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Published 15 February 1949 
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DISSEMINATION NOTICE 
1. This copy of this publication is for the information and use of the recipient 
designated on the front cover and of individuals under the jurisdiction of the recipient’s 
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Further 
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the Department of State 
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c. Chief, 
Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy 
d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force 
e. Director of Security and Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Com- 
mission 
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2. 
This copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning in accordance with 
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PROBABLE ARGENTINE POLICY TOWARD THE US TO 1952 
_ AND ITS EFFECTS ON US INTERESTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
SUMMARY 
I. IMPORTANCE OF ARGENTINA TO THE US. 
Bases of 
Importance 
Argentine Importance to US in 
3. 
Significance to the US of Argentine Collaboration in the 
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Event of War between the US and the USSR. .......... 
II. ARGENTINE FOREIGN POLICY UP TO THE PRESENT 
Bases and. Historical Objectives of Argentine Foreign Policy . 
Argentine Foreign Policy under the Peron Administration. 
. 
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3. Groups and Individuals Influential in the Formation of Foreign Policy : 
OOO 
III. PROBABLE ARGENTINE POLICY TOWARD THE US 
IN THE ABSENCE OF A US-USSR WAR 
Probable Argentine Policy toward the US in the Absence of a US-USSR War. . 1l 
IV. PROBABLE ARGENTINE POLICY IN THE EVENT OF A US-USSR WAR 
BEFORE 1952 
Probable Argentine Policy in the Event of a US-USSR War before 1952. 
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APPENDIX 
Recent Implementation of Argentine Foreign Policy. .........19 
d. Relations with the Soviet Bloc. 
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PROBABLE ARGENTINE POLICY TOWARD THE US TO 1952 AND ITS EFFECTS 
ON US INTERESTS 
SUMMARY 
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Argentine foreign policy is of particular importance to the US because first, Ar- 
gentina is a relatively strong, ‘“‘medium-class” power which ranks as a leader in the 
inter-American system; and second, Argentina, although a member of the regional 
system, has considerable capacity for independent action because it is remote from 
centers of US power, and its economy under normal conditions is oriented toward 
Europe. 
In time of peace Argentina is capable, because of its situation and resources, 
of supporting US policy objectives, opposing them and working to displace US influence 
in Latin America, or of taking an intermediate position. 
Argentina’s ability to utilize 
its connections with extra-Hemisphere powers not appreciably more distant than the 
US has been an important factor in its capacity to oppose the US in the Hemisphere. 
In the event of war between the US and the USSR, the advantages to the US of Argen- 
tine cobelligerency would outweigh the demands made by Argentina and the obliga- 
tions incurred by the US. 
Argentina’s normally large food surpluses would be avail- 
able. 
It could insure domestic and possibly regional security against sabotage of the 
supply to the US of strategic materials, could stimulate production and further stability 
in other Latin American states through leadership and example, and could make rela- 
tively effective use of US matériel and equipment for maintaining internal order and 
assisting the US in regional defense. 
It could also supply certain materials in short 
supply to its neighbors. 
On the other hand, Argentina would require the diversion of 
some US military equipment, and Argentine leaders could be expected to contribute to 
US difficulties by demanding recognition of an undisputed hegemony over southern 
South America, possession of the British-owned Falkland Islands, and armed equality 
with—if not superiority to—Brazil. 
Argentine foreign policy up to Perén’s accession to power has been conditioned by 
a desire to maintain ties with European nations, by a strong urge for independence 
within the Hemisphere particularly in relation to the US, and by an ambition to achieve 
leadership in the Hemisphere. 
The Perén regime has added to these historic Argentine 
objectives the desire to effect a high degree of economic independence, and implemen- 
tation of policy has been complicated by changes in the world situation and by con- 
flicts among groups influencing foreign policy. 
In the absence of a major war, Argentine policy will be influenced by the fact that 
the need for industrialization equipment, which only the US is presently in a position 
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to supply, requires a high degree of cooperation with the US. 
Perdén originally esti- 
mated that satisfaction of his needs from available resources would require little sacri- 
Note: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, and the Air Force have 
concurred in this report. 
For a dissent by the Office of Naval Intelligence, see Enclosure 
A, p. 25. 
The information herein is as of 1 January 1949. 
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fice of nationalistic independence, but lavish expenditures for industrial equipment 
from the US combined with decline in world demand for Argentine products vitiated 
original estimates, produced a financial crisis in mid-1948, and caused virtual suspen- 
sion of procurement in the US for Argentine industrial development. 
This crisis con- 
fronts the Perén regime with the difficult choice between some sacrifice of the appear- 
ance of economic independence and some slackening of the industrialization program— 
either step a dangerous one for the regime’s stability. 
At the moment, the Argentine 
president seems to be temporizing. 
Any decision reached will be subject to constant 
review; if and whenever Perén decides the advantages to be gained from concessions 
to the US outweigh the disadvantages, Argentina will become more cooperative; if he 
decides that the political cost of abandoning appearance of independence is too high’ a 
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price to pay for US assistance, he will intensify Argentine resistance to US policy at 
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home and abroad. 
In case of a US-USSR war before 1952, it is estimated Argentina will be a cobellig- 
erent on the side ofthe US. 
An Argentine alliance with the USSR is extremely unlikely 
in view of the slight possibility of reciprocal advantage, and various factors indicate 
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Argentina would prefer cobelligerence to neutrality. 
By remaining neutral Argentina 
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would risk: another increase of Brazilian armed strength relative to that of Argentina 
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such as occurred from Brazilian participation in World War II; forfeit of Argentina’s 
much-vaunted claim to leadership in Latin America; probable sanctions by the US and 
possibly by other American republics. 
Defeat of the US would, moreover, expose Ar- 
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gentina to ultimate Communist rule. 
There would be strong pressure for a declaration of war from the anti-Communist 
Argentine military, and the government could expect to strengthen its position with 
the predominantly Catholic populace through participating in a war against atheistic 
Communism. The government could also anticipate distinct advantages in controlling 
a war crisis situation through a declaration of war. 
There is evidence of Perén’s own 
apprehension of international Communism; his government has reportedly made ex- 
tensive preparations for an all out attack on Communism and Soviet agents, prepar- 
ations which include the possibility of breaking relations with the USSR and its satel- 
lites. 
The exact nature, extent, and timing of Argentine cobelligerence will be deter- 
mined by the attitude of Argentina toward the US at the time and by bargains struck 
with the US or arranged in an inter-American conference under the Rio treaty. 
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_ PROBABLE ARGENTINE POLICY TOWARD THE US TO 1952 AND ITS EFFECTS 
ON US INTERESTS 
I. Importance of Argentina 
to the US. 
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1. BASES oF ARGENTINE IMPORTANCE. 
The foreign policy of Argentina is of particular importance to the US because this 
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relatively strong, “medium-class” power, which is a member of the inter-American 
system, but remote from centers of US power and influence, has unusual capacity for 
independent action. 
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With an economy naturally competitive with rather than complementary to that 
of the US, Argentina has not been heavily dependent on the US either for markets or 
imports. 
The Argentines are a nation of 16 million people occupying an area slightly 
larger than the US east of the Mississippi and have, of all Latin American countries, 
the highest standard of living, the highest literacy rate, the largest per capita wealth 
and the greatest share in world trade, and the largest proportion of European popula- 
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tion. Attainment of this position of leadership has to a large extent been possible 
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because of the remarkable productivity of Argentina’s main agricultural area—the 
if 
only extensive plain in the temperate zone of South America. 
Argentina is more than 
self-sufficient in foods. 
During the period 1935-1939, Argentina was the world’s larg- 
est exporter of beef, corn, oats, cattle, hides, and skins; it was second largest exporter 
of wheat and wool as well. 
By exporting very large quantities of agricultural products, 
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Argentina has been able to import sufficient fuels, raw materials, and machinery, to be- 
come virtually self-sufficient in a broad range of manufactured consumer goods. 
In 
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1943, the net value created by industrial production for the first time exceeded that 
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created by agricultural and pastoral production. 
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The fact that Buenos Aires is 6,650 miles by water—or twice as far as Europe— 
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from Washington is a most important factor in Argentina’s capacity for independent 
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action. 
Unquestionably, remoteness from the centers of US power has been an im- 
portant element underlying Argentine foreign policy’s pursuit of the most independent 
course of all the Latin American republics both within the Hemisphere and in extra- 
Hemisphere relations. 
The framers of Argentine foreign policy have evidently esti- 
mated that the US would not use its power to coerce that country 
in time of peace no 
- matter what friendly ties they made with potential enemies of the US or to what de- 
gree they failed to cooperate in the inter-American system. 
They have also apparently 
realized that Argentina lies outside the zone in which the US could be certain of its 
ability to make its will militarily effective, should the exigencies of a desperate war 
situation justify considering such action. 
Argentina therefore enjoys, more than any 
other Latin American country, with the exception of Chile and—to a smaller extent— 
Brazil, capacity for independent action deriving from its geographical position. 
But 
because of its larger degree of assertiveness and economic self-sufficiency, Argentina 
actually has much greater independence than Chile or Brazil. 
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2. 
Arcentors Importance To US ut PEACETIME. 
Because of its considerable latitude for independent action, Argentina 
has the 
capabilities for acting as a focus and head of anti-US sentiment in the Western Hemi- 
sphere, both in inter-American organizations and outside of them. 
Conversely Ar- 
_gentine pro-US activities are the more influential because they are, in the eyes of the — 
rest of the Hemisphere, generally free from suspicion of US pressure. Prior 
to World 
War II, Argentina was able to use ties with its European customers, particularly those 
with Germany and the UK, to counter US influence. The war has greatly diminished 
these Argentine capabilities, but a restoration of economic strength in Western 
Europe—providing Argentina with industrial supplies and equipment now obtainable 
in quantity only in the US—would make Argentine use of such ties again of interest 
to the US. Present relations with Spain show Argentina as the stronger partner and 
do not greatly strengthen Argentina vis-d-vis the US. 
Argentine tendencies toward expansionism and authoritarian organization of the 
state are a matter of concern to the US because of the effects 
of these tendencies 
on 
other American states, particularly on those states adjacent to Argentina, and because 
these tendencies complicate.direct US-Argentine relations and activities within the 
inter-American system. 
These tendencies combine with Argentina’s relatively strong 
economic and military potentials to produce fear and suspicion of Argentine intentions. 
The states which consider themselves menaced by Argentine expansionism frequently 
seek US assurances of support against Argentine encroachments, and there is reason 
to believe that these fears are sometimes deliberately exaggerated to increase US con- 
tributions of economic, military and moral support. 
Similarly, Brazil relies on its 
ties with the US in its rivalry with Argentina 
to such an extent that US-Brazilian rela- 
tions inevitably reflect Brazil’s conceptions of US policy toward Argentina. 
Argen- 
tina’s neighbors are strongly jealous of US-Argentine cooperation and tend to construe 
such cooperation as undue favoritism. 
Paradoxically, there is also a contrary tendency 
among the other American republics to come to the defense of their fellow Latins 
when they conceive that the US is abusing its power advantage against the Argentines. 
The expansionist and authoritarian tendencies of Argentina are also of direct interest 
to US long-range policy in view of the possibility that Argentina might succeed in 
altering the balance of power in South America. 
Argentina also has some importance to the US as a market and in providing in- 
vestment and entrepreneurial opportunities. 
While the present situation—resulting 
from impairment of European sources of supply and from increased demand due to 
_Argentina’s accelerated program of industrialization—will probably not be permanent, 
it is unlikely to pass away overnight. 
Argentina was recently the largest market for 
US goods in this hemisphere (purchases 
during the first quarter of 1948 reached 
an an- 
nual rate of $780 million). 
In the past, Argentina has offered exceptionally favorable 
opportunities for secure and profitable investment. 
Although present conditions are 
not encouraging for private investment, it is possible that this situation will change 
so that more than the currently estimated total of $300 million of US investment funds 
will be attracted there. 
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COLLABORATION 
THE 
EVENT or 
WAR 
BETWEEX 
THE US AND THE USSR. 
In the event of war between the US and the USSR, there are of course many theo- 
retically possible Argentine positions ranging from hostility to the US through less or 
more benevolent neutrality to cobelligerence. 
For reasons detailed in Part IV, it now 
seems probable Argentina will choose cobelligerence. 
It is true that while Argentina 
could be expected to provide some purely military support to a US war effort in the 
maintenance of local security and aid to US transport and communications in the 
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area, its far more important contributions would be of a non-military nature, and many 
of these contributions would presumably be forthcoming whether Argentina were a 
cobelligerent or a neutral. 
It is estimated, however, that total Argentine contribu- 
tions as @ cobelligerent would outweigh certain difficulties inherent in Argentine 
participation. 
Argenfina’s large food surpluses would constitute its most valuable contribution 
to a western war effort. 
Control of the seas would probably assure the availability 
of these surpluses to the US and its allies exclusively. 
Although the Argentines could 
in any event be expected to get as much as possible for their provisions, it is probable 
that US procurement of Argentine supplies would be more successful if Argentina were 
an ally than if it pursued a policy of neutrality, however benevolent. Furthermore, 
Argentina, as a cobelligerent or as a benevolent neutral, could be expected to make a 
significant contribution to the relief of US supply and transportation shortages by pro- 
viding considerable amounts of foods, light manufactured consumer goods, and chemi- 
cals to the other American republics, goods which they normally obtain from the US 
or other sources that would be taxed or unavailable in time of war. 
The fact of Argentine cobelligerence could itself be of considerable value to the 
US in the force of Argentine example and leadership in Latin America. 
Competition 
between Latin American states for US favors might well result in increased efforts on 
the part of the various republics. 
Such augmented effort on the part of the Latin 
American states might be expected to compensate the US in some degree for the difficul- 
ties occasioned by their conflicting demands for US military and economic support. 
Argentina itself might be expected to expedite the production and delivery of moderate 
- quantities of beryl and tungsten to aid the US war effort. 
Argentina is probably better equipped than any other major Latin American 
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republic to meet the Communist threat within its own boundaries, and could be counted 
on in its own self-interest for domestic security against Communist sabotage of the 
flow of essential materials to the US and its allies. 
It is also possible that in an extreme 
situation of chaos induced by Communist action, Argentina, if not threatened by in- 
vasion, might be in a position to make a significant contribution to regional security 
by assisting other countries to protect themselves against Communist guerrilla action 
and sabotage of the supply of critical materials. 
Argentina does not now have and will not have in the predictable future the mili- 
tary establishment or the natural and financial resources requisite for the creation of 
forces adequate to repel an attack from a major power or to make any sizable contribu- 
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tions to an expeditionary force. 
In common with all other Latin American republics, 
Argentina would be militarily expensive to the US in any global war, since US matériel 
would have to be diverted for adequate modern defense. 
Furthermore, the contribution 
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that Argentina could make to common military defense of the continent would be 
greatly restricted by the limited extent of its sea and air power as well as by the inade- 
quate land transportation facilities to the other republics. 
In the event of war with the USSR, Argentine leaders will probably demand re- 
sponsibility for regional defense, despite their country’s limited military capacities. 
This will make it difficult to include Argentina in a general strategic plan. It is an- 
ticipated that the Argentine Government will seek to exploit its status as an ally to 
obtain military equality if not superiority to Brazil, to further its efforts to establish 
an undisputed hegemony over the southern half of the continent exclusive of Brazil, 
and to obtain possession of the Falkland Islands. 
Argentine demands for US ac- 
quiescence in such efforts could be expected to generate friction with that government 
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and possibly within the inter-American system and with the UK, which frictions would 
tend to undermine the unity required in war. 
On the other hand, by virtue of its relatively advanced industrial and engineering 
experience combined with the relatively high quality of its military discipline and train- 
ing, Argentina could be expected to make more efficient use of equipment obtained 
from the US than any other Latin American state. 
And it would of course be far less 
costly to the US to send equipment than to send both equipment and military person- 
nel and have to maintain troops at such a distance. 
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The limitations 
of Argentine sea power are such that the US could at best expect 
some assistance in the defense of Cape Horn and the Straits of Magellan as an alterna- 
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tive route to the Panama canal, provision of access to naval bases with their denial in 
Argentina’s own self-interest to Soviet submarines, and limited patrol of sea lanes. 
II. Argentine Foreign Policy up to the Present. 
1. 
BASES AND HISTORICAL OBJECTIVES OF ARGENTINE FOREIGN POLICY. 
In the past Argentine foreign policy has stressed Argentine ties with European 
nations, Argentine independence of US influence, the extension of Argentine leader- 
ship in Latin America, and neutrality in world power conflicts. 
Argentina has considered that its national interest lay in keeping the closest pos- 
sible ties with available and potential customers, in resisting any possible subordination 
- to US economic interests, and in opposing US leadership in inter-American activities. 
Argentina, prior to World War II, depended on Britain for financial development and 
markets for its beef, on Germany for military ideas, and on France for intellectual 
stimulus. 
The historical precedent of Argentina’s former position as the center of the 
Spanish viceroyalty of La Plata, the possession of great wealth in agricultural resources, 
and the existence of a proud nationalist spirit have fostered the Argentine belief that 
their country possesses opportunities and capacities for development greatly beyond 
those of any other Latin American country. 
Since they viewed their country’s po- 
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 tentialities 
as comparable to those of the US in the nineteenth century, the Argentines 
have in the twentieth century conceived of themselves as rivals of the US for leadership 
in the Hemisphere. 
Therefore they have both resisted any inference of subordination 
to the US in the inter-American system and have sought to assert their primacy in a 
grouping of neighboring states whose endowments the Argentines consider inferior to 
their own. 
2. 
ARGENTINE FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE PERON ADMINISTRATION. 
The Perén government has adhered to the main historical objectives of Argentine 
foreign policy; the postwar period has witnessed important changes, however, both at 
home and abroad, and these changes have had their effect on traditional attitudes. 
For example, the division of world power into two camps has been accompanied by a 
weakening of Argentina’s adherence to the concept of neutrality. 
Although the 
Perén group on coming to power continued Argentine neutrality and delayed a declara- 
tion of was against the Axis until the final stages of the conflict, and Perén himself 
has subsequently expressed Argentina’s traditional neutrality in terms of the “Third 
Position”, he has also acknowledged the intensified world pressures against neutrals in 
the unprecedented public statement that Argentina will go to war on the side of the US. 
Three factors have conspicuously affected the execution of Argentine policy. First, 
radical changes incident to World War II have strengthened Argentina’s international 
position including its position in South America; second, the government has empha- 
sized a policy of economic independence including an ambitious program of rapid in- 
dustrialization; third, the Perén revolution in Argentina has both shifted the bases of 
political power in that country and changed the make-up of governmental machinery. 
These new factors have guided the pursuit of continuing basic Argentine objectives and 
therefore have governed Argentine activities in the United Nations and in the inter- 
American system, in relations with other nations, and in Hispanic and labor propa- 
ganda. 
(See Appendix for detail on execution of Argentine foreign policy.) 
Argentina has, largely by default, gained an increasingly important position in 
international affairs as a result of world economic dislocations and the decline of 
Western European power, and has vigorously exploited this opportunity. 
Diminished 
world food supplies gave Argentina an opportunity to dispose of its normally large sur- 
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pluses on a sellers market and, at least temporarily, greatly increased its relative 
economic importance. 
The Perén government has made every effort to extend Ar- 
gentina’s economic importance to the world political arena and has taken an aggressive 
part in some world organizations not paralleled since early Argentine enthusiasm for 
the League of Nations. 
The destruction of Western European industrial and military 
capacity, together with Argentine plans for rapid industrialization, however, has placed 
Argentina in a position of greater dependence on the US for industrial and military 
equipment. 
While one underlying basis for bilateral trade with Europe remained as 
before the war, because of Europe’s need for Argentine raw materials, there were 
fundamental changes in the patterns of Argentina’s relations with the world abroad. 
Because the Europeans were unable temporarily to supply industrial goods in pay- 
Gore 
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PRESIDENT 's SECRBEBARY “FILE 
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ment, they were obliged to finance much of their purchasing through: liquidation of 
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existing investments 
and thereby cut important ties which had for many years bound 
the Argentine economy to Europe. 
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The Perén government’s emphasis on the policy of economic independence is 
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Clearly an attempt to gain in the economic field an independence comparable to the 
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independence Argentina has long asserted in the political field. 
However, in this at- 
tempt Argentina is involved in a paradoxical situation since equipment for indus- 
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trialization essential to economic independence can, temporarily at least, be obtained 
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only from the US and at the discretion of the US. The Perén administration 
has 
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committed 
itself to a program of: planned industrialization for greater self-sufficiency; 
liquidation of foreign holdings in basic industries and a declared policy of excluding 
new foreign investment in such areas; an increase in Argentine exports of manufac- 
tures in addition to maintenance 
of foreign markets for raw materials; and develop- 
ment of Argentine banking, insurance, and other facilities. In large part through 
direct government action the administration has been trying—without, at least for the 
first two years, any appropriate use of priorities—to pay off foreign mortgages on the 
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national property, establish_an industry complete with underlying services, satisfy the 
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demands of military prestige, and at the same time extend its economic influence to 
foreign countries. 
The Perén administration’s policy of all-out industrialization has 
both accentuated the distortion from the prewar trade pattern with Europe and af- 
fected relations with the US; because of economic dislocations in Europe, only the US 
could provide the quantity and quality of machinery needed for the power, transpor- 
tation, and other developments projected under the five-year plan, but US markets did 
not absorb Argentine exports in quantity sufficient to provide the needed dollars 
which could not be obtained from European customers. 
Argentine efforts to overcome its postwar arms inferiority in relation to Brazil have 
increased its need for US products, and considerable procurement from European 
countries has not eliminated this need. 
Argentina hopes also to continue to obtain 
machinery from the US to expand the local arms industry. 
Domestic conditions incident to the revolutionary changes effected by the present 
administration in the scope of governmental operations and in its personnel have pro- 
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duced confusion and inconsistency in the execution of foreign policy. 
Under Presi- 
dent Perén, groups and institutions most influential in the formation of foreign policy 
until 1943 have either lost their influence or been forced out of policy-making councils. 
