ane 
COPY NO, VF +. 
OCI MO. 
ove 
¢ 
30 June 1954 
SLUITIZED Cory 
i 
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. 
| 
| 
— 
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE 
*e 
- 
Pe
Guatemalan mllitary junta 
by Colonel Elfecgo Monzon 
has arranged through American ambassador Peurifoy 
and the 
Comment on the Guatemalan negotiations: { tne new 
Salvadoran government to enter into negotiations with rebel 
leader Castillo Armas designed to work out terms for a 
he 
peace settlement. | 
The nez 
are tentatively 
to take 
place in San Salvador beginning at noon on 30 June..‘/ The 
junta has asked the papal nuncio in Guatemala to act as 
an impartial witness at the proceedings. \ 
Heanwhile both government and rebel radios in 
a cease-fire. 
Castillo Armas has seportedty 
that his 
consent to enter into nezotiations does not obligate him 
to come to any agreement. 
The two sides are, however, 
believed predi~t0sed to reach a settlement. 
There are 
reports that one and possibly both of Monzon'’s Fellow junta. 
members are 
Anclined toward Castillv 
Nonzon himself, ‘though a cabinet minister in the 
regime, has long been considered strongly anti-Conmunist. A 
few hours after becoming interior minister in the short-lived. 
junta headed by Colonel Carlos Enrique Diaz, Nonzon ordered 
the arrest of 111 knove Communist leaders. 
Many of these are 
saw reported to have found asyluc in the Argeatins, Chilean 
and Mexican embassies in Guatemala City. 
| 
36 June 54 
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be 
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CLASSI) 
SSAGE 
\: 
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INFO 
20392 12 JUL 
ROUTINE 
so, * 
CITS: 
DIR 
JULY 12 DRE 
COUN 
STATES TREAT CASTILLO AFMAS IS NEFHEY OF. 
AND WAS SEO GRARY TO 
FLEASS VERIFY. 
' 
‘ 
l 
4th. 
‘ 
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|
oe 
| 
HO INFO THUS FAR Corr 
NEPHEW .TO UBICO. 
N43 
REF REPORT THAT CASTILLO ARMAS 
WE 
ASCERTAINED HE AT 
TIME WAS 
AS SECRETARY TO JBICO. 
END OF MESSAGE 
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ATULY oT 
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DATt 
Pol.iticoul Activities Corte. 
Political Views of Regular Arny 
24 avg 
$3 Zee 
elissicces te Ir 
of tha 
hls ewlors vhon 
thet Carics CASTILW 
Miovity Os ts 
Sever 
Militesy Ce : 
foy3 
cst in 
Ecrigv:: 
OLIVA $23 tira 
ucritirs little 
by ths any. 
RENCE FORK! 
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ID! 
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arés fre. tha Junt: 
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acd th: 
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Fill Thety 
NU, 
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APPREYED 
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ALLEGED 
“UNREST WITH 
RANKS 
“OF ‘MOVEMENT 
Burt: GOVT_ROT. Con NCERNED 
NG PAST WEEK UNCONF IRHED. REPORT — 
ENRAGED. “AND” "DE 
CLOSE OE. 
‘LEON “FROM DEFENSE MINISTR 
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vat 
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_CASTIIIO Ay: 39/0 
DATE OISTR. 
| 
g Kay 1955 
DATE 
OF 
NO. 
RD 
PLACE 
gee 
EVALUATIONS’ ARE 
doen: CORDOVA Cerns, head of the Guatemalan National 
Planning 
oom 
Comnuiesion, hes vehementiy denied reports to the effect that he tried 
'Miak 
to persuade President Carlos SASTILIO Armas to resign and to leave 
Guatemala. 
He attributed the 
to Cerlos 
official 
of the National Defense Committsce Against Communism, ond sdded that Luis 
CORJNADO Lira, head of the secre} Lariat for Propaganda, Culture, sad 
Travel, is responsible for similar reports concerning cemands for 
resignation being presented to CAS -ILLO. 
CORUADO Lira himself denies 
that he has had any connection with these FUROr By but says that LEWS is 
There is considerable evidence that imtual Suspicions 
| 
Jealousies are disturbing the stability of the CASTILLO regime, 
Rumors such as this, which are receiving 
widespread circulation in 
—- 
3 * 
Guetersla, are contributing to the formation of such Suspicions and to , 
recriminations within the gcverrspent, 
=
l. 
On 
SB fine Pres 
CASTILE 
Was 
to 
a luncheon at Chigutsssla 
to ceterrsts “tha 
anniversary of 
the cupture of that town ty the Litesetion Pere 
Many 
employees and especially meanders 
of the Liher:t in 
National 
ray were invited. 
Amons those invited wa 
| 
who was given the jobd of 
the Prostient. 
~CASTILIO, hewever, only made a short visit to Chiquisrle 
and did 
not renin for lunch, 
therefore, vas not able 
fulfill 
his mission, 
2. 
then bezen to drink and“ soon 6éentered into a heated 
political discussion 
Jorge/GaRRIOS Solares, the Govermor 
of the Departrsant of Suste: 
FUNERO tecnme so enrafed he 
tried] 
to use the hand prerede 
he had in his voc eket for 
use in tilling the President. 
Cre of Col, BSKRICS! aiges, however, 
saw what 
to do ard 
throu ch thes Read. 
The grenade went of f wwncirg saverel recrle inelud im? Col. 
1. 
It is not clesr whether this was en organized attempt on the 
2. 
Nhewspsper eccounts of this event indicate only thet 
was 
vilied by a grenate which he had in nis hand and fail to 
indicets why he wss handling a grerede at a flesta. 
Col. BANFIOS 
Las evitently recevered froma his wounds sand hes roturned to 
uty. 
Claersification 
Tale 
| 
‘ 
|
ation e@ecting the 
Defers, 
of the United Sater 
the 
of the 
Bitie 
fee 
ané 
tne tranemison ef 
ef which 
tn any 
to 
pereor, te prohibiicd 
law 
: 
SUBJECT 
Assassination of President CASTILLO 
DATE DISTR. 
August 1955 
Arvas Flanned by Captain Fernando,” 
DATE OF INFO.” 
June 1955 
REQUIREMENT NO. 
RD 
| 
SOURCE EVALUATIONS. ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT 18 TENTATIVE, 
* 
Captain Fernando ROMERO, who, went to Chiquimula, ae on 25 
June 1955 to 
:=. 
° 
| 
attend the celetration of the first anniversary of the capture of the ton by 
® 
liberation forces, planned to assassinate President Carlos*CASTILLO Armas while 
the latter was at a luncheon here, 
Hower ery, CASTILLO made only a short visit 
to Chiquimula and did not remain for the lunchiesn as scheduled; ROMERO was 
therefore unable to carry out his mission. 
2. 
In a@ heated political 
with Col. Jorge RARRICS 
Governor of 
the Departaent, which took place that evening, 
ROMERO became so enraged that 
he atiempted to throw the hand grenade which he had planned té use apeinst 
CASTILLO. 
Wien an aide to BARRIOS saw what ROMERO intended to do, he shct him 
through the head. 
Hoxever, the 
wounded, including Col. 
exploced, and several people were 
a. 
Som 
.. 
2. 
It. is not cle°~ whether this waS part. of an organized attempt on CASTILLO's| 
life or whether ROMERO was acting solely on his ow autnority. 
Newspap er accounts of this incident indicated only that RO’ERO died 4 
Col. BARRIOS has returned, 
after a grenade 
in hie hand. 
° 
‘ 
® 
— 
od 
vorment. 
\ 
a 
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e 
+ 
ot?
ir 
AGE 
ty 
eda cud Toterview with 
Garton Castillo 
os 
a Report by arturo 
boy 
arrived in 
Sisteri: 
Curley 
Lo whom 
written 
vy trtr, 
ny 
Meee ne 29th of Cart ole 
Vere 
t 
hel» 
arrenge on interview wilh 
| 
Thy J] vieite a (ite, 
weatLoned Jawyer, after, 
Anning the reasons 
estranged hiw from the 
president, told ne, with re, cret, 
reesongs Which he 
with persons 
were that Colow] Cyustidlo 
sours 
ved thie 
stn Neg 
WHO, for nulural 
are 
af 
“enti-Comunists whiv are striving for Weir overtiirow; 
sowe of tie 
old COMP 
in the 
of Liberation who sre stil] close to the 
‘cident 
Ferio Sumloval, Gub-Seerstary of the Presidenry; "serio 
Vilistoro, Sub-Seere ty ry of Divulgucién, Colture, 
pnd 
Turscena, Sub-Seeretery ef Selul 
rout 
Diputedo und Wlitor of the mewepaper 
PIARIO, 
¢ 
ing me cyececs in ety plun to telh with the 
perhaps 
might not succeed, 
tent 
13) 
matle 
won Cause will the 
inating 
by 
I proceeded to the Pulscio Wation-1l, in order to eur oY. 
who told me that Le and nol 
my 
in which 
inferned 
of ry trir, but offered to take 
ta 
we that on the following Icy, 
tee vould 
of tw 
rezulls, by telesiiome, of tiie 
fe 
bin 
as 
in vein om his eet) 
And ther no 
on 
Villetere, 
T cob in tonen 
pee 
the 
~Thig Inwyer 
wast lie, Cerloe 
hed bald 
bie ‘Que “Ary before, 
of Cetover after o long 
Adiue that, baviegs returned 
lo 
on 
Oth 
thet he was nut in 
positsou to bel 
. 
| 
Re 
\r 
4, 
ry 
| 
|
Bint: 
of Foreisn Relations, us well ay 
the hinds 
of 
Genfe, 
OF 
first ow of these, To requedtet that 
ange an 
Aitervicw with the President, whiieh 
offered 
to do wi 
corning, boa 
Salome 
und, tn Peet, be 
bis 
he 
we thet he hat obteined an interview fur five ofclook in the efternen of 
the sore duy. 
of the hour I 
ty the precidenticl onte- 
which wos filled with people, 
The President began receiving Unew, 
Aine 
without wy 
coming up. 
Finely, al 
ie 
evenin: 
aide of fhe Presivent elyiged 22) of ve whe were welling 
tie resident Wee legving, orn 
sod Qll presenl fo return Lier Follows 
ing Gay 
ten ofcleck, 
“his worried Le, 
thought it nigit be cn 
* 
 exeuce 
receive re, in view of the beckyround infonaution which the 
lawyers Jelazer and Valladares had piven ve, 
But on the following 
Thursdsy lst of Novonber, prior to the anointed tour, IT 
visited 
Finister of Poreion Reletions, infor ing tim off whut. 
nesdgy evening omni reiterating my request Wet the Pre cide nt receive 
| 
The Minister told me to go to the 
ente-roor to 
would core for we later on und ry. fo have me recatyed, 
This be did and, at 10:25, I wes tie first person to 
receive! 
st cordig] creelines 
ton 
fiety 
the 
Jo cove hin the 
Dette. 
ont tien told Lin 
Tad ree 
letter frm one of big 
in which the Valter. of 
ine 
in Gugterave In accord with tie 
fa Rios that, avetlieg our- 
“elves of the rindsess of Che 
of Peru, 
lead 
gureacd to 
in tins, st an early dates teat, ia comm gueme, 
wis lo inform him - Cavti)lo 
so 
dering tie 
Ing in Lies bis 
would 
a platform From 
To arucmee 
| 
tiv, 
— 
> 
we 
. 
‘ 
. 
> 
~ 
" 
“4 
"he 
>
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“tablished in our herisphere, 
1984, and in 
de 
in 1095, 
I told 
Mut, 
tn Meru 
des qnotration uf sutlentic den gerecy 
L. 
ont, 
of they 
of ell sectors of 
te sent 
of the 
von of frvevicer 
Vrudu, 
“a 
Lo carry 
© 
of 
recuperation curried out hy his 
Aruas') pov 
erment, after the overttrow of the first pro-Seviet revine to be 
Thal, likewise, 
concidered tat having the Third 
in 
woudd gucured1ly contrivute to tie 
Ue de oerntie 
movement in thet country; in cimiler Puchion we considered it advivable 
to concentrate 
the efforts of our continents! orgunization ju zones or 
countries where 
acainst Conmusist infiltration 
was most needed, 
that we 
it best thet our 
corferenceg 
whould 
Lube place in 
Istitudess 
te it woe fish Lhe 
one touok ; Jace in 
a 
ry 
tess tie 
end the third should therefore 
in Tdma, on the weetirn cide 
of Suuth america; and that the fourth 
tuke plece in Guatemala, 
that ia in Cente) 
ve in 
country of the 
or the Cerjbbern area, 
Tie Fresi@ent listened 
regt 
efter tively cmd wit 
cole 
Veber. 
