remy bo, i Bo etensn eres tee, Agency BROWNELL COMMITTEE REPORT SRH-123 gv wie Estioual security DECLASSIFIED per Sec. 3, E. O. 42035 or, NSA/Chiei, css. by Direct -=—_— =. A. 2% Chin Iie
as padocssd ON yee SOTA SS . - = 4% . o . ° - . . . . « . . . ° ° . ° - . . ° . to the..- - . ~- SECRETARY EF STATES . né ihe , . . SECRETARY, OF DEFENSE +. ~ ° :° bad . batied os e « "= * =~ Commoeniy reierreo to as - : *. “BROWNELL, COMMITTEES REPORT! . . . 7 os ° Sp 2 o2T “Tt ‘ “ " i: Ty Tt He PTR ES c Le arbeasil a ale . FO ee LAR ker A. abate ern k = . . an oe = Reviewed 4 August: 1981. . e re w2tteo ote
oe Yuet e at te a wee CERT ne D tea ieg tzu + Sept . : by J OSUfLOF UY SECK ch A ARY OF = STATE - . SEORE EIA RY OF DEFENSE , “By al special COMMNREL TF cpptned pursiant tO letter 9 gp ZS4 Deceniber- 495! Copy or: The Director op Arn: vert Force Ss Securing fez liga &e UxED . Revie Ee 4 ‘August ‘ a > ; : ZA : 4 i =. *. - a faeet - 1 2 . a . wr FOF SEGRE Ferrosens re
_ “POY phen al ~SECURIZY INFORMATION! er oS REPORT TO ee SECRETARY OF STATE Po, ~ eh ot te ° ‘a COMMITTEES APPOINTED BY LETTER OF 2&8 December 1951 -, - TO SURVEY a COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES a ; OF THE GOVERNMENT | , ° . Sree es pocienT CONFERS CODE WOSD WETESISL ~ : . a a Gocument contzins inforimaiion within the m eeningof Puoli¢~iaw 513 - ist Congress. It is to be sess Oty by a US PERSONNSL.- especially indoctrinated*#nd authorized —_— - oe eer . . . to receive Special Ta eliigence iniGrmation.- ‘The security °- . : of this Gocument must besmeisained in eccorcence with SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE SECURITY ZGULATIONS, . toe . No action may-De taken Dy any person on the Special Intel- . ligense: presen nied herein, recercless of any ecvahtage ; ws nich may be geined, unless such action is first apz roved,. ae by the Director of Centra} Iniellig ence. us . _Reviewed 4 August 1981 - pay ype FOES BCP T te oe! sre SECURITY INFORMATION.
REPORT TO ‘SECRETARY OF STATE and . . . . ; a . SECRETARY OF DEFENSE by ° COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY LETTER OF . 23 December 1951 “TO SURVEY’ -°. COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITES OF THE GOVERNMENT : - * —- Se oe
oe lf Senen TOP-SECRET ~<SLOUnR TYE NWFOARTS | THEN tro Sk . — . v . REPORT . - ANY to the ** ° * SECRETARY OF STATE and the . . SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Ss DY 2 special committee eppointed ° *" purscent to letter of 28 December 1851] from the Secretary oi State end the Secretzry of Defense ~~" ee ted 1S-DOCUMENT . 5 George A. Cc Cherjes © AO ONTEINS CODE “WORD M - oc. John Magruc . William H. J a . Brownell, Creairmen ES. Bob) ec, eckso Reviewed 4 August 1981 PES PHS BAG ad baiveresty iw me SECUSITE-INEOBMATION . . eee tS aes hers aires ED. St aateost, TION - acy ‘ .
» 4 gy Sees EB . wi ~ ~ ‘ Oe Lill aw. ee oP an ns ES) . rr 13 June 1952 F << . . 7 Esse Sie Dear Sirs: | — x ‘| In your letter to the undersigned.dated 28. December 1951," you advised oy es 7 that the President had directed you, assisted by the Director of Central Intal- fe a « oars . nO ligence, to have the communications intelligence activities of the Goverament - Fen 4 surveyed, with the yieW of recommending any, corrective measures that might be __ = ; t . . wt eee s . . . ~ -. L y~Fequired to insure the most secure and effective conduct af such activities. In Vie ' ‘, ‘ — _ = f t Vat your letter you appointed the undersigned.as a. Committee to make a survey and submit to you proposed recommendations for your consideration on two general subjects, which may be summarized as follows: ree) (a) The needs of each governmental department and agency i J una rae @ ° 5 ad oO La | the procuction of ‘departmental intelligence, and af the Director of 7 J . 7 . Central Intelligence for the production.of.nationa, .ntelligence. a\¥ f re rt (0) The allocation of responsibilities and authorities respecting ioe _~ communications intelligence activities that should be.made to insure aad . . S | that such needs are satisfiedmos effectively, giving due regard to the requirements of security. In this connection the Committee was directed to give consideration to the extent to which responsibility for, and authority over, the interception and processing of communications intelligence information, or any other aspect of such activities, may \. * See Exhibit A to this Report. <teeees eee eee ee ee lt ee ee ee testa cmmmpbemnin«—_> “ENDED “Cyne gga cae ct
1 U é * FES crustons, to assemble and become fam oe — and should be assigned for performance as a service of common concern, and to which department or agency such assignment should be made. . _ Since its appointment the Committee has held hearings. on 14 days at which it has had formal interviews with 43 witnesses.* In addition to the formal interviews, individual members of the Committee and of its Staff have had a_ large number of informal conferences with certain of the witnesses and other individuals active in the field of communications intelligence, and the Com- > (ittee has had the benefit of a number of special memoranda prepared for it. Finally, the Committee has had extensive executive sessions, Gur conclusions and recommendations are contained in the final Report submitted herewith. It was necessary for the Committee, before attempting to arrive at its . i . iliar with a mass of information and memes data pertaining to the history of communications intelligence in the United States, the past and present forms of organization of the units engaged in that ae tivity, and the manner in which the present organizations are operating. Eaving assembled this material, and finding it to be important background for our conclusions, we have felt that it should be summarized in the Report so that you may have before you the same information in evaluating our recom- mendations. This will, we hope, explain and justify the length of the first four Darts of the Report. Part Lis devoted to the history of the national communi- - eed - Cations intelligence effort from its beginning to the present time; it is believed OSS ee CES AT SS A ED SS ND SD AS ee pf see Exhibit B to this Report.
») . . smet ue - sh a4 . Lye AL: . . : . a — bars that this is the first time ’that any such broad historical statement has been attempted. Part Ilis a summary of the Committee’s findings as to the tmpor- Td + AS CA EOS ey ne ene tance of communications intelligence to the Government in the past as well as mee + wees ee ee Oe ee te ee ne at the present time. Part I contains a description of the manner in which our - te + am 2m me a eeene a oe. - : —_ — <2 oem se cms oe +7 * wmmes communications intelligence activities are now organized, with particular reference to the.statutory authority and the various directives of the National any Council, the Secretary of Defense and the Joiat Chiefs of Staff which uear on that subject. Part IV is an outline of the manner in which these activ- ee ee - - eee, ee =- t ties are now actually being conducted, with a rough estimate of their presen Se EE + re ED meee .-* : “8 — Part V contains the Committee’s conélusions and recommendations on ~ ee EO ee eee ee eee 6 eee . + meee wees - - i ee the two subjects set forth in your letter of 28 December 1951. In addition, we have ventured to add our comments on certain ancillary and miscellaneous ‘issues raised by various witnesses in the course of our survey. We have not, ~— . uswever, attempted to extend the survey to include other subjects not assigned to us in your directive, and we have in particular not attempted to make any : e—_ evaluation of the efficiency or economy of the expenditure of funds used in the . ~ wee oe, ~~ ——— oe om stew eree , “- Overall communications intelligence effort, as this subject is not only cutside your directive but completely beyond the capability of the Committee and its e ‘limited staif. ; ~ aw It is hoped that the Report will accomplish two purposes. The first is oN , cquaint the National Security Council and other interested officials with Ser eae! B pres: a Pi te Sareea yg
. _.. sees sep = p “a ri * ie Se Chk hla aa | Rea, Tew . = S i ‘ ". ~~ the manner in waich our communications intelligence machinery is organized and is operating, the scope and importance of its activities, and the organt- zational and other problems with which it is now confronted. The second is to convey io the Same individuals the recommendations of the Committee, based on its evaluation of the testimony presented to it, for improving the organi- zation and its present product, In summary and greatly condensed form our major findings and recom- en wre ree ne es ees = ee oe aes | Sena em ce em? see oY eo oe ee eS ere mendations are: (a) Coramunications intelligence (COMINT) is of vital importance a Oe ET ewe 8st + Oe ewe we ee eee ww mee se me to the National Defense. In the last War its value to the Armed Services os me o was incalculable. In times such as the present, the information which — ee - - . meee 5 i ee ee oon it produces is needed in almost equal degree by both the Services and : =—e « . - =o" ~~ vw : fertain of the civilian agencies. (o) Tei tree oe Sa yw . as es Sees * = ; S : = Bote fate Sin a a psa a el pad Sta Rey ERR EEN ca ‘<r fat es an ° ™ men ahs a? pve > A, ‘attack places a greater premium than ever on the quantity and quality of the physical and intellectual resources available, and on the efficiency and clarity of the organization charged with the task. While much has. recently been done to provide adequate physical resources for the job, the Committee is convinced that the present organization of our COMINT
activities seriously impedes the efficiency of the operation, and prevents -: .- . eee rae ak to tlt us from attracting and retaining 2s much top quality scientific and manage- ment manpower as this country ought to.be investing in so important a field. Itis highly significant to the Committee that the return of many of the best wartime COMINT brains tc more attractive civilian pursuits {J tL] ( / (c).- In place of the two COMINT organizations (Army and Navy) that Sa 2. Ae ee ee eoeaom eS — o. 2 Oe © ore ets LS A ce eee existed during the War, we now have four -- a unit in each of the three ae Sete | eee + meee oe . oem os —-o ee tame ee Armed Services, and a combined organization called the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) located in Washington and under the Joint Chiefs has _no authority over the Service units, which in turn are independent of each other. For ail practical purposes AFSA is controlled by AFSAC, a committee of the Jaint Chiefs of Staft consisting of repre- sentatives of the three Services. The arrangementis -acompromise, produced in 1949 when there was danger of the establishment of three complete Service organizations, each paraileling the other. Itis not weli ~ Suited in this intensely specialized field to the elimination of duplications - and to the concentration of available resources and funds on the intensely ’ difficult problems that exist and in fact it did not prevent the Air Force eee ee US rem cee ees + een a ee ED EGY SPAR eT sem ||| PEO AS ALE NOE SO
SN Aa ee ee a ce ten ety me wre from establishing .a third complete and virtually autonomous organization which will soon be larger than the Army, Navy or AFSA units and {s still growing. -In addition, it results for all practical purposes in tri- ~. service_military control of | our entire COMINT effort, for the U.S. Communications intelligence Board (on which the State Desartment, the Central intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as of ft eo * well as the’three Services, are represented) has inadequate authority and has become an ineffective organization, The COMINT effort of the Government today has too many of the aspects of a loose combination of the previous military organizations and too few of a true unification of ‘the COMINT activities and interests of all the interested departments and agencies. ‘ (d) For the foregoing reasons, and for others set forth in our Report, the Committee believes and recommends that a point has now been reached Is w ich_makes it_essential,to carry further the 1949 reorganization, Wee x @ | lieve that a more effective centralization of certain of the COMINT activities, brought about by_a strengthening of AFSA itself and an increase units authority over the Service COMINT units, will increase its effec- v __ gafiveness_and.correct_deficiencies.which-have become apparent since 1949. We also believe that_a greater degree of policy control.over, AFSA’S operations should be vested in an interdepartmental board on.which. the -6- ee ET nN eee ee
ee aS R NSS ye : : . SSS eee RA eg ne eS Sywas-Te tin interested civilian_agencies have adequate and effective representation. ‘ Our recommendations on the subject of organization_logically fall cer ts m oO ibe £ rx} ose im Oo os 'g os 4 ra. be | APSA itself; and_(3) the organization above the (e) As to the first, the Committee recommends that AFSA should be mace the keystone of the COMINT organization. Its mission ghould be errs es —_e dezined oy Presidential Memorandum, which should stat that its funccion nes pa is {0 provide effective unified organization and control of the COMINT activities of the Government, and to provice for integrated operational policies and procedures pertaining thereto. This responsibility should of ee ow . “oe _v - . > ery -. ae hee ee ee: not, however, affect the responsibility and authority of the other agencies $) in respect of th evaluation and dissemination of the COMINT procuct received py each of them from AFSA, and their synthesis of that product with information available to them from other sources., To the extent feasible and in consonance with the aims of maximum overall efficiency, economy _and etfectiveness, the Director shouid centralize or consolidate the periorm- ‘ ance of COMINT functions for which he is responsible. Although the Memorandum should make it clear that the Director has the authority to control all collection and processing of COMINT, it should also nag, EE ne - — ee le =o cacemmam 0 cave 0.3 @ - -+- cen ome eee oo ape —- —_————2 ome - ——- eQuee
. * . wy reigasead” on fe sue recara for the close support requirements | eal Have ¢ s ae . . — “Y -, of the Services, _and t that. where necessary for close support of corobat / 2 . » e a . 7 forces, , operational ¢ control of COMINT activities are to be, celegated by ee « - « oo oe teem ow eo e . . . — ° a ° “i Within AFSA igen, the .Dii rector should serve for alonger ferm - or than the ¢ tro-year rotational term proviced for at pr esent, _He must be meee ee we aman of the highest competence... Although qualified witnesses have’ ‘ recommenced to the Committee that he be 2 civilian, we believe that, on balence, ine. poston should be held forthe first term of at Jeest four years by 2 career military officer on actin’, or reactivated cuty_statts, - - —_ : a . “. , 2. %, and-thet he should : enjoy at lezst_ 3- star rank while he occupies _the office... eos} . . , He should haye 2 civilian Geputy; end in other respects (particularly in the field_of research) the Gevelopment of Civils an careers should be _ encouresed to 2 much creater extent than at present, I, as things 4. develop, it should later appezer theta civilian could better quality for the position of Director, we recommend that no sense of tradition or .vesied military interest be allowed to stand in the - way of his eppointment. -. ; (g): As to the organizati on above the AFSA level, the 2d ve -mentioned _ aw Presicential Memorendum should Gesignate | the Depzrtment of Defense “+ 28 the executive agent of the Government (uncer 2 Special Commitiee of . - the National Security, Council --- consisting of the Secretary of Defense we oe oe e . a “ses © oe ee a me TS oe oe oe Reviewed 4 Aug 1981 mS 2 ad, .
Stances may 1. cee eee and the Secretary of State, and the President, as circum reauire,). to manage for_the six interested departments and agencies the procuction, security and distribution of communications intelligence, and to manufacture, safeguard and distribute the nation’s own_crypto- of organization in the existing structure of the Atomic Energy Com- « mission. - ee . . We recommend the abolition of AFSAC and of USCIB as presently con- ~ Stituted. We believe that as_a successor to USCIB there should be a new COMINT ' a er) Board consisting of (1) a representative, of the Secretary of Defense, (2) a repre- mn . °° . . . Smitatiye of the Secretary_of State, (3) the Director of Central Intelligence, (4) the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, (5) a representative of the Federal Sureau of Investigation, and (6) the Director of the Armed Forces Gi Security Agency. The Director of Central Intelligence shouid be the chairman <4 XN . . -— -. this COMINT Board. ? | It should be the duty of the Board to advise and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, in accordance with the procedure outlined below, ” with respect to any matter relating to communications intelligence which falis within the jurisdiction of the Director of AFSA: ‘(a) The Director of AFSA should be required to make regorts from tirae to time to the COMINT Board, either orally or in writing as the -_ een oe i eee mes wee we me ee ee ee ae : - = * Ps Neue ne nn ee
Board may request, and should bring to the attention of the Board, either asaneme ia_sucn reports or otherwise, any new major policies or programs in advance of their adoption by him. In addition, he should be required to furnish to the COMINT Board such information as the Board may request with respect to the operations of AFSA, ne - (6) The Board should reach its decisions by a majority of not less — A SN 10 mt than four members. Each member of the Board shall be entitled to one | . MOL. (c) In the event that the Board votes and reaches a decision, any dissenting member of the Board shall have the right of appeal from such decision within 7 days to the above mentioned Special Committee of the NSC. In the event that the Board votes but fails to reach a majority decision, any member of the Board shall have a similar right of appeal to the Special Committee.- In either event the Special Committee shall review the matter and its determination thereon shall be final. (d) If any matter is voted on by the Board but (1) no decision is reached and any member files an appeal, or (2) a decision is reached in which the representative of the Secretary of Defense does not concur and such representative. files an appeal, no action shall be taken with | respect to the Subject matter until the appeal is decided, provided that if the Secretary of Defense determines, after consultation with the
Secretary of State, that the subject matter presents a problem of an emergency nature and requires immediate action, his decision shall govern pending the result of the appeal. In such emergency situation the appeal may be taken directly to the President, (e) ‘Recommendations of the Board adopted in accordance with the foregoing procedure shall be binding on the Secretary of Defense. xcept on matters which have been voted on by the Boar rd, the Director of AFSA shall discharge his responsibilities in accordance with his own judgment, subject to the direction of the Secretary of Defense. The Committee realizes that the above machinery is more complicated £0 one would desire, ‘although it is less involved than the present arrange- rsents for the determination and control of AFSA policies. Thea complication apcears unavoidable because of two controlling but somewhat conflicting ~~ . factors: (1) all of the interested Services and agencies must have a voice in — determining AFSA policy and giving it guidance, and (2) at the same time, in order to strengthen AFSA and make it a viable organization, it is necessary that for administrative pur poses it be placed under a single government Gegart: ment, In_addition to the duties: of the Board relating to APSA, it should also be Ra. tha duty of the t Board: (1) to coordinate the communications intelligence activ- won ities of all sll departments : and agencies authorized _by the President to participat cue apenas Mehta Sey ees oe so ie snare cee wenn 62 eee eernes EDS EE es ete ge en a en ow ee me
ae en Sas BS = Tye Hmong kG PTSD cet Le EN RY TOE ee pe Baars oe Se ey, ney et I NOS ‘ ares See egy yah ~ Coen: Sinees SO oer eS ae ee es rhe, eae ae ae GE orate Cee eet ae. Trae Set PR RT Reb Ce - = sy2 Ses Soe ee Se See FA ea VOT G PIL es dee TY Agee Bee 5 STE I eo ge Berne Sees ae therein; (2) to initiates to formulate policies concerning and to supervise all <a, seoetroe piegent Seay pose Se < ae, VETTE ee ars eee EW ear eas SST xz Bera eee Beata tats a7 EASED 2 and (3) to’consider and n make recommendations concerning policies - ee oe ee ae a ee eee _—- relating to. communications in intelligence of the common interest to the depart- ments and agencies, including security | standards and practices. Any resom~ mendation of the Board with respect-to these matters (as distinct from those alling witnin the jurisdiction of AFSA) should be binding on all departments and agencies of the Government if rit is adopted. by the unanimous vote of the members of the Board. Recommendations approved by a majority, but not all, of the members of the Board should be transmitted by it to the Special Com-' * wee £ =" o ° SSA ittee fof such action as the Special Committee may see-fit to take, ee rite rs = s: + As we have indicated above, Part V of the Report contains a substantial Ny + elaboration of the above recommencations, as well as comments on certain | a) ~ancillary and related subjects which we believe appropriate for consideration — - — oy the new COMINT Board. a pi} t t t. a ‘The Committee has been assisted by an able staff consisting of Messrs. ‘ ' . - . Ca) at _ Benjamin R. Shute, Lloyd N. Cutler, Harmon Duncombe and Grant C. Manson, | ° all of whom have had previous experience with the subject. We take this opportunity of expressing our grateful appreciation for their valuable assist- ance. We also wish to record our thanks for the unrestricted cooperation which a we received curing the course of our survey from each of the Service departments +? es -12-
“tt tJ 3 me and the other departments and ‘agencies involved, and particularly from the individual members thereof who either appeared before us as witnesses or . who otherwise assisted us in furnishing information and other material. Li after examining our Report you find that there are any parts which seo call for further discussion, the members of the Com meet with you at any time at your convenience, The Honorable . . The Secretary of State Department of State Washington 25, D.C. The Honorable - ° The Secretary of Defense Department of Defense - Washington 25, D.C. eee jaye Aare Ag See. wre PTAs eat, Sines ea eo iad — es oe nn sae - ie mittee will be glad to . Respectfully submitted, ddnew - a ve Cnirman : . ee ee eee toed | ae ere pe eens one STENTS ene wr me we oe Mga a REI Oe Oe Et SR EN UO 08 Rees he eg rn nn re eee cee emotes wrjeen|emepe Fe emer . _ +.
