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FM  30-17A 
FIELD  MANUAL 
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 
SPECIAL 
OPERATIONS  (U) 
HEADQUARTERS,     DEPARTMENT     DF     THE     ARMY 
FEBRUARY  1973 
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GONriDCNTIAL  - 
FM  30-1 7 A 
KiK''"  N,ANUA,'|  ,  HEADQUARTERS 
Xo   30.     A  DEPARTMENT  OFTI  IE  ARM  V 
1  Washington,  D.C\,2<SV'e&™<m//.97S 
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  SPECIAL  OPERATIONS  (U) 
Chaitkii   I.   GENERAL 
I'oracr.-ipli  l-n,.,. 
Si-i-lii.ii    |.    ItftroiJut-litiii  .        
II.    Hostile  I>iU*lliKeiicr...                                            |_4_|J,  x~_.£ 
III.  'IVcl.i.it3US.i|,|».n.                                                                "       ,_,„_,     |2  |_2— 1--| 
IV.   I'liuimtiK  and  KcptirliiiK.                   I_i;{   |_,4  ,_ .. 
V.    Investigative  J^itds.   _     .                                               1-1 -.    I     ■<:  i    ••       ,    \ 
VI.   liOnlivtl  and  .Sii|>rrvisiiiii                                   I_j7    .    ,K  . 
Oijaitkk  2.  GOUNTEKESIMONAOE 
Section  I.   General                             2-1—2-4  2-1—2-.* 
11.    I  >efensiv<?  CwinlcrcspioniiKt-*    2-.ri  2-G  2-3   2-f 
III.   Offensive  Counterespionage    2-7   2-10  2-r>   2-K 
IV.  Neutralization.                                        
".."j         2_,,i2_,2  2-8— 2-!> 
Chaptkk  3.  COUNTERSUBVERSION 
Section  I.   General.             .$-1— :{-:{  .i-1— :i-4 
II.    (^'UnUTSul»VITsiv.-  *)j.lT;i|,i..li:iJ   (i,n,-i-|,t                                           ;{_4    :{_f,  ;{_4 
III.  Tecliiii(|iies  and  Procedures           ;{_(;   .'{-30  :{-.r>   3-X 
IV.  Terrorism   [[[       3_,,i3_,2  ''      3_s 
Chaitkii  4.  COUNTERSABOTAGE 
Section   I.   General..          .                                                    4-1— 4-.J  4-1—4-2 
11.   Types  ofSalMitugo..       4_4_4_x  4_2   4_r, 
Hi.    NoutrRliz.-iti.nl                             .'                   4-!l,  4-HI  4-.-,-_4_ir~r^ 
Chaitkii  .1.  CONFIDENTIAL  SOURCES  --~^ 
Section   I.   CiPnrr.il        r^,   -_.{  -_j   -_., — ■  . 
li.    Utilization  and  Disposition   .  ........  5-4   .1-0  5-2   !»-:{  • 
III.  Source  Administration   _          ;->_7   5-12         5-3   5-7  ■ 
Chaitkii  C.    UNDERCOVER 
Section   I.   (;cncrul.            C-l— &-:{  G-l—O-2 
II.   PlanninK  and  Preparation. .          0-4 — g-io  o-2   0-x  ! 
III.  Conduct,  of  Undercover  Assignment          fi —  ]  1 — 0-|:$  0-K   0-!l 
IV.  Concluding  an  Undercover  Assignment        &-14 — 6-17  0-U — 6-10              i 
Chai-teu  7.  SPECIAL    OPERATIONS     IN     STABILITY  " — 
OPERATIONS 
Section   I.   Introduction    7-1  7_i   7_2  \ 
II.  Counterintelligence  Operations            7-2 — 7-5  7-2 — 7-4               \ 
III.   Plans  and  Estimates       _  7-6  7-4   7_-, 
Chaitkii  X.  TACTICAL  COUNTERINTELLIGENCE— 
DATA   BASE 
Section   I.  Files,  Indices  and  Analyses                X-l  — X-">  8-1 — 8-20                / 
II.  Pattern  Analysis         8-6 — x-II  8-27 — 8-28 
Ai-i-KNi»x  A.  REFERENCES      A_l 
H.   HOSTILE       ESPIONAGE        ORGANIZATION       AND 
METHODS  OF  OPERATION    B-l— B-10 
C.  CHECKLIST  FOR  TECHNICAL  SURVEY    C-l— C-4 
I).  OFCO  REPORTS.        j)_l_D_2x 
E.  SURVEILLANCE   RADIO  COMMUNICATIONS-CODE..  E-l— E-5 
F.  POLITICAL  ORGANIZATION  SYMBOLS      F-l—  F-9 
Index   -   ---    Index-1 
•Thi»  nwnuol  mptnedet  FM  30-1 7A,  28  Ftbruory  1968,  including  oil  chon9«$. 
CONFIDENTIAL  -
CONFIDENTIAL 
FM  30-1 7 A 
CHAPTER  1 
GENERAL 
Section  I.  INTRODUCTION 
1-2.(U)Chan3cs 
Users  of  this  manual  arc  encouraged  to  submit 
recommendations  to  improve  its  clarity  or  accuracy. 
Comments  should  bo  keyed  to  the  specific  page, 
paragraph  and  line  of  the  text  in  which  the  change 
is  recommended.  Reasons  should  be  provided  for  each 
comment  t*>  insure  understanding  and  complete  eval- 
uation. Comments  should  be  prepared  using  DA 
Form  202S  (Recommended  Changes  to  Publications) 
and  forwarded  direct  to  the  Commanding  Officer, 
US  Army  Combat.  Developments  Command  Intelli- 
gence Agency,  Fort  Huachucu,  Arizona  85613.  Origi- 
nators of  proposed  changes  which  would  constitute  a 
significant  modification  of  approved  Army  doctrine 
may  send  an  information  copy,  through  command 
channels,  to  the  Commanding  General,  US  Army 
Combat  Developments  Command,  Fort  Bel  voir, 
Virginia  22060,  to  facilitate  review  and  followup. 
-eONI-IULNIIAL 
1-1
FM  30-1 7A 
•eONrtDCNTIAL 
Section  II.  HOSTILE  INTELLIGENCE 
1  -A.  (U)  Introduction 
The  key  to  effective  counterespionage,  countersub- 
vcrsion,  and  cotintersabotage  is  to  "know  your 
enemy"  Newly  assigned  counterintelligence  person- 
net  must  first,  familiarize  themselves  thoroughly  with 
hostile  intelligence  activities,  methods  of  operation, 
agencies,  and  personalities  common  to  the  aren  in 
which  they  must  operate.  With  unlimited  resources, 
funds,  ami  professionally  skilled  case  officers  or 
principal  agents,  counterintelligence  special  opera- 
tions may  become  very  sophisticated,  using  the  In  test 
technological  developments.  Conversely,  the  methods 
nmy  he  as  simple  as  recruiting  someone  to  observe 
the  "enemy"  and  report  on  everything  he  sees  or 
hears.  Methods  and  techniques  arc  also  mollified  to 
meet  the  requirements  posed  by  the  effectiveness  of 
opposing  counterintelligence  forces. 
1-5.   (U)   Characteristics   of   Hostile   Intelligence 
Activities 
a.  Predominant  among  the  hostile  intelligence 
services  faced  by  US  Korrcs  are  those  of  the  USSR. 
The  services  of  satellite  nations  are  either  patterned 
after  the  Soviet  intelligence  services  or  operate  in  a 
similar  manner.  A  discussion  of  these  methods  is 
included  as  appendix  B. 
ft.  Insurgent  movements  will  probably  have  an 
intelligence  network  patterned  after  the  North 
Vietnamese  apparatus  particularly  in  newly  develop- 
ing countries.  FM  ."iO-.'il  should  be  referred  to  in 
insurgency  situations. 
1—6.  (U)  Functions  of  Counterintelligence 
Counterintelligence  is  that,  phase  of  intelligence 
covering  all  activity  devoted  to  destroying  the 
effectiveness  of  inimical  foreign  intelligence  activities. 
It     also     protects     information     against,    espionage, 
personnel  against,  subversion,  and  installations  and 
material  against  sabotage.  Counterintelligence  special 
operations  are  activities  which  have  peacetime  and 
wartime  applications  since  they  are  used  to  gain 
knowledge  about  enemy  intentions  before,  during, 
and  after  hostilities. 
1  -8.  (U)  Counterswbversion 
Countersub version  includes  operations  designed  to 
detect,  prevent,  or  neutralize  the  activities  of  sub- 
versive groups  and  individuals.  The  countcrsuh- 
version  mission  may  be.  limited  to  designated  defen- 
sive and  preventive  measures  within  the  confines  of 
Army  installations.  In  other  case?  it  may  be  nil 
encompassing,  to  include  offensive  measures  directed 
toward  the  origin  of  hostile  subversive  plans  and 
policies  (chap  :•?)- 
1  -9.  (U)  Countersabotage 
('ountersahotage  operations  are  the  most  difficult  of 
all  counterintelligence  special  operations  to  manage. 
This  is  due  lo  the  highly  rtiinpnrtmciitutioii  of 
sabotage  cells  or  teams;  the  high  security  required 
for  saboteurs;  and  the  fact  that  such  operations 
normally  stem  from  incidents  instead  of  personnel 
actions  (chap  4). 
Section  III.  TECHNICAL  SUPPORT 
1-10.  (U)  General 
In  both  defensive  and  offensive  counterintelligence 
measures  described  in  this  manual,  technical  methods 
or  support  may  be  employed  within  prescribed 
limitations  (A  H  :{SI  -17).  Technical  specialists  should 
be.  included  in  operational  briefings  and  planning  so 
that  Ihev  may  give,  advice  on  available  technical 
support  anil  make  specific  recommendations  for  the 
special  operations  eiiiu-eriied.  Special  equipment  ran 
be  ac(|iiired  and  must  be  accounted  for  as  prescribed 
bv  AK  :ssi    14:5. 
1-2 
COWFIDENTIMr
FM  30-1 7 A 
-eONRPCNTIAL 
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Section  IV.  TERRORISM 
3-11.  (U)  General 
a.  Terrorism  is  normally  employed  in  tin  insur- 
gency us  u  purl  of  the  subversive  iinn  of  the  revolu- 
tion. Terrorism  is  used  ius  u  tactical  and/ur  strategic 
weapon  whereby  the  populace  is  frightened  into 
neutrality  in  the  conflict,  into  cooperation  with  the 
insurgent,  or  inN>  joining  the  insurgent.  Torce,  overtly 
or  covertly.  Terrorism  employed  against  an  armed 
force  cim  make  it  redeploy  combat  troops  out  of  the 
lieh!  and  into  a  security  mission,  exhaust  its  resources 
by  attempting  to  hunt  down  the  terrorists,  over- 
extend  its  lines  of  rommimication,  and  divert  its 
energies  into  other  directions. 
h.  Terrorism,  in  an  insurgency,  will  tend  to  be  less 
sophisticated  than  terrorism  in  a  conventional  con- 
flict, therefore,  those  portions  of  chapter  4  which 
pertain  to  sabotage  in  rear  areas  during  a  conven- 
tional conflict,  are  also  applicable  to  terrorist  tactics. 
c.  Terrorism  ran  be,  and  sometimes  uppears  to  be, 
a  hit  and  miss,  haphazard,  seemingly  palternless 
series  of  nets.  In  most  instances,  however,  terrorism 
campaigns  are  as  fully  organized  and  planned  as  are 
sabotage  campaigns.  Therefore,  every  effort  must  be 
made  to  analyze  incidents  of  a  potential  terrorism 
nature  to  detect  the  pattern  if  one  exists.  One  area 
to  scrutinize  is  the  terrorists  route  into  and  out  of  the. 
area.  In  addition,  all  people  in  the  area  should  be 
interviewed  in  order  to  establish  methods  of  opera- 
tion, and  descriptions  of  the  terrorists.  An  indentikit 
run  be  most  useful,  particularly  with  illiterate  in- 
dividuals. This  information,  MO  and  individual 
descriptions,  must  be  widely  disseminated  among.- 
sources  and  security  forces  in  order  to  counteract 
the  terrorism. 
3-8 
-CONFIDENTIAL
CONriDCNTIAL 
FM  30-1 7 A 
CHAPTER  4 
COUNTERSABOTAGE 
Section  i.  GENERAL 
4-1 .  (U)  Introduction 
a.  Sabotage  is  uny  act  wit!i  nn  intent  to  damage, 
interfere  with,  or  obstruct  by  willfully  damaging  «»r 
destroying  or  attempting  to  damage  or  destroy 
material,  premises  or  utilities,  in  the  interests  of  a 
foreign  power  or  subversive  political  organization. 
6.  Coun.tersabotagc,  then,  is  any  action  designed 
to  destroy  the  effectiveness  of  foreign  sabotage 
activities  "through,  the  process  of  identifying,  pene- 
trating and  manipulating,  neutralizing  or  repressing 
individuals,  groups  or  organizations  conducting  or 
capable  of  conducting  such  activities. 
c.  The  crime  <>f  srbotage  is  discussed  under  Title 
IS,  United  States  Code,  chapter  I05,  sections  215I 
2l5f>  and  is  complex  and  not  simply  defined.  This 
crime  can  occur  in  peacetime  or  wartime;  however,  it 
is  more  common  during  war.  In  a  peacetime  environ- 
ment, any  willful  ml  or  attempt  of  omission  or 
commission  committed  with  the  specific  intent  to 
interfere  witli,  damage,  or  destroy  portions  of  I In- 
tuitional defense  effort  and  in  the  interest  i>f  a 
foreign  power  or  subversive  group  is  sabotage.  In 
wartime,  the  peacetime  definition  applies  and, 
additionally,  a  willful  act  of  omission  or  commission 
committed  by  a  person  who  is  deemed  to  have 
"reason  to  beiieve"  that  his  act  may  adversely  affect, 
the  warmnking  potential  can  he  convicted  of 
sabotage.  During  wartime,  and  particularly  during 
internal  defense  <>r  limited  war  situations,  care  inns) 
be  taken  to  distinguish  those  acts  involving  clandes- 
tine, enemy  agents  or  dissatisfied  friendly  personnel 
from  overt  acts  of  war  perpetrated  by  armed  enemy 
units. 
