r  4  -     it  i  » r- *•* 
THE  WHITE  HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 
The  Assistant  to  the  President 
June  13,  1955 
MEMORANDUM  FOR 
THE  SECRETARY  OF  DEFENSE 
Subject:      Report  of  the  Hoover  Commission  Taek  Force  oa 
Intelligence  Actlvltlee  (Office  of  Specie!  Operation*) 
The  Preeideat  has  received  the  classified  report  of  the  Hoover 
Commission  Task  Force  on  Intelligence  Activities*  and  hue  asked 
me  to  transmit  to  you*  as  a  matter  of  possible  interest  and  concern 
to  the  Office  of  Special  Operations*  Department  of  Defense,  the 
attached  copy  of  Appendix  I  thereof* 
For  your  information,  a  copy  of  this  Appendix  has  been  transmitted 
to  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  with  a  request  that  a  careful 
review  be  undertaken  from  the  standpoint  of  the  USCEB  and  USCSB. 
and  that  coordinated  views  of  interested  departments  be  developed  and 
submitted  within  sixty  days. 
Task  Force  recommendations  relating  to  a  "watch  dog  commission" 
and  to  a  special  commission  on  communications  and  electronic 
resources  to  be  set  up  by  the  President  are  the  subject  of  separate 
action*  and  need  not  be  reported  upon  in  connection  with  the  present 
request. 
D2CLASS:n£D 
E.O.  12W5,  Sic.  3-234 
  ......ii-  J» 
■-/'/-) 
~>  /"?;'. 
-"A 
s"l 
By. 
Date.
THE  WHITE  HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 
The  Assistant  to  the  President 
June  IS.  1935 
MEMORANDUM  FOR 
THE  SECRETARY  OF  DEFENSE 
Subj«ctt     Report  of  the  Hoover  Ctaamlssloo  Tatk  Force  on 
tefelUgonee  Activities  (Department  of  tke  Army) 
Tke  President  he*  received  the  classified  report  of  Hit  Hoove* 
Commission  Task  Foree  en  Intelligence  Activities,  end  has  asked 
me  to  transmit  through  yea  the  attached  portions  of  ths  main  report 
retotlsf  to  matters  of  interest  or  concern  to  the  Deportment  of  the 
Army, 
The  President  would  like  to  have  a  cercfel  revUw  mode  of  tke  etteeked 
report  from  tke  etendpoint  of  tke  Department  of  tke  Army  and  to 
receive  comments  wltk  respeet  to  the  report  within  sixty  days.  Theoe 
comments  should  Include  specific  rejewtrtt*  eoncsrsitog  seek  of  tke 
recommendstions  relating  to  the  Department  of  tke  Army,  and  should 
indicate  those  recommendstions  whfchit  Is  considered  ean  end  should 
he  adopted  (Indicating  for  mess  ike  method  end  timing  deemed  appro- 
priate for  placing  them  in  effect)!  t$* i'Jtattiment  ekonld  else  Indicete 
eny  recommendations  not  considered  appropriate  for  adoption,  to* 
gather  with  enpporting  reasons  «wd  comment. 
Taek  Force  recommendatione  relating  to  a  "watch  dog  commission" 
and  to  a  epeciel  commission  on  communications  and  electronic 
resources  to  he  set  up  hy  the  President  are  the  subject  of  separate 
action*  and  need  not  he  reported  upon  in  connection  with  the  present 
rcQueet, 
E.o.  j; 
i  — 1  S-"**" 
*y^LZ^    r.I=/-/</-r
THE  WHITE-ff<M 
WASHINGTON 
The  Assistant  to  the  President 
June  13,  19S3 
MEMORANDUM  FOR 
THE  SECRETARY  OF  DEFENSE 
Subjects    Report  of  the  Hoover  Commission  Task  Force  on 
iatalllgeace  Activities  (Department  of  the  Navy) 
The  Preeideat  tot  received  the  classified  report  of  the  Soever 
Commission  Task  Fovea  oa  Intelligence  Activities*  aad  aw  naked 
me  to  transmit  throngs,  yea  the  attached  portion*  of  Om  mala 
report  reUtlag  to  matters  of  iatarest  or  concern  to  taa  Department 
of  the  Navy. 
Taa  President  weald  Ilka  to  have  a  earefat  review  made  of  taa 
attacaad  report  from  taa  etaadpeiat  of  taa  Department  of  the  ttavy 
aad  ta  receive  eommaat*  with  respect  to  taa  raport  within  slaty 
days.     Theea  commenta  aaoatd  incladc  opaelfie  remarka  concern. 
taf  aaek  of  taa  veeommcndatlone  relating  to  taa  Department  of  the 
Navy,  aad  aheeld  ladleat*  those  recommendations  which  it  la  con- 
steered  aaa  aad  should  be  adoptod  (ladieatiag  for  these  the  method 
aad  timing  daamad  appropriate  for  placing  them  ia  effeet}}  taa 
atatomaat  should  alao  indicate  aagr  recommendations  aot  eoaeldered 
appropriate  for  Adoption,  together  with  enppcrtiag  reaaoaa  aad  eom- 
maat. 
Taak  Force  racommeadatloaa  relatlag  to  a  "watch  dog  commission" 
aad  to  a/apodal  commlesloa  ea  commaaicatioas  aad  electronic 
reaoareee  to  be  fet  up  by  the  President  are  the  subject  of  separate 
action*  and  aeed  aot  be  reported  open  In  connection  with  the  present 
request* 
DECLASSIFIED 
CO.  11852,  Sec.  11 
>i  m»n& 
LA/?7
THE  WHITE  HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 
The  Assistant  to  the  Presioent 
June  13.  1955 
MEMORANDUM  FOR 
THE  SECRETARY  OF  DEFENSE 
Subject:   Report  of  tks  Hoover  Commission  Task  Force  on 
Intelligence  Activities  (Joint  Cfciels  of  Staff) 
Tke  President  has  rscsivsd  tks  duiiOid  report  el  tks  Hoover 
Commission  Task  Fores  oa  Intelligence  Activities,  and  kas  asksd 
mo  to  transmit  to  you  ths  attached  portions  of  tks  maia  report 
relating  to  nattsrs  of  iatsrost  or  concern  to  tks  Joint  Chiefs  of 
Stall, 
Tks  President  would  liks  lor  you  to  ksve  a  careful  review  mads  of 
tks  attacksd  rsport  sad  to  submit  your  viewe  with  rsspsct  to  it 
within  sixty  days.      Thsas  views  skould  iaeluds  specific  eommsat 
oa  tks  discussion  in  tks  rsport  concerning  tks  Joint  Ckisls  of  Stall. 
Task  Fores  rscommeudstlons  relating  to  a  **watck  dog  commission'* 
and  to  a  special  commission  on  communications  and  electronic 
resources  to  be  eet  up  by  the  President  are  tke  subjset  of  ssparste 
action*  and  need  not  be  reported  upon  in  connection  witk  tke  present 
request. 
DECLASSIFIED 
E.O.  11652.  See.  11
THE  WHITE  HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 
The  Assistant  to  the  President 
June  IS,  1935 
MEMORANDUM  FOR 
THE  SECRETARY  OF  DEFENSE 
"ft 
Smbjectt  Report  of  the  Koorer  Commission  T«k  Force  en 
Intelligence  Activities  (Job*  CMefe  of  Staff! 
Tin  President  has  received  the  classified  report  of  the  Hoover 
Commission  Took  Force  oo  Intelligence  Activities,  and  has  asked 
mo  to  transmit  to  you*  oo  a  matter  of  Interest  and  concern  to  the 
Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff,  too  attached  copy  of  Appendix  t  thereof. 
Too  President  would  Uko  for  you  to  have  a  eare&l  review  mad*  of 
tho  attached  Appendix  aa  it  pertains  to  activities  of  the  Joint  Chiefs 
of  SUff,  and  to  transmit  your  views  with  respect  to  it  within  sixty 
days.      These  vtsws  should  include  specific  eommont  on  sack  of 
tho  recommendatioae  rotating  to  tho  Joint  Chiofs  of  Staff,  indicating 
tho  extent  to  which  it  is  considered  these  can  and  should  be  adopted, 
together  with  the  method  and  timing  deemed  appropriate  for  placing 
them  in  effect. 
Task  Force  recommendations  relating  to  a  "watch  dog  commiesion" 
and  to  a  special  commission  on  communications  and  electronic 
resources  to  be  set  up  by  the  President  are  the  subject  of  separate 
action,  and  need  not  be  reported  upon  in  connection  with  the  present 
request. 
DECLASSIFIED 
£.0.  11652,  S«c.  " 
-/-  ~>  h  ■'fa'L 
W!-.~?       Bate  -iJ^-H — f- 
  •  ■».»•*:-"» 
f  .»_«..*•»••*  *L"*"*"
^X^h^Sgm .  *-•*"•■>  •»> 
i."-  f  »V  ■*■"'• 
June  ?#  l'.?55 
BJ?£*-  WHJaUHWlf  FORTH*  IBESHaW;-  >^^  --V 
"  ^-:^8dbjeett  Hooter  Coaml asi  on  Reports 
The  last  few  days  I  bad  *  chance  to  talk  with  loading  isdus- 
triallste*  bankers*  and  insurance  people  la  Hartford,  Connecticut, 
at  Srown  Gnlvarsit;*  and  in  How  Iork  City.  Z  found  an  alasost  uni- 
versal intaraat  atsong  all  shades  of  opinion  in  these  groups  in  the 
Hoover  Coaaisaion  reports  and  whet  the  artel  nlstr  at  Ion  was  planning 
to  do  about  than.  There  has  apparently  been  a  Tery  thorough  job 
done  of  stirring  up  a  reel!}  active  interest  aaong  the  neabers  of 
the  business  eonminity. 
Tou  probably  noticed  (What  I  hsTe  been  told)  in  oonse  of 
Mr*  Hoover's  ©omaents  yesterday  that  be  feels  that  there  is  con- 
siderable overt  and  covert  opposition  to  the  proposals  in  th*  various 
depertaents.  He  probably  thinks  that  it  is  stirred  up  froa  tbe  lower 
ranks.  Actually  there  is  strong  opposition  to  sons  of  the  proposals 
by  the  very  top  of  the  departuents;  for  example*  Messrs.  Fltrcniiig 
and  Brovnell*  ss  neabers  of  the  Hoover  Concdssion*  have  nude  eub- 
stantial  and*  in  some  cases*  rather  strong  dissents  to  specific 
reaosnendatloas  in  the  reports.  Secretary  Humphrey  and  other  Cabinet 
have  strong  opposition  to  soae  of  the  recoaaendations. 
In  order  to  aeeoapllah  our  objective  of  obtaining  as  many  positive 
supporting  actions  on  the  large  nuaber  of  recoanendatiocs  that  ve  can 
agree  on  and  aake  sure  that  ve  have  an  excellent  record  en  the  points 
there  we  disagree,  1  think  it  might  be  helpful  if  you  would  oentioa  at 
the  Cabinet  meeting  tomorrow  this  situation  and  ask  that  the  replies 
that  ve  ask  for  in  connection  vlth  circulating  the  report*  to  the  dif- 
ferent governaenial  departments  be  signed  in  all  future  cases  by  either 
the  Secretary  or  the  Under  Secretary  and  that  where  there  is  any  sub- 
stantial and  specific  dissent  or  opposition  the  letter  to  the  Budget 
Bureau  reporting  on  these  recoaaendations  be  signed  by  the  Secretary 
or  the  head  of  the  agency. 
we  shall  aore  ahead  as  rapidly  as  ve  can  in  pulling  together  as 
long  a  list  of  iteas  thet  the  administration  can  support  as  it  is 
possible  to  do*  although  there  will  be  torn  delay  because  of  "Operation 
alert"  next  week  and  because  ve  are  in  the  aidst  of  pulling  together 
the  1957  budget  celling  figures. 
Director 
Electrostatic  reproduction  niaut. 
lor  preservation  purposes  by  tit* 
tkenhower  Library  for  replacement 
•f  •  deteriorating  manuscript  iteok
THE  WHITE  HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 
June  2,  1955 
MEMORANDUM  FOR  RECORD 
Meeting  in  Governor  Adams*  office 
11:30  AM,  2  June  1955 
Present:    Gov.  Adams,  Mr.   Allen  Dulles, 
Colonel  Goodpaster 
Mr.  Dulles  will  have  a  check  made  of  the 
individuals  and  allegations  indicated  in  the 
attached  memorandum  and  annexes  (copy 
furnished  him)  and  -will  provide  a  memorandum 
reporting  findings  and  giving  views  in  the 
matter  as  appropriate. 
A.   J/xJoodpaster 
Colonel,  CE,   U  S  Army 
CC:       Mr.   Allen  Dulles
f^?|S)>rrj, 
-iff) 
^'%& 
■%%$* 
%>*&*. 
m- 
z:\c£%^7  \^p,  ~^4^  ^^mm^W- 
itvSfe
^Wt 
■  -■■■  -ji&.<,s  ,3-vAiJ<\'''KV^i-xmm 
r,-';-M-  ■■•"■ 
■v.;  :.:'■■:  ■'  '■^-/.^A^.K'-ft-;..-;"--:..-, ..-.,.-■■- 
■".  -  '■  !vir'.'1^.*'^^-..-      ■  ■■■  ■ 
•-■;■"     .'--':-^..r?i<;W54%f-f:--,.'*a*^y.-.-«-.    v.-   -<:i 
:-.*-"' 
>-■. 
V-/fc. 
^
-V 
The  Assistant  to  the  President 
THE  WHITE  HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 
May  25,  1955 
DETERMINED  TO  BE  AN 
AOf.i:?«,:r  ...'-•..•/■ '•■•--  -:---J3 
Dear  Johns 
By. 
.  ra_,  uate . 
Thank  yen  for  eeading  mo  the  document  resulting 
from  ths  work  of  the  Commission's  Task  Force  on 
Intelligence  Activities. 
It  has  hooa  road  for  security.     A*  might  bo  expected, 
nothing  doomod  to  ho  an  unequivocal  violation  of 
aoeority  has  hooa  noted,  hot  fhoro  are  esveral  pas- 
sagos  having  possibly  adverse  soenrity  implications 
to  which  fnrthor  consideration  might*  with  profit,  ho 
given.     Except  for  oao  passage  whore  rephrasing  is 
proposed,  the  suggestion  is  simply  to  delete  certain 
ssntences  or  phrases*    To  facilitate  your  coasidera* 
tion,  the  deletions  and  the  suggested  rephrasing  have 
been  indicated  on  the  copy  of  the  report  which  you 
cent  me  and  which  1  am  returning  herewith. 
Sincerely, 
Mr.  JohnB.  IfoUister 
Executive  Director 
Commission  on  Organisation  of  the 
Executive  Branch  of  the  Government 
Washington,  D.  C. 
By 
DETERMINED  TO  BE  AN 
ADMINISTRATIVE    MARKING 
E.O.  11652,  Section  1 
-^1-NLE,  Datel^r
Lh & bea, oe, fog By Yuu Mit 2 re
May  23,  1955 
MEMORANDUM  FOR  GOVERNOR  ADAMS 
As  action  on  the  Hoover  Task  Force  report  on  intelligence  activities, 
I  suggest  that  you  (or  I,  if  you  wish)  advise  Mr.  Hollister  generally  as 
follows : 
1.      On  the  basis  of  a  reading  of  the  report  for  security,  it 
is  felt  that  there  are  several  passages  to  which  further  con- 
sideration should  be  given    --  one  of  these  seems  a  rather 
clear-cut  and  unnecessary  disclosure  of  information  poten- 
tially valuable  to  foreign  countries,  and  the  rest  appear  to 
be  of  an  "optional"  character,  in  which  the  value  to  foreign 
countries  of  the  information  disclosed  would  have  to  be 
weighed  against  its  value  in  terms  of  informing  the  American 
public.        The  passages  referred  to  are: 
a.  On  page  v,   at  the  top  of  the  page,   a  preferred  ver- 
sion might  read:    "Two  reports  are  submitted:    one, 
!  unclassified;Jb.e  other,  classified  TOP  SECRET,  with 
■  certain/ appendices  which  require  special  additional 
\  clearance.  "    (This  is  the  "clear-cut"  case  referred 
'  to  above .  ) 
b.  On  page  vii,  the  sentence  in  the  first  full  paragraph 
beginning  "Our  effort  to  achieve,  etc.,"  which  gives  an 
indication  of  success  attained  in  obtaining  a  steady  and 
reliable  flow  of  data,  might  be  deleted. 
c.  On  page  ix,   in  the  second  paragraph,  the  sentence 
beginning  "The  information  we  need,  etc.  ",  which 
identifies  Communist  plans,  progress  and  potential  as 
intelligence  targets,   might  be  deleted. 
d.  There  are  several  references  authoritatively  identify- 
ing attaches  as  intelligence -gatherers  of  major  importance. 
