PiLS Mga Og Ser . we es 2 ~- AME a ee bee bs - * a . as id A } 4 . , Li r ey 0 COPY ? . ve b mace ON De Se te ", Pa af ath bie rat SRUY Se 2 A STE 3 seit 15%: Ghee "Ve Sy] “a ps 2 , Re Fores ‘ Ln C4 on ant RL Tare he Be tg, er BY’ - 1% ° eed eee en p we, : A . MJ , AEE Abe OES OPE AC tare TUT ae toe Ud OS RE Ae ee ees eee eee
; 
_ 
clude in its calculations the import reoulrements and export sur- 
pluses of the satellite powers with their highly variesated eco- 
momic resources. 
The USSR, however, must assume that larze-scale 
Soviet trade arrangements involving Latin America’s strategic ma- 
terials would elicit an immediate and effective answer from the 
US. 
Moreover, the post-war USSK realizes that it is not ina 
“s 
This report has the concurrence of the intellicernce arencies of 
: 
the War and Navy Departments and of the Army Air Forces. 
A etate- 
ment of dissent by the Department of State is contained tn Enclos- 
ure "A" hereto... 
; 
CORE 1, "Soviet Foreign and Military Policy.*® 
te 
-l- 
; 
10 APRIL 1947 
ORE 16 
SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN LATIN AMERICA ° 
The Soviet Government anticipates an inevitable 
conflict with the capitalist world. 
it therefore 
seeks to increase its reletive power by building up 
its own strength and undermining that of its assumed 
antagonists. 
eeece 
In Latin America, in particular, 
Soviet and Communist influence will be exerted to 
the utmost to destroy the influence of the United 
States and to create antafonisms disru~ 've to the 
Pan American system. 
°° 
CONSIDERATIONS INFLUENCING SOVIET OBJECTIVES. 
The pattern of Soviet objectives in Latin America differs sharply 
from that in other areas because of.the following four considerations, 
__eornered trade, mave them dovetsil, 
which are to a varying extent peculiar to this area: 
‘a. 
Latin America as a whole lice within striking distance 
of US naval and air power, and could be shut off from the outside 
world by a US naval blockade. 
The Latin American Republics there- 
fore cannot be of much use to the USSR, either eas military allics 
or as sources of supply, in any future war. 
| 
b. 
The USSR has nothing to gain by intecrating its economy 
with that of Latin America as lonv-torm commercial exchanrve ar- 
rangements would oblige it to do. 
Thies is only in small part be- 
cause Soviet and Latin American imrort requirements and export 
surpluses do not dovetail. 
The imaginative and rescurceful Soe- 
viet state trading agency coul¢, by carcrul manipulation ef three- 
ly sinee it eculd ine 
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position to compete with the superior productive resources of the 
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Final- 
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| 
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would be cut off during a future war is unlikely to comment itself 
Ye. ? 
to the security-conscious USSR. 
He 
ae 
¢. 
The post-war Hemisphere development that the USSR most 
SS oe 
Be 
fears is the negotiation of a Hemisphere Defense Pact that would 
os 
a 
tie together the armed forces of the 21 American Republics under 
Se i: 
| 
the US-sponsored standardization program and mobilize Latin Am- 
oy 
. erica’s vast resources, human and material, in any future defens- 
oa 
ive war against the USSR. 
So long as differences between the US 
Ai 
| 
and Argentina delay the negotiation of such a pact, }* ts to the 
od 
advantage of the USSR to press no objectives that mignt awaken 
in the Hemisphere the sense of urgency about a future war that 
> Fae 
the Soviets themselves already feel. 
d. 
The climate of opinion in Latin America crlls for propa- 
ganda appeals markedly different from those appropriate to the 
Fs 
he 
fhe. 
other areas of current interest tothe USSR. 
Majority opinion 
| 
in the other American Republics is not only Catholic and patri- 
ea 
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otic and thus inherently anti-Communist, but is also strongly 
» 
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| 
pro-democratic and reformist. 
It looks in the direction of 
ae 
| 
greater popular control over government, higher living standards 
for the masses of the people, and increased state intervention 
en 
' 
in economic processes --- within, however, & predominantly cap- 
Oe 
italist framework. 
| 
ANALYSIS OF SOVIET ACTIVITIES. 
