</ 
defense  intej  ugence  agency 
r  egulation  no.  54-13 
HEADQUARTERS,  DEFENSE 
INTELLIGENCE  AGENCY 
WASHINGTON,  DC   20301 
13  August  19S0 
J 
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 
PROCESSING  UNSOLICITED  CORRESPONDENCE 
AND  SUSPECT  MATERIAL 
1.  PURPOSE:  To  provide  guidance  and  establish 
procedures  for  processing  nonofficial  or  unsolicited 
■  correspondence  and  suspect  packages  or  material. 
2.  APPLICABILITY:  This  regulation  applies  to 
all  DJ  A  elements. 
3.  SUPERSESSION:  This  regulation-  supersedes 
DIAR  54-13.  3  June  1975. 
4.  GENERAL: 
a.  Since  the  intelligence  mission  and  relationship 
to  DoD  are  indicated  in  its  title,  the  DIA  frequently 
receives  unsolicited  inquiries,  complaints,  or  sug- 
gestions from  non-DoD  affiliated  personnel  or  or- 
ganizations. Most  of  these  correspondents  have  a  le- 
gitimate and  valid  purpose  for  communicating  with 
a  representative  agency  of  the  U.S.  Government, 
and  their  letters  should  be  processed  in  a  manner  ap- 
propriate to  the  contents.  If  a  letter  reflects  a  re- 
quest, inquiry,  or  solicitation  that  is  within  the 
scope  of  the  Freedom  of  Information  Act,  Title  5, 
U.S.  Code  552  as  amended  by  Public  Law  93-502, 
the  letter  should  be  expeditiously  referred  to  the  at- 
tention of  E  SO  <FO  I  A). 
b.  Occasionally,  the  DIA  receives  correspondence 
or  material  which  appears  to  be  the  product  of  a 
hoax,  prank,  or  delusion,  or  is  originated  by  persons 
who  are  overenthusiastic  or  overactive  in  some  par- 
ticular field  or  cause.  This  type  of  correspondence  is 
usually  addressed  to  either  a  person  of  national 
prominence  or  to  a  position  title  that  has  been  iden- 
tified in  the  various  news  media.  Frequently  an  at- . 
tempt  is  made  to  process  such  correspondence 
through  normal  channels  and  to  make  a  rational  re- 
sponse. This  often  causes  confusion,  wastes  person- 
nel resources,  or  dissrupts  the  orderly  functioning  of 
management.  For  reasons  of  efficiency,  economy, 
and  safety  all  such  correspondence  or  unusual  mate- 
rial will  be  referred  directly  to  the  Policy,  Plans,. & 
Programs  Branch  (RSS-1  A),  Counterintelligence  Di- 
vision for  evaluation  and  special  processing.  RSS- 
1 A  is  designated  as  the  central  point  of  contact  for 
such  material  within  this  Agency. 
5.  RESPONSIBILITIES: 
a.  DIA  personnel  will  forward  all  unsolicited  ma- 
terial, publications,  or  correspondence,  as  described 
above,  from  nonofficial  or  unidentified  sources  di- 
rectly to  RSS-1  A  for  appropriate  action. 
b.  RSS-1  A  will  review  all  such  material  and  refer 
to  the  U.S.  Secret  Service  (USSS).  the  Federal  Bu- 
reau of  Investigation  (FBI)  or  other  appropriate 
agency  any  such  correspondence  reflecting  a  threat 
or  malice  by  the  correspondent  toward  the  addres- 
see or  other  members  of  the  U.S.  Government.  Di- 
rect contact  or  communication  by  other  DIA  ele- 
ments or  individuals  with  the  USSS,  FBI  or  other 
Federal  agencies  is  not  authorized  in  these  matters. 
6.  PROCEDURES: 
a.  Processing  of  such  unsolicited  correspondence, 
material  or  suspect  packages  should  be  conducted 
within  the  guidelines  stated  below: 
-  <1)  The  accompanying  envelope  or^wrapp  lug's,  to 
include  string,  tape,  or  other  bindings,  will  be  retain- 
ed and  forwarded  to  RSS-1  A  with  the  correspond- 
ence or  material. 
(2)  Recipients  of  such  correspondence  or  packages 
should  not  place  any  marks,  comments,  or  extrane- 
ous notes  on  the  material.  If  an  explanation  is  neces- 
sary, a  memorandum  or  note  should  be  made  on  a 
separate  piece  of  paper  to  accompany  the  corre- 
spondence. The  person  who  opened  the  correspond- 
ence or  package,  or  has  knowledge  of  how  it  was  re- 
ceived, should  be  identified  in  this  note. 
