\0!° ira! Jan 21 1955 The Honorable John L. McClellan Chairman, Permanent Subcommittee ; on Investigations Senate Committee on Government Operations -Washington 25, D.C. Dear Mr. Chairman: I would like to call to your attention certain correspondence with Senator McCarthy as your predecessor as Chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. During the hearings on security of the Government Printing Office, Senator McCarthy publicly stated that an alleged member of the Conmimist Party had access to secret data of the Central Intelligence Agency. By letter of 22 October 1953 I pointed out to Senator McCarthy that no CIA classified material is printed in the main GPO plant. Further, it was requested that information concerning this Agency or its personnel developed in the course of investigation be made available to me for thorough inspection. No reply was received to that communication. During the closing days of the Ammy hearings, Senator McCarthy made several references to alleged Communist infiltration of the Central Intelligence Agency. On 7 July 1954 I wrote Senator McCarthy and requested that he make available to me at the earliest possible moment any unfavorable information bearing on the loyalty or integrity of any employee of CIA. Although Senator McCarthy had publicly stated that he was "disturbed beyond words" by the allged success of Communists in penetrating the CIA, there was no reply to this communication. Copies of the aforementioned letters are attached for your information. According to press report of 15 January 1955, Senator McCarthy made available to General Mark W. Clark information on “alleged communism and corruption " in the Central Intelligence Agency. As you will note from the attached telegram of 15 January 1955, I advised General Clark that if any of the information which Senator McCarthy had turned over to him contains any “indication of commmnisn or corruption in the CIA, I would investigate the matter immediately and thoroughly."
I would Like to renew my request that the Committee kindly make available to me any information it may have in its files or which it may develop in future investizations which might reflect on the CIA or its persomel. I would desire to make a thorough investigation of any such information. I would welcome an opportunity to discuss with you personally any matters respecting the CIA which you feel might bear on the Committee's work, and I await word from you whether and when you consider such a conversation would be desirable. Faithfully yours, (signed) Allen W. Dulles Director Enclosures: 2, a8 indicated above
My dear Mr. Dulles: Reference is made to your letter of January 21. After hearing from you, I requested that the files of this Subcommittee contained the material on CIA be reviewed to determine the kind and type of derogatory information contained therein. Unfortunately, it was found that those files were not in the file office of the Investigating Subcommittee, but were in the possession of the former Chairman, Senator McCarthy. Those files have been returned to the Subcommittee within the past week and I have instructed that they be reviewed. Upon the completion of this atudy, I shall again be in touch with you. I regret the delay in answering your letter, but I am sure that you understand there are always certain delays when the Senate reorganizes. With kindest personal regards, I am Sincerely yours, John L. McClellan Chairman Honorable Allen W. Dulles Director of Central Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency Washington 25, D.C.
Document removed by the staff of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library , For further information, see entry/-s of the pink WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES ) at the front of this folder
a ; Pos waz eheN Et “yt: a a Ud Le ae ‘g centenary Sot 2/-0 a+: nn THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT June 13, 1955 MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Subject: Report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities (Federal Bureau of Investigation) The President has receivad the classified report of the Hoover Come mission Task Force on latelligence Activities, andhas asked ms to transmit to you the attached portions thereof relating te matters of interest or concern to the Federal Buresu of Invastigation. The President would like te heve a careful review made of the attached report, and te receive any comment deemed appropriate with respect to it within sixty days. Such comment should include any views with respect to the discussion in the report concerning the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Task Force recommandations relating to « "watch dog commission" and to a special commission on communications and electronic resources to be set up by the President are the subject of separate action, and need not be reported upon in connection with the present request. DECLASSiFizp EO. 12035, Sec. 2.204 ~~ 7 a — — FR ftte7 4_7: i 1 . Coes
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT Lea THE WHITE A eee ta me “WASHINGTON “scene 13, 1955 ~ Rae Bec teiary of Btu.e 2 AtR MOUs tod o - Mesion ANDO aro” ur Rpctee ay ge rae secakrany or state Th BS RETURNED to THE WEITE HOUSE OFFICE , CLATSIFIED MATER'AL FEST PS fa-ntes eerie esc Subjects: Report of the Hester Commleaton’ Task Force on Intelligence Activities The President has received the classified report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities, and has asked me to transmit to you the attached portions thereof relat- ing to matters of interest or concern to the Department of State. The President would like for you to have a careful review made of the attached report from the standpoint of your Department, and to submit your views with respect to it within sixty days. These views should include specific comment on each of the recommendations relating to the State Department, and should indicate those recommendations which you consider can and should be adopted (indicating for these the method and timing deemed appropriate for placing them in effect); the statement should also indicate any recommendations not considered appro- priate for adoption, together with supporting reasone and comment. Task Force recommendations relating to a ‘watch dog commission" and to a special commission on communications and electronic resources to be set up by the President are the subject of separate action, and need not be reported upon in connection with the present request. PECUASSiFIzn 2 a © 12065, Sec. 3.294
“peagine. FEN oa ar i aoa BS ea. ‘ . . _ nema - i= ec ae THE WHITE HOUSE z. etete . UE 23 -- . . HIN fe) Sey, swt OM Bae ge 2 Dre BME E IE ‘ eee ERO sTHE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT :- on — aigaic kreargy Gonmrmts®-c-. Sane 13, 1955 ‘he Thaarenat. eer gs lez az re Fe eee ck aewsied sed dy: + oon MIEMORAN DUMEPOR “ort . s : og oo \ ’ ‘ on a. a2 ~— sid ace Ssan oY  - ATOMIS ENERGY COMMISSION +O BE ZETERNED TO THE WHITE He ae telfigence Activities, The President has received the classified report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities, and bas asked me to transmit to you the attached portions thereof relating to matters of interest or concern to the Atomic Energy Commission, ‘The President would like for you to have a careful review made of the attached report from the standpoint of the Atomic Energy Com- mission, and to eubmit the views of the Commission with respect to it within sixty days, These views should include specific comment on the recommendations relating to the Atomic Energy Commission, indicating the extent to which it is considered these can and should be adopted, together with the method and timing deemed appropriate for placing them in effect. Task Force recommendations relating to a “watch dog commission" and to a special commission on communications aad electronic xosourcos to be set up by the President are the subject of separate action, and need not be reported upon in connection with the present request. o 5 9s neind Ee eead td Boks bw we nthe rITD
” - THE WHITE HOUSE { WASHINGTON ery wi THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT June iS, 1985 MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Subject: Report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activitios The President has received the classified report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities, and has asked me to tranemit to you the attached portions of the main report relating to matters of interest or concern to the Central Intelligence Agency. The Presidant would like for you to have a careful review made of the attached report from the standpoint of your Agency, and to submit your views with respect to it within sixty days. These wiews should include specific comment on each of the recome mendations relating to the Central Intelligence Agency, and should indicate thesc recommendations which you consider can and should be adopted (indicating for these the method and timing deemed appropriate for placing them in effect); the statement should also indicate any recommendations not considered appropriate for adoption together with supporting reasons and comment, Task Force recommendations relating to a ‘watch dog commiseion" and to a special commission on communications and electronic resources to be set up by the President are the subject of separate action, and need act be reported upon in connection with the present request.
‘Tr. :. - em ee me gee 2.7? r ve a. THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT \ June 13, 1955 MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Subject: Report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities (Department of the Air Force) The President has received the classified report of the Hoover Com- mission Task Force on Intelligence Activities, and has asked me to tranemit through you the attached portions of the main report relating to matters of interest or concern to the Department of the Air Force, The President would like to have a careful review made of the attached report from the standpoint of the Department of the Air Force and to receive comments with respect to the report within sixty days. These comments should include specific remarks concerning each of the recommendations relating to the Department of the Air Force, and should indicate those recommendations which it is considered can and should be adopted (indicating for these the method and timing dsemed appropriate for placing them in effect); the statement should also in- dicate any recommendations not considered appropriate for adoption, together with supporting reasons and comment. Task Force recommendations relating to e watch dog commission" and to a special commission on communications and electronic resources to be set up by the President ere the subject of separate action, and need not be reported upon in connection with the present request. *. « PETE. Lae hampers. on i lala . TOL ACSITIED ; ts. kee z - Z ra WiGhasoy si 7 Me SHende au, Bae, AMPS LEE > ene A. * E.0, 12052, Ses. 3-224 Aer eee. 2 W2USe, VCS. J-eu4 % @ , oT A Of - LF a TT : - pos \. eats . ‘=a Date
THE WHI TErHedis WASHINGTON THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIOENT June 13, 1955 MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Subject: Report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities (National Security Agency) The President has received the classified report of the Hoover Com- raission Task Force oa Intelligence Activities, and has asked me to transmit through you, as a matter of interest or concern to the Director of the National Security Agency, the attached cepy of Appendix f thereof, Fer your information, a copy of this Appendix has been transmitted to the Director of Cantral Intellizence with a request that a careful review be undertaken from ths standpoint of the USCIB and USCSB, and that coordinatad views of interasted departments be developed and submitted within sixty days, Task Force recommendations relating to a watch dog commission’ and to a special commiseion on communications and electronic resources to be set up by the President are the subject of separate action, and need not be reported upon in connection with the present request, ee ee a 2 nP Bor WOE AEE ORT Ge DECLASSIFIED £.0. 12935, Sec. 3-204 ty (7F- 2 oe By 222.21 «J Sate Uf, aif 7
vl “es ewe et ARSE nated a. THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON THe ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT Juse 13, 1955 MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Subject: Report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities (Office of Special Operations) The President has received the classified report of the Hoover Com- rmi¢gsion Task Force on Intelligence Activities, and has asked me to transmit to you the attached portions of the main report relating to matters of interest or concern to the Office of Special Operations, Department of Defense. é The President would like for you ta have a careful review made of the attached report and to submit your views with respect to it with- in sixty days. These views should include epecific comment on the recommendations relating ta the Office of Special Operations, indicating the extent to which these recommendations are deemed acceptable, and the intended manner of placing them in effect. Task Force recommendationa relating to a watch dog commission" and to a special commission on communications and electronic resources to be set up by the President area the subject of separate action, and need not be reported upon in connection with the present request. Te a Hehe age tm ue, 4 ! TR aA SaULAS SEFIED cn a oe a : ee yeh *. ie Z a ° ¥——__ Pate | we.
