THE  JOINT  STUDY  GROUP  REPORT 
ON 
FOREIGN  INTELLIGENCE  ACTIVITIES 
OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  GOVERNMENT 
15  December  I960 
SaI-;j.Ii1^j   COPY 
Content  UNCLASSIFIED 
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15  December  I960 
MEMORANDUM  FOR  THE  DIRECTOR  OF  CENTRAL  INTELLIGENCE 
i 
We  present  herewith  the  report  of  the  Joint  Study  Group 
on  Foreign  Intelligence  Activities  of  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment.   In  conducting  this  study  we  have  been  guided  by  the 
attached  terms  of  reference.    We  would  note,  however,  that 
we  inevitably  came  across  matters  of  national  security  interest 
in  the  foreign  intelligence  field  not  specifically  covered  in  the 
terms  of  reference  and  that  we  felt  obligated  to  comment  on 
these. 
In  preparing  this  report  we  have  earnestly  endeavored 
to  consider  what  is  best  for  the  nation.    In  submitting  the  ' 
report  we  recognize  that  in  the  time  allotted  it  was  impossible 
to  cover  in  -detail  the  vast  foreign  intelligence  effort  of  the 
United  States  Government,  but  we  have  endeavored  to  identify 
the  majo?  problem  area*  and  have  recommended  solutions.
Lyman  B.  Kirkpatrick  (Chairman) 
Inspector  General,  Central  Intelligence  Agency- 
Representing  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence 
*/fl/laL^,y^/z.^*  A 
Allan  £#vans 
Special  Assistant  to  the  Director  of  Intelligence  &  Research, 
Department  of  State 
Representing  the  Secretary  of  State 
4/W 
ZL 
Genefal  Graves  B.   Erskine,  USMC 
Assistant  to  the  Secretary  of 
for  Special  Operations 
Representing  the  Secretary  of  Defense 
Robert  M.  Macy* 
Chief  of  the  International  Division,  Bureau  of  the  Budget 
Representing  the  Director,  Bureau  of  the  Budget 
A. 
James  S.  Lay, 
Exe^utyfre  Secretary,  National  Sec^rit/ Council 
Representing  the  Special  Assistant  to  the  President 
for  National  Security  Affairs
APPROVED  TERMS  OF  REFERENCE 
JOINT  STUDY  GROUP 
1.  To  promote  the  most  effective  and  efficient  use 
of  intelligence  resources  and  to  assist  the  DCI  in  carrying 
out  his  responsibilities  for  coordinating  the  foreign  intelli- 
gence activities  of  the  U.  S.  Government,  an  ad  hoc  Stud/ 
Group  is  established  by  agreement  of  the  following  principals, 
who  -will  be  represented  on  the  Group: 
The  Director  of  Central  Intelligence,  -who  will  provide 
the  Chairman 
The  Secretary  of  State 
The  Secretary  of  Defense 
The  Director,  Bureau  of  the  Budget 
The  Special  Assistant  to  the  President  for  National 
Security  Affairs 
The  President's  Board  of  Consultants  on  Foreign  Intelligence 
Activities  will  have  a  representative  sit  as  an  observer  on  the 
Joint  Study  Group  and  the  Board  will  be  given  an  opportunity 
to  comment  on  the  Group's  report. 
2.  The  Group,  under  the  direction  of  the  DCI,  shall 
con  centra. te  its  attention  primarily  upon  organizational  and 
management  aspects  of  the  following  areas  within  the  intelli- 
gence effort.     For  this  purpose  all  aspects  of  foreign  intelli- 
gence shall  be  within  the  purview  of  the  Group.
a.  Inter -departmental,  departmental,   agency 
and  military  service  procedures  for  handling  of  intelligence 
requirements  and  related  guidance  to  collectors  --  with 
particular  attention  to: 
(1)  Procedures  for  keeping  down  the  volume 
of,  and  avoiding  any  unprofitable  duplication  in, 
such  guidance,  and  the  feasibility  of  establishing 
a  central  registry  of  outstanding  intelligence 
requirements  and  of  collection  responses  thereto. 
(2)  Inter -departmental  arrangements  for 
selective  levying  of  requirements  on  the  most 
appropriate  collection  facility  or  facilities. 
b.  USIB  arrangements  for: 
(1)    Ensuring  rapid  adaptation,  adjustment  or 
re -direction  of  existing  collection  assets  to  meet 
changes  in  current  priority  requirements,  and  for 
deciding  upon  and  supporting  expansion  of  existing 
collection  facilities  or  development  of  new  facili- 
ties needed  to  meet  new  agreed  high-priority 
requirements.
(2)    Periodic  community  evaluation  (including 
the  appraisal  of  dollar  and  man-year  inputs)  of 
the  foreign  intelligence  effort  as  a  whole  --  with 
particular  attention  to  improving  the  total  program 
balance,  from  the  geographic  and  functional  points 
of  view,  and  to  increasing  efficiency  and  eliminat- 
ing any  unprofitable  duplication  in  the  utilization 
of  intelligence  resources. 
c.  The  present  military  intelligence  coordinating 
machinery  and  its  relationship  to  the  intelligence  community  -  - 
with  particular  attention  to  possibilities  for  closer  integration 
under  the  authority  of  the  Department  of  Defense  Reorganization 
Act  of  1958. 
d.  The  effectiveness  of  current  implementation  of 
intelligence  coordination  directives  and  procedures  --  with 
special  attention  to  the  field  coordination  of  overseas  intelli- 
gence activities,  and  to  community  support  for  the  intelligence 
needs  e£  senior  U.  S.  .representatives  abroad,  including 
military  commanders. 
e.  Present  arrangements  for  coordinating  research 
and  development  conducted  in  support  of  the  foreign  intelligence
effort  and  for  determining  the  intelligence  community  interest 
in,   and  providing  support  to,   any  R  8c  D  for  other  primary 
purposes  which  may  also  have  significant  potential  usefulness 
to  intelligence. 
3.     The  Group  shall  present,  'by  15  December  1960,  its 
findings  and  recommendations  for  appropriate  action  to  the  DCI 
for  consideration  by  the  Principals,  after  which  time  it  shall 
be  dissolved.    Any  actions  to  implement  approved  recom- 
mendations shall  be  the  exclusive  responsibility  of  the  heads 
of  the  departments  or  agencies  directly  concerned. 
14  July  I960 
H
•^ 
INDEX 
Directives 
Page 
Departmental  Requirements  81 
Central  Body  for  Reviewing  Requirements  82 
Recommendations  85 
VII.    COORDINATION  87 
Basic  Philosophy  87 
Confusion  over  Coordination  87 
Principles  for  Achieving  Coordination  88 
Role  of  DC1  in  Coordination  89 
Separation  of  DCI  from  Head  of  CIA  90 
Use  of  Elements  of  CIA  in  Coordination  92 
NSCID  No.  1,  paragraph  1  95 
NSCID  No.   1,  paragraph  2.  a.  96 
NSCID  No.   1,  paragraph  2.d.  and  3  96 
NSCID  No.  1,  paragraph  3.  c.  97 
Coordination  of  Departmental  Activities  97 
USIB  Principal  Mechanism  to  Assist  DCI  98 
The  United  States  Intelligence  Board  99 
Coordination  Through  Committees  99 
Managerial  Responsibilities  99 
Proposed  Management  Group  10° 
The  Director  of  Central  Intelligence       __  101 
Authority  and  Basic  Powers  101
INDEX 
Page 
Coordination  Overseas  103 
__Three_  Lines  of  .Authority   
i 
103 
_,U  FT] 
,„■■      --J 
Real  Progress  in  Coordination  108 
National  Level:    Conclusion  109 
DCI  Should  Continue  to  be  Coordinator  109 
USIB  Principal  Mechanism  109 
DOD  Coordination  109 
Revise  Coordination  Staff  in  CIA  110 
Overseas:    Conclusions  111 
More  Affirmative  Action  by  Chiefs  of  Mission  JJJL. 
Unified  Commanders  to  Coordinate  Components  1 T2 
Recommendations  113 
Vni.    COST  OF  FOREIGN  INTELLIGENCE  EFFORT  117 
Difficulties  in  Ascertaining  Exact  Costs  117 
"Range  of  Cost  1 19 
Efforts  to  Accurately  Identify  Costs  120 
Recommendations  121 
IX.       RESEARCH  AND  DEVELOPMENT  123 
DOD  Activities  123 
CIA  Activities  123 
Coordination  Between  CIA  and  Defense  124
INDEX 
Page 
Problems  124 
Recommendations  128 
X.       THE  FUTURE  129 
Importance  of  Intelligence  to  National  Security  129 
Development  of  Assets  for  Future  129 
Will  Require  Great  Resources  and  Leadership  130 
Declining  Effectiveness  of  Some  Techniques  130 
,_Must  Anticipate  Technological_Developments  ._\?1 
Need  for  Long-range  Planning  .   132 
Recommendation  132 
SUMMARY  OF  RECOMMENDATIONS  133 
._J
INDEX 
Page 
I.  INTRODUCTION  l 
Decision  to  Establish  Study  Group  1 
Composition  of  Study  Group  1 
Gist  of  Terms  of  Reference  2 
Number  of  Meetings  2 
Places  Visited  3 
Approach  of  Stddy  Group  4 
II.  THE  INTELLIGENCE  COMMUNITY  7 
Composition  7 
Major  Elements  8 
Manpower  —  Order  of  Magnitude  9 
Overseas  Effort.                                                                   "10 
United  States  Intelligence  Board  —  Membership  11 
USIB  --  Subcommittees  13 
Provisions  of  NSCID  No.   1  13 
USIB  as  a  Deliberative  Body  14 
USIB  Managerial  Responsibilities-  15 
CIA  Progress  and  Energy  16 
.Pepartment  of  State  Expertise  16 
Military  Intelligence  Specialized  Knowledge  17 
JCS  Organization  Promises  Stronger  Mechanism  18 
in.    MILITARY  INTELLIGENCE  19 
Department  of  Defense  Intelligence  Organization  19 
Necessity  for  Good  Intelligence  19 
Need  for  Sense  of  Urgency  20 
Need  for  Integrated  Program  20 
Application  of  Technology  to  Intelligence  20 
.  Problems  of  Procurement  of  Equipment  22 
Cost  Problems  in  DOD  22 
Suggestion  for  One  DOD  Intelligence  Service  23 
Need  for  Coordinated  System  23 
Concept  of  DOD  Reorganization  Act  of  1958  24 
No  Limitation  on  Departmental  Missions  25 
NSCIDs  Need  Revision  ~26"
INDEX 
Page 
Field  Operations  2b 
Flow  of  Information  Requires  Action  27 
Necessity  to  Coordinate  Operations 
Recommendations 
Strengthen  Role  of  J-2  of  Unified  Commands  31 
IV.    NATIONAL  SECURITY  AGENCY  35 
V.      COLLECTION  -  RESOURCES  43 
Overt  Collection  43 
Foreign  Service  Reporting  44 
Military  Attache  System  45 
Signal  Intelligence  **                              47 
Photographic  Intelligence     ""  49 
Establishment  of  National  Photo  Center  51 
_Espionage  and  CcuntZTSSpiczzg?-  53
INDEX 
Evaluation  of  Beports 
Page 
Recommendations  60 
VI.     REQUIREMENTS  AND  EVALUATION  63 
Present  Procedures  63 
No  Single  General  Requirements  System  63 
DOD  Screeniag  of  Military  Requirements                  -        64 
CIA  Requirements  System  64 
NSA  Requirements  65 
Department  of  State  Requirements  65 
Post  Mortems  on  National  Estimates  69 
Tne  Role  of  USIB  70 
Priority  National  Intelligence  Objectives  70 
Misunderstanding  of  PNIOs  71 
USIB  Committees'  Coordination  of  Requirements  73 
Field  Coordination  73 
Outstanding  Problems  74 
Lack  of  Central  Coordination  74 
Tailoring  Requirements  to  Assets  74 
Requirements  in  DOD  76 
Duplication  in  DOD  77 
Clandestine  Requirements  77 
General  Collection  Guides  80
I.     INTRODUCTION 
A  meeting  on  6  May  I960  between  the  Director  of 
Central  Intelligence,   the  Secretary  of  Defense,   the  Director 
of  the  Bureau  of  Budget,  the  Special  Assistant  to  the  President 
for  National  Security  Affairs,  and  the  President's  Board  of 
Consultants  on  Foreign  Intelligence  Activities  resulted  in  a 
decision  to  establish  an  ad  hoc  Joint  Study  Group  to  review 
specified  aspects  of  the  foreign  intelligence  effort  of  the 
United  States  Government.    By  12  July  I960  the  terms  of 
reference  had  been  agreed  upon  by  the  principals  and  approved 
by  the  President  of  the  United  States. 
The  terms  of  reference  provided  that  the  membership 
of  the  Study  Group  would  consist  of  representatives  of  the 
Director  of  Central  Intelligence  (who  would  provide  the  Chair- 
man), the  Secretary  of  State,  the  Secretary  of  Defense,  the 
Special  Assistant  to  the  President  for  National  Security  Affairs 
and  the  Director  of  the  Bureau  of  Budget.    In  addition,  the 
terms  of  reference  provided  that  the  President's  Board  of 
Consultants  on  Foreign  Intelligence  Activities  would  have  a 
representative  sit  as  an  observer  with  the  Group  and  that  the
President's  Board  would  be  given  an  opportunity  to  comment  on 
the  Group's  report  following  its  submission.     By  general  agree- 
ment of  the  members  of  the  Study  Group,   the  Assistant  to  the 
Director  of  Central  Intelligence  for  Coordination  was  invited  to 
participate  with  the  Group  in  an  observer  capacity. 
The  Group's  terms  of  reference  provided  that  the  attention 
of  the  Study  Group  would  be  focused  primarily  on  the  organiza- 
tional and  management  aspects  of  the  foreign  intelligence  effort 
More  specifically,  the  Study  Group  was  directed  to  examine  require- 
ments,  which  are  the  means  by  which  intelligence  producers  or 
researchers  request  collection;  the  adaptation  of  collection  assets 
to  changing  needs;  the  method  by  which  the  intelligence  community 
periodically  evaluates  its  efforts;  the  military  intelligence  coordi- 
nating machinery,  particularly  as  related  to  the  Department  of 
Defense  Reorganization  Act  of  1958;  the  implementation  of  intelli- 
gence directives,  particularly  as  related  to  providing  intelligence 
support  to  field  commanders;  and  the  coordination  of  the  research 
and  development  effort  of  the  intelligence  community. 
Commencing  10  July  I960,  the  Study  Group  met  90  times, 
for  periods  ranging  from  two  to  nine  hours  each,  and  received 
briefings  or  presentations  or  engaged  in  discussions  with  51  organi- 
zations.    A  total  of  320  individuals  appeared  before  the  Study  Group. 
-  2  - 
i
o 
The  Joint  Study  Group  concluded  its  sessions  with,  repre- 
sentatives of  the  intelligence  community  by  meeting  -with  each  of 
the  members  of  the  United  States  Intelligence  Board,  except  the
I  IF*,  fc  ^  «»*—»?■ 
representatives  of  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  and 
the  Atomic  Energy  Commission.     In  these  meetings  the  Study- 
Group  had  the  opportunity  to  solicit  views  on  the  major  pro- 
posals incorporated  in  this  report. 
