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O DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY MANUAL NO. 56-3 « > HEADQUARTERS, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON, DC 20301 8 July’1979 * INTELLIGENCE PLANNING/MANAGEMENT DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION, OPERATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT (U) 1. (U) PURPOSE: To describe Defense Intelligence activities, functions, and processes and list the specific intelligence responsibility of cach Department of Defense (DoD) component baxd on cunent US. Government directives. 2, (U) REFERENCES: a. DoD Directive 5137.1, “Assistant Secretary of Defense (Communications, Command, Control] and Intelligence),” 11 March 1977. b. DoD Directive 5105.21, “Defense Intelligence Agency," 19 May 1977. c. DoD Directive §-§10020, “The National Security Agency and the Central Security Service,” 23 December 1971. d. DoD Directive $-3}15.7, "Signals y Intelligence,” 25 January 1973. e. National Security Cocncil — Intelligence Directives No.'s 1, 2, and 3, 17 February 1972. f. Executive Order 12036, 24 January 1978. OPR: DP-1 g. 1977/78 United States Government Manual. h. Report of Secretary of Defense to the Congress, 25 January 1979. 3. (U) APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE: This menual applies to all DoD intelligence components, outlines the intelligence relationships of these DoD components, and explains how the complex Defense Intelligence system operates. The = information contained in this manual is designed to improve DoD intelligence planning, programming, budgeting, operations, and management by providing in one document a comprehensive description of Defense Intelligence activities, products, and services. 4. (YU) AUTHORITY: This publication provides intelligence guidance to all DoD components and is issued under the authority delegated in DoD Directive 5105.21, "Defense Intelligence Agency,” by the Secretary of Defense to the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. 5. (U) SUPERSESSION: This manual supersedes DIAM 56-3, 30 December 1975.
8 July 1979 RECORD OF CHANGES Change No. ___Date of Change | Date Entered I —_ow iii REVERSE BLANK DIAM 56-3 Signature of Person Entering Change wie me tats Se i at
8 July 1979 TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ------7-ct crt rrr cern nee ee CHAPTER 2 BASIC PRINCIPLES . as 1, Guidance 2. Goals trot tr a daiaiennaytanenenetaietatetatea te 3. User Needs cert cette t ttt wean en po ee a ee ae we ee me ee ee ee ee ee ee cee ee ee eet ee es 4. Security §. Value (ornare rte crc err ene CHAPTER 3 THE U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY }. Organization of U.S. Foreign Intelligence ------ ret tot to 2. The National Security Act --r ett ttt tt rn 3. Exccutive Order 12036, 24 January 1978 9 ---- ott rrr rrr rrr 4. Authority of the DC]  ---- rrr rere 5. U.S. Foreign Intelligence Community Boards, Committees, and Advisors --— ttm nn 6. U.S. Foreign Intelligence Activities -------e ctr tte trea CHAPTER 4 DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 1. Development and Relationships -r----t ttt ttm ttre 2. Primary Defense Intelligence Goal and Mission 9 ----~ 77> 7-7-7 > 3. The Defense Intelligence System 9 ----- ocr rrr 4. Defense Intelligence Roles and Responsibilities 9 --------------7-7-7- 5. Defense Intelligence Functions and Operations 9 ------------ 3-7 6. Relations Between Defense Intelligence Organizations and Other Organizations «= -$e$- e-em rn CHAPTER 5 DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE MANAGEME NT SYSTEM 1. General 9 wee rn ee rte ner 2. Defense Intelligence Planning -------------- mrt rer rrr 3. Defense Intelligence Resources Planning, Programming and Budgeting (PPB) --~-----~-----~-- eo errr ‘_- ENCLOSURE 1! Organization Charts Chart 1 NSC-Related Intelligence Activities -----------~---------- Chart 2 Defense Intelligence Relationships ------7-- 7-3 r tte rrr Chart 3 Intelligence Organization of a Typical Unified Command -~-7--~- Chart 4 DoD Intelligence Units Located in a Typical Unified Command Area Which Remain Under Department, DIA, or NSA/CSS Control ----- sre pr re rer rrr Chart 5 DoD Intelligence PPBS ----- (.4------------~---------- ENCLOSURE 2 Glossary -~3~- wren er rt ENCLOSURE 3 Key Terms and Abbreviations 9 ----- tr ttt rt v REVERSE BLANK we ere ee ee re ee ee me we ee ee ~~ cm ee nee ee ee ee ee a ee DIAM 56-3 -(3 i) lo wo G Ww ANA N (This page is UNCLASSIFIED)
8 July 1979 DIAM 56-3 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION (U) In past years, the need for a single DoD document to describe the present complex organizational, operational, = and = management relationships in the Defense Intelligence Community was recognized. Accordingly, this manual] was writtcn to satisfy this need. DIAM 56-3 describes the Defense Intelligence activities and processes, and lists the > specific intelligence responsibility of each DoD intcllivence component based on -current US. Governiment directives. The information contained in this manual is designed to be used as reference matcrial within the DoD, to orient newly-assigned Defense Intelligence personnel, and to provide a teaching vehicle for the Defense Intelligence School. REVERSE BLANK
8 July 1979 DIAM 56-3 CHAPTER 2 BASIC PRINCIPLES 1. (U) GUIRANCE: Official statements by the President, the Secretary of Defense, and directives of the National Sccurity Council (NSC), provide the primary guidance and direction from which US. Defense strategy and related Defense Intelligence plans, programs, and budgets are developed. Intelligence support of national Defense policies requires current knowledge of forcign military, scientific, political, and economic developments which may affect US. national security. This, in turn, requires continued collection and production of essential intelligence about foreign armed forces, their strengths, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and estimates of their possible future military threats to the United States and its international interests. 2. (U) GOALS: U.S. Government national security decisions are based, to a considerable degree, on military intelligence produced by DoD Intelligence components. Therefore, the basic goal of U.S. Defense Intelligence is to provide responsible officials of the U.S. Government, particularly DoD officials and military commanders, with the accurate and timely foreign military intelligence needed to aid them in their planning and decisionmaking. In-this context, Defense Intelligence activities must strive for the earliest identification and accurate interpretation of foreign armed forces’ threats which may require immediate diplomatic and/or military actions by the United States. Additionally, the Defense Intelligence Community must maintain detsiled knowledge of foreign scientific and technical (S&T) developments and related military trends which may affect US. Defense planning and programming in the long-range and mid-range periods. 3. (U) USER NEEDS: The increasing power and effectiveness of modern military weapons and delivery systems, and the interrelationships among foreign diplomatic, economic, and military activities, have 3 resulted in increasing demands for timely and comprehensive Defense Intelligence. Strategic air, underwater, and space weapons systems, in particular, require maximum intelligence attention, Defense Intellizence of this kind is used on a continuing basis by the President, the NSC, the Secretary of Di fense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Secretary of State, other appropriate senior Government officials, and military commanders of ell echelons. 4. (U) SECURITY: Successful Defense Intelligence activilies require vigilant and continuing security of products and sources. Security measures must be constantly reviewed and adjusted to support changing Defense Intelligence activities. Inadvertent disclosures relating to DoD intelligence collection and surveillance methods, sources or final results, may cause foreign governments to increase their counterintelligence activities. This may, in turn, increase costs and decrease effectiveness of U.S. intelligence operations. However, a balance must be maintained between security and the user's "need-to-know.” 5. (U)‘VALUE: The value of intelligence activities cannot be directly equated to dollars. Value of finished intelligence must be measured by its usefulness to U.S. decisionmakers and to the defense of the United Sates. Collection, processing, and production of intelligence, therefore, must be planned, programmed, and conducted in accordance with approved goals and objectives to insure that collection is targeted against validated requirements. The costly and unique nature of many intelligence resources and the variety of continuing needs for intelligence by users at all levels dictate that all U.S. intelligence resources be properly planned, programmed, budgeted, and operated as objective-oriented systems to satisfy all essential US. requirements. To support officials at these many levels of authority requires an integrated, well-managed and responsive Defense Intelligence system. REVERSE BLANK ee a eg ee
~~ O O 8 July 1979 DIAM 56-3 CHAPTER 3 THE U.S. FOREIGN INPELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 1.(U) ORGANIZATION OF US. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE: a. (U) The foreign inthcuce activitics of the United States, as authosived by the National Security Act of 1947, are organized to satisfy the requircinents of the President, the NSC, and specific departments and agencies of the U.S. Government. The "US. Foreign Intelligence Coiminimity™ consists of those departments, agencies, and units which are authorized by Jaw or presidential order to conduct U.S. foreign intelligence or counterintcHigence operations. For a variety of reasons they are not in a common chain of command. Each component of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Community is administratively subordinate to the respective department or agency to which assigned. However, overall natioral intelligence policy, which’ guides their operations, is coordinated by a single U.S. Government intelligence official, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). He is appointed by the President, subject to approval by the U/S. Senate, and is responsible to the NSC. b. (U) The NSC acts as the highest Executive Branch entity that provides revicw of guidance for and direction to the conduct of all national foreign intelligence and counterintelhgence activities. The Policy Review Commitiee (PRC) and Special Coordination Committee (SCC) of the NSC assist in catrying out the NSC's responsibilities in the foreign intelligence and counterinicilizence areas. c. (U) The U.S, Foreign Intelligence Community consists of the following organizations: the Central Intelligence Avency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), offices within the DoD for the collection of specialized national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance programs, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of - the Departinent of State, the intelligence elements of the military services, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Depertment of Treasury, Department of Energy and the Drug Enforcement Administiation (DEA), and the staff elements of the office of the DCI. 2. (U) THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT: The National Security Act of 1947 (amended), as implemented by the NSC, laid the foundation for an interdepartmental “intelhgence community" which had evolved from the competing post World War HY Se OE, I a a ae ee 3 - 7 7 7 oe te ee Mees lk a ee - intelligence interests of several U.S. Government departments. The Act established the office of the DCI and the CHA, and provided for a Presidential appointee to scrve as both the DCI and as the Director, CIA. The DCH advises the President and the other members of the NSC icgarding the intelligence aspects of national security and coordinates intelligence activities of the US. Government. He carries out these responsibilities through his chairmanship and/or membership on senior U.S. Government ot NSC intelligence bosrds and conunittces, which involve planning, reviewing, coordinating, and evaluating U.S. intelligence programs and activities. 3. (U) EXECUTIVE ORDER 12036, 24 JANUARY 1978: This order builds on the experience gained under the superseded Executive Order 11905 which insured that foreign intelligence and  counterintelligence activities are conducted in ful] compliance with the laws of the United States and are consistent with broader national security policies. It establishes oversight of the direction, management and conduct of the foreign intelligence activities of the Federal Government and clarifies the authority and responsibilities of the DCI and the departments and agencies that have foreign intelligence and counterintelligence responsibilities. The = most important features of the Order are-as follows: a. (U) The NSC and its two standing committees - the SCC and the PRC - short of the President, provide the highest level review of and guidance for the policies and practices of the Intelligence Community. 7 (1) (U) The PRC, when acting on intelligence “matters, is chaired by the DCI and defines and establishes priorities for consumer requirements for intelligence, making sure these are reflected in budget decisions and evaluating analytical products. This insutes that the needs of the most important users of intelligence guide the entire intelligence process. (2) (U) The SCC, chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, reviews and makes recommendations to the President on special activities and sensitive foreign intelligence collection operations. This committee also assumes responsibility for developing doctrine for counterintelligence activities, AT ERT ES PME tte Oe. er
DIAM 56-3 b. (U) The authorities and responsibilities of all departments, agencies, and senior officials engaged in foreign iniclligence and counterintelligence activities are made public. Those implementing directives, which must remain classified for security reasons, will be made available to the appropriate Congressional oversight committees. The Order implements an earlier presidential decision to centralize under the DCI the most important national intelligence management functions -- collection requirements, budget control and analysis - while operational and support activities are left unchanged and decentralized. The specific opcrational responsibilities of each of the elements of the Intelligence Community, as well as their most important community relationships, are spelled out. Two important organizational mechanisms are established to facilitate thcse functions: (1) (U) The National Intelligence Tasking Center, operating in peacetime under the control of the DCI or, under the Secretary of Defense when the President - so directs, coordinates and tasks national foreign intelligence collection programs. (2) (U) The National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB), which includes the members of the Intelligence Community, is an advisory body to the DCI on all foreign intelligence activities and the budget. c. (U) The methods employed by the intelligence agencies must meet Constitutional standards protecting the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. personnel and must be in full compliance with the law. To accomplish this objective a major section of Executive Order 12035 is devoted entirely to setting forth detailed restrictions on intelligence collection, special activities in support of foreign policy objectives, experimentation contracting, assistance to law enforcement authorities, personnel assigned to other agencies, indirect participation in prohibited activities, dissemination and storage of information, and a prohibition on assassinations. The FBI's intelligence activities no longer have a blanket exception to these restrictions. At the heart of the restriction process is a greatly enhanced role for the Attorney General, as the nation's top legal officer, to establish and approve procedures to regulate the conduct of the most sensitive intelligence activities. These detailed procedures, which will be made available to the Congressional oversight committees, wil] insure compliance with the law, protect Constitutional rights and privacy, and insure that any intelligence activity within the United States or directed against Americans will employ the least 8 July 1979 intrusive means possible and that the use, dissemination, and storaze of such information is limited to that necessary to achieve lswful governinental purposes. d. (U) As an added protection against abuses and to help insure effective performance, the intclligence oversight process is strengthened, (1) (U) The Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) reviews foreign intelligence and counterintclligence activities that may be iNegal or improper, and is given new authority to conduct investigations. (2) (U) The DCI and senior officers of the Intelligence Community ure instructed to report to the Congressional intelligence committees in a coinplete and prompt manner. 4.(U) AUTHORITY OF THE DCI: The DC! is responsible directly to the NSC and: a. (U) Acts as the primary advisor to the President and the NSC on national foreign intelligence and provides the President and other officials in the Executive Branch with national foreign inteHigence. b. (U) Acts as head of the CIA and of such staff elements, as may be required for discharge of the Director's Intelligence Community responsibilities. c. (U) Acts, in appropriate consultation with the departments and agencies, as the Intelligence Community's principal spokesman to the Congress, the news media and the public, and facilitates the use of national foreign intelligence products by the Congress in a secure manner. d. (U) Develops, consistent with the requirements and priorities established by the PRC, such objectives and guidance for the ‘Intelligence Community which will enhance capabilities for responding to expected future needs for national foreign intelligence. e.(U) Promotes the development and maintenance of services of common concem by designated foreign intelligence organizations on behalf of the Intelligence Community. f. (U) activities. Insures implementation of special g. (U) Formulates policies concerning intelligence arrangements with foreign governments and