eet tk charge Lae get Peers MEE THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON THe ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT June 13, 1955 MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Subject: Report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities (Office of Special Operations) The President has received the classified veport of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities, and has asked me to transmit to you, as a matter of possible interest and concern to the Office of Special Operations, Department of Defense, the attached copy of Appendix I thereof, For your information, a copy of this Appendix has been transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence with a request that a careful review be undertaken from the standpoint of the USCIB and USCSB, and that coordinated views of interested departments be developed and submitted within sixty days. Task Force recommendations relating to 4 ‘watch dog commission" and te & special commission on communications and electronic resources to be set up by the President are the subject of separate action, and need not be reported upon in connection with the present request. TOL ALGITIE oy DECLASSIFIED vn eee es enntrngles S eae ce een aor £.0, 12005, S2e. 3-254 : eee ey 7ST / wee
te reenter tee os THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT June 13, 1955 MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Subjects Report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on intelligence Activities (Department of the Army) The President has received the claseified report of the Hoover Gommiseion Tack Force on Intelligence Activities, aad has asked me to transmit threugh you the attached portions of the main report Selating to matters of interest or concern to. the Department of the Army, The President would like to have a careful yeview made of the attached report frem the standpoint of the Dapartmngut of the Army and to receive comments with respect to the veport withia sixty days. These comments sheuld include specific sémarke concerning esch of the recommendations relating to the Department of the Army, and should indicate these recommendations which it is considered can and should be adopted (indicating far these the method ead tiring deemed eppro- priate for placing them in effect); the. Statement should also indicate any recommendations not considered ‘appropriate for adoption, to- gether with supporting reasons and. céanment, Task Force recommendations relating te a “watch dog commission" and to a special commission on communications aad electroaic resources te be set up by the President are the subject of separate action, and need not be reported upon in connection with the present request. ot at F  Wotlndidced ef od ANTI GIT awed Sos elegy ; . ; rotates EC. ill 0 fon ten - dawn Ce We 79> TAO irl neneen et mn Byes oS. Ste 2-44 -T po il fae
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT DECLASSIFIED E.0. 11852, Sec. It WASHINGTON June 13, 1955 MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Subject: Report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on latelligence Activities (Department of the Navy) The President has received the classified repert of the Hoever Commission Task Force on letelligence Activities, and hes asked me to trénsmit threagh you the attacked portions of the main report relating te matteré of interest or concern to the Department avy. The President would like to have a careful review made of the attached report from the standpoint of the Department ef the Navy and te receive comments with respect to the report within sixty days. These comments chould facluds specific remarks concern- ing each of the recommendations relating to the Department of the Navy, aud should indicate thove recommendations which it fs con- sidered can and should be adopted (indicating fer these the method aad timing deemed appropriate for placing them iu effect}; the atatement should also indicate any recommendations not considered sppropriate for adopticn, together with suppcrting reasons and com- ment, Task Force recommendations relating to a “watch dog commission" and to asepecial commigsion on communications and electronic resources te be set up by the President are the subject of separate action, and need not be reported upon in connection with the prssent request, _ gyre part \ MB TP-S LEY i Date afaifag
THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT June 13, 1955 MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Subject: Report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on. Intelligence Activities: (Joint Chiefs of Staff} The President has received the classified report of the Hoover Commission Task Force oa Intelligence Activities, and hae asked me to transmit to you the attached portions of the main report | relating to matters of interest or concern to the Jolat Chiefs of Staff, The President would like for you to have a careful review made of the attached report and to submit your views with respect to it within sixty days. These views should include specific comment on the discussion in the report concerning the Joint Chiefs of Stzif. Task Force recommendations relating to e ‘watch dog commission" and to a special commission cn communications and electronic resources to be set up by the President are the subject of separate action, and need not be reported upon in connection with the present request, DECLASSIFIED £.0. 11652, Sec. 11 By Lot Date 2faifrd
THE WHITE HOUSE , WASHINGTON THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT June 13, 1955 MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Svdject: Report of the Hoover Commission Task Force ca Intelligence Activities (Joint Chiefs of Staff} The President has received the classified report af the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities, and has sacked me te transmit to you, as a matter of interest and coucern to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the attached copy of Appendix f thereof. Ths President would ike for you to have = careful review mads of the attached Appendix ae it pertains to activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to transmit your views with respect to it within sixty days. These views should taclude specific comment on each of the recommendations relating to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, indicating the extent to which it is considered these can and should be adopted, together with the method and timing deemed appropriate for placing them in effect. Task Force recommendations relating to « "watch dog commission" and to a special commission on communications and clectronic resources to be set up by the President are the subject of separate action, and need not be reported upon in connection with the present request. DECLASSIFIED €.0. 11652, Sec. 11 tte ee ae ‘ : ; eevee eae pines ates: IME ay Va tent Date aff.
June 9, 155 ‘The last few days’ I had a chance to talk with leading isucus- trialists, bankers, and insurance people in Hartford, Connecticut, at Grow University, and in New York City. I found an almost uni- versal interest anony all shades cf opinion in these groups in the Hoover Comission reports and what the aduinistration was planning te do ebout thes. There has agparently been a very thorough job done of stirring up a really active interest among the members of the business commnity. . You probably noticed (what I have been told) in same of Mr. Hoover's comments yesterday that he feels thet there is con- siderable cvert and covert opposition to the proposals in the various Gepertments. ide probably thinks thet it is stirred up from the lower ranks. Actually there is strong opposition to same of the orcpos2is— by the very top of the departuents; for example, Mesars. Flemming end Brownell, as menbers of the Hoover Commission, have made sub- stantial and, in some cases, Tather strong dissents to specific recomendations in the reports. Secretary Humphrey and other Cabinet members have strong opposition to som of the recomendations. In order to accomplish our objective of optaining as mary positive supporting actions on the large number of recommendations that we can agree on and make sure that we bave an excellent record cn the points where we disagree, I think it might be helpful if you would mention at the Cabinet meeting tomorrow this situation and ask that <he replies that we eak for tn connection with circulating the reports to the dif- ferent povernuental Gepartnents be signed in al) future cases by either the Secretary or the Under Secretary and that where there is any sub- etantial and specific dissent or opposition the letter to the Budget Boreau reporting on these recommendations be signed by the Secretary ex the head of the agency. We shall move ahead ee rapidly as we can in pulling together as long a list of items that the administration can support as it is poasible to do, although there will ve some delay vecause of “Operation Alert® next week and becanse we are in the midst of pulling together the 1957 budget ceiling figures. Electrostatic reproduction mucue for preservation purposes by the @ieenhower Library for replacement of a deteriorating manuscript itea.
Sone Won ns { “THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON June 2, 1955 MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD Meeting in Governor Adams' office 11:30 AM, 2 June 1955 Present: Gov.. Adams, Mr. Allen Dulles, Colonel Goodpaster ’Mr. Dulles will have a check made of the individuals and allegations indicated in the attached memorandum and annexes (copy furnished him) and will provide a memorandum reporting findings and giving views in the matter as appropriate. -A. J/Goodpaster Colonel, CE, US Army CC: Mr. Allen Dulles
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THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT May 25, 1955 DETERMINED TO -BE AN ADEENET eT NS Dear John: By va ike, wate Thank you fer sending me the document resulting from the work of the Commission's Task Force on Intelligence Activities. It has been read for security. As might be expected, nothing deemed to be an unequivocal violation of security has been noted, but there are several pas~ sages having possibly adverse security implications to which further consideration might, with profit, be given, Except for one passage where rephrasing is proposed, the suggestion ie simply to delete cortain sentences or phrases, To facilitate your considera- tion, the deletions and the suggested rephrasing have . been indicated on the copy of the report which you eent me and which I am returning herewith. Sincerely, Mr. John B. Holiister Executive Director Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government DETERMINED TO BE AN Washington, D. C. ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING E.0. 11652, Section 1 ey KL me bate 57 7 Zs
a May 23, 1955 MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR ADAMS As action on the Hoover Task Force report on intelligence activities, 1 suggest that you (or I, if you wish) advise Mr. Hollister generally as follows: 1. Onthe basis of a reading of the report for security, it is felt that there are several passages to which further con- sideration should be given ~- one of these seems a rather clear-cut and unnecessary disclosure of information poten- tially valuable to foreign countries, and the rest appear to be of an "optional" character, in which the value to foreign countries of the information disclosed would have to be weighed against its value in terms of informing the American public. The passages referred to are: a. On page v, at the top of the page, a preferred ver-~ sion might read: "Two reports are submitted: one, | unclassified 1;, the other, classified TOP SECRET, with ' certain) &pp pendices which require special additional \ clearance. " (This is the "clear-cut" case referred to above. ) b. On page vii, the sentence in the first full paragraph beginning "Our effort to achieve, etc.,' which gives an indication of success attained in obtaining a steady and reliable flow of data, might be deleted. c. On page ix, in the second paragraph, the sentence beginning 'The information we need, etc.", which identifies Communist plans, progress and potential as intelligence targets, might be deleted, d. There are several references authoritatively identify- ing attachés as intelligence-gatherers of major importance. These include the second sentence of the first paragraph on page 7, the second sentence of the second paragraph on page ll, the second full paragraph on page 22; and the second and fifth sentences of the paragraph beginning at
the bottom of page 23. In addition, there is a similar identification of the Foreign Service in the last sentence on page 14, Fuso wth bs Jets lad. e. The recommendation concerning the NSA at the bottom of page 41 has the effect of giving emphasis to this agency in an intelligence context and might be deleted, 2. The outline of U. S. top organizations for intelligence; is undoubtedly one for which foreign countries would have had to expend a considerable amount of money to obtain -- and would still not have had complete confidence that it was authoritative. Some generalizing might be considered. _ 3. The reference to the "Under Secretary of Defense" on page - 40 might be changed to "Deputy Secretary of Defense." fas inintms ~~ rer, ' i * tn ee nement
THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON * THe ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT May 25, 1955 Sha, Ln ee et nce eee ne emamimenneseniacatenemmammal Dear John: Thank you for sendiag me the document resulting from the work of the Commission's Task Force on Intelligence Activities. It has been read for security, As might be expected, nothing deemed to be an unequivocal violation of — security has deen noted, but there are several pas- sages having possibly adverse security implications to which further consideration might, with profit, be given, Except for ons passage where rephrasing is proposed, the suggestion:is simply te delete certain sentences or phrases, To facilitate your considera- tion, the deletions and the suggested rephrasing have been indicated on the copy of the report which you sent me and which I am returning herewith. Stacerely, Mr. John B. Hollister Executive Director Commiseion on Organisation of the Executive Branch of the Government ape alED be Washington, D. C. M aking £.0, = B ee Seetion 1 y > Sle, Date Y76/Sp Receipt No, 357.
COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT May 21, 1955 “orriee gurLoine Ne WASHINGTON 25, D. G. MERE L Honorable Sherman Adans The Assistant to the President The White House Washington 25, D. C. Dear Sherman: Following our telephone conversation this morning, I am enclosing you the "Overt" portion of the Report of the Commission's Task Force on Intelligence Activities. This is the one, you understand, which will be presented to the Commission and when and if approved, will be filed with the Congress and given complete publicity. While we do not see anything in it which would seem to be a security violation, the Task Force has requested, and we concur in the request, that it be cleared before presentation to the Commission and we feel that in this. clearance, it should not be presented either to the Central Intelligence Agency or to the Department of Defense since they are concerned in it. You have kindly offered to attend to this clearance for us which we hope can be accomplished very quickly in order that we may take it up for Commission action. As you know, our Commission terminates automatically in a few weeks. Yours very sincerely, —He, A Werte - John B. Hollister Executive Director DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING. 3 E.0. 11652, i JBH 3 jws 0. 11652, Section 1 By <n nie, pate 8//L7F P.S. Let me know if you need extra copies of the Report. Enclosure JB.H. d CE Fe Sb EE OES
The recommendations discussed below are from Appendix I of the Task Force Report. The Department of Defense comments are supplementary to those submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence for the United States Commmications Intelligence Board (USCIB) and the United States Commmnications Security Board (USCSB), in which the Department of Defense in and the thres Services concurs "That the National Security Council direct USCIB to establish COMINT realities and consideration of capabilities of other intelligence sources. This operational guidance to NSA should te so clear and succinct as to require minimum interpretation by the Director, NSA, of what is required and its degree of importance. USCIB should be primarily concerned with end products and the Director, NSA, should determine the best way of pro- ducing the end product. If USCIB fails after a reasonable length of time to provide mors adequate guidance to the Director, NSA, then the latter _ phould be made a member of the Intelligence Advisory Comittes.* Department of Defense Position: v—— le Concur, subject to comment. - 26 Gonments It is doubtful that IAC membership for the Director, NSA, would solve the problems it would probably raise additional complications. OS ifazfy2' ASC 2fayty RORTIONS EXEMPTED . Ko. 12356, sec. 13 (ay(4 ) NLE pate _.3/ 4/44 In this connection, the Department of Defense considers that the present status and membership of the IAC give rise to ambiguity which this particular recommendation would only sharpen. The IAC is unique in being neither a policy nor an operational body, but a mixture of the two. This 4s the result partly of unforeseen evolution within the IAC, and partly . NAL of significant changes which have occurred within the Department of Defense since the IAC was established. ns Ss To the extent that the NSC intended the IAC to serve as a policy Ws ec} fy body, its Defense mambership (the three Services and JCS) is at once diffuse es > w and incomplete in that the Service representation is largely at an operating ee al & rather than a policy level and the Secretary of Defense is not directly ) represented, although ths JCS representative (Chairman, Joint Intelligence CAN 4 Committee) coordinates with the appropriate elements of OSD. On the other i i hand, to the extent that the IAC serves as a body concerned with the coordi- nation and formation of intelligence estimates and the coordination of w operational inteliigence matters, its present formaliced structure may not etc i ae eee eee oe awe cee ee ees cece ee ee wee eee e ns cee Smee ce wee sea eee emeamssatresesee® ewe e ree eee tovoeererecerereaer asses “> eee eee tet mone seessse esses eeee ee eet nn This document conpains . pageSe sO an Copy Ko. 2. of copies. Series ———-«. TAP-SEGP A.
