>  •  * 
FEDERAL  GOVERNMENT'S  HANDLING  OF 
SOVIET  AND  COMMUNIST  BLOC  DEFECTORS 
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STAFF  STATEMENT 
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PERMANENT  SUBCOMMITTEE  ON  INVESTIGATIONS 
OF 
THE  COMMITTEE  ON  GOVERNMENTAL  AFFAIRS 
UNITED  STATES  SENATE
-  2  - 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Mr.  Chairman,  ray  name  is  John  F.  Sopko.  I  am  the  Deputy 
Chief  Counsel  of  the  Subcommittee.  Since  1982,  I  have  been 
employed  as  a  counsel  by  the  Subcommittee.  Prior  to  1982,  I  was 
a  Special  Attorney  for  the  Department  of  Justice.  I  have  been 
assigned  to  conduct  this  Subcommittee  investigation  since  its 
inception. 
On  the  evening  of  Saturday,  November  2,  1985,  KGB  agent 
Vitaly  Yurchenko  walked  out  of  the  Georgetown  restaurant  "Au  Pied 
De  Cochon"  and  into  the  annals  of  defector  history.  His 
subsequent  interviews  both  at  the  Soviet  embassy  here  in 
Washington  and  in  the  protective  confines  of  Moscow  detailed  a 
curious  though  somewhat  dubious  litany  of  alleged  United  States 
government  mishandling  of  his  case. 
The  publicity  surrounding  Mr.  Yurchenko's  "last  supper"  in 
Georgetown  continues  to  this  day  both  in  the  controlled  Soviet 
press  as  well  as  in  the  Western  media.  Particularly  in  the  Soviet 
Union,  the  events  surrounding  his  "escape"  and  "handling"  have 
been  expounded  to  illustrate  the  treatment  that  can  be  expected 
by  any  other  fugitives  from  the  Soviet  bloc. 
Not  far  from  Yurchenko' s  memorable  repast,  just  six  months 
before,  another  event  occurred  which  is  just  as  relevant  to  the 
scope  of  this  inquiry.  It  was  the  defection  of  a  senior  diplomat 
from  an  Eastern  Bloc  country.  Although  the  diplomat  neither  knew 
Yurchenko  nor  anything  about  him,  his  treatment  as  a 
non-intelligence  defector  is  just  as  important  as  Yurchenko's  to 
our  understanding  of  the  importance  of  defection  and  the  problems 
inherent  to  the  resettlement  of  a  fugitive  from  totalitarianism. 
Little  publicity  surrounded  the  diplomat's  leap  to  freedom 
because  of  security  reasons  as  well  as  the  desires  of  the 
diplomat  in  question.  Although  in  possession  of  highly  useful 
information,  he  did  not  defect  to  give  us  state  secrets.  Nor  did 
he  defect  for  monetary  or  personal  rewards  as  with  Yurchenko. 
This  Soviet  bloc  defector  left  solely  for  the  chance  to  live  and 
work  in  a  state  of  freedom  that  we  in  the  West  too  easily  take 
for  granted. 
As  the  Yurchenko  case  caused  the  American  people  to 
reassess  the  CIA's  handling  of  intelligence  officers  who  defect 
and  brought  about  needed  improvements,  the  handling  —  or  more 
accurately,  the  lack  thereof  —  of  the  diplomat-defector  who  is 
still  here  appears  to  call  for  needed  reforms. 
The  staff  found  that  defectors  are  not  "squeezed  like  a 
lemon  and  thrown  away"  as  commonly  alleged  in  the  Soviet  press. 
Instead,  most  defectors  seem  to  wish  they  had  been  "squeezed"  a 
little  more  --  much  could  be  done  to  better  utilize  and  assist 
the  non-intelligence  defector.  Not  constrained  by  stringent 
physical  security  requirements  such  as  new  names  and  identities,
-  3  - 
the  non-intelligence  service  defector  could  more  easily  enhance 
our  nation's  understanding  of  the  closed  Soviet  society  which  for 
the  foreseeable  future  will  be  our  country's  primary  protagonist 
in  foreign  and  military  affairs. 
Yet  our  record  so  far  with  the  handling  of  these  defectors 
indicates  the  opposite.   For  example: 
Dr  Petre  Nicolae,  a  high-ranking  economist  for  the 
Romanian  government  attached  to  COMECON,  spent  over  five  years  in 
New  York  running  a  laundromat  and  selling  ice  cream  before  he 
came  to  the  attention  of  the  Jamestown  Foundation  and  others  who 
are  now  attempting  to  find  a  way  to  put  his  storehouse  of 
information  on  the  East  European  economy  to  better  use  through 
writing,  lecturing  and  research.  His  information  and  analysis 
have  been  acclaimed  by  those  government  researchers  who  only 
recently  knew  of  his  existence  in  the  U.S.  and  were  provided,  for 
the  first  time,  access  to  him. 
Alexandra  Costa,  the  wife  of  a  Senior  Soviet 
Diplomat,  was  initially  urged  by  a  government  representative  to 
become  a  clerical  worker.  Fortunately  due  to  her  perseverance 
and  the  personal  interest  of  a  number  of  government  officials, 
she  was  able  to  attend  and  graduate  from  the  Wharton  School  of 
Business.  Eight  years  after  her  defection,  her  insights  into  tne 
Soviet  society  is  now  a  best-seller  here  in  the  United  States; 
Aleksandr  Ushakov,  a  professor  of  Marxism  at  a  naval 
college  in  Odessa,  hiked  for  19  days  over  the  Caucasus  Mountains 
to  reach  the  West  in  1984.  He  had  been  arrested  for  writing 
articles  "slandering"  the  State.  Fortunately,  he  was  released  by 
the  KGB  in  hopes  that  he  would  lead  them  to  other 
"co-conspirators."  Additionally,  the  Soviets  would  not  charge 
him  until  he  had  been  stripped  of  his  communist  party 
membership.  This  peculiarity  of  Soviet  " Justice"  allowed  Us hakov 
to  escape.  However,  once  here  in  the  United  States,  the  fact 
that  he  had  been  a  member  of  the  communist  party  now  bars  him  for 
an  additional  5  years  from  becoming  eligible  for  American 
citizenship.  In  addition,  for  two  years  he  worked  at  various 
odd-jobs  before  he  was  able  to  find  a  way  to  tell  his  story  to 
the  American  people. 
Vladimir  Sakharov,  a  former  Soviet  foreign  service 
officer  who  defected  in  1971  was  eventually  assisted  m  obtaining 
a  doctorate  in  international  relations.  He  is  now  a  prominent 
lecturer  of  Soviet  affairs.  But  before  then  he  had  to  endure  a 
life  of  menial  odd-jobs  and  was  initially  advised  by  government 
representatives  to  become  a  motel  manager  and  forget  about  ever- 
doing  anything  public  about  his  experiences  or  about  the  boviet 
Union. 
Andrey  Sorokun,  a  Japanese  area  studies  student  from 
Moscow  State  University  defected  in  1983  while  studying  as  an 
exchange   student   in   Japan.    Although   proficient   in   three 
t
-  2}  - 
languages  —  Japanese,  Russian  and  English  —  he  wound  up  washing 
dishes  in  a  New  York  restaurant  for  three  years  until  discovered 
by  the  Jamestown  Foundation.  Through  their  efforts,  Andrey  found 
employment  as  a  translator  in  Washington  where  he  is  currently 
combining  his  work  with  research  on  the  "children  of  the  elite" 
of  the  Soviet  Union. 
Tadeusz  Kucharski,  who  defected  in  1983  after  serving 
5  years  as  the  Polish  Commercial  Attache  in  Angola  was  never  even 
debriefed  by  the  U.S.  Government  concerning  Soviet  and  Polish 
activities  in  that  troubled  part  of  Africa.  Since  his  defection, 
he  and  his  wife  have  found  successful  employment  in  real  estate 
and  are  assisting  other  Polish  emigres  to  adjust  to  their  new 
life  here  in  America. 
Others  have  not  been  as  persistent  or  as  lucky. 
Within  the  last  few  months,  two  promising  defectors  returned 
home.  Vladimir  Kovnat,  a  Soviet  TV  correspondent, 
photo-journalist  and  film-maker  who  had  worked  extensively  in  the 
Middle  East  and  Southeast  Asia  returned  with  his  wife  on  July 
31st  to  the  Soviet  Union. 
In  addition,  Bronius  Venclova,  a  former  Soviet 
interpreter  who  defected  in  1985,  could  not  withstand  the 
pressure  of  the  propaganda  campaign  engineered  by  the  Soviets  to 
secure  his  return.  This  August  he  returned  after  complaining 
that  he  could  no  longer  take  the  constant  telephone  calls  from 
his  parents  and  siblings  urging  his  return. 
The  negative  effects  of  the  current  state  of  our  defector 
program  are  numerous.  We  do  not  get  their  insights  in  a  timely 
and  systematic  manner.  In  addition,  the  defectors  have  a  hard 
time  adjusting  here,  a  fact  compounded  by  their  frustration  in 
trying  to  get  someone  in  the  government,  business  or  society  to 
listen  to  them.  And  finally,  their  reception  or  lack  of  it,  here 
in  the  West  is  closely  monitored  by  the  Soviet  bloc  and  utilized 
for  their  purposes  of  discouraging  additional  defections. 
This  last  point  has  been  of  considerable  concern  to  the 
staff  from  the  onset  of  the  investigation.  Well  aware  of  the 
sophisticated  propaganda  capabilities  of  the  official  Soviet  Bloc 
press,  whose  representatives  are  probably  in  the  audience  today, 
we  were  initially  troubled  with  a  public  discussion  of  this 
issue. 
The  Subcommittee's  decision  for  publicly  airing  the  issue 
of  defector  treatment  was  three-fold:  firstly,  unlike  the  Soviet 
Union,  "glasnost"  or  openness  is  not  a  recent  phenomena  in  our 
country.  We  did  not  just  discover  it  during  the  current  regime 
nor  after  the  last  party  congress.  An  open  and  frank  discussion 
of  problems  within  our  government  or  society  is  as  olcL  as  the 
constitution  whose  Bicentennial  we  just  celebrated.  Such 
inquiries  are  an  accepted  way  for  the  American  people,  through 
their   elected   representatives,   to   hold   their   government
-  5  - 
accountable.    It   is   our   historic   method   for   change   and 
improvement. 
Secondly,  from  every  intelligence  expert  and  Sovietologist 
that  we  conferred  with,  we  heard  unanimous  approval  for  a 
thoughtful  and  public  discussion  of  this  issue.  It  was  felt,  that 
such  a  showing  of  interest  by  the  Congress  would  do  far  more 
towards  encouraging  the  would-be  defector  than  either  a 
closed-door  hearing  or  continued  government  silence.  The  message 
a  public  hearing  sends  to  the  V/orld  and  particularly  to  those 
behind  the  Iron  Curtain  is  that  the  Congress  of  the  United  States 
takes  the  plight  of  the  defector  seriously  and  is  doing  something 
about  it.  This  is  a  message  that  every  credible  Sovietologist 
felt  must  urgently  be  sent  to  the  Soviet  bloc. 
Lastly,  these  same  experts  as  well  as  many  of  the  defectors 
we  contacted  believed  that  it  would  be  disastrous  for  Congress 
and  the  American  people  to  be  cowered  into  silence  by  what  the 
Soviet  Bloc  press  may  or  may  not  do  with  the  facts  garnered  from 
a  public  hearing.  To  be  silent  would  give  them  far  more 
importance  than  they  deserve  and  unrealistically  assume  that  they 
even  need  a  public  hearing  to  present  their  tailor-made  views  to 
their  audience  back  home.  Silence  by  our  government  and  Congress 
on  this  important  issue  is  exactly  what  the  Soviet  bloc 
governments  want. 
Clearly,  it  is  also  important  to  state  at  this  juncture, 
that  no  matter  what  our  government  and  society  does,  some 
defectors  and  legal  emigres  will  return  to  their  communist 
homelands.  Some  just  can  not  adjust  to  the  freedom  of  the  West. 
Moreover,  others  may  well  be  "plants"  sent  here  for  intelligence 
purposes,  or,  perhaps  even  for  the  sole  purpose  of  !lre-defecting" 
in  order  to  create  a  propaganda  event  for  internal  consumption 
back  home. 
But,  for  the  bulk  of  the  defectors  and  other  emigres,  who 
come  to  this  country  with  useful  knowledge  and  the  intention  to 
stay,  the  current  system  can  be  dramatically  improved  to  better 
identify,  utilize  and  more  productively  integrate  these  essential 
aliens  into  our  society.   This  is  the  focus  of  our  hearings. 
II.   The  Investigation 
At  the  direction  of  Chairman  Nunn,  the  Subcommittee  staff 
has  conducted  an  extensive  investigation  of  the  handling  of 
defectors  by  the  government.  The  inquiry  included  interviews  of 
a  large  number  of  defectors,  government  officials,  former 
intelligence  officers,  non-governmental  agencies  and  volunteer 
organizations. 
In  the  course  of  this  investigation,  for  example, 
twenty-nine  defectors  from  the  Soviet  Bloc  provided  in-depth 
interviews  and  an  additional  thirty-two  defectors  and  emigres
-  6  - 
were  interviewed  informally  concerning  their  experiences  with 
resettlement. 
Formal  briefings  were  received  from  the  Central 
Intelligence  Agency,  Department  of  State,  Department  of  Justice, 
Department  of  Defense,  Defense  Intelligence  Agency,  National 
Security  Agency  and  by  the  U.S.  Army's  intelligence  collection 
operations  in  Europe. 
Non-governmental  agencies  that  are  involved  in  Soviet 
research  were  consulted,  including  the  American  Association  for 
the  Advancement  of  Slavic  Studies  (AAASS),  the  National  Council 
for  Soviet  and  East  European  Studies  (NCSEER),  the  Center  for 
Strategic  and  International  Studies  (CSIS),  the  Kennan  Institute 
for  Advanced  Russian  Studies,  the  Soviet  Interview  Project  of  the 
University  of  Illinois  at  Urbana-Champaign  and  Delphic 
Associates. 
Academics  involved  in  the  defector  issues  at  Tufts 
University,  Harvard  University,  Boston  University,  Georgetown 
University,  University  of  Maryland,  George  Washington  University, 
University  of  Kansas,  University  of  Arizona,  University  of 
California  at  Berkley  and  Stanford  University  also  contributed 
their  expertise  to  the  Subcommittee  inquiry. 
The  views  from  some  of  the  major  voluntary  refugee 
organizations  were  solicited.  They  included  the  International 
Rescue  Committee  (IRC),  Hebrew  Immigrant  Aid  Society  (HIAS),  the 
Tolstoy  Foundation,  Freedom  House,  U.S  Conference  of  Catholic 
Charities  and  the  Jamestown  Foundation. 
Lastly,  over  twenty  current  or  former  intelligence  officers 
were  interviewed  concerning  their  experiences  with  the  handling 
of  defectors  as  well  as  their  recommendations  for  needed 
improvements. 
Based  upon  these  interviews  and  the  significant  body  of 
work  performed  by  both  Intelligence  Committees  of  Congress,  it 
became  apparent  early  in  the  investigation  that  a  vacuum  exists 
in  current  government  programs  for  the  systematic  identification 
and  productive  integration  of  a  significant  group  of  defectors 
into  U.S.  public  life. 
The  staff  found  that  while  a  government  system  is  in  place 
for  dealing  with  a  very  discreet  type  of  defector  who  falls 
within  the  purview  of  the  U.S.  intelligence  community  --  the  few, 
such  as  Yurchenko,  who  are  judged  vital  to  our  national  security 
and  are  eligible  to  receive  government  support  --  there  is  no 
comparable  system  in  existence  for  the  bulk  of  defectors  who  do 
not  meet  these  specific  criteria. 
Some  of  the  defectors,  at  the  other  end  of  the  spectrum, 
like  the  common  seaman,  Medvid  —  if  he  had  been  permitted  to 
stay  —  the  Subcommittee  staff  found  to  be  covered  by  the
programs  supplied  by  the  various  voluntary  agencies  that  handle 
the  over  60,000  refugees  that  annually  enter  our  country.  These 
programs  are  generally  geared  to  the  resettlement  of  vast  numbers 
of  oeoDle  of  various  ethnic  and  social  backgrounds,  most  of  whom 
arrive  here  as  legal  emigres.  The  staff  found  those  programs 
generally  inadequate  to  handle  the  special,  higher-level  defector 
from  the  Soviet  Bloc  whose  past  close  association  with  a 
totalitarian  government  often  impedes  his  acceptance  in  U.S. 
emigre  communities. 
In  focusing  on  this  latter  group  and  based  on  our 
investigation  the  staff  made  the  following  conclusions: 
1)  These  individuals  can  make  a  useful  contribution  to 
our  society  and  our  national  security  by  helping  to  fill 
important  gaps  in  our  knowledge  of  the  Soviet  Bloc  as  well  as  in 
projecting  future  actions  of  the  Soviet  Bloc  leadership  in  the 
political,  economic  and  military  areas; 
2)  This  unique  resource  remains  for  the  most  part 
untapped  by  both  government  and  society  in  any  long  term, 
systematic  and  open  way  although  a  few  underfunded  and 
uncoordinated  academic  and  government  programs  successfully 
utilize  them  on  occasion; 
3)  Government  assistance  to  defectors  is  limited  to  a 
very  small  group  who  currently  must  meet  the  stringent 
requirements  of  the  intelligence  community: 
4)  These  defectors  face  unique  problems  in  resettlement 
and  integration  into  our  society  that  are  not  currently  being 
adequately  addressed  by  the  government  and  voluntary  private 
organizations,  sometimes  leading  to  their  return  to  the  Soviet 
Bloc; 
Due  to  the  defectors'  prior  experience  and  position 
for  °these~~'individuals   among   previously   established   ethnic 
commu nities  does  not  exist  for  them; 
6)  A  concerted,  sophisticated  and  intense  program  of 
harassment  and  intimidation  meant  to  force  the  defector  to  return 
to  the  Soviet  Bloc  exists  and  appears  to  be  expanding  in  the 
United  States.  Although  it  does  not  approach  the  violence, 
intensity  or  overtness  of  efforts  in  the  1950's  and  1960's,  its 
novel  psychological  methods  for  playing  upon  the  oefector  s 
initial  adjustment  period  are  a  continuing; 
All  of  the  above  directly  and  adversely  affects  our
-  8  - 
These  problems  affect  not  only  the  number  of  future 
non-intelligence  defectors  but  also  the  critically  important 
defection  of  the  intelligence  officer  or  other  essential  alien 
since  their  treatment  is  inexorably  intertwined  to  the  would-be 
defector. 
III.  THE  DEFECTOR  PHENOMENA 
A)     Definition:   Who  Are  Thev? 
Unlike  "political  refugee,"  "asylee"  or  "immigrant"  that 
have  clear  legal  definitions  and  consequences,  the  term 
"defector"  has  been  used  to  cover  a  wide  range  of  activities  and 
any  number  of  individuals  or  events.  Thus  it  has  been  used  to 
describe  the  1986  decision  of  American  jScientist  Arnold  Lokshin 
to  move  with  his  family  to  the  USSR  ,  the  1960*s5  espionage 
activities  of  Col.  Penkovsky  within  the  Soviet  Union  ,  as  well 
as  the  recent  expulsion  of  known  dissidents  such  as  Aieksandr 
Solzhenitsyn  and  Yuri  Orlov  . 
Congress  has  provided  for  selective  assistance  to  a  very 
small  number  of  defectors  who  are  of  special  interest  to  the  the 
intelligence  community  .  Section  7  of  the  Central  Intelligence 
Act  of  1Q4Q.  (50  USC  403h) ,  states: 
Admission  of  essential  aliens:  limitation  on 
number 
"Whenever  the  Director,  the  Attorney  General, 
and  the  Commissioner  of  Immigration  shall 
determine  that  the  ~  entry  of  a  particular 
alien  into  the  United  States  for  permanent 
residence  is  in  the  interest  of  national 
security  or  essential  to  the  furtherance  of 
the  national  intelligence  mission,  such  alien 
and  his  immediate  family  shall  be  given  entry 
into  the  United  States  for  permanent 
residence....  Provided,  That  the  number  of 
aliens  and  members  of  their  immediate 
families...  shall  in  no  case  exceed  one 
hundred  persons  in  any  fiscal  year." 
Due  to  the  nature  of  their  mission,  these  essential  aliens 
are  limited  to  an  extremely  small  number  of  defectors  who  for 
clear  national  security  reasons  are  afforded  the  protection  and 
special  handling  of  the  intelligence  Community.  For  the  most 
part,  due  to  their  special  security  problems,  these  defectors  are 
unable  or  unwilling  „to  enter  the  public  arena  under  their  real 
names  or  identities. 
In  practice  only  an  exceedingly  small  number  of  people  fall 
into  this  category.  The  staff  found  that  the  bulk  of  those 
people  one  would  normally  classify  as  "defectors"  have  tended  to
-  9  - 
fall  outside  of  this  definition,  despite  the  fact  that  many  of 
them  are  often  privy  to  important  and  otherwise  unavailable 
information  that  would  be  useful  in  the  public  domain  for  the 
analysis  of  Soviet  and  East  European  affairs. 
Even  when  this  type  of  defector  is  eager  to  contribute  his 
or  her  knowledge  to  the  analytical  community,  the  staff  found 
that  few  have  been  afforded  that  opportunity.  While  denying 
ourselves  potentially  useful  information,  we  are  also  compounding 
an  already  difficult  process  of  adaptation  and  integration  into 
this  society. 
These  individuals,  unlike  their  intelligence  community 
counterparts,  could  be  helped  to  integrate  "openly"  into  U.S. 
society  and  afforded  an  opportunity  to  publicly  expand  our 
knowledge  of  the  communist  systems  they  have  left  behind. 
B)    Public  Knowledge:  Another  Vacuum 
Despite  the  importance  of  defectors  and  the  many  problems 
occurring  in  conjunction  with  their  treatment,  surprisingly 
little  examination  has  been  conducted  on  this  topic  in  the 
past.  Indeed,  the  Subcommittee  staff  found  that  it  was  not 
until  1985  that  the  first  attempt  was  made  to  comprehensively 
analyze  this  phenomena  outside  of  the  confines  of  the 
intelligence  community. 
That  analysis,  Soviet  Defectors:  The  KGB  VJanted  Listr  by 
Dr.  Vladislav  Krasnov,  was  based  in  part  upon  a  KGB  "wanted  listg 
of  Soviet  Defectors,  commonly  called  the  Possev  material. 
Having  found  his  own  entry  among  the  Possev  records  and  being 
convinced  of  its  authenticity,  Dr.  Krasnovy  selected  470  cases 
of  post-war  defection  from  the  Soviet  Union  (1945-1969)  and 
subjected  them  to  a  computer-assisted  statistical  analysis. 
From  public  records  he  attempted  to  bring  this  analysis  up  to  the 
present.  The  purpose  of  his  work  was  to  establish  a  public  tally 
of  defectors  in  order  to  determine  their  importance  as  well  as 
their  bona  fides.  He  hoped  that  this  would  make  the  public  and 
policy  makers  more  aware  of  their  unique  needs  and 
usefulness. 
Two  other  scholars  have  since  added  their  work  to  our 
understanding  of  defectors.  Dr.  Lawrence  Martin-Bittman,  himself 
a  Czech  defector,  has  initiated  a  study  into  the  psychology  of 
defection  and  its  implications  upon  their  treatment  in  the 
West.  Etienne  Huygens,  the  former  Research  Director  of  the 
Jamestown  Foundation  and  the  son-in-law  of  Zdzislaw  Rurarz,  the, 
former  Polish  ambassador  to  Japan  when  he  defected  in  1980 , 
has  completed  three  monographs  on  the  defector  question. 
