secret 
nofom-noconfract-orcon 
March  1979 
Israel 
Foreign 
Intelligence 
and 
Security 
Services 
secret
This  Foreign  Intelligence  sad  Security  Services  sgrve,  is  prepared  and  published  by  the  Central  Intelligence 
Attncy  Directorate  of  Operations  Counterintelligence  Staff  and  coordinated  with  the  Defense  Inteltiteree 
Agency.  It  i»  the  successor  loth*  National  Intetlif  ence  Survey,  Section  56.  Intelligence  and  Security  and  it  will 
he  revised  and  reiisved  «  approiimately  the  tame  interval*  ai  was  the  National  Intelligence  Survey,  or  at 
atm-topmenu  may  warrant. 
I ntit ial  deaseminatie*  or  additional  copies  of  this  publication  can  be  obuined  through  established  channels  fr-wi 
lite  Centra!  inielligevw  Agency. 
Waning  Noiic* 
Intelligence  Sources 
and  Methods  Involved 
(WNINTEL) 
NarWMN  5CCfjf1ly 
leforautiea 
linaulhoriced  Disclosure 
Subject  to  Criminal  Sanctions 
NOFORN  (NF> 
Net  ReleauM*  10  Foreitn  Niiioult 
NOCONTRACT(NC) 
Not  ReksuMc  lo  Contncion  or  Contractor /CoftutMRit 
BOMN  (■»» 
Ctalion — PrapricMrj  Information  Invotnd 
NFiBONLY  (NO) 
NFIB  Detariawiti  Only 
o*cgn;oc) 
Dtneminttiea  and  Eitrtctioa  of  Jaforattfea 
Controlled  by  Originator 
*EL_ 
Tint  Infnrmalion  Ha  Bens  Aaikorited  for  AetcaM  to... 
FG1 
Fortiin  Government  Infonnalion 
V    ..  { 
Tans  aatticalioa  a  iTtilabtf 
T»  art  a  njaeroflea*  copy  of  ihis 
awbKatioa  <aM  717?  (OCR/ 
DS«>;  far  f»i»rt  itmancaa  ii 
attorn  la  or  m  raw  of 
hard  estate,  call  320.1 
(PTC/RD3). 
Derivative  tiaatificatioe  by  039*10 
Rene*  10  jrtan  from  dale 
Denied  from  D*b.l 
Tkt  Foreign  Iftctniteact  and  Security  Scrviott  wrvey  it  National 
Intcflifeace  (rid  may  «ot  kt  ideated  or  ihowa  lo  rcprsKiiuinw 
of  any  foreign  government  or  iatcraatio*al  body  ciccpl  by 
(pscinc  authorization  of  tkt  Director  of  Central  Intelligence 
I*  accordaace  villi  lit  prmaione  of  National  Sccenty  Council 
Intelligence  Directive  No.  I 
. 
AB  mMml  on  Ikb  pate 
jaCaafideatial.
SECRET 
HOfOHN/PtOCOHTUCT/OHCOa 
TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 
Genera)    1 
1.  Background  and  development  of  services  ] 
t  Objectives  end  strjdure                                                g 
S.  Political  aspects                                              S 
s.  Relationship  between  the  government  and  the  services            S 
b.  Relationship  between  the  services  end  the  populace    6 
4.  Professional  standards                                           ft 
a.  Integrity  .„                                                      e 
b  Efficiency                
.. 
e.  Security    „ 
d.  Monde  end  disciplinary  methods     ,    9 
&  Moasad— Secret  InteOiaenca  Service 
1.  Function   
2.  Organization         
3  Administrative  practice*   
a.  Training   ...'    , 
 
b.  Funds  and  salaries    
4.  Method*  of  operation 
a.  Relationship  with  other  services 
b  Liaison  with  foreign  services 
C  Shin>  Beth— Counterespionage  and  Internal  Security  Service 
1.  Functions     .... 
2.  Organization    
5.  Administrative  pracHoaa   
4.  Methods  of  operation  
 
D.  Military  Intelligenoe  
 
1.  Functiont     
2.  Organization     
a  Air  Force  Intelligence    
b.  Navel  Intelligence    
3.  Administrative  practice*   
4.  Methods  of  operatioD    
5.  Relations  with  other  service*    
E.  Research  and  Political  Planning  Center 
F.  The  National  Police    
G.  Key  offtdab   
IS 
IS 
ttcatjf
mxomm  ittncom  nucr  'O»no* 
H  CnrMnmtt  o*  principal  tourco  40 
1.  Source  materials  
£.  Supplementary  overt  ptibliratioAt .           40 
FIGURES 
Soviet  Amrt  Jirael  Bwr  fpfcotof                             8 
Organization  of  Israeli  Intetlitenc*  and  Security  Service*. 
1977  (chart;  g 
OruniiatiQji  of  Monad.  1677  (chart)                          11 
EftaHu  Ben  Sh|»)  Coded*  transmitter  on  display  In  Damaacw, 
19*5  (photo)                                             .    .  if 
JoSaan  Wotftang  Lois.  Illustrates  the  use  of  a  transmitter  durint 
his  trial  in  Cairo.  July. Amu*   I96S  fpftotol   
,13 
Ovtnintinn  of  Shin  Rrth.  1977  (ehtrt)                  to 
OrtardrMkin  of  Military  IntellifefKc.  1977  (chtrt)             15 
Organization  of  Naval  InteMnwe.  1974  (chart) 
Orxaniution  of  Imeli  National  Police,  1977  (chart)        37 
lmrfi  NatloMl  Polk*  headQuartera,  Jerusalem,  November 
197t  fttanfo}         :38 
Fit    11      Israeli  Border  Guard  pnst  under  construction  at  Kefar  Soaenwald 
(Zarll),  June  1970  (photo)                     
Fit 
Fit 1 
Fit 
r« 
Fir 
S 
Fit « 
Ft» 
Fit. 8 
Fit 
S 
F» 
SfCMT
mfoumttocomucTtcncom 
CLOMttf 
Hmuak       ....  Jrpn  mmmm   
H«n*              JW«  HtHtrat     
HtM*rt  turning  HtUmm      
•M  **«■*■  h'M  TtxM 
JDT    ....  Tm  W^wiI  Ulmt*  (&*) 
Or      JftfhpM  Jfc'AMttb  MTkrt* 
iqa    jryat  Tmm'i  fc'VM     „ 
«*AUm  Hutmw  ._   
HudJu^i  Mmtm     „, 
MAXI      Mtfv*  rumlMT  ttm-ttt  ZZ 
WAPA1    U(fr»«  ftf*  XMU  torn*   
MAFfcM      Mlikm  I*'***  Hf'dMM    
MI        Ami  Ha*M  (Stent  ««*>)   
.    .  .  im  im/h*w  -Tiii  in  tn 
tun 
RftKAH 
WliH 
seem
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. ».     I 
...  •      • 
•  • 
1  *.«»•       •
SfCRET 
nofo*K  hocokthact/okom 
Intelligence  and  Security 
( 
A.  General,    .  .    '  ...f  , . 
famels  priadpsl  intsftaanm  tad  warty  authority 
it  the  Va'adaJ  funnel  HciftmiNm  (the  Committee  of 
the  Heed*  of  Services),  generally  known  41  Va'adat.  It 
coordinates  ihe  operations  and  activitlce  of  It*  mem- 
bats.  Momi  Uttfkidim  Miyetdmilm  (the  Secret 
Intelligence  Service)  or  Mosmd.  KseKnmoa  name,  hit 
the  primary  reaponalbiiHy  for  foreign  operation  and  to 
subordinate  to  the  Prime  Miabter.  Sacral  BiUchom 
JClak  (Coiaterespkmaae  and  internal  Security),  pop* 
tarry  know*  as  Sato  Beth,  ia  raapoMlbie  for  security 
and  i*  direcdy  subordinate  to  the  Prime  Mlntoar.  Age/ 
Uodm  (Military  late&aamos)  bat  the  mate  rapon* 
blBty  f or  strategic  military  teteBlgenoe  aad  eommunt- 
cations  inteHlgma  and  it  leader  the  ~— -tH  of  the 
Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Israeli  Defame  Fcrom  The 
MinUry  of  Foreign  Affairs  provides  impart  to 
research  and  political  pluming  to  the  farad  Intern- 
■enee  community.  The  Minittry  of  Interior  asmts  the 
National  Mice  with  poke*  investigations  and  the 
maintenance  of  border  security. 
■■■  ojovewpamea  •€  sotviost 
dm  Britam  Mandate  ended,  the 
1  of  fatottoe  atfabaabad  the  State  of 
j  the  —nil  of  gmmrmnaat  to  amanja 
was  the  toteamtaot  ami  aacurity  nit  known  a*  the 
laf ormatkm  Service  (Shew*  iWloOk-jwkrf, 
kaowa  w  Shey).  This  eraaramrJoe,  which  wm  the 
mteifcmace  arm  of  dm  Ztoahts'  underground  rmto- 
aaea  force,  the  Haganah.  during  the  yean  of  the 
BrWah  Mandate,  had  began  to  engage  to  opmatiom  m 
a  worldwide  male  with  the  f madias  of  dm  Jewhm 
Agency  to  19»  at  dm  Zionist  Goagram  to  Zurich, 
Swiimskad.  At  that  time,  the  Jewish  Agancy  wm 
oompnmd  of  bom  Zionhts  and  aco-Zkamtt,  tacsudtog 
a  strong  Amtrksa  psrtfcipetkm.  The  Jewish  Agency, 
which  wm  crmtod  to  ud  aad  support  dirtremad  Jews 
and  to  amtoto  the  Palestine  Jewish  community,  hm 
been  effectively  uader  Zionist  control  over  the  yean. 
AB  tn/oramtion  to  this  win  it  cmaHftoi  Secret, 
Nofon,  Noetmtnet,  Oram. 
Is  Kit, 
kbmalmmmd  ma  cover  for  Shay,  which  mtaadad 
let  covert  opararioas  tote  Wamara  Europe  aad  the 
United  " 
From  1933  to  1940.  Shay  a  chsectJvm  'ware  to 
promote  Use  estabUthment  of  an  ladepeadutt  Sum  of 
Israel;  infiltrate  Mandatory  Installations  to  order  to 
apprise  Zionist  leadership  of  British  attitude*  and 
proposed  actions  collect  political  inteiiigeaee  that 
eould  be  used  to  Zioniit  propaganda;  penetrate  Arab 
and  anU-Zionbt  factions  ia  Palestine  aad  peripheral 
nations;  monlior  and  control  ail  eatremto  groups— left 
and  right— among  Jewish  cemmunitiae  to  PalesUaa 
aad  abroad;  provide  security  ior  the  arms  amtajeltog 
•ad  illegal  immigration  programs  of  the  Haganah;  aad 
finally  collect  loformation  on  Nui  Cermaoy  to 
guarantee  the  security  of  the  Jewaa  imdarground  aad 
•scape  chsaneb  thtoughaat  Eampe  htl ore.  durlag  aad 
after  World  War  a 
Shay  conahtod  of  the  foOowiog — "r-ittnt*  Petti- 
cat  Intelligence  (MacMsbt  Medtnuh  Couateraapio- 
aage  and  Internal  Security  (Shtrut  Bbaehoa  KlaUk 
Military  iMtlligeace  (Shtrut  UodU»h  Police  Branch 
of  Military  Intelligence  (Story.  UodUm  Slat  Male 
Artel);  aad  Naval  Intelligence  and  Seoartty  (Sam* 
Modm  i»  BttecAoa  JCahot  Ha  Yarn).  Them  services 
worked  iadepeadentiy  on  behalf  of  the  different 
rabiiitrim  to  which  they  were  tndividaa9y  respondbk 
This  imeUganee  aad  security  community  wm  com- 
petitive aad  frequently  acted  on  Ms  own.  a  prodact  of 
dwgeoaalpoa>»rdmos  which  reqabedtht  aceom- 
punhmoot  of  many  urgaot  teaks  whersvw  and 
whenever  they  might  arias.  In  soma  of  the  Waal 
Earopsaa  apttele  all  anrviem  ware  represented  aad 
competed  for  dm  same  agents  aad 
By  April  1051.  the  Prime  Minister  aad  cabinet, 
seriously  akrmed  by  the  atmosphere  of  mutual 
fealooty  and  miitraat  prevalent  among  the  aervlemat 
tfwtocrearing  eoet  of  their  uncoordinated  efforts  in  the 
field,  decided  »  reorganise  completely  lbs  baric 
SiCttT
SSCXH 
structure  of  Israel's  InTrPigrnre  and  «■«»  eommu- 
niiv  The  dyneri^  farce  bdund  tiW  pto  was  the  lata 
fteuven  Shix*a.  who  tauntttiMd  the  Soviets  accord- 
ing to  functioos  and  reeporetbibtjes  aad  established  a 
mechanism  to  coordinate  their  activiue*.  Shdoah  was 
chairman  ot  tm  auoortty„  the  Commute*  of  the 
He*diolSer*wa{rf*iuhmh#HM»mwm.c»ik& 
V*  adatj.  rie  iuueraieu  me  Naval  Imrifcgrnat  and 
Security-Service  and  the  embryonic  ait  sntetinri** 
unit  into  Military  InieQigeace  {Aasj  Mod***}  The 
Political  Intelligence  Service  was  aude  independent  of 
the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  reorganised  as  the 
Secret  Intelligence  Service  {Messae!  Lrt«A**<* 
MeyowcWun  or  Moattd;  Tie  Ministry,  of  Foreign 
Affairs  retained  Ravmreh  OrvWoaf  (Warlibte  JMeea- 
afar).  Shin  Beth  remained  intact  escefct  for  Imcsasl 
chances.  The  SpesaJ  tasks  Dtvatoe  «a  tec  Invest!** 
lion  Dt-part.nent  ci  the  police  became  a  put  of  ihe 
new  apparatus  Seduahs  reorganiaUoa  of  the  tntele- 
gesce  and  security  suurturc  produced  a*  efficient  and 
well-coordinated  community. 
The  Israeli  inteshgenee  and  security  services  re- 
Uined  this  structure  rdattvery  aadnaged  throughout 
the  Arab-Israel  War  in  Odober-Nwsnber  1356.  the 
Sis-Day  War  in  lone  1967  sad  the  Yam  Klppur  War 
in  Octoba  19?3  During  the  early  and  smd-lfl60s, 
however,  the  Israeli  Covers-meat  had  considered 
changes  in  the  strusture  and  duties  af  the  component! 
of  the  intelligence  aad  security  coaHRnaity.  Despite 
Shiloah's  earlier  reortantextica.  much  ©!  what  hsp- 
rxnedintheUra^servfceaatthbHinedVpendedoB 
the  persona]  rektJoaahips  between  lea  Curfew  and  the 
directors  and  chiefs  fa  early  1963,  jail  before  his 
retirement,  Ben  Genoa  appelated  a  committee  to 
review  the  situation.  Me  was  ounce  oed  that  the 
intelligence  and  security  xatabUaneat  which,  by 
virtue  of  his  serving  both  as  Prime  Minister  and 
Minister  of  Defense.  usuaSy  fuaeti-wed  satisfactorily, 
might  deteriorate  when  Is  left  office.  He  abo  wu 
reported  to  be  dissatisfied  with  the  lack  of  clarity  in 
th?  community's  chain  of  command  and  functions  and 
ordered  the  committee  to  define  the  subordination 
and  tasks  of  these  bodies. 
!n  July  1963  the  cornmiUee  submitted  its  report  to  a 
new  Prime  Minister,  the  late  Levi  Eshkd  The 
committee  stated  that,  while  the  functions  of  Prime 
Minister  and  Minister  of  Defense  did  not  necessarily 
have  to  be  eom«ntrated  in  the  hands  of  one  nerson. 
the  Prime  Minister  must  know  about  all  the  acuvttiai 
of  the  national  inteJitarace  and  security  ; 
oe  giren  objective  IiHi iWgennr  evalualsoai 
and  baaed  on  diiferaat  vtewpuets  iroat  mart  taaa  aat 
souvce.  To  accomplish  taaat  aias*  urn  coaatfOay 
recommended  that  the  Ministry  of  Fontta  Affairs 
Research  Divakm  be  tuenaiheeed  sa  that  u  would  at 
capable  of  presenting  tndcsKudeai  pouotel  mama 
ins,  both  *>  Middle  East  issue)  aad  other  political 
subjects.  By  upgrading  the  rvsseaich  Division,  tee 
committee  believed  that  e  certala  balance  would  be 
created  for  security  and  political  evaharJue,  wksch 
were  handled  almost  sakiy  by  the  Mshtary  tetassV 
gene*  Production  Department.  Tee  oaiamittas  aha 
observed  that  the  tssstance  ot  Masud.  wanJi « 
sevret  lutncn  infatuation  gathering  as 
to  sume  csiaat  the  nonthW  fgratulatsua  af 
indepenkot  evaluation  unit  Tea  iwauatme  aim 
retarded   as  a   seatssc   of   vaa)   imwetsare  tat 
sppotntmeut  of  a  special  adviser,  aifaeilm^sa  oaly  la 
the  Prime  Minbtet.  Ha  would  be  a  person  of  bads 
caliber  who  would  aid  the  Prime  Minuter  ia  keeping 
In  touch  with  aad  monitoring  the  activities  of  the 
inteUigenee  and  security  sennas.  The  committats 
principal  recommendations  were  not  implemented  at 
the  time  eicent  foi  the  estaUafsmeat  of  the  advaer 
posiiion  and  the  shif I  of  rerooreibthty  f«*  Shin  Beth 
from  the  Minister  of  Defease  to  the  Prima  Mutter. 
There  was  a  brief  interlude  from  Siptembar  1965  to 
July  1966  when  Isser  Hard.  Ihe  former  Chairman  of 
the  Va'adat  and  Director  0!  Moassd,  served  w  a  special 
adviser  to  Prime  Minister  Esokol  oa  latilHaenw  aad 
security  matters.  Hard  resigned  as  a  result  of  internal 
poticy  disputes  within  the  community  aad  he  was  cot 
replaced  at  the  rinse. 
Following  the  alleged  "inteiiigsace  failure"  m  the 
Yom  Kippur  War.  the  bradi  Government  established 
the  Agranat  Commission  in  November  1973  to 
investigate  matters  relating  to  the  hostilities  and  the 
performance  of  the  intelligence  and  security  services. 
The  commission  in  its  Partial  Report  in  April  1874 
proposed  reactivating  and  strengthening  the  post  of 
special  adviser  to  the  Prime  Minister  on  ireUieence 
and  security  matters  The  commission  abo  recom- 
mended changes  in  the  intelligence  and  security  forces 
through  the  establishment  of  a  research  and  evaluation 
unit  in  Monad  and  the  elevation  of  the  Research 
Division  in  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs.  The  object 
SECRET
SECftEf 
of  tfcb  modi!  tcation  was  to  avoid  reb  ««  en  lusively  oa 
Military  IntcEigence  f or  major  estimates  and  w» 
atenfr  Trie  commisskmaJsoempa^ir^  die  swed  for 
Inner  operational  coordination  ia  the  field  of  coflec- 
t^  between  the  servtas  but  it  c*pcaedtr«  cochins- 
lioii  of  their  f  inidied  MeUiaeacc  jadsnenti.  A  f  ull  or 
f  iMl  commission  report,  if  there  ever  was  one,  «u 
never  nude  pubfae. 
