:H 
.       •  ^^Pu^tani^la'th'^iiraviniuns  pMWCip.No.  Olds  directive  eslaWJ^ic.^' 
X  procruurrs  fcr-lhc  ihdiir<MMi*Mit,,i:xpiit^tU<m.  irscUlemcnl  and  further', 
handling  of.  defector.*  outside  thu  cr.i.'uuntal  limits  of  the  United  States 
2££j.v.antl  iU'ife'^^ioiu^  I'liis.ciir'.ctivt.t'tli'C::  not  apply  in  active. tbeajers  <lC£l 
f .    war  where  UJS.  Forces  arc  encased  or  where- the  President  so  directs. .  ^  
" 
rfe  2.  DF.yixirroM.Z-t'     'jV.;         •       "    .  Z  .      .  *  ;":'^..v  - ::^ 
C;        For  the  purpose. of  tliir.  directive,  the  terms  listed  below  ahall  have  '' 
the  meanings  indicated:  •  •  :\    -- 
*;;i       a.  Defector*:  Defector,*:  arc  defined  a:;  nationals  of  the  USSR- or  a 
~u  country  in  the  Sino-Sovicl  .nice,  wlio  haw  escaped  irom  Ibo  conn ol  of  any  ... 
.  „  .sueh  country,  or  wlio,  beirif;  ouLid''  sueh  jurisdiction  and  control,  .ai^ 
^  •  u^vMiling  to  return  thereto 'and  wlio  are  of  special  value  tg  the  U.S. 
Government  because:  :>■••■ 
(1)  They  arc' aide  In  add  valuable  new  or  confirmatory  informa- 
tion to  cxistinr;  U.S.  knowledge  ol  Mi'.  Moviet  world: 
(2)  They  arc  of  operational  value  lo  a  U.S.  d(  pari  ment  or  a^cney; 
or  .•.'•'• 
(3j  Their  defection  can  be 'psychologically  exploited  to  the  ad- 
vantage of  the  United  Slates.  .  % 
b.  Inducement:.  Inducement  is  an  act  committed  or  manifestly  insti- 
gated by. a  U.S.  official  and  demonstrably  intended  to  briojj  about  a  defec- 
tion for  which  the  U.S.  Government  mitfht,  if  the  acl  wnc  discovered,  un- 
called upon  to  account. 
c.  Potential  Defector:  A  potential  defector  is  a  national  of  the  USSIl 
or  a  country  of  the  Sino-Sovict  nine  who  (1)  is  di.\.:-at;.;fi?d  or  potentially 
estranged  in  the  allegiance  to  the  government  of  hir,  nationality,  (2)  may 
reasonably  be  expected  to  be  susceptible  to  defection  or  recruitment  in 
place,  and  (3)  appears  to  meet  the  special  values  criteria  of  a  d*fecior 
as  set  forth  in  para.  2.a.  above.  . 
d.  Disaffected  Person:  A  disaffected  person  is  a  potential  d:fcetor 
who,  cither  through  inducement  or  voluntary  action  on  Ins  part,  has 
indicated  willingness  or  desire  to  def^t. 
'  c.  Walk-In:  A  walk-in  is  a  disaffected  person  who  pre::?;:!*-  himr.flf 
to  a  U.S.  installation  in  a  foreign  country  and  requests  asy'um  .-•:  .'dist- 
ance in  escaping  from  Ounmunl/.-t,  con  f  :•<»!. 
f.  Refugee:  A  refugee  is  a  national  or  former  nrs'i'mal  of  a  Conuaw- 
nlstrduiuinated  country,  wlio  ha:,  fled  from  and/or  i.*:  unwilling  (u  return 
•Tin's  Directive  .'.upcrr.odcs  DCil)  No.  </">.  iKcw  L'crlr.-.).  »'r\li-.t  ':'>  April  JSj"..  \:UW\: 
previously  hnd  superseded  JDCOP  No.  2  Uvaic  10M). 
T.'-c  u^o.'w-t 
sF.cinrr
'f'-.-ii.-r!:  .v»'/.t;^!  V;\  Vii  t. -;i  * ; .  .•  .'■"  •«.-':.*  .v.  ;n...r,fvr  ,M'u  ^l-h!{«.  b'i~'n/>l  'lifctl  inlc- 
•»r.-\t»fl  i-ifo  ;..'i*i^onf:i.v  of  the  -•o.-nisiy  ill  p*i.\;eiji.  m:'iO<riic,  awtl'who' 
^uala'Jcfeeior.-  •-  '••:  '  
*:'.•'■•  L-  ^  ••.•.-•^- :'';'; ■  •'*  >;?;  ;'V,;^.^ 
i}.;.  {..  hscajic,;:  An  r~capn:  t*»  a  rc^ujVCjV/ho .!» .a  national.  .  •)  ,nf  a.Ejiro- 
juean  .*:a(NljUr  (cxapt  ethnic  CicrmuiM)''9r,yonhs!avia.'wf;'o'Jw.'?  escaped 
:S>hkv  J  Jami.iry  l*-iG.  or  (2)  of  the  fJl&Xl?rW£|fctfvc<if  Uie'dklfiof  ills 
!wa|iri,  r»r;  {,'.%)' \t>i.  Communist,  Cmnu  "or  -I  he  ;A;>iart  .vilrihJ .••si oil'  a  very. 
C«  iCcQvi':luii»f.s.-t  ■     '.,..'.   «,^    .;-..-    r  .•      <;      ■"    «"  1/  V  ';."  • "'.  ■■?,:  .*  <  •       ;.-•.• 
»3.-'jiu$'sbvrJ:r  'iu.de  nationals  :  ."  *•,-  '•^...•i .-       . .  •  '.  -  •-. . 
