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"OF
S 
ORE 9-48 
CUBAN POLITICAL TRENDS 
SUMMARY 
The Cuban presidential elections scheduled for 1 June 1948 can have an adverse 
effect on US security interests because (a) they will influence the attitude of the Cuban 
Government toward fundamental US strategic interests, possibly with results com- 
parable to those produced by the rejection of the Panama base-sites agreement by the 
government of that country, and (b) they will determine the degree of favor or disfavor 
with which the future Cuban Government will regard basic US policies and objectives 
to be presented and implemented at future international conferences. 
Neither the 
Communists nor the proponents of extreme nationalism (Cubanidad) are likely to 
achieve, as a result of the elections, either a majority of votes or a significant numerical 
increase in popular strength. 
Political events in Cuba, however, make it apparent that 
both pre- and post-election cabals among the various contending groups and parties can 
permit the Communists and/or the Cubanidad nationalists to obtain a disproportionate 
and pervasive influence over Cuban affairs. The influence of the former would be 
exercised in the familiar directions; the ideologies and programs of the latter would 
at once be translated into official government campaigns against US “economic aggres- 
sion” and into noisy apprehension regarding the US concept of hemisphere defense and 
military cooperation. 
Strength of major groups, and possibilities from Communist or 
Cubanidad combinations, are analyzed in the body of this estimate. _ 
| 
Note: The 
in this 
is as of 15 
1948, 
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of the Navy, and the Air Force have con- 
curred in the report; the Intelligence Division, Department of the Army, had no comment; 
the dissent of the Intelligence Organization, Department of State, is published herewith as 
Enclosure 
‘TARRY Ss. 
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CUBAN POLITICAL TRENDS 
Political events in Cuba, like those in other countries situated within the area of 
- 
unquestioned US predominance —the Caribbean and the northern part of South 
America — usually do not assume the white or black, pro-US or anti-US coloration 
which is possible in countries remote from the area of US predominance or even on the 
margin of that area. 
It is, for example, almost inconceivable that one of the Caribbean 
countries should make an open anti-US alliance with an unfriendly power. 
The ques- 
tion important for US security is not whether such-and-such a country will be a constant 
friend or a declared enemy — neither of which is likely to occur — but whether cooper- 
ation will run relatively smoothly or be sabotaged by a series of acts or group of circum- 
stances each relatively unimportant in itself. 
A case in point is Panama’s rejection 
of the base-sites agreement, certainly not to be attributed solely to the personal views 
of Alfaro and Harmodio Arias, or to Panamanian resentment of long-continued military 
restrictions, or to the approaching elections that demanded a nationalistic position 
from a would-be-successful candidate, or, least of all, to any deep-seated hostility to the 
US and desire to shirk defense responsibilities. On the contrary, it was the im- 
pact — both individually and in combination — of these and other factors on a normally 
friendly majority that produced at least temporarily damaging effect on US security 
interests. 
Similarly, in Cuba the degree with which the US will encounter either 
willing cooperation or stubborn recalcitrance in any given situation will be frequently © 
determined by the influence which the numerically small anti-US groups are able to 
exercise through alliance with other, intrinsically more important forces. 
For this 
reason, the Cuban elections must be examined with a view to discovering the individual 
group and party strengths, and the likelihood of interparty alignments and “deals,” if 
the impact of the anti-US forces in Cuban national policy is to be —_— 
1. 
COMMUNIST STRENGTH. 
Communist strength in Cuba is reflected in two organizations tame connected 
with one another: the Confederation of Cuban Workers (CTC recently divided into 
Communist and non-Communist factions) and the Popular Socialist Party (PSP), 
which is the Communist party of Cuba. 
a. 
Confederation of Cuban Workers. 
Communist control of the CTC had its origins in the history of Cuban organized 
labor. 
The first truly national federation of labor unions in Cuba was the National 
Confederation of Cuban Workers (CNOC), organized in 1925, which had, as one of its 
principal organizers, 
Julio Antonio Mella, secretary of the Communist Party. 
President 
Machado rigidly repressed the CNOC, martyrized Mella by having him assassinated 
and established a rival Cuban Federation of Labor with AFL affiliations. 
The AFL 
was considered anti-negro in Cuba and this fact gave additional support to the 
CNOC, which managed to operate illicitly. 
Social upheaval that accompanied the downfall of Machado permitted the - 
CN oc, under Communist domination, to emerge from Senargrouns with enhanced pres- 
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tige and power, and its influence persisted until 1935 when Batista, the real power in 
Cuba, dissolved it and jailed many of its leaders. 
In 1939, however, Batista renounced 
his anti-Communist, anti-labor stand and permitted the formation of a new labor con- 
federation, the CTC, under the leadership of the negro Communist, Lazaro Pefia. This 
organization included many original CNOC leaders. 
Meanwhile a split had developed between Batista and the Auténticos, led by 
Grau, within the initial anti-Machado forces. 
Both sought support from the newly 
created CTC. 
The Communists in the CTC preferred a Batista alliance. 
The Autén- 
ticos sought to oust the Communists from the CTC for, once rid of Communist pro- 
Batista leaders, the CTC would then consent to cooperation with the Auténticos. 
Competition for control continued after Grau became President in 1944, 
although the anti-Communist, pro-Auténtico faction was weakened by the Communist 
Party's s participation in the Grau governing coalition. 
This persisted until 1947, when 
Grau encouraged a split in the Confederation of Cuban Workers between Communist 
and non-Communist members. 
Each elected national committees. 
The anti-Com- 
munist committee was then recognized as the solo CTC committee, leaving the Com- 
munist group without legal standing. 
Grau subsequently broke with the Communist: 
Party, causing it to leave the government coalition. 
Today anti-Communist union 
membership is greater than that of the rival Communist unions. 
The future growth 
and prestige of the anti-Communist unions will be greatly affected by the degree of 
popular support accorded the Auténtico Party in the 1948 elections. 
b. Popular Socialist Party. 
| 
Legalized as a political party by 1939 under Batista, the Cuban Communist 
| Party (the Popular Socialist Party) was accorded cabinet representation in 1943. 
Sub- 
sequent to Grau’s election it retained influence by making a political alliance with the 
Auténticos, thus escaping the consequences of having supported the losing Presidential 
candidate. 
In the registration for the forthcoming (1 June 1948) elections, PSP registered 
158,755, the smallest of any of the six Cuban national parties. 
In the election itself 
the PSP can be expected to poll nearer 200,000 votes. 
The importance of its vote, 
however, will not be derived from the number cast but for whom they are cast and the 
relative strength of the party of the winning Presidential candidate in the next Cuban 
Congress. 
A Communist candidate running alone will have no chance of election. 
The 
PSP is thus now striving for a bargain with a non-Communist candidate by which the 
Communists may obtain postelection influence in exchange for support of the non- 
| 
Communist candidate at the polls. 
The degree of adherence by a non-Communist 
President to any such pre-election bargain with the Communists will depend upon 
the need for the Communist congressional vote in order to maintain a working majority. 
2. Non-CoMMUNIST STRENGTH. 
Non-Communist strength in Cuba is derived from a substantial majority of the 
'. 514,831 unaffiliated registered voters in combination with the adherents of the five 
non-Communist political parties whose registered strength is as follows: 
TIBRARY | 
ers 
; 
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Cuban Revolutionary Party (Auténticos)...................... 793,115 
a. 
Cuban Revolutionary Party. 
| 
The Cuban Revolutionary Party (Auténticos) emerged from the struggle 
against Machado in 1933 as a loosely knit force that included not only students who 
had spearheaded the revolution but also workers opposed to Machado. 
After the 
original primary period of reaction against the Machado dictatorship its political pro- 
gram crystallized into a complex of aspirations referred to as Cubanidad, still the 
strongest and most durable influence in Cuban political life. 
Cubanidad may be sum- 
marized as ultranationalism (especially in economic affairs), greater opportunities 
for the peasants and workers, and improvement in the economic and political status 
of the masses in combination with advocacy of equal rights for negroes. 
Although President Grau San Martin has been both a symbol of Auténtico 
strength and policy, failure to formulate a schematic arrangement of party policy has 
permitted sharp divergencies to develop within Auténtico ranks. 
This has been encour- 
aged by Grau’s personal predilection for remote and philosophical attitudes. 
Party 
discipline, consequently, has been unable to cope with the original anarchist-terroristic 
elements within the party which, by now, have damaged the party’s prestige and 
authority with bombs, assassinations, and organized extortion. 
A party coterie, known as the BAGA, has evolved from the alliance of Pauline 
(Grau’s sister-in-law who lives in the palace with him), her son, her favorite, and her 
cousin by marriage, and has developed into a real political force that now seeks vigor- 
ously to capture for one of its adherents the Auténtico nomination for the Presidency. 
An open deserter from Auténtico ranks has been Senator Eddy Chibas, who led 
his following out of the party in 1947 forming a new party, the Cuban People’s Party. 
Regardless of defections and divergencies, however, the Auténticos, as the party 
in power and as the heir of the traditions of the anti-Machado revolution, remain the 
largest single party in Cuba. 
Its Presidential candidate supported by the Republican 
Party cannot be defeated at the polls except by a united effort of all major opposition 
parties plus a large proportion of the independent voters. 
b. Liberal Party. 
The Liberal Party, the oldest and second largest party in Cuba, has never recov- 
ered from former Machado associations. 
Furthermore, its traditional, conservative, 
and retrospective outlook, its lack of a popular program, and inability to attract young 
people has caused a progressive loss of adherents despite excellent precinct and provin- 
cial organization. 
Only by participation in a successful coalition against the Auténticos 
can it hope to derive power from the forthcoming 1 June elections. 
c. 
Republican Party. 
The Republican Party is a conservative, nonrevolutionary party that sep- 
arated from the Democratic Party in 1944 to support Grau’s candidacy. 
The Republi- 
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cans resented Batista’s continued influence and the coalition with the Communist Party 
that he had perfected. 
But the postelection Auténtico agreement with the Com- 
munists and the unheeded contention of the Republican leader, Alonso Pujol, that the 
Auténticos should name a Republican candidate in 1948 in reward for 1944 support, has 
driven the Republicans to serious conversations with the Liberals and Democrats with 
a view to forming an anti-Auténtico alliance. 
The final outcome of such conversations 
| 
will partially depend on whom the Auténticos nominate. 
Meanwhile, Auténticos’ choice 
of a candidate will possibly be influenced by the realization that the existing Auténtico- 
Republican alliance is essential if the opposition parties unite. 
d. Democratic Party. 
The Democratic Party is intimately identified with its principal leader — con- 
servative, young, and vigorous Raul Menocal, ex-mayor of Havana. 
Menocal actively 
champions united opposition to the Auténticos. 
Although already the Democratic 
nominee for President, he has stated his willingness to step aside in order to form 
a strong anti-Auténtico coalition. 
e. 
Cuban People’s Party. 
The Cuban People’s Party (Ortodoxos), a recent ceitua of the alliance of the 
former ABC Party and the followers of Eddy Chibas, has already developed a split that 
threatens its future. 
The ABC Party originally included many middle- and upper-class young men 
of ability and talent who organized in a cellular pattern against the Machado despotism. 
Although very effective as revolutionaries and publicists, the ABC failed to develop 
electoral strength and won cabinet representation only by successive opportune political 
- 
alliances. 
Rather than face gradual but inevitable disappearance as a political party, 
ABC joined with the colorful radio commentator and senator, Eddy Chibds, notwith- 
standing a wide disparity in basic views. For while the ABC today is comprised largely 
of experienced political opportunists, Chibas continues to broadcast his doctrine that 
no pact should be made with the “evil” opposition parties and that devotion to the 
“orthodox” principles of the 1933 revolution constitutes the proper function of the new 
party. 
Observance of these principles, according to Chibas, would abolish graft, black 
markets, monopolies, and exploitation by foreigners. 
To Chibas, the Communists are 
a perversion; to the ABC they are a blcc of votes capable of possible political utility. 
The intellectual gulf is too great to permit real cohesion. 
Schism appears imminent, 
in which some former followers of Chibas and the ABC will probably promote 
an anti- 
Auténtico coalition and Chibas will endeavor to hold his partisans together as a small 
independent party or drift back to the Auténticos at a favorable juncture. 
f. Unaffiliated Voters. 
| 
The unaffiliated voters are an invisible party of more than a half million who 
did not indicate preferences in the registration and who are a possible deciding element 
in the forthcoming elections. 
The vote of this group, uncommitted as yet, will probably 
be divided among the existing parties in proportion to the effectiveness of the election- 
time appeals of respective candidates and their political alignments. 
_ 
3. 
Factors AFFECTING ELECTIONS. 
— 
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Factors now affecting the 1 June elections are: (a) the Auténticos’ choice of a 
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candidate; (b) the possibility of an anti-Auténtico coalition; (c) adherence of the Re- 
publicans to their present Auténtico alliance; (d) position of the Communists in political 
realignments; (e) possibility of an Auténtico split with one of the two factions lining 
up with the Communists; and (f) trend of the unaffiliated vote. 
Principal present contenders for the Auténtico nomination are: Suarez Fernandez, — 
Prio Socarras, and José de San Martin, a possible compromise candidate, known to be 
favored by President Grau. 
Suarez Fernandez’ nomination might insure Communist 
support. 
Prio, the leader of Grau’s anti-Communist campaign within the CTC, could 
not gain this support. 
On the other hand, his anti-Communist record would have a 
distinct appeal to Chibés. José de San Martin, is not openly identified as either pro or 
> 
anti-Communist, although the BAGA, whose support he would need for nomination, is 
anti-Communist. 
If Sudrez Fernandez were nominated, and elected with Communist 
support, the principal unfavorable effect on US interests would be the re-establishment 
of Communist strength within the Cuban Government. 
If either of the other two 
candidates succeeds in being elected, without Communist support, the possible increase 
in “Cubanidad” nationalism might be harmful to US interests. 
The Liberals, Democrats, Republicans, and opportunists in the People’s Party have 
discussed an anti-Auténtico coalition but there is Republican reluctance to joining such 
a coalition and the other three groups remain unconvinced that Republican adherence 
is indispensable to victory. 
The Republicans, who recall the disaster of the anti-Auténtico coalition in the last 
Havana mayoralty election, will be reluctant again to join such a coalition unless 
assured of victory; the more so since they would have nothing to gain save additional 
patronage and spoils, rather than power. 
In the case of success in the elections by an 
anti-Auténtico coalition formed of a number of parties, not including the Communist, 
actual operations of the resulting government would depend on the personnel in im- 
portant posts and the extent of cooperation obtained from the different parties. 
The 
outstanding possibility as the coalition’s candidate is Nunez Portuondo, of the Liberal 
Party, an old-line political leader whose election would not be detrimental to US 
interests. 
Republican adherence to the coalition would appear to be necessary to 
success. 
Because an alliance with the Communists would now hurt any =e single party 
more than it would help, the Communists are likely to remain isolated. 
There is at 
present a possibility, however, that the Auténticos, unable to agree on a single candidate 
of their own, will split into two opposing factions, one of which will ally itself with the 
Communists. 
But if the Auténticos remain united, the isolation of the Communists 
should continue unless it becomes clear either to a united anti-Auténtico coalition, or to 
its opponents, that Communist votes could decide the election. 
Even then, loss of the 
unaffiliated votes might outweigh the gain. 
Prediction of the trend of the unaffiliated vote is at present imposalble. 
Were it to 
be distributed proportionately among individual parties or coalitions, it will have no 
significant effect. 
But since few Cubans remain indifferent to politics, sudden and 
unexpected events of the moment could have an immediate effect on the unaffiliated 
vote and make it a determining factor. 
— 
SARRY 
TRUMANCL 
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ENCLOSURE “A” 
DISSENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
It is believed that the somewhat alarming tone of'the summary is not justified 
by the main text of the report nor by the known facts of the Cuban situation. 
Although there is developing nationalism and a growing spirit of independence in 
Cuba which is tending in the long run to make it more difficult for the United States 
to deal with Cuba with regard to the interests of the United States in that country, 
there appears to be little if anything in the present political situation which indicates 
that the election of June 1948 will be critical as far as US security interests are con- 
cerned. 
It does not seem likely that the victorious party or coalition will be any less 
cooperative than the present administration. 
The Communists have been eliminated 
in the past year from the coalition supporting the present administration, and although 
it is possible that the Communists might be included in a coalition in the forthcoming 
election, they are unlikely to have more influence than they have had until recently in 
the Grau Administration. 
In any case, it appears that the strength of the Communists 
in Cuba is declining slightly rather than increasing. 
It seems unlikely that the nation- 
alistic Autenticos will be, if elected, substantially more nationalistic than they have 
been for the past four years. 
Of course any election in a foreign country in which the United States hes such 
important interests as it has in Cuba will affect in some manner the relations between 
the countries. 
If the more conservative, anti-administration forces should be success- 
ful in the June election, it is altogether possible that the United States would find it 
easier to obtain concessions or negotiate agreements with the Cuban Government. 
Summation of the facts does not appear to justify statement that United States _ 
Security interests are in jeopardy in the coming election. 
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DISSEMIN ATION NOTICE 
: 
G This copy of this publication is for the information and use of the recipient 
designated on the front cover and of individuals under the jurisdiction of the recipient’s 
office who require the information for the performance of their official duties. 
Further 
- dissemination elsewhere in the department to other offices which require the informa- 
tion for the performance of official duties may be authorized by the following: 
a. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence, for 
the Department of State 
b. Director of Intelligence, GS, USA, for the Department of the Army 
é. Chief, Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy 
_ 
d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force 
e. Director of Security and Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Com- 
mission 
f. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff 
g. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other 
Department or Agency 
2. This copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning in accordance with 
applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by 
arrangement with the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA. 
. DISTRIBUTION: 
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Papers oF 
LIBRARY 
TRUMAN 
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HARRY 
Published December 1948 
SR-39 
CUBA 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
SUMMARY 
CHAPTER I—POLITICAL SITUATION 
1. 
GENESIS oF THE PRESENT POLITICAL SYSTEM 
2. 
STRUCTURE OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT 
. 
a. 
The Executive Branch 
b. 
The Legislative Branch 
c. 
The Judicial Branch . 
d. 
Local Government 
3. 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
: 
Cuban Revolutionary Party 
Republican Party 
The Liberal Party. 
Democratic Party 
Cuban People’s Party . 
Popular Socialist Party (Communist) 
4. 
OTHER INFLUENTIAL GROUPS 
a. 
Confederation of Cuban Workers (CTC) . 
b. 
Federaci6én Estudiantil Universitaria (FEU )—University Student Fed- 
| 
eration 
. 
os 
— 
c. 
Socialist Revolutionary Movement (MSR) 
d. 
Accién Revolucionaria Guiteras (ARG) 
e. 
Other Politico-Terroristic Groups 
ae 
oP 
II 
OWA 
NNW 
a. 
The Racial Problem 
. 
b. 
Failure to Develop Rural Areas 
© 
6. 
STABILITY OF THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION 
CHAPTER II—PRESENCE OF SABOTAGE AND SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS IN CUBA 
| 
1. 
