SUBJECTY: Recessity-for-Integrattom or Coordination of SI.and If Te aye st le. This aerorandus: represents en analysis from the SI point of view of tue eseential relationship tetreen the functions which X-2 _ perfpras or should: perfors and the overall clandestine intelligence program. It is stronsly felt by SI that operations of an J-2 nature are indispensa>le to the maintenance of effective and eecure positive intellicence work, and that.e separation of foreign coutter intelligence - . operettons from foreign positive intelligence operations would be dis— - astrots to the- latter and haspering to the forrer. ; 2.. The functions with which the X-2 Office is charged fall. sozme— what naturally. intostxo. pain estecories: he B. -w we eR ere ame: The ¢ollection and processing for tke tse of other Arerican goverrcent azercies of intel- lizence directed at subversive indivicvals and particolarly at representatives of foreicn dntelligence organizations abroad. Such infor- metion is essential to passport cortrol work, prevention of gubrersive Irmigration, strenzthen— ing of internal American security from foreign intelligence penetration, etc. ‘ The conduct of counter intelligence operations directed toward the protection of A-erican fcret{gm intelligence wark. Such operations thecselves fell into three specific categories: “1. The collection. and processing of thosraphical inforrution for the purpoze of vetting foreign person- rei order corsicaration for vee as erents or sct-erants in Arerican foreign
Pa ~ . 6, It should be aprarent, furthermore, that such operations 4s. those: ecrited above can only be euccessfully perforued in closest cuordination: th tre positive intelligence operations of the American service. 4Leressa resulta may be anticipated frome lack of this coordinations . ore nead only anvrisare the diligent pursuit of American agent personnel “y Ar drican counter intelligence personnel to wnom their colleagues are srieces. Sich actions would be useless and reprshensicle at best, but in. acé(tiat they conetitute a sericus danger to the buccees of the prei tive. ——— rtallicence wark, Lack of coordination aay be due either to SI or 2, - |. tot in ofther case the reavlis are eqially unfortunate and cannot he > toLerstad in a professional intelligence service. - oT wllect‘an of what micht be called positive counter-intelligence (reer et in k ard PL stove) fe fn roality only a specialized or functional eran, of rieltive clarfastina intelifgerce. It requires specialized parsonnel Bist at hee ia wllection of teshnizal or militar, er fiscal intelligence. Pot ich tectalization 4se2 not pravent and chould not discourage the reyrcticce of other tyzes of intailigence to which, in the course of their apataticea, sracialized oprratizves are exposed. reso basic training in all Seta licecce Plel4te stenia ba orovided for tath St and L2 operatives in ordar e 70S eh err lattes tonce: tration aa wesld require warteful cuplication avtecnge. dotnt pslactin-«, wecarative training, ard the clese coormlin- wits. OT aed %-2 will inevitably eliminats euch ration af affart alia ceiemnel, both ateff and operative, and will $40 tr ere affactive [54.4 operations, Such clere coordination lea only ete ster Tl ant LS fare tiar an a part of a single apencze ~<“ -” [ad - a’%one oan 73? LialA cue ratiocagn “a” an
‘ ¢ Pace 4. @. Experience in CSS has ehcwn that lack of close cooperation is I-2 end SI work is pgseible even when the two services operate fron the gaze billdinge It shoul4 be obvious that 1f I-2 functions are to be handled ty an antirely different agency, no favoratle results at all could be expected. Any diversity of agency interests would zwilitate against the success of @ coordination viich is esasntial. It Le no exaggeration to say that if the X-2 function ‘ere te te divorced fros positive intelligence work, ths SI Gf£fics would te forced to establish {ts om X-2 operations. Oct of such an unfortunete situation wold arise additicnal governmental duplication and the possibility of a danzerous conflict of American cuuntar intelligence aervices. Either represents a consunution to be abhorrede _o . oo oh, Stirrlir
(Page 1) MEMORANDUM 22 April 1946 TO: Colonel William W. Quinn FROM: [Excised] SUBJECT: Necessity for Integration or Coordination of SI and xX~-2 Functions 1. This memorandum represents an analysis from the SI point of view of the essential relationship between the functions which X-2 performs or should perform and the overall clandestine intelligence program. It is strongly felt by SI that operations of an X-2 nature are indispensable to the maintenance of effective and secure positive intelligence work, and that a separation of foreign counter intelligence operations from foreign positive intelligence operations would be dis- astrous to the latter and hampering to the former. 2. The functions with which the X-2 Office is charged fail some- what naturally into two main catagories: A. The collection and processing for the use of other American government agencies for intel- ligence directed at subversive individuals and particularly at representatives of foreign intelligence organizations abroad. Such infor- mation is essential to passport control werk, prevention of subversive immigration, strengthen- ing internal Americaz security from foreign intelligence penetration, etc. B. The conduct of counter intelligence operations directed toward the protection of American foreign intelligence work. Such operations themselves fall into three specific catagories: 1. The collection and processing of biographical information for the purpose of vetting foreign person- nel under consideration for use as agents or sub-agents in American foreign SECRET
(Page 2} Page 5 [Excised] 6. It should be apparent, furthermore, that such operations as those described above can only be successfully performed in close coordination with the positive intelligence operations of the American service. Ludicrous results may be anticipated from a lack of this coordination: one need only envisage the diligent pursuit of American agent personnel by American counter intelligence perscnnel to whom their colleagues are unknown. Such actions would be useless and reprehensible at best, but in addition may constitute a serious danger to the success of the positive intelligence work. Lack of coordination may be due to either SI or X-2, but in either case the results are equally unfortunate and cannot be tolerated in a professional intelligence service. 7. The collection of what might be called positive counter-intelligence (described in A and Bl above) is in reality only a specialized or functional area of positive clandestine intelligence. It requires specialized personnel just as does the collection of technical or military or fiscal intelligence. But such specialization does not prevent and does not discourage the reporting of other types of intelligence to which, in the course of their operations, specialized operatives are exposed. Broad basic training in all intelligence fields should be provided for both SI and X-2 operatives in order to avoid such exclusive concentration as would require wasteful dupli- cation of coverage. Joint planning, coorperative training, and the close co- ordination of field operations of both SI and X~-2 will inevitably eliminate much duplication of effort and of personnel, both staff and operative, and will result in more effective field operations. Such close coordination is only possible when SI and X-2 function as part of a single agency. SECRET
(Page 3) Page 4. 8. Experience in OSS has shown that lack of close cooperation in X-2 and SI work is possible even when the two services operate from the same building. It should be obvious that if X-2 functions are to be handled by an entirely different agency, no favorable results at all could be expected. Any diversity of agency interests would militate against the success of a coordination which is essential. It is no exaggeration to say that if the X-2 function were to be divorced from positive intelligence work, the SI office would be forced to establish its own X-2 operations. Out of such an unfortunate situation would arise additional governmental duplication and the possibility of a dangerous conflict of American counter intelligence services. Either represents a consummation to be abhorred. STLP:1?m [Excised] cc: Mr. James Murphy SECRET