«/.  The  use  of  sabotage  against,  military  targets 
can  be.  expected  to  increase,  greatly  prior  to  and 
•luring  uny  future  conllict.  in  which  IIS  forces  are 
involved.  Developments  in  technology  have,  increased 
I  he.  destructive  power  of  sabot  nge  devices  while 
miniaturizing  the  size  of  their  component  parts. 
e.  The  specific  conntersabotage  responsibility  as- 
signed to  a  unit  varies  with  the  area,  military 
situation,  jurisdictional  agreements,  and  directives. 
During  ami  since  World  War  Ji,  sabotage  has  been 
directed  mainly  against  material  and  facilities  which 
support  the  military  effort.  Accordingly,  the  counter- 
sabotage  role  will  be  extensive  in  most  cases  ami 
may  require  the  employment  of  a  significant  portion 
of  available  counterintelligence  resources  in  theaters 
of  operations. 
f.  To  successfully  fulfill  counlcrsabotagc  responsi- 
bilities, counterintelligence  personnel  must  have,  in 
addition  to  complete  understanding  of  installation 
and  personnel  security,  a  thorough  knowledge  of 
sabotage  organizations,  methods,  capabilities,  and 
limitations.  They  must  be  able  to  recognize  an  act 
of  sabotage,  understand  its  relationship  to  hostile 
objectives,  analyze  patterns  of  sabotage  activity, 
and  engage  in  defensive  and  offensive  operations 
designed  to  prevent  or  neutralize  sabotage  activities. 
4-2.  (U)  Sabotage  Targets 
The  planning  and  implementation  of  a  counter- 
sabotage  program  requires  a  thorough  understanding 
of  the  procedures  used  by  sabotage  organizations  in 
selecting  sabotage  targets.  Major  sabotage  targets 
include  natural  resources,  transportation,  communi- 
cations, power,  fuel,  industrial  and  military  facilities, 
ami  equipment.  All  are  susceptible  to  damage  which 
could  substantially  impede,  their  primary  functions 
and  are  considered  highly  lucrative  to  a  saboteur 
because  their  destruction  or  incapacitation  may  have 
a  serious  effect  on  morale,  strategic  capability,  or 
combat  effectiveness. 
a.  'I'm tji I  Silrrliou  I'lirlnrs.  In  selecting  a  target, 
the  sophisticated  sabotage  organization  must  consider 
several  factors  in  relation  to  the  capabilities  of 
available  saboteur  personnel  ami  the  inherent  risks 
required  to  perform  the  task;  however,  a  terrorist 
cell  may  only  he  concerned  with  (2)  anil  (3),  below: 
(1)  Vtiliir..  The  strategic,  and  tactical  value  must, 
he  considered.  Kor  example,  the  relative  tactical 
value  of  disrupting  the  supply  system  or  communica- 
tions lines  during  a  combat  engagement  may  be 
weighed;  or  the  strategic  importance  of  destroying 
either  research  or  production  facilities  may  be  con- 
sidered. Related  to  the  value  of  u  target  is  its  capa- 
bility for  recovery  and  the.  availability  or  other 
facilities  to  assume  the.  mission  or  functions  of  the 
selected  target. 
-  CONriDCNTIAL 
4-1
FM  30-1 7A 
(2)  Acctss.U.l.ly.  The  availability  of  ucr.css  de- 
pends chicflv  upon  the  amount  and  type  of  security 
maintained  niiil  !.»■«  geograplm.  locution. 
(3)  Vulnerability.  Nearly  all  materiel  and  facil- 
ities are  vulnerable  •«•  sabotage.  The  degree  of  vulner- 
ability to  destruction,  however,  vanes  and  is  mi 
important  fur tor  in  target  selection.  Some  turrets 
have  an  inherent  capability  to  destroy  themselves 
.Mint  a  relatively  small  sabotage  device  is  ignited. 
(4)  Availability  of  sabotage  materials.  The  pro- 
curement, transportation,  and  storage  of  some  types 
of  explosives;  and  chemical,  biological,  or  nuclear 
devices  will  present  special  problems  for  some  types 
«,f  sabotage  activity.  However,  in  most  instances  it 
can  be  anticipated  that  the  sabotage  organization  will 
l>e.  able  to  provide  the  materials  required  for  the 
particular    means    most    suitable    for    a    particular 
target. 
6.  Special  Target  Vulnerabilities.  Those  targets 
particularly  vulnerable  to  sabotage,  which  arc  of 
sufficient  importance  to  warrant  sabotage  considera- 
tion are  discussed  in  FM  19-30.  Additional  targets 
are  listed  below : 
(1)  Land    transportation   systems:    power  sys- 
tems; loading,  transfer,  and  repair  plants;  and  the 
road  nets.  . 
(a)  Air  transportation:  aircraft,  gasoline  ami 
lubricants,  or  runways. 
(6)  Water  transportation :  destruction  of  many 
vital  components  of  the  ship,  piers,  canal  locks 
blocking   harbors,    or   navigational    equipment   and 
(c)  Kail  transportation:  track  system,  tun- 
nels, bridges,  switches,  or  signal  can  be  reversed. 
(rf)  Bridges  attacked  by  sabotage  arc  normally 
limited  to  those  with  less  than  12-inch  girders.  Split 
charges,  on  each  side  of  the  girder,  one  slightly  above 
the  other  to  give  a  scissor  effect,  are  used  Railwaj 
bridges  can  be  destroyed  by  the  tram  detonating 
preset  charges.  
, 
(e)  Rolling  stock:  brake  hoses,  freight  cars, 
gasoline  tankers;  and  locomotive  cylinders,  fireboxes, 
brakeshoes,  connecting  rods,  or  air  compressors. 
( f)  Railroad  repair  and  transfer  points:  round- 
house turntables,  locomotive  brakes  hydraulic  or 
electric  switches  in  marshalling  yards,  warehouses, 
and  cranes. 
(2)    Machinery   is  a   vital   element  m   all    trans- 
portation, communications,   and  power  systems,   as 
well   as  in   manufacturing.    Nearly   all    types  ran    be 
readily  sabotaged.  The  simplest  means  is  to  interfere 
with    lubrication    by   draining   oil,    damaging   aut.o- 
maticTubricator  and  oil  pipes,  substituting  improper 
viscosity  oils,  or  by  introducing  abrasives  into  the 
system.    Sensitive    vital    parts,    particularly   valves 
can  be  smashed  or  steel  fragments  can  be  dropped 
into  moving  parts  or  cylinders  of  engines.  Explo- 
sives, too,  are  effective  when  placed  in  proximity  to 
bearing  pedestals,  cast  iron  surfaces,  or  vital  com- 
ponents and  inside  closed  spaces. 
(3)  Fuel  and  power  are  essential  to  all  trans- 
portation, communication,  and  manufacturing.  Con- 
sequently, they  aro  important  sabotage  targets. 
(o)  Hydroelectric  systems  are  vulnerable  to 
explosives  at  underwater  parts  of  dams  and  sluice 
gates,  turbines,  governor  gears,  generators,  pipelines, 
and  valves. 
(b)  Steam  powerplanU  can  be  attacked  with 
explosives  at  coal-loading  cranes  anil  winches,  the 
motor,  gears,  and  supports  of  coal  conveyers,  cast 
iron  links  of  stokersf  bearing  pedestals  or  iron  casting 
surfaces  of  turbogenerators,  feet  ami  inspection  doors 
of  cast  iron  condensers,  pumps,  and  water-cooling 
towers. 
(c)  Gas  plant  production  may  be  stopped  by 
damaging  the  retort  stanchion  supports  for  the 
distillation  tubes,  suction  pumps,  or  the  motor,  gear- 
box, or  supports  for  the  coal  conveyor. 
(4)  Factories  can  be  incapacitated  by  burning 
records  and  stores,  stealing  or  smashing  jigs  and 
patterns,  cutting  off  power,  or  destroying  loading 
and  moving  gear. 
4-3  (U)  Counterintelligence  Responsibilities 
Counterintelligence  elements  will  have  varying  de- 
gree, of  responsibilities  for  the  detection,  prevenUo, 
and  neutralization  of  sabotage  activity.  Ihe  speed,., 
countersabotage  responsibility  assigned  to  a  counter- 
intelligence  element  will  depend  on  the  area,  mi  liter 
situatmn,  and  jurisdictional  or  **^M^^ 
men  is  This  role  will  be  extensive  in  most  cases  ami 
2y  
re.  uire  the  employment  of  a  significant  portion 
„f  available  resources  in  theaters  of  operation. 
Section  II.  TYPES  OF  SABOTAGE 
4-4.    (U)    Chemical,    Biological,    and    Nuclear 
Sabotage 
Chemical  and  biological  agents,  as  well  as  proposi- 
tioned nuclear  devices,  may  be  used  as  means  of 
committing  sabotage  in  future  wars  or  insurgency 
situations  short  of  war. 
a.  (Jhemkal  Agents.  Chemical  agent*  ^.P^ 
effects  ranging  from  highly  lethal  to  "^  "J^ 
toting  Chemical  compounds  may  be  employed  by  a 
Saboteur  to  produce  a  deep  sleep  for  hours;  psycho- 
chemical  agents  which  produce  confusion  and  m- 
ability  to  carry  out  orders;  poisons  which  enter  the 
4-2 
CONFIDENTIAL  -
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FM  30-1 7A 
body  by  absorption  and  are  lethal;  and  drinking 
water  can  very  easily  be  contaminated  with  chem- 
icals sufficiently  potent  to  cause  death.  Initial 
delivery  of  chemical  agents  must  be  of  a  sufficient 
quantity  to  achieve  the  desired  effect.  Factors  of 
dispersion  and  dilution  will  reduce  the  potency  of  the 
chemical  agent.  Therefore,  to  be  effective,  the  agent 
must  be  delivered  to  the  target  in  the  necessary 
strength  to  accomplish  what  is  desired  before  the. 
agent  dissipates.  Aerosols,  capsules,  vials,  special 
types  of  weapons,  and  spreading  chemicals  carried 
by  the  wind  and  dust  are  means  of  disseminating 
chemical  agents. 
6.  Biological  Operations.  Biological  operations  are 
the  employment  of  biological  agents  to  produce 
casualties  in  man  or  animals  and  damages  to  plants 
or  materials.  Biological  agents,  when  employed  by  a 
trained  saboteur,  have  great  sabotage  potential. 
(1)  Biological  agents  are  microorganisms  which 
cause  disease  in  man,  plants,  or  animals,  or  cause  the 
deterioration  of  material.  Such  microorganisms, 
grown,  cultivated  and  introduced  by  man,  are  a 
deadly  weapon  which  can  enter  humans  through 
inhalation  or  through  eating,  and  cannot  be  readily 
detectcd  by  the  five  senses.  Further,  it  may  be  days 
rather  than  hours  before  disease  symptoms  caused 
by  the  microorganisms  become  apparent. 
(2)  Then?  an?  iiiuity  devices  for  spreading  bio- 
logical agents.  Use  and  methods  of  such  devices  are 
limited  only  by  the  ingenuity  of  the  saboteur  and  the 
desired  effect.  The  saboteur's  devices  may  consist 
of  vials,  capsules,  various  sizes  of  aerosol  bombs,  and 
specially  designed  devices  with  delaying  mecha- 
nisms. Under  favorable,  conditions  microorganisms 
may  be  placed  in  old  tin  cans,  bottles,  anil  boxes 
around  aii  urea  from  which  the  microorganisms  miiy 
multiply  and  spread.  An  aerosol  bomb  placed  in  an 
air  intake  ventilation  system  is  a  quick  and  easy 
method  of  spreading  the  agents  throughout  an  entire 
building. 
c.  Nvc.le.ar  Devices.  Prcpositioncd  nuclear  novices 
may  also  be  tools  of  the  saboteur.  Nuclear  devices 
have  great,  destructive'  capabilities  and  will  destroy 
lives,  crops,  property,  industrial  sites,  material,  and 
equipment.  A  hostile  nation  may  plan  the  use  of 
small  nuclear  devices  U>  create  panic  ami  undermine 
the  morale  of  the  citizens.  Additional  information  is 
contained  in  AH  380-  -ISO  and  in  KM  !!>-30. 
4—5.  (U)  Incendiary  Sabotage 
Fire  is  a  very  destructive  type  of  sabotage  and  is 
easily  employed  by  even  the.  untrained  saboteur 
liccniisc  the  means  are  almost  always  available  and 
almost  all  targets  can  be  destroyed  by  fire.  In  addi- 
tion, lire  is  a  natural  hazard  making  it  easier  for  the 
saboteur  to  camouflage  his  actions.  The  means  of 
starting  a  fire  are  simple  and,  once  the  saboteur 
succeeds  in  igniting  combustible  material,  time  will 
dictate  the  amount  of  destruction  achieved. 
a.  Origin,  Fires  may  be  classified   as  natural  or 
deliberate. 
(1)  Natural  fires  include  accidental  fires  as  well 
as  those  caused  by  spontaneous  combustion,  light- 
ning, electricity,  and  by  sparks  from  other  fires. 
(2)  Deliberate  fires  started  by  saboteurs,  dis- 
gruntled employees,  or  people  with  other  personal 
motives  are  often  disguised  as  natural  fires. 
b.  Materials.  A  saboteur  may  use  the  inherent 
combustible  material  of  the  target,  or  available  within 
the  target,  ignited  by  a  simple  device,  or  he  may  use 
specifically  prepared  chemicals  known  as  "hot  in- 
cendiaries." When  using  "hot  incendiaries"  the 
saboteur  usually  prefers  to  select  those  meeting  the 
following  four  requirements: 
(1)  Burn  with  an  intense  heat. 
(2)  Be  easy  to  ignite. 
(3)  Be  difficult  to  extinguish. 
(4)  Bum  without  leaving  a  residue  or  at  least 
alter  the  external  appearance  of  evidence  at  the  scene 
of  the  fire. 
c.  Components.  Incendiary  devices,  as  well  as 
explosives,  used  by  a  saboteur  usually  include  three 
basic  components. 
(1)  A  delay  mechanism  provides  sufficient  time 
for  the  safe,  withdrawal  of  the  agent  who  places  the 
device,  provides  a  time  discrepancy  for  the  establish- 
ment of  an  alibi,  ami  insures  the  ignition  or  detona- 
tion of  the  device  at  the  most  advantageous  time. 