The old-line, conservative, landholding interests, who opposed industrialization and 
emphasized trade in agricultural products with Europe and particularly with the UK, 
have been forced to yield their commanding position. 
The former staff of the Foreign 
Office has been cleared out and replaced by labor leaders, poets, doctors, and profes- 
sors, among whom are many chauvinistic nationalists. 
The resulting organization, 
influenced by combinations among the groups and individuals discussed in the follow- 
_.ing section, has tended to emphasize the aggressive, nationalist, anti-US theme of 
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Peronista policies to the detriment of good relations with the US and other countries. 
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3. 
GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS INFLUENTIAL IN THE FORMATION OF FOREIGN POLICY. 
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Considerable insight into the character of current Argentine policy, particularly 
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with reference to the apparent confusion and inconsistencies mentioned in the previous 
section, can be obtained from an examination of the powerful groups and individuals 
who influence its day-to-day development and execution. 
The conflict between long- 
term requirements of national policy—such as industrial development and national 
defense on the one hand and short-run political profit to be gained from chauvinist 
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gestures 
on the other—is sharply reflected in bitter personal differences at the top level. 
In the continuing struggle for influence on foreign policy, gains and losses by various 
elements occur with such frequency that it is impossible to determine for any con- 
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siderable period whether greatest influence has been exerted by advocates of extreme 
nationalistic ideas, by representatives of the armed forces, or by individual (either 
moderate or extreme) civilian leaders, opportunist politicians or particular combina- 
tions of any of these. 
It is possible, however, to indicate the direction in which the 
various groups seek to guide foreign policy. 
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a. 
Nationalist influence. 
_. 
Because Perén has based his strength to a large degree on the support of the 
largely uninformed populace and because anti-foreign appeals have helped to consoli- 
date his hold on this group, the vacuum in the field of foreign policy created by the 
elimination of conservative internationalist interests has been filled to a considerable 
extent by anti-foreign nationalist elements. 
The extreme nationalists do not exercise 
predominant influence in the Perén administration, but the state of mind which they 
represent is very important in the field of foreign policy. 
The reorganization and 
expansion of the foreign service brought in many nationalist zealots strongly prejudiced 
against the US and the loose and spontaneous character of Argentine administrative 
operations has allowed them to exaggerate nationalist aspects of the administration’s 
foreign policy. 
Nationalists are to be found in large numbers—chiefly in the Hemi- 
sphere—explaining Argentine policy and propagandizing for the Perén administration, 
and it is clear that their activities are at least tolerated by the administration and 
that they work to increase the conflicts between moderate and nationalist trends in 
Argentine foreign policy. 
b. 
Influence of the Army. 
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Despite Perén’s strong political support from the working class and notwith- 
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standing the fact that he has in the past publicly announced his intention of “return- 
ing the Army to its barracks”, there is little doubt that the continuity of his regime is 
subject to the continued approval of the army. 
Thus army leaders have at least twice 
forced Peron to alter his policy and practice. 
In one instance military spokesmen con- 
vinced him of the necessity of restraining Senora Perén from “meddling” in foreign af- 
fairs following her return from Europe in 1947. 
In another case army officers success- 
fully demanded, in an atmosphere suggesting a coup d’état, that Perén repudiate a 
contract for the development of a steel mill which had involved substantial graft by the 
Lad 
Papers 
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President of the National. Economic Council. 
Evidently, therefore; while Perén has 
held the loyalty of the more influential military elements through their confidence in 
his ability to keep labor in line, because of the large appropriations and salary increases 
he has obtained for them, and the important role accorded the army in the industrial- 
ization program, the power of the army poses definite limits within which he must 
operate. 
Neither the limits prescribed by the military nor its direct influence on for- . 
eign policy is clearly evident. 
However, the record of military support for US-spon- 
sored measures for Hemisphere defense and arms standardization indicates that the 
predominant influence in the army favors a considerable degree of collaboration with 
the US. 
Support of such a policy by Argentine military leaders is understandable in 
view of their urgent desire to rearm and particularly to redress the imbalance in armed 
— 
strength effected by US armament of other Latin American republics, especially Brazil, 
and the denial of arms to Argentina during World War II. The US is a most important 
potential source of arms and industrial equipment and the Argentine Army needs a 
fund of US dollars and goodwill to exploit that source. 
There are, of course, anti-US nationalist elements within the Argentine Army, 
and the General Staff reportedly harbors an international policy section which elabo- 
rates Argentine grand strategy on the basis of a plan to gain control of Latin America 
when the US shall be heavily'‘committed and possibly weakened in a war with the USSR. 
However, the army’s practical interest in equipment of troops and 4 measure of military 
industrialization, together with the position of the US as a logical supplier appears to be 
a more important factor in military views on foreign policy than the theoretical projec- 
tions of the General Staff unit. 
In the present national crisis the military group 
headed by Minister of War Sosa Molina appears to hold the balance of power and will 
probably exert an influence favorable to US-Argentine cooperation in important — 
_ 
policy decisions now pending. 
c. 
Civilian Leaders. 
Perén’s most important civilian aides in the field of foreign policy are Forelan 
Minister Juan A. Bramuglia, Ambassador (and Senator) Diego Luis Molinari, and ~ 
Miguel Miranda, President of the National Economic Council. 
Bramuglia, formerly a 
Socialist lawyer active in trade-union affairs, is regarded as the most reasonable and 
respectable and least nationalist civilian member of the cabinet. 
He has shown 
considerable sympathy for the complaints of foreign interest with regard to the nation- 
alist policies of the administration and may be said to represent the tendency to recog- 
nize and deal realistically with Argentina’s inevitable interdependence with the rest 
of the world. 
Senator Molinari, roving ambassador for the Perén administration, who 
formerly exerted only nominal influence on foreign policy, was recently reported to be 
one of the influential individuals in the administration’s foreign policy. 
He represents 
in his own person the unpredictable character of Argentine policy. 
Often identified 
with the extreme nationalist point of view, he has frequently worked against moderate 
policies sponsored by Bramuglia. 
As leader of the Argentine delegation to the ITO 
conference at Havana in 1948 he deplored US predominance in the world, attempted 
to defeat the ITO Charter and in general took a hostile line toward the US. 
As Argen- 
of 
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HARRY S. TRUMAN 
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tina’s dollar crisis has deepened, however, he has reportedly aligned himself with pro- 
US and moderate elements in the cabinet including his enemy Bramuglia. 
Miguel 
Miranda, as President of the National Economic Council, has controlled Argentina’s 
foreign economic policy which is extraordinarily important in the total foreign policy 
developed by the Perén administration. 
The attitudes of Miranda, a self-made indus- 
trialist who entered the government in 1946, illustrate some of the contradictions and 
problems of working out a program of economic cooperation with Argentina. 
He is 
fully conscious that industrialization and the long-range program for economic inde- 
pendence can best be realized with foreign private investment. 
However, many of his 
actions and the trading ventures of IAPA (Argentine Trade Promotion Institute) under 
his direction have apparently done as much to alienate US business as the nationalists’ 
_ War on foreign investors. During the past two years Miranda has gambled on his 
ability to finance much of Argentine capital development through shrewd trading with 
the outside world which has needed Argentine agricultural products. 
III.~Probable Argentine Policy toward the US in the Absence of a US-USSR War. 
Since the long-range, permanent objectives of Argentine foreign policy indicate a 
counter-US—if not actually anti-US—position in Western Hemisphere and in world 
affairs, any exceptional degree of Argentine cooperation in US objectives in the period 
short of war will be due either to casual coincidence of the objectives of the two countries 
or to some special situation pushing the Argentines toward a larger degree of coopera- 
tion than would normally be the case. 
The present impairment of European sources 
of supply of heavy machinery and equipment and the importance attached by the 
Per6én administration to their five-year plan of industrialization constitute such a 
special situation; it is therefore these admittedly temporary factors that are likely to 
be most influential in guiding—within the boundaries set by long-range policies—the 
execution of Argentine policy during the next few years. 
The urgency—from the Argentine point of view—of the present situation, and its 
opportunity—from the US point of view—are both due to a fundamental miscalcula- 
tion on the part of the Argentine Government. 
It seems clear that President Perén 
originally estimated that Argentine resources were such that he could carry out his 
ambitious five-year plan and at the same time avoid any such compromise of Argentina’s 
long-term policy of complete independence, as would be involved in making important 
concessions to the US and to US capital in particular. 
Argentina may derive certain 
long-run advantages, both political and economic from development leading to a great 
measure of independence of US and European sources of supply, and the local political 
advantage deriving from the sponsorship of such a program, can hardly be questioned. 
But the attempt to realize all the elements of the program simultaneously, and without 
incurring unpopular obligations to foreign countries, assumed a highly favorable 
economic situation. 
| 
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To a certain extent Argentina did possess these advantages. 
When Perén assumed 
control late in 1945 there was on hand a wartime accumulation of $1.5 billion in gold 
and foreign exchange. 
Argentina subsequently gained an equal amount of hard- 
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HARRY 3S. TRUMAN 
PRESIDENT'S SECRETARY 
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currency exchange from heavy postwar exports. With these dollar funds and with 
its supplies of foodstuffs Argentina was in a strong position during the first two years 
| 
of the Perén administration. 
It was not only independent 
of US aid; the Argentine 
| 
market was the largest market for US exports in the Hemisphere. Argentina 
did ex- 
: 
tend large credits to European nations, but because 
of the urgency of European food 
requirements and the impaired European capacity to supply desired industrial equip- 
ment in return, the Perén government was in a strong bargaining position that enabled 
it to sell at high prices, demand manufactured goods, fuel or other scarce commodities 
at favorable prices or to demand payment in hard currency which could be—and was— 
used to buy industrial equipment from the US. 
Argentina seems also to have acted on the assumption that more dollars would 
become available when its wartime accumulation was spent—that US loans 
and grants 
to Europe would guarantee a fresh supply of dollars as the original fund became ex- 
hausted. Hence the Perén administration’s plans for future heavy expenditure of 
a | 
dollars, the use of dollars for purchase of US properties, and relative indifference to the 
rf 
possibility of insuring supplies of dollars by measures designed to encourage US private 
investment. 
It is true that extreme nationalist political influence, rather than indif- 
ference to the possibilities of securing dollars, probably explains the administration’s 
reluctance to grant long-term concessions to foreign oil companies and thereby obtain 
financing for the vital development of its own additional crude production and refinery 
capacity. 
But the administration needlessly alienated corporations maintaining 
branch factories and agencies in Argentina, as the government trade-promotion insti- 
tute interfered with their operations and as the import business became more and 
more @ government monopoly subjecting US companies to an uncertain future. 
In 
general, the growing area of government intervention, which extended to insurance, 
transport services, and importation, and the obvious intention of the administration to 
extend its control of business both directly and indirectly, also acted as a deterrent 
to new investment. 
Argentina therefore spent as if the country could draw on an inexhaustible balance. 
Very large imports from the US during the 1946-48 period reached an annual rate of 
: 
$780 million in the first quarter of 1948, when Argentine sales to the US were at an 
‘ 
annual rate of only $330 million. 
These heavy outlays, which exhausted Argentina’s 
expendable supply of dollars, were continued despite the renewed inconvertibility of 
sterling in August 1947 in expectation of large dollar purchases by ECA. 
Fear of a 
third world war and the anticipation that ECA priorities would give European coun- 
: 
tries a preferred place in the US market may explain the speed and extravagance with 
which purchases were made. 
The situation became critical in June of 1948. 
The backlog of expendable dollar 
exchange had been exhausted; payments due for goods on order or already delivered 
amounted to over $400 million; blocked remittances of dollar profits of US firms had 
reached a total of $35 million. 
In effect Argentina was in a state of default to US 
business despite the administration’s insistence that it would honor all obligations con- 
tracted. 
The action taken to give foreign capital a liberalized base on which to cal- 
> SECRET 
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culate profits, whatever hope it held for the future, held little immediate interest. for 
US investors in the absence of dollar funds to remit; and the depreciation of the peso 
decreed at the same time as the liberalized base for calculating 
profits appeared, in 
the absence of any special conversion rate agreement, 
to cut down the dollar total of 
_ 
blocked profits. .The expected supply of ECA dollar funds did not materialize. 
In 
addition, prospects of bumper crops in the US and substantial improvement in Euro- 
pean agricultural production reversed Argentina’s position in international trade from 
that of being able to make exorbitant demands 
in a sellers market to one 
of competing 
for buyers at réduced prices. 
The exhaustion of hard-currency exchange, the failure 
of new dollar supplies to materialize, and the loss of favorable position in food sales 
have forced the Perén administration to face the necessity of assigning priorities 
between the various elements in its foreign economic policy, and — modifying 
the program of government intervention. 
The crisis has underlined the conflict between the policies of independence and of 
economic development and the effect of these policies on the domestic position of 
the Perén regime and on US-Argentine relations. 
If the government is unable to pay 
for industrialization in dollars earned in international trade, as it had apparently 
counted on doing, it must pay in concessions and guarantees to US companies or in 
‘Special arrangements with the US Government in order to finance the industrialization 
program, and these concessions to foreign interests involve a change—possibly danger- 
ous to the stability of the Perén regime—in the nature of Argentine domestic and 
foreign policy as developed by that regime. 
Alternatively it must modify its indus- 
trialization program to suit the reduced dollar receipts, eking these out with goods 
from European countries, and must reckon with the possibility that failure of the 
industrialization program would in its turn neve serious effects on the stability of 
the regime. 
President Perén is thus faced with a grave decision—whether to sacrifice the imme- 
diate appearance of complete independence that is so satisfying to his extravagantly 
nationalist fellow-countrymen, or to modify the program of economic development that 
was to give Argentina real independence in the long run. 
The decision is the more 
difficult because the chances for a face-saving compromise have been lessened by the 
regime’s own activities; the Perén administration has resorted to such extreme measures 
in its economic and political foreign relations, in order to maintain Argentine inde- 
pendence and to increase the administration’s influence at home and abroad, that the 
distance between those policies tending toward cooperation with the US and particu- 
larly with US business and those policies now accepted as normal by Argentine public 
opinion has widened considerably. 
Thus, as the Argentine crisis has deepened, bridg- 
ing this gap has become more difficult as it has become more necessary. 
At present, President Per6én, rather than making a clear decision or trying to 
achieve a compromise, appears to be temporizing while endeavoring to determine 
whether or not US aid will be available in sufficient volume to offset the political dis- 
advantages of curbing anti-US groups. 
The gravity with which he regards his pres- 
ent dilemma is evident in recent crisis measures employed. 
He has been simultaneously 
" 
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Papens 
HARRY 3S. TRUMAN 
PRESIDENT 'S SEORE TARY 
trying to strengthen his political position through demagogic appeals to anti-US senti- 
ment and intensifying his efforts to obtain urgently needed dollars from the US. On 
_the one hand he has attempted to implicate a US citizen and “international capitalist 
intrigue” in an alleged attempt on his life. 
On the other hand he has sent the presi- 
dent of the Argentine central bank to the US to develop a plan for obtaining dollars, 
has given renewed assurances of willingness to comply with US requirements for par- 
— 
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ticipation in European dollar trade, and has taken preliminary steps toward reorganiz- 
ing Argentine economic policy in a direction more consistent with = views of inter- 
| 
nationally cooperative trade policy. 
, 
It seems probable that some short-term decision will have to be made in the near 
future, but it seems equally probable that any such decision will always be subject to 
revision in the light of Argentine necessities as they seem to the Perén administration 
| 
to become less urgent or to press for solution. 
If President Perén decides that the 
| 
advantages to be gained by making the concessions required for US aid outweigh the 
. 
disadvantages, the US should be able to exact as a consideration both some abatement 
of anti-US activities and propaganda and also increased cooperation in international 
agencies and projects. 
If, on the other hand, meeting US terms seems to involve a 
backward step in nationalistic policy that the president dare not risk, he will covertly 
allow the tempo of his industrialization program to slacken and continue to try to 
build up Argentina as the leader of a Hemisphere bloc that would oppose US plans 
in the Hemisphere, and would stress independent action in world affairs. 
The coming 
decision, and any later decisions made in view of changed circumstances will of course 
be influenced by the severity or moderation of US terms as well as by Argentine need, 
and also by the manner of the presentation of US terms in relation to President Perdén’s 
domestic commitments to a nationalist-influenced foreign policy of complete Argentine 
att 
independence. 
The Argentine feeling of rivalry with the US is not likely to disappear; 
but the degree of its manifestation during the next few years—or longer, possibly 
depending on US action—may be lessened by the favorable bargaining position tempo- 
rarily given the US by recent Argentine overestimation of their own strength and 
present need for US cooperation. 
IV. Probable Argentine Policy in the Event of a US-USSR War Before 1952 
While the degree of Argentine opposition to or cooperation with the US during the 
period in which there is no US-USSR war will vary according to the government’s 
changing views of Argentine needs, it is estimated, weighing all considerations as they 
exist at the present time, that Argentina will, in the event of war between the US and 
the USSR prior to 1952, join in the war on the side of the US. 
Argentine alliance with the USSR in such a war must be considered extremely 
unlikely. 
It is true that the Perén administration, in implementing its present rather 
ambiguous foreign policy under the guise of the so-called “Third Position” (opposed 
equally to capitalist and Communist imperialism), has at the propaganda level attacked 
the US much more vigorously than it has attacked the USSR. 
It is also true that the 
Argentine Government has engaged in tentative efforts to play Soviet states off against 
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the US. 
But there is no visible basis for Argentine advantage—except possibly the 
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highly tenuous basis of likeness of interest in such control of US power and influence 
as to permit Soviet expansion in the world and Argentine expansion in the Hemisphere— 
in an Argentine-USSR alignment. 
In fact, Soviet efforts during the past two years 
to reach a basis of collaboration 
with Argentina against the US have been frustrated 
by this lack of community 
of interest. One possible bond by which the Soviets may 
have hoped to attract Argentina—furnishing of heavy equipment essential to Argen- 
tina’s most cherished goal of economic independence—has proved valueless because 
of the Soviet’s inability to furnish such equipment. 
In view of the present deficit 
position of Soviet heavy industry, such inability may be expected to last at least over 
the next few years, and to preclude any Argentine alignment with the USSR which 
would make impossible obtaining from the US, the best potential source, the equip- 
ment.so urgently required. In case of war between 
the US and USSR, these consider- 
ations would apply with even greater force, in view of the fact that the US, by control 
of the seas, will presumably be able to interdict any significant shipments that the 
Soviets might undertake to Argentina. 
There are also impressive reasons for expecting that Argentina would not only 
refrain from making common cause with the Soviets but would also reject neutrality 
in favor of cobelligerence on the side of the US. 
| 
Argentine power policy on the continent of South America has as a primary objec- 
tive maximum Argentine capabilities vis-d-vis Brazil. 
As a result of US arming of 
Brazil during World War II, that country gained a large power advantage over Argen- 
tina. 
The Perén administration, with strong army support, has demonstrated its 
determination to redress this balance and has made diligent efforts to obtain weapons 
and military equipment from all promising sources. 
Although Argentina’s postwar 
arms procurement program has attained a considerable measure of success, particularly 
in aircraft categories, it has not supplied Argentina with matériel adequate for a bal- 
anced military establishment equivalent to Brazilian armed strength, and it is doubtful 
that this parity can be achieved before 1952. 
It is highly doubtful that Argentina 
would risk the aggravation of Brazil’s power advantage which could be expected to 
result from Argentine neutrality in a third world war. 
Rivalry with Brazil is a funda- 
mental assumption of Argentine foreign policy, and there is every reason to believe 
that the Perén government views prominence in military capabilities, and loyalty of 
the army through satisfaction of ambitions for rearmament as important for the attain- 
ment of its priority purpose of increased influence and prestige in Latin America. 
It is estimated also that Argentina’s general position in the Hemisphere would 
suffer from a policy of neutrality in a US-Soviet war. Consolidation of international 
sentiment against neutrals on the outbreak of hostilities would probably convince 
the Argentines that cobelligerence would offer better prospects for acquiring the 
Falkland Islands and hegemony over southern South America. 
It is also probable 
that the demand for sanctions against any Hemisphere government which remained 
aloof from such a war would be much stronger that in past wars, because the US public 
would be much more conscious of the high stakes involved. 
“apens of 
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By remaining neutral, Argentina would also forfeit whatever claim it may have 
to Latin American leadership. In case of a war between the US and the USSR, the 
governments of the other American republics can be expected to align themselves with 
the US more readily than in World War I, because of fear of the consequences of a 
Communist victory and because the pro-Soviet segments of their populations are less 
influential than were pro-Axis elements in the last war. 
| 
Argentina also appears to have larger reasons for supporting the US even if a 
future war with the Soviets did not extend to the Hemisphere security zone, and if the 
US had less than an even chance to win. Furthermore, it is unlikely 
that the death 
or political eclipse of Per6én would result in a different course of action, since the army 
would probably take over and could be expected to be influenced both by its desire for 
US arms and equipment and its aversion to Communism. 
The occupation of Western 
Europe by the USSR would change present relations between Argentina and the USSR 
to a marked degree. 
Currently the Soviet government finds Argentine nationalist 
policies useful in maximizing friction in the Western Hemisphere. 
However, if Soviet 
influence extended to the Atlantic and could be brought to bear on Argentina, possibly 
facilitated through Communist control of Spain with which Argentina has close ties, 
Soviet policies could be expected to change in accordance with the new opportunities. 
Argentine policy-makers must realize that at that time an independent and nationalist 
Argentina would have less value to the USSR, and that the USSR could be expected to 
work to install a Communist administration in Argentina. 
Finally, a number of basic domestic factors will tend strongly to assure Argentine 
cobelligerence on the side of the US in case of war with the USSR. 
Military elements 
would exert pressure for participation and the government could expect to strengthen 
its position by rallying the predominantly Catholic populace in support of a war 
_ 
Which would probably be effectively propagandized by the West as a crusade against 
atheistic Slay Communism. 
Furthermore, President Perén himself is reliably reported 
to be apprehensive of the threat of Communism to his government and to Argentina. 
