AOOftCSO  OFFICIAL  COMMUNICATIONS  TO 
THE  8ECRETARY  OF  STATE 
WASHINGTON  21,  O.  C 
DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 
WASHINGTON 
SEP   i21955 
THE  VHXXB  KJBS& 
Sebjecti    lepert  of  the  Hooter  CoenieelcQ  Sufc 
Fearco  em  Intelligeace  AetlvlUes* 
In  accordance  with  yoor  fteaorandoB  of  Jbm  73,  1*55, 
X  at  admitting  to*  •odeaed  rtgfi— at  setting  forth  the 
vieon  of  the  Department  of  Stat*  oa  the  reeemendatiano 
of  the  Hoover  CoanAngloa  Task  Fare*  on  Intelligence 
Activities* 
HERBERT  HOOVER,  JR. 
Acting  Socretazy 
Snelotmret 
>-» 
ft.1*** 
Bepertsent  of  State 
▼lee*  on  Stfejeet  Report* 
<?;>f*
CENTRAL  INTELLIGENCE  AGENCY 
WASHINGTON  25.  D.  C. 
16  AUG  1955 
OFFICE  OF  THE  DIRECTOR 
HEKEAHDUH  FOR:    SHE  EHES2BBEC 
SUBJECT  :    Report  of  the  Hoover  Commission  Task  Force  on 
Intelligence  Activities  (Appendix  I)  Regarding 
the  Rational  Security  Agency  and  Regarding 
Communications  and  Electronics 
In  accordance  vita  the  memorandum  of  Jane  13  from  the  Assistant 
to  the  President,  it  was  requested  that  the  coordinated  views  of  the 
interested  departments  and  agencies  with  respect  to  the  subject  Ap- 
■Dendix  of  the  Hoover  Commission  Task  Force  Report,  he  submitted  with- 
in 60  days* 
The  views  of  interested  departments  and  agencies  have  been  ob- 
tained by  thorough  discussion  of  the  two  parts  of  the  Appendix  in. 
the  United  States  Communications  Intelligence  Board  (USCIB}  and  in 
the  United  States  Conaanicationa  Security  Board  (USCSB).    The  agreed 
comments  of  the  two  Boards  on  the  two  parts-are  enclosed  herewith, 
together  with  the  covering  memoranda  frca  the  Acting  Executive  Secre- 
tary of  USCIB,  and  from  the  Chairman  of  USCSB. 
In  his  special  first  indorsement  of  Part  1  of  the  Appendix,  the 
Chairman  of  the  Task  Force  on  Intelligence  Activities  especially  em- 
phasized the  importance,  of  Becommeadation  2  of  Part  1,  which  calls 
for  a  "much  greater  and  continuing  effort"  to  produce  high  level  ma- 
terial.   Ton  will  note,  in  connection  with  USCIB* s  comment  on  this 
recommendation  that  it  is  reported  that  steps  ore  heing  taken  to  ob- 
tain the  services  of  the  most  highly  qualified  scientific  and  tech- 
nical experts  for  the  purpose  of  conducting  an  investigation  of  tne 
feasibility  of  solving  the  problem  concerned.-   Until  this  investiga- 
tion has  been  completed  sal  the  steps  referred  to  in  USCIB* a  ccoaents 
on  BecQEEsndatioa  2  have  been  taken,  the  Board  feels  that  it  should 
defer  comment  on  the  expansion  of  the  ISA  effort  recommended  by  the 
Beport. 
Allen  W.  Dulles  dEClassifieo 
Enclosures;  Authority  OV*-    '''*■-   —   — :  
1.  Comments  by  USCIB  and  USCSB  t,                                2/f/K" 
2.  lfcmo  fr  Acg  Ex  Sec,  USCIB  •  gy         ^C/CO   *■;.!•  Date  SUU-+- 
3.  Bano  fr  Chairman,  USCSB        -.-.-.--r^-.--. .  «  portions  VAu:~rzo 
'  •".::::::::::::::".::::::::  1  :::::::::*.:: :  1  -  •'■" '  nle  date  ^2/f/f'^
FEDERAL  COAL  MINE  SAFETY  BOARD  OF  REVIEW 
•'s**".  WASHINGTON  25,  D.  C. 
>  July  28,     1955  ~" 
Dear  Colonel  Goodpastor: 
Reference  Bulletin. Nq.  56-2  o£  the  Bureau  of  the 
Budget,  dated  July  13,   19,55,  Chairman  Steidle  of  this  Agency 
has  directed  that  I  submit  a  statement  on  the  subject  matter  of 
that  bulletin. 
This  Agency  has  reviewed  the  following  report  of 
the  Commission  on  Organization  of  the  Executive  Branch  of 
the  Government: 
Intelligence  Activities 
The  nature  of  our  Agency  is  such  that  the  above 
report  has  insufficient  effect  on  our  operations  to  warrant 
comment  thereon. 
Sincerely  your  a, 
Robert  J.  Freehling 
General  Counsel 
Colonel  Andrew  J.  Goodpastor,  Jr. 
The    White    House 
Washington   25,     B.     C.
r 
c 
Joly&.  1955 
JMSMO&AIIDQM  FOR 
ADMIRAL  STK.A9SE 
(Go^nro.  Ad»fM>«k»d  pi«  to  t«U  you  th*t 
itt  «Uiho  «*4wly ^«aU^«ta*r  Corytm  to 
tt*k^tto^tt^ttm«  for  pr«p»ritti  .yoar  :riow« 
d *o^iit»&itt,yo»jB^«H^»fl^^  19  lo 
,  A.  J.  ^oodpwUr 
Colenol.  C£»  0  S.Army 
Staff  SoqroUry
UNITED  STATES 
ATOMIC  ENERGY  COMMISSIVE  WHITE  HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 
OFFICE  OF  THE  CHAIRMAN 
Jul  20   1Q  56  AM  '55 
19  July  19# RECEIYE0 
MEMORANDUM  FOR:     Governor  Sherman  Adams 
The  Assistant  to  the  President 
Subject:   Report  of  the  Hoover  Commission  Task 
Force  on  Intelligence  Activities. 
On  June  13th  you  transmitted  to  me  portions  of 
the  classified  report  of  the  Hoover  Commission  Task 
Force  on  Intelligence  Activities  and  asked  that  a 
review  be  made  of  it  so  that  the  views  of  the  Com- 
mission with  respect  to  it  could  be  submitted  within 
60  days.  Since  so  large  a  portion  of  my  staff  is 
directly  connected  with  preparation  for  the  Atomic 
Conference  in  Geneva  and  since  I  will  probably  be 
away  from  Washington  for  the  first  two  weeks  of 
August,  this  is  to  request  that  you  allow  me  a 
two-week  time  extension.  I  would  try  to  have  our 
views  before  you  by  August  26th.  Will  this  be 
satisfactory? 
Lewis  L.  Strauss
»—i;-ii— i  —■ 
Omcs  or  1MB  DtMCfoa 
H-23 
*  cy-1 
EXECUTIVE  OFFICE  OF  THE  PRESIDENT  Response  to  my  oral 
  ..__„  .-...-.^..j  request  for  indication  whethei 
OFFICE  OF  DEFENSE  MOBILIZATION  ^  J*      .  .       ... 
wrr,v*  ODM  in  agreement  with 
washinotom  «.  o.  c.  .-Special  Recommendation" 
July  6.  1955  G 
KBCBiSmM  JOB 
Buhjaats 
oaLcnxL  unm  J.  ooooputcK 
Staff  Baeratary 
Jha  Yhlta  Boom 
Boorar  On—  laaloat  Baport 
la  oonnaailon  with  lha  olaaalftad  raport  on  ooaawloatloae 
latalllfanoa  praparad  V  «»•  *ar"  ©oandaatam.  it  U  w  conolMlon  that 
tha  raport  la  earroet  la  ita  ttatoaoata  af  fan*  and  that,  la  prlnclpla. 
tha  eoaolualona  aad  rana—  iiinatlnaa  ara  aooat*  ' 
At  yon  any  know*  tha  fai+rw  Adrlsazy  Ooaodttaa.  at  tha 
direction  af  tha  Batleaal  aocarlty  Owaanll.  node  a.  vx?  thoronffc 
lnreetieatioB  of  all  phaaaa  af  attr  rea  dlaaei  tnnlndlng  nonamieatloae, 
and  ita  oonelualone  la  ceaeral  parallel  tha  fiadiaf •  of  the  Eoorer 
Oaasiaaloa.    Action  reaeaattadatlona  on  tha  toiaaoa  AdTleory  Coaalttee 
report  «U1  b»  amde  ta  tha  Batlonal  8000117  Conaeil  probably  within 
tha  naxt  tva  ooeka,  aad  It  would  he  af  eud«»atioa  that  tha  Booker 
'  Coandaeloa  oUaalflad  raport  ha  hold  aad  reviewed  vlth  tho  President 
.  aftar  ha  boa  haard  tha  finding  of  the  flcleaoe  Adrleory  Coendttee. 
expnlanfciaa*!  reooameadatlone  la  tha  folaaoa  Adrleory 
aora  fer-raaaMag  than  thoae  eafgeeted 
raport  aad.  If  adeptod.  veold  probably 
ndatlaae  of  tha  Hooter  On— laaloa  raport. 
Oeamittee  raport 
In  th4 
aatlefy  tho 
«a  do  hate  Ha 
Oaaadaaloa  laport  that  ad*>t 
fellevat 
la  eeaaeaaloa  with  tha  looker 
it  farther  attaatloa.     they  ara  aa 
1.     Xa  Tort  Meade  a  enltable 
Batleaal  ftcderlty  Aceaey  taklnc  lata 
velaerablllty  tefnthor  vlth  today' • 
!•    Va  veuld  area 
aa  aada  a 
Adrleory  Oeandttee. 
aotlana  taken  by  tha 
loaatlan  for  tho 
it  eeaaamloatlone 
altaat 
that  tha  Director  of  tha  latlooal  Sonority 
or  at  laaat  aa  cheerier  aa  tha  Intelligence 
to  tho  lone  load  tlno  required  to  lmpleaent 
a  hattor  profraaalnc  Job  could  b«  dona. 
da  doalra. I  will  ha  ftOad  to  dlaomao  thla  ■asaa*  farther  with  /on  If  70a 
1. 
Director 
lor   V^58^  °"  ry  tot  «***"*?
THE  WHITE  HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 
The  assistant  to  the  Presioent 
July  6,  19S5 
MEMORANDUM  FOR 
THE  DIRECTOR  OF  CENTRAL  INTELLIGENCE 
Please  feel  froe  to  go  ahead  with  the  production 
of  extra  copies  of  the  reports  referred  to  in 
your  memorandum  to  me  (TS  103808)  of  1  July. 
This  memorandum  constitutes  authorisation  as 
requested  in  your  memorandum. 
■>.A-
HI?#S«-!!?4a. 
ts  #103808 
Copy  #1 
CENTRAL   INTELLIGENCE  AGENCY 
WASHINGTON  25.  D.  C. 
OFFICE   OF  THE   DIRECTOR 
JUL    11955 
MEMORANDUM  FOB:  Governor  Sherman  Adams,  The  White  House 
SUBJECT: 
Consideration  of  Appendix  I  of  the  Report  of  the 
Hoover  Commission  Task  Force  hy  USCIB  and  USCSB 
1.  In  your,  memorandum  of  June  13,  you  request  that  the  views  of 
USCIB  and  USCSB  on  Appendix  I  of  the  Hoover  Commission  Task  Force  he 
supplied  to  your  office  within  60  days .  Analysis  of  the  Report  indicates 
that  it  will  he  necessary  to  reproduce  the  Report  to  a  limited  extent  in 
order  to  make  it  possihle  for  the  two  Boards  concerned  to  consider  it . 
2.  It  is  understood  that  the  Office  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense 
and  the  National  Security  Agency,  as  well  as  the  CIA,  have  already 
received  copies  of  the  Report.  Accordingly,  authorization  is  requested 
to  make  six  additional  copies  for  the  other  members  of  USCIB,  as  follows: 
State,  FBI,  Air  Force,  Navy,  Army  and  the  Office  of  the  Executive  Secretary 
of  USCIB.  ' 
3.  In  addition  to  the  ahove,  in  order  to  arrange  for  consideration 
of  the  pertinent  sections  of  the  Appendix  by  the  USCSB,  authorization  is 
requested  to  reproduce  11  copies  of  these  sections .  These  would  be  issued 
to  NSA,  CIA,  OSD,  Army,  Navy,  Air  Force,  FBI,  State,  Treasury,  the  Atomic 
Energy  Commission  and  the  Office  of  the  Executive  Secretary  of  the  USCSB. 
The  appropriate  sections  would  he  Section  III  of  Part  1  (pp~19--24),  witn 
Recommendations  k   and  5,  and  Section  VTII  of  Part  2  (pp  16—20),  with 
Conclusion  11  and  Recommendations  8,  9  and  10  and  >heN special  recommendation. 
•DUIIES 
Director 
TOF 
DECLASSIFIED 
Authority  .mSSti-^-—^- 
ii-v^bJu
July  5,  1955 
:-f!MORAKDUM,  FOR 
GOVEHIOR  ADAMSt 
Ret     Report  of  the  Eoover  Coacaission 
Tasfc  Farce  on  Intelligence  Activities 
(Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation) 
I  have  your  aamoronduai  on  the  above  subject,  d&ted 
June  11,  1955.  These  excerpts  from  the  classified  report  of  the 
Hoover  Coraaissicn  Task  Force  on  Intelligence  Activities  have  teen 
carefully  reviewed.  I  ea  enclosing  a  aeaorsndua  to  ae  f  roa  the 
Director  of  the  FBI,  dated  June  28,  1955,  on  this  subject  and  have 
no  further  consents  to  add. 
v.  -  :.r.  hoover 
Attachment 
At* 
^   Si"-"    -{^ 
This  docuaent  consin'is   =:~Z — *   ?a.q;2!\ 
'?n.     *L  .-.t*         7      J  :?i':S.
July  5.  1955 
MEMORANDUM  FOR 
Mr.  W.  R.  Oedtl 
Deputy  Atslttaat  to  tho 
Socrotary  of  OtdsM 
With  roforooco  to  your  lotter  of  I  4uly, 
your  raquoat  to  Uko  tho  action  doacribod 
thoroia  baa  boon  approved. 
A.  J.  Goodpaatar 
Colenal,  CE,  US  Army 
Staff  Saeratary
(IUIi  imilfn    im   COMMUNICATIONS  TO 
THE  6ECBETARY  OF  STATE 
WASHINGTON  15,  D.  C 
DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 
WASHINGTON 
July  5,  1$5$ 
MEMORANDUM  FOR  GOUOMEL  A.  J.  GOODPASTER 
THE  "WHITE  HOUSE 
in  accordance  -with  the  arrangements  we  made  over 
the  telephone  tdth  respect  to  the  Hoover  Commission 
Report  on  intelligence,  this  memorandum  iri.ll  introduce 
Mr.  Fisher  Howe,  Deputy  Special  Assistant  to  the 
Secretary  for  intelligence,  nho  is  cleared  to  receive 
State  Department  documents  of  all  classifications. 
His  area  of  the  State  Department  is  responsible  for 
intelligence  liaison  trLth  CIA*  He  has  wq«  clearance 
and  is  fully  cleared  and  indoctrinated  under  USCIB 
Directive  No.  5. 
Robert  G.  Barnes 
Deputy  Director 
Executive  Secretariat
/o^oS* 
CENTRAL  INTELLIGENCE  AGENCY 
WASHINGTON  25,  D.C       '" 
1  July  1955 
V 
MEMORANDUM  FOR:     Colonel  Andrew  J.  Goodpasture,  The  White  House 
—'  +  • 
SUBJECT: 
^Reproduction  of  Appendix  I  of  the  Report  of  the 
'Boo^re'Commissi6a"r5fesk  Force      ' '    ■*"■** ' ?>   " v <'7;?-*:" 
■■■:£*'■■;•• 
■  ■  ..   .ft-     '• 
1.  In  pursuance  of  our  telephone  conversation  today,  this  JLs  „.< 
to  inform  'you  that"  the  Director  W-Centrai"j£t^ 
the "  reproduction  of  Appendiz  I  of  the  Hoover 'Ccffl^fesfctn^TaiBS^orcef*^' 
Report 
Reproduction  will  take  place     __._  _,_.   
a.  Six  additional  copies  of  Appendix ,:JJ, ^both  parts,  will 
he  made  for  those  members  of  ."USCIB  whlcn'^i^^no^'.S^eaJiy'^heen 
supplied  with  a"  copyT"  These  iarei*  *S^'ate|^i^Aif^Fofce,  Navy, 
"Army  and' the  Office  of  the Jteecutive"Wcre^ary"*df. USCIB.  ^--r 
• --^ '-.v-».  ■■■-*--   ■>'."-■-'•«;.  •«'"  •;>?■. ^^.*-.f  &:•,;$'?&% $%$&>:■'*  *$Z   '*£*•=■*. 
b .  In  connection  with  consideration  of  the  pertinent 
sections  of  the  Appendix  by'USCSB,  eleven  copies  will  be 
reproduced  of  Section  HI  of  Tart  1  (pp  19--2J0,  with 
Recommendations  k  and  5,  and  Sect  ion  _VIII  of  Part  2  (pp  l6 — 
20),  with  Conclusion  11  and  Recommendations  8",  9  and  10  and 
the  special  recommendation.  "These  will  be  issued  to  USA,  CIA., 
OSD,  Army,  Navy,  Air  Force,  FBI,  State,  Treasury,  AEG  and  the 
Office  of  the  Executive  Secretary  of  USCSB.  ' 
FOR  THE  ASSISTANT  DIRECTOR,  CURRENT  INTELLIGENCE: 
■  EDMUND  H.  KELLOGG 
DECLASSIFIED 
Authority  flDfi.     79-2*"/ 
By  ^,X£A  N,,  Dv-  ^h/lL
*""D  C~  JU*  COMMISSION  CN  ORGANIZATION 
mJr  **~  OF  THE 
ii  »•■*■-  •-*?'- /Y  '.' 
JflKCUl'lVJS  BRANCH  OF  THE  GOVERNMENT 
*,.,ii?.r&*i£^i^    ..-.  .-  —-  GENERAL  ACCOUNTING 
^;::  HfflSS  RELEASE  OFFICE  BUILDING 
K5£>*-r         -      -      --  WASHINGTON  25,  D.  C. 
.  ii  JW  Newspapers,  SSSS„32q?° 
gay.'  Jon*  29    Extension  5U91 
Washington,  Am*  29— Action  by  the  congress  and  the  president  to  set  up 
twitch-dog"  system  to  cheok  the  operations  and  expenditures  of  intelligence 
a«meiM  of  the  Government  la  recommended  by  the  Cenndsslon  on  organization  of 
<tha  Executive  Branch  of  the  Government* 
vv'  in  a  report  te  the  Congress  today  on  Intelligence  Activities  of  the  Gov- 
ernment, the  Hoover  Bommission  finds  that  such  an  arrangement  la  needed  not  only 
to  review  the  efficiency,  and  effectiveness  of  the  Intelligence  effort,  but  also 
to  reassure  the  people  and  inspire  greater  confidence  in  the  trustworthiness  of 
this  phase  of  Federal  operations. 
The  Commission*  s  recommendation  involves  the  creation  of  two  committees 
which  might  collaborate  on  important  matters  in  this  field.    One  would  be  a 
joint  Congressional  committee  on  Foreign  Intelligence,  and  the  other  would  be 
a  compact  group  of  trustworthy  private  citizens  to  be  named  by  the  President 
and  to  serve  on  a  part-time  basis* 
The  Intelligence  Task  Force,  headed  by  General  Mark  tf«  Clark,  now  president 
of  the  Citadel  in  Charleston,  S.C.,  in  a  report  to  the  Commission  proposed  the 
establishment  of  a  «watch-dog«  group  for  the  same  purposes,  but  in  a  different 
form*    The  task  force  urged  the  creation  of  a  single  small  permanent  commission 
by  Act  of  Congress  for  the  Intelligence  surveillance  job,  to  be  modeled  after 
the  Hoover  Commission  and  to  include  Members  of  both  Houses  of  Congress  as  well 
as  distinguished  private  citizens. 
The  other  proposals  of  the  task  force,  involving  both  administrative  and 
legislative  action  and  including  broad  recommendations  for  an  Internal 
INTELLIGENCE  ACTIVITIES
■^&&W--.£i^&ig:~..-    --  X2«?S 
'reorganisation  ef  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency,  were  presented  without 
by  the  Commission  along  vita  Its  own  report,  for  the  consideration 
'Congress  and  the  Executive  agencies  Involved, 
IW«>-.t,-..-       '        ""   " 
!|fp:  Recommendation  No.  1  of  the  task  force  report  explained  that  the  CI& 
Pi^-'^^;.*:"-      
>  Yi;^   should  be  revamped  Internally  "to  produce  greater  emphasis  on  certain  of 
Its  basic  statutory  functions*" 
Details  and  supporting  factual  natter  relating  to  this  recommendation 
were  contained  in  a  separate,  highly  classified  report  which  was  submitted 
by  the  task  force  to  Mr*  Hoover  and  presented  by  him  directly  to  President 
Eisenhower.  Kach  of  this  data  could  not  be  incorporated  in  the  public 
report  for  security  reasons. 
Both  of  the  task  force  reports,  based  on  exhaustive  surveys  la  this 
country  and  first-hand  studies  abroad,  emphasized  that  the  major  aim  should 
be  greater  concentration  on  the  collection  of  Information  about  technological 
and  military  developments  and  plans  of  "our  primary  target'1— the  Soviet  bloc— 
and  called  for  greater  boldness  and  freedom  of  action  for  our  Intelligence 
forces  to  overcome  the  present  deficiencies  in  this  country's  knowledge  of 
Communist  plans* 
In  a  discussion  of  the  State  Department's  responsibilities  and  the  effect 
of  foreign  policies  and  diplomacy  on  Intelligence  operations,  the  report  said; 
•The  task  force  has  recognized  the  incompatibility  in  method  between  the 
practice  of  diplomacy  and  more  direct  and  active  operations  incident  to  the 
collection  of  Intelligence  and  the  conduct  of  cold  war* 
"While  all  contribute  to  the  end  in  view,  conflicts  between  them  must  be 
resolved,  usually  on  a  high  level,  and  always  in  the  national  interest*  It 
must  be  realized  that  diplomacy  is  not  an  end  in  itself;  that,  while  national 
ends  must  be  served  and  unjustifiable  risks  avoided,  the  collection  of
r 
h 
Intelligence  Is  a  "vital  element  in  our  national  welfare  and  existence, 
instances  have  come  to  the  attention  of  the  task  force  where  too  conservative 
an  attitude  has  prevailed,  often  to  the  detriment  of  vigorous  and  timely 
action  in  this  f ield*" 
The  task  force  expressed  the  view  that  the  legislation,  and  organizational 
set-up  for  Intelligence  purposes  are  soundly  conceived,  bat  that  administrative 
flaws  have  developed  and  it  proposes  remedies* 
"Failure  to  produce  certain  elements  of  intelligence  has  been  due  In  part 
to  the  restrictive  effects  of  some  of  our  national  attitudes  and  policies 
toward  the  collection  of  Intelligence  so  necessary  for  effective  resistance 
to  Soviet  aggression,"  the  report  added*  "Also,  among  some  of  those  responsible 
for  implementation  of  our  foreign  policy  by  diplomacy  and  negotiation,  there 
  
t   
seems  to  exist  an  abhorrence  to  anything  that  might  lead  to  diplomatic  or  even 
protocol  complications* 
"This  negative  attitude,  usually  at  the  desk  level,  at  times  has  stifled 
initiative  and  action  in  the  collection  of  intelligence.  Some  of  these  efforts, 
if  permitted  to  proceed  properly,  might  have  brought  direct  and  immediate 
results  and  made  positive  contributions  to  the  national  welfare  that  would 
have  justified  the  attendant  political  risks  and  possible  inconsequential 
diplomatic  embarrassment* 
"Security  measures  adopted  by  the  Communists  have  been  provokingly  con- 
ceived and  boldly  employed.  They  have  been  quite  effective  in  comparison  with 
our  security  measures,  which  have  permitted  the  eollection  of  vital  secrets  in 
this  country  with  relative  ease. 
"The  information  we  need,  particularly  for  our  Armed  Forces,  is  potentially 
available.    Through  concentration  on  the  prime  target  we  much  exert  every
S    conceivable  and  practicable  effort  to  get  it.  Success  in  this  field  depends 
•  on  greater  boldness  at  the  policy  level,  a  willingness  to  accept  certain  cal- 
culated political  and  diplomatic  risks,  and  full  use  of  technological 
capabilities." 
