Ill 
Y  '--7 /V 
July   12,    197 1 
NUMBER 
Department  of  Defense  Directive 
SUBJECT      Activities  of  DoD  Intelligence  Components 
that  Affect  United   States  Persons 
References:       (a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
(f) 
(g) 
(h) 
(i) 
(3) 
(1) 
(») 
(n) 
Executive  Order  12036,  "United  States 
Intelligence  Activities,"  January  24, 
197B 
Foreign  Intelligence  Surveillance  Act 
of  1978,  Pub.  L.  No.  95-511 
Posse  Comitatus  Act,  18  U.S.C.A. 
§  1385  (1976) 
26  U.S.C.A.  S  6103  (1976) 
Presidential.  Directive/NSC-9, 
March  30,  1977 
DoD  Directive  1000.17,  "Department  of 
Defense  Personnel  Assigned  to  Duty 
•Outside  the  Department  and  Supporting 
Non-DoD  Activities,"  May  31,  1977 
DoD  Directive  5030.34,  "Agreement  Be  twee: 
the  United  States  Secret  Service  and 
the  Department  of  Defense  Concerning 
Protection  of  the  President  and  Other 
Officials,"  July  11,  1977 
DoD  Directive  5030.49,  "Customs  Inspec- 
tion," September  23,  1971 
DoD  Directive  5105.42,  "Defense  Inves- 
tigative Service,"  July  19,  1978 
DoD  Directive  5100.23,  ^Administrative 
Arrangements  for  the  National  Security 
Agency  ,*  May  17 «.  1967 
DoD  Directive  5100.82,  "Inspector 
General  for  Defense  Intelligence, " 
June  30,  1976 
DoD  Directive  5200.27,  "Acquisitioi^  cf 
Information  Concerning  Persons  ana 
Organizations  not  Affiliated  with 
the  Department  of  Defense," 
December  8,  1975 
DoD  Directive  5210.64,  "Alternate  Joint 
Communications  Center  Protection 
Program,"  November  6 ,  1978 
DoD/FBI,  "Agreement  Governing  the  Conduc- 
of  Defense  Department  Counterintelli- 
gence Activities  in  Conjunction  with 
the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation," 
April  5,  1979
A.  PURPOSE 
This  Directive  implements  Executive  Order  12036  and  the 
Foreign  Intelligence  Surveillance  Act  of  1978.   It  provides 
the  authority  under  which  Department  of  Defense  intelligence 
.and  communications  security  components  may  collect,  store  or 
disseminate  information  about  United  States  persons. 
Procedures  previously  approved  by  the  Attorney  General 
are  hereby  superceded  except  procedures  approved  pursuant  to 
Presidential  Directive/NSC- 9  (ref.  (e) ) . 
B.  APPLICABILITY  AND  SCOPE 
This  Directive  applies  to  all  intelligence  components  of 
the  Department  of  Defense.   This  Directive  applies  only  to  the 
intelligence  activities  of  Department  of  Defense  intelligence 
components.   It  does  not  apply  to  law  enforcement  activities. 
C.  DEFINITIONS 
Terms  used  in  this  Directive  are  defined  in  enclosure  3. 
D.  POLICY 
1.  The  intelligence  activities  of  the  Department  of 
Defense  that  involve  United  States  persons  are  implemented 
•taking  account  of  the  paramount  importance  of  the  protection 
©f  the  constitutional  rights  and  privacy  of  the  American 
people.   In  approving  activities  under  these  procedures, 
responsible  officials  shall  ensure  that  information  concerning 
United  States  persons  is  gathered  by  the  least  intrusive  means 
possible. 
2.  Executive  Order  12036  requires  the  Department  of 
Defense  to  promulgate  procedures  for  carrying  out  certain 
kinds  of  intelligence  activities  and  for  use  of  certain 
information-gathering  techniques.   Procedures  that  require 
approval  by  the  Attorney  General  have  been  submitted  and 
approved  in  accordance  with  the  Order.   These  procedures 
are  set  out  in  enclosure  1,   Procedures  that  require 
approval  only  by  the  Secretary  of  Defense  are  set  out  in 
.enclosure  2.   All  DoD  guidance  with  respect  to  Executive 
Order  12036  is  consolidated  in  this  Directive. 
3.  The  procedures  set  out  in  enclosures  1  and  2  contain 
restrictions  and  prohibitions  on  actions  by  or  on  behalf  of 
Department  of  Defense  intelligence  components.   These
restrictions  and  prohibitions  are  to  be  interpreted  strictly. 
No  intelligence  component  may  request  or  otherwise  encourage, 
directly  or  indirectly,  any  person,  organization,  or  govern- 
ment agency  to  undertake  activities  restricted  or  prohibited 
by  these  procedures. 
4.  Violations  of  Executive  Order  12036  or  of  this 
Directive,  whether  intentional  or  unintentional ,  shall  be 
reported  promptly  to  an  inspector  general  or  general  counsel 
with  responsibility  for  the  DoD  intelligence  component  where 
the  violation  occurred  or  to  the  Inspector  General  for  Defense 
Intelligence.   Prompt  reporting  will  help  curb  errors,  correct 
mistaken  interpretations  of  the  Order,  eliminate  or  prevent 
activities  that  are  illegal,  and  provide  helpful  oversight 
within  the  DoD  system. 
5.  The  procedures  in  enclosure  1  do  not  authorize  every 
DoD  intelligence  component  to  engage  in  every  intelligence 
activity  regulated  therein. 
E*    RESPONSIBILITIES  AND  FUNCTIONS 
1.  The  head  of  each  DoD  intelligence  component  shall 
ensure  that  the  requirements  of  this  Directive  are  followed 
scrupulously . 
2.  The  Secretaries  of  the  Military  Departments  shall 
provide  for  implementation  of  procedures  that  permit  issuance 
of  warrants  by  military  judges  by  making  the  necessary  arrange- 
ments for  availability,  scheduling,  and  security  measures  of 
military  judges. 
3.  The.  Inspector  General  for  Defense  Intelligence  shall 
provide  a  central  focal  point  for  contact  with  and  reporting 
to  the  Intelligence  Oversight  Board.   Reports  by  general 
counsels  and  inspectors  general  shall  be  forwarded  to  the 
Intelligence  Oversight  Board  by  the  Inspector  General  for 
Defense  Intelligence  together  with  appropriate  additional 
information  or  comments.   The  Inspector  General  for  Defense 
Intelligence  shall  review  the  reporting  system  periodically 
in  order  to  reduce  paperwork  and  administrative  burden. 
4.  The  Department  of  Defense  General  Counsel  shall 
provide  a  central  focal  point  for  contact  with  and  reporting 
to  the  Attorney  General.   Requests  for  Attorney  General  approval 
shall  be  forwarded  to  the  Department  of  Defense  General  Counsel 
for  coordination  prior  to  transmission  to  the  Attorney  General. 
The  General  Counsel  is  responsible  for  interpreting  this 
Directive  (and  the  procedures  in  Enclosures  1  and  2) ,
Executive  Order  12036,  and  the  Foreign  Intelligence 
Suveillance  Act.   The  General  Counsel  shall  consult  with 
the  Attorney  General  where  significant  new  legal  issues 
are  involved. 
~    5.   The  general  counsel  and  inspector  general  with 
responsibilities  for  each  intelligence  component  shall 
monitor  the  oversight  system  within  the  component  that 
is  intended  to  detect  and  prevent  violations  of  Executive 
Order  12036  and  this  Directive.   Reports  of  activities 
that  raise  questions  of  illegality  or  impropriety  shall 
be  forwarded  to  the  Inspector  General  for  Defense  Intelli- 
gence.  The  general  counsels  and  inspectors  general  shall 
provide  such  other  reports  or  information  as  the  Inspector 
General  for  Defense  Intelligence  may  require. 
F.  •   IMPLEMENTING  INSTRUCTIONS 
No  implementing  instruction  with  respect  to  this       y 
Directive,  Executive  Order  12036,  or  the  Foreign  Intelli-   •   v^ 
gence  Act  of  1978  may  be  promulgated  without  clearance  by 
the  Department  of  Defense  General  Counsel.  \„ 
G.  EFFECTIVE  DATE 
This  Directive  is   effective  immediately. 
Secretary  of  Defense 
Enclosures  -   4 
1.  Procedures   approved  by  the 
Attorney  General  and  the 
Secretary  of  Defense 
2.  Procedures  approved  by  the 
Secretary  of  Defense 
3.  Definitions 
4 .  Classified  Annex
Encl.  1 
PROCEDURE  1.   COLLECTION  OF 
INFORMATION  ABOUT  UNITED  STATES  PERSONS 
Sec.  1.   Applicability  and  Scope 
This  procedure  governs  the  means  that  may  bo  used  and 
the  kind  of  information  about  United  States  persons  that  may 
be  collected  without  their  consent.  These  limitations  apply 
regardless  of  the  means  used  to  collect  the  information  and 
they  apply  to  the  collection  efforts  of  all  DoD  intelligence 
components.   These  limitations  do  not  apply  when  the  infor~ 
mation  is-< — 
available  publicly; 
collected  with  the  consent  of  the  person 
whom  the  information  concerns; 
about  persons  or  organizations  that  do  not 
qualify  as  United  States  persons;  or 
,   collected  for  law  enforcement  purposes. 
•Sec.  2.   Definitions 
The  definitions  of  the  following  terms  f  set  out  in 
enclosure  3,  are  applicable  to  this  procedure: 
agent  of  a  foreign  power 
available  publicly 
clandestine  intelligence  activity 
commercial  organization 
consent 
contact 
contractor 
corporation 
counterintelligence 
counterintelligence  investigation 
DoD  intelligence  component 
employee 
foreign  intelligence 
foreign  power 
.   intelligence  community 
,   intelligence  method 
.   intelligence  source
international  terrorist  activities 
law  enforcement 
law  enforcement  authorities 
lawful  investigation 
narcotics  production  or  trafficking 
•  .   personnel  security 
personnel  security  investigation 
physical  security 
physical  security  investigation 
reasonable  belief 
.   United  States  ■  * 
,   United  States  person 
"Collection.   Information  is  not  "collected"  by  human 
intelligence  operations  until  it  is  communicated  by  an  employee 
to  an  entity  of  the  intelligence  community  by  filing  of  reports 
or  other  means.   DoD  intelligence  components  operate  offices 
that  conduct  liaison  with  foreign  governments  on  behalf  of 
United  States  government  .agencies.  When  passing  information 
between  such  agencies  and  foreign  governments,  these  offices 
will  be  considered  to  have  "collected"  the  information  (for 
which  they  are  a-  conduit)  only  if  an  office  stores  the  infor- 
mation or  disseminates  the  information  within  the  intelligence 
component. that  operates  the  office. 
Where  consent  to  a  particular  collection  activity  is 
implied  on  the  basis  of  adequate  notice  that  a  particular 
action  (such  as  entering  a  restricted  area)  presumes  consent 
to  an  accompanying  action  (such  as  search  of  briefcases) ,  the 
adequacy  of  notice  implying  consent  should  be  determined  by 
the  General  Counsel  of  the  intelligence  component.   Signifi- 
cant questions  as  to  adequacy  of  notice  in  particular  cases 
shall  be  referred  to  the  DoD  General  Counsel,  who  will  consult 
with  the  Attorney  General  where  significant  new  legal  issues 
are  involved.
Cooperating  sources  in  this  context  means  persons  or 
organizations  that  volunteer  information  to  DoD  intelligence 
components,  or  provide  information  at  the  reguest  of  such 
components.   These  include  government  agencies,  law  enforce- 
ment authorities,  credit  agencies,  academic  institutions, 
employees,  foreign  governments,  and  others  who  provide 
information  on  a  voluntary  basis.   Inguiries  made  of 
cooperating  sources  must  include  identification  of  the 
Department  of  Defense  or  a  component  thereof. 
Sec.  3.   Policy 
The  Department  of  Defense  collects  information  about 
United  States  persons  for'  foreign  intelligence  and  counter- 
intelligence purposes  only  when  necessary  to  the  conduct  of 
intelligence  functions  assigned  to  the  Department.   The 
collection  of  information  is  limited  carefully  to  avoid, 
where  feasible,  information  not  necessary  to  the  conduct  of 
these  functions.   Collection  is  accomplished  by  the  least  . 
intrusive  means  that  will  provide  foreign  intelligence  or 
counterintelligence  of  the  guality,  scope  and  timeliness 
reguired . 
Sec.  4.   Procedures 
A.   General  criteria  for  collection.   Information  about 
a  United  States  person  may  be  collected  only: 
1.  From  sources  that  provide  information  that 
is  available  publicly; 
2.  From  cooperating  sources;
3.   From  collection  activities  undertaken  with 
the  consent  of  a  United  States  person  author- 
ized to  grant  such  consent;  or 
_  4.  Prom  intelligence  collection  techniques  con- 
ducted in  compliance  with  the  procedures  set 
out  in  this  enclosure  or  enclosure  2. 
B.  Foreicrn  intelliaence.   Information  may  be  collected 
about  a  United  States  person  under  the  restrictions  set  forth 
in  this  section  if  the  information  qualifies  as  foreign  intell 
gence  or,  as  regards  potential  sources  or  potential  contacts, 
supports  collection  of  foreign  intelligence.   The  means  of 
collection  must  meet  the  criteria  set  out  in  Section  4  (A) 
Intentional  collection  must  be  limited  to  collection  of 
information  about  United  States  persons  in  one  of  the 
following  categories: 
1.  The  information  is  about — 
(a) •  a  person  who  is  reasonably  believed  to 
be  an  officer  or  employee  of  a  foreign 
power,  or 
(b)  an  entity  that  is  owned  or  controlled, 
directly  or  indirectly,  by  a  foreign 
power j   or 
(c)  a  person  who  is  reasonably  believed  to 
be  acting  on  behalf  of  a  foreign  power. M 
2.   The  information  is  about  a  person  who  is 
reasonably  believed  to  be  a  potential  source 
of  foreign  intelligence  or  a  potential  con- 
tact who  will  lead  to  a  potential  source  of 
foreign  intelligence.   The  information  that 
may  be  collected  about  a  United  States  person 
who  is  reasonably  believed  to  be  a  potential 
source  or  contact  is  limited  to  that  necessary 
for  the  purpose  of  determining  the  suitability 
or  credibility  of  such  persons.
A  potential  source  is  a  person  who  is 
situated  by  knowledge,  training,  position 
or  responsibility  so  as  to  have  access  to 
or  be  able  to  obtain  or  develop  foreign 
intelligence.   A  potential  contact  is  a 
person  who  is  situated  by  acquaintance, 
friendship,  affiliation,  position  or  other 
factor  so  as  to  be  able  to  have  contact 
with  a  potential  source. 
3.  The  information  is  about  a  person  who  is 
reasonably  believed  to  be  engaged  in 
international  terrorist  activities. 
A  person  is  "engaged  in"  an  activity  if  that 
person  has  taken  some  action  in  furtherance 
of  the  activity  or  that  person  is  in  contact 
with  a  person  or  organization  that  has  taken 
such  action  under  circumstances  that  support 
a  reasonable  belief  that  action  by  the  person 
in  furtherance  of  the  activity  will  follow. 
4.  The  .information  is  about  a  corporation  or 
commercial^  orqani  zatjon . 
An  organization  that  uses  the  words  "Inc.11, 
"Corp.",  "Co.",  "Ltd.",  or  other  common 
commercial  designations  in  its  name  may  be 
treated  as  a  corporation  or  commercial 
organization  for  this  purpose. 
5.  The  information  is  about  a  United  States 
person  who  is  reasonably  believed  to  be  a 
captured  prisoner  of  war  or  who  is  missing 
in  action. 
C.   Counterintelligence .   Information  may  be  collected 
about  a  United  States  person  for  counterintelligence  purposes 
under  the  restrictions  set  forth  in  this  section.   The  means 
of  collection  must  meet  the  criteria  set  out  in  Section  4  (A)  ', 
Intentional  collection  must  be  limited  to  collection  of  infor- 
mation about  United  States  persons  in  one  of  the  following 
categories:
The  information  is  about  a  United  States 
person  whom  facts  and  circumstances  indicate 
is  or  may  be  engaged  in_  clandestine  intelli- 
gence acJ:iyiti_es...on  behalf  of  a  foreign . 
power  or  international  terrorism  and  that 
person  is — 
(a)  a  person  who  is  reasonably  believed  to 
be  an  officer  or  employee  of  a  foreign 
power; 
(b)  an  entity  that  is  owned  or  controlled, 
directly  or  indirectly,  by  a  foreign 
power; 
(c)  a  person  who  is  in  contact  with  a 
foreign  power  or  an  agent  of  a  foreign 
power;  or 
(d)  a  commercial  organization. 
I 
2.  The  information  is  needed  to  identify  a  person 
who  is  in  contact  with  someone  who  is  the 
subject  of  a  lawful  counterintelligence 
investigation.   The  information  that  may  be 
collected  about  the  United  States  person  who 
is  in  contact  with  the  subject  of  the  counter- 
intelligence investigation  is  limited  to  infor- 
mation necessary  to  identify  that  person, 
including  name,  address,  employment,  and 
security  clearance. 
A  person  is  the  "subject  of"  a  counterintelli- 
gence investigation  when  the  investigation  has 
focussed  on  that  person's  activities. 
3.  The  information  is  about  a  person  who  is 
reasonably  believed  to  be  a  potential  source 
of  counterintelligence  or  a  potential  contact 
who  will  lead  to  a  potential  source  of  counter- 
intelligence.  Information  collected  about  a 
United  States  person  who  is  reasonably  believed 
to  be  a  potential  source  or  a  potential  contact 
shall  be  limited  to  that  necessary  for  the 
purpose  of  determining  the  suitability  or 
credibility  of  such  persons.
A  potential  source  is  a  person  who  is 
situated  by  knowledge,  training,  experience, 
position,  or  responsibility  so  as  to  have 
access  to  or  be  able  to  obtain  or  develop 
counterintelligence.   A  potential  contact 
is  a  person  who  is  situated  by  acquaintance, 
friendship,  affiliation,  position  or  other 
factor  to  be  able  to  have  contact  with  a 
potential  source t 
D,   Intelligence  sources  and  methods.   Information  may 
be  collected  about  a  United  States  person  if  it  is  necessary 
to  protect  an  intelligence  source  or  method  from  unauthorized 
disclosure.   The  means. of  collection  must  meet  the  criteria  in 
Section  4 (A) .   Intentional  collection  must  be  limited  to 
collection  of  information  about  United  States  persons  in  one 
of  the  following  categories: 
1,   Information  about  persons  who  are — 
(a)  present  employees  of  a  DoD  intelligence 
component; 
(b)  former  employees  of  a  DoD  intelligence 
component; 
The  term  "forroer  employee"  includes  ■ 
employees  of  predecessor  components 
of  DoD  intelligence  components. 
(c)  applicants  for  employment  with  a  DoD 
intelligence  component; 
The  term  "applicant"  in  this  context 
means  a  person  who  has  made  a  request 
that  he  or  she  be  considered  for 
employment.   This  includes  applicants 
for  transfer  to  a  DoD  intelligence 
component. 
(d)  present  contractors  of  a  DoD  intelli- 
gence component; 
(e)  present  or  former  employees  of  a  present 
contractor  of  a  DoD  intelligence  component;
(f)  former  contractors  of  a  DoD  intelligence 
component j  or 
(g)  present  or  former  employees  of  a  former 
contractor  of  a  DoD  intelligence  component. 
2,  Information  that  is  needed  to  identify  a  person 
in  contact  with  a  person  covered  by  subsection  1 
above. 
The  information  -that  may  be  collected  about  the 
United  States  person  under  this  subsection  is 
limited  to  information  necessary  to  identify 
that  person (.  including  name,  address,  employment, 
and  security  clearance. 
E..  Physical  security.   Information  may  be  collected  about 
a  United  States  person  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  the 
physical  security  of  DoD  components  and  contractors  that 
serve  such  components  if  such  protection  is  within  the 
assigned  mission  of  the  collecting  agency.  This  information 
must  be  collected  in  the  course  of  a  lawful  physical  security 
investigation,  The  means  of  collection  must  meet  the  criteria 
set  out  in  section  4 (A) .   Intentional  collection  must  be 
limited  as  follows: 
1.   Information  may  be  collected  about  persons 
who  are— 
(a)  discovered  on  a  defense  or  intelligence 
installation  without  authorization; 
(b)  discovered  in  a  portion  of  a  defense  or 
intelligence  installation  under  circum- 
stances such  that  there  is  a  reasonable 
belief  that  such  person  is  violating  or 
is  about  to  violate  laws  or  regulations 
relating  to  the  protection  of  classified 
information; 
(c)  reasonably  believed  to  be  engaging  in 
activities  that'  are  directed  at  or  will
result  in  unauthorized  entry  onto,  or 
damage  to  an  installation;  or 
(d)   reasonably  believed  to  jeopardize  an 
intelligence  operation  because  of 
physical  proximity  to  the  operation. 
Information  collection  within  the  United  States 
under  subsections  (c)  and  (d)  with  respect  to  a 
person  who  is  not  on  a  DoD  installation  should 
•be  collected  only  in  conformity  with  the  agree- 
ment between  the  Department  of  Defense  and  the 
Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  dated  April  5, 
1919,    ref.  (n) . 
2.   Information  may  be  collected  that  describes  the 
person's— 
(a)  identification, 
(b)  location,  or 
(c)  activities,  intentions  and  capabilities 
that  pose  a  clear  threat  to  the  physical 
security  of  the  intelligence  component. 
F,   Personnel  security.   Information  may  be  collected 
about  a  United  States  person  for  personal  security  purposes. 
The  information  must  be  collected  in  the  course  of  a  lawful 
personnel  security  investigation, 
1.   Within  the  United  States,  the  Defense 
Investigative  Service  conducts  personnel 
security  investigations  for  DoD  intelli- 
gence components  in  accordance  with  DoD 
Directive  5105.42,  ref.  (i) ,  and  the 
National  Security  Agency  conducts  certain 
personnel  security  investigations  under 
DoD  Directive  5100.23,  ref.  (j).   DoD 
intelligence  components  are  authorized _ 
to  collect  personnel  security  information 
from  cooperating  sources  as  needed  for 
determination  as  to  whether  a  personnel 
security  investigation  is  warranted. 
2,   Outside  the  United  States,  information 
may  be  collected  by.  a  DoD  intelligence 
component  only  with  respect  to  applicants 
for  employment,  present  employees,  present
contractors,  and  present  applicants 
for  employment  with  or  employees  of 
contractors  of  that  component  or  persons 
granted  access  to  classified  information 
collected  or  produced  by  that  component. 
3.  Outside  the  United  States,  information  may 
be  collected  by  DoD  intelligence  components 
for  the  Defense  Investigative  Service,  other 
.DoD  components  that  are  authorized  to  conduct 
personnel  security  investigations,  the 
Department  of  State,  and  the  Federal  Bureau 
of  Investigation. 