Sad 
Analysis of Soviet activities in the Latin American 
area reveals 
clear grasp of the implications of the sbove considerat 
s with re- 
to a wise allocation of Soviet effort and resources, as follows: 
a. 
Since for strategic reasons tne Latin American Republics 
| 
can be of scant use as allies or sources of supply in any future 
Fe 
war, the emphasis of current Soviet activity in the eres is upon 
ES eS 
measures calculated to underminc the 
of the assumed 
ad 
ture antagonist, the US, rather than uron measures calcula ted to 
ne , Sy 
build up the military potential of the USSR iteelf. 
These? meare 
ures are, without exception, of such chseracter that they wil 
continue to pay dividends after an enforced Soviet withdre 
from the area on the eve of any future war. 
Anything that 
for tension between the US and its future allies in Latin America, 
Dearie 
: 
and thus tends to deley the negotiation of a Hemicphere Defense 
: 
Pact, is pure windfall gain for Soviet policy, and as such is 
BS 
skillfully exploited. 
Thus the strategically situated Arzentine 
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Communist 
has no more determined enemy 
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present president of Argentina, hes over a considerable period 
given qualified support to his regime, and enthusiastically ap- 
proves his vigorous campaign for a South American trade bloc. 
b. 
Since long-term trade relations with Latin America would 
involve economic dependency upon an area from which the USSR could 
© 
be cut off during any future war, the Soviets have made no effect- 
ive effort to offset the remarkably rapid expansion of US trade in 
the area since the war. 
Soviet trade representatives have mde 
overtures to, for example, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Vene- 
zuela; but there is no evidence that these negotiations have led 
to results that will notably affect the flow of gootls across in- 
ternational frontiers. 
The major occupation of Scviet trade mis- 
sions in the other American Republics appears to be intelligence 
activities rather than trade negotiations. 
"Economic penetration’, 
in the ordinary sense of this tern, apperentiy is not a current 
Soviet objective in Latin America. 
Since Soviet-Latin American 
trade is capable of large-scale development, thic must be regarded 
as a deliberate policy choice on the part of the USER. 
¢. 
Since it is to the advantage of the USER to press no ob- 
jectives in Latin America that might awaken US opinion to a sense 
of urgency about a possible future war, the eight Soviet embas- 
sles and legations in Latin America conspicuously devote them- 
selves to diplomacy and culture, avoiding every appearance of an 
organic relationship either with local Communist parties or wit 
the Soviet's Latin-America-wide intelliscence network. 
No nego- 
tiations are on record concerning the placement of Soviet nili- 
tary missions, and up to the present time the USSR 
hes accredited 
only two military representatives in the entire area. 
d. ‘Recognizing the speciel characteristics of Latin American 
public opinion, the Communist strategists in the area have edopted 
@ posture of apparent devotion to cemocratic institutions and the 
democratic freedoms; have seldom referred to the dictatorship of 
the proletariat and the dream of a Soviet aAmericr; and have fol- 
lowed @ propaganda line that leys at tne door of the US responsi- 
bility for Latin America’s extremes of poverty, and conveys the 
impression that the USSR is ae land of freedom and eouallty. 
On 
the strength of this propaganda line, the Communict movement in 
Latin America is winning members and sympathizers. 
These gains, 
however, are made possible primarily by widespreat Lenorence of 
end delusions concerning the economic and politics 1 character 
of 
the USSR and not, as some commentatorc 
by poverty as such. 
(There ie no correlation between the incidence of poverty end the 
incidence of Communism in Latin America.) 
HMoreover, 
democratic appeals it employs, the propaganda cannot contribute 
rectly to the Sovietization of the Latin American countries. 
ae 
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The pattern of Soviet activities in Latin America suggests, there- 
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fore, that Soviet planners have posed their problem to themselves in the 
ee 
‘ 
following terms: 
What, in the time available to us in Latin Arerics, 
aaa 
can we do to undermine the military potential of the Western Hemisphere 
et: Oa 
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as a fighting unit? 
Where, without assuming direct responsibility, ean 
mete 
we channel our resources and energies in such fashion thet the activi- 
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ties we initiate will continue to weaken the US even when we ere no 
) Ag rad 
: 
longer present to supervise them? 