8 July 1979 coordinates intelligence selstionships between agencies of the Intelligence Community and the intelligence or internal security services of forcign governments. h. (U) Conducts a program to protect against overclassification of foreign intelligence information. i. (U) Insures the establishment by — the Intelligence Community of common security and access standards for managing and hendling foreign intelligence systems, information, and products. j. (U) Participates in the development of procedures required to be approved by the Attorney General governing the conduct of intelligence activities, k. (U) Establishes uniform criteria for the determination of relative priorities for the transmission of critical national foreign intelligence, and advises the Secretary of Defense concerning the communications requirements of the Intelligence Community for the transmission of such intelligence. 1. (U) Provides appropriate intelligence to departments and agencies not within the Intelligence Community. . m. (U) Establishes appropriate committees or other advisory groups to assist in the execution of the foregoing responsibilities. 5. (U) US. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY BOARDS, COMMITTEES, AND ADVISORS: National foreign intelligence and counterintelligence operations are reviewed, guided by and receive direction from the following NSC-related intelligence activities (see enclosure 1, chart 1): a. (U) NSC Policy Review Committee (PRC). The PRC, when carrying out its intelligence responsibilities, is chaired by the DCI and is composed of the Vice% President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the Chairman of the JCS, or their designees, and other senior officials, as appropriate. (1) (U) The PRC. (2) (U) Establishes requirements and priorities for national foreign intelligence. (b) (U) Reviews the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) and budget proposals and mJ DIAM 56- reports to the President as to whether the resource allocations for intelligence capabilities sre responsive to the intelligence requirements of the members of the NSC. (c) (U) Conducts pericdic reviews of national foreign intelligence products, evaluates the quality’ of the intelligence product, develops policy guidance to insuse quality intelligence and to meet changing intelligence requirements. (d) (U) Submits an annual report on its activities to the NSC. (2) (U) Recommendations of the PRC on intcHigence matters may be appealed to the President or the NSC by any member of the PRC. b. (U) NSC Special Coordination Committee (SCC). The SCC is chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and its membership includes the statutory members of the NSC and other senior officials, as appropriate. (1) (U) Special Activities. The SCC considers and submits to the President a policy recommendation, including all dissents, on each special activity. When meeting for this purpose, the members of the SCC include the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Chairman of the JCS, and the DCI. (2) (U) Sensitive Foreign Intelligence Collection Operations. Under standards established by the President, proposals for sensitive foreign intelligence collection opetations are reported to the Chairman by the DCI for appropriate review and approval. When meeting for the purpose of reviewing proposals for sensitive foreign intelligence collection operations, the members of the SCC include the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attomey General, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the DCI, and such other members designated by the Chairman to insure proper consideration of these cperations, (3) (U) Counterintelligence. The SCC develops policy with respect to the conduct of counterintelligence activities. When meeting for this purpose the members of the SCC include the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of OMB, the Assistant to the
DIAM 56-3 President for National Security Affairs, the Chairman of the JCS, the DCI, and the Director of the FBI. The SCC's counterintelligence functions include: (a) (U) Developing standards and doctrine for the countcrintelligence activities of the United States. . : (b) (U) Resolving interagency differences concerning implementation of counterintcligence policy. (c) (U) Developing and = monitoing guidelines for the maintenance of central recuids of counterintelligcence information. (d) (U) Submitting to the President an overall annual assessinent of the relative threat to U.S. interests fiom intelligence and security services of forcign powers and from international terrorist activities, including an assessment of the effectiveness of U.S. counterintelligence activities. (e) (U) Approving — counterintelligence activities which, under such standards as may be established by the President, require SCC epproval. (4) (U) Required Membership. The SCC discharges the responsibilities assigned only after consideration in a mecting at which all designated members are present, or in unusual circumstances when eny such member is unavailable, when a designated representative of the member attends. (5) (U) Additional Duties. The SCC Iso conducts an annual review on ongoing special activities and sensitive national foreign intelligence collection operations and reports thereon ta the NSC; and carries out such other coordination and review activities as the President may direct. (6) (U) Appeals. Any member of the SCC may appeal any decision to the President or the NSC. c. (U) NFIB. The NFiB advises the DCI concerning production, review, and coordination of national foreign intelligence; the NFIP budget; interagency eachanges of foreign intelligence information; arrangements with foreign governments on intelligence matters; the pretection of intelligence sources and methods; activities of common concern; and other matters referred to it by the DCI. (1) (U) The NFIB is chaired by the DCI and includes other appropriate officers of the CIA, the 8 July 1979 office of the DCI, the Depzitincnt of State, the DoD, the Department of Justice, the Department of Treasury, the Department of Energy, the DIA, the offices within the DoD for reconnaissance programs, the NSA, and the FBI. A icpresentative of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs may aticnd mectings of the NFIB as an observer, (2) (UV) When the NFIB incets for the purpose of production review and coordination of national forcign intelligence, it is composed solely of the scnior intelligence officers of the designated agencies. The senior intelligence officers of the Army, Navy, and Air Force may attend all meetings of the NFIB as observers. d. (U) National Intriigence Tasking Center (NITC). The NiTC was established under the direction, control, and management of the DCI for coordinating and tasking national foreign intelligence collection activities. The NITC is staffed jointly by civilian and military personnel including designated representatives of the chiefs of each of the DoD _ intelligence organizations engaged in national foreign inteligence activities. Other agencies within the Intelligence Community may also designate representatives. (1) (U) The NITC is the central mechanism by which the DCI: (a) (U) = Translates = national ~— foreign intelligence requizements and priorities developed by the PRC into specific collection objectives and targets for the Intelligence Community. (b) (U) Assigns targets and objectives to national foreign intelligence collection organizations and systems. (c) (U) Insures the timely dissemination and exploitation of data for rational foreign intelligence Purposes gathered by national foreign intellivence collection means, and insures the resulting intelligence flow is routed immediately to relevant components and commands. (d) (U) Provides advisory tasking concerning collection of national foreign intelligence to departments and agencies having information collection capabilities or intelligence assets that are not a part of the NFIP. Particular emphasis is placed on incressing the contribution of departments or agencies to the collection of information through overt means. (2} (U) The NITC has the authority to resolve
8 July 1979 conflicts of priority. Any PRC member may appeal such a resolution to the PRC; pending the PRC's dccision, the tasking remains in effect. (3) (U) All responsbilities and authorities of the DCI concerning the NITC will be uansfcired to the Secretary of Defense upon the express direction of the President. To maintain readiness for such transfer, the Secretary of Defense will, with advance agreement of the DCI, assume temporarily during regular practice exercises all responsibilities and authorities of the DCI concerning the NITC. e. (U) Office of the DCI Staff. The office of the DCI Staff is a small functional group of experienced intelligence specialists structured to provide the DCI with staff support in the following areas: (1) intelligence program review, (2) intelligence plans and evaluation, (3) intelligence budgetary and financial data handling review. f.(U) The = Inielligence = Research — and Development (R&D) Council is a permanent committee to advise the DCI on RED matters pursuant to his responsibilities under Executive Order 12036. g. (U) JOB. The President's 1OB functions within the White House. The IOB has three members who are appointed by the President from outside the Government and are qualified on the oasis of ability, knowledge, diversity of background and eapcrience. One member is designated by the President as chairman. (1) (U) The IOB: (a) (U) Reviews periodically the practices and procedures of the Inspectors General and General Counsel for agencies within the Intelligence Community (they have the responsibility to discover _ and report to the JOB intelligence activities that raise * questions of legality or propriety), and considers written and oral reports authorized unde its charter. (b) (U) Reviews periodically for adequacy the interna] guidelines of each agency within the Intelligence Community concerning the legality or propriety of intelligence activities. (c) (U) Reports periodically, at least quarterly, to the President on its findings and reports in a timely manner to the Presdent any intelligence activities that raise serious questions of legality or propriety. DIAM $6-3 (d) (U) Forwards to the Attorney General, in a timely manner, rcports received conceming intelligence activities in which a question of legality has been raised or which the IOB belicves to involve questions of legality. . (c) (U) Conducts such investigations of the intelligence activities of agencies within the Intelligence Community as the Bourd deems necessary to carry out its functions under the Order. (2) (U) No person who serves on the staff of the 1OB will have any contractual or employment lationship with any agency within the Intelligence Cumniunity, h. (U) National Intelligence Officers (NIO's). The DCI appoints NIO's as his personal representatives for important geographical areas or functional activities in the U.S. intelligence community. The NIO's act as "Staff Officers" for the DCI and provide informal but direct contact throughout the Intelligence Community to insure coordinated support of National Intelligence Estimates (NJE's), production standards, evaluations, and product review. NIE's are coordinated through the US. Intelligence Community, approved by the NFIB, and are signed by the DCI, Each current NIE is considered the basic U.S. nationa) estimate of specific regional or country trends and capabilities, and/or intentions. Special NJE's are requested by the NSC or the President and often involve the entire Intelligence Community. . i. (U) Defense Intelligence Officers (DIO's). The Director, DIA, appoints DIO's for such geographic and/or topical areas of responsibility as he considers appropriate. The DO's are senior staff representatives operating under DIA's Vice Director for Production (VP). Each DIO serves as: (i) (U) The Defense Intelligence interface with NIO's dealing with substantive matters of prime interest to the DoD and the JCS, to insure effective and coordinated Defense inputs to national intelligence efforts, in respective fields of assigned responsibilities. (2) (U) The principal substantive advisor of the Director, DIA, and senior professional expert within his respective field of responsibility. Each DIO advises the DIA on the responsiveness and objectivity of Defense Intelipence products, including alternative views of interpretztions when appropriate, using to the greatest extent possible existing organizations, panels of experts, or committees in order to fully utilize DoD intelligence rescurces,
DIAM 56-3 (3) (U) The personal agent of the VP in identifying and evaluating the needs of intelligence users for Defense Intelligence products. Accordingly, each DIO maintains close personal contact with key users Of military intelligence throughout the Defense establishment and elsewhere. (4) (U) A senior advisory officer, in assigned areas of responsibility, for particular issue-oriented problems of key concern to the Director, DIA, which involve several Defense Intelligence organizations. These duties may involve such matters as the quality of intelligence performance, possible remedial actions, and general resource implications. 6. (U) US. ACTIVITIES: FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE a. (U) Basically, all U.S. Government forcign intelligence activities fall into four general categories - military, S&T, political, and economic. In response to general or specific requirements, a variety of finished intelligence products are produced on these subjects from data which have been collected, processed, evaluated, and analyzed by various methods. (1) (UV) One- of the most difficult US. Government activities involves planning successful collection operations and producing accurate analy tical reports which properly aid U.S. Government officials in making decisions. The worldwide information explosion of recent years has made these tasks more complex and costly, particularly the collection of needed information. Much information is obtuined by routine, overt collection procedures. However, most of the data critical to nationa} survival are obtained by clandestine or highly technical means. (2) (U) The budgetary need to program production and related collection resources and systems years in advance, for eventual use wgainst changing and usually hostile target nations or forces, greatly complicates intelligence planning. In recent years, increasing use has heen made of highly specialized technology to ottain information which most nations actively attempt to protect through a variety of complex security procedures. The result is that extremely costly technical collection systems, which supply large quantities of selected raw or semi-processed data for US. intelligence producers, have been developed and deployed throughout the world. Using data from such systems, US. intelligence activities prepare finished intelligence products which are designed for specific U.S. Government intelligence users. Much of this production is in the area of military 10 8 July 1979 intelligence and is accomplished within the DoD. b. (U) US. Govemment foreign intelivence aclivitics are conducted primarily by the CIA, the Departient of State, and the DoD. The scope of their activities is determined by their — statutory responsibilities and NSC directives. * , (1) (U) The CIA. (a) (U) Collects foreign intelligence and develops, conducts, or provides support for technical and other programs which collect national forcign intelligence. The collection of information within the United States is coordinated with the FBI a5 required by procedures’ agreed upon by the DCI and the Attorney General. (b) (U) Produces and disseminates forcign intelligence relating to the national security, including foreign political, economic, scientific, technical, military, geographic and sociological inteligence to meet the needs of the President, the NSC, and other elements of the Government. (c) (U) Collects, produces, and disseminates intelligence on foreign aspects of narcotics production and trafficking. (d) (U) Conducts — counterintelligence activities outside the United States and coordinates courterintelligence activities conducted outside the United States by other agencies within the InteNigence Community. (e) (U) Without assuming or performing any internal security functions, conducts counter intelligence activities within the United States but only in coordination with the FBI and subject to the approval of the Attorney General. (f) (UU) = Produces = and < disseminates counterintelligence studies and reports. (g) (U) Coordinates the collection outside the United States of intelligence information not otherwise obtainable. (h) (U) Conducts special activities approved by the President and carries out such activities consistent with applicable law. (i) (U)) Conducts services of common concern for the Intelligence Community as directed by the NSC.
8 July 1979 (j) (U) Carries out or contracts for research, development and procurcinent of technical systems and devices relating to authorized functions. (k) (U) Protects — the security of its installations, ‘activities, information and personnel by appropriate means, including such investigations of applicants, employees, contractors, and other persons with similar associations with the CIA as arc necessary. (Ql) (U) Conducts such administrative and technical support activities within and outside the United States which are necessary to perform its functions, including procurement and essential cover and proprietary arraiiy ments. (m) (U) Provides legal and legislative services and other administrative support to the office of the DCi. (2) (U) The Department of State. (a) (U) Overtly collects foreign political, sociological, economic, scientific, technical, political-military, and associated biog aphic information. (b) (U) Produces and disseminates foreign intelligence relating to US. foreign policy as required for the execution of the Secretary of State's responsibilities. (c) (U) Disseminates as appropriate, reports received from U.S. diplomatic and consular posts abroad. (d) (U) Coordinates with the DCI to insure that national foreign intelligence activities are useful to and consistent with US. foreign policy. (e) (U) Transmits reporting requirements of the Intelligence Community to the Chiefs of US. Missions abroad. ( (VU) Supports Chiefs of Mission in discharging their statutory responsibilities for direction and coordination of mission activities. (3) (U) The DoD. (a) (U) Collects national foreign intelligence and is responsive to collection tasking by the NITC. (b) (U) Collects, produces and disseminates forcign military and military-related intelligence 1 DIAM £6-3 information, including scientific, technical, political, geographic and economic information as required for execution of the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense. (c) (U) Conducts progrems and missions necessary to fulfill national and tactical foreign intelligened requirements, (d) (U) Conducts —s counterintelligence activitics in support of DoD components outside the United States in coordination with the CIA, and within the United States in coordination with the FBI pursuant to procedures agreed upon by the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General, and produces and disseminates cuounterintelligence studies and reports, (ec) (U) Directs, operates, controls, and provides fiscal management for the NSA and for Defense and miltary intelligence and national reconnaissance entities. ( (U) Conducts signals intelligence (SIGINT) and communications security (COMSEC) activities, except as otherwise directed by the NSC. (g) (U) Provides for the timely transmission of critical intelligence, as defined by the DCI, within the U.S. Government. (h) (U) Reviews budget data and information on DoD programs within the NFIP and reviews budsets submitted by program managers to the DCI to insure the appropriate relationship of the NFIP elements to the other elements of the Defense program. (i) (U) Monitors, evaluates, and conducts performance audits of DoD intelligence programs. () (U) Carries out or contracts for research, development and procurement of technical systems and devices relating to authorized intelligence functions, (k) (U) Together with the DCI, insures that there is no unnecessary overlap between NFIP and DoD intelligence programs and provides the DCI all information necessary far this purpose. (1) (U) Protects the security of DoD installations, activities, information and personnel by pproprate means including such investigations of oF applicants, employees, contractors, and other persons
DIAM 56-3 with sinilas associations with the DoD as are necessary. (m) (U) Conducts such administrative and technical support activities within and outside the United States which are necessary to perforin the DoD intelligence functions. c. (U) Specific responsibilities for collection, processing, production, and dissemination of finished intelligence, based upon Icgal agency or departmental 12 8 July 1979 missions, are authorized by the NSC and specified by the DCI. Responsibilities for performance of certain basic intelligence senices are set forth in the National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCID's). Implementing actions are issued by the DCI ina series entitled the Director of Central Intellivence Directives (DCID's). Individual ‘departmental or agency regulations assign internal intelligence responsibilities within the parametcrs of these basic directives.
