18 November 1970 Oe. SUBJECT: Report on CIA Chilean Task Force Activities, , 15 ? September to 3 November 1970 edge soe oh e- ws . Cay ae ee ee le Te hee! . NE nn SA GT RIOT BS a Se tae oat 1. Gencral -« @ a. Gn 15 September 1970, CIA was directed to try to prevent Marxist Salvador Allende's assent to the Chilean presidency on 3 November. This effort was to be independent of concurrent ende2zvo rs a being undertaken throush, or with the knowledge of, the 40 Committee, Department of State, and Ambassador Korry. b. Briefly, the situation at that time was the following: -- Allende had attained a plurality of only some 40,000 . e in the Chilean popular vote for president. Jorge Alessandri, a conservative and the runner-up, would face Allende in a Congressional run-off on 24 October, The run-off winner would be invested as president on ° 3 November. \ nn
Cc, . . . 2. Special Organization Allende's designation as president by Congress was very probable given all known factors in the Chilcan ‘political equation. Given the dismal prospects of @ political formula ood et ey OP Re Pig ce. a er tee being worked out to prevent Allende! s designation as. president by Congress, remaining alternatives _ centered around overcoming the apolitical, constitu- tional-oriented inertia of the Chilean-military. U.S. Government intentions were highly suspect, particularly in Allende and certain govermment sectors. Suspicions extended to all Americans in Chile for whatever declared purpose. In addition, the Chilcan military were being monitored quite closcly by the Allende forces for warning signals q of any interventionist proclivitics. >* a. A Chilean Task Force was assembled and functioning three days after CLA was assigned the mission. It was headed », ae and highly-qualified crug ee
- Beeposts specifically for this purpose. A special communi- cations channel was set up simultaneously to Santiago, Chile, and Buenos Aires, Argentina, to handle sensitive cable traffic for the Task Force. . ; , . SPT Soho AS teem roa it consisted of four CLA officers with the * appearance, Janguage, ‘and. experience to sustain the fiction ofv various foreign nationalities. They were recalled from their overseas posts to Washington, briefed, and inserted individually into Chile eel ee nationals. In Santiago, their only U.S. contact was a CIA officer who ; 7 established contact with Chilean intermediaries or principals interested in promoting a military coup. - ?c¢. By a special (and uniquc) arrangement requested by CLA, the U.S. Army Attache in Santiago was placed under operational direction of the CIA Chief of Station there. His assistance ard & Chilean military contacts were invaluable in this program. 43423759
3. The Dual ‘Approach: Constitutional and Cound a. Prospects for inducing Congress to vote for Alcessandri rather than Allende were never bright and, they all focused on inspiring a reluctant, indecisive President Frei to assume an out- of-character role: - dynamic leadership within his own party, with the "persuadables" in Congress, and with the military. Freiwas under no illusions about Chile's fate under an Allende regime. "Chile has avery short future, "he said, "and after 4 Novernber it will only have a past." b. Initially, Frei was willing to consider and even advocate a constitutional solution: the so-called Frei re-election gambit. The question was whether he would be willing to commit his prestige completely in following through on sucha difficult political maneuver with the outcome, at best, unassured. The basic gambit consisted of marshalling enough Congressional votes to clect Alessandri over Allende with the understanding Alessandri would resign immediately after inauguration and pave the-way for a special clection in which ros Frei could legally becom? acandidatc. Asa preliminary step, Frei ‘ ; coordinated Alcssandri's post-election statement that if he were
: - 5 - - . selected for the presidency by Congress, he (Alessandri) would — ° : resign. - The thrust of CIA's endeavors, then, was to use every : plausible pressure ¢ comb: aed w ith inducements to move Frei down eae anne Aga mt rahe: Qenfeliy fy Me IRR capa ESTER AS era a eclinee TREN Yl. wee oy . this path. To this end, virtually overnight | CIA mobilized an inter- locking political action and propagand4 campaign designed both to goad and entice Frei inte following through on the re-election gambit. -c. Atthe same time, recognizing the fallibilitics of Frei, CLA focused on prcvoking a military coup. This undertaking was scgre- gated from that oi the Frei re-election gambit with the intention that it be pursued independently of Frei if necessary, but with his acqui- escence if possible. 4. Propaganda Campaign ae a. The propaganda campaiiga was tailored to gencrating concern afout Chile's future in terms which would condition the thinking and actic. s of the three key elements in the Chilean political equation:
Frei himsclf£, the Chilean political elite, and the Chilcan military (the latter two of which could well bring collateral influence to bear OTE OIC hee aeerS fe cre . on Frei). Each of these clements had hastened to rationalize its _acceptance of an Allende presidency.. Their pailiative was the built- in checks and balance of Chile's demonstrated reverence for democ- racy and constitutionality, sweetened by Allende's promise to honor these traditions. e “b. After the 4 September popular vote, the world press had tended te treat the prospect of witnessing the first freely-elcected Marxist head of state take office as a curious abcrration of dcmoc- racy rather than a politically significant event. Press interest and coverage was relatively light until the Allende forces fortuitously provided an attractive issue which could be exploited. By 15 September, it became apparent that Allende was conducting a rather blatant campaign to intimidate the Chilcan information media through threats of assassination and violence, takeovers by so-called worker organizations, and ultimatums to the management of news - papers and radio stations, Allende's purposc was to smother any opposition ta his clection by Congress and to take advantage of that , a) A 7
Bee peter a2 Latin, and, pronounced Chilean, propensity t to > Jump on an “Sate Ree Lo OS yee’ tet | e : - : | ‘accelerating’ banewagon - -- ideals and the country's welfare to the MEERA major target of Alliendeiwas-"El- Mercurio", «the most. we ce ha nee Reem ate a * erates “prestigious newspaper in Chile and the major opposition voice to en eee eee an Erne Nee wate Sb ne Pee ee eee ete men ec eee te Allende up to that time. CIA mounted a propaganda campaign ema aaitebengiipe Sat sgin watery + Se eg ere ete ree oe REPS teh, eerie beer ee ge ecntered around VEl Mercurio" and the i issue of Allende brazenly taking b his first step it in "communizing” Chile by attacking freedom of the press and, worse, with the election still unsettled. Covert - action resources were used to launch: -- Cables of support/protest from leading newspapers throughout Latin America to "El Mercurio". -- A protest statement from the International Press ae "Freedom of the press in Chile is being strangicd by Communist and Marxist forces and ¢ their allics.") . ° - -- World press coverage of the International Press Cc Association protest and on the details of the e o
-8- . Communist efforts to scize control of the Chilean : press. -- <A program of journalists ~- actual apents and other~ ° wise -- travelling | to Chile for on-the-scene reporting, ness “(By 28 September, CIA had in place in, or enroute to, Chile 15 journalist agents from 10 different countries. This cadre was. supplemented by 8s more journalists ~ gare REG ABT . ae from 5 countries under the direction of high level agents who were, for the most part, in managerial ° capacities in the media field. ) ° Aba result of the ensuing furore, Allende ~~ sensitive to world Opinion and attempting to project the image of a moderate, non- dogmatic socialist -- decided to become more circumspect. By 25 September, heavy-handed intimidation of the press had virtually ceased. - Co Allende's show of strength had madc its point however; the ‘Chilean press, including “El Mercurio", never did regain its resiliency and remained thoroughly muted from thercon out. -Lack- ing the usual forums for spontancous gencration and replay of
propaganda inside Chile, ClA had to rely increasingly on its own resources: ~ wet ge ot ee eee <a : PO gt a wT Ge tp rete oe Pa Or Meg eedeT ih, Oh ee ~ * “ns eee een OURS SSE TAMER . -- ‘an underground press dependent upon direct mail _ , distribution; y ed Arg reg we roe el ee, placement of individual news items through agents against the resistance of a cowed management; onigmtersnseee + financing of a new, albeit smalljunewspaper;" -; oe subsidy of an anti-Allende political group and its retrace i . Qadio programs, political advertisements, and political rallies; and, -- direct mailing of forcign news articles to Presi- dent Frei, Mrs. Frei, selected military leaders, and the Chilean domestic press. This effort did not, and could not, replace 2 Chilean press, fully | opezative and free of restraint. Virtually alone, it did kcep the ° . . 3 ‘voice of public opposition alive inside Chile for coup purposes i a . . 5 , ie) guring the final wecks of this period. ¢ . d. | The magnitude of the propaganda campaign mounted during this six weck period in the Latin American and European media -- 4:--82 °
. . . 10 _ aside {rom the U.S., the two "outside" areas with, by far, the greatest influence on Chile -- is evident from the fact thet only partial returns show 726 articles, broadcasts, editori als, and .*e pera ee a ‘ similar items as a direct result of agent activity. Just how many “rot these items were replayed is not known Ge re ae Nor, has CIA any idea of the scope of the rn norris payee verre! weet Ter tea eo eR Hane pepstatin Mente go oe immeasurable multiplier eff ect -- that is, how much its "induced" news focused media interest on the Chilcan issues and stimuiated e : “e ~ - @s tg . T additional coverage -- except that, even by conservative standards, this contribution must have been both substantial and significant. -- 'e@. Special intelligence and “inside! bricfings were given to U.S. journalists in deference to the international influence of the U.S. media. Particularly noteworthy in this connection was the Time cover story which owed a great deai to written matcrials and . briefings provided by CIA. The Time correspondent in Chile who wus providing much of the background material for the story apparently accepted Allendc's protcstations of modcration and constitutionality at face valuc.. CIA bricfings in Washington fis