(3)  Some  unsolicited  letters  or  packages  may  con- 
tain explosives  or  other  dangerous  substances.  No 
OP  R-  USS- 1
DIAR  54-13 
attempt  should  be  made  by  DIA  personnel  to  move, 
opon  or  disarm  a  suspected  letter  bomb  or  explosive 
parcel.  If  there  is  reason  to  believe  that  explosives 
or  other  dangerous  substances  axe  enclosed  in  a 
package,  the  office  and  adjacent  area  should  be 
cleared  of  personnel,  and  the  emergency  bomb 
threat  and  building  security  procedures  should  be 
initiated. 
b.  The  U.S.  Postal  Service  normally  screens  all 
mail  passing  through  its  facilities;  however,  it  is 
,   possible  for  mail  to  be  received  which  has  not  been 
.  examined  or  screened  for  dangerous  or  explosive 
material.  A  bomb  or  dangerous  package  may  be  in- 
dicated by  one  or  more  of  the  following: 
(1)  Theabsenceof  a  return  address. 
(2)  Unusual  thickness  or  rigidity  of  an  envelope. 
(3)  Use  of  waterproof  or  oil-treated  wrapping  pa- 
per. 
4)  Unusual  odors,  stains  or  sounds  emanating 
from  a  parcel  or  envelope. 
(5)  Instructions  for  opening  only  by  a  specific  per-  . 
son. 
(6)  Erroneously  addressed  (e.g.,  '  Commander, 
DIA;  Chief  of  Intelligence  Operations.  DIA). 
(7)  Delivery  by  an  unidentified  means  or  to  an  un- 
usual place  (package  or  letter  unexplainably  appears 
or  is  left  outside  an  office). 
c.  Unsoh'cited  packages  or  correspondence  for- 
warded to  RSS-1A  will  be  reviewed  to  determine  ap- 
propriate action  based  on  the  nature  of  the  contents. 
RSS-1A  actions  may  include,  but  are  not  limited  to, 
the  following: 
(1)  Referral  to  USSS.  FBI  or  other  agt-ncy.  if  c  ■ 
rcspondence  reflects  malice  or  threats  cf  violer.a? 
against  persons  holding  public  position  or  office. 
(2)  Annotation  of  identifying  data  on  a  3  x  5  inch 
card,  which  is  forwarded  to  the  Pentagon  Counterin- 
telligence Force  (PCF)  for  inclusion  in  their  indices 
of  such  correspondents.  Copies  of  correspondence 
may  be  retained  by  the  PCF  as  deemed  appropriate. 
(3)  Reviewing  files  that  relate  to  such  material  to 
determine  if  information  had  previously  been  report- 
ed on  the  same  correspondent  or  subject. 
(4)  Preparing  a  brief  summary  fwhen  specifically 
requested  by  appropriate  DoD/JCS'DIA  recipients) 
of  the  correspondence  or  other  information  relevant 
to  the  correspondent. 
(5)  Referral  to  the  appropriate  DoD,  JCS.  or  DIA 
office  for  processing  if  the  contents  appear  to  be 
from  legitimate  or  otherwise  bona  fide  correspond- 
ents. 
(6)  Initiating  an  investigation  by  the  appropriate 
Federal  or  DoD  investigative  agency  if  contents  in- 
dicate there  is  criminal,  counterintelligence,  or  secu- 
rity interest. 
(7)  Destroying  without  further  action  or  referral. 
Normally  RSS-A  will  destroy  such  material  within 
30  days  of  receipt  or  after  all  appropriate  action  has 
been  completed. 
7.  ORIENTATION:  Supervisors  at  all  echelons  will 
insure  that  personnel  under  their  supervision  under- 
stand the  procedures  and  responsibilities  contained 
in  this  regulation.  Supervisors  should  provide  ap- 
propriate instruction  or  guidance  necessary  to-^xn- 
plement  precautionary  measures  for  the~processing 
of  correspondence  or  packages  by  DIA  elements. 
FOR  THE  DIRECTOR: 
MANLEY  S.  SULLIVAN 
Chief,  Publication  and 
Presentation  Division 
DISTRIBUTION  C 
RICHARD  X.  LARKIN 
Major  General,  USA 
Chief  of  Staff 
B252         DIA/RSS-3B 
0001       CQPY(S) 
4 0225-05  61000 
(