§ July 1979 DIAM £6-3 CHAPTER 4 DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY }. (U) DEVELOPMENT AND RELATIONSHIPS: a. (U) The intelligence activitics of the DoD form a major effort within the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Community, particularly in terms of military intelligence production. DoD foreign intelligence activities, referred to in this manual as the “Defense Intelligeace Community,” have primary responsibility within. the U.S. Government for management and production of finished intelligence on forcign armed forces, their military capabilitics and related activities. This responsibility includes S&T, as well as economic and political information directly pertinent to the missions of the various components of the DoD. The primary members of the Defense Intelligence Community include the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Coramunications, Command, Control and Intelligence) (ASD(C31)), Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy Review) (DUSD(PR)), the Director, DIA; the Directors, NSA/Chief, Central Security Service (CSS); the intelligence chiefs of the Military Services and the Unified and Specified (U&S) Commands and their component commands. In addition, a variety of intelligence agencies, units, and activities arc assigned to the Services or U&S Commands to accomplish supporting tasks. See enclosure J, chart 2, for a diagram of Defense Intelligence Relationships. b. (U) The Defense Intelligence Community has evolved since the enactment of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act. These acts provide the basic legal authority for the DoD organization. In Congressional discussion on these bills, ir telligence was identified as one of the Defense support activities which could benefit from common DoD functional control and management. Two DoD intelligence agencies, the NSA and the DIA, and certain special collection programs were established to improve the management of Defense Intelligence collection and production activities. The Secretary of Defense also was made responsible, as executive agent, for those Defense Intelligence collection resources which must be managed and controlled at the national level. c. (U) The NSA/CSS is responsible for centralized coordination, direction, and performance of highly specialized technical functions in support of U.S. Government activities to protect U.S. communications and processes forcign intelligence information. The 2 NSA was established by Presidential directive in 1952 as a separately organized agency within the DoD. In this directive, the President designated the Secretary of Defense Executive Agent for the signals intellivence (SIGINT) and communications security (COMSEC) activities of the Government. In 1972, the CSS was established, in accordance with a Presidential memorandum, to provide a more unified cryptologic organization within the DoD and appointed the Director, NSA as Chief of the CSS. The NSA/CSS has two primary missions -- a COMSEC mission znd a foreign intclHigence information SIGINT mission. d. (U) The DIA was established by DoD Directive 5105.21, on 21 August 196}, and was charged to improve coordination and = management — of non-<cryptologic Defense Intelligence collection and production activities and reduce duplication of effort by the Services. The DIA, under provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, operates under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense. The DIA is responsible for producing and disseminating Defense Intelligence to satisfy the intelligence requirements of the Secretary of Defense, the JCS, and major components of the DoD. It accomplishes this either by use of internal resources (through the management, control, and coordination of the intelligence functions of other DoD activities) or through cooperation with other intelligence organizations. e. (U) The scope of intelligence activities of the Military Services was altered considerably with the establishment of the NSA and DIA. However, the Services maintain intelligence staffs at all major levels of command to carn out the statutory responsibitities of the Military Departments for intelligence planning, programming, and training, as well as to support new weapons systems and combat developments. f. (UV) In October, 1977, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) was reorganized, establishing an Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and an Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. (1) (U) The Under Secretary for Policy is the primary advisor and staff assistant for such matters as international peltical military affairs and = arms limitation negouations, intelligence analysis and
DIAM 56-3 requirements, and the integration of departmental plans and policies with overall national security objectives. (a) (U) Reporting to him is the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) (ASD(ISA)), who is also the principal Deputy to the Under Secretary for Policy. (b) (U) Subordinate to the ASD(ISA) is the DUSD(PR), who is the principal staff assistant for Defense policy as it relates to communications and intelligence analysis, requirements and priorities, as well as other policy matters as determined by the Secretary of Defense. The DUSD(PR) also reviews all intelligence and counterinteligence programs and budgets to insure that they are censistent with DoD policy and respond to valid requirements. (2) (U) The Under Secretary for Research and Engineering is the primary advisor and staff assistant on matters relating to research, engineering, acquiStion, communications, commend and control, and intelligence resources (including related warning and reconnaissance activities). (a) (U) Reporting to the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering is the ASD(C3I), who is responsible for the functions formerly performed by the Director, Telecommunications and Command and Control Systems and for the intelligence resource management functions, formerly performed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence). He also serves aS principal staff assistant in carrying out the Secretary's responsibilities as Executive Agent of the National Communications System (NCS). 2. (U) PRIMARY DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE GOAL AND MISSION: a. (U) The Defense Intelligence Community, by virtue of differing military intelligence requirements, has a complex organizational structure. The DIA and NSA are Defense agencies while other DoD intelligence components are established at various Jevels in the Services and U&S Commands. Thus, in many cases, different departmental views dictate different anplications of the same finished imtelligence products. The varied roles of these DoD intelligence components are described as a "system" in terms of the funda:nental intelligence goals, missions, and functions which represent the current basis of all DoD intelligence activities. h. (U) The basic gal of the Defense Inteigence 14 § July 1979 system is to provide Government policymakers, military planners, snd commanders with a reliable, timely and comprehensive appreciation of: (1) (U) The capabilities, vulnerabilities, and options available to forcign powers or factions to use their armed forces or other yoverninental’ power in a manner which will affect U.S. national interests, or US. inilitary capabilities. (2) (U) Situations and contingencies which may require use of U.S. Armed Forces or other Defense programs by the United States. (3) (U) Other fureign factors which may affect the capabilities and/or options available to the United States, and which may affect planning and programming for future use of its armed forces. (4) (U) The threat posed by hostile foreign intelligence activities, sabotage, and subversion aguinst the DoD or its military units and forces. c. (U) The mission of Defense Intelligence in achieving this goal is to develop and maintain an intelligence system which: (1) (U) Satisfies the foreign military intelligence needs of the President, the NSC, the Secretary of Defense and his Assistants, the JCS, the Military Services, UES Commands and their component and joint forces commanders, and other designated US. and international recipients. (2) (U) Provides a cormpiehensive, foreign military intelligence data base of current, basic, estimative, special, S&T, and management intelligence required for the planning and conduct of military operations. « (3) (U) Provides the ~— counterintelligence capability required to protect the DoD against hostile foreign intelligence activities (espionage, sabotage, subversion), and foreign terrorist activities. (4) (U) Functions with efficiency and maximum economy consistent with the needs of national security. (5) (U) Adjusts to changing requirements in periods of tension and to the needs of engaged forces in limited wer, with minimum reorganization and augmentation. (6) (U) Survives and continues to operate under C
8 July 1979 conditions of ceneral war providing adequate redundancy and backup capability. 3. (U) THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM: a. (U) The operation of the Defense Intelligence system is based on sequential steps wh.:-h can best be described as the Defense Intelligence cycle. This includes the standard intelligence functions of requirements, collection, processing, production, dissemination, and support. As discussed below, they augment the responsibilities, doctrines, and procedures for guiding joint intelligence activities of the Armed Forces as outlined in JCS Publication 2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)." b. (U) The following list includes those steps which encompass the Defense Intelligence cycle. (Specific use of each step may vary within various functional or organizational activities.) (1) (U) Enunciation by the user of his needs for foreign military intelligence based on approved strategy. (2) (U) Validation of user needs for such intelligence based on objectives and priorities. (3) (U) Assessment of whether the needed foreign military intelligence is available within the U.S, intelligence community, or can be expected to become available as a result’ of progsammed/budgeted resources, or scheduled production. (4) (U) Formulation of a production program and assignment of production priorities and tesponsibilities to insure the production of intelligence which satisfies the validated needs of intelligence users. (5) (U) Production and dissemination of foreign mulitary intelligence products based on informatioa already available. (6) (VU) Identification of the additional information to be collected, if available data is inadequate or incomplete, indicating items for priority collection and processing which are most needed for intelligence production purposes. (7) (U) Consolidation and validation of collection tequirements. (8) (U) Allocation of collection tasks according to priorities and the specific capabuities of collection resources. DIAM ‘£6-3 (9) (U) Collection and reporting of required information, (10) (U) Processing and data reduction of selected collection information to make it mute uscuble to the production analyst and/or for storage in a data base. . , (11) (U) Transmittal of collected and processed information to sppropriate production elements. (12) (U) Transformation of this data by consolidation, correlation, evaluation, analysis, and synthesis into finished foreign military intelligence products. (13) (U) Dissemination of such finished intelligence to appropriate intelligence users. (14) (U) Evaluation of product utility by users. (15) (U) Review of product evaluations and intelligence cycle operations for system improvement. c. (U) The Defense Intelligence system, in actual operation, is an interrelated and complex process. It involves effective "meshing" of command, administrative, and intelligence processes to insure that requested Defense Intelligence is collected, processed, produced, and disseminated to authorized users at all echelons of the DoD and elsewhere in the U'S. Government. This requires proper training, assignment, and worldwide deployment of intelligence specialists of all types. Additionally, the acquisition and deployment of sophisticated collection, processing, communications, production, and technical support facilities are necessary to insure that the Defense Intelligence cycle satisfies quantitatively and qualitatively the requirements of all authorized users of Defense Intelligence. 4. (U) DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES: , a. (U) The DoD. Executive Order 12036 assigns to the DoD the primary responsibilities within the U.S. Governinent for the collection and production of foreign military intelligence. This responsibility includes the collection and production of S&T and to DoD economic intelligence directly pertinent missions and requirements. b. (U} The Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Chainnan, JCS.
© DIAM 56-3 (1) (U) The Sccretary of Defense is by law the principal advisor to the President on national security. He participates in the development of national intelligence policy as a member of the NCS. In this position, the Secretary, along with other members of the NSC, receives advice and national intelligence from the DCI, who is the principal intelligence officer for the NSC. The Secretary of Defense and Chairman, JCS, by Presidential Executive Order, are members of the PRC and SCC of the NSC. In this capacity, they contribute to the formation of policy relating to forcign intelligence operations and evaluation of intelligence products. (2) (U) The Secretary of Defense, in accordance with Executive Order 12036, and by his departinental management authority, is responsible for the overall supervision and coordination of Defense Intelligence activities. - He discharges his management and coordination responsibilities in this area through the ASD(C31), DUSD(PR), the Chairman, JCS, the DIA and NSA/CSS, and through the command channels of the Services and the U&S Commands. A Director of Net Assessment has also been established in OSD to integrate all DoD activities of this type and to insure a consolidated assessment of DoD strategy planning. c. (U) ASD{C31). The ASD(C31), as principal staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense for DoD communications, command and control, and intelligence resources (including related warning and reconnaissance activities) and as principal staff assistant in carrying out the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense as Executive Agent of the NCS, has the following responsibilities for each of his assigned areas. (1) (U) Provide advice, make recommendations, and issue guidance on DoD plans, programs, and fiscal activities. (2) (U) Develop policies, systems and standards for the administration and management of approved plans and programs. (3) (U) Initiate and review programs and carry out approved policies. (4) (U) Review the quality and timeliness of products and their effectiveness for users. (5) (U) In conjunction with the ASD (Comptroller), review proposed programs and the resources required to implement them, formulate budget estimates, and recommend resource allocations. * over 8 July 1979 (6) (U) Monitor the implementation of approved plograms, cooperztion, and mutual understanding between the other Federal agencies. (7) (U) Participate in those planning, programming, and budgeting activities which relate to ASD(C3N) responsibilities. (8) (U) Exercise, subject to the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, the latter's direction, authority and control over all research and development matters related to communications, command, control, and intelligence. (9) (U) Exercise direction, authority, and control over all DoD actions to allocate resources for intelligence activities, except those organic to combatant forces and those intelligence support activities specifically delegated to the JCS. Authority the intelligence activities of the Military Departments will be exercised through the Secretary of the Military Department concerned. (10) (U) Serve on boards, committees, and other groups pertaining to his functional areas. (11) (U) Peiform such other duties as the Secretary of Defense may prescribe. ; d. (U) DUSD{PR}. DUSD(PR) has the following responsibilities for each of his assigned areas: (1) (U) Develop DoD communications and intelligence policy and means to verify response to policy. (2) (U) Confirm requirements for research, development and systems acquisition for intelligence analysis and production, intelligence collection and cémmunications. (3) (UV) In accordance with existing guidelines determine priorities for Defense Intelligence collection and establish guidelines for the assembly, integration and validation of all Defense intelligence requirements. (4) (U) Exercise staff supervision on policy matters over the DIA, the NSA, the Defense Mapping Agency, the Defense Communications Agency, Air Force and Navy special intelligence programs, Defense communications and intelligence functions retained by the Military Departments, and, in conjunction with the ASD (Comptroller), exercise the same supervision over