(4) th (.2J mts ie’ “8h A 1 ‘ L wn t. J . ‘N Jp xe > Parts I - a4 - ur ~ IV - — . Vv - INDEX A Brief Histery of Communications Intelligence in the United States . . . . The Value of Communications Intelligence During World War. . . . 0. ee Today. . 2. 1 6 1 we we The Present Crganization of United States COMINT Activities . . . Producing Agencies . . . . Consuming Agencies . . . oe How the Present Grganization Operates Size and Cost... . Intercept . 2. 0. 1 ee tk ee Prictities . 2. . 0.0 2 ee ee Processing. 2. 6 wk kk By the Military Service Units. By AFSA . . . 7 Dissemination Tha Military Inteligence Agencies State Department Intelligence . Central Intelligence Agency .. . ‘Federal Bureau of Investigaticn. . Alerting Top Officials . . . .. Cryptography. . 2... ee ee ,. Security. 2... . . e . « € Concilusisns and Recommendaticns The Impsrtance ef Communications Intelligence. . 5 ww kk Tae Organization cf Communicaticns Intalligence Activities .° . od 3 € ad Use cf Processed Traffic. e ° oe ean Ae SAS Ts SN 22 22 28 101 103 110 LU 114
‘yy ae om O a * Recommendations as to Changes in the Below the ATSA Level . 2... 2... Within AFSA Itsey . 2... ote . oe e . e The Security cf Communications Intelligence The Cryptanalytic Effort ....:....4. . The Size and Expense of the COMINT Effort Letter to the Committee dated Dec. 28; 1951... List cf Perscns Interviewed . NSCIDNo.9.-. 2. O.C ; ee . ° e °* ° Letter.to Governcr Dewey from General Marshall, September 25,1944. 2. 1. 0. 3 kk Chart Showing Percentage cf Overall intalli- gence Derived from COMINT EESTI) ~ erg] lf “st ee “ an .. .* ": Chart Showing Percentage of Overall trtelli- gence Derived from COMINT SEQ55Ry 2. Citation for ist Radio Sauadron, Mobile, USAT, Getcber li, i982... °°. ° . e eo. Directive of Secretary cf Defense Creating AFSA, wu May.24, 1949 2. 2 1 os a e ° * ° e oe 121 4 128 135 137 140 Tab aA Tabs Tab Cc Tap D Tab = Tab —_ = - Tab G TadH ~ The.“GONSDO'' Problem pes cee rae my “77 Tab I “USCI8 "Current Inteltigénse Reauirements, ~ List No, 21, Mareh 15, 1952 2. 2 ee: Preposed Drzft Presidestial Memorandum for the Ssoretary of State and the Secretary ci Defense. 2. 2. 1. we ww ee et <3 . * ee. Tad Tab i Ldad Po
ema ae 8h oe oo ae we ree ee Oe 8 ee me er em ene = ee soe twee oe eete ow reyverke “ . . . . - ae) a ries — . : . . . . - a eine. RMATION—~—— | . . . ; “ 77S : . 7 . = . . é e . ; ° ° ° en K ° : r - ¥ ° ry ° . a ‘ . ‘ - — = ° ¢ . . ; t - . ° “ ° . . - wom . ~ « -_ ° « - . e PARTI 2. et OB A BRIEF EISTORY OF COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE =~” IN THE UNITED STATES “THIS DOCUME: =N SONTARS CONE HRD RD MATERIAL OU. SS . ° * ° Let F : . : . tour . . > . . ° tind \ e - . — J rd - . . cy ° . . *» « .. o « - - =~ . <= (— We . “"{ oo. ; s eg § Ne _—_ . - ro ee) oo = - que FOP SECRET Reviewed ji August 198 SECURITY INE GSE HO NOO OO eEC°w_—c_reEeeoreeemeeeeeeeee , 474
=Ayhens — Soot pcr a Py ws ae ee eg et ie Po Sh Scr Raa a sed So se ee ey Ce ee cerry ween ver one en ee ee oe i + hen A * SP 0 RGR oe BT HOLE 9 kt DS t . Pd 5 Before 1917 United States activity in the field of communications intelli- gence Was Sporadic, and there is little record of it.* For all practical purgoses EW 4 the history of American cryptanalysis begins with our entry into World War L ‘At that time codes and ciphers, even those used to carry the most sensitive . | en information,-were naive by current standards. They were hand-constructed and-hand-applied cipher systems usually overlying double-entry code books, 2 tl the attack upon which required skills and patience but not the elaberatea elec- 7 \~ trenic and tabulating devices of today. Consequently, the ceces which this 5 - Government ‘‘cracked’’ from 1917 to 1919 were handled by a small group of lexicographers, mathematicians, and people who had acquired some backgroun - era what was then the hebby of cipher construction. _ The War Department set up the first organized cryptanalytic office in q~ June IS1T under Mr. H. O. Yardley, an ex-State Deoartment telegrapher who tou had taken some interest in cryptography, cr cipher-construction. His office “z-' at first consisted cf three people. It grew rapidly, was suddivided into func- -- ao ticnal sections, and at the conclusion of the War had a table cf organization 3 ° ° 7 “ The phrase ‘communicaticns intelligence’’, abbreviated fe> the sake cf con- as venience and by commen usage to ‘‘COMINT’’, means intelligence produced _. by the study of foreign communications, including breaking, reading and 2 avaluating enciphered communications. The breaking cf ciphers is callec =4'~ “eryptanalysis.’’? The construction of ciphers is called ‘‘cryptcgraphy.’’ = The entire field, including both cryptanalysis and cryptegraphy is called — “‘eryptology.’’ L~ : s* -l-
of some 150 persons with an annua! budget of $100,000, Its security regulations Sa" : . . were primitive. Ciphers were broken and ‘code values were recovered entirely by hand process. The volume of traffic handled by the group was. nevertheless respectable, and the results of its work on the military, diplomatic and eco- nomié fronts W255 mportant encugh to impress both the General Staff and Ge-2, But its budget for fiscal year 1921 ran into oppositiea, and during the next decade was gradually cut to $25,000, ~ During most of the 1920’s what wAs-left of the effort appeared to be of -- eters = “. e . ae isterest primarily te the Staté Department. The group’s capacity and output Py - dwindled to a small daily ‘‘oulletin’’ of and its curtailed y Stopes’ came largely from State Department appropriations. Yardley remained on = the office was removed to New York for ‘‘security reasons’’, and the whole endeavor entered into the era which, a° the result cf subsequent notoricus “publicity, has been dubbed the “‘State Department’s Black Chamber.’ No y .eSe@arch was carried on; there were no training activities, no intercept, no :  Girection-finding studies. The personnel had fallen to six. EEC There was another factor, aside from relaxed pressure, which contributed srvq- ‘0 this stagnation. The entire concept of ‘‘reading other peonle’s mail’’ was act only unfamiliar but actually distasteful to the American people and its Govern- aca ment. The coup-ce-grace to the State Department activity came in i$29, afew weexs aiter Mr. Stimson became Secretary cf State. Current copies of the
x BRS ar aS m7 Sera Sa o Lx ona AV. 2ie roots Sof: SONALI Sores Pe oe a ra atecora: Ses . pot anbs =%* SEC SS Saye eS See Pr ¥ Cyc ee  e Sere - messages of significance, had been.placed upoa.his. desk, Mr. Stimson was =e9 : i ; : 2 . .- i a astonisned. When he was told how the material had been obtained, he dis- —  bandee the Yardley office forthwith. Yardley’s reaction was to set about ’ writing his memoirs, which eventually appeared in 1931 under the title ‘«The (__| American Biack Chamber,’’ and which destroyed by unprincipled exposure most cf the gains that the early effort had made. Fi Joti Y AN t Na .. The records and physical possessicas of the New York cfiice fell by default to the Sign gaal Corps of the Army, which had been giving minor support Ast (_ jueci— to the effort. Ata later date it was decided ta reconstitute and ceatinue the f - work under Army auspices. In light of the fact that Yardley’ S memoirs had Ses ZB . : Bre -~Negplused such a fuz re and-had thrown the entire concept o cryptanalysis and “<4 ; Cryptanalysts into such disr epute (embarrassing t this. Goverament not only vis- anything at “an was salvaged. The period from 1931 to 1935 was one of revival. The fizst job was to Teassamdle icrmer personnel and enlist new recruits; a training p rogram with <3 ~ fq «= instructionel literature was organized, and it is notewerthy that for the first spate | . ™ time 2 complete cryptographic program (the construction of our own ciphers) was > envisasec. There was still no intercept service, as we understand it today, but a , ¢ i, -3- 3 Sora: . xt - 17a 22 EAS wet ee Fe ee = Se ; - ps els Se ree PB oe be BE Sark rn - * .y.
raw material was clandestinely obtained through ‘‘backdcor’’ astTangements. The secrecy surrounding the work, in the backwash of shock following the . Stimson ultimatum, precluded showing the results of the effort to anybody but the Chief Signal Ofzicer -- even G-2 was proscribed, In those depression year funds were éxtremely difficult to get, especially in view of the nervous secrecy engendered by the Yardley disclosures, Perhaps the greatest triumph of the 7 smay cryptanalytic group at this time of stringency and uncertainty was the ‘te™ ey a same: "XN establishment under the Signal Intelligence ‘Service ef a training school for AGREES oe SES CEES FETS Oi We a SS ews EE es fe ea oman es or NE ere ee ee ee = te . “+ ' officers, which grew from a student bocy of one in 1931 te about a dozen tea - : : : m+ o- years later. os . . , 7 his renewed inferest in cryptology was not confined tc the Army. The Navy had for many years conducted its own cryptographi: bureau under the Code and Signal Section of the Ciiice ci Naval Communicaticns, but this office had ccenserned itself sclely with the mantfacture and distribution cf the Navy’s _, own codes. A “‘pinch’’ of a phetostatie cepy cf the main Japanese Naval crde- book in 1921 had given the first rudimentary impetus to 2 Naval counterpart of the Army’s cryptanalytis endeavor, and the cedebcok was exploited for some time by a “‘Research Desk’? within the Code and Signal Sectica established in - 1924, A Secret fund ouried in the budget of the Directer of Naval Intelligence was made available for the werk. Although this fund wes turned back in 1931 oy some fiscal cfficial of the Navy Department who may have been influenced
. ss the Yardley vevelations, the work somehow went on, tor the Navy began in he 30’s to build in earnest a cryptanalytic organizatioa equal to and in some ~_ fe respects more far-flung than the Army’s. Its task was ready-made, for the Japanese Naval Code was formally changed in 1930 and this time had to be recovered the hard way, for no pinch’ was feasible. Also, for the first time, the codebook’s values were enciphered by a more complex system. This made the problem much more difficult and foreshadowed the sophisticated yiphers which confronted the Navy in World War ‘HH, Another milestone in the ~—~* Rn SE ee er nn nS art of cocebreaking was the adoption by the Navy of tabulating machinery to . élp in the attack. : - The Navy’s cryptanalytic ercup, like the Army’s, first came into being Ger the aegis of the communications division. The Director of Naval Intetli- gence conceded the practical advantages of conducting under the Director <f Nav2) Communications an effort which was related to communications in - ceneral, Accordingly, the DNI agreed to the arrangement in return for am —~ assurance that resultant intelligence, which the DNI could get from no other 5 7 source, would always be available to him, and that his requirements would be considered in the direction of the effort, That arrangement remains in effect (The Army subsequently reversed its position and transferred its activities from the Signal Corps to G-2). The Naval cryptanalytic organ- imation was built around a central bureau in Washington with several forward En Sh ce Ee ooo ™
L a r oF \ ° a a . . et . . : . . . ~~, echelons in the Pacific area, a forerunner cf the eventual world networks which 2 modern American cryptanalysis demancs, The main purpose ofthe Navy’s pYogram was coverage of the inovements and cevelopment of the Japanese Navy, : z pnd the effort wes marked by successiul ettacks upon the communications ° (_] surrounding its great periodic maneuvers, Dur ing the "30's, success built upon .? tyre wat ee ae Pahoa ry " success.-in this coverage, each bringing in its train str engthened conviction on LL) i - the part of the Naval High Commend of the indispensability of COMINT, with a shear Hoy T esvitant | iner eases in zNotment of funds and pe: =sonneL By 1$38 the Naval ( ieysseele oe tJ cryDtenalytic group wes in a flourisning state, and had branched ou t into fuli- - - . - . fledged interce nd such leiter-czy concepis ci the art as trail Hic linelysis and _ on we vf aafahatesquency) ais rection- finding. A second: ry central unit in Rewall hed been 3 ares tablished and the tracition hed cevelconved of allowing officers to specialize in a . 2 < apparent. ‘In Octoder 193), the Direcier. ef Neval Communications 5 took action “rt the field of iryptenaly sis, although Wey remadined nominally ‘‘communication a Oificers.? 2 07. ° ; co sss : " | , 7 In this early period of the ’20’s and.’30’s, the mest glowing success in the « a -* , . 2 Americen cryptenslytic iield, subsequently highly publicizedf{was the breeking - . q i es Snneperr ay eny aan r an inv se Diplomatic Codes, so that practically every message of 4 CU -= ooo ue “2 ~~ . . . ‘ + 7 With the growth of the Army end Navy communication intelligence . 1 Se a4 x s sgt: se oe le _ we : activities, the need for 2 definite division cf effert between them Deczame s. s ° >
eas! ni t wed BY to allocate responsibilijes in order ‘‘to preclude duplication of effort, to keep down to a.minimum the expenditures for radio intelligence activities, and to build up a policy of whole-hearted cooperation between the radio intelligence activ ities of the Army and Navy.’’ Asa starting point he proposed that the Navy be assigned responsibility, for activities relating to naval affairs of maritime SFE: erm msezee SFrk aa Beye and that the a Sere available for decoding anit t translating was considerable, and neither the Navy nor the Army grcug souid individually bear the burden. Efforts were then resumed to effect 2 mutually agreeabie allocation of work. in 1940 callabo- tation oetween the Navy and Army resulted in the breaking of the now famous ‘*Purgle’’ code, the chief communications medium used by the Japanese diplomatic network prior to and at the time of the Pear! Harbor attack.
é Although this and other cryptanalytic successes had been brought about through ] pooled effort, the inevitable Tivalry between. the Services had arisen. Much of the work on military ciphers was jealously guarded by whichever Service felt | it ad the primary interest, and the problem of what to do with the voluminous | diplomatic traffic remained unsolved. 7 The method of processing and disseminating the diplomatic messages that - were read was both duplicative and unseemly. For example, in the Japanese tomatic traffic each organization had all the available intercepts and in some a cases all the means for breaking into them - whenever an important message | Was read, each Service would immediately rush to the White House a copy of ~ eo translation, in an effort to impress the Chief Executive, After considerable ~ -_.scussion, the responsible authorities eventually agreed that the only accept- | able and workable soluiion was for the Services to alternate daily in reading 7 the traffic, and for the Navy to disseminate results to the President, and the | Hoy to the State Department. This ‘‘odd-and-even day’’ arrangement for processing traffic was a strange one, but it seemed practical for the reason | that the traffic could be readily sortec according to the cryotographic date. | The arrangement cemained in effect until the middle of 1942. (Curfously . x enough, ii was discovered atter the War. that precisely the same basis for divi- Sion of effort was employed among the German cryptanalytic organizations, and for the same reason.) ° . . 7
. > a ~ American COMINT activity in the years 1938-41 responded to the stimulus | of the second World War; the foreknowledge of our almost certain participation a in it ‘intensified the effort and made budgetary and logistical support compar- atively easy to get. Just before and after the attack on Pearl Harbor, it was clearly realized that COMINT’s immediate target was tactical military traffic. j The jod was at hand and its potentials were enormous. Since the country’s first actual rity engagements were oriented towards the Pacific, the first <ryptanalytic task was the problem of Japanese naval ciphers, So great was the challenge and so great the valume of traffic that the Navy at once decided that the only possible solution was total specialization. By a hastily concluded ~~ sentlemen’s agreement’, ‘the Naval COMINT group transferred to the Army its entire interest and capacity in all cryptanalytic fields other than naval and related ciphers. The idea was that the Army would accept stewardship of the Navy's excess cryptanalytic cargo, would exploit it to the best of their ability 7 w wing the War, and would return it, presumably enriched, when the War was over, ° With expanded facilities now available, the Army turned a large part of COMINT pending the time when it would become more fully occupied with enemy military traific. It came about that the Army’s personnel accretion | its affort to the increasing demand for was largely Civilian, while the Navy’s was largely military. Henceforth, the . on | | ; ; . oe 4 .
those in charge on the Army side were generally civillans with appropriate technical training gained in private or academic pursuits. This unpremed- itated differentiation in staffing was to become an important element in the Gj problem of post-war unification later described. The two eryptanalytic units were housed at the time of Pearl Karbor in wings of the Old Navy Department and of the Munitions Building, where working [y-~condittons were poor and where adequate security was almost impossible. In a November, 1942, and. February, 1943, respectively, the Army unit and the Navy the former girls’ school in Arlington.County, Virginia, known as ‘‘Arlington J ‘ , 2a, and the Navy took over the former girls’ school on Nebraska Ave., i N. W., known as ‘‘Mt. Vernon.’’ Between the two was several miles of distance and the Potomac River, which it was believed at the height of the inter-service ~ sativalry in 1944 would never be bridged for cryptanalytic intercourse, From the period of the disruption of Yardley’s group in 1929 down to the t i: early days of World War U, the civilian consumers of COMINT (primarily the Department of State) were serviced by the Army on the basis of its own best judgment of what they needec. The actual mechanics of such Servicing con- co) Sisted of the simpie device of sending off! cers trom the Army‘to inter ested and t cleared individuals. Where a briefing on the basis of current COMINT results oa ; -10 - 7 unit removed to private grounds in suburban Washington -- the Army took over ai
2 ae 3658, 8-- B85, Dp MOT ri ber < 2 re OS SO, eee ta nm ES She ges i to be conducted, it was entirely oral and the officer-courter left behind f no code-word material of any sort. Until after World War Ii, the State Depart- a st ment had no separate ‘‘functional’’ intelligence office of its own ard no secure _ / u arrangement whereby COMINT could be kept for study or reference Essentially, 7 ; iz this method of servicing the State Department with COMINT remained in effect. F thrcuchout World War IL | 7 tH It soon became-apparent that, with the enormous expansion of the COMINT production, a corresponding increase in the over-all intelligence -consuming fi ability of the Services was required in order to cope with the {low of communi- ; Fy cations intelligence other than that which was strictly tactical or strategic. . = ee this reason, both the Army and the Navy-developed ‘‘special intelligence’’ =e ~ Se rganizations. Because of the importance oi the non-military traffic which the Army was processing, the Army's special intelligence group (Special. (i Branch, G-2) in due course became the larger. The Navy’s special intelli- f — -éence-consuming interest was small because its main target, cryptanalytic - “attack on enemy naval tactical ciphers, brought results which were evaluated and acted upon largely by the Navy’s forward umiis in theaters of war. For, this and other reasons, Special Branch, G-2, eventually assumed an importance Co oo ES within G-2 equal to or even greater than that of the parent organization, At the end of i944, G-2, having at that time an extremely shrewd and energetic attitude toward COMINT in general, acquired control of the Army cryptanalytic effort u i
from the Signal Corps, thus differentiating the organizational Status of COMINT in the Army from that of the Navy, where COMINT has rémained under the Waele) , control of the Director of Naval Communications.* | q Some reference has already been made to the rivalries and jealousies that developed during this period, despite the ‘‘gentlemen’s agreement.” They persisted to a degree that became disturbing to responsible officials in both on Services, One illustration appears in the history of <—gipmeiiGipaen. a ~ pubuduauntureunagunansungimsanaayomanass “RE eae cen nEARREEpET pene, a ‘* The aecomplishments of Special Branch, G-2, in World War Tare a direst testimony to two factors relevant to the COMINT problem today: (i) the & prime importance of top-flight personnel in leadership and at the working ‘ aN wet level; and(ii) the incalculable advantage of top-side civilian and military support for the COMINT effort. _. . -}2-
2 “ Sey f] - Until the War was nearly over ANCICC continued to struggle with the 9 It is cnly fair to say, however, that because of complications arising H during the ‘30’s from the interest of other agencies than the Army and Navy, in the cryptanalytic field, some corrective measures were adopted. In Tuly 1942, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in order to conserve the COMINT resources available for-the prosecution of the war and to promote Security and efficiency, recommended toe the President that cryptanalytic activities be limited to the Army, Navy and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Following a Presidential the work, and agreements were made between-the Army and Navy defining spheres of responsibility. As the War progressed the need for even closer Jv a=serelationship became apparent and, in May 1944, an informal Army-Navy ity Ae coordinating committee (ANCICC) was established at the Navy’s suggestion to improve collaboration and to deal with a variety of operating problems. } -";- problem, Just before V-E Day, correspondence between the Commander-in- ‘ _* Chief of the Navy and the Chief of Staff of the Army set in train a series of ‘Meetings which, with acknowledgment of the need for oroadez cryptanalytic Coordination as the agenda, resulted in the establishment of the Army-Navy Communications intelligence Board (ANCIB), the first high-level COMINT board. it began operating in March, 1945, On which occasion it absorbed CJ ANCICC and reconstituted it as the Board’s working committee, The —- wo BS NS eer ea VI ae ee directive to this effect, a standing committee was established for coordinating ,
(bo 7) - foundation of ANCIB was a somewhat grudging act. A ground-swell had begun to gather among Army specialists, particularly a small group of converts. to the centralized, en Re 2 equally zealous converts existed on the Navy side, their proselyting activities were hampered ma q . && by the conviction of the then COMINCH and the then Director of Naval Communi- g cations that the Navy must never surrender any part of its control of naval COMINT, It was made known that ‘‘political’’ {ssues and forces were involved: aie Oey the old conflict between the Navy and the Army in the communications field A had moved up a notch and had become confused with other matters of bitter | E disagreement between the two Services. COMINCH realized, however, that By ome observance of the. idea of COMINT collaboration was demanded, and - decided upon a Mmited tactical offensive. Accordingly, ANC was urged. into mi being for the purpose of ‘‘extending and improving the existing arrangements * Ff aers of joint interest,”’. although this resolve was watered down by the _ presentation of a memorandum from COMINCH stating that the Navy considered ~ A it ‘‘inadvisable to effect any actual consolidation of the Dbhysical, technical e facilities’’ of the Navy and Army COMINT activities. A Meanwhile, a new functional intelligeace division had bean set up in the f Degartment of State with a Ssecial Projects Staff to service the Department * RICC, and also ANCRAD (Army-Navy Communications Research and “>t, Development). 4 * -14- ‘