(2)  An  initiator  insures  the  complete  and  ef- 
ficient initiation  of  the  main  charge. 
(li)  The  main  charge  contains  sufficient  incen- 
diary or  explosive  material  to  ignite  or  demolish  the 
tnrget. 
it.  Simple  Devices.  Simple  devices  are  those  re- 
quiring little  or  no  preparation  and  using  materials 
readily  available  to  the  saboteur.  Their  use  may  be 
.  preplanned  or  they  may  be  used  when  taking 
advantage  of  a  sabotage  target  of  opportunity.  An 
example  would  be  a  cigarette  ami  match  folder 
utilized  by  inserting  the  imlighled  end  of  the  cigarette 
into  a  row  of  mulch  heads  in  the  folder.  The  folder 
would  then  be  placed  on  the.  combustible  material. 
r.  "llol"  Denicrx.  If  the  simpler  devices  are  nol 
sufficiently  effective  lo  accomplish  destruction  of  » 
target,  the  saboteur  may  use  so-called  "hot" 
incendiaries.  A  few  examples  are.  as  follows: 
(I)  A  mixture  of  three  parts  potassium  chlorate 
an«l  one.  part  sugnr  by  volume  will  Hum  at  a  very 
high  temperature. 
4-3
FM  30-1 7A 
GONNPCNTIAL 
(2)  Imprcgnatin;:  •»  P",,*«'  «»f  paper  witli  white 
phosphorus  lis  another  effective  means  of  making  a 
"hot"  iii.i-iiiliiu  v.  Tlic  iiuprcgiui  led  paper  is  curried 
in  u  viul  lillccl  with  wilier;  phosphorus  will  not  burn 
in  water,  hut  will  ignite  when  il-  dries. 
(■i)  Another  I'oinliiiiulion  is  sodium  mid  calcium 
i-arhide  cnpsuli*s.  Sodium  i>  placed  in  one  gelatine 
capsule  unci  a  quantity  »f  calcium  carbide  is  placed 
in  another  and  drop|>r<i  into  water  near  combustible 
materials.  When  the  capsules  dissolve,  the  sodium 
will  ignite  on  the  water's  surface  and,  in  turn,  ignite, 
the  acetylene  gas  produced  by  calcium  carbide  and 
water.  The  ri^sull.ing  nre.tylene  flume  will  ignite,  uijy 
nearby  combustible  material. 
(4)  Thermite,  whirli  burns  at  approximately 
5,000°  Fahrenheit  anil  is  hot  enough  to  melt  iron 
and  steel,  is  made  by  mixing  one  part,  of  aluminum 
powder  and  three  parts  iron  oxide  by  volume.  As 
thermite  is  dilTieult  to  extinguish,  easily  obtained, 
and  prodiin-s  such  intense  heat,  it  provides  the.  type 
of  an  incendiary  desired  by  the  saboteur.  However, 
it  is  difficult  to  ignite  and  leaves  a  residue. 
/.  lteference.  Additional  details  regarding  incen- 
diary sabotage  may  be  found  in  FM  19-30. 
4-6.  (U)  Explosive  Sabotage 
Explosives  include  any  chemical  compounds  or 
mechanical  mixtures  that,  triggered  by  heat  or  shock, 
undergo  sudden  chemical  change  (decomposition) 
liberating,  at  high  speed,  heat  and  gas  which  cause 
tremendous  pressures. 
a.  I'lmjiltnfine.nt .  Explosives  are  employed  against 
targets  that  resist  destruction  by  other  means,  when 
destruction  must  be  accomplished  instantaneously, 
or  when  targets  are  of  such  a  nature  that  destruction 
requires  a  shearing  or  shattering  force.  They  may 
also  be  used  to  kill,  maim,  or  instill  fear.  The  use  of 
explosives  has  many  disadvantages  and  problems 
such  as  introducing  the  material  into  the  target 
area,  the  need  for  tcehnir.nl  or  specialized  training 
in  their  employment,  the  almost  certain  investigation 
resulting  from  their  use,  and  the  consequent  tighten- 
ing of  security. 
6.  Classification  of  Explosives.  Explosives  are 
classified  according  to  rates  of  decomposition  as 
high  and  low  explosives.  A  high  explosive  is  one  in 
which  chemical  decomposition  occurs  within  an 
extremely  short  period  of  time;  it  is  said  to  detonate. 
Low  explosives  are  those  in  which  the  decomposition 
takes  place  as  rapid  burning;  they  are  said  to  defla- 
grate. Explosives  are  also  classified  according  to  their 
inherent  sensitivity.  An  insensitive  explosive  is  one 
which  requires  only  normal  care  in  handling  or 
storing.  A  sensitive  explosive  must  be  given  special 
care  in  handling,  storage,  or  use.  Both  high  and  low 
explosives  may  be  either  sensitive  or  insensitive. 
c.  Common  Tyjirx.  Explosive  materials  exist  in 
diifereut  physical  states  ami  forms.  Nitroglycerine 
is  a  liquid  high  explosive,  which  is  very  sensitive  to 
shock.  Trini  Ho  toluene  (TNT)  is  n  high  velocity, 
insensitive  explosive  either  in  block  form  '>r  granu- 
lated. Nitrosturt'li  is  a  high  velocity,  insensitive 
explosive  and  has  the  appearance,  of  ordinary 
powdered  starch.  I'icric  acid  is  a  very  powerful  high 
velocity,  insensitive  explosive  and  is  a  lemon-yellow 
crystalline  solid.  Plastic,  explosives,  such  as  Compo- 
sition ('-series  which  have  an  appearance  similar  to 
that  of  putty,  are  the  ideal  all-around  sabotage 
material.  Black  powder  is  a  low  explosive  with 
extreme  sensitivity  to  heat  and  friction.  Nipolit 
is  an  insensitive  high  explosive,  and  is  a  plastic 
which  can  be  pressed  into  any  desired  shape, 
machined  or  cast,  or  formed  into  a  onc-piccc  bomb 
without  casting.  Additional  details  on  explosive 
sabotage,  methods  are  included  in  FM  19-30. 
4-7.  (U)  Mechanical  Sabotage 
a.  Most  acts  of  physical  sabotage  which  are  not 
committed  by  means  of  explosive  or  incendiary 
materials  fail  within  the  category  of  mechanical 
sabotage.  This  type  of  sabotage  is  one  of  the  most 
difficult  to  prevent  and  the  easiest  to  perpetrate. 
Mechanical  sabotage  is  used  in  military  operations, 
but  most  attacks  are  directed  against  transportation 
and  industrial  facilities. 
b.  Mechanical  sabotage  can  be  grouped  into  the 
following  basic,  classifications,  a  detailed  discussion 
of  which  is  found  in  FM  19-30. 
(1)  Breakage  can  be  directed  against  delicate 
equipment  and  machinery. 
(2)  Abrasives  can  be  introduced  into  lubricants 
and  fuels  to  cause  undue  wear  in  motors,  generators,.; 
or  moving  parts. 
(3)  Acts  of  omission  arc  those  perpetrated 
through  willful  failure  to  act,  thereby  causing  damage 
through  neglect. 
(4)  Substitution  is  performed  by  replacing  good 
with  faulty  materials,  changing  direction  of  ship- 
ments, or  altering  important  points  of  information. 
(5)  Contamination  is  the  introduction  of  sub- 
stances into  materials  for  the  purpose  of  rendering 
the  materials  impure  or  injurious.  A  relatively  new 
process  of  contamination  is  metal  embrittlement. 
Embrittlcment  occurs  when  a  prepared  formula  is 
placed  or  rubbed  on  the  ferrous  or  nonferrous  metal 
parts  of  the  target  item.  When  the  metal  part 
is  stressed  under  tension — usually  by  mechanical 
means — the  pores  in  the  metal  arc  temporarily 
opened.  The  formula  then  seeps  into  the  pores  »nd| 
begins  a  rapid  disintegration  of  the  internal  strut'-! 
ture  of  the  metal,  resulting  in  extensive  cracking  anilj 
eventual  total  breakage  of  the  item.  | 
4-4 
■CONflDCNTIAL
/ 
X 
CONFIDENTIAL 
FM  30-1 7A 
4-8.  (U)  Countersabotage  Measures 
That  part  of  the  counterintelligence  mission  which 
directs  "the  detection,  prevention,  or  neutralization" 
of  sabotage  requires  a  comprehensive  program  in- 
cluding defensive  measures  and  aggressive  offensive 
action. 
a.  Detection  of  sabotage  depends  on  thorough  in- 
vestigation of  individual  and  incident  complaint  cases 
in  which  sabotage  is  alleged  or  suspected. 
b.  Prevention    of   sabotage    is    achieved    through, 
rigorous  application  of  personnel  security  procedures, 
nnd  establishment  find  enforcement  of  high  standards 
of  inslid!nt.iorl  security. 
c.  Neutralization  of  the  saboteur  or  sabotage 
organization  before  sabotage  is  attempted  is  the 
most  difficult  part  of  countersabotage  operations 
and  depends  on  penetration  of  sabotage,  partisan,  or 
other  dissident  groups  to  determine  sabotage  plans 
and  identify  saboteurs,  methods  of  operations,  and 
specific  targets.  No  single  measure  or  type  of  activity 
will  provide  adequate  protection  from  the  threat  of 
sabotage.     , 
"CONriDCNTIAh 
4-5
FM  30-1 7 A 
OONriPCNTIAU 
Section  II.  COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  OPERATIONS 
7-2.  (U)  General 
Standard  wHintrainlcllijiciioo  practices  and  proc.e- 
<lurcs  its  set  forth  in  KM  30-17  are  applicable  in 
comliicliiit;  t-oHitteriMn-Hijjence  jwl.ivil.ii-s  for  stability 
operations.  Standard  practices  and  procedures  dilTer 
only  in  decree  and  emphasis.  Counterintelligence 
aspects  of  slnhilil y  special  operations  me  discussed 
in  this  suction. 
7-2
...     r. 
FM  30-1 7 A 
CHAPTER  8 
TACTICAL  COUNTERINTELLIGENCE-DATA  BASE 
Section  I.  FILES,  INDICES  AND  ANALYSES 
8-1 .  (U)  General 
„  Effective  counterintelligence  operations  «rc 
fluently  dependent  on  the  quality  am  complc c- 
S  
of  files,  indices,  and  the  analyses  of  these  files 
,nd  in.lic-es.  This  chapter  discusses  files,  indices  and 
"analyses  at  the  tact=  ,d  level  during  an  insurgency, 
however,  with  slight  modification,  this  information 
i,  applicable  ..<  «1!  '--vcls  of  command,  and  in  all 
intensities  of  warfare 
b.  Files  and  indices,  after  proper  *™^*> ^""™ 
vield  indent  indicators  (FM  WK5  and  ™  ^1 ), 
"ami  venerate  a  useful  data  base  from  which  target 
recommendations,    P<M>"''«"    '»»>    n*,...r«-cs    .on.ro 
measures,  has,-  ramp  security  recommendations,  and 
„...i.t<.rmU.1liK.-..r..  special  operations,  can  be  made. 
r    Counterintelligence  files  provide  the  countcr.n- 
„.|li.rc„«-o  element,  will,  an  expedient   reference  da  a 
bnsc"  from   which    can    be.   drawn    accurate,    tuncly 
inrormation   r.>r  use  in  both  short-  and   1«™K-™"^ 
,onnterintelliSc»ce    operations.    Additionally,    these 
files  will  provide  a  measure  of  continuity  of  opera- 
tions and  eliminate  the  possibility  that  clement  per- 
sonnel will  waste  time  and  effort  on  activities  ami 
methods    attempted     or    rejected    .l.mnK    previous 
operations.  Tl.rc  will  also  provide  a  me.uis  for  quickly 
orienti..!!   newly    assigned    ,>ersonnel.    One    wnri.mp, 
however,  must  be  borne  constantly  in  mind     loo 
iniirh  information  is  often  .us  confusing  as  too  little. 
Goo.l    tiles    are    continuously    screened    ...    order    to 
eliminate  obsolete  or  irreleviviit.  material. 
,/  From  this  .lata  base,  the  countc.ri,itclliKcnc.e 
element,  can  reeomn.end  Uict.ical  interception,  cordon 
and  search  operations,  raids  and  sc.irr.hos,  popula- 
tion and  resources  control  measures,  bonier  security 
measures,  and  other  tactical  operations  to  the 
commander. 
cuMnnrMTifti 
8-1
FM  30-17A  , 
R-3   (U)  Goss-Refeiencing 
Ln'rc  8-19  graphically  shows  the  c.o^rcncmg 
o    t Z    If  the  hi.   .ion  contained  m  «  file  .anno 
tM.fiMfnrin^  system  *<>r  **«* >»  ec  i.chhi 
«iT«rf.  combat  environment  must  .lcv.se  .Is  oun 
system  to  lit  its  own  needs. 
■^UNHDENTIAI 
8-4.  (U)  Use  of  Files 
.•J..™..*^  fiW  have  .nany   varied   »-  « 
.  -  ^  <>i\    U.xii'iiliv    these  lues  arc  an 
■  Ionic-ted  m  figure  H-M-  ua.su.ii.iv,  n» 
2  of  the  foregoing  «>'-.  *«  r«,l'wmB  WUU,,,,,W'  " 
fTt^ «   <'--■  »"-n^«-  fr^"?nUy  "r 
,li   or     t  political  a.,1  jurisdictional  ••»•"••»""«  ^ 
the  host  Lvomn.cn..  A  data  base  that  does  not  n- 
mJS^o  different  boundaries  will  be  incomplete 
1ms  al  owim'  insurant  exploitation  of  the  bounda- 
rapidly    into    subdivision    A    wh.le    the    suUu.su   . 
,1.  in  B  will  be  for^l  t«.  slop  at  boundary  All. 
!       Lurgcnts,  since  they  arc  still  in  U.e.r  own  suh- 
,      "son,  will  be  near  familiar  caches  and  rest  areas 
The  K0h.li.rn  woul.1  be  close  enoperat.o,,  be. _«,,■,    t    < 
,,„,  subdivisions  A  and  B  «  Ion,  as  the  u.su.g     t 
,.„ooses  to  maintain  snbdivis.on  C  ...  ad.  ...on.  th 
insurgent's  subdivisional  bonndanes  rellect  his  nee.ls 
uT^pabilitics,  and  where  he  feels  strong  .    Ih.s 
information  coul.l  he  vital  in  an  analysis  of  a. .nuns- 
.n.tive  and  pacification  roles  to  be  taken  by  the  host 
government-    
b    Fnany  Control.     The  host  government  s  ,,»*- 
en  ;,  ortu:k  of  it,  is  a,,  indicator  as  to  how  nu.cn 
.ontrol   tin,  host  jp.vcrn.iwnl  exen-.ses  ...  an  area. 
