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\CHANGE 
AR  381-20 
U.S.  Army  Counts  intelligence  Activities 
This  regulation— 
o  Contains  major  revisions  concerning  the  definition,  con- 
duct of,  and  jurisdiction  over  counterintelligence 
investigation,  production,  collection,  and  liaison  per 
DOD  Directive  5240.2  (chap  1  through  9). 
o  Updates  Army  intelligence  organization  and  respon- 
sibilities (chap  1). 
o  Adds  new  directives  on  counterintelligence  support  to 
terrorism  counteraction  (chap  3).
Headquarters 
Department  of  the  Army 
Washington,  DC 
26  September  1988 
Army  Regulation  381-20 
Effective  27  October  i?86 
Military  Intelligence 
U.S.  Army  Counterintelligence  Activities 
This  "UPDATE  printing  publishes  a  revision 
which  is  effective  27  October  1 986.  Because 
the  structure  of  the  entire  revised  text  has 
been  reorganized,  no  attempt  has  been  made 
to  highlight  changes  from  the  earlier  regulation 
dated  10  September  1975. 
By  Order  of  ihe  Secretary  of  the  Army. 
JOHN  A.  WICKHAM,  JR. 
General,  United  States  Army 
Chief  of  Staff 
Official: 
R.  L.  DILWORTH 
Brigadier  General,  United  States  Army 
The  Adjutant  General 
Summary.  This  regulation  establishes  the 
authority  and  responsibility  for  the  conduct 
of  U.S.  Army  counterintelligence  (CI)  activ- 
ities, it  includes  guidance  en  the  definition, 
conduct  of,  and  jurisdiction  over  CI  investi- 
gation, production,  collection,  and  liaison. 
It  implements  DGD  Directive  5240.2: 
Applicability.  This  regulation— 
a.  Applies  to  all  Army  intelligence  com- 
ponents, other  military  personnel  and  civil- 
ian employees  of  the  Department  of  the 
Army  when  they  engage  in  intelligence  ac- 
tivities, and  members  of  the  Army  National 
Guard  and  U.S.  Army  Reserve  when  they 
perform  Federal  duties  or  engage  in  activi- 
ties directly  related  to  a  Federal  duty  or 
mission 
ti.  Does  not  apply  to  activities  covered 
under  Presidential  Directive/National  Secu- 
rity Council-9. 
impact  on  the  New  Manning  Sys- 
tem. This  regulation  does  not  contain  in- 
formation that  affects  the  New  Manning 
System. 
internal  control  system.  This  regulation 
is  not  subject  to  the  requirements  of  AR 
11-2.  It  does  not  contain  internal  control 
provisions. 
Supplementation.  Supplementation  of 
this  regulation  and  establishment  of  forms 
other  than  DA  forms  are  prohibited  without 
prior  approval  from  HQDA  (DAMI-CIC, 
WASH  DC  20310-105*. 
Interim  changes.  Interim  changes  to  ihis 
regulation  are  not  official  unless  they  are  au- 
thenticated by  The  Adjutant  General.  Users 
will  destroy  interim  changes  on  their  expira- 
tion dates  unless  sooner  superseded  or  re- 
scinded. 
Suggested  improvements.  The  pro,/ 
nent  agency  of  this  regulation  is  ;he  OfF.. 
of  the  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff  for  hue. 
gence.  Users  are  invite  J  to  send  cosraen1 
and  suggested  improvements  or.  DA  rt>- 
2028  (Recommended  Changes  u,  Publi 
lions  and  Blank  Forms)  directly  to  slQ 
(DAMI-CIC),  WASH  DC  2021C-10e+ 
Distribution.  Distribution  of  this  -ss.ie  ,. 
been  made  in  accordance  with  DA  i"o,. 
12-9A-R  requirements  for  38'  ;eries  pi.w 
cations.  The  number  of  copies  Jistnbuteo  ; 
a  given  subscriber  is  the  r.ainbor  of  njp:. 
requested  in  Btack  326  of  the  *.ub:-. :;ril ■;.- 
DA  Form  ^-9A-R  AR  381-10  ci.^r.:. 
lion  is  A  for  Active  Army,  ARNC,  a  \ 
USAR. 
Contents  (Listed  by  paragraph  number) 
Chapter  1 
General 
Purpose  •  1-1 
References  *  1-2 
Explanation  of  abbreviations  and 
terms  •  1-3. 
Authority  •  1-4 
Policy  •  1-5 
Responsibilities  "      b 
Chapter  2 
Countarlruelligds.ee  Investigations 
Genera!  •  2-1 
Investigations  under  Army  C! 
jurisdiction  '2-2 
Centre;  offices  •  2.-3 
DA  Centra!  Control  Office  ■   ,■-> 
Reparuag  of.  CI  information  s  !  -- 
S&eira&iESffliigaa'/ejuxisdis.-L'nr.  *  2.-4 
Chapter  3 
Counterintelligence  Support  to 
Terrorism  Counteraction 
u>pe  •  3-1 
Responsibilities  <•      2 
Reporting  of  terrorism  ini    mation  •  2-3 
Chapter  4 
Counterintelligence  and  Security 
Support  Activities 
Scope  •  4-1 
°olicy  •  4-2 
CI  and  security  support  to  OPSEC  •  4-3 
Responsibilities  *  4-4 
Support  functional  activities  •  4-5 
Continuing  CI  special  agent  support  •  4-o 
Operations  security  services  «  4-7 
Multidiscipline  threat  data  development, 
maintenance,  ana  dissemination  •  4-i< 
Automated  Data  Processing  Systems 
Security  Enhancement  Program 
(ADPSSEP)  •  4-o 
fecl..iical  surveillance 
Counter-signals  intelligence  (C'  .:■'.• 
S1GINT)  *  4-11 
Hostile  intelligence  sijpuiaiion  (Rec. 
Team)  •  4-12 
Special  access  prog/urns  •  4-13 
>PSECv.;       rt  :<  £CE  •  4-14 
Chapter  .. 
Cojnte.    :eiiicj2.w&  Production 
Gen?ral      51..  .      , 
Prod  tf.      cajectV     ■  i-2 
Type;.  ,»t     oductioi.  •  5-3 
Access  t    uiii  :issc,ni;';»aon  of  o.At 
inforn.  .ion  •  5-4 
MACOlvt-level  product:  on  •  5-5 
Chapter  6 
Counterintellicenc       .Jiect'on 
General  •  (t-l 
Identifying  ar.d  '.a'"--'--"  :..  ci  ikxrion 
requirements  •  t  . 
"JfeSiiiflRW 
flvfjl: 
m$ 
3SK<  --iiT-aBKiEP
*«.  All  investigations  will  be  conducted  in 
accordance  with  this  regulation. 
-  c  Investigations  will  be  coordinated  with 
other  intelligence  and  law  enforcement 
agencies  as  necessary  and  appropriate.  De- 
-  partmental  CI  investigative  jurisdiction  is 
defined  in  appendix  C. 
ti  d.'  Investigations  will  continue  until  alle- 
gations are  resolved,  adequate  intelligence 
information  is  provided  to  responsible  offi- 
cials, or  the  control  office  determines  that 
the  investigation  may  be  closed,  suspended, 
or  terminated. 
;*"e  Investigations  will  be  conducted  only 
by  CI  personnel  (who  have  been  issued 
badges  and  credentials  and  are  school- 
trained  in  specialty  skill  identifier  (SSI)  36A 
or  36B,  or  military  occupational  specialty 
(MOS)  97 1  A,  972A,  97B,  or  97C)  or  by 
Army  civilian  employees,  assigned  to  opera- 
tional duties  in  CI  units,  and  appropriately 
trained  and  issued  badges  and  credentials. 
2-2.  Investigations  under  Army  CI 
Jurisdiction 
'  'fa'  CI  investigative  jurisdiction  is  derived 
from  national,  DOD,  and  Army  policy  that 
,,:  defines  the  types  of  incidents  and  status  of 
,i  personnel  who  are  subject  to  investigation 
o.Jb/Anny  CI  components.  All  investigative 
activity  directed  against  U.S.  persons,  or 
employing  certain  intrusive  investigative 
.techniques,  must  comply  with  AR  381-10. 
?*-b.  Army  CI  jurisdiction  includes  the  fol- 
.   lowing  activities: 
. '(1)  Known  or  suspected  acts  of 
espionage. 
^'"r(2)  CI  aspects  of  known  or  suspected  for- 
eign-directed sabotage. 
}:{(S)  Subversive  activity  by  Army 
personnel. 
i5  «,v(4)  Known  or  suspected  acts  of  treason 
^  by  Army  personnel. 
£v,',.(5)  Known  or  suspected  acts  of  sedition 
>;  by,  Army  personnel. 
n  *>(6)  CI  aspects  of  terrorist  activities. 
*$ .."fi?(')  CI  aspects  of  assassination  or  at- 
*7  tempted  assassination  of  Army  personnel  by 
^terrorists  or  by  agents  of  a  foreign  power. 
*?%t(8)-  Defection  of  Army  military  or  civil- 
;,  V  tan  personnel,  to  include  investigation  of  the 
j,'  -tarcumstances  surrounding  the  defection 
<v';  jttd  debriefing  of  the  individual  upon  return 
J|||iilUJ5:  control. 
||J3|ii©)i  Detention  of  Army  military  or  civil- 
lljianrpersonnel  ,by  a  government  or  hostile 
||j Jbrce  with  interests  inimical  to  those  of  the 
llpBiled  States,  to  include  debriefing  the  indi- 
l^l^dual  upon  return  to  U.S.  control. 
JpftlO)  Investigation  and  debriefing  of 
mknowledgeable  personnel  absent  without 
^^-^"(KAWOL). 
^  (tl)  CI  aspects  of  security  violations  and 
compromises  to  include  acts  or  suspected' 
jgljMUsof  deliberate  compromise  or  willful  dis-; 
j^dosore  of  classified  information  or  material, 
fvjnd  COMSEC  insecurities.  lfi-,».~  r  ? 
|^<12)Impersonation  of  Army  military  in- 
0tdugenee  personnel  or  the  unlawful  posses-i 
f  sion  or  use^of-tmilitaryls.inteJUgence 
;  identification!  vai  ih  ninftian  llw  a  Am  k>u 
(13)  Violations  by  Ami)  personnel  of  the 
Intelligence  Identities  Protection  Act  (SO 
USC  421). 
c.  Within  the  United  States,  Army  CI 
has  investigative  jurisdiction  over  the  fol- 
lowing persons: 
(1)  U.S.  Army  personnel  on  active  duty. 
(2)  Retired  Army  personnel. 
(3)  Active  and  Inactive  members  of  the 
U.S.  Army  Reserve  (USAR)  and  Army  Na- 
tional Guard  (ARNG),  when  the  act  under 
investigation  took  place  while  the  individual 
was  on  active  duty. 
d.  If  the  FBI  waives  jurisdiction  over 
Army  civilian  employees,  Army  CI  may 
take  investigative  actions  necessary  to— 
(1)  Establish  the  basis  for  administrative 
action  by  DA  against  these  employees. 
(2)  Protect  the  security  of  Army  person- 
nel, information,  functions,  activities,  and 
installations. 
e.  Outside  the  United  States,  Army  CI 
has  investigative  jurisdiction  over  the  fol- 
lowing persons  (unless  responsibility  is  oth- 
erwise assigned  by  agreement  with  host 
government,  U.S.  law,  or  Executive 
directive): 
(1)  Army  personnel  on  active  duty. 
(2)  Family  members  of  active  duty  Army 
personnel. 
(3)  Army  civilian  employees  and  their 
family  members. 
(4)  Army  contractors,  their  employees, 
and  family  members. 
(5)  Retired  Army  personnel,  active  and 
inactive  USAR  personnel,  ARNG  mem- 
bers, and  other  U.S.  persons,  subject  to  co- 
ordination with  the  FBI,  CIA,  and  host 
government  agencies. 
(6)  Foreign  nationals  who  are  applicants 
for,  or  are  employed  in,  positions  requiring 
access  to  U.S.  classified  information. 
(7)  Other  foreign  nations,  subject  to  co- 
ordination with  the  CIA  and  agreements 
with  other  DOD  intelligence  components 
and  host  nation  governments. 
/  In  addition,  Army  CI  may  take  investi- 
gative actions  necessary  to — 
(1)  Establish  the  basis  for  administrative 
action  by  DA. 
(2)  Protect  the  security  of  Army  person- 
nel, information,  functions,  activities,  and 
installations. 
g.  Army  CI  jurisdiction  includes  both  the 
investigation  of  known  or  suspected  acts 
against  the  Army  (incident  investigations), 
as  well  as  the  investigation  of  personnel  be- 
lieved to  be  involved  in  activities  listed  in  b 
above  (personal  subject  investigations). 
These  investigations  arc  subject  to  DOD 
agreement  with  the  Department  of  Justice 
(App  C)  and  applicable  Status  of  Forces 
agreements. 
h.  In  those  instances  where  primary  ju- 
risdiction rests  with  another  Federal  or 
State  agency,  Army  investigation  will  nor- 
mally take  the  form  of  coordinating  with 
the  primary  agency,  providing  assistance  as 
required,  and  acquiring  copies  of  reports 
and  determinations  collectable  under  AR 
381-10. 
28.SEPJEMBER  1986  UPDATE  •  AR  381-20 
2-3.  Control  offices 
The  DA  Central  Control  Office  established 
by  the  CG,  INSCOM  and  the  sub-control 
offices  established  by  CINCUSAREUR; 
CG,  Eighth  U.S.  Army;  and  the  com- 
manders of  the  470th,  500th,  and  902nd  MI 
Groups,  have  the  authority  to  initiate,  di- 
rect, and  terminate  CI  investigations  in  ac- 
cordance with  this  regulation.  Specifically, 
the  sub-control  offices  will — 
a.  Initiate  investigations  based  on  infor- 
mation received  from  field  elements,  liaison 
channels,  or  other  sources. 
b.  Within  5  working  days  after  initiation, 
provide  the  following  information  to  the 
DA  Central  Control  Office,  with  follow  up 
reports  as  required: 
(1)  Source  and  substance  of  information 
leading  to  the  initiation  of  the  investigation. 
(2)  Subject  of  the  investigation. 
(3)  Summary  of  investigative  activities 
being  undertaken. 
(4)  Other  Army  or  intelligence  communi- 
ty elements  involved  or  tasked  in  the 
investigation. 
c.  Disseminate  appropriate  tasking  and 
monitor  the  conduct  of  investigations  within 
their  area  of  responsibility. 
d.  Provide  investigative  guidance  as 
required. 
e.  Review  and  coordinate  requests  for  use 
of  investigative  techniques  requiring  approv- 
al. (See  AR  195-6  and  AR  381-10.) 
/.  Coordinate  investigations  with  other 
control  offices  as  required. 
g.  Complete  and  terminate  investigations 
and  transmit  investigative  reports  and  sum- 
maries to  the  DA  Central  Control  Office 
(para  2-4)  and  to  HQDA  or  the  MACOM 
commander  when  required. 
2-4.  DA  Central  Control  Office 
The  DA  Central  Control  Office  acts  for 
Headquarters,  Department  of  the  Army 
(HQDA)  in  the  overall  control  and  coordi- 
nation of  all  Army  CI  investigations.  Specif- 
ically, the  DA  Central  Control  Office  will — 
a.  Exercise  direct  case  control  over  cate- 
gory I  counter-espionage  investigations  (AR 
381-12-1).  The  DA  Central  Control  Office 
will  ensure  that  category  I  cases  impacting 
on  USAREUR  and  Eighth  U.S.  Army  are 
fully  coordinated  with  the  appropriate  sub- 
control  office.  The  DA  Central  Control  Of- 
fice will  open  and  close  such  cases,  may  im- 
part operational  or  investigative  guidance, 
and  will  be  an  action  addressee  on  all  rele- 
vant reporting  and  correspondence. 
USAREUR,  Eighth  U.S.  Army,  and  470th. 
500th,  and  902nd  Ml  Group  sub-control  of- 
fices will  continue  to  exercise  all  other  sub- 
control  office  functions  stated  in  paragraph 
2-3. 
b.  Monitor  all  CI  investigations  conduct- 
ed within  the  Army,  and  provide  guidance 
and  direction  to  control  offices  as  required. 
c.  Conduct  national  liaison  with  the  FBI, 
CIA,  and  other  Federal  departments  and 
agencies  as  required. 
d.  Within  10  working  days  of  receipt,  re- 
view and  forward  the  initiation  report  (para
i  iiijui\  (,L*rtt»ll-v_n_/,  »»/WU  IVV.         rtiiillii  >  vi  nit 
20310-1054. 
e.  Prepare  followup  reports  on  investiga- 
tions in  sufficient  detail  for  the  ACSI  to 
keep  senior  DA  and  DOD  officials  advised 
of  information  of  possible  national  interest. 
This  follow  up  will  include  notice  of  termi- 
nation of  the  investigation  and  final  action 
taken  by  Army  CI. 
/  Ensure  that  investigative  techniques  re- 
quiring prior  approval  have  such  approval 
before  use,  and  assist  control  offices  in  se- 
curing approval. 
g.  Ensure  that  information  concerning 
possible  loss  or  compromise  of  COMSEC 
information  and  any  occurrence  that  may 
jeopardize  the  security  of  COMSEC  materi- 
al is  provided  to  appropriate  COMSEC  or- 
ganizations in  accordance  with  TB  380-41, 
chapter  10. 
h.  Present  a  semiannual  briefing  to  the 
ACSI  on  all  investigations  of  DA  interest, 
including  the  topics  below.  (This  briefing 
may  be  combined  with  briefings  required  by 
AR  381-47.) 
(1)  Summary  of  significant  activities. 
(2)  Significant  developments. 
(3)  Statistics  by  area,  type,  status,  and 
trends. 
'  L  Receive,  process,  and  transmit  investi- 
gative and  operational  records  to  the  Intelli- 
gence Records  Repository  in  accordance 
with  AR  381-45. 
2-5.  Reporting  of  CI  Information 
d.  All  Army  commanders  who  become 
aware  of  information  that  is  or  may  be  of  CI 
interest  will  promptly  report  this  informa- 
tion to  the  supporting  INSCOM  CI  ele- 
ment. In  the  absence  of  a  nearby  INSCOM 
element,  the  information  will  be  reported  to 
the  CI  element  of  the  nearest  tactical  MI 
unit.  Units  belonging  to  the  Supreme  Head- 
quarters Allied  Powers  Europe  and  Allied 
Command  Europe  who  become  aware  of  in- 
formation of  CI  interest  will  report  this  in- 
formation immediately  to  the  nearest  office 
of  the  650th  MI  Group. 