A11  elements  of  the  Intelligence  field  were  surveyed  by  the  task  force, 
but  major  attention  was  paid  to  the  CIA.  because  of  the  special  autonomous 
character  of  that  agency  and  because  "it  is  charged  with  the  overall  respons- 
ibility for  coordinating  the  output  of  aU  the  intelligence  forces." 
The  recommendations  included  provisions  for  lifting  the  prestige  of  the 
Intelligence  forces,  developing  career  incentives,  providing  greater  flexibility 
of  recruitment  of  "the  best  qualified  individuals,"  and  relieving  the  shortage 
of  trained  personnel. 
They  also  embraced  suggestions  for  strengthening  security  surveys  of 
Intelligence  workers  and  employees  of  industrial  plants  engaged  in  "sensitive" 
work* 
In  the  matter  of  personnel  security  checks,  the  task  force  had  this  to  say: 
"The  methods  used  for  selection  of  personnel  were  reassuring  in  the  light 
of  suspicions  which  have  been  voiced  that  subversive  and  Communistic  elements 
were  readily  infiltrating  into  these  sensitive  jobs.  Our  investigations 
Indicated  that  the  Intelligence  leadership  in  all  branches  **s  alert  to  its 
responsibility  and  is  functioning  under  strict  rules  to  prevent  any  such 
infiltration. 
"One  flaw  in  the  present  system,  however,  seems  to  be  the  absence  of  a 
general  plan  for  periodic  review  of  the  security  status  of  every  person  after 
employment  in  Intelligence  activities,  to  guard  against  the  possibility-  that 
some  employee  who  was  completely  dependable  and  honorable  when  starting
•••'•^•-■•'-■>»-™^W!iM>>^.;t^^ 
work  night  have  changed  character,  fallen  from  grace,  or  succumbed  to  alien 
blandishments  or  soma  personal  weakness  such  as  strong  drink  or  sexual 
perversion." 
To  minimize  this  hazard,  the  task  force  recommended  that  measures  be 
instituted  in  aU  agencies  for  rechecklng  the  security  status  of  all  personnel 
engaged  in  Intelligence,  at  periodic  intervals  not  to  exceed  five  years  in 
any  individual  case.  The  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  makes  such  a 
periodic  check  of  all  its  personnel* 
The  investigations  of  the  task  force  with  respect  to  industrial  personnel 
security  indicated  "a  serious  weakness"  arising  from  the  fact  that  an  individual 
who  has  been  declared  to  be  a  security  risk  although  removed  from  work  of  a 
classified  nature,  might  still  be  retained  on  some  other  work  in  the  same 
plant,  be  in  daily  contact  with  workers  engaged  in  sensitive  production  and 
enjoy  freedom  of  movement  within  the  plant. 
"The  military  departments  are  aware  of  the  situation,"  the  task  force 
said,  "and  have  recommended  legislation  to  correct  this  deficiency.  The  task 
force  commends  such  a  proposal  and  feels  that  this  loophole  in  our  security 
barriers  should  be  closed  promptly.  .  • 
"Although  detailed  study  of  the  policies,  functions  and  procedures  of  the 
departments  and  agencies  collecting  and  handling  Intelligence  data,  as  out- 
lined to  us  by  the  Commission,  did  not  primarily  entail  the  investigation  of 
the  security  angle  of  every  individual  engaged  in  Intelligence,  we  recognized 
the  fact  that  the  character  of  personnel  affects  these  Intelligence  functions, 
and  we  faced  squarely  the  issue  of  individual  cases  under  suspicion  or  brought 
to  our  attention  from  various  sources.  A  number  of  names  came  to  us  with 
supposedly  derogatory  information  or  merely  with  derogatory  implications.
c(>Oi>c»;K»i«;>;';jo<iC»;«:»i.»,*ww^vi>i»iKii*c>iJo»><»i.;.-v.-w..wv.„^ 
•Whan  any  sueh  Information  or  any  name  vas  brought  to  our  attention 
from  any  source  concerning  individuals  employed  in  the  Intelligence  field,  or 
even  if  not  so  employed,  every  ease  except  those  obviously  without  merit  was 
referred  to  the  FBI,  or  where  appropriate,  to  the  responsible  agency,  or  to 
both,  with  a  request  for  a  report. 
"Up  to  the  time  this  report  was  prepared,  some  replies  to  our  inquiry 
developed  information  to  the  effect  that  the  records  contained  no  adequate 
basis  for  suspicion  of  the  individuals  as  security  risks*  Some  replies  indi- 
cated that  the  individuals  were  under  investigation  and  that  the  investigations 
were  continuing.  One  of  the  individuals  is  on  leave  without  pay,  pending 
completion  of  an  investigation  now  in  process,  and  appropriate  disposition.11 
The  report  by  General  Clark's  group  said  its  investigations  showed  that 
the  "sensitive  and  vital  work  of  the  Intelligence  community  is  being  led  by 
a  group  which  is  sincere  and  dedicated  to  the  service  of  the  nation,"  and  that 
it  felt  the  American  people  "can  and  should  give  their  full  confidence  and 
support  to  the  Intelligence  program,  and  contribute  in  every  possible  way  to 
the  vital  work." 
"We  found  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence, "  it  continued,  "to  be 
industrious,  objective,  selfless,  enthusiastic  and  imaginative.  We  are  con- 
vinced, however,  that  in  his  enthusiasm  he  has  taken  upon  himself  too  many 
burdensome  duties  and  responsibilities  on  the  operational  .side  of  CIA's 
activities. " 
The  report  suggested  that  the  Director  of  CIA  employ  an  executive  director, 
or  "chief  of  staff,**  so  that  he  might  be  "relieved  of  the  chore  of  many  day-to- 
day  administrative  and  operational  problems,  and  thus  be  able  to  give  more 
time  to  the  broad,  overall  direction  of  the  agency  and  the  coordination  of 
the  entire  Intelligence  effort."
The  task  force  expressed  concern  over  the  "possibility  of  the  growth  of 
license  and  abases  of  power  where  disclosure  of  costs,  organization,  person- 
nel and  functions  are  precluded  by  law,"  as  is  the  case  with  CIA..  Although 
the  Investigation  showed  no  indication  of  such  abuses,  as  a  natter  of  future 
Insurance  it  recommended  that  its  proposed  "watch-dog"  commission  including 
distinguished  public-spirited  citizens  as  members,  be  empowered  by  law  to 
ask  for  and  receive,  under  adequate  safeguards  against  "leaks,"  any  informa- 
tion from  any  source  it  might  need  for  its  own  use. 
Within  the  Armed  Services  Committee,  it  explained,  there  is  a  liaison 
channel  between  the  Congress  and  CIA  which  "serves  a  worthy  purpose"  but 
which  cannot  include  private  citizens  and  does  not  encompass  the  wide  scope  of 
service  and  continuity  which  the  Investigators  consider  essential  for  this 
task*  It  found  the  same  defect  in  more  than  a  score  of  bills  introduced  in 
this  session  of  the  Congress  to  provide  for  review  of  CIA's  work* 
In  a  discussion  of  the  evolution  and  growth  of  our  Intelligence  program, 
giving  the  public  a  clearer  conception  of  the  significance  of  the  operations 
in  modern  times,  the  task  force  report  says: 
"For  self-preservation,  the  defenders  of  a  free  world  need  complete, 
prompt  and  continuing  information  on  the  plans  and  potentialities  of  those 
who  would  enslave  it.  Nations  and  people  who  value  liberty  and  a  sovereign 
national  existence  in  a  free  world  now  look  to  the  United  States  for  leader- 
ship and  inspiration  in  their  struggle  to  safeguard  these  inherent  rights. 
"In  the  historic  family  of  nations,  this  country  ranks  as  a  comparative 
newcomer.  In  the  early  days  of  the  Republic—not  so  long  ago  as  the  world 
measures  time— our  people  felt  comfortably  distant  from  the  hotbeds  of  foreign 
intrigue  and  conflict.
^^Transportation  and  communication  facilities  in  the  days  of  clipper 
ships  and  the  pony  express  were  so  limited  and  so  slow  that  they  fostered  a 
serene  assurance  of  isolation  and  geographical  protection  against  possible 
aggressors.  .  .  Our  early  philosophy  of  peace  still  prevails,  but  within 
our  generation,  and  for  our  own  protection,  organized  intelligence  has  been 
forced  upon  us  by  the  rapidly  shrinking  world  of  electronics,  nuclear  weapons 
and  planes  which  travel  at  supersonic  speed. 
"The  United  States  emerged  from  World  War  H  as  the  political  leader  in 
free-world  affairs  and  the  outstanding  military  power.  The  advent  of  atonic 
bombs,  together  with  the  development  of  advanced  methods  for  their  delivery, 
intensified  the  need  for  adequate  and  timely  intelligence  so  that  we  might 
fulfill  our  responsibilities  in  international  affairs  and  insure  our  own 
survival. 
Effective  Intelligence  has  become  increasingly  necessary  far  our  pro- 
tection against  the  propaganda,  infiltration,  and  aggressiveness  of  the 
Communist  leaders.  By  trial  and  error,  study  and  skill,  we  have  made  progress; 
but  we  must  not  labor  under  any  complacent  delusions.  There  is  still  much  to 
be  done  by  our  Intelligence  community  to  bring  its  achievements  up  to  an 
acceptable  level." 
The  task  force  report  cites  "the  tremendous  importance  to  our  country 
of  the  Intelligence  effort  and  the  unpubliciaed  and  selfless  duties  performed," 
and  says  that  these  services  "demand  that  the  prestige  of  this  function,  and 
of  the  personnel  involved,  be  recognised  through  the  use  of  adequate  career 
incentives  and  benefits  to  encourage  full  development  of  talent  within  the 
Intelligence  community."  v 
To  that  end  the  task  force  recommends  that  the  Executive  Pay  Bill  of  lSh9 
be  amended  to  increase  the  annual  salary  of  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence
O' 
equivalent  of  that  of  the  Deputy  Secretary  of  Defense  (*20,000)j  to 
bring  the  pay  of  the  Deputy  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  up  to  $17,500, 
the  same  as  that  of  most  under  secretaries  of  the  Executive  Branch}  and  to 
provide  operating  directors  of  areas  of  responsibility  in  Intelligence  with 
proportionate  salaries. 
The  recommendation  further  would  provide  that  the  chiefs  of  the  various 
Intelligence  units  of  the  military  services  be  elevated  in  the  organizational 
structure  to  the  level  of  Deputy  Chiefs  of  Staff  in  the  Army  and  Air  Force, 
and  Deputy  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  in  the  Navy. 
Under  this  plan  also  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  Act  of  1$U9  would 
be  amended  to  provide  additional  medical  and  hospital  benefits  and  services 
for  dependents  of  CIA  employees  when  stationed  overseas,  similar  to  the  benefits 
authorized  for  dependents  of  the  members  of  the  Foreign  Service;  and  statutory 
leave  benefits,  or  accululation  of  leave,  for  employees  of  CIA  overseas,  as 
now  applied  to  members  of  the  Foreign  Service. 
The  task  force  calls  attention  to  important  contibutions  which  might  be 
made  to  the  Intelligence  effort  by  retired  civilians  with  long  business  expe- 
rience in  the  foreign  field,  and  suggests  that  "this  resource  should  be 
exploited  fully."  It  points  also  to  the  valuable  reservoir  of  retired  military 
personnel  with  foreign  experience  vhich  might  be  utilized. 
One  major  advantage  in  the  exploitation  of  these  trained  groups,  accord- 
ing to  the  task  force,  would  be  the  speed  with  which  they  could  be  fitted  into 
the  Intelligence  picture.  Certain  outmoded  restrictions  now  are  placed  on 
the  full  use  of  this  pool  of  talent. 
To  remedy  this  situation,  the  recommendation  is  made  that  the  Central 
Intelligence  Agency  Act  of  19h9  be  amended  to  authorize  the  employment  by  the
/'  10 
CIA  of  retired  military  personnel  of  the  Armed  Services  "without  on  arbitrary 
limitation  on  the  number  of  such  employees."  The  limit  now  is  fifteen.  Such 
personnel  would  be  authorized  to  accept  either  their  military  retirement  pay 
plus  any  difference  between  their  retirement  pay  and  the  proper  pay  of  the 
office  they  would  hold  in  CIA,  or  the  proper  pay  of  the  office,  but  not  both. 
The  recommendation  further  proposes  that  the  Department  of  Defense  make 
extensive  use  of  Schedule  A  of  the  Civil  Service  Regulations  (non-corapetitive 
appointments)  in  the  employment  by  the  military  services  of  civilian  Intelli- 
gence analysts  and  other  specialists  "in  order  to  provide  the  necessary 
flexibility  in  the  recruitment  of  qualified  civilian  personnel  and  to  facili- 
tate the  interchange  of  such  personnel  between  Zone  of  Interior  competitive 
service  and  the  overseas  excepted  service.  Such  appointments  would  take  in 
retired  citizens  with  wide  previous  business  experience  in  the  foreign  field. 
"Lack  of  adequate  linguistic  preparation  often  has  proved  to  be  a  serious 
handicap  to  our  representatives  abroad,"  the  task  force  further  reports.  "This 
became  painfully  apparent  during  the  Korean  War.  The  ability  to  write  and 
speak  the  language  fluently,  and  to  Interpret  foreign  words  and  idioms  accu- 
rately always  helps  an  American  to  get  around  in  a  alien  land,  to  win  the 
confidence  of  its  people,  and  to  understand  them." 
To  meet  the  present  deficiency,  the  task  force  recommends  that  a  "compre- 
hensive, coordinated  program  be  developed  to  extend  linguistic  training  among 
American  citizens  serving  the  Intelligence  effort;  and  that  the  Department  of 
Defense  expand  and  promote  language  training  by  offering  credit  toward  Reserve 
commissions  to  ROTC  students  and  drill  credit  to  Reserve  personnel  for  com- 
pletion of  selected  language  courses." 
As  an  added  means  of  insuring  adequate  supervision  over  certain  special- 
ized phases  of  Intelligence  activities,  the  task  force  also  urges  that  prompt
steps  be  taken  "to  introduce  highly  selective  methods  of  choosing  members 
of  the  coordinating  committee  on  atomic  energy  Intelligence,  not  only  to  get 
the  benefit  of  service  by  the  most  competent  individuals,  but  also  to  assure 
long  tenure  in  this  important  assignment*" 
On  the  ground  that  efficient  and  economical  handling  of  Intelligence 
information  demands  modern  quarters  for  the  personnel  and  records.  General 
Clark's  group  recommends  that  the  Congress  appropriate  "as  soon  as  possible" 
funds  to  construct  adequate  headquarters  facilities  for  the  CIA  in  or  near 
Washington,  D*  C«     It  points  out  that  after  eight  years  of  operation,  the 
agency  still  lacks  such  facilities* 
The  CIA  is  known  to  have  its  headquarters  records  and  workers  scattered 
about  in  more  than  thirty  buildings  here,  some  of  them  outmoded  "temporaries" 
dating  back  to  World  War  I:     A.  bill  now  before  the  Congress  calls  for  the 
erection  of  a  central  CIA  structure  estimated  to  cost  about  $50*000,000,  with 
not  more  than  $6,000,000  additional  for  an  appropriate  site  and  site 
improvements  • 
Officials  of  the  agency  have  estimated  that  about  $2,920,000  could  be 
saved  annually  if  all  of  its  offices,   records  and  headquarters  personnel  could 
be  brought  under  one  rOf  t • 
!Dhe  savings  would  include  $853,000  now  spent  for  twenty-four-hour  guard 
service  in  all  bui&dings  and  for  extra  guards  necessary  in  protecting  informa- 
tion and  records,  orders  and  other  material  which  must  be  shuttled  about 
daily  from  one  office  to  another;  $607,000  in  loss  of  time  now  required  for 
officials  and  employees  to  get  from  building  to  building;   $133*500  now  being 
paid  for  some  rented  quarters;  $80,000  for  receptionists  required  at  each 
set  of  offices;  $36,800  for  shuttle  service  between  offices;  $32,800  in  tele- 
phone mileage  charges  and  $25,000  for  PWX  services;  $69,900  for  couriers  and
/  12 
Messengers;  $$0,000  for  building  servicing;  and  more  than  $1,000,000  to 
pay  for  alterations  and  iaprovements  to  old  buildings  to  keep  them  in  suit- 
able shape  and  for  heavy  expense  in  moving  and  switching  offices. 
These  expense  items  now  are  said  to  come  to  $3,800,000  a  year,  and 
could  be  cut  to  $880,000  a  year  in  a  single  headquarters  building,  according 
to  CIA  estimates. 
The  task  force  finds  fault  with  the  present  system  of  gathering  and 
assaying  foreign  scientific  progress,  and  proposes  new  methods  for  handling 
this  work* 
"Our  Government  and  its  Intelligence  forces  are  not  fully  exploiting 
the  possibilities  of  valuable  military  and  technological  data  potentially 
available  in  scientific  reports  and  technical  publications  issued  in  foreign 
countries,"  the  report'  comments.  "The  State  Department  now  is  charged  with 
this  duty.  Under  this  arrangement,  we  lack  adequate  collection  facilities 
and  staff  experts  to  evaluate  the  material." 
To  correct  this  situation,  it  recommends  that  the  responsibility  for 
procurement  of  foreign  publications  and  for  collection  of  scientific  Intelli- 
gence be  removed  from  the  State  Department  and  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  CIA, 
"with  authority  to  appoint  such  scientific  attaches  as  may  be  necessary  to 
carry  on  this  work  abroad." 
Serving  with  General  Clark  on  the  Intelligence  Task  Force  were  Admiral 
Richard  L.  Conoliy  (retired),  of  Brooklyn,  now  president  of  Long  Island  University; 
Ernest  F.  Hollings,  Lieutenant  Governor  of  South  Carolina;  Henry  Kearns,  manu- 
facturer and  executive,  of  La  Verne,  Calif .;  Captain  "Eddie"  Rickenbacker, 
of  New  York,  chairman  of  the  board  of  Eastern  Air  Lines;  and.  Donald  S.  Russell, 
president  of  the  University  of  South  Carolina.  The  staff  director  was  Major 
General  James  G.  Christiansen  (retired). 
mom
OFFICE  OF  THE  SECRETARY  OF  DEFENSE 
WASHINGTON  25,  D.C. 
JUL  1      1955 
MEMORANDUM  FOR  COLONEL  GOODPASTER 
SUBJECT*  Reproduction,  of  the  Report. of  the  Task  Force  on 
Intelligence  Activities. 
Permission  is  requested,  to  reproduce  approximately  six  copies 
of  the  main,  body  of  the  subject  report  and  of  Appendix  1.  These 
additional  copies  are  urgently  needed  in  order  to  enable  the 
numerous  elements,  of  the  Department  of  Defense  involved  in  intelli- 
gence activities  to  make  their  contributions  to  the  Department  of 
Defense  comments  due.  to  the  White  House.  ■  ■  „ 
This  office  will  undertake  to  insure  that  the  additional 
copies  are  accounted  for  and  destroyed  after  they  have  served 
this  immediate  purpose,  and  will  inform  you  as  soon  as  this, 
has  been  done. 
Deputy  Assistant  to  the 
Secretary  of  Defense 
(Special  Operations)
THE  WHITE  HOUSE  s  ~n  ^ 
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Document  removed  by  the  staff  of  the  Dwight  D.  Eisenhower  Library 
For  further  information, 
see  entry  /  of  the  pink  WITHDRAWAL  SHEET  (PRESIDENTIAL  LIBRARIES) 
at  the  front  of  this  folder
THE  WHITE  HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 
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THE  WHITE  HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 
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COMMISSION  ON  ORGANIZATION 
OF  THE 
EXECUTIVE  BRANCH  OF  THE  GOVERNMENT 
TASK  FORCE  ON  INTELLIGENCE  ACTIVITIES 
general.  accounting 
Office  Building 
Washington  25,  D.  C 
The  Honorable  Herbert  Hoover, 
Chairman,  Commission  on  Organization  of  the 
Executive  Branch  of  the  Government, 
Washington  25,  D.  C. 
My  dear  Mr.  Hoover: 
In  my  letter  of  submission  of  the  Task  Force  Reports  on  Intelli- 
gence Activities  of  our  Government,  dated  May  20,  1955,  I  indicated 
that  the  classified  report  was  so  assembled  as  to  facilitate  the  dis- 
tribution of  certain  sections  to  the  various  departments  and  agencies 
to  which  they  apply. 
You  will  recall  that  a  number  of  recommendations  which  my  Task 
Force  made  are  of  particular  interest  to  and  within  the  authority  of 
the  heads  of  various  departments  to  adopt.     The  distribution  recom- 
mended in  the  attached  table  is  designed  to  place  in  the  hands  of 
the  heads  of  the  departments   and  agencies  affected  so  much  of  the 
report  as  pertains  to  their  areas  of  responsibility. 
In  addition  to  the  single  copy  transmitted  with  my  letter  of 
May  20,   1955,  a  sufficient  number  of  copies  of  the  report  have  been 
reproduced  to  accomplish  the  distribution  proposed  herein.     I  suggest 
that  these  additional  copies  be  placed  at  the  disposal  of   the  President, 
or  his  designated  representative. 
Enclosure: 
Table  of  Distribu- 
tion 
Mark  W.  Clark,  Chairman, 
Task  Force  on  Intelligence  Activities
July  10.  1956 
MEMORANDUM  FOR 
MR.  DIU-ON  ANDERSON 
la  connection  with  the  review  your  staff  has  been 
rr*M«rg  of  Department  and  Agency  response* 
concerning  the  report  of  the  Hoover  Commission 
Task  Force  on  Intelligence  Activities.  there  are 
attached  CZA  comments  on  those  recommenda- 
tion* of  Chapter  IV  of  the  report  which  relate  to 
matters  of  interest  or  concern  to  that  Agency. 
Also  attached  is  a  copy  of  Chapter  IV  itself,  to- 
gether with  Department  of  Defense  comments 
thereon. 
A.  J.  Goodpaater 
Colonel,  CE,  U  S  Army 
Staff  Secretary
July  10.  195* 
MEUO&ANDUM  FOR 
MR.  DILLON  ANDERSON 
la  coaaactioa  with  ta*r4rvi«w  your  staff  kaabasa 
making  of  Dspasibaant  aad  Ag aaey  reapeasas 
coacaraJag'  ths  rspott  of  tha  Bsovar  Cnanmliaioa 
Taak  Fovea  on  lataUigaaca  Activitlas,  thava  aro 
attachad  CIA  coxasasata  om  thssa  racoavnaa4a* 
ttaaa  of  Gaaptar  IV  of  tha  rspott  which  raiate  to 
msttara  of  iateraat  or  eoacora  to  that  Agaaey, 
Alao  attachad  ia  a-  copy  of  Chaptar  IV  ttsalf*  te- 
gathar  with  Dapartmaat  of  Dafsasa  eonunaata 
tfaarcosu 
A.  J.  Goodpaater 
Colonel,  C£»  U  S  Army 
Staff  Sacraiary
April  24,  1956 
MEMORANDUM  FOR 
MR.  JAMES  LAY 
RATIONAL  SECURITY  COUNCIL 
fa  connection  vita  fae  review  yon  have  ten 
making  of  Dopartm«at  and  Agwcf  w^mh 
concerning  the  Report  of  the  Hoove*  Commie- 
•ten  Task  Fore*  m  Intelligence  Activities, 
there  are  attached:   a)  *  copy  of  Governor 
Adams'  msmormndam  to  Dr.  Flamming  re- 
garding the  "Special  Recommendation"  in 
Appending  Pert  2  of  that  report,  tndb) 
Dr.  Flonmrieg'e  response  to  Governor  Adams** 
enclosing  copies  of  memoranda  to  Secretary 
Wilson*  and  from  Secretary  Wilson  and 
Mr.  Allen  Dalles. 