The  Joint  Study  Group  has  made  a  conscientious  effort 
to  meet  as  a  body  each  time  so  that  all  members  would  have 
the  benefit  of  hearing  the  same  presentations.  Each  of  the 
members  contributed  at  least  one  staff  assistant  to  the  Group 
•who  indispensably  assisted  in  arranging  meetings,  doing  re- 
search and  drafting  and  redrafting  many  sections  to  expedite 
the  preparation  of  this  report. 
The  Joint  Study  Group  has  tried  to  examine  the  problems 
of  the  intelligence  community  from  a  national  point  of  view 
without  reference  to  personalities  or  parochial  interests.    "Within 
this  over -all  approach  it  has  made  every  effort  fully  to  appre- 
ciate departmental  interests  in  the  fields  of  intelligence  collection, 
processing  and  production.    We  have  endeavored  to  understand 
the  history  and  evolution  ©f  U.  S.  foreign  intelligence  activities, 
and  have  found  ia  this  history  both  advantageous  and  disadvanta- 
geous aspects.    We  have  tried  to  capitalize  in  our  recommenda- 
tions on  the  advantages  the  community  has  gained  from  its  often 
-  4  -
■-J. ...  . .  .- 
effective,   spontaneous  response  to  the  demands  of  events 
and  circumstances.     We  have  sought  corrective  measures  for 
these  deficiencies  in  the  community  that  reflect  lack  of  ex- 
plicitly planned  development. 
We  have  reviewed  the  National  Security  Act  of  1947 
(as  amended)  and  other  applicable  statutes.    We  have  examined 
those  provisions  of  each  National  Security  Council  Intelligence 
Directive  and  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  Directive  within 
our  terms  of  reference  both  to  determine  their  appropriateness 
and  their  degree  of  implementation.     We  have  also  studied  the 
Department  of  Defense  Reorganization  Act  of  1958. 
Finally,  the  Joint  Study  Croup  has  paid  particular  atten- 
tion to  the  future,  and  carefully  examined  the  extent  of  long- 
term  planning  within  the  intelligence  community. 
We  particularly  want  to  thank  those  many  members  of 
the  intelligence  community  who  spent  long  hours  preparing 
helpful  briefing  material  for  the  Study  Group.    In  addition,  their 
very  frank  discussions  of  problems  and  ideas  for  improvements 
were  invaluable  to  us  in  preparing  this  report. 
[P.    6  Blank] 
-  5  -
II.     THE  INTELLIGENCE  COMMUNITY 
The  foreign  intelligence  effort  of  the  United  States 
Government  centers  in  the  "intelligence  community",  which 
consists  of  those  departments  and  agencies  which  are  responsi- 
ble for  the  collection  of  information  and  production  of  foreign 
intelligence  essential  for  the  security  of  the  United  States. 
The  intelligence  community  includes  the  Central  Intelligence 
Agency;  the  intelligence  components  of  the  Departments  of 
State,  Defense,  Army,  Navy  and  Air  Force,  and  of  the  Joint 
Staff  (JCS);  National  Security  Agency  (NSA);  the  Federal 
Bureau  of  Investigation;  and  the  Atomic  Energy  Commission. 
In  addition  to  these  departments  and  agencies,  there  are 
many  c  Jier  elements  of  the  government  which  collect  or 
produce  information  useful  in  the  intelligence  process  and 
which  contribute  to  the  foreign  intelligence  effort;  these 
elements  aTe  brought  into  community  activities  on  an  ad  hoc 
basis. 
The  heart  of  the  intelligence  community  is  in 
Washington  (including  Fort  Meade),  although  considerable 
activity  occurs  elsewhere  in  the  continental  United  States. 
7  -
J 
o 
The  latter  includes  the  major  intelligence  elements  of  the 
Strategic  Air  Command,   the  Commander-in-Chief  Atlantic 
Fleet,   Continental  Air  Command,  Continental  Armies, 
individual  Army  headquarters,  Strategic  Army  Corps,  Air 
Technical  Intelligence  Center,  Army  Map  Service, 
Aeronautical  Chart  and  Information  Service,  and  the  Air 
Force  Security  Service.    The  Army  and  Navy  cryptological 
agencies  are  in  Washington.    All  three  military  services 
maintain  regional  intelligence  offices,  largely  engaged  in 
security  investigative  and  counterintelligence  work  through- 
out the  United  States.    The  Central  Intelligence  Agency  (CIA) 
also  has  regional  field  offices  and  resident  agencies. 
The  following  table  will  provide  an  order-of- 
magnitude  impression  of  the  location  of  the  nation's  foreign 
intelligence  manpower. 
[Pp.    9-10  not  released]
The  intelligence  community  is  formally  organized  under 
the  United  States  Intelligence  Board  (USIB).    This  Board  has 
a  total  membership  of  ten,  of  which  six  represent  the  principal 
producers  and  processors  of  intelligence;  namely,   the  Central 
Intelligence  Agency,   the  Department  of  State,   the  Army,  the 
Navy,  the  Air  Force  and  the  National  Security  Agency.    Two 
other  agencies  are  not  extensively  engaged  in  foreign  intelli- 
gence activities  but  sit  on  the  USIB  as  occasional  contributors  -■ 
the  Atomic  Energy  Commission  and  the  Federal  Bureau  of 
Investigation.    Finally,  there  is  representation  from  the 
Office  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense  (OSD)  and  from  the  Joint 
Chiefs  of  Staff  (JCS).     National  Security  Council  Intelligence 
Directive  No.  1  officially  lists  the  USIB  membership  as 
follows: 
-  11  -
The  Director  of  Central  Intelligence,   Chairman 
The  Director  of  Intelligence  and  Research,  Department  of 
State 
The  Assistant  to  the  Secretary  of  Defense  for  Special   ■  • 
Operations 
The  Director  of  the  National  Security  Agency 
The  Director  for  Intelligence,  the  Joint  Staff 
The  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff  for  Intelligence,  Department  of 
the  Army 
The  Assistant  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  fox  Intelligence, 
Department  of  the  Navy 
The  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  Intelligence,  Department  of  the 
Air  Force 
A  representative  of  the  Director  of  the  Federal  Bureau  of 
,  Investigation 
A  representative  of  the  Atomic  Energy  Commission 
The  above  list  suggests  certain  observations.     Three 
echelons  of  the  Defense  Department  are  represented  on  the 
USIB  —  the  Army,  Navy  and  Air  Force  sit  on  the  USIB  as 
equals  with  the  representative  of  the  OSD,  their  civilian 
superior,  and  with  the  Director  of  Intelligence,  the  Joint 
Staff,  representing  their  military  superiors,  the  JCS.    That 
all  are  not  in  fact  equal  is  implicit  in  the  requirement  that 
military  services,  NSA  and  JCS  representatives  are  not 
permitted  to  appeal  USIB  actions  without  prior  review  by 
the  Secretary  of  Defense.    We  would  finally  note  that  the 
USIB  has  six  military  member  agencies  as  compared  to 
four  civilian  agencies  and  only  two  of  the  latter  are  major 
collectors  and  producers  of  foreign  intelligence. 
-  12
Functioning  directly  under  and  in  support  of  the  USIB 
i   j 
are         committees.     Some  of  these  in  turn  have  established 
sub -committees  or  working  groups  through  which  they 
discharge  part  of  all  of  their  responsibilities.    A  number 
of  these  committees  and  their  subordinate  elements  are 
concerned  primarily  with  the  production  of  finished  intelli- 
gence; others  deal  with  the  coordination  of  guidance  to 
collection  and  processing  activities  and  with  a  variety  of 
reference  services  and  other  support  activities.    The 
composition  of  these  committees  normally  reflects  the 
membership  of  the  USIB  itself.     A  chart  of  the  committee 
and  sub -committee  structure  of  the  USIB  is  shown  on  the 
following  page. 
Any  evaluation  of  the  USIB  structure  must  necessarily 
start  with  an  examination  of  the  functions  of  that  body. 
National  Security  Council  Intelligence  Directive  (NSCID)  No.   1 
indicates  that  this  Board  is  intended  primarily  to  assist 
the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  (DC I)  to  achieve  an 
effectively  coordinated  intelligence  community,  and  the 
Board  itself  to  carry  certain  coordinating  responsibilities. 
Its  responsibilities  cross  agency  boundaries  and  convey
both  a  policy-making  and  management  flavor.     The  develop- 
ment of  program  guidance  for  all  agencies,  the  establishment 
of  community  intelligence  objectives,   requirements  and 
priorities,  and  the  provision  of  a  more  effectively  integrated 
national  intelligence  effort  cannot  be  achieved  unless  the 
Board  plays  a  positive,  constructive  role  in  assisting  the 
management  of  the  community. 
Our  study  has  convinced  us  that  the  US  IB  has  been 
primarily  a  deliberative  body.    It  has  discussed  and  given 
final  shape  to  estimates  which  are  recognizedly  the  capstone 
of  intelligence  effort,  but  it  has  by  no  means  devoted  equally 
adequate  time  to  its  coordinative  responsibilities.    We  are 
not  aware  that  the  Board  has  ever  provided  over -all  program 
guidance  for  the  entire  community.    Problems  confronting 
the  Board  are  all  too  frequently  merely  noted  or  referred 
to  a  committee. 
We  are  of  the  opinion  that  these  deficiences  axe 
rooted  in  several  causes,  not  the  least  significant  of  which 
is  the  size  and  makeup  of  the  Board  itself.    Although  all 
members,  except  the  Chairman,  appear  to  be  equal,  they 
are  not  of  equal  status.    They  do  not  enjoy  like  authority 
14  -
SUB-STRUCTURE  OF  US  INTELLIGENCE  BOARD 
•AND  NSC  INTELLIGENCE   SUPPORT  US  0FK  DECEMBER  i960) 
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within  their  own  agencies,  nor  do  they  represent  similar 
types  of  organization.     The  three  echelons  of  military 
representation  have  already  been  cited;  here  we  would  only 
add  that  the  top  Department  of  Defense  echelon  commands 
no  intelligence  organization,  and  the  Joint  Staff  intelligence 
component  is  comparatively  small.    The  heavy  weighting  of 
military  representation  is  itself  questionable. 
We  feel  that  the  Board  has  slighted  its  managerial 
responsibilities.    To  assist  the  Board  in  remedying  this 
situation,  we  believe  there  should  be  a  USIB  mechanism 
concerned  with  management  matters.    We  have  particularly 
in  mind  major  management  problems,  usually  involving 
several  parts  of  the  community. 
Finally,  we  feel  there  is  an  opportunity  to  make  better 
use  of  the  Board's  time  through  more  careful  screening  of 
matters  coming  before  it.    In  making  this  observation  we 
are  very  conscious  of  the  need  for  safeguards  against  lower 
level  groups  in  effect  usurping  the  powers  of  the  Board. 
The  Study  Group  feels  that  the  first  purpose  of  its 
recommendations  should  be  to  build  upon  the  constructive 
and  favorable  elements  in  the  present  intelligence 
-  15  -
fir  ■'■■•—  >•■■   .».  «*»,.    -^.» 
organizations  and  to  correct  deficiencies.     The  Study  Group 
has  therefore  looked  at  the  major  component  units  in  order 
to  discern  in  each  its  generally  advantageous  and  disadvantageous 
characteristics.    A  quick  review  of  these  observations  is  set 
forth  below  as  a  guide  to  the  over-all  direction  of  the  Group's 
proposals . 
The  CIA  has  made  progress  in  developing  a  corps  of 
well-trained,  dedicated  personnel.     It  has  demonstrated 
notable  energy  in  developing  projects  of  common  concern 
which  have  been  assigned  to  it.    However,  this  sane  energy 
has  in  fact  led  the  Agency  into  some  activities  that  are 
competitive  with  those  of  other  members  of  the  community, 
and  raised  in  these  zxi&rnbers  continuing  fear*  of  increased 
centralization  to  a  degree  that  hampers  the  DCI's  coordinating 
efforts. 
The  department  of  State  contributes  %  fund  of 
expertise  in  the  understanding  of  foreign  affairs. 
-  16  -
The  military  intelligence  services  provide  the  com- 
munity with  specialised  knowledge  and  experience  in 
indispensable  areas  of  intelligence  interest.    Their  dedi- 
cation and  esprit  de  corps  are  of  high  order.    They  are 
disciplined  and  responsive  to  command.    Having  direct 
responsibility  for  preparing  for  military  action  with  the 
potential  enemy,  they  supply  to  the  community  a  sense  of 
urgency  that  is  unfortunately  not  always  matched  elsewhere. 
On  the  other  band  the  participation  of  three  separate  military 
intelligence  services  in  all  community  activities  makes  it 
difficult  to  achieve  an  over -all  military  intelligence  view, 
further,  the  frequent  rotation  of  personnel  does  nothing  to 
encourage  greater  depth  of  understanding  or  collaboration. 
-  17  -
The  JCS  organization  at  present  bears  promise  of  a 
stronger  mechanism  for  reconciling  the  service  views.     Up 
to  now  in  the  field  of  intelligence  the  implementation  of  the 
Department  of  Defense  Reorganization  Act  of  1958  has  not 
progressed  far  enough  to  permit  immediate  reliance  upon 
the  Joint  Staff  contribution  to  solving  intelligence  community 
problems . 
The  recommendations  on  problems  and  issues  raised 
in  this  section  are  presented  in  later  sections  where  they 
are  snore  fully  developed. 
-  18  -
HI.     MILITARY  INTELLIGENCE 
The  problems  in  military  intelligence  identified  by  the 
Joint  Study  Group  fall  roughly  into  two  main  categories  -- 
Defense  organization  and  field  operations. 
Department  of  Defense  (POD)  Intelligence  Organization 
la  attempting  to  visualize  the  future  role  of  military 
intelligence  we  note  that  increasingly  powerful,  sophisticated 
and  costly  weapons  systems  of  mass  destruction  are  becoming 
available  to  both  the  United  States  and  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  in  such 
quantities  as  to  give  each  the  capability  of  destroying  the  other 
several  times  over.    In  such  a  confrontation,  foreign  intelli- 
gence regarding  a  technological  breakthrough  has  great 
significance.    Policy  makers  in  government  will  rely  increas- 
ingly on  intelligence  to  keep  them  apprised  of  enemy  research 
development  and  over -all  capabilities,  to  insure  sound  decisions 
on  weapons  systems.    Moreover,  intelligence  must  be  so  organ- 
ized as  to  give  advance  warning  of  both  general  and  limited 
wars  and  be  able  effectively  to  support  U.  S.  forces.    Finally, 
intelligence  must  avoid  concentrating  so  exclusively  on  military 
aspects  of  the  power  balance  that  it  overlooks  economic  and  politi- 
cal aspects  both  of  that  balance  and  of  the  free  world  generally. 
-  19  -
u-_ 
The  Joint  Study  Group  believes  that  in.  the  foreign,  intelli- 
gence area  a  sense  of  great  urgency  must  be  brought  to  the  study 
of  and  planning  for  such  a  future.     It  is  impressed  with  the  need 
to  make  far-reaching  decisions  now,   without  further  delay,  about 
the  kind  of  intelligence  the  United  States  must  have  --  its  size, 
mission,  the  resources  to  be  devoted  to  it,   and  its  organization. 