From  1974  to  19?*  the  recommendations  of  the 
fiarfiai  Report  of  the  Agranat  Commiaaoa  were 
implemented  The  Prime  Minister  appointed  Reserve 
Geaera]  Rebevaa  Zaevi  as  hit  Intelligence  adviser,  • 
petition  that  was  purely  advisory  and  carried  no 
csacutive  authority.  Zeevi  assumed  this  new  iob  In 
addition  to  serving  a*  the  Prime  Minister's  adviser  on 
Lwmmnmiini   Zerri  wai  abo  lo  be  the  Prime 
Miriam's   wanna  with  the   Director  of   Military 
lateQipnce  and  was  abo  *o  Imp  the  Prime  Minister 
alerted  to  dtflennoa  of  views  among  the  intelligence 
and  security  wn-iosa  In  October  1876,  however.  Zaevi 
resigned  f  row  ibu  pod  and  war  replaced  by  Brigadier 
(Ret}  Tebosbafat  Harfcabt,  a  former  Director  of 
Mthtary  imelugenoe.  The  Research  and  Political 
Pkaaing  Center  of  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs 
came  into  operation  in  January  1975.  Chanaes  in  the 
Military  Ijtfetugenee  structure  were  being  carried  out 
A  new  reacareh  and  evaluation  wit  for  assessing 
information  was  wtablnhad  within  Mossed-   New 
appointee*  had  taken  over  in  ant  of  the  Intelligence 
and  security  ctanpanents.  in  June  1977  the  Knell 
Government  established  a  Ministerial  Committee  on 
Security  Affairs. 
1  Objectives  and  rtructure 
The  principal  targets  cf  the  teach  intelligence  and 
security  services  arc  (1)  the  Arab  states— their 
espac&iies  and  tatenttm  toward  Israel,  their  rela- 
tions with  the  USSR  and  other  powers,  their  official 
INUSaltons  and  representatives  throughout  the  world, 
their  leaden,  internal  and  inter-Arab  politics,  morale, 
military  preparedness  and  other  order  of  battle;  (2) 
coSectxn  of  infs*malion  on  secret  US  policy  or 
decisions.  if  any.  concerning  Israel;  (3)  cdlection  of 
scientific  intelligence  in  the  US  and  other  developed 
courtries;  (4)  detennirtatlott  of  government  policy 
toward  Israel  in  the  USSR  and  East  European  nations 
and  the  problem  of  Jewish  emigratim*  from  these 
areas;  (5)  dose  monitoring  of  anti-Z*m3st  activity 
throughout  the  world,  and  (6)  collection  of  political.  ^pV' 
and  economic  intelligence  in  other  areas  of  interest  to  ^ 
them,  meh  as  Africa-  The  Israeli  services  abo  make 
special  efforts  to  counter  Arab  propaganda  and  it 
neutralise  anti-Zionist  activity.  Within  recent  yean 
the  Israelis  have  devoted  much  operational  activity  to 
combating  Arab  terrorism,  winch  has  grown  over  the 
years  from  isolated  cross-border  raids  by  Palestinian 
Fedayeen  to  daring  and  deadly  attacks,  often  interna- 
tional la  scope,  on  Israeli  personnel  and  property.  The 
Israelis  abo  have  undertaken  widescale  covert  poUtl-    <J/ 
cal.  economic  and  paramilitary  action  programs— par-    v 
tieubrly  in  Africa. 
Authorisation  for  foreign  Intelligence  and  Internal 
security  organisations,  while  not  defined  by  specific 
charter.  •  in  Israeli  legislation.  Paragraph  29  of  the  ' 
Basic  La*  states:  The  Government  is  authorised  to 
carry  out  oa  behalf  of  the  State,  In*  accordance  with 
any  law  any  act  whose  implementation  is  not  lawfully 
entrusted  to  any  other  authority"  This  implies  that  the 
government  si  entrusted  with  the  management  of 
inteOigenee  and  slate  security  affairs  since  no  other 
authority  Is  empowered  to  act  In  this  sphere  by  any 
other  law.  Attempts  have  been  made  over  the  years  by 
off icisb  within  the  government  and  the  community  to 
have  an  act  passed  defining  the  status  of  foreign 
intelligence  and  security  organizations  and  their 
operations,  but  nothing  has  come  of  these  efforts 
Internal  security,  on  the  other  hand,  is  more  clearlr 
defined  in  law.  The  Defense  (Emerjancv)  Regulations 
of  1945  (established  during  the  British  Mandate),  the 
Military  Law  of  21  June  1955  and  the  Penal  Revision 
(Slate  Security)  Law  of  31  July  1957.  the  Israeli 
equivalent  of  the  British  Official  Secrets  Act,  all  are 
concerned  with  internal  security.  The  Emergency 
Regulations  of  1945  gave  the  military-  administration 
the  power  to  arrest  and  deport  troublesome  elements 
and  to  designate  certain  locations  as  "closed  areas." 
thus  requiring  local   inhabitants  to  posses*  travel  / 
permits  to  transit  such  places  While  the  regulations  / 
originally  applied  to  both  Jews  and  Arabs  In  Pclestine. 
they  ere  now  used  largely  to  monitor  the  Arab 
community  In  Israel.  Administration  of  the  regulations 
was  transferrer  from  the  military  to  the  police  in 
1966.  Internal  security  organs  reportedly  increased 
their  agent  activity  to  meet  this  responsibility. 
Israeli  laws  require  severe  punishment  ranging  from 
the  death  penalty  or  life  Imprisonment  for  treason  or 
SCCIfT
s£c«n 
/ 
assistance  to  the  "enemv."  to  «erm»  of  incarceration 
from  three  to  15  years  to  espionage,  contact  with 
foreign  agents,  aiding  and  abetting  •  crime  against 
state  security  and  unautheriaed  disclosure  of  informa- 
tion by  »  public  servant  flint  to  no  rtatute  of 
limitations  regarding  the  unauthorized  disclosure  of 
classified  information. 
The  central  body  in  bracTs  intelligence  and  security 
community  is  the  Va'adat,  which  las  as  its  primary 
function   tbe  coordination  of  a9  intelligence   and 
security  activities  al  home  and  abroad  Toe  Va'adat 
consists  of  the  Director  of  Moated,  the  Director  of 
Military  Ir.!elitg?rKs,  the  Director  of  Shin  Beth,  the 
Inspector  General  of  Police,  the  Direetor«Genetal  of 
the  Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs,  the  Director  of  the 
Research  and  Political  Planning  Center  oY  the  Ministry 
for    Foreign    Affairs,   end   the   political,    military. 
intelligence  and  amiterrorist  advisers  of  the  Prime 
Minister   The  Head  of  the  Special  Tasks  Division  in 
the   Invest  if aitons   Department  of  the   Police  also 
occasionally  attends  the  meetings  with,  or  in  place  of. 
the  Inspector  General  of  Police  Meetings  mutt  be  held 
biweekly  but  may  be  held  more  frequently  At  these 
meeiinfs  each  director  usually  provides  a  briefing  on 
the  key  activities  of  his  service  during  the  preceding 
two  weeks  The  Director  of  Mossad  chairs  Va'adat  and 
in  this  capacity  is  directly  responsible  to  the  Prime 
Minister.  The  members  of  Va'adat  are  quasi-equal  in 
status  and  the  term  mmime  referring  to  the  Director 
of  Mossad  as  chairman  b  designed  to  denote  a  concept 
of  preeminence  among  equal*.  In  actaahty,  however, 
the  DiTecior  cf  Military  Intelligence  now  overshadows 
the  Director  cf  Mossad  in  power  and  importance.  This 
development  resisted  from  the  continuing  Israeli 
reliance  on  military  preparedness  for  national  survival 
Mossad  is  charted  with  the  colleetton  of  foreign 
intell;fera»  and  the  conduct  of  covers  action  programs 
outside  Israel 
Shin  Beth  is  responsible  for  counterintelligence  and 
Interna?  security  It  functions  as  the  governmental 
authority  en  personnel  security  matters,  it  is  also 
responsible  for  she  personal  safety  of  the  Prime 
Minister  and  other  high  ranking  Israeli  officials  Shin 
Beth  is  in  charge  of  physical  security  for  ports,  airports 
and  key  military/industrial  installations  in  Israel  and 
far  Israeli  missions  and  El  Al  operations  outside  Israel 
Shin  Beth  does  not  have  the  power  of  arrest,  this 
function  being  performed  by  the  Special  Tasks 
Division  of  the  Investigations  Department  of  the 
Police,  which  works  in  close  collaboration  with  Shin 
Beth  in  Israel.  Within  the  Administered  Territories, 
which  are  controlled  by  the  Israeli  Defense  Forces. 
Shin  Beth  applies  to  the  military  to  undertake  arrests 
and  searches.  A  special  component  under  the  Inspector 
General  of  Police  is  the  Border  Guard,  whose  mission 
is  that  of  guarding  the  cea  «-fire  lines  against  Arab 
infiltration  and  of  deter.ing  and  running  down 
Fedayeen  terrorists  In  recent  years  Border  Cuard 
units  have  been  used  Increasingly  to  control  and 
suppress  riots  and  demonstrations  in  the  West  Bank 
area. 
Military  Intelligence,  in  addition  to  its  responsibility 
for  strategic  and  tactical  Intelligence,  prepares  the 
national  intelligence  estimates  and  evaluates  all 
information  dealing  with  the  Arabs.  H  also  is 
responsible  for  developing  and  protecting  communica- 
tion codes  and  ciphers  for  all  the  services  and  the 
Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs  and  for  communications 
intelligence. 
The  Research  and  Political  Planning  Center,  which 
was  formerly  the  Research  Division  of  the  Ministry  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  analyses  raw  intelligence  from 
various  sources  for  of f  Klals  on  the  policymaking  level 
Other  Israeli  Government  organizations  that  pro- 
vide support  to  the  intelligence  and  security  commu- 
nity are  the  Ministries  of  Finance  (Customs  and 
Excise.  Investment  and  Securities)  and  Tourism,  the 
national  airline.  El  Al.  and  the  national  shipping  line. 
Zim  Unofficial  Zionist  organizations  based  in  Israel 
and  Jewish  communities  throughout  the  world  also 
give  aid  to  Israel  operations  when  needed. 
There  are  between  1.500  and  2.000  personnel  in 
Mossad.  of  whom  about  900  are  officers.  Shin  Beth  has 
about  1.000  members  of  whom  some  550  hold  officer 
rank  In  Military  Intelligence  thete  are  about  7.000 
personnel,  of  whom  450  are  officers,  the  others  being 
enlisted  personnel  and  civilian  clerks.  The  number  ol 
offictab  in  the  Research  and  Political  Planning  Center 
of  the  Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs  ranges  between  75 
and  100  The  police  number  about  12.000  end  the 
Border  Guards  around  6.000 
Since  the  financing  of  the  intelligence  and  secuiity 
services  is  a  clmely  held  secret,  it  is  very  difficult  to 
y 
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J 
J 
trt    accurate   information   on   the    t««al    ■** 
expended  for  these  purposes  The  funds  are  ooncealed 
in  tbe  defense  budget,  and  known  lo  the  Prune 
Minister,  the  Minister  of  Defense,  one  or twoot  the* 
top  assistants,  tie  Minister  of  Finance,  the  State 
Comptroller  and  hi*  Defense  Services  Inapecterate. 
The  Comptroller  deals  directly  with  the  directors  of 
',be  servim,  who  request  funds  at  the  befjnninf  fll  the 
fiscal  year  in  April  The  estimates  of  "P^^L-! 
directors,  who  have  established  reputations  for  honesty 
and  in?e*rily.  »«  u*"^*  acceptable  as  a  starting  point 
for  budget  oegoiiatiow.  The  Ministry  of  Finance, 
however,  does  require  a  10-year  projection  of  expend- 
ed f  iBancia!  needs  {an  impossible  task  which  «s  no* 
t.ken  seriously)  The  Comptroller  holds  a  series  of 
meetings  with  the  various  service  directors  and JHwr 
staffs,  reviewing  their  programs  in  deull  These 
session  continoe  throughout  May  and  result  in  a 
careful  redefinition  of  the  entire  Intdheence  and 
security  effort  and  tt*  cost  By  October,  the  determina- 
tion of  specific  budget  needs  is  completed^  based  on 
the  program  analysis  completed  in  May.  This  is  then 
submitted  for  higher  approval  and  the  planning  and 
budgeting  cycle  is,  upon  budget  approval,  completed 
rest  in  time  to  begin  again 
Much  of  the  administrative  support  for  the  services 
ii  handled  by  the  Ministry  for  Defense.  Various  types 
of  ««r  are  proofed  for  and  funded  by  the  Israel 
Defense  Form  C1DF}   There  b  ckae  professional 
cooperation  between  the  civilian  intelligence _and 
security  services  and  military   intelligence    These 
^niea.  lire  all  government  offices,  aw  subiect  to 
inspection  by  the  Sute  Comptrollers  office.    An 
Aslant  Director-General  b  in  charge  of  inspecting 
the  defense  and  security  services,  the  Ministry  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  and  the  police  The  annual  inspection 
covers  bookkeeping,  financial  management  and  nan- 
dling  el  administration  The  Comptroller  is  required 
to  see  that  the  services  are  operating  economically, 
efficiently  and  with  irreproachable  morality. 
Uraeli  governmental  offices  and  departments  are 
eontmueusly  borrowing  money,  personnel,  equipment 
and  ms!e«a!  f  raw  one  another  and  salaries  are  paid  by 
the  office  to  which  the  indivKteal  is  sssigned.  An 
intelligence  ofikxr  or  *  Ministr,  Jor  Foreign  Affairs 
official  Atoned  in  Nrw  Yorfc  and  satined  to  the 
Jewish  Agency  is  paid  «la*v  and  allowances  by  the 
SECNcT 
Agency  but  loses  neither  seniority  nor  retirement 
status  while  serving  in  that  capacity. 
1  folitkal  Mtwcto 
a.  BsaATwtmtw  bstwckr  tmi  covcsutMiwr  and 
thk  $ama»— The  intelligence  and  security  commu- 
nity enjoys  a  strong  position  in  the  government,  and 
their  affairs  are  well  integrated  into  mere  general 
operations.  Members  of  the  generation  which  worked 
for  the  etubishment  of  the  slate  were  companions  of 
longstanding  and  Joint  veterans  of  such  enterprises  as 
illegal  Immigration  and  arms-running  Many  ol  the 
current  leaders  came  up  through  the  ranks  of  the 
military  In  a  series  of  wars  with  the  Arabs  and  catered 
polities  through  affiliation  wHh  one  of  the  major 
political  parries.  At!  of  them  had  some  experience  in 
clandestine  matters  and  have  been  personally  con- 
vinced  by    stern   seasons   d    the   value   of    good 
Intelligent*  and  security. 
The   tntelhgenot  and   security  services   receive 
excellent  support  from  the  Ministry  for  Foreign     ^7 
Affairs.  Many  senior  diplomats  are  former  Intelligence 
officers  and  therefore  conversant  with  intelligence 
problems  and  operation*  WHh  their  experienced 
observations  and  manifold  talents,  they  serve  as 
valuable  auxiliaries  to  their  covert  colleagues,  whose 
diplomatic   cover   b  diligently   sustained   by   the 
Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs.  Furthermore,  almost 
every    Israeli   diplomat   abroad   has   good   foreign 
language  and  area  knowledge  or  some  speeUlixatinn 
which  enables  him  to  pursue  a  much  broader  social 
We.  with  its  resultant  contacts,  than  b  the  case  to  most 
foreign  services.  In  many  instances,  embassy  officers, 
including  chiefs  of  diplomatic  missions,  were  former 
citizens  of  the  countries  to  which  they  are.aocredlled. 
Information  developed  by  Israeli  diplomats  b  made 
available  to  the  Intelligence  and  security  community 
for  immediate  use  of  operational  intelligence  or 
inclusion  in  archives    As  a  final  boon  to  covert 
intelligence  personnel,  the  vigor  and  "rie,yncli  ■ 
normal  Israeli  diptemafs  life  outside  h*  installation 
usually  renders  detection  of  Intelligence  off  leers  by  the 
host  country  extremely  difficult  The  same  kind  of 
effective  support  regarding  operations  b  given  by  the 
Ministry  of  Defense  and  the  Jewish  Agency. 
Tbe  Israeli  Intellige nee  and  security  services  play  an 
important  role  throughout  the  government  and  private
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lector.  Mtny  leaders  In  both  the  civil  nrvice  and 
industry  have  at  some  time  in  their  careen  been 
directly  or  indirectly  involved  with  the  intelligence 
community.  Service  aialgnmrnri  are  not  retarded  as 
the  end  of  a  career,  as  persons  with  Intelligence  and 
security  backgrounds  frequently  are  selected  for  other 
jobs  in  the  government.  Thm  the  services  are 
supplemented  by  persons  who  know  and  continue  to 
relate  their  missions  to  intelligence  and  security 
respoDribiiirles,  in  senior  posts  in  both  the  public  and 
private  sectors.  Of  tictally,  the  services  are  nonpoUtkal 
and  members  of  the  community  are  not  encoursBed  to 
enroll  in  any  party  or  encage  in  polRtcal  activity.  The 
Defease  and  Foreign  Affairs  Ccnunittee^of  Knesset  is 
normally  the  government's  point  of  discussion  for  the 
review  and  resolution  of  sentUiv*  policies  and 
activities.  The  Director  of  Hossad  and  the  Director  of 
Shin  Beth  are  often  present  at  sessions  which  are  of 
concern  to  tbenv 
b.  RmonoKsaur'  scrwnx  rm  swims  akd  the 
rorvuiO— The  current  state  of  relations  between  the 
services  and  the  populace  is  apod  as  a  result  ot  the 
present  position  of  the  services  as  protectors  of  the 
Israeli  state  and  people  In  the  forefront  of  the  strunle 
against  Arab  terrorists  and  military  forces.  Most 
Israelis  are  acutely  aware  of  this  situation  and 
therefore  support  the  services  and  their  operations. 
The  historical  development  of  Israel  and  the  long 
continuing  struggle  against  the  Arabs  have  contributed 
to  this 
J 
A!  times  in  the  put  as  a  result  of  political  rivalries 
and  disagreements  on  the  kind  of  order  that  was  to 
prevail  in  Israel,  there  have  been  occastorttl  verbal  and 
Journalistic  attacks  against  the  services  as  instruments 
of  a  police  state.  In  several  instances,  service 
representatives  had  to  appear  In  closed  court  sessions 
to  defend  the  intelligence  and  security  community 
against  accusttions  of  kidnapping,  brutality  and 
Illegality.  Although  debates  in  the  Knesset  occasionally 
have  reflected  probably  illegal  practices  or  procedures 
by  the  services,  the  intelligence  and  security  commu- 
nity is  completely  loyal  and  if  the  government 
requested  the  execution  of  a  certain  task,  legal  and 
illegal,  it  would  be  accomplished. 
Confidence  in  the  intelligence  and  security  commu- 
nity also  received  a  boost  after  the  Six-Day  War  in 
1967  The  pari  played  by  Military  InleliiKence,  Shut 
Beth  and  the  police  in  contributing  to  the  victory  acd 
controlling  the  newly-occupied  Arab  areas  lakea fcZ 
Israel  was  followed  by  s  plethora  of  praise  in  all  Israel 
media.  The  so-called  "intelligence  failure"  in  the  Yam 
Kippur  War  in  1973,  however,  weakened  n^'ttr 
trust  in  the  services  The  subsequent  work  of  the 
Agranat  Commission,  undertaken  to  evaluate  the 
community  and  its  shortcomings  and  to  improve 
cooperation  among  lis  members,  contributed  to  a 
partial  renewal  of  public  confidence.  The  continuing 
battle  by  the  services  against  terrorism  has  eho  kept 
Israelis  loyal  to  the  community.  The  Entebbe  raid  in 
lull  1976,  which  resulted  in  the  rescue  of  hijacked 
Israeli  Soilages,  was  one  action  in  recent  years  which 
fired  the  public  imagination  and  served  as  an  esample 
ot  a  well-coordinated  and  weil-eiecuted  Israeli  opera- 
tion This  raid  and  its  success  buoyed  up  the  moral  of 
the  Israelis  as  nothing  ebe  has  in'racent  years  and 
certainly  showed  the  intelligence  r  x.  security  commu- 
nity in  a  good  light. 
