UNCLASSIFIER 7 Ngsc BO | COPY NO.2i A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL =~ Cro psreas - _- =a ame HE CecCHeTAxIS AF § A2z AND CEPSNS cary on TUS cue rm More Tesiem oi mies we et ele sas —s ve aA ~ Mere LATey TAs test wena NATICN AD. Crt) lee LIDS LI SENT 7. ae «4 sm a hs 3) 124° Raiiety Getkesitea el 32,1987 WASHINGTON a isteee raviriens cf 29 UNG F ieee Meee Lee
July 1, 1949 ress NCTS BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY to the NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL on THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND NATIONAL CRGANIZATION FCR INPELLICENCE mererences: 4. NSC Action No. 202 B. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretery, subject, dated Januery 24, Merch 2, Mar and April 4, 1949, respectively. 4t its 37th meeting the Neticneal Security Council considered the report oy the Dulles-Jackson-Correae Survey Group on the subject and comments with respect thereto (Reference B) end vo the Secretaries of Stete and Defense to prepare, with the Secretery of the Treasury end the Attorney he light of the discussion at that Council meet endations for Council action. (Reference A) - uv mm rererred ther in consultetion The enclosed revort by the Secretertes of State end Defense the subject prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 202 in consultet with the Departments of the Treasury end Justice, is submitted h with for consideration by the Nationel Security Cceuncil et its n meeting of the recommendations centéined therein. The Attorney General is being i wited to perticipets in the Council'ts sonsideretion of this report. The Secretary of Defense expressed the view that, upon epor the recommendations should be put into effect at once and the Co should plén to have < suitabie review of the progress mace efter reasonaple period cr implementation. Tt is reauested that this report ce handied with speciai security orecautions, Distributicr: SIDNEY W. SGUERS The President Executive Secretary The Secretary cf Stete The Secretery of the Treasury The Secretery of Derense The Attorney; Generel - The Secretery or tne Arny The Sécretery of the Nevy The Secretary cf the Air Ferce The Cheirmen, Netionel Security Resources 5ceare Generel, and in specific recon-
s° 2 ec cory f isd SES RET Bie adecdf ECS: vee ~ COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE REPORT OF THE DULLES-JACKSON-CORREA COMMITTEES PREPARED ‘BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND SECRETARY CF DEFENSE The Report on "The Central Intelligence Agency and National Orgenization for Intelligence" includes 57 individual conclusions and recommencetions which we neve regrouped in order to facilitate Council consideration. Although some of the conclusions co not recuire Council action, we wish to bring them to the Councii's attention with cur comments. Other conclusions é4nd recommendations call for concurrence or non-concurrence by the Council and appro- priate implementing action. 1. LEFISLATIVE PROVISIONS GOVERNING CIA AND ITS POSITION NDER THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL. &. Summary or the Report. The Survey Gronp retort concludes that; (1) Sect on 102 of the Naticnal Security Act of 1947 which sets up CIA is sound and that no amendments ere neces- sary et this time; (2) CIA 4s properly placed under the National Sécurity Council, but that its Director should establish cioser liaison with the two members of the Councii on whem the Agency chiefly devends, namely, the Secretaries of State and Detense. OD. Comments. hy ae < a = Taw se sonclusions anc récommencations @ ct We concur in which do not require specific Councii action or 2utnorizetion. it
RULMOAE LL: snould pe notec, nNowever, that the National Military =stablisnrent anc CIA are presently studying the wartime status and responsi- cilities of CIs and that recommendations may be presented at 2 later date on this subject. It may be determined thet certein funcvions and responsibilities should be under the control of the miiitery in time of ver. Cc. Recommended Action. Thet the Netionel Security Council concur in the Survey Group conclusions on this subject, with the understendins thet study may determine thet certain functions and responsiniitities shouic be under the control of the military in time of war. 2. THE COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. . @. Summary of the Revort. The Report conciudes that: (1) The responsibility of CIA with respect to the coordination of intelligence activities nas not teen fully dis- charged; (2) The Intelligence Advisory Committee is soundly conceived 2s @n advisory body, put shoulic, under the forth- right initiative and leadersrip of the Director of Central Intelli- gence, participate more activeiy in the continuing coordination of intelligence activities and in the discussicn énd enprovel of in- veliigence estimates. o. Comments. we concur in wne cpservetions end conclusions of thre Revert on this general subject. We selieve that the objectives UNOLASSIFIE!.