Met 
eet Del Prato 
toe 
Reanton of Prooiteate, 
woe nace 
furs 
> 
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:
Mat he thao ht 
an eveellent 
fot 
thee 
tration, us well 
Our 
take 
in 
feveut 
| 
Yutitudes, And, ‘therefore, heed tat the’ fourth Congress would t:he 
place tn Guatcwole, 
wher’ that time should « 
Ver would ter 
n 
to eff. 
ta the Comfedersetdn ell 
cut 
it wight ned, 
he 
tome 
wily : Sout 
bow’ 
| 
ig just ‘uppeured on thy contemporary po¥tical history of Gustews2a, -- 0 
book whose 
author is 
fario 
Furfin, ve of the pro otore 
of the pregidentiel candidacy of Juan 
co)levLorutor in his reviwe, 
Then he guve ne a pouphlet 
what 
is doing for the bumblest classea, und proceeded fo 
fo we that 
concentrating his wetion in this revpect on the following puinig’s tu 
living conditions by meking the fenver cultivate hits Jor’? in cuch 
way thre: 
it will'projuce what is necessury for reising the living sturndund; intensive 
| 
ganitation effort in order ‘to improve the 
heulth of the pronle, by 
| 
attacking the ender 
se 
from which thes cuffer, 
by uvoiting the 
epicenic ones; to develop syriculture ead hels te 
VW “een 
and Gonestic fowler; und 
out for the alpevetization of 
the 
woll 
for sperte, ase 
of replocing tie” 
tral 
vices which huve cherscterized the 
Finally the conversation noved 
into versons) 
ent he re- 
called how our 
beeen vie corpesno 
ob thee bee 
A 
he secrelarios entered 
the pre 
photo. 
Of the President, 
fhe Vatteu then 
tabi 
tare: 
af 
i 
ots
ES 
« 
ARE_INVOLVED 
THE FAR: 
@e 
f 
ERSITY P PARISH 
ye GUATENALA CITY, HE 1S A CLOSE FRIEND OF THE MELVILLE BROTHERS, 
) 
it, 
| 
Doe enn her 
A REPORT 
f CONFIRMING 
WHAT 
SUSPECTED TO WIT. THAT TH& FOLLOWING 
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(B) ALSO SUSPECTED 1S|FATHFP\ 
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torat conte 
i 
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_- 
. 
ai 
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}connent: Refs refer to” Father ‘BONPANE whe may have beon involved with 
| 
the Guatemala insurgent situation. 
. 
ING 
FROHISITED. 
| 
REQUEST ANY ADDITIONAL INFO STATION MAY RAVE ON ao RE 
ate 
| 
FATHER BLASE BONPANE MARYKNOLL PRIEST AND CLOSE FRIEND MELVILLE 
= 
i 
BROTHERS... PLS REPLY IMMEDIATE, 
. 
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. 
jn 
** 
* 
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ae 
cre 
cron 
‘ 
= 
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bay,
~ 
23 January 1968 
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 
SUBJECT: 
Headquarters Traces on Father Blase BONPANE, 
Maryknoll Priest 
(a) 
} 
Division Tcaces Negative 
___jFather Blase BONPANE, 
a University 
parish priest in Guatemala City, is a close friend of the 
Melville brothers (Thomas and Arthur) and suspected of 
being 
involved with the Rebel Armed Forces _(PAR).- 
(oy! 
KIN 26685) 9 January 1968: 
__).Father BONPANE had_left 
jatemala “and will not “return. 
| 
| 
(d) 
New York Times dated 22 January 1968: 
"A third 
Maryknoll priest, the Rev. Blase BONPANE, 
38, was not at 
the secret meeting (referring to a meeting between Maryknoll 
priests and members of the FAR) but was ordered home and 
‘ asked by his superiors not to discuss the incident. 
He 
(BONPANE) said, however, that to prevent him from discussing 
‘the Guatemala situation at a major conference on Latin 
America that opens 
in St. Louis on January 29, the Maryknolls 
=: 
had ordered him to report for a new assignment in Hawaii on 
f 
. 
. 
‘ 
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bad 
ge 
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° 
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‘
-2- 
| 
- that date, 
A Maryknoll spokesman snid that Father NONPANE 
I | 
would be suspended from his priestly duties---he would be 
; 
forbidden to say Mass or hear confession---if he attended 
© 
PA 
the St. Louis meeting, which is to be sponsored by tle 
= 
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Catholic Inter-American Cooperation Program.” 
— 
~ 
(@)-—Catholic. Di rectory- 
Maryknoll priest as having an address in Huehuvetenango, 
mee 
F 
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dt 
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OVID TOM 
15 tarch 1968 
INFORMAL MEMORANDUM FO2: 
Chic?,' 
SUBJECT: 
Notes Concerning Pather Donpane'’s Lecture 
"Students and the Revolt in Guatemala” 
1. 
On the evening of 12 tarch 1963, Father Blase 
Bonpane of the Maryknoll Order cnol:e to a standing room 
only audience in the M211 of Nations, Georgetown Univer- 
sity. 
The lecture was cporcorcd by three ctudent organ- 
izations; 
Latin American Forum, Pcople to People, and 
the East Campus Christian Forum. 
The prinary theme of 
Pather's talk was about the local Guatemalon student 
effort to assist the socianl revolution of their country 
in an active but non-violent manncr. 
The question and 
answer period that followed his presentation covered the 
entire spectrum of problems confronting Latin America. 
2. 
Father's formal presentation bean by telling 
of the disgruntled and frustrated ctudents at the National 
University of San Carlos who wanted to be active partici- 
pants in the social revolution of their country without 
having to make the final decision of joining one of the 
armed rebel groups in the mountains. 
There seemed to be 
no alternatives open to these students. 
As a last desper- 
ate attempt to find a way to channel the energy talent 
and dedication of these students into a non-violent 
organization that could assist the existing revolution 
Father Bonpane and others began to organize the students 
into groups to go out into the countryside to carry out 
a program of civic action. 
An eight day course was 
initiated at the university to instruct the students on 
pas such as The Social Question, Dignity of Man, Common 
Principles of Organization, and How to Organize/ 
ed 
the Legyfa de Campesinos. 
This pilot project of 
the Christian Guerrilla Organization had the nominal 
blessing of the archbishop. 
liiany of the students with 
whom Father Bonpane dealt had been to Cuba on various 
occasions for some type of tcur, schooling or training. 
— 
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le
3. 
The students not with inmedinte success when sent 
to live with Indion fanilics. 
fThore was an eagerness on 
the part of the Indions to want to lcarn to read and write 
Cpanich and o conoral ocecptance of the porsonal hygiene 
acd public health procodurcs Inpicnoutcd by the otudents, 
groups as to the actiows of the otudcuts and they.coon 
— 
bocane known ac tho “Gucrrilinos de Paz." 
Tho students 
did carry on a dinlecue with the various guerrillas 
in their respective areas. 
4. 
Father statcd the final dissolution of this non- 
violent studcnt movement was brought about by the threats 
of death orcoinst certain ctudecnts and the actual public 
listings of these individuols with ao price on their heads, 
After sone quick coasultations it was dccidod to disband 
the movement formally and Fathor with his friends were very 
occupied in exfiltrating studcnts cut of Guatemala. 
This 
was still.going on up to the tine of Father's recall to the 
United States. 
* 
,5. 
The gains the students hod made in forming the 
Lémfa de Campesinos came to. 9 temporary halt when the 
nevly elected Chief of the 
ria de Campesinos in the 
parish of Father Arthur Melville was brutally murdered. 
6. 
Father tried to sound the alnorm that the United 
States Government is following the wrong line of approach 
to the problems of Guatemalo and to Latin America in 
general. 
He claims that the countcrinsurgency program 
is “counterproductive" to the cbjectives of our govern- 
ment and though the program may be a nilitary success 
the revolution will continue and Vietrnrs could spring 
up all over Latin American. 
Father asked Which is more 
beneficial to the people of Guatemala, the arrival of 
four new HUEYs (fully armed helicopters) or four new 
-hospitais 
which could be built with the money used to 
purchase the helicopters. 
Father stated no country in. 
‘Central America needs o military force, only a national 
police force and our government should not support the 
expansion of the military power structure. 
He pointed 
to Costa Rica as an example to follow in this case. 
He 
claimed that the Americans nore going to become hated 
by the campesinos as more and more American military 
representatives are connected with a Latin American mili- 
tary effort to wipe out the guerrilla. 
The initial 
e*. 
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@ifficulty of the uppor middlo ecloss urban guerrilla to 
iccotify with tho campcoatno and vice-versa has been 
overcc=9 because the 
new is able to identify 
vith tho dcad cgucrvilla Yor horoe is cencene who dicd 
| 
tryicg to ecofut od afd tho enspesino du inproving his 
roality. 
7. 
¥athor mode 
obsorvations 
of the Guate- 
calon guorrilla. 
To dato Yathor tad novor not a loud 
mouth or arrosjont cguorrilla. 
‘Thoy are willing to listen 
to Viat you Lavo to say 03 leng us the rhetoric is not 
couwcd., 
Alvovt man for nun tho cuerrillcs ore dedicated 
ron who hevo lcst thoir initial fear of doath ond consider 
thcuselvcs the vanjruard o? an armed occial revolution. 
any of the gucrrillcs iccatify thoemselvcs with the “new 
socd” coentioncd in the Now Tectamont which “nust fall" 
in order for the harvost to be roapod. 
Wumerous cuerrillas 
when slain or captured have had a copy of the New Testament 
in their back pectot. 
Vatber claims that the guerrillas 
nre willing to cuter into infcvisal discussions with 
gcovernacnt, church, or nilitory officials at any given 
time. 
However, the guerrillas ore dedicated to carrying 
the revolution to its final cocinl conclusion and would 
not be catisficd with juct a “palace revolution because 
they have seen hundred: and don't think any of them are 
worth a damn." 
8. 
Father told the nudience you must understand 
the historical nature of the powor ctructure in Guate- 
mala to undcrstand why little or nothing is being done 
to feed, clothe, ond educate the masces. 
He briefly 
explaincd the pover pyraonid vith the Nilitary sitting 
on top.directing ond dictating the country, right below 
the National Police always acting in o most direct and 
brutal way. 
Under these you have the csovernmental 
structure which is stymied and unable to act on certain 
matters even when willing beccuse of the power exerted 
by. the Military and the National Police. 
Father had 
praise for the court cystem of Guatemala and said if 
one could get to court for due process of law the courts 
were generally fair and gave a cood hearing to the 
guerrillas. 
8. 
When asked about the influence Cuba has on the 
guerrilla movement in Guatemala, Father stated, "Cuba 
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has had influencoc by whot ft ico ond tho example it portrays 
by its vory cxistcnco.” 
Cuba omnoricaccd a gonuine 
revolution involvin; ccrtain cesinl roforecs and was able 
to withstard tho prcsame oY Gho U.0. chaving other 
ecuntrics it woo pecaliblo to (ot out 
underncath the 
vides vory little matorial cunpert to tho cuorrilla 
covencnt in 
and dn uo way controls the action of 
the indcpendont jworrilloa 
VAN, 13th of tlovember 
Movement, and the Chriction Gucrv’illo Organization, 
However, civen the littlo cconc.sitc oid provided by Cuba 
in dircct contriot to ald givon by the Uuited States the 
proportion of influouaco id alaruing. 
10. 
At the conclusion of the qucstion/answer period 
a student asked what the ctudents of Goorgetown could do 
about the Guatemalan sitvation. 
Pathor otated he was 
going to start o fund ond in fact plars to formalize the 
fund into o legitimate foundation hod alrcoady berun go 
that interested octudents cad othor intcrcctod individuals 
who wanted could cupport thosc in Cuatcuala who were seeking 
to slleviate the inhumane occiol conditicnas that presently 
exist. 
He thon statcd that it would probably be called 
the Velville Foundation ard once 
he would get 
in contrect with the ctudent organizations that sponsored 
his talx. 
Another quesiion was raoiccd, “doos this mean 
we would be supporting the cucrrillcs in Guatemala?" to 
which’Father answered nercatively stating that the money 
would go to individuals who would be assisting the local 
‘people upgrade their social pesition vin constructive 
projects of public health, cducction end orderly organ- 
ization of the workers. 
lic cid not indicate who these 
individuals were or if they wore dircctly or indirectly 
connected with the guerrillas. 
ll. 
Attached is a copy of the article appearing 
in the Evening Star, larch 13, 1968, ccmnenting on 
_ Father's lecture. 
The content of the article is basically 
‘ correct, however, the implication via the organization of 
Father's statements in the article that he was using 
the occasion to attack the U.S. and its policies in 
Guatemala in a sensational/enotional manner is incorrect. 
Rather the mood of presentation throuchcut was to analyze 
.the problem as Father viewed it and present constructive 
approaches to the solution cven though his suggested 
approaches were counter to existing U.S. ones. 
| 
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VENEZUELA ACCONPASIED SYA MONSIGNOR ILLICH,. 
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OCT 
Federal Bureau of lavestigation 
ATTN: Special Agent in Charge of 
occ. 
‘RO. SER. 
_.Wa 
Field Office 
FROM: 
Deputy 
for Plans 
SUBJECT: 6 BONPANE, Blase 
Reference is 
to the request « 
dated 10 
Subject, born 24 April 1929 io Cleveland, Ohio. 
