MEMORANDUM FOR: Dacuty to the firectior ior National intsligence Programs Zyalcation SUBJECT: Agency aad Comrmnnity Organizaticaal Surv sy You have rrquested our comments on ihe statstory ? authorities and zeneral ieval backgroend of the Agency. icave reviewed the les gislative history of all statutes sesimining to the .3ency and the various points which were debated ia arriving at 32 preaent stamtory language. Py * 2. The dasic charter cf the Agency is contained in ‘ gection 1€2 of tha Natiocal Secarity Act of 1947, as amended. Tais charter has sroved to be excellent for tha purpose for which itwas designed. 3¢ sats ap the cutlines of acerntzal intelligence structure, but permits great Hexibility in how it can be organized or reorganized aa neecad. EK assigned sovcific f:nctions, but again srovides wide Hexisitity aa fo how they should be carried out. it also provides wids, general functional authorities, and the mackinery of tha National Secusizy Touncil cSivectivesa puts them inte eech —s 3. Inthe eariy days of tha Agency teere wae conctse= tiat the statuta did not proyids adcequata anthority to tea Direc in his canacitty aa over-all scorcizaior of U. S. intelligences. zed, particulariy the idea of having ~ ee fo) '"" . Yariows deyices were consices hic constituted os the executive zgeci or the Natozal Secazity is vacil for all intsliigence ac seviti ea. day suck command rity, nowaver, involves a complex and evesiuaily insoiu-
tao Natisnsal Seeur ty Csusel! taserea that ke would intelligence offices of ti@ Covernmest. Easeicat ha has achleved t8e poaliics of pre-eminence in the in:zilis csesmenlty whieS ceatias bic to carry out bis proser function. me | a > Placias the "Ages cy under tha Naticaal Security Couscil otso resolved another debats oetween those who wisbed to have the wivector report to the President and thosa who wished to have him report to an interagency gromv. Since the National Security Council {se advisory to the Presiceni, the Director has a clzar-cut rssponsi- blilty to the President and yet the members of tha Council can play -~ 2 “a their prooer roles as tha President may decide. — 5. The act permita not anly complete izseéom in the nternal organization of the Agency, but also great lzeway in the eneral organization of tha intelligence community. Thus, we have Pas S tne history of the davalopment of the old Interdssartmental Coordinatins and Planning Staf{, the Intelligence Advisory Cammittee and the United States Communications Intelligenca Board, to the present United States Intelligence Board and its subcommittee stzructure. It aiso petimits special Pacmag euch sees: 23 Corm- . ce CRED Dt a SD and tha recently created Na Sonal intelligence Resources Doara. ‘ (Ca tha covert operations side of the Agency, the act permitted broad National Security Council directives and their implementa- tion through such organizations a3 the erations Coordinatin 13 —ae Board, the Psychological Strategy Board, and subsequest develov- ments up to the present 303 Committee. Thus, whils the Agency pecific mandate to carry out its estimative function in  BOAKE){3) of tha act, it can be expanded or contracted ig determined nacassary in the lisht of tne Bn $§, Thareis one edmninistrahve © Provisicn in section 102!c) which authorizes the Dirsctor hen ha 9 Ceemg it necessary or advisable in thai States. This nas been an invaluabie per to protection of Agency security.
