ry Ta inte} _ UNCLASSIFIE 0 es a ——— 5. - : . - - -. DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE 1/14) MINIMUM PERSONNEL SECURITY STANDARDS AND  2OCEDURES GOVERNING ELIGIBILITY FOR ACCESS TO SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION (Effective 14 Apri} 1986) Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, and Executive Order 12333, the following minimum personnel security standards, procedures, and continuing security programs are hereby established for ali United States Government civilian and military personnel, consultants, contractors, employees of contractors, and other individ- uals who require access co Sensitive Compartmented Information (hereinafter referred to as SCI). The standards, procedures, and programs established herein are minirnum, and the departments and agencies may establish such additional security steps as may be deemed necessary “nd appropriate to ensure that effective security is maintained. 1. Definitions a. Intelligence Carnmunity--those United States Government organizations and activi- ties identibed in Executive Order 12333 or successor orders as making up such Community. Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCY)—-is classified information concerning or derived from intelligence sources, methods, or analytical processes that is required to o be handled exc! .vely within formal access contro! systems established by the Director of Central Intelligence. c. Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community (SOICs+—for the purposes of this directive, SOICs are defined as the heads of organizations within the Intellicence Community, as defined by Executive Order 123533, or their designated representatives 2. Purpose The purpose of this directive is to enhence the security protection of SCI through the ap- plication of minimum security standards, procedures, and continuing security programs, and to facilitate the security certification process amons Government departments and avencies. 3. Applicability The provisions of this directive shall apply to all persons cther than elected officials of the United States Government, federal judges and those individuals for whem the DCI makes a specific excoption) without regara to civilian or military status, form af employment, official rank or position, er length of service 4. General a Individuals who do not meet the minimum security cotena contained herein and whe ate. therefore denied access to SCH shall not, solely for this pachsi, be ppridgred TE No t 7] XO t Th heer ce superwedes DOT LE bao ctrective 27 Nesvr ter [ond u~wet
Ua Mitel) . * “ ineligible forts access to other classified information. Individuals “whose access to SCI has been authorized as an exception ‘granted in accerdance with paragraph 6 below, shall “not, solely for .that reason, be considered eligible for access to cther classified information. Be b. The granting of access to SCI shall be controlled under the strictest applicaiion of the “need-to-know” principle, and in accordance with the personnel security standards and procedures set forth in this directive. In 2ccordance with National Security Decisicn Directive Number 84 and the DCI Security Policy Manual for SC! Contrel Systems, signature of a DCl-authorized Nondisclosure Agreement which includes a provision for prepublication review is 2 condition of access to SCI. 5. Personnel Security Standards Cuteri2 for security approval of an individual on a need-to-know basis for access to SCI a. The individual shall be stable; trustworthy; reliable: of excellent character, judgment, and discretion: and of unquestioned loyaity to the United States. b. Except where there is a compelling need, and a determination has been made by competent authority as described in paragraph 6 beluw that every reasonable assurance has been obtained that under the circumstances the security msk is negligible: ‘}) Both the individual and the members of his or her immediate family shall be U.S. citizens. For these purposes, “immediate family” ‘ncludes the indivi- dual’s spouse, parents, brothers. sisters, and children! 2) The members of the individual's immediate farnily and persens to whom he or she is bound by affection cr obligation? should neither be subiect to physical, mental, or other forms of duress by a foreign power, nor advocate the use of force or violence to overthrow the Government of the United States or the alteration of the form of Government of the United States by unconstitutional means. 6. Exceptions to Personnel Security Standards Exceptions to paragraph 5.b(1) or (2) above may be granted only by the SOIC of the ap- propriate organization or his designee uniess such authority has been specifically delegated to the head of an office or organization as set forth in interdepartmental agreements All exceptions granted will be common sense determinations based on ail available information. and shal! be recorded by the organization making the exception In those cases in which the in- dividual has lived outside of the United States for a substantial period of his or her life, a ther- ough assessment of the adequacy of the investigation in terms of fulfillment of the minimurn investigative requirements, and judicious review of the information therein, must be made tefore an exception is considered rs Investigative Requirements a The investigation conducted on an individual under consideration for acce.s to SCI will be thorough and shall be designed tu develop information as to whether the mdisvidtial clearly meets the above Personne! Security Standarus bahutees The requirement fori S citizenship an thes CUD aiveany le ta ace Jie Leading a cotial ant UNCLASSIFIED
x AE ace peranel EES 2 BS ; 2 SK x ee : < oo = <The investigation shall be: er hed through record checks Keand personal interviews —- = “of various sources by “trained investigative personnel! in ‘order. to establish affirmatively; to the adjudicating agency complete continuity | of identity to include birth, residences” education, employment, - and military service.. Where the circumstances of ‘a case™ indicate, the investigation shall exceed the basic requirements set out below to ensure - _ that these responsible for adjudicating access eligibili ty have i in their possession all the relevant facts available. ~ . The individual shall furnish a signed personal history statement, fingerprints of a quality acceptable to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and a signed release, as necessary, authorizing custodians cf police, credit, education, and medica! records, to provide record information to the investigative agency. Photographs of the individual shall also be obtained where additional! corroboration of identity is required. 