-- 
office contain the following 
concerning 
n 
cate 
2. [A ummary. ‘of 
10 April 1968 
a close associate of 
ELVIL 
uspected of 
nvoive 
witb 
t 
Revolutionary Guerri 
Guerrilla Front (FAR), the Communist para- . 
military group in Guatemala. Subject was the lessee ofa building in: 
Guatemala 
which was raided by the Guatemalan Army on 
e 
Guatemala sometime during December 
o 
| 
that 
udject 
was 
} 
|
3.° According to a report dated 1 April 1968... 
| 
Subject lectured a standing room only audience on. 
March 196d in the Hall of Nations, Ceorgetown University, 
+ 
Washington D. C. The title of the adcrees was "Students anc the - 
Revolt in Guatemala," which according to Source, was delivered with a 
. 
ree of naivete on the part af Subject and contaioed. 
incorrect 
th Monsignos/Ivad ILLICH! The unnamed priest was described as one? | 
the group of Maryknol] priesta who wers suspected of involvement 
‘goerrilla activities in Guatemala. [The files of this office do not . 
~~ 
& 
~. 
‘indicate the whereabouts of Subject after his 12 March 1908 addrese 
Lfaryknoll priest wha was travglling in Venosuela in early April 1968... 
indicated that Subject might be identifiable with an unnamed 
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— 
MELINFORMATION 
(When Fitted Inj 
COUNTRY 
NO, TOCS -3/538,286 
SU3JECT 
RUMOREO PLOT BETWEEN TRUJILLO FAMILY ANO 
DATE DISTR, 
23 reBRUARY 1963 
HATIAN OFFICIALS TO ASSASSINATE JUAN BOSCH 
PRECEDENCE 
ROUT INE 
+20 resruary 1963 
REFERENCES 
IN 7334¢ 
DATE ACO. 
E& 
THIS is UNEVALUATED INFORMATION, SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE, 
| 
SOURCE 
 SANTTIZED COPY 
ON 2g FEBRUARY 1963, Luc DESIR, TOP TONTON 'MACOUTE LEAG 
DER 
' 
AT THE NATIONAL PALACE, SENT: TWO CIVIL MILITLAMEN TO THE BORDER TOWN 
OF BELLADERE WITH A SEALFO LETTER TO BE GIVEN TO THE LOCAL CIVIL 
| MILITIA LEADERS WHEN THE MILITIAMEN ARRIVED AT BELLADERE LATER THE 
SAME DAY, 
THEY REPEATED TO THE LOCAL LEADER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE 
WHICH DESIR HAD GIVEN TO THEM, "KEEP READY. 
THE DAY IS COMING 
SHORTLY". 
2. 
THE CONTENTS OF THIS LETTER WERE UNKNOWN, 
HOWEVER, THE TALK » 
AMONG MILITIAMEN ASSIGNED TO THE PALACE WAS THAT THE TRUJILLO FAMILY 
HAD GIVEN A GREAT DEAL OF MONEY TO HAITIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS FOR 
WAVY | AIR 
Jes Tsecorr] 
nic | 
Justa] 
ocr } one 
| oo 
| AYO 
REPORT 
, 
Content U} ICLASSASD 
OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. 
| 
4. 
j 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
(13-20)
CLASSIFICATION 
— DISSEMINATION CONTROLS 
Tocs~3/538,286 
(When Filled In) 
THE PURPOSE OF CARRYING OUT A PLOT TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT-ELECT 
JUAN BOSCH, ON OR PRIOR TO THE DATE OF HIS JNAUGURATION. 
: 
3. “FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, ‘CINCLANT, CINCARIB 
: 
ZED COPY 
- 
: 
CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINAMON CONTROLS 
‘ 
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY —.BELK 
e ROUTINE 
Intelligence Information Cables; 
ee DING MAN 
,DATEOF 
21 APRIL 196, 
~ 
. 23; APRUL 196h 
REPORTS THAT THE 
NATIONAL PALACE WILL BE THE OBJECT 
NDERS 
AERIAL BOMBARDMENT 
*souRcE 
FIELD REPORT NO. 
APPRAISAL; 
196% 
GRAGTA 
COMMANDER 
OF THE PRESIDENTIAL 
GUARD, skp THAT PRESTDENT FRANCOIS DUVALIER IS AFRAID THAT ‘THE PALACE Is GOING: 
TO BE THE OBJECT “OF AN ARRIAL BOMBARDMENT, DUVALLER'S FEARS WERE CAUSED BY REPORTS. 
‘REGELVED BY 
THE 
OF HAITI THAT THE PALACE WOULD BE BOMBED FROM THE AIR, 
2, FIELD DISSEMs STATE, ARMY, CINCLANT, CINCSO. 
SANITIZED COPY 
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage ‘Laws, Title 
18, 0.8.0, Becs, 793 pnd 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manper to an unsutborized person is prohibited by law, 
| 
STATE/INR 
DIA ARMY/ACS! NAVY 
AIR 
JCS 
SECDEF 
NSA 
NIC 
AID 
A “oct 
ocr’ 
_-REPCINCLANT 
LYNDON BAINES 
‘ 
| 
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‘ 
‘ 
‘ 
‘ 
| 
af
| ANFLUENTIAL PPLN MEMBER, STATED THAT THE REASON FOR THE LEAFLET 
\ 
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. 
ine 
Intelligence Informatien Cable 
| 
| 
Content UNCLASSIFIED 
DATEOF 
7 MAY 
dete 
copy 
8 MAY 
PLAN BY COMMUNISTS FOR ANTI-GOVERNMENT ACTION DURING 
“i 
nay 1964 
REIDY 
—~SAUNDIRS 
DATE ACQ. 
sa 
| 
REF 
19153. 
| 
FIELD REPORT NO. \ 
AND 
APPRAISAL; 
| 
| 
mf AS OF 7 MAY 196%, MEMBERS OF THE PEOPLE'S NATIONAL 
— 
LIBERATION PARTY (PPLN), ONE OF HAITI"S TWO COMMUNIST PARTIES, 
| 
WERE SAYING THAT THE PARTY PLANNED TO DISTRIBUTE ANTI-GOVERNMENT 
"LEAFLETS DURING THE WEEK OF 15-22 MAY. 
(FIELD COMMENT: 
ON 22 
"MAY 1961, FRANCOIS DUVALIER WAS REINAUGURATED PRESIDENT FOR AN 
" ADDITIONAL: SIX YEARS. 
EVERY YEAR SINCE THEN THIS DAY HAS BEEN 
CELEBRATED AS A GREAT NATIONAL HOLIDAY.) 
FRITZLER GAILLARD, 
DISTRIBUTION WOULD/TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE PUSLIC THE CONTINUED 
" PRESENCE OF OPPOSITION TO DUVALIER AND TO. MOBILIZE AN ANT I- 
STATE/INR 
DIA. ARMY/ACSI 
NAVY 
AIR JCS 
SECDEF 
NSA 
NIC 
AID 
USIA 
OCI! 
ONE 
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tee 
_* 
>
CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS 
(When Filled In) 
| 
IN 
PAGE 
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GOVERNMENT CONSCIOUSNESS, 
RESULT IN MANY UNNECESSARY ARRESTS, 
( EN 
ND. OF MESSAGE) 
| 
2. 
ON 7 MAY AN UNIDENTIFIED HIGH RANKING CONTACT OF THE PARTY 
OF POPULAR ACCORD (PEP), HAITI"S OTHER COMMUNIST PARTY, TOLD 
| 
A PEP MEMBER AT A CLANDESTINE RENDEZVOUS THAT THE PEP PLANNED TO 
| TAKE NO ACTION AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT DURING MAY. 
HE SAID, HOWEVER, 
THAT THE PPLN WAS WORKING WITH THE EXILES AND WAS PLANNING TO 
| 
a 
DISTRIBUTE LEAFLETS AND WOULD POSSIBLY UNDERTAKE SOME OTHER ANTI~— 
GOVERNMENT ACTION IN MID-MAY, 
THE CONTACT STATED THAT THE 
ACTIONS PLANNED BY THE PPLN WOULD ACCOMPLISH NOTHING AND WOULD 
3. FIELD DISSEM: 
STATE, ARMY, CINCLANT, CINcso’ . 
> 
. 
| 
CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS 
_ 
CONTINUATION OF TOCS INFORMATION 
LYNDON 2AINES 
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
@ ROUTINE 
COUNTRY FATTY 
ANDER 
DATE OF 29 AUCUS? 196, 
TBELK 
| 
DISTR.31 AUGUST 1964 
| 
BY PERSONS IN THS MILT 
ECSCNESS 
DATE ACQ, 
OMER 
REF 
IN 6367), 
~-MOOD 
| 
SOURCE 
: 
AND 
ATINTERG 
APPRAISAL: 
_SMITH, WM. 
by 
UNCLASSIFIZD 
1. AS OF 29 AUGUST 196 THRE WAS AN INCREASE I'l aNTI-GOvERNMENT PLOTTING 
‘BY PERSCYS IN BUSINESS, GOVERMENT, AND MILITARY CIRCLES. 
PLANS 70 ATTACK THE 
PALACE WILL BE TIMED TO COINCIDE WITH THE ARRIVAL OF RESEL FORCES IN PORT-A's-PRINCE, 
THIS WILL TAXE PLACE AS SOON 
AS KEY MILITARY LEADERS IN FORT-AU-PRINCE AND PRO- 
VINGIAL TOWNS NEAR PORT-AU-PRIUCE HAVE BEE! CONTACTED AND HAYS GIVEN TEEIR AGREE- 
MENT. SCME COLONELS 
AND A-HUMSER OF JUNIOR OFFICERS ARE INVOLTED IN THE P07? 
COLONEL GRACIA JACQUES, CCMMANDER OF THE PALACE QUARD; COLONEL OCTAVE CATARD, 
COMMANDER OF THE COAST GUARD; 
LI. CCL. IWC PIERRE-LCUIS, COMMANDER CP THE 
TACTICAL BATTALICN OF THE NATICNAL PALACE, EAVE BEEN CONTACTED BY THE CCYSPIRATORS, 
\ 
13, 
€ 
and 394, the transmission of 
STAT2/INR 
DIA 
ARMY/ACSi 
NAVY “AIR 
JCS 
 SECDEF 
NSA NIC 
| 
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to 
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|
| 
“CLASSIFICATION = DISSEMINATION CONTROLS 
| 
IN 6357) 
| 
| 
2. I CONJUNCTION WITH TEE MCVE BY THE MILITARY AND REPELS, LOCAL MERCHANTS 
| 
| 
AGREED TO CLOSE THEIR STORES. 
CGMENT: 
TEESE TaCTISS WERE USED 
PRESIDENT MAGLOIRE WAS OVERTFRGW.) 
TEE MOVE AGAINST FRESIDENT FRANCOIS 
DUVAICER WILL TAKE PLACE Ci A WEEKsD, BECAUSE OF TIME WEEDED TO COORDINATE AND 
MAKE CONTACTS, IT WILL ALSO TAKE PLACE AFTER A PAYDAY FOR LOCAL EMPLOYEES, 
| 
WHICH MEANS THZ SECOND OR FOURTH WEEKEND OF THE MONTH, ZN ORDER 79 ASSURE SUPPORT 
, 
OF THE BUSINESS STRIKE BY EMPLOYEES. 
3. THE OPPOSITICN WILL BE COMFOSED CF FIVE GROUPS, MEMBERS 
OF CNE GROVE 
ARE: 
A. 
! 
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* 
CLASSIFICATION = DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
out 
CLASSIFICATION = DISSEMINATION CONTROLS 
6367h 
} 
END CF MESSAGE 
FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, CINCLANT, CINCSO, 
‘ 
FOR 
USE PREVIOUS 
MIG. 2-63 
18-20-4647) 
1-63 
EDITIONS 
cory 
, 
CONTINUATION OF TDCS INFORMATIONy REPORT, Esines Johnaon Libsory 
. 
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‘ 
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
Intelligence Information Cable 
Sep 3-9 03 
Dats OF 2 
1954 
vail ule 
DISTR. 3 
196 
INFO. 
SUBJECT 
FATTIAN REBEL ACTIVITIES 
ATE 
"IN 66453 
UN 
AND 
APPRAISAL, 
} 
Content UNCLASSIFIED 
OSB VIS 
eo: | 
SAID THAT THE MILITIA IN MIRAGOANE DOES 
NOT KNOW HOW TO HANDLE ARMS; MANY OF THEM HAVE NEVER HELO 
OR FIRED A RIFLE. 
MANY OF THEM ARE DISLOYAL TO. DUVALIER 
tains 
incorms 
aSecting the National Defense of the Usited S:ates within jee = 
aRMY/aCSt 
AIR 
JCS 
SECDEF 
NSA NIC 
ONE CCR 
CO 
. 
Lyndon 
| 
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"CLASSIFICATION 
DISSEMINATION CONTROLS 
(When Filled In) 
1S PROBABLY 3E1NG SUPPORTED BY WESSIN.) 
\ 
COMMENT: 
LIMITATION CF REBEL ACTIVITY TO THE 
MOUNTAINS COULD PRODUCE ‘DANGEROUS SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 
AFTER OUVALIER |S OVERTHROWN. 