Dr.  Huygens,  working  with  the  same  Possev  data  supplemented 
by  the  puDlic  media  accounts  concerning  defections,  has  attempted 
to  perform  a  review  similar  to  Krasnov's  for  the  other  East  bloc
-  10  - 
countries.   Dr.  Bittman  takes  this  research  one  step  further  into 
the  treatment  of  defectors  once  they  arrive  in  the  West. 
To  the  knowledge  of  the  staff,  these  individual, 
under-funded  efforts  compromise  the  only  public  research  being 
done  on  defection  in  the  United  States.  No  government  or 
academic  institution  has  supported  larger-scale  public  research 
in  this  area.  No  data  base  or  public  clearing  house  for 
information  on  defectors  has  been  created  from  which  we  could 
possibly  learn  more  about  this  phenomena  in  a  more  systematic 
way. 
As  a  result,  little  is  known  outside  of  the  intelligence 
community  by  the  federal  government,  the  Congress  and  other 
policy  makers  abiuit  the  importance  of  defection  and  the  problems 
defectors  face.  ^  The  investigation  of  this  Subcommittee  is 
really  the  first  public  Congressional  review  of  the  overall 
defector  issue. 
C)     Defector  Trends:  Some  Useful  Insights 
All  three  researchers  mentioned  above  agreed  to  share  with 
the  Subcommittee  the  results  of  their  work,  though  limited  in 
scope.  Their  research  and  the  other  information  gained  during 
the  course  of  this  investigation  suggests  the  following: 
1)  Defections  have  plagued  the  Soviet  Union  and  other 
communist  countries  since  their  inception. 
2)  Although  the  numbers  of  defectors  per  year  have 
dropped  significantly  since  the  construction  of  the  Berlin  Wall, 
the  annual  rate  of  defection  from  the  entire  Soviet  Bloc  appears 
to  have  increased  since  1980.  The  best  estimate  from  the  public 
data  is  that  less  than  fifty  Soviets  successfully  defect  each 
year  to  the  West  of  which  the  majority  come  to  the  United 
States.  The  number  of  attempts'  are  far  higher  but  even  harder  to 
document.  The  best  public  estimate  places  their  figure  in  the 
several  hundreds.  The  number  of  non-Soviet  defections  is  even 
more  difficult  to  determine  since  most  finally  settle  in  Europe 
where  public  coverage  is  intermittent. 
3)  On  the  other  hand,  the  annual  rate  of  defection  for 
the  Soviet  Union  appears  to  have  fallen  since  1980.  According  to 
Dr.  Krasnov,  this  reversal  is  due  chiefly  to  three  factors: 
first,  the  improvement  in  Soviet  social  conditions  has  caused 
many  would-be  defectors  to  momentarily  pause  to  wait  and  see; 
secondly,  more  mature,  sophisticated  and  effective  efforts  of  the 
KGB;  and  lastly,  the  failure  of  the  U.S.  Government  programs  on 
defector  resettlement  as  exemplified  in  the  Soviet  press' 
coverage  of  Medvid,  Yurchenko  and  others. 
4)  Unlike  legal  Soviet  emigration  which  by  definition 
has  been  limited  to  unique  societal  groups,  defectors  tend  to
-  11  - 
come  from  all  walks  of  life  as  well  as  from  all  social, 
professional  and  ethnic  groups, 
5)  Since  1961,  members  of  the  Soviet  elite  have 
displaced  the  conscript  as  the  predominant  defecting  group. 
Although  the  data  for  the  rest  of  the  Eastern  Bloc  is 
insufficient  for  a  similar  conclusion,  it  appears  to  corroborate 
the  Soviet  experience. 
6)  Despite  a  sharp  drop  in  the  number  of  death  penalties 
and  the  length  of  prison  sentences  given  to  defectors  in 
absentia,  almost  all  re-defectors  face  prison  sentences  upon 
their  return.  The  severity  of  the  sentence  does  not  appear  to 
have  significantly  decreased  since  the  1970's.  Statistics  are 
inadequate  for  determining  the  penalties  meted  out  to  Eastern 
Bloc  defectors. 
7)  Following  periods  of  internal  reform,  defections 
increase  rather  than  decrease  for  a  period  of  time.  In  part  this 
is  due  to  thwarted  expectations  after  the  "reform"  period  ends. 
It  also  has  been  suggested  to  the  staff  that  it  may  equally  be 
due  to  the  loss  of  power  and  prestige  by  those  who  are  replaced 
by  the  reformists.  Thus,  in  the  case  of  the  current  Soviet 
regime,  whether  Gorbachev  succeeds  or  not  in  "reforming"  the 
internal  structure  of  Soviet  society,  in  the  long-run  we  should 
expect  a  noticeable  increase  in  defections  within  the  next  few 
years  from  the  Soviet  Union.  This  may  balance  out  the  immediate 
short-fall  in  defections  while  those  inside  the  system  wait  and 
see  what  will  happen. 
8)  The  current  estimate  of  Soviet  soldiers  who  have 
defected  in  Afghanistan  range  from  10  to  300.  Although  neither 
estimate  comes  anywhere  near  to  the  numbers  of  Soviet  conscripts 
that  defected  prior  to  the  completion  of  the  Berlin  Wall  m  1961, 
their  numbers  appear  to  be  increasing.  If  the  war  continues, 
sources  caution  that  we  should  expect  an  increase  in  young, 
poorly  educated  working  class  and  peasant  conscripts  desirous  ol 
fleeing  to  the  West  if  given  a  chance. 
9)  The  risk  of  a  fake  defector  continues  to  exist. 
Although  Krasnov  was  only  able  to  identify  erne  defector  who  was 
charged  with  espionage  after  defecting,  the  staff  was 
advised  that  a  few  recent  "re-defections"  may  have  been  planned. 
The  threat  of  espionage  obviously  exists  and  must  be  recognized 
with  appropriate  cautions. 
In  conclusion,  it  appears  that  the  trend  of  defection 
since  1961  has  been  relatively  constant,  although  the  numbers  of 
skills  of  the  average  defector  have  improved.  Internal  reforms 
and  subsequent  repressions  will  usually  increase  the  numbers  of 
defectors  as  well  as  skew  their  backgrounds  to  include  increased 
numbers  from  all  walks  of  life.  Based  on  the  lifted  data 
available,  we  anticipate  an  increase  in  the  number  of  defections 
from  the  Soviet  Union  simply  because  Gorbachev  has  embarked  upon
-  12  - 
an  unprecedented  public  program  of  reform  to  the  internal  system 
of  his  country.  The  irony  may  be  that  no  matter  how  successful 
in  carrying  out  such  a  policy,  the  end  result  should  be  an 
increase  in  the  migration  of  Soviet  elite  to  the  West. 
If  this  prediction  proves  true,  then  it  would  appear  that 
the  West  will  be  left  with  the  challenge  to  develop  a  more 
coherent  program  than  presently  exists  to  fully  utilize  this  new 
flow  of  talent  from  the  East. 
IV.  DEFECTORS:   KEYS  TO  A  RIDDLE 
A)    Their  Utility 
The  most  obvious  rationale  for  viewing  the  defector  as 
important  to  the  West  was  offered  by  a  defector.  Vladimir 
Rudolph-Shabinsky,  who  defected  in  1947  and  was  the  first 
employee  of  Radio  Liberty  told  the  staff  that  "if  the  defector 
wasn't  important,  why  have  the  Soviets  so  persistently  and 
severely  struggled  for  so  many  years  to  prevent  them  from  getting 
out  and  then  getting  those  who  did,  back  inside?" 
One  answer  may  be  drawn  from  Winston  Churchill's 
description  of  the  Soviet  Union  as  "a  riddle  wrapped  in  a  mystery 
inside  an  enigma."  The  Soviets  prefer  us  to  view  them  in  that 
light  and  understand  that  the  defector  offers  the  West  one  of  the 
best  methods  for  fathoming  the  Soviet  enigma. 
The  staff  found  a  general  consensus  within  the  intelligence 
and  academic  communities,  that  as  a  whole,  defectors  can  be 
extremely  important  to  our  understanding  of  the  communist  world. 
The  reason  for  their  importance  is  based  upon  their  previous 
experiences  in  a  society  that  is  otherwise  closed  to  the 
West.  ID 
Dr.  Murray  Feshbach,  the  past  president  of  the  American 
Association  for  the  Advancement  of  Slavic  Studies  (AAASS),  who 
served  as  the  Soviet  Specialist  to  Lord  Carrington  when  he  was 
the  Secretary  General  of  NATO,  called  the  information  gathered 
from  those  who  have  emigrated  from  the  Soviet  Union  as 
historically  the  most  important  sources  of  information  received 
by  Western  scholars  about  the  Soviet  Union. 
Dr.  Uri  Ra'anan,  Director  of  the  International  Security 
Studies  Program  at  the  Fletcher  School  of  Law  and  Diplomacy, 
called  defectors  one  of  the  most  highly  informative  and 
sophisticated  sources  of  information  available  to  bcth  American 
academics  as  well  as  government  policy  makers.  As  a  result  of 
their  importance,  Dr.  Ra'anan  and  his  associates  have  conducted 
extensive  research  into  the  decision-making  process  in  the  Soviet 
Union  utilizing  extensive  interviews  of  important  defectors  and 
emigres  in  the  West.
-  13  - 
Government  analysts  interviewed  by  the  staff  corroborated 
the  importance  of  the  defector  in  better  understanding  the 
communist  world.  Lt.  General  James  A.  Williams  (Ret.),  the  former 
Director  of  the  Defense  Intelligence  Agency,  advised  the  staff 
that  such  sources  are  extremely  useful  to  the  analyst  as  well  as 
the  policy  maker.  Moreover,  General  Williams  advised  that  the 
non-intelligence  service  defector  can  be  just  as  important  to  the 
government  as  the  ex-KGB  agent.  These  individuals,  just  as 
much  as  the  intelligence  officer,  offer  first-hand  insights  into 
the  inner  workings  of  the  system.  They  give  the  flesh  and  blood 
to  the  skeletal  overview  that  the  American  analyst  can  develop 
from  other  sources. 
Likewise,  Rear  Admiral  William  C.  Mott  (U.S.N.  Ret 
Chairman  of  the  Advisory  Committee  to  the  National  Strate 
Materials  and  Minerals  Program  told  the  staff  that  every  h 
level  defector/emigre  has  a  better  understanding  of  the  worki 
of  Soviet  society  than  the  most  learned  domestic  Sovietologi 
As  examples  of  non- intelligence  officer  defectors  that  offer  s 
insights,  Admiral  Mott  cited  Constantine  Simis  and  D 
Kominskaya,  two  of  the  most  brilliant  Soviet  jurists  who  w 
closely  identified  with  the  defense  of  the  Soviet  refusn 
before  their  forced  departure  from  the  Soviet  Union, 
problem  as  the  Admiral  sees  it,  is  in  getting  their  knowle 
into  our  educational  and  policy-making  process. 
.), 
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The 
dge 
Dr.  Tonu 
European  Studi 
Department  of 
resource  that 
experience  at 
educating  his 
areas  can  be 
analysts.   Par 
perspective  to 
possess. 
Parming,  the  former  Chairman  of  Soviet  and  East 
es  at  the  Foreign  Service 
State  views  defectors  as 
is  being  wasted  by  our 
FSI  he  has  found  them 
students.   The  defectors' 
far  superior  to  that  of 
ming  believes  a  defector  can  give  an  entirely  new 
certain  areas  of  study  that  only  an  insider  could 
Institute  (FSI)  of  the 
a  unique  and  important 
government.  From  his 
to  be  immeasurable  in 
area  expertise  in  some 
American  scholars  and 
Parming  feels  that  most  people  in  the  U.S.  government  don't 
know  about  defectors  or  their  areas  of  expertise.  It  is  a  "hit 
or  miss"  process  in  finding  out  about  them  through  contacts  in 
the  intelligence  community.  In  general,  information  about  them 
is  unavailable. 
Parming  continually  repeated  that  defectors  are  an 
incredible  asset  to  us  that  we  are  wasting.  Parming  says  that 
the  defector  is  currently  only  being  debriefed  for  security 
purposes.  The  government  fails  to  debrief  the  defector 
concerning  his  substantive  expertise.  This  oversight  angers  the 
defector  since  he  feels  he  is  being  ignored  and  also  wastes  their 
most  important  contribution  to  our  country's  collective  knowledge 
of  the  communist  world. 
Dr.  Andrew  Marshal,  Director  of  the  Office  of  Net 
Assessment  told  the  subcommittee  staff  that  these  individuals  act
-  14  - 
as  an  extraordinarily  good  "correction  factor"  to  American 
analysis.  Bringing  the  cultural  context  of  the  Soviet  Union  to 
their  research,  they  ensure  against  the  dangerous  phenomena  of 
"mirror-imaging"  that  can  creep  into  western  analysis. 
"Mirror-imaging"  erroneously  applies  Western  values  onto  another 
culture.  Such  an  approach  fails  to  take  into  account  the 
fundamental  "cultural"  peculiarities  of  the  Soviet  society  which 
is  profoundly  different  from  a  Western  or  other  "open  society." 
The  importance  of  the  Soviet  "mentality"  is  extraordinarily 
important  in  not  only  the  political  arena  but  also  in  the 
analysis  of  military  tactics.  Both  the  Departments  of  the  Army 
and  Air  Force  have  initiated  specific  programs  to  analyze 
strategic  and  tactical  planning  in  light  of  the  Soviet  mind-set. 
In  both  cases,  their  planners  advised  the  staff  of  the  critical 
importancegthey  place  on  the  use  of  defectors  and  emigres  in  this 
endeavor. 
Surprisingly  to  the  staff,  the  Department  of  the  Navy 
either  does  not  have  such  a  program  or  is  unable  to  "find"  it. 
After  repeated  unsuccessful  attempts  to  locate  such  a  program 
through  the  Navy  Congressional  Liaison  Office,  the  staff  was 
informed  that  a  rather  well-respected  Soviet  Awareness  Program 
was  eliminated  during  the  tenure  of  Secretary  Lehman. 
By  contrast,  the  Army  has  developed  two  unique  programs 
that  attempt  to  capitalize  on  the  important  insights  that  both 
defectors  and  emigres  possess.  A  third  program  to  utilize  the 
defector  for  teaching  Army  intelligence  officers  is  on  the 
drawing  board  awaiting  funding  approval. 
The  U.S.  Army  Russian  Institute  (USARI)  located  in 
Garmisch,  West  Germany  was  developed  in  1947  to  conduct  and 
administer  the  overseas  training  phase  of  the  Army  Foreign  Area 
Officer  Program  for  Soviet  and. Eastern  European  specialists.  The 
Institute  provides  a  two-year  program  of  graduate-level  studies 
on  the  political  structure,  ideology,  economic  system,  history, 
literature  and  sociological  characteristics  of  the  Soviet  Union. 
The  Institute  attempts  to  train  the  military  specialists  to 
"think  like  a  Soviet".  As  such,  they  rely  heavily  upon  the 
native  expertise  of  a  cadre  of  defector/emigre  professors  in  the 
faculty/0 
In  addition,  the  Army  has  recently  embarked  upon  an 
in-depth  analysis  and  research  of  open  source  materials  on  the 
Soviet  tactical  and  operational  levels  of  warfare  called  the 
Soviet  Army  Studies  Office  (SASO).  The  program,  which  only 
became  operational  in  1986,  was  necessary  in  order  to  deepen  the 
Army's  basic  understanding  of  the  Soviet  way  of  conducting  war. 
Again,  a  critical  aspect  of  this  program  was  the  effective  use  of 
the  defector/emigre  in  order  to  bring  his  unique  insight  into 
American  analysis.
-  15  - 
The  Director  and  staff  of  the  Army  Intelligence  School 
located  at  Fort  Huachuca,  Arizona,  also  recognized  the  unique 
importance  of  defectors/ emigres  for  national  security  purposes, 
viewing  them  as  critical  to  the  effective  teaching  of  Army 
intelligence  officers.  They  doubted  that  the  typical 
western-educated  Sovietologist  could  adequately  sensitize 
students  to  the  complexities  of  the  Soviet  mind,  man  and 
society.  All  of  these  elements  are  critical  to  the  training  of 
an  intelligence  officer  since  he  is  expected  to  understand  how  an 
adversary  commander  thinks,  perceives  and  processes  information 
and  organizes  his  own  command,  control  and  decision-making 
efforts. 
Their  need  for  such  critical  analysis  which,  only  a 
defector  or  emigre  could  provide,  led  to  their  decision  to 
propose  a  program  in  which  defector  Vladimir  Sakharov  would  be  a 
professor  at  their  school.  Due  to  funding  and  civilianppersonnel 
requirements,  the  proposal  failed  to  come  to  fruition. 
In  short,  the  staff  found  that  defectors  can  make  an 
extremely  useful  contribution  to  our  nation's  understanding  of 
the  Soviet  world.  They  are  unique,  in  this  respect,  since  they 
are  a  product  of  the  very  conditions  that  shape  the  society  and 
decision-making  process  that  our  own  society  needs  to 
understand.  In  addition,  many  were  so  closely  in  contact  with 
aspects  of  policy  formation  and  implementation  that  they  can  act 
as  sophisticated  sources  of  insight  on  an  ongoing  bas-is  far 
beyond  their  utility  as  sources  of  tactical  intelligence.  * 
B)    Their  Current  Use 
The  staff  reviewed  the  current  system  for  identifying, 
debriefing  and  disseminating  the  unique  information  and  talents 
of  defectors.  The  staff  determined  the  system  to  be  limited  and 
not  systematic  outside  of  the  intelligence  community. 
Such  a  system  does  exist  for  the  collection  of  intelligence 
information  by  the  government.  It  involves  the  screening  and 
debriefing  of  a  distinct  number  of  defectors  and  emigres  for 
various  lengths  of  time  at  various  locations  throughout  the 
world.  But,  by  definition,  the  scope  of  these  debriefings  are 
limited  by  the  unique  missions  of  the  intelligence  community. 
Professor  Ra'anan  indicated  to  the  staff  that  in  the  course 
of  his  "Oral  History  Project",  he  interviewed  a  number  of 
defectors/emigres  who  had  been  previously  debriefed  by  the 
government.  They  uninformally  indicated  that  the  type  and  depth 
of  his  interview  was  superior  to  their  previous  experience.  Some 
of  those  interviewed  stated  that  they  had  been  in  the  West  for 
ten  or  more  years  and  had  never  been  asked  those  questions 
before.  They  added  that  they  had  not  felt  the  initial  interviews 
had  been  as  extensive  and  thorough  as  the  Oral  History  Project.
-  16  - 
«tarf  k  *  ^!u  directly  interviewed  by  the  Subcommittee 
staff  corroborated  the  Tufts  interviews.  As  examples:  Dr.  Peter 
ni^wi   '  HfchK6  .^anian  economist,  remarked  that  little  of  his 
u  ,.,  !!  ^lmlfcafclons  in  the  official  government  debrief ings 
should  not  be  viewed  as  a  criticism  of  the  particular  debriefers 
or  the  agencies  for  which  they  are  employed.  Rather,  it  is 
significant  only  as  an  indication  of  a  possible  flaw  in  the 
overall  system. 
expected  to  be  and  are  therefore  given  the  highest  priorities. 
They  focus  on  the  names  and  locations  of  adversary  agents  the 
modus  operandi  of  hostile  networks  as  well  as  other  specific  and 
lethal  threats  to  our  national  security  .  As  one  senior  analyst 
put  it,  "we  don't  have  the  luxury  of  long-term  sociological  or 
politico-economic  analysis,  we're  always  faced  with  short-term 
v  i  x  £>  c  w  • 
The  longer-term  analysis  of  the  communist  system  and  the 
other  "strategic"  insights  that  the  defector  may  bring  with  him 
are  considered  secondary. '*  However,  to  the  defector,  these 
issues  are  more  significant  since  they  usually  involve  his 
professional  interests  and  his  life-time  exoeriences.  Eugene 
Demchenko,  who  defected  in  1971  after  a  career  within  the 
Ukranian  Communist  Party  investigating  government  and  industrial 
programs,  told  the  staff  that  most  defectors  believe  they  will 
find  someone  in  the  West  who  is  interested  in  changing  the  Soviet 
system  and  whp  will,  in  turn,  be  interested  in  their  insights  and 
experiences. 
Regarding  the  question  of  debriefing,  the  staff  also  found 
a  number  of  instances  where  important  defectors,  currently  living 
in  the  United  States,  had  never  been  debriefed.  They  had  totally 
slipped  through  the  debriefing  system. 
Tadeusz  Kucharski,  a  former  Polish  Commercial  Attache  who 
Vas  stationed  in  Angola  for  five  years,  defected  with  his  family 
in  1903  -  In  order  to  avoid  arrest  by  communist  authorities,  tney 
traveled  via  Portugal  on  a  tourist  visa  to  the  United  States. 
Upon  their  arrival  at  Kennedy  Airport,  they  asked  for  political 
asylum.  Other  than  his  initial  contacts  with  the  INS  and  FBI 
oificials  at  the  airport,  Kucharski  told  the  staff  that  no  one 
from  the  government  had  attempted  to  interview  him  up  to  the  time 
of  the  Subcommittee  interview.  This  oversight  deeply  troubled 
and  perplexed  him,  causing  Kucharski  to  believe  that  the 
government  has  no  interest  in  the  defector's  important 
experiences.
-  17  - 
The  staff  was  also  informed  by  officials  at  the  Jamestown 
Foundation  of  a  number  of  other  foreign  diplomats  and  trade 
officials  who  had  never  been  interviewed  by  our  government,  even 
in  a  cursory  fashion. 
Aside  from  those  few  who  qualify  for  P.L.  110  assistance, 
contacts  with  the  government  for  most  defectors  usually  abruptly 
end  shortly  after  their  arrival  in  the  United  States.  A  defector 
is  rarely  re-contacted,  and  if  he  is,  it  will  again  be  along  the 
same  "tactical"  lines  of  the  first  interview.  Andre  Sorokun,  a 
former  Soviet  exchange  student  recruited  by  the  KGB  before  he 
defected  in  1983,  is  representative  of  the  majority  of  the 
defectors  the  staff  interviewed.  He  commented  that  shortly 
after  he  defected  in  Japan  he  was  told  that  he  would  be 
recontacted  again  once  he  got  to  the  United  States.  He  waited 
for  months  but  never  was,  even  though  he  was  a  trained  Soviet  and 
Japanese  language  and  oriental  area  studies  specialist  who  had 
worked  with  numerous  children  of  the  Soviet  elite. 
No  satisfactory  mechanism  exists  for  the  defector  to  get 
access  to  an  interested  government  agency  with  his  information 
once  he  is  in  the  United  States.  Moreover,  there  is  no  practical 
system  for  various  government  agencies  to  find  and  contact  the 
defector  even  if  it  desired  to  do  so.  The  staff  was  told  by  a 
number  of  government  analysts  that  even  if  they  know  of  a 
defector  and  would  like  to  interview  him,  there  is  no  central 
clearing  house  for  locating  that  person.  Even  the  Immigration 
and  Naturalization  Service  is  of  no  assistance  since  it 
eliminated  the  annual  reporting  requirement  for  resident  aliens  a 
number  of  years  ago  due  to  budgetary  restrictions  and  lack  of 
interest.  As  a  result,  the  defector  who  is  not  resettled  under 
the  auspices  of  the  intelligence  community  is  soon  lost  to 
government  analysts. 
