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7    ACTION*    POLICY    APPROVAL 
AND    CCCRDINATION    ?ROCECUP£S 
S) 
'*'*> 
The  US  faces  a  variety  c:  t 
interests  as  well  as  cppcrt 
Amona  these  threats  are 
powers  to  influence  av.d 
Qovernnents,  and  certain  n 
world.   In  particular  the 
continue  to  intervene  m  t 
and  non-democratic  countri 
effective  to  achieve  their 
action  and  propaganda  and 
orocrams  to  assist  their  a 
including  actions  to  subve 
supoort  coups  d'etats,  ter 
disinformation  designed  to 
(TS) 
hreats  to  its  national  security 
unities  to  advance  those  interests 
e  overt  and  covert  efforts  cf  ho'sti 
ntrol  international  organizations , 
on-governmental  croups  throughout  t 
Soviet  3ioc  and  terrorist  orcanizat 
he  internal  affairs  of  both  democra 
es  and  to  use  any  means  considered 
ends.   These  include  covert  ooiiti 
paramilitary  and  intelligence  suppo 
Hies  and  damace  their  oooonents, 
rt  democratic  elections,  orcanize  a 
rorism,  insurgencies,  and  spread 
discredit  the  US  and  its  allies. 
-  e 
cai 
While  the  US  will  not  make  use  of  most  of  the  techmcues 
* 
emoioved  bv  our  adversaries,  we  must  be  creoared  to  counter 
4.  .*  *  -  *■• 
such  efforts  ar.d    to  assist  cur  allies  and  friends  m  resist::.: 
these  tnreats. 
~*u 
7he  US  recuires  a  ranee  of    national  securitv 
tools  to  protect  and  advance  its  interests.   when  the  President 
determines  that  it  is  appropriate,  he  must  have    at  his  disposal 
appropriate  means  to  assist  allies  and  friends  and    to  influence 
the  actions  of  foreign  countries,  including  the  means  to  affect 
behavior  both  when  the  US  wishes  to  acknowledge  its  role,  ar.d 
to  do  this  covertly  when  the  revelation  of  US  sponsorship, 
support,  or  assistance  would  adversely  affect  US  interests. 
These  tools  include  overt  and  covert  diplomatic  information 
channels,  political  action,  and  covert  action  including  para- 
military and  intelligence  support  programs.   (TS) 
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:anct:on  :r.o  use  or  ccvert  action,  :ucseqo3r.: 
activities,  therefore,  require  scecial  review  ar.ci  control 
-echanisnts.   At  the  same  ti*e,  exceptional  care  must  also  be 
taken  to  ensure  that  -mle  there  may  be  evert  .tan  1  res  tat  ions  c 
-revert  action,  the  decision  and  review  process,  as  well  as  the 
specific  mteilicence  means  and  techniques  that  are  used 
ccvert  lv aiwavs  remain  secure. 
i,  i  o ) 
Purnose  ar.d  Gbiectivos 
The  purpose  of  this  NSDD  is  to  establish  procedures  for  the 
planning,  approval,  and   coordination  of  covert  action  {intelli- 
gence "scecial  activities"  under  Executive  Order  12  2  23)  andfer 
the  review  and  evaluation  of  these  activities  in  order  to 
ensure  that  they  continuously  derive  from  and  support  <JS 
national  security  objectives  and  are  integrated  fully  into 
overall  US  policy.   Knowledge  of  covert  action  policies, 
decisions,  and    p roc rams  shall  be  strictly  limited  to  the 
absolute  minimum  number  of  senior  officials  and  their  immediate 
staff  focal  points.   To  the  extent  possible,  knowledge  of 
policies,  deliberations,  and  programs;  knowledge  of  operations; 
and  knowledge  of  supporting  information  or  activities  will  be 
strictly  compartmented  from  each  other-   (TS) 
In  support  of  these  objectives  and  this  process,  the  following 
Procedures  and  resoonsibilities  are  established: 
Aoorcval  Procedures  for  Inteiiicence 
_  *.  A. 
1.    Presidential  Findincs.   The  President  shall  acorove 
.   , 
 ^ 
  •  * 
all  covert  action  Findings  in  writing,   L'nder  Section  662  cf 
the  Foreign  Assistance  Act  of  1961,  as  amended,  all  covert 
actions  undertaken  by  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  must  be 
authorized  by  a  Presidential  Finding  that  each  such  operation 
is  important  to  US  national  secuntv.   E-0.  12233  and  this 
Directive  establish  that  covert  actions  (intelligence  "special 
activities")  undertaken  by  components  other  than  CIA  also 
require  a  Presidential  Finding.   Each  covert  action  is  also 
considered  a  significant  anticipated  intelligence  ac 
under  Section  501  of  the  National  Security  Act  and 
to  certain  Congressional  reporting  procedures. 
