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OC! NO. 
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February 198 
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INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
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Relea: 
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' Minister Roa reaffirmed an 
of internationsl law. The Cuban 
contention, according to Roa,is 
CUBA AND THE CARRIBBEAN 
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 
9 February 1981 
‘Despite Castro's seizure 
of the company which controls 
the water supply of the Guan- 
tanamo Naval] Base, there is still 
no indication that he will at- 
tempt to use force against the 
base. 
The action does not en- 
hance Cuba's ability to cut off 
the water supply to the base. 
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However, 
it will enable the 
Cuban Government to raise water 
rates in an effort to obtain 
additional needed dollars. 
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During the television in- 
terview on 1 February Foreign 
earlier Castro statement that 
Cuba would seek the recovery of 
Guantanamo through the channels 
that the 1903 US-Cuban contract 
Yor the lease of the base is 
invalid because Cuba was not. 
then on "an equal footing with. 
the United States." 
Also, Roa 
said, Cuba did not agree to the 
lease of its own free will, 
“because the Cuban people were 
coerced by a system of govern~- 
, ment imposed from abroad." 
The Castro regime 
the past week stepped up its 
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propaganda attacks on the US 
administratior. 
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST 
A broadczst 
assailed the 
action 
in pro- 
viding $4,000,000 for Cuban 
refugees in the United States, 
saying that since the previous 
administration had allotted 
only $1,000,000 to the "coun- 
terrevolutionaries,'’ President 
Kennedy was "four times more 
the enemy of Cuba". than was. 
his predecessor. 
President 
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Dorticos told a teachers’ rally 
in Havana on 4 February 
that 
the 
intensification 
of coun- 
terrevolutiguary, 
activity by 
the Roman Catholic 
clergy and 
private school students was 
closely connected with the US 
action. 
The teachers’ rally was 
convoked by the government in 
an attempt to counter the grow- 
ing opposition efforts of 
Catholic students and private 
© 
educational institutions. 
The 
regime's attacks on these groups 
probably foreshadow a take-over 
of all Cuban private schools. 
Students at private second- 
ary schools and colleges through- 
out the country apparentiy par- 
ticipated in large numbers in a 
“strike” staged on 
6 February 
a3 
protest against the execu- 
tion of counterrevolutionaries 
by government firing squads. 
Page 9 of ll 
NOTES AND COMMENTS 
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PART II 
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 
© 
9 February 1961 
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Acts of sabotage 
and coun- 
| pended" diplomatic relations 
terrevolutionary guerrilla ac- 
| with Havana, 
tivity continue to be reported, 
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and there has been conflicting 
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information on the progress of 
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the campaign by militiamen 
to 
isolate 
and 
liquidate anti- 
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Castro .forces in the 
Sierra 
Escambray area of. ‘as Villas 
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Province, 
A major fire in a Havana 
tobacco plant on G6 February 
causing damage estimated at 
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several million dollars was ap- 
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parently the result of a sabo- 
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tage operation, 
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Newspapers and radio st2- 
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tions have begun a full-scele 
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propaganda offensive to mobi-~ 
women and children--to harvest 
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the first "people's crop" of 
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sugar cane, 
A 
shortage 
of 
cane cutters, which has put the 
harvest behind schedule, has 
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resulted from the government's 
mobilization of the militia 
. against the alleged US "invasion 
threat" during most of January. 
a 
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In the city of Guantanamo, mu- 
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ee 
 Micipal police have reportedly 
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ordered 
into the 
cane 
fields. 
The Colombian Government 
is under increasing domestic 
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pressure to break diplomatic 
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relations with Cuba, partly be- 
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cause of the belief that Cuban 
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agitation has encouraged the 
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rising violence in rural areas 
of the country. Peru, Paraguay, 
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Nicaragua, Guatemala, Haiti, 
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and the Dominican Republic al- 
Yeady have broken or 
PART 
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST 
Page 10 of 1I 
PART 11 
NOTES AND COMMENTS 
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show @ sharp rise, that 
Activities in Oriente Province 
ENTE AL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
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REPORT INO. 