Faced  with  the  necessities  of  learning  a  new  language, 
finding  work  and  adjusting  to  a  new  culture,  the  defector  is 
preoccupied  after  his  arrival  here.  Even  if  he  is  interested  in 
contacting  the  government  or  other  interested  Americans  to  tell 
his  story,  his  primary  concern  for  financial  security  during  his 
initial  stage  of  adjustment,  takes  most  of  his  time.  Only  if  and 
when  he  is  successful  at  resettlement,  does  the  average  defector 
find  the  opportunity  to  be  heard  —  usually  via  lectures  or  book 
contracts. 
By  that  time,  years  usually  have  passed  and  insights  lost 
or  dated.  In  addition,  publishers  and  lecture  circuit  agents  are 
generally  interested  in  colorful  and  dramatic  material  that 
seldom  provides  the  refugee  with  the  avenue  that  he,  or  trained 
analysts,  would  prefer  for  an  in-depth  and  professional  analysis 
of  the  area  of  his  unique  expertise. 
What  surprised  the  Subcommittee  staff  was  that  5-10  years 
after  their  arrival,  so  many  defectors  were  interested  in  still 
sharing   their   insights   with   the   government.    A   partial
-  18  - 
explanation  for  this  phenomena  was  given  by  a  number  of  the 
defectors  themselves. 
-  4.  Dmi^rL  Mik5eyfv  told  the  sfcaff  fcnat  a  distinguishing 
ieature  of  the  defector  is  that  he  feels  he  has  a  mission  —  much 
like  a  convert  to  a  new  religion.  He  feels  he  must  help  his  new 
country  and  the  major  way  to  do  so  is  by  sharing  his  knowledge  of 
the  old  country. 
Lev  Alburt,  a  former  Soviet  Grand  Master  chess  player 
commented  that  until  this  "mission"  is  satisfied,  the 
defector/emigre  will  always  feel  frustrated  and  unfulfilled 
Other  defectors  have  indicated  that  this  desire  to  assist  is 
borne  of  an  intense  longing  to  improve  their  former  system.  In 
essence,  they  find  solace  for  leaving  their  homeland  bv  knowing 
that  their  contributions  to  the  United  States'  knowledg'e  of  the 
Soviet  Bloc  will  in  turn  help  their  countrymen  by  better  and 
wiser  American  foreign  policy. 
The  staff  found  that  the  defector's  desire  to  be  heard, 
combined  with  his  understandable  ignorance  of  the  vagaries  of  the 
American  political  scene  makes  him  particularly  susceptible  to 
the  manipulation  of  some  political  groups.  A  number  of  defectors 
told  the  staff  that  they  had  unwittingly  given  speeches  or 
written  statements  for  organizations  that  misused  their 
information  for  their  own  political  or  philosophical  ends.  For 
example,  Vladimir  Sakharov  stated  that  most  defectors  can't  tell 
the  difference  between  the  American  political  mainstream  and  far 
right-  or  left-wing  fringe  groups.  Driven  by  their  desire  to 
tell  the  American  people  what  they  know  about  the  Soviet  Union, 
they  can  unfortunately  become  unwilling  tools  for  whichever  group 
gives  them  a  platform.  He  warned  that  such  actions  embarrass  all 
defectors  and  lend  credence  to  those  Americans  who  criticize  the 
defectors  as  being  "extremists." 
Regardless  of  the  motives,  a  majority  of  the  defectors 
indicated  an  earnest  willingness  to  help  the  West.  They  wanted 
to  pass  on  to  American  society  an  appreciation  for  Soviet  Bloc 
society  and  its  threat.  Few,  if  any,  found  an  outlet  for  doing 
so  in  our  government.  Some  were  able  to  write,  but  only  a  number 
of  years  after  they  defected.  The  few  who  have  found  an  outlet 
to  do  so  in  academia,  have  first  had  to  overcome  the  almost 
insurmountable  hurdles  of  language  and  accreditation  to  get  in. 
With  employment  opportunities  extremely  tight  even  for  American 
trained  scholars,  it  is  becoming  even  more  difficult  for  the 
defector  to  pursue  an  academic  avenue. 
Those  programs  mentioned  previously  in  the  military  sector 
are  limited  in  resources  and  mission.  None  were  set  up  with  the 
sole  purpose  of  tapping  this  resource  but  rather  have  done  so  as 
a  by-product  of  their  intended  mission.  The  Tufts  University 
"Oral  History  Project"  also  has  a  limited  budget  and  mission.  It 
will  cease  operations  at  the  end  of  its  current  funding.  In 
addition,  although  its  use  of  defectors  is  intensive  it  is  only
-  19  - 
temporary  and  does  not  provide  a  long-term  outlet  for  them. 
Thus,  to?*?  great  extent,  their  stories  and  insights  remain 
untapped. 
V.   RESETTLEMENT 
A)     The  Current  Programs:   Another  Vacuum 
While  any  newcomer  to  the  United  States  is  faced  with  a 
host  of  difficult  challenges,  defectors  often  face  additional  and 
unique  problems  that  are  not  currently  being  addressed  by  the 
government  or  by  voluntary  organizations. 
For  defectors  not  falling  within  the  strict  purview  of  the 
CIA  Act,  no  government  program  currently  exists  designed  to 
specifically  handle  their  resettlement  and  integration  into  U.S. 
society.  If  assistance  is  provided  at  all,  it  is  generally 
through  the  services  of  voluntary  refugee  agencies  that  provide 
resettlement  assistance  to  all  refugees  coming  to  this  country, 
and/or  through  one  or  two  small,  voluntary  associations  created 
specifically  for  this  purpose  but  limited  in  funding  and  scope. 
The  major  voluntary  refugee  agencies  assisting  these 
individuals  include:  the  International  Rescue  Committee  (IRC), 
the  Hebrew  Immigrant  Aid  Society  (HIAS),  the  Tolstoy  Foundation, 
Freedom  House,  the  U.S.  Conference  of  Catholic  Charities  '  and 
the  Jamestown  Foundation.  With  the  exception  of  the  Jamestown 
Foundation,  these  agencies  handle  the  resettlement  of  all 
refugees  to  the  United  States  —  from  Vietnamese  boat  people,  to 
Soviet  Bloc  ambassadors.  With  offices  around  the  world,  these 
agencies  have  long-standing  relationships  and  experience  with 
foreign  governments.  They  are  staffed  by  trained  linguists  and 
social  workers  who  have  worked  for  many  years  in  the  area  of  job 
placement  and  resettlement  of  refugees  through  offices  located 
across  the  United  States.  Geared  towards  handling  refugees  from 
throughout  the  world,  however,  the  amount  of  resources  they  can 
devote  to  Soviet  bloc  defectors  and  emigres  is  limited.  The 
Jamestown  Foundation,  the  only  agency  created  specifically  to 
assist  Soviet  bloc  defectors,  handles  only  high  ranking  defectors 
as  determined  by  their  Board  of  Directors.  As  the  smallest  and 
youngest  of  these  organizations  —  founded  in  1984  —  it  is 
limited  in  the  resources  ,apd  experience  that  it  can  offer  to  the 
few  defectors  it  assists. 
The  Directors  of  all  of  these  agencies  emphasized  that  a 
significant  number  of  defectors  either  fall  through  the  cracks, 
or  are  provided  inadequate  assistance  relative  to  their  needs  and 
their  importance  to  U.S.  policy  makers  and  the  U.S.  public. 
Soviet  bloc  refugees,  these  agencies  assert,  face  a  number  of 
additional  problems  of  resettlement  that  are  unique  to  their 
refugee  group.
-  20  - 
From  the  vantage  point  of  strict  resettlement,  for  example, 
the  Department  of  State  provides  each  of  these  agencies 
approximately  $650  per  refugee  for  their  resettlement.  V/ithout 
other  means  of  support,  all  of  these  agency  directors  indicated 
that  this  amount  is  not  currently  sufficient  to  cover  even  basic 
resettlement  procedures.  As  a  result,  they  attempt  to  supplement 
this  meager  allowance  through  other  state  and  local  welfare 
programs  or  rely  upon  their  donors. 
This  funding  problem  is  only  compounded  among  Soviet  bloc 
defectors  and  emigres  who  tend  to  come  from  higher  standards  of 
living  than  most  refugees  to  the  United  States  and  have  even 
higher  expectations.  In  the  words  of  Vladislav  Krasnov,  with 
information  "scant  and  distorted  by  Soviet  propaganda,...  most 
defect  in  the  naive  assumption  that  they  will  receive  a  hero's 
welcome  in  the  West  and  be  treated  as  cherished  allies  in  a 
common  struggle"  against  communism.  These  expectations  are 
dashed  not  only  when  they  find  no  hero's  welcome,  but  further 
when  the  assistance  provided  them  is  barely  sufficient  to  last 
them  more  than  a  few  months. 
B)    Unique  Problems:   Usually  Unfulfilled 
In  addition  to  these  questions  of  expectations,  the 
defectors  also  face  a  host  of  more  fundamental  emotional 
challenges  that  often  extend  well  beyond  those  of  their  other 
refugee  counterparts  —  questions  of  guilt,  suspicion,  betrayal, 
harassment  and  fear.  The  emotional  burden  of  having  "abandoned 
their  homes,  friends,  careers,  and  often  their  families^.  .  in 
pursuing  what  they  believe  is  right  and  necessary,"  for 
example,  makes  the  human  adaptation  to  their  new  surroundings 
more  difficult,  and  the  frustration  more  intense  when 
resettlement  does  not  proceed  smoothly.  Former  Soviet  pilot 
Victor  Belenko's  statement  to  the  staff  exemplified  this  problem, 
common  to  all  defectors.  Even  though  in  his  case,  he  was 
financially  secure  upon  his  arrival  to  the  United  States,  he  felt 
driven  to  return  based  upon  this  "crisis"  that  he  felt  every 
defector  goes  through. 
Former  KGB  Major  Stanislav  Levchenko  likewise  commented  on 
the  particular  problems  of  this  "adjustment  period."  Its 
seriousness,  in  his  opinion  is  compounded  by  the  usual  "lack  of 
understanding  of  the  moral,  cultural  and  psychological  ordeal 
that  most  defectors  go  through  during  their  first  years  in  this 
country."  This  lack  of  appreciation  for  the  personal  problems 
the  defector  faces  by  American  officials  or  private  individuals 
is  further  exacerbated  by  the  cultural  differences  between  an 
American  and  a  Soviet.   As  he  writes  in  his  statement: 
"It  is  not  unusual  that  cultural  differences 
lead  to  serious  misunderstandings  and 
misjudgments.  Sometimes  these  officials 
(defectors)  seek  advice  from  psychologists  or 
psychiatrists,   not   realizing   that   these
-  21  - 
professionals  also  lack  the  understanding  of 
such  ethnic  and  cultural  differences.  Quite 
frequently  these  people  forget  that  they  are 
dealing  with  individuals  who  have  spent  most 
of  their  life  under  the  dictatorial  regime 
which  proscribed  them  what  to  do,  where  to 
work,  where  and  how  to  live.  Most  defectors 
had  never  dared  to  express  their  political 
views  even  to  close  friends,  for  fear  of 
being  persecuted.  Unfortunately,  many  people 
in  this  country  fail  to  realize  that 
transition  from  being  a  slave  of  the 
socialist  system  to  being  a  citizen  of  a  free 
country  can  be  an  agonizing  process. 
All  it  takes  to  resolve  this  problem  is  to 
entrust  contacts  with  the  defectors  to 
specialists  on  the  Soviet  Union,  preferably 
Russian  speaking,  selecting  people  who  are 
genuinely  eager  to  help  the  defectors  and  to 
spend  enough  time  and  mental  effort  to 
understand  their  troubles.  Formal, 
bureaucratic  approach  causes  more  damage  than 
anything  else." 
Defectors  and  emigres  alike  carry  a  good  deal  of  guilt 
since  "their  action,  in  the  view  of  many,  involves  betraying  a 
trust  of  their  native  country."  Ladislav  Bittman,  a  defector 
himself,  who  is  in  the  process  of  studying  the  psychological 
trauma  of  defection,  viewed  this  as  one  of  the  more  serious 
problems  faced  by  a  defector.  In  his  own  case  he  felt  it  led  to 
his  own  reluctance  for  years  Jff>  intimately  discuss  with  others 
his  background,  feelings,  etc. 
Likewise,  although  the  defectors  themselves  may  wish  to 
assist  the  U.S.  government,  they,  too,  often  view  both  government 
and  volunteer  agencies  with  a  good  deal  of  suspicion  as  well. 
Coming  from  a  society  where  all  large  government  agencies  are 
viewed  with  suspicion  —  and  where  all  large  agencies  are  in  fact 
government  owned  and  run  —  defectors  often  find  they  view  U.S. 
volunteer  and  government  agencies  in  the  same  light. 
Suspicion  also  plays  a  greater  role  among  Soviet  Bloc 
defectors  than  among  legal  emigres  —  both  the  suspicion  accorded 
them  by  others,  and  the  suspicion  with  which  they  often  view 
others,  including  defectors  and  emigres  who  are  already  settled 
in  the  West.  Coming  from  the  chief  enemy  of  the  U.S.,  and  often 
having  been  closely  tied  in  the  past  with  a  totalitarian 
government,  they  are  often  viewed  with  suspicion  by  other 
refugees  in  the  U.S.,  and  often  by  the  U.S.  public  as  well.-5 
Almost  all  defectors  felt  they  were  not  accepted  in  emigre 
communities  as  a  result  of  this.  Thus,  indirectly,  the  only 
support  system  available  to  them  in  the  West  is  denied  to  them.
-  22  - 
This  is  one  of  the  most  distinguishing  features  of  the 
This  is  one  «i     emiere  groups.   He  has  no  community 
defector  vis-a-vis  other  emlgrf  &™UFr_rmans   Poles,  Vietnamese 
support  network  to  rely  f«-   "f^0;/^"^  "Selector"  ghetto 
or  even  the  Russian- Jewish  emigres,  there " no         and  find 
or  neighborhood  where  te?™^*',?1^"**^  1   unlike  the  rest 
defector   very  /a^/   '^  ?hdrVe  i„'gredfents°for  redefection 
"gallows  humor,"  said  that  tne  tnree  i"^^ 
are 
and 
1)    The  crisis  of  depression, 
2) 
An  insensitive  or  unavailable  resettlement  official, 
3)  Being  within  the  Beltway  (i.e.,  close  to  the  Soviet 
Embassy) . 
His  description  of  this  scenario  was  confirmed  by  almost 
every  "defect "and  intelligence  officer  interviewed  by  the 
Staff.33 
Subsequent  Soviet  bloc  actions  often  father  compou„d  the 
emotional  'difficulties   of .   ^t^-ejt  for   Soviet   bl^ 
defectors.   As  many  told  the ,  SuJ«™^£jJ  by  Soviet  agents  - 
defectors  are  often  suojec  e   to  haras smerrt  D y     frieJds  left 
through  telephone  calls   letters  from  fami xy 
and    __  ^ 
behind,  accusations  oi  being  a  KGB  agent 
or ™  to 
to  make  absorption  into  the  U.b.  aiiiicuiu,  «» 
x,o  mase  d""  JL,,^*.  hinc  refugee  to  return  home, 
encourage  the  Soviet  dio<-  reiu&e~ 
I„   the   words   of   one  ^ec^       --Mr  -^  V^imir 
Rudolf-Shabinsky,  who  from  his  th  f^  f    ere 
commentator  for  Radio  Liberty  "^""^.^f  u°Ve  in  constant 
defectors  to  the  West,  -  "many  of^ejef enters  li  n 
fear...  Many  look  for  an  outlet  in  alcoho1' ••  or  anti_American, 
to  the  USSR,  where  they  will  in  turn  ^  used  lor  in 
anti-Western  propaganda  3«d  afterwards  sent  to  i    ^ 
the  case  of  the  sailors  of  the  steamship  TUAPbfc.  ,. 
Two  nights  before  speaking  with  the  ^Zt^li^ln 
Rudolf-IhabUky  received  such  j 
^  ^^rreTL    Kim" as  "an  'enem 
"ortn:11^;."1^  £.2-^^^^^^  *«  been  a
-  23  - 
constant  experience  since  he  published  a  story  of  his  life  in 
1966. 3U 
Representatives  of  the  Tolstoy  Foundation  and  the 
International  Rescue  Committee  commented  on  this  campaign  of 
harassment  to  the  staff.  They  indicated  that  this  campaign  to 
encourage  defectors  and  even  emigres  to  return  home  has  recently 
intensified.  Leo  Cherne,  Chairman  of  the  I.R.C.,  had  formerly 
served  on  the  Donovan  Emergency  Commission  to  investigate  the 
extraordinary  measures  of  the  1950' s  by  the  Soviets  to  encourage 
redefection.  Although  the  current  campaign  is  not  as  "deadly 
and  "intense"  as  then,  to  Mr.  Cherne,  it  is  serious  enough  to  be 
a  matter  of  great  concern. * 
Some  examples  of  this  darker  side  of  "glasnost"  were  given 
to  the  staff  by  the  various  defectors. 
Ushakov  stated  that  on  a  number  of  occasions  his  car 
was  tampered  with  when  he  was  staying  in  Washington.  On  another 
occasion  he  saw  some  people  who  looked  "like  Soviet  Embassy 
types"  out  in  front  of  his  house  taking  pictures  of  him  and  the 
house. 
As  already  mentioned,  Bronius  Venclova,  who 
redefected  in  August,  complained  to  friends  at  Radio  Liberty  that 
there  was  a  program  to  get  him  to  redefect  that  used  his  family 
in  the  Soviet  Union. 
Another  defector  told  of  tape  recordings  of  his 
family,  pleading  with  him  to  return,  being  sent  "mysteriously"  to 
his  new  address. 
Some  of  the  Soviet  soldiers  who  defected  in 
Afghanistan  complained  to  Ludmilla  Thorne  of  "Freedom  House" 
about  attempts  bv  Soviet  Embassy  employees  to  entice  them  into 
the  Soviet  Embassy  and  Consulate  by  claiming  they  hjgi  letters 
from  their  parents  and  families  there  to  be  picked  up. 
Lastly,  it  was  alleged  by  a  number  of  prominent 
members  of  the  voluntary  resettlement  agencies  that  one  or  more 
self-proclaimed  "Soviet  dissidents"  now  living  in  the  United 
States  were  actively  involved  in  convincing  one  of  the  Soviet 
military  defectors  from  the  Afghanistan  war  to  redefect. 
Although  the  staff  was  unable  to  confirm  this,  the  "coincidence 
of  their  location,  travel  and  movements  before  and  after  the 
return  of  Nikolay  Ryzhkov  to  the  Soviet  Union,  where  he  is 
currently  serving  a  13  year  prison  term,  remains  suspicious. 
The  net  result  of  all  of  these  issues  —  practical  as  well 
as  emotional  —  has  been  mixed.  Some  defectors  have  overcome 
these  hurdles,  and  successfully  integrated  themselves  into  the 
professional  world  —  even  when,  as  in  most  cases,  this  was  done 
without  the  assistance  of  the  U.S.  government  or  other  volunteer 
agencies,  but  was  due  to  perseverance  and  luck.   But  many  others
-  24  - 
have  had  inordinate  trouble  finding  jobs,  homes,  and  careers,  in 
some  cases  leading  to  their  return  to  the  very  system  they  had 
fled. 
It  is  the  staff's  conclusion  that  many  of  the  most 
successful  cases  of  resettlement  have  been  due  to  the  efforts  of 
individual  Americans  who  have  taken  it  upon  themselves  to  assist 
the  defector.  Mark  Wyatt,  a  former  intelligence  officer,  has 
done  probably  as  much  as  any  other  individual  private  citizen  to 
help  the  defectors.  On  his  own  time  and  with  his  own  funds,  he 
has  arranged  job  interviews,  found  housing,  made  introductions 
and  paid  for  their  travel,  and  lodging.  Yet  even  Mr.  Wyatt 
acknowledges  that  this  important  responsibility  should  not  rely 
for  its  success  upon  the  "action  of  a  few  highly  motivated 
individuals."  He  as  well  as  the  others  who  have  acted  "above  and 
beyond"  the  call  of  duty  for  a  private  citizen  feel  that  a 
government  system  should  be  set  up  in  order  to  take  the  "luck" 
out  of  successful  defections  and  resettlement. 
IV.  CONSEQUENCES  AND  CONCLUSIONS 
Just  as  with  the  question  of  the  utility  of  an  individual 
defector,  it  is  difficult  to  judge  the  specific  consequences  of  a 
defector  who  does  not  teach  or  an  emigre  scientist  who  drives  a 
cab  instead  of  working  in  his  true  profession.  Moreover,  it  is 
even  harder  to  determine  the  cost  to  our  society  of  unnecessarily 
delaying,  or  even  preventing,  the  use  of  a  defector's  unique 
insight  in  the  public  domain. 
The  more  apparent  result  of  such  actions  seems  to  be  in  the 
adverse  impact  upon  future  potential  defectors  from  the  Soviet 
Union.  All  of  the  defectors  insisted  that  poor  treatment  is  put 
to  good  use  by  the  Soviet  press  and  by  internal  briefings  given 
to  Soviet  Government  employees,  especially  before  foreign 
travel.  Many  intelligence  analysts  commented  that  Yurchenko  is 
probably  being  put  to  good  use  by  the  Soviet  government  as  a 
guest  lecturer  for  audiences  of  career  Soviet  bureaucrats  as  a 
warning  of  what  will  happen  if  you  defect.  It  is  assumed  that 
only  after  his  usefulness  as  an  internal  propaganda  tool  is  over 
that  he  will  start  to  serve  his  "real"  punishment. 
As  University  of  Kansas,  Vice-Chancellor  Jerry  E. 
Hutchenson  comments  in  his  statement  for  the  record: 
"If  those  who  come  to  the  United  States  find 
the  assimilation  process  to  be  a  salutory 
one,  then  others  will  be  encouraged  to 
follow.  If  the  experience  is  a  negative  one, 
highly  educated  Soviet  citizens  may 
reconsider  defection  or  choose  to  immigrate 
to  other  countries.  Thus,  from  a  political 
viewpoint,  it  is  in  the  best  interest  of  the 
United  States  to  make  the  transition  to  the
-  25  - 
American  culture  an  expeditious  and  positive 
experience." 
In  sum,  the  cost  to  our  society  can  best  be  described  as 
that  of  "lost  opportunities."  Although  totally  unquantif iable 
since  we  will  never  know  who  "would  have  defected  but  for  the 
news  of  a  Yurchenko,  etc.,"  it  seems  obvious  that  a  system  that 
ignores  a  defector's  unique  talents  as  well  as  his  or  her  unique 
problems  bears  a  serious  cost  in  terms  of  our  national 
self-interest.
-  26 
For  a  more  detailed  description  of  the  Soviet  propaganda  use 
of  redefection  as  well  as  the  return  of  Soviet  emigres,  see  the 
monograph  prepared  for  the  Subcommittee,  by  Etienne  Kuygens 
entitled  Return  To  The  Motherland:  A  Study  on  Redefection  and 
Reimmigration  to  Soviet  Bloc  Countries,  as  well  as  Appendix  A  of 
this  staff  report  which  includes  the  translations  of  sample 
articles  recently  published  in  the  Soviet  Bloc  press  on  this 
topic. 