PEASANTS IN THESE AREAS: ARE 
PROVING RESPONSIVE TO REBELS AS THE MOST IMMEDIATE RECOURSE 
FOR STRIKING SACK AT DUVALIER FOR =IS WELL- 
KNOWN AND CONTINUING SLAUGHTER ANS TERROR TACTICS, THE 
PEASA'TS ARE ALSO BECOMING SOCIALLY AWARE OF POSSIBILITIES 
FCx IMPROVING THEIR LOT 
BUT ARE AWAKENING TO THESE POSSIBILITIES 
THROUGH BROADCASTS FROM RADIO HASANA, WHICH ARE 
MAINLY ANTI-U,S, COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA. 
THESE BROADCASTS, 
WHICH HAVE BEEN TARGETTED AT HAIT! OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS, 
ARE THE ONLY “OUTS IDE VOICE” BEINS RECEIVED BY A LARGE 
SECTOR OF THE RURAL PEASANT POPULATION, 
THE BROADCASTS, 
COM8 I NED WITH A CONTINUING CLIMATE OF INSURRECTION AND REPRISALS OVER 
A PERIOD OF TIME,COULD CREATE FERTILE GROUND FOR HAITIAN COMMUNISTS 
WHO COULD DEVELOP BEYOND THE CONTROL OF THE DsMocraTIc 
REBELS 
IN A POST-DUVAILIER REGIME. 
FOR THIS REASON, THE BEST 
INTERESTS OF A DEMOCRATIC HAITI WOULD BE SERVED BY A SHORT: 
TERM FIGHT BEFORE THE PEASANTS ARE OVERLY AROUSED. 
THE 
REBELS NOW ENGAGED IN THE FIGHT AGAINST DUVALIER OFFER THE 
BEST CHANCE THUS FAR FOR A DEMOCRATIC HAITI). 
8. FIELD DISSE: 
STATS ARMY NAVY ATR CINGSO CINSLANT. 
CLASSIFIGATION 
— DISSEMINATION CONTAOLS 
Lyndon Esines Johnson Lib 
« 
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¥ 
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NO FORETGN=DrE 
| 
6 Deceinber 1965 
OCI No: 2378/65 
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM 
| 
{ 
- 
*HAITI AFTER. DUVALIER 
DIRECT ORAT OF INTE ELIGENCE: 
. 
| 
} 
; 
} 
* 
| 
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‘ 
SH 
OCI No. 2378/65 
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
Office of Current Intelligence 
6 December 1965 
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM 
Haiti After Duvalier 
1. 
Haitian society 1s so primitive, 
its people 
are so unsophisticated 
and so prone 
to violent 
settlement of personal scores, 
and their means of 
communicating with one another are so elementary 
that 
it is difficult 
to predict with confidence 
the course political events may take. 
The analysis 
which follows 
is distilled from the best information 
available and reflects 
the belief that even in so 
backward 
a country as Haiti 
the downfall of a 
dictatorial regime will trigger certain consequences. 
2. 
Duvalier's departure may inaugurate a violent 
and possibly bloody period. 
The extent of the turmoil 
probably would depend on the way he goes -- whether 
by natural causes, 
coup or assasSination 
-= 
and the 
ability of his would-be heirs 
to consolidate power 
and forestall,a collapse of public order. 
Whatever 
the immediate outcome of a power struggle, 
over 
the succeeding weeks 
or even months, 
the political 
situation would be extremely confused and likely 
to deteriorate rapidly. 
Duvalier has throttled 
even the most rudimentary 
forms of political dialogue 
and there are few people 
in Haiti qualified 
to hold 
power for long. 
3, 
The Haitian Constitution 
of 1964, which 
legalized Duvalier's status 
as President 
for life, 
made no provision for a vice president or for 
naming a successor, 
Duvalier 
has said informally 
that his 1L5-year-old son 
is to succeed him, with 
Mrs. Duvalier acting as "regent" until 
the boy 
reaches maturity. 
Despite previous constitutional 
provisions for peaceful 
and orderly change of govern- 
ment, 
only five of more 
than 30 of the past Haitian 
COPY. 
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Af 
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NO FURETGN DTSSEM 
chief executives have lived out their terms and 
left office voluntarily, 
and three of these served 
during the US occupation. 
| 
4. 
An assault upon 
the regime from any quarter 
or a successful attack on Duvalier, 
himself, would 
| 
be likely 
to unleash 
a wave of recrimination and 
vengeance on the part of those components or Victims 
of his regime who hate each other but had hitherto 
been held at bay by the President. 
Indeed, 
it is 
likely 
that the death of the dictator’ would rupture 
the government 
and that 
the semblance of a civil 
service which exists 
at present would melt away. 
Dissolution of the central bureaucracy would leave 
the regular armed forces, 
the rabbleelike militia 
and the secret police 
to contend among themselves. 
THE ARMED FORCES 
9. 
The Haitian armed forces, 
including air and 
coast guard personnel, 
number approximately 4,800 
officers and men who are uséd primarily as a constab- 
ulary. 
Roughly half of the armed forces are 
quartered in Port au Princé, where they presumably 
would seek access 
-~ 
now d@mied them «= to the arms 
and munitions cached in thé National Palace. 
Poorly 
equipped and led, 
the armed forces would have no 
more than an even chance of besting the secret 
police and militia. 
6. 
The secret police have no official name or 
status; Haitians refer to them as 
the Ton Ton Macoute 
(TTM), 
a Creole phrase which means "bogeyman." 
The TTMs are armed thugs, 
about 
1,500 in number, who 
carry out special assignments 
-- i.e., assaults 
and murder, arson, pillage, 
extortion and violence 
of all kinds. 
‘From time to time, 
the TTMs overstep 
themselves and Duvalier temporarily curbs them. 
However, 
they are too useful for him to restrain 
for too long. 
7. 
The civil militia, 
dubbed the National 
Security Volunteers 
(VSN), was created by Duvalier 
as a counterforce 
to the regular armed forces and 
is favored by the President. 
Totakfng 
about 10,000 
COPY 
Lynd on Baines Johnson. Library 
| 
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mid 
FOREI. GN DISSE... 
members, 
the VSN is made up of weekend soldiers who 
are administratively separate from the regular military 
but assigned 
to assist 
the army. 
Only about one-third 
of the VSN members are armed -- and these with antiquated 
pistols, 
revolvers 
and bolt-action rifies. 
They 
‘are poorly trained and could not cope with a trained 
and disciplined foe, 
but are efiective against even 
more poorly armed Civilians. 
8. 
Duvalier's sudden death from natural causes 
would probabiy occasion 
the least public disorder, 
assuming that the news could be withheld long enough 
to permit one or more of his palace entourage 
to 
consolidate controi over 
the regular armed forces, 
the militia and the secret police. 
The presence of 
half of the armed forces 
in the capital, where almost 
all of the country's reserves 
of weapons and ammuni- 
tion are stored in the liational Palace, would probably 
give the advantage to tie military in determining 
who would be the new president. 
9. 
The situation would be similar 
if Duvalier’ 
were mentally or physically incapacitated for a 
long time. 
Assuming his henchmen were so disposed, 
they could use their positions as palace insiders 
to supplant him even before his death, 
The length 
of time during which Duvalier was unable to function 
would determine 
the extent of 
within 
the government itsell. 
10, 
Since taking office eight years ago, Duvélier 
has managed to prevent anyone in his regime from 
building up a personal following. 
Nevertheless, 
several men within the government have figured in 
reported plots against Duvalier, 
or are said to be 
ready to step in should he die, 
Various alignments 
do appear from time to time; 
but no determined 
opposition has been detected, 
ll. 
Plotting within the military has been endemic 
Since Duvalier’s accession. 
However, 
premature 
disclosure invariably has led to imprisonment and 
death or exile for the plotters, 
Chief of staff of 
the army General Gerard Constant 
-- along with 
Colonel Jacques Lafoche and Lt. Colonel Roget St. 
Albins -- might set up a junta in the event of 
Duvalier's disappearance. 
While St. Albins is said 
- 
3- 
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wre 
f
NQU 
LORE 
DIS 
to be well liked: 
by his fellow officers 
-- 
but is 
otherwise an unknown quantity 
-- Constant 
is im- 
patient and easily infiuenced, 
LaRoche, 
the 
Strongest willed of the three, 
is said to be un- 
scrupulous and-‘would probably emerge as the dom- 
inant figure. 
None 
is suspected of Communist 
affiliations, 
but LaRoche 
is reported to be strongly 
anti-US. 
12. 
A sudden coup by a person or group closely 
identified’ with Duvalicr would minimize 
the dismay 
among Duvalier's supporters and serve 
to limit the 
degree of bloodshed. 
in this situation, 
those who 
have been most closely identified with the excesses 
and brutaiity of Duvalier's rule 
-- notably the TTMs 
-- would have iess fear of reprisals by a successor 
government because they magne themselves be involved 
in its formation and would have little choice but to 
Support it. 
If, however, 
a coup brought to power a 
person or group not in Sympathy with Duvalier's 
ine 
ternal policies, 
the situation would be radically 
different. 
The militia and Ton Ton Macoutes probably 
would react by striking out at the white and mulatto 
population of Port au Prince out of fear that these 
sroups would seek revenge for their mistreatment under 
Duvalier, 
13. 
Any assassination of Duvalier which caught 
his entourage off guard would be likely to signal a 
reign of terror, 
probably limited to the capital but 
possibly extending to the rural areas as well. 
Meme 
bers of Duvalier's entourage and the military would 
have less of an advantage 
in such a situation, 
ale 
though they still would have the easiest access to 
the arms and munitions in the capital. 
Public dis- 
order would be a major problem. 
The suddenness of 
the assassination and the resulting public uncertainty 
probably would prompt the militia and the Ton Ton 
Macoutes to go on a rampage in Port au Prince == 
both 
to gain what they could out of the breakdown of law 
and order and to try to overcome the Likely reaction 
of the man-in-the-street tonews of Duvalier's death, 
In addition, 
the deliberate racist policies of 
Duvalier -- setting up the majority blacks against 
the minority whites and mulattos 
-- would ensure 
that any conflict would have racial overtones. 
Lyndon Baines Jobn3on Library 
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THE COMMUNISTS 
14. 
-The uncertainty and turmoil following 
Duvalier's departure would almost certainly 
be 
Capitalized on by either or both of “Haiti’s Com- 
munist parties; 
With 
a maximum of 500 members 
and up to 2,000 fellow 
travelers, 
the Communists 
constitute 
the only internal oppesition with any 
' degree of training and organization 
-- however 
primitive. 
Concentrated 
in Port au Prince, 
the 
Communists would be in a position 
to enter 
the 
contest 
from the start. 
Their fortunes would be 
improved under any circumstance 
in waich 
a succes- 
sor 
to Duvalier were not immediately named. 
They 
probably would find it to tneir advantage to pro- 
long any indecision over 
a new government, possibly 
making a stab’at seizing power themseives. 
How- 
ever, 
this would require effective support among 
the military, 
the TIiMs anda the militia. 
We do rot 
know whether 
they would be able 
to garner such 
Support, 
but we doubt that 
they would become the 
controlling factor even 
though they might become 
an important 
force, 
15. 
Three men in Duvalier's cabinet or close 
to him -- Herve Boyer, 
Paul Blanchet and Jules 
Blanchet 
-- are known to have had Communist ties 
in France. 
None of them is known to have such 
connections at the present 
time with either of 
Haiti's two Communist parties, 
but all three are 
anti-US and one or all may be "sleepers." 
THE EXILES 
16. 
The exile population, 
both Communist 
and non-Communist. 
would also attempt 
to take 
advantage of Duvalier'’s passing. 
The exiles could 
be counted upon to try to return to Haiti immediately 
-- 
from the United States, Mexico, 
possibly the 
Dominican Republic and from France, 
In any attempt 
to establish one of their own number in power in 
Haiti, 
the emigrés would be handicapped by the divi- 
siveness, discord and absence of recognized leadership 
coPY | 
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NOW ORDIGN+DISSEM 
that have impeded their activities 
in exile, 
t.dividual emigrés 
almost no following in 
Haiti, 
with the possible exception of former 
President Paul Magloire, 
It seems unlikely.that 
any emigré 
».* group of emigrés would be able to 
Seize power without substantial foreign support. 
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REPORT. 
+4 
HAITI’S DISMAL OUTLOOK—WITH OR WITHOUT DUVALIER 
OFFICE 
OF. CURRE NT INTELLIGENCE ages 
ere 
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‘Gown 
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ffeat 
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% -
HAITI'S DISMAL OUTLOOK--WITH OR WITHOUT DUVALIER. 
Since coming to power eight years ago, Francois 
Duvalier has throttled evon tho most rudimentary 
forms of political dinlocue in Haiti 
and few persons 
there are qualified 
to replaco hin, 
Wis eventual 
disappearance from the sceno moy inaugurate 
a period 
of violence and bloodshed, 
The extent 
of the ture 
moil probably will depend on whether 
he is removed 
by natural causes, 
coup, 
or assascsination--and on 
the ability of his woulcebo heirs 
to consolidate 
- 
power and forestall 
a collapse of public order. 
tending for power will be the bureaucracy, 
the intere 
nal security forces, Communistc, 
Whatever 
the immediate outcone, 
exiles, 
and non-Communist 
the politie 
cal situation will be extremely confused over 
the 
succeeding weeks and even months, 
The Political Scene 
Duvalier was elected Presi- 
dent for a six-year term in 1957, 
Four years later, 
in 1961, 
he 
had himself "re-elected" for an 
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additional six years. 
