Dats Na at (New Sete) i NO. es Oh ava ' fae ePeeeAn, | ACKOAD Ba RINT hace! ieers : wt as i taiciee a 1G, 1959) - os Se = ore ; . . . z eet pan raitdntiter the pravis duns ofN nemp, No. 4, tis dircetiy rc eslablisned? te proccutires fer -Uhe Riddcoient; exvic ihitian, resetilemeni and furtiver’. . handling of defectors outside (he continental linits of the United States id ad Als piesessionis~ STs, directive dees nob apply be diclive theaters d£et - war where US. Forces are cagaged or where the Uret ident so dircets, . wae t aap 72. DEFINITIONS +, or ne i my Ss - For the purpose. of tis directive, Ute terms listed below “hall rave ./ he meanings indicated: . : ods “a. Defectars: Defector: are defines! asx nationals of the USSR or a -. country in the Sino-Sovict Bice who tie escaped trou: Une contied af say - Sue h country, or who. beings atisitle sesh Jurisdichiga aud control, ate o. bavilling fo return therety “and who ace of speent! value ta the us Government bscnuse: ~ eos oe (1) ‘They are’ able ta std valuahte new or coufirnntory informa. tion to existing U.S. knowledge of ne Mavic’ world: “ . (2) They are of operational valu lon US. de Ni intent or wpe NY; ~ or : (3) Their defection cun be ‘psychologically “exploited to the ad- vantage of the United States, b. laducement:. Inducement is an act. committed ar manifesay ‘insti- vated by.a U.S. oflicial and demonstrabty intended to bring avout a defce- tion fer which the U.S. Geverning nt might, if the act were discovered, be calicd upon to account. ; c. Potential Lefector: A notential cc fector is a national of the USSR or a country of the Sino-Sovict Rine who (1) is dissalighed ar potentially estranyed in the allegiance to the government of his nutiouslity, (2) may reasonably be expected to be susceptible to defection er reervilisent fn place, and (3) appears te mec’ the sneeial valucs criteria of 2 dofeator as set forth in para. 2.a. above. d. Disaffected Person: A Gisaffected -person is a polential dafeetor who, cither through inducement or voluntary action an his part, nes indicatcd willingness or desire to defict. e. Walk-In: A walk-in is a disaffected person who presente himself to « U.S. installation In a forcign country and requests esyhrn fr nssist- ance in escaping fram Comunuulet cantral, ; {. Refugee: A refucce is a nation or former national of a Canim. nist-doniunated country, who bas fled from and/or is unwilling tu rciucn "This Dircelive supersedes DCU) No. 4/2 eNew Serle), cated 79 April 59%, wines previuusly hac superseded JDCOP No, 2 Clune 1964). Toe os0aTA 1 SECRET . Copy RG L352
° etal Abst: at met wete: ne pand oWae nA SI. cite ner ettie- datten, | Nis “fiat ‘Yeon inte. praled bafo t. nes OTN; ‘y ae Une wa: UES ial pve seul ee iWeNCe, aul ‘who As nOL'a detec. fee core + atte ott RL Reaficits An excugiee ais wre? cud vila ib ional” hi" ‘Ot i & “Buio- pean satenile (execpt ctiinic Germasisy" or ‘Yorastavia, wh: 0 ‘hag escaped psiivee Jiatary 1945, ar (2) of the iniehte “fevelpeetive af (ie date a? IMs Inna wel Csyoal Comniantst, Caina ‘or (oe ARO saute Bakes ‘s one a very. fue gr iceGve aise see De sagt vi oar 282° NOM SOVIET NLOC NA TOKALS Fake byt : Te provies wis of this directive may be “ahaa in whale’ or in part éo qises Of mublonats of countries other than the USSR or thie Sino-So. vict Noe who otherwise meet the definition, af defectors in para, 2.2, albove, when such aclien is approved hy the Director of Central Intelivence in consuitation with the Uniled States Intelligence ourd, Such action is normaly recommicnded lt the Interagency 7 fector Comraittec . ane), Washingtons — - - 4 : 4. SUMMARY or U. Ss. POLICE CONCERNIKG THE DEL "ECTOR * ‘PROGRAM Oe . a. Nefection, particularly frow the as R, sheila hee me soureied ‘and inducer, cinploying both convenfivaal and unconventional means, when- ever there is a nct advants Wye to U.S, interests. Accordingly, the United States should: Lt - Ses mes) Encourage and induce the defection of (he maximum number cf persons from the VESN and of Goviet nationals outside the USS. . (2) Continue, and I possible expand, elfarts fo encourage and In- ducrthe defcetion of key members of elite groups of countrics other than the US&R who may: qualify as defectors, b. To encourage defection and discourage redefection, the United Slates should assure defectors adequate care, maintenauce, and reseltle- ment assistance not oniy during, but also ailer their exploitation or utilization. . c. The United States should take no action to encourage the depar- ture of large numbers of nationals fron) countries in the Sinc- Soviel Bloc other than the USSR. . d. Prior to Initiation by any US. ‘department or agency of a ction to induce