Army  Regulation  530-2 
Operations  and  Signal  Security 
Communications 
Security 
Headquarters 
Department  of  the  Army 
Washington,  DC 
1  September  1982
A  Transition 
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publication.   Because  the  Baltimore  Publication  Center  exhausted 
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The  Editors
mmm 
AR  530-2 
Communications  Security 
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-  i- 
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base  publication: 
The  quick  brown  fox  jumped  over  the  lazy 
dog. 
Change  text  as  it  appears  in  a 
current  UPDATE  issue: 
The  quick  brown  gray  fox  jumped  over  on 
the  lazy  dog. 
3. 
Fresh  text  as  it  will  appear  in  the 
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dog. 
UPDATE  Tint  Technique 
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2. 
Restructured  change  text  as  it 
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Fresh  text  as  it  will  appear  in  the 
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Chapter  12 
Reporting  Equipment  Ideas, 
Problems  and  Warranty  Claims 
12-1.  General 
This  chapter  tells  you  how  to  make  and 
submit: 
a.  Warranty  Claim  Actions  (WCAs). 
b.  Equipment  Improvement  Recommen- 
dations (EIRs). 
c  Quality  Deficiency  Reports  (QDRs). 
12-2.  Warranty  Claim  Actions 
a.  Purpose.  DA  Form  2407  is  used  to 
send  in  WCAs  for  items  with  bad  compo- 
nents, parts,  or  assemblies  covered  by  a  fac- 
tory warranty.  DA  Form  2407  is  also  used 
to  get  payment  for  labor  used  replacing  the 
bad  items. 
6.  Identity  of  end  items  under  warranty 
is  shown  by  a  decal  plate,  data  plate,  and 
labels. 
c.  All  warranty  actions,  settled  or  not, 
are  reported  to  the  national  level  on  DA 
Form  2407.  Report  local  warranties  settled 
with  DA  Form  2407  with  the  words  "For 
Information  only"  written  in  block  16a.  See 
Appendix  F. 
Chapter  12 
Reporting  Quality  Deficiencies, 
ideas,  Equipment  Improvement 
Recommendations  and  Warranty 
Ciaims 
12-1.  Genera! 
This  chapter  tells  you  how  to  make  and 
fubmit: 
a.  Quality  Deficiency  Reports  and  aug- 
jgest  ideas  and  recommendations  for  improv- 
;iag  equipment  on  the  SF  Form  368. 
'■.  b.  Warranty  claim  actions  (WCA's)  for 
items  with  bad  components,  parts,  or  assem- 
blies covered  by  a  factory  warranty.  Use  the 
DA  Form  2407  for  WCA's. 
12-2.  Reporting  Duality  Deficiencies 
and  Equipment  improvement 
Recommandattorts 
a.  The  SF  Form  368  is  a  multi-use  form 
used  for  reporting: 
Chapter  12 
Reporting  Quality  Deficiencies, 
Ideas,  Equipment  Improvement 
Recommendations  and  Warranty 
Claims 
12-1.  General 
This  chapter  tells  you  how  to  make  and 
submit: 
a.  Quality  Deficiency  Reports  and  sug- 
gest ideas  and  recommendations  for  improv- 
ing equipment  on  the  SF  Form  368. 
b.  Warranty  claim  actions  (WCA's)  for 
items  with  bad  components,  parts,  or  assem- 
blies covered  by  a  factory  warranty.  Use  the 
DA  Form  2407  for  WCA's. 
12-2.  Reporting  Quality  Deficiencies 
and  Equipment  Improvement 
Recommendations 
a  The  SF  Form  368  is  a  multi-use  form 
used  for  reporting:
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The  forms  and  local  reproduction  program  offers 
you  an  opportunity  to  reduce  your 
administrative  burden  and  to  save  prscious 
manhours  for  your  unit. 
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Headquarters 
Department  of  the  Army 
Washington,  DC 
1  September  1982 
Operations  and  Signal  Security 
*Army  Regulation  530-2 
Effective  1  October  1982 
Communications  Security 
The  original  form  of  this  regulation  was  pub- 
lished on  1  September  1982.  Since  that  time. 
Change  1  has  been  issued  to  amend  the  origi- 
nal, and  this  change  remains  in  effect.  This 
UPDATE  issue  is  a  reprint  of  the  original  regu- 
lation with  the  change  incorporated  directly  in- 
to the  text. 
By  Order  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Army: 
E.  C.  MEYER  . 
Genera/.  United  States  Army 
Chief  of  Staff 
Official: 
ROBERT  M.  JOYCE 
Major  General,  United  States  Army 
The  Adjutant  General 
Summary.  This  revision  adds  responsibili- 
ties for  The  Assistant  Deputy  Chief  of  Staff 
for  Operations  and  Plans  for  Command, 
Control,  Communications,  and  Computers; 
identifies  support  of  the  Army  operations 
security  (OPSEC)  program  as  a  communi- 
cations security  (COMSEC)  objective;  ad- 
dresses foreign  electronic  warfare  (EW) 
capabilities  as  a  COMSEC  threat;  defines 
policy  for  record  telecommunications  secur- 
ity; adds  authentication  and  transmission  of 
national  security  information  procedures.  It 
also  eliminates  encrypt-for-transmission-on- 
ly  (EFTO)  procedures. 
Applicability.  See  paragraph  1-2. 
Impact  on  New  Manning  System.  See 
paragraph  1-2.1. 
Supplementation.  Local  limited  supple- 
mentation of  this  regulation  is  permitted  but 
is  not  required.  If  supplements  are  issued, 
HQDA  agencies  and  major  Army  com- 
mands will  furnish  one  copy  of  each  to 
HQDA(DAMO-C4T),  WASH  DC  20310; 
other  commands  will  furnish  one  copy  of 
each  to  the  next  higher  headquarters. 
Interim  changes.  Interim  changes  to  this 
regulation  are  not  official  unless  they  are  au- 
thenticated by  The  Adjutant  General.  Users 
will  destroy  interim  changes  on  their  expira- 
tion dates  unless  sooner  superseded  or  re- 
scinded. 
Contents  (Listed  by  paragraph  number) 
Chapter  1 
General 
Purpose  •  1-1 
Applicability  •  1-2 
Impact  on  New  Manning  System  •  1-2.1 
References  •  1-3 
Explanation  of  abbreviations  and 
terms  *  1-4 
Secure  communications  •  1-5 
Communications  intelligence 
capabilities  •  1-6 
Electronic  warfare  capabilities  •  1-7 
Army  COMSEC  objectives  •  1-8 
Policy  •  1-9 
Chapter  2 
Responsibilities 
Deputy  Chief  of  Staff  for  Operations  and 
Plans  (DCSOPS)  »2-l 
Assistant  Deputy  Chief  of  Staff  for 
Operations  and  Plans  for  Command, 
Control,  Communications,  and  Computer 
(ADCSOPS(C4))  »2-2 
Assistant  Chief  of  Staff  for  Intelligence 
(ACSI)  •  2-3 
Deputy  Chief  of  Staff  for  Logistics 
(DCSLOG)  «2~4 
Deputy  Chief  of  Staff  for  Personnel   . 
(DCSPER)  *2-5 
Deputy  Chief  of  Staff  for  Research, 
Development,  and  Acquisijion 
(DCSRDA)  «2-6 
Commanding  General,  US  Army  Training 
and  Doctrine  Command  (CG, 
TRADOC)  «2-7 
Commanding  General,  US  Army  Materiel 
Development  and  Readiness  Command 
(CG,  DARCOM)  »2-8 
Commanding  General,  US  Army 
Communications  Command  (CG, 
USACQ  «2-9 
Commanding  General,  US  Army 
Intelligence  and  Security  Command  (CG, 
INSCOM)  »2-10 
Commanding  General,  US  Army  Forces 
Command  (CG  FORSCOM); 
Commanding  General,  US  Army  Europe; 
Commanding  General,  US  Army 
Western  Command  (CG,  WESTCOM); 
Suggested  improvements.  The  propo- 
nent agency  of  this  regulation  is  the  Office 
of  the  Deputy  Chief  of  Staff  for  Operations 
and  Plans.  Users  are  invited  to  send  com- 
ments and  suggested  improvements  on  DA 
Form  2028  (Recommended  Changes  to 
Publications  and  Blank  Forms)  direct  to 
HQDA(DAMO-C4T),  WASH  DC  20310. 
Distribution.  To  be  distributed  in  accor- 
dance with  DA  Form  12-9 A  requirements 
for  AR,  Operations  and  Signal  Security:  Ac- 
tive Army:  B,  C,  D,  E;  ARNG,  USAR:  D. 
.Commanding  General,  Eighth  Army;  and 
the  Chief,  National  Guard  Bureau 
(CNGB)  -2-11 
Commanding  General,  US  Army  Health 
Services  Command  (CG,  HSQ  •  2-12 
Commanding  General,  US  Army    „ 
Operational  Test  and  Evaluation  Agency 
(CG,OTEA)«2-13 
Commanders  at  all  levels  *  2-14 
Appendixes 
A.  References 
B.  Clear  Text  Transmission  of  National 
Security  Information 
C.  Authentication  Systems 
Glossary 
*This  regulation  supersedes  (Q  AR  530-2.  3  March  1976;  AR  380-26;  6  September  1965;  and  AR  380-51.  20  May  1974.
•  Chapter  1 
General 
"1-1.  Purpose 
This  regulation  prescribes  policy  and  re- 
sponsibilities for  communications  security 
(COMSEC)  in  the  Army.  It  implements  the 
National  Communications  Security  Direc- 
tive and  DoD  Directive  5200.5.  It  also  es- 
tablishes authority  for  programing  actions 
and  provides  guidance  for  implementing 
"  COMSEC  measures  and  procedures.  All 
Army  publications  which  identify  COM- 
SEC responsibilities  must  conform  to  this 
regulation. 
1-2.  Applicability 
a.  This  regulation  applies  to  those  ele- 
ments of  the  Active  Army,  the  Army  Na- 
tional Guard  (ARNG)  and  the  US  Army 
Reserve  (USAR)  responsible  for — 
(1)  Combat  developments  involving  the 
security  of  telecommunications. 
(2)  Conducting  research,  development, 
test,  and  evaluation  (RDTE)  of  telecommu- 
nications and  COMSEC  equipment. 
(3)  Providing  technical  guidance  to  and 
maintaining  cognizance  of  COMSEC  pro- 
grams and  activities. 
(4)  Computing  quantitative  requirements 
for  COMSEC  material;  programing  and 
budgeting  for  COMSEC  material;  and  pro- 
ducing, procuring,  distributing,  supporting, 
maintaining,  and  disposing  of  COMSEC 
material. 
(5)  Planning,  installing,  operating,  sup- 
porting and  maintaining  cryptofacilities. 
(6)  Conducting  military  operations. 
(7)  Training  individuals  in  the  operation 
and  maintenance  of  COMSEC  equipment  or 
systems  and  incorporating  COMSEC  into 
unit  training. 
(8)  Controlling  and  accounting  for 
COMSEC  material. 
b.  Rescinded. 
1-2.1.  Impact  on  New  Manning 
System 
This  regulation  does  not  contain  informa- 
tion that  affects  the  New  Manning  System. 
1-3.  References 
Required  and  related  publications  are  listed 
in  appendix  A. 
1-4.  Explanation  of  abbreviations  and 
terms 
Abbreviations  and  special  terms  used  in  this 
regulation  are  explained  in  the  glossary. 
1-5.  Secure  communications 
a.  The  security  of  Federal  telecommuni- 
cations is  a  national  responsibility.  The  ac- 
tivities assigned  this  responsibility  must 
satisfy  the  requirements  of  the  National  Se-' 
curity  Council  (NSC)  and  the  departments 
and  agencies  of  the  Federal  Government. 
b.  The  Secretary  of  Defense  (SECDEF) 
is  the  US  Government's  Executive  Agent 
for  COMSEC.  The  Director,  National  Se- 
curity Agency  (DIRNSA)  acts  for  the 
SECDEF  in  a  wide  range  of  COMSEC  mat- 
ters concerned  with  the  security  of  Federal 
telecommunications. 
c.  Telecommunications  of  all  types  are 
vulnerable,  in  some  degree,  to  intercept  and 
to  exploitation  by  hostile  communications 
intelligence  (COMINT).  Encrypted  tele- 
communications and  telecommunications 
transmitted  via  protected  distribution  sys- 
tems (PDS)  are  less  subject  to -exploitation 
for  intelligence  purposes.  However,  trans- 
missions over  the  encrypted  radio  link  por- 
tion of  a  communications  system  remain 
vulnerable  to  interception  and  to  direction 
finding  and  jamming.  Inadequately  protect- 
ed telecommunications  are  lucrative  sources 
of  information  to  foreign  intelligence  collec- 
tion activities. 
d.  The  purpose  of  COMSEC  is  to  protect 
telecommunications  from  foreign  exploita- 
tion and  to  insure  the  authenticity  of  such 
communications.  Encryption  in  an  ap- 
proved cryptosystem  and  radio  silence  are 
the  best  defenses  against  foreign  COMINT 
efforts.  Other  COMSEC  measures  include — 
(1)  PDS 
(2)  Authentication. 
(3)  Proper  operator  skills  and  discipline. 
(4)  Appropriate  user  training. 