B 3,180,309 
DATE 
Vilitis’s Ucvillinness to 
NO. PAGES 
Quevera to Seek 
of Us-Cub an cerexences 
DATE OF 
Fed 61 end 
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3. Drirg this 
sata thet srhotage in 
seca 
w'll) ehov.a carked increase within the next three or four veka, 
Castro vill te overthrcova vithin three or four 
Interest trgly 
erified the follevins tye {tex of 
skvown for a 
of yeers and who bes no 
with ° 
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(1) Cattvo haz 
overstete2 the size of the retel 
Ferces in the 
to cover up the fact that the atlitia 
9.753 8 
to fight exd that the local irdcditarte 
eqeally 
to fect 
Se 
litia, ext (2) the Castro 
Surg 
With resyect to the la‘ter 
itea, 
thes be 
not worry tecaise plucs are afoot 
reutralice the 
itien 
at the first efgn Saat the Castro 
that his contects in Ota bave 
bis. 
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‘CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
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Thte me certal 
infurmetios 
{he Pational Defense of the United 
efthia the 
of the 
Lees, 
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68, CAC. Seca. 193 and 7H, the tranamiasion or 
which ta any manner to 
Unauthorised perenh is 
law. 
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SUMECT 
Indications in Cenapuey of Increas ing 
DATE DISTR. 
March 1561 
NO.PAGSS 
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i. The student strike on 6 February 1961 in Caraguey was partially 
@espite governnent throats to invalicato the year's work of studants fron 
the public schools who went on strixs ard to confiscate the property 
of 
parents of students in private schools. 
The authorities iso threatened 
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to confiscate the private schools at which students wSnt on strike, 
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Lespite these threats, almost all students in private schocls and nore 
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than half of the students in many public schools wert on strixe, 
At tne 
nagury Institute classes were reduced to ons-third their morsal 
Haat me enters of thie militia in 
Prov ince have been 
to the 
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ferra Escanbray area; others have teen. sent to Orieate Provinces, where 
aa upsising wes reorted in Sierra Cristal. 
The militlanen "tert for the 
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of Stenting with little enthusfay: and enly becavse they had aa 
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Thors heve been no previous rererts of open governzent threats to. 
confiscate privates echcols 
sintlar drastic action, although 
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there was considerable speculation ty private schools conserning 
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such possible actions. 
aa 
2. Tne accuracy of these figuras ip difficult to judce, 
Before the 
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echeduled strike was called the govera-2nt ordered classes dismissed 
and examinations scheduled, Students were required to report to 
ue 
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school only at the times their examinations were scheduled, 
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
OFFICE OF WATIONAL ESTIMATES 
21 February 1961 
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR 
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SUBJECT: Why the Cuban Revolution of 
to Cuba's 
with the USSR 
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2, In the world ot lorge there is a widespread disposition 
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to suppuse that Fidel Castro's alignment of Cubo with the USSR was 
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forced upon hin by hostile actions on the part of the US, 
It is 
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true that this development was not inevitable when Castro cane to 
power 
conceivably it could have been averted 
the US 
actions complained of followed developments within Cube instead 
of causing then. 
<A complex of factors is involved: 
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De A widespread predisposition in Cuba to regard the 
US as cespensible for the unsatisfactory status quo against which 
Geka 
the revolution was directcé, because of the role of the US in 
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establishing the existing Cuban polity, through its interventions 
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in 1895 oni Inter, oni becouse of the predominance of US interests 
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in the Cuban econcry. 
Related to this wosc precisposition to 
believe that the US WOs particularly syurathetic toward the 
detested Batista dletatorship ani desirous of minteining 
of restoring the fallen regime. 
b. The psychotic pereonality of Fidel Castro hinself, 
ce. Astute exploitation of the opportunity, first by 
the Cuban Commnist Party (the Popular Socialist Party -- 
later by the Soviet Union ant its olites. 
