Tonrned States Gane Accouncings Ob lice f Pa f t . . . “et j T - see fx Plea ‘s Report to Congressional ReqGuesuers Case Study of the Air Force Space Based Space Surveillance system CONOR NSP ADD RG TSN ET
. rN i7e ye Pi Corben ah ote Neri. bag tts seh ot delay tye tev eer ne Phe er peaba pes co ffir Stega f featharna bt ororbatna ct us sete cepa cies ottsera! bts fepy eg toe bole ofthe Sorc h} “Daan fn Thee tect strategy ¢ phy eta aes Coby peyraat, we teow. pepe PE SQ eras Goze} 3f te oe € ene fre ifn Pac tises on ear *puten Ss ain Veroerdbeaptm: (oaytetiine rp afteb veh oe nat epee tees otep cece deen Fafsans can be een Loopiticn Stretton mya: eONSDAED AR AUS ET Lie fenae Aero ifthe Mork bore
~: Nee rtaey i a ~~ s . fo} Tig +. is Rese w- Soe ak BO ASAE AA TES LA TR SS, At SOE . - . - ~ - Verqyeti gs oe ‘ Pet ofp ob renee Stir ce tte tees Tete feet tr and ods add as ens Cran af tire | rr ee re oe pao Nosals tetrad Sop dibesa thr pe save Ghar oat er hae tyne ter reteset ES So tedioes tatpyetoas esvstuotppg thee tae, Dhtsert Spoce Sucventherce c+ arirre Sas tepgteue, Boatf Steir Sr ohh Po cr ce en Stabe Pope te Pretec toed: PLO eben ret Tob thas ir nt ee} er rT Bc tre f borer) TO Ste Indy te “ham. phere args poor tet Was pee ree Tem tet a ft . ue ue ve Baad . yy ebony De ee ne vt een, aoa t. . wy oti ec 2 2 ca : : oat ttn . ae fet het Ne hat af woos t Pe ty toed htpe Yer fee ‘ bart The ght Pase f CMY NST OLE SUN LT She fe ree Ke tgs ettgeens be
Soran pyres Tres Satte us baat Vee citings bbs Nie baree Spice Tet Peneyty Cenferimve tHtafed teacrnit of WAGs rede sent fa Sows These inetuded HOD WW Seek hotles Chest Sn UE ds sas avo deeatoed hethp rear ce far Ger ee Te The ts j ° ReC HM SORE PUES) OnE Oa e fares port gece gros — ttt Uae S Meas peath ae . wore Corse DSO ettb ary pocee Mobo late er pweat che gh sey etarbset arte oc omarnettces Dre peste PEPE WS Te Sta he fest strtitied re! ere bcss Shee sary SE aay tare tre GDS ON PSP breathy te WEEN ON Ob ST Paty . om geeye fan ereree 2 Pet Mea TO COE are mite. toe Tes Tr Et r PONE GQ Pee eye rr edt het et Saeed Sse bre ht NS . ot fee : : wot, moat oT fees . tetouet pobpyee  te tev ghost, feat res, . arated bee etal Page $ CROP SORE EN ET Soe Lener Aeguistret Wes be pee
Spree tins d Spas er Umea ee Sesteny BeOS SECC eT POGISG De That the requtrerceerts Were stated am a Ghar? thot STOTT bowtie Posted Chars dhation fOsy tec soe iieaiieris cup teccnede: stunned fais: ret tation g ceguceu Qetparte py Phe arin ste cat qipiyitien Trot A ee tes etoped tes the pre rama btice Wars tienes pibicserd bbe Pres pr gee ws cameene cletipe ant. fhe Secured ALS ON CLOTDOT Of a pra bees sfeti and Che Chard ws few doninen® of Second gemernits Poon POOSO hee ststea Cote petition wis planned ony ait tdnise Meco pee the proton mari pod tiet bediewe finds Weed beet cabaiee Doers cer upet tren rate piase FE Phe brestretu s equa atin ony Spratley Bas peoosetted ond approved ima Shere d PASS Ubisimess Stratis Pied cred fa Chae Air Force Ss stergs Corutamea ange tbe Phe p ita ie stratese coited for waarieetoeo fir £ one Deter tte gep pene dh tte _— Wien fhe feet tele ts pises far pense Gh boner plone Lou wee ra ween beg Ge taremeot the pt ose) oontrarters ona fixed (rte red Ses th ined tee byes for be prntutyyws syste fe prestratatfiee | i - ’ ! . ete oy ~ rey Deca tf for peraposais tor pa oise dia Soaverrberal piesa and etoecr trata cpeubendar vei peed Peege st Dor Prat ees ch Wats ecb tecth paste aga Vitred: Gob Poetustp sy con ocnts on the abst! Vee ber sre ay a Ne Cd ct GE steete pa feted oh oN ree leng far fe ssy, Ma there ce beret ad Chao petaty bas Peery tessa Sear diese threoth breed pias oN et retesp et gat whe SIN tee, peed Dot: poetry ro aa pre bos batt ithe. : trodes stect ot eS yee Che ve tate cp pet rr ety Sy ba go Poy if ts ett tag Phat spa hn br ofin Meter bereeab eh phe rear re ‘ sac ‘ ' 7! rho! tee fo pee teres ately ros Pe re oe eech eet be tf reiech bey tfa . . i . te . . : . . rs . aa] i t " Vawe & eNO NSEQ Ta te SUN ET Be Pee Neurite: Ark bree
