REPORT  BY 
THE  OFFICE  OF    THE  SECRETARY  OF  DEFENSE 
STUDY  TEAM 
TO  THE 
SECRETARY  OF  DEFENSE 
REASSESSMENT 
OF 
DEFENSE  AGENCIES 
AND 
DOD  FIELD  ACTIVITIES 
By  Direction  of  the 
Goldwater-Nichols 
Department  of  Defense  Reorganization  Act 
of  1986 
(Public  Law  99-433 ,  October  1,  1986) 
October  1987 
Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  of  Defense 
(Administration) 
Directorate  for  Organizational 
and 
Management  Planning 
The  Pentagon 
Washington,  D.C.  20301
Appendix  D 
DEFENSE  INTELLIGENCE  AGENCY  (DIA) 
I.  SUMMARY  OF  RECOMMENDATIONS 
Mission  and  Oversight 
1.  That  the  Defense  Intelligence  Agency  (DIA)  retain  the  intelli- 
gence mission  with  added  authority  and  resources. 
2.  That  oversight  of  Department  of  Defense  (DoD)  Intelligence 
be  assigned  to  a  single,  senior  Office  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense 
(OSD)  official  responsible  for  all  Defense  intelligence  policy, 
plans,  programs,  and  budgets. 
3.  That  integrated  Defense  intelligence  program  management 
(with  the  exception  of  SIGINT)  be  vested  in  the  Director  of  DIA 
with  oversight  arrangements  as  currently  structured. 
4.  That  the  Director  of  DIA  be  given  the  authority  to  fulfill 
the  expanded  mission  outlined  for  Combat  Support  Agencies  in  the 
Defense  Reorganization  Act.   Combat  Support  Agency  directors 
should  participate  in  the  PPBS  process  for  those  matters  affecting 
their  mission  areas. 
Readiness  and  Responsiveness 
1.  That  DIA  be  given  the  authority  and  resources  to  fulfill  more 
effectively  its  mission  of  satisfying  Unified  and  Specified 
(U&S)  Command  intelligence  requirements.   OSD,  Organization  of 
the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  (OJCS),  and  the  Director  of  Central 
Intelligence  (DCI)  should  identify  minimum  requirements  and 
initiate  corrective  action,  as  appropriate. 
2.  That  DIA  expand  its  efforts  to  develop  joint  intelligence 
doctrine.   DIA  should  work  closely  in  this  regard  with  OJCS,  the 
U&S  Commands,  and  the  Military  Departments. 
3.  That  DIA  in  collaboration  with  the  DCI,  OSD,  OJCS,  U&S  Commands, 
and  Military  Departments  develop  an  achievable  schedule  and 
plan  of  action  for  development  of  an  integrated  Defense  Intelli- 
gence Master  Plan  emphasizing  intelligence  support  to  the  Combatant 
Commands . 
4.  That  DIA  work  with  the  Defense  Communications  Agency  (DCA) , 
OJCS,  the  U&S  Commands,  and  the  Military  Departments  to  ensure 
that  survivable,  secure  intelligence  voice  and  data  communications 
will  exist  to  support  DIA  and  U&S  Command  combat  support  require- 
ments.  The  communications,  operations,  and  intelligence  communi- 
ties should  work  together  to  document,  validate,  and  translate 
these  requirements  into  operational  capability. 
D-l
5.   That  DIA  be  more  responsive  to  LJ&S  Command  requirements  and 
improve  communication  with  consumers  to  ensure  that  users  are 
aware  of  Agency  capabilities  and  limitations. 
Qraani  zat ion  and  Functions 
1.  That  DIA  determine  the  organizational  changes  required  to 
support  its  wartime  mission  ajnd  document  them  in  the  Defense 
Intelligence  Master  Plan. 
2.  That  DIA  consider  consolidation  of  those  planning  and  manage- 
ment functions  in  direct  support  of  U&S  Command  requirements  into 
a  single  organization. 
3.  That  DIA  be  granted  increased  authority  to  fulfill  its  role 
in  counterintelligence  matters-   OSD,  OJCS ,  and  DIA  should 
determine  the  most  appropriate  way  to  ensure  the  J-2  can  guide, 
review,  and  ensure  the  U&S  Commands  have  adequate  counter- 
intelligence capability. 
Efficiency.  Economy,  and  Effectiveness 
That  DIA  explore  with  the  J-2s  of  the  U&S   Commands  possible 
ways  to  rotate  DIA  civilian  intelligence  professionals  through 
command  activi  ties. 
Manpower  And  Budget 
1.  That  DIA  not  be  reduced  by  the  general  Agency  and  management 
headquarters  reductions  identified  in  Title  VI  of  the  Defense 
Reorganization  Act. 
2.  That  requirements  and  budget  constraints  drive  future  manpower 
requests . 
3.  That  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  Defense  (Force  Management  and 
Personnel)  [ASD(FM&P) ]  and  CJCS  review  the  Combat  Support  Agency 
military  manpower  billets  against  Joint  Duty  Assignment  criteria 
and,  where  appropriate,  designate  billets  as  joint  duty  assignment 
positions . 
II.  HISTORY 
Enactment  of  the  1958  Reorganization  Act  prompted  Secretary  of 
Defense  Thomas  Gates  to  ask  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  (JCS)  to 
review  the  adequacy  of  Defense  intelligence  activities. 
Concurrently,  White  House  concern  about  the  management  of  all 
Government  intelligence  activities  resulted  in  an  interagency 
study  chaired  by  Lyman  Kirkpatrick,  Jr.,  Inspector  General  of  the 
Central  Intelligence  Agency. 
In  December  1960,  the  Joint  Study  Group  reported  a  number  of 
deficiencies  in  the  military  intelligence  system,  including 
duplication  of  requirements,  collection  activities,  and 
D-2 
&&&
publications.   The  Joint  Study  Group's  recommendations  to  the 
National  Security  Council  (NSC)    included  proposals  for  consoli- 
dating Defense  intelligence  efforts. 
In  early  1961,  Secretary  McMamara  asked  the  JCS  to  develop  a 
concept  and  plan  to  activate  DIA.   A  compromise  was  developed 
that  provided  for  an  agency  reporting  to  the  Secretary  through 
the  JCS  with  overall  responsibility  for  managing  and  controlling 
Defense  intelligence  resources,  although  the  arrangement  left  a 
number  of  intelligence  functions  with  the  Military  Departments. 