UNGLASSE ILD A cught for can be achieved sy the recognition and implementation ci n tnese principles and by the organizational and operational imorcve- ments recommended elsewhere in the Renert. In accordance with these principles and as partial implementation thereof, we reccommend certain amendments to Nationsi Security Ccuncii Intelligence Directive No. 1, es indicated in Annex "A", appended hereto. These amendments vyoulc (1) define the Status of the Director of Central Intelligence as @ memoer of the intelligence Advisory Committee end (2) cleriry the procecure whereoy dissents are included in coordineted intelligence estimates. c. Recommended Acticn. That the Nationel Security Councii (1) concur in the conclusions end recommendations stated under pera. 2 2 above as é stetement of principles to be followed by the Sirector of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Committee; (2) amend Nationél Security Council Intelligence Directive Neo. 1 in accordance with the changes \roposed in Amnex "A" appended nereto. 3. MEMBERSHIP OF THE INTELLIGENCE ACVESORY COMMITTEE. é. Summery of Report. The Report recommends thet the Federel Bureéu of Ac- Tnvestigeation te added to the membership of the Intelligence ~~ t fy ray {iD ct oO HL Q J ¥, re) 0 ad visory Committee and that the Joint Starr (Jc Commission be dropped Prom membership. oO. Comments. we concur in the ctroposal thet the Sedsrel Bureau
UNCEASSHED Advisory Committee, put dc not agree that the Joint Steff (JCS) end Atomic Energy Commission ce dropped from membership. A surficient roolems arise which are of joint concern to foreign ie) oO i} fe) ba) 'D membership on tne IAC of the FBI in order that coordination and ccoreration in the néticnel interest may be achieved. We also wish to point out thet the Recommended Action uncer pera. 2c above would, if epproved, have the erfect of clar fying the status of the Director of Central Intelligence és a member >) ht ct w oO Hi go ct oO } ligence Advisory Committee Cc. Recommended Action. That the Netional Security Council (i) invite the “Attorney Generel to have the Federal Bureau of Investigation become @ member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee; (2) if this invite- tion *“.s accepted, amend Netional Security Council Direestive No. 1 tla tt ordingl: , as previded in Annex "A" aptrended heretc. 4, PARTICULAR INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS REQUIRING COORDINATION OR ATTENTION. a, Summery of the Revort. rougnout the Conclusions and Recommendations cf tre Survey Group Révort, ettention ts drewn anweis - ~aT34 ~ (1) Scientific Intelligence. ~ Tv Roa => ” wes q = al (2) Domestic Intelligence end ccunter-intelli- = ass - -~— s a ~ oe Bence insolrear 23 they reil2te tc the national security. Wn QO [= Comes es cf a
(3) Provisions for premrt coordcinsted intelli- gence estimates in crisis situations. ct = fe) ry @) iy ty (4) n ‘SS fe) +8] a - o’ {+ ht io ct <e{ Irty fe) ty (4) Phe proper ellocei (6) The coordination of covert intellicence activities in occupied sreas. (7) Coordination of the Nendling of defectors. (8) Increased emphasis on the counter-espionegs activities abroad of the Central Intelligence Azency and closer liaison for counter-espionage matters with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. b. Comments. We concur in these conclusions 2nd comments 2s inter- pretei actove and point out that recent progress nas teen mede in jo somé of these fields. For example, thet of scientific intelli gence aQ through the creation of the Office of Scientifi Intelligence, cy en agreement on 2 procedure fcr providing prompt cocrdineted neticne? intelligence estimates in crisis situeticns, and sy an agreement under considerstion by the IAC egencies and the FSI with respect ts the exploitetion of defectors and other aliens. For the purpose of clarity end suidence: Paregrapn 4 a (2) is considered to refer to the coordins- : > —-—_t Sm = eye unterintésilizgence with 3 Ors fe) = Fa) Gee 7 ct } oO is} co) It mr Oo ty «D I~ 0Q ’ ' - a} ct ce) I~ }-4 jo 0a fe) 3 ?) 6) 5 Qu te
UNCLASSIFIED Gomestic inteiligence and domestic counterintellizgence for the purpose of correlating and éevalueting intellizence relating to nétional security ‘Yd @rasraph + 2 (3) ts considered to refsr to provision for prempt coordineted national intelligence estimates in crisis situa ticns. Peregraph 4 a (5) 1s considered to refer to the exploits- ticn of foreign natlonelity grcuvs and foreisn individuels in the United States for the purposes of foreign intellizgsnce. We anticipate thet the addition cf the Federal Bureau of Investigation to the membership of the Intelligence Advisory Com- B. ttee will contribute particularly to the cojectives under points (2), (3), (5) and (7) above. With respect to paregraph 4 2 (8) above, we telieve the maintenance of close liaison for these pur- voses is essential. c. Recommended Action. That the National Security Council: (1) Draw the perticular ettenticn of the Di-~ rector of Central Intelligence end Intelligence Advisory Committee to the need for early and sustained action for mcre effective co- ordination in the fields listed uncer pare. 4 2 ezove as discussed in the Survey Group Report; (2) Request the Director of Central Intellii- gence to supmit to the Council within 2 pericd of six months 2 re- these matters. ‘Jd Oo rs ‘J ry oO 0Q ty 0) n n }> $3 (3) Invite the Attorney Generel to have the
