NATJON/.L  SECURITY  COUKCJL  IjNTh'LI.JCKKCK  nii'JKCTlVE  NO.  7 
DOMESTIC  EXPLOITATION 
February  12,    19J<3 
Pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  fxKtion  102  of  tho  National  Security  Act  of 
19**7,  a:vi  for  the  purpose  enunciated  In  paragraphs  (d)  and  (c )  thereof,  tho 
I/^tional  Security  Couneil  hereby  authorizes  end  directs  th.it: 
1.  Tho  Central  Intelligence  Agency  shall  bo  rooponniblo  for  tho 
exploitation,  on  q  highly  selective  basis,  within  the  United  States  of 
business  concerns,  other  non-govoriv^atr.l  organizations  cad  individuals 
no  sources   of  foreign   intelligence   inf  oration. 
2.  To  icplc^ent  this  undertaking  tho  Central  Intol.licc.nco  Agency 
shall: 
a.  Determine  the  foreign  intelligence  potential  of  sources  ?o 
that  the  bout  available  ray  -e  oclectcd  orpc-ditiounly  for  cxploita- 
ticn  upon  the  receipt  of  collection  requests  free  the  intelligence 
agoncicc.  For  this  purpose,  CIA  will  maintain  a  central  index  of 
non-govcrnir,ental  sources   in  tho  United  States. 
b.  Fatahlish  unifcrz;  prececal '.roc  end  stain  :_rdr,  for  security 
clearance   of  all  contacts   in  thio  field,  and  crrarge   such  clearances. 
c.  Kctabi^oii  uniform  procedures  to  insure  that  tho  intereets 
of  organizations   nnd  individuals     contacted  will  not  bo   jeopardized. 
d.  Collect  through  tho  establishment  of  field  offices  within 
tho  United  States,  foreign  intelligence  inf  emotion  required  in  the 
interests  of  the  national  security  or  o-f  the  individual  intelligence 
agencies . 
o.  Arrange  for  direct  contact  between  intelligence  agency 
representatives  and  non -governmental  scarce s  within  the  United  States 
whenever  conditions  require  such  action  or  upon  the  request  of  a 
tucisbor  agency  to  secia-c  technical  or  other  foreign  intelligence 
information. 
f.  Obtain  tho  agrccn-ont  of  responsible  policy  -m  king  officials 
or  American  cr.vsni  nations  having  a  foreign  intelligence  potential  bc- 
foro   establishing  and  maintaining   contacts   within   that    organization. 
g.  Tnfcru;  tho  intolligonco  !c;o::Cjcn  of  tho  prospective  depar- 
ture fyc:?.  or  return  to  tho  United  States  of  selected  American  citi- 
zens having  a  high  foreign  into.1  llg.T.co  potential,  so  that  tho  agen- 
cies ir.-iy  furnish  requirements  or  provido  specinliuts  for  briefing  ov 
inte-rrcgnt  ion.
y 
h.  !;!:.:•. ::»lr.-;t-:    t.o      '..■:.•    -vt.i-. 
•:   ,  '•  m: 
'."!'.     ." : 
;  •  :■<-  1  .''•>     i  n- 
/.:.  j'OVLil     }VO- 
ted  i  ;;-•/.:.•::-     1  :.•.'  'o.-:v.t  J  •  u    ('::'.   :\  i...-.i     l.'rrc  •;:  v:    t.hl:;    ]•;••,  y.:-;-:.:  • 
du-';d    by    the  ay/me  iu-r.   aim  LI   he    id.onti  f  L-ri   en    :.ur.i',    unli-nn    the    crl^i 
n-.iti.ny,  a/a.-r.cy  nlipulnLen    to  Die  contrary 
rVrther   to  li;*plc  r.cnt      thio   undertaking,    the 
intoHi^c-nce  ngen- 
cieu   Gli'iiJ.: 
u.  Antalya  to  duty  In  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  field 
officco,  if  they  c-o  dociirc  and  vithin  thoir  cap- =bi  litiou,  represent- 
atives to  fjcrve  their  intercnto  undar  the  direction  cf  the  CIA  i:r:n- 
c^om.  i-'evjhev  nryeneicn  ray,  at  their  discretion,  cetablicd:  active 
vorking  liaioon  betveen  thoir  hacionnl  Off  icoo  and  CIA  F^cld   Officco. 
