D) 2097) XS nor cs an Bae Wwe xs aed
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY Headquarters United States Marine Corps Washington, D.C. 20380 § December 1983 FOREWORD 1. PURPOSE FMEM 2-4, Counterintelligence, sets forth information and guidance conceming the planning and execution of counterintelligence activities within the Marine Corps. 2. SCOPE This manual discusses the z-ission, responsibilities, organization, functions, and employment of counterintelligence assets during combat and garrison operations. Counterintelligence planning and training considerations are also discussed. 3. SUPERSESSION This publicatios, supersedes FMFM 2-4, Counterintelligence dated 15 March 1979. 4. CHANGES Recommendations for improving this manual are invited from commands as well as direcily from individuals. The attached User Suggestion Form shouid be utilized by individuals and forwarded to: Commanding General Marine Corps Development and Education Command (Code D 046) Quantico, Virginia 22134 §. CERTIFICATION Reviewed and approved this date. BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS i(-—c 4 . M. OME" Major General, U.S. Marine Corps Commanding General Marine Corps Development and Education Command Quantico, Virginia DISTRIBUTION: TBD Reviewed & approved for reprinting by CMC (PP) on 25 Mar 1985. For sale by the Superintendeat of Decuments, U.S. Government Pristing OMice. Waabtnagton, D.C. 20162
USER SUGGESTION FORM From: Teo: Commanding General, Marine Corps Development and Education Command (Code D 046), Quantico, Virginia 22134 Subj: FMFM 2-4, Counterintelligence, recommendation concerning i. In accordance with the Foreword to FMFM 2-4, which invites individuals to submit suggestions concerning this FMEFM directly to the above addressee, the following unclassified recommendation is forwarded: Page Article/Paragraph No. Line No. Figure/Table No. Nature of Change: O Add O Delete O Change O Correct i. Proposed New Verbatim Text: (Verbatim, double spaced; continue on additional pages as necessary.) 2. Justification/Source: (Need not be double spaced.) NOTE: Only one recommendation per page.
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY OFFICIAL BUSINESS Oe ma Ty COM PHIVETE USE S8oU To: tht BUSINESS REPLY MAIL FIRST CLASS PERMIT WO. 12495 waseiuGTon, OC POSTAGE wiLL HE CAD AV UNITED STATES MARINE CORES « Coramanding General Marine Corps Development and Education Command (Code D 046) Quantico, Virginia 22134 NO POSTAGE NECESSARY (fF MAILEO InN THE UNITED STATES wien? - og
FMFM 2-4 Record of Changes “Date of Date of i (reverse blank)
. Section 1. Paragraph 10! 102 103 104 Section 2. 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 Section 3. 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 ee Counterintelligence Table of Contents Introduction General Counterinteltigence Measures Responsj bilities Marine Corps Supporting Establishment Counterinteltisence Personne] Commands Without Assigned Counterintelligence Personnel! Counterintelligence Mission alegories of Counterinteltigence Operations Forward Area Operations Tactical} Counterintelligence Interrogation Friendly Prisoners Of War and Persons Missing (Nonhostile) and Missing in Action Counterinsurgency Operations Files and Reports Communications FMFM 2.4 Page I-] 1-3 1-4 1-5 2-1 2-1 2-6 2-8 2-12 2-13 2-13 nn
FMF 2-4 ES Section 4. Counterintelligence Garrison Cperations 401 General 4-1 402 Counterintelligence Survey +1 403 Counterintelligence Evaluation 4-6 404 Counterintelligence Inspections 46 405 Technical Surveiliexice Countermeasures Support 47 406 Reports . 48 Section 5. Counterintelligence Planning 501 General §-1 502 Planning Preceding the Operation 5-2 503 Counterintelligence Targets $-2 $04 Counterintelligence Target Reduction 5-5 505 Sequence of Counterintelligence Activities for Amphibious Operations 5-5 Section 6. Counterintelligence Training &01 General 6-1 602 Responsibilities 6-1 603 Purpose and Scope 6-1 604 Basic Counterintelligence and Security Training 6-2 605 Training of Officers and Staff Noncommissioned Officers 6-2 606 Training of Intelligence Section Personnel 6-2 607 Training of Counterinteiligence Team Personnel 6-3 Appendixes: A Format for Personnel Data Form, Persons Captured, Missing (Nonhostile), or A-l Missing in Action B Counterintelligence Reports B-! Cc Sampie Format for Counterintelligence Estimate C-1 D Partially Computed Counterintelligence Measures Worksheet D-! E JOPS Format for a Counterintelligence Appendix E-1 F Format for a Counterintelligence Plan F-1 G Sample Format for Counterintelligence Reduction Plan G-1
FMFM 4S ection 1 Section 1 Introduction 161. General a. importance. Counterintelligence is that aspect of intelligence devoted to neutralizing or destroying the effectiveness of hostile foreign intelligence activities, and to the protection of information against espionage, personnel against subversion and terrorism, and instal- lations and material against sabotage. Counterintelli- gence measures enhance security, aid in reducing risks to the command, and are essential in achieving surprise during military operations. Accordingly, counterintel- ligence provides a significant contribution to a com- mand’s operations security (OPSEC) program. As an element of intelligence, counterintelligence must be closely coordinated and thoroughly integrated with the overall intelligence effort. The success of any military operation is dependent on reliable intelligence and effective counterintelligence. Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 2-1, daielligence, provides guidance for intelligence activities withia the Marine Corps. b. Basis for Counterintelligence Activities. The enemy can be expected to use every available means to thwart or otherwise impede our forces with his efforts directed towards intelligence collection, sabotage, subversion, and cerrorism. Enemy intelli- gence collection activities are directed toward obtaining detailed knowledge of our forces and their capabilities, limitations, vulnerabilities, intentions, and probable courses of action, as well as information concerning the area of operations, including weather, terrain, and hydrography. Knowledge on the part of the enemy con- cerning an operation projected by friendly forces will enable him to concentrate his efforts on preparing the objective for defense, attacking friendly staging areas, and disrupting the operation through sabotage, ter- rorism, and subversive activities. Accordingly, counterintelligence is essential to the security of our forces from the inception of planning until the operation is completed. 1-1
FMFM Been 2 a grees: Shr mpc Re ateee -@ tf Section 2 Counterintelligence Organization and Functions 201. General Marine Corps counterintelligence teams are organized, trained, and equipped to provide combat support to the Fleet Marine Force (FMF). During peacetime, in addi- tion to planning, preparing, and training for combat, Marine counterintelligence units also provide various counterintelligence services and support to enhance the security and readiness of the Marine Corps. The wide range and continuing nature of counterintelli- gence, and its integration within the overall intelligence effort, require an understanding of the national intelli- gence organization as well as of the intelligence and’ counterintelligence units of the Armed Forces. The prin- cipal organizations concerned with intelligence and counterintelligence are summarized in the following paragraphs. (See fig. 2-1.) 202. National Intelligence Organizatia1s gs. National Security Council (NSC). The National Security Act of 1947 established the National Security Council to advise the President on the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security. The NSC acts as the highest Executive Branch entity providing revicw of, guidance for, and direction to the conduct of ail national foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, special activities, and attendant policies and programs. The NSC, or acom- mittee established by it, considers and submits to the President a policy recommendation, to include dissents, on each special activity, and reviews proposals for uther sensitive intelligence operations. b. Central intelligence Agency (CIA). The Central Intelligence Agency also was establisied by the 2-1
Figure 2-1. Organization for Intelligence. National Security Act of 1947 and is authorized by: this act, as amended; the CIA Act of 1949, as amended; and other appropriate directives and applicable laws to: 2-2 © Collect, produce, and disseminate foreign in- telligence and counterintelligence, including infor- mation not otherwise obtainable. The collection of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence within the United States must be coordinated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). C-lect, produce, and disseminate intelligence on fereign aspects of narcotics production and trafficking. Conduct counterintelligence activities outside the United States and, without assuming or perform- ing any internal security functions, conduct counterintelligence activities within the United States in coordination with the FBI. Coordinate counterirtelligence activities and the collection of information not otherwise obtainable, when conducted outside the United States by other - departments and agencies. Conduct special activities approved by the Presi- dent. No agency except the CIA (or the Armed Forces of the United States in time of war declared by Congress or during any period covered by a report from the President to Congress under the War Powers Resolution) may conduct any special activity unless the President determines that another agency is more likely to achieve a particular objective. Perform services of common concern for the intelligence community, as directed by the NSC. Carry out, or contract for research, development, and procurement of, technical systems and devices relating to authorized functions. Protect the security of its installations, activities, information, property, and employees by appropri- ate means, including such investigations of applicants, employees, contractors, and other persons with similar association with the CIA as may be necessary. Conduct such administrative and technical support activities, within and outside of the United States, “as are necessary to perform the functions described above, including procurement and essential cover and proprietary arrangements. The Director of the CIA also serves as the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). The DCI is the senior
FMFM 2-4 er 202 intelligence advisor to the President; has authority for approval of the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget, and provides the overall coordination, plan- “ning, and review of intelligence programs and activities. ‘The National ieence Tasking Center (NITC), - under direction of the DCI, is responsible for ‘tasking and coordination of national foreign intelligence col- lection activities. In additior, the DCI is responsible for the protection of intelligence sourées and methods from unauthorized disclosure. The DCI also serves as the Chairman of the National Foreign Intelligenc* Board (NFiB). lite 7? c. National Foreign Intelligence Board (1} The National Foreign Intelligence Board is the focal point for the national intelligence organiza- tion and is the primary agency for coordinating intelligence and the intelligence activities of govern- mental departments. The NFIB is comprised of senior representatives of national foreign intelli- gence community organizations who are involved in the collection, processing, and production of national intelligence. The membership is as follows: ¢ Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman. ¢ Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Vice Chairman and CIA member. © Director, National Security Agency. ¢ Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. e Director, Intelligence and Research, Depart- ment of State. e Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investiga- tion (Intelligence Division). « Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter- national Affairs, Department of Energy. e Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury (National Security). e Appropriate representatives from offices for reconnaissance programs within the Department of Defense will serve as members when under their purview are to be discussed; they may attend as observers at other sessions. - © Senior representatives of military intelligence -cgegvices will attend as observers and may partici- ‘ <1) pate at the invitation of the Director of Central . Intelligence. i. (2)'The NFIB is ‘responsible for: ¢ Production, review, and coorination of --) >>” pational foreign intelligence. e Interagency exchanges of foreign intelligence ~ information. e Arrangements with foreign governments on intelligence matters. ¢ Protection of intelligence sources and methods. © Activities of common concern to the intelligence community. © Other matters referred to it by the Director of Central Intelligence. d. Department of State. The Department of State (Bureau of Intelligence and Research) is responsible for: e Overtly collecting information relevant to United States foreign policy concerns. ¢ Producing and disseminating foreign intelligence concerning United States foreign policy, as required. for the execution of the Secretary of State’s responsibilities. e Disseminating, as appropriate, reports received from United States diplomatic and consular posts. e Transmitting intelligence community report requirements [tO the Chiefs of United States Missions abroad. © Supporting Chiefs of U.S. Missions in discharging their statutory responsibilities for direction and coordination of mission activities. 2-3
202 FMFM 2.4 (Note: The Bureau of Intelligence and Research pro- vides inteiligeace, research, and analysis for the Depart- - ment of State and other Federal agencies. The Bureau primarily is concerned with political intelligence and g. Nationai Security Agency (NSA). The National Security Agency is responsible for the: — ¢ Establishment and operation of an effective unified produces intelligence studies and current intelligence analysis essential to foreign policy determinations.) e. Department of the Treasury. The Department of the Treasury is responsible for: © Overtly collecting foreign financial and monetary information. Participating with the Department of State in the overt collection of general foreign economic information. . Producing and disseminating foreign intelligence concerning United States economic policy, as required, for the execution of the Secretary of the Treasury’s responsibilities. Conducting activities, through the United States Secret Service, and as authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury or the President, to determine the existence and capability of surveillance equipment used against the President of the United States, the Executive Office of the President, other Secret Service protectees, and United States officials. f. Department of Energy (DOE). The. Department of Energy is responsible for: Participating with the Department of State in the overt collection of information on foreign energy matters. Producing and disseminating foreign intelligence nec- essary for discharge of the Secretary’s responsibilities. Participating in the formulation of intelligence col- lection and analysis requirements where the special expert capability of the department can contribute. “e Providing expert technical, analytical, and research 2-4 capability to other agencies within the intelligence community. organization. for signals -intelligence activities, except for the delegation of operational control _ over certain operations conducted through other elements of the intelligence community. No other department or agency, may: engage in signals intelligence activities except when delegated by the Secretary of Defense. - Control of signais intelligence collection and pro- cessing activities, including assignment of resources to an appropriate agent for such periods and tasks as required for:the direct support of military commanders. Collection of signals intelligence information for national foreign intelligence purposes in accordance with guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence. Processing of signals intelligence data for national foreign intelligence purposes in accordance with guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence. Dissemination of signals intelligence information for national foreign intelligence purposes to authorized elements of the government, including the military services in accordance with guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence. Collection processing and dissemination of signals intelligence information for counterintelligence purposes. Execution of the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense as executive agent for the communica- tions security of the United States Government. Conduct of research and development to meet the needs of the United States for signais intelligence and communications security. Protection of the security of its installations, activities, property, information, and employees by appropriate means, including such investigations of applicants, employees, contractors, and other persons with similar associations with the NSA, as are necessary.
FMFM 2-4 OT 202 e Security regulations, covering operating practices, including the transmission, handling, and distri- bution of signals intelligence and communications security material within and among the elements under control of the Director of the National Security Agency, and exercising the necessary supervisory control to ensure compliance with the regulations. e Conduct of foreign cryptolegic liaison ‘relation- ships, with liaison fer intelligence purposes conducted in accordance with policies formulated by the Director of Central intelligence. « Conduct of such administrative and technical support activities, within and outside the United States, as are necessary to perform the functions authorized above, to include procurement. (Note: The National Security Agency/' ‘Central Security Service (CSS) is a separate agency within the Depart- ment of Defense and is under the direction and con- trol of the Secretary of Defense. The basic functions of the NSA/CSS include communications security, signals intelligence, and related cryptological activities. The CSS was established under the NSA in 1972 to provide for the centralized management and contro! of the service cryptologic agencies of the military departments. The Director of the NSA concurrently serves as the Chief of the CSS. Further information is contained in FMFM 2-3, (C) Signals In- telligence/ Electronic Warfare Operations (U).) h. Federal Bureau of investigation (FBI). The Federal Bureau of Investigation, under the supervision of, and pursuant to, the regulations prescribed by the Attorney General, is responsible for: e Conducting counterintelligence and coordinating counterintelligence activities of other agencies within the intelligence community in the United States. Counterintelligence activity of the FBI involving military or civilian personnel of the Department of Defense shall be coordinated with’ the Department of Defense. « Conducting counterintelligence activities outside the United States in coordination with the CIA as required by procedures agreed to by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Attorney General. e Conducting, within the United States, activities to collect or support foreign intelligence collection requirements of other ‘agencies within the intelli- gence community or, when requested by the Director of the National Security Agency, support- ing the communications security activities of the United States Government. ® Producing and disseminating foreign intelligence and counterinteliigence. wp e Carrying out or contracting for research develop- ment and procurement of technical systems and devices relating to the functions authorized above. i. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) (Department ot Defense). The Defense Intelligence Agency was established by a Secretary of Defense directive. The chain of command runs from the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Director, DIA. The DIA performs the following functions: e Develops and produces ali DOD inteiligence estimates and contributions to national estimates for the National Foreign Intelligence Group. e Provides for the assembly, integration, and validation of all DOD intelligence requirements and the assignment of relative priorities thereto; assigns specific requirements to DOD collection resources, and originates requests, when necessary, to non-DOD collection resources to fulfill DOD requirements. e Maintains a single DOD collection requirements registry and facility which is fully compatible with any national requirements registry and facility. ¢ Provides plans, programs, policies, and procedures for DOD collection activities. ¢ Provides all DOD current intelligence. e Conducts coordinating and planning activities to ° achieve maximum economy and efficiency in the conduct and management of all DOD intelligence activities. « Provides military intelligence to the Secretary of Defense, staff assistants to the Secretary, military 2-5
203 —————_______—__-——_—-- rrr FMFM 2-4 departments, Joint Chiefs of Staff, specialized DOD agencies, unified and specified commands, and other organizations in the national intelligence ‘community. e Cooperates with the CIA and_other intelligence organizations for mutual support; common and combined usage of facilities, resources, “and train- ing programs; and elimination of duplication, © Manages the Defense Attache System. j. Defense’ Investigative Service (DIS). The Defense Investigative Service was established in 1972 as a separate operating agency and is currently under the direction of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (olicy). DIS conducts personnel security investigations (PSI’s) for DOD components within the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. It also investigates unauthorized disclosure of information at the national level within DOD components lacking investigative capabilities and on cases crossing component lines. DIS administers assigned Defense Industrial Security Programs on behalf of the DOD and other federal departments as directed. The Army, Navy, and Air Force investigative organizations assume PSI leads on behalf of the DIS in areas outside the continental United States and are responsible for pursuing investigative matters resulting from PSI’s with significant counterintelligence or criminal ramifications. As a central control point for PS!’s, the DIS operates the Personnel Security In- vestigation Center, the National Agency Check Center, and the Defense Central Index of Investigations for DOD components. 203. Military Department and Service Intelligence Organizations a. Department of the Army - (1) Assistant Chiet of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI, Department of the Army. The Assistant Chief of 2-6 Staff for Intelligence has general staff responsibility for all matters pertaining to intelligence and " counterintelligence requirements, and for super- _ vising Army intelligence and counterintelligence collection, production, and dissemination. The ACSI reports directly to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Amy. {2) Anny Intelligence and Security Command. The US. Army Intelligence : and Security Com- mand, under, the, -supervision of the ACSI, is responsible for Army counterinteiligence activities in the United States and certain other specified geographic areas. Military intelligence groups (counterintetligence) are the primary operating elements of the intelligence agency with the mission of providing counterintelligence support in specific geographic areas. The military intelligence groups are further organized into regional field offices, and resident offices. (3) Tactical Counterinteiligence Elements. Coun- terintelligence support to Army tactical units is pro- vided by military intelligence battalions or groups comprising counterintelligence elements as well as by other intelligence specialists. Tactical intelligence units are controlled by the commander of the unit to which they are aitached, with general staff super- vision exercised by the unit intelligence officer. Additional counterintelligence units may also be assigned to Army support commands for area security. Department of the Air Force (1) Assistant Chief of Staff, intelligence. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence reports directly to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force and has general staff responsibility for matters pertaining to the intelligence activities of the Air Force. The ACSI ‘develops and implements Air Force intelligence plans and policies; coordinates the collection, production, and dissemination of air intelligence; and monitors the worldwide targeting efforts.
