Apr   1,    82 
5230.22    (End   1) 
c 
DIRECTOR  OF  CENTRAL  INTELLIGENCE  DIRECTIVE  NO.  1/7  ' 
CONTROL  OF  DISSEMINATION  OF  INTELLIGENCE  INFORMATION 
(Effective  4  May  1981) 
Pursuant  to  Section  102  of  the  National  Security  Act  of  1947  and  Executive 
Orders  12036  and  12065,  the  following  controls  on  the  dissemination  and  use  of  intel- 
ligence information  and  related  materials  (hereafter  referred  to  as  intelligence)  *  are 
hereby  established. 
1.  Purpose 
This  directive  establishes  certain  common  controls  and  procedures  for  the 
dissemination  and  use  of  intelligence  to  ensure  that,  while  facilitating  its  interchange 
for  intelligence  purposes,  it  will  be  adequately  protected.  This  directive  amplifies 
applicable  portions  of  the  2  October  1978  Information  Security  Oversight  Office 
(ISOO)  Directive  #1  which  implements  Executive  Order  (EO)  12065.  It  also  prescribes 
additional  controls  on  the  dissemination  of  intelligence  to  foreign  governments  and  to 
foreign  nationals  and  immigrant  aliens,  including  those  employed  by  the  US  Govern- 
ment. Policy  on  release  of  intelligence  to  contractors  and  consultants  is  set  forth  in  the 
Attachment. 
2.  General 
a.  Applicability.  The  controls  and  procedures  set  forth  in  this  directive  shall  be 
uniformly  applied  in  the  dissemination  and  use  of  intelligence  originated  by  all  Intel- 
ligence Community  organizations  as  defined  by  Section  4-207,  EO  12036. 
b.  Implementation.  The  substance  of  this  directive  shall  be  published  in  appro- 
priate regulatory  or  notice  media  of  each  Intelligence  Community  organization,  to- 
gether with  appropriate  procedures  permitting  rapid  interagency  consultation 
concerning  the  dissemination  and  use  of  intelligence.  For  this  purpose,  each  Intel- 
ligence Community  organization  will  designate  a  primary  referent.  Originators  of 
intelligence  bearing  control  markings  or  other  restrictions  required  by  this  directive 
shall  ensure  that  requests  concerning  them  are  answered  promptly. 
c.  "Need-To-Know"  Principle.  "Need-to-know"  is  a  determination  by  an  au- 
thorized holder  of  classified  information  that  access  to  specific  classified  material  in 
his  or  her  possession  is  required  by  one  or  more  other  persons  to  perform  a  specific  and 
officially  authorized  function  essential  to  accomplish  a  national  security  task  or  as 
required  by  Federal  Statute,  Executive  Order,  or  directly  applicable  regulation.  In 
addition  to  an  established  "need-to-know,"  a  person  must  possess  an  appropriate  secu- 
rity clearance  and  access  approvals,  as  required,  prior  to  being  provided  classified 
information. 
1  This  directive  supersedes  DCID  No.  1/7.  effective  18  May  1976. 
1  For  purposes  of  this  directive  the  terms  "intelligence  information  and  related  materials"  (or  "intel- 
ligence") mean: 
(1)  '"Foreign  intelligence"  and  "counterintelligence,"  as  these  terms  are  defined  in  EO  12036.  and 
(2)  Information  describing  US  foreign  intelligence  and  counterintelligence  activities,  sources  and 
methods,  equipment,  and  methodology  used  for  the  acquisition,  processing,  or  exploitation  of  such  intel- 
ligence, foreign  military  hardware  obtained  for  exploitation,  and  photography  or  recordings  resulting 
from  such  US  intelligence  collection  efforts.
