Yhe Defense Panel on intelligence was established by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in the interest of improv- ing intelligence responsiveness to the needs Gf the Secre- tary of Defense and other principal Defense users. The Pane] consisted of 10 distinguished individuals drayn from outside the intelligence community; they were supplemented by four ex-officio members who provided special expertise and assistance. The Honorable Elliot L. Richardson participated as a consultant. Four formal mectings were held and between sessions several sub-groups examined specific areas of interest in greater depth. The ex-oificio menbers participated fully in all Panel deliberations, although the final report was drafted by the main Panel and represents its vicws. Due to the breadth and complexity of the subject and the constraints of time, the Panel decided to narrow the scope of its consideration and focus on those areas of Defense intelligence which they considered of most direct - interest to the Secretary of Defense at this time. As a consecuence, the Panel gave particular attention’ to the means of improving the substantive intclligence support to the Secretary of Defense and the steps required to enhance the professionalism of Defense intelligence analysts. . The summary report discusses these and other aspects of Defense intelligence and provides specific recommenda- tions for actions which are believed to be feasibie and within the authority of the Secretary. The summary and recommendations represent an almost unanimous consensus of the Panel. All members participated fully in their draft- ing and cach reviered and provided comments on several drafts. “Also included are papers providing the views of vari- ous Panel members in Support of the summary and reconmonda- tions as well as commenting on other areas of Uefense intel- ligence of concern to then. ~ , Albert C. Hall
MEMBEES General Donald V. bennett, USA (Ret) ? J Mr. George M. Bunker Chairman of the hoard Martin Marietta Corporation Dr. Edward E. David, Jr. Executive Vice President Gould Inc. Dr. Alexander H. Flax. President Institute of Defense Analyses General Bruce K. Holloway, USAF (Ret) Dr. David S. Lewis . Chairman and Chief Executive Officer General Dynanics Corporation Dr. R. F. Mettler ” President TRW Inc. Dr. William J. Perry President _ Electromagnetic Systems Laboratory Honorable Thomas C. Reed Director, Telecommunications and Command and Control Systems Vice Admiral David C. Richardson, USN (R:
Mr. William Beecher Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) Honorable J. Fred Buzhardt Lieutenant General Daniel O. Graham, USA Director, Defense Intelligence Agency Mr. Thomas K. Latimer Special Assistant to the SECDEF/DEPSECDEF
CONTENTS Sumrary and Recomaendations B. Convening Authority Schedule of Meetings and Agenda Paper provided by Mr. William Beecher Paper provided by Mr. George M. Bunker Paner provided by Dr. Alexander H. Flax Paper provided by General Bruce K. Holloway, USAF (Ret) Paper provided by Dr. William J. Perry Paper provided by Honorable Thomas C. Reed Paper provided by Vice Admiral David C. Richardson, USN (Ret)
Report of the Defense Panel on Intelligence ‘to the Denuty Secretary of Perense In your charge to the Panel, attached as Tab B, you asked for our evaluation from a management perspective, of the state of health of DoD intelligence. In particular you asked us to evaluate the actions taken since the report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, to previde you our views on the effectiveness of the present intelligence structure, to consider the size and scope of DoD intelligence relative to current needs and to submit to you recommendations on feasible means for improving the effectivity or efficiency of the intelligence *»nction. The Panel reviewed the principal intelligence programs in the Department of Defense to illuminate their interre-" - lationships and the mechanisms fer their control. However, to be responsive, within the time constraints imposed, to the particular concerns expressed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense the Panel narrowed its considerations to areas it deemed particularly important with respect to the responsive- ness and quality of intelligence to the Secretary of Deferise’s needs. In addition, a more general review was made oz several . related areas including management interfaces between various DoD intelligence agencies' overall size, scope and effective- ness of the effort, and relationships and mutual support among Government intelligence agencies. The Panel's examine - tion of these related areas led us to the conviction that certain additional studies should be conducted in much more- depth than was possible here, and we make specific recommenda- tions on these. ; I. Support to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary —_ We are concerned over the degree and quality of communication between the producer of intelligence in the DoD and the senior users. The problem of communicating tit¢ final - output of-intelligence efforts and their significance is vexing. The conventional means of inte - formal briefings, memoranda, studies -- ar .Supply fully relevant intelligence support nor to create con- fidence in its content. Too often bdricfin may be encun- -bered by details that may be fascinating but do not lead to conclusions in matters of significance. ' fr) wa *
As we perceive it the Secretary of Nefense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense are concerned with issues of which intelligence is a part but vhich involve in a pe way other information and other considerations. We are t that in @ majority of the cases in which dissatisfaction the intelligence product is expressed there are strong pol tical issucs -- issues in which ISA is or should be involy ISA has, of course, sources of information other than DIA t contribute to the total assessment of a situation and we su gest that means should be found for strengthening the ISA interface with the intelligence community to insure inclusion of appropriate intelligence factors. These issues are best treated with the Secretary or Deputy Secretary by ISA. The key objective should be to integrate all factors into a co- herent form for consideration by the Secretary. ae r fo e¢ ch In our view it is essential to ensure meaningful two-way communication between the Secretary of Defense and. Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Director, DIA if he is to be their principal substantive intelligence adviser. Brief- ings to the Secretary should be the personal responsibility o£ the DoD senicr intelligence officer and on questions in which the Director is not personally expert, we would encour- age the presence of the senior specialist in the pertinent area. In this respect, the move by the Director, DIA to establish top staff specialists (termed Defense Intelligence Officers) in pertinent intelligence areas, shculd prove helpful. a” - . Communication with the top decision makers should be structured to inform them of what they want to know-conm- - bined with what they ought to knew. As a genéral rule those who have first hand knowledge and have themselves played in- portant roles in determining the significance of the material under consideration shovld be invclved in the briefings. Some Panel members feel it would be helpful if the Director, DIA were present when OSD principals participate in interagency matters involving substantive intelligence. For this intelligence support to be effective, the Secretary and Deputy Secretary must understand the neces- Sity of this dialosue and must take responsibility for crea- tion of the environment necessary for effective communication. The Director, DIA needs guidance from his senior users because ‘they alone know to what points of intelligence their decisions and actions are sensitive, and because they have information, not available to others, which shaves the need for specific intelligence support. While it may not always be appropriate
ete i ‘appreciation of what is or may be at $s national and international context. 1 for them to disclose this information, they can and comments, guide the intelligence ef ficor ¢ responsive Support. There must be a pull fs as well as a push from the intelligence officer. > by Gua & £ } Ons ctive and Sony ctary The Pancl considered the matter of liaison between the Secretary and Deputy Secretary and the intelJiecnce coimnu- nity. Some Panel members felt that the appvintment of a speci- fic intelligence liaison officer charged with the full-time support of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary would prove to be very helpful. Another sugse estion was that the functions and staffing of the National Military Intelligence Center should be specifically reviewed to ensure that that operation is con- figured to support the Secretary, puty Secretary and ISA in a responsive, detailed, and Flexibie. nanner- However, we emphasize that the professionalism of the intelligence production process must be improved substan- tially and this improvement, as disclosed below, is an essen- tial prerequisite to an effective dialogue. o RECOMMENDATION We recommend that the Secretary end Deputy Secre- tary and the “Director, OYA an their respective Eapacitias seek means Of eS establishing a reg tive “intelligence issues Of current concern. PeCctiVve dialogue. on 5 Stivstan- We recommend that the ASD(ISA)_ and the Director, a cre 5 eee ae ee DIA establish procedures to insure mere eriective support of ISA by the int Siligen ce COMMUNITY and to prov ide it FOr the =! Pn ee navoral inteL appropriate | nighlighting to pivota issucs brought by [SA to the Secre se The Structure of Effective Intelligence -Suaport - Professionalism and that Required to Enhance It to do more than Sary that “its out- nose who may be ”71 31 with respect to st levels of If the intelligence con produce material for its own use, puts be presented clearly and reieva able to use them. The problem 15 those users, or potential users, at Government since they trust base the be as ct ide tee pore oh CD an) = eeaeg 2M ery we pans oo Sy o ws coe pon) oe] bien Q ee) Cp dete ese on peia fo a eo ta) Tt % ey ie often than not fails to make clear an intelligence estimate or assessient, on whot what degree of uncertainty is aiia "Fs. a Se ee a Pe oa r 3. t z fre Follow: meting: are rth v Of cha kinds tigtbiy rodeyoent giver: e deco bivin pao: bacXteer di gatel- Lgence reports, estiie ie. ~ GF
Character of smputs - Are they independently de- rived Crom new data, drawn trom recent assessment by others, or mainly. deduced fron files and "finished" intelligence re- ports of long standing? Wheat ere the recent changes reflect in then and what do these chanses portend? How reliable are the inputs? Is there divergence of opinion concerning the inputs among elements of the intelligenge organiz ration? Analysis - Given the inputs and uncertaintics, what was the analytical process used? What were the areas of expertise included in the analytical team (e.g., regional political, military, regional economic)? To what desree were analysts in touch with and influenced by other analytical teams dealing with the same subject? What input uncertainties had the greatest degree of influence on the analysis? What factors of which the analytical team was aware, were not taken into account or updated in the analysis? Why? Results, Findings, Conclusions - How certain are these? Within the reasonable limits of error and tolerance in the inputs and the analytical process itself, what are con- sidered the most likely case, the best case and the worst case which could be forecast? What options exist for the other side which depend on actions we or third parties might yet take? What answers to these questions have been arrived at separately or collectively by other analyticai teams? “Obviously not all of these issues and questions need to be discussed or highlighted with respect to every in- telligence report, cstimate and assessment, but the key issues do need to De brought out. For example, 2 key military issue in the Middle East War of 1973 was the change in morale, re- solve, training, leadership and competence of Arab military forces and yet the assumption had been made by the "community" that these had not changed, and indeed, could not change for almost a peneration. Hence, this issue was not critically assessed in what was presented. The primary function of management of in analysis should not be to attempt to second guCSS an specialists in their own areas of expertise (a :Ltnousg and balances by other analyticai ‘specialists si vided}; rather the mang gerial roic should ern mation ’ erans fer proce ss to the users, which iar ferrcting out and highlig hting cf the uncertaint solved questions and the degree of Freedom stil S1ltuetion dependent on our (or third party) ang pronouncenents. . . pon nN sore ra) © HO ry in re? od yee 0 <2 ee om Se = a mo ’ 3sOoOn a49a fr wea F: “3 . ts 0 lied ct ° “ ' Adwrabe ey Weis ket 23° C8 Q we eee ct sn! = Q 4 ' tet nq Hs) ia) ey ed io) we bed ‘ @ bed pee AQ eta mow O09 Nn ~ Oe ~X - bicuaus 1 livence such as, far ww