(2} Inspector General (1G). The Inspector General acts as an advisor to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force and serves as 2 professional assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force. The Inspector Gencral provides for the investigation of matters within Air Force jurisdiction involving crime, espionage, sabotage, subversion, disaffection, and related matters. The Inspector General also directs the counterintelligence programs within the Air Force and ‘establishes security policy. et {3) Office of Special Investigation (OSD. The Office of Special iavestigation, under the direction of the ” Inspector General, provides ‘criminal, counterintelli- gence, personnel security, and special investigative services to Air Force activities; and collects, analyzes, and reports information concerning these matters. . Department of the Navy N (1) Director of Naval Intelilgence (ON). The Direc- tor of Naval Intelligence exercises overall staff responsibility throughout the Department of the Navy in matters pertaining to intelligence, counter- intelligence, and security. (2) Naval intelligence Command (NIC). Under the command of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), the Commander, Naval Intelligence Command (COMNAVINTCOM) commands the Naval Intel- ligence Command headquarters and those compo- nent commands assigned by the Chief of Naval Operations. COMNAVINTCOM’s mission is to direct and manage the activities of the Naval Intel- ligence Command to ensure the fulfillment of the intelligence requirements and responsibilities of the Department of the Navy. The NIC headquarters provides the requisite staff support to the com- mander in fulfilling his responsibilities with regard to managing intelligence manpower, personnel, and training; intelligence collection, production, and dissemination; intelligence planning, programming, and budgeting; and providing Navy-wide manage- ment of the special security officer/ special activities ofiicer programs. {a) The component commands include: :. an ck is aca ¢ The Naval Intelligence Support..Center (NISC), which analyzes and“produces _ scientific, technical, and current intelligence, and develops threat assessments on foreign naval systems. - . 2 e The Naval Field Operational Intelligence Office (NFON, which produces. finished operational intelligence, ocean surveillance information, and indications and warning. © The Naval Intelligence Processing Systems Support Activity (NIPSSA), which plans and manages naval intelligence information processing and communication systems. (b) The Naval Investigative Service (NIS), formerly a component command, became a second echelon command in September 1981; therefore, the Naval Intelligence Command no longer has investigative or counterintelligence recp isibilities. (3) Naval Investigative Service (NIS). The Director of the Naval Investigative Service maintains a worldwide organization composed of Navy and Marine Corps personnel responsive to command re- quirements of both Services. In addition to the investigation of major criminal offenses, the NIS is responsible for counterintelligence investigations and operations, except those combat-related counterintelligence matters within the functional responsibilities of the Marine Corps. (See par. 103g.) During combat or in a combat contingency environment, the commander amphibious task force (CATF) and the commander landing force (CLF) ashore exercise immediate control over assigned Navy and Marine Corps investigative and counterintelligence assets. In addition to regularly assigned Marine Corps counterintelligence person- nel, NIS may also be provided with counterintelli- gence personnel from FMF commands during peacetime in accordance with a Service agreement between the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) and the Director of NIS. Further details on the jurisdiction and responsibilities of NIS are contained in SECNAV Instruction 5520.3. 2-7
204 2-8 (4) Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. The Director of Intelligence, Head- quarters, U.S. Marine Corps, is responsible to the Commandant of the Marine Corps for the formu- lation of plans and policies pertaining to intelligence and counterintelligence within the Marine Corps. The Head, Counterintelligence Branch is the prin- ciple advisor to the Director of Intelligence for counterintelligence matters. The Counterintelli- gence Branch performs the following functions: © Prepares counterinielligence plans, policies, and directives. « Formulates counterintelligence -doctrine and missions. ¢ Coordinates with national level government agenicies. « Acts as counterintelligence military occupa- tional specialty (MOS) sponsor. ® Maintains staff cognizance over counterintelli- gence field units and staff management of training. e Exercises staff responsibility for human intelli- gence (HUMINT) resources and certain classified programs. , * Coordinates with the Naval Investigative Service (NIS) in special investigations and operations. ® Provides for the evaluation and procurement of specialized equipment. @ Conducts security reviews. ® Reviews reports from the field commands con- cerning security violations, loss of classified material, and compromises. * Coordinates the release of information for foreign disclosure. ‘ @ Provides representatives to national level counterintelligence and security committees. , OT FMFM 2-4 204. Fleet Marine Force... = - Counterintelligence CR Ae Organization .. redce ‘ woe, + Feats t - eth Oba st a. Staff Countorint ‘eiligence Offtcor_ , . {t) The staff counterintelligence Officer is an 1 integral part of the intelligence staff of FMF headquarters, Marine amphibious forces (MAF’s), divisions, and aircraft wings. The staff counterinteltigence officer advises and assists the assistant chief of staff, G-2 in carrying out the ‘command’s counterintelligence responsibilities and is the focai point for,the coor- dination of the counterintelligence effort. . (2) The staff counterintelligence officer performs the following functions: © Assists and advises the G-2 in the formulation, interpretation, and implementation of counter- intelligence policy. ¢ Coordinates counterintelligence ‘services provided to the command. © Serves as the principal point of contact between the command and the NIS in matters involving the investigation of actual, potential, or suspected espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and subversive activities, including defection, ensuring that information about these activities is reported promptly to the nearest Naval Investigative Service representative. ¢ Maintains liaison with the NIS and other counterintelligence agencies. * Monitors the command counterintelligence and security training program and provides advice and assistance for the maintenance of an effec- tive program. ¢ In coordination with the communication officer and other staff officers, advises in the maintezance of the physical security aspects of communications security. fN
FMFM 2-4 (3) The staff counterintelligence officer performs the following operational functions: e Prepares counterintelligence directives, plans, reports, and estimates, including portions of estimates, reports, and studies prepared under the supervision of other G-2 elements. e Plans, implements, and supervises all active and passive counterintelligence measures within the command. e Coordinates counterintelligence measures, yperations, and activities with lower, adjacent, and higher headquarters. ° Provides counterintelligence advice and input to contingency operation plans for training exercises. e Maintains counterintelligence reference material for contingency planning and provides for further dissemination as appropriate. « Serves as a member of the command’s opera- tions security (OPSEC) committee, where such committees exist. e Plans, implements, and coordinates the collec- tion of information through special operations and the use of human intelligence resources during combat operations. * Conducts planning for the intelligence and counterintelligence processing of friendly prisoners of war who have been returned to friendly control. (4) The primary efforts of the staff counterintelli- gence officer are directed toward planning and coor- dinating combat counterintelligence operations and ensuring that assigned or attached counterintelli- gence teams are employed properiy. Counterintel- ligence planning must be incorporated into all contingency operation plans to ensure effective employment of counterintelligence assets and proper security of operational elements. During training exercises, counterintelligence planning fs accomplished as early as possible and provides for the realistic training of counterintelligence personnel. —— 204 (5) The staff counterintelligence officer serves as the headquarter’s counterintelligence advisor and monitors the overall command counterintelligence program. Counterintelligence personnel will not perform routine administrative duties associated with the information security program, including processing security clearances, maintaining com- mand access programs, and maintaining the unit’s ot command’s classified files. These tasks are the functional responsibility of the command admin- istrative personnel; assistant chief of staff, G-1; and the command security manager. The staff counter- intelligence officer coordinates counterintelligence services and makes recommendations to the security manager on the adjudication of security investiga- tions, violations, and compromises. (8) The staff counterinteliigence officer is respon- sible for recommending to the assistant chief of staff, G-2 the mission, tasks, and responsibilities of the assigned or attached counterintelligence team(s). The staff counterintelligence officer coordinates and supervises the overall counterintelligence effort and tasking of assigned or attached counterintelligence teams(s). The relationship of the staff counterintel- ligence officer and the team commander is similar to that of a staff officer and the commander of a subordinate unit. The team commander should be permitted to deploy the team in a manner best suited to accomplish his assigned mission and tasks. (7) At the Marine amphibious force (MAF) level, the staff counterintelligence officer must monitor all counterintelligence activity within the MAF, in- cluding that of detached counterintelligence teams or subteams, to ensure that MAF counterintelli- gence objectives are accomplished. Accordingly, close coordination of all counterintelligence activities must be accomplished among all staff counterintelligence officers at all levels of command. (8) In order to ensure comprehensive, all-source counterintelligence estimates and views are available to the supported commander, the staff counterin- telligence officer must possess access to appropriate compartmented intelligence material. 2-9
2046 — oon OOOO 2-10 b. Counterintelligence Teams (i) Counterintelligence teams are combat support elements, organic to the MAF, organized and equipped under tables of organization and equip- ment of the 4722 series. As intelligence specialist teams, they are assigned to the assistant chief of staff, G-2 to accomplish specific counterintelligence objectives. The assistant chief of staff, G-2 exercises direction, control, and supervision of the teams through the staff counterintelligence officer. (2) Counterintelligence teams are assigned to major FMF commands. Three teams are normally assigned to each MAF and one team each to the Head- quarters, Fleet Marine Force Pacific (F(MFPAC) and Fleet Marine Force Atlantic (FMFLANT). The control and coordination of counterintelligence teams at the MAF level is essential to ensure an LEGENG: ACOFSG2 ———< Direction/ Operational Control ~---——Tasking Coordination Attached as required trom MAF Ci TEAMS FMFM 2-4 economical, flexible, and coordinated response to the enemy intelligence threat within the MAF area of responsibility. Garrison counterintelligence team attachments will be the responsibility of the respec- tive FMF headquarters and will be coordinated with the Commandant of the Marine Corps. (3) Counterintelligence teams assigned to the MAF are normally retained in a general support role under the centralized control of the MAF. In cases where units are widely separated, opera- tions would be facilitated, or units are deployed separately; counterintelligence teams may be further attached to divisions, aircraft wings, or Marine amphibious brigades (MAB’s). When com- mands of less than division, aircraft wing, or MAB size require direct counterintelligence support, attachment of counterintelligence subteams is appropriate. The MAF counterintelligence organi- zation is shown in figure 2-2. Counterintelligence Figure 2-2, Marine Amphibious Force Counterintelligence Organization.
FMFM 2-4 support for these units is normally provided by the MAGTF headquarters counterintelligence teams OF by locally assigned counterintelligence assets. Coun- terintelligence subteams or teams (as appropriate to the operational environment) may be assigned by the FMF/MAF commander to the force service support group (FSSG) when the FSSG cannot be supported by the division, aircraft wing, or Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) counterintelligence assets and requires direct counterintelligence support. c (4) Counterintelligence teams assigned to Head- quarters, FMFPAC and FMFLANT provide the commander with the means to meet specific opera- tional requirements and provide support to areas where gaps in counterintelligence coverage may exist due to deployment of MAF comn.ands. (5) The standard counterintelligence team consists of five officers, nine enlisted counterintelligence specialists, and two administrative clerks. The team is organized into a team headquarters and four subteams, each consisting of one officer and two counterintelligence specialists. The counterintelli- gence team is based on a modular concept permit- ting the task organization of a team by the attach- ment or detachment of subteams as required. The standard counterinteiligence team organization is shown in figure 2-3. TEAM HEADQUARTERS 4 Capt Team Commander 4 MSgt Ci Chef 2 LCpl Admin Clerk SUBTEAM SUBTEAM 1 Lt Subteam Commander 1 GySgt Ch Specialist 1 Sgt Ct Specialist 1 WO Subteam Commander 1 SSgt Ci Specialist 1 Sgt Specialist Figure 2-3. Standard Counterintelligence Team. ~ 204 (6) Counterintelligence teams are equipped for tac- tical operations and maintain sufficient organic equipment to support the team headquarters and the separate deployment of fully equipped sub- teams. The team is not capable of self-administra- tion and requires administrative and logistics sup- port from the unit to which assigned or attached. Equipment authorized by counterintelligence teams’ tables of equipment, however, remains organic to the counterintelligence team regardless of supply and maintenance assistance and support. (7) Counterintelligence teams operate under the staff cognizance of the assistant chief of staff, G-2 and perform the following functions as directed: ¢ Conduct active and passive counterintelligence operations including counterespionage, counter- subversion, counterterrorism, and counter sabotage in support of tactical units during combat operations. ¢ Conduct intelligence collection operations utiliz- ing humeau intelligence sources during combat operations. ® Conduct counterintelligence investigations per- taining to espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and subversion, including defection and other speciai counterintelligence investigations as required during combat operations. « Assist the staff counterintelligence officer in the preparation of counterintelligence estimates and plans for areas of operation reflected by con- tingency plans. * Participate in field training exercises of Marine amphibious units (MAU’s) or larger commands. Participation in exercises of smaller units is appropriate provided realistic and meaningful counterintelligence activities can be developed. Participation should include assignment of counterintelligence personnel to the exercise planning staff to ensure adequate counter- ~ intelligence activity in the exercise. ¢ Maintain information concerning person- alities, organizations, and _ installations of 2-11
205 2-12 counterintelligence interest which support combat contingency plans. Conduct counterintelligence surveys of commands and installations to determine the security measures necessary to provide protection against espionage, sabotage, subversion, and terrorism and the unauthorized disclosure of, or access to, classified material. Conduct counterintelligence evaluations and inspections of areas containing classified material. Conduct technical surveiliance countermeasures (TSCM) inspections and surveys of sensitive areas in accordance with MCO 05511.11__. These inspections and surveys are conducted by a designated counterintelligence team within each MAF, which has a TSCM capability. Preparation and conduct of penetration inspec- tions to test the counterintelligence and security measures of the command. These inspections may be in conjunction with the OPSEC pro- gram where appropriate. Cournterintelligence assets should direct their efforts towards iden- tification of friendly vulnerabilities which can be exploited by hostile collection assets and recommend appropriate countermeasures te the command OPSEC officer. Provide instructors in counterintelligence and security subjects for the command training program. (Section 6 provides details on counterintelligence and security subjects for command training programs.) During combat operations, collect and maintain information designed to identify, locate, and recover friendly personnel captured, missing (nonhostile), and missing in action. Conduct the intelligence and counterintelligence debriefing of friendly prisoners of war who are returned to U.S. control. Conduct liaison with unit intelligence sections and local intelligence, counterintelligence, and law enforcement agencies as appropriate. FMFM 2-4 (8) Counterintelligence interest in physical security will often overlap with the functional responsibilities of the provost marshal. During the conduct of coun- terintelligence surveys, counterintelligence personnel are concerned with physical security as it relates to all aspects of counterintelligence, while in the case of counterintelligence evaluations and inspections, this interest primarily is directed toward the protec- tion of classified material. Concurrently, functional interests of the provost marshal/military police are physical security measures designed to safeguard per- sonnel; prevention of unauthorized access to equip- ment, facilities, material, and documents, and the safeguarding of them against espionage, sabotage, terrorism, damage, and theft. The overlapping physical security interests, equally applicable in garrison and combat, must be effectively coordinated to ensure optimum security of the command. Coun- terintelligence personnel may not be utilized to assess physical security areas unrelated to counterintelli- gence, such as armories, post exchanges, disbursing offices, and clubs, where the security thrust is the prevention of damage, theft, and/or pilferage. This function is under the cognizance of the provost marshal. (9) Counterintelligence assets should not be utilized to perform functions such as criminal investigations or incident reporting which would more appro- priately come under the cognizance of other assets available to the commander. 205. Marine Corps Supporting Establishment Counterintelligence Personnel Counterintelligence personnel are assigned to major Marine Corps bases and support activities to advise and assist in planning and implementing the command counterintelligence effort. Counterintelligence personnel assigned to the supporting establishment perform nontactical counterintelligence functions normally performed by FMF staff counter- intelligence officers and counterintelligence teams.