:  ''  The  prpviWjis  of  I  J»f -3  directive:  may  be  applied  I ti  whole  or  hi  part  to 
<:ases"of  national  of  oomiLri.-s  other  than  the  USSH  or  the  Sino-Sovict 
l'Joc.^Iio  otherwise  meet  the  definition  of  deft/dor,-}  in  parn.  2.a.  above, 
when  .such  aclkn  is  approval  hy  Mu;  Dhecfcor  of  Crhtral  Intelligence  In 
consul!*!  ion  with  the  U;iilcd  S-.-ih'.*;  Intelligence  Hoard.  fh:ch  action  is 
uurnuttiy  recommended  by  the  Interagency  Defector  Committee  (IDC), 
Washington.*  ..'.•:•    '••..'*     '* :'  *'-;.:':'-:      ■•*"♦"    ,:- 
4.   SUT.tHAllY   OF    U.S.    POLICY    CONCERNING    THE    DEFECTOR  ' 
PROGRAM   •■'    ",  ;     '•'.-.  •';•'•     -'"■"•".    .       .       -       ,' 
a.- Defection,  particularly  from  the  USSR,  should  be  rnc.ourrgcd  and 
ii.duc«l%  employing  both  conventional  and  unconvenf  i"inl  means,  when- 
ever thcrq  is  a  net  advantage  to  U.S.  interests.  Accordingly,  the  United 
Slate*;  should:  '  .  •  • 
.  (1)  Encourage  and  Induce  the  defection  of  the  maximum  number 
cf  persons  from  the  US'JU  and  of  Soviet  nationals  outside  the  USSR. 
(2)  Con'inuc.  nnrl  if  possible  expand,  clmrts  to  encourage  and  In- 
duce the  defection  of  key  members  of  elite  group.*;  of  countries  other 
than  the  USSR  who  may  qualify  as  defectors. 
b.  To  encourage  defection  and  discourage  redefectiou,  the  United 
Stales  should  assure  defectors  adequate  care,  maintenance,  and  resettle- 
ment assistance  not  oniy  during,  but  also  aftor  their  exploitation  or 
utibzation.  .  .• 
c  The  United  States  should  take  no  action  to  encourage  the  depar- 
ture of  large  numbers  of  nationals  from  countries  in  the  Siuo-Sovict  Bloc 
other  than  the  USSR.  .    .      .  .       •• 
d.  Prior  to  initiation  by  any  U.S.  department  or  agency  of  action  to 
induce  defection  of  a  potential  defector  or  disaffected  person,  the  possible 
value  of  recruitment  in  place  will  be  considered  carefully.  Where  the 
best  interest  of  the  United  States  would  be  served  by  such  recruitment  of 
the  individual  concerned;  the  previsions  ol  DCID  No.  5/1  shall  apply. 
c.  It  shall  be  the  general  policy  that  no  bona  fide  defector  will  be 
returned  without  his  consent.       .  .  • 
f;  IntdJigcjirc  Considerations  and  objectives  shall  take  priority  and 
snail  bo  satisfied  prior  to  psychological  exploitation  of  defectors.  .Psy- 
chological exploitation  will  be  restricted  to  specific  cures  where  a  net 
advantage  to  1  lie  United  Stale*;  can  be  expected.  There  policica  r.hM' 
bo  implemented  to  iho  extent  practical  in  e-'xes  where  a  defector  f;;  under 
tl'.c  control  of  another  government  outside  the  Sino-Sovict  Bloc. 
BECKKT
's'KCjiirr 
■(>.-'  A  icrsd  JJcfrelor  Commit to  • -ahull  \n\  r.s!:iliti.:hrri  under.  lht>  gcrtfral 
super/lrum  of  the  Senior  U..S.  J.'erjrv.senlalivc  in  appropriate,  count  vie<?. 
The  Commit be  .shall  consist  of  reprorrntat  iv'vs  of  the  Central  Intelligence* 
Ap/noy  (CIA).  Chairman.  Deparlnx  n't  of  fi'latc,  (awl  Depni  tmen«s  of  tlitf 
Army,  Navy  and  Air  Kuree.    The.  Commit  Urf-.juny  invito  reprr.un  la  liVe,:,' 
.of  other  department?,  and  agencies  .to  alleiid  it.';  meetings  on  an  ad  hop 
basis. 
The  ioca!  Defector  Corr.miUec  shall: .  .    , 
a.  .fclcet"  periodically, 'normally  at  least  once  quarterly,. to  coordinate 
.  interagency  aspects  of  the  defector  program  in  the  area  concerned  and. 
"10  promote  the  foil  use  of  the  resources  and  capabilities  of  tin*.  VJS.  Gov- 
ernment in  support  of  this  program.  Copies  of  minu'es  of  all  local 
Detector  Committee  meetings  shall  he  forwarded  thiough  CIA  channel.; 
to  IDC/Washinfrton.    .  ••.,•• 
1).  Consider  and  resolve  mutual.,  problems  including  initial  considera- 
tion qT  disaffected  perrons  bclieyrd  t  >  meet  the.  criteria  established  in 
p.v.a.  £.a.  above  who  arc  nominated  by  a  member.  When  such  problems 
cannot  bo.  resolved  by  the  local  committee,  the  mailer  shall  .be  referred 
through  CIA  channels  lo.lDC/VV.'Lshinglon.  In 'such  cares  representa- 
tives of  other  departments  or  agencies  may  communicate  directly  with 
their  principals  in  Washington  on  the  subjects  involved.  If  time,  dorr; 
not  permit  referral  to  IDC/Wash  Sngt  on,  the  matter  shall  be  submitted 
for  decision  to  the  Senior  U.S.  Representative  Jn  the  area. 
c.  Keep  IDC  Washington  informed  concerning  each  defector,  includ- 
ing status  of  i:.;  a-itatlon  and  termination  of  the.  case.  Appropriate  re- 
ports on  disaffected  persons  will  be  made  to  IDC/Washington,  except 
when  recruitment  in  place  or  other  operational  u:;c  is  contemplated. 
d.  Recommend  supplemental  procedures  in  consonance  v/ith  ibis 
directive  for  approval  by  IDCAVashinpJon  .is  may  be  required  for  imple- 
mentation of  the  defector  program  in  the  ore.,  concerned.  Such  proce- 
dures shall  (1)  provide  for  appropriate  security  measures  for  the  per- 
sonnel and  facilities  involved  in  the  program,  and  (?.)  insure  that:  (;») 
at  the  eariiest  possible  time,  information  rclab-d  to  irnmliunec  of  hos-„ 
tilities  or  immediate  threat  to  the  security  of  u  U.S.  installal  i.«Jt  is  suu;;ht 
from  the  disaffected  person  or  walk-in,  (b)  such  information  is  given 
immediate  dissemination  hi  the  field  and  at  the  national  level  with  ap- 
propriate source  attribution  and  evaluation,  and  (c)  the  disaffected  per- 
son or  volk-in  is  transferred  to  CIA  control  at  the  earliest  possible,  time, 
together  with  the  clothing,  documents  and  other  possessions  and  the  full 
results  of  any  preliminary  debriefing"  of  the  individual. 
c.  Establish  local  operating  procedures  to  insure  that  walk- in  cases 
urc  promptly  nhrred  to  the  proper  official  of  the  U.S.  fn>lallalion  in- 
volved and  handled  under  conditions  insuring  the  maximum  pes-ibio 
security  for  both  the  individual  concerned  and  local  U.S.  ins! .-.nations. 