| eine A be extended to the science and technology areas by the ‘-£essionak expertise. . Within Government,, particularly c ‘we bélieve to be essential: ~The Panel feels-: ‘persuasive case can be made for the exemption of i n Die “2 example sifthe volume Of high gerade: aVL! Liable during viorld far II -- and instead, must “Gdevend on huferential evi- 4% dence y= The task of interpr etation hes thus becomc more dif- ficult, and now demands a Superior level of professionalisn. In order to attract and retain superior an (and this applies nearly as well to officer en2lysts a the civilian professionals at whom those comments er we obviously must offer a clear opportunity to perfo function in a reasonable place to live and work, wit epportunity for advancement. We must also provide t ship whom the analyst can respect professionally {and tow jevel he can aspire) and a stimulating and challenging environment. — a ot aid ow cr? vl fw fe 2) Jud fone (3 aad = @  rTaocua Qu pot Ce @ ry «> io OM hw ec VU ry (> A key aspect of analyst professionalism is that ‘analysts should be primarily experts in their subjects, rath ‘than in intelligence tradecraft since the latter can be jearned readily on the job, but depth in the subject area re- - quires a substantial investment.of time, study, and re nal - experience. The: current efforts to institute a Master's pre- vam for beth military and civilian professionals at the :: Defense Intelligence School are commendable and this sh OQ rp Uo ped uld mama ¢ u ¢. oR * fate n ay schools at Monterey and Dayt con. Wi hile the above measures are necessary, they are - of themselves not fully sufficient to keep the ena professionally effective. There also must be a workin ronment of stimulation and challenge. Outside Governnm stinulus may be provided by competition, leading to th out of non-perrormers and early recognition and rewar ™ H (> DW a ct Hy rd pos) mW (ts ar) 30 Se ee b "n > 4 0D W feet oct fet 3 fia under Civil Service procedures, analogous competition exists. Professional leadership can, of course, provide uli; However; the Panel believes that. diz: agement procedures must be adopted if we » w ron & fie FS) i | we v a 3 sO ify provements in analysts professiona lism ton ww od J (he ra Se VO be pee Fl pie ee fa Qo, On dures and we believe that in light of the sensi e Lat extremely difficult under Civil Service regulation cL tial nature of the Defense intelligence analyst ¢ el Ce OO a oO ct Joos analysts from Civil Service requirencnts - Sucn a be consistent with that of CIA and would facizlita change of personnel with CIA and NSA. . f am Screw uc Je pre dee 19 Q wn 4 Oo Hon be ¢ tu ce ct RECOMMENDAT ‘ION _ The Director, DIA shenid take remed oe Teas 443 fee
oo implement | appropriace in the analytic el process and the as seer lates prescntac ay pr ocedures. DIA must be exempted | from Civil Service procedures governing the tenure end promotion OF 3 >Lonal anet iv VSts . ond he GAPE reese y Oo end thie SOCrTecearyv OL Defense give his pérsonal support to_ Tesistatien to provide this exemption. This chense is is is essential and we Tec eee 2. The organization of ane dysts in DIA should be re- vised to establish 2 Structure ceniénucive to increase DLOLES- LS OO De coh nereaseda prozes™ Sionalisn.-. The a Ttinte layers oz non-proressional supers visors Should be eliminated and and the analyst force should be placed uncer an_ approorietely chosen Civilian with a limited term of office who should be annointed at a level of Deputy Director to DIA. This change should be made only arLer eXé exemp- tion from Civil Service procedures has been secured. - Advanced programs, open to civilians and officers of all Services, in technicai intelligence analysis snould be established at the Naval Post -traduate School and the Air Force Institute of Technology- : Military Officers - Mere attention should be given by the Services to maintaining a healthy and motivating carcer pattern for intelligence officers. Poor seicc tion.oppoertunity for intelligence specialists will limit the quality officer needed in this specialty. The Panel has reviewed the evidence of the assign- ment of average and below average officers to BIA and found it alarming. We “believe that th e Agenc cy has too readily accepted Service nominations; a more critical review is essential, even if this requires that gaps and manning shortfalis be accepted. ve appreciate that there is demand for superior officer capa- bility in several specialties and while there are practical difficulties to overcome, we believe that it is essential that the quality be improved. We do not see yet adequate measures to achieve this objective. Experience has shown that. direc- tives alone will not provide the necessary lmprevement in assignments. The Panel considered and felt that a serious ex- amination should be made of double-hatiting the Service Intel- ligence Chiefs to the Director» DIA with thi wee articular objec- tive of improving assignment of superior of ers to DJA. rh (v7) -
RECOMMENDATION We recommend that the top inte!lliconce of fi 7722 in DoD intelligence fea n oe ee ee ee ge ee, Fo - acencies Shouta be career proves ll ies” ee eee ee ee 7 ne Jn intelligence. We recommend aiso that vw eneervéic wrens? - al . - be adopted of planning ehead ror oromisine can the top intellisence ofiicer positions and for these potentiel leaders. gaater te Career planed? We recommend that the Secretary of Defen ve lish precedures that will ensure the selection of a Litts 4a ai of officers tor DIA duty of very superior capability- Tit. Support to the Commands The Panel senses that the preponderance of atten” tion has been to the satisfaction of requirements at the National level, and that less than sufficient attention may have been given to the needs of the commands for effective intelligence support, particularly since the winding-down OF hostilities in Southeast Asia has lessened concern with theater operations. "otate We are encouraged, however, with some of the step~ recently taken to improve support to the commands and to add to their self-support capability -- such. as the distribulhos — of certain intelligence on a real-time basis and the ip hemes tation of the concept under which DIA will share basic patel. ligence product responsibilities with the Services and che ; commands. In-implementing such sheared responsibilities, C#F" should be taken not to dilute DIA'’s overall authority oue responsibility for intelligence production, nor to fragment unduly functions which may be best performed centrally. in general, however, it is our opinion that the probdlei of OT mand support deserves more attention and more formulation oO new initiatives than we perceive to be the case. RECOMMENDATION ; aed Teh participie: ve recommend thet an examination, with particiPe. tion by the commands, be made of current Ter 5 of antell igeae’, support availabie to the commanders unc ions Of Pera. time, conrcinaency and crisis, “ega inst MCUs and required Capabiliti dations for hie iv. HUMINT Due to the complex world power relationships
existing today, buman jatelligence (YUMINT) is becoming more important. While other sources provide seod intelligence on capabilities, HUMINT remains the nost important source to determine foreign intentions. The Panel fecls that we are not getting the level cr quality Of information that we need from this source. It iay be that we have cone to accept the admitted difficulties as insurmountable. We point out, how- ever, that the heavy investment in technical means of collec- tion and the exceptionally high premiuin on analyst quality today are ascribable in part to this deficiency in a valuable traditional source. ‘in our deliberation we addressed:clandes- tine HUMINT and the Defense Attache. Systen. 7 : The major effort in clandestine HUMINT today, and the greatest: expertise and potential for success is in the CIA Clandestine Services. We note, however, that while other _ national programs zre reviewed jointly by the DCI and the Sec- retary of Defense, this does not obtain for the Clandestine Services program. While we appreciate the sensitivity, we wish to emphasize the importance of making the product of this ffort more responsive to the nigh priority needs of the DoD. While the Panel had no-in-depth exposure to this effort, the Panel became convinced that the Secretary of Defense should explore with the DCI the possibility of the Secretary's repre- sentative participating fully in the review of CIA Clancestine Service programs with the objective of assuring greater respon- Sivyeness to Departme nt of Defense needs. “The Panel noted the veluable return’on the basis of relatively small investments made ty the Defense Att System. However, it was. felt that we must require and obtain greater productivity from this valuable source. In order to do this, ways must be found to attract the most qualified military: officers available. In our view a substantial im- pediment in the assignment of good officers to this service is the requirement that the Defense Attache be the senior mai in the post. : We recommend that to waive seniority requirener the the best qualified of! orficers a Service at attaches resardt @ss or z ed a . - - lod . - OV. Relations with the Director ox Central iInteliicence It appea rs that relati “tween the DCI and the Department o
thai problems are tpparently b: eine approached cooperative y- At the same time, however, we fee] that we should underscore the importance of méintaining a partnership in iniellizeace managencnt between the Secretary of Defense and the DC! The majority of the national inte llis ‘ence programs wre within the DoD, and, in our vie properly 50, since the Secretary of Defense is charged with the national defense and commend of the forces. At the same time, it is essential to maintain in the DCI an independent perspect ive of all intelligence with access to the President for issues of great substance. VI. Size and Scope of Intelligence ne You asked us for our perspective on the size and scope of DoD intelligence today. We consider. that the widely held concern over the inflated size of the intelligence effort is no longer valid. Over the past several years, DoD intelligence manpower has been reduced by one-third, and the level of investment in con- stant dollars has been reducea] Also, this period of near-parity between the U.S. and tHe7Soviet Union places an in- creased premium on the timeliness and accuracy of intelligence. We are impressed with the capabilities of our tech- nical collectors as an essential input to the intelligence data base, and we believe that comparison of the data base today with that available 10 years ago illustrates the detail and precision to which we have become accustomed. We emphasize however, that the data froin these collectors are provided only at considerable cost, and we see no immediately feasible way of providing this information by substantially less costly means. The cost of analytical and producticn resources to pro- ' cess the collected data is also considerabie. It is, of course, true that in any large organization there are usually means of Anproving effectiveness, and constant search for improved efficiency is require In particular, attention shoutd _be given ts establishing» a proper balance between production and colicction. However, we believe that additional appre iable
resource reductions may no longer be feasii ficant reductions in the quantity and quali tion collected, at least ian the near tern. political In light of rapidly developing ri t eve that the ul tary and economic trends worldwide, we bol important geographical areas that are rec attention and reassessment of objectives priorities may be required. A review of now of low priority seems in order ing the allocation of resources to to be receiving inadequate effort. j “ivine inadequ bands Lr Yo ek] pad f= ued sa) sO ae: ed ‘oO a fo “ : cr fee (omnn aEe i?) wy obete a) “i 0 Q ima) SS ct yO oO crn OO oO tT Ww) Since many intelligence collection programs require years to reach the operational stage, a major planning reassess- ment for the next decade may be in “order. RECOMMENDATION © —_— We recommend thet further substant ial personnel reductions in Defense intelligence should 6 olementeda only as a consequence of deliberate modiricati prioritiss and coverage, (2 (2) the. the introduction of equiomen sses ave demonstrated capabilities | "OY wand oT wh Rels (3 G) eff: efficiencies in management. —_— We recommend that a review be i graphic areas of low priority with the obié ae WES a ncaa nce Dt cea re ang if means should be sought for i) increées2 rg cove areas. VII. | Actions Taken Since Blue Ribbon ~ You asked for our evaluation of the actions tak in implementation of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel recommendations. Jn our view the central} thrust of the Blue .Ribber Defense Panel recommendations with respect to Defense intelli- gence was that a mechanism needed to te establisned to enable the Secretary of Defense to manage the intelligence programs for which he is responsible as an integrated function. Cne speci fic action taken to implement this need was the establish- ment of the Office of the Assistant Secretary cz Vefense ror Intelligence. A focal point was thus created for the coordi- nation of DoD intelligence progrcrs, providing resource visi- bility, fiscal control, capability for intecr-prosran reviews, 2nd means for prioritizing necds. Ye believe that the oatan- Lishment of the office fulfills importani parts cf the Blus Ribbon Defense Panel recommendiiions. tf
The Bluc Ribben Panel recomnmeaded t he establisn- ment of a single-point Line-< tutho ority over ell Dou intelli- gence operations. This recomumencation was not beplerented and we did not address this decision in depth. Ne are im- pressed, however, thet the DoD intelligence organization as it exists today is a complex and tortuous one, and pariicu- larly dependent for its effectivity upon the apnointment of competent and dedicated principals to insure the erfective working together of the separate intelligence organizations without demanding that an undue vortion of the Secretary's and Deputy Secretary's time be devoted thereto. There are historical and current reasons for much if not ail of this separation of intelligence responsi- bilities. However, if we accept that the DoD intelligence organization must have some considerable degree of complexity, we believe that it is necessary that effective staff cogni- zance, beyond 2 purely resource management role, be exercised at the Secretary of Defense level. The office of the ASD(I) has, since its inception, proven valuable in. resource manage- ment in maintaining the level of productivity during a period of drastically declining rescurces. The ASD(I) has also made substantial contributions to the improvement of the manage- ment of the intelligence process, and to the final intelli- gence product itself. However, in view of the connelling interest of the Secretary of Defense in the total intelligence - effort, we believe that the office of the ASD(I) shculd devote greater effort to management overview, beyond that peculiar to resource allocation matters. In narticular, we believe that an examination of the flow of inzormation through the systen should be conducted. This examinetion should seek to ensure that. organizational structure and management relationships are optimized to produce the most professional intelligence result. Another indirect result of the Blue Ribbon Panel's recommendations wes the creation of the Central Security Serv- ice for the management cf all Signals Inteiligence, with the Director, NSA specified as Chiez. The evidence indicates that this organizational change has both enhanced personnel: manage- ment and improved working relationships wi ithin the SIGINT con- munity. The effectiveness of the new unified organization, particularly in view of the many compromises incorporated i its creation, should be reassessed periodically. RECOMMENDATION - We reconmend that as study he undertexen of the flow of intelligence informstion fren collecters to producers aad 1)