The.  absence  .,f  host  government  tax  ofhees,  s.l,. mis 
police  departments,  hospitals,  and  clccUons  in  aea> 
fs  
indicalivc  of  insurgent  control.  'Phis  inform Uon 
,,m   be   obtained    fro",    a   pol.t.cal    Si  I  MAI     «h«n. 
insurgent  and  host  country  agenc*  are  map  ph»«U  .  
. 
c    &**>•  Inhaled    Incidents.  The.    pr.hl.cal    Si  I 
MAP  1  "form  a  nucleus  for  analysis  of  enemy  m, 
U  
L  
incidents.  Kuch  ab.lnction.  bo.n  >,ng  «ss  ss,  .   - 
tion  or  other  such  action  should   be  piotl.  <  .    i 
Syl  however,  should   not  jump  J"-*  ™J 
but  should  analyze  such  activity  carefulU     Ihe    "k 
of  such  activity  could  mean  ^^^^^u- 
in  control  or  it  could  mean  he  has  ,.., ■••»»■—< > ,., 
vcrscly.  a  high  incident  rate  may  induce  that  tin. 
AT  THE   END  OF  A    SO-DAY 
PERIOD.    REPORTS  ARE 
TRANSFERRED  TO  A  FILE 
FOLDER  WHICH  IS  STORED 
IH  CHROMOUOGICAl.  ORDER 
WITH  OTHER  FOLDERS 
COVERING  PREVIOUS  PERIODS 
Figure  8-17  (U).  Incident  file,  (U). 
i 
8-18 
f?(HK*."ipijipir«nww.?r
-     -  A~\ 
} 
CONFIDENTIAL. 
(CLASSI?ICATi(.;Q 
FM  30-1 7A 
DAILY  STAFF  JOURNAL  OR  DUTY  OFFICER'S  LOG 
(AR  230-346  4  FM  101   S) 
OnC«Ni:»TIO»   OP    IKSTALL1TION 
CI   SiCTlLN,  2332  MI  DzT 
20T>i  DIVISION 
ITEM 
NO 
2330 
2340 
2355 
2035 
20^5 
2400 
LOC  A  TlON 
PillLGERlA 
PACE    MO 
PERIOD  COVERED 
PBOM 
HOUR 
0C01 
DATE 
IF  I-i-iy  £4 
INCIDENTS.  MESSAGES.  ORDERS.    ETC. 
FH  Tm  A  via  radio:  Radio  station  vie  UTN 
365402  searched.  12  lbs  docts  uncovered. 
Four  guards  posted. 
FM  MV  G2  via  LA:  S2,  1st  Bde  reported  arm. 
ed  civ  captured  en  route  to  PU  cage. 
HOUR 
2400 
DA  TE 
11  Hay  SA 
ACTION  TAKEN 
02,   Ch  Notified. 
fin  D  instr  to 
Fr-I  Tm  B  via  radio:      Circle  TriEon  Party 
official  disclosed  loc  of  concealed  enemy 
records  in  cave  at  UTM  370621. 
proceed  to  l'WC. 
INL 
LnV 
LAV 
Tm  F  ordered  to 
site  to  re.iove 
docts  to  CP  &- 
cont  inte  of  CiV 
official. 
LAV 
T»*»E£>  NAME    AK.D    l OBADE    OF   OFF.CEH   OR   OFFICIAL   ON   D<JT» 
Lucius  A.  Valliant,  S/A,  2332  MI  Det 
DA.noSm«1594 
sna  Tuns') 
/*gf/4 
(CLASSIFICATION) 
figure  S   In   (II).   CI  j.mrunl   (II).  * 
<*Oi^ 
>HIO-IMtt4 
L-UNI  IUlniiaL 
8-19 
»"»i  ~i  r»  «  ?^r»?»  ?*  ^t»  r*  r*.-»  c*
FM  30-1 7 A 
,J4RDENT1AL 
In  consolidate  his 
ilWUI-TIll    is   employing   terrorism  ..... 
c^trol  over  contested  ureas.  Basically,  incidents  do 
have  a  meaning.  The  key  is  interpretation 
,/    Omanizatioiuil    File*.    Organuat.omd    M«n ;    
>< 
•„„,,,„,,.•,-„„,  h.,.I  block  charts,  are  use  u I  analytic. 
t()()ls    f»r    establishing    e»cn,v    su bord.nat.on    «  < 
strength     A    well-developed,    complnated    line   ami 
block chart  allows  the  analyst  to  draw  certa.n  con- 
clusions  about   the  insurant,    for  example    his  or 
  ,i,a.i.,.al    and    numerical    strong,    par  icularb 
^  areas  of  l»w  military  and  political  ar«.,v.ty;  N«-« 
organizations  might  rolled  a  change  ...  mission  «>r 
additional     missions    assigned    to    that    »>W™«| 
I  Motions  of  ol.l  organizations,  ami  consolidations  «r 
existing  organizations  could   mean  the  insurgent  is 
beine  hurt,  cither  in  this  subdivision  or  in  others,  or 
„.  could  m«-nn  he  is  streamlining  the.se  organizations 
r«»r  a  new  mission,  liy  also  analyzing  ««»»  «s  subor- 
dinate to  who,.-.,  it  will  be  easier  to  establish  priorities 
for  targeting  against  the  organization  or  individuals 
within  it. 
,  Other  U*es.  Money  and  rood  are  important  to 
U,e'  insurant.  Map  plots  of  taxation  pomts  or  food 
drops  may  indicate  exploitable  patterns  of  msurgent 
activity.  The  use  of  the  data  base,  there  ore,  is 
limited  only  by  the  person  making  the  analysis  or 
the  information  contained  therein. 
8-22 
-eONI  IULN !  IAL
_    _  _     r\ 
T 
COMriDCNTIAL  - 
FM  30-1 7 A 
Section  II.  PATTERN  ANALYSIS 
8-6.  (U)  General 
Because  human  beings  have  certain  needs  and  habits, 
the  insurgent's  activities,  movement  ami  locations. 
may  be  analyzed  through  pattern  analysis.  Counter- 
intelligence personnel  should  be  aware  of  these 
methods  in  case  of  employment  in  support  of 
stability  operations. 
8-7.  (U)  Area  of  Operations 
An  analysis  of  the  insurgent  should  first  begin  with 
the  "area-of-operation"  study.  This  study  should 
yield  descriptive  facts  about  the  area,  a  discussion  on 
how  they  influence  certain  factors  selected  for  their 
importance  in  developing  courses  of  actions,  and 
conslusions  on  how  the  influenced  factors  affect 
possible  courses  of  notion. 
8-9.  (U)  Terrain  Analysis 
In  effect,  the  above  analysis  leads  into  a  parallel 
analysis  which  can  be  furnished  to  the  tactical 
commander.  Terrain  needs  to  be  factually  described 
for  its  effect  on  insurgent  and  on  countcrinsurgent. 
If  certain  terrain  features  are  best  suited  for  insurgent 
basing  areas,  then  the  rniinl-orinsurgcnt.  should 
consider  all  terrain  of  this  type  its  key  terrain.  The 
same  principle  applies  to  avenues  of  approach  which 
are  logically,  in  an  insurgency,  avenues  of  movement 
since  an  insurgent  band  tends  to  retrace  its  previous 
movement. 
««)»-  49*    ii  -   71    -  *. 
8-27
r\ 
GONriDCNTIAL 
FM  30-1 7  A 
.ion 
nty 
cnt 
tied 
ing 
in 
ork 
ort 
tics 
the 
AR  380-series 
AR  381-series 
AR  405-10 
AR  710-2 
DA  Pam  310-series 
DA  Pam  381-series 
/-"{SfDIAT  58-19 
\     (S)  DIA1  5S-2I 
\     (S)  DIAM  58-1 
(S)  DIAM  5S-1 1 
i 
APPENDIX  A 
REFERENCES 
FM  19-30 
FM  19-40 
FM  21-76 
FM  30-15 
FM  30-10 
FM  30-17 
(S)  FM  30-18 
FM  30-31 
FM  31-73 
(C)  FM  32-5 
FM  33-1 
FM  100-scries 
FM  101 -series 
TB  (PMG  series) 
TC3-16 
TOE  30-series 
Note.  For  additional 
Military  Security. 
Military  Intelligence.   • 
Acquisition  of  Real  Property  and  Interest  Therein. 
Materiel  Management  for  Using  Units,  Support  Units,  and  Installations. 
Indices,  as  appropriate. 
Intelligence,  Security,  and  Related  Subjects. 
Defense  Intelligence  Agency  Instructions  (U). 
Defense  Intelligence  Agency  Instructions,  Intelligence  Acquisition  (1SR)  (U). 
Defense  Intelligence  Acquisition  Manual  (U). 
Defense  Human  Resources  Intelligence  Collection  Management  Manual  (U). 
Vol  I,  Human  Resources  Collection  System  Management. 
Vol  TT,  Controlled  TIUMTNT  Collection  Operational  Planning  and  Tradecraft. 
Physical  Security. 
Enemy  Prisoners  of  War  and  Civilian  Internees. 
Survival,  Evasion,  and  Escape. 
Intelligence  Interrogation. 
Technical  Intelligence. 
Counterintelligence  Operations. 
Intelligence  Collection  Operations  Intelligence  Corps,  WSA  (U). 
Stability  Operations-Intelligence. 
Advisor  Handbook  for  Stability  Operations. 
Signal  Security  (SIGSEC)  (U). 
Psychological  Operations — US  Army  Doctrine. 
Field  Service  Regulations. 
Staff  Officers. 
Provost  Marshal  General. 
Employment  of  Riot  Control  Agents,  Flame,  Smoke,  Plant  Agents,  and  Personnel 
Detectors  in  Countcrguerrilla  Operations. 
Military  Intelligence, 
references,  sec  FM  30-17. 
A-1 
t^H^s^SKvywwKHwq*wfWTyyw<ww?w^
■COMHOCNTIAlL 
FM  30-1 7A 
APPENDIX  B  i$(£) 
HOSTILE  ESPIONAGE  ORGANIZATION  AND  METHODS  OF  OPERATION 
B-1 .  Introduction 
fc.  ■'Basic  methods  of  espionage  have.  not.  varied 
significantly  in  the  past,  except  as  technological 
developments  have  pcrmitt.cd  the.  sophistication  and 
modification  of  these  methods.  Regardless  of  the 
sponsoring  country,  certain  far. tors  or  principles 
luivii  contributed  In  successful  espionage  operations. 
The  purpose  of  tins  appendix  is  to  amplify  the  doc- 
trine on  espionage  contained  in  chapter  2  by  present- 
ing a<hlitional  information  on  espionage  organiza- 
tions nnil  fundamental  methods  of  operation. 
sclf-r.hoscn  piirsuits  of  education  and  professions, 
the  freedom  of  interna!  and  external  travel,  and  the 
absence  of  censorship  of  communications. 
B-2.  Operational  Controls 
(yjln  operations  in  the  field,  three  fundamental  opera- 
tional control  procedurivs  arc  usually  exercised  by 
hostile  intelligence  organizations.  These  controls 
emphasize  the  concern  for  operational  security. 
c.  Countries    with    mam 
c:  <Jnuu  tries  with  many  years  of  experience  in 
worldwide  espionage  have  achieved  a  high  decree,  of 
professionalism  in  their  intelligence  personnel.  Stair 
ami  operational  personnel  are  carefully  selected  after 
thorough  investigation  with  maximum  cinphiisis  on 
political  loyalty.  Intelligence  may  bo  a  lifetime  pro- 
fession, barring  purges,  and  there  is  a  great  deal  of 
specialization.  Intelligence,  personnel  are  well  ac- 
cpininleil  with  the  language,  history,  economics,  mid 
politics  of  their  target  countries.  r'reipientlv,  thev 
spend  time  in  the  target,  country  for  area  familiariza- 
tion prior  to  engaging  in  espionage  operations. 
/aj/AJnJled  SUU.es  constitutional  lil>erties  have  l>cen 
studied  in  detail,  and  hostile  intelligence  organiza- 
tions take  full  advantage  of  our  freedoms  of  speech, 
press,  ami  religion;  the.  right  of  assembly  and  meet- 
ings, democratic  elections,  t.ho  legal  existence  of  more 
than    one   pu!itic:ii    party,    our   judicial    system,   our 
B-1
FM  30-i7A 
rp* 
(cfJJi'lii-  ic^nl  iu:«*iu-y  ••»«'  »ls"  |>'i'l"'!'"l<'.  '" 
„  large  extent,  in  i.v.h-1  collection.  It  has  been  stated 
1>V  several  defectors  from  hostile  intelligence  that  us 
hicrh  as  90  percent  of  their  intelligence  requirements 
agTiinsl.  the  US  can  be  fulfilled  through  the  collection 
of  material  openly  available. 
B-3.  Types  of  Operations 
<L°)rIostiIo  intelligence  operations  abroad  may  be 
referred  to  «s  cither  legal  or  illegal.  This  distinction 
I uis  nothing  to  <lo  with  the  legality  or  espionage; 
nithcr  it  refers  to  tho  status-of  the  personnel  involved 
in  such  operations. 
(lfojjThc  logal  operation  makes  use  of  logal 
representations  such  as  an  embassy,  consulate,  trade 
or  cultural  mission,  exchange  group,  or  economic- 
organization  as  cover  for  the  hostile  intelligence 
personnel.  As  a  member  of  such  a  legal  representation, 
one  is  in  the  target  country  with  official  status, 
sanctioned  by  the  host  government. 
(aijfn  a  legal  operation,  hostile  intelligence 
personnel  may  enjoy  the  privilege  of  diplomatic  im- 
munity; they  are  not  subject  to  search,  arrest,  or 
prosecution  for  their  unlawful  activities.  At  best, 
they  can  be  declared  persona  non  grata  and  asked  to 
leave  the  country. 