3.  Use  and  Dissemination  Among  US  Intelligence  Community  Organizations 
a.  "Third  Agency"  Rule.  The  ISOO  Directive  implementing  EO  12065  states 
that,  except  as  otherwise  provided  by  Section  102  of  the  National  Security  Act  of  1947, 
classified  information  originating  in  one  US  agency  shall  not  be  disseminated  outside 
any  other  agency  to  which  it  has  been  made  available  without  the  consent  of  the 
originating  agency.  This  is  commonly  described  as  the  "third  agency"  rule. 
b.  Advance  Authorization.  To  facilitate  the  dissemination  and  different  uses 
made  of  classified  intelligence  within  and  among  Intelligence  Community  organiza- 
tions and  to  assure  the  timely  provision  of  intelligence  to  consumers,  it  is  necessary  to 
provide  controlled  relief  to  the  "third  agency  rule"  within  the  Intelligence  Commu- 
nity in  addition  to  that  provided  by  the  National  Security  Act  of  1947  (50  USC  403 
(d)).  Accordingly,  Intelligence  Community  organizations  are  hereby  authorized  to  use 
each  other's  classified  intelligence  in  their  respective  intelligence  documents,  publica- 
tions or  other  information  media,  and  to  disseminate  their  products  to  other  Intel- 
ligence Community  organizations  except  as  specifically  restricted  by  control  markings 
prescribed  in  paragraph  6.  Classified  intelligence  documents,  even  though  they  bear 
no  control  markings  will  not  be  released  in  their  original  form  to  third  agencies  with- 
out permission  of  the  originator. 
4.  Use  and  Dissemination  to  Other  US  Organizations 
Classified  intelligence,  even  though  it  bears  no  restrictive  control  markings,  will 
not  be  released  in  its  original  form  to  US  organizations  outside  of  the  Intelligence 
Community  without  permission  of  the  originator.  Any  organization  disseminating 
intelligence  beyond  the  organizations  of  the  Intelligence  Community  shall  be  responsi- 
ble for  ensuring  that  recipient  organizations  understand  and  agree  to  observe  the 
restrictions  prescribed  by  this  directive  and  maintain  adequate  safeguards. 
5.  Foreign  Dissemination  of  Intelligence 
a.  Dissemination  to  Immigrant  Aliens,  Foreign  Contractors,  and  Other  Foreign 
Nationals. 
(1)  Classified  intelligence,  even  though  it  bears  no  control  markings,  will  not  be 
released  in  any  form  to  foreign  nationals  or  immigrant  aliens  (including  US  Govern- 
ment employed,  utilized  or  integrated  foreign  nationals  and  immigrant  aliens)  with- 
out permission  of  the  originator. 
(2)  Release  of  classified  intelligence  to  a  foreign  contractor/company  under 
contract  to  the  US  Government  will  be  made  according  to  paragraph  5b  through  the 
government  under  which  the  contractor /company  operates.  Direct  US-to-foreign 
contractor /company  release  is  prohibited. 
b.  Dissemination  to  Foreign  Governments. 
Classified  intelligence,  even  though  it  bears  no  control  markings  authorized  by 
this  Directive,  will  not  be  released  in  its  original  form  to  foreign  governments  without 
permission  of  the  originator.  Information  contained  in  classified  intelligence  of  an- 
other Intelligence  Community  organization,  and  which  Ksars  no  restrictive  control 
markings,  may  be  used  by  the  recipient  Intelligence  Community  organization  in  re- 
ports disseminated  to  foreign  governments  s  provided: 
(1)  No  reference  is  made  to  the  source  documents  upon  which  the  released 
product  is  based. 
( 
5  Excepting  RESTRICTED  DATA  and  FORMERLY  RESTRICTED  DATA,  which  is  prohibited  from 
foreign  dissemination  under  Sections  123  and  144  of  Public  Law  585,  Atomic  Energy  Act  of  1954.  as 
amended.
c 
c 
Apr   1,    82 
5230.22    (End   1) 
(2)  The  information  is  extracted  or  paraphrased  to  insure  that  the  source  or 
manner  of  acquisition  of  the  intelligence  cannot  be  deduced  or  revealed  in  any 
manner. 
(3)  Foreign  release  is  made  through  established  foreign  disclosure  channeb  and 
procedures,  such  as  prescribed  in  DCID  6/1,  DCID  6/2,  and  DCID  1/13. 