(5)  COMSEC  awareness. 
(6)  Command  emphasis  on  COMSEC 
matters. 
e.  COMSEC  measures  that  are  effective 
today  may  not  be  adequate  in  the  future  be- 
cause of  advances  in  COMINT  technology. 
Therefore,  COMSEC  measures  in  use  must 
be  continuously  evaluated.  This  is  necessary 
to  identify  weaknesses  which  may  be  ex- 
ploitable within  the  useful  life  of  the  infor- 
mation transmitted. 
1-6.  Communications  intelligence 
capabilities 
a.  Most  foreign  countries  engage  in 
COMINT  operations  to  meet  their  intelli- 
gence requirements.  These  COMINT  efforts 
are  assumed  to  be  commensurate  with  the 
countries'  technical  competence  or  access  to 
technical  assistance.  Such  efforts  involve  in- 
tercepting and  exploiting  unprotected  or  in- 
adequately protected  communications.  They 
may  range  from  highly  sophisticated  opera- 
tions capable  of  extracting  useful  informa- 
tion from  all  types  of  transmissions  to  a 
simple  capability  of  intercepting  clear  text 
voice  transmissions. 
b.  Foreign  COMINT  efforts  operate  con- 
tinuously. These  efforts  are  directed  against 
those  telecommunications  systems  that  pro- 
duce the  most  useful  and  timely  intelligence. 
As  use  of  encryption  increases,  foreign  col- 
lection activities  will  seek  to  employ  other 
techniques.  This  may  include — 
(1)  More  comprehensive  coverage  of  re- 
maining clear  text  transmissions. 
(2)  Obtaining  keying  material  by  covert 
means. 
(3)  Exploiting  compromising  emanations. 
(4)  Placing  more  emphasis  on  informa- 
tion derived  from  radio  direction  finding, 
signals  analysis,  radio  fingerprinting,  and 
operator  identification  techniques. 
c  The  composite  of  all  information  avail- 
able through  collection  techniques  Is  ex- 
tremely important  to  .the  international 
relations  and  military  planning  of  foreign 
countries.  Determined  efforts  to  obtain  in- 
telligence information  from  US  telecommu- 
nications will  continue  as  long  as  it  is 
technically  feasible  to  overcome  the  COM- 
SEC effort  and  achieve  acceptable  levels  of 
success. 
dL  It  is  assumed  that  the  worldwide  for- 
eign intelligence  effort  provides  extensive 
COMINT  coverage  of  all  Army  telecommu- 
nications. This  includes  nontactical  and  tac- 
tical telecommunications  in  CONUS  and 
overseas.  Also,  the  nature  and  scope  of 
COMINT  coverage  will  change  as  intelli- 
gence requirements  change.  During  periods 
of  normal  international  relations,  the 
COMINT  coverage  may  be  limited  and 
highly  selective.  During  periods  of  military 
exercises  or  increased  international  tension, 
the  COMINT  coverage  may  be  expanded  to 
exploit  COMSEC  weaknesses. 
e.  COMINT  successes  result  from  techni- 
cal competence,  operational  resources,  and 
opportunity  (COMSEC  weaknesses).  Tech- 
nical competence  and  operational  resources 
are  supplied  by  the  enemy.  Opportunity  is 
supplied  by  the  victim.  Therefore,  the  tele- 
communications user  can  and  must  reduce 
the  potential  for  the  COMINT  success  of  an 
enemy. 
/  Classified  COMINT  threat  information 
is  available.  Requirements  for  this  informa- 
tion  should  be  forwarded  to 
HQDA(DAMI-FI),  WASH  DC  20310. 
1-7.  Electronic  warfare  capabilities 
Enemy  forces  in  a  hostile  tactical  environ- 
ment will  employ  electronic  warfare  (EW) 
and  tactical  weaponry  to  selectively  disrupt 
(jamming  and  deception)  or  destroy  com- 
mand, control,  and  weapon  communica- 
tions systems.  Enemy  electronic  warfare 
support  measures  (ESM)  identify,  locate, 
and  prioritize  valuable  friendly  targets  for 
electronic  counter  measures  (ECM)  or  de- 
struction. For  example,  Soviet  doctrine  ad- 
vocates the  use  of  EW  as  an  element  of 
combat  power.  It  is  certain  that  electromag- 
netic radiations  emitted  by  most  tactical 
command  and  control  communications  sys- 
tems will  subject  those  systems  to  jamming 
or  destruction. 
a.  Jamming  may  cause  friendly  operators 
to  change  to  a  less  secure  communications 
means,  thereby  reducing  the  security  of  the 
information  being  passed. 
6.  Imitative  electronic  deception  can  re- 
sult in  passing  sensitive  information  to 
hostile  elements  which  intrude  into  friendly 
nets. 
c.  Good  COMSEC  procedures  will  re- 
duce the  effectiveness  of  hostile  ESM  by 
making  it  more  difficult  to  select  targets  for 
ECM. 
1-8.  Army  COMSEC  objectives 
The  Army's  COMSEC  goal  is  to  provide  to- 
tal security  for  all  electrically  transmitted
information  from  the  originator  to  the  re- 
cipient. Objectives  supporting  this  goal  are 
as  follows: 
a.  Insure  that  all  military  voice  radio  sys- 
tems will  be  secured.  (See  para  l-9a). 
b.  Insure  that  COMSEC  policy,  plans, 
programs,  budgets,  and  materiel  life-cycle 
management  are  directed  toward  a  fully  co- 
ordinated and  effective  Army  COMSEC 
effort. 
c  Provide  total  cryptographic  security  or 
a  PDS  for  electrical  transmission  of  all  clas- 
sified information. 
d.  Provide  cryptographic  protection  or  a 
PDS  for  electrical  transmission  of  unclassi- 
fied national  security  related  information. 
e.  Provide  effective  defense  against  inter- 
ception, traffic  analysis,  and  imitative  com- 
munications  deception  by  using 
transmission  security  practices. 
/  Protect  COMSEC  material  and  COM- 
SEC information  from  compromise. 
g.  Emphasize  COMSEC  awareness  and 
training  by  routinely  using  all  available 
COMSEC  capabilities  during  day-to-day 
activities. 
h.  Conduct  and  plan  the  RDTE,  pro- 
curement, and  distribution  of  telecommuni- 
cations and  related  COMSEC  equipment 
and  associated  installation  or  adapter  kits  to 
insure  their  concurrent  availability. 
L  Reduce  the  cost  of  COMSEC  equip- 
ment developed  for  Army  applications. 
j.  Reduce  or  eliminate,  to  the  extent  pos- 
sible, the  security  classification  of  and  ac- 
counting controls  for  COMSEC  equipment 
and  material  at  the  tactical  level. 
k.  Support  the  Army  operations  security 
(OPSEC)  program  as  outlined  in  AR  530-1. 
/.  Support  the  National  COMSEC  As- 
sessment Program  in  accordance  with  DOD 
Directive  5200.5. 
1-9.  Policy 
COMSEC  will  be  an  integral  part  of  Army 
planning,  programing,  engineering,  and 
operations. 
a.  All  military  voice  radio  systems  will  be 
secured  or  securable  by  an  approved 
cryptosystem. 
(1)  In  the  absence  of  a  machine  encryp- 
tion capability,  manual  cryptosystems  will 
be  used  to  provide  the  requisite  security. 
(2)  All  future  military  radios  intended 
for  the  inventory  will  be  developed,  pro- 
cured, and  deployed  for  operational  use  as 
either  secured  or  securable  equipment. 
b.  Further  procurement  of  radios  pres- 
ently in  the  inventory  will  be  limited  to 
those  which  are  either  secured  or  securable. 
c.  Excluded  from  the  securable  radio  pol- 
icy are  radios  used  to  relay  traffic  all  of 
which  is  encrypted  and  decrypted  at  termi- 
nals remote  from  the  radio  itself.  These  arc 
multichannel  radios  that  receive  and  trans- 
mit only  encrypted  signals. 
d.  All  record  telecommunications  will  be 
secured  by  either  encryption  in  approved 
cryptosystems  or  by  PDSs.  Record  telecom- 
munications is  the  telecommunications  or 
teleprocessing  of  record  information. 
e.  During  electrical  transmissions,  all 
classified  information  will  be  provided  cryp- 
tographic security  unless  the  following 
occurs: 
(1)  The  information  is  transmitted  in  the 
clear  over  a  PDS  as  authorized  in  appendix 
R. (2)  Emergency  conditions  exist  as  speci- 
fied in  appendix  B. 
/.  Off-line  cryptosystems  (machine  and 
manual  codes  and  ciphers)  will  be  used  to 
protect  classified  information  over  nonpro- 
tected distribution  systems  and  over  those 
telecommunications  systems  not  secured  by 
on-line  machine  cryplosystems. 
g.  Authentication  systems  will  be  used  to 
provide  a  defense  against  imitative  commu- 
nications deception  and  to  establish  the  au- 
thenticity of  stations,  communicators,  or 
communications.  (See  app  C.) 
h.  Only  hardcopy  keying  material  pro- 
duced by  National  Security  Agency  (NSA) 
and  cryptoequipment  approved  by  the  NSA 
will  be  used.  In  an  emergency,  the  US  Ar- 
my Intelligence  and  Security  Command 
(INSCOM)  may  produce  and  distribute 
hardcopy  keying  material  (para  2-1  Oh).  Lo- 
cal production  of  hardcopy  keying  material 
by  non-INSCOM  activities  is  prohibited. 
L  COMSEC  will  be  an  integral  part  of 
the  planning  and  conduct  of  unit  training 
and  day-to-day  operations  at  all  levels  of 
command.  Full  use  will  be  made  of  availa- 
ble  cryptosystems  (machine  and 
nonmachine)  during  training. 
j.  The  application  of  COMSEC  will  be 
continuous  throughout  the  life-cycle  man- 
agement and  operation  of  telecommunica- 
tions equipment. 
k.  COMSEC  equipment  developed  for 
the  Army  should  be  small,  reliable,  and 
lightweight.  All  such  equipment  should  be 
low-powered,  unclassified  when  not  keyed, 
and  capable  of  operating  in  the  required  op- 
erational environment.  No  significant  opera- 
tional,  environmental,  or  power 
requirements  should  be  imposed  on  commu- 
nications systems  by  COMSEC  equipment. 
/.  COMSEC  will  be  achieved  with  no 
more  than  a  minimal  increase  in  the  fre- 
quency bandwidth  required  by  the  basic 
telecommunications  equipment. 
m.  Commercially  developed  privacy  or 
security  equipment  using  the  DES  or  a  com- 
mercial algorithm  will  not  be  used  to  pro- 
tect or  encrypt  any  form  of  classified 
information  within  the  Army.  The  only  ex- 
ception to  this  will  be  when  prior  approval 
has  been  obtained  from  HQDA 
(DAMO-C4T)  WASH  DC  20310.  The  un- 
authorized use  of  such  devices  to  encrypt 
and  transmit  classified  information  will  be 
considered  a  case  of  clear  text  transmission 
and  a  violation  of  military  security. 
n.  Unclassified  national  security-related 
information  of  value  to  an  adversary  trans- 
mitted by  and  between  Government  ele- 
ments and  contractors  will  be  given 
communications  protection  commensurate 
with  the  associated  risk  of  exploitation.  For 
this  purpose  maximum  use  will  be  made  of 
those  telecommunications  systems  that 
either — 
(1)  Have  an  on-line  machine  encryption 
capability. 
(2)  Use  PDS. 
(?)  Use  commercial  communications  pro- 
tection equipment. 
o.  US  Army  commands  and  agencies 
may  procure  and  use  NSA  approved  com- 
mercial cryptographic  equipments  and  tech- 
niques to  satisfy  communications  protection 
requirements  for  unclassified  information, 
except  in  some  significant  risk  situations 
where  other  communications  protection 
measures  may  be  prescribed. 
p.  Only  commercial  communications 
protection  equipment  that  meets  Federal 
Standard  1027  will  be  considered  by  Army 
commands  and  agencies.  Approval  of  the 
use  of  this  equipment,  using  the  Data  En- 
cryption Standard  (DES)  or  a  commercial 
algorithm,  for  the  protection  of  unclassified 
national  security  related  or  sensitive  infor- 
mation  will  be  obtained  from 
HQDA(DAMO-C4T)  WASH  DC  20310 
on  a  case-by-case  basis.  Army  commands 
and  agencies  desiring  to  procure  and  use 
commercially  available  hardware  must  for- 
ward their  requests  through  appropriate 
channels  to  HQDA(DAMO-C4T)  with  the 
following  information: 
(1)  Identification  of  equipment  by  manu- 
facturer and  model  name  or  number. 
(2)  Intended  purpose  or  proposed 
application. 
(3)  Type  of  unclassified  information  to  be 
protected  and  an  assessment  of  whether  the 
information  to  be  protected  during  trans- 
mission is  national  security  related. 
(4)  Approximate  length  of  time  the  infor- 
mation needs  to  be  protected. 
(5)  Adversary  or  adversaries  against 
whom  the  protection  is  desired. 