2. Prior to the overthrow of Datista, the 26th of July 
Movenent was not Communist inspired or directed. It was primarily 
Q middle class revenent for Liberation from the Batista tyranny, 
It won peasant support by vague promises of agrarion reforn, a 
commonplace tenet among Latin Aucrican Ltberals,. Bovever, no 
specific 
of reforn hnd been vorked out. The primary 
motivation of all concerned was cimply to overthrow the Batista 
segine, after which the pollticnl and social orler would approe 
priately 
36 Bone individual Communists hed indeed 
the 
novenent, particularly in those elements led by Foul Castro and 
Che Guevara, but the PSP itsulf (which enj oyed certain privileges 
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iisunitics unler the Batista regime) withheld its support 
until the victory of the revolution was clearly inpending. 
Fidel 
Castro, on his part, rejected Communist support when it wos finolly 
proffered, 
Inieci, on coming to power, he acted to break the cone 
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trol of organized labor which the Communists had seized on the 
collayse of the Batista reginc. 
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4, If the 26th of duly bowenent wos not initially pro- 
Communist, neither wos it essentially antieAnerican, 
It made 
considerable efforts to solicit US syupathy and support, but, vhen 
these were not forthcoming, concluded that the US was committed to 
the preservation of the Datista regime. 
This conclusion was thought 
to be ecnfirned by the manifestly pro-Batista 
of Anubassador 
Smith and by the supposed continuance of US nilitary aid to Datista. 
Actually, the US had undortaken to render such aia to the Cuban 
Governnent only 
o normal part ef the henischere defense pro- 
gron ond had sus;ende? deliveries early in 1958, when it wos 
finally realized that o real civil war was in progress in Cuba, 
but this foct was simply not believed by the rebels, 
5. Thus Cubanrevolutionary opinion was strongly prejusiced 
ogainst the US when Castro came to power in January 1959. 
Castro 
unicubtelly believed that the US had tried to prevent his victory, 
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an} he tust heve realized that any scricus reforn in Cuba would 
inevitably 
upon vested US interests, provoking further 
US hostility. 
Stil, no sone maa undertaking to govern ana reforn 
Cuba would have chosen tc pick Oo fight with the US, 
If, at this 
point, Castro could have been persuaicd that the US accepted his 
revolution os an accoaplished fact end would cooperate with his 
reform progran, a modus vivenii could urebably have been arranged 
ond subsequent developecnts could probably have been averted. 
6. What happened next prevented any such developnent and 
began the train of events which has led to Cuba's alignnent with 
the USSR. It 48 not a function of US policy and astite: but of 
Castro's psychotic personality. 
It is evident, on the testimony 
of his suppoiters at the tine, that Castro arrived in Hovana ina 
high state of elation ozounting to nentel i21ness. He received the 
adulation of the macces, not only in Havans, but also in Caracas 
(in person) ond elsewhere in Latin Anerica (by re;-ort). 
But fron 
the US he heard oniy universal condemation of the suxmary courte 
rartiol ond execution of Datista henchnen in the atucs;here of a 
Reran eirous. Hc becan 
that the US would never under- 
stan’ and acce;t his revolution, that he could expect only ine 
rlacable hostility fron Wachington. 
This was the conclusion of 
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his own disordered noind, unrelated to any fact of US policy 
*or action. 
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7e The US accepte’ the wholesale exprepriation of US 
private properties in Cuba pursuant to Castro's inpulsive re- 
prograns, jarticulorly the eprarian réforn 
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forn/initiated in 1959, dut correctly insisted upon prompt and 
adequate compensation for the 
in accordance with inter 
notional law. 
This insistence was taken as further evidence of 
‘impJacable hostility toward the Cuban revolution == as were cere 
tain incendiary flights frou Florida, despite US apblogies and 
efforts to stop the practice. 
Dy Ayril 1959 Roul Castro had 
Colivercd the first public and official diatribe against the US, 
. 