6.  Authorized  Control  Markings 
a.  "WARNING  NOTICE— INTELLIGENCE  SOURCES  AND  METHODS 
INVOLVED"  (WNINTEL) 
(1)  This  marking  is  used,  with  a  security  classification,  to  identify  information 
whose  sensitivity  requires  constraints  on  its  further  dissemination  and  use.  This 
marking  may  be  used  only  on  intelligence  which  identifies  or  would  reasonably 
permit  identification  of  an  intelligence  source  or  method  which  is  susceptible  to 
countermeasures  that  could  nullify  or  reduce  its  effectiveness. 
(2)  Classified  intelligence  so  marked  shall  not  be  disseminated  in  any  manner 
outside  authorized  channels  *  without  the  permission  of  the  originator  and  an  assess- 
ment by  the  senior  intelligence  officer  in  the  disseminating  agency  as  to  the  poten- 
tial risks  to  the  national  security  and  to  the  intelligence  sources  or  methods  involved. 
In  making  such  assessment,  consideration  should  be  given  to  reducing  the  risk  to  the 
intelligence  sources  or  methods  which  provided  the  intelligence  by  sanitizing  or 
paraphrasing  the  information  so  as  to  permit  its  wider  dissemination.  To  avoid 
confusion  as  to  the  extent  of  dissemination  and  use  restrictions  governing  the  in- 
formation involved,  the  marking  may  not  be  used  in  conjunction  with  special  access 
or  Sensitive  Compartmented  Information  (SCI)  controls.  This  marking  may  be 
abbreviated  as  "WNINTEL"  or  as  "WN." 
b.  "DISSEMINATION   AND    EXTRACTION   OF   INFORMATION   CON- 
TROLLED BY  ORIGINATOR"  (ORCON) 
(1)  This.marking  is  used,  with  a  security  classification,  to  enable  a  continuing 
knowledge  and  supervision  by  the  originator  of  the  use  made  of  the  information 
involved.  This  marking  may  be  used  only  on  intelligence  which  clearly  identifies  or 
would  reasonably  permit  ready  identification  of  an  intelligence  source  or  method 
which  is  particularly  susceptible  to  countermeasures  that  would  nullify  or  measur- 
ably reduce  its  effectiveness.  This  marking  may  not  be  used  when  an  item  of  in- 
formation will  reasonably  be  protected  by  use  of  other  markings  specified  herein,  or 
by  the  application  of  the  "need-to-know"  principle  and  the  safeguarding  procedures 
of  the  security  classification  system. 
(2)  Information  bearing  this  marking  may  not  be  disseminated  beyond  the 
headquarters  elements s  of  the  recipient  organizations  and  may  not  be  incorporated 
in  whole  or  in  part  into  other  reports  or  briefings  without  the  advance  permission  of 
and  under  conditions  specified  by  the  originator.  As  this  is  the  most  restrictive 
marking  herein,  agencies  will  establish  procedures  to  ensure  that  it  is  only  applied  to 
particularly  sensitive  intelligence  and  that  timely  procedures  are  established  to  re- 
view requests  for  further  dissemination  of  intelligence  bearing  this  marking.  This 
marking  may  be  abbreviated  as  "ORCON"  or  as  "OC." 
I 
'  Unless  otherwise  specified  by  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  in  consultation  with  the  National 
Foreign  Intelligence  Board  (NFIB)  or  as  agreed  to  between  originating  and  recipient  agencies,  authorized 
channeb  are  the  Intelligence  Community,  as  defined  in  Section  4-207,  EO  12036,  and  Intelligence 
Community  contractors  and  consultants  and  officials  of  agencies  represented  on  the  NFIB  as  determined 
on  a  "need-to-know"  basis  by  recipient  senior  intelligence  officials. 