4,  As  a  protective  service,  information  may  be 
collected  about  a  United  States  person  who 
is  reasonably  believed  to  be  endangering 
the  safety  of  a  Department  of  Defense 
official  or  foreign  official  if  the  DoD 
intelligence  component  has  been  assigned 
responsibility  by  the  Secretary  of  Defense 
for  protection  of  that  person. 
G.   Narcotics.   Information  may  be  collected  about  a 
United  States  person  who  is  reasonably  believed  to  be  engaged 
in  narcotics  production  or  trafficking.   "Narcotics  production 
or  trafficking"  is  a  defined  term  and  should  be  construed 
strictly,   A  person  is  "engaged  in"  an  activity  if  that  person 
has  taken  some  action  in  furtherance  of  the  activity  or  that 
person  is  in  contact  with  a  person  or  organization  that  has 
taken  such  action  under  circumstances  that  support  a  reasonable 
belief  that  action  in  furtherance  of  the  activity  will  follow, 
Information  collected  should  be  limited  to  the  person's  identi- 
fication; location;  and  activities,  intentions,  capabilities 
and  associates  with  respect  to  narcotics  production  or 
trafficking. 
^r^^Z  f.*^-^wRU»7-;  m*  y^fiT.«f^rt »n^w^a^r;
H.  "Secret  Service,   Information  may  be  collected  about 
a  United  States  person  who  is  reasonably  believed  to.be 
endangering  the  safety  of  a  person  protected  by  £he  United 
States  Secret  Service.   Persons  protected  by  the  Secret 
Service  include  the  President  and  his  immediate  family,  the 
President-elect,  former  Presidents,  the  Vice  President,  the 
Vice  President-elect,  and  visiting  heads  of  state.   The 
collection  of  such  information  should  be  in  compliance  with 
the  Agreement  between  the  Department  of  Defense  and  the  Secret 
Service,  as  prescribed  in  DoD  Directive  5030.34,  ref.  (g) . 
I.   Department  of  State.   Information  may  be  collected 
about  a  United  States  person  for  the  Department  of  State. 
Collection  efforts  must  be  reasonably  designed  to  limit 
collection  of  information  about  a  United  States  person  to 
one  of  the  following  categories: 
1.  Information  about  a  person  who  is 
reasonably  believed  to  be  endangering 
the  safety  of  a  person  protected  by 
the  Department  of  State.   Persons 
protected  by  the  Department  of  State 
include  heads  of  foreign  states,  official 
representatives  of  foreign  governments, 
distinguished  foreign  visitors,  the 
Secretary  and  Deputy  Secretary  of  State 
and  official  representatives  of  the 
United  States  and  their  immediate 
families. 
2.  Information  about  a  person  who  is  abroad 
if  the  collection  is  in  response  to  a 
request  from  the  Department  of  State  for 
support  of  its  consular  responsibilities 
relating  to  the  welfare  of  such  persons. 
A  consular  officer  must  submit  a  written 
request  to  the  DoD  intelligence  component. 
The  request  must  state  that  the  person  is
abroad  and  describe  -the  information 
required  in  support  of  the  Department 
of  State's  consular  responsibilities. 
Information  collected  by  DoD  intelli- 
gence components  should  be  limited  to 
that  described  in  the  reguest. 
j.   Overhead  reconnaissance.   Information  may  be 
collected  from  overhead  reconnaissance^  not_directed  "at 
specific  United  States  persons. 
d  f  y  £"j  »-j  q   /Lr?  ^ 
Date  of  Attorney  General  approval:        '  '   '    '   v:n^  <^» 
Date  of  Secretary  of  Defense  approval:      "   ;
PROCEDURE  2.   STORAGE  OF  INFORMATION 
ABOUT  UNITED  STATES  PERSONS 
Sec.  1.   Applicability  and  Scope 
This  procedure  governs  the  kind  of  information  about 
United  States  persons  that  may  knowingly  be  stored  by  a 
DoD  intelligence  component  without  the  consent  of  the  person 
that  the  information  concerns.   These  limitations  apply  regard- 
less of  the  means  used  to  store  the  information  and  they  apply 
to  the  information  storage  and  retrieval  systems  of  all  DoD  in- 
telligence components.  These  limitations  do  not  apply  when  the 
information  to  be  stored  is: 
collected  with  the  consent  of  the  person  whom  the 
information  concerns; 
available  publicly 
.   stored  solely  for  administrative  purposes  not  related 
to  intelligence  or  security; 
required  by  law  to  be  maintained; 
about  persons  or  organizations  that  are  not  United 
States  persons; 
stored  for  law  enforcement  purposes;  or 
.   not  immediately  identified  with  a  United  States  per- 
son because  the  identity  of  the  United  States  person 
is  deleted  and  a  generic  term  or  symbol  is  substituted 
so  that  information  cannot  be  connected  with  an  identi- 
fiable United  States  person.   When  the  name  of  a  United 
States  person  is  included  in  a  brand  name,  the  name  of 
a  military  or  political  doctrine  or  other  descriptive 
figures  of  speech  that  do  not  disclose  information  about 
the  United  States  person,  the  information  may  be  treated 
in  the  same  manner  as  if  a  generic  term  or  symbol  were 
used.
Sec.  2.   Definitions 
The  definitions  of  the  following  terms,  set  out  in 
enclosure  3,  are  applicable  to  this  procedure: 
administrative  purposes 
available  publicly 
consent 
counterintelligence  _  : 
.  DoD  intelligence  components 
foreign  intelligence 
intelligence 
law  enforcement 
physical  security 
United  States  person 
Sec,  3.   Policy 
The  Department  of  Defense  stores  information  about  United 
States  persons  for  foreign  intelligence  and  counterintelligence 
purposes  only  when  necessary  to  the  conduct  of  authorized 
intelligence  functions  of  Department  of  Defense  components 
or  other  government  .agencies.   Storage  of  information  for  law 
enforcement  purposes  is  limited  to  short-term  storage  incident 
to  delivery  to  law  enforcement  agencies. 
Sec.  4.   Procedure 
A;   Storage  of  Information  Collected  Under  Procedure  1. 
Information  about  United  States  persons  may  be  stored  if  it 
was  collected  pursuant  to  Procedure  1. 
B.   Storage  of  Information  Acquired  Incidentally.   Infor- 
mation about  United  States  persons  may  be  stored  if::'. 
1.   Its  collection  is  incidental  to  authorized 
collection  and  such  information  could  have 
been  collected  intentionally  under  this 
directive;  or
2.   The  information  is  foreign  intelligence 
or  counterintelligence  collected  irom 
electronic  curveil lance  conducted  ~~±n 
compliance  with  Procedures"  4~,    57~or~6. 
•3.   Such  infromation  is  stored  for  crypto- 
analytic  and  traffic  analysis  purposes. 
i 
Unless  not  practicable,  information  about  United  States  persons 
acquired  as  a  p'art  of  or  incidental  to  collection  activities 
authorized  under  this  directive,  shall  be  processed  prior  to 
storage  in  the  following  manner:  . 
If  the  identification  of  the  United  States 
person (s)  involved  is  necessary  to  the     y 
under standing  of  such  information,  it  may 
be  retained  without  alteration. 
If  the  identification  of  the  United  States 
person (s)  is  not  necessary  to  the  under- 
standing of  the  information  contained  therein, 
the  information  which  identifies  the  United 
States  person (s)  involved  shall  be  deleted 
and  replaced  with  a  symbol  or  generic  term 
which  conveys  the  desired  meaning,  prior  to 
storage. 
C.  Storage  of  Information  Relating  to  Functions  of  Other 
DoD  Component  or  Executive  Agencies.   Information  about  United 
States  persons  that  pertains  solely  to  the  functions  of  other 
DoD  components  or  agencies  outside  the  Department  of  Defense 
shall  be  stored  only  as  necessary  to  transmit  or  deliver  such 
information  to  the  appropriate  recipients. 
D.  Temporary  Storage.   Information  about  United  States 
persons  may  be  stored  temporarily,  up  to  90  days,  solely  for 
the  purpose  of  determining  whether  that  information  my  be 
stored  under  these  procedures. 
•E.   Storage  of  Other  Information.   Information  about
United  States  persons  other  than  that  covered  by  Sections 
A  (A)  or  (B)  shall  be  stored  only  for  purposes  of  reporting 
such  collection  for  oversight  purposes  and  for  any  subsequent 
proceeding's  that  may  be  necessary. 
Y,      Controls  on  Access  to  Stored  Information.   Storage 
systems  shall  be  reasonably  designed  to  limit  access  to  infor- 
mation about  united  States  persons  to  those  with  a  need  to 
know. 
G.   Duration  of  Retention.   Information  about  United 
States  persons  retained  in  the  files  of  DoD  intelligence  com- 
ponents shall  be  reviewed  periodically  if  practicable  to  en- 
sure that  its  continued  retention  serves  .the  purpose  for  which 
it  was  collected  and  stored, 
H.   Information  Acquired  Prior  to  Effective  Date.   Infor- 
mation acquired  prior  to  the  effective  date  of  this  procedure 
may  be  stored  by  DoD  intelligence  components  without  being 
screened  for  compliance  with  this  procedure  or  Procedure  1,  if 
such  storage  was  in  compliance  with  E.O.  11905,  E.O.  12036  or 
other  applicable  law.   Information  acquired  prior  to  the  effecti 
date  of  this  procedure  may  be  reviewed  under  Subsection  G  above 
if  such  a  review  is  determined  by  the  head  of  the  component  to 
be  practicable  and  an  economic  use  of  resources. 
Date  of  Attorney  General  approval:      ___L     
Date  of  Secretary  of  Defense  approval:     ;   _
PROCEDURE  3.   DISSEMINATION  OF  INFORMATION 
ABOUT  UNITED  STATES  PERSONS 
Sec.  1.  Applicability  and  Scope. 
""    This  procedure  governs  the  kind  of  information  about  United 
States  persons  that  may  be  disseminated,  without  consent,  out- 
side the  DoD  intelligence  component  that  collected  and  processed 
the  information.   These  limitations  apply  regardless  of  the 
means  used  to  disseminate  the  information  and  to  dissemination 
by  all  DoD  intelligence  components.   These  limitations  do  not 
apply  when  information  is: 
disseminated  with  the  consent  of  the  person  the 
information  concerns; 
available  publicly; 
about  persons  or  organizations  that  do  not  qualify  . 
as  United  States  persons; 
.   not  immediately  identified  with  a  United  States 
person  because  the  identity  of  the  United  States 
person  is  deleted  and  a  generic  term  or  symbol 
is  substituted  so  that  the  information  cannot  be 
connected  with  an  identifiable  United  States  per- 
son.  When  the  name  of  the  United  States  person 
is  included  in  a  brand  name,  the  name  of  a  mili- 
tary or  political  doctrine  or  other  descriptive 
figures  of  speech  that  do  not  disclose  information 
about  the  United  States  person,  the  information  may 
be  treated  in  the  same  manner  as  if  a  generic  term 
or  symbol  were  used. 
disseminated  solely  for  administrative  purposes 
not  related  to  intelligence  or  security; 
disseminated  in  accordance  with  law;  or 
disseminated  for  law  enforcement  purposes.
Sec.  2.   Definitions 
The  definitions  of  the  following  terms,  set  Out  in 
enclosure  3,  are  applicable  to  this  procedure: 
administrative  purposes 
available  publicly 
communications  security 
consent 
contractor 
counterintelligence 
DoD  intelligence  components 
electronic  surveillance 
employee  j 
foreign  intelligence 
intelligence 
intelligence  method 
intelligence  source 
international  terrorist  activities 
law  enforcement 
law  enforcement  agencies 
narcotics  production  and  trafficking 
personnel  security 
personnel  security  investigation 
physical  security 
reasonable  belief 
United  States 
United  States  persons. 
'  Sec.  3.   Policy 
The  Department  of  Defense  disseminates  information  about 
United  States  persons  that  was  collected  and  stored  by  intelli- 
gence components  pursuant  to  Procedures  1  and  2  only  to  DoD 
components  and  contractors;,  to  federal,  state  and  local  govern- 
ment entities  authorized  to  receive  such  information  for  the 
performance  of  lawful  government  function,  and  to  foreign 
governments  under  approved . arrangements  or  agreements. 
Sec.  4.   Procedure 
A«   General  criteria  for  dissemination.   Information 
about  United  States  persons  that  identifies  those  persons  may
be  disseminated  only  if  it  is 
..  information  that  was  collected  under  Procedure  1, 
■**   .   foreign  intelligence  or  counterintelligence 
gathered  abroad, 
Foreign  intelligence  or  counterintelligence  that  was 
collected  from  electronic  surveillance  conducted  in 
compliance  with  Procedures  A,    5,  or  6;  or 
Foreign  intelligence  or  counterintelligence  that  was 
collected  from  cooperating  sources  in  the  United  States; 
and  it  has  been  determined  that  each  entity  that  is  a  recipient 
has  a  requirement  in  the  performance  of  its  official  duties  for 
the  identity  of  the  United  States  person,  and  the  identity  of 
the  United  States  person  is  required  for  the  understanding  or 
utilization  of  the  information. 
B.   Dissemination  within  the  Department  of  Defense.   Infor- 
mation about  United  States  persons  that  identifies  those  persons 
may  be  disseminated  to  other  components  within  the  Department 
of  Defense  or  .to  contractors  only  if  it  meets  the  criteria  under 
Section  4  (A)  and,  at  the  time  the  information  is  disseminated, 
it  also  meets  one  of  the  following  criteria: 
1.  The  information  constitutes  foreign  intelligence 
or  counterintelligence; 
2.  The  information  is  necessary  to  provide  for  the 
physical  security  of  the  installation  of  any  DoD 
component  or  the  contractor  to  whom  it  is  dessera- 
inated; 
3.  The information  is  necessary  to  provide  for  personnel 
security  of  the  Department  of  Defense  or  the  con- 
tractor to  whom  it  is  disseminated; 
4.  The  information  relates  to  a  violation  of  the  Uniform 
Code  of  Military  Justice,  10  U.S.C.  §§'801-940  (1976), 
or  to  a  violation  of  foreign,  federal,  state  or  local 
law  by  a  DoD  employee  or  to  an  activity  that  may  occur 
in  the  future  and  if  it  occurs  is  likely  to  involve 
such  a  violation;
5.   The  information  is  necessary  to  provide  for 
communications  security  of  the  United  States 
Government; 
6X     The  information  is  necessary  for  the  protection 
of  intelligence  sources  and  methods;  - 
7.   The  information  is  enciphered  or  reasonably 
believed  to  contain  secret  meaning  and  the 
actual  meaning  has  not  been  ascertained;  or 
8X  The  information  has  been  collected  pursuant 
to  a  judicial  warrant  and  the  dissemination 
is  consistent  with  .the  warrant. 
Where  practicable,  information  about  United  States  persons  that 
identifies  those  persons  and  is  disseminated  to  other  components 
within  the  Department  of  Defense  should  be  transmitted  in  a 
manner  that  alerts  the  recipient  that  information  about  United 
States  persons  is  contained  therein  and  has  been  processed  in 
accordance  with  these  procedures. 
C.   Dissemination  to  Agencies  within  the  Intelligence 
Community.   Information  about  United  States  persons  that 
identifies  those  persons  may  be  disseminated  to  other  agencies 
within  the  intelligence  community  not  otherwise  expressly  pro- 
vided for  by  these  procedures  only  if  it  meets  the  criteria 
under  Section  4  (A)  and,  at  the  time  the  information  is  dis- 
seminated, it  also  meets  one  of  the  following  criteria: 
1.  The  information  constitutes  foxeJ-gn__xntel~ 
ligence  or  counterintelligence; 
2.  The  information  is  necessary  to  provide 
for  the  physical  security  of  the  Department  of 
Defense,  its  contractors  or  -the  agency  to 
which  it  is  disseminated; 
3.  The  information  is  necessary  to  provide  for  the 
personnel  security  of  the  agency,  to  which  it  is 
disseminated;
4.  The  information  is  necessary  to  provide  for 
the  communications  security  of  the  United 
States  Government; 
5.  The  information  is  necessary  for  the  protec- 
^                   •        tion  of  intelligence  sources  and  methods; 
6.  The  information  is  necessary  for  the  evalua- 
tion of  a  potential  source  of  assistance  in 
an  foreign  intelligence  or  counterintelligence 
activity 
7.  The  information  has  been  collected  pursuant 
to  a  judicial  warrant  and  the  dissemination 
is  consistent  with  the  warrant;  or 
8.  The  information  is  necessary  to  provide  for 
the  physical  security  (including  safety)  of 
the  personnel  of  the  agency  to  which  it  is 
disseminated. 
D.   Dissemination  to  other  federal  departments  and  agencies. 
Information  about  United  States  persons  that  identifies  those 
persons  may  be  disseminated  to  federal  government  departments 
or  agencies  outside  the  intelligence  community  not  otherwise 
expressly  provided  for  by  these  prodecures,  including  the 
Executive  Office  of  the  President,  only  if  the  information  meets 
the  criteria  under  Section  4  (A)  and,  at  the  time  the  information 
is  disseminated,  it  also  meets  on  of  the  following  criteria: 
1.  The  information  constitutes  foreign 
intelligence  or  counterintelligence; 
2.  The  information  is  necessary  to  provide  for 
the  communications  security  of  the  United 
States  Government; 
3.  The  information  was  collected  outside  the 
United  States  for  personnel  security  pur- 
poses in  response  to  a'  request  from  another 
federal  government  department  or  agency  and 
is  desseminated  to  the  requesting  agency;
4.  The  information  has  been  collected  pursuant 
to  a  judicial  warrant  and  the  dissemination 
,,  is  consistent  with  the  warrant; 
5.  The  information  is  necessary  to  provide  for 
the  physical  security  or  the  personnel  security 
(including  safety)  of  the  agency  to  which  it  is 
disseminated;  or 
6.  The  information  is  disseminated  to  the  Attorney 
General  as  evidence  of  a  crime  under  guidelines  adc 
by  the  Attorney  General.   Dissemination  under  this 
subsection  shall  be  through  the  DoD  General 
Counsel. 
E.   Dissemination  to  FBI.   Information  about  Unite'd  States 
persons  that  identifies  those  persons  may  be  disseminated  to 
the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  only  if  it  meets  the 
criteria  under  Section  4(A)  and,  at  the  time  the  information  is 
disseminated, it  meets  one  of  the  following  criteria: 
1.   The. information  constitutes  foreign   / 
intelligence  or  counterintelligence;  / 
2   The  information  relates  to  a  violation  of 
federal,  state  or  local  law  or  to  an 
activity  that  may  occur  in  the  future 
and  if  it  occurs  is  likely  to  involve  a 
violation  of  federal  state  or  local  law; 
-3.   The  information  relates  to  narcotics 
production  or   trafficking  activity 
that  violates  federal,  state 
or  local  law  or  would  be  such  a  violation 
if  the  activity  occurred  in  the  United 
States; 
4.      The  information  relates  to  international 
terrorist  activities  that  violate 
federal,  state  or  local  law  or  would 
be  a  violation  if  the  activities 
occurred  in  the  United  States; 
MMmvrrre  r>— a  'uw  urn..*  JU'Jf  m»«T" -■J^JI*.  »».«»>■;.  CTrer*'*1'?*'?''''!
5.  The  information  relates  to  the  physical 
safety  of  a  person  protected  by  the 
United  States  Secret  Service; 
6.  The  information  relates  to  the  physical 
safety  of  a  person  protected  by  the 
""  Department  of  State; 
7 .  The  information  relates  to  the  physical 
security  of  the  Department  of  Defense  or 
it  contractors; 
•8.   The  information  is  provided  for  a  personnel 
security  investigation  by  the  FBI; 
9.   The  information  is  necessary  to  provide  for 
the  communications  security  of  the  United 
States  Government;  or 
10.   The  information  is  necessary  for  the  pro- 
tection of  intelligence  sources  and  methods. 
F.   Dissemination  to  other  law  enforcement  authorities. 
Information  about  United  States  persons  that  identifies  those 
persons  may  be  disseminated  to  federal,  state  or  local  law  en- 
forcement authorities  only  if  it  meets  the  criteria  under 
Section  4(A)  and  one  of  the  following  criteria: 
■  1.   The  information  relates  to  a  violation 
of  federal,  state  or  local  law  cr  to  an 
activity  that  may  occur  in  the  future  and 
if  it  occurs  is  likely  to  involve  a  vio- 
lation of  federal,  state  or  local  law; 
2.   The  information  relates  to  narcotics 
production  or  trafficking  activity  that 
is  a  violation  of  federal,  state  or  local 
law  or  would  be  such  a  violation  if  the 
activity  occurred  in  the  United  States;  or
3.   The  information  relates  to  international 
terrorist  activities  that  violate  feoeral, 
state  or  local  lav  or  would  be  a  violation 
if  the  activities  occurred  in  the  United 
***  States. 
G.   insemination  to  Secret  Service,   Information  about 
United  States  persons  that  identifies  those  persons  may  be 
disseminated  to  the  Secret  Service  only  if  it  meets  the  criteri. 
under  Section  4(A)  and  meets  one  of  the  following  criteria: 
1   The  information  relates  to  the  physical 
saxety  of  a  person  protected  by  the  Secret 
Service  including  persons  m  facilities 
protected  by  the  Secret  Service;  or 
2.   The  information  relates  to  international 
terrorist  activities. 
K.   n^m^ation  to  DePartment_g^State.   Information 
about  United  States  persons  that  identifies,  those  persons 
may  be  disseminated  to  the  Department  of  State  only  if  it 
meets  the  criteria  under  Section  4(A)  a.nd  is: 
1.   information  disseminated  under  Section  4(D); 
2   Information  that  relates  to  international 
terro-ist  activities  that  violate  federal, 
state" or  local  lav  or  would  be  a  violation 
if  the  activities  occurred  m  i-he  Uni.cc. 
States; 
3  information  that  relates  to  the  physical 
safety  of  a  person  protected  by  the 
Department  of  State;  or 
4  Information  disseminated  in  response  to 
a  request  for  support  of  Department  o± 
State  consular  activities  for  the  welfare 
of  the  person  whom  the  information  conceri
I.   Dissemination  to  PEA.   Information  may  be  disseminated 
to  the  Drug  Enforcement  Administration  only  if  it  meets  the 
criteria  under  Section  4 (A)  and  is  information  related  to 
narcotics  production  or  trafficking  activity  that  is  a  viola- 
tion- of  federal,  state  or  local  law  or  would  be  such  a  viola- 
tion if  the  activity  occurred  in  the  United  States. 