eee eascasreteavesgeseeeseeeseee ere a a ee ee dd eaeeesteseoeoeaeanersenes be entirely necessarye The thre are suitable representation in this context, and although the Chairman, JIC, does not conduct operations, he is the appropriate indirect. representative of the Secretary of Defense for these matters. In its dual capacity the IAC works, but in an unnecessarily complicated and probably uneconomical context of differing levels of activity. mo, The Départment of Defense considers that a more desirable ultimate organization of the top structure of 0.5. dntelligence would involve a peepee single board with policy cognizance over all aspects of intelligence. The _— Secretary of Defense's representative would be an appropriate civilian official, compstent to act for him. Under this board would be several specialist committess te deal with operat‘: -al matters; one concerned with commmications and electronics intelligence and commmications security (as - pecommended by the Clark Task Force); another with intelligence operations; a third with intelligence production; and possibly others. Representation on these committess would be provided by the Service intelligence chiefs and other operators (such as the Director, NSA) when appropriate. The following main points summarise the views that are crystallizing in the Department of Defense on the general subject of intelligences 1. The Socretary of State and the Secretary of Defense mst assume final responsibility for guidance and control over all aspects of intelligence. 2. The Director of Central Intelligence as the actual executive agent must have adequate and clearly defined coordinative powers under the Secretaries of State and Defense. ‘ 3. National intelligence policy is under the cognizance of the inet iss National Security Council. However, because of the sensitive nature of important elements of intelligence, intelligence matters night most appropriately be dealt with by a Special Comittee of the NSC a («hich is now the case, to the satisfaction of all concerned, with ' - yespect to COMINT and COMSEC matters: the Seorsetaries of State and Defense, and the Attorney General for matters under his cognizance, with the advice of the Director of Central Intelligence, constitute the Special Committee of the NSC). ke The concept behind USCIB has proved to be the nost satisfactory solution so far in one important intelligence area. Appropriately modified, 1t ‘could usefully be applied to the entire intelligence The changes which this general concept would invol.ve do not require <cs + oan aloe Pas legislation. Internal reorgabization within the IAC and probably an . executive order to establish the new organization would suffice. The Department of Defense proposes to discuss this subject further with the Director of Central Intelligence and the Department of State, and hopes 4n due course together with them te arrive at an agreed proposal for sub- mission. ; “* saps ‘
RECOMMENDATION NO. 2 tfhat the Diractor, NSA, be given clearcut directives which will enable him to make mich greater and continuing effort to produce high- level commnications intelligences. This 4s of such great importance that monetary considerations should be waived and an effort at least equal :to | tf the Manhattan Project should be exerted at once.” . a Department of Defenss Position? © ase . SES , ba | With respect to that portion of the Recommendation advocating "an _ 5 wer ss ese rescence eoese ‘eo eeeee _ effort at least equal to the Manhattan Project" ........ seccsccccccvecece eeeaensee ‘a - -~se @ @ & 8 @ “g" “wee _ aed ceeee Tevvetssvevveetecssecss 4 the Department of Defends ‘considers same ——-—s—s eeeneen eee 0246 2 @ ea nenneet ansion on the USCIB coments is warranted. a rn @eeaeeeesaenes @esep@eeeneeaes eee @eoveee @esnuegeeeveaeseaeevneveeeeev eee @eeoeane were ee eee ee eensovess Terrcerrerree eee eee eee ee ee Comer eee meen esrasasoseeses eeneee @eeneanmeeaonovenes ed | eeeecee er a a re a ee ee ee re ee ee ee eee eee eee ee ee eee | eeeoeoeecaeeeveaeneoeeve eoeee eeococeaatse @et@eoeeeeeee eeeenoeaneeveaesveneaenevevn evens @eeeoeneesn onan oe esa av eane @evooaosp eeeespeeensvpeesveeeeneaesed eeonoeeeeepeaeeeveaavesrs eaten evnteae ad eeeeeoeeaoass oeseeoeneaeveen @o@eeseaaeaeeoed Ceres eeseseeeesnvoereseeses eeoreeracseos eoeeeee Pere ereeecen ee eenearsesnesensreses eeenees eorreeoeeeeee seas eenaesavevreseeeeeeesateanzaeeneans wmneeeneereerene easerenaneesore @eenee e eeeoeeoseceonaeeaneaeetceaneeessreneenenveaee orev eseeanvaseeseaneaevae te eoenoev an ee aeeoeeewoeteeeaeetasease eae . ra ar ee ee ee ee ee ee ee @veveseeesaasestesteseorssees's eoancee eeoserasseoe Coser oeseeenevevesene wee ere receee ee esacccee eeerreeece eee eee ee seeedl | @e@se@ee#e#e#eeoees #eesveaee¢ eeenvneeneeceeaacaevvneseee eevee eoeeveaoevneveevneevneaeseveaeeeeee eee Seeeenevaeeteeeevs ee #) eeeceenseasecevece errr ee ee ee eee ocosesevee Peers eecneanenseveves encase eosncacesees eeeceenaeeoeeseeeaevneeseeeecesceseeeeseeaeeee SOSH SS SEHR SoH EHS RHEE HEHAEHRHRSHRSHHESOHSSHSHEF HE HH HEHEHE OOH OS ev,ee Pee aeenaeecesvoeeerseevuevetreateanve eee @ecee@ eevee eveeeneseeaeneaeaeseeeeaeceaeteaveenanr ee nan asease @eoeee eeoeeaoneeoeoeeaaeseneneveeanenaenevneseeanetresee eee @eeseeeoee ese eeeoeptGorevoeeee eee eetasd ent eeeeens eeeoue i oeceove CROC Re RARE SEHSHEHSHHEHHETHTSE OHS EHRSC OER HEARSE BE EHE SHE SHHSHOHHEHOH OHH SHED ET HESeHEBH ASO er Terr Cert rere ee ee eee eee eee ee) Ce eecreseeaenaeseenaeecone eee ee reese aeeoeoen Coen reeseoeoes H eoeovnneeveeeeovneee een eaneeeseoe nae neaneaee @eeeoveeoeanegcea een eae ena eaoesoveeeteeaneneeeee ee eeteereeeeeeeane eee eee saesee eeeceseccve eeetcese COSCO S HBL HB EEDO LH EH HETERO OOES eeevcrce eee ee | eTrrrrrrrrrrrrerrrerrrrre eee eee eee eee eee eee eee eee ee eee @cersncna H eeceses POSE AESOOHESESSEOETEMEHROSHHC OR HEECHHO HEHE HOES EED Sommerer seceeesenaneerersevese COSCO S OHSS HHREHSEHSEKESESESH HEMET HEHEHE ESCH SHHEHER ERECT EHESERHEHAD EES Cones eecestevesoee Trrrrrrrrerrererererrer se eee eee eee eee eee errr rereree eee eee eee eee eee ee ee ee) CROMER HESEESEHSHTHESE EERSTE OHEHEHED EH OHHH EHH SEHR AEE HEH USER OB SEE EBSEO OS eee erereseeeczes rg @eespeasceaeewe eee onveereeoeaeneoceeeaeeneereeoaee se wpe toeoeveosone ewoeaeneevete esee@eaeoseeeeaeneaevnaeeaneeesereaee aeeonoee 3 . eee *@eecevestoovoeneeoveeeo ee aeeaeeoaes @etmaeeeeneoenaneaeaeaeaaae sree @eeoee@eonaeeeaeseasvp eevee eaeeoneenene a eae i everson eeaesasaavecen ever ceeseeresenve @evecveces eee eseveecrrvecy a@eeces er er er ered i Comes sere ccesreentaeaesves CO MOTHER SEHR EDS HHS H ASH HHA OHEEFOSTESE SH HEHEHE HE SO RERH EEO EEE HT ; 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and USCIB has recommended _ that this country undertake a maximm effort tor... sere see metts ty Seacsseesees a@eoeeeeeveeeeeeoeesreaaenseeeeaeonse See eeeeseoeravesse Tee anne“ SRmEE ene ana ~ ve. wancccncccceceeesesesesesees \ rev dhe Department of Defensa considers that: :.2:s sees sree SeeoeH eee eeoseoszesesesereenesseeeeee eeoveneaene ° eeesnean COCO HEHEHE CHES SHSHHR HOHE SHSHEHDHHASH SH HAETDHEHBEKLOHHEBSEHSES OTD AEE aoe . “as te-warrant’ the’ uli force of the government behind both projects. ~~" eee re RT rere ner + ~3~
——_ and COMSEC activities, an —_—— ee ee ee ee eee eee TTC eee oe en eeveersees zee evescese ‘ae eveaoeue eocevereaose eo ey RECOMMENDATION NO. 6. : tn Poe Tiler ned "That the Department of Defense carefully study the organisational structure and proper positioning within its respective services of the three cryptologic agencies ~ AFSS, ASA, and NSG ~ with a view toward improving their prestige and effectiveness, thereby strengthening their personnel assignment policies and logistical support." Department of Defense Position? . USCIB considered that this recommendation pertains to an internal problem within the Department of Defense, and has accordingly referred it to this Department, for comments . The Department of Defense has long recognised that high professional standards and opportunity for a rewarding career for military and civilian personnel engaged in the commmnications intelligence effort mst be ~ strengthened if we are to deal successfully with the increasingly diffi-~ cult technical problems confronting that effort. One means of achieving this objective is to constitute the Service cryptologic agencies as major coumar.dse ‘These shovld be subordinate neither to the intelligence nor to the commnications elements within the Services, but should in each case report directly to the chief of staff. Adequate recognition of cryptology as a mayor operational career field cannot be otherwise achieved. The Air Force eryptologic agency, the Security Service (AFSS), has rcimate: _ The A¥SS-ia responsible addition operated the Air Force's ground= , based ELINT stations and its 8SO (Special Security Officer) system for the dissemination of COMINT. ‘Largely because of its status es a major command, - the AFSS has developed a dynamic and promising program for recruiting, developing and holding on to technically qualified military career personnel. Until recently the Army cryptologic agency_(the_Axmy_Security Agency {ASA)) was responsible for COMINT production :::2iiis:iiiiiiiiji2t] and for COMSEC. It was subordinate to G-2. On 23 June 1955, the ASA was designated as a major command responsible to the Chief of Staff, with virtually complete cognizance over all Arny aspects of COMINT, COMSEC, ‘T, | - ELINT and commnications electromagnetic countermeasures (zeus. It 4s anticipated that this action wi}l facilitate development of an energstic Arny eryptologic career program paralleling that-ef the Air Force. The Kavy eryptologic activity, the Navy Security Group (ns), 4s not so constituted. It operates at a lower echelon and under divided 4ntelligence and communications cognizances The NSG dees not nominally have a commanding officer;it functions under the Chief of Security Branch who 4n turn reports to the Director, Naval Commmications. The responsi~ bilities of the NSG include COMINT production:::3:isscssiiiscssiitisie: o|- eoovceesean COMSEC, and ELINT, 2 —~*«ét eseee -he- EEE NE EE SEE ERE Ne NERF Wl ae OS Bd Tes he OZ Bd Ba Sd ba ar hs be BE Be he Oe Oe Fe es
ti RA ad he hk ek ee re 00 © © Ore et wm mm wae te eo ee we ow Peewee esreresseecsresrecvresseresrseccsecee twee eeresreresr ese eserecerssesseresresresan | Pee eeeresrrrssesesesersseasessseneos tircsssssese ssc cee ee ee The Secretary of Defense proposes in the near future to ask the ‘Secretary of the Navy to review ths placement of the Navy cryptologic organization to determine whether a subordination and structure more closely paralleling that of the Army and the Air Force might not be | Bdvantageouse RECOMMEND. MMENDATION NO. ‘That the military Services give greater attention te selecting officers for COMINT duties, assign reguler or ‘career? reserve officers to the maxima extent possible, indoctrinate officers in COMINT prior to sending them to command field stations, and establish career opportunities for specialists equal, to those of the line or general service:officers. Rotation _and replacement procedures should be 4mproved. The feasibility "It 4s also recommended that the Congrese enact legitation to suthorise the National Security Agency to employ specially qualified retired military personnel as presently authorized the Central Intelligence Agency and with no restriction on the number so amployed. Such legislation should also permit the Secretary of Defense to recall retired officers to active duty | with NSA and have those officers counted against the authorized strength of NSA but not of the respective military services." Department of Defense Positiont | The Department of Defense submits the following additional observations — 4in expansion of the USCIB comment on this recommendation. As set forth in 4ts comments on Recommendation No. 6, the Department ef Defense belicves that the establishment of major eryptologic commands in each of the military services will do much to promte the carver possibilities advocated in — Recommendation No. 7. Also, with the support of this s Department. tt the ne Army and NSA are already emoarked on a program to develop. .ciisiscs:cctccsece e@ecesceteovreenaeevnesvesense errererrer: st) Recently the Secretary of Defense endorsed a Wasy PrOpobht’ t @eneevesese With respect. to the © axploynent b by KSA of > specialty qualified 7 retired military personnel, the Department of Defense supports this proposal for NSA in principle as an element of the Department, but would exphasize that .the highest objective standards of professional ortechnical skill should be applied in hiring such persons, in order to avoid possible abuses which could seriously prejudice career civilian morales .. Ful consideration of the application of thie, proposal is currently in progress among personnel and legislative experts vathin the. Departmen’ of Defensa, a
THE CITADEL THE MILITARY COLLEGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA CHARLESTON, 5. C. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT March 9, 1955 Maj. Gen. J. G. Christiansen Committee on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government Room 4850, Gen. Acctg. Ofc. Building 5th and G Streets Washington 25, D. C. Dear Jim: Here is a copy of a letter to Senator McCarthy for your information. I will be seeing you on the 22nd. gncerely, Mark W. Clark MWC/spb Encl.