What existing diplomatic or politi- 
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cal situations, favorable to our long-term purmoses, can we exploit --- 
again without assuming direct responsibility? 
oe 
SOVIET OBJECTIVES. 
reer 
| 
The USSR has found the answer to its problem in the following 
Cuoala 
| 
four objectives: 
(1) the development of strong local Communist par- 
eee 
ties, (2) the Communizaticn of the leadership of the local trade 
; 
Be 85", 
unions, (3) the dissemination of carefully selected propaganda 
bs face 
themes which, implanted in the hearts and minds of the Latin Amerl- 
i ett 
cans themselves, tend to undermine US hegemony in the Hemisphere ond 
| ee 
make inter-American military cooperation cifficult to achieve, and 
(4) the creation and maintenance of an intelligence network ther will 
pate an 
obtain for Soviet planners the data they require in order to forward 
mst 
these objectives with a maximum of ckill and 
minimum expenditure of 
| 
effort. 
All the available evidence indicates that the USSR can already 
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point to advantageous developments with respect to each of these four 
i 
objectives, as follows: 
aa 
. 
‘ 
. of Soviet progress is the CTAL, 
or Con nfeacretion of Latin : 
The local Communist parties. 
Thesé are st srongest in Cuba, in Dra- 
vil, and in Chile, but in none of these countries is there any likeli- 
hood of an early Communist bid for power. 
There are sever al counttles, 
such es Bolivia, Guatemala, Honduras, en? [lL Salvedor, where there is 
at present no Communist party. 
However, most of the Latin American Req 
publics, and all of the important ones, 
have alert and vigorous. Cormun- 
ist parties which have an impact on day-to-day soclel and political 
events entirely out of proportion to their actual numbere 
wesw 
Communist leadership in 
wnions . 
ere the main evidence 
merican Worke 
ers, which has as affiliates 
bulk of the trade unions 
the areca. 
The top echelons of the Confederation and the lenders of mott of the 
_key. member-unions are Communist-controlled, with the result that th 
— 
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be 
Confederation’s "line" ts rarely distinguishable from that of the 
; 
munist parties. 
The head of the Confederation is Vicente Lembardo 
| 
Tas. 
Toledano, who, despite his essertion that he is not a Commnict, 
is 
ies nb. : 
vegarded throughout the area es the Communists’ spekesmin in labor 
; 
SECRET 
oPARRY S. TRIAS 
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affairs. 
He end his lieutenants have been able to dominate the movement 
' 
 Ddecause, like Communist labor leaders everywhere, they know what they 
! 
_ 
want, give careful thought to how to get it, and are more diligent than 
| 
| their opponents. 
There is, moreover, little prospect of their being 
| 
jockeyed out of their present commanding position, despite the fact that 
: 
socialist-led labor factions in certain countries, resenting the Confed- 
| 
eration’s reputation for being Communist-dominated, are now opposing 
| 
_ them. 
Naturally, the unions that extract, process, and transport ma- 
| 
: 
terials the US would need from Latin America in any future war are 
Major targets for Communist penetration. 
Propaganda themes. 
By press and radio propaganda through most of 
the area, the Communists skillfully drive home their major themes: 
: 
"The USSR is right, the US wrong", whenever there is e clash between 
them. 
"The Hemisphere Defense Pact is part of a US plan to fight to 
| 
the last Latin American in en agcreesive imperialist wer against the 
) 
Soviet Union.* 
"The Hemisnohere Defense Pact is inconsistent with the 
| 
United Nations, which ie in turn Latin Anerica'’s only defence arainst 
, 
an indefinite future of oppression and exploitetion oy the United 
States.* 
"The Good Neighdor Policy dled with Presi¢ent Rocesevelt.* 
In short, the Communist press and redio in Latin Arcrica miss no oppor- 
tunity to inculcate resentment anid distrust of the United States and 
the Hemisphere Defense Pact, postponement de 
local Commnicets 
> 
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treat as the Soviet Union's major fo2l in 
area. 
The resultant dis- 
ee 
trust and resentment of the United States would remain end be exploited 
scm 
long after the negotiation and signature of the Pact itself. 
pate 
Intelligence activities. 