.  6.  In  view  of  the  increased  application  of 
analysis  and  production  to  CI  support  to 
OPSEC,  terrorism  counteraction,  and  other 
security  requirements,  CI  elements  will  en- 
sure the  rapid  exchange  of  information 
outside  immediate  command  channels.  CI 
elements  that  obtain  raw  CI  information  re- 
lating to  OPSEC,  terrorism,  and  other  secu- 
rity matters,  will  forward  the  information  to 
analysis  and  production  centers  using  the 
Intelligence  Information  Report  (IIR)  for* 
mat  (This  report  is  exempt  from  reporting 
requirement  by  AR  335-U,  para  5-2e(2).) 
2^-6.  Shared  investigative  Jurisdiction 
Intelligence  and  related  crimes  of  actual  or 
alleged  acts  of  espionage,  treason,  sabotage, 
and  sedition  may  present  situations  where 
.  MI  and  CID  have  concurrent  investigative 
jurisdiction.  The  primary  responsibility  of 
MI  i»  to  investigate  such  incidents  for  intel- 
ligence and  security-related  purposes;  CID 
share*  the  responsibility  to  investigate  the 
inadeat-fix  the  purpMtcCrepqrtin^criiDfc 
>f<iigUII>l  jUUSt.llk.lln|l.    I  lie 
lead  agency  concept  will  be  employed,  based 
on  coordination  with  the  appropriate  CID 
component,  to  determine  which  agency  will 
undertake  primary  investigative  responsibil- 
ity. Generally,  MI  will  take  the  investigative 
lead  to  first  exhaust  all  intelligence/security 
dimensions  of  incidents  of  espionage,  trea- 
son, and  sedition  before  investigation  for 
possible  criminal  prosecution  is  initiated. 
Generally,  CID  wilt  assume  the  investiga- 
tive lead  for  actual  or  suspected  incidents  of 
sabotage.  Should  jurisdictional  disputes 
arise,  or  should  security  considerations  pre- 
clude local  coordination,  the  matter  should 
be  referred  to  HQDA  (DAMI-CI),  WASH 
DC  20310-1054,  for  resolution  at  HQDA 
level. 
Chapter  3 
Counterintelligence  Support  to 
Terrorism  Counteraction 
3-1.  Scope 
This  chapter  prescribes  policies  and  proce- 
dures and  assigns  responsibilities  for  CI 
support  to  terrorism  counteraction. 
3-2.  Responsibilities 
a.  The  ACSI  will  provide  guidance  and 
develop  policies,  plans,  and  procedures  for 
the  collection,  analysis,  and  reporting  of  in- 
formation on  terrorist  activities. 
b.  The  CG,  INSCOM  will— 
(1)  Conduct  foreign  intelligence  (FI)  and 
CI  activities  to  collect  and  disseminate  in- 
formation on  all  aspects  of  terrorism  and 
terrorist  threats  against  the  Army  and 
DOD.  These  activities  will  be  conducted  in 
accordance  with  AR  381-10,  AR  381-15, 
AR  381-20.  AR  381-47  and  AR  381-100. 
(2)  Operate  a  24-hour  operations  center 
to  receive  and  disseminate  worldwide  ter- 
rorism threat  information  to  and  from  ap- 
plicable INSCOM  staff  elements, 
subordinate  commands,  and  national  agen- 
cies. On  receipt  of  terrorism-related  traffic 
from  INSCOM  reporting  channels,  this  op- 
erations center  will  ensure  dissemination  to 
all  affected  units  and  appropriate  DA, 
DOD,  and  national  agencies. 
(3)  Provide  Army  commanders  with  in- 
formation on  terrorist  threats  concerning 
their  personnel,  facilities,  and  operations. 
(4)  Investigate  terrorist  incidents  for  in- 
telligence aspects  together  with  the  FBI  or 
host  nation  authorities. 
(5)  Include  terrorist  threat  information 
in  subversion  and  espionage  directed  against 
U.S.  Army  (SAEDA)  briefings  per  AR 
381-12. 
(6)  Serve  as  the  Army's  liaison  represent- 
ative to  Federal,  State,  and  local  agencies, 
and  host  country  national,  state,  and  local- 
level  agencies,  to  exchange  terrorist' 
information.  ....  /     •■•• 
c.  The  CG.  USAIA  will— 
(1)  Analyze  information  on  all  aspects  of 
terrorism  .and  the  threat  it  poses  to  U.S. 
Army  personnel,  facilitiry  and  activities. 
2fi,£B3aifia^t3K&FCKf&  -  ARt*M& 
formation  on  terrorist  threats  concerning 
their  personnel,  facilities,  and  activities. 
(3)  Provide  terrorism  analysis  and  threai 
assessments  in  response  to  Army  Staft 
requirements. 
(4)  Serve  as  the  Army's  analytic  reprc 
sentative  for  terrorism  intelligence. 
d.  Intelligence  staffs  at  all  levels  will — 
(1)  Promptly  report  all  actual  or  suspect- 
ed terrorist  incidents,  activities,  and  early 
warnings  of  terrorist  attack  to  their  chain  oi 
command,  supported  and  supporting  activi- 
ties, local  INSCOM  office,  and  the 
USAITAC. 
(2)  Initiate  and  maintain  liaison  with,  as 
a  minimum,  the  provost  marshal's  office 
(PMO),  local  CID  and  INSCOM  elements, 
security  officers  and  managers,  host  nation 
intelligence  and  security  agencies,  and  othci 
organizations,  elements,  and  individuals  as 
required  for  the  efficient  conduct  of  the 
mission. 
(3)  Develop  and  present  terrorism  aware 
ness  training  briefings  to  all  personnel  with 
in  their  command.  ■■ 
e.  Law  enforcement  staffs  at  all  level1 
will— 
(1)  Promptly  report  all  actual  or  suspect 
ed  terrorist  incidents  and  activities  to  theii 
chain-of-command,  other  activities  poten 
tially  affected,  and  local  INSCOM  CI 
elements. 
(2)  Initiate  and  maintain  liaison  with  lo 
cal  INSCOM  CI  elements. 
f.  Installation  security  officers/manager 
will— 
(1)  Promptly  report  all  actual  or  suspect 
ed  terrorist  incident(s)  and  activities  to  then 
chain-of-command,  other  activities  poten 
tially  affected,  and  local  INSCOM  CI  am' 
CID  offices.  In  addition,  they  will  conduc 
regular  liaison  with  their  local  PMO,  IN 
SCOM  CI,  and  CID  representatives,  and  lo 
cal  intelligence  staffs. 
(2)  Ensure  that  terrorism  threat  aware 
ness  training  and  briefings  are  presented  t 
their  personnel. 
3-3.  Reporting  of  terrorism 
information 
a.  Commanders  will  report  acts  of  terroi 
ism  and  other  major  disruptions  on  installs 
tions  in  accordance  with  AR  190-52,  wit: 
immediate  telephonic  notification  to  th 
Army  Operations  Center  (AO( 
AUTOVON  851-1800,  or  commercial  (20; 
697-0218,  and  to  the  MACOM  emergent 
operations  center.  This  will  be  followed  I1 
additional  electrical  messages,  detailing  sul 
stantive  facts  as  they  become  available,  t 
HQDA  WASH  DC//DAPE-HRE//.  A- 
ditional  message  information  addressees  wi 
include  HQDA  WASH  DC//DAM1 
DAMO//,  CDR  USAITAC  AHS  VA/ 
AIAIT-KT//.  and  CDR  USACID' 
WASH  DC//CIOP-IS//. 
b.  The  initial  report  will  provide  a  narr 
tive  description  of  the  event  to  the  AC'
of  occurrence,  number  of  persons  in- 
,  votad  (hostages  and  abductors),  specifics  of 
dcuunds,  and  current  status. 
:    Chapter  4 
Counterintelligence  and  Security 
Support  Activities 
j",    4-1.  Scope 
I'.j  This  chapter  prescribes  policies  and  proce- 
%i  .  duns  and  assigns  responsibilities  for  CI  and 
pj.  security  support  to  U.S.  Army  OPSEC 
'  j-"  programs.  .'.',' 
i'&,*-  x-  '  ;«•.  i  ,;  .f  •  i  "  ,  :•  ■■•  ■ 
^!;4-2i' Policy  '(■•■•■■ 
^Kd.'-- OPSEC  is  concerned  with  the  mainte- 
£&;  nance  of  security  and  achievement  of  sur- 
^.prise  in  U.S.  military  operations  and 
'vf  activities  through  the  protection  of  capabili- 
ty ties' and  intentions  from  hostile  intelligence 
Ijfi  exploitation.  Its  ultimate  objective  is  to  pre- 
'ij<  .vent  an  enemy  from  obtaining  sufficient  ad- 
J^/vance  information  to  predict,  and  thus  be 
£%  able  to  degrade,  friendly  operations  or 
r{l  capabilities. 
|g-;  ■>  b.  OPSEC  is  a  command  responsibility. 
g%  Command  OPSEC  programs  are  established 
|||;and  conducted  in  accordance  with  AR 
|^530-1.  To  carry  out  assigned  OPSEC  re- 
l^sportsibilities,  the  commander  requires  sup-. 
Import  from  several  sources,  to  include  the 
■£■7  military  intelligence  community.  MI  OP- 
%?$.  SEC  support  is  provided  by  MI  components 
|pt '  at  both  echelons  above  corps  (EAC),  and 
jp.  echelons  corps  and  below  (ECB). 
«Cn£fe-:6'CI  and  security  support  to  OPSEC  is 
P|only;one  part  of  the  Army  OPSEC  pro- 
gram, although  it  is  a  major  contributing 
^factor.  This  support  takes  three  basic  forms: 
plMH)  Information  acquired  through  inter- 
Jlna!  command  security  programs  to  include 
^information  security  (AR  380-5)  and  per- 
^eonel  security  (AR  604-5).  •.  . 
fei%>  (2)  Information  acquired  through  on-go- 
png^Army  CI  programs  (AR  381-12,,  AR 
j£>M7<  *nd  this  regulation). 
rp(3)  Programs  specifically  developed  and! 
tailored  to  provide  security  support  to  the 
'  tomander  as  described  herein.         . 
'd  Because  the  hostile  intelligence  threat 
arrayed  against  U.S.  forces  and  agencies  is 
^nultidiscipline'd,  the  countering  of  that 
1linat,;niust  also  be  multidisciplined. 
^terititeiligence  support  recognizes  the 
,fc*¥requirement  that  counters  hostile 
in>tdligehce  (HUMINT),  signals  in- 
Iftnce^IGINT),  and  imagery  intellw 
^fl»UNT)'c£l!«tion  and  provides  an 
J^pibiliry'  to  bring  threat,  friendly ' 
i^ulMmbQities;'  and  existing  security 
•^^gw^Cl  arid  security'  support 
iPSECnU$aesth'i  requirement  and  is 
e  to  al|  echekrh*  Ironrbattaiion  to 
must  be  considered  in  implementing  OP- 
SEC improvements  remain  a  command  re- 
sponsibility. OPSEC  evaluations  made  by 
supporting  MI  elements  should  be  consid- 
ered, though,  by  the  MACOMs  and  HQDA 
in  evaluating  the  overall  effectiveness  of  the 
MACOM  and  DA  OPSEC  programs. 
4-3.  CI  and  security  support  to 
OPSEC 
a.  The  level  of  CI  and  security  support  to 
OPSEC  will  be  tailored  to  the  sensitivity  of 
the  supported  organization  and  its  vulnera- 
bility to  hostile  intelligence  collection  and 
terrorist  attack. 
b.  Supporting  MI  elements  will  routinely 
consider  the  following  in  determining  the 
degree  of  CI  and  security  support  required: 
(1)  All  aspects  of  the  supported  organiza- 
tion's activities.  This  includes  contracts  and 
contractor  facilities,  weapons  systems  (spe- 
cial/new), communications  systems,  and  in- 
terfaces with  other  military  departments, 
DOD,  other  Federal  agencies,  and  foreign 
governments  as  appropriate. 
(2)  The  total  threat  from  hostile  intelli- 
gence collection  and  terrorist  attack 
capabilities. 
(3)  Specific  identification  of  vulnerabili- 
ties to  hostile  intelligence  collection  and  ter- 
rorist attack. 
(4)  The  regulatory  requirements,  such  as 
the  requirement  for  cryptofacility 
inspections. 
(5)  Recommendations  of  countermea- 
sures  for  the  supported  organization's 
activities. 
Responsibilities 
a.  Deputy  Chief  of  Staff  for  Operations 
and  Plans  (DCSOPS).  See  AR  530-1  for  re- 
sponsibilities of  the  DCSOPS  as  they  apply 
to  this  chapter. 
6.  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff  for  Intelligence. 
TheACSIwill—  . 
-(I)  Formulate  pblicy  for  intelligence  and 
security  support  to  OPSEC. 
(2)  Provide  HQDA  staff  supervision  over 
Army  intelligence  and  security  support  to 
OPSEC  programs. 
c;  CG,  1NSCOM.  Within  assigned  re- 
sources, the  CG,  INSCOM  will— 
(1)  Provide  intelligence  and  security  sup- 
port to  the  OPSEC  programs  of  the  Army 
Staff,  all  elements' at  EAC,  and  designated 
DOD  activities.     1* '  •  ■ ;  <■ 
(2)  Supplement  CI  and  security  support 
resources  organic  to  other  commands  (in- 
cluding those  at  ECB)  with  technical  skills, 
advice,  and  assistance.  •..■■•., 
(3)  Establish  priorities  for  INSCOM  in- 
telligence and  security  support  to  OPSEC 
support  programs  in  accordance  with  Army 
regulations  and  HQDA  tasking.  Conflicts  in 
priorities  between  INSCOM  and  another 
MACOMs  will  be  referred  to  HQDA  for 
#T*""t"j~T^ --»■——*-—--■  »v  ?wfi»wi  ""5  «»»*     resolution. 
MBtt W  improvements  to  QPSE^'are  .      (4)  On  request,  assist  in  the  development 
piKbwr  i*  natoret' unless  provided  for    orcomprehensive  OPSEC  programs  to  in- 
r-Cf"endcwedai*uchby     elude  evaluating  the  OPSEC  plan  of  the 
nderf<^«/ priority^    supported  command. 
26nSEWEMBER'1986  UPDATE  •  AR  381-20 
mm mm 
\jf  wii  rcqucsi,  vanaaica  per  inmjom 
procedures,  provide  Operations  Security 
Evaluations  (OSEs)  and  Project  Security 
Analyses  (PSAs)  to  supported  commanders 
for  critical  or  sensitive  facilities,  activities, 
or  programs. 
(6)  Advise  and  assist  Army  commanders 
in  electronic  warfare  (EW)  matters  and  pro- 
vide technical  support  to  manipulative  elec- 
tronic deception  (MED)  activities  that 
relate  to  OPSEC. 
(7)  Maintain  continuous  contact  with  the 
Army  Staff  and  other  supported  commands 
and  activities,  provide  OPSEC  advice  and 
assistance,  assist  in  identifying  appropriate 
OPSEC  support  requirements,  and  interface 
for  coordinating  support  programs. 
(8)  Provide  liaison  personnel  to  those 
Army  commands  and  activities  requiring 
frequent  technical  assistance  in  intelligence 
and  security  matters. 
(9)  Ensure  compliance  with  all  regulato- 
ry policies  governing  the  conduct  of  intelli- 
gence activities  by  personnel  assigned  to  or 
under  the  operational  control  of  INSCOM. 
d.  CG,  VSAIA.  The  CG,  USAIA  will— 
(1)  Provide  all-source  threat  evaluations 
of  foreign  intelligence  and  terrorist  organi- 
zations that  threaten  the  security  of  the  U.S. 
Army. 
(2)  Prepare  multidiscipline  threat  data 
pertaining  to  SIGINT,  EW  (less  MED  and 
electronic  counter-countermeasures 
(ECCM)),  HUMINT,  and  IMINT  for  in- 
clusion in  OPSEC  training  programs  of  the 
supported  commands. 
e.  Supported  commanders.  These  com- 
manders will — 
(1)  Comply  with  command  OPSEC  pro- 
gram requirements  in  AR  530-1. 
(2)  Ensure  that  supporting  MI  elements 
are  given  all  data  relating  to  the  organiza- 
tion and  activities  of  the  unit  needed  to  sup- 
port the  OPSEC  mission. 
/  Organic  Ml  elements  at  ECB.  These  el- 
ements are  responsible,  within  resource  ca- 
pabilities and  regulatory  guidance,  for  the 
OPSEC  support  to  activities  of  their  com- 
mands. Organic  MI  elements  may  request 
support,  advice,  and  assistance  from  the  IN- 
SCOM supporting  element,  and  other  CI 
analysis  and  production  elements  as 
required. 
4-5.  Support  functional  activities 
The  activities  below  are  those  functional  ac- 
tivities that  support  the  Army  and  designat- 
ed DOD  OPSEC  programs  (AR  530-1).  In 
most  instances,  the  requirements  for  receiv- 
ing this  support  and  the  procedures  for  the 
conduct  of  these  activities  arc  governed  by 
separate  Army  regulations. 
a.  Continuing  CI  special  agent  support. 
b.  OSEs. 
c.  PSAs. 
d.  Multidiscipline  threat  data  develop- 
ment, maintenance,  and  dissemination. 
e.  Security  support  to  special  access  pro- 
grams  (SAPs).  (See  AR  380-381.) 
/  Support  to  the  U.S.  Port  Security  Pro- 
gram. (See  AR  380-89.) 
&& 
*;••■ 
M
g.  Automatic  data  processing  (ADP)  sys- 
tems security.  (See  AR  380-380.) 
h.  Technical  surveillance  countermea- 
sures  (TSCM).  (See  AR  381-14.) 
L  COMSEC.  (See  AR  530-2.) 
;.  Telephone  communications  security 
monitoring.  (See  AR  380-53.) 
k.  Control  of  compromising  emanations 
(TEMPEST).  (See  AR  530-4.) 
/.  Electronic  security  (ELSEC).  (See  AR 
530-3.) 
4-6.  Continuing  CI  special  agent 
support 
a.  An  INSCOM  CI  special  agent  at  the 
local  level  acts  as  liaison  between  INSCOM 
and  all  Army  elements  receiving  intelligence 
and  security  support  from  INSCOM  for 
command  OPSEC  programs.  This  special 
agent  either  provides  the  required  intelli- 
gence and  security  support  directly  or  as- 
sists the  supported  unit  in  obtaining  needed 
support  that  is  beyond  his  or  her  direct 
capability. 
b.  Special  agents  are  the  key  element  in 
effective  CI  and  security  support  to  OPSEC. 