These  include  the  second  sentence  of  the  fir?t  paragraph 
on  page  7,  the  second  sentence  of  the  second  paragraph 
on  page  11,  the  second  full  paragraph  on  page  22',  and  the 
second  and  fifth  sentences  of  the  paragraph  beginning  at
the  bottom  of  page  23.      In  addition,    there  is  a  similar 
identification  of  the  Foreign  Service  in  the  last  sentence 
on  page  14.  ~7u*,<-     *~~\t.l      L*~        t/^dt*..* 
e.       The  recommendation  concerning  the  NSA  at  the 
bottom  of  page  41  has  the  effect  of  giving  emphasis  to 
this  agency  in  an  intelligence  context  and  might  be 
deleted.  . 
2.  The  outline  of  U.  S.  top  organization*  for  intelligence/is 
undoubtedly  one  for  which  foreign  countries  would  have  had  to 
expend  a  considerable  amount  of  money  to  obtain  —  and  would 
still  not  have  had  complete  confidence  that  it  was  authoritative. 
Some  generalizing  might  be  considered. 
3.  The  reference  to  the  "Under  Secretary  of  Defense"  on  page 
40  might  be  changed  to  "Deputy  Secretary  of  Defense.  "
THE  WHITE  HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 
The  Assistant  to  the  President 
May  2S,  1935 
Doar  Joha: 
Thank  yon  lor  ocadtag  me  the  document  resulting 
from  the  work  of  tko  Commls«len*o  Took  Fore*  on 
Intelligence  Activities. 
It  ha*  boon  rood  for  •eenrtty.     As  might  ko  expected, 
notklng  deemed  to  ho  an  nnaoniiroeel  violation  of 
security  ho*  boom  noted,  bat  there  «ro  several  poo- 
sages  having  possibly  adverse  security  implication 
to  which  farther  consideration  might,  with  profit,  bo 
given.     Except  for  oao  paateg*  where  rephrasing  is 
propossd,  tho  suggestion is  •Imply  to  delete  eortaln 
sentences  or  phrases*   To  facilitate  yoar  consldera- 
titm.  tho  deletions  and  tho  suggested  rophraalng  havs 
boon  indicated  on  Iho  eopy  of  tho  roport  which  yon 
•oat  mo  and  which  X  am  returning  herewith. 
Sincerely, 
»'7  l«»V 
Mr.  JohnB.  Heliistsr 
Executive  Director 
Commission  on  Organiaation  of  tho 
Executive  Branch  of  tho  Government 
Washington,  O.  C. 
% 
■**  **$&£* 
Receipt  No.    357.
COMMISSION  ON  ORGANIZATION 
OF  THE 
EXECUTIVE  BRANCH  OF  THE  GOVERNMENT 
Mn-ir  91      1 QKK  general  accounting 
nay  "•»  "L'->->  office  building 
Washington  25.  D.  C 
Honorable  Sherman  Adams 
The  Assistant  to  the  President 
The  Unite  House 
Washington  25,  D.  C. 
Dear  Sherman: 
Following  our  telephone  conversation  this  morning, 
I  am  enclosing  you  the  "Overt"  portion  of  the  Report  of 
the  Commission's  Task  Force  on  Intelligence  Activities. 
This  is  the  one,  you  understand,  which  will  be  presented 
to  the  Commission  and  when  and  if  approved,  will  be  filed 
with  the  Congress  and  given  complete  publicity* 
While  we  do  not  see  anything  in  it  which  would  seem 
to  be  a  security  violation,  the  Task  Force  has  requested, 
and  we  concur  in  the  request,  that  it  be  cleared  before 
presentation  to  the  Commission  and  we  feel  that  in  this  . 
clearance,  it  should  not  be  presented  either  to  the  Central 
Intelligence  Agency  or  to  the  Department  of  Defense  since 
they  are  concerned  in  it. 
You  have  kindly  offered  to  attend  to  this  clearance 
for  us  which  we  hope  can  be  accomplished  very  quickly  in 
order  that  we  may  take  it  up  for  Commission  action.    As  you 
know,  our  Commission  terminates  automatically  in  a  few  weeks. 
Yours  very  sincerely, 
John  B.  Hollister 
Executive  Director 
DETERMINED  TO  BE  AN 
Enclosure  administrative  makkinc. 
E.O.  11652.  Section  1 
P.S.  Let  me  know  if  you  need  extra  copies  of  the  Report. 
J.B«H •
:W-SEGMT" 
AFPMDDC 
Ssfts 
■5 
%S3 
p  v 
2  « 
2^ 
as  5 
(V) 
a 
z 
UJ 
& 
v 5 
The  recommendations  discussed  below  are  from  Appendix  I  of  the  Task 
Force  Report.  The  Department  of  Defense  comments  are  supplementary  to 
those  submitted  by  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  for  the  United 
States  Communications  Intelligence  Board  (USCIB)  and  the  United  States 
Communications  Security  Board  (USCSB),  in  which  the  Department  of  Defense 
and  the  three  Services  concur* 
flBCOMKEKDATION  Ko.  1 
«That  the  national  Security  Council  direct  USCIB  to  establish  COMIKT 
realities  and  consideration  of  capabilities  of  other  intelligence  sources. 
This  operational  guidance  to  KSA  should  be  so  clear  and  succinct  as  to 
require  minimum  interpretation  by  the  Director,  USA,  of  what  is  required 
and  its  degree  of  importance.  USCIB  should  be  primarily  concerned  with 
end  products  and  the  Director,  MSA,  should  determine  the  best  way  of  pro- 
ducing the  end  product.  If  USCIB  fails  after  a  reasonable  length  of  time 
to  provide  more  adequate  guidance  to  the  Director,  KSA,  then  the  latter 
should  be  made  a  member  of  the  Intelligence  Advisory  Committee.** 
• 
Department  of  Defense  Position! 
1.  Concur,  subject  to  comment. 
"  2«  Comment! 
It  Is  doubtful  that  IAC  membership  for  the  Director,  BSA,  would 
solve  the  problem}  it  would  probably  raise  additional  complications. 
In  this  connection,  the  Department  of  Defense  considers  that  the 
present  status  and  membership  of  the  IAC  give  rise  to  ambiguity  which  this 
particular  recommendation  would  only  sharpen.  The  IAC  is  unique  in  being 
neither  a  policy  nor  an  operational  body,  but  a  mixture  of  the  two* .  This 
is  the  result  partly  of  unforeseen  evolution  within  the  IAC,  and  partly 
of  significant  changes  which  have  occurred  within  the  Department  of  Defense 
since  the  IAC  was  established* 
To  the  extent  that  the  NSC  intended  the  IAC  to  serve  as  a  policy 
body,  its  Defense  membership  (the  three  Services  and  JCS)  is  at  once  diffuse 
and  incomplete  in  that  the  Service  representation  is  largely  at  an  operating 
rather  than  a  policy  level  and  the  Secretary  of  Defense  is  not  directly 
represented,  although  the  JCS  representative  (Chairman,  Joint  Intelligence 
Committee)  coordinates  with  the  appropriate  elements  of  DSD.  On  the  other 
hand,  to  the  extent  that  the  IAC  serves  as  a  body  concerned  with  the  coordi- 
nation and  formulation  of  intelligence  estimates  and  the  coordination  of 
operational  intelligence  matters,  its  present  formalised  structure  may  not 
is 
This  document  con' 
Copy  Ko. 
of T 
&. 
ins  _S2-  pages, 
copies.   Serie3 
VfflHBilEF
S-ttSgS-? 
:**?:  -"4 
lT9HE6SETt 
«.*.*_«_•_*.  **********  *.*  ••■•»*«« 
be  entirely  necessary.  The  three  Service  intelligence  chiefe  are  euitable 
representation  in  this  context,  and  although  the  Chairman,  JIC,  does  not 
conduct  operations,  ho  is  the  appropriate  indirect  representative  of  the 
Secretary  of  Defense  for  these  matters.  In  its  dual  capacity  the  IAC  works, 
but  in  an  unnecessarily  complicated  and  probably  uneconomical  context  of 
differing  levels  of  activity. 
The  department  of  Defense  considers  that  a  aore  desirable  ultimate 
organization  of  the  top  struoture  of  D.S'.  intelligence  would  involve  a 
single  board  with  policy  cognisance  over  all  aspsets  of  intelligence.  The 
Secretary  of  Def  ense*s  representative  would  be  an  appropriate  civilian 
official,  competent  to  act  for  him.  Under  this  board  would  be  several 
epecialist  eommitteee  to  deal  with  operate  >al  matters;  one  concerned  with 
communications  and  electronics  intelligence  and  communications  security  (as 
recommended  by  the  Clark  Task  Force)}  another  with  intelligence  operations; 
a  third  with  intelligence  production;  and  possibly  others.  Representation 
on  these  committees  would  be  provided  by  the  Service  intelligence  chiefs  and 
other  operators  (such  as  the  Director,  USA)  when  appropriate. 
The  following  reH.ii  points  summarise  the  views  that  are  crystallising 
in  the  Department  of  Defense  on  the  general'  subject  of  intelligence  t 
1.  The  Sscretary  of  State  and  the  Secretary  of  Defense  must 
assume  final  responsibility  for  guidance  and  control  over  all 
aspects  of  intelligence. 
2.  The  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  as  the  actual  executive 
agent  must  have  adequate  and  clearly  defined  coordinative  powers 
tinder  the  Secretaries  of  State  and  Defense. 
'  3«  National  intelligence  policy  is  under  the  cognizance  of  the 
national  Security  Council.  However,  because  of  the  sensitive  nature 
of  important  elements  of  intelligence,  intelligence  matters  might 
most  appropriately  be  dealt  with  by  a  Special  Committee  of  the  HSC 
(which  is  now  the  case,  to  the  satisfaction  of  all  concerned,  with 
respect  to  COKERT  and  COKSBC  matters  I  the  Secretaries  of  State  and 
Defense,  and  the  Attorney  General  for  matters  under  his  cognisance, 
with  the  advice  of  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence,  constitute 
the  Special  Committee  of  the  NSC). 
4.  The  concept  behind  USCIB  has  proved  to  be  the  most  satisfactory 
solution  so  far  in  one  important  intelligence  area.  Appropriately 
modified,  it  'could  usefully  be  applied  to  the  entire  intelligence 
field. 
The  changes  which  this  general  concept  would  involve  do  not  require 
legislation.  Internal  reorganization  within  the  IAC  and  probably  an 
executive  order  to  establish  the  new  organisation  would  suffice. 
The  Department  of  Defense  proposes  to  discuss  this  subject  further  with 
the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  and  the  Department  of  State,  and  hopes 
in  due  course  together  with  tbsm  to  arrive  at  an  agreed  proposal  for  sub- 
mission* 
imWBGKn
T0P-&8K1 
RECOKMEKDATIOH  TKO.  2 
•■ »-  a-*.  t_  •_•_*.  •-  * 
"That  the  Director,  HSA»  be  given  clearcut  directivee  which  will 
enable  him  to  make  nuch  greater  end  continuing  effort  to  produce  high- 
level  cojaaunieations  intelligence.  This  ie  of  ouch  great  importance  that 
monetary  consideratione  ehould  be  waived  and  an  effort  at  least  equal  it© 
the  Manhattan  Project  ehould  be  exerted  at  once.* 
Department  of  Defense  Position!  " 
With  respect  to  that  portion  of  the  Eeconnendation  advocating  '•an 
effort  at  least  equal  to  the  Manhattan  Project" : : : ! : ! : !  1 1 1 :  *  I "  I :_: ".  I "  *  Ij  *.  / 
'ill'.',  rrrr   .   j  the  Department  of  Defeaee  'considers  some 
e^ansion*on*the*U^B*c«na8ntB  ie  warranted. 
>•«•••••< 
>••••*< 
•**•••• 
>  •  •  •  •  < 
i  •  •  •  •  i 
>•••••< 
>•••••< 
LT     1**""     «.»■     «»•■•*_•_= 
With  this  ob jective  In  »*»«*  the  Department  of  Defense  has  aathorixad 
the  Director,  NSAt  to  bring  the  beat  possible  analytical  brains  from  outside 
NSA  to  bear  on  the  problem  (if  they  can  be  * nundli ^  andUSCIB  has  rooonnsndod 
that  this  country  undertake  a  wfnrtimnn  effort  to.   ....•  LI. I"  ^T..e... •.•••••] 
,  
—  mw._  i  
ii  
i    ■    ii  ■    l         r  
"■ "  ■    rTT  -•———— ■*-— -«»-^  ♦  »  ♦  «•••»  >  '.'.^'j*  •  «_  T.*  •  •••••       *      .  -\ 
•.•••eeeeee*«««««ee*.ea*e*.e«  ,,.   u— mnmi   ■■   
  
  ....«..*.  T  ,1|T  tin    '  J  -^.-w-»-VT-i r. *v.   ^TITTS*. 
»     The  Decartmsnt  of  Defense  considers  that,   •   •  •  *^ 
?••••••••.•••••'••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••  ♦  *.  *  V*  *  *  *  *  *  *  •  •  •  •  •  *******  ••*•••' 
"aV  Vo^warrant^thT  fulT f orcV  of*  "thV  gOTTrSfihTbehind  bolfi^ro"jects. 
-3- 
'TDwaaEri
w\n.vv>A<WW*nn^W^WWVV^UWk/tig»JaWwW^hlWi^lJQ^ij^CvlUWWi.»...S,V>,1.  .iii>i.;>i 
•'S&s 
.<&£»? 
R3C0MMEHDATI0H  KO»  6 
"That  tho  Department  of  Defense  carefully  study  the  organisational 
structure  and  proper  positioning  within  its  reepectivd  services  of  the 
three  cxyptologic  agencies  -  AFSS,  ASA,  end  KSG  -  with  a  fie*  toward 
improving  their  prestige  and  effectiveness,  thereby  strengthening  their 
personnel  assignment  policies  and  logistical  support." 
Department  of  Defense  Position! ' 
USCIB  considered  that  this  recommendation  pertains  to  en  internal 
problem  within  the  Department  of  Defense,  and  has  accordingly  referred 
-«•-         it  to  this  Department  for  comment* 
The  Department  of  Defense  has  long  recognised  that  high  professional 
standards  and  opportunity  for  a  rewarding  career  for  military  and  civilian 
personnel  engaged  in  the  communications  intelligence  effort  must  be  ■ 
strengthened  if  we  are  to  deal  successfully  with  the  increasingly  diffi- 
cult technical  problems  confronting  that  effort*  One  means  of  achieving 
this  objective  is  to  constitute  the  Service  cryptologic  agencies  as  major 
commands.  These  should  be  subordinate  neither  to  the  intelligence  nor  to 
the  c«mfflunicationa  elements  within  the  Services,  but  should  In  eaeh  case 
report  directly  to  the  chief  of  staff.  Adequate  recognition  of  cryptology 
as  a  aagor  operational  career  field  cannot  be  otherwise  achieved. 