To  insure  that  intelligence  will  be  equal  to  the  great 
demands  placed  upon  it,   it  must  be  viewed  as  an  integrated 
program  demanding  an  intense  effort,   closely  coordinated  planning, 
and  the  allocation  of  resources  in  money  and  human  skills  com- 
parable to  weapons  systems  of  the  highest  priority  and  on  an 
equal  footing  with  them.    In  view  of  the  importance  of  intelligence, 
we  believe  the  chiefs  of  the  military  intelligence  services,  as 
well  as  those  in  commands  and  joint  staffs,   should  have  equal 
position  and  rank  to  their  operational  counterparts. 
More  specifically,  the  kind  of  future  suggested  above 
will  pose  for  the  DOD  problems  which  have  already  begun  to  take 
shape.    Tor  example,  advanced  technology  is  being  applied 
increasingly  to  intelligence  and  involves  the  expenditure  of  great 
sums. 
[p.   21  not  released] 
-  20  -
In  addition  to  the  problems  of  developing  new  intelligence 
systems,   there  axe  difficult  procurement  decisions  regarding  the 
modernization  and  replacement  of  obsolescent  equipment  involving 
considerable  cost. 
A  continuing  serious  problem  is  the  difficulty  in  arriving 
at  an  accurate  cost  figure  for  intelligence  for  the  reason  that 
there  is  no  basis  for  comparability  common  to  all  three  military 
service  departments. 
As  i3  pointed 
out  in  Section  VIH,  this  makes  fiscal  management  very  difficult. 
-  22  -
United  States  intelligence  must  be  a  community  effort 
in  fact  as  well  as  name,   which  means  that  effective  coordination 
of  intelligence  as  a  truly  national  effort  must  be  achieved.     By 
far  the  preponderant  part  of  U.  S.  intelligence  in  terms  of  man- 
power and  money  is  that  undertaken  by  the  DOD.     Great  strides 
toward  a  more  closely  integrated  community  would  result  from 
improved  intelligence  coordination  within  the  DOD. 
It  has  been  suggested  to  the  Study  Group  that  a  positive 
solution  would  be  to  establish  one  intelligence  service  for  the 
whole  DOD,  reporting  directly  to  the  Secretary  of  Defense. 
Although  this  proposal  has  considerable  merit,  it  is  our  view 
that  on  balance  it  would  be  unwise  to  attempt  such  an  integration 
of  intelligence  activities  so  long  as  there  are  three  military 
services  having  specialized  skills  and  knowledge. 
Nonetheless,  intelligence  management  within  the  DOD 
must  be  organized  in  such  a  way  as  to  provide  adequately  for 
intelligence  as  a  coordinated  system  of  highest  priority.    Besides 
increasing  JCS  responsibility  in  coordinating  over-all  defense 
substantive  matters,  there  is  need  to  establish  and  maintain 
cognizance  of  the  over-all  program  in  terms  of  resources  of 
manpower  and  money  allocated,  and  to  eliminate  waste,  duplication 
-23  - 
r
L — =■-  -  -i- -■!•■.:;■-■  '-  ..■.'■■.'•y 
and  inefficiency.  For  this  there  should  be  an  authoritative  focal 
point  within  the  Office  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense,  which  should 
also  be  the  primary  point  of  contact  with  the  rest  of  the  community. 
Among  the  internal  factors  influencing  U.  S.  military 
intelligence  is  the  Department  of  Defense  Reorganization  Act  of 
1958.    In  general,  a  process  of  evolution  is  taking  place  in 
which  the  strengthened  position  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  (JCS) 
in  the  command  line  from  the  Secretary  of  Defense  is  gradually 
emerging. 
However,  it  does  not  appear  that  the  concept  of  the 
Defense  Reorganization  Act  of  1958  has  yet  been  fully  realized 
in  the  field  of  intelligence.    Essentially  the  same  general 
methods  and  procedures  for  the  control  of  intelligence  opera- 
tions and  the  exercise  of  intelligence  responsibilities  that  existed 
prior  to  the  Defense  Reorganization  Act  of  1958  are  still  in 
effect  today.    In  fact,  intelligence  activities  of  components  of 
unified  and  specified  commands  continue  to  be  as  responsive 
as  formerly  to  direction  by  the  military  departments. 
It  is  clear  from  the  concept  of  the  Defense  Reorganiza- 
tion Act  of  1958  that  the  JCS  can  logically  assume  direction  or 
control  over  such  intelligence  activities  as  are  undertaken  in 
-24-
support  of  the  strategic  mission  of  the  JCS,  whether  they  are 
now  being  performed  by  the  military  service  departments  or 
by  unified  and  specified  commands.    However,   it  is  not  so 
specifically  stated  in  DOO  directive  #5100. 1.     Furthermore, 
National  Security  Council  Intelligence  Directives  (NSCLDs) 
charge  the  military  departments  with  certain  intelligence 
responsibilities  but  fail  to  do  the  same  regarding  J-2  of  the 
JCS,  indicating  instead  that  the  military  service  departments 
produce  that  intelligence  required  by  the  JCS* 
-25  -
f  --.\:.  ■'    ;  '..  r,-.>ti. 
It  seems  probable  that  the  situation  described  above 
cannot  be  positively  corrected  unless  the  relevant  NSCIDs  are 
revised  to  assign  authority  and  responsibility  for  military 
intelligence  activities  to  the  Secretary  of  Defense  who  can  in 
turn  allocate  responsibilities  to  the  services  and  JCS  as  he 
sees  fit. 
Field  Operations 
In  common  •with  other  national  purposes*  U.  S.  military 
intelligence  is  strongly  affected  by  external  factors  of  major 
importance.     Foremost  among  these  is  the  existence  of  the 
cold  war,  a  condition  of  neither  peace  nor  war  which  imposes 
enormous  complications  on  military  commanders  who  must 
maintain,  in  a  wot  Id  nominally  at  peace,  a  posture  of  full  war- 
time readiness.    Military  commanders  in  these  circumstances 
quite  naturally  demand  that  their  intelligence  support  give 
absolute  priority  to  the  security  of  command  and  early  warning. 
-  26  -
If  the 
United  States  is  to  be  prepared,  it  must  be  assured  of  the  beat 
possible  flow  of  information  about  enemy  strength,  disposition, 
combat  readiness,   science  and  technology,  and  probable 
intentions  in  sufficient  quantity  and  detail  to  support  the  com- 
mander's mission. 
The  Joint  Study  Group  appreciates  the  desire  of  com- 
tnaxtdeTS  to  maintain  control  of  intelligence  assets  which  they 
deem  necessary  to  assure  security  of  their  commands.    At  the 
same  time,  intelligence  operations. 
-  27  -
must  be  closely  coordinated 
The  Joint  Study  Group  believes  that  a  solution  lies 
in  a  new  approach  to  coordination  in  the  field.  This  is  dis- 
cussed at  length  in  Section  VII  on  Coordination. 
[Pp.    29-30  not   released] 
-28  -
There  is  a.  great  need  fox  improvement  in  the  role  of 
J-2  of  the  unified  commands.     The  Joint  Study  Group  believes 
that  positive  coordination  by  J-2  of  intelligence  operations  of 
the  component  commands  would  do  much  to  alleviate  many 
existing  difficulties. 
It  is  recommended  that: 
1.    The  Secretary  of  Defense  take  appropriate  action 
to  bring  the  military  intelligence  organization  within  the 
Department  of  Defease  into  full  consonance  with  the  con- 
cept of  the  Defense  Reorganization  Act  of  1958.     Toward 
this  end: 
-  31  -
a.  there  should  be  established  within  the  Office 
of  the  Secretary  of  Defense  a  focal  point  for  exerting 
broad  management  review  authority  over  military 
intelligence  programs,   and  providing  over -all 
coordination  of  all  foreign  intelligence  activities 
conducted  by  various  Defense  components. 
b.  the  authority  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  in 
intelligence  coordination  and  operations  should  be 
strengthened  in  support  of  their  assigned  mission 
by  such  means  as: 
(1)  placing  under  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  control 
increased  intelligence  resources  to  support  its 
strengthened  authority; 
(2)  requiring  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  to 
coordinate  the  intelligence  views  on  substantive 
intelligence  matters  within  the  Department  of 
Defense,  notably  for  estimates; 
(3)  requiring  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  to 
coordinate  military  intelligence  requirements 
(see  recommendation  no.   26  of  Section  VI); 
(4)  requiring  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  to 
coordinate  the  intelligence  activities  of  the  unified 
and  specified  commands  and  be  the  primary  channel 
to  these  commands  for  guidance  and  direction  of 
intelligence  matters  originating  with  the  Depart- 
ment of  Defense,  (see  additional  discussion  and 
recommendations  en  Section  VHJ; 
c.  National  Security  Council  Intelligence  Direc- 
trres.  Department  of  Defense  and  Joint  Chiefs  o£ 
Staff  directives  should  be  revised  in  accordance  with 
the  above* 
2.    The  increased  intelligence  resources  required  by 
the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  and  the  unified  commands  should 
be  drawn  from  the  existing  resources  of  the  military 
departments  and  component  commands  as  appropriate. 
-  32  -
3.  Budgeting  procedures  for  intelligence  operations 
and  activities  should  be  brought  more  closely  under  the 
control  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense,    including  clear 
identification  of  the  total  intelligence  costs  throughout 
all  of  the  echelons  and  elements  of  the  Department  of 
Defense. 
4.  Policies  should  be  initiated  that  would  permit  more 
rigorous  selection  and* training  of  personnel  assigned  to 
intelligence  activities  and  operations 
-and  personnel  so  assigned  should  be  given 
position  and  rank  comparable  to  their  operational  counter- 
parts* 
-  33  - 
[P.    34  Blank]
IV.     NATIONAL  SECURITY  AGENCY 
The  National  Security  Agency  (NSA)  is  the  Department 
of  Defense  (DOD)  Agency  established  by  the  Secretary  of 
Defense  to  carry  out  most  of  the  responsibilities  now  assigned 
to  him  by  National  Security  Council  Intelligence  Directive 
(NSCID)  No.   6  as  the  executive  agent  of  the  government  for 
communications  intelligence  (COMINT)  and  electronics  intelli- 
gence (ELINT),  as  well  as  certain  responsibilities  in  the 
field  of  communications  security.     In  order  that  NSA  can 
carry  out  both  the  COMINT  and  ELINT  missions,  the  COMINT 
and  ELINT  activities  of  the  United  States  are  placed  under  the 
operational  and  technical  control  of  the  Director,  NSA.i 
[Pp. 
36-42  not  released]
V.     COLLECTION  -  RESOURCES 
For  the  purposes  of  this  report  we  have  divided  the 
collection  of  intelligence  information  into  four  major  fields: 
overt,   signal  intelligence,  visual  -aerial,   and  clandestine. 
The  principal  collectors  of  overt  intelligence  infor- 
mation are  the  diplomatic  and  consular  officers  of  the  United 
States  and  the  military  and  civilian  attaches.    Their  reporting 
is  largely  based  upon  official  and  noa-official  contacts, 
general  observation  and  research.    Other  overt  sources 
include  the  monitoring  of  open  radio  broadcasts,   the 
exploitation  of  foreign  publications 
A  secondary  source  for  overt  collection  involves 
United  States  business  organizations  and  individual  travellers 
vrho  xeceive  or  obtain  information  irosa  abroad. 
The  Study  Croup  wishes  to  emphasize  that  the  infor- 
mation collected  through  overt  means  is  the  foundation  of  all 
-  43  -
intelligence  and  should  not  be  neglected  through  over- 
concentration  on  less  conventional  modes  of  collection. 
We  anticipate  no  change  in  this  in  the  future. 
[Pp.    45-46  not  released] 
-  44  -
Among  the  specific 
fields  of  signal  intelligence  is  communications  intelligence 
(COMINT)  which  is  the  interception  of  communications  trans- 
mitted by  electrical  means  both  by  voice  and  in  code.    The 
emission  of  electromagnetic  emanations  and  radiations 
provides  a  second  source  of  signal  intelligence 
known  as  electronics  intelligence  (ELINT). 
Recommendations  regarding  the  collection  of 
signal  intelligence  are  made  in  other  sections,  particularly 
the  section  on  the  National  Security  Agency     (Section  IV). 
-  47
One  serious  problem  relating  to  signal  intelligence, 
but  also  present  in  the  photographic  intelligence  field, 
results  from  the  security  classification  system  currently 
in  use.     Entirely  apart  from  the  well-known  tendency 
throughout  the  intelligence  community  to  over -classify, 
the  special  handling  required  for  a  very  significant  portion 
of  intelligence  information  has  at  times  deprived  key 
personnel  of  information  vital  to  the  successful  discharge 
of  their  responsibilities.    Among  United  States  agencies, 
practices  vary  regarding  the  granting  of  special  intelli- 
gence security  clearances. 
-48  -
A  third  major  source  of  foreign  intelligence  is 
photographic  and  other  visual -aerial  observation.    This 
is  probably  the  most  precise  form  of  intelligence  collection, 
inasmuch  as  photographs  provide  accurate  information. 
The  U-2  program  provided  what  was  probably  the  greatest 
amount  of  valuable  information  obtainable  from  any  single 
source,  and  the  Study  Group  heard  consistent  requests 
that  this  program  or  something  similar  to  it  be  resumed 
at  the  earliest  possible  date. 
The  Study  Group  has  spent  many  hours  discussing 
the  problem  of  processing  and  interpreting  aerial  photography 
-  49  -
for  intelligence  purposes. 
There 
is  also  agreement  in  most  of  the  community  that  a  central 
photographic  intelligence  center  of  common  concern  should 
-  50  -
be  established.     Opinions  vary,   however,   as  to  (a)  how 
much  interpretation  and  analysis  should  take  place  at 
such  a  center,  and  (b)  who  should  run  it. 
It  is  the  consensus  of  the  Study  Group  that  a  photo - 
grapbic  center  of  common  concern  should  be  established. 
TJbe  most  difficult  problem  is  to  determine  whether 
CIA  or  the  Department  of  Defense  should  run  such  a  center. 
{P.    52  not  released] 
-  51  -
The  Joint  Study  Group  believes  that  a  decision  on 
the  executive  direction  of  such  a  center  should  be  determined 
by  consultation  between  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence 
and  the  Secretary  of  Defense  and  thereafter  a  new  National 
Security  Council  Intelligence  Directive  issued. 
The  last  form  of  collection  is  that  by  clandestine  means 
through  espionage  and  counterespionage.    This,  however,  is 
one  of  the  most  difficult  forms  of  collection  and  requires  a 
considerable  expenditure  of  manpower  carefully  trained 
-  53  -
j  over  a  long  period  of  time. 
[Pp.    55-59  not  released] 
54  -
It  is  recommended  that: 
11.  The  Department  of  State  place  greater  emphasis 
on  intelligence  responsibilities  in  the  indoctrination 
of  its  personnel. 
12.  Military  departments  should  concentrate  more 
effort  on  career  management  by  developing  programs 
of  constantly  broadening  assignments  in  intelligence 
-60  -
for  qualified  and  specifically  designated  officers, 
which  will  gain  the  benefits  of  a  career  intelligence 
service  without  isolating  the  officer  from  contact 
with  the  general  mission  of  his  service  and  its 
operations. 
13. 
14.    The  United  States  Intelligence  Board  should 
review  existing  compartmentation  of  sensitive  infor- 
mation with  a  view  ';o  achieving  more  uniform  practices 
and  ensuring  that  essential  security  safeguards  do  not 
result  in  vital  information  being  withheld  from  officials 
and  organizations  with  urgent  national  security  responsi- 
bilities. 