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RECOMMENDATION No. 8 ; "That the Secretary of Defense give further consideration to the allocation of an appropriate number of ‘super grades* and positions under Public Law 313 to NSAz to the posaibility of further inducements or higher pay to selected consultants; and to © privileges extended to civilians overseas," Denartment of Defense Position:. The Department. of Defense is supporting the efforts of the Director, NSA, to obtain additional super grades from the Civil Service Commission. Further, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Personnel) is seeking as a priority matter (within existing legtitation) to meet the request of the Director, NSA, for further inducements to selected eonsul- tants and privileges for civilians employed overseas. The consultant problem-is not confined to NSA alone, and the Department prefers te resolve it for NSa as part of an over-all Department of Defense solution. Such additional legislation as may be required to achieve these ) objectives is also, under coneideration. TOP-SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON 26 Manag 5 ME flu. 25 Mex, at Cae, Mirus! dirscfie. | mak Xk Wife Uh S Etja Phrorn, ciple te confents and bscuste! te hy eZee, E. he pedcdhedé Hf 16 waslef Borcaghle fo fel AF Atha Pattes  alguf rh re pecet fers ~ ¢, fb tek was fame ihef haf mies chen ever faved, — fh shoped ( becane of pa A exe Lt14 te Con SS Mn een palais, ef). He jie > Flfes has erlid A ke hyhn Wel x es fokK £9 awe. A anne
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va fee, CF ff by Mitey AS cm ajas/se Cy vf Be ft, Bh. Of Sf, ond OY a SOE wWatshy, 5 NLC Date... 7/20/69)... mo, ae fe p DECLASSIFIED f Authority VIX. ce By SECLE tT June 1, 1955 MEMORANDUM FOR RECEIPT SUaJECT: Case Files of Task Force on Intelligence Activities, Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Goverment. “il. List of names furnished General Mark ®. Clark by Senator Joseph McCarthy. - 2. List cf names eent by Task Force to the Federal Bureau of In- vestigation. 3. Report by Central Intelligerce Agency on names furnished by the Task Force. wl. Report by Depertment of the Army on names furnished by the Task Force. 5- Report by Department of the Air Force on names furnished by. the Task Force. 6. Report by Department of the Navy on nanes furnished by ths Task Force. . 7+ Report by Department of State on names furnished by the Task Force. 8. Report by Federal Bureau of Investigation on names furnished by the Task Force. “9. "Dead Man Case" furnished General Mark W. Clark by Senator Joseph McCarthy and Central Intelligence Agency's report thereon. -10. Paix et Liberte case furnished General Mark W. Clark by Senator Joseph McCarthy. Central Intelligence Agency's reply and memorandum from Colonel Herman 0. Lane, Staff Member of the Task Force. $200,000 allegedly lost by Central Intelligence Agency. This case was furnished General Mark W. Clark by Senator Joseph MoCarthy. Central Intelligence Agency's reply. a a a a ee ee 2 The case of [ILILIIIIiiiiiiniiimic scectetigsiripiiipii furnished General Mark W. Clark by Senator Joseph HeCarthy. Letter frou David S. Smith, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force to General 3. G. Christiansen, dated 25 April 1955, with enclosure. (Air Force Contract No. AF 33 (038) 12909, withHarvard University? Analysis of the Soviet Social System.) \ i
AS f < ( <: <, Ry +. ° Memorandum for Receipt -2- . Cr) se ccc cece este ees tees eeeeeeetsce sce lelelllbliliaihiiiLlnhehnininy ec cciiiitccttiice: pe ee ee he ee wwe ee ae eee eee eam w anne cane eee sa tacnieccccceccccance ee ee ee ee Cee mee reas ee He sereninsaersennranccercaceceuaeuccar pleco lac ccccc ccs cecewcee cr ececccee sees cceceerereesscscseaccscncces ee cetiiiiiiiiiig: eeeiriiiiis: ti. eoeeeves e ee a a 2 a lee enee . Copy of lstier fron General Mark W. Clark to General Nathan Twining, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, dated 23 Mey 1955. “13. Copy of letter from Alfred Kohlberg to Senatc> Joseph McCerthy (copy furnished General Mark W. Clarzx.by Mr. Lohiberg-) Report by CLA on the case, dated 16 March 1955. “lj. Final Eeport of the Select Committee to Bonduct an Investigation end Study of ths Facts, Evidence, md Circumstmces of the Katyn Forest Kassacre, pursuant to H.Fes. 390 and H.Res. 539 {82nd Con- gress) I certify that I have received -the above listed docuxents from Colonel John J. Diwbelde, U.S. Army, Retired, Deputy Staff Director, Task Force on Intelligence Activities, Commission on Organization of the Executive dgranch of the Government. ; . oe sO
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RECEIVEO OF © DOCUMENTS RECEIPT iw Leone DATE JREGISTER NO. |: neral J. G. Christiansen Ty le. 12 APR oa | i _ Securi ty Status - 3 pgs, 2 cys 12 APR i. eecteast! > ececcwia Lined oles rigs YE SIGNATURE Pleese aign and return dmwediately aa this receipt is necesaary to close our records. FORH (Formerly DA 1 Noy 50 63 BA AGO) REPLACES AGO FORM O1404, 2 WAY 50, WHICH WAY BE USED. GPO: 1882 O- 221508
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY April 6 » 1955 ia DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE WASHINGTON Dear Mr. Christiansen: I refer to your letter of March 30, 1955, which re- quests information on employment and security status of certain individuais. Records maintained at Headquarters USAF do not indi- cate that any of the individuals named in your letter of March 30 are now or have been employed in any headquarters activity. As you are aware, the maintenance of civilian personnel records is decentralized to the various field. operating agencies. . refore, in conformity with the agreement made by Captain Knight of your staff and Colonel Paul H. Crews of our Office of Special Investigations, no effort has been made to check any of the many civilian personnel offices in the field in connection with your request. For this reason, it is not possible to furnish conclusive informa- tion as to present or past employment of these individuals in any of the various USAF operating elements not directly administered by Headquarters USAF. In view of the above, the Department of the Air Force 4s unable to furnish security information as requested by you. Sincerely, yng. Re FREDERICK AYER, JR. Special Assistant to the Secretary Mr. J. G. Christiansen Staff Director Task Force on Intelligence Activities Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government General Accounting Office Building Washington 25, D. C.