want ve dtdepaed be tre prouwrar diaiter ag deontraetinsiedi oop [tae me Peqiies? Lar preg Wats Pear Weel Got caresgstenc ys Withhooe oe ptiss H Plan ON beth the pega cup eager are thie comtrantigcerth ae ce Selection Started Die Saree Seloetion pla vas cainraeted Se pterie pti PON ond at Serire gt sedoe Dati bear | OS ystat dae) DP bre sas corbre re Se yee Henry a yuan Swan edevelane ad wart: Mo anavter and theeerresrd eon funterttiecer Phe Seon rar tinatoffieer caper ted i \uatist hotated bre rey Cie sacirerm sehectrop bien gud comtacced) rt woh VIOUS MOTITOR se dec lian plates fised af space Pisisien sid cb terinined: rt weouitel Gecoroplish The selection mc copelaeoe asathp re aushatiags anbeantrachioierioenr pantio deterieneceadg bebe epprogr ate for the copiept oe taration Phew che tormiped thot firne tine dd: ta soon dod ba pps an prepr Departure Prem the velpba thse biueeeneqth otuaty op neta h Note date sade terrent ap Dos Qe teert oat Beat Noemie PSS toe Pie piesa erb ag bergs Pray Were: temaeitedg ¢ otf BEND MAGN Peter fomecergyr PPT bad SUD wath les Poe etre psp ter ta ctites thy fee eM tite sys pat pe erist t : The Werttid tee thle ta bebe cr Shek hendh erect tea herent ob pose, herepeste the Station bt ep rt be tye ogy Voyrretnom tras Woes ben geet chergiee gy poteette? Hh bey Serer a Par thee PEE EN Ge Py Hote beer dg athe pope ate Marl Oe ure h pereie ts faye 4 CREE NSA 86 BSS ET Poe feta Aciuiteitiin Wark bocce
RE no SB aS PT ES Riaidinet bevwers Stow hase eh tytn Mie waillanee Sy sce ness tonteditdeseis. os retie ted in tha fiseth your Poo SU oregram Ob ONO TOCTROP EE Were Gite qHiire Ta ripaersent tbe orntinial SCCRISTDAGT ST pAIV  P ire she SSO mn COME pt W Heb Was cape] Wats besedoon the taedints et the LYsa Air moree Spaee Surverianee Vretitec: Phare Stites cane Subseqrecn® Grabs Ses Corre Ged DY Sp ee Cena) tad Space baagecon Phe fading ceattestedd ca ffi tO bi Gover his € Teri: Pb ep dh eed Py can ' t traetiiad Study conte tod freni Geer’ tan f, Temedatbar at Cie at Geer bose dl woin diac cd vt The DOSi Ate Poree Source Surveriianee Architecture Sores sid its follow ovvetionts were conducted to tdentiby aed closes a oie opera Honal space Surveriiance sve tentin the near foro the PAT ba ESsSd con. Prieta steely. desever, Was pectormed orice diy fo demonstrate Che eopobhat. eb oe gen wave indciied technala wy par fhe space Infrered Setser (restora fo de Ceiope a siss baseline system concent ta bier! Poems yao certocinan. eateechives Plesormninabcon en: cated fara SO TETROAS EDD Sith LEG anttiN Loss Cnediiriiiiy, SHS EM ats und @ pera Crna Oper DUGG eM StOnedg In the bos Comeepet an Dds POS, ‘ Ap Cur Poree Quit Adee vo report. dated November 25. PS. reviewed theeoriaured Sequisition strategy aod fedned if posed feel patiute ab Pheks anda bahis cenctirrent. soocess-criented senoiie that soi fesabein scheduie sitps and coxstanereases Phe Air Porce sedis top ert aise reported that suffierent fopds macht not becavaitat fe fo posture uss pro- nt SGibn Ett airdb perentress because thie hindi: co requestodt pp Give AGr Force fiscal sears PSS ach presen ebrec tive (ier iordes oh Meus nat cans sistent shack Ghe Pay GON eas Se Cann O pt tid Cont ban £6 SETAE Poundiacg feveds were based en ass stem caneent thot edied? tor sothil Canbiv cess dicdipebairs. stv awelan is gd en eriier. bet roaais Chan COV stoned in Phe sce coneent as er bets Pods Phe Are Parca Auidht Astones reported tint the osddtjagiiven cohen scare dotier )reanested in thee Vir Force PY POSS OS UO pred Of ecr pee Tle Heraig ic fw TaN beeps dabdas sd bilhenetben var douars; sherteb tino oat required fasrippart Loe stas procrar Soboamteatenipbinds an tuttaatial polite shitted fhe directcon ol the sess prog Op Moreh 23. Pp oso) Prosident Teacup atesered a speccde ii wtih he cared Dora ehat ceri reser i auch aqeedopnoul Bre trany ta beatin foacine veconr on on ie tend Of 6 Pie Chre Chik) ab pac ent fy Sipateric pic iecar TmiSsmes Sate ca henhin, beirestabeisd co tpe deren sive Pectinelovies Study beamband fae Patiire Strategie Strategy Sods desde fe posess the techimead and padios tssues of a paditstie missile Gebers Paye f GAG NSTAERSKG 458 17 flefenas Accumition thork Force