8 July 1979 the Defense Investigative Service. (5) (U) Provide staff support for the Defense Intelligence Advisory Board. (6) (U) Conduct liaison with the Joint Staff and USS Commands on policy matters related to his areas of responsibility. (7) use of space for matters related responsivility. (U) Develop DoD policy and requirements for to his areas of (8) (VU) Provide to the ASD(C3]) requirements for intelligence and communications programs. (9) (U) Oversee DoD participation in sensitive intelligence matters, including contracts or arrangements with other countries; cooperate with the ASD(ISA) with respect to review of intelligence matters related to the NSC Special Coordination Committee. (10) (U) Provide policy guidance, oversight, and coordination for intelligence-related programs and issues to include counterintelligence and security policy. (11) (U) Participate in studies and analyses involving communications or intelligence policy matters and other matters as directed by the Secretary of Defense. (12) (UY) Serve on boards, committees, and other groups pertaining to his functional areas. (13) (U) Perform such other duties as the Secretary of Defense may prescribe. e. (U) The JCS. (1) (YU) The JCS, supported by the Organization of the JCS (OJCS), constitute the military staff of the Secretary of Defense. To accomplish _ their responsibilities for advising and assisting the Secretary of Defense, the JCS are charged in DoD Directive 5100.1 “to provide adequate, timely, and reliable joint intelligence for use within the DoD." As the OJCS does not include a joint intelligence directorate (J-2), the DIA provides all required joint intelligence support to the JCS, as described in DoD Directive $105.21. (2) (U) The JCS utilize the Director, DIA, as their primary agent and staff officer to carry out their military intelligence and countesintelligence functions. 17 DIAM 56-3 ime Bn also serves the JCS as the primary producer ot tlie ense In'elligence for the development of intelligence guidance ; i a planning. § and estimates to support joint (3) (U) The JCS review the Defense portion of the NFIP and related plans and programs to detennine their impact on and support of stated military requirements, JCS secommendations for chanies in NFIP intelligence resources are made to the Scatctary of Defense through ASD(C31). f. (U) Defense Agencies. DIA and NSA are DoD intelligence organizations jointly manned by professional civilian personne] and military personnel of all the Services. The Directors of both agencies are active duty general or flag officers of at least three-star grade. They have broad managerial authority for tasking and resource review of Defense Intelligence activities which support their assigned missions. g.(U) The ASD{Comptroller) The ASD (Comptroller) is the principal staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense for programming, budgeting, auditing, and fiscal functions; for all matters pertaining to organization, management and administration; and for DoD investigative and security policies to include counterintelligence and security policies. He provides staff supervision for the Defense Contract Audit Agency and Defense Mapping Agency. In addition, he: (1) (U) Provides for the design and installation of resource management systems throughout the DoD. (2) (U) Collects, analyzes, and reports resource management information for the Secretary of Defense and as required for the OMB, the Congress, the General Accounting Office, and other agencies outside of the DoD. h. (U) The Director, DIA. (1) (U) The Director, DIA, is responsible for satisfying the foreign intelligence requirements of the Secretary of Defense, the JCS, the U&S Commands, DoD components, and other authorized agencies, and for providing the military intelligence contribution to national intelligence. The Director, DIA, serves as both the substantive intelligence advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the intelligence staff officer of the JCS. In these capacities, the Director, DIA, provides foreisn intelligence and counterintelligence for military and defense purposes, supervises the DoD indications and warning (IAW) system, and coordinates, validates, and evaluates the satisfaction of all DoD intelligence
DIAM $6-3 collection requirements, As program manager for the Genetal Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) and as the DoD senior substantive voice for foreign intelligence matters, the Director, DIA, serves as a member of the NFIB. In this capacity, he advises the DCI concerning the NFIP budget and production, review, and coodination of national foreign intelligence. (2) (U) The Director, DIA, has broad authority for the following four basic management soles within the DoD: (a) (U) The principal military intelligence officer and advisor to the Secretary of Defense for all substantive foreign military intelligence matters. (b) (U) The coordinator of all collection and production of finished foreign military intelligence. In this role, he is responsive to all major users of Defense Intelligence. (c) (U) Responsible primarily to the Chairman, JCS, for providing foreign military intelligence, counterintelligence and related staff support to the Joint Staff and the U.S. military establishment, (d) (U) Program Manager for the GDIP. (3) (U) The DIA has authority under DoD Directive 5105.21, to issue DoD-wide manuals or regulations governing — collection, — production, dissemination, integration, and evaluation of foreign military intelligence. This authority establishes DIA's key role in the Defense Intelligence Community. The impact of DIA management controls over general non-cryptologic military intelligence resources varies with different intelligence functional areas. (4) (U) For military S&T intelligence production, the DIA formulates DoD-wide program planning guidance and exercises comprehensive management control, although most S&T facilities are operated by the Services. For most other Defense Intelligence activities, the DIA validates collection and production requirements, tasks collectors, assigns priorities, and coordinates production schedules. On the other hand, DIA management authority over the intelligence staffs of Service headquarters and U&S Command headquarters is limited to review, coordination, and/or technical direction of those foreign military intelligence functions retained by the Services or assigned to those commands. 18 8 July 1979 (5) (VU) The production of general intelligence within the DoD is accomplished by the Military Services, the UfS Commands, and DIA. The overall management of this program rests with the DIA. To fulfill its responsibility for developing a single DoD general intclligence production program, the DIA has established a production manageinent systent, (a) (U) This coordinated and mutually. supporting sy'sicin consists of three parts: production management documentation, production management conferences and visits, and participation in the annual Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) cycle. The purpose of the documentation program is to provide an informational framework to facilitate sound decisions concerning the scope and direction of DoD gencra) intelligence production. Specifically, management documentation is required: to review and coordinate the general intelligence production activities of the, Commands and the Services; to support resource-telated judgments; and to respond to queries (by oversight staffs) on the community's current and future intelligence production. The information and documentation maintained under this program focuses on the entire DoD production community. The Production Responsibilities Document (PRD) details the geographic and topical areas of responsibility of each DoD gencral intelligence production organization to serve as a basic reference on all DoD intelligence production. It is also designed to become a primary tool in justifying production resource requests and in tasking and scheduling the flow of intelligence production, (b) (U) The second basic document is the Defense Intelligence Production Schedule (DIPS) designed to provide an inventory of planned DoD general intelligence production. It is used by production managers for such actions as elimination of duplicative production, establishment of mutual supporting relationships and to advise collectors of future production tasks requiring collection action. The DIPS is also used by consumers to review programmed production, vis-a-vis their own needs, as a basis for identifying unsatisfied intelligence production requirements. (c) (U) Under procedures adopted by the October 1978 DoD General Intelligence Production Management Conference, the DIPS file will distinguish between products and files “endorsed” by DIA and those produced at local Command initiative. Further, the DIPS will be a primary means of establishing the degiee to which the production effort satisfies a
8 July 1979 priority intelligence need, is redundant or duplicative of other production, and is within the limits of the preducer's responsibilities cited in the PRD. (d) (U) Under cunent procedures, each intelligence producer undertakes an active evaluation program of his DIPS production, Summary results of user surveys conducted under this program are provided to the DIA and are maintained as a discreet and privileged Production Evaluation File. The file is used to respond to Congressional queries on DoD wide production effectiveness and/or a basis for making resource judgments. (6) (U) The JCS charged DIA, in SM-262-462, 6 March 1962, with providing foreign military intelligence support to the U&S Commands. To accomplish this, the DIA operates mainly through the military chain of command, working with the intelligence staffs of the U&S Commands to improve their intelligence forces, to insure rapid exchange of - intelligence, and to provide intercommand support arrangements. As necessary, such measures are submitted for approval by the commander-in-chief concerned and the DIA. Those measures requiring JCS approval] are processed by DIA in its Joint Staff role in accordance with JCS procedures. (7) (U) The Director, DIA, has established a formal coordination mechanism, the Military Intelligence Board (MIB), so he can officially obtain Service advice and assistance in Defense Intelligence matters. He is the chairman of the MIB, whose members include the Service intelligence chiefs. MIB meetings are called by the DIA to discuss Defense Intelligence activities, problems, and estimates and to insure that all Service intelligence views are aired. Through this participative approach, the best possible intelligence advice can be presented to the Chairman, JCS, the Secretary of Defense, and the NFIB. (8) (U) A MIB subcommittee, generally referred to as the MIB Working Group, was established by the DIA in September 1974, The membership consists of senior officers or civilians from each of the Services as designated ty the Service Intelligence Chiefs. The Assistant Deputy Director for Pians and Policy chairs the MIB Working Group. The working group provides a forum for addressing topics and problem areas of mutual concern to military intelligence in support of the MIB. It also provides a medium for rapid communication, problem definitions, solutions and cooidination among the DIA and the Service intelligence organizations at the Sub-MIB level. DIAM 56-3 (9) (U) Jcs Publication 4, DIAM 49 1 (9) ; ! -I,and DIA publication RCC-2600.926.78 contain a summary of the duties and responsibilities of all D : j and offices. all DIA directorates (10) (U) The specific res onsibiliti Director, DIA, are: - P ities of the (a) (U) Produce, or through tasking and courdination, provide forcign intelligence for military and defense purposes, including political, economic and scientific and technical intelligence. This function includes the maintenance of a strong DoD scientific and technical intelligence program. (b) (U) Participate in the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council process as established in DoD Directive 5000.2 by providing the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering with threat evaluations and threat validations based on information derived from coordinated intelligence. (c) (U) Supervise the DoD indications and warning (J&W) system and provide timely support to the Worldwide Military Command and Control System as well as appropriate military field commanders. (4) ¢ U) Under policy and guidelines established by the DUSD(PR), cocrdinate all ‘DoD intelligence collection and production ‘requirements and validate, register, assign, recommend priorities for and evaluate the satisfaction of, DoD collection and production requirements, including those requizements assigned under the provisions of DoD Directive 5000.2. (e) (U) Maintain and operate a facility for the timely and interactive tasking of collection systems and capabilities in response to the time-urgent needs of the DoD. ‘4 (f) (U) Assume primary responsibility for the day-to-day operations of the National Intelligence Tasking Center when transferred from the DCI to the Secretary of Defense, and maintain readiness for such transfer through regular practice. (g) (U) Manage the Defense Attache System , (DAS) (h) (U) Participate in joint national and Defense Intelligence activities such as the National Photographic Interpretation Center, the National Intelligence Tasking Center, the Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center and other such activities as
DIAM 56-3 may be developed by mutual inter-agency agreement and approved by ihe Secretary of Defense. (i) (U) In coordination with — other intelligence agencies concerned, recommend plans for intelligence opcrations, including plans for the use of national intclligence systems to support military operational commanders. (j) (U) As directed, coordinate the execution of approved intelligence operation plans. (k) (U) Act as manager for all aspects of Defense Intelligence production within the GDIP and recommend changes in the application of current and new collection systems or improvements in DoD intelligence collection systems and related collection systems to the DUSD(PR) and the ASD(C3)). (1) (U) Serve as Program Manager for the GDIP (m) (U) Manage such other intelligence programs as may be designated by the Secretary of Defense. (n) (U) Coordinate for the OSD and the JCS, Defense collection, production and analysis of information concerning the international terrorist threat to US. forces, installations, and nuclear weapons facilities. (0) (U) Establish, maintain and operate facilities for DoD imagery indexing, processing, duplication, evaluation, exploitation and central repository services in support of DoD and other authorized recipients. (p) (U) Supervise a DoD-wide intelligence dissemination program and provide centralized dissemination services in support of DoD and other authorized recipients. (q) (U) Operate the Defense Intelligence School. (r) (U) Maintain a central repository for all DoD intelligence reporting and provide intelligence bibliography, reference library, and research services. (s) (U) Exercise management authority for ali DoD intelligence information systems and related intelligence telecommunications systems except those systems dedicated to SIGINT operations and support 8 July 1979 functions falling within the scope of DoD Directive $-3115.7, (t) (U) Operate a DoD-wide = carcer development program for civilian general intelligence personnel and review, coordinate and evaluate the career development ‘program for military gencral intelligence personnel; conduct planning and guidance activities in coordination with DoD components on these programs to meet DoD requirements. Provide technical assistance in the development, and monitor and evaluate the conduct of, DoD general intelligence training. (u) (U) Provide guidance to DoD components concerning the release of Defense Intelligence information to foreign governments, international organizations, and the public. (v) (U) Provide representation on national * and international intelligence committees, boards and 20 working groups, as appropriate. (w) (U) Provide the DoD focal points for relationships and exchanges with foreign intelligence services except as exempted by the DUSD(PR). The DIA will coordinate new proposals for relationships and exchanges with the DUSD(PR). Maintain a central registry of all DoD intelligence agreements with foreign services, (x) (U) Establish and conduct or recommend, research, development, test and evaluation programs or projects to carry out the responsibilities assigned. (y) (U) Administer assigned DoD security policies and programs to protect intelligence and intelligence sources and methods, including direction of the Defense Special Security System. This responsibility will not apply to programs of the NSA, or other programs exempted by the Secretary of Defense. (z) (U) Adjudicate clearance eligibility for DIA civilian personnel and eligibility for access to compartmented intelligence for all personnel assigned to OSD, OJCS, and the Defense agencies, with the exception of NSA, including contractors and consultants. (aa) (U) Perform such other functions and services as the Secretary of Defense may assign. .,
§ July 1979 i. (U) The Director, NSA. (1) (U) The function of the NSA is to conduct SIGINT activities and COMSEC activities for the U.S. Government, to provide an effective unified organization for the conduct and control of the *SIGINT activities and COMSEC activities of the United States, and foz formulating and promulgating operational plans, policies, and procedures for such  veactivities. The unified organization is the U.S. SIGINT ) system, the purpose of which is to meet the needs for national, departmental, and tactical SIGINT. (2) (U) The functions of the NSA are carried out under the direct supervision and control of the Secretary of Defense, who must comply with intelligence and COMSEC policies, needs, and priorities established by the NSC. This is done through the Director, NSA/Chief, CSS,, who is charged in DoD Directives, S-5100.20 and S-3115.7 with general management of SIGINT and COMSEC activities. (3) (U) The Director, NSA will: (a) (U) Establish and operate an effective unified organization for SIGINT activities, except for the delegation of operational control over certain operations that are conducted through other elements of the Intelligence Community. No department or agency other than NSA may engage in SIGINT activities except pursuant to a delegation by the Secretary of Defense. (b) (U) Control SIGINT collection and processing activities, including assignment of resources to an appropriate agent for such periods and tasks as required for the direct’ support of military commanders. (c) (U) Collect SIGINT information for national foreign intelligence purposes in accordance, < with tasking by the NITC. (d) (U) Process SIGINT data for national foreign intelligence purposes consistent with standards for timeliness established by the DCI. (e) (U) Disseminate SIGINT information for national foreign intelligence purposes to authorized elements of the Government, including the Military Services in accordance with guidance from the NITC. (f} (U) Collect, process, and disseminate SIGINT information for counterintelligence purposes. 2] DIAM 56-2 (g) (U) Provide SIGINT support for the conduct of military operations in accordance with lesking, prioritics and standards of timeliness assigned by the Secretary of Defense. If provision of such support requires use of national collection systems, these sysiems will be tusked within existing guidance from the DCI... , "os (h) (U) Execute the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense as executive agent for the COMSEC of the U.S. Government. (i) (U) Conduct R&D to meet needs of the United States for SIGINT and COMSEC. (j) (U) Protect the security of NSA installations, activities, information and personnel by appropriate means including such investigations of applicants, employees, contractors and other persons with similar associations with the NSA as are necessary. (k) (U) Piescribe, within the field of authorized operations, security regulations covering operating practices, including the transmission, handling and distribution of SIGINT and COMSEC material within and among the elements under his control and exercise the necessary supervisory control to insure compliance with regulations. ‘ (1) (U) Serve as program manager for the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP), which is part of the NFIF, and manage such other programs as designated by the Secretary of Defense. (m) (U) Act as the functional director, under the ASDX(C3I) for developing DoD career development programs for military and civilian cryptologic personnel. aay The NSA/CSS[i? the U.S. Government's primary collector and processor of communications intelligence (COMINT) on foreign nations and activities, the primary processor the primary coordinator of all DoD electronics .ntelligence (ELINT) collection activities, and the final authority for all US. Government cryptographic systems, equipment, and procedures. The NSA either supervises, or conducts the processing of all COMINT, and some ELINT data, but does not produce finished intelligence from processed SIGINT. The Director, NSA/Chief, CSS, also conducts those SIGINT operations which directly support electronic warfare (EW).