They  know  the  threat  and  vulnerabilities  of 
the  supported  unit,  and  are  familiar  with 
available  support  programs  and  counter- 
measures.  They  can,  therefore,  provide  valu-: 
able  advice  <'-&v  assistance  pertaining  to  the 
supported  uu><s  needs. 
c  A  special  agent  may  be  designated  to 
support  a  number  of  general  activities  on  a 
given  installation  or  in  a  given  geographic 
area,  or  the  agent  may  provide  dedicated 
support  for  a  specific  project  or  exercise  for 
either  short-  or  long-term  periods.  The 
method  of  allocation  is  tailored  to  the  sup- 
port needs  and  nature  of  Army  units  in,  a 
given  locale. 
d.  Duties  of  the  special  agent  include,  but 
are  not  limited  to  the  following: 
(1)  Providing  direct  intelligence  and  se- 
curity support  within  his  or  her  capability 
to  include  threat  assessments. 
(2)  Advising  on  availability  and  feasibil- 
ity of  additional  support  and  countermea- 
sures,  and  providing  assistance  in  obtaining 
the  necessary  support,      i 
(3)  Conducting  liaison  with  local,  State, 
Federal,  and  host  country  agencies  for  intel- 
ligence information  and  .threat  data. '      ■:  r 
(4)  Providing  assistance  in  developing 
and  reviewing  command  OPSEC 
.;!••; 
4-7.  Operations  security  services 
OSS  are  a  variety  of  tailored,  multidiscipline 
intelligence  services  designed  to  evaluate 
and  contribute  to  the  OPSEC  program  of 
the  supported  command.  OSS  are  those  ac- 
tivities listed  in  paragraph  4-5/  through  /, 
plus  other  CI  services  developed  to  assist' 
the  supported  command  in  strengthening  its 
OPSEC  program.  The  basic  level  in  deter- 
mining OSS  requirements  is  interface  be- 
tween' the  supported  command  and  the 
mpoMBbic  INSCOM  unit,  whktc  has.  many 
rfllH  isBBBTOBMiw  dVHMflflfcfRF'  IHH^.'UB.  CVflsW 
4-8.  Multidiscipline  threat  data 
development,  maintenance,  and 
dissemination 
a.  The  development,  maintenance,  and 
dissemination  of  multidiscipline  threat  data 
should  be  ongoing.  In  order  to  meet  the 
needs  of  the  supported  commander,  there 
must  be  a  continuous  application  of  the  in- 
telligence cycle  (FM  34-1),  to  provide  infor- 
mation on  the  multidiscipline  and  terrorist 
threat. 
b.  The  focal  point  for  this  support  is  the 
local  CI  special  agent.  Additional  compre- 
hensive threat  analysis  and  intelligence  sup- 
port may  be  obtained  from  the  USAIA  per 
AR  381-11  and  AR  381-19. 
c.  A  major  component  of  this  aspect  of 
OPSEC  support  is  the  multidiscipline  threat 
briefing.  Briefings  can  be  tailored,  both  as  to 
scope  and  classification  level,  to  familiarize 
supported  commands  with  the  nature  of  the 
HUMINT,  SIGINT,  and  IMINT  threat 
posed  against  the  command  or  activity.  Fre- 
quently, multidiscipline  threat  briefings  can 
be  combined  with  required  SAEDA  brief- 
ings presented  under  AR  381-12. 
4-9.  Automated  Data  Processing 
Systems  Security  Enhancement 
Program  (ADPSSEP) 
The  purpose  of  the  ADPSSEP  is  to  preserve 
the  availability,  integrity,  and  confidentiality 
of  Army  computer  resources  and  computer- 
based  systems.  The  ADPSSEP  provides 
services  that  are  scheduled,  conducted,  and 
reported  under  AR  380-380. 
4-10.  Technical  surveillance 
countermeasures 
The  TSCM  program  is  conducted  in  sensi- 
tive areas  to  prevent  or  detect,  nullify,  and 
isolate  clandestine  monitoring  systems, 
technical  security  hazards,  and  physical  se- 
curity weaknesses  in  accordance  with  AR 
381-14. 
4-11.  Counter-signals  Intelligence 
(counter-SIGINT) 
The  term  counter-SIGINT  is  used  to  distin- 
guish between  CI  activities  to  support  sig- 
nals security  (SIGSEC)  and  SIGSEC  itself. 
a.  SIGSEC  includes  COMSEC  (AR 
530-2)  and  ELSEC  (AR  530-3).  It  includes 
all  measures  taken  by  a  command  to  pre- 
vent exploitation  of  Army  communications- 
electronics  by  hostile  intelligence.  SIGSEC 
is  closely  related  to  command,  control,  and 
communications  countermeasures,  electro- 
magnetic cover  and  deception,  and  ECCM 
(AR  105-86).  Counter-SIGINT  is  intelli- 
gence support  to  a  command's  SIGSEC 
program. 
b.  Counter-SIGINT  consists  of  four  pri- 
mary support  functions:  threat  assessments, 
vulnerability  assessments,  countermeasures 
recommendations,  and  countermeasures 
evaluations.  The  counter-SIGINT  support 
proas  described  in  FM  14-61  aopfies  at  all 
"  hr^niifcaatfcshntifat  bemaofcas;  Mil  h—  fin1 
c.  INSCOM  CI  elements  are  assigned 
missions  to  perform  certain  regulatory  func- 
tions that  are  closely  related  to  counter- 
SIGINT  in  support  of  the  overall  Army  op- 
erations and  signal  security  program.  These 
include — 
(1)  Approving  cryptofacilitics.  The  CG, 
INSCOM  is  responsible  for  approving  new, 
relocated,  or  modified  Army  fixed 
cryptofacilities.  (See  AR  380-40  and  the  TB 
380-41  series.) 
(2)  Inspecting  cryptofacilities.  The  CG, 
INSCOM  must  periodically  inspect  Army 
cryptofacilities  to  ensure  that  COMSEC 
material  is  properly  protected,  accounted 
for,  used,  stored,  distributed,  and  main- 
tained. (See  AR  380-40  and  the  TB  380-41 
series). 
(3)  Evaluating  compromising  emanations 
control  measures.  INSCOM  CI  elements 
with  appropriately  qualified  personnel  sup- 
port the  Army  Compromising  Emanation 
Control  Program  (AR  530-4),  usually  re- 
ferred to  as  the  TEMPEST  program.  The 
level  of  support  may  consist  simply  of  rec- 
ommending appropriate  TEMPEST  coun- 
termeasures or  could  include  instrumented 
TEMPEST  tests  to  determine  the  existence 
and  strength  of  compromising  emanations 
(TB  380-7). 
(4)  Monitoring  Army  telecommunica- 
tions. COMSEC  monitoring  (AR  380-53) 
and  analysis  may  support  the  countermea- 
sures evaluation  phase  of  the  counter- 
SIGINT  process.  Monitoring  should  never 
be  conducted  separately  from  the  counter- 
SIGINT  process.  An  evaluation  based  on 
monitoring  alone  would  be  misleading  since 
only  a  very  small  sample  of  a  command's 
telecommunications  can  be  collected  and 
analyzed. 
4-12.  Hostile  intelligence  simulation 
(Red  Team) 
a.  At  the  request  of  a  supported  Army 
command  or  agency,  INSCOM  CI  person- 
nel may  plan  and  execute  a  simulation  of  a 
hostile  intelligence  attack  on  a  specified  tar- 
get (such  as  headquarters,  installation,  oper- 
ation, or  program).  Such  simulations  are 
informally  known  as  "Red  Team  evalua- 
tions." The  number  of  Red  Team  evalua- 
tions is  extremely  limited  due  to  their 
complexity  and  high  resource  requirements 
As  a  result,  they  are  conducted  principally 
on  SAPs  and  similar  sensitive  activities. 
b.  Red  Team  evaluations  may  take  a 
multidisciplinary  approach,  in  other  words, 
simulate  hostile  HUMINT,  SIGINT.  and 
IMINT  collection  and  analytical  activities 
against  the  target.  The  objective  of  the  Red 
Team  operations  is  to  provide  a  supported 
command  or  agency  a  realistic  tool  with 
which  to  evaluate  internal  OPSEC  pro- 
grams. To  this  end,  hostile  intelligence  sim 
ulations  should  be  carried  out  a- 
realistically  as  possible,  but  within  the  pro 
visions  of  AR  381-10. 
4-13.  Special  access  programs 
TheCC  ENSCOM  »  r-wrrnsbie  frr  — • 
.  ".mUBtV  ' 
Bpjeg*3S>E>-AiS3S£~3;:
I, /the  attendant  capability,  methods,  and  ex* 
j|f  pertise  to  meet  Army  requirements.  IN- 
?V*SCOM  will  provide,  as  directed  by  the 
'"  V  Office  of  the  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff  for  In- 
1  telligence  (OACSI),  life  cycle  support  to 
.  ,SAPs  approved  by  the  Secretary  of  the 
i   Army.  Such  support  will  be  in  accordance 
^with  AR  380-381. 
a  SAPs  generally  involve  either  a  sensi- 
tive military  commodity  or  military  opera- 
tion. In  many  cases,  defense  contracts  may 
>  •  be  involved.  The  support  rendered  by  IN-  " 
;>  SCOM  to  SAPs  may  thus  extend  to  both 
V  Government  and  industrial  security  en- 
:%.  hancements  and  to  the  full  range  of  Army 
■J^  research,  development,  acquisition,  and  sen- 
§ f  sitive  operational  activities  for  which  DA  is 
i|  either  proponent  or  the  executive  agent. 
%  r-  b.  INSCOM  activities  in  support  of  SAPs 
r*  will  generally  include —  ■  »'•■■■ 
:>i>t  (1)  Preliminary  assessments  of  the  OP- 
••:•-  SEC  posture  of  proposed  SAPs.  These  as- 
|^  sessments  are  prepared  in  conjunction  with 
§■.■  the  process  of  initial  approval  of  a  SAP  per 
^  AR  380-381.  They  are  intended  as  decision- 
'i/i  making  aids  for  the  Special  Access  Program 
^Oversight  Committee,  HQDA;  antTilhe 
I y  Army leadership:   "-T-r\  .    -, 
'%■:  >'  (2)  Periodic  reassessments  of  the  OPSEC 
£"5Posture  of  existing  SAPs.  These  assess- 
'laments,  similar  in  scope  and  intent  to  the 
' .';■  preliminary  assessments  discussed  in  (1) 
'■x~  above,  are  prepared  in  conjunction  with  an- 
V  nual  SAP  revalidations  required  by  AR 
\ '"■■■  380-381;'or  at  other  times  as  directed  by 
s<%.  OACSI.        :    '     '     ■"-  ■   '■■'■■■  >■'■'■■'■■ 
')$$**  (3)  Advice  and  assistance  to  SAP  propo- 
^.nents.  INSCOM  will  advise  and  assist,  as 
|^t  directed  by.  OACSI,  the  proponent  comT 
p}„  mand  or  agency  of'  a  SAP  iy|;.tfae  areas 
-IW  shown  below.  ''",VJ'  ""  " 
^SiK-to  Organizing  and  structuring ;an  effec- 
j^^ve  OPSEC  program.  ,       r''.f     ,. 
.  t 
i«||£(W  Developing  classification  guides.. 
ff 
Jfe?*^''  Security  planning.  ■'!•'■■••''  ;  •■».•"••?'■* ' 
yw?M^)  Technical  assistance  and  services.^,.', 
?-ffe^c(W  Hostile  intelligence  simulations.-  ., ...  • 
aS^'W  Termination  of  SAPs.  When  SAP  sta- 
^pusfor  a  program  is  terminated,  INSCOM 
Ipiasststance-may  be  required  to  ensure  an  or- 
f^derly  transition  to  traditional  security'  pro-' 
grams]  and,  in  some"  cases,-1  to  provide 
tinued  special  protection  for  residual  as- 
jptete  of  completed  or  cancelled  programs.'" 
f$>1«.'OreEC  support  to  ECB  '?;*■"' ■** 
^elements  of  the  Combat  Electronic 
|^ajfare>  Intelligence  (CEWI).  battalion/. 
Jgrpi^and.designated  MI  units,  are  the  ele- 
||»entsSwith.in;  the  Army's  tactical  force 
^structure  •responsible  for  providing  direct 
|OPSEC  support  to  U.S.,  Army  units  at 
^  and  below  where  these  resources  exist. 
i  •uppo^velementa.  should,  provide  CI 
Hp^EQ»ciW«;support.tp'QPSEg  Its? 
Counterintelligence  Production 
5-1.  General 
a  The  publication  and  reporting  of  CI 
information  to  meet  intelligence  needs  takes 
place  at  all  levels.  This  chapter  provides 
guidance  for  CI  analysis  and  production 
provided  by  CG,  USAIA  in  support  of  the 
Army  and  other  DOD  and  national 
agencies. 
b.  To  the  maximum  extent  possible,  in- 
formation from  all  intelligence  collection 
disciplines  (HUMINT,  SIGINT,  and 
IMINT)  will  be  used  to  develop  a  complete 
analysis  of  foreign  intelligence  and  terrorist 
activities,  and  threats.   
5-2.  Production  objectives 
The  objectives  of  Army  CI  production  are 
to— 
a.  Collate,  analyze,  and  evaluate  infor- 
mation of  CI  significance. 
b.  Prepare  studies,  estimates,  and  analy- 
ses of  foreign  intelligence  services,  the  activ- 
ities of  terrorists,  and  related  security 
threats. 
c.  Support  Army  security  programs  by 
studies  and  analyses  of  the  total  intelligence 
threat  posed  to  the  Army  by  foreign  intelli- 
gence services. 
d.  Support  contingency  planning  and  ma- 
jor exercises. 
e.  Provide  analysis  and  summary  of 
hostile  collection  and  terrorist  activities  by 
geographic  areas. 
/  Participate  fully,  and  represent  Army 
interests,  in  DOD  and  intelligence  commu- 
nity CI  production  planning  committees 
and  working  groups. 
5-3.  Types  of  production 
The  objectives  in  paragraph  5-2  are  met  by 
publication  of  the  following: 
a.  Current  CI  information,  consisting  of 
raw  or  partially  evaluated  perishable  data 
that  must  be  expeditiously  disseminated. 
b.  CI  threat  analyses  tailored  to  specific 
activities,  units,  installations,  programs,  or 
geographic  areas. 
c.  CI  studies  to  support  contingency 
planning  and  major  exercises. 
d.  CI  analyses  and  studies  in  support  of 
requirements  from — 
(1)  HQDA,  MACOMs.  and  other  valid 
Army  requestors.  .   • 
0(2)  Director  of'Central  Intelligence. 
f-  (3)  The  Deputy  Under  Secretary  of  De- 
fense for  Policy. 
'  (4)  Defense  Intelligence  Agency  (DIA), 
acting  for  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff. 
'"(5)  Other  agencies  within  the  national  in- 
telligence community. 
e.  Studies  dealing  with  the  organization, 
methods  of  operation,  personnel,  and  activi- 
ties of  foreign  intelligence  services  that  pose 
a  current  or  potential  threat  to  the  Army. 
/ -Analyses  and  estimates  of  intelligence 
on  the  organization,  location,  funding, 
training,  operations,  capabilities,  and  inten- 
tions of  terrorist  organizations. 
2&SEPTEMBER  1986  UPDATE  •  AR  381-20 
g.  Analyses  of  trends  to  permit  integra- 
tion of  pertinent  information  into  the 
Army's  SAEDA  program  under  AR 
381-12. 
5-4.  Access  to  and  dissemination  of 
existing  CI  Information 
a.  USAIA  will  provide  current  CI  infor- 
mation to  supported  MACOM  commanders 
as  required  and  within  resource  constraints. 
b.  USAIA  maintains  a  data  base  to  sup- 
port CI  analysis  and  production  require- 
ments. Requests  for  intelligence  production 
requirements,  which  do  not  need  to  be,  or 
cannot  be  satisfied  in  less  than  30  days,  may 
be  submitted  to  Commander,  USAIA, 
ATTN:  AIA-PD,  WASH  DC  20310-1001, 
per  AR  381-19.  Send  an  information  copy 
to  Commander,  USAITAC,  ATTN: 
AIAIT-KM,  BLDG  203,  STOP  314, 
Washington  Navy  Yard,  WASH  DC 
20374-2136. 
c.  CI  requirements  that  must  be  satisfied 
in  less  than  30  days  may  be  submitted  di- 
rectly to  USAITAC,  with  information  cop- 
ies to  HQDA  (DAMI-CIC),  WASH  DC 
20310-1054,  and  to  Commander,  USAIA, 
ATTN:  AIA-PD,  WASH  DC  20310-1001. 
5-5.  MACOM-level  production 
Information  copies  of  all  CI  production 
within  the  MACOM  will  be  provided  to 
HQDA  (DAMI-CIC),  WASH  DC 
20310-1054,  and  USAITAC  (AIAIT-KM), 
Bldg  203,  STOP  314,  Washington  Navy 
Yard,  WASH  DC  20374-2136. 
Chapter  6 
Counterintelligence  Collection 
6-1.  General 
a.  The  collection  and  reporting  of  infor- 
mation of  a  CI  nature  is  a  continuing  re- 
quirement for  all  Army  CI  elements. 
b.  National-level  collection  requirements 
for  CI  information  are  validated  and  issued 
by  DIA.  These  consist  of— 
(1)  Intelligence  collection  requirements. 
(2)  Continuing  intelligence  requirements! 
(3)  Source-directed  requirements. 
6-2.  Identifying  and  validating 
collection  requirements 
Guidelines  for  validating  collection  require- 
ments for  counter-intelligence  information 
are  in  DIAM  58-11.  '       ■"       • 
6-3.  Collection  and  reporting 
procedures 
a.  All  Army  CI  elements  will  collect  and 
report  military  and  military-related  FI  and 
CI  information  on  the  foreign  aspects  of 
narcotics  production  and  trafficking  in  ac- 
cordance with  intelligence  collection  respon- 
sibilities (validated  collection  requirements), 
assigned  priorities,  and  resource  capabilities. 
b.  Collection  of  information  on  U.S.  per- 
sons to  satisfy  legitimate  CI  needs  is  autho- 
rized when  the  criteria  in  AR  381-10, 
$$$M-
Procedure  2,  are  met.  This  includes  the  situ- 
ations in  (1)  through  (4)  below.  (The  de- 
tailed criteria  in  AR  381-10,  Procedure  2, 
paragraph  C,  should  be  reviewed  before  in- 
formation on  U.S.  persons  is  collected  and 
reported.) 