4,  Professional  standards 
a.  Inticwtt— The  directors  and  senior  staff  mem- 
bers of   the  Intelligence  and  security  community 
conform  to  the  highest   professional  standards  of 
integrity  and  honesty  and  impose  these  standards  on 
the  lower  echelons.  There  is  relatively  little  difference 
betwsen  the  basic  salary  of  a  new  employee  and  the 
stall    member    who   enjoys   a    top   porilion.    The 
insignificant  disparity  has  resulted  in  the  gramma  of 
compensatory  amenities  and  privileges  such  as  eipense 
accounts,  purchasing  of  foreign  goods  that  enter  the 
country  through  devious  tax-free  channels,  and  "pro 
i  tekttfa,"  a  magic  word  in  Israel,  which  means  that  one 
can  get  items,  housing  or  privileges  at  low  cost  through 
influential  governmental  connections.  This  is  common 
practice  throughout  the  government  establishment, 
however.  Because  the  intelligence  and  security  ser- 
vices, especially  Shin  Beth,  maintain  a  very  tight  cover 
within  their  own  community,  information  on  person- 
nel, budgets  and  accounts  b  closely  held  by  a  few  top 
people  in  the  government  and  not  subjected  to 
widespread  bureaucratic  perusal  and  control.  The 
higher  echelons  scrutinize  the  expenditure  of  funds  by 
the   lower    ranks,   and   if   financial   dishonesty    is 
discovered,  the  guilty  individual  receives  very  severe 
treatment. 
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l/ 
h  Emavtcr— Israels  intelligence  and  security 
serves  we  among  the  best  in  the  world.  Their  e xpert 
personnel  and  sophisticated  techniques  have  nude 
them  highly  effective,  and  they  have  demonstrated 
outstanding  ability  to  organize,  screen  and  evaluate 
information  obtained  from  recruited  agents.  Jewish 
communities,  and  other  sources  throughout  the  world. 
Israels  ir.fellttence  capabilities  give  it  a  significant 
advantage  over  the  Arab  states— an  advantage  which 
was  an  important  factor  In  the  1967  war. 
Those  members  of  the  intelligence  and  security 
community  who  were  Identified  with  the  Information 
Service  and  other  components  of  the  Haganah,  before 
and  during  World  War  H.  developed  a  high  standard 
of  efficiency  and  level  of  competence  The  organiza- 
tion succeeded  in  recruiting  a  core  of  capable  and 
highly-educated  individuals  from  Europe  and  the 
Middle  East  whose  equal  has  been  difficult  to  find,  let 
alone  attract,  since  the  founding  of  the  state  The  corps 
of  the  "old  guard."  for  eaample,  is  fluent  in  four  or 
five  languages,  an  accomplishment  which  alone  raises 
their  general  average  of  efficiency.  The  younger 
generation  has  been  given  Intensive  training,  including 
study  abroad,  to  assist  them  in  gaining  these  qualifica- 
tions it  is  not  uncommon  for  students  to  engage  in 
clandestine  operations  while  pursuing  their  course 
of  studies. 
Israeli  signal  tntelfarenc*  successes  against  the  Whs 
in  the  past  were  of  such  high  order  thai  the  Israelis  had 
less  need  than  at  present  for  good  agent  operations 
again*  the  enemy.  Part  of  this  success  was  due  to  poor 
Arab  communications  security.  The  Israelis  now  face 
some  problems  since  Arab  communications  security  is 
gradually  improving.  The  Yom  Kippur  War  intelli- 
gence failure  U  an  eaample  of  inadequacies  in  their 
communications  Intelligence  capability  at  that  time.  In 
recent  years,  as  well,  there  also  have  been  indications 
that  Israeli  intelligence  on  the  Arabs,  other  than 
communications  intelligence,  has  been  somewhat 
inadequate  in  Quality  and  their  agent  operations 
lacking  in  success. 
One  of  the  principal  weaknesses  of  Israeli's  intelli- 
/  gence  and  security  system  appears  to  be  that  the 
v/     production  of  most  finished  intelligence  and  the 
preparation  of  national  estimates  is  done  by  Military 
Intelligence  rather  than  by  an  independent  service. 
Inherent  in  such  an  organizational  arrangement  is  the 
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danger  that  the  armed  services  will  not  be  objective  in 
observing  and  reporting  foreign  developments  and  in, 
making  national  intelligence  estimates— a  major  prob- 
lem in  the  Yom  Kippur  War— and  their  vested  interest 
in  military  operations  will  influence  intelligence 
assessments.  The  Agranat  Commission  has  recognized 
this  problem  and  recommended  changes. 
c.  Secumtt— The  physical  security  of  the  civilian 
and  military  intelligence  and  security  headquarters  in 
Tel     Aviv    Is    reported    to    be    excellent.    Two 
services—  Mossad    and    Military    Intelligence— were 
formerly  Sorated  within  a  general  army  compound  in 
the  heart  of  the  ci!>  The  buildings  were  protected  by 
high    wire    fences    and    military    guards    Military 
Intelligence  remains  in  this  location  but  Monad  now 
occupies  a  wing  of  a  multistory  commercial  office 
building  across  the  street  from  the  compound.  Shin. 
Beth,   which  was  formerly  located   In  a   rundown 
building  in  Jaffa,  occupied  new  quarters  fust  north  of 
Tel  Aviv  in  June  1970.  This  new  building,  which  was 
designed  for  their  use,  is  fenced  in  and  contains  a 
technical  laboratory  as  well  as  regular  offices.  Cuards 
control  the  entrance  and  badges  bearing  a  photograph 
of  the  employee  are  worn  within  the  compound 
There  is  an  elaborate  protected  government  "guest 
house"  for  the  training  and  accommodation  of  visiting 
foreign  intelligence  officers,  foreign  dignitaries  and 
sensitive  agents 
There  are  a  little  over  1 .000  persons  working  as  staff 
officers  tor  Mowad  and  Shin  Reth.  ail  of  whom  have 
been  given  a  king,  thorough  security  check  If  there  is 
the  slightest  doubt  raised  Mainst  an  individual,  the 
application  is  rejected    Personnel  with  leftist  back- 
grounds generally  are  not  trusted  by  leading  members 
of  the  intelligence  and  security  services  This  attitude 
did  not  always  apply  to  former  members  of  European 
Communist  parties,  some  of  whom  were  eminently 
qualified  for  clandestine  service,  especially  if  they  had 
renounced  their  Communist  ideology  and  affiliated 
with  the  Israeli  Labor  Party   This  demotion,  hov.- 
ever.  has  not  applied  since  the  exposure  of  several 
high-level   espionage   cases   In    governmental    and 
political  circles  in  the  late  1950s  and  early  1960s  The 
cases  of  Aharon  Cohen,  a  MAPAM  party  expert  on  the 
Middle  East,  and  Israel  Beer  (Figure  1).  a  Defense 
Ministry  contract  employee  and  IDF  Reserve  lieuten- 
ant colonel,  who  spied  for  the  USSR,  and  Dr.  Kuft
StCHEI 
KB**  1.  Soviet  Agm*  IvmI  Urn 
Sittf.  a  Ontile  professor  of  physics  at  Haifa  Technion. 
who  worked  for  the  Czech  Service,  caused  Shin  Beth 
to  reconsider  its  own  security  procedures  while 
stimulating  considerable  deubt  about  the  reliability  of 
recanted  Mariists  The  services  have  devised  internal 
security  systems  to  expose  ideological  weaklings  by 
more  thorouth  periodic  security  checks.  The  Israelis 
bflieve  such  individuals  constitute  a  possible  long-term 
security  threat  Israels  citizens  are  subiected  to 
stringent  registration  requirements  and  must  carry 
identification  papers.  Within  the  intelligence  and 
security  community  (real  pains  are  taken  not  to  reveal 
the  identities  of  personnel  even  to  the  average  Israeli 
employed  in  the  government  at  large.  Gompartmenta- 
tion  is  strictly  maintained  between  services  with  only 
designated  individuals,  usually  members  of  the  "hard- 
core." crossing  lines.  Intelligence  and  security  person- 
nel widely  use  and  frequently  change  pseudonyms 
The  national  practice  of  Hebrafcizinc  European  or 
Yiddish  birth  names  also  makes  the  identification  of 
some  Israelis  difficult  Visiting  foreign  officials  and 
agents  never  use  the  same  car  twice  when  meeting 
clandestinely  with  Israeli  officers  within  the  country 
Certain  unlisted  official  and  personal  telephone 
numbers  are  known  only  to  relatively  few  people  This 
type  of  professional  demeanor  at  home  provides 
excellent  daily  training  for  intelligence  and  security 
personnel  before  receiving  foreign  assignments. 
Classified  Information  may  not  be  discussed  over 
(he  telephone.  Despite  their  relatively  high  standards 
of  security,  however.  Israeli  officials  reportedly  are 
occasionally  careless  in  observing  this  restriction  They 
also  have  "an  old  boy  network"  much  like  the  British. 
Israelis  in  the  "network"  are  willing  to  discuss 
classified  subjects  whether  or  not  there  is  i.  need  to 
know  Tfir  Israelis  also  have  problems  dealing  with 
overseas  Jewry  whose  support  they  need  but  whose 
security  is  questionable  because  of  the  possibility  of 
divided  loyalty. 
Installations  and  storage  containers  must  conform  to 
rigorous  security  standards.  Classification  terms  Top 
Secret.  Secret.  Confidential  and  Restricted  (compara- 
ble to  For  Official  Use  Only)  are  used.  Top  Secret  and 
Secret  documents  are  transmitted  by  courier  only  in 
double  envelopes  and  two  receipts  are  required-one 
for  the  package  and  one  for  the  contents.  These 
documents  are  logged  In  and  out  by  date,  document 
number,  title  or  subject,  and  the  office  accepting 
responsibility  for  them.  At  least  three  periodic 
inventories  are  held  each  year.  A  registry  produces  a 
computer  printout  four  times  a  year  listing  all  Top 
Secret  material  for  which  each  unit  is  responsible 
Electrical  communication  is  handled  entirely  by 
teleprinter  and  other  communication  security  devices. 
A  record  is  made  of  documents  to  be  destroyed  and 
security  officers  must  witness  the  destruction  of  alt 
Top  Secret  and  Secret  material. 
All  personnel  requiring  a  clearance  mutt  complete  a 
personal  history  statement  and  undergo  a  routine 
investigation  For  higher  clearances  the  investigations 
could  include  the  applicant's  entire  family  and  a  full 
field  investigation.  New  immigrants  from  the  USSR 
and  East  European  countries  ere  normally  denied 
access  to  classified  information  for  c  minimum  of  four 
or  five  years.  This  ruling  is  not  always  possible  to 
enforce  because  of  "protektsia."  Within  the  IDF 
security  risks  are  reported  to  Shin  Beth  and  are  closely 
supervised  by  the  unit  security  officer,  who  is  required 
to  make  periodic  reports  on  the  individual's  activities 
To  stimulate  and  evaluate  the  security  consciousness  of 
SECRET
sh.-  !0r"  cadre.  Field  Security  prrxmnel  i-mulalr 
•moiig  the  troop*  ind  attempt  lo  elicil  military 
information 
d.    MORALE   AND   DiSCtPUNAAT    MCTHODS — MoSSad 
and  Shin  Beth  are  components  of  the  israeti  civil 
service  structure  and  applicants  must  pass  a  civil 
service  examination.  Those  in  their  twenties  with  a 
university  degree  are  preferred,  although  other  indivf- 
duab  who  have  especially  desirable  qualifications  are 
accepted.  The  intelligence  and  security  services,  in 
direct  competition  with  the  Ministry  for  Foreign 
Affairs  and  the  rapidly  expanding  butiners  commun- 
ity, are  at  a  disadvantage.  Most  young  Israelis  do  not 
like  the  anonymity  of  the  secret  service  and  prefer  the 
more  remunerative  pay  scales  of  the  business  world. 
Intelligence  and  security  personnel  who  do  not  or 
cannot  subscribe  to  the  circumscribed  life  limited  by 
security  restrictions  and  operational  considerations  are 
either  dropped  or,  if  their  actions  should  Jeopardize 
the  service  or  the  state,  are  severely  punished.  To  boost 
the  morale  of  staff  intelligence  officers,  the  services  in 
the  early  1960s  sought  and  secured  from  the  Knesset  a 
seem 
30  percent  annual  bonus  for  their  personnel  to 
compensate  for  the  risks  and  the  anonymity 
involved  (Figure  H 
B.  Mossad-- Secret  Intelligence  Service' 
1.  Functions 
Mossad  is  responsible  for  foreign  intelligence  collec- 
tion, political  action  and  couaterterrorism.  In  carrying 
out  its  mission  to  collect  positive  Intelligence,  the 
principal  function  of  Mossad  is  to  conduct  agent 
operations  against  the  Arab  nations  and  their  official 
representatives  and  installations  throughout  the  world, 
particularly  in  Western  Europe  and  the  United  States, 
where  the  national  interests  of  the  Arabs  in  the  Near 
East  conflict  with  Israeli  interest.  Mossad  collects 
information  on  the  disposKion,  morale,  armaments, 
equipment  and  state  of  leadership  of  every  Arab  Army 
that  could  be  called  into  action  in  the  ease  of  another 
round  of  fighting;  and  all  the,  information  that 
illuminates  Arab  internal  politics  and  relationships 
among  the  principal  Arab  leaden  and  the  diplomatic 
activity  of  all  countries  In  the  Arab  world.  Mossad 
I 
I 
r-  * 
i   
PflM!  MMSTf  B 
rVli^l  AfMvt 
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i 
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iitit*4r^jfWil 
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CMnwa-Va'*** 
Sra"*  M^t 
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■«       -      CMA»*  O*  COMMAND 
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stasis  *-»•  DA 
Figure  2.  Orgonlzetion  of  tsrost  tntcwasftte  and  Security  Sennets,  1977 
SECKET 
IS
sfctn 
monitors  Arab  commercial  aetivrly.  particularly  in  the 
field  of  km  psrchasa  »  the  Watt,  and  attempts  to 
connstraet  Arab  nenrittat  of  military,  economic  and 
pohrica)  esperts.  Ik  thfecaa*  the  principal  desire  if  to 
reensft  these  persons  at  aaliragmra  agsrits.  or  failing 
the*.etihertodia*st^rhemfreaaaidfe«theArabs&r 
to  discover  their  precise  fancttena.  Mr— rf  abo  b 
cJtcrard  with  rnc&ing  disturbances  calculated  to  create 
nwtval  distrust  among  the  Arabs  and  to  draw  Western 
sympathy  away  from  the  Arab  came,  and  monitoring 
and  counteracting  Arab  propaganda  aad  detecting  and 
countering  Arab  terrorism.  In  the  area  of  counterter- 
roriim.  at  timet  the  Israel*  have  carried  the  fight  to 
Arab  terrorist*  by  taking  eucuHve  action  against 
them.  especially  in  parts  of  the  Near  East  and  Wejtem 
£&T*»  Ic  articular,  the  fact  that.  Lebanon  hai  a 
miied  Christian,  Dr  -*«  and  Moslem  population  has 
made  that  country  arrraeUa*  for  intelligence  protects. 
The  Israelis  have  covert  assets  and  run  operations  in 
their  northern  neighbor.  In  the  past  they  have 
mounted  paramilitary  and  executive  action  operations 
again*  Pslestinian  terrorist  leaders,  personnel  end 
installations  in  Lebanon,  They  have  abo  provided 
support  to  Christian  rightists  in  the  Lebanese  civil  war. 
In  addition  to  running  operations  against  the  Arabs, 
Monad  collects  political  economic  and  scientific 
intelligence  in  bosh  the  Eastern  and  Western  worlds 
for  the  protection  of  the  Slate  of  Israel.  Zionirm  and 
jews  genera!!*  Their  cellectJon  efforts  are  especially 
concentrated  in  the  Soviet  Union  and  ihe  United 
States,  as  weU  as  at  the  United  Nations,  where  policy 
decutora  could  have  repercussions  on  Israel  and 
Zionist  mak 
Intelligence  objectives  to  the  USSR  and  East  Europe 
consist  of  determining  governmental  policy  toward 
Israel  *nd  ihe  problem  of  Jewish  emigration;  recruit- 
ing persons  strategically  located  in  Soviet  sod  East 
European  bureaucracies  who.  motivated  either  by 
conviction  or  corruption,  are  willing  to  assist  Zionist 
action  in  those  countries;  and  ascertaining  the  degree 
and  quality  of  assistance  made  available  to  New 
Eastern  groups,  whether  in  Israel  or  the  Arab  nations, 
by  Soviet  and  East  European  Governments. 
Objectives  in  Western  countries  are  equally  impor- 
tant to  Ihe  Israeli  intelligence  service.  Mossad  collects 
intelligence  regarding  Western.  Vatican,  and  UN 
pdicies  toward  the  Near  East;  promotes  arms  drab  for 
the  benefit  of  the  IDF;  and  acquires  data  for  use  in 
silencing  anti-Israel  factions  in  the  West 
L  Organization 
Mossad  has  eight  departments:  (I)  Operational 
Planning  and  Coordination;  (2)  Collection;  (3)  Political 
Action  and  Liaison;  (4)  Manpower.  Finance.  Logistics 
and  Security;  (5)  Training;  (6)  Research;  (7)  Technical 
Operations;  and  (8)  Technology  (Figure  3). 
The  Operational  Planning  and  Coordination  De- 
partment b  concerned  with  the  management  of 
Mctsad  resources  and  responsible  for  interdirertorate 
operational  and  administrative  coordination  within  the 
organisation  and  interserviee  liaison  within  the  Israeli 
Intelligence  and  security  community.  ThU  department 
also  deals  with  requirements  and  the  development  of 
overall  collection  plans. 
The  Collection  Department  'b  responsible  for 
foreign  covert  operations  and  the  processing  and 
production  of  reporting  from  clandestine  sources.  This 
component  is  the  largest  unit  in  Mossad.  The 
department  has  offices  abroad  under  Israeli  diplo- 
matic and  nonoffidal  cover  and  is  active  mainly  in 
Europe,  where  it  concentrates  on  Arab  targets  through 
third-country  operations. 
The  Political  Action  and  Liaison  Directorate  b  in 
charge  of  political  action  end  relations  with  friendly 
foreign  services.  Thb  componeia  abo  maintains 
contact  with  those  nations  and  political  groups  with 
whom  Israel  does  not  have  normal  diplomatic  relations 
(that  is,  African  countries,  Lebanon  and/or  Lebanese 
Christian  rightist  factions  and  Indonesia). 
There  b  also  a  Psychological  Warfare  or  Special 
Operations  Division,  probably  in  the  Political  Action 
and  Liaison  Directorate,  which  runs  highly  sensitive 
covert  action  operations  against  Arab  terrorists  and  ex- 
Nazis,  and  sabotage,  paramilitary  and  psychological 
warfare  protects,  such  as  character  assassination  and 
black  propaganda. 