The  Air  Force  cryptologic  agency,  the  Security  Service  (AFSS),  has 
been  so  constituted  for_gDpro3dmatcly  seven  years.  The  AFSS  is  responsible 
for  comint  production' '. '. 1 HTT:~: :::::::::::: r: ::::::::::: : ::' i: : : :::::: :l 
and  CQMSEC  activities,  and  in  addition  operated  the  Air  Force's  ground- 
based  HJHT  stations  and  its  SSO  (Special  Security  Officer)  system  for  the 
dissemination  of  COHIET.  largely  because  of  its  status  as  a  major  command, 
-?$*«?        .  the  AFSS  has  developed  a  dynamic  and  promising  program  for  recruiting, 
developing  and  holding  on  to  technically  qualified  military  career  personnel*' 
■"'■■■■  Until  recently  the  Army  cryptologic  agencyJfchc^Arny  Security  Agency 
(ASA))  was  responsible  for  COHEJT  productioalllllLLilllLililiii-UJ  and 
for  COMSBC.  It  was  subordinate  to  G-2.  On  dgTJim*  1955,  the  ASA  was 
designated  as  a  major  command  responsible  to  the  Chief  of  Staff,  with 
virtually  complete  eognizance  over  all  Army  aspects  Of  COMIKT.  COMSBC, 
ELIOT  and  communications  electromagnetic  countermeasures  (EGH).  It  is 
anticipated  that  this  action  will  facilitate  development  of  an  energetic 
Army  cryptologic  career  program  paralleling  thatof  the  Air  Force* 
The  Navy  cryptologic  activity,  the  Navy  Security  Group  (NSO),  is 
not  so  constituted.  It  operates  at  a  lower  ebhelen  and.  under  divided 
intelligence  and  communications  cognisance*  The  NSG  does  not  nominally 
have  a  commanding  offioerjit  functions  under  the  Chief  of  Security  Branch 
who  in  turn  reports  to  the  Director,  Haval  Communications.  The  responsl- 
biutiss  of  the  Kso  include  cohikt  production : :::::::::::::::::::::: rTTij 
COKSBC,  and  SLIHT.    '         '         -^— ' 
-4- 
iTTOHWftfiPTi
t.>.>..'VOs.-v>(>OOi.«0*>»-* 
■.!■&% 
r         "      t \W*WM i 
i 
Tho  Secretary  of  Defense  proposes  in  the  near  future  to  ask  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy  to  review  the  placement  of  the  Navy  cryptologio 
organisation  to  determine  whether  a  subordination  and  structure  nor* 
closely  paralleling  that  of  the  Army  and  the  Air  Force  might  not  be 
advantageous* 
RBCOMHEHDATION  MO*  7 
"That  the  military  Services  give  greater  attention  to  selecting  officers 
for  COMET  duties,  assign  regular  or  'career*  reserve  officers  to  the 
fflayjmmn  extent  possible,  indoctrinate  officers  in  CQHJUT  prior  to  sending 
them  to  command  field  stations,  and  establish  career  opportunities  for 
specialists  equal  to  those  of  the  line  or  general  service -officers* 
Rotation _and  replacement  procedures  should  be  improved*  The  feasibility 
of  using: : : : : : ::::::::::::::::::::::: ifehouid  be  thoroughly  tested* 
"It  is  also  recommended  that  the  Congress  enact  leg&ation  to  authorise 
the  Rational  Security  Agency  to  employ  specially  qualified  retired  military 
personnel  as  presently  authorised  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  and  with 
no  restriction  on  the  number  so  employed*  Such  legislation  should  also 
permit  the  Secretary  of  Defense  to  recall  retired  officers  to  active  duty 
with  KSA  and  have  those  offioers  counted  against  ths  authorized  strength  of 
RSA  but  not  of  the  respective  military  services*" 
Department  of  Defense  Position  t 
The  Department  of  Defense  submits  the  following  additional  observations 
in  expansion  of  the  USCIB  comment  on  this  reeoianendation*  As  set  forth  in 
its  comments  on  Recommendation  No*  6,  the  Department  of  Defense  believes 
that  the  establishment  of  major  cryptologic  conaanda  in  each  of  the  military 
services  w^l  do  much  to  promote  the  career  possibilities  advocated  in 
Recommendation  No*  7»  Also,  with  the  support  of  this  Department *_  the  Army 
and  USA  are  already  embarked  on  a  program  to  dovelop^TTT:  *H*jjj  * : : : '  *  *  *1 
'. '. '.  ML ". '. * '. '.  1 1  Recently  the  Secretary  of  Defense  endorsed  a  Navy  proposal*  to 
*  augment*  the  Naval  Security  Group  with  civilians* 
With  respect  to. the  enjoyment  by:KSA  of  specially  qualified  retired 
military  personnel,  the  Department  of  Defense  supports  this  proposal  for 
NSA  in  principle  as  an  element  of  the  Department,  but  would  emphasise  that 
the  highest  objective  standards  of  professional  orttechnical  ekill  should 
be  applied  in  fairing  such  persons,  in  order  to  avoid  possible  abuses  which 
could  seriously  prejudice  career  civilian  morale* 
•   •..  .Full*  consideration  .of  the  application  of  this,  proposal  is  currently 
in  progress  among  personnel  and  legislative  experts  within  the  Department 
of  Defense* 
-5-
THE     CITADEL 
THE    MILITARY    COLLECSE    OF    SOUTH    CAROLINA 
CHARLESTON.    S.  C 
OFF.C.OF  March  9,    1955 
THE   PRESIDENT 
Maj.  Gen.  J.  G.  Christiansen 
Committee  on  Organization  of  the 
Executive  Branch  of  the  Government 
Room  4850,  Gen.  Acctg.  Ofc.  Building 
5th  and  G  Streets 
Washington  25,  D.  C. 
Dear  Jim: 
Here  is  a  copy  of  a  letter  to  Senator  McCarthy 
for  your  information.   I  will  be  seeing  you  on  the  22nd. 
tncerely, 
Mark  W.  clark 
MWC/spb 
Encl.
Syed recat weg AME OR TERE O8 Tah Lat is fe tobe ah beceag ity g ‘. in - pignias Ser ast : CE ee COMMISSION TON/ORG Ne ead © a SSPORLTHE | uh bis 7 eh ed CXECUTIVE BRANCH OF, THE, PV Aa wheter betta yey ; ia, Us ay ‘ ¥ Loa and ; ang ‘ WASHINGTON 2 a. c. , yd “a : AL. BUSINESS A” #2 ! EUAL BUSINESS ps) ii) . . > Eg. ° 4 8 . “ if. 2 re oe 5 baa AY 10 oy fee OU e : eS: ee if sea! fe AY Fa a ron A
&CA-4XX? 
s?^i  s$^--2*^^^  C&t^is/c~  ^gs^ue  S~ 
js»gfc-g*-e,  £d  "W—q— 
n^Z^yL^     &Z*c-C^ 
^ku^J^s^V^ 
^    /^f^<5e^7     £X-^£^C^>?' 
^L^t^d^p 
j^^*^J^&^U<f    &L^?      -£^tf»L^7^^ 
'^r^&MjzL**^^—  *$C~ 
^  ~  Z-"        L^f^^C^     ^^C^-c^ug^ 
£stS^>V<S<^^&^J    lytf 
^,.<Z^£r~r. 
..-M.).
TOP  SBG&i 
RECOMMEKDATION  Ko*  8  ;   ~~ 
"That  the  Secretary  of  Defense  give  further  consideration  to  the 
allocation  of  an  appropriate  number  of  •super  grades*  and  positions 
under  Public  Law  313  to  KSA;  to  the  possibility  of  further  inducements 
or  higher  pay  to  selected  consultants;  and  to  privileges  extended  to 
civilians  overseas**1 
Department  of  Defense  Position  t. 
The  Department  of  Defense  is  supporting  the  efforts  of  the  Director* 
USA,  to  obtain  additional  super  grades  from  the  Civil  Service  Commission* 
Further  j  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  Defense  (Manpower  and  Personnel)  is 
seeking  as  a  priority  matter  (within  existing  legislation)  to  meet  the 
request  of  the  Director,  KSA,  for  further  inducements  to  selected  consul- 
tants and  privileges  for  civilians  employed  overseas*  The  consultant 
problem  is  not  confined  to  MSA  alone,  and  the  Department  prefers  to  resolve 
it  for  KSA  as  part  of  an  overfall  Department  of  Defense  solution*  Such 
additional  legislation  as  nay  be  required  to  achieve  these  objectives  is 
also  under  consideration* 
-  6- 
top---shsh
THE  WHITE  HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 
/ 
/e^i^cs  -    ,;<\    /^^a      fry/   ""*s  /£.<*,«£/
COMMISSION    ON    ORGANIZATION      ■_ 
OF  THE 
i.v;;rnvi:  uhanch  of  the  GOVERNMENT' 
WASHINGTON   25.   D.  C.  ^    [ 
OFFICIAL   BUSINESS 
7,.?' 
■  y...;. 
5r- *■!  '-- 
'.■  "/•iffjyj'i'IrW.''    .J  J"!!'    J^J    ,'.'■    )    •■)■■■'/■,      ,'■    >■  ....'■-■■'  ■■:•■>■  ■     _■■■'" 
<&st-u.ji*  '-^p^^^^^-^! 
6*6 
r  '? 
■SI.:-', 
'Mil'.
SEQ4ET 
June  1,  1955 
MEMORANDUM  FOR  RECEIPT 
SU3J*CT:  Case  Files  of  Task  Force  on  Intelligence  Activities, 
Commission  on  Organisation  of  the  Executive  Branch  of 
the  Government. 
v  1. 
y  i 
:l^ 
rs*^ 
^ 
3! 
V' 
n 
-9' 
HI 
i 
!•_ 
; 
■J'. 
Jo 
o- 
■- 
Cr" 
< tt 
_l 
O 
Ul 
a 
I 
i 3 
.It ^ 
.g 
< 
CO 
2. 
•5- 
r' 
6. 
K  7. 
^9- 
^10. 
^11. 
^  32. 
List  of  names  furnished  General  Hark  V.  Clark  by  Senator  Joseph 
McCarthy. 
List  cf  names  sent  by  Task  Force  to  the  Federal  Bureau  of  In- 
vestigation. 
Report  by  Central  Intelligence  Agency  on  names  furnished  by  the 
Task  Force. 
Report  by  Department  of  the  Array  on  names  furnished  by  the  Task 
Force. 
Report  by  Department  of  the  Air  Force  on  names  furnished  by  the 
Task  Force. 
Report  by  Department  of  the  Havy  on  names  furnished  by  the 
Task  Force. 
Report  by  Department  of  State  on  naraes  furnished  by  the  Task  Force. 
Report  by  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  on  names  furnished  by 
the  Task  Force. 
"Dead  Man  Case"  furnished  General  Mark  W.  Clark  by  Senator  Joseph 
McCarthy  and  Central  Intelligence  Agency's  report  thereon. 
?aix  et  Liberte  case  furnished  General  Hark  W.  Clark  by  Senator 
Joseph  McCarthy.     Central  Intelligence  Agency's  reply  and  memorandum 
from  Colonel  Heiman  0.  Lane,  Staff  Member  of  the  Task  Force. 
$200,000  allegedly  lost  by  Central  Intelligence  Agency.     This  case 
was  furnished  General  Mark  V.    Clark  by  Senator  Joseph  McCarthy. 
Central  Intelligence  Agency's  reply. 
The  c ase  of   III!!!""   V"    """   ■. 
furnished  General  Mark  W.  Clark  by  Senator  Joseph  McCarthy.     J^ter 
from  David  S.  Siaith,   Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Air  Force  to  General 
J.  G.   Christiansen,  dated  25  April  1955,  with  enclosure.      (Air 
Force  Contract  No.  AF  33  (038)  12909. withHarvard  University? 
Analysis  of  the  Soviet  Social  System.)
Memorandum  for  Receipt     -2- 
Copy  of  letter  from  General  Hark  W.   Clark  to  General  Nathan  Twining, 
Chief  of  Staff,  D.  S.  Air  Force,   dated  23  Kay  1°5$. 
^13.  Copy  of  letter  from  Alfred  Kohlberg  to  Senator  Joseph  McCarthy 
(copy  furnished  General  Mark  W.  Clark. hy  Mr.  Lohlberg.)     Eeport  by 
CIA  on  the  case,  dated  15  March  19$$. 
vOLli.  Final  Eeport  of  the  Select  Committee  to  Sonduct  an  Investigation 
and  Study  of  the   Facts,  Evidence,   aid  Circumstances  of  the  Katyn 
Forest  Kassacre,  pursuant  to  R.Res.  390  and  K.Res.  539  (82nd  Con- 
gress) 
I  certify  that  I  have  received -the  above  listed  documents  from  Colonel 
John  J.  Dubbelde,.D.S.  Army,  Retired,  Deputy  Staff  Director,  Task  Force  on 
Intelligence  Activities,   Coramission  on  Organization  of  the  Executive  Branch 
of  the  Government.
COMMISSION.  ON' ORGANIZATION 
'"•.■'•";' '.^.v,-;'''; 
.   
"of  THE.     .'"'•:  '■'■'Jv-t'Sv'.-'' 
uxlcutive  branch  of  the  government'v;,.v;;'.'.',i 
washington  25,  d.  c.  ;';','".■ 
__    '■':,'■'( 
OFFICIAL  BUSINESS 
.■'r-.-vi:--. 
7^'JV' 
■  '■».'■■•. 
.-.v. '■.--■*<•:  •'v-^-ii? >:■-;/;  .i'.>*H<:  -•„ 
,'••■.•(*" .-;-'■  ■';-.,,;'-fi^ ■}>-..;,:;»'A<i,»r-'l:.i-.'}",  .-.'•  •''        •'•  ri V.v-  -">■•  •■•    ■'.  '■  " 
,:■  u-sy:        ■  ■  ■  ■ 
■;^-:- ■■:■.-.  •.- 
■  '•  •"•■'■'ii'.v'''V'i,-''vV .;'•■".,■;'■•'     >■    ■;;■-.  .-';*•>'■'.••'■;"  ,-' ■■•'•.■':■'>  ,:-:- .-\.-,-.v--: ■:- >■•» .f~ ••■- ■  ■■•' .- 
-fid
*.)/•'.' I 
-•)  /'j  ...   i  ;..  ■  j' 
.'■'•.  >'^  •■]!■•?,-■-•   :'■; 
',,;rvj-ii''..>  ,'•
\"-     .  '   <  "<  *'■    '■   ' 
COMMISSION   ON   ORGANIZATION     .' 
.  OF  THE  "    '  '.: 
■:lc:i.itive  branch  of  the  government 
washington  25.  d.  c.  ' 
official-  business    '  '.   . 
' '  •  ■■■ 
■■:>{•?&< 
-'  ■/■ 
'vi'     '   * 
Si- 
"■'/'• 
i'i'.V,' 
v'-i 
■;-.-yS: 
l,r.. 
■M\, 
v^i  ■ 
•*>*>• 
j#t'' 
;#: 
■;.,/,*  ,;_ 
'■•\',n 
Mr:;* 
;.■  (J  .:  : 
^  .'"^."•■••i'i 
V/>:- 
'.•JW'.ir.*'-;. 
.:..Vr.J;'if;!; 
•'.'.'•s.-yv'i,''
■t■^■^■/;:■:^■^,•^vv^^™V!■":;■;•■v.', 
■^:'--'-.V-^;---^:#^ 
7'  ■  -1'  '..    )■■  ■■■  ..      .^M$&4^.''    '  ■■■■■•■',■    '  ■•      •-■^^ii^:i'' 
i  ■■■*■■  ;- ' '\^ w?»:» ' ■  J   ;i     '      ,•'■■.'    >v^%vv^>-V-
IFIED 
DOCUMENTS 
RECEIPT 
*',;'*  •'**'*!'$(&;.■•""■■-, 
RECEIVEO   OF 
SSrafegaT  J.  0.  Christiansen 
t:i 
FILE   NUMBER 
.a»v- 
G2-SPS 
it": 
OATE 
OATE 
TIME 
OATE 
12  APR  195SJ 
REGISTER   NO. 
SUBJECT 
12  APR  199  J 
Security  Status  -  3  pga,  2  cys 
sr^- 
J.  J-f  -- 
SIGNATURE 
Pioooo  iijn  and  rmturn   tmmadiataly  »m    thim   rocoipt  i«  n«c»«««ry  to  cleao  our  rtcordt. 
DA 
FORM        CQ1   (Formmrly 
i  nov  50  OOI    04  i«a» 
REPLACES  AGO  FORM  014 04,  1  MAT  50,  WHICH  MAY  BE  USE0. 
CPO:  l«l  o-  U1U>
'.rr^i'f;'' 
^:■^^^•MLfi^,;« ■:■'■'■  ■;■■■'  " 
■  :  '.••■;':  V-iv>:-+-;  '■'' ';  "  • 
,  .'. v,<.\i.,f  ■ 
-  --r'.  ..-'fv ', 
,'  <■ 
i^I^Vi^'.' 
.  '■ 
"vi;r^.    ,J 
3  ->.-ii  V)  "* 
,  '   ,^:i'"'-- '  • 
)4 
')?*■■  '"'■  ^ 
.,  I 
' 
rf Vf '  -'  V" '
DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  AIR  FORCE 
WASHINGTON 
OFFICE  OF  THE  SECRETARY 
April  6,  1955 
Dear  Mr.  Christiansen: 
I  refer  to  your  letter  of  March  30,  1955,  which  re- 
auests  information  on  employment  and  security  status  of 
certain  individuals. 
