tat 
212 
| 
| 
* 
— 
. 
@ 
. 
. 
* 
° 
. 
oe 
* 
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
{| 
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE 
* 
| 
j 
* 
— 
— 
— 
— 
* 
q 
Nor RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS. 
CONTINUED CONTROL 
| 
content UNCLASSIFIED! W. 
+. 
por 256375 
— 
** 
— 
> 
| 
| 
81 April 
‘ 
* 
| 
} 
—
* 
* 
* 
| 
LATIN AMERICA 
11, The Cuban a_ Situation 
? 
The communiqué read in 
Fidel Castro's name on the 
Cuban radio early on 20 April 
* acclaimed the victory "in less 
| 
than 72 hours“ over the "mercene 
- 
ary army" in southern Las Vil- 
las Province. Future Cuban 
statements are likely to ex, 
pand on the theme that this 
“victory was a significant de- 
Feat for "US imperialis 
m.“ 
Meanwhile, strong repressive 
measures continue against 
Castro, and several "traitors," 
including Castro's former Min- 
ister of Agriculture Humberto 
Sori Marin, were executed on 
In ‘Guatemala, Communists 
| are reported by a usually. 
reliable source to be planning 
- 
demonstrations on 21 April 
against President Ydigoras for 
his alleged assistance to the 
anti-Castro 
mercenaries, 
. 
those Cubans unsympathetic to 
Another source reports that 
the demonstrations are to paye 
the way for a coup that would be 
„„ lesson to the United States 
to leave Castro alone in the 
future.” 
Y¥digoras, 
though at 
present in a relatively ill 
position, does face opposition 
From diverse political elements 
and some — 
in the armed — 
abst: 
wt 
mie 
ye 
at 
of 
Sources: 
CIA) 
TDCS-3472034, 
20 Apr 6x -- 
. ** 
@'+ 
ole: 14677 
° 
* 
; 
| 
J 
Pay 
PAY 
ee. 
* 
* 
* 
° 
* 
* 
* 
“20 A 
e 
* 
. 
‘ 
ee 
"2°? 
| 
* 
‘ 
* 
| 
| 
* 
* 
| 
t 
| 
* 
— 
; 
~ 
} 
~ 
* 
| 
>
* 
& 
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
Mu material 
Information ef 
the Maticca!l Defrane 
of 
.. 
tO 
* pt to 
DATE DiStTR, 
19 May 1901 
1S . 29 April 1941 
BAM ACO. 
22 Apeit 1961) 
FIELD REPORT NO. 
| 
14. 27175 
1. After the air attack on Canp Lider t., 4 and San Antenlo de los Banos dur ing 
VVV 
the early wwrning hours of 15 April 1961 the people of Habana eagerly 
awaited a full-scale effort to topple the CASTAU regixe. 
Their hopes faded 
only @ little when the announcenant was made over Radio Svan that the attack 
: 
e 
had bean nade by defecting cuban pilots and not dy the anti-CASTRO forecs 
Ne 
outside Cubs, 
Even the security measures, wholesale house searches, 
and rats 
srrests 
that followed did not dininish their hopes. 
| 
2. That the CASTRO regime feared that the gereral 
of the people would 
* 
turn into active resistance was shown by the speed with which the security 
Noh 
force of tho Cuban 
nt acted. Mass arrests of those belicvwd to bo. 
oppored to the rezgine begin just a few hours after the atr attack on 15 April, 
sucurity forces, 
of selected vanbers of the militta and 0-2, 
were quickly sent to polata throughout the elty, 
Acting on information 
| 
mast ine- curt, 
arrested 
Cubing and search: 
j 
Whoa the 
ted person was not found tn his hese, threats we: 
mut: to arrist an ſanz cent mosber of the 
until the person 
care 
forsurd, 
Arrests ware rade without resird fer eg: or sex, 
of their 
de ta nod de irg ws 
eldecly Fr lers. 1 
4, 
J. 
Steps to eliminate any ant l- zerortaent influsiice of tha Catholic Charen were 
| 
schools, an! convents, 
Catholic priests 
the few who hat not bean irrestet 
were farziltted to hald servites on the condition thit they not delive: 22 71:3. 
Parishionzcs whe 
attendet services were starched upen entertag ard 
the 
u. 
Thoze arrested were 
in the 
de Hornedo Theater, 
Prison, Botany Soorts Falaze, £1 Morro Cat lz, TA Catana Portrasa, and la Pinta 
Forts, 
Ia 
of thess 
th. factisties 
ite fe: ths 
‘ 
* 
| 
| 
Approved for Roloase 
| 
* 
& 
| 
Date 
*
5. When the invasion dy anti-CASTRO forces tock place on 17 April all security 
| 
precautions were taten. 