That the Sov Let Union today has 
Latin- 
aa 
America-wide intelligence network, so related to she local Communtet 
| 
organizations as to enable it to Keep th- 
> 
Latin American scene under 
. 
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continuous observation, is attested not 
by the weight of the evi-g 
dence in the possession of US intelligencs avencies, but 
by the 
fact that Soviet activities in Latin ‘merica are clizarly dased upon 
thorough knowledge and deep understandin7 ‘of the main nolitical and 
| 
economic trends. 
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Papers of 
| HARRY S. TRUMAN 
ORE 16/1 
1 November 1947 
Copy No. 
IN LATIN AMERICA 
SUMMARY 
| 
Since for strategic reasons the Latin American Republics can be of scant use to 
the USSR as allies or sources of supply in any future war, the emphasis of current 
Soviet activity in the area has recently shifted to measures that can be counted on 
to prevent, reduce, or place in doubt US access to the area’s strategic materials or 
military support. 
_ 
For so long as the US exercises its present role of leadership in the Western Hemi- 
_ sphere, the Communists cannot hope to seize and retain power in any Latin American 
) 
country, which means that the Communist Parties in Latin America are of interest 
to the USSR only insofar as they forward objectives other than that of winning power 
and forming a government, and only insofar as they donot, by becoming too strong, call 
down upon themselves punitive measures by the Latin American governments. 
Most 
of the energies freed by de-emphasizing Party activity as such, appear, however, 
to have been channeled into preparations for espionage, sabotage, and clandestine 
operation of the Party in the event of suppression. 
The present Communist line apparently rests on the assumption that the USSR’s 
objectives in Latin America can be achieved with the Party’s present following, and 
that it would be unwise to risk alienating that following or to invite suppression by 
advocating the overthrow of the existing governments. 
A show-down with the anti- 
- Communist Latin American governments is thus indefinitely postponed. 
The Communist Parties in the other American Republics are unlikely to increase 
their following or extend their influence during the months ahead; in fact, with certain 
exceptions, they may lose both membership and influence. 
In many Latin American 
Communist Parties there is a tendency for intraparty disputes to arise, thereby weaken- 
ing Party prestige, but the dissenting factions may actually aid Soviet espionage agents 
to reach sectors of the public not normally available to the Communist Parties them- 
selves. 
This loss of strength does not mean, however, that the Soviet Union’s basic 
objectives in Latin America are likely, within the near future, to become unrealizable or 
- that it does not still lie within the Soviet Union’s power to reverse the present trend. 
‘It is estimated that Communist nonpolitical organization in Latin America has 
already prdceeded so far and so effectively that in the event of war with the US, the 
USSR can, by merely giving the necessary orders, paralyze the economies of Chile and 
Cuba and thus deny to the US, at least temporarily, the copper and sugar that they 
=| 
_ 
pula Jtherwise contribute to the US war effort. 1+ ‘~éurther cectitiatea tat in other 
| 
jmportant areas of Latin America,,Communist undercover 
of strategic 
geetors of the various economies is already such as to 
the necessary 
to*withhold from ‘the US its 
flow of strategic 
| 
“yaw materials from Latin America, and 2) to precipitate economic crises in several key 
Detin American countries. 
Note: 
This paper has the concurrence of the intelligence organizations of the Departments of 
the Army and of the Air Forces. 
Statements of dissent by the Departments of State and of the 
Navy are set forth in Enclosures “A” and “B”. 
4. 
| 
SHORET 
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2! 
LIBRARY 
PRESIDENT 'S 
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Papers of 
| HARRY S. TRUMAN 
i PRESIDENT'S SECRETARY FILE 
HARRY 
S$ 
SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN LATIN AMERICA 
“The Soviet Government —" an inevitable conflict with the capitalist 
world.” 
1) 
“Since for strategic reasons the Latin American Republics can be of scant use (to 
the USSR) as allies or sources of supply in any future war, the emphasis of current 
Soviet activity in the area is upon measures calculated to undermine the strength of 
the assumed future antagonist, the US, rather than upon measures calculated to build 
up the military potential of the USSR itself. 
These measures are, without exception, 
of such character that they will continue to pay dividends after an enforced Soviet 
_ withdrawal from the area on the eve of any future war.” 
