MEIGANOG FOR THE DIRECTOR re . Sudsect: CIA Authority to Perform Prose gonéa and ~ . - . . *. Comsando Tyce Functions - mt : ° .e ne soe OO kee “oS . 2. A review of the IMational Security Ace > Yeve2is ‘tz0- provisions. which night te construed as au vhowity for CIA to eng2g3 infbize ck pro-- . pagenda o> the typeof activity kecen during the wer as 5-0-5 ucick - neivied] ranger and conzando raids, bebird-the-Lines s2dtege, end sup-— i (uh) provides tha’, 44% sheld . Suerridla wer ~fare.] Section 102 (2) ( sency Ww perrom for tre mW cdditionel services of cozmoa concer <s ‘hia: be nefis of existing Lo a 5 suca 5i7 Council cetercines can b2 nore efficiently eccosplished 1c2 (a) (5) provides trast the Agency shell. pervlorm + | 2 cuties related tO intelligence effeciin Zz tx ad security as the FSC ney direct. Teken cut of con cext axa £ its bistor:;, these Sectiens cowld hear ainost wn~ peridmes. comida be shomn . & roviced ths service tellisence agency or related to petional ine 5 . , ret de toe UL ee a ° . . e = cCellisence- ‘= ; . Sr een Se . om e . - . . . » prizarily cesigred for subversion, . cen te skew incidentally to cenefit 2S OF checking roliepilit vor inforients, Bren cercain £ ras oF S.0u oz, and so force intelligence by Vestabli isthent of Y, br ovaning pensztration pciats in con- ricte fm our opinion, however, eittas tension of ons 2 sy] Pais is based on our understanding ot these provision: were er2cte oJ co ‘eifestivers SrOTL could D2 here t stiveress of pests ati ta the functions avutnorineg a 3 2 » fe Lg 1 i [5 sy ray) a ' Moro tre intent or F Gossres 3 at 4- 3. Lrevier of cetates frdicates thet Congres coord icaesns anvele gece Axnterested in an:agency Tor eS Cid sot vrovsse auz ovossees collection scvi7is ee Ee aS TIRES ES OTEESSES. ecelon Ovsrs falal to. piovice Specitic ay lor such coil mov ara, (2a 2 conproaiza, Szctionz 1C2 (4a) Ch) eed (5) sha pormitta’ the National Security Council to “ee teraite ieee =k collection wore to ta vcerforzed by CIA Af ve co not believe that trers was ang toougss ta tha ninds of Consress Uma tis sCantros anweliscrne eersy wader this a shnornty ond s UAKE Wesisiyas Sction Wer suevetsion and, snbotazee) A Sie Sop Gdepate at about the sung tine on tee Stats Le- ntia Forosizn Broatcast Service tands tao confira cur CPENLOz~ founa tn the briog and off-te-recoru bearings eee. Purtrer confliumabios is on spnropriactions for CL. | .
. . “he. sides froa the discussions of nomal caepartzental expenses for CLi as a whole, anproval vas given te the unvouchered funds raquested py the Directer ef Central Intelligence mainly for the specific purpesa of conducting clandestine inteliisence ogerations outside the Unite Stetes. (We telieva that there wes no intent to use either the vouchered or usvouctered funds for ti.0. or S.0. work. Either of thesa activities would requires establishment of 2 new branch of office “enployszent of . onsicaresia pérsonsel, tes procuresgent of huze quantities of 211 tyres of socds and materisis, and lerge suts for expenses of edainistretivs © USS support and inciesntals m We delievs this would be an unsstkorized of the fimés neds ayelz2 ols to S-O. 3s spowid be wi undertaken | icka Crh a MEAOUS 2 OTe wiers CTA. it is cur ¢9! consiusics On: “ihemetames bai —_— nF thet ceithir HO. nor Snforming Congress and cotiining its Ss approval of the _functious_ead tre —-——— exran eituce OL furés £ for Laos 2 _pUcposes~ s- | oe at - on “5S. There is, hoxever, ome function now being p be scermtionsd in conzec e forsation on plans in tion ty Vestern ao! Fad oe verly performed revita. hn {esortent by-product ox tz. clances wire in telDigencs’ “Fines Sion i is. Euro. “tne contsition of extensive in: Lor .estao oLisicent. of | resistanca movesenits in the event ‘of further extension of Conaunist control. to. - Thesa plans include" treinis rated 0f 2 agen z ery other form of vesistance- <% is t Or actvetl resista ts and /T's, organizing groups, + vertiadarly, S. 0» woul. Gepend Lor. mos ° . e . ° . . ° . ° = £3 information might be the bas i> 7 tha Hational Secmity Council, cma cul_cosaittes to form a basic policy of cocperetion wits plarmed ma by Crs which 3 is so Closely related “to the natiers Seen veseet 2Dove 2S to— and to assign the implenentation of such : 2 +. colicy «3 toe proper ‘egen sonivurad to CTA. 34% sews - > asgligrtad ©O Clty, 2 Soul, WS 122 er aut Se : ° If such japlenentation Were thon sti] bs necessary te go ta Congress CUSIRENCE Ho HOUSTON: Generar. Couis2er 4