6, Revulsion towarl the excesses of the Castro dictator- 
ship, at howe as well as abread » had cireacy becone apparent by 
March 1959. Althcugh Castro remained o hero to the peasantry, 
his oriyinal middle class su;yorters were increasingly disillusioned 
by his radical and impulsive reforn measures and bis chaotic ade 
ministration, 
Defecticrs from the 26th of July Movenent becane 
d4nerecsingly frequent. 
In these circunstances, the 
becane the only 
ani effective organizers, operators, 
ani supporters upon whon Castro cuuld rely, and Roui Castro ani 
Che Guevara were at hand to influence hin toward increasing 
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“relianee on there 
The evident extensicn of Ccnuunist influence 
thruughout the adninistrati ch stinuicte further defecticns anoung 
Castru's criginal BU) porters By niccurner, the ficurchead 
Procident, Urrutia, had been forced from office for ,rotesting 
against the Cormmmist treni, and any criticicn of cczariisn had 
been declared to be counterrevolutionary. 
These 
ciso alienated 
Latin Auverican 
Jiberals who hat originally syn,athiced with Costro, including 
wicely res,ectcé rcforcist leaders as Figueres, Betancourt, 
ane Lleras Camargo. 
Dut by new the USSR was reacy tu 
fore 
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wanl to suyply Castro's desperate neo? fur cuteide recamition 
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and 
The Scvict Unicon wilertuck 
gurchose Cuban sugar 
oni Soviet 
began to raise the Cuban revuiuticn as an 
extalary national Jiberaticn ncvenent. There fullowet in steady 
progression formal ciplomtic relations with Dloe countries, vwidee 
ronging trace and crecit agreevents, nilitary 024, ant a flow of 
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Dlvc personnel into Cuba, Finally, the Cuban revoluti'n was 
accorie? the dignity cf recognition in Cctamnist dugaa as an 
ex, licit stace in develo;nont toward courmnisa. 
10.. In May 1960 Castro urdercd certain US-owiec refineries 
in Cuba to refine Soviet cruwte cil an’, cn their refusal, exproe 
printed then, Until this tine, US jolicy tcward Cuba hod been 
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rorked by couticn 
rectraint. The US now 
rived Cuba of its 
privileges ;,osition in the US sugar market, not so pouch in ree 
talfatiin for the seizure cf the refineries 
in 
to 
the gencral trea’ «f events. 
The gencral 
enbargo 
established in October an? the form] break in reloticns in 
January sintlorly carl the ent of :atience after a lung endurance 
unwarranted vilification and 
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES 
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
This material contains information affecting the ffational Defense of the United S:ates @ithh. the 
of the Exzlonage Lave. 
16, USC. Gece. 
aad TH, the 
or 
ich ts 
manoer | 
to 6n 
perron le prut..dited by lee. 
| 
COUNTRY Cuba 
REPORTINO. 
3/469, 391 
SUMJECT 
Growing Dissatisfactton of Cuban 
DATE DISTR. 
March 1961 
People with CASTRO Regime 
DaTe OF Earl February 
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DATE ACQ. (22 February 1961) 
FIELD REPORT NO, 
Tris 
UNEVALUATED 
SOURCE GA 
GRADINGS ARE 
APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. 
4. 
Activities of the Cutan pecr te are censtent? ly 
to the 
: 
Cutan Governzent by such persons as inspectcrs frou the Derartuent m2 
Senitation end from the Urbcn Reform Institute an? postren, all of whor 
can obtsin access to private hones 
on a nunter of pretextz, 
This surveillance 
ch 
systen has mace it increasingly difficult for opposition ercurs to crecsate; 
ty soe 
however, the atmosphere of fear created by the system dally causes are 
AL 
people to oppose the governzent. 
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The shortege of basic ford end houschold tens, felt by all levels of society, |. 
fat. 
is ceusing increasing dissatifectinn, 
Because a lack of replacezert parts 
§ 
hes rade many buses inoperative, bus 
in the workers’ 
distriets, 4s very poor,! 