2 The  power  to  probe  by  Congress  on  behalf  of  the  American 
electorate  is  almost  as  old  as  that  document;  going  back  to  1792, 
when  Congress  embarked  upon  its  first  oversight  inquiry  into  the 
disastrous  failure  of  Major  General  Arthur  St.  Clair's  expedition 
against  the  Miami  and  Shawnee  Indians. 
^On  October  4,  1985,  Miroslav  Medvid,  an  electrician  on  the 
USSR  bulk  carrier  Marshal  Konev,  successfully  jumped  ship  in  the 
port  of  New  Orleans  but  was  forceably  returned  by  U.S.  immigration 
officials.  A  detailed  analysis  of  this  case  is  found  in  the 
Report  of  the  Commission  on  Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe, 
May  1987. 
^Washington  Post,  October  9,1986  at  p.  A29 
-*See  generally,  "The  Defectors"  by  Col.  Vernon  Hinchley  (1967) 
For  an  extensive  discussion  of  the  definition  of  defector,  the 
Subcommittee  received  a  monograph  from  Etienne  Huygens  entitled 
"The  Notion  of  Defector;  Attempt  to  Define  and  Compare",  which  is 
introduced  into  the  hearing  record  as  a  seperate  exhibit. 
^The  "essential  alien"  that  is  the  subject  of  Section  7  of  the 
CIA  Act  of  1949  is  commonly  referred  to  in  the  intelligence 
community  as  a  "P.L.1 10"  due  to  the  public  law  number  of  that 
section. 
8The  official  title  of  the  KGB  Wanted  List  is  "The 
Alphabetical  List  of  Agents  of  Foreign  Intelligence,  Traitors  to 
the  Fatherland,  Members  of  Anti-Soviet  Organizations, 
Collaborators  and  Other  Wanted  Criminals."  It  is  commonly  called 
the  Possev  List  because  of  the  name  of  the  Soviet  emigre  magazine 
published  in  Frankfurt,  West  Germany,  which  received  the  smuggled 
official  KGB  document  in  1977- 
It  is  far  more  than  a  mere  alphabetical  list  but  rather  gives 
detailed  physical  descriptions  of  defectors  in  the  West,  their 
last  known  addresses  and  employments  as  well  as  the  criminal 
offenses  they  committed  in  defecting  and  the  prison  sentence  they 
received  in  abstensia.  Its  mere  existence  gives  added  credence 
to  the  concerns  expressed  by  some  of  the  defectors  toward  their
-  27  - 
safety. 
Although  th.  IfflUHjJ^t  1.  ££«  1969,  i.for-jd  |°»™«t  a^fne 
IS 
v ief go™ rn-nt5'.""  t'h '^."r'co-™!.?  regi.ee  currently  use 
!!Iuar  "iateh  lists"  to  keep  traok  of  defectors  and  prominent 
sim 
dissidents 
9Dr  Krasnov  is  also  a  defector,  having  fled  from  a  trade 
conference  °n  Sweden  in  1962  while  serving  as  an  editor  at  Radio 
Moscow's  Foreign  Broadcast  Division.  He  is  currently  a  Professor 
and  the  Coordinator  of  Russian  Studies  at  the  Monterey  Institute 
of  international  Studies  in  Monterey,  California.  His  entry  in 
IL   Possev  file  with  translation  is  attached  as  appendix  B. 
10For  greater  detail,  see  the  prepared  statement  for  the  record 
of  Vladislav  Krasnov  and  his  book,  "Soviet.  Defectors  ;_JIte_jfoB 
Wanted  '  <^.«  (Hnnver  Press.  1985?  . 
11  Dr.  Sittman  has  submitted  a  statement  for  the  hearings. 
^Ambassador  Rurarz  has  submitted  a  statement  for  the  hearings. 
1 3 Attempts  have  been  made  to  study  the  three  emigre  movements  of 
1917-1926,  1945-1950  and  1970s.  The  Harvard  Project  or  Ingles 
Stldy  named  .fte?  its  director,  Dr.  Alex  Inkeles  was  funde 
in 
the  1950's  to  interview  some  of  the  second  wave  emigres.  Currently 
the  Soviet  interview  Project  conducted  by  Dr.  James  R.  Millar  _  is 
underway  to  attempt  to  interview  a  large  sampling  of  .he  Jewish 
SoTiet  emigres  of  the  1970's.  However,  no  ^^^ut  oriticaTly 
deemed  it  important  to  do  the  same  with  the  smaller  but  critically 
important  group  of  defectors  who  trickle  in  every  year. 
UTuan  Rngaiskv   a  34-year  old  former  Soviet  seaman  who  had 
incompetent  to  stand  trial. 
15See  also,  statements  for  the  record  of  F.  Mark  Wyatt  and  Tom 
Polglr  for  the  intelligence  officer's  point  of  view  on  thxs 
subject. 
l6See,  statement  of  Dr.  Ra'anan  presented  at  the  hearings  for  a 
more  detailed  discussion  of  the  "Oral  History  Project  . 
^For  a  more  detailed  description  of  their  lives   the  Soviet 
legal  system  as  well  as  the  importance  of  the  "second  or  black 
economy  in  the  Soviet  Union,  see  Final  Judgement-   My  Life  As  A, 
^?;;yn.f.n.ft  Attorney,  by  Ka-inskaya  (Simon  ^  .^u»ter,  1983> 
gr,H  n<^P-Th«»  corrupt  Society,  by  Simis  (Simon  &  Schuster,  19»<^. 
l8See  statement  of  Dr.  Marshal  introduced  into  the  record  of  the 
hearings.
-  28  - 
A  pamphlet  describing  the  Air  Force  Soviet  Awareness  Program 
is  attached  as  Appendix  C. 
Lt.  General  William  E.  Odom,  Director  of  the  National  Security 
Agency  will  discuss  the  USARI  program  in  greater  detail  during  his 
testimony. 
21 Dr.  Bruce  Menning,  Director  of  SASO,  will  submit  a  statement 
on  this  program  for  the  hearing  record. 
See   statement   of   Major   General   Julius   Parker,   Jr., 
Commander/Commandant,  U.S.  Army  Intelligence  Center  and  School 
introduced  into  the  hearing  record. 
For  a  concise  yet  complete  delineation  of  the  important 
contributions  a  defector  can  make  to  government  and  society,  see 
the  statement  of  former  KGB  Major  Stanislav  Levchenko  which  is 
introduced  into  the  hearing  record. 
24 Such  analysis  would  appear  to  the  staff  to  fall  within  the 
natural   purview   of   the   Department   of   State,   Bureau   of 
Intelligence  and  Research.   Unfortunately,  it  appears  that  the 
Department  of  State  abdicated  much  of  this  responsibility  years 
ago  in  response  to  budget  considerations.   A  return  to  such  an 
effort  would  appear  to  be  an  appropriate  endeavor  on  the  part  of 
State. 
which  would  be  comparable 
the  Senate  wielded  as  much 
the  Soviet  Union,  is  fully 
made  part  of  the  hearing 
Mr.  Demchenko's  interesting  career, 
to  the  staff  of  this  Subcommittee  if 
power  as  the  Communist  party  does  in 
developed  in  his  statement  which  is 
record. 
An  example  from  the  private  sector  of  what  can  be  done  to 
better  tap  the  unique  resources  of  defectors  exists  with  the 
operation  of  Delphic  Associates.  Gerald  Guensberg,  the  President 
of  Delphic  explained  to  the  staff  that  he  attempts  to  match-up  an 
emigre/defector  with  an  interested  government  or  industry 
contractor  for  research.  Delphic  has  successfully  done  so  on  a 
limited  basis  since  1980.  Unfortunately,  it  does  not  provide 
steady,  full-time  employment  to  the  emigre  nor  does  it  specialize 
in  the  socio-political  and  foreign  affairs  arenas.  However,  it 
does  offer  an  ideal  model  for  further  review  by  the 
Subcommittee.  See,  statement  of  Gerald  Guensberg  submitted  for 
the  hearing  record. 
separate  statements  of  these 
description  of  their  programs. 
voluntary  refugee  agencies 
27See 
for  a 
pO 
It  should  be  clearly  noted,  that  nothing  in  this  statement 
should  imply  any  criticism,  whatsoever,  toward  these  or  other 
voluntary  refugee  agencies.  With  minimal  government  assistance 
they  have  tirelessly  performed  excellent  work  successfully 
resettling   thousands   of   refugees.    If   anything,   the   staff
-  29  - 
complements  their  outstanding  accomplishments  and  the  strong 
support  that  their  volunteers  and  generous  donors  have 
contributed  to  alleviating  the  plight  of  the  new  arrival  to  the 
United  States.  But  even  the  voluntary  agencies  acknowledged  the 
need  for  greater  assistance  of  those  refugees  from 
totalitarianism  regimes  due  to  the  additional  problems  they  face 
here  in  the  West. 
29See  statement  of  F.  Mark  Wyatt  who  bases  his  views  upon  over 
thirty  years  of  experience  with  defectors. 
3°See  statement  Ladislav  Martin-Bittman  submitted  for  the 
record. 
31  This  public  view  is  enormously  tied  to  the  term  "defector" 
itself.  To  many,  it  implies  a  "defect"  or  someone  who  is 
"defective."  This  led  former  CIA  Director  Allen  Dulles  to  refer 
to  them  as  "volunteers"  in  order  to  overcome  this  pejorative 
label.   See  The  Craft  of  Intelligence.  (Harper  &  Row,  New  York, 
1963). 
32For  a  more  detailed  description  see  Mig   Pilot:   The  Final 
Escape  of  Lt.  Belenko  bv  John  Barron  and  Victor  Belenko.  (1980). 
33For  example,  see  statements  of  Wyatt  and  Polgar  for  an 
intelligence  officer's  view  point  as  well  as  Krasnov,  Costa, 
Bittman,  Belenko,  Levchenko,  Sakharov,  Sorokun  and 
Rudolph-Shabinsky  statement  for  the  defector's  description  of 
this  crises  scenario. 
34See  Parallax,  by  Vladimir  Yurasov  (aka  Shabinsky,  Vladimir 
Rudolph),  (W.W.  Noton,  N.Y.  1966). 
35See   Etienne   Huygens   monograph   Return   to   the — Motherland, 
introduced  into  the  hearing  record,  for  a  more  detailed 
description  of  this  redefection  campaign  of  the  1950's  and  how 
the  current  program  closely  follows  the  stages  of  the  earlier 
Soviet  efforts.  Huygens  argues  that  the  current  program  is 
similar  to  the  initial  stages  of  the  1950  endeavor  but  is  just 
more  sophisticated. 
36For  a  discussion  of  the  unique  problems  faced  by  the  Soviet 
defectors  in  Afghanistan,  see  the  statements  of  Ludmilla  Thorne 
and  former  Soviet  Sergeant  Nikolay  Mouchan  submitted  for  the 
record.
.°PENDI*  A 
SAMPLE   SOVIET   BLOC   PRESS    REPORTS   ON   DEFECTOR   AND    EMIGRE   TREATMENT    IN 
THE   WEST 
Mncrntf  TV:      TUMA.NOV  QUESTIONED  ON  RADIO  LIBERTY 
LD034318  Moscow  Televsion  Service   in  Russian  1740  GST  3  iun  l? 
f "Round-able  discussion"  with  Oleg  Aleksandrovich  Tuaar.av,   "forcer  head  of  Radio  Liber-     . 
v  "entitled  "rnflruth  .About   the   Corporation  of  Lies'"  vith  Xoscow  Radio's  D.   Biryukov 
U'-nSritorVid  the  following  participants:  Viktor  Por.^rev  from  IAS S,  Viktor  Gribachev 
£JT^£x£l£-  Yuriv  toitrivev  fro,.  TRUD;  Aleksandr  >b2govcy  fro.  SOVETSKAYA  ROSSIY,.; 
;avel1u^neisov  "representing"  the  USSR  State  Co^ttee  for  Television  and  Radio  Broad- 
casting    ana  Vladislav  Sarkov  and  Aleksandr  Lopukhin,  who  are  not  further  identxfxed; 
Xte  and  place  not  specified  ~  live  or  recorded  with  video  showxng  the  partxcxpants  sxt- 
ting  at  tables   arranged  in  a  circle] 
r-e«1    fBirvukov]  Todav  representatives  of  a 'number  of  she  organs  of  jte  Soviet  press  are 
1      ^ \  m?e  Aieksandrovi-h  Tumanov.     He  worked  for  over  20  years  at  Radxo  Lxberty. 
meeting  Oleg  Aieksanarovi^   iu  vouth,   decided  to  return  to  his  homeland. 
Tumanov,  having  long  re.  " -dthe  ^^^JJ^J  docusentary  Daterials  about  the 
It  was  xn  this  ^g^—0^^^  activity  of  ?adio  Liberty  and  its  use  by  the 
ut^TrvxcS   for'  urPoE ^"hostile  to  the   Soviet  Union.     Upon  his  return  to  the  homeland, 
L.5.  services   ioi   y»  v       _..,.«,  Mtay.  tn  ^e  eometent   Soviet  bodies.     Taking  into  account 
Tumanov  handed   these  docu=*nt%°*?'  "     had  Se     S»  voluntary  acknowledgement  of  his 
Tumanov' s  sincere  repentance  ?J^  *^^-'p  Jl-    ^L  exposure  of  the"  activity  of 
fault,  his   desire  to  expiate  hxs  guilt  *   "^J^JV.j  tJJ  information  he  had  sup- 
foreign  ideological  subversion  centers  and  the  ^^  ^  made>     A  tepresentat:ion 
.ail^rto^S^mel^  JoT^^I^*-  criminal  responsibility 
through  a  pardon. 
...   .„   ,,!.;.,  vm,  cnry>  ouestions  about  the  activity  of 
and   facts: 
ij  im«   »n  K.j.   .-no-  hov  Radio  Libertv  is  used   to 
[S.rfcov]   Oleg  Aleksandrovich     I  ^^^1^  eWes  of  them.     I  also  want  to  ask 
conduct  various  kinds   of   anti-Soviet  act  "»»«^  e^  ?;«J  °  Tree  r     ,pe  vith  the  B.s. 
what  you  can  say  about,,  the   ^YL^at  ituTe  ?   t£  £es«t  ad=inis, ration  of  the 
Embassy  in  Moscow.      Finally     what  is   the  .^  S«e   ^--sive   radio  stations?  *      • 
United  States   of  America  and  Congress  tovarc  tnese   su-.-.si 
i  "»ii      ,11   the  a-tivitv  of  the  radio  station  is   in  principle  subordinated  to 
[lumanov]   well,    all    the  *-££■•    ol  however,  broadcasts  and  there  are  vnat.we  correctly 
anti-Soviet  propaganda.      Tnere  are,  howevef>  °  permanent  basis.    fOn  a  permanent 
called  campaigns  which,   so  to  speak     ^   conducted  on  .  p«r  .P   ^ 
basis,   since  about   1967,   there  has  been  »  c^"*"  ™  ^J^ed  contact  with  the  NTS, 
Soviet  Union.      At  one  time   the  radio  «^^™f/!j£iU.  the  NTS.     At  that   time 
[People's   Labor  Alliance]   obtained  Samizdat  documents   ..r 
they  were   the    first  such  documents  ^^inniL       Late-!   the   radio  station  started  try- 
was  not  even  concealed.      That  was   the  beginning,      ..«      ,  ^sible  channels, 
ing,    so  to  speak,    to   get   all  ^"^'^^J^^rto  .^some  materials.      It 
sometimes  promoting   these   cnannels  and  &ovx  t                               situation  of  human  rights  in 
started   getting  Samizdat  materials,  mainly  devotee 
the   Soviet   Union. 
a   ,-„m  >  dailv   one.      Tne   nrograr.  is   given  a    lot   of 
Kh.i   began   as    a  weekly  program  turned   into  a 
,lM/it   and   the  problem,  of 
attention  at    the   radio  station.      Pre"°.        "    ..L-      " 
human   rich ts.    at    the   request    of   the  radio  ... -ft. o...  _   _._:...
.  ,  USSR  IKTERSATIOSAL  AtirAUU* 
*  RA  UNITED  STATES  &  CANADA 
III.  6  Jun  8& 
'  a  *r   -he  radio  station,  so  that  we 
-t  of  the  material  for  his  speech  «"  P"P££  t^mouth  of  the  President. 
*";/!"     I  mean  the  radio  station  wanted  it  from 
could  hear...  remember... 
our  first  question.  The  second  question,  as  .« 
That  was  your  tirst  s 
,   i   t>,o»-  links  with  tb*.  embassy. 
ISarkov]  Abou.  lin*  
could  even  be 
v  .  n„Vs  with  the  U.S.  Embassy:  One  could  say         lomaclc  MU,  that 
[Tumar.ov]  ^^^.tlaa.  because  it  is  via  the  em  assy  .the  ^  ^ 
^f  l^uaterla!  roX  Soviet  Union  finds  it. ^JJ^  h^an  rlghts  attache  -  who 
Sha^al^ a  snecial  -^/^efof  certain  P—  in  whose  information  the 
v  1  Thank  you.  Viktor  Ponomarev  of  TASS. 
[Birj-ukovl  Thanfc  you.  
^  conference  in 
s^^^rSSs  Jr^iSrtrb^  £■&-  *«—  - 
trroUr-TedVith  intelligence, 
,     u  V      Robert  Redlich,  ha  is  the  lla*SO°  f^'Vprinciple.  he  would,  of 
Uumanov]     Vel;;  **«*  ^  and  Deutsche  Well-     ^Py  _  ^^  ^ 
Toursl   oe  fired  straightaway  if  he  said  that  we 
laborated  with  the  CIA.  enployee  of  the  Central 
»  v  rf  Redlich  himself  is  an  experienced  empy  ^  ^  the 
Fev  people  know  that  *f  ^^te  was  head  of  a  military  ioteU*     ^  ^  ^ 
intelligence  Agency  •     J^rttenberg.    But  vhat  can  one  say  *  ^  ^  o£       tlvley 
west  German  town  of  Baflen  rf  „         feoy     and,   as  yo  f  mlsuse  of     _ 
W.11.    in  the  West   ^*>  b*Vinan*ial  outlay,   and  at  ^f*;^  Ration .     But,   it- seems 
requires  •  P'^.S  Et  Sr-  *  few  years  ago  from  the  radi  ^  ^  ^^  at 
finances,   **"*  ahigher  authority  was  set  up 
that   some  kind  of   higne  station. 
Langley  -  and  he  stayed  at  x  sjil  ^  &  ds 
_,-«   is   concerned,    nrsi  «  ,         is  material  from 
As  far  as  •-!••  a*51*™  ^  Ho^'c^  of  .*.  material  "?»"/*"„,.*   research 
»0,.  ea»  «  -»«•  *!"t  H     c^,  Tt"£T&  S„  
%K«     sa°'ar«  actu.il, 
«»,'.-  a  tinv  minority  o.   tne  s  tbat  n0u  aj.i  «  e  ^  say  of 
S*   speaU  directly  o*«   *»*»£  Jl*^tB  i«mrn.li.t.;^S«jlxsW  ^^ 
enaaged    in  espionage  •«!--«  Rentalicy,   specially  trained, 
another  hue,    and   of   a  di-feren.  _      conncctlon  with  this,  what  was  this  . 
"    -  ov~u<;c  ne  but,    in  conned  •-  ess  conference, 
'      Diet  Aleksandrovicr.,   e^u*c  °         vou  mentioned   at  the  press  , 
•  Ponomarev j      Oxeg  «"  ^  'r.arta    s   bureau,    yui 
Intricate   organization      ...i     .^.    .his? 
could   you   comment    xn  _e-<--
III.      6    iun  86  A  A  USSR  INTERNATIONAL  AFFAIRS    " 
UNITED  STATES   £.  CANADA. 
[Tuir.a-  ov]     Yes,   I  will  now  really  tell  it  all.     This  is  very  importan-. .     On  Boulevard    ' 
St.   Germain,  house  No   193,  there  is  a  so-called  Audience  Research  Department.     At  least 
that   is  its  official  title.     A  number  of  people  work  there.     3ut  that  is  just  a  part  of 
it,   a  subdepartment ,  that   is,  to  the  main  department.      It  has   its  own  subdepartments   in 
many  towns  of  Western  Europe  and  the  United  States  of  America,  say,   in  Vienna, 
Salzburg,  Copenhagan,   Rome  —  I  could  continue  this  list.     What  are  this  department 
and  its  subdepartments  specifically  engaged  in?     It  is  headed  by  Gene  Parta,  a  trained 
American  intelligence  officer,  and  Charles  Allan  also  a  trained  American  intelligence 
officer,  although  his  cover  is  that  he  is  an  Oxford  graduate.     Sever  mind. 
In  recent  years  a  number  of  citizens  have  left  the  Soviet  Union  in  order,   say,   to 
reunite  with  their  families,  to  Israel,  but  not  all  of  them  go  straight  to   Israel, 
some  of  them  go  to  the  United  States.     In  these  cases  these  people  settle  for  a  while 
either  in  Vienna  or  Rome,  where  they  are,  so  to  speak,  checked  over  by  American  intel- 
ligence.     It   is  not  just  a  check  over,  but  a  gathering  of  information.     Parta fs  bureau 
has  people  in  these  American,  intelligence  departments  in  Vienna  and  Rome  and  also  uses 
info  mat  ion  in  the  sense  that  it  gathers  inforration  required  by  the  radio  station. 
This   is  where  they  get  hold  of  it,  but  in  some  jf  their  other  bureaus  they  gather 
material  for   intelligence,   that  is  they  provide  the  material.      Some  of  this  material 
is  needed  by  the  radio  station  with  the  purpose  of  gathering  information  about  the 
quality  ?f  the  broadcasts,  what  sort  of  programs  are  successful,  which  should  perhaps 
be  axed. 
But   at   the  same  time  —  I  saw  these  questionnaires  —  people  are  asked  questions  on 
quite  different  issues  which,   in  principle,  the  station  should  have  no  interest  in 
whatsoever.      These  could  be  questions  —  there  are  questions  —  of  a  military  nature, 
in  particular;  there  are  also  questions  about  the  development,  say,  of  the  road  network 
in  the  Soviet  Union,   that  also  comes  into  the  military  field.     And  immigrants  are  sub- 
jected to  obligatory  questioning."    Delegations  come  in  from  the  Soviet  Union,   individual 
tourists  arrive,  and   these  people  —  Soviet  citizens  —  nay  also  be  approached  and 
introduced.      All  the  people  who  work  with  Parta  speak  excellent  Russian,  and  perhaps 
indirectlv  they  gain  their  confidence,  perhaps  all  different  kinds' of  methods  are  used, 
bu-   nevertheless  thev  trv  to  ret  information  that  they  obtain,   say,  from  emigres.     Of 
co— se,   this  might  be  a  ainicia  of   information,  but  the  fact   is  that  in  all   —  every 
particle  of   this  mosaic   gathered  together  or  one  canvas  —  provides  a  very  accurate 
and  clear  picture  of  certain  events  in  th        -viet  Union. 
But  on-   might   also   say   that  Parta's  bureau  in  Paris  on  Boulevard  St.   Germain  is 
equipped  with  a  special  computer,   thanks  to  which  information  is  also  summarized 
along  certain   parameters,   including  those  which  interest  the  American   [word   indistinct] 
military. 