(ORE 16) 
1. The measures most certain to pay the Soviet Union dividends after an enforced 
withdrawal from Latin America are those that can be counted on to prevent, reduce, or 
place in doubt US access to the area’s strategic materials or military support. 
2. Such measures of course require careful study on the part of the Soviets, and 
such study cannot proceed in the absence of full, continuous, and dependable intelli- 
gence that will lay bare the amount and character of the assistance the US will wish 
to receive from its Latin American allies in the assumed future war as well as the latter’s 
capabilities and intentions, and the character of their political, economic, and social 
systems. 
A prerequisite for such intelligence is an efficient espionage and intelligence- 
collection service within the area, so organized as to be able to perform its tasks without 
military or diplomatic protection from the Soviet Union. 
Without such a service the 
Soviets, unable to make prior plans for the campaign of slowdowns, strikes, and sabo- 
tage that will be the USSR’s most effective Latin American weapon during any future 
war, would have to place their reliance upon uncoordinated local improvisation. 
3. The measures in question also call for peacetime concentration of Soviet effort 
‘in each Latin American country upon a) the development of the Communist Parties; 
b) the capture of organized labor with special attention to the trade unions whose 
menibers extract, process, and transport materials of vital importance to US war 
economy; c) achievement of a propaganda position that will assure widespread 
and continued popular sympathy for the Soviet cause in the war; and d) providing an 
4, Of tne foregoing objectives the “frst (the Gevelopment of the several Latin 
ajdt” emphasis “at present ‘in no country. 
For so long as the 
cannot hope to seize and retain power in any Latin American country, which means 
that a) no Latin American Communist Party can realistically look forward to success 
as a political party in the ordinary sense of the term; b) the Communist Parties in 
Latin America are of interest to the USSR only insofar as they forward objectives other 
than that of winning power and forming 4 government, and only insofar as they do 
not, by becoming too strong, call down upon themselves punitive measures by the 
base for ‘Undercover wartime activities 
further 
US exercises its present role of leadership in the Western Hemisphere, the Communists — 
re. 
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apers of 
HARRY Se TRUMAN 
PRESIDENT 'S SECRETARY FILE 
Latin American governments; c) the USSR would be wasting money, time, and energy 
if it sought to develop the Latin American Communist Parties beyond the limits set 
by b). These considerations, plus the sharply anti-Communist trend of governmental 
policy in the several Latin American countries, apparently account for the fact that 
the local Communist Parties, presumably under guidance from Moscow, have in recent 
months stepped down the level of intensity of their activities that are appropriate to 
organizations expecting to become great mass movements and to appeal for majority 
electoral support. 
They have, however, continued those efforts directed against the 
US, and those stressing (a) the Communist Party’s devotion to democracy, (b) its non- 
revolutionary attitude toward the locally established form of government, and (c) its 
independence, as an indigenous Party organization, vis-a-vis Moscow. 
Most of the 
energies freed by de-emphasizing the Party as such, appear, however, to have been 
channeled into preparations for espionage and sabotage (including arming for up- 
risings in and guerrilla attacks upon areas and facilities of strategic importance) as 
well as continuing the clandestine life of the Party in the event of suppression. 
5. The present propaganda line, save for its anti-US emphasis, largely parallels the 
Communist Party line during World War II, when it supported all local governments 
that were aiding the Soviet war effort. 
The Communists are at this time apparently 
ready to support any local governments that oppose the “imperialist” US, and to 
attack any local government that serves US interests. 
The present line, in short, appar- 
ently rests on the assumption that the USSR’s objectives in Latin America can be 
achieved with the Party’s present following, and that it would be unwise to risk alienat- 
ing that following, or to invite suppression by advocating the overthrow of existing 
governments. 
While a show-down with the anti-Communist Latin American Govern- 
ments is thus indefinitely postponed,* it is clear that this policy has not been success- 
ful in avoiding anti-Communist action by various Latin American Governments, and 
that, with the possible exception of Costa Rica, no Latin American Government is 
today publicly cooperating with the Communists. 
6. To organize and retain control of a subversive political movement in a geographi- 
cally remote area is, even under the most favorable conditions, a difficult enterprise 
and one that calls for both trained personnel and large expenditures of funds. 