J.   Dissemination  to  Foreion  Governments.   Information 
about  United  States  persons  that  identifies  those  persons 
may  be  disseminated  to  foreign  governments  only  if: 
1.  The  information  is  furnished  in  furtherance  of 
United  States  interests  pursuant  to  an  agreement 
or  understanding~wTth~£uch  government  by  the 
United  States;  and 
2.  The  information  disseminated  falls  within  one  of 
the  following  categories   
a.  The  information  relates  to  a  violation  of 
foreign  law  or  to  an  activity"  that  may  occur 
in  ""the" 'future  and  if  it  occurs  is  likely  to 
involve  a  violation  of  foreign  law; 
b.  The  information  relates  to  narcotics  produc- 
tion or  trafficking  activities  that  would 
violate  U.S.  law  if  the  activity  occurred 
in  the  United  States,  or  that  violate  foreign 
lav;; 
c.  The  information  relates  to  international 
terrorist  activities  that  would  violate  U.S. 
law  if  the  activities  occurred  in  the  United 
States,  or  that  violate  foreign  law;
d.  The  information  relates  to  the  safety_of  any 
person; 
e.  The  information  constitutes  foreign  intelli- 
^  gence  or" counterintelligence;  or  — „ 
f.  The  information  is  enciphered  or  reasonably 
believed  to  contain  secret  meaning  and  the 
actual  meaning  cannot  be  or  has  not  been 
ascertained. 
K.   Other  Dissemination.   Dissemination  other  than  as 
provided  in  subsections  4 (B)  through  (J)  above  must  be 
approved  by  the  General  Counsel  of  the  Department  of  Defense, 
Such  approval  shall  be  based  on  a  determination  that  the 
proposed  dissemination  complies  with  applicable  laws, 
executive  orders  and  regulations. 
Date  of  Attorney  General  approval: 
Date  of  Secretary  of  Defense  approval: 
G>Z    tf>?frl
3TT 
PROCEDURE  A.       GENERAL  REQUIREMENTS 
FOR  ELECTRONIC  SURVEILLANCE 
KITHIN  THE  UNITED  STATES 
£ec.  lt   Applicability  and  Scope 
This  procedure  implements  the  Foreign  Intelligence 
Surveillance  Act  of  1978/  ref.  .'(b),  and  applies  to  electronic 
surveillance  conducted  by  DoD  intelligence  components  within 
the  United  States. 
Sec,    2.      General  Bules 
A.   Electronic  surveillance  pursuant  to  judicial  varran- 
A  DoD  intelligence'  component  may  conduct  electronic  surveill 
within  the  United  States  pursuant  to  a  judicial  warrant  iss' 
by  a  judge  of  the  court  appointed  pursuant  to  the  Foreign 
Intelligence  Surveillance  Act  of  1978.   Applications  for 
judicial  warrants  will  be  .made  through  the  Attorney  Genera 
only  after  prior  clearance  by  the  DoD  General  Counsel. 
B.  .  Authority  to  request  electronic  surveillance.   A- 
to  approve  submission  of  applications  for  electronic  surv 
under  the  Foreign  Intelligence  Surveillance  Act  of  1978  .•  I 
limited  to  the  Secretary  of  Defense,  the  Deputy  Seer e tar 
Defense,  the  Secretary  or  Acting  Secretary  of  a  Military 
Department,  and  the  Director  of  the  National  Security  A 
Authority  to  make  applications  shall  be  vested  in  such 
of  DoD  intelligence  components  as  are  designated  by  on 
approval  authorities  above.
2B 
C.   Electronic  surveillance  in  emergency  situations, 
A  DoD  intelligence  component  may  conduct  electronic  surveil- 
lance within  the  United  St2tes  in  emergency  situations  under 
an  approval  from  the  Attorney  General  even  though  a  warrant 
would  otherwise  be  required.   An  emergency  situation  exists 
when:  •  " 
1.  The  time  required  to  secure  the  prior 
approval  would  cause  failure  or  delay  in 
obtaining  significant  foreign  intelligence 
or  counterintelligence  and  such  failure  or 
delay  would  result  in  substantial  harm  to 
the  national  security; 
2.  A  person ls  life  or  physical  safety  is 
reasonably  believed  to  be  in  immediate 
danger;  or 
3.  The  physical  security  of  a  Defense  installa- 
tion or  government  property  is  reasonably 
believed  to  be  in  immediate  danger. 
The  head  of  any  DoD  intelligence  component  may  contact  the 
Attorney  General . directly  in  an  emergency.   If  possible, 
such  requests  should  be  made  through  the  DoD  General  Counsel. 
If  a  warrant  is  denied  in  a  subsequent  proceeding,  the  infor- 
•  mation  collected  under  the  emergency  authorization  roust  be 
destroyed  unless  it  indicates  a  threat  of  death  or  serious  '- 
bodily  harm  to  any  person,  and  the  Attorney  General  approves 
retention  of  the  information. 
,1:     &ftft     7{'*rh  <j 
Date  of  Attorney  General  approval 
Date  of  Secretary  of  Defense  approval:   ^ 
\ 
iiyffrCTggTWiB*.?*1^ .- V "*  "f  -?g?W '  >  "V**  ■"■*■« *l  WgW?^
ADDENDUM  TO  PROCEDURE  A :   IMPLEMENTATION 
OP  GENERAL  REQUIREMENTS 
Sec.    I.   Applicability  and  Scope  ._  . 
Procedure  A   applies  only  to  electronic  surveillance 
conducted  by  DoD  intelligence  components  within  the  United 
States.  This  procedure  does  not  apply  to: 
.   activities  conducted  with  the  consent  of  one 
or  more  of  the  parties  surveilled;  the  defi- 
nition of  electronic  surveillance  includes 
only  nonconsensual  surveillance; 
.   electronic  surveillance  for  law  enforcement 
purosesj  the  Act  provides  only  for  collecting 
foreign  intelligence  or  counterintelligence; 
,  electronic  surveillance  under  Section  102(a)  of 
the  Act;  those  surveillances  do  not  involve 
United  States  persons  and  are  conducted  under 
Attorney  General  certification; 
,   the  use  of  electronic  equipment  for  testing; 
such  use  is  governed  by  Procedure  8  established 
under  section .2-202  of  Executive  Order  12036, 
Ref.  (a)  and  subsection  105(f)(1)  of  the  Act; 
t   the  use  of  electronic  communications  and  sur-    ; 
veillance  equipment  for  training;  such  use  is 
governed  by  Procedure  9  established  under 
Section  2-202  of  Executive  Order  12036,  ref. 
(a)  and  subsection  105(f)(3)  of  the  Act; 
.  measures  conducted  within  the  United  States 
for  purposes  of  determining  whether  electronic 
surveillance  equipment  is  being  used  unlawful 
these  measures "are  governed  by  Procedure  7 
established  under  Section  2-202  of  the  Execut 
Order  and  subsection  103(f) (2)  of  the  Act;  o: 
,   the  use  within  the  United  States  of  televisi 
cameras  or  other  electronic  means  of  continv 
monitoring  not  directed  at  the  acquisition^ 
wire,'  radio,  or  oral  communications;  use  ox 
means  for  the  purposes  of  physical  surveill 
is  governed  by  Procedure  10  established  un£ 
Section  2-203  of  the  Executive  Order  and  Sc 
102(b)  of  the  Act. 
v,c^tS3aB.T
Sec_.   2.   Definitions 
The  following  definitions,  set  out  in  enclosure  3f  are 
applicable  to  this  procedure: 
agent  of  a  foreign  power 
clandestine  intelligence  agency 
consent 
counterintelligence 
DoD  intelligence  components 
electronic  communi cations  equipment 
.   intelligence 
,   international  terrorist  activities 
,   law  enforcement 
,   physical  security 
reasonable  belief 
United  States 
wire  communication 
NOTE:   THE  FOREIGN  INTELLIGENCE  SURVEILLANCE  ACT 
OF  1978  USES  DEFINITIONS  THAT  IN  SOME 
INSTANCES  ARE  DIFFERENT  FROM  THOSE  PRE- 
SENTED IN  ENCLOSURE  3.   THIS  ACT  GOVERNS 
ELECTRONIC  SURVEILLANCE.  WITHIN  THE  UNITED 
STATES  FOR  FOREIGN  INTELLIGENCE  PURPOSES, 
SO  FOR  PURPOSES  OF  THIS  PROCEDURE  ONLY  TEE 
FOLLOWING  DEFINITIONS  OF  "ELECTRONIC  SUR- 
VEILLANCE," "FOREIGN  INTELLIGENCE  INFORMA- 
TION," "FOREIGN  POWER,"  AND  UNITED  STATES 
PERSON"  APPLY: 
Electronic  surveillance,  in  this  context,  means: 
1,   the  acquisition  by  an  electronic,  mechanical 
or  other  surveillance  device  of  the  contents 
of  any  wire  communication  sent  by  or  intended 
to  be  received  by  a  particular,  known  United  - 
States  person  who  is  in  the  United  States , 
if  the  contents  are  acquired  by  intentional 
targeting  that  United  States  person,  under 
circumstances  in  which  a  person  has  a 
reasonable  expectation  of  privacy  and  a 
warrant  would  be  required  for  law  enforce- 
ment purposes; 
: 2%      the  acquisition  by  an  electronic,  mechanical 
or  other  surveillance  device  of  the  contents 
of  any  wire  communication  to  or  from  a  person 
in  the  United  States,  without  -the  consent  of 
any  party  thereto,  if  such  acquisition  occurs 
in  the  United  States;
3<   -the  intentional  acquisition  by  an  electronic, 
mechanical  or  other  surveillance  device  of 
the  contents  of  any  radio  communication,  under 
circumstances  in  which  a  person  has  a  reason- 
able expectation  of  privacy  and  a  warrant 
would  be  required  for  law  enforcement  purposes, 
and  if  both  the  sender  and  all  intended  reci- 
pients are  located  within  the  United  States;  or 
4,   the  installation  or  use  of  an  electronic, 
mechanical,  or  other  surveillance  device 
in  the  United  States  for  monitoring  to 
acquire  information,  other  than  from  a 
wire  or  radio  communication,  under  circum- 
stances in  which  a  person  has  a  reasonable 
expectation  of  privacy  and  a  warrant  would 
be  required  for  law  enforcement  purposes. 
Foreign  "intelligence  information,  in  this  context,  means: 
1,   information  that  relates  -to,  and  if  concerning 
a  United  States  person  is  necessary  to,  the 
ability  of  the  United  States  to  protect  against-— 
(a)  actual  or  potential  attack  or  other 
grave  hostile  acts  of  a  foreign  power 
or  an  agent  of  a  foreign  power; 
(b)  sabotage  or  international  terrorism  by _ 
a  foreign  power  or  an  agency  of  a  foreign 
power;  or 
(c)  clandestine  intelligence  activities  by 
an  intelligence  service  or  network  of  a 
foreign  power  or  by  an  agent  of  a  foreign 
power ,  or 
2.   information  with  respect  "to  a  foreign  power  •- 
or  foreign  territory  that  relates  to,  and  if 
concerning  a  United  States  person  is  necessary 
tO— r 
(a)  the  national  defense  or  the  security- 
of  the  United  States;  or 
(b)  the  conduct  of  the  foreign  affairs  of 
the  United  States. 
Foreign  power,  in  this  context,  means: 
1.   a  foreign  government,  or  any  component  thereo^ , 
whether  or  not  recognized  by  the  United  States;
'2,   a  faction  of  a  foreign  nation  or  nation,  not 
substantially  composed  of  United  States 
persons; 
•.  3.   an  entity  that  is  openly  acknowledged  by  a 
foreign  government  or  governments  to  be 
directed  and  controlled  by  such  foreign 
government  or  governments; 
4 j   a  group  engaged  in  international  terrorism 
or  activities  in  preparation  therefor; 
5.  a  foreign-based  political  organization,  not 
substantially  composed  of  United  States 
persons;  or 
6.  an  entity  that  is  directed  and  controlled  by 
a  foreign  government  or  governments. 
United  States  person,  in  this  context,  means  a  citizen 
of  the"  United  States,  an  alien  lawfully  admitted  for  permanent 
residence  (as  defined  in  section  101(a) (2)  of  the  Immigration 
and  Nationality  Act) ,  an  unincorporated  association,  a  sub- 
stantial number  of  members  of  which  are  citizens  of  the  United 
States  or  aliens  lawfully  admitted  for  permanent  residence,  or 
a  corporation  which  is  incorporated  in  the  United  States,  but 
does  not  include  a  corporation  or  an  association  which  is  a 
foreign  power. 
Electronic  surveillance  is  conducted  "within  the  United 
States"  in  this  context  when  it  is  designed  to  intercept  wire 
or  radio  communication  sent  by  or  intended  to  be  received  by 
a  known  United  States  person  within  the  United  States  by 
intentionally  targeting  that  United  States  person;  is  designet 
to  intercept  in  the  United  States  a  wire  communication  sent  t< 
or  from  a  person  in  the  United  States;  is  designed  to  interce 
a  radio  communication  when  the  sender  and  all  recipients  are 
located  'within  the  United  States  under  circumstances  where 
the  communicants  have  a  reasonable  expectation  of  privacy;  or 
involves  the  installation  of  an  electronic,  mechanical,  or
other  surveillance  device  to  acquire  information  from  other 
than  a  wire  or  radio  communication  under  circumstances  in 
^which  a  person  has  a  reasonable  expectation  of  privacy  and 
a  warrant  would  be  required  for  law  enforcement  purposes. 
Electronic  surveillance  that  does  not  fall  within  the  above 
definition  and  that  results  in  the  incidental  acquisition 
.  of  communications  sent  from  or  intended  for  receipt  within 
the  United  States  does  not  thereby  become  electronic  surveil- 
lance within  the  United  States. 
Sec.  3.   Policy 
Electronic  surveillance  by  DoD  intelligence  components 
within  the  United  States  is  conducted  only  pursuant  to  the 
Foreign  Intelligence  Surveillance  Act  of  1978,  ref.  (b) . 
Sec.  4.   Procedures 
A.   Electronic  surveillance  pursuant  to  judicial  warrant. 
Requests  for  judicial  warrants  shall  include — 
1.  the  identity,  if  known,  or  a  description  of 
the  target  of  the  electronic  surveillance; 
2.  a  statement  of  the  facts  and  circumstances  suffi- 
cient to  support  a  reasonable  belief  that 
(a)  the  target  of  the  electronic  surveillance 
is  a  foreign  power  or  an  agent  of  a  foreign 
power;  and 
(b)  each  of  the  facilities  or  places  at  which 
the  electronic  surveillance  is  directed 
is  being  used,  or  is  about  to  be  used,  by 
a  foreign  power  or  an  agent  of  a  foreign 
power;
3.  a  statement  of  the  proposed  minimization 
procedures  (in  most  cases  this  will  be  a 
standard  set  of  procedures  approved  by  the 
Attorney  General  attached  to  these  procedures 
as  Annex  B?  these  procedures  can  be. modified 
where  necessary  to  fit  particular  circumstances) ; 
4.  a  detailed  description  of  the  nature  of  the 
information  sought  and  the  type  of  communi- 
cations or  activities  to  be  subjected  to  the 
surveillance; 
.5.   a  statement  of  the  means  by  which  the  surveil- 
lance will  be  effected; 
6.  a  statement  whether  physical  entry  is  reguired 
to  effect  the  surveillance; 
7.  a  stat°.ment  of  the  facts  concerning  all  previous 
applications  that  have  been  made  to  any  judge  in- 
volving any  of  the  persons,  facilities,  or  places 
specified  in  the  application,  and  the  action 
taken  on  each  previous  application; 
8.  a  statement  of  the  period  of  time  for  which  the 
electronic  surveillance  is  required  to  be  main- 
tained, and  if  the  nature  of  the  intelligence 
gathering  is  such  that  the  approval  of  the  use 
of  •  electronic  surveillance  should  not  automatic- 
ally terminate  when  the  described  type  of  infor- 
mation has  first  been  obtained,  a  description  of 
facts  supporting  the  belief  that  additional  infor 
•  .    mation  of  the  same  type  will  be  obtained  there 
after;  and 
9.  whenever  more  than  one  electronic,  mechanical 
or  other  surveillance  device  is  to  be  used  with 
respect  to  a  particular  proposed  electronic  "- 
surveillance,  the  coverage  of  the  devices 
involved  and  what  minimization  procedures 
apply  to  information  acquired  by  each  device. 
Each  request  for  a  warrant  must  include  a  draft  of  a  proposed 
certification  from  the  Assistant  to  the  President  for  Hationa 
Security  Affairs ,  the  Secretary  of  Defense  or  the  Deputy 
Secretary  of  Defense.   The  certification  is  reguired  by 
statute  to  include  a  finding  by  the  certifying  official  that-
(a)  the  information  is  foreign  intelligence 
information; 
(b)  the  purpose  of  the  surveillance  is  to 
obtain  foreign  intelligence  information; 
(c)  such  information  cannot  reasonably  be 
obtained  by  normal  investigative 
techniques; 
(d)  the  type  of  foreign  intelligence  information 
being  sought  falls  into  one  of  the  statutory 
categories.   The  statutory  categories  are: 
first,  information  that  relates  to/  and 
if  concerning  a  United  States  person  is 
necessary  to,  the  ability  of  the  United 
States  to  protect  against — 
(i)   actual  or  potential  attack  or 
other  grave  hostile  acts  of  a 
foreign  power  or  an  agent  of 
a  foreign  power; 
(ii)  sabotage  or  international  terrorist 
activities  by  a  foreign  power  or  an 
agent  of  a  foreign  power;  or 
(iii)   clandestine  intelligence  activities 
by  an  intelligence  service  or  network 
of  a  foreign  power  or  by  an  agent  of 
a  foreign  power;  or 
second /  information  with  respect  to  a  foreign 
power  or  foreign  territory  that  relates  to, 
and  if  concerning  a  United  States'  person  is 
necessary  to- —  : 
(i)   the  national  defense  or  the  security 
of  the  United  States;  or 
(ii)   the  conduct  of  the  foreign  affairs- 
of  the  United  States. 
The  certification  must  include  a  statement  of  the  basis  for 
the  findings  under  subsections  (c)  and  (d)  above.
Bi   Authority  to  request  electronic  surveillance.   In 
most  cases,  the  judge  will  require  that  the  DoD  official  who 
is  the  applicant  for  &  warrant  be  present  in  the  courtroom 
when  the  judge  considers  the  application.   Designation  of 
officials  for  this  purpose  should  be  flexible. 
ci   Electronic  surveillance  in  emergency  situations. 
The  Foreign  Intelligence  Surveillance  Act  of  197  8  permits 
the  Attorney  General  to  grant  emergency  authorization  only 
in  limited  circumstances  when  the  factual  basis  exists  for 
issuance  of  a  warrant  under  Section  4 (A)  of  Procedure  4  and 
surveillance  for  longer  than  24  hours  requires  a  warrant 
issued  under  Section  4 (A) .   Requests  for  warrants  subsequent 
to  an  emergency  approval  by  the  Attorney  General  shall  be 
processed  under  Section  4  (A) . 
Date  of  Secretary  of  Defense  approval:
PROCEDURE  5.   GENERAL  REQUIREMENTS  FOR  ELECTRONIC 
SURVEILLANCE  OF  TARGETS  OUTSIDE  THE  UNITED  STATES 
Sec.  1.  Applicability  and  Scope  - 
""      This  procedure  implements  Section  2-202  of  Executive 
Order  12036,  ref.  (a),  and  applies  to  electronic  surveil- 
lance directed  against  the  communications  of  a  United  States 
person  who  is  outside  the  United  States.   This  procedure 
does  not  apply  to: 
.   activities  conducted  with  the  consent  of  one 
or  more  of  the  parties  surveilled;  the  defi- 
nition of  electronic  surveillance  includes 
only  nonconsensual  surveillances; 
.   electronic  surveillance  for  law  enforcement 
purposes; 
.   electronic  surveillance  directed  against  a 
person  who  does  not  qualify  as  a  United  States 
person; 
.   the  use  of  electronic  surveillance  equipment 
for  training  or  testing;  those  uses  are 
governed  by  Procedures  8  and  9, 
.   measures  conducted  outside  the  United  States 
for  purposes  of  determining  whether  electronic 
surveillance  equipment  is  being  used  unlawfully 
and  is  being  directed  against  United  States 
Government  facilities;  those  measures  are  governed 
by  Procedure  7;  and  ; 
.  the  use  outside  the  United  States  of  television 
cameras  or  other  electronic  means  of  continuous 
monitoring;  that  use  is  governed  by  Procedure  10. 
Sec.  2.   Definitions 
The  following  definitions,  set  out  in  enclosure  3, 
are  applicable  to  this  procedure: 
.   clandestine  intelligence  activity 
*   consent 
counterintelligence 
.   DoD  intelligence  components
electronic  surveillance 
electronic  surveillance  equipment 
.   employee 
,   foreign  intelligence 
.   foreign  power 
..  .   international  terrorist  activities  ~ 
•   law  enforcement 
physical  security 
,   reasonable  belief 
sabotage 
.   United  States  .  -• 
.   United  States  person 
.  wire  communication 
Electronic  surveillance  is  "directed  against  a  United 
States  person"  when  the  surveillance  is  intentionally  targeted 
against  or  designed  to  intercept  the  communications  of  that 
person.   Electronic  surveillance  directed,  against  persons  who 
"are  not  United  States  persons  that  results  in  the  incidental 
acquisition  of  the^congnunications  of  a  United  States^ person 
d~oeF1riot~tnereby  become  electronic  surveillance  directed 
against  a  United  States  person. 
The  regulation  of  electronic  surveillance  under  this 
procedure  is  intended  to  be  applied  in  conjunction  with  the 
regulation  of  electronic  surveillance  "within  the  United 
States"  under  Procedure  4  so  that  the  intentional  interception 
of  all  wire  or  radio  communications  of  United  States  persons 
is  covered  by  one  procedure  or  the  other.   The  place  where 
the  electronic  surveillance  is  conducted  is  not  the  deciding 
factor.   Electronic  surveillance  of  communications  that  origi- 
nate and  terminate  outside  the  United  States  can  be  conducted 
from  within  the  United  States  and  still  fall  under  this  pro- 
cedure rather  than  Procedure  4.
Sec.  3.   Policy 
Electronic  surveillance  by  DoD  intelligence  components 
directed  against  the  communications  of  a  United  Stater;  person 
who  is  outside  the  United  States  is  conducted  only  pursuant  to 
the  approval  of  the  Attorney  General  or  in  emergency  circumstances 
the  approval  of  a  senior  official  of  the  Department  of  Defense. 
Sec.  4.   Procedure 
A.   Electronic  surveillance  pursuant  to  Attorney  General 
approval.   A  DoD  intelligence  component  may  conduct  electronic 
surveillance  directed  at  a  United  States  person  if  the  surveil- 
lance is  approved  by  the  Attorney  General.   Requests  for  approval 
will  be  forwarded  to  the  Attorney  General  through  the  DoD  General 
Counsel  or  the  NSA  General  Counsel.   Each  request  shall  include: 
1.  An  identification  or  description  of  the 
target; 
. 