Records  maintained  at  Headquarters  USAF  do  not  indi- 
cate that  any  of  the  individuals  named  in  your  letter  of 
March  30  are  now  or  have  been  employed  in  any  headquarters 
activity.  As  you  are  aware,  the  maintenance  of  civilian 
personnel  records  is  decentralized  to  the  various  field 
operating  agencies. 
.,   Therefore,  in  conformity  with  the  agreement  made  by 
\\\<V-"        Captain  Knight  of  your  staff  and  Colonel  Paul  H.  Crews  of 
p        our  Office  of  Special  Investigations,  no  effort  has  been 
made  to  check  any  of  the  many  civilian  personnel  offices 
in  the  field  in  connection  with  your  request.  For  this 
reason  it  is  not  possible  to  furnish  conclusive  informa- 
tion as  to  present  or  past  employment  of  these  individuals 
in  any  of  the  various  USAP  operating  elements  not  directly 
administered  by  Headquarters  USAP. 
In  view  of  the  above,  the  Department  of  the  Air  Force 
is  unable  to  furnish  security  information  as  requested  by 
you. 
Sincerely, 
FREDERICK  AYER,  JR. 
Special  Assistant  to  the  Secretary 
Mr.  J.  G.  Christiansen 
Staff  Director 
Task  Force  on  Intelligence  Activities 
Commission  on  Organization  of  the 
Executive  Branch  of  the  Government 
General  Accounting  Office  Building 
Washington  25,  D.  C.
COMM 
EXECUTSVE 
■"-mimm^^  v  : •■■■.■■  •■h-m^- 
.'-  .t-.  ^'!  ''.■■■  j  ■    •'  .         "     •         -    j    •  -        .  .   •    ,  ■     ■  .  t 
'iV,v('-,;i
Teese , WC - = ‘ ‘ rare, Pa) ea ee het ent bse ow “4 i) a \ He J Meee wd Sia ‘ oe on f “ee & iets “ ate Spee e) pets A) Mes 2 Bet Vaan: a f ge NAc TC NN a etRS Data Hyer ast cielbaan umNas pelts Pale eyed Raat ed Bae een etait ay y 3 4 5 4 y" 4 TM 5 . “ 4 t t (ah J oe ss ee ‘ < ania Ae tf Ha bapenesa ae a ae ae toa ie 6 oe Pale watery Ta evry eS A i ry 5 i) ; a hyo ¢ fe Ae rst Pete ae . ry A, ; Gis GS ahesu EAP ATH ie TAN eu aa 3 Mat Dean cay a TrAec vay Bageneyy 32) be AO ats ECE seats aainel at Ste Hees IG nat eka were Sc Mito s tt eat atiy alee a NR UR tA NE pL hgh
26  January  1955 
MEMORANDUM  FOR  THE  RECORD 
SUBJECT:    Dead  Man  Case 
The  following  is  the  true  story  which  was  apparently  the  basis  for 
the  "Dead  Man  Case"  item. 
Mr.   Howard  Louis  JAMISON,  Jewish,  entered  on  duty  with  the 
Training  Office  of  CIA  on  1  October  1951.    He  was  to  be  a  lecturer  and 
his  first  lecture  was  to  be  given  on  22  October  1951. 
Since  his  subject  was  one  which  required  the  use  of  libraries  and 
facilities  outside  CIA  (such  as  the  Library  of  Congress)  he  was  given 
twelve  days  (from  10  October  1951  until  22  October  1951)  to  do  outside 
research  and  collect  materials  to  be  used  in  his  lectures.     This  plan 
and  the  materials  he  would  collect  and  the  research  he  would  do  had 
all  been  carefully  gone  over  in  Training  Division  prior  to  10  October 
1951  when  Mr.  JAMISON  last  talked  to  Training  Division  officials. 
Mr.  JAMISON  was  living  at  the  YMCA  in  Washington  and  YMCA 
officials  (and  his  personal  papers)  had  no  data  or  knowledge  of  his  CIA 
employment.     These  were  correct  security  precautions  which  Mr. 
JAMISON  had  taken.     YMCA  officials  only  knew  (and  could  only  find 
in  his  papers)  his  home  address  in  Springfield,   Massachusetts. 
On  11  October  1951  Mr.  JAMISON  died  in  his  room  at  the  YMCA 
of  natural  causes  (heart  failure)  and  the  YMCA  immediately  notified  his 
family  at  his  home  address  in  Springfield,  Massachusetts  and  they 
(because  of  the  Jewish  custom)  immediately  took  the  body  home  for 
burial  services. 
CIA  did  not  know  of  his  death  until  he  failed  to  show  up  on  22  October 
1951.     When  he  failed  to  appear  on  22  October  1951  for  the  scheduled 
lecture  the  Training  Office  immediately  called  the  Security  Office  and 
they  learned  all  of  the  above  on  that  date.       • 
ex.  i" :",  ;> ....  :!->" , 
*k&«K. .  By _^y_  Date  <//  7  /;  
•
ot  we  I 
-  2  - 
There  were  no  security  breaches  by  JAMISON  or  his  family. 
Mr.  Robert  BANNERMAN  (Deputy  Director  of  Security,   CIA)  advises 
that  the  case  was  quite  properly  handled  in  every  aspect  and  Training  - 
Division  was  not  blamable  in  any  way  for  actions  taken.     This  is  simply 
a  case  of  an  employee  having  had  very  few  friends  in  CIA  and  having  been 
on  a  task  which  (for  twelve  (12)  days)  allowed  him  to  do  independent 
research  in  libraries  outside  CIA  and  having  quietly  died  while  on  this 
outside  duty. 
FD^7:cr:?  r":\::'-r;; 
E.O.  12GS5.  C:c    i-^U^i 
NLE  Pats       Wh/gj
|;3;<V\ 
'  Uf' 
.  •  >u»  ■, .  ■ 
■     ■,,*i", 
■';,-f'iy: 
1  ,; 
'     ,^'?.; 
.:)-,i^'- 
' 
1 '  ,/IW 
k 
.-..'''/v: 
■;.    •};*£&&?: :■■-■,+:■■■  ■'■■■.:  .;.■■  :,•■■;■:-:,  ■ 
:  
•     ^?k  st44;3#«J^ !'.* Vf; W^m?'-* 
...-•  '.'■     ■  •,':':  ;''      '    -".', •.:>■'•.  '.•-'/■.•'''!  '■.•.TV1-"' ,•'.';  •     ■■.'>:'•.,  j'.'Vi  \"r.',.„-i 
■;-i  'ij;.  ■■•.  "  !•>«
!   I 
wwt*ir 
26  January  1955 
UJ 
K 
a:  "  >< 
oriH 
u  rj 
MEMORANDUM 
SUBJECT:    $200, 000  Allegedly  Lost  by  CIA  ^Germanyin  1948-4^  ^ 
....••«•••••••••••••••••■*•"*"■••*"""**"""********"*" 
This  story  is  not  correct.    A  cursory  review  of  financial  and  oper- 
ational records  in  1948,   1949,   1950  (and  subsequently)  for  the  Division 
covering  Germany  has  been  made;  and  personnel  who  were  in  Germany 
and /or  are  in  a  position  to  know  of  any  such  loss  as  that  indicated  have 
been  asked  for  anything  they  can  recall  of  a  loss  of,official  funds.     Among 
the  persons  questioned  were   •  •  • 
  --.  , 
::::::::::::::*. : : : : :  :::::*.:*  *  *•  *. '.  "•"*.: : : : : : : :  said  he  would  most  certainly 
'have  known' of  any  loss  of  CIA  (official)* funds  and  he  categorically  has 
stated  the  story  is  not  true. 
In  addition  to  the  above,  there  is  the  obvious  error  in  date.  J: ::::::::: : 
"  :   arrived  in  Germany  in  April  1951  and  neither  of  the  two  (2)  others 
"named*  :::::::::::::*. : : :::::::: : : : : : :::::: :  *-  *.  '■  \  \  
\  was  in  Germany  during 
1949.     :::: 
The  first  OPC  representative  in  Germany  was .   
:;:::::::::".".::  there  are  some  unresolved  questions  regarding  his  finances 
and'some'of  his  accountings  but  there  is  no  question  which  should  give 
rise  to  any  story  similar  to*$200,000.00  being  lost  by  CIA". 
C :  .*  t '.  *. '.  ::::::*.::::: :  *. '.  who  is  presently  in  Washington,   states  he 
arriUd  m  German'y  ::::::::iin  late  August  1950.     He  has  never  heard 
of  any  loss  of  (or  even  any  questions  about)  $200,000  and  is  certain  that 
he  would  have  heard  of  it  if  it  had  occurred  in  1949  (prior  to  his  arrival). 
He  states  he  knows  no  loss  of  official  funds  occurred  while  he  was  in 
  •   :::::::::i:::::::::' '•'•' •"•'•'''' 
  ::::;:::::::::::::::::: : : ::.:::......."  •   *  — 
:i  "  I  i 
:  *  
" ".  i : :  They  "have,*  therefore"  not  been  questioned  about  this  allegation. 
^is  '.'.'.   * 
C    *  * 
>■  Jus**" 
Author  jvKiJig.-  k  l'-L-  -
sles Ages ight Py te {3s BP hae eres snenemes 4, 5 ae ft yaberte REGED Fee comMM| SION RON NIZATIC oot YT TARYOR SHELA Uefa ; : EXECUTIVE BRANGE 22h THE{SAYEON MENTS baked at Aaa Fo ri ¥ aes Ae a f tet st asta’ 19 AL ‘3 . - wa = i TE : 3 | ea Ren SES) eG ih, a Auk a - “tafe Lae Coe ree ar Pare RA SST a) aa airs oon Reet LN pb ide Sra i tolad at wea : : ; ‘ ‘ ates oS rome) : nes : A 2 PS wae ra (" ne 854 SAP ASE - ry Go Lope: eFC SP Coxe 3 aS SSRs: eae ¥ ee. oA ON yee: : ae yes: woe oot tie A eo * Setants ae $ or r. A ~ . SS : ean" 4 a red ‘ >. Je wy , a? be Hive co y, ce a 4% > x Pa " Se ee fa 4 Saar ae y 3 ono <4 outer ne 4 ; Sal Js CM ANS 4 PRU renee atalw esr) La . EP ath ' aiehakR y Tee Spee “ak EH ;
Air  Force  Contract  No.  AF33( 038) 12909  with  Harvard  University 
Analysis  of  the  Soviet  Social  System 
The  Contract  Mission:  On  1  June,  1950,  the  Human  Resources  Research 
Institute  of  the  Air  University  Command,  entered  into  a  contract  with 
Harvard  University  whereby  its  Russian  Research  Center  would  undertake 
to  gather  information  about  the  life  experience  of  the  Soviet  people 
and  the  institutions  which  control  their  behavior  by  interviewing  ex- 
Soviet  citizens,  to  integrate  the  interview  data  with  such  other  sources 
of  data  on  the  Soviet  Union  as  are  available  and  pertinent,  and  to  syn- 
thesize the  resulting  information  into  a  "provisional  working  model," 
or  analysis,  of  the  Soviet  social  system.  Specifically,  the  research 
is  intended  to: 
(1)  Describe  and  analyze  the  components  of  the  Soviet  social  system 
the  people,  their  key  institutions,  and  the  way  institutions  and  people 
interact ; 
(2)  Indicate  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  the  system  under  given 
conditions; 
(3)  Develop  a  series  of  inter-related  statements  or  propositions 
about  the  structure  and  function  of  Soviet  society  as  a  total  system, 
in  order  to  provide  a  basis  for  more  accurate  predictions  as  to  the  prob- 
able behavior  of  the  system  under  specified  conditions,  especially  under 
conditions  of  internal  stress  or  external  force,  and  consequently  "to 
provide  a  basis  for  Air  Force  policy  and  planning  in  regard  to  the  Soviet 
Union.  This  predictive  device,  as  described  above,  is  termed  the  Working 
Model  of  the  Soviet  Social  System. 
Cost  and  Current  Status  of  the  Project:   This  contract  was  initiated 
1  June  1950  and  terminated  30  June  1954.  A  no-cost  extension  was  granted 
to  30  September  1954.   The  total  cost  for  the  contract  was  $908  thousand. 
At  the  present  time  the  Air  Force  monitor  of  this  project  is  the 
Air  Force  Personnel  and  Training  Research  Center,  Air  Research  and 
Development  Command. 
The  Project  has  been  divided  into  four  phases  each  of  which  were 
accomplished  in  approximately  one  year: 
Phase  1.   Collection  of  data.   During  this  period,  interviews  and 
questionnaires  were  completed  in  Europe  and  in  this  country. 
Phase  2.   Processing.   Materials  were  translated,  content  examined, 
topically  organized,  and  tabulation  commenced.
Phase  3.  Analysis.  This  phase  was  concerned  with  the  completion 
of  coding  and  tabulation,  and  the  preparation  of  analytical  reports  on 
special  topics. 
Phase  4.  Completion  of  Analysis  and  Conclusion.  All  special  reports, 
summary  reports  and  prediction  guides  are  being  completed  and  forwarded 
to  the  Air  Force  monitor.  Completion  of  work  in  this  phase  is  being 
accomplished  by  Harvard  University  without  additional  cost  to  the 
government . 
Results  of  this  contract  have  been  used  by  various  staff  offices 
of  the  Air  Force,  by  the  Army  and  by  CIA  through  published  reports, 
reference  to  project  files  or  through  briefings  presented  by  Dr.  Clyde 
Kluckhohn,  formerly  director  of  the  Russian  Research  Center.
HARVARD  UNIVERSITY 
Faculty  of  Arts  and  Sciences 
Office  of  the  Dean  5  University  Hall 
Cambridge  38,  Massachusetts 
May  5,    1955 
General  J.  G.  Christiansen 
Staff  Director 
Task  Force  on  Intelligence  Activities 
Commission  on  Organization  of  the 
Executive  Branch  of  the  Government 
General  Accounting  3uilding 
V/ashington  25,  D.  C. 
Dear  General  Christiansen: 
Your  letter  of  April  2  addressed  to  President 
Pusey  has  been  referred  to  me  for  reply. 
I  am  able  to  inform  you  that  Professor  John 
K.  Fairbank  (not  Fairbanks)  did  not  participate 
in  the  work  done  by  the  Russian  Research  Center 
of  Harvard  University  under  Air  Force  Contract 
No.  AF  33(038)  12909. 
Very  truly  yours , 
McGeorge  Bundy 
Dean
Dr.  Nathan  Pussy,  President, 
Harvard  University, 
Cambridge,  Massachusetts 
My  dear  Dr.  Pusey: 
Under  the  Conmission  on  Organization  of  the  Executive  Branch 
of  the  Government,  the  Task  Force  of  which  General  Mark  tf.  Clark 
is  chairman,  has  been  engaged  for  the  past  few  months  in  a  survey 
of  Federal  intelligence  activitiea.  In  the  course  of  this  work,  a 
wide  variety  of  information  has  been  made  available  to  the  Task 
Force,  some  of  which  is  insufficiently  complete  to  permit  proper 
appraisal  of  its  worth. 
Of  the  nature  of  information  mentioned  above,  is  a  statement 
concerning  Air  Force  Contract  Ho.  AF  33(038)  32909  with  Harvard 
University.  The  Task  Force  has  been  advised  that  the  Human  Resources 
Research  Institute  of  the  Air  University  Comand  entered  into  this 
contract  with  Harvard  University  on  June  1,  1950,  whereby  its  Russian 
Research  Center  would  undertake  an  analysis  of  the  Soviet  social 
system.  It  is  understood  that  this  contract  terminated  June  30,  195U- 
The  additional  information  needed  by  the  Task  Force  concerns 
whether  or  not  Mr.  John  K.  Fairbanks  participated  in  this  contractual 
effort.  Tour  cooperation  is  requested  to  the  extent  of  advising 
whether  Mr.  Fairbanks  was  employed  by  the  Russian  Research  Center 
during  the  term  of  the  contract  referred  to,  whether  he  took  part  in 
the  work  involved  in  that  contract,  and  the  inclusive  dates  of  such 
participation.  A  brief  statement  as  to  the  nature  of  the  work  per- 
fomed  by  Mr.  Fairbanks  would  be  helpful. 