1  At  the  discretion  of  the  originator,  the  term  "headquarters  elements"  may  include  specified  subordi- 
nate intelligence-producing  components.
c.  "NOT  RELEASABLE  TO  CONTRACTORS /CONSULTANTS"  (NOCON- 
TRACT) 
This  marking  is  used,  with  a  security  classification,  to  prohibit  the  dissemination 
of  information  to  contractors  or  consultants  (hereinafter  contractors)  without  the 
permission  of  the  originator.  This  marking  may  be  used  only  on  intelligence  which,  if 
disclosed  to  a  contractor,  would  actually  or  potentially  give  him  a  competitive  advan- 
tage which  could  reasonably  be  expected  to  cause  a  conflict  of  interest  with  his  obliga- 
tion to  maintain  the  security  of  the  information;  or  which  was  provided  by  a  source  on 
the  express  or  implied  condition  that  it  not  be  made  available  to  contractors.  The 
restrictions  applicable  to  this  marking  do  not  apply  to  consultants  hired  under  Office 
of  Personnel  Management  procedures,  or  comparable  procedures  derived  from 
authorities  vested  in  heads  of  organizations  by  law,  and  who  are  normally  considered 
to  be  extensions  of  the  office  by  which  they  are  employed.  This  marking  may  be 
abbreviated  as  "NOCONTRACT"  or  as  "NG" 
d.  "CAUTION— PROPRIETARY  INFORMATION  INVOLVED"  (PROPIN) 
This  marking  is  used,  with  or  without  a  security  classification,  to  identify  in- 
formation provided  by  a  commercial  firm  or  private  source  under  an  express  or  im- 
plied understanding  that  the  information  will  be  protected  as  a  trade  secret  or  propri- 
etary data  believed  to  have  actual  or  potential  value.  Information  bearing  this  marking 
shall  not  be  disseminated  in  any  form  to  an  individual,  organization,  or  foreign  gov- 
ernment which  has  any  interests,  actual  or  potential,  in  competition  with  the  source  of 
the  information  without  the  permission  of  the  originator.  This  marking  may  be  used  in 
conjunction  with  the  "NOCONTRACT"  marking  to  preclude  dissemination  to  any 
contractor.  This  marking  may  be  abbreviated  as  "PROPIN"  or  as  "PR." 
e.  "NOT  RELEASABLE  TO  FOREIGN  NATIONALS"  (NOFORN) 
This  marking  is  used  with  a  security  classification  to  identify  intelligence  that 
may  not  be  released  in  any  form  to  foreign  governments,  foreign  nationals,  or  non-US 
citizens  without  permission  of  the  originator.  This  marking  may  be  used  on  intel- 
ligence which  if  released  to  a  foreign  government  or  national(s)  could  jeopardize  intel- 
ligence sources  or  methods,  or  when  it  would  not  be  in  the  best  interests  of  the  United 
States  to  release  the  information  from  a  policy  standpoint  upon  specific  determination 
by  a  Senior  Intelligence  Officer  of  the  Intelligence  Community.  Senior  Intelligence 
Officers  of  US  Intelligence  Community  organizations  are  responsible  for  developing, 
publishing  and  maintaining  guidelines  consistent  with  the  policy  guidance  herein  for 
use  in  determining  the  foreign  reusability  of  intelligence  they  collect  or  produce. 
These  guidelines  shall  be  used  in  assigning  NOFORN  control  markings,  and  by  pri- 
mary referents  (paragraph  2.b.  above  applies)  in  responding  to  inquiries  from  other 
organizations  on  application  of  this  control.  This  marking  may  be  abbreviated 
"NOFORN"  or  as  "NF." 
f.  "AUTHORIZED  FOR  RELEASE  TO  (name  of  country(ies)/ international 
organization)"  (REL   -) 
This  marking  is  used  to  identify  classified  intelligence  that  an  originator  has 
predetermined  to  be  releasable  or  has  released,  through  established  foreign  disclosure 
procedures  and  channels,  to  the  foreign  country(ies)/organization  indicated.  No  other 
foreign  dissemination  of  the  material  is  authorized  (in  any  form)  without  the  permis- 
sion of  the  originator.  This  marking  may  be  abbreviated  "REL  (abbreviated  name  of 
country(ies)/international  organization)."  In  the  case  of  intelligence  controlled  under 
DCID  6/2,  authorized  distribution  indicators,  published  separately,  may  be  used  in- 
stead of  the  "REL"  control  marking. 
