REPORT 
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DEFENSE  PANEL  ON  INTELLIGENCE 
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PORhUOUl) 
The  Defense  Panel  on  Intelligence  was  established  by 
the  Deputy  Secretary  of  Defense  in  the  interest  of  improv- 
ing intelligence  responsiveness  to  the  needs  of  the  Secre- 
tary of  Defense  and  other  principal  Defense  users. 
The  Pane]  consisted  of  10  distinguished  individuals 
drawn  from  outside  the  intelligence  community;  they  were 
supplemented  by  four  cx-officio  members  who  provided  special 
expertise  and  assistance.   The  Honorable  Elliot  L.  Richardson 
participated  as  a  consultant-   Four  formal  meetings  were  held 
and  between  sessions  several  sub-groups  examined  specific 
areas  of  interest  in  greater  depth.   The  ex-officio  members 
participated  fully  in  all  Panel  deliberations,  although  the 
final  report  was  drafted  by  the  main  Panel  and  represents 
its  views. 
Due  to  the  breadth  and  complexity  of  the  subject  and 
the  constraints  of  time,  the  Panel  decided  to  narrow  the 
scope  of  its  consideration  and  focus  on  those  areas  of 
Defense  intelligence  which  they  considered  of  most  direct  -' 
interest  to  the  Secretary  of  Defense  at  this  time.   As  a 
consequence,  the  Panel  gave  particular  attention' to  the 
means  of  improving  the  substantive  intelligence  support  to 
the  Secretary  of  Defense  and  the  steps  required  to  enhance 
the  professionalism  of  Defense  intelligence  analysts. 
The  summary  report  discusses  these  and  other  aspects 
of  Defense  intelligence  and  provides  specific  recommenda- 
tions for  actions  'which  are  believed  to  be  feasible  and 
within  the  authority  of  the  Secretary.   The  summary  and 
recommendations  represent  an  almost  unanimous  consensus  of 
the  Panel.   All  members  participated  fully  in  their  draft- 
ing and  each  reviewed  and  provided  comments  en  several 
drafts . 
Also  included  are  papers  providing  the  views  of  vari- 
ous Panel  members  in  support  of  the  summary  and  recommenda- 
tions as  well  as  commenting  on  other  areas  of  Defense  intel- 
ligence of  concern  to  them. 
Albert  C.  Hall
DEFENSE  PANEL  ON  INTELLIGENCE 
General  Donald  V.  Bennett,  USA  (Ret)  . 
Mr.  George  M.  Bunker 
Chairman  of  the  Board 
Martin  Marietta  Corporation 
Dr.  Edward  E.  David,  Jr. 
Executive  Vice  President 
Gould  Inc. 
Dr.  Alexander  H.  Flax. 
President 
Institute   of  Defense   Analyses 
General    Bruce    K.'  Hollov/ay,    USAF    (Ret) 
Dr.  David  S.  Lewis 
Chairman  and  Chief  Executive  Officer 
General  Dynamics  Corporation 
Dr.  R.    F.  Mettler  " 
President 
TRW  Inc. 
Dr.  William  J.  Perry 
President 
Electromagnetic  Systems  Laboratory 
Honorable  Thomas  C.  Reed 
Director,  Telecommunications  and 
Command  and  Control  Systems 
Vice  Admiral  David  C.  Richardson,  USN  (Ret)
dpfhnsh  panki.  on  I n"J"l-:i.t.ic;h:-:ci-: 
M  r .  V;  i  1 1  i  a  m  Be e  ch e  r 
Acting  Assistant  Secretary  of  Defense  (Public  Affairs) 
Honorable  J.  Fred  Kuzhardt 
Lieutenant  General  Daniel  0.  Graham,  USA 
Director,  Defense  Intelligence  Agency 
Mr.  Thomas  K.  Latimer 
Special  Assistant  to  the  SECDEF/DEPSECDEF
CONTENTS 
A.  Smeary  and  Recoraendations 
B.  Convening  Authority 
C.  Schedule  of  Meetings  and  Agenda 
D.  Paper  provided  by 
Mr.  William  Beecher 
E.  Paper  provided  by 
Mr,  George  M.  Bunker 
F.  Paper  provided  by 
Dr.  Alexander  H.  Flax 
G.  Paper  provided  by 
General  Bruce  K.  Hollowa/,  USAF  (Ret) 
l\.     Paper  provided  by 
Dr.  William  J.  Perry 
I.  Paper  provided  by 
Honorable  Thomas  C.  Reed 
J.  Paper  provided  by 
Vice  Admiral  David  C.  Richardson,  USN  (Ret)
SUMMARY  STAT ^I^I...^^_M'^0^^AlL^i§ 
Report  of  the  Defense  Panel  oil  Inti:11j^cnc.e 
"    to  "TiTe~I)c p ii  t : y  S e c rem r y  ot  He  Tense 
In  your  charge  to  the  Panel,  attached  as  Tab  B,  you  asked 
for  our  evaluation  from  a  management  perspective,  of  the  state 
of  health  of  DoD  intelligence.   In  particular  you  asked  us  to 
evaluate  the  actions  taken  since  the  report  of  the  Blue  Ribbon 
Defense  Panel,  to  provide  you  our  views  on  the  effectiveness 
of  the  present  intelligence  structure,  to  consider  the  size 
and  scope  of  DoD  intelligence  relative  to  current  needs  and  to 
submit  to  you  recommendations  on  feasible  means  for  improving 
the  effectivity  or  efficiency  of  the  intelligence  Amotion. 
The  Panel  reviewed  the  principal  intelligence  programs  •  • 
in  the  Department  of  Defense  to  illuminate  their  interre- 
lationships and  the  mechanisms  for  their  control.   However, 
to  be  responsive,  within  the  time  constraints  imposed,  to 
the  particular  concerns  expressed  by  the  Deputy  Secretary  of 
Defense  the  Panel  narrowed  its  considerations  to  areas  it_ 
deemed  particularly  important  with  respect  to  the  responsive- 
ness and  quality  of  intelligence  to  the  Secretary  of  Defense's 
needs.   In  addition,  a  more  general  review  was  made  of  several 
related  areas  including  management  interfaces  between  various 
DoD  intelligence  agencies'  overall  size,  scope  and' effective- 
ness of  the  effort,  and  relationships  and  mutual  support 
among  Government  intelligence  agencies.   The  Panel's  examina- 
tion of  these  related  areas  led  us  to  the  conviction  that 
certain  additional  studies  should  be  conducted  in  much  more 
depth  than  was  possible  here,  and  we  make  specific  recommenda- 
tions on  these. 
I.    Support  to  the  Secretary  of  Defense  and  the  Deputy 
Secretary 
We  are  concerned  over  the  degree  and  quality  of 
communication  between  the  producer  of  intelligence  in  the  DoD 
and  the  senior  users.   The  problem  of  communicating  the1  final  - 
output  of -intelligence  efforts  and  their  significance  is 
vexing . 
The  conventional  means  of  intelligence  support  -- 
•formal  briefings,  memoranda,  studies  --  are  not  adequate  to 
supply  fully  relevant  intelligence  support  nor  to  create  con- 
fidence in  its  content.   Too  often  briefings  nay  be  encurr.- 
-bered  by  details  that  nay  be  fascinating  but  do  not  lead  to 
conclusions  in  matters  of  significance.
As  we  perceive  it;  the  Secretary  of  Defense  and 
the  Deputy  Secretary  of  Defense  are  concerned  with  issues 
of  which  intelligence  is  a  part  but  which  involve  in  a  major 
way  other  information  and  other  considerations.   V.'e  are  told 
that  in  a  majority  of  the  cases  in  which  dissatisfaction  with 
the  intelligence  product  is  expressed  there  are  strong  poli- 
tical issues  --  issues  in  which  ISA  is  or  should  be  involved. 
ISA  has,  of  course,  sources  of  information  other  than  DIA  that 
contribute  to  the  total  assessment  of  a  situation  and  we  sug- 
gest that  means  should  be  found  for  strengthening  the  ISA 
interface  with  the  intelligence  community  to  insure  inclusion 
of  appropriate  intelligence  factors.   These  issues  are  best 
treated  with  the  Secretary  or"  Deputy  Secretary  by  ISA.   The  • 
key  objective  should  be  to  integrate  all  factors  into  a  co- 
herent form  for  consideration  by  the   Secretary. 
In  our  view  it  is  essential  to  ensure  meaningful 
two-way  communication  between  the  Secretary  of  Defense  and 
Deputy  Secretary  of  Defense  and  the  Director,  DIA  if  he  is  to 
be  their  principal  substantive  intelligence  adviser.   Brief- 
ings to  the  Secretary  should  be  the  personal  responsibility 
of  the  DoD  senior  intelligence  officer  and  on  questions  in 
which  the  Director  is  not  personally  expert,  we  would  encour- 
age the  presence  of  the  senior  specialist  in  the  pertinent 
area.   In  this  respect,  the  move  by   the  Director,  DIA  to 
establish  top  staff  specialists  (termed  Defense  Intelligence 
Officers)  in  pertinent  intelligence  areas,  should  prove 
helpful . 
# 
Communication  with  the  top  decision  makers  should 
be  structured  to  inform  them  of  what  they  .want  to  know -com---  - 
bined  with  what  they  ought  to  know.'  As  a  general  rule  those 
who  have  first  hand  knowledge  and  have  themselves  played  im- 
portant roles  in  determining  the  significance  of  the  material 
•under  consideration  should  be  involved  in  the  briefings.   Some 
Panel  members  feel  it  would  be  helpful  if  the  Director,  DIA 
were  present  when  OSD  principals  participate  in  interagency 
matters  involving  substantive  intelligence. 
For  this  intelligence  support  to  be  effective, 
the  Secretary  and  Deputy  Secretary  must  understand  the  neces- 
sity of  this  dialogue  and  must  take  responsibility  for  crea- 
tion of  the  environment  necessary  for  effective  communication. 
The  Director,  DIA  needs  guidance  from  his  senior  users  because 
•they  alone  know  to  what  points  of  intelligence  their  decisions 
and  actions  are  sensitive,  and  because  they  have  information, 
not  available  to  others,  which  shapes  the  need  for  specific 
^intelligence  support.   While  it  may  not  always  be  appropriate
for  them  to  discJose  this  information,  they  can,  by  questions 
and  comments,  guide  the  intelligence  office.-:-  to  effective  and 
responsive  support.   There  must  :>-:■  n  pull  from  the  Secretary 
as  veil  as  a  push  from  the  intelligence  officer. 
The  Panel  considered  the  natter  of  liaison  between 
the  Secretary  and  Deputy  Secretary  and  the  intelligence  commu- 
nity.  Some  Panel  members  felt  that  the  appointment  of  a  speci- 
fic intelligence  liaison  officer  charged  with  the  full-time 
support  of  the  Secretary  and  Deputy  Secretary  would  prove  to  be 
very  helpful.   Another  suggestion  was  that  the  functions  and 
staffing  of  the  National  Military  Intelligence  Center  should  be 
specifically  reviewed  to  ensure  that  that  operation  is  con- 
figured to  support  the  Secretary,  Deputy  Secretary  and  ISA  in  a 
responsive,  detailed,  and  flexible  manner. 
However,  we  emphasize  that  the  professionalism  of 
the  intelligence  production  process  must  be  improved  substan- 
tially and  this  improvement,  as  disclosed  below,  is  an  essen- 
tial prerequisite  to  an  effective  dialogue. 
RECOMMENDATION 
We  reconnend  that  the  Secretary  and  Deputy  Secre- 
tary  and  the  Director,  D1A  in  their  resnecti ve  capacities 
seeU 
means  of  establi  shi  rig  a  regular  ei'iective  dialogue  on  substan- 
tive intelligence  issues  of  current  concern. 
We  recommend  that  the  ASP (ISA)  and  the  Director, 
DI'A  establish  procedures  to  insure  more  effective  support  of 
ISA  by  the  intelligence  community  and  to  provide ....  jor ._  t  he_ 
appropriate  highlighting  to  "pivotal  intelligence  matters  on 
is.sues  brought  by  ISA  to  the  Secretary  of  Defense. 
II.    The  Structure  of  Effective  Intelligence  Support  -- 
Professionalism  and  that  Required  to  fcnhancc  It 
If  the  intelligence  community  is  to  do  more  than 
produce  material  for  its  own  use,  it  is  necessary  that  its  out- 
puts be  presented  clearly  and  relevantly  to  those  who  nay  be 
able  to  use  them.   The  problem  is  most  critical  with  respect  to 
those  users,  or  potential  users,  at  the  highest  levels  of 
Government  since  they  must  base  their  decisions  on  an  adequate 
•appreciation  of  what  is  or  may  be  at  stake  in  the  broadest 
national  and  international  context.   The  present  system  more 
often  than  not  fails  to  make  clear  the  essentials  of  what  is 
an  intelligence  estimate  or  assessment,  or.  what  it  is  based, 
-what  degree  of  uncertainty  is  attached. to  it. 
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Analysis  -  Given  the  inputs  and  uncertainties, 
what  was  the  analyTfcal  process  used?   What  were  the  areas  of 
expertise  included  in  the  analytical  team  (e.g.,  regional 
political,  military,  regional  economic)?  To  what  degree  were 
analysts  in  touch  with  and  influenced  by  other  analytical 
teams  dealing  with  the  same  subject?  What  input  uncertainties 
had  the  greatest  degree  of  influence  on  the  analysis?  What 
factors  of  which  the  analytical  team  was  aware,  were  not  taken 
into  account  or  updated  in  the  analysis?  Why? 
Results,  Findings,  Conclusions  -  How  certain  are 
these?   Within,  the  reasonable  limits  of  error  and  tolerance 
in  the  inputs  and  the  analytical  process  itself,  what  are  con- 
sidered the  most  likely  case,  the  best  case  and  the  worst  case 
which  could  be  forecast?  V.'hat  options  exist  for  the  other,  side 
which  depend  on  actions  we   or  third  parties  might  yet  take? 
What  answers  to  these  questions  have  been  arrived  at  separately 
or  collectively  by  other  analytical  tcair.s? 
Obviously  not  all  of  these  issues  and  questions 
need  to  be  discussed  or  highlighted  with  respect  to  every  in- 
telligence report,  estimate  and  assessment,  but  the  key  issues 
do  need  to  be  brought  out.   For  example,  a  key  military  issue 
in  the  Middle  East  War  of  1973  was  the  change  in  morale,  re- 
solve, training,  leadership  and  competence  of  Arab  military 
forces  and  yet  the  assumption  had  been   made  by  the  "community" 
that  these  had  not  changed,  and  indeed,  could  not  change  for 
almost  a  generation.   Hence,  this  issue  was  not  critically 
assessed  in  what  was  presented. 
The  primary  function  of  management  of  intelligence 
analysis  should  not  be  to  attec.pt  to  second  guess  analytical 
specialists  in  their  own  areas  of  expertise  (although  checks 
and  balances  by  other  analytical  -specialists  should.be  pro- 
vided); rather  the  managerial  role  should  emphasize  the  infor- 
.mation  transfer  process  to  the  users,  which  would  include  the 
ferreting  out  and  highlighting  of  the  uncertainties,  key  unre- 
solved questions  and  the  degree  of  freedom  still  left  in  the 
situation  dependent  on  our  (or  third  party)  actions,  policies 
-»nc>.   pronouncements. 
We  bc.1i-rv-e  that  a?:*:  7 /St  prof-:  -s  ii>."..-}  i>-r:  hv;  I---.;?:  -* 
of  c  »"  •  t  i  c  a  J  i  rvo ':'?■'.":  ^.' '.■  '  i\   \)i<'m    y-"~c?>^    •**"  i  i- 1  iurf  o  •.  ir.  tci  :.*■»■  •*■>■■ 
support.   This  is  so  because  too:;/  we  no  nui-j^-r    have  accr-:-s  u> 
la'r'-e  amounts  of  unar.ib  i  nmus  intelligence  --  such  as,  for
example  ^'.THhe  volume  or  h.if'h.  grade-;        aval  I  able:  during 
Vi'orlcl^iva-r  II  --  and  instead,  mus  t  "cfepchd  on  inf  <rren  Llai  evi-    '' 
dencev^" jThe  task  of  interpretation  lias  thus  beco::ia  norc  dif- 
ficult, and  now  demands  a  superior  level  of  pro  fess  iouai  isr:;. 
In  order  to  attract  and  retain  superior  analysts 
(and  this  applies  nearly  as  v;eli  to  officer  analysts  as  to 
the  civilian  professionals  at  whom  those  comments  are  directed) 
we  obviously  must  offer  a  clear  opportunity  to  perform  a  useful 
function  in  a  reasonable  place  to  live  and  work,  with  visible 
opportunity  for  advancement.   V»'e  must  also  provide  the  leader- 
ship whom  the  analyst  can  respect  professionally  (and  to  v.'hose 
level  he  can  aspire)  and  a  stimulating  and  challenging 
environment. 
A  Icey  aspect  of  analyst  professionalism  is  that 
analysts  should  be  primarily  experts  in  their  subjects,  rather 
••than  In  Intelligence  tradecraft  since  the  latter  can  be 
learned  readily  on  the  job,  but  depth  in  the  subject  area  re-  - 
quires  a  substantial  investment  of  time,  study,  and  regional 
experience-  "  The-  current  efforts  to"  institute  a  Master's  pro- 
gram for  both  military  and  civilian  professionals  at  the  ■■■ 
Defense  Intelligence  School  are  commendable  and  this  should 
be  ext.Qnd.Qd.   to  the  science  and  technology  areas  by  th^   Service 
schools  at  Monterey  and  Dayton.      -  • 
V/hile  the  above  measures  are  necessary,  they  are  : 
of  themselves  not  fully  sufficient  to- "keep  the  analyst  forces 
professionally  effective.   There  also  must  be  a  working  envi- 
ronment of  stimulation  and  challenge.   Outside  Government,  this 
stimulus  may  be  provided  by   competition,  leading  to  the  weeding 
out  of  non-performers  and  early  recognition  and  reward  of  pro- 
fessional -expertise.  .  Within  Government,  .particularly  cperatint- 
under  Civil  .Service  procedures,  analogous  competition  seldom 
exists.   Professional  leadership  can,  of  course,  provide  stim- 
uli; however,  the  Panel  believes  that  different  personnel  man- 
agement procedures  must  be  adopted  if  v;e  are  to  reach  the  im- 
provements in  analysts  professionalism  that -we  seek  and  which 
ve  believe  to  be  essential.   The  Panel  feels- that  this  will  be 
extremely  difficult  under  Civil  Service  regulations  and  proce- 
dures and  we  believe  that  in  light  of  the   sensitive  and  essen- 
tial nature  of  the  Defense  intelligence  analyst  duties,  a 
persuasive  case  can  be  made  for  the   exemption  of  intelligence 
analysts  from  Civil  Service  requirements.   Such  a  policy  would 
'  be  consistent  with  that  of  CIA  and  would  facilitate  the  ex- 
change of  personnel  with  CIA  and  NSA. 
"■  RECOMMENDATION 
The  Director.  DTA  should  t-'.l.ce  irm-?o.ia :•?  r-t^n?  tv.
implement  appropriate  mniKi^omc-jV^c'-i  scipl  i  ;:es  ^JL.JLi^iLO. Jzl*®JL(L 
in  TFfe    anTTj y  tic  a _l  I2J1°C ;£s 5  iiIicLJ-I:CL  :; ~' ^-iiLii-^-  j—'0^-0"--^  :-°;t 
procedures . 
I)  I A  must  be  exempted  from  C_ivil  Service  procedures 
g o v e i- n  i n g  t he~t e"nuVc  a'ucl  p romot 1 o n_~ 
' o r _ pro  1  c / 5.- 1 o n a  1  a n a  1  y s  t s  . 
This  chTuigc  l s  essentia  1  and  we  rc^o^mend- the  Secretary  of 
ITeTeus e  plve  his""  persona .1  support  to  legislation  to  proyicfe 
this  exemption . 
The _o r gani zation  of  analysts  in  DIA  should  be  re- 
v i s e d  to  estapTTsh"  a  structure  contluc ive  to  increased  profes- 
Fionalism.-  The  multiple  layers  of  no'n-proressional^  super- 
visors should  be  eliminated"  and  the  analyst  torce  snould  6~e 
placed~under  an  appropriately  chosen  civilian  with  a.  limite'd 
term  of  office  who  should  be  appointed  at  a  level  or.  Deputy 
Director  to  DIA.   This  change  should  be  made  only  after  exemp- 
tion from  Civil  Service  procedures  has  been  secured.  - 
Advanced  programs ,  open  to  civilians  and  officers 
of  all  Services,  in  technical  intelligence  analysis  should  be 
established  at  the  Naval  Post  -Graduate  School  and  the  Air 
Force  Institute  of  Technology. 