In  order  that  this  information  may  be  available  to  the  Task 
Force  when  it  next  assembles  for  deliberation  on  May  12,  1955,  an 
early  reply  is  requested.  Thank  you  for  your  assistants  in  this 
regard. 
Very  truly  yours, 
J.  G.  Christiansen 
Staff  Director
•   i 
r-         f,        f   ,'?■''      &       ■■'  Jf'0  *  / 
-J7. 
s~~s- 
.'         ^ 
/ 
/ 
/  
- '  
- 
/  '      / 
/
Kj. 
NATION'S  BUSINESS  •   MARCH   1955 
'V: 
•**>  ■     -$  "VS^-.Y-   ;-r"'.    .  ■..''ft'? 
WHAT  RUSSIA 
WILL 
•  II NEXT 
•■V  .       . .  .  e. 
■Mii. 
Kremlin  wants i  to  avoid  all-out  war,  Air  Force 
Russian  study  reveals.  The  chances  of  revolt  in 
Soviet  Union  held  slim,  although  many  Russians 
are  fed  up  with  terror  tactics  of  Red  regime 
-l^'y--'^'^:-y  .'-.'     By'  PAUL   HENCKE 
MALENKOV's  resignation  as  Russia's  premier  and 
his  replacement  by  Bulganin  will  mean  little  change 
in  Russia's  over-all  strategy. 
This  is  the  opinion  to  be  drawn  from  a  four  year 
study  of  communist  power  and  weaknesses  which  the 
Russian  .Research.  Center  at  Harvard-ltoiyersifar  has 
just  completed  for  the  United  States  Afr  force. 
An  exclusive  interview  starting  on  page  26  sum- 
marizes the  most  important  findings  of  the  study. 
Some  of  the  conclusions  are  heartening  to  the  cause 
of  freedom.  Others  seem  to  justify  the  darkest  of 
doubts  about  the  future. 
Air  Force  evaiuators  describe  the  Harvard  material 
as  "the  most  thoroughgoing  and  extensive  examina- 
tion of  national  life  in  the  Soviet  Union  ever  under- 
taken by  western  scholars." 
Their  enthusiasm  is  warranted.  The  study — begun 
in  1950  and  completed  last  Nov.  30 — provides  our 
government  with  an  X-ray  picture  of  the  many 
forces  at  work  in  Soviet  society:  of  a  regime  shaken 
by  ideological  controversies  and  conflicting  personal 
ambitions  yet  unified  by  communism's  historic  drive 
toward  world  conquest;  of  a  people  weary  of  the 
burdens  thrust  on  them  by  totalitarian  masters  yet 
NATION'S     BUSINESS  ■  MARCH     19S5 
mesmerized  by  communism's  promise  of  a  better  life: 
of  an  economy  capable  of  eauipping  a  mammoth. 
modern  war  machine  yet  pathetically  ineDt  in  its 
efforts  to  supply  consumer  goods  to  the  citizens  of 
the  Soviet. 
The  basic  contents  of  the  study  are  the  accounts 
which  Russian  people  themselves  have  given  of  their 
day-to-day  life.  Harvard's  research  teams  conducted 
hundreds  of  oral  interviews  with  Russian  emigres  in 
Europe  and  America  during  1950  and  1951.  This 
information  was  augmented  by  thousands  of  question- 
airas  filled  out  by  Soviet  escapees,  special  reports 
written  by  former  factory  managers.  Communist 
Party  officials  and  others,  and  papers  prepared  ex- 
pressly for  the  Project  by  American  experts  on  the 
Soviet  Union. 
In  its  unprocessed  form  the  Harvard  data  exceeded 
33,000  pages.  Specialists  working  under  the  super- 
vision of  Dr.  Clvde^Kluckhohn.  director  of  the  proj- 
ect for  Harvard,  integrated  this  information,  and  fun- 
neled  the  end-product  into  the  Officer  Education  Re- 
search Laboratory  at  Maxwell  Air  Force  Base,  Mont- 
gomery, Ala. 
There  two  Air  Force  intelligence  specialists,  ur.
Herman  J.  Sander  and  Edmund  O.  Barker  have 
been  working  the  data  into  final  shape.  Their  work 
will  not  be  completed  until  some  time  this  summer. 
The  study  covered  many  aspects  of  Soviet  life — 
■'  reaction  to  German  occupation,  Soviet  policy  toward 
national  minorities,  the  arrest  system,  attitude  of  the 
man-in-the-street  toward  the  regime,  the^role  of  the 
factory  manager,  and  so  on. "  "./>:.:■?  b$-.  •"/  rt 
-  •  The  final  report  was- written  by  Dr.  Kluckhohn  in 
cooperation  with  two  staff  assistants,  Drs.  Alex  In- 
keles .  and  Raymond  Bauer.  It'  bears  the  wordy 
title,  "Strategic  Psychological  Strengths  and  Vulner- 
abilities of  the  Soviet  Social  System,"  but  amounts, 
in  fact,  to  a  simple  summing-up  of  all  that  was  learned 
during  the  four  years  of  exhaustive  research.  It  is  in 
this  volume,  too,  that  Harvard's  Russian  experts  pre-; 
diet  what  Russia's  next  moves  will  be.  -.5*-" 
The  thoroughness  of  the  scholarship  which  went 
into  this  study  is  illustrated  by  the  special  compe- 
-  tericies  of  Drs.  Kluckhohn,  Inkeles  and  Bauer.  They 
are,  in  the  order  named,  an .  anthropologist,  sociol- 
ogist, and  social  psychologist  Also  included  on  the 
-.  -.^project  research  staff  were  historians,  economists, 
/>  political  scientists,  clinical  psychologists,  students  of 
s-f*  Russian  literature  and  other  recognized  experts  on 
•'the  USSR.  .,:.  ' 
Sixty  of  the  former  Soviet  citizens  interviewed  were 
_  given  clinical  psychology  tests  designed  to  reveal  to 
the  researchers  the  innermost  workings  of  the  Soviet 
mind. 
Special  care  was  taken  in  all  phases  of  the  research 
to  insure  against  biased  opinion. 
.  The  interviewees  were  both  men  and  women,  but 
.  men  predominated.  Most  were  in  their  middle  years. 
-   Many  of  them  were  carried  out  of  Russia  as  im- 
pressed laborers  by  the  retreating  Nazis  during  World 
War  II.    Others  left. Russia  in  the  immediate  post- 
war era. 
Some  got  out  as  late  as  1950.  -     - 
No  significant  differences  were  noted  in  the  atti- 
tudes expressed  by  those  Russians  brought  out  of 
their  homeland  by  the  German  Army  and  those  who 
left  later.  For  this  reason  the  research  directors 
believe  that  they  obtained  a  portrait  of  Russian  so- 
ciety as  it  is  today,  as  well  as  ten  or  15  years  ago. 
The*  average  Soviet  citizen,  in  other  words,  has 
been  much  the  same  person  since  about  1940  and 
probably  won't  change  much  in  his  basic  attitudes 
in  the  foreseeable  future. 
The  interviewees  made  up  a  cross-section  of  work 
groups — housewives,  students,  Red  Army  and  Com- 
munist Party  officials,  farmers,  doctors,  lawyers — and 
included  members  of  many  disparate  national  groups 
— Armenians,  Byelorussians,  Georgians,  Great  Rus- 
sians, Ukrainians,  and  so  forth.  Many  had  been 
active,  loyal  supporters  of  the  regime  right  up  to  the 
time  they  left  Russia. 
Few  could  be  labeled  as  "social  failures"  and  their 
testimony  challenged  on  that  basis. 
Certain  themes  recurred  often  during  the  four 
years  of  fact-finding:  agriculture  is  a  very  weak  cog 
in  the  Soviet  machine  (Harvard's  researchers  call  the 
peasant-farmers  the  "angry  men"  of  the  Russian  pop- 
ulace) ;  many  Russians  dislike,  even  detest,  the  re- 
gime yet  like  and  support  such  communist  devices  as 
state  ownership  of  the  means  of  production  and  the 
concept  of  the  welfare  state;  there  is  little  chance  that 
the  Party  and  the  regime  will  be  overthrown. 
What  prompted  the  Air  Force  to  have  this  research 
performed? 
The  answer   is  simple.    Nations  are   interrelated 
...A.    > 
.>'"-        '■' 
social  systems  of  great  complexity  m^         ijodemi, 
world,  and  the  impact  of  air  weapons  in  aiv  future 
war  will  go  much  beyond  the  physical  damage  which 
can  be  accomplished.  .XAy--i<'\---r'  :'>'->~  "■ 
Since  the  definition  of  a  target  system  has  expanded 
and  the  potentiality  of  weapons  has  changed,  it  has  . 
become  necessary  to  consider  factors;  previously  ig- 
nored. Among  the  most  importanfjjf  thffle^are  the 
psychological  and  sociological  baseff-oifpgwnmuiuty 
and  national  life.       '  t   -?-"    .-.■^''.-•"^SB&'ohS'''     <-'-•-• 
In  the  case  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  its.  M3,000,000 
people,  this  has  necessitated  turning  social  science 
methods  to  the  description  and  analysis,pf .  tjbe  basic 
components  of  the  Soviet  system-^the^opl^  their 
'key  institutions,  and  the  manner  in  wbich  institutions 
land  people  interact         •*^"' ~9^S^8^?^r;:H*.'*L':; 
^,-^.t      »vte  ,^^,*f^l^>:^>; ... 
The  report  gives  the  Air  Force  new  analyses  of  the 
people  and  of  basic  institutions  of  the  Soviet  system 
— analyses  wbich  will  have  particular  yalueJUistra- 
.  .tegic  planning,  '. vv  :  ?K  if5V34^K^^¥'>  "■■-  "■'■ 
.  Considerations  of  strengths  and' weaknesses  of  the 
Soviet  system,  loyalty  and  disloyalty  of  the  people, 
or  any  other  social  vulnerabilities;  provide -a"  realistic 
framework  within  which  Russian  capabilities  can  be 
measured.  -•  '--4  'J-  '•*  '.^fP  «,'PH?'*'"- '.^-^V;  \  ' 
Whether  at  policy  levels,  in  training  programs,  or 
in  the  hands  of  Air  Force  research  experts,  this  study 
brings  to  each  a  more  penetrating  view  and  under- 
standing of  the  USSR  as  it  exists  today. 
'  '  -To  draw  out  the  significant  findings  of  the  Air 
Force-Harvard  study,  Nation's  Business  interviewed 
-Edmund  O.  Barker,  the  Air  Force  official  most  fa- 
miliar with  the  Harvard  material. 
Mr.  Barker's  answers  are  based  solely  on  the  con- 
tents of  the  Harvard  Project. 
INSIDE  I 
RUSSIA! 
How  will  Malenkov's   resignation   affect  future 
moves  by  the  Soviet  government? 
Changes  in  leadership  were  expected  by  the  Proj- 
ect. Barring  profound  crises  (as  might  occur  in 
agriculture),  the  outlook  is  for  relative  stability  and 
continuation  of  substantially  the  present  system  re- 
gardless of  "palace  revolutions." 
Will  Malenkov's  resignation  affect  the  validity 
of  the  Project  findings? 
No — not  at  all,  because  the  Project  was  primarily 
concerned  with  basic,  largely  unchanging,  aspects  of 
Soviet  life,  institutions,  and  people,  rather  than  with 
the  changing  fortunes  of  leaders  at  the  top  involved 
in  the  struggle  for  power.  These  fundamental  ele- 
ments in  Soviet  national  life  are  continuing:  They 
weather  crises  and  outlive  loaders. 
NATION'S    BUSINESS -MARCH     1355
:'■*■*         " 
l^^^^f^^^B agMV«j?sgTr: 
->..  -"y  ,  ;" 
ri-'Hir-^-yj}- 
WI^B^^^^^^^m 
■'-- -;j 
'?<TriBi»>4fPt-J; 
V.-;»vw:,  r-  c-1;: 
-rfv>-*  l'.-:-.''ss 
■  --  ™    -  _: ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B^S^^^^^H^^^S 
:".•--* -3*r-.jitt  ' 
';-:!  ..T-wyjv/s 
."^  »!?'*££*<.;  VUV 
^lilsKftiryaV  it 
...     ., '    ■•.'■»■"'> 
;  <o  v-vl.-s  :.<:<•;• 
"i-Ktfofec?  BiTfl!-- 
fi_:  >-V?<V.V>  >"-7iti'' 
vj^J'i 
.    *  '             "  'y'-*~-' 
?sjocv*  v^s*.';o: 
•'VYasjstsijatfi 
.  .<  ;.i.S.--.r '-•■«* 
.  ;^!;..*i  »i-..^ 
-",".;?.•;  .'if,-.  :-i.'ow 
•-:.  •;':■:." •:'«».'• 
,  •_".*:-.-,  \vwj 
-■'..- 
J2@£££^^^^^^^^H 
\~j    .">?  .  fjt'*-':-->?5  v 
*             ■   ■   ?.i 
•i'*  ■  .v. "'   •.'.•  T'X- 
.  'iiiVwafiVJispSS 
;.p                 ■          1         •  '- 
Voluminous  Soviet  study  is  discussed  by  its' 'Air  Force  evaluaiors: from  left,  'lit.' Col. 
■■'■'■'■'  "Albert  L.  Betz,  Col.  Myron  F." Barlow,' Dr.  Herman  J.  Sander,  and  Edmund  O.  Barker 
Hundreds  of  refugees  were  interviewed  to  gain  pic- 
ture of  Soviet  society.  Air  Force  will  use  the  Project's 
findings  to  plan  strategy  it  will  use  in  event  of  war 
It  is  evident  that  the  changes  in  leadership  (Ma- 
lenkov's  succeeding  Stalin,  Beria's  execution,  Malen- 
IccVs  "resignation,"  Bulganin's  accession — and  to- 
morrow possibly  Khrushchev)  have  not  significantly 
changed  or  improved  life  for  the  Soviet  masses.  To 
the  contrary,  as  successive  leaders  promise  more  and 
deliver  less  (that  is,  failure  in  consumer  goods  and 
agricultural  programs),  they  may  be  significantly 
adding  to  popular  discontent. 
What  forecasts  can  be  made,  using  the  Project 
findings? 
A  continuation  of  the  cold  war  is  expected  for  the 
next  five  years  at  least.  All-out  war  seems  unlikely. 
The  struggle  for  power  among  the  top  leaders  of 
Russia  will  continue.  This  is  almost  inevitable  in  the 
Soviet  state  unless  a  genuine  cliange  in  the  nature  of 
SCION'S     BUSINESS  •  MARCH     1955 
the  system  occurs.  The  trend  toward  managerial 
bureaucracy  may  give  the  "committee"  type  of  dic- 
tatorship a  greater  chance  of  stability  in  the  USSR 
than  many  westerners  are  likely  to  predict 
What  direction  is  Soviet  over-all  policy  likely  to 
take  in  the  next  five  years? 
The  Soviet  regime  appears  to  be  clearly  committed 
to  stabilization  and  consolidation  both  at  home  and 
abroad.  Industrial  productivity  is  to  be  heightened, 
the  morale  of  the  population  improved,  and  the  pres- 
ent position  in  Europe  is  to  be  maintained  but  not 
extended;  expansive  activities  are  to  be  centered  in 
Asia  and  in  "colonial"  regions  generally. 
Two  extreme  possibilities  are  completely  discarded: 
breakdown  or  continuation  of  the  Soviet  system's  de- 
velopment without  any  change.
INSIDE  RUSSIA continued 
Project  spokesman  Barker  thumbs  through  final 
report.  Study  cost  Air  Force  more  than  (900,000 
One  prong,  ironically  enough,  involve,  jontain-i 
tnent"  of  the  revived  strength  of  the  West  by  drying  to 
obstruct  French  ratification  of  EDC,  German  rearma- 
ment, stirring  up  old  hostilities  between  Germany 
and  France,  dividing  .the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain  on  China  policy  and  so  on. 
Increasing  emphasis  is  placed  on  "intra-imperialist" 
conflicts  and  upon  the  allegedly  disastrous  eventual 
consequences  of  "internal  contradictions"  in  western 
economies.  -  , 
.There  seems  to  be  a  rather  definite  decision — at 
least  for  the  immediate  future — to  let  our  western  sys- 
tem fall  to  pieces  through  its  own  internal  dynamics, 
and  with  a  certain  minimum  amount  of  aonmilitary 
facilitation  on  the  part  of  the  Soviets. 