ComMMUNIST 
.. 
a 
a. 
Juan Marinello 
. 
b. 
Blas Roca 
. 
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PRESIDENT'S SECRETARY FILE 
— 
d. Fabio Grobart 
e. 
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez z 
2. 
Non-CoMMUNIST 
CHAPTER III~ECONOMIC SITUATION | 
GENESIS OF THE PRESENT ECONOMIC SYSTEM 
2. 
PRESENT EcONOMIC SITUATION 
. 
a. 
Agriculture 
b. 
Mining 
c. 
Manufacturing 
. 
d. 
Domestic Commerce 
. 
e. 
International Trade 
. 
f. 
Transportation 
. 
g. 
Public Utilities. . 
h. 
Public Finance 
. 
3. 
Economic STABILITY 
CHAPTER IV—FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
1. 
GENESIS oF THE PRESENT FOREIGN POLICIES 
2. 
OPERATION OF PRESENT FOREIGN POLICY 
CHAPTER V—MILITARY SITUATION 
1. 
GENESIS OF PRESENT MILITARY POLICIES 
2. 
STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF THE ARMED FORCES 
a. 
Army. 
‘ 
The National Police 
. 
Navy: 
3. 
War POTENTIAL . 
a. 
Manpower 
. 
b. 
Natural Resources, Finance, Industry, and Science 
. 
4. 
Mrirary INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES 
CHAPTER VI—STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING US SECURITY 
. 
CHAPTER VII—PROBABLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 
APPENDIX A—Topography and Climate 
APPENDIX B—Population Facts. 
. 
APPENDIX C—Biographical Data 
APPENDIX D—Statistical Data 
Map of Cuba 
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HARRY S, TRUMAN’ 
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HARRY S, TRUMAN 
SECRETARY FILE. 
The fundamental importance of Cuba to the US derives primarily from (1) .its 
! 
ability to fill US sugar requirements, and (2) its tactical relationship to US plans for 
| 
| 
defense of the Panama Canal and the US itself. 
Any state at. war with the US can 
a 
expect concurrently to be at war with Cuba. 
Since Cuba is physically incapable of 
protecting itself from any such potential enemy, and since the US cannot afford ade- 
, 
quate protection to the Panama Canal and its Caribbean interests without the as- 
) 
1. 
surance that Cuba is friendly, the two countries have, through the years, by treaty and 
informal relationship, closely bound themselves to one another. 
a 
The two countries are also most intimately linked by their sinus Twenty- 
eight percent of Cuba’s national income is derived from the sale of sugar to the US. 
In 1947 the US took 92 percent of Cuba’s exports and supplied that country with 84 
percent of its imports. 
Cuba’s prosperity depends almost entirely on the demand for 
, 
sugar in the world market in general and in the US in particular. 
The Cuban Government consists of a superstructure modeled principally on US 
political institutions and rests on a foundation of Roman law and procedure inherited 
from Spanish colonial times. 
At present, the Cuban Government affords the people 
: 
a relatively high degree of democracy and, aside from a certain amount of endemic 
: 
corruption, it constitutes, by Latin American standards, a relatively adequate instru- 
; 
ment for the execution of public policy. 
| 
- 
Cuba’s international position, as a result of the close ties with the US and as a 
} 
result of the basic fact that Cuba is small and weak and the US large and powerful, 
| 
is subordinate by force of circumstances to that of the US. 
It is this situation that 
i 
forms the basis of all = inherent in fundamental relationships between the 
two countries. 
Cuba’s spirit of nationalism now requires that any government in office—if it is 
i 
$2 
to survive politically—must (1) deny any inference of inferiority to the US and (2) 
; 
$2 
strive to promote its position as a sovereign and completely independent country 
within the family of nations. 
Cuba is well aware, however, of the benefits derived 
; 
from especially close ties with the US and is consequently reluctant to press its 
independence beyond the point which might jeopardize the support and benefits for 
which it must depend on the US. 
A consequent ambivalence in Cuba’s attitude toward 
the US results, which makes it the more difficult for each administration in Cuba to 
formulate its basic policy somewhere between the urge to assert sovereign rights and 
| 
the expediency of recognizing the realities of Cuba’s relationship to the US. 
Since 
the opinion which particular Cubans and individual political parties and groups adopt 
toward the problem varies, the relationship between the two countries is not constant, 
Note: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force 
have concurred in this report. 
The information herein is as of 1 September 1948. 
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but continuously subject to re-examination and reorientation according as one or the 
other of the two objectives seems more relevant. 
Cuba’s military establishment has limited potentialities and is concerned primarily 
with maintaining domestic law and order and serving as a final arbiter in matters of 
major political importance. 
Within this limited scope it is capable of performing its 
duties with relative efficiency and is a protection against extensive sabotage by Com- 
munists or other subversive groups. 
In the event of a joint US-Cuban war against 
: 
1. 
GEwesi 
the USSR, the Cuban Army would probably need little help from the US in controlling 
| 
Cuba, | 
an integrated program of sabotage by Cuba’s 150,000 Communists. 
) 
the only on 
The regime of President-elect Prio should enjoy relative stability for the next two 
nearly four 
years, and can be expected fully to support the US in its anti-Soviet policies. 
In other 
| 
the US as a 
matters, however, US-Cuban relations will probably become embroiled in a series of 
of US militi 
vexatious disputes arising from President-elect Prio’s and his associates’ desire to 
Cuba was, tc 
assert Cuba’s sovereign — rather man accept the more expedient course of deferring 
ment gave tl 
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HARRY 
S, TR 
PRESIDENT’ ‘SECRET ARY 
asoneorthe 
' 
CHAPTER | 
POLITICAL SITUATION. 
1. 
GENESIS OF THE PRESENT POLITICAL SYSTEM. 
Cuba, the last of the Spanish colonies in the New World to gain independence and 
the only one to obtain it by virtue of direct US help, became a republic in 1902. 
After 
nearly four centuries as a Spanish colony (1511-1898), Cuba was closely bound to 
the US as a result of the joint war against Spain and the subsequent four-year period 
of US military government. 
Until the abrogation of the Platt Amendment in 1934 
Cuba was, to all intents and purposes, a quasi-protectorate of the US. The Platt Amend- 
ment gave the US intervenient rights “for the preservation of Cuban independence” and 
“the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and 
individual liberty.” 
Cuba was further estopped by its terms from entering into treaties 
detrimental to its independence and from incurring foreign debts that could not be 
amortized from “normal current revenues.” 
Cuba further granted the US military 
_ bases on Cuban territory. 
The peculiar political bonds then existing between the two 
countries were further tightened by an exclusive agreement reducing tariffs on each 
others’ products 20 percent or more below standard rates. 
Between 1902 and 1933 the US intervened in Cuba three times. 
On two oc- 
casions the newly established democratic institutions were unable to function at election 
time, and on one occasion racial animosities became so aroused as to require forcible 
_ 
Tepression. 
In 1933, when the Cuban people rebelled against President Machado, the 
US offered its mediation in an effort to forestall bloody revolution. 
Nevertheless, there 
were extensive disorders until a strong leader—Sergeant Batista—emerged from the 
— 
confusion and seized control of the government, which he held until defeated in fair 
. elections by Grau San Martin in 1944. 
A significant element in the 1933 revolution was the rising tide of Cuban national- 
ism. 
The US recognized this and, as a consequence, agreed to the abrogation of the 
Platt Amendment in 1934 and thus allowed Cuba to assume a more independent role 
among the family of nations. 
Despite this technical abolition of political ties between 
Cuba and the US, the principle of special economic treatment for Cuba by the US 
continues—its latest expression being an exclusive trade agreement effective 1 January 
1948. 
The unique US-Cuban relationships since 1902 have produced important effects 
on the government of Cuba as well as on its national character and international at- 
titudes. 
The following are significant: 
a. The possibility of US intervention, prior to 1934, limited the revolutionary dis- 
orders that otherwise would have developed from inherent political rivalries and gave 
Cuba a false sense of political stability. 
b. Many Cubans developed a tendency to hold the US responsible for the welfare 
of Cuba and obligated to initiate action in order to correct unfavorable conditions. 
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HARRY S. TRUMAN 
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c. 
Alarge number of Cubans, as a result of their reaction against US domination, 
of specific exe 
- developed an exaggerated sense of nationalism which, when translated into political 
- 
vides that all 
and economic programs, has been harmful to basic Cuban as well as US interests. 
Representativ 
: 
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d. Cubans have developed an exceptional knowledge of US Government and in- 
lack of confid 
‘ 
stitutions. 
This enables Cuba, probably better than any of the other American re- 
; 
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The. 
: 
publics, to understand the US and has, as a consequence, engendered in many Cubans _ 
Ton 
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a feeling of hopelessness before the task of raising Cuban economic and political stand- 
| 
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ards to those of the US. The inferiority complex, thus induced, has produced a great 
# 
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variety of attitudes toward the Cuban Government—as well as toward the US—that 
@ 
‘Bey Serve 3. 
has resulted in a marked degree of inconsistency and conflict. 
| 
evidenced 1 
Senate who hi 
Srrucrure or THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT. 
office. 
The Si 
treaties, and a 
The Cuban Government consists of a superstructure modeled principally on US 
jm 
Officers. 
It sel 
political institutions but rests on a foundation of Roman law and procedures inherited 
| 
Vincial govern 
from Spanish colonial times. 
There have been two constitutions. 
The 1901 con- 
The fF 
stitution provided for the familiar division into executive, legislative, and judicial 
of the populat 
branches and for autonomous municipal and provincial government. 
The centralizing 
j 
term. 
A syste 
tendency inherited from Spain reduced the power of the local governments and in- 
@ 
_ 
Parties seats ir 
creased the powers of the executive beyond that of the US. 
In 1928 the Machado regime 
J: 
amended the 1901 constitution to permit a six-year presidential term instead of four. 
‘ 
After Machado’s 
fall in 1933, government was by “constitutional laws” until the adop- 
3. 
one & 
tion of the present constitution in 1940. 
® 
provincial gore 
Although this constitution maintains the Spanish tradition of a strong executive, 
j; 
Cours oe me 
reaction to the despotism of Machado led to the inclusion of a “semiparliamentary” 
} 
owe ang mee 
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cabinet appointed by the President but removable on a vote of lack of confidence by 
jj 
eanenany Ope 
either house of Congress. 
Local government remains autonomous in theory. Many 
: 
advanced social and economic concepts with national agencies for their implementa- 
| 
a Cour’ of Can: 
: 
tion are propounded in the new constitution. 
The governmental branches are: 
tyeem, howeve 
a. 
The Executive Branch. 
| 
new constitutio 
The President, who must be a native Cuban at least 35 years of age, is elected 
| 
d. 
Local ¢ 
for a single four-year term and cannot be a candidate again until eight years have 
{| 
mies nt 
elapsed since the end of his first term. 
_Nominating and electoral procedures have 
j 
right of provinc 
been complicated to an extraordinary degree in a vain effort to reduce political cor- 
: 
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ruption. 
The power of the Chief Executive greatly exceeds that of the legislature and 
faihbinis eee tne 
the judiciary, and is derived from extensive control of patronage, the right to issue 
province elects a 
decrees, the right to initiate and to veto legislation, and the power to declare states of 
trative regulatio 
national emergency in which presidential power is supreme. 
The Executive also has 
provincial const. 
the power, when government income exceeds budgeted expenditures, to disburse all 
that include bot 
excess funds without congressional approval. 
The Vice President is of no importance 
— 
| 
Althoug 
whatever except in the event of the President’s death. 
A council of ministers consisting of a prime minister and other ministers are 
appointed by the President to aid him in his executive duties. 
Some assume charge 
principles that h 
stitutional gover 
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HARRY S, TRUMAN 
HARRY § 
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into political 
interests. 
:ment and in- 
American re- 
many Cubans 
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Huced a great 
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inherited 
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judicial 
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ead of four. 
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states of 
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ortance 
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charge 
of specific executive departments; others are without portfolio. 
The constitution pro- 
vides that all ministers shall be subject to interpellation by the Senate or House of 
Representatives and may be forced to eM individually or as a body, by a vote of 
lack of confidence of either house. 
b. 
The Legislative Branch. 
The Cuban Congress, like that of the US, consists of a Senate and a 
, 
House 
of Representatives. 
There are nine senators from each of Cuba’s six provinces, and 
they serve a four-year term. 
The anti-militaristic tradition in Cuban political life 
is evidenced in a constitutional provision that declares ineligible candidates for the 
~ 
Senate who have served in the armed forces within two years of the time they seek 
office. 
The Senate, like that of the US, besides its regular legislative duties, ratifies 
treaties, and approves the nomination of chiefs of diplomatic missions and other high 
officers. 
It serves as a court in impeachment proceedings against the President or pro- 
vincial governors. 
The House of Representatives consists of 136 members; one for each 35,000 
of the population. 
Half of the members are elected every two years for a four-year 
term. 
A system of proportional representation assures the more significant minor 
parties seats in the Congress. 
c. 
The Judicial Branch. 
The administration of justice in Cuba is primarily a federal function, and 
_ 
provincial governments are denied virtually all judicial power. 
There are a Supreme 
Court and inferior federal courts, including superior provincial courts and subsidiary 
civil and criminal courts. 
The judiciary, in its methods and its philosophy, retains its 
essentially Spanish colonial character. 
The new Cuban constitution, in an effort to 
modernize the judicial process, provides for special courts of final jurisdiction, such as 
a Court of Constitutional and Social Guarantees. 
These additions to the traditional 
system, however, remain largely theoretical. 
Only the Superior Electoral Court has 
been established, and such other plans for modernization as were enunciated in the 
new constitution exist only on paper. 
d. 
Local Government. 
The national constitution expressly guarantees to the Cuban people the 
right of provincial and municipal self-government and establishes three alternative 
forms for the latter. 
The federal judiciary enjoys the right of review over local regu- 
lations and has power to remove provincial and municipal elected officers. 
Each 
province elects a governor and a provincial council; the latter enacts provincial adminis- 
trative regulations within the limits set by the national constitution. 
(There are no 
provincial constitutions.) 
Each province is divided into a number of municipalities 
that include both urban places and the surrounding countryside. 
Although the theory of the constitution—save for new social and economic 
. 
principles that have not yet been implemented by law—is respected in practice, con- 
stitutional government is not on a firm footing in Cuba. 
The Cuban people do not 
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place so high a value on observance of the law as do Anglo-Saxons. 
Furthermore, 
there is an influential group within Cuban political life that rejects authority and sub- 
' 
scribes to anarchism. 
Political bickering and graft are traditional in Cuba and con- 
) 
tinually subject to trial the constitutional life of the Republic. 
: 
Freedom of assembly, of speech, of the press, and of religion are guaranteed 
by the constitution and observed for the most part by the government. 
Freedom of ; 
: 
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assembly is curtailed on occasion by police regulations; but freedom of speech and of | 
: 
the press are enjoyed to a degree unusual in any part of the world. 
| 
The Cuban constitution in effect rejects the doctrine of laissez faire. 
The 
“inalienable” right of the individual to work is protected. 
There are also constitutional 
provisions for social security, the eight-hour day, the right of workers to organize and 
j 
strike, and the prohibition of child labor. 
The state sponsors the organization of pro- 
| 
fessional societies, membership in which is a prerequisite to the practice of nearly all | 
_ 
professions; Cuban citizenship is usually a requirement for membership. 
3. 
PoxrrrcaL PARTIES. 
Both the composition and the alignment of Cuban political parties have under- 
gone constant change since the downfall of the Machado regime in 1933. 
Division and | 
recombination continue. 
The ease with which parties may be organized under the 
- electoral code, Spanish-American personalism, and the inability of the two traditional 
| 
parties to readjust to post-Machado conditions have caused the development of a multi- 
party situation. 
At the present time, it is possible to identify six national political 
a. 
Cuban Revolutionary Party (Auténticos). 
As the major political support of the Grau (and the forthcoming Prio) ad- } 
ministration, the Auténticos regard a program of economic nationalism and social re- | 
form popularly known as Cubanidad as the embodiment of their guiding principles. 
@ 
Born of the struggle to overthrow Machado, this party emerged from the revolution 
| 
as a loosely knit combination of semi-independent groups of students and workers. 
| 
Some were anarchist-terrorists who masked criminal activities by avowed allegiance to 
popular, anti-Machado political and social beliefs. 
Others were idealists honestly seek- 
ing a solution of their nation’s problems. 
In the revolutionary period and after, a 
complex of nationalistic aspirations was developed. 
It was during his four-month 
term as provisional President after the fall of Machado that the Auténtico Dr. Grau 
San Martin formulated these aspirations into the program of Cubanidad. 
As a result, 
Grau became the symbol of the new revolutionary movement and its nationalist aspira- 
tions, though minor leaders maintained control over the various sectors of which it 
was composed. 
Cubanidad, plus Grau’s personality, provided enough appeal to hold 
the party together and bring it to a triumph in the 1944 elections after a decade of 
suppression at the hands of General Batista, and was a source of popular appeal in 1948. 
Four years as the government party, however, have been more disastrous to 
| 
_ 
the Auténticos than ten years in opposition. 
Rivalries for personal advantage and for 
Papers of 
HARRY S. TRUMAN 
RESIDENT 
SECRETARY Fripp 
(
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Papers of 
-PRESIDENT'S SECRETARY FILE 
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revolution 
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Dr. Grau 
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the party’s presidential nomination have split the party into three main factions. 
Eddy Chibas, senator and popular radio commentator, at one time Grau’s spokesman, 
led a personal following out of the party in 1947 and joined with a non-Auténtico revo- 
lutionary group to form the “Cuban People’s Party.” 
Disagreement during the Au- 
téntico national convention in 1948 precipitated the withdrawal of a third of the dele- 
gates, who unsuccessfully endeavored to make a deal with various opposition groups 
and finally returned to the fold after winning concessions from the Autfentico leaders. 
The remaining group includes within itself a tightly organized patronage coterie, the 
BAGA, made up of former Minister of Education Aleman, his protector Paulina Grau 
Alsina—the Cuban “First Lady”—and her relatives and palace associates. 
The future 
of this group under the forthcoming Prio administration is in doubt. 
But whatever may be the final results of Auténtico schism and recombination, 
the ideals of Cubanidad, with its stress on nationalistic legislation designed to protect 
the Cuban masses and middle class from foreign competition and foreign interests, 
will remain to play a lasting part in Cuban politics and, because of their popular 
appeal, will no doubt be used with frequency and intensity. 
As the political party 
in power, the Auténticos are the most influential party in Cuba. 
Their leader is 
President-elect Carlos Prio Socarras. 
The party registered 793,115 votes for the 1948 
elections. 
| 
b. 
Republican Party. 
| 
This is the personal party of Vice-President-elect Alonso Pujol and other of 
his close associates who cynically trade votes for a good share of important electoral 
Offices. 
Its views on issues rather than personalities have never been formulated. 
The party was founded in 1944 by a group of dissatisfied members of the older Demo- 
cratic Party who preferred to join with the Auténticos and support Grau rather than 
continue collaboration with Batista. 