(6)  An  assessment,  from  the  user's  stand- 
point, of  the  risk  of  exploitation  of  the  infor- 
mation by  an  adversary. 
q.  Only  NSA  approved  keying  material 
will  be  used  with  the  commercial  communi- 
cations protection  equipment  approved  for 
Army  use.  Requirements  for  keying  materi- 
al will  be  submitted  as  required  by  TB 
380-41. 
r.  All  exceptions  to  the  general  policy  of 
secure  communications  for  voice  radio  or 
record  telecommunications  must  be  ap- 
proved by  HQDA(DAMI-CIC)  WASH 
DC  20310. 
Chapter  2 
Responsibilities 
2-1.  Deputy  Chief  of  Staff  for 
Operations  and  Plans  (DCSOPS) 
The  DCSOPS  has  general  staff  responsibili- 
ty for  the  development  of  strategic  concepts, 
estimates,  plans,  and  broad  base  require- 
ments in  accordance  with  AR  71-9.  In  dis- 
charging this  responsibility,  the  DCSOPS
a.  Monitor  Army  Staff  actions  involving 
COMSEC. 
b.  Monitor  traicuig  activities  to  insure 
that  proper  emphasis  is  given  to  COMSEC 
during  training  conducted  at  all  levels. 
c.  In  matters  involving  Army  combat 
developments — 
(1)  Approve  COMSEC  studies,  concepts, 
and  proposed  doctrine. 
(2)  Insure  that  COMSEC  doctrine  is  in- 
tegrated into  overall  Army  doctrine. 
(3)  Approve  operational  capability  objec- 
tives (OCOs),  letters  of  agreement  (LOAs), 
and  required  operational  capabilities 
(ROCs)  for  COMSEC  equipment.  Establish 
priorities  for  the  RDTE  effort. 
(4)  Insure  that  realistic  and  essential 
COMSEC  requirements  are  included  in 
OCOs  and  material  requirement  documents 
for  telecommunications  equipment 
(5)  Insure  allocation  of  enough  manpow- 
er to  accomplish  essential  COMSEC 
functions. 
(6)  Insure  that  adequate  COMSEC  in- 
struction is  included  in  appropriate  individ- 
ual training  programs  at  Army  training 
centers  and  at  Army  Service  schools. 
d.  When  establishing  requirements  for 
the  use  of  Army  forces — 
(1)  Insure  integration  of  COMSEC  into 
OPSEC  planning  and  practices. 
(2)  Set  operational  priorities,  considering 
both  operational  and  security  requirements, 
for  worldwide  distribution  of  COMSEC 
equipment 
2-2.  Assistant  Deputy  Chief  of  Staff 
for  Operations  and  Pfans  for 
Command,  Control,  Communications, 
and  Computers  (ADCSOPS<C4)) 
The  ADCSOPS(C4)  has  general  staff  re- 
sponsibility for  the  overall  management  of 
Army  COMSEC  activities.  As  part  of  this 
responsibility,  ADCSOPS(C4)  will— 
a.  Serve  as  the  principal  Army  Staff  point 
of  contact  to  The  Office  of  the  Secretary  of 
Defense  (OSD),  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff, 
NSA,  and  other  military  departments  on 
COMSEC  matters. 
b.  Insure  the  development  and  execution 
of  coordinated  programs  to  achieve  Army 
COMSEC  goals  and  objectives. 
c.  Develop  and  disseminate  HQDA 
COMSEC  resources  programing  guidance. 
Provide. this  guidance  to  major  Army  com- 
manders and  to  directors  of  the  Army 
RDTE  and  procurement  appropriations  re- 
flecting COMSEC  resources. 
d.  Review  COMSEC-related  program  el- 
ements. This  will  insure  that  the  COMSEC 
operations  and  maintenance,  Army  (OMA) 
portions  are  consistent  with  the  HQDA 
COMSEC  programing  guidance. 
e  Justify  and  defend  COMSEC  budget 
requirements  contained  in  the  COMSEC 
Resources  Program  (CRP). 
/.  Review  the  usage  of  COMSEC  re- 
lources  by  major  Army  commands 
'MACOMs)  and  provide  guidance  as 
required. 
%.  Represent  the  Secretary  of  the  Army 
on  the  National  Communications  Security 
Committee  (NCSC). 
h.  Prepare  the  Army  report  to  the  NCSC 
on  the  status  of  COMSEC  as  directed  by 
the  NCSC. 
L  Include  COMSEC  considerations  as  an 
integral  part  of  telecommunications  systems 
planning  and  programing. 
j.  Monitor  telecommunications  and 
COMSEC  concepts  and  doctrine  for  con- 
formance to  establish  COMSEC  policies 
and  standards. 
k.  Review  Army,  joint,  and  combined 
telecommunications  plans  to  insure  that 
provisions  for  COMSEC  are  adequate  and 
conform  to  established  COMSEC  policies 
and  standards. 
L  Review  and  approve  the  basis  of  issue 
plan  (BOIP)  for  COMSEC  equipment  to  in- 
sure that  the  proposed  distribution  and  type 
of  equipment  are  compatible  with  the  tele- 
communications systems. 
m.  Establish  priorities  for  procurement 
of  COMSEC  equipment 
n.  Review  COMSEC  requirements, 
plans,  and  programs,  including  RDTE,  to 
insure  supportability  from  a  frequency  man- 
agement standpoint. 
o.  Assist  Deputy  Chief  of  Staff  for  Re- 
search, Development,  and  Acquisition 
(DCSRDA)  in  justifying  and  defending  pro- 
grams and  budget  requirements  for  COM- 
SEC RDTE  and  procurement. 
p.  Approve  commercial  communications 
protection  equipment  for  Army  use. 
2-3.  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff  for 
Intelligence  (ACSI) 
The  ACSI  has  general  staff  responsibilities 
for  intelligence,  counterintelligence,  and  se- 
curity activities.  In  discharging  this  respon- 
sibility, the  ACSI  will— 
a.  Provide  evaluations  of  COMINT 
threats.  Recommend  levels  of  encryption, 
by  priorities,  and  other  measures  to  protect 
Army  telecommunications  from 
exploitation. 
b.  Prescribe  the  degree  and  kind  of  pro- 
tection needed  to  safeguard  national  securi- 
ty and  national  security  related  information 
during  electrical  transmission. 
c.  Develop  and  implement  COMSEC 
policies  and  standards  to  minimize  intelli- 
gence exploitation  to  prevent  unauthorized 
access  to  COMSEC  material  and  to  insure 
the  physical  security  of  cryptofacilities. 
d.  Provide  staff  supervision  for  COMSEC 
surveillance  activities. 
e.  Authorize  release  of  COMSEC  materi- 
al and  information  to  foreign  governments 
per  AR  380-10. 
/  Review  existing  and  proposed  COM- 
SEC doctrine  and  Army  ROCs.  Make  rec- 
ommendations as  appropriate. 
g.  Develop  and  implement  policies  and 
standards  for  the  control  and  security  ac- 
counting of  COMSEC  material. 
h.  Assist  the  ADCSOPS(C4)  in  justifying 
and  defending  program  and  budget  require- 
ments in  support  of  COMSEC  surveillance 
activities. 
2-4.  Deputy  Chief  of  Staff  for 
Logistics  (DCSLOG) 
The  DSCSLOG  has  general  staff  responsi- 
bilities for  development  and  supervision  of 
the  Army  logistics  system  and  for  manage- 
ment of  material  and  supplies.  With  respect 
to  COMSEC  the  DCSLOG  will— 
a.  Develop  logistics  policies,  including 
Integrated  Logistics  Support  (ILS)  policy, 
concepts,  procedures,  and  guidance  for  dis- 
tribution, supply,  maintenance,  and  trans- 
portation of  COMSEC  equipment  used  in 
support  of  all  Army  telecommunications 
systems.  This  includes  the  Army  portion  of 
the  Defense  Communications  System 
(DCS).  '     " 
b.  Prescribe  execution  of  NSA  or  OSD 
logistics  management  directives  that  apply 
to  COMSEC  material. 
c  Act  as  proponent  of  the  Army  COM- 
SEC Commodity  Logistics  Accounting  In- 
formation  Management  System 
(ACCLAIMS). 
<L  Prescribe  and  supervise  the  implemen- 
.tation  of  procedures  for  property  control 
and  the  accounting  of  COMSEC  material 
during  distribution,  storage,  maintenance, 
use,  and  disposal.  All  guidance  will  conform 
with  the  policies  and  standards  developed 
by  the  ACSI  for  safeguarding  COMSEC 
material. 
e.  Supervise  logistics  support  planning  to 
insure  the  availability  of  material  and  publi- 
cations needed  for  repair,  test  measurement 
and  diagnosis  of  COMSEC  equipment. 
/  Assist  the  ADCSOPS(C4)  in  justifying 
and  defending  program  and  budget  require- 
ments in  support  of  COMSEC  logistics 
functions. 
2-5.  Deputy  Chief  of  Staff  for 
Personnel  (DCSPER) 
The  DCSPER  has  general  staff  responsibili- 
ty for  the  development  and  administration 
of  the  military  personnel  management  sys- 
tem. As  this  relates  to  COMSEC,  the 
DCSPER  will— 
a.  Manage  COMSEC  personnel  resources 
to  meet  approved  manpower  requirements. 
b.  Provide  career  development  opportu- 
nities for  COMSEC  personnel  to  fill  key 
COMSEC  positions. 
c  In  comformance  with  policies  and 
standards  developed  by  the  ACSI  prescribe 
measures  for  physical  security  exterior  to 
the  walls  of  cryptofacilities  and  assure  inte- 
gration of  those  measures  into  command 
and  physical  security  plans. 
d.  Review  materiel  requirements  docu- 
ments for  physical  security  equipment  used 
to  safeguard  COMSEC  material  at  fixed  in- 
stallations in  the  continental  United  States 
(CONUS)  and  outside  the  continental  Unit- 
ed States  (OCONUS). 
2-6.  Deputy  Chief  of  Staff  for 
Research,  Development,  and 
Acquisition  (DCSRDA) 
The  DCSRDA  has  general  staff  responsibili- 
ties for  RDTE  and  procurement  of  material
from  concept  formulation  through  produc- 
tion acceptance  testing  (AR  70-1).  With  re- 
spect to  COMSEC,  (he  DCSRDA  will—. 
.  a.  Develop,  coordinate,  and  allocate 
RDTE  and  procurement  resources  in  sup- 
port of  the  CRP.  Supervise  the  execution  of 
RDTE  and  procurement 
b.  Justify  and  defend  program  and  budg- 
et requirements  for  COMSEC  RDTE  and 
procurement. 
c.  Serve  as  the  Other  Procurement,  Army 
(OP A)  appropriations  -director  for  COM- 
SEC material. 
d.  Forward  to  the  NSA  HQDA-ap- 
proved  materiel  requirement  documents  for 
COMSEC  equipment  along  with  requests 
for  RDTE  efforts  to  fulfill  those  needs.  Des- 
ignate an  Army  developing  agency  to  moni- 
tor development  and  to  insure  that  Army 
material  life-cycle  management  milestones 
are  satisfied. 
e.  Monitor  planned  COMSEC  RDTE 
projects  which  are  of  interest  to  the  Army, 
but  are  conducted  by  NSA  or  another  mili- 
tary department  Designate  an  Army  devel- 
oping agency  as  defined  in  AR  70-1  for 
each  project  having  potential  application  for 
Army  use.  Insure  that  the  designated  agen--, 
cy  conducts  liaison  with  the  developer  and 
keeps  interested  Army  agencies  informed  of 
the  progress  of  such  projects. 
/.  Insure,  in  coordination  with  NSA,  the 
development  of  COMSEC  equipment  and 
any  companion  telecommunications  equip- 
ment at  the  same  time.  RDTE  of  related 
equipment  should  have  concurrent  life-cycle 
management  milestones  from  concept  for- 
mulation through  production  acceptance 
testing.  ■'■ 
g.  Provide  the  primary  Army  member  for 
the  NSA  COMSEC  Research  and  Engineer- 
ing Coordination  (CREC)  Group. 
h.  Serve  as  RDTE  appropriations  direc- 
tor for  COMSEC  material. 
2-7.  Commanding  General,  US  Army 
Training  and  Doctrine  Command  (CG, 
TRADOC) 
The  CG,  TRADOC  is  responsible  for  Army 
combat  development  activities  and  for  Ar- 
my individual  training  programs.  In  dis- 
charging these  responsibilities,  the  CG, 
TRADOC  will— 
a.  Integrate  approved  COMSEC  doc- 
trine, material,  and  techniques  into  the  in- 
structional programs  of  Army  service 
schools  for  which  TRADOC  is  responsible. 
b.  Train  individuals  in  COMSEC  aware- 
ness and  in  the  operation,  maintenance,  and 
safeguarding  of  COMSEC  material.     . 
c.  Develop  and  insure  that  COMSEC 
training  literature  to  support  individual  and 
unit  training  programs  is  included  in  the 
TRADOC  portion  of  the  Army-wide  Train- 
ing Literature  Program.  Coordinate  with 
the  other  MACOMs  tc  insure  the  compati- 
bility of  COMSEC  training  literature  with 
current  unit  training  needs  and  programs. 
d.  Include  COMSEC  as  a  subject  to  be 
evaluated  during  written  and  performance 
testing  of  the  soldier  in  Army  individual 
training  and  in  the  annual  skill  qualification 
test      *.:  -  -    .-  . 
e.  Develop  training  aids  and. training 
<i1m<;  for  COMSEC  equipment  and  support 
of  Army-wide  COMSEC  training  and 
awareness  programs. 