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lary pelicesan, postmen, ard teachers have not veecived their ent ire 
ard have retursed their pezchecks because Of the apparcc! error in 
axcunt paid ther. 
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purser sont pelicie: In 
mere sitbte. 
Tre lover 
ere 
petively opposed to 
Ir, frunt of the G-2 effies the Mines 
@etaine? ero rede Up of the peover 
Recent visltezs ta Ta. 
Catena Priscen heve reported that the majority of inrates there are fron the 
Lower class, which has bern the source of 
rain 
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an untested eouree hos report’ tat dn 
1961 
of Sovie’ 
Crosh ranufacture were seen on the 
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NO. PAGES 
REFERENCES 
RO 
aCQ. (7° 
FIELO REPORT NO 
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isk 
‘ho regime uf Fidel CASTRO ts facing many internal problens, 
The number of 
officinis whe seek political asyluc continues to grow. 
Persons 
previcusly considered loyal to the CASTRO governzent are baine watched by 
tany aenters of the militia ere harassing physiciens to obtain certificotes 
exespt then fren allitary duties, 
One physician in Habana has séid thst 
when the militia was firet organized ho was constantly asked for certificates 
thr 
Of fttness for those who yantad to serve in spite of their alleents, 
The 
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persons are now 
for certificates shoving thit they are plysically 
de 
Villas 
large nurters of ailitianen mve refuse! to figtt. 
Resentiy 
truck touwled with allitinnen, shouting "they have arrested us 
we do 
went to Sleht cur bretners”, pasted through the otrects 
OF thyt 
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se 
atterdance 
at 
events in the eltes has duin'led, 
A pailic meeting on 7 Februery 1961 in front of the Presidential Palace, 
at which trousands of students were expected, we ettended by only eligi. 
of them allitinnen wno were forced to attend. 
Oruwds ut the. 
celebrations tn Hatana 
in 1961 vere szall. 
On 19 February 
attoriance waa only abcut 15 per cent of that. in 1959 ard 1960, 
Stations 
which were televising carnivel activities switche! to other programs when 
tuey realise! that tie television 
was providing visible proof of the 
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to! 
by
etterdance at the school was the patriotic duty of all good revolutionaries ? errolzent 
fron 300 to about 30. 
canis and stickers ty Catnolie organiratiens in 
to collect funds fer Catachicn 
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the Slergn Escanatray area are roportedly co-operating with the opporition | 
nave teen seen carrying signs which said "the revo lution, yes} 
pet 
Tnere Ls restlesoness azong workers on the egriculturnal co-operatives, 
anitin] five-year perioi nezters of the co-operatives were to receive 20 per 
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‘ent of the net profits, am! the gcvernzert was to receive €0 per cent. 
The goverrzent 
tacan tne entire profits 
alrost ell the co-operatives, end the farsers feel 
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tue governaent has cheated and deceived then. 
The governzent's failure to 
distritute crofits as Promised vas the cause of an urrising by «armers in Corralillo, 
‘dt 
an inaicatisn of the attitude of the vorking classes teverds the CASTRO recine was 
arep in enrolment at theMechanical-Blectrie School et the Belen Institute when 
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tse scnocl was intervened by the government. 
Despite gcvernzent pleas that cortirued 
aw 4. 
Cormert. 
An untested source who is a businesszan in Cube estinated in 
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late February 1961 that CASTRO had the support of fewer than 20 per cent of the people 
Lefer: : 
amy, trat fewer than 10 per cent of these supporters were true {idelistes. 
The sare 
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sourc? said that, in contrast to the feelings of the average Cuban in Jan 
that the 
Situntion was hopeless, many Cubans think that it io possible that CASTRO will eoon 
fall, 
It is generally believed, he also reported, that approximately 75 to 
per cent 
of tue militia units will defect when it becomes evident that the real fight agnénat, 
CASTRO has begun, 
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