. eo 4 sala -aptt € Portiasts beclacstt -/ ry B November 1, 1985 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE/COUNTERMEASURE IMPLEMENTATION TASK FORCE (U) Intelligence collection by foreign intelligence officers and agents operating in the United States presents the greatest counterintelligence (CI) threat confronting the United States. Under cover of diplomatic establishments, foreign-owned commer- cial entities and exchange student programs, the Soviet, Soviet’ Bloc, Peoples Republic of China and other criteria countries have emplaced large numbers of professional intelligence officers and other intelligence collectors (economic, scientific and technical, and military) in the United States. The numbers of foreign intelligence officers far surpass the counterintelli- gence assets the US Government has been able to deploy against them, and the number has been increasing over the years. This issue has been studied extensively by the Interagency Group on Counterintelligence (IG/CI) and a series of recommendations were forwarded to and endorsed by the Senior Interagency Group for Intelligence (SIG/I). These recommendations were reviewed and endorsed by the National Security Planning Group (NSPG) on August 7, 1985. I have decided it is in the national interest to implement each of these proposals. (U) The NSPG also recommended that the US Government adopt, in principle, the use of aperiodic, non-life style, CI-type polygraph examinations for all individuals with access to US Government Sensitive Compartment Information (SCI), Communications Security Information (COMSEC) and other special access program classified information. I have decided this policy should be established. (U) In order to facilitate the implementation of these decisions, I am directing the establishment of a task force to develop the time table, procedures and method to implement this Decision Directive. This implementation task force will be chaired by a representative of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The task force will be composed of a repre- sentative of each NSPG principal: Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Director of Central Intelligence, and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, the task force will include a representative of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and a representative from Department of State/Office of Foreign Missions (OFM). (U) “EaSO2 Leste, ety pera minds COMED Released ' 5A AN |} Partial Text of der pro isic - 7 £0. 1238 NSDD 196 Ragen, mations: 3 curly Couttsit a alegre
Tha itlliwind agencies will crovilte 3n cose = w~ ~ -:- task force since the timinid an Le atL > 2 met wolerencti tion ~iv nave an impact cn one or more of them Lolomatic Securi > Service (Department of State), Diltice of Foreicn Missions (Department of State), Oepartment of the Treasury, Department of Commerce, US Army Intelligence and Security Command, Naval Intelligence Command, US Air Force Office of Special Investigations, National Security Agency, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. (U) The Intelligence Community Staff Secretariat will provide necessary administrative support. (U) The purpose of this task force will be to make recommendations on the method, timing and procedures to implement the SIG(TI) options; establish implementation policy for the national polygraph program and implement other counterintelligence and countermeasures improvements which have appropriate national policy level implications. Final implementation decisions will be made by fhe President. (U) preva f ” meets -4 S a
THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Press Secretar: NEWS CONFERENCE BY THE PRESIDENT January 7, 1986 The East Room 8:00 P.M. EST Extract from Pages 6-7 Regarding Lie Detector Tests Sam? Q Mr. President, you signed a directive which would require a great number cf government employees to take lie detector tests for security purposes. But when Secretary Shultz publicly complained, you changed your mind and cut back on that directive. And one of your aides said to reporters that you really hadn‘t understood what was in it when you signed it. My question is, did you understand it when you signed it originally, and if so, why did you change your mind? THE PRESIDENT: If there was an aide that said anything of that kind, he wasn't an aide. (Laughter.) Q He won't be tomorrow. THE PRESIDENT: No. No, when Secretary Shultz came back, he had been accosted by the press in Europe and they were leading to believe that I had okayed virtually carte blanche the two and a half Million federal employees subject to lie detector tests and they would be tested based on their personalities or their own personal lives and so forth. None of this was true. And the document I signed was not changed nor did I change my mind. I was able when the Secretary and I had a chance to talk when he came back to point out that what I had signed was a directive that was creating an investigative policy that we were -- I did not create it -- in chat I asked for and was proposing that we come together on a policy for heading off espionage. And therefore, out of the thousands and thousands of employees, there is a very limited number that actually deal with classified material or could possibly be involved in this. And I recommended, among other things, that this be included as an investigatory tool in such investigations and it would be limited to what we were trying to find out -- espionage and whether to head it off or not. So, whoever was telling that -- and I've seen it and heard it and so forth. And I've sat there fidgeting in my chair because it wasn't true. That's what I signed and that's what ig still signed. Q Sir, Secretary Shultz made the point that he doesn't believe lie detector tests are accurate -- that often they catch people who are not guilty, and even let people who are guilty go. I take it you think they are accurate. THE PRESIDENT: I think that it's a useful tool. I know that he does not have too nigh an opinion of them and I think that he was thinking also if you're going to have one of those in which you get into people‘s personai lives and so forth -- out also, there are others who have a greater confidence in them in such an investigation where you are directly going after a subject. One of the things that they've done and the record of polygraph tests throughout our land has proven, that they have been responsible for more confessions than anything actually proven there -- that the very nature of the test has led to a multitude of confessions of various crimes and so forth.