These reports are substantiated by his administration’s development and current exe- 
cution of an ambitious secret master plan which contemplates the possible necessity of 
a break in relations with the Slav states in accomplishing the purpose of eliminating 
the Communist potential from Argentina by 1952. 
Any final doubt that might exist 
in Argentine government circles on the advisability of a declaration of war against the 
Soviets would in all probability be resolved by the pressing need for wartime controls 
and US supplies and equipment to deal with large-scale public disturbances and acute 
world shortages that would inevitably accompany a global conflict between the US 
and the USSR. 
It is not possible to predict the exact nature, extent or timing of Argentine cobel- 
ligerency. 
A reasonable minimum estimate would be a pro forma declaration of war, 
strict domestic control of hostile and subversive elements, and making supplies available 
on terms profitable to Argentina. 
It is also considered highly probable that Argentina 
would wish to be assigned certain specific responsibilities in coordinating and executing 
coastal and sea-lane defense in its area, and would desire to furnish expeditionary 
ey 
wy 
HARRY 
“DHOMAN 
CIBRARY 
Pepers .of 
HABBY"S. 
TRUMAN 
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PRESTDENT'S SEBCREGARY 
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- forces of the approximate size agreed on for Brazil. 
Both the timing of the Argentine 
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declaration of cobelligerency and the extent of its cooperation will probably be affected 
zane 
by the way in which the war begins and thus by the obligations that devolve upon 
na 
Argentina under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. 
It is believed 
le3s 
that Argentina will ratify the Rio treaty and formally fulfill its obligations under that 
instrument. 
If, however, a war begins outside the Hemisphere zone described by the 
fa 
treaty, Argentina may take advantage of its limited obligation to consult and thereby 
the 
delay any positively helpful action lest it appear overly ready (from the traditional 
Argentine point of view) to come to the assistance of the US. 
It must be expected 
that the Argentines will in any event endeavor to drive a shrewd bargain for their 
participation, either in direct discussion with US authorities if an attack occurs against 
the US in the Western Hemisphere defense zone, or in inter-American deliberations 
according to the machinery provided by the Rio treaty in case the war begins outside 
that zone. 
| 
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It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that, if war between the US and the 
USSR occurs before 1952, Argentina will be a cobelligerent with the US, and that the 
promptness, extent and effectiveness of Argentine cooperation will depend on the 
future course of US-Argentine relations and on bargains struck at the time. 
Papems -o 
SARRY SS. 
TRUMAN 
an 
PRESTDENT'S “SHORRDARY 
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APPENDIZ 
RECENT IMPLEMENTATION OF ARGENTINE FOREIGN POLICY 
Analysis of the recent implementation of Argentine foreign policy clearly demon- 
strates that the Perén administration has adhered to traditional Argentine objectives. 
It has, however, adapted its program to the changes in its international position brought 
about by World War II, and has guided its relations with the US with reference to the 
requirements of its accelerated industrialization program. 
a. 
United Nations. 
In central UN bodies the objectives of Argentine foreign policy have generally 
coincided with those of the US on vital issues. 
The Argentine delegates have voted 
with the US with noteworthy consistency when the US-USSR division has been clear 
and unmistakable, except as on such issues as freedom of information. 
But also con- 
sistent with Argentina’s foreign policy objectives has been the effort to capitalize Argen- 
tine leadership in seeking compromise solutions, to use the UN as a sounding board 
to propagandize a greater Argentina under Perén leadership, to oppose the unequal 
position of the great powers in the UN organization, and to oppose the censure of Spain 
in accordance with Argentina’s long opposition to intervention in domestic affairs and 
| 
its special friendship for Spain. 
aan 
ia 
In the special UN organizations, the pursuit of Argentine special interests has 
| 
made its delegates far less cooperative than in the central UN organizations. 
In some 
they have not even participated—e.g., the International Emergency Food Committee, 
the World Bank, and the Monetary Fund—because such participation was considered 
| 
inimical to national interests or did not suit the government line of economic inde- 
: 
pendence. 
In those organizations, in which Argentine delegates have participated— 
e.g., the ITO Conference in Habana—they have on the whole vigorously opposed the 
US program, emphasizing what they considered national interest in spheres such as 
bilateral as opposed to multilateral trade. 
The divisions between the US and Argen- 
tina in these gatherings have been underlined by Argentine efforts to capitalize on 
them for propaganda purposes and by the obvious notice taken of these differences 
by other delegations participating. 
Argentina’s record at the ITO Conference is fairly typical of its activities at spe- 
cial conferences directly involving nationalinterests. 
The bitter attack of Senator Moli- 
nari, chief of the delegation, on the ITO Charter and on US economic policies was an 
expression of the powerful nationalist influence in the Perén government that resists any 
immediate limitations on Argentina’s economic sovereignty in return for what that 
group considers the unlikely advantages of international cooperation. 
This group 
felt that Argentina had much to lose from multilateral economic agreements and that 
it could strike more favorable bargains on a bilateral basis using its decisive weapon 
of control of food supplies. 
The attack on US economic policy was calculated to under- 
— 
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Penpems of 
A 
MARRY S. TRUMAN 
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RESIDENT'S SECRETARY 
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\ “PRESIDENT 
‘SECRETARY 
mine support for the US by appealing to Latin American delegations and to those of 
other undeveloped areas that view protective quotas, exchange controls, state trading, 
and bilateral and preferential agreements as natural devices to —— their infant. 
| 
industries and to find markets for their raw materials. 
1 | 
b. 
Inter-American System. 
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Historically the significance of Argentina to the attainment of US policy objec- 
tives has been most clearly revealed in Argentine obstruction to inter-American cooper- 
ation. 
Motivated by the desire for independence and leadership in Latin America and 
conditioned by strong ties with Europe, Argentina has been the least cooperative of 
republics in the inter-American system. 
Inevitably this position in relation to inter- 
American cooperation has involved very frequent obstruction to US inter-American 
policy by Argentine representatives. 
The attitudes of the Perén administration in the 
inter-American system appear to have been no less cooperative than those of previous 
administrations and on certain issues they have been more cooperative. 
At the August 1947 Inter-American Conference at Rio de Janeiro representa- 
tives of the Perén government supported the US-sponsored Inter-American Defense 
Plan which was the main item on the agenda. 
With the backing of most of the Army 
and the Peronista Party, Perén offered this unprecedented degree of Argentine cooper- 
ation in inter-American affairs despite considerable domestic opposition from Nation- 
alists, Radicals, Communists, and some members of the armed forces. In doing so, he 
was apparently motivated by a hope of obtaining US technical and material aid for 
Argentina’s industrial and armament expansion program as well as by a desire to 
perfect arrangements for defense of the Hemisphere in case of a third world war. 
In insisting at the Bogota Conference in 1948 that political and military pow- 
ers should be withheld from, and that no broad economic powers should be granted to, 
the central organization of the inter-American system, the Argentine representatives 
gave renewed evidence that Perén’s foreign policy embraces the traditional Argentine 
aversion to cooperation in the inter-American system at the cost of what it considers 
a possible sacrifice of Argentine sovereignty. 
The traditional Argentine fear of a 
“super state” was employed early in the conference as the basis for ostensible oppo- 
sition to collective action against Communism. 
Actually, this obstruction seems to 
have been merely part of a maneuver designed to gain a bargaining position on the 
Falkland Islands question. 
Eventual Argentine adherence to the resolution for the 
defense of democracy against international Communism was consistent with President 
Perén’s efforts to initiate action of this nature at the Rio Conference. 
The Argentine offer at Bogota to contribute generously to the capitalization 
of an Inter-American Bank for economic development and to provide an important 
part of the machinery and raw materials needed by the other Latin American repub- 
lics was clearly a pretentious gesture designed to extend Argentine influence in the 
Hemisphere at the expense of that of the US. The offer was timed to take advantage 
| 
of the bitter disappointment of the other American republics with Secretary Marshall’s 
statement that European reconstruction was first in importance and that Latin Ameri- 
can countries should rely principally on private capital for economic. development. 
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_ This was obviously a hollow offer since Argentina itself is in need of machinery and 
its ability at the time to make foreign loans was essentially limited to the sale of 
food surpluses on credit. 
c. 
Relations with European Countries. 
The political relations of the Perén administration with Europe have been 
marked in general by attempts to turn Argentine economic advantage to political use 
in gaining 
power and prestige at home and abroad, and by tentative moves 
to engage 
in the game of playing off European countries against the US. Only relations 
with 
the UK and with Spain merit particular note. 
) 
Tension between Argentina and the UK over their conflicting territorial claims, 
which gained world attention following the dispatch of British, Argentine, and Chilean 
naval units to Antarctica in February 1948, is a phase of a century-old dispute over 
the Falkland Islands and of recent changes in world power relationships. 
The Perén 
government has revived the dispute at this time both for current domestic political 
advantage, and because it sees an opportunity in the weakening of British power to 
recover the islands by direct pressure or with the support of the US and the inter- 
American system. 
President Perén did not hesitate before the Bogota Conference to 
play off US concern with the USSR in an attempt to gain US support for Argentine 
claims to the Falklands against those of the UK. 
Failing in this, he collaborated with 
other governments in obtaining sufficient support at the conference for the passage of 
a resolution, from which the US abstained, that condemned the occupation of American 
territories by extra-continental powers. 
The dispute in Antarctica, which also reflects 
the growing ambitions of the Argentine Government, differs from the Falklands ques- 
tion in that the rights of the claimants are less well-defined and because other govern- 
ments are involved as actual or potential claimants. 
Recent Argentine disapproval 
of the terms of a US proposal to settle conflicting Antarctic claims through joint con- 
trol by an eight-power condominium and indications that Argentina will increase the 
intensity of its efforts against the UK over the Falklands emphasize the significance 
of the prestige-conscious and expansionist Perén foreign policy in relation to US respon- 
sibilities. 
Present Argentine relations with Spain are in a sense complementary to the 
change in its relations with Britain. 
The Perén administration has cut important 
ties that bound Argentina to Britain for a century and has declared its independence 
of British guidance. 
At the same time it has also undertaken what might be termed 
an Argentine adoption of Spain. 
The Perén government has extended credits to 
Franco, shipped urgently needed foodstuffs, assumed the role of his strongest defender 
in the UN and projected the extensive use of Spain as Argentina’s entrepdt for the 
sales of goods to Europe. 
In return for benefits received, Franco Spain has pursued 
a consistently friendly policy toward Perdén and has lent itself to his use of propaganda 
emphasizing kinship with the mother country, which has been an important vehicle 
in his drive for Latin American union under Argentine leadership. 
A 
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| HARRY <S. TRUMAN 
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| PRESIDENT 
'S "SECRETARY FILE 
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on 
ay 
‘ 
d. 
Relations with the Soviet Bloc. 
The Perén administration, although stressing its anti-Communist character 
in national politics, has drawn a distinction between its attitude toward the local Com- 
munist Party and that toward the Soviets and has continued to carry on a sporadic 
affair 
with the USSR. Because the Communist Party has not been a threat to the 
Argentine Government and because Argentine propaganda is geared to a neutral posi- 
tion as between capitalism and Communism, President Perén has felt himself under 
no strong compulsion to break relations and to make hostile gestures toward the 
Soviet as part of an anti-Communist campaign. 
On the contrary, Argentine economic 
negotiations with the Soviets—initiated soon after President Perén came to power, 
suspended 
for over a year, and renewed with the gathering financial crisis and receding 
prospects of ECA dollars— suggested a tentative effort to use the USSR as a counter- 
poise to US influence. 
Although it is extremely unlikely that Argentina will find 
any firm basis of collaboration with the Soviets because of the strongly anti-Com- 
munist character of Argentina and because the basis for substantial trade intercourse 
does not exist, Perén’s relative tolerance for the Soviets in the context of balance as 
against the US contains potentially serious dangers to the Hemisphere and US security 
interests. 
The quasi-Marxian content of the “Third Line” propaganda offensive in 
Latin America directed against the US has impaired the Argentine potential for lead- 
ership in any Hemisphere effort against Communism. 
Furthermore Soviet and satel- 
lite diplomatic representatives in Argentina have effectively used their diplomatic status 
for proselytizing and organizing Slav groups who constitute the chosen instrument of 
planned sabotage for the Soviets. 
é€. 
Relations with Latin American Countries. 
| 
The activities of the Per6én government most conspicuously directed against 
US interests have been undertaken in connection with Argentine efforts to extend its 
influence among Latin American states. 
Labor propaganda has been an outstanding 
weapon used by the administration in its attempts to displace US influence. 
Peronista 
labor leaders, who have been conspicuous in Argentina’s postwar foreign propaganda 
offensive, are thoroughly indoctrinated with anti-US propaganda and have made it 
their business to tear down the US while building up Argentina. 
Argentine foreign 
policy in the Latin American countries leans heavily on the identity of race, language, 
and culture, and, as in the case of its labor policy, it has taken on an anti-US color- 
ation. 
President Perén himself appealed in his 23 May 1948 broadcast message to the 
Mexican people on the anniversary of Argentine independence, for the indestructible 
unity of the two nations “prompted by the voice of blood, religion, and language” 
coupling this with an attack on “imperialist capital and international trusts.” 
Reactions of the other Latin American governments to attempts to extend 
Argentine influence through labor, nationalist, military, and general propaganda chan- 
nels vary considerably. 
The governments of nearby countries—including all potential 
members of a southern bloc—have expressed to US officials serious misgivings regard- 
ing the purpose of Argentine activities. 
They have repeatedly complained that the 
GARRY 
SRUMAN 
LIBRARY 
Papers 
YARRY 
TRUMAN 
. 
PRESIDENT 'S SECRETARY 
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Papems of 
‘HARRY iS. TRUMAN 
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“PRESIBENT'S SECREDARY ‘FIDE 
Perén administration is trying to infiltrate labor, nationalist, and military circles es 
thereby to gain a commanding position in local politics. 
The Brazilian Governm 
po 
| 
has also voiced its suspicion that Argentina is actively working to gain control hago 
Bien 
ern South America. 
Governments of countries farther north are naturally 
ps 
i 
cerned with the problem of Argentine political or economic domination. 
They appear 
in some cases to have welcomed tokens of Argentine 
2! post- 
! 
ing weapon in their dealings with the US. This is especially true in Central = 7 
. een 
and the Caribbean, to which areas the combined operations of labor, nationalist, 
‘a - 
anti-US propaganda have been carried with particular emphasis by Argentine missions. 
To date the political operations of the Argentine Government have not attained 
- ae 
any 
large measure of success in Latin America. 
They have been hampered by lack 
inferior personnel, the tendency of other Latin American 
to 
find 
the US for leadership on matters of importance, by a 
of 
--Com- 
some cases outweighs a distrust of the US, and by Argentina’s own n 
-Ourse 
friendly relations with the US. 
..ce as 
Urity 
ive in 
‘ead- 
atug . 
> of 
‘ 
HARR? 
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UT 
Or a5 
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‘te 
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DISSENT OF THE OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE 
1. The Office of Naval Intelligence dissents from those portions (Section 
IV and part 
of Summary) of ORE 50-48 which estimate the probable Argentine policy in the event 
of a US-USSR 
war before 1952, for the following reasons: , 
a. 
ONT believes that, in the event of a US-USSR war, Argentina would probably 
follow a course of Neutrality rather than cobelligerency on the side of the US, because: 
position would be to her advantage. 
“i 
(2) 
Neutrality would not necessarily mean the loss of Argentine leadership 
in South America. 
Basically she is far superior to other Latin nations and this enor- 
mous advantage is not lost by non-participation in a war on the other side of the world. 
(3) The Communist threat to Argentina is too remote to be used as “pressure 
for a declaration 
of war’’. 
b. 
ONI does not believe that the advantages to the US of Argentine cobelligerency 
would necessarily outweigh the disadvantages. 
“Benevolent” neutrality might furnish 
the US with required Argentine support but with fewer US obligations. 
Pax 
oft 
: 
S.. TRUMAN 
- 
DpESIDENT'S SECRERARY 
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PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY 
JANVARY 1964 
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TABI 
CON TEN LS 
Page 
a. Buenos Aires Provincial F Police 
D. Comments on principal sources 
... 
. 31 
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FIGURES 
Page 
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Fig. 1 
Federal Police organization (chart) 
Fig. 3 
Investigations Directorate (chart) 
Fig. 4 
National Gendarmerie organization (chart) .............. 
Fig. 5 
National Maritinie Prefecture orranization (chart) ........ 
| 
Fig. 6 
Guenos Aires Provincial Police organization (chart) ...... 
Fig. 7 
Buenos Aires Provincial Police effectiveness (table) ....... 
; 
Fig. 8 
Selected crimes «nd penaltics (table) .............. 
Fig. 9 
Institute cf Criminoiogical ghana and Teaching 
Fig. 10 
Foeral penal institutions (table) ... 
Fig. 11 Population of provincial penal institutions 
‘Fig. 12 Location of penal institutions (map) 
: 
This Section was prepared for the NIS by the 
Central Intelligence Agency.
A. 
General 
Public order and safety in Argentine. have tra- 
difionally 
been influenced by the nation’s hign 
standord of living, high rate of literacy. the tra- 
ditionally honest court system, and 2 hugh degree 
of 
int rest 
in cerimnology. 
In recent 
mony 
insiifutions concerned 
with public order 
ond 
safety have been adversely affected by pro- 
troeted political and military unrest and the dis- 
tortion of justice during the Peron exa. 
Argentina shares with Uruguay Latin America’s 
bichest standard of living. 
Generally poverty has 
not constituted a stimulus to crime although diur- 
ing: the past year ecoiiumic hardship has prompted 
some increase. 
stitutions are better equipped and finunced than 
those of most other Latin Ainecrican nations, al- 
though below the standard of the United States. 
The Argentine legal profession has manifested in- 
terest in criminology and penology dating back to 
the 19th century and authorities have kept wei 
deenies 
abreast of new ideas in these sciences although. 
these ideas have not always found their way into 
law. 
Political and military unrest, becoming marked 
during World War II, and characterizing most of 
the ensuing regimes—of Peron (1946-55), of the 
provisional 
military government 
(1955-58), 
of 
ousted President Arturo Frondizi (1958-62), and 
of 
succeeding 
President 
José 
Maria 
Guido 
(1962-63)—-has greatly increased the probiem of 
maintaining public order and safety. 
Sincé the 
successful overthrow of Peron the prime cause of 
disorder has been the attempts 
of extremist 
groups—Peronists, Communists, or extreme na- 
tionalists—to gain power by subversive means, and 
the occasional extralegal efforts of opponents to 
block these groups. 
Unrest has manifested itself 
in the overthrow of established governments three 
times since 1943, in numerous cabinet changes 
and major shifts of policy, and in open battles be- 
tween factions of armed forces, the most recent 
in September 1962 and April 1963. 
Political instability has led to economic stagna- 
tion with little growth since World War II and 
has inhibited investment of the size acceded to 
Overcome the econumic deterioration of the Perén 
era. The recession during 1962-63 was aggravated 
by the ouster of Frondizi in March 162 and has 
been characterized by widespread unemployment, 
J 
Argentina’s police and pena! 
tof Sas oty 
default, 
scarcity. 
Eeononic 
difficulties have resulted 
tions 
of operating 
funds 
of law-enforcement 
agencies and penal institutions. 
Low salaries and 
lech of modern equipment have decreased the ef- 
iclenecy of police forces, 
while penal institutions 
are crowded and lack facilities for rehabilitation. 
i. gradual upturn in the economy evidenced in 
mid-1963 may tend to change these situations for 
the hetter. 
Subversive movements have caused the armed 
forces, who regard themselves as the foremost de- 
iencers of constitutionalism, 
to maintain tight 
control.over 
the nation’s 
security 
units. 
Ex- 
cepting a few provincial forces, the military ex- 
ercises direct or indirect control over the police, 
largely by placing its active or retired officers in 
command positions. 
Althougi: this practice has 
aroused public criticism and resentment among 
subordinates on the various police units, armed 
forces leaders are reluctant 
to withdraw their 
ontrol of national security organizations barring 
the removal of subversive threats from Peronism 
and Communism. 
Unrest has also caused the 
suspension 
of many constitutional 
rights over 
long periods through the imposition of a state of 
siege and the “CONINTES” plan, which places 
the police under the military in an emergercy. 
In accord with the federal organization of the 
nation, Argentine police functions are divided on 
a national and a provincial basis. 
Each of Argen- 
tina’s 22 provinces has its own police forces. 
The 
Irederal Police (Policia Federal) have nationwide 
jurisdiction in certain types of crimes as well as 
exclusive 
jurisdiction 
in the 
Federal 
District 
(Distrito Feceral) of Buenos Aires and in Tierre 
del l"uego, the only remaining administrative unit 
governed as a national territory. 
Federal Police 
authority in the provinces is exercised by small 
regional offices located in the provincial capitals 
and major interior 
cities. 
Other countrywide 
police functions are exercised by the National 
Gendarmerie 
(Gendarmecria 
Nacional), 
a mili- 
tarized 
police fore. 
under army 
control. 
A\l- 
though 
it normally serves as a land frontier 
guard, the Gendarmerie performs internal police 
functions in case of *mergency aud is the first 
element called upon to reinforce regular police 
units. 
The National Maritime Prefecture 
(Pre- 
feclura Nacional Maritima), which is under navy 
on payment 
of salaries, 
inflation, and 
in reduc- 
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ok 
Pon 
yey 
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halory, 
contiol, 
is charged 
with 
policing 
the nation’s 
water boundaries and ports and performs securily 
functions in designated waterfront rreas. 
Argentina's police elements, backed by armed 
forces, are considered capable of containing any 
security threat short of a nationwide uprising. 
Despite a need for improved communications and 
transportation 
equipment 
and 
despite 
morale 
problems brought about Ly low pay and inadce- 
quate public support, the Nationa! Gendarmerie 
and National Maritime Prefecture are well dis- 
ciplined and efficient. 
