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DRAFT:
HS
23 June 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
See Distribution
SUBJECT:
Briefing of Church Committee:
Quality and Utility
of Estimates on Soviet Strategic Capabilities
I.
Outline —
see annex
II.
Case Studies
-- These should each consist of not more than four
doublespaced pages of briefing notes, accompanied by a backup
discussion of the
case including relevant excerpts and documentation,
together with illustrations recommended for use in direct presentation
and backup.
The materials should summarize
(a) the intelligence
problem,
(b)
the main elements of evidence and analysis,
(c)
the
USIB findings and how they treated uncertainty and differences of
view,
(d)
the resolution
(or, where appropriate, the current status)
of the problem.
25X1
A.
B.
C.
D.
HI-
Briefing Notes —
total
of not more
than
16 double-spaced pages
including
two of the case studies:
I
I
25X1
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DRAFT
SUBJECT:
Briefing of Church Committee:
Quality and Utility
of Estimates on Soviet Strategic Capabilities
IV.
Illustrations —
x 40 briefing boards,
not more than 12 including
those selected for direct presentation on case studies:
25X1
Howard Stoertz,
Jr.
National
Intelligence Officer
for Strategic Programs
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A Proposal
-
23 June
1975
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Step
- Develop
succinct papers with analysis,
alternatives,
"pros
and
cons,"
and recommendations
on
the following
six
topics.
(Papers
to
be written
as
if
to
be
read
by
the
President.)
PCI
Role
in Community
.
^
What should
role
be?
Substance?
Resources?
Operational
management and
tasking?
How should
the Community
be
defined?
Organizational
implications
for CIA.
To
what extent should such
a role
be defined
in
law?
Executive Order?
Intelligence Community Organizational
Arrangements
.
Applicability of ExCom arrangements
to other Community
programs:
clandestine collection,
SIGINT.
Cl c
r
US
t
/)
f P *'t<-
The Need for Secrecy .
Putting
"teeth"
into the
DCI's
responsibility
to protect
sources
and methods.
How Much
"Openness?"
Declassification
of the
"fact
of" overhead photography.
Open
budgets,?
External
Controls
on
the Community,
the Agency .
Executive Branch controls,
congressional
oversight and
controls,
other.
Ga /? C
Intelligence and the Congress
.
To what extent and
in what ways
can
or should Intelligence
Community
information
be made available
to
the Congress?
Effect of changes
in
this
area
on
intelligence
ILLEGIB
relationships within
the
Executive
Branch.
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Step
- Consideration
by you
and members
of the Management
Committee of the proposals developed
above.
Step
-
Development of
a specific proposal
for consideration
by
the
President setting
forth our
recommendations
for action
in
each
of
the above areas,
taking account
of proposals
already made,
the Rockefeller Commission
recommendations,
etc.
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Paper
- What is the Intelligence Community?
A descriptive piece explaining the various components of the
Community; the production,
collection,
processing, R&cD roles of
the various components; and describing the management interrelationship
between the various components including the DCI's resource
management responsibilities as set forth in the November 1971
letter.
5 pages ultimately.
Paper 2
- CIA Within the Intelligence Community.
A more detailed factual piece on CIA, focusing particularly on
the production,
collection and R&D responsibilities of the Agency
and on the various mechanisms available to the Agency and the
DCI to exercise leadership in the Intelligence Community including
control over covert activities abroad,
control of the estimates process,
the various USIB committees with policy making responsibilities
in functional areas,
the November 1971 letter,
etc.
5'pages.
Paper
- The Future of Intelligence.
Purposes of intelligence
in the next 10-20 years including but not
limited to peace keeping,
supplying policy makers with critical
advice on wide variety of subjects,
etc.
Arguments for and against
an independent production capability independent of policy makers
within the Intelligence Community (State, Treasury,
etc.
) and
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operational departments like Defense; and arguments for and against
some control over collection and R&cD programs by the independent
production entity.
5 pages.
Paper 4
- The Management of Intelligence / CIA Leadership in the Community.
Paper
1 described existing arrangements; Paper
3 outlines some
basic assumptions about a future CIA;
this paper must grapple with
the question of alternative management arrangements for the
Intelligence- Community.
Here we will need to describe the DCI's
current responsibilities and how they have developed over the years
(both with respect to substantive and to resource matters).
We
will then have set the stage for whatever critique we care
to make
of existing arrangements and for defining a set of problems we
think should be solved.
A tentative list of these might include the
facts that the DCI has a Community resource review responsibility
but no authority;
the DCI has a Community "sources and methods"
responsibility but no authority; the DCI lacks full access
to DoD
collection and resource information,
despite the law and a Presidential
letter; etc.
Having defined a brief series of fundamental problems, we will
then be able to set forth some analysis of possible alternative arrangements.
In concept,
these seem to fall into about four basic categories;
1. No Community resource management role for DCI at all,
return to pre-1971 and focus only on a Community
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production role for Agency.
(Comment: A step back-
ward and probably undesirable.
)
2.
Consolidate all "national" (what are they?) programs under
the DCI's command and control.
(Comment:
Politically
unrealistic and probably not sensible in any event.
)
3. Take certain minimum steps
to expand DCI's effective
authority to do better what he now does.
(Example of such
steps:
Segregate out within Defense all resource decision
making related to intelligence and establish a parallel review
procedure involving the DCI.
Comment:
Worth considering
further.
)
4. Examine the joint management arrangements between CIA
and NRO,
isolate reasons why this arrangement is considered
"successful" and consider whether the model could or should
be applied
to the SIGINT world,
to the CS with State,
to communications with State,
etc.
(Comment: A Colby
favorite, with possibilities.
)
Paper
- Secrecy and Intelligence.
The principal task is
to explain what must always remain secret
(if we are
to do our job) in the Intelligence Community and to
explain our legislative proposal on protection of sources and methods
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in this context.
The "open budget" issue will need to be explored
as well,
though our position on this
is quite clear.
On the other side of the coin,
the DCI has asked that we pursue
the issues surrounding secrecy of the
"fact of" overhead
reconnaissance, with the hope that certain basic activities in this
area could be declassified.
Probably there are other similar issues.
Basic
to this paper
is the need to reconsider where the line
(must be drawn on revelation of our activities,
to examine critically
whether that line must be drawn where
it is now, and
to see
if clear
guidelines can be drawn for the future.
5 pages.
Paper 6
- External Controls on the Agency and Community.
a. What are these controls and how do they work (with respect to
covert action,
clandestine and technical collection, and so forth)?
b. What additional controls did Rockefeller Commission recommend
c. What additional controls might Congress recommend?
d.
Recognizing Rockefeller Commission recommendations and
probable congressional demands, what would we recommend,
both within Executive Branch and with respect to Congress?
Paper
- Intelligence and the Congress.
(Paper
to deal with substantive intelligence issues,
not oversight
and controls which should be treated above.
)
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What use
is now made of intelligence by the Congress?
Do we
react to requests or do we have a conscious program?
Where might
Congress--if
it could keep secrets - -benefit from more intelligence
information?
What could we do
to make more information more widely
available
to Congress?
What problems would this cause?
Is Congress
likely to legislate a request that we make substantive information
available
to relevant members on a periodic basis?
If they did,
what ground rules for handling this should there be?
5 pages.
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