2.  A  statement  of  the  facts  supporting  a  finding 
•  that: 
(a)   There  is  probable  cause  to  believe  the 
target  of  the  electronic  surveillance  is  — 
(1)  a  person  who,  for  or  on  behalf  of 
a  £oreign_pow_er^  is  engaged  i n 
clandes"tin_e__intellrgejice  activities 
( including  covert  activities  in€g n d e-d 
to  af f ect_the  political  or  govern- "~ 
men"tal7jp^pces_s )  ,  sabotage,  or  inter- 
national terrorist  activites,  or  who 
conspires  with,  or  knowingly  aids  and 
abets  such  a  person  engaging  in  such 
activities; 
(2)  a  person  who  is  an  officer  or  employee 
of  a  foreign  power; 
(3)  a  person  unlawfully  acting  for,  or 
pursuant  to  the  direction  of,  a 
foreign  power.   The  mere  fact  that 
a  person's  activities  may  benefit     I 
or  further  the  aims  of  a  foreign      j
power  is  not  enough  to  bring  that 
person  under  this  subsection  absent 
evidence  that  the  person  is  taking 
direction  from,  or  acting  in  knowing 
concert  with,  the  foreign  power. 
(b)  The  electronic  surveillance  is  likely  to 
result  in  the  collection  of  significant 
foreign  intelligence  or  counterintelligence. 
(c)  The  significant  foreign  intelligence  or 
counterintelligence  expected  to  be  obtained 
from  the  electronic  surveillance  could  not 
reasonably  be  obtained  by  other  less  intru- 
sive collection  techniques. 
3.  A  description  of  the  significant  foreign 
intelligence  or  counterintelligence  expected 
to  be  obtained  from  the  electronic  surveillance; 
4.  A  description  of  the  means  by  which  the  elec- 
tronic surveillance  will  be  effected; 
.5.   If  physical  trespass  is  required  to  effect  the 
-  •        surveillance,  a  statement  of  facts  supporting 
a  finding  that  the  means  involve  the.  least 
amount  of  intrusion  that  will  accomplish  the 
objective; 
6.  A  statement  of  the  period  of  time,  not  to 
exceed  90  days,  for  which  the  electronic 
surveillance  is  required;  and 
7.  A  description  of  the  expected  dissemination  of 
the  product  of  the  monitoring  including  a 
description  of  the  means  by  which  communi- 
cations that  are  not  sent  or  received  by 
persons  targeted  will  be  protected  from 
storage  or  dissemination. 
B.   Electronic  surveillance  in  emergency  situations.   A 
DoD  intelligence  component  may  conduct  electronic  surveillance 
outside  the  United  States  directed  at  a  United  States  person 
in  emergency  situations  under  the  following  limitations:
1.   Senior  officials  of  the  Department  of  Defense 
designated  in  subsection  4  (D)  (2)  below  may 
authorize  electronic  surveillance  outside  the 
United  States  directed  at  a  United  States  per- 
son in  emergency  situations  when  securing  a 
military  warrant  or  the  prior  approval  of  the 
Attorney  General  is  not  practical  because  — 
(a)  the  time  required  would  cause  failure  or 
delay  in  obtaining  significant  foreign 
"intelligence  or  counterintelligence  and 
such  failure  or  delay  would  result  in  sub- 
stantial harm  to  the  national  security; 
(b)  a  person's  life  or  physical  safety  is  reasonably 
believed  to  be  in  immediate  danger;  or 
(c)  the  physical  security  of  a  Defense  instal- 
lation or  government  property  is  reasonably 
believed  to  be  in  immediate  danger. 
2.  Except  when  a  person's  life  is  in  danger  the  senior 
official  authorizing  such  emergency  surveillance 
shall  make  a  finding  that  the  requirements  of 
§  4 (A) (1) 'are  met  and  shall  notify  the  DoD  General 
Counsel  promptly.     -  • 
3.  The  Attorney  General  shall  be  notified  by  the  DoD 
General  Counsel  as  soon  as  possible  of  the  nature 
of  the  electronic  surveillance,  the  circumstances 
surrounding  its  authorization,  and  the  results 
thereof. 
4.  Electronic  surveillance  authorized  by  a  senior 
official  pursuant  to  this  section  may  not  continue 
longer  than  the  time  required  for  a  decision  by 
the  Attorney  General  and  in  no  event  longer  than 
72  hours. 
C.   Officials  authorized  to  request  foreign  electronic 
surveillance. 
The  following  officials  may  authorize  or 
request  approval  of  foreign  electronic  sur- 
veillance under  subsections  4 (A)  above  — 
(a)   the  Secretary  and  Deputy  Secretary 
of  Defense;
(b)  the  Secretaries  and  Acting  Secretaries 
of  the  Military  Departments;  or 
(c)  the  Director  of  the  National  Security 
Agency. 
2.   Authorization  for  electronic  surveillance  under 
subsection  4  (B)  may  be  granted  by  — 
<a)   any  civilian  Presidential  appointee, 
(b)  any  general  or  flag  officer,  or 
(c)  any  head  of  a  DoD  intelligence  component. 
Date  of  Attorney  General  approval: 
Date  of  Secretary  of  Defense  approval: 
6^P>     ef«sflT
PROCEDURE  7:   COMMUNICATIONS  SECURITY  ACTIVITIES 
Sec.  1;   Applicability  and  Scope 
This  procedure  implements  Section  2-202  of  Executive 
--Order  12036,  ref.  (a),  which  refers  to  electronic  surveillance 
equipment,  and  Section  105(f)(2)  of  the  Foreign  Intelligence 
Surveillance  Act  of  1978,  ref.  (b) ,  which  refers  to  electronic 
surveillance  equipment.   It  applies  to  technical  counter- 
measures  and  to  vulnerability  surveys.   Nothing  in  this 
Procedure  supercedes  any  provision  of  Procedure  4  or  5. 
•Sec.  2.   Definitions 
The  following  definitions,  set  out  in  enclosure  3,  are 
applicable  to  this  procedure t 
communications  security 
contractor 
DoD  intelligence  components 
electronic  surveillance 
electronic  communications  equipment 
foreign  power 
,   United  States 
United  States  person 
The  term  technical  countermeasures,  when  applied  to  acti- 
vities within  the  United  States,  includes  measures  to  determine 
the  existence  and  capability  of  electronic  surveillance  equip- 
ment being  used  unlawfully.   The  term  includes  the  use  of 
electronic  surveillance  equipment  and  other  electronic  or 
mechanical  devices  necessary  to  determine  whether  facilities, 
communications  equipment,  or  other  equipment  or  devices  owned 
or  controlled  by  the  United  States  Government  or  by  Department 
of  Defense  contractors  are  susceptible  to  unlawful  electronic 
surveillance;  or  to  determine  whether  electronic  surveillance
equipment  is  present  and  is  being  used  unlawfully.  When 
applied  to  activities  outside  the  United  States  the  require- 
rxnent  with  respect  to  "unlawful"  use  and  "unlawful"  electronic 
surveillance  does  not  apply;  any  use  and  any  surveillance  is 
included. 
Communications  security  entity  means  each  entity  subject 
to  the  guidance  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense,  acting  as  the 
executive  agent  of  the  United  States  Government,  and  the 
Director,  National  Security  Agency,  acting  for  the  Secretary 
in  executing  responsibilities  as  executive  agent,  that  carries 
out  any  of  the  comimmications  security  activities  of  the  United 
States  Government. 
Hearability  survey  means  monitoring  radio  communications 
to  determine  whether  a  particular  radio  signal  can  be  received 
at  one  or  more  locations  and,  if  reception  is  possible,  to 
determine  the  quality  of  receipt ion  over  time. 
Sec.  3.   Policy 
DoD  intelligence  components  use  technical  counterroeasuxes 
and  conduct  vulnerability  surveys,  to  the  maximum  extent  that 
is  practical,  without  interception  of  or  interference  with 
the  communications  of  United  States  persons.   The  Director, 
National  Security  Agency,  is  assigned  responsibility  for 
communications  security  activities.
S2 
Sec.  4.   Procedures 
A.   Criteria  for  counter-measures.   A  DoD  intelligence 
component  may  use  technical  countermeasures  against  electronic 
surveillance  equipment  being  used  by  persons  not  authorized 
to  conduct  electronic  surveillance  i£; 
1.  The  use  is  limited  in  duration  and  scope 
to  that  necessary  to  determine  the  exist- 
ence and  capability  of  such  equipment; 
2.  The  Use  is  solely  for  the  purpose  of  deter- 
mining the  existence  and  capability  of  such 
equipment ; 
3.  The  use  is  at  the  request  or  with  the  consent 
of  an  authorized  official  in  charge  of  a  facility, 
organization  or  system  where  the  countermeasures 
are  to  be  undertaken;  and 
4.  Access  to  the  content  of  communications 
/'t:-:^  acquired  during  the  use  of  countermeasures 
is  limited  to  persons  involved  directly  in 
conducting  such  measures,  and  any  content 
acquired  is  destroyed  as  soon  as  practical 
or  upon  completion  of  the  particular  use 
except  that  information  with  respect  to 
violations  of  federal  law  may  be  transmitted 
to  the  Attorney  General  and  information  with 
respect  to  violations  of  military  law  may  be 
transmitted  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Military _ 
Department.   A  record  of  the  types  of  communi- 
cations and  information  subject  to  acquisition 
by  the  illegal  electronic  surveillance  equip- 
ment may  be  retained.   Such  information  may 
be  used  only  to  protect  against  unlawful 
electronic  surveillance  or  to  enforce  criminal 
laws  if  such  use  outweighs  the  possible  harm 
to  national  security. 
B.   Criteria  for  vulnerability  surveys.   Nonconsensual 
surveys  may  be  conducted  to  determine  the  potential  vulner- 
,T....,   ability  to  intelligence  services  of  a  foreign  power  of
w.ansmission  facilities  of  cornmuni cat ions  common  carriers, 
other  private  commercial  entities/  and  entities  of  the 
Federal  Government,  subject  to  the  following  limitations t 
~"        1.   No  vulnerability  survey  may  be  conducted 
without  the  prior  written  approval  of  the 
Director,  National  Security  Agency  or  a 
•  designee ; 
2.  No  transmission  may  be  acquired  aurally; 
3.  No  content  of  any  transmission  may  be 
acquired  by  any  means; 
4.  No  transmissions  may  be  recorded;  and 
5.  No  report  or  log  may  identify  any  United 
States  person  or  entity  except  to  the  extent 
of  identifying  transmission  facilities  that 
are  vulnerable  to  surveillance  by  foreign 
powers.   If  the  identities  of  the  users  of 
such  facilities  are  not  identical  with  the 
identities  of  the  owners  of  the  facilities, 
the  identity  of  such  users  may  be  obtained, 
-       but  not  from  the  content  of  the  transmissions 
themselves,  and  may  be  included  in  such 
report  or  log.   Reports  may  be  disseminated. 
Logs  may  be  disseminated  only  if  required 
to  verify  results  contained  in  reports. 
.; 
C.  Hearability  surveys.   The  National  Security  Agency 
may  conduct  or  may  authorize  the  conduct  of  hearability  surveys 
of  telecommunications  that  are  transmitted  in  the  United  States 
1.  Collection.   Where  practicable,  consent 
will  be  secured  from  the  owner  or  user 
of  the  facility  against  which  the  hearability 
survey  is  to  be  conducted  prior  to  the  com- 
mencement of  the  survey. 
2.  Processing  and  storage.   Information  collected 
during  a  hearability  survey  must  be  processed 
and  stored  as  follows: 
(a)   The  content  of  communication  may  not 
be  recorded  nor  included  in  any  report.
(b)  •  No  microwave  transmission  may  be  demulti- 
plexed or  demodulated  for  any  purpose. 
(c)  No  report  or  log  may  identify  any  person 
or  entity  except  to  the  extent„pf  identi- 
fying the  transmission  facility  that  can 
be  intercepted  from  the  intercept  site. 
If  the  identities  of  the  users  of  such 
facilities  are  not  identical  With  the 
identities  of  the  owners  of  the  facili- 
ties, and  their  identities  are  relevant 
to  the  purpose  for  which  the  hearability 
surveys  has  been  conducted,  the  identity 
of  such  users  may  be  obtained  provided 
such  identities  may  not  be  obtained  from 
the  content  of  the  transmission  themselves. 
3.   Dissemination .  Reports  may  be  disseminated  only 
Within  the  United  States  Government.   Logs  may 
not  be  disseminated  unless  required  to  verify 
results  contained  in  reports. 
D.   Other  communications  security  monitoring.   Other 
communications  security  monitoring  that  is  directed  against 
the  communications  of  United  States  persons  may  be  conducted 
only  with  the  consent  of  one  of  the  parties  to  the  communica- 
tion. 
Date  of  Attorney  General  approval: 
Date  of  Secretary  of  Defense  approval: 
<£ftiv  fAch)
PROCEDURE  8.   TESTING  AND  CALIBRATION  OF 
ELECTRONIC  EQUIPMENT  ■ 
Sec<  1,  Applicability  and  Scope  i 
*  This  procedure  implements  Section  2-202  of  Executive 
Order  12036,  ref.  (.a)  ,  which  refers  to  electronic  communica- 
tions equipment?  and  Section  103(f) (.1)  of  the  Foreign"  Intelli- 
gence Surveillance  Act  of  1978t  ref.  (b) ,  which  refers  to 
electronic  equipment.   It  applies  to  the  testing  and  calibra- 
tion by  Department  of  Defense  intelligence  components  of 
electronic  equipment  that  has  the  capability  to  intercept 
communications. 
Sec,  2t   Definitions 
The  following  definitions,  set  out  in  enclosure  3,  are 
applicable  to  this  procedure: 
DoD  intelligence  components 
,   electronic  surveillance 
employee 
United  States 
i     United  States  person 
Sec.  3.   Policy 
Testing  and  calibration  of  electronic  equipment  that  can 
•  intercept  communications  is  conducted,  to  the  maximum  extent 
that  is  practical,  without  interception  of  the  communications 
of  United  States  persons. 
Sec.  4.   Procedures 
A.   Criteria  for  testing  and  calibration.  A  DoD  in tell i- 
component  may  test  and  calibrate  electronic  equipment  subject 
to  the  following  limitations:
.  56 
1.  To  the  maximum  extent  that  is  practical,  the 
following  should  be  used  — 
(a)  laboratory  generated  signals, 
(b)  Department  of  Defense  official  agency  ; 
communications  with  consent  from  an 
appropriate  DoD  official, 
(c)  official  government  agency  communications 
with  consent  from  an  appropriate  official 
of -the  originating  agency, 
(d)  individual  government  employee  communications 
with  consent  from  the  employee,  or 
(e)  communications  transmitted  between  terminals 
located  outside  the  United  States  not  used 
by  any  known  United  States  person. 
2.  Where  it  is  not  practical  to  test  electronic 
equipment  solely  against  signals  described  in 
subsection  A(l)  above, "testing  may  be  conducted 
provided — 
(a)  it  is  limited  in  scope  and  duration  to 
that  necessary  to  determine  the  capability 
of  the  equipment; 
(b)  no  particular  United  States  person  is 
targeted  intentionally  without  consent 
and  it  is  not  reasonable  to  obtain  the 
consent  of  the  persons  incidentally 
subjected  to  the  surveillance;  and 
(c)  -the  test  does  not  exceed  90  calendar  days. 
B.  Time  limitations.  Where  the  test  involves  communications 
other  than  those  identified  in  subsection  (A) (1)  above  and  a 
test  period  longer  than  90  days  is  required,  the  DoD  intelligence 
component  shall  submit  a  test  proposal  to  the  DoD  General  Counsel 
or  the  NSA  General  Counsel  for  transmission  to  the  Attorney 
General  for  approval.  The  test  proposal  shall  state  the  require- 
ment for  an  extended  test  involving  such  communications,  the
nature  of  the  test,  the  organization  that  will  conduct  the  test, 
and  the  proposed  disposition  of  any  signals  or  communications 
acquired  during  the  test. 
c.   storage  and  dissemination.  The  content  of  any  communi- 
-  acquired  during  a  test  shall  be: 
1.   Retained  only  for  the  purpose  of  determining 
the  capability  of  the  electronic  equipment; 
i 
12.   Disclosed  only  to  persons  conducting  the  test; 
and 
i       .     3,   Destroyed  upon  completion  of  the  testing. 
The  technical  parameters  of  a  communication,  such  as  frequency, 
modulation,  and  time  of  activity  of  acquired  electronic  signals 
-nay  be  retained  and  used  for  test  reporting  or  collection 
-■■avoidance  purposes.   Such  parameters  may  be  disseminated  to 
other  DoD  intelligence  components  and  other  entities  authorized 
to  conduct  electronic  surveillance  provided  such  dissemination 
and  use  are  limited  to  testing  or  collection  avoidance  purposes 
No  content  of  any  communication  may  be  retained  or  used. 
/ 
Date  of  Attorney  General  approval:         _ 
 — < 
Date  of  Secretary  of  Defense  approval:
PROCEDURE  9,   TRAINING  OF  PERSONNEL  IN 
THE  OPERATION  AND  USE  OF  ELECTRONIC 
COMMUNICATIONS  AND  SURVEILLANCE  EQUIPMENT   . 
Sec.  1.  Applicability  and  Scope 
This  procedure  implements  Section  2-202  of  Executive 
Order  12026,  reft  (a),  which  refers  to  electronic  communi- 
cations equipment;  and  Section  104(f) C3)  of  the  Foreign 
Intelligence  Surveillance  Act  of  197 8 r  ref.  (b) ,  which  refers 
to  electronic  surveillance  equipment*   It  applies  to  the 
training  of  the  personnel  by  DoD  intelligence  components  in 
the  operation  and  use  of  electronic  communications  and 
surveillance  equipment.   These  procedures  do'  not  apply  to 
.   interception  of  communications  with  the 
consent  of  one  of  the  parties  to  the 
communi  cation . 
.   training  of  intelligence  personnel  by  non- 
intelligence  components. 
Sec.  2,   Definitions 
The  following  definitions  set  out  in  enclosure  3  are 
applicable  to  these  procedures: 
consent 
DoD  intelligence  components 
.   electronic  communications  equipment 
electronic  surveillance 
,   intelligence 
United  States  person 
Sec,  3t   Policy 
Training  of  DoD  personnel  in  the  operation  and  use  of 
eelctronic  communications  and  surveillance  equipment  is  con- 
ducted, to  the  maximum  extent  that  is  practical,  without 
interception  of  the  communications  of  United  States  persons 
who  have  not  given  consent.
•Sec,  4.   Procedures 
A#  Training  guidance.  .  The  training  of  the  personnel  of 
JDoD   intelligence  components  in  the  operation  and  use  of 
electronic  communications  and  surveillance  equipment  shall 
include. guidance  concerning  the  requirements  and  restrictions 
of  the  Foreign  Intelligence  Surveillance  Act  and  Executive 
Order  12036  with  respect  to  the  unauthorized  acquisition  and 
use  of  the  content  of  communications  of  United  States  persons. 
B.   Training  limitations.   The  use  of  electronic  communi- 
cations and  surveillance  equipment  for  training  purposes  is 
permitted  subject  to  the  following  limitations: 
1.  To  the  maximum  extent  that  is  practical;  use 
of  such  equipment  for  training  purposes  shall 
be  directed  against  intelligence  targets 
otherwise  authorized;  . 
2.  The  contents  of  private  communications  of 
nonconsenting  United  States  persons  may  not 
be  acquired  aurally  unless  the  person  is  an 
authorized  target  of  electronic  surveillance; 
and 
3.  The  electronic  surveillance  will  be  limited 
in  extent  and  duration  to  that  necessary  to 
train  personnel  in  the  use  of  the  equipment. 
There  are  two  exceptions  to  these  limitations: 
4.  Public  broadcasts,  distress  signals  or 
official  United  States  Government  com- 
munications may  be  monitored  provided 
that  where  government  agency  communi- 
cations are  monitored,  the  conseri  of  an 
appropriate  official  is  obtained;  and 
5.  Minimal  acquisition  of  information _ is 
permitted  as  required  for  calibration 
purposes,
C.   Storage  and  dissemination.   Information  collected 
luring  training  that  involves  authorized  intelligence  ; 
targets  may  be  stored  in  accordance  with  Procedure "2  and 
lisseminated  in  accordance  with  Procedure  3.  Information 
[collected  during  training  that  does  not  involve  authorized 
intelligence  targets  or  that  is  acquired  inadvertently  shall 
be  destroyed  as  soon  as  practical  or  upon  completion  of  the 
training  and  may  not  be  disseminated  for  any  purpose.   This 
subsection  does  not  apply  to  distress  signals. 
Date  of  Attorney  General  approval: 
Date  of  Secretary  of  Defense  approval: 
(C4,fr    tf>r(Tj
PROCEDURE  10:   CONCEALED  TELEVISION  MONITORING 
AND  OTHER  CONCEALED  MONITORING 
Sec.  Is   Applicability  and  Scope 
_•  "  This-  procedure  implements  Section  2-203  of  Executive 
Order  12036,  ref.  (a),  and  Section  102(b)  of  the  Foreign  In- 
telligence  Surveillance  Act  of  1978,  ref.  (b) .   It  applies  to 
concealed  television  and  other  nonitoring  for  foreign  intelli- 
gence and  counterintelligence  purposes  conducted  by  a  DoD  in- 
telligence component  -within  the  United  States  or  directed  against 
a  United  States  person  who  is  outside  the  United  States.   These 
procedures  do  not  apply  to: 
surveillance  conducted  with  consent  including 
appropriate  general  notices  to  employees; 
television  and  other  monitoring  for  law  en- 
forcement purposes,  or  for  physical  security 
purposes; 
electronic  surveillance  for  foreign  intelli- 
gence and  counterintelligence  purposes;  that  is 
governed  by  Procedures  4  and  5; 
measures  conducted  to  determine  whether  elec- 
tronic surveillance  equipment  is  being-  used 
xinlawfully;  those  measures  are  governed  by 
Procedure  7; 
physical  surveillance  by  means  other  than  con- 
cealed television  and  other  concealed  monitoring; 
that  is  governed  by  Procedure  13; 
television  monitoring  outside  the  United  States 
directed  against  a  person  who  is  not  a  United 
States  person;  or 
overhead  reconnaissance  not  directed  at  specific 
United  States  persons. 
Sec.  2:   Definitions 
The  definitions  of  the  following  terms,  set  out  in 
enclosure  3,  are  applicable  to  this  procedure:
counterintelligence 
.   DoD 'intelligence  components 
;   electronic  surveillance 
employee 
.   foreign  intelligence 
intelligence  . 