* 
TfJC  030:VM 
ar.cnKC 
copy    >jo  1  k  2
U4  «V.I'  I»  t 
f.e!or  C't.  •.'.n:!i'  •  ::.•   i.epl  m:  \Vnliy  inluimed  «.«u  luraj  defector  rTfbl'mis 
n«  v:UI  ;is*  r.p;ilii-;il.l«:  (J.S.  puiioitii  ar..S  prc)ro<1trivn.- .  •'    :. '•.   . :"i 
!    4  g.  ii.'j-oin.i". •:•!  u.    'J{VV,';v:hif'::!iiif  "'jiroj:n:.-:ii.:  h-r  Mr/aei;'g  or  the 
rcJcaso  ui'  ini  J  in  i  ovc  .    vik'icil.y  nonet  rrdng  a  defector.'  • 
n.  ovr.UAYisc.  roucir.r.-ANu  PitncsniniKS     •    '       '"  ;'"•;.    ''• 
r..  Tin-  l:-'-r»tt:trnt  Jivcivcd  !*y  u  ]«</!« .-ull'i I  tfrfc.MCU*  *i\"  tll.*ialfcC(Ctl  \<t-' 
w\\  v.\uti\  ;i:7.».  coidac.l.  vdira  U.S.  oiikud  may  bd'.ucnee  his  d^eisiou  to 
(Icin-j  .ir  :u\  falinv  \u.c!iiliii\v.  »o  {lie  United  .Sinus.  Any  i|in:ry  tlii-.'ctly 
or  llu'"»iiji  anrnlcrmpdiruy  by  :i  potential  d<ferfnr  to  ascertain  the 
opporumdy  »d  ml  Mi:;.-.]  on  to  the  Unilcd  Mlalcr.  or  to:  m.hcr  assistance  for 
him'cjf  and  family  should  be  met  with  a  clear  indication  ol  tin;  difficul- 
ties involved  v.ilhout  indicating  that  the  difficulties  are  iir.mmounrablc. 
Except  m  cn?cs  uf  ivctuil.jr.cnt  iu  place,  or  other  operational  use,  no- firm 
fmauvi. '1  oi'  o'ih<r  commitments  .shall  be  made  until  the  case  bar.  teem 
conrideu-.-l  by  tb;-  local  Detector  Committee  and,  in  tbc  event  movement 
jo  ihe  lbnl<  d  &l;.t i.v.  Ik  involved,  appropriate  cb'Jimjccs  are  obtained  irom 
\V".i:..'ii;«;:i«in.  A;,  eai  ly  as  feasible,  each  disaffected  person  should  be  re- 
quired lo  r.iy.n  a  .■.lalcnicnt  indicating  Miaf  lib.  defection  was  purely  vol- 
untary .'I'd  'hat  ho  desires  political  asylum. 
b.  The  cr.se  of  any  disaffected  person  or  defector  in  the  hands  of  a 
non-Si: in-J'o'.Vl  lilor  government  that  become.';  knmvn  In  any  U.i>.  Gov- 
ernment official  abroad  should  be  reported  promptly  to  the  Chairman 
of  Ibc  local  Defector  Committee  who  will  consult  with  appropriate  mem- 
bers 0-'  the  Committee  and  be  responsible  /or  taking:  and  coordinating 
rn-iibn  jn  ibc  interest  of  tb.c  United  States.  To  the.  extent  feasible,  de- 
fectors oiidei  t!ie  eontrol  of  another  government  will  bo  exploited  in  the 
in  Iciest  of  the  U'Xl.  Government  as  provided  herein.  It  is  recognized, 
however,  thai  political  considerations  of  and  agreements  with  a  host 
government  may  affect  exploitation  of  defectors  under  its  control. 
c.  V/hcn  a  defector  is  to  bo  used  for  operational  purports  and  v.'hcn 
his  ideality  should  be  concealed,  the  Chairman  of  the  lue.il  Defector 
Com  mi  I  tee  will  inform  the  Committee  of  the  existence  —  bat  not  the 
identity  — of  the  defector  together  with  a  general  statement  of  his  back- 
ground, area  knowledge  and  field  of  relative  competence.  DCID  No.  5/1 
shall  apply  to  such  cases.  Efforts  shall  be  made  to  satisfy  intelligence 
requirements  as  promptly  and  completely  as  possible. 
'  d.  Information  related  to  imminence  of  hostilities  or  immediate 
tb/rat  lo  Hie  security  of  a  U.S.  installation  will  be  sought  at  the  earliest 
po.j-iblc  lime  fiom  disaffected  persons. 
c.  The  establishment  of  bona  fides  of  disaffected  persons  will  be  given 
particular  attention  because  of  the  demonstrated  use  of  defector  cbsn- 
ncb;  by  hostile  scivjcrs  lo  ncneiralc  and  convey  false  or  deceptive  Infor- 
mntion  to  U..S.  inU-lligenee  servlrcs. 
7.   RKHrCitlXlMI.lTir.'J  OF  the  field  RKVIIK&ENTATIVS  OF  CIA 
The  Fn-kl  licprccntativc  of  CIA  ]\uh  primary  responsibility  lor  the 
conduct  of  the  defector  jirogrnm  abroad  and  for  providing  certain  perv- 
lees  of  common  concern.     He  shall: 
SECltKT
::.  '.:i»>i.!i'ii  .  ;»•:  \Ur  .'•■'  «?«i>..f--»l   i  -plf.v/---n!;.llv-»  «f  Uu%  Director  i-.f 
Cfu'.frii  ;i.J«-Jli;;«'iirf.  Hl-d-fci  im'  act'Wi:.;  eouduehd  t-.'itinii  hi.:  :u\.i  oi 
;;rcsiMimibi1i:y  inrl.ultii:;:  •• 
*... :      ".  (J)  J.l::i:uiii  \v.'lii  (!.«•  i:il:::i»;;rii.-i*-.nu<!  rlt't.nWy    .  -vires  or  other 
r:/i  Inlciesb.-d  elements  «»f  foreign  governments  f  '\  .lefector  wutlc*:;,  ' 
.    (?.)  Promotion  of  the  f*:l(*;i.*:u  of  lli<».iv«-.o»>r(TN  and  cnpabiliiiej  of'' 
nil  d'-p.ut  men  ta  rwul  rij-.'vivi'v:  in  yupjmvl  ol  this  jii'i^ram,  ',. 