‘ cee SCT) sveter? Ep inieres POSE te Ste ue Pletense Litsrive desearedp Pro Arann Wotsoestiblo steed hes osc hbiise Prequest for prota Wes sctiedited tebe: retedused) ins . * . . i sf . - seers tap Arr Pores ounowementoarpn Sau Wascitarerd: Pasever, ped tre Gerad the Vest shat Seere MDa one yet tore: Carsoai thee Qe Pere bas cise. Hm Gobations ape coneerk Cat Che PPOMen Was men bras 7 th the Strategie Pletorse Tmitiative Vite tterne *S weere mice Hei Stes Wath the Spratestic Petense frathitive. the d opitty | eben S\ steris consrcered these HUDCIN EDS a Tres parise fe oo Str hete Detense Paredes sure VGH eG CQUESITIOIL ERGO UIC ba age sces nent prectram ehomient pins and te feiaty ahuectives Om Abin 2s) Pood the Denuty for Stratytie Syston denied approsaa fer release of the recgaest for propasal ES ITS EE - ee Tm ese eee ae Evaluation of Role and Act " “ELON SUrAtagey poster had Teed rein developing the corral theres Roles aoc espensarrbilittes phased qequuistiegs strate Js whie the fies conicacttietotticer ae ted as anourdorentnadb adsiser, Che crestsam thagecger baler chained tine strate fou twee pliised stratesty aa sod costed on fhe second conticns Uiatl Otocer, Te GO ESOT SEA LOEDS Was eb mn Varin Ces TOW leyeta cd the Vir bese e Mops Ptbre Assert Se cres taryoot tre \ar Pree wep ety wipscefercedt hy tan ue tet ary dha athe re myps Pesren Competilian OOD Pi techie GaCi Pa re aigmate soe eh he tee Work tif ' prrede MOS TO COPD te prs tate Tee Prt ab Os DON PON cs Stinfe tn ftadesc ite - Neccopment ore pretecnois therein feb seat de vet epupert dhowever he Ur Boron Due SoC eeP cagppetotran bor tie eS Oras CHPOtn. Combeent Ceti 3 Clrhacinteatof cocuper orm at fies tee faa bave bee ip orernitire coven thi tee tisslontie pC hap ceteam pechneatestos tor the erties ated Gab processcrt bad pet Gas b; VPage 7 GAO SAE Ppa S56 17 Defense Aequstton Wark bore
The Production Copspetition H SE PAE SEI UE A SLE By € extermial daddies: RIOT EL LE: Si, RRB MOP GNC MOLES Presenp Stats heen fuoy provenur cemonstacted The Deputy Assttant Secretary of “ Mar the Agr boree cspace thins and Pohey bexpressed concern tian che Poree gmcht be trvips to des elop the needed technoliagy an che same ine Us i Was proceeding with contractor selection far svaterd development Heexpressed Che view that the Agr Barce showld not cormmat to fublescale Cevelopmentoroverspend on concept cecmition diol Che requnred tech ralawy Was avaidoble and stated Chat aitl Che techimoiody wats net satis fiie- tomy deveioped aud demonstrated. produenon, components cond Siibsvstergs qth rec ire miedifie acon, schedule mnereases, or cost ONE PIUS Que tothe finuted number af stss satelites to be accuired, competion Wits Rot planned for fhe production phase af Che prover. veyed ree) The program macager’s perception of Che operatiog environment inated There tatecompenition Whicb ssa coe fided an Che Orica cecgiist Howsesscastthe anonintof fands that world kes be Hag strates: | dha bee toon pment Tie strate, be cone duded thin funds would net HReiv be variable the first pbyise of the program COMO TPN CediipacCiecni parse diese proctor Was deferred becuse of bo abaeGory and of har COnCELNS Prue GACr NSSTATING HIS ET Defense Acamistien Work bere
tscal Year [G70 Spice tabrared Senso Prosteam initiated ‘ohrurney LOSE Program Sutnieter apposite! lav PS2 Space Paired Senser Dioectrata feriared Direction to proaccee Vath develouinent af ao prototype ros satel ire wstied Avrebateetore Study conus tod aneary-October P52 - Space Surat rive Posy spas Tastification tor Migor System New Sturt approved Faria Pstas Space CHV ISTO Bastiess Sora tegie Pane b recieves ae qQuUisitiat: SPpahouy, Draft recaiest for pronesat issned Air Force Systems Conenand Business Stratis Panel gneoray os ae ie b TOD Strategy, Presiden’ caucus s stratedio dete bt anbrahiges Spr iis. ACatb hon strates fordunrgdized * stlempropoeabse, edured per anges cf hie PUSS iver MuruSt POs Sey ee ED Ie Pine Deore nes eee ene for per taf mt breadtyterd far celeste Secor pcomtiaehirst of ptocr appamted eatiesn hark Force i Beye GAO) SSTADD Ss SO 17 De Fetise Wer:
August-November (83 Changes made fo cequisitian strategy September 198: Source seicetion plan compueted. October LoS83 Source Selection Board schedoled to be established, November 1983 Air Force audit report issied. t January ist Soratege Defense Tiitietise Program established. March Lis! Decision miide to defer ee isitlan Of sis bg Page $0 GAGE NST ADO AADS TT fieferne Acaiisitigd Work Force