EMEM 24 ——<—<—_—<—$—_—_—~ eee TT 207 206. Commands Without Assigned Counterintelligence Personnel Commands that do not have counterintelligence person- ne! assigned or attached, are still responsible for establishing counterintelligence measures to ensure the security of the command and to deny the enemy, infor- mation which might be used to increase the effectiveness of hostile operations against the cormmand. These com- mands, however, conduct neither counterintelligence in- vestigations, nor special operations against enemy capabilities in the fields of espionage, sabotage, subver- sion, or terrorism. If these types of investigations or operations appear to be required, a request must be sub- mitted to the local Naval Investigative Service office. When appropriate, the request should go through the chain of command for concurrence of the commander who has counterintelligence staff advisors. Those commands not assigned or attached counterintel- ligence personnel normally operate as part of larger com- mands having counterintelligence personnel. These coun- terintelligence specialists are usually available, upon request, to provide advice and assistance on such mat- ters as conducting lectures and demonstrations, testing unit security, advising on counterintelligence measures to be adopted, and checking security of offices, war rooms, and other areas used for the preparation or stowage of classified material. 207. Liaison Effective performance in ike field of counterintelligence requires extensive liaison. Counterinteligence activities often closely parallel functions and responsibilities of other organizations and agencies and, in some cases, may overlap. Close and continuous liaison and coordination aids in the effectiveness of operations, the exchange of information, and in providing for mutual assistance. Policies and procedures for liaison and the coordination of counterintelligence activities are developed and pro- mulgated at the general staff level. Depending on the area of operations and the type of counterintelligence activity, liaison and coordination is normally conducted by coun- terintelligence elements with local intelligence, counter- intelligence, security and law enforcement organiza- tions/agencies, and civil affairs and psychological opera- tions units where appropriate. In all cases, liaison must be conducted within jurisdictional limitations imposed by higher authority. (reverse blank) 2-13
FMFM 2-4—— Section 3 Section 3 Counterintelligence Combat Operations 301. General Major Fleet Marine Force (FMF) units are provided coun- terintelligence support by assigned or attached counter- intelligence teams. During tactical operations, counter- intelligence activities are characterized by aggressive, resourceful, and well-coordinated operations designed to protect the command from hostile intelligence collection, sabotage, terrorism, and subversive activities. Counter- intelligence teams contribute to mission accomplishment by assisting the commander.in accomplishing his coun- terintelligence responsibilities. 302. Counterintelligence Mission The mission of counterintelligence assets in Fleet Marine Force units is to plan and recommend the implementation of measures designed to discover, neutralize, or destroy the effectiveness of actual or potential hostile intelligence, sabotage, terrorist, and subversive activities, and to recommend measures necessary for the protection of information against espionage, personnel against sub- version and. terrorism, and installations and materiel against sabotage. 303. Categories of Counterintelligence Operations — Counterintelligence operations within the Fleet Marine Forces normally comprise the following five categories: a. Military Security. Military security encompasses all measures taken by a command to protect itself from sabotage, terrorism, and subversion, and to deny information to the enemy. In Fleet Marine Force units, it emphasizes protection of airfields and other
303 ——_—________-. major installations, and the defeat of hostile target acquisition efforts. Typical measures include operations ‘security (OPSEC), counterreconnaissance, counter- signs, passwords, and restrictions on access to selected areas and installations. (1) Operations Security ta) OPSEC denies the enemy prior knowledge of essential elements of friendly information (EEF!) regarding command activities, plans, operations, and intentions. The enemy collects this information through a variety of means. To effectively counter this threat, commanders must have access to reliable informaticn on enemy intelligence capabilities. This informa- tion must be timely and accurate to ensure Com- manders maximum security for their operations. (b) Counterintelligence units support the com- manders’ OPSEC programs by providing assess- ments of friendly vulnerabilities; briefings on enemy threats of espionage, sabotage, subver- sion, and terrorism; and assistance in estab- lishing safeguards against those security threats. (c) OPSEC is the functional responsibility of the operations officer (G-3/S-3). To be effective, OPSEC principles and concepts must be established and continuously practiced during the conduct of peacetime operations as well as in combat environments. Commanders, staffs, and individuals at all echelons of command are responsible for developing an effective OPSEC program. Commanders must determine what OPSEC measures to implement, when to implement them, and what level of risk they are willing to accept. (@) An OPSEC committee should be formed at each command consisting of the following staff sections: G-3 (Chairman), G-2, G-4, G-1, public affairs, communications-electronics, adjutant, medical, and others as desired. The committee is responsible for the overall planning and monitoring of the OPSEC program. Command- ers should ensure that OPSEC is considered in the initial planning phase of all operations. The OPSEC plan should include, as a minimum, the ’ BEFI for the operation and should state specsfic countermeasures which will be implemented to enhance surprise and increase security for the el FMFM 2-4 command operation. OPSEC concepts and techniques should be developed to include the following: 14. Central Control and Direction. This may be accomplished through the establishment of an OPSEC team comprised of members of the operations section (G-3/S-3), intelli- gence section (G-2/S-2), and communi- cations-electronics section. Through assets available to them ({counterintelligence, signals intelligence, photoimagery interpre- tation, etc.), the OPSEC team will direct its efforts towards the identification of enemy intelligence collection assets and recom- mending countermeasures, including the use of deception. 2 Close Integration of Operations, Communi- cations Security, and Counterintelligence. Members of the OPSEC team will review and monitor operation plans, actions, and after- action reports for evidence of indicators which disclose EEFI, establis:: patterns, or provide other mission-criented information to the enemy. Continuous efforts will be maintained to discover enemy methods of information collection directed towards the command. Upon discovery of such indicators and/or methods, recommended methods of improv- ing friendly security and/or nullifying the enemy’s collection capabilities will be provided to the commanders. 3 Cperations Security Data Base. The OPSEC officer is responsible for developing and maintaining an OPSEC data base. AS information is developed on f riendly vulnez- abilities and enemy intelligence capabilities, it is analyzed, acted on, and filed in an easily retrievable manner. The information, espe- cialiy that concerning enemy intelligence capabilities, is continually updated and used to plan methods of information denial and/or deception. The type inf ormation that might be found in the data pase is as follows: ¢ Unit communication equipment/ procedures. e Communication violations. © Counterintelligence measures in effect. » Imagery of friendly positions.
© Technical collection and operational capabilities of known enemy units in the area of operations, including operaticnal capabilities of equipment. e Enemy sightings/contacts. © Clandestine enemy personnel, organiza- tions, and installations. © Record of camouflage/blackout discipiine. (2) Counterreconnaissance. Of all the counter- intelligence measures that are taken by a unit in combat, one of the most effective is counterrecon- naissance. Units may be assigned both reconnais- sance and counterreconnaissance responsibilities; these two activities complement each other and are inseparable. Good reconnaissance ensures a certain amount of security, and counterreconnaissance pro- vides a certain amount of reconnaissance informa- tion; however, a unit armed and equipped for a pure reconnaissance mission is not ordinarily given a supplementary counterreconnaissance mission as accomplishment of the counterreconnaissance mis- sion generally requires defeat of hostile reconnais- sance elements. The primary object of reconnais- sance is collection of information, not combat. Covunterintelligence includes all measures taken to prevent hostile observation of a force, area, Or place. Counterreconnaissance can include the setting up of a defensive screen to deny enemy reconnaissance or an offensive screen designed to meet and destroy enemy reconnaissance. In combat air operations, counterair operations to deny or reduce an enemy’s capability for visual, photo- graphic, OF electromagnetic reconnaissance may be defined as counterreconnaissance. (a) Principles of Counterreconnalssance. Counterreconnaissance elements focus on friendly forces being screened; hostile: recon- naissance forces are destroyed or neutralized by combat, and friendly screening forces are echeloned in depth. (b} Forms of Counterreconnaissante 4 The defensive screen is protective and is usually established behind natura! obstacles. FMFM 2-4 I 303 2 The offensive screen meets the enemy’s reconnaissance forces and destroys them. An offensive screen may be moving or sta- tionary depending on the activities of the friendly force being screened. 3 The commander’s adoption of a form of counterreconnaissance screen is dependent upon the situation, mission, weather, and terrain; thus the form of counterreconnais- sance screen adopted need not reflect solely the tactical mission of the command. The fact that there are offensive and defensive screens does not imply a requirement for their employment only in support of a like tactical mission. An offensive screen may well be employed to support a tactical mis- sion of defense, while an attack mission may be supported best by a defensive screen. (3) Countersigns (a) Dissemination 4. Countersigns, each consisting of a challenge and password, are normally issued as a tab to the counterintelligence appendix to the intelligence annex to the operation order. They appear as shown in the follow- ing examples: identifying Code Number Chalienge Password 1 Larap Wheel 12 Powder Quaint 43 Glass Table 2 Words that are closely associated or normally used in conjunction with one another are avoided. Unless compromised or otherwise changed, countersigns are nor- mally effective for no more than 24 hours. Dissemination of the initial primary and alternate countersign for the first period troops are ashore can be made in the coun- terintelligence appendix to the intelligence annex. Subsequent countersigns can be disseminated in a message such as the following: Code I] countersign effective 012300 (local time), alternate code 13. 3-3
303 (b) Compromise. When a unit knows or suspects that the designated countersign has been compromised, the alternate is put into effect by that unit. Landing force headquarters must be immediately notified so that subor- dinate and adjacent units can be informed that the alternate countersign is in effect and a new alternate countersign is then designated. (c) Use of the Countersign. It must be emphasized that countersigns are not used when other means of identification ~ce possible. Fur- ther, neither the challenge nur the password is given in a loud voice. b. Civil Security. Civil security operations include all the counterintelligence measures affecting the popula- tion of the area. Typical measures include security screening of civilian labor, imposition of curfews, other circulation control measures, and the monitoring of suspect political groups. c. Embarkation Security. Embarkation security con- sists of the special application of military and civil security measures to the embarkation phase, which includes the movement to the point of embarkation and the actual embarkation. Examples include the screening of civilians employed in the port or airfield, control of contact be- tween troops and civilians, covering or removing tactical markings and other unit designations, and moving to the port or airfield under cover of darkness. d. Wartime Information Security Program (WISP). The Wartime Information Security Program is the con- trol and examination of communications to prevent disclosure of information of value to an enemy and the collection of information of value to the United States. e. Special Opezations. Special counterintelligence - operations include the specialized employment of active and deceptive counterintelligence techniques and pro- cedures in the conduct of covert operations against 3-4 —— - FMEM 2.4 hostile and unfriendly intelligence collection, sabotage, terrorism, and subversive organizations and activities. These operations are conducted by trained counterin- telligence personnel and include the following: (1) Counterespionage. Counterespionage opera- tions are designed to detect or expose hostile espionage efforts and to institute offensive measures intended to penetrate and nullify hostile intelligence plans and operations, thus contributing to the security of the FMF in the field. (2) Countersubversion. Countersubversion opera- lions are designed to detect, prevent, or neutralize the activities of subversive groups. Because sub- versive activity is closely related to and frequently supports, conceals, or provides a favorable environ- ment for hostile espionage and sabotage operations, the countersubversive mission may include offen- sive measures directed toward the crigin of hostile subversive plans and policies. (3) Countersabotage. Countersabotage operations require a comprehensive program of defensive measures and aggressive offensive action to penetrate saboteur, partisan, or other dissident groups to determine sabotage plans, and to iden- tify saboteurs, methods of operation, and specific targets. Sabotage is a principal weapon of guerrilla and partisan groups, and is increasingly important as a threat to rear area logistics installations. (4) Counterterrorism. Counterterrorism operations are designed to deteci, restrain. or neutralize those terrorist organizations and personalities who pose a threat to U-S. installations and personnel, or other interest. Counterterrorism operations will be conducted in the same manner as other special operations and will include the collection and analysis of inforrnation pertaining to the terrorist threat. (The term antiterrorism refers to the defen- sive measures by DOD to reduce the vulnerability of DOD personnel and their dependent facilities and equipment to terrorist acts. Antiterrorism measures should not be confused with counter- terrorism operations).
FIAFM 2-4 304. Forward Area Operations a. Offensive Operations (1) Counterintelligence operations during the attack consist primarily of neutralizing, exploiting, or destroying counterintelligence targets which are known to be located in the enemy held areas. These targets are normally contained in the counterintel- ligence target reduction plan (see par. 504). {2) Counterintelligence personnel may be deployed with forward elements depending on the number and criticality of identified counterinteiligence targets within the objective area. In some instances, it is advantageous for counterintelligence personnel to take immediate custody of persons of counter- intelligence interest, while in the case of installa- tions, exploitation may be delayed until forward elements have occupied or passed through the objective area. The preservation and protection of installations of counterintelligence interest, pending exploitation by counterintelligence personnel, is arranged with commanders of lead units. (3) Flexibility of operations is required to ensure coverage of all counterintelligence targets. Counter- intelligence personnel may be deployed from one unit to another and from rear areas to forward elements as the situation changes. Defensive Operations (1) In the defense, counterintelligence efforts are primarily directed against the enemy intelligence efforts to collect information concerning FMF units, infiltration of enemy intelligence agents, sabotage, and terrorist activities. In a static Situation, the enemy can be expected to increase all of these activities, as well as to increase guerrilla force operations against installations, command posts (CP’s), lines of communications, supply, and other critical areas. a a ere SO (2) Counterintelligence elements are normally deployed with the command headquarters rather than forward tactical elements in order to provide timely support to those areas where enemy intelli- gence activities require a greater counterintelligence effort. (3) A defensive situation allows for greater develop- ment and exploitation of counterintelligence targets. Counterintelligence elements normally accomplish the following: © Develop an effective human source collection system targeted against enemy intelligence activities. © Conduct operations against enemy intelligence organizations and activities. e Screen and interrogate those civilians and prisoners of war who are known to be, or suspected to be, of possible counterintelligence interest. ¢ Provide security services to enhance the security of critical installations and activities. e Conduct briefings for the command and other organizations, such as military police, psycho- logical operations units, and civil affairs units, on hostile intelligence activity and methods of operation. ® Conduct counterintelligence investigations as required. ® Conduct investigations and collect information to aid in identifying, locating, and recovering friendly personnel captured, missing (non- hostile), and missing in action. (4) During a defensive situation, counterintelligence elements may also initiate human intelligence (HUMINT) resources collection programs if the counterintelligence situation permits and the resources are available. These programs are design 2d to collect order of battie (OOB) information 2nd information concerning enemy intentions. Acidi- tionally, counterintelligence units may participate in 3-5
305 3-6 certain special operations concerning infiltration of sources, deceptive operations, and exploitation of enemy intelligence agents as directed by higher headquarters. Retrograde Operations (1) During retrograde operations, the security of troop movements and lines of communications are of prime importance to the commander. Counter- intelligence operations and the collection of infor- mation must be compatible with the commander’s courses of action and designed to limit the effec- tiveness of enemy intelligence activities during the movement. (2) Counterintelligence units are norma’ con- cerned with the following functions during a retrograde operation: * Collecting information on enemy intelligence activities that could hinder friendly troop movement. ® Maintaining continuous liaison with military police and other security forces responsible for the control of refugees and other civilians in order to detect persons of possible counterin- telligence interest. ® In support of units involved, assisting in and coordinating the inspection of vacated com- mand post areas to ensure that no information cr material has been left behind which might benefit enemy forces. © Evaluating personnel of counterintelligence interest for evacuation and/or protection. ® Evaluating sources of information for evacua- tion or further operational employment. ® Coordinating activities with counterintelligence and security units of higher and adjacént commands. FMFM 2-4 305. Rear Area Operations Those areas in which combat service support (CSS) activities are accomplished are referred to as rear areas. These areas provide a lucrative target for enemy intelli- gence activity and guerrilla operations. Enemy espionage, sabotage, terrorist, and subversive activities, and the disruption of lines of communications within rear areas may serve to jeopardize combat operations. Counterintelligence support for rear areas is normally provided by the counterinielligence team supporting the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) headquarters. Counterintelligence activities in support of rear area security include the following: ¢ Collecting information concerning hostile intelligence personalities, organizations, and activities in rear areas. e Conducting operations to destroy, neutralize, or exploit hostile intelligence elements. * Developing HUMINT programs. ¢ Providing security services, including technical surveillance countermeasures (TSCM) support to enhance the security of commands. e Conducting counterintelligence investigations as required. Screening and interrogating those civilians and prisoners of war who are known to be, or are suspected to be, of counterintelligence interest. * Conducting further exploitation of counterintelligence targets referred from forward tactical commands. © Providing assistance in and support for the command security orientation and indoctrination program. ® Conducting briefings for unit and installation com- manders on the hostile intelligence threat and providing recommendations to enhance security measures. Conducting investigations and collecting information to aid in identifying, locating, and recovering friendly personnel captured, missing (nonhostile), and missing in action.