fron producers to users to dete: of Conmmunice tion of such _ infornn: derivation | OL the requ rrenent “through i es of “that: requi LYE coment. SIR me me mn nm ~4
PRE BOTY Se | aeeress VACHE A Db CO. 2029 In view of the actions which have bien taken to jm in response to the recommendations ct the Blue Ribbs: and to the President's memorandum ci 5} g it would be useful to ask an outsice group "to asses effects which have rasulted. Accordingly, I would yo constitute a panel of six to ten cualified and excerienced individuais to undertake such a task. 5 “ 9 iy Y p n 2 he we ~! Following are the duties which the panel should undertake: 1. Review the actions which have been taken in the last three years to improve and strengthen DoD intelligence operations. 2. Examine the size and scope of vresent DoD intelligencs operations. 3. Exanine the interrelationshiss which exist snong tne various DoD intelligence activities and the management considerations which result from them. 4. Report to the Secretary of Defense its assessment “effectiveness of DoD intelligence overations and the ¢effic which. these operations are conducted. "5. Recommend actions which the Secretary of Dafense should consider to improve intelligen nce responsiveness to Bofense needs, to imorove the general effectiveness end cost efficiency of DoD . intelligence operations, and to correct any problems which ere observed, . I would Tike you to -possible. Their £ DeZense by 15 January 1 establish ard convene such a grous as soon as a s => :5$ should be 2 resorted to the Secretary of 7
SCHLOULE OF Mi NTINGS AND A Mecting of 29 Cetober 1974 . Overview of Defense intelligence activities . Review of Special Air Force - progran Review of Blue Ribbon Defense Presentation covering developments sin Panel - the Blue Ribbon Defense Meeting of 21 November 1974 Presentation by Director, Defense Intelligence Agency Presentation by Director of Central Intelligence Presentation by Intelligence Community Staff on "Yon Kippur War Intelligence Problems" Presentation by ASD(I) Staff on "Yon Kippur War Intelligence Problems” Meeting of 12 December 1974 Presentation by ASD(I) Staff on "Improving Professicnalism of Intelligence Personnel" Presentation by Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) on "Communicating Intelligence to the SscDef/DepSecDaf" Presentation and discussion by Panel members of "Paper A' prepared by the ASD(I) staff to illustrate a range of optional recormen- dations for Panel consideration Present tation by the Deputy Director, National Security Agency ‘Meeting of 9 January 1975 ne a a et Executive Session consideration of draft summary report
ISSUR PADLE ’ SUBJECT: Communicating Intelligence to SecDef/DepSecDet 2EPARED BY: William Beecher, Acting Assistant SecDef/P4 In an earlier and less complicated time, Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson expressed his view of the proper boundaries of the intelligence craft when he declared: "Gentlemen do not read each other’s mail.” - 7 For reasons that will shortly become clear, however, I choose | to begin this paper by quoting -- without permission —- some extensive excerpts from a personal letter received by Janes R. Schlesinger two years ago, shortly after he had been named Director of Central Intelligence. The letter writer, an experienced Washington hand, but a man in no 3 +3 2 way connected with intelligence, was adcressing a critical period during the Paris Peace Talks on Vietnam. He wrote, in part: - "I have been repeatedly and deeply concerned by the impression that - -we often have good, fresh information, but fail either to recognize | + it in time, or make use of it in tine. If this is true, it suggests that a monumental problem exists at the middle or top rank analysis. levels. . "A recent example: I sturbled, well after the fact, oato the information that on Decenser 4 [1972] Hanoi ordered an evacuation of women and children from its capital. Since such informatioa . must have been easy to come by (friendly ewbassy in Hanoi teliing us, or unfriendly one radioing the word back hone), this should have been flagsed imnadiately for the attention of the Presidseat and Mr. Kissinger, both in terms of what it cuuld sugzest Hanoi's intentions in the Paris talks which resumed that ¢ and what we might have done absut it..- fw ? cue a . a “OG > "Such an evacuation order, presuvably vould have maant one oF two things: 1) either Hanoi inteaded to dig two or three S outstanding issues remaining and was signaling its intent to be ole a] ° =) a. iad eee
io) hard-nosed with this gesture, or 2} ft was preparing to revere to z much tougher stance, renaying on Socve issues alrecdy settled, raising new ones, end prepering against the possibility that the USG micht react by a resunption of the Lonbing north of the 29ra cr Parallel. . "I don’t know r sent to the Wnite House. Ib . 6 rt rt in b 2 .o is eg "What might we have done -- if the Waite House had such information at the start of the last rouad of talks? Well, for one thing, while Hanoi has been surprised again and again by the actions of this President (the Casbodian and Laotian invasions, the reswaption of bombing, the mining), all the optimistic talk of an early settlement might have been enalyzed by the other side as putting us under tremendous self-icposed pressure. Settlesent by Thanksgiving, or Christmas, or at least by January 20, had filled all the Washingtoa = L = Ak _.. reports ~~ inspired by the highest Administration officiais. There “ Vv / and time again I've seen, from the outside /the bright, young, essential OAS was also the matter, totally clear to everyone, that the air war has been costing $500 million a month (vuafunded since October 1) and that Mr. Nixon would like to liquidate and disengage as soon as possible to concentrate on other vitel matters in his final four yeér thing, Henry might have pulled Le Duc Tho aside, mentioned the evacuation, and gently put firely warned him not to underestimate the President. Also, if since October 23 the caly airborne recce we had flown over the North was by drone, we might have sent sere SR-7ls over. They would have noted the signal... And, if during the talks (as occurred) .it becane clear the other side was operatin under new instructions, we might have moved a couple of F-4 squadr rons from CONUS back to the theater, er flown an armed recce mission north of 20 but still shallow enough so as to, minimize chances of azy heavy encounter, etc. . "My example may be Full of holes. But the principle is rn 3 n “How might we have countered Hanoi's signal early? Well, for one a information was not analyzed properly = x Doubtless there are good men on the of thing for you factually... kes and nove thea in to positio poe a rh Q x b cr ody Q +s] Je po] pt} rr 4 a = 4 MS Pr he 7] sO) tak) ie} a) . e
3 For readers of this paper vho ¢g not recall the cituation discussed in the letter, the Nixon Adwinistration thovghe it had Hanol’s azrecinanat on most outstanding issues in the Paris Peace Talks, and had only to cross a few t's and dot some. i's at the meeting schuduled eT v mK nm v a4 id ¥ Q 3 w 0 n iy 8 Lo) m n ‘> 1972, to wrap up a formal agreement. But Wanoi backed far off previously agreed positions at that rouad; the so-called Christnas bombings in the vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong in 1972 were required to get the negotiations back on track. me : I feel free to quote from this letter because I was the letter writer- At the time, I was a Washington correspondent for the New York Tiu2s with more than a dozen years experience reporting from the nation’s cepital and, as a citizen, felt that the naw DCI should hava underscored for him a problea so glaring that it was perceived cutside the Intelligence Community. ° 7 va L quote from the letter for other reesous as well. First of all, to make the point that even persons on the outside can perhaps make useful suggestions for improvements within since, if a Washington reporter is halfway successiul, he must exercise maay of the same skills as the intelligence analyst: an ability to gather useful bits and pieces of information, calibratiag each source for his degree and type Jos “ rt (9 £9 cre. bee, Fe] a3 8) ¢ C] ry “q of bias, developing a conceptual framevork for the materia thesis and discarding those that appear deficient -- ead accomplishing ali .of this in-a timely fashion. And secondly, another problem of even the best intelligence auslysis - - . - js the need to be able to get the attention ef the custener. In this
4 pacticular case, the customers of this report are #@ nusber of very busy leaders in industry and government cho (IL judcsed) would be more likely to spend some tine on a leagthy report if 3t ware packaged in a m ene te ry ~ Ce a} a) cr would pique their curiosity and interest. The Intelligeace Conaunity must make a determined and continued effort to determine who are its principal customers and what techniques might best be employed to capture their attention and satisiy their requirements. : , . It becane abundantly clear in addressing this topic that the Community has been deficient in that regard. This report is based on extensive interviews with James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Deferse; William P. Clements, Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense; General George S. Brotm, Chairnzan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Robert’F. Ellsworth, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Se curity Afiaixs | (who together comprise the principal policy makers and thus the principal te fy cus toners of the intelligence product beins ddressed in this report), together with a number of others in or long associated with the Intelligence Community in Washington. While the findings and conclusions are semawhet lupréssienistic, if they effer only a few valuable insights, the effort will have beep worthwhile A special caveat is worth offering at this pcint. Since the focus ef - . - wo. “nm - * et. - - oN That is not to infer, horever, thet PIA hes nat aceorsiished 2 geod a1 of beaiatst oe : a sty tee oe ett ; awit ze 2 Pee awe ee ign BAG Se SR ee ee . . on ToT eee . SiS OVS CE na The
L 2 and its product. Such a conclusion vould be both unfair ene erroneous. Every single person interviewed rode a point of the fact thet Dis (indeed the whole of the Intelligence Concunity) is Jong on ticbits vE fascinating deta (gleaned by very inpressiv e mechanical collection aa decrypting systems) and very short on cozprehensive, insightful and tinely analysis. Most ascribed this to: a thinness of quality analysts, civilian and military; an overlayering organizational structure so thet the report of the original analyst becomes increasingly bland as it makes its way up through layers of supervisors; an inability to make broad-gauzed judgments oa the basis of new fragments of information; an unwillingaess to go out on 2 limb in early-warning soundings and long-range estimates; a tendency to downgrade BUMINT and SIGINT in favor of "harder" photo intelligence data. Comments Mr. Schlesinger: "Most of what I see represents a lot af. £ seraping together of factual material without much analysis. But when you havé good analysis, it's more valuable thaa the facts on a ratio of ten to one : He and other senicr officials cozplained that much of the naterial presented each day, especially current general intelligence, consists of a bunch of photos and snippits of informe tion that fail to put the new data junto perspactive or iully enoush i p J o g tt (9 4 id S " % cr ik) tr n n tad AY 2 dite a) pe ie] fy rs fe) iD e Mr. Ellsworth has discontinued his daily DIA briefing regarded as a waste of time) in favor of a very briei paper u with intelligeace and overnight cable traffic highlights. General Brown has restructured his worning inteliigence briefin
6 Inceting 1s richer than othecs im that bt ine¢cliudes either the Director or Deputy Director of DIA, together with his J-3, J-5 and the Director of the opinions of the operators, the planners and the intelligence experts. * Messrs. Schlesinger and Clements for the most part get such writte: ~ . wakes om. items of intelligence as are screened by their military assis on the basis of known interest and perceived value to the issues at hand. There is an obvious lack of regular, meaningful comeunication betwe the offices of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary, on the one hand, and the _-—an -intelligence analysis on the other. The former complain that the analysts don’t comprehend what is of particular interest, either generally or ina . particular crisis, while the latter complain there is no feedback, so they have no idea whether what they are producing is hitting the bull's-eye or even the taveet. This problem appears te be compounded by th 1@ makeup of the Intelli: Community where the analysts (frequently academic types without ouch or eve: a "any experience in the field) don't have a clear idea cf whether they are writing primarily for their immediate supervisor, for the Intelligence Community at large, for the Secretary of Defense, or whom, according to y ot? J experienced hands. Frequently, alse, they work under a publish- ~or-perish pressure not unlike that in acadenia, leading to a te ney im some case to make much of some little new teapt supervisors to round sharp edges for fear that too much is cteing made of the latest glisser of infermarion. Bul when a situation SILSeS +