DIAM 56-3 Po j. CU) Athtary Deparmients'Services, (1) (U) The role of the Military Departments derives from the statutory departmental missions. These include, primarily, preparing forces for conduct of war and = previding  pers-mel, logistic, and administrative support io the combatant commands. Accordingly, the primary intelligence role of the Military Departments is similarly to arcenize, train, and o equip intellic forces for assiznment to the combatant commands, and to cenduct those intelheence functions which pecuharly relate to departmental micsons. Included is the deselopment and support of intelligence systems and the provision 8 July 1979 of intclligence support to the Military Departinents staffs, agencies, and subordinate commands. (2) (U) The Military Departments are charged in accordance with DoD Directive $100.1 to “provide adequate, timely and reliable departmental intclivence for use within the DoD." These responsibilities are primarily fulfilled by the respective Military Services for their Departments. DUD Directive $100.1 tasks the Army and the Air Force to "provide an organization capable of furnishing adequate, timely, and reliable intellicence for cach respective Service. The Directive also states that a primary function of the Navy and Marine Corps is to “furnish adequate, timely and rehable intelligence for the Navy and Marine Corps.” In this miganer, the intelhysnce responsibilties of the Departments and Services support their broad, statutory missions. The Services are primary producers of technical intelligence for themselves, the DIA, and other components of the DoD. A major responsibility of each Service, unique to cach Service, is to relate intelligence programs to operational support of each type of combat force. The current edition of the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) instructional manual, “Intelligence for Joint Forces," AFSC Pub 5, contains a current sumunary of the major intelligence organizations of each Service. Current Service directives and regulations contain the authoritative responsibilities of the various Service intelligence organizations. (4) (U) Coordination of intelligence activities in the Services is exercised through Service chiefs of intelligence. Each Service intelligence chief is responsible to his Service Chief for supervision of Service worldwide resources. Another primary responsidility of each Service intelligence chief is the contribution to the annual departmental portions of the GDIP, including Service intelligence activities of components of the U&S Commands. (5) (U) Within constraints, Service intelligence staffs prepare finished intelligence reports and studies for internal use, particularly to develop Service positions for NFIB or JCS deliberation. Service intelligence staffs and ave cies use DIA, CIA, or State Department finished intelivence as well as their own reports for a variety of Service planning, programming
8 July 1979 and/or operational purposes. Service intelligence representatives from these staffs and agencies patticipate regularly in DoD, Joint or other intelivence activities, including membership on DCI committees and subcommittees. (6) (U).The Military Departments provide the tactical and other intelligence and counterintelligence resources for the component commands. However, these resources are authorized only after the appropriate DoD programming and budgeting decisions have been made on Service recommendations. Resources are procured through Service channels. The Military Departments also furnish trained and experienced military intelligence personnel for joint staff duty in the DIA, NSA/CSS, and the U&S Commands. (7) (U) Specific intelligence responsibilities of the Military Departments and Services are listed below. (2) (U) Organize, train, and equip intellirence and counterinichlizence units and personnel for assignment to combatant commands, departmental elements, and other components of the DoD. Provide for the continued support of such units end personnel. (b) (U) Develop intelligence doctrines and techniques, and plan and develop tactical intelligence systems, as required, for support of the combatant forces. (c) (U) Provide military intelligence training and advisory assistance to selected foreign countries in accordance with approved programs. (d) (U) Establish and administer career development programs for military and civilian intelligence personnel, guided by the Intelligence Career Development Program (ICDP). (ec) (U) Develop and procure intelligence equipment and supplies, and conduct the research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) incident thereto, as authorized. (f) (U) Develop, establish, and support the Service segments of the DoD Intelligence Information System (DODHS) in accordance with approved policies and procedures. (g) (VU) Conduct counterintelligence operations for the protection of worldwide departmental and Service activities and other DoD activities, as required. N tw DIAM 56-3 . (h) (U) Conduct operations to collect intelligence information and develop collection resources in accordance with approved proctams. (i) (U) Conduct SIGINT and acoustical intelligence (ACOUSTINT) operations in accordance with applicable directives. , (j) (U) Produce S&T intelligence and other special finished intelligence products directly related to departmental missions under tasking or other ° appropriate management supervision of the DIA. (k) (U) Produce finished counterintelligence products under tasking of the DIA or other appropriate management supervision. ' (1) (U) Receive finished intelligence and _collate, interpret, adapt, and present it to departmental “ consumers in the form required to satisfy their needs and in support of particular forces and weapon systems development requirements. (m) (U) Provide, at appropriate levels of command, intelligence staff support as required, including intelligence staff support to the Chief of Service in his capacity as a member of the JCS. . (n) (U) 9 Operate the departmental components of DoD systems for protective handling and dissemination of special intelligence materials, in accordance with applicable directives. (0) (U) In conformance with DoD Directive 5100.1, develop and administer an integrated system for the Military Departments’ intelligence and counterintelligence activities. k. (U) U&S Commands. <1) (U) The operational intelligence role of the U&S Commands is to insure the availability of foreign military intelligence necessary to support the command mission. Related responsibilities are to insure necessary counterintelligence measures to protect their commands, to exercise “operational command" and thus, guidance, over the intelligence activities of their component commands, subordinate unified commands, and task forces; and to satisfy the intelligence collection and reporting requirements of higher authority. The intelligence chiefs of the U&S Commands are responsible to their commanders-inchief for command-wide intelligence planning for support of the command's operational missions. This requires integration and coordination of
DIAM 56-3 most Defense Intelligence operations in their command's theater of operations. The U&S Commanders are not formally involved ia the annual programming and budgeting for component command intelligence resources. However, the program managers informally request their views. While the Services furnish trained intelligence manpower and financial support for the component command intelligence activities, the operating policies of these components emanate from the U&S Commander through his intelligence staff, which prepares intelligence reports or studies for command-wide use, within the limits of available resources. In most cases, DIA, CIA or State Department finished intelligence is combined with internally produced data for this purpose. See enclosure 1, Chart 3 for the intelligence organization of a typical U&S Command. Much of the current 7MeNigence used by the jount’ commander in support of his operations, is produc. ? by DoD intelligence activities. See AFSC Pub 5 ‘or detailed discussion of joint intelligence operations involving joint planning, estimates, collection, production, use of computers, etc. Doctrine on joint intelligence is contained in JCS Publication 2. (3) (U) Specified intelligence responsibilities of the U&S Commands are listed below. =, (a) (U) Conduct foreign military intelligence - collection and production operations, in order to accomplish the command mission and to satisfy the intelligence requirements on the command by higher authority, © 9000S ae, (b) (U) Insure that the necessary counterintelligence measures are taken to protect the command, (c) (U) In conformance with DIA guidance, & July 1979 develop and administer supporting integrated inteNigence planning and management systems. (d) (U) Produce finished foreign military intelligence, as required, to execute command missions; levy on higher authority. or other commands requirements for finished intelligence which cannot be met by resources within the ‘command. . (¢) (U) Participate in the DoD Indications and Warning Systems. (f) (U) Review, validate, and levy collection requirements on subordinate commands; levy on higher authority or other commands those validated command collection requirements which cannot be met by collection resources within the command. (g) (U) Conduct collection operations and manage, as required, the collection operations of subordinate commands. (h) (U) Develop, establish, and manage the DODUS within the command. (i) (U) Insure that intelligence and counterintelligence support is furnished to subordinate elements of the command, (j) (U) Participate in the DoD.wide ICDP. 1. (U) Component Commands. (1) (U) U&S Command intellivence resources are primarily assigned to the individual Service component commands. These serve in tactical or operational needs, e.g., the war or contingency planning requirements, of the component commanders 2s well as the needs of the U&S Commanders. These specific Service resources consist of a variety of intelligence units, ’ ' Joint intelligence centers exist in ‘some tneaters for special intelligence processing and production. Intelligence staffs, counterintelligence, and investigative activities exist in component commands in accordance with assigned missions. Component command intelligence resources are programmed and budgeted through appropriate Military Department channels in accordance with “prescribed PPB procedures. Most of the component intelligence output serves nat only its oan needs but also the intelligence requirements of the U&S Conunander invelved, and
8 July 1979 to a degree, certain national needs. ‘Tactical intelligence units at a component or oy mg Jevel normally remain under the “control «of . the = cumponent commanders, Such operational control is essential to accomplish assigned tactical missions and to insure that these units are “immediately responsive to the tactical commander in emergencies or combat (3) _, Some theater general intelligence units also Play 2 role in the development of national intelligence. At the same time, these units must continue to pravide the required data for normal comunand intelligence operations. ) Continuous intetligence and operations coordination is essential in tactical operations and in all operational commands. At these levels, planning for intelligence production and related collection by the commander's staff must be tailored to tactical (operations) objectives and priorities. Conduct of intelligence operations at the tactical level must directly support the_tactical commender's immediate, needs. ‘in addition ‘1o~satisfying the tactical commanders’ imimediste needs, much current military intellisence may be produced, which satisfies other_ intelligence requirements, as operational capability allows, “and operations. DIAM 56-3 5. (U) DEFENSE AND OPERATIONS: a. - Basie Procedures, The Defense Intelli- ecme Community has established procedures to insure effective supervision of Defense Intelligence functions Working relationships have been INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS * developed among the OSD, DIA, NSA, the Services, wee ee and the UAS Commands which have resulted in b, Identification of User Needs. (Information Requirements). The initial step in the operation of the intelligence cycle is the identification ‘of specific user information’ needs. c. (U) Intelivence Collection, Collection operations are conducted in (1)
‘DIAM 56-3 response to validated requirements for the production . * a - . = ™ of finished forcign military intelligence. (4) (U) The basic DoD intelhgence collection systems currently in use are described below. (a) (U) HUMINT collection uses human 8 July 1979 beings as collectors of information, documents, and equipment. Collectors may be within or outside the Intelligence Community. Included are the military attaches, the Services, and components of the U&S Commands. (b) Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) collection results in a record of likeness of the target on sensitized material, particularly photographic Yinaterial, which is interpreted and processed for intelligence use. ” ~~ o (c) (U) SIGINT collection consists of: 1, (U) COMINT collection, the intercept of foreign communications from which technical and intelligence information is derived, does not include the monitoring of foreign public media or the intercept of communications obtained during the course of counterintellizence investigalons within the United ? States. The NSA/CSS, with support from the Military Services, is responsible for the execution of COMINT collection programs. 2. (U) ELINT collection, the collection of foreign noncommunications electromagnetic radiations from other than nuclear detonations or radioactive sources and from which technical and intelligence information is derived, is executed by national level resources, the NSA/CSS, the Services, the U&S Commands and their components. 3. (U) TELINT collection, the intercept of foreign telemetry, which is processed ard analyzed to obtain technical and intelligence information is a subcategory of foreign instrumentation — signals intelligence. (d) (U) Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) collection results in S&T intelligence information obtained by quantitative and qualitative analysis of data derived from specific technical sensors for the purpose of identifying any distinctive features associated with the source, emitter, or sender, and to and/or measurement of the same. The term MASINT is not terms when referring to the specific disciplines, but will be used only when referring to the broad category of special facilitate subsequent identification intended to replace the established sensor disciplines. 26 (
8 July 1979 (5) (U) DIAM 58-2, "Defense Intelligence Collection Requirements Manual (DIRM)," is the basic DoD authority for Defense Intelligence worldwide collecticn operations. It contains an explanation of the collection requirements management system and related procedures. The DIRM identifies in broad terms all subjects of military interest for collection planning and operations. d. (U) Information Processing. (1) Intelligence information and data processing embraces those activities which are necessary to seduce collected information to readable text, or to a form suitable for analytical exploitation or sforage in an intelligence data base. b 27 DIAM 56-3 e. (U) Types of Intelligence Products. (1) (U) Intelligence production is normally based on the correlation and analysis of all available information collected and processed by methods just described. The final intelligence products are as objective, accurate and timely as possible to serve user needs. Such production includes a wide range of geographic and functional topics based on approved intelligence objectives and priorities, or on special requirements of current crisis situations. (2) Finistied intelligence may take many forms. It can be prepared as summaries for verbal briefings to DoD officials and senior military commanders, as formatted reports for electrical
‘ DIAM 56-3 transmission, a$ additions to intcligence data bases or as detailed and comprehensive studies and estimates. Finished intelligence consists of several general functional categories, as discussed in the next paragraph. For clarity, it is desirable to consider finished intciligence products in these categories, rather than in terms of levels of use, eg., national, Strategic, tactical, or operations. Some of these terms are defined in enclosure 2 due to usage elsewhere. In general, however, most of these and related terms define types of intelligence products which can be broadly included in the initial categories discussed below: (3) (U) Four distinct categories of foreign military intelligence are normally produced within the Defense Intelligence Community, having products in a variety of formats, with different details of coverage and varying reporting frequencies, all keyed to user needs. These categories are: ; (a) (U) Current military intelligence -usvally concise, brief, and timely studies or reports *,on significant foreign military and related activities, "time-critical" indications of significant existing or impending foreign military trends, activities or threats, or counterintelligence reports. (b) (U) Basic military intelligence-covering the widest spectrum of information such as order of battle, target data, biographic data, regional studies, economic, politico-muitary, insurgency, terrorism, military geography, counterintelligence, and other encyclopedic categories. (c} CU) Military S&T intelligence-which in’ udes specific studies of developmental work on foreign weapons systems and materiel] and their associated operational performance and technical characteristics, countermeasure techniques, nuclear energy programs and weapon trends (including stockpiles), electronic warfare capabilities, R&D activities and trends, technical aspects of multi-system operations, developments in basic applied sciences and technologies with warfare potential. (d) (U) Miltary intelligence estimates-which include assessments of fureign military capabilities, 8 July 1979 limitations, possible courses of action, and future trends of forcign military forces and weapons systems. f. (U) Intelligence Production and Reporting. (1) (U) Requests for both general and S&T finished intelligence are normally validated by the DIA. Requests to the DIA for Defense Intelligence come from throughout the DoD, but also from many other governmental departments, the White House staff or from committees of the Congress which deal with national security matters. To fulfill such repetitive or continuing requirements, specific intelligence products are programmed by the DIA. These intelligence products, including those produced at all echelons, are periodically reviewed to insure that they continue to be responsive to validated intelligence requirements and are not substantively duplicative. (2) (U) The DoD | Intelligence Community . . . 7 : teceives guidance concerning DoD user requirements af 28 through the Key Intelligence Requirements (KIR) program. The KIR's are those military intelligence tequirements which surface as most critical to decisionmakers for the formulation of policy and decisions in the area of national security. The purpose of the KIR's is to anticipate, identify, and address critical defense-related intelligence requirements and to provide specific intelligence questions for the DoD needed to focus collection and production efforts, create audit trails of requirements, efforts, products and user satisfaction, and evaluate the DoD Intelligence Community performance. (a) (U) In order to provide more explicit guidance concerning intelligence efforts for the foreseeable future, the JCS issues the Intelligence Priorities for Strategic Planning (IPSP), which identifies countries and military intelligence requirements of interest to the United States and is the basic guide for the assignment of priorities to DoD intelligence production and collection. In the development of this document, several documents which provide official expressions of strategy and/or intelligence needs are considered. These include the DCID 1/2, the US. Intelligence Community's national objectives and priorities document; Annex A, Intelligence, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), which contains intelligence tasks and planning guidance for the U& Commands for the oncoming fiscal year; Annex A, Intelligence, of the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD), which covers the 8 mid-range years and documents the JCS and UES Command intelligence needs, selected intelligence estimates; and the Unified Command Plan (UCP). The DIA, as the primary
