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MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT:
Church Committee Oversight Bill
STATINTL
We agree with^^^^^^^^^^^^comment of 26 January of the new draft
of an oversight bill from the Church Committee staff (24 January) is a step
backward.
Our comments on the bill follow:
a.
It seems undesirable to entitle the bill with the word "Oversight"
and to refer to "vigilant legislative oversight," as in section 2.
We
know of no statute which utilizes the term "oversight" in this way.
The
House recommendation also embodies the term and is objectionable for
the same reasons.
b.
Section 3 is constitutionally defective in that it would authorize
one body of the Congress to change the rules of that body which were
established by a statute.
c.
Limiting a Senator to only six years on the Committee on
Intelligence Activities, as provided in section 4,
is objectionable.
Intelligence activities and intelligence functions are novel and difficult
and it takes time for one to acquire expertise.
d.
It is highly undesirable to have both foreign and domestic
intelligence activities within the jurisdiction of one committee (see
section (s)(l)b., page 3).
The two subjects are quite different, and
there are different legal, practical and political considerations for
the two.
e.
The proposal, on page 3, placing authorizations for CIA
appropriations within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Intelligence
Activities almost certainly would disclose CIA budgets and therefore
is objectionable.
f.
The proposal at (s)(2) at the bottom of page 3 concerning
exclusive and concurrent jurisdictions is not clear.
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The proposal at (i) on page 4 that service of a Senator on the
Committee on Intelligence Activities would not be taken into account in
determining the committees on which a Senator serves downgrades the
importance of the Committee
Section 8(a) should be amended to require secrecy agreements.
i.
Section 8(b) is objectionable in that it would require consultation
with the Director on security clearances for employees of any agency,
including those whose responsibility is in the area of domestic intelligence
only
j
Section 10(a) is constitutionally defective in its effort to authorize
the Committee to disclose information classified by the executive branch.
k.
Section 10(a) would operate so as to permit five Senators to
override a decision of the President, and therefore is highly objectionable.
1.
Section 11 appears unnecessary.
m.
Section 12 fails to deal with the probable time lapse which will
occur between expiration of the Church Committee and the establishment
of any new oversight committee.
n.
The term "notwithstanding any provision of law" in subsection
13(a) and (b) would probably negate the sources and methods provision
of the National Security Act and should be deleted.
In the fourth line
of 13(b) the word "any" should be deleted, since it is simply too broad
in that form
o.
Subsection 13(c) would violate the separation of powers concept.
In any event the bill also should repeal section 662 of the Foreign
Assistance Act.
p.
The language of a proposed section 14 is not included but we
understand it would result in the disclosure of budget totals and there-
fore is objectionable.
q.
In keeping with the objection of the concept of one oversight
committee for both foreign and domestic intelligence, the definition in
section 15 should be modified so that the term "intelligence activities"
would cover only foreign intelligence activities
JOHN S
. WARNER
IGejtbral Counsel
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