ae Se aay ‘considered assessments -- before, during end after crises. Iw whea much, indeed, ought toe be wade of now dota, iin sy stevn can and often co2s homnopenize the aualysis. Mr. Clements, on the besis of two years -- and several crises -- in his current post, provides this overview of the problem: "in every instance I know about where the re was a horrendous failure of intelligence, the information was in fact available to have averted the problem. But the ‘analysts and the system didn't allow the raw data toe surface. "Tn a mechanical sense,” he continued, "the systea produces the information, but it’s so damn big and cumbersome and uncoordinated, that you can "t.pet the informatien properly assessed and to the right people.” He concludes: "What ZI want ere more reflective, accurate and well- ant a constant . . : ~ oat rocess. Civen that we're spending better than 2 year, with o x > = better than] _Jpeopie involved, the performance of the Intelligence Comhunity is disgraceful." ; This report opened with the judgment —— from the outside looking in that one of the basic shortcomings of the systen was the lack of talented, experienced, imaginative and--courageous analysts getting their warnings end estimates to policy makers in a timely manner. reinforced by talks with many of the top decis siou-rakers ~~ and by the autho ‘nearly two years at a senior level on the other side of the mirror. People are the main probien, thoush by no means the cni What might, then, be donc? Soe sugzestions follow: REOPCANIZE DIA. zation of DIA to put a widcely experienced civilian intell: ed ” td oe re ve o an) B ry a ' w 4 ' +o] ay _ with so. goatinerlab ta
ae a would provides some ceutinuity Cuuch es at the heticnal Security 4¢ :) ~~ and would be looked te by the civilian enelysts throughout the crgeanizatior as providing a countervecight against the teudency for a prepoaderantly F rancl nilitary-oriented agency. THE WISE MEN. -As part of the reorganization, Five or six imaginative thinkers (civilian and military, dependiag strictly on experience and ability) should be set up with a charter of following as many key functione areas both to creatively evaluate trends and xide herd on those individuals throughout DIA who could be contributing more to these high priority areas ‘interest. They ought net be saddled with managezent reponsibility, but must have enough authority so their “suggestions” to the system would not “be ignored. In a crisis involving their area of snecialty, they could accompany 2 7 A 3 y <> the Director of DIA in briefings of the Secretary and other key policy make CIVILIAN ANALYSTS. At middle and lewer levels better analysts must be recruited, provided first rate training doth in intelligence schools and, where appropriate, in graduate schools. Consideration cught be givea te broadening theix experiénce with occasional tours with CIA, NSA aad possibl in political-military assignments in embassies where their regional specialization would be enhanced. Pay ust be conmensurate with demoastrat ability end performance. MILITARY ANALYSTS. The sane approach should be followed here as with | 4 7 onal. joo the civilians. As an addit ital, step the Services must be persuada we « to send more of their very best officer n Q pe) fo oe) “Wy re igament to DIA and to procod £ a re such men, on the basis of merit, as fast as their contenporaries who sery ~ oN
9 assipgovents privarily withta their jacividual Services. CRISIS MANS Cent. Since one of tie main probicms, as far ac policy nokercs are concerned, with intellicence performance Fm a crisis is a lack of responsiveness, thousht should be given to assigning a senior intellige professional to the Office of the Secre rr o re oO Py wo ty rh Q a] 1 m Cu f= n Sal ts G2 f ia ©] Q cat | oak) ° Qe ° rh crisis, such as the Middle East war of 1973 or the more recent Cyprus duvasion. This man would spend considerable tiwe each day. talkiag with the Secretary and his military assistants on precisely wnat kinds of data and analysis would best serve the Secretary. “He would also accompany the Secretary to the Situatioa Room in the NMCC to immediately pass on to the appropriate sections of DIA (or elsewhere in the Community) just what the ‘Secretary believes he needs to facilitate his decisioa making. ‘his could either be one man, with the sort of personality aud judgment to get along _ well with whoever is Secretary, or different man selected because ot visis situation. n experience in the area most concerned in a particular TALLOR TNE PRESENTATION. DIA must leam te be esoacially sensitive to the’ personalities of the key people being served and fashion the method of providing information to the individuals involved. Dering the Mideast 4 for example, Mr. Schlesinger often went to the special NMCC Sit Rooa for updates, but was bored by most of the "checklist" type briefing ithat . reported U.S. ships having noved 20 miles since the last briefias, etc., along with a few new Cevelopnents of ganuine significance. No one seened to notice what interested hin and what did not, in his view. Additionally, a little personal researca vould nave ascertained that he prefers (on any significant iten of intelligence) a brief oral report by an expert who can
10 aoswer questions 3, mot a briefer who only knows @ seript -- backed up by -] ty ‘ ri c ’ 2 lengthier written analyois uhich can be read “at J WORE THE SYSTEM TOCKTHYER. There eppear to be too many fieidsnn at Defense without sufficient cr systematized cross-fertilizetion. General Brovn's format at his morning meeting is a small step in the right direction However, it ought to be broadened significantly. DIA regionzl analysts ough to freely talk and compare notes with desk men in ISA (rarely the case, I'm informed), with operators in J-3 and planners in J-5, just for starters. In addition, why not have ISA set up 2 series of special “what /if?" groups, eared to anticipated problems and pessible options, including DIA prominen Dp P P Bp ? & P in the process. For example, in anticipation of the Coagressionally rendat cutoff of military assistance to Tuckey unless signiticanat progress is mada in solving the Cyprus crisis, one such group could have analyzed 2 series o - questions and offered sugse ions te the policy makers, to wit: What if ? ald Turkey agreed to pull 5,0C0 troops out of Cyprus, would thet satisfy Congres What kinds of inducements might the U.S. make to Ankera to increase chaaces rh Q (ef meaningful concessions? What would happea i ongress shut dow aid, wot Turkey pull out of NATO, disinvite the U.S. from using bases there? What implications? For the U.S., for Greece, for intelligenca on Russia, for tri shipment of weapons through Turkish air space or overland to Syria?) What elements in the Turkish political spectrum should be cultivated in eaticip of this possible crunch? Should arms in the pipeline be speeded en or show Et catera.
HORE AND BNTURR HUMINT Withosl questions the: cxtroeordinary capabilities ef technolcgsy teve unlocked sore reat velue to the U.S. Other breekthroucns will foltow ulti eaevaliv nd a important results no doubt. but there is a danger of becor:ing so resmerizeéd \ - by the product of the intelligence vacuum cleaner that we tend to underrate the value of cultivating (at times, buving in place) well informed individuals in key places. During my crevious incernatioa, I had occasion to. go on extensive reporting trips in the Nicdle East and quickly dis- covered that the best informed scurces in the region were the British and ae we the oil companies. And they depended prinarily on HUMIN _—e The foregoing suggesticns are not meant to represent an exhaustive -list of things that ought be considered, bet rather an illustrative one-~ : - in addition, certain other moves, some essentially mechanical others substantive, merit attention. For example, it would make sexse For DIA to explore sone very modern techniques of communication, parhags consultiug with a big advertising agency for expert advice. slick, catchy, sell-'em-the-packa (oi “a is competing for the time and attention of some colessclly busy men. “oa _ehen, for instance, trying to brief ea the military builcep along the 7 Sino-Soviet border, wiper noi oe brie - ‘ Q "i '
ey eel correspouding Chinese reactions -- gn a way thet car be quichty presned and Likely remewbered leag aiter the bGrigsins? I clain no substantive experbis.s oa wy extes. iva resource: are targeted oa certein things and not on others. But [ arm samesshat discquicted, that we know a lot more about the new weapons being developed for Soviet divisions, for instance, and a lot less about how fast divisions could be mobilized and moved to the front and how much combat consumedles could be ' moved forvard for sustained warfare. Also, in the Middle East, we try to make Juégaents on the likelihood of a new round of war and possible outcomes, yet we seen “to place relatively scant resources on learning such things as precise Israeli and Arab order of battle information, and stockpiles of certain key weapons (such as SAM missile stocks, rather than merely numbers of launchers). 2 period when we cannot, indeed dare not, fail te significantly iugrove our ability to comprehend and deel in real time with the myriad problems that face this nation. And that requires, first off, better intelliseace.
“DERENSE PANIIT. ONE: George M. Bunker - s Following the three meetings of the Panel in which informative briefings were presented and discussion among panel members ensucd, I want to set forth my interim reactions and such conclusions as J may have in ad- vance of the next meeting in carly January. {have reread Mr. Clements’ memorandurn of 13 Jely 1974 setting forth y g -the five duties which the panel should undertake,-and will comment on my views 2s to each of therm. I. "Review the actions which have taken place in the last five years ~--- etc." In the briefing of 29 October we heard 2 review segting forth the recommendations of the BRDP that had and had not been . implemented. I shali not comrnent in detail upon cwhat was presented as it is well known except to say I particularly noted the following: {a} The recommendation that line responsibility for all Defense intelligence be centered in one office. This oO ; . "+ was not implemented. {b) The recommendation that career opportunities be en- hanced for both military is said to have been part The advantages, in theory at least, of for all Defense intelligence are readily apparent of implementation ar evidences of less than eptimiura centrzlized controls should be directed perhaps by a continuou Q MY we ~ ve or) 0) re ay re ° =} a 2 “4 mM AY Ww Q ee we » a is] < e dowdstless £ a Q 4 roe € zation, line of autherityv and re: andthe Like, s hat ttcilivence neiivities ? tightly controlied.
- Jn the matter of carcer opportunities for bolhn civilian are military poxssonnel the BRDP eco -ntiiecnsthations rave eon pertly implemented. However, it issay belief thei rnuth more can and should be done and further in this rsemeren naduin Iwish to comment on this aspect zs l consider ii to be one of the most practicable areas for improvernent. "Examine the size and scope of present DoD intelligence operations." . The briefings and the data presented dealt with the nature of intelligence operations both in size and scope. Certainly we need a first class intelligence operation. Itis clear that we have 2 very large 1d a very costly operation but whether, taken 2s a whole, it is first class I do not know. Looking at the technological aspects separately from the human aspects I think we must conclude that technologically the intelli- gence operation is in fact very good indeed. Thus if we consider the overall systern to have deficiencies we should look first to . the human aspects for improvement. The functioning of the present organization apparently nee eds attention to achieve clear cut responsibilties for all aspecis of intelligence with emphasis on control 2nd flow of information and its analysis. Perhéeos we have focused on technological advances and given less then adequate attention to the other fundamentals. As a generality it is safe to say that almost any activity of such size and complexity can be made more effective by reexamination of priorities with a view to eliminating those of 2 lower or for cost reduction alone but in the present context to increa effectiveness of those of a higher order. Whatever cen be done ta eliminate lower priorities is likely to irnprove eifectiveness. “ixamine the interrelationships which exist emon NoD intelligence activities and the mana which result from them." The foregoing raises the key question in regard to the organi- Q g 5 i zation of activities that we know are of great ranguitude 2r ptenity. The present form of or ganization hand the interrelationship t that have resulted are so tortuous that one might wonder how any- thing useful is acaamoiiihed. . ,
ee i tas To make any worthwhile immproverent one must po bach to the scope Of activities, Cxamine the priorities, and try to clirninate those of low ty prioriiy, Having vrecuced activities as much as 9ossible then undertake to oreanize them and pul them into a £ } network that is as simple és the situation will perrnit. It seems quite apparent thet technology and resource manage - ment have received much more attention than has been given to matters of personnel and organization. No doubt this explains why our intelligence data scems io be superior to our methods fo & handling it. The writer recognizes such generzlities may not be too helpful j in identifying actions that might be recoramended for reasonably ; - prompt improvement. On the other hand if these conditions are mot realized improvements are unlikely to be achieved, - "Report to the Secretary of Defense its assessment of the effect- iveness of DoD intelligence operations ---- ete." The advances that have becn made in technology and it applications in recent years are indced truly remarkable. One suspects, but can- not prove, that technolosy is elmost solely responsible for the intelli- gence gains have been made despite enormous complexities in both scope and form of organization, 7. it is my impression that the net result of our inte Mligence activities is much better than we sometimes believe. But this is not to sa ay that they could not be greatly improved by examination of priorities, by better people and by a simplified form of organization. This all leads me to an anomalous conclusion, namely that if, 2s some seem to believe in the real world little can be done toward simplification of scope and organization then indeed intelligence activities may be at least as reasonably effective as one might expect. ; As a matter of personal reaction I cannot see the Yom Kippur experience as a failure, but rather as a circumstance in which the most that might have been extracted from the system was not realized, J would caution that we not mistake a crack for a fault. Perhaps we expect too much. In retrospect we can now identify indicators of a possibie surprise attack prior to the Yom Kippur war. Had these indicators boun acted upen there eee | have been