defection of a potential defector or disaffected person, the possible ‘value of recruitment in place will be considered carefully. Where lhe best interest of the United States would be served by such recruitmcat of the individual concerned; the provisions of DCID No. 5/1 shall apply. ec. It shall be (he general policy that no bona fide defector will de returned without his ¢ consent. f? Intelligenee Considerallons and objectives shall take priotity atd snall be satisficd prior to psychological explotlation of defectors. .Psy- chological exploitation will be restricted to speeifle enses where a nes advantage to the United States can be expected. There policies chots be Jmplementcd to the extent practical fa cuscs where a defector fi undee the control of another governinent outside the Sino-Soviet Bluc. . 2 BECRET
wane Naydiage tion of overt jarblic tly Concernbay Mefeetars shitt be a +o) : uP bilities utd: “rerjansiuilitios of ini This at Bade ic apeibilities. in | Suir’ af fe alt: Sector, jr ure nes ‘5. “LOCAL: DEFECTOR, COMA 74 TES + oes " yA oral Defeetar: Committee shill he estat ae a uniter. the renersi een of the Senior U.S, Mepresentative in appropriate counlricd. i ° io a can ry yedtas Meee Nepes rit “t he Did. an ctengetet ¢ odalinud Siow, as private: af ies, hcl res soe Lilie. inten sts, cupa- 5 all, departments and ars rates ta" Insure vo The Commiltec stilt consist of representatives af the Central Tntelligenact - Apeney (CIA), Clisinuan, Depurtnie ut of Slate, and Depardnents of bres Army, Navy and Sir Foree. ‘The Cominitteeguay invite representatives .of other de: partarents and avencies lo atleiid ils meetings on an ad hoz basis. > ‘Tne locai Defietur Committee Shall: , ‘ ‘a, Mect™ periodically, norm: wally ¢ at least once quarterly,. to coordinal £ interagency aspects of the defector program in the area concerned and, Yo premaie the Qill use of the resaurces and expabiliti¢s af the U.S. Cav- ernasent. jn support of this program. Copies of minutes of alt Jacul Detcelur Commitice meetings shall be for warded Hiroujsh CIA (channels to WIC/Washingion.. - z b. Consider aud resolve mutual, ‘probtenis including initiat cum sidera- tion gf disaffected persons believed fo mect the crileria catublished in pares. Za. above who are nominated by a member. “When such prolleais cannot. be resolved by the local cammilteo, Ube matter shall be referre:] through CIA channels to-1DC/Viashingion. In such cares represents ‘tives of other departments or agencies may communicate dicectl¥ with their principals in Washington on the subjeels bwelved. If time dass not permit referral to IDC/Washingten, the inaller shall ba submilled for decision to the Senior U.S. Representative In the area. : c. Keep IDC /ashington informed concerning cach defector, inelud- Ing status of c:; eifation and termination of (he cause. Appropriate re- ports on disaffected persons will be made to IDC/Washinatan, except when recruitment in place or other apcrational use {s conteniplated. d. Recommend supplemental procedures in consonance with unis directive fur approval by IDC/Washinglon as may be requires for inipie- mentation of the defector proyruin in the ave.. concerncd. uch protec. dures shall (1) provide for appropriate sccurity measures for the por- sonnel and facilities invotved in the program, and (2) insure that: (a) at the earijest possiie time, information related to imiminenee af has; tilitics or immediate threat to the security of # U.S. installation: is suupht froma the disaffected person or walk-in, (b) such information is given immediate dissemination in the ficid and at the national level with wy py opriate ¢ source attribution and evaluation, and (c) the disafierted jer. son or walk-in is transferred to CJA control at the earliest possible time, togcther with the clothing, decuments and other possessions and the fuil results of any preliminary debriefing of the individual. e. Fstablish local operating preeedires ta insure that wellein cases are promptly referred to the proper official of the U.S. instidlation in volved and Kiaadled under condilions tnswlog the mixin possibte sceursty for bovh the individual concerned and local U.S. inst: ations, SC O3057- 3 SECRET cory NO f