However, exce,t for the 
police of the Province of Buenos Aires—an orga- 
nization 
as large and capable as the Federal 
Police—provincial police forces are less reliable 
than national forces. 
Pay is low and equipment 
is poor. 
In the event the provincial police are 
incapable of maintaining order, Gendarmerie or 
armed forces units can be speedily substituted. 
The Argentine penal system, like 
all others in 
Latin America, is governed by codified laws on the 
concept of Roman law. 
Trial by judge rather 
than jury is the rule and the aim of the system is 
the rehabilitation rather than the punishment of 
the prisoner. 
Fenal practices, however, do not al- 
ways meet re-uirements of the law, due to lack 
of funds and insufficient facilities. 
Nevertheless, 
Argentina’s penal system remains among the best 
in Latin America. 
Argentina’s federal organization of government 
is reflected in a dual system of courts, with both 
provincial and national or federal courts of first 
instance and of appeal, as well as supreme courts. 
Supreme authority 
is held by the national 
or 
federal supreme court. 
National courts have sole 
jurisdiction in the federal capital and ‘Territory of 
Tierra del Fuego, while jurisdiction in the nrev- 
inces is divided netween national and provincial 
courts. 
The national government and provinces 
have their own prisons. — 
The Argentine Criminal Code (Cédigo Pena!), 
dating from 1922, is classical in philosophy but 
with influences irom the positivist school of pe- 
nology. 
Its penalties are average by Latin Ameri- 
can standards but lenieat in comparison 
wit! 
many U.S. criminal codes. 
The death penalty has 
been abolished and iife imprisonment is rare. 
‘The 
penalty of disquatification (inhabilifacidn), whieh 
bars the recipient from official employrment or 
Civic privileges, is frequently given fo. crimes in- 
Volving malfeasance in office, while fines are com- 
monly prescribed 
for 
less serious 
crimes. 
The 
Usefulness of fines as a penalty has been reduced 
in recent years, however, by inflation which makes 
Prescribed fines inconsequential. 
The chieZ weak- 
Hhesses of the Argentine penal code are the failure 
t) to ‘omprehend types of crimes which have be- 
Come fomimon since the code was promulgsted and 
+; to Lake copnizance of the most modern theoric. 
The 
national 
Cude 
of 
Pt 
(Cédiqo de Procedimi-ntos), dating from 
i883, 
calls for trial by judge ana written forms of court 
process, 
It 
hes 
been 
frequently 
criticized 
ag 
placing too much reliance upon the ability and: 
impurtiaiity ef tne judge and for causing long 
trial delays.. 
The detention of persons for long 
periods while awaiting trial is a cause of concern 
among Argentine penologists. 
Procelural codes 
wholly or partially utilizing oral process are in 
force in seven of Argentina’s 22 provinces. 
Argentina’s federal prison system has some 15 
institutions, located in the city of Buenos Aires 
and elsewhere. 
Slightly less than half of Argen- 
tina’s total prison population is confined in fed- 
erai prisons with the balance in provincial insti- 
tutions. 
Although legal codes call for separation 
of prisoners according to character and offense, 
various categories of prisoners, including those ar- 
rested for political reasons, may be housed in one 
institution. 
Most of the 235 political prisoners 
still held in mid-1963 were released after the elec- 
tions in July of that year. 
New prison construction has been minimal since 
Wo.:c Was II and institutions are crowded. 
The 
Detention Institute 
(IJnsti:uto de Detencion) 
in 
Buenos Aires, where a riot of discontented prison- 
ers in December 196. cost 25 lives, is illustrative 
of the poor conditions in many prisons. This in- 
stitution was not only overcrowded but lacking in 
workshops and recreation and sanitary facii ‘ics. 
Provincial prisons, with the exception of tho :e in 
the Province of Santa Fe, are even more poorly 
equinped and maintained. 
The caliber of admin- 
istrative personnel and guards in federal vrisons 
is generally above the Latin Arnerican average. 
Treatment of prisoners follows legally prescribed 
norms. 
fany prisoners, especially those awaiting trial, 
pass their days in idleness. 
Postprison rehabili- 
tation is also deficient since national and provin- 
cial parole boards receive little supervision, are 
not effectively controlled, and only partly meet 
their responsibilities. 
Excepting the Provinee of 
Santa Fe, the caliber of personne! and tie cliec- 
tiveness of rehabilitation are lower in previneci 
prisons, as opposed to federal prisons. 
Plaws: 
peen formulated by the national government fo 
construction 
which 
will end overcrowding 
acd 
provide facilities necessary for rehabilitation, out 
fulfillment will depend in large measure on 
the reestablishment of tranquillity and on eco- 
nomic recovery. 
There is af present no active civil defense organ- 
ization 
in Argentina. 
Civil defense plans come 
under the jurisdictiun of the armed forces and 
consist of brief ovllines dating from the er of 
World War iT for passive air raid defense (acfease 
aniiaerea 
pasiva). 
Systems for blackout aad 
carts 
mned. 
d forces, police, 
und 
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aie 
B. 
Police system 
Primary responsiolity for the maintenance of 
law and order in Argentina is divided between the 
national 
government’s 
Federal 
Police 
(Policia 
Federal) and the various provincial police forces, 
roughly in the same manner that police authority 
in the United States is divided between state and 
federal governments. 
However, the Federal Police 
also assume exclusive police functions in the Fed- 
eral Capital of Buenos Aires, 
Other police func- 
tions in designated areas are carried out by the 
National Gendarmerie 
(Gendarmeria 
Nacional) 
and the National Maritime Prefecture (Prefectura 
Nacional Maritima). 
All Argentine police forces 
are modeled on European systems, principally 
French. 
1. Federal Police 
&. ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP — The Argen- 
tine Federal Police were established with the fed- 
eralizatioa of the city of Buenos Aires on 9 Decem- 
ber 1880. 
They were an outgrowth of the police 
of the city of Buenos Aires, created’ by law on 24 
December 1821, 11 years after Argentina declared 
its independence from Spain. 
By Decree 17,550 
of 1943 the authority of the Federal Police was 
extended to the provinces, giving this force juris- 
diction (fuero federal) over all crimes of a na- 
tional nature, such as political offenses or simple 
crimes involving nationai authorities. 
Under the 
Peron regime (1946-55) the Federal Police were 
granted the privilege, similar to that of the armed 
forces under the Code of Military Justice, of trial 
by police courts under a special police pena! code, 
but by a decision of the Mational Supreme Court 
(Corte Suprema de Justicia) in May 1956 Yederai 
Police were again subject to civil penal codes. 
The Federal Police are subordinate to the Pres- 
ident of the Republic through the Minister of the 
Interior, 
The influence of the armed forces has 
traditionally been strong, even though the Fed- 
eral Poli:e do not fall under organizational con- 
trol of tie military as do Argentina’s other na- 
tional law-enforcement agencies, the Gendarmerie 
and the Macitime Prefecture. 
Organic rerpulations 
approved in November 1962 provide that any quali- 
fied person may orcupy the posts of Chief of Fed- 
eral Police and head of the Directorate of Federal 
Coordination (Coordina.cion Federal), the counter- 
subversive arm of the force, thereby reversing a 
decree of January 1958, which required that these 
positions be filled from the armed forces. 
Under 
present conditions of relative instability, chiefs 
of the armed 
forces, however, 
feel that only 
through preserving their influence in Argentina’s 
national law-enforcement agencies can they in- 
sure strong and concerted action against subver- 
sive elements. 
Other posts which are usually 
filled by piesidential appointment rather than 
from the ranks of professional police officers are 
the Deputy Chief (Subjefe) of Federal Police, the 
head of the Directorate of Federal Coordination, 
and the head of the force’s iegal arm, the Legal 
Counsel (Asesoria Letrada), who must be a law- 
yer. 
This practice has resu'ted in friction, since 
retular Federal Police officers resent the aprpoint- 
ment of outsiders to high posts and because armed 
services appointees often have no particular qualifi- 
cations for these assignments. 
Admiral Recaredo 
E. Vazquez, whu served as chief of Federal Police 
from. September 1960 to March 1962, had never 
performed police duties during his career and had 
never lived in the Fede’ al Capital. 
The organization of the Federal Police is shown 
in Fraure 1. In addition to his duties as head of 
[ 
OF ChE, 
Government House Preciwt 
DIRECTORATES 
OU ECTORATES 
| Security 
Personnel 
: Jud cial 
Fire Departnent 
| 
lnvestyatons | 
| 
instruct.on Divectovaie 
Counc:! of 
General Pion, 
| 
ie 
Owectors 
Cenartin: 
legal Counsel 
Police Clergy | 
Pycurnz 
Social Work 
aad Hec!th 
General 
Secre 
tone 
DENAL 
FOLLICLE 
| 
| 
| 
| 
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| 
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or 
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| 
C 
cant
én 
the foree, the Chief of Federal Police acts as a 
judge of violations (contravenciones) 
perta 
to police ordinances in the city of Vuencs Aires 
and controls the granting of identity documents. 
Directly subordinate to the Office of the Chief 
(Jefatura) are the Legal Counsel and the Direc- 
torates of Instruction (Instruccién) anc Federal 
Coordination. 
Tae 
Directorate 
of Ins.ruction 
controls the ti+ 
‘ng of all policemen, and oper- 
aies three schoo!s. 
The Legal Consel serves as 
a technical-juridical agency which examines the 
acts of the Federal Police and advises on their 
lerality cr turisdicticn. 
The Directorate of Fed- 
eral Coordination operates against subversion by 
domestic extremist groups or by foreign powers 
and controls the Regional Police Offices (Delega- 
viones Exteriores) which exercise the authority of 
the Federal Police in Argentina’s 22 provinces. 
(See Section 56, Intelligence and Security, for a 
move complete discussion of the Directorate of 
Coordinavion.) 
In addition to assuming the functions of the 
Chief in his absence, the Deputy Chief serves as 
Inspector General and Comptroller of all opera- 
tions of the force. 
Nine directorates are depend- 
ent upon the deputy’s office (Subjejaiura). 
‘The 
Administrative Directorate controls repair facili- 
tles for equipment anu vehicles, provides veter- 
inary service, and performs ordinary administra- 
tlve tusks such as the payment of salaries and 
collection 
of fines. 
The Directorate 
of Social 
Work and Health (Direccion Obra Social y Sanidad 
. 
Policial) promotes the well-being of federal police- 
men and their families and provides medical as- 
sistance 
to 
jailed 
persons. 
It operates 
the 
Bartolomné Churruca Police Hospital and other in- 
Stitutions devoted to police social benefits. 
The 
Personnel Directorate controls recruiting, retire- 
ment, and pensions, and is responsible for the ad- 
ministration of all active duty personnel. 
A variety of operations are charged to the Gen- 
eral Secretariat 
(Secretaria General), including 
police bands, library, and museum. 
It also issues 
duty rosters, regulations, and bulletins and con- 
trols the General Archives. 
The Judicial Dirce- 
torate compiles criminal statistics and has charge 
Of relations with the nation’s judicial hierarchy 
nd prison system and is responsible for the se- 
S 
“ederal Police custody. 
It controls 
the Women Police (Policia Femenina), a unit pri- 
yarily devoted to police work among women 1nd 
"Ors, and has charge of the Police Warehouse 
The San Miguel Asylum 
“lon 
Comunicaciones) 
operates telegraph, 
and radio networks and 
installation 
“ Fepalr shops for these facilities, and 
also 
4 communications for the nation’s federal 
4 7 ‘ 
q 
4 4 = 
4 4 
; 4 
; 
— 
Ve 
laweourts. 
It does not control Radio Communica- 
tions Command (Comando Radineléctrico), which 
is @ part of the Security Directorate (Direccion 
Seguridad). 
All uniformed Federa! Police with the exception 
of the Women Police and the Fire Department 
serve under the Security "Directorate, the organi- 
zation of which is shown in Iicure 2. This direc- 
torate is the major operational division under the 
Deputy Chief of Police. 
Personnel engaged in 
ordinary patrol work serve in the Public Order 
(Orden Piiblico) Division of this directorate while 
the four specialized uniformed units are in the 
Corps (Cuerpos) Division. 
The territorial juris- 
diction of the Public Order Division, entirely within 
the city of Buenos Aires, is divided into six sub- 
divisions 
(circunccrvipciones) 
and 
50 precincts 
(cc .isarias), with the latter forming the basic 
control unit. 
The office of Passive Air Raid De- 
fense (Defensa Antiaérea Pasiva), shown as <e- 
pendent to the Subdirectorate, 
exists only on 
paper. 
The Investigations Directorate 
(Direccién In- 
vestigaciones), 
the 
organization 
of which 
is 
shown in Ficune 3, conducts specialized crime in- 
vwugation 
and 
maintains 
extensive 
criminal 
ide. tification files. 
Its jurisdiction, however, is 
confined to the Federal Capital. 
Fedeval investi- 
gative functions in the provinces are «arried out 
by the Regional Police Offices under the author- 
ity 
of. 
the 
Federal 
Coordination 
Directorate. 
These regional offices were formerly under a Di- 
rectorate of the Interior (now defunct) and their 
assignment to the Federal Coordination Director- 
ate. appears to reflect an increasing preoccupa- 
Stcurity 
D'RECTORATE 
Subdirectorate 
iv 
Yodo 
Pow 
Adanutratiee 
Cor mute 
gt ony 
Au Raid 
Oi 
Deleme 
Divison 
Public Orde. 
Division ’ 
| 
Ver 
fic 
Polce 
Corps 
J 
Sul 
| 
‘ 
3% 
ar 
ié 
JY 
| iu 
= 
j a? 
43. 
2) 
| 
a? 
2? 
; 
iJ 
—\,
INVESTIGATIONS 
OMECTORATE 
inter po! 
Oltice 
Technical 
Personol Records 
Crumes and 
Surveniiome 
Wotertront, Bonks, 
Pol«e 
Reports 
ond Theaters 
Photography 
Personal Hondboo«s 
Personal 
lego! Medicine 
Genero! Files 
Protection 
Planimerric 
Delraudotion 
Loborotory 
Personal 
and Swindle 
Scope Laborotory 
Special lows 
Chemico! 
Personal Records 
Robbery ond Theft 
Loboratory 
Study Boord 
FIGURE 3. ORGANIZATION OF THE INVESTIGATIONS DIRECTORATE 
tion with suppression of subversion as oppesed to 
ordinary crime and an effort of armed forces Jead- 
ers to win firmer control over such activity. 
Five 
regional offices are located in populous Buenos 
Aires Province, two each in the provinces of Santa 
Ie, Cérdoba, Corrientes, Entre Rios, and Chubut, 
and one in the capital of each remaining prov- 
ince. 
The staffing of each office varies between 2 
and 12 men, cepending on local requirements. 
The Buenos Aires Fire Department* (Direccidn 
Bomberos) 
was established 
in 1870 ard 
later 
p'aced under the uuthority of the Federal Police. 
In addition to firefighting duties, the department 
Initially had some paramilitary functions, joining 
regular Federal Police forces in combating revolu- 
tlonary outbreaks 
and 
civil disturbances. 
In 
1930, however, the carrying of sidearms by fire- 
men was abolished and technical proficiency im- 
proved, although firemen continue to support pe- 
lice units in riot control. 
A rapid increase in thx 
fneldence of arson 
in 1955 brought abont 
thi 
creation of the Investigative 
Section 
(Seecidn 
Pericias) within the Fire Department to assis! 
the judicial authorities in apprehending and con- 
Vicling arsonists while an increase in terrorism 
caused the creation 
of the xplosives Brigade 
Gemolition experts, in 
eeccion Inspecciones Técnicas) 
for fire 
Safety in commerce and industry was founded. 
sual designation tn other countries is Direce: 
ue 
ombeos; Argentina often omits the art! 
‘ 
‘ 
> 
‘ne Fire Department consists of a directorate 
and subdirectorate, with the Investigative Section 
and Administrative Office dependent on the for- 
mer, and Administrative Services, Technical Serv- 
ices, and 
the two 
territorial 
subdivisions 
into 
which the city is divided dependent on the latter. 
Each subdivision has three zones 
(zonas), the 
basic control un’t. A harbor firefighting unit, the 
river 
detachment 
(destacamento . 
fluvial), 
and 
various other detashments are administered sepa- 
rately. 
The Technical inspection Section is a de- 
pendency of Technical Services. 
b. BUDGET AND SALARIES — Total salaries (base 
pay plus allowances) for the diiferent ranks of | 
Federal Police officers (excluding enlisted men and 
noncommissioned officers) range from a low of 
12,000 pesos (US$89 as of mid-1963) 
to 50,000 
pesos (US$370) per month. 
Basic salary is about 
50% of the amount, the balance being composed of 
allowances such as time in grade (10% of basic 
saiary), family, and professional risk. 
Latest pay 
scales for enlisted personnel are not available, 
but in the past, base pay for the highest enlisted 
rating, Principal Noncommissioned Officer (Subo- 
ficial Principal), has been only slightly less than 
that of tie middle grade Inspector Officer (Jnspec- 
tor Oficial), while only the two lowest enlisted rat- 
ings, Agent (Agente) and Corporal (Cabo), were 
paid at a lower basic rate than the Subadjutant 
Officer (Subayudante Oficial) the lowest grade of 
commissioned status. 
In addition, cash awards are given for acts of 
clor, unusual devotion to duty, arrests performed 
while off duty, and injuries sustained. 
Expenses 
to cover traveling, mov ng, and other official activi- 
ties are also provided. 
| 
Although Federal Police are better paid than 
other 
nonmilitary 
security 
forces 
except 
the 
Buenos Aires Provincial 
Police, their combined 
solaries and fringe benefits are considered inade- 
quate. 
In 1961 the salaries of lower ranking po- 
Hee enlisted personnel were found to be compa- 
rable with, and in some cases less than, those of 
chauffeurs and truck drivers working: for goveri- 
ment avencies. 
Retirement benefits are computed on 
bass 
pus 
pilus certain sNowances and length of service. 
fieers receive 100% benefits after 30 yeours’ Sciv- 
ice ard enlisted men after 25 years, 
‘the former 
become 
eisible 
for voluntary 
retirement, 
With 
64% benefits, after 20 years’ service, while the lat- 
ter are 
eligible 
after 
17 years. 
‘The 
scale is 
exactly the same as that of the Argentine armed 
forces and although generous by US. standacds, 
e average for civil 
Ay- 
na, 
Whose 
retirement 
approach 
ther 
re 
ul 
| 
| 
| 
| 
Security 
| 
A 
a
c. Stnencru — Present strength of the Yed- 
eral Police is approximately 16,000 men, including 
the 100 officers and 1,200 enlisted men of the Fire 
Department. 
The size of the force is considered 
inadequate for preserving public order and satety 
in an urban area with a population of approxi- 
mately 4,000,000 and represents an absolute de- 
cline of ubout 25% from a strength of 20,000 in 
1957, and a much sharper drop in relation to 
population growth since that year. 
The ratio of 
police to population is even more disproportionate 
when. the great numbers of persons who com- 
mute daily to the Federal District from outlying 
suburbs 
are 
considered. 
Among 
other 
factors 
reducing the capabilities of the Federal Police is 
the division of each 24-hour period into four shifts 
instead of three. 
This practice is followed in or- 
der to give policemen the opportunity to supple- 
ment their incomes with part-time jobs. 
Inadequate strength 
is probably most acute 
among uniformed policemen engaged in routine 
patrolling in Buenos Aires, where it is estimated 
that the number of men available for such duty 
is little more than in 1922, when the population 
of the Federal Capital was only 1.8 million. 
In 
1961 a total of 6,547 enlisted men were assigned 
to the 59 precincts of the capital. 
Each patrol- 
mun on duty was estimated to be responsible for 
the safety of 7,036 persons, and to have charge of 
an average of 18 densely populated square blocks. 
A former chief of Federal Police siated that an 
additional 9,000 men would be required to patro! 
Buenos Aires’ streets adequately. 
Similarly, the 
strength of the Investigations Directorate of the 
Federal 
Police declined 
from 
1,504 
in 1945 
to 
1,111 in 1961, while crimes against property rose 
from approyvimately 7,590 in 1940 
to 16,400 in 
1961. 
.The Mounted Police and Infantry Cuard, 
principal riot-control forces, declined from 3,949 
men in 1945 to 2,000 in 1961. 
The present trend 
indicates that pers nnel shortages are likely to be- 
come more serious; in 1961 it was estimated that 
only one person entered the ranks of the Federal 
Police for every four who left. 
d. Operations — The mission of the Federal 
Police is to perform security and judicial! func- 
tions 
in the provinces and the Federa! Capit. 
within the limitations provided by the Consiitv- 
tion and the laws of the nation. 
Within Buenos 
Aires the territorial jurisdiction of the Federal! 
Police 
is limited only by that of the National 
Maritime Pryfecture in the port area. 
Ordinary patrol'ing 
is still carried out prin- 
cipally by unmounted police who report via a spe- 
cial police telephone network. 
When funds are 
available authorities hope to replace most 
foot 
patrolmen with car and motorcycle patrols and 
equip 
Individuals 
with 
portable 
radio 
transmiutter-receivers, 
The 
Reprional 
Police 
©! 
the provinees are pencrally inadequuce! 
staifed 
to meet their responsibilities. 
Their of- 
fectiveness is also often reduced by limited coup- 
eration offered by provincial police forces which 
dislile interference by outsiders. 
federal Police are 1esponsible for issuing and 
maintaining records of identity cards (cédulas de 
identidad), including the necessary 
file of bio- 
eraphic information required to obtain such of- 
ficial documentation. 
Possession of the card 
jis 
not required by law, but is necessary for many 
purposes of identification, such as registration at 
hotels, and it is carried by most Argentines. 
It 
may be issued to resident aliens and minors below 
the age of 18 as well as to adult citizens. 
Identity 
cards 
are 
of wallet 
size and carry the right 
thumbprint and a passport-type picture of the 
bearer. 
Control of widespread automobile 
theft 
has 
been a major problem since World War II and 
much of the task has fallen on the Federal Police. 