would have been criticized for cwwrone, for cresting tension, for possibiy provoking war, to tay to know the capnbilities y I @ : A ry of others bul certainly we must not eesumme that copotabit intention. We cantry to predict the intentions of others but it would be fatuous to expect thet we can ebhvays know their intentions. “Recommendations which the Secretary of Defens«: should consider to improve intelligence responsiveness to Defense needs ---- ete." In this connection I focus upon the rather obvious opportunities to improve the quality of the output both by upgrading the cormpetence of the personnel, and by improving the means by which it is com- municated. We are told that betterments in these areas have been made as a result of the BRDP recommendations of 1970, Be that as it may we have none theless seen evidence that says there is room for further upgrading ; : The Services do not assign a high priority to the intelligence function in the career pattern. It does not seem unreasonable to reach far a priority at least equal to that of other career opportunities. Few would disagree that the quzlity of output wil of personnel.. Accomplishment rnay not be or Limprove with competenc either easy or fast but . this is nonetheless one important step for betterment that can be taken by the Secretary of Defense. On the civilian side we see that civil service regulations make it “most difficult to recrvit and retain personnel skilled in the eppro- prizte disciplires and of the intellectu capacity | required ofa - clue first rate ane ane The analyst rele c2 ie x patterns and the like. But perhaps even rnore importent is the need to recognize the function as not 6) v3 Q ie) rey 7) 2) we iv) as 4 9 4 a a a rs Qo ~— 6 QQ “ but as one of lone based upon intimate, in some cases Life long o 2 > knowledge of the poltiical, eecrraghicel, ethnic, and cultural nepects of a particuler grea. These talents are not casily guired t y oO and the assignments cannot be adcquately filled by transfer: rin an employes wh performed well in other assignrnents. . » romoting either a military officer or 2 civil: <>
efforts ere being mace tou that as rnuch emphasis es ylied ta modhiyurs civil service requiremen the functioning of the syst have its difficulttes it of Defense-ceuld lend his direct In the final accounting the quality of the output cen be no betier than the com- petence of the pe ersonnel. Aside froin rnatters o : flectiveness of person nnel. ‘DIA is seriously fragmente ed in several or ey sical locations and jts effectiveness in general must be diminished thereby. £ question of funds required this is a situztion that ¢. can be easily and useiully corrected, | a —— an averaze briefing for @ e@ slings up by details that may be fasci atin ig but do not lewd to conclusions. Where they are inciuded solely to v2 lidate the Cate they rnzy in fact obscure siginii- cance. a , itis my belief tha t cémmunicetion with the top decision makers should be . structured to inform them of what they want to knew combined with what ” they ought to know. And furthermore at the top ef leas? the briefing should be done by those who have first hand knowledge and have themselves played important roles in determining the significance of the meterizl under con- sideration. . 7 ; . mey be tac inclined to ‘seek cOMmD cause of a pre-occupation with technolog we may have given too Little atten that nothing w ould | improve our vateltincnee ef people, clearly defined responsibilities and a scund organizational structure. be Ne os na ¢ =~ z an o 1 ~ pw 2 ~ ae
nae AN OVER TEE GE Refs ER Tos 208 PIGGY ibs Dr. Alexarmde: th Ptax The present posture Of the duicliivence couwunity, its physical assets, its oreanizational structure, bts aiieceticn of Manpower and resources are all still very largely tho product of histery since World var T) aml particularly, the pericd S Inve the Soviet stractesic nuclear threat beran to develap | Ge, since 3859). Me inmvestrent in large collection systen explo tation prosr: aint overscas stations since that 7 time has been ve Lares and the ynertic of the associated institutions and bureaucratic mechanisms has: grown correspondingly larser. Major collection programs tend to take on the order of Five years or more to plan, program, budget, develop and implement and fron requirenents point of view, most of the present collection systeas are vastly more capable follow-ons to predecessor systeas which began ten to twenty years ago, made possible by the phenomenal technological growth which took place during this period. In a detailed sense, v.unat happened was an illustration of one form of one of Parkinson's laws, namely, detailed coliection "requirements" expanded to meet the technolozical capabilities available. » Given the historical sequence that breucht the intelligence community to where it is today it is not surprising that alnost ali systems for collection (and thererore also a goed bit of the enphasis in processing, analysis and production) are focused on the Soviet strategic nuclear threat and more recently, as a clese second priorit ty on the Soviet con- ventional threat to Furope. This 15 not to say that these very cap2bi “vacuum sweeper” collection systems do not also collect a great de stail of other useful information on other areas which is suitably processed and analyzed but the pringry driving force which affects the size and scope of the programs and, therefore, their major costs (and bureaucratic constituencies} is the emphasis which has historically been laid on the Soviet threat. Third in priority is the so-called Sino-Sovict bloc (a tena which, if not factual as a descriptor may be resarded as a historic relic of the old days of bipolarisn) which brings in China, North Korea, North Vietnan, etc. then the needs, objectives and requirements associated with these countries and the threat postulations they evoke pave boen taken cate of, it is safe to say we have accounted for probably at Teust G0 percent of ‘fall intelJigence costs, military ami civilian, tactical and stratesic, “Y theater and national. Therefore, if one leoxs at other areas of the world, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, etc., it is risleading to refer ti othe re ‘esources involved. ces are ten perCoat or less of those chount stantial, are no longer so astronomical in $s legs out “among the many different areas invo
seek — Oe The hey uted biesace over tho past decade Trive Afvica, cid Latin Auerici ohio: ti Tara the Jatter almost @lveys boi, in Years: coupt ing to the action. Jn Jight recedd ments dn SALT, MBER and cetomic-or SOMenb lite <atcad ard : industrial exchanees with tie Seviei Union, other and China, and the many new or enhanced tes fevcel co! which have been developed cipce 1950, the Uline ds rips ne. for mental reevaluation and recricring of boin ob jective: ond rey. for different scographical areas and ihe best means for moct iin “objective *s and requirements. In particular, if appears that i HUMINT should be especially reassessed with respect te the c evolving. situations. What is involved her 3S not ha reordering of n 2 ane) & 3s ‘ intelligence priorities as a reconsideration of the relat priorities, objectives, and resources. ow . Lonships between THE PRESENTATION OF INTELLIGENCE REPORTS Jf the intelligence community is to do more than produce material for its own edification, it is necessary that it give significant atten- tion to the ways in ‘hich its outputs are to be presented to those wh may be able to use them. And the problen is most critical with respect to those users, or potential users, at the hichest levels of government since thoy must base their decisions on aa adequate appreciation cf wha is or may be at stake in the breadest rational and international coutext ; SO much because probebly an unettain- mat 1s in an inteliigence sha Le elaperetel of uncer- zB It is here that the present system most often fails, not it fails always to give the right answer (which is able goal) as in making clear the essentials of © estimate or assessment, on what it is based, and tainty is attached to. s 3" ee ‘fhe following facts are illustrative of the Ki information which is cften, if not usually, leckin reports, estimates and assessments. Character of inputs. Are they independeniiy drawn fron recent assessments by others, or 12! "Finished" intelligence reports of long standing? changes reflected in them? Wnat has beon the reliable are the inputs? Is there any diverges the inputs amon elements? alysis. Given the inputs end wicertainiics, a . _p “sed? What were the areas of expertise tean. .e.9., regional political, mill degree were analysts in touch witi teams dealing with the sane subje Tdobes Ss _such analyses, he should know the degr What inpul uncertainties had the gre iP analysis? What Fac 3 taken anto account of
Reeibioy Vtidines) Consdutons. bis, ; } ( peascuchio limite of error cid tafera process Lt sete, wait ere Conmtdered th aeyb tho worst Cie whieh ceric bo forgone Other side which dopend Gi antiga Ue or . Wheto Gre the thine cog 8ihs el deci! Co (Gr third party ‘) act Wiiat ise arrived at separately or “Collectively | Obviously not all of these issues anZ questions need to be or highlighted with resmect to every ditchligsace report, est 2, @S - ent, but the key issues do nced to be brousat out (c.g., the key mili issue in the Middle Fast War of 1973 wes obviously the change in morale, resolve, training, Leadership and Competence or Avab military forces anc not the count of the iast ai rcvaft or tank delivered from the Soviet Uni yet the tacit asstnption had been made by ae ‘community’ that these had not changed, indeed could not change for almost a gsoneration. Hence, this key issuc was not addressed.). x The. prima ary function of manageaent of intellig not be to attempt to second guess anaiytical spec areas Of expertise (although checks and balanc ces specialists could be provided); rather the manag u size the information transfer process to the users, which would include the ferreting cut and highlighting of the uncertainties, key unresolved questions and the degrees of freedom still left an the situation dependent on cur (or third party actions, policies and proncuncements. ft ais important to rm ro a] ligence community to achier s respect to users are the t llective Wis Ral homogenized judements a 5 ground ¢ out bY committees or either tha intra or intera tgCACY coordinatio oA process. These procesure °S always tend to reduc- tion of all problenis by the lowest cormon dencainetors which often fore- casts a dull gray dawa when what is really to be expected 15 either a rosy red or an ominous blue. Although the general pri of all intelligence outputs special force to the support reasons (sone stated abave), nc repeatedly been tried and Foun: tomers. The Director, DIA Situation by creating the necessary sts “organizational a arrangements (whicn need these appropriate management Jisciplinis process and. the associated presentetion 7
Ae overall gqeuidgace for te Goeniat Oo fe sae Bisich ar tmielticp: Secretary Clavents said: “Pleas: de mot ticker wilh Gt." He further seid rn puecace best if the poeel thinks the systae fo qenerotly ell ridin gated to caun up with recemaund:.fong Por eicot lions sbochaages unless they are beliaveaed to be geanuinely regtuired or desirable. In atbemoting to apply this guidance end at the a major resheping ar _Festruct turing of tne United Stat probably not in ordec--end certainly not es a credible determination of this pang the first erder of business seems to be identification Pground which the penel should plow.” . 2. SHORE OF PANEL ACTIVITY. gence vis-a-vis the management of resources required to serve the avarali be examined hes occurred. Hanegers ere locking For outside judgment which has ne! been involved in the failure, but whose collective breezdth of ex uncover significant Plaws that thase close $} cr eh er to the preblen have nat detected, Certcinly there was a failure which promsated this ena, and beth Secretory Cleinant: and Secretary Hall mecde clear that it was the Middle Eeet War of Gctote’r 1975. be were caught by surprise. Ma seanent of the intelligquncenmplax officinily that the Egyptians were going to attack. J 3. PSTELLICS NCE CXPERIERCE , . - a : . : - es . ¢ a - During a fast three days of interviesiog several poopie in OFA end the Sorvies Tatelliqesue agentias, § sfogeb i orsbher above -7
‘usually mat incli ties Reda. Ti was poateled oul aiveragl tines that owe didoavt fave this at the toss dering the period that preceded the Qetebnr (ova wtbeok, aad thus purhans did suffe a failure that could et Teast in part be liid to t ry bee ts , . Shoavbceativy. Ido not Fully agree with this, and atteapled to meke sure thet I undarstos a an “experienced” intelligence officer is in this epoarent consensus. Tire answer sc to be that he is one whe is either a designated specialist, of ane wha hes had mens assignments in intelligence jobs, or both. Certainly these specialists are require ir i) cr Ss to) cr Oo ae) pw e < fet] ae) i) °o -n cr Pa ( ee so cr Q b= ~~ be ite) (9 bs) ce] Q zs bee he ry i) ty) i?) Po “< “ oO ios cr 2 Q co iets a 3 < o V ba 2, Q 2 cr Q tr pas at b07 iy] x oO rm Cc sion of nonspecialists. The care in selection of the Chief of the DIA and his deputy is Certainly no 1 alection of a key military commander or chief? of staff foe important than the cere in i%) I feel in fect that it may in some cases be even more so. Many important character istics shauid be considered. An insetiehle demand For qoud information is one of . cr a tl Fa . roar Q w oe) 2 cr G rs fy ) ce we 2 Lp QO O x ts ue) 0) [rood st ) dete 4) Ie “ uy ~ 1) ct ro : Le . ive} Cc cc a long list of previous assic ments in intelligence snecialties is relatively unimso ortant provided goed people of sucn background are assigned to his immediate staff. we hy cr pws teria for the selection of a high-level defense or militery intelligence chief would center First on an officer whs has been a successful commander. Good Commanders understang the importance of intellicence; and cf sascialists. They als understand resgonsib ~ ~ joe er “ c Oo cr i] = oO ct ) be rs 12] un role as zn analyst ("estinete of th ee] pve tuation"), and are not gancrally inclined to be sueyed by a presonderance of — ct Lo} a] < wv ry ~~ 3. “4 og xf chal co. ra b) ios Q vd rv 2 "y “) Q — ey ve o a cr ree in Q ry 19) ¢) a 3) or fee — re et ~ he “7 of “4 . cad Q cf a conapounded analysis of probable intentisns, T have knowa, wsrked For, end seen in action comaanders whe continuclly qive