(Page 1) 25 September 1947 MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR Subject: CIA Authority to Perform Prepaganda and Commando Type Functions 1. A review of the National Security Act reveals two provisions which might be construed as authority for CIA to engage in biack pro- paganda or the type of activity known during the war as S.O., which included ranger and commando raids, behind-the-lines sabotage,and sup- port of guerrilla warfare. Section 102 (d) (4) provides that it shall be tne duty of the Agency to perform for the benefit of existing intelligence agencies such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally. Section 102 (dad) (5) provides that the Agency shall perform such other functions and duties related too intelligence affecting the national security as the NSC may direct. Taken out of context and without knowledge of its history, these Sections could bear almost un- limited interpretation, provided the service performed could be shown to be of benefit to an intelligence agency or related to national in- telligence. 2. Thus, black propaganda, primarily designed for subversion, confusion, and political effect, can be shown incidentally to benefit positive intelligence as a means of checking reliability of informants, effectiveness of penetration, and su forth. Even certain forms of S.O. work could be held to benefit intelligence by establishment of [(W/I?] teams in accessible areas and by opening penetration points in con- fusion following sabotage or riot. In our opinion, however, either activity would be an unwarranted extension of the functions authorized in sections 102 (da) (4) and (5). This is based on our understanding of the intent of Congress at the time these provisions were enacted. 3. A review of debates indicates that Congress was primarily interested in an agency for coordinating intelligence and originally did not propose any overseas collection activities for CIA. The strong move to provide specifically for such collection overseas was defeated and, as a compromise, Sections 102 (d) (4) and (5) were enacted, which permitted the National Security Council to determine the extent of the collection work to be performed by CIA. We do not believe that there was any thought in the minds of Congress that the Central Intelligence Agency under this authority would take positive action for subversion and sabotage. A bitter debate at about the same time on the state De- partment’s Foreign Broadcast Service tends to confirm our opinion. Further confirmation is found in the brief and off-the-record hearings on appropriations for CIA.
(Pace 2) 25 september 1947 4. Aside from the discussions of normal departmental expenses for CIA as a whole, approval was given to the unvouchered funds requested py the Director of Central Intelligence mainly for specific purpose of conducting clandestine intelligence operations outside the United States. We believe that there was no intent to use either the vouchered +r unvouchered funds for M.O. or §.0O. work. Either of these activities would require establishment of a new branch of office, employment of considerable personnel, the procurement of huge quantitites of all types of goods and materials, and large sums for expenses of administrative support and incidentals. We believe this would be an unauthorized use of the funds made available to CIA. It is cur conclusion, therefore, that neither M.O. ncr S.O. should be undertaken by CIA without previously informing Congress and obtaining its approval of the functions and the expenditure of funds for those purposes. 5. There is, however, one function now being properly performed by CIA which is so closely related to the matters discussed above as to be mentoned in connection therewith. An important by product of the clandestine intelligence function is the acquisition of extensive in- formation on plans in Western Euope for establishment of resistance movements in the event of further extension of Communist: control. These plans include training of agents and W/T’s, organizing groups, providing cutside cortacts, and every other form of resistance. It is on such group that M.O. and, particularly, S.O. would depend for most efficient function. 6. It is felt that this body of information might be the basis fot consideration by the National Security Council, or a sub~committee thereof, in order to form a basic policy of cooperation with planned or actual resistance movements and to assign the implementation of such policy to the proper agency cr hody. If such implementation were then assigned to CIA, it would, we feel, still be necessary to go to Congress for authority and funds. LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON General Counsel LRN: mbt