8. Minimum standards for the investigation are as follows: a. Verification of date and place of birth and citizenship. d. £ Check of the subversive and criminal files of the Federal Bureau cf Investigation, including submission cf fingerprint charts, and such other national agencies as are appropriate to the individual’s background. An additional check of Immigration and Naturalization Service records shall be conducted on those members of the individual's immediate family who are United States citizens other than by birth or who are resident aliens. A check of appropriate police records covering alj areas of the individual's employment, and education in the U.S. throughout the most recent Sftecn since age eighteen, whichever is the shorter period. Verification of the individual's financial status and credit habits through ctiecks of appropriate credit institutions or, if such checks are nct productive, through interviews with knowledgeable sources covering all areas of emplsyment, residence, and educa tion in the most recent seven (7) years Interviews with neighbors in the vicinity of all tne individual's residences in excess of six (6) months throughout the most recent five (5) year period. This coveraze shall be ex- panded where the investigation suggests the existence ct some questionable behaviorai pattern. Confirmation of all employment during the past fifteen (15) years or since ave eighteen, w' ichever is the shorter period, bui in any event the most recent two (2) years Personal interviews with supervisors and cowsrkers at places of employment covering the past ten (10) years shall be accomplished Verification of graduation or attendance at ail institutions of higher learning within the past fifteen (15) years. If the individual did not attend an inst tution cf higher learning. verification of graduation or attendance at lest secondary schoo! within the past ten (1G: years Heview of appropriate military records Interviews with a sufficient number of knowledgeable sources (a minimum of three investigation) as necessary to provide continuity, to deseloped during the course u! the extent practicable, of the individual's activities and behavioral patterns over the past fifteen (15) years When employment, education, or residence has occurred in foreign countnes (except for periods of less than one year for personnel on LOS Government aciznment and les Cc -y Cy i > re) wn a fal ©
L. teen, 2 ‘check of the records wil] be made at ‘the Department cf State and jor other ap- = propriate agencies. Efforts shall be made to develop scurces, generaily in the United ~ States, who knew the individual overseas in order to cover significant employment education or residence and te attempt to determine if any lasting foreign contacts‘or < connections were established during this period. However, in all cases where an. individual has worked er lived outside of the U.S. continuously for ever one year, the in. estigation will be expanded to cover fully this period in his er her life through the use .* such investigative assets and checks of record sources as may be available tc the U.S. <- wernment in the foreign countries: in which the individual resided. When :) ¢ individual has immediate family members or other persons to whom the in- dividual i: beund by affection or obligation in any of the situations described in subparagraz 1 5.b.(2) above, the investigation will include an interview of the individual by trained security, investigative, or counterintelligence personnel te ascertain the facts as they may rela‘e to the individual's access eligibility. In all cases, the individual's spouse or echabitant sha!) at a minimum be checked through the subversive and crimina! files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other national agencies as appropriate. “hen conditions indicate, additionad investiga- tion sha!l be conducted on the speuse ci the individual and members of the immediate family (o: other persons to whom the individual is bound by affection or obligation) to the extent necessary {2 permi! a determination by the adjudicating ageacy that the crovisions of paragrapt 3 (Personne! Security Standards) above are met (sce Annex A). “A personal interwiew -' the © lividual may be conducted by trained security. investigative, or counter: -ellizen > personnel to ensure full investigative coverase. A personal in ntery sew will be conduc: d when necessary to resolve any signiacant adverse information anc,/or inccnsistencies | veloped during the investis: tion. In departments or agenvies with oob-ies ar tienins he use of the nelieranh fer personnel security purposes, the personal intesw.ew maonclud) a pedyyraph examination, conducted by a qualified polyzragh exemenes 3. Exceptions fo Incestigative Regucreme nt: a. te “+ exceptional ves, the SOI or his des ee ray determine thatiti necessary or ad visable in the nati onal interest fo autiy ize aceess ta SCT price to ce het th of che fully prescribed investigation note-/ in parssiag’ S above In tiis situation, such investigative checks as are irnmediately pe osiale stall + made at once and chali include a persona! interview cf the individus! by trained --curity, investigative, or countennteliyenace personne! Access in such oases chall ix strictly controled, and the fully prescribed uivestigatior, and final -vaiuation shu’ be completed at the earliest practicable mnoment. Certification ty other o:gar-cations of individuals authernzed access in cach case. shall include explic: natibeoton of the exception ecS) years which cr Where a previous invest: ‘ation hie oeen conducted within the ract substantially meets the a.ave mocumum standards, tt may serve as a bass for aranting access approval pro. der a resiew of the personnel and security Gles das not reveal substantive changes im -1e individual's secunty elisibilt, df a presious investigation does not substantially cieet the minumurm stuadards or if os mere than fee (3, years old. a current investigation shall be required but may be limited to that necessary to bring the individual's fle up to date in accordance with the investigative requiremerits set farth in paragraph S above. Should new information be Helo dunn the los aq current investization which bears uniasoral Hhy upon the individual's activities covered id by the previous investization, the current waquities Chall te expanded as necessary to develop full details of tho anformirte st