Radio Swain was ecnple 
jarred, and little news 
| 
was available to tha public. 
411 travel to ani! froa Habana was 
stopped, 
Official ars were later allow:2 to enter and leave the city, 
but only after a thorough search by m111t sen. 
Mass arrests continued 
. 
| 
on ea large scale.) 
6. When the government announced the collazse of the invasion on 19 April” 
there was deep despair among the people of Eabana. 
They realized that not 
‘ce F 
only had CASTRO defeated an outsido force but be had also destroyed, by the 
Pa 3 ; 
use of terror, 
the organized resistance inside Cuba. 
The mass arrests, 
115 
although 
many people whe were innocent, succeeded in eliainating 
wise 
the Cuban underground, at least teaporar 
y. CASTRO's ability to withstan 
the attack has given hin added strength. 
A sense of resignation in the face 
„ 
of his seealnaly secure position has ‘acreased support for his regime, 
1. 
Two wenen who wore arrested in the late stizes of pregnancy were reported 
to have suffered miscarriages while uncer detention. 
227. 
2. Cases of nuape and typhus are reported to have been discovered anong 
those detained at the Rlanquita de Hornedo Theater. 
5. As of 29 April only a few of the 
arrested were known to haro ben 
| 
| 
4. 
| 
‘ 
| 
i 
| 
| 
| 
e 
‘ 
* 
* 
4g 
* 
e 
— 
*
ͤ 
¶́ 
ü¹ũ — 
— 
— 
— 
— — 
. 
295 
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENC 
CuLa 
90-K 2,2€7,929 
Experterces Before, bur in; and After 
* ‘ 
datt 
she 
Invasion of 
Apr 61 
| 
duse 1951 
| 
NO PAGES 
REFERENCES 
Yay 61 acd earlier 
May 61 and earlier 
| 
| 
17. 
| 
* 
1. 
group with which I was affiliated wus 
as Directorie 
kotuddantil Rovolucionario, 
I first heard about the invasion attexpt at 0700 
an 1/ Apr 61 by seans of a brondcast from ani. 
I heard nothing fron ny 
umlersroun! group until 1500 that afternoon when I received a call fron ons 
ol the leader, an alumnus of our school, a man about 21 years old, vho told 
„„ dient. tie invaston was doorec, that ren of the invalers had been capture, 
antl tha. we piould attempt to conceal ourselves. 
I learned later that after- 
noun Unt tlhe you: aan who hn warned us surrenterci 
and about 40 
auler voa to 
Secret Police. 
I do not 
at happened to then 
ssere\atier. 
Of our atudeat body of about 150 only six or seven boys vere 
swmbers of the Directorio Estudtantil Revolucicrerio. 
2. 
che school went on as usunt during the day un! the lLecal stuzeats went here 
about 160), 
At avout 1/00 the t arrived an? piazed the six feeulty 
eerbers an! she boarding 
uniter arres’. The totwrders vere relersed 
about 10, 
At 2530, 50 or sere cilitincon cane acl searched the school and 
the faculty residence with great thoroughness. 
They 
sce literatus 
nuch they regarded as anti-Corcunis:. ar! at C305 on 23 May O1 they took ne 
atul other faculty cembern to Sccre? Police 
an? then to a concen. 
tration camp. 
There were 300 - 1000 people in that carp rein; many of 
the stwients from our school. 
That camp wis in Crater. 
Laer, we vere 
raved ta another place outside of the town on the airport Hier. 
None of 
the cn; ured inva‘ers vas in either 
I recaine’ in the camp for eight 
police attespted to recrult me as a mechanic and offered to pay 
ee a satary if I would resuze teaching at the school and would keep the 
po! le veiicles in repair. 
I pretenled to agree and told the police that I 
woul! rest 
z. fra: ry Order an wouli do whatever they wished, 
I told the, 
towever, thut oy status with the Cuban Innigratics 
vas that of 
relicious 
A grant ant that it woul be necessary for ze to visit the 
Italian Stascy in Havana in order tw renounce ny reiisious staniing and to 
Approved for Release 
¥* 
* 
1. 
Fond 
* 
Se 
* 
, 
fies. 
‘ 
* 
of 
— 
of "ite 
. 
— 
* 
he 
; 
é 
* 
; 
. 
; 
* 
® 
| 
*. 
* 
a 
„ 
J 
‘ 
‘ 
7. 