A.  Jf.  Goodpaster 
Colonel,  CE,  U  S  Army 
Staff  Secretary
il_ih  ■  ■■  i{  I  ■  m  "L  fim 
'il   *w'  •  \~it  uc*  'y^f  £  -  £jd 
The  Assistant  to  the  President 
March  2.  1956 
MEMORANDUM  FOR 
THE  HONORABLE  ARTHUR  FL.EMMING 
SUBJECT:   Report  of  the  Hoover  Commission  Tank  Fovea  on 
Intelligence  Activities  (Appendix  I.  Part  2) 
Reference  i*  and*  to  your  memoraadnm  to  Colonel  Qoodpastor  dated 
July  *»  1955  wherein  yon  set  Corth  g anaral  comments  relative  to  the 
"Special  Recommendation1*  of  the  snbject  report  which  suggests:  "That 
the  President  net  np  a  special  commiaeion  compoae*of  technically       :.  j  
■'. 
qualified  civil  and  military  communications  and  ele^onic*  repre-       ":  ■   r 
aentattves,  to  survey  and  prodaee  rocommccdalions  as  to  ways  and 
means  to  insure  the  more  effective  utilisation  of  all  cemmtmlcatioas 
and  electronics  resourcss  of  the  United  States  in  the  national  interests 
incuse  of  war  or  national  emergency.** 
On  the  hasis  of  further  analysis,  it  now  appears  deslrahle  mat  more 
detailed  views  on  this  "Special  Recommendation**  he  provided  hy  the 
Office  of  Defense  Mobilisation,  the  Department  of  Defense*  end  the 
Central  Intelligence  Agency.      Accordingly,  it  ie  requested  that  you 
obtain  the  views  of  the  latter  agencies  with  respect  thereto  end  provide 
them  to  this  office  together  with  your  own  views  concerning  the  substance 
of  the  Special  Recommendation. 
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The  Assistant  to  the  President 
March  2.  1956 
MEMORANDUM  FOR 
THE  HONORABLE  ALLEN  W.  DULLSS 
Subject:      Report  of  the  Hoover  Commission  Teak  Force  on 
Intelligence  Activitiee  (Mala  Report) 
Enclosed  ia  one  copy  of  Chapter  IV  of  the  main  report  on  the  subject 
and  one  copy  of  the  Defease  Department  ccmsaente  thereon. 
Although  Chapter  IV  of  the  subject  report;  is coac^iia4  primarily  with 
the  Department  of  Defense,  it  is  iwte4thet,certaiaef  the  recommenda- 
tion* of  that  Chapter*  of  which  the  fallowing  ^e  noted*  also  relate  to 
matters  of  Interest  or  ceacera  to  the  Central  Intailigeuce  Agency: 
Recommendation  No,  Page  Ho, 
3  137 
4  137 
l  179 
1  204 
3  204 
1  205 
2  205 
3  205 
It  is  requested  that  you  examine  the  above-listed  recommendations 
along  the  lines  of  your  earlier  review -of  other  segments  of  the  Report 
(as  outlined  in  my  memorandum  to  you  dated  June  13*  1955)  and  that 
you  furnish  your  views  thereon  at  your  earliest  convenience. 
The  enclosed  material  should  be  returned  to  this  office  at  the  time  you 
furnish  your  views  teereoa. 
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The  Assistant  to  the  President  .,.--, 
March  2.  1956 
MEMORANDUM  FOR 
THE  HONORABLE  ALLEN  W.   DULLES 
Subject:      Report  of  the  Hoover  Commission  Task  Force  oa 
Intelligence  Activities  (Main  Report) 
Enclosed  is  one  copy  of  Chapter  IV  of  the  main  report  on  the  subject 
and  one  copy  of  the  Defense  Department  comments  feereon. 
Although  Chapter  IV  of  the  subject  report  Is  concerned  primarily  with 
the  Department  of  Defense,  it  is  noted  that  certain  of  the  recommenda- 
tions of  that  Chapter,  of  which  the  following  are  noted,  also  relate  to 
matters  of  interest  or  concern  to  (he  Central  Intelligence  Agency: 
Recommendation  No.  **■  Page  No* 
3  137 
4  137 
1  179 
1  204 
3  204 
1  205 
Z  205 
3  205 
It  is  requested  that  you  examine  the  above -listed  recommendations 
along  the  lines  of  your  earlier  review  of  other  segments  of  the  Report 
(as  outlined  in  my  memorandum  to  you  dated  June  13,  1955)  and  that 
you  furnish  your  views  thereon  at  your  earliest  convenience. 
The  enclosed  material  should  be  returned  to  this  office  at  the  time  you 
furnish  your  views  thereon. 
C. 
Y 
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DRAFT 
-n  February  17,  1956 
MEMORANDUM  FOR  THE  DIRECTOR  OF  CENTRAL  INTELLIGENCE 
SUBJECT:  Report  of  the  Hoover  Commission  Task  Force  on  Intelligence 
Activities  (Main  Report) 
Enclosed  is  one  copy  of  Chapter  IV  of  the  main  report  on  the 
subject  and  one  copy  of  the  Defense  Department  comments  thereon. 
i 
Although  Capter  IV  of  the  subject  report  is  concerned  primarily 
with  the  Department  of  Defense f   it  lsuipted  that/ the  foUxmlPg  recom- 
mendations  of  that  Chapter  "also  rel^te~to~fflSt~ters  'oFTThterest  or  con- 
cern  to  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency: 
Recommendation  No.  Page  No. 
3  137 
4  137 
1  179 
1  204 
3  204 
1  205 
2  205 
3  205 
It  is  requested  that  you  examine  the  above-listed  recommenda- 
tions  along  the  lines  of  your/ review  cf  other  segments  of  the  Report 
(as  outlined  in  my  memorandum  to  you  dated  June  13,  1955)  and  that 
you  furnish  your  views  thereon  at  your  earliest  convenience. 
The  enclosed  material  should  be  returned  to  this  office  at  the 
time  you  £.1  n.i.'sh  your  views  thereon. 
Sherman  Adams 
Assistant  to  the  President 
ffdt  nq-  * 
D  -Tit  i , ,:  h  "i/<  7TflO-85flOS2«
CENTRAL    INTELLIGENCE    AGENCY 
WASHINGTON  23.  D.  C. 
OFFICE   OF   THE   DIRECTOR 
'/!<r# 
-  ->    UU'. 
The  Honorable  Sherman  Adams 
Special  Assistant  to  the  President 
The  White  House 
"Washington,   D.    C. 
Dear  Governor  Adams: 
Reference  is  made  to  my  letter  dated  15  June  1955  con- 
cerning certain  allegations  against  employees  of  this  Agency 
which  your  office  received  from  the  Hoover  Commission  and 
which  you  turned  over  to  this  Agency  on  2  June  1955. 
I  wish  to  inform  you  that  the  cases  of' 
have  been  considered  by  senior  officials  in  the  Central  Intel- 
ligence Agency  and  I  have  approved  their  findings  that  these 
employees  should  be  retained  in  their  employment  under  the 
provisions  of  Executive  Order  10450. 
The  case  of  {•••*•••-•- -is  still  under  investigation  by  the 
FBI  and,   upon  completion  of  investigation,   will  be  fully  adju- 
dicated under  Executive  Order  10450 .     '.  * '.  '.  '. '.  '.  '.  '.  '.'.  is  no  longer 
an  employee  and  although  he  has  re- applied,    his  acceptance 
will  depend  upon  a  favorable  determination  of  his  case.     I 
will  advise  you  separately  at  that  time. 
^      I 
Sincerely  yours, 
W.    JUulles 
Director 
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February  15,  1956 
MEMORANDUM  K)R  MR.  ANDERSON 
SUBJECT:  Report  of  the  Hoover  Commission  Task  Force  on  Intelligence  Activities 
In  response  to  your  request  there  follows  a  list  of  the  recommendations 
of  the  subject  report  -which  Coyne  has  flagged  as  being  of  particular  interest 
from  the  standpoint  of  the  White  Bouse  or  the  NSC.  The  list  is  keyed  to  Coyne's 
1/20/56  memorandum  (copy  attached)  •which  analyzes  the  entire  report  and  agency 
comments  thereon. 
**-- 
The  Main  Report 
Page  No. 
Recommendation  No. 
Action  Agency 
Tlhite  House 
it     n 
NSC  possibly 
NSC 
k 
NSC  possibly 
ii     n 
1U 
it     n 
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tt        H 
White  House 
Appendix  I, 
Part  1 
NSC  possibly 
Appendix  I, 
Part  2 
k 
li 
White  House 
Appendix  II 
NSC  possibly 
it      n 
*/ 
Attention  is  directed  to  the  fact  that  somt  of  the  attachments  require 
Special  Handling  in  line  with  COMINT  regulations. 
/s/      E.  G. 
Coyne/MMC 
Attachments      AlJthority  I^fc  O^-'V**! 
By  C^iy  KC  ■*:*  jAlirlfl 
S.  Everett, Gleason 
Acting  Executive  Secretary 
DEClASSiREC 
.3t 
Tflt^fftfFT
NATIONAL  SECURITY  COUNCIL 
February  17,  1956 
MEMORANDUM  JOR  COLONEL  GOODPASTER: 
Per  conversation. 
J.  Patrick  Coyne 
Attachment 
Colonel  A.  J.  Goodpaster 
Staff  Secretary.  / 
The  White  House  p"/^ 
„POM  REMOVAL  ^\\^ 
A-3532
4$>*Si@&* 
THE  WHITE  HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 
February  1U,  1956 
Memorandum  for: 
Subject: 
Colonel  A.  J*  Goodpaster 
Staff  Secretary 
The  "White  House 
Report  of  the  Hoover  Commission  Task  Force 
on  Intelligence  Activities 
/ 
On  December  10,  1955,  at  the  President's  direction,  you 
referred  the  following  documents  to  me  for  further  action  and 
recommendations  as  appropriate:     (l)  the  subject  Report,  and 
(2)  departmental  and  agency  comments  upon  applicable  sections 
of  the  subject  Report. 
To  facilitate  consideration  of  the  material  -which  you 
referred  to  me,  a  member  of  the  NSC  Staff  has  prepared  the 
enclosed  memorandum  and  analysis  dated  January  20,  1906. 
Tflhen  you  have  reviewed  the  attachments  I  suggest  that  Tie 
jointly  consider  the  next  step  -which  should  be  taken  with 
respect  to  the  subject  Report,  with  particular  reference  to 
those  recommendations  of  the  Report  which  suggest  action  by 
the  TShite  House  and  the  National  Security  Council. 
I  want  to  specifically  call  your  attention  to  those 
segments  of  the  enclosed  memorandum  entitled  "Additional  Action 
Required"  and  "Observations."    Because  they  were  prepared  by 
the  aforementioned  NSC  staff  representative  merely  in  an  effort 
to  point  up  particularly  relevant  areas  of  the  subject,  and 
because  they  were  included  merely  for  our  guidance,  it  is 
requested  that  they  not  be  further  disseminated  by  you. 
It  is  my  understanding  that  representatives  of  the 
Budget  Bureau  have  reviewed  the  subject  report  and  their  written 
observations  thereon  are  expected  to  be  received  momentarily. 
Until  we  have  had  an  opportunity  to  review  this  matter 
jointly,  I  do  not  contemplate  taking  any  further  action  with 
respect  to  the  subject.     The  Report,  however,  will  be  retained 
by  us  and,  pursuant  to  the  recent  approval  granted  by  you,  will 
be  made  available  to  appropriate  representatj 
Board  of  Consultants  on  Ibreign  Intelligence 
jSQfe-. 
e.c-.  •: 
09- 
■3^0^ 
DILLON  ANDERSON 
Special  Assistant 
Enclosure 
MiL— __7_^ — °r_   .    '    Special  Assistan 
Bv-JML  c:.a  0/Jp/     to  the  ^^dent
Report  on  Intelligence  Activities  in  the  Federal  Government 
red  for  the  Commission  on  Organization  of  the  Executive  Branch  of  the  Government 
Ey  the  Task  Force  on  Intelligence  Activities 
  May  195S   : 
 
CHAPTER  I  -  Brief  History  of  U.  S.  Foreign  Intelligence  Activities 
(Pages  1-12T. 
This  Chapter  contains  no  recommendations. 
CHAPTER  II  -  The  Central  Intelligence  Agency  (Pages  13-75 )» 
Recommendation  1  (page  72):  That  "covert  intelligence"  and  "cold  war"  functions 
of  the  current  DD/P  be  assigned  to  separate  Deputy  Directors  -whose  areas  of 
responsibility  shall  be  administratively  and  logistically  self-supporting. 
(A  minority  of  the  Task  Force  members  did  not  concur  in  this  recommendation, 
believing  that  "covert  intelligence"  and  "cold  war"  operations  should  be 
under  the  staff  and  operating  control  of  a  single  operating  Deputy  Director  - 
as  at  present.) 
Agency  Comment:  CIA  opposes  the  recommendation  on  the  grounds  that: 
Tl)  "the  experience  of  CIA  during  the  period  of  separate  operation  prior  to 
1952  proved*  the  operational  disadvantages  of  attempting  to  conduct,  on  a 
secure  and  efficient  basis,  two  world-wide  clandestine  organizations,  each 
compartmented  from  the  other";  and  (2)  organization  of  separate  supporting 
elements  for  each  of  the  clandestine  services  would  be  duplicative,  costly 
and  ineffective. 
Additional  Action  Required:  Presidential  decision  as  to  whether  the  Task 
Force  (majority)  recommendation  or  the  contrary  views  of  CIA  should  be  adopted. 
Observation:  Cli's  view  should  be  adopted  since  the  majority  proposal  of  the 
Task*  Force  has  been  tried  previously  and  found  less  satisfactory  than  present 
organizational  arrangements  which  combine  the  covert  and  cold  war  functions 
of  CIA.  (The  CIA  view  is  consistent  with  that  of  the  Doolittle  Committee 
whose  survey  of  CIA's  clandestine  services  was  much  more  extensive  than  that 
made  by  the  Task  Force. ) 
Recommendation  2  (page  73):  That  CIA  be  reorganized  with  a  Director,  a  Deputy  ^ 
Director,  an  Executive  Director,  a  general  Secretariat,  necessary  staff  sections 
and  offices  of  the  administrative  and  logistic  services  and  an  operating 
Deputy  Director  of  Intelligence  v/ith  seven  operating  offices  thereunder, 
including  an  Office  of  Basic  Intelligence. 
Agency  Comment:  CIA  concurs  in  the  creation  of,  and  has  established,  an 
Office  of  Basic  Intelligence.  CIA  notes  that  the  balance  of  this  recommendation 
consists  of  suggesting  that  the  names  of  four  of  the  offices  under  the  Deputy 
PORTIONS  EXEMPTED         -, 
n^r?  rrs'.riliD  e-o-  12055,  sec.  1-301  {old ) 
n-r-//  ri. 7  ,4(1*1
-..."-r.^'f ' 
Director  of  Intelligence  be  changed.  CIA  mil  change  the  name  of  one  of 
these  offices  shortly,  but  believes  that  little  will  be  accomplished  in 
effecting  the  other  name  changes  suggested. 
Additional  Action  Required:  Hone. 
Recommendation  3  (page  73):  That  CIA  re-establish  the  Office  of  Executive 
Director  to  relieve  the  DCI  of  the  necessity  of  having  to  devote  a  large 
part  of  his  time  to  the  solution  of  many  daily  administrative  and  minor 
operational  problems. 
Agency  Comment:  CIA  is  opposed  on  the  grounds  that  the  interposition  of 
another  command  echelon  would  not  necessarily  accomplish  the  intended 
objective.  CIA  is  giving  this  recommendation  further  study,  however. 
Additional  Action  Required:  Hone  by  the  "White  House  or  the  HSC. 
Observation:  This  recommendation  does  not  involve  any  major  policy  con- 
siderations. Internal  reorganizations  of  the  type  recommended  should  be 
left  to.  the  sound  discretion  of  the  agency  head. 
Recommendation  U  (page  73):  That  the  status  of  the  three  major  operating  Deputy 
Directors  be  changed  from  Civil  Service  appointees  (now  Grade  GS-18) 
to  Public  Law  Presidential  appointees,  at  an  annual  salary  of  $16,000. 
Agency  Comment:  CIA  concurs  in  the  recommended  pay  increases  but  thinks 
it  unwise  that  the  Operating  Deputy  Directors  require  Senatorial  approval, 
particularly  where  an  individual's  background  and  competence  in  clandestine 
operations  would  have  to  be  reviewed.   CIA  has  received  no  indication  of 
any  Senatorial  desire  to  review  CIA  appointments,  other  than  the  appointments 
of  the  DCI  and  his  Deputy. 
Additional  Action  Required:  Hone  by  the  VJhite  House  or  HSC.  CIA  is  taking 
action  through  appropriate  channels  in  an  effort  to  obtain  the  pay  increases 
recommended. 
Recommendation  5  (page  73):  That  the  "cold  war" operating  deputy  director  be 
designated  as  CIA's  representative  on  the  Operations  Coordinating  Board 
to  free  the  DCI  to  devote  a  greater  share  of  his  time  to  the  Agency's 
intelligence  functions. 
Agency  Comment:  CIA  is  opposed.  It  notes  that  the  DCI  is  required  to 
personally  attend  OCB  meetings  by  virtue  of  a  Presidential  Directive, 
and  that  his  participation  in  OCB  meetings  is  not  unduly  burdensome. 
CIA  notes  further  that  the  Deputy  Director/Plans  is  closely  associated 
with  OCB  activity  in  that  CIA  members  of  OCB  working  groups  are  drawn  from 
CIA's  clandestine  services. 
-  2  - 
W4**&
TW2^L«^E*«^P^' 
Additional  Action  Required:  Presidential  decision  as  to  whether  the  Task 
Force  recommendation  should  be  adopted. 
Observation!  Because  the  benefits  derived  from  DCI 's  participation  in 
0C3  meetings  outweighs  the  burdens  occasioned  by  such  participation,  the 
Task  Force  recommendation  should  be  rejected.  If  this  observation  is 
concurred  in  advice  should  be  communicated  to  CIA  as  to  the  President's 
reaffirmation  of  the  directive  -raich  provides  for  DCI's  membership  on  the 
OCB. 
Recommendation  6  (page  73):  That  a  comprehensive  internal  management  survey 
of  the  Agency  be  conducted  by  CIA  -within  a  year  following  the  reorganization 
of  CIA,  as  recommended  by  the  Task  Force. 
Agency  Comment?  CIA,  presently  has  in  progress  three  concurrent  programs  of 
an  internal  management  nature. 
Additional  Action  Required:  Hone,  at  this  time. 
Recommendation  7  (page  7U):  That  all  NSC,  IAC,  and  DCI  Intelligence  Directives 
be  reviewed  by  the  IAC  and  others  concerned,  -with  a  view  to  establishing 
clearer  areas  of  responsibility  and  to  allocating  intelligence  tasks  in 
accord  with  each  agency's  capability,  interest,  and  paramount  national 
responsibilities. 
Agency  Comment;  The  DCI  will  recommend  the  establishment  of  an  IAC  Sub- 
committee to  review  all  such  Intelligence  Directives,  as  necessary,  to 
clarify  areas  of  responsibility  or  reallocate  tasks. 
Additional  Action  Required:  Action  at  appropriate  levels  (IAC,  DCI,  NSC) 
to  be  taken  on  the  basis  of  the  review  of  Intelligence  Directives  being 
initiated  by  CIA. 
Recommendation  8  (page  7U):.f 
Additional  Action  Required:  None  by  the  "White  House  or  the  NSC. 
-  3  -  18H^*fe-l 
fit!  ^  r  n  Mr?
TtTSECEET 
'  Raeo^^ndation  9   (page  7k)  *     That  the  Scientific  Estimates  Committee  be  abolished 
i;  ;■>_.;£.£  and  in  lieu  thereof  there  be  established  under  the  IAC  a  Scientific  Intel- 
^v ,-:"',  ligence  Committee  with  appropriate  subcommittees  to  insure  community-rode 
coordination* 
Agency  Comment:  CIA.  is  in  general  agreement  with  this  recommendation. 
The  substance  thereof  is  under  active  consideration  in  the  IAC. 
Additional  Action  Required:  None,  other  than  the  normal  actions  -which  mil 
flow  from  IAC  consideration  of  the  recommendation. 
Recommendation  10  (page  ?ll):  That  the  effectiveness  of  CIA's  security  program  be 
re-evaluated  to  establish  a  system  assuring  personnel  security  rechecks  on 
a  Tniniirmm  five  year  basis. 
Agency  Comment:  CIA  reports  that  the  recommended  program  has  been  in  effect 
as  of  liarch  26,  1955  and,  in  addition,  that  there  is  a  continuing  review  made 
of  the  security  of  its  employees,  including  automatic  rechecks  in  the  case  of 
personnel  actions,  such  as  transfers,  promotions,  appointments  to  special 
activities,  etc. 
Additional  Action  Required:  None. 
Recommendation  11  (page  7k) :  That  Congress  be  requested  to  appropriate  funds  to 
construct  adequate  CIA  housing  facilities  in  or  near  Washington. 
Agency  Comment:  CIA  reports  this  has  been  done. 
Additional  Action  Required:  None. 
Recommendation  12  (page  7U):  That  the  CIA  Act  of  19U9  be  amended  to  authorize 
employment  of  "any"  (instead  of  15  now  authorized)  retired  officers  or 
warrant  officers  of  the  Armed  Services;  and  to  authorize  overseas  personnel 
additional  dependent  medical  benefits  and  employee  leave  accumulations 
equivalent  to  those  authorized  for  Foreign  Service  personnel. 
Agency  Comment:  CIA  would  welcome  an  increase  in  the  number  of  retired 
officers  of  the  Armed  Services  authorized  to  be  employed  by  the  Agency. 
It  believes  that  the  authorized  number  should  be  between  twenty-five  and 
fifty.  CIA  concurs  in  granting  additional  Foreign  Service  benefits  for 
dependents  as  well  as  leave  benefits  and  leave  accumulations  for  CIA  employees. 
(Current  inquiry  of  CIA  reflects  the  Agency  has  prepared  draft 
legislation  -  now  being  processed  by  the  Budget  Bureau  - 
designed  to  authorize  employment  of  as  many  as  forty  retired 
officers  of  the  Armed  Services,  as  well  as  draft  legislation 
- u  -  HFSlSRE?
ffi  SEGtiLI  • 
designed  to  carry  into  effect  the  Task  Force  recommendations 
concerning  CIA  personnel,  their  leave  accumulations,  and 
•"•."''  additional  medical  benefits  for  dependents  of  CIA  employees 
stationed  abroad.) 
Additional  Action  Required:     None, 
Recommendation  13  (page  75) J     That  legislation  be  sought  to  increase  the  annual 
salary  of  the  DCI  to  $20,000;  to  increase  the  compensation  of  .the  Deputy 
DCI  to  0l7,5OOj  and  to  authorize  the  appointment  of  an  Executive  Director 
of  CIA  at  an  annual  salary  of  $16,000. 
Agency  Comment:     The  recommended  increases  in  the  salaries  of  the  DCI  and 
the  Deputy  DCI  have  been  included  in  proposed  amendments  to  the  Executive 
Pay  Bill  of  l°li°.    CIA,  as  indicated  in  Recommendation  3  above,  opposes 
establishing  the  office  of  Executive  Director,  but  is  giving  further 
study  to  the  Task  Force  recommendation  on  this  point. 
Additional  Action  Required:     None. 
CI-ifePTER  III  -  The  Department  of  State  (?a?es  76-88). 
Recommendation  1  (page  87)  s     That  the  personnel  strength  of  the  Intelligence  Area 
be  maintained  at  a  level  consistent  -with  functional  responsibilities  and 
work  load. 
Agency  Comment:     State  concurs.     An  increase  of  ten  persons  for  the  present 
fiscal  year  has  been  authorized  for  the  Intelligence  Area.     State  is  budgeting 
a  substantial  increase  for  its  intelligence  function  in  fiscal  year  1957. 
Additional  Action  Required;     None. 
Recommendation  2  (page  88):     That  1ISCID  Mo.  10  be  revised  to  place  responsibility 
for  collection  of  information  in  the  basic  sciences  in  CIA. 
Agency  Comment:     State  reports  that  -while  it  is  not  possible  to  comment  favor- 
ably or  unfavorably  on  this  recommendation  at  this  time,  meetings  on  the 
subject  are  being  held  vath  CIA  and  every  effort  will  be  made  to  develop 
a  satisfactory  solution. 
Additional  Action  Required:     Action  is  dependent  upon  the  outcome  of  the 
State-CIA  meetings  mentioned  above  and  on  the  IAC  review  of  all  Intelligence 
Directives  (to  which  reference  is  made  in  Chapter  II,  Recommendation  7). 
-  s  -  WSECHEt
lEi1  EailiU 
pprr.oaiaendation  3  (page  88):   That  State  finalize  its  plans  for  the  periodic  review 
~   0f  all  personnel  coning  within  the  provisions  of  Executive  Order  10k50. 