They gave as the reason for their shift Batista’s 
coalition with the Communists. 
With 284,914 members registered for the 1948 elec- 
tions, the Republicans are essentially a politically opportunistic group without distinct 
convictions. 
c. 
The Liberal Party. 
The Liberal Party, sole survivor of the pre-Machado parties, is second only 
_ 
to the Auténticos in numbers, and has a well-disciplined provincial and local organiza- 
tion. 
Its association with Machado and its traditionally conservative and retrospective 
outlook, together with its lack of a popular program that appeals to young people, cost 
it membership after 1933, but it still plays an important part in affairs and seeks to 
become dominant by obtaining the support of minor opposition parties and/or dis- 
illusioned or disgruntled followers of Cubanidad; it has been unable to accomplish this 
purpose. 
It stands for stability and sound business methods in government. 
It regis- 
tered 358,881 members for the 1948 elections and is under the command of Ricardo 
_Nufiez Portuondo, an uninspired but highly respected leader whose honesty and per- 
sonal integrity are admitted even by his political enemies who consider the Liberal 
_ 
Party the bulwark of conservatism in general and the sugar magnates in particular. 
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HARRY 5, 
Papers of TRUMAN LIBRARY 
HARRY S, TR 
PRESIDENT 
SBCRETARY FILES 
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. 
Democratic Party. 
This is a smaller political party which bases its appeal to the voters in terms : 
indistinguishable from those of the Liberal Party but which has refused to join with 
| 
the latter in a permanent coalition for historic reasons, despite the seeming logic of 
such a decision from the standpoint of identity of platform. 
Saladrigas, who was 
backed by Batista for the presidency in 1944, is a leading member as is vigorous young | 
Ratil Menocal, ex-mayor of Havana and son of a former President. 
The 193,700 
| 
registered members represent primarily business and middle-class interests and the } 
political tradition of the Menocal Conservative Party—one of the two pre-Machado 
j 
political parties. 
e. 
Cuban People’s Party. 
This party, still lacking adequate organization, was formed by Senator Eddy 
| 
Chibas when he bolted the Auténtico Party in 1947. 
It originally comprised his per- ; 
sonal following, plus several disparate groups that joined the new party for reasons 
| 
of political strategy. Chibas, despite internal differences that threatened the existence ; 
of the new group within a few weeks of its creation, refused to compromise with dis- ; 
sident factions and maintained his view that the People’s Party should not combine 
with the traditional enemies of the Auténticos but should stand for pure and uncorrup- j 
ted Cubanidad and integrity of administration. 
His surprising success in attracting 3 
votes in the 1948 campaign indicated that a large segment of the Cuban population : 
approved his position. 
Success at the polls has guaranteed Chibas’ political future, ¢ 
whether in the continuance of the People’s Party or by its reincorporation with the 
parent Auténtico Party. The People’s Party registered 165,000 voters for the 1948 
@ 
election and, although double that number actually voted for Chibas, most of the ad- # 
ditional voters were Auténticos without permanent loyalty to the new party. 
f. 
Popular Socialist Party 
(Communist). 
The Communist is the smallest Cuban party in point of numbers, but its dis- ¢ 
cipline, influence, and international connections make it important. 
The party follows 
the usual practice of making propaganda in the language of economic determinism 1 
and the class struggle on behalf of themes fashionable in Moscow. Because of large 
US investments in the Cuban sugar industry, this policy commits it to noisy appre- 
hension over the fate of the Cuban sugar workers who, it argues, endure a miserable 
existence because of the machinations of US capitalist-imperialists. 
In an effort to: 
attract national support, the Communists also propagandize in favor of national con-4 
trol of foreign investments, a merchant marine, and independence for Puerto Rico. 4 
Batista allowed the Communists to establish a legal political party in 1939 and used it. 
as a counterforce to the Auténticos, who were his consistent opposition after 1934. 
Communist control over the major labor federation (CTC) down to 1947 provided the 
Communists with an influence in Cuban affairs beyond that which their numbers 
deserved. 
The chief leaders of Cuban Communism—Blas Roca, Lazaro Pena and 
Juan Marinello—have held positions as representatives, senators, and even, on one 
occasion, a cabinet post. The Cuban system of proportional representation and favor4 
able politic 
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HARRY S. TR 
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able political alliances enabled the Communists to place a sizeable delegation in Con- 
gress in 1946 (three senators, nine representatives). 
The registration of the Com- 
munists for the 1948 elections was 158,755. 
Their actual vote in 1948 was, for the first 
time, less than the registered number of party members, and today, as a result, the 
Communists have nine representatives only, having lost their three senators and their 
favorable relations with the government parties. 
This will necessarily reduce the 
party’s influence on Cuban political life. 
4. 
OTHER INFLUENTIAL GROUPS. 
The following organizations, though not primarily political, are sufficiently in- 
fluential to merit attention in any survey of Cuban political life. 
a. 
Confederation of Cuban Workers (CTC). 
From 1925, the year of its founding, until 1947, the Cuban workers’ confed- 
eration was dominated by Communists who used it for political purposes and who are 
thus able to claim for themselves credit for many of the economic benefits the CTC 
won for the workers. 
Communist control of the confederation was contested from the 
moment it was organized by Auténticos who sought to use the organization for their 
own political purposes. 
This rivalry ultimately resulted in a split early in 1947 into 
© 
Communist and Auténtico factions, both of which maintain the use of the CTC name, 
and claim to be the legitimate representative of the workers. 
The government, how- 
ever, has recognized the Auténtico faction as the official one and thus has given it the 
advantage over its Communist rival. 
The two rival CTC factions claim a total membership of over 500,000. 
The 
component unions include such important groups as the sugar workers and long- 
shoremen. 
The strength of the organization, combined with a sympathetic attitude 
towards it by the Grau regime until the 1947 split, resulted in genuine economic gains 
for many types of workers. 
The average wage of sugar workers, for example, has more 
than doubled since 1944. 
The total wages paid in private industry increased 32 per- 
cent from 1946 to 1947. 
In general, organized labor in Cuba has been able to maintain 
or improve standards of living and real wages in the face of rising prices for consumers’ 
The success of the CTC in bringing this about has also increased its political 
influence and, regardless of any ultimate decision concerning the present split in 
the ranks of labor, the authority of unions organized on a national scale will continue 
as one of the basic realities of Cuban economic life. 
b. 
Federacién Estudiantil Universitaria (FEU)—University Student Federation. 
This highly influential group is the semi-autonomous student government or- 
ganization in Cuba and is composed of representatives from all the departments and 
delegates from each academic course of the National University. 
It maintains close 
contact with similar organizations in the secondary schools. 
The effective political 
activity of university students in the 1933 revolt and thereafter made this organiza- 
tion an important political force which, by means of demonstrations, strikes, and dis- 
orders has frequently influenced government action. 
Its leaders, unlike those of similar 
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organizations in the English-speaking world, are not only students but full-time pro- 
_ fessional organizers and politicians who, by one device or another, have won a per- 
sonal following among the highly inflammable and politically conscious student body. 
The organization reflects—and to a great degree shapes—the political thinking of the 
nation’s future professional men whose increasing measure of control over affairs begins 
while they are still in school. 
There are relatively few Communist students in the 
University, but several of the leaders of the FEU are party members, and they have 
exploited the nationalist-patriotic tendencies of the students to steer them into pro- 
grams that embarrass US interests. 
Meetings have been inspired on behalf of Puerto 
Rican independence and propaganda lines such as “Get the Americans out of Guanta- 
namo”, “Prevent US economic oppression of Cuba”, are repeated with monotonous 
frequency. These themes cannot, of course, be called exclusive Communist property, 
but they are actively supported by the Communists, and the protests they produce 
among the excitable student body are not without effect on Cuban official policy. 
c. 
Socialist Revolutionary Movement (MSR). 
- 
A unique feature of Cuban political life is the Socialist Revolutionary Move- 
ment, popularly known as the MSR. 
Although claiming five to ten thousand ad- 
herents, the MSR is in reality a far smaller organization dominated by militant anarch- 
ists and student gangsters who first won political influence by their participation in 
the violent overthrow of the Machado regime. This group has maintained its original 
organization in order to perpetuate this power. 
Organized extortion and strong-arm 
methods are frequently employed. 
The MSR is now closely associated with certain 
Auténtico leaders and aspires to be an independent political party. 
It has given a 
socialistic slant to parts of the original Cubanidad doctrine and is now waging a bitter 
attack on the Communists who are, they claim, a perversion of true Socialism, and the j 
mere agents of Russian imperialism, a development as dangerous to Cubans as US @ 
imperialism. 
Former Communists and Trotskyites are active in the MSR, but the real 
control remains among the old student gangsters who received their baptism of fire 
in the 1933 revolution. 
Its most ambitious recent project was participation in the 
much-publicized Dominican invasion attempt. 
: 
d. 
Accién Revolucionaria Guiteras (ARG). 
A revolutionary group, formed originally to oppose Batista, the ARG has be- 
; 
dhe 
come actively anti-Communist and thus able to enlist a measure of support from | 
individuals who previously looked askance at it because of its terroristic activities. 
Still largely composed of gangster elements, the ARG is endeavoring to infiltrate the 
labor unions dominated by Communists and favors the forcible liquidation of the Com- 
munist leadership of Cuba by strategic assassinations or other use of violence. 
e. 
Other Politico-Terroristic Groups. 
The “revolutionary” sanction of recent years has permitted groups of men who 
in other countries would be regarded purely as brigands to carry on their illegal ac- 
| 
tivities without interference so long as they propagandize in behalf of their political 
ren 
4°) 
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ir 
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—
HARRY 
S, TR 
HARRY 5 
a 
apers of 
LIBRARY 
SECRETARY 
political 
full-time pro- 
4% 
rather than their personal criminal intent. 
Among these is the MSR’s rival the UIR 
sve Won @ per-. 
§ 
(Insurrectionary Union), also originally a student group which vies for advantage with 
s student body. 
the MSR by means of assassinations and machine-gunning. 
Ideology is but the cloak 
‘ainking of the 
for the desire for gain on the part of its leaders, who measure their success in terms 
>. affairs begins 
of either the number of political sinecures they obtain or their return from protected 
-udents in the 
rackets and extortion. 
Even such ostensibly plausible groups as the “Anti-Communist 
ond they have 
League” are basically this type of organization and have on occasion imitated the 
‘xem into pro- 
#§ 
strong-arm and predatory tactics of their better-known rivals. 
--alf of Puerto 
§ 
cut of Guanta- 
} 
5. 
CURRENT ISSUES. 
| 
.. monotonous § 
Cuba’s postwar prosperity has precluded the development of serious economic 
. ist property, 
; 
issues. 
Scarcities, high prices, black-market operations, a general decline in the effi- 
they produce 
ciency and dependability of labor, coupled with extravagant wage demands by some 
<1 policy. 
™ 
unions, have been a source of controversy and partisanship, but the unparalleled in- 
e 
f™ 
crease in national income has been distributed to all sectors of the population well 
| 
enough to make it possible for the effects of these conditions to be absorbed without 
onary Move- 
overwhelming difficulty. 
Political pressure, therefore, from dissident elements has 
‘housand ad- 
been slight. 
tant anaren- 
§ 
Issues stated in the 1948 election campaign were superficial and ephemeral. 
The 
: ‘cipation in 
G% rapid shift in political alignments with little reference to ideology made it impossible 
ee. its original 
i 
for basic issues to emerge. 
The Auténtico administration, now in power, was under 
ee strong-arm 
im © 
attack for its more obvious shortcomings, and intuitive popular disappointment in a 
: vith certain 
/ government from which so much was expected and so little accomplished, led to cynical 
ana given & # 
appraisal of all campaigners who spoke in terms of progress and reform. 
Because of 
sing a bitter 
@™ 
the lawlessness and disorder that the Grau government permitted, opposition to the 
} sm, andthe 
#% 
government spread from those who originally for one reason or another opposed it 
a US 
; 
to a large number of the middle and lower classes from which it once drew its greatest 
aut the real 
support. 
Instead of capitalizing on these defections, however, the opposition parties 
‘ism of fire i 
were content to conceal their lack of a stated program with oratorical bows to the 
‘ion in the 
#3 
precepts of Cubanidad. 
Only the Liberals, since for them it would have been manifestly 
| 
: 
absurd, sought to avoid the well-worn phrases of “progressive”, “revolutionary”, and 
« 
| | “Cuba for the Cubans.” Consequently, they hoped to gain the most from votes of 
= 
protest agairist Cubanidad. 
| 2G has be- 
9m 
Several basic issues are connected with the economic and political relations that 
| °port from 
#@% 
exist between Cuba and the US and will be discussed in Chapter IV, Foreign Affairs. 
j 
- activities. 
Ji 
Other problems implicit in the situation did not become open issues in the 1948 
| ‘itrate the 
§ 
elections. 
These are: 
the Com- 
| 
tae 
a. 
The Racial Problem. 
| 
| 
: 
The percentage of colored population of Cuba is from 25.6 percent (Cuban 
census 1943) to 50 percent, depending on the source reporting and the criteria used. 
bia idle 
Although surface aspects of racial discrimination are much fewer than those observed 
‘egal ac- 
. In the US, complete harmony does not exist. 
Colored people are endeavoring to obtain 
@ more equitable share of all jobs, especially governmental. 
Commercial and public 
— 
i 
. 
i 
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; 
HARRY 5. 
Papers of TRUMAN’ LIB 
! 
TRUMAN 
PRESIDENT 
SECRETARY FILE: 
HARRY 
S, 
- equal rights. 
The Communist Party has endeavored 
racial discrimination is prohibited by law, but the whites, especially of the middle and 
upper classes, employ various expedients and indirections designed to deny the blacks 
,.with some success, to capitalize 
on the colored people’s feeling of discrimination for the purpose of creating unrest. 
Other parties make every effort to show complete impartiality. 
Although the other 
‘parties would openly deny discrimination, the fact remains that they have never gone 
so far as the Communists in advocating measures for the advancement of the colored 
people. 
The Morua law, enacted after a negro revolt in 1912, prohibits political organi- 
zation on the basis of race, so that the various social organizations for negroes, in- 
b. 
Failure to Develop Rural Areas. 
_ 
Neglect of the country and the provincial cities by successive national govern- 
ments has created dissatisfaction among the country people, who point to heavy gov- 
ernment spending in Havana and other urban areas as evidence of discrimination 
against them. 
Although recent agitation by various provincial towns, protesting their 
neglect, appears on the surface to be merely an expression of exaggerated local pride, 
it is in fact indicative of the failure to plan governmental spending in relation to the real 
needs of the country. 
All parties recognize this around election time, but poor organ- 
ization makes the protests of the peasantry ineffective and the victorious party soon 
forgets all about agricultural improvements, rural sanitation, farm-to-market roads, 
-and many other measures that would promote the prosperity and well-being of the 
entire nation. 
The peasantry, sunk in poverty and ignorance, remains politically 
impotent and consequently unable to inject its problems onto the national political 
scene to the degree necessary to guarantee their solution. 
6. 
STABILITY OF THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION. 
The election on 1 June 1948 of the Auténtico candidate Carlos Prio Socarras and 
cluding some founded by the Communist Party, are the main channels for the drive 
; 
of the colored people to improve their relative economic and social status. 
a substantial majority of his followers to both houses of Congress will probably assure ‘ 
Cuba a stable government for the next two years. 
The popularity of the Auténtico 
candidates at the polls is believed indicative of the basic strength of their present po- 
j 
sition in Cuban political life, and it is not expected that such popularity as they now 
enjoy-will diminish within the next two years to a degree sufficient to permit individuals 
| 
or groups hostile to the regime to oust them from power by illegal means. 
In the past 
~ 
it has been believed by many that General Batista is the greatest single threat to the 
stability of an Auténtico regime, and this may still be the case. 
It is doubted, however, 
that even he, whatever may be his personal motives and ambitions, would endeavor to 
overthrow the present government by illegal means with the popular mandate that 
Auténticos received fewer votes than the total vote of the opposition, but no analyst 
of Cuban election results can avoid the basic fact that many of the opposition votes 
were in fact an endorsement of the ténets of the Auténticos even though they clearly 
implied criticism of individual Auténtico party leaders. 
General Batista has always 
f 
_ 
the Auténticos received at the polls still so fresh in people’s minds. 
Admittedly, the 3 
been to. 
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HARRY 
SECRETARY FILE 
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re middle and 
the blacks 
;. to capitalize 
eating unrest. 
‘hoh the other 
never gone 
© t the colored 
 itical organi- 
negroes, in- 
for the drive 
tonal govern- 
to heavy gov- 
uccrimination 
‘ccesting their 
local pride, 
1 to the real 
oor organ- 
is party soon 
\..rket roads, 
E 
of the 
cs politically 
onal political 
<>carras and 
ably assure 
Auténtico 
oresent po- 
38 they now 
‘ndividuals 
the past 
(eat to the 
|, however, 
ideavor to 
idate that 
“tedly, the 
tion votes 
ey clearly 
48 always 
og 
ad 
analyst 
been too much the opponent of the Auféntico party program to derive direct benefit 
from such sentiments. 
In 1950, the Auténticos will be faced with a congressional election at which they 
will seek popular endorsement of their conduct of Cuban affairs. 
At such a time Cuba 
may be faced with serious economic problems resulting from a decline in the price 
of sugar. 
If the Awténticos have failed to meet such problems boldly and if, as many 
people believe, they also will have been guilty of gross dishonesty and corruption, it is 
possible that they may receive a sufficient setback at the polls to endanger their control 
of the executive branch of the government. 
For under such conditions many of the 
elements now unwilling to risk the penalties of frustrated subversive action against 
them may well come to feel that, either individually or by combined action, the pos- 
sibilities of success are too great to forego the gambit especially since, under such con- 
ditions, the Auténticos could not count on continued army support. 
Such opposition could develop from the following elements in Cuban political life: 
1. The conservative forces including General Batista and his personal following 
in the army. 
2. The Communists. 
3. Certain of the dissident extreme nationalists alienated from the Auténticos by 
their corruption. 
| 
HARR* 
TRUMAN LIB 
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CHAPTER II 
PRESENCE OF SABOTAGE AND SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS IN CUBA 
1. 
COMMUNIST. 
Because of its wealth, size, and power, Cuban Communism (cf. Chapter I, pages 
6, 7) constitutes the most significant sabotage threat in Cuba to facilities vital to the | 
US in case of war with the USSR. 
Most important of these facilities are the means of 
production and shipping of sugar, the US naval base at Guantanamo and military 
bases in Cuba that would be made available to the US in the event of war, and chro- 
mite, nickel and manganese mines. 
Vital for effective operation of the foregoing are } 
the highways, railways, bridges, ports, and installations for the supply of fuel, water, 
food, and power. 
For sabotage activities in Cuba, the USSR will count on the various Cuban Com- : 
munist organizations now in Cuba. 
Besides the Communist Party (Partido Socialista ¢ 
Popular) with its official registration of 158,755 members, there are the Communist- 
dominated labor unions (200,000 members), as well as various “front organizations” 
that support USSR-inspired or -directed activities. 