c
Apr   1,    82 
5230.3    (End   1) 
7.  Procedures  Governing  Use  of  Control  Markings 
/("*  a.  Any  recipient  desiring  to  use  intelligence  in  a  manner  contrary  to  the  restric- 
V  v  tions  established  by  the  control  markings  set  forth  above  shall  obtain  the  advance 
permission  of  the  originating  agency.  Such  permission  applies  only  to  the  specific 
purposes  agreed  to  by  the  originator  and  does  not  automatically  apply  to  all  recipients. 
Originators  should  insure  that  prompt  consideration  is  given  to  recipients'  requests  in 
these  regards,  with  particular  attention  to  reviewing,  and  editing  if  necessary,  sani- 
tized or  paraphrased  versions  to  derive  a  text  suitable  for  release  subject  to  lesser  or  no 
control  markings. 
b.  The  control  markings  authorized  above  shall  be  shown  on  the  title  page,  front 
cover,  and  other  applicable  pages  of  documents,  incorporated  in  the  text  of  electrical 
communications,  shown  on  graphics,  and  associated  (in  full  or  abbreviated  form)  with 
data  stored  or  processed  in  automatic  data  processing  systems.  The  control  markings 
also  shall  be  indicated  by  parenthetical  use  of  the  marking  abbreviations  at  the  begin- 
ning or  end  of  the  appropriate  portions.  If  the  control  markings  apply  to  several  or  all 
portions,  the  document  may  be  marked  with  a  statement  to  this  effect  rather  than 
marking  each  portion  individually. 
c.  The  control  markings  in  paragraph  6  shall  be  individually  assigned  at  the  time 
of  preparation  of  intelligence  products  and  used  in  conjunction  with  security  clas- 
sifications and  other  markings  specified  by  EO  12065  and  its  implementing  ISOO 
Directive.  The  markings  shall  be  carried  forward  to  any  new  format  in  which  the 
same  information  is  incorporated,  including  oral  and  visual  presentations. 
c 
8.  Reporting  Unauthorized  Disclosures 
Violations  of  the  foregoing  restrictions  and  control  markings  that  result  in 
unauthorized  disclosure  by  one  agency  oT  the  intelligence  of  another  shall  be  reported 
to  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  through  the  DCI  Security  Committee. 
9.  Obsolete  Restrictions  and  Markings 
The  following  markings  are  obsolete  and  will  not  be  used  subsequent  to  the  date 
of  this  directive:  WARNING  NOTICE— SENSITIVE  SOURCES  AND  METHODS 
INVOLVED,  CONTROLLED  DISSEM,  NSC  PARTICIPATING  AGENCIES  ONLY, 
INTEL  COMPONENTS  ONLY,  LIMITED,  CONTINUED  CONTROL,  NO 
DISSEM  ABROAD,  BACKGROUND  USE  ONLY,  WARNING  NOTICE— SEN- 
SITIVE INTELLIGENCE  SOURCES  AND  METHODS  INVOLVED,  NO  FOR- 
EIGN DISSEM,  USIB  ONLY,  AND  NFIB  ONLY.  Questions  with  respect  to  the  cur- 
rent application  of  control  markings  authorized  by  earlier  directives  on  the 
dissemination  and  control  of  intelligence  and  use  on  documents  issued  prior  to  the  date 
of  this  directive  should  be  referred  to  the  originating  agency  or  department. 