•  The  other  prong,  of  course,  is  a  continued  policy  of 
nibbling  away  at  the  choicest  of  the  overripe  colonial 
morsels:  Indochina  is  the  latest  victim,  but  others  in 
Asia  and  Africa  are  presumably  on  the  list. 
What  does  the  final  report  have  to  say  about 
the  Soviet  program  of  "peaceful  coexistence?" 
The  Soviet  attitude  toward  "coexistence"  is  that  it 
is  tolerable  as  a  temporary  state  of  affairs.  It  is  clear 
that  the  present  leadership  intends  to  cooperate  with 
the  free  world  only  to  the  extent  that  this  will  ad- 
vance the  eventual  prospect  of  a  completely  commu- 
nist world.  -/'..•■  -  ■■.'•".■■'V' 
'".  ""  »  ' "  'v  vo- 
ls the  Soviet  regime  committed  at  home  to  a 
policy  of  relaxation  of  internal  rules? 
.Are  the  Russian  people  likely  to  revolt  against 
the  regime? 
No.  There  is  scant  evidence  for  the  view  that  more 
than  a  very  tiny  part  of  the  population  would  take 
appreciable  risks  to  sabotage  the  regime  or  to  aid 
western  democracy. 
'What  changes  did  the  Project  research  indicate 
might  occur  in  the  Soviet  system? 
Changes  will  be  evolutionary  rather  than  revolu- 
tionary, and  possibly  in  one  of  the  following  main 
directions,  or  some  combination  of  them: 
1.  Gradual  reversion  to  "Stalinism,"  especially  if 
a  single  leader  attains  unquestioned  supremacy. 
2.  More  emphasis  on  national  bureaucracy,  that  is, 
greater  control  by  managerial  technicians  than  by 
Party  ideological  zealots. 
3.  Reversion  to  certain  traditional,  pre-Soviet  pat- 
terns with  strong  development  of  Russian  or  Pan- 
Slavic  nationalism  and  imperialism. 
4.  Gradual  movement  in  directions  likely  to  change 
— eventually — the  essential  nature  of  the  Soviet 
system  and  to  make  possible  stable  accommodation 
with  the  West. 
What   is   the   present   over-all   strategy  of  the 
Soviet  leaders? 
They  want  to  consolidate  their  internal  position  and 
exploit  the  weakness  of  the  non-Soviet  world  by  prop- 
aganda, diplomacy,  fifth-column  movements,  and 
local  rebellion,  while  waiting  for  the  processes  of  his- 
tory to  produce  Lenin's  predicted  decay  of  capitalism. 
The  immediate  causes  of  this  policy  seem  to  be  a 
combination  of  the  increased  strength  of  the  West, 
and  the  accentuation  of  internal  difficulties  in  the 
USSR. 
What   does   the   present   foreign   policy   of  the 
USSR  appear  to  be? 
It  is,  to  a  significant  degree,  two-pronged: 
SOVIET  CITIZENS' 
VIEWS  OF  AMERICA 
This  is  how  the  majority  of  Soviet  citizens 
view  America  and  the  West: 
America  (and  the  capitalistic  West  in  general, 
but  to  a  lesser  degree)  is  aggressive  and  bent 
on  world  domination.  This  propaganda  point 
has  been  established  by  dissociating  the  Amer- 
ican government  from  two  symbols  wl-ich  Soviet 
citizens  still  value:  the  American  people  and 
Franklin  D.  Roosevelt.  The  Soviet  press  insists 
that  the  U.S.  government  and  its  foreign  policy 
do  not  represent  the  people.  .  .  . 
America  is  respected  for  its  technology  and 
its  material  power.  The  goal  of  overtaking  and 
surpassing  American  production  was  a  Soviet 
slogan  from  the  beginning  of  the  First  Five- 
Year  Plan.  .  .  . 
Capitalism  is  a  decadent  socio-economic  sys- 
tem which  survives  only  by  exploitation  of  the 
workers  and  under  the  artificial  stimulation  of 
armament  production.  .  .  . 
The  standard  of  living  of  the  rank-and-file 
citizen  of  western  countries  is  lower  than  it  is  in 
the  Soviet  Union.  ... 
Americans  are  materialistic  and  lack  spir- 
itual values.  (These  criticisms  came  overwhelm- 
ingly from  intellectual  emigres.)   .   .   . 
Westerners  are  soft  and  can't  take  it. 
All  people  are  not  treated  alike  in  Amer- 
ica. Certain  racial  and  'ethnic  groups  are  dis- 
criminated against. 
NATION'S    BUSINESS-  MARCH     1955
5-33K 
V 
*l,SOO,OOOrOOO 
FOR  PROPAGANDA 
-"  ji-.-fwijr*!^***---"' ..■«:,.  .  •-.  ■■.•■■ 
The  Importance  of  propaganda  in  the  USSR 
■As  indicated  by  the  budget.  In  1950,  out  of  a 
'  $70,000,000,000  national   income,   $1,500,- 
000,000  went  to  propaganda  activities.       J  , 
.  The  Soviet  Union  has  soma  6,000  special 
local  schools,  in  addition  to  regional  and  na- 
tional    schools,    for    training    propagandists. 
.  Trainees  come  from  every  part  of  the  world  to 
attend  these  schools.'         -    ..:  .;     r 
Soviet  propaganda  has  sought  to  reverse 
;  certain  stereotyped  propaganda  images.  Our 
-  mental  picture  of  the  Bolshevik,  who  was  always 
a  heavily  bearded  figure  sitting  on  a  huge  pile 
'of  bombs  with  a  hammer  in  his  hand  and  a 
•'■;  sickle  in  his  teeth,  has  now  been  picked  up- by 
the  Soviets  for  their  own  use;  ihey  have  Uncle 
V  Sam. sitting  on  an  enormous  pile  of  atom  and 
hydrogen  bombs  with  o  Coca-Cola  bottle  in  his 
mouth.  ■:'      ':;- [■  J  -"'-•  •  • ""   "  '," ' 
'■■  To  propagandize  Soviet  factory  workers 
on  the  exploitation  and  enslavement  of 
workers  in  America,  a  film  was  shown  concern- 
ing a  police-striker  fight  in  Detroit.  In  the  fight- 
ing,.some  white  and  Negro  workers  were  injured 
and  had  to  be  carried  on  stretchers  to  waiting 
ambulances.  As  the  injured  were  carried  past 
the  camera,  feet  first,  the  Soviet  factory  workers 
noticed  that  the  American  workers  wore  shoes 
without  holes  in  the  soles.  Word  quickly  went 
around  that  the  picture  was  a  fake. 
Yes.  The  rulers  clearly  want  better  internal  morale 
and  various  improvements.  At  the  1954  Supreme 
Soviet,  Malenkov  and  Khrushchev  complained  about 
the  standard  of  labor  discipline,  the  quality  of  out- 
put, and  the  rate  of  increase  in  productivity.  The 
Soviet  leaders  are  indeed  facing  a  dilemma,  but  we 
must  not  be  guilty  of  easy  optimism  as  to  the  out- 
come. In  the  first  place,  we  must  remember  that  a 
little  sop  can  go  a  long  way  in  the  Soviet  system. 
Expectations  are  low  and  there  is  also  still  sufficient 
belief  in  the  reality  of  "capitalist  aggression"  to  make 
the  people  satisfied  with  small  concessions. 
What  other  forecasts  are  found  in  the  final  re- 
port concerning  the  future  of  the  Soviet  system? 
1.  An  improvement  in  the  standard  of  living  and  a 
slackening  of  the  tempo  of  development,  accompanied 
by  an  easing  of  rigid  administration  and  intense  ter- 
ror, could  effect  a  substantial  and  perhaps  a  profound 
reorientation  of  the  population  toward  the  regime. 
2."  As  time  goes  on,  the  role  permitted  rational  tech- 
nical bureaucracy  in  running  things  within  the  limits 
of  set  policy  will  increase,  and  such  technical  consid- 
erations may  come  to  have  more  effect  on  the  actual 
direction  of  policy. 
3.  Concerning  agriculture,  the  authors  of  the  final 
report  are  convinced  that  the  regime  will  not  give  up 
the  collective  farm  system,  and  this  will  remain  a 
source  of  friction,  tension,  and  lowered  production. 
What  does  the  final  report  forecast  for  the  fu- 
ture of  the  USSR?     . 
NATION'S    BUSINESS  •  MARCH    19SS 
In  short,  the  best  prediction  for  the  abort-run  is 
that,  at  the  worst,  the  present  regime  may  revert 
to  Stalinism,  and  at  best  it  may  become  a  more 
popular,  or  at  least  less  resented,  but  no  less  totalitar- 
ian government.  ..  ..;•• 
;In  neither  case  do  we  anticipate  that  either  the 
long-range  goals  or  the  strategy  of  Russian  foreign 
policy  will  be  greatly  changed  in  the  next  decade,  al- 
though there  maybe  some  modifications  of  tactics 
and  methods. 
What  has  the  Project  to  say  about  Soviet  society 
in  general,  and  the  emergence  of  a  managerial 
bureaucracy  in  particular?  ".:--, -^^aiij-.  i...- 
.  It  is  certainly  true  that  there  has  been  some  crucial 
crystallization  of  Soviet  society.  A,  new  kind  of 
bourgeoisie  has  become  accustomed  to  relative  lux- 
ury. Social  stratification  is  more  rigid.  The- decrease 
in  social  mobility  has  lessened  a  certain  kind  of  vital 
dynamism  which  characterized  Soviet  society  for  a 
long  period.  An  intrenched  group  has  strong  vested 
interests  in  the  status  quol  There  is  a  conflict  between 
two  conceptions:  the  old  ideal  of  party  asceticism, 
and  that  of  "the  rich  new  life."  However,  in  spite  of 
some  tendency  in  the  direction  of  managerial  bureau- 
cracy, the  ideological  element  in  communism  weighs 
against  a  very  rapid  bureaucratic  dominance  in  the 
USSR.  :  -     /   :_■':;■..;.  . 
If  the  factory-manager  class  emerges  as  a 
powerful  group  In  the  USSR,  would  this  lead  to 
a  "managerial  revolution?" 
Far  from  seeking  great  changes  in  the  industrial 
system,  these  key  managerial  personnel  want  to  main- 
tain it  in  its  present  form.  They  have  a  considerable 
stake  in  its  continuance  through  high  salaries,  siz- 
.  able  cash  bonuses,  production  rewards,  better  apart- 
ments, and  other  special  privileges  attaching  to  high 
position.  Within  the  factory  system,  they  seek  to  re- 
duce interference  from  the  center — that  is,  Mos- 
cow-located ministry  chiefs — and  to  make  the  system 
work  more  smoothly.  ?;Vvv "•"'•. 
Will  you  explain  what  is  implied  in  the  Project 
reference  to  the  fact  that  Soviet  people  have 
built-in  "mental  radar?" 
Living  in  a  country  where  a  slip  of  the  tongue  may 
land  you  in  jail,   -  (Continued  on  page  48) 
RUSSIA'S 
WORKING  FORCE 
The    approximate    urban    population    of 
Russia  in  1953  was  86,000,000,  with  124,000,- 
0G0  living  in  rurai  areas. 
Agricultural  work  claims  about  55  per  cent 
of  the  Soviet  labor  force. 
The  labor  force  is  about  1 10,000,000  people. 
This  is  about  75  per  cent  of  all  people,  male 
and  female,  1 5  years  of  age  or  older.  Half  of 
the  total  Soviet  labor  force  is  women. 
Some  60  to  65  per  cent  of  all  women  over 
the  age  of  1 5  are  employed. 
In  agricultural  employment,  women  hold 
60  per  cent  of  the  jobs.  In  the  nonagricultural 
economy  of  the  USSR  they  hold  half  of  She  jobs.
THEY  BUILD 
ATOM'S  ROAD 
TO  PEACE 
By    PHILIP    GUSTAFSON 
Dean  Ralph  A.  Sawyer  (left)  and  Prof.  Henry  J.  Gom- 
berg  with   model  of  $1,500,000  Phoenix  Laboratory 
TWENTY-FIVE-THOUSAND  believers  in  private 
enterprise  have  bought  themselves  a  share  in  the 
atomic  age.  These  shareholders  range  from  house- 
wives to  industrial  giants  like  General  Motors  and 
Ford  whose  contributions  run  into  seven  figures. 
Among  them,  they  have  piled  up  $7,500,000  to  help 
find  peacetime  applications  of  nuclear  energy  and  to 
study  its  effects  on  society. 
These  25,000  have  made  cash  gifts  to  Phoenix  Proj- 
ect, the  pride  and  joy  of  the  University  of  Mich- 
igan and  its  students,  alumni  and  friends.  Phoenix 
Project  is  the  only  organized  non-government  opera- 
tion which  attempts  to  come  to  grips  on  a  comprehen- 
sive scale  with  the  problems  atomic  energy  creates.  It 
lives  by  the  grace  of  private  donations  alone;  yet  in 
Phoenix  Project  started  as  a  me- 
morial to  University  of  Michigan 
war  dead.  Now  this  research 
center— dedicated  to  peaceful 
uses  of  the  atom  and  financed 
wholly  by  private  enterprise- 
has  become  a  "light  high  in  the 
sky  for  future  generations" 
peacetime  research  it  ranks  with  the  country's  great 
nuclear  laboratories — Brookhaven,  Argonne  and  Oak 
Ridge — supported  by  government  funds. 
Phoenix  is  not  a '.foundation,  nor  an  institute.  It 
is  simply  a  project,  run  by  deans  and  professors  who 
also  carry  full-time  academic  schedules.  It  is  kept 
going  by  teachers  who  conduct  its  research  without 
additional  salaries.  In  five  years.  Phoenix  has  grown 
until  it  consists  of  nearly  100  research  projects;  it 
permeates  practically  every  division  of  the  university 
and  virtually  every  department  of  human  knowledge. 
Phoenix  sprang  into  being  after  Hiroshima  as  a 
memorial  to  University  of  Michigan  war  dead— a 
means  of  turning  the  destructive  potential  of  the 
bomb  to  human  benefit.    From  the  idea  of  one  Mich- 
KATION'S     BUSINESS  •  MARCH     !93S
What  Russia  Will  Do  Next 
(Continued  from  page  29) 
or  in  Siberia,  the  people  have  be- 
come sensitive  observers  and  evalu- 
ators  of  other  persons.  Friends, 
associates,  colleagues — all  are  given 
a  careful  appraisal  and  size-up  in 
order  to  assess  the  risk  in  such 
contacts  and  associations.  The  net- 
work of  regime  informers  is  report- 
edly large,  and  interestingly  re- 
plenished by  petty  thieves,  prosti- 
tutes and  criminals  who,  in  ex- 
change for  their  freedom  from  jail 
sentences,  must  become  "neighbor- 
hood spies"  for  the  regime. 
Additionally,  the  "block  system," 
which  holds  each  member  of  a  group 
responsible  for  the  actions  of  all  the 
other  members  of  his  group,  helps  to 
keep  the  average  citizen  extremely 
chary  of  close  contacts  with  others. 
What  are  the  main  social  and 
psychological  weaknesses  of  the 
Soviet  system? 
The  system  is  vulnerable: 
To  an  increase  in  the  people's 
correct  knowledge  of  the  outside 
world. 
To  situations  where  the  reachable 
elite,  especially  the  military  elite, 
feel  a  conflict  between  patriotism 
and  their  loyalty  to  the  regime  in 
power. 
To  actions  by  the  United  States, 
whether  of  an  economic,  military  or 
psychological  warfare  nature,  which 
are  unexpected  by  the  Soviet  lead- 
ership, and  hence  disturbing  to 
their  confidence  that  their  calcula- 
tions about  us  are  sound. 
To  clogging  of  the  decision-mak- 
ing process  at  higher  levels. 
To  the  risk  that  a  purge  campaign 
initiated  at  the  top  may  become  a 
run-away  affair  like  that  of  the 
mid-1930's; 
To  exposure  of  weak  links  or  in- 
consistencies in  its  ideological  ar- 
mor. 
To  substantial  increases  in  the 
discontent,  in  the  Soviet  population, 
and  perhaps  even  more  to  abrupt 
alterations  in  the  tightening  and 
relaxing  of  pressures  upon  the 
people. 