16.    The  Secretary  of  Defense  and  the  Director  of 
Central  Intelligence  should  consult  preparatory  to  the 
early  preparation  of  a  new  National  Security  Council 
Intelligence  Directive  designed  to  provide  authority  and 
assign  responsibility  for  the  establishment  of  a  National 
Photographic  Intelligence  Center  (NPIC). 
17. 
18.    The  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  should  focus 
community  attention  on  the  important  area  of  counter- 
intelligence and  security  of  overseas  personnel  and 
installations  and  assign  responsibility  for  periodic  reports 
to  the  United  States  Intelligence  Board. 
[P.    62  not  released] 
-  61  -
;  'IT'/5  ■.'.:""■>'■ 
W.      .-l.-lfmrntirmmiii 
VI.     REQUIREMENTS  AND  EVALUATION 
Present  Procedures 
The  Joint  Study  Group  is  concerned  with  the  inade- 
quacy of  current  mechanisms  within  the  intelligence  com- 
munity for  the  guidance  of  collection  efforts  by  selective 
levying  of  requirements,  and  subsequent  evaluation  of  the 
intelligence  generated  by  these  requests  for  information. 
While  we  acknowledge  that  considerable  decentralized  effort 
is  being  expended  by  the  various  'iepartments  and  agencies  in 
these  fields,  we  believe  that  the  effort  is  frustrated  through 
lack  of  coordination  and  that  the  total  personnel  assigned  to 
this  work  is  excessive  in  relation  to  the  results  achieved. 
Within  the  intelligence  community  in  Washington 
there  exists  no  single  general  requirements  system,  and  no 
single  place  where  an  analyst  or  agency  may  determine  if 
needed  information  has  already  been  collected  and  how  it 
may  be  located  for  exploitation,  or  if  a  requirement  tot  the 
same  information  is  outstanding  on  the  part  of  an  analyst  from 
a  second  agency,   although  some  approximation  exists  in
3        Central  Intelligence  Agency's  (CIA)  Office  of  Central 
Reference.  jj 
t 
In  Washington,  the  three  military  intelligence 
organizations  and  J-2  maintain  separate  units  for  the  co- 
ordination of  requirements  and  evaluation  of  intelligence 
reports.    There  is  no  place  within  the  Department  of  Defense 
for  centralized  reviewing  and  screening  or  for  the  coordina- 
tion of  all  military  requirements. 
Each  military  intelligence  organization  prepares  and 
issues  to  its  field  collectors  its  own  guide -type  collection 
manuals,  statements  of  interest,  long-range  requirements 
and  ad  hoc  requests  for  information.     In  general,  each  mili- 
tary intelligence  organization  does  its  own  evaluation  of  reports 
received  from  its  field  collection  effort. 
The  same  situation  prevails  within  CIA  notwithstand- 
ing the  existence  of  the  Office  of  Central  Reference,  which 
was  cxeated  fox  the  purpose  of  centralizing  and  coordinating 
all  Agency  requirements.    Each  major  component  of  CIA 
maintains  its  own  requirements  office  as  well  as  requirements 
personnel  at  division  and  branch  levels.  < 
64  -
Bequirenients  levied  on  the  National  Security  Agency 
(NSA)  and  the  service  cryptologic  agencies  are  controlled 
by  the  United  States  Intelligence  Board  (USIB) through  its 
communications  intelligence  (COMINT)  and  electronics 
intelligence  (ELJNT)  committees.    Additional  specific  re- 
quirements are  passed  to  NSA  for  collection  through  NSA's 
requirements  unit  which  maintains  liaison  with  other  members 
of  the  USIB  for  this  purpose. 
Requirements  within  the  Department  of  State  are 
coordinated  on  a  geographical  basis  by  the  various  policy 
desk  officers  through  whom  flow  all  requirements  to  the 
respective  embassies  and  consulates.    An  Intelligence  Col- 
lection Division  within  the  Bureau  of  Intelligence  and  Research 
coordinates  all  formal  requirements  from  or  to  other  mem- 
bers of  the  intelligence  community  and  coordinates  interagency 
-65  -
'  '  -  " ■  *    -      -■-■-.■  »-J 
evaluations  of  Foreign  Service  reporting.     The  same 
organization  prepares  country  statements  of  guidance 
for  each  embassy  or  principal  post  as  an  aid  to 
political,   sociological,   scientific,  and  in  some  instances 
economic  reporting.    Owing  to  the  Department  of  State's 
extra  burden  of  responsibility  to  the  numerous  other  non- 
intelligence  departments  active  in  the  economic  field, 
economic  requirements  on  countries  outside  the  Sino- 
Soviet  bloc  are  handled  by  a  special  division  of  the  Depart- 
ment, the  Foreign  Reporting  Staff.    This  staff  coordinates 
economic  intelligence  requirements  of  the  community  into 
the  Current  Economic  Reporting  Program.    It  thus  does 
program  planning  for  the  economic  collection  effort,  and 
coordinates  community  evaluations  of  Foreign  Service 
economic  reporting. 
In  the  main,  each  department  or  agency  involved 
in  intelligence  collection  formulates  its  own  specific  and 
general  requirements  based  primarily  on  its  seeds  to  meet 
its  production  responsibility  on  its  own  behalf  and  on  behalf 
of  the  community.     These  requirements  may  be  divided  into 
standing,  serial,  or  ad  hoc  requirements,  and  are  sent  to 
-  66
the  field  in  the  form  of  guide -type  all-inclusive  shopping 
lists  requesting  basic  information  about  a  country  or 
subject,  or  more  selective  but  still  general  "statements  o£ 
interest"  or,  as  last  mentioned,  as  special  requests  for 
information. 
[P.    68  not  released] 
67  -
Evaluation  of  reports  is  closely  tied  to  collection 
requirements  because  evaluations  serve  as  encouragement 
to  the  collector,  as  well  as  a  form  of  guidance.     Raw  intelli- 
gence reports  are  evaluated  by  Washington  end-users  on  a 
request  basis  and  provide  a  spot-check  of  the  usefulness  of 
the  reports.    However,  collectors  feel  that  there  are  too  few 
evaluations  of  their  reports.    On  the  other  hand,  consumers 
find  the  task  of  evaluating  reports  burdensome  and  time- 
consuming.    In  any  event,  the  present  decentralized  system 
for  the  evaluation  of  field  reports  fails  to  provide  an.  adequate 
means  for  an  over -all  assessment  of  the  responsiveness  of 
field  collectors  to  levied  requirements  or  to  the  quality  of  the 
information  submitted. 
Finished  intelligence  is  evaluated  in  a  more  systematic 
manner.    The  Board  of  National  Estimates  conducts  periodic 
reviews  or  post-mortems  on  National  Intelligence  Estimates, 
including  assessments  as  to  gaps  in  existing  information. 
These  post-mortems  are  in  turn  reviewed  by  the  U5IB.    Some 
of  the  USlb  committees  also  evaluate  intelligence  is  specific 
areas. 
-69
The  Role  of  USIB 
The  USIB  as  an  important  part  of  its  responsi- 
bility for  managing  the  national  intelligence  effort  is  charged 
-with  the  establishment  of  appropriate  intelligence  objectives, 
requirements  and  priorities.    One  of  the  principal  means  by 
which  the  USIB  meets  this  responsibilities  is  its  annual  state 
ment  of  Priority  National  Intelligence  Objectives  (PNIOs) 
which  set  forth  specific  subjects  "requiring  priority  atten- 
tion and  effort".    The  introduction  to  the  PNIOs  states, 
*'. .  .the  following  list  of  Priority  National  Intelligence  Ob- 
jectives is  established  as  a  guide  for  the  coordination  of  in- 
telligence collection  and  production".*    The  nature  of  these 
objectives  is  importantly  qualified  in  the  same  introduction: 
"Although  a  given  subject  may  be  listed  as  a  matter  of 
priority,  not  every  bit  of  information  relating  to  it  -will  be 
required  with  equal  urgency  and  some  may  be  procurable 
by  routine  means.    It  is  therefore  incumbent  upon  research 
personnel  to  exercise  discrimination  in  allocating  analytical 
♦Underlining  added 
-  70
»■&"■'«!    '■'■.* 
resources  and  in  formulating  information  requirements  so 
as  to  accord  priority  only  to  those  aspects  of  the  listed 
subject  .which  actually  require  a  priority  research  or  col- 
lection effort".    Again,  in  identifying  the  criteria  for 
selecting  these  objectives,  the  Directive  states:    "Most  of 
the  intelligence  required  in  the  formulation  and  execution 
of  national  security  policy  -will  be  the  product  of  normal 
intelligence  collection  and  research.    Priority  National  In- 
telligence Objectives  should  be  limited  to  those  critical 
factors  which  require  special  attention  and  effort".    It  is* 
clear  that  the  PNIOs  are  not  intended  to  replace  or  exclude 
broad  regular  coverage  of  the  world.    Indeed,  the  PNIOs 
would  be  ineffective  without  such  background. 
The  Group  found  that  these  limitations  on  the  ap- 
plication of  the  PNIOs  as  stated  are  not  generally  under- 
stood.   It  is  worth  noting  at  this  point  that  one  of  the  diffi- 
culties observed  by  the  Group  was  a  tendency  among  collect- 
ing units  to  concentrate  heavily  upon  some  central  area  of 
concern  at  the  expense  of  matters  within  their  responsibility 
which,  although  of  minor  interest  to  them,  are  yet  of  high 
priority  value  to  one  or  more  other  agencies.    This  finding 
-  71  -
combined  with  the  tendency  to  give  exclusive  authority  to 
the  PNIOs  has  had  serious  effects  in  distorting  the 
collection  of  intelligence  information.     It  is  common 
practice  for  individual  requirements  prepared  and  levied 
through  the  decentralized  mechanisms  described  above  to 
claim  a  priority  derived  directly  from  the  PNIOs.    The 
main  complaint  of  this  practice  is  that  a  requirement 
related  to  a  "first  priority"  objective  is  not  necessarily 
more  important  in  itself  than  another  requirement  related 
to  a  "second  priority"  objective.    Further,  it  is  illogical 
to  suppose  that  every  single  item  of  information  has  an 
importance  proportionate  to  the  importance  of  the  priority 
objective  on  which  it  bears,  however  remotely.    It  should 
be  noted  that  USIB  likewise  has  responsibilities  in.  the  field 
of  evaluation  under  the  provisions  of  NSCID  No.   1,  that  it 
shall  "Ensure  thai  the  pertinence,  extent  and  quality  of  the 
available  foreign  intelligence  and  intelligence  information 
relating  to  the  national  security  is  continually  .reviewed 
as  a  basis  for  improving  the  quality  of  intelligence  and 
the  correction  of  deficiencies". 
72  -
Certain  committees  of  the  USIB  devote  considerable 
time  and  attention  to  coordination  of  collection  requirements 
on  specific  subjects  or  in  reference  to  special  types  of  col- 
lection organizations.     These  include  the  Economic  Intelligence 
Committee,  the  Scientific  Intelligence  Committee,  the  Guided 
Missile  and  Astronautics  Intelligence  Committee,  the  Critical 
Collection  Problems  Committee,  the  Joint  Atomic  Energy 
Intelligence  Committee,  the  ELINT  and  COMINT,  and  the  Inter- 
agency Clandestine  Collection  Priorities  Committees. 
Field  Coordination 
In  addition  to  the  above  mechanisms  for  the  coordination 
of  requirements  at  the  Washington  level,  we  noted  that  each  of 
the  commands  in  Europe  has  personnel  attempting  to  coordinate 
requirements  of  the  command,  requirements  received  from 
Washington,'  and  requests  received  from  other  field  organizations. 
-  73  -
Outstanding  Problems 
At  the  Washington  level  and  in  the  field  the  Joint  Study- 
Group  found  numerous  problems  in  the  requirements  field. 
Most  are  predicated  on  the  lack  of  central  coordination  of  re- 
quirements.    The  difficulties  include  some  general  to  the  com- 
munity at  large  and  others  relating  to  the  individual  departments 
and  agencies. 
Kequirements  in  general  are  not  sufficiently  tailored  to 
collection  assets  or  resources 
An 
urgent  need  in  the  intelligence  community  today  is  a  much  closer 
correlation  between  requirements  or  needs  and  collection  re- 
sources.   (See  also  Section  V) 
Another  general  problem  is  that  too  often  requests 
for  collection  are  duplicative,  incomplete  relative  to 
community  needs,  are  scattered  out  to  collectors  in 
-2^.
excessive  numbers,  and  too  often  are  without  indication 
of  priority  in  relation  to  other  outstanding  require- 
ments of  the  same  general  urgency.     Field  collectors 
are  anxious  to  have  less  requirements,  clearer  indi- 
cation of  priority,  and  more  precise  requirements. 
The  unilateral  production  by  the  departments  and  agencies 
of  collection  requirements  guides  causes  further  dupli- 
cation and  excessive  numbers  of  outstanding  requirements. 
The  Department  of  State  is  relatively  small  in 
size  compared  to  the  other  departments  and  agencies 
interested  in  intelligence  collection,  and  perhaps  for  this 
reason  is  without  serious  problems  in  the  requirements 
field.    The  other  departments  and  agencies  are  noi  as 
fortunate. 
A  serious  problem  exists  in  the  form  of  barriers 
erected  between  signal  intelligence  and  other  forms  of 
]
intelligence.     While  we  recognize  the  need  to  protect 
communications  intelligence,  we  feel  there  is  need 
for  closer  integration  of  signal  intelligence  require- 
ments and  evaluation  with  those  of  the  rest  of  the 
community. 
The  levying  of  requirements  within  the 
Department  of  Defense  largely  follows  patterns  that 
existed  before  the  Department  of  Defense  Reorganiza- 
tion Act  of  1958  --  individual  military  departments 
levy  them  directly  on  their  overseas  components. 
There  has  not  yet  emerged,  pursuant  to  this 
reorganization,  a  fully  established  program  either 
within  the  JCS  or  The  Office  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense 
(OSD)  for  the  development  of  requirements  designed 
to  support  their  presently  assigned  missions,  in  part 
because,  as  has  been  pointed  out  in  Section  HI,  the 
NSCEDs  have  not  been  appropriately  readjusted.    There 
is  also  no  mechanism  within  the  JCS  or  the  OSD  for 
reviewing  and  managing  military  service  sequirements 
which  would  serve  both  to  assure  the  most  efficient 
-76  -
utilization  of  military  intelligence  resources  and 
to  provide  support  for  JCS  and  OSD  over -all  missions. 
The  Joint  Study  Group  notes  the  duplication 
of  requirements  levied  on  military  intelligence  collectors. 
This  can  be  traced  to  the  absence  of  over -all  coordination 
-within  DOD. 
CIA's  main  requirements  problem,  as  might 
be  expected,  relates  to  clandestine  collection  and  con- 
cerns the  great  number  of  requirements  served  on  the 
-  77
\gency  without  benefit  of  screening  to  determine 
priority  or  the  necessity  for  clandestine  collection. 
One  of  the  reasons  this  problem  exists  is  CIA's  own 
failure  to  insist  that  its  customers  use  the  machinery 
established  to  handle  the  problem,  and  use  it  properly. 