In July 1947 the Executive Com- § 
mittee of the Communist Party is reliably reported to have resolved to take action 
in favor of Russia in the event of armed conflict between that country and the US. # 
Since, however, Communism in Cuba is a mass movement rather than an integrated ¢ 
and disciplined organization of selected pro-Soviet revolutionaries, it is estimated that § 
the Party itself does not expect, in the event of a US-USSR conflict, complete coopera- ¢ 
tion from its whole membership. 
Article 77 of the Communist Party statutes carefully 
@ 
The Article 4 
specifically defines “militant socialists” as those “who work regularly in the party, who @ 
actively take part in the carrying out of the tasks set out by the Assemblies and Com- 
mittees, which create propaganda for the party line, its ideals and program, and who. 
try to apply its principles in an effective manner.” 
CIA estimates, therefore, that it 
is from these “militants”, rather than from associate or ideological members that 
: 
distinguishes between “militant” and associate or intellectual Communists. 
saboteurs will be recruited. 
There is no reliable information available at present as 
to the total number of “militants” in Cuba. 
The figure 50,000 has been reported, but 
| 
CIA estimates that this is somewhat high. 
Neither is there reliable information that 4 
describes the covert organization of the militant saboteurs and the methods used to: 
correlate their activities in Cuba, one with another, and with the overt Communist: 
organizations in Cuba. 
The principal leaders of the Communist overt organizations are: 
a. 
Juan Marinello, president of the Partido Socialista Popular—poet, intellectual, | 
and a presidential candidate in 1948. 
As member of the Cuban Senate, and, for a while, 
@ 
of the Cabinet, Marinello serves as a propagandist and intellectual leader To 
called on for lectures and speeches in other Caribbean countries. 
portant 
and is t 
tion frc 
of Labc 
(See als 
d. 
USSR a 
é. 
| 
All 
out the 
in many 
Des 
CLA esti 
to resort 
over thi: 
(1) dest 
mines of 
such as s 
and CIA 
destruct: 
break of 
part, be 
prior to 
Labor, of 
port to tr 
the US ir 
would en 
Com 
contrast 
has been 
anti-Com 
and beca 
fluence o 
labor uni 
to infiltra 
: 
| 
| 
| 
| 
ment—at 
uniting lz 
| 
party whi 
}
\ PRESIDENT'S SECRETARY FILE, 
'b. 
Blas Roca, Secretary General of the Partido Socialista Popular, the most im- 
portant political official 
He has been a member of the Cuban Congress since 1940 
and is the author of a book used as a text for the indoctrination of Cuban Communists. 
_¢. 
Lézaro Pena, labor union leader who dominated the Cuban labor confedera- 
tion from 1935 to 1947. 
Pefia is vice president of the Latin American Confederation 
_ 
of Labor and is influential in labor circles in Cuba and in the Caribbean in general. 
(See also Appendix C.) 
d. Fabio Grobart, a Polish immigrant, reportedly a liaison agent between the 
USSR and Cuban Communists, assigned to Cuba to organize Cuban Communists. 
\apter I, pages 
es vital to the 
ith = eee 
e. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, director of propaganda agencies and activities. 
‘ 
~ and preg 
All of these men enjoy great influence and prestige, not only in Cuba, but through- 
-“=syegoing are 
out the Caribbean and have made their party the model and guide for Communism 
in many of the other Latin American republics. 
Despite reports listing various residents of Cuba as covert USSR sabotage leaders, 
“i fuel, water, 
‘Cuban Com- 
§ 
CIA estimates that, in the events of war with the USSR and a Communist decision 
ico Socialista: 
, 
to resort to sabotage, it is likely that none of the known leaders will have direct control 
- ommunist- 
} 
over this branch of Communist operation, and that the operation will take two forms: 
- anizations” 
(1) destruction of special facilities vital to the US—the sugar industry, Guantanamo, 
\ itive Com- 
mines of strategic or critical minerals; and (2) that made possible by control of labor 
‘ -ske action — 
such as strikes, sit-downs, and slow-downs. 
The Cuban Government at present believes, 
te od the US. 
§ 
and CIA concurs in this estimate, that Soviet agents to direct or participate in the 
ij ntegrated 
: 
destruction of special facilties vital to the US will filter into Cuba prior to the out- 
fica 
ated that 
#™™ 
reak of hostilities while over-all plans and programs for sabotage will, for the most 
i: © coopera- 
me 6 Part, be established by Cuban Communist leaders, in agreement with USSR directives, 
EX 
- carefully | 
prior to hostilities. 
The Communist-dominated Latin American Confederation of 
1 “he Article i 
Labor, of which Pefia is vice president, has already labeled sugar—Cuba’s principal ex- 
| oarty, who : 
port to the US—at the No. 2 strategic material which labor must strive to withhold from 
is and Com- 
& 
the US in the event of a US-USSR conflict. 
But who the sabotage experts will be who. 
i‘ and who 
| | 
would endeavor to withhold sugar from the US in the event of war remains unknown. 
“ce, that it 
J 
Communist ability to impair industrial activity through action of the unions, in 
: ers that 
§ 
contrast to sabotage activities designed to destroy special facilities vital to the US, 
; esent as 
has been reduced considerably since the labor movement split into Communist and 
. 
- ‘ted, but 
| 
anti-Communist factions in 1947. 
Communist labor leaders, however, are experienced; 
# 
ion oC : 
and because of the economic gains they have won for labor, they still have great in- 
used 
to 
fluence over many workers. 
Besides their direct control of a large number of the 
labor unions, the secretary of the Communist federation has instructed the members 
to infiltrate the anti-Communist unions. 
Their future influence over the labor move- 
ment will depend on their success in this infiltration and in reuniting the labor move- 
nmunist 
§ 
* 
lectual, 
ment—at least for specific strikes or other labor objectives. 
Their chances of re- 
! 
_ while, 
uniting labor have been reduced by the electoral victory of the Auténtico Party—the 
uently | 
tid which forced the ™ and strengthened the anti-Communist faction with political 
elp. 
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HARRY S, “BRUMAN 
LIE 
Papers of 
TRUMAN 
PRESIDENT 'S SECRETARY FILE 
LIBRARY 
2. 
Non-COMMUNIST. 
Sabotage agencies and possibilities in Cuba are not restricted to those under Com- 
munist control—though only these are highly significant from a, strategic standpoint. 
The terroristic organizations mentioned in Chapter I, page —, frequently resort to 
sabotage to further their political, criminal or economic purposes. 
Since 1930 many 
Cubans, as students: or revolutionists, have mastered the techniques of making and 
using bombs, burning canefields, or disrupting transportation. 
The resort to malicious 
4§ 
- 
violence is a common measure by which individuals or groups attempt to attain their § 
ends. Few months go by in Cuba without the bombing of a store or plant or the as- 
§ 
sassination of some business or political leader who has incurred the enmity of some 
} 
individual or group. 
Most of this is unimportant to the US while, as at present, the § 
majority of Cubans are sympathetic to US aims, but the propensity to violent action 
§ 
and the existence of secret groups devoted to such activities increase the sabotage po- # 
tential in the country by providing a reservoir of experienced saboteurs and can, from / 
| 
this standpoint, be dangerous to US interests. 
: 
As a protection against extensive sabotage, whether by Communists or non-Com-_ 
munists, stands the Cuban Army, which—under its present Chief of Staff General 
| 
Pérez Damera—appears able to control the situation and is increasingly aware of the 
§ 
dangers involved. 
Although General Pérez appears to be more concerned with Com- @ 
munistic activity than with the terroristic acts of peripheral members of the party in 7 
power, the increasing authority he has assumed (since late 1947) and the high morale § 
and discipline of the army are strong factors tending to contain and control the opera- 4 
tions of the various sabotage agencies existing in Cuba. 
It is estimated that once Cuba @ 
and the US are allied in a common war effort, the present Cuban Army would need very 
| 
little help from the US in controlling 
the sabotage efforts made in that country. It is also 4 3 
estimated, however, that in spite of awareness of this danger on the part of the present | 
Cuban Army command the period prior to open hostilities, though somewhat less impor- 
tant from a strategic standpoint, presents greater sabotage opportunities to subversive 
| 
agencies than the war period itself. 
| 
Cub: 
the | 
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| 
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HARRY 5. 
| 
Papers of 
| 
those under Com- 
~tategic standpoint. 
. 
equently resort to § 
| Since 1930 many 
resort to malicious 
ie enmity of some 
‘as at present, the 
to violent action 
the sabotage po- 
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| 
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iof Staff General 
; 
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| 
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| 
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's 
FILE 
CHAPTER III 
ECONOMIC SITUATION 
1. 
GENESIS OF THE PRESENT ECONOMIC SYSTEM. 
Cuba has a highly developed money economy based primarily on the production of 
raw sugar that is sold in one principal market—the US. 
The sugar industry gives direct 
employment to about a third of the working population, and sugar and other cane 
derivatives normally comprise three-fourths to four-fifths of the value of all exports. 
The US since 1938 has bought from 64 percent to 92 percent of Cuba’s sugar exports. 
Cuba's sugar industry developed rapidly after the 1903 reciprocal treaty under which 
the US granted tariff preference of 20 percent or more on all Cuban products. 
The 
highest annual sugar production prior to 1898 (in 1894) was doubled by 1912 and 
doubled again by 1920. 
This growth—disproportionate to that of other Cuban indus- 
tries—has created the pattern of monoculture that makes the Cuban national economy 
subject to the vagaries of the foreign and world sugar market and thus to conditions 
largely independent of the Cuban economy itself. 
Awareness of the risks inherent in 
this pattern of productive activity has inspired efforts in behalf of diversification 
designed to reduce the relative importance of sugar in the national economy. 
But these 
become general only when sugar is relatively cheap and the attempts to develop sec- 
ondary crops die down when sugar prices are generally profitable. 
Sugar continues to 
_ Gominate the economy of Cuba despite the fact that Cuba has enough land to accom- 
modate a wide range of other crops without detriment to the maintenance of a large 
Sugar industry. 
Whatever the outcome of these efforts, a certain amount of war-born 
mining and manufacturing activity will remain and will partially cushion the shock 
‘that will result from the world sugar glut that many believe inevitable. 
A distinguishing feature of the Cuban economy is the large proportion of properties 
either owned by or mortgaged to US interests. 
US investments increased with par- 
ticular rapidity after 1903 and especially during World War I. The 1914-1920 sugar 
boom stimulated extensive US purchases of sugar mills and large loans to finance 
expansion of the productive plant. 
This boom ended in bitter depression during the 
early 1920's. 
The resulting bankruptcies, foreclosures, forced sales, and reorganiza- 
tions increased the US share of ownership of sugar-manufacturing facilities. 
By 1934 
over 68 percent of Cuban Sugar was produced in US-owned mills. 
Prior to 1939, this 
trend alarmed Cuban nationalists and inspired consideration of protective legislation. 
Nothing was actually done, however, to reduce the extent of US control of the industry. 
The World War II sugar boom reversed the trend, and has permitted an increase in the 
percentage of the industry owned by Cubans (from 28 percent in 1939 to 45 percent in 
1346). 
Should the present boom be followed by a slump comparable to that following 
World War I, however, the accompanying bankruptcies and foreclosures by US mort- 
gage holders would probably stop the trend toward Cuban ownership. 
. 
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HARRY S. TRUMAN 
PRESIDENT 
SECRETARY FILE 
TRUMAN 
Sugar will remain “king” for some time to come in Cuba despite restrictions on 
@ 2. 
Pre 
imports by the major sugar-producing countries. 
Natural advantages plus modern } 
technology still enable Cuba to compete effectively in world markets. 
The US Sugar 4 
Act of 1948 gives Cuba the largest quotas granted any non-US producer and Cuba now 
supplies approximately 42 percent of US ordinary requirements, or about three million 
# 
tons. 
Although this is a severe cut from the 5.725 million tons sold the US in 1947, # 
_ 
the remaining portion of the 1948 bumper crop (6.7 million tons) will probably be pur- 
§ 
chased with US dollars under the Economic Cooperation Administration or otherwise. 
j 
Although Cuban modern thinking agrees with the Spanish colonial tradition in 
@ 
rejecting laissez faire and accepting the authority of the state as absolute in all fields, g 
systematic government control of the economy has been even less pronounced in Cuba ¢ 
than in the US. The 1940 Cuban constitution establishes the norms for centralized 
: 
and systematic control of economic life by government. 
To date, however, specific 
legislation has been largely limited to efforts to protect Cuban labor and capital from ¢ 
foreign competition, and business operations have been relatively free of direct govern- 
, 
ment controls and taxation. 
Instead, the major industries—sugar, tobacco, and cof- 4 
fee—have evolved a system of joint industry-government control boards that implement 
the terms of international agreements negotiated by the government on behalf of the ¢ 
producers of these commodities. 
In the case of sugar, a control board known as the 
¢ 
Cuban Institute for Stabilization of Sugar apportions production quotas among the 
_ Cuban producers, acts as agent for global sales of Cuban production, and supervises the 4 
| 
In the case of tobacco, the board 
§ 
attempts to stabilize production and farmer income by buying and storing tobacco when 4 
foreign markets decline. 
The object of the coffee board is to stimulate domestic produc- ¢ 
tion to meet domestic demand, importing and distributing foreign coffee only in the ¢ 
fixing of wage rates in relation to sugar prices. 
amount necessary to cover deficiencies of local production. 
Despite the present nature of these control boards, the acceptance by Cubans of a Mm 
legal and social philosophy that recognizes the right of the state to seize, operate, and @% 
control the means of production whenever considered necessary for the general welfare # 
represents, because at any time it can be put into practice, a constant threat to US 
commercial interests in Cuba and is a source of vexation in their activities. 
existing economic policies. 
Meanwhile, Cuban capital is not sufficiently concentrated to finance major projects, 
and Cuban disinclination to enter corporate businesses in Cuba in the role of minority: 
interests causes available Cuban capital to flow principally into local real estate or 
foreign investments. 
This 
theory of economic statism also creates difficulties for any Cuban government that 
¥ 
desires to encourage development of national resources. 
Foreign private capital is 
necessary to Cuba if its full potentialities for the production of wealth are to be realized. & 
And venture capital cannot be attracted without guarantees that would run counter to § 
As a matter of practical politics, pressure organized by ; 
proponents of Cubanidad constitutes an almost insuperable obstacle to any Cuban gov- 4 
ernment that would seek to insure a favorable climate for foreign investment capital. § 
The 
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Papers of 
HARRY S. 
PRESIDEN 
FILE 
restrictions on 
; 
; plus modern 
| 
rhe US Sugar 
21d Cuba now 
_ three million 
> US in 1947, 
be pur- 
or otherwise. 
| tradition in 
in all fields, 
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(3 
“TRUMAN LIBRARY 
TRUMAN 
2. 
PRESENT ECONOMIC SITUATION. 
The present cold-war heavy demand for sugar at high prices has made Cuba very 
prosperous. 
Total 1947 exports of all products (92 percent of which were sent to the 
US) were valued at 746.5 million dollars in contrast to imports valued at 520 million 
dollars. 
Five years of highly favorable payments balances have permitted Cuba to 
accumulate gold holdings and short-term dollar assets of 831 million dollars, which, in 
relation to Cuba’s population of approximately five million people, is an enormous 
amount. 
| 
The Cuban national debt is less than the value of gold deposits to Cuba’s account in 
the US and is considerably less than the governmental income for 1947. 
_ Forvhermare, 
the funded Cuban debt is 90 percent in Cuban hands. 
Employment is high, and wage scales have advanced in terms of purchasing power 
since 1939. 
Cuba’s terms of trade with the US appear reasonably favorable, and notable 
increases in Cuban- wealth in nearly every category have been registered since 1941. 
Individual Cubans have made substantial investments in US properties and securities. 
_ Although US investments in Cuba amount to approximately one billion dollars, this 
figure does not appear undesirably high in terms of Cuba’s present capacity to trade on 
favorable terms. 
Despite all these favorable factors, however, a scien and precipitous decline in 
_ the price of sugar would soon create severe imbalance in Cuban economic life. 
a. 
Agriculture. 
Cuba does not produce its own food because of present emphasis on sugar 
production. 
Potentialities exist for self-sufficiency except for small requirements of 
certain temperate-zone bread grains. 
About one-third of all Cuban soil is arable, but 
less than one-sixth is actually cultivated. 
Of this, 57 percent is devoted to sugar 
culture. 
Principal food staple imports in 1947 were rice, wheat, lard, and beans. 
Except for wheat, all could be produced in Cuba; but at present Cuba imports 85 percent 
of its rice requirements, and 64 percent of its bean requirements. 
Even poultry and 
eggs have been among recent imports from the US. 
Practically all lard is imported. 
By necessity, and with the efforts of US and other companies, locally produced peanut 
oil has replaced high-priced and highly regarded Spanish olive oil in the Cuban kitchen. 
While fruit and vegetable products in wide variety supply part of the local 
demand, they are usually inefficiently produced on a small scale. 
Winter tomatoes, 
pineapples, and truck produce are exported from a few intensively developed and spe- 
clalized farms. 
Some attempt has been made recently to export some produce in frozen 
form. 
| 
The principal reasons for the lack of domestic food production are the profita- 
Oleness of sugar, the Cuban preference for urban life, and the system of rural land- 
“olding. 
The sugar harvest hands—the largest single agricultural labor group— 
remain in the country only for the harvest, returning to urban centers for the rest of 
“he year. 
While most sugar mills encourage the growing of food crops, the effects of 
‘nis effort reach only the permanent mill staff. 
Tobacco and coffee growers, though 
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Papers of 
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5. T™ 
_ resident in the country, tend to | follow a similar one-crop system of farming and buy 
their food rather than grow it themselves. 
Both the Batista and Grau governments 
fixed on the basis of the 1947 price of sugar in order to prevent their falling in propor- 
- from Cuba. 
Cuba would be greatly benefited, it is claimed, were it permitted to refine ¢ 
the great bulk of its sugar production before export to the US. 
The 61 million dollars § 
worth of refined sugar that Cuba sold the US in 1946 is regarded as but a small portion #% 
staffs, both at the 
have made efforts to distribute farms to landless rural workers, but these moves have 
failed because the workers were not prepared to undertake subsistence farming. 
— 
Sugar is grown in all Cuban provinces, but half the production is in the two 
cannot be displaced 
go to the country 
cane are rigidly controlled by the sugar control board. 
Wages were tied by law on a 
sliding scale to the average market price of sugar. 
In 1948, however, wages were kept 
tion to the decline of sugar prices. 
Tax concessions were granted the mill owners to 
compensate them for the loss caused by failure to lower the wage scale. 
Sugar is grown with great ease. 
The same planting can produce from five to 
twenty successive crops and only a little cultivation is required. 
With present prices, 
and the fertility of the Cuban soil, it is a very profitable crop. 
To date income of the . 
colonos has been sufficient to maintain them as a rather stable rural middle class 
assured of the political influence necessary for the protection of their position. 