Congressional  reporting  procedures  for  significant  intelligent 
activities  aoolv  to  all  acencies  of  the  mteilicence  cemmur.  if. 
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the  form  of  personnel,  :uncs,  equipment 
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ticn,  traminq,  lociscics,  and  facilities  by  'love  rr.-er.:  compo- 
nents other  than  CIA  to  support  a  covert  action 
itself  be  considered  a  separate  covert  action  bv  the  -••--♦  v?  - 
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\    4.   .J  I 
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Memorandum  of  Mo 
♦-  ■*  £"  <t 
k-  -*-  ■*- cation  (MON) .   The  MCN  is  the 
means  by  which  CIA  or  other  designated  components  seek  aocrcvai 
for  a  substantial  chance  or  modification  in  the  means  of* " 
implementation,  resource  level,  other  chance  in  assets  or  level 
of  activity,  or  when  there  has  been  a  significant  chance  in  the 
operational  conditions  or  risks  associated  with  a  covert  acticn 
program.   The  President  shall  approve  all  such  modi f ications^tc 
existing  covert  action  findings.   All  such  changes  must  be 
within  the  scope  of  authorities  granted  by  an  existing 
Presidential  Finding.   MONs  shall  not  be  used  to  exceed   the 
limits  authorized  in  the  Finding  or  to  modify  objectives, 
targets,  or  add    foreign  states,  organizations,  or  individuals 
of  countries  other  than  those  authorized  in  the  Findinc.   The 
MON  shall  also  be  used  to  request  cancellation  or  suspension  c: 
a  Finding  for  which  action  has  been  completed,  which  has  been 
bypassed  by  events,  or  which,  for  other  reasons,  should  be 
cancelled.   (TS) 
National  Securitv  Planmnc  GrouD  (NSPG)  . 
•I 
The  National  Security  Planning  Group,  as 
National  Security  Council,  shall  provide 
the  President  on  each  proposed  covert  ac 
modification  to  an  oncoinc  covert  action 
a  committee  of  the 
a  recommendation  t 
ion  or  proposed 
1.    For  consideration  of  cover 
consist  of  the  foliowmc  members: 
t  acticn,  the  NSPG  shall 
The  Vice  President 
The  Secretary  of  State 
The  Secretary  of  Defense 
Counsellor  to  the  President 
The  Director  of  Central  Intelligence 
Chief  of  Staff  to  the  President 
Deputy  Chief  of  Staff  to  the  President 
Assistant  to  the  President  for 
National  Securitv  Affairs 
AKW042  4  55 
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conduct    of    covert    acticns,    evaluate    covert    action    prcc 
operations    for    adequacy   cine    efficacy    and    recommend    the 
^  —  , 
r.ent  or  resources.   .he  :'<S?G    shall  review  the  ft 
covert  actions  to  he  included  m  the  National  fcreicn 
cer.ee    Program  and  the  procran-.s  of  other  rJS  Gcvernr.ent 
components  arid    report  tc  the  President  en  the  adecuacv 
covert  action  prccrar.s  ~~d    capabilities.   (75} 
assign- 
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y 
** 
-»•  v,  «   nr SPG  annuiliy  shall  review  ail  current  covert 
action  programs  and  seer,  the  President's  concurrence  m  the 
continuation  of  dacr.    tree  ram.   fTS) 
a  *  ^^   ^  ^i  •  *  -^  *-^  ^* 
d  /—  •-  r- \   *— 
National  Security  Council  Staff,  shall  act  as 
written  minutes  at  N£?G  r.eetmcs,  nreoare  oaoers  for  and 
maintain  records  of  N'SPC-  .teetir.es  and  administer  the  soecial 
access  security  compartment  protective  covert  action  coiicies 
(C) 
Planninc  and  Ccordinaticr.  Grouo  (?CG) 
■» 
? 
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the  ouroose  of  ensurmc  their  effectiveness  and  tneir 
a  ^c x,  replaces  ai.  ac  tec  mteracencv  croups  fcr  t.tis 
7he  ?CG    shall  :::.sist  of  a  representative  of  t 
the  Under  Secretary  of  Sta 
*  *    *» 
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Office  or  t  ne  vice  ^ - o  c -  - ^ - - 
CG  reolaces  ail  ad    tc 
— '  *ui  fc  fc*"  >w  fc*  v»-  • 
fc    v_  .  . 