* 
456 
of 
rast 
% 
| 
: 
— 
17, 
‘ 
* 
| 
} 
‘ 
é
; 
00-K 3,187,929 
roularize py status as @ layzsan, 
This, of course, vas foolishucss, but 
7¹ 
4, 
5. 
‘ 
6. 
ay 
+ 
of 
| 
’ 
‘ 
q 
ty 
’ 
| 
“| 
the police were deceived and wrote ne out a safe-coniuct which enabled. 
re 
to go back to the school and pick up ry few personal belonzincs and then to 
boar! the tratn for Havana. 
The militia was arresting everyone they 
t 
and on cy journey to Havana, end betveen the railroad station and the ED , 
I was stopred and questioned 611 tices. 
However, with my safe 
banaged to cake it to the Nbassy. 
I reratned in asylu in the 
assy unt 
ae 
I boanied the stip on 3 May 61. The Bhbassy officials were unaware of ryt 
connection with vhe anti-Castro undercround. 
| 
T have been asked out the conditions in the concentration cacps, 
They vere 
ruzged but act unbearable. 
We slept on the ground. 
But I sav no evidences 
of torture or of egacutions. 
Discipline was maintained, 
Cn one occusion a 
eilitiacan attamted to hit one of the prisoners. 
His superior sav hin, 
immediately int zrvened 
and took the militiacan avay. 
From tire to 
tire 
groups of prisoners vere released. 
When I left, after eight days, there vere 
about 3CO prisoners still remaining in the camp. 
Of course, all prisoners 
vere photograp'.ed and fingerprinted. 
Prisoners vho were released vere in- 
formed that uny infraction of the lav, no matter how slight, would result in 
Le 
their reircucceration. 
| 
| 
I have also been asked about the usefulness of Radio Swan. In ny opinion, it 
would have been better if Radio Swan had never existed. 
Its broadcasts vere 
475 
full of lies and exaggerations. 
Yor example, Ralio Swan, in one of ite broad- 
casts, spoke at length about a big fire vtich vas supposed to be raging at 
i 
that din in Cameguey, 
I know for a fact that that story was completely 
| 
we 
false. 
Radic Swan also deceived, or attexpted 
to deceive, the people about 
41 * 
the 
icflency of the operations in the Escambray mountains. 
Most of the 
ek 
people in the underground estopped listening to Radio Swan because they dis- 
Bays 
trusted everything it broadcast, 
| 
I estimate that GO-70% of all Cubans are now ant 1-Cas 
tro but they are dis- 
or antzed am are afraid of Castro's inforzers and of his strong-ara acthois, 
As to lealersnip, the Cubans would prefer to be governed by a junta rather 
N at 
Sy 
than dy an Inlividual dictator, 
However, they recomtze the need for 
a 
E656 1 Md 
eilitery lealer in the counterrevolution and there are several men in Cuba 
whas they trust and respect. 
Probasly the best cholce is 
ho fs, I 
believe, still fighting in the Facazbray. 
Mis lieutenant 
| 
is also a goal unn. 
has an extensive orgenization in Cubs which 
has been responsible for mmoroùs acts of sabotagz, but he is suspected or 
haviny leftist tenlencics. 
I heard a rwor at an uniergroul Council in 
Caza 
to the effect that. 
[planned to recoynize the Corrzunlst Party 
in 
Cuba, 
That rusor cost) 
“or his followin; in Canscuzy, including his 
lealer in that area, 
If there is to be a new invasion it will have to ce mounted on a gasastv'e 
V 
scale if it is to have any chnace for success. 
The underground must be arzel 
an'! kept informed. 
When the invasion is imminent the unierground Forees 
should be given time to go to the hills. 
Then, and not until then, should 
| 
Bey 
„ 
a landing be at tezyted. 
| 
a 
E 
|: 
* 
1. 
> ~ 
— 
. 
272 
e. 
e 1 
* 
@ 99 
“al 
; 
| 
| 
* 
¥ 
| 
|
that the invasion uns u der way care fron a broadcast froa Miant,Fla, 
vhich I heard on 17 Apr 61 at 0500. 
Shartly thereafter I received wirntng 
fron one of the underground verbers that the cilitia 
ws on the way 
to our 
2. 
school and he urged ce to go into hiding. 
This warning vas repeated, sone 
a 
hours later, by the superior of ny order. 
Unfortunately, I could not 
: 
, 
cocply immediately since I had all the boys in ow school to think about. 
E 
At noon I disnissed the school ud saw that the boys were taken to their 
boues, 
I then set about arranging for hidins places for the priests on 
our faculty. 