. 10. Periodic Reinscutiations Z ~ eS A i nee Oa lee 9, Oe A a ae |e UNCLASSIFIED gee Sete err a. Programs shall be instituted | “requiring the ‘periodic’ ‘Teinvestigation ‘of personnel provided access to SCI. These reinvestigations shall be conducted on a five (5) year re- current ‘basis, but on 2 more frequent basis where the individual has shown some questionable behavioral pattern, his or her activities are otherwise suspect, ¢ or when deemed necessary by the SOIC concerned. te ts b. The scope of reinvestigations shal! be determined by the SOIC concerned hased 6 on such considerations as the potential damage that might result from the individual's defection or willful compromise of SCI and the availability and probable effectiveness of other means to evaluate continually factors reiated to the individual's suitability for continued access. The individual shall furnish an up-to-date, signed personal history statement and signed releases as necessary. In all cases, the reinvestigation shall include. as a minimum, appropriate national agency checks, Iccal agency checks, overseas checks where appropriate, credit checks, and a persona! interview with the individual by trained investigative, security, or counterintelligence personne! when necessary to resolve significant adverse information and/or inconsistencies. When conditicens so indicate, additional investigation may be ccnducted as determined by the SOIC or his designee. 11. Qutside Activities Individuals who hold, or are being considered for, SC! access approval shall have made available to them for reading the seccnd and third paragraphs of the “Outside Activities” section of Annex A to DCID 1/14, and shail be instructed to report in writing to their securitv officer any existing or contemplated ovtside employment or activity that appears to meet the criteria of those paragraphs. Written reports must be submitted before beginning any outside employment or activity as defined in Annex A to DCID 1/14. In addition, initial or updated personal history statements must include details of outside employmer. or activities (as defined in Annex A to DCID 1/14). Investigation must cover the renorced outside employment or activities. Information concerning actual! or planned outside employment or activities that would create a potential risk to the security of SCI shall be evaluated in accordance with the faciors specited in Annex A to determine whether the circumstances create an unaccepiable tisk of unauthorized disclosure. 12. Determination of Access Eligibility The evaluation of the information developed by investigation on 2n individual's loyalty and suitability shail be accomplished under the cognizance of the SOIC concerned by analysts of broad knowledge, good judgment, and wide experience in personnel security and/or counterintelligence. When al! other information developed on an individual is favorabie, a minor investigative requirement which Las not been met shouid not preclude favorable adjudication In all evaluations the protection of the national interest is paramount. Any doubt concerning personnel having access to SCI should be resolved in favor of the national security and the access should be denied or revoked The ultimate determination of wether the granting of access is clearly consistent with the interest of national security shall be an overall commen sense determination based on all available information 13. Appeals Procedures Annex B prescribes common appeals procedures to be followed when an individual's SCI access has been denied or revoked. I4. Continuing Security Programs a In order to facihtate attainment of the highest standard of personnel security and to augment both the aeeess approval criteria and the investigative requirements ectab- UNCLASSIFIED gag wy bc W145 -
,UNCLASSIFIED - cto i Se een tee ae PES TET : security programs for all individuals having access to SCL In eddition to security = we oe indoctrinations (see . Annex | ‘C, “Minimum Standards for SCI Security Awareness . ~ Programs in the U.S. Intelligence Community”), these programs shall be tailored to = =e create mutually supporting procedures under which no issue will escape notice or be ~ a left unresolved which brings into question an individual's loyalty and integrity or a suggests the possibility of his or her being subject to undue influence or duress through - fcreign relationships or exploitable personal conduct. When an individual is assigned to perform sensitive work requiring access to SCI, the SOIC for the department, egency, or Government program to which the individual is assigned shall assume security supervision of that individual throughout the period of his or her assignment. b. The continuing security programs shall include the following. (1) Individuals are required to inform the department or agency which granted their SCI access about any personal problem or situation which may have a possible bearing on their eligibility for continued access te SCI and to seek appropriate guidance and assistance. Security counseling should be made available. This counseiing should be conducted by individuals having extensive backsround and experience regarding the nature and special vulnerabilities of the particular type of compartmented information involved. (2) SCI security education programs of the member departments and agencies shall be established and maintained pursuant to the requirements of Annex C. (3) Security supervisory programs shal! be established and maintained to ensure that supervisory personnel recognize and discharge their special responsibility to safeguard SCI, including the need to assess continued eligibility for SCI access. These programs shall provide practical guidance on indicators which may signal matte.s of security concern. Specific instructions concerning reporting procedures shall be disseminated to enable the appropriate authority to take timely corrective action to safeguard the security of the Uniied States as well as to provide ai] neces- cary help to the individual concemed to neutralize his or her vulnerability. Security review programs to ensure that appropriate security authorities always receive and exchange, in a timely manner, all information bearing on the security posture of persons having access to SCI. Personal history information shall be kept current. Security and related files shall be kept under continuing review. i Whenever adverse or derogatory information is discovered or inconsistencies arise which could impact upon an individual's security status, appropriate investigation shall be conducted on a timely basis. The investigation shall be of sufficient scope necessary to resolve the specific adverse or derogatory information or inconsistency in question so that a determination can be made as to whether the individual's continued utilization in activities requiring SCI is clearly consistent with the interest of the national security is. Security Violations Individuals determined to have disclosed classified information to any person not officially authorized to receive it may be considered ineligible for in:tial or continued SCI ac- cess Determination wil! be based on an evaluation cf all available information, including whether the disclosure was knowing. willful, negligent, or inadvertent A determination of ineligibility for individuals who current! hold SCI access shall result in immediate debriefing and termination of access for cause. 