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ae H 26 January 1955 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Dead Man Case The following is the true story which was apparently the basis for the "Dead Man Case" item. , Mr. Howard Louis JAMISON, Jewish, entered on duty with the Training Office of CIA on 1 October 1951. He was to be a lecturer and his first lecture was to be given on 22 October 1951. Since his subject was one which required the use of libraries and facilities outside CIA (such as the Library of Congress) he was given twelve days (from 10 October 1951 until 22 October 1951) to do outside research and collect materials to be used in his lectures. This plan and the materials he would collect and the research he would do had all been carefully gone over in Training Division prior to 10 October 1951 when Mr. JAMISON last talked to Training Division officials. Mr. JAMISON was living at the YMCA in Washington and YMCA officials (and his personal papers) had no data or knowledge of his CIA employment. These were correct security precautions which Mr. JAMISON had taken. YMCA officials only knew (and could only find in his papers) his home address in Springfield, Massachusetts. On 11 October 1951 Mr. JAMISON died in his room at the YMCA of natural causes (heart failure) and the YMCA immediately notified his family at his home address in Springfield, Massachusetts and they (because of the Jewish custom) immediately took the body home for burial services, CIA did not know of his death until he failed to show up on 22 October 1951. When he failed to appear on 22 October 1951 for the scheduled lecture the Training Office immediately called the Security Office and they learned all of the above on that date. aoe — * Be ee ani me 2 hye? af pe, By A) pate ¥/ 7 /,
-2- There were no Security breaches by JAMISON or his family. Mr. Robert BANNERMAN (Deputy Director of Security, CLA) advises that the case waS quite properly handled in every aspect and Training - Division was not blamable in any way for actions taken, This is simply a case of an employee having had very few friends in CIA and having been on a'task which (for twelve (12) days) allowed him to do independent research in libraries outside CIA and having quietly died while on this tside duty ou Sl e u ee ewe ee eeoeeoeoeeve eee e see 7 Yee va ene eeeravneceeseaseanseeoes ae ewnene: loc ewer se wese escent wee eee tees ones leacerveseseseenenseenseseeesesneasne een eeeeaee leew ccc rc e rare mene ee ween eeesas lew ween eeeeresreesneevreeeereriseveven- a ee ee ee ee ee er ee poe nce e weet een cere weeneee cae foccr cece rece ccceeeneereeces eee [reese eee ne eee esc n wees enw eeeee pee ce cee ec ec eae cece ew enee Pec ee ce eww ee eee sees eeeeevesese eevee eeteeaeseese sean eae eenwe PORTIONS oecyiecrs rr i a er ers ence eee . re, ee ee ere eeeceoe ee ee ee E.6. 12565, con tes G game et ee wcnne eee ene en seee-: ne ‘ Sec w cece ww eens NLE Date. 4172/6 | ‘LA bebe f
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| Seber 26 January 1955 MEMORANDUM SUBJECT: $200,000 Allegedly Lost by CIA in Germany in 1948-49 This story is not correct. A cursory review of financial and oper- ational records in 1948, 1949, 1950 (and subsequently) for the Division ° covering Germany has been made; and personnel who were in Germany and/or are in a position to know of any such loss as that indicated have been asked for anything they can recall of a loss of official funds. Among enna ee i al ee eee ee eee esener essere seevreseressserreae wees ececceseseteaeeneeeeeaeeseeesr eserves eee ns stated the story is not true. ee ee In addition to the above, there is the obvious error in date. lecetctt: oe: creiiettttarrived in Germany in April 1951 and neither of the two (2) others. named PItllLLLiiLiltiiliiliniihiiiniiiiiiiiiil lt was in Germany during eer rere neces e een aes esreueesrerenesererven ee % wees eet e mer eee eee ea eeresesewreseseesaeesrer” The first OPC representative in Germany WaSssliiiiiisisss “CEILIDIIDIIIi i there are some unresolved questions regarding his finances ‘ and Some of his accountings but there is no question which should give rise to any story similar to'$200,000.00 being lost by CIA", RSLLLILiLiiiiiniiiiiii who is presently in Washington, states he arrived in Germany !!121:71in late August 1950. He has never heard of any loss of (or even any questions about) $200,000 and is certain that 2 g he would have heard of it if it had occurred in 1949 (prior to his arrival). rs He states he knows no loss of official funds occurred while he was in = et jososecooe ——— ub CUNT fe ew we ees ad Jesesseees nan? eee eceovveaznenaneserevnocweeeeeee aeeeeaeaeaanzneoe eee e@necsesrseeoveseevreeaeaanee eee @eeoevueve vee Qs | chtescescecss saeeeee ce eee ee eee PSeeeeTeeeeT TTT TET EE :. os ees st coeee reece cere ee a eseeseonwnaaee aan oreo Cs wSiiiiiiiin: They have, therefore, not been questioned about this allegation x Prerererrers oR Arr sence eceoseess _. oss eh tee ewer ereeeereereresessrereeene® - f: te ee a a i i eae if 4A SEDPDIIIIIIippitiisescorn , ! THe /ClAr - al Auihorily Wad
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Air Force Contract No. AF33(038)12909 with Harvard University Analysis of the Soviet Social System The Contract Mission: On 1 dune, 1950, the Human Resources Research Institute of the Air University Command, entered into a contract with Harvard University whereby its Russian Research Center would undertake to gather information about the life experience of the Soviet people and the institutions which control their behavior by interviewing ex- Soviet. citizens, to integrate the interview data with such other sources of data on the Soviet Union as are available and pertinent, and to syn- thesize the resulting information into a “provisional working model," or analysis, of the Soviet social system. Specifically, the research is intended to: (1) Describe and analyze the components of the Soviet social system the people, their key institutions, and the way institutions and people interact; (2) Indicate the strengths and weaknesses of the system under given conditions; (3) Develop a series of inter-related statements or propositions about the structure and function of Soviet society as a total systen, in order to provide a basis for more accurate predictions as to the prob- able behavior of the system under specified conditions, especially under conditions of internal stress or external force, and consequently to provide a basis for Air Force policy and planning in regard to the Soviet Union. This predictive device, as described above, is termed the Working Model of the Soviet Social System. Cost and Current Status of the Project: This contract was initiated 1 June 1950 and terminated 30 June 1954. A no-cost extension was granted to 30 September 1954. The total cost for the contract was $908 thousand. At the present time the Air Force monitor of this project is the Air Force Personnel and Training Research Center, Air Research and Development Command. The Project has been divided into four phases each of which were accomplished in approximately one year: Phase 1, Collection of data. During this period, interviews and questionnaires were completed in Europe and in this country. Phase 2. Processing. Materials were translated, content examined, topically organized, and tabulation commenced.
Phase 3. Analysis. This phase was concerned with the completion of coding and tabulation, and the preparation of analytical reports on special topics. Phase 4, Completion of Analysis and Conclusion. All special reports, summary reports and prediction guides are being completed and forwarded to the Air Force monitor. Completion of work in this phase is being accomplished by Harvard University without additional cost to the government. Results of this contract have been used by various staff offices of the Air Force, by the Army and by CIA through published reports, reference to project files or through briefings presented by Dr. Clyde Kluckhohn, formerly director of the Russian Research Center.
HARVARD UNIVERSITY Facutty or Arts anp Scr=NcEs Orrice oF THE Dean 5 Unrversrry Hau. Camarince 38, MassacHusetrs May 5, 1955 General J. G. Christiansen Staff Director Task force on Intelligence Activities Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government General Accounting Building vlashington 25, D. C. Dear General Christiansen: Your letter of April 2 addressed to President Pusey has been referred to me for revly. I am able to inform you that Professor John K. Fairbank (not Fairbanks) did not participate in the work done by the Russian Research Center of Harvard University under Air rorce Contract No. AF 335(038) 12909, Very truly yours, Tiras — Grn cy McGeorge Bundy Dean
Dr. Nathan Pusey, President, Narvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts My dear Dr. Pusey: Under the Comission on Organization of the Executive 3ramch of the Government, the Task Force of which General Mark W. Clark 4s chairman, has been engaged for the past few months in a survey of Federal intelligence activitivs. In the course of this work, a wide variety of information has been made available to the Task Force, some of which is insufficiently complete to permit proper appraisal of its worth. , Of the nature of information mentioned above, is a statement conceming Air Force Contract No. AF 33(038) 12909 with Hervard University. The Task Force has been advised that the Hunan Resources Research Institute of the Air University Command entered into this contract with Harvard University on June 1, 1950, whereby its kussian Research Center would undertake an analysis of the Soviet social system. It is understood that this contract terminated June 30, 195k. The additional information needed by the Task Force concerns whether or not Mr. Jom ik. Fairbanks participated in this contractual effort. Your coopsration is requested to the extent of advising whether Mr. feiraanks was employed by the Russian Research Center during the term of the contract referred to, whether he took part in the work involved in that contract, and the inciusive dates of such participation. A brief statenent as to the nature of the work per~ formed by “r. Fairbanks would be helpful. In order that this information may be available to the Task Force when it next assembles for deliberation on May 12, 1955, an early reply ia requested. ‘Thank you for your assistante in this Very truly yours, J. G. Christiansen Staf? Director
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7: .. . J NATION'S BUSINESS - MARCH 1955 Kremlin wants SP ce ot a ES C2 SO Russian s udy F Sent Seay eas “are fed up with terror tactics of Red regime: oy (By PAUL HENCKE | aa MALENKOV's resignation as Russia’s premier and his replacement by Bulganin will mean little change in Russia's over-all strategy. This is the opinion to be drawn from a four year study of communist power and weaknesses which the Russian Research Center at Harvard Univeysity has just completed for the United States Aiy Force. An exclusive interview starting on page 26 sum- marizes the most important findings of the study. Some of the conclusions are heartening to the cause of freedom. Others seem to justify the darkest of doubis about the future. Air Force evaluators describe the Harvard material as “the most thoroughgoing and extensive examina- tion of national life in the Soviet Union ever under- taken by western scholars.” Their enthusiasm is warranted. The study—begun in 1950 and completed last Nov. 30—provides our government with an X-ray picture cf the many forces at work in Soviet society: of a regime shaken by ideological controversies and conflicting personal ambitions yet unified by communism’s historic drive toward world conquest; of a people weary of the burdens thrust on them by totalitarian masters yet NATION'S RUSINESS-: MARCH 1955 © avoid al eveals. The c Soviet Union hel d slim, although many Russians 1 l-out war, Air Force || hances of revolt in mesmerized by communism’s promise of a better life: of an economy capable of eauipping a mammoth. modern war machine yet pathetically ineot in its efforts to supply consumer goods to the citizens of the Soviet. The basic contents of the study are the accounts which Russian people themselves have given of their day-to-day life. Harvard’s research teams conducted hundreds of oral interviews with Russian emigres in Europe and America during 1950 and 1951. This information was augmented by thousands of question- aires filled out by Soviet escapees, special reports written by former factory managers, Communist Party officials and others, and papers prepared ex- pressly for the Project by American experts on the Soviet Union. In its unprocessed form the Harvard data exceeded 33,000 pages. Specialists working under the super- vision of Dr. Clyde Kluckhohn, director of the proj- ect for Harvard, integrated this information, and fun- neled the end-product into the Officer Education Re search Laboratory at Maxwell Air Force Base, Mont- gomery, Ala. There two Air Force intelligence specialists, Dr. 25