FMFM 2-4 306. Employment of Counterintelligence Teams a. Operational Concept (1) Counterintelligence teams are normally assigned to the MAGTF and provide general support within the MAGTF area of operations. Control of coun- terintelligence teams by the force commander pro- vides the commander with the means to meet the specific operational requirements of various com- mands within the force and to hold counterintelli- gence teams or subteams at force level to effect counterintelligence support of subordinate com- mands as required. In some instances, due to the time element, tactical conditions, or operational ex- igencies, it may be necessary for the force com- mander to attach some or ali counterintelligence teams to his subordinate tactical commands. (2) Counterintelligence teams are not normally placed under the operational control of commands of less than Marine amphibious brigade (MAB) size. However, in the case of a Janding force of less than MAB size, assignment of subteams is appro- priate. In addition, under those circumstances where attachment of subteams to an infantry regiment or aircraft group would facilitate the early reduction of specific counterintelligence targets, attachment of counterintelligence personnel to those units may be appropriate. (3) During operations involving widely separated units in areas of dense population, counterintelligence subteams may be made available to the unit com- manders to accomplish specific counterintelligence missions assigned by higher headquarters. (4) The tactical concept: of operations in depth governs the execution of counterintelligence plans and operations. Counterintelligence teams can be deployed on an area coverage concept or by unit assignment. . 306 (a) Area Coverage 1. Counterintelligence teams deployed for area coverage are assigned a specific geographic area of responsibility and pro- vide counterintelligence support to com- mands located within that area. The team continues to operate within the assigned area even though the tactical or support units operating in the area change. 2. The area coverage concept allows counter- intelligence operations to focus on the enemy’s intelligence organization and activities while remaining unfragmented and unrestricted by the tactical areas of responsibility assigned to supported units. Area coverage provides the greatest continuity of counterintelligence operations and allows counterintelligence per- sonnel to become thoroughly familiar with the area, enemy intelligence organization and Operations, and counterintelligence targets. 3 Area coverage is particularly effective during counterinsurgency operations where the insurgent prefers to operate on the political or military boundaries. (b) Unit Assignment. Counterintelligence teams deployed on a unit assignment basis normally remain with the supported unit and operate within that unit’s area of responsibility. As tactical units displace, it is necessary for higher echelons to provide counterintelligence coverage for the areas vacated. Reiief of an area can be accomplished in the following manner: 1. Augmentation Subteams. Augmentation subteams may be attached from the force level to assault units, in advance of opera- tions, to provide adequate personnel for reduction of specific counterintelligence targets during the initial phases of the operation and to prepare for the transfer of areas of responsibility from assault units to force without loss of continuity. These sub- teams operate under the direct control of the assault unit during the reduction of 3-7
306 b. counterintelligence targets and then remain in place as the unit advances, thereby ensur- ing continuous coverage as the force moves forward and assumes control of the area. 2 Leapfrog System. This method requires the team initially responsible for an area to be detached from the assault unit and a new team attached. The new team is aitached sufficiently in advance to permit the team to become thoroughly familiar with current operations. This method of relief permits the team familiar with the area, informants, and targets to remain and conduct more exten- sive operations and is similar to the area coverage concept but on a smaller scale. 3 Relay System. This method requires furce counterintelligence teams to be held in reserve and dispatched forward to assume control of areas as the assault units move forward. Factors Bearing on the Employment of Coun- terinteliigence Teams 3-8 (1) The characteristics of an objective area deter- mine the character and extent of counterintelligence operations required within that area. The density of the population, its cultural level, the attitude of the people and political groups toward friendly and enemy forces and their susceptibility to enemy penetration (hostile intelligence threat) and pro- paganda, and the stability of local governments are all factors in determining the number of counter- intelligence teams needed to accomplish the coun- terintelligence mission. (2) The number of counterintelligence teams available has a significant bearing on the ultimate accomplishment of the counterintelligence mission. Overestimation of the teams’ capabilities will result in dispersion of activity on many targets with limited effectiveness. Careful planning and a grasp of the overall counterintelligence pattern of operations from rear to forward areas, plus detailed —— FMFM 2-4 detailed preparation, is required. The counterintel- ligence targets which, in the overall counterintelli- gence picture, require early reduction can then be selected and the employment of teams planned. (3) The commander landing force (CLF), once established ashore, assumes immediate control over all assigned counterintelligence assets. In some instances, Naval Investigative Service (NIS) elements may be assigned in support of the land- ing force. In such cases, jurisdiction and respon- sibility must be clearly defined for efficient utiliza- tiou of counterintelligence assets. Normally, Marine counterintelligence teams are assigned responsibility for counterintelligence operations and investiga- tions which directly support tactical units. Coun- terintelligence operations and investigations of a general support nature in rear areas are more com- patible with the Naval Investigative Service’s organization and mission. c. Employment of Counterintelligence Teams at Division Level (1) The relative number of personnel devoted to counterintelligence is, as a rule, greater in the Marine division zone of actior than in support areas. The constant contact of opposing ground forces and the presence of indigenous or displaced populations in the combat or occupied areas afford the enemy a better opportunity to penetrate the counterintelligence screen. The counterintelligence team operating with a division is usually in the posi- tion of being the first security unit to enter territory recently cleared of the enemy. Its role in counter- intelligence operations is of primary importance in laying the groundwork for all later security measures. The team secures the most obvious targets, the agents left behind by the enemy far espionage and sabotage, the best known collabo- rators with the enemy, and key public buildings such as the seat of the local government and the communication centers. Prompt action by a coun- terintelligence team is often of great value to the security of friendly forces and can make
FMFM 2-4 available, through interrogations and seized docu- ments, important elements of tactical intelligence. (2) The counterintelligence team normaily confines its activities to the area roughly forward of the division command post. Responsibility for rear areas must be assumed by higher echelons. Counterintelligence teams operating with a division are generally deployed by subteams which are responsible for the counter- intelligence coverage of specific areas within the jurisdiction of the command. Each subteam acts as an independent unit, but its activities are coordinated by the tearm commander, who maintains his head- quarters near the division command post. (3) Time is of the essence during the assault phase of an operation. Counterintelligence teams employed with an assault division wili generally limit their screening operations to the identification and classification of civilians disguised as military personnel, enemy agents, and collaborators. Although immediate tactical interrogations may be conducted, providing time permits, normally suspects will be passed to rear areas for more detail- ed interrogations and classification. (Also see par. 307d.) d. Employment of Counterintelligence Teams at Aircraft Wing Level (1) There is no significant difference in the mission of counterintelligence teams employed with either ground or air units; however, employment with air units is normally characterized by a static situation. (2) An aircraft wing is sometimes widely dispersed with each aircraft group operating from a separate field, and wing headquarters operating ashore with the landing force. Since wing equipment is highly susceptible to damage and difficult to replace, wing units are a high priority target for enemy sabotage and terrorism. In most instances, air units have a requirement for the employment of large numbers of indigenous personnel who become a source for —— 306 enemy intelligence activities. Under these condi- tions, it may be necessary to provide subteams to Marine aircraft groups (MAG’s) or independent squadrons. (3) In air operations or an airborne movement, counterintelligence personnel are included in the ad- vance command echelon to advise the commander on the control and security of sensitive areas, civilian contro! measures, screening of local residents and transients, and to check establish- ments in the vicinity as may be required. 9. Employment of Counterinteiligence Teams at Marine Air-Ground Task Force Level (1) A counterintelligence team supporting the MAGTFE headquarters normaily operates in the rear areas. Generally, the MAGTF headquarters team completes and follows up on all matters of coun- terintelligence interest initiated by assault units, conducts special operations of a relatively long-term nature, and provides assistance on military and civil security matters. The MAGTF headquarters coun- terintelligence team normally has the capability to perform technical surveillance countermeasures inspections and surveys for the entire MAGTF and will establish and operate the MAGTF counterin- telligence interrogation center if required. Paragraph 305 details the functions appropriate for counterintelligence support in rear areas. (2) Within rear areas, two organizations requiring counterintelligence support are the CSS organization and the civil affairs unit. The former is primarily concerned with military security and the latter with civil security. Despite the apparent differences of in- terest between the two units, their counterintelligence problems are interrelated. A dissident civilian population hampering the efforts of a civil affairs unit to establish effective administrative control in an area is also likely to be the primary source of support for guerrilla operations capable of disrupt- ing logistics operations through sabotage, terrorism, and harassment attacks. The MAGTF headquarters 3-9 es
ee A A A a A 306 counterintelligence team is normally responsible for the counterinteltigence support for these units. This includes support for installations and facilities dispersed through the combat service support areas. The number of team personnel supporting civil affairs units depends on the number of refugees to be identified in the area. f. Counterintelligence Team Operations. Em- ployment of the team and team operations in combat is influenced by the mission of the supported command. The mission assigned the team, and the tactical scheme of maneuver for the unit which the team is supporting, also influence the type of team control, methods of communication, equipment, deployment of subteams, and the determination of the team’s area of operations and targets, including the development of a counter- intelligence target-reduction plan. Based on the mis- sion, the team commander formulates the plan for the employment of his team. (1) Team Planning. The successful accomplishment of the team’s mission requires thorough pianning by the team commander. The following must be considered when planning for team operations: * Detailed study of all available maps and phc- tographs of the projected area of operations. * Study of all available intelligence products per- tinent to the area of operations. e Location of all important targets and specific buildings on the map. These are categorized and studied and plans formulated for coverage and reduction. Target priorities must be assigned in advance to ensure efficient use of personnel. An estimate and follow-up request must be made for troop requirements and employment in- cidental to any sealing offor uncovering action. Marine Corps counterintelligence personnel are rarely available in sufficient numbers to handle such actions alone. The area surrounding a target is studied to determine points where seal- ing off would be most effective. Streets and approaches to targets are studied thoroughly, thereby minimizing the need for extensive 3-10 FMFM 2-4 physical reconnaissance. Main traffic routes are studied to determine locations in which to establish screening centers and checkpoints. ¢ Acquisition or development of black, gray, and white lists of persons in the target area. (See par. 503.) Study of ali available records listing public offi- cials opposed to the enemy and other persons who could be of value in administrative assignments, such as members of the police force, fire department, post office, railway, telephone, telegraph, and broadcasting stations. Much of this data can be obtained from civil affairs units and the various G-2/S-2 sections. © Acquisition of available information concerning pro-American or antiopposition elements, such as guerrillas and partisans in the zone of operations and other areas, which would facilitate immediate utilization of such groups if necessary. e Acquisition and study of all information con- cerning other underground forces, groups, and personnel who, by reason of training and ex- perience, can provide assistance in the conduct of counterintelligence interrogations. e Counterintelligence contingency materials (CICM), the Naval Intelligence Processing System (NIPS), and the Marine -Air-Ground In- telligence System (MAGIS) segments, as well as other data bases, are valuable sources of information. (2) Team Control. Control of the team operations is centralized under the team commander. Only in those situations where team operations require the detachment of subteams to subordinate commands and centralized control is unf easible should opera- tional control be released to the commanders of the units to which the subteams are attached. (3) Tactical Deployment of the Team (a) During both static and fluid tactical situa- tions in populated areas, the team headquarters
FMFM 2-4 normally is centrally located and easily accessible to indigenous personnel. Locating the team headquarters within a headquarters com- mand post is undesirable since it must be accessible to indigenous personnel, thereby increasing the security problem. The team head- quarters is located to provide maximum assistance to other agencies and to ensure pro- tection by them if required; however, during fluid tactical situations in uninhabited areas, the team headquarters may be located in or near the supported unit’s command post. {b) In deploying team personnel, consideration is given to retaining at least one subteam at the team headquarters for special assignments and emergencies. (c) When counterintelligence teams are held in reserve, team personnel are organized and equipped so that the augmentation subteams may be immediately dispatched when forward units require counterintelligence reinforcements. (d) Subteams are attached to subordinate units sufficiently in advance to coordinate the former’s plans and target reduction plan with ‘the unit’s scheme of maneuver and assigned mission. (e) Whenever possible, subteams are employed in area rather than unit support. This permits the employment of as many personnel as required in areas where counterintelligence operations are extensive. Units whose zones of action do not require counterintelligence opera- tions do not have counterintelligence personnel attached. The team commander must provide for the rapid detachment/attachment of subteams as the counterintelligence situation develops. (f) In effecting the relief of a counterintelligence team, it is the responsibility of the team being relieved to turn over prisoners, records, and in- formants to the team assuming responsibility for the area. To make this transition as ° smoothly as possible, one or two men from the team relieved remain behind to familiarize the relieving team with the counterintelligence situa- tion in the area, or representatives of the relief team are sent forward to effect familiarization with the counterintelligence situation. 307 307. Counterintelligence Operations Counterintelligence operations in 4 combat environment require detailed planning and coordination. Counterin- telligence operations are usually conducted in conjunc- tion with, and require support from, other units. To be effective, all elements involved must be thoroughly briefed and knowledgeable of the purpose and objectives of the operation. , a. Counterintelligence Screening Operations. Counterintelligence screening operations are designed to identify and apprehend enemy intelligence agents, subversives, terrorists, and saboteurs attempting to infiltrate friendly lines or conceal themselves among the population. In a conventional warfare situation, screening operations primarily consist of screening refugees and prisoners of war and using checkpoints in populated areas. (1) Coordination (a) Refugee and prisoner-of-war screening is planned and coordinated, where possible, with military police elements, interrogator- translator teams (ITT’s), civil affairs units, and pyschological operations elements. (b) The tactical commander is primarily con- cerned with the movement of refugees and prisoners through his area without disrupting operations, and with obtaining information of tactical value from these refugees or prisoners. Screening operations must be compatible with the commander’s scheme of maneuver. (2) Preparation (a) Prior to the operation, counterintelligence personnel must become thoroughly familiar with all available information concerning the enemy intelligence organization, the military and political situation within the enemy con- trolled area, and the geography of the area. 1 In order to successfully identify enemy intelligence agents, counterintelligence 3-11
307 3-12 personnel must be knowledgeable of the enemy intelligence organization, including its mission, methods of operation, officials, schools and training, known agents, and policies and regulations. 2 Knowledge of the political situation and of the restrictions piaced on the population within the enemy controlled area aid in detecting discrepancies during the screening. Information required includes travel retric- tions, curfews, draft and conscription regulations, civilian labor forces and work patterns, and the education system. 3 Obtaining order of battle information is primarily the responsibility of the interrogator- translator teams; however, counterintelligence personnel must be aware of the enemy military units operating within the area, and knowledgeable of their disposition, composi- tion, activities, training, equipment, history, and commanders’ personalities. This informa- tion aids in identifying military intelligence personnel or other persons attempting to hide their identity. 4 Counterintelligence personnel must also be familiar with the geography and the political, sociai, and economic conditions of the area. Travel conditions, distances, major landmarks, customs, and composition of the population are essential to the successful Screening operation. (b) Preparation for the operation also includes compiling a list of personnel of known counter- intelligence interest, a list of indicators to aid in identifying persons of counterintelligence interest, and basic data sheets which may be completed on persons being screened. This information is distributed to key personnel participating in the operation to aid in identifying those persons requiring interrogation by counterintelligence per- sonnel, The basic data sheets are filled out to aid in determining the individual’s knowledge and in formulating questions for further interrogation. The basic data sheet contains, as a minimum, the following information: — FMFM 2.4 * Basic identification data of the individual and his family including name, aliases, date and place of birth, sex, race, religion, citizenship, address, and marital status. e Education and professional experiences. e Knowledge of languages, foreign travel, mil- itary service, and technical qualifications. © Political affiliations and membership in other groups and organizations. * Details of current travel to friendly lines or point of capture, to include point of depar- ture, times, and circumstances. * Additional questions may be included which relate to specific indicators revealing areas of counterintelligence interest. {3} Initial Screening {a) Prisoners of war and refugees normally enter prisoner-of-war and refugee cliannels rear- ward of the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) for further movement to rear areas. Ini- tial screening is conducted as soon as possible after the prisoners of war or refugees come under friendly contro. Initial screening is usual- ly accomplished by unit intelligence personnel, ITT’s, or counterintelligence personnel. In the case of a large number of refugees, assistance in initial screening may be provided by military police, civil affairs units, psychological opera- tions personnel, and tactical troops, if available. (b) Persons identified or suspected to be of counterintelligence interest are separated from other prisoners of war or refugees and referred to coumerintelligence personnel for interroga- tion, after information of immediate tactical value has been obtained. Personnel of counter- intelligence interest are exploited, if possible, and then evacuated to higher headquarters for further detailed interrogation and exploitation by rear area counterintelligence teams. Further counterintelligence screening also continues for
FMFM 2-4 (4) (5) other prisoners of war and refugees at the higher echelons. Procedures for the handling of captured enemy personnel are contained in FMFM 2-1, intelligence, and FM 19-40, Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Detained Persons. Conduct of the Screening (a) In many cases, numerous prisoners of war and refugees preclude counterintelligence inter- rogation of every individual. The initial screen- ing is designed to identify those persons who are, or are most likely to be, of counterintelli- gence interest and who requiie interrogation by counterintelligence personnel. The success of the screening operation is, therefore, directly influenced by the degree of preparation and the quality of the information provided to person- nel conducting the initial screening. (b) Counterintelligence interrogation is designed to confirm or to deny that the person is of coun- terintelligence interest and to exploit the infor- mation obtained when appropriate. Persons who are determined not to be of counterintelli- gence interest are returned to the prisoner-of- war or refugee channels as appropriate. Those persons who are of counterintelligence interest are evacuated through counterintelligence chan- nels for further interrogation and exploitation by rear area counterintelligence teams. An interrogation report is completed on each in- dividual! referred for further interrogation. This report clearly identifies those areas of counter- intelligence interest and includes as much infor- mation as possible concerning the individual's identity and documentation, background, recent activities, and route of travel to. friendly lines or point of capture. A sample format for the inter- rogation report is contained in appendix B. Indicators (a) Indicators to aid in the identification of possible hostile infiltrators are determined after a thorough study of the enemy area, the political and military situation, and the enemy intelli- gence organization. 307 (b} For maximum effectiveness, indicators must relate to the specific area of operations; however, the following general indicators may serve as a guide to identify persons as possible infiltrators: ¢ Persons of military age who are not members of the armed forces. ¢ Persons without identification or with unusual or altered documents. e Persons attempting to avoid detection or questioning, or displaying peculiar activity. * Persons using enemy methods of operation. ¢ Person: possessing unusually large amounts of money, precious metals, or gems. ¢ Persons traveling alone or in pairs. ® Persons having a pro-enemy background, family members in enemy areas, or who have collaborated with the enemy. e Persons with a suspicious story or who have violated regulations in enemy areas. (6) Other Methods of Screening. In addition to interrogation, the following methods of screening can be used separately or in combination: * Insertion of informants into prisoner-of-war and refugee channels and detention centers. e Use of concealed informants at screening col- fection points. Use of sound equipment in holding areas. © Polygraph examination. Specialized identification equipment. (7) Mobite and Static Checkpoints (a) Checkpoints are used in screening opera- tions in populated areas and along routes of 3-13
307 b. 3-14 travel to detect and prevent enemy infiltration of espionage, sabotage, terrorist, and subversive agents and to collect information which may not otherwise be available to intelligence units. (b) The preparation for employment of meoale and static checkpoints is the same for o.her screening operations. Lists of persons known or suspected of enemy activity (black and gray lists), and of indicators, are normally utilized in the screening operation, Specialized detection equipment may also be used, if available. (c) Checkpoints are established at strategic loca- tions where sufficient space is available for con- ducting searches and assembling the people to be screened. Provision is made for the security of the checkpoint, and personnel are position- ed to the front and rear of the checkpoint to apprehend those attempting to avoid it. © A mobile checkpoint can be used as a moving system whereby the screening team, either mounted in vehicles or on foot, selects individuals to be stopped for questioning and a check of identity. The mobile check- point also may be established at various locations, usually for periods not to exceed 1 day. ¢ Static checkpoints are those manned per- manently by military police or combat troops at entrances to towns, bridges, and other strategic locations. (d) Screening teams may be composed of combat troops, intelligence interrogators, military police, counterintelligence personnel, civil affairs person- nel, or a combination of such personnel. Screen- ing teams conduct the initial screening and refer suspects to the counterintelligence element for interrogation and further exploitation. Neutralization and Expioitation Operations . (1) Operational Support. The timely seizure and exploitation of counterintelligence targets require — FMFM 2.4 a detailed and coordinated pian that has been prepared well in advance. (Information on targeis and target reduction can be found in paragraphs 503 and 504.) Counterintelligence teams, in most instances, cannot neutralize, guard, or physically control targets without assistance. In some cases, for the seizure and protection of well-defended targets, this assistance must come from ground combat units. In other cases, the assistance may be provided by combat support, combat service support, or aviation units. It is essential that the required assistance be provided for during the planning phase. Counterintelligence personnel will normally accompany the trcops used in target reduction to advise, assist, and examine and/or exploit the target at the earliest possible time. In some instances, it may be advantageous for counterintelligence personnel to rendezvous with the assigned troops at the target area. Except in unusual cases, the tactical effort will take precedence over the neutralization and exploitation of counterintelligence targets. If assistance in target reduction is not available, counterintelligence elements may have to rely on their own assets to neutralize or exploit targets. In friendly control- led areas, counterintelligence elements may also receive assistance from civil police and security agencies. (2) Target Personalities. Target personalities are often valuable sources of combat and strategic in- telligence information. Information of immediate tactical value must be promptly obtained and the individual evacuated to higher headquarters as soon as possible. If evacuation is to be delayed due to the tactical situation, a report of the circumstances must be forwarded to higher headquarters so that arrangements may be made for further interroga- tion, exploitation, and disposition when the tactical situation permits. It is essential that target per- sonalities be handled separately and that they remain out of contact/association with prisoners or other persons detained or being evacuated. (3) Target Installations. The exploitation of in- stallations should be accomplished by counterintel- ligence personnel immediately following the neutralization of the installation if the tactical
FMFM 2-4 situation permits. The installation is searched thoroughly for documents, equipment, and other material of intelligence or counterintelligence interest. Procedures for the disposition of enemy documents and materia! are contained in FMFM 2-1, Intelligence. In some instances, it may be desirable to retain the documents or material within the installation for thorough examination by technical intelligence personnel or other specialists. Due to explosive devices (i.e., boobytraps, mines, etc.}, extreme caution should be used when searching installations known or suspected to have been occupied by the enemy. c. Investigations and Internal Security Functions (1) Investigations. During combat operations, counterintelligence personnel may be required to conduct investigations concerning personnel, security matters, espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and subversive activities (including defection). The investigation is a duly authorized, systematic, detailed examination/inquiry to uncover and report the facts of a matter. While facts, hearsay, infor- mation, opinions, allegations, and investigators’ comments may make a significant contribution, they should be clearly labeled as such in the report of investigation. The Naval Investigative Service manual, NIS-3, Manual for Investigations, may be used as a guide for investigation techniques and procedures. (a) Counterintelligence investigations utilize basic investigative techniques and procedures and are designed to detect, prevent, and/or neutralize actual or potential threats to the security of the command. The primary purpose of the investigation is to provide the commander with sufficient factual information to.reach a decision or to ensure the security of his command. {b) Investigations may be conducted overtly or discreetly depending on the type of investiga- tion and the area of operations. Investigations will normally include the examination of records, interviews or interrogations, and the a 307 collection and handling of evidence. Surveil- lance and the conduct of raids and searches may also be appropriate as the investigation progresses. (c) Upon assumption of primary counterintel- ligence jurisdiction, counterintelligence in- vestigations will be conducted in accordance with guidance contained in NIS-3, Manual for Investigations, and instructions published by the MAGTF commander. (d) Certain unique probiems are involved in conducting investigations of indigenous person- nel in a tactical environment. Counterintelli- gence personnel are normally responsible for conducting security investigations of indigenous personnel employed by FMF units and may also be involved in the investigation of indigenous personnel retained in official civilian positions. Difficulty in investigations often will be en- countered due to a lack of files and records in the repositories of civilian police and in- vestigative agencies, as such documentation may have been destroyed or removed during tacti- cal operations. Every effort must be made to check all files and records which are available. Special investigative techniques, such as the use of polygraph examinations by criminal in- vestigative personnel, may be required. The utilization of indigenous personnel by FMF units presents a definite security threat because of the enemy’s efforts to penetrate units through the use of indigenous civilian employees who are sympathetic to, or may be coerced into serving, the enemy cause. All units utilizing indigenous personnel must exercise caution to preclude the enemy’s collection of information, both classified and unclassified, useful to the him. In addition to the initial security investigation, con- tinual checks are made on employees. Counter- intelligence elements maintain close liaison with the civil affairs units responsible for providing civilian labor to military forces. (2) Troop Movement Security. The movement of troops is of vital concern to the enemy and, in many cases, may provide the first indication of friendly intentions. Enemy intelligence activity 3-15
307 ——_—________—_----—__.- 3-16 may be expected to increase prior to, during, and immediately after the movement of troops. Troop movement security is designed to deny the enemy as much information as possible, to prevent es- pionage and sabotage from interfering with the movement, and to ensure the element of surprise. Counterintelligence personnel coordinate closely with the commander’s staff and provide security services and assistance as required. (a) Some of the services and assistance normal- ly provided by counterintelligence personnel in- clude the following: ° Providing advice and assistance on security matters during the preparation of plans for the movement. ¢ Conducting counterintelligence evaluations and inspections, providing recommenda- tions for maximum secrecy, and assisting in instructions to unit personnel concerning troop Movement security. e Observing the move, investigating and reporting security violations, and providing briefs on other security threats. (b) The following security measures must be considered regardless of the type of transpor- tation utilized for the move: e Imposing the Wartime Information Secur- ity Program. ¢ Monitoring or restricting communication facilities. © Increasing emphasis on security education programs. e Gradually reducing leave and liberty, if appropriate. ¢ Surveillance of areas and facilities where loose talk may be prevalent. ® Removing or covering tactical markings and other identifying marks on vehicles and equipment. FMF 2-4 e Providing instructions for the storage or destruction of personal diaries, mail, and other documents and papers. © Arranging for special issue of equipment and clothing, and for other administrative activities in such a manner that will minimize the indication that a move is imminent. © Covering and guarding certain material and equipment to conceal its identity and pre- clude unauthorized access during the move. e Providing security guards ai loading points, at critical areas along the route, and at the destination. e Inspecting vacated areas to ensure that nothing of intelligence value has been left which might indicate the destination, iden- tity, cr mission of the unit. Inspecting and evaluating the destination area for physical security hazards when possible. * Deceptive actions designed to mislead the enemy when approved by the senior area commander or higher authority. (3) Counterintelligence Surveys, Evaluations, and Inspections. Ina combat environment, counterin- telligence surveys, evaluations, and inspections, including TSCM inspections and surveys, are con- ducted in essentially the same manner as during garrison operations (see sec. 4); however, counter- intelligence surveys and TSCM inspections and surveys are usually limited to permanent installa- tions in rear areas. In those instances where perimeter security is the responsibility of a tactical unit, the physical security portion of the counter- intelligence survey is primarily concerned with those areas within the perimeter containing classified material and areas susceptible to sabotage and ter- rorist attack. Special weapons sites require extra emphasis and may include counterintelligence monitoring of shipments in addition to other security services.