Despite the present prosperity of the Cuban sugar industry, there is resent- 
| 
ment over US determination to limit the importation of refined as opposed to raw sugar 
of what could be sold if there were not a US quota of 375,000 tons for refined sugar. 
The raising and processing of Cuban tobacco, known throughout the world § 
because of the fame of “Havana” cigars, is a moribund industry. 
There has been a | 
downward trend in its importance in relation to sugar for some time, but the present § 
depressed state of the industry is due to the shortage of dollars among the European 
nations where a large part of total production was formerly sold and to the sudden ter- 
mination of US military purchases. 
Formerly about 60 percent of production was § 
exported, and the remainder consumed locally in the form of cigars and cigarettes. 
§ 
With the large German, Dutch, and British markets now gone, the US becomes the only 
_ eastern provinces of Oriente and Camaguey, principally in the former. 
The 161 oper- { 
ating mills are large-scale enterprises, valued at from 2 to 5 million dollars each. 
The # 
average sugar central resembles a small town with adjoining houses for the permanent 
staff, barracks for the hands who are there for the harvest only, independent electric 
{ 
and water facilities, commissaries, and other services—in some cases, its own port—and § 
the mill complex with an average of 100 miles of railway trackage to the cane fields. § 
Less than a. third of total Cuban cane is grown on company land—“administration 
} 
cane”—and the balance is cultivated by colonos—growers who sell their cane to the mill } 
for the equivalent of about half the sugar product. 
This gave the colonos a gross return 
| 
of about $116 an acre in 1947 and company growers about $235 an acre. 
The Cuban 
¢ 
Government assures a definite share in the total production to the colonos, who thus 
} 
y increases in “administration cane.” 
In addition to permanent 
# 
and in the independent farms, over 500,000 transient workers § 
r the sugar harvest, which usually takes place in the first four 
¢ 
months of each year. The dates for commencing and terminating the grinding of 
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gross return @ 
The Cuban 
Tonos, who thus 
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to permanent. 
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grinding of 4 
by law on a} 
.ges were kept ; 
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of the 
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itted to refined 
Sugar. 
ut the world 
has been 
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he European4 
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aillion dollars 
small portion’ 
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'S SECRETARY FILE 
moves have 
middle class 4 
IBRARY | 
. 
important customer for Cuban tobacco. 
Spain, Canada, and Switzerland buy only 
small amounts. 
Furthermore, the cigar industry has been handicapped by the US 
tariff policy which favors the importation of unmanufactured tobacco. 
Faced with an inability to market the present tobacco crop, the stabilization 
board decreed a ceiling on 1947-48 production and administers a fund to purchase, 
store, and ultimately, it is hoped, sell excess tobacco. 
Future prospects are not good, 
though Cuba looks hopefully to ECA as a means of enabling European nations to buy 
more Cuban cigars. 
Coffee is grown in Cuba, though at greater cost than in Brazil and other Latin 
American countries. 
A protective tariff policy inaugurated in 1930 stimulated pro- 
ductiqgn. 
Though the 1947-48 crop was one of the largest on record, increased Cuban 
purchasing power caused the supply to be insufficient, and Brazilian and Dominican 
coffee was imported. 
Importation and distribution of imported coffee are controlled 
by the government to prevent competition between imported and domestic coffee. 
Production for 1947 was 589,000 bags (132.276 lbs. per bag) as compared with 381,000 in 
1946. 
| 
As a result of wartime scarcities, as well as the intermittent search for new 
industries in Cuba, efforts have been made to grow various plants as possible sources of 
fiber for cordage. 
Most successful to date has been henequen, to which 38,000 acres 
have been planted. 
Production reached a peak of over 30 million Ibs. in 1946, but 
declined slightly in 1947. 
A US cooperative fiber research project has endeavored to 
| 
develop the growing of kenaf as a material for the making of sugar bags. 
Prospects 
for commercial operation are considered good. 
Ramie and other plants have been tried 
without much success. 
| 
Bananas and plantains, though important to the domestic food supply, are of 
minor importance in Cuba’s international trade. 
Plantations for organized export 
exist in Oriente province. 
In 1947, 4.2 million bunches of bananas were exported, val- 
ued 2: $2.7 million. 
One and three-tenths million lbs. of plantains were exported also, 
valued at $26,000. 
| 
Root crops such as yuca and malanga constitute important items of the Cuban 
diet but are rarely exported in any form. 
Yuca is also an important source of commer- 
Ciai starch. 
Peanuts have become an important field crop. 
Peanut oil is now used as a 
substitute for olive oil, formerly imported. 
Cattle-growing has always provided a large share of Cuban agricultural in- 
- come, though exports are insignificant. 
Normally, the number of livestock per capita 
in Cuba is exceeded only in Australia and Argentina. 
Meat production, however, has 
barely met domestic requirements for years, leaving scant margin for export. 
Higher 
prices tor cattle in the early years of World War II stimulated export so that the total 
number of cattle in Cuba was reduced. 
This fact, plus the reluctance of growers to sell 
a. the unrealistically low ceiling prices imposed by the Cuban government, has led t¢™ ~~ 
periodic meat shortages in Havana and to the importation of $2.7 million of meat 
products in 1947. 
Cattle growers have received little technical aid or advice from their 
| 
oat 
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government. -Much could be done to improve breeds, pasturage, types of food, and 
methods of distribution. 
Dairying is also deficient and underdeveloped. 
These two 
related fields constitute one of the most promising areas for a to stabilize 
and improve the Cuban economy. 
Mining. 
| 
Mining plays a small part in Cuban economy, and its importance as an indus- 
try is derived largely from the strategic value to the US of the products exported. 
All 
production is exported. 
The total value of mineral exports in 1946 was $26.2 million, 
; 
only 5.2 percent of the value of total exports in that year. Principal minerals mined in 
j; 
1946 were nickel, manganese, copper, and chromite. 
Most Cuban mines can be economically operated only in periods of high prices : 
resulting from wars or other unusual conditions. 
Cuba became, during World War II, 
the principal Latin American producer of chromite—necessary for armor-plate produc- 
tion—and was second in Latin America in the production of manganese and nickel— ; 
also strategic metals. 
Nickel mines in Cuba were closed in March 1947 at the conclu- | 
sion of US Government purchases. 
Both manganese and chromite production declined 
in 1947, but increases in copper production, combined with high prices, held up the total 
value of mineral exports. 
Many other minerals—including gold, lead, light-gravity 
#% 
petroleum, barite, stone, salt, and asphalt—are also extracted. 
Extensive iron deposits 
percent, and 10 percent, respectively. 
Manufacturing. 
Despite increases since 1941, manufacturing in Cuba is a secondary activity, 
and employs but one-eighth of the total gainfully employed labor force. 
Aside from 
‘processing of the two major agricultural products—sugar and tobacco—significant 
manufactures include textiles, cement, boots and shoes, beer, soft drinks, dairy products, 
and canned and processed foods. 
Nearly all Cuban manufacture, save sugar and 4 
tobacco products, is for domestic consumption for which it is in most cases insufficient. 
War conditions stimulated manufactures, though some of the development seems des- 
tined to succumb to postwar competition. 
Production of textiles, including both 
rayon and cotton goods, provides a living for over 6,000 Cuban families. 
The number 
| 
of spindles—30,000—is small even by Latin American standards, but tariff protection 
has been extended, and it is possible that this industry will be able to survive postwar 
readjustments. 
Cement production from local stone increased to meet the building 
industries’ wartime demand but the arbitrary imposition of high taxes has handicapped 
operations during the past year. 
Manufactures, in general, if unsupported by special 
tariff protection, will have difficulty surviving postwar competition. 
The only type of | 
_ exist in Cuba, but they are not exploited because of their low quality and divergence { 
from the type usually processed in the US. 
The primary importance of Cuban minerals ¢ 
is their variety and their proximity to the US for emergency use in case of wartime 
interference with normal sources of supply. 
For example, of US imports of mineralsin 
} 
1939, the following percentages came from Cuba: manganese, 15 percent; chromite, 16 
; 
percent; and nickel, none. 
In 1943, the corresponding ew were 20 percent, 25 3 
for 
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HARRY 
S, 
LIBRARY 
( 
Papers of 
HARRY 
S. TRUMAN 
PRESIDENT'S SECRETARY FILE! 
| 
_ types of food, and 
j 
yeloped. These two | 
lopment to stabilize 
prtance as an indus- 
jucts exported. Al 
& was $26.2 million, 
§ 
minerals mined in 
| 
‘iods of high prices 
ring World War II, 
; 
 {rmor-plate produc- 
anese and nickel— 
1947 at the conclu- . 
)roduction declined 
_-s, held up the total 
isad, light-gravity @ 
‘nsive iron deposits @ 
‘cy and divergence | 
Cuban minerals 
case of wartime 
of minerals in ; 
‘cent; chromite, 16 
20 percent, 25 
dairy products, 
. ineluding both 
23. 
The number 
protection 
) survive postwar { 
cet the building 
handicapped 
>orted by special 
.€ only type of 
econdary activity, | 
orce. 
Aside from 
pacco—significant 
{ 
save sugar and 
insufficient. | 
pens seems des- 
manufacturing likely to continue and expand is the finishing of raw and semi-manu- 
factured materials for local consumption. 
Cuba cannot at present compete on a price 
basis in the manufacture of semi-processed goods—other than sugar and tobacco—even 
for its own domestic market. 
Despite this fact, the extent to which Cuba in the past 
has depended on imports of fully finished consumers’ goods provides a wide area for the 
profitable expansion of manufacturing activities. 
d. 
Domestic Commerce. 
One-tenth of all Cubans gainfully employed are occupied in the distributive 
trades. 
Spanish-born and their first generation descendants dominate trade and they 
are rivalled only by Chinese and more recent European immigrants. 
The Spanish 
concept of retail merchandising involves small turnover, high mark-ups, and quickness 
in capitalizing on goods shortages.. The result is an expensive system of distribution 
that lowers the real wages of the Cuban consumer. 
At the same time, shopkeeping 
has supported and enriched most of those who comprise the substantial middle class in 
Cuba who, as a result of these profits, have become the owners of most urban real 
property and investors in many other enterprises. 
Attempts to establish US distribu- — 
tion techniques would not only run counter to established patterns of buying but would 
be opposed by the middle class, which has great political power. 
Another obstacle to 
any change is the fact that labor difficulties, which are not a problem to small family- 
operated neighborhood stores, would have to be faced by large-scale enterprises. 
The 
Cuban Government has given some encouragement to consumer cooperatives among 
rural workers, but the idea has won no great success as yet. 
e. 
International Trade. 
_ As is the case with all countries that devote their major economic effort to the 
production and marketing of a single commodity, foreign trade is of paramount impor- 
tance to Cuba. 
Cuba’s exports in 1947, 90 percent of the value of which were sugar 
| 
and derivative products, amounted to nearly 40 percent of the value of gross national 
production. 
The US took 88 percent of the total Cuban sugar production and the sugar 
industry provided a living for over one-third of those gainfully employed in Cuba. 
It 
is thus clear that foreign trade in general, and sugar sales to the US in particular, con- 
stitute the most important single factor in Cuba’s economic life. 
As a corollary of this 
situation, any debate in the US Congress and any consideration given by the Executive 
— 
Branch of the US Government to the position of Cuban sugar in the US market is fol- 
lowed in the greatest detail by the Cuban Government and its citizens, whose welfare is 
dependent in such large part on decisions which the US makes regarding its imports of 
Cuban sugar. 
The US Sugar Act of 1948 is the latest in a series of attempts during the last 30 
years both by the Cuban and US governments to control and stabilize non-US and US 
_ Sugar markets. 
After World War I, sugar-consuming countries imposed restrictions 
on imports, and, as a result, Cuba’s war-expanded sugar industry could not dispose of 
its total production. 
In an effort to solve the problem of the then-existing sugar glut, 
the Cuban Government first placed limits on its production of sugar and later adjusted 
ws 
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° 
HARRY 
S, TR 
PRESIDENT! SECRET ane PILE 
this production quota to (a) the amount of sugar it could sell in the US plus (b) the § 
amount of sugar it could market in other countries in accordance with international § 2 
agreements. 
Three international sugar arrangements were tried with varying success @ U 
between 1928 and 1942, the last being the 1937 International Sugar Agreement: 
Mean- @@ 
sj 
while Cuba’s position in the US market was improved by lower tariffs and favorable 4 
quota treatment. 
World War II caused the suspension of all previous sugar quota % 
arrangements, and Cuba agreed to sell to the US its entire crop. 
This arrangement was 
§ 
repeated during six years (1942-47) ; dearest restrictions were removed, and the 
m 
CC 
total crop reached an all-time high. 
| 
| 
| 
By the 1948 Sugar Act the US prewar quota system was reimposed on Cuban = 
2! 
sugar. 
US producers—continental and non-continental—as well as the Philippines 
@y 
4% 
were given tonnage quotas greater than their previously demonstrated capacity to pro- | 
| 
is 
duce. 
At the same time, Cuba was given a quota of 28.6 percent of estimated US con- sm 
sumption, plus a share of the amount by which other areas may fail to meet their quotas. 
# 
#! 
In effect, Cuba was given permission to market larger amounts of sugar in the US if @ 
¢ 
US consumption estimates should be adjusted upward or if, as appeared likely, other#y 
™ 
producers should not fill their quotas. 
Cuba’s 1948 share of the US domestic market Mm ™' 
amounts to 2.8 million tons as compared to 5.7 million tons it sold the US in 1947. 
While a drastic readjustment might have been involved, Cuba has been able to place a fm 
P' 
total of 5.6 million tons this year by virtue of sales to the US Government for use ing 
“ 
Europe (1.3 million tons) and direct sales to other nations (1.5 million tons). 
Cubang 
el 
production in 1948, however, was greater than in 1947 so that an unsold surplus will beam 
=~ 
carried over to 1949. 
Although ECA plans call for continued heavy sugar purchases am 
from the Western Hemisphere, Cuba’s task of selling future crops may become increas- 
C 
ingly difficult unless new limitations of production are placed in effect. _ 
"(A detailed statistical study of Cuba’s foreign trade and Cuba’s sugar sales to4 
the US which constitute so important a factor in over-all Cuban economic relations will § 
be found in Appendix D.) 
a 
Transportation within Cuba is provided by air, railway, and highways. Thea 
** 
8,700 miles of Cuban railways include both common carriers and lines maintained by 
g | sh 
sugar centrales to provide connections with ports. 
The largest of 22 public-service rail-@ 
ad 
ways is the British-owned United Railways, which is in poor financial and physical@™ 
°* 
state. 
(It lost nearly six million dollars in 1946.) 
The other railways are owned by } e 
Cuban and US capitalists. 
Five of the nine largest railways showed losses for the latest g Se 
fiscal year reported. 
Bus and truck lines, making use of the central highway system, 
transport an increasing share of passengers and freight, though most of the sugar sfill | 
moves to port by rail. 
An increase in rail rates was allowed in March 1947 to apply to -” 
wy 
passengers and certain categories of freight. 
Results have not been reported yet, but @am 
standards of service and equipment on most railways in Cuba are so poor as to require@ 
. 
more extensive changes than even the higher rates will permit. 
Expansion of highway. 
a 
construction by the state, already initiated by the government, seems the only practical@ 
solution at present to Cuba’s problem of inadequate internal transportation facilities. 
~ 
\. 
TRUMAN LIBRAR 
Papers of 
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HARRY 5 
zs of 
PRESIDEN 
S SECRETARY FILE: 
TRUMAN LIBRARY 
Pape 
Cuba has, by Latin American standards, a large number of automotive units, 
and development of travel and transport by motor has been notable in the last decade. 
Urban public transportation in Havana—both streetcar and bus—has deteriorated 
US plus (b) the 
§ 
th international § 
‘varying success 
§ 
-eoment. 
Mean- 
§ 
s and favorable | 
"is sugar quota § 
tvangement was § 
r oved, and the 
| 
yosed on Cuban 
the Philippines # 
—janacity to pro- § 
cnated US con- 
§ 
©: their quotas. # 
i in the US if - 
likely, other 
@ 
naestic market | 
g. Public Utilities. 
‘ 
The principal electric and telephone services in Cuba are supplied by US-owned 
companies. 
Public utilities have been made a political issue by the nationalists who 
seek to make political capital out of the rates, high as compared with those of the US, 
| 
and the indifferent services. 
One of President Grau’s first acts as provisional Presi- 
dent in 1933 was to force a cut in electric and telephone rates. 
At present a campaign 
- 
is being waged in the press and courts against the US-owned power company. 
Rates 
q 
are, indeed, much higher than those of most US cities, but the cost of higher production 
and the unstabilized “peak” loads may justify the difference in rates. 
There is, how- 
| 
ever, a strong undercurrent of hostility to the electric company that will become even 
more significant in a period of economic stringency. 
US investments in Cuban public 
utilities and railways total more than 300 million dollars. 
| 
‘© US in 1947. 
Inadequacy of municipally owned water and sewage plants is a perennial 
| 
s31e to place a 
public scandal in Cuba, and President Grau’s reported refusal to allow foreign capital 
: 
“at for use in #4 
~ De used in improving the Havana water system was followed by the suicide of the last- 
; 
“ as). Cuban 
| 
elected mayor, who had been publicly jeered because of his failure to provide a new 
‘ 
will be # 
water system. 
| 
“ar purchases # 
Domestic telegraph service is a state monopoly under the Department of 
1 ome increas- # 
Communications, with low levels of service, but rates less than those charged in the US. 
h. 
Public Finance. 
if? 
sales to 
‘tations will @ 
q 
Government finances have been so managed that a modest surplus has been 
' Shown at the end of each of the past several years. 
Revenues in 1947 were $303,544,127, 
an increase of 25 percent over 1946. An additional $4,500,000 in proceeds of the national 
| 
lottery was deposited in pension fund accounts or given to charity. 
While official 
ways. 
The 
figures are not yet published, expenditures in 1947 were about 290 million dollars. 
Two 
: 
. ntained by # 
hundred million dollars constituted funds drawn from the regular budget. 
Because 
{ 
ervies elk 
the Cuban Congress has failed to enact a new budget since 1938, that budget has been 
PG physical 
extenced annually as the “regular” budget, and additional revenue, depending on 
-- 
owned by 4 
availability of funds, goes into an “extraordinary” budget established and expendable 
the tegen 
by executive decree. 
Main sources of revenue are excise and land taxes, 19 percent; 
ay systeml 
customs revenues, 16 percent; gross sales tax, 15 percent; and lottery profits, 14 percent. 
| 
sugar still 
Principal items of expenditure are education and national defense. 
In spite of the fact 
* apply tod 
brat President Grau promised a budget before taking office, none was approved during 
+ 4 yet, ale | 
his incumbency, and public spending, though on a vast scale, has remained unplanned 
he required 
and without legislative approval. 
| 
| 
Y > highway 
The Cuban public debt, as of 31 December 1947, consisted of outstanding bonds 
oractical 
in the amount of $91,551,220; $12 million owed to the US Export-Import Bank, and a 
‘acilitiess 
99 to 90 million dollar “floating loan” (non-funded obligations contracted by previous 
| 
j 
| 
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| 
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?