16. Implementetion Existing directives, regulations, agreements, and other guidance governing access to SCI as defined lierein shall be revised accordingly UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED... pees née Sigs ih dS phan} . © ANNEX A oR awe ADJUDICATION GUIDELINES PURPOSE This annex is designed to ensure that a common approach is followed by Intelligence Community departments and agencies in applying the standards of DCID 1/14. These guidelines apply to the adjudication of cases involving persons being considered for first-time access to Sensitive Compartmented Infcrmation (SCI) as well as these cases of persons being readjudicated for continued SCI access. ADJUDICATIVE PROCESS The adjudicative process entails the examination of a sufficient pericd of a person's life to make a determinaticn that the person is not now or is not likely to become an unacceptable se- curity risk later. SCI access adjudication is the careful weighing of a number of variables known as the “whole person” concept. The recency of occurrence of any adverse incident, to- gether with circumstances pertaining thereto, is central to a fair and uniform evaluation. Key factors to be considered in adjudication are the maturity and responsibility of the person at the time certain acts or violations were committed as well as any repetiticn or continuation of such conduct. Each case must be judged on its own mierits and final determination remains the re- sponsibility of the individual SOIC. Any doubt concerning personnel having access to SCI shal! be resolved in favor of the national security. The ultimate determination of whether the granting of SCI access is clearly consistent with the interests of national security shall be an overall common sense determination based on all available information. In arriving at a decision consistent with the foregoing, the adjudicator must give careful scrutiny to the following matters: a. Loyalty b. Close relatives and associates c. Sexual considerations d. Cohabitation Undesirable character traits a {. Financial irresponsibility Alcohol abuse va h. MWlegal drugs and drug abuse i. Emotional and mental disorders i. Record of law violations k Security violations 1 Involvement in outside activities Adiudicative actions concerning the foregoing items are examined in greater detail below LOYALTN DCID 1/14 establishes the categorical requirement that, to be eliynble for SCI access, an individual must be of unquestioned loyalty to the United States UNCLASSIFIED
. ms Ne Wire be~ ~* CLOSE RELATIVES AND ASSOCIATES : nag on same ae get, Seer se ek _ DOD 1 /14 requires close-examination by the SCI adjudicator ‘when ucmbers of an individual's immediate family ‘and persons to whom he/she is bound by affection or obligation are not citizens of the United States; or their loyalty or affection is to a foreign power, or they are sub-° ject to any form of duress by a foreign power, or they advocate the violent overthrow or unconstitutiona! alteration of the Government of the United States. ~— Sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of their citizenship status, may be indicative of a close relationship, whether or not it is considered intimate. The potential for adverse influence or for duress should be considered in any close or long-term relationship between the subject and another individual The adjudicator must assess carefully the degree cf actual and potential influence that such persons may exercise on the individual based on an examination of the frequency and nature of personal contact and correspondence with and the political sophistication and general maturity of the individual. A recommendation for access disapproval is appropriate if there is an indication that such rel- atives or associates are connected with any foreign intelligence service. When there is a “compelling need” for SCI access for an individual whose family member is a non-U.S. citizen and the background investigation indicates that the security risk is negligible, an exception to paragraph 5.b.(1) or (2) of DCID 1/14 may be recommended. In some circumstances, marriage of an individual holding SCI access approval could present an unacceptable security risk. Such individuals are required to fle intent-te-marry statements. It is the responsibility of the SOIC to advise the individuals of the possible security consequences. If the individual marries a non-U.S. citizen, SCI access will be suspended until the case is readjudicated unless an appropriate investigation of the spouse. as required by Paragraph 8.1. of DCID 1/14, was conducted with favorable results. In readjudicating such cases, the same judgments and criteria as are reflected in this section apply. SEXUAL CONSIDERATIONS DCID 1/14 requires that, to be eligible for SCI access, individuals must be stable, of excellent character and discretion, and not subject to undue influence or duress through exploitable persenal conduct. Sexual promiscuity, prostitution, and extramarital relations are of leg.timate concern to the SCI adjudicator where such conduct reflects a lack of judgment and discretion or when the conduct offers the potential for undue influence, duress or exploitation by a foreign intelligence service. Deviant sexual behavior can be a relevant consideration in circumstances in which it indicates flawed judgment or a personality disorder, or could result in exposing the individual to direct or in- direct pressure because of susceptibility to blackmail or coercion as a result of the deviant sexual behavior. Such behavior includes, but 1s not limited to, bestiality, fetishism, exhibitionism, necrophilia, nymphomania or satyriasis, masochism, sadism, pedophilia, transvestism, and voyeur- ism. Homosexual conduct is also to be considered as a factor in determining an individual's judgment, discretion, stability and susceptibility to undue influence or duress In examining cases involving sexual conduct of security signifcance, such as those described above, it is relevant to consider the age of the person, the voluntariness, and the frequency of such activities, the public nature and the recency of the conduct, as well as any other circumstances which may serve to aggravate or mitigate the nature or character of the conduct A recommenda- tion for disapproval is appropriate when. in view of ail available evidence concerning the indiv:dual’s history of sexual behavicr, it appears that access to SCI could pose a risk to the national security. COHABITATION The identity of a cohabitant and the extent and nature of actual or pxential influence upon the subject should be ascertained Based upon the criteria in the section on Close Relatives UNCLASSIFIED 355 DCIo 1/14-8 . .