With  DIA's  establishment,  Secretary  McNamara  abolished  the  Assis- 
tant to  the  Secretary  for  Special  Operations,  his  previous  point 
of  contact  for  coordination  of  Defense  intelligence  activities 
and  for  liaison  with  other  Government  intelligence  organisations. 
Additionally,  the  JCS  transferred  their  Joint  Staff  J-2  Direc- 
torate to  DIA. 
In  1970,  the  Blue  Ribbon  Defense  Panel  reported  that  "The  principal 
problems  of  the  Defense  Intelligence  Agency  can  be  summarized  as 
too  many  jobs  and  too  many  masters."   The  panel  believed  that 
DIA's  supervision  of  Military  Department  intelligence  collection 
and  processing,  and  fiscal  control  over  Military  Department  intel- 
ligence programs  was  "largely  impotent."   In  response,  Secretary 
Melvin  Laird  established  an  Assistant  Secretary  of  Defense  for 
Intelligence  [ASD(I)].   This  new  official  was  charged  wi-h  exer- 
cising a  greater  degree  of  authority  over  resource  allocation 
than  DIA  had  been  able  to  achieve.   Despite  the  changes  in 
oversight  and  a  number  of  internal  reorganizations  during  the 
early  1970s,  DIA  continued  to  operate  under  the  charter  Secretary 
McNamara  issued. 
In  February  1976,  President  Ford  issued  Executive  Order  11905  to 
strengthen  control  and  management  of  U.S.  intelligence  activities. 
Secretary  Rumsfeld  established  an  Inspector  General  for  Intelli- 
gence and  double-hatted  the  ASD(I)  the  Director  of  Defense  Intelli- 
gence (DDI).   The  Director  of  DIA  was  instructed  to  report  to  the 
Secretary  of  Defense  through  the  DDI  and  to  the  CJCS.   Additionally, 
the  Secretary  directed  further  DIA  reorganization  to  emphasize 
its  production  and  managerial  responsibilities. 
Under  the  the  Carter  Administration,  staff  supervision  on  policy 
matters  was  assigned  to  the  Under  Secretary  for  Policy  [USD(P)j 
and  staff  supervision  for  resource  allocation  to  the  Assistant 
Secretary  of  Defense  for  Command,  Control,  Communications,  and 
Intelligence  [ASD(C3I)j. 
Under  present  arrangements  the  Director  DIA,  reports  to  the 
Secretary  of  Defense  and  CJCS.   Staff  supervision  is  received 
from  the  ASD(C3I) . 
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Hi.  MISSION,  OVERSIGHT,  AND  AUDIT 1UUAL  Ll-IG  I S LAT I  Of  J 
Mi  :;::.  i  on 
In   accordance  with  its  charter,  DoD  Directive  5105.21,  DIA's 
mission  is  to  satisfy,  or  to  ensure  the  satisfaction  of,  the 
foreign  intelligence  requirements  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense, 
the  CJCS,  DoD  Components,  and  other  authorized  recipients,  and  to 
provide  the  military  intelligence  contribution  to  national  intel- 
ligence.  The  Director  of  DIA  wears  four  hats.   He  is  the  Director 
of  a  Combat  Support  Agency,  the  J- 2  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff, 
the  senior  military  intelligence  advisor  to  the  Secretary  of 
Defense,  and  the  Program  Manager  of  the  General  Defense  Intelli- 
gence Program  (GDIP). 
Mission  Alignment  Alternatives 
Alternative  1 :   Retain  the  present  DIA  mission . 
Although  additional  resources  and  authority  are  required  to  carry 
out  the  intelligence  function,  the  mission  should  continue  to  be 
consolidated  in  a  single  agency.   Further  fragmentation  of 
intelligence  activities  would  reduce  overall  efficiency,  economy, 
and  effectiveness,  and  mitigate  the  benefits  of  consolidation. 
Alternative  2 :   Return  the  mission  to  the  Military  Departments . 
Returning  the  mission  to  the  Military  Departments  would  compromise 
efficiency,  effectiveness,  and  economy;  fragment  resources;  promote 
analytical  duplication;  and  provide  decision  makers  with  uncoordi-       ^*"^: 
nated  intelligence  data.   Inherent  in  this  alternative  is  the 
potential  for  manipulation  of  intelligence  assessments  to  support 
weapon  system  choices. 
Alternative  3 :   Centralize  in  DIA  all  DQD-wide  intelligence 
production,  processing,  and  infrastructure  activities  that  „do 
not  provide  direct  support  to  the  U&S  Commands  and  their 
Component  Commands  but  are  common  to  more  than  one   Military 
Department . 
On   the  surface,  this  alternative  appears  to  eliminate  the  frag- 
mentation of  intelligence  activities  by  merging  intelligence 
production,  processing,  and  infrastructure  in  a  single  agency. 
However,  most  interviewees  believe  it  is  neither  politically- 
feasible  nor  warranted. 
The  largest  Military  Department  production  activities  are  the 
Scientific  and  Technical  (S&T)  Intelligence  Centers.   They  support 
both  national  and  Military  Department  specific  requirements  under 
the  functional  management  of  DIA  and  resource  management  of  the 
Director  of  DIA  as  the  General  Defense  Intelligence  Program  (GDIP) 
Manager.   DIA  currently  manages  the  S&T  intelligence  production 
that  is  shared  among  DIA  and  Military  Department  S&T  Intelligence 
Centers.   Few  efficiencies  and  many  problems  would  result  by 
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consolidating  this  timet  ion  in  iua. 
Oversight 
DIA  is  under  the  authority,  direction,  and  control  of  the  Secretary 
of  Defense.   Staff  supervision  and  policy  guidance  are  provided 
by  ASD(C3I).   The  Assistant  to  the  Secretary  of  Defense  for  Intel- 
ligence Oversight  ensures  that  DIA's  activities  are  in  compliance 
with  existing  law. 
The  Director  of  DIA  is  under  the  operational  control  of  the  CJCS 
for  the  intelligence  support  required  by  the  CJCS  to  perform  his 
statutory  and  other  assigned  responsibilities.   As  Program  Manager 
of  GDIP  and  as  an  activity  in  the  Foreign  Counterintelligence 
Program,  further  guidance  and  oversight  is  provided  by  DCI  and 
the  Intelligence  Community  Staff. 