FMFM 2-4 (4) Port and Harbor Security. Port and harbor secur- ity is normally provided jointly between military police and the counterintelligence elements supporting the logistics command operating the port. Counterintelli- gence elements concentrate their efforts on counterin- telgence security procedures and special operations. e Counterintelligence security procedures for ports and harbors are essentially the same as those required for installations, with the addi- tion of controls established for ships and their crews. Special emphasis is required for ships under a foreign flag. ¢ Special operations place emphasis on hostile sabotage and subversive activity. Special opera- tions are normally required within the port as well as the surrounding area. d. Special Operations. Special operations are con- ducted by counterintelligence personnel and require detailed planning, coordination, and control. (See par. 303e.) Procedures for the conduct of special operations are contained in FM 30-17A, (C) Counterintelligence Special Operations (U). e. Intelligence Collection (i) Counterintelligence teams can collect both counter- intelligence and combat intelligence information through the use of HUMINT resources. In addition to its counterintelligence functions, a team may be assigned additional responsibility for combat intelli- gence collection, particularly in low counterintelligence threat areas; however, care must be exercised to ensure that these responsibilities do not impair the accom- plishment of the overall counterintelligence mission. (2) The procedures and authority for the conduct of human intelligence operations and certain special operations are normally provided by the senior area commander. Guidance and operational procedures for HUMINT operations are contained in DIAM 58-11, Volumes 1 and 2, and FM 30-18, (S) Inteili- gence Collections Operations (U). - 307 f. Wartime Information Security Program (1) The WISP is designed to control and examine communications to prevent disclosure of informa- tion of value to the enemy and to collect informa- tion of value te the United States. (2) DOD Directive 5230.7 assigns responsibility and provides guidelines for WISP planning within the Department of Defense, to include national, armed forces, civil, enemy prisoner of war and civilian internee, and field press WISP’s. (3) OPNAVINST $530.6B is a Joint Service direc- tive which provides basic policy and guidance for commanders in the establishment and operation of the U.S. Armed Forces WISP. Armed Forces WISP is the examination and control of personal com- munications to or from persons in the Armed Forces of the United States and persons accom- panying or serving with the Armed Forces of the United States. (4) OPNAVINST 5530.04 is a Joint Service direc- tive which provides basic policy and guidance for commanders in the establishment and operation of civil WISP, the review of civilian communications, such as messages, printed matter, and films, entering, leaving, or circulating within areas or ter- ritories occupied or controlled by the Armed Forces of the United States. (5) OPNAVINST 5530.11 is a Joint Service direc- tive which provides basic policy and guidance for the establishment and operation of WISP for the incoming and outgoing communications of enemy prisoners of war and civilian internees held by the United States military authorities outside the limits of the United States and Puerto Rico. {6) Additional responsibilities are published by unified and specified commanders, type com- manders, fleet and numerical fleet commanders, special commanders, and area coordinators. 3-17
308 (7) Fleet Marine Force units are primarily con- cerned with Armed Forces WISP, the objectives of which are to prevent the disclosure of information that might assist the enemy or adversely affect any policy of the United States, and to collect and disseminate information to assist the United States in the successful prosecution of a war. (8) Fleet Marine Force units must be prepared to institute WISP when directed; WISP is a functional responsibility of the G-1. 308. Tactical Counterintelligence Interrogation Within the area of operations, there may be numereous people who are viewed as threats to security, perhaps solely due to their presence in the combat zone. The number of suspect personnel will vary, but frequently it will preclude detailed interrogation of all but a selected few who are of primary interest. Counterintelligence personnel will be partly dependent upon such agencies as the provost marshal, civil affairs units, and interrogator-translator units (ITU’s) to identify suspect persons or persons of counterintelligence interest. In some situations, the number of persons volun- teering information to counterintelligence operation permits concentration on those of the greatest potential interest or value. Most suspects are apprehended while trying to enter the area, or their cover stories (which will closely parailel their true places of origin and identities) are exposed. The counterinteiligence interrogator’s success in such interroga- tions is primarily dependent upon his questioning skill, linguistic ability or support, knowledge of the area of opera- tions and adjacent areas, and familiarity with the intellec- tual, cultural, and psychological peculiarities of the persons encountered. a. Types of Subjects. As the battlelines in combat change, entire segments of the population may be over- run. The local population in any area may also be increased by refugees and displaced persons (persons from other countries conscripted by enemy forces for labor). The following categories of persons are of counterintelligence interest: 3-18 FMFM 2-4 ° Refugees and displaced persons. e Line crossers. © Deserters from enemy units. © Civil prisoners. e Enemy intelligence personnel. e Inmates of enemy detention camps. e Members of underground resistance organizations seeking to join friendly forces. ® Collaborators with the enemy. ¢ Target personalities, such as black, gray, or white list personalities. ® Volunteer informants. e Persons who must be questioned because they are under consideration for employment with FMF units or for appointment as civil officials. b. Objectives of Counterintelligence Interroga- tions. The counterintelligence interrogation in com- bat areas assists in the accomplishment of three major objectives: (1) In the screening process, refugees whose very presence threatens overall security are removed from the battlefield. (2) in detailed interrogations, enemy agents with espionage, sabotage, terrorist, Or subversive mis~ sions are detected. (3) The wide range of activities permits the collec- : tion of information of value to other intelligence and security agencies and to the planners of military operations. Counterintelligence interrogators must be especially alert to obtain and report information of immediate tactical value which may not have been previously obtained or reported. Ne
FMFM 2-4 c. Indicators Warranting Suspicion. Counterintel- ligence personnel must be alert during interrogations for indications of intelligence activity. Indicators which, separately or collectively, may generate suspicion that a subject is in the employ of, or acting in sympathy with, enemy forces are as follows: (1) Acecss to Information or Targets. A prospec- tive terrorist, subversive, espionage, or sabotage agent must have access to the information desired by the enemy or to the target installation to be destroyed in order to carry out his mission. The in- terrogation should establish a subject's accessibility to potential targets, including his location at the time he was apprehended. (2) Technical Skitis. Proficiency in certain technical skills is frequently an attribute of an espionage or sab- otage agent. The subject who has a mastery of one or several foreign languages and a knowledge of radio operation or cryptography is questioned carefully on the nature and purpose of his training in those fields. His practical experience and his work in those fields, during or shortly prior to the war, should give coun- terintelligence personnel cause for strong suspicion, and the individual’s story must be closely examined. (3) Documents and Funds. An overabundance of documents and new documents of questionable authenticity are reason for doubt and provide the basis for detailed questioning. Discrepancies in the document’s contents or conflicts between data and the subject’s story may lead to the detection of hostile agents. Unexplainable possession of large amounts of money, valuable jewelry, or other items of great value are investigated carefully. (4) Pro-Enamy Background. Residence or travel in enemy territory, membership in a hostile party, or known former coHaboration with the enemy are facts of obvious importance. Counterintelligente personnel must determine whether the subject is actually in sympathy with the enemy or has acted merely to serve his own best interests with regard to his life, the welfare of his family, or his property. 308 (5) Family in Enamy-Held Tenitory. Enemy pressure is often applied to individuals whose families reside under enemy control, particularly if the family has no past connection with the enemy-held area. (6) Inconsistent Story. Small discrepancies in the .subject’s story may be important. Distance com- ‘pared to travel time; accent peculiar to an area the subject refuses to acknowledge as his own; unrea- sonable explanation of deferment, exemption, or discharge from military service; exemption from labor conscription; or implausible reasons for risk- ing the crossing of combat lines may be warning signals to the counterintelligence interrogator. Contradictions in a subject's story do not warrant jumping to conclusions; however, counterintelli- gence personnel must remain alert to all possibil- ities. Allowances must be made for defective memory or lack of logic due to emotional stress. (7) Suspicious Actions or Activities. Unusual interest displayed by indigenous persons in troop units or equipment, or persistent loitering in the vicinity of troop units and installations without reasonable explanation, are sufficient to warrant interrogation for the purpose of clarifying the status of a person so involved. (8) Violations of Civil or Military Regulations. Mere violation of military regulations in an area controlled by the military, such as mandatory reg- istration, curfews, travel restrictions, or declaration of weapons, may be relatively unimportant to coun- terintelligence elements. However, the motives which cause such violations despite severe penalties must be compelling and possibly may be of great interest to counterintelligence personnel. (9) Modus Operandl. The frequent similarity in tactics of hostile agents working for the same enemy agency, their means of contact with their agent handlers, type of cover story, and manner of collecting and reporting their information may lead to identification of suspects with a known enemy agency or group. Established patterns of 3-19
308 activity or behavior of enemy agents are disseminated to other intelligence and security agencies to assist in the identification of agents still operating. d. Screening or Initial Interrogation. Initial inter- rogation and screening are generally synonymous, except that the former indicates that there will be a follow-up detailed interrogation, while screening in- volves the selection, by brief questioning, of a relatively small number of persons from a large group, for detailed interrogation. In both cases, the technique, purpose, and scope of the questioning are generally the same. The object is to select for detailed interrogation, a reasonable number of persons who appear to be suspect or knowledgeable on matters of counterintel- ligence interest. Initial interrogation or screening is generally concerned with identity, background, recent activities, travel or escape routes, and information of immediate value. Documents and personal belongings of a subject are examined; the circumstances of appre- hension are studied; and available files are checked. e. Detailed Interrogation. Detailed counterintelli- gence interrogations may be conducted in joint inter- rogation centers or at interrogation sites established by intelligence or counterintelligence units. Detailed inter- rogation does not differ radically from the initial interrogation except that attention is now focused on individuals who are suspect or who are known to have extensive information of interest. A study of the ini- tial interrogation report, examination cf the subject’s documents and belongings, and checks of avilable files and information must be conducted and analyses made in preparation for the interrogation. (4) Details of the subdject’s personal history must be reviewed, Should the subject admit that he is an enemy agent, he becomes an important source of information on enemy intelligence methods of operation and, perhaps, on identities of other hostile agents. This will lead to exhaustive inter- . fogations on such issues as hostile intelligence, training, and missions assigned. However, counter- intelligence personnel must be alert to the possible insertion of confusion agents. 3-20 FMFM 2-4 (2) The suspect, or any person being interrogated, may also be an important source of information of intelligence value, strategic and/or tactical. (3) The questioning usually follows a logical sequence to avoid confusing the subject and to facilitate reporting; however, an illogical sequence may be used as a technique to purposely confuse the subject so that he will inadvertently contradict himself. The interrogator must be alert for dis- crepancies and retain his psychological advantage. (4) Specific techniques of interrogation are dis- cussed in FM 30-15, Intelligence Interrogation. f. Operation of a Counterintetligence Interro- gation Center (1) A counterintelligence interrogation center serves as acentralized Jocation where persons of counter- intelligence interest are interrogated. In offensive situations where assault unit counterintelligence teams are reducing priority counterintelligence targets, it may be necessary for higher echelons to assume the interrogation responsibility ai the lower echelon. For this, the use of augmentation subteams is of value. Each major command with counterin- telligence support normally establishes such in- terogation centers, thereby supporting the concept of counterintelligence coverage in depth. (2) A centrally located counterintelligence inter- rogation center is placed in operation as soon as possible. in a static situation when the counterin- telligence team has no immediate offensive targets, consideration may be given to selection of a build- ing that will provide adequate facilities, such as a waiting room for arrivals, an interrogation room, . a detention room, and a waiting room for depar- tures. In fast-moving situations, interrogation centers are necessarily moved rapidly and frequently. All units concerned with disposition of line crossers, refugees, etc., must be kept notified as to the loca- tion of interrogation centers. Additionally,
FMFM 2-4 arrangements must be made for the guarding and disposition of line crossers, refugees, and other per- sons processed at such installations. (3) The counterintelligence interrogation center is normally established in the vicinity of the prisoner- of-war compound/collecting point, or in a secure location specified by the operational: counterintel- ligence team/subteam commander. Regerdless of location, a close working relationship is established between counterintelligence and interrogator- translator units. Routine prisoner-of- war interroga- tion is not a function properly assigned to the coun- terintelligence team. Team personnel are utilized to interrogate only those prisoners who have been determined to be of counterintelligence interest. (4) All persons detained are handled and treated in accordance with the applicable Geneva Conventions. (See FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare.) 309. Friendiy Prisoners of War and Persons Missing (Nonhostile) and Missing in Action Friendly personnel who fall into the hands of the enemy can be a source of information through the compromise of documents, persona! papers, or as the result of effec- tive interrogation or coercion. It is incumbent upon the tactical commander to counter this threat by taking those steps necessary to counter any possible disclosure which would affect the immediate tactical situation. Counter- intelligence units are assigned responsibility for the col- lection of information of potential intelligence value on friendiy personnel possibly in enemy hands and the col- lection of intelligence information to aid in identifying, lecating, and recovering those personnel. In addition, counterintelligence personnel conduct the intelligence and counterintelligence debriefings cf those Marines who have been detained by the enemy and returned to. friendly con- trol, as well as those personnel whe were recovered or who evaded capture during an incident resulting in the capture or missing status of a Marine, hospital corpsman, or other assigned personnel. 309 Marine Corps commands notify the nearest counterin- telligence unit when Marine Corps personnel, including hospital corpsmen or other assigned personnel, are cap- tured or determined to be missing (nonhostile) or missing in action. The counterintelligence unit may be abie to pro- vide information which could aid in the search and recovery efforts, such as possible routes to enemy detec- tion centers, location of possible holding areas, and enemy procedures for handling and evacuating prison- ers. If appropriate, the counterintelligence element can also initiate immediate collection action utilizing coun- terintelligence sources*to gain information for possible recovery or search and rescue operations. if the search or recovery attempts are unsuccessful, the counterintelligence unit initiates an immediate investiga- tion to gather basic identification data and to determine the circumstances surrounding the incident. The investiga- tion is designed to provide information to aid in sub- sequently identifying and locating the individual, to assess the potential intelligence gain if the individual is held, and to collect intelligence information which will be of value when evaluating future intelligence reports. Format for the basic identifying data required is contained in appen- dix A. Every attempt is made to obtain a recent photo- graph and a sample of the individual’s handwriting. A synopsis of the investigation, including a summary of the circumstances, is prepared on the counterintelligence report form (NAVMC 10481 [Rev ___]). The completed basic identifying data form is attached as an enclosure to this report. The investigation must be as thorough and detailed as possible and classified according to content. In the case of aircraft incidents, the investigation includes type of aircraft, location and sensitivity of classified equipment, bureau or registration number, call signs, and any aircraft distinguishing marks, such as insignia, etc. When feasible, the investigator should coordinate with the accident investigation team or aviation safety officer of the unit which experienced the loss. The counterintelligence report with the attached persun- nel data form is distributed to the following commands: * * Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code INT). © * Appropriate headquarters (Fleet Marine Force Pacific [FMFPAC] or Fleet Marine Force Atlantic {FMFLANT]). 3-21
310 ® * Marine ais-ground task force headquarters. ® Individual’s parent command (division, wing, or MAB). e Each counterintelligence team in the combat area. These reports are designed to aid in the counterintelli- gence mission and are not intended to replace the nor- mal casualty reporting procedures. When the counterin- telligence report concerns a member of another Service assigned to a Marine Corps unit, a copy of the report is also provided to the appropriate Service organization. All subsequent information, which pertains or may per- tain to persons captured or missing in action, is distributed in the same manner as the initial counterin- telligence report. Marine Corps personnel returned to friendly control after being detained by the enemy are debriefed by Marine Corps counterintelligence personnel. Normaily, counter- intelligence personnel supperting the unit which first gains custody of the individual conduct an initial debriefing for information of immediate tactical value and the location of other rrisoners of war in the area. As soon as possible, the returnee is evacuated to the MAGTF headquarters for further debriefing or for evacuation to a debriefing site as determined by higher headquarters. Upon return of a person who was captured, listed as missing (nonhostile}, or missing in action, those commands listed (*) in paragraph 369 are immediately notified. Specific guidance for the processing and handling of Marine Corps personnel captured or missing in action is contained in applicable Marine Corps orders. 310. Counterinsurgency Operations To effectively conduct counterintelligence operations in an insurgency environment, counterintelligence personnel must be thoroughly familiar with the nature of insurgency —its causes, characteristics, and peculiarities. Information concerning counterinsurgency operations and intelligence and’ counterintelligence applications are contained in FMFM 8-2, Counterintelligence Operations; FM 30-17, Counterintelligence Operations; and FM 30-17A, (C) Counterintelligence Special Operations (U). 3-22 FMFM 2.4 Insurgency efforts are directed and highly controlled by a hard core insurgent infrastructure which employs an exten- sive intelligence network. Basic responsibilities of counter- intelligence units in an insurgency environment are the denial of information to the insurgent force and the iden- tification and neutralization of the insurgent infrastructure, with emphasis placed on its intelligence apparatus. Counterinsurgency operations basically are aimed at the restoration of internal security in the area of operations, which requires a vigorous and highly coordinated coun- terintelligence effort. The nature of insurgency and its covert methods of operation require the employment of a greater number of counterintelligence personnel than is necessary for conventional operations. a. Jurisdiction. The commitment of Marine Corps forces for counterinsurgency operations is normally covered by a status of forces agreement which may include Jimitations and restrictions concerning the investigation and apprehension of host country citizens or other operations matters. Host country counterin- telligence, security, and law enforcement agencies usually are extensively engaged in counterintelligence and security operations prior to the arrival of U.S. forces. Counterintelligence units may be assigned to assist these agencies; however, Marine Corps counter- intelligence teams are normally employed in support of Marine Corps units. Effective counterintelligence Operations require extensive coordination with host country intelligence, counterintelligence, security, and law enforcement agencies. b. Employment of Counterintelligence Teams (i) The employment of ccounterintelligence teams in counterinsurgency operations is similar to that described in paragraph 306. Area coverage is usually preferred to provide continuity of opera- tions and to ensure continuous coverage of the area. The insurgent infrastructure and intelligence apparatus usually have been operating within a given area for many years and are thoroughly familiar with all aspects of the area and its people.