William  J.  Casey 
Director  of  Central  Intelligence
( 
Apr   1,   82 
5230.22    (End   1) 
( 
DIRECTOR  OF  CENTRAL  INTELLIGENCE  DIRECTIVE  NO.  1/7 
(Attachment) 
DO  POLICY  ON  RELEASE  OF  INTELLIGENCE 
INFORMATION  TO  CONTRACTORS  AND  CONSULTANTS  ' 
1.  So  that  Intelligence  Community  agencies  may  better  discharge  their  respon- 
sibilities, they  may  release  selected  intelligence  information  and  related  materials 
(hereafter  referred  to  as  intelligence)1  to  contractors  and  consultants  (hereafter  re- 
ferred to  as  contractors)  without  referral  to  the  originating  agency,  provided  that: 
a.  Release 3  is  made  only  to  private  individuals  or  organizations  certified  by 
the  Senior  Intelligence  Officer  of  the  sponsoring  Intelligence  Community  organiza- 
tion as  being  under  contract  to  the  United  States  Government  for  the  purpose  of 
performing  classified  services  in  support  of  the  mission  of  his  or  a  member 
organization;  *  as  having  a  demonstrated  "need-to-know;"  and  an  appropriate  secu- 
rity clearance  or  access  approval.  If  retention  of  intelligence  by  the  contractor  is 
required,  the  contractor  must  have  an  approved  storage  facility. 
b.  The  Senior  Intelligence  Officer  of  the  sponsoring  agency,  or  his  designee(s), 
is  responsible  for  ensuring  that  releases  to  contractors  are  made  pursuant  to  this 
policy  statement  and  through  established  channels. 
c.  The  sponsoring  agency  maintains  a  record  of  material  released. 
d.  Contractors  maintain  such  records  as  will  permit  them  to  account  for  all 
intelligence  received,  disposed  of  or  destroyed,  produced  and  held  by  them  for  the 
duration  of  the  contract,  and  to  permit  identification  of  all  persons  who  have  had 
access  to  intelligence  :n  fheir  custody. 
1  General  policy  is  set  forth  in  DCID  1/7,  "Control  of  Dissemination  of  Intelligence  Information," 
effective  4  May  1981.  Sec  DCID  No.  1/19  for  minimum  standards  for  control  of  Sensitive  Compart- 
mented  Information  (SCI)  released  to  contractors.  In  accordance  with  paragraph  6c.  DCID  1/7,  Intel- 
ligence Community  organizations  agree  that  government-owned,  contractor-operated  laboratories 
performing  classified  services  in  support  of  the  intelligence  mission  of  an  Intelligence  Community 
organization,  and  which  are  designated  authorized  channels  by  the  Senior  Intelligence  Officer  (as 
defined  in  DCID  1/19)  concerned,  are  not  considered  contractors  for  the  purposes  of  this  policy 
statement. 
*  For  purposes  of  this  attachment,  the  terms  "selected  intelligence  information  and  related  materials" 
(or  "intelligence")  mean: 
(1)  "Foreign  intelligence"  and  "counterintelligence"  as  these  terms  are  defined  in  EO  12036. 
(2)  Information  describing  US  foreign  intelligence  and  counterintelligence  activities,  sources  and 
methods,  equipment  and  methodology  used  for  the  acquisition,  processing,  or  exploitation  of  such  intel- 
ligence, foreign  military  hardware  obtained  for  exploitation,  and  photography  or  recordings  resulting 
from  such  US  intelligence  collection  efforts. 
(3)  Intelligence  produced  and  disseminated  by  CIA.  INR/State,  DIA,  FBI.  NSA.  ACSI/Army. 
ACSI/Air  Force,  Naval  Intelligence  Command,  DOE  and  the  military  commands.  This  specifically 
excludes  Foreign  Service  reporting  and  SCI.  Permission  to  release  Foreign  Service  reporting  must  be 
obtained  from  the  Department  of  Stale.  Release  of  SCI  is  governed  by  lateral  agreements  and  advise- 
ments between  Intelligence  Community  organizations. 
'  Release  is  the  authorized  visual,  oral,  or  physical  disclosure  of  classified  intelligence. 