He then 
proclaimed himself "President 
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for Life” in 1964--an action 
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sanctioned by a controlled pleb- 
iscite,. 
The next step, accord- 
ing to recurring rumors, will be 
to proclaim himself 
than 30 chiefs of state have 
lived out their terms and left 
office voluntarily; 
three of 
these served during the US occu- 
pation from 1915 to 1934. 
The 
Haitian Constitution of 1964 
made no provision for a vice 
president or for choosing 
a suc- 
cessor to the president. 
Duvalier 
has said that his lS-year-old son 
will succeed him, with Mrs. Du- 
valier serviug as "regent" until 
the boy reaches maturity. 
Only five of Haiti's more 
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Duvelier has erected 
a facade 
of legality around his regime, 
but he has remained in power by 
cestroying or neutralizing all 
sources 
of opposition, 
The only 
Legal nolitical grouping is his 
own National Unity Party. 
Governe 
ment and military lenadvrs have 
been rotated often to keep them 
from developing personal followe 
nes or hecoming potential rivals, 
Ss a counterforce to the regular 
ilitary, 
Duvaltier 
has set up his 
civil militia and secret poe 
. 
AS a result, there is probe 
Sly no person or group within 
the government able to mount 
a 
coup. 
Even eo, opposition to the 
Duvalier regime is believed to 
be widespread among the relatively 
few politically minded Haitians, 
notably the business community. 
This opposition 
is unorganized, 
nonvocal, 
and ineffective against 
the internal security forces, 
ese 
pecially the secret police. 
Two 
small Communist parties, 
which 
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SPECIAL REPORT 
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Operate more 
or 
less overtly, 
comprise the only organized 
in- 
ternal opposition. 
The politi- 
cally apathetic majority--prob— 
ably 90 percent of the popula~ 
tion--i8 illiterat®, 
physically 
and culturally isolated, 
and 
exists on the fringe of starva-. 
‘tion. 
Many accept Duvalier's 
grandiose claims to supernatural 
powers sand authority and believe 
him the reincarnation of a voo- 
doo deity. 
Military and Security Forces 
Duvalier derends for survival 
on the armed forces 
(FAdii), 
the 
civil militia, 
and the secret 
police. 
The FAdH numbers around 
4,800 officers and men, 
including 
ground, 
air, 
and coast guard per- 
sonnel. 
It is primarily 
a na- 
tional constabulary, 
with respon- 
Sibilities 
for internal security, 
local police functions, 
and fire 
fighting. 
Half of its totai 
strength is in Port-au-Frince, 
the capital; 
the remainder is in 
. 
on 
Slums in Port-au-Prince 
49944 
Small, 
police-type units through- 
out the country. 
Duvaiier has replaced most 
he FAdCH's professional of- 
palletes: h Less capable men who 
e ungestionably Loyal to him. 
e FrAGH is poorly equipped with 
ebsolescent hardware. 
Except for 
two unarmed T-28 aircraft, 
a twin- 
cugine 
Cessna 310, and one C.47 
transport-eall illegally ac- 
quired in 1964--no new equipment 
has been purchased since about 
ivO2. 
There are serious short- 
ages of weapons, ammunition, 
vehicles, 
ships, aircraft, 
and 
logistical support of all "kinds. 
The FAGH has almost no capa- 
for standard military. 
erations 
in the countryside. 
In 
nid-1964 two groups of rebels-- 
23 to 30 in one group and 
13 in 
another--eluded capture for over 
two months before being over- 
rowered by sheer numbers. 
The 
military forces might, however, 
ve more effective within Porte 
au-Frince, where they would have 
access 
to munitions stored in 
the National Pulace. 
The 10,000-man civil militia, 
the National Security Volunteers 
(VSN), was created by Duvalier 
and is rersonally loyal to hia. 
About one-third of its members 
are armed, 
but with a motley cole 
lection of pistols, revolvers, 
and bolteaction rifles. 
The 
group is poorly trained and could 
.-pot.cope with a well-armed-and 
-trained enemy. 
However, 
their 
uniforms and their public train- 
ing sessions add to Duvalier's 
appearance of strength and help 
to cow the populace. 
Page 2 
SPECIAL REPORT 
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The secret police apparentiy 
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have no official name or status; 
Haitians privately refer 
ta then 
as Ton Ton Macoute (TT), 
a Creole 
phrase meaning “"bogeyman." 
The 
TTMS are armed thugs, about 1,500 
in number, 
who specialize in boate 
ings, murder, 
arson, 
pillage, 
ex- 
tortion, 
and other violence. 
Oce- 
casionally, 
the TTMs overstep 
their rather broad authority and 
Duvalier is forced to curb them. 
However, 
he seems to find them too 
useful to limit their power for 
long. 
The Economy 
Haiti's GNP currently is esti- 
mated at $300 million--equivalont 
to about $60 per capita, 
the low- 
est level in Latin America, 
There 
is little prospect that the down- 
ward trend of recent years wili be 
reversed, 
When fiscal year 1965 ended 
On 30 September, 
foreign exchange 
reserves were very tight, 
and the 
internal budgetary situation placed 
additional pressure on the Sohne 
ment. 
Revenues were lower than 
anticipated, 
at least partly bes 
cause of theft by customs and tax 
officials. 
The $28,2-million bude 
get approved for FY 1966 is about 
$400,000 lower than last year's 
and contains no provision for any 
direct government investmont, 
Production of export crops-- 
coffee, sugar, 
and cocoa--in- 
creased this year, but their value 
did not rise because world prices 
declined, 
Projected increases in 
the output of coffeo and sugar in 
1966 are unlikely to benefit Haiti 
because of the likelihood that 
SPECIAL’ 
Page 3 
world prices will continue low and 
that sugar production will far exe 
ceed the quota set by the US--the 
principal market for Haitian sugar. 
Life for the peasants, 
who 
comprise over 80 percent of Haiti's 
population, 
has been even more dif- 
ficult 
in the past year because of 
a prolonged drought. 
Although the 
peasants customarily exist at a 
subsistence level, 
1965 saw actual 
cases 
of starvation. 
The small 
middle class--especially the mer- 
chants--also feels the effects of 
the decline in the economy, 
in ad- 
dition 
to exorbitant taxes, harass- 
ing retulations, 
and arbitrary 
"“voluatary" collections, 
Possible Opposition 
Vithnin 
the Government 
Several men within the govern- 
ment have figured in past plots 
against Duvalier, 
or are described 
as ready to take over when he dies, 
Various alignments appear within 
the palace entourage from time to 
time, put no determined 
has been detected. 
Minister of Finance and Eco- 
nomic Aifairs Clovis Desinor ap- 
pears to be trying 
to disassociate 
himself from the most odious fea- 
tures of the regime in order to be 
available for some role in the poste 
Duvalier period. 
Desinor probably 
could count on some support from 
Port-au-Prince businessmen, 
Colonel 
Gracia Jacques and other illiterate 
Duvalier favorites probably are not 
intelligent enough to make more 
than a stab at gaining power. 
10 Dec 
OFF 
Lyndon }isines Johnaen 
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SEGREL. 
Three others--Minister 
for 
Coordination 
and Information 
Paul 
Blanchet, 
and Duvalier 
intimates 
Jules Blanchet 
and Herve Boyer-- 
have been mentioned as possible 
contenders 
for the presidential 
chair. 
All 
anti-US and have 
-had past Communist connections 
in 
France, 
but none 
is known 
to have 
connections with either of Haiti's 
Communist parties. 
Plotting within the military 
is endemic, 
However, 
premature 
leaks invariably have led to im- 
prisonnent 
or exile 
for the con- 
Spirators. 
The chief of stafi 
of the army, 
General Gerard Con- 
Stant, 
is said to be prepared-- 
along with Colonel Jacques La 
Roche and Lt. Col. 
Roger St. Ale 
bins--to set up a junta in the 
event of Duvalier's disappear- 
ance, 
Of the three, 
La Roche 
is 
the strongest willed and presun- 
ably would be the dominant 
figure. 
He is reportedly unscrupulous and 
strongly anti-US. 
Constant 
is 
impatient and easily influenced. 
The only information available on 
St. Albins 
is that he is well 
liked by other officers. 
None of 
them 
is suspected of having Com- 
munist connections. 
The Communists 
Haiti's two Communist par- 
ties--the Party of Popular 
cord (PEP) and the Popular Party 
of National Liberation 
(PPLN)-- 
are small, 
lacking in discipiine, 
and poorly indoctrinated, 
Their 
Split stems from personal rivalry 
among the leaders, 
rather than 
any real ideological differences. 
There is no precise informa-~ 
tion on the number of PEP menoers 
Page 4 
SPECIAL REPORT 19 
Johnsen Libs 
youth fronts. 
and sympathizers; 
estimates 
place the membership at around 
200 and the number of fellow 
travelers between 300 and 1,000, 
The PEP is seexinyg adherents 
mainly 
in labor ranks, 
and 
formerly supported 
the Inter- 
syndical Union of Haiti (UIA). 
The UIH was disbanded by the 
regime 
in December 1963 because 
of its antigovernment propaganda, 
and now 
iS thought 
to ve operat- 
ing clandestinely as the Haitian 
Syndical Front 
(FSH). 
The PEP 
presentiy has no newspaper; 
how- 
ever, 
between 
1962 and 1964 
it 
published the clandestine monthly 
Voix du Peuple. 
The PEP is recognized by the 
international Communist movement 
aS the Haitian Communist party, 
it is Moscow oriented; 
the amount 
of financial assistance 
it receives 
from Moscow, 
if any, 
is unknown, 
but it is believed to be receiving 
soviet guidance via Mexico through 
a Haitian Communist exile, Gerard 
Pierre-Charles,. 
A recent estimate places 
the number of PPLN members at 
around 300, with perhaps 500 to 
1,000 sympathizers. 
Thesleader- 
Ship currently publishes no news- 
paper, 
but during 1962 and 1963 
it sought to win readers for a 
monthly called Haiti-Demain among 
the urban workers, pe@aSants, and 
the very small middle class. 
© 
The PPLN has concentrated 
on a succession of short-lived 
One of the most 
recent, 
taking its name from a 
type of peasant attire, 
was called 
the Caracoa Bleu. 
Organized 
around the end of 1962, 
it report- 
ediy had about 400 members and an 
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additional 
500 or so sympathizers 
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who attended 
lectures, 
concerts, 
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and art exhibits which were used 
as vehicles 
for Communist 
propa- 
ganda. 
Caracoa Bleu became 
in- 
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active toward tae end of 1964 
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and is thought to have been re- 
: 
Organized early in 1965 under the 
name Popular Youth League (LJP), 
which continues 
to sponsor much 
the same type of activities. 
The PPLN suffered 
a setback 
. 
in July 1965, when the accidental 
shooting of a member during an 
arms training class enabled the 
police to discover its meeting 
place and arrest several members 
-~including somé who possessed 
extensive knowledge of party or- 
ganization and activities. 
There 
were follow-up arrests and severai 
| 
party leaders hurriedly left the 
country. 
No direct contact between 
Moscow and the PPLN has been de- 
tected. 
It is Castro-oriented 
and receives ideological guidance 
from Radio Havana, 
which beams 
one program in French and another 
in Creole, 
| 
Over the past few years, 
there have been unsuccessful 
at- 
tempts to unite the PEP and PPLN 
in something to be called the 
United Democratic Front. (FDU). 
Radio Havana treats the FDU as 
if it were an organized party 
and has called on all "patriotic 
Haitians" to join it to overthrow 
Duvalier. 
host of the exiled Haitian 
Communists are 
in Europe, 
or 
Mexica, 
The largest group is in 
France, 
where thore 
is an organiza- 
40 are 
in \iexico, 
where they re- 
portedly publish a bulletin called 
Raliiement which is also circu- 
lated 
in Europe. 
‘In addition, 
there are probably 40 to 50 Come. 
munsist exiles’ studying 
in bloc 
countries and in Cuba. 
The Non-Communist Opposition 
Most of the non-Communist 
Haitian exile opposition 
is lo- 
cated 
in New York and Miawi, 
with 
sualler groups scattered around 
the Caribbean 
in Venezuela, Puerto 
Kico, 
the Dominican Republic, 
and 
perhaps 
in the Bahamas, 
Cther 
large groups of uneducated Haitian 
workers 
in the Dominican Republic, 
Cuba, 
and the Bahamas are not 
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active politically. 
Of those with political pre- 
tensions, 
about 
ten leaders 
in 
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New York have grouped their in- 
dividual followings into the In- 
: 
ternational Haitian Union. 
It 
is presently active and sponsors 
a2 half-hour daily short-wave 
broadcast 
to Haiti in Creole 
over New York station WRUL, 
The 
program consists of music, news, 
and poetry, 
and carefully ‘avoids 
any direct reference to Duvalier 
or his regime. 