co! a -ll- J- — changed the ERE er ad od a OES basic thrust of the story in the final stages according to another = Time correspondent. : “Tt provoked” Allende to "complain ‘on ree EH . hs Octoder, ‘We are suffering the most brutal and horrible pres- .. r - peat ee, both domestic and. international, | ‘ ‘ singling out Time in . particular zs having "openly called" for : an invasion of Cnile. ° 5. Political Action . Ne Ae re a. The political action program had only one purpose: to induce President Frei to prevent Alicnde's election by the Congress on 24 October and, failing that, to support -- by benevolent neutrality at the least z.:4 conspiratorial benediction at the most -- a military “ coup which would prevent Allende {rom taking office on 3 November. Realistically, the task was one of attempting to recast Frei, asa political personality, in a role demanding decisiveness and X "machismo" to a degrec that, thus far, had eluded him. Pressures fxrém those whose opinion and/or approval he valued -- in combination with adequate propaganda orchestrations -- represented the only hose ee = '. of converting Frei. HM
et Rapeg hip série -— == Allende as president would be an unparallcied . . disaster for Chile (Frei agrecd). -~- Frei had both the power and obligation to prevent . . this. . Ld Mg. . - * POET ree me ee wn G . . -- Inthe event Frei's re-election gambit.succecded, the U.S. Governr.ent wauld be preparca to provide e . substantial support for Frei's presidential campaign. 44282
WE SB Stee! ah 0s ERT AEE OIL REMEBER LE DUES ce. In Europe and Latin America, prominent and influcntial members of the Christian Democratic movements well as the Catholic Church were prompted to visit Frei or send personal messages to him urging that he save Chile. Some cf these endcavors were the following:
a wens foot nyen. : The West German Christian Democratic Party -- - ‘which enjoyed special equities with Frei by virtue of gencrous support to the Christizn Democrats in eo Chile over a range of many y years -- . Gispatehed - " several top-level emissarics 5 to Chile. they con- ie tacted sli and other © Christian Democratic leaders ot Soa ent “+ £4266 Sy
re Ce “ . my onc of the international fipgurcs ¥ + gn Catholicism most respected by Frei, scenta . ° personal message indicating thet Frei and his 1 i a re 2 Pye: eS BS tiple oa ee Sd Rete ene : : a a eee ° party must oppose Marxism. — ° RR Ep pe + | Christian’ Democratic Party - -- which had good . : fraternal ‘relations with Frei and his party -- © vetused to is nie “(He ‘said it was a hopeless . situation and he saw no point in risking his repute mae ot ne Nee tie «Nea ane te gS ine crete te ne ate te ge es . . “ tion in a lost cause.) ; . Collateral efforts were made to influence Frei or those close to Frei, such ss: . ° ‘ : -- Influential lay Catholics sent messages to or visited the Vatican. ; cy . ; ae ; -~< Po SE = scries of ley - ; & . » and clerical pressurcs from other countries, was : ° dissuaded from ceding an Allende victory prioz to * ; é ‘So . . his Congressional election actually taking place. . -- Telegrams were sent Mrs, Frei from women's. ; ‘groups in other Latin American countries, ‘ oO , . . _ 43267 . < . . e ° : e : e « .
~ 16 - -- Forcign press items were mailed directly to Frei, ‘Mrs. Frei, and Christian Democratic Congressmen Tesi. "Ldn Chile. a, ce teat me OE Intelligence was surfaced piaractaih Peetares once in . Sg feheda S Oh noe oy ered . vs ~e Sage ek . 4 6 s adeeT ° Bf eae anaes HS eee pe ae nt eer a ste, satel “> Sa coin kee aes — ee re power, the Communists intended to denigrate Frei ow + . @ the first step in the dissolution of his party. rien “ie wiht oh aay pie RIE REDE EN ei * a eeent eae 9 FR a. In ‘spite of everything, Frei never asserted himself. Indeed, he failed to attend or to influence otherwise the ‘3-4 October Congress OF ae he Ve Ue teres - ceee o Sux Leen el aN LEE of his party at which time it was decided by : a substent ial margin to make a deal with Allende. With that decision, the Frei re-election gambit died and constitutional alternatives had been exhausted. Subd- sequently, Frei did manage to confide to several top-ranking military officers that he would not oppose a coup, with a guarded implication “he might even welcome one. Yet, when a coup opportunity and _ situation prescated itself upon the assassination of Army Commander in Chief Scincider, Frei moved quickly away from it. P) 6. Military Coun as After carly Octobcr -- absent any evidence that Frei was responding, politically speaking, to artificial respiration -- a 43.288 nate a,
-17- : military coup increasingly suggested itself as the only possible - solution to the Allende problem. Anti-Allende currents did exist in ‘the military and. the Carabincros,., but were immobilized by: .. e -- the tradition of military resyctt, forthe Constitution; oes =the public and privete Stance of General ‘Schneiders? me wees aces: wee we tee - ¢ Commander in Chief of the Army, who advocated ‘strict adherence to the te Constitution; | . ; . o~ “fear ot the reaction of non-cornmissioned officers : _ who tended to harbor pro-Allende sympathies; and, cet Lat astte me tek EN 2 eR enter xo: ert AL owner roa aero vas -- a strong prepensity to acecpt Allende blandishments to the effect that the military hed little to fear from him. * Although individual officers among the top leadership of the military and Carabineros were pre-disposed to take action, they felt the Army was-central to a successful coup, and, as long as General Schneider remained the head of the Army, the Arms would not be counted upon. General Schneider' s attitude could only be changed through the personal ‘inftervention and forceful advocacy of a coup by President Frei; somcthing, it became obvious, the latter was most unlikely to ° bring himsclf to do.