— 
HARRY s, 
LIBRARY 
HARRY S. TRUMAN 
of 
| 
PRESIDENT 'S 
FILE 
— 
administrations). 
The funded debt is 90 percent held by Cuban owners and is subject ‘| 
to amortization in accordance with statutory requirements. 
The Cuban peso is pegged 
to the US dollar at one for one. 
Currency is 98 percent covered by gold bullion and US 
§ 
dollars, exchanging freely at par for US currency within the country. 
No Cuban paper #4 
money was issued until 1935; as a result, the amount of US currency in circulation in 4 . 
Cuba usually exceeds that of Cuban currency, é 
as many prefer US currency for saving 
and — 
3. 
STABILITY. 
Cuba’s present cash and credit position is sufficiently sound to withstand, for at. | 
least a year, a fairly severe decline in sugar sales and prices. 
Were a decline in the price | 
of sugar to be extended beyond that time, however, severe economic distress would ; 
result, especially if, as is likely, a decline in the price that Cuba pays for its imports 
should lag behind sugar prices. 
This would immediately affect Cuba’s terms of tradeq 
adversely, ahd cause a decline in the real income of a substantial = ority of Cubang 
people. 
| 
| 
mu! 
Cub 
m 
natr 
| 
forei 
debt: 
situa’ 
j 
slowly 
| 
| 
larly i 
| 
| 
by the 
| 
| 
q 
the Cu 
| 
| 
| 
to the 
the lat: 
| 
Cubans 
t 
a tyran 
| 
| 
Servier 
| 
abrogat 
nationa 
| 
Cor. 
but con 
| 
ferences 
National 
| 
CPinion i 
| 
Which ©
LIBRARY 
HARRY S, 
+ 
{Papers 
of 
. 
| HARRY S, TRUMAN 
\ PRESIDENT'S SECRETARY FILE, 
ay 
‘owners and is subject # 
Cuban peso is pegged 
+, gold bullion and US: 
‘ry. No Cuban paper# 
in circulation 
currency for saving # 
& withstand, for at: 
cecline in the price: 
distress would, 
for its imports 
terms. of trade4 
rnajority of Cuban; 
CHAPTER IV 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
i. 
GENESIS OF THE PRESENT FOREIGN POLICIES. 
Cuba’s foreign policy is essentially a compromise between its desire to obtain maxi- 
| | 
| mum benefits from its special relationship to the US and the increasing desire of the 
| 
+ 
Cuban people for international prestige and a freer exercise of sovereignty than th 
. 
nature of their dependence on the US permits. 
| 
| 
Under the Platt Amendment the US prevented Cuba from signing treaties with 
foreign powers which might impair Cuban independence and from incurring excessive 
| 
debts. 
These restrictions, plus the grant to the US of a permanent lease for a naval 
| 
base and the basic economic relationships established between Cuba and the US, made 
Cuba a quasi-protectorate of the US. 
Cuban public opinion originally accepted this 
| Situation for the sake of the benefits it conferred. 
Dissatisfaction with what the Cuban regarded as their “semi-colonial” status grew 
| 
, Slowly and did not become a positive political force until 1920. 
This discontent, particu- 
| 
| 
tarly acute during the post-World War I slump, tended to be forgotten when President 
| Adachado’s US-financed public works program alleviated existing economic distress. 
| 
The world-wide economic crisis of 1929 and the resulting cessation of US loans to 
| 
} 
Cuba, however, reawakened the latent dissatisfaction which was in turn aggravated 
by the repressive practices of the Machado regime. 
There was thus generated among 
the Cuban people widespread and bitter hostility, not only 
to the regime itself, but also 
-— 
wa 
to the ties that, in their opinion, made Cuba so dependent on the US that a change in 
— 
the latter's tariff policy could plunge Cuba into poverty and suffering. 
Thus to many 
| 
| 
Cubans the revolution against Machado in 1933 was not only designed to put an end to 
| 
| 
a tyrannical domestic regime, but also to terminate Cuba’s economic and political sub- 
i 
servience to the US of which Machado was regarded as the principal symbol. The 
abrogation of the hated Platt Amendment in 1934 represented to the successful Cuban 
naUonalists a substantial, but only partial, attainment of objectives. 
Consequently Cuban nationalists have not been content with this important gain 
: 
"ON continue to exploit every opportunity at international and inter-American con- 
i 
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to make patent Cuba’s sovereignty and to try to win for Cuba enhanced inter- 
OF initiating independent, and sometimes anti-US moves. 
Majority 
however, opposes this conduct whenever it threatens US relations from 
quota elec sO many obvious economic benefits such as favorable tariff and 
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- The resulting conflict of interests has thus turned Cuba toward 
natuonalistic domestic regulations as a device by which to demonstrate complete 
sovereignty. 
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Their sympathies, less strong than their antipathies, are with the present 
- governments of Venezuela, Guatemala, and Haiti. 
In the event that the present divi™ 
2. 
OPERATION OF PRESENT FOREIGN Po.icy. 
Despite the anti-US aspects of Cuban policy mentioned above, Cuba would align 
itself solidly with the US in case of war with any possible group of states led by the 
USSR. It will also support the US position in any serious situation short of war. 
This 
attitude is determined by Cuba’s basic economic interests, its location, and the convic- 
tions of the vast majority of its people. 
The Communist minority cannot maneuver 
_ pro-Cuban nationalists, who in foreign policy are its logical allies, into a position where 
they would support the USSR against the US, though there are many intermediate _ 
positions where anti-US policies would be. acceptable as “the legitimate defense of Cuban 
interests.” 
Cuba, next to the special US economic ties which make possible its prosperity, is 
most interested in developing bi-lateral and multi-lateral relations with other American | 
states. 
It is one of the leaders in the inter-American movement because it thus gains | 
a measure of international prestige and develops a counterbalance to complete depend- | 
ence on the US. 
The United Nations has had little practical effect on Cuba but Serves | 
as a useful forum before which to ventilate Cuban protestations of equality and inde- : 
pendence vis-a-vis the US. 
Cuba is certain to remain an active participant in the UN; 
but it will continue to rely for its security upon the armed forces of the US. 
ef 
Spain, because of the traditional and cultural ties of Hispanidad, is the only nation 
that could become a strong competitor with the US and other American states for 
Cuba’s sympathy. 
Close ties are, however, at present impossible because of the con- 
tempt which most Cubans have for the Franco regime. 
Spanish Republican intellec- 
tuals who are refugees in Cuba maintain the prestige of Spanish culture although, at 
the same time, they reinforce the sentiment against Franco and dictators in general. 
The appeal of Franco-led Hispanidad is thus limited to a minority composed of the 
wealthy and the ultra-montane. 
This group, although anti-US during World War IT, 
now favors the US because of its present attitude toward the USSR. 
d 
Cuba’s opposition to “dictators” also influences its position within Caribbean 
balance-of-power alignments. 
Both the present Cuban Government and a majority of 
public opinion are opposed to the Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic. 
Though 
less interested in Central America, Cubans also oppose Somoza of Nicaragua and Carias 
sion within the Caribbean area continues, Cubans can be expected to maintain their 
hostile attitude toward the present governments of the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua,’; 
and Honduras and to support jointly with Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Guatemala con-# 
spiratorial and propaganda activities designed to overthrow the “dictatorships” and: 
embarrass their leaders. 
To date no formal alliances or agreements have been made tox: 
implement this policy which will probably be continued on the basis of informal underss 
standings among the leaders of the “democracies.” 
e 
Cuban aversion to “dictators” also makes it difficult for Argentina to gain convertsa 
in Cuba to its “third position,” though Cuban anti-US ultra-nationalistic sectors woula@ 
otherwise be attracted to such an idea. To the highly individualistic and emotional 
HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY 
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HARRY S. TRUMAN 
PRESIDENT!S SECRETARY FILP 
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HARRY S, TRUMAN 
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Cuba would align 
‘of states led by the 
§ 
1 short of war. 
This @ 
and the convic- 
ty cannot maneuver 
nto a position where 
_many intermediate 
defense of Cuban 
ble its prosperity, is ; 
other American | 
ecause it thus gains 
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ticipant in the UN; 
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ne US. 
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aerican states for 
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composed of the 
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Gecrease 
Cuban, absolute rule by a majority represents a tyranny equally as repugnant as that 
of a repressive government by an organized minority. 
Cuba's own experience as a 
Spanish colony, exploited, taxed, and persecuted at the hands of a corrupt metropolitan 
power, has been the major factor in determining its attitude toward European posses- 
sions within the Western Hemisphere. 
It opposes the continuance of European sov- 
ereignty over such areas. 
There is also much sentiment in Cuba for political inde- 
pendence for Puerto Rico. 
As a consequence, Communist propaganda in behalf of 
Puerto Rico independence, no matter how inaccurate, is effective in creating anti-US 
sentiment among the ebullient Cuban youth. 
; 
Recently, Cuba has evolved a “doctrine” for international relations which seems to 
satisfy both aspects of its foreign policy—a demand for favorable treatment in the US 
market, and a desire for an international reputation for leadership and independence. 
The US Sugar Act of 1948 provided that the US could withhold or withdraw increases in 
sugar quotas, as provided in that act compared with the 1937 Sugar Act, from “any 
nation that denies free and equitable treatment to the nationals of the US, its com- 
merce, navigation or industry.” 
Guillermo Belt, Cuba’s Ambassador at Washington, 
charged that this represented “economic aggression” and proceeded to campaign at 
subsequent international conferences in favor of an agreement that would prohibit such 
“aggression.” 
Asa result of his efforts, a variant of this so-called ‘““Grau Doctrine” was 
adopted as Article 16, Chapter III of the new Charter of the Organization 
of the Ameri- 
can States. 
It provides that “no state may use or encourage the use of enforcement 
measures of an economic or political character in order to force the sovereign will of 
another state and obtain from it advantages of any kind.” 
This appears to have been 
primarily an attempt to circumscribe the US in its use, for political ends, of the economic 
power it derives from its dominant position in the Cuban economy. 
It is also signifi- 
cant as a projection of the aims of the Cuban ultranationalist groups into inter- 
Amencan and international affairs, and as an indication of the type of maneuver that — 
‘s to be expected in the event that Cuban-US economic relations become less favorable 
to Cuba than they are at present. 
| 
Cuba's foreign policy is in such delicate balance between nationalism and depend- 
ence on the US that it lacks both stability and consistency and is peculiarly subject to 
changes in international conditions and Cuban public opinion. 
Reduced economic 
activity and difficulty in economic relations with the US stimulate nationalism since, to 
| 
Cuban public opinion, the immediate gains to be derived from ultranationalistic moves 
rather than the long-term gains derived from economic cooperation with the US, seem 
the greater when trade relations with the US decline in value or become unfavorable to 
Cuba. 
Furthermore, control of the government by the political parties partial to 
national ism rather than cooperation can swing Cuban foreign policy toward a nation- 
assist viewpoint even when economic conditions are favorable to cooperation. 
Cuban-US relations are so close that the task of maintaining US interests in Cuba 
“an d« made more difficult and complicated if Cuba merely fails to cooperate willingly 
= *noleheartedly. 
Though Cuba is not likely, within the near future, to adopt 
ice 
policies seriously adverse to major US interests, the degree of cooperation could 
rapidly if a radically nationalistic government came to power in Cuba or if 
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US-Cuban economic relations declined in value and advantage 
to Cuba. In such 
a cases 
the cost of maintaining US interests in Cuba would increase proportionately. 
Fort 
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example, lessened demand for Cuban sugar in the US market, with consequent depres4 
: 
sion in Cuba, will stimulate nationalistic agitation to expropriate foreign-owned proper4 
ties and will cause onerous controls to be imposed on foreign economic activity. 
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The most extreme and unfavorable turn Cuban policies could take, from the stand- 
; 
point of US interests, would be to oppose continuance of the naval base at Guantanamo: 
or to refuse additional bases in case of an emergency. 
Both Communists and ultra- 
nationalists advocate the termination of the base lease. As early as 1935 the US Foreigni 
Policy Association took account of Cuban popular sentiment to this effect and suggested 4m 
that the US give up Guantanamo. 
Though events since that date have convinced both 
Americans and the majority of Cubans of the necessity for the base, as well as other 
bases in time of war, anti-US forces in Cuba seize on the theme of lease-cancellation 
#@ 
as a means of embarrassing the US. Any rise in anti-US feeling, however produced, 4% 
may be reflected in greater efforts to force the removal of the US base from Cuban soil. 4 
It is estimated, however, that in the foreseeable future, anti-US feeling in Cuba will not : 
increase to the point of depriving the US of these necessary privileges, though it could¢ 
reach the point where it would become necessary. for the US to grant Cuba concessions § 
of one type or another in exchange for Cuba’s continued cooperation in this respect. i 
This would especially be true in a period prior to a war in which the US would be j 
engaged, rather than during hostilities themselves. 
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CHAPTER V 
MILITARY SITUATION 
1. 
Genesis or Present Mrurrary POLICIES. 
Cuba’s armed forces have never served away from home. 
Their proudest military 
traditions derive from their bloody guerrilla-type struggle for independence from Spain | 
between 1868 and 1898 and the subsequent early days of the republic during which 
the claim of military leaders to political power was confirmed. 
Although Cuba 
promptly followed the US lead in entering both World Wars, its military action was 
largely confined to cooperation with Us forces in anti-submarine patrol of the Cuban» 
coasts and adjacent waters. 
: 
The Cuban Army, though now large and well trained by Latin American 
: 
neitete. 
was organized by its founders for the purpose of maintaining domestic law and order 
and serving as a final arbiter in matters of major political importance. Its efficacy 
for these uses only was emphasized during World War IT when General Batista, elevated 
. 
to the presidency solely. through his army connections, frankly stated that the Cuban 
& 
Army was unable to repel any but the most mediocre of invasion forces. 
Recent Carib- 
bean tension has forced Cuba for the first time to consider its armed strength in 
a 
‘relation to its Latin neighbors. There is no evidence, however, that this has become 
. 
a 
a serious strategic consideration. 
The Cuban armed forces are primarily designed to 
| 
meet the specific needs of an island republic close to the protection of a friendly major 
power — the US — but subject to an endemically difficult domestic political situation. 
Any attempts, therefore, to establish a completely professional Cuban Army, Navy, or 
Air Force divorced from domestic political decisions is contrary to Cuban traditions and 
is therefore unlikely as a permanent achievement. 
| 
As an armed force, the value of the Cuban establishment cannot be judged from 
the standpoint of its ability to wage 
an aggressive war. 
The appropriate standards are 
those of a Latin American island republic and from that point of view the question is, 
can it, on the basis of existing training, organization, and equipment, and through its 
control over all arms and weapons, maintain law and order in normal conditions, and 
“protect the established Government” in times of stress. 
The military estimate in the 
following paragraphs is made from this standpoint: 
2. 
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STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF THE ARMED FORCES. 
As of 1 July 1948, the Cuban Armed Forces— Army, Navy, and National 
Police — had an estimated strength of 27,181 officers and men. 
Air forces, connected 
with the army and navy, are included in this figure. 
The separate services are as 
follows: 
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a. 
Army. 
The ground forces of the Cuban Army include 1,392 officers and 14,200 enlisted 
men — a total of 15,592 personnel. 
There are one infantry regiment, one artillery regi- 
ment, and seven “rural guard” cavalry regiments. 
The first two regiments are known 
in Cuba as the “regular army” and are stationed in Havana together with the General 
Staff and the specialized services — constituting together 26 percent of the army ground 
forces. 
These units, stationed as they are in the center of the Cuban political power, 
constitute the nexus between the military and the civilian establishment and exert a 
pervasive influence over the civilian political scene. 
The seven “rural guard” regiments 
are stationed in small detachments throughout the interior of the Republic where they 
perform the functions of rural police. 
Only in Santiago, Cuba’s second city, is there an 
large unit of the “rural guard” in one garrison. 
— 
The Havana-stationed “regular army” is considered to be good, the “rural 
guard” regiments inferior. 
The quality and training of Cuban Army personnel in 
general are adequate. 
Equipment and armament are obsolescent and insufficient for 
purposes of combat againts a US or European army of comparable size, but are adequate 
for the police and political-functions of the Cuban Army. 
Maintenance of equipment 
and training in its use are sufficient. 
Present armament includes 20 light tanks (12 
M3A1), 23 Schneider 75’s (1909 Model), 5 88-mm. anti-aircraft guns, 6 antiquated field 
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guns, and 4 15-cm. Ordéfiez Coast Defense guns. 
Infantrymen and rural guards are 
normally equipped with Springfield rifles and/or Colt automatics of which there is an 
ample supply. 
Artillery and special service units are also equipped with Colts. 
In spite of the traditional political pattern of the Cuban Army, the present 
Chief of Staff has endeavored to make the army a non-political force and has empha- 
sized law enforcement functions. 
In line with this policy, a large proportion of the 
officers have received US training, and a genuine attempt has been made to instill 
professional pride throughout the army. 
Graft has been reduced. 
It is estimated, 
however, that these disciplinary achievements are temporary. 
The army’s political 
potential is so high that despite several years of reform, the army will undoubtedly be 
drawn into politics. 
President-elect Prio is already reported to be looking about for a 
_ new Chief of Staff who can the better assure him of army support. 
Cuban army officers and enlisted men are drawn primarily from the rural. 
regions of Cuba where the peasants consider the army a Career more promising than 
any they could expect at home. 
Though one-year enlistments are legally possible, 
most enlistments are for longer periods, and there is a high proportion of re-enlistment. 
As a result, a majority of the army are veterans with 5 to 20 years service. 
Most of the 
officers are former enlisted men who obtained their present rank as a result of the 
reorganization of the army that stemmed from the 1933 revolution. 
Both officers and 
men, consequently, come from the same general social stratum. 
In contrast to other 
Latin American republics, in Cuba few of the upper classes now elect army careers. 
Since the total army strength has been reduced since 1943, the year of peak war 
strength, the present army — except for officers named by the Grau regime and replace- 
ments in the ranks —is substantially the army General Batista turned over to his 
HARRY S, TRUMAN I 
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Places in the regular army are so eagerly sought that there 
is rather rigorous selection, and new recruits are far superior physically and educa- 
tionally 
to existing personnel. 
Training for recruits, as well as for non-commissioned officers and officer 
candidates, is given at an army school established at Managua, Havana Province. 
This school—apparently well-equipped and well-managed—has a present enrollment 
of 76 cadets and over 500 in the other categories. 
The officer in command, a deserter 
from the US Army during World War Il, is proving to be an excellent commandant. 
Many Cuban officers have taken advantage, at one time or another, of courses in US 
Army service schools, and the effect of this training in improved efficiency is noticeable 
throughout the Cuban Army. © 
The air corps of the Cuban Army is relatively less efficient and useful than the 
ground forces, though improvement has been noted in the past two years. 
The air 
forces have not, as yet, established the character of the service they may render, in 
relation to the ground forces or to the republic at large. They have the double problem 
of training personnel and fitting the corps’ functions into those regarded as the normal 
functions of the ground forces. 