U with COMINT. Th is radical departure meant that the Department would hence- qj forward be independent of G-2 as a consumer of COMINT and that by the same a token it.would become a claimant to status within the COMINT family equal to that of the old-line members, Army and Navy. In December, 1945, ANCIB 3 admitted the- Department of State to membership and changed its name accord- ingly to STANCIB (State-Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board) and —" A easy PARAS Sahn ae Se agt jan A the name of its subcommittee to STANCICC. f - = . FY of State took full part in those deliberations. In the first half of 1946 there were further devélopments. te 3 Was téferred to’ the FederalBureau of Investi- gation, which had had for years a marginal interest in COMINT. .The Bureau a expressed a desire to become more actively associated with the regular P . -- ————= rere L COMINT group, a trend which STANCIB members welcomed and approved. * wel ‘ Also in 1946, the President directed the establishment of the Central Intelli- J gence Group, forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and it was U at once recognized that this Group had a Naturai claim to intelligence from the COMINT source and 2 place in the coordinating mechanism. in June, 1946, after these new members of STANCIB had been installed, the Board voted to ma Co call itself USCIS, the United States Communications Intelligence Board, (its ] Cc ceed . present name), and its working committee became USCICC. ~15 - cD > Ce eee SC ERLE OS tat t= LEP oO Lee Loh SEERA YS . eS TT Pes 2s Ta Zs ‘ ad é ae nr, nee et oe apeer oe iby cia Ca OC, Ee TES oe eS EY OE -«
. ecole co, oc: ae | exploit the to impcse COMINT Security regulations and limitations upon the entire Aa} ™ Ww = — ) . lead | * NSCID No. 9 in its present form is. attached as Exhibit C. 0 2 16 - ee n® mh the original Presidential mandate given to the Army.and Navy to work out and association was attempting, from necessity but without adequate authority, as an intelligence directive through the special channel of the Central intelli- u gence Agency.* This directive (more fully discussed in Part Il of this Report) GE orice for the establishment of USCIB ‘‘to effect the authoritative coordi- UY communications intelligence for which he is responsible.’’ It gave member- ...—- ———~ Through 1946, ANCIB-STANCIB-USCIB had no formal charter other than Early in 1947 the State Depart- - ment representation in USCICC pointed out.that not only were the latter-day members without legal footing in the COMINT association but also that the executive Branch. The result of the ensuing discussions was the present USCIB q charter, known as NSCID No. 9, promulgated by the National Security Council i ; m nation of communications intelligence: activities of the Government and to advise the Director of Central Intelligence in those matters in the field of e Tie Ship to the Services, State, CTA and FBI, required unanimity for decisions, Ol with reference to the National Security. Council in the event of disagreement, 7 and directed all departments and agencies represented on o> subordinate to the National Security Council (and any others cesignated by the President) to implement the Board’s decisions and policies. However, it left ‘‘the internal
t fl merober departments or agencies. ” U ‘The next development of the COMINT structure was the direct result of * the organization within the National Defense Establishment in 1947 of a separate Hy Air Force, which promptly teck steps to develop its own unit for the intercepting a and processing of foreign radio communications of special application te its mission, thereby further complicating an already complex problem and inten- sifying existing frictions in the COMINT field, Shortly after it came into being, A the Air Force was accorded full Fepresentation in the USCIB structure, bringing er en 7 the swollen proportions of wartime to the normal peacetime volume, largely 7 Political rather than military in character, Althcugh everyone was now alert = -/ to the need for cryptanalytic continuity, and although every effort was made mc co Cy - ©. iz the total membership - to six departments.and agencies, where it Stands today. The immediate post-war period was one. of adjustment and in a sense etrenchment of the COMINT effort. In August, 1945, its business shrank from to avoid the disruption of the COMINT endeavor which had followed World War I, certain drastic cut-backs in personnel and funds tcok place. The COMINT Structure became suddenly top-heavy in management, geared to high - speed production but with a scarcity of raw materials and labor, and with six stock- holders where it had once, in the days of its greatest productivity, had two. a sense of frustration and anticlimax was feit by a all those who remained in 1 rcv -17- a
vu— *. } a - a Pore a a. er =e . - Seamer ee Les eae, the business. An ebbing of morale, which later became one of the most serious Issues in the COMINT problem, set in very soon after v- Pi Day. - It was in this atmosphere that the Navy approached the Army with a view to re- examining the ‘‘gentlemen’s agreement’ and Tepossessing its share . of TPE 26210. Practically speaking the Navy COMINT unit was out of business by 1946, but it had a plant, trained personnel, ‘‘career’’ officers, and a vital stake in cryptanalytic continuity which could not be kept going on imaginary problems. Live traffic, as had been foreseen in 1942, was of the essence. The Navy’s effort to reenter the qin. was strongly resisted by the Army, which had in the intervening years developed . a sense of ownership in place of the trusteeship that was originally intended. It was considered absurd at Arlington Hall that a shift of pieces of the ae. ERNE: 2x obiem, for the processing of which effective machinery existed, should be seriously pr cposed merely for the purpose of ‘‘giving the Navy something to do.”” The Navy, on the other hand, could not afford to- ---—-- — commit cryptanalytic Suicide for the sake of keeping the peace. A compromise transfer program was eventually adonted and dragged out its painful course for many months,
+ See Part IV, pp. 105-107 : the experience had injected into the effort a badly-needed sense of fresh pure. pose and incentive, and it had provided a new basis upon which to duild sub- sequent glans for fuller collaboration within the Americsn COMINT structure. - ‘The emergence of the Air Force as 2 potent factor in the COMINT story * has been mentioned. It brought into sharper focus the question df duplication ad "=19-
a ae ae sme oe em cee cee ete eet ne te a a ee ae ete es “versus amalgamation. After passage of the National Security Act of 1947, there were not two but three vested military interests actively engaged in collecting, processing, evaluating and disseminating communications intelli- gince. Roughly, the position among the Services was this: the Army, with its large civilian component, the most inclusive commitment; and the greatest . g experience with the non-military aspects of the COMINT complex, was gen- ray in favor of some sort of consolidation of the effort; the Navy, only too : : an vell aware of the indispensable importance of COMINT to the success of naval os i war, and reluctant to share an effective COMINT organization that had become = ( integrated with its operating forces, stoed behind its top command to a manin ~ one Tefusal to surrender COMINT sovereignty; the Air Force, stimulated by eo “tts new freedom, asked only to be left alone to develop its Brooks Field and other COMINT outposts. In August,. _J948, the Secretary of Defense created a board under the chair- aanship of Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone, then Director of Naval Communi- cations, to study the COMINT situation within the Defense Establishment and to recommend some finai solution, The Stone Board was composed of repre- Sentatives of all military interests in the COMINT family. In December it submitted a split paper to the Secretary ef Defense. The Navy and the Air Forze both opnosed consolidation, while the Army advocated placing respon- sibility for all COMINT tasks, other than the performance of intercept and -20'- © en €0 Sy) heenrenree an « . « ce __ LL A TENS . -
i —d ‘decentralized field processing, within a single organization, After reading the paper the Secretary called in General McNarney to assist in resolving the dilemma by directive, since the more democratic method had failed to pro- duce a workable conclusion. General McNarney adopted a plan which in part [7 Ca & required a merger but in part left the three Services the right to maintain their own separate COMINT organizations, and in due course this type of organ- ization was ordered into effect by Mr. Johnson. Supplementary directives, oN which go beyond the scope of the Secretarial directive, were later issued by i the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The resulting and existing structure is described in (| | Part Ul of this Report, | a | |
fe . . . . . . ‘ * y : \ - ° s and = a * . ~s = J . . . ° - . - nd wm oe ew oe - eee eee oe . . . c.f ad . . - - - ”~ - °. . . .» 7 - . 8 . . . Py - ~- * 6 -” . ee? eo *. & . w 2 7 Vs © . . oe o ° ° = sp e . 7-7 « . oe . . . .? = ._° « . ee we woe em meee me me ate SB ett 2 Ome were ee « (5 SEOP-SECREB me vee SECURIPYINEORMATI OM cerca, ot . . . ; . PART O v - THE VALUE OF ; . COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE ; ‘ ° : . oo \ : ; — . . —_ Seis ates Oa one eee ES ee ted ye NEE Be Reet vate . ptruS*DOCUPENT “CONTAIN DE"WORD MATERIALS oe. . . ° . » '  « . - pass QPuAChaprm 2 Reviewed 4 August 1981 ores vitae! vy
. Before considering the present COMINT organization, it is appropriate to appraise the value of COMINT in the recent past and at the present time as a measure of the scale of effort that COMINT deserves, and of what might be expected if the conduct of our COMINT activities could be substantially _ improved. __ | . . _ . . | In World War COMINT may well have been our best paying invest- s ment, Its cost cannot be accurately computed, but an informed guess would ne perhaps a half billion dollars annually at the outside. Admiral Nimitz rated | ‘fc its value in the Pacific as equivalent to another whole fleet; General Handy is ‘ R reported to have said that it shortened the War in Europe by at least a year. In the Pacific, COMINT located the Japanese fleet enroute to the Coral ~: _ Sain 3 Bt ~ = ea and again enrouté’to Midway in 1942, enabling us to mass the carriers tor iz the battles which are ‘generally regarded as the turning point of the War against if Japan.* In 1942 COMINT also told us of the critical Japanese decision not to join the Axis war on Soviet Russia. In 1944, it-helped us to pick the soft Spots for our island advance, often showing where the Japanese expected us to attack and where their troops were massed. The official narrative of the Joint Combat Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas, includes the fellowing comment on this engagement: ‘The factors that vitally affected the battle of Midway were many and complex, but it is undoubtedly true that without radio intelligence it would have been impossible to have achieved the concentration of forces and the tactical surprise that made the victory possible.’ "~ 22 - ane Pe pgs eed eg POSED ND ee PR te ee pe R Foy a eB as ae <f ae he 204 =, Tahest: SSE RS HENS “ Sey 2 RN eota ass be fo
li Throughout the War, COMINT supplied a day-to-day check onthe results =~ ¥ of our submarine and air campaign against Japanese merchant shipping. It - . gave us detailed knowledge of how many ships Japan had, where they were, Z and when they were lost; armed with this intelligence, we planned and exe- cuted the remarkably efficient and effective Submarine, direct air and aerial A mining campaign of 1944-45. The Strategic Bombing Survey mission which py checked on Japanese Shipping losses after the surrender discovered that 3 ‘ W ss on V-s Day had been more exact than the records of the Japanese Ministry of F Merchant Marine. COMINT’s knowledge of the size and location of the Japanese merchant fleet . HE Finally, COMINT provided us with our only reliable measure of how fast ey e Japanese were losing their will to resist. Our leaders had a thorough and z immediate record of the peace feelers which the Japanese asked Ambassador fy _ Sato in Moscow te send to us through the Russians, and of the explanations to. ot _ iim of’ how decisions were being reached and on what points further con- cessions would be made. . (Some of these feelers were not passed on promptly i { \ by the Russians, and our only knowledge of them came from COMINT). co Througtout 1965, from Manila through Okinawa and Hireshima to V-J Day itself, we were in possession cf Japan’s instructions to her rincipal negotl- pan ; p ; ator, oftea before the Japanese code clerks in. Mascow could put the message c - 23 -. rr aa a:
gt ge ¢ if } Up on the desk of Ambassador Sato, the intended recipient.* ae hey SBA TE Fe oe Before Dearl Harbor, our own Japanese COMINT ccntributed to the Allied a effortcin Europe by giving advance warning of the German decision to attack _ Russia. General Oshima, Japan’s Ambassador in Berlin, was a veritable mine of information to more governments than his own, as he faithfully comrouni- ‘cated to Tokyo what was confided to him by the German leaders. Qi@@gmiraainep a Lees ge I, " COMINT intercepted, decoded, ‘translated and delivered some of these messages io’U.S, consumers while the Japanese code clerks in Moscow were Struggling with garbles and asking Tokyo for repeats. - er on o5-4 erates teen eee pigurie siz fas © ca ee +o = RY) + we ee om mee 22 eee we:
ox See ere cara sey epithe PR, BOS tS EO LS mig S td * a eames enemas So airiesy a and equally profitable results soon followed. Gnce we had butt enough escort vessels, they were guided by COMINT to the U-boats which habitually and carefully reported their positions each night to the German Admiralty. COMINT also intercepted German reports to, its submarines on our convoy _ movements, and our Naval orders to the convoys were changed accordingly. (This was represented’ts the Committee as another well-kept COMINT secret, and perhaps one of the most sensitive -- aptly reinforced by results of post- WO war inves tigations of captured. German documents showing that the Nazis con- 3 tinued to blame their high U-boat losses on some hypothecated Allied invention - for direction-finding the source of U-boat emissions. The Committee, oe however, found much, of the story of our COMINT- ‘based anti- U- boat campaign 9 oread out in detail in the May, 1952, edition of ‘'The Reader’ Ss Digest”, a _ 3 publication with a circulation of 15,000, 000. The Committ ee could not avoid some Speculation as to the nature of other “well- ~kept COMINT secrets’? that = ~were confided to it in camera.) . a In the war on land, COMINT did even better. It read Rommel’s intentions in 1 Africa so well that the Desert Fox guessed the truth; he confided his sus- Picions to Berlin, only to be told by the German High Command that such things
" Re as "f fstalate 4 Mis BX walniearees = 2 a et eee COMINT also helped to trace of Pett eee ‘<a U the transfer. of German forces between the Eastern and Western Fronts and . ° ee tS, : rs . F Before D-Day in France, COMINT furnished several of Von Rundstedt’s Ia periodic appraisals ofthe situation for the High Command, showing where he theught the main attack would come, as well as some of Berlin’s replies ignoring Von Rundstedt’s good advice, presumably in favor of Hitler intuition. (] COMINT also contributed Ambassador Oshima’s detailed reports te Tokyo on = his pre-invasion tour of the Channel defenses, which led, the Comrnittee has q been. told, to basic revisions in our landing plans. After the assault was launched, COMINT supplied a large quantity of battle reports and Dattle orders i : , yl on every level ‘rom the OKW itself down to the varicus divisions. Throughout ‘| the campaign in France and Germany, cur estimates of enemy troup strengths, locations and intentions were based more on COMINT than on any other source. COMINT was also the principal source of the information used to select e * di ™ ; ne a eens eee: rs) meee eee SO NE peed eh, ORE ED . Sa Pineeny Sd esata Ste ND ic on a ; -° . Si cer ca ee Oe - : . he aren oe at EP er ae were ~ oe ° ~ many — _ - ,
Pe ~. . { “Strategic and tactical bombing targets behind German llnes; and it helped - = us to identify the testing of advanced weapons (such as improved torpedoes a and guided airborne missiles) in time to get our scientists started on suitable . counter-measures, thus greatly reducing the ultimate tactical effectiveness of the enemy’s new developments. Of course COMINT was not always a perfect mirror of enemy intentions. We did not intercept all important enemy messages, and we could not always decrypt the messages we heard. Even when we did intercept and could read, our COMINT producers sometimes failed to turn out the messages in time mee — to be useful. Several significant Japanese messages that could well have B made the difference in forewarning us cf an impending surprise attack on Pearl Harber were intercepted from November 24, 1941 through December 6, 1941, and might have been but were net in fact available to the COMINT con- 0 sumers until after December 7. At times, the failure to make effective use om, 1; of COMINT capabilities was chargeable to those who ‘‘consumed’’ COMINT ud and formed intelligence cenclusions from it. The Japanese messages dis- AD closing Japan’s decision not to attack Russia in 1942 were yiewed with reserve ‘by our military planners at the time; those with the responsibility had already m formed the apposite opinion and rejected the strong COMINT evidence pre-. sented by G-2 on the ground that it might have been a deliberate Japanese ad rf attempt to deceive us with false messages. Faulty appreciation of COMINT rm) \ ? - 27 - Cc) 2 eS ee ES I I — hee Ee
their highest diplomatic code and yet were continuing to use it throughout the world. . Perhaps the most'striking tribute to COMINT’s value in World Ware. is the remarkable letter written by General Marshall to Governor Dewey on September 25, 1944, at-the height of the Presidential election campaign. This ~° | .letter was written without the knowledge of President Roosevelt or Secretary [y—Stimson -- ‘sgithout the knowledge of any other person except Admiral King rn (who concurs).”’ The unprecedented nature of this step by a professional soldier reflects the vital importance General Marshall attached to protecting the security of COMINT sources. The letter is attached as Exhibit D to this Cr evo, The question of Administration bungling at Pearl Harbor was a key f] campaign issue. In the ‘letter, General Marshall urged Gevernor Dewey against taking any steps in the campaign that might-disclose or force the disclosure of “our ability to read the Japanese codes, This plea is supported by a detailed [57 recital of Specific examples of COMINT’s value in the conduct of the War on fi both fronts, and of the tragic consequences if the Japanese were warned to @ Change their codes. COMINT’s value today is more difficult to measure. In time of peace - { even what we now call peace - day to day knowledge of specific enemy strength a and specific enemy intentions is still of the greatest importance, but COMINT ~ ; ‘= 28 -
EI DEDEDEDLIDPODOSSSSSS SCS” ; . _ 1.0. SQE¢6 KbesC Yuna We He of war, Of course, COMINT could do nothing more valuable than lo forewarn (eof 2 Soviet surprise attack on the {ree world, but its capabilities on this point rem ain to be fully tested. nd ee tik inate a aed On OE grad Tete met oy rn as ee: ran * e they often are able to communica! on interior land lines, ‘and cannot be heard. There is less pressure onthe -. ts communications network; the operators -mzke fewer mistekes, and COMINT . . . fe aE - has 2 much harder time Gecry pting what there is to hear. As 2 result, the — . . “fF = intelligence consumers 2lso have much greater di iii iculty ini g together into‘2 coherent story t scattered bits and nieces they receive-f{rom the CONLI producers. oe oo ; in testifying that COMINT: ranks as our mest important single source of intelli- “gence today. The attached charts (Exhibits E and F) show the estimates of . < we (3 Nevertheless, the wilnesses before our Committee have been unanimous the intelligence agencies as to how much COMINT contributes to our overall ~29- Reviewed 4 August 1981
oem . ar intelligence as compared to other sources.4 sod ~ . . ~. _ >! . % + In submitting these charts, the Coramittee stresses that they have been furnished to. it as estimates enly, and any accurate percentage allocation is obviously impossible. "Also the fact that in seme fields a high percentagé of our total information comes AY taay be very small, Nevertheless, the charts serve to indicate ina general way (i the importance which the using agencies ascribe to COMINT sources. nn anasar mate HR open
Even these limited and largely low-level sources-provide much valuable intelligence. The. COMINT consumers have given th e following recent-examples: — Ce, Ag ah wea GFE en ~ - . 2 oe are =» Serre eee cme eee) ee ee ee eee A ep enews a a —_ -
e te ht _. t 1 Fae As oe 'e' . c Sh 3 +. ba = = : * sé Ape fey Cod T = ns. =< oe STEN ey ee (mtd ar RAS Saha re ee - = eA Aare wit meter a: Be 2) Se “5 Pag Pha Bee a Hee an Eat x = = = en, on te aT ake 3 | x ae, ; ; ~ 32 - 4 4 ",
_— et me ~ EX oy eS ~ = SEMEL Ra Sat Fe ions ee — —. Uc (=) (— Ase tin te Fatal eZ, at son ans <->: wen —
ETS IT EL LLL SS LIT, Gomis on ghe this can usually be gathered in’peacetime from a variety of open sources, rr {inres! such as traveling businessmen and tourists, American engineers and technicians engaged in particular foreign assignments, technical magazines, railroad timetables, and similar data. But in the case of the Soviet Union these sources ar@ now virtually nen-available. itm eee beer baer! 5h teed . _ ce net 652 ei eee 8 CESS r ; ~ " : eek _ Ee2- et errt Af _ at Sa 54 i - n Oe, t = Led oan — : =. Sent Et Lear ae x 5 * . <= =] . = Soe = . PL -, Prom | - i : _ ened . = = a, wi iy ma! f ~ ne ae ee N ; ae + ore ae - wee « . -. we oem welt mee Os Scene. cee. —_ se =~:
CZ 3 ” gence conclusions based on such material contain ample margins of error; unless processed carefully, they can become ultimate assumptions piled on a ma number of preceding assumptions. ; a (i) Mistakes can be and often are made en any of these points, particularly : by analysts whe lack a back eground of long COMINT experience. In battle, the See gener: eave y JS ven eo So 7S ee Bee Sot - = erie = —— wae >: ™ show - oan Breese
. i so! , Whether the margin of error is Small or large today, it is apt to increase _~Seometrically as time passes, until something more solid thang comes along as a check on our mounting accumulation |. owe rv . . we —! | hare a eae ew aes cee oe lee . —_ 7 oe 7 mee
. Marts win ser a 2S Pah oe on poem KS Sa ESOS ep eee patient watch over these sources can preduce three results of enormous value upea the approach of general war. z
ca Gost hy fF ESSA eee Rete ae . COMINT was mined from.a rich ore in World War ¥. Today, the ore i. being processed is of far lower grade, Large-volumes of materiais are being ne, ane: ee handled, and the refining process is complicated in the extreme. Costs-of : operation are high. New veins of ore need to be unearthed, and the costs of ene) exploration are also high. If the new veins are to be opened up, part of the tr . ‘os ae eo! -39- . —, - =. ' ! we aul i te
Ment (= APES da ees ¢ ep mmr ray Ry eS SE Er gs, & te re hig PEERS sree ‘ present operation may have to be sacrificed, Whether richer ore will be = {J discovered, and whether the operation can keep in the black meanwhile, depend primarily on the skill and efficiency of the management. 9 4 ‘y aes Ee OS ' i @ Be ° = 7S, . Ct ~ —J) C s at i . PN c! ‘ ee eR Res WIVES ch Sen koe, St i Pe aU EN ATA EON CREE Mie CRY oa I - at Sin SERS Nyy mee Wh ee Eee = ame ‘ °
2 oe ele ot} 4 . : et ed eee ee ee ee . ---. W., ee ° o oe! Py . - : R . . ” oe - . ar .° .: a ed “. . *. . . - ‘° ~~ ase = od ee ee er ee ee ee te et -BOP-SE RET SECURITY. INFORMETION => . ; PART.I1D° . . Stee : a THE PRESENT ORGANIZATION OF UNITED STATES COMINT ACTIVITES _ -BOGUMENT:CONTADS-GODEWORD HATERTAY™ SHR - rd “- \ . Reviewed 4 August 1981
The present organization of U. S. COMINT activities includes four at ry principal producing agencies, six principal consuming agencies and two prin- cipal coordinating bodies. All of the four principal COMINT producing agencies ° are within the Department of Defense. These agencies, and their positions ° within the Department, are as fellows: . it 1. Within the Army, the Army Security Agency (ASA), the — commanding officer of which is responsible to the Assistant Chief ¢ of Staff, G-2, who is the prjncipal intelligence staff officer of the . Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. | | 2=“withinethe Navy Department, the Naval Security Group,” mo i the chief of which is respensible to the Director of Naval Communi-- cations, who ia dura is responsible to the Chief of Naval Operations. 3. Within the Department of the Air Force, the Air Forces Security Services (AFSS), the commaziding cfficer of which is - responsible to the Chief of Staff, USAF. : | ”. : . 4. Withia the Defense Department, the Armed Forces Security . Agency (AFSA), the commanding officer.of which is directly respon- sible to the Joint Chiefs cf Staff.