de tee eee ceen is Ctedh Cub Coates ee a Pepe sips Bere bar y Ea Tah 5 mo Uyuuting, of pouyiey the Goewil's advocate. liege Ca cenaton. GPlb ool pul ap with & chink viv noiounderobant chy he desist: on theo bacticn ane the qmuaslily reepoqce which the aeaarate, Contrarivion, they will olteapt to hoid an Leaccioinly bo e chick who and wha dees his best to produce the reab-dite: dé Formation ant analysis thet his needs. Usually, Cosaruiders will look for inteliiquice chicts who have hed good opereticnal experience (to include tackicel commends), end will shy evay fren specialists" for this tup jos unless they nave hed such exoericace ° i In summary of this point thon, I believe that at eny level which involves ca ‘or decision-making resnons ibili ty, the intelligence chief and his immediate statf shoutd have a balance of experience. If the chief is selected for his rezl-norld down-to-earth, pragmatic experience--usuelly as a commander or onerator~--his depu should be a specialisi; and vice versa. I! prefer the former conbination. a 4. CURREP:T OIA SCOPES CF ACTIVITY AND BESBIISTZILITY. ° The starpede for centralization in the 00D in the early 1959s most certeinly invalved defense intelligence. This was one of the first activities to face swee reform under Secretary icNemara. As stated in the Issue Paper, two broad roles envisioned as centralized production of all military intelliaence wt OSD level = 2 z vel, & centralized collection managenent through centrol, velidaticn, registry, and levy of ali O90 collection requirements. This wes a big arcer, end in my judguent mor conducive to empire building than it wes te the savings and cast-erfectiveness wh wow “tail-number"™ menagemaent at the top wea susposed to bring apse The order wes Further campounded ver a resource management tasks on DIA's back. and charting, S€f production, photo Libr 1 . ny A ' Lind ~ Me re a ") ns ve 1 ms 5 ‘ m a "
Owed and partly Uhrou,t bine hacd cok ang Paceuighied sur His hag heen chanved, aarliy thoough rence ido Ob fhe tiue hes emer pxratitoe: cf £50 (1). The best exanples ate Sepurealion ant af GrA ef mapping and cherting responsitilittes, some reatrucburing of sobeculed Gai prasuctien effoerk which «lier more Flexibility for meebing wilitery service requirements, and essumptinna by £5. ( of general intelligence and SRV resource managoment responcitility. Mera can be dane, in wy opinion, toward Further improve: 5. JOT ASSECY PHILOSCEHY ASD GARAGE HENT It is my belief that within the period since Wlorid War IT when first the Unification of Armed Forces and later the Ager ies for Joint Supscrt emerged, Jo or Unified Command has worked better than have most of the Jaint Agenciss. th bed ye Ss so in tha case ef intelligence (DIA). s so because the joint agencies have attemated tea much, end am convinced it Generally speeking the measures for redressing this imbslance are Functional decentralization of collection, specizlized enalysis, end in sovs instences management (a good deal of resource management has already been decentreli The principles of management for eccanplishing further cecantralizetio include executive agencies, counterpart production, and bath closer cosperation an Formalized interdapendencies at the tcp (OIA, Service intelliceace Chiefs, and JCS 25 recommended in the Folloving paregrephs). ? 6. DIA VIS-A-VIS MILITARY SERVICE be. IT have sowe rather strong views on this ghich tie Girenti Comsand Plan and the Unified Betion for Armed Forces paseo. Thesa tus Fe Sco owblicatian: bagresgeucb aha © tart foi d > co
Oh dey ew prescoibed hy abe ave reqardod elthe Strictly military sorvi responsibilsti ally which contributes to the forces to meet the defense The Unified and Soecified include operaticnal unit training. I believa that form the basis f need For much services, and rc s possibly S&i. the easly 6is based on this shicn the S because of this CP end the UN te + voryee - . the clas ZCOSF surrounded hinself lew in the Unifisetion Acts of 4247 aed Wha. Tn oy opinien these ton ofien puid only lip scevier by Lhe average ot Siogibecresea gerued coulth igsorence of ao aliituds of usimpucienee. soeaking, aad in ils theca done. ces are anes of supporting the Uaified and Specified Conazacers supnULt es of operating Functions «re bas sical ones of training and logistical nature. They include everythin Lion and maintenance of well-traineo end ell-equ E yer conbetant responsibil ies ; of the t 2 r Component Cormenders. The AINA Lommensetse Y sofar as they epply to indivicusal end strict interpretation of Service roles and missions ar redical chsages in enzlysis which the scope of mast every The original efforts toward caitralizetion of adaoted a blueprint fer inte} reading, yet curiousiy none of the cost-affreccivans strict reading, but courgently propsse that all planners keen the RAF in mind~-to becone batter ciudents of thoon fuacsmenteal decunants shionrast of iatcili ows : sheer fer sooscher nay athe: -
pitivary pioanioag., Pit is ay ehurryvation that dnch of Zew tecye tad te Cacuuents dn eutte usiverual im militery percousel, jure an laos OF tiacundeckya ene reserct far the Constitution and Gocleraiion of Pedependcace is alarainghy bechkion on the aevi of the averaya voter. r Go propose changes in DTA/Services relelioashios, Aawiver, that are believed: not to fall under the heading of “tinkering.” In attempting to perlay “thea lau’? of the UCP and the UtAAr to the honast I~ ity of how things shauld work--and essotiated requirements-~I believe there are tuo considerations of overriding importance te remember. The first is that each Service Chie? is a member of the JCS, and as such he does have very definite operat ional resoonsibilities since the JCS is the immediate governing body oF the Unified P 3 and Specified Commanders, These responsibi lities are recognized to be of specialis character--respectively For air, sea, end grouad matters-~and ere fundasantal to £h fabric ef balanced homogeneity of the highest military tribunal raporting direct} os | = ed Ne ta the Secretary of Defense. The secand consideration is that of the Service-oriented camaonents cf th Unified Commands. These are of ths same fabric by design ual-service w a. 0 ri 0 - ied Canmands. They depend m ba ¢ Q 2 it] ~ ie] 3 te] 4 - cr a (ss) Cc 2. be ty yoo rie) a 8 a is) 2 ie} pa) 1S je Gv I~ ia} ro] ‘9 Ow ty ie) te] cr ~y (a) c pe] jwe “0 today, and if so how they can be eccomaliched fa the decatl paasved wlth a minincs if of resource-consuming duplication. on . Qne iden that offers much promise to mea is thet ef dist rales for Service Eech would te a deput y Girecter af DIA, and shore with the npocer a gdaFiedtiene: care entttittian Tos and within fie system. Grunluran cy
. mo ~ wee 6 ae tt . te avs 2oree act aievick eb 63 d pices ef oringdoal sucpork to OFA inin the ayefea gales Elo. toe acpeed on g Taos foreclived becis of cosperation. bo recur clrermgly thot thin be Gong, amd thet afier ectatlishing the principle a etudy Groun be Varad too celoraioe Lise Cateils how best toa accomplish the obgectives of true intearation of the DGD incelligeaca systea withoul exacerbating the Flexibilities thet must be preserved, The YER anc the UNAAr should serve <s aparepr riate guides in establishing the procedures which poly. 7. OTF AND TEE JOTHT STAFF. The arrangement whereby the Director, DIA is also t a « a t N foe io) c c ct io] er a pe OQ Puedd 3 w . not know how well the Chairman and the other members of the JCS taxe edvantage of this in sheping requirements and effecting inter-service coordination--zes well as defense intelligence policy--but it is meade to order, end I hope this teo-way influence is being exercised to overall national adventege. This errangement is in eccord with the recomaendation made ebave that Service intelligence chiefs ba appointed deputy directors, DIA. Service intelligence chiers would thus serve th re Live service chiefs of staff both in the service role eng the JOS role. _General Graham received praise from all Service intelligance chiefs for his action in revitalizing the DI8. It was pointed out that he holes requler weekly etings, other nonscheduled meetings ws required, and that he ellows only the principals to attend (noe date-shufllers as a much-needed procedure in order te 2nd T support the wisdaa of such a move with utmost enthusicss. In the course of recent discussions I] osined the imnresuion that the defense - * oan ca unity ccanpelly ragavce SiO TA. aes . tothe) as tha nm ~
velucble sourcas oF defense bebelliosnce. roatan quinsd Gieo tmavuseion thet peter gs. Pelt te the in order fn Goth af thou: casi beenis. the ceobratication: of SECU) combrst and anslyaia all ESA-procuced SEGMIY analyocen ware ool tafeg meda aveiluole Tor service ust, ev , that there was no way for sure of knowing wnat was mat being onc 3 not formed specific conclusions or opinions on what correckive measures~-if enay--z in crder here--but co a feo in there cr vee the 3 a ceqree of autonomy in USA that is pote tially unhealthy; that more SIGIUT analyses should be performed by the OLA end th: military services; and that other controls and crossfeeds could improve the quick availability of vital SIGINT intelligence to 2ll service user neads. Recommend tt be given a particular examination. oo + The Defense Attache systen is believed to need some overhaul. The first and most vital fault is the policy which requires that the Defense Attache be the sea! in military renk amongst all assigned service attaches at that station. I believ: - thet this policy should be abolished, end that the officer best qualified for the P q job be assigned irrespective of his dete of rank relative to that of the other abtaches. The policy in question-~insafar as can be determined--stems From the t: honored military custom that in eny military office or Functien the mana wha has o: in grad2 the lengest of those in tne highest grave present is the bass. This cus ped is belisved to have largely cutlived its usefulness, and particulecly so as it e5; Il believe that attaches should ba assigned to the theator ceanendars (CINCs). Th are at least three arquments which meke this attractive. the first is the CiInc- Knbassedar relaticnshio. Tf is naseasnarily 2 ciesa une if thinas wark as thay ar. ~ . ~ od on eo earl gers -\h + - ye Le olin Sow a weve? : “ss Verma CO wy, Ae termeiye: bay Sor la YUL Saree er ate mh ooifFeresnt a rs a
Lbecush established Cogmuainnbion avauctice, and the inforaunt: dopa and Gi eploan, bivtp Gajgectiveu in sovrviny tim: ooliowse) Gaus: fever munch They dieave a cantar: rengori. * t ef. - a oe : . . , . . ¢. The attache sorpven thes bath. Hie prediction sheold Se avellasiea ta both wital and time-sensitive at the MCA level ofll act thare just es Test ane office of the DIA. Moareavar, it will eliminate the CINCs sometiaas being bypassed with valuavle information or intelligence frum this source. : ° The setond advantage of this managerial change perteins to tha very insortant representational aspects of the atteche profession. it could be better se earyad in my opinion if attaches were assigned to the Unified Commands. . enhanced. (Promotion boards pay a lot more ettention te effective The third advantage of this changs would be that promotional equity should be written or indorsed by a Unified Commander than they do to those of the DIA Atteche Chicf.) The overall banafit here is the liveration of a requirement to be of high seniority in grade to qualify for the Full spectrum of attache resocnsibility-—end hence a step through proven perfarmence tovierd bigger jobs in or out of specialties. Tagether with an enlightened attitude by service chiefs end promotion boar of intelligence (and especially atts che) essignments on the part o d 7] toward “intelligence types,” this would do much to eliminate the unasopularit mTayFtLous and “t) broadly talented of Fic » _ PareeereneDanian ganas SPECTAL IZED COLLECTIC! By and large these shovld doe operate oe Cu. 0 2 tf = 3 1] i] i uo rs c: Le) < et a ies) ry tes ra ts tary Sarvices, overall policy and operationnl cantral being exerniced by the A5D (I). Vi. AIALYSIS AND ESTIMATES. . moe A Dib 2
&. Officer mention of DEAL Tnapraving Ule cuality of the me produet will imprave resoect and roger’ even probable = - that increasing raph . ibe counterprody o @astoned ta DEL searching for roanagement or rangement bureaucratic procedural nonsense ane the viability of any oreanization, chicken-and-eg# situation in my view. To these issues I would add the following: a. Achieving a better batance in the Intelligence Comrnunity. Scares & bet eeee Ths Teese ek eee A great deal of effort goes intohardware and into what the cornrnunity terras "bean counting", i.e. data base correction, and not enough into supporting. tactical commanders. Technical intelligence is largely consumed within the intelligence community. The emphasis on tactical application and tactical priority of intelligence collection, analysis and distribution should be increased relative to that given technical application. When new systems are being censidered, and older s systems being updated, tactical needs must be ascertained and e: <ploitation and tirneliness of product must be assessed raost carefully in order that the total systém is responsive to tactical needs. At the ‘Clo: se of our last meeting you wane "Whet kind of a job does military intelligence do to be responsive to SecDei? Can DIA be structured to do tharkind of job?". You spoke of the need for improving professionalism of the operation, asked what kind of Ss and how responsive should it be. These views are submitted in response to those questions. , , 1am attaching to this Ietter a "Statement of Surveillance R Si d m t ments { r Fleet Tactical Support", which I pre repared ee - .} fiewia B Richardssn y, i ~, bvT Attachment { $ 4 ~ — — MER Attachment is properly classified , per EO 11652, due to the intelligence sources and methods described in the contents of the enclosure, thus exempt per 5 USC. thy classification and (3) sources and methods.