(3)   )»(j:jri  jjicjit  opera' ionu.atid  operational  icy*  of  d  •ftrtinx  by 
other  departments  raid  agencies  Ju  aceordmsec  with  the  provi'  ions-'uf 
.DC/D  No.  5/1.  .•  i 
b.  In  'consultation  with  (In :  local  IX'frclor  Committee: 
(1)  Determine,  in  thcen'cof  disairoeted  persons,  the  special  v.\(u-::. 
applicable  and  the  risk,  if  any,  to  the  political,  military,  diplomatic 
and  security  interests  »t  the  United  Slates. 
(?.)  Insure  appropriate  rind  p.ompt  dissemination  of  intcib'Ecnee 
information  obtained  from  dcfcclwr:.,  and 
(3)  Determine:  such  special  handling  technique:;.  inoJuoin;;  re- 
striction of  local  dissciuiti.iiiun  of  information,  a:;  may  be  required  in 
ca;.os  of  disalTcctcd  persona  orulefrdors  when  exceptional  polita-p.i. 
military,  diplomatic,  security  or  other  factors  a  jo  involved.  In  r.p- 
"propr tale  cases,  recommendations  for  special  handling.;  will  be  sent  lo 
I  DC/ Washing  ton.  ... 
c.  Induce  defection  and  u~e  defectors  operationally. 
d.'  Establish  the  bona  fide:;  of  disaffected  person.':  in  consultation  with 
the  representatives  of  app.epiialc  departments  or  pgc.nrie:?  who  may 
have  participated  in  the  identification  or  delivery  of  the  disaffected  per- 
son, or  for  other  reasons  may  have  u  special  interest  or  capability  in  the. 
area.  .  .-...„ 
. ■-  (1)  Representatives  of  departments  and  agencies  concc^nd  will 
be  kept  informed  on  a  timely  basis  during  the  process  of  dcierm;n;n<: 
bona  fides- and  will  be  provided  a  final  summary  when  bona  tide.;  and 
special  values  are  established.  At  such  time,  departments  au.l  a»en- 
cies  concerned  will  be  provided  access,  initially  lo  satisfy  security  ci 
other  operational  intelligence  requirements  and  thcieaflcr  for.clber 
exploitation  purposes.  ■  .\.-    "  . 
(2)  Information  indicating  imminence  of  ho:,tiUlics  or  other 
highly  .s  jificant  intelligence  information  of  immediate  mlcrcxf.  *vi!l 
be  soug'.  L  the  earliest  opportunity  and  given  immediate  di.^-enrina- 
tion  in  t*.e  field  and  at  the  national  level.  Debriefing  of  defectors 
lo  obtain  intelligence  Information  of  immediate  opei  at  tonal  value 
will  be  conducted  in  conjunction  with  other  departments  and  agen- 
ctcs  concerned;  specific  operational  leads,  applicable  to  tie  tr  clan- 
destine activities,  will  be  made  available  to  appsourialc  departments 
and  agencies'. 
.  (3)  1Vhc:i  the  bona  fides  of  a  d  sai.ectecl  person  cannot  be  estab- 
lished within  a  tcnsnnable  time,  tbc  other  members  or  V.\c  local  Se- 
lector Committee  will  be  given  a  .situation  rep-ul  ou  the  di'..nri  .- 1 •.••'. 
person  together  with  a  general  statement  of  his  fiM-.j-.ed  bae::;,ru_i<iJ, 
TiiC  020.r.7l 
SUCRCl' 
COPY     NO  trj2
i.'ix'K^i  r. 
;•  r.i   !;.■>»< rrli- !,••..•  a:*.d   :■.  J.j  o;    iH'di-i!  {•••fiijK'Un'v.-   Spnlk:   #xitc!JI- 
;,'.:j;-..  •:«  .{'ii«fi;u  :)i.-.  v.ul  U-  ,.itu-    ,'.il  u.ul .  :.;i  J  i.,*lc  i  »u.  |»r«jtijplly  und 
luiiv  ru:  potable,  notiualiy  v. It Ud«:  •'-.•»  an-ivr.  k»  Iho  disaffected  pei'soa'. 
by  Mut'rifpnrljiH'nL;  and  ."•;,.c«,cf<r.  conernird  nndrr  conditions  oslali- 
iiJied  by  Uio  CIA  repier.'-jitativcm  the  light  ol  the  uiitfeu.il  circuit;-. 
stance:  of  (he  oasov  .        .'..''      ;,v/'"    "         -;    '  •'  ■    r-  V 
(-1)  When  counN.T-f.spiniiagc  operational  action  ir.  Indicated^  be-. 
c.iw.vo  ho-uio  ,.;;rjii  statu.;  U  established  or  I  mi  si  be  #  assumed,"  fbc 
p;-(.vi';:«V);;c,f  the-  iliarlivo  shall  not  apply  nnd  the  cn.se  .'hall  hi*  hun? 
.died  i:i  .••...r.f.rd.ti:cc  Willi  l)C)\)  No.  5/J.  When  counler-ospinnnp:  a<!-' 
t'.on  is  r.ot  indicated,  Void  prior  to  dispu'al  of, such  cases,  departments 
and  ajrcnrir;!  v:ilJ  be  provided  an  opportunity  to  request  the  servicing 
of  specific  requirements  under  condition.*:  established  by  the  CIA  rep- 
resentative, normally  by  direct  access  to  lhc.di-".afIceUd  person. 
e.  Infoun  the  Junior  U.S.  Jh-pre:.cntative  in  tins  area  involved  of  the. 
lac.rne:  of  a  defo  r  or  potential  defector  and  advise  such  representa- 
tive ou  ail  u.;pc.r.l..    »  defector  mullets."  •"  :         *'=  y 
f.  Dr  brief  defectors  for  punitive  IntelJfgcnce  infommlion  with  par- 
ticipation i>/ departments  and  agencies  Involved  in  the.  defi  ctor  program. 
g.  Provide  or  anange  for  secure  facilities  and  personnel  for  the  proc- 
csrlngaud  dcbrlc.'b:g  or  defectors  including  transportation  or  cv.ieuation 
to  seeufo  areas  as  retpjired.  • 
h.  Provide  nr  arrange  for  care,  maintenance,  uhabllilollon  and  reset- 
tlement of  defector.;  within  the  limit;:  of  available  funds. 
t.  .->.  . .  „  a.,  iho  eliauncl  of  communication  between  the  local  Defector 
•Ccsiinn'.tci-  and  lJKJ/V.'atfhinglon. 