In  the  absence  of  the  Director  of  Mossad.  the 
Director  of  the  Operational  Planning  and  Coordina- 
tion Department  now  becomes  acting  Director, 
whereas  in  pa<tt  years  the  Director  of  the  Collection 
Department  acted  for  the  Director  of  Mossad  With 
the  drive  for  greater  and  improved  coordination 
within  the  intelligence  and  security  community,  the 
SECR6T
SECRET 
OWKTOt 
Ucfcjfcw 
tffom 
BtKMf 
MMActtoi 
j  Hoimi     I  r   r""i 
Cwri 
C*«rrfa 
(Ml 
SiKilS-TSCI* 
Figure  3.  Organisation  of  Mouad.   1W7 
Director  eT  »f  e  Operational  **»'«nlng  aH  Coordina- 
tion Depai*r*er4  has  apparently  take-,  precedence 
over  •**  Erector  «rf  '.he  C*"»«Sion  Department. 
In  r-eadauaT»»»T,  the  <t>nartn»»iil  direfWt  direct  »he 
varirar  are*,  functional,  administrative,  and  financial 
controller*  The  area  departments  under  the  control  of 
the  Collection  and  Special  Political  Action  and  Liaiion 
Departments  are-  (1)  Central  America.  (2)  South 
America.  (3)  Eastern  Europe  including  the  USSR.  (4) 
Afrira.  {5}  Asia  and  Oceania.  (6)  the  Mediterranean 
aH  Ni-ir  East  areas.  (7 J  Europe,  and  (8)  North 
America  Under  each  controller  there  are  branches  or 
desks  which  are  responsible  for  one  or  more  countries. 
native  |n*ri!<gence  and  counterintelligence  reports 
jre  sent  back  tn  Mossad  headquarters  in  Tel  Aviv, 
evaluated  by  the  Research  Department,  and  dissemi- 
nated  to  various   government   offices.    Intelligence 
reports  on  the  Arabs  are  forwarded  Kv  M*«*<t  to  the 
Research  Department  of  the  DM!  white  courrfererpto- 
nage  reports  are  sent  through  Mossad  to  Shin  Beth, 
where  they  are  given  special  processing  by  counterin- 
telligence investigative  departments.    - 
Mossad  controb  Israeli  foreign  Intelligence  activities 
eicept  for  operations  launched  from  Israel  aaainst 
military  obiectiva  in  peripheral  areas  of  surrounding 
Arab  countries,  which  are  under  the  hmsdiction  of 
DMI.  Mrmad  operations  abroad  tali  ln;o  .*o  principal 
categories:  those  in  the  Near  East,  as  a  first  line  of 
defense,  and  those  elsewhere  The  Israelis  have 
designated  Egypt  as  the  main  target  ami  for 
establishing  Intelligence  netwnrki  In  1970  th*  Israelis 
estimated  that  about  SO  percent  of  their  operational 
effort  was  directed  against  Eirypt  The  nest  priority  Is 
Syria.  Much  of  this  activity  against  the  Arab*  In  the 
Near  East  is  based  on  deep  cover  operations  by  Israeli 
/ 
SECIET
Sfctit 
iHetab  or  the  lecruttment  of  Arabs  in  third  countries 
followed  by  their  dispatch  or  normal  rotation  hack 
Some  to  en  Arab  aim.  Two  toad  examples  of  Israeli 
Imp  cover  Illegal  operations  are  the  Cohen  aim)  Lotz 
EJiahttBeaShMiICohoBvssoKEcypHw-bonkw 
•ho  was  invorvad  ill  Israel  sabotage  operarioe  against 
Aiwrtctn  &no  Britisli  issfteJIetioiw  in  EgypS  in  195* 
Cohen  mccrodod  te  ar  Taping  detactteft,  when  most 
members  of  the  ritst  won  arrested  by  the  Egyptians, 
and  went  to  braat  EvcsthsetV  Monad  recruited 
Cohen  for  u  lltntal  opnrsrk?*  designed  to  develop 
intelligence  networks  aad  acquire  pofytkal  and  mili- 
tary information  in  Syria.  He  received  intensive 
training,  adopted  the  identity  of  thnltte  Kami]  Amin 
Thibet,  a  Syrian-born  aanhaat.  and  emigrated  to 
Argentina,  where  he  baeaaaa  m  active  aaanber  of  the 
Arab  emigre  corns*  entry.  Cohan  eventually  went  to 
Syria,  where  he  «aa  sssaaad  by  two  Arab*  who  had 
previous!?  been  nensltad  by  the  Ism**.  From  1961 
until  1965  Gcbeo  w  active  as  as  metal  in  Damascus. 
where  he  succeeded  in  snatJasj  SHtweroua  eontactt 
with  political  and  mffitary  personates  In  the  Syrian 
esublithaieet.  He  awdV  occasional  trips  to  Europe  and 
Israel  for  extensive  debrief  sasja.  Eventually,  in  January 
1965.  the  Syrians  did  delect  and  locate  Cohen  while  he 
was  la  the  net  of  transmitting  information  to  Tel  Aviv 
One  ceuae  of  fiat  downf tl  waa  that  be  war  oalnt  hand 
morse  radio  equipment  and  had  been  on  the  air  for  an 
hour  when  lie  was  caught  (Figure  4).  A  Syrian  court 
tried  Cohen  sad  found  hks  unity  of  m<"na»  He 
was  pubhehr  hanand  in  Tlisaasnu  to  May  1965. 
Johenn  WoHgang  Lett  fab*  known  nt  Zeev  Gur 
Arifh).  was  an  officer  in  Military  tmenagcnce,  In  1959 
during  a  VVadat  amtiria.  Monad  aarwawied  its  need 
for  a  man  to  be  a  new  illegal  i  arias  nl  agent  in  Cairo 
under  cover  at  a  former  Natl  officer.  Lotz  accented 
the  asstgnraest,  which  was  directed  ersmarily  antral 
spseUf  usapnns  activity  by  German  scientists  in 
Egypt.  He  received  iMenatve  training  in  brae). 
including  equestrian  JaatiwUkny.  and  in  early  1960  he 
went  to  Germany  and  anrfaend  at  an  East  German 
refugee  and  former  African  Cares  officer.  A'Mhough 
Lota  had  a  wife  in  bract,  be  eventually  married  a 
German  woman  to  detnlup  bis  legend  In  1961  he 
went  to  Cairo,  where  be  opened  a  riding  academy. 
Through  his  activtrjaa  Lots  snade  a  variety  of  contacts 
In  the  German  eomstuauty  la  the  Egyptian  capita]  and 
Figure  4.  gfiehv  tan  Show  Cairn's  Iranawltlsi  i 
to  OowasLin.  IfeS 
in  time  made  the  acquaintance  of  a  number  of 
prominent  and  wefr»pbced  Egyptians.  He  made  a 
number  of  trips  from  Egypt  to  Western  Europe  for 
debriefing*  Finally,  in  1964  Lotx  began  to  mail 
threatening  letters  to  selected  German  expsrts  in 
Egypt  In  February  1965.  he  was  arrested  by  the 
Egyptians,  who  tried  and  imprisoned  him  Eventually 
he  was  released  and  returned  to  Israel  in  1968.  The 
Israelis  have  stated  that  the  operation  cost  them  about 
I250.000l  They  have  also  admitted  that  errors  by  Lotz 
in  handling  his  communications  and  his  use  in 
executive  action  operations  may  have  led  to  his 
downfall.  During  his  captivity  Lotz  was  abo  forced  to 
reveal  the  whole  operation  (Figure  5). 
Moasad  stations  outside  of  the  Arab  areas  in  the 
Near  East  are  generally  under  diplomatic  cover  within 
the  embassies  and  comubtes  of  Israel.  There  are 
stations  in  the  United  States,  most  of  the  European 
capitals.  Turkey.  Iran  and  strategic  centers  in  Latin 
America.  Africa  and  the  Far  East.  Operations  range 
from  formal  liaison  exchanges  with  host  services 
through  unilateral  projects  to  special  executive  actions 
directed  against  Arab  terrorists.  There  are  abo  smaller 
stations,  which  run  mostly  unibteral  operations  and 
handle  local  liaison  on  such  matters  as  Arab  terrorists 
The  Collection  Directorate  and  the  Political  Action 
and  Liaison  Directorate  are  separate  components  of 
SECRET
SfCMT 
figures.  MmmWt 
traMSMfiv  *s***g  nis  trial 
Lett  inMM  *•  VM  a*  • 
in  Coirs,  My/Up*  IMS 
Ktostad  and  are  care!»l!y  compartmented  a)  head- 
Quarters.  OUtettion  tad  Political  Action  and  Liaison 
milntsln  separate  permanent  staffs  outside  brad  in 
larger  sUttcr*.  There  aie  thus  either  two  Musssrt 
stalinm  w  two  eompartmenJed  components  in  each 
statKW  in  tone  countries— one  for  unilateral  dandW 
tine  coBeetion  and  one  for  liaison.  For  esample.  a! 
pment  ia  Parte  tie  Israelis  have  an  Embassy, 
Consulate-General  and  Ministry  of  Drfense  Mission. 
Under  embassy  cover,  Monad  has  a  Collection 
Directorate  regional  controller  and  a  Political  Action 
and  Lisbon  Directorate  regional  controller  In  the 
French  «r>0»l  which  hu  more  or  less  over  the  yean 
remained  the  f  ulerum  of  Israeli  intelligence  activity  on 
the  continent  of  Europe 
In  Switzerland  the  braeht  have  an  Embury  in  Bern 
and  a  Csrsdate-Genera!  in  Zurich  which  provide 
cover  for  Co3]ection  Department  of f Seen  involved  la 
oni!«!f?a]  operations  These  Inch  diplomatic  tmtafle* 
ttooi  abo  maintain  daw  relations  with  the  Swiss  on  a 
local  level  la  regard  to  evert  functions  aack  as  physical 
security  for  Israeli  official  and  oommarcial  toUalla* 
Horn  la  the  coantry  and  the  prUoctkw  of  staff 
members  and  vWUng  Israelis.  There  is  alio  dose  J 
coflaborarioa  between  the  Israelis  and  Swiss  oa  ^ 
scientific  aad  IschaJcaJ  Barters  portalarng  so  Mefr 
pence  and  security  operations.  Swiss  officials  nave 
isrlr  Irequeat  trips  to  Inaal  There  ss  a  umUUussi  flow 
of  Israelis  toaad  through  Swfaerlead.  Thast  Hits. 
however,  are  usually  arranged  tWoagh  the  Political 
Aetioa  aad  liaison  regfcmd  coatraBar  at  the  Esabasry 
la  Parts  directly  with  the  Swiss  aad  aot  ttaaagk  Iha 
officials  ia  the  breast  Eatbasty  to  Bats,  although  the 
fatter  arc  kept  informed 
In  Spain,  an  the  other  hand,  than  is  aa  known 
official  or  stavofffcwl  bradi  hataBatina  Thar*  have 
baea  contacts,  howevar.  between  Pnlllfcfel  Aetioa  and 
Liaison  Directorate  offldali  of  Mossed  aad  the  Spanish 
service  for  sosne  Haw.  The  original  meeting  appar- 
ently eesarred  ia  Parts  in  the  late  196Tb;  stooa  then 
thare  have  been  contacts  la  Madrid  aad  Parts.  There  is 
a  possfbikty  that  Mossed  snay  alio  have  a  cfaadsstiaa 
CoflecrJon  Departsaeat  starJoa  la  Spain.  Ia  January 
1973k,  Barach  Asher  Cohen,  a  Mossa  d  offiosr.  was 
assassinated  ia  Madrid  by  Arabs. 
Special  operations  ere  saoanted  oa  aa  ad  hor  basis. 
Headqaertan  diretts  the  effort 
esnploys  Mnssad  offieen  aad 
temporary  duty,  la  Jury  1979.  an  Israeli  assasstnattaa 
squad  of  18  was  involved  in  the  murder  of  a  Moroocaa 
Arab  in  Ullehammer.  Norway.  Norwegian  authorities 
captured,  tried  and  Imprisoned  sts  of  the  group,  the 
rest  escaped,  tt  became  clear  in  the  course  of  the  trial 
that  the  squad,  which  was  composed  of  faraeas.  who 
were  Mossed  officers,  and  European  lews,  who  were 
recruited  for  the  mission,  did  much  of  Ms  preparatory 
work  in  Peris  and  entered  Norway  oa  a  specific 
assignment— the  elimination  of  Arab  terrorists.  After 
the  murder,  two  of  the  squad  sought  refuge  with  an 
Israeli  Embasry  security  officer.  The  Norwegians 
dedared  the  officer  personna  ran  grata,  although  he 
apparently  was  not  privy  to  the  operation. 
J.  Administrative  practices 
The  Israeli  Prime  Minister  appoints  the  Director  of 
Monad.  The  Prime  Minister  does  not  need  the 
approval  of  the  cabinet  or  the  Knesset  for  this 
appointment 
SECIIT
SlCtt? 
rWf*  «d  station  end 
efftivjs  ft*a  toey 
Bctk  or  the  IDF  it 
tadtvldwiiinihe 
jr*.  hs  aWB  belongs  to  his 
•astmed  to,  and  aubfeet 
lens  w  he  mMiM 
rale  <ts*e  ml  eppry, 
(winy,  air,  navy)  whs 
Director  «f  Military 
their  ataffa  are  Mosstd  career 
abroad  nd  behalf  of  ait  Ida 
iJceanmberotSbin 
A*  aaost  qualified. 
todea  particular  foreign 
parent  organisation,  but  he  it 
to  the  control  of.  Mnaiiii  aa 
the  barren  of  brad.  This 
to  mtfrury  attaches 
remain  sstbordlnate  19  lha 
Me—  if  oWi  not  law*  •  logical  career  piogitssiun 
program.  The  ore>*isatiast  promotes  case  officen  who 
haw  been  ainaafal  in  the  fteftl  to  top  managerial 
Jeha  The  results  of  this  arrawarmewt  an  miied  at 
of  the  iwrattfat  upas alias  am  often  ml 
u^  ^av  flmpn  wr  ■aniwmx& 
a.  TaAnnwc— The 
pastotafUjicOpereHeee 
ranking  persermci  and 
Operations  course,  Aft 
required  to  take  An  f< 
court*  before  •cruelty 
cycle 
far  twerests  and  tower 
end  a  Field 
officer  candidates  are 
Baiie  Operations 
an  doty.  The  entire 
minim  cyeV  tA»»  almost  two  yean  and  it  generally 
gfeni  t«  efuwM  «f  it.  M**  *f  *fc*  iniwlwg  lata  piaoe 
In  the  Tel  ***»  «f*n  Tr*  lastniraww  »>•  the»  Mossed 
cahui^an  nn*  AWAJiAAeaei  meuh  ^laaMnsAanA  &*iaal^BM^^fcA^b>     *  —  *  -wla 
^•W*#    w*rf«W"H    Qll    WWflW»f^    VQaWV    **f    QtttV,    SIM] 
Ljufaiwalaai  ^^^_^^^^^k^3  ^^^^^^^^^»  AeV^  f^T»  ■  iini  — ■* 
Te^»*u'  MemsT1^^*    pn^w^^Wf!^     tWP^Hf^fUpT     f^e»     t^lTCCffW    Off 
tnrtinvt  an  their  aaniTi>fcn 
The  three  services  ran  a  Mat  advanced  achool  in 
ferumhan  rfctt  offer*  mechfaad  course)  of  two  in 
three  months'  duration  on  world  political  attain, 
braet  a  peJrHeal  and  auinteak  objectives,  new  techni- 
cal operational  aid*  and  the  lata*  information  on 
foreign  intelligence  mrvfees.  Al  officen  who  are 
nidway  in  their  careen  are  lequlied  to  attend  thli 
advanced  srhocl  wpon  their  return  from  a  foreign 
aaifnment.  As  stony  w  49  to  50  tbsdents  are  reported 
to  have  been  enrolled  in  a  single  running  of  this 
cewrae.  The  faeufcy  it  uaeiuouJ  of  rapreaentativei  of 
the  three  services  and  it  directly  aubordinate  to  the 
Dtwtnrcf  Mcaaad.  The  IWuw  Minister  or  tome  other 
Mg*i  *uticiat  net  aoVfreawa  ajfaonatins  cJacea 
Some  younger  Motd  officen,  who  may  be  weak  in 
certain  fields  of  higher  education  or  languages,  are 
sent  to  universities  abroad,  where  their  pursuit  of  an 
advanced  degrt*  simultaneously  serves  as  cover  for 
■their  extracurriruhf  operational  activities.  One  of  the 
established  goals  of  the  Intelligence  and.  security 
services  is  that  each  officer  be  fluent  in  Arabic.  A 
nine-month,  Intensive  Arabic  language  coum  b  given 
annually  in  the  Tel  Aviv  area  to  students  from  each 
service  The  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affain  abo  tends  two 
or  three  off Iciais  to  each  course.  Moasad  officen  who 
art  going  Into  Arab  aoentiona  take  the  tame  Arabic 
language  training  at  Shin  Beth  officen  At  further 
training,  these  Monad  officen  work  hi  the  Adminis- 
tered Territories  for  two  yean  to  sharpen  their 
language  skills  before  being  potted  abroad.  During  this 
period  they  usually  serve  in  the  Snal  and  often  run 
Bedouin  agents  into  Egypt  In  conjunction  with 
Military  IitterUgenoa. 
All  Mossed  of  f  lean  am  tninad  in  the  we  of  small 
arms  and  required  to  fire  them  at  angular  intervals. 
b  Ftmaaajroaatanim  The  Dfcwtor  of  Masted  It 
a  civil  service  Ctats  I  officer.  He  raoarvet  generous 
eapente  and  entertsimnent  allowances.  There  are 
reported  to  be  several  Oats  t  and  Chss  S  officen  in 
Moasad  at  watt.  The  aasttthry  lake  home  pay  of  a 
ranking  Mo>wd  officer,  after  tain  but  including 
bonuses  and  cmt-of-livlng  and  family  aflowancn.  is 
about  IL4.000  per  month  (I'SMM).  They  aha  receive 
espente  and  entertainment  allowances  end  are  pro- 
vided with  a  car  and  gasoline  aUnwanee  as  well. 
Higher  academic  dmres  place  int»lllceF:e  officen  in 
a  hither  pay  bracket,  thus  a  directorate  director  with 
en  advanced  degree  makes  the  tame  as  the  Director.  A 
middle-ranking  officer  with  allowances  for  a  large 
number  of  dependents  would  receive  more  than  his 
seniors.  In  general,  higher-grade  civil  service  salaries 
are  roughly  comparable  to  those  of  higher-ranking 
military  officers.  The  rather  insignificant  differential 
between  grades  is  compensated  by  fairly  impressive 
perquisites,  especially  in  the  senior  ranks.  Officen 
abroad  ars  given  generous  cost-of-living  allowances 
that  conform  to  the  allotmeUs  df  the  regular  Foreign 
Affairs  officen  For  cover  purposes  these  are  paid  by 
the  Foreign  Affain  Ministry.  If,  however,  an  intelli- 
gence officer  needs  a  larger  apartment  or  house  for 
representation,  operational  purposes,  or  family  re- 
quirements, his  service  quietly  pays  the  difference. 
Officen  and  their  families  usually  travel  tourist  class 
on  Israeli  carriers  whenever  possible  but  the  absence  of 
SECIET
MOOT 
J 
a  fina  rule  permits  them  to  travel  on  any  air  or 
t*e*mship  lae  at  their  dssrrotioa  Clerical  empwyoas 
travc)  tourist  data. 