-^      •   . .   law  enforcement 
"~         .   physical  security 
physical  surveillance 
United  States 
.  •  United  States  person 
•  Concealed  monitoring  in  this  context  means  monitoring 
that  is  both  surreptitious  and  continuous/  Monitoring  is 
surreptitious  when  it  is  targeted  against  a  particular  per- 
son or  groups  of  persons  and  is  conducted  secretly  for  the 
purpose  of  keeping  the  subject  of  the  monitoring  unaware  of 
it.   Monitoring  is  continuous  if  it  is  conducted  against  tar- 
geted persons  without  interruption  for  a  substantial  period  of 
time.   It  does  not  include  monitoring  when  television  cameras 
are  within  sight  although  placed  unobtrusively.   It  does  not 
include  monitoring  by  beepers  when  there  is  a  notice  affixed 
to  the  item  to  which  the  beeper  is  attached  indicating  the 
presence  of  the  beeper.   It  does  not  include  monitoring  of 
'space  not  targeted  at  specific  persons. 
Other  concealed  monitoring  in  this  context  means  monitoring 
by  movie  cameras  or  radiating  devices  and  receivers  known  as 
"beepers"  or  other  means  used  for  concealed  monitoring.   It 
does  not  include  binoculars,  search  light  or  still,  photographic 
devices. 
Monitoring  is  "within   the  United  States"  if  the  television 
camera,  monitoring  device  or  the  target  of  the  monitoring  is 
located  within  the  United  States.
Monitoring  is  for  physical  security  purposes  if  it  is  used 
to  monitor  open  spaces,  parking  lots,  corridors,  entrances, 
exits,  windows;  or  safes,  vaults,  restricted  access  areas,  or 
-other  areas,  used  primarily  for  the  .storage  of  classified  materials 
Sec-  3.   Policy 
.:     •  The  Department  of  Defense  normally  relies  on  the  Federal 
Bureau  of  Investigation  for  concealed  monitoring  conducted  in 
the  United  States  except  for  activities  on  DoD  property.   Use 
of  concealed  television  and  other  similar  types  of  monitoring 
within   the  United  States  by  DoD  intelligence  components  is  con- 
ducted only  on  installations,  facilities,  or  property  of  the 
Department  of  Defense  or  its  contractors.   This  limitiation  does 
not  apply  to  assistance  furnished  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investi- 
gation under  procedure  16  or  Sec.  2-309  of  Executive  Order 
12036. 
Sec.  4.      Procedures  . 
A.   Televis ion  monitoring  under  no  expectati on_of 
privacy.   Judgments  about  reasonable  expectations  of  privacy 
should  be  made  on  a  case-by-case  basis  and  only  after  consultation 
with  the  General  Counsel  of  the  intelligence  component,  and 
should  take  into  account  the  great  importance  of  preserving 
privacy.   A  reasonable  expectation  of  privacy  is  measured 
against  an  objective  standard  of  what  a  reasonable  person  would 
expect  under  the  circumstances.   There  are  reasonable  expectations 
of  privacy  in  work  spaces  if  a  person's  actions  and  papers 
are  not  subject  to  ready  observation  by  others  under  normal  work
circumstances.   The  limitations  on  television  monitoring 
where  there  is  no  reasonable  expection  of  privacy  are  as 
follows:  ■" 
1,  A  DoD  intelligence  component  may  conduct 
concealed  television  monitoring  within 
the  United  States  if  the  monitoring  is 
conducted  within  a  DoD  installation  or 
facility,  if  the  person  subject  to  moni- 
toring does  not  have  a  reasonable  expecta- 
tion of  privacy  and  if  no  physical  trespass 
is  used  to  effect  the  monitoring. 
2,  Television  monitoring  directed  at  a  United 
States  person  may  be  conducted  outside  the 
United  States  if  the  person  subject  to  the 
monitoring  does  not  have  a  reasonab] e 
expectation  of  privacy  and  if  no  physical 
trespass  is  used  to  effect  the  monitoring. 
3,  Concealed  television  monitoring  conducted 
under  this  subsection  requires  approval 
by  the  head  of  the  intelligence  component 
based  on  a  determination  that  such  moni- 
toring is  necessary  to  the  conduct  of 
assigned  intelligence  functions. 
4,  If  physical  trespass   is  involved  to  effect 
the  monitoring,  approval  of  the  Attorney 
General  or  a  warrant  issued  by  a  military 
judge  is  required. 
B.   Television  monitoring  where  there  is  an  expectation 
of  privacy.
1.   A  DoD  intelligence  component  may  conduct, 
concealed  television  monitoring  under 
circumstances  where  the  persons  subjected 
to  monitoring  have  a  reasonable  expectation 
of  privacy  if  the  monitoring  has  been 
approved  by  the  DoD  General  Counsel  or  a 
general  counsel  with  responsibility  for  an 
•  intelligence  component  and  the  necessary 
approvals  by  the  Attorney  General  or 
warrants  have  been  obtained.   Warrants 
approving  television  monitoring  conducted 
outside  the  United  States  may  be  issued 
by  a  military  judge  under  the  same  stan- 
dards as  are  required  for  electronic 
surveillance  outside  the  United  States 
(Procedure  5).   Submissions  to  the 
Attorney  General  under  this  subsection 
shall  be  made  by  the  DoD  General  Counsel. 
2.   Requests  for  concealed  television^  moni- 
toring under  this  subsection  must  be 
authorized  by-- 
(a)  the  Secretary  of  Defense,  Deputy 
Secretary  of  Defense  or  Deputy 
Under  Secretary  of  Defense  (Policy)  ; 
(b)  the  Secretaries  and  Acting  Secre- 
taries of  the  Military  Departments; 
(c)  the  Director  of  the  National  Security 
.  .Agency;  or 
(d)  the  Director  of  the  Defense  Intelli- 
gence Agency. 
C.  Other  concealed  monitoring.  Concealed  monitoring 
by  means  other  than  television  cameras  may  be  conducted  in 
accordance  with  Sections  4(A)  or  (B)  .   Monitoring  by  use  of
L   A  DoD  intelligence  component  may  conduct 
concealed  television  monitoring  under 
circumstances  where  the  persons  subiected 
to  monitoring  have  a  reasonable  eJPecta^°^r<a, 
of  privacy  if  the  monitoring  has  been  approved 
bv  the  DoD  General  Counsel  or  a  general  counsel 
with  responsibility  for  an  intelligence  com- 
ponent and  the  necessary  approvals  by  the 
Attorney  General  or  warrants  have  been  obtained. 
Submissions  to  the  Attorney  General  under  this 
subsection  shall  be  made  by  the  DoD  General 
Counsel. 
2   Requests  for  concealed  television  monitoring 
under  this  subsection  must  be  authorized 
by  — 
J  (a)   the  Secretary  of  Defense,  Deputy 
I  Secretary  of  Defense  or  Deputy  _ 
J...         *   Under  Secretary  of  Defense  (Policy)  ; 
(b)   the  Secretaries  and  Acting  Secretaries 
I  of  the  Military  Departments; 
I  (c)   the  Director  of  the  National  Security 
I  Agency;  or 
I  ■  (d)   the  Director  of  the  Defense  Intelli- 
f  gence  Agency. 
"  C.   Other  concealed  monitoring,.   Concealed  monitoring 
by  means  other  than  television  cameras  may  be  conducted  in 
f     
accordance  with  Sections  4 (A)  or  (B) .   Monitoring  by  use  of
night  vision  devices  or  telescopic  vision  devices  may  be 
»    approved  under  Section  4 (A)  if  these  devices  are  not" 
'  -"directed  against  building  interiors  in  which  there  is  a 
reasonable  expectation  of  privacy. 
Date  of  Attorney  General  approval: 
Date  of  Secretary  of  Defense  approval: £ii_j£rf?7
night  vision  devices  or  telescopic  vision  devices  may  be 
approved  under  Section  4 (A)  if'  these  devices  are  not" 
-"directed  against  building  interiors  in  which  there  is  a 
reasonable  expectation  of  privacy. 
Date  of  Attorney  General  approval:      ($"&  ^S>           »  ( ( ->   I  ?  ") 
Date  of  Secretary  of  Defense  approval:     '  '  '       - 
/ 
/ 
/
PROCEDURE  11:   PHYSICAL  SEARCH 
Sec,  1.  Applicability  and  Scope 
This  procedure  implements  section  2-204  of  Executive 
Order  12036,  ref  (a) ,  and  applies  to  physical  searches  of  any 
person,  or  property  within  the  United  States  and  to 
physical  searches  of  the  person  or  property  of  a  United  States 
person  outside  the  United  States  by  DoD  intelligence  components 
for  foreign  intelligence  or  counterintelligence  purposes.   This 
procedure  does  not  apply  to: 
physical  searches  authorized  pursuant 
to  the  Uniform  Code  of  Military  Justice 
or  the  Manual  for  Courts  Martial,  including 
\  command  inspections  or  to  other  physical 
searches  for  law  enforcement  purposes; 
use  of  electronic  or  mechanical  devices 
within  the  United  States  governed  by 
Procedures  4 ,  6 ,  7 ,  8,9  and  10 ; 
mail  searches  governed  by  Procedure  12;  or 
searches  outside  the  United  States 
involving  persons  who  are  not  United 
States  persons . 
unconsented  physical  searches  within  the 
United  States  and  within  a  Defense  facility 
when  there  is  an  immediate  threat  to  the 
safety  of  individuals  or  to  prevent  destruc- 
tion or  loss  of  government  property  where  the 
cooperation  of  local  law  enforcement  officials 
cannot  be  obtained  in  time  to  prevent  harm  to 
individuals  or  destruction  of  property  as,  for 
example,  in  response  to  a  bomb  threat  where 
the  bomb  cannot  be  located. 
Sec.  2.   Definitions 
The  definitions  of  the  following  terms,  set  out  in 
enclosure  3,  are  applicable  to  this  procedure:
"k--*jC- -'•■"  ,J—'-"  ^r  ' -P-^-'    '     '•- '"— "-  '--^—  '-^t— ^-^-n^n^n-^T-irn-Maffii -fa- 1-^.^ --.^■Mvm».^YT1  ^tMTWif>Mi 
clandestine  intelligence  activity 
consent 
counterintelligence 
DoD  intelligence  components 
employee 
foreign  intelligence 
foreign  power 
Intelligence  Community 
international  terrorist  activities 
law  enforcement 
law  enforcement  authorities 
narcotics  production  or  trafficking 
"sabotage 
United  States  • 
United  States  person 
Physical  search  means  any  intrusion  upon  a  person  or  a 
person's  property  or  possessions  to  obtain  items  of  property 
or  information.   The  term  does  not  include  examination  of 
areas  that,  are  in  plain  view  and  visible  to  the  unaided  eye 
if  such  areas  constitute  public  places,  and  does  not  include 
abandoned  property  left  in  a  public  place. 
Sec.  3.   Policy 
DoD  intelligence  components  may  not  conduct  unconsented 
physical  searches  within  the  United  States.   Assistance  may 
be  rendered  to  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  in  the 
conduct  of  such  searches,  however,  in  accordance  with  sections 
2-308  and  2-309  of  Executive  Order  12036. 
DoD  intelligence  components  may  conduct  unconsented 
physical  searches  of  United  States  persons  who  are  outside 
the  l.-nited  States,  or  of  property  of  such  persons  that  is 
located  outside  the  United  States,  for  foreign  intelligence 
or  counterintelligence  purposes,  pursuant  to  a  warrant  issued
. 
by  a  military  judge,  the  approval  of  the  Attorney  General,  or 
in  emergency  circumstances,  pursuant  to  the  approval  of  a 
designated  senior  DoD  official.  " 
Sec.  4t   Procedures 
A.   Consented  Physical  Searches.   A  DoD  intelligence 
component  may  conduct  physical  searches  under  implied  or 
express  consent  as  follows: 
1.   Express  consent.   A  DoD  intelligence  component 
may  conduct  physical  searches  of  persons  or 
property  with  the  express  consent  of  the  person 
searched  or  a  person  with  authority  over  real 
or  personal  property.   Determinations  of  author- 
ity shall  be  made  by  the  general  counsel  of  the 
DoD  intelligence  component  concerned. 
2»   Entrance  to  or  Exit  from  Facilities.   A  DoD 
intelligence  component  may  conduct  physical 
searches  of  persons  and  property  as  a. condi- 
tion of  entrance  to  or  exit  from  a  DoD  facility 
provided  — 
(a)  notices  are  posted  publicly  at  the 
entrances  to  the  facility  indicating 
that  consent  to  personal  and  property 
searches  is  a  condition  to  access  to 
the  facility; 
(b)  searches  of  a.   person  are  limited  to  a 
"pat-down"  search  designed  to  locate 
equipment,  documents,  or  related  espion- 
age devices; 
(c)  searches  of  property  are  limited  to  that 
in  possession  of  a  person  entering  or 
leaving  the  facility;  and 
(d)  searches  of  person  or  property  are  not 
made  when  the  person  learns  of  the 
search  requirement  before  entering 
the  facility  and  elects  not  to  enter 
3.   Contents  of  United  States  Government  Storage 
Facilities,  Pu'biic  'Records,  Lockers,  Desks  or 
other  Containers.   A  DoD  intelligence  component 
may  search  the  contents  of  United  States  govern- 
ment storage  facilities,  public  records,  lockers,
desks  and  other  containers  on  government  property 
subject  to  the  following  limitations  — 
(a)  The  contents  of  Defense  Department" 
storage  facilities  and  public  "re- 
cords may  be  examined  for  counter- 
intelligence purposes,  provided  the 
official  having  control  over  such 
records  or  facilities  or  superior 
consents  to  such  examination; 
(b)  Government  furnished  leckers ,  desks  or 
other  containers  assigned  to  individual 
employees  may  not  be  examined  without 
the  employee ' s  consent  except  by  a 
supervisor  or  other  person  acting 
for  such  supervisor  and  then  only  to 
retrieve  public  records  related  to 
the  employee's  responsibilities  or, 
in  the  case  of  the  death  or  illness 
of  the  employee,  to  obtain  other 
materials  belonging  to  the  employee 
for  delivery  to  a  person  acting  on 
behalf  of  the  employee.   This  prohi- 
bition does  not  apply  where  employees 
are  notified  in  writing  that  such 
lockers,  desks,  or  other  containers 
are  for  official  use  only  and  are  to 
remain  unlocked  or  if  locked,  duplicate 
keys  or  combinations  are  maintained  and 
will  be  used  to  conduct  searches. 
(c)  Lockers,  desks  or  other  such  containers 
located  inside  a  Defense  facility  that 
are  not  the  property  of  the  Government 
and  that  are  the  property  of  any  employee 
or  other  person  granted  access  to  a  Defense 
facility  may  not  be  examined  without  con- 
sent unless  such  furniture  is  being  re- 
moved from  the  facility  by. the  employee 
or  other  person  granted  access  and  the 
facility  has  posted  notices  a   its 
entrance  of  the  type  described  in  sub- 
section 4(A)(2)  above.   Personal  property 
used  solely  in  residences  within  a  Defense 
Department  facility  may  not  be  examined 
without  consent.
4.  Areas,  Containers,  Objects,  Vehicles  and 
Other  Property  not  on  or  Constituting 
Government  Property.   A  DoD  intelligence 
component  may  not  conduct  physical  searches 
of  property  that  is  not  Government  property 
or  that  is  not  located  on  Government  property 
without  the  express  written  consent  of  a  per- 
son with  authority  over  such  property.   The 
written  consent  shall  include  a  statement 
concerning  the  purpose  of  search,  the  specific 
places,  things  or  vehicle (s)  to  be  searched, 
the  right  of  the  individual  not  to  consent 
and  shall  be  signed  by  a  person  with  authority 
over  the  property. 
5.  Persons  Not  Employees.   A  DoD  intelligence 
component  may  not  conduct  physical  searches 
of  persons  who  are  not  employees  of  such 
components  or  persons  who  have  not  been 
granted  access  to  facilities  or  information 
of  such  components  except  for  counterintelli- 
gence purposes  related  to  the  protection  of 
personnel  or  facilities  and  then  only  with 
the  express  written  consent  of  the  individual 
to  be  searched.   The  written  consent  shall 
include  a  statement  concerning  the  purpose 
of  the  search,  the  degree  to  which  the  body 
of  the  person  will  be  searched,  the  right  of 
the  individual  not  to  consent  and  shall  be 
signed  by  the  individual  to  be  searched. 
B,   Physical  Searches  Under  Implied  Consent.   A  DoD 
intelligence  component  may  search  containers  entrusted  to 
a  person  under  circumstances  where  there  is  no  expectation 
of  privacy  with  respect  to  examination  of  the  contents  of 
the  container  by  that  person.   These  searches  must  be  con- 
ducted with  the  consent  of  the  person  to  whom . the  container 
has  been  entrusted.   This  search  permits  the  exmination  of 
pouches,  packages  or  envelopes  carried  by  carriers  if  the 
above  standard  is  met.
C.   Unconsented  Physical  Searches.   A  DoD  intelligence 
component  may  conduct  physical  searches  for  foreign  intelli- 
gence and  counterintelligence  purposes  of  United  States  persons 
who  are  outside  the  United  States  or  of  property  of  such  persons 
that  is  located  outside  the  United  States  if  the  search  is  con- 
ducted pursuant  to  a  military  warrant,  express  approval  by  the 
Attorney  General  or,  in  emergency  circumstances,  approval  of 
a  senior  official  of  the  Department  of  Defense. 
1.   Physical  search  pursuant  to  Attorney  General 
approval.   A  DoD  intelligence  component  may 
conduct  a  physical  search  of  a  United  States 
person  who  is  outside  the  United  States  or  of 
:  the  property  of  a  United  States  person  that  is 
•-•"••      .'  located  outside  the  United  States  if  the  search 
is -approved  by  the  Attorney  General.   Requests 
for  approval  will  be  forwarded  to  the  Attorney 
General  through  the  DoD  General  Counsel.   Each 
request  shall  include: 
(a)  An  identification  of  the  person  or 
description  of  the  property  to  be 
searched; 
(b)  A  statement  of  facts  supporting  a 
finding- that: 
1.    There  is  probable  cause  to  believe 
the  United  States  person  against 
whom  the  search  is  directed  is  — 
a.   a  person  who,  for  or  on  behalf 
of  a  foreign  power,  is 
. engaged 
in  clandestine  intelligence 
activities  (including  covert 
activities  intended  to  affect 
the  political  or  governmental 
process) ,  sabotage,  or-  inter- 
national terrorist  activites, 
or  who  conspires  with,  or 
knowingly  aids  and  abets  such 
a  person  engaging  in  such 
activities;
b.  a  person  who  is  an  officer 
or  employee  of  a  foreign 
power;  or 
c.  a  person  unlawfully  acting  for 
or  pursuant  to.  the  direction  of , 
a  foreign  power.   The  mere  fact 
that  a  person's  activities  may 
benefit  or  further  the  aims  of 
a  foreign  power  is  not  enough 
to  bring  that  person   under  this 
subsection  (c.)  absent  evidence 
that  the  person  is  taking 
directions  from,  or  acting  in 
knowing  concert  with,  the  foreign 
power . 
2.  Significant  foreign  intelligence  or 
•  counterintelligence  is  likely  to  be 
obtained  as  a  result  of  the  search; 
3.  The  significant  foreign  intelligence 
or  counterintelligence  expected  to  be 
obtained  could  not  be  obtained  by 
less  intrusive  means. 
(c)  A  description  of  the  significant  foreign 
intelligence  or  counterintelligence  expected 
to  be  obtained  from  the  search;  and 
(d)  A  description  of  -the  extent  of  the  search 
and  a  statement  of  facts  supporting  a 
finding  that  the  search  will  involve  the 
least  amount  of  physical  intrusion  that 
will  accomplish  the  objective  sought. 
Physical  search  in  emergency  situations.   A  DoD 
intelligence  component  may  conduct  a  physical 
search  of  a  United  States  person  who  is  outside 
the  United  States  or  of  the  property  of  a  United 
States  person  that  is  located  outside  the  United 
States  in  emergency  situations  under  the  following 
limitations : 
(a)   Senior  officials  of  the  Department  of 
Defense  designated  in  Section  5 (b)  may 
authorize  physical  search  in  emergency 
situations  when  securing  the  prior 
approval  of  the  Attorney  General  is  not 
practical  because  —
(i)   the  time  required  would  cause  failure 
or  substantial  delay  in  obtaining 
significant  foreign  intelligence  or 
counterintelligence  and  such  failure 
or  delay  would  result  in  substantial 
harm  to  the  national  security. 
(ii)   a  person's  life  or  physical  safety 
is  reasonably  believed  to  be  in 
imminent  danger,  or 
(iii)   there  is  an  immediate  threat  of 
destruction  of  government  property 
and  local  military  or  other  appro- 
priate law  enforcement  authorities 
"  cannot  be  notified  or  reach  the 
scene  in  time  to  prevent  the  harm. 
(b)   The  senior  official  authorizing  a  physical 
search  shall  make  a  finding  (unless  a 
person's  life  is  in  immediate  danger)  that 
the  requirements  of  subsection  4(C) (1) (b) 
are  met,  there  is  no  breaking  or  nonconsen- 
sual entry  of  real  property  and  any  con- 
tainer to  be  searched  as  in  the  lawful 
custody  of  the  United  States.   This  finding 
need  not  be  in  writing.
•  (cl   The  senior  official  shall  notify  the 
DoD  General  Counsel  promptly  and  the 
Attorney  General  shall  be  notified  by 
the  DoD  General  Counsel  as  soon  as 
possible  of  the  nature  of  the.search, 
-*  the  circumstances  surrounding  its 
authorization,  and  the  result  thereof. 
D,   Cooperation  with  physical  searches  by  the  FBI. 
Employees  of  a  DoD  intelligence  component  may  cooperate  with 
and  assist  in  physical  searches  conducted  by  the  Federal  Bureau 
of  Investigations  only  as  follows: 
1.   Foreign  intelligence.   When  a  DoD  intelligence 
component  identifies  a  requirement  for  an 
unconsented  physical  search  within  the  United 
States  that  is  related  to  foreign  intelligence, 
such  a  requirement  shall  be  submitted  in  writing 
to  the  Director  of  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Inves- 
tigation.  Employees  of  DoD  intelligence  compo- 
nents may  not  participate  with  the  FBI  in  the 
conduct  of  an  authorized  unconsented  physical 
search,  but  may  be  present  and  assist  the  FBI 
in  identifying  articles  of  interest  or  render 
technical  assistance  with  respect  to  foreign 
intelligence  collection  equipment. 
