LOU ANDUM POR THE NATIONAL SECTUTY Colic. er ve a RATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL: So oD. 1, WASH INGTOW 3) 37 a : as .° nd se anand . a a . Bape ee - ces : Ne “ee ’ : ‘ ‘ - ot - : _ 4 Poor Fetvablishinut of 6 Special services Unit in Ci£é | a reste ts AA ' - ~ Se tS RES LG ‘ , - . . . = “roe a “ee sae aad ‘ - : tyes : e. . CL FLD . -> Ww «7 . teats ee. LY aes eee
ESTABLISHMENT OF A SPECIAL SERVICES UNIT IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ‘~ Further consideration of the problem of duveloping our active ities in the ffeld ef covert political warfare leads co the feilustne eotnes which, {0 is suggested, should serve as a basis for the ftucher a} vousiderations of this prublen by the National Security Coun it. CLA provides the legal stracture wirhin etch covert polilti- cal a. tivities can be conducted ans {0 fs elresiy Charged unser Noe eTA WED One contact ot vovert poyehologies! operations aoruad. in siitien, fs aiveace Sharecs be Naticnal Seiurity ceancia Dire. t tere - weed baw. beta 2d Hater esp boipage are ral aay eoboaly os Boeperali ha aie fy Oa dl iestre ver Poseive rebated ¢ fort ogo4 Stl Dae itiea as : sted face dy Po. theratete, set de sdailt por odesret, fiogsa opetatbosg: reastus, net Co vie at tones er Pogue tt poeidtiea aotiwities, but ta pian. the re eeitoadt ToOUnd ss ew Tr Willie. 0 jovrt structure af the Cemtia. bits Lites ek re ones looede redatle itt secter intebllages . The peitne tp ah uifecttion to this propesal artsaes cut ai dautt gow tetier CHA is presentiy so constituted char tO cau e:tectively baudle this prefien whicn £5 se different from ClA‘s primary Caer of fnleilinen s a fivifies correlating and evaelsatine intecbiges ec tedaila, tu the national securdty. ihre fe ais fear i i tedaila., ¢ he at s Poot oe asert uperatroin. fey. tap ti a Miata: Do oligcasdite st with Gul - cist di w.iater, bivdhen. ~ 0 ©) . : Je Gr Tact i RETAPE . Wee Re eet $c ee lei, . . . 7 : tn, wathe ete _ laces me = 088 Aes weep we
TOP SECRET These considerations lead to the following general “conclusions and recommendations: “qQ) Responsibility for both secret intelligence and Bé- cret operations, including covert psychological activities, should be placed in a new Special Services unit to be created in CIA. (2) This unit should have a considerable measure of au- tonomy within CIA and its director should be suthortzhe to ap- peal directly to the National Security Council in case of dif- ferences srising between him and the Director of Central In- celligence. (3) A highly qualified person recruited from outside the present ranks of CIA and approved by the National Security Coun- cil should be appointed to head the new unit in CIA. (4) Provision should be made so chat the chief of the newly created unit has accees to and receives policy guidance from the Department of Scate and the Military Establishment. (5) Le {s understood that this is 6 provisional arrange- ment subject to review st a later date. The following actions should be taken if the National Security Council approves in principle the foregoing points: RETYPE (a) The Department of State, the National Military Estab- lishment, and CIA should jointly request funds for che proposed operation. (b) The Executive Secretary, National Security Council, ahould be directed co prepare a detailed directive covering the above points for approval by the Council. -~-2- RETYPE TOP SECRET
(Page i} NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON June 2, 1948 MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SUBJECT: Establishment of a Special Services Unit in CIA REFERENCE: NSC 10 The enclosed proposal on the above subject, which [...suggests...] alternate [...conclusions...} NSC 10 represents the results of an informal discussion be- tween the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of State, and Mr. Allen W. Dulles. At their request the enclosure is submitted here {illegible] for consideration by the National Security Council in connection with NSC 10, which is scheduled as Item 1 on the agenda for NSC 12th Meeting on Thursday, June 3. SIDNEY W. SOQUERS Executive Secretary
(Page 2) CIA provides the legal structure within which covert poli- tical activities can be conducted and it is already charged under NSC 4-A with the conduct of covert psychological operations abroad. In addition, CIA is already charged by National Security Council Direct- ive No. 5 with conducting espionage and counter-espionage operations abroad, which operations are by their nature very closely related to covert political activities as contemplated in NSC 10. It, therefore, seems desirable for legal, as well as operational reasons, not to cre- ate a new agency for covert political activities, but to place the re- sponsibility for this work within the legal structure of the Central Intelligence Agency and closely relate it to secret intelligence. The principal objection to the proposal «rises out of doubt as whether CIA is presently so constituted that it can effectively handle this problem which is se different from CIA’s primary task of coordinating intelligence activities and correlating and evaluating intelligence relating to naticnal security. There is also fear lest covert operations develop in a manner inconsistent with our for-~ eign and military policies.