/  Insure  that  all  Army-wide  training 
literature  issued  by  TRADOC  includes 
COMSEC  considerations. 
g.  Insure  that  major  Army  commanders 
are  advised  regularly  of  changes  in  COM- 
SEC doctrine,  techniques,  material,  and 
procedures  for  their  use  in  discharging  com- 
mand COMSEC  responsibilities. 
h.  Develop,  test  as  directed,' and  recom- 
mend to  the  DCSOPS  (DAMO-C4T), 
WASH,  DC  20310,  operational  and  organi- 
sational concepts  and  doctrine  to  meet 
COMSEC  goals  and  objectives  for  the 
Army. 
L  Develop  OCOs  and  material  require- 
ments documents  to  meet  the  COMSEC  re- 
quirements of  the  Army  in  the  field  and 
submit  them  to  the  DCSOPS  (DAMO- 
C4T)  WASH  DC  20310. 
j.  Review  and  evaluate  material  require- 
ment documents  developed  by  other  com- 
mands to  see  if  they  represent  a  valid 
COMSEC  need  for  the  Army. 
fc.  Before  being  forwarded  to  the 
DCSOPS,  coordinate  material  requirements 
documents  prepared  by  Army  elements  for 
COMSEC  equipment  with — 
(1)  DIRNSA. 
(2)  US  Army  Communication  Command 
(USACQ. 
(3)  US  Army  .Materiel  Development  and 
Readiness  Command  (DARCOM).    " 
(4),INSCOM. 
(5)  Other  MACOMs,  as  appropriate. 
7.  Coordinate  the  following  with 
INSCOM— 
(1)  Training  and  doctrinal  literature  in- 
cluding programs  of  instruction. 
(2)  Training  films. 
(3)  OCOs. 
(4)  Operational  and  organizational  con- 
cepts and  procedures. 
(5)  Material  requirement  documents  for 
telecommunications  or  COMSEC 
equipment 
m.  As  directed,  plan  for  and  conduct  op- 
erational testing  of  COMSEC  equipment  to 
be  used  by  the  Army  in  the  field.  Assure 
early  coordination  of  operational  test  plans 
with  the  MACOM  designated  to  provide 
test  forces.  The  cryptonetting  philosophy  to 
be  used  during  the  operational  testing  of 
COMSEC  equipment  must  be  coordinated 
with  and  approved  by  INSCOM. 
n.  Together  with  INSCOM,  and  other 
MACOMs  as  appropriate,  develop  and  rec- 
ommend to  DCSOPS  the  BOIP  for  COM- 
SEC equipment  to  be  used  by  the  Army  in 
the  field. 
o.  Insure  that  COMSEC  tasks,  condi- 
tions, and  standards  appear  in  unit  evalua- 
tion programs. 
2-9.  Commanding  General,  US  Army 
Materiel  Development  and  Readiness 
Command  (CG,  DARCOM) 
The  CG,  DARCOM  has  responsibility  for 
providing  material  and  related  logistics 
services.  With  respect  to  COMSEC,  the 
CG,  DARCOM  will— 
a.  Together  with  NSA,  conduct  RDTE 
of  COMSEC  techniques  to  increase  the  fu- 
ture COMSEC  capability  of  Army 
equipment 
6.  Together  with  DCSRDA,  conduct  liai- 
son with  NSA  and  other  military  depart- 
ments conducting  COMSEC  RDTE.  Advise 
DCSRDA  of  any  planned  projects  that  have 
potential  application  for  use  by  the  Army  in 
the  field  and  insure  that  interested  Army 
agencies  are  informed  of  the  progress  of 
ongoing  projects. 
c  Perform  those  material  developer  and 
ILS  support  functions  prescribed  for 
nondevelopment  items  (NDI)  of  COMSEC 
equipment  developed  by  NSA  which  have 
Army  application. 
<L  Perform  the  functions  of  a  developing 
agency  (AR  70-1)  for  COMSEC  surveil- 
lance equipment. 
e.  Conduct  RDTE  of  COMSEC  equip- 
ment when  the  RDTE  responsibility  is  as- 
signed to  the  DA. 
/  Advise,  assist,  and  provide  system  en- 
gineering support  to  agencies  regarding 
COMSEC  aspects  during  their  RDTE  of 
telecommunications  equipment  and  weap- 
ons systems. 
g.  Together  with  ACSI  and  INSCOM, 
prepare  COMSEC  guidance  on  the  safe- 
guards to  be  applied  during  a  developmental 
or  operational  test  This  guidance  will  ac- 
company pertinent  proposed  material  re- 
quirements documents. 
h.  In  accordance  with  AR  70-61,  initiate 
classification  or  reclassification  of  COMSEC 
equipment  for  which  DARCOM  is  the  de- 
veloping agency. 
L  Review  BOIPs  for  COMSEC  equip- 
ment and  accomplish  those  DARCOM  re- 
sponsibilities assigned  in  AR  71-2. 
/  Develop  and  provide  criteria,  instruc- 
tions, and  installation  kits  for  integration  of 
COMSEC  equipment  (developed  or  man- 
aged by  DARCOM)  with  telecommunica- 
tions systems. 
k.  Prepare  the  DARCOM  input  to  the 
CRP  and  submit  the  input  thru 
HQDA(DAMA-CSQ  to  HQDA(DAMO- 
C4R),  WASH  DC  20310. 
I  Exercise  COMSEC  commodity  man- 
agement by — 
<1)  Operating  the  National  Inventory 
Control  Point  (NICP)  per  AR  710-1  and 
the  National  Maintenance  Point  (NMP)  per 
AR  750-1  as  part  of  the  COMSEC  whole- 
sale supply  and  maintenance  system. 
(2)  Acting  as  the  assigned  responsible 
agency  for  the  Class  Al  multicommand 
standard  ACCLAIMS. 
(3)  Conducting  maintenance  support 
planning,  per  AR  750-1,  for  all  COMSEC 
material. 
(4)  Conducting  new  equipment  training 
per  AR  350-35.  '    •
(5)  Providing  technical  Assistance  to 
users  of  COMSEC  equipment  per  AR 
700-4. 
(6)  Recommending  to  the  Commanding 
General,  US  Army  Military  Personnel 
Center,  per  AR  611-1,  new-MOSs  and 
changes  to  existing  MOSs  required  to  main- 
tain COMSEC  equipment.  Developing 
human  engineering  factors  peT  AR  602-1.  - 
(7)  Managing  the  COMSEC  Material 
Control  System  per  AR  380-40  and  TB 
380-41.  This  includes  operation  of  the  Ar- 
my COMSEC  Central  Office  of  Record. 
(8)  Announcing  compromises  of  COM- 
SEC material  when  directed  by  the  control- 
ling authority  and  taking  emergency 
resupply  actions  as  required. 
(9)  Announcing  the  identification  and 
supply  availability  of  COMSEC  keying  ma- 
terial which  is  regularly  superseded. 
(10)  Together  with  the  appropriate  mili- 
tary departments,  federal  agencies,  and  for- 
eign governments,  distributing  keying 
material  for  joint  and  combined  cryptonets. 
(11)  Together  with  INSCOM,  con- 
ducting annual  keying  material  reviews  per 
AR  38O40  and  TB  380-41. 
(12)  Granting  relief  from  security  ac- 
countability for  COMSEC  material  ac- 
countable to  the  Army  COMSEC  Central 
Office  of  Record  (ACCOR)  per  AR  380-40. 
(13)  Consolidating  all  Army  COMSEC 
equipment  requirements.  Stratify  these  re- 
quirements for  OPA  programing  in  the 
CRP. 
(14)  Managing  the  COMSEC  Equipment 
Modification  Application  Reporting  System 
(CEMARS). 
(15)  Providing  COMSEC  logistics  assis- 
tance to  Army  commanders  worldwide. 
(16)  Providing  NSA  with  the  Army 
quantitative  requirements  for  COMSEC 
keying  material.  Insure  the  availability  of 
such  material,  consistent  with  operational 
and  contingency  requirements  of  the  Army. 
(17)  Reviewing  plans  and  directives  hav- 
ing COMSEC  logistics  implications.  Insure 
the  adequacy  for  logistics  support  and  ad- 
herence to  established  COMSEC  logistics 
policy. 
(18)  Developing  Army  ILS  requirements 
and  conducting  ILS  planning  for  new 
COMSEC  acquisition  programs. 
(19)  Operating  and  maintaining  the 
COMSEC  Equipment  Asset  Reporting  Sys- 
tem (CEARS). 
(20)  Coordinating  with  the  other  Services 
and  DoD  Agencies,  as  appropriate,  to  de- 
velop standard  logistics  procedures  for 
COMSEC  material. 
(21)  Accounting  for  sealed  authentica- 
tion system  per  JCS  Pub  13. 
m.  (U)  Coordinate  command-developed 
technical  literature  for  telecommunications 
or  COMSEC  equipment  and  systems  with 
INSCOM. 
2-9.  Commanding  General,  US  Army 
Communications  Command  (CG, 
USACC) 
The  CG,  USACC  »  responsible  for  engi- 
neering, installing,  operating,  and  maintain- 
ing the  Defense  Communications  System 
^Army),  air  traffic  control/navigation  aids, 
*nd  assigned  Army  Telecommunications 
systems.  The  CG,  USACC  will— 
.  a.  Develop  and  operate  the  assigned  Ar- 
my in  the  field  COMSEC  Logistics  System 
•in  support  of  Army  Component  commands 
and  unified  commands.  . 
b.  Assist  in  the  development  and  review 
of  concepts,  studies,  and  regulations  which 
concern  or  affect  COMSEC  logistics  func- 
tions for  the  Army  in  the  field.  .  ,*    . 
c  Prepare  the  USACC  Operations  and 
Maintenance  (O&M)  portion  of  the  CRP 
and  submit  it  to  HQDA(DAMO~C4R) 
WASH  DC  20310. 
d.  Prepare  requirements  for  COMSEC 
material  for  inclusion  in  the  OPA  portion  of 
the  CRP  and  in  the  production  forecasts  for 
COMSEC  aids.  Submit  these  requirements 
to  DARCOM  (US  Army  COMSEC  Logis- 
tics Activity,  Ft  Huachuca,  AZ  85613). 
e.  Together  with  TRADOC  and 
DARCOM,  conduct  liaison  with  NSA  and 
other  military  developments  conducting 
COMSEC  RDTE.  Advise  DCSRDA 
(DAMA-CSC)  WASH,  DC  20310  of  any 
planned  projects  which  have  potential  appli- 
cation for  use  by  USACC. 
/  Perform  operational  tests  and  eyalua- 
tions  per  AR  70-10  and  AR  71-3  when  des- 
ignated as  the  operational  tester. 
g.  Develop  and  recommend  to  TRADOC 
the  BOIP  for  COMSEC  equipment  for 
which  USACC  Table  of  Organization  and 
Equipment  (TOE)  units  of  the  theater  Ar- 
my are  intended  users. 
h.  Insure  that  adequate  COMSEC  mea- 
sures are  applied  and  that  approved  COM- 
SEC equipment  requirements  are  reflected 
in  telecommunications  requirements 
(TELER).  Coordinate  TELER  processed 
under  AR  105-22  with  INSCOM  and  the 
gaining  major  command. 
L  Coordinate  command-developed  tech- 
nical literature  for  telecommunications  or 
COMSEC  equipment  and  systems  for  DCS 
(ARMY)  and  assigned  Army  Telecommuni- 
cations systems  with  INSCOM  and 
DARCOM. 
;.  Provide  input  to  TRADOC  for  COM- 
SEC equipment  training  needs  at  the  US 
Army  Signal  Center  and  School. 
k.  Insure  compliance  with  paragraph 
l-9a  for  those  telecommunications  systems 
engineered,  installed,  operated,  and  main- 
tained by  USACC.  Request  waivers  from 
HQDA(DAMI-CIQ  WASH  DC  20310  as 
required. 
