragraphs 1-1--1-4 4-14 4 BAe G t-i—6-4 7-4-7 4 NE SN 70 Oo §--9 6 1) $---8 10 T=) 1-38 feo V8 ----98 2 t4-1— 14-6 bo. 3 — 14-5 6 t tet 71-417 0 IS. T—IS-3 1 I—-1G- $2 This field manvol supersedes FM 30-9A, ‘August 1958, FM 30-18, July 1963, ond FM 30-314, August 1967. SECRET "FM 30-1 HEADQUARTERS DIEPARTPALENT OF THEE D.C., ARMY 30 November 173 ID he K (ie He fei Jai Kat Index-!
SECRET— FM 30-18 Comm Pit* > > GRC-106 1G | Coll Pit* Coll Pis* Ps > > | | Coll Pir [c] Coll Pir Ps] * See figure 2-3 for other equipment. t Figure 2-8 (U). Operations monitoring net (CW) CE). SECRET 2-9
i mi <0, COLL | CO HQ OP SEC © } COMMSEC | COLL PLT 4 PLT HQ COLL TM 3 Figure 2-4 (U). MI company collection, thecter army (U). 2-10 SECRET
FM 30-18 Figure 6-4 (U). Relationship between IP and AAA (U). Sf  @- . 3g im BC gsr: 2 YOM SECRET en
Soar ae S. be cs ‘ ta] (B) A) Ng? + (> = 50 METERS mamta PY clam 50 METERS sume (X) RELEASE POINT SO METERS / AR (S) Figure 6-5 (U). Methods of release point marking (U). e412 SECRET— CPC CT, LUN PLPRTR TR RA EMER ee
b SECRET FM 30-18 APPENDIX A (U) REFERENCES a AR 105-31 AR 135-380 AR 195-6 AR 310-25 AR 310-50 AR 340 2 AR 340-15 AR 340-16 AR 380-series AR 381 series AR 405-10 AR 600-3 (FOUO) AR 614-31 (C) AR 614-32 AR 640-20 AR 715-320 AR 930-5 DA Pam 27-1 PM. 30-series (S) BM 31-214 BM 31-73 FM 32-5 (S) PM 32-10 (C) FM. 42-20 (Ss) iM lof ran TM 1t-401 ‘TM. 30-series TOT 80-series DIAM 58-1) Mossnge Preparation and Processing Release of Classified Information to Army National Guard, United States Army Reserve, and Reserve Officers ‘Training Corps Department of the Army Polygraph Activities Dictionary of United States Army ‘Terms Authorized Abbreviations and Brevity Codes Maintenance and Disposition of Records in TOE Units of the Active Army and Army Reserve Preparing Correspondence Safeguarding Nondefense Information Security Military Tntelligence Acquisition of Real Property and Loterests Therein Women’s Army Corps—General Provisions Assigninent and ‘Travel Restrictions Restrictions of Assignment and ‘Travel of Personnel Thaving Access to Special In- telligenee (U) US Army Intelligence Badges and Credentials Local Purchase of Civilian Type [tems American National Red Cross Service Program and Army Utilization Treaties Governing Land Warfare Military Intelligence Special Forces Operations (U) Advisor Handbook for Stability Operations Signal Security (SUGSIEC) USASA in Support of Tactienl Operations (U) Electronic Warfare (U) Staif Officers’? Field Manual, Organizational, ‘Technical, and Logistical Data, Classi- fied Data (U) Elements of Signal Photography Military Intelligence Military Intelligence Human Resources Tatelligence Collection Management Mannal, Volumes }oand tf (DILIUM and DICOM)
dus pecessery) (May be modific ,. (U) \dentification Data a. Original! iz Hendauarte Ts. hb, Vate orig c. Prayect © code 8 d. Target coun e. Reference equine nen is qnatet- or eountries- RCD and for col objectives of he Ah propose rajyect pertains. al op
SPCRET FM 30-18 Section Il. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORIS GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS—BODY OF REPORT J-5. (U) Report Organization The batly of the report will be started at the left margin immediately below the dashed line on DD orm 196. All of the space between the vertical margin lines on DD Forms 1396 and 1396e will be used. Paragraphs must be numbered if there arc more thin one. Paragraphing and subparagraphing must conform to usual military correspondence practice. “Phe abbreviated classification for each paragraph must be inserted in parentheses after the number of ench paragraph. When using standardized format (military and industrial installation reports) the paragraph number, abbreviated classification symbol in parentheses and the paragraph heading in underlined upper case letters must be included. ‘The narrative is continacd on DD Forms 1396¢, using ns many as necessnry Lo complete the report, Over- lnys and sketches, together with their legenis, immedintely follow the text, also using DD Iorms 3060, Albachiments ure placed after sketches. Srpebbe eee te
SECRET— FM 30-18 By Order of the Secretary of the Army: OREIGHTON W. ABRAMS General, United States Army OMcial : Chief of Staff VERNE L. BOWERS Major General, linited States Army The Adjutant General Distribution: To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-11B requirements for Intelligence Collections Operations, InteHigence Corps, USA (U) (Qty Rar Block No. 282).