The six principal COMINT consuming agencies are the Military Intelli- gence Division of the Army, the Office of Naval Intelligence within the Navy, the Air Force Intelligence Division, the Office of Research and Intelligence ef the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. All-ef these agencies receive COMINT material from the .. ‘ - COMINT precuciag agen ies and themselves collate and evaluate suca maaterial. The customers of thése six intelligence producing agencies réceive their prod--—— uct, which in some Cases consists of or contains COMINT and in other cases has been prepared against the background of COMINT. The two principal COMINT coordinating bodies are the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) and the Armed Forces Security 2 Agency Council (AFSAC). From the point of view of organizational position within the Executive Branch of the Government, USCIB is the highest U. 5. (- COMINT body. As indicated in Part I, USCIB was the outgrowth of a long historical development in the coordination ef COMINT activities and now exists under National Security, Council Intelligence Directive No. 9, issued on July 1, im 1$48 (ia its present form attached as Exhibit C). That directive establishes \ a _ °° , Sm - 42 «- ° { p . 7s - PT tene er rd edie
the Board, to be composed of ‘‘not to exceed’’ two members each from the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Central InteLlli- = gence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. (FBI was added in March, 1950). The Board may act only unanimously; when it fails to reach a decision, it is required to refer the matter to the National Security Council, - : provided that if unanimity is not reached among the military departments of the _ Department of Defense, the Board shail first present the problem ‘to the Sec- oy retary of Defense. wee (7 The functions of the Board are stated in paragraph 1 of the Directive as ~, "es . wee follows: ae (l} ‘*to effect the authoritative coordination of Communications ~- .~— Intelligence activities of the Government”’ and, - (2) ‘to advise the Director of Central Intelligence in those matters in the field of Communications Intelligence for which he is responsible.”’ — This is weak and unsatisfactory language. With respect to the first . - - functioa, the word ‘‘coordinate’’ ordinarily means to bring into common action or harmonize, but the preceding word ‘‘authoritative’’ appears to indicate some greater power. Yet the requirement of unanimity precludes any greater power. With respect to the second function, although the Board is charged with the auty of advising the Director of Central Intelligence in those matters in the field of communications intelligence ‘‘for which he is responsible’ there is ao statement OP ceeee wn nye rere ee ee ty
Par antans Creme variant FN Lee ee we TR ta, well” Of} x tod e 7 : Vl . as to what are the matters in that field for which he is responsible, and para- graph 6 of the Directiwe expressly provides that all other orders, directives, policies or recommendations of the Executive Branch relating to intelligence shall be inapplicable to communications intelligence, Accordingly, the second function can‘at the most mean that the Board is to advise the Director of Central intelligence on those COMINT matters concerning which he in turn is respon-.- sible uncer the National Security Act for advising and making recommendations s aN got Pe Rae Pe Ta — ~m In the final analysis, therefore, the only functions given to the Board are — 7 Da knente ad ° to attempt to coordinate, with unanimous agreement, the communications intelli- . g@nce activities of the member agencies, Even these functions are limited by ATER yaragraph 10 of the Directive which provides that the Board ‘‘shall leave the’ internal administration and operation of Communications Intelligencé activities to the member departments or agencies.’’ This limitation seems designed to ia insure that in the field of actual production of COMINT (i.e., interception, -) decoding, translating and preparation of COMINT reports), the Board shall not | | have even the coordinating and advisory functions set forth in paragraph l of i the Directive. Thus, the proposed move cf AFSA to Fort Knox, Kentucky was’: - apparentiy considered by the military a question solely for decision by the
m~ . a ti Department of Defense and beyond the province cf USCL. i: The Board has twelve membess. Each military secvice is represented by its chief intelligence officer and by the chief of its COMINT producing agency, the Central Intelligence Agency by its Director and an Assistant Director, the Cc“ State Depa>tmenat by the Special Assistant for Intelligence and his principal (—J COMINT assistant, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation by two represent- es atives of the Director. The Director cf AFSA is not a member cf ‘the Beard, but 7 | Na . ‘acts as its ‘Coordinater,’’? or executive agent, The chairmanship is rotated a) anfually. The Beard hélds Teguia> monthly meetings and interim meetings when ti requested by any member. At its meetings there are usually present, in addition Bis ‘the thitteen Board members or persens acting for them, twenty or more other ots . ‘ . \. representatives cf the’ member agencies, so that the tetal attendance is between (7 thisty and forty persons, The Board as such has no office, staff or secretariat, {—7] and AFSA provides secretarial service, In addition to the Board itself, an aggre- — . , — gate of thirty representatives cf the member agencies are members of the three 7 | nN Standing committees described below, each cf which meets at least once a month, c= but none cf which has any staff o> secretariat cf its own. . . a Other than for liaisca perpeses abroad, the entire USCIB organization if apparently provides ne persennei, either member or staff or secretariat, whese n Sole o> primary duty is to consider or act upcn COMINT matters frem the national ~ pciat of view, and it appeszs that all cf the members cf USC and its committees Ls . . - 45 - ~ lees . - . . . a = PSS AE EGR SEIS Aa he eM et ee ie wees oot ov far rf, po Sion . ‘ veoe pole iS ; esa NC a ' : 7 ‘ {
Eee SR SS SS re oe ge ee Tene rn ee Be . t . ane . . . . e . cy las well as its ‘“‘Ccordinates,’’ are pezsens holding full time positicns of heavy “= a resocasibility in theiz respective organizaticas. C The Board has issued’ eight directives, which deal cnly with its own organ- i . . . s izaticn and COMINT secusity standards, It has three standing committees, one . i) for “intelligeice,”” one for “sesuzity,” one for ‘collateral information,” and an [1 ad hos ‘‘technical’’ committee appcinted for 4 particular current problem. Since ~ ey the issuance cf NSCID No, 9, the Board has held appreximately sixty meetings. A review ci the minutes cf those meetings indicates that its activities have been < cenfined principally te-matters relating to <sfRaeeses age ceneral security preblems andtoa =. . “EB extent the cooSdinatica ef evaluation and dissemination of COMINT intelli- gence, No matters have been referred to the National Security Council fer failure to reach unanimity. ic Thus, the actual cperatica of USCIB csatizms the very limited scope of its [/~ sunetien as prescribed by its charter acd intespreted by its members. USCIB and its subcommittees undeubtedly perform valuable axd necessary coordinating functions in Limited fields, but it is evident that USCIB does not have o> exercise any power comparabie with its pesitica at a high ievel in the organization of the * Executive Branch. It has been mude clear to the Committee by 2 number of
yo i¢) D U “I: oe i mm uy) ¥ ay (~) \ = hay 2 «+ ae as . . “@ (Barna inefficieat body. BO - . . - AFSA was established by Secretary of Defense Jchnsen, by a memorandum (— dated 20 May 1949 and a Directive (JCS 2010) attached as Exhibit H, which ’ placed AFSA ‘“‘under the direction and control cf the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” m— Its stated purpese was ‘‘te provide for the placing uader one authority the CoJ< conduct of communications intelligence and communications security activ- ities. . . within the National Military Establishment, except those which are to be conducted individually by the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force.’ The Directive enumerates 15 specific functiens of the Director, Armed Forces Security Agency, of which the most Significant for present purpeses appear to be (3) ‘operational control of all AFSA facilities, units and me nilitery personnel; and operational and administrative control of all AFSA civilian pexsoanel,’’ (2) produstioa cf COMINT and conduct cf all operations (= necessary to such praduction, ‘except those cperaticns which. . . are to be ; — conducted individually by the Army, Navy or Air Force’’ and (3) accounting (tor, and preparation, preduction, storage and distribution of all crypto- i material for the Armed Forces. Under the Directive, AFSA consists of such facilities, units and military = { 4 t ! * . 2 ve J . “ ana civilian persennel, including the headcuarters, Army Security Agency, the [} Communicatiens Supplementasy Activity (cf the Navy), 2 ° abl ie ommunicaticas Supplementary Activity (cf the Navy), and any comparavle A Organizations cf the Air Forse, and ‘‘sych cther facilities, units and personnel found — 4S the IJcint Chiefs cf Staff may determine as necessary to fulfill the functions t . i ton . “amy HeTein assigned.” Ta + - 47 - ;x . wl a
: A, Thus, as far as COMINT is concerned, the functions of AFSA are defined, (—) not affirmatively, but in terms of what is net performed by the Army, Navy and (“J Air Force. The Directive affirmatively assigns six missions to the Army, Navy and Air Force, including (1) assigning facilities and personnel to AFSA, (2) pro- _) al a ( viding ‘‘fixed intercept installations’’ to be ‘‘manned and administered’’ by the (= Services but to be ‘operationally directed’ by aFSA, (3) providing “mobile } mae intercept facilities’’ for the Services, to be ‘‘manned, administered, and oper- { are a) ~ationally controlled’? by the individual Services but which ‘‘may also be used to perform special missions for AFSA,’’ (4) providing communications facilities é (™ required by AFSA ané{5) to ‘‘continue to be responsible for all such crypto- ey . : U logic activities as aré required by intra-service or joint needs... and are Geytermined by the Joint Chiefs ci Stati not to be the sole responsibility of AFSA.’’ - The Directive also created the Armed Forces Security Agency Council (AFSAC) (with ten members, all of whom are military officers within the ~ Department of Defense). The Directive gave AFSAC certain duties to make (i= recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in respect of COMINT and to ‘‘deter- 7 mine and coordinate joint cryptologic military requirements.” Under the Direc- tive itself, AFSAC is given no actual control cver AFSA or the Director of AFSA, except for the cetermination of requirements. ii July 1949, AFSAC submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff two further Getailed directives with respect to the functions of AFSA, AFSAC, and the - 48 - ; —- a! . te = one} Me he ase, Pek Se Se - 7 ment eke rege Sree LS Teme = NTT ee ee en ey Ga Be ee ew Sos: 9 bang Li a2 hata pat he a ~: PS OG ome TON a et mh ty Pe Ee ee TE <= ae" ees tras a Wi eS Ao Stare a $e Oe ee a ES ragk ap ® Ts
(0 ¢ Z ED recto: of ArSA, stating that they were submitted ‘‘pursuant to the directive — by the Secretary of Defense in the appendix to JCS 2010, to prepare for approval | . = by the Joint Chiefs oi Staff -- (1) a draft charter for the Armed Forces Communi- | (—) ri cations Intelligence Advisory Council (AFCIAC); and (2) a draft directive to the — virector, Armed Ferces Security Agency (AFSA).” While it is not readily i ~ apparent why such documents were prepared for the Joint Chiefs of Staff except ~ a perhaps the necessity to amplify the directive of the Secretary of Defense, the ~~ results unquestionably altered the arrangements set fcrth in that directive, spec- a ifically with respect tc the authority of the Director of AFSA vis-a-vis the Service oa’ . - “ . @ - gencies and ATSAC. ~~ : =) p? oe t ae The draft charter for AFSA and the draft directive to the Director of AFSA Cis ere approved by the-“oiat Chiefs of Staff on 1 September 1949: The charter for a - AFSAC designates that body as ‘‘the agency of the Jeint Chiefs of Staff charged - _— ( with insuring the most effective operation’’ of AFSA and gives AFSAC the _functions to ‘‘determine policies, operating plans and doctrines’’ for AFSA in ~ ey “ts production of COMINT; ta ‘coordinate and review’’ the Service-operated ™~ -~ ' COMINT facilities; to recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the facilities, _ personnel, and fiscal and logistic support to be provided by the Services to AFSA = on the vasis of requirements determined by the Director of AFSA; and to forward nt to the Diredter of AFSA “tor implementatica, without reference to the Joint Chiefs qj of Staff, its unanimous decisions on matters which it determines not to involve = 49 - ; me =e bal wn
‘44: ae 2 toa - Kapmees in major policies. . .’’ It will be seen that for all practical purposes the directive made AFSAC (which is nothing except a committee made up of = the three Services) the boss cf AFSA, which in tura is completely dependent upon mac the three Service organizations for all its communications and practically all of its collection of COMINT. The pattern was not unification under a single control, = but rather 2 Combination of limited functions under the three-headed control of * tY 4 . . Son 2 . ve | ty the combining agencies. = “oN The directive of the Jcint Chiefs cf Staff to the Director, AFSA, complements o the charter of AFSAC by providing that the Director of AFSA will implement, ~ without reference to the Jcint Chiefs of Staff, unanimous recommendations of LJ AFSAC which are determined by 4FSAC not to involve changes in major policies. ° ° aa . : - ay < . “e" directive further provides that all AFSA COMINT activities of unique or, q principal interest to any one service will, insofar as practicable, be carried out under the immediate direction of AFSA personnel of the Service concerned, and U! that APSA will provide for a full-time Deputy Director from each Service. s) Tue directive further restates the responsibilities of the Director, AFSA, and _ of the Services at great length, with repeated emphasis upon the position of AFSAC. ‘came ) Under the above directives the COMINT functions of AFSA are defined only 7) in terms of what the Services are not to do, and the COMINT functions-of the —) Services, other than intercegt, are not defined but left to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to datermine. As more fully explained ia Part IV of this Report, the Joint Chiefs fm) pan > } a on Oo r Seneca ye ee eee epee ENE OTE lem kee ep meee
Sept Staff have not made any clear-cut or definitive determination, and the actual division cf respensibilities has been and centinues to be reached through nego- = [i tigtions among the various Service c#ganizations and AFSA. ; Gi AFSAC ccasists of the Director of AFSA as permanent chairman, the two ; = USCIS members irom each of the Services, and one additional member from each u Service, or i tctal membership of ten. Attendance at meetings usually approx- A imates 30 perseas. It has two standing committees, one of which coordinates, am Po technical COMINT matters among the member agencies and the other of which ~ coordinates the intelligence requirements of the Military Services for COMINT. J Like USCIS it has no Staff or secretariat of its own, and all of its members fF have full time military positions of heavy responsibility in their respective * . Gseyer ganizations, : 7 A review cf the minutes ef the thirty-five meetings cf AFSAC from its (=) czganizstica in July, 1949 until the end of 1951 indicates that its activities fall (J w~ ito three principal categories: the logistic support for AFSA, the relaticns ;- aad divisions of respoasibility between AFSA and the three Service COMINT tad organizations, and a variety of matters involving commurications Security aiid \ . = COMINT production orcblems cf a technical nature. The activities of AFSAC U tus are cf a different sccoe and nature than the activities cf USCB. t The negotlaticns among the Services and AFSA with respect to the divi- q Sion ci respeasibilities among the three Servize COMINT preducing agencies (
- Ly a —) f C ee) y -] of a Nome U {2S teane =) ~~ a 3 (— \ aS ) ae —— f ne eo EE ES SE es eee o . operaticnal autonomy of the individual Service organizations and relate to ‘ three principal matters: (1) intercept, (2) processing of intercepted traffic {i.e., cryptanalysis, traffic-analysis, decoding, translation), and (3) the relations among the Services and ArSA in theaters of cperations. The present division of responsibility with respect to each of these fields is the result of protracted negotiations over the period of more than two and a half years since AFSA was established. Such negotiations have absorbed a substantial portion of the time and energies of the principal officials of the four producing agencies. These and other ‘aspects of the actual working-out in practice of the USCIS Charter (NSCID No. 9)-and the AFSA Charters (JCS 2010 and 2010/6) are dee scrioed in the succeeding Part IV of this Report. -% Be . oo. ‘ tee . = ” ° ee Rae < ; 0 Moe Remmee came ee see See a eee eee we en ae ee = ago — ee £*., . > * @: oe: . ° - . , . - - — 2, - ee °. .@ . ° 2 ee . . . ° ‘e : - - 52 - LOX ag 2 nS Stet te Spent UR IOP OS tis ee te ROBES RS pr tn se is ries is ate g
' ~ \ {1 i a f a é ’ o r) Dy . : e ° (@) . - 2 rn .. . . id % N . iN ro a4.) . 3 Zn , ° k < & \ a 1 O + s “A . ix} ! * By “ t txt . -y 9 Ss ’ +? . e “Lh: oO ‘ . HP of ‘ . e - x syst >. ¢ t- it “oy 3 * ya
— et .- Part Iq, we have outlined the communications intelligence Organi- ~~ & bed : 5 zation as it was created by the USCIB Charter and JCS 2010. | That autline is in part a skeleton; a useful picture of the flesh and blood organization J ‘requires a statement a$ to how its normal daily operations are being con- ° ducted. Only by following the ‘‘production-line’’ of COMINT down to the delivery of the finished product can we learn how this paper organization has ~ . . . . . . functioned in fact, and understand the organizational and operating problems, “NS In this Part IV, we attempt to show how the COMINT organization created 2 by the USCIB Charter and JCS 2010 ‘actually operates in the fields of inter- cept, priorities, processing, dissemination to consumer agencies and use in ay, CFU ating intelligence, cryptography, and security. se: ‘ bY a * Le 2 =SSize and Cost om = _7 , ; | “The Committee has felt that it would be helpful to these reading this | _ Report to have a rough estimate cf the amount that the Government is spend- - S — ing annually in the production of communications: intelligence. However, we have found that it is impossible to give any Completely accurate figures. , This‘results from the fact that great masses of the personnel involved belong to the three Services, and that a large amount ef the work and effort which goes into the production of communicaticas intelligence is the product of -. Service personnel and. equipment which are also engaged in other duties and . XN : _ functions. - . . med . _ . -. eee . naoe cs wom ve seme ee ek. mee ee
2 The Committee has, however, obtained from AFSA and other sources ) ~ . certain estimates and data which it believes are sufficiently informative to merit reproduction here, even though some of them may be only little bettar than informed guesses. A breakdown of this material by major categories appears on the following pages. Many of the expense figures are necessarily only estimates of the proper allocation of various indirect support costs, such as military pay and maintenance and the very considerable cost of Jd ty C3 Co vo cg, "AN passing raw COMINT traffic through cur. military communications networks. The Committee emphasizes that it has not attempted to make anything re- sembling a cost accounting analysis. It believes that the summary given furnishes a reasonable approximation of the amount that we are spending to _i +,¢qQuire and process communications intelligence.. The summary does not “include any estimate of the amounts expended by the various departments and agencies in analyzing, utilizing and distributing the intelligence summaries : sie are based in whole or in part on COMINT. “37 Intercept | | Under the 1949 directive of the Secretary of Defense referred to above A (ICS 2010), each of the Services is responsible for providing intercept - facilities for its own use and to serve AFSA. The only criterion provided js in the directive for the allocation of intercept facilities between the Service ‘| organizations and AFSA is that ‘‘fixed intercept insta!lations will be manned 5 woe, /Text resumed on page 577 (~~ \ re) ) a - 54 - ‘
ee Bee Se ESTIMATED ANNUAL MANPOWER AND EXPENDITURES FOR COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE, 1952 , . (all figures are rounded) . MANPOWER _ separa aks pela sere sites tare ne lace ry — " i ‘ TO Ry IEP hens . Sy PT are ct iy Sree gE Fe og te ee BIO RS ESAS eke SANS ae ea Cpe i! wre pt Dane Ae Coe spe fo . Lagat evi gen oe SS Sg eg CS elon oe, * a oa. eg Sak he : <5 Th a ae ete oe ayer mere tetera vegas oe ~ we mw +4 oy SE aE nc NR eR TE a RE OE _) EXPENDITURES >» 4 " ih { i 25 Fb A OR POCA OE GE ae epee Syoite,? Pare tes Es BAe SENS RENT rena Scar Sy eS LOW Ty ae aoe Beta otto ms St : ate eis Mae = — a se . pace. *: Es ot. > ‘ a Aimee -~ ‘ Pa ant SEO ae ht - ate ED weve = PA > ee athe Sei ery pt ot cn ieee 4 eee Se. She orean nae rg, Sher. , re pin et FRI, ria Mer ‘ b fa) h 4
ee ee ww eee ee oe Ad - MS ae f. oe = o z = Ge mare Ey: ate Em made Agente a = Saoite pt SENS PSK a Cys ake gh yd : 4 ¥ _ = of = = a “yx> acer S28, ~~ Lape: p PEs Pot yea San moan Sse eS reste B= SS eee peg ee Sra Oe eS ET oo en fo Re RO OY ~ —= . Res . So . —_o mo * pt . hin - e, ° o- = . e _ ~~ = Pe rage “a 5 iad > 0 oe ammmipe. em -— —— = Feit See Coser Ee pI Ea ae : . —: er | rg . . ft | * | - . ane ee t . OS TT © MmNEynaD estrone . * ( alin . ial . . —_ _ - -
and a¢ministered by the Service providing them’’ but will be ‘operationally : directed’’ by AFSA, and that ‘‘mobile intercept facilities’? required by the ° respective Services will be “manned, administered and operationally con- ; trolled’’ by the individual Service but ‘‘raay also be used to perform Special . ° 4 | missions for AFSA as requested by the Director thereof.” fF The subsequent directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff establishing AFSA 7 did not further defice the responsibilities for intercept, but merely stated, . - ‘intercept - as indicated in JCS 2010.’" “The first relevant Joint Chiefs of |] Staif directive (JCS 2010/10, dated 25 October 1949), ‘stated that “operational 5 7 control’’ of Se eS ined intercept stations should be _~fam, Vested in the Director of AFSA, The accompanying papers emphasized that Ze .. was an ‘initial’? allocation of units “engaged primarily in support of the _ functions of AFSA,’’ but did not state the functions of AFSA except by refer- ence to the previous directives, which had not defined the functions of AFSA. _—! | The theory of JCS 2010 seems to have been that “‘fixed’’ intercept faci- K _ ities are most suitable for performance of AFSA’s undefined mission ‘and L_° that ‘‘mobile’’ facilities are most suitable for the periormance of the unde- tined Service missions. It appears, however, that in most cases the actual physical nature of an intercept facility as being ‘‘tined’’ or ‘‘mobile’’ has (Jt3 td little relation to the adaptability of that facility to perform missions for AFSA 4— or for a Service. The test set up in the directive is also impractical because 7a . . ars - 57 -
= on le " - OW nn age ~ = 5, ror toe ERE east Peace SoS ace INS ear od, PaO Se Saree? Soe wae OC Dat SE ote rae 3 age a Shy Masood, ROS: ae aoe Sata Seas Sure erga Seg eS See eee rs SCI a ee SS ! noite: toe) caer =: SAE ioe ee : ace bass Pea oe test hope ee es rt 3X 2 Raab a See. et Fa) PAS eee een RES a ewer = s ; aXe ooh rng mS « a = wate Sake ete Ss os = te irre en Pale EL A tact fixed or mobile. For example, the Air Force designates all of its inter- oo ‘ cent facilities as ‘mobile’ although, we are informed, maay of such facilities eas physically fixed in location as facilities of the Army and Navy which are designated by them as fixed, a. . ot ' - AS of April 10, 1952, -thé three Service’ had in operation an aggregate of’ st Re SOr ‘of whist! zs. intercestunits “teatted 3 Radio Reconnat issance Companies) having a total of CES (| SESSP The Navy nad BSS intercept st ations with eS La —", six 10bile units with a Mobile and other intercept units with an aggreg UJ C wm and Navy re ncluding all of the Army positions) were under the operational [\7 direction of AFSA. SaaRagessss Sen ned OE ee eS were uncer