Agency  Comment:  State  has  given  substantial  thought  to  the  matter  and  agrees 
that  a  program  for  periodic  review  should  be  carefully  considered.  Through 
its  normal  channels  State  will  pursue  the  natter  with  interested  agencies, 
such  as  Justice  and  the  Civil  Service  Commission. 
Additional  Action  Required:  Hone,  beyond  that  indicated  in  State's  comment. 
„„.   :•   ;;~~  *  "*  *   •'--•:.-..;..   
Recoaaendation  h  (page  88):  i .:: ;; ::;::;::;: ::::   : ::::::::::: : ::::::: : :: :: : • 
•   ••••••::::::::::::::::::   •  —  •':::::::::::::::   
•  
 n   *   .   '   
»  
 ii..:::   :::.:::   
f  
 ••".::::::::::::::::::   :.:::::: :::::: :::::::::   
,::::::::::::::::::::::   "•.::::::::::::::::::   ::::::::::::: 
i 
 •:::::::::::::::::::::••••   :...::::::::::::::••:   
Recommendation  5>   (page  88):    /: : 
•  ••*■< 
♦  ••••< 
CHAPTER  17  -  The  Department  of  Defense  (Pages  89-20$). 
A.     Office  of  Special  Operations   (Pages   89-9h) 
Recommendation  1  (page  9k):      That  DOD  Directive  5>10$.7  be  examined  -with  a  view 
to  clarifying  and  eliminating  any  ambiguities  which  would  lead  to  a  mis- 
interpretation of  the  functions  and  misapplication  °£  the  authority  of  0S0; 
and  that  the  relationships  of  0S0  with  the  intelligence  organization  of  the 
JCS  and  the  military  departments  be  spelled  out  more  specifically  to  reduce 
possibilities  of  friction  and  misunderstanding. 
Agency  Comment:     DOD  does  not  consider  that  the  Directive  is  ambiguous. 
However,  DDD  will  give  continuing  attention  to  the  operations  of  0S0  under 
the  Directive. 
.  6 .  TOHtffitt
tacKtional  Action  Required:  Hone,  beyond  that  referred  to  in  DOD's  comment . 
B.  The  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  (Pages  9h-99) 
This  Section  contains  no  recommendations. 
C.  Department  of  the  Army  (rases  99-13?) 
Recommendation  1  (page  137):   That  the  Army  Attache  System  be  manned  to  permit  full 
exploitation  of  its  collection  potential  and  that  present  personnel  ceilings 
imposed  by  DOD  be  lifted  in  order  to  achieve  greater  flexibility  and  permit 
more  extensive  prior  training  of  assigned  personnel. 
Agency  Comment:  DOD  agrees  -with  the  concept  calling  for  maximum  exploitation 
of  the  intelligence  potential  of  the  Attache  System.  It  does  not  agree. that 
present  personnel  ceilings  are  seriously  inhibitive.  DOD  reports  that  its 
ceilings  on  Attache  strength  (in  the  three  services)  are  flexible;  that  DOD 
now  has  underway  a  program  for  consolidating  and  simplifying  the  Attache 
functions  of  the  services;  and  that  it  is  studying  ways  of  improving 
selection  and  training  of  Attaches. 
Additional  Action  Required:  Pinal  decision  by  DOD  as  to  lifting  personnel 
ceilings  in  the  Attache  System. 
Recommendation  2  (page  137):   That  the  (Army)  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  Intelligence, 
be  elevated  to  the  level  of  Deputy  Chief  of  Staff. 
Agency  Comment:  DOD  does  not  concur.  It  notes  that  the  top  staff  of  the  Army 
was  recently  reorganized  following  a  balanced  consideration  of  all  its  aspects 
and  it  concludes  that  it  would  be  premature  to  reorganize  now  as  recommended, 
particularly  since  legislation  -rould  be  necessary  to  achieve  the  Task  Force's 
recommendation. 
Additional  Action  Required:   None  by  the  "Shite  House  or  the  NSC. 
Observation:   This  recommendation  does  not  involve  any  major  policy  considerations. 
Internal  reorganizations  of  the  type  recommended  should  be  left  to  the  sound 
discretion  of  the  agency  head. 
Recommendation  3  (page  137):.
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RecoErpendation  5   (psge  137):      That  consideration  be  given  to  more  extensive  use 
of  "Schedule  A"  in  the  employment  of  civilian  analysts  and  other  intelligence 
specialists  in  the  Department  of  the  Army,   in  order  to  achieve  necessary 
flexibility. 
Aeency  Comment:     DOD  concurs  in  general  and  has  initiated  a  thorough  study 
of  the  problem. 
Additional  Action  Required:     Decision  by  DOD  follovring  its  study  of  the  problenu 
-  9  - 
*  *><    :  ..JUL  r
fS?«E! 
Recommendation  6  (page  137):   That  the  Army  aggressively  attack  the  linguist 
problem  by  developing  and  using  outside  sources  for  training  in  colleges 
and  universities  through  the  method  of  (for  example)  its  comprehensive 
ROTC  and  Reserve  programs. 
Agency  Comment:  DOD  reports  that  considerable  use  is  now  being  made 
of  civilian  facilities  for  the  purpose  indicated,  but  that  the  problem 
involves  quality  rather  than  quantity  and  is  most  accute  in  the  case  of 
rare  languages.  The  recommendation  concerning  ROTC  language  training 
requires  further  study. 
Additional  Action  Required;  Decision  by  DDD  following  its  further  study. 
Recommendation  7  (page  137):  That  measures  be  instituted  for  the  periodic  security 
recheckLng  of  personnel  assigned  in  sensitive  areas  at  intervals  not  to 
exceed  5  years. 
Agency  Comment:  DOD  believes  that  its  current  security  practices  essentially 
fulfill  the  objectives  of  this  recommendation.  The  general  subject  will  be 
reviewed  by  DOD  however  to  insure  that  the  underlying  objective  of  the  recom- 
mendation is  adequately  served. 
Additional  Action  Required;  Apart  from  the  review  referred  to  by  DOD,  no 
additional  action  is  required. 
D.  Department  of  the  Navy  (Pages  138-156) 
Recommendation  1  (page  156):  That  the  Navy  put  its  counterintelligence  program 
on  a  wider  base  so  as  to  bring  its  worldwide  protection  up  to  an  adequate  level. 
Agency  Comment:  DOD  concurs  but  believes  that  the  actual  method  of  expansion 
should  be  further  investigated. 
Additional  Action  Required:  Further  investigation  as  suggested  by  DOD,  followed 
by  action  consistent  with  its  investigative  findings  and  with  the  objective 
of  establishing  an  adequate  counterintelligence  program  in  the  Kavy. 
Recommendation  2  (page  156):  That  the  Navy  provide  for  periodic  review  of  the 
security  status  of  intelligence  personnel  who  come  within  the  provisions  of 
Executive  Order  10U50. 
Agency  Comment:  DOD  believes  that  its  current  security  practices  essentially 
fulfill  the  objectives  of  this  recommendation.  The  general  subject  will  be 
reviewed  by  DOD  however  to  insure  that  the  underlying  objective  of  the 
recommendation  is  adequately  served. 
-  10  - 
ID?  St&RET
TTJ7  CuUilLI 
Additional  Action  Required:  None. 
Recommendation  3  (page  13>6):  That  the  Navy  expand  its  intelligence  collection 
effort. 
Agency  Comment;  See  DOD's  comment  on  Recommendation  1  of  the  Task  Force 
Report  on  the  Department  of  the  Army,  (page  7,  above). 
Additional  Action  Recuired:  KLnal  decision  by  DOD  as  to  lifting  personnel 
ceilings  in  the  Attache  System. 
Recommendation  k   (page  156):  That  the  Navy  continue  and  expand  its  efforts  to 
improve  intelligence  consciousness  at  all  ranks  and  levels  of  the  Department. 
Agency  Comment:  DOD  concurs.  Instruction  on  the  mission  and  role  of  intel- 
ligence is  included  in  the  regional  training  schools,  intelligence  centers, 
and  in  the  curricula  of  line  schools  at  all  levels. 
Additional  Action  Required;  None . 
E.  Department  of  the  Air  Force  (Pages  156-179) 
Recommendation  1  (page  178):  That  the  position  of  Director  of  Intelligence,  Air 
Force,  be  raised  to  that  of  a  Deputy  Chief  of  Staff. 
Agency  Comment;  DOD  does  not  concur.  It  notes  that  the  Task  Force  made  a 
similar  recommendation  (which  DOD  opposes)  with  respect  to  the  Director  of 
Intelligence,  Army,  but  that  it  made  no  recommendation  respecting  the  position 
of  the  Director  of  Naval  Intelligence. 
Additional  Action  Required;  Hone  by  the  white  House  or  the  NSC. 
Observation:  This  recommendation  does  not  involve  any  major  policy  considerations  4 
Internal  reorganizations  of  the  type  recommended  should  be  left  to  the  sound 
discretion  of  the  agency  head. 
Recommendation  2  (page  178):  That  a  limited  number  of  civilian  personnel  spaces 
for  Air  Force  Intelligence  be  exempt  from  certain  Civil  Service  requirements. 
Agency  Comment:  DOD  concurs  in  general  and  has  initiated  a  thorough  study 
of  the  problem. 
Additional  Action  Required:  Decision  by  DOD  following  its  study  of  the  problem. 
*fiH!Sfi
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£*'  p   emendation  3  (page  178):  That  a  board  or  commission  be  established  to  make 
-fCO  an   equitable  and  coordinated  allocation  among  the  member  agencies  of 
personnel  spaces  exempt  from  certain  Civil  Service  requirements. 
Agency  Comment:  DOD  has  initiated  a  thorough  study  of  the  problem. 
Additional  Action  Required:  Hone,  pending  the  completion  of  DOD's  study. 
Recommendation  1;  (page  178):  That  the  Air  Attache  System  be  maintained  at  a 
level  -which  ■will  insure  an  adequate  collection  capability  and  that  Air 
Attache  qualifications  be  commensurate  with  the  collection  potential  of 
the  station. 
Agency  Comment:  See  DOD's  comment  on  Recommendation  1  of  the  Task  Force's 
Report  on  the  Department  of  the  Army  (page  7,   above). 
Additional  Action  Required:  Final  decision  by  DOD  as  to  the  Attache  System, 
its  adequacy,  personnel  strength,  training,  qualifications,  etc. 
Recommendation  5  (page  179):  That  an  Intelligence  Research  Center  be  established 
under  CIA  to  guide  the  total  intelligence  research  program. 
Acency  Comment:  DOD  notes  that  each  service  intelligence  agency  and  CIA. 
conduct  research'  programs  and  it  agrees  that  a  common  research  service  would 
be  desirable.  However,  it  believes  that  the  effort  to  establish  such  a 
center  "should  be  under  the  DCI  acting  for  the  IAC  and  not  under  the  CIA." 
Additional  Action  Required:  Joint  consideration  of  this  recommendation  by 
the  IAC  agencies. 
Observation:  It  vould  appear  desirable  that  CIA  be  apprised  of,  and  be 
afforded  an  opportunity  to  comment  on,  this  recommendation.-  This '.is  particu- 
larly so  if  the  "additional  action"  indicated  above  is  not  taken  (if  such 
action  is  taken,  CIA  vd.ll  automatically  have  such  an  opportunity  by  virtue 
of  its  identification  -with  the  IAC). 
Recommendation  6  (page  179):   That  a  board  be  established  to  supervise  declassi- 
fication  of  security  information. 
Agency  Comment:  DOD  does  not  concur.  It  believes  such  a  procedure  would 
be  cumbersome,  and  is  of  the  view  that  its  present  practices  in  this  area 
are  adequate. 
Additional  Action  Required:  None,  because  ultimate  responsibility  for  such 
matters  is  lodged  in  the  head  of  the  Department  concerned. 
12  -
SEt 
s|p-"  "    Ration  7  (?aSe  179)  i  That  a  periodic  examination  be  made  of  Air  Force 
°°  ^^"elligence  publications  to  assure  justification  for  both  the  publication 
and  distribution  thereof. 
Agency  Cosnentt  DOD  concurs;  the  recommended  action  is  now  being  implemented. 
Additional  Action  Required:  Uone. 
Recommendation  8  (page  179):  That  mechanical,  and  electronic  devices  to  analyze, 
classify,  file,  and  produce  intelligence  information  be  put  into  use  at  the 
earliest  possible  moment. 
Agency  Comment:  DOD  concurs.  It  believes  that  automation  in  intelligence 
production  has  undoubted  value  and  it  notes  that  considerable  investigation 
has  been  conducted  along  the  lines  indicated  in  this  recommendation. 
Additional  Action  Required;  Implementation  of  the  recommendation  by  DOD. 
Recommendation  9  (page  179):  That  all  possible  resources  be  used  to  eroloit 
""  technological  means  for  intelligence  collection. 
Agency  Comment:  DOD  concurs,  advising  that  the  recommendation  is  currently 
receiving  attention. 
Additional  Action  Required:  iJone  (assuming  the  attention  being  afforded  this 
matter~by  DOD  results  in  the  implementation  of  this  recommendation). 
Recommendation  10  (page  1?9):  That  the  use  of  "overflights"  to  secure  vital  infor- 
mation receive  constant  consideration. 
Agency  Comment:  DOD  concurs,  noting  that  the  constant  support  of  other 
U.  ~S . "  Government  agencies  is  required  if  full  results  are  to  be  achieved. 
(DOD  observes  that  upon  resolution  of  some  of  the  details  involved  in  this 
recommendation,  it  may  be  advisable  to  seel:  USC  action  thereon.) 
Additional  Action  Required;.  Presidential  and/or  NSC  consideration  following 
receipt  of  DOD's  recommendation  on  the  subject. 
Recommendation  11  (page  179):  That  the  Air  Force  develop  adequate  procedures  for 
the  periodic  security  review  of  personnel  occupying  sensitive  positions. 
Agency  Comment:  DOD  believes  that  its  current  security  practices  essentially 
fulfill  the  objective  of  this  recommendation.  The  general  subject  will  be 
reviewed  >v  DOD  however  to  insure  that  the  underlying  objective  of  the 
recommendation  is  adequately  served. 
-  13  -
Qi;"i"^ 
Additional  Action  Reo'Jlred:      Apart  from  the  review  referred  to  by  DDD, 
'no  additional- action  is  required. 
F.     Covert  Operations  -  Department  of  Defense  (Pages  179-205) 
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Hecoamendation  5  (page  205):   That  the  National  Security  Council  review  present 
assets  and  direct  the  necessary  action  to  assure  adequate  preparation  for 
evasion  and  escape  and  support  of  guerrilla  warfare. 
Agency  Consent:  DOD  concurs.  To  facilitate  the  review  recommended  DOD  suggests 
that  CIA  and  DOD  report  the  pertinent  facts  to  the  NSC  with  recommendation  for 
necessary  action.  To  that  end  DOD  will  initiate  a  proposal  looking  to  the 
preparation  of  an  appropriate  report. 
Additional  Action  Required:  None,  pending  preparation  of  the  referenced  report. 
Recommendation  6  (page  20$): 
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CHAPTER  V  -  Atomic  Energy  Intelligence  (Pages  205-220). 
•  •  •  • 
Reconziendation  2   (page  220):   That  the  responsibility  of  AEG  for  intelligence  be 
defined  in  an  KSC  Intelligence  Directive  and  that  an  H3C  Intelligence  Directive 
set  forth  the  responsibility,  authority,  functions,  and  composition  of  the 
Joint  Ato.tdc  Energy  Intelligence  Committee. 
Agency  Conment:   AZC  agrees.  It  is  of  the  belief  that  this  tv/o-fold  recommenda- 
tion may  be  accomplished  by  one  1:50  Intelligence  Directive;  that  such  a 
Directive  should  also  establish  the  responsibilities  of  the  other  IAC  agencies 
for  atomic  energy  intelligence  "in  order  that  anibiguities  of  present 
directives  ...  be  clarified. " 
CIA  advises  that  .-.EC's  intelligence  responsibilities  are  now  under  discussion 
between  CIA  and  AEC,  and  that  at  the  appropriate  tine  an  intelligence  directive 
thereon  »ill  be  orooosed  to  the  :;SC. 
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*  D3D  concurs  in  this  t-.7D-fold  recommendation.  It  favors  an  !J3CID  for  the 
purpose  of  definine  A3C"s  intelligence  responsibilitj':  but  it  believes  thatV- 
since  the  JAEIC  is  a  subcommittee  of  the  IAC,  a  DCID  (rather  than  an  I3SCID) 
will  suffice  to  carry  out  the  latter  part  of  the  recommendation. 
Additional  Action  Required:  None,  pending  completion  of  IAD's  processing 
of  the  directives  envisaged  by  this  rec emendation. 
Recommendation  3  (page  220):  That  the  A3C  define  the  responsibility  and  functions 
of  its  Division  of  Intelligence. 
A.rency  Consent:  ABC  reports  that  its  Division  of  Intelligence  has  received 
the  informal  concurrence  of  the  other  intelligence  agencies  as  to  its  national 
intelligence  responsibilities.  Follovjing  Commission  consideration  thereof, 
the  intelligence  agencies  vail  be  formally  notified  of  sane. 
Additional  Action  Required:  Hone. 
Recommendation  h   (page  220):   That  each  of  the  member  agencies  of  the  Joint  Atonic 
Energy  Intelligence  Committee  insure  that  it  is  represented  on  that  Committee 
by  the  best  qualified  individual  available  concerning  the  matter  under  dis- 
cussion, and  that  changes  in  representation  be  made  as  infrequentl;/  as  practicable. 
Agency  Comment:  AEG  concurs.  A3C  reports  that  every  effort  has  been  and  ttLII 
continue  to  be  made  to  comply  -with  this  recommendation. 
CIA  reports  that  it  has  pressed  for  the  assignment  of  the  best  qualified  personnel 
to  the  Committee,  and  it  notes  that  the  record  of  the  Committee  in  the  matter 
of  continuity  and  length  of  tenure  is  a  very  favorable  one. 
DOD  concurs  in  this  recommendation  noting  that  it  vd.ll  continue  to  make  every 
effort  to  insure  the  fulfillment  thereof. 
State  reports  that  it  has  been  folio-wing  the  practice  recommended  by  the  Task 
Force. 
Additional  Action  Reouired:  None. 
-  17  - 
Vi}
DGD  concurs  in  this  recommendation. 
State  concurs.     In  order  that  the  National  Intelligence  Estimates  may  reflect 
the  full  extent  of  available  intelligence  in  this  field,  State  recommends 
specific  courses  of  action  ?mich  appear  appropriate  for  IAC  consideration. 
Additional  Action  Required:     Consideration  by  the  IAC. 
CHAPTER  VI  -  The  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  (Pages  221-226). 
This  Chapter  contains  no  recommendations. 
CHAPTER  VII  -  Intelligence  Production  (Pages  227-2Uu). 
Recommendation  1  (page  2I4I4):     That  an  agreed  glossary  of  intelligence  terms  be 
produced  and  reviewed  periodically. 
Agency  Comment:     DOD  agrees  and  suggests  that  an  IAC  Subcommittee  be  appointed 
to  produce  it. 
State  has  no  particular  difficulty  in  this  area,  but  it  Trill  be  pleased  to  assist 
IAC  in  implementing  the  recommendation. 
CIA  reports  that  it  has  compiled  a  glossary  of  intelligence  terras  and  that  action 
Trill  be  taken  through  the  IAC  to  secure  acceptance  thereof  as  the  authoritative 
dictionary  of  intelligence  nomenclature. 
Additional  Action  Required:     Completion  of  the  project  by  the  IAC. 
-  18  - 
U1!        ^-  "-  ~  **  w    *
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Recommendation  2  (page  25U):  That  the  State  Department's  program  for  integration 
and  expansion  of  the  Foreign  Service  and  for  acceleration  of  language  and  area 
training  be  pursued  vigorously. 
Agency  Comment:  State  reports  that  this  matter  is  the  subject  of  vigorous 
action  at  all  levels  of  the  Department  on  a  continuous  and  top  priority  basis. 
CHAPTER  U  -  Personnel  (Pares  255-27U) . 
Recommendation  1  (page  273)  J  That  DOD  give  consideration  to  the  exploitation  of 
the  ROTC  and  reserve  intelligence  programs  for  language  training  purposes  by 
offering  credit  toward  reserve  commissions  and  drill  credits  respectively  3 
for  the  completion  of  selected  language  courses. 
Agency  Comment;  DOD  notes  that  considerable  use  is  now  being  made  of  civilian 
facilities  for  the  purpose  indicated  in  this  recommendation;  that  the  problem 
involves  quality  rather  than  quantity:  that  the  recommendations  concerning 
ROTC  language  training  require  thorough  study:  and  that  it  vroold  be  unv,ise  to 
give  blanket  accreditation  for  language  vrork  regardless  of  the  type  of  service 
for  -.vh-ich  the  trainee  is  destined. 
Additional  Action  Required:  Completion  of  BJD's  study  and  consideration  of 
the  recommendation. 
Recommendation  2   (page  273):  That  DOD  conduct  periodic  surveys  of  service  personnel 
procedures  to  insure  that  adequate  consideration  is  being  given  to  the  require- 
ments of  the  intelligence  agencies  for  their  share  of  the  best  qualified 
military  personnel. 
Agency  Comment:  DOD  does  not  concur.  DOD  believes  its  current  practices  are 
adequate.  It  agrees  that  the  highest  practicable  standards  should  be  applied 
in  the  selection  of  attache  personnel. 
Additional  Action  Required:   None,  assuming  DOD's  current  practices  are  in  fact 
adequate. 
Recommendation  3  (page  273):  That  DOD  require  that  the  Military  Services  study  the 
problem  of  improving  the  prestige  of  the  civilian  analyst  vis-a-vis  his  military 
colleagues. 
A~enc..'  Comment:  DOD  concurs,  noting  that  in  practical  terms  there  is  no  easy 
solution  to  this  problem.  DOD  reports  much  has  been  done  on  the  problem  and 
that  it  -.Till  keep  same  under  review. 
Recommendation  h   (page  273):   That  DOD  facilitate  the  employment  as  intelligence 
specialists  of  qualified  retired  military  personnel  by  initiating  action  toward 
amending  the  laws  concerning  Federal  employment  of  retired  military  personnel, 
v.lth  a  view  to  removing  the  present  ceiling  on  the  Federal  pay  of  such 
individuals. 
-  20  -  *  v-  —   -~ l
cv  Comment:  DOD  believes  present  laws  on  this  subject  are  too  restricted; 
tihe  other  band  it  is  fearful  lest  statutory  amendments  be  such  as  to 
uermit  retired  officers  ivith  intelligence  experience  to  automatically  find 
emoloyment~as  civilian  intelligence  analysts.  DOD  reports  that  the  CSC  has 
developed  a  proposal  to  relax  existing  legislative  requirements  along  the 
general  lines  of  this  recommendation. 
Additional  Action  Required:  Executive  Branch  processing  of  C5C's  legislative 
proposal  and  submission  thereof  for  Congressional  consideration. 
Recommendation  g  (page  273):  That  DOB  give  consideration  to  more  extensive  use  of 
"Schedule  A"  in  the  employment  of  civilian  analysts  and  other  intelligence 
specialists,  in  order  to  provide  necessary  flexibility  in  the  recruitment  of 
qualified  civilian  personnel  by  the  military  services,  and  to  facilitate  the 
interchange  of  such  personnel  between  the  Zone  of  Interior  conpetitive 
service  and  the  overseas  excepted  service. 
Agency  Comment:  DOD  agrees  that  greater  flexibility  in  hiring  and  in  the 
ability  to  shift  civilian  personnel  between  the  Zone  of  the  Interior  and 
foreign  stations  is  essential.  It  believes  a  degree  of  relaxation  of  Civil 
Service  regulations  is  desirable  to  deal  with  these  problems.  DOD  has 
initiated  a  thorough  study  of  the  matter. 
Additional  Action  Required:  Appropriate  action  by  DOD  following  completion 
of  its  study  of  the  problem. 
Recommendation  6  (page  273):  That  DOD,  in  the  consideration  of  future  economies, 
give  proper  weight  to  the  importance  of  intelligence  in  peace  time,  so  as  to 
avoid  serious  reductions-in-force  in  our  centers  of  intelligence  production. 
Agency  Comment:  DOD  concurs,  noting  that  the  purpose  of  this  recommendation 
can  be  further  served  by  applying  such  reductions-in-force  as  do  occur  to 
overhead  positions  rather  than  to  basic  productive  elements. 