Military  Officers  -  Mere  attention  should  be  given 
by  the  Services  to  maintaining  a  healthy  and  motivating  career 
pattern  for  intelligence  officers.   Poor  selection  ..opportunity 
for  intelligence  specialists  will  limit  the  quality  officer 
needed  in  this  specialty. 
The  Panel  has  reviewed  the  evidence  of  the  assign- 
ment of  average  and  below  average  officers  to  BIA  and  found  it 
alarming.   We  believe  that  the  Agency  has  too  readily  accepted 
Service  nominations;  a  more  critical  review  is  essential,  even 
if  this  requires  that  gaps  and  manning  shortfalls  be  accepted. 
V.re  appreciate  that  there  is  demand  for  superior  officer  capa- 
'  bility  in  several  specialties  and  while  there  are  practical 
difficulties  to  overcome,  we  believe  that  it  is  essential  that 
the  quality  be  improved.   We  do  not  see  yet  adequate  measures 
to'  achieve  this  objective.   Experience  has  shown  that  -direc- 
tives alone  will  not  provide  the  necessary  improvement  in 
assignments 
The  Panel  considered  and  felt  that  a  serious  ex- 
amination should  be  made  of  double-hatting  the  Service  Intel- 
ligence Chiefs  to  the  Director,  DIA  with  the  particular  objec 
tive  of  imoroving  assignment  of  superior  officers  to  DIA.
UECO.MMr.NDATIOM 
We    re contend  _that_  the  _top  jn^f!  1  i  <;ertce   off  <  '■"■?''. 
in   DoD    into]  iTr.eiVcc   a  c e p. c  i  c  s    s h o i:  I  a  "be-  jcari.'t.-V    p rotes 7.  ">'  •"'-:.-.  ; 
in    i  n  t  c  1 1  i g e n c e  .      Wo    rec o rime nd   a  i  l; o    l i ■  a  t   a    '■  pecl'tic   p  f(::'r-'— 
b~e~  a  clop  t  e  d  "*  o  £   p  3~a  n  n  i  i 1  5ji    ahead   tor  p~r'oi:n.*srnT;"  cah7iTdatc*%    .5V;- 
tlfe    top    intell i pence   ofi" i c e r  p o s :;. z i o n s    a n d  c .i x- ee~r~p .1  ■'' .'.!.'.'. !. '';->.. 
for    these    potential    leaders. 
We   recommend    that    the   Secretary  of  Defcri/'^./;/!?-.  ?./',, „ 
ures    tfrat   will    ensure    toe"  selection   of   a    i  -l  LC—H^'-'  ■' 
lish  prcced 
 
of  officers  for  PI A  duty  of  very  superior  capability . 
III.    Support  to  the  Commands 
The  Panel  senses  that  the  preponderance  of  at  ten 
tion  has  been  to  the  satisfaction  of  requirements  at  the 
National  level,  and  that  less  than  sufficient  attention^/ 
have  been  given  to  the  needs  of  the  commands  for  effect/.'/'-*  ^ 
intelligence  support,  particularly  since  the  winding -down  °u 
hostilities  in  Southeast  Asia  has  lessened  concern  with 
theater  operations.  .   • 
recent; 
to  the: 
of  certain  intellige^-^  ^  ~  ^^  ,.^...~  „~^^.~   -. —  — __   -.  ..  .-i  „ 
tation  of  the  concept  under  which  DIA  will  share  basic  .l «»-*-"  • 
ligence  product  responsibilities  with  the  Services  and  ,:,   . 
commands*.   In  -implementing  such  shared  responsibilities,  ^-l  ■ 
should  be  taken  not  to  dilute  DIA's  overall  authority  aim 
respc 
unduly 
gene] 
niand  suppo: 
new  initiatives  than  we  perceive  to  be  the  case, 
RECOMMENDATION 
IV.    HUM INT 
Due  to  the  comolex  world  no  we  .•:  rel  a  t  ions  a  \  p*
J 
existing  today,  human  x  ntclligence  (HUMIXT)  is  bocowing  more 
important,   tthiie  other  sources  provide  good  in tell  igence  on 
capabilities,  HUM  I  XT  remains  the  most  impor  taut  source  to 
determine  foreign  intentions.   The  Panel  feels  that  we  arc 
not  getting  the  level  cr  quality  of  information  that  we  need 
from  this  source.   It  may  be  that  v;e  have  cone  to  accept  the 
admitted  difficulties  as  insurmountable.   »ve  point  out,  how- 
ever, that  the  heavy  investment  in  technical  means  of  collec- 
tion and  the  exceptionally  high  premium  on  analyst  quality 
today  are  ascribable  in  part  to  this  deficiency  in  a  valuable 
traditional. .source.  Un  our  deliberation  v:e  addressed  clandes- 
tine HUMINT  and  the  Defense  Attache  System. 
■The  major  effort  in  clandestine  HUMINT  today,  and 
the  greatest'  expertise  and  potential  for  success  is  in  the 
CIA  Clandestine  Services.   We  note,  however,  that  while  other 
national  programs  are  reviewed  jointly  by  the  DCI  and  the  Sec- 
retary of  Defense,  this  does  not  obtain  for  the  Clandestine 
Services  program.   While  we  appreciate  the  sensitivity,  we 
wish  to  emphasize  the  importance  of  making  the  product  of  this 
effort  more  responsive  to  the  high  priority  needs  of  the  DoD. 
While  the  Panel  had  no  in-depth  exposure  to  this  effort,  the 
Panel  became  convinced  that  the  Secretary  of  Defense  should 
explore  with  the  DCI  the  possibility  of  the  Secretary's  repre- 
sentative participating  fully  in  the  review  of  CIA  Clandestine 
Service  programs  with  the  objective  of  assuring  greater  respon- 
siveness to  Department  of  Defense  needs. 
The  Panel  noted  the  valuable  return  on  the  basis 
of  relatively  small  investments  made  by  the  Defense  Attache 
System.   However,  it  was.  felt  that  we  must  require  and  obtain 
greater  productivity  from  this  valuable  source.   In  order  to 
do  this,  way';  must  be  found  to  attract  the  most  qualified 
military  officers  available.   In  our  view  a  substantial  im- 
pediment in  the  assignment  of  good  officers  to  this  service 
is  the  requirement  that  the  Defense  Attache  be  the  senior  man 
in  the  post. 
RECOMMENDATION  l  
** ' 
We  recommend  that  the  Director,  DIA  be  authorized 
to  wai ve  seniority  req uirements  as  r.ecess a ry  to  ensure  that 
the  best  qualified  orficer?  are  appointed"  as  Defense  and 
Service  attaches  regardless  of  senioritv. 
^V.    Relations  with  the  Director  of  Central  Ip.tellicenc 
It  appears  that  relations  as  we  observe  then  be- 
'tween  the  DCI  and  the  Department  of  Defense  are  effective,  and
that  p rob Icrs  are  apparently  being  approached  cooperatively. 
At  the  same  time,  however,  we  fee  J  t  r.-j  t  we  should  underscore 
the  importance  of  maintaining  a  par tnership  in  intelligence 
rsanagepicnt  between  the  Secretary  of  Defease  and  the  DCI.   The 
majority  of  the  national  intelligence  programs  are  within  the 
DoD,  anj,  in  our  view,  properly  so,  since  the  Secretary  of 
Defense  is  charged  with  the  national  defense  and  command  of 
the  forces.   At  the  same  time,  it  is  essential  to  maintain  in 
the  DCI  an  independent  perspective  of  all  intelligence  with 
access  to  the  President  for  issues  of  great  substance. 
£>  ' 
VI.    Size  and  Scone  of  Intelligence 
You  asked  us  for  our  perspective  on  the  size  and 
scope  of  DoD  intelligence  today. 
We  consider. that  the  widely  held  concern  over  the 
inflated,  size  of  the  intelligence  effort  is  no  longer  valid. 
Over  the  past  several  years,  DoD  intelligence  manpower  has 
been  reduced  by  one- third,  and  the  level  of  .investment  in  con- 
stant dollars  has  been  reduced/^ 
Also,  this  period  or 
near-parity  between  the  U.S.  and  tTfe^Soviet  Union  places  an  in- 
creased premium  on  the  timeliness  and  accuracy  of  intelligence. 
We  are  impressed  with  the  capabilities  of  our  tech- 
nical collectors  as  an  essential  input  to  the  intelligence  data 
base,  and  we  believe  that  comparison  of  the  data  base  today 
with  that  available  10  years  ago  illustrates  the  detail  and 
precision  to  which  we  have  become  accustomed.   We  emphasize, 
however,  that  the  data  from  these  collectors  are  provided  only 
at  considerable  cost,  and  we  see  no  immediately  feasible  way 
of  providing  this  information  by  substantially  less  costly 
means.   The  cost  of  analytical  and  production  resources  to  pro- 
cess the  collected  data  is  also  considerable.   It  is,  of  course, 
true  that  in  any  large  organization  there  arc  usually  means  of 
improving  effectiveness,  and  constant  search  for  improved 
efficiency  is  required.   In  particular,  attention  should  be 
given  te  establishing  a  proper  balance  between  production  and 
collection.   However,  we  believe  that  additional  appreciable
resource  redactions  may  no  longer  be  feasible  v;ithout  signi- 
ficant reductions  in  the  quantity  and  quality  of  the  infor-aa- 
tion  collected,  at  least  in  the  near  tern. 
In  light  of  rapidly  developing  political,  mili- 
tary and  econo.'iic  trends  worldwide,  we  believe  that  there  are 
important  geographical  areas  that  are  receiving  inadequate 
attention  and  reassessment  of  objectives  and  reallocations  of  . 
priorities  may  be  required.   A  review  of  geographical  areas 
now  of  low  priority  seems  in  order  to  seek  means  for  increas- 
ing the  allocation  of  resources  to  problems  which  now  appear 
to  be  receiving  inadequate  effort. 
Since  many  intelligence  collection  programs  require 
years  to  reach  the   operational  stage,  a  major  planning  reassess- 
ment for  the  next  decade  may  be  in  order. 
RECOMMENDATION   '     ' 
  ~~~     We  recommend  that  further  substantial  personnel 
reductions  in~Defense  intelligence  snould  be  implemented  only 
as  a  consequence  of  (1)  deliberate  modification  of  priorities 
and  coverage,  (2)  the~~introduction  of  equipments  or  processes 
which  have  de-Hbnstratea  capabilities"  for  manpower  savings,  or 
(3)  'efficiencies  in  management. 
We  recommend  that  a  review  be  initiated  of  geo- 
qraph ic  areas  of  low  priority  with  the  objective  or  determin- 
ing i~x  means  should  be  sought  for  increasing  coverage  in  these 
areas . 
VII.    Actions  Taken  Since  Blue  Ribbon 
'  You  asked  for  our  evaluation  of  the  actions  taken 
in  implementation  of  the  Blue  Ribbon  Defense  Panel 
recommendations. 
In  our  view  the  central  thrust  of  the  Blue .Ribbon 
Defense  Panel  recommendations  with  respect  to  Defense  intelli- 
gence was  that  a  mechanism  needed  to  be  established  to  enable 
the  Secretary  of  Defense  to  manage  the  intelligence  programs 
for  which  he  is  responsible  as  an.  integrated  function.   One 
specific  action  taken  to  implement  this  need   was  the  establish- 
ment of  the  Office  of  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  Defense  tor 
"  Intelligence.  A  focal  point  was  thus  created  for  the  coordi- 
nation of  DoD  intelligence  programs,  providing  resource  visi- 
bility, fiscal  control,  capability  for  int.cr-progra-i  reviews , 
„and  means  for  prioritising  needs.   We  believe  that  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  office  fulfills  important  parts  of  the  Blue 
Ribbon  Defease  Panel  recommend;:  •  i'-ns  . 
1  A
The  Blue;  Ribbon  Pane:]  recommended  the  establisn- 
  t  of  a  single-point  line-authority  over  vl\    !)o»)  intelli- 
gence operations.   Th is  reco.-.-ricn elation  v:as  not  implemented 
and  v:e  did  not  address  this  decision  in  depth.   V.'e  are  im- 
men 
f 
There  are  historical  and  current  reasons  for 
much  if  not  all  of  this  separation  of  intelligence  responsi- 
bilities.  However,  if  we  accept  that  the  DoD  intelligence 
organization  must  have  some  considerable  degree  of  complexity, 
we  believe  that  it  is  necessary  that  effective  staff  cogni- 
zance, beyond  a  purely  resource  management  role,  be  exercised 
at  the  Secretary  of  Defense  level.   The  office  of  the  ASD(I) 
has,  since  its  inception,  proven  valuable  in  resource  manage- 
ment in.  maintaining  the  level  of  productivity  during  a  period 
of  drastically  declining  resources.   The  ASD(I)  has  also  made 
substantial  contributions  to  the  improvement  of  the  manage- 
ment of  the  intelligence  process,  and  to  the  final  intelli- 
gence product  itself.   However,  in  view  of  the  compelling 
interest  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense  in  the  total  intelligence 
effort,  we  believe  that  the  office  of  the  ASD(I)  should  devote 
greater  effort  to  management  overview,  beyond  that  peculiar  to 
resource  allocation  matters.   In  particular,  we  believe  that 
an  examination  of  the  flow  of  information  through  the  systen 
should  be  conducted.   This  examination  should  seek  to  ensure 
that,  organizational  structure  and  management  relationships 
are  optimized  to  produce  the  most  professional  intelligence 
result .  
" 
Another  indirect  result  of  the  Blue  Ribbon  Panel's 
recommendations  was  the  creation  of  the  Central  Security  Serv- 
-  --  ~-    -       -    -  -,-       v.-ith  the 
munity.  The  effectiveness  of  the  new  unified  orga 
particularly  in  view  of  the  many  compromises  incor 
its  creation,  should  be  reassessed  periodically. 
RECO.MMESDATION 
V'e    r e c o nme n d   t h at   a    stud y   he   undertaken  of   the    flow 
of   intelligence "TrTfcrinst ion    from  collectors    to    uroclucers    and
fror^  PJ"C>cKicc-rs_  To  i-isc^is  _to_dci  c-r_r.]jno_  hov:  :..ori:ir.c::,:i»nt;  an:]  pet  hod  5, 
of  co:.:i:;iiii.ic:i  r.  i.o:i  of  such  in  fc:::..'i*..  Lou  can  be-  i: 
'"vroyc-ci    fro::,    the 
deri_v£i  tiou   of    t?»c    roqui  rcnont    through    the    uJt  irate    satisfaction 
°£    that    requirc::>.en  t . 
.12
,.  \  v.-i'i  ii:;-UTY  :.•.:■:.;".:. i'/,::y  o:  L:;r,:_-f 
v»  •'  v.'Ar.i;^;-M:.<.v.  o  c.  r.ooi 
HFKOP.AuD'JM  FOR  ASSISTAM?  SF.CMJ.TAi'Y  CF  DV.Fl.llZZ    (ItrJ'r.r.T-IG-^'.Cn) 
,   SUBJECT:   Panel  on  Department  of  Defense  Intelligence  Activities 
In  view  of  the  actions  which  have  h~-jn   taken  to  j reprove  intelligence 
in  response  to  the  recommendations  cf  the  Blue  Ribbon  Defense  Panel 
and  to  the  President's  memorandum  cf  5  November  IS'71,  I  believe  that 
it  would  be  useful  to  as):  an  outside  group  to  assess  the  cumulative 
effects  vrhich  hax'e  resulted-   Accordingly,  I  would  like  you  to 
constitute  a  panel  of  six  to  ten  qualified  and  experienced  individuals 
to  undertake  such  a  task. 
Following  are  the  duties  which  the  panel  should  undertake: 
1.  Review  the  actions  \>.'hich  have  been  taken  in  the  last  three 
years  to  improve  and  strengthen  DoD  intelligence  operations. 
2.  Examine  the  size  and  scope  of  present  DoD  intelligence 
operations. 
3.  Examine  the  interrelationships  which  exist  arnorvg  the 
various  DoD  intelligence  activities  and  the  management  considerations 
which  result  from  there. 
4.  Report  to  the  Secretary  of  Defense  its  assessment  of  the 
effectiveness  of  DoD  intelligence  operations  and  the  efficiency  with 
which. these  operations  are  conducted. 
•'  5.   Recommend  actions  which  the  Secretary  of  Defense  should 
consider  to  improve  intelligence  responsiveness  to  Defense  needs, 
to  imorove  the  general  effectiveness  and  cost  efficiency  of  DoD 
intelligence  operations,  ana  to  correct  any  problems  which  are 
observed. 
I  would  like  you  to  establish  rind  convene  such  a  group  as  soor.  as 
-possible.  Their  findings  should  be  reported  to  the  Secretary  of 
Defense  by  15  January  1975. 
Vv  9  Oy  "^^ 
'.V 
/.::::•  r\)     ?-'/  -  2J?±l.^
SCKi.-rv.JLt-:  OF  Mi  !TJ\"f.5  AND  ACF'.VDA 
Mooting,  of  29  October  1974 
Overview  of  Defense  intelligence  activities 
Review  of  Special  Air  Force  program 
Review  of  Blue  Ribbon  Defense  Panel  recommendations 
Presentation  covering  developments  since  the  Blue  Ribbon  Defense 
Panel" 
Meeting  of  21  November  1974 
Presentation  by  Director,  Defense  Intelligence  Agency 
Presentation  by  Director  of  Central  Intelligence 
Presentation  by  Intelligence  Cornnanity  Staff  on  "Yom  Kippur  War 
Intelligence  Probleins" 
Presentation  by  ASD(I)  Staff  on  'Tom  Kippur  War  Intelligence 
Problems" 
Meeting  of  12  December  1974 
Presentation  by  ASD(I)  Staff  on  "Improving  Professionalism  of 
Intelligence  Personnel" 
Presentation  by  Acting  Assistant  Secretary  of  Defense  (Public 
Affairs)  on  "Cornxiunicating  Intelligence  to  the  SecDef/DepSecDef" 
Presentation  and  discussion  by  Panel  merriers  of  "Paper  A"  prepared 
by  the  ASD(I)  staff  to  illustrate  a  range  of  optional  ■  recommen- 
dations for  Panel  consideration 
Presentation  by  the  Deputy  Director,  National  Security  Agency 
•Meeting  of  9  January  1975 
Executive  Session  consideration  of  draft  smnmaiy  report
ISSUF.    j'AI'r.k 
SUBJECT:       Corraun.icat.i1t3   Intelligence    to   SecDef /DepSecDef 
ITJvPARED  BY:      William  Bee char,   Acting  Assistant   SecDeE/PA. 
In   an  earlier  and   less   complicated   time,    Secretary  of   State 
Henry  L.    Stimson  expressed  his  view  of    the  proper  boundaries  of   the 
intelligence  craft  when  he   declared:    "Gentlemen  do  not  read  each 
other1 s  mail." 
For  reasons   that  will  shortly  become  clear,  however,  I  choose 
to  begin   this  paper  by  quoting  —  without  permission  — -  some  extensive 
excerpts  from  a  personal  letter  received  by  Janes  R.   Schlesinger  two  years 
ago,    shortly  after  he  had  been  named  Director  of  Central   Intelligence  .- 
The   letter  writer,    an  experienced  Washington  hand,   but  a  man  in  no 
way  connected  with  intelligence,  was  addressing  a  critical  period  during  the. 
Paris  Peace  Talks   on  Vietnam.      lie  wrote,   in  part: 
-     •     "I  have  been  repeatedly  and  deeply  concerned  by   the   impression   that 
we  often  have   good,    fresh  information,   but  fail  either  to  recognize 
it  in   time,    or  make  use  of  it  in  time.      If   this   is   true,   it   suggests 
that  a  monumental  problem  exists  at   the  middle  or   top  rank  analysis 
levels . 
"A  recent  example:    I   stumbled,   well  after   the  fact,    onto   the 
information    that  on  December  4    {1972]  Hanoi  ordered  an  evacuation 
'of  women  and   children  from  its   capital.      Since  such  information 
must  have  been  easy   to  coae  by    (friendly  ecbassy   in  Hanoi   telling 
us,    or  unfriendly  one  radioing   the  word  back  hone),    this  should 
have  been  flagged  immediately  for  the  attention  of    the  President 
and  Mr.  Kissinger,   both  in  terr.s  of  what  it  c  ;uld  suggest  about 
Hanoi's   intentions   in   the  Paris   talks  which  resumed    that  day, 
and  what  we   night  have   done  about  it... 