J.  Condurl  hr.i.'on  v.itli  foici«;ii  intelligence  and  security  services  con- 
cerning dc  ft  dor  matters  including  Uio  exchange  of  interrogation  reports. 
6.  JlKSrCK'SiniLJTir.S  OF  the  field  representatives  of  THE 
DEPARTMENTS  OF  STATE,  ARMY,  NAVY  AND  AIR  FORCE     • 
Designated  representatives  of  Uic  Departments  of  State,  Army,  Navy 
and  Air  Force:  '••  ••  •  ."' 
a.  Subject  to  the  provisions  of  para.  7.a.  above,  may  conduct  supple- 
mental activities  in  support  of  the  defector  program  including  the  in- 
ducement of  defection,  liaison  with-  foreign  intelligence  and  security 
services  concerning  defector  matters,  and  exchange  of  their  own  inter- 
rogation reports.  . ••'    •.;.'"•  - 
b.  Shall  report  promptly  to  CIA  representatives  the  identity  of  any 
potential  defector  together  with  all  available  pertinent  information. 
c.  Shrill  provide,  within  their  capabilities,  transportation,  housing, 
personnel  and  other  facilities  in  .support  of  the  defector  prognurt. 
d.  Shall  advise  the  representative  of  the  Director  of  Central  Intelli- 
gence ol  Hip  political,  mllitaiy,  diplomatic,  or  security  implications  of 
ucti<m.~  \no\n.K.t'cl  or  tal.cn  In  umporl  of  thin  program. 
. 
9.    RUST-ON Slfll LIT If.:;  OF  THE  SENIOR  U.S.  REPRESENTATIVE  IN 
THE  AREA 
The  Senior  U.S.  Kc preventative  in  the  area  concerned  will  be  respon- 
sible for: 
G 
SEC11ET
CKCur-rr 
:!  "-'<».'  Dctot  ntj,r.nj:,  v;jih  i> -**  .•..".•icr  ;i»al  Vir<iiiniv\,.;,,.'..::>ti  o:  :ia:  rcpro- 
-  ccjifuiln*  of the  J)'ifc«.'lnVV..'  fi.ofnj  In].  Il'^/uir,  Jl^  ..an.H'f  :..id  d'^ice 
li»  V.J-ilch  action:;  conli  ni;»!.*I:d  {uv.'-.rd'  i  .i.^mWIi  'j  :-;•-.•  on  ni  dv:'(r.!or 
may ahVcl  lhcj>riUlk\al  jin.i  diiiUanatw:  mim-st, «  f  \U>:  ;j..ri.  •.  "' . 
Y'o.'JnsiirJiiK  M»;«t  nppn«|i'ri»i!Jr  U.li.  official..',  no'  rmrfed  by  jura,  fi.f.v 
who  a  re  likely  lo  be  in  oiu!.:ri.  viMi  <lUifTir!icl-|>crs«»i«;:  arc  fciven  limited 
« luicOiiK  cou«  «*ivtin;i  <U'iocl»it  mutOn;  ;ia  prt/vidoil  JuivinT  .  .' 
'•     &•  Co.»i<Iiu-.:Uj»;:  with'  I  he  .  irprcwnlnUvua  of  in  ten:,  ted  U.S.  dr)*art> 
mcnls'aiici  agencies  ural,  lo  I  in*  cUfircc  mrj'.vsary,  wilh  i.[i\)ro\:v::A*:  for- 
eign governmental  agencies,  any. publicity  or  psychological  exploit  a.1  inn 
'  of  a  rjefctttor.  '  ., . '•'  ;  /     ">  •    :  •, 
d.  Providing  assistance  to  the  CIA  rcproicnlalive  In  carrying  out  his 
rcspomibiliUir.  undrr  this  directive.  '  '■'.'•  '  •    .  s 
•  ALLEN  W.  DULLES 
Director  of  Central  intelligence  • 
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SECRET  DCID  No.  4/2 
(New  Series) 
DIRECTOR  OF  CENTRAL  INTELLIGENCE  DIRECTIVE  NO.  4/21 
THE  DEFECTOR  PROGRAM  ABROAD 
(Effective  26  June  1959) 
1.  SCOPE 
Pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  NSCID  No.  4,  this  directive  establishes 
procedures  for  the  inducement,  exploitation,  resettlement,  and  further 
handling  of  defectors  outside  the  continental  limits  of  the  United  States 
and  its  possessions.  This  directive  does  not  apply  in  active  theaters  of 
war  where  U.S.  Forces  are  engaged  or  where  the  President  so  directs. 
2.  DEFINITIONS 
For  the  purpose  of  this  directive,  the  terms  listed  below  shall  have 
the  meanings  indicated: 
a.  Defectors:  Defector?  are  defined  as  nationals  of  the  USSR  or  a 
country  in  the  Sino-Soviet  Bloc  who  have  escaped  from  the  control  of  any 
such  country,  or  who,  being  outside  such  jurisdiction  and  control,  are 
unwilling  to  return  thereto  and  who  are  of  special  value  to  the  U.S. 