Nevertheless, 
Duvaiier has complained to the 
US Government that these broad- 
casts are inciting 
the Haitian. 
population to revolt. 
There are about 30 rela- 
. 
tively well-trained Haitians 
in 
the Dominican Republic, 
under 
the command of Fred Baptiste, who 
aye 
led them in incursions across 
| feet 
the vorder in 1963 and 1964, 
They operated an arms repair 
center for the rebel Caamano gov- 
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tion of approximately 
i150. 
About 
ernment during the Dominican 
Page 9 
SPECI A! 
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SHORAL. 
rebellion. 
Baptiste and several 
other Haitians reportedly have 
left for France, 
appareatly be- 
_ Cause they are pessimistic about 
being able to launch anything 
against Duvalier under 
the Do- 
minican. provisional government. 
‘They may plan to join other ex- 
iles in the Western Hemisphere. 
Haiti After Duvalier 
There 
is almost certain 
to 
be a complete breakdown 
of the 
government 
and extensive disordor 
when Duvalier leaves the scene, 
For eight years "Papa Doc" has 
Silenced all political dialogue; 
executed or exiled all potential 
Opposition; 
played on racial an- 
tipathies; 
allowed the economy 
to stagnate; 
permitted quasi- 
military terrorist organizations 
to exercise almost unbridled au- 
thority over the popuiace; 
and 
made no provision for a legal, 
orderly transfer of power. 
The 
way in which Duvalier goes--as 
well as the ability of his would- 
be successors 
to consolidate taeir 
control--will determine the ox- 
tent of the turmoil. 
: 
Duvalier's sudden death froma 
natural causes probably would 
occasion the least public disor- 
der, assuming that news of his 
demise could be withheld long 
enough to permit one or more of 
his entourage to consolidate con- 
trol over 
the militia, military, 
and internal security forces be- 
fore they fell upon one another, 
If Duvalier were mentally 
or physically incapacitated over 
no long period of time, 
his hench- 
men might be able to capitalize 
Page 6 
SPECIAL REPORT 
act by striking out at the 
on their positions within 
the 
: 
palace to supplaut 
the ailing 
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dictator. 
The length of tine 
which Duvalier was. unable 
to function 
or the choice of a 
successor remained unclear would 
determine 
the extent 
of dislocation 
witnin 
the administrative 
bureauc- 
racy. 
A coup could also limit the 
amount 
of attendant bloodshed, 
The assunuption of power by a 
person 
vor group closely identi- 
fied with Duvalier would cause 
less dismay to his rank-and-f 
le 
Supporters. 
Those most closely 
associated with the excesses and 
vprutality of the Duvalier regime 
~-ifor example, 
the militia and 
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the Ton Ton Macoutes--would 
robably go along with it on 
the assumption that there would 
be no wholesale reprisals against 
them. 
If however, 
the coup should 
bring to power someone not in 
sympathy with Duvalier, 
the situa- 
tion would probably be radically 
different. 
The militia and Ton 
Ton Macoutes probably would re- 
10 Dec 65 
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lohg-suffering white aad mulatto 
population 
of Port-au-Prince out 
of fear that these groups would 
Seek 
to exact revenge 
for. their 
mistreatment 
under Duvalier, 
A public assassination. 
of 
Duvalier would be likely to occa- 
‘sion 
a reign of terror, 
probably 
limited to the capital but pos- 
Sibly extending to the rurai areas. 
Members 
of Duvalier's entourage 
and the Haitian military wouid cn- 
joy less of an advantage 
in such 
a situation, 
although they would 
still have access 
to arms and muni- 
tions stored 
in the capital. 
Pub- 
lic disorder would be a major prob- 
lem. 
The militia and Ton Ton 
Macoutes probably would go on 
a 
rampage 
in Port-au-Prince, 
both 
to seize what they could 
in the 
way ff booty and to attempt 
to get 
the jump on what would likely be 
a vendetta against them. 
Moreover, 
the deliberate racist policies of 
Luvalier--setting up the majority 
blacks against the minority elite 
of whites and mulattoes--would 
probably result 
in bloody racial 
turmoil, 
with the blacks scekins 
vengeance and the whiteg and mulat- 
toes fighting for their lives. 
Either or both of Haiti's 
Communist parties will try to 
capitalize on the uncertainty and 
turmoil, 
Concentrated in Port- 
au-Prince, 
where the expected 
power struggle and public disor- 
der would be centered, 
the Com- 
munists could only hope to improve 
their fortunes during any vacuun 
in national leadership and would 
probably seek to prolong the choice 
vf a successor to Duvalier, 
pos- 
sibly to make a stab at seizing 
tremely heavy guard, (SSek2T™s 
the top office themselves, 
To 
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Page 7 
SPECIAL 
seize 
a pre-eminent position, 
how- 
ever, 
the Communists would require 
tne effective support of the mili- 
‘tary, 
and probably the Ton Ton . 
“acoutes and-the militia. 
There 
is no indication that they could 
garner such support. 
any attempt 
by the various 
exiles 
to establish one of their 
number 
in power would. be handi- 
capped by the same divisiveness 
and lack of effective leadership 
that 
has hindered emigré activi- 
ties 
in exile. 
With the possible 
exception of former président 
Magloire, 
the exiles have 
aimost no following within Haiti. 
It seems unlikely that any exile 
or group of exiles would be able 
to seize power without substantial 
foreign support. 
Pat 
Prospects 
Barring a totally unfore- 
seen development, 
there 
is no 
indication that Duvalier will 
voluntarily leave the scene 
in 
the immediate future. 
He is a 
diabetic and suffered a serious 
heart attack in 1959, but ‘a 
US doctor who talked with him 
within the last six months found 
him in excellent health for his 
age and medical history. 
The possibility of assassi- 
nation, 
however, 
cannot 
be over- 
- 
looked, 
even though there have 
( 
been no known threats 
in recent 
years. 
Duvalier ventures out 
of the heavily fortified palace 
only rarely and then under ex- 
Dec 
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CONTENTS 
A. With Duvalier Continuing in Power 
B. In the Event of Duvalier’s Departure ........ 
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SITUATION AND PROSPECTS 
IN HAIT! 
THE PROBLEM 
- To estimate the situation and outlook in Haiti over the next year or 
so, and to consider what might happen in the event of President 
— 
Duvalier’s death or overthrow. 
CONCLUSIONS 
A. Duvalier’s position sti!]l seems fairly strong, despite the sporadic 
plotting and political tension nornna! in Haitian affairs. 
We think 
the chances are better than even that he will remain in power during 
the period of this estimate. 
If he does, there will be continuing politi- 
sal 
repression and economic stagnation or decline. 
B. Duvalier’s. overthrow wou!d probably have to be largely an 
inside job, with some key members of the security forces—and espe- 
cially the Presidential Guard—participating. 
We doubt that any 
now in a position to organize such a coup has the will or the courage 
to attempt it. ! None of the many smal! groupings among the divided, 
bickering Haitian exiles could succeed in overthrowing Duvalier with- 
— out decisive help from the US or some other foreign government. 
The 
Haitian dictator might, of course, die suddenly of natural causes, 
though he is only 59 and in reasonably good health; assassination is also 
a possibility, though he takes unusual precautions. 
C. Duvalier’s departure would probably be attended by some acts 
of violence in Port-au-Prince anc other towns. 
Whether this violence 
was limited and sporadic or became widespread and intensive would 
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depend in large part on the manner of his going. 
The danger of 
widespread hostilities would probably be greatest in the event Du- 
valier were assassinated in public. 
A coup attempt that failed at the 
last minute could produce equally nasty results. 
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D. The most likely successor to Duvalier would be a inilitary junta 
which might or might not choose to exercise power behind a civilian 
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Initially at least, such a government would probably not be 
stable, and there would likely be maneuvering for power among its 
members. 
E. The two Communist parties are too sma!! and weak to be abie 
to contend for power even in a disorderly situation following Duvalier’s 
departure. 
We doubt that outside Communist support—from Castro, 
the Soviets, or Haitian Communist exileg—would be forthcoming on a 
significant scale. We believe that the Haitian Communists themselves 
would see their best chance of gaining influence as coming through 
offers of their administrative assistance to new government leadership 
rather than through any attempt to seize power on their own, and we 
think they would act accordingly. 
F. 
In a situation where order had completely broken down, the 
Organization of American States (OAS) would almost certainly ac- 
quiesce in action by the US to evacuate foreign nationals. 
Any pro-. 
posal for US or OAS intervention to restore order and establish an 
effective government, however, would encounter strong opposition 
within the OAS. 
Any contention that such intervention was necessary 
in order to forestall 
a Communist takeover would be disbelieved by 
many OAS members unless the supporting evidence was incontro- 
vertible. 
Whatever.the purpose for intervening, the US would face 
considerable criticism internationally. 
G. The initial Haitian reaction to the landing of a US force would 
probably be favorable, but if a military occupation were at all pro- 
longed, opposition would develop. 
Nev ertheless, the problems in 
Haiti are such that it might prove more ciMicult to get a force out than 
to put it in, as was the case in 1915. 
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BACKGROUND 
1, Haiti is the most backward country in the Western Hemisphere and one 
of the most backward in the world.' 
Its resources are poor in quality and under- 
utilized; population pressure is heavy.” Perhaps 10 percent of the people are 
literate in French; the rest are illiterate and speak Creole, a local dialect. 
Most 
Haitians are s.perstitious as well as uneducated; voodou beliefs are more 
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influential than the country’s nominal Catholicism, 
Standards of health and 
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sanitation, though somewhat improved with foreign aid, are still abysnally low. 
Malnutrition is the rule, not the exception; malaria, tuberculosis, typhoid, para- 
sitic infestation, tetanus, and syphilis are widespread. 
The bulk of the popula- 
tion, which subsists by farming small plots of depleted land in the countryside, 
is politically apathetic. 
2, Ever since Haiti became independent (1504), antagonism between mulat- 
toes and blacks has been the most sensitive factor in Haitian politics. The 
mulatto elite were very few in number; but, because of their virtual monopoly 
of education, their services were indispensable in the administration of the 
government and, as a class, they were able to exercise effective contro! through 
behind the scenes manipulations, even after it became normal for the President 
to be black. 
3. Haiti has never developed an effective electoral process. 
Political power 
has always been acquired and held by military force, overt or lucent. 
Since 
Haitian Presidents have seldom, if ever, retired voluntarily, a de facto system 
developed whereby a military junta would depose each President at the end of 
his constitutional term. 
His successor would then be selected in back room 
consultations and -this selection would be formalized by duly constitutional 
processes. 
In 1957, however, this system broke down because each of the 
several black leaders who thought himself in line for the Presidency refused to be 
passed over. 
After a period of turmoil anc instability, the army conducted 
an election which brought Dr. Francois Duvalier to the Presidency for a six- 
year term. 
4. There is little doubt that the election was rigged, but Duvalier probably 
did have at least the passive acceptance of the majority of the peasantry. 
More- 
over he had the enthusiastic support of most of the black elite, who saw his 
election as a revolution against mulatto domination. 
This meant, however, that 
* Statistics concerning Haiti should consequently be treated with reserve; those used in 
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this paper, though the best available, are approximations. 
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*The population in 1963 was about 4.6 inillion—or some 430 per square mile, 
Except for 
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Moreover, 
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is higher than 1,000 per square mile of cu’tiveted land or posture. 
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some among the mulattoes immediately began to conspire with the disappointed 
black leaders to unseat him. 
His position was precarious for a time, and it was 
partly in reaction to this threat that he took the first steps to transform his regime 
or forced into exile every actual or suspected opponent, mulatto or black. 
Ex- 
tolling négritude and representing himself as the protector of the black masses 
against mulatto domination and exploitation, he has deliberately intensified 
racism in Haiti. 
ll. THE PRESENT SITUATION 
A. Methods of Rule 
5. Duvalier, realizing from the outset that the military establishment was the 
key to power, proceeded to bring it under contro! by purging many of its most 
capable officers and by building up two counter forces—a civil militia and a 
special sort of secret police. The latter, called the Ton Ton Macoutes (Creole 
for “bogeymen”), serve as Duvalier’s enforcers and informers. 
To ensure that 
the military behave, Duvalier severely restricts their supplies of ammunition and 
their access to heavy arms, keeping the bulk of i in the cellar of the Na- 
tional Palace, 
6. President Duvalier has not hesitated to solidify his contro! by taking ad- 
vantage of popular superstitions, 
He has won the support of leading voodoo 
priests, and has encouraged the belief—held by many in Haiti—that he himself 
has supernatural powers. 
7. The President has made himself both the source of power and the chief 
administrator of the regime. 
He delegates responsibility only for minor decisions, 
but makes it worthwhile for a favored group of government officials and businers- 
men to cooperate in carrying out his dictates. 
Theso “insiders” are not a savory 
lot in any case; a few of them have connections with the Communists. 
Even 
for a country which has seldom known honesty in government, Duvalier has set 
new records of venality and corruption. 
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8. In 1961 Duvalier staged elections for a new national legislature, providing 
his “National Unity Party” a near monopoly of seats. 