aot oy Bs unaceoptable tc security risk. 65) s09 2! oP ~ UNCLASSIFIED. rg hie mires “Cohabitation, per se, does. not ‘preclude SCI. access S  pproval, Other factors could affect the 2 -™ gocess determination. Cohabitation with a an alien, for example, requires the s same scrutiny 2 ‘as ee marriage to an alien. UNDESIRABLE CHARACTER TRAITS Do. It is emphasized that an individual's lifestyle is examined only in an effort to determine whether a pattern of behavior exists which indicates that granting SCI access could pose a risk to national security. In cases where allegations have been reported which reflect unfavorably on the reputation of an individual, it is incurnbent upon the SCi adjudicator to distinguish fact from opinion and to determine which negative characteristics are real and pertinent to an eva!- vation of the individual's character and which are unsubstantiated or inelevant. Relevant negative characteristics are those which, in the adjudicator's informed oginion, indicate that an individual is not willing, able, or likely to protect SCI information. The adjudicator’s personal likes or dislikes must not be permitted to affect the determination. Examples of specific concern in determining whether an individual has undesirable character traits are any substantive, creditle, derogatory comnients by associates, employers, neighbors, and other acquaintances; any litigation instituted against the individual by such persons as a result of the individual's actions; or allegations of violations of law. A recommendation for disapproval would be appropriate for an individual who cannot be relied upon to obey rules and regulations. In examining the circumstances of cases involving incidents of untruthfulness, the adjudicator must weigh all factors with particular emphasis on establishing the intent of the in- dividual. Where an individual has tried to obscure pertinent or significant facts by falsifying data, e.g., on the Persona! History Statement by either omission or false entry, such action should be weighed heavily against recommending access. Failure to disclose derogatory personal information. such as a court martial or serious crime, would appear to be intentional and, consequently, would warrant a recommendation for disapproval. FINANCIAL IRRESPONSIBILITY Financial irresponsibility represents a serious concern to the SC! adjudicator. Persons who have engagec in espionage for monetary gain demonstrate the hazard of granting SCI access to an individual with overly expensive tastes and habits or living under the pressure of serious debt. A recommendation for disapproval is appropriate when there is a pattern of financial irresponsibility and it appears that an individual has not made a conscientious effort to satisfy creditors. In such cases, the adjudicator should determine whether the individual had been no- tified about the debts and whether they were legally valid or ultimately satished. When the financial irresponsibility alone is not of such magnitude to warrant disapproval, it may aoe hate to recommendation for denial of SCI access when there is other evidence of irresponsibility ALCOHOL ABUSE The SCI adjudicator should examine any information developed relative to an individual's use of alcoholic beverages to determine the extent to which such use would adversely affeci the ability of the individual to exercise the care, judgment, and discretion necessary to pretect SCI information. The adjudicator should determine whether a pattern of impropriety exists, although cne incident caused by alcohol abuse may be of such magnitude to warrant 4 recommendation for disapproval. In determining the security impact of a person's pattern of alcohol ue. the adjudicator should consider the circumstances, amount and rate of consumption. the time and place of con- sumption. and the physiological and behavioral effect such drinking has on tre individual For UNCLASSIFIED
example. eae UP woes Rs 2g does the” individual's $ anekine’ result i in ‘absences Does the individual become talkative, abusive, or manifest other undesirable Sheeriaien? Does the individual drink until intoxicated? Has the individu! been arrested for any ects re sulting from the influence of alcohol?: = Ae oe ao In the absence of conclusive evidence, additional insight may “be ‘gvailable from appropriate medical authorities. If the individual acknowledges having an alcohol abuse . problem and is seeking help, it may be appropriate to defer access determination and monitor the individual's progress for a year or so. If, after considering the nature and sources of the information, the adjudicator determines that an individual’s drinking is not serious enough to warrant a recommendation for disapproval of SCI access, it may be appropriate to recommend approval with a warning at the time of indoctrination that future incidents of alcoho! abuse may result in SCI denial. The ad- judicator may also recommend a reinvestigation of the individual's use of alcoho! after an ap- propriate period of time has passed. ILLEGAL DRUGS AND DRUG ABUSE The SCI adjudicator should examine all allegations of an individua!’s use, transport, transfer, sale, cultivation, processing and manufacturing of hallucinogens, narcotics, drugs and other materials and chemical compounds identified and listed in the Controlled Substance Act of 1970, as amended. Consequently, an individual's involvement in any of these activities is of direct concern to the SCI adjudicator in order to determine the individual's capability to exercise the care, discretion, and judgment required to protect SCI information. The use of these substances may lead to varying degrees of physical or psychological dependence as weil as having a deleterious effect on an individual's mental state and ability to function. Persons involved in drug trafficking, ie., the commercial cultivation, processing, manufac- turing, purchase, or sale of such substances should normaily be recommenced for disapproval. In cases involving the use of drugs, the adjudicator must consider the nature of the substance used and whether the use is experimental or habitual. The frequency, recency, and circumstances surrounding said use are key