FMFM 2-4 Continuity of operations and other characteristics of the area coverage concept are particularly suited to counter the insurgent intelligence threat. (2) In assigning any areas of responsibility, ensure coverage overlaps to preclude gaps occuring be- tween areas. Insurgent forces usually prefer to operate on the political or military boundaries where the assigned responsibilities of U.S. and allied forces may be vague and coordination is more dificult. Counterintelligence teams employed through unit assignment also are assigned respon- sibility for the area of influence around the unit's tactical area of responsibility (TAOR). Under the unit assignment concept, rear area counterintelli- gence teams assume responsibility for any gap in coverage that may develop. c. Counterintelligence Measures and Operations (1) The basic counterintelligence operations, techniques, and procedures previously discussed in this section are generally applicable in an insurgency environment. Both passive and active counterintelligence measures must be increased and aggressively pursued to effectively thwart the insurgent strategy. (2) All commands must institute and continuously enforce counterintelligence and security measures to deny information to the insurgent force and to protect the command from sabotage. In coordina- tion with host country authorities, emphasis is placed on security measures and checks of in- digenous employees or other persons with access to installations or commands. (3) A significant factor in counterinsurgency operations is population and resources control. The movement channels and patterns necessary for support, communications, and operations of - insurgent forces are observed and controlled. Prior to implementing control measures, the population should be informed of the reasons for controls, and whenever possible, such controls I BAY should be performed and enforced by host couniry agencies. {4) Counterintelligence teams must implement imaginative and highly aggressive special operations and HUMINT collection programs targeted against the insurgent infrastructure and guerrilla forces. The primary objective of special operations is the identification, location, and neutralization of specific members of the insurgent infrastructure through systematic intelligence collection and analysis with complete documentation concerning the activities of each individual. This allows the host country to be provided with an account of the individual’s illegal activities once the person is apprehended. Penetration of the infrastructure must be obtained at all levels possible. Human in- telligence operations are implemented to cover critical areas to identify and locate insurgent forces. information derived from HUMINT programs may also be useful in special operations. (5) In counterinsurgency operations, cordon and search operations may be employed to ferret out the insurgent infrastructure as well as individual unit elements which may use a community or area as cover for their activities or as a support base. The cordon and search operation basically consists of security forces which surround the area, usually at night, to prevent persons from leaving the area; a sweep element which escorts the people to a collec- tion point at first light; search elements which search the area: and screening elements to process and screen the people for identification of known or suspected infrastructure or guerrilla force personnel. Cordon and search operations should be conducted in conjunction with host country forces and organizations, with U.S. forces, including counter- intelligence units, providing support, advice, and assistance for the entire operation. As a minimum, host country personnel should be part of the screen- ing and sweep elements of any cordon and search operation. The operation is often conducted in con- junction with medical, civil affairs, and psychological operations programs which are accomplished after the screening phase. Throughout the operation, care must be exercised to prevent an adverse psychologi- cal effect on the populace. Details concerning 3-23
3190 <i EMM 2g the intelligence and counterintelligence aspects of cordon and search operations are contained in FM 30-17, Counterintelligence Operations. 311. Counterintelligence Funds Special funds for conducting counterintelligence operations and intelligence collection activitics by counterintelligence teams are available at higher headquarters. These funds may be made available upon request from the MAGTF. Pro- cedures for the use, control, and accountability of funds are provided by the issuing headquarters. 312. Files and Reports a. Files. Counterinteiligence teams are responsible for establishing and maintaining operational files essential to their combat counterintelligence mission. The following operational files are normally maintained in a combat environment: * Information concerning personalities, organiza- tions, and installations of current and future coun- terintelligence interest. Often basic information of this type also is recorded in a card file or automatic data system (ADS) for ready reference and is cross- indexed to more detailed information. ® Correspondence and reports concerning specific operations and investigations. * Source records containing essential data on sources of information. ® Area files containing basic reference data and in- formation on enemy intelligence activity and coun- terintelligence measures within a particular geographic area. b. Reports. The accomplishment of the counterintel- ligence mission requires accurate, timely, and pertinent 3-24 reports disseminated in a usable form. Counterintelli- gence reports are prepared to transmit accurate infor- mation to units that can take action, to aid in the pro- cessing of intelligence, and to serve as a record of coun- terintelligence activities. The method of dissemination of counterintelligence information depends primarily on the nature and urgency of the information, the loca- tion of the receiving units, the security requirements, and the means available. Normally, information is disseminated by message, personal liaison, radio, telephone, briefings, messenger, and written revorts. Sample formats for preparation of counterintelligence reports are provided in appendix B and may be modified for electrical transmission. Reports are classified according to content. (1) Spot Report. Spot reports are used to rapidly report and disseminate information of immediate value. These reports are not limited to any specific type of informatica but must contain sufficient detail to answer basic interrogatives (who, what, when, where, why, and how). A requirement for speed in reporting and disseminating establishes the criteria for use of the spot report. Information contained in a spot report later included in another report must be clearly identified as having been previously reported SO as not to oe considered as confirming information. Source and information evaluation will be included on all spot reports together with the coded source identification, when applicable. (2) Counterintelligence Information Report. The information report is the basic form for reporting coliected counterintelligence/intelligence informa- tion. Information is normally reported by subject category and includes an initial evaluation of the source and the information. Significant informa- tion addressing national requirements will be reported by the MAGTF staff counterintelligence efficer (SCIO), utilizing DD Form 1396. The counterintelligence information report format has been revised to coincide with DD Form 1396 format. (See DIAM 58-2A, Vol 2 for further guidance in completing DD Form 1396.) (3} Counterinteliigence Interrogation Report. The interrogation report notes the results of interroga- tions of counterintelligence interest. Designed to
EMEM 2-4 ———————_________— 313 provide information essentially of counterintelli- gence interest, it also contains information which could aid other intelligence organizations/agencies level upon which it can be acted. Internal and external wire communications are established by the supported command as required. in their evaluation of any possible interest in the persons interrogated. Often, higher headquarters will require that certain information/reports initially be submitted on all persons captured or detained. In cases where a person is of interest to both counterintelligence and intelligence inter- rogators, close coordination with ITU’s is required to ensure the proper submission of reports. (4) Counterintelligence Report Form. The counter- intelligence report form 3850 (NAVMC 10481 {Rev }) will be used to report the results of counterintelligence investigations, surveys, evalua- tions, and inspections. When longer than two pages, the first page of the report contains a synop- sis. For uniformity and ease of report writing, the counterintelligence report normally contains five major sections — predication, purpose, background, results, and comments or recommendations. Enclosures to the report are designated in numerical order and are used to amplify or confirm informa- tion contained in the report. In the case of physical security evaluations for the storage of classified material, a locally produced security evaluation checklist may be used as an enclosure to the standard report form in lieu of lengthy written comments. (5) Counterintelligonce After-Actlon Report.After- action reports are prepared by counterintelligence teams to report the results of counterintelligence operations or operations which were supported by counterintelligence personnel and involved significant counterintelligence aspects. In addition, these reports serve as a record of tactical counter- intelligence support activities within an area. 313. Communications b. Communication Requirements (1) A counterintelligence tactical net should be established for each counterinte!ligence tearn. In addition, consideration should be given early in the planning to the establishment of a station on the counteriatelligence tactical net. Coordination should be established with the communications- electronics officer to obtain radio element augmen- tation to support this station. (2) Internal and external wire communications also must be planned for and coordination effected with the communications-electronics officer. (3) Where feasible, counterintelligence circuits should be secure to preclude compromise of sen- sitive information. c. Communication Management (1) Staff counterintelligence officers/team com- manders must coordinate with the communications- electronics officer regarding frequency allocation and assignment. Also, particular attention must be given to allocating available resources for the establishment of a station for the staff counterin- telligence element on the counterintelligence tactical net. (2) Consideration should be given to planning the use of various frequencies for agent communications. (3) FMFM 10-1, Communications, provides addi- tional information regarding communication a. Capabitities. Each counterintelligence team possesses organic radio equipment to enable coordina- tion Gf activities and the reporting of information to the systems, concepts of operaiion, planning, training, maintenance, and communications security for the Fleet Marine Forces. {reverse blank) 3-25
FMEM 2-4————_________________________"____________Section 4 Section 4 Counterintelligence Garrison Operations 401. General The primary peacetime/garrison mission of counterintelligence teams is planning, preparing and training to accomplish their combat co interintelligence and human intelligence (HUMINT) functions. Secondarily, counterintelligence teams provide certain counterintelligence services to enhance the security of the command against espionage, sabotage, terrorism, subver- sion, and inadvertent disclosure or compromise of clas- sified material. Guidance for the planning and conduct of combat coun- terintelligence operations and for training are provided in sections 3, 5, and 6. This section provides guidance for conducting Marine Corps counterintelligence services while in garrison. 402. Counterintelligence Survey The counterintelligence survey is designed to assist com- manders in establishing systems, procedures, and safe guards to protect military installations, personnel, and organizations from espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and subversion. To determine the requirements for security, the survey includes an analysis of counterintelligence factors influe.cing security at the installation, a determi- nation of the counterintelligence measures required by the sensitivity or criticality of the installation, an assess- ment of the counterintelligence measures which currently exist, and recommendations to bring existing counterintel- ligence measures to the required standard. The counterintelligence survey is not a recurring service. The purpose of the survey is to establish requirements to
fit a specific installation, rather than to test compliance with requirements aiready established. Once a counter~- intelligence survey has been conducted, it remains valid unless there are major changes in the physical security characteristics of the installation, the mission of the cornmand, or the potential threat. initiation of a Counierintelligence Survey. The request for a counterintelligence survey originates with the commander of the installation concerned or with a higher commander in the same chain of command. Counterintelligence surveys are normally requested for the following reasons: 4-2 Activation or reactivation of an installation or major command. Significant change in mission or functions, or a major physical reorganization of an installation or major command. New, hazardous conditions within an installation which necessitate the reevaluation of the security system. Significant changes in classified material produced, processed, stored, or handled. Change in locale or environment in which the installation is located. Upon determination that a record of a previous survey does not exist. Upon a major change in potential threat to the installation. Preparation for Counterintelligence Surveys {1) Selection of Personnel. The number of person- nel used to conduct the survey will vary depending on the size and nature of the installation, the avaii- “ability of counterintelligence personnel, and any special operational or technical considerations. If possible, the survey team should include personnel who have been trained in methods of entry, FMFM 2-4 computer system security, technical surveillance countermeasures (TSCM), and photography. (2) Collection of Data. Prior to conducting the survey, the survey team must become as thoroughly familiar with the installation or command as possible. Information concerning the mission, organization, functions, security directives, and previous surveys, evaluations, and inspections of the installation/command provides valuable back ground end reference data. The files of intelligence and investigative organizations as well as those of the provost marshal’s office may provide informa- tion on particular security hazards or probiems. A complete set of security regulations is compiled for ready reference during the survey. Security regula- tions for reference during a counterintelligence survey include but are not limited to the following: ® DODINST 5200.1R (io be used as a reference when reports are forwarded outside the Depart- ment of the Navy. ¢ SECNAVINST 5521.6__. ¢ OPNAVINST 5510.1___. © OPNAVINST 5510.45 . e Applicable Marine Corps orders in the 5500 series. (3) Coordination. Prior to initiating the survey, a counterintelligence representative contacts the commander of the installation/organization to be surveyed (or his representative) to coordinate the foliowing matters: ¢ Determination and coordination of the proposed scope of the survey. * Arrangements for access to necessary records, buildings, offices, and other areas. * Procurement of applicable security directives, if not previously acquired. ° Arrangements for a survey team escort, if required.
¢ Arrangements for an initial briefing of key per- sonnel on the purpose and objectives of the survey, if desired. (4) Preparation of Checklists. The study and analy- sis of data collected on the installation or organiza- tion to be surveyed may indicate the necessity or desirability of preparing checklists to serve as a guide for personnel conducting the survey. The checklist notes general or specific points to be covered and serves as a reminder to surveying personnei to satisfy the predetermined scope of the survey. General points to be covered are common to all installations and organizations and include document, personnel, and physical security. Each of these major divisions are comprised of many subdivisions. (a) Document security considerations may include storage containers, marking and han- dling of classified documents, application of need-to-know, duties of security control per- sonnel, downgrading procedures, maintenance of classified document logs and receipts, and destruction procedures. (b) Personnel security includes all aspects of the security clearance procedures, including clearance termination and the security education program. ic) Physical security includes perimeter fencing, lighting, guard system, visitor control and pass systems, restricted areas, and building security. c. Conduct of Counterintelligence Survey (1) Preliminary Exterior and Interior Checks. The survey begins with a tour of the installation and the surrounding area to familiarize the survey team with the physical layout of the former and its rela- tionship to the latter. During this tour, the survey team locates those areas, buildings, or offices which require special security considerations or which are considered to be sensitive. After the tour, it may also be necessary to interview certain staff officers to determine the operational importance of par- ticular areas or buildings. FMEM 2-4 —————________________ 402 (2) Determination of the Installation’s Sensitivity. Analysis of the collected data, and the toyr of the installation and surrounding area, permit the survey ‘team to make a preliminary evaluation of the installation’s importance to national defense and its vulnerability and value as an espionage, terrorist, or sabotage target. An accurate appraisal of the security needs of the installation in relation to its sensitivity and importance is next required so that specific recommendations are commensurate with actual security needs. In determining the installa- tion’s sensitivity, the following are considered: (a) Mission. The first consideration is the mis- sion of the organization being surveyed. It must be determined if the mission is continuous or of short duration, unclassified or classified, and if technical or highly skilled personnel are necessary for its successful operation. (b) Cost of Replacement. In estimating the cost of replacement of the installation, a com- parative analysis (not a dollar and cents figure) is made. The time necessary to replace person- nel, documents, and materiel in the event the installation is neutralized or destroyed is estimated. Further consideration is given to potential sources for the procurement of com- parable personnel, and to sources for copies of essential and critical documents to replace or reactivate the installation. (c) Location. Consideration must be given to installation location and the effect surrounding elements have upon its security. The area may be highly industrial, congested residential, urban, or sparsely populated. The surrounding area may offer favorabie natural cover to enemy espionage, terrorist, or sabotage agents. Con- sideration should also be given to the area’s transportation facilities and to endemic natural hazards, such as flood, forest fires, or adjacent flammable storage areas. (d) Security Classification of information. A major factor in evaluating the sensitivity of an in- stallation is the classification of the information stored, used. and generated thei. “ogically, information of greater importance to national
402 defense requires greater safeguarding from ail standpoints. While regulations establish some safeguarding requirements, comparable meas- ures, not specifically established by regulations, very likely are required in other areas. In con- sidering the classification of information, the ariount of classified information present must also be determined. {e) Number of Like Installations. In determin- ing the overall importance of an installation, consideration must be given to installations or activities capable of absorbing the functions of the surveyed installation to maintain mission continuity in the event the surveyed installation is neutralized or destroyed. If no other organiza- tion can assume these duties, the importance of the surveyed installation is greatly increased; however, the fact that similar installations or activities exist may not significantly lower the critical rating. Similar installations may not be in a position to absorb the mission of another, or if the mission is primarily devoted to a defined geographical area, there may be no substitution regardless of how many similar in- stallations exist. In considering the substitution or replacement of an installation or the assump- tion of its mission, consideration must be given to the time involved. How long before the changeover or substitution can be effected? Can the alternate installation facilities achieve a com- parable level of operating efficiency? If the alter- nate installation cannot operate at an acceptable level of efficiency, how jong will it take to at- tain this desired level? Will this transition period affect the national defense effort to a great degree? (f) Importance to the Defense Effort. In same instances, evaluation of the installation’s impor- tance may be made locally, based upon a joint effort between the survey team and the installa- tion commander and his staif. Other knowledge- able persons within the installation and com- mand, and the evaluation and correlation of available information from other agencies, __ adjacent commands, and from the agency utiliz-, ing the end product are 2: 9 of prime importance. FMFM 2-4 In most instances, this evaluation will be made at higher echelons of command. The basic consid- eration is the importance of the installation — its mission, functions, and production—to the na- tional defense effort. The mission of the installa- tion is a fairly good indicator of its importance; however, when the mission is compared with the cost of replacement, location of the installation, existence of similar installations able to absorb the operation of the surveyed installation, the overall importance of the surveyed installation may be higher or lower than anticipated. The survey team requires such information before determining the actual security needs of the particular installation. When the sensitivity rating is juxtaposed with the installation’s current security situation, the survey team can offer recommendations to raise or lower the level of security on the installation in con- sonance with its sensitivity or importance to the national defense effort. (g) Vulnerability to Terrorist Attack. An evalua- tion of the installation and its personnel as possible terrorist targets also must be made. This evaluation is based also on the elements listed in subparagraphs 402d(2)(a) through (f), and on the potential or known terrorist threat. (3) Determination of Existing Security Measures. Once a determination of the relative degree of security required for the installation has been made, a detailed examination of the existing security situa- tion is conducted. This examination includes all factors pertaining to document, personnel, and physical security measures. Examination techniques are dependent on the number of personnel available, personnel capabilities, time available, and choice. Security (document, personnel, and physical) may be examined separately at each loca- tion at different times. This 1s easier but more time- consuming than examining all types of security simultaneously at each location. If sufficient per- sonnel are available, individuals or teams may be assigned to conduct separate portions of the survey; however, due to the interrelationships of security elements and areas, extensive ccordination is required.