Although  diffused  among  different  officials  and  performed  in 
different  ways,  the  record  of  performance  would  indicate  that 
oversight  of  DIA  has  been  effective.   However,  fragmented  oversight 
of  the  broader  intelligence  community  is  problematic  due  largely 
to  the  multiplicity  of  programs  and  proponents  with  frequently 
competing  institutional  interests.   For  example,  within  OSD,  all 
programs  are  not  centrally  managed.   Others,  such  as  the  National 
Foreign  Intelligence  Program  (NFIP) ,  are  largely  outside  the  control 
of  DoD.   Although  each  impacts  upon  the  others,  they  are  frequently 
not  integrated  into  a  coherent  planning  and  programming  framework. 
Direct  involvement  in  the  DoD  planning,  programming,  and  budgeting 
system  (PPBS)  process  is  needed  to  ensure  that  the  Combat  Support 
Agencies  are  able  to  perform  the  increased  responsibilities  they 
were  assigned  in  the  Defense  Reorganization  Act.   Currently,  they 
do  not  have  sufficient  authority  to  carry  out  their  expanded 
r espons  ibi 1 i  ty . 
Each  Combat  Support  Agency  director  is  responsible  to  both  CJCS 
and  the  Secretary  of  Defense  for  advice  concerning  his  Agency's 
mission  area,  yet  none  has  a  direct  role  in  the  planning,  pro- 
gramming, and  budgeting  decisions  that  effect  other  activities 
involved  with  their  mission  area.   Each  of  these  Agency  directors 
is  program  manager  for  a  mission  area,  but  they  cannot  ensure 
complete  mission  performance.   Each  of  the  Combat  Support  Agency 
directors  needs  more  direct  planning  and  managerial  oversight  for 
those  programs  that  affect  his  area  of  responsibility. 
Alternative  1:  Leave  Defense  intelligence  oversight  as 
currently  structured  with  ASD(C3I)  performing  DIA  staff 
supervision  and  CJCS  overseeing  DIA  as  the  J-2, 
This  alternative  would  retain  oversight  of  DIA  and  the  Defense 
Intelligence  Community  as  it  exists  today.   Most  U&S  Command  and 
Component  Command  interviewees  noted  the  programming  and  budgeting 
problems  inherent  in  this  arrangement,  especially  the  difficulty 
of  working  within  separate  program  management  guidance  and  time- 
D-5
lines.   Most  frequently  cited  was  the  program  and  budget  sub- 
missions of  the  NFIP,  the  Tactical  Intelligence  and  Related 
Activities  Program  (TIARA) ,  and  the  Tactical  Cryptologic  Program 
(TCP).   All  U&S  Command  intelligence  capability  is  spread  among 
these  programs,  yet  each  program  is  built  and  reviewed  in  isolation 
Alternative  2:   Leave  DIA  oversight  by  ASD(C3I),  CJCS ,  and  PCI 
as  currently  structured.   Select  a  single  senior  OSD  official  to 
be  responsible  for  all  Defense  intelligence  policy,  plans, 
programs .    budget,  and  oversight.   Assign  to  DIA  responsibility 
for  development  of  integrated  Defense  intelligence  plans, 
programs,  and  budgets. 
There  was  substantial  agreement  among  interviewees  that  a  senior 
OSD  official  should  be  in  charge  of  all  DoD  intelligence  policy. 
The  advantages  of  this  arrangement  include  integrating  all  Defense 
intelligence,  providing  a  unified  thrust  to  policy  and  resource 
programs,  and  establishing  a  single  spokesman  for  Defense  intelli- 
gence . 
DIA  performs  substantive  and  functional  management  for  much  of 
Defense  intelligence  and  validates,  recommends  priorities  for, 
and  monitors  satisfaction  of  collection  requirements.   The  Director 
is  the  Program  Manager  of  GDIP.   With  additional  authorities  and 
resources,  the  Director  of  DIA  is  the  most  logical  candidate  to 
be  the  Defense  Intelligence  Program  Manager  responsible  for  inte- 
grated Defense  intelligence  plans,  programs,  and  budgets,  with 
the  exception  of  SIGINT. 
As  a  related  issue,  some  officials  believe  that  the  oversight 
performed  by  the  ASD(C3I)  is  less  than  effective  and  that  the 
command,  control,  and  communications  side  of  C3I  is  too  big  and 
detracts  attention  from  intelligence;  emphasizes  data  collection 
without  determining  user  needs  adequately;  and  overemphasizes 
equipment  acquisition  at  the  expense  of  non-hardware  aspects  of 
intelligence  requirements.   Many  proposed  that  there  should  be  a 
separate  Assistant  Secretary  of  Defense  for  Intelligence.   A 
large  part  of  this  issue  rests  with  the  knowledge  and  experience 
of  the  ASD(C3I).   This  official  must  be  equally  knowledgeable  of 
both  command,  control,  and  communications  activities  and  intelli- 
gence.  If  these  qualifications  cannot  be  found  in  one  individual, 
then  consideration  should  be  given  to  separating  intelligence 
under  a  new  Assistant  Secretary  of  Defense  or  a  Director  of  Defense 
Intelligence. 
Conclusions 
1.  DIA  provides  products  and  services  common  to  more  than  one 
Military  Department.   Although  some  are  unique  to  a  single  Military 
Department,  no  transfer  of  DIA  functions  would  result  in  increased 
efficiency,  economy,  and  effectiveness. 
2.  Eliminating  centralized  management  of  the  intelligence 
function  would  promote  duplication  and  provide  decision  makers 
D-6
with  uncoordinated  intelligence  data.   Decentralization  of 
production,  processing,  and  infrastructure  would  not  improve 
overall  efficiency,  economy,  and  effectiveness. 
3.  Further  consolidation  of  Military  Department  intelligence 
production,  processing,  and  infrastructure  activities  is  neither 
politically  feasible  nor  warranted.   Such  a  consolidation  would 
not  improve  overall  efficiency,  economy,  and  effectiveness. 
4.  DIA  does  not  have  the  requisite  resources  and  authorities  to 
fulfill  its  mission. 