In the 
course of the months since April 1947 the USSR has nevertheless withdrawn much of 
its experienced diplomatic personnel from Latin America, and through the same 
period it has become increasingly evident that no considerable sums of money are being 
spent on Communist activities in the area. 
The one exception among the other Ameri- 
can Republics in this respect appears to ‘be’ Argentina, ‘where the available data point 
“td tontinaed generous investment of both men and money. 
(Argentina, alone among 
_ the Latin American Governments, is to some extent in a position to oppose US leader- 
as qualitatively different from the other countries.) Durjng the months since April | 
1947, moreover, there have been increasingly numerous reports of internecine disputes, 
_ 
struggles for control, and disputes in Latin America’s Communist Parties. 
A peculiar 
* The Communist-led strike in the Chilean coal fields in October 1947 does not appear to have 
. 
been intended by the Communists as a show-down, although President Gonzalez Videla of Chile 
alleged that such was the case. 
H. 
HARRY S, TR 
LIBRARY 
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HARRY S, TRUMAN. LIBRARY 
‘Papers of 
| HARRY S. TRUMAN 
| PRESIDENT'S SECRETARY FILE 
‘ 
feature of the reports is that the sources from which they were obtained invariably 
offer only the most superficial guesses regarding the cause of these difficulties, which 
are without precedent in the recent history of Latin American Communism. 
Perhaps 
because of concern over the issues between the contending parties, none of the sources 
has yet seen the probable connection between the lapse of discipline within the parties 
on one hand and the USSR’s niggardliness with men and money on the other hand, one 
unavoidable result of which would, naturally, be a relaxation of control from Moscow. 
7. Under such circumstances, the Communist Parties in the other American Repub- 
lics are unlikely to increase their following or extend their influence during the months 
ahead. 
It is, indeed, possible that they are entering upon a period during which they 
will actually lose both membership and influence. 
But this does not mean, in any 
sense, that the Soviet Union’s basic objectives in Latin America are likely, within the 
near futtre, to become unrealizable, or that it does not still lie within the Soviet 
Union’s power, by resuming large-scale expenditures of men and money, to reverse the 
present trend. 
Rather it is estimated that, so long as it retains its grip on the strategic 
sections of the Latin American labor movement, the USSR has good reason to regard 
that trend as favorable. 
(The Communists do face, however, increasing opposition to 
their control of key Labor groups, and may find it desirable at some point to revise their 
tactics in order to maintain their position.) 
National authorities in the several 
countries are unlikely to maintain strict surveillance over a Communist movement, 
which is notoriously weakened by internal dissension. 
For espionage purposes, more- 
over, a Communist movement split into many factions independent vis-a-vis one another 
would not only be extremely difficult to liquidate in a moment of crisis, but also might 
well, through varied appeals, reach sectors of the population that could not otherwise 
be mobilized for Communist purposes. 
There is, therefore, some reason to believe 
recent unconfirmed reports that the USSR is encouraging the present fissiparous 
tendency in the Ltin American Communist movement. 
Furthermore, there is evidence 
that the USSR has given express orders for the creation of a whole new series of 
ostensibly non-Communist political and cultural groups. 
These groups, operating 
under secret Communist control, would make their appeal to persons in general 
sympathy with the declared objectives of the Communist Party who have nevertheless 
_ opposed it hitherto.* 
8. The defeat of Soviet espionage in Canada in 1946, though partial, could‘hardly "SS 
have failed to impress Soviet planners ‘with the necessity: of reconsidering the whole 
problem of the comparative value of the traditional Communist: Parties, upon which 
reliance had been placed with such disastrous reste in Canada, and of “front” organi- 
Whien might well heve provided a more effective eaver for 
opera-— 
‘tions. The emerging new pattern of Communist activities in Latin America may, 
therefore, have been influenced by the lessons learned in Canada. If so,. however, a 
natural inference would be that in Latin America today, as in Canada in connection’ 
with the atomic bomb, clandestine operations are, or are about to become, the order of 
the day. 
of Slavic descent now resident in Latin America. 
The Slavic colony in the River Plate area is 
unusually large and has been the target of extensive organization under Soviet direction. 