(6)(Cfjrhc  legal  operation,  particularly  when 
controlled  from  diplomatic  representations,  has  rela- 
tively secure  communications  with  the  headquarters 
in  tho  homo  country  through  use  of  the  diplomatic 
pouch.  Communications  is  a  prime  problem  for 
agents  and  this  method  offers  a  good  solution. 
B-2 
CONFIDENTIAL
r\ 
I 
i 
i 
! 
CONFIDENTIAL  fm  30-,  7a 
B-4.  Typ«  of  A9enb  and  A3e».  System,  lMcnli,j  „f  ,|cv„l„pi„Ki„u,  l,icl,-!„vd,  wHl-ron.^lo.1 
U,)in   conducting   cspmnngc    operations,    hostile    intcl-  agents. 
licence    uses    several    types    of    agents    and    upon  J. 
•systems: 
a/ujThe  individual  agent  system  involves  the  in- 
telligence collection  efforts  of  one  person.  The  intel- 
ligence- collector  operates  alone,  with  direct  clan- 
destine communication  with  intelligence  in  the  home 
country  (via  radio,  courier,  or  personal  contact). 
He  may  have  support  agents  such  as  radio  operators 
or  courier  system,  or  both;  however,  only  one  per- 
son does  the  collecting.  An  individual  agent  may  he 
any  one  of  the  several  categories  of  agents,  as  follows: 
(\foyenetration  agents.  These  agents  have  direct 
access  to  information  of  a  military,  political,  eco- 
nomic, scientific,  or  counterintelligence  nature. 
{2^)Maitft  recruited  aijents.  Mass  recruited 
stents  are  low-level,  poorly  trailed  agents  who  are 
infiltrated  into  target  countries  in  large  numbers 
whenever  favorable  opportunities  exist.  Thev  are 
infiltrated  among  refugee  streams,  repatriated  prison- 
ers of  war,  displaced  persons,  and  linccrosscrs.  Thev 
are  assigned  low-level  missions,  such  as  the  collec- 
tion of  military  unit  identification,  movements  „f 
military  equipment  and  weapons,  and  troop  maneu- 
ver activities.  The  hostile  intelligence  services  have 
little  difficulty  in  recruiting  them.  The  compromise 
•>r  a  few  does  not.  really  constitute  mu.lt  of  „„ 
operational  loss  since  quantity,  rather  than  qunlitv 
is  a  major  consideration  in  these,  operations. 
Cii^r-m fusion  and  provocation  ayents.  Soiye  «-.„>- 
I'lsion    agents   nro   i„stril<:U>l,    U)  fu|)rirnte   ,  nm| 
«  etailcd  stones  of  contaet  with  hostile  intelligence. 
I  
l'e  hope  is  to  lure  target  country  counterintelligence 
»>to  recruiting  these  agents  or  dissipating  its  efforts 
»>  useless  u,  vesication.  Other*  may  carry  fabricated 
document*    containing    seemingly    important    data 
roneernmg   the    home  country   for   the   purpose   of 
dece.vmg  and  misdirecting  counterintelligence    Prov- 
<»ul.,„n   agents  are   used    to   provoke,  target  country 
'o.mlennl.elhgence  agencies  inU,  some  course  of  ac- 
tion whirl,  W!|I  be  to  their  disadvantage  ami  to  the 
advantage  of  u,,,  S1><)ns,)r5nj,  J.<>1|I„ry.  Vw  ,.X||111   ,,. 
»'i    "Kent    may    be   instructed    to   contact   a    target 
••«»»«lry  intelligent  ,ip.nry  ,„„,  ,|Mloll,lrn  u        ^ 
oUicial  as  being  an  informant  of  hostile  intelligence 
A    f«se  denunciation   of  this    typo  could    result  in 
longthy  investigation  of  the  official  concerned   and 
V  Z  "nsniiissationnl  upheavals. 
,,,  W&**P«r  «S*U*.  Sleeper  agents  may  bo  i»- 
lilmitcll  ...to  the  target  country  or  recruited  from 
.imong  local  residents.  They  remain  inactive  until 
« be  sp„,,s„nng  inUdligence.  service  Ills  «  specific 
mission  for  them  to  perform.  Sleeper  agents,  for  the 
Krpnlrr  part,  cost.  V,uU-  or  nothing,  and  some  have  the 
CONFIDENTIAL 
B-3
FM  30-1 7 a  «CONnDCMTIAL 
B-5.  Multiple  Coverase 
Jv)vloie  tliun  one  uspioiiugu  system  from  the  same. 
,„•  dilfcivnl  intelligence  agencies  may  be  used 
ronc.urenllv  to  operate  against  the  same  target  or 
,,n,je«-.L.  Tliry  ...ay  .-penile  imlcpemlclltly  «»f  ••»«-h 
other  mill  iimy  »»t  know  of  each  other's  existence. 
/oKlulliplc  coverage  increases  the  possibility  that 
ll„\l.«ire.l   information   will   be  obtained.    Further-^ 
more,  iiifiM-niHtioii  obtained   from  the  different  nets" 
can  be  compared  »»  "nlcr  u»  *»bmil  ft  more  complete* 
and  accurate  evaluation,  as  well  as  to  reorient  the 
effort  when  necessary. 
B-6.  Agent  Recruitment 
(^Espionage    praelif.es    normally    include   ut    least   a 
^    three-phase  recruitment.  These  phases  are  spoiling, 
analysis  or  stmly,  ami  the  approach. 
((VlHostilo  intelligence  must  locate  individuals  who 
can  be  induced  or  coerced  into  accepting  recruitment. 
lCmphasis  is  naturally  placed  on  persons  who  have 
access    to   information   sought,    or   on    persons   who 
might   later   be   inserted    into    positions   of    access. 
Higher-level     professional      persons     arc     sought 
government  officials,  scientists,  managers,  educators, 
niilitary  officers,  meilical  doctors,  ami  others.  How- 
ever,  the  unschooled,  the  semiskilled,  ami  the  lower 
military    ranks,    e.g.,     messengers,    communication 
center    personnel,    are    lucrative    sources    and    also 
serve  useful  purposes  as  espionage  agents.  A  secretary, 
typist,  or  a  message  center  clerk  may  have  access  to 
highly  sensitive  information  which  would  make  him 
an  extremely  valuable  agent. 
B-4
r\ 
B_7.  Agent  Motivation 
There    are    many    motivations    used    in    recruiting 
agent*.  Of  these,  throft  nrft  ™ploitw!  most  frequently 
by  hostile  intelligence  agencies: 
'rLW«W.  Preference  '«  K'vft»  «"  ,,,c  ",'1«,,,,,">,U 
recrhit;  that  is,  the  one  favorably  dispose.!   toward 
homo  country  or  its  national  theories.  This  type  of 
person  generally  is  the  most  reliable,  for  he  works 
with    political    conviction,    zeal,    perseverance    and 
,,.mplete  adherence  to  policies  ,m<l  instructions;  he  is 
frequently  willing  to  make  many  personal  sacrifices. 
ibllemmutratum.  Hostile  intelligence  has  recruited 
mnJiv     individuals     on     the     basis     of     mcrccnary 
lend'encies.  Some  mercenaries  offer  t<» sell  information 
to  the  hostile  service,  and  others  are  recruited  after 
having  been   spotted   by  hostile  intelligence   repre- 
>pntal.ivcs  in  the  target  .country. 
(li))"Walk-ins"  may  have  large  gambling  debts; 
they  nlny  have  wild  spending  proclivities;  or  they 
may  he  motivated  simply  by  greed.  Generally,  their 
intentions  are  to  sell  information  to  the  hostile 
intelligence  service  or  to  any  buyer  on  a  short-term 
basis."]  Iostilo  intelligence  may  be  quirk  to  take 
ml  vantage  of  these  exploitation  opportunities;  and  as 
soon  as"possible  they  develop  leverage  factors  to 
force  tlm  informants'  rontinucd  cooperation. 
(2K>)lostilc  intelligence  is  continuously  on  the 
lookoufSfor  individuals  with  financial  difficulties  or 
other  personal    problems.    Kxcessivc  gamblers,   nlco- 
holics,  anil  irresponsible  spenders  in   the  Army  are 
among  the  favored   recruitment  targets.   Attractive 
females  are  often   used    U>  induce  soldiers  to  spend 
money  freely  mid  excessively.  .Sometimes  females  are 
successful    in    persuading    the    soldiers    to    provide 
information  for  money,  an   'easy"  means  for  them  to 
continue     their     indulgences.     Initial     requests     are 
sometimes   camouflaged    by    raise   claims    that    the. 
desired    information    is    for    some    national    cause, 
research  institute,  or  friendly  country.  The  innocent 
requests    then    develop    into    demands,    with     the 
revelation    that   hostile   intelligence    has   been    the 
recipient  of  information  already  provided. 
JjjVrefMwe.  The  instances  in  which  hostile  intclli- 
•lewe  services   have    recruited    by    pressure,   tactic 
FM  30-1 7 A 
are  innumerable.  Despite  the  fact  that  many  indi- 
viduals have  reported  pressure  recruitment  ap- 
proaches ami  actual  involvement  in  espionage 
pressure  tactics  have  been  used  with  a  great  deal  o 
success.  The  tactics  may  take  numerous  forms,  and 
their  effectiveness  depends  upon  the  extent  to  which 
various  types  of  acts  have  been  tolerated  in  the 
target  countries. 
(\i)\Tlireats  to  expose  past  or  current  criminal 
actfvitu*  which  have  not  come  to  the  attention  of 
employers  or  law  enforcement  agencies,  'lhc  criminal 
acts  may  involve  anything  from  black-marketing  U> 
theft,  smuggling,  extortion,  dope  peddling,  sexual 
crimes,  and  even  murder.  In  some  cases,  hostile 
intelligence  has  induced  individuals  to  commit  or 
participate  in  criminal  nets,  the.  sole,  purpose  being 
to  develop  pressure  points  which  can  be  applied  in 
forcing  them  to  engage,  in  espionage. 
{2$hxploifatitm  of  clutracter  weaknesses  atul 
indiscretions.  These  frailties  might  involve  alco- 
holism, drug  addiction,  adultery,  »r  sexual  perver- 
sion. Kciimlo  agents  are.  used  to  lure  soldiers  into 
illicit  sexual  affairs,  and  homosexual  agents  are 
placed  in  contact  with  Army  homosexuals  I  he 
soldiers  are  then  confronted  with  photographs  or 
the  acts,  with  threats  to  send  prints  to  wives, 
superior  officers,  or  government  officials,  unless 
l.hcv  a.'ree  to  cooperate.  Ue.eause  of  the  many  control 
problems  presented  by  drug  users,  hostile  intelligence 
services  arc  not  expected  to  exploit  a  drug  addict 
except  on  a  one-time-basis  proposition. 
WJticsplmtaliim   of  prisoners   and   prisoners   of 
vxtr.  There  have  been  cases  where  political  prisoners 
were    offered    early    release,    provided    they    sign 
agreements   to  work   as  agents.  The  same  is   true 
of  prisoners  of  war,  who  are  offered  early  repatriation 
or   who    are    threatened    with    nonrcpatriation,    the 
condition   being   thai   they   work    as   agents   after 
release.  Another  technique  is  to  threaten  the  prisoner 
of  war  with   torture,  or  death   unless   they   become 
informers.    Once    they    cooperate,     levers    can     be 
applied  to  force  their  cooperation  after  repatriation. 
(AlsploitatUm   of  family   ties.    Active,    agents 
"are  persuaded  or  pressured  infc.  recruiting  their  close 
relatives.    This    can     be    done    with    considerable 
impunity,  because  the  relatives  are  often  reluctant 
to  expose   the  recruiter-relative  t«   the  authorities. 
Manv  agents  have  been  recruited  through  threats 
to  first  degree  relatives  living  in  the  home  country 
of   the   hostile   intelligence   service.   Threats    may 
entail   confiscation   of   property,  imprisonment,   in- 
carceration in  slave  labor  camps,  torture,  and  even 
death.  A  variation  is  the  promise  to  allow  relatives 
to  emigrate  to  the  West,  provided  that  the  subject 
agrees  to  cooperate.  Pressure  recruitments  through 
B-5
FM  30-17A 
■eONriDCNTIAL 
relative-  ri't-t pifiit ly  un-  accompanied  by  financial 
inducements*  cither  directly  to  the  subject  or  to 
relatives  kept  us  hostages. 
B-8.  Cover 
al^As  limy  be  assumed,  hostile  intelligence,  spends 
:i  ^riMil  deal  of  lime  planning  and  developing  cover 
fi>r  espionage  agents.  In  t Iter  "legal"  operation,  the 
agency  mil v*  spend  several  month-  <n  even  a  year 
learning  his  job  to  support  his  co\«t  .-.lory  in  the 
West,  in  I  in-  "illegal"  operation,  cover  must  be 
constructed  |n  permit  the  agent  to  disappear  into 
the  |>nptilalioii  of  l.lit*  target  riiimlry.  To  this  end, 
the  tremendous  files  available  at  the  headquarters 
provide  tlio  necessary  background  information. 
idrAlenerally,  li<isLilt>.  intelligence  categorizes  rover 
us  either  "natural"  or  "artificial." 
(lpjNntural  cover  takes  the  form  of  legal  resi- 
dence or  legal  entry  into  n  country,  the  use  of  true 
iiiiines  in  most  instances,  mi  then  tic  ilociimcnl.al.ioii, 
nml  u  normal  or  legal  occupation.  The  best  examples 
of  agent*  using  natural  cover  are  natives  of  a  target 
country  with  legitimate  occupations  and  no  connec- 
tion^ whatsoever  with  the  home  country.  Other  ex- 
amples are  persons  recruited  from  among  repatriates 
and  refugees,  and  hostile  intelligence  officers  serving 
aboard  in  diplomatic  and  other  official  representations. 