FMFM 2-4 (a) Document Security. Document security is probably the most important part of the coun- terintelligence survey. It includes a systematic inspection of all security procedures used in the handling of classified documents, information, and other classfied material. Many aspects of document security may appear to be mechanical in nature; however, these may be misleading. Survey team personnel must visualize the secur- ity procedures employed from the viewpoint of an enemy agent in order to identify weaknesses and vulnerable areas in the system. A clear understanding of installation/unit organization is required to check the security and flow of classified information. The inflow of classified information generally starts at higher head- quarters and flows down to lower echelons. The outflow of classified information usually follows the reverse pattern. Normally, all accounting records and security procedures for handling classified documents and material are examin- ed at one ‘zvel of command before moving to the next. (b) Personnel Security. Personnel security in- cludes the security clearance and education pro- grams. Personnel security clearance procedures for the installation or unit must be carefully audited for the proper initiation, granting, record- ing, and termination of security clearances. In ad- dition, the distinction between clearance level, ac- cess, and need-to- Know is clearly emphasized in examining requirements for access to classified material. The security education program of the installation or unit is examined for completeness and effectiveness. Objectives of the security educa- tion program are to protect classified information and to instill a sense of security awareness in all personnel. The security education of an individua. can be successful only when security is consciously accepted as a personal responsibility. Procedures for conducting required briefings/debricfings, as well as individual proficiency and attitudes toward security, provide an indication of the efficiency of the security education program. (c) Physical Security. Physical security is distinct from document and personnel security as it comprises a system of controls, barriers, 402 and other devices and procedures to prevent destruction, damage, and unauthorized access to installations and facilities. The overall physical security of ai installation is the functional respon- sibility of the provost marshal; however, physical security measures which directly protect areas con- taining classified material, and critical areas susceptible to sabotage and terrorism, are of direct concern in conducting the counterintelligence survey. In addition, the overall physical security measures, plans, and procedures of the installa- tion are evaluated as they relate to all aspects of counterintelligence. In the event that the instalia- tion/organization being surveyed has on record a physical security survey performed by the military police, a statement referring to the report and additional recommendations, if any, are sufficient. If: there is no record of a previous survey, the provost marshal is contacted to schedule and coordinate, with the counterintel- ligence agency, the conduct of a physical secur- ity survey. When the installation is of the open post type with few physical restrictions directly related to counterintelligence security re- quirements, emphasis is on an examination of the physical security factors directly affecting classified storage areas, security areas, critical areas that re- quire protection from sabotage, or terrorist at- tack, and other locations designated as sensitive. (4) Recommendations. Based on the security requirements of the command and the existing security measures and procedures, recommenda- tions are made to safeguard the installation/ organization against espionage, sabotage, ter- rorism, and subversion. For each security hazard, there must be a reasonable recommendation for correction. In formulating realistic recommenda- tions, consideration is given to cost, time, man- power, and availability of materiel. Alternate recommendations may be made to ensure correc- tive action if the primary recommendations cannot be implemented. (5) Exit Briefing. Upon completion, and after preliminary formulation of the results and tentative recommendations, the commander and _ his 4-5
403 staff should be briefed on the survey. During this briefing, the findings and tentative recommenda- tions are discussed. A successful briefing will, in most cases, ensure that the survey team’s recom- mendations are realistic and can be implemented with minimum difficulty. 403. Counterintelligence Evaluation Counterintelligence evaluations are similar to surveys, but limited in scope. An evaluation is normally conducted for a small unit or a component of a larger organization when there has been a change in the security posture, an activation or reactivation, or a physical relocation. Counterintelligence evaluations are normally limited to areas containing or processing classified material. The counterintelligence evaluation may be limited to an assessment of only one type of security, such as docu- ment, personnel, or physical security, or it may include any combination, depending on the needs of the unit. The procedures for the preparation and conduct of the evalua- tion are the same as those for the counterintelligence survey; however, they usually are not as extensive. The counterintelligence evaluation also may be used to update counterintelligence surveys when only minor changes have occurred within an installation or major organization. 404. Counterintelligence Inspections The counterintelligence inspection is performed to determine compliance with established security policies and proce- dures. The scope of the inspection will vary depending on its type and purpose. Inspections may include the following: © Determination if assigned personnei with access to classified material are properly cleared. © Determination if classified material is properly safe- guarded by assigned personnel. FMEM 2-4 * Examination of facilities and containers used for storing classified material to determine adequacy. * Examination of procedures fcr contrelling en- trances and exits, guard systems, and special guard instructions relating to security of classified material and sensitive areas. Counterinteiligence inspections include announced, unan- nounced, and penetration inspections. In addition to for- mal inspections, counterintelligence elements also main- tain regular contact with al! supported units to provide continuous informal assistance, support, and advice regarding security matters. a. Announced Inspections. An announced inspec- tion is one that has been publicized. All personne! con- cerned are aware of the inspection schedule and make preparations as necessary. Inspections are conducted on a recurring basis to ensure security standards remain at a high level. The announced inspection is often ac- complished in conjunction with inspections conducted by the Inspecior General and the commanding general. b. Unannounced Inspections. The unannounced inspection is conducted to determine compliance with security policies and procedures at a time when specia! preparations have not been made. The unit or section to be inspected is not informed in advance of the in- spection. The inspection may be conducted at any time during or after normal working hours. Counterintelli- gence personnel conducting unannounced inspections must have with them their credentials and authoriza- tion of the commander to conduct the inspection. In addition, a responsible person from the command should accompany the inspection team. c. Penetration Inspections. A penetration inspec- tion is designed to provide a realistic test of the securi- ty measures of an installation. The inspection is con- ducted in such a manner that installation personnel, other than the commander and those persons he desires
FMFM 2-4 to notify, are unaware that such action is taking place. This type of inspection may be all-inclusive or may be limited to an attempt by counterintelligence personnel to fraudulently gain access to a specific sensitive area within the installation for the purpose of performing simulated espionage or sabotage acts. The simulated activities should be realistic and correspond to activities which might be attempted by a foreign power or hostile agent. The penetration inspection must be thoroughly planned and coordinated. Planning for the inspection includes consideration of the following: ® Aresponsible person from the inspected command, knowledgeable of the inspection, must be available at the installation during the inspection. * Inspection personnel must carry a letter of iden- tification and authorization to be used only in emergency situations. e If at any time during the inspection a situation arises which would physically endanger personnel, the inspection is immediately terminated. ® The inspection must not impair or disrupt the activities of the command or installation unless that is specifically within inspection guidelines. e Command or installation personnel must not be uti- lized in a manner that would tend to discredit them. 405. Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) Support Historically, hostile intelligence services have used technical surveillance monitoring systems in their espio- nage operations against U.S. installations, both in the United States and abroad. A technical surveillance monitoring system may be defined as any visual surveil- lance or audio monitoring system which is used clandes- tinely to obtain classified, or sensitive unclassified, infor- mation for intelligence purposes. These monitoring systems include, but are not limited to, the following: — 405 ¢ Sound pickup devices, such as microphones and other transducers which use wire and amplifying equipment. ® Passive moduiators. e Energy beams (i-e., electromagnetic, laser, and infrared). @ Radio transmitters. ¢ Recording equipment. Telephones (i.e., taps and bugs). ¢ Photographic and television cameras. Normally, one Marine counterintelligence team assigned to each Marine amphibious force (MAF) maintains a TSCM capability to support tactical units of the MAF. This capabil- ity, designed primarily for combai support, also supplements the Naval Investigative Service GNIS) TSCM responsibilities during peacetime garrison conditions. The purpose of the TSCM support program is to assist the commander in his overall security responsibilities by employ- ing devices and techniques designed to locate, identify, and neutralize the effectiveness of hostile intelligence services technical surveillance activity. Technical surveillance countermeasures support consists of inspections and surveys. A TSCM inspection is an evaluation to determine the physical security measures required to protect an area against visual and audio surveillance; TSCM surveys include a com- plete electronic and physical search for unauthorized modification of equipment, the presence of clandestine audio and visual devices, and other conditions which may allow the unauthorized transmission of any conversation out of the area being surveyed. All TSCM operations are governed DOD Directive 5200.9, SECNAVINST 5500.31, and MCO OS5SI1.1i_. Requests for TSCM support must be classified and no conversation concerning the inspection should take place in the vicinity of the area to be inspected. Procedures for requesting inspections and surveys, TSCM responsibil- ities, and further information on the audio surveillance threat are contained in OPNAVINST 0500.46__ and MCO 05511.91__.
406 ———______$$______________—_____—_-+-/_ FFM 2-4 406. Reports countermeasures support are contained in appendix B. Format for TSCM reports will be modified to meet the Sample formats for reports concerning counterintelli Naval Investigative Service requirements when sup- gence surveys, inspections, and technical surveillance plementing the NIS effort.
ection 5 Section 5 Counterintelligence Planning 501. General Counterintelligence planning is accomplished concur- rently with other intelligence and operational planning and continues until completion of the operation. All aspects of counterintelligence activities are considered to ensure adequate support for all phases of the operation. Counterintelligence plans become mcre detailed at each lower echelon, but remain flexible to respond to chang- ing situations. Counterintelligence activities are characterized by imag- inative exploitation of all available resources. The counterintelligence effort focuses on the overall hostile intelligence collection, sabotage, terrorist, aid subversive threat and is sufficiently flexible to adapt to the “ “* geographical environment, attitudes of the indigczious population, mission of the supported command, and changing emphasis by hostile intelligence, sabotage, ter- rorist, and subversive organizations. Counterinteiligence activities do not achieve maximum effectiveness when conducted separately from other in- telligence activities. Counterintelligence activities must be integrated with the veral! intelligence effort and be closely coordinated with activities of other intelligence specialist teams as well as with civil affairs, psychologi- cal operations, and similar organizations in contact with the indigenous population. Counterintelligence participation and assistance is included early in the planning phase of tactical operations so that commanders benefit from counterintelligence information and assistance in the early formulation of tactical plans. Particular attention is directed towards identification of friendly vulnerabilities to be exploited 5-1
502 by hostile collection assets and toward recommendations for specific counterintelligence measures. 502. Pianning Preceding the Operation The effectiveness of counterintelligence operations in tac- tical areas depends largely upon the planning preceding the operation. The counterintelligence staff officer per- forms three separate functions in carrying out his plan- ning responsibilities: ¢ Directs the effort to obtain information on the enemy’s intelligence, sabotage, terrorism, and subversion capabilities. © Provides for the production and dissemination of intelligence on the enemy’s intelligence, sabotage, terrorism, and subversion capabilities, including clandestine and covert capabilities. » Plans, recommends, and monitors counterintelli- gence measures throughout the entire command. a. Collection and Processing of Information. The determination of réquirements for information in counterintelligence planning, and the collection and processing of such information, follow the sare pro- cedures prescribed for other types of intelligence information. (See FMFM 2-1, Intelligence.) Especially pertinent to counterintelligence planning is informa- tion on every aspect of the enemy’s intelligence system. Included are such matters as the hostile intelligence organization, means available to the enemy for the col- lection of information, and hostile sabotage, terrorism, and subversion agencies and capabilities. b. Counterintelligence Estimate. Normally, a counterintelligence estimate is prepared by Fleet Marine Force (FMF) organizations having counterintelligence personnel assigned or attached. Forming the basis for the counterintelligence plan and appendix, the coun- terintelligence estimate includes*he enemy’s capabilities for intellipence, subversion, terrorism, and sabotage 5-2 FMFM 2-4 and the effects of the characteristics of the area on these capabilities and friendly counterintelligence measures. If a counterintelligence estimate is not prepared, the counterintelligence officer contributes to the prepara- tion of the intelligence estimate, particularily sub- paragraphs on enemy intelligence, subversion, sabotage, guerrilia warfare, terrorism, and the effects of the characteristics of the area on these enemy capabilities. See appendix C for a sample format of a counterintelligence estimate.- c. Counterintelligence Measures Worksheet. Based upon the conclusions reached in the intelligence estimate of the enemy capabilities for intelligence, subversion, terrorist activities, and sabotage, the coun- terintelligence worksheet is prepared or revised. This worksheet is an essential aid in counterintelligence plan- ning and is the basis for preparing counterintelligence orders and requests. See appendix D for an example of a counterintelligence measures worksheet. d. Joint Operational Planning System (JOPS). Counterintelligence input to operation plans (counter- intelligence and human intelligence (HUMINT) resources appendixes) will be in the current JOPS format (see app. E). The counterintelligence plan (see app. F) is no longer used as the counterintelligence ap- pendix to the intelligence annex to operation plans. Nevertheless, the counterintel‘igence plan is a useful guide for planners at the Mé@rine amphibious force (MAF) or higher level as a working paper. Selected elements of JOPS, Volume II may be integrated into the counterintelligence plan, as required. 503. Counterintelligence Targets a. Selection and Priorities (1) Counterintelligence targets include personalities, installation, and organizations of intelligence or counterintelligence interest which must be seized, exploited, or protected.