Each  station  abroad  is  granted  fundi  for  operational 
and  entanaawBeat  expenses.  Itesporaible  sadiridaab 
do  not  entertaia  any  a»or«  than  b  necessary  bul  when 
they  do.  *  if  dona  lavishly.  Efforts  to  citend 
hotcttsHty  as>«intiagly  arc  nude  at  headquarters  in 
brad  when  f  avotad  agents  ar  ranking  foraiga  iataU> 
pence  officers  ate  guests, 
4  Methods  af  eperatlaa 
Moaad  over  the  yam  lot  onjnyad  aarat  rapport 
with  highly-placed  parsons  and  government  officas  to 
every  country  of  Jmportaaca  to  laraal  Within  Jewish 
coramuaatiae  iaahaost  avary  oauairy  of  the  world, 
there  are  Zionists  and  other  sytnpathiaan,  who  render 
strong,  support  to  the  Israeli  intelliaenoe  effort.  Such 
contacts  are  caret ally  nurtured  and  serve  as  channels 
for  Information,  deception  material,  propaganda  and 
other  purposes,  Moaad  directs  clandestine  operations 
throughout  Europe,  including  the  USSR  and  East 
European  countries;  North  and  South  America;  the 
Near  Easu  Africa;  and  the  Far  East,  including  South 
East  Mia.  Moaad  activities  are  generally  conducted 
through  Israeli  official  and  semiofficial  establishments; 
deep  cover  enterprises  in  the  form  ot  firms  and 
organisation,  soma  especially  created  for.  or  adapt* 
able  to.  a  spedfie  objective;  and  penetrations  effected 
within  non-Zionist  national  and  international  jewah 
orgaarzaiiam. 
The  function  of  intelligence  officers  under  cover  of 
diplomatic  establishments  to  to  arrange  information 
exchanges  with  officials  of  local  services,  manage 
corntmmlcaliora.  serve  as  accommodation  addresses 
and  funding  channels,  and  direct  agents  toward  targets 
of  interest.  Official  organizations  used  for  cover  are: 
Israeli  furchasing  Missions  and  Israeli  Government 
\  Tourist.  El  Ai  and  Zim  offices.  Israeli  construction 
i  firms,  industrial  groups  and  international  trade  organi- 
zations abo  provide  nonoffkial  cover.  Individusb 
working  under  deep  or  illegal  cover  are  normally 
charged  with  penetrating  objectives  that  require  a 
long-range,  more  subtle  approach,  or  with  activities  in 
which  the  Israeli  Government  can  never  admit 
complicity. 
Many  Israelis  have  come  from  Aisb  countries  where 
they  were  bom  and  educated  and  appear  more  Arab 
than  Israeli  ta  speech,  demeanor,  and  attitude.  B> 
fcrgii»graaporUandlo\mthya^nimenUof  Arab  and  y 
western  countries  and  providing  sound  bevkarouftt  * 
legends  and  covar.  Moaad  has  successfully  seat  into 
Egypt  and  other  Arab  countries  Israelis  disguised  and 
documented  aa  Arabs  ar  cMseas  of  European 
countries. 
There  am  naammua  parsoaa  la  Israel  wba  have  a 
thorough  area  and  language  fcaawledgc  of  any  area  of 
interest  to  the  Intelligence  services.  These  area  eipertt 
can  render  extremely  valuable  assistance  in  analyzing 
Intelligent*  Information  and  formulating  country 
requirements,  thus  contributing  to  the  .total  opera* 
lionet  potential  since  they  enable  Israeli  intelligence 
officers  to  animate  rapidly  the  efficiency  and 
reliability  of  their  agents  aad  informanU.  -.These 
persona  am  aba  useful  for  their  ability  to  pass 
completely  for  a  citizen  of  the  nation  in  question.  The 
Israeli  talent  for  counterfeiting  *or  forging  passports 
and  documents  ably  supports  the  agent's  authenticity. 
The  Israeli  tetclligcntn  service  depends  haaviU  on 
the  various  Jewish  communities  aad  organizations 
abroad  for  recruttuu*.  aacnU  aad  eliciting  general 
information  The  aagressiiraly  ideological  nature  of 
Jtoniwn.  »hkh  emphatiies  that  ail  laws  balm*  to 
Israel  and  must  return  to  tatad.  bad  bed  Ha  drawback 
in  enlisting  support  for  inteUtacnoe  operations,  how- 
ever, since  there  is  cotuidtraLie  apposition  to  Zionism 
among  Jtws  thiuuglio.it  the  world  Aware  of  tbb  fact. 
Israeli  intelligence  repre*eouti*ea  usually  operate 
discreetly  within  Jewuh  communities  and  aie  under 
instructions  to  handle  their  muaiom  with  utmost  tart 
to  avoid  embarrassment  to  Israel.  They  abo  attempt  to 
penetrate  anti-Zionist  elements  in  order  to  neutralise 
the  opposition  Despite  such  precautions,  the  Israr-lis 
frequently  eaperience  setbacks  and'  there  have  been 
several  cases  where  attempted  rarruiiments  of  Ameri- 
cans of  the  Jewish  faith  have  been  rejected  and 
reported  to  US  authorities. 
Israel's  program  for  accelerating  Its  technukajitsl. 
scientific  and  military  development  as  rapidly  as 
possible  has  been  enhanced  by  exploiting  scientific 
exchange  programs.  Mosssd  pbys  a  key  role  in  this 
endeavor.  In  addilton  to  the  large-scale  acquisition  of 
published  scientific  papers  and  technical  journab  f  rum  y 
all  over  the  world  through  overt  channels,  the  Israelis  * 
devote  a  considerable  portion  of  their  covert  oper- 
ations to  obtaining  scientific  and  technical  intelligence. 
HCIEl
SECIIE1 
Tim  had  included  attempts  In  praetratr-  certain 
classified  defense  projects  in  thr  United  States  and 
other  Western  nations 
The  United  Nations  is  a  major  target  for  Mossad 
penetration  because  a  is  a  major  sponsor  of  interna- 
tional exchanges  in  aB  fields  and  because  of  its 
importance'  in  settling  disputes  between  Israel  and  the 
Arab  states.  Israeli  agents  operate  at  the  UN  under 
diplomatic  and  journalistic  cover. 
Mcsad  recruitment,  training  and  control  of  agents 
varies  widely,  depending  upon  the  target,  ares  of 
ope.-ation  and  the  desk  in  neadQMiten.  White  there  is 
•  certain  amount  of  standardisation  in  the  handling  of 
operation*.  Israeli  intelligence  officers  appear  to  have 
considerable  freedom  in  running* operations.  There  is 
no  hsrd  rule  requiring  specific  headquarters'  approval 
prior  to  the  recruitment  of  an  agent  except  in  the  case 
of  Communist  countries,  Name  traces  are  requested  of 
headquarters  voluminous  files  but  this  is  not  a 
consistent  routine  Contemplated  operations  against 
the  USSR  and  the  East  European  countries,  however. 
are  approached  very  cautiously,  and  entail  a  great  deal 
of  headquarters  planning  and  control  and  a  special 
branch  disposed  of  area  experts  is  responsible  for 
authorizing  and  directing  this  activity    Mosstd   is 
especially  interested  in  anrty  warning  regarding  such 
developments  as  the  dispatch  of  Soviet  military  units 
from  the  USSR  to  the  Near  East  There  also  exists 
within,  or  affiliated  with.  Monad  a  small  unit  whose 
sole  objective  is  to   remind  the  Soviets  through 
'  propaganda  and  contacts  about  the  Jewish  question  at 
any  point  throughout  the  world  All  sorts  of  people, 
even  Cyrus  Eaton,  have  been  stimulated  to  raise  the 
subject    Israeli  efforts  must  at  times  be  effective 
because  the  Soviets  often  attack  the  Israeli  service  in 
their  propaganda  with  detailed  revelations  of  Israeli 
plots  against  allegedly  innocent  Soviet  citizens 
The  Israelis  select  their  agents  almost  exclusively 
from  persons  of  Jewish  origin  However,  there  are 
security  hazards  involved  in  cases  of  divided  alle- 
giance between  dedication  to  the  Ziorast  State  of  Israel 
and  loyahy  to  a  homeland.  The  recruitment  of 
Gentiles  is  comparatively  rare. 
Many  Arabs,  especially  walk-ins,  have  directly  or 
indirectly  helped  the  services,  usually  at  a  result  of 
monetary  inducements,  but  the  Israelis  do  not  consider 
these  Arabs  good  sources  of  reliable  information.  More 
often,  they  recruit  Palestinians  over  whom  they  may 
have  more  control  became  of  bank  assets  frozen  in 
Israel  since  the  war  in  1948  In  certain  cases  these 
bank  assets  have  been  released  for  intelligence  services 
tendered 
The  Israelis  are  prepared  to  capitalize  on  nearly 
every  kind  of  agent  motivation.  A  substantial  effort  it 
made  to  appeal  to  Jewish  racial  or  religious  procliv- 
ities. pro-Zionism,  dislike  of  anti-Semitism.  anti-Soviet 
feelings  (if  applicable)  and  humanitarian  instincts 
Blackmail  is  alsc  used.  Other  recruiting  techniques 
include  the  proflrr  of  money,  business  opportunities, 
or  release  from  prison  Among  the  Arabs,  money  has 
been  especially  effective.  Apprab  have  also  been 
made  successfully  to  other  Arab  vulnerabilities  such  as 
jealousy,  rivalry,  fear  and  political  dissension. 
The  Israelis  have  used  false-flag  recruitment  pitches 
extensively  and  successfully.  In  jemal  cases  they 
approached  citizens  of  Western  European  nations 
under  the  cover  of  a  national  NATO  intelligence 
organization  for  operations  in  Arab  target  countries 
While  intelligence  officers  in  the  field  recognize  the 
importance  of  security,  they  tend  to  be  careless. 
Although  otherwise  well  trained.  Israeli  intelligence 
officers  occasionally  have  been  las  in  their  use  of  the 
telephone  abroad  Abo.  they  often  have  given  away  a 
considerable  amount  of  informaiiou  by  confiding  in 
agents  and  contacts  with  whom  they  have  had  only  a 
slight    relationship    Nonetheless,    they    periodically 
recall  the  basic  principles  of  their  profession,  and  for 
awhile  complicate  ihe  lives  of  their  agents  with  a 
wetter  of  security  regulations  that  they  themselves 
eventuslly  transgress  Occasionally  a  rendezvous  ar- 
ranged between  an  officer  and  in  agent,  u  countersur- 
veilled  by  two  or  more  officers,  both  to  spot  possible 
surveillance  of  the  meeting  and  to  protect  the  of  licet 
In  Ihe  recruiting  process,  the  officer  generally  uses  a 
fictitious  name,  executes  a  secrecy  agreement  with  the 
prospective  agent,  and  provides  him  with  a  pseudo- 
nym or  alias.  Whenever  money  or  other  gratuity  is 
given  to  an  agent,  an  attempt  is  made  to  secure  a 
signed  receipt  in  the  agent's  handwriting. 
Although  an  agent  occasionally  may  be  sent  to  Israel 
for  special  training,  this  course  of  action  is  neither  easy 
nor  inexpensive  to  accomplish.  Therefore,  the  intelli- 
gence officer  himself  is  usually  responsible  for  training 
the  agent  in  the  iundamentab  of  tradecraft.  security 
SECRET
SECtIT 
measures,  and  the  use  of  radio  and  code  communica- 
iiora  II  the  ev-gencies  of  the  situation  demand  special 
training,  the  Israelis  rent  an  apartment  f  
or  this  purpose 
In  places  like  Paris  and  New  York.  Agents  who  have 
been  so  trained  were  taught  to  mil  and  use  secret  ink; 
conceal  documents  and  letters  on  the  person;  deliver 
information  to  secure  hiding  places,  and  to  com- 
nuaricate  otherwise  with  the  case  officer  and/or 
bezdoaartm. 
The  methods  of  communication  vary  greatly  de- 
pendint  on  locations  and  circumstances.  Personal 
meeiiftgs  between  the  agent  and  his  case  officer  are 
arrant*!  fey  secret  writing,  open  mail,  or  oral  mrssate 
b»  couiien  The  cities  or  towns  to  be  uied  have  code 
names  and  the  meeting  places  are  at  specified  times 
with  alternative  times  and  places  In  case  of  emergen- 
cy, the  ateni  can  alert  the  intell  igence  officer  by  use  of 
m  prearranged  ©pen  code  in  cables  or  letters,  or  if  time 
penalty  by  secret  wrHine  or  courier. 
The  Israelis  place  conitderabteempbHts  on  personal 
reUttomhips  with  thdr  agents.  They  have  been  known 
to  be  exceedingly  generous  in  granting  personal 
ccnceftions  and  monetary  assistance  to  keep  their 
ageats  happy  One  such  individual,  a  journalist  in  Paris 
who  recruited  French  officials  and  elicited  informa- 
tion from  witting  and  unwitting  informants  in  the 
French  political  world,  was  paid  the  equivalent  of 
USI1.000  per  month.  After  years  of  steady  employ- 
ment and  a  succession  of  Israeli  case  officers,  his 
services  were  gentry  but  peremptorily  terminated 
SevtfiiKf  pay  was  calculated  at  the  rate  cf  one 
month's  salary  for  each  year  of  service  to  assuage  any 
hard  feelings.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Israelis  can  be 
absohrtely  ruthless  to  both  the  intelligence  officer  and 
the  agent  if  the  litter's  disaf  f  ection  or  treachery  should 
threaten  a  sensitive  operation  or  endanger  the  security 
of  the  stale.  There  are  several  cases  of  Jews  in  Europe 
who.  while  or  after  working  for  the  Israeli  service, 
trafficked  with  the  Egyptians  for  substantial  sums  of 
money   These  Jews  were  enticed  into  traveling  to 
luael  or  abducted,  tried  in  camera,  ami  given  stiff 
prison  terms  of  10  to  14  years. 
Mossad  heafaurteis  controb  the  acquisition,  flow 
and  dissemination  of  reports  in  a  rigid  manner,  which 
contrasts  with  the  considerable  freedom  allowed  in 
running  operations.  An  Israeli  intelligence  officer 
abroad  must  accept  ail  information  reported  by  an 
went  and   may  not  change  a  single  word.   The 
intelligence  officer  receives  detailed,  prepared  Ques- 
tions from  headquarters  and  is  allowed  little  leeway  fet 
terms  of  what  he  submits.  In  a  meeting  with  an  agent, 
many  of  whom  are  low-level,  the  intelligence  oflicei 
debriefs  him  on  the  basis  of  headquarters  questions. 
The  intelligence  officer  must  then  forward  all  the 
agent  says,  even  overt  information.  The  intelligence 
officer  may  if  be  wishes  add  his  own  remarks  lo  the 
report 
Monad  headquarters  does  not  disseminate  agents' 
reports  to  all  customer  agencies  The  overwhelming 
bulk  of  the  reports  goes  to  one  specific  analytical  unit, 
for  example,  usually  reports  on  Arab  affairs  are  sent  to 
Military  Intelligence,  counterintelligence  reports  to 
Shin  Beth.  However,  an  exceptional  agent  report  is 
disseminated  to  Israeli  policymakers.  The  Mossed 
intelligence  officer  abroad  does  not  show  copies  of  his 
reports  to  the  Israeli  Ambassador 'but  sends  them  only 
to  Mossad  headquarters  in  Tel  Aviv. 
The  Israeli  services  have  a  very  keen  interest  in  the 
use  and  development  of  technical  equipment.  As  far 
back  as  1947-1948.  the  Information  Service  conducted 
technical  surveillance  operations  against  Arab  and 
British  delegates  to  the  UN.  Mossad.  with  assistance 
from  Shin  Beth,  hat  provided  technical  training  to  the 
Turkish  and  Ghanaian  security  and  intelligence 
services  Exchanges  of  technical  equipment  and 
information  have  abo  been  carried  out  with  the 
Japanese  intelligence  and  security  service.  Mossad 
receives  support  in  external  technical  operations  from 
Shin  Beth  and  Military  Intelligence  The  technical 
capabilities  of  the  Israeli  services  are  adequate  for 
normal  demands.  Moreover,  the  very  dose  coordina- 
tion existing  between  the  services  and  the  industrial 
concerns  of  the  country  ensure  that  technical  equip- 
ment to  support  continuing  audio  operations  is 
supplied  and  developed  as  needed.  The  existence  of  a 
limited  research  program,  coupled  with  high  Israeli 
competence  in  technical  matters,  indicates  that  the 
Israelis  intend  to  remain  abreast  of  advances  in 
autiosurveillance  and  countermeasures- 
a.  RroATtoMSNip  vm  omtm  sa»vM»— Mossed 
has  good  relationships  with  Shin  Beth.  Military 
Intelligence,  the  Research  and  Political  Planning 
Center  of  the  Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs,  and  the 
Special  Tasks  Division  of  the  police.  Successes  like  the 
Entebbe  raid  are   illustrative  of   well-coordinated 
SICK!
SSCSS 
rJjmiirg  and  *B«.i:li!OT— »  ieSKruimsl  t«  grwd  relj- 
m-:r.s  *mcT}8  ihe  se.rv«ts 
Ti^r  Ajrtnsl  Commsiitun  ad%ocaied  gre*iej  «*»' ds- 
naiM.-n  Lei  ween  ibe  services  and  r*»«*ed  the  prai  u!  , 
iu.ell.ger/«  adviser  to  mofijlor  snlerd,recSora3e  dis- 
putes Tit?  eirnaiiges  between  Maasd  and  the  at?*! 
iftiif«  ihirtunii  the  cuuidifaiini  ntefJaniun  tsl  thr 
Va'i-ial  and  Jbe  «se  el  fid  Ik*:  cwnnjiMees.  hc»e*«. 
tr.rMutjp  »o  ensure  coordination  and  «»i*jji»r,n 
brttvjr.fi  the  iPTfiitw 
b  LiAiSCS  WITH  rCRtKIli  idiwco~ Mosud  ha* 
}:*iw;fi  re:!it«>n',T:ips  wish  many  of  iftlelligenr*  and! 
wt-ur-..*  services  ihrougnsct  the  «^d  Wiih  *  If* 
eiwpisRiv  the  Directorate  ©1  Foreign  Liaison  and 
Pc!-.t'rral  Action  is  responsible  for  teJatinni  wish  most 
fcteisn  crganizatioru  In  enos)  instances  the  p^tel  c! 
ccr.!*st  it  abroad  in  foreign  capitals,  although  some 
!cre':m  services  insist  on  liaison  in  Israel 
As  ssreser.l  Mossed,  in  coordination  wish  Shsm  Belh, 
rnsirrisir.j  liaison  with  foreign intelligence  and  security 
services  Vhioagh  fnernbership  in  the  Kitewatt  group. 
in  iwrga-Mzaiion  which  »  concerned  »»th  Arab 
l?rrm;s:n  «:t2  »  comprised  eS  vYess  Germany. 
iVlRvirri.  Italy,  ihe  United  Kingdom.  LusrmbiniJg. 
NrthyrUnfli,  Switzerland,  Denmark,  Frame.  Canada 
Ireland  Sweden.  Norway  «nd  Israel  The  Israelis  »!*«» 
have  rrdarmai  conned  raw  regarding  ter'israsra  with 
cJ'hei  Iwropran  nanuns,  including  Syain,  io;lugal  a«»d 
The  Israels -bave  ever  Jbe  yean  mid?  efforts  to 
bTux  Xbe  Arab  rir.g  erKirrfir.g  Israel  by  involvement 
J»sib  am- Arab  Moslem  nations  in  the  Near  E»st  A 
toils')  jh  i'li'.eril  Sinsnn  caKed  the  Trident  organization 
«ss  esiaMsshed  by  Mosszd  with  Turkey's  Natir.na! 