In  addition,   the  radio  station  has  a  number  of  departments  that, operate  directly  for 
the  Central   Intelligence  Agency.     At  the  Foreign  Ministry  news  conference  I  was  asked 
about   some  of   these  departments.      Among  these  were  the  Red  Archives,  which  exists  at 
the  radio   station.     What  does  it  do?     People  sit  ther ,  slicing  through  the  Soviet  ..press 
and   placing  news  items   in  separate  files,  filling  cards,  and  keeping  card  indexes ^  , 
Nevertheless,   all   this  material   that   is  gathered  and   sorted   m  various  parameters 
orsvides   the  opportunity  to  .sake  judgements  about  many  things   in   Soviet  li.e,    for 
instance  about   the  development  of   the  Soviet   economy;   about   changes  at   tne  top  in 
««v  leadershin;   and   even   forecasting,  perhaps,    these  changes   sometimes;    to  speak 
a=out    foreign  poiicv   and   forecast,  perhaps,   future  foreign  policy.      All  this  material 
is    registered   and   sent    to  Washington  in  the   for*  oi   a   special  dossier. 
-*-    'here    is   the   Research   ueoartment.      The   Research   Department    is  more   specialized 
::':".;^I   -"orde-        That  means    that    instructions   nigh:    con*    rror.    kasr.ingtor.   and 
.....    -o.ks    ..    o.ae-.      ina.  research   oeosit   a:    Radio  Liberty    assess 
raterii".   r.a;     oe   preparec.   sa;  .    or.   nov    ^.nc   r^L  . 
- -.-.   :::=:e:::    ::.    say,   th~   Z~'~~'.-  concress.
FOREIGN  BROADCAST  INFORMATION  SERVICE  <  F3IS  ) 
USSR  -  Daily  Reports,  January  7,  1937,  p.  CC5. 
POXOMAREV  DESCRIBES  'SAD  FATE'  OF  DEFECTORS 
PM061025  Moscow  IZVSSTIYA  in  Russian  5  Jan  87  Morning  Edition  p  h 
{TASS  Observer  Viktor  Ponomarev  Article  written  for  I2VESTIYA.:   "The  •Diminishing 
Returns*  of  Treachery"] 
[t.x.]  "I  want  to  get  to  America,  where  I'll  be  able  to  say  what  I  like  and  live  as  1 
UkV"  This  is  what,  according  to  his  recollections,  Murat  Kanmov,  a  former  Soviel 
citizen  who  fled  abroad,  told  the  Turkish  border  guards  about  his  reasons  for  appearmj 
on  their  coast.  Soon  afterwards  he  was'  transported  to  Munich,  -here  CIA  staffer, 
-he-ked  and  interrogated  him  for  3  months  in  a  safe  apartment  under  reliable  guard.  H« 
:Ts  convinced T  thatf  being  a  serviceman,  he  would  be  able  to  "offer"  something  to  the 
Americans  and  would  receive  an  "appropriate  reward"  in  return  He  was  assured  that  ir 
jtew  v"rt  there  is  a  "Tols.oy  Foundation"  which  would  help  him  to  learn  English,  fm< 
him  somewhere  to  live,  and  supply  him  with  pocket  money. 
►  ».   ,f>OT.  hi«=  arrival  in  the  United  States,  he  sits  with  (Peyman  Pedzhmen) 
orksTondent  of  THE  WASHINGTON  POST  NATIONAL  MEEKLY  EDITION,  and  laments  his  fate:   H. 
"neUhe  \    job  nor  the  promised  knowledge  of  the  language  to  enable  him  to  ear, 
anything  and  is  up  to  his  neck  in  debt,  since  he  borrows  spending  money  from  a  f riend 
Aside  Som  the  monthly  rent  for  his  apartment  and  S^O  to  ser  up  home,  Karimov  sighs,  h, 
has  received  absolutely  nothing  from  the  foundation. 
"Ah  yes."  the  U.S.  journalist  bitterly  echoes  him.  "Many  refugees  find  the  promise* 
land 'highly  inhospitable." 
That  is  the  phrase  he  used  for  the  headline  of  an  article  describing  the  collapse  61 
Ihe  iUusions"  of  former  Soviet  citizens  who  have  broken  away  from  their  motherland  «| 
whom  he  met  in  America. 
Y-  another  eloquent  admission  of  the  unenviable  fate  of  the  "former  citizens'"?  J 
^"already  seen  a  televi^on =  movie  aW.  them ^™Z^^*™J£* 
truth,  and  have  heard J^^'^^^iiSS  'Sx  ".  nothing  new  to  add  and  $ 
hctr.e.    It   would   see...   "»"*•*  defectors  tperebezhchikij  who  have  betray©* 
(Pedzhmen's)  tears  over  the   sad  faje   or  «  ec  o    IP  article  by  oul 
the  motherland  would  hardly  be  worthy  <£  J"8"^™/^.  \0RK  TIMES  MAGAZINE  in  ear^ 
jjli  noouaintancc  David  Slnplcr.  ^^^peared  inTi  ^J°  ^^^  ^  ^ 
^^*^ 
"Old  acquaintance"      use  until   quit,   race   Y  *        everythin 
correspondent  in  Moscow  and  was  .£°"  '»  ^P1^,,  the  ocean".  So  he  has  firsthand 
••Soviet"  and  to  gossip  about  life  over  there,  across 
k::ovleugs  of  the  essence  of  the  problem.  ^ 
.   ,     c      .-   ^h^oler  writes.  de*ectojrsfrcrL.the  Soviet  Union  and  Eas_t  Eurofe 
Life  in  America...   [paragraph  continues] 
JF-87.2
cc  ,  USSR  INTERNATIONAL  AFFAIRS 
III.  7  Jan  87  WORLD  I   REGIONAL  ISSUES 
,   The,  start  in  filled  1*.  ^^^"^'^^^'i^S 
'      l^T^'T^^ulV^^y  '££.  ~~  endless  ~  -  cpportunUUs.. . 
•„»  ,c»  is  an  extremely  apt  journalistic  proviso.  Where  is  it.  that 
y  ^J IlLSSSSi."   Let"  hear ^t  'hose  who  have  plunged  into  it  have  to  say 
^cc^^  And  ve  quote:  •      ^ 
-A  refugSe  fro.  the  Soviet  Union  ^^^^^jK-  EoloUSn. 
radio  stations  like  VOA  while  you  were  still  xn  *«£»«      /  f 
Ske  a  castle  in  the  air  or  a  house  *«£«"- 1*££ Sof  raeaC  y„as  in  the  States 
recall  hearing  a  VOA  program  to»c»*  ^eh£?  *  or  other  had  obtained  a  wonderful 
compared  with  the  Soviet  Union,  and  ^  ^^f  ^"J  the  United  States.  They  never 
job  and  started  living  in  luxury  as  soon  as  he  got  t         ^^      ^   everyChing 
directly  say  to  you:  /^^T^J^^^eep  on  dropping  hints  to  nake  people  think 
you  can  imagine.   But  I  would  "y  that  they  Keep       «£      ^      oU  ^.^  ^ 
U    taking  such  a  st=?-'  ^?'  *apP^*  *Hhat  you  bm't  the  slightest  idea  on  whose 
left  with  a  mass  of  opportunxtxes,  except  tnac  yo 
door  to  knock  and  how  the  local  system  wor«... 
t.  „.,.»  wol*  •  He-e  is  what  THE  WASHINGTON  POST 
But  it  must  be  said  that  the  system  works  very  wel..  He.e 
has  to  say  about  it: 
•p*  ea«  that  she  has  "difficulties  in  relationships" 
Aleksandra  Kosta,  a  diplomat's  wife,  says ,  that  she  n s  ^   ^  ^  ^ 
since  people  do  not  understand  her  ^«itx.l^  *r  ^   ^  ^.^  ^^  ^ 
children,  you  are  not  young,  and  you  win  not 
a  secretary! .. 
K.SS!  S.'™U2JTiX^J  J 
^  
"fusee  conization  in  ».  Y»r„,  vhere  5he 
was  offered  a  job  on  a  farm... 
....  a  f^  "mass  of  opportunities"?  Here  is  what 
What  about  the  -  of  opportunities"  and  the  mass  of  opp  ^  ^  ^^ 
the  actual  "bosses"  who  deal  with  refugees  hav   to  say  believed,  as  THE 
SSli).  executive  director  of  ^e  Tolstoy  Foundat^ l0  If  ^  ^  bear  „  Ul 
WASHINGTON  POST  notes,  this  organxzatxon  xs  in ^n  /  foundation."  According  to 
responsibility  for  refugees  and  '••"^'JW^e  ^art-r.ent  of  State,  (Marian)  says,  we 
an  unwritten  agreement  between  ^"^*  "J^nor  90  days,  but  that  is  all!  0£ 
are  morally  obliged  to  keep  an  eye  on .  out  ci  government,  but  the  money  is  spent 
course,  we  receive  S560>  per  "^"J™^  ^"^assment.  As  for  any  promises, 
Minlr^;at^^U^U«nt  in  his  field,  these  hopes  stem  fro, 
according  to  inarian;,  *«»v»  *"  .  ., 
"misunderstandings  and  lack  of  information. 
.  ..    ,   r*  to  a  NEW  YORK  TIMES  MAGAZINE 
Washington  lawver  William  Seimer  read  a  sim iia    ""  '  ivate  organization,  founded  ir 
correspondent.'  He  heads  the  "Jamestown  rc^daU...   pr ♦*     *f  the  lotelllgenMl,. 
Chicago  in  198.,  which  is  concerned  with ^-^ -  •  ^  repairs  typewriters,  another 
from  las,  Europe.   He  subsidizes  25  of  tr    one        ^   ^^  ^  qui.e     ,c, 
is  still  harried  by  lawyers  and  «w~c.s.^.  _   u,.e.   .n   another   sxmiia! 
conc-rns.   but   as   for   opportunities.  ...ne     ._-   ^  _        New  Y„k   which  issue, 
"jan^lon.   7ha  =  is  the  "™*^™\^    "^.ot     complain:   Others  are  no, 
defectors  with... 5*5  each-^   So.  Hurat  wr- 
getting  any  better  "breaks  .
0SSR  INTERNATIONAL  AFFAIRS 
,  ,   R7  CC  '  WORLD  t.   REGIONAL  ISSUES 
III.  7  Jan  a/ 
1  ofte"  „n  Lomise  escapers,  deserters,  and  retuSe*  le  anything,  because 
as  soon  as  tney 
for  all  of  «s..."  ^  ^         whQ 
r-s^ss^s:  ^:&. »  «*-.  -  -  «-u,  -  r 
i°f!t,h  its  "unlimited  opportunities...' 
^th  Us"  ilwV..  opportunities 
Looked  after!  For  a  while 
t    ~i*a  after!      For  a  wniie... 
Looked  alter.  refugees  encountering 
•       »    erave    problem    of    lack   of   ««de"*andin6  *"*    could    give    serious     food    for 
-There    xs    •  J^TJS [psychological    difficulties        They    cou        g  ^   ^    ^   the 
various    ?c"°"aln  "f  a^ade    or    so    to    any    *««»"»    who    may  ^  States  and 
^•Sd'scates^     "this    is  what  -rries   one   of    those  who   fl*^   ^    his    relatives. 
^sha-e^f^bet-yal.    and   ^-"^.^^7^0^   been    refused    further 
^ndLshiS  ^rwhV^e%-l"    of^ack  of  understanding"  bas  arisen... 
subsidies.     This  Mt   ^  vast  as  lt 
t„  -sea  of  opportunities"  proves  to  be.  even  for  the  Ul  ^  up  ouUUy  , 
SJT  to  beWfro«  afar.  It  is  'f^se  of  "/lea  Orivoios.  vhose  fate  vas  reported 
Seversibie •      %<™£ L-dsin„e«  ep«  KAACSCK,  CO^ST. 
a  few  days  ago  by  the  .«etne  scandal       clamor,     an< 
.  ctIy    .    year    since    she    left    the    ■"***£,£?  .St '.ret    sbo»    o, 
It     'V""'1'    Vlp«l«.     leader    of    a    Uoeral    par-y    »«      ^  van  Voore„  (also  know 
as   Johannes    Baks).    a   CIA     g  ^  un(Jer  hl£        al   and   «sum  I£RS  had  alread 
proclaimed  her  to  be     a  famous  p°e 
in  Moscow.  .  m   furnished  by   the   Salvation  Army 
„         t„    «    rundown    apartment    in   Amst erdam    «*««"*,  y£s    also    the    headlin 
A    year    passed.       In    a    *^«^     MPeuninghof f :      "I    was    used.         Tlws ^  pr0cess  an 
SJr^^SS^    ^  iTas^ted  by'the^.^oLaHst. 
aba„deoed   their  -otherUnd.  •  ^   ^   ^  ^   ^   , 
Th.0  first   thin,   that   a    person   findUS  *-£    »£     propa^da    apparato.    Hoes    op 
sc.jrti..ous     stories     aboot     the     ^  ^    "££."„£      btever.    that    this    Is 
ir.t.rvie»    him    for    ' a  tlo„.       It    soon    b  cms    '■<      •  £.na5   MMelf   .„ 
listened     to    »ith    great    «       publieity"   diminishes   day   by   day  en    souaas 
misconception.     ™«     "a"  tlc„l,rly     interested     in     b»»-       ™.  jf  ,c 
sccUty      that     is     f  t,,'',r''4«™-  ttiM    '•    >"    '."""T,<r««<SCSS  COBBfT  vc!« 
Ili^rlT  'tT  Ec-rilA.    ^i.«-«"£.W£.  'Ei'-V  -Plete.y    incorrect    r 
around    hi.   has    •=^o;„i„;    .ith    Crivnina.    ,Tho    >.«.    na 
-^  'iam„c    tried 
T,e   «...    5,™    .. .    ba„P       t!fute<1    impression      °      he 
. 
^   ^   £es[lve   coel„a    pa, 
lannto'her  Vood  beads,   and  she  was   treated  as 
jz    the    editorial   oir-ce.
7  cc  8  USSR  INTERNATIONAL  AFFAIR! 
III.  7  Jan  w/  WRLD  &  REGI0NAL  ISSUES 
But  the'  euphoria  was  soon  over.   "I  should  have  adapted  sooner  in  order- to  becor 
n^ster  of  my  fate  here."  Grivnina  smokes  nervously  while  conversing  with  tJ 
^urnalist,  "but  instead  I  let  myself  be  dragged  all  over  tae  place  to  appear  as 
dissident..." 
She  recalls  how  she  went  off  in  hysterics  at  the  Geneva  press  center  during  the  summ 
meeting: 
"I  was  inexperienced.   Some  people  wanted  me  to  create  a  scandal  there,  and  I  gave 
out  of  emotion." 
••You  were    exploited   by   politicians,    ELSEVIERS,    and    the    'Bukovskiy   Foundation *?»   -  tl 
correspondent  clarifies- 
"I  fully  agree  with   that." 
*      v   j  a       cko  *.9n   nut   of   fresh  mud   to  sling   at  her   former  motherlam 
Sirs?  *^&^j&f3^jrjr£^  jarr1 
no  longer   in  contact  with  the  "Bukovskiy  Foundation. 
-I.,.     Bnw  nuirfclv   the   "pond   of  opportunities"  dried   up!      But   s 
S}r^rT£i™&    £    £?  off  ere'd    Support"  Tn    Bavaria,    where    she    has    be 
•     /       hoS"   "      "live      almost      for      nothing      in      the      home      of      a      successf^ 
promised      she      can        live    £»£      *  "diminishing    returns"    of    treachery    are 
anticommunist...'        For    a    tew    veens.       *»«=  % 
defector's   fate  and   lot. 
.v-        •.!..„   ^n   from   these   people,   and    then   cast   them    off,"    Shipl 
"They  squeeze   everything    thay   can   from   tne se ^  
pe«P -     ,  .       defectors,      They 
of   4  NEW  YORK  TIKES  was  told  by  •»  *£«"»"  '^ve   no   douots   at   all,    and   Robe 
.    that  means   the  CIA,    J^W^^i  £   named  by    the   correspondent   -  and    t 
(     Gates,    first   deputy  director  of    the   CIA,   wno .is  jr  President   Jam 
l       "Jamestown  Foundation."  we  would  add  for  our  P«'-     Jf 
t.r   al I  ^    ^ 
\^     Williams     told    Shipler    that    neither    the '«£«>*    ^"f.        williLs     is     another     we 
SSnST'SSS"-".—  <™  5fST:.rV—  Intellisence  A8encyI  They  a 
incapable,  he  said,  of  providing  "social  services. 
Why?  And  we  quote: 
u  u„^^™^<r  a  rfpf^etor  is  a  traitor  from  any  point 
"People  there  believe  that  anyone  who  becomes  a  derec.oi  is  a 
view,  and  they  treat  defectors  like  dirt.*
III.   5  Jun  86       USSR   INTERNATIONAL   AFFAIRS        Al 
UNITED  STATES  &  CANADA 
TUMANOV  CLAIMS  U.S.  ESPIONAGE  AT  RADIO  LIBERTY     A 
LD0219O3  Moscow  Television  Service  in  Russian  1700  GMT  2  Jun  86 
[Fron  the  "Vremya"  newscast] 
[Text]   Television  and  newspapers  have  received  many  letters  requesting  a  fuller 
account  of  the  subversive  activity  of  Radio  Liberty,  the  Russian-language  service  that 
was  headed  by  Oleg  Tumanov.  Tumanov  recently  spoke  at  a  nevs  conference  in  Moscow. 
Central  television  has  held  a  meeting  between  Oleg  Tumanov  and  representatives  of 
Soviet  press,  television,  and  radio: 
[Begin  Tumanov  recording]  Radio  Liberty  as  such  is  headed  by  Dr  Vaslev.  Dr  Vaslev 
is  a  regular  officer  of  the  U.S.  military  intelligence  service.  The  Russian-language 
service  of  Radio  Liberty  is  directly  headed  by  Golskiy,  Konstantin  Vladimirovich 
Golskiy.  He  is  a  regular  intelligence  officer,  a  U.S.  military  intelligence  officer, 
a  specialist  in  the  methods  of  conducting  psychological  warfare.  He  is  a  major.  At 
the  radio  station  there  are  several  sections  working  directly  for  the  CIA.   [end 
recording]   [Video  shows  Tumanov  speaking  to  eight  men  seated  around  a  table;  the 
namecards  Ponomarev  (initials  indistinct),  D.D.  Biryukov,  and  V.A.  Starkov  are  visible.] 
[Announcer]  Oldg  Aleksandrovich  Tumanov,  who  worked  more  than  20  years  at  the  radio 
station,  in  an  effort  to  put  right  the  mistake  he  made  in  his  youth,  collected  confi- 
dential material  over  a  long  period  of  time  that  unmasks  the  activity  of  the  subversive 
radio  station.  Following  his  return,  he  handed  this  material  over  to  the  relevant 
Soviet  organs.  You  will  be  able  to  see  in  full  the  program  "The  Truth  About  the 
Corporation  of  Lies"  tomorrow  immediately  following  the  "Vremya"  program. 
TASS  Report 
LD032228  Moscow  TASS  in  English  2219  GMT  3  Jun  86 
[Text]  Moscow  June  A  TASS  —  Radio  Liberty  was  set  up  under  the  CIA  auspices  and  is 
still  operating  under  its  guidance,  Oleg  Tumanov,  a  former  editor  of  the  radio  sta- 
tion's Russian  service,  has  revealed.  A  videotape  of  his  meeting  with  representatives 
of  several  Soviet  press  bodies  in  Moscow  was  shown  on  Soviet  television  on  Tuesday. 
According  to  Tumanov,  no  one  could  be  hired  by  Radio  Liberty  without  a  thorough  vetting 
by  U.S.  special  services.  The  radio  station  was  directed  by  Nikolay  Vaslev,  an 
American  career  military  intelligence  officer,  he  said. 
In  Munich,  the  "security  department"  was  headed  by  Richard  Cummings,  a  CIA  officer. 
Robert  Redlich,  in  charge  of  Radio  Liberty's  relations  with  the  press,  Vladimir 
Golskiy,  head  of  the  Russian  service,  Nikolay  Petrov,  assistant  director  of  the 
Russian  service,  and  many  other  senior  and  rank-and-file  employees  of  the  radio 
station  were  serving  at  American  intelligence  departments,  Tumanov  revealed. 
Radio  Liberty,  he  went  on,  had  departments  gathering  information  about  the  USSR: 
"Research  Department",  "Red  Archives",  and  "Samizdat  Archives". 
In  Paris,  there  operated  a  department  studying  the  audience,  headed  by  Jean  Parta 
and  Charles  Allen  (both  CIA  officers).   The  department  had  branches  in  many  Western 
l jropean  cities.
5  J   86  A  2  USSR  INTERNATIONAL  AFFAIRS 
11 1'  UNITED  STATES  £.  CANADA 
Tumanov  said  that  there  existed  a  special  "Censorship  Department"  headed  by  CIA 
official  Sara  Lion. 
Radio  Liberty  maintained  close  contacts  with  branches  of  U.S.  military  intelligence 
having  headquarters  in  Munich  and  its  environs,  Tumanov  pointed  out. 
These  were  intelligence  schools  specializing  in  espionage  against  the  USSR.  "There 
are  two  such  schools  in  Bavaria.  One  is  at  the  McGrow  barracks,  the  other  is  in 
Garmisch-Partenkirchen.   Students  at  the  two  schools  have  free  access  to  the  Radio 
Liberty  area,  to  the  station's  classified  materials  and  files,  while  RL  employees 
deliver  lectures  at  the  schools.  They  train  the  students,  tell  them  how  to  behave 
in  the  USSR  and  East  European  countries,  how  to  establish  contacts  with  Soviet  citi- 
zens for  spying  or  other  subversive  purposes.  The  students  then  move  on  to  Langley, 
the  Pentagon,  and  not  in  the  last  turn,  to  the  embassy  and  other  missions  of  the  U.S. 
in  the  USSR."
POLITICS  YUGOSLAVIA 
YUGOSLAV  CITIZENS  ENTERING  U.S.  ILLEGALLY  VIA  MEXICO  >^ 
Zagreb  VJESNIK  in  Serbo-Croatian  20  Apr  86  p  7 
[Excerpts]  The  small  town  of  Tuzi,  not  far  from  Titograd.   The  starting 
point  for  many  young  Albanians  from  this  district  near  the  border,  who, 
using  the  so-called  Mexican  connection,  depart  for  the  United  States  without 
entry  visas.   Illegally!  Just  recently,  20  young  men  aged  17  to  25 
departed  for  Mexico,  from  which  they  will  endeavor  to  enter  the  "promised 
land." 
Because  this  is  a  very  profitable  business,  special  guides-smugglers  will 
avrait  them  at  the  U.S. -Mexican  border,  and  after  receiving  $5,000  from 
each  youth,  will  attempt  to  get  them  across  the  border.  Many  will  long 
remember  their  walk  through  this  roadless  area  as  a  difficult  golgotha. 
If  it  happens,  as  it  sometimes  has  in  the  past,  that  the  U.S.  Border 
Patrol  catches  them,  each  vill   have  to  pay  an  additional  $5,000.  The 
Americans  return  those  who  cannot  pay  this  amount  to  Mexico,  where  a  new, 
no  less  difficult  test  awaits  them.  Unable  to  endure  all  these  enormous 
strains,  some  kill  themselves  on  their  journey,  and  their  graves  will 
never  be  found,  which  is  the  most  tragic  aspect  of  all  this. 
"My  son  arrived  in  America  via  the  Mexican  connection,  and  when  he  wrote 
to  me  later  about  all  the  horrors  of  that  journey,  I  wept  for  days," 
a  villager  from  Vukasin-Lekici  on  the  Yugoslav-Albanian  border  tells  us. 
The  large-scale  exodus  of  youths  to  America  is  a  big  problem  in  the 
district,  which,  if  the  present  pace  of  departure  persists,  will  be 
left  without  young  inhabitants,  and  it  is  known  what  that  would  mean. 