4  Non-Intelligence  Community  government  components  under  contract  to  fulfill  an  intelligence  sup- 
port role  may  be  treated  as  members  of  the  Intelligence  Community  rather  than  as  contractors.  When  so 
treated,  it  shall  be  solely  for  the  specific  purposes  agreed  upon  and  shall  in  no  case  include  authority  to 
disseminate  further  intelligence  made  available  to  them.
e.  Contractors  do  not  reproduce  any  intelligence  without  the  permission  of  the 
sponsoring  agency,  and  classify,  control  and  account  for  reproduced  copies  in  the  same 
manner  as  for  originals. 
f.  Contractors  destroy  intelligence  only  according  to  guidelines  and  by  standards 
set  by  the  sponsoring  agency. 
g.  Contractors  make  provision  to  ensure  that  intelligence  in  their  custody  is  not 
released  to  foreign  nationals,  whether  or  not  they  are  employees  or  contractors  them- 
selves, except  with  the  permission  of  the  originating  agency  through  the  sponsoring 
agency. 
h.  Contractors  receiving  intelligence  do  not  release  it:  (1)  to  any  of  their  compo- 
nents or  employees  not  directly  engaged  in  providing  services  under  the  contract;  or 
(2)  to  any  other  contractor  (including  subcontractors),  without  the  consent  of  the  spon- 
soring agency  (which  shall  verify  that  any  second  contractors  satisfy  all  security  re- 
quirements herein). 
i.  Contractors  agree  that  all  intelligence  released  to  them,  all  reproductions 
thereof,  and  all  other  material  they  may  generate  based  on  or  incorporating  data 
therefrom  (including  authorized  reproductions),  remain  the  property  of  the  US  Gov- 
ernment and  will  be  returned  upon  request  of  the  sponsoring  agency  or  expiration  of 
the  contract,  whichever  comes  first. 
j.  Sponsoring  agencies  arrange  for  and  contractors  agree  that,  upon  expiration  of 
contracts:  (1)  all  released  intelligence,  all  reproductions  thereof,  and  all  other  materials 
based  on  or  incorporating  data  therefrom,  are  returned  to  the  sponsoring  agency;  or  (2) 
all  or  a  specified  part  of  such  items  are  retained  by  the  contractor  under  all  applicable 
security  and  accountability  controls  when  the  contractors  have  specific  needs  for  such 
retention  that  are  validated  by  sponsoring  agencies. 
k.  Sponsoring  agencies  delete:  (1)  the  CIA  seal,  (2)  the  phrase  "Directorate  of 
Operations,"  (3)  the  place  acquired,  (4)  the  field  number,  (5)  the  source  description, 
and  (6)  field  dissemination,  from  all  CIA  Directorate  of  Operations  reports  passed  to 
contractors,  unless  prior  approval  to  do  otherwise  is  obtained  from  CIA. 
2.  National  Intelligence  Estimates  (NIEs),  Special  National  Intelligence  Estimates 
(SNIEs),  National  Intelligence  Analytical  Memoranda  and  Interagency  Memoranda 
may  not  be  released  to  contractors.  Such  materials  shall  be  marked  NOT  RELEAS- 
ABLE  TO  CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS.  However,  information  in  them  may 
be  made  available  to  contractors,  without  identification  as  national  intelligence,  by  the 
Senior  Intelligence  Officer  of  the  Intelligence  Community  agency  authorizing  its 
release. 
3.  Intelligence  which  by  reason  of  sensitivity  of  content  bears  control  markings 
"CAUTION—PROPRIETARY  INFORMATION  INVOLVED,"  "NOT  RELEAS- 
ABLE  TO  CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS,"  or  "DISSEMINATION  AND 
EXTRACTION  OF  INFORMATION  CONTROLLED  BY  ORIGINATOR,"  as  speci- 
fied in  DCID  1/7,  may  not  be  released  to  contractors  unless  special  permission  has 
been  obtained  from  the  originator. 
4.  Questions  concerning  the  implementation  of  this  policy  and  these  procedures 
shall  be  referred  for  appropriate  action  to  the  DCI  Security  Committee. 
C