The present air forces have 446 officers and men 
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organized into three squadrons (fighter, bomber, and maintenance). 
There is a total 
of 72 aircraft of which all but 25 can be classified as training and liaison planes with 
little tactical significance by US standards. 
The 25 include 5 B-25’s, 6 P-38’s, 1 B-24, 
and several B-34’s and transport planes. 
Since the proper role of the air corps in the 
Cuban scene has not been determined, the relative value to Cuba of different types of 
planes cannot be estimated. 
Although a proposed US Air Mission will aid greatly in 
technical proficiency, neither it nor any foreign air mission can be expected to solve for 
Cuba the fundamental problem of what an air corps can do for a country where the 
military establishment is used primarily for political and police purposes. 
b. 
The National Police. 
The national police with a total strength of 7,231 men is second in importance 
only to the army with which it is closely associated. 
The commander of the national 
police must be selected by the President from among the senior officers of the army 
and occupies, by virtue of his position, a sub-cabinet post. A large proportion of the 
personnel are former soldiers. 
The organization is military in character and is divided 
into seven divisions, of which the most important is stationed in the city of Havana. 
. 
This division is split into 14 units, each with separate motorized equipment. 
The other 
divisions are stationed in the smaller cities of the interior where their work is supple- 
mented by that of local municipal police who have only subordinate authority. 
The 
national police, through their commander, is subject only to the orders of the President 
of the Republic. 
The national police now includes gangsters, who in the guise of sincere revolu- 
tionaries primarily fought the repressive police of Machado and Batista, and use their 
present position under the Autenticos to extend immunity or actual protection to male- 
factors of all kinds. 
Recent shooting frays in Havana reveal that gangster rivalries 
have thus penetrated the national police, and its members, because of their intimate 
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personal connections with rival gangs, have factionalized the force to the point where 
its groups are prepared, on occasion, to engage in bloody combat with one another. 
FoHowing a particularly spectacular battle in a residential suburb of Havana, 
a new commander of the police was appointed who, it was hoped, would put an end to 
the lawless activities of the police. 
The hoped-for reforms have not been accomplished, 
so that the police does not honestly perform its prescribed function of enforcing the 
laws of the Repubile. 
Despite these faults, however, the national police would, in 
i 
time of national emergency, make a definite contribution toward defending the Republic 
itself. 
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c. 
The Navy. 
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Cuba maintains a navy principally because it feels that one is necessary to its 
national prestige. 
The navy is seldom used for any practical purpose, and Cuba does 
not regard its presence as a necessary protection against naval attack by any of its 
neighbors. There are 41 vessels, including 7 gunboats, 13 modern submarine chasers, 
and 14 vessels acquired from the US during 1947 (3 PF’s, frigates; 2 ATR’s, ocean tugs, 
rescue; 5SC’s, subchasers 110’; 2 PCE’s, patrol vessel escort 183’; and 2 PT’s, motor 
torpedo boats). 
The operatirig condition of all units — except those recently obtained 
yi 
from the US—is uniformly low, and most vessels spend months and even years 
— 
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anchored in one place. The terminated US Naval Mission (21 September 1946) accom- 
plished little during its tour of duty in Cuba. 
The mission was utilized principally by 
the Cuban Navy as a means of acquiring vessels and equipment during the war period, 
and when the submarine menace declined, the Cuban Navy resumed its accustomed 
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indifference toward progress and improvement. 
The 3,755 naval personnel, under the 
command of a Commodore, the highest officer in the Cuban Navy, are subject to political 
_ 
influences similar to those that corrupt the police force. 
Though greatly inferior in 
numbers and importance to the army, the navy is not directly controlled by the army 
; 
and at times pursues an independent course. 
Since the Cuban Navy does not serve any 
: 
well-defined peacetime purpose and since its wartime role is indefinite, it would appear 
e 
to be difficult to establish proper discipline and efficiency. 
Cooperation with the US 
in 
forces on submarine patrol during World War II and anti-submarine training received 
ti 
at Miami by some of the personnel were excellent morale builders for which there is 
r 
no corresponding peacetime activity. 
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The Navy Air Arm, consisting of 19 planes and 144 men, is considered to be 
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“largely inoperative” at the present time, and is inferior in every respect to the army 
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3. 
War PorENTIAL. 
a. 
Manpower. 
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The present armed forces of Cuba constitute 1.5 percent of the total population. 
wit. 
It is estimated that Cuba could mobilize 30,000 additional men within 180 days of the 
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beginning of mobilization. 
An Emergency Military Serivce recruitment system is in 
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birthday, thereby entering military Class One (ages 20 to 24), subject to conscription. 
No conscripts are being added to the army at this time though there are plans to select 
6,000 from the 16,000 who registered in the fall of 1947 and give them six months’ 
training. Army reserves consist of those who have completed emergency military train- 
ing and who are still in Class One by reason of age (20 to 24). 
The laws provide that 
Classes Two (ages 25 to 34) and Three (ages 35 to 50) also constitute reserves, though 
no conscription has been applied to these classes. 
The full quotas needed by present 
training plans are met by those in Class One who volunteer for service. 
No training 
is now given the various reserve classes. 
In view of the relatively favorable career 
offered by the Cuban Army, there is no difficulty in filling present quotas with satis- 
factory volunteers. For this reason, the present Cuban Army is considered above the 
Latin American average in regard to physical condition and education. 
b. 
Natural Resources, Finance, Industry, and Science. 
From the standpoint of natural resources, it is improbable that Cuba one 
maintain its own defense forces even if it decided to make the attempt. 
Although its 
budgetary position would probably permit large-scale acquisition elsewhere, its industry 
could not, within the foreseeable future, supply the necessary weapons and equipment. 
Similarly, the level of both scientific research and production are such that no signifi- 
cant war service in his respect could be rendered by Cuba. 
4. 
MILITARY 
AND 
As an armed force, the Cuban military establishment is capable of making a con- 
tribution in any struggle in which Cuba finds itself allied with the US against the USSR. 
There is no evidence of extensive Communist infiltration in the army, the national 
police, orthe navy. 
Such limited infiltration as has occurred is under the close scrutiny 
of the military chiefs who can be counted upon to suppress it with vigor immediately 
upon the outbreak of hostilities. 
Consequently, the military establishment can be 
_ expected to serve as (1) an effective device to prevent such Communists as are at present 
in Cuba from obtaining control of the government and (2) as an adequate police force 
to assure ultimate production and delivery to Cuban ports of such strategic and critical 
materials as Cuba is capable of supplying. 
It could not, however, prevent temporary 
dislocations of production and delivery. 
Ina 
period prior to the outbreak of hostilities, 
the military establishment can be counted on to give maximum support to any program 
which the government might adopt for the surveillance or suppression of Communist 
activities, although it would not, so long as the Communists enjoy the benefits of Cuba’s 
democratic tradition, independently attempt to suppress the Communists. 
The political influence of the Cuban military establishment on the government has 
for the present been reduced. 
It is axiomatic, however, that it will again become a 
determining factor in a period of stress. 
At such a time, tendencies toward division 
within the army into pro-Batista and pro-Auténtico factions would not, it is estimated, 
be sufficient to neutralize the army as a political force. 
On the contrary, in a time 
of stress, one of the two factions would emerge ascendant and would, by open espousal 
of particular issues, win for itself sufficient support from the Cuban civilian population 
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to enable it to take control of the government. 
Such a situation, it is estimated, could 
evolve from disputes over domestic rather than foreign issues. 
No matter which army 
faction came to power, it would probably not be anti-US but more favorable to the US 
point of view than the present majority of Cuban civilian politicians. 
At present the 
Auténtico faction, backed as it is by the high command of both the civilian and military 
establishments, is in the ascendancy. : It can be expected to maintain its position for 
another two years when a new election, changed economic conditions, and the results of 
General Batista’s present political maneuvers in Cuba may bring about a shift in rela- 
tive positions. 
| 
Although the functions of the Cuban military establishment are now limited to the 
maintenance of law and order in normal times and the “protection” of the government 
in times of stress, other contributions would be possible during a joint war with the US 
against the USSR. 
With the appropriate US direction and equipment, the military 
establishment could be counted upon to assist in the aerial and surface patrol of Carib- 
bean waters and could dispatch to Europe or Asia a small land and/or air expeditionary 
force, as well as garrison units. The combat abilities of such expeditionary forces as 
Cuba might contribute, would be strictly limited. 
They would, however, serve as an 
important morale factor within Cuba and would indicate Hemisphere solidarity and 
inter-American unity of action against the designs of a non-American power. 
PRESIDanrre SECRET 
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CHAPTER VI 
STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING US SECURITY 
Because of the role of Cuba in the defense of the Panama Canal, in the protection 
and patrol of US lines of communication, and as a source of strategic materials, Cuba 
and thus Cuban foreign policy are of importance to the US. 
, 
-_—Im general, Cuba’s constitutional democratic system of government, its Western 
cultural orientation, and its well-defined political and economic ties to the US render 
very unlikely any Cuban political development unfavorable to US security. 
Specifically, there are, however, two elements at work in the political life of Cuba 
that could conceivably impede the ability of the US to meet its strategic requirements 
by (a) making of Cuba a base of operations for Communist groups which the Cuban 
government could not control, and (b) causing Cuba to deny in a period preparatory to 
conflict between the US and the USSR, air bases and expanded naval facilities deemed 
necessary by the US. 
These two elements are the Popular Socialist Party and anti-US 
nationalists. 
In this connection, the relevant problems are whether either of them, 
acting independently or together, could (a) lessen the Cuban government’s degree of 
cooperation with the US and impede its capacity to associate with it, in support of the 
US, a substantial majority of the Cuban people, and (b) reduce Cuba’s ability to main- 
tain public order. 
The Popular Socialist Party — the Communist Party of Cuba — is inimical s US 
Strategic interests in the area. 
Although, at present, it does not have sufficient strength 
at the polls to capture control of any branch of the government, Cuba’s republican form 
> 
of government and multi-party system, in combination with Cuban traditions of purely 
fortuitous and expedient political alliances and “deals” are such as to afford the Com- 
munist Party an opportunity to influence Cuban policy to a degree beyond that which 
its numbers or its popularity at the polls might warrant. 
Furthermore, much of the 
Communist propaganda in Cuba is presented in terms of nationalism and consistently 
_ 
attributes Cuba’s misfortunes to its subservience to US commercial and political in- 
terests. 
The appeal of propaganda of this nature is not confined to those in Cuba who 
are communistically inclined, but also to the anti-US nationalists who, no matter how 
strongly they may reject the philosophy of economic determinism and the class struggle, 
find, on individual issues at least, that they are on common ground with the anti-US 
Communists. 
For this reason there is, in Cuba, always the peacetime possibility of the 
combination of these two political forces for reasons of expediency. 
The existence of 
such a possibility thus enhances the Communists’ opportunity to lessen US-Cuban 
cooperation and Cuba’s support of US foreign policy. 
Accordingly, a substantial in- 
crease in the number of adherents of the Communist Party, even if less than that neces- 
_ Sary to afford the party a majority at the polls, could jeopardize US interests by imped- 
ing the ability of the Cuban government to associate with it, in support of the US, a 
majority of the people. 
| 
\, 
2pers of 
IBRARY 
| 
ROMAN 
‘ 
ECRETAR Y F 
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(From the standpoint of the ability of the Cuban government to control the revolu- 
tionary aspects of a See Chapter II, Presence of Sabotage and Subversive 
Elements in Cuba.) 
ae 
Anti-US nationalists—particularly numerous among the adherents of Cubani- 
dad—favor ambitious schemes to reduce Cuba’s economic dependence on the US. 
Because of the peculiarly close economic ties between the two countries, they pose 
many vexatious problems for US-Cuban relations. 
Since there is general confusion in 
the minds of Cubans as to the difference between US commercial and strategic interests 
in Cuba, the anti-US nationalists thus interrelate the two to a degree beyond that which 
the reality of the situation deserves. 
The expediency of terminating US ownership 
of a utility company, for example, despite all logic, becomes involved in general dis- 
cussion of the expediency of terminating all US special interests in Cuba. 
Although 
it is most unlikely that, in the event of an armed conflict between the US and the 
USSR, the nationalists would-oppose the US, it is a fact that they have in the present 
period prevented cooperation from running relatively smoothly and have demonstrated 
their ability to impair US-Cuban relations by a series of acts or group of circumstances 
each unimportant in themselves. 
And in a period preparatory to a US-USSR conflict, 
the gravity of which would escape anti-US Cuban nationalists who would remain pre- 
occupied with the superpatriotic precepts of Cubanidad, the anti-US nationalists, acting 
alone or even in combination with the Communists, ~— cause Cuba to deny addi- 
tional military installations to the US... 
Cuba’s principal contribution to the US is cheap sugar. Adeaneed technology, in 
combination with natural advantages, has made of Cuba the greatest single sugar 
producer in the world and the only country capable of meeting US wartime require- 
ments. 
Cuba is also capable of supplying the US with important quantities of nickel, 
manganese, copper, and chromite. 
Other minerals, including gold, lead, light-gravity 
petroleum, asphalt, salt, barite, stone, and iron ore, are present in Cuba and available 
for emergency use. A limiting factor in their utility to the US, however, is relatively 
low quality and, in the case of iron ore, divergency =m the type usually processed in 
the US. 
At present Cuba has a joint industry-government system of niin over Sugar 
| 
production. 
This system enables the US —in the event of an emergency — to nego- 
tiate and regulate the flow of sugar to the US with greater facility than would be the 
case if it were necessary to deal with a multiplicity of nonintegrated, individual pro- 
ducers. 
For this reason, it is estimated that US security interests would not be 
jeopardized even if Cuba acted to increase state control of its economic life as is possible 
under the provisions of its present constitution which expressly reyecee the principles of 
laissez faire. 
The Cuban armed i including the national police, are a present capable of 
keeping under observation, and containing during a US-USSR shooting war, most ele- 
ments within the Cuban population regarded as hostile to basic US interests. 
As such, 
they make a contribution to US security interests. 
They are not capable, however, of 
protecting Cuba from invasion by any major power or of contributing substantially in 
any joint US-Cuban effort against a common enemy. 
( 
Pers 
TRUMAN LIB 
HARR 
| PRES 
TRUMAN 
| 
SECREP 
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SI 
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= 
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co. 
his 
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CHAPTER VII 
PROBABLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 
Cuba’s economic and political future will be determined principally by a factor over 
which Cuba itself has little control — the condition of the world Sugar market. 
Pros- 
pects for good prices and disposal of large proportions of the Cuban production are far 
less promising now than they were at the close of hostilities. 
The majority of Cuban 
sugar experts foresee a further decline both in the amount of sugar Cuba will be able 
to sell as well as in the price. 
They are thus much concerned over the necessity for 
downward readjustments in wage levels and reduced production goals. 
To date no real 
progress has been made in this direction. 
But if sugar prices continue to decline, these 
readjustments will become a compelling necessity which the government of President- 
elect Prio will have to face. 
ae 
; 
Since Prio’s announced program calls for increased economic self-sufficiency for 
Cuba and a vigorous defense of the Cuban worker’s standard of living, there are only 
two principal means by which these objectives can be attained in the face of a further 
decline in sugar prices: diversification of production with emphasis on food products, 
and increased demands on foreign-owned enterprises in Cuba. 
The first. will be ex- 
_ tremely difficult to accomplish, and the second will have limited practical value because 
excessive government impositions would cause foreign corporations to resort to meas- 
ures costly to Cuba. 
A theoretical third solution of the difficulty, borrowing money 
from the US in order to subsidize Cuba’s present level of employment and prices, would 
not be easy for Prio to adopt since it would be contrary to his publicly espoused goal of 
Despite any difficulties that might arise from a decline in sugar prices, popular 
support and the state of disunity of the opposition will probably enable the Prio regime 
to survive for two years at least. 
By 1950, however, the opposition might be able to 
join forces sufficiently to defeat him in the scheduled by-elections. 
Were this to happen, 
it might well be the first step toward more direct efforts to overthrow the government 
since it would be irrefutable evidence that the Auténticos had lost their mandate from 
the people. 
In such a period, the principal threat to the Prio government would be the 
conservative opposition which might combine under a strong leader like Batista. 
_ President-elect Prio is supported by a substantial majority of the Cuban people in 
his pledge to support the US against the USSR and to give all possible aid in the event 
of a war. 
The Prio administration’s preoccupation with policies that tend to increase 
Cuba’s independence, however, will influence its relations with the US in matters not 
directly connected with US-USSR rivalry so that cooperation will not be continuously 
smooth. 
Difficulties will become proportionately greater if Cuban-US commerce de- 
clines and it appears to the Cuban Government that there are more immediate advan- 
tages in anti-US nationalistic moves than in long-term economic cooperation with 
the US. 
| 
Ev / 
UMAN 
* | P 
UMAN 
is 
SESTDENT 
SECREP 
| 
j
Cuba’s nationalistic urge to assert its independence can be expected to be especially 
— 
strong at international conferences and congresses. 
Such a course would not be dic- 
tated by obstructionism, since Cuba wholeheartedly supports the UN and inter- 
American organizations, but rather by a desire to show that Cuba is not subservient to 
the US. 
Cuba will probably continue to oppose the Caribbean “dictatorships.” 
Since both 
the US Government and the provisions of inter-American agreements are opposed to 
one republic’s interference in the domestic affairs of another, Cuba’s efforts will probably 
be confined to (a) surreptitious aid to and tolerance of the activities of revolutionary 
groups, and (b) the further development of friendly relations with the Caribbean 
“democracies” with the one in view of jointly pursuing a hostile policy toward the 
“dictatorships.” 
Prio’s past performance as Secretary of Labor and his statements as President-elect 
indicate that his government will continue to repress Cuba’s Communists. 
As long as 
he is in power, therefore, it is.estimated that Communist strength will decrease politi- 
cally and within the labor unions. 
Only if Prio were to abandon his stated program of 
defense of the Cuban worker could the Communists hope to gain strength, and this is 
considered extremely unlikely because it would signify the reversal of all Prio’s major 
- policies and would alienate the very group on which the government depends for 
support. 
Two other domestic problems have been mentioned as major in Cuba: the racial 
_ problem and the need to develop rural areas. 
The government under Prio—one of the 
— 
most liberal members of the Auténtico Party—will be in an excellent position to win 
the confidence of the colored people, and it can be expected to strive to reduce racial 
discrimination in Cuba. 
Efforts in this direction should be helpful in forestalling Com- 
munist attempts to win additional negro support. 
In public statements, Prio has recognized the need to develop rural areas and has 
already proposed the construction of farm-to-market roads as a step toward its solution. 
His ability to devote a significant amount of money to these purposes, however, will be 
greatly limited if sugar markets decline. 
Furthermore, his corrupt associates can be 
expected to divert a considerable portion of such funds as may be appropriated to other 
purposes. 
It is estimated that little will be accomplished to solve the rural problem. 
Ss SECREp 
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APPENDIX A 
TOPOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE 
Cuba, 
an island republic, is over 700 miles long with an area equivalent to that of 
Pennsylvania. 