Subsequently he announced 
that since every ballot had carried the caption, “Francois Duvalier, President of 
the Republic,” he had been unanimously elected to a second six-year term. 
In 
April 1963, near the end of his constitutional term, he easily broke up the 
customary military plot to oust him. 
Also in 1963 he managed to overcome 
several minor invasion attempts by Haitian exiles. 
In 1964, at the age of 57, 
he proclaimed himself President for life.* 
9. In recent months Duvalier, apparently hoping to encourage a renewal of 
sizable US economic aid, has made a few gestures to give his regime a better 
* Life tenure was customary during the first 65 years of Haitian independence, but fell 
into disuse when the last previous President for life faced a fring squud iu 1569, 
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In the course of time he has eliminated 
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image. He has otdered Ton Ton Macoute leaders to be less arbitrary and more 
circumspect, and, according to several sources, he has hinted that he might be 
willing to give up his life tenure and to hold elections. 
It is highly unlikely, 
however, that he waquid make any change that would impair his control of the 
government. 
B. The Opposition 
10. Among the few peuple in Haiti who are politically minded, there is still 
latent opposition to Duvalier and his methods of rule. 
But such opponents are 
cowed, nonvocal, and almost entirely unorganized. 
There are no longer any 
significant opposition parties; there is however, an underground social Christian 
movement called the Personulistes, and there are two weak Communist parties. 
ll. The Personalistes seem to have no strong organization as yet, but may 
have 100 or 200 adherents, most of them in Port-au-Prince. 
The two Communist 
parties—the Party of Popular Accord (PEP) and the Popular Party of National 
Liberation (PPLN)—constitute the only internal political opposition with any 
appreciable degree of training and organization, but lack discipline, are poorly 
incoctrinated, and are inclined to compete rather than cooperate with each 
other. The two parties may have as many as 500 members, all told, in Haiti 
and in exile, and perhaps 2,000 sympathizers, many of them abroad. 
The PEP 
is Moscow-oriented and is the generally recognized Haitian Communist Party. 
The PPLN has ties with Cuba, where some of its former leaders are in exile. 
Radio Havana, which broadcasts in Creole or French to Haiti two hours daily, 
has been unsuccessfully exhorting the two parties to unite and build strength 
for an “insurrection.” 
Most exiled Haitian Communists are in Europe or Mexico, 
the largest organization (about 150) being in Frar~e. 
There are, however, prob- 
ably 70 or 80 exiled Haitian Communists studying in Cuba, the Soviet Union, or 
other Communist countries. 
12. Most non-Communists forced into exile are now living in New York or 
Miami, with smaller groups in Canada, Venezuela, Pucrto Rico, and the Domini- 
can Republic. 
There are also considerable numbers of Haitian workers living 
in such countries as the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and the Baham.s, but these 
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people aré not politically active. The exiles’ activities have been constantly 
hampered by divisiveness, discord, and inability to agree on a common leadership. 
13. In the New York exile community 8 or 10 of the leaders have grouped 
their small individual followings into an organization called the Haiti Coalition. 
It sponsors a half-hour daily shortwave broadcast to Haiti in French and Creole, 
which sometimes attacks the excesses of the Duvalier regime, but generally 
refrains from inflammatory content. 
This program has apparently attracted 
a sizable audience in Haiti and has caused Duvalier to make repeated protests 
to the US. 
His panicky reaction to two smail exile incursions in 1964, which 
occupied the security forces for several weeks, also suggests that he regards 
the exiles with apprehension. Rumors of exile plans for a new “invasion” in 
April 1966 produced a characteristic overreaction by Duvalier in the form of 
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an order to execute summurily all Haitians caught returning to their country 
from the Bahamas, 
C. Security Forces 
l4. The regular Haitian Armed Forces (F’Ad’H) number about 5,000 men. 
All officers in key positions were handpicked by Duvalier. 
Originally a con- 
stubulary organized by the US Murines, the 
FAd’H performs coast guard, border 
patrol, immizration, civil aviation, fire and police, and general rural administra- 
tive services, in addition to its military duties. 
(There is no civil police force.) 
Ill equipped, poorly trained, and incompetently led, the FAd’H has still had 
reasonable success in keeping order, perhaps because it has not had to face up 
to any major challenge. 
On more than one occasion the FAd’H Chief of Staff, 
Brigadier General Gérard Constant, has secretly professed willingness to par- 
ticipate in a coup movement, but he seems a weak, plodding figure without the 
guts for risky action, 
15. The largest organization among Haitian security forces is the National 
Security Volunteers (VSN), a civil militia of about 7,000 created by Duvalier as 
a counterforce to the FAd’H. 
These are essentially weekend soldiers, adminis- 
tratively separate from the regular military, but called upon to assist in keeping 
order and in mobilizing popular support for Duvalier. 
Duvalier handpicked 
many of them; their loyalty is directly to him and not necessarily to higher 
ranking militia officers. 
The VSN is badiy trained and only about a third of 
its members have firearms, but even those armed only with machetes make a 
strong impression on the populace. 
16. Units of both the FAd’H and the VSN are stationed at the palace under 
Duvalier’s direct control. 
The FAd’H unit is the Presidential Guard consisting 
of some 400 men selected specifically for their loyalty. 
Their commander—at 
present Colonel Gracia Jacques, a tough, uneducated former mess sergeant— 
has primary responsibility for Duvalier’s safety and is thus in a highly strategic 
position. The VSN unit at the palace numbers 200-300 men—also carefully 
chosen. 
17. Most feared of all are the Ton Ton Macoutes. 
With no official title or 
- legal status, they function as “secret police” and may number as many as 1,500. 
Save for strong control at the top, theirs is not a cohesive organization. 
It is 
inexpensive for Duvalier to maintain, however, since its members obtain much 
of their compensation from shakedowns and extortion, 
Essentially the Ton Tons 
are thugs; some are members, as well, of the Armed Forces or the militia; a few 
are also voodoo priests. The Ton Ton Macoutes concentrate on acquiring in- 
formation on any internal opposition and on “special assignments”—e.g., murder, 
assault, and intimidation. 
Occasionally Duvalier has found it necessary to curb 
them temporarily; such restraint has never lasted long. The chief of the Ton 
Ton Macoutes, one Luc Desir, handles political interrogation, confinement, and 
- torture at the National Palace, and is noted for utter brutality and ruthlessness. 
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D. The Economy 
1S. The level of living in Haiti, long the lowest in the Western Hemisphere, 
has become still worse uncer the Duvalier regime. 
Per capita gross national 
product (CNP) decline? from about $90 in 1955 to about $70 in 1965. 
(The 
average for Latin America as a whole in 1965 was more than $590.) 
19. The waste of humun and material resources in Haiti stems from a long 
history of mismanagement and neglect.‘ 
The economic problems are too basic 
and severe tor any quick solution. 
Yet Duvalier, far from taking any construc- 
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tive measures to ameliorate them, has usuclly pursued policies with the opposite 
effect. 
Investment has been very low, averaging five percent or less of GNP 
annually—a rate probably inadequate to maintain the country’s existing stock 
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of capital. 
Duvalier’s behavior in relations with the US—and in particular, his 
blatant diversion of economic aid funds to his own use—caused the termination 
of most US aid in 1962-1963.* 
And the climate of insecurity and violence in 
Haiti has contributed to a sharp drop in tourism, once an important source of 
foreign exchange. 
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20. Haiti’s export earnings, which generate 10 to 12 percent of GNP, have 
gradually declined since 1962. 
Coffee produces about 50 percent of these earn- 
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ings; sugar and sisal, copper and bauxite, the bulk of the remainder. 
The de- 
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crease in export earnings, along with the curtailment of US aid and of incoine 
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from tourism, have caused a worsening of Haiti's foreign exchange position and 
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have forced a reduction of imports. 
This has had some immediate impact in- 
ternally since Haiti has to import all its capital equipment, all its petroleum 
products, anc. much of its industvial raw materials and cons:imer goods—includ- 
ing some basic foodstuffs. 
On 30 June 1966, the country’s suort-term foreign 
indebtedness exceeded its foreign exchange reserves by some $6 million. 
ill. THE OUTLOOK 
A. With Duvalier Continuing in Power 
21. Now 59 years old, Duvalier is in reasonably oe health. He appears 
in 
public places only infrequently and then under heavy guard. The cowed state 
of most internal opposition, continuing use of informants and enforcers, and the 
counterbalancing of security forces all serve to bolster his hold on power. 
Assas- 
sination is an ever-present possibility; he is certainly more hated than many 
‘Weather too has typically beea a difficult and complicating factor. 
The heavy rains in 
the wet season tend to leach and erode the soil, and the Haitians know and do little in the 
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way of conservation, 
Occasionally—as in 1965—there are droughts which seriously reduce 
agricultural output. Moreover Haiti is in the hurricane belt and was badly hit in 1963 and 
+o 
again in 1908. 
*US aid at present is limited to a malaria eradication program (US $2.2 million will be 
made available for this program in 1966) and a PL-tS0 Title Ill food-for-work program, 
involving US $1 million in commodities, administered by three American voluntary — 
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Lyndon taines Johnsen Libr 
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leaders of government, though harder to get at. 
The kind of attempt most 
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likely to succeed in killing or deposing him would be on. “avolving insiders—asso- 
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ciates of Duvalier whom he continued to trust; further = would probably ueed 
the partivipation or connivance of some Ggures in the s¢ cw ty forces, particularly 
in the Presidential Guard. 
We doubt that this sort of plo. or conspiracy is now 
in process of development. 
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22. This is not to say that we anticipate a peric 
tranquillity. 
As in the 
past few years, there will probably be plots and run ors of plots—some internal 
tu Elaiti, some involving exile groups. 
Duvalier will probably respond to certain 
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of these with shurp repressive measures. . 
Thus, while we iook for more of the 
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turmoil and tension which are normal in Haiti, we think these factors are not 
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likely to cause Duvalier’s downfall for some time to come. 
22. As long as Duvalier does remain in power, Haiti’s political, social, and 
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Duvalier 
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may, from time to time, make new attempts to clothe his ‘government in more 
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civilized garb, particularly when an economic pinch makes foreign aid icok 
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especially ‘desirable. 
But the underlying nature of his repressive, one-man dicta- 
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torship will almost certainly stay the same. 
He will continue to provide order 
and control to the Haitians—but not much else. 
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24. Economically, 1967 will be another year of stagnation or decline. 
Even 
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before the damage wrought by Hurricane Inez, it appeared that the coffve crop 
now being harvested would be below that of 1965-1966 and world market prices 
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for coffee, as well as for sugar and sisal, are not promising. 
These factors may 
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be offset somewhat by a current tendency toward an increase in tourism. 
To 
the extent that they are not, imports will have to be reduced, since Haiti’s foreign 
exchange and credit position will not permit a trade deficit of any significant 
size. 
<A lower level of trade in turn would reduce government revenues—custums 
duties being the source of approximately one-third of such revenues—and prob- 
ably force some cut in government expendituies. 
25. All this is likely to necessitate some further belt-tightening in Haiti and to 
prevent any improvement from present levels of unemployment and underem- 
ployment. 
Those living in Port-au-Prince and the other towns will probably be 
affected more than the great majority of Haitians in the countryside. 
Duvalier 
may find it more difficult than usual to pay government emplovees on time, but = * 
we believe that in one way or another he will find funds for the security forces. 
In sum, we believe that these economic conditions will produce further grumbling 
and disaffection, but that they are not likely in themselves to provide the impetus 
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for a coup. 
B. In the Event of Duvalier’s Departure ° 
26. Duvalier’s death, incapacitation, or overthrow probably W ould be attended 
by some acts of violence in Port-au-Prince and in the other sizable towns. 
*This section of the Wotimate is in response: to specific etn posed to us in connection 
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Whether the violence were limited and speradic or became wickeaprees and 
intensive would depend in large part on the manner of his going.’ 
27, The assassination of Duvalier in public would carry the greatest immediate’ 
danger of provoking a generally violent reaction. 
Even this probably would not 
lead to serious strife in the countryside, but it might cause fighting and blood- 
shed in the capital and other towns, 
Such violence might originate with people 
who have suffered at the hands of the VSN and the Ton Tun Mucoutes, and 
seek vengeance; or it might occur between elements of the FAd’'H, VSN, and 
Ton Ton Macoutes, 
It could conceivably lead to fighting between blacks and 
mulattoes, an unequal contest in which the mulattoes might be virtually wiped 
out. 
It could also endanger the 3,500 white foreigners, including some 1,380 
Americans, who reside in Haiti. 
2S. The likelihood of violence would be least if Duvalier died of natural 
causes in private, so that the key figures moving to take control might have 
time to decide on a provisional leadership before they announced the dictator's 
death. 
29. The makeup of a successor government would also depend to some cegree 
on the manner of Duvalier’s going, but it would depend still more on the rela- 
tive strengths of the contenders for power. 
Here individuals would be important 
as well as groups, and there is no way of knowing ahead of time how some 
of those in strategic positions might act when the showdown came. 