(Page 1) The Chairmen of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and its Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management asked GAO to examine the capabilities of the program manager and contracting officer in weapon systems acquisition. As part of this study, GAO examined 17 new major weapon system programs in their initial stages of develop- ment. These case studies document the history of the programs and are being made available for informational purposes. This study of the Space Based Space Surveillance Program focuses on the role of the program manager and contracting officer in developing the acquisition strategy. Conclusions and recommendations can be found in our overall report, DOD Acquisition: Strengthening Capabilities of Key Personnel in Systems Acquisition (GAO/NSIAD-86-45, May 12, 1986). {signed "Bill W. Thurman for"] Frank C. Conahan, Director National Security and International Affairs Division Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-86-458 17 Defense Acquisition Work Force
(Page 2) The purpose of space surveillance is to detect, track, identify, and assess space objects of all kinds, especially satellites and antisatellite interceptors. Through space surveillance the United States can: ® determine the place of objects put into orbit by other nations, r) identify their orbits, and ® determine the space object’s mission. With this information, actions can be taken to protect U.S. satellites from attack or initiate attacks against enemy satellites should the need arise. The purpose of the Space Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) Pro- ram, deferred in March 1984, was to develop a survivable system capable of providing surveillance of space activities and timely informa- tion on those activities to the appropriate agencies. The SBSS Program had its origin in conceptual studies begun in the early 1970’s. At that time, it was recognized that objects in space (resident space object population), both foreign and domestic, would increase dra- matically in the next two decades. In fiscal year 1976, the Space Infrared Sensor Program and the early phases of the SBSS Program were initiated. The Space Infrared Sensor Program was to provide a proof of concept demonstration for a long wave infrared sensor system. The SBSS was to address the definition, design, and acquisition of a system employing more advanced tech- nology than the Space Infrared Sensor Program. During its conceptual phase, SBSS had been referred to as Deep Space Surveillance Satellite or Low Altitude Surveillance Satellite. According to a program management directive issued in May 1982, the Space Infrared Sensor Program was to be terminated and the Air Force Systems Command, “shall proceed with preliminary design and develop- ment of a prototype SBSS satellite based on LWIR [long wave infrared] technology." In July 1982, a Justification for Major System New Start for space surveillance was approved by the Defense Resources Board as a fiscal year 1984 new start. During the 1976-82 time period, a number of parallel efforts were ongoing in support of SBSS, including: (1) the Background Measurements Program, (2) technology programs under the Air Force Space Tech- nology Center (previously the Air Force Space Division Deputy for Tech- nology), and (3) the Space Surveillance Architecture Study. The Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-86-458-17 Defense Acquisition Work Force
(Page 3) Background Measurements Program provided data on various back- grounds that targets must be viewed against. The Air Force Space Tech-~ nology Center investigated four critical technology areas relevant to SBSS. These included: long life cryogenic coolers, long wave infrared focal plane arrays, data processing, and long wave infrared optics design/analysis. The Architecture Study identified both near and far term requirements for space surveillance in seven mission catagories. The program manager for SBSS was appointed in February 1980 as head of the Directorate of Surveillance and Command Systems. This office was part of the Space Defense program office, which incorporated sev- eral separate program offices. The program manager was responsible for ground and space-based space surveillance systems. Before the formal start of the program, a contracting officer was also designated. The program manager had approxamately 16 years experience in acqui- sition management. He worked approximately 7 years as a test engineer, 7 years as a program manager, and 2 years as a management consultant. The Air Force sponsored the 1982 Space Surveillance Architecture Study from January through October 1982. Individuals from throughout The Department of Defense (DOD) and key contractors participated in working groups to identify current surveillance sensor systems, define all possible