Government  because: 
(1)  They  are  able  to  add  valuable  new  or  confirmatory  informa- 
tion to  existing  U.S.  knowledge  of  the  Soviet  World; 
(2)  They  are  of  operational  value  to  a  U.S.department  or  agency; 
or 
(3)  Their  defection  can  be  psychologically  exploited  to  the  ad- 
vantage of  the  United  States. 
b.  Inducement:  inducement  is  an  act  committed  or  manifestly  insti- 
gated by  a  U.S.  official  and  demonstrably  indendcd  to  bring  about  a  defec- 
tion for  which  the  U.S.  Government  might,  if  the  act  were  discovered,  be 
called  upon  to  account. 
c.  Potential  Defector:  A  potential  defector  is  a  national  of  the  USSR 
or  a  country  of  the  Sino-Soviet  Bloc  who  (1)  is  dissatisfied  or  potentially 
estranged  in  the  allegiance  to  the  government  of  his  nationality,  (2)  may 
reasonably  be  expected  to  be  susceptible  to  defection  or  recruitment  in 
place,  and  (3)  appears  to  meet  the  special  values  criteria  of  a  defector 
as  set  forth  in  para.  2.a.  above. 
d.  Disaffected  Person:  A  disaffected  person  is  a  potential  defector 
who,  either  through  inducement  or  voluntary  action  on  his  part,  has 
indicated  willingness  or  desire  to  defect. 
e.  Walk-In:  A  walk-in  is  a  disaffected  person  who  presents  himself 
to  a  U.S.  installation  in  a  foreign  country  and  requests  asylum  or  assist- 
ance in  escaping  from  Communist  control. 
f.  Refugee:  A  refugee  h  a  national  or  former  national  of  a  Commu- 
nist-dominated country,  who  has  fled  from  and/or  is  unwilling  to  return 
xThis  Directive  supersedes  DCID  No.  4/2  (New  Series)  dated  29  April  1958,  which 
previously  had  superseded  IDCOP  No.  2  (June  1954). 
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to  such  country,  does  not  possess  another  citizenship,  has  not  been  inte- 
grated into  the  economy  of  the  country  of  present  residence,  and  who 
is  not  a  defector. 
g.  Escapee:  An  escapee  is  a  refugee  who  is  a  national  (1)  of  a  Euro- 
pean satellite  (except  ethnic  Germans)  or  Yugoslavia  who  has  escaped 
since  I  January  1948,  or  (2)  or  the  USSR  irrespective  of  the  date  of  his 
escape,  or  (3)  of  Communist  China  or  the  Asian  satellites  on  a  very 
selective  basis. 
3.  NON-SOVIET  BLOC  NATIONALS 
The  provisions  of  this  directive  may  be  applied  in  whole  or  in  part  to 
cases  of  nationals  of  countries  other  than  the  USSR  or  the  Sino-Soviet 
Bloc,  who  otherwise  meet  the  definition  of  defectors  in  para.  2.a.  above, 
when  such  action  is  approved  by  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  in 
consultation  with  the  United  States  Intelligence  Board.  Such  action  is 
normally  recommended  by  the  Interagency  Defector  Committee  (IDC), 
Washington. 
4.  SUMMARY  OF  U.S.  POLICY  CONCERNING  THE  DEFECTOR 
PROGRAM 
a.  Defection,  particularly  from  the  USSR,  should  be  encouraged  and 
induced,  employing  both  conventional  and  unconventional  means,  when- 
ever there  is  a  net  advantage  to  U.S.  interests.  Accordingly,  the  United 
States  should: 
(1)  Encourage  and  induce  the  defection  of  the  maximum  number 
of  persons  from  the  USSR  and  of  Soviet  nationals  outside  the  USSR. 
(2)  Continue,  and  if  possible  expand,  efforts  to  encourage  and  in- 
duce the  defection  of  key  members  of  elite  groups  of  countries  other 
than  the  USSR  who  may  qualify  as  defectors. 
b.  To  encourage  defection  and  discourage  redefection,  the  United 
States  should  assure  defectors  adequate  care,  maintenance,  and  resettle- 
ment assistance  not  only  during,  but  also  after  their  exploitation  or 
utilization. 
c.  The  United  States  should  take  no  action  to  encourage  the  depar- 
ture of  large  numbers  of  nationals  from  countries  in  the  Sino-Soviet  Bloc 
other  than  the  USSR. 
d.  Prior  to  initiation  by  any  U.S.  department  or  agency  of  action  to 
induce  defection  of  a  potential  defector  or  disaffected  person,  the  possible 
value  of  recruitment  in  place  will  be  considered  carefully.  Where  the 
best  interest  of  the  United  States  would  be  served  by  such  recruitment  of 
the  individual  concerned;  the  provisions  of  DCID  No.  5/1  shall  apply. 
e.  It  shall  be  the  general  policy  that  no  bona  fide  will  be 
returned  without  his  consent. 
f.  Intelligence  considerations  and  objectives  shall  take  priority  and 
shall  be  satisfied  prior  to  psychological  exploitation  of  defectors.  Psy- 
chological exploitation  will  be  restricted  to  specific  cases  where  a  net 
advantage  to  the  United  States  can  be  expected.  These  policies  shall 
be  implemented  to  the  extent  practical  in  cases  where  a  defector  is  under 
the  control  of  another  government  outside  the  Sino-Soviet  Bloc. 
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g.  Implementation  of  overt  publicity  concerning  defectors  shall  be 
coordinated  with  the  Department  of  State. 
h.  Coordination,  as  provided  herein,  shall  respect  the  interests,  capa- 
bilities and  responsibilities  of  all  departments  and  agencies  to  insure 
full  use  of  such  capabilities  in  support  of  the  defector  program. 
5.  LOCAL  DEFECTOR  COMMITTEES 
A  local  Defector  Committee  shall  be  established  under  the  general 
supervision  of  the  Senior  U.S.  Representative  in  appropriate  countries. 
The  Committee  shall  consist  of  representatives  of  the  Central  Intelligence 
Agency  (CIA),  Chairman,  Department  of  State,  and  Departments  of  the 
Army,  Navy,  and  Air  Force.  The  Committee  may  invite  representatives 
of  other  departments  and  agencies  to  attend  its  meetings  on  an  ad  hoc 
basis.  The  local  Defector  Committee  shall: 
a.  Meet  periodically,  normally  at  least  once   juarterly,  to  coordinate 
interagency  aspects  of  the  defector  program  in  the  area  concerned  and 
to  promote  the  full  use  of  the  resources  and  capabilities  of  the  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment in  support  of  this  program.  Copies  of  minutes  of  all  local 
Defector  Committee  meetings  shall  be  forwarded  through  CIA  channels 
to  IDC/Washington. 
b.  Consider  and  resolve  mutual  problems  including  initial  considera- 
tion of  disaffected  persons  believed  to  meet  the  criteria  established  in 
para.  2.a.  above  who  are  nominated  by  a  member.  When  such  problems 
cannot  be  resolved  by  the  local  committee,  the  matter  shall  be  referred 
through  CIA  channels  to  IDC/Washington.  In  such  cases  representa- 
tives of  other  departments  or  agencies  may  communicate  directly  with 
their  principles  in  Washington  on  the  subjects  involved.  If  time  does 
not  permit  referral  to  IDC/Washington,  the  matter  shall  be  submitted 
for  decision  to  the  Senior  U.S.  Representative  in  the  area. 