5.  Although  oversight  of  DIA  is  diffused,  it  appears  to  work 
effectively. 
6.  Oversight  of  the  Defense  Intelligence  Community,  at  large, 
is  fragmented,  causing  program  disconnects  for  the  U&S  Commands 
and  their  components,  the  Military  Departments,  and  other 
Defense  Agencies. 
7.  The  directors  of  Combat  Support  Agencies  do  not  have  the 
authority  to  coordinate  and  approve  plans  for,  and  ensure 
interoperability  and  connectivity  among,  the  wholesale  and 
retail,  strateaic  and  tactical,  and  long-haul  and  tactical 
portions  of  their  combat  support  mission  areas.   Changes  are 
needed  to  ensure  that  the  Combat  Support  Agencies  have  the 
authority  and  resources  to  perform  the  expanded  responsibilities 
they  were  assigned  in  the  Defense  Reorganization  Act. 
Recommendations 
1.  That  DIA  retain  its  present  mission  with  added  authority  and 
resources. 
2.  That  oversight  of  all  DoD  intelligence  be  assigned  to  a  single, 
senior  OSD  official  responsible  for  intelligence  policy,  plans, 
programs,  and  budgets. 
3.  That  integrated  Defense  intelligence  program  management 
(with  the  exception  of  SIGINT)  be  vested  in  the  Director  of  DIA 
with  oversight  arrangements  as  currently  structured. 
4.  That  the  Director  of  DIA  be  given  the  authority  to  fulfill 
the  expanded  mission  outlined  for  Combat  Support  Agencies  in  the 
Defense  Reorganization  Act.   Combat  Support  Agency  directors 
should  participate  in  the  PPBS  process  for  those  matters  affecting 
their  mission  areas. 
IV.   READINESS  AND  RESPONSIVENESS 
Readiness 
Although  DIA  is  working  aggressively  with  the  Combatant  Commands 
and  Military  Departments,  joint  intelligence  doctrine  continues 
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to  be  a  major  weakness.   Integrated  intelligence  plans  must  be 
structured  around  coherent  joint  doctrine.   131 A  needs  to  ensure 
that  the  intelligence  capabilities  of  the  CJCS  and  the  U&S  Commands 
and  their  components  are  mission  capable.   Interviewees  cited_ 
s  i gn i  f  i can t  di sconnec t s  between  tac t  i :ca 1 _ and  nat^OTa^T^apaKITi  ties. 
DIA  should  lead  the  planning"  necessary  to  guarantee  that  a  war- 
ready  intelligence  system  exists  to  support  the  Combatant  Commands. 
The  Defense  Reorganization  Act  requirement  for  strategy-based 
plans  underscores  the  need  for  more  effective  joint  intelligence 
doctrine  development  and  integrated  planning  efforts.   In  this 
regard,  DIA  is  currently  working  with  the  U&S  Commands  and  the 
Military  Departments  to  ensure  that  achievable  plans  are  developed 
and  that  interoperability  and  connectivity  issues  are  addressed, 
It  is  also  actively  working  with  the  program  managers  of  the 
national  and  tactical  intelligence  programs  to  make  sure  funds 
are  available  and  programmed  to  cover  execution  of  architecture 
and  planning  requirements.   With  more  authority,  DIA  would  be 
able  to  integrate  the  various  efforts  more  effectively  and  ensure 
that  the  appropriate  capabilities  are  programmed  and  approved. 
DIA  should  work  with  the  U&S   Commands,  Component  Commands, 
and  the  Military  Departments  to  develop  a  Defense  Intelligence 
Master  Plan.   The  plan  should  be  based  on   a  realistic,  achievable 
set  of  requirements  and  capabilities  to  document  where  U.S.  Intel- 
ligence is  new,  where  it  needs  to  be  to  support  the  strategy- 
based  operational  plans,  and  how  to  get  there. 
Intelligence  data  bases  are  not  complete.   Much  additional  data 
is  needed  to  realistically  plan  for  both  contingencies  and  war. 
DIA  worked  with  intelligence  producers  and  consumers  to  develop 
The  Fundamental  Intelligence  Data  Base  to  describe  the  minimum 
essential  elements  of  intelligence  required  for  all  countries. 
These  data  elements  are  being  compared  with  the  the  results  of 
the  Data  Base  Adequacy  Study  to  identify  the  gaps  in  intelligence 
data.   DIA  is  using  these  efforts  to  better  define  priorities  for 
intelligence  collection  and  analysis.   The  ongoing  Warfighting 
Data.  Base  Modernization  effort  will  attempt  to  correct  the 
remaining  shortfalls.   Command  interviewees  believe  these 
initiatives  must  continue. 
The  DoD  intelligence  structure  must  be  linked  by  an  effective, 
survivable  communications  structure.   Exercises  and  crises  are 
replete  with  examples  of  delays  in  the  delivery  of  high  precedence 
traffic  to  tactical  commanders.   Important  messages  are  not 
received.   Operational  forces  are  unable  to  communicate  with  each 
other. 
The  near  term  solution  for  data  communications  is  the  installation 
of  the  DIA-managed  DoD  Intelligence  Information  System  (DoDIIS). 
This  network  will  provide  the  U&s  Commands  a  more  survivable  and 
secure  data  switching  system.  This  network  will  permit  intelli- 
gence analysts  in  over  50  separate  DoD  organizations,  throughout 
the  world,  to  perform  a  variety  of  sophisticated  analytical  tasks 
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and  to  exchange  sensitive,  classified  information  using  some  300 
computers  of  various  types,  capacities,  and  ages.   The  Tactical 
DoDTTS  Extension  could  add  over  .150  additional  users  to  the  network 
The  long  term  search  for  solutions  to  the  intelligence  communica- 
tions problem  rests  with  the  DIA-managed  Intelligence  Communica- 
tions Architecture  (INCA)  project.   INCA  was  established  to  improve 
the  timely  flow  of  intelligence  to  tactical  commanders.   The 
project,  centering  on  the  early  1990s  time  frame,  addresses  communi- 
cations hardware  shortfalls  as  well  as  procedural,  policy,  and 
organizational  issues  that  affect  the  intelligence  process  and 
the  flow  of  intelligence  to  operational  users. 