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Papers of 
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| PRESIDENT'S SECRETARY FILE 
9. It is estimated that the Communist nonpolitical organization in Latin America 
(that is, the organization for other than straight political Party purposes) has already 
proceeded so far and so effectively that in the event of war with the US, the USSR 
could a) receive an extensive flow of reasonably accurate information from Latin 
America, b) recruit sabotage agents, and c) by merely giving the necessary orders, 
paralyze the economies of two countries (Chile and Cuba) that are normally im- 
portant US suppliers. 
Thus the USSR could deny to the US, through at least the 
crucial early months of the war, the militarily important copper and sugar these two 
countries would otherwise contribute to the US war effort. 
It is further estimated 
that in the remaining Latin American countries (excepting only Argentina, Mexico, 
Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, and El Salvador), Communist under- 
cover penetration of strategic spheres of the various economies is already such as to 
permit the USSR, by merely giving the necessary orders a) to withhold from the US 
at least, for a limited period, its normal peacetime flow of strategic raw materials from 
Latin America, b) to precipitate, in the several Latin American countries, economic 
crises that would oblige the US to-choose between fiscally expensive programs of emer- 
gency aid on the one hand, and the politically expensive step of denying such aid on the 
other hand. 
Specifically, the USSR could today interrupt the flow of Latin American 
supplies of tin, quartz crystal, natural rubber, quinine, andoiltothe US. 
10. CIA estimates that none of the Latin American countries, again excepting 
Argentina, Mexico, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, and El Salvador 
(plus, perhaps, Peru), is today capable, by its own governmental action, of preventing 
the success of a Communist attempt either to a) interrupt the flow of supplies to the 
US, or b) disrupt the domestic economy of the country involved. 
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ENCLOSURE “A” 
DISSENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
The Intelligence Organization of the Department of State finds itself unable to 
concur completely in this estimate. 
Certain internal inconsistencies and a failure to 
distinguish sufficiently between long-range Soviet objectives and short-range tactics, 
especially as applied generally to the various Latin American countries, tend to estab- 
lish an erroneous concept of the mechanics and strength of Soviet influence in Latin 
America. 
The paper insufficiently distinguishes between assumed broad Soviet objectives 
deduced from the theoretical logic of the situation, and the varying tactical objectives 
of local Communist Parties. 
This confusion conceals the facts that Latin America for 
the present seems to be low on the Soviet target list, and that local Communist activities 
seem largely to be conditioned now by local economic and political situations and 
personal ambitions. 
In particular, it is logical deduction from standard Kremlin tactics rather than 
reasoning from available evidence to suggest that 
a. 
The USSR has adopted new priorities or strategy in its policy towards Latin 
America. 
Tendencies of Communist Parties to split up have recently increased. 
ec. 
Undercover activities of Communists have increased (except in Brazil where 
the Party has been outlawed). 
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Papers of 
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diggers mortgaged to th 
unist ‘armed uprisings or 
* 
» Possibly, Peru) is 
vernmental action, of a Communist attempt either 
to the US, or (b) to disrupt the domestic economy 
ENCLOSURE “p” 
DISSENT OF THE OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, 
NAVY DEPARTMENT 
i 
The Office of Naval Intelligence is unable fully to concur in the findings of this 
paper. 
It is felt that the subiect has not yet been thoroughly explored and that, in 
this paper, too much emphasis is placed on factors presumably working towards the 
realization of Soviet objectives and little or none placed on those counter-forces whose 
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present and potentia} ability is patent. 
While it is agreed that the Soviet objectives 
in Latin America are to deny strategic materials to the US in time of war, ONT nonethe- 
less believes that the realization of this objective’ 
is remote if not impossible. 
In other 
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words, the real or latent danger from Comm 
in Latin America, as expressed in 
this paper, seems exaggerated. 
H 
In considering Communism in Latin Amefica it is believed that some attention 
Should be paid to the Obvious distinction betwden the European Communist and the 
Latin American Communist. 
In the latter case! the majority of the adherents are not 
die-hard Marxists but people of a very low economic, social, and cultural scale. 
These 
would be the first to desert the Party banner in the event of war between the us and 
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USSR and go along with the masses who would probably rally around each government. 
{ 
Naturally there would be some who would attempt and commit acts of Sabotage, but 
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such acts would probably be Sporadic and more in the nature of an irritant which 
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can be liquidated rather than a persistent Serious threat. 