I placed three of them under concealrent in private hoces 
* 
but when I returned for the fourth tke nilitia had arrived and were engaged 
in an intensive search of the school ard the private quarters of the faculty. 
ees 
They said they were searching for ant! Castro literature. 
They found none, 
412 
* 
but they told us that we were restricted to the school buildings, 
; 
cf 7 
2. We remained under house arrest for the rext 10 days, during which 8 lay 
adciinistrator che and took over the sanacenent of tite school. 
On 27 
pt 
Apr 61 1 cunncped to escape by going throush a glass door which the guards 
1 * 
thought wig an frmovable 
and rade hy way to the Italian Erbassy, 
where J wus granted asylui. 
On 3 May 61, the Ecbassy place i ne abonrd a 
whip bound for Italy, via certain Gulf ports in the US, 
J. Cormunications betweea the various ant 
- 
tro grows before the invasion 
Wed 
was most ineffectual. 
The group 
of rebels in the rountains vere know as 
the Lecidn Denoerdtica Antico=punista. 
It wos supported and, insofar as 
eh 
possible, suppied with food, by the groups in the various cities and towns, 
known, collectively, es the Legida Demoerftica Constitucicnal, 
Also, 
ae 
they were supplied by air drops from the exile groups. 
There were five. 
prominent exile groups in Cuba, anceg thes “Rescate,” the zoth of Novenber 
Approved fou Release 
‘ 
Ct, 
cuba 
c- K 7,187,928 
223 
— 
* 4 
‘= 
a 
* 
ee 
Exper tences Jus: Before, bur un? 
| 
, 
after the 17 apr 02 Invusion Arte. 
wart 
Ly 
7% 
May 61 and earlier 
A. 
Havana, May 61 and varliers 
| 
1. The invasion of 17 Apr 61 cane as a cocplete surprise. 
We of che unler- 
cround had expected it not sooner than 28 Apr 61. 
Our first intication 
-S4° 
12 Lex 2 
4.4 
„„ 
* 
* 
— 
Ge 
ww" 
2: 
¢ 
% 
> 
Pe ven 
> 
Brey 
A U 
bgt 
— 
— 
. 
* * 
¢* 
4. 
29. 
* 
* 
i 
e?* 
+ 
Ad 
* 
hg 
— 
| 
— 
~ 
* 
> 
yt 
te 
we 
> 
* 
* ‘| 
¢ 
A 
— Ten 
— 
* 
. 
. 
of 
: 
** 
* 
Mey 
— 
P 
» 1 
| 
* 
| 
; 
{ 
* 
A A 
‘wie? *
‘ 
—— 
„* 
— 
> 
— 
— 
* 
‘ 
* 
of 
* 
* 
* 
* 
‘ 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
„ 
‘ 
. 
} 
“ 
— 
— 
—— 
| 
- 
ev 
? . 
é 
—— 
> 
> 
— 
. 
— 
— 
„„ 
* 
* 
- 
— 
* 
— 
% 
„ 
* 
a* 
~ 
— 
„ 
— 
„ 
ad 
“ 
* 
— 
— 
— 
— 
-+ 
5.5 
6. 
Nek, 3,107,923 
%˖nt“ atu "Monte Christi.” Their 
cangisted of 
person qeetings between their leaJerc. 
Aalto "Swan" uuns consistently 
by Manu, but, even before the jamming started, ve of the undere 
‘Found had l. termed to diccount the cessaves from Radio "Swan" because of 
the 
rut tons which they invariably contained. 
. 
There 18 no doubt that a creat anz people im Cubs are disaffected. 
| 
Prubnhly not core than one-third of the populace is pro-Castro, but those 
we dhe people who have profited fron the Castro revolution, they are 
fanatically in favor of the re;:ime ond alrost all of thes are voll arced, 
| 
another third of the populace is anti-Castro but they would probably rezain 
pasaive if another invasion vere launched. 
The rezainine third of the 
Feople, and, probably, Of of the arned forces, would militantly Join an 
ftort to overthrow the Castro regie provided: (a) they had sufficient 
| 
‘mrcing thas the invasion was to take place, (b) they nad access to veapons, 
(3) the tavns1 1 wes of sufficient magnitude as to appear to have a reasonable 
chance of gucceus. 
An efrective borbing of military installations vould de 
of pora::ounĩ irrwrtance. 
It would also be not helpful, of course, in the 
case of these .cultful starters, if the invasion were initlated by the 
tfgutjutsom vf the Castros and Guevara. 