(1)  When  U.S.  persons  are  reasonably  be- 
lieved to  be  engaged  in  intelligence  activities 
on  behalf  of  a  foreign  power. 
(2)  When  U.S.  persons  are  reasonably  be- 
lieved to  be  engaged  in  international  terror- 
ist activities. 
(3)  When  necessary  for  the  protection  of 
the  physical  security  of  Army  and  Army 
contractor  installation,  if  such  protection  is 
within  the  assigned  mission  of  the  collecting 
agency. 
(4)  When  the  U.S.  person  is  reasonably 
believed  to  jeopardize  an  intelligence 
operation.  .  ' 
c.  CI  information  responsive  to  collection 
requirements  will  be  reported  in  IIR  format 
using  DD  Form  1396  (Department  of  De- 
fense Intelligence  Information  Report)  or 
message  equivalent.  Format  details  are  pre- 
scribed in  DIAM  58-13,  part  one,  chapter 
1.  Dissemination  is  limited  to  headquarters 
and  organizations  having  a  direct  interest  in 
the  information,  and  to  CI  production  orga- 
nizations. In  all  cases,  the  original  IIR  will 
be  sent  to  DIA,  with  an  information  copy  to 
CDR  USAITAC  AHS  VA//AIAIA- 
KM//.  When  sensitivity  of  the  information 
dictates,  reporting  CI  elements  may  invoke 
the  ORCON  caveat  per  DCID  1/7  to  en- 
sure restricted  dissemination.  .'.'.' 
Chapter  7 
Liaison  and  Coordination 
7-1.  General  "'  ""  '  
~ rtl  '">'■ ' _'''  
'"' 
This  chapter  sets  forth  policy  for  liaison  and 
coordination  with  the  FBI,  Department  of 
Justice,  and  other  Federal,  State,  and  local 
agencies  in  matters  related  tp  Army  CI  and 
security  support  activities.    ,:' 
7-2.  Policy  '■:-'■■ 
Effective  and  continuing  liaison  with  other 
agency  members  of  the  intelligence  commu- 
nity, host  and  other  foreign  government  in- 
telligence agencies,  and  law  enforcement 
agencies  is  essential'  to  CI  support  pro- 
grams.' Commanders  of  CI  elements 
charged  with  a  liaison  responsibility  will  en- 
sure that  it  is  properly  carried  out,w!i'  '*•  -^ 
■i-'W 
7^3.  Responsibilities 
a  Within  the  United  States— 
(1),  The  CG,  INSCOM  wili  maintain 
continuous  liaison  with  the  FBI  and  other 
Federal,  State,  and  local  agencies  to  include 
USACIDC' and  will  represent  the  Army  at 
liaiso*  meeting*  and  conferences  pertaining 
law  enforcement  authorities  is  discerned, 
MACOM  commanders  will  establish  a  for- 
mal Memorandum  of  Understanding 
(MCU)  with  the  CG,  INSCOM.  Use  or  dis- 
semination of  information  gathered  through 
liaison  must  comply  with  AR  381-10. 
b.  In  overseas  areas,  MACOM  com- 
manders will  establish  effective  liaison  pro- 
grams with  other  U.S.  and  foreign  agencies, 
consistent  with  the  following: 
(1)  Liaison  will  be  conducted  by  MI 
units  with  area  responsibilities  at  EAC. 
(2)  Tactical  MI  units  are  authorized  to 
conduct  liaison  with  local  level  police  and 
security  agencies  when  such  liaison  cover- 
age is  not  available  from  area  support  MI 
units  on  a  regular  and  timely  basis.  Such  lo- 
cal liaison  will  be  limited  to  matters  specifi- 
cally within  the  operational  jurisdiction  of 
the  tactical  MI  unit.  . 
(3)  To  avoid  confusion  and  duplication, 
intelligence  components  that  desire  liaison 
with  foreign  agencies  will  first  determine  if 
some  other  component  is  performing  the 
needed  liaison.  If  so,  attempts  should  be 
made  to  obtain  the  desired  data  through 
agencies  with  existing  liaison. 
c.  When  CI  and  security  cases  are  under 
consideration  for  prosecution  by  civil  au- 
thorities, the  Office  of  The  Judge  Advocate 
General  and  the  Office  of  the  General 
Counsel  will  be  notified  promptly  so  they 
may  coordinate  with  the  Department  of  Jus- 
tice and  U.S.  Attorneys  in  the  investigation 
and  prosecution  of  the  cases.  Notification 
will  be  via  electrical  message  to  HQDA 
WASH  DC//DAMI-CIC//. 
7-4.  Liaison  and  coordination  with  the 
FBI..- 
a.  OACSI  is  the  DA  liaison  agent  with 
the  FBI  for  CI  and  security  matters.  Except 
as  provided  in  this  regulation,  or  as  other- 
wise authorized  by  OACSI,  communica- 
tions with  the  national  headquarters  of  the 
FBI,  Washington,  DC,  concerning  such 
matters  will  be  handled  through  OACSI. 
b.  The  CG,  INSCOM  will  maintain  con- 
tinuous liaison  with  the  FBI  national  head- 
quarters and,  acting  for  OACSI,  will  receive 
and  disseminate,  within  the  Army,  FBI  re- 
ports of  security  interest,  i 
c.  If,  during  the  course  of  CI  operations 
or  investigations,  evidence  of  a  crime  or  in- 
telligence activity  surfaces  that  is  within  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  FBI,  this  information  will 
be  provided  expeditiously  to  the  local  FBI 
representative  and  HQDA  (DAMI-CIC). 
Evidence  of  hostile  intelligence  activity,  de- 
veloped during  the  course  of  a  USACIDC 
investigation  and  that  is  outside  Army  juris- 
diction, will  be  reported  to  the  FBI  through 
the  local.  Army  CI  component.  Additional' 
1?,  the  ttapecwd  vkilatiwi  of  any  Federal 
xxna&TT?  x  imiuim  qgcgaatayeg-sfe  as 
^"niriTT — I — Tiii   aaii-rr   ''" 
Chapter  8 
Employment,  Use,  and  Special 
Administration  of  U.S.  Army 
Counterintelligence  Personnel 
8-1.  Applicability 
This  chapter  applies  to  the  following: 
a.  Active  Army  commands  to  which  CI 
personnel  are  assigned. 
b.  Personnel  with  SSI  36A  or  36B,  or 
MOS  971  A,  972 A,  97B,  or  97C  as  a  pri- 
mary or  additional  speciality,  or  those  who 
are  assigned  to  duties  in  those  specialties. 
c.  Army  civilian  employees  assigned  to 
investigative/operational  duties  in  CI  units. 
This  includes  employees  in  the  Military  In- 
telligence Civilian  Excepted  Career  Pro- 
gram (MICECP). 
8-2.  Use  of  CI  personnel 
i'  a.  General. 
(1)  U.S.  Army  CI  special  agents  are  spe- 
cially trained  to  perform  the  following: 
(a)  Detect  and  investigate  espionage  as 
defined  in  18  USC  792-798;  sabotage  as  de- 
fined in  18  USC  2151-2156;  treason  as  de- 
fined in  18  USC  2381;  sedition  as  defined  in 
18  USC  2384-2390;  and  criminal  subversion 
as  defined  in  18  USC  2387. 
(b)  Initiate  action  with  military  or  civil- 
ian law  enforcement  agencies,  when  appro- 
priate, to  prevent  and  neutralize  the  threat 
posed  to  U.S.  Army  commands,  personnel, 
and  functions  by  these  activities. 
(c)  Provide  CI  support  to  the  OPSEC 
process  in  Army  commands  and  agencies. 
(2)  The  principles,  techniques,  and  proce- 
dures employed  in  CI  investigations,  sup- 
port functions,  and  operations  are  outlined 
in  this  regulation,  AR  381-10,  and  AR 
381-47. 
b.  Assignment  of  CI  personnel.  CI  person- 
nel with  the  primary  SSIs/MOSs  listed  in 
paragraph  8-16,  and  U.S.  and  foreign  civil- 
ian employees  assigned  to  operational  duties 
in  CI  units  should  be  assigned  to  duties  and 
activities  that  aid  the  CI  effort.  This  howev- 
er, does  not  prohibit  assignments  to  other 
duties  that  would  broaden  the  person's  ex- 
perience and  enhance  advancement  poten- 
tial. Assignment  to  consecutive  tours  in 
noncounterintelligence-related  positions 
may  be  made  only  with  the  approval  of  the 
Officer  Personnel  Management  Directorate 
or  Enlisted  Personnel  Management  Direc- 
torate, U.S.  Army  Military  Personnel 
Center  (MILPERCEN). 
c.  Limitations  of  duties.  The  use  of  CI 
personnel  for  essential  military  functions, 
except  as  described  in  this  subparagraph,  is 
not  prohibited.  However,  such  use  should 
be  decided  by  local  commanders  in  conso- 
nance with  the  policy  of  denying  a  potential 
enemy  routine  access  to  the  identity  of  CI 
personnel.  Personnel  assigned  to  position^ 
in  operating  Units,  authorized  an  SSI  o< 
W)<  «  Yittmt  in  paraararih  '*.  \h    ,ivt  w 
~£l&UU!UM.-'^EmiifcP%    1  hZl* 
Was
or  preclude  accomplishment  of  essential  CI 
functions.  ■•.'"■  *  ■  : 
(2)  Will  not  be  used  to  perform  the 
following:  '     *  ■' 
(a)  Investigations  of  war  crimes,  atroci- 
ties, criminal  activities  other  than  those 
under  CI  jurisdiction,  moral  turpitude,  wel- 
fare of  the  civilian  populace,  command,  and 
administrative  investigations  under  AR 
15-6  and  AR  380-5,  or  other  similar  activi- 
ties, unless  such  investigations  contribute 
directly  to  theXI  mission,  except  for  inter- 
nal investigations  required  by  the  MI  unit  to 
which  they  are  assigned. •    ■ 
(b)  Interrogation  or  detention  duties  not 
connected  with  assigned  missions  and  func- 
tions of  the  unit  to  which  assigned. 
(c)  Combat  patrols  and  reconnaissance 
activities,  unless  CI  targets  are  involved.    ' 
(d)  Guard  or  duty  officer-type  duties,  ex- 
cept as  required  by  the  MI  unit  to  which 
they  are  assigned.  •■•'*'• 
(e)  Housekeeping  or  other  duties  of  a 
similar  nature,  except  for  those  required  by 
the  MI  unit  to  which  they  are  assigned. 
8-3.  Security  provisions  .  i  '['.'■'.': 
•  ;;  o.  General.'''-'      '  '    ' 
(1)  Dissemination.  Information  concern- 
ing the  following,  even  if  unclassified,  is 
considered  operationally  sensitive  and  will 
be  given  out  only  on  a  strict  need-to-know 
bases:         .'    ' 
(a)  The  internal  activities  and  organiza- 
tions of  CI  units.  '   ;  
• 
(b)  CI  operations,  to  include  techniques, 
methods,  and  results  obtained. 
(2)  Publicity.  Release. for  publication  of 
any  information  relative  to  U.S.  Army  CI 
investigations  or  operations  will  not  be 
made  without  prior  approval ,  of  HQDA 
(DAMI-CIC).        ';t  V ',;/ 
(3)  Debriefing.  When  the  need-to-know 
requirements  of  personnel  assigned  to  C! 
duties  or  activities  have  ceased,  the , unit 
commander  will  have  such  personnel-rr .  . 
,  (a)  Orally  debriefed.  * '-''•  ;'  [  
' 
(b)  Execute  a  DA  Form  2962  (Security 
Termination  Statement  and  Debriefing  Cer- 
tificate) in  accordance;  with  AR  380-5, 
chapter  10.  This  form  will  be  executed 
before  the  person  is  retired  or  released  from 
active  duty,  on  the  withdrawal  one  of  the 
SSIs  or  MOSs  listed  in  paragraph  8-16,!  or, 
^|»  at  any  preceding  time  judged  appropriate  by 
;#i  the  unit  commander.  The  above  does  not, 
,-*H  aPP'y  to  personnel  transferring  fromone as- 
=>m  signment  to  another  when  the!new,,a£sign> 
lament  will  be  to  CI  or  related  dui^,,—^ 
^,^(0.  Classification.  >  '■'>.,, ;.^...., :','..-■ 
>,  (1)  Information  concerning  the  matters; 
I  in  (a)  and  (b)  below  will  be  classified  Confi. 
•"  dential  or  higher  and  marked  as  follows; 
I  Classified  by:  AR  381-20.  Declassify,  on& 
"Specify  date,  event,  or"OADR")-  .,  ,4 
,  -  (a)  Plans,  sources,  methods,  activities*: 
and  results  of  CI  operations  and  investiga-, 
|,tions  conducted  under  the  provisions  of  AR 
Ji|»l-12-lk  and  para  2-26  of  this  regulation.' 
ffi»;  (b)  Nature  of,  and  use  by,  CI  units  of 
g classified  nonstandard  equipment,) . ■  i  ;«,;<..  ,<; 
No 
(2)  Normally,  there  is  no  security  classifi- 
cation assigned  to  identification  of  CI  per- 
sonnel, such  as  names,  ranks,  and  duty 
positions.  Such  information  will  be  classified 
only  if  essential  to  mission  security.  If  un- 
classified, it  will  be  protected  under  the  pro- 
visions of  the  Freedom  of  Information  Act 
as  For  Official  Use  Only. 
(3)  CI  special  agents  in  the  conduct  of  CI 
activities  will  not  be  required  to  reveal  their 
military  grade  or  position  other  than  as  "CI 
special  agent"  when  such  disclosure  might 
interfere  with  the  discharge  of  investigative 
or  operational  duties.  Their  status  as  a 
member  or  employee  of  the  U.S.  Army  may 
also  be  concealed  if  such  concealment  is  in 
the  best  interests  of  a  specific  investigation 
or  operation.  (See  AR  381-10,  Procedure 
10.) 
i  (4)  The  authorized  and  assigned  person- 
nel strength  of  a  CI  unit  is  usually  unclassi- 
fied.-The  personnel  strength  of  a  "special 
mission"  CI  unit  may  be  classified  if  knowl- 
edge of  such  information  would  impair  mis- 
sion accomplishment.  Such  classification 
requires  the  approval  of  the  commander  of 
the  MACOM  to  which  the  unit  is  assigned. 
(5)  Officer  and  enlisted  evaluation  reports 
will  be  classified  Confidential  or  higher  only 
when  they  include  the  following: 
(a)  A  description  of  classified  duties  per- 
formed, or 
(b)  Statements  of  operational  proficiency 
(if  classified  duties  are  discussed). 
(6)  Personnel  evaluation  reports  will  be 
unclassified  unless  such  status  inhibits  the 
accurate  rating  or  description  of  the  individ- 
ual's ability  and  potential. 
(7)  This  subparagraph  does  not  preclude 
CI  personnel  from  including  in  resumes  or 
discussing  with  prospective  employers  un- 
classified information  from  their  back- 
grounds and  from  duties  performed  by  them 
in  their  assignments. 
c.  Declassification  of  classified  records. 
Losing  units  will — 
(1)  Screen  records  of  persons  with  a  spe- 
cialty MOS  or  SSI  listed  in  paragraph  8-16, 
when  any  of  the  following  occurs: 
(a)  Relieved  from  active  duty. 
■  (b)  Discharged  from  the  Service. 
(c)  Reassigned  from  duties  in  CI  units  to 
duties  in  other  units. 
(2)  Declassify  records  when  appropriate. 
(3)  Withdraw  and  retire  or  destroy  infor- 
mation that  should  remain  classified  in  ac- 
cordance with  this  regulation  and  AR 
380-5. 
•'(4)  Use  unclassified  orders  to  effect  reas- 
signment of  personnel.    . 
8-4;  Clothing 
a.  Personnel  assigned  to  CI  duties  will 
wear  clothing  appropriate  to  the  mission 
and  cover  as  authorized  by  the  unit  com- 
mander to  which  assigned  or  attached.  Per- 
sonnel authorized  to  wear  civilian  attire  in 
accordance  with  the  mission  and  cover  will 
not  be  required  to  perform  military  func- 
tions or  attend  military  formations  that 
would  reveal  their  military  status. 
26  SEPTEMBER  1986  UPDATE  ••-AR  381-20 
6.  Enlisted  personnel  assigned  to  perform 
duties  requiring  the  wearing  of  civilian 
clothing  are  entitled  to  the  allowances  pre- 
scribed under  the  procedures  in  AR 
381-141. 
8-5.  Nonstandard  spectacles 
Issue  of  nonstandard  spectacles  to  personnel 
assigned  to  MOS  or  SSI  positions  listed  in 
paragraph  8-16  is  authorized  by  AR  40-3. 
8-6.  Access  to  military  privileges 
CI  personnel  required  to  wear  civilian  cloth- 
ing have  medical,  exchange,  commissary, 
and  other  normal  military  privileges  to 
which  they  are  entitled  as  members  of  the 
armed  forces.  When  required  for  security 
purposes,  local  procedures  will  be  estab- 
lished that  will  permit  such  personnel  access 
to  above  noted  services,  on  presentation  of 
agreed-on  identification.  This  may  include 
the  issue  of  identification  cards  bearing  the 
title  "special  agent"  in  lieu  of  military  or  ci- 
vilian grade.  (Such  cards  will  be  turned  in 
on  transfer  of  the  individual  to  whom  is- 
sued.) When  required  to  protect  the  rights 
and  benefits  of  persons  concerned,  essential 
elements  of  identification,  properly  classi- 
fied, will  be  made  a  matter  of  record  be- 
tween intelligence  unit  cemmanders  and 
agencies  concerned.  Thereafter,  grade  and 
unit  to  which  assigned  will  net  be  required 
as  elements  of  identification.  Such  elements 
of  identification  will  be  given  li.nited  dis- 
semination on  a  need-to-know  basis  only. 
Documents  involved  will  be  classified,  if 
required,  in  accordance  with  this  paragraph. 
8-7.  Billets  and  messes 
a.  Enlisted  CI  special  agents  assigned  to 
special  agent  duties  will  not  be  billeted  in 
normal  troop-type  billets.  When  warranted 
by  the  nature  of  official  duties,  as  certified 
by  their  commander,  CI  special  agents  will 
be  authorized  to  reside  offpost  and  will  be 
entitled  to  allowances  commensurate  with 
their  grade  (AR  210-11). 