2.   Counterintelligence .   When  a  DoD  intelligence 
component  identifies  a  requirement  for  an 
unconsented  physical  search  within  the  United 
•States  that  is  related  to  counter  in  £eJLJJLgfiD,ce  , 
such  a  requirement  shall  be  submitted  in 
writing  to  the  Director  of  the  Federal  Bureau 
of  Investigation.   Employees  of  DoD  intelli- 
gence components  may  net  participate  with  the"  - 
FBI  in  the  conduct  of  an  authorized  unconsented 
physical  search  but  may  be  present  and  assist 
the  FBI  in  identifying  articles  of  interest  or 
render  technical  assistance  with  respect  to 
the  analysis  and  exploital Ion  of  material  and 
.  equipment  identified  for  purposes  of  — 
(a)  protection  of  personnel  or  facilities  of 
any  agency  within  the  Intelligence  Community; 
(b)  investigation  or  preventation  of  clandestine 
intelligence  activities  by  foreign  powers;
(c)   investigation  or  prevention  of  narcotics 
production  or  trafficking;  or 
.^  (d)   investigation  or  prevention  of  inter- 
"**  national  terrorist  activities. 
3.   Other ,   Expert  personnel  provided  to-  the 
FBI  in  accordance  with  Procedure  21  may 
participate  in  unconsented  physical  searches 
as  a  part  of  their  duties  with  the  FBI. 
E .   Cooperation  with  physical  searches  by  foreign 
officials.   Employees  of  DoD  intelligence  components  may 
not  participate  with  foreign  officials  in  the  conduct  of  an 
unconsented  physical  search  .not  conducted  pursuant  to  these 
procedures  but  may  be  present  and  assist  "foreign  officials 
in  identifying  articles  of  interest  or  render  assistance 
with  respect  to  foreign  intelligence  collection  equipment. 
Sec.  5.   Authority  to,  request  physical  searches 
A.   Requests  for  approval  of  unconsented  physical 
searches  under  subsections  4 (C) (1)  and  (2)  must  be  authorized 
by: 
1.  The  Secretary  or  the  Deputy  Secretary  of 
Defense ; 
2.  The  Secretary  or  the  Acting  Secretary  of  a 
Military  Department, 
3.  The  Director  of  the  National  Security  Agency;  or 
4.  The  Director  of  the  Defense  Intelligence  Agency. 
B.   Authorization  for  physical  searches  under  subsection 
4(B) (3)  may  be  granted  by: 
1,  Any  civilian  Presidential  appointee; 
2,  Any  General  or  Flag  officer;  or 
3,  The  head  of  a  DoD  intelligence  component.
C.   Cooperation  with  physical  searches  conducted  by 
the  FBI  may  be  authorized  by  the  head  of  any  DoD  intelligence 
component  or  a  designee. 
Date  of  Attorney  General  approval: 
Date  of  Secretary  of  Defense  approval: 
<&&&[*£/ n  J
PROCEDURE  12:   HAIL  SEARCHES  AND  SURVEILLANCE 
Sec.  1.   Applicability  and  Scope 
This  procedure  implements  section  2-205  of  Executive 
^rder  12036,  ref.  (a).  It  applies  to  the  openinq  of  mail  or 
examination  of  envelopes  in  United  States  postal  channels  and 
to  the  opening  of  mail  to  or  from  United  States  persons  where 
such  activity  is  conducted  outside"  the  United  States  and  such 
mail  is  not  in  United  States  postal  channels.  This  procedure 
does  not  apply  to: 
.  opening  of  mail  or  examination  of  envelopes 
for  law  enforcement  purposes ; 
opening  or  examining  mail  with  the  consent  of 
the  sender  or  the  addressee; 
activities  related  to  the  DoD  Military  Customs 
Inspection  Program  conducted  under  DoD  Directive 
5030.49,  ref.  (h) ;  or 
opening  or  examining  mail  outside  the  United  States  to 
or  from  persons  who  -are  not- United  States -persons. 
Sec.  2.   Definitions 
The  definitions  of  the  following  terms,  set  out  in 
enclosure  3,  are  applicable  to  this  procedure. 
consent 
counterintelligence 
Dod  intelligence  components 
foreign  intelligence 
intelligence 
law  enforcement 
United  States 
United  States  person 
Mail  within  United  States  postal  channels 
includes  mail  originated  in  the  United  States  and  mail  within 
APO  or  FPO  channels.   It  also  includes  mail  originating  out-
side  the  United  States  once  it  comes  within  the  United  States 
and  is  handled  by  the  Postal  Service  regardless  of  the 
nationality  or  status  of  the  sender  or  recipient. 
Mail  cover  means  the  process  by  which  a  record  is 
made  of  any  data  appearing  on  the  outside  cover  of  any  class 
of  mail  matter  as  permitted  by  law,  other  than  for  the  purpose 
of  delivery  of  mail  or  administration  of  the  postal  service. 
Sec.  3.  Policy 
Mail  within  the  United  States  postal  channels  or  mail 
to  or  from  United  States  persons  that  originated  in  United  States 
-  postal  channels  is  not  opened  or  examined  by  DoD  intelligence 
components  except  in  rare  circumstances  where  significant 
foreign  intelligence  or  counterintelligence  is  involved  and 
except  as  permitted  under  applicable  statutes  and  regulations. 
Sec.  4.   Procedure 
A.   Department  of  Defense  intelligence  components  may 
open  mail  within  United  States  postal  channels  only  pursuant 
to  a  judicial  warrant  in  accordance  with  applicable  law.   Re- 
quests for  such  a  warrant  shall  be  approved  and  submitted  to 
the  Attorney  General  by  the  DoD  General  Counsel.
B.  Department  of  Defense  intelligence  components  may 
open  mail  to  or  from  United  States  persons  that  is  found  out- 
side United  States  postal  channels  only  pursuant  to  approval 
— — —  « 
^"by  the  Attorney  General.   Requests  for  such  approval  shall  be 
submitted  to  the  Attorney  General  by  the  DoD  General  Counsel. 
C.  The  following  officials  may  request  approval  to 
open  mail  — — 
1.   The  Secretary  and  Deputy  Secretary  of 
Defense;  and 
.2.   The  Secretaries  and  Acting  Secretaries 
of  the  Military  Departments. 
D.  Department  of  Defense  intelligence  components  may 
utilize  mail  covers  — 
1.  within  the  United  States  consistent  with 
postal  regulations. 
2.  outside  the  United  States  if  consistent, 
with  applicable  status  of  forces  agree- 
ments, or  where  there  are  .no  such  agree- 
ments, if  consistent  with  the  law  of  the 
jurisdiction  where  the  activity  takes  place. 
E.  Department  of  Defense  intelligence  components  may 
request  postal  authorities  to  inspect  the  contents  of  any 
second-,  third-,  or  fourth-class  mail  within  the  United 
States  and  may  inspect  such  contents  outside  the  United 
States  for  intelligence  purposes. 
Date  of  Attorney  General  approval: 
Date  of  Secretary  of  Defense  approval": 
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PROCEDURE  13;   PHYSICAL  SURVEILLANCE 
Sec.  1.   Applicability  and  Scope 
This  procedure  implements  section  2-206  of  Executive  Order 
"12036,  re£\  ta) f   and  applies  to  the  physical  surveillance  of 
United  States  persons  by  DoD  intelligence  components.   This 
procedure  does  not  apply  to: 
physical  surveillance  of  persons  who  are  not 
United  States  persons?' 
physical  surveillance  for  law  enforcement; 
.   surveillance  activities  that  use  electronic  of 
mechanical  devices  such  as  television  cameras, 
movie  cameras,  beepers  or  telescopic  microphones 
in  circumstances  in  which  a  warrant  would  be  re- 
quired in  the  criminal  context;  those  are  governed 
by  Procedures  4,  5,  and  10; 
activities  involved  in  physical  searches;  those 
axe  governed  by  Procedure  11? 
undisclosed  participation  in  organizations;  that  is 
covered  by  Procedure  14 ; 
routine  surveillance  of  open  areas,  parking  lots, 
corridors,  entrance  and  exits,  safes  and  vaults, 
restricted  access  areas  and  other  areas  where 
classified  information  is  stored; 
use  of  uniformed  guards  to  control  access  to  the 
premises  or  portions  of  the  premises  of  DoD  intel- 
ligence components ;  or 
physical  surveillance  conducted  as  a  part  of  a  military 
training  exercise  where  the  subjects  are  participants 
in  the  exercise. 
Sec.  2.   Definitions 
The  definitions  of  the  following  terms,  set  out  in 
enclosure  3,  are  applicable  to  this  procedure:
consent 
contact 
contractor 
counterintelligence 
counterintelligence  investigations  .. 
DoD  intelligence  components 
electronic  surveillance 
employee 
foreign  intelligence 
foreign  power 
intelligence  method  .  '•' 
intelligence  source 
international  terrorist  activities 
law  enforcement 
lawful  investigation 
member  of  a  military  service 
narcotics  production  or  trafficking 
physical  security 
physical  security  investigation 
physical  surveillance 
reasonable  belief 
United  States 
United  States  person 
The  Executive  Order  defines  the  term  "physical  surveillance' 
as  an  unconsented,  systematic  .  and  deliberate  observation  of  a 
person  by  any  means  on  a  continuing  basis,  or  unconsented 
acquisition  of  a  nonpublic  communication  by  a  person  not  a 
party  thereto  or  visibly  present  thereat  through  any  means 
not  involving  electronic  surveillance  or  physical  search. 
There  is  a  "systematic  and  deliberate  observa- 
tion" of  a  person  when  the  observation  is 
made  over  a  period  of  time  with  the  purpose 
of  keeping  a  person  under  observation.   Inci- 
dental observations  made  in  the  course  of  a 
surveillance  are  not  included. 
A  communication  is  "nonpublic"  when  it  is  not 
a  public  .broadcast  and  when  it  is  made  under 
circumstances  in  which  there  is  a  reasonable
expectation  that  no  one  will  hear  it  other 
than  the  person  or  persons  to  whora  the  com- 
munication is  directed, 
,  A  person  is  ^visibly  present"  at  a  conversation 
:r  ■    if  he  or  she  is  within  plain  sight  of  the  per- 
son doing  the  communicating.   If  a  person 
deliberately  concealed  from  view  overhears  a 
conversation^  that  would  constitute  physical 
surveillance, 
Sec,  3.   Policy 
DoD  intelligence  components  do  not  use  physical  surveillance 
directed  against  a  United  States  person  unless  that  technique 
is  necessary  to  achieve  a  lawful  foreign  intelligence  or 
counterintelligence  purpose  or  is  a  part  of  a  lawful  physical 
security  investigation.   Physical  surveillance  within  the 
United  States  and  outside  DoD  installations  is  conducted  in 
conformity  with  the  agreement  between  the  Department  of 
Defense  and  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  dated  April 
5,  1979,  Ref.  (n) . 
Sec.  4.   Procedures 
A.   General  Criteria  for  Physical  Surveillance.   A  DoD 
intelligence  component  may  direct  physical  surveillance  only 
at  certain  categories  of  persons  — 
1.   Within  the  United  States  only  against  — 
employees  of  the  intelligence  component; 
contractors  of  the  intelligence  component;
employees  of  such  contractor;  and 
members  of  the  military  services^ 
Within  the  United  States  a  DoD  intelligence  component  may 
conduct  physical  surveillance  only  on  DoD  installations 
unless  such  surveillance  is  directed  at  a  member  of  the 
military  service  or  is  "hot  pursuit ,"  or  is  otherwise 
undertaken  consistent  with  Ref .  (nj , 
2,   Outside  the  United  States  may  be  conducted 
against — 
all  persons  under  Subsection  4(A) (1);    / 
former  employees  of  a  DoD  intelligence 
component; 
former  contractors; 
former  contractor  employees; 
civilian  persons  employed  by  a  non- 
intelligence  component  of  DoD;  and 
persons  in  contract  with  a  present  or 
former  employee  or  contractor  (but  only 
to  the  extent  necessary  to  identify  that 
person) . 
B.   Physical  surveillance  for  positive  foreign  intelli- 
gence purposes.   A  DoD  intelligence  component  may  conduct 
physical  surveillance:
\.      Within  the  United  States,  if  the  surveillance 
meets  the  criteria  set  out  in  Section  4 (A)  and 
is  conducted  solely  for  the  purpose  of  identi- 
fying a  person  who  is  in  contact  with  someone 
who  is  the  subject  of  a  lawful  foreign  intelli- 
gence investigation.  A  person  is  the  "subject 
of"  a  foreign  intelligence  investigation  if 
.  foreign  intelligence  is  sought  from  or  about 
that  person.   The  person  who  is  the  foreign 
intelligence  target  may  be  either  a  United 
States  person  or  a  foreigner.   The  information 
that  may  be  collected  about  the  foreign  intelli- 
gence target's  contact  is  limited  to  information 
necessary  to  identify  that  person,  including 
name,  address,  and  employment. 
2.   Outside  the  United  States,  if 
(a)   the  surveillance  meets  the  criteria  in 
Section  4(B) (1) ,  or 
\ 
(b)   the  person  surveilled  is  reasonably 
believed  to  ^b^_actin.g_o.rL_bje.h.a  1  f .  of  a 
f oreign_power .  An  action  is  taken  "on 
behalf  oF""~~a~  foreign  power  when  it  is 
done  to  further  an  activity,  capability   j  j 
or  intention  of  a  foreign  power.         j  ' 
C.   Physical  surveillance  for  counterintelligence  purposes, 
A  DoD  intelligence  component  may  conduct  physical  surveillance 
for  counterintelligence  purposes  if 
1.   The  surveillance  is  directed  at  a  person 
who  is  the  subject  of  a  lawful  counter- 
intelligence investigation. 
*?.-****•—»?-%
A .person  is  the  "subject  of"  a  counter- 
intelligence investigation  when  the 
investigation  has  focused  on  that  person's 
activities. 
r"        2.   The  surveillance  is  conducted  solely 
for  the  purpose  of  identifying  a  person 
who  is  in  contact  with  someone  who  is 
the  subject  of  a  lawful  counterintelli- 
gence investigation. 
The  information  that  may  be  collected  about 
the  United  States  person  who  is  in  contact 
with  the  counterintelligence  target  is 
limited  to  information  necessary  to  identify 
that  person,  including  name,  address,  employ- 
ment /  and  security  clearance. 
Physical  surveillance  conducted  for  counterintelligence  pur- 
poses within  the  United  States  must  also  meet  the  criteria 
set  out  in  Section  4 (A) . 
D.   Physical  surveillance  for  protection  of  intelligence 
sources  and  methods.   A  DoD  intelligence  component  may  conduct 
physical  surveillance  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  a  foreign 
intelligence  or  counterintelligence  source  or  method  from 
unauthorized  disclosure.   Physical  surveillance  for  this  pur- 
pose may  be  conducted: 
1.   Within  the  United  States,  only  if  the 
surveillance  meets  tne  criteria  set  out 
in  Section  4(A)  and  only  against: 
(a)   A  present  employee  of  a  DoD  intelli- 
gence component;
(b)  A   present    contractor  of   a   DoD   intelli- 
gence  component; 
(c)  •  A  present  employee  of  a  present  con- 
tractor of   a  DoD  intelligence  component; 
•"""  or 
(d)  A  member  of  a  military  service. 
2,   Outside  the   United  States,  if  the  surveillance 
meets  the  criteria  set  out  in  Section  4  (A)  above 
and  is  conducted  against: 
(a)  Any  person  covered  by  subsections  4 (D) (1) 
(a) -(d)  above; 
(b)  A  former  employee  of  a  DoD  intelligence 
component; 
(c)  A  former  contractor  of  a  DoD  intelligence 
component ;  or 
(d)  A  present  or  former  employee  of  a  present 
or  former  contractor  of  a  DoD  intelligence 
component; 
(e)  A  person  who  is  in  contact  with  someone 
described  in  subsection  4(D)(2)(a),  (b)  , 
or  (c)  above  but  only  to  the  extent  neces- 
sary to  identify  that  person,  including 
name/  address,  employment  and  security 
clearance. 
E.   Physical  surveillance  for  'physical  security  purposes. 
A  DoD  intelligence  component  may  conduct  physical  surveillance^ 
for  the  purpose  of  protecting  the  physical  security  of  the 
installations  of  DoD  components.   The  surveillance  must  be 
conducted  as  a  part  of  a  lawful  physical  security  investigation 
and  must  meet  the  following  criteria: 
1.   The  surveillance  is  conducted  against  persons 
who  are  specified  in  Subsection  4  (D)  (1)  and 
(2)  above;
2.   The  surveillance  is  conducted  against  persons 
who  are  — 
(a)  discovered  on  a  Defense  or  intelligence 
installation  without  authorization; 
(b)  discovered  in  a  portion  of  an  installa- 
tion under  circumstances  such  that  there 
is  a  reasonable  belief  that  such  person 
is  violating  or  is  about  to  violate  laws 
or  regulations  relating  to  the  protection 
of  classified  information;  or 
(c)  reasonably  believed  to  be  engaging 
in  activities  that  are  directed  at  or 
will  result  in  unauthorized  entry  onto 
or  the  compromise  of  the  security  of 
an  installation. 
2.      Information  may  be  collected  regarding 
the  person's  — 
(a)  identification; 
(b)  location;  and 
(c)  activities,  intentions,  and  capabilities 
with  respect  to  breaching  the  physical 
security  of  the  installations . 
F.   Physical  surveillance  of  persons  engaging  in  inter- 
national terrorist  activities.   A  DoD  intelligence  component 
may  conduct  physical  surveillance  outside  the  United  States 
of  a  United  States  person  who  is.  reasonably  believed  to  be 
engaged  in  international  terrorist  activities.   A  person  is 
"engaged  in"  an  activity  if  that  person  has  taken  some  action 
in  furtherance  of  the  activity  or  is  in  contact  with  a  person  or 
organization  that  has  taken  such  action  under  circumstances 
that  support  a  reasonable  belief  that  action  by  that  person 
in  furtherance  of  the  activity  will  follow.
■■■fr*.fc-i»»»fcTiiiiir 
G.   Physical  surveillance  of  persons  engaging  in  narcotics 
production  or  trafficking.   A  DoD  intelligence  component  may 
"conduct  physical  surveillance  outside  the  United  States  of  a 
United  States  person  who  is  reasonably  believed  to  be  engaged 
in  narcotics  production  or  trafficking.   Information  collected 
should  be  limited  to  the  person's  identification;  location; 
and  activities,  intentions,  capabilities  and  associates  with 
respect  to  narcotics  production  or  trafficking. 
H.   Approval  of  physical  surveillance.   Physical  surveil- 
lance other  than  for  purposes  of  identification  must  be  author- 
ized by  the  head  of  the  intelligence  components  or  one  of- 
two  designated  senior  officials.   Physical  surveillance  for 
identification  purposes  may  be  authorized  by  a  field  supervisor. 
Date  of  Attorney  General  approval: 
Deat  of  Secretary  of  Defense  approval: 
CrBfe      KhllJ
PROCEDURE  14 .   UNDISCLOSED  PARTICIPATION 
IN  ORGANIZATIONS 
Sec.    1.  Applicability  and  Scope 
This  procedure  implements  Section  2-207  of  Executive 
Order  12036,  ref,  (a),  and  applies  to  participation  by 
employees  of  DoD  intelligence  components  in  any  organization 
within  the  United  States  or  that  is  primarily  composed  of 
United  States  persons  when  participation  is  on  behalf  of  any 
entity  of  the  intelligence  community.   These  procedures  do 
not  apply  to: 
the  undisclosed  participation  by  DoD  employees 
acting  on  behalf  of  Department  of  Defense  in- 
vestigative organizations  when  the  participa- 
tion is  for  law  enforcement  purposes  and  is 
conducted  under  the  provisions  of  DoD  Directive 
520.0.27,  ref.  (1)  ,- 
,   contracting  or  other  arrangements  for  goods  and 
services;  that  is  governed  by  Procedure  15;  or 
assignment  of  employees  of  DoD  intelligence 
components  to  other  agencies;  that  is  governed 
by  Procedure  18. 
Undisclosed  participation  in  organizations  not  affiliated  with 
the  Department  of  Defense  by  employees  of  DoD  intelligence 
components  is  exempted  from  the  requirements  of  DoD  Directive 
5200.27,  Ref.  (1) , 
Sec.  2.   Definitions  and  Interpretations 
The  definitions  of  the  following  terms,  set  out  in 
enclosure  3,  are  applicable  to  this  procedure: 
.   contact 
,   counterintelligence 
,   cover 
,   DoD  intelligence  component 
employee
I 
foreign  intelligence 
foreign  power 
intelligence  community 
international  terrorist  activities 
law  enforcement 
lawful  investigation  ^ 
_       :'  reasonable  belief 
United  States 
.   United  States  person 
Participation  in  this  context  means  taking  one  or  more 
of  the  following  actions  with  respect  to  an  organization  — 
acquiring  membership,  attending  meetings  not  open  to  the  public,' 
contributing  to  the  work  of  the  organization,  or  providing 
funds  to  the  organization  other  than  in  payment  for  goods  or 
services.   Participation  is  covered  by  this  procedure  if  it 
occurs  within  the  United  States. 
Participation  is  on  behalf  of  an  agency  within  the  intelli- 
gence community  when  the  employee  has  been  directed  to  participate 
as  a  part  of  his  or  her  work  assignment  or  when  any  information, 
contacts,  cover,  or  work  product  of  the  participation  is  intended 
for  delivery  to  or  for  the  benefit  of  such  agency.   Participation 
for  personal  purposes  of  increasing- an  employee's  store  of 
knowledge,  personal  associations  or  social  contacts  or  for  the 
benefit  of  an  employee's  extra-curricular  interests  is  not 
covered  by  this  procedure.   A  person  will  not  be  acting  on 
behalf  of  an  agency  within  the  intelligence. community  if  he  is 
not  paid  by  the  agency,  if  he  is  not  in  any  way  controlled  by 
the  agency,  and  if  he  does  not  undertake  any  action  that 
constitutes  participation  at  the  direction  or  request  of  the 
agency.
An  organization  is  primarily  composed  of  United  States 
persons  when  one-half  or  more  of  the  members,  participants  or 
employees  of  the  organization  are  United  States  persons.  This 
is  a  rough  rule  of  thumb  and  doubts  about  total  members  or 
numbers  of  United  States  persons  should  be  resolved  in.- favor 
of  the  additional  protection  accorded  organizations  that  are 
substantially  coirposed  of  United  States  persons.  An  action  is 
taken  on  behalf  of  a  foreign  power  when  it  is  done  to  further 
an  activity,,  capability  or  intention  of  a  foreign  power.  An 
organization  acts  only  through  its  members,  officers,  employees 
and  agents.   The  act  of  a  person  may  be  attributed,  to  the 
organization  when  it  was  done  at  the  direction  of  or  for  the 
benefit  of  the  organization. 
Sec.  3.   Policy 
Employees  of  Department  of  Defense  intelligence  components 
do  not  participate  in  organizations  within  the  United  States 
without  disclosing  their  affiliation  with  the  Department  and 
with  the  intelligence  component  unless  the  participation  is  for 
personal  and  not  official  purposes  or  unless  participation  with- 
out disclosure  has  been  approved  by  the  Deputy  Under  Secretary 
of  Defense  (Policy  Review) . 