9. Acminisizratve authorities of the Agency are contained in the Ceatral Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended. This has provided wa with all the authoridies and exemptions needed to cazsy cut tha wide variety of functions a3signed to the Agency auring the past 20 years. It enadles as to have an eLective and Mexidle perscnnel program, ranging from the normal desk officer in head- quasiers to persons in-a relaNcnshis so remote that they do aot knoe they are working for the Agency. it enables us to exercise all the technicues required for clandestine activities, from traditional azert cperations through proorietary and other more scpnhisticated types of machinery. [: has enabled us ie undertake major unforeseen projects, such a3 the U-2 operation. 10. Two provisicns of the act are particularly important. The unique authoriry in section 5 to transis ey to and recsive fom cther Government agencies such sums a3 may be aovroyed by the Sureau of tha Budget. This has given us great Mexibility and securizy in our fumcing. The other is sectios 3 with its wide authority for wiilization of sumsa made availadle to the Agency, and carticularly subaection (5) thereof which allows us to make any expendinires recoired soy confidential, extraordinary, or emergency puspeses, and theas exvenditurea will be accounted for solely on the certificate This haa been tasendHal to the Aex<aility aad secarity - or the Director. of our coyert activities. li, Another imsortaat provision bas been the authority in section 7 to bring allens into the United States with the concuryseance oi the AHormey General and tha Commissioner of Immigration when j2 is im the interest of taticnal secarity or essential to the fasther- ~~ ance of tha national inteUigenca mi3sicn. This srayided for the oolemsa inyolving defectors and siher aliens of isrel- 4 srwise- weil-aigh insoiuble. soluiioa of oF ljizvence interest which wera cthe t. 2. Yad most imoortant tegisiation ia tha CL oie ~ - 2 . . 334. i 2etup an tar. 9) 4 t 6) Sha Agaacy'3s employees,
service. Tis is 2 asst weefsi cerscrsel wissazemest tool, which viii srceably reauizre continzing amesdments 43 Govermmest oolicy Cs retirement Senefits changes. {Ss eningstacscs, a Sill just rasaed which equated the cosi-oi-living formula for retirees uncer this act t2 other ratizecent 37ste:rna wich n wad forged abead in this type of fone 3ort a ’ ID i res re} bave Dean & mumber of other enact ents o have c2en ale toa maintain tha basic “authorities set for to above asd taexrsoy preserve the freedom of action necessary tO Carry oa the imasy fanciicus of the Agency. MSfy conclusion, thareilore, is that for the ioreseeable fomere we do not seed to seek any susstanGve egisiatioa bart must be most carefal to oreaerve the Sasic autkoritles ce which tha Agency now depends. 13. i believe Il should add my sersonal opinion, which is hnaxec by cthers, that despite the successful passaze of tha cost- f-living bill acted atoye, any ahempi to maka any major charge the substantive iegialetion might well stir wa u reactica iu the cagres2 waich could reselt in legisiation limiting the Agency's” owers or tha flexibility now available to the executive braachin e intelNizgence commnuily. GO G wee ta i Crt OFT BecE= Eat ee Sere BIE | ozislative Counsel - fA AER RAEN EI Tp co
(Page 1) OGC [??]-19[2]9 9 October 1968 MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the Director for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation SUBJECT: Agency and Community Organizational Survey 1. You have requested our comments on the statutory authorities and general legal background of the Agency. I have reviewed the legislative history of all statutes pertaining to the Agency and the various points which were debated in arriving at the present statutory language. 2. The basic charter of the Agency is contained in section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. This charter has proved to be excellent for the purpose for which it was designed. It sets up the outlines of a central intelligence structure, but permits great flexibility in how it can be organized or reorganized as needed. It assigned specific functions, but again provides wide flexibility as to how they should be carried out. It also provides wide, general functional authorities, and the machinery of the National Security Council directives puts them into effect. 3. In the early days of the Agency there was concern that the statute did not provide adequate authority to the Director in his capacity as over-all coordinator of U. S. intelligence. Various devices were considered, particularly the idea of having him constituted as the executive agent of the National Security Council for all intelligence activities. Any such command authority, however, involves a complex and eventually insolu- ble problem of command channels, and I think the concept was properly abandoned. The fact that he is termed in the act as the Director of Central Intelligence as well as the head of the Agency connotes congressional intent as to his role, and the specific duty placed on the Agency to advise and make recommendations to