Emigration  is  an  old  phenomenon  in  this  area,  but  since  the  end  of  1984 
the  rate  has  increased  dramatically.  The  exact  number  of  those  who  have 
departed  is  unknown,  but  the  figure  3,000  is  mentioned.  Demo  Pepic,  a 
member  of  the  Presidium  of  the  Opstina  Conference  of  the  Titograd  SAWT 
and  a  delegate  to  the  Vranj  Communal  Assembly,  estimates  that  about  2,500 
young  people  have  emigrated. 
And  Djerdj  Berisa,  teacher  of  history  and  former  director  of  the*  inter- 
mediate school,  who  was  among  the  first  to  publicly  warn  about  the  harmful 
consequences  of  this  emigration,  reports  that  this  plague  has  affected 
even  elementary  school  students;  they  can  hardly  wait  to  finish  school 
while  hoping  for  a  trip  across  the  ocean. 
103
"Previously  young  people  went  to  America  with  their  parents.  Mow  they 
go  alone.  Anyway,  air  passage  to  Mexico  and  certain  other  services  cost 
about  200  million  old  dinars.  I  think  a  business  has  arisen  around  all 
this  which  some  of  our  people  in  our  country  are  participating  in.  It 
is  my  impression  that  everything  is  conducted  in  an  organized  manner, 
from  agitation  among  the  youth  to  their  departure  from  Tuzi.  Who  knows 
how  many  stations  there  are  on  that  road.  Upon  their  arrival  in  Mexico 
these  young  people  fall  into  the  hands  of  suspicious  characters  who  try  to 
extract  as  much  money  as  possible  from  them,  even  by  extortion.  Five 
thousand  dollars  are  no  longer  enough  for  crossing  the  Mexican-U.S. 
border;  because  of  the  favorable  conditions,  the  price  has  gone  up," 
One  of  the  four  sons  of  Pasko  Dresaj,  56,  an  agricultural  producer  from 
the  vicinity  of  Tuzi,  departed  for  America  via  the  Mexican  connection 
19  months  ago  and  now  lives  in  Detroit. 
"When  he  left,  I  felt  terrible.  However,  he  was  genuinely  ill  until  he 
left.  What  could  I  do?  I  gave  him  the  money  and  wished  him  a  safe  journey. 
I  have  only  a  little  land,  and  if  I  divided  it  into  five  parts  none  of 
us  would  have  any  place  to  keep  a  cow.  Nonetheless,  I  would  have  preferred 
it  if  my  son  had  remained  at  home.  I  know  that  a  difficult  life  awaits 
him  there.  He  lives  illegally;  he  does  not  have  a  work  permit.  People 
like  him  to  the  dirty  jobs,  dodging  the  police,  for  if  they  are  caught 
without  residence  permits,  they  will  be  expelled,  as  some  from  this  area 
have  been.  Their  difficulties  last  for  3  or  4  years,  until  they  obtain 
work  and  residence  permits.  One  must  wait  for  that,"  says  Pasko,  who  was 
recently  in  America  and  witnessed  in  person  the  hard  lives  of  many  young 
people  from  this  area. 
/96Q4 
CSO:   2800/240  END 
104
COMMENTARY  ON  LETTER  TO  REAGAN  REGARDING  KUKLINSKI  V/ 
LD191834  Warsaw  Television  Service  in  Polish  1730  GMT  19  Jun  86 
[Text]  Alojyz  Mazewski,  chairman  of  the  Congress  of  the  American  Polonia  [Poles  living 
abroad],  was  offended  by  the  Department  of  State  statement  on  Kuklinski,  an  American 
spy,  which,  we  quote:  Does  not  answer  many  questions  important  to  Poles  and  Americans 
of  Polish  origin!  In  connection  with  this,  the  Voice  of  America  reports,  he  sent  a 
letter  tc  President  Reagan  in  which  he  asked  why  Kuklinski  could  not  find  a  job  after 
his  arrival  in  the  United  States;  why  U.S.  broadcasting  stations  have  not  yet 
interviewed  him;  and  finally,  why  solidarity  was  not  warned  about  the  planned 
declaration  of  martial  law. 
Had  Mr  Hazewski  acquainted  himself  with  the  Polish  Government  press  spokesman's 
statements,  he  would  not  have  had  to  pretend  to  be  absolutely  naive  and  would  have 
understood  Washington's  embarassment.  However,  one  ought  to  agree  with  one  statement 
by  the  chairman  of  American  Polonia,  namely,  we  quote:  The  trust  and  friendship  of  the 
Polish  nation  toward  America  has  been  undermined!  Let  us  add:  Toward  the  U.S. 
Administration,  and  not  for  the  first  time. 
WASHINGTON'  'SILENT'  OVER  KUKLINSKI  AFFAIR 
LDl 12325  Warsaw  Domestic  Service  in  Polish  1700  GMT  11  Jun  86 
[Report  by  correspondent  Grzegorz  Wozniak  from  New  York] 
X 
[Text]  Not  having  any  convincing  arguments,  official  Washington  has  fallen  silent  in 
the  so-called  Kuklinski  case.  However  the  weekly  press  has  returned  to  the  case.  TIME 
underlines  that  the  State  Department  has  been  unable  to  deny  that  Kuklinski  was  a  U.S. 
agent.  He  was  evacuated  from  Poland  by  the  CIA  before  the  introduction  cf  martial  law 
and  he  is  staying  in  the  United  States  under  an  assumed  name.  TIME  also  quotes 
another  extract  of  a  statement  by  State  Department  spokesnan  in  which  he  admits  that 
the  United  States  did  indeed  have  information  about  the  activities  of  the 
constitutional  authorities  of  Poland,  and  TIME  repeats  the  spokesman's  statement  that 
this  information  was  incomplete. 
When  confronted  with  facts  —  facts  which  the  State  Department  also  cannot  deny  —  this 
last  thesis  is  clearly  faise,  while  the  activities  of  the  United  States  in  the  latter 
months  of  19S1  are  politically  and  morally  repulsive.
DEPUTY  CHIEF  ON  'ANTI-SOVIET  ACTIONS' 
141219  Belgrade  TANJUG  in  English  2314  GMT  13  Jun  86 
•Text]  Moscow,  June  13  (TANJUG)  —  First  Deputy  Chairman  of  the  Soviet  State  Security 
Ccmnittee  (KGB)  Filip  Bobkov  has  disclosed  that  around  3,000  anti-Soviet  actions  were 
undertaken  in  the  past  year,  which  he  said  required  a  higher  alertness  on  the  part  of 
Soviet  citizens. 
In  article  published  in  the  party  magazine  POLITICHESKOYE  SAMOOBRAZOVANIYE  (POLITICAL 
SELF-EDUCATION),  Bobkov  writes  that  the  perpetrators  of  the  anti-Soviet  actions  were 
"anti-Soviet  emigre,  nationalist,  and  Zionist  organizations".  The  actions,  as  he 
notes,  included  the  planting  of  explosives  and  fires,  the  use  of  fire  arms,  bribes,  and 
•ioience. 
Vhe  first  deputy  KGB  chairman  notes  that  "numerous  Soviet  citizens  were  threatened  or 
■uniiiated,  beaten  or  robbed",  and  singles  out  the  provocations  staged  during  guest 
:ours  abroad  of  Soviet  artists. 
icbkov  writes  in  the  article  that  the  foes  are  trying  to  paralyze  Soviet  institutions 
orking  abroad,  and  that  Western  intelligence  services  "have  been  shoving  an  increased 
interest  in  the  Soviet  scientific-technical,  military,  and  economic  potential  . 
o  reports  that  "in  the  past  few  years,  criminal  proceedings  have  been  instituted 
-.-a last  a  whole  range  of  employees  of  Soviet  foreign-trade  organizations  for  receiving 
.ribes  and  betraying  the  interests  of  their  country". 
'he  Jirst  deputy  KGB  chairman  also  makes  note  6f  attempts  to  fan  inter-nationality  dis- 
■ord,  naming,  in  addition  to  Western  radio  stations,  Iran  radio,  which,  as  he  says,  is 
)re--ding  "pan-Islamic  propaganda"  in  the  Soviet  Central  Asia  and  Kazakstan.
RETURNED  EXILES  CRITICIZE  U.S.  WAY  OF  LIFE 
LD282038  Moscow  TASS  in  English  1717  CMT  28  Oct  86 
["Fleeing  From  the  Statue  of  Liberty"  —  TASS  item  identifier] 
[ExcerptJ  Moscow  October  28  TASS  —  News  analyst  Aleksey  Grigoryev  writes: 
The  great  Russian  writer  Ivan  Turgenev  once  said  that  Russia  can  manage  without  each  of 
us  while  each  of  us  will  never  snanage  without  her.
t   III.  29  Oct  86  n  -; 
UNITED  STATES  {,  CANADA 
These  words  invariably  cone  to  my  mind  when  I  learn  about  the  return  of  yet  another 
"has  been".  Mikhail  Gorokhovskiy,  born  in  Soviet  Ukraine,  spent  abroad  almost  nine 
years  ("No",  he  specifies,  "exactly  5,020  days").  An  ordinary  driver,  maybe  he  never 
knew  these  lines  from  Turgenev  but  in  Washington  he  would  co~.e  to  the  Soviet  Embassy 
with  a  poster  reading  "One  can  live  without  one's  father  or  mother,  but  life  is 
impossible  without  one's  motherland". 
After  experiencing  all  the  "unlimited  possibilities"  of  the  American  way  of  life  — 
unemployment,  exploitation,  rightlessness  and  cruelty  —  Mikhail  Gorokhovskiy  was 
permitted  by  the  Soviet  authorities  to  return  to  his  homeland. 
Israel  Glikman,  a  former  resident  of  the  Black  Sea  port  of  Odessa,  was  met  at  Mosocw's 
Sheremetyevo  Airport  by  his  wife  and  nephew.  Bis  daughter  could  not  come  because  of 
her  two  small  children.  Glikman  did  not  have  any  grandchildren  twelve  years  ago  when 
he  was  leaving  for  Israel  and  than  on  to  the  United  States.  "How  right  was  my  wife 
Sonya  when  she  flatly  refused  to  go  with  me",  he  said. 
Aleksandr  Belikin  arrived  on  the  same  flight  from  New  York  after  ten  years  in  the 
United  States,  or  "ten  years  in  prison"  as  he  described  then. 
Human  lives,  difficult  hu-ran  lives.  These  people  did  not  leave  the  Soviet  Union  for 
the  sake  of  unifying  families.  Many  of  them,  like  Glikman,  left  without  their  wives 
and  children.  The  promises  of  Western  propaganda  made  them  giddy.  Many,  like 
Gorokhovskiy  and  Belikin,  lost  their  families  in  the  West. 
Why  had  they  left  the  Soviet  Union?  "I  fell  for  Zionist  propaganda  and  lost  my 
senses,"  says  Gorokhovskiy.  "He  gave  in  to  the  persuasions  of  a  relative  and  was 
deceived  by  him",  said  Glikrran's  wife. 
But  that  is  only  a  part  of  the  story.  It  is  not  by  chance  that  only  on  finding 
themselves  in  the  West/  in  the  shadow  of  the  Statue  of  Liberty  that  these  people  had 
really  come  to  appreciate  what  they  had  in  the  Soviet  Union,  took  for  granted  and  did 
not  appreciate:  genuine  rights,  and  not  just  rights  on  a  piece  of  paper,  to  work  and 
housing,  to  education  and  medical  treatment,  relations  of  human  concern  and  mutual 
assistance.  They  took  it  all  for  granted  as  something  as  natural  as  the  air,  water  and 
the  sun.  "All  this  simply  must  exist  in  America  as  well  which  is  also  a  land  of 
'unlimited  opportunities,"'  they  reasoned. 
Everything  turned  out  to  be  different.  This  was  the  topic  of  a  recent  press  conference 
at  the  Soviet  Embassy  in  Washington  held  by  former  Soviet  citizens  who  were  permitted 
to  return  home.  They  spoke  at  length  and  in  detail  but  the  coverage  of  this  press 
conference  in  the  American  press  was  very  scant  and  limited  mostly  to  words  about 
nostalgia,  about  a  longing  for  friends  and  relatives,  birch  trees  and  the  Black  Sea. 
For  the  American  press  to  quote  the  words  of  the  participants  in  the  press  conference 
about  the  cruelty  of  the  "free"  society,  its  hypocricy,  Ihe  money  cult  and  abasement  of 
the  individual  would  be  tantamount  to  passing  sentence  on  that  society  which, 
incidentally,  is  capable  of  wrecking  the  lives  not  only  of  those  who  have  grown  up  in  a 
different  social  enviornment . 
The  Western  propaganda  is  now  trying  to  hold  these  people  responsible  for  their 
reccvery  of  sight  and  presenting  them  as  good-for-nothings  incapable  of  finding  a  place 
for  themselves  in  the  world  of  free  enterprise.   [passage-  omitted] 
nutnsfnmxxxrrmtfxa'. 
^"^•KHwsrr^Jsrar
SOVIET  SEAMAN  DISCUSSES  NEW  ORLEANS  'PROVOCATION" 
LD040945  Moscow  in  English  to  North  America  2300  GMT  3  Mar  86 
[Text J  Four  months  have  passed  since  the  American  authorities  in  the  port  of  New 
Orleans  staged  a  provocation  against  the  Soviet  seaman.  Radio  Moscow's  Anatoliy 
(?Ilchinko)  has  met  with  the  26-year-old  seaman,  Miroslav  Medvid,  and  sent  in  this 
report. 
Miroslav  was  born  and  spent  his  childhood  in  the  Ukraine.  Nov  he  lives  in  the  city  of 
Lvov.  He  says  he  hasn't  recovered  yet  from  what  he  experienced  in  the  American  port 
last  October.  About  his  condition  he  had  this  to  say: 
"I'm  still  undergoing  medi-il  treatment,  staying  at  home,  trying  to  forget  everything. 
I  lived  through  as  a  res.  ^  of  the  provocation.   I  spent  2  months  with  my  parents  in 
the  village  of  (?Solets)  in  the  Trans  Carpathian  Ukraine.  My  mother  is  working  in 
the  local  farm  cooperative  and  my  father  is  a  miner.  He  began  working  in  the  pit 
almost  30  years  ago.  Meetings  with  relatives  and  friends  have  been  the  best  medicine. 
I  was  so  psychologically  depressed  that  only -positive  emotions  could  pull  me  out  of 
the  crisis." 
Wiat  led  to  the  crisis  happened  on  24  October  last  year.  The  Soviet  ship  Marshal 
Konyev  arrived  at  the  port  of  New  Orleans  to  take  grain  on  board.   In  the  evening 
Miroslav,  an  electrician,  was  checking  the  lighting.  One  of  the  searchlights  on  deck 
was  out  of  order;  Miroslav  tried  to  reach  it,  but  slipped  and  fell  overboard.
III.   4  Mar  86  A  6  USSR  INTERNATIONAL  AFFAIRS 
UNITED  STATES  &  CANADA 
An  American  motorboat  was  passing  by  and  fished  the  seaman  out,  returning  bin  to  the 
ship.   It  seemed  nothing  extraordinary  had  happened,  except  that  Miroslav  was  bruised 
when  he  fell  and  was  taken  to  the  sick  bay.   However,  a  few  days  later  the  American 
authorities  arrested  the  ship.  They  did  not  explain  why.  Here's  what  Miroslav  Medvid 
recalls: 
"On  28  October,  when  I  felt  better,  representatives  of  the  American  authorities  ar- 
rived. They  said  they  wanted  to  take  me  to  a  Red  Cross  clinic   I  said  no  I  wouldn't 
go.   They  said  they  would  ask  me  questions  at  some  other  piece.  They  insisted  I  go 
with  them  to  an  American  vessel  to  talk.   I  said  I  would  if  ny  fellow  countrymen  ac- 
companied me.  As  a  result,  two  men  from  our  embassy  in  Washington  —  the  captain,  the 
doctor,  and  myself  —  went  to  a  U.S.  Navy  launch.  There  I  was  treated  in  a  high- 
handed way,  with  a  light  shining  in  my  face.   There  were  many  reporters  around  r.e,  and 
probably  30  if  not  40  policemen  behind  me.   I  could  not  understand  what  was  happening, 
and  I  was  again  beginning  to  feel  bad.  I  had  a  splitting  headache;  I  limped  in  my 
right  leg  and  had  an  injured  arm." 
However,  Miroslav  quickly  understood  what  the  representatives  of  the  American  authori- 
ties were  driving  at  when  they  began  to  persuade  him  that  he  had  deliberately  jumped 
off  the  Soviet  ship  to  escape  and  ask  for  political  asylum.  At  the  same  time,  they 
tried  to  persuade  him  to  defect.   He  was  promised  all  the  boons  of  life  in  America. 
When  he  said  he  was  a  Soviet  citizen  and  was  not  going  to  renain  in  the  United  States, 
the  Americans  pretended  not  to  hear.   But  hard  as  they  tried  to  provoke  the  Soviet 
seaman,  they  failed  to  achieve  what  they  wanted;  so  they  had  to  lift  the  arrest  of 
the  Soviet  ship  and  let  Miroslav  go  home.  Nothing  came  either  of  the  provocative 
noise  raised  by  emigrants  of  Ukrainian  origin.   They  all  were  former  criminals  who 
collaborated  with  the  Nazis  during  the  Second  World  War  and  who  had  found  refuge  In  the 
United  States  after  the  war.   But  what  about  Miroslav?  What  plans  does  he  have  for  the 
near  future? 
"I'd  like  to  resume  work  as  soon  as  possible,  and  also  I'd  like  to  enroll  at  Lvov 
University  to  study  law."
III.  25  Jun  86     USSR   INTERNATIONAL   AFFAIRS  A  1 
UNITED  STATES  &  CANADA 
U.S.  'ESPIONAGE'  ACTIVITIES  IN  USSR  DETAILED  ^x 
PM241609  Moscow  I2VESTIYA  in  Russian  25  Jun  86  Morning  Edition  p  6 
(V.  Vladimirov  Article:   "The  Fall  Meeting  Will  Not  Take  Place:  Failure  of  a  Pentagon 
Intelligence  Agent"] 
CText]  Moscow,  Kastanayevskaya  Street,  7  May  1986.  The  twilight  is  rapidly  deepening. 
The  woman  standing  by  a  car  with  a  diplomatic  license  plate  from  the  U.S.  Embassy  in 
Moscow  glances  timidly  from  side  to  side.  She  looks  tensely  in  the  direction  from  which 
the  man  she  is  waiting  for  should  appear.  She  is  Ursula  Sites,  an  American.  She  is 
waiting  for  Eric  Sites,  her  husband,  a  professional  intelligence  agent  listed  on  the  U.S; 
Embassy  payroll  as  a  civilian  assistant  to  the  defense  attache.  She  is  waiting  for  his 
return  from  a  spy  meeting  in  order  to  immediately  deliver  him  and  the  expected  "catch" 
to  the  premises  of  the  intelligence  department  at  the  American  Embassy,  which  are  reli- 
ably protected  by  the  Marines. 
Ursula  will  be  waiting  a  long  time,  hoping  desparately,  before  she  realizes  that  Eric 
Sites  is  not  going  to  return  to  the  rendezvous  with  her  on  Kastanayevskaya  Street... 
At  that  time  Eric  Sites,  civilian  assistant  on  the  apparatus  of  the  defense  attache,  has 
quite  different  concerns:  He  has  been  caught  red-handed  during  a  conspiratorial  meeting, 
carefully  prepared  for  by  the  U.S.  special  services,  with  an  agent  recruited  by  American 
intelligence,  and  is  watching  in  anguish  as  the  tools  of  the  spy's  trade  are  removed  one 
by  one  from  the  blue  bag  he  was  intending  to  give  to  the  agent.  Here  is  a  "Kharkov" 
electric  razor  —  in  reality  adapted  to  act  as  a  container  for  storing  spy  equipment. 
The  most  thorough  external  inspection  will  not  arouse  any  suspicions.  That  is  the  in- 
tention: Nobody  must  have  any  idea  that  there  is  a  secret  compartment  inside  that  can 
conceal  a  mini-camera  the  size  of  a  tube  of  toothpaste  designed  for  photographing  secret 
documents.  Here  is  a  little  cardboard  box  with  a  souvenir  writing  implement  manufactured 
at  the  Moscow  Writing  Materials  Plant  named  for  Sacco  and  Vanzetti.  In  this,  too,  the 
American  espionage  "craftsmen"  have  fitted  a  secret  compartment.   It  is  in  a  little  de- 
pression covered  by  a  metallic  plate,  designed  for  a  mini-camera. 
phial  is  taken  out  of  the  bag:  Our  pharmacists  sell  vitamins  in  these  phials.  Inside 
are  tablets  designed  for  invisible  writing;  they  have  to  be  dissolved  in  water.  En- 
velopes with  addresses  in  the  United  Stater  are  laid  on  the  table.   Ordinary  envelopes 
such  as  can  be  bought  at  any  kiosk.   In  them  are  letters  in  English,  harmless  in  content; 
the  authors  share  their  impressions  of  a  tour  of  our  country,  they  like  our  historical 
and  cultural  monuments.   Similar  letters,  but  written  by  American  tourists,  leave  our 
country  by  hundreds  and  cross  the  ocean.  But  these  two  are  special.  They  were  to  have 
provided  the  cover  for  espionage  reports  to  the  intelligence  center.  The  addresses  on 
the  envelopes  are  genuine,  the  address  are  one  (Rudi  Komak)  in  Brookfield,  Wisconsin, 
and  one  Arnold  (Iston)  in  (Bvern),  Texas.  The  agent  must  enter  an  encoded  text  on  the 
margins  of  these  letters  or  between  the  lines,  in  invisible  ink.   If  the  report  xs  im- 
portant, American  intelligence  instructions  advise  duplicating  the  letters  and  dropping 
them  in  different  mailboxes.  It  seems  that  the  fatherly  dressing-down  which  the  U.S. 
Congress  once  delivered  to  the  special  services  about  interference  in  the  private  lives 
of  American  citizens  has  already  been  forgotten. 
Finally,  a  notebook  appears,  in  no  way  remarkable  in  appearance,  except  the  cover  is 
slightly  swollen,  as  if  it  had  absorbed  moisture.   There  is  another  secret  compartment 
in  the  cover.   American  intelligence  instructions  to  the  secret  agent  are  concealed 
there.   They  give  instructions  on  organizing  future  meetings,  detailed  diagrams,  and 
calls  for  special  vigilance.
III.  25  Jun  86  A  2  USSR  INTERNATIONAL  AFFAIRS 
UNITED  STATES  6  CANADA* 
On  the  pages  of  fine  script,  the  most  important  thing  is  the  American  intelligence  ser- 
vice's list  of  topics  of  particular  interest.  The  intelligence  leaders  ask  the  agent 
for  information  about  the  tactical  and  technical  characteristics  of  aircraft,  the  location 
and  purpose  of  defense  facilities,  and  the  personnel  working  there.  "We  wish  you  a  plea- 
sant summer  and  await  a  meeting  with  you  in  the  fall."  These  words  complete  the  message 
from  the  U.S.  intelligence  center  to  its  agent  in  the  Soviet  Union. 