"Such  an  evacuation  order,    presumably  would  have   near. t   one   of    two 
things:    1)    either  Hanoi    intended    to  dig   in  en    the     two  or   three 
outstanding   issues  rer^ir.ing   and  was   signaling   its   intent    to  be
hard-nosed  with  this  gesture,  or  2)    it  \:c.;   pr<>r>;,rim;  to  revert  to 
a  much  tougher  stance,  renewing  o:'  com   ir.r.ncr.   already  settled, 
raising  new  one-:; ,  ?-ncl  preparing  against  the  possibility  that;  the 
USG  night  react  by  a  resumption  of  the  bccibing  north  of  the  20th 
Parallel. 
"I  don't  know  that  this  information  was  not  flagged  and  i-madiately 
sent  to  the  White  House.   1  believe  it  was  not. 
"What  eight  we  have,  done  —  if  the  White  House  had  such  information 
at  the  start  of  the  last  round  of  talks?  Well*  for  one  thing,  while 
Hanoi  has  been  surprised  again  and  again  by  the  actions  of  this 
President  (the  Cambodian  and  Laotian  invasions,  the  resumption  of 
bombing,  the  mining),  all  the  optimistic  talk  of  an  early  settlement 
might  have  been  analyzed  by  the  other  side  as  putting  us  under 
tremendous  self-imposed  pressure.   Settlement  by  Thanksgiving,  or 
Christcas,  or  at  least  by  January  20,  had  filled  all  the  Washington 
.reports  —  inspired  by  the  highest  Administration  officials.  There 
was  also  the  matter,  totally  clear  to  everyone,  that  the  air  war 
has  been  costing  $500  million  a  month  (unfunded  since  October  1) 
and  that  Mr.  Nixon' would  like  to  liquidate  and  disengage  as  soon  as 
possible  to  concentrate  on  other  vital  matters  in  his  final  four  year 
"How  might  we  have  countered  Hanoi's  signal  early?  Well,  for  one 
thing,  Henry  might  have  pulled  Le  Due  Tho  aside,  mentioned  the 
evacuation,  and  gently  but  firmly  warned  him  not  to  underestimate 
the  President.   Also,  if  since  October  23  the  only  airborne  recce 
we  had  flown  over  the  North  was  by  drone,- we  night  have  sent  setae 
SR-71s  over.   They  would  have  noted  the  signal...  And,  if  during 
the  talks  (as  occurred). it  became  clear  the  other  side  was  operating 
under  new  instructions,  we  might  have  moved  a  couple  of  F-4  squadrons 
from  CONUS  back  to  the  theater,  or  flown  an  armed  recce  mission  north 
of  20  but  still  shallow  enough  so  as  to  minicize  chances  of  any 
heavy  encounter,  etc. 
"My  example  may  be  full  of  holes.  But  the  principle  is  not.  Time 
/  and  time  again  I've  seen,  froa  the  outside,  instances  where  critical 
v  information  was"  not  analyzed  properly  right  away,  or  was  sidetracked. 
Doubtless  there  are  good  nen  on  the  inside  who  can  docun-sAt  this  sor^ 
of  thing  for  you  factually... 
"I  hope  you  will  make  one  of  your  priority  tssks  an  attempt:  to  find 
/the  bright,  young,  essentially  fearless  analyses  within  the  Co—unity 
v  and  move  them  into  positions  of  authority  so  that  ve  can  exploit 
information  in  a  tir.ely  fashion..."
For  readers  of  this  paper  who  do  ;-.ot.  n-call  eho  ;.;  tuition  discussed 
in  the  latter,  the  N'i:<ou  Administration  though t  it  had  Hanoi's  agree;n:int 
on  most  outstanding  issues  in  the  Paris  Peace  Talks,  and  had  only  to  cross 
a  few  t's  and  dot  some.i's  at  the  meeting  scheduled  to  resume  on  December  4, 
1972,  to  wrap  up  a  formal  agreement.   But  Hanoi  backed  far  off  previously 
agreed  positions  at  that  round;  the  so-called  Chris teas  bombings  in  the 
vicinity  of  Hanoi  and  Haiphong  in  1972  were  required  to  get  the  negotiations 
back  on  track.  . 
I  feel  free  to  quote  froa  this  letter  because  I  was  the  letter  writer. 
At  the  time,  I  was  a  Washington  correspondent  for  the  New  York  Tiaes  with 
more  than  a  dozen  years  experience  reporting  from  the  nation's  capital  and, 
as  a  citizen,  felt  that  the  new  DCI  should  have  underscored  for  hin>  a  problec 
so  glaring  that  it  was  perceived  outside  the  Intelligence  Community. 
I  quote  frca  the  letter  for  other  reasons  as  well. 
First  of  all,  to  aake  the  point  that  even  persons  on  the  outside  can 
perhaps  nake  useful  suggestions  for  improvements  within  since,  if  a 
Washington  reporter  is  halfway  successful,  he  Eust  exercise  inany  of  the 
sa<ae  skills  as  the  intelligence  analyst:  an  ability  to  gather  useful  bits 
and  pieces  of  information,  calibrating  each  source  for  his  degree  and  type 
of  bias,  developing  a  conceptual  framework  for  the  material,  testing  every 
thesis  and  discarding  those  that  appear  deficient  —  and   accomplishing  all 
.of  this  in  a  ticely  fashion. 
And  secondly,  another  problem  of  even  the  best  intelligence  analysis 
is  the  need  to  be  able  to  get  the  attention  of  the  customer.   In  this
A 
part ici.iT.tr  cr.r.e,  the  custor^r:;  of  this  report  are  a  ni:".b-:r  of.  vc-ry  bu<:y 
leaders  in  industry  and  government  who  (I  judged)  would  be  rcorc  likely  to 
spend  KOite  tine  on  a  lengthy  report  if  it  wore  packaged  in  a  manner  that 
would  pique  their  curiosity  and  interest. 
The  Intelligence  Community  must  make  a  determined  and  continued 
effort  to  determine  who  are  its  principal  customers  and  what,  techniques 
might  best  be  employed  to  capture  their  attention  and  satisfy  their 
requirements.  '...". 
It  became  abundantly  clear  in  addressing  this  topic  that  the 
Community  has  been  deficient  in  that  regard. 
This  report  is  based  on  extensive  interviews  with  Jai-ies  R.  Schlesinger, 
Secretary  of  Defense;  William  P.  Clements,  Jr.,  Deputy  Secretary  of  Defense; 
General  George  S.  Brown,  Chairman  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff;  Robert. "F. 
Ellsworth,  Assistant  Secretary  of  Defense  for  International  Security  Affairs 
(who  together  comprise  the  principal  policy  makers  and  thus  the  principal 
customers  of  the  intelligence  product  being  addressed  in  this  report), 
together  with  a  number  of  others  in  or  long  associated  with  the  Intelligence 
Community  in  Washington. 
While  the  findings  and  conclusions  are  somewhat  impressionistic,  if 
they  offer  only  a  few  valuable  insights,  the  effort  will  have  becp.^  worthwhile 
A  special  caveat  is  worth  offering  at  this  point.  Since  the  focus  cf 
this  report,  indeed  the  thrust  of  the  entire  Defense  FaAei  on  Intelligence, 
is  to  suggest  improvements  in  the  Defense  Intelligence  Agency,  che  emphasis 
of  what,  follows  will  be  essentially  critical,  hopefully  constructively  .so. 
That  is  not  to  infer,  hcvev-r,  that  I>IA  bar.  not  r.c.civ.:-.':  [shed  a  good  e'eal  of 
li.w.'rx'.»]^.  wo;v.,  or  ;;•.:.-.:■.  :.t  i.   -  :  r-^'.:  •:■.:.  -•:  :"-.:rt.:  :  •"  ;-.••  \ :-    i^~.   o:;-..:i:r.;.rion
end  its  product.   Such  a  conclusion  would  he  both  unfair  and  error^m;:;. 
Every  single  person  interviewed  r.;:dc  a  point  of  the  fact  that  DIA. 
(indeed  the  whole:  of  the  Intelligence  Co:-:r.unity)  is  Jong  on  tidbits  of 
fascinating  data  (gleaned  by  very  impressive  necharticai  collection  aad 
decrypting  systems)  arid  very  short  on  comprehensive,  insightful  and  tinely 
analysis. 
Most  ascribed   this   to:    a   thinness  of  quality  analysts,    civilian  and 
military;    an  overlayering  organizational  structure  so   that   the  report  of 
the  original  analyst  becomes  increasingly  bland  as  it  makes  its  way  up 
through  layers  of  supervisors;    an  inability  to  make  broad-gauged  judgments 
oa  the  basis  of  new  fragments  of  information;   an  unwillingness   to  go  out 
on  a  limb  in  early-warning  soundings  and  long-range  estimates;   a  tendency 
to  downgrade  HUMINT  and  SIGIXT  in  favor  of  "harder"  photo  intelligence  data. 
Comments  Mr.    Schlesinger:    "Most  of  what  I  see  represen-ts  a  lot  of.  . 
scraping   together  of   factual  material  without  Euch  analysis.      But  when  you 
have  good  analysis,    it's  nore  valuable  than  the  facts  ori  a  ratio  of  ten  to  one 
He  and  other  senior   officials  complained   that  Euch  of   the  naterial 
presented  each  day,   especially  current  general  intelligence,   consists  of  a 
bunch  of   photos  and  snippits   of   information   that  fail   to  put   the  new  data 
into  perspective  or  fully  enough  interpret  its  significance. 
Mr-   Ellsworth  has  discontinued  his  daily  DIA  briefing   (which  he 
regarded  as  a  waste  of  time)   in  favor  of  a  very  brief  paper  with  intelligence 
and  overnight  cable   traffic  highlights. 
General  Brown  has   restructured  his  wc-.rning  intelligence  briefing  in  n.\ 
attempt    at   putting    the   ir.tc-rrr.ation  briefed  into   .:»  brj.-.-'or   context,      "is   S:30  <
ir.ee tip.:;    it;    richer    than   others    in    that    it    includc-n   either    the  Director   or 
Deputy  Director   of  1)1  A,    together  with  hi;;   J-3,   Jo   and    the  Director  of    the 
Joint   Staff;    in    that  uny  he    tends    to  get   son-.e   cross-fertilization  of    the 
opinions  of    the  operators,    the   planners   and   the  intelligence  experts. 
Messrs.    Schlesinger  and  Clements   for   the  nost  part   get  such  writte; 
iteir.s   of   intelligence   as   are  screened  by   their  military  assistants  — 
on   the  basis  of  known  interest   and  perceived  value    to   the  issues   at  hand. 
There  is   an  obvious   lack  of  regular,  meaningful  coa-unication  betwe 
the  offices  of   the  Secretary  and  Deputy  Secretary,    on   the  one  hand,   and   the 
intelligence  analysts  on   the  other.      The   former  complain   that   the  analysts 
don't   comprehend  what  is   of  particular  interest,   either  generally  or  in  a 
particular   crisis,  while   the   latter   complain   there   is  no  feedback,    so    they 
have  no  idea  whether  what   they  are  producing  is  hitting   the  bull's-eye   or 
even   the   target. 
This  problem  appears    to  be  compounded  by   the  nakeu?  of   the  Intelli- 
Community  where   the   analysts    (frequently   academic  types  without  ouch  or  ever 
.  "any  experience  in  the   field)    don't  have  a   clear  idea  of  whether   they  are 
writing  primarily  for    their  immediate  supervisor,    for   the  Intelligence 
Community   at   large,    for   the   Secretary  of  Defense,   or  Saovci,    according  to 
experienced  hands.      Frequently,    also,    they  work  under  a  oublish-or-parish 
pressure  not  unlike   that   in  aeade-da, '  leading   to  a   tendency   in  ser.e   cases 
to  cake  much  of   sone   little   new   fact  or   occurrence.      This,    in   turn,    can 
teapt   supervisors   to  round  sharp   edges    for   fear   that    too  p.uch   is  being 
**      made   of    the    latest   glir.n.er   of    information,      nut  when   a  situation   arises
when  r'iK-h,  irnN.-ed,  ought  to  he  l-=;:-.I-v  c>1  new  dc'-a,  i.he  sy-:'e:i  can  ar;d  oft-jr. 
does  homop.c-ni -/.■;:  the  analysis. 
Mr.  Clements,  on  Lhc  basis;  of  two  yc«rs  —  and  several  crises  --  in 
his  current  post,  provides  this  overview  of  the  problem:  "in  every  instance 
I  know  about  where  there  was  a  horrendous  failure  of  intelligence,  the 
information  was  in  fact  available  to  have  averted  the  problem.   But  the 
"analysts  and  the  system  didn't  allow  the  raw  data  to  surface. 
"In  a  mechanical  sense,"  he  continued,  "the  system  produces  the 
information,  but  it's  so  damn  big  and  cumbersome  and  uncoordinated,  that 
you  can't  get  the  information  properly  assessed  and  to  the  right  people." 
He  concludes:  "Kha't  I  want  are  more  reflective,  accurate  and  well- 
'considared  assessments  —  before,  during  and  after  crises.   I  want  a  constant 
process.   Given  that  we're  spending  better  thanj  >a  year,  witn 
better  than)       jpeople  involved,  the  performance  of  the  Intelligence 
» 
Community  is  disgraceful."  . 
I  This  report  opened  with  the  judgment  —  froia  the  outside  looking  in 
i 
'  that  one 'of  the  basic  shortcomings  of  the   system  was  the  lack  of  talented, 
;  experienced,  imaginative  and  -courageous  analysts  getting  their  warnings  and 
estimates  to  policy  makers  in  a  timely  manner.  That  notion  has  been 
reinforced  by  talks  with  s.any  of  the  top  decision-makers  —  and  by  the  autho; 
'nearly  two  years  at  a  senior  level  on  the  other  side  of  the  mirror. 
People  are  the  main  problem,  though  by  no  means  the  cnl>  one. 
What  might,  then,  be  done?   Some  suggestion  follow: 
REORGANIZE  DIA.  Sone  consideration  ought  to  he  given  to  a  reorgani- 
zation of  DIA  to  put  a  widely  experienced  civilian  intel  1  "igence  analyst  (ncv 
with  so::--;  m;-.;i  iT^-riai  U-,3o?.L)  in  c.r-    i'  :•  L*;.  r-'-'-I-"  '--'-'-   '■'*?■'■■'■'.
would    provide-    sur.e    co:U  iisui  Ly    (i-iuoh    ;>:;    .'.t     the    Nal  ■  <.:r.;ii    S:-c.t:rity   A<xncy) 
and  would  be    looIv.ec!    to   by    the:    civilian   .■.u«i  Lysts    t.iirovr.r-J-.r.'.it    the   crt'.ariizat..;.:>-" 
as    providing;   a   counterweight   against,    the    tendency   for    a   preponderantly 
Diili  Lary-oriented   agency. 
THE  WISH  M£X.    .As   part  of    Che   reorganisation,    five   or  six  imaginative 
thinkers    (civilian  and  military,    depending  strictly   on  experience  and 
ability)   should  be  set   up  with  a  charter  of   following  as  cany  key  functions 
areas  both   to   creatively  evaluate   trends  and   ride  herd  on   those  individuals 
throughout  DIA  who  could  be  contributing  more   to   these  high  priority  areas 
•interest.      They  ought  not  be  saddled  with  management  reponsibility,  but 
must  have  enough  authority  so   their  "suggestions"   to   the  sys tea  would  not 
"be  ignored. 
In  a  crisis  involving  their  area  of  specialty,  they  could  accompan}'  _ 
the  Director  of  DIA.  in  briefings  of  the  Secretary  and  other  key  policy  rcake 
CIVILIAN  ANALYSTS.   At  Diddle  and  lower  levels  better  analysts  nust  be 
recruited,  provided  first  rate  training  both  in  intelligence  schools  and, 
where  appropriate,  in  graduate  schools.  Consideration  ought  be  given  to 
broadening  their  experience  with  occasional  tours  with  CIA,  NSA  and  possibl 
in  political-ailitary  assignments  in  embassies  whare  their  regional 
specialization  would  be  enhanced.   Pay  mist  be  commensurate  with  deir.onst rat 
"  ability  and  performance. 
MILITARY  ANALYSTS.   The  sane  approach  should  be  followed  here  as  with 
the  civilians.   As  an  additional,  vital,  step  the  Services  oust  be  persuade 
to  send  aore  of  their  very  best  officers  on  assignment  to  DIA  and  to  pro=o: 
such  men,  on  the  basis  of  ncrit,  as  fast  as  their  cc-nte-poraries  who  serve
n:::-}  gnvcnt ;;  p;  J  ;:i  r  i  1  y  v.ir'.ii::  lii^ir  i  .■;!  i  v  i  d  ■.!.-•  1  S'-rvi  c  •_'.', . 
CRISIS  M-W.'.Cr'.'v.   Since  one  of  tiif:  r.o  i .;:  proVif.-:-::; ,  ar.  f.-.r  ar,  policy 
nnkers  are  concerned,  with  Juiteirige-ice  performance  in  a  crisis  is  a  lack 
of  responsiveness,  thought;  should  be-  given  to  assign  iri£  a  senior  intellige 
professional  to  the  .Of  rice,  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense  during  a  period  of 
crisis,  such,  as  the  Middle  East  war  of  1973  or  the  more  recent  Cyprus 
invasion.   This  man  would  spend  considerable  tit'.e  each  day  talking  with. 
the  Secretary  and  his  military  assistants  on  precisely  what  kinds  of  data 
and  analysis  would  best  serve  the  Secretary.   He  would  also  accompany  the 
Secretary  to  the  Situation  Room  in  the  NMCC  to  immediately  pass  on  to  the 
appropriate  sections  of  DIA  (or  elsewhere  in  the  Coscinunity)  just  what  the 
'  Secretary  believes  he  needs  to  facilitate  his  decision  making.  This  could 
either  be  one  man,  with  the  sort  of  personality  and  judgr.ent  to  get  along 
well  with  whoever  is  Secretary,  or  different  men  selected  because  oil 
experience  in  the  area  cost  concerned  in  a  particular  crisis  situation. 
TAILOR  THE  PRESENTATION.   DIA  must  learn  to  be  especially  sensitive 
to  the  personalities  of  the  key  people  being  served  and  fashion  the  method 
of  providing  information  to  the  individuals  involved.   During  the  Mideast  v 
for  example,  Mr.  Schlesinger  often  wer-t  to  the  special  XKCC  Sit  Rooa  for 
updates,  but  was  bored  by  most  of  the  "checklist"  type  briefing : that 
•  reported  U.S.  ships  having  tr-oved  20  miles  since  the  last  briefing,  etc., 
along  with  a  few  new  developments  o:  genuine  significance.   No  one  seeded 
to  notice  what  interested  him  and  what  did  not,  in  hi.s  view.   Additionally, 
a  little  personal  research  would  have  ascertained  that  he  prefers  (on  any 
significant  itea  of  intelligence)  a  brief  oral  report  by  an  expert  who  can
«np.r.'.*v 
•r  <;uos  tioits ,  not  a  inicfor  
who  only  know:;  
a  script  
--■  b.'irkod  
up  by 
a  lengthier  
written  
anoly::  
ir;  which  
ca:i  be.  read  at  leisure. 
WIRE  THE  SYSTEM  TOCr.Vtll'R.   There  appear  Lo  be  too  r,i;>.y  f j.ef  d';nr.  at 
Defcr.sc  without  sufficient  cr  systematized  cross-fertilization.   General 
Brown's  format  at  his  morning  meeting  is  a  snail  step  in  the  right  direction 
However,  it  ought  to  be  broadened  significantly.   DIA  regional  analysts  ough 
to  freely  talk,  and  compare  notes  with  desk  men  in  ISA  (rarely  the  case,  I'm 
informed),  with  operators  in  J-3  and  planners  in  J-5,  just  for  starters. 
In  addition,  why  not  have  ISA  set  up  2  series  of  special  "what  if?"  groups, 
geared  to  anticipated  problems  and  possible  options,  including  DIA  prominent 
in  the  process.   For  example,  in  anticipation  of  the  Congressionally  mandate 
cutoff  of  military  assistance  to  Turkey  unless  significant  progress  is  cade 
in  solving  the  Cyprus  crisis,  one  such  group  could  have  analyzed  a  series  oi 
questions  and  offered  suggestions  tc  the  policy  makers,  to  wit:  What  if 
Turkey  agreed  to  pull  5,000  troops  out  of  Cyprus,  would  that  satisfy  Congres 
What  kinds  of  inducements  Eight  the  U.S.  make  to  Ankara  to  increase  chances 
of  meaningful  concessions?  What  would  happen  if  Congress  shut  down  aid,  woi 
Turkey  pull  out  of  NATO,  disinvite  the  U.S.  from  using  bases  there?  What 
implications?   For  the  U.S.,  for  Greece,  for  intelligence  on  Russia,  for  trj 
shipment  of  weapons  through  Turkish  air  space  or  overland  to  Syria?  What 
elements  in  the  Turkish  political  spectrum  should  be  cultivated  in  aaticipal 
of  this  possible  crunch?   Should  arms  in  the  pipeline  be  spoc-.ded  «j?  or  slow* 
Et  cetera.