The  IPC  is  supposed  to  determine  the  essential 
foreign  information  requirements  -whose  fulfillment 
necessitates  clandestine  collection.    The  USIB  specifies 
that  these  requirements  must  be  of  such  a  nature  that 
they  cannot  normally  be  covered  by  non-clandestine 
collection  methods.     The  committee  is  required  to  pre- 
pare requirements  lists  and  to  provide  special  guidance 
to  CIA.  to  meet  unusual,  critical  or  emergency  situations. 
m 
Each  member  of  the  USIB  has  a  member  on  the  IPC,  and 
these  individuals  are  expected  to  pay  particular  attention 
to  requirements  submitted  by  their  respective  depart- 
ments and  agencies  for  clandestine  collection. 
-  78
With  respect  to  the  IPC  lists,   some  participants 
believe  that  their  interests  are  not  properly  represented 
on  the  lists  because  they  have  been  unable  to  get  com- 
munity agreement  on  the  priority  they  desire.     They  have 
in  consequence  too  often  attempted  to  short  circuit  the 
procedures. 
We  believe  that  the  key  to  this  problem  is  a 
more  active  and  across-the-board  use  of  a  coordinating 
mechanism 
79  -
While  there  remain  some  instances  of  dupli- 
cative activity  in  a  given  field  of  collection,  the  Group 
found  none  that  could  not  be  cured  by  normal  coordination. 
Another  problem  is  the  large  number  of  require- 
ments that  results  from  the  inclusion  in  general  collection 
-  80  -
guides  of  everything  that  everybody  wants  to  know.     Ideally 
such  statements  of  interest  might  better  be  called  "programs'* 
and  the  word  requirement  reserved  for  short-term  specific 
ad  hoc  questions.    In  any  case,  while  some  such  program- 
matic statements  are  needed  for  general  training  and  orderly 
planning,  it  should  be  possible  to  reduce  the  number  and 
overlap  of  these  guides.    We  believe  that  all  collection 
requirements  manuals  should  be  integrated  into  a  compatible 
series  of  coordinated  guides.    Further,  the  Group  urges 
the  cxeation  of  integrated  requirements  guides  which  on  a 
country-by-country  basis  would  set  forth  the  specific  col- 
lection requirements  and  responsibilities  of  each  department 
and  agency  concerned. 
Although  departmental  production  and  collection 
responsibilities  have  been  allocated  in  terms  of  subject, 
geographic  and  functional,  .such  as  world  military,  or  Soviet 
bloc  economic,  there  cuts  across  this  allocation  an  overlay 
of  requirements  labelled  with  the  term  "departmental". 
This  term  is  frequently  interpreted  to  include  everything 
a  department  decides  to  be  necessary  or  desirable  to 
support  its  mission.    It  should  be  clearly  understood  that 
-  81  -
departmental  intelligence  must  lie  within  the  subject  fields 
allocated  to  the  departments  by  the  NSCIDs.    At  the  present 
time  these  subject  fields  need  to  be  more  clearly  defined 
by  the  NSCIDs  especially  in  the  military  areas.    A  depart- 
ment's collection  efforts  should  normally  be  confined  to 
those  subject  fields  so  allocated  to  it. 
The  Joint  Study  Group  believes  that  the  described 
individual  efforts  of  the  members  of  the  intelligence 
community  to  handle  their  own,  requirements  and  evalua- 
tions are  inadequate  to  properly  coordinate  the  collection 
activities  of  the  community,  and  that  the  USIB  must,  as 
a  part  of  its  management  responsibility,  require  that 
coordination  be  done  on  a  community-wide  basis,  both  at 
the  Washington  level  and  in  the  field. 
At  the  Washington  level,  we  believe  that  there 
should  be  *  central  body  for  reviewing  requirements, 
manned  by  top  quality  experts  from  the  intelligence  com- 
munity representing  All  -the  .agencies  which  eUhr-r  produce 
intelligence  reports  or  collect  intelligence  information. 
This  would  in  effect  become  a  central  clearing  house  for 
the  most  effective  tying  together  of  all  requests  for 
-  82  - 
"" "   "1
information  with  all  resources  for  collecting  that  information. 
We  recognize  that  this  is  a  large  undertaking  and  therefore 
suggest  that  its  development  be  evolutionary.    We  would 
suggest  that  such  a  center  for  the  time  being  concern  itself 
with  collection  by  clandestine  and  signal  intelligence  assets. 
In  such  a  center  the  agencies  would  endeavor  to 
identify  their  assets  in  the  collection  fields  indicated  and 
to  select  or  stimulate  relevant  requirements.    Therefore, 
this  center  would  concern  itself  basically  with  two  aspects 
of  collection:    first,  modification  and  correlation  of  the 
basic  collection  guides;  second,  the  handling  of  current 
requirements.    The  collection  resources  would  be  tabu- 
lated on  performance.    There  would  also  be  a  tabulation  of 
relevant  requirements.    We  would  suggest  that  an  inter- 
agency clearing  house  be  established  representing  each  of 
the  collection  and  production  agencies,  which  would  review 
all  requirements  when  received  and  determine  which  collection 
medium  is  best  adapted  to  satisfy  the  requirement    Such  a 
facility  using  available  resources  should  reduce  the  number 
ef  personnel  engaged  in  requirements  work. 
83  -
Such  a  center  should  be  very  closely  tied  in  to  the 
CIA  Office  of  Central  Reference  (OCR)  in  which  there  should 
be  a  record  of  all  of  the  information  collected  through  intelli- 
gence media.     The  first  effort  of  such  a  clearing  house 
would  naturally  be  to  check  the  available  information  in  OCR 
and  the  usual  public  repositories  and  insure  that  the  required 
information  is  not  already  available  in  Washington,, 
In  order  to  insure  that  the  center  be  kept  apprised 
of  new  assets  and  be  informed  about  every  form  of  col- 
lection resources,  it  should  be  manned  by  high-level,  ex- 
perienced and  fully  cleared  professionals  from  each  agency. 
These  professionals  should  be  thoroughly  acquainted  with 
all  of  the  collection  resources  of  their  respective  organizations 
i 
to  assure  that  their  requirements  are  not  unnecessarily  directed 
to  other  agencies.    Consequently,  it  would  be  most  important 
that  they  spend  a  considerable  amount  of  their  time  with  their 
own  agency  as  well  as  in  the  center.    Finally  all  collection 
requirements  in  the  indicated  fields  should  be  screened  by 
the  center  prior  to  issuance  to  the  collectors. 
We  believe  that  the  center  should  be  responsible 
for  reporting  to  USIB  any  failure  to  act  upon  assigned 
84  -
requirements.     Finally,  the  proposed  clearing  house  would 
develop  data  on  collection  that  would  assist  USIB  in  carrying 
out  its  assigned  management  responsibility. 
We  strongly  urge  that  the  USIB  in  its  annual 
evaluation  of  community  effort  prepared  for  the  NSC  pay 
specific  attention  to  collection.    This  evaluation  might  be 
associated  with  periodic  evaluation  at  embassy  and  command 
level  of  collection  requirements  and  collection  assets. 
It  is  recommended  that: 
21.  The  United  States  Intelligence  Board  es-  * 
tablish  a  central  requirements  facility,  initially 
to  coordinate  all  requirements  levied  for  clandestine 
and  signal  intelligence  collection,  and  if  successful, 
subsequently  expand  its  operations  to  other  types 
of  requirements.    Personnel  assigned  to  this  facility 
should  be  drawn  from  existing  requirements  personnel 
of  the  member  agencies. 
22.  The  new  central  requirements  facility  use 
the  Central  Intelligence  Agency's  Office  of  Central 
Reference  as  its  reference  facility. 
23.  The  United  States  Intelligence  Board  establish 
a  program  for  the  integration  of  all  collection  require- 
ments manuals  into  a  compatible  series  of  coordinated 
guides;  likewise,  the  creation  of  integrated  require- 
ments guides  on  a  country-to-coantry  basis  setting 
forth  the  specific  collection  requirements  and  responsi- 
bilities of  each  department  and  agency  concerned. 
-  85
\;tJ  &•   '--  ----iliin  i   '      "  miY'mf''v:-t"r  '■*■■?  A 
24.  The  chief  of  mission  or  principal  officer 
in  each  overseas  area  should  be  given  affirmative 
responsibility  for  coordination  of  all'    .  \~~?\ 
Y   r/'":"      .^intelligence  requirements  concerning 
that  area."^ 
25.  The  United  States  Intelligence  Board  in 
its  annual  evaluation  of  community  effort  prepared 
for  the  National  Security  Council  pay  specific 
attention  to  collection,  and  request  similar  evalua- 
tion from  each  chief  of  mission  and  military  command. 
26.  All  military  requirements  at  the  Washington 
level  be  coordinated  by  the  Department  of  Defense 
so  as  to  prevent  duplication  or  concentration  on 
low  priority  targets. 
27. 
-  86  -
VH.     COORDINATION 
Basic  Philosophy 
Much  effective  coordination  has  been  accomplished  in 
the  dozen  years  that  the  intelligence  community  has  existed 
as  a  recognized  entity.    The  Study  Group  finds,  however, 
that  two  major  elements  of  misunderstanding  and  confusion 
in  regard  to  the  philosophy  of  coordination  have  impeded  and 
continue  seriously  to  impede  the  growth  of  much  needed 
further  coordination.    There  is,  on  the  one  hand,  no  common 
understanding  of  how  coordination  should  be  achieved.    On 
the  other  hand,  there  has  been  a  lack  of  clarity  regarding 
the  relation  of  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  (DCI) 
and  of  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  (CIA)  to  the  responsi- 
bilities of  coordination.    Finally,  throughout  the  government 
the  philosophy  of  coordination  ranges  from  a  concept  of 
command  to  one  of  persuasion. 
-  87  -
"m  Jiii'ii  tiiw     r^* 
Thus,   the  term  "centralized  direction"  appears  in  No.   5 
alone  among  the  National  Security  Council  Intelligence 
Directives  (NSCIDs).     Although  in  that  directive,   the  term 
is  equated  with  coordination,  the  Study  Group  sees  no  reason 
to  doubt  that  coordination  in  the  clandestine  field  should  be 
more  mandatory  than  in  other  fields .     The  Group  feels 
that  while  ••centralized  direction"  by  the  DCI  cannot  mean 
outright  command  in  relation  to  the  intelligence  activities  of 
independent  departments,  coordination  should  tend  toward 
"direction"  in  clandestine  intelligence,  and  focus  more  on 
leadership,  initiative  and  cooperative  action  elsewhere.. 
We  feel  that  adequate  coordination  can  be  achieved 
by  the  coordinator  following  the  list  of  principles  below: 
i)  Leadership  in  developing  and  adapting  new  intelli- 
gence programs; 
2)  initiative  in  identifying  problem  areas  and 
instances  of  duplicate  effort  or  missing  effort; 
3)  Investigation  of  these  problem  areas,  if -necessary 
through  use  of  the  right  to  survey  intelligence  activities; 
4)  Solution  of  these  problems  to  the  extent  possible 
by  agreed  cooperative  action  of  relevant  parties  under 
leadership  of  the  coordinator; 
-  88  -
5)  Recommendation  of  solutions  to  higher  authority 
when  common  agreement  is  not  promptly  forthcoming,  with 
indication  of  the  position  of  the  various  parties. 
The  Joint  Study  Group  is  confident  that  if  all  members 
of  the  intelligence  community  were  to  become  convinced 
that  the  coordinative  authority  envisaged  in  the  basic  laws 
of  the  community  were  of  the  above  nature  much  of  the 
reluctance  and  apprehension  that  now  remain  would  disappear. 
If  one  obstacle  to  full  development  of  coordination  has 
been  uncertainty  about  the  nature  of  coordination  itself,  the 
second  major  obstacle  has  been  uncertainty  about  the  nature 
of  the  coordinator.    There  is,  of  course,  no  doubt  anywhere 
that  the  coordinator  is  and  must  be  the  Director  of  Central 
Intelligence.    The  media  through  which  he  is  to  practice 
coordination  are  less  clear.    The  Joint  Study  Group  is  aware 
that  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  has  several  responsi- 
bilities, one  of  which  is  to  command  the  CIA.,  and  another  is 
to  coordinate  foreign  intelligence  activities  both  within  and 
outside  the  CIA. 
We  have  given  lengthy  consideration  to  the  possible 
separation  of  the  role  of  the  DC1  from  that  of  the  head  of  the  CIA. 
-89  -
-—  ■  
■  
i  
-ii .,   »i  
-— 
This  separation  could  be  accomplished  in.  two  different  ways: 
first,  by  separating  the  DCI  and  a  small  staff  of  personnel 
assistants;  second,  by  separating  the  DCI  plus  estimating, 
current  intelligence  and  planning  and  coordination  staffs. 
Such  a  separation  would  eliminate  objections  raised 
to  an  arrangement  whereby  the  DCI  commands  one  of  the 
agencies  he  is  responsible  for  coordinating.    Furthermore, 
through  such  separation  the  DCI  could  spend  more  time  on 
coordinating  foreign  intelligence  activities. 
Although  the  potential  advantages  outlined  above  for 
separation  are  impressive,  such  a  step  has  a  number  of  dis- 
advantages.    The  President  could  no  longer  look  to  one  man 
to  brief  hizn  across  the  board  on  intelligence  and  covert  action 
matters.    Furthermore,  if  the  DCI  were  separated  as  proposed, 
there  is  the  danger  that  he  and  his  staff  would  tend  to  get  out 
of  touch  -with  the  ■practical  operational  problems  of  the  com- 
munity.   In  addition,  if  he  is  assisted  by  only  a  small 
staff,  he  axaay  in  fact  be  able  to  tichieve  te«s  coordination  of 
the  conmxnnity  t^?^  is  possible  under  present  conditions.    It 
is  also  possible  that  the  result  would  be  that  the  DCI  would 
-90  -
end  up  with  a  large  staff  but  with  little  or  no  offsetting 
reductions  in  CIA  or  elsewhere  in  the  community.     Finally, 
it  is  noted  that  such  a  separation  would  require  a  change  in 
the  basic  law  for  the  CIA. 
The  Study  Group  feels  that  included  in  this  report  are 
recommended  actions  which  should  help  to  eliminate  objections 
to  the  present  organisation  arrangements  for  the  DCI.    For 
example,   it  is  proposed  that  the  DCI  use  a  staff  drawn  from 
the  entire  community  and  attached  directly  to  his  office  to 
assist  him  in  his  coordinating  purposes 
In  summary,  the  Joint  Study  Group  feels  that  the 
actions  recommended  in  this  report  should  go  a  long  way 
toward  removing  impediments  to  the  success  of  the  present 
arrangement,  and  should  he  given  a  fair  trial.    If  after  a 
reasonable  period  of  time  the  role  of  the  DCI  is  still  in 
question,   then  serious  consideration  should  be  given  txi 
complete  separation  of  the  DCI  from  CZA. 
However,  the  representative  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense 
on  the  Joint  Study  Group  does  not  agree  with  the  above  views 
91  -
m  ■  * —  •  ■"    ■  -j 
and  believes  that  some  of  the  arguments  against  separation  of 
the  DCI  and  the  CIA  are  invalid.    He  would  note  that  the  present 
system  has  been  in  existence  for  ten  years  and  has  failed 
to  achieve  proper  coordination.    He  would  recommend  making 
a  separation  at  this  time,  in  accordance  with  the  second 
alternative  proposed  above. 