Thisgods a big nuigeat to sorb cub ott paused be GlAnereviou welsti wdaicady eccterow few Camscate and vecomened lian abies GL Further oofore feeling qualified too mote: even af.ner.> resonsondalins; PE eins who shouta Ca what and bow. A few brand observations are, hovever, in order. The Pirst concerns ler tae warning. Must Unified and Companunt Comacndors have en indisputably vi bal firsez6 fo tactical in stelligente. lt needs to be as near re#l-time as possible, and ‘much of a specialized nature «es reusrds air, ground, and azyval operation & ret cr hws °Q impossible to meet these needs without en appreciable stru we ~~ et ure of interpreters analysts, specialized equipment, and resource controls directly undar the sunervis and control of the commanders concerned. Oirect readout, for exemnle, of certain sources of tactical intelligence is vital tn the commandars of nuclear strike Force ' They cannot wait for layers of analysts undse somebody els2’s contrel to praduce estimates thet are fed back to them through the bureaucratic or reversa-flau comrand processes. This is not te say, psrenthatically, thet imarevenents cewld r he o er 5 be made in organization of the comaand structure for nuclear Forces which woud obviate | same duplication of these vitalities, but the fact renains thet each such commander in the established systea naads it. I believe that the cutbacks in recent yeers in intellicanc technical specialists) has been borne too heavily at the aracs this type of intelligence must be generated. This is ¢congers resources for tactical intelligence needs ettsatian. Another broad cbservation cancerns the raguireaent for procduchieon at the ten As ted earlier 2nmcnh reauires intelligence end it must caver tha “ar AS noted lier, the NCA requires Good intel €. ti ‘ ‘ : : tert subjectively. However, I would davdt that the emouat of datnil eust oa an uoteric 2s has traditionally existed in modern’ tises--ner that the quantities af sesci ow
wo wooviag Of decenipalized pradauction da sthawtateh web besraved, Che Letent a: mph Catia for OFA, OUIfAil, ACST, enc OFT ce mst ceflect (ai the wewhingbon Jevel) fhe. kind of decentralizing trang that bP believe to be epurgprintes-canpecially in basic | produclian, 12. SURUARY CUSERVATIONS AND COuCLUaIG a. The Directer, CIA anv cther ton defence selected under & primery requirement of long exnerience 23 an intelli & balance at the top echelons of successful command or speretional manegament ience, in association with immediate staff specialists of extensive intelligence experience, is the best combination. — . . . be The ‘management of defense intelligence production is overcentralized. fA long-term plan for decentralization of much of the production and certain resource management responsibilities should be eccomolished. Generally soestin tactical Pp 2 a) wre a intellig ence end S47 should be given pricrity attention in this effort, end also generally sneeking DIA should provide policy, contingency direction, end management,» c. In the process of dsce entralization f production, to inc estimates (and withaut losing necessary control of procedure end requirements), ths principles of executive agency, Counterpart producer, and closer top-level casrdinz should be given prine consideratign. d. 5A should perform pvimarily collecticn of SiGini and C ould bo assigned directly to the Theatre Contucder . sbkreative of fice unltng Lhe: Oia.
Nat f. Generethy ceackiog, the oallitery accvices shoubd ope leet weaicholizved imtelligoace Collection vesourean. g. The errangeccat of the Director, OLA helng ee may —) ” fe a ' ‘ewe NN ~ 2 ~ ~ Me os 2 ms o. c [cal er : oe el ™ jw e outsiuadiag. Pt sheuld not be changed. h. The revitelizetion of th: Defense Intelligante Razed under Geaers Gratasi- and the manner of conductian its business free of cumbersove deteil-~is-great. Thi is a real contribution to better intelligance management. : i. Tactical Warning is a requirement which must be supported by intelligence specialists in threat anelysis and estimates, It must be under the direct control of the cemmanders involved. Recent intelligence manoower cuts have reduced these resources ta a dangerously low point. oo pe ttle /-. OO Aectel tneed Oe, . BRUCE K, HELLOWAY
e . . we Blectrorverenetic systems Laboratory Sunnysale, California 94666 Honorable Albert C. Hall Assistent Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) Department of Defense Dear Al: As I sce it, the principal issue confronting defense intelligence today is how to make marked improvements in the quality of the intelligence product within the obvious constraints on funding. I believe that the collection program is generally in good shape and ‘ain particular, the recent generation of exotic technical sensors are doing an outstanding job. The analytical and interpretative effort on a uv . the other hand has fallen far behind to the detriment of the ultimate produ-t. I believe that truly significant improvements can be made in our intelligence analysis program by a determined effort in three areas: . - a 3. Irnproving techniques e I will comment briefly on each of these. . 1, Improving Professional Standards J believe that five specific stens s professiona. standards of Defense intelligence analysts. . ‘a. Establish a M.S. program in technical intelligence analysis to supplement the M.A. programs at Montercy Naval Postgraduate School and the Defense Intelligence School. Vhere could be two such prograins; one at Monterey specializing in Computer Analysis of Signal Data and Analysis of Electronic Systems; and one at the Air Foree Institute of Technology specializing in Tele ly ‘of Aerospace Systems. Both programs should y Analy and academic standards raay be in order for t
“4: fo} ee boo fimprove career apportanitiog for civitioa. ene the inteNigence anslysis fieki, Ab EVas hes e)redaeby rae suggestions on weys of acconmptichiong this, : ce. Bxerop! DIA from Civil Service rogubvions, as done with NSA dg. Establish @ civilian Deputy Director in Dif. TF could be specifically tr € fee’ Cle esponsible for Defense intelligence anal e. Nurture an uncquivocal cormmiirment to objectivity of analysis within DiA, 2. Improving Or¢anizational Structure fheeas a a Pris Deputy a. Establish an organizational relation between DIA and the Service intelligence agencies (FTD, e.g. and the Service cryptologic agencies. b. Broaden the role of the Service Cryptologic ISLINT and Electronic Warfare (as now exists at ASA). _ include like the rela Ace encies to These rvices aspects of their charter would be under the cognizance of the Se while their SIGINT activities would remain under the cognizance of NSA. 3. Improving Efficiency a. A considerable improvernent in analysis Cue achieved by making much broader use of the computc tool. Generally the computer is alreesy © e technical analyst as a computation toola general intelligence analyst, however, is wmakia of the computer and the potential for imp t applications are unglamorous but sowerful: data s automatic indicators of a change of state in collect comparison of data from diverse sources; and con Writing. ‘ - b. A conside the results of analys of consumers. Bill e made a number of excellent recommendations, tion betweeen NSA
IL hope these ideas are of somne help to you, Iwill be happy ‘o claborate on any of thein 45 you ¢ i esire. Sincerely, J Williara J. Perry
. Reheat let FE fone 2 ee kL te. 2 8 ? see WAS Dots, fe oo Ban Phsceanbers D2, V0 AL fe MEMOR ANDUM FOR DR, HALL, ASD) 7. SUBJECT: Issues for Defense Pane! on Intelligence m J would like to camment on four issues this rnonth: 1. Qualified Personnel - - My inv tion on the quality of people 2ssi problem (attachment A) and part agencies (attachment B). restigetions confirm your presenta gn ed to DIA. That is partly a DLA ly 2 problem afflicting all defense 2. Communicating Intelligence Cuiput - Bill Beecher has outlined the problem very well. The SecDei might wish to consider an assistant from the world of j journa alism or equivalent to help him put intelligence in perspective whiic not interfering with DIAs proper . role (see attachment C). », CS 3, Compartrentalization vs. Real Time Needs - The committee seems to be in ayreement that action j is necessary, but some recommenda- tions are athached {aitac herent D), ; 4. ‘CON MSEC vse SIGINT - Our operators! desire to pro ovide COMSEC to. friends and allies runs afoul of tne SIGINT communi ye The need to develop some policy in this regard right be consid ce) Lad re) Rs bee jon) Cy 9 5 f= fv rf S a e . ; eee = . SI yy prmeren ee - \ a . Thoinas Cy, Reed ** | . 4 Attachments
- ftechinent A. Quslifiecd inteltigosce Perscniuel G.itiarry) Probleny = Vane intelligence Comic ty Cogs nut ei r to cet its fairy share of the best quolified officcrs. . Qualification within the iniclligence ficid is obtained by participating ina well des ane career Cevelopment pattern with goad balance between a varicty of intelligence assigniments and attendance at specialized sc chools both Service and civilian, ‘he c#liber of officers within the intelligence field, in relation to ot ther officers in the Service, can generally be deterrnined by observ ing their rate of promotion and their selection for Service schools ' An analysis of these criteria indicates that the intelligence community does not get its fair share of the best.qualified officers in the senior grades, and none of the services has sufficient carcer trained O-és and up to fill their most critical intelligence requirements. Recomimen seten a . . 1., Milita ary departments should be directed to initiate programs to assure that colonels/captains and V/admir trained in Service Intelligence career field are provided to the carcer t tions. Current practice o of placing untrained officers in should be stopped. 2. OSD should establish a panel chaired by DIA te make a cetailed 2 evaluation of the Intelligence career developraent pattern in the Service L « and recommend minimem standards rewsired to assure qualified senior xz officers are available to fill joint billets. 3. Navy and Air Force Int eliicence officers should be providéed.a fair - vy r = z E . share of Senior Service School selection end Senior Foint Intellicence positions should require this schooling. (Army appears to ba doing
Jered Cen bane relly So nob secimowtiters. or aye tes Gs fe tedented officers io Gefencus egcncies such as DTA. Discussion . Analysis by the Defense Inteliigence Panel siaffi shows that premotion and selection for schooling are cenerally lower in DIA than in the Services as a whole. A similar analysis perforrned by # subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee a few years azo revealed the same problem then within DCA. In the case of comrnunicators a solution has been to show youn a visible route to flag rank within their specialty and to adopt a "positive action" program to upgrade their technical skills ° by late’ ee i¢] vt ta! 77) On the. other hand, turbulence and an atternpt to over- diversify some officers may have been counter-productive. Conclus sions 1, The ASD/M2&RA should exarnine what penalties and incentives can be imposed on the Services to insure at least pro- rata assi ignrnent of o good officers to joint duty, (No flag rank w: vithout a “purple suit" tour? ) rd olicy of carcers yith a "major"! Z The Services should consider a fied "minor! in which an officer , combat specialty and a well ident “+ becomes proficient: cornmunicet , i ADP, the Mid East, etc. The "rninor" shoul short of fleg rank.