Oo 8 July 1979 military intelligence producer and/or coordinator, uses the IPSP as a means of guiding intelligence activities for the oncoming years, principally those concerning production and collection tasking, and related support functions. Through this process, improved production schedules can.be developed, more explicit und timely collection actions can be programmed, and the quality of intelligence reporting can be more closcly aligned with consumers’ necds. (b) (U) In implementing portions of the IPSP, the DIA annually updates three production plans which list the major intelligence products to be produced by all Defense activities. Two of these plans, the DIPS, for general inteNigence, and the Counterintelligence Publication Registry (CIPR), prescribe who is to produce what and when in the area of general intelligence. The CIPR also lists available counterintelligence products. S&T intelligence is produced in accordance with a Service coordinated, DIA-approved DoD schedule covering current and projected fiscal year production. This schedule is ‘maintained by quarterly updates in response to Service inputs. A complete listing of current, valid S&T intelligence products is maintained in the Scientific and Teclinical Intelligence Register (STIR) which is published semi annually. Entries contained in the STIR include anticipated dates of scheduled revisions for each product. (c) (U) Two DIA manuals provide guidance, policy and procedures for DoD-wide military intelligence production. DIAM 57-1, "General Intelligence Production (U)," CONFIDENTIAL, establishes policies for the processing and production of all DoD finished general intelligence. It contains data on general intelligence production management, standardization, numbering of intelligence subject publications, production scheduling, reporting formats and related guidance information. This manual also contains Organizational charts of Defense Intelligence production facilities in the Military Services and U&S Commands, current Defense Intelligence production responsibilities of these organizations, as well as the DIA/CIA division of responsibilities for overail U.S. national level intelligence production. DIAM 75-1, "Scientific and Technical Intelligence Production (U)," CONFIDENTIAL, describes the DIA S&T production management system and sets forth the assigned responsibilities of DoD components in the system. This manual outlines the major elements of the system;i.e., production management structure, production program procedure, management data reporting, information Services, foreign materiel exploitation and use of re.ated technical sensor data. These manuals are issued DIAM 56-3 periodically under the authority of DoD Directive 5105 21. (3) The most vital task of Defense Intelligence is to insure the immediate reporting to the National Command Authorities (NCA) of indications and warning of the imiminence of hostilities. Worldwide Defense indications systems, with warning centers at various echelons, have been established to insure the most rapid reporting of such critical intelligence to the President, the Secretary of Defense, the JCS, and other U.S. governmental decisionmakers. This type of intelligence is processed, evaluated, and reported by highly-skilled and experienced Defense Intelligence personne) at various warning centers in a matter of minutes, | (4), Finished intelligence is normally reported by the most rapid means considered essential to insure that the intelligence reaches the required user at the time specified or according to an established schedule (even hourly, if required, during crises or emergencies). Defense Intelligence analysts at all levels try to santicipate information that is going to be needed. [ The DIA and other DoD intelligence producers watt "automatically" initiate continuous or periodic feporting to intellivence users when the situation so requires. 29
» DIAM 56-3 § July 1979 (5) The actual operations of the Defense Intelligence worldwide production and reporting system are complex and integrated with related - operational command and control system. The entire integrated system is directly responsive not only to the NCA but also to all other U.S. governmental officials who need current Defense Intelligence to aid their daily activities and their decisionmaking. ’ \ \ (a) Defense Intelligence products are ‘ used by DoD representatives during NSC, NFIB, and other meetings, and during crises. The DIA provides atange of military intelligence estimates, services, and products to the White House, Defense, and military decisionmakers on an hourly or daily basis during crisis periods. . ——— ~y ow _H) Defense “Alractie i Sumees” (DAQ's)“are“4o be “difeCled, operated, and maintained by the DIA to collect and report military and political-military intelligence, to provide representational services, to accomplish certain security Ff assistance functions and to serve their assigned US ~.ambassadoss__as_ requested and required Ww 30
8 July 1979 (e) (U) Defense Attaches are diplomatically accredited, overtly-assigned, professional U.S. military representatives who are permanently stationed in most foreign capitals. They are unique elements of the DoD intelligence collection system and are in regular personal contact with foreign military officers and officials of friendly, ncutral, and potentially hostile countries. Defense Attaches, usually senior military officers, provide Defense, State Department, and other U.S. Government officials with rapid and unique "first-hand" reporting on assigned countries, as well as providing direct advice and assistance to their "country team" chiefs, the resident U.S. Ambassadors. Defense Attaches represent, simultaneously in many cases, the DoD, the JCS, and their respective Services to their host government's military establishment, In many cases the attaches are the only US. Defense or Service representatives in particular countries or regions, and must provide U.S. official representational services and functiens on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman and members of the JCS, the Chiefs of the Services, and the Commanders of U&S Commands, as well as perform a variety of assigned Defense Intelligence collection tasks. (6) (U) Each Military Service has S&T intclligence production activities which come under the direct management authority of the Director, DIA. Under this centralized management system, the ‘itary Services and other DoD components submit current and foreseeable needs for foreign military S&T and related intelligence products. These production requirements are then reviewed, validated, and assigned priorities. The majority are tasked to the Service S&T production elements by the DIA. These tasking assignments are based “on assigned areas of responsibilities. In this manner, most of the S&T products prepared by the Services are developed to satisfy DoD-wide intelligence requirements in all military S&T areas. Oe ogee —— The DYA™ HES *the “tesponsibility for tasking, coordinating, and counterintelligence. Counterintelligence and other special products directly reiated to departmental missions are produced and distributed directly to departmental users and planners ts well as to other monitoring the production of : DIAM 56-3 appropriate echejons throughout Defense Intelligence. - 8) With some exceptions, forcign military intelligence produced at DoD (DIA) echelons must be supplemented by local production at operational echelons in order to satisfy the detail of reporting required by a particular command. This requirement for local ‘production normally increases down the echelons of command, commensurate with increasing needs for detail, timeliness, and special orientation to local situations. At the tactical level, commanders are “necessarily heavily dependent on their own staffs and other assigned resources for immediate production of intelligence to support ongoing operations. g.(U) Intelligence Support Functions. In addition to the basic functions which comprise the primary intelligence process of collection, processing, production, and dissemination, there are certain functions which contribute to this process and which are integral elements of the Defense Intelligence system. These include: _. (1) ' _DODNS. The system is comprised of the information handling facilities, equipment, and personnel of the DIA, the U&S Commands, their components and the Military Services supporting the Defense Intelligence Mission. ” « - ' i ‘ 31 _ . The aysiem provides analytical tools and techniques for the efficient. manipulation, storage, snd retrieval of intelligence and is specifically designed to serve
ne om emacs an eee eee: epee wee an es DIAM 56-3 individual performance of their functionsf ~ (2) . Phe timely and accurate Screening, dissemination, storage, and retricval of documents are essential to the intelligence planning, collection, and production efforts. Central management control and/or guidance of such intelligence support systems in the DoD is essential to assure economical and responsive document service. (3) (U) Intelligence Career Development and Training. The increasing complexity and technical nature of intelligence today requires highly qualified experienced, technically oriented personnel, both military and civilian. Sound career . development programs are vital to develop and” maintain a core of such personnel and provide - assignments for them throughout Defense Intelligence. Basic intelligence courses are conducted by the Services and all authorized military personnel. The CIA conducts all clandestine training for military departments, and the Air Force provides formal training in imagery interpretation. Such joint training is coordinated, monitored, and evaluated by the DIA. The Defense Intelligence School, as a JCS-chartered institution, is responsible for the professional intelligence training of all DoD personne! in the joint intelligence area. The DIA, through its Defense Intelligence School, provides senior and graduate intelligence training for both military and civilian intelligence analysts and managers in the { | and dedicated 32 8 July 1979 personnel, The NSA, similarly, provides several courses for training personnel in cy ptology. Other specialized courses ure authorized for Defense Intelligence training needs. This intelligence training, supplemented by other college graduate Jeve] and National and Service college education, are prerequisites to developing the highest caliber of profes sional personnel for duty with Defense Intelligence. In accordance with DoD Directive §101.10, DIA reviews and cooidinates the ICDP for military general = jiatelligence = personnel — (less cryptologic) and similarly is the executive agent for establishing a DoD-wide ICDP for non-ryptologic civilian intelligence personnel to provide opportunities for education, training, rotation, and promotion equal to their contemporaries in other career fields. (4) (U) intelligence RED. [%. The development, validation, and full financial™ support of creative Defense Intelligence RDT&E programs are essential to insure the continued future effectiveness of collection, production, and. reporting systems of Defense Intelligence.
8 July 1979 . . DIAM 56-3 ' ’ . - c. (U) Forcign Governments and International - Organizations. (b) (U) The Intelligence Resource and (1) (U) Relations between the DoD intelligence Development ‘Council explores new directions and activities and those of foreign governments and techniques in- both the “hard" and "soft" sciences international organizations arise by virtue of Defense which hold promise for intelligence and which should and/or mutual gssistance treaties or through official receive program support and application It maintains — caccutivé arrangements. Such relations are conducted a continuing knowledge of the allocation and uses of — by various echelons of the DoD, but are, in all cases, R&D resources related to intelligence, and advises the subject to review and coordination by the DIA and Chairman, Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee, approval by the Office of Secretary of Defense. (IRAC) on R&D strategy and technology that will best contribute to the attainment of national intelligence obicctives, 6. (U) RELATIONS BETWEEN DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS. a. (U) Private Contractor Organizations, (1) (VU) Relations between DoD_ intelligence | components and private contractors involving the . release of classified intelligence material are governed . by NFIB policy. \ (2) (U) If contractors for governmental agencies, who are not DoD components nor members of NFIB, require access to classified DoD intelligence, requests for approval will be forwarded fiom the contracting government agency to: (a) (U) The Military Department concerned if an agreement has been entered into between the governmental agency and the department. (b) (Uj) The DIA in all other cases. b. (U) Other U.S. Agencies and Departments. Relations between DoD intelligence organizations and: * other U.S. agencies or departments outside the US.: Inteligence community are determined by pertinent DoD and DCI directives governing the use and. dissemination of intelligence materials. 33 REVERSE BLANK
8 July 1979 DIAM 56-3 CHAPTER 5 DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 1. (U) GENERAL: a. (U) The complexity and varied responsibilities of the Defense Intelligence Community, together with the reality of increasingly limited resources, require an integrated management system controlling all DoD intelligence activities. To achieve this, improved planning, programming, and evaluation of products and services must be accomplished. These management activities are affected by a variety of influences such as U.S. national goals, changing military strategy and objectives, financial constraints and the expected — military threats to the United States and its interests. ‘ Development of realistic intelligence resource programs , and operational intelligence capabilities by Defense Intelligence managers are essential to a cohesive and effective Defense Intelligence management system. b. (U) An important aspect of the Defense Intelligence management system is the interrelationship between planning, programming, and budgeting (PPB) for development of future intelligence resources and | the use of available resources to satisfy present! intelligence operational requirements. The planning : and programming for most Defense Intelligence future | resources are performed by senior DoD, DIA, and NSA . program managers in close coordination with: intelligence officials of the Services. On the other hand,! most operational Defense Intelligence collection,’ processing, and some production activities are carried | out by military commands which must be responsive compatibility, there must be close coordination to the military chain of command. To insure | between the planners and the programmers and the |; current operational managers. Thus, officials and military commanders at all Jevels must have a continuing voice in their intelligence requirements and in the products and_ services developed in their behalf. 2. (U) DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE PLANNING: a. (U) Coordinated Planning. Q)) Coordinated planning of all Defense Intelligence activities is essential to reaching Defense Intelligence __goals. Since Defense 35 intelligence | \ Intelligence supports military planning based on national policy and strategy, it must be keyed to_ national and Defense goals and objectives. ~ (2) (U) This planning system, in some respects, parallels but does not duplicate required Defense Intelligence support for JCS planning. It is designed to integrate all Defense Intelligence planning to maintain the capability to simultaneously and directly support the President, the NSC, other national intelligence requirements, the Secretary of Defense, as well as the JCS. This planning system is designed to insure the most efficient allocation of Defense Intelligence resources to achieve the somewhat differing NSC and JCS requirements. The Defense Intelligence planning system will include internal evaluation mechanism for collection, production, and reporting accountability to insure a viable managernent