Incidence of automotive theft has rise rapidly in 
recent years as high duties and other restric- 
tions on imports have forced the price of new and 
used vehicles to several times that of comparable 
rmouels in the United States and Europe. 
Re- 
sponsibility for combating auto thefts falls on the 
Automotive Brigade 
(Brigada ve Automotores), 
and upon the recently established National Auto- 
motive 
Registry 
(Registro 
Nacional 
de Auto- 
motor), 
which 
aims 
at the 
registration and 
indexing of all cars and trucks in Argentina. 
Through 
intensified 
investigative 
work 
and 
a 
campaign 
of public 
education 
Federal 
Police 
succeeded in lessening the number of thefts from 
their 1961 highs, anc increasing the recovery rate 
from 19% in June 1960 to 46% in February 1962. 
Propocais have been made 
to curb automotive 
heft further by giving the Federal Police nation- 
wile jurisdiction over such cases. 
Although administrative corruption has become 
go widespread in recent years as to cause extensive 
popular mistrust and to be a factor in military un- 
rest, the Federal Police are not authorized to in- 
vestigate or control corruption 
in foverniment. 
Federal Coordination officials, however, may 
terverne in eases of official irremularitics involyi 
national 
security. 
A 
National 
Committee, created by executive order, operit 
from April to October 1962 and uncovered trrenu 
lavities by the President of the National Bauk 
(Boenco de la Nacion) and lesser officials and some 
exnerts lave proposed the creation of a Federal 
Police division modeled on the U.S. Federal Bu- 
reauofInvestigation, 
Traffic control in the city of Buenos Aires is 
the 
responsibility 
of the 
Traffic 
Police 
Corps, 
familiarly 
known 
as 
the 
“prey 
foxes” 
(20770: 
aes), 
beacause 
of 
their 
distinclive 
the Federal 
Canitsl 
read 
ral 
| 
|
tions among motorists and pedestrians. 
Traite 
lights, which were nob in use unti) after World 
War II, have been gradually increased, despite the 
complaints of motorists, 
As of May 1903, bucnos 
Aires had only 100 intersections controlled 
by 
lights, as compared to 9,000 in New York City. 
Traffic Police still lack an adequate number of 
squad cars 
and 
motorcycles 
for 
their 
duties 
Traffic at most heavily used intersections is con- 
trolled by patrolmen through manually operated 
lights or hand signals given from enclosed traific 
tubs (castilletes), while observance of automatic 
traffic lights is often enforced by stationing police- 
men nearby. 
In early 1963 a corps of women 
‘traffic Police (Policia Femenina de Trdnsito) was 
organized to reinforce traffic control efforts in 
the Federal Capital. 
A large proportion of the Federal Police effort 
is directed against manifestations of subversive 
activity, although direct responsibility for investi- 
gating and controlling subversion rests with the 
Federal Coordination staff and armed forces in-. 
telligence units under the direction and coordina- 
tion of the Secretariat of State Inte'ligence (Se- 
cretaria de Infurmaciones del Estado). 
ob- 
jectives of terrorists, rioters, and saboteurs have 
been 
attempts 
to intimidate 
legal! 
opposition 
groups and to weaken the stability of the gov- 
einment through bombings, some of them of con- 
siderable daring. 
Pressure by armed forces leaders who felt that 
the police were not taking sufficiently vigorous 
ection against suspected terrorists anc who were 
aturmed by attempts against military personnel 
and installations, caused the imposition of .the 
CONINTES (a contraction of the term conmocién 
interna del estado—internal commotion 
in the 
statc) plan in March 1960. 
The plan calls for 
Suspension of certain constitutional guarantees 
and combining police and armed forces cleinen‘s 
into a unified antiterrorist command under army 
direction. 
The plan authorizes trial by military 
tribunals. 
When put into effect it was apparently 
Successful in greatly diminishing the incidence of 
terrorism. 
It was suspended 
in -Aurust 
1961, 
due to increasing allegations of arbitrary imnie- 
mentation as well as to a decline of terrorist ac- 
tivity. 
It has since been reimposed for brief pe- 
riods of time, but in order to curb general nolitical 
vantuge. 
The Mounted Police and the Infantry 
Guard, together numbering about 2,000 men, are 
tie prime riot-control elements, 
In emergency, 
reinforcements may be drawn from other police 
units, from the National Gendarmerie, and from 
units of the armed forces, 
Many measures are used to prevent o1 contrcl 
disturbances, 
Known Coinmunist, Peronist, or 
other agitators may be arrested in anticipation of 
disorders, 
The 
efficacy 
of this 
measure 
was 
demonstrated on May Day of 1962 and during 
the Cuban crisis of October 1962. 
These “ates 
assed with a minimum of disturbance. 
Police 
try to control potentially explosive situations by 
dispersing assemblies 
of small groups or by a 
show of force in which open-sided police vans, 
loaded with about 35 men armed and ready for ac- 
tion, ere parked in strategic locations. 
Mounted 
Police try to control crowds by mancuvering their 
horses. 
The Infantry Guard Corps is equipped 
with sidearms, nightsticks, 
steel helments, and 
tear-pas guns. 
Riot control activities are supported by the Fire 
_ Department 
which 
operates 
high-pressure 
fire 
lioses and armored cars which squirt streams of 
brightly colored dve on demonstrators. 
This last 
device enables police to identify and arrest mob 
participants after they have left the scene of the 
disturbance. 
Although efficient, Federal Police are 
restrained in dealing with disorders, and serious 
easualties among demonstrators are rare. 
Ordinary Fire Department operations are han- 
died from six engine houses (cuarteles) in Buenos 
Aires, which contain most of the department’s mo- 
torized equipment and $00 of its 1,300 men. 
The 
balance of the department’s personnel are as- 
signed to detachments in the various police pre- 
cinets. 
lule-of-thumb is that one truck is sent in 
case of uire in a private house, two if in a factory 
or commercial 
establisament, and three if in a 
larce building or at a public event. The Technical 
inspection Service of the Fire Department report- 
ecily inspects safety installations in an average of 
20 buildings of various types a day. The anproval 
of the Plans and Assessments Section 
(Seecclor 
Proyectos. 
y Asesoramientos) 
is required 
bei 
any building may be occupicd in 
Sinee most buildings ere constructed 
wilh 
aremadble materials, fires are not a serious prob 
and military unres 
ier 
t 
| 
‘bat 
tei 
rest, 
rather than to combat tei- 
rorist activity 
lem 
in the Federal District. 
In 1962 they juin- 
red 1,813, an inerease 
from the 1,094 rezislered 
Control of politically inspired riots and strikes 
;,, 39g” but lees than the 1,888 of 1961. 
other civil disorders forms an important part 
= 
rgentina and elsewhere in Letin America is a po- 
Federal Pohce, 
threat to the stability of the government, . 
equipment for patrolling, 
15 consi 
Only Peronists, Communists, and rightwing, 
erally adequate. 
Patrolmen are armed with 
organizations, but also elements with-. 
sticks 
and pistols, usuaily 
calibre or 
and 
the more moderate national 
political pariios 
submachine guns are available 
for issuc. 
atiermpted lo use civil disorders to 
onty 
50 patrol cars were rerul 
‘ 
‘ 
‘ 
‘ 
‘ 
‘ 
‘ 
4 5 
4 4 
4 4 
| 
|
ba 
An 
a serlous deficlency considering the size of Buenos 
Aires. 
The telecommunications 
system 
of 
thie 
Federal Police, although good by Latin American 
standards, does not compare favorably to those of 
police forces in the United States. 
Telephone 
communications for individual patrolme are not 
good, particularly on 1tainy days when dampness 
affects the lines. 
Radio, the means of communl- 
cation with patrol cars and with the Regional Po- 
lice OcNlces, is considered adequate. 
Federal Police laboratory and record keeping 
facilities are considered satisfactory although be- 
low the standards of U.S. police forces, princi- 
pally because of a lack of funds to purchase the 
latest equipment 
and 
to send 
technicians 
to 
study abroad. 
As elsewhere in Argentina, the Fed- 
eral Police use the Vucetich fingerprinting sy.- 
tem, invented by an Argentine in 1891, 
Similar to 
the Henry system, it has been adopted by. police 
forces in many nations. 
The fingerprint files of 
the Federal Police are extensive but no nationwide 
registry of fingerprints has been sct up. 
The 
biograpaic and criminal records and card index 
files are administered by hand. 
Professional and 
technical publications of the Federal Police, ex- 
cept for a technical pericdical of the Fire Depart- 
ment, have been discontinued since 1955. 
Motorized equipment of the Fire Department 
consists of 36 fire trucks, two portable power 
plants, a portable repair shop, three ladder trucks, 
two special trucks for chemical fires. 
The depzurt- 
ment also has a fireboat in Buenos Aires har- 
bor. 
Federal Police wear blue uniforms of wooi or 
cotton except the Traffic Police who wear 
grey. 
The quality and style of uniforms compare iavor- 
ably with those of the aimed forces. 
Firemen 
usually wear 
a fatigue uniform: 
on duty while 
mounted police are outfitted in riding pants and 
boots. 
f. PERSONNEL, RECRUITMENT, AND TRAINING — 
All persons employed by the Federal Police serve 
in the broad categories of officer (personal su- 
perior) 
or enlisted man 
(personal suballerno). 
Advancement to the rank of Inspector General, 
highest officer rank, is theoretically possib'e in 
all branches of the force, except the administra- 
tion, band, or Women Police. 
Qualified physiciaus 
or lawyers serving the Federal Police hold officer 
grades, 
Enlisted men are ranked in descending 
order as follows: Principal Noncommissioned Ci- 
ficer (Suboficial Principal), Adjutant Noncommis- 
Sioned Officer (Suboficial Ayudante), Clerk Non- 
commissioned Officer (Suboficial Escribdiente) , First 
Sergeant 
(Sargento 
Primero), 
Sergeant 
(Sar- 
gento), First Corporal (Cabo Primero), Corporal 
(Cabo), 
and 
Policeman 
(Agente), 
or fireman 
(Loinbero),. 
‘The small Woinen’s Police unit his 
Ho enlisted rank higher than that of Pirst Sec 
reant, 
wey 
Ye 
fn. order to be promoted both officers and cn- 
listed men must be approved by uw qualification 
board (junta calificadora), 
The board for officers 
is composed of the heads of the various direc- 
torates, presided over by the Assistant Chief of 
Police, and meets annually in October to deter- 
mine those eligible. 
The enlisted men’s board {is 
composed 
of lower rank representatives from the 
various directorates. 
Conditions for promotion 
are proressional and physical aptitude, compiction 
of the requisite time in grade, and passing special 
courses required at each grade level. 
Extraordi- 
nary promotions may be made for distinguished 
acts. 
Officer personnel may resign from the service 
at any time, and enlisted men may leave after 
their initial 3-year enlistment period. 
Personnel 
who resign are not barred from applying for reas- 
signment to the force. 
While om active duty per- 
sonnel may be placed on temporary inactive status 
{disponibilidad) at their own request or that of 
their superior officer in order to attend to per- 
sonal affairs or in the event of long sickness. 
Men with no specific post may be placed on dis- 
nonibilidad until one is available. 
Personnel who 
have been arrested are also placed on inactive 
duty status. 
Retired personnel are subject to re- 
cali to active duty in the event of an emergency. 
Upon retirement they are permitted to live in any 
part of the Argentine Republic but must report 
change of domicile within 3 days and cannot re- 
side abroad without special authorization. 
Training of Federal Police personnel is good by 
Latin American standards and Argentine authori- 
ties have such confidence in their methods that 
the establishment of an international police acad- 
emy to train representatives from all parts of 
Latin America is contemplated. 
However, recruit- 
ment of both officers and enlisted personne! re- 
mains a vroblem, as reflected by persistent per- 
sonnel shortages. 
The present lack of popularity 
of Federal Police service as a career steins not 
only from low pay but from a decline in the social 
and professional prestige of the police among the 
seneral public. 
Low prestire isfin part a 
of the Perén era when the Federal Police acquire. 
reputation for brutality, andi in part a resull of 
occasional disorders and scandals within the force. 
Mnlisted men must be Argentine nationals, 
un- 
der 26 years of age, over 5 feet 5 inches tall, and 
have prior service in the armed forces unless ful- 
Ching compulsory military obligations with the 
police. 
The applicant must 
also be in pood health 
und without any criminal record. 
Minimum edu- 
cational 
requirements 
are 4 years 
of primary 
schoohnrr 
or qualifying by examination 
in Weu 
 éspicants for special appointment, such 
fecehnieians 
or 
on 
demonstrate them 
shatlis ac 
° 
| 
|
—— 
ment, 
recruits 
either 
receive 
a basic 
training 
course of 1 month or are placed directly in unts 
for on-the-job training. 
Salary, equipment, an 
uniforms are provided from date of acceptance, as 
are medical, social, and other benefits. 
Continuous manpower shortages, dating frora 
the Perén era, have made necessary the use of 
military service conscripts. 
Conscripts 
are 
in- 
ducted. in March, June, September, and Decerm- 
ber of each year, and totaled 2,992 as of mid-1963. 
Volunteers for service with the Federal Police re- 
ceive the benefits 
of higher pay than armod 
forces inductees and the assurance of spending 
their conscription term in Buenos Aires. 
Except 
for conscripts, who represent a cross-section of 
Argentine society, most enlisted personnel of the 
Federal Police are from the lower and lower nuid- 
dle classes. 
With the exception of technical and professional 
personne! all Federal Police commissioned officers 
are graduates of the 2-year school, “Coronel Ra- 
mon L. Falc6én.” There is no provision for advance- 
ment to officer grade from enlisted ranks. 
Pro- 
spcvtive cadets must be Argentine citizens, be- 
tween 17 and 23 years of age, and have completed 
the third year of secondary schooling. 
They must 
also pass a medical examination and be between 
5 feet 5 inches (1.65 meters) and 6 feet 5 inche 
(1.935 meters) 
tall. 
Federal Police officers differ 
little in background from officers of the Argentine 
armed forces, many choosing a pclice career after 
failing to gain admission to armed forces acade- 
mies through physical defect or lack of ‘amily in- 
fluence. 
Most are of middle class origin aid have 
completed secondary education. 
Cadets may be trained as either regular or ad- 
ministrative officers. 
Courses for regular nclice 
Officers 
penal law, police administration, 
police practices and techniques, 
Argentine 
his- 
tory, gymnastics, and use of firearms. 
Courses 
for administrative officers also include accounting 
and mathematics. 
The academy is operated un- 
der strict military discipline. 
Upon cor.pletion of the 2-year course cadets 
receive the rank of Subadjutant Officer (Subayu- 
dante Oficial), the lowest officer rank, and fre as- 
Signed to police divisions. 
At specific periods dur- 
ing an officer's career he is required to enroll for 
further courses 
at the Superior 
Police 
Schoo! 
(Escuela superior de Policia). 
Established in 1906 in the Caballito district of 
Buenos Aires, the Coronel Ramén L. Falcon Aced- 
emy is dilapidated and crowded. 
A new buildine 
is in preparatior. in the Villa Lugano district of 
the city, but no information 
is available 
as to 
When it will be comp!teted. 
Police authorities have 
Proposed expanding training *t the academy to 4 
years after the new building is occupied. 
Vorcign training for police coitinucs to be lim- 
ited by lack of funds, bat is increasine., 
A pro- 
gram to provide U.S, training for 15 participants 
over a S-year period beinning in 1963 was preceded 
by the attendance of 3 officers at the Inter-Areri- 
can Police Academy in the Canal Zone. Two high- 
ranking 
officers 
attended 
special 
riot 
control 
courses In the United States in 1963, and four 
ollicers were sent tc the United Kingdoin, France, 
and West Germany for training in 1962. 
U.S, ad- 
vice 
specific police problems has oecasionally 
been requested and films of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation are used in some training cvurses. 
g. MORALE AND PUBLI! RELATIONS —— Poor morale 
is regarded as one of the chief problems oj the 
Federal Police, although it has not reached such 
a magnitude as to limit effectiveness. 
A well- 
developed system cf fringe benefits has not served 
to counteract the adverse effect of low pay scales 
or the low prestige of Federal Police among the 
general public. 
Other factors adverse to morale 
include the numerois deaths and injuries suf- 
fered by police in line of duty and the opinions 
held by the rank and file that the government is 
indifferent to the well-being of members of the 
force and that the legal system favors the crimi- 
nal. 
Fringe benefits are provided by the government 
and private societies. 
A limited number of low- 
cost housing units have been provided through 
covernment housing programs. 
Free hospitaliza- 
tion is provided at the Bartolomé Churruca Police 
Hospital in Buenos Aires. 
The principal private agencies aiding police are 
the Police Family Benefit Associations 
(Asocia- 
ciunes Pro Hogares Policia?es), about 50 of which 
operate on a neighborhood basis in Buenos Aires. 
“inancial and social assistance which these yclun- 
tary societies provide include low-interest loans, 
donations for family emergencies, schoiarships for 
cl.ildren, courses for self-improvement, sporiu and 
social meetings, and tree entertainments, suc. as 
(asados). 
However, the basic 
ol jecc- 
{ ve of such societies, which is to provide low-cost 
housing for enlisted personnel, has been r.pated 
iz <econt years by lack of bank credits. 
Another 
agency benefiting Federai 
Police 
ts 
the 
Vacation Camp Assistance Comricsion 
a? Ayudit a Colonia de Vacaciones) Witch 
2 surame. 
camp for police children ab Capri. 
col 
Monte, in the Province of Cordoba. 
‘Viiere 
is a 
social-athletic 
club for enlisted personnel, but as 
yet no officers’ club, a pronounced detriment to 
morale of police commissioned oflicers since hearly 
every branch of vovernment in Buenos Aires has 
its own club. 
° 
Other than appeals on their behalf by high po- 
lice officinls and interested cilivens, the Federal 
Police have little meens of publicizing 
or exerting pressive ou the poverumecni 
sor 
ercand 
budeet suppor. 
Tn the past 
‘ 
5 4 ‘ 
4 ‘ 
‘ 4 4 
‘ 
| 
]
ory 
... 
ai. 
ve 
a 
‘vefore{the Perén regimd 
tality and 
torture 
by police personne! 
een infrequent, but such cases have been 
called 
* to public notice often enough|to keep Federa! Po- 
_not resorted to strikes or demonstrations to achicve 
their demands. 
The only professional organiza- 
tion in the Federal Police ts the Federat Police 
Enlisted 
Personnel 
Club 
(Circulo 
de Personcai 
Subcticrno de la Policia Federal), whose leaders 
have thus far resisted strong pressures among 
the rank and file to engage in union-typ? activi- 
ties. 
Police took concerted action, however, in de- 
manding the ouster of unpopular Federal Police 
Chief Enrique Green in August 1962. 
Incensed 
by Green’s passive attitude following the killing of 
a firemen on duty by Marine sentries during an 
armed forces uprising, 200 officers, supported by 
enlisted personnel, met and named a five-man 
committee to ask for his resignation. 
The principal manifestation of police discon- 
tent in recent years occurred in July 1961 during 
a funeral proccssion for two members of the force 
who had been killed on duty. 
As the procession 
passed the Congress Building members of the 
group fired a number of shots against the build- 
ing. 
Investigation revealed that, in addition to 
dissatisfaction with equipment and legislation con- 
sidered inadequate to control crime, those respon- 
sible were embittered by activities of a congrcs- 
sional committee 
investigating 
police brutality 
und other malpractices and were angered by 
failure to lower the Congressional flag to half- 
mast as the procession passed. 
Congressional in- 
dignation was calmed by a public apology from 
the Chief of Federal Police, but the cvent was 
regarded as evidence of poor discipline within the 
force. 
The Federal Police have not succeeded in re- 
covering the good reputation which they enjoyed 
Since 1955 cases of bru- 
Nave 
lice prestige below its pre-Perén level’ 
Ocvca- 
sional strained relations with the press have also 
served to damage the public image of the (force. 
Newsmen declared a 24-hour protesv strike in July 
1961 following the rough handling of reporters at 
the Congress Building shooting incident, and the 
bruising of a newsman covering an airplane crash 
at a Buenos Aires airport. 
Corruption 
is not believed 
to be widespread 
within the Federal Police but Jow salaries and the 
large financial rewards to be gained by abetting 
smugeling and other activities constitute a formi- 
dable temptation. 
An investigation in Septern- 
ber 1960 uncovered complicity by high officials in 
such activities as dcpe and white slave traffic and 
automobile thefts. 
The Chicf of Federal Police, 
Adiuiiral Ezequiel Vera, and five other naval officers 
on duty with the force were arrested for involve- 
ment in corrupt practices or failure to prevent 
thern, while five regular police officers were sus- 
pendcd, 
Borther investigation 
ivrerv! 
~~ 
tics of such extent that a full-scale reorganiza- 
tion of the Federal Police was ordered hy the new 
chief. 
Although sufficiene evidence for criminal 
prosecution of offenders was felt to be lacking, a 
total of 217 officers, suspected of malpractices or 
judged by their peers to be incompetent, were 
forced from the. service. 
Awareness of unsatisfactory put lic relations has 
caused the Federal Police to make efforts to bolster 
their 
prestige, 
especially 
among 
the 
poorer 
classes, upon whom fears of police brutality fall 
most heavily. 
The success enjoyed by the poiice 
athletic learue of many large cities in the United 
States prompted the creation of a similar organi- 
zation in Buenos Aires; athletic contests, usually 
sccecer, are organized for youth under the super- 
vision of police volunteers. 
__ 
h. Errectiveness — The Argentine Federal 
Police are universally regarded as one of Latin 
America’s best police forces, many observers plac- 
ing them second only to the Carabineros of Chile 
in effectiveness. 
The Federal Police are well led 
and experience no seriou” “eficiencies in training 
and materiel, although 
.. ir effectiveness could 
be improved with additional telecommunications 
and automotive equipment. 
Careful considera- 
tion of the caliber of the Federal Police (and ¢ 
f 
other Argentine police forces) prompted the U.S. ~ 
“Ambassador to advise that there is no need for a 
“3 
US 
S. AID police ass!stance program in Argentina. 
The 
effectiveness 
of the 
Federal 
Police 
in 
hanciing civil disorder has been repeatedly demon- 
strated. 