surveillance requirements, identify all practical surveillance sensor alternatives, and analyze the results to determine the best set of new sensors to meet the requirements. The SBSS program manager par- ticipated in the Svace Surveillance Architecture Study of requirements, both near and far term. The SBSS was identified, in the Space Surveillance Architecture Study, as the most effective approach to satisfy the majority of the requirements. In May 1982, an Air Force space surveillance Mission Element Need Statement was incorporated into a Justification of Major System New Start and presented to the Defense Resources Board. The SBSS system was identified as an Air Force major system fiscal year 1984 new start in a program decision memorandum signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The program manager indicated that he reviewed the mission Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-86-458-17 Defense Acquisition Work Force
(Page 4) needs statement to insure that the requirements were stated in a manner that allowed translation to system specifications and to understand mis- sion needs. According to the program manager, the original SBSS acquisition strategy, as developed by the program office, was three-phased. The first phase was concept definition, the second phase was development of a pro- totype system, and the third was development of a second generation highly survivable system. Competition was planned only in phase I because the program manager did not believe funds would be available to carry competition into phase II. The program’s acquisition strategy was presented and approved in a March 1983 Business Strategy Panel meeting chaired by the Air Force Systems Command Competition Advocate. The acquisition strategy called for awarding two firm fixed-price, level of effort contracts in phase I to define the approach to the program and identify the technology risks for phase II~. Under phase II, a single award would be made to one of the phase I contractors on a fixed-price incentive basis for the prototype system. The program office planned to release the request for proposals for phase I in November of 1983 and award contracts in calendar year 1984. A draft request for proposal was released to industry in March 1983. Industry comments on the draft were submitted in May 1983. Phase I, the concept exploration phase, was expected to extend from fiscal years 1984 through 1986, followed immediately by a Defense Sys- tems Acquisition Review Council Milestone II review expected to result in the development of the prototype from fiscal year 1987 through 1990. The SBSS statement of work was developed primarily by the program manager with input from his staff and the contracting officer. The SBSS specifications were developed primarily by the program manager and his engineering personnel; the specifications were based on the require- ments provided by the using command. Business terms and conditions were suggested by the contracting officer, with inputs from the staff. The business terms and conditions were reviewed and critiqued by the Space Division Solicitation Review Panel. Evaluation criteria were Tr we doe ge ee nn ee Three contracts for phase I definition were originally considered to provide a wider range of options. However, due to funding constraints in fiscal years 1984 and 1985, this approach was abandoned. Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-86-458-17 Defense Acy-isition Work Force
(Page 5) jointly developed by the program manager and contracting officer. The SBSS request for proposal was reviewed for consistency with the acquisi- tion plan by both the program manager and the contracting officer. The source selection plan was completed September 20, 1983, and a source selection board was established. The SBSS source selection plan was developed jointly by the program manager and the original con- tracting officer. The second contracting officer, appointed in August 1983, stated he reviewed the source selection plan and compared it with previous source selection plans used at Space Division and determined it would accomplish the selection in accordance with regulations. The SBSS program manager and contracting officer jointly determined the contract type that would be appropriate for the concept definition phase of the system’s development. They determined that firm fixed- price level of