Herman J. Sander and Edmund O. Barker have been working the data into final shape. Their work will not be completed unti! some time this summer. The study covered many aspects of Soviet life reaction to German occupation, Soviet policy toward national minorities, the arrest system, attitude of the man-in-the-street toward the regime, the role of the | -- factory manager, and so on.” pase bho. : The final report was. written by Dr. Kluckhohn in cooperation with two staff assistants, Drs. Alex In- keles. and Raymond Bauer. It bears the wordy _ title, “Strategic Psychological Strengths and Vulner- abilities of the Soviet Social Svstem,” but amounts, in fact, to a simple summing-up of all that was learned during the four years of exhaustive research. It is in .this volume, too, that Harvard's Russian experts pre dict what Russia’s next moves will be. ' The thoroughness of the scholarship which went into this study is illustrated by the special compe- - tericies of Drs. Kluckhohn, Inkeles and Bauer. They are, in the order named, an. anthropologist, sociol- ogist, and social psychologist. Also included on the + project research staff were historians, economists, "8 political scientists, clinical psychologists, students of +4 Russian literature and other Fecognized experts on oo ‘the USSR. ”- Sixty of the former Soviet Citizens interviewed were. _given clinical psychology tests designed to reveal to the researchers the innermost workings of the Soviet mind. _ ‘Special care was taken i in all phases of the research to insure against biased opinion. . The interviewees were both men and women, but -. men predominated. Most were in their middle years. - Many of them were carried out of Russia as im- pressed laborers by the retreating Nazis during World War II. Others left-Russia in the immediate pest- war era. Some got out as late as 1950. No significant differences were noted i in the atti- udes expressed by those Russians brought out of _ their homeland by the German Army and those who left later. For this reason the research directors believe that they obtained a portrait of Russian so- ciety as it is today, as well as ten or 15 years ago. The average Soviet citizen, in other words, has been much the same person since about 1940 and probably won't change much in his basic attitudes in the foreseeable future. The interviewees made up a cross-section of work groups—housewives, students, Red Army and Com- munist Party officials, farmers, doctors, lawyers—and included .members of many disparate national groups —Armenians, Byelorussians, Georgians, Great Rus- sians, Ukrainians, and so forth. Many had been active, loyal supporters of the regime right up to the tirne they left Russia. ‘Few couid be labeled as “social failures’ and their testimony challenged on that basis. Certain themes recurred often during the four years of fact-finding: agriculture is a very weak cog in the Soviet machine (Harvard's researchers call the peasant-farmers the “angry men” of the Russian pop- ulace); many Russians dislike, even detest, the re- gime yet like and support such communist devices as state ownership of the means of production and the concept of the welfare state; there is little chance that the Party and the regime will be overthrown. What prompted the Air Force to have this research performed? The answer is simple. 26 Nations are interrelated ae Hy Le a . <* a social * systems of great complexity i jiodern * world, and the impact of air weapons i in uizy Future war will go much beyond the physical damage which can be accomplished. po taat Since the definition of a target system has expanded _and the potentiality of weapons has changed, it has = become necessary to consider factors, Previously ig- - In the case of the Soviet ‘Uition and its 21 213, 000, 600 people, this has necessitated turning social science methods to the description and analysis of f the, basic components of the Soviet system—the”pecple, their ; ,key institutions, and the manner j in'y ich istitutions . sand People interact. | a ae SS Fe tad site or The report gives the ‘Air Force new ‘analyses of the people and of basic institutions of the Soviet system —analyses which will have particular: value ‘in stra- . tegic planning. “ss | > Fi LATE GR : _ Considerations of strengths and weaknesses 0 Soviet system, loyalty and disloyalty . of the people, or any other social vulnerabilities; provide a’ realistic framework within which Russien capabilities can be measured. ares Le” ae : Whether at policy levels, in training programs, or in the hands of Air Force research experts, this study greg” ’ brings te each a more penetrating view and under- __ Standing of the USSR as it exists today. 7. te "To. draw out the significant findings of the ‘Air ¥orce-Harvard study, Navion’s Buspvess interviewed “Edmund O. Barker, the Air Force official most fa- * miliar with the Harvard material. ‘Mr. Barker’s answers are based solely on the con- . tents of the Harvard Project. . : INSIDE RUSSIA How will Malenkov’s resignation affect future moves by the Soviet government? Changes in leadership were expected by the Proj- ect. Barring profound crises (as might occur in agriculture), the outlook is for relative stability and continuation of substantially the present system re- gardless of “palace revolutions.” Wilt Malenkov’s resignation affect the validity of the Project findings? No—not at all, because the Project was primarily concerned with basic, largely unchanging, aspects of Soviet life, institutions, and people, rather than with the changing fortunes of leaders at the top involved in the struggle for power. These fundamental ele- ments in Soviet national life are continuing: They weather crises and outlive leaders. NATION'S BUSINESS- MARCH 1355
sea BOON HS nae a Nee aes ™ ~ ents et i Bd wy “Voluminous Sovtet study is discussed by’ tt “Albert L. Betz, Cot. Myron F. “Barlow, Dr. Herman J. Sander, and Edmund Oo. Barker “Jrom left, Lt. “Col. ture of Soviet society. Air Force will use the Project’s findings to plan strategy it will use in event of war It is evident that the changes in leadership (Ma- lenkov’s succeeding Stalin, Beria’s execution, Malen- kov's “resignation,” Bulganin’s accession—and to- morrow possibly Khrushchev) have not significantly changed or improved life for the Soviet masses. To + the contrary, as successive leaders promise more and deliver less (that is, failure in consumer goods and agricultural programs), they may be significantly adding to popular discontent. What forecasts can be made, using the Project findings? A continuation of the cold war is expected for the next five years at least. All-out war seems unlikely. The struggle for power among the top leaders of Russia will continue. This is almost inevitable in the Soviet state unless a genuine change in the nature of ARON BUSINESS- MARCH 1955 the system occurs. The trend toward managerial bureaucracy may give the “committee” type of dic- tatorship a greater chance of stability in the USSR than many westerners are likely to predict. . What direction is Soviet over-all policy likely to take in the next five years? The Soviet regime appears to be clearly committed to stabilization and consclidation both at home and abroad. Industrial productivity is to be heightened, the morale of the population improved, and the pres- ent position in Europe is to be maintained but not extended; expansive activities are to be centered in Asia and in “colonial” regions generally. Two extreme possibilities are completely discarded: breakdown or continuation of the Soviet system’s de- velopment without any change. 27
INSIDE RUSSIA conn Project spokesman Barker thumbs through final report. Study cost Air Force more than $900,000 Are the | Russian people likely to reveit against the regime? -. No. There is scant evidence for the view ‘that more than a very tiny part of the Population would take “appreciable risks to sabotage the regime or to aid western democracy. “What changes did the Project research indicate might occur in the Soviet system? Changes will be evolutionary rather than revolu- tionary, and possibly in one of the following main directions, or some combination of them: 1. Gradual reversion to “Stalinism,” especially if a single leader attains unquestioned supremacy. 2. More emphasis on national bureaucracy, that is, greater control by managerial technicians than by Party ideological zealots. 3. Reversion to certain traditional, pre-Soviet pat- terns with strong development of Russian or Pan- Slavic nationalism and imperialism. 4. Gradual movement in directions likely to change —everitually—the essential nature of the Soviet system and to make possible stable acccmmodation with the West. What is the present over-all strategy of the Soviet leaders? They want to consolidate their internal position and exploit the weakness of the non-Soviet world by prop- aganda, diplomacy, fifth-column movements, and local rebellion, while waiting for the processes of his- tory to produce Lenin’s predicted decay of capitalism. The immediate causes of this policy seem to be a combination of the increased strength of the West, andre accentuation of internal difficulties in the What does the present foreign policy of the USSR appear to be? It is, to a significant degree, two-pronged: 28 : aD 4’ One prong, - ironically encugh, involve ‘sontain- i ment” of the revived strength of the West by ying to obstruct French ratification of EDC, German rearma- ment, stirring up old hostilities between Germany and France, dividing the United States and Great Britain on China policy and 80 on. Increasing emphasis is placed on “intra-imperialist” conflicts and upon the allegedly disastrous eventual consequences of “internal contradictions” in western economies. “There seems to be a rather definite decision—at least for the immediate future—to let our western sys- tem fall to pieces through its own internal dynamics, and with a certain minimum amount of nonmilitary facilitation on the part of the Soviets. - The other prong, of course, is a continued policy of nibbling away at the choicest of the overripe colonial morsels: Indochina is the latest victim, but others in Asia and Africa are _Presumably on the list. What does the final report hav. ve to: say about the Soviet program of “peaceful, cooxistence?’” “The Soviet attitude toward “coexistence ”? ig that it is tolerable as a temporary state of affairs. It is clear that the present leadership intends to cooperate with the free world only to the extent that this will ad- vance the eventual Prospect ¢ of a completely commu- nist world. eon the 286 Ran is the Soviet regime ‘committed at home to a policy of relaxation of internal rules? SOVIET CITIZENS’ VIEWS OF AMERICA This is how the majority of Soviet citizens view America and the West: America {and the capitalistic Wast in general, but to a lesser degree} is aggressive and bent on world domination. This propaganda point has been established by dissociating the Amer- ican government from two symbols which Soviet citizens still value: the American people and Franklin D, Roosevelt. The Soviet press insists that the U.S, government and its foreign policy do not represent the people. ... America is respected for its technology and its material power, The goal of overtaking and surpassing American production was a Soviet slogan from the beginning of the First Five- Year Plan... . Capitalism is a decadent socio-economic sys- tem which survives only by exploitation of the workers and under the artificial stimulation of armament production. . . . The standard of living of the rank-and-file citizen of western countries is lower than it is in the Soviet Union... . Americans are materialistic and lack spir- itual values. (These criticisms came overwhelm- ingly from intellectual émigrés.) . . . Westerners are soft ond can't take it. eta: All people are not treated alike in Amer- ica, Certain racial and ethnic groups are dis- criminated against. NATION'S BUSINESS- MARCH 1955
etter pommems J“ $70,000,000,000 national income, $1,500,- _#1,$00,000,000 “FOR PROPAGANDA Saat ee” : The ‘importance « of propaganda i in the Ussr :.is indicated by the budget. In 1950, out of a 000, 000° went to propaganda | activities. Foon The ‘Soviet | Union ‘has some . 6,000 special - fecal schools, in addition to regional and na- . fional schools, for training propagandists. , Trainees come from every port of the world to . attend these schools. ° ee S 4. ‘ _ Soviet ‘propaganda hos ‘sought to reverse > certain stereotyped propaganda images. Our ‘- mental picture of the Bolshevik, who was always "a heavily bearded figure sitting on a huge pile Al < of bombs with a hammer in his hand and a ~~ sickle in his teeth, has now been picked up-by “. the Soviets for their own use; they have Uncle *. Sam. sitting on an enormous pile of atom and . hydrogen bombs with a Coca-Cola boitle i in. his mouth. : . To propagandize Soviet factory workers _ on the exploitation and.‘enslavement of workers in America, a film was shown concern- . ing Go police-striker fight in Detroit. In the fight- ing,.some white and Negro workers were injured and had to be carried on stretchers to waiting ambulances. As the injured were carried past the camera, feet first, the Soviet factory workers noticed that the American workers wore shoes without holes in the soles. Word quickly went around that the picture was a fake. : Yes. The rulers clearly want better internal morale and various improvements. At the 1954 Supreme - Soviet, Malenkov and Khrushchev complained about the standard of labor discipline, the quality of out- put, and the rate of increase in productivity. The Soviet leaders are indeed facing a dilemma, but we must not be guilty of easy optimism as to the out- come, In the first place, we must remember that a little sop can go a long way in the Soviet system. Expectations are low and there is also still sufficient belief in the reality of “capitalist aggression” te make the people satisfied with small concessions. What other forecasts are found in the final re- port concerning the future of the Soviet system? 1. An improvement in the standard of living and a slackening of the tempo of development, accompanied by an easing of rigid administration and intense ter- ror, could effect a substantial and perhaps a profound reorientation of the population toward the regime. 2.” As time goes on, the role permitted rational tech- nical bureaucracy in running things within the limits of set policy will increase, and such technical consid- erations may come to have more effect on the actual direction of policy. 3. Concerning agricuiture, the authors of the finai report are convinced that the regime will not give up the collective farm system, and this will remain a source of friction, tension, and lowered production. What does the final report forecast for the fu- ture of the USSR? . NATION'S BUSINESS-MARCH 1955 In short, the best prediction for the short-run is that, at the worst, the present regime may revert to Stalinism, and at best it may become a more popular, or at least less resented, but no less totalitar- ian government. In neither case do we anticipate that ‘either the long-range goals or the strategy of Russian foreign policy will be greatly changed in the next decade, al- though there may be some modifications of tactics and methods. Whet has the Project to say about Soytet ‘society in general, and the emergence of @ managerial bureaucracy in particular? ee oR! Whe oo "It is certainly true that there has been sunie crucial 7 crystallization of Soviet society. A new kind of _ bourgeoisie has become accustomed to relative lux- ury. Social stratification is more rigid. The decrease in social mobility has lessened a certain kind of vital dynamism which characterized Soviet society for ‘a long period. An intrenched group has strong vested interests in the status quo. There is a conflict between two conceptions: the old ideal of party asceticism, and that of “the rich new life.” However, in spite of some tendency in the direction of managerial bureau- cracy, the ideological element in communism weighz USER. a very rapid bureaucratic dominance | in 1 the USSR : (€ the factory-manager class emerges as a powerful group in the USSR, would this lead to a “raanagerial revofution?”’ Far from seeking great changes i in the ‘industrial system, these key managerial personnel want to main- tain it in its present form. They have a ‘considerable stake in its continuance through high salaries, siz- _able cash bonuses, production rewards, better apart- ments, and other special privileges attaching to high position. Within the factory system, they seek to re- duce interference from the center-—that is, Mos- cow-located ministry chiefs—and to’ make the system work more smoothly. ae Will you explain what is implied in the Project reference to the fact that Soviet people have built-in “mental radar?“ Living in a country where a slip of the tongue may land you in jail, - (Continued on | page 48) RUSSIA'S WORKING FORCE The approximate urban population of Russia in 1953 was 86,000,000, with 124,000,- 060 living in rurei areas. Agricultural work claims about 55 per cent of the Soviet labor force. The labor force is about 110,000,000 people. This is about 75 per cent of all people, male and female, 15 years of age or older. Half of the total Soviet labor force is women, Some 60 to 65 per cent of all women over the age of 15 are employed. In agricultural employment, women hold 60 per cent of the jobs. In the nonagricultural economy of the USSR they hold half of the jobs.