° Alicoorrvent € GCoinrauniceting Intelligence Out Problera - A mez ming fat analysis of intelligence Cote rarely mankes bis vay inte the consciousness of Gur Key decinion- ining Cushoraers. Discussion ° Ahnost all of our customers are turned off by : without perspective" and "briefings froin a script." This is nota new problem in modern society. Weekly newsmagezines grew up to meet the need for a perspective on the daily torrent of news, If there is a real crisis, the leadership may well fern te CBS or the Washincton Post for the quickest and best analysis o all but hard SIGINT/PHOTINi * dato. Beecher has detailed this a elem very weil. When it comes to analyzing essentially political rews ( up to? Will the embargo work?) should military intell eLli really be doing the analysis? Or are they out of their field? Con rclVsioONn Ve mig ght try a variant of Bee cher's "wise men," namely a staff assistant to the SecDef and DepSecDef with the following attributes: “1. ATSD, GS-18 NEA rank with no staff except a military assistant drawn from DIA and a secretary. - » 2. Successful journalism,analytic, or political background, 3. No resource management, ection officer respousidility. Only duty to listen, read, sort, appraise, and brief the SecDef, perhaps in lieu of the rnilitary assistant doing so 4s at present, but with the ;ilatier present, , , ar 4, Authority to tas’ DIA and to add specialists in the event of a. : -erisis.. A responsioiiy w provide tcedtack on Suctul interests to DIA, ot a roadblock to DCI, Dir. DIA, or ASD). 6. Authorized to establish non-governmental sources. { c rentives in the event oa? am emberes;
HVE a bse aol se . * Ceompartiventilisation vi. Reel Paro Neale : : * ae - wat 3 ° Problein - ‘Phe "green door! will create some very critical ©" protter: in the next few years. Operators Cont know how to ash the right ques - tions, Automatic sys ite ins are precluded from direct interaction, Options require real-tirve tasking of intelligence enets, Discussion The current system of compartmentalization places an emphasis on protection of sources that may. not be warranted, especially in a crisis. Sources must be protected, and the problems of multi-level security in ADP/telecom systems means that separate channels may be neces- sary. But limited releases, slow distribution, "spoon feeding" of users, all delay command center operations. Intelligence should be produced for use in decision-mzking, not remote historical records. ° - . . Conclusions .. 1. National policy on safeguards at the operations interface should be re-examined ona systen Oy cystem basis. 2. Users, and the CINCs in particular, should have a voice in task- ing the intelligence assets, 3. Data should be if stributed to them in real tirne. 4, R&D in ADP/telecormmmuenications multi-level security should be vigorously supported,
. VELEC Ps Dr. Albert C. Hatt Assistant Secretary of Defense . (Intelligence) . Washington, D. C. 20301 Dear Al: ‘ My purpose in writing tnis letter is to set forth some views regarding our Intelligence Panel discussions thus far in the hope that they will be of use in our further considerations. i think it is possible to enunciate sorme general propositions of fundamental nature regarding intelligence. We are all concerned regarding production and distribution of intelligence which is not of use in arriving at decisions, hence is an impediment in that it imposes delay and diversion of attention. These general propositions are useful in my view in identifying most needed intelligence, among other things, and, consequently, in prioritizing intelligence collection and distribution. I have in mind time sensitive intelligence, however, the views are also pertinent in considering the issues circulated in your letter of & November. _ The quality and utility of intelligence is very dependent on the attitudes and outlook of the Commander being served, and now he uses intelligence in his day-to-day conduct of affairs. The functioning of the intelligence organization depends upon achieving a close association and intimate relationship betweer. the intelligence structmre and those - dependent upon intelligence in exercising command and management at all levels in order to perform their tasks efficiently. Whea this relationship exists, the exchange of information that helps identify » intelligence needs on the one hand and its availability on the other substantially improves the performance both of "' operstors" and those charged with providing intelligence. Wit ange, the intelli- ania gence officer and his org wational support find it quite difficult to ‘ded intelligence ithout this ex target resources to greatest advantage an we 3 mn Those charged with management of our day-to-day affairs of military Significance « are concerned with a continuous assessment of h er boy bee (4°) n mere a ro} mee imal ~ a fp 0 po) fa) © Se) nan © jon on Oo eo a ee J fase oO oA 9 = rr yh Es a Le | 0 ~— p pa (4 - re) er & hy ie) rt ie] Q ice] 52) wn t Ss ca G ~”
‘Shou: clarred with collection aedbyats ane pronerh tices Of teforrnatior: fo, Liin ausensiment musi be huoviodseabbe: aot aul, re we ity apes tire concerns of Uiancgement', or Corian Yor: SO Of tie posditeia wes that might bo made Gf tke inflerreiton wheat prosidind, Such decisions as collection tashing, prigriiies of coverage and trvatment (fait, assessed or relatively raw) of needed information are dependsat , voor fully understanding the customer needs. Inthis regard, « guideline question is, "Whatis the char acter of change taking place and weatdo operational responses, roan euseasor sy. “2 Three corollaries derive from the above. gence function is not coraplate with the deliver it must be viewed as being interactive wi conditions of readiness vo aut? wority an re ate frorm higt able to the commander, ponsible commanders of military forces cont analytical eftar ts (not alwasy sufficiently form2 discern changes in normal pat ferces that portend heighte including augmenta sorters ttefosmatins,—noLes a a ized terns of operations by potentiaily hostile ned danger, in order to int ja! é (LOR of surveillanc Lact rare-ofsen—capaola-ofcol ——-2 2 it necesser Hy—-urgent;—that-is-oi— Ln Mitaks gee emrerk The uses to be made of this intelligenc | include a variety of operational responses that are in general quite defina! and include force positioning, alert ard warning and cover, deception and _jamming, in exercising a degree of control of the electronic environment in order that a commander cam avoid disaster in a surprise situation and transition ta active combat in good condition. Thus the second rhetorical question, "What are the targets?" Analyiical efforts continuously conducted by force coramanders also underiie derivation of targets, assignment of target priorities and determination of character and scale of strike efisrt requived at the + outset of an outbreak of hostilities. Quite obviously, = force's survi- vability is dependent upon wise, quick and effective initial action. .- - Obviously, commanders must think through in advnace the situations ‘they may face. They cannot respond to best advantage by innovation under pressure of events. , | H y of information. Rather, yith other factors, suchas Py Wapnetany Al actiyite of . Smee ac I; ats ge and caaracecer SO. ace:vby C2 OWN -CTCaS, BitTec-sve2: xd specific sets of possible responses avall- ha i] 7° raed z —? wved gee - ” - inchuding deception, jamraing and wespons 2 peat or TAF fe fe Ve oO”
applications; all of which apust be co: related, pracesseqd ane einplayed for coronvend decision. Nhe adeauac voof imttlissnecer witte Respect bo coverage, Content and titue:tiness car only be vaueed in the linkt of the use that is to be made of it. Secondly, as essential to wise action 28 edeaaate intelligence is, it must nonetheless ramain suppartive. Organizational arrangernents that tend to undermine the authority of commanders of forces by isolating the intelligence cammunity or by erecting vadn ministrative barriers tnat set intelligence officers apart froin others involved in providing staff . support are disadvantageous. It is essential that the integrity of command be preserved. In this reyard assessments of the adequacy of intelligence functioning is a command function, although not necesszerily exclusively so & Finally, special security restrictions must be most carefully considered in the light of customer needs since they often inhibit a commander's ability to discharge his responsibilities. . -- Quite specifically, the commanders of our forces at sea and in the field and their Soviet counterparts are each constrained, as they go abo their normal duties, by the presence and activity of the other. Considera- tion of how one would respond to the initiatives of the other is a never- ending discharge of command responsibility. Tentative planning occurs daily, some of which is formalized on paper and exercised in training operations, some for a variety of reasons is not exercised, and some exists as exchanges of views and verbal expressions of intentions. We all know how difficult it is to assess correctly in the middle of 2 night under the pressures of a quickly developing situation. If we have not thought through in advance whet we might face, and how we might react, and if we do not surveil in ways that enable us to be alert in time, then our prospects for success are dim, indeed. Gur responses to ancther's iniliatives mzy be "from the hip" as measured by timeliness, but it must not be that at all by every other measure, - Combat management has its srigins in coraparative analyses conducted in the cool light of day, and its currency in assessing the | nature of charges taking place zs revealed through surveillance contin- , uously conducted. Our responses vary from increasing watchfetnes at one end of the scale to actual encounters with weapons at the othe
Pbcheve that mavascement of ou: politicnde fates ino reth. amilarly depondeat apon intelligence, ond atthe chars ter af nutellbgence provided and its timeliness -- ite ather words, te Guelity of tatetligence support -- can best be dulerrained by Gdeslification of i potitical "options" that are thought useful in response to developing t The Se Ps Def's § responsibility relative to military inte Wasence can be broadly summarizec r zed as twofold: a. Assurance that comrnaaders of forces are adequately supported by a functioning intelligence organization in order that they can discharge the responsibilities assigned them to yrcatest advantage, and ; b. Function as required by law to greatest advanta the agent of the President exercising control of military forces, the provision of advice in connection therewith. We are familiar with developments associated with the creation and subsequent functioning of the DIA. Certain difficulties mey have arisen because the interrelationship and inte rdependence of the cornrmmander and his intelligence supporting structure may not have been fully eppreciate My own experience as a commander of deployed forces, including the cornplaints relative to the DIA expressed by others sirnilarly situated, have centered on the institutional inability of the Agency to provide other than intelligence for background and data base purposes. Yet, quite obviously, unnecessary duplication must be avoided in the overall interest, and the DIA can be effective in that regard. High cost "national! level Sensor systems have unique coliection capabilities of great Significance to tactical commanders. Some of these systems could have been even more productive tactically had specific tactical needs been knawn when in design. DIA can be effective in this area. While the quality of intelligence support rendered commanders of forces may be best judved L in in some respects by the appropriats commanders, as noted carliar, other respects it rnust be judged by intelligence com: i itself, particularly with regard to the compctence of 2 ntelligence personnel as professionals, and with respect to the functioning of the overall commu- ‘nity in its many interrelaiionships. It would seem that the DIA is the agency to continually assess this aspect of intelligence functioning in order that the ASD{I) can assure the SecDef in this vital aspect of rnilitary ‘force effectiveness.
~ ; Theos, the proper fuochouing of the DEN a paoedel: Bey ioe te SecDel should include advising regardin: We oder ouey i all resneets of intelligence support rendercd the ete sarvices Rea Gailitsry forces. It does not necessarily follow that ie OP. chould be the . primary agent in assisting the SecbDei in dische rging: te because of the necessity te preserve the respon accountability -- of commend. Nevertheless, if the Chiefs oft tha military services iutélligence organizations were alse assigned as Deputy Directors of the DIA, a mechanistn would exist for Cealing n more advantageously with the many interfaces between forces, services and the DIA. In particular, since the Service Chiefs of Intelligence are in fencral expert in their knowledge of detailed intellizvence needs of service forces, a mechanism would exist for improving the functioning of the DIA and the entire intelligence community in Supporting forces in the field and at sea, A mechanisrn would exist that would improve DIA capabilities in providing advice to ASD(I) regarding prioritics in connection with management decisions aifecting the intelligence community To summarize, we are dealing with constant change, including changes in our own responses to anticipated events, Trends in technology will increase our vulnerabilities and decrease the tirne available to structure responses. Intelligence can keep us appraised of current developments and what they portend, and suggest to us the character ~ - and utility of many of the responses that developments might demand, Definition of these "options" by management and by commanders of forces in advance of necessities to respond enable the intelligence agencies to perform more efficiently. Force effectiveness in combat and as a deterrant to an outbreak of combat is espzcially dependent upon maximiz- ing the unique contributions that intellisence can make. When forces are reduced because of fund limitations, intelligence assumes an even more critical role. By thinking through in advance the specific responses we may wish to make, based largely on our study of int igence, we provid Gefinitive guidance regarding intelligence collection and prioritization, and at the same time enable ourselves to handle more advantayzously the "surprise", or unforeseen, situations that occas all these matters the carefully nurtured flow of information between 1 Q rw — management and the intelligence comme & dy enhances the effec-~ st : “success that constant attention net be given to assur tiveness of both, and this la tion. Although this discusSion centers maint; intellic ‘exploitation, the basic ideas and principles are applicable in political
and polilicofmilitery areas. And, Grolly, shorteoedigs tn inteliecnce likely atso reflect weakuesses in Che existing relaetionwhin, orviinizatlonalls or otherwise, between management and tie intclieenece Cormmtuargty. Thave also reviewed the "Issue Paper"! circulated } by your letter of Novernber &th, and offer the following cormiments: : - a. Pro oduct utility. Concur in service view. Idoubt thet DIA could or should ‘atternpt to ‘tailor products to service needs in many cases when very detailed specifics are required, as for equiprnent des This issue rust be looked at on a case-by-case basis. It does not follow that duplication need result. . b. S&T intelligence. The above comments are germane Rigid attitudes by DIA and the services must be avoided. If the DIA product is not satisfactory, why continue that specific endeavor? Would augmentation by the services make it acceptable? In many cases analysis is by contract to industry. "Raw" data is often quite significant to producers of equipment. Arrangements’ should permit such access when there is a need. The “enemy' in this case is too much preoccupation with organizational responsibilities and too little improvisation to produce results. Proper exercise of management involves searchiug cut problem areas, surfacing them for higher lev ot: resolution. . eee Nee c. Resources managernment. No comment. , d. DIA as J-2. This arrangement is not gsod. The DIA and the service intelligence organizations should provide support to an independent J-2, with DIA being responsible for effecting the necessary Coordination. I see no reason why J-2 need have a large stafi, nor why many routine intelligence staff functions should not be performed by the DIA for the J-2. oo e. Collection management. Concur with service view. Again, a more resilient attitude by DIA regarding its respons :bilitics in totlect management should permit the objective being met witheul imposition of So much "management", f. Attache system. My considerable experience wit attaches as Commender, Sixth Fleet fot wo years (August 1948- August 194 led me to believe thet the Unified D “rescinded. It creates more problem t ense Attache systern should pe 8 5 tnan it soives.