Political  Affairs,  the  L'nter  Secretary  of  defense 
the  Deputy  Director  of  CIA  fcr  Operations,  the  Assistant 
Chairman  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  cf  Staff,  and  be  chaired  cy 
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and    Legislative    requirements,    public    and    media    issues  ,'  
"and  * 
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Identify    si 
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=.nc  ccoromate  Concress  lonai  briefing, 
—  ^^^x^^^-t:  d..c-,  —  ur;-.^rfc.dLef  -UDiic  ai^airs  stratecies  ro 
ert  action  crccrajr.s.   (7S) 
•  ■  ^*  fs-r   *«*^  ******  v.*  *  ^  V,^^. and  coordinate  operational  security  an: 
over  stratecies  which  will  enhance  the  likelihood  o 
success- 
(TS) 
L.    Unless  otherwise  authorized,  ail  proposed  Findings 
and   Memoranda  of  Notification  shall  be  prepared  bv  the  ccrtoo- 
/*  *.  u  _  ^ 
o  ^..e  r 
nent  selected  by  the  President  to  perform  the  covert  action 
for  staffing  and  deliberation  by  the  ?CG  and  the  NS?G. 
components  of  the  L"S  Gcvernr.ent  shall  participate  in  the 
drafting  of  proposed  Findings  and   Memoranda  of  Notification 
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/-s  j: 
Draft  Findings  and  MCNs  shall  be  submitt 
to  the  President  for  National  Security 
rcuiation  to  ?CG  and  NS?G  ormcioais 
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he  NSPG  shall  review  .-■> 
trar.srr.it  tr.em  togetner  witn  any  acc;:;cr.a:  eemmer. ts  , 
recommendations  or  dissents,  via  the  Assistant  to  tr.e 
for  National  Security  Affairs  to  the  President  for  at 
Concurrence  on  MONs  may  oe  via  a  signed  memorandum  m 
formal  NSPG  meeting  unless  any  NSPG  member  requests  3 
meetinc.   (TS) 
^  ''n  C  *  •"**--**  *■ 
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6.    Normally  a  minimum  of  four  working  days  snail  he 
available  to  ?CG  ^r.c    NSPG  members  for  processing  Findmcs 
MONs  at  each    level  prior  to  r.eetir.cs  or  votes. 
—  u 
he  Senior  Director  of  Ir.teliicer.ee  Prccrams, 
National  Security  Council,  shall  make  available  a  copy  of  the 
final  proposed  Finding  to  the  Attorney  General,  and  the  Direc- 
tor, Office  of  Management  and  Budget  for  legal  and  budgetary 
review  at  least  three  full  davs  before  NSPG  ceiiu-**-3- 
■eraticn. 
\  * 
"3  rfl/^ 
»*»     *^*     4»     *■-     W^ 
VJ 
The  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  s: 
to  brief  the  final  proposed  rinding  to  the 
eneral;  the  Director,  Office  of  Management  and 
ether  NSPG  members  at  least  three  full  davs  trio 
~*  a  o  *-  ^   -,  r*  f  *C  ] 
•         1   *       ■ 
*^3t  <    ^"Xk   ^*  *-  rs  — 
It*"*  **•*  *>  V 
udget;  or 
»-0   w.4e  t^r^L; 
9.    NS?G  members  shall  be  notified  m  writing  by  :r.e 
Assistant  to  the  President  for  National  Securitv  Affairs  -  *    -*- 
>^  ^ 
-  « 
M   T  -'  - 
1   rv 
*  'J  - 
—  u 
o   -^ 
rigmai  approved  Finding  and  MCN  shall  be 
retained  :or  recorc  purposes  by  the  Senior  director  ci    Intelli- 
gence Prcgram.s,  NSC  Staff.   A  record  copy  shall  be  provided  to 
the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  or  to  ether  components 
undertaking  a  covert  action.   No  ether  copies  cf  approved 
findings  or  MONs  are  authorized.   (TS) 
Ccncress icnal  Notification  Procedures 
1.    Section  30  1 
DC1  and  the  heads  of    a 
involved  m  mteliicen 
.'"nM^  1  ♦•  *-nnc    r*  *~        *"*~£S    (~  ^  *~*  r~ 
or  the  National  Secur 
ii  otner  components  o 
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procedures  acreec  :: 
w::r.  :r.e  Congress,  tr.e  TCI  snail  provide  the  Congress  with  a 
briefing  on  eacn  Finding  *r.c  MON  after  they  have  been  apprcvo 
by  tr.e  President.   This  briefing  snail  consist  of  an  "adviser 
vmen  shall  he  provided  to  the  ?CG  and  ::s?G   with  each    propose 
Finding  and  MON .   This  advisory,  undated  and  unsigned,  shall 
describe  the  Finding  or  MON ,  the  scope  of  each,    &r*d    these 
additional  elements  required  by  the  agreed  Congressional 
reporting  procedures.   Since  the  Congressional  reporting 
procedures  perr.it  oral  notification,  no  paper  other  than  the 
dviscry  shall  be  creviced  to  the  Ccncress. 