S«i:i;]*  Service  stTNSS')  and  Iran *  National  Organsra- 
Ssnra  fr.y  ItSe'kgence  and  Secants  lS*VftKl  in  btr 
JS^S  V/rwr  sJ*  tmgsnsJ  sgTMmer.5  Jiwer  toi  *»*•:  3" 
a-iJ'S-iii-f-n  fti  Mossidi  bi»»!wj3  wUalKimfcip  »-Wl»  earh 
sfHOT  Tihf  TrsdiT.!  cT.Eiraja3i«5  jn»nJ»«  runtunsung 
sT.irlhf;cT;w  etc^.ar.Rf  p'.!a»  spjniasinua?  rnpeiasigi  a!  l!»f 
y 
t:!.  :■ 
vttvsr?  4»>tj 
Thr  cr-iNal  »pin»  n!  ihe  ciJiinal  ifiwrornJ  will* 
stii-  I'ijilj.,  *K(2e  Slow  tefilinajaing  IsiafS,  Jaaasen  w«»l» 
T',«fc?y,  ««:ed  5ih«l  Mxissad  wtsuVJ  funsih  infcimaJnw 
<«3a  «3jt  *«3vjU  «3  bwwel  «tei)ls  an  Turlr*  and  <hi«« 
«ri»H:g  agaudl  TwiJiev  thlougJwuJ  «*«  MsJdJr  tai? 
3jj  f?2am.  «?•  Turks  agreed  !e  sappiy  Iwael  *:Jh 
ir4croa!icn  an  the  poUsitea!  sr.letE3ion»  o}  the  Aiab 
reunifies  which  could  affect  the  serurijy  o!  I.rarl,  and  - 
I  he  adivilv  and  ider.Jif  teaStoJts  of  IJAR  ager.t*  w«kim 
against  Israel  The  f»ae!i  service  has  aSso  ti«en  the 
Turks  counterespionage  and  technical  trainii^ 
]  The  tnaira  piirpttse  of  Ute  Israeli  tehtioii^ip  wttli 
Iran  wu  the  develcpiner.t  of  a  pia-biaei  «i«i  auo> 
Arab  policy  cm  the  part  et  Iranian  c!{ic»a!»  Muuad  M* 
engaged  in  join'  creratinrj  ws?h  SAVAK  o*«  Ow 
yean  since  the  Sate  19&X  Mstsad  aided  SaVaK 
tt!iv}i««  and  sucponed  the  Koias  in  liao  The  Isftria) 
aisa  regularly  transmitted  to  the  han!»«a  intelligenn 
irpcHi  en  Egypt's  acti*iiiej  in  the  Arab  rouniriea, 
trends  and  deweSoctnenu  in  Iraq,  and  Gomfnunbi 
•tiiviiies  affecting  l»a  -. 
\  \ 
I  israeSi  linns*  in  Africa  has  varied  ccnsideiably  froaa 
country  to  country,  depending  on  the  exigencies  of  the 
situation-  Israeli  Intelligence  activities  in  Africa  tu*«  j 
usually  been  carried  out  under  the  cover  of  miliiary 
and  police  training,  anm  sales  In  national  military 
forces,  and  aid  and  development  programs  The  Arab 
nattens,  in  connsnetion  with  the  Organization  of 
Alrtcan  Unity,  have  brought  great  pressure  to  bear  on 
most  Alrtcan  nations  to  break  all  formal  ties  villi 
Israel  Despite  the  beets  in  diplomatic  relation 
between  Israel  and  many  of  the  African  nations,  the 
Israelis  still  maintain  good  intell^ence  liaison  wild 
certain  Airiean  services  The  Israelis  also  have 
relations  with  the  Kenyan  Service  In  Central  Africa 
the  Israelis  are  still  active  in  Zaire  In  West  Africa  the 
israehs  trained  the  Libeiian  Security  Service  and 
police  They  also  helped  establish  the  Chaniaa 
Military  Intelligence  Service.  In  southern  Africa  the 
Israelis  hava  a  relationship  with  the  South  Alricaa 
if-stellegence  and  security  services 
The  Israelis  have  been  very  active  in  Latin  America 
over  she  years  Or.e  o!  the  greatest  intelligence  coupv 
ihf  caplure  «f  Adu'jsh  Eiclimann.  the  former  K«» 
tader.  €xfurred  in  Argentina  Becenlly.  much  of  ihrir 
Iiaiwin  activity  in  Latin  America  has  centered  «* 
training  and  antilerrnrist  aperattnns  The  la**» 
Omsulate  •«  Hio  de  Janeiro,  for  eiamp!*.  proidrt 
cover  for  a  Musud  regiunal  station  rr»ponsib!r  for 
Brazil.  Argentina.  Chile,  and  Uruguay  Officers  Irian 
this  poit  have  gone  to  Buenos  Aires  to  give  training  to 
i he  Argentines,  in  the  course  of  thew  contafti  tnr 
Israelis  rrouiimended  greater  involvement  in  jmi* 
aniiterrcnst   operations    The   Israelis  also  mamlart 
y 
^ 
SECIII
SfCKI 
,  „i!b  sevurily  services  d    Mrsitm.  Nicaragua. 
rSJlT°MtM    *r»d  Piruma.  J»w  Dnrniwran  BepiASir. 
Vnrtorla  'Cclcmtii,  Ecaidw.  and  P«w  Caracas  is 
V: ;  B««fon»l  Crmw  for  ncrtfc  and  »«»««  L."» 
trneriea  ■"*  Cer-,r*1  Aroeri£* 
The  Iraelis  have  operated  for  scmetfme  in  East 
y*       Tr-¥  *»*«  provided  ixrtrHigenee  training  la  the 
r*tnr.roertJ  oi  ft*  Bepablic  of  Oura  and  inu:-.»in 
«?„-.,  *-rth  i)  The  Uracil*  a!»  fc»ve  rein  tons  »ti5»  she 
"j't  ,"„««  Thai.  Indonesian,  and  South  Koreas  sesvire*. 
.'va'b  en  lemma  mum    1>*  mud  Monad 
"iJal  center  in  East  ftti»  «« <n  Siimwrae  The  Israeli 
\'   ,',nn  Mlirl  l^fJ*  Jr«lUfMJv  «»««1»  throughout  the 
r<J   and  rondurts  business  waih  services  «n  «t* 
"  !-Bi.V».ir.g  nations   indonesii  *>  »  Moslem  nation 
Tr»  nrit  *■■»«  Iorm»'  diplomatic  ties  wilh  Ssra*i  Thf 
\i,«a«nh«w««»   teiatfcrahw.   theietee.   is   very 
1-)iT«*i   The  Mott»d  representative  in  Singapore  is 
^rmJi'ed  so  the  Indonesian  service  There  »re  »*» 
\t.«ad  t>!TiWT8  in  Jekartg  sindw  commercial  cow 
The  iiri.'r.krv  ««»n  for  if»e  Indonesian  liaison  «  to 
w;t.  lidjnwwnierteiJOTnl  «?!&"»»  The  Is»e3»*.  on  the 
f«Vr  fcand.  ate  nc*  only  easing  in  anlrtriruiist 
.<«-Mlittnj  but  *1»  have  »«  ODWMMJM5V  «"  cdJrct 
«nt^.m*i«f*T>  and  engage  in  pcluscal  a.-tmn  in  arwther 
\lf«.1r.n»  powei 
C  Shin  Belli— Counterespionage  «nd  Inter- 
nal Security  Service 
i,  Functions 
Shis,   flesh   has  the   reiponsdkility   in   Israel   for 
«wr«",w«pi3nage  «nd  airteroil  security  and  the  service 
nlrtwci"!v  internally  orienled  Shin  Beth  is  primarily 
n-HWftMble   lor   roiietring   information   on   foreign 
sitt&lwTW  ortirjiasjnnv  bdh  horiiie  and  friendl*. 
!:«!  1'S.ru  *cliv::i(rt,  i»«ertini  the  «C'jri5»  ui  !»««!> 
»13mwlk  and  mslalUlJora  »b««d.  a?«3  »n«a«W«»»«  •» 
J.<tt!i*  »t1  tufeveretan  djTKied  bv  esjiwf  inierral  <» 
,-vn-i:ujl  inn**,  «Ttt3ua..TrR  uboiaif  assd  teifofiim  «« 
l^*i-3  £ia)  a!bwusd  Shm  Belli  eva3ui!«  •!!  in!crmation 
,l.-»T-3vrj«)    tfdlnl«  jJ  »«h  oiJk»  miiwial  r«su»sr.fW 
jte3  rufjsJ^  availsWr  from  bolh  Isj*?3j  and  fcteijn 
»mf««  arid  sutrans  rvs3«»5«3  wpcrt*  So  the  apcicjm- 
*ir  s«veTT.Tr.rr.l  ag?ncj»  for  acucn  Shin  Brt!«  ope ratrt 
»»  cnjT.lai  l»o  main  adversaries  the  Arabs  and  the 
*«nai  ar-d  Easlem  European  inleJJsgenre  aiM?  «cu»U» 
bhin  Beih  at  owJiae  ea«ai«J  in  p.«live  inlrlli- 
tence  ojieralioia  and  imtr.i*rat«on  atlair*  i»  the 
Da!kan  couniriei.  particull»»W  »"  R<MRa««>.  I^w'ii. 
Vufosiavia.  and  in  Hungarv.  but  no  bnjer  »k«  Shm 
Eeth  is  the  government's  auib«««v  on  personnel  and 
physical  wearily  ma«ers.  is  responsible  for  the 
personal  security  of  the  President,  the  Primr  Minister. 
and  the  Miuisler  ©I  Defense 
Shin  Beth  does  «*  ha*e  the  po««r  o(  arte*,  which 
is  the  right  on!y  ol  the  Specsal  Tasks  Division  of  the 
tnveslnasrara  Department  el  the  UtaeJi  Police,  a 
naiicnal  force  with  headqwarten  in  leruialem  When 
an  a:re«  is  desired    Shin  Besh  submiU  a  detailed 
report  on  the  ease  phis  •  request  for  an  arrest  warrant 
to  the  Mininry  of  Jastiiee   The  Legal  Denartmenl 
trar.srr.us  the  request  to  the  Special  Tasks  Division, 
which  issuei  tha  warrant  and  makes  the  arrest  When 
more  espeditioui  handling  is.iustified,  Shin  Beth 
directly  rwtifiea  the  Special  Tasks  Division,  which  is 
empowered  to  take  the  suspect  into  temporary  ciulody 
pending  receipt  of  the  warrant  On  occasion  a  Shin 
Beth  officer  wit!  sSI  in  court  wish  the  prosecution  staff 
as  a  tpectts!  coruutiant 
t.  OrganltatSo* 
Shin  Beth  is  organised  into  eight  operational  and 
factional  departments   (IS  Arab  Affairs;  (2)  Non- 
Arab  Affairs.  {35  Protective  Security;  (4)  Operational 
Support.  {51  Teehndkitv.  {65  Interrogation  •«*  Legal 
Counx!.  I'i  Coa««J!inat!on  and  Planning;  and  (8) 
Administration  Regional  departments  in  the  field  are 
located  in  the  Gaxa/Sicai  area  with  headquarters  In 
Ashqeten.  the  Northern  area  with  headquarters  in 
Haifa,  and  the  West  Bank  area  with  headquarters  In 
Jerusalem  A  unit  within  Shin  Beth  national  headquar- 
ter*  in   Tel    Aviv   serves  u   the  lovrth   regional 
department  These  regional  departments  are  broken 
down  into  subdivisions  identical  to  but  smaller  than 
those  of  the  parent  organization  (Figure  6) 
The  Arab  Affairs  Department  is  responsible  for 
counterespionage,  entiterrcrist  operations,  control  of 
political  subversion,  research  and  the  maintenance  of  a 
counterintelligence  indei  on  Arabs.  The  components 
handling  these  activities  are  organ»«d  Into  offensive 
and  defensive  sections.  This  department  operates 
through  field  offices  controlled  by  regional  olficers 
These  officers  report  to  the  regional  commanders  but 
rely  on  the  Arab  Affaire  Department  for  guidance  and
SfCiO 
li 
1  I  it  I 
i     i 
a  .* 
Lil 
} 
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if  I**  i 
*      c      t 
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i        i        i      -j 
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-f " 
■j  ■     i 
til 
-u »  » Ji  I]  Is  J«  ii 
»U  It  li  jJ 
JU—   ,1  ,       i 
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-li !  I  
ill  li!  fi  i 
J  ■         i 
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SSCRET
SECRET 
tujiJXW*-  which  includes  aid  in  njiiiilerrspionige. 
cnuntersabotaie  and  surveillance  as  *eli  as  research 
and  recvrds  support  The  overall  headquarters  func- 
tion «  «b»i  °*  determining  doctrine,  tystematizing 
work  and  supervising 
The  Non-Arab  Department  handles  counterintelli- 
gence operations  dealing  with  all  other  countries. 
eountcrsubverrion  (one  component  dealing  with  Com- 
munis* subversion,  the  other  with  non-Gommuniat 
New  Left  subversion},  foreign  liaison  and  research 
Each  unu  dealing  with  these  activities  has  offensive 
and  defensive  sections.  The  Non-Arab  Department 
investigates  and  counter!  espionage  activity  by  foreign 
powers,  both  hortiSe  tad  friendly,  by  all  known 
methods,  including  the  penetration  of  their  intelli- 
gence services  and  diplomat*  installations  in  Israel 
Operations  again*  foreign  missions  within  Israel  were 
formerly  conducted  by  Military  Intelligence,  but  with 
the   evolution   towards   greater   centralisation   and 
professional  specialization  since  the  reorganization  of 
I9SI,  this  function  has  been  the  responsibility  of  Shin 
Beth- 
The  Non-Arab  Affairs  Department  engages  In  the 
penetration  of  extremist  political  parties  such  as  MAKI 
(the  Communist  Party  of  Israel*.  RAKAH  (the  New 
Communist  Hal  a  largely  Arab-supported  splinter 
group;  S1AH  Cthe  New  Israel  Left*,  and  anti-ZlonW 
and  extreme  rightist  organization*..  The  Department 
also  investigates  counterfeiting,  blackmarketlng.  the 
ssnsjglini  of  money  and  goods  in  and  out  of  the 
country,  and  violations  of  the  economic  control  laws.  It 
is  responsible  for  tapping  telephone  lines  and  inter- 
cepting domestic  and  diplomatic  telephone  conversa- 
tions. 
The  Non-Arab  Affairs  Department  b  responsible  for 
foreign  liaison  and  handles  all  correspondence  by  Shin 
Beth  with  other  foreign  intelligence  and  aecurity 
service*  The  interrogation  of  immigrants  from  the 
USSR  and  Easitra  European  nations  is  also  undertaken 
by  this  department 
The  Protective  Security  Department  is  responsible 
for  the  protection  of  Israeli  Government  buildings  and 
embassies.  El  Al  and  32m  Installations  and  craft, 
defense  industries  and  scientific  establishments,  and 
leading  personalities.  -This  department  is  also  charged 
with  the  security  of  al!  important  industrial  plants, 
especially  those  of  actual  or  potential  military  value. 
SECtE? 
and  is  engaged  in  the  prevention  of  leakage  of 
industrial  secrets  such  as  patents,  processes,  statistics, 
etc.  It  also  carries  on  liaison  with  security  officers 
throughout  the  Israeli  Government.  Although  guards 
and  aecurity  officers  are  paid  by  the  institutions  to 
which  they  are  assigned,  their  recruitment,  training, 
and  control  as  a  Shin  Beth  responsibility.  The 
Protective  Security  Department  conirob  the  security 
of  internal  communications  and  the  secrecy  of 
Information,  A  small  unit  within  the  department,  fo 
eiample.  handles  all  matters  concerning  espionage 
with  the  Office  of  Mall  and  Telegraph  Censorship 
The  Protective  Security  Department  directs  Shin 
Beth  aecurity  activities  overseas  including  the  protec- 
tion of  Israeli  personnel  diplomatic  and  transport 
offices,  faeUirJaa  and  equipment  Although  Monad  has 
responsiblliiv  for  unilateral  operations  and  liaison  on 
intelligence  matters  and  Milltaiv^ntelligenee  controb 
the  attache  system  and  military  uaboo.  Shin  Beth 
handles  protective  security  and  liaison  with  local 
security  services  abroad  to  safeguard  Israeli  personnel 
and  property.  For  inetanee,  there  is  a  regional 
Protective  Security  office  Sn  Parte  which  is  concerned 
primarily  with  HAl  and  Zim  aecurity. 
The  Operatarau'Sapport  Department  at  responsible 
for  assisting  the  operational  departments  with  surveil- 
lance, observation,  airport  security.  censorship,  listen- 
ing devices,  special  tasks  asd  counteraudio  support. 
This  department  has  tactical  components,  which  aid  in 
counterintelligence  opvratiow.  VIP  protection  and 
telephone  taps  The  Department  provides  support  it 
running  a  highly  developed  Intercept  operation  from  i 
switchboard  iauBar'J  la  Shin  Beth  offices.  This  enables 
the  service  to  avoid  having  to  make  taps  either  across  1/ 
pairs  in  a  local  bee  or  even  In  the  telephone  centrals 
under  the  Jurisdiction  of  the  Ministry  of  Communica- 
tions Telephone  Services;  and  also  avoids  any  possible 
compromise  by  leftist  employees  of  the  Telephone 
Services. 
ind  , 
ai  y 
The  Technology  Department  lends  support  to  the 
operating  departments  In  electronics,  mechanics,  and 
chemirtry.  It  provtdas  technical  support  to  operations 
In  the  following  areas:  audio  and  visual  •urveillanoa. 
communications,  photography,  surreptitious  entry. 
telephone  taps,  mail  censorship,  security  devices,  etc. 
The  Interrogation  and  Legal  Counsel  Department 
handles  all  counterintelligence  end  security  interroga-
i. SECKfT 
snent  control  of  Israeli  naval  attache  activate*  abroad. 
cm!!  ban  couul  creation*.  COM1NT,  ELINT  and 
,«i*l  nwKMiwae*  in  uoupettlkm  with  A2i  Force 
Ir.telagence,  and  a  merchant  mertoe  prep**  The 
rott-World  Wh  II  Israeli  endeavor  to  dendestine 
srmi  procurement  and  illegal  toimarratioa  developed 
ircparunt  commercial  and  shipping  eoatasb,  mm  of 
which  may  stlD  be  handled  by  or  at  lea*  coordinated 
wish  Naval  inteHigenee 
The  Targeting  DepartMBi.  with  abort  »  penoa- 
net,  to  diwded  into  two  dlrtav»  Syrto/LebanoB  sad 
Egypt/North  Africa.  There  Aviates*  ai»  responsible 
for^  CI)  prepsrine;  coastal  *****  '•  "«*»J  «urf,w 
tninoow,  (2)  tnmm  beach  ***•  *»  *»Pbd*w 
assault*  (3)  prepariag  apacisl  targe*  srudiea  to  support 
commando  operation*  a*sl  (4)  prepMlm  tad  aaato- 
ulning  target  folder  on  Labi****,  Syrian  end  EgVP- 
tian  porta  The  Departraani  aw  acorn  to  all  sources  of 
information  available  to  the  OML  la  addttioa  to 
levying  requiremea**  tor  coOeetton  est  the  Military 
Intelligence  Ccfieettoei  Department,  the  Director  of 
Naval  lateQigene*  to  oa  regular  Attribution  for 
irrforaetioo  cfctatoed  by  th*  DM1  talatad  to  ml 
attain 
The  Production  DnjaiTmart,  with  a  Half  of  abort 
40,  ti  the  large*  compw"*  of  Naval  Intelligence. 