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The Office of Naval Intelligence would give in this paper consideration to the forces 
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working against) Soviet objectives in Latin America such as the Catholic Church; 
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the ultra-conservative armed forces, the rea] key to civilian power; the influence of the 
s 
a and other western powers; the Hemispheric Defense Plan: and the economic de- 
pendence of Latin America on the US, especially in time of war, which means that 
. 
the US would greatly influence the intern) and foreign policies of the various countries. 
It is not believed by the Office of Naval Intelligence that the Soviets wil! place 
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emphasis on espionage and the collection of intelligence, but rather on sabotage in 
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are 
- the form of Strikes, etc. 
It is a matter of public record what Strategic materials are 
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produced in Latin America and the Soviets should assume that we will take the maxi... 
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Meera 
mum output. 
It is doubted that: the Communists in. 
time of wat, could 
th- economic tife"s? 
that country. Cuba is too close scographically and too 
of Naval Intelligence cannot envisage 
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guerrilla attacks on areas of strategic importance in 
<sune wte 
Satin 
America. Isolated acts of strategic importance could be expected but certainly 
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no really concerted action. 
_. .The Office of Naval Intelligence is not Prepared at this time to agrée that none 
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of the Latin American countries ( excepting Argentina, Mexico, the Dominican Re- 
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public, Paraguay, Honduras, El Salvador and 
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to (a) interrupt the flow of supp
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of the country involved. 
The tenor of the CIA paper is based on the assumption of 
an inevitable conflict in the unforseeable future between the Soviets and the capitalist 
world, so the ability or inability of the Latin American nations today to cope with the 
situations appears not to bear on the problem. 
If anything, the passage of time 
might well increase the effectiveness of the various nations to put down Communist 
disorders in their respective countries, at least in this Hemisphere. 
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2 liarch 1948 
LELIORANDUL TO Tide DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
SUBJECT » 
Disturbancos in Contral America and Antarctica 
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le Attachod horeto is a brief appreciation 
of subject situations. 
Ae 
Deputy 
istant Director 
RNoports “and Estimates 
Declassified by 
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date 
20 FEB 1976 
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Disturbances in Centr] America 
Antarctic Situation 
Summary: 
CIA estimates that the most serious Centrel American revolutionary 
situation at present exists in Costa Rica, where « civil disobedience strike as 
a result of the presont political impasse is likely, 
There are no new develop- 
ments since special memorandum of 27 rcbruary in the revolutionary situation in 
Guatemala, iionducas, and Nicaragua. 
Although disorderly anti-british activity 
in Guatemala exists as a consequence of the cispatch of British warships to Be- 
lize, a deepening political rift within Guatemala will, it is estimated, roduce 
the likelihood of a retaliatory show of force by Guatezala against British gar- 
risons in Belize, 
There has beon no important new development on the Antarctic 
controversy since the article in CIA Weekly Summary of 20 February, 
Chances of revolution in Costa Rica: 
The 1 larch vote by the Costa Rican 
Congress voiding the recent presidential elections has created a revolutionary 
situation, 
The “lectoral Tribunal by a two to one vote had previously declared 
the Opposition candidate Ulate the winner. 
Unless a last minute compromise 
can be effected, a civil disobedience strike -- which will force all banks and 
many business establishments to close their doors and which will impair the funce 
tioning of the country's major public utilities -- is to be expected, 
Gunatonale 
and British Honduras: 
There have been no new developments respect- 
ing Guatemalan-British relations yis-a-vis the Belize controversy since CIA. » 
Dally Swamaries of 28 February andl ‘arch, 
Anti-British cisturbantes persist 
in Guatemala, 
CIA estimates that political conditions there now make it even 
less likely that Guatemala will participate in e retaliatory show of force 
against British garrisons in Belize: 
deepening political rivalry botween the 
Racical PAR and the more moderate FrL will make Guatemalan Chief of the Arnod 
Forces Arana, a moderate, more reluctant than ever to move forces out of Cuate- 
male City toward the frontier of Sritish Honduras; such a move vould leave the 
capital in the hands of PAR extremists, who would then be able to take over com- 
plete control of the government and oust him from office. 
2 Warch 1948 
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