2-10.  Commanding  General,  US  Army 
Intelligence  and  Security  Command 
(CG,  INSCOM) 
The  CG,  INSCOM  provides  technical  assis- 
tance in  the  application  of,  and  adherence  to 
Army  COMSEC  policies.  The  CG,  IN- 
SCOM will— 
"  o.  Assist  Army  Staff  arid  Army  com- 
manders at  all  levels,  to  include  Reserve 
Components,  in  developing  and  evaluating 
COMSEC  policies,  plans,  operating  proce- 
dures, and  training  programs.         ,-.  ■  >  •  « 
b.  Advise  Army  Staff  and  Army  Com- 
manders at  aU  levels,  to  include  Reserve 
Components,  in  planning,  coordinating,  end 
implementing  communications  cover.,  t;  J 
c.  Review  plans,  directives,  and  training 
and  doctrinal  material,  including  training 
films  and  programs  of  instruction.  Review 
OCOs,  O&O  concepts,  material  require- 
ments documents,  and  BOIPs  having  COM- 
SEC implications.  Insure  the  adequacy  of 
COMSEC  considerations  and  adherence  to 
■established  COMSEC  policy. 
d.  Conduct  COMSEC  surveillance  opera- 
tions in  support  of  Army  commands  and 
agencies  (both  Active  and  Reserve  Compo- 
nents) at  echelons  above  corps  (EAQ.  Aug- 
ment COMSEC  surveillance  capabilities  of 
Army  commands  at  echelons  corps  and  be- 
low, as  required.  Perform  analysis  to  deter- 
mine the  effectiveness  of  COMSEC 
applications. 
e  Approve  requests  for  the  -establish- 
-  ment,  alteration,  or  relocation  of  Army 
cryptofacilities  and  other  cryptofacilities  as 
directed  by  HQDA.  " 
/  Conduct  inspections  of  all  Army  and 
'other  specified  cryptofacilities  per  AR 
380-40.  * 
g.  Recommend,  from  a  security  stand- 
point, NSA-produced  COMSEC  material 
for  use  within  the  Army. ' 
h.  Produce  COMSEC  keying  material 
when  the  Army  is  authorized  such  produc- 
tion. This  includes  codes,  nonmachinc  ci- 
phers, authentication  systems,  and  other 
cryptographic  and  transmission  security 
aids.  '    ""  -     ■      * 
i  Review  and  approve  operational,  con- 
tingency, and  training  cryptonets  and 
cryptonetting  philosophies  contained  in 
newly  developed  operational  concept  docu- 
ments. Insure  that  cryptonetting  is  consis- 
tent with  sound  COMSEC  principles. 
j.  Evaluate  reports  of  physical  and  cryp- 
tographic insecurities. 
fc.  Establish  security  criteria  for  disposal 
of  Army  COMSEC  material.     ■  < 
L  Exploit  foreign  cryptologic  information 
for  COMSEC  purposes. 
m.  Participate  in  preparation  of  studies 
concerning  intelligence  threats  and  opera- 
tional vulnerabilities  against  which  COM- 
SEC must  be  provided. 
n.  Recommend  COMSEC  doctrine  to 
TRADOC.  As  required,  participate  in  com- 
bat development  of  doctrine  relating  to 
COMSEC.  This  will  insure  compatibility 
with  COMSEC  policy. 
o.  Recommend  materiel  requirements 
and  BOIP  for  COMSEC  surveillance  equip- 
ment to  TRADOC. 
p.  Exercise  technical  control  by  prescrib- 
ing and  promulgating  technical  procedures 
for  the  conduct  of  COMSEC  surveillance 
operations.  Monitor,  through  coordination 
with  other  MACOMs,  the  application  and
implementation  of  these  technical 
procedures. 
q.  Assist  HQDA  in  evaluating  the  status 
of  COMSEC  Army-wide. 
r.  Manage  the  Army  COMSEC  Assess- 
ment Program;  represent  the  Army  on  Na- 
tional COMSEC  Assessment  Program 
Working  Groups  and  panels  as  directed  by 
HQDA. 
s.  Maintain  liaison  with  COMSEC  sur- 
veillance activities  of  other  Services  and 
DoD  agencies  to  monitor  and  evaluate 
COMSEC  surveillance  policies  and  proce- 
dures for  Army  applications. 
l  Inspect  and  certify  those  Automatic 
Secure  Voice  Communications 
(AUTOSEVOCOM)  terminals  which  are 
under  the  jurisdiction  of  DA. 
u.  Prepare  the  INSCOM  portion  of  the 
CRP  and  submit  it  thru  HQDA(DAMA- 
CSC)  to  HQDA(DAMO-C4R),  WASH  DC 
20310. 
2-11.  Commanding  General,  US  Army 
Forces  Command  (CG,  FORSCOM); 
Commanding  General,  US  Army 
Europe;  Commanding  General,  US 
Army  Western  Command  (CG, 
WESTCOM);  Commanding  General, 
Eighth  Army;  and  the  Chief,  National 
Guard  Bureau  (CNGB) 
These  are  responsible  for  maintaining  the 
combat  readiness  of  assigned  and  attached 
troop  units.  Assigned  troop  units  for  FOR- 
SCOM and  WESTCOM  include  Active  Ar- 
my and  USAR  units.  With  respect  to 
COMSEC,  they  will  perform  the  following: 
a.  Review  material  requirements  docu- 
ments for  COMSEC  equipment,  develop 
material  requirements  to  support  unit  train- 
ing, and  recommend  to  TRADOC  that 
these  requirements  be  included  in  the  mate- 
rial requirements  documents. 
b.  Introduce  and  integrate  approved 
COMSEC  doctrine,  material,  and  tech- 
niques into  the  unit  training  programs. 
c  Direct  the  application  of  unit  COM- 
SEC training  tasks,  conditions  and  stan- 
dards to  all  assigned  and  attached  units. 
d.  Insure  that  sufficient  COMSEC  ac- 
counts are  established  and  that  necessary 
COMSEC  material  is  issued  to  assigned  and 
attached  units.  This  is  done  to  insure  that 
training  and  mobilization  requirements  are 
met. 
e.  As  required,  participate  with 
TRADOC  activities  in  combat  development 
studies  and  force  development  testing  and 
experimentation  (FDTE)  of  concepts  and  in 
the  development  of  doctrine  relating  to 
COMSEC.  As  directed,  support  FDTE  de- 
velopmental and  operational  tests  of  COM- 
SEC material. 
/  Monitor  COMSEC  surveillance  activi- 
ties of  assigned  and  attached  COMSEC  sup- 
port units.  Assist  INSCOM  in  the  Army 
COMSEC  assessment  program  by  providing . 
information  requested  in  response  to  nation- 
al COMSEC  assessment  program 
requirements. 
g.  Monitor  the  command  cryptofacility 
inspection  programs  of  subordinate  units 
conducted  in  accordance  with  AR  380-40 
and  TB  380-41. 
2-12.  Commanding  General,  US  Army 
Health  Services  Command  (CG,  HSC) 
In  discharging  responsibilities  for  medical 
combat  development  activities  and  training 
of  medical  personnel,  the  CG,  HSC  will — 
a.  Introduce  and  integrate  approved 
COMSEC  doctrine,  material,  and  tech- 
niques into  the  following  programs: 
(1)  Instructional  programs  of  CONUS 
Army  HSC  schools. 
(2)  Training  programs  for  medical  per- 
sonnel and  units. 
b.  Include  COMSEC  tasks,  conditions, 
and  standards  in  the  evaluation  programs  of 
medical  units. 
2-13.  Commanding  General,  US  Army 
Operational  Test  and  Evaluation 
Agency  (CG,  OTEA) 
The  CG,  OTEA  is  responsible  for  managing 
all  user  testing,  operational  tests  (OT). 
FDTE,  and  joint  user  tests  directed  by 
OSD.  In  discharging  this  responsibility,  the 
CG,  OTEA  will— 
a.  Plan,  budget  for,  and  conduct  OT  or 
FDTE  of  COMSEC  equipment  assigned  for 
testing. 
b.  For  assigned  testing,  coordinate  with 
INSCOM  to  assure  COMSEC  aspects  are 
adequate. 
c.  Provide  an  independent  evaluation  of 
tested  COMSEC  material  to  the  appropriate 
decision  body  at  major  system  milestones. 
2-14.  Commanders  at  all  levels 
In  planning,  programing,  and  providing  re- 
sources for  COMSEC  activities,  com- 
manders will — 
a.  Designate  staff  responsibilities  for 
planning,  supervising,  and  evaluating  com- 
mand COMSEC  activities.  (See  TB  IG  1  for 
guidance  on  evaluating  command  COMSEC 
activities.) 
b.  Insure  that  associated  telecommunica- 
tions equipment  is  on  hand  or  on  order 
before  requisitioning  COMSEC  equipment. 
c.  Use  only  hardcopy  keying  material 
produced  by  NSA  or  INSCOM.  Insure  the 
proper  use  of  this  material.  , 
d.  Obtain  INSCOM  approval  for  com- 
mand cryptofacilities  per  AR  380-40. 
e.  Appoint  COMSEC  custodians.  Insure 
that  the  COMSEC  material  is  accounted  Tor 
per  TB  380-41. 
/  Maintain  adequate  COMSEC  surveil- 
lance of  command  telecommunications  by 
the  supporting  signal  security  (SIGSEC)  el- 
ement (organic  tactical  and  INSCOM 
EAC).  Insure  that  COMSEC  surveillance 
activities  contribute  to  a  continuing  assess- 
ment of  the  effectiveness  of  the  command 
COMSEC  effort. 
g.  Insure  that  the  protection  of  COM- 
SEC material  conforms  to  DA  standards. 
Include  cryptofacilities  in  command  physi- 
cal security  plans. 
h.  Insure  that  command  cryptofacility  in- 
spections are  conducted  per  AR  380-40  and 
TB  380-4!. 
i.  Insure  that  appropriate  emphasis  is 
placed  on  COMSEC  in  unit  training,  com- 
mand school  programs,  and  training 
exercises.  *         ' 
■j.  Insure  responsive  logistics  support  for 
the  effective  application  of  COMSEC  mate- 
rial in  their  commands.  Insure  that  this  lo- 
gistics support  includes  timely  application 
of  COMSEC  equipment  modifications  and 
modification  reporting  as  specified  in  AR 
380-40  and  TB  380-41. 
k.  When  performing  controlling  authori- 
ty functions  as  required  by  AR  380-40 — 
(1)  Provide  for  COMSEC  compatibility 
in  planning  cryptonets  for  which  the  com- 
mander is  the  controlling  authority;  deter- 
mine requirements  for  COMSEC  keying 
material,  and  inform  the  appropriate  COM- 
SEC distribution  authority. 
(2)  Announce  effective  editions  of  all 
keying  material  to  be  used  in  cryptonets  for 
which  the  commander  is  the  controlling 
authority. 
(3)  In  accordance  with  TB  380-41,  eval- 
uate reports  of  lost,  missing,  or  unaccounted 
for  COMSEC  keying  material  used  in 
cryptonets  for  which  the  commander  is  the 
controlling  authority.  As  required,  declare 
compromises;  notify  responsible  agencies, 
and  conduct  appropriate  investigations. 
(4)  Take  actions  specified  in  AR  38CMO 
and  TB  380-41  for  lost,  missing,  or  unac- 
counted for  COMSEC  material. 
L  Prior  to  publications,  submit  copies  of 
plans,  directives,  and  unit  training  material 
having  COMSEC  implications  to  the  sup- 
porting or  organic  SIGSEC  element.  This 
element  will  review  the  adequacy  of  COM- 
SEC considerations  and  adherence  to  COM- 
SEC policy. 
m.  Make  maximum  use  of  all  available 
COMSEC  systems  (machine  and  manual). 
Operational  and  training  after-action-re- 
ports will  specifically  include  all  instances  of 
failure  to  use  available  COMSEC  systems. 
n.  Incorporate  the  provisions  of  the 
COMSEC  Penalty  Assessment  Program 
(FM  105-5)  during  training  exercises,  tests, 
and  similar  training  activities  to  improve 
COMSEC  field  training. 
o.  Establish  and  operate  aggressive  net 
control  station  procedures  in  all  radio  com- 
munications. Include  COMSEC  in  all  radio 
operator  training  on  proper  net  and  radio 
procedures  to  insure  communications  disci- 
pline and  adherence  to  approved  COMSEC 
practices. 
p.  Improve  telephone  security  by  provid- 
ing visibility  for  the  present  secure  tele- 
phone system  as  shown  below: 
(1)  Add  secure  telephone  numbers  to  the 
organization  or  department  locator  charts. 
(2)  Add  secure  telephone  numbers  to  the 
organization  section  of  the  telephone 
directory. 
(3)  Insure  that  all  personnel  are  aware 
when  AUTOSEVOCOM  service  is  available 
and  provide  ready  access  to  the  DCS 
AUTOSEVOCOM  directory. 
(4)  Continually  remind  all  personnel  of 
the  availability,  location,  and  telephone
J  «  « 
numbers  of  the  AUTOSEVOCOM  and  oth- 
er secure  telephone  terminals.  '•  f — -> 
q.  Implemement  the  Army  Communica- 
tions-Electronics Operation  Instructions  .      r  •  ••  ... 
(CEOI)  Program  in  accordance  with  AR                                                                                                           ,  , 
105-64.                                                                                                                          '  .  r. 
r.  Insure  compliance  with  paragaph  l-9a  -'_..*• 
for  all  assigned  telecommunications  sys-  - 
tems.  Request  a  waiver  from  HQDA,  -y  . 
ATTN:  DAMI-CIC;  WASH,  DC  20310.  ,  .    ', 
for  those  telecommunications  systems  where  , 
compliance  is  infeasible. 
i  Prescribe  measures  to  be  taken  to  se- 
cure the  exterior  of  cryptofacilities,  per  AR 
190-13. 
L  Insure  that  DD  Form  2056  (Telephone 
Monitoring  Notification  Decal)  1  December 
76,  is  applied  to  all  nontactical  unsecured 
telephone  instruments. 
u.  Insure  unclassified  national  security 
related  information  and  sensitive  informa- 
tion is  provided  adequate  protection  during 
transmission. 
v.  Insure  adequate  security  or  protection 
is  provided  for  all  command  telecommuni- 
cations per  paragraph  1-9  above.
Appendix  A 
References 
Section  I 
Required  Publications 
AR  7(V-1 
Army  Research,  Development  and  Acquisi- 
tion. (Cited  in  paras  2-6  and  2-8.) 