The  evening  of  7  May.  Malaya  Priogovskaya  Street.  The  twilight  is  thickening  still  more 
over  Moscow  and  the  breeze  carries  a  scent  of  popular  resin.  There  are  quite  a  few  peo- 
ple on  the  street.  Sites  is  in  the  yard  of  Apartment  Block  No  22.  The  spy  meeting  is 
to  take  place  here.  The  passers-by  and  the  inhabitants  of  the  block  who  are  sitting  on 
the  benches  on  this  warm  May  evening  hardly  pay  attention  to  hin.  Eric  Sites  is  indis-^  ■• 
tinguishable  from  a  Musovite:  He  wears  jeans,  a  check  shirt,  a  zippered  jacket,  and  a 
cap  bought  in  a  Moscow  store.  He  carries  the  blue  bag  that  by  now  is  familiar  to  readers. 
Sites  looks  nervously  from  side  to  side.  It  seems  there  is  nothing  suspicious.  At  ex- 
actly 2115  a  man  appears  carrying  a  rolled-up  newspaper:   that  is  the  sign.   Sites  ap- 
proaches him,  gives  the  password,  hears  the  answer,  and  invites  hia  to  take  a  walk. 
Caught  red-handed,  Sites  stands  deathly  pale,  as  if  thunderstruck.  He  will  remain  in 
that  state  for  a  long  time. 
As  for  the  Soviet  citizen,  who  is  an  American  intelligence  agent,  he  has  been  arrested, 
and  an  investigation  is  in  progress.  There  is  no  doubt  that  he  will  get  what  he  de- 
serves. That  is  really  all  we  can  say  about  the  failure  of  this  major  espionage  action 
by  American  intelligence  and  the  ignominous  end  of  the  latest  "crusader"  from  the  Penta- 
gon. 
As  for  Eric  Sites,  a  resolute  protest  was  convyed  to  the  U.S.  Embassy  and  that  country's 
defense  attache  about  his  espionage  activity.  Sites  was  declared  persona  non  grata  and 
quickly  dispatched  to  the  United  States. 
The  Washington  administration,  White  House  Deputy  Press  Secretary  L.  Speakes  stated,  will 
not  comment  on  the  accusation  of  espionage  against  Sites.  Yes,  the  case  is  so  obvious 
that  commentaries,  as  they  say  in  these  cases,  are  superfluous.  That  was  evidently  what 
the  official  American  spokesman  meant. 
Let  us  spare  Larry  Speakes  this  unpleasant  duty.  Let  us  coraaent  ourselves  on  what  hap- 
pened. 
Reporting  Sites'  expulsion  from  the  Soviet  Union  for  espionage,  American  news  agencies 
noted  that  prior  to  him,  Embassy  Second  Secretary  Michael  Sellers  had  been  the  last 
American  with  a  diplomatic  passport  told  to  leave  the  USSR  for  similar  reasons.  This  is 
not  an  exhaustive  list  of  exposed  American  intelligence  agents  expelled  from  the  USSR 
recently.  U.S.  Embassy  employees,  Third  Secretary  Peter  (Bogatyr),  attache  Lewis  Thomas, 
First  Secretary  Richard  Osborne,  Second  Secretary  Paul  Stambaugh,  and  Lon  Augustenborg 
and  Richard  Muller,  employees  at  the  U.S.  Consulate  General  in  Leningrad,  were  expelled 
for  espionage.   Third  Secretary  (D.  Makmekhen),  Counselor  Peter  Semler,  Second  Secretary 
Jospeh  McDonald,  and  Alex  (Grishchuk),  civilian  assistant  to  the  defense  attache,  were 
exposed.  Intelligence  agent  Martha  Peterson,  who  used  the  diplomatic  cover  of  an  embassy 
secretary  and  archivist,  was  detained  while  carrying  out  an  act  of  espionage.  Vincent 
Crockett,  speical  assistant  to  the  U.S.  defense  attache,  was  caught  red-handed. 
American  intelligence  agents  do  not  lack  cynicism  and  blatant  self-confidence.   U.S. 
Assistant  Naval  Attache  Lipscombe,  who  was  detained  while  carrying  out  an  act  of  espion- 
age, stated  unceremoniously  that  he  was  operating  on  the  direct  instructions  of  his 
leadership,  which  had  tasked  him  with  ...  "monitoring  the  situation  at  Leningrad  indus- 
trial enterprises."
III.*  25  Jun  86  A3  u^ar.  i.^-^   «...-■...  ...   „w 
UNITED  STATES  &  CANADA 
The  basest  methods  were  demonstrated  by  U.S.  Assistant  Air  Force  Attache  Wolf,  who  with 
the  assistance  of  a  Canadian  colleague  stole  official  [sluzhebenyy]  documents  from  an 
inturist  worker's  desk  in  Kazan  when  she  left  her  "visitors"  alone  in  her  office  for 
literally  a  minute. 
As  in  the  case  of  Mr  and  Mrs  Sites,  American  intelligence  agents  Assistant  Military  At- 
tache Reppert,  Assistant  Naval  Attache  Henry,  Vice  Consul  Augustenborg  of  the  U.S.  Con- 
sulate General  in  Leningrad,  U.S.  Embassy  First  Secretary  Osborne,  and  others,  who  en- 
listed their  wives  in  espionage  activity,  demonstrated  an  original  form  of  "family  es- 
pionage" to  the  world. 
The  Italians  say  that  two  coincidences  make  a  phenomenon.  But  what  if  we  are  talking 
about  dozens  of  incidents  that  become  more  frequent  with  every  passing  year?  This  is  a 
trend  compelling  serious  thought. 
The  conclusion  is  unequivocal:  The  United  States  is  attempting  to  expand  intelligence 
activity  agianst  our  country.  According  to  American  press  information,  it  is  planned  to 
allocate  $24  billion  to  the  U.S.  special  services  from  the  budget  in  fiscal  1987  (by 
comparison  they  received  §10  billion  in  1979,  and  it  is  believed  that  this  figure  will 
reach  $30  billion  in  1990).  The  main  resources  and  efforts  of  the  American  special 
services  are  directed  against  the  Soviet  Union.  U.S.  Defense  Secretary  Caspar  Weinberger 
spoke  at  closed  congressional  hearings  some  tine  back.  The  defense  secretary,  THE  WASH- 
INGTON POST  writes,  named  the  biggest  recipient  of  intelligence  information.  It  is  the 
Pentagon. 
The  American  special  services  have  joined  frantically  in  the  "crusade"  against  our  coun- 
try  They  are  hotly  pursuing  our  defense  secrets.  However,  it  would  do  the  new-found 
"crusaders"  no  harm  to  remember  how  such  crusades  end.  The  Sites  episode  provides  fur- 
ther confirmation.  The  "fall  meeting"  will  not  take  place.
SOCIAL  ISSUES 
WOULD-BE  EMIGRES  DECIDE  TO  REMAIN,  CITE  REASONS 
Moscow  SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA  INDUSTRIYA  in  Russian  19  Mar  37  p  3 
[Article  by  SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA  INDUSTRIYA  special  correspondent  A.  Kurbatov 
"•Please  Return  my  Application  to  Emigrate...*,  or  Several  Interviews  at  the* 
Final  Boundary"] 
[Text]  An  old  detached  building  on  one  of  the  quiet  streets  in  the  center  of 
Moscow.  In  the  reception  line,  there  is  a  man  of  about  50  and  a  man  and  women 
of  the  same  general  age.  Closest  of  all  to  the  door  of  an  office,  where  an 
employee  of  the  visa  administration  will  see  the  visitors,  sits  a  no-longer- 
young,  loudly-dressed  woman.  In  well-delivered  tones  she  is  informing  her 
neighbor  and,  it  turns  out,  everybody  else  as  well  that:  "I  have  been  living 
"in  refusal"  for  two  years,  it's  not  so  terrible!  Good  people  will  always 
help.  The  main  thing  is  to  fight  until  you  win."  Is  she  buoying  up  her 
neighbor  or  sharing  experiences?  I  already  knew  what  a  "refusednik"  is  —this 
is  a  person  whose  request  to  emigrate  has  been  refused.  The  reasons  are 
varied:  some  have  been  connected  with  work,  the  nature  of  which  touches  upon 
the  security  interests  of  our  country,  others  have  aged  parents  who  are 
dependent  upon  them  and  need  their  help,  or  minor  children...  With  us,  as  in 
other  countries,   people  have  not  only  rights,  but  also  responsibilities. 
Receiving  hours  still  have  not  begun.  Hushed  voices,  half  whispers.  It 
seemed  to  me  at  first  that  I  had  landed  in  a  line  where  everybody  knew  each 
other  well.  I  now  have  the  impression  that  I  am  in  home  where  ...  there  is  a 
dead  person.  The  faces  of  the  people  reveal  now  fright,  now  confusion,  now 
eerie  curiosity  —  it  is  frightening  and,  at  the  same  time,  you  want  to  watch 
them. 
Somebody  in  the  line  is  now  talking  about  acquaintances  who  have  settled 
themselves  very   well  "there"     ~  and  hope  flares  up  on   the  faces.      But, 
somebody  drops     the  rejoinder  that  "Mikhail  Isakovich  has  not  been  lucky", 
and  the  faces  of  everyone  grow  long.     And  it  seems  that  many  of  them  want  to 
get  up  then  and  there  and  leave  the  reception  room... 
I  ask  my  neighbors  about  the  recent  television  broadcasts  of  the  film 
"Byvshiye"  (The  Have-Beens).  They  have  seen  it,  and  they  watched  the  press 
conference  with  those  who  had  returned  to  the  motherland.  From  the  way  that 
they  answered  me,   from  certain  of  their  rejoinders,  I  realized  that  these
people,  in  general,  are  greedily  searching  out  any  information  that  come  -from 
there".      But... 
textbook  for  upper  school  students. 
in  order  to  obtain  telephone  numbers  of  people  who  have  withdra™  f  V? 
Plications  to  emigrate  from  our  country.     There  are  getting  to  be  more  and 
sending  to  the  archives. 
The  first  call.     Aleksandr  Vladimirovich  N.  decisively  refuses  to  meet  with  a 
correspondent : 
-I  would  like  to  bury  the  past,"  he  says.  "We  are  trying  to  forget  the  stupid 
thing  that  we  almost  did  with  the  entire  family. 
"Perhaps  your  experience  will  help  others,"  I  say. 
«You  don't  know  much  about  the  psychology  of  those  people  who  are  bursting ^to 
gYo°  abroad,"  laughed   my   telephone  o-J^^ I  TfTfuturTis Tn  es^iaKy 
with  words."   'They  consider  that  the  choice  01   a  iutui* 
individual  thing.      They  don»t  need  advisors." 
"And  what  caused  you  to  stop?" 
there,   if  you  don't  want  to  take  chances,   you  may  ena  up  u«u 
Next  Call. 
*•„«  «=„*.<>  of  that  category  of  unrecognized  geniuses, 
"You  know,  I  am  a  member,  for  sure,  of  that ^^^ory  seemed  to  me 
of  which  there  are  many ^among  the  people  ^^H"  able  to  judge  my 
that,  on  the  other  side  of  the  ocean,  tney  "°  f  the  lant3 
capabilities  according  to  their  worth."  says  an  engineer  at  one  01 
in  Moscow,  Georgiy  Konstantinovich  M. 
"And  now  it  doesn»t  seem  this  way  to  you?" 
"Do  you  want  an  honest  answer?" 
"Yes, 
.  .   .  a  ,n.   nn1.  T  Mas  frightened  of  the  loneliness.  I 
"I  really  am  capable  of  a  lot.  But  I  rfas .'«■«       earlier.  There  is  a
if  oniy  to  have  company,   their  tears  flow  over  gypsy  song3  in  cheap  bars... 
And  what  do  I  need  all  this  for?  And,  in  general,  a  letter  I  received  from  a 
close  lady  friend,  who  would  now  like  to  return  to  the  motherland,  made  a  very 
strong  impression  on  me.  Do  you  know  what  shook  her  cost  of  all  in  the  United 
States?  The  reaction  of  parents  to  attention  paid  to  their  children!  For  us, 
it  is  a  usual  thing  to  praise  an  unknown  child,  to  smile  at  him,  but  there, 
this  is  a  danger  signal:  aren't  they  playing  with  him  so  as  to  steal  him?  This 
vexed  her  to  the  point  of  tears,  because  she  loves  children,  is  drawn  to  them. 
For  some,  and  for  me  personally,  this  fact  ha3  been  etched  in  memory,  and  I 
have  understood  that  there  we,  who  have  grown  up  in  a  completely  different 
environment,  would  simply  be  like  people  from  another  planet." 
I  call  another  number.  Lidiya  Davydovna  Klyuzner  also  agreed  to  answer  my 
questions. 
"What  drew  me  abroad?  My  children.  They  left  for  Israel  several  years  ago, 
then  moved  on  to  the  United  States.  Do  I  need  to  say  how  much  I  mi33ed  -them? 
And  so,  somehow  I  made  the  decision  and  was  getting  ready,  but  then  I  thought 
it  over:  what  awaits  me  there;  who  needs  me,  other  than  my  children?  And  is 
it  possible  to  be  happy  in  a  home  where  a  foreign  world  lies  beyond  the 
threshold?  Here  I  have  an  apartment,  a  decent  pension,  people  who  are  close 
to  me,  with  whom  I  can  get  together  and  talk  in  my  native  language.  The 
motherland,   don't  you  know,  doesn't  make  changes  and  doesn't  make  choices." 
Still  another  call.  Savelii  Mikhaylovich  Linnik  is  in  mourning  —  he  recently 
buried  his  wife.  He  could  meet  with  a  correspondent,  but  it  would  be  better 
in  about  two  weeks,  in  a  month. 
"I  have  to  get  myself  together.  Such  a  loss.  But  I  have  something  to  say  to 
those  who  have  frivolously  agreed  to  leave  for  abroad.  No  matter  what  golden 
promises  they  made  us  there,  we  couldn't  leave  our  motherland.  I  and  my  wife 
wrote  this  in  our  request  to  remain.    And,  indeed,  we  were  a  special  case. 
"My  wife  was  hopelessly  ill  ~  cancer.  Her  si3ter,  who  lives  in  the  US,  wrote 
that  she  needed  to  try  change  in  climate,  to  be  seen  by  a  foreign  specialist. 
We  grasped  at  this  straw  and  submitted  an  application  to  UVIR  to  leave.  But, 
later,  we  thought  it  over:  how  would  we  feel  outside  our  own  home,  in  which 
even  the  familiar  walls  help?  My  wife  and  I  lived  a  long  life  together.  We 
had  something  to  remember  and  to  understand,  which  we  would  lose.  I  once 
spent  3  weeks  on  an  assignment  abroad.  The  first  week,  it  was  interesting  for 
me.  The  second  went  by  —  I  had  an  irrepressible  urge  to  return  home.  The 
third  week  was  torture...  And  it  will  be  this  way  with  every  normal  person, 
particularly  one  who  has  grown  up  in  our  environment.  Here,  in  our  country, 
there  are  differences  in  the  material  well-being  of  people,  based  on  their 
work.  But  this  differentiation  is  insignificant  in  comparison  to  the 
capitalist  world,  You  know,  a  normal  person  need3  only  to  see  the  fashionable 
store  windows  there,  with  an  impoverished  child  on  the  sidewalk  next  to  them, 
in  order  for  him  to  understand  everything:  where  social  justice  is  real,  and 
where  it  i3  imaginary.  Is  it  really  possible  for  everyone  to  live  equally  in 
a  society  where  they  consider  inequality  to  be  the  norm?"
SOCIAL  ISSUES 
WOULD-BE  EMIGRES  DECIDE  TO  REMAIN,  CITE  REASONS 
Moscow  SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA  INDUSTRIYA  in  Russian  19  Mar  87  p  3 
[Article  by  SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA  INDUSTRIYA  special  correspondent  A.  Kurbatov: 
"•Please  Return  my  Application  to  Emigrate...',  or  Several  Interviews  at  the 
Final  Boundary**  3 
[Text]  An  old  detached  building  on  one  of  the  quiet  streets  in  the  center  of 
Moscow.  In  the  reception  line,  there  is  a  man  of  about  50  and  a  man  and  women 
of  the  same  general  age.  Closest  of  all  to  the  door  of  an  office,  where  an 
employee  of  the  visa  administration  will  see  the  visitors,  sit3  a  no-longer- 
young,  loudly-dressed  woman.  In  well-delivered  tones  she  is  informing  her 
neighbor  and,  it  turns  out,  everybody  else  as  well  that:  nI  have  been  living 
"in  refusal"  for  two  years.  It*s  not  so  terrible!  Good  people  will  always 
help.  The  main  thing  is  to  fight  until  you  win."  Is  she  buoying  up  her 
neighbor  or  sharing  experiences?  I  already  knew  what  a  "refusednik"  is  — this 
is  a  person  whose  request  to  emigrate  has  been  refused.  The  reasons  are 
varied:  some  have  been  connected  with  work,  the  nature  of  which  touches  upon 
the  security  interests  of  our  country,  others  have  aged  parents  who  are 
dependent  upon  them  and  need  their  help,  or  minor  children...  With  us,  as  in 
other  countries,   people  have  not  only  rights,   but  also  responsibilities. 
Receiving  hours  still  have  not  begun.  Hushed  voices,  half  whispers.  It 
seemed  to  me  at  first  that  I  had  landed  in  a  line  where  everybody  knew  each 
other  well.  I  now  have  the  impression  that  I  am  in  home  where  ...  there  is  a 
dead  person.  The  faces  of  the  people  reveal  now  fright,  now  confusion,  now 
eerie  curiosity  —  it  is  frightening  and,  at  the  same  time,  you  want  to  watch 
them. 
Somebody  in  the  line  is  now  talking  about  acquaintances  who  have  settled 
themselves  very  well  "there"  —  and  hope  flares  up  on  the  face3.  But, 
somebody  drops*  the  rejoinder  that  "Mikhail  Isakovich  has  not  been  lucky"., 
and  the  faces  of  everyone  grow  long.  And  it  seems  that  many  of  them  want  to 
get   up  then  and  there  and  leave  the  reception  room... 
I  ask  my  neighbors  about  the  recent  television  broadcasts  of  the  film 
"Byvshiye"  (The  Have-Beens).  They  have  seen  it,  and  they  watched  the  press 
conference  with  those  who  had  returned  to  the  motherland.  From  the  way  that 
they  answered  me,   from  certain  of  their  rejoinders,   I  realized  that  these
APPENDIX    B 
Sample  Entry  of  the  KGB  Wanted  List 
(Vladislav  Rrasnov) 
KPACMOB  B.-iajuciao  rcopntcoim,  1937  roaa  poaaeHiisi.  ypox.  r.  nep.Mii.  pycc- 
Kitfi.  o5pa30Bai!iie  BMcuice.  6biBtii.  pcaaKTop  uiBeacKoro  oT.rc.ia  rbcyaapcTBCH- 
Moro  KOMHTCTa  npii  CM  CCCP  no  paaiioBemamirc  ;i  tcicbiuchuio.  Cpcjiicro 
pocTa,  bo.-iocm  pycbte,  -nmo  OBa.ibiioe.  pot  6o.iuuoit.  r>"6"  Tomate.  hoc  npHMoi'i, 
ocHOBaKiif  noca  uHipoKoe,  Mojjpn  60^-ibuiue,  hocht  ohkii.  Ot«i  KpaciioD  rcopntfi 
HiiKonaesiiH.  MaTb  Kpaciiosa  EKaTcpiuia  HsauoBaa,  6paT  Kpaction  rep.\ian 
reopriiCBiM,  cecrpti  Kpacuosa  OoHTOBa),  3oa  reoprs!»ua.  KpatHOBa  {KoKiiHCK-an) 
JlioSoBb  rcoprueBHa,  3JJTb  Kokiihckmm  Ba.icpuii  EopiicoBiii  npoAisoaiOT  11  r. 
riep.MH. 
Haxoascb  b  Uiocuui!  b  cocrasc  rpynnu  cobctckhx  tjphctob.  26  0KT»5pn  1962  r. 
o6paTiinc«  k  uiBeacKitu  snacTflM  c  npocboofi  o  npeaorraaaeiiiiu  e%iy  no.ntmi'iech- 
oro  yoe*iiuia.  22  «HBapa  1963  r.  b  r.  CTOKro.ib.ve  BucryniiJi  11a  npccc-Koiitttcpeiiiiiiu 
nepcn  ripencTaoiiTejiHMii  6yp%ya3H0fi  neqaTii  c  KncseTHMtecMiMit  3a»a;iemmMn  o 
coBtTCKOfl  flencTBiiTe<iHOCTii.  B  UIbcuiiii  npoavitBan  jo  HKoapa  1966  r.  C  1966  r. 
npO/KHBacr  b  CUJA,  rac  ymixcji  b  yHiiBepciiTCTC  11  npenoaaer  ypoKii  pyccKoro 
s3L!ko.  Mmch>tc(i  (JiOTOKapTO'iKa  i!  oSpaieu  nonepKa. 
PoiwcKHoe  aeno  b  YKVE  npn  CM  CCCP  no  IlepMCKon  06.7. 
KRASNOV  Vladislav  Georgievich,  born  in  1937  in  the  city  of  Perm, 
Russian,  university  graduate,  former  editor  of  the  Swedish  Department  of 
the  State  Committee  of  Radio  and  Television  Broadcast  at  the  CM  of  the 
USSR.  Medium  height,  light  brown  hair,  oval  face,  large  mouth,  ihin 
lips,  straight  nose,  wide  at  the  base,  with  large  nostrils,  wears  glasses. 
Father  Krasnov  Georgii  Nikolaci'ich,  mother  Krasnova  Ekatcrina  Ivan- 
ovna,  brother,  Krasnov  German  Gcorgievich,  sisters  Krasnova  (Zontova) 
Zoya  Geurgievna,  Krasnova  (Kokinskala)  Liubov"  Gcorgicvna,  brother- 
in-law  Kofc'nskii  Va'cry  Borisovich  reside  in  the  city  of  Perm. 
While  visiting  Sweden  with  a  group  of  Soviet  tourists,  on  October  26, 
1962,  turned  himself  in  to  Swedish  authorities  asking  them  for  political 
asylum.  On  January  1963,  appeared  at  a  press  conference  before  represen- 
tatives of  the  bourgeois  press  with  slanderous  statements  about  Soviet 
reality.  Resided  in  Sweden  until  January  of  1966.  From  1966  has  been 
residing  in  the  USA  where  he  studies  at  a  university  and  gives  Russian- 
language  lessons.  A  photograph  and  handwriting  sample  are  on  file.1*
&'  he  U.S.'  audience  sits  motionless 
H  as  the  Soviet  colonel  chides  them 
saying:  "You  do  not  know  what  war 
is:  you  have  not  had  your  towns 
bombed;  families  murdered  in  front  of 
vou;  and  mothers,  sisters,  and  wives 
raped  by  Nazi  soldiers."  The  emotion 
with  which  he  speaks  is  chilling.  The 
colonel  goes  on  to  say  that  such 
thoughts  are  alive  in  every  Soviet 
citizen  over  the  age  of  45  and  are  kept 
aIKe  for  future  generations  by  the 
efforts  of  the  party  and  the  people.  He 
then  berates  the  audience  by  ascribing 
virtually  all  the  ills  of  the  world  to 
America  and  all  the  positive  influences 
to  the  USSR.  When  the  tirade  is 
finished,  the  American  audience  is 
stunned  and  angry. 
The  scene  described  above  seems 
unlikely  until  you  know  that  the  Soviet 
colonel  is  actually  a  USAF  officer  at  a 
USAF  Soviet  Awareness  Program.  The 
USAF  officer,  in  his  role  playing,  is 
trying  to  educate  an  American 
audience  on  Marxist-Leninist  ideology 
and  the  Soviets'  perceptions  of  the 
world.  Everything  said  in  the  lecture  is 
an  accurate  portrayal  of  Soviet  stylized 
propaganda  and  is  derived  from  Soviet 
writings.  Far  too  few  Americans  are 
aware  of  these  perceptions  and,  as  a 
result,  are  often  easily  duped  by  Soviet 
propaganda,  or  put  on  the  defensive  in 
a  conversation  with  a  Soviet  citizen. 