1).  Send  direct];,'  to  tbc  Central  lutclli-a.-nco  Ayency  for  col- 
lection all  th'-ir  roquentn  for  fere  i  en  intelligence  inform  v.  ion  to 
be   obtained  i'ron  nor.-gcvcmLeor.tal     courcc3  vitiiin  the  United  Stateo. 
c.  Tren.Tuit  to  the  Central  Intelligence  Ay/ency  for  appropriate 
dioccsrinatioii  full  i  radiant  ion  r.nd  n.-y-cyta  resulting  frciu  approved 
direct  contacts  by  agency  rcpreeentati vec  vith  non-govcrimsntai 
oovrcez,    identify ing  cuch  rjcurceo  "by  CIS:  cede   r.ujdber. 
d.  Obtain,  to  the  r/rtinun  extent  poecible,  fro™  their  depart - 
centu  and  ageneiea  the  foreign  intelligence  Irforaeti  or.  vhich  the 
dopartr^entn  end  agencies  have  received  ae  a  by-product  of  the  name  I 
rolatiorahip  vith  btisircce  concerns  and  other  non-govcrnr-enta  1  or- 
"gauizatioan  and  Individuals  in  the  United  btatcn  in  connection  vith 
non-intelligence  activities,  and  trance  it  to  ti:e  crax'aiar.  extent  pen- 
oible,  the  inf  o:\~etioa  to  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  for  editing 
for  doutcc  occur ity  and  for  appropriate  disacziiaeti  on. 
o.  Obtain,  in  no  far  an  ie  practicable  end  vithin  existing 
oecurity  regulat  lean,  from  their  departments  and  agencies  Jr_f  cr:.- e tic:: 
concerning;  baeineea  concerns  and  other  r.c.n-governn^ntel  orgaviea- 
tionn  and  Individuals  in  the  United  Stateu  having  foreign  intelli- 
gence potential,  vhich  the  department  or  agency  ponr,ee::cc  cr  nub- 
GcquontJy  acquirer?,  and.  radio  the  inf  crceation  available  to  the  Central 
Intolligonco  Agency. 
f.        Noininnto  represent  c.tiven      to  serve      on.  a      coreaittoo,    under 
<-    Tier  j  c\. „ 
Die  chair-ranch  ip   of  the   Centre!  Intelligence   Agency,  to  :.:e.. 
cnl]^   to  co;n-idor     i:ntual  2:nebie:ni)   and      Intereotn    in   con::eet  i  c-n   v:i 
thio  pre^rniii. 
!:-itiou-i   fiecuritv 
h.        FurUior   to      I::nplenent   tbio      un  lortah!  :\z,    Vr.o 
Kouoarcou   ;?io*.\>'d   and    l.J:o      co:;::iononLr:    oi*   the      MHilary  nn-tah-]  !:;::•■.  -it, 
tlian   t)ie   c-OL"po:v?:iln    rcpr-jvsont.^d    on   tho    ]"AC,    i&jill   :'u:n'rd;    (!  in..-c'.]y    to    t): 
CL\,    to   tho   nvi.riamj   citeul    pcnjih-.li',    nil    I'or.-i-u    ir.U.-l  J  .'..••nnee    1  ::;V;:t;-:  1.  \  ■:. 
vbicii    iu    roceived   an   a  by-p;-o.h:ct    of    th-jJr   :ior::-J    re  lat  \  c.-kj-iI;-.   vitii    h;::i: 
noon   ee:uv'rnn  and    ot.be:-   nen.--'.ow]-u-:-.r!i;.al    f;ra'i:;L:at. I  •;•:;;;    -ik 
n,-'       '...''. 