THEY BUILD ATOM’S ROAD By PHILIP GUSTAFSON OF Dean Ralph A. Sawyer (left) and Prof. Henry J. Gom- berg with model of $1,500,000 Phoenix Laboratory TWENTY-FIVE-THOUSAND believers in private enterprise have bought themselves a share in the atomic age. These sharehoiders range from house- wives to industrial giants like General Motors and Ford whose contributions run into seven figures. Among them, they have piled up $7,500,000 to help find peacetime applications of nuclear energy and to study its effects on society. These 25,000 have made cash gifts to Phoenix Proj- ect, the pride and joy of the University of Mich- igan and its students, alumni and friends. Phoenix Project is the only organized non-government opera- tion which attempts to come to grips on a comprehen- sive scale with the problems atomic energy creates. It lives by the grace of private donations alone; yet in 30 Phoenix Project started as a me- morial to University of Michigan war dead. Now this research center—dedicated to peaceful uses of the atom and financed wholly by private enterprise— has become a “light high in the sky for future generations” peacetime research it ranks with the country’s great nuclear laboratories—Brookhaven, Argonne and Oak Ridge—supported by government funds. Phoenix is not a‘foundation, nor an institute. It is simply a project, run by deans and professors who also carry full-time academic schedules. It is kept going by teachers who conduct its research without additional salaries. In five years, Phoenix has grown until it consists of nearly 100 research projects; it permeates practicaily every division of the university and virtually every department of human knowledge. Phoenix sprang into being after Hiroshima as a memorial to University of Michigan war dead—a means of turning the destructive potential of the bomb to human benefit. From the idea of one Mich- NATION’S BUSINESS- MARCH 1955
What Russia Wili Do Next (Continued from page 29) or in Siberia, the people have be- come sensitive observers and evalu- ators of other persons. Friends, associates, colleagues—all are given a@ careful appraisal and size-up in order to assess the risk in such contacts and associations. The net- work of regime informers is report- edly large, and interestingly re- plenished by petty thieves, prosti- tutes and criminals who, in ex- change for their freedom from jail sentences, must become “neighbor- hood spies” for the regime. Additionaliy, the “block system,” which holds each member of a group responsible for the actions of all the other members of his group, helps to keep the average citizen extremely chary of close contacts with others. What are the main social and psychological weaknesses of the Soviet system? The system is vulnerable: To an increase in the people's correct. knowledge of the outside : world. To situations where the reachable elite, especially the military elite, feel a conflict between patriotism and their loyalty to the regime in power. To actions by the United States, whether of an economic, military or psychological warfare nature, which are unexpected by the Soviet lead- ership, and hence disturbing to their confidence that their calcula- tions about us are sound. . To clogging of the decision-mak- ing process at higher levels. To the risk that a purge campaign initiated at the top may become a run-away affair like that of the mid-1930's: To exposure of weak links or in- consistencies in its ideological ar- mor. To substantial increases in the discontent, in the Soviet population, and perhaps even more to abrupt alterations in the tightening and telaxing of pressures upon the people. How does the regime maintain stability? The stability depends upon ela- borate machinery for reporting and suppressing deviant behavior. This machinery includes the secret pol- ice, informer networks, Communist Party snoopers, government inspec- tors, and the like. 48 a Do the people get away with anything in the Soviet system? Yes—to the extent that the re- gime feels that such actions con- tribute to the success ef programs! Since much of the citizen’s extra- legal activity is actually necessary to the functioning of the system, no institutions are run completely ac- cording to the book, and an un- stable balance is worked out be- tween the application and evasion of the means of control. How does the average citizen get along in the Soviet system? The rank-and-file citizen learns to apply complicated techniques of accommodation and evasion to car- ty on his daily affairs and to main- tain himself in reasonably success- ful or at least untroubled adapta- tion to the regime. Do the people resent the Soviet ¢ leaders or the Soviet system? - 4 . Their hostility is toward the re-  gime—the actual people in power— ‘rather than toward the system. -{Even those who are violently anti- «Soviet favor state ownership of ¥ means of production, and other in- & 'stitutional features which are as- ! sociated with socialism. What general features of So- viet life are most intensely resented by the people? The low standard of living, the excessive pace of everyday life and the threat of arbitrary political re pression. } $3 3 s . What organizational feature of. the Soviet sys: em is most hated? The collective farm system. The Project interviews contained strik- ingly little complaint about the fac- tory system other than dislike of harsh labor discipline laws. For example, repeated tardiness means &@ prison sentence. Millions of people have been arrested by the secret police at one time or another. How has this affected their attitudes? Being arrested has little effect on @ person's general social and politi- cal attitudes and values. The indi- vidual does not generalize his ex- Pperierice to the point of revising his judgment concerning the kind of society in which he lives. Arrest, however, does increase his hostility to the regime. . Furthermore, arrest-—whether his own or that of a family member— makes him anxious about his own future, and thereby increases the probability of his leaving the Soviet . Union voluntarily if the opportun- ity arises. Does discontentment cause the individual to put less effort into his job? The degree of dissatisfaction with, or even disaffection from, the system § does not necessarily detract from the energy with which a person does the job assigned to him. The 4 disaffected person often does his job well, and in fact may work with a little extra energy, either because he feels he has to prove himself or be- cause he finds comfort in his work. The fact that the Soviet system tends to produce dissatisfaction in its citizens does not in itself mean that it gets less effective work from them. 7 THE PEOPLE SPEAK Types of criticism permitted in the Soviet press (mainly in the form of letters to the editor): The Palace of Culture of the Novo-Tagil Metallurgical Plant has “dressing rooms so small that it is impossible for an actor to put on his make-up.” The Teacher's Garette, the official journal of Soviet teaching, published this criticism of Comrade Komarova, a geography teach- erin the 264th school in Moscow: “In discussing Rome, the capital of Italy, he never mentioned a word about the reactionary role of the Vatican! The Turkmen Iskra of August 20, 1954, published this criticism in its letters to the editor column: “At the Vorovsky rest home (a health-vacation resort for workers), it was announced that the hot showerbath was working. This was a great event for the guests. However, it was impossible to take a bath since the water came up to one’s knees in the shower-room.’’ NATION’S BUSINESS- MARCH 1955
a0 hg te ATL ORT PIRE ee = - s ot 5 . On whet does the stability of the Soviet system rest? The stability of the Soviet sys- tem involves a nice balance between the regime's powers of coercion and the adjustive habits of the Soviet citizenry. The stability of the sys- tem and of the people’s loyalty de- pends to a high degree on the citi- zen’s own belief in the stability of that system and on his having 1 no alternative but to adjust. Are the non-Russian nationalities in the USSR the most dissatisfied? Not at all. People in the same social group, peasants, workers, em- ployes, intelligentsia, hold essential- ly the same attitudes and values regardless of nationality. The na- tionality element is sometimes strong, but more often it is latent and seems to be only a secondary contributing cause to disaffection. What did the Project find out about the peasantry which con- stitutes about 55 per cent of the Soviet labor force? The peasantry is the outstanding- ly disaffected group in the popula- tion. Further, the peasants’ hatred of the institutional form of the col- lective farm is generally shared by all social groups. The collective farm is revealed as the most whole heartedly opposed of all Soviet eco- nomic and social institutions. How does the regime indoctri- nate Soviet youth to be good communists? Mainly through state-controlled education and also through the ubiquitous communist organizations for youth: the Octobrists for ages 8-11, the Pioneers for ages 10-15, and the Komsomol—Communist Youth League—for ages 15-23. Are Soviet young people likely to become disaffected as they mature? NATION'S BUSINESS-MARCHE 1955 No. Although there is a period of crisis, when the individual reaches maturity, in the relationship of youth to the regime, only a small minority actualiy turn against the system because of disiliusionment. In most instances, they are able to reconcile the conflict in their feel- ings toward the regime. The young- er generation is coming to accept as natural many aspects of Soviet life and the Soviet system that the older generation rebelled against. How aware of the outside world are the Soviet people? Ignorance and distorted views of the outside world are deeper and more widespread—even among the intelligentsia—than heretofore had been realized. How does the regime control the radio programs heard by the Soviet people? In several ways. Some foreign programs are jammed to prevent their being heard. In addition the radio system is almost completely (80 per cent) based on wired speak- ers. ‘These are speakers wired to a central control station in the city instead of individual tube or aerial sets. The regime has been largely successful in keeping foreign broad- casts from reaching the population and in putting into the communica- tions network its own propaganda. How classless is Russia‘’s class- less society? Anything but! Soviet society is highly stratified into classes some- what similar to those in western in- dustrial society. In theory, the class system is open—a person can rise from one class to a higher—and such movement has actually been extensive. However, certain ave- nues are blocked for those of bour- geois family background and for many others whose close relatives have been proscribed as enemiies of the state. How have the Soviet people fared at the hands of their rulers? Supported by their ‘belief or claim that they are executing the wili of history, the regime has been ruthless in handling people. Little is thought of enormous physical suffering, and even loss of life if, by these means, appropriate geals are fet be advanced. Cnly when bad morale is believed to affect produc- tion or even to raise the threat of disorders does the regime relax the pressures. 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RUSSIA continued What features of Soviet fead- ership receive widespread ap- proval? The people like the purposeful- ness, the activism, and the steady looking to the future. Have the Soviet leaders de- veloped among the elite a cen- siderable proportion of people of an externally disciplined and driving character? To a certain degree, this has been done. However, even in this group the underlying personality of these peoyle often seems to continue to conform to the traditional Russian characteristics familiar in literary and historical sources: ~ Violent psychological ups and downs. ; Need for warm personal relations and for a firm place in the group. Unwillingness to compromise. Passive resistance, only occasion- ally marked by violent outbursts, to strong and arbitrary authority. Vitality and spontaneity alternat- ing with melancholy and apathy. Mixed attitudes toward foreigners. These are traits which continue to characterize the personality of the rank-and-file Russian. How do informal adjustive mech- anisms contribute to the opera- tion of the Soviet system? These are the many evasive, quasi-legal or illegal actions of Soviet citizens which are most criti- cized in the official press and generally regarded by western ob- servers as signs of weakness. They include: ‘“‘scroungers”; “five per- centers”; “the Tolkach” (a supply expediter); blat -(the reciprocation of favors and the use of personal influence to obtain illegal advan- tages); the “web of mutual sup- port” (collusion between manufac- turers and government inspectors) ; simulation of required output; 50 hoarding supplies; padding esti- mates; concealing reserves; under- reporting output. These activities are actually ad- vantageous for the system, helping to keep it from bogging down in its own red tape. The research has _ provided a strong realization of the mechanisms importance of informal in the operation of a society that on the surface appears and pretends to be highly centralized, controlled, and rationalized. Does the regime tolerate inde- pendent clubs, labor unions, fra- ternal orgenizations? No. However, “localism”-—which is the tendency for local loyalties to develop and for iocal interests to be advanced over those of the re- gime—has a more important status in the Soviet scene than it had been accorded heretofore. How do the people fee! toward their native land? The depth of their loyalty: to the Motherland is an outstanding senti- ment in all classes irrespective of religion, political attitudes, and of personality structure. This is cou- pled with a genuine fear of foreign aggression. These sentiments are strongest in the heartland, but pre- vail pretty generally. Does Soviet propaganda de- mand mere than conformity from the people? Yes. The Soviet propaganda ma-:, chine does not limit itself, as most other systems of political propa- ganda have done, to the technique of reiteration, hammering in, and to the suppression of complaints and disturbing information. It in- sists upon positive action from the people. It is true that incessant profession of faith is the prerequi- site not only of personal security but also of advancement at school, in work, and in every sphere of life. att To conform, at least outwardly, is necessary for survival . .