In form, it is a great shallow crescent, one horn of which partially 
closes the entrance to the Gulf of Mexico, while the other extends southeastward to 
the Windward Channel. 
The northern coast of Cuba begins at Cape San Antonio, some 
150 miles off Yucatan, curves northward to within 90 miles of Key West, Florida, then 
curves southeastward continuing in this direction more than 400 miles to end in Point 
Maisi, about 50 miles from Haiti. 
The concavity of the south coast includes the shallow 
waters of the Gulf of Bataband, the Isle of Pines, and myriad islets. 
Both northern and 
southern coasts of Cuba are fringed with coral reefs in most places, making access by 
sea difficult except from the west or through a few safe passageways. 
There are, how- 
ever, several excellent natural harbors—Guantanamo, Havana, and Santiago. 
With an average width of 60 miles, Cuba has no significant rivers or lakes, but 
there is, nonetheless, a wide range of types of terrain—from the swamps of the south- 
ern Zapata Peninsula to the mountains of Oriente which contain peaks higher than any 
| 
in eastern US. 
Smaller mountain ranges in western and central parts of the island 
cause a high percentage of the area to be hilly or rolling. 
Several different types of 
soil are found, some maintaining their fertility for dozens of harvests without artificial 
_ 
fertilization. 
The deforestation of the island which has been rapidly advanced within 
the past decades is a threat to the long-range maintenance of some soils. 
Although Cuba is located within the northern limits of the tropics, a combination 
of favorable ocean and wind currents helps create a very equable and pleasant climate. 
The Gulf Stream curves north of Cuba as a water barrier against the effects of cold 
northern winds while the eastern trade winds temper the heat of summer. 
The mean 
annual temperature is 75° F. with a difference of less than 11° in the average tempera- 
ture of the coolest (February 70.6°) and the hottest month (August 81°). 
The most 
extreme temperatures ever officially recorded in Cuba were 36° and 96°. 
Annual rain- 
fall varies from a mean of 40 to 6Q inches. 
Heavier rains usually take place in certain 
interior areas. 
The greater amount of rain falls in the months from April to November, 
_ the winter months being relatively dry and sunny. 
While Cuba’s temperature and evenness of climate disqualify it as one of the areas 
regarded as stimulating to human achievement, the more harmful secondary effects 
of the tropics—diseases, etc.—are controlled to a remarkable degree for a tropical 
country by public health and sanitation measures. 
Cuba’s leadership in this field has 
continued since the notable work initiated there by Americans during the war with 
Spain. 
While malaria and intestinal parasites are still common in Cuba, yellow fever, 
cholera, typhus, smallpox, and various other diseases are effectively controlled. 
Com- 
plete eradication of many of these is scientifically, if not economically and politically, 
feasible. 
aa 
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Pinar del Rio 
Habana 
Matanzas 
Las Villas 
Camaguey 
Oriente 
APPENDIX B 
POPULATION FACTS 
POPULATION OF CUBA, BY PROVINCES, IN 1903, 1933, AND 1943 
19332 
19431 
398,794 
1,235,939 
361,079 
938,581 
487,701 
1,356,489 
TOTAL CUBA ™ 4,778,583 
346,667 
961,905 
(343,775 
826,386 
414,187 
1,071,946 
1903 ? 
181,604 
440,523 
211,650 
375,742 
95,049 
353,746 
1,658,314 
The 1943 figures indicate a population density of 108 per square mile. 
The Cuban population is 54.5 percent urban, 91.8 percent native born, 78 percent 
literate, and the average age is 24.9 years. The percentage of white population, accord- 
ing to the 1943 census, is 74.4 percent. 
Of the working 
employees while 57.77 percent are self-employed. — 
1Cuban census of 1943. 
2Cuban Department of Public Health. 
population, 42.23 percent are 
HAP 
ap Cnr Ss 
7. 
| 
°F 
LIBR, 
SIDENT 
UMAN 
|
APPENDIX C 
BIOGRAPHICAL DATA 
CARLOS PRIO SOCARRAS, President-elect of Cuba, is a product of the revolu- 
tionary movement which overthrew Machado but did not gain full control of the gov- 
ernment until ten years later in 1944. 
Prio was born in Pinar del Rio, Cuba, in 1903, of 
middle-class parents, and. went to the University of Havana where he had a distin- 
guished record as a student politician. 
He became a leading member of the famous 
| 
revolutionary committee of 1930 and took an important part in the formation of the 
Auténtico Party. 
Exiled by Batista in 1935, Prio later returned to Cuba to participate 
in the Constitutional Convention and was elected to the Senate in 1940 where his per- 
sonality and youthful vigor won for him an influence beyond that of his associates. 
Prio served as Prime Minister under President Grau from October 1945 to April 1947. 
Later he became Minister of Labor and gained prominence by forceful measures that 
eliminated Communist control of the officially recognized confederation. 
Despite the 
fact that Prio was elected President in 1948 with the support of Grau and the palace ~ 
Clique, and although he has long been associated with the terroristic and revolutionary 
_ 
elements of his party, there are indications that he may attempt to restrain the violence 
of former associates and give Cuba a less corrupt government. 
His intentions and 
capabilities in this respect will be subjected to severe tests when he takes office 10 
October 1948 and on the outcome, to a large degree, depends the future of his regime 
in the event that economic conditions deteriorate to a point where sound and efficient 
administration become necessary. 
| 
FULGENCIO BATISTA, a former President of Cuba who long was and is possibly 
_ 
destined to be again the most influential person in Cuban politics, was born 16 January 
1901 of plebeian parents in Oriente Province, Cuba. 
He received no formal education 
and worked at a series of lowly jobs until he entered the Cuban Army. There by virtue of 
outstanding initiative and self-discipline, he advanced slowly, grade by grade, until he 
became sergeant and typist at Army Headquarters. 
After the fall of Machado in 1933, 
Batista led a coup of non-commissioned officers who purged the army of pro-Machado 
officers and made him their Chief. 
At first, Batista coordinated his efforts with those 
} 
of other revolutionary groups; later, he readjusted his position to one more acceptable 
| 
to the US Embassy in Havana and to conservative Cubans. 
This shift caused dissen- 
+ 
sion and revolt among the revolutionaries which Batista suppressed quickly and 
“i bn 
cruelly. 
He thus became the supreme power in Cuba and forced all branches of the 
! 
government to carry out his orders, which included the impeachment of the legally 
elected President who had refused to be subservient. 
As Commander of the Army, 
Batista governed unofficially from his headquarters at Camp Columbia until 1940 when 
he sought and obtained the presidency for himself. 
In 1944, to everyone’s surprise, he 
HARRY S 
° 
TRUMAN 
; 
PRESIDENT 
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HARRY 5, 
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went into voluntary exile. 
He plans to return to Cuba as a senator in November 1948, 
and probably intends to run for the presidency in 1952. 
Batista has an intuitive understanding of Cuba andits people. 
His political astute- 
ness is a product of this understanding in combination with great native intelligence. 
Upon his return to Cuba he will become a significant factor affecting the island’s future. 
While he performed a great service in bringing Cuba from revolutionary chaos to repub-- 
lican stability, he appears to lack idealism or any integrated concepts for his country’s 
| 
future. 
His talent appears to lie in the conciliation of opposing forces in the interest of 
order, stability and the peaceful maintenance of the status quo. 
His political develop- 
ment has been in the direction of increasing conservatism, but realistic political — 
tunism remains stronger in him than devotion to a particular anne 
EDUARDO RENE CHIBAS Y RIVAS, known as “Eddy” to practically everyone in 
Cuba, has always been a colorful figure, provocative of headlines, controversies, and 
duels, but only recently has he proved at the polls that his influence over a significant 
sector of the Cuban population-is decisive. 
Chibas was born in 1907 in Santiago de 
Cuba where his father was a prominent engineer closely associated with US military 
government activities. 
Chibas’ inherited wealth has enabled him to adopt the inde- 
pendent role he so strikingly manifests in political affairs. 
He became a follower of 
Dr. Grau during the revolution against Machado and acted as Grau’s unofficial spokes- 
man until 1947. 
His first important political post was as delegate to the 1940 Consti- 
tutional Convention, after which he served as representative and, most lately, as sena- 
tor. 
The increasing popularity of his weekly radio chats and public speeches gradually | 
created for Chibas a special following within the Auténtico Party. 
Although he is in- 
clined to go to extremes in wringing the full publicity possibilities from each passing 
incident, Chibas does have certain beliefs to which his loyalty is more or less continuous. 
One is that the economic and political self-determination of Cuba should be advanced 
by all possible means. 
Another is that the Cuban masses should be given fair treat- 
ment.by an honest government which should consistently support the ideals of the 1933 
revolution. 
His break with Grau in 1947 came ostensibly because he felt that the Grau 
regime had become corrupt. 
Actually, the fact that President Grau did not decline 
~ 
renomination until a late date was a weighty though unadmitted reason for the break, 
since Chibas coveted the nomination for himself. 
| 
Chibas’ success in attracting more than 300,000 votes in his independent presiden- 
tial campaign is proof that he is a leading Cuban political figure and that he will be a 
principal contender for the presidency in 1952 if he is able to maintain the support of 
the group which voted for him in 1948. 
Previous to his success at the polls many 
Cubans considered him merely a radio commentator and publicity seeker. 
GENEVEVO PEREZ DAMERA, Chief of Staff of the Cuban Army, represents a per- 
sonal link between the Army and the revolutionary student groups of 1933. Born in Ma- 
‘anzas, Cuba, in 1910, Pérez attended the University for a short time during which he es- 
tablished several important friendships with those who later were student leaders. Hav- 
ag entered the army as a private, he became a second lieutenant as a result of Batista's 
bes 
of 1 
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“Sergeants’” revolt of 1933. 
As the friend of Dr. Grau, he was assigned to his staff as 
a military aide during Grau’s short provisional presidency. 
When Grau left the presi- 
dency, Pérez was able to remain in the army under Batista, receiving one or two routine 
promotions in the ten years between 1934 and 1944. 
When Grau was elected president 
in 1944, however, promotions came rapidly until Pérez became Grau’s Chief of Staff in 
1945. 
Prior to this last appointment few people—except perhaps Grau himself—took 
Pérez very seriously as an army Officer and he was the butt of many jokes based on his 
obesity and his supposed lack of manly qualities. 
His surprisingly vigorous and deter- 
mined action as Chief of Staff, however, has won him respect. 
Army efficiency and 
morale have been improved, and the army has been most effective in maintaining order 
during elections and in controlling Communist-inspired labor difficulties. 
General 
Pérez has developed into a key figure in Cuba. 
Although opposed by certain members 
of the palace clique, Pérez is the best military figure the Auténticos have produced so 
that, despite repeated rumors that he will be replaced by President-elect Prio, his ability 
to control the army is increasingly valuable at a time when opposition military men like 
Batista and Benitez are returning to the country. 
| 
LAZARO PENA. 
Of the publicly known leaders of the Cuban Communists, Lazaro 
Pefia is the most popular and effective in organizing support among non-Communist 
groups. 
His efforts as secretary general of the Cuban Workers Confederation from the 
time it was organized until its division in 1947 won him influence among non-Commu- 
nist workers and the Cuban masses in general. 
The fact that he is a coal-black negro 
has increased his popularity among the Cuban colored population. 
This advantage has 
provided a favorable background for Pefa’s undeniable astuteness, energy and ability as 
organizer and public speaker. He was born in Havana in 1911 and earned his own liv- 
ing from the age of ten. 
Despite the fact that he had held a variety of menial jobs, he 
was able to enter the cigar-makers union—traditional stronghold of the more elite and 
best-organized of Cuban workers. 
Later he became secretary of the Havana chapter 
of the union and gained the confidence of General Batista who allowed him to form the 
CTC. 
As secretary general of the new confederation he cooperated with the Batista 
- 
regime politically at the same time that he increased Communist control of labor—the 
one was, in fact, the means to the other as Batista’s political enemies were also Pefia’s 
rivals within the labor organization. 
At the same time that he advanced the cause of 
- 
Communism, he won economic gains for the workers which probably explains his popu- 
larity with non-Communist workers. 
| 
Papers oF UMAN LIBRARY 
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APPENDIX D 
STATISTICAL DATA 
SUGAR STATISTICS 
TABLE I 
RATIO OF 
CUBAN 
WORLD 
RATIO OF 
US CON- 
CUBAN PRO- 
YEAR * 
PRODUCTION” 
PRODUCTION 
CUBAN TO 
SUMPTION‘* 
DUCTION TO 
(in 1,000 
(in 1,000 
WORLD 
(in 1,000 
US CON- 
short tons) 
shorttons) 
shorttons) 
SUMPTION 
1930-34 Average 
2.847 
29,919 
095 
6,572 
432 
1935-39 Average 
3,183 _ 
34,710 
091 
6,702 
AT5 
1940-41 
4,134 
30,543 
135 
6,763 
611 
1941-42 
4,516 
28,489 
7,350 
615 
1942-43 
3,240 
30,781 
105 
6,102 
531 
1943-44 
5,643 
28,110 
201 
5,569 
1.013 
1944-45 
3,923 
26,692 
147 
6,158 
637 
1945-46 
4476 
30,049 
148 
5,107 
876 
1946-47 
6,448 
31,984 
202 
5,558 
1.160 
1947-48 
6,674 
34,147 
195 
6,790 
981 
1 Crop year 1 July to 30 June. 
* Variability of Cuban production. 
: 
*Increasing importance of Cuban production in relation to world production and to US con- 
sumption. 
| 
‘Relative stability of US consumption. 
*Calendar Years. 
Pa 
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} 
‘ 
‘ 
Ps, 
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\ PRESIDENT'S 
S 
‘ 
‘ 
{ 
‘Papers of 
| HARRY S. TRUMAN 
BCRETARY FILE! 
“ 
o 
SUGAR STATISTICS 
| 
TABLE IL 
RATIO CUBAN 
‘CUBAN SUGAR 
TOTAL CUBAN 
- 
SUGAR EXPORTS 
-— RATIO CUBAN 
YEAR* 
EXPORTS 
TO US SUGAR EXPORTS 
TO US TO TOTAL 
SUGAR EXPORTS 
(in 1,000 
© 
(in 1,000 
CUBAN SUGAR 
TO US SUGAR 
short tons) 
short tons) 
EXPORTS 
CONSUMPTION * 
1930-34 Average 
2,055 
2,978 
.690 
313 
1935-39 Average 
2,029. 
2,942 
690 
303 
1940-41 
1,901 
2,332 
815 
281 
1941-42 
2,884 
; 
3,586 
804 
392 
1942-43 
1,850 
3.006 
.922 
.303 
1943-44 
4,163 
805 
.602 
1944-45 
3,882, 
4,352 
892 
.630 
1945-46 
3,813 
4475 
146 
1946-47 
5,725 
6,081 
1.031 
1947-48 
2,850 * 
420 
1 Crop year 1 July to 30 June. 
“Increasing importance of US as a market for Cuban sugar ond of Cuba as a source of supply 
to US up to 1948, abrupt change in 1948 reflecting termination of US wartime global purchases of 
Cuban sugar. 
* Estimated. 
| 
| 
¥ 
og 
i 
a 
’ 
:
Papers of 
| HARRY S. 
_ PRESIDENT'S SECRETARY FILE 
TRUMAN 
~ 
VALUE CUBAN EXPORTS 
(in millions of dollars) 
TABLE III 
1935 
89.8 
14.1 
825 
128.0 
101.5 
193 
1.98 
1936 
122.4 
91.7 
“149 
154.8 
121.8 
187 
2.39 
1937 
127.2 
112.0 
.880 
186.0 
150.1 
.807 
2.36 
1938 
99.6 
80.5 
.808 
142.6 
108.3 
139 
1.94 
1939 
105.8 
82.3 
“781 
147.6 
111.1 
153 
1.79 
1940 
79.2 
66.5 
840° 
127.2 
104.9 
.825 
1.69 
1941 
137.8 
119.0 
.864 
211.4 
181.2 
857 
2.04 
1942 
107.6 
99.3 
.926 
182.3 
164.1 
900. 
2.65 
1943 
226.0 
181.8 
.804 
351.5 
295.6 
841 
2.65 
1944 
237.2 
210.8 
.890 
433.0 
379.9 
877 
2.65 
1945 
259.2 
192.8 
144 
409.9 
323.3 
1946 
—- 314.6 
197.5 
.628 
475.8 
320.6 
674 
3.67 
1947 
609.5 
398.6 
.654 
746.5 
688.1 
922 
4.96 
‘Predominance of sugar in total exports and in exports to US. Consequent significance 
of 
changes in the price of sugar as a factor affecting value of exports. 
TABLE IV 
CUBAN BALANCE OF PAYMENTS—1946 
Gross balance, merchandise account 
+ 223.2 
millions of dollars 
Net credit balance after interest, dividends, in- 
surance, etc. 
+- 135.9 
Capital movement (Cuban investments abroad or 
purchase of foreign-owned properties in Cuba) 
— 71.5 
Gold and silver purchases 
— 34.9 
Donations and payments international 
organizations 
— 
Net residue not accounted for 
— 25.2 
(possibly undeclared exports US currency 
for investment or expenditure abroad.) 
TOTAL 
+1365 
Note: Until 1946, the Cuban Government did not gather balance-of-payment statistics so that 
there is no basis for comparison with previous years. 
HARRY S 
LIB RARY 
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% 
{ 
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* 
~ 
<
HARRY’ $, TRUMAN 
L. 
LIBRARY 
Papers of 
HARRY S. TRUMAN 
TABLE V 
CUBAN BALANCE OF PAYMENTS—1947 
(figures rounded) 
| 
Exports of Merchandise 
+ 780,786,179 
- Imports of Merchandise 
— 519,890,404 
+ 260,895,775 
I: COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS AND SERVICES 
Favorable merchandise balance 
+ 260,895,775 
Freight charges 
38,215,244 
2. Insurance 
— 
2,949,467 
3. 
Interest, dividends and rent 
— 
10,429,626 
4. 
Services and commercial, banking and 
professional fees and commissions 
+ 
18,391,599 
5. Remittances to relatives and 
students 
— 
9,856,581 
6. Other personal remittances and 
travel expenses 
— 
30,942,488 
7. Payment to diplomatic and consular 
service 
807,576 
8. Capital yield not expressed in in- 
terest or dividends 
| 
— 
63,000,000 
total 
19,199,175 
— 155,393,407 
II. GOLD 
AND SILVER 
9. Net gold imports 
— 
65,164,283 
II. UNILATERAL TRANSACTIONS 
10. Lend-lease payments 
— 
2,400,000 
IV. 
CAPITAL 
11. Net purchases of foreign bonds, bonds of 
the Republic of Cuba, stocks and other 
| 
securities, and payments on public debt 
— 
10,143,983 
12. Net increases of balances in favor of 
| 
conics 
Cuba abroad and net currency imports 
— 
44,919,814 
Net residue unexplained 
— 
— 
2,073,462 
280,094,950 
— 280,094,950 
PRESIDENT'S SECRETARY 
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