They have usuaily managed to contain 
riots with a minimum of property damage and 
bloedshed. 
Little information is available on the 
capability of the Federal Police to combat ordinary 
crime, but the incidence of crime, particularly 
crimes or violence, in Puenos Aires appears lower 
than in many cities of similar size elsewhere. 
‘he principal threats to the effectiveness of 
the Federal Police He in the areas of morale and 
public relations. 
Public authorities have cited the 
necessity of pay.ng police at a rate compatible 
with the responsibility of their job and of improv- 
ing 
facilities 
and 
equipment. 
These 
actions 
would have the additional benentls of attroetingss 
recruits to restore the I’ecderal Police to adeguai 
strencth 
and 
of 
aecreasing 
Susceptibility 
to 
. 
National Gendarmerie 
a. Orcanrzarion 
The National Gendarmerie 
(Gendarmeria Nacional) was created in July 19258 
and numbers approximately 11,000 men. 
It is or- 
eanized on a military basis and responds to Ar- 
rentine Army regulations. 
Like other national police ageidcles, the Gen- 
is under firm armed forces contol 
“dre 
divector 
must hokl 
a rank not lower 
thom brie 
adios 
darimecric 
| 
j 
‘ 
| 
| 
|
sistants are also army Officers on active duty; 
the organization Is under the jurisdiction of the 
Secretary of War (Secretaria de Ljercito) rather 
than 
the 
Ministry 
of 
Interior. 
In 
&e ptemi er 
1951, under the Perén regime, the National Gen- 
darmerie was placed under the control 
of the 
Ministry of Interior, becoming a police force in 
fact as well as in function; 
it was returned to 
military control in October 1955, following the 
overthrow of Perén. 
The General Security Command, the Quarter- 
master General, and the Directorate General of 
Instatutes, which controls training, are subordi- 
nate to the General Directorate 
(Direccion Ge- 
neral) of the Wational Gendarmerie which has its 
headquarters in the city of Buenos Aires. 
Heac- 
quarters controls matters pertaining to registra- 
Communist activities in border areas, and smu: 
rling activities. 
Territorial organization of the National Gends: 
merie is shown In Ficune 4. There are three 1c 
gional commands comprising a total of 10 grou; 
(cqgrupaciones) in the fie'd forces of the Gendar 
merie.. 
group is commanded by a licutenar' 
colonel or major and is of rezimental size. 
eroup covers the frontier security zone in one o 
two provinces. 
Within the groups are frorn tw. 
vo five squadrons 
(with the exception 
of th 
Buenos Aires group), equivalent to battalicns anv 
under the command of a captain. 
Each squadro:. 
is composed of from two to four sections, equivi 
lent to companies and commanded by a lieutenant 
Basic commanc 
unit is the post, approximately 
four of which constitute a section. 
Each post ha: 
from 2 to 10 men under the command of a non- 
tion, 
identification, 
communications, 
investiga- 
tions, supply, and motor repairs, as well as ad- 
ministration. 
The National Gendarmerie has a 
small intelligence unit, which is subordinate to 
cornmissioned officer. 
In addition to their tactical commands, Gen- 
darmerie personnel are assigned to one of two 
functional groups or corps; the command corp: 
the Secretary of War, but not to the Army In- 
(geourity, 
tellimence Service (Servicio de Informaciones del 
anized) 
or the professional corps 
(legal, sani- 
_ Ejército—SIE). 
This unit reports on non-Com- 
tary, 
administrative, 
veterinary, 
construction, 
munist subversive activities directed against the 
clerical, and including tailors, carpenters, shoc- 
Argentine government 
from 
border 
countries, 
malsers, saddlers, orderlies, and cooks). 
Civilia” 
NATIONAL 
| 
GINDARMERIE 
NERA 
Cer 
Deve 
Detachment @4 
Cont 
darmeria 
Noncomnmitsioned 
Deto 
om 03 
(Buenos Aires) 
(Buenos Awes) 
DIRECTORATE 
Officers School 
) 
(Buenos Aires) 
Aires! 
(Jesus Maria) 
Northeast! tegional 
Nerthwest Keg .onal 
South Regional 
Commond 
Commerg 
Command 
(Rusario) 
(*Aend 
190) 
(Viedma) 
Grove IV 
Group Vi 
Road Detadment 
Group 
| 
Grovp Ail 
Group KiV 
Group Avi 
(Posodus) 
(Farmesa} 
(Pirane) 
Ne vauen! 
(Viedmna) 
{Esquel, Chubut! 
(Ria Galle jos) 
is 
Squous 
Squod:ons 
Jucurons 
| 
© guedra au 
one 
J 
> 
la leonesa 
Chos Molol 
Son Carlos de 
Esquel 
Pevito 
Oberg 
(Chaco) 
Les Lojos 
Barioche 
lose de San 
AA 
Formosw 
t! Boisoa 
Marin 
fi tus 
ti Derade 
Su 
San 
Clorinda 
SHED 
Sarmiento 
‘ 
grace 
Comand ante 
| 
ade Los 
Fontona 
Ar Ges 
} 
| 
{ 
Sq vodrans 
Squodrans 
Qua 
Oran 
Sections, 
Funtn ce 
la 
Cat 
Voc 
Two Sections, 
Molarque 
‘ 
fan Antoma 
la 
de Los 
Maraqvescdoe 
Cobres 
ol 
| 
FIGURE 
4, ORGANIZATION 
OF Tie 
AND 
LO
‘Lhe 
Netional 
| function As a seeurity force and 
force, 
with normal 
security Jurtediction 
in 
frontier zone and extraordinary jurisdiction 
the country, 
As 
inilitary force the 
(Gendarmerie 
participates 
in army mobilization 
plans. 
~ 
functions principally 2s a riot control force. 
Outside the fronhier security zone the 
meric 
NMempers 
are thoroughly trained in control tactics 
nd 
are 
the first to be called upon when cfiorts 
OF 
local 
police prove inadequate. 
They 
atso 
lake 
| 
pines ef local police forees in emergen- 
CicS 
during the strike of provincial police 
im Cordoba 
Provinee in mid-1961, 
Although no 
recidar 
Gendarmerie units are normally stationed 
in Cordove, 800 men were rapidly brought in to 
relieve the army units which had initialiy replaced 
the police, 
The Gendarmerie may supplement regular rili- 
tary forces in border areas in the event of war and 
provide military intelligence. 
The force is nor- 
mally charged with border traffic control, preven- 
tion of smugpeling and illegal border crossing, 
guarding against or ferreting out arms caches, 
and preventing unauthorized assemblages of per- 
sons. 
It may also serve as auxiliary customs po- 
lice and regulate navigation in the large Patago- 
nian lakes under Gendarmerie jurisdiction. 
Most 
of the casualties sustained by the force are in the 
area of the Paraguayan frontier and result from 
clashes with armed bands crossing from that 
country. 
Gendarmerie officers have complained 
that they are hampered by insufficient personnc' 
in carrying out their mission of preventing illegal 
border crossings. 
For instance, the Salta group 
consisting of only 700 men in mid-1963 guarded 
1,400 kilometers of rugged boundary separating 
Argentina from three other nations. 
_ 
The National Gendarmerie also performs duties 
not ordinarily associated with police work, espe- 
cially in areas which are particularly isolated or 
where 
colonization 
is being attempted. 
It is 
charged with such civic functions as aiding in 
the creation and development of population cen- 
tue operalion 
approxi- 
radio posts, and pickup and delivery of 
in tcolated places. 
— 
The 
Gendarmerie 
is 
not 
known 
to have any serious materiel deficiencivs 
but, 
ike 
other Argentine polices forees, perform- 
ve improved by additional and more 
transportation 
and 
telecommunications 
| 
Mom are armed 
with 
7.65 Mauser 
tities, 
.49 caliber pistols, and an unknown number 
‘chine 
guns. 
Molcrized transportation 
; of small British Army-type trucks, and U.S. 
vpe 
station 
wagons, 
jecps, 
and 
motorcycles. 
Iiorses,. skis, and snowshoes are‘also used under 
vpropriate conditions. 
Aircraft equipment con- 
sists vf one helicopter and three Piper Cubs; 6 
lace helicopters and i6 light liaison planes 
have been ordered from the United States. 
Com- 
imunicolions equipment is predominantly of U.S. 
manufacture (CA) or Argentine copies thereof. 
d. TRAINING AND PERSONNEL — With the ex- 
ceplion of the director, his two chief assistants, 
and a mumber of retired Army officers who staff 
administrative 
and 
supply 
positions, 
all non- 
technical positions in the National Gendarmerie 
are filled from the ranks of graduates of the Na- 
tional Gendarmerie School (Zscuela de Gendar- 
meria Nacional), where both officers and enlisted 
men receive training. 
Candidates for positions 
as officer cadets in the school must be Argentine 
citizens, single or widower without children, be- 
tween 17 and 25 years of age, aad have comp!eted 
the third year of secondary 
school. 
Physical 
and admission examinations must ordinarily be 
passed, 
but the latter is waived for secondary 
school graduates and those with equivalent aca- 
demic credentials. 
Enlisted recruits must be between i9 and 27 
ears of age. 
Unlike armed forces personnel, all 
Gendarmerie 
enlisted mer 
are 
volunteers, but 
service in the force satisfies legal compulsory mili- 
tary training requirements. 
After the _ initial 
enlistment period both enlisted and officer person- 
nel are periodically offered subsequent 3-year reen- 
listment contracts. 
Promotions to a higher en- 
listed rank are usually given after a minimum 
time in grade of 3 years. 
| 
{our-| 
: 
ters anc with increasing standards of living and ed- 
Cadets in the officer candidate curriculum grad- 
: 
' 
ucational levels in the zones under its jurisdiction. 
wate as sublieutenants (sub-alfcrez) after a 3-year 
: 
} 
| The 
force 
conducts 
primary education 
where 
course. 
Instruction 
includes 
routine 
academic 
' 
} 
| other facilities are lacking and often provides sani- —_ subjects, military drill, use of weapons and equip- 
; 
| 
| tary instruction, vaccination, and medical sur- 
ment, physical training, and maneuvers, 
After 
: 
} 
veys. 
It builds and repairs roads in isolated areas) = rraduation officers may return periodically for 
: 
| 
and keeps them open in inclement weather. 
In — further 
courses 
at 
the Superior Gendarmerie 
emergencies such as floods, earthquakes, or fires, it 
School (Escuela de Gendarmeria Superior), Gen- 
’ 
. 
aids in evacuating persons and repair of damages. 
darmerie 
officers 
sometimes 
receive 
additional 
P 
The Gendarmerie communications network sip- 
training at Army institutes, such as the Superior 
plements the federally controlled telephone and 
Technical School (Escuela Superior Técnica) and 
telegraph system in frontier areas. 
Communica- 
the Superior Intelligence School (E£scuela Supe- 
a> 
‘ 
4 = 
4 7 ‘ 
4 ‘ 
‘ 
4 4 4 
‘4 
4 4 A 
|
— 
< = 
— 
the 
S-vear course 
at 
J offieers 
school], 
located 
at Jesu 
arin 
Mrovinee 
of Coraoba. 
Civilion 
have completed their l-year compulsory milivary 
eervice 
or men 
selected 
from 
the 
Gendarmerie 
are: 
eligible: 
In 
addition 
to all 
types 
of 
police work, instruction includes eca- 
demic work at the secondary school leycl. 
By a 1956 decree salaries and benefits of th 
Gendarmerie were placed on. A level 
with 
those 
of the army. 
Allowances for longevity, purchase 
of equipment and uniforms, 
and 
instebiity 
of 
resilcnce, are given in addition 
to base 
salary. 
may voluntarily 
retire 
upon 
comptle- 
fion of 17 and 20 years of strvice for enlisted and 
officer perso 
uel, respectively 
or may he forecd 
into retirement on account of age or if disuuell 
ficd for promotion. 
Retirement pay is in proportion to the service 
credited to an individual, provided a minimuin of 
10 years has been served, and is awarded on a 
scale equivalent to that of the Federal Police and 
the armed 
forces. 
Maximum 
benefits 
(100%) 
are extended to officers with 30 years of service 
and to enlisted personnel with 25 years of service. 
Disability benefits are extended to personnel dics- 
abled during service, and pensions to the survivors 
of those who die on active duty. 
e. EFFECTIVENESS 
— The 
National 
Gendar- 
merie is considered one of Argentina’s most etf- 
fective police forces. 
Cooperation between Gen- 
darmerie, army, and police is considered good. 
The Gendarmerie has demonstrated its ability to 
assume ordinary police functions with speed and 
effectiveness and the force is considered more wiil- 
ing than are ordinary police units to employ 
harsh measures, such as firing into a crowd. 
bi} 
Gendarmerie effectiveness in border patrol is hand- 
lcapped by insufficient forces, but it is antici- 
pated its. effectiveness will improve with greater 
use of light aircraft and helicopters in remote 
areas, 
| 
3. National Maritime Prefecture 
&. ORGANIZATION — The Argentine 
National 
itime Prefecture (Prefectura Nacional Mari- 
tima) polices all seas, rivers, canals, and ports 
Subject to national jurisdiction. 
Its duties are 
somewhat analogous in function to those of the 
US, Coast Gu 
of 
the 
Ministry 
o 
e Nav 
(Ministerio de ta Marina), except 
the iat 
re bart of the Perén regime, when it, was trans- 
tred to the Ministry of the Interior, 
Strong 
Mar 
arm ed forces control is manifest by the provision 
volunteers 
-whno 
lon of 
unils of varying size known as subprefectur 
aroncies, and detachments. 
Within 
the orrnni- 
as a whole are 48 subprefectures, 49 accn- 
cies, and 193 detachments. 
Present strenrth of 
the 
Maritime 
Prefecture 
is 8,000 
enlisted 
men 
and £00 officers, representing a slicht increess in 
sircngth over 
1255 when it numbered 5,500 en- 
listed men and 590 oflicers. 
Pay and retirement 
scales are equivalent to those of the Gendarmerie. 
Reecnt budget appropriations 
for the Maritime 
Preiecture 
are not available but appropriations 
ror retirement, pensions, and indemnities in iiscal 
year 
1263 
amounted 
to 75 million 
pesos 
or 
OreratTions — The jurisdiction of the Mari- 
vime rrefecture extends from the Pilcomayo and 
Iguazu rivers on the Paraguayan and Brazilian 
borders, respectively, down the entire length of 
the Atlantic 
seaboard 
to the Antarctic. 
The 
only substantial water boundaries not policed by 
the Maritime Prefecture 
are the lakes on the 
southern Argentine border with Chile, which are 
under the jurisdiction of the National Gendar- 
meric. 
Maritime 
Prefecture 
duties 
include 
re- 
pression of smuggling and illegel entry of persons 
and maintenance of public order in port arcas 
under its jurisdiction. 
its functions incluie the 
supervision of all shipping, including regulations 
of arrival, departure, and anchorage; 
registra- 
tion of embarking personnel and of membcrs of 
merchant marine and maritime unions; and the 
investigation of marine accidents and collisions. 
Marine rescue and firefighting are also important 
duties. 
The Maritime 
Prefecture 
approves 
or 
authorizes 
the construction and conversion 
of 
ships and 
stipulates the safety and lifesaving 
equipment carried on board. 
Judicial functions 
include the judgment of violations 
(contraven- 
ciones) carried out in its jurisdiction and the re- 
solving of maritime disputes. 
c. Equipment — The 
Maritime 
Prefecture 
utilizes the following vessels: 
one frigate; one 
minesweeper (used for training); four patrol tor- 
pedo (PT) boats; 107 general service launches; 54 
patrol launches; 48 speed boats; 300 miscellaneous 
smell 
craft; 
four 
transports; and one 
rescue 
launch. 
The force has approximately 350 ve- 
hicles, including jeeps, trucks, motor sidecars, am- 
bulances, buses and sedans. 
Scuba and deep-sea 
diving equipment are used for salvage and rescue 
operations; and the force has limited firefighting 
equipment. 
The 
Maritime 
Piefecture 
has 
an 
adequate supply of weapons, including automatic 
eannons, heavy and light machine guns, auto- 
matic rifies, carbines, and pistols. 
rr 
‘ 
| 
| 
*
— 
a 
end 
Police | 
D rectorote 
UOlectorote 
Desartrent 
| 
'* 
Navicotongl 
Polce 
Directorate 
Commoncations 
Directorote 
| 
| 
Ovrectorate 
Un poor River 
Atlontic North 
Atlantic South 
Pio de la “loty 
P elecrure 
Pratecture 
Profecture 
Prefecture 
Pratecture 
— 
Delte 
Upper Parogqvoy 
ond Porana 
Rivers Prefecture 
lower Parond 
River Pratecture 
| Dorelectures 
Agences 
e’ochments 
Similar breatdoewn in oll prefectures 
Inspection 
Ficure 5. ORGANIZATION OF TIE NATIONAL MARITIME PREFECTURE, 1959 
d. Trarninc — All Maritime Prefecture per- 
sonnel are volunteers. 
Officers are graduates of 
the General Martin de Irigoyen Cadet 
S. nool 
(Escuela de Cadetes) located at Tigre, a nortn- 
west suburb of the city of Buenos Aires. 
Al- 
though smaller and less impressive than Argen- 
tina’s regular naval academy, it is reported to be 
an excellent school with a notable esprit de corps 
among staff and students. 
Enlisted personnel 
are trained at the “Coronel Martin Jacobo Thomp- 
son” Petty Officers and-Seamen School (Escuela de 
Suboficiales y Marineros). 
Officers are required to 
return periodically during their careers for fur- 
ther courses at the Chiefs and Officers School 
(Escuelu de Jefes y Oficiales). 
4. Provincial police forces 
Primary 
responsibility 
for public order and 
Safety in each of Avgentina’s 22 provinces rests 
With the provincial police forces which exercise 
functions similar tathose of U.S. state police 
forces. 
The authority of provincial police forces 
in criminal matterg:ordinarily is subordinate to 
that of the Fedete] Regional Police Offices (sce 
above) in the case of crimes under federal juris- 
diction, such as those involving the national au- 
thorities or political offenses. 
Provincial police 
authority may also at times be limited by appli- 
cation of the CONINTES plan for the suppres- 
sion of terrorism. 
Armed furces units have also 
on occasion used CONINTES pian authority to 
usurp ordinary police functions such as investi- 
vation and arrest. 
Provincial police jurisdiction 
is limited ih many areas by the border-patrolling 
activities of the Gendarmerie. 
a. BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL POLICE 
(1) Organization and strength — The Bue- 
nos Aires Provincial Police control public order 
and safety in Argentina’s most populous, highly 
industrialized, and agriculturally productive prov- 
ince. 
They work in close cooperation with Fed- 
eral Police in the suppression of crime ard control 
of civil disturbances, particularly in the indus- 
trial suburbs surrounding Buenos Aires. 
With headquarters in the provincial capital of 
La Plata, Buenos Aires Provincial Police are re- 
sponsible to the governor of the province through 
the provincial minister of the interior. 
A 1962 de- 
cree requires that the chief of the force be an air 
force officer. 
Organization of the force is shown 
in Ficure 6. 
There are eight directorates and six 
administrative offices. 
'The Deputy ' 
ief serves 
as inspector general. 
The unifor.':.' gersonnel 
| 
| 
| 
| 
; 
— 
_ 
| 
a
a 
tua 
‘or? 
se 
ote 
| 
Communicotites 
| 
| 
tecal Medicir: 
Pertorr 
curity 
Crime Vivition 
Courtel 
j 
Suritotion 
tt 
Ac cling Persons 
Telephones 
Entronce Board 
| 
oF 
Protecion 
Inlegroph 
Police 
fe 
rity 
Archives 
Treowry 
Rodio 
Files 
Detachment 
Comorroiler 
Tromport 
Juan Vuce 
te 
ty . 
tortion 
Pantie 
Acad 
intend 
— 
lroon School 
Pobece Lyceum 
Suerd 
of me 
Ficune 6. ORGANIZATION oF Burnes 
Provincia, PoLice 
are administered 
in two different 
directorates: 
patrolmen 
serve 
in the 
Security 
Directorate, 
other 
uniformed 
units, including traffic police, 
Fire Department, and security guards, in ine in- 
stitutes Directorate. 
Within the nine territorial 
districts into which the province is divided the 
basic 
organizational 
unit 
is the 
commissary, 
whose jurisdiction is further divided into subcom- 
missaries and detachments in thinly populated 
parts of the province. 
Present strength of the Buenos Aireg Provincial 
Police is believed to be somewhat i 
excess of 
18,000, about the same as that reported in 1957 
and a slight increase over the 1955 strength of 
| 
16,122. Roughly 40% are estimated to be adminis- 
trative and technical personnel. 
Strength has 
not kept pace with population growth, the pres- 
ent number of uniformed personnel being no 
greater than that of 1945. 
The volume wus opera- 
tions and degree of effectiveness may be gauged 
by Ficure 7. 
Although percentage of arrests is 
good in the case of crimes against persons, which 
are mainly crimes of violence, it is considerably 
lower in the case of crimes against property, be- 
lieved in part due to the lack of suflicient person- 
nel to investigate all petty thefts. 
(2) Operations —- Police operations range 
from riot control to rural patrol activities, often 
conducted on horseback, in the sparsely populated 
countryside. 
The organization maintains both 
infe atry and cavalry security guards (guardia de 
seguridad}, % capinc section, and a small Woman’s 
Brigade (Brigada Femenina), created in 1947. 
Traffic control, a task made difficult by the cx- 
tensive system of highways leading into the Ied- 
eral District, is entrusted to the Highway Police 
& 
> 
Corns (Cucrpo de Camineros), with headquarters 
in the Buenos Aires suburb of Florencio Varela, 
aud subeommands in the suburbs of San Martin 
and Lanus, and in the provincial capital of La 
?jata. 
The industrial suburban area surrounding 
the city of Buenos Aires, extending from the sub- 
urb of Tigre to the city of La Plata, is patrolled 
by some i100 aetachments, each consisting of one 
automobile and two motorcycles. 