« ° But the regime wants more than conformity; it wants not so much belief, in the sense in which Chris- tians would use that term, as active support of the Party as the trust- worthy custodian of all the funda- mental doctrinal questions, The individual can so comply by active- ly propagating and carrying out the Party program and ifs concrete demands. What is the significance of ide- ology in the Soviet regime? Enormous stress is put on ide- ology both as a doctrine and as a practical instrument. The operat- ing ideology of the leadership at any given point in time is kept re- markably consistent. The more formal total theoretical system has, in fact, undergone change through time, but much effort is expended to rationalize these. changes and preserve the appearance of con- tinuity and consistency. There is good evidence that communist ide- ology affects the thinking and the acts of leaders and of other intelli- gentsia who grew up under the Bolshevik regime. Bo the Soviet leaders carry on a constant battle against oppo- sition elements? Yes. Both because of their ad- diction to rational planning and be- cause of their conviction that “everyone who is not completely for us is against us,” the ruling elite have made great efforts to stamp out growing centers of independent power and communication in the Soviet system. Their success, how- ever, is incomplete. Is the Soviet terrorization of the people an integral part of the system? Yes. Terror and forced labor are well known communist instruments of power. They are primarily goal- achieving tools, rather than sadistic methods, as in the Nazi case. The motivation behind their use is dominantly political—that is, elimi- nating opposition to the regime, through economic utility, as send- ing prisoners to work the uranium mines—is exploited. What is the regime‘’s attitude toward the little piece of private tand allowed the peasant? As a sop to the serious resistance to forced collectivization, the Col- lective Farm Statutes of 1935 al- lowed each farm household a pri- vate plot varying in size from two thirds to one and one fifth acres. The regime has tried to whittle NATION’S BUSINESS-MARCH 1955
ee eee . ” -~ ry dawn these pt'vate holdings, partly to free more labor for communal work, partly to increase the peas- ant’s dependence upon the proceeds from the collective farm to which he belongs. The leaders have a still more fundamental distrust of pri- vate agriculture because, in Lenin’s words: “Peasant small-scale production breeds capitalism and a bourgeoisie —every day, every hour—by a natural process and on a mass scale.” Collective farms take up 85 per - cent of al! agricultural land in the USSR, and another nine per cent is organized into state farms. ts the agricultural system cur- rently in crisis? Yes. According to the Russian leaders themselves, during the period 1940-1953 when the popula- tion of the USSR increased by 15,- 000,000, there was a total decline in grain acreage of 3.5 per cent of the prewar average. Food production is the lowest and the average Soviet diet the smallest and poorest since the First Five-Year Plan came into force in 1929. The numbers of beef and dairy cattle in 1953 were less than the total in 1916. Whet are some of the central and repetitive patterns of be- havior of the Soviet regime? Overcontrol, overconcentration, and overcommitment. As to over- commitment of resources, the lead- ers tend to undertake a massive program in such a way that every conceivable resource, including critical reserves, must be totally in- volved. Alternative policies, how- ever, are more nearly ready for im- plementation than would appear on the surface. Can the Soviet regime complete- ly disregard the wishes ond welfare of the peuple? NATION’S BUSINESS: MARCH 1955 TOMORROW'S ROADS eeewhat will they be like? Road building and maintenance nearly stopped in depression and war years, but the search for safer, more durable and economical pavement went right on. The Portland Cement Association has played a major role. One project consists of roads built more than ten years ago with different cements and concrete mixtures as part of the highway systems of New York, Missouri and South Carolina. Purpose: to test weathering effects in various climates. Already this field experiment has shown conclusively that air-entrained concrete (containing billions of tiny air cells) eliminates damage caused by freeze-thaw cycles and chemicals used to melt snow and ice. Result: a safer, longer-lasting, lower-annual-cost pavement. Developments like this from PCA's continuing field and laboratory work help make toforrow’s roads @ benefit to all Americans, who pay for them with license fees, gas and other taxes on private and commercial vehicles. PORTLAND CEMENT ASSOCIATION 33 W. Grand Ave. i A notional organization to improve and extend the uses of portland cement Chicago 10, Iil, ? and concrete through scientific research and engineering field wark
RUSSIA continued No. Since the individual is the most flexible resource of the Soviet system, the regime is necessarily concerned with the morale of the population—not as an objective in itself, but as an unavoidable pre- Tequisite to economic production and military readiness. How does one get ahead in the USSR? A citizen’s social class and his oc- cupation largely determine both his opportunities for advancement and his attitudes toward the system. Social position is more important than such factors as nationality or previous arrest in affecting his hoe- tility toward, passive acceptance of, or active support of the regime. Is discontent in the USSR the same as disloyalty? No. Although there is a great deat of popular dissatisfaction, there - is only a relatively small amount of disaffection and disloyalty. So- “viet escapees and DP’s left little doubt about the extent to which most of them were unhappy about many aspects of their lives in the USSR. But these same interviews indicated that most of the citizens of the USSR feel helpless in the face of the power of the state and desire only to live peacefully—to keep out of trouble, to do nothing that would bring them to the at- tention of the secret police. is there a difference between the psychological make-up of the Soviet leaders and the people? Psychologically, there continues to be a great gap between the So- viet masses and the elite. The masses remain rather close to the traditional literary picture of Rus- sian character. They are warm- hearted, impulsive, given to mood swings and contradictory in be- havior. The goal—and to some ex- tent the attainment—of the elite is the rather puritanical “new Soviet man”: disciplined, working steadily and consistently, subordinating per- sonai conduct and motivation to the requirements of Party discipline. What evaiuation did the Project make of the nationalities prob- lem? Nationality feeling undoubtedly still exists and is of genuine im- portance in a number of groups within the USSR—Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Georgians, Armeni- ans, the Moslem peoples, and so on. However, while ethnic minorities 52 represent something like half or more of the total population of the Soviet Union, their power is not proportionately great. Second, the minorities by no means present a united front; on the contrary, they have their own frictions and jealousies. Third, individuals from the minor nationalities occupy a dispropor- tionately smali number of power positions in the total system. Fourth, the minorities are being rather rapidly Russified. In general, nationality groups feel the same resentments toward the regime and the same dissatis- factions with the system as other citizens of the USSR, ° although they may feel- them somewhat more intensely. Do the intelligentsia of the USSR enjoy a favored position? Yes, even though they are sub- ject to closer surveillance than are rank-and-file citizens. They run greater risks of punishment and more extreme demands are put upon them. Yet they are also the favored beneficiaries of the system. Which class fares worst of ail under the Soviet system? The peasants. What can the regime do to en- kance its Position among the people? Leaders of the present regime can gain very solid popular support if they supply more consumer geods and better housing, ease up on the terror, make some conces- sions to the peasant, and somewhat relieve the frantic pace at which all the population has been driven. What is the present situation of the military clique in the USSR? The military is a key group. The relative prestige and power of mili- tary leaders have netably ine creased—and is further enhazced by Bulganin’s accession to premier. They have greater capabilities for independent action than do any other group in the Soviet Union, save the Communist Party. Méili- tary leaders, on the whole, have had a little more experience with the West and tend to have a more real- istic estimate of its power. They are more trusted by peoples of the Soviet Union than any other power echelon. While virtually all officers above the grade of captain are mem- bers of the Party or Komsomol, it is likely that patriotism will prevail over the regime or ideological com- . mitment among most senior officers in « crisis situation. What is the greatest weakness of the Soviet system? The fact that the Soviet system violates so many interests of its citizens in achieving state goals that the regime cannot rely on their loyalty. What is the chance that @ revo- lution will wreck the Soviet sys- tem? There is little likelihood that the Soviet dictatorship will crumble from its own faulty structure within the immediately foreseeable future. Nor do we anticipate an internal revolution other than possibly, a change in the personnel of the rul- ing clique. What are the chronic failures of the Soviet system? The prolonged depression of the standard of living; the unrelenting pace of industrialization; the con- tinued unchanged operation of the despised collective farm system; and the ever present threat of ter- ror. Did this study cover attitudes and conditions in satellite coun- tries? No, the Harvard Project was cenfined to the USSR, and in par- ticular, to three aspects of national life in the Soviet Union: the day- to-day life of the people; the struc- , ture and functioning of basic Sceviet ’ institutions (family, education, in- dustrial system, political life, com- munication system, popular behav- ior, professional life, etc.); and the interaction of Soviet people and Soviet institutions. How seriously do the Soviet leaders take communist dac- trine? The communist ruling elite take ideology and indeed philosophy NATION’S BUSINESS- MARCH 1955
OE rere ieee 1 . a“ seriously.¢u' a degree that is difficult for a mid-twentieth century west- 2) erner to comprehend. Soviet news- y//- papers and journals contain a great (s ] ~ deal on these abstract subjects. - These widely publicized utterances : e. oO leaders , of course, are R f of the leaders also, of coune, ero | OW MOOT FEPpairs to which the leadership is involved in and concerned about every as- | with TROPICAL'S new maintenance pect of Soviet life. Why is cyclical behavior one of system for industrial, the most distinctive operating . “fas characteristics of the Soviet sys- commercial buildings tem? The long-range goals of the lead- ership are highly stable. From a shorter-term point of view, there have been enough sudden alterna- tions between rigidity and flexibili- 4 ‘ ae ty and between two drasticaliy con- a g — trasting courses of policy and ac- tion, to warrant designating cycli- cal behavior a distinctive operating characteristic of the system. This is well illustrated by recent stress on consumer goods and then the ab- rupt repudiation of this program. in view of widespread dissatis- factions among the people, what accounts for their loyalty to the system? The loyalty (in practice) of most of the population of the USSR arises primarily from belief in the stability of the system and the con- viction that one has no alternative but to adjust. —ND FREE BOOK shows how 90% of leaky roofs can be Saved; cut costs in half with unskilled labor! You can save a great deal of money in roof repairs by sending for this free hook “Saving Old Roofs.” Roofing men of long experience wrote it. They have been responsible for the formulation of Business To Guide. ontrols Planning. improved roofing materials and developing modern recondi- tioning methods. (Continued from page 46) e : carry dut the proposed emergency It shows there are no “trade secrets to good roof repair. By stabilization operations / / following this simple step-by-step manual, your own labor force does first-class repair work on any type of industrial roof. It shows how leaky roofs can be given added years of weather-tight life, saving the high cost of a new roof. It covers every detail of repair. Do you \think this brgparedness work can ae be successful? I don’t wercan get wider Even if complete roof renewal is necessary, it shows how your own rocogmnon ne fa¢t that the gov: employes or men without experience can do a fine job at great ing drawn into\ this field in case of savings with Tropical's Cold Process Roofing! real emergency-yif we can achieve an increased an tanding of the GET YOUR COPY NOW! Sent only to owners or manag- problems and /limjtations—and if ers of industrial or commercial buildings, “Saving Old Roofs” we have enough i ext, patience is FREE upon your business letterhead request. Write today! and forebearance—then I would be : : . : inclined to feel useful work could TROPICAL PAINT COMPANY, 1134-1286 W. 70th St., Cleveland 2, Ohio be carried © I presume might seem appropriate dient if afi emergency did arise. I suggest, however, that re- sponsiblé government could. do nothing/-therefore, it might ‘well pay to. give the subject thoughtful attention even though we hope it will not become relevant. eno PARKER RUST PROOF COMPANY NATION'S BUSINESS-MARCH 1955 53