AR  70-10 
Test  and  Evaluation  During  Development 
and  Acquisition  of  Materiel.  (Cited  in  para 
2-9.) 
AR  70-61 
Type  Classification  of  Army  Materiel.  (Cit- 
ed in  para  2-8.) 
AR  71-2 
Basis  of  Issue  Plans.  (Cited  in  para  2-8.) 
AR71-3 
User  Testing.  (Cited  in  para  2-9.) 
AR71-* 
Materiel  Objectives  and  Requirements.  (Cit- 
ed in  para  2-1.) 
AR  105-22 
Telecommunications  Requirements  Plan- 
ning, Developing,  and  Processing.  (Cited  in 
para  2-9.) 
AR  105-64 
US  Army  Communications  Electronics  Op- 
eration Instructions  (CEOI)  Program.  (Cit- 
ed in  para  2-14.) 
AR  190-13 
The  Army  Physical  Security  Program.  (Cit- 
ed in  para  2-14.) 
AR  350-35 
New  Equipment  Training.  (Cited  in  para 
2-8.) 
AR  380-10 
Department  of  the  Army  Policy  for  Disclo- 
sure of  Military  Information  to  Foreign 
Governments  (U).  (Cited  in  para  2-3.) 
(O  AR  380-40 
Policy  for  Safeguarding  and  Controlling 
COMSEC  Information  (U).  (Cited  in  paras 
2-8,  2-10,  2-11,  and  2-14.) 
AR  530-1 
Operations  Security  (OPSEC).  (Cited  in 
para  1-8.) 
(S)  AR  530-4 
Control  of  Compromising  Emanations  (U). 
(Cited  in  para  B-5.) 
AR  602-1 
Human  Factors  Engineering  Program.  (Cit- 
ed in  para  2-8.) 
AR  611-1 
Military  Occupational  Classification  Struc- 
ture Development  and  Implementation. 
(Cited  in  para  2-8.) 
AR  700-4 
Logistic  Assistance  Program.  (Cited  in  para 
2-8.) 
AR  710-1 
Centralized  Inventory  Management  of  the 
Army  Supply  System.  (Cited  in  para  2-8.) 
AR  750-1 
Army  Materiel  Maintenance  Concepts  and 
Policies.  (Cited  in  para  2-8.) 
FM  105-5 
Manuever  Control.  (Cited  in  para  2-14.) 
(O)  TB  380-41 
Procedures  for  Safeguarding,  Accounting 
and  Supply  Control  of  COMSEC  Material. 
(Cited  in  paras  1-9,  2-8,  2-U.  and  2-14.) 
(O  TB  530-1 
Identification  and  Application  of  Compro- 
mising Emanation  Control  Measures  (U). 
(Cited  in  para  B-5.) 
(S)  JCS  Pnb  13,  Vol  I 
Policy  and  Procedures  Governing  the  Au- 
thentication and  Safeguarding  of  Nuclear 
Control  Orders  (U).  (Cited  in  para  2-8.) 
Section  ii 
Related  Publications 
A  related  publication  is  nierery  a  source  o*  addfconal 
information.  The  user  doe*  not  have  to  read  it  to 
understand  this  regulation. 
AR  105-10 
Communications  Economy  and  Discipline 
AR  105-31 
Record  Communications 
AR  380-5 
Department  of  the  Army  Information  Se- 
curity Program 
AR  380-53 
Telephone  Communications  Security 
Monitoring 
AR  380-380 
Automated  Systems  Security 
(OAR  530-3 
Electronic  Security  (U) 
AR  640-15 
Criteria  for  Insuring  the  Competency  of 
Personnel  to  Install,  Maintain  and  Repair 
Communications  Security  Equipment 
(O  DA  PAM  310-9 
Index  to  Communications  Security  (COM- 
SEC) Publications  (U) 
(O  DA  PAM  380-2 
SIGSEC:  Defense  Against  SIGINT  (U) 
(OTB  380-7      '     v     ">;   ;     ;- 
Tempest  Inspection  and  Test  (U) 
(OTB  380-9  v.-    .- 
SIGSEC  Survey  Guide  (U)   . 
JCS  Pttb  1 
Dictionary  of  Military  and  Associated 
Terms 
(O  DoD  DirectiTe  52005 
Communications  Security 
National  Communications  Security  Direc- 
tive (U),  June  20,  1979
Appendix  B 
Ciear  Text  Transmission  of 
National  Security  information 
B-1.  Purpose 
This  appendix  prescribes  DA  procedures  to 
be  used  for  the  unsecured  electrical  trans- 
mission of  classified  information  during 
emergency  situations.  It  also  prescribes  cri- 
teria under  which  PDS  (formerly  known  as 
Approved  Circuits)  may  be  established  and 
used  for  transmission  of  classified  informa- 
tion under  a  variety  of  situations. 
B-2.  Emergency  procedures 
Secure  communications  systems  that  allow 
complete  freedom  and  flexibility  in  the  ex- 
change of  information  are  essential  elements 
of  military  operations.  However,  emergency 
situations  may  arise  when  secure  communi- 
cations of  any  form  are  not  available  and 
immediate  needs  dictate  the  clear  text  elec- 
trical transmission  of  classified  information. 
a.  Information  classified  TOP  SECRET 
may  not  be  electrically  transmitted  in-the- 
clear  over  unsecured  means  at  any  time. 
During  hostilities,  CONFIDENTIAL  and 
SECRET  information  may  be  electrically 
transmitted  in-the-clear  by  unsecured  means 
(such  as  telephone,  teletypewriter,  and  ra- 
dio) as  an  emergency  measure  when  all  of 
the  following  conditions  exist: 
(1)  The  transmitting  or  receiving  station 
is  located  in  a  theater  of  actual  hostilities. 
(2)  Speed  of  delivery'  is  essential. 
(3)  Encryption  cannot  be  accomplished. 
(4)  Transmitted  information  cannot  be 
acted  upon  by  the  enemy  in  time  to  influ- 
ence current  operations. 
b.  When  CONFIDENTIAL  OR  SE- 
CRET information  must  be  transmitted  in- 
the-clear,  according  to  paragraph  a,  the  fol- 
lowing procedures  will  be  followed: 
(1)  Each  transmission  in-the-clear  must 
be  individually  authorized  by  the  command- 
er of  the  unit  or  element  transmitting  the 
message  or  by  his  or  her  designated 
representative. 
(2)  References  to  previously  encrypted 
messages  are  prohibited. 
(3)  The  classification  will  not  be  trans- 
mitted as  part  of  the  message.  Messages  will 
be  identified  by  the  word  "CLEAR"  in 
place  of  the  classification. 
(4)  Each  transmission  in-the-ciear  must 
be  individually  authenticated  using  an  ap- 
proved authentication  system  (transmission 
authentication). 
(5)  When  "emergency  in-the-clear"  com- 
munications are  received,  record  or  other 
hard  copy  messages  will  be  marked  "RE- 
CEIVED IN-THE-CLEAR  HANDLE  AS 
CONFIDENTIAL"  before  delivery  to  the 
addressees.  In-the-clear  messages  will  be 
handled  as  CONFIDENTIAL  material  and 
will  not  be  readdressed.  Should  an  address- 
ee determine  that  the  information  must  be 
forwarded  to  another  addressee,  a  new  mes- 
sage will  be  originated,  classified,  and  han- 
dled as  the  subject  matter  and  situation 
dictate. 
B-3,  PDS 
PDSs  are  a  form  of  secure  communications 
systems  and  augment  encrypted  communi- 
cations. Such  PDSs  are  afforded  physical 
and  electromagnetic  safeguards  to  minimize 
the  risk  associated  with  communications 
cables  carrying  classified  clear  text  informa- 
tion through  unrestricted  areas.  Every  prac- 
tical effort  should  be  made  to  install 
communications  cables  carrying  clear  text 
classified  information  entirely  within  re- 
stricted areas.  Access  to  such  cables  should 
be  limited  to  personnel  cleared  for  the  high- 
est level  of  information  the  system  will 
transmit.  When  portions  of  the  cables  must 
be  installed  in  unrestricted  areas,  they  must 
be  under  sufficient  control  (physical  protec- 
tion and/or  surveillance)  to  preclude  covert 
penetration  and  interception  (tapping). 
PDSs  include  all  equipment  and  cabling 
used  for  the  clear  text  transmission  of  classi- 
fied information.  Prior  to  a  PDS  being  used 
for  the  transmission  of  classified  informa- 
tion, the  PDS  must  be  evaluated  for  compli- 
ance with  the  criteria  in  this  appendix  and 
be  approved  for  the  specific  level  of  classi- 
fied information  to  be  transmitted. 
B-4.  PDS  in  multichannel 
telecommunications  systems 
a.  COMSEC  equipment  to  secure  mul- 
tichannel telecommunications  systems  has 
been  entering  the  Army  inventory  for  both 
fixed  and  tactical  applications.  This  COM- 
SEC equipment  encrypts  the  information 
transmitted  between  the  multiplexers  of 
such  systems  and  negates  hostile  intercept 
and  exploitation.  However,  the  intercon- 
necting communications  lines  and  cables 
which  carry  unencrypted  classified  informa- 
tion between  the  multiplexers  and  subscrib- 
er equipment  must  be  protected. 
b.  By  applying  the  fixed  or  tactical  crite- 
ria in  paragraphs  B-5  and  B-6,  PDS  may  be 
used  for  securing  communications  lines  be- 
tween subscriber  equipment  and  multichan- 
nel telecommunications  systems  secured  by 
approved  COMSEC  equipment.  In  addition 
to  the  fixed  or  tactical  criteria,  the  following 
criteria  must  also  be  met. 
(1)  Where  PDSs  are  employed  at  both 
ends  of  a  secured  multichannel  system,  the 
approval  authority  for  both  PDSs  will  be 
the  senior  approval  authority  of  the  individ- 
ual PDSs. 
(2)  The  classification  of  information  to  be 
transmitted  will  not  exceed  the  classification 
of  the  CRYPTO  key  securing  the  mul- 
tichannel system. 
(3)  Procedures  must  be  established  for 
subscribers  to  report  improper  technical  op- 
erations of  the  system.  For  example,  cross 
talk  problems  on  th-  PDS  circuits  must  be 
reported  to  maintenance  and  security  per- 
sonnel for  correction.  Security  personnel 
must  promptly  evaluate  the  security  risk 
and,  if  the  risk  is  unacceptable,  remove  the 
PDS  from  service  until  the  problems  have 
been  corrected. 
B-5.  Fixed  PDS  ' 
a.  Authority  to  approve  PDS 'for  the 
clear  text  transmission  of  classified  informa- 
tion within  fixed  plant  and  garrison  installa- 
tions is  delegated  as  follows.  This  authority 
will  not  be  further  delegated. 
(1)  Heads  of  the  Army  General  and  Spe- 
cial Staff  for  activities  under  their  staff  su- 
pervision, direction,  or  control.     * 
(2)  MACOM  commanders  for  their  or- 
ganic activities. 
b.  Before  approval  action  is  completed 
for  fixed  plant  and  garrison  installations,  ap- 
proval authorities  will  coordinate  with  and 
obtain  concurrence  from  the  following  if  the 
PDS  directly  supports  any  of  their  elements 
or  is  within  their  security  cognizance. 
(1)  Director,  National  Security  Agency. 
(2)  Director,  Defense  Intelligence 
Agency. 
(3)  Director,  Defense  Communications 
Agency. 
(4)  Unified  and  Specified  Commanders. 
c  Approval  authorities  may  request  tech- 
nical assistance  from  the  INSCOM  local 
support  element  in  applying  security  criteria 
and  processing  the  approval  action.  This  as- 
sistance may  include  review  and  examina- 
tion of  any  of  the  following: 
(1)  The  physical  security  safeguards 
which  will  be  maintained. 
(2)  Plans  for  installing  and  using  the 
PDS. 
(3)  Adherence  to  the  RED/BLACK  in- 
stallation criteria. 
(4)  The  capability  of  the  system  to  main- 
tain the  security  required. 
d.  Approval  actions  for  PDS  to  transmit 
TOP  SECRET  information  must  include  an 
evaluation  by  the  INSCOM  local  support 
element.  Information  copies  of  approvals  for 
PDS  to  transmit  TOP  SECRET  informa- 
tion, with  all  supporting  documentation, 
will  be  forwarded  to  HQDA(DAMI-CIQ, 
WASH  DC  20310. 
e.  Once  a  PDS  is  approved,  no  changes 
in  installation,  additions,  or  use  may  be 
made  until  approval  for  such  changes  has 
been  granted  by  the  approval  authority. 
/  Fixed  PDS  must  meet  the  following 
criteria: 
(1)  PDS  will  be- located  entirely  within 
the  limits  of  the  installation  under  the  using 
commander's  physical  control. 
(2)  Security  techniques  for  PDS  will  be 
evaluated  on  a  case-by-case  basis  by  approv- 
al authorities. 
(3)  All  personnel  involved  in  the  opera- 
tion of  a  PDS  will  have  a  security  clearance 
at  least  equal  to  the  highest  classification  for 
which  the  PDS  has  been  approved. 