c.  Keep  IDC/Washington  informed  concerning  each  defector,  includ- 
ing status  of  exploitation  and  termination  of  the  case.  Appropriate  re- 
ports on  disaffected  persons  will  be  made  to  IDC/Washington,  except 
when  recruitment  in  place  or  other  operational  use  is  contemplated. 
d.  Recommend  supplemental  procedures  in  consonance  with  this 
directive  for  approval  by  IDC/Washington  as  may  be  required  for  imple- 
mentation of  the  defector  program  in  the  area  concerned.  Such  proce- 
dures shall  (1)  provide  for  appropriate  security  measures  for  the  per- 
sonnel and  facilities  involved  in  the  program,  and  (2)  insure  that:  (a) 
at  the  earliest  possible  time,  information  related  to  imminence  of  hos- 
tilities or  immediate  threat  to  the  security  of  a  U.S.  installation  is  sought 
from  the  disaffected  person  or  walk-in,  (b)  such  information  is  given 
immediate  dissemination  in  the  field  and  at  the  national  level  with  ap- 
propriate source  attribution  and  evaluation,  and  (c)  the  disaffected  per- 
son or  walk-in  is  transferred  to  CIA  control  at  the  earliest  possible  time, 
together  with  the  clothing,  documents  and  other  possessions  and  the  full 
results  of  any  preliminary  debriefing  of  the  individual. 
e.  Establish  local  operating  procedures  to  insure  that  walk-in  cases 
are  promptly  referred  to  the  proper  official  of  the  U.S.  installation  in- 
volved and  handled  under  conditions  insuring  the  maximum  possible 
security  for  both  the  individual  concerned  and  local  U.S.  installations. 
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f.  Establish  procedures  to  insure  that  all  members  of  the  local  De- 
fector Committee  are  kept  currently  informed  on  local  defector  problems 
as  well  as  applicable  U.S.  policies  and  procedures. 
g.  Recommend  to  IDC/Washington  proposals  for  surfacing  or  the 
release  of  initial  overt  publicity  concerning  a  defector. 
6.  OPERATING  POLICIES  AND  PROCEDURES 
a.  The  treatment  received  by  a  potential  defector  or  disaffected  per- 
son upon  first  contact  with  a  U.S.  official  may  influence  his  decision  to 
defect  or  his  future  usefulness  to  the  United  States.  Any  query  directly 
or  through  an  intermediary  by  a  potential  defector  to  ascertain  the 
opportunity  of  admission  to  the  United  States  or  for  other  assistance  for 
himself  and  family  should  be  met  with  a  clear  indication  of  the  diffic- 
ulties involved  without  indicating  that  the  difficulties  are  insurmountable. 
Except  in  cases  of  recruitment  in  place,  or  other  operational  use,  no  firm 
financial  or  other  commitments  shall  be  made  until  the  case  has  been 
considered  by  the  local  Defector  Committee  and,  in  the  event  movement 
to  the  United  States  is  involved,  appropriate  clearances  are  obtained  from 
Washington.  As  early  as  feasible,  each  disaffected  person  should  be  re- 
quired to  sign  a  statement  indicating  that  his  defection  was  purely  vol- 
untary and  that  he  desires  political  asylum. 
b.  The  case  of  any  disaffected  person  or  defector  in  the  hands  of  a 
non-Sino-Soviet  Bloc  government  that  becomes  known  to  any  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment official  abroad  should  be  reported  promptly  to  the  Chairman 
of  the  local  Defector  Committee  who  will  consult  with  appropriate  mem- 
bers of  the  Committee  and  be  responsible  for  taking  and  coordinating 
action  in  the  interest  of  the  United  States.  To  the  extent  feasible,  de- 
fectors under  the  control  of  another  government  will  be  exploited  in  the 
interest  of  the  U.S.  Government  as  provided  herein.  Ft  is  recognized, 
however,  that  political  considerations  of  and  agreements  with  a  host 
government  may  affect  exploitation  of  defectors  under  its  control. 
c.  When  a  defector  is  to  be  used  for  operational  purposes  and  when 
his  identity  should  be  concealed,  the  Chairman  of  the  local  Defector 
Committee  will  inform  the  Committee  of  the  existence-but  not  the 
identity-of  the  defector  together  with  a  general  statement  of  his  back- 
ground, area  knowledge  and  field  of  relative  competence.  DCID  No.  5/1 
shall  apply  to  such  cases.  Efforts  shall  be  made  to  satisfy  intelligence 
requirements  as  promptly  and  completely  as  possible. 
d.  Information  related  to  imminence  of  hostilities  or  immediate 
threat  to  the  security  of  a  U.S.  installation  will  be  sought  at  the  earliest 
possible  time  from  disaffected  persons. 
e.  The  establishment  of  bona  fides  of  disaffected  persons  will  be  given 
particular  attention  because  of  the  demonstrated  use  of  defector  chan- 
nels by  hostile  services  to  penetrate  and  convey  false  or  deceptive  infor- 
mation to  U.S.  intelligence  services. 
7.  RESPONSIBILITIES  OF  THE  FIELD  REPRESENTATIVE  OF  CIA 
The  Field  Representative  of  CIA  has  primary  responsibility  for  the 
conduct  of  the  defector  program  abroad  and  for  providing  certain  serv- 
ices of  common  concern.  He  shall: 
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a.  Coordinate  as  the  designated  representative  of  the  Director  of 
Central  Intelligence,  all  defector  activities  conducted  within  the  area  of 
responsibility  including: 
(1)  Liaison  with  the  intelligence  and  security  services  of  other 
interested  elements  of  foreign  governments  on  defector  matters, 
(2)  Promotion  of  the  full  use  of  the  resources  and  capabilities  of 
all  departments  and  agencies  in  support  of  this  program, 
(3)  Inducement  operations  and  operational  use  of  defectors  by 
other  departments  and  agencies  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of 
DCID  No.  5/1. 
b.  In  consultation  with  the  local  Defector  Committee: 
(1)  Determine,  in  the  case  of  disaffected  persons,  the  special  values 
applicable  and  the  risk,  if  any,  to  the  political,  military,  diplomatic 
and  security  interests  of  the  United  States. 