The  fact  is  and  has  been  that  the  DC1  has  used  elements 
of  ,the  CIA  as  instruments  of  community  coordination.    Since 
August  of  1957  he  has  had  a  staff  of  three  officers  within  the 
CIA  charged  with  improving  coordination  within  the  national 
intelligence  effort  which  has  worked  primarily  on  the  revision 
of  the  NSCIDs  and  their  implementing  Director  of  Central 
Intelligence  Directives  (DCIDs),  but  has  been  unable  to 
devote  any  major  effort  to  day  to  day  coordination  in  the 
intelligence  community.    Furthermore,  the  community  has 
never  had  occasion  to  look  upon  this  staff  as  anything  other 
than  a  part  of  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency. 
Clearly  from  the  first  the  CIA  has  l»een  engaged  ±a 
coordination.    To  take  one  of  the  conspicuously  successful 
examples,  the  work  of  the  Office  of  National  Estimates  (ONE) 
in  coordinating  community  knowledge  and  views  in  the 
-  92  -
National  Intelligence  Estimates  (NIEs)  is  surely  one  of  the 
activities  that  derives  from  the  Agency's  specific  responsi- 
bility under  the  National  Security  Act  of  1947.    The  CIA 
chairmanship  of  a  large  proportion  of  the  United  States 
Intelligence  Board  (USIB)  committees  is  another  aspect  of 
the  same  recognized  responsibility. 
jthis  essential 
i 
coordinating  activity  of  the  CIA  has  meant  that  the  other 
agencies  found  themselves  being  coordinated  by  an  organi- 
zation which  from  time  to  time  appeared  as  a  vigorous 
competitor  of  theirs.    In  the  process  of  developing  the 
agreed  areas  of  action,  the  CIA  has  also  raised  apprehensions 
in  other  agencies.    It  does  appear  that  some  of  the  assigned 
functions  of  CIA  have  been  expanded  to  the  point  where  there 
is  overlap  with  the  activities  of  other  agencies, 
In  all  fairness  it  should  be 
noted  that  some  of  tlie.ee  CIA  activities  were  originally 
requested  by  other  agencies  oar  were  mounted  to  fill  gaps. 
In  considering  this  situation  as  of  the  present  and 
future,  the  Joint  Study  Group  concludes  that  the  community 
-  93  -
i  iA "•  .«■«■- 
has  by  now  matured,   and  has  reached  an  understanding  of 
functional  responsibilities  sufficiently  stable  to  permit  a 
frank  facing  of  the  problems  involved.    In  consequence  the 
Joint  Study  Group  believes  that  there  are  two  kinds  of 
coordination  which  can  be  practiced  separately.    Although 
the  familiar  operating  elements  under  both  the  Deputy 
Director /Plans  and  the  Deputy  Director /Intelligence  of 
the  CIA  must  more  than  ever  look  upon  their  substantive 
relations  with  the  community  as  factors  in  over -all  coordi- 
nation, there  is  need  for  a  different  unit,  apart  from  the 
CIA.  operations  and  which,  responding  immediately  to  the 
DCI  may  work  on  major  problems  that  arise  in  the  over -all 
management  of  the  community.    It  is  these  prospects  that  are 
discussed  in  this  section. 
Directives 
The  duties  assigned  by  Congress  to  the  CIA.  under 
the  National  Security  Act  of  1947  and  by  the  National  Security 
Council  (NSC)  to  the  DCI  and  the  TJS1B  xtndsr  the  provision*  of 
NSCID  No.  1»  are  for  the  declared  purpose  of  coordinating 
the  intelligence  activities  of  the  several  departments  and 
agencies  in  the  interest  of  national  security. 
-94
In  the  preamble  of  NSCID  No.  I,   the  NSC  enunciates 
the  philosophy  that  the  intelligence  effort  of  the  United  States 
is  a  national  responsibility;  that  it  must  be  organized  and 
managed;  that  it  must  achieve  maximum  exploitation  of  the 
available  resources  of  the  Government;  and  that  it  must 
satisfy  the  intelligence  requirements  of  the  NSC,  and  of 
the  departments  and  agencies  of  the  Government.     To  realize 
these  intentions,  the  Directives  set  forth  a  basic  purpose 
of  coordinating  the  intelligence  activities  of  the  several 
departments  and  agencies,  and  to  accomplish  this  basic 
purpose  the  NSC  has  provided  for  a  variety  of  actions  and 
conditions  which  are  all  a  part  of  and  equally  essential  to 
the  achievement  of  effective  coordination: 
Coordination  in  terms  of  a  specific  action  responsi- 
bility —  "The  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  shall 
coordinate  the  foreign  intelligence  activities  of  the  United 
States. ..."  (NSCID  No.  1,  paragraph  1.) 
Coordination  in  terms  of  the  governmental  framework 
in  which  it  shall  be  accomplished  —  **To  maintain  the  relation- 
ship necessary  for  a  fully  coordinated  intelligence  community 
and  to  provide  for  a  more  effective  integration  of  and  guidance 
-95  -
to  the  national  intelligence  effort,  a  United  States  Intelligence 
Board  (USIB)  is  hereby  established  under  the  directives  of 
the  National  Security  Council  and  under  the  chairmanship  of 
the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence.  "    (NSCED  No.  I, 
paragraph  2.  a.) 
Coordination  in  terms  of  corporate  participation  in 
the  development  of  rules  and  procedures  —  NSCIDs  are  to 
be  based  upon  recommendations  made  to  the  Council  by  the 
DCI,  in  each  case  indicating  the  concurrence  or  non-concurring 
views  of  those  members  of  the  USIB  concerned;  detailed 
implementation  of  the  NSCIDs  is  provided  for  by  the  DCIDs, 
which  have  been  agreed  to  by  the  USIB  under  the  same 
procedures  as  are  used  for  resolving  the'content  of  the 
NSCIDs.    The  DCI  may  issue  them  unless  a  dissenting  member 
requests  referral  to  the  NSC.    (NSCID  No.  I,  paragraphs  2.  d. 
and  3.) 
Coordination  in  terms  of  authority  --  NSCIDs  having 
been  approved  by  the  President  in  consultation  with  the  heads 
of  the  departments  chiefly  concerned,  shall,  as  applicable, 
be  promulgated  and  implemented  by  the  intelligence  depart- 
ments and  agencies;  within  the  framework  of  these  directives, 
-96  -
including  the  implementing  DCIDs,   decisions  of  the  USIB 
shall  be  binding,  as  applicable,   on  all  departments  and 
agencies  of  the  Government. 
Coordination  in  terms  of  management  responsibility  -- 
the  USIB  is  directed  to  establish  policies  and  develop 
programs  for  the  guidance  of  all  departments  and  agencies 
concerned;  the  DCI  is  authorized  to  make  such  surveys  of 
departmental  intelligence  activities  of  the  various  depart- 
ments and  agencies  as  he  may  deem  necessary  in  connection 
with  his  duty  to  advise  the  NSC  and  coordinate  the  intelligence 
effort  of  the  United  States.    (NSCID  No.  I,  paragraph  3.  c.) 
Some  members  of  the  intelligence  community, 
especially  the  military  services,  believe  that  the  coordinating 
authority  of  the  DCI  is  qualified  by  the  clause  in  the  National 
Security  Act  of  1947  permitting  each  department  and  agency 
to  collect,  -produce  and  disseminate  departmental  intelligence 
required  to  support  its  mission.    We  believe,  howeveT,  that 
it  -was  the  clear  intent  of  the  Congress  and  the  NSC  that  it 
is  the  departmental  intelligence  activities  of  the  several 
departments  and  agencies  which  are  to  be  coordinated. 
Furthermore,  it  was  clearly  not  the  intent  of  this  clause 
-  97  -
\f  i  •    -  -        --  *    .-■'-'  1           r  ■!■  M 
«l   i       r-li.i...    ->  1»" 
that  these  activities  be  exempted  from  coordination: 
notably,  for  example,  the  allocation  of  substantive 
responsibilities  in  NSCIDs  No.   2  and  No.   3;  and  the 
general  principle  that  an  agency  look  to  other  agencies 
for  any  intelligence  it  needs  that  lies  in  their  fields  of 
responsibility. 
We  believe  that  the  authority  and  responsibility 
assigned  to  the  USXB  make  that  body  the  principal 
mechanism  for  assisting  the  DCI  in  coordinating  the 
foreign  intelligence  activities  of  the  United  States.    The 
Board  participates  in  the  development  of  the  directives 
tinder  which  the  intelligence  community  operates.    The 
Board  in  its  own  right  is  directed  to  establish  policies  and 
develop  programs  for  the  guidance  of  all  departments  and 
agencies  concerned.    Decisions  of  the  Board  within  the 
National  Security  Council  Intelligence  Directives  in  which 
the  heads  of  departments  participated  are  binding  on  all 
departments  and  agencies.    A  first  step  in  detailed  exami- 
nation of  community  coordination  should  therefore  be  a 
consideration  of  the  USE3. 
-98
^— — -    '  '  '  i"l  "i '  ibm  ak\ 
■  fcllMl   I   HI       I        ■•■' 
The  United  States  Intelligence  Board 
On  the  national  level  formal  coordination  is  achieved 
through  the  meetings  of  the  USIB  and  its        [standing  committees. 
Many  of  these  committees  in  turn  have  sub -committees,  working 
groups  and  other  ad  hoc  groups  which  are  again  forums  for  a 
comparison  of  views  and  the  development  of  procedures  where 
inter -departmental  or  other  types  of  joint  action  are  required. 
Among  the  most  active  USIB  organisms  in  the  field  of  coordi- 
nation are  the  Watch  Committee ,  the  Guided  Missiles  and 
Astronautics  Committee,  the  Joint  Atomic  Energy  Intelligence 
Committee,  the  Communications  Intelligence  Committee,  the 
Electronics  Intelligence  Committee,  the  Economic  Intelligence 
Committee  and  the  Committee  on  Overhead  Reconnaissance. 
These  committees  have,  in  addition  to  their  responsibilities 
for  producing  inter -departmental  intelligence,  in  some  instances 
coordinated  requirements  for  collection,  and  in  other  instances 
developed  common  activities. 
An  important  task  of  the  USIB  is  the  managerial 
responsibility  assigned  to  it  under  the  terms  of  NSCED  No.  1, 
paragraph  2.  a.  (I),  to  "establish  policies  and  develop 
programs  for  the  guidance  of  all  departments  and 
-99  -
agencies  concerned. "    We  feel  most  strongly  that  the  intelli- 
gence programs  developed  by  the  individual  member  agencies 
of  the  community,  especially  their  planned  allocations  of 
effort,   should  be  reviewed  by  the  USIB  for  consistency  and 
guidance  prior  to  the  submission  of  budget  estimates  within 
the  departments  and  agencies.    However,  we  do  not  believe 
that  the  USIB  is  now  organized  in  such  a  way  that  it  can 
achieve  truly  effective  management. 
We  suggest  that  the  USIB  establish  a  group  composed 
of  senior  officers  of  USIB  members  for  purposes  of  (a)  more 
carefully  screening  matters  and  papers  to  be  presented  to 
the  Board  other  than  estimates  and  substantive  intelligence 
matters,  making  decisions  themselves  on  matters  of  lesser 
importance  to  save  the  Board's  time;  and  (b)  staffing  out 
major  management  problems  for  the  Board's  consideration. 
This  group  should  also  Teview  the  USIB  committee  structure 
and  functions  for  purposes  of  stimulating  more  regular  and 
worthwhile  reporting  to  lie  Board,  generating  aaore  interest 
in  management  problems,  and  determining  if  ther«  can  be 
any  worthwhile  consolidation  or  rearrangement  of  the -com- 
mittee structure. 
-  100  -
The  Director  of  Central  Intelligence 
The  key  to  the  coordination  problem  in  the  intelligence 
community  is  the  role  of  the  DCI.     We  have  previously  dis- 
cussed the  position  of  the  DCI  as  the  coordinator. 
We  believe  that  the  Director's  authority  to  command 
is  limited  to  the  ClA,   including  those  services  of  common 
concern  assigned  to  the  Agency  by  the  NSCXDs.    However, 
under  the  -terms  of  the  National  Security  Act  of  1947,  as 
amended,  NSCIDs,  and  the  Executive  Orders  of  the  President, 
the  Director  has  a  combination  of  authority  and  responsibility 
which  we  believe  enables  him  to  achieve  through  the  normal 
command  channels  of  the  departments  and  agencies  concerned 
the  practical  coordination  effect  of  strong  centralized  direction 
of  all  foreign  intelligence  activities.    In  this  connection  he 
has  the  following  basic  powers: 
he  can  make  such  surveys  of  departmental  intelligence 
activities  as  he  may  deem  necessary  (although  he  has 
*rer  used  this  important  authority); 
He  can  make  recommendations  to  the  National  Security 
Council  with  or  without  the  approval  of  the  intelligence 
community,  his  only  obligation  in  this  regard  being  to 
-  101  -
I*.. 
transmit  a  statement  indicating  the  concurrence  or  the 
non-concurring  view  of  those  members  of  USIB  concerned; 
his  recommendations  to  the  NSC,   when  approved  by 
that  body  and  specifically  by  the  President,  are  issued  as 
NSCIDs  and,  as  applicable,  shall  be  promulgated  and 
implemented  by  the  departments  and  agencies  of  the 
Government; 
he  acts  for  the  NSC  when  issuing  DCIDs  to  provide  for 
the  detailed  implementation  of  the  NSCIDs  and  these 
directives,  when  approved  by  the  USIB  and /or  the  NSC, 
are  required  to  be  promulgated  and  issued  through  the 
normal  command  channels  of  the  departments  and  agencies 
concerned.    Although  the  DCI.must  have  the  concurrence 
of  the  USIB  before  he  can  directly  issue  a  DCID,  dis- 
senting members  cannot  block  the  action,  because  any 
non-concurrence  in  the  USIB  maybe  referred  either  by 
the  DCI  or  dissenting  members  to  the  NSC  for  final  decision. 
We  believe  that  the  DCI  now  has  ample  authority  tc 
carry  out  his  assigned  role  as  coordinator  of  the  foreign 
intelligence  effort  of  the  United  States  to  whatever  degree  may 
be  required  to  ensure  the  effective  coordination  of 'depart- 
mental intelligence  activities. 
-  102  -
"We  are  convinced  that  the  DCI  and  the  U5IB  together 
have  a  combination  of  assigned  authorities  and  responsibilities 
which  enable  and  require  them  to  exercise  a  stronger  role  in 
improving  the  management  of  the  foreign  intelligence  activities 
of  the  member  agencies  of  the  intelligence  community.     The 
effort  of  the  Joint  Study  Group  has  been  to  suggest  means  of 
more  fully  carrying  out  these  responsibilities. 
Coordination  Overseas 
The  DCI  has  over -all  responsibility  for  the  coordination 
of  United  States  foreign  intelligence  activities.     The  NSCIDs 
provide  three  lines  of  authority  for  achieving  coordination  of 
intelligence  activities  overseas: 
under  NSCID  No.  2  the  senior  U.  S.  representative  in 
each  country  is  responsible  for  the  coordination  of  all 
collection  activities  not  covered  by  other  NSCIDs; 
-  103  -  ^P#    104   not   released]
We  believe  that  chief  s  of  mission  generally  should  take 
more  positive  steps  ia  connection,  with  their  responsibility 
to  coordinate  overt  collection  and  reporting  activities.    To 
do  so  would  not  entail  any  great  problem  with  respect  to 
these  activities  being  conducted  by  those  U.  S.  personnel 
-  105  -
.^mi       ii  —i*  i^mmki 
directly  connected  with  an  embassy.     However,   there  are 
complications  with  respect  to  the  coordination  of  overt 
collection  and  reporting  activities  conducted  by  military 
commands  which  have  areas  of  responsibility  which  cover 
many  countries  and  therefore  involve  a  number  of  chiefs 
of  mission.     This  problem  is  further  complicated  by  the 
somewhat  confused  situation  concerning  the  coordinating 
responsibilities  of  unified  commanders  with  respect  to  the 
intelligence  activities  conducted  by  their  component  commands . 