Command  interviewees  cite  problems  with  secure,  survivable  communi- 
cations, both  for  voice  and  data  transmission.   DIA  should  continue 
working  with  OSD ,  OJCS,  DCA,  the  U&S  Commands ,  and  the  Military 
Departments  to  ensure  that  survivable,  redundant  voice  and  data 
communications  capabilities  exist  to  support  validated  requirements 
Discussions  with  Combatant  Command  communication  planners  raise 
the  concern   that  intelligence  requirements  are  frequently 
unconstrained  and  in  many  cases  unnecessary.   The  intelligence, 
communications,  and  operations  communities  must  work  together  to 
review  requirements  and  validate  those  that  are  essential  to 
support  warfighting  needs.   Requirements  should  be  carefully 
documented  and  translated  into  operational  capabilities. 
Crisis  Support 
DIA's  crisis  support  is  rated  good.   However,  it  was  noted  that 
support  is  generally  provided  by  shifting  resources.   Sustaining 
this  support  over  a  long  period  of  time  may  degrade  analytical 
work  in  other  important  areas.   Some  interviewees  suggest  that 
DIA  needs  a  dedicated  crisis  support  team,  but  recognize  that  the 
manpower  to  create  this  capability  is  not  likely  to  be  provided. 
Responsiveness 
In  general,  interviewees  believe  DIA  is  responsive  within  existing 
resources  and  that  both  DIA-produced  and  managed  production  is 
good,  but  often  not  tailored  to  meet  command-unique  requirements. 
They  want  more  command- focused  analysis  and  filtered  reports  to 
avoid  re-reporting  information  that  is  already  in  the  intelligence 
traffic  and  to  eliminate  extraneous  information. 
A  number  of  officials  expressed  the  view  that  DIA  would  be  more 
responsive  to  Combatant  Command  requirements  if  it  were  more  of  a 
corporate  manager.   They  believe  DIA  should  lead  the  Defense 
intelligence  Community  to  ensure  that  duplicate  ca-  ^ lities ^ are 
not  developed,  especially  those  that  ultimately  w?     *t  be  inter- 
operable with  Combatant  Command  equipment. 
DIA  should  institute  measures  to  improve  communications  and  work 
more  closely  with  its  consumers  and  producers  to  identify  and 
D-9
resolve  responsiveness  issues.   In  addition,  DIA  should  explore 
with  OSD   and  OJCS   ways  to  clarify  DIA  authorities. 
Exercise  Participation 
DIA  participates  extensively  in  OJCS  exercises  and  u&S  Command 
sponsored  exercises.   DIA  support  includes  scenario  development 
assistance,  scripting  support,  and  control  cell  augmentation  with 
on-site  DIA  analysts  and  collection  managers.   In  OJCS-sponsored 
command  exercises,  DIA  coordinates  U&S  Command  participation. 
Interviewees  believe  that  DIA  is  an  effective  participant  in  the 
exercise  program  and  that  participation  increases  its  combat 
readiness. 
Conclusions 
1.  DIA  is  responsible  for  ensuring  that  the  U&S  Commands  have 
adequate,  timely,  and  reliable  intelligence  support,  but  cannot 
satisfy  this  requirement  as  effectively  as  it  might  because  of 
resource  constraints. 
2.  Although  DIA  is  aggressively  working  with  the  Combatant  Commands 
and  Military  Departments,  joint  intelligence  doctrine  is  not 
fully  developed. 
3.  Intelligence  planning  is  fragmented.   Interoperability  and 
connectivity  issues  are  frequently  not  addressed  or,  because  the 
various  intelligence  plans  are  not  linked,  they  are  not  identified. 
4.  More  detailed,  specific  intelligence  threat  information  is 
required  by  U.S.  planners  to  develop  strategy-based  operational 
and  contingency  plans  that  are  realistic  and^ achievable.   DIA  is 
working  to  provide  this  additional  information,  but  there  are 
significant  gaps  in  the  quality,  accuracy,  and  completeness  of 
intelligence  holdings  needed  to  satisfy  this  requirement  fully. 
5.  Secure,  survivable  intelligence  voice  and  data  communications 
are  a  fundamental  requirement.  Near  and  long  term  solutions  are 
being  worked  to  correct  shortfalls. 
6.  Although  DIA's  crisis  support  is  generally  rated  good,  there 
is  some  concern  regarding  its  sustainability  since  crisis  teams 
are  created  by  shifting  manpower  from  their  normal  tasks. 
7.  DIA  is  responsive  within  existing  resources;  however,  Command 
representatives  cited  the  need  for  more  tailored,  tactical  intel- 
ligence focused  more  specifically  on  Command  mission  and  geographic 
area  of  responsibility. 
8.  DIA  has  a  consumer  relations  problem.   The  Commands  are  not 
certain  why  DIA  can  or  cannot  perform  certain  functions  on  their 
behalf,  why  products  are  late  or  cannot  be  produced,  and  why 
additional  guidance  is  not  available. 
D-10
9.  DIA  participation  in  OJCS  and  U&S  Command  exercises  is  effective 
Interviewees  suggested  that  some  peacetime  exercises  should  be 
desianed  to  use  the  saine  oersonnei  that  would  be  actively  involved 
in  an  actual  crisis  or  war  situation. 
Recommendations 
1.  That  DIA  be  given  the  authority  and  resources  to  fulfill  more 
effectively  its  mission  of  satisfying  U&S  Command  intelligence 
requirements.   OSD ,  OJCS,  and  DCI  should  identify  minimum  require- 
ments and  initiate  corrective  action,  as  appropriate. 
2.  That  DIA  expand  its  efforts  to  develop  joint  intelligence 
doctrine.   DIA  should  work  closely  in  this  regard  with  OJCS,  U&S 
Commands,  and  the  Military  Departments. 
3.  That  DIA  in  collaboration  with  OSD,  OJCS,  U&S  Commands,  Military 
Departments  and  DCI  develop  an  achievable  plan  of  action  for 
development  of  an  integrated  Defense  Intelligence  Master  Plan 
emphasizing  support  to  the  Combatant  Commands. 
4.  That  DIA  continue  working  with  OJCS,  the  U&S  Commands,  the 
Military  Departments  and  DCA  to  ensure  that  survivable,  secure 
intelligence  voice  and  data  communications  exist  to  support  DIA 
and  the  U&S  Commands  combat  support  requirements.   The  commu- 
nications, operations,  and  intelligence  communities  should  work 
together  to  document,  validate,  and  translate  these  requirements 
into  operational  capability. 