'  t   1  ^   ^  "  ♦■  ii  n  ^*  a  .^ 
that  tnis  advisory  replace  the  scope  paper  and  MONT  as  the 
instrument  of  Congressional  notification-   (TS) 
«A 
•■^   %i   «*^   **^   *»    rf^    *W    **  »      «•    "^^   *^   ^—   *•"■»   *^*   "^    ^— '   ~* 
Security  is  indispensable  to  the  successful  conduct 
of  covert,  action.   Therefore,  security  requirements  and 
administration  are  major  elements  in  the  development  of  cover 
action  policy.   The  Assistant  to  the  President  for  National 
Security  Affairs  shall  establish  a  separate,  specially 
compartmented  control  and  access  system  at  the  Top  Secret 
classification  level  for  ail  policy  matters  concerning  covert 
action.   Each  NS?G  member  shall  ensure  that  access  to  informa- 
tion or.   US  covert  action  policies  shall  be  restricted  to  the 
absolute  minimum  number  of  persons  possible.   (TS) 
2.    Each  NS?G  member  shall  designate  one  senior  member  c 
his  component  as  the  sole  focal  point  for  all  matters  related 
to  covert  action" for  both  the  ?CG  and  the  NSPG.   Each  focal 
point  shall  strictly  adhere  to  the  special  access  security 
compartment  procedures  regarding  covert  action  policies  to  be 
promulgated  under  separate  cover.   In  accordance  with  these 
procedures,  each  focal  oomt  shall  deveioo  imolementina 
procedures  for  ensuring  strict  limitation  of  knewiedee  and  for 
separating  knowledge  of  covert  action  policy  from  operational 
or  support  information  and  knowledge  within  other  elements  of 
r^  i 
*  1  <r  c  ^s«-*^/~i'^£an** 
(TS) 
numoer  o 
covert  a 
\'S?G  members  shall  ensure  tha 
documents  and  files  necessarv 
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RQCEDUR.ES     FOR    SAFEG 
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and    approval    procedures     (i.e 
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?  res  iden: 
related    c 
r^ re  *.»  e  c *_  e c    u  *  * c e  *v    a    — »"*-■&*,  «-»*-e^     «< m-g v- * u *, *  *    '■_ «.. 
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access    svstem    identified 
-»  «.     V_-     w      —    v—    " 
a  a  d 
■crrGspor.der.ee)  shall  b 
-partner ted  control  ar, 
fied  codeword  "VEIL." 
Security  Planning  Group  (NS?G)  and  Planning  and  Coordination 
Group  (?CG);  designated  focal  points;  and  an  absolute  minimum 
number  of  supporting  personnel  wnose  maicr  responsibilities 
involve  the  review,  evaluation,  development,  and/or 
implementation  of  covert  action  policies  and  operations. 
Access  to  VEIL  information  shall  be  on  a  "MUST  N'EED-TO-KNCW* 
basis  and  does  not  automatically  entitle  an  individual,  who  has 
knowledce  of  a  specific  covert  action  or  a  particular  asoecr  of 
a  covert  action,  to  have  access  to  the  entire  body  of  VEIL 
Desicnated  focal  oomts  are  responsible  for  ensuring  strict 
»  *■  *■  ^ 
limitation  of  knowledce  and,  to  the  extent  ocssibie,  for 
secaratinc  knowledce  of  covert  action  oolicies  from  operational 
or  suooort  information  and  knowledce  witnm  his  comoonent. 
Additionally,  he  shall  be  responsible,  within  his  component, 
for  receivmc  and    acccuntmc  f 
1  1 
cersonnei    with    authorized    access;    secure    handlinc; 
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authorised. 
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