(2|UArtificial  cover  involves  the  fabrication  of 
an  agent's  background  and  status,  and  falsi  licit  lion 
of  documents,  passports,  and  other  identification 
documents  in  such  a  manner  as  to  match  the  agent's 
fabricated  background  and  cover  story.  Sometimes 
certain  parts  of  the  cover  story  must  be  bac.kstopped 
so  that  if  officials  cheek  parts  of  the  story  against 
official  records,  the  records  will  support  atid  verify 
the  false  parts  of  the  cover  story.  Home  country 
nationality  and  all  connections  with  it  arc  concealed. 
c.Wbviously,  artificial  cover  is  much  more  difficult 
to  establish  and  maintain  than  natural  cover.  A 
great  deal  of  planning  and  preparation  must  precede 
the  use  of  artificial  cover,  Inking  into  consideration 
the  agent's  linguistic  ability,  accent,  habits,  clothing, 
education,  professional  training,  and  familiarity  with 
the  customs  and  characteristics  of  pertinent  geo- 
graphic areas.  The  training  and  preparation  for  an 
assignment  may  take  years. 
B-9.  Training 
fO)  Agent  training  begins  with  the  recruitment.  Hostile 
^     intelligence  gives  agents  two  types  of  training — 
political  nml   technical.  The  training  usually  con- 
tinues as  long  as  the  agent  is  active. 
tlyJPtditicat  Iwloclr'niatiim.  Agents  who  are  trained 
in  the  home  country  or  who  meet  their  handlers  there, 
e 
regardless  of  their  motivations,  are  generally  sub- 
jected to  a  great  deal  of  political  indoctrination. 
Indoctrination  is  administered  at  meetings  he '.ween 
the  handler  and  the  ugcnl,  and  it  comprises  a  large 
portion  of  the  curriculum  if  the  agent  attends  an 
intelligence  or  espionage  school.  The  national 
theories  are  expounded  upon,  its  well  as  the  advance- 
ments of  the  home  country.  At  the  same  time,  the 
United  States  is  painted  as  a  decadent,  corrupt,  and 
warmongering  capitalistic  society.  The  objective  is  to 
convert  the  agent  completely,  thereby  strengthening 
his  political  reliability  and  ideological  convictions. 
Agents  met  in  the.  West  generally  receive  ;i  minimum 
of  political  indoctrination  in  order  to  keep  meetings 
between  agents  and  agent  handlers  as  brief  as 
possible. 
bNieclkmcal  Training. 
(lVb)TJadrc  workers  (stuff  officer  agents)  of 
hostile  intelligence  arc  well  qualified  for  espionage 
work,  and  their  intelligence  training  is  specific  and 
detailed.  Espionage  agents  in  the  field  arc  pre- 
dominantly of  a  nationality  other  than  the  home 
country.  These  agents  arc  given  espionage  training 
_  to  the  extent  necessary  to  complete  their  assigned 
missions,  to  include  contact  and  identification  ar- 
rangements, detection  of  surveillance,  selection  and 
use  of  letter  drops,  concealment  of  information  for 
transmittal,  and  jH'.rhaps  simple  techniques  of  photitg- 
raphy,  codes,  and  secret  writing.  Higher  level 
agents  arc  given  additional  and  mere  refined  train- 
ing in  espionage  tradoscraft,  which  might  include 
instruction  in  advanced  photography,  microphotog- 
raphy,  intricate  codes  and  secret  writing  systems, 
and  clandestine  radio  assembly  und  operation.  Where 
necessary,  some  arc  also  trained  in  an  occupation 
which  will  serve,  as  effective  cover  and  facilitate  the 
development  of  natural  access  to  the  target. 
(2ft4J\4ost  agents  receive  espionage  training  from 
their  handlers  rather  than  from  formal  intelligence 
schools.  A  few  highly  competent  agents  are  sent  to 
home  country  headquarters  for  more  specialized  and 
formal  intelligence  training  when  such  training  is 
deemed  essential.  A  few  of  these  individuals  may 
eventually  reach  the  stature  of  "illegal"  resident  net 
directors  abroad.  These  agents,  of  course,  must  be  of 
demonstrated  reliability  and  motivation. 
B-1 0.  Operations  Security 
Unsuccessful  espionage  requires  a  high  level  of  opera- 
tions security.  In  no  other  aspect  of  operations  is  this 
concern  for  security  more  appurent  than  in  the 
conduct  of  meetings.  Certain  techniques  have  come  t«i 
be  standard  procedure  for  hostile  intelligence  in  thi> 
concern  for  security. 
B-6 
GONriPCNTlAL
FM  50-1  7  A 
eewnDEMTiAL 
c 
B-1 1 .  Communications 
0)1  lnstilc  intelligence,  in  its  worldwide  operations,  must 
rely  on  sound,,  secure  communications.  Generally, 
couriers  are  preferred  us  tin-,  most,  secure.  and  having 
the  capability  of  transmitting  l.l.--  largest  amount  of 
material.  Tim  next.  preference  is  radio,  the.  fastest 
but  least  secure  method.  It  appears  that  hostile 
intelligence  may  reserve  radio  for  imminent  reporting 
and  wartime  operations,  although  there  is  evidence 
that  agents  in  the  US  may  be  able  to  use  offshore 
trawlers  or  submarines  as  relay  stations.  In  some 
countries,  commercial  cable  lines  are  used  to  exchange 
enciphered  messages. 
aj\)pourier  Communications. 
X IX) Widespread  use  is  made  of  couriers  who 
enter  itriil  leave  target  countries,  both  legally  and 
illegally.  Example*  of  legal  courier  systems  are 
embassies,  consulates,  aitd  military  attaches  who 
make  extensive  uso  of  diplomatic,  pouch  for  espionage 
communications.  Illegal  courier  systems  involve  the 
.use  of  illegal  anil  nondiplomatic  legal  travelers. 
Examples  are  illegal  border  crossers,  seamen,  tourists, 
and  intelligence  officers  assigned  to  cultural  exchange 
groups  and  certain  international  trade  organizations. 
(2W)iulky  documents  are  usually  reduced  to 
microfilm,  which  Is  carried  through  courier  systems. 
Often,  the  films  are  carried  undeveloped  so  that  in 
the  imminence  of  search  or  arrest,  the  courier  can 
expose  them  to  light  and  destroy  the  evidence  o.f 
espionage.  Even  when  the  diplomatic  pouch  is  used, 
information  is  transmitted  on  undeveloped  microfilm. 
(M^n  somo  cases,  soft  JUrn  is  used.  The  hard 
acovato  backing  is  removed  from  film  negatives, 
making  them  thin  and  pliable  so  that  they  can  bo 
rolled  up  and  hidden  in  small  concealment  devices. 
Still  another  technique  is  the  use  of  microdots.  This 
lechniquo  consists  of  tho  reduction  of  a  film  negative 
to  the  size  of  a  pinhcad,  which  can  be  concealed  in 
any  one  of  numerous  places  on  a  person's  body,  in 
his  clothing,  or  in  luggage  or  other  articles  which 
are  carried.  Unless  a  person  is  suspected  of  carrying 
microdots  and  is  subjected  to  a  meticulous  search, 
their  presence  is  almost  impossible  to  detect. 
(4tUjf  tho  information  is  not  photographed,  it 
can  be  written  in  code  or  in  secret  writing,  or  a 
combination  of  both.  In  view  of  their  vulnerability 
to  arrest,  couriers  generally  are  not  permitted  to 
know  'the  code  and  secret  writing  systems  used  in 
tho  communications  thoy  carry.  Courier  communi- 
cations ore  used  most  extensively  and  with  greatest 
effectiveness  during  peacetime,  because  it  is  then 
that  international  travel  and  l»ordor  restrictions  nro 
at  a  minimum. 
m  CONflDCNTIAL
r\ 
eONV'lULN  I  IALT 
FM  30-17 A 
(5)fc/The  transmission  of  information  by  courier, 
although  the  most  secure,  presents  a  problem  for  the 
courier.  Therefore,  hostile  intelligence  agencies  use 
concealment  devices  of  numerous  types  to  transmit 
and  store  espionage  messages.  These  devices  are  such 
articles  as  hollowcd-out  coins,  buttons,  screws,  bolt>, 
cufflinks,   rings,    pencils,   secret   compartments   in 
suitcases,  briefcases,  handbags,  toilet  articles,  shoes 
and  others.  These  devices  make  it  easier  for  espionage 
operatives  to  conceal  microdots,  microfilm,  and  thm 
sheaves  of  paper.  Considerable  effort  and  money  is 
devoted  to  development  and  manufacture  of  such 
devices.  • 
(6$ln  addition  to  the  transmission  information, 
the  espionage  agent  or  even  the  director  may  have 
need  for  a  storage  place  for  information  or  equipment. 
Such  caches  receive  considerable  attention  from 
hostile  intelligence. 
fi(y)l/c?7  Communications. 
(1  ^Information  is  transmitted  through  the 
mails,  Waking  use  of  codes,  secret  writing,  simple 
coded  phrases,  and  microdots.  Code  messages  are 
usually  reduced  to  secret  writing,  and  coded  phrases 
an-  used  throng-"'  "'*  visiWo  "xL  of  U,B  , ' 
to  transmit  short  messages.  Microdots  can  be 
concealed  on  typewritten  texts  of  a  letter,  under  the 
flap  or  postage  stamp,  or  in  the  case  of  post  cards 
between  the  fibers  or  on  the  face  of  the  card. 
(2I)]Espionage  communications  arc  often  trans- 
mittedMbrough  neutral  or  third  countries.  Circuitous 
routing  slows  down  communications,  but  it  increases 
the  effectiveness  of  security.  Espionage  communi- 
cations through  international  mails  are  vulnerable 
to  detection  during  wartime  when  censorship  is 
widely  imposed. 
e.   Ratlin  Communications. 
(iJAikadins  are  used  overtly  by  embassies  ami 
consultktes.  Enciphered  messages  arc  transmitted 
and  received  over  high-powered  wireless  radio  sets 
which  arc  legally  authorized. 
(2V0lTwo  types  of  clamlesline  radio  communica- 
tion which  arc  commonly  used  by  hostile  intelligence 
are  the  one-way  system  and  the  two-way  system.^ 
When  the  one-way  system  is  used,  coded  messages 
are  transmitted  over  powerful  commercial  ra.ho 
networks  from  the  home  country,  generally  by 
shortwave.  Using  an  ordinary  home  radio  set  with 
a  shortwave  band,  the  agent  in  the  target  country 
listens  to  transmissions  at  designated  times,  trans- 
cribes the  messages  intended  for  him  and  deciphers 
them.  A  disadvantage  of  this  system  is  that  the 
agent  does  not  have  a  rapid  method  of  communicating 
with  the  intelligence  service  in  the  homo  country. 
When  the  two-way  system  is  usod  the  agent  has  a 
transceiver  radio,  compact  in  size  and  designed  for 
clandestine  operations. 
(3)  (ftipher  svstems  are  used  with  both  radio 
svstems^to  translate  open  text  material  into  groups 
of  usually  five  numbers.  In  deciphering  the  messages, 
an  a-cnt  uses  a  code  devised  for  his  exclusive  use. 
Some  cipher  systems  are  based  on  a  one-time-pad 
system.  The  sender  and  recipient  both  have  identical 
code  pads  The  sender  uses  one  or  more  sheets  for  a 
message,  and  the  recipient  uses  the  corresponding 
identical  sheets  to  decipher  the  message.  Both  parties 
then  destrov  the  used  sheets  ami  take  up  the  next 
one.  If  the  code  used  in  any  one  message  is  broken, 
succeeding  messages  cannot  be  deciphered. 
(4#plandestine  radio  communications  are  vul- 
nerable^ interception  and  direction-finding  opera- 
tions, especially  when  transmissions  are  lengthy. 
These  hazards  have  been  partially  overcome  by  the 
development  magnetic  tape  recordings.  The  entire 
message  is  recorded  on  magnetic  tape  and  then 
transmitted  at  high  speed  (burst  transmission)  so 
that  the  entire  length  of  time  the  transmission  is  on 
the  air  is  reduced  to  seconds. 
(Stifhc  use  of  clandestine  radio  remains  largely 
a  device  for  wartime  operations  for  use  by  stay- 
behind  nets  in  enemv  rear  areas  sime  other  menus  or 
communication  are  generally  morn  secure  dur.ng 
peacetime.  In  wartime,  radio  is  often  the  most  prac- 
tical method  of  communication.  It  should  be  borne 
in  mind  that  hostile  intelligence  agencies  establish 
numerous  clandestine  ratlio  communication  systems 
in  target  countries  so  that  they  will  be  available  for 
use  in  the  event  of  war. 
B-12.  Finances 
^Iostiic  intelligence  finances  its  espionage  opera- 
tions, wherever  possible,  in  the  currency  of  the  area 
of  operation,  so  that  agents  will  not  be  picked  up 
with  large  amounts  of  currency  foreign  to  the  coun- 
tries in  which  they  are  operating. 
tWAlmost  unlimited  funds  for  espionage  operations 
mav  come  from  the  national  budget  of  the  home 
country  of  the  intelligence  service.  Other  sour.es  of 
funds  are  businesses  and  cover  organizations  estab- 
lished for  that  purpose.  Some  agents  are  directed  to 
engage  in  illegal  activities  to  raise  funds  and  to 
obtain  local  currencies  by  such  means  as  extortion, 
blackmarkct  activity,  and  counterfeiting.  Some 
agents  are  given  saleable  articles  such  as  gold, 
jewelry,  narcotics,  and  scarce  medicines  for  conver- 
sion to  money.  Others  are  trained  in  professions  which 
will  enable  self-support  in  the  target  area  and  add 
weigh'-  to  the  cover  story. 
$Kunds  arc  transmitted  into  target  countries  and 
to  espionage  agents  by  diplomatic  pouch,  by  other 
official  representatives  in  the  target  country,  i>> 
clandestine  couriers  such  as  merchant  seamen,  and 
by  agents  themselves  when  entering  target  countries. 
B-9 
CONFIDENTIAL
ouioncaMTJPH  — 
FM  30-1 7  A 
•n,r...i»l.    i..u-m..i»......l    rurrrn.-y    Inu.sn.t.ons    bunk 
lmlmll.;,  m:lV  l-V  ,-1,l..!,>l1-.l  i„  lb.-  uwx ..-..."try  ... 
tll(,imm,<,fllMU>p.,t^,nl.an^.,cU..,.sl;,. 
„s    required,    ...    .I-    .-*,.■.»....*•    »*«'»'■    "»',"r    S""" 
pretext. 
B-1 3    Disposition  of  Agents 
cMlostile  mlelli*e„<c  apparently  m»kt-s  *.....•  d.s- 
H„Ai»n  between  sb.iT  off.cers  ...i<l  n^-nUs  ,„  consulcr- 
i„K    dispositions.     Reported    .lispos.i.on    lechn.qucs 
iixlii.l.-A1"'  f»l!'>w'.»t:--  .     . 