3.1 
MOIlirl   AND    i'.f'.T'i'Ktl   iii;:;i:.i  .       '.:  i  []-.<>. :l    c;:;.."jt  i  o.;    the    t::-:t  (-.•orcii  ur-.ry 
capab  i  1  It  icr;  of  technology  have  unlocked  ;;o:  -  bixv;lht  a'--.  i.ng  secrets  of 
great  value  to  the-  U.S.  Other  hi  c:.k*  hro-jr:;:;  '..111  folio.:  ::tth  equally 
important  results;  no  doubt.   liut  there-  is  a  dar.ger  of  becoming  so  mesmerized' 
i 
by    the  product   of    the  'intelligence  vacuum  cleaner  that  ve   tend    to   underrate 
the  value  of   cultivating   (at   tic.es,   buying  in  place)   well   informed 
individuals  in  key  places.      During  my  previous   incarnation,    I  had  occasion 
to  go  on  extensive  reporting  trips   in   the  Middle  East   and  quickly  dis- 
covered  that   the  best  informed  sources  in  the  region  vrere  the  British  and 
the  oil  companies.      And    they  depended  prinarily  on  HUMINT. 
The   foregoing   suggestions   are  not  meant   to   represent   an  exhaustive 
-list  of    things    that  ought  be  considered,  but  rather  an  illustrative   one. 
-    In  addition,    certain  other  coves,    some  essentially  mechanical, 
others   substantive,   merit   attention. 
For  example-,'  it  would  r.:eke   ser.se  for  DIA  to  explore  sons  very 
modern   techniques   of   communication,    perhaps   consulting  vith  a  big 
advertising  agency  for   ercpert  a:!vice.      This   is   in  no  v.-ay   to   suggest  a 
slick,    catchy,    sell-'em-the-packags-not-the-ccntents   approach.      But  DIA 
is   competing   for    the   time  and   attention  of   sor.c   colossal ly  busy  aea. 
J%hen,    for   instance,    trying   to  brief   on   the  nuMltcry  buildup   along   the 
Sino-Sr»viot   border,    vh.y      not    a  bri<-f    -lUi-coIor^    :"-:!::.    ?• 
i  llust  r  ;_t  I  r  .-,    t-h-    s :.-;;.  ;;\:.c    ...•.:   cKtrcr.it    -rf    r '.".-.•   Sov;-.  :    ),:•  \  i:\c%
J./. 
cor  respond  ir;;   Chinese*    react  inii::   --•    j:\   a   vj.y    ttr.'f    c  ."••::   be    quirV.jy   $;ra:;ped 
and    .likely    rdveutbe  rt-d    lo;u;    n  i.  L  '.• »"    the    bv  iv  I  i  ::£■.? 
I    claim   no   r-ubsL~.nC.iv-:.'   c>:i>cr  L  ir._-   on  why   c:-:tc:-:.  •  ve.    i  e:j  cm  re  •:.•:-.   are 
targeted   on   certain    thirsts    and   not   on   other;;.      Rut    I   an  sor.--.--.-h  at   disquieted . 
that  we  know  a    lot   more   about    the   new  weapons   being  developed    for   Soviet 
divisions,    for   instance,   and  a  lot   less   about  ho;/  fast   divisions   could  be 
mobilized  and  moved   to   the   front  and  hov  nuch   ccn.bat   consumables   could  be 
moved   forward  for   sustained  warfare.      Also,   in   the  Middle  East,  we   try   to 
make  judgments  on   the   likelihood  of  a  new  round  of  war   and  possible  outcomes, 
yet  we  seen   to  place   relatively  scant   resources  on  learning  such   things  as 
precise  Israeli  and  Arab  order  of  battle  information,  and  stockpiles  of 
certain  key  weapons    (such  as  SAM  missile  stocks,   rather   than  merely  numbers 
of  launchers) . 
On  one   thing   the  expert  and   the  non-expert  can  agree.     Ue  are  into 
a  period  when  we   cannot,    indeed  dare  not,    fail  tc  significantly  iuprove  our 
ability   to  comprehend  and  deal  in  real   tine  with   the  myriad  problems   that 
face   this  nation.      And   that   requires,    first  off,   better   intelligence.
Gcorj-c  Wt.    }>un';cr 
Following  the  three  meetings  of  the  Panel  in  which  informative  briefings 
were  presented  and  discussion  among  panel  members  ensued,    I  want  to 
set  forth  my  interim  reactions  and  such  conclusions  as  I  may  have  in  ad- 
vance of  the  next  meeting  in  early  January. 
I  have  reread  Mr.    Clements'  memorandum  of  13  July  1974  setting  forth 
•the  five  duties  which  the  panel  should  undertake,   and  will  comment  on 
my  views  as  to  each  of  them. 
1.             "Review  the  actions  which  have  taken  place  in  the  last  five 
years   etc." 
In  the  briefing  of  29  October  we  heard  a  review  seating  forth 
the  recommendations  of  the  BRDP  that  had  and  had  not  been 
implemented.     I  shall  not  comment  in  detail  upon  what  was 
presented  as  it  is  well  known  except  to  say  I  particularly  noted 
the  following: 
-  (a)  The  recommendation  that  line  responsibility  for  all 
Defense  intelligence  be  centered  in  one  office.      This 
•     was  not  implemented. 
(b)  The  recommendation  that  career  opportunities  be  en- 
hanced for  both  military  and  civilian  personnel.     This 
,  is  said  to  have  been  partially  implemented. 
The  advantages,    in  theory  at  least,    of  a  centraiir.ee?  line  a.uthority 
for  all  Defense  intelligence  are  readily  apparent,    but.  the  difficulties 
of  imoleinentation  are  doubtless  formidable.     There  are  many 
evidences  of  less  than  optimum  organizational  functioning  and  if 
'     '-      centralized  controls  are  not  to  be  implemented  then  much  attention 
should  be  directed  at  organizational  deficiencies  by  other  means, 
perhaps  by  a  continuous  review  function  covering  form  of  organi- 
zation,   line  of  authority  and  responsibility,    flow  of  information, 
and  the  like,     /.pporer.tly  it  is  'he  ?r:ethn.:l  a-.-i  no'.   {'-■:    objective 
where  tV.crn  art:  differvi-c-.. .  r.  ;>.'  epl:'.;-*:'.  :--"•;■     .  ■■•■'•'■   '- -    of.r'.riicn  a.-.  r*-i-- 
ment  that  inUiUgence  activities  :-.:u::L  be  carvivd  ly   coord:  n:-icd  and 
tightly  controlled.
Jn  tin:  mallei    of  career  o-.>porlunitie:.  f  c> ;    bo'h  <;viJ:;::i  and 
jnililary  po  rr-or.nel   the     F-UDP   )<:co.r>:iR::.'!;;:;t.::s  havo  h'.-tv.i 
partly  implemented.      Hwcvcr,    it  i ;;  my  belief  thai  ir.ur!, 
more  can  ami  should  be  done:  and  fmlher  in  t:ti:;  tnc-moran-Join 
I  wish  to  comment  on  thU  aspect.  as  I  consider  ii  to  be  one  of 
the  most  practicable  areas  for  improvement. 
2.  "Examine  the  size  and  scope  of  present  DoD  intelligence 
operations.  " 
The  briefings  and  the  data  presented  dealt  with  the  nature  of 
intelligence  operations  both  in  size  and  scope.     Certainly  we 
need  a  first  class  intelligence  operation.     It  is  clear  that  we 
have  a  very  large  and  a  very  costly  operation  but  whether, 
taken  as  a  whole,   it  is  first  class  I  do  not  know. 
Looking  at  the  technological  aspects  separately  from  the' human 
aspects  I  think  v/e  must  conclude  that  technologically  the  intelli- 
gence operation  is  in  fact  very  good  indeed.     Thus  if  we  consider 
the  overall  system  to  have  deficiencies  we  should  look  first  to     . 
the  human  aspects  for  improvement.     The  functioning  of  the 
present  organization  apparently  needs  attention  to  achieve  clear 
cut  responsibilties  for  all  aspects  of  intelligence  with  emphasis 
on  control  and  flow  of  information  and  its  analysis.     Perhaps  we 
have  focused  on  technological  advances  and  given  less  than 
'     adequate  attention  to  the  other  fundamentals. 
As  a  generality  it  is  safe  to  say  that  almost  any  activity  of  such 
-      size  and  complexity  can  be  made  more  effective  by  reexamination 
'  .      of  priorities  with  a  view  to  eliminating  those  of  a  lower  order  not 
for  cost  reduction  alone  but  in  the  present  context  to  increase  the 
effectiveness  of  those  of  a  higher  order.     Whatever  can  be  done 
to  eliminate  lower  priorities  is  likely  to  improve  effectiveness. 
3.  .  "Examine  the  interrelationships  which  exist  among  the  various 
DoD  intelligence  activities  and  the  management  considerations 
which  result  from  them." 
■  The  foregoing  raises  the  key  question  in  regard  to  the  organi- 
zation of  activities  that  v.-e  know  are  of  great  magnitude  and  com- 
plexity.    The  present  form  of  organisation  and  the  interrelationship 
that  have  resulted  are  so  tortuous  that  one  might  wonder  how  a:iy- 
thmj.':  user..:;
J  J 
To  make  any  worthwhile  imp  vi»vt-i:;c:it  one  mu:;l  go  \---.r.\\  lo  the- 
se opt*  of  activities,    c  xa  mine  the- prio:  iti  es,    r:nc!  try  lo  eliminate 
thor.c  of  lower  priority.     Having  reduced  activities  ;■.:.  much  a;. 
possible  then  undertake  to  organize  ihern  and  put  their:  into  a 
■network  that  is  as   simpte  as  the  situation  v/il!.  perrr.it. 
It  seems  quite  apparent  that  technology  and  resource  manage- 
ment have  received  much  more  attention  than  has  been  given  to 
matters  of  personnel  and  organization.      No  doubt  this  explains 
('  why  our  intelligence  data  seems  to  be  superior,  to  our  methods  for 
handling  it. 
The  writer  recognizes  such  generalities  may  not  be  too  helpful  jn 
identifying  actions  that  might  be  recommended  for  reasonably    "  -   ' 
prompt  improvement.     On  the  other  hand  if  these  conditions  are 
not  realized  improvements  are  unlikely  lo  be  achieved. 
4,             "Report  to  the  Secretary  of  Defense  its  assessment  of  the  effect- 
--     iveness  of  DoD  intelligence  operations   etc." 
The  advances  that  have  been  made  in  technology  and  it  applications 
in  recent  years  arc  indeed  truly  remarkable.     One  suspects,   but  can- 
not prove,    that  technology  is  almost  solely  responsible  for  the  intelli- 
gence gains  have  been  made  despite  enormous  complexities  in  both 
.     scope  and  form  of  organization.  ■  . 
It  is  my  impression  that  the  net  result  of  our  intelligence  activities 
is  much  better  than  we  sometimes  believe.     But  this  is  not  to  say 
'    :       that  the.y  could  not  be  greatly  improved  by  examination  of  priorities, 
«       by  better   people  and  by  a  simplified  form  of  organization.     This  all 
leads  me  to  an  anomalous  conclusion,    namely  that  if,  as  some  seem 
to  believe  in  the  real  world  little  can  be  done  toward  simplification 
of  scope  and  organization  then  indeed  intelligence  activities  may  be 
at  least  as  reasonably  effective  as  one  might  expect. 
•'  As  a  matter  of  personal  reaction  I  cannot  see  the  Ycm  Kippur 
.:'   experience  as  a  failure,   but  rather  as  a  circumstance  in  which  the 
1   most  that  might  have  been  extracted  from  the  system  was  not 
realized.     I  would  caution  that  we  not  mistake  a  crack  for  a  fault. 
;    Perhaps  we  expect -too  much.     In  retrospect  we  can  now  identify 
;     indicators  of  a  possible  surprise  attack  prior  to  the  Yom  Kippur 
war.     Had  these  indicators  boi'n  acted  unon  there  me.ht  have  been 
■■    .no  surprise;  there  img:.:  ,:."-.*■•.    :  :■■•.*.  :.-.»  a' '...'^k.     V'r.-.  .:  i  ..'■.<• }  Jigeucv
would  }>;ivf.   lictrii   (  ;  i'liciv.ed  for  be  in-    v.tomi;,    (uv   c  i  <:.  1 1  r.  ;*     ten:. ion, 
for  possibiy  p  i  ovohing  war.      V,'e  car:  try  lo  kno.v  the   t.r;:  j  r-.  bil  i  t  i  f:  r, 
.''/  of  other;;  but   certainly  we  must  v.r>\  i:  ;;:;;::r!C  t  ri-s  t  c  ;••:>:■.  *>I  J  i  t  y   iridic ::  U-s 
v     inJ.eni.io:1..      We  can  try  to  predict  ihv  intentions  of  others  but  it 
.would  be  fatuous  to  expect  that  wo  can  always  know  their  intentions. 
.     "Recommendations  which  the  Secretary  of  Defense   should  consider 
to  improve  intelligence  responsiveness  to  Defence,  needs   etc." 
In  this  connection  I  focus  upon  the  rather  obvious  opportunities  to 
improve  the  quality' of  the  output  both  by  upgrading  the  competence 
of  the  personnel,    and  by  improving  the  means  by  which  it  is  com- 
municated.    V/e  are  told  that  betterments  in  these  areas  have  been 
made  as  a  result  of  the  BRDP  recommendations  of  1970.     Be  that 
as  it  may  we  have  nonetheless   seen  evidence  that  says  there  is 
room  for  further  upgrading 
The  Services  do  not  assign  a  high  priority  to  the  intelligence  function 
in  the  career  pattern.     It  does  not  seem  unreasonable  to  reach  for  a 
priority  at  least  equal  to  that  of  other  career  opportunities.      Few 
would  disagree  that  the  quality  of  output  will  improve  with  competence 
of  personnel.     Accomplishment  may  not  be  either  easy  or  fast  but 
this  is  nonetheless  one  important  step  for  betterment  that  can  be 
taken  by  the  Secretary  of  Defense. 
On  the  civilian  side  we  see  that  civil  service  regulations  malce  it 
most  difficult  to  recruit  and  retain  personnel  skilled  in  the  appro- 
priate disciplines  and  of  the  intellectual  capacity   required    of  a 
•      first  rate  analyst.     The  analyst  role  calls  for  very  special  and 
professional  abilities  coupled  with  proficient  leadership,    career 
patterns  and  the  like.     But  perhaps  even  more  important  is  the 
need  to  recognize  the  function  as  not  one  of  science,  or  technology 
but  as  one  of  logic  based  upon  intimate,    in  some  cases  life  long, 
knowledge  of  the  political,    geographical,    ethnic,    and  cultural 
aspects  of  a  particular  area.      These  talents  are  not  easily  acquired 
■and  the  assignments  cannot  be  adequately  filled  by  transferring  or 
promoting  either    a  military  officer  or  a  civilian  employee  who  has 
performed  well  in  other  assignments.
Although  Hut sc  metro:;   so  em  to  be  know.:  ;  :id  un-h ■:  r.toe-d  and 
efforts  arc  being  m.u'c  to  upgraee  p*.::-r.o:-.:.e],    it  is  my    reaction 
that  as  much  einphar  i :.  as  polemic   should  he  .-.:>;;!  Ef-!  to  modifying 
civil   service   requi  rement r>  not    only  because  of  its   •::.;, o;  lane*:  to 
the  functiomr-."  of  the  system  but  also  because  although  it  may 
have  its  difficulties   it  is  one  of  the  areas   in  which  the  Secreta;'y 
of  Defense -could  lend  his  direct  support. 
In  the  final  accounting  the  quality  of  the  output  can  be  no  better  than  the  com- 
petence of  the  personnel.     Aside  from  matters  of  organization  which  have 
been  commented  upon,  working  conditions  do  influence  the  effectiveness  of 
personnel.      DLA  is  seriously  fragmented  in  several  physical  locations  and 
its  effectiveness  In  general  must  be  diminished  thereby.      A  side  from,  the 
question  of  funds  required  this  is.  a  situation  that  can  be  easily  and  usefully 
corrected.  , 
The  problem  of  communicating  the  final  output  and  its  significance  is  vexing' 
and  is  a  matter  to -which  the  writer  has  given  much  attention  over  the  years. 
I  have  little  regard  for  the  average  briefing  because  it  is  exactly  that,   namely 
an  average  briefing  for  an  average  audience.      Too' often  briefings  are  cluttered 
up  by  details  that  may  be  fascinating  but  do  not  ie  .d  to  conclusions.      Where 
they  are  included  solely  to  validate  the  data  they  may  in  fact  obscure  signifi- 
cance. .•'"'  , 
It  is  my  belief  that  communication  with  the  top  decision  makers   should  be  _ 
structured  to  inform,  them  of  what  they  want  to  knew  combined  with  what 
they  ought  to  know.     And  furthermore  at  the  top  at  least  the  briefing  should 
be  done  by  those  who  have  first  hand  knowledge  and  have  themselves  played 
important  roles  in  determining  the  significance  of  the.  material  under  con- 
sideration. . 
WV  S_ 
Because  of  the  complexity  and  sophistication  of  intelligence  operations  v; 
may  be  too  inclined  to  seek  complex  and  sophisticated  improvements.      Be- 
cause of  a  pre-occupation  with  technology  and  high  level  roles  and  missions 
we  may  have  given  too  little  attention  to  the  fundamentals.     I  have  the  feeling 
that  nothing  would  improve  our  intelligence  effort  as  would  .-.".gh  quai^y 
people,    clearly  defined  responsibilities  and  a  "sound  organisational  ftructuro. 
3,    197-1
A>:  ovr.itvji.w  o::  ni-^iiu; •;;■;!-;  .v.:i  i::--i(!:iiT;--.\ 
Dr.  Alc>::i!!!-'.-;  t!.  !"lr:x 
The  present  posture  of  the  jnUT  riverr:*.'  v  :>::.'m::ii  ty,  its  physical 
assets,  its  or^.'trii.Zcil  io.'i'il  si"  rue  Lure,  its  ::.)  location  of  ;  aripower  and 
resources  are  all  still  very  largely  the  product  of  history  since  l.'orld 
War  1.1  and  particularly,  of  the  period  sia.e  the  Soviet  strategic  nuclear 
threat  began  to  develop  (i.e.,  since  1950).  The  investment  in  large 
collection  system  exploitation  programs,  and  overseas  stations  since  that 
time  lias  been  very  large  and  the  inertia  of  the  associated  institutions 
and  bureaucratic  mechanisms  has  grow*  correspondingly  larger.  Major 
collection  programs  tend  to  take  on  the  order  of  five  years  or  more  to 
plan,  program,  budget,  develop  and  Implement  and  from  a.  requirements 
point  of  view,  most  of  the  present  collection  systems  are  vastly  more 
capable  follov;-ons  to  predecessor  sy stents  which  began  ten  to  twenty 
years  ago,  made  possible  by  the  phenomenal  technological  growth  which 
took  place  during  this  period.  In  a  detailed  sense,  what  happened  was 
an  illustration  of  one  form  of  one  of  Parkinson's  laws,  namely,  detailed 
collection  •'requirements"  expanded  to  meet  the  technological  capabilities 
available . 
Given  the  historical  sequence  that  brought  the  intelligence  community 
to  where  it  is  today  it  is  net  surprising  that  almost  all  systems  for 
collection  (and  therefore  also  a  good  bit  of  the  emphasis  in  processing, 
analysis  and  production)  are  focused  on  the  Soviet  strategic  nuclear 
threa/t  and  more  recently,  as  a  close  second  priority  on  the  Soviet  con- 
ventional tiireat  to  Europe.  This  is  not  to  say  that  these  very  capable 
"vacuum  sweeper"  collection  systems  do  not  also  collect  a  great  detail 
of  other  useful  information  on  other  areas  which  is  suitably  processed 
and  analyzed  but  the  primary  driving  force  which,  affects  the  size  and 
scope  of  the  programs  and,  therefore,  their  major  costs  (and  bureaucratic 
constituencies)  is  the  emphasis  which  has  historically  been  laid  on  the 
Soviet  threat. 