Policing the swamrv Parana delta, which con- 
tains the summer homcs of many wealthy Buenos 
Aires citizens as well as isolated rural dwellings, 
is entrusted to the Security Guard oc the Is- 
lands (Cardia de Seguridud de las Islas). 
Twis 
unit is equipped with motor patrol boats and re- 
lics om an extensive radio communications net- 
work, 
(3) Training, facilities, and effectiveness —- 
The training of Buenos Aires Provinciai Police of 
officer rank is similar to that of Federal Police of- 
ficers. 
Cadets take 2 years of training under mili- 
tary discipline at the Juan Vucetich Pelice Acad- 
emy at La Plata. 
Courses include history, geosra- 
phy, and psychology; 
law-enforcement 
studics; 
and military training which stresses the “art of 
leadership.” 
Cadets participate in military excr- 
cises with regular army units. 
Physical training 
includes gymnastics, boxing, and judo. 
Second 
year cadets engage in law enforcement work in 
the cities of La Plata and Mar del Plata during 
the summer raonths. 
Buenos Aires Provincial Police officers receive 
further training during specified periods of their 
careers in order to be eligible for advancement. 
Such courses, lasting up to 1 year, are given at 
the Superior Police School (Z£scucla Superior de 
. 
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Fiavay 7. NATURE OF CRIME AND RAYE OF APPREHENSION, BUENOS AIRES 
PROVINCE, 1957 
NUMBER 
CRIMES AGAINST 
Prehable | Arrested | 'emaining 
offen Jers 
at large 
Persons (Las Personas) (Violent crimes)..... 
13,299 
17,112 
14,165 
2,047 
Chastity (La 
932 
i, 129 
SLO 
309 
Property (La Propriedad) (Theft and swin- 
Liberty (La Libertad) (Illegal servitude and 
Py. fe 
Public administration (Administracion 
lica) (Misappropriation of funds, sbuse of 
authority, resistance against authority).... 
R45 
1,155 
302 
853 
Public 
Security, 
(La 
Seguridad 
Publica) 
Marriage (El Estado Civil) (Bigamy)....... 
l 
Character (El Hunor) (Libel). ............. 
8-4 
Public Trust (La Fe Pdblica) (Counterfeiting 
and bad-check pasting)......... 
138 
107 
Public Order (El Orden Pablico) (Intimida- 
Public 
<Anthority 
(Los 
Poderes 
Publicos) 
Norp 
The most common offenses in cach category are given in parentheses. 
Policia) in La Plata. 
Courses deal with advanced 
lepal and criminological subjects, but also include 
military tactics, small arms firing, fencing, and 
riding. 
Enlisted personnel aie trained 
at the 
Noncommissioned Officer and Troop School (2s- 
(.elc para Suboficiales y Tropa). 
The Buenos Aires Provincial 
Police 
are 
not 
known to have any serious deficiencies in equip- 
ment or facilities, although authorities have cited 
a need 
for more 
vehicles and communication 
equipment. 
Criminological facilities are reported 
to be inferior to those of Federal Police although 
better than those of other provinces. 
The ‘Tech- 
nical Secretariat makes an 
effort 
to keep 
in- 
formed of the latest scientific advances in crimi- 
nology and police communications. 
Pay scales for Buenos Aires Provincial Police 
are comparable to those of Federa! 
Police and 
higher than those 
of other provincial 
security 
forces. 
Certain tringe benefits are provided. 
A 
department of social assistance within the Social 
Secretariat is devoted to aiding policemen and 
their families. 
A police cooperative store offers 
low prices and credii. on foodstuffs for both aciive 
and retired personnel, and a summer vacation 
colony is operated at the resort of Miramar for 
police and thei~ families. 
The San Jose 
is 
maintained for orphans of policemen. 
Buenos Aires Provincial Police are considered by 
most observers the equal or near-equal of the 
federal Police in riot control and the suppression 
Of ordinary crime, 
They are well organized and 
diseinlined 
~ 
ire 
b. OTHTR PROVINCIAL POLICE ForcES — Little in- 
formation is available on the police forces of prov- 
inces other than Buenos Aires; however, none is 
believed to equal the Buenos Aires Provincial Po- 
lice in size or efficiency. 
A 1963 aid report de- 
seribed their organization, training, and equip- 
ment as “fair to poor.” 
All provincial police forces 
are under the control of the governor of the prov- 
ince through the provincial minister of the in- 
terior and their organization is generally similar 
to that of the Federal Police and the Buenos Aires 
Provincial Police, but usually less elsborate. 
Most 
are Civided into separate sections which perform 
the 
functions 
of administration, 
investigation, 
and law enforcement, with the last separated into 
ordinary patrol and traffic control units. 
Tiot 
control 
duties 
are 
frequently 
perforiacd 
by 
mounted police. 
Because motorized equipment is in shart ovy 
piv, much patrolling 
in rural @reas is slut 
on 
horseback. 
Traffie sontroi ic made diificull vy «a 
shortage of patrol cars and motoreyelos. 
Corm- 
munications and laboratory equ'pment are 
iike- 
wise inferior. 
Most provincial police carry pistols 
or 
carbines, 
while 
mounted 
units 
may 
utilize 
sabers for riot control. 
Pay seales for provincial policemen are gener- 
ally inadequate, resulting in low capability and 
efiriciency of personnel, and pfiving rise to morale 
probicms. 
In July 1961 Cordoba Provincial Police 
k, demanding increased wares, and police tt 
Province 
of 
Mendoza 
reportediy 
the 
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policemen 
are 
reportedly 
often 
susceptible 
to 
bribery. 
Training facilities and programs are considered 
inferior to those of the Federal and Buenos Aires 
Provincial 
Police although 
the more 
populous 
provinces have special police academies. 
Leader- 
ship is generally poor. 
Au investigation of Cor- 
doba Provincial Police in early 1960 revealed that 
among chiefs of police districts were men wno had 
been previously passed over for promotior., others 
who had no prev’ous police exrerience, and some 
who had criminal records. 
One chief was report- 
edly almost illiterate. 
A system of examinations 
for competence was subsequently introduced to 
correct the situation. 
C. Penal system 
1, Civil 
a. LEGaL BASIS — Argentina’s leyal system, 
like that of other Latin American nations, follows 
the concept of the Roman Justinian Code with ern- 
phasis on the administration of justice through 
the application of formal and highly detailed legal 
codes. 
In contrast, the United States and most 
of the English-speaking world emphasize. common 
law, which places heavy reliance upon prior court 
decisions to provide legrl precedents. 
Argentina 
and 
Mexico 
are 
the 
only 
Latin 
Americar nations to retuin the dual system of 
courts and administration of justice characteris- 
tic of federal republics such as the United States. 
Argentina has both federal and previncial court 
systems, but strong unitary influence is shown by 
the fact chat crimingi, civil, c-mmercial, and min- 
ing codes are nationalin scope. 
Procedural codes, 
however, ere left to the provinces. 
(1) Constitutional 
provisions —-‘Vhe 
Ar- 
gentine Constitution of 1853, which has been in 
force since that date with the exception of 1949- 
1955 whei it was replaced by a Peronist-inspircd 
charter, contains guarantees of civii rights, defini- 
tions of certain crimes, and ksoad ovtiines of judi- 
cial procedure. 
Specifically guaranteed are free- 
dom of employment, petition, teaching, learning, 
association, and publication of ideas: 
Prohibited 
are confiscation of property, punishment without 
previous 
trial, 
self-incrimination, 
vivintion 
cf 
domicile, and penalties for treason which go be 
yond the person of the offender. 
The Constitu- 
tion also specifically forbids the punishments of 
flogging and torture, and the imposition of the 
death penalty for political offenses. 
Several arti: 
Cles which provide for the establishment of trial 
by jury have never been impleraented and tria) by 
judge continues to be the practice. 
The Constitu- 
lion makes no mention of weit of hebess corpus 
but in practice it is recognized by the courts on 
the basis of other laws. 
‘ 
‘ 
‘ ‘ 
‘ ‘ 4 
‘ 
‘ 4 
‘ > 
‘ 4 4 4 4 
Constitutional guarantees may be temporarily 
suspended by the declaration of a state of sicze 
by the president; however, the president may not 
convict individuals or apply punishment on his 
own authority, his power being limited to arrest 
and transfer of persons fromm one part of the 
esuntry to another. 
The imposition of a state of 
siege has been frequently used to circumvent the 
civil rights provisions of the Constitution in order 
to combat subversive groups., In practice, Arpen- 
tina was almost continuously under state of siege 
from 1941 until September 1963. 
(2) Criminal code — The 
first 
national 
criminal code was promulgated in 1887. 
subsequently replaced by the Criminal Code of 
1922 which still remains in effect. 
This code, 
while 
retaining much 
of the 
1887 
code, was 
strongly influenced by the Italian Criminal Code 
of 1890 and other European codes. 
It shows the 
restrained influence of the Italian positivist school 
of criminology which is evident in the system of 
individualization and gradation of punishment. 
However, the code of 1922 is thought of as princi- 
pally classical in outlook and secondarily posi- 
tivist. 
Numsrous attempts have been made to modify 
or replace the code in the light of newer ideas in 
criminology, 
but 
none 
has 
been _ successful. 
Changes and additions to criminal iaw have been 
made piecemeal through subsequent legislation. 
Typical are laws of 1946 and 1947 against speculc- 
tion, usury, and exorbitant prices, and three laws 
of 1958 against other shady financial and busi- 
ness 
dealings. 
A wave 
of automobile 
thelts 
prompted a special decre®-law in 1958, while revul- 
sion against arbitrary arrest and abuse of politi- 
cal prisoners by the Peron regime led to a 1958 law 
prohibiting such practices. 
The increasing use of 
sabotuge and terrorism as a weapon of subversion 
led to the creation of two 1960 laws which not 
only defired such crimes and their nenalties, but 
ruled that such cases wouid be judged ‘1 federal 
courts and prescribed 
a more 
rapid 
trial pro- 
cedure, 
The Arger .ne code is divided inio two parts, 
general and special. 
The general part covers ap- 
plcation of criminal law, penalties, 
tadbil- 
ity, concurrence of [eclonies, habitual 
aud 
similar 
legal 
considerations, 
while 
the 
sauch 
loner special part deals 
wilh 
specific 
crinies, 
classifying 
them according to 12 dificrent cate- 
gories. 
Although the code is applicd throughout 
Argentina by both federal and provincial courts, 
federal criminatt law is not exclusive. © Provinces 
may enact additional criminal laws or repulitions 
in accordance with their local police powcr, 
a! 
though they may nol eeal with 
national 
or 
It was. 
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* 
are not reterred to in the code but are left to na- 
tlonal, provincial, or municipal legislation. 
Extradition provisions of the code are buset en- 
tirely upon 
treaty. 
Treati*s have been sijned 
with the following nations: Spain, Italy, Pelyiuta, 
the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Chile, the 
United States, Switzerland, and Bolivia, Peraguay 
ane Uruguay. 
Where no treaty exists extradi- 
tion 
from 
Argentina 
is a difficult 
and time- 
consuming procedure, with the legal formalit-es 
"frequently givjng criminals ampie time to evade 
arrest. 
b. CRIMINAL AcTS — Criminal acts im Argen- 
tino are 
divided 
into two categories: 
felonies 
‘delitos) or crimes of a serious nature or having 
serious consequences, and misdemeanors (faltas) 
or violations (contravenciones), acts of & less seri- 
ous nature. 
The code fails to define these grades 
of criminality, just as it fails to give a definition 
of what is considered to be a criminal offense but 
it does state that no violat.on may have 2 penalty 
of more than 30 days arrest or 10,000 pesos fine. 
Enumeration of violations not covered in either 
national, provinci2!, or municinal codes is left to 
the police. 
The Argentine code considers a crime as a con- 
scious and voluntary act. 
Exemption from pun- 
ishment may be awarded to these who at the mo- 
ment of committing a crime do not comprehend 
tine criminal nature of the act or who cannot con- 
trol their actions, a definition which includes the 
insane and minors under 14, although they may 
be subject to security measures. 
Also exempt are 
those who are impelled by irresistable physica! 
force or threats, those who cause damage trying 
to avcid greater damage, and those impelled by 
fulfilment of duty, authority, or legitiniate. obe- 
dience. 
The eode makes no specific reference to 
drunkenness as an exempting or mitigating cir- 
curnstance and negligence may also be pimished 
by a criminal sentence. 
Arnong factors which mitigate the severity of a 
sentence is inabilily tu complete the crime, which 
reduces the sentence by one-half 
to one-third. 
Similarly, 
if rebeWion 
or sedition brings about 
only “momentary disturbanve of order,” 
pun- 
ishment is cut in half and if the plot is discovered 
beforehand the guilty receive only 
normal sentence. 
Those that cooperate in any way with the ex- 
me-fourth the 
“-* 
culfon of a criminal deed, even beforehand, 
considered criminal participants, and receive en 
established proportion of the sentence. 
If the ac- 
complice cooperated in a crime believine that the 
acl to be accomplished would be a less serious 
crime, however, he receives only the neualty for 
Lhe less serious erime, 
Penautrics — The principle guiding Argen- 
tine erfiminal law fs the rchabilitation of the crimi- 
nail. 
The code attempts to ii.cividualize punish- 
ments. by a system of maximum and minimum 
penalties and by giving cor siderable discretion to 
judges in meting out punishment. 
Prior to sen- 
Lenecing the judge must try to evaluate the con- 
vict’s personality and must commit his observa- 
tions and his disposition to writing. 
He must obd- 
tein 
medical 
information 
on 
the 
defendant's 
mental condition and disposition for crime when 
the sentence imposed is more than 10 years. 
The state is entitled to combat crime through 
security measures as well as peualties. 
Examonles 
of such measures are commitment to juvenile in- 
stitutions of minors whcse home envirorment is 
considered detrimental and confinement of crimi- 
nally insane to an asylum. 
The criminally in- 
sane can be freed only by a judicial resolution, 
which may be issued if experts agrce ‘hat the 
subject is no longer dangerous. 
| 
Tour types of penalties are provided .n the code: 
reclusion (reclusion), prison, disqualification (in- 
capacided), and fine. 
Violations are punished by 
incarceration, disqualification, fine, and warning. 
Punishment by confiscation of property was spe- 
cifically abolished by the 1853 Constitution and 
the death penalty was not included in the 1922 
code. 
The Code of Military Justice provides for 
ceath by firing squad in the case of treason during 
wartime, but this sentence has never been carried 
out. 
Unsuccessful attempts have been made in 
recent years to revive the death penalty as a de- 
terrent to terrorism. 
Little practical difference exists at present be 
tween the sentences of reclusion and prison. 
The 
former was to be the more severe punishment and 
ceparate penal establishments were to be provided 
for those receiving it. 
The duplication of facili- 
U.cs did not prove feusible, however, and sentences 
of reclusion and prison are usually served in the 
same institution. Theoretically, convicts scutenced 
to reclusion may be used in any type of public 
work while those serving prison sentences 
may 
worl only where they are lodged, but alina 
t 
all 
convict labor now takes place within the 
prison. 
be seen in the following tabulation cover- 
ine 1,153 feder2! court sentences, the penalty of 
ceclusion is most commonly piven in cascs of life 
imprisonment. 
ReCLUSION 
Life 
isonment (merpeiua) 
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a
Selected crimes and penalties 
are showa 
in 
Ficure 8. 
Unless otherwise noted, only the pen- 
alty for the basic crime is given and penalties 
may be substantially raised or reduced by cir- 
cumstances such as death or injury to the vic- 
tim or lack of malice on the part of the offender. 
Although sentences may seem lenient by U.S. 
standards, they are average for Latin America. 
Imposition of life imprisonment is rare. 
Those 
sentenced to life imprisonment may be parceled 
after 20 years’ confinement if they are first of- 
fenders. 
Life sentences being served by habitual 
criminals may be commuted only by judicial ac- 
tion upon good behavior of the convict or by a rov- 
ernmental pardon. 
Fines are widely used as penalties for nonvio- 
lent crimes. 
Guilty persons may also be required 
to pay damages and ccurt costs to victims of a 
crime. 
For the poor the effect of the fine may: be 
mitigated by payment in installments, but jail 
is 
customarily 
imposed 
tor 
nonpayment 
of 
fines. 
Part of tne wages received for prison labor 
is customarily set aside for payment of fines or 
damages. 
In Aigentina as in many Latin Ameri- 
can nations, however, large-scaie inflation 
has 
done much to nullify the punitive effect of fines. 
The only financial! penalties which continue to 
have their intended effect are those few which are 
based on a percentage of the money involved in an 
illegal transaction, for example false witness ob- 
Fraure 8. SELECTED CRIMES AND PENALTIES 
—_ 
PENALTY 
(IMPRISONMENT) 
CRIME 
Homicide: 
Against members 
of immediate 
Life. 
- 
family; 
involving 
treachery, 
cruelty, personal gain, severe 
damage to victim, brutal per- 
versity, poison, fire, flood, de- 
railment 
or explosion; to fa- 
cilitate another criminal act. 
10 to 25 years, plus abso- 
lute disqualification for 
life. 
1 to 5 years 
Assault: 
Causing temporary injury....... 
{ month to 1 year. 
Causing permanent injury. ..... 
to 6 years. 
Robbery (appropriation of goods by 
1 month to 6 youre. 
force), 
3 to 15 yeurs. 
Acceptance 
of bribes 
by public 
6 months to 2 years, plus 
oMeiuls, 
absolute disqualification 
for & to 10 years. 
Nort, 
Unless otherwise specified, penntties are for erimina! 
acts 
without 
exacerbating 
or 
exteounting 
ei: 
‘ 
* 
tained by bribery, in which both briber and brihed 
are fined double the amount of the bribe. 
The penalty of disqualification has two forms, 
absolute and special. 
Vhe former disqualifies the 
guilty person from his present job or profession, 
from obtaining public ernployment, from voting, 
and from receiving a pension, while special dis- 
qualification deprives tne guilly person only of a 
speciuic job, profession, or right. 
Absolute dis- 
qua'fication may extend over a set period or be 
perpetual. 
Disqualification is ordinarily not called 
for unless the crime in questior treats of titles, 
offices, or authorization. 
Judges and public offi- 
cials are subject to disqualification for crime or 
nerlicence, and public officials guilty of tortur- 
ing prisoners receive absolute perpetual disquali- 
fication. 
The criminal code provides for the suspended 
sentence. 
This may be awarded to first offenders 
with a sentence of less than 2 years, if justified 
by the character of the guilty person and the na- 
ture of the crime. 
No restrictions are placed 
upon the recipient and the conviction is considered 
voided if no new crime is committed during the 
period of the original sentence. 
Precautionary imprisonment (prisién preventa- 
tiva) is not mentioned in the criminal code but 
is justified in the national Code of Procedure 
(Co. 
jo de Procedimientos) in order to hold sus- 
pects during irdictrnent procesdines 
Nelease on 
bail 
(libertad bajo fianza) may be awarded 
if 
the person is considered unlikely to elude justice. 
Changes of administration 
have occasionally 
effected a decree of amnesty for political crimes 
or for civil and military crimes committed 
in 
a nolitical context. 
Such a decree was issued.in 
September 1955, after the overthrow of the Pe- 
rom repime; again in May 1958, after the ascen- 
sion to the presidency of Arturo Frondizi; and 
most recently (September 1963) by the govern- 
ment of José M. Guido in anticipation of the in- 
aururation of Arturo Ilia as constitutional presi- 
Gent. 
The 1958 decree freed 8,000 persons and 
lifted sentences of disqualification on 41,201. 
Official and private criminological agencis play 
n important part in determinings penal 
dvitey. 
a 
Vhe. most tmportant of these is the Tistiiute 
of 
Criminological Investipation and 
sitiuto 
de Investigaciones 
y Docencia 
Craunimo 
logicas) of the Province of Bucnos Aires. 
‘The tn- 
stitute studies the delinquent and his crifae as a 
social phenomenon, functions as a criminolopical 
teaching facility, compiles official criminal statis- 
tics, 
and js charged with the formation of a scien- 
tific base for provincial criminal policy and with 
the study of penal science. 
In 1957 it was fiver 
authority over the provincial Protectorate 
of 
mer Convicts and Released 
Prisoners 
(fatroraio 
iy 
L[rberedos 
y Eacarecelados), 
an 
ta 
paroi board tm the 
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$ 
| 
¥ 
!
~- 
— 
The organization of this Institute {s shown in 
Fioure 
9. 
It receives 
its own budget directly 
from the province rather than through the pro- 
vincial Directorate of Prisons 
(Direccion de Pe- 
nales). 
The Institute 
trains criminological 
as- 
sistants, specialists in scientific criminological in- 
vestigations, and criminological social assistants 
who carry on social work among criminals and 
their families. 
The 2-year courses are open lo 
those with secondary school diplomas while the 
library of the Institute is open to anyone whose 
activities are connected with criminolozy. 
The 
Argentine Institute of Criminology (/nstifuto Ar- 
gentino de Criminologia), a private organization, 
is engaged in the same field but has no direct in- 
fluence on penal policy. 
d. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
(1) Organization of the courts — Argen- 
tina’s dual system of federal and provincial courts 
was originally modeled after that of the United 
States and still contains many similar features. 
The supreme judicial body of the nation is the 
five-man Supreme Court of Justice (Corte 
Suprema 
de Justicia). 
Each province likewise has its su- 
preme court subordinate to the national body. 
The federal government and the provinces each 
ave @& paralicl system of courts of appeal and 
courts of first instance. 
Federal courts have sole 
jurisdiction in the Federal Capital and the Terri- 
tory of Tlerra del Fuego; elsewhere authority 1s 
divided between provincial and federal courts. 
Argentina's judicial system has suffered frorm 
interference 
of the executive branch, although 
such interference has been legal in form. 
Peron 
removed judges unsympathetic to him, while his 
appointees were removed after his ouster in 1955. 