ter Ore its Pat eb bp seeeeddugie fe ienere Gatti Gears af Ose tesal Det featar Cosamtie mee be ye corcenily ploimedt on lsatried eclectyr Prolslenis ; “as well a8 ap ilieatie US. nalieies and procedures. | a | TO aera th an OC Washinton proposes fee str Iseing ar the release ui Hiei aver. | ea conecrning a cefcetur.’ Fe Wi. OVERATING POLICIVS ARD PROCEDURES (7° 000 00 OE a. Vie lee ate reat vevived by a Polentiat defectac ar dl: sulfected pere’ sont ipa i comtiek wittt aa U.S, ailioak may fnfiuence his decision to depeekoiar his Gature uselatuess (oa Me United Slates, Any query dirselly or then ‘h anc inte rmediary Dy a potemtlal defector fu ascerlain the oppertuniy ofaditission to Che Uniled States or foc other assistanes Cor hitaceld and Canty should be met with a clear iidiestion af the dilficul-- fies involved without indicating Uhat the ditficulltes are fusurmountible. Except in esses of recruilmentia place, ar other operational use, no firm fnwes boar other commitments shall be made until the ease has been conridoied by the local Defector Committee and, in he event movement fo he Viited Stufes ts invalved, apprapriate clear sees are obtained from Wanhiaton, Az carly as fcasible, each disalected persion should be re- quired fo sign a statement indicating Ghia of Unis defection was purcly vol- ‘untary Sed Maat Ge desires political asylum. b. “the once of any disaffected person or defector in te hands of a NON-Ging-Goviet iige yoyernment Gat becomes knawn la any U.S, Gov. ernment ofaeial quroad should be reported provaptly (a the Chairman af ine lecal Defector Committee who will consul with appre; viate iicm- evs oF the Connnitica and be responsible fur taking and cosrdinaling action mn the jaferost af the United States. ‘Lo Ure extent feasible, de- fectors ender Che control of another poverninent will be exploited in (he interest of the U.S. Governinent as provided herein. It is recopatied, howeve:, that political considerations of and agreements will: a host . . : 2 Governacnt may affect exploitation of defectors under its control. c. When a defector is to be used (or operational purpeses and when his identity should be conccaled, the Chairman of the lucal Defeclo: Coaumittee will inform the Committee of the cxistence — but not the identity — of the defector Logcther with a general statement of his back- pround, area knowledge and ficld of relative competence. DCID No. 5/3 shall apply to such causes. Efforts shall be made to satisfy intelligence requirciments as promptly and camplctely as possibie. d. Information related to immuinence of hostilities or immediate threat. to the securily of 2 U.S. Installation will be sought at the carlics! poscible time from dis atfeeted persons, e. The establishment of bona fides of disaffected persons will be given particu #itention hecause of the demonstrated use of defector chcon- nels by hestile sciviees to penetrate and convey false or deceptive Infar- mation {9 U.S. intcligence services, 1. RES?PGHSIBILITILS OF THE FIELD REPRESENTATI VP OF CIA The Pickt Representative af CIA has primary ccsponstuilily for the conduct of the defectus program abroad and for providing certain serv- fees of conumon concern. He shall: 4 SECRET
HECHST he deraadead cl peerediebllyy of Chie Dirtefar af “ Ctameretite ds Sate Uae ates Coulpat sciclligetee. oWecete ine aebvai:s conducted wilhain bbs acca cd prespansibglity iacthadiag: Seer, “% 2 1) Liteon cele fhe bketggenece and sceariigs . ovlees ar other of faleresicad cleinents of foreign pavetunents 69 efector matiors, | ©. (2) Prametion of (he (alfiise of Ure wesanrees and capabilities, ale “all departinents: Gad tq:nneies in support of this progeara, ‘: (3) Undarcownat operations, auc aperationial us of defectors ‘hy: Other departmeuts and age ueles ju accordance with (he provisians‘uf CID Ma. 5/2. s moot . r b. In consultation wifia (he local Lefeclor Connnilice: (1) Determine, in the en-e of divaiTeeted persons, (he special vate: applicable and the risk, if any, fo Che political, miliary, diplomatic and security interests of the United Slates, (2) Insure appropriate aad prorapt dissemination of intciligenes jaformation obtained frum defeelurs, and . (3) Delerming such speci handling techniques, iacluaing re- striction of local dissciuitiaiion of information, as may be required in cuses of disallected persons oridelectors when exceptional polilens, nila ¥, diplomatic, security or other factars are invalwed. In ap- ‘prepriate cases, recommendations for special handling; will be sent lo IDC/Washington. “ c. Induce defection and uve de fectors operationally. d.” Fstabiish the bona fides of disaficetend persons in consultation With the representatives of appiesiate departments ar agencies who may have participaiod in the identification ov delivery of the disaffected per- son, or for other rcasons may havea a Special interest or capability in the arca. . ty ' -@Q Repres ontatives of departiuents and agencies caneerace will be kept informed on a linicly basis duciig the proccss of deierminiag bona fidées-and will be provided a final summary when bona fides and special values are established. At such lime, departinents