Third  in  priority  is  the  so-called  Sino- Soviet  bloc  (a  term  which,  if 
not  factual  as  a  descriptor  may  be  regarded  as  a  historic  relic  of  the 
old  days  of  bipolarism)  which  brings  in  China,  North  Korea,  North  Vietnam, 
etc.  V.h.en  the  needs,  objectives  and  requirements  associated  with  these 
countries  and  the  threat  postulaticns  they  evoke  have  been  taken  care  of, 
it  is  safe  to  say  we  have  accounted  for  probably  at  least  90  percent  of 
//all  intelligence  costs,  military  and  civilian,  tactical  and  strategic, 
JJ  theater  and  national.  Therefore,  if  one  looks  at  other  areas  of  the 
.world,  the  Middle  East,  Africa,  Latin  America,  etc.,  it  is  misleading  to 
refer  toj 
['        the  resources  involved.  Rather,  the  applicable  resources  arc- 
ten  percent  or  less  of  those  amounts  and  these,  while  still  substantial, 
_are  no  longer  so  astronomical  in  size,  even  lesf  so  when  pai'celleJ  out 
among  the  many  different  areas  involved.
'ilu:  key  iutell  igem  e  csi  ;:•.-:  •  i"n«;  lew  the  hn.h.s:  Ic.ils  o''  gover:   -at 
over  the  past  decade  have,  ka--a.-,  er,  ten.h'  lo  javd-.v  ; !•;•  '•'.!■■::•:]•;:  !-a.'t, 
Africa,  ead  Latin  /wierica  elr-ust  as  ::.  ;;h  ;•:.  th  •  -"  =  =  r .  >  i.-.vii-l  bio.  :■':  '.  hough 
the  Jailer  almost  £•  1  i .\ •. >■  :••  hh;,  in  g: eat;::  <•:    1  •-•:'•: a:  de..  ;<.-::,  a  c.-ri.':  ;n 
coupling  lo  the  action.   Jn  3  iv.hr  of  this  i-^-.-i.t  e.\p.'i  •'r.ni-.e,  the  develop- 
ments in  SALT,  M.'.iti  and  dotenr.e-oricn'.ed  vc ieni  i ( iv,  ii-;h;:icnl  and 
industrial  exchange:;  wiih  the  Sovk-;.  liaic-n,  o'.i.er  Y.:-.\  ■:.■  ■.-.■:   Pa.:t  nations, 
and  China,  and  the  many  now  or  enhanced  technical  collection  cap:;1;::!  ities 
which  have  been  developed  since  3  9SO,  the  line  is  ripe  now  Tor  a  {ic.;-n- 
inental  rccvaluation  and  reordering  of  both  objectives  an:i  reo*  si  recants 
•  for  different  geographical  areas  and  the  b.;st  means  for  mooting  these 
^objectives  and  requirements.  In  particular,  it  appears  that  the  role  of 
HUMIisT  should  be  especially  reassessed  with  respect  to  the  currently 
evolving,  situations.  Vfnat  is  involved  here  is  not  so  much  a  reordering  of 
intelligence  priorities  as  a  reconsideration  of  the  relationships  between 
priorities,  objectives,  and  resources. 
THE  PRESENTATION  OF  INTELLIGENCE  REPORTS 
If  the  intelligence  co.raiu.nity  is  to  do  more  than  produce  material 
for  its  own  edification,  it  is  necessary-  that  it  give  significant  atten- 
tion to  the  \v-ays  in  which  its  outputs  are  to  be  presented  to  those  who 
may  be  able  to  use  them.  And  the  problem  is  most  critical  with  respect 
to' those  users,  or  potential  users,  at  the  highest  levels  of  government 
since  they  must  base  their  decisions  on  an  adequate  appreciation  of  what 
is  or  nay  be  at  stake  in  the  broadest  national  and  international  context. 
It  is  here  that  the  present  system  most  often  fails,  not  so  much  because 
it  fails  always  to  give  the  right  answer  (which  is  probably  an  unattain- 
able goal)  as  in  raking  clear  the  essentials  of  what  is  in  an  intelligence 
estimate  or  assessment,  on  what  it  is  based,  and  what  degree  of  uncer- 
tainty is  attached  to. 
The  following  facts  are  illustrative  of  the  kinds  of  highly  relevant 
information  which  is  often,  if  not  usually,  lacking  in  intelligence 
reports,  estimates  and  assessments. 
Character  of  inputs.  Are  they  independently  derived  from  new  data, 
drawn  froiTrecent  assessments  by  others,  or  r--.air.ly  deduced  fro^i  files  and 
"finished"  intelligence  reports  of  long  standing?  V.hat  are  the  recent 
changes  reflected  in  them?  What  has  been  trie  recent  rate  of  change?  How 
reliable  are  the  inputs?  Is  there  any  divergence  of  opinion  cc; 
the  inputs  among  elements? 
Ji  i*~~!  iij  :  i 
alysis.     Given  the  inputs  and  uncertainties,  what  was  the  analytical 
p  '^isecf?     V.'hat  were  the  areas  of  expertise  incheke:;   i:\  the  analytical 
'  tean  .    ve.g. ,  regional  political,  military,  regional  ecoae:  \c) .     To  what 
degree  were  analysts  in  touch  with  ana  influenced  by  o-htr  analytical 
teams  dealing  with  the  same  subject?     (Since  the  ui-er  ::ay  receive  several 
^such  analyses,   he  should  knew  the  degree  to  which  they  are   i:-.l:-p:-:::.e::t.) 
V.hat   input  uncertainties  had  the  greatest  degree  of  infUm-aco  on  ih-.-- 
analysis?     V.hat   factors  of  wb:ch  t  ":•..••  r:d;:k:d      '        ■    ■•    '     -  v  a  : :  •  :•:? 
taken  into  account  or  undated  jn   La:.-  ;.:.:;'
/"  ;  * 
•  i .'! ;  :i   a  r  •■    ',:••'. 
...■!:.■•     (.  ,i 
1   .1 1  he    i ;:■..•;■.  .-.   ;:: 
;    ;  he  an  ■  1  yi  ica 
;,t'; 
-.1     ]  i!;<  :y    (.■;•;  c ,    the  has-    came 
•  '■  1  : 
V.hnl    :y '  ',(,;  : 
(.•■.:  U.    for    the 
ih 
i.id   parlies  ;   : ; V.l      \-i-t     lake? 
o:> 
[ )  -' ;  i  1 1.  * .    fo:     the. -<.:    C^ric.-.l.    ;:::! 
VI  :'• 
to   t }■/.:■'.•.:  ones' 
:  io;:s  have   !n:en 
Ot he;    anal.u  u  ai 
tC',:.::l? 
• ,  !•' iiu! \:.:' ■.-.'. .  Cow  i  'i.-  i < >:•:•; .  '"■■.'. 
I  wu  t  v.  of  or;  or  r  ;.••!  mi.!'.'  a  ; 
piii'-.'Sr.  it  sel  i  ,  what  aii:  c  '.'".W-  i  dared  I?.' 
and  the  worst  case  v.hich  c.^i'd  he:  forem 
other  si-.!..:  whbh  depend  o:i  actions  we  o: 
l.'ha ;  a:e  ill;?  time  c<.>i:;'>l. : :: ; '':  l  ■-  and  deci-.d 
our  (or  third  party)  notions?  l.'ha  t  arm 
arrived  at:  scparatel  y  or  collectively  iv. 
Obviously  not  all  of  these  issues  and  questions  need  to  be  discussed 
or  highlighted  with  respect  to  every  ii::elli<:',c ace  report,  estimate,  assess- 
ment, but  the  key  issues  do  need  to  be  brought  out  (e.g.,  the  key  military 
issue  in  the  Middle  Hast  War  of  1973  '..as  obviously  the  change  in  morale, 
resolve,  training,  leadership  and  competence  of  Arab  military  forces  and 
not  the  count  of  trie  last  aircraft  or  tank  delivered  from  the  Soviet  Union, 
yet  the  tacit  assumption  had  been  made  by  the  "community"  that  these  had 
not  changed,  indeed  could  not  change  for  almost  a  generation.  Hence,  this 
key  issue  was  not  addressed.). 
The.  primary  function  of  management  of  intelligence  analysis  should 
not  be  to  attempt  to  second  guess  analytical  specialists  in  their  onn 
areas  of  expertise  (although  checks  and  balances  by  other  analytical 
specialists  could  be  provided);  rather  the  managerial  role  should  empha- 
size the  information  transfer  process  to  the  users,  which  would  include 
the  ferreting  out  and  highlighting  of  the  uncertainties,  key  unresolved 
questions  and  the  degrees  of  freedom  still  left  in  the  situation  dependent 
on  cur  (or  third  party  actions,  policies  and  pronouncements. 
It  is  important  to  realize  that  what  :mist  be  foregone  in  the  intel- 
ligence coTLT.unity  to  achieve  both  credibility  and  effectiveness  v/ith 
respect  to  users  are  the  time  honored  forms  of  collective  wisdom  and 
homogenized  judgments  as  ground  out  by  committees  or  either  the  intra  or 
interagency  coordination  process.  These  procedures  always  tend  to  reduc- 
tion of  all  problems  by  the  lowest  common  denominators  which  often  fore- 
casts a  dull  gray  dawn  when  what  is  real.lv  to  be  extracted  is  either  a 
rosy  red  or  an  ominous  blue. 
Although  the  general  principles  set  forth  here  apply  to  presentation 
of  all  intelligence  outputs  to  all  of  its  consumers,  they  rpply  with 
special  force  to  the  support  which  DIA  provides  to  the  Odd  level  for  r.iary 
reasons  (some  stated  above),  not  the  least  of  which  is  that  they  have 
repeatedly  been  tried  and  found  wanting  by  this  .;:. portent  group  of  cus- 
tomers. The  Director,  DIA  should  take  jmm?ainte  step-  to  ;d  Predate  this 
situation  by  creating  the  necessary  staff  (which  ]ucd  n.»t  be  fargO  and 
•organizational  arrangements  (which  need  not  be  extensive)  to  imp-omen!" 
these  appropriate  management  disciplines  set  for- 
process  and  the  associated  presentation  procedure 
«.•.._•  ^.nj-i  •  i  n,<:
A:;    ov-l:<11    guidance    f<*r    IV:    *-'><*<■.::{  a  \    ',)■  '  '.".-•   ?■:•■.::}    '.>•'.    j  r;i  eH  i  •  ;-.;':e  ,    S<c ; et^r 
i;.lp„i":>'.:;    :.;:i(!;    "Ple;-.<:-    cJ'»    n>'-     I  <  :•.!■:<.•:•    uith    i  i  . "      He    furtf;<::     -.-id    in    f::;'.':;:ce    tl»>.L 
if"    Hi-:    pane]     think:;    the    s  >■■.-.  La.  i    is    gen-::  ;d  1  y    ;d  I    vight,    say    r.'-.       Do    :.-.>'-    ff.d    eb!  i-| 
rj-ii.f.'d    to   c:nri;.    up    i:ith    l  ecui.:  ;^::id:'.in:>',    for    :.ig:ii  f  ic-:.-it    chr;_.-'S    u"d  lt.j    they    era 
believed   to   be   genuinely   required  or    des.lrab!  e. 
In   attempting   to   apply    this   guidance   and  at    the   sane   tir^a   keeping    if.  mind   th| 
a  major   reshaping  or   restructuring  of   the  United  Stater.   Intelligence  systems  is 
probably  not   in   order — end  certainly  not   as  a  credible  determination  of   this  pane| 
the   First  order  of  business  seems   to  be   identification  of  '"ground  which   the  panel 
should  plow.*' 
2.      SCOPE   OF    PAK£L   ACT! VI TV. 
I   believe   this  panel   can  best   make  a  contribution  by  concentrating  en   the 
'  policies  and  organizational    responsibilities   for  production  of   substantive  intnll 
oonce  vis-?. -vis  the  management  of  resources  required  to  serve  the  overall  intclij 
rr.issj.on. 
Most  panels  such  as  this  one  are  convened  after  a  major  failure  of  t.hatevar 
be  examined  has  occurred.   Managers  are  locking  for  outside  judgment  which  has  nc 
been  involved  in  the  failure,  but  ujhose  collective  breadth  of  expericr.ee  n;ay  '~sll 
uncover  significant  flaws  that  those  closest  to  the  problem  have  not  detected. 
Certainly  there  was  a  failure  which  prompted  this  er.e,  and  both  Secretary  Clement: 
and  Secretary  Mall  made  clear  that  it  was  the  Middle  Efcst  VJar  of  October  1975.  Vr- 
were  caught  by  surprise.   Mo  saq.T.cr.t  o  f  the  Intel  .liceriC:?-v..:-.;!lex  :>f  ricially  esti.v.?.! 
that  the  Egyptians  v;ere  going  to  attack. 
3 •  T'.'.Tz.l\..\C£f:C€   EXPERIENCE. 
-During  a  fast  three  days  of  intorvievirg  several  pe:-:-'-  :.•  in  DIA  v.r.d   tfi.->  Scrvio 
In:,  el  1  i  qe;,":e  agencies,  I  sensed  a  Vzil'-'-v    -:-:  '■'  "■   "•;  "■'    ■-".':   '  •    .   ._-•...
;:■...:•■-.  :<:.'    it  (.'!'  nl  1  --•.;:;•  •!';:<:  i  nt::?  1  i  ;;-:;Se  r-;c;;ii  :".■••  t  /p  :c  .i  ■■■."■':•:.•!<  :• 
t?i-:  h-.-t  :■>.   11  was  pointed  out  :.:.■<.<•. -n-al  times  th.-.t  •.;•:  di  d  i>:.,L  .Vive  this  at  the  to;; 
ci.u-if.-)  th'i  period  Ui;i{.  pr-sed-d  the  tit: t '.:li;.r  i'JVl'i  attack,  ;::id  thus  p;;:  haps  did  cuffi 
a  failure  that  could  at  least  in  part  hv   laid  to  this  shs:  tcs.-iln-j. 
I  do  not  fully  agree  with  this,  and  attempted  Lo  make;  sure  thai  1  understood  •- 
an  "experienced"  intelligence  officer  is  in  this  apparent,  consensus.  The  answer  sc 
to  be  that  he  is  one  u;ho  is  either  a  design?.: tod  specialist,  or  one  t.ho  has  had  rnsnv 
assignments  in  intelligence  jobs,  or  both.  Certainly  these  specialists  are  require- 
in  the  top  levels  of  the  intolligsnca  hierarchy,  but  not  in  my  opinion  to  the  exclu 
sion  of  nonspecialists.  '    • 
The  care  in  selection  of  the  Chief  of  the  DIA  and  his  deputy  is  certainly  no  1 
inportanh  than  the  care  in  selection  of  a  key  military  commander  or  chief  of  staff. 
I  feel  in  fact  that  it  may  in  pons  cases  be  even  more  so.  Many  important  character 
istics  should  be  considsred.  An  insatiable  demand  for  good  information  is  one  of. 
them.  Top  interest  in  good  analysis  is  another.  But  a  long  list  of  previous  assic 
ments  in  intelligence  specialties  is  relatively  unimportant  provided  gaod  people  of 
such  background  are  assigned  to  his  immediate  staff.  \ 
My  criteria  for  the  selection  of  a  high-level  defense  or  military  intelligence 
chief  would  center  first  on  an  officer  ivho  has  been  a  successful  corr.mandsr.  Good 
commanders  understand  the  importance  of  intelligence;  and  of  specialists.  They  olsj 
understand  responsibility,  understand  their  cxn  role  as  an  analyst  ("estimate  of  th 
situation"),  and  are  not  generally  inclined  to  be  stayed  by  a  preponderance  of  I 
opinion  counter  to  the.ir  Gv.n  hard-gained  beliefs,  f'lest  importantly,  they  are 
usually  not  inclined  to  overlook  hard  indicators  of  potential  or  capability  in  fevo 
of  a  compounded  analysis  of  probable  intentions. 
I  have  known,  worked  for,  and  seen  in  j:stisn  commanders  who  ccntir-.uallv  nivc 
Lk;i:.-  f..'.t,c.,-lj..~le;',C". :j  oii'.'.rs  a  i  •:■:■'    ''..■"..      l.y    ck:..  I  i-^-.i'i  c  ■;:  i  >  v.  t  *.-.."■  '  •.■'  :..:-iiv»,  r;\:?'stior>ii-;~:
tuiwt    ai-i   ci'.r 
!<•..)    tb-    d.-vil 
■•'    upd-tiny,    i.< 
Th--*-a    Cv<  ■:. .■::  1'! .■:  .•    i-ill    i:-d.    put    up    -..i:.h   £.    chief    y  ho 
f.:.i    ur.dai  sl:.-i>d    uhy    he    insist:.   ci;»    Ih-.'su    taut  .■:--•.■   and    tfi-.-   r;.<  -\  i  Ly    rt".'-;n^';    uhish   the 
c;«.-.i.-:r.-ito.      C(.;iLi-,;:iui::.<,    they   will    i.ti.e.upt    to   h'sld  on   U..-:::  • ..:;:;!  y    to   a   chief   uho 
end   t'ho    ones    his    best    to   produce    the    ix:il-Jih:   inf  oir-.tit:  :>    end   i-.ri^l  yr;I  r;    that   his 
needs.      Usually,   cor.  menders   will    look    For   into]  licence  chief:;  who   havi-   had  good 
operational    experience:    (to   include    tactical,   ccumands) ,    and  trill,    shy   away   frcm 
"specialists"    for   this   top   job  unless   they  have   had  such  experience.-. 
In   summary  of   this  point   then,    I    believe   that   at  any  level   which  involves  co 
or   decision-making   responsibility,    the   intelligence  chief   and  his  immediate   staff  j 
should  have   a  balance  of  experience.      If   the  chief   is  selected   for  his   real-uorld 
down-to-earth,   pragmatic   experience — usually  as  a  cenmendnr  or  operator — his  dapu 
should  be  a   specialist;    and  vice  versa.      I   prefer   the   former  combination. 
4 .      CURRENT    DIA   SCOPE:   CT    ACTIVITY  A':D   r~  5PCV:513ILITV. 
The  stampede  for  centralization  in  the  OCD  in  the  early  1950s  most  certainly 
involved  defense  intelligence.  This  fas  one  of  the  first  activities  to  face  sv.ee 
reform  under  Secretary  McNamara.  As  stated  in  the  Issue  Paper,  two  broad  roles  u 
envisioned  as  centralized  production  of  all  military  intelligence  at  C3D  level,  a 
centralized  collection  management  through  control,  validation,  registry,  and  levy 
of  all  DQO  collection  requirements.  This  i=;as  a  big  order,  and  in  my  judgment  moj 
conducive  to  empire  building  than  it  v.as  to  the  saving:;  and  cost-cf fectiveness  i;h 
"tail-number"   management   at    the   top    -.'-as   supposed   to   bring    about. 
The  order  was   further  compounded  very   shortly,   hruwer,-  by  piling   all  manner 
.    resource  management   tasks  on  DIA's  back.      These  included  C.DIP   resource  manager, 
operation   of    the   attache   system  and   school,    functional   maneye^ent   of   all    D3D  nrppi 
j-.ncl  charting,   S&T   production,    photo   library  s-rvice,   policy   stuff   to   the  JC5 ,   and 
rl'i.r  manoo-vr   a-.d   :u':\:.nistr;:ti  v\   rv-_-r  '.~-:'j.~:   •  -■..'. '-.r--:,  ■■p';iv. .      !!■■    rii-iu.-.ry   ''issi'r.n.-.   •„:::
f-Uich    t:T    this    ,*  u-.'.i    »i-:'.  ri   cJk:i  •'_:•."!,    p.-.j.  tiy    :  hi.j'i'jli    ;••-.••:::,  -.-•:  ■..:."> :.  i  ;:>"••    of    Lr.-j   Uiue 
fiii/L'O.-i   r«::i  =  vl  ,    iirui  partly    Ihrouyi    In-   L,;:li!   ■:>\>.   ;-.uti    F  ::-:;i<,:i -•-•■!  •  .;.::v:ger:-;::t   j. r ;:■- 1 i. ';■,-: 
c;f   /V.iD    (!)•      The   best    example:-   are   separ..-.t  i  '-•:>   a-it    of   C'iA   ef  rapping   and  charting 
r-Oi;:>nnsibili  tic.;,    Eor.io    restructuring  of    schedu?  r::I  S.v-i'   product  inn.   effort    f.-hir-ii   alio 
nor,-,    flcxihil  i. ty   for  mat-Ling  Military   service   r equir •:?-: ^nts,    and  assumption  by  ASD.  ( 
of   general    intelligence   and.  SRV   resource  manaoenont   responsibility,      flora  can  be 
done,    in  r.iy   opinion,    toward  further  improvement. 
5 .      JOirJT    AGENCY  PHILOSOPHY   AMD  rsAHACEKclMT. 