Recommendation  7  (page  27U):  That  DOD  take  prompt  action  to  insure  that  proper 
consideration  in  personnel  planning  is  given  to  the  impact  of  the  time  lag 
involved  in  our  present  clearance  requirements  for  filling  sensitive  positions. 
A-encv  Comment:  DOD  believes  this  recommendation  requires  further  study. 
ZZ^   1 —   — 
Additional  Action  Required:      Further  study  and  appropriate  action  by  DOD. 
CHAPTER  X  -  Security  (Pases  275-263). 
Recommendation  1  (page  273):     That  any  individual  employed  in  an  intelligence  organi- 
zation  "about  whom  sufficient  doubt  concerning  his  security  has  been  raised 
should  be  renoved  from  employment  pending  final  determination  of  his  case." 
-  21  - 
w~mm
Aeen'-y  Comment:  DOD  considers  that  its  current  security  practices  and  pro- 
•   cedures  essentially  fulfill  the  objectives  of  this  recommendation.  However, 
it  reports  that  the  general  subject  will  be  reviewed  in  order  to  insure  that 
those"  objectives  are  adequately  served. 
CIA  reports  that  it  is  carrying  out  the  intent  of  this  recommendation  in 
that  it  adheres  carefully  to  Executive  Order  10h$0  which  provides  for  the 
suspension  of  Federal  employees  when  a  reasonable  doubt  exists  as  to  their 
security  status.  State  reports  that  "this  recommendation  requires  no 
implementation  in  the  Department  of  State"  ....  since  State's  regulations 
do* not  preclude  employee  suspensions  in  such  circumstances. 
Additional  Action  Required:  Strict  adherence  to  Executive  Order  lOltfO  by 
the  agencies  concerned  -  such  adherence  will  accomplisn  the  ocjective- of 
this  recommendation. 
Observation:  State  has  missed  the  point  of  this  recommendation.  All  agencies 
now  ^ave  the  authority  to  susoend  employees  under  the  circumstances  indicated 
in  the  recommendation.  The  point  the  Task  Force  appears  to  be  making  is  that 
some  of  the  agencies  fail  to  suspend  when  there  is  sufficient  cause  and  it 
is  the  Task  Force's  view  that  in  the  intelligence  organizations  of  our  govern- 
ment in  particular,  such  suspension  should  occur  pending  final  determination 
of  the  employee's  case. 
Recommendation  2  (page  283):  That  the  "findings  and  proposed  disposition  of  those 
  cases  which  were  reported  as  still  in  process  at  the  time  the  survey  by  tms 
Task  Force  was  concluded  should  be  reported  to  the  President. 
Agency  Comment:  DOD  did  not  comment  on  this  point. 
CIA  noted  that  under  normal  reporting  procedures  as  established  by  Executive 
Order  10U50,  information  is  furnished  to  the  Civil  Service  Commission  or  the 
FBI  on  such  cases,  and  that  thereafter  the  status  of  such  cases  is  available 
to  the  President,  through  the  executive  agencies  he  has  designated,  to  report 
on  the  iirolementation  of  Executive  Order  10ii$0. 
State  advises  that  detailed  reports  concerning  the  very  small  percentage 
of  such  emoloyees  in  its  Intelligence  Area  have  been  made  available  to  the 
Civil  Service  Commission,  and  that  CSC  makes  a  composite  report  periodically 
on  such  cases  in  all  government  agencies. 
Observation:  CIA  and  State  seem  to  have  missed  the  point  of  this  recommendation. 
(DOD  did  not  comment  upon  it  at  all.)   If  the  recommendation  is  deemed  to  have 
validity,  the  Tfhite  House  may  wish  to  request  that  the  heads  of  the  intelligence 
agencies  concerned  report  the  findings  and  disposition  of  alleged  security  risk 
cases  (in  their  intelligence  areas)  in  process  at  the  time  the  Task  i-orce 
conceded  its  survey. 
-  22  -
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CHAPTER  XI  -  Counterintelligence  (?a?es  2BU-292). 
Reconaendation  1  (page  292):   That  the  liavy  give  due  consideration  to  the  require- 
ment for  additional  conpetent  and  trained  counterintelligence  personnel  in 
order  to  provide  adequate  security  for  its  personnel  and  facilities. 
Agency  Conraent:  DOD  concurs  in  principle,  but  believes  that  the  actual  oethod 
of  expansion  should  be  investigated. 
Additional  Action  Required:  Further  investigation  as  suggested  by  DDL,  followed 
by  action  consistent  tTith  its  investigative  findings  and  with  the  objective 
of  providing  adequate  security  for  naval  personnel  and  facilities.  (See 
Reconmendation  1,  Chapter  IV,  D,  page  10,  above.) 
-  23  - 
I0P  StGHET
-  --r.r' 
rSftr^w 
CHAPTER  III  -  Ha-JS  arid  Libraries    (Faroes  293-305). 
Recommendation  1  (oage  305):      That  the  IAC  consider  the  adoption  of  a  single  index 
— ' — system  based  on°the  Intelligence  Subject  Code  now  in  use  by  CIA. 
Ar.^cv  Comment:     CIA  and  33B  concur.  CIA  reoorts     that  this  recommendation 
i^urrlntlT^nder  study  in  a  special  subcommittee  of  the  IAC.     The  subcommittee 
is  exmected  to  rer-ort  to  the  IAC  within  the  next  fev.-  »eeks. 
CHAPTER  Xin--J^oordination  in  Overseas  Areas   (Paees  306-309) » 
Recommendation  1  (oage  30?) :     That  sender  military  commanders  in  the  field  be  given 
  greater  flexibility  in  their  use  of  information  on  a  need-tc-loio-  basis, 
giving  due  regard  to  the -protection  of  its  source. 
Agency  Comment:    ; 
DDD  considers  that  "current  practices  in  the  D3D  are  satisfactory  ^.vithin  the 
regulations  imposed  by  other  agencies." 
CHAPTER  XIV  -  Development  of  Ke-  Equipment  and  Techniques   (Panes  310-311).' 
T?eConmendation  1  (nage  312.)'.      That  the  IAC  take  positive  action  to  insure  that  a 
""" — definite  and  concerted  effort  is  made  to  develop  new  techniques,   methods  and 
equipment  for  the  collection  and  production  of  intelligence  and  ins-ore  that 
a  free  exchange  of  information  concerning  such  projects  is  accomplished  -.m_thm 
the  intelligence  community. 
r 
? 
t 
t  •  •  • 
DOT)  concurs,   stating  that  continuing  efforts  are  being  devoted  to  fulfillment 
of  this  recommendation.     DDD  observes  that  in  all  cases   full  effectiveness  can 
be  achieved  only  rath  a  frank  and  free  interchange  of  inicrmatxon. 
State  concurs,  noting  that  it  has  initiated  a  number  of  steps  in  social  science, 
psychological  and  research  areas,   all  of  which  are  designed  to  further  the      . 
objective  of  this  recommendation. 
-  2U  -
t\i:     ^-~^- 
CHAPTER  XV  -  "Watch-Pop"  Commission  (Parres  312-317): 
.Recommendation  1  (page  317):  That  a  small,  permanent,  bipartisan  commission, 
composed  of  members  of  both  Houses  of  the  Congress  and  other  public-spirited 
citizens  commanding  the  utmost  national  respect  and  confidence,  be  established 
by  Act  of  Congress  to  make  periodic  surveys  of  the  organization,  functions, 
policies,  and  results  of  the  Government  agencies  handling  foreign  intelligence 
operations;  and  to  report,  under  adequate  security  safeguards,  its  findings 
and  recommendations  to  the  Congress,  and  to  the  President,  annually  and  at 
such  other  times  as  may  be  necessary  or  advisable.  The  proposed  "watch-dog" 
commission  should  be  empowered  by  law  to  demand  and  receive  any  information 
it  needs  for  its  own  use.  It  would  be  patterned  after  the  Concussion  on 
Organization  of  the  Executive  Branch  of  the  Government  (Hoover  Commission). 
Appointments  by  the  President  of  persons  from  private  life  to  the  proposed 
commission  should  be  made  from  a  select  list  of  distinguished  individuals  of 
unquestioned  loyalty,  integrity,  and  ability,  with  records  of  unselfish 
service  to  the  nation. 
Agency  Comment:  CIA  does  not  concur  in  this  recommendation.  CIA  believes, 
with  the  Hoover  Commission  itself,  that  'Jwhile  mixed  Congressional  and 
citizens  committees  for  temporary  service  are  useful  and  helpful  to  undertake 
specific  problems  and  to  investigate  and  make  recommendations,  such  committees, 
if  permanent,  present  difficulties."  CIA  points  out  that  it  now  reports  to 
the  Armed  Service  Committees  of  the  Senate  and  House,  and  to  the  Senate  and 
House  Appropriations  Committees.  As  a  consequence  CIA  does  not  consider  that 
a  Joint  Congressional  Committee  would  add  any  essential  helpful  element. 
CIA  does  concur,  however,  in  the  appointment  (as  recommended  by  the  Hoover 
Commission,  but  not  by  its  Task  Force)  by  the  President  of  a  committee  of 
experienced  private  citizens  to  examine  and  report  periodically  on  the  work 
of  the  Government's  foreign  intelligence  activities. 
DDD  believes  that  the  permanent,  bipartisan  commission  recommended  by  the 
Task  Force  would  afford  improved  protection  for,  as  well  as  efficiency  in, 
foreign  intelligence  operations. 
Additional  Action  Reo;aired:  None,  in  view  of  the  establishment  on  January  13, 
1956  by  the  President  of  a  Board  of  Consultants  to  review  periodically  the 
foreign  intelligence  activities  of  the  Government. 
CHAPTER  XVI  -  Summary  of  Conclusions  and  Recommendations  (Pages  31S-3U8), 
This  Chapter  is  merely  repetitious  of  information  appearing  earlier  in  the  Report. 
Conclusions  and  recommendations  are  restated  in  verbatim  fashion  in  some 
instances;  in  other  instances  they  are  paraphrased  and  combined  with  still 
other  opinions  and  recommendations  contained  in  the  body  of  the  report. 
This  Chapter  does  not  appear  to  contain  any  new  information.  It  merely 
restates,  repeats,  and  re-emphasizes  certain  of  the  points  previously  made. 
-  25  -  ttirs
/ 
I    u__»li 
Top  Secret  -  U.  S.  Eyes  Only 
:'::T::T:J 
in 
Report  on  Intelligence  Activities  in  the  Federal  Government 
Prepared  for  the  Commission  on  Organization  of  the  Executive  Branch  of  the  Government 
By  the  Task  Force  on  Intelligence  Activities 
May  1955 
".iWil 
Appendix  I 
Part  1  -  The  National  Security  Agency  (Pages  1-58) 
Recommendation  1  (page  1*6):  That  NSC  direct  USCIB  to  establish  COUINT  requirements 
in  the  light  of  COMINT  realities  and  consideration  of  capabilities  of  other 
intelligence  sources.  This  operational  guidance  to  NSA  should  be  so  clear  and 
succinct  as  to  require  mwrmni  interpretation  of  -what  i3  required  and  of  its 
degree  of  importance.  USCIB  should  be  primarily  concerned  with  end  products 
and  the  Director,  NSA,  should  determine  the  best  way  of  producing  same.  If 
USCIB  fails  after  a  reasonable  length  of  time  to  provide  more  adequate  guidance 
to  the  Director,  NSA,  the  latter  should  be  made  a  member  of  the  IAC. 
Agency  Comment:  USCIB  considers  the  first  part  of  this  recommendation  to  be 
in  hand  in  that  a  revised  COMINT  requirements  list,  prepared  with  NSA  participa- 
tion, has  been  approved  by  a  Working  Committee  -within  USCIB  and  will  soon  be 
presented  for  USCIB  approval.  "Kith  respect  to  the  second  part  of  the  recommenda- 
tion, USCIB  does  not  believe  that  NSA  membership  on  the  IAC  should  be  related 
to  the  development  of  or  failure  to  develop  USCIB  directives  or  requirements. 
DOD  concurs,  but  is  doubtful  that  the  problem  to  which  the  latter  part  of  the 
recommendation  is  addressed  would  be  solved  by  making  the  Director,  NSA,  a 
member  of  the  IAC.  DOD  is  presently  crystal  i  zing  its  views  on  the  general 
subject  of  intelligence  and  on  the  ultimate  organization  of  the  top  structure 
of  U.  S.  intelligence.  DOD  proposes  to  discuss  the  matter  with  State  and  CIA 
and  hopes  in  due  course,  together  with  those  agencies,  to  arrive  at  an  agreed 
proposal  for  submission. 
Additional  Action  Required;  As  to  COMINT  requirements  -  none.  As  to  NSA's 
membership  on  the  IAC  -  defer  decision  pending  a  determination  as  to  whether 
USCIB' s  revised  COMINT  requirements  constitute  sufficient  guidance  for  NSA. 
(In  the  interim  consideration  should  be  given  to  granting  observership  status 
on  the  IAC  to  the  Director,  NSA.) 
Recommendation  2  (page  U8)s  That  the  Director,  NSA,  be  given  clear  cut  directives 
iihich  wiiT"enable  him  to  make  much  greater  and  continuing  effort  to  produce  high 
level  communications  intelligence.  This  is  of  such  great  importance  that 
monetary  considerations  should  be  waived  and  an  effort  at  least  equal  to  the 
Manhattan  Project  should  be  exerted  at  once.  (It  is  noted  that  in  forwarding 
Appendix  I,  Part  1,  the  Task  Force  indicated  that  "the  importance  of  the 
adoption  of  Recommendation  2  is  especially  emphasized  -  this  is  believed  to 
DECLABSlWaai  to  the  intelligence  effort.")  ?o'iT;c;,"  EXEMPTED 
EC).  12356.  SEC.  3  •'.  ii?)  z.O.  Yi: ',  vJ-C.  1.3  (&}fw  ) 
-Ji/d 
WP»ET
Agency  Comment:  USCIB  does  not  concur  in  the  implication  that  guidance  or  lack 
thereof  has  adversely  affected  the  production  of  high  level  communications  intel- 
ligence. USCIB  notes  that  "emphasis  upon  the  guidance  factor_has_  tended,  to  obscure 
the  real,  and  critical.. -weakness  -nhich  does  exist,  namely. ;;;;;;;;*;::|xiliii"**" 
"• 
 ''"  °   ^As'  to  the  proposed  initiation  of  efforts  in  this  field 
"aiong'the  lines  of  the  Manhattan  Project,  USCIB  states  that  it  is  not  now  in  a 
position  to  determine  .  the  .  nature  and  scope  _  of  ^ the  ^creased>effort_}Ad,ch_  Eight  be 
applied   *   "•   •   » « « »   ...../ 
'.\\  \  
'•  >]  jj«||jUSC^'*Deiieves"it*Tdii"be  in  a  better  position  to  decide  this  fatter 
"as"]a[resuit_of  NSA's  plan,  for. implements^,  the  newCOMINT  objectives^  list.;  •  • "  ■  
* 
II
"problem  referred  to  above.     USCIB  is  convinced  that  maxi  mm  assistance,  ypuld  be 
provided  .to^NSAju^he  J  solution,  of.  its  major  problem  by  the;  i i ; ; ; ; ; ; : ; ; '.  y '. ; ;  r  ] r 
y.y.y.y.y.lll  1.11ZZ.'J11.'. '.'.Ill Based  thereon,  the  Special  Committee  of  the  NSC  for 
'  COMIKT"  ( Sec/State  "and*  Sec/Def)  has  agreed  that  an ,  optimum.  _if_  not  indeed  a  pre- 
requisite, step  toward": :::::::::;::::;::::::::::;::::::::::::: :::::::::::::::  ij 
i  i\  m  *  m  m  *  r   A 
  ^__      -_^__-  -Ts.l&SLj^.t't?.  -SPSSi3^-  Committee  has 
=  authorized  marshalling  "oT^slD.  relevant!  :::*"*  I :  * ::  I :::::: !  ^resources  of  the  intel- 
ligence agencies.  -**-^        '  "•j^*x- 
Additional  Action  Required:    Reconsideration  by  NSC' s  Special  Committee  for 
COMDJT  of  the  recommended  expansion  of  NSA's  efforts. 
Observations     Such  reconsideration  should  be  deferred  pending  completion  of  the 
study  and  related  steps  referred  to  by  USCIB  and  summarized  above. 
Recommendation  3  (page  U9):     That  ELINT  and  COinUT  be  integrated  to  the  extent  of 
placing  rcTTNT  -under  NSA  for  analysis  of  the  product  and  guidance  and  coordination 
in  the  collection  and  dissemination  of  ELINT.    The  authority  of  operational 
commanders  over  the  integral  ELINT  resources,  however,  should  not  be  abridged. 
USCIB  or  the  combined  board  which  is  recommended  in  this  report  to  replace  it 
should  exercise  only,  policy  control  over  ELINT  matters. 
Agency  Comment:     USCIB  believes  this  recommendation  has  been  overtaken  by  the 
issuance  of  NSCID  No.  17  and  by  the  DOD  Directive  on  ELINT  dated  July  13,  1955* 
USCIB  believes  no  further  action  should  be  taken  on  this  recommendation  until 
these  recent  directives  have  been  implemented  and  tried. 
Additional  Action  Requiredt     Following  a  reasonable  trial  period  the  reference 
Directives  should  be  re-examined  in  the  light  of  this  recommendation. 
Observation:     The  USCIB  response  is  unclear.    By  inference  it  appears  that  ELINT 
has  not  been  placed  under  NSA,  as  recommended  by  the  Task  Force. 
Recommendation  U  (page  S>0):     That  the  military  services  and  NSA  continue  to  strive 
for  a  higher  degree  of  cryptographic  securityj  that  the  problem  of  communications 
security  be  restudied  by  USCSB  (or  the  combined  board  as  recommended  in  this 
report)  with  a  view  to  reducing  to  the  lowest  practicable  level  the  quantity 
of  information  released  through  telecommunications;  and  that  NSC  168  be  re- 
examined to  ascertain  if  the  Director,  NSA,  has  sufficient  authority  to  carry 
APPENDIX  I
Tfi 
out  his  C-DIEE3  responsibilities. 
Agency  Comment:  USCIB  agrees  with  the  need  for  a  higher  degree  of  communica- 
tions security  and  feels  that  efforts  to  attain  this  end  should  continue; 
however,  it  does  not  consider  that  the  recommendation  falls  within  the 
purview  of  USCIB. 
USCSB  reports  that,  at  all  times,  the  military  services  and  USA  keep  the 
problem  of  cryptographic  security  under  thorough  review.  USCSB  concurs  in 
the  recommended  review  of  NSC  168,  but  notes  that  in  essence  this  review 
is  already  underway  pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  NSC  168  itself. 
Recommendation  5  (page  5l):  That  a  single  board  with  appropriate  technical  sub- 
committees  have  policy  guidance  over  communications  intelligence  and  com- 
munications security.  If  the  recommendation  to  place  the  evaluation  and 
analysis  of  ELINT  under  NSA  is  adopted,  then  policy  guidance  for  ii.INT  as 
well  as  COIUHT  and  COISEC  should  be  exercised  by  the  proposed  single  board. 
Agency  Consent;  "USCIB  is  not  now  willing  to  recommend  establishment  of  a 
■'single  board  "because  the  basic  functions  and  organizational  arrangements 
within  a  number  of  the  interested  agencies  are  sufficiently  divergent  to 
justify  the  continued  separate  existence  of  USCIB  and  USCSB."  •  USCSB  opposes 
the  recommendation  because  of  the  difficulties  of  implementation  which  would 
result  from  the  establishment  of  a  single  board,  as  proposed. 
Recommendation  6  (page  5l):  That  DOD  study  the  organisational  structure  and  proper 
positioning  within  its  respective  services  of  the  three  cryptologic  agencies  - 
AFS3,  ASA,  and  KSG  -  with  a  view  toward  improving  their,  prestige  and  effectiveness, 
thereby  strengthening  their  personnel  assignment  policies  and  logistic  support. 
Agency  Comment t  USCIB  endorses  the  aim  of  this  recommendation  but  considers 
it  a  problem  internal  to  DOD.  DOD  believes  that  one  means  of  achieving  the 
objective  of  this  recommendation  is  to  constitute  the  service  cryptologic 
agencies  as  major  commands.  The  Air  Force  Cryptologic  Agency  (AF5S)  has  been 
so  constituted  for  about  seven  years.  The  Army  Cryptologic  Agency  (ASA) 
was  designated  as  a  major  command  following  the  submission  of  the  Task  Force 
Report.  The  Navy  Cryptologic  activity  (HSG)  is  not  so  constituted  at  present; 
DOD  will  in  the  near  future  ask  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  to  review  his 
cryptologic  organization  to  determine  whether  it  might  be  re-established  on 
a  basis  paralleling  that  of  the  Army  and  the  Air  Force. 
Recommendation  7  (page  $2)i     That  the  military  services  give  greater  attention  to 
selecting  officers  for  C01HNT  duties,  assign  regular  or  "career"  reserve  officers 
to  the  n^rni™  extent  possible,  indoctrinate  officers  inCOIUNT  prior  to  sending 
them  to  command  field  stations,  and  establish  career  opportunities  for  specialists 
equal  to  those  of  the  line  or  general  service  officers.  Rotation jmd^reolacement 
procedures  should  be  improved.  ■  The  feasibility  of  using  civilian  ;  —  -j :;:  ;\ 
'.'.  7". I.*'.*.  Vrrishould  be  tested.  It  is  also  recommended  that  Congress  enact  legislatio: 
awssa-  z  .  3 .  tshttwa-
&£££ 
TflB£» 
to  authorize  NSA  to  employ  especially  qualified  retired  military  personnel 
with  no  restriction  on  the  number  so  employed.  Such  legislation  should  also 
permit  Sec.  Def.  to  recall  active  officers  to  duty' with  USA  and  have  those 
officers  counted  against  the  authorized  strength  of  USA,  but  not  of  the 
respective  military  services. 
Agency  Comment;  TJSCIB  concurs  in  this  recomnendation.  DOB  reports  that 
full  consideration  of  these  proposals  is  currently  'in  progress  within  DOD. 
Recomaendation  8  (page  5U):  That  the  Secretary  of  Defense  give  further  consideration 
  to  the  allocation  of  an  appropriate  number  of  "super  grades"  and  positions 
■under  Public  Law  313  to  NSA;  to  the  possibility  of  further  inducements  or 
higher  pay  to  selected  consultants j  and  to  privileges  extended  to  civilians 
overseas.. 
Agency  Comment:,  USCIB  concurs  in  this  recommendation.  DOD  also  concurs  and 
is  talcing  the  steps  it  deems  appropriate  in  an  effort  to  accomplish  the 
objectives  of  this  recommendation. 
Recommendation  9  (page  55):  That  USCIB  or  its  successor  board  clarify  the  objectives 
and  functions  of  intelligence  liaison  detachments  with  KSA,  establish  uniform 
procedures  to  be  followed  for  such  detachments  in  their  relationship  with  USA, 
and  specify  f^™"™  numbers  of  personnel  to  be  assigned  for  liaison  duties 
after  examining  the  extent  of  interest  of  each  agency  concerned.  Intelligence 
personnel  assigned  to  liaison  duty  with  MSA  should  be  required  to  attend  an 
indoctrination  course  conducted  by  KSA.  *  . 
Agency  Comment?  USCIB  does  not  concur  in  this  recommendation.  It  agrees 
that  mutual  familarization  with  the  requirements,  capabilities  and  operations 
;v-.^        of  both  KSA  and  consumer  agencies  is  desirable?  it  feels,  however,  that  be- 
"  n"        cause  the  necessary  functions  of  intelligence  liaison  detachments  vary  continuously 
with  the  missions  of  the  consumer  agencies  and  the  character  of  COlflBT  production 
activities,  the  arrangements  called  for  by  this  recommendation  cannot  successfully 
be  rendered  uniform. 
Additional  Action  Required:  Decision  as  to  whether  the  view  of  the  Task  Force 
or  the  view  of  USCIB  should  be  adopted. 
Observation:  USCIB' s  view  is  most  sound.  The  Task  Force  recommendation  should 
be  rejected. 
*#&          Recommendation  10  (page  56):  That  NSA  and  the  three  cryptologic  services  give  greater 
$%*  eaohasis  to,  and  continue  to  develop  mutual  cooperation! 77   ^77. .  •  .'•  • ;  H 
,m  :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::TTTTTrrA        '^^   ~"J 
APPEMDIjL  I 
-u  - 
v^i  '-;.r'rT
&U&6MT 
Agency  Comment:  USCIB  concurs.  Greater  emphasis  has  been  given  this  matter 
and  USCB  considers  the  arrangements  which  have  been  undertaken  in  this 
regard  to  be  satisfactory. 