Federal Bureéu of Investigetion vecome 2 member of the Inteliligencs Advisory Committee. (4) If this invitation is accepted, amend Mational Security Council Directive No, 1 accordingly, as previced in 4nnex “A" appended hereto. (5) Mote thet nothing contained in NSCID1, as amended, is intended to affect or change NSC 17/4, approved by the President on Merch 23, 194 and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 1s e member cof the Intelligence tcdvisory Committee for the purpese of coordinating domestic intelligence end related matters with foreign intelligence matters and nis relations with the CIA shall be 2s provided in Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947. 5. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES. a. Summery of the Report. The report conclucées thet in CIA there has been ¢< confusion between the respcnsibdility for vroducing coordinated national intelligence estimates anc the responsipility for miscel- lanecus research and reporting. It finds further thet the Councii's Intelligence Directives on this subject are sound, put have not deen effectively carried out. It recommends, esicde from organizational changes described in the follewing section, that CIA should draw (41) "cS Ky oO re) tC Q ct $4 fe) He] re) b ct tr (40) upon énd review the srecialized intelligenc agencies in order to prepare coordineted netionsl intellisence éesti- gh tne TAC, whose members should be collectively resoonsible. Such
= “Se t aren’ kal estimeatss snould ve recognized as the most authoritative available to policy makers. d. Comments. We concur in these conclusions excent that we co not pelisve that the Director and the IAC should be bound by the concept or ccliective responsibility, because this would inevitably reduce ccorcinated nationel intelligence to the lowest common denoninator emong the agencies concerned. A vrocedure should ce adopted wnich would permit the Director and the IAC to fulfill tneir respective responsibilities to the President and the NSC regardless of unani- mous egreement, but providing for concurrent suomissions of dissent. The CIA, however, should interpret end follow the NSC Inteliigence Directives so as to refrain as far as possible from competitive intelligence activities in the production or resea rch intelligence estimates. Cc. Recommended Action. That the Nationel Security Councii concur in the conclusions and recommendations stated above, as interpreted by our comments, as a statement of orinciples to be ooserved by the Director or Central Intelligence and the TAC. D> 6. ORGANIZATION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. {e Summery of the Revort. changes in the internel orgenization of CIA with a view to supp \\eemenmmes a the cbjectives set forth in the Revort. These changes are the i TT neering. :
1, Fanoura be integrated under single over- 211 direction in an crerations division, with its serarate adminis- - 3 < tration, within CIA. stimates there should be created (2) 2 small estimates division ies) ecialised intelligence product 4 ct ir a) 173) "d which would drew upon and revier of the departmental asencies in order to prepare cocrdinated nationel intelligence estimates and (b) 2 research and reports division te accomplish central research in, and coordineted preduction of, in- telligence in recognized fields of common interest. -- - (3) The Foreign Documents Branch ot ") should be included in the pros osed research enc reports division. 4 The Toreigen Broadcast Information 3rench & should be included in the proposed operaticns division. (5) The Interdepartmental Coordineting and Planning Staff should be reconstituted @as a starr responsidle only to the Director of Centrel Intelligence, with the task of ceveloving tans for the coordination of intelligence ectivities, It would 6 ‘d - also perform the present tesks of the Office of Collection end Dis- seminetion with respect to the coordination of coliection reauire- ments and requests 2nd thse disseminetion of intelligence. Oo. Comments. We concur in these recommendations with the excepticn we 5s 9 - UNCLASSHFED