It   is  ray  belief  that  within   the  period  since?  World  War   II    when   first   the 
Unification  of  Armed  Forces  and  later  the  Ager-.ies  for  Joint  Support  emerged,  Join 
or  Unified  Command  has   worked  better  than   have  most  of  the  Joint  Agencies.      I    feel 
this   is   so  because  the   joint   agencies  have  attempted  too  much,    and  a:n  convinced  it 
so   in   the  case  of  intelligence    (OIA). 
Generally   speaking   the  measures   for   redressing   this  imbalance  are   functional 
decentralization  of  collection,    specialized  analysis,    and  in   sovs  instances   resourc 
management   (a  good   deal   of  resource  management  has  already  bean  decentralized 
beneficially  as  noted  elsewhere). 
The  principles   of  management    for  accomplishing   further   decentralization   should 
include   executive  agencies,   counterpart   production,    and  bath  closer  cooperation  and 
formalized  interdependences  at   the  top    (DIA,   Service   Intelligence  Chiefs,   and  JCS 
as   recommended  in   the   following  paragraphs). 
6-      DIA   VIS-A-VIS  MILITARY  SERVICE!    IMELi.ir^r'iM  rjCcD^. 
Any   attempt   to   sort  out   DIA-3ervicu   Intelligence   relationships   and  intarfece^ 
•  should  begin   with  an   examination  of  what    the  military  .-services   requirements   should 
be.      I    have   sor.;e   rather  strong   vie-as  on    this  which   tie  d"!  rcr.tiy   to   the  Unified 
Co— and  Plan   and  the  Unified  Action   for  Armed  Foi-cns  paper-..      Thvso   ti;a   fu:»c!>.--e.^t-:i 
;•..':.• !  Ic.i.'.i  c: 
j --jj-i.-'icnt   the   ,;e.\!-:-.-.ti  •..•:'  -en"'    f 
A
|;;--.!sc;'ih'.'d  hy  lav;  in  thr:  Un>.f'i;:;:Licir:  Acts  of  rVAY  ai.-:!  iv'.O .   I  •'■  •'•'/  opinion  the:,o 
c;;:  ;:.,::;i(.:;  i!:\>  ton  often  [i-irl  (•;«'  y  1  i  ;■  service  by  th-.?  av*.-;-;--;..-  :t  :f  i  jjI  r-.r.r  ;«ti-  ;:.-,ri 
rc»u.ard::d  either  v:ith  ignorance  c>;-  an  at  tit  tic'::  of  t.ir .  i  r.-..  i;j ;  
- 1,  v  -  -..-.  -i . 
Strictly  r.oo.tklr.g,  and  if.  accu:.  ;k:rr:o  til  Lr:  the' o  do:.*-  .-.c  ;;L  '■ ,  ton  roles  of  th.- 
military  services  are  ones  of  supporting  the  Unified  and  ['.pi::: if led  Commanders  in  tr 
respunsibilities  of  operating  the  military  form-;.  These  support  functions  are  be: 
caily  the  classical  anos  of  training  and  logistical  nature.  They  include  bvarythin 
which  contributes  to  the  production  and  maintenance  of  u:ell-trained  and  u-ell-equipp 
forces  to  meet  the  defense  readiness  and  corr.betar.t  responsibilities  of  the  operator 
The  Unified  and  Specified  Commanders  and  Their  Component  Commanders.,  They  do  not 
include  operational  responsibilities  except  insofar  as  they  apply  to  individual  and 
unit  training.  ...  •  ■ 
I  believe  that  strict  interpretation  of  Service  rules  and  missions  could  thus 
form  the  basis  for  radical  changes  in  the  intelligence  requirements  u;hich  the  ss-rvij 
claim  today,   f'lost  real-time  sensitive  data  would  ba  unnecessary;  there  would  be 
questionable  need  for  service  alignment  of  attaches  and  other  ri^'UNT  resources,  no 
need  for  much  of  the  detailed  analysis  which  the  services  say  is  so  vital  to  them  a 
services,  and  a  reduction  in  scope  of  most  every  type  of  intelligence  effort  except 
possibly  S&7V  The  original  efforts  toward  centralization  of  defense  activity  in 
the  eauiy  60s  adopted  a  blueprint  for  intelligence  management  u;hich  seemed  gensrall 
based  on  this  reading,  yet  curiously  none  of  the  cost-effective-ess  experts  vdth 
u:hich  the  SEXDET  surrounded  himself  seemed  to  grab  the  UCP  as  a  "near-perfect" 
justification  for  their  actions. 
I  do  not  propose  sweeping  changes  in  the  DI A -Service  intelligence  relations 
because  of  this  strict  reading,  but  do  urgently  propose  that  all  planners  keen  tha 
UCP  £nd  the  UN'AAF  in  mind—to  beccr.o  better  cledents  of  thasa  fund-mental  document 
~-;  •;-..   .■■-:;-:':.  {•;•  C.-r    \   -.\  v:u-.-t-  a  v/  other 
ir.  any  fd. 
1:12." 
„._..,  .1   ..  F  i  -,r       -  1  :
tiil:;..::y    (» •:•:«'•:  5  no,.       IL    i'-.   «■•'/   r.!>v;':i-v.-«licj:i    lit.:'.:    3  .•;■:!:    of    xnM-  '.  '-.' y-    : -id    vi^l:!    ;"oe    lh:;. 
c!-;    i'  M-.^it :.    •  ::    t;i:it'!    i:r,i  v'M.  .nl     in    ni  1  i.  t:.:ry   ;.::.:.  !:.:.-•!  ,    ji>:-t    •'■'•'■    \  •■■'■'■'<    of    '-'.f.-.r.-.lvti-.y.i    i  :■.:' 
r--:-.;::'c:t    for    the  Const  i  Uition    and   D.;;j  ;;n\i.  i  <ki   :;:"    Ir.di-p'-.-,-:.;.;.:;':    is    al -:r-mir.-r:ly    li!Ckir.» 
on    the    p.:vl    of    the   average    voter. 
I    do   propose  changes   in  OIA/Servicer.   re.U-'.ionsb Lps,   h'j:,-::ucr,    that   arc  believed 
p.ol    to   fall    under   the   heading  of  "tinkering." 
In   attempting   to     parlay    "the  law/'   of   the  iXP   arid  the  U.'.'AAF    to    the  honest 
reality  of  how   things  should  work-- and  associated  requirements~I   believe   there,  arc 
tvso   considerations  of  overriding   importance  to   remember.     Tha   first   is   that   each 
Service  Chief  is  a  member  of   the  JCS,   and  as  such  he  does  have   very   definite  operat- 
ional   responsibilities   since  the  JC3   is   the  immediate  governing  body  of   the  Unified 
and  Specified  Commanders.      These   responsibilities  are   recognized   to   be  of   specialis 
character   respectively   for  air,    sea,    and  ground  matters — and  are   fundamental   to    th 
^       fabric   of  balanced  homogeneity  of   the  highest  military  tribunal    reporting   directly 
to   the  Secretary  of  Defense. 
The   second  consideration  is   that  of   the  Service-oriented  components  cf   the 
Unified  Commends.      These  are  of   the   same   fabric  ,   and  are  by  design  uni-sarvice 
extensions   cf   tha  unified  action  envisioned   for   tha  Unified  Co.".mands.      They  depend 
on   their  associated  service   for  many  things  i.hich  contribute  directly   to   their 
operational    mission  effectiveness,    to  include  detailed  intelligence  end  analysis. 
The  question  then   seems   to   bo  whether  there   is  a  batter  way   to   ser-vc   these 
Service-oriented  responsibilities— which,  are  in  accord  with    che   CCP— thsn   exists 
tcdey,    and   if   so  hoi)   they  can   be  accomplished  in  the   deteil    required  uith  a  minimc- 
■  of   resource-consuming   duplication. 
One  ill?.:.*,   that   offers  much  promise   to  me  is  that  of  d .:-•    roles   for  Service 
ir.fr-rrlirr.ncc  chiefs.      Each  c:ould  be  a  deputy  director  of  D!AS    and  share  with   the 
--.:..    ..,rr    -,..■-.    ,:...T-;r,-'.  .-.,-,    :-:;-■  .--.:.1;' !  :  •.■•■-.    i'V.-    *r.c   wUhir.   '■■  <~    i/star..      C:vl^p:T-
..,  .  ...  ......  .  ......  ii.-...  .•  :.  «-'.!  \  
::■■'■:     it:-.:  .»?-.■;■•./ 
j.  
a  OS  ;::>  :j 
,,;;•:.,•;  of  prlnr:i;i;il  support  t.o  01  A  it.}--.  t?i=:  :.-/-.!  <  ■;    «-.--« M  :■-.- r  ;.!:->.  If  t.k-p-,v.-i'  f.:.  a  Iu:,s 
{";>;  rvl  r/od  basis  of  f-wju'Mli  on.   I  i~s:.-.:..:;-..--.-.:fid  i,  I  .*  »*f  i-jl  y  It.:'     '-hi.::  ho  d;:.?,  and  lr.-;l| 
aftor  establishing  the  principle  u    study  graop  h.-  funned  '-••  d-:.  :m -iine  the  dolails 
h:>','  best  to  accomplish  tho  object  ivo:;  of  true  in!:  •.•oration  of"  th-j  [>r;!>  intel).i.ge.-iCe 
system  without  exacerbating  the  Flexibilities  th^t  nust  ho  preserved.   TI12  UCP  an: 
the  UilAA'r'  should  serve  as  appropriate  guidon  in  establishing  the  procedures  which 
apply.  * 
7.   DIA  A>.'D  TH£  JOINT  STAFF. 
Tha  arrangement  whereby  the  Director,  DIA  is  also  the  J-2  is  outstanding.  I 
not  know  how  well  the  Chairman  and  the  other  rce.ribers  of  the  JCS  take  advantage  of 
this  in  shaping  rcqui rements  and  effecting  inter-service  coordination — as  well  as 
defense  intelligence  policy — but  it  is  rcede  to  order,  and  I  hope  this  t~o-wey 
7j   influence  is  being  exercised  to  overall  national  advantage.   This  errsngomsnt  is  f 
in  accord  with  the  recommendation  made  above  that  Service  intelligence  chief's  be 
appointed  deputy  directors,  DIA.   Service  intelligence  chiefs  •j.-ould  thus  serve  the 
respective  service  chiefs  of  staff  both  in  th-3  service  roie  and  tha  JCS  role. 
8 •   THE  DZfrrS.Z   IfiTELLIC^iCg  SCARP. 
General  Graham  received  praise  fro.-;i  all  Service  intelligence  chiefs  for  his 
action  in  revitalizing  the  Die.  It  tws  pointed  out  that  he  holds  regular  weekly 
meetings,  other  nonscheduled  meetings  as  required,,  and  thst  he  allows  only  the 
principc'-ls  to  attend  (no  datu-shuf flers  or  backer-uppers  allo^c).  Apparently  thi: 
u.as  a  much-needed  procedure  in  order  to  stimulate  tcp-lovcl  understanding  and  truss 
•and  I  support  the  wisdom  of  such  a  move  with  utmost  enthusiasm. 
9 .   CGLtr.CTirj.-J. 
In   the  course  of  recent  discussions  •  I  gained  the  impression  that  ths  defense 
cz.-    .in  icy  r-'j,ir:iv].  1.  y  r  ?-*;-v.  :.'.  or...i  i..-*  -  •   --      •-•  •   ■-■•-  '     ...  .  »..  -.^  »-*.  -  ........
mvr.i::.   of    if-.-f  >•;»-.«•    iiitel  1  J.f;on';e.       i    p1  :.:;   t j  -. i  r .---.-!    (.;-;••■    •■  r.x.t •.■;:.: ^izs:i    that    r.'::c: 
j  : .    f  til  t     i'.:    in!    in   nn'"i-    in   both    (if    t!:;:*;«:    c.c;  .  >'.:  L;  •'.ti!.:..      S'':v»i.t.':   c'j'.v:v..\-iL'_,    irdic.:t-.-d 
Lh-tt  the  c  ■.-.'iitfc'1  i:\;  t  in;i  of  r<H;"!*.r  ccmti . :  i  ;:.'■.•;!  ;-.i;;. lysis  ]i:ft.  an  uneasy  fc.-el  i.rj  thai 
all  k^A-pri-duoed  iilt'.KiV  analyses  u;;;ra  not  bain;;  Mad.:  avai  Iwble  for  service  use,  ar 
that  thert;  was  no  i:ay  for  sure  of  knowing  i.Iiai  i.v::.  not-  being  n=ade  available.   I  he 
not  formed  specific  conclusions  or  opinion:;  on  v.hat  corrective  caasures — if  any- — i 
in  order  hero — but  do  agree  that  there  in  a  degree  of  autonomy  in  flSA  that  is  pots 
tially  unhealthy;  that  more  SIGIfJT  analyses  should  be  performed  by  the  OIA  and  th; 
military  services;  and  that  other  controls  and  crossfeeds  could  improve  the  quick 
availability  of  vital  SIGIMT  intelligence  to  all  service  user  needs.   Recommend  li 
be  qiven  a  particular  examination.  ' 
The  Defense  Attache  system  is  believed  to  need  so;ne  overhaul.  The  first  and 
"?\    most  vital  fault  is  the  policy  u.hich  requires  that  the  Defense  Attache  be  the  sen: 
■J* 
.     in  military  rank  amongst  all  assigned  service  attaches  at  that  station.   I  believ; 
that  this  policy  should  be  abolished,  end  that  the  officer  best  qualified  for  the 
job  be  assigned  irrespective  of  his  date  of  rank  relative  to  that  of  the  other 
attaches.   The  policy  in  question — insofar  as  can  be  determined — stems  from  the  t: 
honored  military  custom  that  in  any  military  office  or  function  the  nan  who  has  bs 
in  grade  the  longest  of  those  in  the  highest  grade  present  is  the  boss.  This  cus 
is  believed  to  have  largely  eutlived  its  usefulness,  and  particularly  so  as  it  as; 
to  the  management  of  attache  affairs. 
Another  Defense  MLJMIMT  change  which  I  recommend  concerns  chain  of  command. 
.1  believe  that  attaches  should  be  assigned  to  the  theater  ccmmaridars  (CI,\Cs).  Th 
are  at  least  three  arguments  ';;hich  r:ako  this  attractive.  The  first  is  the  CIi'IC- 
Aribassr.dsr  relationship.   It  is  necessarily  a  closa  sne  if  things  work  as  they  ?.?. 
Allhauah  the/  ca-.*:-  :.v.    .In  diffnro.it  era- a-  a-v5  •.  ;.  i
'prr-.""-i!':v;:."    ;\:*.il    t\  ■ .:-.;-  -p'  ■:;>". ,    ?.::-:;     f  :".i  j':f:  t  \  vi.--. :    i :;    ■.;-.■  "vi  :-.ij    In-   r:v  I  :".-•.-,.-•>    c;iiu'.-:    5,  ■  :•/«.•   r:u::;i 
:n    ,'i.:."on,       TtKiy   Ii-'.vi.-    ;:   cor;*.>n  ;  mi  :    r.'-.pp'i  v  l  . 
TJu:    jitl.-.che    s-.tvi.-;.    th?:v,   i>;:';:.       Hi  v.   prodi^i'.ri    r,ho;dii   \-.,:    .-;v.: :.  !.-.';l  r:    Id    both 
tiiLC;ii;;h    established   c:or.-:r.unicati-:::ri   p::;:ctir:o.    ;::•=■.!    the   information   collected   y.hich    is 
vital    ;:nd    time-sen:,  i  Li  va   at    the   fvCA   level    will    n-L    there   just   as    font   a.-.d  v;e;ll-sery- 
if   not    faster    in   so-.e   caser.--;.,M  In   tins  al  io-imcnt   as    ih    dues   nov;   through   the  DA7T    • 
office  of   the  DIA.      Moreover,    it   will    eliminate  the  CITJCs  sometimes  being  bypassed 
with   valuable   information  cr   intelligence   from  this   source. 
The  second  advantage  of   this  managerial  change  pertains   to   the   very   important 
representational   aspects  of   the   attache  profession,      it  could  be  better  served  in 
my  opinion   if  attaches   were  assigned  to   the  Unified  Commands. 
The  third  advantage  of  this  change  uould  be  that  promotional   equity  should  be 
enhanced.      (Promotion   boards  pay  a  lot  more  attention  to   effectiveness   ratings 
written  or   indorsed  by  a  Unified  Commander   thsn   they  do   to   those  of   the  DIA  Attache 
Chief.) 
The  overall   benefit   here  is  the  liberation  of  a   requirement   to   be  of  high 
seniority  in   grade  to  qualify   for   the   full    spectrum  of  attache   responsibility — and 
hence  a  step   through  proven  performance   toward  bigger   jobs  in  or  out  of  intellige.-c 
specialties.      Together  with  an   enlightened  attitude  by  service  chiefs  end  promotion 
boards   toward  "intelligence   types,"    this  would  do  much  to   eliminate   the  unpopularit 
of  intelligence   (and  especially  attache)    assignments  on   the  part  of  ambitious  and 
broadly   talented  officers. 
10.  SPECIAL  IZED  CQLLECTirr;   r-sgtiPCES. 
3y  and  large   these  should  be  operated  and  managed  by  the  ciJitary   services, 
t.-ith  overall   policy   and  operational   control   being   exercised  by   the  A50   (I). 
11.  ANALYSIS   AND  ESTK-ATfS.
g.      Of  iic:c  r_»r!^;:!!i;rr:  of  IV!  A.      ?:-.i;.!  o •.  \: •:;   t'  c    r-.i^lir.y  of  the 
product   will   imp  ro  vc    :>.-sri'.(  t  •  •.•id    r-.:^.-. ::!  i<>  i    *'•■-.-    I  )•/•..       !'    :..   ;»or:  *,;:>!.■.;   -  - 
cVlti  prohibit-   --    thai  increasing  emp::  .;-  is  f.:s  r-i:1.':;;-   "L»:: '.'..•  1  "  penpb: 
a;;:;i;;i!..:c!   to   DIA   will  be   count'.- rprodv.clive,    ;> ;.    i»    \:^:tr.' -.:   '_',  ceiu:p:.;:'J :»: 
searching  for  management  ,-'.rr? ngem.  r .'.«■.  that   icvici:   f  rui-tralioris, 
bureaucratic  procedural  nonsense  and  similar  «-.  i '.:;».;  r;  t3  that   reduce 
the  viability  of  any  organization,    including  the   DJA.      This  is  not  a 
chicken-and-egg  situation  in  my  view. 
To  these  issues  I  would  adc!  the  following: 
a.     Achieving  a  batter  balance  in  the  Intelligence  Community. 
A  great  deal  of  effort  goes  iatohardv/are  and  into  what  the  community  terms 
"bean  counting",    i.e.    data  base  correction,    and  not  enough  into  supporting 
tactical  commanders.     Technical  intelligence  is  largely  consumed  within 
the  intelligence  community.     The  emphasis  on  tactical  application  and 
tactical  priority  of  intelligence  collection,    analysis  and  distribution 
should  be  increased  relative  to  that  given  technical  application.     When 
new  systems  are  being  considered,    and  older  systems  being  updated, 
tactics.1  needs  must  be  ascertained  and  exploitation  and  timeliness  of 
product  must  be  assessed  most  carefully  in  order  that  the  total  system 
is  responsive  to  tactical  needs. 
At  the  close  of  our  last  meeting  you  asked,   "What  kind  of  a  job 
does  military  intelligence  do  to  be  responsive  to  SccDef?     Can  DIA  be 
structured  to  do  that  kind  of  job?".     You  spoke  of  the  need  for  improving 
professionalism  of  the  operation,    asked  what  kind  of  product  was  needed 
and  how  responsive  should  it  be.      These  views  are  submitted  in  response 
to  those  questions. 
1  am  attaching  to  this  letter  a.  "Statement  of  Surveillance  Require- 
ments  for  Fleet  Ta.ctical  Support",    which  I  prepared  for  use  in  improving 
the  understanding  of  National  level  sensor  system  authorities  of  fleet  needs- 
It  describes  more  specifically  some  of  the  views  e:-:pr^^  =  ad  abjve. 
Vcrv  respect:-.;!''-". 