This  unit  to  divided  lots  two  divisloe*  CI)  Arab  Navies; 
and  {2)  the  Soviet  Navy.  Th*  ProduetJoa  Department 
haadfes  research,  aaalyato,  production  and  dtossmina. 
ticn  of  iaforaatioaooal  aaalnle  fores*  associated  with 
Arab  Navies  aad  the  Soviet  Navy  to  the  Mediterra- 
nean. This  ccspoa***  to  th*  prianery  taw  of  aU  source 
material  which  flows  lato  Naval  Inadanaiten,  espe- 
cially SC1NT  irformstto*,  The  work  of  thto  depart- 
sect  to  mainly  to  support  of  ante  operatise  out  a!  the 
four  aevaJ  baas  aad  the  eotnnmrtn  unit  In  toutheni 
Sinai  Product**  to  hatted  largely  to  atudlea  on 
enemy  order  of  battle  and  spatial  weapons  These 
studies  and  othara.  including  target  foMen,  tdentiflca- 
tk«  manuals  aad  enemy  tnetica  outline*,  are  dtneml- 
oated  ta  operaOoaal  commander*  aad  crews  through 
the  baae  Irnelhgeao*  officers.  The  bast  intelligence 
officer  dtoemiaalM  such  information  by  briefing 
crew*  or  epdattng  a  thto'*  to*  t ttgenna  library  throngh 
addidoot,  t^idaUi  aad  chaaaaa. 
The  Security  BaputBart.  wbkto  hts  a  ataff  of 
«ho^  11  perform  a  htofcad  oouBteriftUlUgeooe 
foaetion  wlthla  Navy  leadoaaitan  at  aQ  naval  bate*. 
Security  Department  penonnel  are  navy  offieera  and 
entijted  men  who  have  been  tpectolly  trained  by  the 
Field  Security  Department  of  Military  Intelligence 
They  perform  buie  countenubvenion  and  counset- 
aahotage  taaka  at  headQuartera  aad  at  aubotdinate 
bate*.  They  do  not,  however,  carry  out  baae  aecurHy  ot 
penortneS  iavcatigauoiav  which  are  done  by  MiliUry 
tnteOigenc*  FlcU  Security  unita. 
The  Organisation  and  Acbnintotratlon  Departaaent 
with  about  aUpenortnd  asigned,  providea  ancretarial 
aupcort  for  the  Director  of  Naval  Intelligence.  These 
penonnel  handle  routine  administrative  duttoa. 
Naval  IftteUonwe,  although  amaE.  U  a  well-trained 
and  evidently  highly  efficient  aervica.  Recruiting  of 
panonacl  into  Naval  Inteliiaence  la  done  by  swan  of 
a  very  efficient,  toforaaai  ayiteai  which  tdenUiiea 
mdivlduab  and  caatehea  them  to  the  need*  of  the 
Director   of    Naval   lotelligenc*.,  (Thto   syXem   to 
apparently  to  f  ore*  throughout  Itraeh  ailiUry  tntelb- 
gence  organizations.)  Naval  IntelUtence  officer  per- 
tonne'i  are  recruited  through  aeveral  different  ehen- 
nek  Moat  yocnger  junior  of ficera  enter  diracily  fan 
the  univenitto)  while  other*  transfer  wUhln  tha  Navy 
from  naval  operation*  unit*  to  the  intelligence  aervica. 
A   third   aourae  to  enliated   penonnel   who   have 
displayed  the  neoeaary  quelitiee  *ad  have  Indicated 
an  interest  in  following  a  career  is  naval  intelligence. 
Once  identified,  such  people  are  tent  (to  a  university  at 
Navy  eiperae.  Upon  completion  of  their  training  they 
are  cwnmiotoned  and   punue  careen   in   Naval 
Intelligence.   Israeli  Navy  enhUed  penonnel,  both 
male  and  female,  are  mostly  volunteer*  who  have  been 
screened  by  the  Director  of  Naval  Intelligence.  The 
Naval  intelligence  women  serve  20  month*,  while  the 
men  «erve  36  months. 
There  are  oo  special  naval  Intelligence  *chooa  in 
brae!,  and  naval  Intelligence  of  f teen  and  key  enlisted 
personnel  are  trained  at  the  MiliUry  Intelligence 
School  In  general  women  receive  only  oo-the-lnb 
training;  however,  if  a  woman  ihow*  an  interest  in  a 
naval  Intelligence  career,  she  wiD  be  enrolled  In  the 
eultoted  course  of  the  Military  Intelligence  School 
Naval  Intelligence  enlisted  men  attend  an  abbreviated 
course,  enrollment  in  an  expanded  course  depending 
on  motivation  and  intended  utilization.  There  appear* 
to  be  very  little  problem  with  the  retention  of  naval 
intelligence  penonnel  The  primary  constraint  on  the 
Director  of  Naval  Intelligence  U  the  total  number 
stem
SfCUT 
{oil  ie«  and  enlisted)  of  slots  assigned  The  centralised 
jyjtcra  combined  »JUh  primary  area  of  lateUiexnot 
interact  lends  itself  .cry  weB  to  the  NaVsl  late&igeme 
peraerjat  structure.  The  da*  knit  irtflignCT  support 
syjtoa  alto  works  well  considering  the  lack  «f  latagral 
eoOectlffl 
InlellifeK*.  prior  to  tod  during  the  Too  Klppur 
War.  vti  received  in  ti«  Operations  Center  at  Naval 
hndousrien.  Daring  ike  war,  the  Director  of  Naval 
!n5?!!i«asee  worked  very  closely  with  the  Officer 
Comm*tidlfig  the  Nivy  is  tS*  Center  during  ongoing 
optrttioot.  Information  from  SGINT  and  other 
icurces  «h  received  is  the  Center  as  raw  data. 
Correlation  of  all  iftfomatkn  was  the*  dona  or  the 
spot  by  the  Chief  of  Naval  InteOiaanee  aad  paaaad  en 
to  the  Officer  Commanding  She  Navy.  The  toforma- 
Hoc  wardlasemlnatad  in  the  fans  ef  ordan  or  report* 
to  operational  cammanaan  and  uato.  Processing  tad 
dissemination  of  wva!  intelligence  was  aceompiisbed 
in  a  hie**?  profeariooai  manner  with  no  major 
eVficwneies  or  Arab  naval  surprises  In  the  Tom 
Kipper  War.  Naval  Intelligence  she  revealed  a 
built-ia  flexibility  when  the  aerviee  shifted  quickly 
to  a  not  war  afautmn  and  handled  tupport  for 
active  naval  opentkiea  iaeJudim  shore  bombardment 
missions.  One  major  area  where  Naval  Intelligence 
has  pnifems  is  the  limited  number  of  pcnoaneL  In 
cue  of  continuous  operetioni,  atmilar  to  the  Yon 
Kippur  War,  quality  naval  inteilioBne  work 'would 
probably  degenerate  after  a  month  of  ateadv 
operations. 
3.  AdauststrarJve  sttoUoas  of  the  Dfestorato  of 
Mffltair  latettiaoaco 
There  ere  approximately  450  effteen  pros  a  lanjar 
mxrJxf  of  NCOt,  enlisted  peraconel  and  civilian 
clerical  puamcitl  in  the  DML  The  aerviee  has  priority  - 
hi  the  seketioa  of  qualified  military  personnel  for 
Intelligence  anngnments.  Military  Intelligence  prefen 
to  brirg  tadividoels  into  inteSitence  work  while  they 
are  young  and  move  them  upwards  as  they  acquire 
experience  end  can  assume  greater  raeporsnoiiity. 
Recruiters  seek  promising  young  people  who  am 
studying  foreign  knguegreevmber  subjects  of  lsterart 
to  the  service  in  secondary  wrhnol  Prior  to  gnduattoa, 
Military  Intelligence  offleen  contact  selected  young 
students—males  and  female*— and  offer  them  pari- 
uons  w  lntetpratan  daring  the  two  yean  of  eompuV- 
aory  military  aerviee  which  follows  at  the  completion 
of  secondary  aducaiioa.  Tbceo  who  accept  aw  assigned 
to  Military  fntafiigtnno  whan  they  fete  the  IDF*. 
Promising  yoang  army  penaaail  are  then  sent  to  the 
Military  InteBigswaa  School,  following  which  they 
may  be  «rmmiwwoed  cad  aerigoad  as  aaustaots  to 
fafeftgeaoe  of  f  Scan  ia  the  f  told.  Whea  they  attain  the 
rank  of  captain,  having  served  as  Intrfligawnr  officers, 
aome  are  assigned  to  an  area  command  headquarters 
or  to  the  Directorate  of  Military  Intelligence  to  etpaad 
their  experience  and  qualify  mem  for  mote  respond 
bUity  and  eventual  pNrnotma  to  higher  rank,  Thus. 
many  of  the  offioan  now  serving  with  Military 
InteOigenee  entered  as  young  men  and  moved  up 
through  the  ranks. 
Meat  Military  Imririgwwa  panonnal  are  regulars, 
sot  reservists  became  tie  IDF  requires .  career 
iateSigenaB  officers.  Al  personnel,  Including  eon- 
ecripts,  loin  Military  tMeOigeom'voIuntarily.  Female 
enlisted  members,  who  often  serve  a*  trensfatora, 
usually  serve  only  tO  months  wbareas  male  enlisted 
penonael  serve  3§  months. 
Military  Intetligenee  training  is  profeaional  and 
extensive.  Officers  and  analysts  are  weti- trained  nnd 
competent  ia  their  fields.  The  Military  InteQigeao* 
School  is  located  north  of  Td  Aviv  on  the  road  to  .'ids 
Dov  airport  This  school  trains  both  officers  and 
oooeommisttontd  of  f  lean.  Approximately  150  iastnsc- 
ton  and  90  support  personnel  train  bat  wean  1,000  and 
3,000  students  annually.  The  school's  usual  count  rum 
from  September  through  February.  This  arrangement 
has  been  made  to  take  advantage  of  new  groups  of 
high  school  graduate*.  This  center  is  a  relatively  new 
facility  which  wm  established  in  the  late  1060s.  It  was 
formerly  part  of  the  IDF  Infantry  School. 
The  commander  of  the  Military  f  nteiligeoc*  School 
is  responsible  to  the  DMI  for  inteOigenco  Instruction 
and  to  the  Intelligence  Corps  for  training  in  general. 
Course  content  (s  the  responsibility  of  the  DMI.  The 
training  staff  supervises  training  aids  and  instruction 
methods.  A  Combat  Intelligence  Branch  provides 
instruction  for  operational  personnel  and  a  General 
Subjects  Branch  trains  specialists.  The  Cotters]  Subjects 
Branch,  for  exampt*,  teaches  course*  la  field  security, 
censorship,  military  drafting,  photo  toierpretatioa, 
research  for  order  of  battle  analysis,  collection,  and 
aerial  observation.  Other  special  courses  are  taught  as 
needed.  Field  Security  countointefligenoe  personnel,
SECKT 
Air  Force  and  Navy  students  aho  Use  courses  at  the 
Miliary  late&geaw  School  and  Military  Intelligence 
Instructors  are  responsible  to  the  DM1  for  intellig enee 
training  si  the  schools  of  other  IDF  branehei  They  we 
doited  by  the  DM1  far  Quality  <*  ««teH**ence 
teaching.  These  instructors  usually  have  wartime 
ttignments  with  tactical  units.  Military  Intelligence 
personnel  staff  intelligence  positions  down  through 
brigade  level;  hs*  officers  with  intelligence  training  at 
the  Infantry  School  staff  the  lower  echelons. 
Field  Security  personnel  are  selected  on  the  basis  of 
strict  criteria  regarding  personal  security  and  loyalty 
to  Zionism  and  the  Isjeeii  State.  They  are  trained  by 
Shin  Beth  , 
!n  general  Military  InteUlgaweai.  ahhooih  It  hu  a 
good  training  program  aad  trie*  to  offer  career 
inducement*,  hat  difficulty  in  retaining  competent 
personnel  because  of  low  wage*  and  dim  opportunities 
far  advancement 
4,  Methods  «f  operalioe 
Military  intefissenee  it  responsible  for  crow-border 
operations  into  the  oeighfaorlnt  Arab  states  Us 
operations  rely  heavfly  on  the  eipfeiution  of:  Arab* 
within  Israeli  and  the  Adminiiteied  Territories;  Arab 
students,  who  though  residents  of  Israel  attend 
universities  in  the  Arab  nations;  Arab  travelers  and 
visiles*;  Arabs  in  Israeli  prisons;  and  Arab  military 
deserters,  defectors,  Bedouins  and  smugglers. 
Military  InteBSgenee  ceHeetiori  wouireraerits  cover 
political  aad  economic  subjects  as  well  as  military 
irJormatkm  and  tats  the  information  acquired  both 
for  policymaking  purposes  and  a»  basic  intelligence. 
Military    InteiligetKe  is  also   active   In  collecting 
information  from  sources  outside  Israeli  terrorist  and 
subversive    organisatlom    and    activities.    Although 
S1G1NT  sources  acquire  some  Information  on  these 
subtests.  Military  Intelligeisce  off  leers  believe  that  only 
agent  sources  can  really  obtoin  the  date  needed  on 
various  terrorist  groups'  policies  and  plans,  methods  of 
operatic*,  eQuipment,  training  and  relations  with 
other  groups.  Primary  Israeli  Interest  In  terrorism  is  to 
obtain  early  warning  of  impending  operations. 
In  each  regional  ansa  of  Israel,  local  cittens.  In  some 
cases  Arabs,  who  are  Israeli  agents,  act  as  spotters  for 
Military  InteBJgenoa.  Moat  of  these  spotters  have  long 
worked  fw  Military  Intefligenee,  which  alerts  them  to 
the  type  of  sources  desired  Once  a  spotter  hu 
reported  a  potential  source,  he  steps  aside  and  leaves 
the  rest  to  Military  Intelligence  officers.  Military 
Intelligence  contacts  the  potenila!  source,  assesses  hin 
and,  if  appropriate,  attempts  to  recruit  him  as  u 
agent.  This  is  describsd  as  the  "direct  method"  of 
recruiting  agents  for  Military  Intelligence.  The  "indi- 
rect method"  refers  to  recruiting  sources  by  or  through 
agents  cutside  Israel  Both  Field  Security  and  the 
police  investigate  the  backgrounds  of  potential  agents 
for  Military  intelligence. 
The  motives  of  the  spotters  and  local  support  people 
are  either  monetary  or  a  desire  for  services  In  the  form 
of  aid  in  reuniting  families  or  representation  on  behalf 
of  the  spotter  In  some  problem  with  the  Israeli 
Government,  Ths  baste  agent  motivation  is  generally 
economic  gain  in  the  form  of  salaries,  loans  (which  are 
seldom  repaid),  and  gifts.  Another  common  Incentive 
is  a  wish  to  move  to  Israel  and  reioin  relatives  who 
reside  there  In  some  cases  the  agent  may  be  a 
Palestinian  refugee,  who  believes  that  he  still  hu  a 
claim  to  property  in  Israel  and  wants  either  recom- 
pense or  a  guarantee  of  the  eventual  return  of  his 
property.  Other  agents  are  members  of  Arab  minority 
groups  or  opponents  of  Arab  regimes. 
Military  Intelligence  officers  do  have  problems  in 
handling  Arab  agents,  who  tend  to  exaggerate  and 
often  fail  to  report  accurate  details.  Therefore,  the 
Military  Intelligence  officers  encourage  their  Arsb 
agents  to  provide  photographs,   maps,   and  other 
corroborating  documents.  Military  Intelligence  officers 
also  cross-check  reports  often  by  using  other  agent*  In 
the  same  region.   Despite  Israeli  warnings  during 
training.  Arab  agents  tend  to  tell  other  members  of 
their  family  about  their  association  wilh  Military 
Intelligence  Occasionally  an  Arab  agent  may  recruit 
•U  the  members  of  his  immediate  family  u  subagents 
and  try  to  get  his  case  officer  to  pay  them  salaries.  The 
Israelis  refer  to  these  family  subagents  as  "nonfune- 
tlonalist."  These  subagents  sometimes  compromise  a 
whole  operation  as  a  result  of  boasting  about  their 
activities.  Occasionally  the  Military  Intelligence  case 
officer  will  order  these  unwanted  "nonfunctionats 
across  the  border  Into  Israel  for  security  briefings  but 
Military  Intelligence  has  not  solved  this  problem 
completely. 
Military  Intelligence  trains  Its  agents  In  tradecraft. 
Election  methods,  security  and  reporting  procedures 
SECKT
SCCftST 
MiliUry  Intelligence  runs  iii  agents  in  networks  or  u 
singletons;  the  latter  are  referred  to  as  lone  wolves ."* 
For  security  reasons.  Military  Intelligence  prefers  that 
an  agent  with  trad  access  remain  t  "lone  woH."  Agent 
networks  consist  of  a  primary  source  and  subsources. 
MiliUry  Intelligence  does  not  refer  to  sources  as  such. 
Instead  calling  both  primary  and  subsource  "agents." 
MiliUry  Intelligence  officers  try  to  meet  and  train 
each  agent  personally  on  the  Israeli  side  of  the  border. 
Networks  usually  include  a  radio  operator  and  in  same 
cues,  a  courier. 
When  possible.  Military  Intelligence  case  officers 
prefer  direct  meeting*  with  all  agents  inside  Israel  in 
order  to  receive  their  reports  personally,  to  check 
requirements  and  to  formulate  future  plana.  One 
aspect  of  the  relationship  between  Military  IsHelli- 
tenee  officers  and  agents  is  unique  when  compered  to 
the  techniques  employed  by  other  services.  In  many 
operations  MiliUry  Intefljgenee  headquarters  analysts 
accompany  case  officers  to  personal  agent  meetings,  in 
order  to  clarify  certain  details  of  the  agent's  reports 
and  give  him  guidance  on  certain  points  or  problems 
These  meetings  are  usually  held  in  stfehousei  with 
both  the  case  officer  and  the  analyst  present  but  if  an 
agent  is  pressed  for  time,  the  case  officer  and  analyst 
may  meet  him  during  darkness  at  a  prearranged  spot 
along  the  border. 
Mlltfwy  Intelligence  also  communicates  with  its 
agents  by  5/'W  letters  -posted  in  third  countries,  by 
agent  radio  and  by  deaddrops.  MiliUry  intelligence 
operations  hive  been  marked  by  flexibility,  economy 
is  the  use  of  assets  and  by  responsiveness  to  require- 
ments; the  system  worked  wefl  prior  to  the  Yom 
Xippur  War  in  October  197a  Agents  reported  early 
warning  information  which,  in  retrospect.  conUined 
reliable  indications  cf  a  earning  Arab  attack.  Direct 
communication  with  agents,  however,  virtually  ceased 
during  hostilities  and  what  little  agent  reporting  there 
was  during  the  war  was  of  limited  value  to  Israeli 
MiliUry  headquarters  and  field  commanders.  The 
principal  problem  faced  by  MiliUry  Intelligence  in  the 
acqiusUka  and  repotting  of  intelligence  by  agents  b  the 
lack  of  modem  equipment  Although  many  of  the 
agesu  have  radios  {mainly  receivers)  and  cameras,  and 
are  familiar  with  secret  writing,  the  sophistication  level 
of  technique  and  equipment  b  low.  Thb  adversely 
affects  the  Quality,  s-curity  and  timeliness  of  collection 
operations.   Military  Intelligence  employs  a  S1CINT 
system  that  b  modem,  sophisticated  and  effective 
The  DMI  b  responsible  for  providing  technlca 
support  to  other  directorates,  but  the  technical  services 
of  the  various  miliUry  intelligence  directorates  are 
inferior  to  the  technical  groups  of  Shin  Beth,  The 
DMI  s  technical  equipment,  such  as  that  oed  in  audio 
surveillance  or  that  employed  in  work  agent  support  b 
generally  high  although  it  b  less  good  in  some  special 
fiekjj  such  as  miniaturisation.  In  the  use  and  application 
of  infrared  devices,  however,  the  DMI  capability  b 
usually  good.  MiliUry  Intelligence  personnel  are  capable 
of  making  ad  hoc  modifications  of  canting  equipment 
and  are  up  to  date  on  technical  advances  concerning 
remote  control  and  activation  of  transmitters,  and  in  the 
field  of  tow-light  photography.  MiliUry  IcteUigence 
sella*  heavily  on  aerial  raconnaissaaot  and  SICINT  for 
timely  order  of  battle  tnfonastkm.  Aerial  reconnais- 
sance b  apparently  a  primary  Instrument  for  locating 
fedayeen  groups,  although  such  organizations  are  well 
penetrated  by  field  agents. 