(4)  Individuals  who  must  be  granted  ac- 
cess to  any  portion  of  a  PDS,  but  who  do 
not  meet  the  security  clearance  requirement, 
must  be  under  surveillance  by  appropriately 
cleared  and,  where  available,  technically 
qualified  personnel.
(5)  All  personnel  who  will  guard  and/or 
inspect  the  PDS  will  be  cleared  for  the  high- 
est classification  for  which  the  PDS  has 
been  approved.  Guards  may  be  stationary 
or  roving  patrols,  but  must  be  assigned  to 
the  PDS  areas  and  not  merely  assigned  as 
building  guards. 
(6)  Areas  in  which  a  PDS  is  installed  will 
have  either  protective  perimeter  construc- 
tion (with  a  minimum  number  of  entry 
points  secured  or  under  direct  control  at  all 
times)  or  be  under  the  surveillance  of  a 
guard  or  patrol. 
(a)  Floors,  ceilings,  walls,  doors,  win- 
dows, and  vents  will  be  constructed  or  in- 
stalled to  prevent  clandestine  entry.  Air 
conditioning,  heating,  and  other  ducts  will 
be  provided  protection  against  access  by  un- 
authorized individuals  and  will  be  provided 
acoustical  treatment. 
(b)  Vertically  adjacent  areas  in  which 
PDS  will  be  operated  are  considered  sepa- 
rate areas  on  each  floor.  An  exception  is 
when  stairwells  are  located  entirely  within 
the  perimeters  of  the  areas  subject  to  the 
same  security  safeguards. 
(7)  PDS,  other  than  fiber  optic  cables, 
will  be  physically  and  electrically  isolated 
from  unprotected  distribution  systems  to 
prevent  inadvertent  coupling  to  unprotected 
distribution  systems.  After  a  PDS  has  been 
approved,  instances  of  improper  operation 
or  cross  talk  on  circuits  will  be  reported  im- 
mediately to  maintenance  and  security  per- 
sonnel for  corrective  action.  The  part  of  the 
system  affected  will  be  shut  down  until  the 
trouble  is  eliminated. 
(8)  The  passage  of  PDS  through  walls, 
floors,  and  ceilings  will  be  made  at  right  an- 
gles to  the  plane  of  the  surface.  The  passage 
will  be  through  a  pipe  or  other  sleeve  of  suf- 
ficient size  to  permit  visual  inspection. 
(9)  Cables  and  equipment  will  be  inspect- 
ed by  technically  qualified  personnel  (such 
as  C-E  installation  teams  or  maintenance 
personnel)  immediately  before  approval  and 
at  frequent  irregular  intervals  after 
approval. 
(10)  PDS  must  be  accessible  throughout 
its  entire  run  to  permit  physical  inspection 
and  surveillance.  PDS  should  not  be 
marked  or  otherwise  specifically  identified 
in  unrestricted  areas. 
(11)  Subscriber  sets  used  in  PDS  will  be 
clearly  marked  with  the  highest  classifica- 
tion for  which  the  circuit  has  been 
approved. 
(12)  The  provisions  of  AR  530-4  and  TB 
530-1  will  be  adhered  to  as  appropriate. 
The  installation  of  all  equipment  and  inter- 
connecting cables  will  be  accomplished  in 
accordance  with  the  TEMPEST  criteria  for 
RED  circuits. 
.  (13)  All  cables  and  wires  present  in  PDS 
terminals  will  be  fully  identified.  All  extra- 
neous wiring  will  be  removed  if  possible. 
Spare  communications  cables  and  electric 
power  lines  which  cannot  be  removed  will 
be  terminated  in  accordance  with  TEM- 
PEST standards.  This  does  not  include  fiber 
optic  cables. 
(14)  A  general  starting  point  for  PDS  de- 
sign is  a  ferrous  conduit  distribution  (FCD) 
system  as  described  below:  ...       •.-.'■ 
(a)  The  FCD  system  must  terminate  in  a 
terminal  box  installed  within  a  restricted 
area  at  each  end  of  the  system. 
(b)  A  completed  FCD  system  should 
form  a  single  tube  from  terminal  box  to  ter- 
minal box.  This  will  insure  that  access  to 
PDS  cables  between  terminal  boxes  cannot 
be  obtained  without  physically  drilling  or 
cutting. 
'  (c)  FCD  systems  should  be  constructed 
of  rigid,  threaded,  thickwall  ferrous  conduit 
or  pipe  using  elbows,  couplings,  nipples, 
and  connectors  of  the  same  material. 
(d)  All  connections  in  a  FCD  system 
should  be  clean  threaded  joints  securely 
tightened  and  welded  completely  around  all 
mating  surfaces,  including  both  ends  of  a 
coupling. 
(e)  For  turns  in  FCD  systems,  elbows  are 
preferred  over  pull  boxes.  If  pull  boxes  are 
used,  the  pull  box  cover  must  be  attached  to 
the  pull  box  with  a  continuous  weld  com- 
pletely around  the  mating  surface.  Boxes 
equipped  with  locked  or  removable  covers 
must  be  approved  by  the  local  INSCOM 
support  element. 
(J)  With  the  concurrence  of  all  approval 
authorities,  two  or  more  PDS  cables  may  be 
carried  through  the  same  FCD.  If  required 
to  serve  areas  of  different  classification 
levels,  the  cables  will  be  separated  in  the  re- 
stricted area  with  the  highest  classification 
levei  for  further  routing. 
(15)  Intrusion-resistant  cable  (IRC)  is 
another  design  technique  for  PDS.  Two  de- 
sign approaches  for  IRC  are  alarmed  cables 
and  hardened  cable  paths.  IRC  frequently 
use  an  FCD  as  the  design  starting  point  and 
apply  hardening  (such  as  reinforced  con- 
crete) and/or  technical  design  techniques, 
to  meet  portions  of  the  physical  protection 
and  surveillance  requirements.  The  criteria 
for  FCD  systems  also  apply  to  IRC  systems. 
Additional  IRC  considerations  are  as 
follows: 
(a)  Developmental  work  has  been  per- 
formed and  is  continuing  on  alarmed  cable 
(wire  or  fiber  optic)  systems.  Currently,  no 
alarm  system  has  been  considered  adequate 
as  the  only  security  measure  for  an  IRC 
Hardening  and/or  surveillance  are  still 
required.  Approval  for  use  of  alarmed 
cables  as  an  IRC  in  a  PDS,  and  their  specifi- 
cations, is  the  joint  responsibility  of  the  en- 
gineering agency  and  the  PDS  approval 
authority. 
(b)  Fiber  optic  cables  by  themselves  do 
not  meet  the  criteria  for  an  IRC.  However, 
fiber  optic  cables  may  be  used  in  lieu  of  wire 
lines  in  FCD  systems  or  IRC  systems. 
(c)  Physical  protection  must  be  provided 
for  any  hardened  cable  paths  in  areas  which 
may  be  within  normal  reach  or  easy  access 
of  unauthorized  personnel.  Techniques 
should  be  chosen  to  provide  a  penetration 
delay  factor.  This  delay  factor  will  be  com- 
mensurate with  the  expected  detection  time 
for  an  intrusion  attempt.  The  technique  pro- 
viding the  delay  factor  should  reduce  vul- 
nerability to  sabotage  and  provide  added 
physical  protection  in  areas  where,  inadver- 
tent damage  to  the  IRC  system  may  occur. 
(d)  Frequent  inspections  of  the  cable 
path  should  be  ijonducted  at  irregular 
intervals.       •-..-•»  .   J--    - 
(16)  Prior  to  construction  of  an  FCD  or 
IRC,  concurrence  of  the  INSCOM  local 
support  dement  should  be  obtained  by  the 
engineering  agency  for  the  proposed  overall 
plan  and  general  installation  techniques. 
g.  Requests  for  approval  of  PDS  will  be 
submitted  through  channels  to  the  appropri- 
ate approval  authority.  Requests  will  be 
classified  CONFIDENTIAL  as  a  minimum 
and  will  contain  the  following  information: 
(1)  Full  identification  and  location  of  the 
requesting  organization. 
(2)  A  statement  of  the  classification  of  in- 
formation to  be  transmitted  over  the  PDS. 
(3)  A  copy  of  the  building  floor  plan  (or 
a  diagram  of  the  field  area,  as  appropriate) 
designating  the  following: 
•  (a)  Proposed  cable  route  and  location  of 
subscriber  sets,  distribution  frames,  keyers, 
junction  boxes,  and  any  other  components 
associated  with  the  circuit. 
(b)  Other  wiring  along  the  PDS  route. 
(4)  Description  of  the  cable  installation; 
for  example,  24  pair  shielded  cable  in  rigid 
steel  conduit,  6  pair  shielded  cable  in  floor 
or  cells,  and  fiber  optic  cable.  Specify  the 
manner  in  which  the  cable  will  be  installed; 
for  example,  exposed  on  the-  ceiling,  or  sus- 
pended below  the  false  ceiling  or  bn  the 
wall.  Indicate  the  length  of  the  cable  runs. 
(5)  A  description  including  nomenclature 
of  terminal  and  subscriber  equipment  to  be 
used. 
(6)  The  clearance  status  of  individuals 
having  access  to  circuit. 
(7)  Type  of  guards,  (for  example,  US 
Military,  US  civilian,  foreign  civilian)  and 
their  clearance  status. 
(8)  Description  of  access  control  and  sur- 
veillance of  uncleared  personnel  who  may 
be  allowed  entry  into  the  area  housing  any 
part  of  the  PDS. 
(9)  Identification  of  the  power  source  to 
be  used  for  the  PDS  and  a  statement  of  the 
distance  to  the  nearest  point  where  unde- 
tected tampering  would  be  possible. 
(10)  A  statement  that  teletypewriter  cir- 
cuits will  or  will  not  use  low-level  keying 
and  signaling.  This  statement  is  not  applica- 
ble to  fiber  optic  circuits. 
(11)  A  justification  for  use  of  the  pro- 
posed PDS. 
(12)  A  statement  concerning  deviations, 
if  any,  from  the  criteria  outlined  in  para- 
graph B-36(6)  and  an  evaluation  of  the  in- 
herent security  implications. 
B-6.  Tactical  PDS 
a.  Authority  to  approve  circuits  for  clear 
text  electrical  transmission  of  SECRET  and 
CONFIDENTIAL  information  in  tactical 
environments  is  delegated  to  commanders 
of  battalion  and  higher  echelons.  Under
combat  conditions,  commanders  may  sub- 
delegate  this  authority  to  the  company  level. 
Tactical  PDS  will  not  be  approved  for  clear 
text  transmission  of  TOP  SECRET 
information. 
b.  The  security  risk  involved  in  clear  text 
transmission  of  transitory  tactical  informa- 
tion is  less  than  that  involved  in  long-term 
strategic  information.  In  many  cases,  the 
value  of  the  tactical  information  perishes 
before  it  can  be  acted  upon  by  an  adversary. 
Therefore,  the  risk  evaluation  should  be  per- 
formed and  predicated  on  the  ability  of  the 
command  to  prevent  exploitation  attempts 
in  a  tactical  environment  and  to  eliminate 
or  disrupt  any  such  attempts  that  are 
initiated. 
c  Tactical  PDS  must  meet  the  following 
criteria: 
(1)  Routine  transmission  of  clear  text 
classified  information  is  not  authorized  until 
the  PDS  has  been  approved. 
(2)  PDS  will  be  located  entirely  within 
the  limits  of  the  installation  or  command 
post  or  in  areas  directly  under  the  using 
commander's  physical  control.  PDS  will  not 
include  lines  which  run  outside  of  the  area 
where  the  using  commander  can  maintain 
positive  physical  control  of  the  lines. 
(3)  Security  techniques  will  be  evaluated 
on  a  case-by-case  basis  by  approval 
authorities. 
(4)  All  personnel  involved  in  the  opera- 
tion of  the  PDS  will  have  a  security  clear- 
ance at  least  equal  to  the  highest 
classification  for  which  the  PDS  has  been 
approved. 
(5)  Individuals  who  must  be  granted  ac- 
cess to  any  portion  of  a  PDS,  but  who  do 
not  meet  the  security  clearance  requirement, 
must  be  under  surveillance  by  appropriately 
cleared  and,  where  available,  technically 
qualified  personnel. 
(6)  The  area  surrounding  the  PDS  will 
have  either  protected  perimeters  or  be  under 
the  surveillance  of  guards  or  patrols. 
(7)  PDS  will  be  electrically  isolated  from 
unprotected  distribution  systems  to  prevent 
inadvertent  coupling  to  unprotected  distri- 
bution systems.  All  wires  present  in  a  PDS 
terminal  will  be  identified.  Other  communi- 
cation lines  will  be  separated  from  the  pro- 
tected circuits  and  all  extraneous  wiring  will 
be  removed  to  the  maximum  extent 
possible. 
(8)  Subscriber  sets  of  PDS  will  be  clearly 
marked  with  the  highest  classification  for 
which  the  circuit  has  been  approved. 
(9)  The  use  of  single-wire  circuitry  using 
the  earth,  or  the  chassis  of  equipment,  or 
the  shields  of  the  conductors  as  a  return 
path  will  not  be  used  for  PDS. 