■a  v ;  Ct  x.\.  r  c  n  f.  r  e .-;  \>  r«  / 
I  -Attachment    f 
Attachment     is  properly  classified  ,    per  EO  11652,   due 
to    the  intelligence  sources  and  methods  described  in  the  contents  of  the 
enclosure,   thus    exempt  per  5JTJ.SC.  {l}  .classification  and  (3)  sources 
and*  methods.
k  lh:s    i  :.    ;:   hie;    r.ub  joe'.    In    •..■•>:  I    i;uL    i:.i;.h    -.::•;;-;•:•■.  I    le   •;[  /.  ■■;.■.-•;  v  i r: i;    Vi:l :: !.  •'  ,,,,._ 
c:!ii'.:!iy    I.'.--:!-'?    a    fiw:    l.i:i":i--;i!.';    and    I  <V:(;:;im:;;k:  .-'.  i  :r.  .    ibir:.1.    tc.vxh    0.;    i  '.  ,    hit    n-.-'    ;,         , 
it     further    before    f"t;r»l  j.h'i    (;!r-:l  if  i  ed    to    r.v;!:»:    •■•j-.u\    <\:.i,".'.-:.\     I  >•:.-,:..  ;:ui-.:.i :;;:  .    '  r<      .  ,. 
f:!vi   should  d:i   i;hat    and  how. 
A  few  brand  ob-.ei  cations  are,  hnvavo;-,  iri  order.   I!::.-  fi .'  r.t  concerns  i. ::'.',  ,,_,\ 
warning.   Must  Unified  and  Ccnpsnunt  Compandors  ha  v.* a  an  indisputably  vital  ne,;rj  To 
tactical  intelligence.   It  needs  to  be;  as  near  real-time  as  possible,  and  mush  of 
is  of  a  specialized  nature  as  regards  air,  ground,  and  nsvnl  operations.   It  is 
impossible  to  meet  these  needs  without  an  appreciable  structure  of  interpreters, 
analysts,  specialized  equipment,  and  resource  controls  directly  under  the  supsrvis 
and  control  of  the  commanders  concerned.  Direct  readout,  for  example,  of  certain 
sources  of  tactical  intelligence  is  vital  to  the  commanders  of  nuclear  strike  fore 
They  cannot  wait  for  layers  of  analysts  undsr  somebody  else's  control  to  produce 
'■)         estimates  that  are  fed  back  to  thorn  through  the  bureaucratic  or  reversa-flow 
command  processes.   This  is  not  to  say,  parenthetically,  that  improvements  could 
be  made  in  the  organization  of  the  command  structure  fci-  nuclear  forces  uhich  waul 
obviate  some  duplication  of  thsse  vitalities,  but  the  fact  regains  that  each  such 
commander  in  the  established  system  naads  it. 
I  believe  that  the  cutbacks  in  recent  yesrs  in  intelligence  resources  (prima: 
technical  specialists)  has  been  borne  too  heavily  at  tho  grass  roots  levsls  v.here 
this  type  of  intelligence  must  be  generated.  This  ir.  e'engercus,  and  apportionment 
resources  for  tactical  intelligence  needs  attention. 
Another  broad  observation  concerns  the  rciguireienr.  f  or  "prcd-scr  ic:,  at  the  tea. 
As  noted  earlier,  tha  fJC A  requires  good  intelligence,  tr.c!  it  must  csvor  t't-.u  "i.rterf 
subjectively.  Kovjevar,  I  would  doubt  that  the  amount  of  det--.il  -uat  '_,.;.  ;..-.  vatumi.-: 
as  nbs  traditionally  existod  in  modern"  ti :■:.-?-_;- -no r  th;:t  L!:e  c;u ---.nti  ti  ■;  s  of  sr;-~ci ::'.  i.-
•■••:.-:  ••.'.:  nr:   c.V    tUy.:i:nivi\\  I  y.c.zt  prod,  ict  •  c«f  t   .> :;    «;t.j.i.r.:! ;-.  t  ?:M    r-.-r.'    j.:-;;r  civ  .".••:'.       The    1;::_--.;    -,-■.    ■    • 
i 
data    fiT   ('lA,    n;;i/;;i[:,    W.SI,    v.u-A  ,'.r  I.*--    do    nji    i-rf.li-.:L    (r.T     th-;  Va  ..hinfjlcn    J«:v_-1)    t 
kinct   tiT    d-.-crntrrl  i  zing    LmricJ    that    I    heliuv^    to   ;•■:.-    ap::rop;-ii:'.-'---c::.pr  ci;;l }  y    in   basic 
pro duo  tion. 
12.     Su.-ofiiARv  o::srnvATin-;r;  amp  en  :c:i.u'iin:;n . 
a.      The  Director,   DIA   gnJ  cthor   top   defense:  intoilioencc  chiefs  shauld  not   be 
selected  under  a  primary  requircinant  of  long  experience  as  an  Intelligence  special! 
A   balance  at    the   top   echelons  of  successful   command  or  operational   manacrj.-nent  cxo?r 
ier.ee,    in  association  with  immediate  staff   specialists  of  extensive  intelligence 
experience,   is  the  best  combination. 
.'    b.     The  management  of  defense  intelligence  production  is  ovarcentralized,      A 
long-term  plan  for  decentralization  of  much  of  the  production  and  certain  resource 
-,      management   responsibilities  should  be  accomplished.      Generally  speaking,    tactical 
intelligence  and  S&T    should  be  given  priority  attention  in   this  effort;    and  also 
generally  speaking  DIA  should  provide  policy,  contingency  direction,   and  requirema 
jement. 
c.  In   the  process  of  decentralization  of  production,    to   include  warning  and 
estimates   (and  without  losing  necessary  control  of  procedure  and  requirements) ,    ths 
principles  of   executive  agency,    counterpart  producer,    and  closer  top-level   coordin^ 
should  be  given  prine   consideration. 
d.  N5A  should  perform  primarily  collection  of  SICI';T  and  CG.^Ii'JT,  and  asscciat 
deciphering  and  basic   interpretation.      Analysis  should  ret  be  an  ?!SA    function. 
e.  The  Defence  Attache  System  should  be  overhauled.  The  pslicy  that  the  0AT1* 
must  be  the  senior  attache  assigned  to  the  station  should  oe  e.li..-.5.n-:».Led:  end  attach 
officers  should  be  assigned  directly  to  the  Theatre  Cc.---:a.-der  cence cficd  rather  ihi«--» 
a   crr-tr^l    administrative  office  und.-u-    Lho  DIA.
f.       Gwii'rslly    j;:.:^iiv:,    Uk;   t..i)  i  L;t-/    :•. "  r-'/ica.-.    sfrm!  d   r.;;-  :  at'.-    vra.cia!  izrd 
jnl.c!  1  i  •";:••  r'-f*   cu1 .1  eccirti    vaitativa::; . 
(j.       1!k:    i-rraru,. :,-:.;!.    of    the;   Directc,  v,    Oif.    ::--ir:-^    alvj    J-'/    r>'     Lb:.-   .5r..i:.L   Staff    iu 
outstanding.       H    should  n-;t   be   changed. 
h.  The  ruviLylizittiof!  of  tfr;  Daft::.:;':  IntoUigen-c  H:iv. ^c:  cncL-r  (^TicTol  Grab:j.-:.- 
and  the  manner  of  conducting  its  business  f  reo  of  c»:rr,bi>r^o.-T!  detail— -is-  great.  Thi 
is   a   real    contribution   to   better  intelligence  n-jnagerrtcnt. 
i.      Tactical  Warning  is  a   requirement   which  must  be  supported  by  intelligence 
specialists   in   threat   analysis   and  estimates.      It  must  be  under   the  direct  control 
of   the  commanders   involved.      Recent  intelligence  manpower  cuts  have  reduced  these 
resources  to   a  dangerously  low  point. 
£ 
BRUCE   K.    KDLLQ.'iAY 
S~-r:^sc  <>;■
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Pn.-NStic::: 
K!ccl :  oin-:;'r:f*  i «.    5 
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Sunnyvale,    Ca!ifor;.ja     94086 
f;!-t.T.'.;   Laboratory 
Honorable  Albert  C.    Hall 
Assist.- nt  Secretary. of  Defense  (Intelligence) 
Department  of  Defense- 
Dear  Al: 
As  I  see  it,    the  principal  issue  confronting;  defense  intelligence 
today  is  how  to  make  marked  improvements  in  the  quality  of  the 
intelligence  product  within  the  obvious  constraints  on  funding.     I 
^  bslievc  that  the  collection  program  is  generally  in  good  shape  and 
in  particular,   the  recent  generation  of  exotic  technical  sensors  are 
doing  an  outstanding  job.     The  analytical  and  interpretative  effort  on 
the  other  hand  has  fallen  far  behind  to  the  detriment  of  the  ultimate 
produ' •«:.     I  believe  that  truly  significant  improvements  can  be  made 
in  our  intelligence  analysis  program  by  a  determined  effort  in  three 
areas: 
1.     Improving  professional  standards 
,  .2.     Improving  organizational  structure,    and 
3.     Improving  techniques 
I  will,  comment  briefly  on  each  of  these. 
1.     Improving  Professional  Standards 
1  believe  that  five  specific  steps  should  be  taken  to  improve  the 
professiona    standards  of  Defense  intelligence  analysts. 
a.     Establish  a  M.  S.    program  in  technical  intelligence  analysis 
to  supplement  the  M.  A.    programs  at  Monterey  Naval  Postgraduate 
School  and  the  Defense  Intelligence  School.      There  could  be  two  such 
programs;  one  at  Monterey  specializing  in  Computer  Analysis  of  Signal 
Data  and  Analysis  of  Electronic  Systems;  and  o::e  at  the  Air  Force 
Institute  of  Technology  specializing   in  Telemetry  Analysis  and  Analysis 
of  Aerospace  Systems.     Both  programs  should  be  open  to  civilians  and 
^  to  officers  of  all  Services.      I  also  suspect  thai  a  reappraisal  of  curricul 
and  academic  standards   may  be  in  order  for  lb.-  e>:;:;tin 
a 
•  P''     I'-  *  O"-  ?  —  «  v
b.  Improve  r;i  !•«.•!■:•   oppo:  1 1.:;  i! ;  •.■:..    for    tiv!!;:-.:..   ;;.->n   t.f  }'•«  f: «  r;    in 
llu-   iui.elli-.iKO  ar»::ly.-.i:i   f.urld.      A  I    Ft;::-:  ;.:•:    ;  l;»;:'iy   !.:.•.'"■'■   *:;.*-f  i  f  i .-; 
.-.uge.tstioa:.   cj:  i  w.-y:.   of  ;.c  con  ip!  i ..  hi::;;  t!.if.. 
C      Exempt    IM:\   from  Civil   Service    r i  ;-.i'.l .-.'. • ').-.-.,    ;■  f.   h  • '.  l>f-,-:;i 
done  with  NSA. 
d.      Establish  a  civilian  Drpuiy  Dirci.ior  in  D:A.      This,  Deputy 
could  bo  sptT.ific.iUy   responsible   for  Defense  irUc-ll  ig  c  -ncc  analysis. 
c.  Nurture  an  unequivocal  commitment  to  objectivity  of 
analysis  within  DiA. 
2.  Improving  Oreanizational  Structure 
a.  Establish  an  organizational  relation  between  DIA  and  the 
Service  intelligence  agencies  (FTD,   e.g.)  like  the  relation  between  NSA 
and  the  Service  cryptologic  agencies. 
b.  Broaden  the  role  of  the  Service  Cryptologic  Agencies  to 
..include  EEINT  and  Electronic  Warfare  (as  now  exists  at  ASA).     These 
aspects  of  their  charter  would  be  under  the  cognizance  of  the  Services 
v/hile  their  SIGINT  activities  would  remain  under  the  cognizance  of  NSA. 
3.  Imp7-oving  Efficiency 
a.  A  considerable  improvement  in  analysis  effectiveness  can  be 
achieved  by  making  much  broader  use  of  the  computer  as  an  analysis 
tool.     Generally  the  computer  is  already  being  well  employed  b-,  the 
technical  analyst  as  a  computation  tool  and  in  signal  analysis.      The 
general  intelligence  analyst,   however,   is  making  relatively  little  use 
of  the  computer  and  the  potential  for  improvement  is  enormous.     The 
applications  are  unglamorous  but  powerful:    data  storage  and  retrieval; 
automatic  indicators  of  a  change  of  state  in  collected  data;  synthesis  and 
comparison  of  data  from  diverse  sources;  and  comp-.tor-assisted  report 
writing. 
b.  A  considerable  improvement  should  be  nvide  in  communicating 
the  results  of  analysis  and  interpretation  and  i»  determining  the  needs 
of  consumers.      Bill  Beecher  has  addressed  th".5  issue   eloquently  a::d 
made  a  number  of  excellent  recommendations. 
?.
1  hope  these  ideas'  are  of  some  help  to  you.     I  will  be  happy     o 
elaborate  on  any  of  iheiri  as  you  desire. 
Sincerely, 
"William  J.    Perry 
,/.
v.'/,'.:  :i::e,';  ■.::.•.  '.,  ;:.     2 ;;',*>; 
]>■..•  c«  !.*»><:;•  IX,    ](;7-* 
MIOMOKANJHiM  FOR  DU.    HAM,    AS!)(I)    /-' 
SUBJECT:     Issues  for  JXfenst:  Pane!  on  Intelligence 
* 
I  would  like  to  comment  on  four  issvtcs  this  month: 
1.     Qualified  Personnel  -  My  investigations  confirm  your  presenta- 
tion on  the  quality  of  people  assigned  to  DIA»     That  is  partly  a  DIA 
problem  (attachment  A)  and  partly  a  problem  afflicting  all  defense 
agencies  (attachment  B). 
_    2.     Communicating  Intelligence  Output   -  Bill  Beecher  hay  outlined 
the  problem  very  well.     The  SecDef  might  wish  to  consider  an 
assistant  from  the  world  of  journalism  or  equivalent  to  help  hire 
put  intelligence  in  perspective  while  not  interfering  with  DIAs  proper 
role  (see  attachment  C). 
3»     Compartmentalization  vs.    Rer.l  Time  Needs  -  The  committee  seems 
•    to  be  in  agreement  that  action  i?.  necessary,   but  some  recommenda- 
tions are  attached  (attachment  D}0 
;    4.     COMSF.C  vs.   SIGINT  -  Our  operators'  desire  to  provide  COMSEC 
to  friends  and  allies  runs  afoul  of  the  SIGINT  community.     The  need 
to  develop  some  policy  in  this  regard  might  be  considered  in  January. 
Thomas  C,    Reed 
4  Attachments
/•l'.,-c:::i:.ei/.   /. 
Qu.'.lii'j.-.-s    irl'.:l'il'f:u:i:    ]'V  r;.c..>::'.vl.  (:.*:!  it. t  -  >") 
a 
Problcrn   -•  The;  mleUsgi-isce  <;<>::«:;:■::  :'\    tU'iL-.u  not  : •;-:■  ■•;  r  to  j/.et  its 
        fa  is  •  sh-irt    of  the  best  qu;.l  i  ;u-d  office  ;:.. 
J)ii|CU!'.:'.!OM 
Qualification  within  the  intelligence  field  is  obtained  by  participating 
in  a  well  designed  career  development  pattern  with  good  balance 
between  a  variety  of  intelligence  assignments  and  attendance  at 
specialised  schools  both  Service  and  civilian.     The  caliber  of  officers 
within  the  intelligence  field,   in  relation  to  other  officers  in  the 
Service,    can  generally  be  determined  by  observing  their  rate  01 
promotion  and  their  selection  for  Service  schools  ' 
An  analysis  of  these  criteria  indicates  that  the  intelligence  community 
does  not  get  its  fair  share  of  the  best.quaiified  officers  in  the  senior 
grades,   and  none  of  the  services  has  sufficient  career  trained  O-os 
and  up  to  fill  their  most  critical  intelligence  requirements. 
Recommendation        :  .  "  •  • 
1.  ,  Military  departments  should  be  directed  to  initiate  programs  to 
assure  that  colonels/captains  and  general/admirals  are  thoroughly 
■  trained  in  Service  Intelligence  career  fields  and  that  promotion-.quotas 
are  provided  to  the  career  trained  officers  to  fill  the  important  posi- 
tions.    Current  practice  of  placing  untrained  officers  in  these  positions 
i    should  be  stopped..    .       • 
2.  OSD  should  establish  a  panel  chaired  by  DIA  to  make  a  detailed 
evaluation  of  the  Intelligence  career  development  pattern  in  the  Service; 
and  recommend  minimum  standards  required  to  assure  qualified  senior^ 
•  officers  are  available  to  fill  joint  billets. 
3.  Navy  and  Air  Force  Intelligence  officer;;  should  be  provlced.a  fair 
share  of  Senior  Service  School  selection  zvA  Senior  Joint  lntellicer.ee 
positions  should  require  this  schooling.      (Army  appears  to  be  doing 
this.)
Qualified  jvlili!:.  ry   )  V:  r:  o:.:i«:l    5-.-    D  ■■''•:i::t.    .'.;.-.  ;.,:;- :. 
l'roMcm   -   'I  '::•.■  Service."   gene  v-rll^    ro  isot   .■;:•■:.-•  v.;i:;-  ;.  01    v.\A<-  l-'> 
assign  their   more  i  •  !•.  :i!  «-d  o!f  •<.«• ;  s  10  d  off  .■:.;•:.  a g <;:.'.  i e : :  j.uclt  a-;   DfA. 
Discus;:- ion 
Analysis  by  the  Defense  Intel"!  igence  Panel   siaff  s.h-,'.7N  th.-it  promotion 
and  selection  for  schooling  are  generally  lower  in  }Y- A  than  in  the 
Services  as  a  whole.     A  similar  analysis  performed  by  a  subcommittee 
of  the  House  Armed  Services  Committee  a  few  years  ago  revealed  the 
same  problem  then  within  DCA. 
In  the  case  of  communicators  a  solution  has  been  to  show  young  officers 
a  visible  route  to  flay  rank  within     their  specialty  and  to  adopt  a 
•'positive  action"  program  to  upgr?-de  their  technical  skills. 
On  the  other  hand,  turbulence  and  an  attempt  to  over-diversify  some 
officers  may  have  been  counter-productive. 
Conclusions 
1.  The  ASD/M&RA  should  examine  what  penalties  ar.cl  incentives  can 
be  imposed  on  the  Services  to  insure  at  least  pro-rata  assignment  of 
good  officers  to  joint  duty.     (i\To  flag  rank  without  a' "purple  suit"  tour?) 
2.  The  Services  should  consider  a  policy  of  careers  with  a  "major" 
combat  specialty  and  a  well  identified  "minor"  in  which,  an  officer 
becomes  proficient:     communications,   intelligence,   r.uclear  weapons, 
ADP,   the  Mid  East,    etc.     The  "minor"  should  not  become  diversified 
short  of  flag  rank.
Co;n:i)un'uv. t ing  J*.-. t c  ! !i ge ;;c e  Oui :» .: ! 
Problem        A   ir.cjiniugf'.^    ;::-..-Uy  :>I.-".  of  i::'v!!:^;:r:-  ck'.-     rarely  :;i^:er:  its 
way  ir.f.o  the  consciousness  or  <-.,.r  key  cu.ci  s:io:s-  ;:i;:!-l:.g  ci:  stoir.ors. 
I>i:i  cushion 
Almost  all  of  our  customers  arc  turr.ee!  off  by  "snippets  of  information, 
without  perspective"  and  "briefings  fro  in  a  script.  "    This  is  not- a  new 
problem  in  modern  society.     Weekly  newsmagazines  grew  up  to  meet 
the  need  for  a  perspective  on  the  daily  torrent  o£  news.     If  there  is  a 
real  crisis,    the  leadership  may  well  turn  tc  CBS  or  the  Washington 
Post  for  the  quickest  and  best  analysis  of  all  but  hard  SIGINT/PHOTIN' 
data.     Beechcr  has  detailed  this  problem  very  well. 
When  it  comes  to  analyzing  essentially  political  news  (What  is  Sadat 
up  to?     Will  the  embargo  work?  )  should  military  intelligence  specialist 
really  be  doing  the  analysis?     Or  are  they  out  of  their  field? 
Conclusion 
We  might  try  a  variant  of  Beecher's  "wise  men,"  namely  a  staff 
assistant  to  the  SecDcf  and  DopSscDcf  with  the  following  attributes: 
1.  ATSD,   GS-18  NEA  rank  with  no  staff  except  a  military  assistant 
drawn  from  DIA  and  a  secretary. 
2.  Successful  journalism, analytic,    or  political  background. 
3.'    No  resource  management,    action  officer  responsibility.     Only 
duty  to  listen,    read,    sort,   appraise,   and  brief  the  SecDcf,   perhaps 
in  lieu  of  the  military  assistant  doing  so  as  at  present,   but  with  the 
•latter  present. 
4.  Authority  to  tas^  DIA  and  to  add  specialists  in  the  event  of  a. 
•  Crisis..    A  responsiomiy  >.o  provide  ieedback  on  Socfio;.  ir-tci-e $•'..$  to 
'DIA. 