The  USAF  was  the  first  of  the 
services  to  create  a  program  to  make 
its  members  more  aware  of  who  the 
Soviets  are,  how  they  think  and  why 
they  think  so  differently  from  us.  The 
program  was  begun  in  1976  at  the 
direction  of  the  USAF  Chief  of  Staff, 
General  David  C.  Jones,  who  agreed 
with  a  task  force  assessment  that  most 
Air  Force  members  and  their  families 
knew  little  about  the  U.S.'s  prime 
adversary.  The  program  from  its  in- 
ception has  dealt  with  the  historical, 
socioeconomic,  and  military  factors 
which  bear  upon  the  actions  and  de- 
cisions of  the  USSR. 
Colonel  Lloyd  T.  Moore,  Jr.  is  the 
Director  of  this  program,  which  is  now 
headquartered  in  new  facilities: 
building  1304.  Boliing  AFB. 
The  Soviet  Awareness  Program  has 
tr.ed  to  reach  as  many  Air  Force 
members,  their  families,  and  friends  as 
The  USAF 
Program 
—  an  AFIS 
•        • 
mission 
by  CapJ  Jack  |.  Nettis,  Jr. 
AFiS/INC 
Photos  by  Sgt.  Robert  Chambers 
Det.  4,  1361st  AAVS/Bolling  AFB 
Capt.  lack  /.  Nettis  )t. 
Smii'l  Aw.ireni.'ss
Dr.  Robert  Moore  j_ 
possible  through  two  basic  means:  the 
spoken  word  and  the  written  word. 
Soviet  Affairs  Publications  Division 
The  written  portion  of  the  Soviet 
Awareness  Program  is  delivered  by  the 
Soviet   Affairs    Publications    Division 
(INCF),    headed    by    Major    Orr    Y. 
Potebnya,    Jr.    This   division    is   also 
unique  in  the  US  Government  since  it 
is  the  oniy  body  whose  primary  focus 
is   the  translation   of  Soviet  military 
writings.  The  Soviets  have  numerous 
professional    military    journals    and 
newspapers    which    openly    discuss 
Soviet  military  life-styles  and,  more  im- 
portantly, their  doctrine  and  tactics. 
These  works  are  screened  and  selec- 
tively translated  for  publication  in  a 
bimonthly  periodical  known  as  Soviet 
Press    Selected    Translations.    Recent 
articles  of  special  interest  include  a 
tour-part  series,  "New  Features  of  Air 
Combat,"  a  Soviet  analysis  of  how  air 
combat  has  evolved  due  to  the  in- 
fluences   of    modern     aircraft    and 
technology.     Other    articles    have 
addressed  such   important  topics  as 
the    U.S.    Army's    new    Reconnais- 
sance/Destruct:on    Systems   and    the 
Strategic  Defense  Initiative.  We  often 
think  of  the  Soviet  press  as  so  "con- 
trolled" that  it  is  of  no  analytical  use; 
however  this  is  definitely  not  the  case. 
In  addition,  INCF  also  is  extensively 
involved  in  the  translation  of  whole 
books  mainly  from  the  Soviet  Military 
Officers'  Library.  These  hooks,  which 
the  Soviet  Officer  is  expected  to  read, 
<ire    p.irt    of    the     "Soviet    Military 
Thought"  series  (see  pages  6  and  7). 
Some  of  the-  books,  such  as  Military 
Psychology,  the  Officer's  Handbook 
and  the  People,  Army,  and  the  Com- 
mander, give  a  rare  look  into  Soviet 
tenets  of  leadership  and  what  effects 
and  problems  can  be  experienced  by 
subordinates  in  various  situations, 
including  during  operations  in  nuclear 
environment.  Another  book.  Fun- 
damentals of  Tactical  Command 
Control  discusses  their  view  of  the 
command  and  Control  management 
function.  These  publications,  plus  the 
others  which  the  division  produces, 
are  used  extensively  both  within  DOD 
and  throughout  the  academic  com- 
munity. (The  Directorate  of  Soviet 
Affairs  is  an  anomaly  in  DOD  in  that  it 
has  produced  revenues  approaching 
Si  million  over  the  years.) 
Soviet  Military  Power  Lecture  Series 
The  oral  presentations  are  delivered 
by  the  Directorate's  Soviet  Awareness 
Division,  headed  by  Lt.  Col.  James  M. 
Simpson.  Over  the  past  ten  years,  the 
Soviet  Military  Power  program,  an 
8-hour  set  of  lectures,  has  been  given 
to  every  major  Ai.  Force  base 
worldwide,  reaching  over  150,000 
members.  The  lecture  scries,  given  at 
the  SECRLT  level,  attempts  to  reach  all 
levels   of  Air   Force   personnel   from 
Maj.  Orr  Y.  Potebynya,lr. 
airman  basic  to  general  officer;  and    - 
ranging   from    the   civil   engineering 
troop  and  fightline  mechanic,  to  the 
medical  technician  and  intelligence 
specialist. 
The  program  begins  with  a  discus- 
sion of  Marxist-Leninist  ideology.  The 
audience  hears  the  same  statements 
and    arguments    currently    used    in 
Soviet    propaganda.    The    audience 
finds  it  very  enlightening  to  see  how 
the    Soviets   view    history    and    the 
United    States.    For    instance,    few 
Americans    realize    the   xenophobic 
concerns  of  the  Soviet  people.  Just  in 
this  century,  the  Soviets  have  fought 
two  major  wars  (VVWI  and  WWII)  a 
revolution,  and  a  civil  war.  In  WWII 
their  loss  of  20  million  people  (the  U.S. 
losses  in  WWII  were  approximately 
300,000)  left  their  citizens  and  leader- 
ship with  a  very  deep  concern  for 
defense.   They   see  themselves   sur- 
rounded   by    potential    enemies    — 
China  and  the  NATO  countries.  Every 
Soviet  citizen,   after  years  of  being 
reminded  by  his  government,  is  quick 
to    tell    Americans    that    after    the 
Bolshevik  Revolution  of  1917  it  was 
the  British,  French,  Japanese,  and  also 
the    Americans    who   invaded    their 
country  trying  to  eliminate  the  new 
Bolshevik  Government. 
However,  the  Soviet  view  of  history 
is  not  always  accurate  nor  complete. 
For  example,  their  heavy  losses  during 
WWII  can  be  attributed  to  many 
causes  which  they  brought  upon 
themselves,  such  as  eliminating  their 
senior  military  staff  during  Stalin's 
purges  prior  to  the  war.  Also,  Stalin 
failed  to  heed  warnings  from  his  own 
Soviel  Awareness
Hllfc.-|llgt-|ll.t.'*llClk*Uilv  <JI    UlC   llil(.ICIlUlllg 
Nazi  attack  because  he  didn't  believe 
Hitler,  with  whom  the  USSR  had 
signed  a  secret  pact  in  1939.  would  at- 
tack the  USSR.  Furthermore,  in  their 
darkest  days  during  WWII,  the  U.S. 
sent  large  amounts  of  military  equip- 
ment to  help  them  fight  the  Nazis. 
However,  when  a  Soviet  confronts  an 
American,  few  Americans  are  able  to 
respond  to  Soviet  rhetoric  because 
Americans  are  simply  ignorant  or 
unaware. 
This  discussion  of  Soviet  ideology  is 
followed  by  two  hours  of  talks  on  their 
society  and  economy.  It  is  difficult  for 
us    to   appreciate   the   size   of   this 
country  and  the  associated  manage- 
ment difficulties.  You  probably  know 
it  is  the  world's  largest  country;  but 
just  how  large  is  it?  It  covers  one-sixth 
of  the  world's  land  surface,  stretching 
across  1 1  time  zones  —  as  the  sun  sets 
on  one  border  it  soon  begins  to  rise  on 
the  other.  Within  this  vast  area  the 
Soviets  are  rich  in  natural  resources, 
not  nearly  as  dependent  as  the  U.S.  on 
imports.  However,  much  of  what  they 
have  is  trapped  in  the  difficult  Siberian 
frontier.     Dealing    with    the    harsh 
weather  there  is  a  major  engineering 
teat.  Temperatures' can  range  over  a 
year  from  lOO'Fto  -60°F  in  the  same 
area,  and  when  the  ground  does  thaw, 
a  muddy  mire  makes  travel  difficult.  In 
many  of  the  areas  only  the  top  several 
feet  completely  thaws.  This  frozen- 
earth    condition    is    referred    to    as 
permafrost  —  requiring  special  engi- 
neering  for    the    building   of   roads, 
pipelines    and    towns.     Before    this 
system  of  engineering  was  developed 
roads    literally    disappeared     and 
buildings    sank.    Moreover,    as    the 
Russian  Empire  and  then  the  Soviet 
Union  expanded  over  this  vast  ter- 
ritory, they  engulfed  approximately  60 
different   nationalities  speaking  over 
100  different  languages  with  many  dif- 
ferent customs  and  religions.  Today 
the    Russian    nationality,    which    has 
always    been    dominant,     is    losing 
ground  as  its  birth  rate  declines. 
The  USSR  is  still  quite  backward 
when  compared  to  the  U.S.  and  other 
developed  countries.  In  villages  you 
still  see  women  washing  their  clothes 
in   the  rivers.  Food  rationing  occurs 
"Americans  .  .  . 
are  often  easily  dupt 
by  Soviet  propaganda 
Ma/.  Martin  L.  Raynor  makes  an  adjustment  to  the  Soviet  display  cas< 
during  years  of  poor  harvest  and 
Soviet  people  wait  in  long  lines  for 
virtually  all  consumer  goods.  There 
are  many  reasons  why  they  have  these 
economic  problems,  but  the  biggest  is 
their  centralized  economy.  Totally  re- 
jecting the  familiar  laws  of  supply  and 
demand,  the  Communist  Patty  dic- 
tates what  will  be  produced,  by  whom 
and  in  what  quantities.  Historically, 
the  Soviet  military  has  been  the  prime 
beneficiary  of  this  centializecl 
planning. 
The  second  part  of  the  program 
deals  with  Soviet  military.  For  exam- 
ple, military  officers  are  among  the 
highest  paid  members  of  Soviet  society 
(even  more  highly  paid  than  doctors, 
lawyers  and  engineers).  This  high 
stature  is  a  good  indication  of  the  im- 
portance of  the  military  in  the  USSR.  In 
discussing  the  military,  we  not  only 
look  at  the  tactical  and  strategic 
weapon  systems,  but  also  at  how  the 
USSR  says  they  will  be  employed.  The 
Soviets    produce   some    of   the    best 
Soviet  Avv.ucncss
./.  lames  M.  Simpson  assists. 
military  equipment  in  the  world  and 
certainly  more  military  equipment 
than  any  other  country  —  much  more 
than  they  need  for  their  own  defense. 
As  a  result,  they  use  primarily  the 
military  aspect  of  their  national  power 
in  their  efforts  to  project  their  power 
abroad.  This  is  where  the  discussions 
are  concluded  with  a  look  at  the 
Soviets'  use  of  economic,  political, 
ideological  and  military  means  to 
project  their  influence  around  the 
world. 
TSgt.  Richard  L  /ohnson 
When  travelling  and  visiting  the 
bases,  the  Soviet  awareness  team  also 
gives  a  2-hour  condensed  program  for 
the  dependents,  so  that  husbands, 
wives,  and  children  can  better  under- 
stand'why  the  member  must  occa- 
sionally work  late,  go  TOY,  participate 
in  an  ORI  or  go  overseas.  Once  a 
month,  this  Soviet  Military  Power  Dav- 
is expanded  into  a  5-day  Sov.et 
Military  Power  Week  given  at  the 
Directorate's  new  facilities  on  Boiling 
AFB.  The  week  is  presented  with  a 
good  balance  of  lectures,  videotapes, 
and  guest  lecturers. 
The  Directorate  of  Soviet  Affairs  is 
the  focal  point  in  the  Air  Force  for 
disseminating  information  about  how 
the  Soviets  think,  why  they  think  so 
differently  from  us,  and  why  it  is  such  a 
mistake  to  "mirror-image,"  i.e.  to 
assume  that  because  we  think  or  act  in 
a  certain  way,  they  will  also.  For  ten 
years,  the  directorate  has  been  "get- 
ting the  word  out"  to  Air  Force 
members  worldwide. 
Soviet  Aw.irrne**
The  Soviet  Awareness  Program  began  shortly  after  I 
returned  from  Moscow.  After  studying  the  USSR  for 
manv  years,  and  then  living  there  as  an  assistant  air  attache, 
I  was  keenly  aware  of  how  Soviet  society  operates  and  I 
had  a  good  idea  of  their  state  intentions.  However,  I  was 
also  \  ery  disturbed  and  frustrated  about  the  total  ignorance 
the  vast  majority  of  Americans  displayed  in  regard  to  the 
"other"  superpower  in  the  world.  In  1976,  when  I  first 
heard  of  the  establishment  of  the  Directorate  of  Soviet 
Affairs.  I  was  very  interested  in  this  project  which  I  felt  was 
a  much  needed,  long  overdue  program.  Over  the  next 
eight  years  I  watched  the  program  develop  and  grow.  I 
knew  the  people  assigned  to  the  directorate  were  all  top- 
notch  experts  and  the  feedback  I  was  receiving  from  Air 
Force  members  worldwide  was  also  very  complimentary.  It 
v.  as  evident  that  both  the  lecture  program  and  the  transl.v 
1ICATI0 
The  director's 
postscript 
by  Col.  Lloyd  T.  Moore,  Jr. 
Director.  Soviet  Affairs 
tions  of  Soviet  military  writings  were  accomplishing  their 
goals  —  awareness 
In  1984  when  the  opportunity  arose  for  me  to  become 
the  Director  of  this  program  I,  quite  naturally,  jumped  at 
the  opportunity.  My  expectations  proved  to  be  well 
founded;  the  people  are  knowledgeable  and  very 
dedicated  to  "getting  the  word  out."  The  principal  negative 
aspect,  from  my  point  of  view,  was  that  we  weren't  able  to 
get  our  program  before  the  true  policy  makers  of  the  Air 
Force  and  the  US  Government. 
For  the  future,  therefore,  it  is  our  intention  to  broaden 
even  further  the  audience  for  our  program.  In  my  opinion, 
we  cannot  begin  to  feel  sanguine  until  virtually  all  the 
opinion  makers  and  policy  setters  in  America  understand 
more  completely  the  realities  of  Soviet  society  and  the  con- 
comitant threat  which  it  poses  to  our  way  of  life. 
SOVIET  MILITARY  THOUGHT 
Translations  of  major  military  writings  on  doctrine, 
strategy,  tactics,  and  other  topics.  These  volumes  may  be 
ordered  by  title  and  stock  number  from  the  Superinten- 
dent of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  DC  20402.  Prices  are  subject  to  change. 
Th..  0-Vcni.tf,  Sidorenko.  Col  A.  A.  008070  00329-5  (S6.00).  Praise*  the 
ofi'en,  .r  as  tho  only  type  of  combat  operation  that  attains  the  complete 
•out  ry  ;►>►■  enemy. 
\ta-  =Ti-temniim  on  War  arid  Army.  Author  collective.  008  070-00338  A 
S'.ry.  Discusses  doctrine,  modern  military  power,  and  the  revolution  in 
*-;;'  -ci*.  d'ldirv 
Sc.<-v'iC-TKhnica/  Progress  arid  the  Revolution  in  Military  A/fairy 
lr,™„  Col  Gen  N.  A.  {HI.).  00fJ  070  003-10  f.  ($7  00)  Describes  the 
">pv.-  'i  science  and  technology  (including  nuclear  weapons)  on  military 
'■•  \t  ',:,mer.ts. 
)>•-.  B*-ic  Principles  of  Operation  a.'  Art  arid  Tactic.  Savkm.  Col  V  Ye. 
i  ■OS  '.'')  rx)342-2  tS/.OO).  Presents  the  "essence  of  the  laws  of  armed  con 
For  more  information  on 
the  program  and  how  to  attend; 
call:    (202)  767-4205 
or    AV  297-4205 
Soviet  T-72  tanks  ,u»n (>».<« 
Soviet  Awareness
'  *'*^-v  p-mtoiopSca!  HrritaseofV.  »  levin  and  Problems  of  Contemporary 
.:-'.  Milovidov.  Maj  Gen  A.  5.  and  Kozlov.  Co!  V.  G.  (Eds). 
.•.".3-070-00343-1  (S7-00).  Glorifies  communist  ideology  and  outlines  the 
'?'■  -v  approach  to  problems  relating  to  war.  the  armed  forces,  and  military 
5-2:rs. 
Tontept.  Algorithm.  Decision.  Druzhinin.  Co!  Cen  V.  V.  and  Kontorov. 
Cj  D.  S.  008-070  00344  9  (S7.00).  Integrates  ideas  from  philosophy. 
Ci.choiogy.  social  science,  mathematics,  and  linguistics  for  the  military 
c:~mander  and  his  staff. 
•.♦.i'-tary  Pedagogy.  Danchenko.  Co!  A.  M.  and  Vydrin.  Co!  I.  F.  (Eds), 
o:  3-070-00352-0  (57.50).  Discusses  Soviet  political,  combat,  and  technical 
:-;  ->ing  to  increase  combat  readiness. 
\M.un,-  Psychofogy.  Shelyag.  V.  V..  Glotochkin,  A.  D-.  and  Platonov.  K. 
K.     Edsx  008-070-00353-8  CS7.30).  Appraises  man's  psyche  under  both 
COBETCKMM 
AETHHKAM 
CAABA! 
"Glory  to  Soviet  Aviators" 
n  .dear  and  conventional  warfare  conditions  to  gauge  effective  ways  to  in- 
cxtrtrate  personnel. 
Dctionary  of  Basic  Military  Terms.  Radziyevskiy.  Co!  Cen  A.  I,  (Senior 
E-:  003  07000360-1  (S6.50).  In  effect,  a  small  military  encyclopedia  that 
c-.nes  Soviet  military  terminology.  Compiled  by  the  Ceneral  Staff 
v.ademy  fjculty. 
Cm/  Defense.  Yegovov.  P.  T..  Shlyokhov,  I.  A.,  and  Alabin.  N.  I. 
O'.S  070  00382-1  'S7.00).  Provides  a  comprehensive  overview  of  the  Soviet 
v  -.•  survival  program. 
.-•«.«,  Soviet  Military  Writing  ?970-J975.  008-070  00392-9  (S7.00). 
V,.  t-r  ^rit.ngs  on  the  international  situation,  theoretical  foundations  of 
S;.  «•:  rr.ilit.iry  thought,  the  command  structure  and  military  organization. 
i":  tnfory  in  fi'dCtke. 
JKTh .       ^  ^^ 
10GT0HHGTB0 "'  ^  ^^^ 
GBiETiBDrO    v 
<>s^^-' 
<& 
!■■  .     tC*\ 
\> 
"Maintain  the  honor  and  dignity  of  a  Soviet  soldier" 
The  Armed  Forces  of  the  Soviet  State,  Crechko,  Marshal  of  the  Soviet 
Union  A.  A.  008-070-00379- 1  'S7.00).  The  late  Soviet  Minister  of  Defense's 
most  comprehensive  work,  covering  the  development  and  essence  of 
Soviet  military  power. 
The  Officer's  Handbook.  Kozlov.  Maj  Cen  S.  N.  (ed.).  008-070-00396-1 
(S7.00).  Aids  Soviet  officers  "in  broadening  their  outlook  and  in  resolving 
many  practical  problems  related  to  the  training  and  education  of 
subordinates." 
The  People.  The  Army,  The  Commander,  Skirdo.  Col  M.  P.  008-004101 
(S5.50).  Examines  the  political,  moral,  administrative,  and  leadership 
factors  that,  according  to  the  author,  bring  victory  in  a  thermonuclear  war. 
long-Range  Missile-Equipped.  Vasil'yev.  Maj  Cen  B.  A.  008-070-00428-3 
(S4.25).  lauds  the  heroic  deeds  of  Soviet  long-Range  Aviation  and 
emphasizes  the  undiminished  role  of  aviation  in  general. 
Forecasting  in  Military  Affairs.  Chuyeu,  Yu.  v.  and  Mikhaylov,  Yu.  B. 
008070-00456-9  (S6.50).  Provides  a  broad  review  of  recent  thinking  in 
both  the  USSR  and  the  West  on  military  planning,  forecasting,  and  decision 
making. 
The  Command  and  Staff  of  the  Soviet  Army  Air  Fore-  in  the  Creat 
Patriotic  War  i94?/945,  Kozhevnikov,  M.  N.  0O3-O7000490-9  ($6.50). 
Presents  a  participant's  picture  of  the  role  of  the  command,  staff,  and 
Ceneral  Headquarters  in  the  recovery,  reorganization,  and  direction  of 
operations  of  the  Soviet  Air  Force  in  World  War  II. 
fundamental's  of  Tacticaf  Command  and  Control.  Ivanov,  D.  A.. 
Savel'yev.  V.  P.,  and  Shemanskiy.  P.  V.  008-070  00514  (S9.00).  Discusses 
basic  principles,  organization  equipping,  support,  and  monitoring  of 
command  and  control  activities,  as  well  as  information  acquisition  and 
processing,  decisionmaking,  and  battle  planning  and  management. 
The  Soviet  Armed  Forces:  A  History  of  Their  Organization  Development. 
Tyushkevich.  S.  A.  008-070-00524-7  (SI 4.00).  Outlines  Soviet  military 
history  from  the  formation  of  the  first  Red  Guard  detachments  to  the 
development  of  the  modern  Soviet  Armed  Forces. 
STUDIES  IN  COMMUNIST  AFFAIRS 
This  series  places  in  the  public  domain  Department  of 
Defense-sponsored  unclassified  analyses  of  contemporary 
communist  affairs.  Order  from  the  U.S.  Government 
Printing  Office. 
The    Soviet    Theater    Nuclear    Offensive.    Douglass,    Joseph    D.,    \r. 
008  070-00375  9  (S5.50). 
Naval  Power  in  Soviet  Po.'.o.  Murphy.  Paul  |.  (cd.).  008-070  00421-6 
($7.50). 
Soviet  Air  /'oner  and  the  Pursuit  of  New  Military  Options.  Petersen. 
Phillip  A.  (td).  008-070  00!->9-KS4  50). 
Soviet  Awjn-ness
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S:>wcr  PoUcy  in  the  Poittito  I  .Uam,  Petersen.  Phillip  A.  (Ed.), 
003  070-00440-2  (S5.50) 
fecial  Reading*  From  Military  Thousht,  J963-J97J.  (Port  I)  Douglas. 
Joseph  D..  Jr.  and  Hoeber.  Amoa-tta  M.  (Comp .).  008  070-00471-2  (S7.50) 
Selected  Readings  From  Military  Thought,  J963  J973,  (Pat!  II)  Douglass. 
Joseph  D..  Jr.  and  Hoeber.  Amoretta  M.  (Comp.).  003  070-00480- 1  (S7.50). 
The  Soviet  Union:  What  Lies  Ahead?  Military  Political  Affairs  in  the 
1980$.  Kenneth  M.  Come  and  Gregori  Vacball  (Ed).  008-070 OC359-0 
(S18.00). 
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and  contractors  in  connection  with  their  official  or  contractual  duties. 
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