5.  That  DIA  be  more  responsive  to  U&S  Command  requirements  and 
improve  communication  writh  consumers  to  ensure  that  users  are 
aware  of  Agency  capabilities  and  limitations. 
V.   ORGANIZATION,  FUNCTIONS,  EFFICIENCY,  ECONOMY  AND  EFFECTIVENESS 
Organization 
DIA's  organizational  structure,  displayed  at  enclosure  1,  is 
responsive  to  its  mission.   Organizational  changes  required  to 
support  the  wartime  mission  should  be  documented  in  the  Defense 
Intelligence  Master  Plan  discussed  in  Section  IV  of  this  report. 
Most  interviewees  were  satisfied  with  DIA's  organizational  struc- 
ture, but  suggested  that  DIA  consolidate  those  planning  and  manage 
ment  functions  in  direct  support  of  U&S  Command  requirements  into 
a  single  organization.   This  would  provide  a  focal  point  for  U&S 
Command  related  activity  and  allow  interoperability  issues  to  be 
worked  more  coherently.   Many  noted  a  requirement  for  DIA  to 
strengthen  its  performance  of  the  J-2  function.   A  separate 
organization  that  dealt  solely  with  Combatant  Command  issues 
might  help  reinforce  DIA*s  J-2  role. 
D-ll
^incjt  j.  on  s 
The  Director,  DIA  advises  the  Secretary  of  Defense  on  intelligence 
matters  and  is  the  proqrain  manager  for  GDiP.   Under  his  direction 
and  cont  ro  L ,    u LA: 
--  Supports  DoD ,  national  level  planners,  decision  makers, 
and  operational  elements  by  producing,  or  aanaging  finished  basic 
military  intelligence,  scientific  and  technical  intelligence,  and 
all  DoD  intelligence  estimates  and  DoD  contributions  to  National 
Intelligence  Estimates  (NIEs). 
--  Serves  as  the  J-2  of  the  OJCS  and  provides  the  intelligence 
staff  support  required  by  the  CJCS  to  perform  his  assigned  respon- 
sibi lities . 
--  Supervises  the  DoD  Indications  and  Warning  System. 
--  Manages  and  operates  the  National  Military  Intelligence 
Center  (NMIC) 
. 
--  Validates,  registers,  and  recommends  priorities  for,  and 
monitors  satisfaction  of,  all  DoD  intelligence  collection 
requi rements . 
--  exercises  DoD-wide  Human  Source  Intelligence  (HUMIMT) 
program  management  authority,  issues  policy  and  planning 
guidance,  and  monitors  operations.   DIA  also  conducts  DoD 
HUMINT  collection  activities,  and  manages  and  operates  the 
Defense  Attache  System. 
--  Provides  counterintelligence  staff  support  to  the  OSD , 
OJCS,  and  the  UsS  Commands. 
--  Manages  and  operates  the  DoD  central  repository  for  all 
intelligence  imagery,  the  National  Area  Coverage  Data  File,  the 
DoD  Imagery  Standards  Laboratory,  and  the  DIA  photographic 
laboratories . 
—  Provides  DoD  intelligence  elements  with   a  specialized 
intelligence  reference  library  and  intelligence  document  distri- 
bution, dissemination,  and  translation  services. 
--  Manages  and  operates  the  Defense  Intelligence  College. 
--  Acts  as  management  authority  for  all  DoD  intelligence 
information  systems,  except  those  dedicated  to  signals 
intelligence  operations  and  support  functions. 
--  Provides  guidance,  in  conformance  with  policies  of  DoD 
and  DCI,  to  DoD  Components  concerning  the  release  of  Defense 
intelligence  information  to  foreign  governments,  international 
organizations,  and  the  public. 
D-12
c 
t 
Si 
Wh 
an 
re 
--  Administers  DoD  security  policies  and  proa rams  to 
protect  intelligence  and  intelligence  sources  and  methods. 
--  Adjudicates  clearance  eligibility  tor  DIA  civilian  personnel 
and  eligibility  for  access  to  compartmented  intelligence  tor  all 
personnel  assigned  to  OSD,  OJCS,  and  the  Defense  Agencies,  with 
the  exception  of  N3A,  including  contractors  and  consultants. 
A  number  of  interviewees  expressed  concern  with  respect  to  DIA's 
ability  to  fulfill  its  counterintelligence  (CI)  responsibilities. 
Although  DIA  is  the  CI  staff  of  the  OJCS  and  a  participant  in  the 
CSD-managed  Foreign  Counterintelligence  Program  (FCIP) ,  it  does 
not  have  effective  means  to  ensure  the  U&5  Commands  have  adequate 
CI  capabilities.   In  view  of  this  deficiency,  consideration 
should  be  given  to  granting  increased  responsibility  to  DIA  for 
the  review  and  approval  of  Military  Department  programs  to  ensure 
adequate  CI  support  to  the  Combatant  Commands. 
Conclusions 
1.   DIA's  organizational  structure  is  suited  to  its  peacetime 
and  crisis  functions;  however,  it  will  require  modification  to 
support  its  wartime  mission  effectively. 
2.   Although  generally  satisfied  with  DIA's  organizational 
structure,  many  interviewees  believe  DIA  needs  a  focal  point 
for  U&S  Command  related  activity  to  foster  improved  consideration 
L     of  interoperability  issues  and  to  strengthen  its  performance  of 
the  J-2  function. 
3.   Although  DIA  is  a  participant  in  the  OSD-managed  Foreign 
k     Counterintelligence  Program  (FCIP),  it  does  not  have  a  wray  to 
ensure  the  U&S  Commands  have  adequate  CI  capabilities.   In  the 
meantime,  Combatant  Command  requirements  are  not  being  addressed 
t.     adequately. 
Recommendat  ions 
1.   That  DIA  determine  the  organizational  changes  required  to 
support  its  wartime  mission  and  document  them  in  the  Defense 
Intelligence  Master  Plan. 
2.   That  DIA  consider  consolidation  of  those  planning  and  manage- 
ment functions  in  direct  support  of  u&S  Command  requirements  into 
So     a  single  organization. 