ee ee we ee we ee me, ee — ne { 1 r r7 » assigned to the operational direction of AFSA pursuant to an agreement be- Col.. tween AFSA and the Air Force Security Service (AFSS) entered into on (7 November 16, 1951, providing that AFSA and AFSS ‘‘will each have exclusive am) * task assigaments on 50% of all AFSS intercept positions.’’ However, under | _ the agreement AFSA may now assign ‘‘non-Air missions’’ to a maximum of two positions. The agreement provides that this maximum will be increased by mutual agreement as the total number of Air Force positions increase. It _ ‘on should be noted that all arrangements between AFSA and any of the Service : (i COMINT organizations in the allocation of positions not designated by the _ Service as ‘‘fixed’’ have had to be effected by negotiated ‘‘agreements.’’ An important aspect of the process of operating through long and painful nego- -:tiations is that, should a negotiated arrangement prove wrong or unworkable, oO 2 or should circumstances change, further negotiations are required to annul : it and then to make a fresh start. Each of the Services is now carrying forward a program of expansion ~, of its intercept facilities under authorization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Ca iC (JCS 2010/46, dated 6 November 1951), pursuant to which SjqagRSRnDEIN om { Within each Service, all intercept facilities have been kept subject to am ‘the command of the Service COMINT organization, rather than being assigned
vo theater or tactical commands. The Army Security Agency (ASA) has two principal overseas heacquaz sters, ASA, Europe, and ASA, Pacific, each of Which commands all fixed and mobile intercept facilities of the Army within its geographic area but has working relations with ‘the theater commander to supply his local COMINT needs. All of the Navy intercept tacilities are under the direct command of the Washington headquarters of the Naval Security Group. Air Force intercept facilities are under the direct command of tha rN rocks Field, Texas, headquarters of the Air Force Security Service and its subordinate Security Groups. 7 No intercent faci! Hiies are “assigned” to AFSA for “‘command,”’ but’ ach Service has work ced out with AF SA an agreement as to how the command ™ nction of that Service over its intercept facilities shall’be reconciled with /@ ( 1 ‘operational dir ection’ by AFSA. Extensive negotiations have been held _betw een AFSA and the respective Services as to whether AFSA’s operational is “rection of Service intercept facilities will be exercised through general te ' —_ intercept requirements transmitted to the heacquarters of the Service organ~ {4 — ization, or through detailed assignments So transmitted, or by directions sent by AFSA, either in its aame or the name of the Service CoMENT commander, directly to the intercept Station, It would serve no useful purpose in this Report to detail the negotiations on this matter and its present Status, but the great amount of time absorbed by and significance attached to such arr ange- “ients are noted aS a commentary upon the present COMINT organization. a . . men,”
It should be helpful, at this “stage, to illustrate how the exemption of particular Service intercept facilities from AFSA’'s “operational direction’’ , . ‘ vw has affected the employment of our total intercept capabilities. Sas. ay ae IS * inert Vint sy pee Ses % - es” LEESON AT Lyra ae 1 ag agin TER Ree ee ict ” S ? 4 q { pret Eon —_—— ange een SM) eee ees ins on ~ eperitroerinutwyea4 Oe a fa ee ones ore ar ive oS ‘ a . | re > < ‘ ms ee a ee ae reer) ahh pany Blon So e—) At eee Sg “ae, Te : a Oe Once emer ye Omen nN ee: pa
ce i: AEles - SERN aoe 2 Use UCcstd an impressive increase in total effort, the division of “operation al direction” a among the Services and AFSA led to 2 number of wasteful and inefficient . {] practices. The Army (ASAPAC) 2 anda Air Force e (Ars) units in the theater oi ree ae wae : | headouarters) that ASAP AC end AFSS divide and coordinate their efforts by . esreement, the Guplication continued for en zdditi onal year until BSAPAC . : veluntarily discontinued its own eiforts/on both problems \in “March of 1952. 2 . fe . ” 5 \ G in the Spring of 195 SER eT FEO ya New ae aeren Oe amar Be Cia Se th the limited NE: ed and could not be achieved wi i facilities possessed by. any one Service. The Committee is advised that this | Single and | obvious siep wes not 2 2dopied until this s Spring, more ihan 2 year the proportion under ATSA a Girection hes actually declined, ae nee AIRS MAS tab as LS SE CER en RY Sree wi ae SEAN es _ Reviewed 4* August 1981 See te
Set makes no provision as to whether such facilities shall be fixed or mobile or shall be subject to AFSA or Service oneraticnal direction. The Committee is informed that, in negotiations among AFSA and the Services leading to suth authcrizaticn, the understanding was Pr i ee 2 Soc oo ae <i tad rn wee . ~ "ge . . ° soo . reuched by at least some-cf the negotiators that a certain number of the total ~ authorized positions would be deemed to be reserved to the Services for the . ‘direct support of combat commanders’’ and thet the remainde> would be ceemed available fer AAFSA requirements. However, the JCS authorization contains nothing which prescribes this allocation, and it appears difficult if -~ : not impossible to-maRe any allocaticn qa the basis cf what 1s and what is not | &. ‘direct support ofcombat commanders.’’ Accordingly, under the present directives, the future allocation of intercept facilities as between AFSA and - rr ee wee mee ce : le yo the Service crganizations appears to depend upon what perticen of such facil- at | _/7— ities shall be fixed or mobile in the case cf the Army and the Navy and what portion shall be allocated to AFSA by voluntary agreement in the case of the Air Force. Also it appears that the manner cf exercise of cperaticnal direc- ; tion by AFSA ef such facilities as may be at its dispesal will probably continue to be the subject cz dispute and orctracted negctiaticns. The feregoing detailed deseripticn oz the intercept situsticn illustrates . one ef the complex problems whish cccupies an incrdinate amcunt of the time
Banc anergy of the COMINT organizations.’ An effectively controlled COMNT organization would permit complete flexibility in the use of intercept facil- q 4 ities, having in mind at any time the available traific, the intelligence require- ° | ments of military and civilian consumers, the nature of the processing re- 7 1] | quired, the need for speed in a given situation, the-ability to identify targets, | and other pertinent factors. These various factors may change rapidly, os - particularly in time of war, and the desired flexibility cannot be achieved - DON by application of the present arbitrary standards of allocation or through _ r “‘negotiations’’ among separate COMINT organizations. | ) Priorities es a Although throughout the COMINT process the interrelationship of pro- — Soe users and users is continuous, the consumers first enter at the point where i: they make their COMINT needs known to the producers -- a periodic act of _ a instruction known as the ‘‘determination of-priorities,”” . i .t is obviously impossible, as well as impractical, to intercept, ana- a lyze and disseminate to all interested agencies each of the hundreds of | ; thousands of radio messages traveling daily through the air and theoret- 5 ically available for study. It is necessary, therefore, that machinery exist - for determining the particular channels for particular subjects to which i. . - attention is to oe primarily directed. Two committees meet monthly to . 7 adézess themselves to the question of determining the national COMINT ‘ : ee — EO: TONE OE SE RS A RE oi OR SoD Ay come eure
7 q i a — a — First, the USCIB Intelligence Committee has formal responsibility for USCIS COMINT priorities. The Intelligence Committee has repre- sentatives from all member departments and agencies of USCIB: i.e., ON], G-2, A-2, Siate, CLA and FBI, with the chairmanship retating among these representatives. Voting is done on chart-like forms divided by countries, and under each country there is a list of topics previously drafted and agreed pon by the Committee from time to time. The interests in these topics are expressed in terms of the numerals 1 through 5, with 5 the highest. The ° results of this preferential voting are forwarded directly to DIRAFSA (the _Siractor of the Armed Forces Security Agency). There is appended as Exhibit a =), characteristic sample of USCIB intelligence requirements for the month oi -| — ~ 15 January to l¢ February 1952. I: will be seen that these requirements are broadly -pnrased, subject-matter interests of the USCIB intelligence con- — 7 ST dimers, which co not attempt to pinpoint the type cf information desired either by nationality of traffic or by links or frequencies. We believe that in most cases these priorities are so broadiy expressed as to be of little value to AFSA, . The weaknesses of this methed of expressing consumer priorities are well illustrated oy the USCB Priority Lists furnished tc AFSA during the Seven months’ period December, 1949 - June 1950, immediately preceding the e «> eS SS Se Ne Ht ETS ON I EN 7 x Be Nereis memes
J a _. amvasion of South Korea. As shown below, the various intelligence agencies . | were becoming increasingly concerned during this period about the possi- i bility of a Soviet move against South Korea, and yet this concern was never . directly communicated to AFSA through the mechanism of the USCIS Intelli- gence Requirements Lists: (a) _ . ae —" (this. Committee wads the predecessor of the present official inter- agency Watch Committee presided over by G-2). The Com- mittee had 10 members, 2 each from Army, Navy, Air Force, State and CIA. The Committee operated at the COMINT level; dt 3 of the 10 members had their offices in the consumer beach- - . ° - heads at AFSA which are described below. (b) The Watch Committee did not deal with COMINT exclu- . nk a 2 } Sively, but examined evidence from all sources so as to select and identify every available means of warning that might indicate a Soviet move against the non-Soviet world. The Committee’s minutes for its meeting of April 12, 1950 record only six items ot evidence on Soviet intentions. The sixth item was the fol- lowing collateral resort: . ‘fA report relayed by CinCFE stated that the North Korean Peoples’ Army will invade South Koreain -~ 68 -
ot oe 8 «ow. ence eee te me ne ewe ee ee wee See ow etme 4 oes ee Fw ate June of 1950. Representatives of the Department df the Army undertcok to ask for further information on this subject.”’ (c) This particular report is.not mentioned again in the minutes until the meeting held July 31, 1959, five weeks after the invasion, . when the Department of the Army stated that the report ‘‘had emanated from an Air Force source whose reports were not given much reliability by the Air Force.’’ But meanwhile, Korea had con- tinued to hold the attention of the Watch Committee, along with a number of other areas the Committee regarded as sensitive. In the minutes of the meeting held on June 14, 1950, the following appears: “A list of sensitive areas for consideration by the Watch Committee as potential scurces of conflict with the USSR was presented by the Chairman (a CIA man). These areas, arranged in the Chaizman’s estimate of the order of their explosiveness in the near future (six months to cne year) are: Indo-China, Berlin and West Germany, Iran, Yugo- Slavia, South Korea, the Philippines and Japan. Members of the Watch Committee were asked to present alterazative lists or rearrangements cf this list at the next meeting, 28 June 1950." /The invasion occurred on the 25th, and subsequent minutes do not indicate that the alternative lists were ever prepared./ The above quoted minutes of the Watch Committee indicate that the consumer agencies hac South Xorea cn their minds, and that at least the CIA representative regarded South Korea as the Sth most poten- tlal source of conflict with the USSR throughcut the entize world, But this degree of concern over Kcrea was never Specificaliy indicated ! H ; - 67 ~-
2c om ro og at fe oo A in the USCIB Intelligence Priorities List. (d)’ The table on the following page shows the number of priority requests by consumer agencies. for traffic relating to particular areas of the world during the period December 1949 - June 1950. (During “these 7 months, 9 separate lists of intelligence requirements were sub- mitted by the USCIB members). On the highest priority list (List A), Korea is mentioned only once out of 124 separate specific priority items, and ranks 12th and last.in frequency of. mention among the areas of the world. On the 2nd priority. list (List B), Korea is mentioned only 5 times out of 277 separate items, and ranks lith of 18 areas in fre- quency of mention. On the 3rd priority list (List C), Korea is mentioned once out of 90 separate items, and is tied far.13th and last place in fre- quency of mention. As a comparative measure of the importance . evidently assigned to coverage of traffic on Korea by the intelligence “agencies, Latin America, while never mentioned in List A, received 15 _ mentions on List B and 25 mentions on List C during the same period. (e) The above evidence suggests the possibility that the USCIB Intelligence Requirements Lists do not accurately reflect the views of the inteNigence agencies themselves as to comparative priorities, and it is not surprising that the Lists are of such little assistance to AFSA. [Text resumed on page 70/7 - 68 -
cy fm se eee 2 e,8" - FREQUENCIES OF USCIB CONSUMER REQUESTS FOR TRAFFIC ON KOREA AS SHOWN BY USCIS INTELLIGENCE BEQUIREMENTS LSTS (December 1949 - June 1950) List A includes those individual subjects considered to be of greatest concern to U. S. policy or security. . List B includes those individual subjects considered to be of high importance. . ; List C includes those individual subjects considered to be of considerable _interest but of less immediate concern. Under each List is shown the number of priority requests by consumer agencies for traffic relating to each area during the period December 1949 - June 1950: . oa — zee EO ea Pea ap Ee nara . awe “res PARES Ce a Eokd ae eS rey tats = af tersy wae ls Bx et ' a
9 - ~— rc rer eens if yr et ete atte aah aes io F —~ ca’ * i ras er os ‘a ae! . “= as Ne Lt. ‘ -F Since the inlelligence zeencies themsely "eS failed to cominunicate to AFSA the extent of their’ growing interest in the Korean problem, | it . ° "Re ee Pee [ "AF SA's own dissat!sfaction’ wi ith the USCIS intelligence Requirements no Lists, ilustr aled by the Korean episode described above, led the Director of | AFSA fo protest to AFSAC on August 18571950 that he was in a position of having. var direct the intercept and processing efforts of AFSA without formal inte- ' [3 erated guid ance {rom the Services 2s lo their intells gence requirements. On 5 October 2, 1950, APSAC agr reed to establish 2 2 special Intellig ence “Require- - Te - o * ae e <a ents Committee consisting oi member s of i ONI, C- 2, A- 2 and APSA, Since 1? a “36 creation cf this Committee, it hes assumed the res 19) on sibility for meking ie Lv intelligence priority recommend tiens 2s to militery twattic, 2na the USCIB .- | Intellicence Committee hes confined iiself primarily, to nonemili ilery traf =~ | Si, The partof the total eCOMINT pie”’ available {o the USCIS intelligence e .Commilitee for the expression oi its pr ior itie es is what i is known as ‘‘Joint.’’ iF 7 7. a - ws Tt is primarily’ non-m military ir fic | inwnich, however, the intelligence diri- 4] sions of the Service Componen's ci usc is heve an interest. For this reason, 5 they participate in the. expression of USCIS oriori ities, The part of the pie Gealt with by the AFSAC Intelligence Commitiee !s composed ent tirely of ss ° military traffic in which in the main the civillen components ef i eSCIB hare
ae i When the. recommendations of the two intelligence committees reach DIRAFSA, they are acted upon by the intercept Priorities Board (IPB), of AFSA-02 (the processing center af AFSA). As in. the case of the intelligence committees, 1B meets monthly. Its voting members. are the heads of the branches of AF SA-02; its chairman is always the Chief of. AFSA-02, The x Po~civilian components of USCIB have no. voting members i in IPB but have the =, right to station observers at its meetings and customarily do so. The IPB, in turn, “has about ten SIPG's (Special Intercept Priorities . Groups) set up within the various branches of AFSA-02, In advance of the —a EBortly meeting of RB, the SIPG’s prepare and submit their own recommen- : dations based upon the interests and. needs af the processing units. As in the Fy case of the IPB, the civilian agencies participate in the SIPG’s through non- ® -*-voting observers, — id On the basis of the priority recommendations received from the two _—e intelligence commitiees and the various SIPG’s, IPB lays out the actual inter- cept plan for the coming month. At this time the total COMINT intercept capa- dilftles necessarily exercisd a Heniting influence. it will be remembered that . tee . . —- eee ee See me heme mee oe ant ee aT eed :
4 — trvSecommendations received from the consuming agencies only in laying fal 3 for them by the three military Services. out the intercept plan for approximately two-thirds of the available tatercept positions. The remaining intercept positions follow.the priorities laid down A ; t will thus be seen that each of the three military Services has. abso- ‘lute control over priorities for its own reserved intercept facilities, and that - itis also authorized to make recommendations to. AFSA as to priorities for [ow tne intercept facilities under AFSA control. Within AFSA the military Services A have an effective voice, if not absolute control, over the actual intercept plan "1 laid out by the IPB for the AFSA control stations, through military personnel ~ a8Signed to AFSA who happen to.serve as.members of IPB. et bane ess The civilian consumer agencies are therefore at a substantial disad- vantage in determining tatercept priorities. With respect to the one-third of the total intercept capability reserved by the three military Service., the eaeivilian agencies have no right even. to.make priority recommendations. With Lr respect to the ‘‘Joint’’ (but not the military) portion of the remaining two~ a] . thirds of the intercept more or less controlled by AFSA, the civilian agencies are permitted to make priority recommendations, in conjunction with the Services, but, since they do not assign personnel to serve under APSA command (as the military Services do), they do not sit on the AFSA Beard (IPB) which . . a. . . considers the various recommendationsagd which makes the decisions. PLew a - =£12- “Oss
It {s a natural consequence of this arrangement that, in the opinion of “3 the civillan agencies, an Intercept Priorities Board composed wholly of , d employees of the Department of Defense tends to place undue emphasis on é ‘priority recommendations made by the military Services, as compared to _ : those made by the civilian consumers. Thus the State Department represen- tatives have advised this Committee th increase in the number o f intercept positions available to AFSA, both the. q _ military Services, rather thai AFSA. = * WF a. — Once the actual priorities for a giyen month are set in terms of sub- i, stantive requirements, it is necessary to translate them into the ‘‘profes- f |. sional’"terms required by intercept station practices. Se. 0? nee
é ‘ ty for the benefit of intercept cperators is. done by AFSA-28, the Intercept -Division of the Collection Group of AFSA. As a result ef this translation into Jf eS gta SOFA PES EL took So PLN OT im oe, arta Skee ~ y Cro banner ee assigned along with that number which is preferred, because of ionospheric an. and other technical complications which may make it necessar A Processing . After the raw material is intercepted, it is returned to AFSA and to the rs ok ‘ “Sslecrypting units of the three Services according to current instructions, which . vary with the type of tFaific. at a. Processing as between the Service units and AFSA Ae eerste geese ene ae reese fo The allocatioa of responsibility for processing traffic as ; between the Service units and AFSA has proved as controversial Sey and difficult as the pardllel problem cf intercept already men- tionec. The 1949 directive of the Secretary of Defensa orovided | eae no criterion for allocaticn of respcasibility fer processing. The = diractive cf the JCS to AFSA states that the Services shall be Q responsible for precessing ‘‘as needed for intercept control and
” f am = .s | fmm co . . cessing unit in the continentai United Statés, but'the Air Force combat intelligence,’’ but that ‘‘Exploitation by each Service applies only to material of operational interest to that Service’’ and ‘will not entail undesirable duplication.’’ The ‘initial composition’’ of AFSA prescribed by, ICS 2010/10 placed under . the direction of AFSA portions of the Army and Navy processing organizations, but did not limit the right of the Services to engage . -° in processing with any retained or new personnel. At present neither the Army or the Navy maintains any pro-~ 2 . . . . . - maintains a processing unit at Brooks Field, Texas, See mus Lalways.be.done inthe, lo field processing centers, because of the time element, because of special direct support requirements for certain military operations, -md-because-eny*effortto-concentrate-all ‘processing at-AFSA.would. . - produce such overcrowding of telecommunications circuits as to be . unworkable. The processing at the Service centers consists mostly ves ae 0 ~ Ske tnpleue Ce
! + ie But despite agreement on this general principle, AFSA and the Services have had a good deal of difficulty reaching an understanding as to where the line of processing responsibllity i . , should be drawn between them and between the Services themselves, As between AFSA and the Air Force, the debate continued for = 3 more than two years.- Eventually, the division of responsibility for processing was set forth in a so-called ‘‘reporting agreement’? : rd dated December 13, 1951 and accepted by AFSA on February 8, 1952, which contemplates three levels of processing, first at the point of intercept, second at the theater level and third by AFSA and AFSS. ) Although the wording of this agreernent is in some respects ambig- uous and its actual application has not yet been tested, the: principle — C4 of allocation appears to be that processing which can be accomplished ae effectively within twenty-four hours after intercent shall be done at @.2 am
co oe ca ft. ) . Co Jz ‘be accomplished at the most forward locations at which the desired _ the Army nor the Navy has at any time since the organization of AFSA " so. The division of vrocessing resoonsibility between AFSA and the . the point of intercept within the theater, that further processing which can be done within forty-eight hours shall be done at the theater level, and that all other processing shall normally be done within the continental United States, with AFSA performing the COMINT processing and AFSS performing certain reporting and unique technical support” functions, the exact nature of which is - ao not entirely cMar. This agreement thus appears to reflect to some . extent a recognition that the processing of intercepted traffic shall speed can be achieved and’ shall otherwise be performed by AFSA rather than a Service organization. . As between AFSA and the Army and the Navy, no written agree- ment exists as to the allocation of processing responsibility. Neither undertaken to establish processing units within the United States, but the Army has on various occasions strongly asserted its right to do Army and the Navy field processing units has, we undersiand, involved less controversy than the relations with the Air Force, and nas deen reached through frequent liaison and close cooperation.* * For example, Navy processing areleepeaty is currentiy under the operational direction of AFSA. ; "= TT -
\. In general, the Army and the Navy field units have performed such processing as can be done with speed and efficiency within the theater to provide information for the theater commander on the basis of | oe ee} technical assistance provided by AFSA,. As in the case of intercept, however, there has been a certain amount of duplication of processing effort between the military Services themselves, best illustrated by the previously mentioned duplication of effort between the Army and Air Force units ae. ene the result that neither unit was able to accomplish complete analysis on either problem. An AFSA ‘» aoeapoees team was invited to study this problem and concluded that a much greater degree of success could be achieved on SRIaaerereie ' gem! £ the Army and Air Force units would divide and coor- dinate their efforts by agreement Despite such a recommendation by wrt oor AFSA in the Spring of 1951, duplication continued until March, 1952, - ~~ 4 __when the Army unit voluntarily abandoned the entire field to the Air Force. As in the case ef intercept, the general principle has been followed in processing that each Service organization is concerned primarily with the traffic of the same Service of the ‘‘enemy’’ nation. ms q U a The soundness cf this fundamental premise depends uper the particular "78 - wo tte