An executive decree of April 1962, issued by Presi- 
dent José M. Guido, authorized federal interven- 
tors in the provinces to place the local judiciary 
in “a state of suspense,” thereby abrogating their 
lifetime tenure and resulting in the removal of 
several, 
Appointment to federal judiciary posts is 
now made following examination of candidates by 
an examining board. The best qualified candidates 
are chosen to fill vacancies, but persons of bad 
moral character or anti-democratic ideology (Com- 
munist or Peronist) are disqualified. 
All Fereral 
Supreme Court justices and all federal mag.stra- 
cies are appointed by the president with tlhe con- 
sent of the Argentine Senate. 
Provincial Su- 
preme Court justices and magistracies are gen- 
erally 
appointed 
by the 
respective 
pyovernors 
with the consent of the provincial legislatures. 
The Argentine Supreme Court consists of a 
chief justice and six associate justices, appointed 
for life and during good behavior. 
The Supreme 
Court interprets national legislation, serves 
as 
highest court of appeal in both national and pro- 
OrRECTOR 
| 
sedwicol Secretory 
| 
DIVISIONS 
Educational 
Cruninal Register 
| 
| 
Cours 
Poro'e Foard 
Sechons 
Criminal 
Crime aleg:<ai 
File 
Boord 
Ag hive 
Socigiogy 
Parole board 
Regiter 
Penology and 
Mousemus 
Regulotan 
Perweniiaty 
an of 
Crinunal 
Perioarel 
Pesagegy 
ove 
informuteon 
t 
~ 
Ce 
ii 
Ficure 9. Instirure or Crininonociesr, 
mers, La 
Mohn 
Aiur del Plota 
Aisi 
Cisloves 
Lo Fiala 
i> 
AND ‘TRACHING, Province or 
— 
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J 
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¥ 
on 
yincial cases, resolves questions of jurisdiction be- 
tween federal and provincial courts, and has origi- 
nal jurisdiction in cases concerning foreign diplo- 
mats and their servants and in cases involving in- 
ternational law. 
its rulings are binding upon al! 
other courts and judges. 
Federal appellate courts (cortes de apelacidn) 
correspond to the federal circuit courts of appeal 
in the United States and are composed of three 
or more members. 
The court of the Federal Capi- 
tal is at present composed of 12 members, divided 
into four chambers, one of which concerns itself 
with criminal matters. 
Appellate 
courts, 
both 
federal and provincial, supervise their respective 
courts of first instance in addition to hearing an- 
peals from them. 
There are 37 Federal Courts of First Instance 
(Juzgados Federales de Primera Instancia) out- 
side the Federal District. 
Corresponding roughly 
to federal district courts in the United States, 
they are located in all provincial capitals, in ma- 
jor cities, and in the Territory of Tierra del Fuego. 
Such courts have originul jurisdiction in crimes 
committed on the high seas, in Argentine waters 
or ports, and in places where the federal govern- 
ment 
has absolute 
and 
exclusive 
jurisdiction. 
They also try cases involving national sovereignty 
and security, that concern national incorne, aifect 
the mails, concern national elections, or involve 
falsification of currency or national documents. 
Federal criminal courts have sole jurisdiction 
In the Federal Capital or District. 
They are of 
two types: 
criminal and correctional. 
Neithei 
the national code of procedure which states the 
functions of the various courts, nor the decree of 
February 1944, which established the Municipal 
Tribunal of Misdemeanors (Tribunal de Faltaus 
nicipales) 
precisely defines the juriscictions 
of 
these courts, but violations, tried by correctional 
courts, are understood to include all criminal! acts 
not constituting felonies as enumerated in the 
criminal code. 
Violations in the Federal Capital are tried by the 
Municipal Tribunal of Misdemeanors and by the 
Chief Of Federal ‘Police; they may fall uncer na- 
tional or municipal law or under police regula- 
— National violations are few and include 
7 practices as illegal gambling and maltreat- 
Aiotigg 
Both courts have their juris- 
h 
mited to cases involving penalties of less 
etki days’ confinement, whi'e the Municipal 
“Sunal cannot assess fines of more than 10,000 
Pesos aud the police court, fines of more than 
1,200 pesos. 
ome Municipal Tribunal is cormposed 
of 10 
are distributed 
in § courts with 
‘Procedure before both the Tri- 
| he Chief of Police is o1al and summary, 
convictions 
in 
these 
correctional 
SOLIT 
Te 
; 
| 
Ls 
taken 
before 
Correctiona: 
ww 
= 
‘ 
‘ 
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> 
second and final instance. 
(Juezes Correccionales), which serve as courts of 
Appeal must be made 
within 24 hours of the finding of the court and 
must involve penalties of more than 5 days’ con- 
finement or 200 pesos fine. 
| 
Argentine federal and provincial law has spe- 
cinl provisions for the trial of minors. 
In the 
capital one or more judges may be added to the 
criminal courts of original jurisciction and a spe- 
cial trial process is used. 
In mosv cf the provinces 
independent courts for minors have been created. 
Parents at fault may be included within the juris- 
diction of these courts and may be jailed or fined 
for neglect and other offenses. 
(2) Trial procedure — Each province as 
well as the nation has its own code of trial pro- - 
cedure. 
The national code, in force in all federal 
courts, is dated October 1888 and modeled after 
the Spanish law of 1855. 
Despite much agitation 
for a change to the more rapid and less cumber- 
sume oral trial, Argentina is one of the few coun- 
tries maintaining the use of written forms of 
court 
procedure. 
The 
oral 
system 
has been 
adopted in the Provinces of Cordoba, Santiago del 
Estero, Jujuy, La Rioja, and Mendoza, and is par- 
tially in force in the Provinces of Buenos Aires 
and San Luis. 
A new procedural code calling for 
oral trial has been drawn up under the direction of 
legal expert Dr. Alfredo Vélez Mariconde, buf has 
not been enacted. 
Criminal procedure is modeled on French forms 
and involves three stages: the pretrial investiga- 
tion, the indictment 
(sumario), and the 
trial 
(plenario). 
Arrests can be only by written order 
of a judge, unless the accused is apprehended in 
the act of committing the crime 
(infraganfi). 
(Citizens’ arrests in such cases are authorized.) 
Persons arrested are brought beiore an instruc- 
tion judge (juez de instruccién) who combines 
the functions of committing magistrate and grand 
jury. 
Witnesses 
are heard and the accused is 
questioned to determine if he is guilty and, if so, 
whether he should be released on his own recopiil- 
zance, freed on bail, or placed in preventative ar- 
rest until the trial begins. 
In federal 
trials the 
judze is not permitted to release an accuocd if the 
riaximum penalty for the alleged criine 
6 years. 
The indictment proceedings ate secret as is the 
investigation which 
is directed by the instruc- 
tion judge with the aid of police. 
‘Viieoretically 
the judge is impartial and acts only in the in- 
terest of the state. 
The accused is held incoin- 
municado without benefit of counsel, on the theory 
that his actions or those of his friends mieht in- 
fluence the Investigation. 
Tle may be controntod 
with 
witnesses 
the judge chooses 
to 
Witnesses 
whose 
testimony 
eoutliebls 
De 
@dowith euch 
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there Is sufficient reason to believe the accused 
guilty, the instruction judge declares the indict- 
ment proceedings closed and passes the case to- 
gether with the evidence to a trial judge (juez de 
sentencia). 
A stay of proceedings 
(sobresetimi- 
ento) may be decreed by the judge at any time 
during the investigation. 
It may be permanent 
if the innocence of the accused is evident, or pro- 
visional, in which event the case is held open 
pending new evidence. 
This phase of the Argentine procedural system 
has been criticized as overdependent on the dis- 
cretion of the instruction judge. 
His impartial- 
ity may be impaired by dislike of the accused or 
a tendency to identify himself with the prosecu- 
tion. 
The case for the prosecution in the trial is led 
either by the public prosecutor (ministerio fiscal) 
or by an attorney for the injured party, if the 
latter chooses to hire counsel rather than rely 
solely on the public prosecutor to protect his in- 
terests. The accused is legally permitted to defend 
himself personally, but will be assigned a lawyer 
if the judge deems it advisable. 
Burden of proof 
rests on the accuser who has a period of 30 days 
in which to produce it. 
Because of the use of written pruceedings during 
the trial it often is only necessary to review the 
files of the pretrial investigation and indictment. 
The clerk reads the witnesses’ statements and 
reports of findings by the police and others anu 
sometimes procedure is so routine that the judge 
absents 
himself and permits the clerk of tri- 
bunal to preside. 
During the reading of the files 
ceponents are available for further questioning 
and new witnesses may be called. 
At the con- 
clusion of the trial the respective parties, includ- 
ing third parties seeking damages, sum 'p the 
case after which the judge takes it under advise- 
ment. 
In theory sentence must be pronounced 
within 
20 days but the judge sometimes 
con- 
siders the case for longer periods. 
The judce’s 
findings not only resolve the question of guilt or 
innocence of the defendant but, in event of in- 
nocence, may declare the accusation to be slan- 
derous. 
Proponent’. 
of oral procedure 
as opposed 
to 
written procedure maintain that the latter tends 
to present the accused to the judge as a narne 
rather than a person and permits only limited 
evaluation of the accused’s character. 
They also 
contend that falsehoods and abuses of justice are 
facilitated under the present system. 
Appeal of a sentence must be made within 5 
days under ordinary circumstances. 
Not only the 
accused but the prosecution may appeal a judicial 
decisiou and attorneys for both may appear in 
person bheiore thie Judges of the apnellite court 
Procedure in the courts of appeal, in contrast to 
courts of first instance, Is oral. 
Reeause the pretrial investigation of a serious 
crime may extend over a year or more, Argentine 
trial processes have been criticized as being slow, 
resulting in a backlog of cases and persons await- 
ing trial. 
Figures on the total number of persons 
held pending trial in Argentina are not avail- 
able, but some idea of trial delays may b 
 ained 
by the fact that of 1,598 persons so held. 
Villa 
Devoto Prison in December 1962, 110 hac been 
held since 1960, 73 since 1959, 51 sirce 1938, 12 
since 1957, and one person each since 1966 and 
1954, 
¢. INCIDENCE OF CRIME — Crime rates in Ar- 
eentina are generally lower than those of other na- 
tions of comparable size and socioeconomic de- 
velopment. 
Incidence of juvenile delinquency and 
of crime by women is low, although the latter has 
shown a steady rise in recent years. 
Crimes in- 
volving bloodshed are less frequent in Argentina 
than in most other Latin American nations; the 
Argentine criminal has been characterized as one 
who is interested in enriching himself. 
Crimes committed under the infiuence of alco- 
hol, although not of serious proportions, are more 
cormmon in rural areas anl especially in certain 
of the provinces of the north, often taking the 
form 
of murder or assault. 
In the northern 
province of Tucuman crimes against property are 
rare but the number of homiciues and aggravated 
assaults (lesiones dolasas) in certain years has ap- 
proximated 
that of the city of Buenos 
Aires, 
which has five times the population. 
Statistics on Argentine criminality do nut re- 
veal any characteristics that differ widely froin 
those of other nations.. 
The ratio between crimi- 
nals of urban and rural origins closely approxi- 
mates urban-rural ratios in the population as a 
whole. 
However, as shown in the following tabu- 
tation, of 1,153 persons sentenced to federal penal 
institutions in 1955, the latest year for which such 
Statisties are avancble, 63% of the rural criadnals 
sentenced were first offenders, as apaimst 
of 
those 
Of urban 
origin, an 
indication 
that 
the 
recidivist is more often found 
in am urban 
on 
vironment: 
URuan 
343 
One previous conviction ..... 
1L0 
Ts 
Four or more convictions 
.... 
The group included 150 illiterates, 932 persons 
who had never gone beyond primary school (404 
eranuates), 67 wha had attained some 
education 
(4b 
and 
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received university training 
(1 groduate). 
The 
ages of those sentenced were as fol ws: 
YEARS 
233 
An occupational breakdown of the group re- 
yealed urban day laborers (jornalercs) to be most 
numerous, followed by white-collar workers (em- 
pleados) 
and 
rural 
laborers 
(peones 
rurales). 
A large percentage of the prison population are 
foreign born as might be expected in a nation 
which has received extensive currents of immicra- 
tion. 
In 1955 the federal prison population to- 
talled 2,760; of these 530 were foreigners. 
High- 
est crime rates among foreign nationals are held 
jointly by Chileasis and Paraguayans, who form a 
numerous lavoring class element in the southern 
and northein parts of the nation, respectively. 
| 
Crime rates among European foreign horn, prin- 
i 
cipally Italian and Spanish, are a smaitl fraction 
of those of Chileans and Paraguayans. 
Crimes against property and against persons 
form the overwhelming proportion of criminal 
acts. 
Among women, the most common crime is 
simple theft; of the 385 persons held on federal 
indictments on this charge in 1955, at least 125 
were women, 
in Argentina than in most other Latin American 
nations; however, it falls short of the level reached 
in the United States. 
Spurred by inflated prices 
for new 
and used automobiles, 
cer theft has 
Teached unusual heights in recent years and has 
evidenced 
considerable 
organi:ation 
ant 
profi- 
ciency. 
In 1961 an estimaced 4,320 of Arpentina’s 
1,200,000 vehicles were stolen, 2,800 uf them in 
Bucnos Aires and its suburbs. Hich!y organized 
fangs divided functions into stealing vehicles, al- 
tering their appearance, and transporting them 
to cther parts of the country for resale. 
Cases of 
! 
lies with important or minor government officials 
Were revealed: in one case cars were altered in p 
pearance within the Santiago del Estero provincial 
Jail with the complicity of the diré ctor, and in 
another officials within the municipal government 
Of Buenos Aires were 
issuing own ership docti- 
ments to gangs. 
Intensified 
investigative 
work 
has increased 
recoveries and somewhat 
reduced 
thefts from the record high reached in 1961, bub 
automobile theft continues to be a major prob- 
lem while import restrictions insure exeererated 
Values for automobiles. 
‘mport restrictions applied to luxury goods have 
Elven rise to smuggling. 
In 19528 the volume 
of 
‘Urging 
was estinated ab 
¥ 
Organized crime appears to be more prevalent 
nually. 
‘There ts evidence that smuggling is fre- 
quently expedited by bribery of customs officials. 
Unlike auto theft, however, there is no evidence 
of criminal organizations being involved in smug- 
cling except in drug traific. 
This latter is most 
prevalent 
across 
the Bolivian 
frontier 
and 
is 
carried on principally by Bolivian farm workers 
who cross into Argentina to assist in harvesting 
sugar cane and other crops. 
In addition to Bolivian cocaine, drug traffic in- 
cludes opium from the Orient and matihuana 
trom Central America. 
Most of the users are 
found 
in urban areus, particularly among the 
criminal element. 
Laws against drug peddlers are 
lenient by U.S, standards, while users are not 
commonly prosecuted. 
Corrupt ties with govern- 
ment administration were evi’enced by accusa- 
tions in 1961 that the Secretary General of Salta 
Province and the son of the governor were accom- 
plices in the traffic. 
White slave traffic, notorious in Buenos Ailes 
previous to Worle War II, is alleged to continue 
on a reduced scale. 
However, those most often 
enticed or coerced into prostitution now are girls 
arriving in Buenos Aires from rural districts to 
seek employment, rather than Europeans. 
Ar- 
gentina has ratified U.N. covenants prohibiting 
legal 
prostitution, 
but 
individual 
prostitutes 
who operate 
clandestinely 
are 
not} commonly 
prosecuted. 
Administrative corruption and theft has occa- 
sionally been widespread at all levels of govern- 
ment. 
Irregularities range from acceptance of 
bribes to embezzlement, 
in one case involving 
sums exceeding 96 million dollars, which is the 
charge against José Mazar Barnett, who served as 
vresident of the National Bank (Banco de le 
Nacién). 
As stated 
above, 
there 
is no police 
bureau to deal directly with corruption in gov- 
ernment and disclosures of corruption must of- 
ten await changes in administration, since fov- 
elsuments in power are reluctant to reveal crimi- 
nal avts by subordinates, 
f. JUVENILE 
DELINQUENCY 
--- Juvenile 
delin- 
quency is not a problem of seriouws 
proportions, 
The Argentine soeeo is more cohesive than that 
of many other societies and, since larye-scale 
cin- 
ployment of women 
is not yet the 
rile, 
most 
children 
receive 
close parental 
supervision. 
In 
addition, Argentina does nol expericnec the wide- 
spread poverty common 
in many 
other 
Latin 
American 
nations. 
An unusual 
feature 
of the 
Argentine 
juvenile delinquency problem 
is_ the 
political motivation which leads youths from up- 
and uyper raiddle class fanilies to participate 
in violence inspired by ultranationalist, antis 
nillie subversive groups 
Arcentine 
lerislation 
fave 
attention 
to 
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when the protectorate of minors (patronato de 
menores) law was passed putting those under 18 
years of age who are accused of a crime or are in 
conditions of “material or moral abandonment” 
:* the disposition of the courts, 
By legal defini- 
tion abandonment includes frequenting sites of 
immorality, gambling, or selling objects on the 
street; but this is loosely enforced. 
The minor 
may be put under the guardianship of a “decent” 
(honesta) relative or other person, or confined in 
a suitable institution until age 21. 
Parents or 
guardians guilty of grave negligence tmnay be fined 
or jailed for short periods. 
Officials are required 
to present a report on the background of mincrs 
and their families when preparing indictments 
against juveniles. 
Since action is designed to be 
more corrective than punitive, preventive arrest 
is applied only when absolutely necessary. 
Close 
observation of the juvenile is maintained after 
trial through reports to the judge by the institu- 
tion where the subject is lodged or, if set at liberty, 
by inspectors or police officials. 
The legal functioning of the protectorate of 
minors is controjled by the National Council for 
Protection of Minors (Consejo Nacional de Protec- 
cion de Menores), which is a dependency of the 
Ministry of Education and Justice (Ministerio de 
Educacion y Justicia). 
In addition to overseeing 
the protectorate, the Council is charged with su- 
pervising private establishments for minors. 
The protectorate of minors functioned 
effec- 
tively until 1942 when military and potitical crises 
began to interrupt its development. 
It has in re- 
cent years regained some of its former importance 
but still operates at a reduced level, with many of 
the provisions of law only partially enforced and 
others remaining unenforced. 
A cmuplete reor- 
ganization is now contemplated. 
Argentina has over 100 establishments, public 
and private, devoted to minors. 
The most famous 
juvenile 
institution 
is the “Ricardo 
Gutiérrez” 
Colony Home (Colonia Hogar), fuunded in 1924, 
Which has served 
as 
a model 
for: subsequent 
homes. 
It has roughly 500 boys, aged 8 to 17, who 
reccive training in a variety of trades. 
Facilities 
are considered excellent and inmates are housed 
in small cottages, each under the direction of a 
married couple. 
New inmates are given medica! 
and psychological tests, and records are kept of 
their progress. 
Other 
national 
imstitutions, 
lo- 
cated, like the Kicardo Gutiérrez home, near luc- 
nos Aires, are the Carlos Pellegrini home, which 
teaches industrial, commercial, and agricultural 
trades, the Almafuerte 
Artisan School 
(#scuela 
de Artesanos Almafuerte), which operates on a 
systern of minimum security, and the Mariano 
Ortiz 
Basualdo 
Schvol Home 
(Escvela 
Hogar), 
Which 
specializes 
in 
agricultural 
education. 
Three homes for girls administered by the Urini- 
larian order of nuns are the Santa Rosa 
> 
(Amparo) in the federal Capital, and the Caye. 
tono Zebecchi Institute and Maria Muzzarellio Ar. 
ricultur2l Schoo! in Buenos Aires province. 
Most juvenile homes, public and private, do not 
equal 
the standards 
of the 
Ricardo 
Gutiérre 
Colony Home; those operated by provincial Poy. 
ernments are most likely to be deficient because 
of the lack of financial support. 
A weakness in 
treatinent of juvenile offenders is the frequent 
confinement of those awaiting trial in the same 
jails with adults, 
In addition, tnere does not ap- 
pear to be any nationwide agency to help readjust 
those discharged from juvenile institutions. 
2. Military 
Military law is governed by the Code of Military 
Justice (Codigo de Juscicia Militar), which is di- 
vided into three parts. 
The first part deals with 
the organization 
and competence 
of military 
courts; 
the second, with procedure in military 
trials; and the third, with punishments. 
The 
jurisdiction of military courts in Argentina 
is 
wide: it may be applied not only to regular mili- 
tary personnel and conscripts but also to )etired 
military peiconnel in certain instances. 
How- 
ever, military personnel are tried in a civil court 
uncer the civil code for crimes defined by that 
code unless the crime has a specific military con- 
text. 
Not only military personnel but civilian em- 
ployees of the armed forces are subject to trial 
under military law for crimes enumerated in the 
Code of Military Justice and for crimes in the 
civilian criminal code when committed in places 
subject to military authority. 
The jurisdiction of 
the military is greatly widened by the invocation 
of the CONINTES 
(a contraction of conmocion 
interna 
del estudo) 
plan to combat 
terrorism. 
Among 
other 
measures, 
the CONINTES 
plan 
calls for the trial by court marti.l of civilians ac- 
cused of terrorism or sabotage. 
It was invoked 
froma March 1960 to August 1961 and for subse- 
quent shorter periods. 
The military court system 
is headed by the 
Superior Military Court 
(Tribunal Superior de 
iTonor) consisting o¢ six general officers and thrce 
level experts chosen froin Argentina’s three 
tary services. 
Ordinary military courts, couiposed 
of seven members, are divided into those for oii 
cers and these for enlisted men: 
the former are 
eormmosed 
of higher ranking 
officers 
than 
the 
Civilians accused of niilitary crimes are tried by 
2 court for enlisted men, vniere the alleged crime 
wes committed in donjunction with officers, bul 
no civilians participate in the functions of mill 
tary courts; both prosecution and defeose ave coi 
ducted by repuor military officers, 
Aceused 
are 
iVied 
hetore 
tailitary beivunals chosen 
frome 
th 
respective services, unless defendants 
caster 
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