6.  Enlisted  CI  special  agents  performing 
investigative  or  operational  duties  in  a  tem- 
porary duty  (TDY)  status  will  not  be  bil- 
leted in  troop  transient  billets.  TDY  orders 
will  reflect  that  use  of  Governmental  mess 
and  billeting  facilities  would  be  detrimental 
to  the  mission,  if  such  disclosure  might  in- 
terfere with  sensitive  investigative  or  opera- 
tional duties.  , 
c.  Enlisted  CI  special  agents  will  be 
authorized  rations  not  available  (RNA) 
under  the  provision  of  the  DOD  Military 
Pay  and  Allowances  Manual,  chapter  1, 
part  3. 
d.  The  provisions  in  (a)  through  (c) 
above  apply  in  overseas  areas  except  in 
those  areas  not  authorized  basic  allowance 
for  quarters  and  RNA. 
8-8.  Oath  administration 
a.  In  the  performance  of  investigative  du- 
ties authorized  by  this  regulation,  a  CI  spe- 
cial agent  on  active  duty  in  the  Army  is 
authorized  to  administer  oaths  when  taking
statements.  The  agent's  title  for  the  pur- 
poses of  administering  oaths  is  "Counter- 
intelligence Special  Agent,  U.S.  Army". 
(See  the  Uniform  Code  of  Military  Justice, 
Article  136(b).) 
b.  An  Army  civilian  employee  who  is  as- 
signed to  investigative  or  operational  duties 
in  a  CI  unit  is  authorized  by  5  USC  303(b) 
to  administer  oaths  when  taking  statements 
as  part  of  an  official  investigation.  This  in- 
cludes Army  civilians  in  the  MICECP.  The 
employee's  title  for  the  purposes  of  adminis- 
tering oaths  is  "Counterintelligence  Special 
Agent,  U.S.  Army."  ,  , . 
8-9 .  Freedom  of  movement 
'• .  a.  During  the  course  of  a  CI  investiga- 
tion or  operation,  CI  special  agents  are 
authorized  freedom  of  movement  between 
geographical  areas  of  responsibility. 
b.  CI  personnel  assigned  to  the  Foreign 
Counterintelligence  Activity,  INSCOM,  are 
not  required  to  obtain  specific  theater  clear- 
ance from  overseas  commanders  prior  to 
undertaking  overseas  travel  in  connection 
with  their  official  duties.  (See  AR  1-40, 
para  l~2b(S).)  The  senior  intelligence  officer 
of  the  Army  theater  will  be  notified  in  ad- 
vance of  such  travel,  or  as  soon  as  possible 
thereafter,  if  circumstances  preclude 'ad- 
vance notification. 
8-10.  Weapons       ' 
CI  personnel  may  carry  weapons  openly  or 
concealed  as  required  in  the  performance  of 
official. duties,  when  authorized  by  a  CI 
commander  or  supervisor  of  field  grade  or 
higher  rank.  Written  authorization,  using 
DA  Form  2818  (Firearms  Authorization), 
is  required  for  carrying  a  weapon  and  will 
be  carried  at  all  times  by  CI  personnel  when 
armed.  If  the  weapon  is  authorized  to  be 
concealed,  the  DA  Form  2818  will  so  state. 
CI  commanders  will  ensure  the  individual 
has  met  the  requirements  of  AR  350-4  and 
■the  qualifications/familiarization  require- 
ments of  AR  .190-14.  ;        ;    '  -'"}  y-i 
8-14.  Apprehension  authority 
MI  special  agents  who  are  officers  or  non- 
commissioned officers,  and  intelligence  com- 
ponent employees  of  DOD  who  are 
authorized  to  carry  badges  and  credentials, 
ihave  the  authority  to  apprehend  persons 
subject  to  the  Uniform  Code  of  Military 
Justice  in  connection  with  investigations  in- 
to national  security  offenses  over  which  MI 
has  investigative  jurisdiction  (para  2-2), 
provided  that  such  agents  have  a  probable 
cause  to  believe  that. an. offense  has, been 
committed. and  that  the  person, to.be  appre- 
hended committed  it.,  f  ./,  !"•.,,.'. .  5i ,,. 
8-12.  Involvement  In  civilian  legal ,,.  , 
;'  proceedings  ..•,;■■; ■> 'ua f  >;.<,-  '-.„  jn;  >•'«.- • 
;  'Requests  tor  the  appearance  of  CI  personnel 
lev  incttii  proceeding*  sod  for 
Chapter  9 
U.S.  Army  Intelligence  Badges  and 
Credentials 
9-1.  General 
This  chapter — 
a.  Establishes  policies  and  procedures  for 
the  procurement,  issue,  control,  and  disposi- 
tion of  U.S.  Army  intelligence  badges  and 
credentials. 
b.  Applies  to  all  active  U.S.  Army  MI 
units  and  to  personnel  authorized  to  use 
U.S.  Army  intelligence  badges  and 
credentials. 
9-2.  Responsibilities 
a.  The  ACSI— 
(1)  Exercises  general  staff  supervision 
over  and  establishes  policies,  regarding  the 
procurement,  manufacture,  issue,  use,  and 
disposition  of  badges  and  credentials  and  as- 
sociated items. 
(2)  Provides  guidance  to  enable  the  CG, 
INSCOM  to  procure,  store,  issue,  and  dis- 
pose of  badges  and  credentials. 
b.  The  CG,  MILPERCEN— 
(1)  Notifies  the  CG,  INSCOM  of  the 
award  or  withdrawal  of  the  SSIs/MOSs 
listed  in  paragraph  8-16. 
(2)  Furnishes  copies  of  assignment  orders 
or  instructions  on  above  personnel.     • 
c.  The  CG,  INSCOM— 
(1)  Manages  the  U.S.  Army  intelligence 
badge  and  credential  program.  ' 
(2)  Exercises  supervision  over  the  stor- 
age, accounting  for,  issue,  and  disposition  of 
badges,  credentials  and  credential  forms 
(DA  Forms  3363,  and  3363-1  (U.S.  Army 
Intelligence  Credential)  and  DA  Form 
3363-A  (U.S.  Army  Intelligence  Credential 
(Representative)).  •    ■     . 
(3)  Operates  the  central  repository  for 
badges,  credentials,  and  credential  forms. 
(4)  Manages  the  badge  trophy  program. 
d.  MI  unit  commanders —  ■ 
(1)  Control  and  safeguard  badges,  cre- 
dentials, and  credential  forms  charged  to 
their  unit  in  accordance,  wjth  this 
regulation. 
(2)  Appoint  badge  and  credential  custo- 
dians, subcustodians,  and  their  alternates. 
When  possible,  custodians,  subcustodians, 
and  alternates  will  possess  an  intelligence 
MOS.    '     '    ■■••■''  • 
'  e.  Custodians,  alternate  custodians,  sub- 
custodians, and  alternate  subcustodians  re- 
ceive and  issue  badges  and  credentials.  They 
are  the  only  persons  authorized  to  receipt 
for  badges.  .i 
/.  The  CG,  U.S.  Army  Intelligence 
Center  and  School  (USAICS) — 
(1)  Performs  initial  processing  of  creden- 
tials for  school  attendees. 
(2)  Informs  the  CG,  INSCOM  when  per- 
sons are  dropped  from  courses  at  USAICS. 
g.  Persons  issued  badge  and  credentials — 
(1)  Are  responsible  at  all  times  for  safe- 
guarding their  badge  and  credentials  unless 
property  relieved  of  this  responsibility  by 
ttarcMOifiaaLxtaaKDdian.  or  an  alternate* 
9-3.  Use  of  badges  and  credentials 
a.  Badges  and  credentials  are  for  the  sole 
purpose  of  identifying  the  bearer  as  a  duly- 
accredited  special  agent  or  representative  of 
U.S.  Army  intelligence  who  is  performing 
official  intelligence  duties.  Their  use  for  oth- 
er than  official  duties,  or  when  other  means 
of  identification  would  suffice,  is  sufficient 
basis  for  disciplinary  action  and  removal 
from  investigative  duties. 
b.  Only  credentials  prepared  on  DA 
Forms  3363,  3363-1,  and  3363-A  are  valid 
U.S.  Army  intelligence  credentials. 
c.  The  falsification,  forgery,  alteration  of. 
or  tampering  with  intelligence  badges  or 
credentials  is  prohibited.  Photographing  or 
otherwise  copying  badges  or  credentials,  as 
well  as  willful  misuse,  is  also  prohibited.  Vi- 
olations of  these  provisions  may  result  in 
administrative  or  criminal  penalties  as  pre 
scribed  by  law  and  regulation. 
9-4.  Channels  of  communication 
U.S.  Army  intelligence  badges  and  creden- 
tials will  be  produced  by  the  CG,  INSCOM 
and  shipped  to  custodians.  Unless  otherwise 
indicated  herein,  all  correspondence  con 
ceming  badge  and  credential  procurement 
manufacture,  accountability,  storage,  ship 
ment,  withdrawal,  and  destruction  will  b< 
addressed  to  the  CG,  INSCOM,  ATTN 
IACI-BC,  Fort  Meade,  MD  20755-5900. 
9-5.  Criteria  for  issuance 
a.  DA  Forms  3363  and  3363-1  are  issue< 
to  the  following  personnel  who  are  at  leas 
21  years  of  age; 
(1)  Military  personnel  on  active  dut; 
with  MI  units  for  over  2  weeks  who  hold  C 
investigative  SSIs/MOSs  as  listed  in  para 
graph  8-lfr,  and  who  have  attended  the  C 
course  at  the  USAICS,  or  USA! 
equivalent. 
(2)  Military  personnel  with  the  abov 
SSI/MOS  on  active  duty  for  over  2  weeks  h 
a  nonintelligence  unit,  but  performing  0 
investigative  duties. 
(3)  Civilians  employed  with  tli 
MICECP  performing  CI  investigate 
duties. 
(4)  Other  Army  civilian  investigate 
who  are  assigned  CI  investigative  dutii 
under  U.S.  Army  cognizance. 
(5)  ARNG  and  USAR  CI  personnel  wl 
are  performing  CI  duties  in  conjunctio 
with  Active  Army  CI  units,  on  approval  < 
the  CG,  INSCOM  and  for  the  duration  of 
specific  mission.  When  not  being  usci 
badges  and  credentials  of  USAR  CI  perstx 
nel  will  be  held  by  the  appropriate  acti 
Army  CI  unit  custodian  or  subcustodian. 
b.  DA  Form  3363-A  may  be  issued  •■ 
the  following  personnel  whose  intelligen 
duties  require  unique  identification  that  c;< 
not  be  provided  by  other  means  (for  exai 
pie,  military  identification  card;  or  letter 
introduction): 
•  (1)  MI  personnel  who  hold  Army  inte 
genceSSI  36B.  MOS  972A  or  °XC  aasticr
(2)  Civilian  employees  (including 
MICECP)  assigned  to  HUM1NT  duties. 
(3)  Foreign  national  employees  of  MI 
units  assigned  to  investigative  duties. 
(4)  Target  exploitation  (TAREX)  person- 
nel, when  such  identification  is  necessary  for 
the  conduct  of  official  duties. 
9-6.  Special  issue  of  credentials 
a.  Under  exceptional  circumstances,  per- 
sonnel other  than  those  identified  in  para- 
graph 9-5,  who  are  performing  intelligence 
or  intelligence-related  duties,  may  request 
representative  credentials.  A  detailed  justifi- 
cation of  the  exceptional  circumstances 
must  be  submitted  through  the  MACOM 
with  the  request  and  will  be  signed  or  en- 
dorsed by  the  commander  of  the  MI  group 
or  separate:  MI  element  to  which  the  indi- 
vidual is  assigned. 
b.  Requests  will  include  name,  grade, 
SSI/MOS  (or  civilian  job  series),  and  Social 
Security  Number  (SSN).  Requests  are  sub- 
ject to  the  approval  of  the  CG,  INSCOM  or 
his  designated  representative.  Disapproved 
requests  will  be. returned.,,  .    . 
9-7.  Issuance  procedures 
a.  Active  Army  units  having  personnel 
who  require  use  of  badges  and  credentials  in 
the  performance  of  official  intelligence  or 
counterintelligence  duties  must  first  estab- 
lish a  custodian  account  with  the  command- 
er, INSCOM,  ATTN: .  IACI-BC  Fort 
.  Meade,  MD  20755-5900,  unless  one  has  al- 
ready been  established  by  a  parent  unit.  A 
letter  request  will  be  submitted  through 
channels,  identifying  the  unit,  the  number 
of  personnel  requiring  badges  and  creden- 
tials, and  the  nature  of  the  mission  or  duties 
requiring  such  identification.  The  letter  will 
include  correct  mailing  and  message  ad- 
dresses for  the  custodians,  their  telephone 
numbers,  and  a  copy  of  appointment  orders 
for  the  custodian  and  alternate  custodian. 
b.  Once  the  account  is  established,  subse- 
quent communications  will  be  directly  be- 
-    tween  the  custodian  ■  and  the  badge  and 
•    credential  controller.    ■••-■••■■••■ 
c.  Sub-custodians  and  alternate  sub-cus- 
todians will  be  appointed  as  necessary  to  en- 
sure continuous  control  and  receipting 
between  the  parent  (custodian-level)  unit 
'.-.    and  any  subordinate  elements. v  r' -V  "■ 
d.  USAR  units  using  badges  and'  creden- 
j     tials  in  support  of  or  to  assist  Active  Army 
'intelligence  or  CI  programs  will 'obtain 
■'..  them  through  the  Active  Army  custodian. f 
£.  ^'e.  Badges  and  credentials  for  authorized 
,i" .  personnel  will  be  obtained  by  the  custodian 
;V'  in  the  following  manner:  '•  "'•  ''■'  '"" 
A-  (1)  Submit  letter  or  message  request;  to 
ji •"'  'the  badge  and  credential  controller  (para 
jf  9-4),  with  full  identifying  data,  citing  au- 
■$  thority  for  issue  and  providing  justification 
£$    if  required  (paras  9-5  or  9-6).  "■>  -" 
Itr*  ^°  (2)  Two  color  photographs,  head  and 
Hi  shoulders,  in  civilian  business  dress,  large 
I -enough  to  be  cut  to  size  1  by  IW  inches, 
|will  be  forwarded  as  an  enclosure  to  the  re- 
| 
'quest,  if  badge  and  credentials  were  not  pre- 
viously  manufactured.    If  instant 
I&2 
development-type  photographs  are  used,  do 
not  mount  them  on  stiff  backing. 
(3)  On  receipt  of  the  color  photographs, 
the  badge  and  credential  controller  will  for- 
ward a  blank  DA  Form  3363-1  to  the  re- 
questing unit  with  instructions  to  have  the 
individual  for  whom  the  badge  and  creden- 
tials are  intended  sign  the  blank  form.  No 
other  person  may  sign  the  form.  A  legible 
payroll  signature  will  be  made  with  a 
ballpoint  pen  (black  ink)  in  the  appropriate 
portion  of  the  form. 
'  '  (4)  The  signed  credential  form  will  be  re- 
turned to  HQ,  INSCOM  within  10  working 
days  for  manufacture  of  the  credentials. 
(1)  Transfer  to  a  unit  having  no  require- 
ment for  intelligence  investigative 
personnel. 
(2)  Permanent  assignment  to  noninvesti- 
gative  or  non-HUMINT  duties  with  an 
Army  intelligence  unit. 
(3)  Withdrawal  of  SSIs/MOSs  listed  in 
paragraph  8- lb. 
(4)  Relief  or  retirement  from  active  duty. 
(5)  Termination  of  USAR  CI  personnel 
affiliation  with  an  Active  Army  CI  unit  if  is- 
sued badges  and  credentials  under  para- 
graph 9-5a(5). 
(6)  Resignation  by  an  Army  civilian 
employee. 
*.**.• «i. 
9-8.  Safeguard  and  control 
a.  Storage.  When  in  storage,  badges,  cre- 
dentials, and  credential  forms  will  be  prop- 
erly secured  to  guard  against  loss,  theft,  or 
unauthorized  use.  These  items  will  be 
locked  in  a  security  container  that  meets  the 
requirements  of  AR  380-5,  paragraph 
5-101. 
b.  Correspondence.  Routine  correspond- 
ence concerning  badges  and  credentials, 
badge  and  credential  numbers,  and  names 
of  individuals  to  whom  issued  is  unclassi- 
fied. However,  such  correspondence  that 
lists  personal  identifying  data  (for  example, 
name,  SSN,  and  date  and  place  of  birth)  of 
individuals  requiring  credentials  shall  be 
marked  For  Official  Use  Only.  The  For  Offi- 
cial Use  Only  caveat  will  serve  to  indicate 
that  such  information  may  be  exempt  from 
the  public  disclosure  provisions  of  the  Free- 
dom of  Information  Act. 
.  c.  Temporary  surrender. 
(1)  The  badge  and  credentials  will  be  sur- 
rendered to  the  appropriate  custodian,  sub- 
custodian, or  alternate  custodian/subcus- 
todian, as  appropriate,  if  the  individual  to 
whom  they  are  issued  is — 
(a)  Hospitalized. 
(b)  On  leave  in  excess  of  72  hours. 
(c)  Placed  in  a  temporary  noninvestiga- 
tive  status  for  any  reason. 
(d)  Planning  to  cross  international 
boundaries  on  other  than  official  business. 
(e)  Expected  to  be  placed  in  a  situation 
where  loss  of  badge  and  credentials  is  likely. 
(2)  The  badge  and  credentials  will  be  re- 
issued to  the  member  on  return  to  investiga- 
tive duties. .      . 
d.  Surrender  means..  In  circumstances 
where  the  surrender  of  badge  and  creden- 
tials (c)  above  would  involve  mailing  them 
or  otherwise  increase  the  risk  of  loss  (for  ex- 
ample, a  one-man  office),  the  CG,  INSCOM 
may  approve  alternate  procedures. 
e.  Individual  safeguards.  Individuals  is- 
sued a  badr,c  and  credentials  will  appropri- 
ately and  reasonably  safeguard  them  at  all 
times  to  preclude  their  loss  or  theft. 