aml asen- cies concerncd will be provided access, initially lo satisfy secur ity Ce other operational intcHigence fequiremenis and theres viter forother exploitation purposes. a . ‘ (2) Infor mation. indicating imminence of hostilities ur oll: cr highly s) iificant intelligence information of immediate interest will be soup! =: t the earliest opportunity and given hmincdiate dissemina- tion in t.0 field and at the nafional level. Debriefing of defectors to vbtain intelligence Inforination of immediate operationsl v: will be conducted in conjunction with other dcpartmcats and ace: cles concerned; specific operational loads, applicahle tu theic ctn- destine activitics, will be made avatlaule to appropriate departawnits and agencies. - (3) When the bona fides of a d sai. ected person cannot be estab. lished wilhin a rcasonable lime, the otfier members al Cie local e- fector Conmcittee will be given a situation repout on the disailectet person together with a general stutenient of his atleyed baci: cused, TSC OS0574 Ht) SECRUY cory NY 152
e aD | hos tora at wee Kaentlediie and uehd ai relates: cenpelonce, Sprevg intelil- ence beg neers Wl be paaee vat ‘J del dated ae prompuly aod suily as peible, nariailiy withide Sst aeesss fo the dignieched parsed. “by dhe departaienta and arereics canverne “dl tinder conditions cislab-- lidted by (he CTA tuple ative, da Ue she al the tusuial cireuny,. *e slanees of (he case. a dee (1) When counter-« spies C Ope rational eclion ‘ts Indicated “bee Gane Nochile event shelius is csfablished ar must be ies sumed, the prowians GE thie direclive sledt not apply and the citse shatt be hag, dled in sceerdines with DED No. 5/). When countler-espionage: ace {ton is wot didicated, and prict to dispattl of such cases, departments, and ageneies will be provided an opportunity to request the servicing: of specific veqrucements uncer conditions established by Unie CIA rep- resentative, normatiy by direct access to the disallected person. e. Inforn: the Senior U.S. Represamtative int the arca involved of the presences CO a defo. ror patential defector wud avi ise suc hh representa tive an ail aupoel. 1 defeelar nielpers.* : net, 1 f. Debrief dvfectors for pusitive intelligence information with par- Ucipatan by departments and wgencies involved in the deli ctor prograr g. Provide or arvange for secure facilities and personnel fur the Aree. esslug and debrictinrd ar defectors including transpor tation or evacuation to seeure areas as required. . - . ht. Pravide ar arcane for care, maintenance, vchabhitation and Testte thament of defectors within Ube Limits of availible funds. bo ee Lie channel of communication uelween the local Detéetor ‘Comimnilice and WME Wa sehinglon. j. Conduct haison with forcicn intelligence and sceurity Scrviccs con- cerning defector matters including the exchange of interrogation teparts. 6. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIELD REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF STATE, ALMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE Designated repr escntatives of ue Depar tmien{s of State, Ar mys Navy and Air Force: a. Subject to the provisions ‘of para. 7a. above, may conduct supple. mental activities in support of the defector program including Che in- ducement of defection. lisison with: foreign intelligence and sccurily serviccs cancerning defector mutters, and exchange of their own inter. rogation reports. oof "py. Shall report promptly to CIA ‘representatives the identity of any potential defector logetiscr with all available pertinent infqrmation. c. Shal! provide, within thelr capabilities, transportation, housing, personnel and ollicr facilitics in support of fhe detector progriun. d. Shall advise the representative of the Director of Central Intelli- tence of the political, vallitary, diptomatte, or sceurlty implications of fclivus proposed or Uehen tn support of Oia program, . 9 RESTFONSIBILITIUS OF TIE SENIOR U.S, REPRESENTATIVE in THE AREA the Senior U.S. Nepresentative In the arca a concerned will be respon-- sible for: "ye fy G SECRET
SECHET Mae Determiaings with Goer acdee and recammecdstion of Me rep te roritative of the Ditectny | me Contd babe the Jee, they, an. we sad deg to Site aetions contin Mage dduward a ucadeetes cron ar ds “kelot my ifieet the palttical uel “diplomatic ralerest of he 0.5, bh “Tnkurdinge {hab approprifft: U5. offielals, not cur ered by j. wa. 4s fy wha are likely to be jo coutset wilh disadTyel d posers are given Hniited sbuichiyg, cane eratug detector avallert i provided Jere int “OO Courdin:: Liang? ‘willy the. icpresentabives: at intere: steal US. aeparts ments! and eeencivs ‘faut, fo the degree Necessary, wilh spprapeate for cign fovermmnental agence; . any, publicity, or Psychologies ub cxplobtation “ofa ee tor, . a. Providins assist: mee st0 {he cla representative fay carrying out i his responsibilities under this, directive. © Tt . es - ALLEN W. DULLES Director of Centrot intelliyence - 4 ae THC 030571 SECRET 10