Recommendation  11  (page  £6):  That  more  thorough  periodic  re-investigations  of 
personnel  be  made.  Particular  effort  should  be  concentrated  on  persons 
occupying  the  more  sensitive  positions. 
Agency  Comment:  USCIB  has  established  a  special  committee  to  investigate 
the  matter,  and  USCIB  is  prepared  to  act  on  whatever  recommendations  are  made 
by  that  committee. 
Observation:  See  "Observation"  Section  of  Chapter  X,  Recommendation  3« 
Recommendation  12  (page  p7):  That  the  Director,  KSA,  be  given  authority  to  inspect 
the  service  cryptologic  schools  and  make  appropriate  recommendations  for 
improvement  inhere  COHIMT  is  affected. 
Agency  Comment:  USCIB  concurs. 
A??EJJDIX  I 
-5  - 
i'ttf-Stuiffl
gf.! 
Too  Secret  -  "J.  S.  Eyes  Only 
Report  on  Intelligence  Activities  in  the  Federal  Government 
Prepared  for  the  Commission  on  Organization  of  the  Executive  Branch  of  the  Government 
By  the  Task  Force  on  Intelligence  Activities 
Hay  1955 
Aooendix  I 
Part  2  -  Communications  and  Electronics  in  Support  of 
"       Intelligence  Activities  (Pages  1-hU) 
Recommendation  1  (page  37)*  That  an  Intelligence  Communications  and  Electronics 
Subcommittee  (ICES)  to  the  Combined  Intelligence  Board  (this  assumes  that 
USC3E  and  USCSB  have  been  combined  into  a  single  board,  as  proposed  elseiihere   ____. 
in  the  report)  be  established  to  review  and  produce  recommendations  to  the 
Combined  Intelligence  Board  xdth  respect  to  all  communications  and  electronics 
proposals  from  intelligence  activities  Trbich  call  for  facilities,  equipments, 
or  additional  personnel  -which  cannot  be  obtained  from  existing  resources! 
and  to  supply  technical  advice  to  the  Board  on  such  natters  as  it  might  request. 
Agency  Comment:  USCIB  does  not  agree*  It  believes  that  the  spirit  of  this 
recommendation  is  being  accomplished  by  expert  communications  and  electronics 
advice  provided  from  trithin  the  agencies  concerned  -nith  the  subject. 
Additional  Action  Required:  None,  assuming  the  USCIB  comment  on  this  recommenda- 
tion is  accurate. 
Recommendation  2  (page  38):  That  more  effective  use  be  made  to. thin  DOD  of  the  high 
potential  value  and  kno-r-how  available  in  the  Joint  Communications -Electronics 
Committee  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  to  deal  tri-th  communications  and  electronics 
problems  related  to  the  broad  intelligence  field.  Responsibility  should  be 
placed  on  that  group  for  reviewing  and  commenting  on  communications  and  electronics 
requirements  that  the  USA  considers  necessary  to  meet  the  intelligence  objectives, 
and  the  demands  being  placed  by  NSA  on  the  special  communications  and  electronics 
groups  in  the  military  services  under  KSA  operational  control;  and  for  submitting 
recommendations  to  the  Secretary  of  Defense  on  -nays  and  means  to  insure  maximum 
coordination  and  effectiveness  in  the  over-all  communications  and  electronics 
effort  in  support  of  intelligence. 
:s|??       Agency  Comment:  USCIB  considers  that  existing  procedures .  for  reviewing  and 
commenting  on  MSA  requirements  are  satisfactory. 
Recommendation  3  (page  38):  That  more  effective  technical  advice  be  injected  into 
USCIB  deliberations  to  permit  development  of  more  appropriate  statements  of 
the  intelligence  objectives  to  be  accomplished  by  communications  or  electronics 
means.  DECLASSIFIED  PORTIONS  EXEMPTED  -, 
E.0. 12356,  SEC.  3,",  (b)  E.O.  12Si'J.  vLC.  1.3  fcX)  (U) 
':•'■**
Tersms 
:#g 
Agency  Comment:     USCIB  agrees  rath  the  spirit  of  this  recommendation  and 
believes  that  it  is  now  being  carried  into  effect. 
Recommendation  h  (page  38):     That  the  present  basic  policy  for  the  provision  of 
point-to-point  communications  services  to  intelligence  community  activities 
from  existing  governmental  or  civil  communications  services  be  continued. 
That  any  attempt  to  set  up  separate,  duplicate,  or  paralleling  point-to-point 
communications  facilities  be  authorized  only  -when  the  necessity  therefor  has 
been  fully  reviewed  and  agreed  to  by  the  Intelligence  Communications  and 
Electronics  Subcommittee  recommended  in  Recommendation  1,  above. 
Agency  Comment:     USCIB  concurs  in  the  first  sentence  of  the  recommendation. 
It  agrees  with  the  second  sentence  to  the  extent  of  believing  that  no  separate 
facilities  should  be  established  for  intelligence  use  -without  full  consideration 
by  appropriate  authority. 
Recommendation  5  (page  39)  s     That  a  basic  policy  of  utilising  existing  facilities, 
services,  and  equipment  to  the  maximum  degree  be  applied  -wherever  it  is  deter- 
mined to  be  technically  feasible  in  the  C01HKT,  ELINT,   and  COJBEC  operations 
(this  applies  particularly  to  certain  aspects  of  the  technical  training  phases, 
operational  procedures,  and  logistics)}  that  exceptions  to  this  policy  be 
authorized  only  when  the  necessity  therefor  has  been  fully  reviewed  and  agreed 
to  by  the  Intelligence  Communications  and  Electronics  Subcommittee  recommended 
in  Recommendation  1,  above. 
Agency  Comment:     USCIB  considers  that  the  spirit  of  this  recommendation  is. 
now  being  carried  out.     It  does  not  agree  that  the  additional  review  (called 
for  in  the  last  sentence)  is  either  necessary  or  desirable. 
Recommendation  6  (page  39)*     That  any  arrangements  with  respect  to  centralised 
control  of  ELIHT  give  adequate  consideration  to  the  immediate  and  vital  interest 
of  the  military  in  this  field  and  the  need  to  keep  electronic  countermeasures 
(ECU)  -  a  tactical  weapon  -  clearly  under  military  operational  control. 
Agency  Comment:  USCIB  believes  that  this  recommendation  has  been  overtaken 
by  the  issuance  of  NSCID  1?  and  the  .related  Deoartment  of  Defense  Directive 
of  July  13,  1955. 
Recommendation  7  (page  39):     That  all  planning  and  operation  of  communications  and 
electronics  efforts  in  support  of  intelligence  activities  include  full  considera- 
tion of  the  following  to  meet  national  emergency  conditions: 
a.    Day-to-day  operation  and  training  be  based  on  realism  in  light 
of  the  situation  and  facilities  expected  to  be  available  in  time  of  war 
or  national  emergency.     This  applies  in  a  special  manner  to  planning 
operations  to  be  effective  in  case  of  heavy  jamming  operations. 
a??e:idh:  i 
-  2  -
WBEeftE! 
■Xj&Vi 
b.  Key  intelligence  installations,  served  by  costly,  hard-to-replace 
electronics  equipment  and  associated  records  be  located  outside  established 
target  areas.     That  these  installations  have  integrated  plans  for  national 
emergency  or  disaster  operations.     That  all  agencies  involved  in  planning 
new,  alternate,  or  emergency  locations  for  Federal  agencies  expedite  action 
to  assist  NSA  in  its  current  efforts  to  obtain  a  suitable  site. 
c.  Pending  accomplishment  of  b,  that  effective  interim  disaster  plans 
be  developed  promptly  for  each  key  intelligence  installation  to  include  as 
a  minimum  (l)  alternate  site,   (2)  installed  and  tested  minimum  equipment 
with  necessary  basic  records  at  the  alternate  site,  and  (3)  adequate  knowledge 
of  disaster  plans  by  key  personnel. 
Agency  Comment:     USCIB  concurs  in  Recommendation  7-a  and  considers  that  it 
is  now  being  carried  out.     USCIB  agrees  in  principle  with  Recommendation  7-b 
but  notes  that  the  great  extension  of  target  areas  by  fallout  hazards  would" 
require  relocation  at  such  great  distances  that  reduction  in  operational 
efficiency  would  be  unacceptable  and  the  agency  concerned  would  be  unable 
to  retain  or  attract  key  personnel.  .  USCIB  reports  that  plans,  for  the  loca- 
tion of  alternate  NSA  sites  are  now  being  developed  by  DOD.     USCIB  concurs 
in  Recommendation  7-c  and  reports  that  it  is  being  carried  into  effect  except 
fo^f:r.T:Trr^T7rr....v:i .........  ::::::::,:::::::::lTrT^ 
.t '-JJJJMt i'i'iVi i^-i'-iSrn^arKAkTTrggh.-.* .-. .... ^...^t.--i*;«-» 
*■«-*-« ».«■*■«  V-'-«* 
Recommendation  8  (page  UO):  That  the  present  basic  communications  (cryptographic) 
security  plan,  providing  for  centralised  control  with  effective  decentraliza- 
tion of  operations,  be  continued;  that  each  agency  and  service  maintain 
effective  inspection  and  vigorous  training  programs  to  reduce  to  the  minimum 
cryptographic  operational  security  violations. 
Agency  Comment;  USCSB  concurs,  noting  that  the  Communications  Security  Plan 
referred  to  represents,  in  reality,  a  number  of  communications  security  arrange- 
ments each  of  which  is  considered  satisfactory. 
Recommendation  9  (page  UO):  That  NSC  determine  ways  and  means  to  control  more 
effectively  release  of  valuable  intelligence  to  potential  enemies  via  clear 
text  messages  being  transmitted  over  government  and  civil  communication  networks. 
Agency  Comment:  USCSB  considers  that  the  policy  responsibility  for  control  of 
governmental  clear  text  messages  falls  within  its  charter.  It  reports  that  it 
has  long  recognized  this  problem  and  is  working  toward  its  solution.  It  does 
not  believe  that  the  problem  is  one  for  NSC  consideration.  USCSB  considers 
that  the  policy  responsibility  for  control  of  nongovernmental  clear  text 
messages  over  civil  communications  network  is  outside  its  purview. 
Additional  Action  Required:  Referral  of  the  nongovernmental  aspects  of  the 
subject  to  Commerce  for  consideration  in  the  light  of  its  NSC-assigned 
responsibilities  relating  to  the  safeguarding  of  unclassified  strategic 
information. 
APPESDEC  I 
"3"  BKiSiiEJ
TS?  UjHET- 
Recommendation  10  (page  liO):  That  the  general  tendency  within  the  communications 
intelligence  and  the  communications  security  agencies  to  overemphasize  the 
special  security  facets  of  their  operations  -with  respect  to  basic  communications 
and  electronics  features  be  examined  objectively  and  comprehensively  by  competent, 
technically  qualified  authority  to  insure  that  such  overemphasis  is  not  producing 
unnecessary  duplication  of  facilities  and  operations  in  peacetime  which  will 
grow  to  completely  unrealistic  figures  in  -wartime,  and  producing  a  system  -which 
may  fail  in  an  emergency  because  it  will  require  considerable  readjustment  of 
basic  operational  practices  at  a  critical  time. 
Agency  Comment:  USCIB  believes  existing  procedures  for  review  of  communications 
requirements  are  adequate.  USCIB  does  not  believe  that  the  security  aspects 
of  C0LHNT  are  significantly  overemphasized.  Accordingly,  USCIB  opposes  creation 
of  the  special  committee  called  for  by  this  recommendation.  USCS3,  in  essence, 
concurs  in  USCIB »s  view;  it  believes  that  no  separate  examination  of  the 
problem  is  required. 
Recommendation  11  (page  I4I):  "SPECIAL  RlfcoiriEKDATION1!:  That  the  President  set  up 
a  special  commission  composed  of  technically  qualified  civil  and  military  com- 
munications and  electronics  representatives,  to  survey  and  produce  recommendations 
as  to  ways  and  means  to  insure  the  more  effective  utilisation  of  all  communications 
and  electronics  resources  of  the  United  States  in  the  national  interests  in  case 
of  war  or  national  emergency.  (This  recommendation  was  singled  out  by  the  Task 
Force  as  one  worthy  of  special  emphasis  and  as  one  believed  to  be  of  great 
importance.) 
Agency  Comment;  ODJJ  expressed  the  view  (7/6/55)  that  the  Report  which  was 
shortly  thereafter  to  "be  made  to  the  NSC  by  the  Science  Advisory  Committee 
would  contain  organizational  recommendations  somewhat  more  far  reaching  than 
those  suggested  in  the  Task  Force  Report  and,  if  adopted,  would  probably 
satisfy  the  recommendations  of  the  Task  Force  Report*. 
Additional  Action  Required:  DOD,  DDL!  and  CIA  views  should  be  obtained  on  this 
recommendation,  including  recommendations  as  to  its  implementation.   (The  ODU 
comment  of  7/6/55  is  not  specific  enough  to  assess  the  validity  of  the  Task 
Force  recommendation.) 
APPZIJQIX  I 
T--&F- 
re? r- sjtt 
-  Ji  -
f^f-trfeyitlri 
Report  on  Intelligence  Activities  in  the  Federal  Government 
Prepared  for  the  Commission  on  Organization  of  the  Executive  Branch  of  the  Government 
By  the  Task  Force  on  Intelligence  Activities 
I£ay  1955 
Atroendix  II 
"he  Clandestine  Services  of  the  Central  Intellirence  Arency 
Beconrendation  1  (page  lj2}:   That  the  "covert  intelligence"  and  "cold  -.7ar  functions" 
of  the  Deputy  Director/Plans  be  assigned  to  separate  Deouty  Directors  vrhose 
areas  of  responsibility  should  be  administratively  and  logistical!;/  self- 
supporting. 
„  ~ng 
conduct  on  a  secure  and  efficient  basis  tvro  vrorldwide  clandestine  organisations, 
each  conpartmented  from  the  other. 
Additional  Action  Recuired:  See  Chapter  II,  Recommendation  1,  Page  1,  above. 
Recommendation  2  (page  U2):   That  the  part  of  CIA's  July  15,  1952  Directive  appoint- 
ing area  division  chiefs  as  executives  of  the  DCI  and  providing  for  their^ 
direct  dealing  -tvith  his  and  senior  overseas  representatives  be  rescinded. 
Agency  Cogent:   CIA  reports  this  Directive,  has  been  revieiTed 
ic.  rescinded. 
Recommendation  3  (page  U2):  That  the  DCI  re-establish  the  office  of  Executive 
Director  of  that  agency. 
Agencs'-  Coonent:   CIA  is  opposed  to  this  recommendation  on  the  ground  that  the 
interposition  of  another  coinniand  echelon  vrould  not  necessarily  accomplish  the 
intent  of  the  recormsndation.  Further  study,  hov/ever,  is  being  given  the 
subject. 
Observation:  Because  this  is  ourel 
seem  appropriate  to  defer  to  DCi's  judgnent  thereon. 
v 
PORTIONS  EXEMPTED" 
E.O.  12065,  Sec.  1-301  (£>W  ) 
Pi  A^/ft' AJ5e  W?A/ 
.  Mji  till 
of  an  intra-agency  character,   it  vrould 
NLE  Date . 
DECLASSIFIED 
WHBIftT
^S^UM- 
S»*3 
fSFHRitl 
Observation:     In  view  of  the  reasons  advanced  by  Cxi,  all  of  which  are  valid, 
the  Task  Force  recommendation  should  not  be  adopted. 
Rscousendation  7   (oage  U3):      That  the  prograa  Tor  training  of  specialists  in^covert 
intelligence  collection  and  Tor  the  development  of  linguists  be  intensified. 
Agency  Coraenb:      CIA  concurs  and  has  in  effect  a  number  of  measures  the  objectives 
of  TThich  coincide  vriLth  this  reconnendation.     L  mandatory  quota  of  five  per  cent 
of  all  clandestine  service  personnel  are  in  training  at  all  tines.  > 
a??e:idd:  ii 
-   2  - 
fSP4ftif
I 
v*> 
)n 
Recommendation  8  (page  1*3):   That  submission  of  individual  budgets  to  the  CIA  Project 
:~~'      Review  Conndttee  by  the  area  division  chiefs  be  discontinued  and  funds  for  each 
cold  war  component  be  prepared  under  the  supervision  of  its  chief  and  submitted 
for  the  conponent  to  the  Project  Review  Committee. 
Ar-ency  Comment;  CIA  observes  that  this  recommendation  is  based  on  a  separation 
of  CIA  "cold  ivar"  and  "covert  intelligence  functions"  with  which  CIA  does  not 
concur.  It  notes,  however,  that  in  relation  to  its  existing  organisation  the 
orogramming  system  of  the  clandestine  services  now  being  put  into  operation 
"assures  a  review  by  the  DD?  and  his  staff  of  the  budget  recommendations  of  the 
area  divisions  of  CIA  clandestine  services. 
Recommendation  9  (page  U3):  That  the  number  of  auditors  of  the  regular  CIA  audit 
staff  be  increased  materially. 
Agency  Consent:  CIA  concurs.  This  action  is  being  taken  as  rapidly  as  possible 
in  line  with  an  internal  organizational  survey  made  by  CIA  several  months  ago. 
Recommendation  10  (page  i<3) :  -:-  •  •  -  •  •  •  -  •*  -  •  -  -  •  •"  -  *  
• "  •  '■>  -  •  '•  •  •  • "  •  •  *  •  - 1 "  *. "  '• '  I "  • '.  *  t '. '.'.'. '. '. '. '. '. '. 
r"  
 
fe.«C...........«»....««.   .......•.•*••••..••.....*.••..•.•.•.••......•..  ........... 
i  .....  . 
 
t::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
r 
 
■   
r 
 * 
 
Recommendation  11  (page  h3):  That  the  ESC  render  a  specific  interpretation  of  the 
~    provisions  of  paragraph  U-b,  SSC  !?Ul2/l  as  it  affects  the  several  members  of 
the  intelligence  community. 
Agency  Comment:  CIA  notes  that  the  reference  paragraph  directs  that  the  D3I 
shall  be  responsible  for  "informing  through  appropriate  channels  and  on  a 
'need-to-kr.ow'  basis,  agencies  of  the  U.  S.  government,  both  at  home  and 
abroad,  including  diplomatic  and  military  representatives,  of  such  operations 
as  will  affect  their.."  CIA  reports  that  it  has  been  scrupulously  careful  to 
keep  other  agencies  appropriately  Informed  pursuant  to  the  "need-to-know" 
principle;  and  that  it"  is  trying  constantly  to  remedy  and  prevent  individual 
instances  of  failure  on  trie  part  of  its  personnel  in  their  efforts  to  strike 
the  difficult  balance  between  the  proper  range  of  interests  of  another  agency 
and  the  restrictive  principle  of  "need-to-know. "  CIA  points  out  that  as  a 
standard  procedure  it  provides  individual  briefings  for  Ambassadors  and  other 
State  personnel,  Defense  Commanders,  Chiefs  of  Liilitary  liLssions,  Attaches, 
etc. 
Recommendation  12 ,  (page  U3):  That  the  CIA  Act  of  19k9  be  amended  to  authorize  the 
employment  of  "any"  (instead  of  fifteen  now  authorized)  retired  officers  or 
warrant  officers  of  the  armed  services. 
Agency  Consent:  See  Chapter  II,  Recommendation  12,  Page  U,  above. 
-3-  iirrcrrrii-i
Document  removed  by  the  staff  of  the  Dwight  D.  Eisenhower  Library 
r_^ff{  For  further  information, 
see  entry  £?of  the  pink  WITHDRAWAL  SHEET  (PRESIDENTIAL  LIBRARIES) 
, /       at  the  front  of  this  folder
EXECUTIVE  OFFICE  OF  THE  PRESIDENT 
NATIONAL  SECURITY  COUNCIL 
WASHINGTON 
January  20,  1956 
MEMDRANDUM  fOR  MR.  LAI 
SUBJECT:  Report  of  the  Hoover  Commission  Task  Force  on  Intelligence  Activities 
1.  You  idll .recall  that  the  President  directed  referral  of  the  subject 
report  and  the  agency  comments  thereon  to  Mr.  D.  Anderson  for  further  staff 
action  and  recommendations  as  appropriate.  Pursuant  to  that  referral  I  have 
examined  in  their  entirety  the  report  and  the  agency  comments  thereon. 
2.  The  subject  report,  totaling  583  pages,  consists  ofs 
A.  The  Main  Report  (362  pages)  -which  is  classified  Top  Secret. 
B.  Appendix  I,  Part  1  (58  pages)  (relating  to  the  National  Security 
Agency)  -which  is  classified  Top  Secret.  This  document  contains  code  tiord 
material*  It  requires  special  handling.  It  should  be  1  juadled  via  Gomint 
Channels  on  a  Top  Secret  -  P.  S.  Eyes  Only  basis. 
C.  Appendix  I,  Part  2  (Ut  pages)  (relating  to  Communications  and 
Electronics  in  Support  of  Intelligence  Activities)  -which  is  classified 
Top  Secret.  This  document  contains  code  word  material.  It  requires 
special  handling.  It  should  be  handled  via  Comint  Channels  on  a  Top 
Secret  -  P.  S.  Eyes  Only  basis. 
D.  Appendix  H  (U3  pages)  (relating  to  CIA's  Clandestine  Services) 
■which  is  classified  Top  Secret  and  requires  special  handling. 
E.  The  Published  Report  (76  pages),  which  is,  of  course,  unclassified. 
t^\   3.  In  an  effort  to  facilitate  the  action  directed  by  the  President  I  have 
S^p  pepared  the  enclosed  memorandum  which: 
^N     A.  Sets  forth  chronologically  each  recommendation  in  the  report 
and  its  appendices  (exclusive  of  the  published  report,  which  merely  re- 
states some  of  the  recommendations  in  the  classified  report); 
B.  Sets  forth  the  gist  of  the  agency  (agencies,  in  some  instances) 
comments  on  each  recommendation; 
C.  Contains,  where  appropriate,  my  "Observations"  and  suggestions 
as  to  "Additional  Action  Required11  (in  terms  of  the  recommendations  in 
the  report  and  the  agency  comments  thereon).  It  is  emphasized  that  the 
subparagraphs  entitled  "Additional  Action  Required"  and  "Observations" 
are  merely  the  suggestions  and  views  of  the  writer,  prepared  only  with 
the  thought  in  mind  that  they  might  be  helpful  in  pointing  up  unresolved 
problems  to  be  considered  by  $bo4*  responsible  for  taking  the  further
•v/*" 
4«hs» 
staff  action  directed  by  the  President.  If  the  subparagraphs  do  not 
serve  that  purpose,  they  should  t,  j.  ignored. 
U*  The  enclosed  memorandum  is  lengthy,  because  the  subject  report  is 
lengthy;  it  contains  some  duplication,  partly  because  the  subject  report 
contains  a  great  amount  of  duplication,  but  more  particularly,  because  I  have 
listed  separately  every  recommendation  in  the  report  to  insure  that  none  is 
overlooked* 
5.  It  is  to  be  noted  that,  due  to  the  nature  of  the  distribution  made 
of  the  report,  some  of  the  agencies  did  not  receive  sections  of  the  report 
containing  data  and  recommendations  on  matters  falling  within  their  primary 
jurisdiction* 
6.  It  is  also  to  be  noted  that  the  report  nas  submitted  in  May  1955  J 
that  agency  comments  thereon  "were  submitted  during  the  late  Summer  or  early 
Fall  of  1955$  and  that  as  a  consequence,  some  of  the  recommendations  -which 
are  flagged  as  possibly  requiring  additional  action  may  have  been  acted  upon 
during  the  period  between  the  submission  of  the  agency  comments  and  the  re- 
ferral of  the  subject  to  Mr.  Anderson  for  attention* 
7.  Recommendation*  That  this  memorandum  and  its  enclosures  be  referred 
to  Mr.  Anderson  for  such  further  action  as  he  deems  appropriate. 
J.  Patrick  Coyne 
_  2  -  .......
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January  12, 19  56 
MEMORANDUM  FOR 
OR.  RALPKREXD 
BUREAU  OF  BUDGET 
With  regard  to  year  memorandum  attached* 
I  hare  now  advised  Jimmy  I*ay  to  let 
Meesre.  Macy,  Perry  and  Hamilton  have 
access  to  the  Hoover  Commission  Intel* 
ligence  Activities  report. 