DIAM 56-3 system, responsive directly to xpproved goals, objectives and related priontics, b. Estimates - Basis for Plan. ig. The basic national defense strategy of the United States, as developed by the DoD for the NSC and sppioved by the President, must be built upon the framew ork_of good Defense estimative intelligence. f c. (U) JCS Strategic Planning Periods, Defense estimative intelligence is the foundation for the basic military contribution to the President's national strategy. This ase fiected tine “the | DoD FYDP’ which, hg Pieper’ Shnvelly | through the DoD PPB 5" Siem] These es) estimates “are. formally” published in. the. vantly oer . 4 “Pens” and? studies, in “accordance ‘ with 1 the JCS Join Srratecie:. Pls 2firing “Sysiem, USPS); a_siructured, *Srnually updated: Planning “system? picserk ibed 1-inc ICS tucincrndum=-of- Pelicy, 847 (MOP—84): -The, ISPS “neludesi “the: Joint—Long -Range=, Strategic - “Study LR sg)kZande- the: Joint:Long- -Rarigé =. -Estimativ Jrtelligence_Document GLREDD) Jor 3 “the, é long-i 1angg Planfing_period..These_ “documents. will be seplaced: in 1980" “by ‘the, Joint, Long: Range, Stfetegig, “Appraisal ZULRSA); = covering”. ‘estimative,. “intelligences: Sf * siiategic., forecasts, — broad. ~ force. ~ structuring. Saplicutions® “and “probable, issues i in the. ~petiod, froin * 40 to 20 years i in the. “future; the mid “Fangs, Spt Straiegic. Planning, Document it OSPD), w Which provide E ‘ton npichensive rinvitary epprassl ¢ of. the: threat” US. Anterest7 and” Objectives. “Rondaide, a” tem off 7 oe oe statement, ° } 2 ek, ieceiminende ¢ inilitary o see ctives, derived, from Rational, ubjectives, “2 " - Heyl ed to. “attsin agonal “objec tives in ‘he. iid- Janse g Period; "End" the” Joint_ it Strategic 4 “Caps: ities. _Plan? Ont en 8 July O ra d. (U) Long-Renge Intelligence Planning. (1) Long-range Defense planning by the U.S, Government is largely dependent upon a systematically updated Defense Intcllivence data bse on military and iclated political and econornic activities of the sclected nations and regions of the world, ~ H £7 (Q2YXU)TICS| estima tive ~ planning and” Thibtans. R&D ‘needs for, this petiod 3 are 10 be. ‘published in the. ’ JLRSAZ or will” “summarize” “ trends’ ‘o “off: ‘world® ‘powers felationships= in” “the ~ long-range” period, “includ: ing a Sstimatese ‘on: the! » expected~ Capabilities” of foreign’ Ee S: national’ ihicrests> ee tad Lape Ae ey ations” io take, ‘ctfons ‘which "could: adversely” affect is eh woe (3), Defense Intelligence forecasts are required on a continuing basis to_support DoD and JCS Jongsange planning. - 36 79 (
§ July 1979 . DIAM 56-3 3 eQ-3 (4) Providing intelligence support for the Defense system process is a joint undertaking by the Services and DIA. Long-range projections of the thieat will generally extend over the anticipated operational To. . lifetime of the US. systems. a J A se (2) JCS planners concerned with mid-ra:ce force planning largely depend on Defense Intelligeiice for the data they need for this purpose. Future US. Forces have to be planned with the knowledge that intelligence is never complete or entirely accurate, e. (U) Mid-Range Intelligence Pianning. \ (1). Joint Defense Intelligence estimates are conunually prepared by DIA to describe the interrelated military, political, and economic trends that may affect U.S. national interests in the , forthcoming 10 years. These estimates are based on intelligence from the DIA, the Services, and the U& Commands. ~~ wy (4) . efense Intelligence mid-range planning, imarily concerned with identification and itself, is pr which must be selection of future resources, programined several years in advance. 37
Mee / s - , oe _ (5) (U) Realistic resource planning and programming for the mid-range period must occur every year, building upon PPB actions and decisions of previous years and laying the foundation for Jater budgeting for actual intelligence capabilities for current use. In this phase, Defense Intelligence mid-range requirements and priorities are translated into the types and costs of intelligence resources it is anticipated will be needed in the short-aange period. This results in decisions to request specific collection, procuction, and related support resources believed required to obtain the desired information, to process | it, and then to produce the required intelligence. Great | care must be eaercised in the programming phase. | Future needs for intelligence cannot be met if required | resources are not carefully programmed, fully funded, | or procured. Additionally, personnel must be properly | trained and equipped in time to be deployed within , the periods required by the President's strategy. (6) (U) The Defense Intelligence Plan provides a framework for DoD-wide integrated intelligence planning. It makes use ef the JIEP and the DIPP in Gescribing the future threat in terms of implications for Defense Intelligence in the mid-range period. It is applicable to those elements of the DoD involved in planning and programming for intelligence as a source document for: a description of the threat as it relates to intelligence and the intelligence environment in the mid-range time frame; a statement of the 38 be 8 July 1979 comprehensive and key intclligence needs against which intelligence must work during this period; a presentation of prioritized capabilities to achicve required resources to overcome inadequacies in the support of Defense intelligence; and puidance in the Preparation of plans in specific functional areas. f. (U) Short-Range Intelligence Planning. (1) (U) Integrated short-range operational planning primarily involves development, coordination, and assignment of production and related collection tasks for the next 2 fiscal years. Such planning must be related directly to current user needs and to existing or budgeted resousces. It is also an outgrowth of mid-range resources program decisions. The short-range period generally covers 2 fiscal years, the current year and the budget year, described in DoD Directive 7045.7. In most cases, the entire period can be covered by current intelligence collection and production tasking. Since cxisting resources are involved for current fiscal year operational planning, resources piogrammed for use or procurement in the forthcoming budget year usually have been, or shortly will be, approved by the Secretary of Defense and the President. While these resources cannot be used or procured until final Presidential signature on a Congressional appropriation act, this will normally occur in sufficient time for continuous current planning for the entire short-range period. (2) To support short-range planning, intelligence estimates must be explicit as to foreign military capabilities, trends, and force levels which are expected during the period ~ ~ ~~ g.(U) Summary. The Defense Intelligence planning system is intended to integrate ali military intelligence estimates, _ planning, programming, Operations, evaluation, and management activities. It identifies and describes their use to meet the future Defense Intelligence collection, production, and Support requirements. The system must support DoD programming and procurement decisions which involve billions of dollars and determine the national Defense posture and military capabilities of the future. The system provides guidance, goals, and objectives for collection, production, and dissemination activities to
8 July 1979 insure that Defense Intelligence products and scrvices are timely and accurate, and satisfy user needs. 3. (U) DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, AND BUDGETING (PPB). - a. (U) Defense Intelligence PPB Responsibilities. (1) Defense Intelligence resources planning supports orderly development of the needed intelligence systems and military forces. It also supports related intelligence resources programming and budgetary requests to the U.S. Congress. (2) (U) Executive Order 12036, 24 January 1978, defines certain intelligence activities of Defense as part of the NFIP, and gives the DCI full and exclusive authority for approval of the NFIP budget to be submitted to the President. Within the Defense portion of the NFIP, there are five intelligence programs: (2) (U) The Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP) which comprises efforts of the NSA and SCA's engaged in the SIGINT mission. (b) (U) Tp€ General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIPY# which includes all Intelligence activities in the NFIP except SIG!NT and specialized national programs. (c) (U) Air Force Special Activities and Navy Special Activities, which provide essential information to national policymakers and to force commanders. (d) GY) The Defense Foreign Counterintelligence (FCI) Program, which consists of the counterintelligence activities of the three Military* Departments. (3) (U) Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, March 6, 1978, subject: implementation of Executive Order 12036, Replacing E.O. $1905, specifically assigns responsibilities within the DoD for each area covered by the Executive Order. (4) (U) Approved NFIP procvams and budgets are entered intc Defense data bases and are included in Defense budgets presented to Congress. b. (U) Defense Intelicence PB Cycle. The various programs in the Dirense portion of the NFIP proceed through similar steps in the PPB cycle, though Defense. 39 . DIAM 56- there are some differences. However, for the purpose of simplification, the GDIP will be used as a cc reral example in the presentation of the DoD Jnici.. once PPBS below, and in the outline of the DoD Int." cnce PPBS in enclosure 1, chart $. The reader should be aware that variations exist between Programs. In bief the cycle is as follows: (1) (U) Planning/Program Guidance, The DoD PPB cycle for a specific S-year period begins with the planning/program guidance. (a) (U) The DIA prepares the JILP (a JCS document) and the DIPP. These provide the intelligence estimative foundations for preparstion of the JSPD. (b) (U) The JSPD is a mid-range JCS planning document designed, among other things, to assist the Secretary of Defense in preparation of the Consolidated Guidance (CG). (c) (U) The DIA publishes the D¢fense Intelligence Plan, which presents a view of the intelligence capabilities that must be acquired to overcome inadequacies, and, in the form of required capabilities, provides inputs to the Secretary of Defense's CG for the GDIP, CCP, Air Force Special Activities Program, and contributes support for NFIP decisions by the PRC(I). (d) (U) The Program Manager's Guidance Memorandum (PMGM) is issued early in the PPB cycle to provide substantive intelligence guidance to be used for GDIP programs. (e) (U) Secretary of Defense provides broad policy guidance in his CG, which highlights his views and assumptions and those of the President reiating to the ISPD strategy and related intelligence otjectives and priorities. (f) (U) The DCI issues guidance for program and budget development for the NFIP, including the NFIP activities managed by Defense. (2) (U) Using the DC] guidance and tie CG, the program manager issues a supplement to the PMGM which provides definitive information and specific instructions for GDIP program preparation. (2) (U) Programming. (a) (U) DIA and the Military Departments, as components in the GDIP, prepare and submit eee get
DIAM 56-3 proposed programs to the GDIP Mznager. (b) (U) The GDIP Program Manager reviews the DJA and Services’ intelligence resources requests; specifically, the manpower and dollars needed to achieve specified- intelligence objectives and requirements. Alternatives are considered in the search for the optimal allocation of resources. The process involves reviewing recommendations of the DIA and the Military Scrvices, plus considerable internal review and analysis. The final program judgments result from "crossfunctional review," based partially on quantitative analyses to determine which are the most beneficial “trade-offs.” (c) (U) The GDIP Program Manager's Recommended Program (PMRP) is developed and coordinated within the DoD and is submitted to the DC]. The PMRP also ranks all the individual decision pachages (brief justification documents which include information necessary to make judgments) on program or activity levels and resource requirements included in the PMRP -- from the most important to the least important, (d) (U) The Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) incorporates DCI decisions into the DoD PPB system. (e) (U) The approved programs become the basis for the GDIP budgets. (3) (U) Budgeting. FOR THE DIRECTOR: OFFICIAL: AM rrmace ‘J. H. BOWMAN Acting Assistant Deputy Director for Support and Services 40 8 July 1979 (a) (U) The DCL issues budget puidance. The Director, DIA, as GDIP Program Manager, issues supplementary guidance. (b) (U) GDIP budgets are submitted by DIA und the Military Departments to the DCI, with copies to OSD. . , (c) (U) Budget submissions are reviewed by OSD, DCI, and OMB. Budget Review Decision Documents (BRDD's) are issued by the DCI. Decision Package Sets (DPS's) incorporate DCI decisions into the DoD PPB system. (d) (U) After budget decisions are made, the Congressional Budget Justification Book (CBJB) is prepared, providing detail of budget requests presented two Congress. (4) (U)  Enactment/Execution. Congressional authorization and appropriation lead to enactment into law and apportionment. (5) (U) Fiscal Cycle Overlap. Because of the length of time for the completion of the "annual" fiscal cycle, there are always three different fiscal year budgets active, if measured from JSPD issuance until final passage and signing of the Appropriations Bill (four different fiscal year budgets active, if the influencing/foundation documents, the JIEP, DIPP and Defense Intelligence Plan, are considered). B. H. ANDERSON, JR. Colonel, USA Acting Chief of Staff %
OO ee anal . eS ae ee ~~. . ee -- - = #0 - : ‘ ee er ee ary ‘ NSC-RELATED INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES ‘ , , —_ INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD !i0B) PRESIOENT NSC SPECIAL COORDINATION COMMITTEE (SCC) i ° ASST TO PRES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY - NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC) AFFAIRS (C1474) NSC POLICY REVIEW COMM:TTEE (INTELLIGENCE (PRC 1) } a ——— ¢ MEMBERS OF NSC ‘ | A ert . © OTHERS AS APPROPRIATE ;  * OCLICHMI * SECTREAS | | DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE (DCI) t e yo «cscs : @ SECSTATE # ASST TO PRES FOR NATIONAL ‘ SCC (SPECIAL ACTIVITIES) © SECDEF SECURITY AFFAIRS \ « OTHERS AS APPROPRIATE i * ASST TO PRES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS ICHM) * SECSTATE * DIR, OMB a * SECDEF * CJCS 2 . * ATTYGEN * oC! b> > D 2 ~ a . EN SCC [SENSITIVE FOREIGN - | NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE TASKING CENTER INITC) } ; INTNATIONAL FOREIGN INTEL COLLECTION OPERATIONS) ° an Rect On Oe PRESIDENT! :* DCHICHM} RECTION OF PRESIDEN i oat \ . _ Hi ry ~ ‘ © STAFF INCLUDES REPS OF -. © APPROPRIATE OFFICERS OF: ASS ae er NATIONAL SECURITY ~ DOD INTELLIGENCE { - CIA — TREASURY * SECSTATE = ORGANIZATIONS | — O0c! - ENERGY * SECDEF m © OTHER INTELLIGENCE | ~ STATE = — DIA * ATTYGEN _ : COMMUNITY AGENCIES ~ DEFENSE — DOD RECON » DCI 2 i MAY HAVE REPS | — JUSTICE — NSA © OTHER AS DESIGNATED ti | - FBI BY CHAIRMAN i * OBSERVERS nm TASKING ! — AEP OF ASST TO PRES FOR t NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS SCC (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE} a [wrecucence commony | w REPS OF MILITARY SERVICES z INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ASST TO PRES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY o AFFAIRS (CHM) > SECSTATE a SECDEF + pik, OMB 4 oz . ATTYGEN * CICS -mS5 DIA, FBI * 0¢l — oD 1 TO | £2 — ' c x i tT j med 6L6l Aine 8 £-95 WVIG
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8 July 1979 DIAM 56-3 GLOSSARY JCS Pub 1, “The DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," contains the DoD standardized military and associated tenns and definitions approved for joint usage, and is referred ‘to herein.,Supplementary information or additional explanatory matter necessary to provide « technical clarity or convey a special connotation are designated by "Executive Order 12036," _ ."NSCID," "NFIB," "DoD Directive $-3115.7," and "DoD Instruction 7045.7," and should not “be construed as changing or conflicting with a standardized DoD definition. Acoustical Intelligence. Sce JCS Pub. 1 - Advanced Imagery Requirement and Exploitation System (AIRES). An information system for the integrated storage, processing, manipulation, and presentation of all imagery-related data. System will provide data rapidly to imagery collection and exploitation managers, photo interpreters, and production analysts. The system is highly automated to provide a responsive flow of relevant information throughout the collection, processing, dissemination, and analysis cycle. Basic Intelligence. See JCS Pub. 1. Basic Intelligence. Factual intelligence that results from the collation of encyclopedic information on a fundamental and more or less permanent nature and that, as a result of evaluation and interpretation, is determined to be the best available. (NSCID). Combat Intelligence. See ICS Pub. 1. Command-Deaicated Intelligence Unit/Activity. An intelligence unit or activity whose primary mission is tactical intelligence, and which is assigned or attached to, or operates primarily in support of, a U&S Command headquarters or Service component headquarters thereof. Conpnunications Intelligence. See JCS Pub. 1. nes oo ee eer eee "853115, 7). COMINT: ‘Fs. produced by the collection’ and? processing of foreign “communics tions “assed by . ‘electromagnetic. means, “with specific, exceptions stated below, and by the process: ag (of foreign encrypted, communications, however transmitted. Collection comprises search, intercepts i and ‘direction ‘finding. Processing ~< comprises’ range estimation, transmitter/operator identification 4 ‘ 3 ] 1 signal _anaiysis, ‘trafficn analysis, _cryptanalysis," decryption, study of plain text} the fusion of these} fe processes, and. ‘the Feporting | of Tesults, COMINT. wil ‘hot, include. intercept and Processing off Ne we behd processing “Of i press, “propesanda, and other public broadcasts, except “for hrocessing ener; ted le “hidden, meaning’. ; passages jn “such. “broadcasts: certain. ope rations conducted by secuniy authorities: and“censorship.. {DoD Directive S:314'5. 4)32y TREE Sue (rates oe “MS deme et “Communications Security (COMSEC). See ICS Pub. 1 and Executive Order 12036. Counterintelligence. See JCS Pub | and Executive Order 12036. 47 ENCLOSURE 2 (This page is UNCLASSIFIED) 1. Y ". & ry