1  U'.l  i  \   ;  lj  11  ''. 
t)ie   UuiU'il  iJtatu-cj,    in   connection  vUh   iw;i-  J  uLn  1  .Ld/;..»iun;   aclh.';;.;.  :;
c;.  moI-Mmc  j,.  V.-An  y.vs;:":n  nli-.ll  hi:  J  ntert  "..tod  to  :.ff--ot.  the 
c-.'i  tab]  J  n'.i'.rl  rel-U  :;;-.:;:.  In  of  tlio  D:>p.u-t:t:'M)t.'i  ••.;;<]  A;*<"::k:  ir.:;  vjth  ln::uni::ir« 
t'i.f:<::-:.n,  r.\.'::-r  nc:i-'; v/oj-jii.:  . j,1.-i i  t.;\r;:ni  i  :-.!t  Ic.j::,  ;nvj  5  nili  v  id:i.  :1:j  in  the 
•j.-ill'.-d  ::i'-:.f;:\  for  j>-j»  ;j  r;'.;i  <.•!.':;.  T  tlnn  the  ;>:-'-_i<.i-<;:>;i.t  r..f  l". -.••'?  !.;ri  ii:tt\llj.- 
f7;:»C'.t  jiifvr.'ritJon.  Y.ry  .:;h.':ll  it  affect  the  norrr!l  i.itcre!:;.!\'.;e  of  dcc:u- 
ir.o;;t?i  b'-.l-..-'.--.n  lil-r:tr<o:j  oV  t't-.v.  dc-jnrUnent:;  r.:.&  other  lU-rarien ,  or  the 
d-jvc.l  c-p:.-. ■;::*_  cf  rcaoarcli  projects  with  individuals  or  na  i -cover  n:.:ont:jl 
Ir.ntilutior.r, .
(Page  1) 
NATIONAL  SECURITY  COUNCIL  INTELLIGENCE  DIRECTIVE  NO.  7 
DOMESTIC  EXPLOITATION 
February  12,  1948 
Pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  section  102  of  the  National  Security  Act  of 
1947,  and  for  the  purpose  enunciated  in  paragraphs  (d)  and  (e)  thereof,  the 
National  Security  Council  hereby  authorizes  and  directs  that: 
1.  The  Central  Intelligence  Agency  shall  be  responsible  for  the 
exploitation,  on  a  highly  selective  basis,  within  the  United  States  of 
business  concerns,  other  non-governmental  organizations  and  individuals 
as  sources  of  foreign  intelligence  information. 
2.  To  implement  this  undertaking,  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency 
shall: 
a.  Determine  the  foreign  intelligence  potential  of  sources  so 
that  the  best  available  may  be  selected  expeditiously  for  exploita- 
tion upon  the  receipt  of  collection  requests  from  the  intelligence 
agencies.  For  this  purpose,  CIA  will  maintain  a  central  index  of 
non-governmental  sources  in  the  United  States. 
b.  Establish  uniform  procedures  and  standards  for  security 
clearance  of  all  contacts  in  this  field,  and  arrange  such  clearances. 
c.  Establish  uniform  procedures  to  insure  that  the  interests 
of  organizations  and  individuals  contacted  will  not  be  jeopardized. 
d.  Collect  through  the  establishment  of  field  offices  within 
the  United  States,  foreign  intelligence  information  required  in  the 
interest  of  national  security  or  by  the  individual  intelligence 
agencies. 
e.  Arrange  for  direct  contact  between  intelligence  agency 
representatives  and  non-governmental  sources  within  the  United  States 
whenever  conditions  require  such  action  or  upon  the  request  of  a 
member  agency  to  secure  technical  or  other  foreign  intelligence 
information. 
f .  Obtain  the  agreement  of  responsible  policy-making  officials 
of  American  organizations  having  a  foreign  intelligence  potential  be- 
fore establishing  and  maintaining  contacts  within  that  organization. 
g.  Inform  the  intelligence  agencies  of  the  prospective  depar- 
ture from  or  return  to  the  United  States  of  selected  American  citi- 
zens having  a  high  foreign  intelligence  potential,  so  that  the  agen- 
cies may  furnish  requirements  or  provide  specialists  for  briefing  or 
interrogation .