tnat we do not agree thet the Foreign Broadcast Informsticn Branch shouid be included in the pronesed operations division. This @ivisicn should include those activitiesf. pe Peers: conduct ccvert or semi-covert Tisid intelligence and related operations which 2re closely inter- Serencent and have similar éadministrative and security problems. With regard to the recommendations regarding the cPfice of Reports end Estimates, the Interdepartmentel Coordinating anc Planning Staff and the Office of Collection and Lissemtnation, we concur in them end in the concept of CIA upon which they ere based. Hcwever, we recognize thet there may be cther methoés of organization which will accomplish the same -objectives. c. Recommended Action. That the National Security Councii (1) approve the recommendations of the Survey Group Repo:t on the reorganizatio; of CFA as listed in pere. 5.a above, subject to the exception and comments noted in para. €& b; (2) direct the Director of Central In- telligence to carry cut these recommendstions, as approved ty the Council, and report to the Council in ninety cars on vrogvess toward twneir implementation. T. THE SECURITY OF THFORMATION AND THs AVOIDANCE OF PUBLICITY, &. Summery of the Report. The Report recommends that (1) the Director of Censral & csure oF secret infoume- t-! tntelligence shoulic, in cases where the disc tion is sought from him and ne hes doubt as to whether he sheuid =. . UNGEASSIFIEL
comply, refer the question to the Nations] Security Council; (2) in cne interest of security, the Central Intelligence Agency should increasingly emphesize its duties as the coordinator of intelligence retner than its secret intelligence activities in order to reverse the present unfortunate trend where it finds itselr advertised almost exclusively as a secret service organization. o. Comments. We concur in these recommendaticns with the reserve- tion that, in principnle, 211 publicity is undes where it is unavoidable should the precedure set forth in suopera- raph 7 2 (2) above be followed. Cc. Recommended Action. Thet the Netional Security Council (i) approve th recommendations of the Survey Group Revort on the security of in- formation and the evoidence of publicity, subject to tne reservaticn o irs a) Q ct oO Up | 9) ry oO Q tJ ct 8 qo }a tH ‘3 i] noted in para. 7 b above; (2) instruct the telligence to prepare cpprcpriste National Security Counc: 1 Inteili- zence Directives covering these points and submit them fo. appreval within e pericd of thirty days. 8. CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE UNITED STATES COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE BOARD. a. Summery of the Retort The report recommends thet the Director of Central inteliigence snould te made permanent cheirmen of the United States = i Communicaticns Intelligence soarcd. ‘ — NEL Adsit Siritl Hay 1@)) co) Wn
O. Comments. We do not concur in this recormmendstion. This ‘matter was considered when the U. S. Communications Intelligence Board was p and the present arrangements decided on. These arrangeréents, which previde for a rotating chairmanship, are orerating setisfec- soriiy and it seems undesirable to make e change. C. Recommended Action. That the National Security Council nct concur in the recommendation contained in the Report. g. OPERATING PROBLEMS RELATING TO CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES. &. Summary of che Report. The Report sets forth certain recommendations re- garding individual operating problems of the clerdestine activities of CIA. These are questions which, acco ordins to the Report, recuire perticular emphesis or have been neglected in the past. The srinc:- pel aquesticns so indicated muy be summerized as follows: ot (2) Relations with departmental agencies should C o >) 4 fe) & iy ct Qa we) fe) a a Hy B Ap. ct is © 7 A. ie oO } ne ie a ty
UNCLASSIFIED c J (3) The Director of Central Intelligence should assure nimselr that the operating services of CIA receive adequate guidance on the current and stretegic intelligence and sclicy needs ok J We concur in these recommencaticns o11 cf which point of the Government. b. Comments. to significant operating problems relating to clandestine activities which require particular and constant emphasis. c. Recommended Action. Theat the National Security Council (1) epprove the reccumendation of the Report as listed in para. 9 a above; (2) direct the Director cf Centrel Intelligence t>2 carry them out with the assistance of the cther departments and agencies concerned and report to the National Security Council on any difficulties en- countered, 10. THE QUESTION OF CIVILIAN OR MILITARY PERSONNEL IN Key CIs 2CSITIONS. Ie Summery of the Report. The Report concludes that 3 . (1) The vlacing in key positions in CIA of 2 }~ re) 6 ° 1 —s se _- —_ UNCEASSIFIED Ue | 3 ersomnne "S NS lerge vercentage of militery