Sec.  4,   Procedures 
A.   Undisclosed  Participation  on  Behalf  of  the  FBI,  The 
undisclosed  participation  of  an  employee  of  a  DoD  intelligence 
component  in  an  organization  within  the  United  States,  as  part
of  a  lawful  Investigation  or  operation  by  the  Federal  Bureau 
of  Investigation  must  be  requested  in  writing  by  the  FBI  and 
approved  by  the  Deputy  Under  .Secretary  or  Defense  (Policy 
Review) , 
B.   Undisclosed  Participation  in  an  Organization  Not 
Primarily  Composed  of  United  States  Persons  and  Reasonably 
Believed  to  be  Acting  on  Behalf  of  a  Foreign  Power,   Undisclosed 
participation  of  this  type  shall  be  requested  and  approved  in 
the  following  manner: 
1.  Authority  to  approve  such  participation  shall 
be  limited  to  the  Deputy  Under  Secretary  of  Defense 
(Policy  Review)  who  shall  find  that  such  non- 
disclosure is  essential  for  accomplishment 
of  a  lawful  purpose.  Such  finding  shall  be 
subject  to  review  by  the  Attorney  General. 
2.  Authority  to  request  such  participation  shall 
be  limited  to  the  Secretaries  and  Under  Secre- 
taries of  the  Military  Departments. 
3.  Requests  for  authority  for  such  participation 
shall  include  a  statement  of  facts  sufficient 
to  show  that  the  organization  concerned 
is  not  primarily  composed  of  United  States  per- 
sons, and  is  reasonably  believed  to  be  acting 
on  behalf  of  a  foreign  power.   Such  requests 
shall  also  show  that  the  FBI  has  concurred  in 
the  participation  being  requested. 
C.   Undisclosed  Participation  for  Limited  Foreign  Intelli- 
gence Purposes.   Employees  of  DoD  Intelligence  components  may 
participate  in  the  following  activities  without  disclosure  of 
affiliation  with  an  intelligence  component. 
1.   Participation  in  meetings,  conferences,  exhi- 
bitions, trade  fairs,  and  similar  gatherings 
sponsored  by  organizations  which  are 
open  to  the  public  and  which  are  designed  to 
enhance  the  skills,  knowledge  or  capabilities 
of  the  employee.
^w.,i..,^M^ifc,rr»Mii*i'a»M^i 
i.:,**r~Mr.i--  .  ...  .,    -,;mt    gr^n,    nM— r-  1 1  Jif  wlTTin  I  ji 
2.  Participation  in  technical  or  professional 
■seminars /  associations,  conferences,  work- 
shops, symposiums  and  other  meetings  spon- 
sored by  technical  organizations  although 
^  such  education  and  training  could  be'applied 
to  foreign  intelligence  uses 
3.  Membership  in  an  organization  solely  for  the  / 
purpose  of  establishing  professional  or  / 
educational  credentials.  .•'•'   / 
4.  Employees  who  participate  in  the  activities 
of  an  organization  under  subsection  (1) ,  (2) 
or  (3)  above  may,  if  requested,  identify  them- 
selves •  as  Department  of  Defense  employees ,  or 
members  of  a  military  service  or  command/ 
without  specifying  their  intelligence  affilia- 
tion. 
D.   Participation  in  Organizations  Where  Non-Disclosure 
of  Affiliation  is  Essential  to  Achieving  Lawful  Purposes. 
Undisclosed  participation  under  this  subsection  shall  be 
approved  as  follows: 
1.  Authority  to  approve  such  participation  shall 
be  limited  to  the  Deputy  Under  Secretary  of 
Defense  (Policy  Review)  who  shall  find  that 
such  non-disclosure  is  essential  for  accomplish- 
ment' of  a  lawful  purpose.   Such  finding  shall  be 
subject  to  review  by .the  Attorney  General. 
2.  Authority  to  request  such  participation  shall 
be  limited  to  the  Secretaries  and  Under  Secre- 
taries of  the  Military  Departments,  and  the 
heads  of  DoD  intelligence  components. 
3.  Requests  for  approval  of  such  participation 
shall  include  a  statement  of  facts  sufficient 
to  show  that  such  participation  is  essential 
to  a  lawful  foreign  intelligence  purpose. 
"Lawful  foreign  intelligence  purposes"  are 
limited  to  — 
(a)  Participation  to  establish  contact  with  a 
potential  source  of  foreign  intelligence 
or__a_j2aten-tiai— source— ox— assjkstance  il 
foreign  intelligence  activities;
(b)  Participation  to  establish  contact  with  someone 
who  is  a  target  of  foreign  intelligence; 
(c)  Participation  outside  the  United  States  to 
collect  foreign  intelligence,  but  not  to  acquire 
information  concerning  the  organization  in  which 
the  individual  is  participating; 
(d)  Participation  within  the  United  States  to 
collect  foreign  intelligence  from  cooperating 
sources,  otherwise  unobtainable,  where  such 
sources  would  be  lost  if  disclosure  of  the 
relationship  with  the  intelligence  component 
were  made,  provided  that  such  participation  has 
been  approved  by  the  Special  Coordination  Committee 
of  the  National  Security  Council,  and  the  organi- 
zation is  primarily  composed  of  persons  subject 
to  the  Uniform  Code  of  Militarv  Justice,  10  U.S.C. 
S  802,  Art.  2(1)  through  (10);  or 
(e)  Participation  to  establish  cover  necessary  to    I 
protect  the  security  of  foreign  intelligence. 
(f)  Participation  in  organizations  which  permit 
government  employees  to  so  participate  in  their 
official  capacity. 
4.  Participation  may  not  be  undertaken  for  the  purpose 
of  influencing  the  activity  of  the  organization  or 
its  members .. 
5.  Approval  under  these  procedures  shall  specify  the 
duration  of  participation  (not  to  exceed  12  months) 
and  include  provisions  to  ensure  that  the  partici- 
pation is  limited  to  approved  purpose. 
E.   Disclosure  of  Participation.   Unless  nondisclosure  is 
approved  uncer  this  procedure,  all  participation  in  organizations 
by  employees  of  DoD  intelligence  components  on  behalf  of  such 
components  shall  be  disclosed  to  an  executive  officer  of  the 
organization  or  to  the  official  in  charge  of  membership,  attendance, 
or  the  records  of  the  organization,  if  disclosure  of  affiliation 
is  normally  required  of  all  members  or  participants  in  such 
organization. 
Date  of  Attorney  General  approval:       J~' ^ 
Date  of  Secretary  of  Defense  approval: 
\ 
^^-^'S-'-ir*-*^  »»"»**«■  ■■)■»' ■"»'*.»in»l.;».j.vm"  .*»"•£•*■« J**wiff ^j"«^^'i»'i^a.^'yji^.>fiJ^*tfiy."j*<Ji.w-wji«*i."~y'>JH-*'*  ■"-«?*
'  PROCEDURE  J.5.   CONTRACTING  FOR  GOODS  AND  SERVICES 
Sec.  1.   Applicability  and  Scope 
This  procedure  implements  Section  2-303  of  Executive  Order 
2&CL36,  re£.  -Ca.).  c- and  applies  -to •  contracting  or  other  arrangements 
for  the  procurement  of  goods  and  services  by  DoD  intelligence 
components  within  the  United  States.   This  procedure  applies  to 
contracting  with  or  procurement  from  corporations,  other  commercial 
organizations,  academic  institutions  and  other  private 
institutions  or  individuals.   This  procedure  does  not  apply  to: 
contracting  outside  the  United  States 
even  if  the  contractor  is  a  United 
States  person  and  the  goods  and  services 
are  to  be  delivered  wholly  or  in  part 
within  the  United  States;  or 
contracting  with  government  entities. 
Sec.  2.   Definitions 
The  definitions  of  the  following  terms,  set  out  in 
enclosure  3,  are  relevant  to  this  procedure: 
avaiblable  publicity 
contractor 
commercial  organization  . 
corporation 
cover 
DoD  intelligence  components  ; 
intelligence 
intelligence  method 
intelligence  source 
intelligence  community 
United  States 
United  States  person 
A  United  States  academic  institution,  in  this  context, 
is  an  institution  that  is  a  United  States  person  and  that  is 
operated  or  holds  itself  out  as  a  degree-granting  institution. 
Both  public  and  private  academic  institutions  are  treated  the 
same  for  this  purpose.
The  term  "private  institution"  includes  associations, 
organizations  and  other  entities  that  have  no  government 
affiliation  and  that  are  not  corporations,  commercial  organiza- 
tions,  or  academic  institutions. 
A  contract  is  with  an  individual  rather  than  the 
organization  with  which  the  individual  is  affiliated  -when 
it  is  in  writing,  only  the  name  of  the  individual  appears 
as  a  contracting  party,  and  no  part  of  the  consideration  is 
specified  in  the  contract  as  payable  to  the  organization. 
Contracting  "by  or  for"  a  DoD  intelligence  component 
includes  placing  with  or  accepting  from  other  agencies  within 
the  Intelligence  Community  requests  to  procure  goods  and 
services  from  corporations,  commercial  organizations,  and 
private  institutions  in  order  to  protect  from  disclosure 
sensitive  intelligence  activities,  facilities,  or  relationships. 
Contracting  or  other  procurement  arrangements  are  "within 
the  United  States"  when  the  contract  is  entered  at  a  place 
within  the  United  States.   The  contract  may  recite  that  it 
was  entered  within  the  United  States  and  that  will  be  dis- 
positive for  purpose  of  this  procedure. 
Sec.  3.   Policy 
The  Department  of  Defense  discloses  the  maximum  amount 
of  information  about  the  sponsorship  of  contracts  made  within 
the  United  States  to  obtain  goods  and  services  that  is  con- 
sistent with  the  need  for  protection  of  intelligence  activities 
or  intelligence  sources  and  methods  from  disclosure.
Sec.  4;   Procedure 
A.  Academic  institutions.  Contracting  by  or  for  DoD 
intelligence  components  with  United  States  academic  insti- 
tutions may  be  done  only  in  compliance  with  the  following 
requirements : 
1.  No  DoD  intelligence  component  may  enter 
a  contract  for  goods  or  services  with  an 
academic  institution  unless,  prior  to  the 
making  of  the  contract,  the  intelligence 
component  has  disclosed  to  appropriate 
officials  of  the  academic  institution  the 
fact  of  sponsorship  by  a  DoD  intelligence 
component. 
2.  No  DoD  component  may  enter  a  contract 
with  an  academic  institution  for  the  pro- 
vision of  goods  and  services  to  be  used 
primarily  by  or  for  the  principal  benefit 
of  a  DoD  intelligence  component  unless 
prior  to  the  making  of  the  contract,  the 
DoD  component  has  disclosed  to  appropriate 
officials  the  fact  of  sponsorship  by  a 
DoD  intelligence  component. 
3.   Disclosure  is  adequate  if  — 
(a)  the  name  of  the  DoD  intelligence  com- 
ponent appears  on  the  face  of  the  con- 
tract as  a  contracting  party  or  as  a 
component  authorized  to  take  delivery 
of  goods  or  services  under  the  contract; 
(b)  there  is  appended  to  the  contract  a 
classified  annex  stating  that  the 
goods  or  services  to  be  delivered 
under  the  contract  are  for  the  use  of 
a  DoD  intelligence  component;  or 
(c)  the  contracting  officer  or  other  appropriate 
officer  of  the  academic  institution  is 
informed  orally  of  sponsorship  of  a  DoD 
intelligence  component  and  a  written  memorandum 
describing  the  information  given  to  the 
officer  and  the  time  and  place  of  the  oral 
communication  is  made  a  part  of  the  con- 
tract files  of  the  DoD  intelligence  component. 
/
Under  subsections  4(A)(3)(b),  and  (c)  above,  disclosure  need 
not  include  the  identity  of  the  specific  DoD  intelligence 
component  that  will  receive  the  goods  or  services. 
B,   Commercial  organizations  and  private  institutions. 
Contracting  by  or  for  a  DoD  intelligence  component  with 
corporations,  commercial  organizations  or  private  institu- 
tions may  be  done  only  if  at  least  one  of  the  following 
criteria  is  met: 
1.  There  has  been  disclosure,  prior  to  the  making 
of  the  contract,  of  the  fact  of  sponsorship  by 
a  DoD  intelligence  component.   Disclosure  is 
adequate  if  one  of  the  criteria  of  subsection 
4(A)  (3)  is  met. 
2.  The  contract  is  for  written  material  that  is 
available  publicly,  such  as  books,  magazines, 
and  journals  available  to  the  general  public, 
routine  goods  or  services  for  office  use  such 
as  telephone,  heat  and  light;  and  office  equip- 
ment and  supplies  available  to  the  general 
public.,  such  as  typewriters,  furniture ,  data 
processing  equipment,  interior  or  exterior 
maintenance  services;  and  routine  supplies 
•  or  services  for  vehicle  operation  and  main- 
tenance. 
3.  The  contract  is  for  routine  goods  and  services 
such  as  credit  cards,  car  rentals,  travel, 
lodging,  meals  and  other  items  incident  to 
approved  intelligence  activities. 
4.  There  is  written  determination  by  the  Secre- 
tary or  the  Under  Secretary  of  a  Military 
Department,  the  Director  of  the  National 
Security  Agency,  the  Director  of  the  Defense 
Intelligence  Agency,  or  the  Assistant  Secre- 
tary of  Defense  (Communications,  Command, 
Control  and  Intelligence)  that  the  sponsor- 
ship of  a  DoD  intelligence  component  needs 
to  be  concealed. .  That  determination  must 
be  supported  by  findings  that —
100 
Xa)   concealment  is  necessary  to  maintain 
cover  or  proprietary  arrangements, 
(b)  the  cover  or  proprietary  arrangements 
to  be  maintained  are  essential  to  the 
intelligence  activities  of  a  DoD  com- 
ponent, and 
(c)  the  activities  of  the  DoD  component 
for  which  cover  or  proprietary  arrange- 
ments are  used  are  authorized  intelli- 
gence activities. 
Determinations  may  be  made  for  categories  of 
contracts. 
C.  Individuals.   Contracting  by  or  for  a  DoD  intelli- 
gence component  with  an  individual  person  may  be  done  only 
if  there  has  been  oral  or  written  disclosure  of  the  sponsor- 
ship by  the  intelligence  component  or  a  determination  under 
subsection  4(B)(4)  has  been  made. 
D.  No  contract  shall  be  void  or  voidable  for  failure 
to  comply  with  this  procedure. 
Date  of  Attorney  General  approval:  •   £x_j_    •-    (  '  7 
Date  of  Secretary  of  Defense  approval:
101 
PROCEDURE  16.   PROVISION  OF  ASSISTANCE  BY  EXPERT 
PERSONNEL  TO  LAW  ENFORCEMENT  AUTHORITIES 
SecT" 1 .   Applicability  and  Scope 
This  procedure  implements  Sections  2-309 (c)  of  Executive 
Order  12036,  ref.  (a),  and  applies  to  the  prevision  of  assistance 
by  expert  personnel  -from  DoD  intelligence,  components  to  law 
enforcement  authorities  within  the  United  States.   These  pro- 
cedures do  not  apply  to: 
employees  of  DoD  intelligence  components  who 
are  assigned  law  enforcement  duties  when 
carrying  out  such  duties;  or 
activities  of  intelligence  components  outside 
the  United  States 
Sec.  2:   Definitions 
The  definitions  of  the  following  terms,  set  out  in  enclosure 
3,  are  applicable  to  these  procedures. 
DoD  intelligences  components 
employee 
expert  personnel 
law  enforcement 
law  enforcement  activities 
law  enforcement  authorities 
state 
United  States 
Sec .  3 .   Policy 
DoD  intelligence  components  may  provide  expert  personnel  to 
assist  law  enforcement  authorities  in  other  departments  or  agencies 
'.'-■i.  .*^j>*&*'WT;"~T™m™*'~.-'  "■  -.'.■■-■■**"  '  "  . .".■»,j.-j.-»^?rrr~m.~~7-» 
fc*!*^W-j'';'-'.V.T.,Ty<"'  '"f.  'T"A,,>.-1^-^°w.'    w»:ivi  'mnjjm.ijn  ■    »a  ,  i  ■■  ■  ■  m  jjj    »m  ryff"»."v'j.»i: ..  ~%i  i
102 
of  the  United  States  Government,  or,  if  lives  are,  .endangered, 
■such,  assistance  may  be  provided  state  and  local  .law  onforcement 
authorities.   Such  support  shall  be  limited  to  those  persons 
"With  particular  skills  which  are  otherwise  not  readily  avail- 
v. 
able  to  such  authorities  but  are  necessary  for  performing  a 
law  enforcement  function. 
Sec.  4.   Procedures 
A.  .Provision  of  Expert  Personnel  to  Federal  Law  Enforcement 
Authorities.   Provision  of  expert  personnel  to  any  federal  law 
enforcement  agency  may  be  made  only  pursuant  to  a  request  from 
the  head  of  such  agency.   The  participation  of  a  DoD  intelli- 
gence component  in  response  to  such  a  request  shall  be  limited 
::::Ln  the  following  respects: 
1.  The  only  personnel  to  be  provided  are 
experts  who  can  assist  in  specialized 
technical,  systems  or  logistics  assign- 
ments; 
2.  The  assignment  of  expert  personnel  to  a 
federal  law  enforcement  agency  is  accom- 
plished in  compliance  with  the  require- 
ments of  DoD  Directive  1000.17,  ref.  (f ) , 
and  procedure  14; 
3.  Such  personnel  are  not  used  by  the  request- 
ing federal  law  enforcement  agency  to 
participate  actively  in  or  direct  the 
apprehension  of  persons  violating  the 
criminal  laws  of  the  United  States; 
4 .  The  requirements  of  the  Posse  Comitatus 
x  Act, -.ref.  (c)  ,  are  met; 
5.  No  assignment  exceeds  90  days  without  the 
written  approval  of  the  Secretary  of 
Defense  or  a  designee;  and
3,03 
6.    The  requesting  federal  law  enforcement 
agency  does  not  assign  such  personnel 
to  duties  other  than  those  set  out  in 
-  '  ._.       -  the  memorandum  required  by  Section  D(Sl  Cc)  CD 
of  DoD  Directive  1C10.Q,17,  ref,  CE1. 
B.  Provision  of  Expert  Personnel  to  State  and  Local  Law 
Enforcement  Authorities.  Expert  personnel  may  be  provided  by 
DoD  intelligence  components  to  state  and  local  law  enforcement 
authorities  only  when  lives  are  endangered  and  only  pursuant 
to  a  request  by  the  head  of  such  authority.  Under  these  cir- 
cumstances expert  personnel  may  be  provided  to  such  agency 
provided  participation  in  law  enforcement  activities  is  limited 
as  follows: 
1.  Only  personnel  with  technical  skills 
not  readily  available  to  such  law 
enforcement  authorities  which  can  be 
utilized  to  prevent  death  or  serious 
injury  may  be  provided; 
2.  Provision  of  such  personnel  will  be 
limited  to  that  necessary  to  prevent 
the  death  or  serious  injury  that  is 
threatened,  but  in  no  'case  shall  such 
assistance  be  provided  for  more  th£in 
72  hours; 
3.  Such  personnel  are  not  used  to  apprehend 
persons  who  are  suspected  of  committing, 
or  who  axe  about  to  commit,  a  crime;  or  . 
4.  Use  of  such  personnel  does  not  violate 
the  Posse  Comitatus  Act ,    ref,  Cc) . 
C.   Emergency  Assistance.   In  emergency  situations, 
where  life  is  endangered,  the  request  required  in  subsection 
A  or  B  of  this  section  may  be  oral,  provided  that  it  is  reduced
104 
to  writing  and  submitted  in  accordance  with  this  section 
within  72  hours.   Where  life  is  endangered,  doubt  as  .£0  the 
legality  find  propriety  of  the  requested  assistance  under 
this  procedure  should  be  resolved  in  favor  of  providing  the 
- assistance.  •-  "-* 
D.   Notice  of  Assistance.  Notice  of  the  provision  of 
expert  personnel  to  law  enforcement  authorities  pursuant  to 
this  procedure  shall  be  given  to  the  General  Counsel,  Depart- 
ment of  Defense,  within  five  days  after  such  assistance  has 
been  provided. 
Date  of  Attorney  General  approval:      ■ 
   / 
Date  of  Secretary  of  Defense  approval:
(Encl.  3) 
July  12,  1979 
DEFINITIONS 
1.  Administrative  purposes .   Information  is-- stored  for 
^administrative  purposes"  when  it  is  retained  solely  because 
it  relates  to  one  or  more  of  the  following:   Contracting, 
building  maintenance,  construction,  fiscal  matters,  internal 
accounting  procedures,  disciplinary  matters,  public  affairs, 
legislative  affairs,  and  other  matters  not  related  to  .intelli- 
gence or  security. 
2.  Agent  of  a  foreign  power,  means  — 
(1)   any  person  other  than  a  United  States  person, 
who  — 
(a)  acts  in  the  Dnited  States  as  an  officer 
or  employee  of  a  foreign  power,  or  as  a 
member  of  group  engaged  in  international 
terrorism  or  activities  in  preparation 
therefor r 
(b)  acts  for  or  on  behalf  of  a  foreign  power 
which  engages  in  clandestine  intelligence 
activities  in  the  United  States  contrary 
to  the  interests  of  the  United  States,  when 
'the  circumstances  of  such  person's  presence 
in  the  United  States  indicate  that  such 
person  may  engage  in  such  activities  in 
the  United  States,  or  when  such  person 
•  _      knowingly  aids  or  abets  any  person  in 
the  conduct  of  such  activities  or  knowingly 
conspires  with  any  person  to  engage  in  such 
activities;  or 
(2)   any  person  who  — 
(a)  knowingly  engages  in  clandestine  intelli- 
gence gathering  activities  for  or  on  behalf 
of  a  foreign  power,  which  activities  involve 
or  may  involve  a  violation  of  the  criminal 
statutes  of  the  United  States; 
(b)  pursuant  to  the  direction  of  an  intelligence 
service  or  network  of  a  foreign  power,  know- 
ingly engages  in  any  other  clandestine  intelli- 
gence activities  for  or  on  behalf  of  such 
foreign  power,  which  activities  involve  or 
are  about  to  involve  a  violation  of  the 
criminal  statutes  of  the  United  States;
(c)  knowingly  engages  in  sabotage  or  inter- 
national terrorism,  or  activities  that 
are  in  preparation  therefore,  for  or  on 
behalf  of  a  foreign  power;  or 
(d)  knowingly  aids  or  abets  any  person  in  the 
conduct  of  activities  described  in  sub- 
paragraph (a) ,  (b)  or  (c)  or  knowingly 
conspires  with  any  person  to  engage  in 
activities  described  in  subparagraphs  (a) , 
(b) ,  or  (c) . 