(lM(>ii  Jtmrniiijl  t»mt  ugenl-s  were.  «">.|>r»»'^ '   - 
1H».|  in  .lander  of  arrest,  hostile  intelligence  warned  ^ 
.hen.  U.  -o  into  hiding  or  tx.  nmke  their  way  to  the 
hon.e    or    friendly    country.    This    rcs..lU-d    ...    the 
termination  of  their  services,  or  their  ,denlit.es  ami 
.overs  were  changed  Tor  operation  elsewhere  in  the 
target  country. 
(2MVIiwi  hostile  intelligence  learned  lh.it  agents 
were  intelligence  swindlers  or  hud  been  doubled  by 
turret  country  counterintelligence,  it  directed  their 
return  when  possible  to  a  friendly  country  on  some. 
1M,p,ire»tlv  innoee.nl  pretext.  Swindler*  frequently 
have,  been  imprisoned.  Doubled  agents  have  been 
imprisoned  or  sent  to  slave  labor  camps,  or  they  have 
been  redoubled.  
.     . 
(^Intelligence  stuff  officers  whose.  missions 
were  complete!  in  a  target  country  were  recalled  U> 
the  home  country,  and  a  number  of  them  later 
appeared  in  the.  same  or  different  countries. 
(4]f0)te.sidc..i.  lyp«'  esp'»>»age.  *psn«*  wi\"*1' 
spccif.cSmssions  were  completed  were  transferred  to 
other  targcLs  in  the  same,  country,  or  they  tempo- 
rarily became  dormant. 
(5}0ln  cases  where  intelligence  staff  »  hc.crs 
defecteVto  the  West,  effort*  were  made  to  locate 
Uiein  an.l  persuade  them  to  return  to  the  home 
country  with  promises  that  they  would  not  be 
prosecuted.  The.  Tate  for  such  mdividua Is  was  death, 
or  at  best,  life  imprisonment.  -  When  hostile  intel- 
|„.e,,x  had   reus,.,,   U.  l-ci.-c  Uml  stuff  oll.cers  Were 
,„„,.e„.plu<i.^  defection,    they   were   d.recled    to   n- 
,,,„,  mm.cdiulcly  to  the  J........  country  or  they  wc.c 
taken  into  physical  custody  .....i  forcibly  returned. 
These  individuals  were  never  herd  of  agam. 
bftkW  the  major  espionage  services  operate  in  a 
similar  manner  with  deviations  to  meet  local  con-, 
ditions.  In  allemplinR  U»  counter  the  activities  or 
hostile,  intelligence  services,  it  is  wise  to  remember 
that  most  of  the  key  intelligence  officers  are  *ell 
trained  and  experienced. 
<A))ln  conclusion,  it  shoul.l  be  noted  that,  even 
though  the  organization  and  methods  of  operation 
are  extremely  professional  and  well  conceived,  men 
are  required  to  make  these  organisations  am 
techniques  effective.  This  is  the  basic  weakness  of 
all  espionage — man. 
B-10
fU  30-1 7  A 
D-4 
I
DDisr.  1396-1  — ■-  —  — -~~ 
Fi,jnTv.l>*  (U).   Hmraphirrtvorl  UD- 
■CONriDCMTlAW 
>0i
rmr.  ).n  >»«*» 
FM  30-1 7  A 
'  ,   hi     i     »•»•<*" 
rSSS5&-   -r:::r.rrr.::. .-   -> 
,0.».0»0*    IM.".'"""1"1 
l 
/.-,<,»«/>  2   CI)      Omlinii"!    HI). 
CQWriDCNTI  Al 
D-5
FM  30-1 7 A 
CQNnnCNTIAIr 
r»y  >  »'  l  r»>»* 
I  «0-    U-&-  *COu» 
amcci  *»o  «ci.*T»ve»  #w. 
u<ruo*  u.».  »iim*»f 
»kc fckemccs     **•»•»»•*  **•*•»*»*•  *"  *' 
la  (»»*,  *r**k.  »*•«' e*.  ♦■f#r*»M—*»*.  •»•»«».  »•**••••* 
V,..,s-I0.c«    ,r   -....«..  "»••>.<'   —  "  '""""-  •""""* M.  <•■•  »•»»•»•*  »•»!■•»••.  » 
s 
Mltf^ 
trpUSt  -FAMILY 
«*ME.  ©F  t^OUil 
M.    MAIOCN  »*«  OF  SPOU&C 
U.   D*Tf  fr**r.  *—*.  **?> AND  F.kCC  OF  H«tt» 
NATION  *Lt*T*     (ln*tt» 
,  «—t  ..(UwiMr  -*»••  •#*««•*'•  ' 
•a.  AfuictOM 
i      r~i**pi*^*AcT'ci,,G 
..*  ItinU  ».»»»wi  »«!•»"«•  »-  •*«'«•'* ,*•*!.-  «»«cl*l  Wl«»»'»* 
e,.L.... ,.-   -   -  -   •'-  ~~  '"""'  ' 
mow»».i»o»»'-«T»- 
mik  o»nc»   ""  » -  »>■"■ 
Figure  l>-e  (I/)— Continued  (U). 
D-6
FM  30-1 7  A 
WARNING  NOTICE:  SENSITIVE  SOURCES  AND  METHODS  INVOLVED 
I. 
US  (Army)  Intelligence  in  a  classified  activity  at_ 
_,  born  on  .  . 
 —   —   ~ 
_,  presently  residing  at   —   
_,  acknowledge  that  I  have  voluntarily  cooperated  with 
(geographic  location)   
        to. 
during  the  penort  . 
 ;         — -    -  .  „  „„_:_„  made  to  me  have  been  discharged 
Intelligence  or  the  US  Government 
•Date  of  Recruitment  or  Initial  Activity  of  Source 
•*J)atc  of  Termination 
(Witness) 
(Signature) 
(Date) 
(Classified  When  Completed) 
(For  Non-US  Nationals— Termination) 
figure  D-.'l  (U).  Severance  statement  (V). 
S  E  C  U  R  I  T  Y 
CE _R  T  I  F  I  C  A  T  E 
(Nairn-,   upon,  SKAN) 
I   
,,.rlifv  .!...«    1   l,.,vo  .,,,  thw  date  hron  entrusted  with  informa.mn  con.-enung  a  serine    1.^     »l     .m  . . 
„„,mVi»n/i.,v^«.ipHio...  and  ngn,-  U,  p.-rfom,  functions  n^u,\  ,..  .,.,„.„,.-„..,.  .l,...,n.,l,   I   r,  „  ,  
"         " 
o     ,  on  in  v.-stiL.ion  is  .l.^ified  within  the  meaning  of  ,«U.h«I  .!.*«*-  ^lyn,,^-  «...    •     "    .    .     ■ 
opera  t.ion/im-i*sligat-u>n 
nil  
other  persons  and  , Jicics,  except  as  may  be  spccifical.y  authorise,,  by  US  Army  .nle.hg-n,,. 
(Dat.0  (SiKnat..rc) 
(Classified  when  completed) 
(For  US  National  Source  Only,  When  Recruited) 
Figure  Ii-10  W).  Security  certificate  (11). 
CONHULNTIAL 
D-21
fm  30-1 7A  CONnPCNTlAW 
I 
S  IOC  U  K_l  T  Y 
CERTIFICATE 
WARNING  NOTICE:  SENSITIVE  SOURCES  AND  METHODS  INVOLVED 
j   t  certify  that  I  have,  been  iiif(>rnir.il  l>y  Mr.     -  > 
ftll  nn'lhori/.c.l  rcpn-sentative  of  the  United  States  Army  Intelligence,  that  disclosure  of  the  nature,  sources,  or 
even  tin-  exigence  of  counterintelligence  »€:tivili«^,  to  which  I  have  become  i»urty,  arc  not  to  be  .lisclose.l  to 
any  persons  without  the.  express  approval  of  the  United  States  Army  Intelligence. 
I  further  certify  that  I  am  aware  of  the  provisions  of  Alt  HXO-5,  ami  Unit  any  unauthorized  disclosure  of  the 
counterintelligence  information  discussed  with  nu-  by  the  above-named  representative  of  the  United  States 
Army  Intelligence,  will  be  considered  a  violation  of  AR  HS0-5,  and  will  subject  me  to  appropriate  disciplinary 
action. 
(Date)  (SiKnature) 
(Classified  When  Completed) 
(For  US  Military  Source — Termination) 
Figure  D-ll  (V).  Security  certificate  (I/). 
■SECUltl  T  Y 
CERTIFICATE 
,   ,  acknowledge  this  date  that  1   have  voluntarily  cooperaU 
with  'intelligence    officials    in    a    sensitive    clarified    security    operation/in vesication    during    the.    peri( 
1111    "uc'»Bc,t  '    ^        )o   T  hftve  receiVe,I  all  remunerations  and  allowane 
,|„e  ...<•  ami   there  ^re  "no  other  outstanding  ol.lip.Uons.   1   realize  that  the  operation   is  classified    within .   t 
ixtttttzszszzzzz  ass  siisasi  w 
in  such  operation/investigation.  ^   
(Date)  (Signature) 
(Witness  (Case  Officer)) 
(Classified  When  Completed) 
(For  US  National  Sources— Termination) 
Figure  D-li  (U).  Security  certificate  (U). 
d-22  CONFIDENTIAL
FM  30-1 7 A 
A  G  K  EJEMEJil 
presently  residing  at, 
  _  presently  ^^n^^^^^^  ^J" 
•Insert  identification  of  m*"*>1    ' 
(Classified  when  completed) 
(For  non .US  nationals  only,  "hen  rccru 
lited) 
Figure  D-W a  (V).  Seeurito  «rt'/tMfc  (U)- 
h 
D-23
_~.-«-iAI  FM  30-1 7 A 
APPENDIX  E  (Q 
.GLANCE  RADiO  COMM^CATO«ODES^ 
5-_3    (U)  Police  10-Seri« 
1  1-     -      IflHI'lil'S     S    IIS    folloW*. 
Vn  -1   Receiving  Poorly 
10-2   Receiving  Well 
10  :t  KU>(>  Transmitunc 
l0-4  OK,  Message  Hceeive.1 
10  5  Rcl.vy  Message 
10-6  K«sy,  Stand  By 
,07OHt.ofServ..«M^vymgA 
,0-S  In  Service,  Subject  I  o  Cull 
100   UePe,v..  Message  .       n>, 
H>_10  Tmnsnussion  ("'»»"""•
*"  3(M7A  '  l0_o9  Mission  Completed,  All  Unit-  S,r,m- 
ID- 11  Talking  To..  U.M.i'll.v  1()  .2„„   l»„|i.-<-  NvimIim!  At 
lft-19   Visitors  Present  ,.  .uCiidc  *iltnal  mav  be  rcvcr>i-tl  by  staling  »l  a--. 
J:"  ^vt  w.-.  wr.«.i  oon.i,.,o«s  ^.rv:^:,;^  .*-**  »,.„*  -T •■*>** ,  >-- 
10-1B  Make  Pick  Up  At    u.^uT  or  lo-ao*.  "What  »  the  c.mxi  t..,.,, 
jo  -17   Urgent  Bn^iiii"^ 
10-1S  Anything  For  Us? 
,1,19  Nothing  For  Y»...  U«*«n,   L.B.V.M 
10-20   N!v  l-oration  Is. 
 
1»-21  Cull  By  Telephone^ 
10  22    K«-|»»rl  l»  IVrstm  To   
10-2H  Sunwl  By 
10_24  Completed  h«st  Assignment        ^ 
IO  2.r>  (-mi  Yo»  ('"til*'1'  .  '" 
10-20   Disregard  1-ust  Informal. on 
10-27  I  Am  Moving  To  Channel   
10-2S  Identify  Your  Station 
10-:i0  Do,*  Not  Conform     »   ;<-  ;  
Hide. 
10-H5  Confidential  Information 
10-:i»l  Corri'it  Time  Is   
10-H7  Wrecker  Needed  At  —   
10-HS  Ambulanec  Needed  At   
10-:<<)    Your  Messuge  Delivered 
,0-41    Please  Tune  To  Channel  ...   
10_42  Trnflic  Accident  At   
10-50  Break  Channel   
,0_60  What  Is  Next  Message  Number.' 
10-C2  Unable.  To  Cop.V.  Use  Phone 
10-63  Net  Directed  To  _—   
10-G7  All  Units  Comply 
10-73  Speed  Trap  At  —   
10-75  You  Are  Causing  Interference 
10-77  Negative  Contact 
10-S1    Reserve.  Hotel  Room  For  — 
10-82  Reserve  Room  For 
10-84  My  Telephone  Number  Is  __ 
ia-85  My  Address  Is  __-—- 
10-89  Radio  Repairman  Needed  At 
10-90  1  Have  TVI 
10-91  Talk  Closer  To  Mike 
i0~92  Your  Transmits  Is  Out  of  Adju'tmcn 
££  Check  My  Frequency  On  Tins  Channel 
1(>-94  Please  Give  Mc  A  l-*Owl 
10-95  Transmit  Dead  Carner  tor  5  Second 
E-2
■eONHDCNTIAli 
FM  30-1 7  A 
Areas  arc  divided  into  points  or  routes.  The  move- 
ment of  subject  r«n  he  r«H..w.-.l  .fsing  these  grid  or 
rout*  numbers.  When  discussing  iho  subject's  move- 
ment- Aver  nulio  or  telephone  communications,  to 
insure  message  security,  nn  approved  operations  «r 
specially  designed  rode  system  should  be  used. 
E-5    (U)  Example  of  Transmission 
The'control  point  (Bull  Durham)  and  an  operatmg 
team  (Satan)  arc  in  communication- 
Bull  l>urhwnf  Ibis  is  Satan      OVEU 
Satan,  this  is  Bull  Durham      «VtK 
Bull  Durham,  this  is  Satan      ROGER  OUT 
E-6.  (U)  Use  of  Radio  Code  in  Conjunction  with 
a  Town  Plan  or  Area  Map 
Ficurcs  E-l  and  E-2  illustrate  a  simple  numerical 
„,,!«.  u,  -bow  Ihe  location  and  movement  of  subject. 
r> 
Figure  K-i  W).  Orid  »y*le>n  cade  <"). 