The  component  commands  at  present  appear  to  receive  roost 
of  their  guidance  and  direction  directly  from  their  respective 
service  departments  at  the  Washington  level. 
The  implementing  provisions  contained  in  the  NSCZDs 
and  the  DCIDs  are  consistent  with  the  concept  that  intelli- 
gence is  a  function  of  command;  i.  e.,  these  directives  are 
required  to  be  promulgated  and  disseminated  through  normal 
command  channels.    Therefore,  it  would  appear  that  unified 
commanders  should,  at  least,  coordinate  the  intelligence 
activities  of  their  component  commands  and  be  the  primary 
channel  to  them  for  guidance  and  direction  on  intelligence 
matters,   including  that  originating  in  the  service  departments 
at  the  Washington  level. 
[P.    107  not  released] 
-  106  -
Despite  the  problems  indicated  above,  a  great  deal  of 
effort  has  gone  into  coordination  of  foreign  intelligence 
activities  and  real  progress  has  been  made  over  the  past 
ten  years.     There  is  still  need  in  our  diplomatic  missions 
for  a  more  standard  pattern  of  coordination  and,  on  the  part 
of  the  senior  officials  concerned,  a  more  thorough  under- 
standing of  the  problems  involved  and  their  responsibilities 
to  achieve  coordination. 
However, 
from  an  over-all  standpoint  the  key  factor  as  we  «ee  it  i&  that 
coordination  in  every  case  is  being  done  by  individuals  "who 
have  other  important  duties. 
-  108  -
National  Level:     Conclusions 
The  DCI  should  continue  to  be  coordinator  of  all  U.  S. 
foreign  intelligence  activities  and  directly  responsible  to 
the  NSC  and  the  President. 
The  US  IB  should  continue  to  be  the  principal  mechanism 
for  assisting  the  DCI  in  carrying  out  his  coordination  responsi- 
bilities.   However,  we  believe  this  Board  should  be  reorganized 
so  as  to  become  more  efficient  and  assume  a  stronger  role 
in  the  management  of  the  foreign  intelligence  activities 
conducted  by  those  departments  and  agencies  which  comprise 
the  intelligence  community.     (See  page  100  of  this  section.) 
We  have  recommended  in  Section  m  that  the  Joint 
Chiefs  of  Staff  be  given  a  stronger  role  in  substantive  military 
intelligence  matters,  and  that  a  focal  point  be  established  in 
the  Office  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense  for  improved  manage- 
ment of  military  intelligence  activities.    In  phase  with 
implementation  of  these  changes,  the  size  of  the  USIB  should 
be  reduced  to  four  members.    The  reorganized  Board  should 
include  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  (Chairman),  and 
one  representative  each  of  the  Secretary  of  State,  the 
Secretary  of  Defense  and  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  with 
-  109  -
ad  hoc  representation  from  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation 
and  the  Atomic  Energy  Commission.    Such  a  reorganized 
Board  should  assume  a  stronger  role  in  the  management  of 
the  foreign  intelligence  activities  of  the  United  States,  in 
addition  to  their  substantiv.e  responsibilities.     The  three 
military  service  intelligence  chiefs  and  the  Director  of  NSA 
should  serve  as  advisors  to  the  two  representatives  of  Defense, 
as  appropriate. 
To  provide  for  including  full-time  professionals 
into  the  field  of  coordination  and  minimizing  the  conflict  of 
interest  problem,  we  propose  that  the  DCI  organize  under 
his  Assistant  for  Coordination  and  as  part  of  his  personal 
staff,  a  full-time  group  of  intelligence  professionals  owing 
primary  allegiance  to  the  intelligence  community  rather  than 
to  any  one  member  agency.    Membership  on  the  staff  would 
be  drawn  from  the  foreign  intelligence  community -et»lar ge . 
We  believe  that  this  coordination  staff  should  be 
charged  with  assisting  the  DCI  ±a  his  community-wide 
responsibilities  for  the  coordination  of  XJ.  S.  foreign 
intelligence  activities,  including  the  surveys  of  departmental 
110  -
intelligence  activities  authorized  in  NSCED  No.   1,   paragraph  3.   c. 
The  staff  and  its  entire  membership  should  be  responsible  to 
the  DCI  as  coordinator  and  they  should  be  separated  from  any 
operational  responsibility  of  the  CIA  or  other  department  or 
agency. 
Overseas:    Conclusions 
Chiefs  of  mission  should  more  affirmatively  exercise 
the  responsibility  for  the  coordination  of  overt  collection 
activities  assigned  to  them  by  NSCID  No.  2.    At  the  smaller 
posts  the  chief  of  mission  can  usually  Assume  full  responsi- 
bility himself.     Where  this  coordination  problem  is  more 
complex  he  should  delegate  this  responsibility  to  the  deputy 
chief  of  mission  and,  if  it  requires  full  time  attention,  a 
special  officer  for  coordination  should  be  assigned  to  the 
post  to  carry  on  these  duties  on  behalf  of  the  chief  of  mission. 
Turther,  as  recommended  in  Section  VI,  we  believe  that  at 
all  posts  the  chief  of  mission  should  ensure  the  effective 
coordination  of  all  requirements  received  for  the  I 
^collection  of  intelligence  information  so  that  the 
'   l 
most  efficient  use  can  be  made  of  the  manpower  and  resources 
available. 
-  Ill  -
With  respect  to  military  intelligence  activities  over- 
seas, *ve  nave  recommended  in  Section  HI  that  unified 
commanders  should  exeTcise  a  more  positive  coordinating 
authority  over  the  intelligence  activities  of  Iheir  component 
commands  and  should  be  the  primary  channel  through  which 
the  latter  receive  advice  and  guidance  on  intelligence  matters, 
including  requests  that  originate  in  the  service  departments 
(fj        at  the  national  level. 
-  112  -
The  unified  commanders  should  work  out  with  the 
chiefs  of  mission  concerned  an  appropriate  plan  for  the 
coordination  of  those  overt  collection  activities  of  the 
component  commands  which  are  subject  to  coordination  by 
the  chief  of  mission  under  NSCED  No.  2.     In  addition,  there 
:   :   ~~  7 
are  overt  collection  Jactivities  conducted 
  ~   J 
by  military  elements  overseas  who  are  directly  responsible 
to  the  service  departments  at  the  Washington  level;  chiefs 
of  mission  responsible  for  areas  in  which  such  activities 
are  being  conducted  should  ensure  that  these  activities  are 
included  in  their  over -all  coordination  plan. 
In  submitting  the  following  recommendations,  attention 
is  again  invited  to  recommendations  particularly  in  the 
Sections  on  Military  Intelligence,  Collection  -  Resources, 
and  Requirements  and  Evaluation,  which  also  deal  with 
coordination  matters  and  are  not  repeated  here. 
It  is  recommended  that: 
28.    The  .Director  -of  Central  intelligence  should  take 
action  to  achieve  snore  effective  coordination  within  the 
intelligence  community  using  the  normal  command 
channels,  as  distinct  from  staff  channels,  of  the  depart- 
ments and  agencies  concerned. 
-  113
29.  The  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  should  be 
supported  in  taking  leadership  and  initiative  to  develop 
solutions  for  the  problems  of  coordination  by  the  establish- 
ment of  a  coordination  staff,   under  his  personal  supervision 
and  separate  from  any  operational  responsibility  of  the 
Central  Intelligence  Agency  or  other-  department  or  agency. 
This  staff  should  seek  to  identify  at  the  earliest  possible 
time  and  promptly  recommend  solutions  to  coordination 
problems,  especially  through  surveys  of  intelligence 
activities  as  authorized  by  National  Security  Council 
Intelligence  Directive  No.  1.  * 
30 .  In  phase  with  the  organizational  changes  in  the 
Department  of  Defense  recommended  in  Section  in,  the 
membership  of  the  United  States  Intelligence  Board  should 
be  reduced  to  four  members  who  shall  be  the  Director 
of  Central  Intelligence  (Chairman),  and  representatives 
of  the  Secretary  of  State,  the  Secretary  of  Defense,  and    ' 
the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff,  with  ad  hoc  representation  from 
the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  and  the  Atomic  Energy 
Commission. 
31.  To  strengthen  its  role  in  management  of  the 
intelligence  community,  the  United  States  Intelligence 
Board  should  establish  a  management  group  which  would 
analyze  and  propose  solutions  to  non-substantive  com- 
munity problems  of  an  administrative  or  management  type. 
This  group  would  be  composed  of  one  senior  representative 
of  each  member  of  the  United  States  Intelligence  Board. 
32.  The  United  States  Intelligence  Board,  through 
the  recommended  management  group,  should  Teview  the 
future  plans  and  programs  of  each  member  of  the  intelli- 
gence community  for  consistency  and  proper  allocation 
of  effort  at  the  beginning  of  each  annual  budget  cycle.    Its 
views  should  serve  as  a  basis  for  guidance  and  coordination 
to  the  intelligence  community  and  for  reporting  to  the 
National  Security  Council  annually. 
*  -  See  page  91  for  dissent  regarding  separation  of  Director  of 
Central  Intelligence  from  Central  Intelligence  Agency. 
114  -
*&***: 
33.  The  management  group  referred  to  above  should 
review  the  functions  and  activities  of  the  several  com- 
mittees and  sub -committees  of  the  United  States 
Intelligence  Board.     This  review  should  include 
consideration  of  possible  changes  in  the  committee 
structure  and  improved  reporting  procedures. 
34.  Intelligence  guidance  and  instructions  to  com- 
ponents of  unified  commands  originating  in  military 
departments  should  be  transmitted  to  these  commands 
through  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  (J- 2). 
35.  Unified  commanders  should  exercise  control  and 
command  over  the  intelligence  activities  of  their  component 
commands  and  be  the  primary  channel  to  them  for  guidance 
and  direction  on  intelligence  matters  including  any 
instructions  that  originate  in  the  service  departments. 
36.  Chiefs  of  diplomatic  and  consular  missions 
abroad  should  take  positive  steps  to  effectively  coordinate 
all  overt  intelligence  collection  and  reporting  activities 
within  their  assigned  areas  of  responsibility. 
37. 
IP.    116  Blank] 
-  115
L— ■*—.*.—   **'  —  +     ■>   -->  '<  ? 
VIII.     COST  OF  FOREIGN  INTELLIGENCE  EFFORT 
The  Group  has  been  unable  to  ascertain  with  any  degree 
of  accuracy  the  cost  of  the  foreign  intelligence  effort  for  the 
following  reasons: 
1)  Accounting  systems  differ  in  the  departments  and 
agencies  concerned  with  the  foreign  intelligence  effort  and 
are  not  designed  to  separately  identify  and  measure  the  total 
intelligence  costs. 
2)  There  are  varying  interpretations  within  those  - 
departments  and  agencies  as  to  what  should  be  included  or 
excluded  from  any  foreign  intelligence  costing  effort. 
3)  Certain  activities  are  of  a  mixed  nature  which 
makes  it  difficult  to  distinguish  intelligence  from  non- 
intelligence  elements. 
4)  Intelligence  receives  direct  or  indirect  support, 
•uch  as  communications  and  transportation,  which  is  hard 
to  separate  out  as  intelligence  cost. 
5)  Some  new  and  expensive  projects  are  initially 
justified  as  being  primarily  in  support  of  the  foreign 
intelligence  effort  but  later  turn  out  to  be  primarily  or 
exclusively  operational  activities. 
-  117  -
Even  after  the  best  available  figures  have  been  put 
together  there  remain  certain  complexities  involved  in  the 
analysis  of  the  cost  of  intelligence.    The  total  cost  cannot  be 
appraised  exclusively  in  terms  of  the  output  of  finished  intelli- 
gence because  the  costs  cover  important  and  expensive 
activities  of  training  and  operations  of  units  designed  largely 
to  maintain  an  essential  capability  for  wartime.    Furthermore, 
some  of  the  research  and  development  expenses  attached  to 
intelligence  projects  have  valuable  by-products  in  other  areas 
of  the  government  and  even  in  the  private  economy;  e.  g. , 
communications  security  devices,  automatic  data  processing. 
[P.    119  not  released] 
-  113  -
The  Group  urges  the  vital  importance  of  carrying 
through  to  the  best  feasible  result  in  the  continuing  process 
of  cost  accounting  for  the  intelligence  effort. 
In  recent  years  progress  has  been  made  in  developing 
procedures  ior  determing  annually  the  order  of  magnitude 
of  the  costs  of  the  foreign  intelligence  effort.    The  Study  Croup 
feels  the  time  has  now  arrived  to  refine  these  estimates  and 
develop  cost  breakdowns  which  would  provide  a  better  basis 
-  120  -
for  USIB  coordinating  and  guiding  the  efforts  of  various  parts 
of  the  community. 
It  ia  recommended  that: 
38.    In  order  to  achieve  a  more  effective  system 
fox  utilizing  cost  and  manpower  data  in  the  entire 
foreign  intelligence  effort,   the  United  States  Intelligence 
Board  should  refine  and  improve  its  process  for -pre- 
paring and  appraising  such  data  by  the  following  means: 
(a)  the  United  States  Intelligence  Board's 
making  a  clear  and  specific  determination  as  to 
those  activities  which  properly  are  foreign  intelli- 
gence and  thus  subject  to  the  coordination  of  the 
Director  of  Central  Intelligence  and  the  guidance 
of  the  United  States  Intelligence  Board. 
(b)  based  on  this  determination,  the  United 
States  Intelligence  Board  should  continue  to  evolve 
an  improving  pattern  for  the  development  of  cost 
and  manpower  data  so  that  the  resulting  figures 
will  be  comparable  and  will  permit  the  United 
State 8  Intelligence  Board  to  review  and  coordinate 
the  effort  expended  on  foreign  intelligence  activities 
by  the  several  departments  and  agencies,  especially 
through  the  review  referred  to  in  Section  VII, 
recommendation  no.  32. 
tP.    122  Blank] 
-  121  -
DC.     RESEARCH  AND  DEVELOPMENT 
Research  and  development  activities  for  intelligence 
purposes  are  conducted  primarily  by  the  Department  of 
Defense  (DOD)  and  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  (CIA). 
AU  of  these  defense  activities,  as  a  result 
of  the  Defense  Reorganization  Act  of  1958,  as  amended,  aTe 
under  the  general  supervision  of  the  Director  of  Defense 
Research  and  Engineering,  and  the  Assistant  to  the  Secre- 
tary of  Defense  for  Special  Operations  participates  in  this 
review. 
As  a  result  of  the  above  steps, 
a  more  effective  coordination  of  research  and  development 
activities  has  been  achieved  within  the  DOD. 
Within  CIA  research  and  development  is  conducted 
primarily  by  two  units, . 
-  123  -
Current  coordination  of  research  and  development 
activities  between  the  CIA  and  members  of  the  Defense 
Establishment  varies  according  to  the  subject  under  review. 