How  does  the  regime  maintain 
stability? 
The  stability  depends  upon  ela- 
borate machinery  for  reporting  and 
suppressing  deviant  behavior.  This 
machinery  includes  the  secret  pol- 
ice, informer  networks,  Communist 
Party  snoopers,  government  inspec- 
tors, and  the  like. 
Do  the  people  get  away  with 
anything  in  the  Soviet  system? 
Yes — to  the  extent  that  the  re- 
gime feels  that  such  actions  con- 
tribute to  the  success  of  programs! 
Since  much  of  the  citizen's  extra- 
legal activity  is  actually  necessary 
to  the  functioning  of  the  system,  no 
institutions  are  run  completely  ac- 
cording to  the  book,  and  an  un- 
stable balance  is  worked  out  be- 
tween the  application  and  evasion 
of  the  means  of  control. 
How  does  the  average  citizen 
get  along  in  the  Soviet  system? 
The  rank-and-file  citizen  learns 
to  apply  complicated  techniques  of 
accommodation  and  evasion  to  car- 
ry on  his  daily  affairs  and  to  main- 
tain himself  in  reasonably  success- 
ful or  at  least  untroubled  adapta- 
tion to  the  regime. 
[  
Do  the  people  resent  the  Soviet 
\  leaders  or  the  Soviet  system? 
jj  Their  hostility  is  toward  the  re- 
;  gime — the  actual  people  in  power — 
:  rather  than  toward  the  system.  1 
-J  Even  those  who  are  violently  anti-  f 
v  Soviet  favor  state  ownership  of  \ 
V  means  of  production,  and  other  in-  i, 
'  stitutionai  features  which  are  as-  j 
.'  sociated  with  socialism.  f 
What  general  features  of  So- 
viet life  are  most  intensely 
resented  by  the  people? 
The  low  standard  of  living,  the 
excessive  pace  of  everyday  life  and 
the  threat  of  arbitrary  political  re- 
pression. 
What  organizational  feature  of 
the  Soviet  sys;«m  is  most  hated? 
The  collective  farm  system.  The 
Project  interviews  contained  strik- 
ingly little  complaint  about  the  fac- 
tory system  other  than  dislike  of 
harsh  labor  discipline  laws.  For 
example,  repeated  tardiness  means 
a  prison  sentence. 
Millions  of  people  have  been 
arrested  by  the  secret  police  at 
one  time  or  another.  How  has 
this  affected  their  attitudes? 
Being  arrested  has  Utile  effect  on 
a  person's  general  social  and  politi- 
cal attitudes  and  values.  The  indi- 
vidual does  not  generalize  his  ex- 
perience to  the  point  of  revising  his 
judgment  concerning  the  kind  of 
society  in  which  he  lives.  Arrest, 
however,  does  increase  his  hostility 
to  the  regime. 
Furthermore,  arrest — whether  his 
own  or  that  of  a  family  member — 
makes  him  anxious  about  his  own 
future,  and  thereby  increases  the 
probability  of  his  leaving  the  Soviet 
Union  voluntarily  if  the  opportun- 
ity arises. 
Does  discontentment  cause  the 
individual  to  put  less  effort  into 
his  |ob? 
The  degree  of  dissatisfaction  with, 
or  even  disaffection  from,  the  system 
does  not  necessarily  detract  from 
the  energy  with  which  a  person 
does  the  job  assigned  to  him.  The 
disaffected  person  often  does  his  job 
well,  and  in  fact  may  work  with  a 
little  extra  energy,  either  because  he 
feels  he  has  to  prove  himself  or  be- 
cause he  finds  comfort  in  his  work. 
The  fact  that  the  Soviet  system 
tends  to  produce  dissatisfaction  in 
its  citizens  does  not  in  itself  mean 
that  it  gets  less  effective  work  from 
them. 
THE  PEOPLE  SPEAK 
Types  of  criticism  permitted  in  the  Soviet  press  (mainly  in 
the  form  of  letters  to  the  editor): 
The  Palace  of  Culture  of  the  Novo-Tagil  Metallurgical  Plant  has 
"dressing  rooms  so  small  that  it  is  impossible  for  an  actor  to  put 
on  his  make-up." 
The  Teacher's  Gazette,  the  official  journal  of  Soviet  teaching, 
published  this  criticism  of  Comrade  Komarova,  a  geography  teach- 
er in  the  264th  school  in  Moscow:  "In  discussing  Rome,  the  capital 
of  Italy,  he  never  mentioned  a  word  about  the  reactionary  role 
of  the  Vatican!" 
The  Turkmen  Iskra  of  August  20,  19S4,  published  this  criticism 
in  its  letters  to  the  editor  column:  "At  the  Vorovsky  rest  home  (a 
health-vacation  resort  for  workers),  it  was  announced  that  the  hot 
showerbath  was  working.  This  was  a  great  event  for  the  guests.. 
However,  it  was  impossible  to  take  a  bath  since  the  water  came 
up  to  one's  knees  in  the  shower-room." 
NATION'S     BUSINESS  •  MARCH    1955
On  whet  'does  the  stability  of  the 
Soviet  system  rest? 
The  stability  of  the  Soviet  sys- 
tem involves  a  nice  balance  between 
the  regime's  powers  of  coercion  and 
the  adjustive  habits  of  the  Soviet 
citizenry.  The  stability  of  the  sys- 
tem and  of  the  people's  loyalty  de- 
pends to  a  high  degree  on  the  citi- 
zen's own  belief  in  the  stability  of 
that  system  and  on  his  having  no 
alternative  but  to  adjust 
Are  the  non-Russian  nationalities 
in  the  USSR  the  most  dissatisfied? 
Not  at  all.  People  in  the  same 
social  group,  peasants,  workers,  em- 
ployes, intelligentsia,  hold  essential- 
ly the  same  attitudes  and  values 
regardless  of  nationality.  The  na- 
tionality element  is  sometimes 
strong,  but  more  often  it  is  latent 
and  seems  to  be  only  a  secondary 
contributing  cause  to  disaffection. 
What  did  the  Project  find  out 
about  the  peasantry  which  con- 
stitutes about  55  per  cent  of  the 
Soviet  labor  force?      
The  peasantry  is  the  outstanding- 
ly disaffected  group  in  the  popula- 
tion. Further,  the  peasants'  hatred 
of  the  institutional  form  of  the  col- 
lective farm  is  generally  shared  by 
all  social  groups.  The  collective  farm 
is  revealed  as  the  most  whole- 
heartedly opposed  of  all  Soviet  eco- 
nomic and  social  institutions. 
How  does  the  regime  indoctri- 
nate Soviet  youth  to  be  good 
communists? 
Mainly  through  state-controlled 
education  and  also  through  the 
ubiquitous  communist  organizations 
for  youth:  the  Octobrists  for  ages 
8-11,  the  Pioneers  for  ages  10-15, 
and  the  Komsomol — Communist 
Youth  League — for  ages  15-23. 
Are  Soviet  young  people  likely 
to  become  disaffected  as  they 
mature? 
No.  Although  there  is  a  period  of 
crisis,  when  the  individual  reaches 
maturity,  in  the  relationship  of 
youth  to  the  regime,  only  a  small 
minority  actually  turn  against  the 
system  because  of  disillusionment 
In  most  instances,  they  are  able  to 
reconcile  the  conflict  in  their  feel- 
ings toward  the  regime.  The  young- 
er generation  is  coming  to  accept  as 
natural  many  aspects  of  Soviet  life 
and  the  Soviet  system  that  the  older 
generation  rebelled  against 
Hew  aware  of  the  outside  world 
are  the  Soviet  people? 
Ignorance  and  distorted  views  of 
the  outside  world  are  deeper  and 
more  widespread — even  among  the 
intelligentsia — than  heretofore  had 
been  realized. 
How  does  the  regime  control  the 
radio  programs  heard  by  the 
Soviet  people? 
In  several  ways.  Some  foreign 
programs  are  jammed  to  prevent 
their  being  heard.  In  addition  the 
radio  system  is  almost  completely 
(80  per  cent)  based  on  wired  speak- 
ers. These  are  speakers  wired  to  a 
central  control  station  in  the  city 
instead  of  individual  tube  or  aerial 
sets.  The  regime  has  been  largely 
successful  in  keeping  foreign  broad- 
casts from  reaching  the  population 
and  in  putting  into  the  communica- 
tions network  its  own  propaganda. 
How  classless  is  Russia's  class- 
less society? 
Anything  but!  Soviet  society  is 
highly  stratified  into  classes  some- 
what similar  to  those  in  western  in- 
dustrial society.  In  theory,  the  class 
system  is  open — a  person  can  rise 
from  one  class  to  a  higher — and 
such  movement  has  actually  been 
extensive.  However,  certain  ave- 
nues are  blocked  for  those  of  bour- 
geois family  background  and  for 
many  others  whose  close  relatives 
have  been  proscribed  as  enemies  of 
the  state. 
How  have  the  Soviet  people 
fared  at  the  hands  of  their 
rulers? 
Supported  by  their  belief  or 
claim  that  they  are  executing  the 
will  of  history,  the  regime  has  been 
ruthless  in  handling  people.  Little 
is  thought  of  enormous  physical 
suffering,  and  even  loss  of  life  if,  by 
these  means,  appropriate  goals  are 
felt  to  be  advanced.  Only  when  bad 
morale  is  believed  to  affect  produc- 
tion or  even  to  raise  the  threat  of 
disorders  does  the  regime  relax  the 
pressures.  This  indifference  adds  to 
the  flexibility  of  the  regime's  pur- 
suit of  short-term  goals. 
By  every  standard 
** 
NATION'S     BUSINESS  ■  MARCH    1055 
.  Int  RMV  W  #qw^Waflr 
f  *r  copying  «fUI 
pr*Mrvitif  r«<«nU 
•a  b*th  p*p*r 
and  film. 
Business,  industry  and  government  alike 
are  finding  an  increasing  need  for  quick, 
accurate  and  inexpensive  copies  of  records 
on  paper  .  .  .  and  are  becoming  equally 
aware  of  the  space  saving  and  security 
advantages  of  copying  and  preserving  their 
records  on  film. 
Here  is  the  answer  that  will  best  satisfy 
both  needs. 
Photostat  Corporation  now  offers  the 
widest  range  of  6nc  equipment  available 
.  .  .  PHOTOSTAT  Photographic  Copying 
Equipment  and  M1CROTRONICS  Micro- 
film Cameras,  Enlargers  and  Film  Proc- 
essors .  .  .  for  small,  moderate-sized  and 
the  largest  requirements  alike.  It  is  splen- 
did equipment . . .  properly  sold  . . .  faith- 
fully serviced.  You  should  get  all  the  facts 
before  you  purchase,  any  photocopying 
or  microfilming  equipment. 
Let  us  help  with  your  copying  problems 
.  - .  no  obligation.  One  of  our  trained  sales- 
service  representatives  will  gladly  make 
specific  recommendations  as  to  the  best 
solution  .  .  .  with  worthwhile  savings  in 
time  and  money. 
Write  us  .  .  .  your  inquiry  will  receive 
our  prompt  and  interested  attention. 
PHOTOSTAT    CORPORATION 
J77    JUIt    ITIttT.    tOCHflTU    14,    MEW    YOHC 
S«rvk«  *ffic*«  m  m«it  priiKi#«l  fitm 
oftd  wt  lannH.  C*ft«4o 
PHOTOSTAT   it   '*•    trad»-mork 
o(  PHOTOSTAT  COLORATION
RUSSIA  continued 
What  features  of  Soviet  lead- 
ership receive  widespread  ap- 
proval? 
The  people  like  the  purposeful- 
ness,  the  activism,  and  the  steady 
looking  to  the  future. 
Have  the  Soviet  leaders  de- 
veloped among  the  elite  a  con- 
siderable proportion  of  people 
of  an  externally  disciplined  and 
driving  character? 
To  a  certain  degree,  this  has  been 
done.  However,  even  in  this  group 
the  underlying  personality  of  these 
people  often  seems  to  continue  to 
conform  to  the  traditional  Russian 
characteristics  familiar  in  literary 
and  historical  sources: 
Violent  psychological  ups  and 
downs. 
hoarding  supplies;  padding  esti- 
mates; concealing  reserves;  under- 
reporting output 
These  activities  are  actually  ad- 
vantageous for  the  system,  helping 
to  keep  it  from  bogging  down  in  its 
own  red  tape.  The  research  has 
provided  a  strong  realization  of  the 
importance  of  informal  mechanisms 
in  the  operation  of  a  society  that  on 
the  surface  appears  and  pretends  to 
be  highly  centralized,  controlled, 
and  rationalized. 
Does  the  regime  tolerate  inde- 
pendent clubs,  labor  unions,  fra- 
ternal organizations? 
No.  However,  "localism" — which 
is  the  tendency  for  local  loyalties 
to  develop  and  for  local  interests  to 
be  advanced  over  those  of  the  re- 
gime— has  a  more  important  status 
Need  for  warm  personal  relations 
and  for  a  firm  place  in  the  group. 
Unwillingness  to  compromise. 
Passive  resistance,  only  occasion- 
ally marked  by  violent  outbursts,  to 
strong  and  arbitrary  authority. 
Vitality  and  spontaneity  alternat- 
ing with  melancholy  and  apathy. 
Mixed  attitudes  toward  foreigners. 
These  are  traits  which  continue 
to  characterize  the  personality  of 
the  rank-and-file  Russian. 
How  do  informal  adjustive  mech- 
anisms contribute  to  the  opera- 
tion of  the  Soviet  system? 
These  are  the  many  evasive, 
quasi-legal  or  illegal  actions  of 
Soviet  citizens  which  are  most  criti- 
cized in  the  official  press  and 
generally  regarded  by  western  ob- 
servers as  signs  of  weakness.  They 
include:  "scroungers";  "five  per- 
centers"; "the  Tolkach"  (a  supply 
expediter);  blat  (the  reciprocation 
of  favors  and  the  use  of  personal 
influence  to  obtain  illegal  advan- 
tages) ;  the  "web  of  mutual  sup- 
port" (collusion  between  manufac- 
turers and  government  inspectors ) ; 
simulation     of     required     output; 
in  the  Soviet  scene  than  it  had 
been  accorded  heretofore. 
How  do  the  people  feel  toward 
their  native  land? 
The  depth  of  their  loyalty  to  the 
Motherland  is  an  outstanding  senti- 
ment in  all  classes  irrespective  of 
religion,  political  attitudes,  and  of 
personality  structure.  This  is  cou- 
pled with  a  genuine  fear  of  foreign 
aggression.  These  sentiments  are 
strongest  in  the  heartland,  but  pre- 
vail pretty  generally. 
Does  Soviet  propaganda  de- 
mand mare  than  conformity 
from  the  people? 
Yes.  The  Soviet  propaganda  ma-<, 
chine  does  not  limit  itself,  as  most 
other  systems  of  political  propa- 
ganda have  done,  to  the  technique 
of  reiteration,  hammering  in,  and 
to  the  suppression  of  complaints 
and  disturbing  information.  It  in- 
sists upon  positive  action  from  the 
people.  It  is  true  that  incessant 
profession  of  faith  is  the  prerequi- 
site not  only  of  personal  security 
but  also  of  advancement  at  school, 
in  work,  and  in  every  sphere  of  life. 
To  conform,  at  least  outwardly,  is 
necessary  for  survival.       .  «, 
But  the  regime  wants  more  than 
conformity;  it  wants  not  so  much 
belief,  in  the  sense  in  which  Chris- 
tians would  use  that  term,  as  active 
support  of  the  Party  as  the  trust- 
worthy custodian  of  all  the  funda- 
mental doctrinal  questions.  The 
individual  can  so  comply  by  active- 
ly propagating  and  carrying  out  the 
Party  program  and  its  concrete 
demands. 
What  is  the  significance  of  ide- 
ology in  the  Soviet  regime? 
Enormous  stress  is  put  on  ide- 
ology both  as  a  doctrine  and  as  a 
practical  instrument  The  operat- 
ing ideology  of  the  leadership  at 
any  given  point  in  time  is  kept  re- 
markably consistent  The  more 
formal  total  theoretical  system  has, 
in  fact,  undergone  change  through 
time,  but  much  effort  is  expended 
to  rationalize  these,  changes  and 
preserve  the  appearance  of  con- 
tinuity and  consistency.  There  is 
good  evidence  that  communist  ide- 
ology affects  the  thinking  and  the 
acts  of  leaders  and  of  other  intelli- 
gentsia who  grew  up  under  the 
Bolshevik  regime. 