3.   That  DIA  be  granted  increased  authority  to  fulfill  its  role  in 
counterintelligence  matters.   OSD,  OJCS,  and  DIA  should  determine 
the  most  appropriate  way  to  ensure  the  J-2  can  guide,  review,  and 
ensure  the  U&S  Commands  have  adequate  counterintelligence  capabil- 
ity. 
D-13
Efficiency ,  Economy  and  Effectiveness 
DIA  has  led  Intelligence  Community  procurement  actions  that  have 
created  significant  dollar  savings.   Cross-community  management 
efforts,  especially  in  the  DoDIIS  community,  have  ameliorated  the 
costs  associated  with  each  activity  independently  developing  and 
procuring  its  own  intelligence  processing,  production,  and 
dissemination  hardware  and  software.   DoDIIS  management  saves 
funds,  and  ensures  improved  interoperability  across  the  DoDIIS 
community. 
DIA  has  automated  many  intelligence  processing  and  dissemination 
functions  to  streamline  the  analytical  process.   New  technology 
and  methods  are  used  to  the  maximum  extent  possible.   Examples 
of  improved  efficiency  include: 
-  Photographic  processing  (1977  to  1986) 
--  50  percent  increase  in  prints  produced. 
--  60  percent  increase  in  aerial  reconnaissance  film 
processed 
-  265  percent  briefing  aids  (1977-1986) 
-  133  percent  increase  in  publications^  produced  (1977-1986) 
-  25  percent  increase  in  intelligence  reports  processed 
(1977-1986) 
-  135  percent  increase  in  students  trained  by  the  Defense 
Intelligence  College  (1977-1986) 
-  114  percent  increase  in  hardcopy  special  intelligence  products 
processed  (1981-1986) 
-  88  percent  increase  in  AUTODIN  messages  processed  (1984-1986) 
With  the  exception  of  students  trained,  the  other  increases  were 
achieved  through  a  combination  of  equipment  improvements,  better 
training  and  use  of  personnel,  and  streamlining  of  workflow. 
Student  training  increases  were  accomplished  by  initiating  new^ 
educational  approaches  such  as  course  revisions  and  mobile  training 
teams.   Mobile  training  teams  are  particularly  cost  effective 
since  they  allow  students  to  be  trained  at  their  job  site,  thus 
reducing  travel  and  transportation  costs  and  time  away  from  their 
jobs. 
Several  interviewees  suggested  that  rotating  DIA  civilian  intelli- 
gence professionals  through  U&S  Command  intelligence  activities 
would  increase  overall  efficiency,  economy,  and  effectiveness. 
Since  many  DIA  civilians  have  not  had  military  experience,  they 
would  gain  a  better  appreciation  of  Combatant  Command  requirements 
and  other  important  military  experience.   It  would  also  help  to 
D-14
improve  DIA's  readiness  since  these  analysts  would  bring  this 
knowledge  back  to  DIA.   At  the  same  time,  command  personnel 
would  gain  an  appreciation  for  DIA's  capabilities  and  limitations. 
Conclusions 
1.  DIA  has  improved  its  efficiency,  economy,  and  effectiveness 
to  keep  pace  with  the  expansion  of  intelligence  requirements. 
2.  Rotating  DIA  civilian  intelligence  professionals  through  U&S 
Command  intelligence  activities  would  provide  DIA  personnel  a 
better  appreciation  of  Command  requirements  and  improve  readiness. 
Command  personnel  would  gain  a  better  understanding  of  DIA's 
capabilities  and  limitations. 
Recommendations 
That  DIA  explore  with  the  J-2s  of  the  U&S  Commands  possible 
ways  to  rotate  DIA  civilian  intelligence  professionals  through 
Command  activities . 
VI.   BUDGET  AND  MANPOWER 
The  Defense  Reorganization  Act  reduction  would  cut  over  one 
thousand  billets  from  DIA.   The  Agency  cannot  absorb  a  reduction 
of  this  magnitude,  perform  its  mission  adequately,  and  be  combat 
ready. 
DlA's  manpower  levels  have  changed  dramatically  over  the  past 
twenty  years.   Between  FY  1968  and  FY  1979,  DIA  was  reduced  by 
over  2,300  billets.   This  situation  was  reversed  in  the  early 
1980s,  partially  in  response  to  systemic  problems  and  partially 
because  of  increased  emphasis  on  Third  World  intelligence  require- 
ments.  DIA's  manpower  growth  between  FY  1979  and  FY  1986  was 
almost  1,400  billets,  a  partial  replacement  of  the  total  reductions 
taken  in  the  mid-1970s,  but  primarily  authorized  for  new  Defense 
intelligence  requirements.   If  implemented,  the  Goldwater-Nichols 
Act  reductions  would  signif icantlv  exacerbate  Agencv  manpower 
shortfalls . 
Intelligence  requirements  have  grown  in  complexity  and  volume. 
For  example,  technology  transfer  was  not  recognized  as  a  problem 
when  DIA  was  created.   Now  it  requires  scarce  manpower  to  exploit 
foreign  materiel  and  identify  how  U.S.  technologies  may  be 
used  to  help  the  Soviet  Union  and  its  Bloc  Allies  close  the  U.S./ 
Soviet  technology  gap. 
Terrorism  has  also  become  a  significant  problem.   Terrorist  plans 
and  intentions  are  the  easiest  requirements  to  articulate,  but 
the  most  difficult  and  most  manpower  intensive  to  satisfy. 
The  U.S.  military  presence  in  Third  World  areas  has  increased 
requirements  for  intelligence.   Adequate  information  has  never 
D-15
existed  tor  some  of  these  areas  and  collection  is  a  continuing 
problem . 
Contingency  plans  must  be  based  on  detailed,  specific  threat 
information.   This  threat  must  be  based  on   accurate,  timely,  and 
complete  orders  of  battle,  installations  information,  and  knowledge 
of  available  equipment.   Planners  need  to  know  -hat  equipment  is 
in  foreign  inventories  and  whether  the  weapon  is  an  export  version 
of  Soviet,  U.S.,  French,  or  another  military  exporter  country, 
including  weapon  vulnerabilities  and  necessary  countermeasures . 
As  a  practical  matter,  the  world  has  changed;  the  missile  U.S. 