effort contracts would be most appropriate. The SBSS program office developed a three phase acquisition apprceach (concept definition, prototype system development, and development of a survivable system). In the August-November 1983 time frame, the program office altered this strategy to a two phased approach. Because of a budget cut and as more detailed cost estimates for the pro- gram were generated, the program manager concluded that a more cost effective approach was necessary. A two-phased approach was pro- posed by the second contracting officer. This approach envisioned the elimination of phase II (prototype system development) and proceeding directly to phase III (development of a second-generation survivable system). The decision to go directly to a survivable system, thus saving the cost of developing a nonsurvivable prototype system in phase II, was based on an assessment of technclogical risks. The program manager believed the contractors would not have to validate any new technology and that they would be able to build a satellite without great technological risk; therefore the validation phase would not be necessary. Validation that was to be done in phase II had, according to the program manager, already been done in other research and development projects. Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-86-458-17 Defense Acquisition Work Force
(Page 6) SBSS funding levels, as reflected in the fiscal year 1985-89 program objective memorandum, were inadequate to implement the original acquisition strategy. The SBSS system concept which was adopted was based on the findings of the 1982 Air Force Space Surveillance Architec- ture Study and subsequent analyses conducted by Space Command and Space Division. The funding requested in the program objective memo- randum, on the other hand, was based on a concept developed by a con- tractual study conducted from 1979 to 1981. The 1982 Air Force Space Surveillance Architecture Study and its follow-on efforts were conducted to identify and develop a fully opera- tional space surveillance system in the near term. The 1979 to 1981 con- tractual study, however, was performed primarily to demonstrate the capability of the long wave infrared technology for the Space Infrared Sensor Program, and to develop a SBSS baseline system concept to meet. the mission performance objectives. This original concept called for a system with significantly less endurability, survivability, and opera- tional capability than envisioned in the SBSS concept as of July 1983. An Air Force Audit Agency report, dated November 25, 1983, reviewed the original acquisition strategy and found it posed technological risks and a highly concurrent, success-oriented schedule that could result in schedule slips and cost increases. The Air Force audit report also reported that sufficient funds might not be available to insure SBSS pro- gram stability and progress because the funding requested in the Air Force fiscal years 1985-89 program cbjective memorandum was not con- sistent with the July 1983 SBSS system concept and contracting strategy. Funding levels were based on a system concept that called for signifi- cantly less in durability, survivability. and operational capability than envisioned in the SBSS concept as of July 1983. The Air Force Audit Agency reported that the $800 million (then-year dollars) requested in the Air FOrce FY 1985-89 program objective memorandum may have been as much as $1 billion (then-year dollars) short of funding required to support the SBSS progran. A change of emphasis in national policy shifted the direction of the SBSS program. On March 23, 1983, President Reagan delivered a speech in which he called for a “long-term research and development program to begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles." Subsequently, DOD established the the Defensive Technologies Study Team and the Future Strategic Strategy Study Team to assess the technical and policy issues of a ballistic missile defense Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-86~-458-17 Defense Acquisition Work Force