@ ” { aa cx ) ( x r nature of the ‘‘enemy’’ traffic and also upon the organization of our own military forces for operations. Although no serious difficulty appears to have arisen to date, it may be questioned whether enemy military traffic can always be divided effectively on the basis of three Service organizations, whether for the purpose of intercept, or for the processing purposes of traffic analysis and cryptanalysis. Also, under our own present concept of unified commands in theaters © of operations, the premise that any U. S. military Service has a pe- cullar command responsibility for deriving COMINT from the traffic of its ‘‘enemy’’ counterpart Service appears of doubtful validity. Considerations such as these have led to extensive negott- ations among the Services components of AFSA with a view to the establishment of a so-called “global COMINT organization.” In general, it has been the position of AFSA in such negotiations that COMINT activities require coordination within any theater’ ‘similar to the coordination within the continental United States through AFSA. In general again, the Services have opposed any such concept as {ncon- sistent with norma! commane relationships and with the responsibility of each Service to provide combat intelligence for its owa operations. The only tangible outcome to date of the extensive negotiations with regard to the so-calied ‘‘global COMINT organization” has been the - 79 ~
aes a3 oot g «. cc ct Aa fe establishment ee eee (ieee, eee, nena, : ent cee SME 206 provide technical Support to service COMINT activities within the area. Each of the three Service COMINT organ- izations, however, continues to maintain {ts own COMINT organ- ization within the theater, Although the Services have tended to cppose the establish- ment of any AFSA field activity as béing inconsistent with normal command relaticnships, we understand that each Service has utilized a vertical command organization for its own COMINT activities, regardless of the fact that such organization likewise appears inconsistent with normal command relationships in theaters of operation and results in the presence in each theater of two or three separate COMINT agencies reporting directly to their respec- tive Service COMINT organizations in the continental United States. b. Processing within AFSA AFSA eventually receives, either by telecommunication or € "= 80 -
\ t i ‘ s 4 is 1 6h) tS nue TU EB 4 con ee to ca Se \ fy a 4 my ted aR, Ui t vy fi wv fe by pouch according to urgency, one copy at least of every item of ° owe we ee oe se tem meee. , Faw traffic intercepted anywhere, While the Services and AFSA. ° are often in disagreement as to the division of processing respon- Cl). Ca Sibilities, there is considerable team-work in the matter of sending (4 raw traffic around. Service communications networks are currently handling AFSA’s raw traffic requirements in the following proportion: - ; ae ‘Army 44%, Navy 38%, and Air Force 18%. These are largely the 4 same networks upon which the Services must rely not only for the ‘ passing of their-own COMINT traific but also for their overall oe: . * . . . a's ra ~ communications of a general nature (= fe 8 { e i ——s Sees eras ptirany erneerrsarel —™. ad COL ar TT eam, - BO a gmt tA AT OS GAR cnn SSDs . e ' A eT SP aa, Pt Sousa peeten alfa , OP eS 3k = eng oe a Ee 3 Se pericrriarpee a ‘ La ) - nd . . apt Sa i‘ Mpeit. ~ * . Rime we : B CO GS ee ? a Tyke, -, wo? - * re es ere tee! ald tw ge Ma pone anil oe . _ > . +. - t a? " ¢ . . ry ha ad ~ : — .- — 7” , ea Sere
WAI 3 3 at *" 1x zs) EL ARS oO IRN CE NS et Ok Be i cae eae ames pivepe uring Pet Toe
ae no eet ycn a a ee Exe =e - spe ee aie - Pek wie RS ec cake nce SITE nal, 2 “; 7 ° o PRPS eg ae Ts PNT ES Eow to divide AFSA’s re- = sources between such speculative research and current produc- - tion is a problem that is more ocervlexing in the COMINT fiald a 4 than is the comoarasla issue so frequently found in orivats_ indusizy. To ace to the difficulty, AFSA’s manpower potential iy caf a, It is estimated that there remain only ten or fifteen top-flight - 83 - ag RA TAP ee tire
_ = rs AAS 3 Sen Fags TINE Te BTR ET NL SES ae ES ee ERE ae, Pare Seton pees aire ee tate SSeS pes. Ny Sacks et ee Coa re. eye ” 1 Pees nee Ce te sc gees RCS EA Rad es esos te 5 oe re ea SEES AES PRO eae em nn See tee Sy cart FY; or ies Soke Sy es L res oh Free Pare b Re Bet aN ores ee a eta See ae See ae aoa Sabie ne i : a bores mathematicians and technicians to provide the necessary guidance . : and incentive, as compared to three or four times that number during | World War 0. Low pay and ‘‘too many military bosses’’ are the reasons usually cited for this distressing attrition. AFSA, asa . “2 * iY military organization, is operated largely with military officers a as heads ‘of its various departments and units, and with the rotation policy now employed at least by the Army and Air Force, the officers in charge often appear greatly inferior in skill and experience to the civilian professionals under their command. Day-to-day operating r" frustrations and tha difficulty of advancement under these conditions. are cited by a number of our better World War I cryptanaly sts as primary factors in nAFSA'S inability to retain the best men, while . the Government pay scale and the problems involved in original security clearances have seriously tnipeded AF FSA's efforts to recruit and train qualified young replacements. It should be recognized that many of these baffling personnel problems exist despite ATSA’s management, and not because of it. AFSA was not spared the genera! budget restrictions prevalent throughout the military establishment trom the date of AFSA’s creation. through June, 1950, Perhaps ! because of AFS4’s role as the cirst ‘‘combined’’ functional military operation not directly under the
ee y q i$ f a yt), & S rf ae. aah Wy t ae ont) OL. HY eo a pti tay fe , hs “a $s a2K! Wi 1 if 4 a BY) aK F _ ‘ee . * . - oo. . . Fi nation (unfortunately stimulated by: too frequent publicity) control of a single military Service, it began existesce by adopting the principle of awarding proper billets to the officers of all three Services, too _ often at the expense of a deserving civilian professional better qualified for a particular task. The present Director of AFSA is well aware of this pro- blem, and has ta%en a number of significant steps in the direction of higher pay and greater responsibility for his Civilian professionals. So much for the processing of ment a * w Bye ied which is that aspect of AFSA’s assignment that engages popular imnagi- . 7 . . . =e. : - . tee o , . . - At the other extreme is the bulky flow of SRS an IA ae ee - tas SMO 2) See ae a ew re -
pees = ee we See ia ag eee ee REF Kone eae ats i ng ya . Herel 0) ng Ow a et eT Ae “l e niaeniert: iene 7 hy Ways pa: » eas = Fj with little or no knowledge of the language, or, indeed, of what ultimate purpose fae work serves, who are trained to recognize merely as patterns the appear- ° . ance of these words wherever they may occur in the message, and then by F| reflex to file the message in the corresponding bin. So far, no other more yy numane or less haphazard methed of reducing the millions of bits of paper to usable and workable proportions has been developed. . _ .,, Of the remainder thus produced, expert linguists in eleven separate reading panels make the second sort, reducing the bulk again by some
-25%, and cross-filing the retained material in about ninety general cate- gories. It is these readers who also select those individual texts which are translated verbatim and disseminated to censumers, a final distillation of iess than 1% Semehesmemsey @. However, nothing that results from the second sort {ts destroyed, and these messages are available for further * study or for subsequent transiation’as required. Just as an example of the actual totals handled; Be ren ea ete ere =b ¥ tae x <— anew rs SAU en eee] Yi wa ~ —,
Before we turn to the final steps of the actual dissemination to con- sumers of the. COMIN'T product and the use they make of it, something should © be said of the so-called. ‘‘beachheads’’ at AFSA. These are groups of intelli- [7 cence analysts and Maison personnel stationed at AFSA by the six consumers: _ F ONI, G-2, AFSS, Staté, CLA and the FBL. While. varying considerably from 1 consumer to consumes; the main purpose cf.the beachheads is to study com- munications intelligence in its unpublished state both for the sake of speed and — Sor reduction where pessible of the quantity of finished COMINT to be dis- 0 seminated. The beacKheads also serve as.a valuable device whereby con— _ | a 7}  Sumers and users of COMINT can.keep abreast of each cther and understand “Ty C=) ; “more completely the requirements on.cne. hand and. the capabilities on the other, The beachhead principle is not entirely without its opponents, however. . The beachheads-are physically within the AFSA compound; they have full access to all levels of the AFSA cperation; yet they are not under AFSA control. It has been suggested with much force that beachhead personne! shculd be, for the sake of efficient management, under the Operational centrel of AFSA pro- duction chiefs, even though they continue, as now, to influence AFSA’s effort ae : - 88 - « . 7 ° ~ . nigt ie Pre TG ¥ mee ‘ ene ofa GPa pA ve Ae Se, 4 ae © =
in the direction which individual customers desire, Dissemination and Use of Processed Traffic el To coraplete the picture. of how the present.COMINT organization operates we next come to the arrangements for. disseminating processed traffic to the intelligence consumers, and the methods employed by the con- Sumers in producing intelligence from this trafiic. Any reorganization of our COMINT efiorts should be based on an understanding of how the processed traffic is supplied to the intelligence agencies and used by them. A knowl- . edge of the methods of the intelligence agencies is also an essential element ae TC. in considering the aiequacy of present COMINT security pr dcedures, dis- Cc -cussed at a later point in n this Part IV, and the merits of the “CONSIDO”’ it will be recalled that the six conSumer agencies each have sovereign powers. over the internal administration and operation ef their COMINT activ- - ities, recognized and confirmed by paragraph 10 of the USCIB charter. The methods and habits of the six consumer agencies in evaluating the bulk COMINT ‘that they receive and in disseminating the resuitant intelligence are thus J . allowed to vary considerably, and they do. Some of the differences stem from — —— ~ basic divergencies in the intelligence requirements of particular agencies, but whatever the Feasons, the differences exist, and it is therefore necessary * See the Committee’s. observations on the CONSIDO problem, attached hereto as Exhibit I. , ea — ——~s — tae - ~ . 7 = a il ° Pa | sé
- LY Cr rj _ aes =~ i: zZyto describe the procedure of each agency in turn, although a few general- ; -2 izations apply to all three. of the military intelligence Services as a group. . a ” Military Intelligence. _ . (| ; The three military Services use the COMINT product as a major c} source of ‘‘tactical’’ order-of-batile and operational intelligence | 7 Po A ee «Each Service concentrates on its opposite ; A enemy number, but keeps abreast of developments in all branches Fl oi the enemy forces under study. The COMINT needed for tactical purposes is largely intercepted. and processed by the Service inter- - : =) cept facilities in the combat theater, and immediate tactical intelli- 3 gence is produced by the Service intelligence unit stationed there. Fj Both the theater -processed traffic and any resultant intelligence / — estimates are returned by each Service in the theater to its own a headquarters in the United States (as well as to AFSA). On arrival fi . here, these estimates are used by the Service intelligence units to - (2 brief military and Civilian officials on tactical developments in the theater, as well as to produce additional intelligence (primarily oe order-of-battle) which is of interest to the theater commanders and - a is transmitted back to them,
The COMINT needed for strategic intelligence ayeaemareers either at AFSA or at the Air Force unit at Brooks Field, and the resulting product {s turned into useful intelligence by the Service chief of intelligence or units under his command. Again, each Service concentrates primar ilyassteeeenet are ie Le teat asteete Si Sa ee In Washington, the three Services follow substantially the same procecures, with minor variations. Each of the three maintains a produce intelligence from the bulk traffic delivered by AFSA. Each . Maintains its intelligence analysts at AFSA and prepares intelligence i] i Ri beachhead at AFSA not only ta perform liaison functions, but also to Ul summaries there, -thus avoiding the security risk involved in deliv-— . ering bulk traffic outside the physical confines of AFSA's production . . 7 “4 meee ~ +? center at Arlington Hall Station.*.  - } The Army and Air Force units at AFSA prepare only working intelligence papers which are edited, published and distributed among their top Washington commanders by the parent G-2 or A-2 stzffs in ite the Pentagon. G-2 in the Pentagon then cables important items to-the army tield commands throughout the world, while in the Air Force . . : . . . . * The Navy, however, sends a full set of AFSA's ‘take?’ to CINCPAC at Hawaii, where a separate intelligence staff maintains a complete and permanent message file for Pacific naval operations, amt ; ° ~ 91 -
§ t is ge Cy i staelc its * this role is performed by the AFSS Command at Brooks Field tn Texas, to which the Air Force beachhead at AFSA has recently been subordinated.* The Navy Director of Intelligence, on the other hand, | has deiegated full COMINT responsibility to the ONI party (¥-1) at AFSA. ¥- 1 not only prepares intelligence summaries from COMINT, ° but also edits and publishes the weekly Navy Special Intelligence Briet ° 7 ‘and other reports, and services Navy commands throughout the world with cables, COMINT Summaries and urgent operational flashes as occasion requires. Army G-2 has also authorized its AFSA beach- head to originate cables to the theater whenever the beachhead develops Operational intelligence on the Korean campaign. The production of intelligence at the AFSA beachhead serves military needs if a number of ways. It is obviously the fastest method or nae. , of developing operational intelligence and getting it back to the theater, in the frequent cases where hours and minutes count, The tricky nature of order-of-battle intelligence and of tactical military inteltigence . b { .- 7 5 - - ° a4. LH premium: on -closenotnttiet dobpetanbi Between the: intelligence analysts, ~~ "r.0 net scien Se oe eee a 7 ee reer TS Swe: Soa wmemes as taemencemen = cm meas mes ee eee mes meres we cmenes eee we tem me mee : baer . . * AFSS, in turn, is s subortinate to the Chief of Staff rather than the AsSistant Chief of Staff, A-2. - 92 -~ ewe—teeeees “cep ees ca ee ee oo eee ee eee ee,
. . . ‘mee 6 . oat OP ae 3° ry rai Ce “as tratfic analysts, and cryptanalysts.. Each type cf Sheet a t can and ae f often does save the other from critical mistakes. Working jointly, they are far more effective than when they work separately. If the . Es A a intelligence analysts remained ata physically Separate location, a oes i _ | joint work of this sort would be far less effective. Adother important . = z E| advantage of the “beachhead”? arrangement is that it not only facilitates “ cooperation between the Service greups and. AFSA but has greatly aS va. improved cceperation among the Service groups themselves. Finally, , Ul the physical cencentration at AFSA, reduciag as it does the shipment Es A and sterage of righ traffic throughout the city, undcubtedly contributes a a a to the security of the COMINT source. .Partiy because of this concen- er i: : =a" tration, the Services are also able to held dewn the number ef intelli- ¢ f var weoime TENCE personnel cleared for COMINT. Each Service manages with an C3. AFSA beachhead cf 100 or less, ard with no more than about 300 tc 400 cieared intelligence-producizg personzel on duty with each Service in the Washingtoa area. Only a small percentage cf the Service intelli- gence staffs in Washizgtoa are cleared for COMINT (except that in fields See Se whese COMINT is virtually the a only souzce, thé entire group must necessarily be cleared to do aod ~w effective work), del
_. = cnt aeaneeanes wate eee: - nenmec: ees see ‘oom, RAL SEINE Ot SOL ER AL AESS e E Ke RTA eget Na EO ge Pea el aE Ee pe SENT eget ayers ve 7 Ep EES & mbna cme SEES a0 Sarcapt 2 es TITS he Tt /7 a ee om ad SEPA ee ee Rar oes ee mes? ee BET a a Speed Reet Sage PT =i : me Ss ween Te a Cae a aS J State Department Intelligence co a . a : - “ee t te, . . . . . The State Department does not Carry on any part of.its intellizence- ~ * producing function at AFSA,.and.limits its beachhead. to. liaison duties. ot r, ° oom cw ates x C7) NP me sec an 7 awe -lysre: > Re! yo rers yg tee, Mr. eo me om
. - mew oe commen | eee. +) yee | LS : +: 2 queers = so. _ * . ry . . : femme eee a ee wate 5 eee ok Byte pe Tags oe Se ITs dani ety + ears we . ae a eee sree . ° 243 - riers & a) . “§ . oc . . . i. se a Ta ae ater eine Pere aera 27, areata: ALY | The Federal Bureau of Investigation carries on a smaller COMINT
o, - ts. atoat On the basis of these . lists, AFSA picks out traffic <f possible interest to the FBI, running to some 7000 items a month, or about half of the total AFSA product, One set of this culled traffic is delivered to the FBI headquarters in the De- partment cf Justice. } m4 —_~ | xy fey p SO v = — Alerting Top Officials Something should be said of the existing machinery whereby COMINT , messages of crucial importance are immediately furnished to topmost officials - harry een = 98 + ef t t i ty « . 7) {
_ of the Executive Branch. The Pearl Harbor investigation shed a hard and =<? relentless light on the necessity for such machinery, and for keeping tt in -periect working order. eich
* —_ oe AF a) wire “Ay iN 2D. a ee ree Sit * . SIRE CHD Pee ——— ST Man va 2 me 'S = SS me Meare Sen rc ae 6S ets a 3 ete od ft be R edly Ph ~ A ep ae *
t " if it u Y x « ; tu at t 20, re J b ty wad Serene one. The inevitable relationship between ‘cryptography and ery pranal; isis | ee ee ee et ee ort tee 6 emcee 6 ee ee. man Sect © TM wae Beate H a airy ization which has net been hitherto menticned in this part of the Report, name} vs ot ee ,. sei, nk cryptographic 3 activities. ‘These are confined lo the construction the checking, has nat ‘been beset by rivalry and Strife to nearly t the : same degree as has ‘the : — . ot Secon * . ise eae + - . . cryptanalytic effort; for this re ason, the eryploy: -aphic picture isa relatively < ose . let! . we ton:
i thetic word ‘cryptology’! bas. been coined) bas_long.been recagaized.. Shey tS _ © for the. combination of which.two activities the snecial all-embr ¢ syn-_ = 2 7 ' When AFSA was created, the cryptographic activities of both Army and --~ Navy were transferred by the.Services to AFSA. At the time, the. Air Force | . EN . er . * 3 . - had ao independent cryptographic. unit of. its own, and no such unit has since ff been created. The. State Department and. other. government agencies had. i already adopted.the practice of relying upon. the Military Services for cry pto- ==. graphic service and they. have continued.to.rely upon AFSA. As 2 result; — true unification and centralization of. this Government’s.crjptographic activ- — - ities was achieved by the creation of. AFSA.. So far as. the Committee has __- -been able to determine, our cryptographic activities have been performed o efiiciently by AFSA without Significant jurisdictional contlict, and without any of the various unfortunate consequences which the Services have often pre- - ort dicted would £ ollow from a unification of other phases of our COMINT operations. - 4102 - 2. art oats eh re on C4 4
C29 . nd ! . inherent | in the COMINT world by. its: Py Ha: separ et 4 eee Se ae brings into apace the numerous probleme $f security och rage a an: are a ole = vee ais 3 7 TE te wie Pe . ny gee. he Fon tort its sata, : or) é el oa wa ers egtty atte ‘Swix . tained between the vescsy seEeS source, which | is ‘vital if coatiaiee : a, ft ae = nos > cmatl's tats “sos tee “? wan : = Mey ix ws. » fa wy 0 ase eens Se state eon ss ewe “Ne * 8 wad we ay me Ren ins rn ha td aie “ ee Te Sst, avr) intelligence is to ‘continue, and the application of comm as an instrument . . Meal teks at: hist ees Sa-vis the target nations, without which COMINT would * - aor the arabia the i‘need-to- know, oar ie i dese wheth er or not a  progpective whose need- ~to- “Enc ow has ‘been ‘established are anor from Sy bane any . south Mop Fee Bons cent orn! Med pete, cd + . weattes | om ; knowledge of other aspects & of Soniniunieations intelligence which He beyond 5) Bibel . adi inn ee , the province of their " Special responsibility or activity. The ‘purpose of: see. : ag Se inne a ~ ie - eet weet Me* " compar tmentation i is “primarily to localize the dangers and effecis of com- . tee . natin * ats: we ye. ny promise. The’ mai jintenance of this balance lies at the very Foot of the COMINT | “ . = et security iy prea It becomes particularly difficult as the size at, the COMINT. - 2. vee Bee
be hee sn et Se ESS OOS TTT ows ee wwe ~, - .s . : mee oy r . t. a “+E world increases, COMINT security w2s | relatively simple in the days when. : . the tot2} number of people with ‘established need+to-know amounted to" no more S sate, on eaggatN , thashZ00 oF 200 but, with the growth of importance of COMRNT asa source re | te of national intelligence and with the increasing complexity of the cryptena sock en eae | ye lytic iste iereby COMINT is | produced, that number has grow wn trom GES including the consumer agencies), And in | Spite of the tw 0 pr inciples ment tio ne 2bove, jt must be teken for granted that AN indoctrinz ition, even thougn Gissé on de compartmentalized a: nd | resiricted | to the nerrowest scope, involves-jull knowledge of the existence of the com- | munications intelli ence endeavor end periphera] knowlecdze of {he general © " mezns and techniques of jis production, Thus, it can be seen that people 5 ae %~ . e « . oat 2 2 a rd . *. 22 engaged in the COMINT effort, whether their pesitions within that effort be ° . . . a e | - humble or exalted, are 21 by Gefinition p ossessed with information of 2 mest - -« . . - - | sensitive neture.” Tnais necessitates, in-turn, thet ey ery member of the Co? ALN —>~ World be screened before indoctrination end be periodically scrutinized there- a bd ° | after, enormous proolems of investigation and clearence are unzvoicebly | br ‘ought into play 2s the result of th ; At present, COMINT security is the sovereign Province of each COMINT s agency, SO fer 2s concerns that < zen icy "Ss OWN practices and personnel, There | ‘isa USC Security Committee < at which the sovereign agencies meet ana * negotiate agreement on general security standarés, but the epplication of .
an a¢ | | | 4. le ahese standar ud ds within each agency is for the agency itself to determine, Even the original clearance of COMINT personnel is handled by different investi. maa gators in each agency, and the FBI, which for a time carried.ajarge share of the general burden, has recently ceased screening AFSA’s own personnel  ™ because of the pressure of other duties. As a result, one of the most sensi- tive agencies of the Government, AFSA, has lost the services of our most protessional screening organization. Among the unfortunate results of the sovereignty enjoyed by each COMINT agency over its own security affairs is the tendency of each COMINT agency to suspect and criticize the security practices prevailing in other agencies, Without being able to learn the true facts or do anything about them. The uf o ommittee has been struck by the frequency with which representatives of. f particular COMINT agencies have pointed to poor security practices in other COMINT agencies, practically on a round-robin or pot and kettle basis. AFSA ai Gorries over the security practices of the consumer agencies, the consumer agencies worry about AFSA and about each other; yet so far as the Coramittee has been able to determine, no COMINT agency, and no individual in the COM- INT world, has sufficient information about security practices outside his own immediate field of COMINT activity to form a sound opinion one way or the other. A good example of this weakness of the present system is the reaction - 105 - .