It my be asked why none of these 
peuple di 
.nything to help the invaders 
on 17 Apr 61. There are two 
n. Wers: 
In the first pluce, they were not informed that the invasion vas 
to take place on that day co that they were not prepared to act. 
In the 
second place, Castro got the Jump on then by arrest 
aud imprisoning froa 
190 thousand to 200 thousand people within the first 
hours after the 
tuvasion be an,. 
It is my estinute that the anti-Cactro underground, before 
the invastoa,nucbered about two thousand in Havana and about 10 thousand in 
tre rest of the country, 
mile I have no exact inforcation wou the fate 
of the 
of the undercround, I doubt that caany of thea escrped Castro's 
JF 
. 
Gariinal archbishop Arte apa io in asylum in the Arcent ine Enbassy in Havana. 
The obier cicht bishops are all in their home dioceses but are under house 
arr. 38d. They hive (won permission for foreircn priests and relipivus to 
actwe 
Native-born priesza and nuns are expected to stay. 
I know of 
no posns ay 
authorities to take countermeasures acuimst Castro. 
Ghvicechy, av hus serited excc,.suntcation but he announced on the radio, on 
* May 61, I believe, that he vould pay no attention to such a eve, 60 I 
thlak LS trprovable that the Church authorities will resart to that pemlty. 
The church 
are Luin, taken over by lay authorities. 
In ay scheni, 
tor 
a Jayunn is in shaarge, although four priests still resata there. 
My schocl is a collete devoted to higher cducation, but since Castro's 
representative has taken over, r of the stuients are illiterates vho are 
us ind the school 
te facilities to try d learn to real and write, 
The text 
decks use) in the acliool aboun! in pro-Co:muniss and aat 1-HLpper 
fol ist 
senthcents. 
Befure the Castro take-over of the school, a great 
of 
the students were anti-Castro, but, au ts usuil, there was u szall core of 
devote} Fidelistas, 
I do not mor what the situstion 10 at present. 
1 hove 
asked if 1 have 
information about possible 
110 sites on 
the 1e lan! of Cuba or on Cayo Grande. My inf orzat 
ton is entirely infercntial 
or bac] on ruwrs. 
There is an arca bout 20 ka eact of Havana, on the 
nirtihern conct, which ia closed to all traffic. 
J have heard thet many 
techalttans hive cone to that area and that none of then have beea persitted 
to return, 
when trucks arrive at the cate to the installation the drivers 
are ru: ieve! an! supplante! ty drivers from the Installation. 
I tried to 
peoeteuse the installation by gend In,; 23 yroup of boy-scouts on a hike in 
that 
but the scout 
toll] me that the croup was turne] back by 
cuards. The 
by a roo] but not by any railros). 
There are a 
mister of benz. sr whore cramt could liad. 
With recurd to Cao Grande, there 
ia Little 
thnt a 
den! of construction zu puting on there but ao 
ow: 
ars to have any 
Infor ation as to want da bein- 
The 
very 
hotels to pric 
> 
Ws 
? 1 
hy 
“a 
Pid 
** 
* 
. 
> . 
— 
> 
* 
* 
MIF 
‘ 
— 
* 
‘ 
„* 
a 
‘ 
. 
‘ 
| 
* 
* 
- 
~ 
| 
„ 
> 
‘ 
* 
te 
* 
Py 
| 
4} 
‘ 
“ 
} 
— 
| 
| 
| 
*, 
* 
** 
| 
| 
J. 
i 
is 
r 
a 
ony 
f 
w 
| 
— 
|
eet 
775 
* 
* 
se 
. 
ven before 
d 
£3 
. 
122 
243123712 
8 S 
be 
— 
35343222 
E 
| 
131372 
= 
© 
a 
— 
E 
1217175! 
333844333 
1522275 
22327238 
22132332 
153135 
14232222 
3432329 
gH 
sa 
233 22 
111132210 
* 
tet 
‘ 
The fact that the 
leader or leaders had had scone past identification with Batista vould not 
As to the personality of the leader of an invasion vho would be acceptable 
disqualify thea. 
to the anti-Castro groups, I do not think that his background is too 
portant provided he is un-istakably anti-Communist. 
* 
» end « 
git: 
4g 
* 
—— 
* 
* 
* 
³˙—wſ 
‘ 
— 
— 
— — 
— 
— 
‘ee: 
* 
* 
ape 
7 te 
— 
. 
| 
A 
| 
» 
„ 
? 
° 
‘ 
* 
*. 
1.5 
— 
| 
‘ae 
: 
7112 * 2 1 
- 
* 
* 
. 1 * 
‘ 
* 
¥ ie 
| 
* 
;