(Page 7) system. In January 1984, the Stretegic Defense Initiative Research Pro- gram was established. The SBSS phase I request for proposal was scheduled to be released as soon as top Air Force management approval was obtained. However, management approval was held up at the Office of the Assistant Secre- tary of the Air Force because of funding limitations and concern that the program was not fully integrated with the Strategic Defense Initiative. Although attempts were made to reconcile SBSS with the Strategic Defense Initiative, the Deputy for Stategic Systems considered these attempts a marginal response to the Strategic Defense Initiative’s sur- veillance, acquisition, track and kill assessment program element plans and technology objectives. On March 28, 1984, the Deputy for Strategic Systems denied approval for release of the request for proposal. The program manager had a lead role in developing the original three- phased acquisition strategy while the first contracting officer acted as an influential advisor. The program manager later changed the strategy to a two-phased strategy as suggested by the second contracting officer. The acquisition strategy was approved through the various review levels of the Air Force until it reached the Office of the Assistant Secre- tary of the Air Force where the program was deferred due to budgetary and other reasons. DOD Directive 5000.1 encourages competitive design work up te full-scale development or beyond if cost effective. Air Force Systems Command policy is to compete programs up to critical design review (an advanced stage in full-scale development) and preferably through full-scale devel- opment. However, the Air Force planned to carry competition for the SBSS only through concept definition. Curtailment of competition at this point may have been premature given the technological risks involved in the program. Technologies for the SBSS (cyrogenic coder, focal plan, optics and signal processor) had not Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-86-458-17 Defense Acquisition Work Force
(Page 8) been fully proven or demonstrated. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Space Plans and Policy) expressed concern that the Air Force might be trying to develop the needed technology at the same time as it was proceeding with contractor selection for system development. He expressed the view that the Air Force should not commit to full-scale development or overspend on concept definition until the required tech- nology was available and stated that if the technology was not satisfac- torily developed and demonstrated, production, components, and subsystems might require modification, schedule increases, or cost overruns. Due to the limitied number of SBSS satellites to be acquired, competition was not planned for the production phase of the program. The program manager’s perception of the operating environment limited the amount of competition which was included in the original acquisi- tion strategy. In assessing the amount of funds that would likely be available to implement the strategy, he concluded that funds would not likely be available to carry competition past the first phase of the program. The SBSS program was deferred because of budgetary and other concerns in March of i984. Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-458-17 Defense Acquisition Work Force
(Page 9) Fiscal Year 1976 February 1980 May 1982 January-October 1982 July 1982 January 1983 March 1983 April 1983 June 1983 August 1983 Space Infrared Sensor Program Initiated. Program manager appointed. Space Infrared Sensor Program terminated. Direction to proceed with development of a prototype SBSS satellite issued. Space Surveillance Architecture Study conducted. SBSS Justification for Major System New Start approved. Space Division Business Strategy Panel reviews acquisition strategy. Draft request for proposal issued. Air Force Systems Command Business Strategy Panel approves acquisition stratecy. President announces strategic defense initiative. Acquisition strategy formalized. Request for proposal scheduled for approval. Solicitiation Review Panel convenes. Request for proposal scheduled for release. Second contracting officer appointed. GAO/NSIAD-86-458~-17 Defense Acquisition Work Force
(Page 10) August-November 1983 September 1983 October 1983 November 1983 January 1984 March 1984 Page 10 Changes made to acquisition strategy. Source selection plan completed. Source Selection Board scheduled to be established. Air Force audit report issued. Strategic Defense Initiative Program established. Decision made to defer acquisition of SBSS. GAO/SIAD-86-458-17 Defense Acquisition Work Force