(Page !) SECRET DCID No. 4/2 (New Series) DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 4/2! THE DEFECTOR PROGRAM ABROAD (Effective 26 June 1959) L. SCOPE Pursuant to the provisions of NSCID No. 4, this directive establishes procedures for the inducement, exploitation, resettlement, and further handling of defectors outside the continental limits of the United States and its possessions. This directive does not apply in active theaters of war where U\S. Forces are engaged or where the President so directs. 2. DEFINITIONS For the purpose of this directive, the terms listed below shall have the meanings indicated: a. Defectors: Defectors are defined as nationals of the USSR or a country in the Sino-Soviet Bloc who have escaped from the control of any such country, or who, being outside such jurisdiction and control, are unwilling to return thereto and who are of special value to the USS. Government because: (1) They are able to add valuable new or confirmatory informa- tion to existing U.S. knowledge of the Soviet World; (2) They are of operational value to a U.S.department or agency; or (3) Their defection can be psychologicaily exploited to the ad- vantage of the United States. b. Inducement: inducement is an act committed or manifestly insti- gated by a US. official and demonstrably indended to bring about a defec- tion for which the U.S. Government might, if the act were discovered, be called upon to account. c. Potential Defector: A potential defector is a national of the USSR or a country of the Sino-Soviet Bloc who (1) is dissatisfied or potentially estranged in the allegiance to the government of his nationality, (2) may reasonably be expected to be susceptible to defection or recruitment in place, and (3) appears to meet the special values criteria of a defector as set forth in para. 2.a. above. d. Disaffected Person: A disaffected person is a potential defector who, either through inducement or voluntary action on his part, has indicated willingness or desire to defect. e. Walk-In: A walk-in is a disaffected person who presents himself to a US. installation in a foreign country and requests asylum or assist- ance in escaping from Communist control. f. Refugee: A refugee is a national or former national of a Commu- nist-dominated country, who has fled from and/or is unwilling to return 1This Directive supersedes DCID No. 4/2 (New Series) dated 29 April 1958, which previously had superseded IDCOP No. 2 (June 1954). TSC 030574 1 SECRET
(Page 2) SECRET to such country, does not possess another citizenship, has not been inte- grated into the economy of the country of present residence, and who is not a defector. g. Escapee: An escapee is a refugee who is a national (1) of a Euro- pean satellite (except ethnic Germans) or Yugoslavia who has escaped since | January 1948, or (2) or the USSR irrespective of the date of his escape, or (3) of Communist China or the Asian satellites on a very selective basis. 3. NON-SOVIET BLOC NATIONALS The provisions of this directive may be applied in whole or in part to cases of nationals of countries other than the USSR or the Sino-Soviet Bloc, who otherwise meet the definition of defectors in para. 2.a. above, when such action is approved by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation with the United States Intelligence Board. Such action is normally recommended by the Interagency Defector Committee (IDC), Washington. 4, SUMMARY OF U.S. POLICY CONCERNING THE DEFECTOR PROGRAM a. Defection, particularly from the USSR, should be encouraged and induced, employing both conventional and unconventional means, when- ever there is a net advantage to USS. interests. Accordingly, the United States should: (1) Encourage and induce the defection of the maximum number of persons from the USSR and of Soviet nationals outside the USSR. (2) Continue, and if possible expand, efforts to encourage and in- duce the defection of key members of elite groups of countries other than the USSR who may qualify as defectors. b. To encourage defection and discourage redefection, the United States should assure defectors adequate care, maintenance, and resettle- ment assistance not only during, but also after their exploitation or utilization. c. The United States should take no action to encourage the depar- ture of large numbers of nationals from countries in the Sino-Soviet Bloc other