5.  Not  a  roadblock  to  DCI,    Dir.    DIA,   or  A5D(l). 
6.  Authorised  to  establish  non-government;;-.!  source.-:,  f  ;:>:;^:.;plo: 
oil  production  cmd  transport  executives  in  the  ---vr-nt  of  "-.•*.  c:v.c?r;-o; 
bankers  i:'  ■■;v.-:-co::o:y:\c  c~: .-.-:-.:  .  >
/  I  >„«.«!'..  i  -I  !  II    «•  L      •-  ' 
Ccn jp;tr'.'n:M:t:(lii-.a!.io;i  v:..    J l«: ;;  1  Jj '!::>:•  I\eo'h- 
Problem   -   TIm*  "gnon  di>';r"  will   c  rc-atc   sons.;  very  cHlsci]    O'  probler: 
in  the  next  fcv.'  years.     Opi:r«Uor-.-.  f'or:'t  kr.ov.  l:o\v  U>  as'-,  the   rif'.nt  ques- 
tions.    Automatic  r. y .*•- 1  eti mi  are  pr.r hided  from  dircc.  iriteracthm. 
Options  require  real-time  tar.kin:-;  of  intelligence  a:.::ets. 
Discussion  . 
The  current  system  of  compartmentali'/.ation  places,  an  emphasis  on 
protection  of  sources  that  may-  not  be  warranted,    especially  in  a  crisis. 
Sources  must  be  protected,    and  the  problems  o£  muiti-level  security 
in  ADP/telecom  systems  means  that  separate  channels  may  be  neces- 
sary.    But  limited  releases,    slow  distribution,    "spoon  feeding"  o£ 
users,   all  delay  command  center  operations.     Intelligence  should  be 
produced  for  use  in  decision-making,   not  remote  historical  records. 
Conclusions 
1.  National  policy  ">n  safeguards  at  the  operations  interface  should  be 
re-examined  en  a  cystern-by- system  basis. 
i 
2.  Users,   and  the  CliNiCs  in  particular,    should  have  a  voice  in  task- 
ing "the  intelligence  assets. 
i 
3.  Data  should  be  distributed  to  them  in  real  time. 
4.     R&D  in  ADP/tei'e communications  multi-level  security  should  be 
vigorously  supported,.
i  2  DI-C  137-1 
Dr.    Albert  C.    Hall 
Assistant  Secretary  of  Defense 
(.Intelligence) 
Washington,    D.    C.     2030 1 
Dear  Al: 
My  purpose  in  writing  ttiis  letter  is  to  set  forth  some  views 
regarding  our  Intelligence  Panel  discussions  thus  far  in  the  hope  that 
they  will  be  of  use  in  our  further  considerations. 
I  think  it  is  possible  to  enunciate  some  general  propositions  of 
fundamental  nature  regarding  intelligence.     We  are  all  concerned 
regarding  production  and  distribution  of  intelligence  which  is  not  of  use 
in  arriving  at  decisions,   hence  is  an  impediment  in  that  it  imposes  delay 
and  diversion  of  attention.     These  general  propositions  are  useful  in  my 
view  in  identifying  most  needed  intelligence,    among  other  things,    and, 
consequently,    in  prioritizing  intelligence  collection  and  distribution.    I 
have  in  mind  time  sensitive  intelligence,   however,    the  views  are  also 
pertinent  in  considering  the  issues  circulated  in  your  letter  of 
8  November. 
The  quality  and  utility  of  intelligence  is  very  dependent  on  the 
attitudes  and  outlook  of  the  Commander  being  served,   and  how  he  uses 
intelligence  in  his  day-to-day  conduct  of  affairs.     The  functioning  of 
the  intelligence  organization  depends  upon  achieving  a  close  association  and 
J    intimate  relationship  between  the  intelligence  structure  and  those 
•    dependent  upon  intelligence  in  exercising  command  and  management 
at  all  levels  in  order  to  perform  their  tasks  efficiently.     When  this 
relationship  exists,    the  exchange  of  information  that  helps  identify 
intelligence  needs  on  the  one  hand  and  its  availability  on  the  other 
substantially  improves  the  performance  both  of  "operators"  and  those 
charged  with  providing  intelligence.     Without  this  exchange,    the  intelli- 
gence officer  and  his  organizational  support  find  it  quite  difficult  to 
target  resources  to  greatest  advantage  and  to  identify  needed  intelligence. 
Those  charged  with  management  of  our  day-to-day  affairs  of 
military  significance  are  concerned  with  a  continuous  assessment  of 
the  significance  of  unfolding  events  that  relate  to  their  force  posture.
Thci'"-:   C(!.-.ir};cci  v/ ith  col  \>.-.c'.  \v:\,    ait;'.  !y  .■■•:;  nu<!   p:  '.■:.'.:.- v.  -;- 3  '.«••  e.r  »:•. for  .'nation 
f;>.    !:••:•    a:;r.c::.s;nonL   muui.  J'O   !;:iowi  :d;.f:d»:  •:   ;::,!   cr-'j    i  !:;;•■  :i!  ::>;;  Lh-: 
.-:,cc;.;!c:    c:o:>ce;;is  oC  "  ;i\;i.i\;:«c.r;:cu:" ,    or  "Co- ,;:;    a  •-'."  ,    b-.L  •'.!  ;o  of  lb-.: 
«.o_"-i:  ;.'»ii:  vu;oi.  that  might  he-   mnde  of  ih^  itsier  r:;  \'.'>,.>:\  v.-!i'':.i  jiroi.^x!. 
Much  decisions  as  collection  tasking,    priorities  of  cove-rag*:  ;.n:5    ir eat men-. 
(\ilV,    assessed  or  relatively  r?,w]   of  nf.-^cic-rl  information  are  dependent 
f-iO'.-.  fully  understanding  the  customer  needs.      hi  this   regard,    a  guideline 
question  .is,    "What  is  the  character  of  change.  lakiu;:;  place-  and  what  do      . 
these  changes  -.ir.rtend? 
Responsible  commanders  of  military  forces  continuously  conduct 
analytical  efforts  (not  alwasy  sufficiently  formalised  or  emphasized)  to- 
discern  changes  in  normal  patterns  of  operations  by  potentially  hostile 
forces  that  portend  heightened  danger,   in  order  to  initiate  approoria^2 — '•  ( 
operational  responses,    including  augmentation  o£  surveiilanc&r-^^lia-fSfci- 
_\  g.ve"l  ^t-e  rr  so-rs-J  r?- r  e—o-*  * = s-c  a  p  a-ol  e  -o  £~c  o  I L  e  c  t 
- vit-11--  Ir:rj  Jj*'£r.t'  Lsj^?-r'"'^tn-.^    nat^aJd^qf^tJ^ces^^ri^ 
-g-uuf.il  .cIj-i  fcj  fo^ie  >:r>v>ru;--r:de<i>?jf<The  uses  to  be  made  of  this  intelligenc 
include  a  variety  of  operational  responses  that  are  in  general  quite  defina? 
and  include  force  positioning,   alert  ar.d  warning  and  cover,   deception  and 
jamming,   in  exercising  a  degree  of  control  of  the  electronic  environment 
in  order  that  a  commander  can  avoid  disaster  in  a  surprise  situation  and 
transition  to  active  combat  in  good  condition. 
Thus  the  second  rhetorical  question,    "What  are  the  targets?" 
Analytical  efforts  continuously  conducted  by  force  commanders  also 
underlie  derivation  of  targets,   assignment  of  target  priorities  and 
determination  of  character  and  scale  of  strike  effort  required  at  the 
outset  of  an  outbreak  of  hostilities.     Quite  obviously,    a  force's  survi- 
vability is  dependent  upon  wise,    quick  and  effective  initial  action.     ..- 
Obviously,    commanders  must  think  through  in  advnace  the  situations 
they  may  face.  '  They  cannot  respond  to  best  advantage  by  innovation 
under  pressure  of  events. 
Three  corollaries  derive  from  the  above.     One  is  that  the  intelli- 
gence function  is  not  complete  with  the  delivery  of  information.     Rather, 
.it  must  be  viewed  as  being  interactive  v/ith  other  factors,    such  as 
conditions  of  readiness  and  character  of  activity  of  own  forces,    directive: 
from  higher  authority  and  specific  sets  of  possible  responses  r.v?.i;- 
able  to  the  commander,    including  deception,   jamming  ?nd  weapons 
?. 
/Pr»*r  *,-  t#l  Dam***  &>* '
applications;  all  of  which   itnssl  he   co:  rol.;  (•..(! ,    pm-  •  :.:>«.f!  ;.ti'J  til  r  ;>!>.\  «:f; 
for  command  decision.      *j  >\<:  adequacy    »?  in;<: !  1 1:**:  .■•«_■*;  v.j'.i«    iv-suec  t  to 
coverage,    content  nj-.d  timeliness  cat-  o::ly  be  '•..'•.i.jif-d  in  the   light  of  the 
use  that   is  to  be  made:  of  it. 
Secondly,    as  essential  to  wise  action  its  adequate  intelligence  if., 
it  must  nonetheless  remain  supportive.     Organizational  arrangements 
that  tend  to  undermine  the  authority  of  commanders  of  forces  by  isolating 
the  intelligence  community  or  by  erecting  administrative  barriers  that 
set  intelligence  officers  apart  from  others  involved  in  providing  staff 
support  are  disadvantageous.     It  is  essential  that  the  integrity  of  command 
be  preserved.     In  this  regard  asses sments  of  the  adequacy  of  intelligence 
functioning  is  a  command  function,    although  not  necessarily  exclusively  so 
Finally,    special  security  restrictions  must  be  most  carefully 
considered  in  the  light  of  customer  needs  since  they  often  inhibit  a 
commander's  ability  to  discharge  his  responsibilities. 
Quite  specifically,    the  commanders  of  our  forces  at  sea  and  in 
the  field  and  their  Soviet  counterparts  are  each  constrained,    as  they  go  abo 
their  normal  duties,  by  the  presence  and  activity  of  the  other.     Considera- 
tion of  how  one  would  respond  to  the  initiatives  of  the  other  is  a  never- 
ending  discharge  of  command  responsibility.     Tentative  planning  occurs 
daily,    some  of  which  is  formalized  on  paper  and  exercised  in  training 
operations,    some  for  a  variety  of  reasons  is  not  exercised,   and  some 
exists  as  exchanges  of  viev/s  and  verbal  expressions  of  intentions. 
We  all  know  how  difficult  it  is  to  assess  correctly  in  the  middle 
of  a  night  under  the  pressures  of  a  quickly  developing  situation.     If  we 
have  not  thought  through  in  advance  what  we  might  face,    and  how  we 
might  react,   and  if  we  do  not  surveil  in  ways  that  enable  us  to  be  alert 
in  time,    then  our  prospects  for  success  are  dim,    indeed.     Our  responses 
to  another's  initiatives  may  be  "from  the  hip"  as  measured  by  timeliness, 
but  it  must  not  be  that  at  all  by  every  other  measure. 
Combat  management  has  its  origins  in  comparative  analyses 
conducted  in  the  cool,  light  of  day,    and  its  currency  in  assessing  the 
nature  of  charges  taking  place  as  revealed  through  surveillance  contin- 
uously conducted.     Our   responses  vary  from  increasing  watchfulness 
at  one  end  of  the  scale  to  actual  encounters  with  weapons  at  the  other.
1  believi-    that  Mi-Si.  .•ij'.ciiicii!.  of  O.!  I    po!  It.'.-.l  ;•'•".••.  i;  •■    >.-.    ,•,:•;.  .... 
similarly  di-ptmdt:nt  upon   i  1. 1«:  1 1  i  ;-o  f  .<-«?      «■  mc'   •'.-■!   "■•    '';•?•?...    ,  •- 
intelligence   provided  and   i!s   tinv:!i :,.••>..   -  -    i„  oti.-y  v,  ,  r,-;u>    l!lt,  C;:i.-.l !  t  v 
of  intelligence  support  --   can  bo-it  !..<■  ddermir.'.d  i,y   jr'..:.|  i :  u  -j,',.,  of" 
political  "options"  that  are  thought  usc-u!  in  respond-  to  cir: velo^'V 
events. 
The  SecDcf's  responsibility  relative  to  military  intolhj-.or.ee  can 
be  broadly  summarized  as  twofold: 
a.  Assurance  that  commanders  of  forces  are  adequately 
supported  by  a  functioning  intelligence  organization  in  order  that  they 
can  discharge  the  responsibilities  assigned  them  to  greatest  advantage 
and  
°   ' 
b.  Function  as  required  by  law  to  greatest  advantage  as 
the  agent  of  the  President  exercising  control  of  military  forces,  Including 
the  provision  of  advice  in  connection  therewith. 
IVe  are  familiar  with  developments  associated  with  the  creation 
and  subsequent  functioning  of  the  DIA.     Certain  difficulties  may  have 
arisen  because  the  interrelationship  and  interdependence  of  the  commander 
and  his  intelligence  supporting  structure  may  not  have  been  fully  appreciate 
My  own  experience  as  a  commander  of  deployed  forces,  including  the 
complaints  relative  to  the  DIA  expressed  by  others  similarly  situated, 
have  centered  on  the  institutional  inability  oi  the  Agency  to  provide  other 
than  intelligence  for  background  and  data  base  purposes.     Yet,   quite 
obviously,   unnecessary  duplication  must  be  avoided  in  the  overall  interest, 
and  the  DIA  can  be  effective  in  that  regard.     High  cost  "national"  level 
sensor  systems  have  unique  collection  capabilities  of  great  significance 
to  tactical  commanders.     Some  of  these  systems  could  have  been  even 
more  productive  tactically  had  specific  tactical  needs  been  known  when 
in  design.     DIA  can  be  effective  in  this  area.     While  the  quality  of 
intelligence  support  rendered  commanders' of  forces  may' be  best  judged 
in  some  respects  by  the  appropriate  commanders,    as  noted  earlier,  In 
other  respects  it  must  be  judged  by  intelligence  community  authority 
itself,    particularly  with  regard  to  the  competence  of  ir: Joll'igcnce  personnel 
as  professionals,   and  with  respect  to  the  functioning  of  the  overall  commu- 
nity in  its  many  interrelationships.     It  would  seem  that  the  DIA  is  the 
agency  to  continually  assess  this  aspect  of  intelligence  functioning  in 
order  that  the  ASD(I)  can  assure  the  SecDef  in  this  vital  aspect  of  rnilitary 
"force  effectiveness.
Thv.r.,    the   proper   .•"•.;  cc  I  ior.i:ig  '.f  >'.».•   [):  \   1:.  •••  <-,-.-  •':;:. r-;  a  r -.••«.■•■•   to 
SocD-jf  should   iiuliwie  advising   rcj;;-.  t  di:  •.  :   »!•,     ;-rk-i:     n\    in  all    »  e:-:.:.:cts 
of  intelligence   suiiport   rcii'!-ri'f]  thu   milii-":  •  v   5  _•  rvi:  ..i:  atd  ;nili:;:v 
Morcc:..      It  docs   not  nece :.  s.ir  ily   foil';./  ♦!••;•.  I  ihc   i>!\   ::.'>•.•  1:1  be   the 
primary  agent  in  assisting  the  SecU-jf  in  discha  ••«•::;:  t  a  :•*:.:;  m:  above, 
because  of  the  necessity  to  preserve   the   responsibility  --  and 
accountability  _--  of  command.     Nevertheless,    if  Iho  Chief;;  of  the; 
military  services  intelligence  organi  i'.arloris  were  also  assigned  as 
Deputy  Directors  of  the  DIA,    a  mechanism  would  exist  for  dealing  more 
advantageously  with  the  many  interfaces  between  forces,    services  and 
the  DIA.     In  particular,    since  the  Service  Chiefs  of  Intelligence  arc  in 
general  expert  in  their  knowledge  of  detailed  intelligence  needs  of 
service  forces,    a  mechanism  would  exist  for  improving  the  functioning 
of  the  DIA  and  the  entire  intelligence  community  in  supporting  forces 
in  the  field  and  at  sea.     A  mechanism  would  exist  that  would  improve 
DIA  capabilities  in  providing  advice  to  ASD(I)  regarding  priorities  in 
connection  with  management  decisions  affecting  the  intelligence  community, 
To  summarize,   we  are  dealing  with  constant  change,    including 
changes  in  our  own  responses  to  anticipated  events.     Trends  in  technology 
will  increase  our  vulnerabilities  and  decrease  the  time  available  to 
structure  responses.     Intelligence  can  keep  us  appraised  of  current 
developments  and  what  they  portend,   and  suggest  to  us  the  character       -  - 
and  utility  of  many  of  the  responses  that  developments  might  demand. 
Definition  of  these  "options"  by  management  and  by  commanders  of  forces 
in  advance  of  necessities  to  respond  enable  the  intelligence  agencies  to 
perform  more  efficiently.     Force  effectiveness  in  combat  and  as  a 
deterrant  to  an  outbreak  of  combat  is  especially  dependent  upon  maximiz- 
ing the  unique  contributions  that  intelligence  can  make.     When  forces  are 
reduced  because  of  fund  limitations,    intelligence  assumes  an  even  more 
critical  role.     By  thinking  through  in  advance  the  specific  responses  we 
•-may  wish  to  make,    based  largely  or.  our  study  of  intelligence,   we  provide 
definitive  guidance  regarding  intelligence  collection  and  prioritization, 
and  at  the  same  time  enable  ourselves  to  handle  more  advantageously 
^the  "surprise",    or  unforeseen,    situation?  that  occasionally  occur".     In 
all  these  matters  the  carefully  nurtured  flow  of  info rmatiyn  bc-tweon 
management  and  the  intelligence  community  greatly  <  r. liar.ee s  the  effec- 
tiveness of  both,    and  this  last  state  o:  affairs  is  so  fundamental  to 
success;  that  constant  attention  must  he  given  to  assuring  its  preserva- 
tion.    Although  this  discussion  centers  mainly  on  military  intelligence 
exploitation,    the  basic  ideas  and  principles  are  applicable  in  political
and  politico/iniU.ary  areas.     And,    fi:cl!y,    ;,!,or  kr-i::';:-   in   in-.l  1  ir-;.:-r  <• 
likely  also  reflect  v.-citkucsr.oi  in  t<u;  c>:i?;ti:ig   relai  ior:..:.:p,    o.' v  •  u: /.ai'oi.ull-. 
or  otherwise,    between  man-vement  ar.d  the  in* t:li ?«•■-.■:■«:»:  ct.'i!i'>':--i'v 
» 
1  have  also  reviewed  the  "Issue  Paper"  circulated  by  y.-ycr  letter 
of  November  8th,    and  offer  tlie  following  comments: 
a*     i^JI_q.c!'-tct  utility.     Concur  in  service  view.      I  doubt  th?.t 
DIA  could  or  should  attempt  to  tailor  products  to  service  needs  in  many- 
cases  when  very  detailed  specifics  are  required,   as  for  equipment  design. 
This  issue  must  be  looked  at  on  a  case-by-case  basis.     It  does  not  follow 
that  duplication  need  result. 
*>.     S&-.T  intelligence.    The  above  comments  are  germane. 
Rigid  attitudes  by  DIA  and  the  services  must  be  avoided.     If  the  DIA 
product  is  not  satisfactory,    why  continue  that  specific  endeavor?     "Would 
augmentation  by  the  services  make  it  acceptable?    In  many  cases  analysis 
is  by  contract  to  industry.     "Raw"  data  is  often  quite  significant  to 
producers  of  equipment.     Arrangements'  should  permit  such  access  when 
there  is  a  need.     The  "enemy"  in  this  case  is  too  much  preoccupation 
with  organizational  responsibilities  and  too  little  improvisation  to  produce 
results.     Proper  exercise  of  management  involves  searching  cut  problem 
areas,    surfacing  them  for  higher  level  resolution. 
c#     Resources  management.     No  comment. 
**•     DIA  as  J-2.    This  arrangement  is  net  good.     The  DIA.  and 
the  service  intelligence  organizations  should  provide  support  to  an 
independent  J-2,   with  DIA  being  responsible  for  effecting  the  necessary 
coordination.     I  see  no  reason  why  J-2  need  have  a  large  staff,   nor  why 
many  routine  intelligence  staff  functions  should  not  be  performed  by  the 
DIA  for  the  J-2. 
"    '  e.     Collection  management.    Concur  with  service  view.    A«ain, 
a  more  resilient  attitude  by  DIA  regarding  its  responsibilities  in*  collection 
management  should  permit  the  objective  being  met  without  imposition  of 
so  much  "management". 
f.     Attache  system.     ?<.'y  considerable  experience  with 
attaches  as  Commander,   Sixth  Fleet  for  two  years  (August  1<K.S-  August  19", 
led  me  to  believe  that  the  Unified  Defense  Attache  system  should  be 
rescinded.     It  creates  more  problems  than  it  solves.