(Page  2) 
h.    Disseminate  to  the  appropriate  agencies  all  foreign  in- 
telligence information  obtained  through  this  program.  Reports  pro- 
duced by  the  agencies  shall  be  identified  as  such,  unless  the  origi- 
nating agency  stipulates  to  the  contrary. 
3.    Further  to  implement  this  undertaking,  the  intelligence  agen- 
cies shall: 
a.  Assign  to  duty  in  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  field 
offices,  if  they  so  desire  and  within  their  capabilities,  represent- 
atives to  serve  their  interests  under  the  direction  of  the  CIA  man- 
agers. Member  agencies  may,  at  their  discretion,  establish  active 
working  liaison  between  their  Regional  Offices  and  CIA  Field  Offices. 
b.  Send  directly  to  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  for  col- 
lection all  their  requests  for  foreign  intelligence  information  to 
be  obtained  from  non-governmental  sources  within  the  United  States. 
c.  Transmit  to  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  for  appropriate 
dissemination  full  information  and  reports  resulting  from  approved 
direct  contacts  by  agency  representatives  with  non-governmental 
sources,  identifying  such  sources  by  CIA  code  number. 
d.  Obtain,  to  the  maximum  extent  possible,  from  their  depart- 
ments and  agencies  the  foreign  intelligence  information  which  the 
departments  and  agencies  have  received  as  a  by-product  of  the  normal 
relationship  with  business  concerns  and  other  non-governmental  or- 
ganizations and  individuals  in  the  United  States  in  connection  with 
intelligence  activities,  and  transmit  to  the  maximum  extent  pos- 
sible, the  information  to  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  for  editing 
for  source  security  and  for  appropriate  dissemination. 
e.  Obtain,  in  so  far  as  is  practicable  and  within  existing 
security  regulations,  from  their  departments  and  agencies  information 
concerning  business  concerns  and  other  non-governmental  organiza- 
tions and  individuals  in  the  United  States  having  foreign  intelli- 
gence potential,  which  the  department  or  agency  possesses  or  sub- 
sequently acquires,  and  make  the  information  available  to  the  Central 
Intelligence  Agency. 
f .  Nominate  representatives  to  serve  on  a  committee,  under 
the  chairmanship  of  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency,  to  meet  periodi- 
cally to  consider  mutual  problems  and  interests  in  connection  with 
this  program. 
4.  Further  to  implement  this  undertaking,  the  National  Security 
Resources  Board  and  the  components  of  the  Military  Establishment,  other 
than  the  components  represented  on  the  IAC,  shall  furnish  directly  to  the 
CIA,  to  the  maximum  extent  possible,  all  foreign  intelligence  information 
which  is  received  as  a  by-product  of  their  normal  relationship  with  busi- 
ness concerns  and  other  non-governmental  organizations  and  individuals  in 
the  United  States,  in  connection  with  intelligence  activities.
(Page  3) 
5.    Nothing  in  this  program  shall  be  interpreted  to  affect  the 
established  relationship  of  the  Departments  and  Agencies  with  business 
concerns,  other  non-governmental  organizations,  and  individuals  in  the 
United  States  for  purposes  other  than  the  procurement  of  foreign  intell- 
gence  information.  Nor  shall  it  affect  the  normal  interchange  of  docu- 
ments between  libraries  of  the  departments  and  other  libraries,  or  the 
development  of  research  projects  with  individuals  or  non-governmental 
institutions.