4-IN-4V1    O  -  11   -  9
FM  30-1 7A 
■GONriDCNTIAL 
¥ 
/\;.%;^:^o 
v< 
figure  E-*  (U).   Point  and  route  system  code  (I/)- 
E-4 
CONFIDENTIAL
FM  30-1 7 A 
c.  Texas— Supermarket 
E-8.  (U)  Keyword  Code  Phillip's- Route  #66 
lowing  arc  examples:  .  ./•  ^R'»«"»* 
a.  Palace— Mayor's  office  or  similar  high  oincinl  s  ^    Georgia— South 
or  subject's  home.  ,t    Georgia  California— Southwest 
b.  Hawaii— Route  #50 
<> 
-CONFIDENTIAL 
E-5
<•» 
Jiy  Order  of  the-  Secretary  of  tin:  Armv: 
Oniciiil : 
VEltNK  L.  HOW  Kim 
Major  Gf.ur.rnJ.   Jl-nHe.il  Sfnf,:x  Arttu/ 
The  Adjutant.  General 
FM  30-1 7A 
OREIGIITON  W.  AIHtAMS 
Geiutrul,  United  State*  Army 
Chief  of  Stuff 
^ 
DiRt-rihiirjon: 
To  lie  distributed  in  ueeordnme  with  DA  FoYm   P>-1 1   n»m;».l»....i  ■  r  -  r>        .-.,,•  ^ 
IntoJJiBcnr«  Corps,  US  Army  (U).  requirement,  for  Co,.ntennte!l,<re„ee  Operations, 
...  s.  ^VKH^mum  ™IN.TBn;  „„.„  K;   1H(  (i    w> _4 f) 
CONriDC
j$«k 
FM  30-18  The  following  pages  have  been  deleted  due  to 
classification  (Exemption  (b)(1)): 
1-1  thru  1-2 
2-1  thru  2-8 
2-11  thru  2-15 
3-1  thru  3-8 
4-1  thru  4-4 
5-1  thru  5-13 
6-1  thru  6-9 
7-1  thru  7-3 
8-1  thru  8-9 
9-1  thru  9-5 
10-1  thru  10-4 
11-1  thru  11-4 
12-1  thru  12-8 
13-1  thru  13-2 
14-1  thru  14-5 
15-1  thru  15-4 
16-1  thru  16-2 
17-1  thru  17-8 
18-1  thru  18-2 
19-1  thru  19-11 
B-l  thru  B-29 
C-l  thru  C-10 
D-l  thru  D-3 
E-l  thru  E-3 
F-l  thru  F-4 
G-l 
H-l 
J-l  thru  J-23  (minus  J-3) 
K-l 
Index-1  thru  Index-8
Oil. 
V 
fM  30-18 
^ 
FIELD  MANUAL 
INTELLIGENCE  COLLECTION  OPERATIONS  (U) 
& 
NATIONAL  SECURITY  INFORMATION 
Unauthorized  Disclosure  Subject  to  Criminal  Sanctions. 
fey 
HEADQUARTERS,  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  ARMY 
NOVEMBER  1973 
-SKREf- 
CLASSIFIED  BY:  DIM*  St-U(S),  30  Jum  1965 
DEFENSE  HUMAN  RESOURCES  INTELUGENCE 
COLLECTION  MANAGEMENT  MANUAL  (U) 
EXEMPT  FROM  GENERAL  DECLASSIFICATION  SCHEDULE  OF  EXECUTIVE  OROER  IK52 
EXEMPTION  CATEGORY:  2 
DECLASSIFY  ON:  CANNOT  BE  DETERMINED
SECRET- 
i.  u 
.:ii-in 
PART   I. 
(    II  (l-TI  I!     I. 
>|-l-tl«il!      I- 
11. 
111. 
C'll  \ITKII     '.i. 
PART   II. 
Oil  \ITKU    ■%. 
r>. 
7. 
s. 
*i. 
H). 
II. 
part  in. 
^ -j j  \rr»:fi    12. 
i:i. 
14. 
I.'.. 
!<".. 
I'AItT   IV. 
OlIAITKU     17. 
IS. 
I'.». 
A. 
I'.. 
O. 
!). 
i:. 
I". 
( ;. 
'FM  30-1 
IIKADQUAKTIOKS 
OICPAKTMKNT  OK  TIIK  ARMY 
Washington,  i).C,  HO  Nuwmbrr  /.V7.f 
INTELLIGENCE  COLLECTION  OPERATIONS  (U) 
ceneral  policy  ouidance 
r.KNERAL.            
OROANIZATION  OK  COLLECTION    UNITS 
Iiil«-rn:il  J*nnc'litm;il  OrgiuiizatiiHi     
(\>llrrtii>i»  Orii.mi/.ntioii  ixnti  1'iimlii.iis  .   
Til  E  CASK  OFFICER  AM)  Ills  AOENTS        
OPERATIONAL   PLAN  NINO 
PLANNINO           .  .. 
THE  OPERATIONAL  CYCLE        ..      .   
INFILTRATION  AN!)  KXFILTRATION   
SPECIAL  OPERATIONS.   
STABILITY  OPERATIONS      OOI,|,E<  :TH  >N 
SECURITY  AND  OPERATIONAL  OHSTACLES. 
COVER     
A  !-*-►.  Tvl.l  \ 
il. 
I. 
.1. 
K. 
Inokn 
REPORTS   -.. 
TRADKCRAFT  AX1>  TECHNICAL  COI.I.KCTION  M KAN'S 
SECRET  WRIT1NO 
CONCEALMENT  DEVICES  ANI»  AOENT  DOCUMENTATION        
(■LAI'S  AND  SEALS  TECHNIQUES   
OPERATIONAL  P1IOTOO  RAPII  Y 
 
CACHINC      .    ...     
CI.ANDKSTI  NE  (,'OMM  UNICATIONS 
NONTECHNICAL  MEANS  OF  COMMUNICATION   
CR  YPTOORAPil  Y 
 -   
CLANDESTINE  ELECTRONIC  COM  M UNICATIONS   
REFERENCES 
OI.OSSARY  OK  1  NTEI. LICENCE  TERMINOI.OU.Y      .   
OPERATIONAL   REPORTS              
HASIOSOURCE  DATA/ISR  REGISTRATION  OR  NAMETRAOE  REQUEST 
S  1*1  )TTER'S  GUIDE             - 
OPERATIONAL   PLAN  '    .    .  .    
MINIMUM      REQUIREMENTS     Vdlt     CLANDESTINE     INTELLIGENCE 
OPERATIONAL  PROPOSALS              .. 
MINIMUM    REQUIREMENTS  Villi   OVERT   PROJECTOR   PROPOSAI   
MINIMUM  REQUIREMENTS  KOIt  SENSITIVE  PROJECT  OR  PROPOSAL  . 
INTELLIOENCE  INFORMATION  REPORTS                            .                 .    .    . 
SOURCE    DATA    CHANCE ...     .  ...    
11—1-4 
2-1—2   2 
•>  .1-   2    1 
>-:>-•>  is 
::  I     ::  r, 
4-1—  4   4 
.".I-  .".  r, 
iv- 1—  r.-4 
7    1-7    I 
s    |       S    ill 
«»  i- -'.•  i> 
in  i— -to  III 
i » — i — 1 1  -:$ 
12    I        12    II 
i:t  I-  -i:t  2 
ii-i— 14  r. 
I.V  I  —  I'i-.I 
n;  i     Hi  i 
17    I       17  !l 
is-  i  — is  :; 
I'.l    I  — l!l-  12 
I'll, 
S 
!)■ 
10- 
II- 
14- 
\r,~ 
17  • 
.-.is- 
I'.i- 
A 
I) 
K 
C
II- 
l-i 
.1-1 
K  -I 
Index- 1 
c 
This  field  rooaeol  scpwjidej  FM  30-9A,  Agaurt  1958;  FM  30-18,  July  1963,  end  FM  30-31  A,  Adjust  1967. 
BccncT-
SECRET" 
FM  30-18 
t 
-Aj 
fJ      GRC-106 
Comm  Pit 
GRC-106 
G  Col!  Pit*  PS 
r X. 
-— —H      GRC-106         l_ 
£ 
Coll  Pit* 
PS 
V 
11      GRC-106         L 
Coll  Pit' 
PS 
*     See  figure  2-3  for  other  equipment. 
Figurr.  £-:t  {IJ).  Operations  numiloriug  net  (CW)  ((,'). 
2-9
Ml  CO,  COLL 
CO  HQ 
OP  SEC 
COMM  SEC 
COLL  PLT 
PLTHQ 
COLL  TM 
Figure  2-4  (U).  MI  company  collection,  theater  army  (I/). 
2-10
rM   3G    i3 
•^eeR&x^.. 
.drop  «^^f^a 
-*-M. 
JYoure  0-3  f  £/>.  Reporting  oj  obitacies  and  target  approach  point  (U). 
6-10
-sccnET- 
FM  30-18 
FiQure  fi-4  (U).  Relationship  between  IP  anil  AAA  (U). 
6-11
-4i!'i-Ol!"»iL  I  -* 
(B) 
•50  METERS' 
(A) 
■50  METERS' 
-<& 
RELEASE  POINT 
50  METERS 
(S) 
Figure  6-5  (I/).  Methods  of  release  point  marking  (t/). 
6-12
.gCGRS-T. 
FM  30-18 
APPENDIX  A  (U) 
REFERENCES 
AR  ior,-:ii 
AK  135-3X0 
AR  195-0 
AR  310-25 
Alt  310-50 
A  R  340  2 
AR  340-15 
AR  340-16 
AR  3K0-serics 
AR  :ixisiTirs 
AR  405-10 
AR  000-:* 
(KOUO)  AR  014-31 
(C)  AR  614-32 
AR  040-20 
AR  715  30 
AR  930-5 
DA    Pain  27-1 
KM    30-series 
(S)    KM   3 1-2 1  A 
KM    31-73 
KM    32-5 
(S)    KM   32-10 
(C)    KM  32-20 
(S)    KM    lol    in  3 
TM    11-401 
TM   30-series 
TOE  30-series 
UIAM   5S- 11 
Message  Preparation  unci  Processing  ...  . 
Release  of  Classified    InromiulicMi   l»  Aniiy    National   Guard.   United   states  Army 
Reserve,  ami  Reserve  Officers  Training  Corps 
Department  of  the  Army  Polygraph  Activities 
Dictionary  or  United  Stales  Army  Terms 
Authorised  Abhreviutions  anil  Brevity  Codes 
Maintenance  and  Disposition  of   Records  in  TOE  Units  of  the  Active  Army  and 
Army  Reserve 
Preparing  Correspondence 
Safeguarding  Nondefense  Information 
Security 
Military  Intelligence 
Acquisition  of  Real  Property  ami  Interests  Tin-rein 
Women's  Army  Corps — General  Provisions 
Assignment  and  Travel  Restrictions 
Restrictions  of  Assignment  ami  Travel  of  Personnel   Having  Access  to  Special   In- 
telligence (U) 
US  Army  Intelligence  Badges  ami  Credentials 
luteal  Purchase  of  Civilian  Type  Items 
American  National  Red  Cross  Service  Program  and  Army  Utilization 
Treaties  Governing  Land  Warfare 
Military  Intelligence 
Special  Forces  Operations  (U) 
Advisor  Handbook  for  Sodality  Operations 
Signal  Security  (SIGSEC) 
USASA  in  Support  of  Tactical  Operations  (U) 
Electronic.  Warfare  (U)  .    .  . 
Stair  Of hcers'  Kield  Manual,  Organizational,  Technical,  and  Logistical    Data,  Classi- 
fied Data  (U) 
Elements  of  Signal  Photography- 
Military  Intelligence 
Military  Intelligence 
Human   Resources  Intelligence  Collection  Management.  Manual,  Volumes  I  ami   .1 
(DI1IUM  and  DICOM) 
SECRET- 
A-1 
±J  J  JMUHMH  \  UJJLAllJgflJi.).'1;
rv- 
AP*HW*  '  
(S>           coNCEPT  OR  PROPOSAL 
pnR  SENSITIVE  PROJE^  <" 
MHIMUM  REQUIRt^5  [^^   — 
c     Vroic'.-^^  or  country-  objcnlivc*/ 
  ;.-..u>cnts    v-> 
I
FM  30-18  ||
Section  II.  INTELLIGENCE  INFORMATION  REPORIS 
GENERAL  INSTRUCTIONS-BODY  OF  REPORT 
1-5.  (U)  Report  Organization 
The  bo.lv  <>f  t»»«'  "'l»»rt  will  be  started  at  the  loft 
margin  immediately  below  the  dashed  hnc  on  DD 
S    ,:»«,».    All    of    the   space    between    the   vertical 
,  ar«in  lines  «...  DD  K»rms  i:»9G  ami  JSOtta  w.ll  be 
Z\     Pa.  graphs   must  bo  numbered   if   there   are 
mo«  than  on"    Paragraphing  and  *'W»W^»»J 
1st    «.nf«n,.     u,    usual    military    correspondence 
practice.    The    abbreviated    classification    for    each 
pa  agraph  must  be  inserted  in  parentheses  after    he 
number  of  each  paragraph.  When  using  standardized 
Lnl.  (military  and  industrial  installation  report.) 
he    parUnvph    ..».«■>•*.    nbhreviaU-d    clossd.cation 
symbol  in  parentheses  an,,  the  paragraph  heud-gm 
underlined  upper  case  letters  must  be  included.   I  he 
,,h  many  as  necessary  to  complex  the  report.  Ov«  r- 
Lliatolv  follow  the  text,  also  using  DD  r«ins 
,:{.»„•.  AU....:h....-..ls  »r.-  placed  after  sketches. 
J-3
-GCCnOP 
FM  30-18 
My  Order  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Army  : 
Official: 
VERNE  L-  BOWERS 
Major  General,  flniteii  States  Arm;/ 
The  Adjutant  General 
OREIGHTON  W.  ARKAMS 
General,  United  Slates  Army 
Chief  of  Staff 
Distribution: 
To  he  distribute!  in  accordance  with  DA  Form  12-1 1 B  requirements  for  Intelligence  ( 'olleclions  Operations, 
IntelliKence  Corps,  USA  (U)  (Qty  Kqr  Block  No.  282).