Do  the  Soviet  leaders  carry  on  a 
constant  battle  against  oppo- 
sition elements? 
Yes.  Both  because  of  their  ad- 
diction to  rational  planning  and  be- 
cause of  their  conviction  that 
"everyone  who  is  not  completely 
for  us  is  against  us,"  the  ruling  elite 
have  made  great  efforts  to  stamp 
out  growing  centers  of  independent 
power  and  communication  in  the 
Soviet  system.  Their  success,  how- 
ever, is  incomplete. 
Is  the  Soviet  terrorization  of  the 
people  an  integral  part  of  the 
system? 
Yes.  Terror  and  forced  labor  are 
well  known  communist  instruments 
of  power.  They  are  primarily  goal- 
achieving  tools,  rather  than  sadistic 
methods,  as  in  the  Nazi  case.  The 
motivation  behind  their  use  is 
dominantly  political — that  is,  elimi- 
nating opposition  to  the  regime, 
through  economic  utility,  as  send- 
ing prisoners  to  work  the  uranium 
mines — is  exploited. 
What  is  the  regime's  attitude 
toward  the  little  piece  of  private 
land  allowed  the  peasant? 
As  a  sop  to  the  serious  resistance 
to  forced  collectivization,  the  Col- 
lective Farm  Statutes  of  1935  al- 
lowed each  farm  household  a  pri- 
vate plot  varying  in  size  from  two 
thirds  to  one  and  one  fifth  acres. 
The   regime   has   tried    to   whittle 
NATION'S    BUSINESS-MARCH    1955
down  these-  prorate  holdings,  partly 
to  free  taore  labor  for  communal 
work,  partly  to  increase  the  peas- 
ant's dependence  upon  the  proceeds 
from  the  collective  farm  to  which  he 
belongs.  The  leaders  have  a  still 
more  fundamental  distrust  of  pri- 
vate agriculture  because,  in  Lenin's 
words: 
"Peasant  small-scale  production 
breeds  capitalism  and  a  bourgeoisie 
— every  day,  every  hour — by  a 
natural  process  and  on  a  mass 
scale." 
Collective  farms  take  up  85  per  - 
cent  of  all  agricultural  land  in  the 
USSR,  and  another  nine  per  cent 
is  organized  into  state  farms. 
Is  the  agricultural  system  cur- 
rently In  crisis? 
Yes.  According  to  the  Russian 
leaders  themselves,  during  the 
period  1940-1953  when  the  popula- 
tion of  the  USSR  increased  by  15,- 
000,000,  there  was  a  total  decline  in 
grain  acreage  of  3.5  per  cent  of  the 
prewar  average. 
Food  production  is  the  lowest 
and  the  average  Soviet  diet  the 
smallest  and  poorest  since  the  First 
Five- Year  Plan  came  into  force  in 
1929. 
The  numbers  of  beef  and  dairy 
cattle  in  1953  were  less  than  the 
total  in  1916. 
What  are  some  of  the  central 
and  repetitive  patterns  of  be- 
havior of  the  Soviet  regime? 
Overcontrol,  overconcentration, 
and  overcommitment.  As  to  over- 
commitment of  resources,  the  lead- 
ers tend  to  undertake  a   massive 
program  in  such  a  way  that  every 
conceivable  resource,  including 
critical  reserves,  must  be  totally  in- 
volved. Alternative  policies,  how- 
ever, are  more  nearly  ready  for  im- 
plementation than  would  appear  on 
the  surface. 
Can  the  Soviet  regime  complete- 
ly disregard  the  wishes  and 
welfare  of  the  people? 
TOMORROW'S  ROADS 
...what  will  they  be  like? 
Road  building  and  maintenance  nearly  stopped  in  depression  and  war 
years,  but  the  search  for  safer,  more  durable  and  economical  pavement 
went  right  on.  The  Portland  Cement  Association  has  played  a  major  role. 
One  project  consists  of  roads  built  more  than  ten  years  ago  with  different 
cements  and  concrete  mixtures  as  part  of  the  highway  systems  of  New 
York,  Missouri  and  South  Carolina.  Purpose:  to  test  weathering  effects  in 
various  climates.  Already  this  field  experiment  has  shown  conclusively 
that  air-entrained  concrete  (containing  billions  of  tiny  air  cells)  eliminates 
damage  caused  by  freeze-thaw  cycles  and  chemicals  used  to  melt  snow  and 
ice.  Result:  a  sifer,  loDger-lasting,  lower-annual-cost  pavement. 
Developments  like  this  from  PCA's  continuing  field  and  laboratory  work 
help  make  tomorrow's  roads  a  benefit  to  all  Americans,  who  pay  for  them 
with  license  fees,  gas  and  other  taxes  on  private  and  commercial  vehicles. 
PORTLAND   CEMENT  ASSOCIATION 
33  W.  Qrand  Ave.  j   A  nalianai  organization  to  impiove  ond  extend  the  uses  of  porlland  cement 
Chicago  10,  III,  I  and  concrett  through  scientific  reseorch  ond  engineering  field  work 
NATION'S    BUSINESS- MARCH    1933
RUSSIA  continued 
No.  Since  the  individual  is  the 
most  flexible  resource  of  the  Soviet 
system,  the  regime  is  necessarily 
concerned  with  the  morale  of  trie 
population — not  as  an  objective  in 
itself,  but  as  an  unavoidable  pre- 
requisite to  economic  production 
and  military  readiness. 
How  does  one  get  ahead  in  the 
USSR? 
A  citizen's  social  class  and  his  oc- 
cupation largely  determine  both  his 
opportunities  for  advancement  and 
his  attitudes  toward  the  system. 
Social  position  is  more  important 
than  such  factors  as  nationality  or 
previous  arrest  in  affecting  his  hos- 
tility toward,  passive  acceptance  of, 
or  active  support  of  the  regime 
Is  discontent  in  the  USSR  the 
same  as  disloyalty? 
No.  Although  there  is  a  great 
deal  of  popular  dissatisfaction,  there 
.  is  only  a  relatively  small  amount 
of  disaffection  and  disloyalty.  So- 
viet escapees  and  DP"s  left  little 
doubt  about  the  extent  to  which 
most  of  them  were  unhappy  about 
many  aspects  of  their  lives  in  the 
USSR.  But  these  same  interviews 
indicated  that  most  of  the  citizens 
of  the  USSR  feel  helpless  in  the 
face  of  the  power  of  the  state  and 
desire  only  to  live  peacefully — to 
keep  out  of  trouble,  to  do  nothing 
that  would  bring  them  to  the  at- 
.tention  of  the  secret  police. 
Is  there  a  difference  between 
the  psychological  make-up  of 
the  Soviet  leaders  and  the 
people? 
Psychologically,  there  continues 
to  be  a  great  gap  between  the  So- 
viet masses  and  the  elite.  The 
masses  remain  rather  close  to  the 
traditional  literary  picture  of  Rus- 
sian character.  They  are  warm- 
hearted, impulsive,  given  to  mood 
swings  and  contradictory  in  be- 
havior. The  goal — and  to  some  ex- 
tent the  attainment — of  the  elite  is 
the  rather  puritanical  "new  Soviet 
man":  disciplined,  working  steadily 
and  consistently,  subordinating  per- 
sonal conduct  and  motivation  to  the 
requirements  of  Party  discipline. 
What  evaluation  did  the  Project 
make  of  the  nationalities  prob- 
lem? 
Nationality  feeling  undoubtedly 
still  exists  and  is  of  genuine  im- 
portance in  a  number  of  groups 
within  the  USSR — Ukrainians, 
Byelorussians,  Georgians,  Armeni- 
ans, the  Moslem  peoples,  and  so  on. 
However,    while   ethnic   minorities 
represent  something  like  half  or 
more  of  the  total  population  of  the 
Soviet  Union,  their  power  is  not 
proportionately  great 
Second,  the  minorities  by  no 
means  present  a  united  front;  on 
the  contrary,  they  have  their  own 
frictions  and  jealousies. 
Third,  individuals  from  the  minor 
nationalities  occupy  a  dispropor- 
tionately small  number  of  power 
positions  in  the  total  system. 
Fourth,  the  minorities  are  being 
rather  rapidly  Russified. 
In  general,  nationality  groups 
feel  the  same  resentments  toward 
the  regime  and  the  same  dissatis- 
factions with  the  system  as  other 
citizens  of  the  USSR, "  although 
they  may  feel  them  somewhat 
more  intensely. 
Do  the  intelligentsia  of  the  USSR 
enjoy  a  favored  position? 
Yes,  even  though  .they  are  sub- 
ject to  closer  surveillance  than  are 
rank-and-file   citizens.     They   run 
greater  risks  of  punishment  and 
more  extreme  demands  are  put 
upon  them.  Yet  they  are  also  the 
favored  beneficiaries  of  the  system. 
Which  class  fares  worst  of  all 
under  the  Soviet  system? 
The  peasants. 
What  can  the  regime  do  to  en- 
hance its  position  among  the 
people? 
Leaders  of  the  present  regime 
can  gain  very  solid  popular  support 
if  they  supply  more  consumer 
goods  and  better  housing,  ease  up 
on  the  terror,  make  some  conces- 
sions to  the  peasant,  and  somewhat 
relieve  the  frantic  pace  at  which  all 
the  population  has  been  driven. 
What  is  the  present  situation  of 
the  military  clique  in  the  USSR? 
The  military  is  a  key  group.  The 
relative  prestige  and  power  of  mili- 
tary leaders  have  notably  u> 
creased — and  is  further  enhasced  bj? 
Bulganin's  accession  to  premier. 
They  have  greater  capabilities  for 
independent  action  than  do  any 
other  group  in  the  Soviet  Union, 
save  the  Communist  Party.  Mili- 
tary leaders,  on  the  whole,  have  had 
a  little  more  experience  with  the 
West  and  tend  to  have  a  more  real- 
istic estimate  of  its  power.  They 
are  more  trusted  by  peoples  of  the 
Soviet  Union  than  any  other  power 
echelon.  While  virtually  all  officers 
above  the  grade  of  captain  are  mem- 
bers of  the  Party  or  Komsomol,  it 
is  likely  that  patriotism  will  prevail 
over  the  regime  or  ideological  com- 
.  mitment  among  most  senior  officers 
in  &  crisis  situation. 
What  is  the  greatest  weakness 
of  the  Soviet  system? 
The  fact  that  the  Soviet  system 
violates  so  many  interests  of  its 
citizens  in  achieving  state  goals 
that  the  regime  cannot  rely  on  their 
loyalty. 
What  is  the  chance  that  a  revo- 
lution will  wreck  the  Soviet  sys- 
tem? 
There  is  little  likelihood  that  the 
Soviet  dictatorship  will  crumble 
from  its  own  faulty  structure  within 
the  immediately  foreseeable  future. 
Nor  do  we  anticipate  an  internal 
revolution  other  than  possibly,  a 
change  in  the  personnel  of  the  rul- 
ing clique. 
What  are  the  chronic  failures  of 
the  Soviet  system? 
The  prolonged  depression  of  the 
standard  of  living;  the  unrelenting 
pace  of  industrialization;  the  con- 
tinued unchanged  operation  of  the 
despised  collective  farm  system; 
and  the  ever  present  threat  of  ter- 
ror. 
Did  this  study  cover  attitudes 
and  conditions  in  satellite  coun- 
tries? 
No,  the  Harvard  Project  was 
confined  to  the  USSR,  and  in  par- 
ticular, to  three  aspects  of  national 
life  in  the  Soviet  Union:  the  day- 
to-day  life  of  the  people;  the  struc- 
,  ture  and  functioning  of  basic  Soviet 
institutions  (family,  education,  in- 
dustrial system,  political  life,  com- 
munication system,  popular  behav- 
ior, professional  life,  etc. ) ;  and  the 
interaction  of  Soviet  people  and 
Soviet  institutions. 
How  seriously  do  the  Soviet 
leaders  take  communist  doc- 
trine? 
The  communist  ruling  elite  take 
ideology    and     indeed    philosophy 
NATION'S    BUSINESS- MARCH    1935
seriously  <o  a  degree  that  is  difficult 
for  a  mid-twentieth  century  west- 
erner to  comprehend.  Soviet  news- 
papers and  journals  contain  a  great 
deal  on  these  abstract  subjects. 
These  widely  publicized  utterances 
of  the  leaders  also,  of  course,  are 
calculated  to  symbolize  the  extent 
to  which  the  leadership  is  involved 
in  and  concerned  about  every  as- 
pect of  Soviet  life. 
Why  is  cyclical  behavior  one  of 
the  most  distinctive  operating 
characteristics  of  the  Soviet  sys- 
tem? 
The  long-range  goals  of  the  lead- 
ership are  highly  stable.  From  a 
shorter-term  point  of  view,  there 
have  been  enough  sudden  alterna- 
tions between  rigidity  and  flexibili- 
ty and  between  two  drastically  con- 
trasting courses  of  policy  and  ac- 
tion, to  warrant  designating  cycli- 
cal behavior  a  distinctive  operating 
characteristic  of  the  system.  This  is 
well  illustrated  by  recent  stress  on 
consumer  goods  and  then  the  ab- 
rupt repudiation  of  this  program. 
In  view  of  widespread  dissatis- 
factions among  the  people, 
what  accounts  for  their  loyalty 
to  the  system? 
The  loyalty  (in  practice)  of  most 
of  the  population  of  the  USSR 
arises  primarily  from  belief  in  the 
stability  of  the  system  and  the  con- 
viction that  one  has  no  alternative 
but  to  adjust  end 
Business  To  Guide,; 
Controls  Planning 
SAVE  50% 
on  Roof  repairs 
with  TROPICAL'S  new  maintenance 
system  for  industrial, 
commercial  buildings 
& 
(Continued  from  page/4( 
cany  out  the  proposed  emergency 
stabilization  operations/  J 
hink    this  /preparedness 
work  can  actually  be  successful? 
I  don't  know.  If  we-can  get  wider 
recognition  of  the  fact  that  the  gov- 
ernment probably  cannot  avoid  be- 
ing drawn  into\this  field  in  case  of 
real  emergency^pif  we  can  achieve 
an  increased  understanding  of  the 
problems  and /limitations — and  if 
we  have  enough  interest,  patience 
and  forebearahce — tnen  I  would  be 
inclined  to  feel  usefuV  work  could 
be  carried  o/i.  Otherwise).  I  presume 
this  country  would  do\  whatever 
might  seem  appropriate  \>r  expe- 
dient if  aA  emergency  did  arise. 
I  suggest,  however,  that  no  re- 
sponsibly government  coiildV  do 
nothing^— therefore,  it  might  Well 
pay  to.  give  the  subject  thoughtful 
attention  even  though  we  hope  it 
will  not  become  relevant.  cno 
NATION'S    BUSINESS- MARCH    1955 
FREE  BOOK  shows  how  90% 
of  leoky  roofs  can  be  Saved;  cut 
costs  in  half  with  unskilled  labor! 
You  can  save  a  great  deal  of  money  in  roof 
repairs  by  sending  for  this  free  book  "Saving 
Old  Roofs."  Roofing  men  of  long  experience 
wrote  it.  They  have  been  responsible  for  the  formulation  of 
improved  roofing  materials  and  developing  modern  recondi- 
tioning methods. 
It  shows  there  are  no  "trade  secrets"  to  good  roof  repair.  By 
following  this  simple  step-by-step  manual,  your  own  labor  force 
does  first-class  repair  work  on  any  type  of  industrial  roof.  It  shows 
how  leaky  roofs  can  be  given  added  years  of  weather-tight  life, 
saving  the  high  cost  of  a  new  roof.  It  covers  every  detail  of  repair. 
Even  if  complete  roof  renewal  is  necessary,  it  shows  how  your  own 
employes  or  men  without  experience  can  do  a  fine  job  at  great 
savings  with  Tropicai's  Cold  Process  Roofing! 
GET  TOUR  COPY  MOW!  Sent  only  to  owners  or  manag- 
ers of  industrial  or  commercial  buildings,  "SavinR  Old  Hoofs" 
is  FREE  upon  your  business  letterhead  request.  Write  today! 
TtOPICAL  PAINT  COMPANY,  1 134-1284  W.  70th  St.,  Cleveland  2,  Ohio