elements. For example, has the individua! used “hard” drugs or hallucinogens such as heroin, cocaine, or LSD? Has the individual used drugs regularly or only on occasion? Does the individual! currently use drugs? Does the individua! regularly purchase drugs or participate merely when cffered drugs by others? Has the individuai’s behavior been affected by the use of drugs and, if so, to what exten’? Once the judgment is made that an individual! is a habitual user of any controlled substance (multiple use beyond the point of mere experimentation), a recommendation for disapproval is appropriate. Moreover, even experimental use of hard drugs or hallucinogens, such as LSD, could warrant a recommendation for disapproval EMOTIONAL AND MENTAL DISORDERS DCID 1/14 requires that persons considered for access to SCI be stable, trustworthy, reliable, and of excellent character, judgment and discretion. Emotional and cnenta} disorders which interfere with an individual's perception of reality or reliability are of serious concern to the SCI adjudicator in determining whether an individual is able or willing to protect SCI information. It is essential to obtain as much infermation as possible when an allegation has been mide in this area. If feasible. the individual sould be interviewed to obtain additional detail. Wien appropriate, government psychological and psychiatric personne! should be consulted so that psychiatric or psycholos:cal data may be properly evaluated UNCLASSIFIED
" caused by a death, i!Iness, or marital breakup), it may be ‘advisable to recommend postponing ~ Ke UMD . . i ses z Wan ion k, : If a “current Se Gtidnal “stabi are to! bee a "femporary y condition” ‘tak asd : ise final action and rechecking the situation at ry later date. This precludes a security disapproval ~:- for what may be a temporary condition 1 which, when cured, would have no security. implications. ae Military and civilian personnel who decline to take medical /psychiatric tests when so 7. ot directed by competent authority should not be recommended for SCI access. . RECORD OF LAW VIOLATIONS In determining whether an individual is stable, trustworthy, and of excellent character, judgment, and discretion as required by DCID 1/14 for access to SCI, the adjudicator must weigh carefully any record of law violations by the individual. Although a pattern of repeated minor traffic violations could be significant, the adjudicator is principally concerned with more serious criminal violations or court actions reflecting adversely upon the individual's reliability or trustworthiness. Each case involving convictions for criminal offenses must be considered from the standpoint of the nature and seriousness of the offense, the circumstances under which it occurred, how long ago it occurred, whciner it was an isclated offense or a repeated violation of the law, the offender's age at the time, social conditions which may have a bearing on the in- dividual’s actions, and any evidence of rehabilitation. Any conviction for a felony wiil normally suppert a recommendation for disapproval. If the offense was committed many years prior, the individual has shown evidence of rehabilitation, and the investigation shows no other derogatory information, an approval may be considered. A large number of minor offenses, however, could indicate irresponsibility and may support an adverse recommendation. SECURITY VIOLATIONS Most security violations are caused by carelessness or ignorance with no intention of compromising security. However, the record of an individual responsible for multiple violations should be serutinized. The individual's current attitude toward security should be confirmed with his/her supervisor. A pattern of violations may be sufficient ground for a recommendation for disapproval. Individuals responsible for unauthonzed disclosure of classified information may be denied initial or continued SCI access. OUTSIDE ACTIVITIES Involvement in non-US Government employment or activities that raise potential conflicts with an individual's responsibility to protect classified information is of security concern and must be evaluated by a security officer to determine whether the conflict ts of such a nature that SCI access should be denied or reveked. Employment that must be reported includes compensated or volunteer service with any foreizn national, with a representative of any foreign interest, or with any foreign, domestic. or internations! organization or person engaged in analysis, discussion, or publication of material on intellizence, defense, or foreign affairs ctivities that must be reported include association with nationals of Communist countries or countries hostile to the United States membership in organizations which have as members nationals of Communist countries oar countries hostile to the United States «hen the membership involves contact with those nationals, and sponsorship of the entry of aliens into the United States. Adjudicators of new SCI access evaluations shall carefully consider whether an indivi- dual’s outside ernployment or activities may pose a conflict with his er her security responsibilities that could result in his or ber disclosing classihed inforrmation to unauthorized UNCLASSIFIED
fv had, J 4 Re SEES . “e o*an- individual's willingness“ or’ ability. t to. safeguard classified Lie? woe : as: t : information shall be resoived by denying SCI access. Reports from* ‘individuals approved ‘for SCI access or from. other sources concerning outside employment or activities of security concem shall be evaluated by security officials to determine if SCI access should be continued. When an individual's outside employment or ac tivity raises doubts as to individual's willingness or ability to safeguard classified information, he or she shall be advised that continuing that employment or activity may result in withdrawal of SCI access, and be given an opportunity to discontinue. if the individual terminates the cutside employment or activity of security concern, his or her SCI access approvals) may be continued, provided that this is otherwise consistent with national security requirements UNCLASSIFIED