(2)  Insure  appropriate  and  prompt  dissemination  of  intelligence 
information  obtained  from  defectors,  and 
(3)  Determine  such  special  handling  techniques,  including  re- 
striction of  local  dissemination  of  information,  as  may  be  required  in 
cases  of  disaffected  persons  or  defectors  when  exceptional  political, 
military,  diplomatic,  security  or  other  factors  are  involved.  In  ap- 
propriate cases,  recommendations  for  special  handling  will  be  sent  to 
IDC/Washington. 
c.  Induce  defection  and  use  defectors  operationally. 
d.  Establish  the  bona  fides  of  disaffected  persons  in  consultation  with 
the  representatives  of  appropriate  departments  or  agencies  who  may 
have  participated  in  the  identification  or  delivery  of  the  disaffected  per- 
son, or  for  other  reasons  may  have  a  special  interest  or  capability  in  the 
area. 
(1)  Representatives  of  departments  and  agencies  concerned  will 
be  kept  informed  on  a  timely  basis  during  the  process  of  determining 
bona  fides  and  will  be  provided  a  final  summary  when  bona  fides  and 
special  values  are  established.  At  such  time,  departments  and  agen- 
cies concerned  will  be  provided  access,  initially  to  satisfy  security  or 
other  operational  intelligence  requirements  and  thereafter  for  other 
exploitation  purposes. 
(2)  Information  indicating  imminence  of  hostilities  or  other 
highly  significant  intelligence  information  of  immediate  interest  will 
be  sought  at  the  earliest  opportunity  and  given  immediate  dissemina- 
tion in  the  field  and  at  the  national  level.  Debriefing  of  defectors 
to  obtain  intelligence  information  of  immediate  operational  value 
will  be  conducted  in  conjunction  with  other  departments  and  agen- 
cies concerned;  specific  operational  loads,  applicable  to  their  clan- 
destine activities,  will  be  made  available  to  appropriate  departments 
and  agencies. 
(3)  When  the  bona  fides  of  a  disaffected  person  cannot  be  estab- 
lished within  a  reasonable  time,  the  other  members  of  the  local  De- 
fector Committee  will  be  given  a  situation  report  on  the  disaffected 
person  together  with  a  general  statement  of  his  alleged  background, 
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area  knowledge  and  field  of  relative  competence.  Specific  intelli- 
gence requirements  will  be  produced  and  satisfied  as  promptly  and 
fully  as  possible,  normally  with  direct  access  to  the  disaffected  person 
by  the  departments  or  agencies  concerned  under  conditions  estab- 
lished by  the  CIA  representative  in  the  light  of  the  unusual  circum- 
stances of  the  case. 
(4)  When  counter-espionage  operational  action  is  indicated  be- 
cause hostile  agent  status  is  established  or  must  be  assumed,  the 
provisions  of  this  directive  shall  not  apply  and  the  case  shall  be  han- 
dled in  accordance  with  DCID  No.  5/1.  When  counter-espionage  ac- 
tion is  not  indicated,  and  prior  to  disposal  of  such  cases,  departments 
and  agencies  will  be  provided  an  opportunity  to  request  the  servicing 
of  specific  requirements  under  conditions  established  by  the  CIA  rep- 
resentative, normally  by  direct  access  to  the  disaffected  person. 
e.  Inform  the  Senior  U.S.  Representative  in  the  area  involved  of  the 
presence  of  a  defector  or  potential  defector  and  advise  such  representa- 
tive on  all  aspects  of  defector  matters. 
f.  Debrief  defectors  for  positive  intelligence  information  with  par- 
ticipation by  departments  and  agencies  involved  in  the  defector  program. 
g.  Provide  or  arrange  for  care,  maintenance,  rehabilitation  and  reset- 
tlement of  defectors  within  the  limits  of  available  funds. 
i.  Serve  as  the  channel  of  communication  between  the  local  Defector 
Committee  and  IDC/Washington. 
j.  Conduct  liaison  with  foreign  intelligence  and  security  services  con- 
cerning defector  matters  including  the  exchange  of  interrogation  reports. 
8.  RESPONSIBILITY  OF  THE  FIELD  REPRESENTATIVES  OF  THE 
DEPARTMENTS  OF  STATE.  ARMY,  NAVY,  AND  AIR  FORCE 
Designated  representatives  of  the  Departments  of  State,  Army,  Navy 
and  Air  Force: 
a.  Subject  to  the  provisions  of  para.7.a.  above,  may  conduct  supple- 
mental activities  in  support  of  the  defector  program  including  the  in- 
ducement of  defection,  liaison  with  foreign  intelligence  and  security 
services  concerning  defector  matters,  and  exchange  of  their  own  inter- 
rogation reports. 
b.  Shall  report  promptly  to  CIA  representatives  the  identity  of  any 
potential  defector  together  with  all  available  pertinent  information. 
c.  Shall  provide,  within  their  capabilities,  transportation,  housing, 
personnel  and  other  facilities  in  support  of  the  defector  program. 
d.  Shall  advise  the  representative  of  the  Director  of  Central  Intelli- 
gence of  the  political,  military,  diplomatic,  or  security  implications  of 
actions  proposed  or  taken  in  support  of  this  program. 
9.  RESPONSIBILITIES  OF  THE  SENIOR  U.S.  REPRESENTATIVE  IN 
THE  AREA 
The  Senior  U.S.  Representative  in  the  area  concerned  will  be  respon- 
sible for: 
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a.  Determining  with  the  advice  and  recommendation  of  the  repre- 
sentative of  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence,  the  manner  and  degree 
to  which  actions  contemplated  toward  a  disaffected  person  or  defector 
may  affect  the  political  and  diplomatic  interest  of  the  U.S. 
b.  Insuring  that  appropriate  U.S.  officials,  not  covered  by  para  5.fM 
who  are  likely  to  be  in  contact  with  disaffected  persons  are  given  limited 
briefing  concerning  defector  matters  as  provided  herein. 
c.  Coordinating  with  the  representatives  of  interested  U.S.  depart- 
ments and  agencies  and,  to  the  degree  necessary,  with  appropriate  for- 
eign governmental  agencies,  any  publicity  or  psychological  exploitation 
of  a  defector. 
d.  Providing  assistance  to  the  CIA  representative  in  carrying  out  his 
responsibilities  under  this  directive. 
ALLEN  W.  DULLES 
Director  of  Central  Intelligence 
TSC  030571 
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