'/  Permanent  surrender.  The  badge  and 
credentials  of  persons  involved  in  the  fol- 
lowing personnel  actions  will  be  returned  to 
CG,  INSCOM  (at  the  address  in  para  9-4) 
within  2  working  days  after  the  date  the  ac- 
tion is  effective:  ' 
26  SEPTEMBER  1986  UPDATE  •  AR  381-20 
9-9.  Accountability 
a.  On  change  of  custodian  or 
subcustodian — 
(1)  A  joint  inventory  of  badges,  creden- 
tials, and  credential  forms  will  be  conducted 
by  the  old  and  new  custodians  or  subcus- 
todians. Such  inventories  should  be  made 
sufficiently  in  advance  to  allow  verification 
and  clarification  of  discrepancies  prior  to 
the  departure  of  the  old  custodian/ 
subcustodian. 
(2)  Items  will  be  listed  in  numerical  se- 
quence on  DA  Form  2496  (Disposition 
Form).  The  DA  Form  2496  will  be  pre- 
pared in  duplicate  and  contain  the  following 
statement:  "A  joint  inventory  of  all  badges 
and  credentials  assigned  to  the  (name  of 
unit)  was  conducted  on  (date)  by  (name  of 
old  custodian/subcustodian)  and  (name  of 
new  custodian/subcustodian).  All  badges, 
credentials  and  credential  forms  listed  be- 
low are  in  serviceable  condition.  As  of 
(date),  I  assume  full  responsibility  as  the 
unit  badges  and  credentials  custodian/ 
subcustodian." 
(Signature  of  the   new   custodian/ 
subcustodian) 
(3)  Inventories,  together  with  two  copies 
of  the  orders  appointing  a  new  custodian, 
will  be  forwarded  to  the  address  in  para- 
graph 9-4.  On  verification  of  the  inventory, 
the  Badge  and  Credentials  Controller,  HQ, 
INSCOM  will  sign  the  duplicate  copy  of  the 
inventory  and  return  it  to  the  unit.  This 
completely  relieves  the  old  custodian  of  ac- 
countability. The  original  of  the  inventory 
will  be  retained  by.CG,  INSCOM. 
(4)  Change-of-subcustodian  inventories, 
together  with  two  copies  of  the  DA  Form 
2496  appointing  the  new  subcustodian,  will 
be  forwarded  to  the  parent  unit  custodian. 
Custodians  will  complete  verification  proce- 
dures as  described  in  a  above. 
b.  Badge  and  credentials  custodians  will 
conduct  an  inventory  of  all  badges,  creden- 
tials, and  credential  forms  assigned  to  their 
custody  during  the  first  work  week  in  Janu- 
ary and  July,  each  year.  Results  of  the  in- 
ventory will  be  forwarded  to  the  CG, 
INSCOM  no  later  than  the  last  day  of  Janu- 
ary and  July.  Results  of  the  inventory  wili 
be  submitted  in  a  format  similar  to  that  in  a 
above.  Subcustodians  will  also  conduct  sem- 
iannual inventories.  They  will  forward  the 
results  to  the  parent  unit  custodian  in  time
to  allow  the  custodian  to  comply  with  this 
paragraph. 
c.  Badges,  credentials,  and  credential 
forms  are  accountable  on  a  continuous  re- 
ceipt system  at  all  times.  MI  unit  com- 
manders, badge  and  credentials  custodians/ 
subcustodians,  alternate  badge  and  creden- 
tials custodians/subcustodians,  and  individ- 
uals to  whom  badge  and  credentials  are 
issued,  will  ensure  use  of  this  system.  A 
similar  system  will  be  kept  on  registered 
packages  of  badges,  credentials,  and  creden- 
tial forms. 
d.  DA  Form  4354-R  (U.S.  Army  Intelli- 
gence Badge  and  Credentials  Receipt  and/ 
or  Tracer)  will  be  used  to  maintain  a  contin- 
uous receipting  system  for  all  badges,  cre- 
dentials, and  credential  forms. 
(1):  Shipment  of  badges,  credentials,  and 
credential  forms  will  be  in  accordance  with 
paragraph  9-12. 
(2)  The  issuing  custodian  or  subcustodi- 
an will  maintain  the  signed  DA  Form 
4354-R  until  the  badge  and  credentials  are 
surrendered.  At  time  of  surrender,  the  form 
is  to  be  annotated  (relieving  the  individual 
of  accountability).  A  copy  of  the  annotated 
form  will  be  furnished  to  the  individual. 
(3)  A  copy  of  DA  Form  4354-R  is  locat- 
ed at  the  back  of  this  regulation.  It  will  be 
reproduced  locally  on  8-  by  1 1-inch  paper. 
9-10.  Initial  processing  of  USAICS 
attendees  for  credentials 
Initial  processing  of  individuals  for  creden- 
tials will  be  done  at  USAICS.  The  names  of 
those  attending  courses  awarding  SSI  36A, 
or  MOS  971 A  and  97B  will  be  forwarded 
from  USAICS  to  INSCOM  within  4  weeks 
after  the  start  of  the  appropriate  class. 
USAICS  will  also  forward  the  names  of 
members  who  have  been  dropped  from 
these  courses  so  that  credential  processing 
can  be  stopped  and  original  lists  corrected. 
9-11.  Reissue 
Requests  for  reissue  of  badge  and  creden- 
tials will  be  forwarded  directly  from  custo- 
dians to  the  CG,  INSCOM  by  the  fastest 
means  available  when  authorized  personnel 
are  assigned  to,  or  arrive  on  station.  Re- 
quests should  include  the  name,  SSN,  and, 
if  known,  the  badge  and  credentials  number 
of  the  individual. 
9-12.  Shipment 
Badges,  credentials,  and  credential  forms 
will  be  shipped  by  registered  U.S.  mail  or  by 
military  courier  using  DA  Form  4354-R. 
Shipping  instructions  are  given  below. 
a.  Packaging.  Regardless  of  the  quantity, 
badges  and  credentials  shipped  by  the  fol- 
lowing methods  Will  be  treated  as  shown: 
(1)  Registered  mail  will  be  packaged  with 
buffer  maKi?-?!  to  prevent  damage  from  in- 
ternal shifting  or  external  causes.  Each 
package  will  be  doublewrapped  with  the  in- 
ner wrapping  stamped  "To  be  opened  by 
addressee  only."  Badges  and  credentials  will 
not  be  combined  with  other  registered  mail. 
(2)  Items  sent  via  U.S.  military  courier 
will,  be  r/aced  in  a  double  envelope  with 
buffer  material  if  necessary  to  prevent 
damage. 
b.  Shipping  from  HQ,  INSCOM  to  custo- 
dians. The  original  copy  of  a  DA  Form 
4354-R  (containing  the  INSCOM  return 
address)  for  each  badge  and  credential  being 
sent  will  be  enclosed  in  that  shipment.  HQ, 
INSCOM  will  keep  a  copy  of  each  form  on 
which  will  be  recorded  the  registered  pack- 
age number.  On  receipt  of  badges  and  cre- 
dentials, the  unit  badge  and  credentials 
custodian,  or  alternate,  will  sign  and  return 
DA  Form  4354-R  to  HQ,  INSCOM. 
c.  Shipment  from  custodians  to  HQ,  IN- 
SCOM. A  copy  of  the  reassignment  or  sepa- 
ration orders  of  each  member  concerned 
and  a  properly  executed  DA  Form  4354-R 
containing  the  return  address  of  the  unit 
will  be  enclosed  in  each  shipment.  A  copy 
of  the  form  on  which  the  registered  package 
number  is  recorded  will  be  kept  to  ensure 
the  return  of  a  signed  receipt  or  for  tracer 
action.  On  receipt  of  badges  and  credentials, 
the  Badge  and  Credential  Controller,  HQ, 
INSCOM  will  sign  and  return  the  original 
DA  Form  4354-R  to  the  custodian,  along 
with  the  original  DA  Form  4354-R  signed 
by  the  unit  custodian.  This  relieves  the  cus- 
todian of  accountability.  In  no  case  will 
badges  and  credentials  be  shipped  later  than 
the  individual's  actual  departure  date  from 
the  unit. 
d.  Shipping  between  custodians  and  sub- 
custodians. Each  unit  will  follow  a  parallel^" 
procedure  to  c  above  using  DA  Form 
4354-R  when  badges,  credentials,  and  cre- 
dential forms  are  shipped  between  custodi- 
ans and  subcustodians. 
e.  Shipping  between  continental  United 
States  units  or  units  in  the  same  overseas 
command.  The  badges  and  credentials  of 
transferred  personnel  will  be  shipped  by  the 
custodian  of  the  losing  unit  directly  to  the 
custodian  of  the  gaining  unit.  A  copy  of  the 
individual's  transfer  orders,  as  well  as  the 
original  copy  of  DA  Form  4354-R,  will  be 
enclosed  in  the  badge  and  credentials  ship- 
ment to  the  new  unit.  This  original  DA 
Form  4354-R  will  be  signed  by  the  custodi- 
an of  the  gaining  unit  and  returned  to  the 
sender.  The  gaining  custodian  will  execute  a 
new  form  in  two  copies  and  forward  the 
original  to  HQ,  INSCOM.  On  receipt,  HQ, 
INSCOM  will  return  to  the  custodian  of  the 
losing  unit  the  signed  DA  Form  4354-R, 
thereby  relieving  him/her  of  accountability. 
9-13.  Replacement  of  unserviceable 
badges  and  credentials 
a.  Inspection.  To  ensure  credentials  are  in 
a  usable  and  professional  condition,  during 
each  inventory  (para  9-96),  custodians  or 
subcustodians  will  inspect  credentials  for 
damage  or  obsolescence.  Inspections  should 
note  cracks,  chips,  creases,  and  warping  or 
obsolescence  due  to  any  change  in  facial  fea- 
tures. Records  of  this  inspection  will  be  kept 
in  unit  files  for  1  year  or  until  the  soldier  de- 
parts his  or  her  current  assignment. 
26  SEPTEMBER  1986  UPDATE  ♦  AR  381-20 
6.  Replacement  procedures.  When  U.S 
Army  intelligence  credentials  are  deter 
mined  to  be  unserviceable  or  must  be  re 
placed  because  of  an  unusable  badge, 
replacement  will  be  obtained  using  the  pro 
cedures  for  re-issue  prescribed  in  paragrapl 
9-11.  On  issuance  of  the  replacement  badg 
and  credentials,  the  old  badge  and  creden 
tials  will  be  returned  to  INSCOM. 
c.  Leather  holders.  Holders  for  creden 
tials  are  procured,  issued,  and  mailed  with 
the  badge  and  credentials  by  HQ,  IN 
SCOM.  Replacement  holders  will  be  fur- 
nished by  HQ.  INSCOM  on  request 
Serviceable  holders  will  be  returned  witl 
the  badge  and  credentials  for  reissue. 
9-14.  Central  badge  and  credentials 
repository 
a.  HQ,  INSCOM  holds  badges  and  ere 
dentials  of  authorized  personnel  whose  cur 
rent  duties  do  not  require  their  use. 
b.  Badges  and  credentials  for  personnel 
either  separated  or  retired  from  active  dun 
with  U.S.  Army  intelligence,  and  whose  du 
ties  formerly  required  badge  and  creden- 
tials, will  be  maintained  by  HQ,  INSCOM 
Badges  will  be  returned  to  stock  for  reissue 
Credentials  will  be  held  for  a  period  of  1. 
months,  then  destroyed. 
9-15.  Badge  trophy 
All  badge-carrying  personnel  with  the  SSIs. 
MOSs  listed  in  paragraph  8-16,  or  prior  ser 
vice  equivalent  (this  includes  MICECP) 
may  obtain,  at  their  own  expense,  a  U.S 
Army  MI  badge  in  trophy  form  on  honora- 
ble final  separation  from  the  Army,  provid 
ed  their  SSI/MOS  was  not  withdrawn  foi 
cause.  Details  concerning  this  program  ma 
be  obtained  by  writing  to  Director,  Foreign 
Counterintelligence   Activity   Attn 
IAFS-RM    (B&C)    Ft    Meade,    Mr 
20755-5986. 
9-16.  Loss  or  misuse  of  badges  and 
credentials 
a.  The  loss  or  misuse  of  badges  and  crt 
dentials  may  be  considered  a  basis  for  re 
moval  of  the  SSIs/MOSs  listed  in  paragrapl 
8-16.  Immediately  upon  discovering  th< 
loss,  the  individual  accountable  for  the  los' 
item  will  notify  his  or  her  immediate  superi 
or  and  will  conduct  an  immediate  search  o1 
the  suspected  area  of  loss. 
b.  On  loss  of  a  badge,  credentials,  o: 
blank  DA  Form  3363,  3363-1,  or  3363-A 
units  will  take  the  following  actions: 
(1)  Notify  HQ,  INSCOM  (at  the  addrcs 
in  para  9-4)  of  the  loss  by  the  fastest  mean 
available. 
(2)  Begin  an  immediate  search  fo: 
recovery. 
(3)  Start  an  investigation  into  the  circum 
stances  of  loss  under  the  provisions  of  A I 
15-6. 
(4)  As  appropriate,  notify  local  and  n:i 
tional  investigative  agencies  of  the  loss.  S< 
figs  9-1  and  9-2  for  sample  notification  lei 
ters  for  badge  and  credentials  loss. 
c.  A  copy  of  the  results  of  the  loss  o 
misuse  investigation  will  be  forwards r
through  command  channels  to  HQ,  IN- 
SCOM  within  30  days  of  the  incident. 
d.  The  report  will  include  a  request  for 
relief  from  accountability  from  1NSCOM 
for  the  lost  item  and  a  statement  of  any  dis- 
ciplinary action  taken,  to  include  any  action 
taken  to  remove  the  responsible  individual's 
SSI/MOS  under  AR  140-192*  AR  614-200, 
or  DA  Pam  310-1  as  appropriate.  Relief 
from  accountability  will  be  granted  on  satis- 
factory review  of  the  investigation  and  any 
corrective  measures.     . 
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^p!*.  26  SEPTEMBER  1986  UPDATE  •  AR  381-20
Appendix  A 
References 
Section  I 
Required  Publications 
AR  1-40 
Clearance  Requirements  and  Procedures  for 
Official  Temporary  Duty  Travel  Outside  the 
Continental  United  States.  (Cited  in  para 
8-96.)_ 
AR  27-40 
Litigation.  (Cited  in  para  8-12.) 
AR40-3 
Medical,  Dental,  and  Veterinary  Care.  (Cit- 
ed in  para  8-5.) 
AR  105-86 
Performing  Electronic  Countermeasures  in 
the  United  States  and  Canada.  (Cited  in 
para  4-1  la.) 
AR  140-192 
Organization,  Training,  Assignment,  and 
Retention  Criteria  for  Military  Intelligence, 
Signals  Intelligence,  Electronic  Warfare, 
and  Signals  Security  Units.  (Cited  in  para 
9-16d.) 
AR  190-14 
Carrying  of  Firearms.  (Cited  in  para  8-10.) 
AR  190-52 
Countering  Terrorism  and  Other  Major 
Disruptions  on  Military  Installations.  (Cited 
in  para  3-3.) 
AR  195-6 
Department  of  the  Army  Polygraph  Activi- 
tites.  (Cited  in  para  2-3e.) 
AR  350-4 
Qualification  and  Instructional  Firing  with 
Weapons  and  Weapons  Systems.  (Cited  in 
para  8-10.) 
AR  380-5 
Department  of  the  Army  Information  Secu- 
rity Program.  (Cited  in  paras  8-3a(3)(6) 
and  c(3),  and  9-8a.) 
AR  380-40  (O 
Policy  for  Safeguarding  and  Controlling 
COMSEC  Information  (U).  (Cited  in  para 
4-Uc(J)  and  (2).) 
AR  380-53 
Communications  Security  Monitoring.  (Cit- 
ed ia  (■»  4—5j  aod.4-41ci4).) 
AR  380-381  (S) 
Special  Access  Programs  (SAPs)  (U).  (Cited 
in  paras  4-5e  and  4—13.) 
AR  381-10 
U.S.  Army  Intelligence  Activities.  (Cited  in 
paras  2-2a  and  h.  2-3e,  4- 12b,  7-3a(2)  and 
7-4c,  %-2a(2),  and  8-36(3).) 
AR  381-11 
Threat  Support  to  U.S.  Army  Force,  Com- 
bat, and  Material  Development.  (Cited  in 
para  4-86.) 
AR  381-12 
Subversion  and  Espionage  Directed  Against 
U.S.  Army  (SAEDA).  (Cited  in  paras 
4-2c(2),  4-8c,  and  5-3g.) 
AR  381-12-1  (C) 
Processing  of  Subversion  and  Espionage  Di- 
rected Against  U.S.  Army  Incidents  (U). 
(Cited  in  para  -8-36(7)(a).)  (Distribution  of 
this  regulation  is  limited  to  active  CI  units.) 
AR  381-14  (O 
Counterintelligence:  Technical  Surveillance 
Countermeasures  (U).  (Cited  in  paras  4-5h 
and  4-10.) 
AR  381-19 
Intelligence  Support.  (Cited  in  paras  4-86 
and  5-4c.) 
AR  381-45 
Investigative  Records  Repository  (IRR). 
(Cited  in  para  2-4i.) 
AR  381-47  (S) 
U.S.  Army  Offensive  Counterintelligence 
Operations  (U).  (Cited  in  paras  1-66(2), 
2-4/i,  4-2c(2),  and  8-2a(2).)  (Distribution 
of  this  regulation  is  controlled  by  OACSI 
and  is  limited  to  active  CI  units.) 
AR  381-141  (C) 
Provisions  for  Administration,  Supervision, 
Control,  and  Use  of  Intelligence  Contingen- 
cy Funds  (U).  (Cited  in  para  8-46.) 
AR  530-1 
Operations  Security  (OPSEC).  (Cited  in  pa- 
ras 4-26,  4-4a  and  e(l),  4-5,  and  4-7.) 
AR  530-2 
Communications  Security.  (Cited  in  paras 
4-5iand4-lla.) 
AR  530-3  (O 
Electronic  Security  (U).  (Cited  in  paras 
4-5/.  and  4-1  la.) 
DIAM  58-11  (S-NF) 
Defense  Human  Resources  Intelligence  Col 
lection  Management  Manual.  (Cited  in  para 
6-2.) 
DIAM  58-13 
Defense  Human  Resources  Intelligence  Col- 
lection Procedures.  (Cited  in  para  6-3c.) 
FM34-1 
Intelligence  and  Electronic  Warfare  Opera- 
tions. (Cited  in  para  4-8a.) 
FM  34-62 
Counter-Signals  Intelligence  Operations 
(Cited  in  para  4-1 1(6).) 
TB  380-7  (O 
TEMPEST  (U).  (Cited  in  para  4-lcf3).) 