(10)  After  a  PDS  has  been  approved,  in- 
stances of  improper  operation  or  cross  talk 
on  circuits  will  be  reported  immediately  to 
maintenance  personnel  and  security  person- 
nel for  corrective  action.  The  part  of  the 
system  which  is  afTected  will  be  shut  down 
until  the  trouble  is  eliminated. 
(11)  Cables  and  equipment  at  PDS  termi- 
nals will  be  inspected  for  physical  taps  and 
other  evidence  of  tampering  immediately 
before  approval  and  at  frequent  irregular  in- 
tervals after  approval  by  technically  quali- 
fied personnel. 
c  (12)  The  criteria  contained  in  (c)  may  be 
waived  by  the  approval  authority  during 
hostilities. 
d.  Formal  request  for  and  approval  of 
tactical  PDS  may  be  eliminated  at  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  approval  authority  concerned. 
Approvals  may  be  granted  in  any  form  at 
the  discretion  of  the  approval  authority. 
Approvals  should  be  based  on  the  following 
information,  which  will  be  classified  CON- 
FIDENTIAL when  associated  with  a  spe- 
cific PDS. 
(1)  Description  of  the  PDS.      " 
(2)  Classification  level  of  the  information 
to  be  transmitted. 
(3)  An  evaluation  of  the  security  risk 
involved. 
(4)  Standing  operating  procedures  (SOP) 
and  installation  parameters.  ' 
•€.  Telecommunications  systems  in  the 
tactical  environment  may  be  designed  or 
combined  into  many  configurations.  Yet, 
the  underlying  national  policy  is  unchanged; 
that  is,  a  classified  information  electrically 
transmitted  over  telecommunications  sys- 
tems must  be  secured  by  approved 
cryptosystems  or  by  PDS.  Care  must  be  ex- 
ercised to  prevent  the  compromise  of  classi- 
fied information  through  inadequate 
surveillance  or  physical  protection  or 
through  improper  installation  and  operation 
of  PDS  or  combined  systems.  • 
(1)  Field  telephones,  their  wirelines  and 
switchboards,  within  a  tactical  command 
post  (CP)  may  be  established  as  PDS.  The 
simplest  case  is  a  tactical  CP  established  in 
a  rural  area  where  circuits  are  not  connect- 
ed or  connectable  outside  the  CP.  In  these 
situations,  positive  physical  control  and  sur- 
veillance of  PDS  wirelines  and  cables  is  eas- 
iest to  maintain. 
(2)  A  tactical  CP  established  in  urban 
areas  increases  the  difficulty  of  establishing 
and  maintaining  physical  control  and  sur- 
veillance of  PDS  wirelines  and  cables.  More 
care  in  separation  of  PDS  from  existing 
wires,  and  posting  of  guards  with  visual  sur- 
veillance and/or  frequent  guard  patrols  may 
be  necessary. 
(3)  A  tactical  CP  dispersed  throughout  a 
wide  area,  (for  example,  several  villages 
used  to  house  elements  of  the  CP)  may  still 
permit  establishment  of  a  PDS.  However, 
the  increased  distances  and  wider  dispersion 
further  increase  the  difficulties  of  maintain- 
ing physical  control  and  surveillance.  In 
such  cases  the  possibility  of  hostile  forces 
operating  within  friendly  areas  of  control 
must  be  considered.  Guard  forces  protecting 
and  patrolling  such  PDS  should  be  familiar 
with  wiretap  techniques  and  schedule  fre- 
quent but  irregular  patrols  of  all  PDS  wire- 
lines and  cable  runs.  Operators  and 
maintenance  personnel  must  be  alert  to  any 
abnormal  operation  of  the  PDS. 
(4)  To  reduce  or  alter  the  electromagnet- 
ic profile  of  a  CP,  radio  transmitters  may  be 
dispersed  and  remotcd  some  distance  from 
their  CP.  Wirelines  and  cables  linking  the 
CP  to  remote  radio  transmitters  can  only  be 
oonsidered  for  PDS  if  the  radio  transmitters 
or  connecting  cables  are  secured  .by  ap- 
proved COMSEC  equipment.  When  the 
COMSEC  equipment  is  available  to  aecure 
the  radio  transmitters,  the  circuits  tothe  ra- 
dio transmitter  may  be  established  as  PDS; 
considerations  and  criteria  for  PDS  within 
the  CP  (rural,  urban  or  dispersed)  apply.
Appendix  C 
Authentication  Systems 
C-1.  Gehoral 
Authentication  systems  prevent  unautho- 
rized stations  from  entering  friendly  radio 
nets  to  disrupt  or  confuse  operations.  They 
also  protect  a  communications  system 
against  false  transmissions  (imitative  decep- 
tion). The  only  authentication  systems  au- 
thorized for  use  in  the  US  Army  are  those 
produced  by  NSA,  or,  for  an  emergency  re- 
quirement, by  INSCOM.  If  a  special  or 
emergency  requirement  arises,  the  unit  com- 
mander must  notify  the  controlling  authori- 
ty of  the  authentication  system  in  use  or  the 
controlling  authority's  designated  represen- 
tative (C-E  Officer). 
C-2.  Instructions 
The  two  methods  of  authentication  that  are 
authorized  for  use  are  shown  below.  The 
operational  distinction  between  the  two  is 
that  challenge  and  reply  requires  two-way 
communications,  whereas  transmission  au- 
thentication does  not. 
a.  Challenge-reply  authentication.  In 
challenge-reply  authentication,  the  called 
station  always  gives  the  first  challenge.  This 
challenge  and  reply  method  validates  the 
authenticity  of  the  calling  station.  It  also 
prevents  an  unauthorized  operator  from  en- 
tering a  net  to  obtain  authentication  re- 
sponses for  use  in  another  net.  The  station 
making  the  call  may  counterchallenge  the 
called  station,  using  a  different  challenge. 
Only  the  station  responding  to  a  challenge 
is  verified.  Do  not  accept  a  challenge  as  an 
authentication. 
(1)  If  an  incorrect  reply  is  received  or  if 
an  unusual  (15  to  20  seconds)  delay  occurs 
between  the  challenge  and  the  reply  another 
challenge  should  be  made. 
(2)  Operators  will  occasionally  mis- 
authenticate  by  using  the  wr  ig  system  or 
misreading  the  table.  In  such  cases,  the 
challenging  station  should  attempt  to 
pinpoint  the  difficulty  and  then  rechallenge. 
(3)  Never  give  the  challenge  and  reply  in 
the  same  transmission  (self-authentication). 
b.  Transmission  authentication.  This  is  a 
method  used  by  a  station  to  authenticate  a 
message.  It  is  used  when  challenge-reply  au- 
thentication is  not  possible;  for  example, 
when  a  station  is  under  radio  listening  si- 
lence. Transmission  authentication  differs 
from  self-authentications  in  that  authentica- 
tors  are  either  carefully  controlled  to  insure 
one-time  use  or  are  time  based. 
C-3.  When  to  authenticate 
Challenge  and  reply  or  transmission  authen- 
tication systems,  as  appropriate,  will  be 
used  when — 
'        a.  A  station  suspects  imitative  deception 
on  any  circuit. 
b.  A  station  is  challenged  to  authenticate. 
Stations  will  not  respond  to  a  challenge 
when  under  an  imposed  radio  Uitening 
silence. 
c  Directing  radio  silence,  radio  listening 
silence,  or  requiring  a  station  to  break  an 
imposed  silence.  (Transmission 
authentication). 
d  Transmitting  contact  and  amplifying 
reports  in  plain  language. 
e.  Transmitting  operating  instructions 
that  affect  the  military  situation.  Examples 
are  closing  down  a  station  or  watch,  chang- 
ing frequency  other  than  normal  scheduled 
changes,  or  directing  establishment  of  a  spe- 
cial communications  guard.  Other  examples 
are  requesting  artillery  fire  support  or  di- 
recting relocation  of  units. 
/.  Transmitting  a  plain  language 
cancellation. 
g.  Making  initial  radio  contact  or  resum- 
ing contact  after  prolonged  interruptions. 
h.  Transmitting  to  a  station  under  radio 
listening  silence  (transmission 
authentication). 
i.  Authorized  to  transmit  a  classified 
message  in  the  clear. 
j.  Forced,  because  of  no  response  by  the 
called  station,  to  send  a  message  in  the  blind 
(transmission  authentication). 
C-4.  Exceptions 
Authentication  is  not  required  under  the 
following  conditions: 
a.  When  using  authorized  on-line 
cryptosystems,  unless  it  is  suspected  that 
the  cryptonet  has  been  compromised. 
b.  When  making  initial  contact  after  a 
scheduled  call  sign  and  frequency  change, 
since  only  bona  fide  stations  should  know 
their  assigned  call  sign  and  frequency  for 
the  time  period  in  use.
Glossary 
Section  I 
Abbreviations 
ACCLAIM 
Army  COMSEC  Commodity  Logistics  Ac- 
counting Information  Management  System 
ACCOR 
Army  COMSEC  Central  Office  of  Record 
ACSI 
Assistant  Chief  of  Staff  for  Intelligence 
ARNG 
Army  National  Guard 
AUTOSEVOCOM 
automatic  secure  voice  communications 
BOIP 
basis  of  issue  plan 
CEARS 
COMSEC  equipment  asset  reporting  system 
CEMA 
COMSEC   equipment    modification 
application 
CEOI 
communications  electronics  operation 
instructions 
COMINT 
communications  intelligence 
COMSEC 
communications  security 
CONUS 
Continental  United  States 
CP 
command  post 
CRE 
COMSEC  research   and   engineering 
coordination 
CRP 
COMSEC  Resource  Program 
DARCOM 
United  States  Army  Material  Development 
and  Readiness  Command 
DCS 
Defense  Communications  System 
DCSLOG 
Deputy  Chief  of  Staff  for  Logistics 
DCSOPS 
Deputy  Chief  of  Staff  for  Operations  and 
Plans 
bCSPER  ' 
Deputy  Chief  of  Staff  for  Personnel 
DCSRDA  '  '      , 
Deputy  Chief  of  Staff  for  Research,  Devel- 
opment, and. Acquisition    , 
DES  .     .- 
Data  Encryption  Standard 
PIRNSA 
Director,  National  Security  Agency 
i  • 
EAC 
echelons  above  corps 
ECM 
electronic  countermeasures 
EMSEC 
emissions  security 
EW 
electronic  warfare 
FDTE 
force    development    testing    and 
experimentation 
FORSCOM 
United  States  Army  Forces  Command 
HQDA 
Headquarters,  Department  of  the  Army 
HSC 
United  States  Army  Health  Services 
Command 
ILS 
Integrated  Logistics  Support 
INSCOM 
United  States  Army  Intelligence  and  Securi- 
ty Command 
LOA 
letter  of  agreement 
MACOM 
major  Army  command 
NCSC 
National   Communications  Security 
Committee 
NICP 
national  inventory  control  point 
NMP 
national  maintenance  point 
NSA 
National  Security  Agency 
NSC 
National  Security  Council 
OCO 
operational  capability  objective 
T     *     t        ^ 
OCONUS 
Outside  the  Continental  United.States 
OAM 
operations  and  maintenance 
: .  ■••  <  r. 
O&O  "     ;  ;•' 
operational  and  organizational " 
OPA 
other  procurement.  Army 
OPSEC 
operations  security 
OSD 
Office  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense   - 
OT 
operational  test 
OTEA 
Operational  Test  Evaluation  Agency 
i.  • 
PDS 
protected  distribution  system 
RDTE 
research,  development,  test  and  evaluation 
ROC 
required  operational  capability 
SECDEF 
Secretary  of  Defense 
SIGINT 
signals  intelligence 
SIGSEC 
signal  security 
TELER 
telecommunications  requirement 
TOE 
table  of  organization  and  equipment 
TRADOC 
United  States  Army  Training  and  Doctrine 
Command 
USACC 
United  States  Army  Communications 
Command 
USAR 
United  States  Army  Reserve 
USAREUR 
United  States  Army,  Europe 
WESTCOM 
United  States  Army  Western  Command
Section  II 
Terms 
COMSEC  Resources  Program 
Includes  all  resources  and  manpower  con- 
cerned with  or  in  support  of  the  communi- 
cations security  (COMSEC)  efforts  of  the 
Army. 
COMSEC  surveillance 
The  systematic  examination  of  telecommu- 
nications to  determine  the  adequacy  of 
COMSEC  measures,  to  identify  COMSEC 
deficiencies,  to  provide  data  from  which  to 
predict  the  effectiveness  of  proposed  COM- 
SEC measures,  and  to  confirm  the  adequacy 
of  such  measures  after  implementation. 
Protected  distribution  system  (PDS) 
(formerly  called  an  "approved  circuit ") 
A  wireline  or  fiber  optics  system  which  in- 
cludes adequate  acoustical,  electrical,  elec- 
tromagnetic, and  physical  safeguards  to 
permit  its  use  for  the  transmission  of  unen- 
crypted information. 
Telecommunications 
Any  transmission,  emission,  or  reception  of 
signs,  signals,  writing,  images,  and  sounds 
or  information  of  any  nature  by  wire,  radio, 
visual,  or  other  electromagnetic  systems. 
Record  information 
All  forms  (e.g.,  narrative,  graphic,  data, 
computer  memory)  of  information  regis- 
tered in  either  temporary  or  permanent 
form  so  that  it  can  be  retrieved,  reproduced, 
or  preserved.