than the USSR. d. Prior to initiation by any U.S. department or agency of action to induce defection of a potential defector or disaffected person, the possible value of recruitment in place will be considered carefully. Where the best interest of the United States would be served by such recruitment of the individual concerned; the provisions of DCID No. 5/1 shall apply. e. It shall be the general policy that no bona fide will be returned without his consent. f. Intelligence considerations and objectives shall take priority and shall be satisfied prior to psychological exploitation of defectors. Psy- chological exploitation will be restricted to specific cases where a net advantage to the United States can be expected. These policies shall be implemented to the extent practical in cases where a defector is under the contro! of another government outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc. 2 SECRET
(Page 3) SECRET g. Implementation of overt publicity concerning defectors shall be coordinated with the Department of State. h. Coordination, as provided herein, shall respect the interests, capa- bilities and responsibilities of all departments and agencies ta insure full use of such capabilities in support of the defector program. 5. LOCAL DEFECTOR COMMITTEES A local Defector Committee shall be established under the general supervision of the Senior U.S. Representative in appropriate countries. The Committee shall consist of representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Chairman, Department of State, and Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Committee may invite representatives of other departments and agencies to attend its meetings on an ad hoc basis. The local Defector Committee shail: a. Meet periodically, normally at least once juarterly, to coordinate interagency aspects of the defector program in the area concerned and to promote the full use of the resources and capabilities of the U.S. Gov- ernment in support of this program. Copies of minutes of all focal Defector Committee meetings shall be forwarded through CIA channels to IDC/Washington. b. Consider and resolve mutual problems including initial considera- tion of disaffected persons believed to meet the criteria established in para. 2.a. above who are nominated by a member. When such problems cannot be resolved by the local committee, the matter shall be referred through CIA channels to IDC/Washington. In such cases representa- tives of other departments or agencies may communicate directly with their principles in Washington on the subjects involved. If time does not permit referral to IDC/Washington, the matter shall be submitted for decision to the Senior U.S. Representative in the area. c. Keep IDC/Washington informed concerning each defector, includ- ing status of exploitation and termination of the case. Appropriate re- ports on disaffected persons will be made to IDC/Washington, except when recruitment in place or other operational use is contemplated. d. Recommend supplemental procedures in consonance with this directive for approval by IDC/Washington as may be required for imple- mentation of the defector program in the area concerned. Such proce- dures shall (1) provide for appropriate security measures for the per- sonnel and facilities involved in the program, and (2) insure that: (a) at the earliest possible time, information related to imminence of hos- tilities or immediate threat to the security of a US. installation is sought from the disaffected person or walk-in, (b) such information is given immediate dissemination in the field and at the national level with ap- propriate source attribution and evaluation, and (c) the disaffected per- son or walk-in is transferred to CIA control at the earliest possible time, together with the clothing, documents and other possessions and the full results of any preliminary debriefing of the individual. e. Establish local operating procedures to insure that walk-in cases are promptly referred to the proper official of the US. installation in- volved and handled under conditions insuring the maximum possible security for both the individual concerned and local US. installations. TSC 030574 3 SECRET