There are, 
however, certain observations which can be made with reasonable confidence 
about the possibilities for a successor government. 
"s 
30. Because all political individuals and groups have been so thoroughly re- 
pressed, or (if friendly) so sharply circumscribed by Duvalier, we think that 
an individual or combination from the security services is most likely to take 
the leading role in a successor regime. 
Duvalier’s system of countervailing 
forces in these services is keyed to his own command and probably could not 
long survive him. ‘If the Chief of Staff of the FAd’H were a stronger figure, 
the regular military would almost certainly take charge once again. They will 
probably be the strongest contender anyway. 
There are in the FAd’H some 
relatively shrewd and courageous figures who might come quickly to the top: 
e.g., Col. Daniel Beauvoir of the Army General Staff; Major Jose Borges, one 
of the army's few competent troop commanders, and perhaps Col. Jacques 
Laroche, the FAd’‘H Deputy Chief of Staff. 
Initially, however, a junta of several 
FAd'H officers would be more likely. The members of such a junta might find 
it necessary to take in some leaders of the VSN, and even of the Ton Ton 
Macoutes, although that would be distasteful to them. 
31. A security forces’ junta of this kind might include, as well, a few political 
figures who have attained a measure of prominence under the Duvalier adminis- 
"A particularly nasty situation might be created if a coup effort failed at the last moment. 
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und Duvalier carried out his frequent threat that he would respond by ordering those loyal 
to him to cut down any and all suspected opponents, 
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tration. 
Alternatively, a cabinet member or other administration official might 
be used as front mun for what would actually be a military government. 
32. None of these possible junta governments would be. stable from the outset. 
A struggle for power within the junta would almost certainly ensue. 
This could 
lead to open violence between the contending factions or to the emergence of 
a single dictator. 
33. The existing political parties of opposition—Personalistes on the one hand, 
Communists on the other—are simply too small and weak to compete for power 
even in a disorderly situation following Duvalier’s departure. 
The Communists’ 
best chance of gaining influence within a post-Duvalier regime would be in 
offering administrative assistance to whatever power yroup emerged on top. 
. Such assistance would be in short supply and urgently needed; offers of help 
would be likely to be accepted without too particular a security investigation. 
Thus the few capable Haitian Communists would have a chance to penetrate 
the Haitian bureaucracy and, from that point of vantage, to exercise influence 
and to build up their party organizations. We believe that the Hajjign Com- 
munists themselves would estimate their chances in this way and . 
pursue 
this course, rather than attempt to take over the government. 
34. We doubt that either of the Haitian Communist parties would receive 
much outside support for an attempt to seize power. 
The Soviets would prob- 
ably counsel PEP leaders to move cautiously and aim for a gradual accretion 
of political assets. 
Fidel Castro, whose connections are with the PPLN, would 
probably use Radio Havana broadcasts to exacerbate any political crisis, at the 
time of Duvalier’s removal or subsequently. 
He could put a smal! invasion 
force into Huiti,* but we think it unlikely that he would take this risk any more 
than he dared take a similar risk during the crisis in the Dominican Republic. 
He might assist the small number of Haitian political exiles now in Cuba and 
the Dominican Republic to return in hopes that they could instill new spirit 
among the Haitian Communists so that they might play a2 more decisive role 
at some future time. 
35. The exile groups generally are not likely to count for much in the im- 
mediate situation after Duvalier. 
We estimate that none now has the capa- 
bility—without foreign help—cither to overthrow him or to land a large enough 
force quickly after his downfall to determine the nature of the new government 
and the course of future events. 
What the exile groups can do, if there is no 
*Cuban air and naval forces have a theoretical capability to put more than 1,000 men 
into Haiti by sea, air, or airdrop in a few hours’ time. 
This ussumes no constraint by nee! 
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resupply or support of their force. 
Several thousand people of Haitian extraction live in 
Cuba, but we have no evidence that the Castro regime has tried to create any military or 
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restraint on their activities, is to complicate in many ways the already difficult 
task facing a new government.’ 
36. Because there is such an acute lack of administrative and technical talent 
among Haitians, in Haiti or in exile, there is scant likelihood that the government 
which succeeds Duvalier will be much better than the present one. 
Liberal 
parliamentary institutions have never been able to survive in Haiti; Duvalier's 
successors are not likely to have either the will or the ability to establish such 
a regime in that country. 
They will do well to establish an orderly and effective 
administration by the authoritarian methods that are customary there. 
It is 
conceivable, however, that a more respectable regime than Duvalier’s could 
be set up. 
37. Given Haiti’s limited ability to absorb capital and forvign technology, 
economic and social development would probably remain minimal, Any new 
regime would probably continue to view Haiti's needs for foreign assistance 
primarily in terms of financial support for the administration and would resist 
reforms that would undermine its politica! control. 
Nonetheless, the YS might 
gain some leverage over the situation simply by being able to deal with a new 
group which wou!d be seeking US financial aid and political backing. 
38. If the situation following Duvalier’s departure became so disorderly as 
to require military action to protect and evacuate foreign nationals, the Organiza- 
tion of American States (OAS) wou!d almost certainly acquiesce in such action 
by the US. 
Even those OAS members generally opposed to intervention are 
likely to go along, recognizing that Haiti is a special case. 
It would be re- 
membered, however, that the US military intervention in Haiti in 1915, for the 
stated purpose of protecting ‘ves and property, turned into an 18-year military 
occupation. Any proposal for US or OAS intervention to restore order and estab- 
lish an effective government would encounter strong opposition within the OAS. 
Any contention that such intervention was necessary in order to forestall a Com- 
munist takeover would be disbelieved by many OAS members unless the support- 
ing evidence was incontrovertible.’ 
39. In the circumstances postulated, the Haitian townspeople generally would 
probably welcome a US: military intervention with intense relief, as was the 
case in 1915, expecting it to reestablish order and security for themselves. 
If 
* Although the administrative services of returning exiles would be useful to a successor 
regime, they would be likely to cause trouble, as a group, by their pretensions to political 
or military leadership and their demands for the restoration of expropriated or abandoned 
property. 
Some could cause international complications. 
One group led by Cuban exile 
Masferrer wants to use Haiti as a base for operations against Cuba. 
Another group seeking 
association with Dominican “constitutionalists” in Paris might be disposed to assist them in 
operations from Haiti against 
Dominican 
threut as 
Thus the Dominican 
would be likely to press privately 
for the landiny of a US force in Haiti, and to seek US assurances, as well as more military aid 
Lyndon Raines 
1] 
y 
Johnaon 
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protracted] perind of disorder and confusion in Haiti. 
Elements among the military and on 
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a military occupation were at all prolonged, however, opposition to it would 
develop. 
Whatever Haitians came to power in such circumstances would be 
bitterly denounced by all the disappointed aspirants for office. A continuing 
US military presence might be required to’ sustain the new regime. As in 
1915, it would be easier to get into Huiti than to get out. 
40. These reactions would be generally Jimited to the towns and their im- 
mediate environs. 
The remoter peasants would almost certainly remain inert 
unless and until something happened to affect them directly and adversely. 
41, Much of the international reaction to a landing of US forces in Haiti— 
whatever the reason given—would probably be adverse, particularly that of 
countries with neutralist or leftist governments. 
Even a brief US intervention 
to evacuate foreign nationals might face criticism on two counts. 
First it would 
be called a new “imperialist” move, a violation of the Charter of the OAS, and 
an unjustified interference in the affairs of a small nation. 
And second, if the 
force departed quickly when the foreigners were out and the Haitians then 
went back to chopping at each other, the US would be criticized for saving the 
whites and not caring what happened to the Negroes. 
cory 
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“eines Jobason Libriure 
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SANTTITD COPY 
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY 
¢ PRIORITY 
Intelligence Information Cable 
137206 
we 
PAGE 1 OF } PAGES 
STATE/INR 
DIA 
ARMY 
NAVY 
AIR 
JCS 
SECOEF 
NSA 
NIC 
AID 
USIA 
$00 
ONE 
OCR 
ORR 
OCS 
CGS 
CIA/NMCC 
DO/ 
EXO 
D/OCI 
FBI 
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE, 
-" 
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CITE TOCS -314/14439-66 
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ey 2 
Dist 
11 NOVEMBER 1266 
Do! 
10 NOVEMBER 1966 
Kin, 
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sussectT 
SITUATION IN CAPE HAITIEN 
1, 
THE SITUATION IN CAPE HAITIEN IS TENSE, 
THE MILITIA HAS 
BEEN CONFINED TO THE CITY BECAUSE IT IS UNDFR SUSPICION, 
THE 
. 
AUTHORITIES IN CAPE HAITIEN SUSPECT EVERYONE OF REBEL ACTIVITY, 
2. \ 
COMMENT: THIS MAY INDICATE THAT THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
ARE MORE NERVOUS THAN USUAL DUE TO THE RECENT CIRCULATION OF RUMORS, 
THE TENSION IS PROBABLY ONLY A FURTHER INDICATION OF UNREST AND OF 
THE GOVERNMENT'S ALERTNESS TO POSSIBLE TROUBLE.) 
a= 
3, FIELD DISSIM: STATE, ARMY, CINCLANT, CINCSO, 
Con'o-t UMCLASSIFIE! 
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COPY 
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14 June 1968 
ae J 
SUBJECT: 
MASFERRER (ROJAS), Rolendo Arcedio aka 
Rolend Rohas 
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A covert*national agency name check was conducted on subject 
in January 1950 but his services have never been utilized by the 
ae 
Agency. 
6ubject, born about 1916 in Havana, Cuba, is a former 
: 
. 
Cuban Senator and Cuban Communist Party member from 1933 until 1945 
when he wes expelled from the Cuban CP. 
He is an enemy of CASTRO 
and was described as a former “goon Squad commander for BATISTA's private 
— 
Nest 
army". 
He has been @ political refugee since Jenusry 1959. 
His files 
|. 
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eae 
contain numerous FBI reporte regarding his ectivities as head of an 
.% 
anti-CASTRO organization know as Milicias Anticonmunistes Obreras y 
© 
Compesinas (MROC) and hie attempt to invade Cuba in 1960. 
This matter 
ves inveetigated by the FR 
Latest information in hie file 
deted February 
concerns 
| a 
consideration by the Internal Gecurity Division, Department of Justioe,. 
~ 
to prosecute Subject end certain of his followers es co-conspirators. 
aa 
He and 73 of his followers had been areested at Cocos Plum Beach near 
Marathon, Florida while preparing to leave for an invasion of 
Outcame of 
case is not reflected jin his fille. 
a 
 Bubfject had eseerted that his plotting hed been approved by the 
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U. 8. Government. 
On some occasions Subject claimed approval Ly CIA 
ee ae 
and at other times intimated approval came from the FBI. 
Unfavorable 
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publicity and compromise of Agency and sources and personnel were matters 
a - 
being considered if the criminal charges agéinst Subject were pressed 
Riis 
in court and the Agency was forced to document its denial of involvement. 
. 
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19 February 1969 
ee 
ni 
Subsequent to the date of reference (1) memo, Rolando MASFERRER and 
his follewers were arrested nesr Marathon, Florida while preparing to leave 
! 
for an invasion of Haiti. 
MASFERRER had asserted on numerous occasions that 
his plotting had been approved by the U. S&S. Go vernment.f/ 
ix 
SRS/OS 
Atts. 
Refs. 
MEMORAND 
n/RECORD: 
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8 October 1976 
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Yirector of Securit 
‘ 
an 
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b. 
Rolando Masferrer Rojas--Covert.(36 859)_ 
pk 
and overt _(352 772) security files were located 
regarding Rolando Arcadio Masferrer (Rojas), aka: 
" 
Roland Rojas Masferrer, a Cuban citizen born 
‘ 
12 January 1918 in Holguin, 
Cuba. 
Although 
limited national agency checks were conducted on 
, 
Subject in January 1950, there is no indication 
that Masferrer was ever utilized by the Agency. 
He is 2 former Cuban senator and Cuban Communist 
Party member (expelled in 1945), a former com- 
mander -for Batista's private army, and firmly 
anti-Castro. 
The two files contain numerous FBI 
reports regarding his activities 
in connection 
with an attempt to invade Cuba in 1960 and a 
subsequent effort to invade Haiti in 1967. 
‘ 
Masferrer and 75 of his followers were arrested 
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in January 1967 in Marathon, Florida, while 
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preparing for the invasion of Haiti. 
pe 
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Masferrer claimed that his Haiti invasion 
lot was appreved by the U. S. Government 
(varying 
‘between the CIA and the FBI as the approving 
agency). 
While the CIA approval claim was untrue, 
_ Agency concern, at the time, centered around the 
- 
possibility 
of unfavorable publicity and the 
compromise 
of sources and methods if the Agency 
was forced “to disprove Masferrer's charges in 
court. 
A handwritten note in Nasferrer's file 
revealed that he died in 1975 when his car was 
apart by a bomb in Florida, 
No .further 
details regarding his death were contained in 
his subject files. 
Since Masferrer has never 
. 
been affiliated with the Agency, despite his 
Claims, it is, helieved that Dade County officials 
should be referred to the FBI for information 
regarding Masferrer. 
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