TB  380-41 
Procedures  for  Safeguarding,  Accounting 
and  Supply  Control  for  SOMCES  Material 
(Cited  in  paras  2-4g,  4-llc(J),  ?,<id  (2).) 
UCMJ 
The  Uniform  Code  of  Military  Justice.  (Cit 
ed  in  paras  8-8a,  and  8-11.) 
Section  II 
Related  Publications 
A  related  publication  is  merely  a  source  ol  adriitiona1 
information.  The  user  does  not  have  to  read  it  to 
understand  this  regulation. 
AR15-6 
Procedures  for  Investigative  Officers  am 
Boards  of  Officers  Conducting 
Investigations. 
AR  190-47 
The  U.S.  Army  Correctional  System. 
AR  195-2 
Criminal  Investigation  Activities. 
AR  210-11 
Installation — Billeting  Operations. 
AR  381-15  (C) 
Foreign  Military  Intelligence  Collection 
Activities  Program  (U). 
AR  604-5 
Personnel  Security  Program. 
AR  606-45
Section  HI 
Proscribed  Form*  . .  
• «'  <' 
A'.  -.,"■■■    ' 
DA  Form  4354 
U.S.  Army  Intelligence  Badge  and  Creden- 
tials Receipt  and/or  Tracer.  (Cited  in  para 
9-9e.)  ..•>:»• 
Section  IV 
Referenced  Forms 
DA  Form  2496 
Disposition  Fojnii      ;•.!':. 
DA  Form  2818 
Firearms  Authorization. 
DA  Form  2962 
Security  Termination  Statement  and 
Debriefing  Certificate. 
DA  Form  3363 
U.S.  Army  Intelligence  Credential. 
DA  Form  3363-1 
U.S.  Army  Intelligence  Credential. 
DA  Form  3363-A 
U.S.  Army  Intelligence  Credential 
(Representative). 
DD  Form  1396 
Department  of  Defense  Intelligence  Infor- 
mation Report.  '*         •  •• 
?1.J;.    .  t.'1:.- 
*■'.<'    '". 
fif  >.'• 
;•!  \ 
■I.;'  .•..•:!.•  :-..-     t 
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.-'".'1-.'.  .1 
••s-Oi'i  :■. 
■ 
1  ■....<   >  .■'( 
J-'fl     :'..'-. 
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p)  <»i-lK  8A 
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•.    ri  .:3')':-t^A 
'l4!»-K^ 
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<V-\"\       I 
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26  SEPTEMBER  1986  UPDATE  •  AR  381-20
Appendix  B 
Department  of  Defense  Directive 
5240.2 
Department  of  Defense 
Directive 
June  6,  1983 
NUMBER  5240.2 
SUBJECT: 
DoD  Counterintelligence 
References: 
(a)  DoD  Directive  5240.2,  "Department  of 
Defense  Counterintelligence,"  Decem- 
ber 18,  1979  (hereby  canceled) 
(b)  Executive  Order  12333,  "United  States 
Intelligence  Activities,"  December  4, 
1981 
(c)  DoD  Directive  5240.1,  "Activities  of 
DoD  Intelligence  Components  that  Af- 
fect U.S.  Persons,"  December  3,  1982 
(d)  DoD  Directive  5148.11,  "Assistant  to 
the  Secretary  of  Defense  (Intelligence 
Oversight),"  December  1,  1982 
(e)  DoD  Directive  5000.19,  "Policies  for  the 
Management  and  Control  of  Informa- 
tion Requirements."  March  12,  1976 
A.  Reissuance  and  Purpose 
This  Directive: 
1.  Reissues  reference  (a). 
2.  Implements  reference  (b)  as  it  pertains 
to  the  assignment  of  counterintelligence 
(CI)  responsibilities  to  the  Secretary  of  De-  ■ 
fense  and  the  Military  Departments. 
3.  Establishes  and  maintains  a  compre- 
hensive, integrated,  and  coordinated  CI  ef- 
fort within  the  Department  of  Defense. 
4.  Assigns  responsibilities  for  the  direc- 
tion, management,  coordination,  and  con- 
trol of  such  activities  conducted  under  the 
authority  of  reference  (b)  and  this  Directive. 
5.  Establishes  the  Defense  Counterintel- 
ligence Board  (DCIB). 
B.  Applicability         !  ■' 
This  Directive  applies  to  the  Office  of  the 
Secretary  of  Defense,  the  Military  Depart- 
ments the  Organization  of  the  Joint  Chiefs 
of  Staff  (OJCS),  the  Unified  and  Specified 
Commands,  and  the  Defense  Agencies 
(hereafter  referred  to  collectively  as  "DoD 
Components"). 
Counterintelligence  Activities  in  Conjunc- 
tion with  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investiga- 
tion," between  the  Attorney  General  and 
the  Secretary  of  Defense,  April  5,  1979 
(hereafter  referred  to  as  the  "Agreement"), 
that  is,  "the  systematic  collection  of  infor- 
mation regarding  a  person  or  group  which 
is,  or  may  be  engaged  in,  espionage  or  other 
clandestine  intelligence  activity,  sabotage, 
international  terrorist  activities  or  assassina- 
tions conducted  for,  or  on  behalf  of,  foreign 
powers,  organizations  or  persons." 
2.  Counterintelligence  Operations.  The 
meaning  as  used  in  the  "Agreement,"  that 
is,  "actions  taken  against  hostile  intelligence 
services  to  counter  espionage  and  other 
clandestine  intelligence  activities  damaging 
to  the  national- security." 
D.  Policy 
It  is  DoD  policy  that  CI  activities  shall 
be: 
1.  Undertaken  to  detect,  identify,  assess, 
and  counter  or  neutralize  the  intelligence 
collection  efforts,  other  intelligence  activi- 
ties, sabotage,  terrorist  activities,  and  assas- 
sination efforts  of  foreign  powers, 
organizations,  or  persons  directed  against 
the  Department  of  Defense,  its  personnel, 
information,  material,  and  activities. 
2.  Conducted  in  accordance  with  applica- 
ble statutes,  E.O.  12333  (reference  (b)),  and 
other  DoD  issuances  that  govern  and  estab- 
lish guidelines  and  restrictions  for  these  ac- 
tivities. This  includes  the  procedures  that 
are  issued  under  DoD  Directive  5240.1  (ref- 
erence (c))  and  that  govern,  among  other 
things,  CI  activities  that  affect  U.S.  persons. 
3.  Conducted  in  accordance  with  this  Di- 
rective, other  DoD  issuances,  and  the  poli- 
cy, standards,  criteria,  and  operational 
guidelines  established  by  the  Secretary  of 
Defense  or  designee. 
4.  Coordinated  within  the  United  States 
in  accordance  with  the  "Agreement"  (iden- 
tified in  subsection  C.I.,  above)  between  the 
Attorney  General  and  the  Secretary  of  De-~ 
fense,  and  outside  the  United  States  with 
the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence.    , 
5.  Inspected  in  accordance  with  DoD  Di- 
rective 5148.11  (reference  (d)). 
.'.  ■     '■•  i;   -.    .-..■-•  •■■•  ■  ■-,•■  •.';■'. 
E.  Delegation  of  Authority  '■'    ■ 
"The  Deputy  Under  Secretary  of  Defense 
for  Policy  (DUSD(P)),  under  the  direction, 
management,  and  control  of  the  Under  Sec- 
retary of  Defense  for  Policy,  is  delegated  the 
authority  to  act  for  the  Secretary  of  Defense 
in  carrying  out  CI  responsibilities  assigned 
by  reference  (b). , ,  
',. 
P.  Procedures 
"~1  lli.U.11.  3eQ  CI.  ;:n*e 
OrQ'tp- 
1.  Conduct  CI  investigations  to  detect 
and  neutralize  or  prevent  espionage  activi- 
ties and  detect  and  resolve  incidents  of  for- 
eign-directed sabotage,  terrorist  activities, 
and  assassinations. 
2.  Employ  offensive  CI  operations  against 
hostile  foreign  intelligence  services  to  identi- 
fy and  exploit  hostile  agents,  lessen  the 
hostile  intelligence  threat,  uncover  espio- 
nage penetrations  of  the  Department  of  De- 
fense, and  identify  hostile  intelligence 
targeting  of  DoD  personnel,  information, 
and  resources. 
3.  Collect,  analyze,  evaluate,  and  dissemi- 
nate information  of  CI  significance;  and  pre- 
pare studies,  estimates,  and  analyses  of  (a) 
foreign  intelligence  services,  their  organiza- 
tion, methods  of  operation,  personnel,  activ- 
ities, communications,  funding,  and  support 
and  (b)  international  terrorism  and  related 
security  threats  to  DoD  interests. 
4.  Prepare,  in  support  of  DoD  operations 
security  programs,  studies  and  analyses  of 
the  multidisciplinary  intelligence  threat 
posed  to  the  Department  of  Defense  by  for- 
eign intelligence  services,  including  systems, 
targeting,  control  mechanisms,  deployment, 
and  capabilities. 
G.  Defense  .Counterintelligence  Board 
.  1.  Organization  and  Management 
a.  The  DCIB  shall  be  chaired  by  the  Di 
rector  for  Counterintelligence  and  Securilv 
Policy,  Office  of  the  DUSD(P) 
(ODUSD(P)).  The  Director.  Counterintel- 
ligence and  Investigative  Programs. 
ODUSD(P).  shall  serve  as  Executive 
Secretary. 
•  b.  The  DCIB  membership  shall  include 
the  Assistant  General  Counsel  (Internation- 
al); the  Assistant  to  the  Secretary  of  De- 
fense (Intelligence  Oversight);  and  one 
representative  from  each  of  the  Military  De- 
partment CI  components,  the  Defense  Intel- 
ligence Agency  (DIA),  and  the  National 
Security  Agency/Central  Security  Service 
(NSA/CSS). 
c.  The  DCIB  shall  be  supported  by  sub- 
committees, with  participation  from  those 
organizations  represented  on  the  DCIB  and 
the  OJCS.  Chairs  of  the  subcommittees 
shall  be  appointed  by  the  Chair,  DCIB. 
2.  Functions.  The  DCIB  shall  advise  and 
assist  the  DUSD(P)  on  CI  matters  within 
the  purview  of  E.O,  12333  (reference  (b)) 
and  this  Directive. ' 
H*  Responsibilities 
1.  Tie  Deputy  Under  Secretary  of  Defense 
for  Policy  shall: 
a.  Exercise  policy  supervision  over  and 
manage  DoD  CI  p  o,:-.ms  and  activities  as 
defined  in  this  Direc  >*■■:. 
b.  Establish  po:.cie.;  and  procedures  for 
the  conduct  and  administriTirm  ~.f  DoD  CI 
H3K***»«aiJa.-<
planning  guidance  for  DoD  resources  en- 
gaged  in  CI. 
,  e  Act  as  program  manager  for  DoD  re- 
sources included  in  the  DoD  Foreign 
Counterintelligence  (FCI)  Program;  review 
proposed  Military  Department  and  DIA  CI 
resource  programs  for  efficiency  and  effec- 
tiveness; formulate  budget  estimates  for  the 
DoD  FCI  Program;  allocate  resources  to 
these  programs;  review  costs,  budgets,  and 
financial  plans;  and  evaluate  the  implemen- 
tation of  approved  programs. 
/  Conduct  assessments  of  the  effective- 
ness of  CI  support  to  users,  the  quality  of 
the  CI  product,  and  the  effectiveness  and  ef- 
ficiency of  DoD  CI  components  and  sys- 
tems; review  and  monitor  the  progress  of 
offensive  CI  operations;  and  approve  or  «■> 
fer  to  the  National  Security  Council  (NSC) 
sensitive  operations  that  involve  significant 
policy  issues. 
g.  Coordinate  DoD  CI  programs  and  ac- 
tivities with  other  U.S.'  Government 
organizations. 
n.  Provide  staff  support  to  the  Secretary 
of  Defense  on  NSC  matters  and  provide  for 
DoD  representation  on  national,  interna- 
tional, and  interdepartmental  boards,  com; 
mittees,  and  other  organizations  involved  in 
CI  matters. 
'  L  Conduct,  or  provide  for  the  conduct  of, 
staff  inspections  of  DoD  CI  components  to 
monitor  established  programs. 
j.  Assign  special  tasks  to  DoD  Compo- 
nents as  may  l)e  necessary  to  accomplish 
DoD  CI  objectives.  . 
2.  The  Secretaries  of  the  Military  Depart- 
ments shall: 
a.  Provide  for  the  conduct,  direction, 
management,  coordination,  and  control  of 
CI  activities  in  accordance  with  this  Direc- 
tive and  E.O.  12333  (reference  (b)). 
b.  Maintain,  operate,  and  manage  their 
respective  CI  components  in  accordance 
with  the  authorities  and  responsibilities  as- 
.  .signed  in  this  Directive  and  provide  person- 
nel, equipment  and  facilities  that  CI  tasks 
require.  )        ' 
c.  Establish  Military  Department  plans, 
programs,  policies,  and  procedures  to  ac- 
complish authorized  CI  missions.  ' 
d.  Establish  and  maintain  a  worldwide 
CI  capability  for  the  purposes  outlined  in 
subsection  D.I.,  above.        '     '':  "•"'  u''"'; 
e.  Develop  CI  techniques,  methods,  and 
equipment  required  for  CI  activities.  ' 
/.  Provide  CI  support  to  pthe?  DoD, 
Components,  U.S.  Government  organiza- 
tions, and  foreign  CI  and  security  agencies 
as  provided  for  in  this  Directive  and  refer- 
ence (b).  /'  .  "     
' ' ''"     .''  ,':.  '.'.  '  ,' 
g.  Provide  basic  and.  specialized  training 
to  CI  personnel.. 
h.  Submit  CI  operational  data  and  pre- 
pare CI  analyses  as  requested  by  the 
PUSD(P).  , 
'  i.  Establish  and  maintain  liaison  with 
FCI  and  security  agencies  in  accordance 
.    with  policies  formulated  by  the  Director  of 
Central  Intelligence  and  as  provided  in  E.O. 
12333  (reference  (b))  and  coordinate  Milita- 
ry Department  programs  and  activities  with 
other  U.S.  Government  organizations. 
j.  Participate  on  DoD,  national,  interna- 
tional, and  interdepartmental  boards,  com- 
mittees, and  other  organizations  involving 
CI  as  requested  by  the  DUSD(P). 
3.  The  Director,  Defense  Intelligence 
Agency,  shall: 
a.  Prepare  joint  and  DoD-level  multidis- 
ciplinary  analyses  of  foreign  intelligence  and 
international  terrorist  threats  to  joint  and 
DoD-level  military  security  interests. 
b.  Coordinate  the  CI  production  pro- 
grams of  the  Military  Departments  and 
publish  annually  a  DoD  CI  production 
schedule  and  a  DoD  CI  Publications 
Registry. 
c.  Ensure  that  adequate,  timely,  and  reli- 
able CI  analysis  and  production  support  is 
provided  to  the.  JCS  and  the  Unified  and 
Specified  Commands. 
d.  Establish  and  maintain  a  DoD  CI  data 
base,  consistent  with  DoD  Directive 
5000.19  (reference  (e)),  to  support  the  DoD 
CI  production  efforts  .of  the  DoD  Compo- 
nents concerned. 
e.  Participate  on  DoD,  national,  interna- 
tional, and  interdepartmentalboards,  com- 
mittees, and  other  organizations  involving 
CI  as  requested  by  the  DUSD(P). 
/  Provide  staff  support  to  the  Chairman, 
JCS,  on  NSC  matters  and  represent  the  in- 
terests of  the  Chairman,  JCS,  on  the  DCIB. 
4.  The  Director,  National  Security  Agen- 
cy/Chief, Central  Security  Service,  shall: 
a.  Collect,  process,  and  disseminate  sig- 
nals intelligence  information  for  CI 
purposes. 
b.  Participate  in  the  production  of  mul- 
tidisciplinary  intelligence  threat  analyses  as 
required. 
c.  Participate  on  DoD,  national,  and  in- 
terdepartmental boards,  committees,  and 
other  organizations  involving  CI  as  request- 
ed by  the  DUSD(P). 
5.  The  Heads  of  DoD  Components  (except 
Military  Department  Secretaries) 
a.  Refer  matters  of  a  CI  nature  involving: 
(1)  Military  personnel  assigned  to  their 
Components  to  the  Military  Department 
concerned  for  appropriate  investigation  and 
disposition. 
(2)  Civilian  personnel  employed  by  their 
Components  in  the  United  States  to  the 
Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  (FBI)  and, 
when  overseas,  to  the  Military  Department 
responsible  for  providing  administrative  and 
logistical  support. 
6.  Request  the  Military  Departments, 
DIA,  and  NSA/CSS  to  provide  CI  support 
and  information,  as  provided  in  subsections 
H.2.  through  H.4.,  above. 
'  c.  Notify  the  DUSD(P)  when  such  refer- 
rals or  requests  are  made  and  a  Military  De- 
partment, Defense  Agency,  or  the  FBI 
declines  to  provide  requested  CI  support  or 
information. 
adequate;  no  further  implementation  is 
necessary. 
Signed  by  PAUL  THAYER 
Deputy  Secretary  of  Defense 
M to 
I.  Effective  Date  and  Implementation 
This  Directive  is  effective  immediately. 