UNCEASSIFIE? short tour of cuty essigmment, tends to disccuraze competent civil- he sgency 2s & career. v ct ian personnel from locking to empleyment in (2) Continuity of service is essential for the successful carrying out of the duties of Director of Central Inteilii- gence. The cest nope for insuring this continuity and the grectest assurence of independence of ecticn is for 2 civilian to be Directcr of Central Intelligence. A serviceman selected for the post should resign from éective military duty. We do not wholly concur in these conclusions. It is most important that octh civilian and military verscnnel be repre- sented tn the key positions in the Centrel Intelligence Agency al- vw ct 3 ” though we do not believe desirable tc attempt to fix any pre- cisé ratio for the two. This is a matter to be worked out by the us ct ny 3 1¢ Defense. rs Director in consultation with the Secretaries of State a We agree that continuity of service is essenticl for the 1erson availeodlie should be hy > 1) fr. post of Director. The most cuali selected for the post. In order to insure continuity and indererd- ence of action, ne shoule be either 2 civilian, or if a service men or @ foreign service officer, ne should be either retired or one whose service és Director will be his final tour of active duty. c. Recommended Action. Thet the Neticnal Security Council: Sion of its views on tnis question. (2) Inform the President of these views insofer
(9 “ ct v w “4 (?) @) i} [?) Q 'y +e] ct im) wo fe) (@) n ct (e) rE Ww Ie "§ 1) ?) «t re) ry (8) ery Q ) i a ty ( te t ts ct oO {- {-4 1 & 0u wo He | Q r¢t) (3) Inform the Director of Central Intelligence oO ry ay D r i Cu) te these views insofar as they concern the staffing of othe pesitions in CIs. > iw) eS a) n Pj La) oO ty oO tc! {- ©) +4 tl {A [®) hj r} oe ie ii. GENERAL APPRAISAL OF THE Le CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. a. Summary of the Report. The Report concludes that: (1) The directing staff of CIA has not demen- strated en acequete understanding of the mandate of the organization or the ability to discharge that mandate effectivels. (2) Administrative crganization and policies tend to impede the carrying cut of the essential intelligence functions of CIA under the Act. b. Comments. We do not wnolly concur in these conclusions. While we recognize the existence of izpertant defects in tne crganizstion end operation or CIA, we believe thet these conclusicns are too swseving. Complicating factors in eaepvoreising Cia's efficiency have n veen tne shortness of time during which te develop an effective re) oO th re) resvective cr orgenization and e lack of common understanding as missicns of CIA and the devertmental intelligence agencies. How- ever, eas indicated in the Report and concurred in oy us, numerous end imvortant improvements cre necessary and nesc to be carried 3 1 out promptly and effectivelis.
c. Reccomended Action. Thet the National Security Council (1) nete the Con- clusicns and Reccmmendations of the Report cn this subject: (2) 12. THE SERVICE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES. 2, Comments. The Naticnal Military Zstetblishment concurs in the Conclusions and Recommendations of Chapter ll of the Zevert excent that it does not egree that the Service intellisence asenctes should de staffed with personnel who concentrate in intellizence over the major portion of their careers. It is-the policy of che Military edlishment to assign qualified personnel to intelligence duties i 5 td sven though they have nct hed previous intellisence experience. However, continued efforts are made to ettract the hizshest type personnel to intelligence duty. b. Recommenced Acticn. Thet the Netional Security Council ncts the 2b0ve Comments by the National Military Establishment. 13. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, &. Comments. The Department cr Stete concurs in the Conclusions and Recommendations crf Chapter l2 of the Report enc is undertaking to put them intc effect as pert of general plans for reorsanizetion witnin the Depvertment. i} & y-' 15 oO ct w ot 3 0) ry) 16) @) <q D comments oy thse Department of State. HSC 50 - 16 - (EL ASS Saal
UNGLAOOIT ILL ANNEX "A" i, To meintsain the relationship essential to cocrdinetion : betveen the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organi- 4 mes zations, an Intelligence Advisory Committee consisting cf the Director of Central Intellisence, who skeli be Chairman thereof Director of Federal Bureéu of Investi gation, and the rescectii intelligence chiefs from the Departments of State, armay, Navy, anc pn Oo Air Force, end from the Joint Staff (JCS), end tne Atomic Energy Commission, or their representatives, shall be established to acvise the Director of Central Intelligence. The Director of Central In- éliigence will invite the chief, or his representative, of any other intelligence Agency having functions relatec to the national security to sit with the Intelligence Advisory Committee whenever “metters wit ‘hin the purview of his agency ere ta ve discussec. HHRRKE 5. The Director of Central Intelligence sheli disseminate Hational Intelligence to the President, to members cr the Neticonel Security Council, to the Intelligence Chiefs of tne IAC Agencies, and to such Governmental Departments and Agencies cs the N Security Councii from time to time may designate. Intelligence so Gisseminated shell be officially concurred in oy the Intelligencs Agencies or shall carry an-agreee 2 statement of sudstantialiy us i) Gissens differing opinions. HSC 50 17 | WNEIASSIT IE