“ANNEX 8 APPEALS POLICY This annex establishes common appeals procedures for the denial or revocation of access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) by entities of the Intelligence Community after adjudication pursuant to the provisions of DCID 1/14. This annex is promulgated pursuant to Executive Crder 12333, Executive Order 12356 and Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947. For the purpose of this annex, all references to DCID-1/14 include the basic document and all of its annexes. Any person who has been considered for initial or continued access to SCI pursuant to the provisions of DCID 1/14 shall, to the extent provided below, be afforded an opportunity to appeal the denial or revocation of such access. This annex supersedes any and all other practices and procedures for the appeal of the denial or revocation of SCI access. This annex shal] not be construed to require the disclosure of classified information or information concerning intelligence sources and methods, nor shall it be construed to afford an opportunity to appeal prior to the actual denial or revocation of SCI access. In addition, the provisions of DCID 1/14, this annex, or any other document or provision of law shall not be construed to create a property interest of any kind in the access of any person to SCI. Further, since the de- nial or revocation of access to SCI cannot by the terms of DCID 1/14 render a person ineligible for access to other classified information solely for that reason. the denial or revocation of SCI access pursuant to the provisions of DCID 1/14 and this annex shall not be construed to create a liberty interest of any kind. APPLICABILITY This annex applies to all United States Government civilian and military personnel, as wel! as any cther individuals, including contractors and employees of contractors, who are considered for initial or continued access to SCI. This annex does not apply to decisions regarding employment and shall not be construed to affect or impair Public Law $5-299 or the authority of any entity to effect applicant or personnel actions pursvant to Public Law $5-290, Puoiic Law 86-36, cr other applicable law. SCI ACCESS DETERMINATION AUTHORITY Adjudications for access to SCI shall be made in accordance with DCID 1/14 by a Determination Authonty designated by the Senier Official of the Intellizence Community (SOIC) of each entity. Access to SCI shall be denied or revoked whenever it is determined that 2 person does not meet the security standards provided for in DCID 1/14 PROCEDURES 1. Persons shall be: a. notified of the denial or revocation of SCI access, b notified that they may request to be provided the reasons for such denial or revocation; and/or c. afforded an cpportunity to appeal, wherever the Determination Authority of any entity, in the exercise of his or her discretion, deems such action in any given case to be clearly conastent with the interests of the national SECUTIEV UNCLASSIFIED
fe paragraph 1> ‘ebove may, within 45 days of the date on whick such person is notified of the rea- _ sons for denial or revocation of SCI access, submit a written appeal of that denial or revocation to the Determination Authority. The written material submitted for consideration may include oo a2" u ak : xe ews Fone . anaes r. : a . . ‘2. SAny person whois is given notification ‘and ‘afforded i an SS oportunlity to SSpeal ¢ pursuant to’ 3 THES any information which the person believes will assist the Determination Authority in reviewing . - a thecase. .- lo. 3. After a further review of the case | in the light of the written appeal the persen will be notified of the decision of the Determination Authority. 4. If the Determination Authority reaffirms a denial or revocation of access, the person may, within 30 days of the date on which such person is notified of the Determination Authority’s reatfirmation, request a final review of the case. In that event, the SOIC, or his or her designee, shall personally review the case and exercise his or her discretion pursuant to the provisions of DCID 1/14, and shal] inform the person of his or her decision. which shall be f- na! and unreviewable. UNCLASSIFIED
she AN fae rity ANNEX C MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR SCI SECURITY AWARENESS PROGRAMS IN THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY — Minimum standards are hereby established for the SCI security education programs designed to enhance the security awareness of U.S. Government civilian and military personnel and private contractors working in the U.S. Intelligence Community. Compliance with these standards is required for all departments/agencies within the Intelligence Com.aunity. Existing security awareness programs shall be modified to conform with these standards Departments/agencies will establish a documented program to ensure that training has been presented to all personnel. All individuals nominated for er holding SCI access approval shall be notified initially and annually thereafter of their responsibility to report to their cognizant security officers any outside employment or activities (described in DCID 1/14, Annex A) that could confict with their duty to protect classified information from unauthorized disclosure. Any other outside employment or activities which could create real or apparent conflicts with their responsibility to protect classified information alsc must be reported. Individuals granted SCI access approvals shall be advised: « whom they may consult to determine if particular outside employment or activity might be of security concern: ° of the need to exercise security caution in their activities as members of professional, commercial, scholarly, or advocacy organizations that publish or discuss information on intellizence, defense, or foreign affairs; and ¢ of their continuing obligation to submit for revieve any planned articles, books, speeches, or public statements that contain <r purport to contain SCI or information relating to or derived from SCI, as specified by the nondisclosure agreements that are a prerequisite for access to SCI. The security awareness requirements set forth herein are divided into three phases. Phase i concerns the initial indoctrination of individuals which is nermally administered prior to ac- cess to SCI. Phase 2 concerns the continuing security awareness program required to maintain and increase security awareness throughout the period of access. Phase 3 sets forth the Gnal guidelines and instructions when access to SCI is terminated. 