A.  J.  Goodpaster 
Colonel,  CE«  U  S  Army 
Staff  Secretary 
Ojl 
fi-~*-<>- 
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NATIONAL  HEADQUARTERS  J^f      h^l^ 
FEDERAL  CIVIL  DEFENSE  ADMINISTRATION  '  ^ 
Battle  Creek,  Michigan. 
OFFICE  OF  THE  ADMINISTRATOR 
OEC  2  9  1^55 
■4*      ._  vnA  " 
Honorable  Rowland  R.  Hughe  a 
Director*  Bureau  of  the  Budget 
Washington  25,  D.  C.     _~ 
Dear  Mr,  Hughes: 
The  Intelligence  Activities  Report  prepared  by  the  Comnrissfon,  on 
the  Organization  of  the  Executive  Branch  of  the  Governirhent  has 
been  reviewed  in.  accordance  with  Bureau  of  the  Budget  Bulletin 
No.  55-5. 
The  only  recommendation  on  which  it  is  appropriate  for  the 
Federal  Civil  Defense  Administration  to  comment  is  number 
5,  concerning  the  rechecking  of  the  security  status  of  all  personnel 
engaged  in  Intelligence  activities.     This  Agency  concurs  in  this 
recommendation  and  plans  to  institute  rtchecks  of  all  personnel 
engaged  in  such  activities  at  five  year  intervals. 
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December  13,  1955 
MEMORANDUM  FOR 
MR.   DILLON  ANDERSON 
For  further  staff  action  and  follow-up  as  appropriate*  the  President 
had  approved  and  directed  referral  to  you  of  the  attached  Depart- 
mental and  Agency  submissions  relating  to  implementation  of  the 
report  of  the  Hoover  Commission  Task  Force  on  Intelligence 
Activities.       These  were  received  in  response  to  memoranda  to 
the  Departments  and  Agencies  indicating*  on  behalf  of  the  Presi- 
dent, actions  desired  by  him  with  respect  to  the  report.    Copies 
of  these  memoranda  are  attached*  together  with  the  full  classified 
report  of  the  Task  Force  (President's  copy)  and  a  schedule  show- 
ing the  distribution  given  to  the  various  components  of  the  report. 
For  your  information*  this  follow-up  action  was  delayed  until  the 
matter  could  be  taken  up  with  the  President  following  his  recovery* 
since  he  had  earlier  indicated  that  he  wished  distribution  and  handl- 
ing of  the  report  to  be  only  as  personally  directed  by  him. 
Action  with  regard  to  the  recommendation  for  a  "watch* dog  com- 
mission" is  proceeding  separately.       Tour  action  should  include 
such  further  action  with  regard  to  the  special  commission  on 
communications  and  electronic  resources  as  is  deemed  appropri- 
ate. 
A.  J.  Goodpaster 
Colonel*  CE*  U  S  Army 
Staff  Secretary
Colonel  Goodpaster 
Mr.  Dillon  Anderson 
11/16/55 
525 
Memo  to  AEC 
fromO'ov.  Adams  6/13/55 
Memo  to  Gov  Adams 
From  Adm  Strauss    9/15/55 
(2134-1A 
cy  1,  Series  a,  a  pgs 
Memo  to  Atty  Gen  6/13/55 
from  Gov  Adams 
Memo  to  Gov  Adams       7/5/55 
from  Atty  Gen 
cy  1;  memo  to 
atty  Gen  from  the    *'  '•  ":  • ' 
Director,  FBI  6/28/B5 
(2  pages) 
3  memos  to 
Director,  CIA 
from  Gov  Adams  6/13/55 
Memo  to  the 
Prdsident  from 
Director.  CIA;  8/16/55 
memo  to  Dir.  CIA 
from  H,  D.  Jones 
(USCD3)  and  11  pg  8/12/55 
report 
Memo  to  Dir  CIA 
from  Gen  Ersldne  8/16/55 
Cy  1  and  4  pg  rpt 
Memo  to  Ex  Sec  NSC 
f m  W  F  Armstrong         LO/14/55 
No  1  of  6  and 
2  enclosure »(TS) 
Top  Secret 
Top  Secret 
Top  Secret 
Top  Secret 
Top  Secret 
Top  Secret 
Top  Secret         (Special  Handling) 
Top  Secret 
Top  Secret 
Top  Secret
No.   525  Continued 
8    Memos  to  Secy 
of  Defense  from 
Gov  Adams  6/13/55  Top  Secret 
Memoto President  8/17/55  Top  Secret 
from  Sec  Def 
(TS143)  cy  1  of  8 
(2  pages); 
20  page  mimeo  report 
(TS)  (cy  1  of  8) 
Appendix  (6  pgs,  cy  1 
of  8) 
Department  of  Defense 
Comments,  Unclassified 
Memto  Secy  of  State  6/13/55  Top  Secret 
from  Gov  Adams 
Top  Secret  (Special  Handling) 
Memo  to  Gov  Adams 
from  Secy  Hoover;  9/12/55  Secret 
15 -page  report,  cy  1 
of  9,  series  A  Secret 
Memo  to  Col  Goodpaster 
from  Dr.  Flemming  7/6/55  Top  Secret 
H-23,  cyl 
Central  Intelligence  Agency 
Comments  on  Intel!  Act  Report 
Task  Force  Report 
Appendix  I 
Appendix  II 
May  1955 
Top  Secret 
Top  Secret 
Top  Secret 
Top  Secret
MAIN  BODY  OF  THE  REPORT 
CONTENTS 
DISTRIBUTION 
SUBJECT 
PAGES 
' 
OSO 
DEFENSE 
M 
CO 
CHAP. 
JCS  {ARMY 
AIR 
NAVY  FORCE  < 
o 
CO 
< 
pt. 
LETTER OF  SUBMISSION 
vi,vii 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
PREFACE 
viii  to 
xkxi 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
I. 
HISTORY 
1-12 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
II. 
CIA 
13-75 
X 
III. 
DEPT.  OF  STATE 
76-88 
X 
IV. 
DEPT.  OF  DEFENSE 
OSO 
JCS 
ARMY 
NAVY 
AIR  FORCE 
89-205 
89-94 
94-99 
99-137 
138-156 
156-179 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
COVERT  OPERATIONS 
179-205 
X 
X 
X 
x 
x 
V. 
AEC 
206-220 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
x 
X 
! 
I 
VI. 
FBI 
221-226 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
i 
X 
VII. 
INT.  PRODUCTION 
227-2U 
x ' 
X 
X 
X 
X 
x 
X 
X 
X 
VIII. 
FUNCTIONAL  INTELLIGENCE 
245-254 
x 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
IX. 
PERSONNEL 
255-274 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
:„: 
X. 
SECURITY 
275-283 
X 
x 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
XI. 
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 
284-292 
X 
X 
x 
X 
x 
X 
X 
X 
X 
XII. 
MAPS  &  LI3RARIES 
293-305 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
XIII. 
COORDINATION  OVERSEAS 
306-309 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
XIV. 
DEVELOPMENT  OF  NEW  EQUIP. 
31C-311 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
i 
x   i
XV. 
WATCH-DOG  COMMISSION 
312-317 
j; 
X 
X 
a; 
X 
;.; 
'<■'- 
x   I
V 
APPENDIX  I 
Parts  1  and  2 
No.  of  Copies  _       Distribution 
1  U.S.  COMMUNICATIONS  INTELLIGENCE  BOARD 
and  the 
U.S.  COMMUNICATIONS  SECURITY  BOARD 
1  DEPARTMENT  OF  DEFENSE  (OSO) 
1  NATIONAL  SECURITY  AGENCY 
1  JOINT  CHIEFS  OF  STAFF 
APPENDIX  II 
CENTRAL  INTELLIGENCE  AGENCY
July  7,  1955 
MEMORANDUM  FOR  RECORD: 
Mr.  Barnes  at  State  called  me  on  5  July  asking  that  Mr. 
Fisher  Howe  be  permitted  to  read  the  full  basic  report  of 
the  Hoover  Commission  Task  Force  on  Intelligence 
Activities.         He  did  so  on  6  July,  indicated  he  did  not 
think  it  necessary  for  State  to  have  a  copy  of  the  report, 
although  they  might  wish  to  read  it  again  (to  which  I 
agreed). 
He  asked  that  I  read  Appendix  II  from  the  standpoint  of  see< 
ing  whether  there  are  references  to  the  State  Department 
in  it  which  would  warrant  a  State  representative  reading  it. 
I  said  I  would  do  so. 
A.  /J.   Goodpaster 
Colonel,   CE,   U  S  Army
June  20,   1955 
MEMORANDUM  FOR  THE  RECORD: 
On  direction  of  Governor  Adams,  I  visited  President  Hoover  on 
27  May  1955.      Among  other  matters  discussed,   he  advised  me 
that  General  Clark,  early  in  the  work  of  his  Task  Force  on 
Intelligence  Activities,  had  made  certain  contacts  and  under- 
takings to  have  an  investigation  made  of  certain  individuals  whose 
names  were  given  to  him,  together  with  certain  material  relating 
to  them.  President  Hoover  indicated  that  the  investigations 
were  not  complete,  and  that  General  Clark  felt  that  he  was  under 
an  obligation  to  arrange  for  their  completion.  President  Hoover 
said  he  would  not  be  able  to  carry  out  this  action;  his  plan  was  to 
send  the  material  to  Mr.  J.  Edgar  Hoover,  who  would  then  make 
a  report  to  the  "White  House.  I  undertook  to  consult  with  Gov- 
ernor Adams,   see  whether  this  procedure  is  suitable,  and  inform 
President  Hoover's  office  appropriately. 
I  thereupon  informed  Governor  Adams  of  the  foregoing,   and  he 
indicated  that  President  Hoover  could  send  the  material  directly 
to  him  at  the  White  House.         I  also  advised  the  President  on 
31  May  in  general  terms  of  the  action  being  taken,  and  called  Mr. 
Tuck  of  the  Hoover  Commission  the  same  day  and  advised  him 
of  Governor  Adams'  decision  in  the  matter.        He  said  he  would 
so  inform  the  Commission. 
On  25  May,   at  Governor  Adams'  direction,   I  met  with  Mr.   Brownell, 
who  handed  me  a  memorandum  to  him  from  Mr.    J.    Edgar  Hoover, 
explained  its  contents,   and  discussed  them  briefly.       He  indicated 
that  it  would  be  acceptable  to  talk  to  Mr.    Allen  Dulles  about  it  in 
general  terms  --  i.  e.  ,   that  the  list  was  furnished,   that  an  investi- 
gation was  started  and  then  halted  because  of  a  possible  require- 
ment to  examine  CIA  records,    make  interviews,   etc.       He  indicated 
that  Mr.    Dulles  has  asked  to  be  kept  in  touch  with  any  further  action, 
so  as  not  to  have  any  interference  with  special  operations  of  CIA.
After  studying  the  material  provided  by  Mr.   Brownell,   I  dis- 
cussed the  matter  with  Governor  Adams  and  prepared  a  mem- 
orandum for  discussion  with  Mr.    Dulles,  as  to  further  steps  to  be 
taken,  and  indicating  the  individuals  named  and  the  principal 
allegations  made  in  the  material  submitted. 
On  June  2  Governor  Adams,   Mr.    Dulles  and  I  met  in  Governor 
Adams'  office,   and  after  discussion  it  was  agreed  that  Mr.   Dulles 
would  have  a  check  made  of  the  individuals  and  allegations  indi- 
cated in  the  brief  I  had  prepared,   copy  of  which  was  furnished 
him,   and  would  provide  a  memorandum  reporting  his  findings  and 
giving  views  in  the  matter  as  appropriate. 
Later  the  same  day  Colonel  Dubbelde  of  the  Clark  Task  Force 
turned  over  material  which  had  been  developed  in  the  course  of  the 
Task  Force  work,   including  reports  from  the  departments  concerned 
on  individuals  and  allegations  substantially  the  same  as  those  set 
forth  in  the  material  given  to  me  by  Mr.   Brownell. 
On  15  June  Mr.   Dulles  submitted  to  Governor  Adams,   with  copies 
to  the  Attorney  General  and  to  the  FBI,   a  memorandum  reporting 
investigation  made  on  the  individuals  and  allegations  provided  to 
him,   and  relating  this  to  previous  actions  of  a  similar  kind.     In 
his  memorandum  he  advised  that  certain  CIA  employees  listed  were 
under  investigation  within  the  Agency  and  their  cases  are  being 
turned  over  to  the  FBI  together  with  investigative  results  of  the  CIA 
for  whatever  action  is  appropriate.         (The  memorandum  also  indi- 
cated that  Mr.   Dulles  is  forwarding  a  copy  of  it  with  a  request  for 
investigative  action  where  deemed  warranted  under  Executive  Order 
10450.) 
I  advised  General  Persons  today  of  the  essentials  of  the  foregoing 
(pursuant  to  direction  of  Governor  Adams)  for  use  in  connection 
with  any  reference  to  the  matter  pertaining  to  his  Legislative  Liaison 
activities. 
A.   J.    Goodpaster 
Colonel,   CE,    U  S  Army
May  27,    1955 
MEMORANDUM  FOR  THE  RECORD: 
On  direction  of  Governor  Adams,  I  visited  President  Hoover 
this  afternoon.  He  turned  over  to  me  the  classified  report 
with  appendices  of  his  Task  Force  on  Intelligence  Activities. 
He  also  made  the  following  points: 
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a.  The  Task  Force  is  preparing  about  ten  addi- 
tional partial  copies,   each  of  which  contains  material 
pertinent  to  a  particular  agency  and  would  be  suitable 
for  referring  to  that  agency  if  the  President  so 
desired.  Mr.   Hoover  does  not  plan  to  send  these 
reports  to  anyone  but  the  President.     At  his  request, 
I  undertook  to  inform  Mr.   Hollister  or  Mr.    Tuck 
if  it  was  desired  to  have  these  copies  transmitted  to 
the  President. 
b.  A  considerable  amount  of  highly  classified  material 
has  been  accumulated  in  the  process  of  the  Task  Force 
work.        Mr.   Hoover  has  asked  the  Task  Force  to  draft 
an  order  for  him  to  them  as  to  the  disposal  of  this 
material.        When  he  receives  it,   he  will  send  it  to 
.  Governor  Adams  for  comment  as  to  the  proposed  dis- 
position. 
c.     General  Clark,   early  in  the  Task  Force  work,   made 
certain  contacts  and  undertakings  to  have  an  investiga- 
.     ,.    .  ■■       whose  names  . 
tion  made  of  certain  individuals /were  given  to  him,   to- 
gether with  certain  material  relating  to  them.        These 
investigations  are  not  complete,    and  he  feels  that  he  is 
under  an  obligation  to  arrange  for  their  completion. 
President  Hoover  will  not  be  able  to  carry  this  out;  his
-  2 
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plan  is  to  send  the  material  to  Mr.   J.   Edgar  Hoover 
i  who  would  then  make  a  report  to  the  White  House. 
t /    i  I  undertook  to  consult  with  Governor  Adams  and  see 
tr      ) whether  this  procedure  is  suitable. 
d.     Mr.   Hoover  indicated  that  changes  recently  sug 
gested  in  the  unclassified  report  had  been  made.      He 
also  said  that  he  thought  he  would  not  submit  this 
report  to  the  Congress  until  after  the  completion  of 
his  Commission's  work,   and  his  return  from  a  vaca- 
tion which  he  expects  to  last  for  about  four  months. 
A.'tj.   Goodpaster 
Colonel,   CE,    U  S  Army 
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May  23.  1955 
MEMORANDUM  FOR  GOVERNOR  ADAMS 
As  »etion  on  the  Hoover  Task  Fore*  report  on  intelligence  activities* 
I  suggest  that  yon  (or  I.  if  you  wish)  advise  Mr.  Hollister  generally  as 
follows: 
1.     On  the  oasis  of  a  reading  of  the  report  for  security,  it 
is  felt  that  there  are  several  passages  to  which  further  con- 
sideration should  he  given  —  one  of  these  ssems  a  rather 
clear-cut  and  unnecessary  disclosure  of  information  poten- 
tially valuable  to  foreign  countries,  and  the  rest  appear  to 
bs  of  an  "optional"  character,  in  which  the  value  to  foreign 
countries  of  the  information  disclosed  would  have  to  be 
weighed  against  its  value  in  terms  of  informing  the  American 
public.      The  passages  referred  to  are: 
a.  On  page  v,  at  the  top  of  the  page,  a  preferred  ver- 
sion might  read:   "Two  reports  are  submitted:   one. 
unclassified!  the  other*  classified  TOP  SECRET,  with 
certain  appendices  which  require  special  additional 
clearance. "   (This  is  the  "clear-cut"  case  referred 
to  above. ) 
b.  On  page  vii,  the  sentence  in  the  first  full  paragraph 
beginning  "Our  effort  to  achieve,  etc.,"  which  gives  an 
indication  of  suceess  attained  in  obtaining  a  steady  and 
reliable  flow  of  data,  might  be  deleted. 
c.  On  page  ix.  in  the  second  paragraph,  the  sentence 
beginning  "The  information  we  need,  etc.  "•  which 
identifies  Communist  plans,  progrees  and  potential  as 
intelligence  targets,  might  be  deleted. 
d.  There  are  several  references  authoritatively  identify- 
ing attaches  as  intelligence-gatherers  of  major  importance. 
These  include  the  second  sentence  of  the  first  paragraph 
on  page  7.  the  second  sentence  of  the  second  paragraph 
on  page  U,  the  eecond  full  paragraph  on  page  22,  and  the 
second  and  fifth  sentences  of  the  paragraph  beginning  at
f 
-2- 
the  bottom  of  page  23.     la  addition,  there  it  a  similar 
identification  of  tha  Foraign  Service  in  the  laat  aantence 
on  page  14. 
e.     The  recommendation  concerning  the  NSA  at  the 
bottom  of  page  41  haa  the  affect  of  giving  amphaaia  to 
thia  agency  in  an  intelligence  context  and  might  be 
delated. 
2.  Tha  outline  of  U.  S.  top  organisatione  for  intelligence  ia 
undoubtedly  one  for  which  foraign  countries  would  have  had  to 
expend  a  considerable  amount  of  money  to  obtain  —  and  would 
still  not  have  had  complete  confidence  that  it  waa  authoritative. 
Some  generalising  might  be  considered. 
3.  The  reference  to  the  "Under  Secretary  of  Defense"  on  page 
40  might  be  changed  to  "Deputy  Secretary  of  Defense. " 
Goodpaster
EXECUTIVE  OFFICE  OF  THE  PRESIDENT 
BUREAU  OF  THE  BUDGET 
WASHINGTON  25.  D.  C 
BULLETIN  NO.  55-5  1bx6ki  **»  1955 
TO  THE  HEADS  OF  EXECUTIVE  DEPARTMENTS  AND  ESTABLISHMENTS 
SUBJECT:     Study  of  reports  of  the  Commission  on  Organization  of  the 
Executive  Branch  of  the  Government 
In  accordance  with  Public  Law  108,  83d  Congress,  the  Commission  on 
Organization  of  the  Executive  Branch  of'  the  Government  is  currently  sub- 
mitting its  reports  to  the  Congress.    Reports  on  Personnel  and  Civil 
Service,  on  Paperwork  Management,  and  on  Federal  Medical  Services  have 
been  released,  and  it  is  understood  that  more  than  a  dozen  further  re- 
ports will  be  issued  during  the  weeks  ahead. 
It  is  the  desire  of  the  President  that  each  agency  make  a  review 
of  each  of  the  Commission's  reports  and  submit  its  views  to  the  President 
through  the  Bureau  of  the  Budget  within  thirty  days  after  the  release  of 
the  particular  report.     Each  such  statement  should  be  forwarded  in  five 
copies. 
These  reviews  should  determine  the  application  to  the  agency  of 
the  Commission's  recommendations,  including  task  force  recommendations 
specifically  endorsed  by  the  Commission.     Each  agency  statement  should 
indicate  the  extent  to  which  the  recommendations  can  be  put  into  effect 
and  the  manner  of   carrying  them  out. 
ROWLAND  R.  HUGHES 
Director
THE  WHITE  HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 
Af*,^,      svi/^   f-<^AAC^) 
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THE  SECRETARY  OF  DEFENSE 
WASHINGTON 
NOV  10  1955 
Sear  Mr.  President: 
The  views  of  the  Departaent  of  Defense 
an  the  Hoover  Co— 1s»1on  Report  on  Intelligence 
Activities  (unclassified)  are  attached.  Qpedfie 
consents  are  Included  on  each  of  the  recaaseada- 
tlons  considered  applicable  to  this  Dspartswrt. 
As  70a  know,  it  is  nor  la*  -  Sion  that  each 
of  the  Coss&sslan  reports  receive  careful  stody 
and  evaluation  within  the  Separtsent  of  Defense. 
Accordingly,  it  say  he  that  after  farther  con- 
sideration of  this  report  we  will  have  additional 
consents  to  nake* 
With  great  respect,  X  am 
Faithfully  yoors, 
SIGNED 
C.  E.  WILSON 
Inclosare 
The  President 
The  Unite  House
DSBABDIEHT  OF  DEFEASE  COMEHTS 
OS 
HOOVER  COMKCSSIOH  BEPORT 
OH 
3MELLKEHCE  ACTIVITIES  (UHCLASSIFIED) 
October,  1955 
fr
/ 
COMMENTS  OF  THE  DEPARTMENT  CF  DEFENSE  ON  THE  RECOMMENDATIONS 
OF  THE  HOOVER  COMMISSION  TASK  FORCE  ON  INTELLIGENCE  ACTIVITIES 
~~  '  OF  THE  GOVERNMENT 
The  following  comments  are  addressed  to  the  Recommendations  of  the  Task 
Force  which  are  applicable  to  the  Department  of  Defense.  Recommendations  (a) 
and  (b)  of  the  Commission  itself,  and  Recommendations  Nos.  1,  2,  and  7  of  the 
Task  Force,  are  considered  not  to  be  sufficiently  applicable  to  the  Department 
of  Defense  to  justify  comment  by  it, 
RECOMMENDATION  NO.  3 
That  the  chiefs  of  the  various  intelligence  units  of  the  military  ser- 
vices be  elevated  in  the  organisational  structure  to  the  level  of  Deputy 
Chiefs  of  Staff  in  the  Army  and  the  Air  Force,  and  Deputy  Chief  of  Naval 
Operations  in  the  Navy." 
Non-concur 
Comment 
The  Department  of  Defense  agrees  that  it  is  essential  that  intelligence 
be  given  adequate  weight  and  representation  in  the  staff  organization  of  the 
military  services  if  it  is  to  funotion  with  optimum  efficiency,  -  but  it 
considers  that  this  can  be  assured  without  the  recommended  organizational 
changes  at  this  time* 
Implementation t     None  at  this  time. 
RECOMMENDATION  NO.  U 
"That  the  Department  of  Defense  make  extensive  use  of  Schedule  A  of  the 
Civil  Servloe  Regulations  (non-competitive  appointments)  in  the  employment 
by  the  military  services  of  civilian  intelligence  analysts  and  other  spe- 
cialists in  order  to  provide  the  necessary  flexibility  in  the  recruitment 
of  qualified  civilian  personnel  (to  Include  retired  citizens  with  wide 
previous  business  experience  in  the  foreign  field)  and  to  facilitate  the 
interchange  of  such  personnel  between  zone  of  interior  competitive  service 
and  the  overseas  excepted  service." 
Concur 
Comment 
Each  of  the  three  Services  has  taken  or  is  developing  measures  to  apply 
Schedule  A  to  elements  of  its  civilian  intelligence  staff.  In  addition, 
the  Department  of  Defense  is  studying  the  matter  with  a  view  to  finding  an 
optimum  balance  between  desirable  flexibility  in  hiring  and  rotation  of 
skilled  career  personnel  on  the  one  hand  and  providing  the  fullest 
practicable  job  security  and  incentive  (as  a  vital  morale  factor)  on 
the  other.  *
Implementation  s  Take  action  in  accordance  with  the  results  of  such  study. 
RECOMMENDATION  HO.  5 
"That  measures  be  instituted  in  all  agencies  for  rechecking  the  security 
status  of  all  personnel  engaged  in  intelligence  activities  at  periodic  inter- 
vals not  to  exceed  5  years  in  any  individual  case." 
Concur  in  principle. 