Forces  face  on  the  battlefield  may  be  U.S.  manufactured  or  a  copy 
reverse-engineered  by  the  Soviets.   Target  Identification  Friend 
or  Foe  (IFF)  devices  will  not  recognize  a  U.S.  or  Allied  weapon 
unless  these  devices  are  properly  programmed.   The  information 
and  programming  comes  from  intelligence  sources. 
Such  other  areas  as  intelligence  support  for  the  Strategic  Defense 
Initiative  reflect  new  requirements,  representing  technologies 
that  did  not  exist  when  DIA  was  created.   Intelligence  support  is 
required  for  all  new  high  technology  weapons  such  as  mobile 
missiles,  especially  for  onboard  computer  data  bases.   Requirements 
for  such  data  are  increasing  with  each  weapon  developed  and  for 
each  operational  scenario. 
If  DIA's  manpower  is  reduced,  requirements  will  not  decrease. 
The  Military  Departments,  U-SS  Commands,  and  their  components 
already  share  collection,  processing,  production,  and  infra- 
structure responsibility  with  DIA.   They  face  the  same  intelli- 
gence requirements/resources  available  gap  as  DIA,  and  could  not 
absorb  the  additional  workload  generated  by  a  manpower  reduction 
of  DIA. 
Joint  Duty  Assignments 
One  of  the  most  important  contributors  to  Defense  Agency  efficiency 
and  effectiveness  is  the  quality  of  its  manpower.   The  Combat 
Support  Agencies  must  know  what  the  forces  need,  understand  tactics 
and  doctrine,  and  must  be  able  to  determine  when  and  why  require- 
ments are  more  or  less  important.   The  military  officers  assigned 
to  these  agencies  must  translate  these  demands  into  war  required 
capability  both  in  the  Defense  Agencies  and  at  the  commands.   This 
translation  is  critical  and  depends  on   quality  and  well  trained 
military  personnel.   The  features  of  the  Goldwater-Nichols  Act 
prescribed  for  Joint  Duty  Assignments  should  fulfill  these  require- 
ments . 
However,  the  current  allocation  of  Joint  Duty  Assignment  billets 
presents  a  problem.   About  50  percent  of  the  Defense  Agency  mili- 
tary officer  billets  (0-4  and  above)  have  oeen   designated  Joint 
Duty  Assignments.   This  creates  a  "have"  and  "have  not"  situation 
that  is  already  affecting  morale.   Additionally,  Defense  Agency 
military  are  traditionally  criticized  as  being  lower  in  quality 
than  those  kept  in  the  Military  Departments.   The  "50  percent 
D--16
rule"  vi.ll  exacerhato  this  problem  because  it  is  unlikely  that 
top  quality  officers  will  be  assigned  to  the  non-Joint  assignments. 
Conclusions 
1.  DIA's  ability  to  satisfy  the  intelligence  requirements  of  the 
Secretary  of  Defense,  C JCS ,  U&S  Commands,  Component  Commands, 
the  Military  Departments  and  others  depends  on  adequate  manpower; 
current  assets  are  not  sufficient. 
2.  Title  VI  general  manpower  reductions  would  further  exacerbate 
the  already  significant  gap  between  available  manpower  and  satis- 
faction of  requirements.   This  gap  translates  to  large  deficiencies 
in  U.S.  force  readiness. 
3.  Added  Combat  Support  Agency  responsibilities  in  the  Defense 
Reorganization  Act  demand  more  management,  oversight,  and 
dedicated  planning  support.   Management  headquarters  reductions 
will  prevent  DIA  and  the  other  Combat  Support  Agencies  from 
fulfilling  their  expanded  roles. 
4.  comoat  Support  Agencies  must  provide  operational  expertise, 
know  what  the  forces  need,  understand  tactics  and  doctrine,  and 
be  able  to  determine  when  and  why  requirements  are  more  or  less 
important.   The  military  officers  assigned  to  these  Agencies  play 
a  role  in  each  Agency's  ability  to  translate  requirements  into 
operational  capability  both  in  the  Defense  Agency  and  at  the 
Combatant  Commands.   This  translation  demands  the  quality  of 
personnel  and  training  required  by  the  Defense  Reorganization  Act 
provisions  regarding  Joint  T  uy  Assignments. 
Recommendations 
1.  That  DIA  not  be  reduced  by  the  general  Agency  and  management 
headquarters  reductions  identified  in  Title  VI  of  the  Defense 
Reorganization  Act . 
2.  That  requirements  and  budget  constraints  drive  future 
manpower  requests. 
3.  That  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  Defense  (Force  Management  and 
Personnel)  and  the  CJCS  review  Combat  Support  Agency  military 
manpower  billets  against  Joint  Duty  Assignment  criteria  and, 
where  appropriate,  designate  billets  as  Joint  Duty  Assignment 
positions. 
D-I7
DEFENSE    INTELLIGENCE   AGENCY    fDIA ) 
COMMAND   ELEMENT  | 
DIRECTOR  ! 
DEPUTY  DIRECTOR 
ENCLOSURE    1 
GENERAL 
DEFENSE 
INTELLIGENT: 
EXECUTIVE  DIRECTOR 
SENIOR  ENLISTED  ADVISOR 
|      PROGRAMS 
j    STAFF  _ 
i. 
SECRETARIAT 
CENTRAL  ACTIONS 
OFFICE 
EXECUTIVE   SUPPORT 
OFFICE 
PROTOCOL  OFFICE 
ASSISTANT  DEPUTY 
DIRECTOR  FOR 
SECURITY  AND 
COUNTERINTELLLIGENCE 
SCIENTIFIC 
ADVISORY  COMMITTEE 
INSPECTOR 
GENERAL 
DEFENSE 
INTELLIGENCE 
OFFICERS 
GENERAL 
n OUNSEL I 
DEPUTY 
DIRECTOR 
FOR  OPERATIONS 
AND   ATTACHES 
STAFF   
DEPUTY  DIRECTOR  FOR 
OPERATIONS,    PLANS 
AND   TRAINING   
DEPUTY  DIRECTOR 
FOR  FOREIGN 
INTELLIGENCE 
ATTACHE 
OFFICES 
ASSISTANT  DEPUTY 
DIRECTOR  FOR 
COLLECTION 
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