(Page 2) the National Security Council assured that he would be the chief intelligence officer of the Government. Based on these concepts, he has achieved the position of pre-eminence in the intelligence community which enables him to carry out his proper function. 4. Placing the Agency under the National Security Council also resolved another debate between those who wished to have the Director report to the President and those who wished to have him report to an interagency group. Since the National Security Council is advisory to the President, the Director has a clear-cut responsi- bility to the President and yet the members of the Council can play their proper roles as the President may decide. 5. The act permits not only complete freedom in the internal organization of the Agency, but also great leeway in the general organization of the intelligence community. Thus, we have the history of the development of the old Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff, the Intelligence Advisory Committee and the United States Communications Intelligence Board, to the present United States Intelligence Board and its subcommittee structure. It also permits special arrangements for such functions as com- munications intelligence Leese reccscees Excised........e.20e0- j and the recently created Naticnal Intelligence Resources Board. On the covert operations side of the Agency, the act permitted broad National Security Council directives and their implementa- tion through such organizations as the Operations Coordinating Board, The Psychological Strategy Board, and subsequent develop- ments up to the present 303 Committee. Thus, while the Agency has a specific mandate to carry out its estimative function in section 102(d)(3) of the act, it can be expanded or contracted in accordance with what is determined necessary in the light of the international situation. 6. There is one administrative provision in section 102(c) which authorizes the Director to terminate employees when he deems it necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States. This has been an invaluable personnel tool and essential to protection of Agency security. 7. The one significant amendment to this charter was the one in 1953 which provided for the appointment of a Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. This not only gave the Deputy standing in the intelligence community, but enabled the Director to delegate to him many of his legal authorities in connection with running the Agency.
(Page 3) 8. An obvious shortcoming of the act is that the Director has no authority to carry out the responsibility in a third proviso in section 102(d)(3) for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. This is a most complex problem which has been under close study for many years, and no satis- factory solution has been forthcoming. 9. Administrative authorities of the Agency are contained in the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended. This has provided us with all the authorities and exemptions needed to carry out the wide variety of functions assigned to the Agency during the past 20 years. It enables us to have an effective and flexible personnel program, ranging from the normal desk officer in head~ quarters to persons in a relationship so remote that tney do not know they are working for the Agency. It enables us to exercise all the techniques required for clandestine activities, from traditional agent operations through proprietary and other more sophisticated types of machinery. It has enabled us to undertake major unforeseen projects, such as the U-2 operation. 10. Two provisions of the act are particularly important. The unique authority in section 5 to transfer and receive from other Government agencies such sums as may be approved by the Bureau of the Budget. This has given us great flexibility and security in our funding. The other is section 8 with its wide authority for utilization of sums made available to the Agency, and particularly subsection (b) thereof which allows us to make any expenditures required for confidential, extraordinary, or emergency purposes, and these expenditures will be accounted for soley on the certificate of the Director. This has been essential to the flexibility and securit of our covert activities. 11. Another important provision has been the authority in section 7 to bring aliens into the United States with the concurrence of the Attorney General and the Commissioner of Immigration when it is in the interest of national security or essential to the further- ance of the national intelligence mission. This provided for the solution of problems involving defectors and other aliens of intel- ligence interest which were otherwise well-nigh insoluble. 12. The most important new legislation is the CIA Retirement Act of 1964. It set up an early retirement system for a portion of the Agency’s employees, mainly those with extensive overseas
(Page 4) service. This is a most useful personnel management tool, which will probably require continuing amendments as Government policy on retirement benefits changes. As an instance, a bill just passed which equated the cost-of-living formula for retirees under this act to other retirement systems which had forged ahead in this type of benefit. There have been a number of other enactments of one sort or another which have had effect on the Agency, but by and large we have been able to maintain the basic authorities set forth above and thereby preserve the freedom of action necessary to carry on the many functions of the Agency. My conclusion, therefore, is that for the foreseeable future we do not need to seek any substantive legislation but must be most careful to preserve the basic authorities or. which the Agency now depends. 13. I believe I should add my personal opinion, which is shared by others, that despite the successful passage of the cost- of-living bill noted above, any attempt to make any major change in the substantive legislation might well stir up a reaction in the Congress which could result in legislation limiting the Agency’s powers or the flexibility now available to the executive branch in the intelligence community. s/ LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON General Counsel cc: [Excised] Legislative Counsel [Excised]