CoBg.ent 
It  is  considered  that  the  current  security  practices  and  the  procedures 
for  acting  on  adverse  information  essentially  fulfill  the  objectives  of  these 
recommendations.  Within  the  objectives,  however,  it  is  desirable  to  leave 
to  each  individual  service  reasonable  latitude  in  the  method  of  Implementation. 
For  example,  it  may  in  some  cases  aid.  the  investigation  not  to  alert  the 
individual  involved  by  suspending  him.  Measures  are  taken,  of  course,  in 
such  cases  to  insure  that  classified  information  is  adequately  safeguarded. 
This  general  subject  is  being  reviewed  in  order  to  insure  that  the  under- 
lying objectives  of  these  recommendations  are  adequately  served. 
Implementation:  Additional  precautions  indicated  by  such  review. 
RECOMMENDATION  HO.  6 
"That  the  responsibility  for  procurement  of  foreign  publications  and 
for  collection  of  scientific  intelligence  be  removed  from  the  State  Depart- 
ment and  placed  in  the  hands  of  CIA,  with  authority  to  appoint  such  scienti- 
fic attaches  as  may  be  necessary  to  carry  on  this  work  abroad  •" 
Concur  in  part 
Comment 
The  collection  of  scientific  intelligence  is  one  of  the  most  important 
intelligence  activities  of  the  Government.  It  is  of  vital  concern  to  the 
Department  of  Defense.  The  CIA  should  have  coordinating  responsibility  but 
it  would  be  unwise  and  inefficient  to  give  it  or  any  other  agency  a  monopoly 
in  this  field,  nor  does  any  one  agency  now  have  such  a  monopoly.  The  Depart- 
ment of  Defense  considers  it  inappropriate  for  the  Central  Intelligence 
Agency  to  have  overt  attaches  stationed  abroad. 
Implementation:  None  by  Department  of  Defense. 
RECOMMENDATION  NO.  8 
"That  steps  be  taken  to  introduce  highly  selective  methods  of  choosing 
members  of  the  coordinating  committee  on  atomic  energy  intelligence,  not 
only  to  get  the  benefit  of  service  by  the  most  competent  individuals,  but 
also  to  assure  long  tenure  in  this  important  assignment."
Comment 
The  salaries  the  Department  of  Defense  oan  pay  for  top-flight  talent 
in  this  field  compare  unfavorably  with  those  offered  outside  the  Government, 
and  this  makes  it  difficult  to  insure  long-term  continuity. 
Implementation >  The  Department  of  Defense  will  use  its  best  efforts  to  carry 
out  this  Recommendation. 
RECOMMENDATION  HP.  9 
"That  a  comprehensive,  coordinated  program  be  developed  to  expand 
linguistic  training  among  American  citizens  serving  the  Intelligence  effort; 
and 
"That  the  Department  of  Defense  expand  and  promote  language  training  by 
offering  oredit  toward  reserve  commissions  to  ROTC  students  and  drill  oredit 
to  Reserve  personnel  for  completion  of  selected  language  courses ." 
Concur  in  principle 
Comment 
The  Department  of  Defense  endorses  the  importance  of  a  comprehensive  pro- 
gram of  foreign  language  and  area  specialist  training  for  persons  serving  the 
national  intelligence  effort  and  allied  activities.  It  and  its  elements  have 
taken  various  measures  during  the  past  years  to  further  such  a  program.  But 
in  the  case  of  ROTC  and  reserves,  the  Department  of  Defense  is  reluctant  to 
provide  for  additional  language  training  if  such  training  must  be  at  the  ex- 
pense of  training  in  primary  military  subjects.  Specifically,  the  Task 
Force* s  recommendation  would  make  for  wider  participation  but  would,  not  by 
itself,  produce  well-trained  linguists. 
Implementation:  The  various  existing  programs  are  being  studied  in  the  light 
of  this  recommendation  with  a  view  to  achieving  an  optimum  balance  between 
qualitative  and  quantitative  standards.
c 
22  October  1953 
Dear  Mr*  Chairman: 
I  have  recently  read  orer  the  first  printed  volume  of  your  hearings 
on  "Security  -  Government  Printing  Office,"  and  recall  that  at  the  time 
the  hearings  began,  the  press  published  several  quotations  to  the  effect 
that  an  alleged  member  of  the  Communist  Party  had  access  to  secret  data 
of  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency*  Subsequently  it  was  developed  that 
this  person  was  a  Government  Printing  Office  employee*  In  addition* 
the  Deputy  Public  Printer*  Mr*  Cole,  was  quoted  in  the  papers  as  stating 
to  a  reporter,  in  referring  to  the  main  GPO  plant,  that  he  could  not  say 
positively  whether  they  handled  CIA  material,  but  that  it  was  his  belief 
that  they  could  or  would. 
At  the  time  these  investigations  were  being  conducted,  I  had  a 
careful  check  made  of  our  reproduction  facilities  and  found  that  no 
classified  CIA  material  is  printed  in  the  main  GPO  plant*  The  only  CIA 
work  which  is  handled  there  is  routine  unclassified  matter  such  as  blank 
forms*  On  12  August  Walter  Prorzheimer,  our  Legislative  Counsel,  informed 
Mr,  Carr  of  your  staff  of  these  facts.  Mr.  Cole  informs  us  that  these 
facts  are  correct,  and  in  addition  that  he  has  submitted  a  statement  of 
these  facts  to  your  Committee. 
The  press  reports  mentioned  in  the  first  paragraph  have  received 
widespread  circulation  both  in  the  United  States  and  abroad,  and  have 
raised  some  questions  as  to  our  security.  Under  the  circunstances,  there- 
fore, I  would  appreciate  it  if  you  would  include  this  letter  in  the  printed 
hearings  so  that  the  fact  that  CIA  does  not  have  classified  material  printed 
in  the  main  GFO  plant  is  made  a  matter  of  record. 
It  has  occurred  to  me  that  in  the  course  of  your  investigations  you 
may  possibly  run  across  information  concerning  this  Agency  or  its  personnel. 
Naturally,  I  would  appreciate  it  if  you  would  make  such  information  available 
to  me  so  we  can  take  a  thorough  look  at  such  matters* 
Faithfully  yours, 
/s/  Allen  W.  Dulles 
Allen  W.  Dulles 
Director
c 
~p "t 
7  July  1954 
The  Honorable  Joseph  R.  McCarthy 
Chairman,  Permanent  Subcommittee 
on  Investigations 
Senate  Committee  on  Government  Operations 
Washington  25,  B.C. 
Dear  Senator  McCarthy: 
Daring  the  closing  days  of  the  recently  conducted  hearings 
before  the  Permanent  Subcommittee  you  made  several  references  to 
alleged  Communist  infiltration  of  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency* 
In  reply  to  a  similar  charge  made  earlier  in  the  Comnittee  hearings 
I  denied  such  infiltration* 
In  the  event  that  you  should  have  any  evidence  in  support  of 
these  allegations,  it  would  be  of  the  utmost  importance  that  I  should 
have  an  immediate  opportunity  to  investigate  them*  Accordingly  I 
-would  appreciate  it  if  you  would  let  me  have  at  the  earliest  possible 
moment  any  unfavorable  information  you  may  have  bearing  upon  the 
loyalty  or  integrity  of  any  employee  of  this  Agency*  Any  such  in- 
formation will  be  immediately  investigated  and  appropriate  action  takm  • 
I  have  noted  that  you  have  indicated  that  you  ars  making  available 
to  General  Clark  your  material  on  this  subject*  Consequently  I  am 
sending  him  a  copy  of  this  letter  and  asking  that  he  kindly  advise  me 
if  the  information  which  he  may  receive  from  you  is  of  a  nature  to 
require  any  investigation  on  my  part* 
I  feel  that  any  unfavorable  information  regarding  any  CIA  employee 
would  require  any  iamediate  action  and  should  not  necessarily  await 
the  report  of  the  Task  Force. 
Faithfully  yours, 
(si#ied) 
Allen  W.  Dulles 
Director
c 
15  January  1955 
General  Mark  W*  Clark 
The  Citadel 
Charleston,  South  Carolina 
Dear  General  Clark: 
The  Press  reports  today  that  Senator  Joseph  R.  McCarthy  states 
that  he  gave  to  you  yesterday  information  on  "alleged  communism  and 
corruption"  in  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency. 
Under  date  of  7  July  1954  I  wrote  Senator  McCarthy  a3  Chairman 
of  the  Permanent  Subcommittee  on  Investigations  referring  to  his  al- 
legations of  Communist  infiltration  of  the  CIA  and  requesting  that  he 
make  available  to  me  any  evidence  he  had  in  support  of  these  allega- 
tions to  permit  an  immediate  investigation  thereof.  A  copy  of  that 
letter  was  sent  to  you  on  7  July  1954.  I  received  no  reply  whatsoever 
from  Senator  McCarthy  to  this  letter. 
In  the  event  that  any  of  the  information  which  Senator  McCarthy 
now  states  he  has  turned  over  to  you  contains,  as  alleged,  any  indica- 
tion of  Communism  or  corruption  in  the  CIA,  I  would  investigate  the 
matter  immediately  and  thoroughly.  Certainly  such  investigation  should 
not  repeat  not  await  the  report  or  findings  of  your  committee  some 
months  hence.  Action  should  be  taken  now. 
Accordingly,  I  urgently  request  that  you  make  available  to  me  at 
the  earliest  possible  moment  any  information  in  the  material  furnished 
you  by  Senator  McCarthy  which  would  permit  an  immediate  and  thorough 
investigation  of  the  McCarthy  charges. 
Faithfully  yours, 
Allen  W.  Dulles 
Director 
(Central  Intelligence  Agency)
c 
Jan  21  1955 
The  Honorable  John  L.  MeGLeUan 
Chairman,  Permanent  Subcommittee 
on  Investigations 
Senate  Committee  on  Government  Operations 
Washington  25,  D.C. 
Dear  Mr,  Chairman: 
I  would  like  to  call  to  your  attention  certain  correspondence 
with  Senator  McCarthy  as  your  predecessor  as  Chairman  of  the  Permanent 
Subcommittee  on  Investigations. 
During  the  hearings  on  security  of  the  Government  Printing 
Office,  Senator  McCarthy  publicly  stated  that  an  alleged  member  of 
the  Communist  Party  had  access  to  secret  data  of  the  Central 
Intelligence  Agency.    By  letter  of  22  October  1953  I  pointed  out 
to  Senator  McCarthy  that  no  CIA.  classified  material  is  printed  in 
the  main  GPO  plant.     Further,  it  was  requested  that  information 
concerning  this  Agency  or  its  personnel  developed  in  the  course  of 
investigation  be  made  available  to  me  for  thorough  inspection.    No 
reply  was  received  to  that  communication* 
During  the  closing  days  of  the  Army  hearings,  Senator  McCarthy 
made  several  references  to  alleged  Communist  infiltration  of  the 
Central  Intelligence  Agency.    On  7  July  1954  I  wrote  Senator  McCarthy 
and  requested  that  he  make  available  to  me  at  the  earliest  possible 
moment  any  unfavorable  information  bearing  on  the  loyalty  or  integrity 
of  any  employee  of  CIA.    Although  Senator  McCarthy  had  publicly  stated 
that  he  was  "disturbed  beyond  words"  by  the  allged  success  of  economists 
in  penetrating  the  CIA,  there  was  no  reply  to  this  communication. 
Copies  of  the  aforementioned  letters  are  attached  for  your 
information. 
According  to  press  report  of  15  January  1955,  Senator  McCarthy 
made  available  to  General  Mark  W.  Clark  information  on  "alleged 
communism  and  corruption  M  in  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency.    As 
you  will  note  from  the  attached  telegram  of  15  January  1955,  I 
advised  General  Clark  that  if  any  of  the  information  which  Senator 
McCarthy  had  turned  over  to  him  contains  any  "indication  of  communism 
or  corruption  in  the  CIA,  I  would  investigate  the  matter  immediately 
and  thoroughly."
I  would  IIVo  to  renew  my  request  that  the  Committee  kindly 
make  available  to  me  any  information  it  may  hare  in  its  files  or 
which  it  may  develop  in  future  investigations  which  might  reflect 
on  the  CIA  or  its  personnel*    I  would  desire  to  make  a  thorough 
investigation  of  any  such  information. 
I  would  welcome  an  opportunity  to  discuss  with  you  personally 
any  matters  respecting  the  CIA  which  you  feel  might  bear  on  the 
Committee's  work,  and  I  await  word  from  you  whether  and  when  you 
consider  such  a  conversation  would  be  desirable « 
Faithfully  yours, 
(signed) 
Allen  W.  Dulles 
Director 
Enclosures: 
2,  as  indicated  above
c 
March  7,  1955 
My  dear  Mr.  Dullest 
Reference  is  Bade  to  your  letter  of  January  21. 
After  bearing  from  you,  I  requested  that  the  files  of  this 
Subcommittee  contained  the  material  on  CIA.  be  relieved  to  determine 
the  kind  and  type  of  derogatory  information  contained  therein* 
Unfortunately,  it  was  found  that  these  files  were  not  in 
the  file  office  of  the  Investigating  Subcommittee.,  but  ware  in  the 
possession  of  the  former  Chairman,  Senator  McCarthy.  Those  files 
have  been  returned  to  the  Subcommittee  within  the  past  week  and  I 
have  instructed  that  they  be  reviewed.  Upon  the  completion  of  this 
study,  I  shall  again  be  in  touch  with  you. 
I  regret  the  delay  in  answering  your  letter,  but  I  am 
sure  that  you  understand  there  are  always  certain  delays  when  the 
Senate  reorganizes. 
With  kindest  personal  regards,  I  am 
Sincerely  yours, 
John  L.  McClellan 
Chairman 
Honorable  Allen  W.  Dulles 
Director  of  Central  Intelligence 
Central  Intelligence  Agency 
Washington  25,  D.C.
Document  removed  by  the  staff  of  the  Dwight  D.   Eisenhower  Library 
For  further   information, 
see   entry /^of   the   pink  WITHDRAWAL  SHEET    (PRESIDENTIAL  LIBRARIES) 
at   the  front   of  this    folder
THE  WHITE  HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 
The  Assistant  to  the  President 
June  13,  19SS 
MEMORANDUM  FOR 
THE  ATTORNEY  GENERAL 
Subject:   Report  of  the  Hoover  Commiaaion  Taak  Fore*  on 
Intelligence  Activities  (Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation) 
TIm  President  has  received  the  claeaified  report  of  the  Hoover  Com* 
miesion  Task  Force  on  Intelligence  Activities,  aadbae  aeked  me  to 
transmit  to  you  the  attached  portion*  thereof  relating  to  mattere  of 
interest  or  concern  to  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation* 
The  Preeldent  would  like  to  hove  a  careful  review  made  of  the  attached 
report*  and  to  receive  any  comment  deemed  appropriate  with  reepect 
to  it  within  sixty  day*.     Such  comment  should  Include  any  views  with 
reapect  to  the  discussion  in  the  report  concerning  the  Federal  Bureau 
of  Investigation. 
Taak  Force  recommendatione  relating  to  a  "watch  dog  commiaaion" 
and  to  a  apecial  commiaaion  on  communicationa  and  electronic 
reeourcee  to  be  aet  up  by  the  Preaident  are  the  eubject  of  aeparata 
action*  and  need  not  be  reported  upon  in  connection  with  the  present 
request. 
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THE  WHITE  HXruSE 
The  Assistant  to  the  Presioent 
'-'  WASHINGTON 
Ion*  13.  1935 
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MCUOHANDUM  FOR v;Ic.!;"'i  •»' 
>  ■■  vL~&~=-—  -THE  SECRETARY  OF  ST  ATE 
TO  Si£  nF-TORNEC  tO  THE  W37E  HOUSE  OWCE 
  --      Subject:  -  ■■  Report  of  the  Hoovlr 
Intelligence  Activities 
Task  Force  on 
The  President  lute  received  the  classified  report  of  the  Hoover 
Commission  Task  Force  on  Intelligence  Activities*  end  bee 
eeked  me  to  transmit  to  70a  the  attached  portions  thereof  relat- 
ing to  mattare  of  intereet  or  concern  to  the  Department  of  State. 
The  President  would  like  for  you  to  hare  a  careful  review  made 
of  the  attached  report  from  the  standpoint  of  your  Department, 
and  to  eubmit  your  views  with  respect  to  it  within  sixty  days. 
These  views  should  Include  specific  comment  on  each  of  the 
recommendations  relating  to  the  State  Department*  and  should 
indicate  those  recommendation*  which  you  consider  can  and 
should  he  adopted  (indicating  for  these  the  method  and  timing 
deemed  appropriate  for  placing  them  in  effect)}  the  statement 
should  also  indicate  any  recommendations  not  considered  appro- 
priate for  adoption*  together  with  supporting  reasons  and  comment. 
Task  Force  recommendations  relating  to  a  "watch  dog  commission" 
and  to  a  epecial  commission  on  communications  and  electronic 
resources  to  he  eet  up  by  the  President  are  the  subject  of  separate 
action*  and  need  not  be  reported  upon  in  connection  with  the  preeeat 
request.
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THE  WH I.TJE  HOUSE  V  |;- 
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.The  Assistant  to  the  President 
•She  Cteir,**..,    ^w=nic  toergy  Commlet^ 
June  13,  1955 
THECUAIEMAW 
TO  BE  *ET.,«He»  **  THE  WHIW  H^W*-^ 
t  »**»  ma,     fiubj«cti  Report  of  the  ffeovsr  Commission  Tack  Force  on 
—         Intelligence  Activities. 
The  President  has  received  the  classified  report  of  the  Hoover 
Commission  Task  Force  on.  Intelligence  Activities,  and  has  asked 
me  to  transmit  to  you  Che  attached  portion*  thereof  relating  to 
matters  of  interest  or  concern  to  the  Atomic  Energy  Commission. 
The  President  would  like  for  you  to  have  a  careful  review  made  of 
the  attached  report  from  the  standpoint  of  the  Atomic  Energy  Com- 
mission,  and  to  submit  the  views  of  the  Commission  with  respect  to 
it  within  sixty  days.      These  views  should  include  specific  comment 
on  the  recommendations  relating  to  the  Atomic  Energy  Commission, 
Indicating  the  extent  to  which  it  is  considered  these  can  and  should 
he  adopted,  together  with  the  method  and  timing  deemed  appropriate 
for  placing  them  in  effect. 
Task  Force  recommendations  relating  to  a  Mwateh  dog  commission" 
and  to  a  special  commission  on  communications  and  electronic 
resources  to  he  set  up  by  the  President  are  the  subject  of  separate 
action,  and  need  not  be  reported  upon  in  connection  with  the  present 
request. 
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THE  WHITE  HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 
The  Assistant  to  the  President 
June  tt,  1955 
MEMORANDUM  FOR 
THE  DIRECTOR  OF  CENTRAL  INTELLIGENCE 
Subject:     Report  of  the  Hoover  Commission  Task  Force  on 
Intelligence  Activities 
The  President  has  received  the  classified  report  of  the  Hoover 
Commission  Task  Force  on  Intelligence  Activities,  sad  hss 
nsksd  me  to  transmit  to  you  the  attached  portions  of  the  main 
report  relating  to  matters  of  interest  or  concern  to  the  Central 
Intelligence  Agency. 
The  President  would  like  for  yon  to  have  a  careful  review  made 
of  the  attached  report  from  the  standpoint  of  your  Agency,  and 
to  submit  your  views  wilth  respect  to  it  within  sixty  days.    These 
views  should  Include  specific  comment  on  each  of  the  recom- 
mendations relating  to  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency*  and  should 
indicate  these  reeommendations  which  you  consider  can  and  should 
he  adopted  (indicating  for  theee  the  method  and  timing  deemed 
appropriate  for  placing  them  in  effect)t  the  statement  should  also 
indicate  any  recommendations  not  considered  appropriate  for 
adoption  together  with  supporting  reasons  and  comment. 
Task  Force  recommendations  relating  to  a  "watch  dog  commission" 
and  to  a  special  commission  on  communications  and  electronic 
resources  to  be  set  up  by  the  President  are  the  subject  of  separate 
action,  and  need  not  be  reported  upon  in  connection  with  the  present 
request. 
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THE  WHITE  HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 
The  Assistant  to  the  President 
June  13.  195S 
MEMORANDUM  FOR 
THE  SECRETARY  OF  DEFENSE 
Subject:   Report  of  the  Hoover  Commission  Task  Force  on 
Intelligence  Activities  (Department  of  the  Air  Force) 
The  President  has  received  the  classified  report  of  the  Hoover  Com- 
mission Task  Force  on  Intelligence  Activities,  and  has  asked  me  to 
transmit  through  you  the  attached  portions  of  the  main  report  relating 
to  matters  of  interest  or  concern  to  the  Department  of  the  Air  Force. 
The  President  would  like  to  have  a  careful  review  made  of  the  attached 
report  from  the  standpoint  of  the  Department  of  the  Air  Force  and  to 
receive  comments  with  respect  to  the  report  within  sixty  days.    These 
comments  should  Include  specific  remarks  concerning  each  of  the 
recommendations  relating  to  the  Department  of  the  Air  Force,  and 
should  indicate  those  recommendations  which  it  is  considered  can  and 
should  he  adopted  (Indicating  for  these  the  method  and  timing  deemed 
appropriate  for  placing  them  in  effect);  the  statement  should  also  in- 
dicate any  recommendations  not  considered  appropriate  for  adoption, 
together  with  supporting  reasons  and  comment. 
Task  Force  recommendations  relating  to  a  "watch  dog  commission" 
and  to  a  special  commission  on  communications  and  electronic  resources 
to  he  set  up  by  the  President  are  the  subjsct  of  separate  action,  and 
need  not  be  reported  upon  in  connection  with  the  present  request. 
E.Q.  miZ,  ii£c.  3-23-5 
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Date.
THE  WHIT! 
WASHINGTON"  '' 
The  Assistant  to  the  Presioent 
June  13,  1955 
MEMORANDUM  FOR 
THE  SECRETARY  OF  DEFENSE 
Subject:   Report  of  the  Hoover  Commission  Task  Force  on 
Intelligence  Activities  (National  Security  Agency) 
The  President  has  received  the  classified  report  of  the  Hoover  Com. 
mission  Task  Force  on  Intelligence  Activities,  end  hee  asked  me 
to  transmit  through  you*  ee  e  matter  of  interest  or  concern  to  the 
Director  of  the  National  Security  Agency,  the  attach©*  copy  of 
Appendix  X  thereof. 
For  your  information,  a  copy  of  this  Appendix  has  been  transmitted 
to  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  with  a  request  that  a  careful 
review  be  undertaken  from  the  standpoint  of  the  USCIB  and  USCSB, 
and  that  coordinated  viewc  of  interested  departmente  be  developed 
and  submitted  within  sixty  days. 
Task  Force  recommendations  relating  to  a  "watch  dog  commission" 
and  to  a  special  commission  on  communications  end  electronic 
resources  to  be  set  up  by  the  President  are  the  subject  of  separate 
action,  and  need  not  be  reported  upon  in  connection  with  the  present 
request. 
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DECLASSIFIED 
E.Q.  12035,  Sc-c.  3-204 
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By 
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**■+>■"*'' 
THE  WHITE  HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 
The  Assistant  to  the  President 
June  IS.  1955 
MEMORANDUM  FOR 
THE  SECRETARY  OF  DEFENSE 
Subject:     Report  of  the  Hoover  Commission  Task  Force  on 
Intelligence  Activities  (Office  of  Special  Operations) 
The  President  has  received  the  classified  report  of  the  Hoover  Com* 
mission  Task  Force  on  Intelligence  Activities,  and  has  asked  me  to 
transmit  to  you  the  attached  portions  of  the  mala  report  relating  to 
matters  of  interest  or  concern  to  the  Office  of  Special  Operations, 
Department  of  Defense. 
The  President  would  like  for  you  to  have  a  careful  review  made  of 
the  attached  report  and  to  submit  your  views  with  respect  to  it  with* 
in  sixty  days.       These  views  should  include  specific  comment  on 
the  recommendations  relating  to  the  Office  of  Special  Operations, 
indicating  the  extent  to  which  these  recommendations  are  deemed 
acceptable*  and  the  intended  manner  of  placing  them  in  effect. 
Task  Force  recommendations  relating  to  a  "watch  dog  commission" 
and  to  a  special  commission  on  communications  and  electronic 
resources  to  be  set  up  by  the  President  are  the  subject  of  separate 
action,  sad  need  not  be  reported  upon  in  connection  with  the  present 
request. 
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