SJ ry efore AFSA was created, but relating to security.practices, which the ‘creation of APSA ., Reeser: " Cre eae ” eee om Ks; ; ES TORS A wigan hod a = ¥
It also seems worth noting that the USCIB Board considered the problem pa 4 . ‘ — es? a and made the following ne ee — recommendations: a { t « ~ | (c) The following counter measures are required: ; 1 ! mo 7 toT -
ri 5 ry ox, Ny Pr 2 Pie A, ited apm: a i its a . RNa ten ¥ Hf SiF see RAR ah v4 ! rs 13 oe - + |. items essential to the accomplishment of the dissemination i (| (2) A thorough review of present dissemination lists and dis- - . semination practices, by each of the consumer agencies with ne . _. ‘a view to insuring that: * 7 eye a -a.-“Bhe~“need-to-know!? principle is rigidly adhered to, ae u. ; b, That the producing agencies are required to furnish only | LQ: those COMINT items which the application of the ‘‘need- . Z .; *——~té-kniow’” principle reveals are actually required by a - °  onsumer agency. ES) c, Only thé minimum number of copies of individual COMINT "program be requested from the producing agencies, and ‘d. Proper measures for handling, custody and stowage are being practiced.” | _~ yo od if ~- So far as the Committee has been able to learn, very little has been done by_ USCIB to carry out these recommendations. The general tenor of the testi- mony before the Committee was, that, in the opinion of each witness, security practices in his own agency are excellent but that Security practices in other -}—branches.of the U.S. COMINT effort are poor, with no observation of any *- ‘| a improvencnt qq The Committee is unable to express an opinion on Fy . PN the accuracy of these statements, but it is convinced that under our present re, . . | - 108 -
. hue ¢ , g 73 aT UB yy: rip a’ ¢ nan “it 1 al A AU aus 4 4 (Sm OD 1 4 €y) 5) 1 tone. af ies Bei '* Rees) wee Et aie a i weal I Co =. cod tare BY } aXe fi é form cf COMINT organization, no one COMINT official has acquired, or has the authority or ability to acquire, sufficient information about ‘actual security «< ot practices in all agencies to reach any sound conclusions on this subject. | to . uN: ‘ ar es . . . gre - "6 . oo Loe . wns ‘ °* som . ‘ 3 E . - Cam “ 4 2 “. . at _ . a ° in - . Dele | Mo mgonmmeman me so ee ns wee are “es - . , a ; ny . ie t . 2 ro = * = . ~- ‘ ed < < o . J . - = ‘ - a an ws we. : . iste . ' oF ” we » bd “= , - . ore : - . eS . ° . . ve a 7 ry - ry - ‘ ° . ‘ i - ° ve . - . ’ - - . . —_ . - . e ’ . ° ‘ 2, —
HPOP -DLCR ET : _ PSSCUSITY INFORMATION? =" yw 2 . eo . ' . * ° ° ° . ° . . BT ; . PART V : CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS a : THBLHS*HOCUMENTCONTERNS “GODE “WORD - MATER biog . . tinal . ‘ . o va “ 7 3 : Reviewed 4 August 1981 i aT ol - . . et . . ' " f “GE2@URFSINECAMATION.-~. . 4 238 oy.reen theta enemy ofS, e°d ° = j jv — ere ~ ~ . . . .
g paw an — me SoA Ser ete: Fatma Seay ore ates » Se ROE ‘ 32 oot Es) ea eae pees Oe eee eee pre The fiz st four parts of this Report do not purport to be a complete 4, summary of all of the evicence presented to the Committee, or of the humerous = and varying opinions which have t been received from.the witnesses listedin . . - ’ Exhidit 3 and ‘rom other individuals with whom members of the Committee = and its S stati have held informal. discussions. Oa the other hand, they are more a axcensive than would have been necessary if the Committee had Limited its = report to specific Teplies to the two main questions submitted to it. In order z to put itself in a position to answer these aquest ions, however, it was essenti . i for the Committee t8- acquire the background information which these four 7 parts contain, and itwas decided that, since-the mater ‘fal had been collected, - Qo taignt be equally helpful to the officials to whom the Report {s addressed eg have this same background, : = E [ . Our con nelusions ake necesSari ily matters of opinion and judgment, based ~ s | “on the evicence we have. received. They have been arrived at unanimously. — In add ion to those submitted.in response to the two main questions raised in our dir ective, we have added certain’ ‘others. of an ancillary nature on three - _ oF four other subjects necessarily encountered in the course of our survey. . j -We have not, however, attempted to extend the survey to include consideration A of the efficiency of the exsenciture of funds used in the overall COMINT effort, - nor to evaluate the methods cr machinery used by the varicsus departments | . a] and agencies in utilizing the COMINT information currently being made
available to them, as these subjects are completely outside our terms of referénce, 22 ee The Importance of Communications Intelligence... — (J In our cirective..of.28.Decemher. 195L.we were.asked first to. consider ~~ i ‘Che legitimate Communications, Intelligence’ needs.of each governmental de- _ i partment and agency for. the production af- departmental intelligence , and of the - Ton Director of Central Intelligence for.the. production af national intelligence.” Our - reply to this question is in-large part contained in.the material set forth in part 0 and in pages 89-102 of Part.IV....The.Committee.can advise.without qualification Abs fan that communications intelligence bas béen.in the past, and still. fs, of vital im- ortance to the Government, .There Was. a.tendency.on.the partaf certala wit- % a acy 5 nesses from the three. Services.to emphasize. that.its. primary importance js ““Tilltary’’, and that the primary. justification for. our. great COMINT effort should (— __, be to furnish the three Services with intelligence which is necessaxy in con- nection with the conduct.of a war and. in preparing to meet attack-if-a war starts. ) a oe - When one considers the fact that/in the past most of the spectacular. examples \. 4 b ia pa ala : Lae Ni ecg 'ton 4 (( \' 4? a _ oe . of its success have been directly connected with our military effort, this view is wi not survrising. Oa the other hand, ‘there. is no. question in the Committee’s mind. . that at this stage of our country’s history cormmunications intelligence is. also of primary importance to the successful. operations of certain of.the. civilian agencies, - t _ particularly the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal f . >) t - li - Co¢ (I eae aE oS a DOS ot Os |. ‘ ee, ‘
(a ‘= == s = “7 . “ Ares S Bureau of investigation, These civilian agencies today play a vital part La the national security of the United States, and it is apparent to us that COMINT 2s ai-essential part in our entire effort to protect that Security and not only 4 ‘in that large part of the effort which is the direct responsibility of the Military —" ~~ ee rT ‘Services. This principle should govern our COMINT organization to a greater . , Qe eee vas + + ere | Os Sad a ‘extent in the future than it has in the past. , a oo? 1 — a Information obtained through COMINT is of importance in a number of 4 ways, but it is not too much of an oversimoplification to divide its importance 4 =~. - into two main categories. The first of these relates to the direct support of ~ ee J a eN, our military units in the field through communications intelligence gertaining -: .. «+3 ome een amend . a° order-~<fattle, movements of the enemy, enemy plans and intentions, and so : Ce forth. The second includes the longer-range military information, =e . — ~ While the two interlock, the former is unquestionably of primary importance ° wee to the Services and is indispensable to them. The latter is of importance to the Scrvices and the civilian agencies alike. The two-fold characteristic of j | i ! ° — . . ‘ the finished product is the source of one of the difficulties in the organization ‘+ oC of a central communications intelligence effort. The difficulty is compounded ee + a. me oe by the fact that, although it is possible to separate to the extent indicated the EE RE use cf the finished product, it is not at all possiole to segregate to an equal extent the functions ef collecting and processing the material which is the St SS - 112 - . ste They pus eG i rage ye . RG ZF See Neg ee ra Soe) a i eet ane eS ena? ow OT ewer PE peal ° Swe oe ee tied ted —
, an SEPALS ML ES wT | SS USC ALG . Sot . aa 4 GSC TAG "source of the information. .Some.3 inforrma2tion.in the first category can be oplzined directly at a.forw ard intercept stztion.. .Otber. such. infor ma tion, very ‘probably of eyen greater imporiance,.can be obtzined only by compiling at . es - one cf the factors thet leads us to the conclusion.that COMINT is 2 national re- 5 . * sconsjbility (2s Gistinct from the resnorsibility cL any. perticuler Service, de- Fa < . é partment or egency) and thet es 2. consequence the activity must be so menaged and orgenized 2s to exploit 2] available intellicence resources in the pertici- pating ceperimenis and agencies in ordez to obizin the optimum resultsfor - “~~ each 2nd for the.Government 2s awholes 1-1 Ul) 6 eS eee / 2 . - . a eo 8 - OO OO . . _— . “Ss ° importence i ~ ea cece res pease igi nota. . ve iwk SS Rg ere rma ree ae aeE LADS BTS aoe Be ates i ee EE ROR RS A Re RE . ~ ws ow Tet tS Vis eae a eT 7 ao ers 3 Tssis at es *e —eo : ; oo 3. SM eGo e 13? pacerseseti eo sip nie OEE no IES Re TST SMS SSeS Pan SaCcS: => momen,” * 2a eS as SEBS: Se. Se SS 52 - . . a - = . . ote . Sata Sree * Por aan e oe wo ‘Sve "Fae =, sss ".* ome et ed Sie eee” tents te “- ake es
efficient COMINT organization is maintained, it may at any moment reward — . : . ~ : , ~st us with more satisfactory results. Because our enemies are today much better informed, perhaps because of our own disclosures, of the importance of com- munications intelligence to this Government, we mzy never see a return of the great successes and victories attributable to COMINT during the course of World War I, Nevertheless, the art is one which will be of such impor- 4tance to the defense of our country in the foreseeable future that we must os ~ . maintain our eiforts aggressively and efficiently so that (1) we may employ this source of intelligence during the present critical period and (2) we will have in existence a skilled organization that can furnish the communications - intelligence that will be of even greater importance in the event cf a general a The Organization of Communications Intelligence Activities . 2 rr meses AP i > a Tne second of the two general subjects which our Committee was re- quested to survey relatesto the organization of the Government’s communi- a rs cations intelligence activities. This organizational problem has been by far the most difficult part of the Committee’s assignment. . [ee a. nn gp ae ES Se EO a —
cee ve Fe we es eee 2 aD Oe ce ee ee, The 1949 reorganization and the creation of AFSA was a compromise. 3, It did not bring into. one organization. all of the functions which atthe time ss ”siy = were being performed separately by tha Army and.the Navy and. which the 3 Air Force was beginning to put into operation for itself. The two previous _ l= COMINT organizations were each vertically organized, each largely self- . = sicficieat, and eacn relied on “ecordination” and “Liaison?” for reduction of ° - duplication, Since,1949 we have had four COMINT organizations; besides APSA LAN itself, each of the three Services has its own, ASA (Army), CSA (Navy), AFSS ( (Air Force). As explained in Parts If and IV ef this Report, each of these m three is incependent,-each is subject to the command control of its partic- i = . . - . - -_ ular Service and performs certain functions for that Service, and each col- =~, Lieects COMINT traffic and furnishes it to AFSA, receiving in return finished _ . || material from AFSA, Each of the Service units. processes certain categories 7 of the material which it collects, and distributes the results both downward S[— to its own field commands and upward to.AFSA, AFSA is dependent on the ‘es Service units for all of its direct interception of COMINT (esau , a agencies tor all of its communication channels. However, none of the three Service units is subject to AFSA controi, except for the intercept positions . xj LW... Blaceé uader AFSA’s ‘‘operational direction’? by negotiated agreements, and 0 ” APSA has no power to compel elimination of duplication between them, or to
= ort etek Pete CPL Ci . A ee =t3 ps Nate iy pt Ble tent 3 of eens SEE . et Mee eerie eae ne SESS eS restrain them from engaging in activities that could better be centralized in AFSA itself, or tc observe intercepticn priorities established by AFSA. Stated as baldly as this, it may appear that the creation of AFSA was (a step backward. As a practical matter, however, it was preferable to the only two alternatives that were considered at the time. ° . . The first of these would have been the creation or continuance of a complete COMINT organizaticn for each of the three Services, and con- ; ceivadly a fourth to serve the civilian agencies. Obviously this would have been ridiculous duplication, and undesirable for many reasons in addition to _ the extravagant expense that would have been involved. Although ai the time 3 Baers - e& such separate setups were urged by the Navy and the Air Force, the Com- ~“ mittee has been told that today none of the Services or agencies would re- - commend this plan. > The second alternative would have been to concentrate in AFSA all COM- INT activities, top to bottom, of ali the Services and civilian agen ~~ J arom —— sen ? 1p Rene et OG) cies. This in general is the plan Aes SRC Sane Cae ORO a " avy 5 = (Pind Pe awe ~ 7 | i 1 and Cae wt ee Nat Ete to ~ Panay 32S i) EPP] se ~ c— SIS -« avers Re Na role Roan 3 é _ ee oe ee —-- ooo —— eee aeReES —
” Centralization to this extent would not be practical in the case of the United States at this time. As has been explained at length in earlier parts as 2 of this Revort, our organizations for COMINT in the field are ee eeed macned and cperated by the three Service st. ~ econ" units. In addition, the essential communicatioas networks are inte- gral parts of the military organizations. While as indicated below we believe that AFSA should be given authority to determine the*scope of the activity of i] "these Service units, and to control them.in.certain other respects, we would —-_-™ . . : | omnes Wy wait a 1) not go so far as to recommend that they be incorporated organizationally into AFSA itself. ys ctf Although we feel that the organization created in 1949 was preferable to these alternatives we have concluded, on the dasis of all the testimony presented . me « ee ees ee wee eg
to us, that the experience of the past two years has demonstrated that the 1949 reorganization should be regarded as a first step, and that a point has < now been reached which makes it essential to carry it further. We believe > “that a more effective centralization of certain of the COMINT activities, — a brought about by a strengthening of AFSA itself and an increase ia its authority a over the Service COMINT units, will increase its effectiveness and correct = deficieacies which have become apparent since 1949, Before turning to the : organizational changes that we wish to suggest, it is appropriate to enumerate 7” certain of the ee which prompt them. l. The COMINT effort of. the Government today has too many of . the aspects of. a loose c combination of the previous military organi- , zations and toc: ‘few of a true unification of. the. COMINT activities of -_ ‘all the interested departments and agencies. This ; is “easily understood when one considers the historical. development, but does not justify the continuation of the present setup. It is not well suited in this ‘intensely specialized field to the elimination of duplications, the =. intense concentration of available funds and the flexible assignment - of resources to the solution of a problem that must be treated as a whole. AFSA must be the keystone, The success or failure of the national effort depends on AFSA’s strength or weakness. And today its success is of vital importance to every department and agency ‘ _ * . . ™ a - . - 118 - é woes oe ee RS EE A SL LE RS © AS Mek SS
Lo. aoe) ) L. Cn m7) Co to Co Y Q. —~r a8 participating in the national defense,. 2. In theory the Joint Chiefs of Staff.exercise. direction over AFSA, \ In practice this direction is taken over. almost entirely. by their agency /”. AFSAC, which is an interservice. committee acting under. the rule of - \ unanimity. Its members devote much of their time In frustrating. : detail to safeguarding individual Service autonomies, The Director of AFSA is obliged to spend much of his energy on cajolery, negotiation : and compromise in an atmosphere of interservice. competition... He has no degree of control, except by. making use of such techniques, over the three COMINT.units operated by the Services.. Infact, he is under the - | conirol of the three Service units, through their. representation on AFSAC. His only appeal is to the same three Services sitting as the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 3, These difficulties have not been corrected. by. USCIB. As shown in some detail in Part II of this Report, its charter powers are vague and its jurisdiction is limited,.and it. has. itself no authority.to exercise policy direction cr control... Despite this, the.Committee feels that, if ‘USCIB had from its inception been mo.re.aggressive and alert, it could have made its weight felt in bringing ahout.needed reforms... 4. Inside AFSA itself the organization reflects the comments made above. By direction of the Joint Chiefs the Director has a two-year term, - 119 -
ook ec Pot ant Sgt NS, tee { @ ) v4 im mt wd { Fes ee ee ] “é oF | and the position is rotated among the Services. .He ts required to 4, have a deputy from each Service. There is inadequate attention to 4 the development of career officers and inadequate opportunity for . _ that advancement of civilians which is necessary to the building up” = of a strong and permanent civilian staff. The increasing complexity e of the task before AFSA demands the continuity which will result if | = more of its key personnel are career experts, | : : 5. The evidence shows that as a result of all these factors, AFSA has had a high furnover of personnel, has lost tco many valuadle ; men, and its general morale has been low. Presumably these are _ among the conditions that prompted the appointment of this Committee. The Committee found no evidence that they are due to the lack of te effort of the present Director or of his predecessor. ‘The major | difiiculties stem from the current organizational structure. Lack of success in certain important fields is undoubtedly, due!in part .to the extreme difficulty of the problems that exist teday as com- _ pared with those of World War I, but qualified witnesses have con- . vinced the Conimittee that there is sufficient hope of their eventual Solution to justify a major effort to correct the situation we have ° described. This effort will nct be effective without a further reor- giization of the COMINT structure. a re em
. f boies "ba ll Our recommendations on the subject of organizatica logically fall into three categories: (1) the organizaticn below the AFSA level; (2) the ergani- zation withia APSA itself; and (3) the organization above the AFSA level. Recommendations as to changes in the organization below the AFSA level, _ ~~ The Committee suspects that the present ASA, CSA and AFSS have growa A te greater proportions, and have assumed more autcnomcus functions, than ~* was intended by Secretary Johnson’s 1949 directive which created AFSA: It 7 is hard to avoid the conclusion that the three.Services, instead of exerting themselves to che greatest extent possible to bring about a maximum unifi- ! ; cation of COMINT agtivities in a strong AFSA, have put their emphasis on i - develosing their ows COMINT units at least to the limit permitted by the Sec- ; retary’s Cisective md have relegated a minimum of functions Gf commoncon- _ <= cern to an AFSA organization that.for all practical purpeses was kept subject to thei> joint control. We believe that in order dest to exploit the available - an resources in oll departments and agencies, to cbtain the proper ccordination of the three Service units into the national COMINT structure, and to insure _ the elimination of unnecessary duplicaticn, it is essential that AFSA be given -° ~ a substantial degree of autharity over those three organizaticns. At present the Director can theoretically exercise centrel by ebtaining acticn through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which in practice means persuading AFSAC -- really the three Services themselves -- to take the action he desires. This is not | Yes effective, ‘+ sada LS Sy A ep oe ee ee ee ee > ee ee ee ements, ew ere ee ee ae
With very few exceotiozs, all of the witresses who appeared before the ] Committee agreed that the authority and power cf the Director cf AFSA ‘Should ~ 7 be increased. This was true whether the particular individual Came from one = ~ of the Services, er one of the interested civilian agencies, o> APSA itself, oS i *: U The only difference bore ca the extent to which this increase should go. . = | We recommend that the mission of AFSA should be detined b by Presi- ~ _ . dential Memorandum (referred to more specifica! ally below), which should state ~~ that its fenction is to provide effective. Unified organization and coatrol of the u | COMINT activiti ies'ot the Goverament conducted against for eign governments, ‘| as these activities are Gefined in Public La: aw 513, and to provide for integrated ( 2a operational nol icies. and procedss as pertaining thereto: This. memorandum 7 should provide that), ‘subject to. the tep policy ccatr al described belew, the “ Director ot APSA is * responsible for accomplishing the cdission of AFSA, and ac that for this purpose al COMINT collection and technical processing resources *, ° of the United States are placed under his operational control and technical Ly & control. This authcrity should net, however, affect the responsibility of other ~ agencies and departments in respect of the evaluation and dissemination of ‘the COMINT procuct received by each of them from APSA, and neir synthesis ren e . oge : > ° 5 of that preduct with information available to them from cther sources._ n To the extent feasible and in consonance with the aims of maximum over- all efficiency, eccnomy, and effectiveness, the Directer should centralize or
© consotieate the performance of COMINT functions for which he is responsible, i . ~ Althouga the Presidential Memorandum should make it clear that the Director u has the authority to coatrol all collection and processing of COMINT, it should i: also provide that where necessary for close support of forces in the field, le 5 operational control of COMIN’ T activities necessary for such support are to be. ~ 2 4 delegated by the Director, during such periods and for such tasks as are deter- 3 u mined by him, to the appropriate unit. * = There should de direct access and direct communication between the Direc- tor and any Government COMINT activity. The Director should be authorized to obtain such information and materials pertaining thereto as may be required ie rae The memorandum should further provide that the Director shall exercise 7 ‘ such administrative control over COMINT activities as he finds essentialto - : - the effective performance of his mission.: Ctherwise, administrative control f | . r— of personnel and facilities will remain with the departments and agencies pro- S viding thera. CI If the authority of AFSA-and its Director is expanded in the manner above A recommenced, we will still have other units besides AFSA engaged in COMINT “ collecting and processing activities, but only to the extent that the Director . 7 determines that such separate operations should, in the overall national A interest, be separately concuéied. We appreciate that this will involve draw- e af .- d- ing a line beeween the powers to be etnployed by any one of the Services or a 1c