(Page 4) SECRET f. Establish procedures to insure that all members of the local De- fector Committee are kept currently informed on local defector problems as well as applicable U.S. policies and procedures. g. Recommend to IDC/Washington proposals for surfacing or the release of initial overt publicity concerning a defector. 6. OPERATING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES a. The treatment received by a potential defector or disaffected per- son upon first contact with a US. official may influence his decision to defect or his future usefulness to the United States. Any query directly or through an intermediary by a potential defector to ascertain the opportunity of admission to the United States or for other assistance for himself and family should be met with a clear indication of the diffic- ulties involved without indicating that the difficulties are insurmountable. Except in cases of recruitment in place, or other operational! use, no firm financial or other commitments shall be made until the case has been considered by the iocal Defector Committee and, in the event movement to the United States is involved, appropriate clearances are obtained from Washington. As early as feasible, each disaffected person should be re- quired to sign a statement indicating that his defection was purely vol- untary and that he desires political asylum. b. The case of any disaffected person or defector in the hands of a non-Sino-Soviet Bloc government that becomes known to any U.S. Gov- ernment official abroad should be reported promptly to the Chairman of the iocal Defector Committee who will consult with appropriate mem- bers of the Committee and be responsible for taking and coordinating action in the interest of the United States. To the extent feasible, de- fectors under the control of another government will be exploited in the interest of the U.S. Government as provided herein. It is recognized, however, that political considerations of and agreements with a host government may affect exploitation of defectors under its control. c. When a defector is to be used for operational purposes and when his identity should be concealed, the Chairman of the local Defector Committee will inform the Committee of the existence-but not the identity-of the defector together with a general statement of his back- ground, arca knowledge and field of relative competence. DCID No. 5/1 shall apply to such cases. Efforts shall be made to satisfy intelligence requirements as promptly and completely as possible. d. Information related to imminence of hostilities or immediate threat to the security of a US. installation will be sought at the earliest possible time from disaffected persons. e. The establishment of bona fides of disaffected persons wiil be given particular attention because of the demonstrated use of defector chan- nels by hostile services to penetrate and convey false or deceptive infor- mation to U.S. intelligence services. 7. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIELD REPRESENTATIVE OF CIA The Field Representative of CIA has primary responsibility for the conduct of the defector program abroad and for providing certain serv- ices of common concern. He shall: 4 SECRET
(Page 5) SECRET a. Coordinate as the designated representative of the Director of Central Intelligence, all defector activities conducted within the area of responsibility including: (1) Liaison with the intelligence and security services of other interested elements of foreign governments on defector matters, (2) Promotion of the full use of the resources and capabilities of all departments and agencies in support of this program, (3) Inducement operations and operational use of defectors by other departments and agencies in accordance with the provisions of DCID No. 5/1. b. In consultation with the iocal Defector Committee: (1) Determine, in the case of disaffected persons, the special values applicable and the risk, if any, to the political, military, diplomatic and security interests of the United States. (2) Insure appropriate and prompt dissemination of intelligence information obtained from defectors, and (3) Determine such special handling techniques, including re- striction of local dissemination of information, as may be required in cases of disaffected persons or defectors when exceptional political, military, diplomatic, security or other factors are involved. In ap- propriate cases, recommendations for special handling will be sent to IDC/Washington. c. Induce defection and use defectors operationally. d. Establish the bona fides of disaffected persons in consultation with the representatives of appropriate departments or agencies who may have participated in the identification or Gelivery of the disaffected per- son, or for other reasons may have a special interest or capability in the area. (1) Representatives of departments and agencies concerned will be kept informed on a timely basis during the process of determining bona fides and will be provided a final summary when bona fides and special values are established. At such time, departments and agen- cies concerned will be provided access, initially