Existing  implementing  documents  still  are 
26  SEPTEMBER  1986  UPDATE  •  AR  381-20
Appendix  C 
Extract  from  "The  Agreement 
Between  the  Deputy  Secretary  of 
Defense  and  Attorney  General, 
April  5, 1979" 
Section  6 
Delineation  of  responsibility  for  CI 
Investigations 
Responsibility  for  CI  investigations  shall  be 
apportioned  between  the  FBI  and  the  mili- 
tary CI  services  of  the  DOD  as  follows: 
a.  All  investigations  of  violations  of  the 
Atomic  Energy  Act  of  1946,  which  might 
constitute  a  CI  investigation  as  defined  here- 
in, shall  be  the  responsibility  of  the  FBI,  re- 
gardless of  the  status  or  location  of  the 
subjects  of  such  investigations. 
b.  Except  as  provided  by  paragraph  c(2) 
herein,  all  CI  investigations  of  foreign  na- 
tionals undertaken  within  the  United  States 
shall  be  the  responsibility  of  the  FBI. 
c.  CI  investigations  within  the  United 
States  shall  be  conducted  in  accordance 
with  the  following  jurisdictional  guidelines: 
(1)  Except  as  provided  herein,  investiga- 
tions of  all  civilians,  including  DOD  civilian 
personnel,  shall  be  the  responsibility  of  the 
FBI; 
(2)  Investigations  of  US  military  person- 
nel on  active  duty  shall  be  the  responsibility 
of  the  CI  service  of  the  appropriate  military 
department; 
(3)  Investigations  of  retired  military  per- 
sonnel, active  and  inactive  reservists,  and 
National  Guard  members  shall  be  the  re- 
sponsibility of  the  FBI;  provided,  however, 
that  investigations  of  actions  which  took 
place  while  the  subject  of  the  investigation 
was,  or  is,  on  active  military  duty  shall  be 
conducted  by  the  CI  service  of  the  appropri- 
ate military  department;  and, 
•  (4)  Investigations  of  private  contractors 
of  the  DOD,  and  their  employees,  shall  be 
the  responsibility  of  the  FBI,  Provided,  how- 
ever, that  nothing  contained  in  this  para- 
graph shall  prevent  the  military  CI  services 
of  the  DOD,  in  a  manner  consistent  with 
applicable  law  and  Executive  Branch  policy, 
from  undertaking: 
(a)  In  those  cases  where  the  FBI  chooses 
to  waive  investigative  jurisdiction,  investiga- 
tive actions  which  are  necessary  to  establish 
or  refute  the  factual  basis  required  for  an 
authorized  administrative  action,  to  protect 
the  security  of  its  personnel,  information, 
activities,  ar.J  installations;  or 
(b)  To  provide  assistance  to  the  FBI  in 
support  of  any  CI  investigation  for  which 
the  FBI  is  herein  assigned  responsibility. 
d.  CI  investigations  outside  the  United 
States  shall  be  conducted  in  accordance 
with  the  following  guidelines: 
(1)  Investigations  of  military  personnel 
*  on  active  duty  shall  be  the  responsibility  of 
the  military  CI  services  of  the  DOD. 
(2)  Investigations  of  current  civilian  em- 
ployees, their  dependents,  and  the  civilian 
dependents  of  active  duty  military  personnel 
shall  be  the  responsibility  of  the  military  CI 
services,  unless  such  responsibility  is  other- 
wise assigned  pursuant  to  agreement  with 
the  host  government,  US  law  or  Executive 
directive. 
(3)  Investigations  of  retired  military  per- 
sonnel, active  and  inactive  reservists,  Na- 
tional Guard  members,  private  contractors 
and  their  employees,  and  other  US  persons, 
who  permanently  reside  in  such  locations, 
shall  be  undertaken  in  consultation  with  the 
FBI,  CIA,  and  host  government  as  appro- 
priate, Provided,  however,  that  nothing  con- 
tained in  this  paragraph  shall  prevent  the 
military  CI  services  of  the  DOD,  in  a  man- 
ner consistent  with  applicable  law  and  Ex- 
ecutive Branch  policy  from  undertaking: 
(a)  Investigative  actions  which  are  neces- 
sary to  establish  or  refute  the  factual  basis 
required  for  an  authorized  administrative 
action,  to  protect  the  security  of  its  person- 
nel, information,  activities,  and  installations; 
or (b)  To  provide  assistance  to  the  FBI  or 
security  service. of  a  host  government  in 
support  of  CI  investigations  outside  the 
United  States  for  which  DOD  is  not  herein 
assigned  investigative  responsibility. 
-■£.- 
20  SEPTEMBER  1986  UPDATE  •  AR  381-20
(Appropriate  letterhead) 
(Office  symbol)  ;  .•       •     .  (date)  "  \ 
SUBJECT:  lost  or  Stolen  U.S.  Army  Intelligence  Badge 
(Name  and  address  of  agency  to  which  loss  is  being  reported) 
1.  It  Is  requssted  that  the  following  information  be  disseminated  to  the  appropriate  offices  of  your; 
organisation: 
a.  U.S.  Amy  Intelligence  badge  number  (badge  number)  issued  to  special  agent  (name  of  agent),  has  been 
lost  or  stolen  on  or  about  (date  of  loss)  ip  the  vicinity  of  (place  of  toss). 
b.  The  badge  is  2-by  1 1/2-inches  in  size,  made  of  a  gold-colored  alloy  in  the  shape  of  a  shield  - 
surmounted  by  the  figure  of  an  eagle.  On  the  top  of  the  shield  proper,  in  blue  lettering,  are  the  words 
"Department  of  the  Army .  ■  On  the  bottom  of  the  shield  are  the  words  'Military  Intelligence , "  also  in 
blue  lettering.  In  the  center  of  the  shield  between  the  two  legends  is  an  engraved  seal  with  the  legend 
■United  States  of  America  War  Office*  around  its  rim.  On  either  side  of  the  engraved  insignia  in  the  . 
center  are  letters  'U*  and  *S"  in  large  capitals.  The  badge  is  stamped  on  the  reverse  with  a  number. 
2.  If  the  above  badge  is  found  or  any  information  is  obtained  that  may  lead  to  its  recovery,  please 
forward  It  to  (complete  address  where  badge  is  to  be  sent).  ' 
"\<t 
(Signature  of  notifying  official) 
Figure  9-1.  Sample  notification  fetter  for  lost  or  stolen  badge 
'.»     , 
26  SEPTEMBER  1986  UPDATE  •  AR  381-20
(Appropriate  letterhead) 
(Office  symbol)  ^ 
SUBJECT:  Lost  or  Stolen  U.S.  Army  Intelligence  Credentials 
_  (Name  and  address  of  agency  to  which  loss  is  being  reported) 
1.  U.S.  Army  Intelligence  credentials  number  (credentials  number)  issued  to  special  agent  (name  of  agent)  has 
been  lost  or  stolen  on  or  about  (date  of  loss)  in  the  vicinity  of  (place  of  loss). 
2.  The  U.S.  Army  Intelligence  credentials  are  encased  in  a  leather  wallet-type  holder,  approximately 
3  1/2-  by  5-inches  in  size.  The  credentials  consist  of  two  laminated  parts,  approximately  3-  by  4  1/2- 
inches  in  size.  Each  portion  bears  the  U.S.  Army  watermark.  The  upper  laminated  portion  is  identified 
by  the  name  of  the  special  agent  that  appears  printed  within  the  certification  statement.  The 
credentials  number  is  centered  below  the  certification  statement .  The  lower  laminated  portion  of  the 
credentials  is  identified  by  the  official  mission  certification  in  the  upper  left  corner  and  a  color 
photograph  of  the  special  agent  in  the  upper  right,  corner.  The  official  signature  block  of  the  Chief 
of  Staff,  U.S.  Army,  appears  in  the  center  of  the  credentials.  In  addition,  this  portion  of  the 
credentials  contains  the  signature  of  The  Adjutant  General,  U.S.  Army,  and  the  signature  of  the 
special  agent  to  whoa  It  was  issued.  The  credentials  number  is  printed  below  the  signature  of  the 
special  agent.       .•".•'•■■". 
3.  If  the  above  credentials  are  found  or  any  information  is  obtained  that  may  lead  to  their  recovery 
please  forward  to  (complete  address  to  where  credentials/information  are  to  be  sent). 
'  "   '  (Signature  of  notifying  official) 
Figure  9-2.  Sample  notification  letter  for  lost  or  stolen  credentials 
i~i;~.i      I)  v.      .  ..,,;; 
'si  :''*,.•         .'    ■,      .■.:■-,., ..   .•,■■• ... 
>?'.'  1   !'V'ji:-i 
\ ... ,..  ,  ..      .-•■■;.  ■■.-   ■■■•.■to.vru.fi.-.-i 
W-WJJr^ivj:  .•;■     ';.       ;     ,;;,;.■.,.•,(.     ,!.,;,>  . 
I, 
»'f>J TO  _nr»f»Y/  y,w>-,y 
>•:  \u->    /• 
'.fJWTi'-v.nmtvti  ■■•■:  .■.:.  ,.  ;,    ;,. 
r-'i,  .'.^r'.ci'p')  jfpi:ift|f.-.  it..  ■;■!,*  <■   t,,    
-r.".v>: '■'■>i'ifi<,?ib1btZ1#.  .biiWr  ».*zu.\  '-.,■' . 
i^&'ii^VhiM-to  vtiiwVWi'.ib,it;/"  ..  -. . 
26  SEPTEMBER  1986  UPDATE  •  AR  381-20  21
Glossary 
Section  I 
Abbreviations 
ACSI 
Assistant  Chief  of  Staff  for  Intelligence 
ADPSSEP 
Automated  Data  Processing  Systems  Secu- 
rity Enhancement  Program 
AOC 
Army  Operations  Center 
■"        i     '     »'V."4    '•••■■. 
AOR 
area  of  responsibility 
ARNG  _  •"; 
Army  National  Guard 
•a  :-:\y-:::  ■     ■ 
counterintelligence         ' ' 
QA 
Central  Intelligence  Agency 
Criminal  Investigation  Division 
CINCUSAREUR 
Commander-in-Chief,  U.S.  Army  Europe 
,    COMSEC 
communications  security 
.,      DA 
,      Department  of  the  Army 
f    DCSOPS 
t-     Deputy  Chief  of  Staff  for  Operations  and 
%     Plans 
*      DIA 
\      Defense  Intelligence  Agency 
|!     DOD 
%     Department  of  Defense 
%    EAC 
V-    echelons  above  corps 
Iecb 
m/'  echelons  corps  and  below 
P 
m.  ECCM 
W.  electronic  counter-countermeasures . 
fe    ELSEC 
m$  electronic  security 
R;EW 
'Ms-. electronic  warfare 
Pederal  Bureau  of  Investigation 
?I 
foreign  intelligence 
GC 
General  Counsel 
HQDA 
Headquarters,  Department  of  the  Army 
HUMINT 
human  intelligence 
IIR 
Intelligence  Information  Report 
IMINT 
imagery  intelligence 
SIGINT 
signals  intelligence 
SIGSEC 
signals  security 
SSI 
specialty  skills  identifier 
SSN 
Social  Security  Number 
TAREX 
target  exploitation 
TDY 
INSCOM 
U.S.  Army  Intelligence  and  Security     temporary  duty 
Command 
KAWOL 
knowledgeable  person  absent  without  leave 
MACOM 
major  Army  command 
MED 
manipulative  electronic  deception 
MI 
military  intelligence 
MICECP 
Military  Intelligence  Civilian  Excepted  Ca-      Center 
reer  Program 
TSCM 
technical  surveillance  countermeasures 
USACIDC 
U.S.  Army  Criminal   Investigation 
Command 
USAIA 
U.S.  Army. Intelligence  Agency 
USAICS 
U.S.  Army  Intelligence  Center  and  School 
USAITAC 
U.S.  Army  Intelligence  and  Threat  Analysis 
USAR 
MILPERCEN 
U.S.  Army  Reserve 
U.S.  Army  Military  Personnel  Center 
■      ;- 
USAREUR 
MOS 
U.S.  Army  Europe 
military  occupational  specialty 
Section  II 
OACSI 
Terms 
Office  of  the  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff  for 
Intelligence 
OPSEC 
operations  security 
OSE 
Operations  Security  Evaluation 
OSS 
operations  security  services 
PMO 
provost  marshal's  office 
PSA 
Project  Security  Analysis 
RNA 
rations  not  available 
SAEDA 
Army  civilian  personnel 
Includes  all  U.S.  citizen  officers  and  em- 
ployees of  the  Army  not  on  active  military 
duty,  and  all  foreign  nationals  employed  by 
the  Army. 
Assassination 
The  murder  or  attempted  murder  of  Army 
personnel  or  employees  for  political  or  retal- 
iatory reasons  by  terrorists  or  agents  of  a 
foreign  power. 
Compromising  emanations 
Unintentional  intelligence-bearing  signals 
which,  if  intercepted  and  analyzed,  disclose 
national  security  information  transmitted, 
received,  handled,  or  otherwise  processed  by 
any  information  processing  system.  Often 
referred  to  by  the  short  name  "TEMPEST." 
Counterintelligence 
Information  gathered  and  activities  con- 
subversion  and  espionage  directed  against  ducted  to  protect  against  espionage,  other 
U.S.  Army  intelligence  activities,  sabotage,  or  assassina- 
tions, conducted  for  or  on  behalf  of  foreign 
SAP  powers,  organizations  or  persons,  or  terror- 
special  access  program  ist  activities,  but  not  including  personnel, 
26  SEPTEMBER  1986  UPDATE  •  AR  381-20
physical.  document,  or  communications  se- 
curity programs. 
Counterintelligence  collection 
k  The  acquisition  of  information  of  a  counter- 
f  intelligence  nature  by  means  of  direct  obser- 
vation, liaison  with  official  agencies,  or 
solicitation  from  other  sources  in  response 
to  officially  approved  counterintelligence 
collection  requirements.  Counterintelligence 
collection  may  be  developed  during  investi- 
gations or  operations,  or  may  be  acquired 
for  the  specific  purpose  of  satisfying  a  re- 
quirement. Information  will  be  considered 
as  "collected"  only  when  it  has  been  made 
part  of  the  files  or  information  holdings  of 
an  Army  intelligence  component. 
Counterintelligence  investigation 
The  systematic  collection  of  information  re- 
garding a  person  or  group,  which  is  or  may 
have  engaged  in  espionage  or  other  clandes- 
tine intelligence  activity,  sabotage,  terrorist 
activities,  or  assassinations,  conducted  for, 
or  on  behalf  of,  foreign  powers,  organiza- 
tions, or  persons. 
Counterintelligence  operations 
Actions  taken  against  hostile  intelligence 
services  to  counter  espionage  and  other 
clandestine  intelligence  activities  damaging 
to  national  security. 
Counterintelligence  production 
m       The  process  of  converting  significant 
W       counterintelligence  information  into  intelli- 
gence through  the  evaluation,  analysis,  inte- 
gration and  interpretation  of  all  source  data. 
Defector 
A  person  who  unlawfully  and  voluntarily 
leaves  U.S.  control  and  allows  himself/her- 
self to  come  under  the  control  of  a  foreign 
power  with  interests  inimical  to  those  of  the 
United  States. 
'    Deliberate  compromise 
The  act,  attempt,  or  reported  contemplation 
by  Army  personnel  of  intentionally  convey- 
ing classified  documents,  information,  or 
material  to  any  unauthorized  person,  to  in- 
clude public  disclosure  in  an  unauthorized 
manner.  :- 
Detainee 
A  person  who  inadvertently  or  involuntarily 
comes  under  the  control  of  a  nation  or 
hostile  force  with  interests  inimical  to  those 
of  the  United  States. 
Espionage 
The  act  of  obtaining,  delivering,  transmit- 
ting, communicating,  or  receiving  informa- 
k  tion  in  respect  to  the  national  defense  with 
P  an  intent  or  reason  to  believe  that  the  infor- 
y  mation  may  be  used  to  the  injury  of  the 
1  United  States  or  to  the  advantage  of  any 
foreign  nation.  The.  elements  of  *fi*mmp> 
ate  set  forth-in  li  USCJ7Z*TWL„ 
Knowledgeable  AWOL 
A  military  individual  absent  without  leave 
and  designated  by  a  major  commander  as 
having  knowledge  of,  and  recent  access  to, 
national  defense  information  classified  Se- 
cret or  higher,  or  COMSEC  information, 
the  unauthorized  disclosure  of  which  would 
result  in  serious  damage  or  exceptionally 
grave  danger  to  the  United  States. 
Multidiscipline  CI  Analysis 
Work  involving  the  assessments  of  threats 
to  U.S.  security  presented  by  activities  of 
hostile  intelligence  collection  systems.  In- 
cludes all-source  analysis  of  the  integrated, 
combined  effort  of  hostile  collection  disci- 
plines, and  SIGINT,  HUMINT,  and 
IMINT,  and  special  operations  controlled 
by  hostile  intelligence  agencies. 
Operations  Security  Evaluation  (OSE) 
A  specialized,  integrated,  multidisciplinary 
analysis  of  military  operations  and  activities 
to  identify  weaknesses  that  could  compro- 
mise current  or  future  plans  or  operations. 
Project  Security  Analysis  (PSA) 
An  OSE  that  is  conducted  for  a  specific  ac- 
tivity within  a  larger  organization. 
Sedition 
Participation  in  one  or  more  of  the 
following: 
a.  Knowingly  or  willfully  advocating  or 
teaching  the  duty  or  necessity  of  overthrow- 
ing the  United  States  Government  or  any 
political  subdivision  therein  by  force  or 
violence. 
b.  Printing,  publishing,  circulating,  sell- 
ing or  publicly  displaying  written  matter, 
with  intent  to  cause  the  overthrow  or  de- 
struction of  any  such  government,  which 
advocates  or  teaches  the  duty  or  necessity  of 
such  overthrow  by  force  or  violence. 
c.  Organizing  a  society  or  group  whose 
purpose  is  to  advocate  or  teach  the  duty  or 
necessity  of  such  overthrow  by  force  or 
violence. 
d.  Being  or  becoming  a  member  of,  or  af- 
filiated with,  such  society  or  group  knowing 
the  purpose  thereof. 
Subversion 
Includes  the  following: 
a  Actively  encouraging  military  or  civil- 
ian personnel  of  the  Department  of  Defense 
to  violate  laws,  disobey  lawful  orders  or  reg- 
ulations, or  disrupt  military  activities; 
b.  With  the  willful  intent  thereby  to  in- 
terfere with,  or  impair  the  loyalty,  morale 
or  discipline  of  the  military  forces  of  the 
United  States. 
TEMPEST 
A  short  name  referring  to  investigations  and 
studies  of  compromising  emanations.  It  is 
often  used  synonymously  for  the  term  com- 
Terrorist  activities 
The  actual  commission  of  violent  acts, 
threat  of  violent  acts  to  attain  goals  poll 
cal,  religious,  or  ideological  in  nature.  Tl, 
is  done  through  intimidation,  coercion,  < 
instilling  fear.  Terrorist  activities  are  crin 
nal  acts  that  are  often  symbolic  in  nattr 
and  intended  to  influence  an  audience  h 
yond  its  immediate  victims. 
Terrorism  counteraction 
Defensive  measures  (antiterrorism)  to  r. 
duce  the  vulnerability  to  terrorist  activitii 
and  offensive  measures  (counterterrorisn 
taken  in  response  to  terrorist  activities.
•■..    '\t)    •'■<<,    '.  (■■        '•: 
RESERVED 
i^/u•.i'y.,  '■■■ 
-ft>  --i 
Vis:":  •  • 
fmz2A 
Jj.'l'J  .••10'"..  .-•'     >  -  '>•  '•'  Jii-i       '  •■    . 
26  SEPTEMBER  1986  UPDATE  •  AR  381-20
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