FMFM 2-4 (2) The selection and assignment of targets is based on an assessment of the overall hostile threat and considers both the immediate and obvious threats to security as well as future threats. This assessment normaily is conducted at the force level where the resultant counterintelligence target lists are also pro- duced, and which include any counterintelligence targets assigned by higher headquarters. (3) Numerical priority designations are assigned to each target to emphasize the relative importance and value of the target and/or to indicate the degree of security threat and urgency in neutralizing or exploiting the target. Priority designations established by higher headquarters are not altered; however, lower echelons may assign priorities to locally developed targets. (4) Counterintelligence targets are usually assigned priority designations according to the following criteria: (a) Priority One. Those targets representing the greatest security threat or possessing the largest potential source of intelligence or counterintel- ligence information/material and which must be exploited or neutralized as soon as possible. (b) Priority Two. Those targets of lesser significance than priority one to be taken under control after priority one targets have been neutralized or exploited. (c) Priority Three. Those targets of lesser sig- nificance than priority one or two to be neutral- ized or exploited as time and personne! permit. b. Personalities. Except for well-known _per- sonalities, most persons of counterintelligence interest are identified and developed by counterintelligence units once operations are established ashore. Personali- ties are divided into three categories comprising those persons who are a threat to security, whose intentions are unknowa, and who can assist the inte!ligence and counterintelligence effort. For ease in identification, a color code indicates the categories. (1) Bleck List. Black lists, developed or compiled at all echelons of command, contain the identities and locations of individuals considered to be a threat to security and whose capture and detention are of prime importance. The black list includes the following persons: © Known or suspected enemy cr hostile espionage, sabotage, terrorist, political, and subversive individuals. ¢ Known or suspected leaders and members of hostile paramilitary, partisan, or guerrilla groups. © Political leaders known or suspected to be hostile to the military and political objectives of the United States and/or an allied nation. © Known or suspected officials of enemy govern- ments whose presence in the theater of opera- tions poses a security threat to the U.S. forces. ® Known or suspected enemy collaborators and sympathizers whose presence in the theater of operations poses a security threat to the U.S. forces. e¢ Known enemy military or civilian personnel who have engaged in intelligence, counterintelli- gence, security, police, or political indoctrina- tion activities among troops or civilians. Other enemy personalities indicated by the G-2, such as local political personalities, police chiefs, and heads of significant municipal and/cr nationai departments or agencies. (2) Gray List. Gray lists, compiied or developed at all echelons of command, contain the identities and locations of those personalities whose inclinations and attitudes toward the political and military objectives of the United States are obscure. Regardless of their leanings, personalities may be on gray lists when xnown to possess information or particular skills required by U.S. forces. They may be individuals whose political motivations re- quire further exploration before they can be util- ized effectively by U.S. forces. Examples of indi- viduals who may be included in this category are: 5-3
£03 ———— $$ _——— 5-4 © Potential or actual defecters from the hostile cause whose credibility has not been established. © Individuals who have resisted, or are believed to have resisted, the enemy government and who may be willing to cooperate with U.S. forces, but whose credibility has not been established. ¢ Nuclear scieatists, physicists, and technicians _ suspected of having been engaged in enemy nuclear research projects or auclear missile programs against their will. (3) Whits Lists. White lists, compiled or developed at all echelons of command, contain the identities and locations of individuals in enemy-controlled areas who are of intelligence or counterintelligence interest and are expected to be able to provide information or assistance in the accumulation of intelligence data or in the exploitation of existing or new intelligence areas of interest. They are usualy in accord with or favorably inclined toward U.S. policies. Their contributions are based on a voluntary and cooperative attitude. Decisions to place individuals on the white list may be affected by the combat situation, critical need for specialists in scientific fields, and such intelligence needs as are indicated from time to time. Examples of individ- uals included in this category are: e Former political leaders of a hostile state deposed by the hostile political leaders. ® Intelligence agents employed by U.S. or Allied intelligence agencies. ® Key civilians in areas of scientific research, to include faculty members of universities and staffs of industrial or national research facilities whose credibility has been established. * Leaders of religious groups and other humanitarian groups. * Other perscns who can significantly aid the political, scientific, and military objectives of the __ U.S. and whose credibility has been established... FMFM 2-4 c. instaltations. The installation target is any instal- lation, building, office, or field position that may contain information or material of counterinteliigence interest or which may pose a threat to the security of the command. Examples of installation type targets are as follows: © installations formerly er currently occupied by enemy espionage, sabotage, and subversive agencies or enemy pclice organizations, including prisons and detention centers. * Installations occupied by enemy intelligence, coun- terintelligence, security, or paramilitary organiza- tions, including operational bases, schools, and training sites. e Enemy communication media and signal commu- nication centers. ¢ Nuclear research centers and chemical laboratories. ¢ Enemy political administrative headquarters. © Production facilities, supply areas, and other in- stallations to be taken under contro! to deny support to hostile guerrilla and partisan elements. ¢ Public utilities and other installations to be taken under early control to prevent sabotage. These in- stailations are usually necessary for the rehabilita- tion of civi! areas under U.S. contvol. e Embassies and consulates of hostile governments. d. Organizations. Any organization or group which is an actual cr potential threat to the security of U-S. or Allied forces must be neutralized. The threat an organization or group presents may not be immediately apparent to the military commander, intelligence officer, or counterintelligence unit. The enemy fre- quently camouflages his espionage or subversive activ- ities -with the establishment of front organizations or groups which, if permitted to remain in being, could impede the success of the military operations. Examples
FMFM 2-4 of hostile organizations and groups which are of major concern to the counterintelligence unit during tactical operations include: © Hostile intelligence, sabotage, subversive, and in- surgent organizations or groups. e National and local political groups and parties known or suspected to have aims, beliefs, or ideologies contrary or in opposition to those of the United States. e Paramilitary organizations, including student, police, militia/veterans, and excombatant groups, known to be hostile to the United States. © Hostile sponsored groups and organizations whose objectives are to create dissension and spread unrest among the civilian population in the area of operations. 504. Counterintelligence Target Reduction The timely seizure and exploitation of counterintelligence targets requires a detailed and well-coordinated counter- intelligence reduction plan prepared well in advance. The reduction plan must be kept current. All targets, assigned or developed, located within the unit’s area of operation are listed in the reduction plan. Counterintelligence elements supporting tactical assault units normally prepare the reduction plan based on the scheme of maneuver with the targets listed in the sequence in which they are expected to appear in the area of opera- tion. The target priority designations, however, remain as assigned on the counterinteiligence target list, with highest priority targets covered first when more than one target is Ic-cated in the same general area. Neutralized and exploited targets are deleted from the counterintelligence reduction plan and appropriate reports are submitted. - A well-prepared and comprehensive counteriritelligence reduction plan ensures coverage of all significant coun- terintelligence targets and allows all counterintelligence units to conduct daily operations based on established priorities. Appendix F coniains a sample covnterintelli- gence reduction plan. r 505. Sequence of Counterintelligence Activities for Amphibious Operations Counterinteiligence functions fall into a logical sequence corresponding to the five phases of an amphibious opera- tion and into required actions in the postoperation period. The following outline of counterintelligence activities is provided as a guide for intelligence and counterintelli- gence officers in planning for amphibious operations: a. Amphibious Operations (1) Planning Phase (a) Provide assistance to the command opera- uions security program. During the initial plan- ning phase, counterintelligence assets provide assistance to the G-3/S-3 in establishment of the Operations security program. (b) Planning information is released only on a need-to-know basis. Common sense is required to determine the size and composition of the need-to-knaw group. It may be necessary to ini- tiate action to obtain clearances for certain members of the command. (c) All material referring to the operation is given appropriate security classification. Guidance ensures that particularly sensitive items are identified and restricted from being carried forward of battalion command posts or in aircraft flying over enemy held terrain. (d} Determine if code symbols are necessary for marking of vehicles and operational equipment; if so, they are used to cover existing tactical marking. 5-5
505 $$ $$ FMFM 2-4 5-6 (2 — (e) Avoid compromising activities. Special innocuiations or the issuance of special clothing | and equipment should be postponed until after embarkation, when possible. Leave and liberty are reduced gradually, since any sudden curtail- ment will engender speculation. (f The Wartime Information Security Program (WISP) is stressed constantly. Individual self- censorship is emphasized as this is the only effec- tive censorship program. Also, possession of diaries is normally forbidden, and personal cameras are rigidly controlled. (g) Prepare the HUMINT and counterintelli- gence appendixes for issuance as part of the intelligence annex. (h) To minimize the probability of later com- promise, recommendations should be submitted on the selection of embarkation and rehearsal areas, routes, and times for the movement to the embarkation areas. () The importance of these measures can be appreciated when the unique opportunities for es- pionage during the planning phase are under- stood. The nature and extent of friendly activities, offering widespread opportunity for information collection, cause information on the operation to be most susceptible to compromise during this phase, unless properly protected. Embarkation Phase (a) Establish liaison with other counterintelli- gence agencies to ensure control of civilians in the embarkation area and along the routes to that area. Civilians working in the embarkation area are screened prior to employment. {b) Ensure that contact between troops and civilians en route and in the embarkation area is kept to an absolute minimum. (c) Establish security over the embarkation area to prevent espionage and sabotage. (d) Ensure positive identification of all persons to be embarked. (3) (4) 6) (6) Due to the necessity to transport and mar- shal large amounts of equipment, the threat of sabotage is at its height during the embarkation phase. Proper measures are necessary to deny the enemy access to the many potentially lucrative targets. Rehearsal Phase (e} If the rehearsal area is close to possible civilian observation, patrols are placed ashore to seal off the rehearsal area. Similarly, the am- phibious task force (ATF) seals off the rehearsal area from sea and air observation. (b) In coordination with the communication officer, communication security is emphasized. Transmission power should be reduced to the minimum required, and frequencies and call signs should not be those intended for actual operational use. Movement Phase {a) Remove restrictions on informing the troops about D-day, H-hour, designated landing beaches, helicopter landing zones, selected objective and force beachhead, and the mission. (b) Impose WISP if directed. (c) In coordination with the communication officer and subordinate commanders, provide assistance in the maintenance of communica- tions security within units of the landing force. Assault Phase. Supervise the accomplishment of counterintelligence operations in accordance with the counterintelligence plan. Included are the following: (a) Contact local authorities and persons known to be friendly to collect all available counterin- telligence information and to screen local inhabitants. (b) Establish security against sabotage or ter- rorism for all military installations and those civilian installations to be kept in operation.
EMEM 2-4 —————____________——————————— iS (c} Establish a counterintelligence interrogation @ Seize, exploit, and protect counterintelligence - center adjacent to the prisoner-of-war interroga- targets. tion center or other secure area. (&) Establish civilian control measures such as checkpoints, identification cards, and curfews b. Postoperation Period in coordination with the personnel officer. (e) Locate and recover contraband materiels, (1) Complete studies of the enemy organization, such as arms, explosives, communication equip- weapons and equipment, techniques, and effective- ment, food, medical supplies, or other items not ness in conducting intelligence, subversion, terrorism, surrendered in accordance with prociamations. and sabotage operations. (f) Enforce camouflage and blackout regulations. (2) Submit appropriate reports on observed or in- (g) Publish effective countersigns. vestig (h) Conduct security checks of all areas vacated (3) Evaluate and report the effectiveness of the coun- by our troops, particularly command posts, to terintelligence teams, techniques and procedures, and determine if any compromising material has been equipment employed. inadvertently left behind. (j Establish counterreconnaissance measures in (4) Evaluate and report the effectiveness of counter- coordination with the operations officer. intelligence operations. (reverse blank) 57
FMFEM 2-4——______________"—_- Section 6 7 the poe ‘ bef Wilber Section 6 Counterintelligence Training 601. General Counterintelligence training is integrated with other in- telligence training and the command training program. All personnel receive training in counterintelligence and security as a basis for fulfilling basic responsibilities in safeguarding information of value to the enemy or a potential enemy. Intelligence and counterintelligence personnel receive additional training to improve their proficiency in accomplishing the intelligence and coun- terintelligence mission. 602. Responsibilities Counterintelligence and security training is the respon- sibility of the commander. This responsibility is not limited to units with assigned counterinielligence or intelligence personnel, but extends also to commanders of smaller units. The intelligence officer is responsible to the commander for the planning and supervision of intelligence and counterintelligence training of his own section and, in coordination with the operations officer, exercises staff supervision over intelligence and counter- intelligence training within the entire command. The staff counterintelligence officer monitors the counterintelli- gence and security training programs of the command and advises and assists the intelligence officer in performing his counterintelligence training responsibilities. Counter- intelligence team. commanders are responsible for the training of team personnel. 603. Purpose and Scope The ultimate objective of counterintelligence training is to ensure effective contribution by all personnel to the 6-1
604 FMFM 2-4 counterintelligence effort and to instill a sense of security discipline. The effectiveness of command counterintelligence and security measures often rests on the individual Marine’s ability to recognize and accurately report threats to the security of the command and his willing acceptance of a high degree of security discipline. Basic counterintelligence and security training requirements are common to all com- mands; however, emphasis on certain subjects will vary according to the mission of the command and duty assignments of personnel with the unit. Generally, train- ing can be divided into the following categories: e Basic counterintelligence and security training for all personnel. ® Training for officers and staff noncommissioned officers. ® Training for intelligence personnel. ¢ Training for counterintelligence teams. 604. Basic Counterintelligence and Security Training a. Counterinteltigence and Security Subjects. All officers and enlisted personnel should receive train- ing in the following counterintelligence and security subjects: © Protection of classified material and other infor- mation which may be of value to an enemy. e Troop movement security measures. e Wartime Information Security Program (WISP). ¢ Defense against hostile espionage, subversion, ter- rorism, and sabotage. © Actions in the event of possible espionage, subver- sion, terrorism, or sabotage. -«. Use of countersigns. * Purpose, scope, and organization of Marine Corps counterintelligence. 8-2 b. Related Subjects. All officers and enlisted per- sonnel should receive training in the following related subjects: e Camoufiage. @ Survival, evasion, resistance to interrogation, escape, and the U.S. Code of Conduct. © Rights and responsibilities under the Geneva Con- vention of 12 August 1949. 605. Training of Officers and Staff Noncommissioned Office7s The following subjects are considered appropriate for ad- ditional counterintelligence training of officers and staff noncommissioned officers: e Functions, capabilities, limitations, and employ- ment of counterintelligence teams. ® Counterintellience operations and security measures. ° Organization, methods of operation, and intelli- gence collection capabilities of hostile intelligence organizations in areas of probable operations. e Identification, control, and reporting of persons and installations of counterintelligence interest. ¢ Implementation, cperatior., and responsibilities of WISP. 606. Training of Intelligence Section Personnel The following additional subjecis are considered appro- priate for the counterinteiligence training of intelligence section personnel: © Intelligence collection capabilities of counterintel- gence teams.
EMEM 2-4 ——__—__________——__ © Counterintelligence sources of information and methods of reporting. e Counterintelligence operations and security measures. 607. Training of Counterintelligence Team Personne! a. Essential Subjects Training. Counterintelli- gence team personnel are subject to essential military subjects training designed to maintain their basic military proficiency. In addition, in order to maintain a high degree of proficiency, expertise, and profession- alism in accomplishing the counterintelligence mission, covnterintelligence teams conduct an active training program which includes the following subjects: (1) General Subjects (a) Appropriate aspects of the mission, task organization, and concept of operations of the command to which attached (b) Hostile intelligence organizations in the area of probable operations, to include organization, methods of operation, schools and training, capabilities, limitations, communications, and personalities. (c) History, geography, and political, social, and ethnic factors in the area of probable operations. (d) Customs, habits, and commonly used ex- pressions of the populace in the area of prob- able operations. {e) Friendly and hostile underground, political, or paramilitary organizations or groups inthe - area of operations. (f) Security and Jaw enforcement agencies in the area of operations and the methods of popula- tion control. 307 (9) Hostife ground, air, and naval organiza- tions, tactics, and techniques. h) Hostile weapons, documents, maps, and overlays. (} Hostile communication systems and equip- ment in the area of probabie operations. () Visual recognition of key persons of coun- terintelligence interest believed to be in the target areas, utilizing photographs, written descriptions, or identifying characteristics based on all obtainable information. {k) U.S. and allied intelligence, counterintelli- gence, and security organizations including their functions, capabilities, and limitations. () International terrorist organizations, per- sonalities, and methods of operation. (2) Intelligence Subjects (a) Order of battle analysis. {b) Photo imagery interpretation. (c) Battlefield surveillance planning and analysis. (d) Preparation of intelligence studies, such as beach and helicopter landing site studies, town plans, and road and trail net studies. (8) Maintenance of enemy situation maps. (f) Intelligence and counterintelligence aspects of tactical cover and decepiion operations. (g) Principles of the intelligence cycle and the integration of counterintelligence. (h) Additional intelligence subjects as contain- ed in FMFM 2-1, Intelligence. (3) Counterinteliigence Planning and Operations (a) Determination of requirements for the collection of the information necessary for 6-3
07 ——______—____—_—_—______—. ——— counterintelligence planning, to include sources of information and the intelligence collection plan. (b) Preparation of counterintelligence estimates, plans, worksheets, target lists, and reduction plans. (c) Evaluation, selection, exploitation, and neutralization of counterintelligence targets. {d) Planning, preparation, coordination, and conduct of special cperations, inciuding coun- terespionage, countersubversion, counterter- rorism, and countersabotage operations. {e) Planning, preparation, coordination, and conduct of screening operations and troop movement security. () Principles and techniques of interrogation with and without the use of an interpreter. (g) Investigation of espionage, sabotage, sub- version, terrorism, and defection to include principles, techniques, handling of evidence, and legal principles. (h) Planning, preparation, and conduct of counterintelligence surveys, evaluations, and inspections. (i) Planning, selection, and control of human intelligence sources. () Investigation and debriefing of U.S. person- nel listed as captured, missing (nonhostile), and missing in action. {k) Planning, implementation, and conduct of WISP operations. (i) Maintenance of counterintelligence files and preparation of reports. (m) Techniques for the handling, treatment, and contro! of enemy personnel captured or de- tained, and the handling of captured documents and equipment. Training includes applicable provisions of the Geneva Conventions. FMFM 2-4 (n) Establishing and maintaining liaiscn to in- clude methods, types of organization/agencies, and benefits derived. (0) Foreign language training to maintain and enhance language capabilities. (4) Technical Training . (a) Defense against methods of entry and technical surveillance devices. Training in defense against technical surveillance devices is generally limited to the threat, types of clandestine listening devices, and protective measures, except for those teams that have a technical surveillance countermeasure (TSCM) capability where training is more extensive. (b) Principles and techniques of photography and defense against clandestine photography. (c) Chemical, mechanical, and electronic in- vestigative aids. (d) Sabotage and terrorist devices and techniques. (e) Operation and maintenance of team com- munication equipment. (f) Operation and first echeion maintenance of team ordnance and motor transport equipment. (g) Marine Air-Ground Intelligence System/Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Con- trol Systems (MAGIS/JINTACCS). (5) General Military Subjects (a) Map reading to include map tracking, overlays, and use of the compass. (0) Weapons training to include small arms, grenade launchers, and machineguns. (c) Mines and boobytraps, including detection, emplacement, neutralization, and fabrication.
FEM 2-6 ———_—___—__$_$_$________________—_——_ 7 (dj Offensive and defensive tactics and retro- grade movements. Training includes amphib- ious and helicopterborne operations, scouting and patrolling, ambushes, and raids. b. Field Training Exercises. Counterintelligence teams participate to the maximum extent possible in field training exercises to maintain and improve proficiency in counterintelligence planning, coordina- tion, operations, and tactical concepts. To obtain max- imum benefit from such training, the following aspects must be considered: (1) Counterintelligence personne! are assigned to the exercise planning staff to conduct counterintel- ligence planning and ensure realistic counterintel- ligence activity during the exercise. (2) Complete counterintelligence planning is con- ducted to include counterintelligence estimates, plans, target lists, and reduction plans. (3) Hostile intelligence activity must be included which will require the widest range of counterin- telligence operations. (4) Acters are used to the maximum extent possi- ble to add realism to counterintelligence operations. Often, personnel with a foreign language capabil- ity and interrogator-translator personnel can be used effectively as actors for specific counterintel- ligence activities. (5) In addition to conducting the widest range of counterintelligence operations, the exercise in- cludes, whenever possible, the attachment and detachment of subteams, movement of the team headquarters, and situations to test the adequacy of tean: control and communications. (reverse blank) 6-5
FMFM 2-4 Appendix A Appendix A Format for Personnel Data Form, Persons Captured, Missing (Nonhostile), or Missing in Action 1. PERSONAL DATA: a. NAME: b. RANK: c. SSN/MOS: d. FORMER SERVICE NUMBER: e. ORGANIZATION: f. DATE OF BIRTH: PLACE OF BIRTH: h. HOME OF RECORD: i. RESIDENCE (if other than home of record): j. MARITAL STATUS (Include number, sex, citizen status, and age of children): k. PEBD: 1. EAS/EOS: m. DATE ARRIVED IN COUNTRY: n. DUTY ASSIGNMENT: 2, PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: a. HEIGHT (Metric as well as U.S. equivalent): tb. WEIGHT (Metric as well as U.S. equivalent): c. BUILD: d. HAIR: e. EYES: f. COMPLEXION: g. RACE: h. RIGHT/LEFT HANDED: A-1
App A——___—————————————w—X—Xv—vw lo er FMFM 2-4 3. DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS: a. SPEECH (include accent and speech patterns used): b. MANNERISMS: Qa . SCARS/IDENTIFYING MARKS (Include type, location, size, color, and detailed description): d. OTHERS: 4, CIRCUMSTANCES OF INCIDENT: a. DATE: b. LOCATION (Coordinates and geographic name): c. CIRCUMSTANCES: d. REPORTED WOUNDS: e. LAST KNOWN LOCATION: . LAST KNOWN DIRECTION OF TRAVEL: . LAST KNOWN PLACE OF DETENTION: —_ g h. STATUS (Prisoner-of-war/missing {nonhostile]/missing in action as reported by unit): 17) . OTHER PERTINENT DATA: a. GENERAL PHYSICAL CONDITION: b. LINGUISTIC CAPABILITIES AND FLUENCY: c. RELIGION: d. CIVILIAN EDUCATION: e. MILITARY SCHOOLS: roa) . CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT WHEN LAST SEEN: g. JEWELRY WHEN LAST SEEN (Include description of glasses, rings, watches, religious medalions, etc.): h. OTHER PERSONNEL LISTED PW/MIA/MIS DURING SAME INCIDENT: 6. PHOTOGRAPH: 7. HANDWRITING SAMPLES (Attach sample of correspondence, notes, etc. If no other sample is available, include reproduction of signature from SRB/OQR.) . ENCLOSURES: (May not be given wide dissemination based on classification or content.) a. CLEARANCE/ACCESS INFORMATION. (Inciude information concerning security clearance, access, knowledge of recurring tactical operations, knowledge of projected or proposed operations, or any other special knowledge possessed.)