to satisfy security or other operational intelligence requirements and thereafter for other exploitation purposes. (2) Information indicating imminence of hostilities or other highly significant intelligence information of immediate interest will be sought at the earliest opportunity and given immediate dissemina- tion in the field and at the national level. Debriefing of defectors to obtain intelligence information of immediate operational value will be conducted in conjunction with other departments and agen- cies concerned; specific operational loads, applicable to their clan- destine activities, will be made available to appropriate departments and agencies. (3) When the bona fides of a disaffected person cannot be estab- lished within a reasonable time, the other members of the local De- fector Committee will be given a situation report on the disaffected person together with a general statement of his alleged background, TSC 030574 5 SECRET
(Page 6) SECRET area knowledge and field of relative competence. Specific intelli- gence requirements will be produced and satisfied as promptly and fully as possible, normally with direct access to the disaffected person by the departments or agencies concerned under conditions estab- lished by the CIA representative in the light of the unusual circum- stances of the case. (4) When counter-espionage operational action is indicated be- cause hostile agent status is established or must be assumed, the provisions of this directive shall not apply and the case shall be han- dled in accordance with DCID No. 5/1. When counter-espionage ac- tion is not indicated, and prior to disposal of such cases, departments and agencies will be provided an opportunity to request the servicing of specific requirements under conditions established by the CIA rep- resentative, normally by direct access to the disaffected person. e. Inform the Senior U.S. Representative in the area involved of the presence of a defector or potential defector and advise such representa- tive on all aspects of defector matters. {. Debrief defectors for positive intelligence information with par- ticipation by departments and agencies involved in the defector program. g. Provide or arrange for care, maintenance, rehabilitation and reset- tlement of defectors within the limits of available funds. i. Serve as the channel! of communication between the local Defector Committee and IDC/Washington. j. Conduct liaison with foreign intelligence and security services con- cerning defector matters including the exchange of interrogation reports. 8. RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FIELD REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF STATE, ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE Designated representatives of the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force: a. Subject to the provisions of para.7.a. above, may conduct supple- mental activities in support of the defector program including the in- ducement of defection, liaison with foreign intelligence and security services concerning defector matters, and exchange of their own inter- rogation reports. b. Shall report promptly to CIA representatives the identity of any potential defector together with all available pertinent information. c. Shall provide, within their capabilities, transportation, housing, personnel and other facilities in support of the defector program. d. Shall advise the representative of the Director of Centrai Intelli- gence of the political, military, diplomatic, or security implications of actions proposed or taken in support of this program. 9. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SENIOR U.S. REPRESENTATIVE IN THE AREA The Senior U.S. Representative in the area concerned will be respon- sible for: 6 SECRET
(Page 7) SECRET a. Determining with the advice and recommendation of the repre- sentative of the Director of Central Intelligence, the manner and degree to which actions contemplated toward a disaffected person or defector may affect the political and diplomatic interest of the U.S. b. Insuring that appropriate U.S. officials, not covered by para 5.f., who are likely to be in contact with disaffected persons are given limited briefing concerning defector matters as provided herein. c. Coordinating with the representatives of interested U.S. depart- ments and agencies and, to the degree necessary, with appropriate for- eign governmental agencies, any publicity or psychological exploitation of a defector. d. Providing assistance to the CIA representative in carrying out his responsibilities under this directive. ALLEN W. DULLES Director of Central Intelligence TSC 030571 7 SECRET