“DIAM 56-3 . 8 July 1979 Cryptologic Intclligence Unit/Activity, An intelligence unit or activity whose primary mission is collection of COMINT or communications security. Current Fiscal Year. The fiscal year in being. It refers to the fiscal year of budget execution. Current Intelligence. See JCS Pub. 1. . . Defense Intclligence. A conceptual tenn embracing all of the military intelligence and counterintelligence operations and activities of the DoD. . Defense Intelligence Community. The primary members of the Defense Intelligence Community include the ASD(C3I), the DUSD(PR), DIA, the NSA/CSS, intelligence staffs of the Military Services, the U&S Commands, their component commands, DoD intelligence activities, and the information handling facilities, equipment, personnel, and telecommunications supporting the Defense Intelligence mission. Department of Defense Components. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, DIA, JCS, the Military Departments and the Military Services within those departments, the U&S Commands, and such agencies as the Secretary of Defense has established to meet specific requirements. Departmental Intelligence. See JCS Pub. 1. Department Intelligence Unit/Activity. An intelligence unit or activity operating primarily in support of a military department headquarters, whose primary mission is to satisfy departmental or interdepartmental intelligence requirements or the training of intelligence personnel. Electronics Intelligence (ELINT). See JCS Pub. | find") DoD ‘Directive S-3115.3 re Essentiel 2°. ts of Information (EEI). See JCS Pub. 1. Estimet;: fice? ence. Judgments, assessments, and projections of probable future courses of action and developments. It employs basic, current, and finished intelligence from all sources and agencies in arriving at conclusions. It is designed to serve planner's decisionmaking needs. Evaluation. See JCS Pub. 1. Finished Intelligence. Information which has been processed, evaluated, analyzed, collated, correlated, synthesized, interpreted, and formatted, as necessary, to satisfy user requirements. The process by which raw information becomes finished intelligence may not involve actual performance of any of the above operations except evaluation and analysis, but does require judgments on whether each of these operations is necessary before presentation to the user. Fiscal Year. In the Federal Government, a 12-month period beginning 1 October and ending 30 September of the following calendar year. The fiscal year is designated by the calendar year in which it ends. Five-Year Defense Program (FYDP). The official program_which summarizes the 1e_ Secretary of Defense- approved. plans and programs for the DoD. he “FYDP is ‘published at least once annually; 1¢, FYDP Vis ‘also arepresented . by=a, computer “d “data base which i Ss “updated” regularly “to Te flee Setter odent decisions.” as (DoD- ‘Instruction J045-7),< a Fao Sac baa teas Sah 7. nsttucy ENCLOSURE 2 48 (This page is UNCLASSIFIED)
8 July 1979 ; DIAM 56-3 General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP). An aggregation of intelligence program elements of the National Foreign Intelligence Program viich provides for military intelligence required at the national level and by major military commands (excluding tactical commands). General Intelligence (Production). Military intelligence in the fields of area and terrain intelligence, including urban areas, coasts and landing beaches, and medical, meteorological, and geological intelligence; transportation in all modes; materiel production and support industries, telecommunications, military economics, military facilities and targeting, physical vulnerability, government control, escape and evasion, threats and forecasts, indications, and military capabilities, including orders of battle, organizations, training, tactics and all other factors bearing on military strength and effectiveness. - General Intelligence Unit/Activity, A non-cryptologic intelligence unit or activity, not designated aS special or selected. . Human Source Intelligence (HUMINT). Collection in which human beings serve as both collectors and sources of information, or as document and equipment collectors. Imagery Intelligence (IMINT}. The collected products of imagery interpretation processed for intelligence use. (NFIB). Imagery Interpretation (II), The process of locating, recognizing, identifying, and describing objects, activities, and terrain represented by imagery; it includes photographic interpretation. (NFIB). Integrated Intelligence. Intelligence consisting of data elements from two or more basic intelligence topics combined into a specialized topic. Intelligence. See JCS Pub. 1 and Executive Order 12036. Intelligence Cycle. See JCS Pub. 1. Intelligence Data. Information which has been processed and, to some extent, evaluated or analyzed. It may or may not be collated, synthesized, correlated, interpreted, or formatted in finished form. Intelligence Data Base. See JCS Pub. 1. < Intelligence Data Handling Systems (IDHS). See JCS Pub. 1. Intelligence Dissemination. The transfer of raw or processed information, intelligence data, or finished intelligence from one organization to another. Performance of this function by the disseminating agency includes the identification and selection of the recipients of material to be disseminated in accordance with their stated requirements. . Intelligence Estimate. See JCS Pub. 1. Intelligence Information. Information of potential intelligence value which has not been processed, analyzed, or evaluated. : 49 ENCLOSURE 2 (This page is UNCLASSIFIED)
DIAM 56-3 8 July 1979 Intelligence Information. Information of potential intelligence value concerning the Capabilities, intentions, and activilies of any foreign power, organization, or associated personnel. €NFIB). Intelligence Report (INTREP). See JCS Pub. 1. (Also called Intelligence Information Report). Intelligence Reporting. See JCS Pub. 1. Intelligence Requirement. See JCS Pub. 1. Intelligence Subject Code. See JCS Pub. 1. Intelligence Summary (INTSUM) See JCS Pub. 1. Intelligence Support Functions. Those functions which are not integral to the performance of intelligence or counterintelligence collection, processing, production, or dissemination, or to the performance of counterintelligence investigations, but which assist performance of these operations. (See Substantive Intelligence Functions.) Intelligence Unit/Activity. An identifiable unit, activity, or staff element, or major element thereof, comprised of personnel and equipment, with the primary mission of collecting or processing intelligence information, producing intelligence, disseminating intelligence products, or of providing support for intelligence collectio:, processing, production, or dissemination by other units or activities. Combat units which collect intelligence information as a direct result of combat operations a. -xcluded, e.g., the S2 staff of an armored cavalry regiment is an intelligence activity; the line units are not. ' Interdepartmental Intelligence. See JCS Pub. 1. International Terrorist Activities. See Executive Order 12036. Joint Force Memorandum (JFM). A document prepared annually by the JCS and submitted to the Secretary of Defense, which provides recommendations on the joint force program within the fiscal guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense (DoD Instruction 7045.7). Joint Intelligence. See JCS Pub. 1. Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning (JIEP). See JCS Pub. 1. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). See JCS Pub. 1. Management of Intelligence Operations. Actions by higher authority to require, modify, restrict, or validate and support performance of intelligence operations at a lower echelon. Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT). The quantitative and qualitative data derived from special sensing instruments not normally associated with HUMINT, COMINT, ELINT or IMINT. (See Chapter 4, paragraph 5.c.(4)(d) of this manual for added definition.) Military Intelligence. Basic, current, or estimative intelligence on any foreign military or military-related situation or activity (NFIB). ENCLOSURE 2 50 : (This page is UNCLASSIFIED)
8 July 1979 , DIAM 56-3 National Command Authorities (NCA). See JCS Pub. 1. National Foreign Intelligence Program. Consists of the programs of the CIA; the Consolidated Cryptologic Program, the General Defense Intelligence Program, and the programs of the offices within the DoD for the collection of specialized national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance except such elements as the DCI and Secretary of Defense agree should be excluded; other programs of agencies within the Intelligence Community designated jointly by the DCI and the head of the department or by the President as national foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities; and the activities of the staff elements of the office of the DCI. See also Executive Order 12036. National Intelligence. See ICS Pub. 1. National Intelligence, Foreign intelligence produced under the aegis of the DCI and intended primarily to be responsive to the needs of the President, the National Security Council, and other Federal officials involved in the formulation and execution of national security, foreign political, and/or economic policy. (NFIB). National Intelligence Estimate. See JCS Pub. 1. National Intelligence Surveys. See JCS Pub. 1. Operating Program. A specific line of effort or grouping of related projects to accomplish a single general purpose or goal against which there is an identifiable allocation of resources. Operational Intelligence. See JCS Pub. 1. Planning /Programming/Budgeting System (PPBS). An integrated system for the establishment, ’ maintenance, and revision of the FYDP and the DoD budget (DoD Instruction 7045.7). Processing. Those operations necessary to convert raw information to readable or exploitable form for use by intelligence production analysts (e.g., readout of ELINT recordings, imagery interpretation, and document translation). Processing. Conversion of collected information and/or intelligence information into a form | more suitable for the production of intelligence. (NFIB). Production. Operations necessary to analyze, evaluate, collate, correlate, synthesize, and present intelligence to users. Production. Conversion of information or intelligence information into finished intelligence through the integration, analysis, evaluation, and/or interpretation of all available data and the preparation of intelligence products in support of known or anticipated customer requirements. (NFIB). Program. A combination of program elements designed to express the accomplishment of a definite objective or plan which is specified as to the time-phasing of what is to be done and the means proposed for its accomplishment. Programs are aggregations of program elements and in tum aggregate to the total National Foreign Intelligence Program. (DoD Instruction 7045.7). Program/Budeget Decision (PBD). A Secretary of Defense decision in prescribed format authorizing changes to a submitted budget estimate and the FYDP. (DoD Instruction 7045.7). 5] ENCLOSURE 2 (This page is UNCLASSIFIED)
DIAM 56-3 8 July 197 Program Decision Memorandum (PDM), A document which provides decisions of the Secretar: of Defense on Program Objective Memoraide (POM's) and The Joint Force Memorandum (JFM) (DoD Instruction 7045.7). Program Element. A description of a mission by the identification of the organizational entitie and resources needed to perform the assigned mission. Resources consist of forces, manpower material quantities, and costs, as applicable. The program element is the basic building block of the FYDP. (DoD Instruction 7045.7). Program Objective Memorandum (POM). A memorandum in prescribed format submitted to the Secretary of Defense by the Secretary of a Military Department or the Director of a Defense agency which recommends the total resource requirements within the parameters of the publishec Secretary of Defense fiscal guidance. (DoD Instruction 7045.7). Raw Information. Information which has not been processed, analyzed, or evaluated. Scientific and Technical Intelligence. See JCS Pub. 1. SIGINT Operational Tasking. The authoritative operational direction of and direct levying of SIGINT requirements by a military commander on designated SIGINT resources. These requirements are directive, irrespective of other priorities and conditioned only by the capability of those resources to produce such information. Operational tasking includes authority to deploy and redeploy all or part of the SIGINT resources for which operational tasking authority has been delegated. (DoD Directive S-3115.7). Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). See JCS Pub. 1 and DoD Directive S-3115.7. Strategic Intelligence. See JCS Pub. 1. Substantive Intelligence Functions. Functions integral to the provisions of intelligence users; they include collection, processing, production, and dissemination of intelligence and counterintelligence, and the conduct of counterintelligence investigations. Tactical Intelligence. See JCS Pub. 1}. Tactical Intelligence Unit/Activity. An intelligence unit or activity not included within the NFIP, whose primary mission is tactical/combat intelligence, and is assigned or attached to, or operates primarily in support of, a numbered army, fleet, or air force, or lower level unit, and whose resources are exclusively provided from and managed under General Purpose Forces Program of the FYDP. Unevaluated Files. Library holdings which have been processed as necessary, but not collated, synthesized, correlated, interpreted, or formatted in finished form. US. Intelligence Community, The “U.S. Foreign Intelligence Community" consists of those departments, agencies, and units which are authorized by law or presidential order to conduct U.S. forcign intelligence or counterintelligence operations. See Executive Order 12036 (4-207). ENCLOSURE 2 52 : (This page is UNCLASSIFIED)
8 July 1979 Alphabetic List ACOUSTINT ADPS AFSC AIRES ASD ASD(C31) ASD(ISA) BRDD CBJB CG Cl CIA ccP CIPR COMINT COMSEC CRITIC CRITICOMM CSS DAO DAS DC DCI DCID DCI/IC DCP DDSR DEA DIA DIAVP DIO DIPP DIPS DIRM DN DOD DODHS DPS DSARC DUSD(PR) EE] ELINT EUDAC . DLAM 56-3 KEY TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS Term Acoustical Intelligence ' Automated Data Processing Systems Armed Forces Staff College Advanced Imagery Requirement & Exploitation System Assistant Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense (Communications, Command, Control and Intelligence) Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) Budget Review Decision Document Congressional Budget Justification Book Consolidated Guidance Counterintelligence Central Intelligence Agency Consolidated Cryptologic Program Counterintelligence Publication Registry Communications Intelligence Communications Security Critical Intelligence Message Critical Intelligence Communications System Central Security Service -Defense Attache Office Defense Attache System DIA's Directorate for Collection Director of Central Intelligence Director of Central Intelligence Directive Director of Central Intelligence/Intelligence Community Decision Coordinating Paper Document Dissemination, Storage and Retrieval System Drug Enforcement Administration Defense Intelligence, Agency DIA's Vice Director for Production Defense Intelligence Officer Defense Intelligence Projections for Planning Defense Intelligence Production Schedule Defense Intelligence Requirements Manual DIA's Current Intelligence Directorate Department of Defense Department of Defense Intelligence Information System Decision Package Set Defense System Acquisition Review Council Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy Review) Essential Elements of Information Electronics Intelligence European Defense Analysis Center 53 ENCLOSURE 3 (This page is UNCLASSIFIED)
DIAM 56-3 EW FBI FC] FYDP GDIP HUMINT 1&W IC ICDP IDHS IGCP IMINT INR 1OB IPSP IRAC ICS JEP JLRKEID JLRSA JLRSS JSCP JSPD JSPDSA JSPS KIR MASINT MENS MIB MOP NATO NCA NCS NFIB NFIP NIE -NIO NITC NMCC NMIC NPIC NSA NSA/CSS NSC NSCID OJCS OMB OSD PDM ENCLOSURE 3 8 July 1979 Electronic Warfare Federal Bureau of Investigation Foreign Counterintelligence Five-Year Defense Program General Defense Intelligence Program Human Sources Intelligence . , Indications and Warning . Intelligence Community Intelligence Career Development Program Intelligence Data Handling System | Intelligence Guidance for COMINT Production | Imagery Intelligence ! Intelligence and Research Bureau (State) Intelligence Oversight Board Intelligence Priorities for Strategic Planning Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning Joint Long Range Estimative Intelligence Document Joint Long Range Strategic Appraisal Joint Long Range Strategic Study Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan Joint Strategic Planning Document 3SPD Supporting Analysis Joint Strategic Planning System Key Intelligence Requirements Measurement and Signature Intelligence Mission Element Need Statements Military Intelligence Board Memorandum of Policy (of the JCS) North Atlantic Treaty Organization National Command Authonties National Communications System National Foreign Intelligence Board National Foreign Intelligence Program National Intelligence Estimate National Intelligence Officer National Intelligence Tasking Center National Military Command Center National Military Intelligence Center National Photographic Interpretation Center National Security Agency National Security Agency/Central Security Service National Security Council National Security Council Intelligence Directive Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Office of Management and Budget Office of the Secretary of Defense Program Decision Memorandum 54 (This page is UNCLASSIFIED)
8 July 1979 PMGM PMRP PPB PPBS PRC PRC(I) PRD R&D RDT&E SCA scc SecDef SIGINT SIOP SPINTCOMM S&T STIR TELINT ucP UNAAF U&S Commands us USDRE&E USEUCOM DIAM 56-3 Program Manager's Guidance Memorandum Program Manager's Recommended Program Planning, Programming, and Budgeting Planning, Programming and Budgeting System Policy Review Committee Policy Review Committee (Intelligence) ’ Production Responsibilities: Document Research and Development Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Service Cryptologic Agency Special Coordination Committee Secretary of Defense Signals Intelligence Single Integrated Operational Plan Special Intelligence Communications Scientific and Technical Scientific and Technical Intelligence Register Telemetry Intelligence Unified Command Plan Unified Action Armed Forces (JCS Pub 2) Unified and Specified Commands United States Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering United States European Command 55 REVERSE BLANK ENCLOSURE 3 (This page is UNCLASSIFIED)