It  ranges  from  close  coordination 
jat  the  operational  level  to  informal  exchanges  of 
information  on  other  matters,  sometimes  by  means  of  the 
USIB  committee  structure.    While  the  Joint  Study  Group 
believes  that  the  intelligence  community  should  develop  a 
better  system  for  exchanging  research  and  development 
information,  it  also  notes  that  such  exchange  of  information 
is  so  effective  substitute  for  coordination.    In  view  of  this 
fact,  DOD  and  the  CIA  should  seek  means  for  effecting 
better  coordination. 
Several  problems  of  special  concern  to  the  members 
of  the  intelligence  community  were  revealed  in  the  course 
of  the  general  review  conducted  by  the  Joint  Study  Group. 
[Pp.    125-127  not  released] 
-  124  -
It  is  recommended  that: 
39.  The  Department  of  Defense  and  the  Central 
Intelligence  Agency  should  seek  means  to  effect 
better  coordination  of  their  respective  research  and 
development  activities  for  intelligence  purposes. 
40.  The  United  States  Intelligence  Board  should 
monitor  efforts  to  develop  automatic  systems  to  store 
and  retrieve  intelligence  information  and  the  extent 
to  which  compatibility  of  systems  is  assured. 
41. 
42, 
( 
-  128  -
X.     THE  FUTURE 
The  Joint  Study  Group  wishes  to  emphasize  the 
necessity  for  policy  makers  to  recognize  intelligence  as  an 
instrument  not  only  for  use  in  the  probing  of  areas  of  current 
interest  to  the  United  States,  but  also  and  especially  for 
exploring  those  areas  which  may  be  in  the  future  of  great 
concern  to  the  national  security  of  the  United  States.    We  feel 
that  too  often  intelligence  is  used  as  the  handmaiden  of  cur- 
rent operations  to  the  detriment  of  long-range  considerations. 
Historically,  conflict  has  been  normal  to  all  societies  and 
although  we  may  strive  for  more  stable  international  relations 
it  would  be  unrealistic  and  extremely  dangerous  for  the  United 
States  to  ignore  the  lessons  of  history  that  conflicts  are  ever 
present  and  also  ever  changing.    It  is  likely  that  conflicts 
of  the  future  will  not  be  limited  to  those  with  our  current 
major  antagonists.    In  1942  few  Americans  could  have  fore- 
seen our  present  close  alliance  with  Germany  and  Japan  or, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  current  menace  of  mainland  China. 
U.  S.  intelligence  should  be  sharpened  as  to  the 
quality  of  its  collection,  production  and  estimates  in  support 
-  129  -
of  current  operations. 
We  foresee  no  diminution  in  the  importance  of  the 
role  of  intelligence  in  support  of  our  national  security.    It 
will  require  great  resources  in  manpower  and  money. 
Management  of  this  effort  "will  continue  to  demand  leadership 
of  the  highest  order  if  the  intelligence  needs  are  to  be  met 
from  resources  available. 
-  130  - 
K
Intelligence  must  be  careful  to  take  into  account 
anticipated  technological  developments.     These  developments 
should  be  imaginatively  utilized  by  U.  S.  intelligence  itself  for 
foreign  positive  intelligence  and  counterintelligence  purposes. 
A  tremendous  advance  has  been  made  during  the  past 
ten  years  in  the  fields  of  transportation  and  delivery  of 
weapons,  making  it  imperative  that  equal  advance  be  made  in 
the  field  of  electronic  communications.  1 
All  these  prospects  point  to  one  final  conclusion  — 
that  a  primary  responsibility  before  the  intelligence  community 
is  long-range  planning.     Both  in  respect  of  how  to  carry  on  its 
-  131  -
u 
 ...,-,.-:  ,-■-,. ;:1 
business  through  processes  of  management,  and  in  respect 
of  the  area  and  subjects  in  which  effort  shall  be  expended,  the 
community  is  obligated  to  look  forward  as  far  as  it  can,  and 
to  make  the  best  possible  forecasts. 
The  Group's  last  recommendation  (No.  43)  urges 
upon  the  intelligence  community  that,  to  a  markedly 
greater  extent  than  it  has  done,  it  should  establish 
specific  arrangements  for  planning  its  work,  and 
anticipating  its  problems. 
132
SUMMARY  OF  RECOMMENDATIONS 
1.     The  Secretary  of  Defense  take  appropriate  action 
to  bring  the  military  intelligence  organization  within  the 
Department  of  Defense  into  full  consonance  with  the  con- 
cept of  the  Defense  Reorganization  Act  of  1958.    Toward 
this  end:         Page  31 
a.  there  should  be  established  within  the  Office 
of  the  Secretary  of  Defense  a  focal  point  for  exerting 
broad  management  review  authority  over  military 
intelligence  programs,  and  providing  over -all  coordi- 
nation of  all  foreign  intelligence  activities  conducted 
by  various  Defense  components   
Page  32 
b.  the  authority  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  in  _ 
intelligence  coordination  and  operations  should  be 
strengthened  in  support  of  their  assigned  mission  by 
such  means  as:            Page  32 
(1)  placing  under  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  control 
increased  intelligence  resources  to  support  its 
strengthened  authority;       Page  32 
(2)  requiring  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  to 
coordinate  the  intelligence  views  on  substantive 
intelligence  matters  within  the  Department  of 
Defense,  notably  for  estimates;      .    .    .        Page  32 
(3)  requiring  the  Joint  Chief  s  of  Staff  to 
coordinate  military  intelligence  requirements 
(see  recommendation  no.  26  of  Section  VI}; 
  
Page  22 
(4)  requiring  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  to 
coordinate  the  intelligence  activities  of  the  unified 
and  specified  commands  and  be  the  primary  channel 
to  these  commands  for  guidance  and  direction  of  in- 
telligence matters  originating  with  the  Department  of 
Defense  (see  additional  discussion  and  recommen- 
dations on  Section  VII);        Page  32 
-  133  -
"***  *    -  ■       —  •     ■■  m<1  fir  >+/,<- 
c.     National  Security  Council  Intelligence  Direc- 
tives, Department  of  Defense  and  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff 
directives  should  be  revised  in  accordance  with  the 
above   
Page-  32 
2.     The  increased  intelligence  resources  required 
by  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  and  the  unified  commands  should 
be  drawn  from  the  existing  resources  of  the  military  depart- 
ments and  component  commands  as  appropriate.     Page  32 
(3)    Budgeting  procedures  for  intelligence  operations 
and  activities  should  be  brought  more  closely  under  the 
control  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense,  including  clear 
identification  of  the  total  intelligence  costs  throughout 
all  of  the  echelons  and  elements  of  the  Department  of 
Defense   
Page  33 
(£\    Policies  should  be  initiated  that  would  permit 
snore  rigorous  selection  and  training  of  personnel  assigned  - 
to  intelligence  activities  and  operations               I 
]and  personnel  so  assigne<Tshould  be  given 
position'and  rank  comparable  to  their  operational  counter- 
parts       \   
Page  V 
(X 
^' 
a.  »void  duplication  of  channels  to  non-military 
consumers; 
b.  be  staffed  by  personnel  of  rank  commensurate 
with  a  courier  function; 
c.  avoid  placing  their  own  interpretation  on 
material  transmitted  by  the  Special  Security  Officer 
systems.   
Page  33J 
-  134  -
*ll.    The  Department  of  State  place  greater  emphasis 
on  intelligence  responsibilities  in  the  indoctrination  of  its 
personnel   
Page  60 
\2>.    Military  departments  should  concentrate  more 
effort  on  career  management  by  developing  programs  of 
constantly  broadening  assignments  in  intelligence  for  quali- 
fied and  specifically  designated  officers,  which  will  gain 
the  benefits  of  a  career  intelligence  service  without  isolating 
the  officer  from  contact  with  the  general  mission  of  his 
service  and  its  operations.   
Page  60 
-  135  -
Cr./  ■ 
'      •.;-''-.  (\4j    The  United  States  Intelligence  Board  should 
review  existing  compartmentation  of  sensitive  information 
with  a  view  to  achieving  more  uniform  practices  and 
ensuring  that  essential  security  safeguards  do  not  result 
in  vital  information  being  withheld  from  officials  and 
organizations  with  urgent  national  security  responsibilities. 
         Page  61 
16.     The  Secretary  of  Defense  and  the  Director  of 
Central  Intelligence  should  consult  preparatory  to  the  early 
preparation  of  a  new  National  Security  Council  Intelligence 
Directive  designed  to  provide  authority  and  assign  responsi- 
bility for  the  establishment  of  a  National  "Photographic 
Intelligence  Center  (NPIC)          Page  61 
18.     The  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  should  focus 
community  attention  on  the  important  area  of  counterintelli- 
gence and  security  of  overseas  personnel  and  installations 
and  assign  responsibility  for  periodic  reports  to  the  United 
States  Intelligence  Board         Page  61 
-  136  -
21.     The  United  States  Intelligence  Board  establish 
a  central  requirements  facility,  initially  to  coordinate  all 
requirements  levied  for  clandestine  and  signal  intelligence 
collection,'  and  if  successful,  subsequently  expand  its 
operations  to  other  types  of  requirements.    Personnel 
assigned  to  this  facility  should  be  drawn  from  existing 
requirements  personnel  of  the  member  agencies.    Page  85 
23.  The  United  States  Intelligence  Board  establish 
a  program  for  the  integration  of  all  collection  requirements 
manuals  into  a  compatible  series  of  coordinated  guides; 
likewise,  the  creation  of  integrated  requirements  guides 
on  a  country-to -country  basis  setting  forth  the  specific 
collection  requirements  and  responsibilities  of  each  depart- 
ment and  agency  concerned   
Page  85 
24.  The  chief  of  mission  or  principal  officer  in  each 
overseas  area  should  be  given  affirmative  responsibility  for 
coordination  of  all  ^intelligence 
requirements  concerning  that  area.       ."".....     Page  86 
^A)  The  United  States  Intelligence  Board  in  its 
annual  evaluation  of  community  effort  prepared  for  the 
National  Security  Council  pay  specific  attention  to  collection, 
and  request  similar  evaluation  from  each  chief  of  mission 
and  military  command         <.-..-     Page  S6 
Q&    All  military  requirements  at  the  Washington 
level  be  coordinated  by  the  Department  of  Defense  so  as 
to  prevent  duplication  or  concentration  on  low  priority 
targets   
Page  86 
-  137  -
\2S)    The  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  should  take 
action  to  achieve  more  effective  coordination  within  the 
intelligence  community  using  the  normal  command  channels, 
as  distinct  from  staff  channels,  of  the  departments  and 
agencies  concerned.         Page  113 
29.  The  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  should  be 
supported  in  taking  leadership  and  initiative  to  develop 
.solutions  for  the  problems  of  coordination  by  the  establish- 
ment of  a  coordination  staff,  under  his  personal  supervision 
and  separate  from  any  operational  responsibility  of  the 
Central  Intelligence  Agency  or  other  department  or  agency. 
'  This  staff  should  seek  to  identify  at  the  earliest  possible 
time  and  promptly  recommend  solutions  to  coordination 
problems,  especially  through  surveys  of  intelligence  activi- 
ties as  authorized  by  National  Security  Council  Intelligence 
Directive  No.  I.  *      
       Page  114 
30.  In  phase  with  the  organizational  changes  in  the 
Department  of  Defense  recommended  in  Section  III,  the 
membership  of  the  United  States  Intelligence  Board  should 
be  reduced  to  four  members  who  shall  be  the  Director 
of  Central  Intelligence  (Chairman),  and  representatives  of 
the  Secretary  of  State,  the  Secretary  of  Defense,  and  the 
Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff,  with  ad  hoc  representation  from  the 
Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  and  the  Atomic  Energy 
Commission   
- 
      Page  114 
31.  To  strengthen  its  Tole  in  management  of  the 
intelligence  community,  the  United  States  Intelligence  Board 
should  establish  a  management  group  which  would  analyze 
and  propose  solutions  to  non-substantive  community  problems 
of  an  administrative  or  management  type.     This  group  would 
be  composed  of  one  senior  representative  of  each  member  of 
the  United  States  Intelligence  Board        Page  114 
-  See  page  91  for  dissent  regarding  separation  of  Director  of 
Central  Intelligence  from  Central  Intelligence  Agency. 
-  138  -
(32y    The  United  States  Intelligence  Board,   through 
the  recommended  management  group,    should  review  the 
future  plans  and  programs  of  each  member  of  the  intelligence 
community  for  consistency  and  proper  allocation  of  effort 
at  the  beginning  of  each  annual  budget  cycle.     Its  views  should 
service  as  a  basis  for  guidance  and  coordination  to  the 
intelligence  community  and  for  reporting  to  the  National 
Security  Council  annually   
Page  114 
(33 3  The  management  group  referred  to  above  should 
review  the  functions  and  activities  of  the  several  committees 
and  sub -committees  of  the  United  States  Intelligence  Board. 
This  review  should  include  consideration  of  possible  changes 
in  the  committee  structure  and  improved  reporting  pro- 
cedures.  
Page  115 
34.  Intelligence  guidance  and  instructions  to  com- 
ponents of  unified  commands  originating  in  military  depart- 
ments should  be  transmitted  to  these  commands  through  the 
Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  (J-2)   
Page  115 
35.  Unified  commanders  should  exercise  control  and 
command  over  the  intelligence  activities  of  their  component 
commands  and  be  the  primary  channel  to  them  for  guidance 
and  direction  on  intelligence  matters  including  any  instructions 
that  originate  in  the  service  departments.     .   .   .     Page  115 
B6J  Chiefs  of  diplomatic  and  consular  missions  abroad 
'  should  ta£e  positive  steps  to  effectively  coordinate  all  overt 
intelligence  collection  and  reporting  activities  -within  their 
assigned  areas  of  responsibility   
Page  115 
-  139
^33.     In  order  to  achieve  a  more  effective  system  for 
utilizing  cost  and  manpower  data  in  the  entire  foreign  intelli- 
gence effort,   the  United  States  Intelligence  Board  should 
refine  and  improve  its  process  for  preparing  and  appraising 
such  data  by  the  following  means:   
Page  121 
(a)  the  United  States  Intelligence  Board's  making 
a  clear  and  specific  determination  as  to  those  activities 
which  properly  are  foreign  intelligence  and  thus  subject 
to  the  coordination  of  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence 
and  the  guidance  of  the  United  States  Intelligence  Board. 
,  .        Page  021 
(b)  based  on  this  determination,  the  United 
States  Intelligence  Board  should  continue  to  evolve  an 
improving  pattern  for  the  development  of  cost  and  man- 
power data  so  that  the  resulting  figures  will  be  comparable 
and  will  permit  the  United  States  Intelligence  Board  to 
review  and  coordinate  the  effort  expended  on  foreign 
intelligence  activities  by  the  several  departments  and 
agencies,  especially  through  the  review  referred  to  in 
Section  VII,  recommendation  no.   32   
Page  121 
The  Department  of  Defense  and  the  Central 
Intelligence  Agency  should  seek  means  to  effect  better 
coordination  of  their  respective  research  and  development 
activities  for  intelligence  purposes   
Page  128 
@)    The  United  States  Intelligence  Board  should 
monitor  efforts  to  develop  automatic  systems  to  store  and 
retrieve  intelligence  information  and  the  extent  to  which  com- 
patibility of  systems  is  assured.     .       Page  128  x 
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-  140  -