1. Initia! Indoctrination—As soon as practicable after being approved for access to SCI, personnel shall receive an inittal security indoctrination which shall include a. The need fcr and purpose of SCI, and the adverse effect on the national security: that could result from unauthorized disclosure. b) The intelligence mission of the department/agency to include the reasons why intelligence information 1s sensitive c. The administrative, personne}, physical and other procedural security require- ments of the department/agency and those requirements peculiar to specific duty assignments d. Individual classification management responsibilities as set forth in appropriate directives and regulations to inclade classification: declassification guidelines and marking requirements UNCLASSIFIED ae = Fee ar tet +. heated ser es “ Selle 7 wane eee Date wees :
te eget te . ee! oo UNCLASSIFIED . (bei 1/14-16 “eri acess “and “criminal: tia for Sionagh “neludin ng » harbsting or . _ + concealing persens: gathering, transmitting, or losing defense information: gathe:- wie ee 7 .°. ing or delivering defense information to aid foreign governments, photographing ATR and sketching defense installations; unauthorized disclosure of classified informa- oe fo tion (Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 792 through 795, 797 and 798), the Internal Security ~ _ . _ Act of 1950 (Title 50, U.S.C, Section 783) and, when appropriate, the Atomic : Energy Act, Sections 224 through 227). . f{. The administrative sanctions for violation or disregard of security procedures. g. A review of the techniques employed by foreign intelligence organizations in attempting to obtain naticnal security information. h. Individual security responsibilities including: (1) The prohibition against discussing SCI in 2 nonsecure area, over a nonsecure telephone, or in any other manner that permits access by unauthorized persons. ‘2) The need to determine, prior to disseminating SCI, that the prospective recipient has the proper security access approval, that the SCI is needed in rder to perform official duties, and that the recipient can properly protect the information. Administrative reporting requirements such as foreign travel, contacts with foreign nationals, attempts by unauthorized person’ to obtain national security information, physical security deficiencies, and foss or possible cempromise of SCI material. ' & or (4) Obligation to report to proper authorities any information which could reflect on the trustworthiness of an individual who has access to SCI, such as: (a) willful viclatien of security regulations, ‘b) unexplained affluence or excessive indebtedness, cc; serious unlawful acts, (d) apparent mental or emotional probiems, (e) coercion or harassment attempts, and or (f) blackmail attempts. (5) Identification of the elements in the department /agency to which matters of security interest are to be referred. 2. Periodic Awareness Enhancement—Each department /agency shall establish: a continu- ing security awareness program which will provide for frequent exposure of personnel to security awareness material. Implementation of a continuing program may include ine briefings, audio-visual presentations (e.g., video tapes, films and slide/tape programs), printed material (e.g., posters, memoranda, pamphiets, fliers), or a combination thereof ft 1s ecsential that current information and materials be utilized. Programs should be designed tu meet the particular needs of the denartment/agency. a The basic clements for this program shall include, but are not limited to, the folowing (1) The foreign intelligence threat (2) The technica! threat 23) Administrative, personnel, physical, and procedural security UNCLASSIFIED
, rye Une b | some UNCLASSIFIED _ tyeees eee . oop PEERS Seu ts : @) dividual classification management responsibility. wes ao Mae SS eet : aM . « (6) Individual security. responsibilities. (7) A review of other appropriate departiment/agency requirements wees b. Special security briefings /debriefings are: required to supplement the existing security awareness programs in the following situations: (i) When an individual is designated as a courier. (2) When an individual travels, officially or unofficially, to or through Commu- nist countries, or areas of high risk. (3) When an individual has, or anticipates, contact with representatives of Communist-controlled countries. (4) When any other situation arises for which a special briefing/debriefing is required by the department/agency. 3. Debriefing—When a department/agency has determined that access to SCI is no longer required, final instructions and guidelines wii! be provided to the individuai. As a minimum these shall include: a. A requirement that the individual read appropriate sections of Titles 18 and SQ, US. Code, and that the intent and criminal sanctions of these laws relative to espi- onage and unauthorized disclosure be clarified. . The continuing obligation, under the prepublication and other provisions of the nondisclosure agreement for SCI, never to divulge, publish, or reveal by writing, word, conduct cr otherwise, to any unauthorized persons any SCI, without the written consent of appropriate department/agency officials. . An acknowledgement that the individual will report without delay to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or the department/agency, any attempt by an unautho- rized person to solicit national security information. A declaration that the individual no longer possesses any documents or material containing SCI. A reminder of the risks associated with foreign travel and certain hazardous activities as defined in DCI Directive 1/20, Security Policy Concerning Travel and Assignment of Personnel with Access fo Sensitive Compartmented informa- tion, and department/agency reporting requirements as applicable UNCLASSIFIED