MiliUry  Intelligence  b  capable  of  providing  timely 
and  detailed  Information  on  Israel's  primary  neighbor- 
ing enemies  through  agent  operations  that  are  well 
planned  and  highly  imaginative 
The  main  purpose  of  MiliUry  tntelhpm*  Field 
Security  units  b  to  control  the  local  Arab  population  in 
the  Administered  Terrorities  and  to  minimise  their 
participation  in  terrorism,  in  thb  endeavor.  Field 
Security  of  the  Administered  Territories  works  closely 
with  Shin  Beth  and  the  Border  Guard.  Residents  are 
required  to  carry  ID  cards,  curfews  have  been 
imposed,  suspected  resistors  have  been  detained,  and 
the  houses  In  the  area  of  persons  presumed  to  know  of 
terrorist  activities  have  been  demolished,  even  though 
the  inhabitants  were  not  directly  involved.  In  the  early 
1970s  it  was  estimated  that  the  Israelis  had  some  800 
residenu  of  the  Administered  Territories  under 
administrative  detention.  Personnel  of  Field  Security 
unite  have  carried  out  sweeps  in  searches  for  terrorists 
and  arms  caches  through  areas  in  the  West  Bank 
where  terrorism  has  occurred.  On  some  occasions 
Israeli  operations  have  Uken  place  at  night,  apparently 
Intended  at  least  in  part  to  intimidate  the  populace. 
In  December  1969  the  Defense  Minister  announced 
that  516  buildings  had  been  demolished  in  the 
occupied  territories  since  the  1967  war— 265  »  the 
SECSH
SECttI 
Wot  Bank.  227  to  Gam  end  U  to  Janeakm.  While 
these  Israeli  paliciei  end  actions  km  WmiiXtd 
many  Arabs  w!»  might  otherwise  have  encaged  i» 
resistance  actJviUei  or  hi  terrarlam,  toaaeey  caaai  they 
have  been  «unterpre*rth»  to  thai  they  have 
•roused  deep  and  widespread  iiintma*  among  the 
resident!  of  the  Occupied  Territories.  In  uw  where 
buildings  haw  been  destroyed,  sa  etmcapbere  of 
personal  anger  and  teientmeaa  If  been  added  to  the 
natural  bitterns  of  a  defeased  people,  perticuiarly 
among  the  younger  Arabs. 
S.  RctatloM  with 
There  appear*  at  the 
harmonicai  rtktka&p 
and  the  other  Israeli 
Meat   Israeli    inufliasase   sad 
apedany  on  the  pakey  aad 
that  the!r  very  aatfaaal 
effective  and  amootaty 
security  community.  In 
tttftbft  &  wry 
Mfistary  InaaOaeeacc 
personaei, 
lawl  realize 
;  an 
and 
af&ean  at  the 
department  chief  aad  evens  wm  a*  at  die  division 
chief  level  all  have  known  aec*  other  panonaay  for  a 
long  period  of  time  These  lalarloaahsps  have  been 
forged  daring  tJwMad  ttmaa  seldom  operlencad  by 
any  other  ration  and  now  prgride  a  framework  far 
cooperative  teamwork  and  (juotilanHni  among  the 
service*. 
Uaboa  between  lame*  Military  liaaBlganr*  and 
foreign  orgsranttom  have  varied  ever  the  yean  from 
good  to  poor,  depend**  ea  the  eaaeeadet  of  the 
situation  and  the  demands  ol  pofcy.  In  recent  yean 
the  Israelis  have  provided  mlitary  and  aeeortty  aid 
and  training  to  rata*  African  nation*,  including 
Ethiopia.  Uganda  and  Zaire.  They  bave  ahe  engaged 
in  military  and  security  training  and  equipment 
exchanges  with  Lata  American  and  Asian  services. 
The  Israelis  have  matetataad  good  nsaUora  with 
Turkey  and  Iran  Sa  military  and  seenrity  matters 
While  the  Israelis  do  not  have  Wi  dfekxaaUc  relations 
with  Iran;  they  have  an  evert  official  ataman  whose 
members  have  diplomatic  tBlea.  iaereding  that  of 
military  attache. 
E.  Research  and  Political  Planning  Center 
The  Research  and  Political  Pkneing  Center,  for- 
med* the  Seerdi  Diriatoa  in  the  Ministry  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  prepares  analysis  based  on  raw 
Intelligent*  for  government  policymakers,  itt  office  is 
located  in  a  separate  fenced  compound  within  the1 
Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  eonples  in  Jerusalem.  A 
guard  at  the  compound  gate  prevents  unauthorized 
entrance  into  the  Center,  and  photo  ID  cards  are 
required  for  admittance. 
The  Center  presently  employs  fewer  than  100 
people,  both  analysts  and  support  staff,  who  were 
recruited  from  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  and 
Israeli  universale*.  The  Center  has  sis  divisions:  North 
Africa,  the  Fertile  Crescent;  the  Arabian  Peninsula; 
other  Geographic  Regions,  Economic;  and  Siretegic. 
Some  70  percent  of  the  Center's  personnel  are 
employed  in  the  three  Arab  units.  The  Center 
prepares  its  analyses  o;»  the  basis  of  raw  Intelligence 
data  available  to  the  Israeli  intelligence  community. 
The  Center  produces  short  papers  on  current  intelli- 
gence and  longer  analytical  memoranda,  as  required. 
The  Center's  products  are  diaeminated  to  all  minis- 
tries of  the  government. 
.  The  Foreign  Minister  uses  the  Center  as  his  personal 
braintrust  to  give  him  an  independent  means  of 
nidging  the  products  of  Military  Intelligence  and 
Monad.  Ahhw*h  its  analyses  are  eent  to  Israel 's  top 
decisionmakers,  the  Center's  role  in  the  Israeli 
intelligence  and  security  community  probably  is  still  a 
modest  one.  The  Center  reportedly  has  few  problems 
arislnc  from  competition  within  the  community. 
probably  because  of  a  lack  of  status  In  comparison 
with  the  established  and  larger  intelligence  and 
security  organizations. 
F.  The  National  Police 
The  Israeli  Police  Force  U  a  national  organisation 
headed  by  an  Inspector  General  responsible  to  the 
Minister  of  the  Interior.  The  national  headquarters 
moved  in  mid- 1969  from  Tel  Aviv-Yaio  to  Jerusalem. 
The  force  at  comprised  of  the  following  departments: 
(1)  Administration,  which  is  responsible  for  transport, 
supplies,  communications,  property  and  finances;  (2) 
Investigations,  which  is  concerned  with  criminal  and 
fraud  investigations  and  special  tasks  In  support  of  the 
intelligence  and  security  community;  and  (3)  Oper- 
ations, which  is  in  charge  of  training,  patrols  and 
traffic.  There  are  also  personnel,  research,  planning 
and  development  offices.  The  Prison  Services  and  the 
Civil  Guard  are  also  part  of  the  Police  (Figure  9). 
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The  force  to  divided  territorially  inio  districts, 
subdistticts,  sanea,  police  stations,  and  potts.  The  three 
police  districts  ue  Northern,  including  Haifa;  Tel 
Aviv,  and  Southern,  ioctading  ferussiem.  Attached  to 
the  Haifa  subdistrict  k  a  small  tarn*  guard  or  marine 
police  forte,  which  it  band  in  the  port  of  Haifa  and 
pairok  the  whole  coastline  to  prevent  smuggling, 
infiltration,  and  illegal  f  ishing.  This  unit  abo  has  petrol 
craft  on  Lake  Tsberias  and  at  Elat  on  the  Gulf  of 
Aoaba.  The  Soothers  District  includes  a  special  unit  at 
Ben  Guric*  (Led)  aifport  (F«ures  10  and  11). 
A  special  eonsoaent  of  the  national  police  force  is 
the  Border  Guard,  whow  ntasioiw  are  to  guard  the 
ceasefire  lines  against  Arab  infiltration  and  detecting 
and  manias  don  tanorilb.  It  works  closely  with  the 
Array  and  patrols  -At  Admirlitered  Territories  and 
0<e  border  area*.  The  Border  Guard  alio  trains  settlers 
«a  defene  mearana  against  brflhrators.  and  schedules 
guard  duty  In  border  villain  Military  conscripts  who 
elect  to  fulfill  their  terra  of  service  by  Joining  the 
Border  Gaud  an  the  principal  source*  of  new  recruits 
for  this  component.  The  Border  Guard,  which  number 
about  6.000,  is  integrated  Into  the  Army  in  time  of 
war. 
The  effective  strength  of  the  police  force  (not 
Including  the  Border  Guard)  reached  about  12.000  at 
the  end  of  1869.  Roughly  1.100  of  the  police,  including 
76S  Arabs,  were  employed  In  the  Administered 
Territories  In  1969.  Over  half  the  police  force  are  lews 
of  Oriental  background  and,  in  fact,  the  police  force  is 
a  branch  of  government  to  which  !&»  assignment  of 
Oriental  Jews  has  been  particularly  encouraged 
The  police  force  is  capable  of  maintaining  public 
order  and  safety  under  normal  circumstances,  it  has, 
however,  been  troubled  by  a  manpower  shortage 
caused  by  resignations  resulting  from  low  pay. 
overwork  and  the  attraction  of  higher  paving  fobs 
elsewhere.  Despite  the  persistent  shortage  of  manpow- 
er, police  discipline  is  generally  satisfactory  and.  in  the 
case  of  die  Border  Guard,  excellent.  The  public 
altitude  toward  the  police  has  improved  since  the 
-■■'•  v::«"-;;-v-:-*r  ■•■'-■■*•»?, -■-&-■■;  -•:'■-■•-■.■ 
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figure  10.  nroal  Norieml  Mn  heodquort* t,  Mwwtom.  frontoMda  vww,  Ho»wi<>ai  1972 
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Figure  11.  hrea*  tordar  Gvord  poet  undv  tonHiutHon  o»  Kafir  IiiwuM  (*orKJ.  Jons 
1970 
y 
early  days  of  statehood,  despite  scaadab  involving 
inssifglint  and  the  acceptance  of  bribes,  The  police 
force  hu  worked  hard  to  overcome  the  traditional 
Jewish  fear  of  police  authority  stemming  from  the 
historic  oppression  of  lews.  The  Israeli  Police  Force  In 
effect  acts  as  a  very  important  auxiliary  to  Shin  Beth 
in  the  preservation  of  interna!  securttv  throuthout  the 
country.  The  police  support  5hin  Beth  in  Investiga- 
tions, by  providing  cover  and  making  arrests. 
C.  Key  officials  *" 
AchKftrv,  Avraham 
Achi-Ta*  became  Director  of  Shin  Beth  In  the 
summer  of  1974.  He  is  a  career  security  officer.  His 
reputation  was  established  as  chief  of  Shin  Beth  s  Arab 
Affairs  Department,  where  he  was  responsible  for 
concocting  operations  in  the  Administered  Territories 
and  within  the  Arab  community  in  Israel  He  served 
briefly  as  Deputy  Director  of  Shin  Beth  prior  to  his 
tppointnent  as  Director.  Achl-Tuv  is  of  German 
background  He  b  married  and  hu  a  daughter.  He 
earned  a  law  degree  at  ihe  University  of  Tel  Aviv  in 
the  early  1970s  while  serving  in  Shin  Beth  He  is 
extremely  bright,  hard-working,  ambitious  and  thor- 
ou*h  He  is  also  known  to  be  headstrong,  abrasive  and 
arrogant 
Hoffi,  Yitzhak 
Major  General  (Ret.)  Yittak  Hoffi  became  Director 
of  Mosnd  on  1  September  1974.  He  was  born  in  Tel 
J 
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Aviv  oa  25  January  I«7.  He  joteed  the  Hsgsnab  in 
1944  end  commanded  a  company  is  the  Arsb-lirae3i 
War  ia  1943.  He  conrJooed  to  ant  in  th*  Israeli 
Def ewe  Force*  ta  a  variety  of  command,  ataff  and 
training  pom,  including  the  nrn  maud  of  the  Pan- 
troop  Brigade.  Hofli  was  Acting  Chief  of  Staff  f or  a 
brief  period  ia  April  1974,  but  retired  frees  the  IDF  at 
that  time,  apparently  because  he  was  not  appointed 
Chief  of  Staff  HoTfi  attended  die  US  Amy  Command 
and  General  Staff  College  ia  tae  mid-19601.  He  hat 
a!*o  viBied  the  US  oa  away  ocetstom.  In  1968  he 
Inspected  police  units  and  participated  In  amy 
exercises  in  Uganda.  He  traveled  as  a  tourist  to 
Hawaii,  lapen.  Hong  Kong.  Bangkok  and  Tehran  in 
1970  and  went  to  Singapore 'on  undisclosed  business. 
He  Inspected  Israel]  advisory  efforts  in  Ethiopia  in 
1972  and  abo  went  to  other  parti  of  Africa.  Although 
not  aa  intelligence  offioar  by  background  or  training, 
Hoffi  apparently  demonstrated  has  flair  for  InleBi- 
pence  analysis  at  Goaasntader  of  the  Northern 
Command  ia  the  days  preceding  the  Tom  Kippur  War 
in  October  1873  by  tearing  the  impending  Syrian 
attack  and  requeuing  the  Defense  Minister  to 
reinforce  the  Goka  Heights  with  an  armored  brigade. 
Hoffi  reportedly  has  expanded  Monad's  role  in  the 
coGeetion  of  intelligence  on  Arab  capabilities  and  the 
interpretation  of  such  information. 
Hoffi  it  leauwd  and  oasct  but  can  be  warm  and 
genial  among  friends.  He  is  married  and  has  two 
daughters  He  speaks  Engfesk  Neither  as  flashy  nor  as 
Imaginative  at  tome  of  las  tuedeixjauii  in  Mossad,  he 
it  reported  to  be  mcrirafa«  and  somewhat  dour. 
Sail, 
General  Yehoafena  Sad.  bora  17  September  1933. 
Jerusalem,  Pakatiae  ibnetl  entered  the  Uracil  De- 
fense Force  (IDF)  la  1851  aad  was  commissioned  in 
1653,  From  1933  to  1964  he  served  ia  the  Southern 
Command,  fulfilling  field  duties.  During  the  Sinai 
Campaign  he  served  as  tofrTliarmy  officer  of  the 
Armored  Corps  aad  as  commander  of  a  reconnais- 
sance unit  Following  the  1956  war.  he  served  as  an 
Intelligence  officer  with  the  7th  Brigade  and  later  as 
an  assistant  intelligence  tfiicer,  Southern  Command. 
In  1965  he  graduated  from  the  IDF  Command  and 
Staff  College.  Following  hb  graduation  he  served  as 
commander  of  an  Intelligence  Officer  Training 
Course,  and  as  an  Intelligence  officer   with  the 
Southern  Command  before  returning  In  1971  as  an 
instructor  with  the  Command  and  Staff  College  In 
1972  he  became  commander  of  the  Intelligence  School ' 
but  left  in  1973  to  become  intelligence  officer  with  the 
Armored  Division.  Southern  Command.  On  19  May 
1974  Sagi  was  appointed  Deputy  Director.  Military 
Intelligence,  Production  and  Estimates.  On  2  February 
1979  he  assumed  the  Directorship  of  Military  inielli-        / 
fence  Sagi  is  soft-spoken,  direct  and  has  a  no-nomense  \/ 
outlook  He  considers  himself  an  Arab  etpert.  He  is 
married  and  has  three  daughters.  He  speaks  English. 
H.  Comments  on  principal  sources 
1.  Source  materials 
Most  of  the  Information  to  this  publication  has  been 
derived  from  a  variety  of  sources  including  covert 
assets  of  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency,  publications 
of  the  Israeli  Government  and  reports  prepared  by  the 
.  United  Stains  Department  of  Defense.  Research  was 
v  basically  completed  in  December  1976 
1  Suppleaaaatary  evert  publications 
a.  Atdouby,  Zwy  and  Bellinger.  Jerrotd  The 
Shattered  Stlrnet;  the  EH  Cohen  Affair.  New  York 
Coward.  MeCann  and  Ceoghegan.  1971. 
b.  Arendt,  Hannah  Eiehmann  in  Jerusalem. 
New  York.  Viking  Press.  1963 
c  Bar-Zohar,  MkheL  The  Acaigere.  London: 
Arthur  Barker.  1968, 
d.  Bar-Zohar.  MkheL  Spin  to  the  Promised 
Land;  fair  ffgref  and  the  fstaeft  Secret  Service. 
Boston:  Houghton  Mifflin  Company.  1972. 
e.  Bes-Hanaa.  Eli,  Our  Man  to  Damascus,  New 
Yotk:  CroWn  Publishers.  1969. 
f.  Ben-Porat.  Y.  (Dan.  Uri).  Stent  War.  New 
York:  Sabre  Books,  197Q. 
g.  Ben-Porat,  Y.  (Dan.  Uri).  Spy  from  Itraet. 
New  York:  Tower  Publications.  1969. 
h.  El-Ad.  Avrl  and  Creech  III.  fames.  Decline  of 
Honor.  Chicago:  Henry  Regnery,  1976. 
i.  Eytan.  Steve.  Repeated  Triumphs  Scored  by 
hrat!  Spy  System.  Washington:  loin)  Publications 
Research  Service.  1970 
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s  H*?eL  luei  The  Haute  on  Carthalii  Street. 
the  Capture  oj  Adolf  Eichmann  lemden  A  Deutsch. 
1975 
k  Itrael  Government  Year  Bod  S73S-6  (187S- 
J87B).  JerosaSera,  1975. 
1  Lotz,  Jokann  WcHsang.  The  Champagne  Spy. 
New  York:  Manor  Boots,  1373 
m.  Peartraan.  Moshe.  TA«  Capture  ef  Adolf 
Etchmenn.  London.  We&nfeld  and  Nicobon.  5961 
n.  PickalkiewJra,  Janun.  f«*f*  £«nfrr  Arm. 
FrartUurt  {Main)   Covert*,  1975 
o.  Rabin.  Jacob  Elit  Cohen,  L'etpton  de  Datruu. ' 
Paris:  Flammaricn.  1867. 
pi  Shlaitn,  A«i  Fatluret  fit  Ntttonal  tnttllttence 
EtUtmtit:  The  Cat*  c/  (.He  Yom  Kippur  Wat. 
Princeton:  World  Politics.  April  1976 
q.  Tadmar,  Joshua.  The  Stknt  Wcrrtort.  Edited 
and  translated  by  Raphael  Rothsiein.  Toronto.  Mac- 
Milian.  1969. 
r  Tinnin.  David  B  and  CfcrMeroen,  D«t  The 
Hit  Team.  Boston:  Utile  Brown,  1976 
v  WhoM  Who  In  Itrael.  1976  TeJ  Aviv:  Bronf- 
man and  Cohen,  1976 
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