3.  Available  publicly  means  information  that  has  been 
published  or  broadcast  for  general  public  consumption,  is  avail- 
able on  request  to  a  member  of  the  general  public,  could  lawfully  b 
seen  or  heard  by  any  casual  observer,  or  is  made  available  at  a 
meeting  open  to  the  general  public.   In  this  context,  the  "general 
public"  also  means  general  availability  to  persons  in  a  military 
community  even  though  the  military  community  is  not  open  to  the 
civilian  general  public. 
4 .  Clandestine  intelligence  activity  means ' an  activity 
conducted  for  intelligence  purposes  or  for  the  purpose  of 
affecting  political  or  governmental  processes  by  or  on  behalf  of 
a  foreign  power  in  a  manner  designed  to  conceal  from  the  United 
States  Government  the  nature  or  fact  of  such  activity  or  the  role 
of  such  foreign  power,  and  any  activity  conducted  in  support  of 
such,  activity. 
5.  Collecting  agency  means,  with  respect  to  information, 
the  department  or  agency  that  collects  the  information. 
r 
6.  Commercial  organization  means  an  organization  that  is 
not  incorporated  and  that  operates  or  holds  itself  out  as  a 
business  enterprise  usually,  but  not  necessarily,  for  the  purpose 
of  making  a  profit.   This  term  covers  business  partnerships, 
companies,  associations,  and  sole  proprietorships.   Organizations 
that  use  the  word  "Co.,"  and  other  common  commercial  designations 
may  be  treated  as  commercial  organizations  for  purposes  of  these 
procedures.   Some  charitable,  literary,  and  social  organizations 
conduct  incidental  operations  for  profit.   Not  every  activity 
designed  to  make  a  profit  will  qualify  an  entity  as  a  commercial 
organization.   Nor  will  any  incidental  charitable,  literary  or 
social  activity'  remove  an  organization  from  that  category  of 
commercial  organization.   The  determination  is  made  by  assessing 
the  nature  of  the  organization. 
7.  Communications  security  means  protective  measures  taken 
to  deny  unauthorized  persons  information  derived  from  tele- 
communications of  the  United  States  Government  related  to 
national  security  and  to  ensure  the  authenticity  of  such 
telecommunications . 
x*=r X-Jf?*UB» .S «L'.T->.nS ■.' "  ■■""PTir.l"^
8.   Consent  is  the  agreement  by  a  person  or  organization 
to  permit  DoD  intelligence  components  to  take  particular  actions 
that  affect  the  person  or  organization.   Consent  may  be  oral  or 
written  unless  a  specific  form  of  consent  is  required  by  a 
particular  procedure.   Consent  may  be  implied  if  adequate  notice  • 
is  provided  that  a  particular  action  (such  as  entering  a  build- - 
ing)  carries  with  it  the  presumption  of  consent  to  an  accompany- 
ing action  (such  as  search  of  briefcases)., 
9*  Contact.   Several  sections  in  the  procedures  permit 
collection  of  information  about  a  United  States  person  who  is 
in  "contact"  with  someone  else.   Contact  in  this  context  means 
a  reasonable  belief  that  there  has  been  direct  communication 
between  two  persons.   "Reasonable  belief"  should  be  determined 
in  accordance  with  guidance  under  the  definition  of  that  term 
in  this  enclosure. 
10.  Contractor  means  a  person  or  organization  that  pro- 
vides goods  or  services  directly  to  a  DoD  intelligence  com- 
ponent. A  person  or  organization  is  a  contractor  of  a  DoD 
intelligence  component  if  the  work  done  by  the  contractor  is 
under  the  direction  of  or  solely  for  the  use  of  a  DoD  intelli- 
gence component  regardless  of  the  source  of  funds  for  payment 
to  the  contractor. 
•  11.  Corporation  means  an  organization  incorporated  in  the 
United  States  under  federal,  state  or  local  law.  The  fact  and 
place  of  incorporation  is  determinative.  Entirely  foreign 
ownership  does  not  disqualify  an  organization  for  treatment  as 
a  corporation  under  these  procedures.   Use  of  the  words  "Inc.," 
or  "Corp.,"  in  the  title  of  an  organization  is  sufficient  for 
it  to  be  treated  as  a  corporation  .for  purposes  of  these  pro- 
cedures. 
12.   Counterintelligence  means  information  gathered  and 
activities  conducted  to  protect  against  espionage  and  other 
clandestine  intelligence  activities,  sabotage,  international 
terrorist  activities  or  assassinations  conducted  for  or  on 
behalf  of  foreign  powers,  organizations  or  persons,  but  not 
including  personnel,  physical,  document,  or  communications 
security  programs. 
.13.   Counterintelligence  investigation  includes  inquiries 
and  other  activities  undertaken  to  determine  whether  a  particular 
U.S.  person  is  acting  for,  or  on  behalf  of,  a  foreign  power  for 
.purposes  of  conducting  espionage  and  other  clandestine  intelli- 
gence, activities,  sabotage,  international  terrorist  activities
or  assassinations  and  to  neurtralize  such  acts.  A  counter- 
intelligence investigation,  for  purposes  of  these  procedures, 
does  not  include  counterespionage  operations  undertaken 
^against  foreign  powers. 
14 .  Cover  means  an  arrangement  to  conceal  the  true 
identity  of  persons  acting  for  or  on  behalf  of  an  entity  of 
the  intelligence  community,  or  the  relationship  of  such  per- 
sons to  such  entities. 
15.  DoD  intelligence  components  include  the  following 
organizations: 
(a)  The  National  Security  Agency /Central 
Security  Service; 
(b)  The  Defense  Intelligence  Agency; 
(c)  The  offices  within  the  Department  of  Defense 
for  the  collection  of  specialized  national 
foreign  intelligence  through  reconnaissance 
programs ; 
(d)  The  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff  for  Intelligence, 
Army  General  Staff; 
(e)  The  Office  of  Naval  Intelligence; 
(f)  The  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff  for  Intelligence, 
Air  Staff; 
(g)  The  Army  Intelligence  and  Security  Command; 
(h)   The  Naval  Intelligence  Command; 
(i)   The  Air  Force  Intelligence  Service; 
(j)   The  counterintelligence  elements  of  the 
Naval  Investigative  Service; 
(k)   The  counterintelligence  elements  of  the  Air 
Force  Office  of  Special  Investigations; 
(1)   The  650th  Military  Intelligence  Group,  SHAPE; 
and 
(m)   The  intelligence  units  of  the  Military  Depart- 
ments that  support  Unified  or  Specified 
Commands . 
16.   Electronic  surveillance  means  acquisition  of  a  non- 
public communication  by  electronic  means  without  the  consent 
of  a  person  who  is  a  party  to  an  electronic  comtunication  or, 
in  the  case  of  a  nonelectronic  communication,  without  the  con- 
sent of  a  person  who  is  visibly  present  at  the  place  of  communica- 
tion, but  not  including  the  use  of  radio  direction  finding 
equipment- solely  to  determine  the  location  of  a  transmitter 
or  the  use  of  pen  register  equipment.
17.  Electronic  communications  equipment  means  electronic 
equipment  capable  of  undetected   interception  of  electronic  or 
oral  communications.      It  does  not  include  equipment  designed 
for  use  only  in  the  transmission  of  communications.      It  does  not 
include  -equipment  designed,  to  determine  the  direction  and  loca- 
"""tion  of  radio  transmitters  such  as  radio  direction-finding 
equipment. 
18.  Employee  means  a  person  employed  by,   assigned  to,   or 
acting  for  an  agency  within  the  Intelligence  Community.      It 
includes  military  personnel  assigned  to  an  intelligence  com- 
ponent.     It  includes  persons  on  leave  status  or  other  arrange- 
ment for  absence  from  duties  except  permanent  severance.      It 
includes  persons  who  are  consultants,  members  of  an  advisory 
board,    employees  of  a  nonappropriated  fund  activity  associated 
with  a  Defense   intelligence  agency,  employees  of  an  agency 
credit  union,    or  commercial  enterprise  located  within  agency 
premises,   or  gratuitous  servants   assigned  to  duty  with  the 
DoD  intelligence  component.      See  DoD  Directive  5200.25   and 
5210.26. 
19.  Expert  personnel  means  persons  who  are  employees  of 
a  DoD   intelligence  component  and  who  possess  a  specialized 
technical  knowledge  or  skill. 
20.  Foreign  intelligence  means  information  relating  to 
the  capabilities,    intentions,   and  activities  of  foreign  powers, 
organizations   or  persons,   but  not  including  counterintelligence 
except  for  information  on  international  terrorist  activities. 
21.  Foreign  power  means   any  foreign  government    (regardless 
of  whether  recognized  by  the  United  States)  ,    foreign-based 
political  party- (or  faction  thereof) ,    foreign  military   force, 
foreign-based   terrorist  group,    or  any  organization  composed, 
in  major  part,   of  any  such  entity  or  entities. 
22.  Intelligence  means   foreign  intelligence   and  counter- 
intelligence. 
23.  Intelligence  Community  and  agency  or  agencies  within 
the   Intelligence  Community   refer'  to  the  following  organizations: 
(a)  The  Central  Intelligence  Agency    (CIA) ; 
(b)  The  National  Security  Agency    (NSA) ; 
(c)  The  Defense  Intelligence  Agency    (DIA) ; 
(d)  The  Offices  within  the  Department  of  Defense 
for  the  collection  of  specialized  national 
foreign  intelligence  through  reconnaissance 
programs ;
(e)  The  Bureau  of  Intelligence  and  Research  of 
the  Department  of  State; 
(f)  The  intelligence  elements  of  the  military 
services,  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation 
(FBI),  the  Department  of  the  Treasury,  the 
Department  of  Energy;  and  the  Drug  Enforce- 
ment Administration  (DEA)  ;  and 
(g)  The  staff  elements  of  the  Office  of  the 
Director  of  Central  Intelligence. 
24.  Intelligence  method  means  any  process,  mode  of 
analysis,  means  of  gathering  data,  or  processing  system  or 
equipment  used  to  produce  intelligence. 
25.  Intelligence  product  means  the  estimates,  memoranda 
and  other  reports  produced  from  the  analysis  of  available  in- 
formation . 
26.  Intelligence  source  means  a  person  or  technical 
means  that  provides  intelligence. 
27.  International  terrorist  activities  means  any  activity 
or  activities  which: 
(a)  involve  killing,  causing  serious  bodily  harm, 
kipnapping  or  violent  destruction  of  property, 
or  an  attempt  or  credible  threat  to  commit 
such  acts;  and 
(b)  appear  intended  to  endanger  a  protectee  of  the 
.Secret  Service  or  the  Department  of  State  or  to 
further  political,  social  or  economic  goals  by 
intimidating  or  coercing  a  civilian  popula- 
tion or  any  segment  thereof,  influencing  the 
policy  of  a  government  or  international  organi- 
sation by  intimidation  or  coercion,  or  obtaining 
widespread  publicity  for  a  group  or  its  cause;*' 
and 
(c)  transcend  national  boundaries  in-  terms  of  the 
means  by  which  it  is  accomplished,  the  civilian 
population,  government,  or  international  organiza- 
tion it  appears  intended  to  coerce  or  intimidate, 
or  the  locale  in  which  its  perpetrators  operate 
or  seek  asylum.
28.  Law  enforcement  means  detecting  violations  of  criminal 
law  and  identifying  or  apprehending  persons  who  have  violated 
kthe  criminal  law  so  that  they  may  be  prosecuted  for  other 
crimes.   In  this  context  the  criminal  law  includes  federal 
statutes,  federal  regulations  and  the  Uniform  Code  of  Military 
Justice. 
29.  Law  enforcement  activities  means  the  activities  under- 
taken in  order  to  detect  violations  of  law  or  to  locate  and 
apprehend  persons  who  violate  the  law.   These  include  activities 
to  enforce  the  Uniform  Code  of  Military  Justice.   Some  DoD 
intelligence  components  carry  out  both  law  enforcement  and 
intelligence  functions.  The  same  personnel  may  be  used  to 
carry  out  both  functions.   They  are  engaged  in  law  enforcement 
activities  when  the  purpose  of  the  activity  is  detecting 
violations  of  criminal  law  and  identifying  or  apprehending 
persons  who  have  violated  the  criminal  law.   They  are  en- 
gaged in  intelligence  activities  when  the  purpose  of  the 
activity  is  to  obtain  or  produce  foreign  intelligence  or 
counterintelligence.  There  is  one  exception  to  this  distinction 
between  the  two  functions.   Espionage  investigations  could  be 
seen  as  serving  both  law  enforcement  and  counterintelligence 
purposes.   But  for  purposes  of  these  procedures,  all  espionage 
investigations,  even  if  undertaken  under  circumstances  where 
criminal  prosecution  is  a  possible  -outcome,  which  constitute 
part  of  the  foreign  counterintelligence  program  of  the  Depart- 
ment of  Defense,  shall  be  considered  as  counterintelligence 
activities  and  not  law  enforcement  activities.   Some  activities 
of  DoD  intelligence  components  undertaken  in  order  to  collect 
foreign  intelligence  and  counterintelligence  will  produce 
information  that  is  useful  in  detecting  violations  of  law  or 
locating  and  apprehending  persons  who  violate  the  law.   These 
intelligence  and  counterintelligence  activities  do  not  thereby 
become  law  enforcement  activities. 
30.  Law  enforcement  authorities  include  military  police, 
local  police,  state  police,  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investiga- 
tion, the  Executive  Protective  Service,  and  special  police 
employed  by  federal,  state  and  local  government  agencies. 
The  Army  Intelligence  and  Security  Command,  the  Naval  Investi- 
gative Service,  and  the  Air  Force  Office  of  Special  Investi- 
gations each  have  counterintelligence  responsibilities  and 
law  enforcement  responsibilities  under  the  Uniform  Code  of 
Military  Justice.   When  engaged  in  law  enforcement  responsi- 
bilities, these  components  are  law  enforcement  authorities. 
Components  that  supervise  these  military  investigative 
authorities,  when  they  are  engaged  in  law  enforcement 
responsibilities,  are  also  law  enforcement  authorities.
31.  Lawful  investigation.   An  investigation  qualifies 
as  a  lawful  investigation  if  it  is  conducted  by  a  DoD  com- 
ponent that  has  authorization  to  conduct  the  particular  type 
of  investigations  (for  example,  counterintelligence,  physical 
security,  communications  security)  and  if  the  techniques  used 
to  further  the  investigation  are  lawful.   The  term  does  not 
include  an  investigation  of  "leaks"  directed  against  a 
particular  individual  and  using  techniques  governed  by 
procedures  in  enclosure  1  when  the  purpose  of  the  investigation 
is  to  determine  the  individual's  source  of  information.   Such 
inquiries  may  be  undertaken  only  if  there  is  a  reasonable 
belief  that  the  individual  who  has  the  information  is  personally 
engaged  in  activities  that  may  involve  a  violation  of  law  or 
Department  of  Defense  regulations  applicable  to  that  individual. 
32.  Member  of  a  military  service  means  a  person  currently 
serving  in  the  Unxted.  States  Army,  Navy,  Air  Force,  Marine  Corps, 
.  or  an  active  reserve  or  National  Guard  component  thereof,  in- 
cluding the  United  States  Coast  Guard  when  the  Coast  Guard  is 
operating  as  a  part  of  the  Department  of  the  Navy. 
33.  Narcotics  production  or  trafficking  means  activities 
outside  the  United  States  to  produce  or  deal  in  narcotics 
or  other  substances  controlled  under  the  Controlled  Substances 
Act  of  1970,  Pub.  L.  No.  91-613,  title  II,  84  Stat.  1242 
(codified  in  scattered  sections  of  15,  31,  42  U.S.C.). 
34.  Personnel  security  means  the  protection  resulting 
from  measures  designed  to  insure  that  persons  employed  in 
sensitive  positions  of  trust  are  suitable  for  such  employment 
with  respect  to  loyalty,  character,  emotional  stability  and 
reliability  and  that  such  employment  is  clearly  consistent 
with  the  interests  of  the  national  security.   It  includes 
measures  designed  to  insure  that  persons  granted  access  to 
classified  information  remain  suitable  for  such  access  and 
that  access  is  consistent  with  the  interests  of  national 
security. 
35.  Personnel  security  investigation  means: 
(a)   An  inquiry  into  the  activities  of  a  person 
granted  access  to  intelligence  or  other 
.  classified  information;  or  a  person  who  is  to 
be  granted  access  to  intelligence  or  other 
classified  information,  including  persons  who 
are  granted  access  to  facilities  of  Defense 
intelligence  components;  or  a  person  to  be 
'""*"  ^  ?r"-y?^"'>?"^****-tt1-n«J.'  ■■jiiy.i, ...  .i-|.  %amj^-.;c«uuj-~»,s,.t»ii .  i  !,m'K\i<r^ir'Jt'iKi.v>»^!r-,'^!(.y^'M^ffi^:^^^t^h'^ii>fTV!^^^
assigned  or  retained   in  a  position  with 
sensitive  duties.      The   investigation  is 
designed  to  develop  information  pertaining 
to  the   suitability,    eligibility  and -trust- 
—  *  worthiness  of  the  individual  with  respect 
to  loyalty,    character,    emotional  stability 
and  reliability; 
(b)  inquiries  and  other  activities  directed  - 
against  DoD  employees  or  members  of  a  mili- 
tary service  to  determine  the  facts  of  pos- 
sible voluntary  or  involuntary  compromise  of 
classified  information  by  them; 
(c)  investigations  conducted  when   it  is  learned 
that  a  DoD  employee  or  member  of  a  military 
service  has  relatives  or  close  associates 
abroad;   and 
(d)  the  collection  of  information  about  or  from 
military  personnel  in   the  course  of  tactical 
training  exercises  for  security  training 
purposes. 
36.      Physical  security  means   the  protection  resulting  from 
physical  measures  designed  to   safeguard  personnel,    to  prevent 
unauthorized  access   to  equipment,    facilities,   material  and 
documents,    and  to  safeguard  against  espionage,   sabotage, 
damage  and   theft. 
37 •      Physical   security   investigation  means  an  inquiry  into 
or   survey  of   the  effectiveness  of   security   controls   and  pro- 
cedures  established  to  protect  classified  information,    equip- 
ment or  property.      Security   controls  or  procedures   include 
physical   controls  established  around  the  perimeter  of  a 
facility,   building   or  office;    controls   established  with  respect 
to   the   equipment  or  other  property;    procedures  governing 
access  by   visitors   and  procedures   related  to   access   to  intelli- 
gence  information  by  persons   other  than  employees;    procedures 
and   controls   related   to  the   safe   storage  and   transmittal  of 
classified   information  including  cryptographic  information, 
materials   and  equipment;    procedures   limiting   employee  access 
to   classified    information   on   a   need-to-know   basis;    and
procedures  and  controls  related  to  the  disposal  of  classified 
equipment  and  wastes.   Physical  security  investigation  includes 
inquiries  and  other  actions  undertaken  against  United"  States 
jpersons  who  are  present  upon,  or  are  in  physical  proximity  to, 
an  installation  or  facility  of  a  DoD  component 
and  who  are  reasonably  believed  to  pose  a  clear  threat  to  the 
physical  safety  of  personnel,  equipment,  information,  or 
activities  of  such  component. 
38.  Physical  surveillance  means  an  unconsented,  systematic 
and  deliberate  observation  of  a  person  by  any  means  on  a 
continuing  basis,  or  unconsented  acquisition  of  a  nonpublic 
communication  by  a  person  not  a  party  thereto  or  visibly 
present  thereat  through  any  means  not  involving  electronic 
surveillance.   This  definition  does  not  include  overhead  re-, 
connaissance  not  directed  at  specific  United  States  persons. 
39.  Reasonable  belief.  Several  of  these  procedures 
require  an  assessment  ox  "reasonable  belief."  A  reasonable 
belief  arises  when  the  facts  and  circumstances  are  such  that 
a  reasonable  person  would  hold  the  belief.   Reasonable  belief 
must  rest  on  facts  and  circumstances  that  can  be  articulated; 
"hunches"  or  intuitions  are  not  sufficient.   Reasonable  belief 
can  be  based  on  experience,  training  and  knowledge  in  foreign 
intelligence  or  counterintelligence  work  applied  to  facts  and 
circumstances  at  hand,  so  that  a  trained  and  experienced 
"reasonable  person"'  might  hold  a  reasonable  belief  sufficient 
to  satisfy  this  criterion  when  someone  unfamiliar  with  foreign 
intelligence  or  counterintelligence  work  might  not.   Reasonable 
belief  also  depends  on  the  circumstances  in  which  it  is  formed. 
•In  emergency  situations,  a  reasonable  belief  can  be  supported 
by  the  facts  at  hand  and  the  need  to  take  action  immediately 
to  avoid  imminent  harm. 
40.  Sabotage  means  any  activity  that  involves  a  violation 
of  chapter  I0S  of  title  18,  United  States  Code,  or  that  would 
involve  such  a  violation  if  committed  against  the  United 
States. 
41.  Signals  intelligence  means  a  category  of  intelli- 
gence including  communications  intelligence,  electronic  intelli- 
gence, and  instrumentation  intelligence,  either  individually  or 
in  combination. 
•(a)   Communication  intelligence  means  infor- 
mation  derived  from  foreign  communications 
by  other  than  the  intended  recipients. 
p^ai^-i-,--*-— jj^,.
(b)  Electronics  intelligence  means  infoimation 
derived  from  elect romagentic  radiations 
other  than  communications  emanating  from 
foreign  sources  other  than  nuclear  detona- 
tions or  radioactive  sources. 
(c)  Instrumentation  intelligence  means  infor- 
mation derived  from  the  collecting  and 
processing  of  foreign  telemetry,  beaconry, 
nonimagery  infrared  and  coherent  light 
signals. 
42.   State  means  any  State  of  the  United  States,  the 
«i5trict"oirTolumbia,  the  Commonwealth  of  Puerto  Rico,  the 
(>-nonvealth  of. the  Northern  Mariana  Islands,  the  Virgin 
Inlands,  American  Samoa,  Wake  Island,  Midway  Island,  Guam, 
I'alr.yr  a*  Island,  Johnston  Atoll,  Navassa  Island,  and  Kingman 
Kcc£. 
*3'   United  States,  when  used  to  describe  a  place  in- 
cludes the  tcrrorities  of  the  United  States. 
44.  United  States  person  means  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States,  an  alien  lawfully  admitted  for  a  permanent  residence, 
an  unincorporated  association  organized  in  the  United  States 
or  substantially  composed  of  United  States  citizens  or 
aliens  admitted  for  permanent  residence,  or  a  corporation 
incorporated  in  the  United  States. 
45.  Wire  communication  means  any  communication  while  it 
is  being  carried  by  a  wire,  cable  or  other  like  connection 
furnished  or  operated  by  any  person  engaged  as  a  common 
carrier  in  providing  or  operating  such  facilities  for  the 
transmission  of  interstate  or  foreign  communications. 
Date  of  Attorney  General  Approval  <aT>  V*    -  -    .•    / 
Hate  of  Secretary  of  Defense  Approval