ee a YY pa ‘hy , field commander and the functional dirécter in Wasbington, However, the problem is by no means a new one in the Armed Services, and it has been i solved in other fields, althcugh any such solutioa necessarily involves sincere i ‘and jatelligent cooperation between the commancers involved, Recommendaticns as to organiza tion within AFSA itself. eeu At, AY plea ‘Tne Committee received much testimony from both military and civilian sources very critical of the situation that exists.today within the AFSA organ- jzation. This criticism was. directed agaicst.the present organizaticnal struc- a ture cof AFSA and not against the oa cz efficiency of any individual occupying 4 responsible pesition, . ; _- At present the directership of APSA is rotated amoag the Services, each incumbent holding the. positicn for two. years. There was.cota-single individ ual whom the Commi ttee quastionad.on this point who.did rot exoress the opinion that this term was tco short. Recommendations. varied from three years to an indefinite cr “pareer”? pericd...Everyone agreed that under the oe . Dresent setup it teck a year fer .the Director. to get his feet under bim and that he really oaly besame well trained ts perform his difficult tac: «x Shortly " before his term of office expired. The Committee reccmmends strongly that AFSA should be administered by a director with a substantially lenger term of cffice, 4K aé The witnesses differed in their opinion as to whether the director should sada
s be an cificer or a civilian, These differences by no means followed the | status of the particular witnesses; one of our senior generals stated flatly that he should be a civilian, and scme other officers said that they did not {_- think it made great difference whether he was a civilian cr not. The majority, i) both military and civilian, expressed the strong view that, rightly or wrongly ’ see es ~ eye +e - . tom. ee — a civilian would have a harder road, and greater difficulties to overcome, or ee ee sm ee te wee — ee oe em eee. o . on unless by chance he was a retired cificer with good military experience behind baa .: rs ae wmeated _ oo 8 : . him. This questica would of course depend in any particular case on the 7 ne aE eae DO a = particular personality invelved. The primary qualification which should deter- mine the selection cf the disecte> is competence, and the thoroughly competent te ae oe me we enna. —_ —~em, individual may be found in any field of endeaver. Nevertheless, on balance, Py rial are at ~ tne Committee feels that initially the position should be held by a career military cfficer on active or reactivated duty s > et ere Sere oan Se eee - star rank during the pericd of his incumbency. He should be appointed pre- tatus, enjoying at least three- ~— . ‘. ‘ferably tor a term of 6 years, but not less than 4 years. If, as things develop, it should ultimately appear that a civilian could better qualify sor the position, it is strongly recommenced that no sense cf tradition or vested military terest be allewed to stand in the way cf his appciatment. If the director is an officer, he shculd have as his deputy a career civilian. The Director shculd — . . 4 ' be designated by the President cn the nominaticn of the Secretary of Defense. or ; ~—_ Below the directerata level, senior nesiticns should be filled by individ- “= » ; ot the Le 3 ras { — ada
communicatiezs intelligence, We do not believe that these pesitions should be limited to civilians, because we are.impressed by the testimony given by many witnesses as to the importance cf familiarizing the Service organi- zations in the field with ASA organization and operations by rotating officers from ASA iato field positions and then back again. Also, the long experience of several Navy cfiicers is one cf the great assets of the activity today. On — ems me emcee the other hand, it wculd be a major mistake to limit the senicr positions to officers, Decause itis cf the greatest importance to enccurage civilians to make careers in the COMINT field by clear demonstraticn that senior positions will be available to them if their talents merit promotions. We have been disturbed by the testimony as to the high rate cf turnover ‘ among AFSA empleyees. This has been a tremendous handicap to the building - up of an efficient orgonizatica, as well as a Serious hazard fom the point of view of security. One cause, emphasized by informed witnesses, appears to be that many of the civilian emp!cyees bélieve that no matter how long they work nor how expert they become, the top pesiticns in the divisions will gen- erally be filled by cificer personnel cf less exverience and training than they. Another factor curicg the past year was undcubtedly the decisicn (sub- Sequenity cancclicd) to move the entire AFSA establishment to Fort Knox, To predu:e COMINT material requires as high a professicnal skill as any other applied science, and perhaps cryptanalysis and intelligence based ~~ 126 - ° or mv mony ui. t,- {. aac nde 4 On ad
ht a . aes seers ek LI! ah t 7 ; on cryptanalysis require longer. training and experience than most = _ "other scientific fields. The COMINT agencies today are in poor 4 : ~ position to compete for the people they need. They cannot offer 7 a : 2 comparable salaries; they cannot give the tangible rewards.of . - ~ 7 ‘public service such as the recognition of the community; they ~ cannot oifer the opportunity to acquire a skill usable in private Ite. We are not only not attracting capable young people inthe numbers that dre needed, but we are losing many that we have had . . in the past. Apparently there are only ten or fifteen top flight cxyptanalysts left at Arlingzon Eall out of the much larger number Ses. ray , who were in the COMINT effort curing the War. In this connection, ~ none of the so-called super-grades has been allocated to AFSA. Only under the present Director was application for such grades made; = ° Sr it is understood that the pending application is stalled today because _ all authorized super-grades have been allocated elsewhere in the Government. ; os The Committee cannot ventire to prescribe methods of solving these personnel problems, except to emphasize what has been said as
a 7 .* aeara =< SN Liat Orta whey : _ J . oa . fa . a | to the importance of making careers in the Agency attractive and 4 xt . ry to recommend that a study should be made as to the desirability ‘4 . . ot . . 1 of increasing salaries paid to the key-individuals. On the military > , : . : Ce b's ty. b abiey alt Side, a corresponding si_dy Should be initiated on the question of extending to the Army and to the Air Force the policy now in force in the Navy of making communications intelligence a career assign- ment, and of recognizing its importance by promotions to general * or flag rank for those who achieve success in the field. The Committee also adopts the recommendation made to it by SCAG (the? SGientific-Commurizations Advisory Group referred , - to more fully below) that the Director should have a civilian chief : i technical assistant who would have under him all research and ~ development in the cryptanalytic field, ; —— =~. ie ' 1 | . C7) Co a! or fc) (4) 4 C t:
This research work requires the employment of expert career men to an even ‘ greater extent than other APSA departments, The Director should provide for increased participation by represent. tm Sate = aiives Ci each ci the agencies eligible to raceive COMINT in those offices 1 . : of APSA where priorities of intercept and cryptanalysis are finally determined. , Recommendations as to organization above the AFSA level | Ln re ee ene ene — (7) y The changes that should be made in the organization above the AFSA level ) present the single most citticult question that the Committee has encountered. he on oe { As has been explained in detail, AFSA is now under the Joint Chiefs of Stsi - Geta e 4 C The Joint Chiefs as 4 body pay little direct attention to the organization and a its supervision almost entirely to their agent, AFSAC. Contrel of AFSA i is thus under three Bosses (the three Services represented in AFSAC), whose principal energies «ad loyalties are elsewhere, and to make matters worse, ("J ~~, three bosses who must act by unanimous agreement. Tne Committee believes that this situation is highly undesirable and that it is responsible for many of the handicaps under which AFSA is now operating. y= my it also means that AFSA has been, for all practical! purposes subject only to { military control anc policy guidance. It is true that USCIB exists, and that a | ob abe . ; . _ J  onit there ore representatives of the State Department, CLA, and the FSI, as Ss wail as of the three Services. However, USCIB’s actual powers, as pointed awe . . m7 - ~ 128 - r
out in Part If of this Report, are exceedingly limited. We are more concerned over the fact that the present top level control of AYS#*. is in a three-headed group, each member of which often has in mind the interests of his own Service, than by the fact that the group is military, ~~ Although itis our opinion that the 1949 experiment whereby APSA was placed uncer the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be terminated, we would not adopt the — plan ursed cn us by some witnesses that, Giep wine should te placed directly under a civilian agency, such as the Central Intelli- ) (2 gence agency. We reach this cenclusion net so much en the theory.that the - — COMINT oroduct is:more important to the Services than to the civilian agencies —- ~ as because (1) the Services are practically the sole collectors and trans- mitters of the raw ‘intercepted material, and (2) the product is used to so . C4 important an extent in combat activities in time of war as to dictate the desir- —) — ility of preserving lines of command through established defense channels. Ps We have received no convincing evidence that.it is necessary to put AFSA out- m Side the Defense establishment in erder to assure that the needs of civilian _ Vy . - agencies are properly taken care cf. t | ~ it ihere were a Chief of Staff cf the armed forces of the United States, ~ tne Committce might wellhave recommended placing AFSA under his juris- { Ciction. But there is ne such position. We also explored the possibility af (3 puting ArSA directly under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but
+ pu “we . ~ after discussion with the present incumbent of that office, we have been convinced that the arrangement would not be workable, We have concluced that the problem should be resolved by the issuance which will define the mission of AFSA and the specific responsibilities of the ( Director of AFSA as cutlined in tne preceding subsections of this Part V, and (2) a charter for a reorganized USCB (to which reorganized Board we here- [f- (9 aiter refer for-.convenience 25 the COMINT Boare) replacing NSCID No. 9, . that particular subject. I would Seem that this precedent can be satisfac- torily followed in this case. : , : : : ~ Of a Presidential memorandum designating the Department of Defensa as the — “_ * : f . : ° : u . executive agent cf the Government for the production and dissemination of ] COMINT for the benefit of the Services and the civilian agencies and depart~ rm ments and for the-procuction, security and distribution of our own codes and © ~ _ Cipher systems, This memorandum should further provide that the Department —_~ . ‘ . _ of Defense as such executive agent will be directly under and responsible to | a Special Committee’of the National Security Council for COMINT, which — Special Committee should consist cf the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary “> of State, and the President as circumstances may require.“ The memorandum —_ : ; snould instruct this. Special Committee to prepare and issue implementing -~ : 1 { directives Setting forth: (1) the terms of reference for the Secretary of Defense ~~ : , { : which will provide that the Director of AFSA shall report directly to him and ij : tenn my * Weaiare informed that in connection with matters certaining to atomic energy, aad the Naticnal Security Council oserates through a similar Special Committse a Consisting only of those members of the NSC who have primary interest in PANGS -
SS NS NS NE ET FS: Se NS eee - awd “reconstituting the Board as a body acting for and under the Soesial Coramittee, and prescribing the Board’s composition, general functions and responsibilities in the COMINT field, This will involve the abolition of AFSAC, The following principles should apply to the jurisdiction of the COMINT ~~ Board as so reconstituted: a. The COMINT Board shall be composed of the Director of Central a, Intelligence, who shall be the Chairman of the Board, a representative fom) a t irom | pte ca 1 fo, a _- a =~ of the Secretary cf Defense, a representative of the Secretary of State 3 the Director of.the Armed Forces Security Agency, the Chairman of- { (_.J the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-and a repre- - a sentative of the Director of the Federal Bureau of lavestigation. - b. The Board shall have a staff headed by a full time civilian executive secretary designated by'a majority of the Board. ae: c. It shall be the duty of the Board to advise and make recom- ns oor oe mendations to the Secretary of Defense in accordance with the fol- 7 ‘lowing procedure with respect to any matter relating to communi- - cations intelligence which falls within the jurisdiction of the Director _ ef AFSA: 3 (1) The Director of AFSA shall make reports from time to ' time to the Eoard, either orally or in writing as the Board may _~ A request, and shall bring to the attention of the Board, either in m: a —_ Net $B ot “te 6; es een .
. ee ee . tld yd {_) t =e t—] Lod tL] such reports or otherwise, any new major policies or programs in a¢vance of their adoption by him. In addition, he shall furnish to the Board sucha information as the Board may request with respect to the operations of AFSA, _ (2) The Board shall reach its decisions by a majority of not less than four members. Each member of the Board shall be entitled to ane vote. . . (3) in the event that the Board votes and reaches 3 decision, ~, . any dissenting member of the Board may appeal from such decision within 7 days to the Special Committee. In the event that the Soard votes but fails to reach a majority cecision, any member of the Board may also appeal within 7 Gays to the Special fa ad Committee. “In either event the Special Committee s*all -eview - the matter and its determination thereon shali be final. . (4) If any matter is voted on by the Board but (a) no decision ' is reached and any member files an appeal, or (b) a decision is reacned in which the representative of the Secretary of Defense Goes not concur and the representative of the Secretary ci Defense files an 25, eal, no action shall be taken with respect to the subject matter until the appeal is decided, provided that, if the Secretary of Defensa determines, after corsultation with the Secretary of - 132 - x a ke ee oe By. ios vee nay
NERY ae ES eS ot 2. Ab es Satay wan tees Fyre x . ~ CPA CSL AS Se eas aA Oe ee et hed State, that the subject matter presents a problem of an emergency nature and requires immediate actioa, his decision shall govern pend- y é haben ing the result of the appeal. In such an emergency situation the appeal ad may be taken directly to the President. | m | . ve wh es ees alt (3). Recommendations cf the Board adopted in accordance with the foregoing procedure shall be binding on the Secretary of Defense. Except on matters which have been voted on by the Board, the Director of AFSA shall discharge his responsibilities in accordance with his own judgment subject to the direction of the Secretary of Defense. dane @. It shall also be the duty of the Board as to matters not falling within the jurisdiction of AFSA: (1) to coordinate the communications intelligence - etivities of all departments and agencies authorized by: Presicential Memo- a « SIRENS nd (3) te consider and make recommendations Fmd : e . . - oes . . concerning policies relating to communications intelligence of common interest to the departments and ‘agencies including security standards and practices, and, for this purpose; to investigate and study the standards and practices of Ce ETS . — << —— = ee Such Genartments and agencies in utilizing and protecting COMINT information. Any recommendation of the Board with respect to the matters described in this paragraph e. shall be binding on al} departments or agencies of the Government if it is adopted by the unanimous vote of the memoers of the “eases oe - qt oo 4 ama —— +e mee on
(3 tt 4 LJ ; ) ) (9 td | .) Gp Jc) to (2) CI oy C3 of. =? .9 ig teh be ws. SaLeP Sigs tet SAS beet eee oe cam Stat pe aaa gee ake ay eT gh ae Board. Recommendations approved by a majority, but not all, of the members of the Board shall be transmitted by ~ it to the Scecial Committee for such action as the Specia ‘Committee may see fit to take. “While it is believed that the above prososal is less com- ~ . plicated than the structure which now exists above AFSA, it is realized that it is more involved than one would desire. However, some complication is mace necessary by two controlling but - somewhat conilictiag factors: (1) all of the interested Services and agencies should have a voice in determining AFSA policies and giving it guidance, and (2) in order to strengthen APSA and raake it 2 viable organization, itis necessary that for adminis- trative purposes it be placed under-a single Government depart- : ment. The somewhat involved machinery for appeals to the Special Committee has been dictated as a result of our strone deliez that the unanimity rule which now hampers USCIS should be eliminated for the new COMINT Beard in matters pertaining to AFSA. We are
4 a oN i FY I ! ., 3 RCT G) if an 3 ir " ie i ay - i 5 (J (7) j a ys he 4 \ us ae \vt Tye if 44 rf a pra nb) g hooeful that this machinery will seldom be used, and that its mere existence will stimulate harmonious action. Of course, no machinery will work Satisfactorily unless the several Services, cepartments and agencies bend every effort to coop- erate in the commen.cause, It is imperative that lack of such ccoperation be never allowed to weaken or dissipate our COMINT activities. The Committee has ventured to prepare a draft Presiden- tial Memorandim (annexed as Exhibit K) designed to carry into ry affect the mzicr organizational changes which are recommended above. Although the preparation of such a memorandum is a technical matter‘and doubtless involves problems with which the Comittee is nct familiar, we submit the draft partly because it will further clarity the Committee's recommendations and partly because it may be of assistance, if you approve those recommencations, in putting them into effect. We point out, nacwever, that the memorandum does not cover all of the recom- raendzticns contained in this Report.
oe rx Se Rey Hy POSS REE Tg iS RS eS aS . & The foregoing conciusionas and recommendations are the Cammittes’s  ~ reply to the soacific questions included in our Directive. In the course of-————— our survey, we have encountered a number of ancillary issues raised by | . . . . . . Pad e “ i 7 various witnesses in addition to those discussed above. Examination of those “ |’: accitional issues has been relevant to the conclusions and recommendations, but we believe that their proper solution should be left for the revised COMINT Board. Brief ciscussicrs cf three or four of them at this point, however, may ? __Pwserve to further support and illustrate the necessity for the reorganization | i recommended shove, and record for the benefit of the new. COMINT command - the results of cur investigation of these problems which should he of early a concera ia the work cf the new organizaticn. 7 he Security of Commiunicaticns Intelligens a The current security measures and pscblems in the COMINT field have a 2 : A been discussed ia Part IV. Suffice it to record here several basic principles ° anne ccaclusions. The success of our COMINT effort has varied in the past, iy and will undoubtedly vary in the future, in direct prcportion to the effective- ness cf the security measures taken to protect it, During World War'IZ our ee s7eat successes were possible only because our enemies had little if any knowledge ef what we were dcing or the degree of our accomplishments. Our . - Successes are smaller and fewer today, despite great advances in the art of Mpc) C2) ba ee c-yprtanalysis, partly because these security measures have been cn occasica 7 - 135 - t a’ 2.
RA OS Bee iota SIGS MO tea EE Ae a ger eens SAS TARE GR ee D> x aX ar “a ew se. -_~ ~& Raientionally abandoned (as in the case of the Pearl Harbor shv@Stigation) 9 “777 ' . . Se aay s- or not adequately protected... J [ We must assume that the Soviet Coverament is fully aware of the face (3 that we are striving to break its codes and read its messages. We have from ) time to time in the pesi made no secret of the fact that we have been active in this field; and furthermore, the dividuals (including the con- ("45 Sumer agencies) engaged in the COMINT effort from all walks of life, and ° e . ») ) o Ad = 2 = *. tne high rate of turnover, creates a serious security risk. But this does not mean that security precautions can be eliminated; constant coordinated effor t ce? must be made to improve security. To be sure, we cannot xeen frora other governments the knowledge that we are in the business cf trying to read their ( i alee 34 fe pia . We can, however, Keep from them the extent of our effort and the success a . ry that we are having at any particular time. If by chance we should be so success-. “4 ry oy ul as to Dreak some new cede, there must be in existence effectivel: wording 4 : can Security mecsures which will reduce to an absolute minimum the possibility i! “ that that fact will be disclosed. ~. i i. At present each of the three Services and three civilian agencies making = use of communications intelligence, and the Armed Forces Security Agency {.. iiseu, incivicually handles security matters pertaining to its own personnel. 4 2 Each agency is supposed to follow general rules laid down by the USCiB Se- curity Committee, but each agency is free to apply these general rules to { am] - 136 - > 4, oN, we " BAL ee a an EE Be he = ~ Aa, ran Ne et TR
concrete cases 2s it sees fit, without any supervision or checkup whatever. The Committee has not attempted to make a survey of the precautions which each of these groups. is taking, and even if.it were able to do so, it would not feel qualitied to express an opinicn.as to their suticiency.. It does eppear 2 . to us that the number of indivicuals ‘‘cleared’’ for the use of communications (1) intelligence (as distinct from its collection and processing) is too large. . Ld an A second prcdlem called to our attention has been the too widespread + iN —t +: : : -_ : A : ° : Gistridution of the APSA procuct, in terms both of needless circulation of uselass messages aad ci unnecessary multiplication of required copies of () " each message. Thisidifficulty at least in part is inherent in the present fe oc intelligence processing outside the control of AFSA, which is.com- ceo ft Syren - mented oa celow. While the Committee cannct attempt to lay down rules on the subject of Security, it believes that the entire subject merits careful study and action Cpe ia . . by a central organization such as the new COMINT Board. rand me { The Cryotanalytic Effort We nave seen that at the presenttime AFSA’s efforts in certain impor- f ey parts of the cr (- Jpianalytic field have not been crowned with success, to } ne sudject is so sensitive that, if the Secretary of State and or ee0 ( -“ . ~ - 137 - —_ ’ bine, ee KS neo . TORE Sopp cow ee EL ea 5 PN Neg ean eva ats SS. ree if : et ene = ome es eS -  D —oreee = a
the Sacretary of Defense wish more detailed information on it, we would prefer to arrange to furnish it to them orally. However, we would submit bane ry in this Recort cur observations as to some ci the possible causes, io) Thre Committee had the beneZit cf an extensive ccrference with cop oo exyptanalysts in AFSA and aiso with seven ci the members of the Scientific Commuzications Advisory Group (SCAG). This latter group has been appoimted ~ by the Director of AFSA from among the leading civilian industrial experts =\ * ‘in the tieid of the develcpment and construction cf the intensely complicated iS machinery waich is today the bacibone of the cryptanalytic effort. (The Z names and titles of these individuals appear in the list ef witresses annexed Sam 28 Exhibit B). The Committee has also studied and discussed with the senier . ryptanalytic consuitant to the Directer cf AFSA a recent report made by SCAG Lot to the Director on this scbject tis the cpinion of the experts that there is reasonable hope of greater success, provided 2 sreater end more efficient -_ 3° a-- @itortis made, This means the empicymeat cf a larger number of highly Sxillec personnel, and the expenditure of additional funds for machines. It also would require the cevelesment within AFSA, undes civilian direction, ef a s¢ 2 Strong research and develonment grcup. Greater civilianization, accerding to SCAG, is absolutely necessary in that branch of AFSA which is charged with the conduct cf technical research. (39 9) C2) ta tf Many scientists and mathematicians in recent years have felt the appeal of