CS   Historical    Paper 
No.  i 
CLANDESTINE    SERVICES   HISTORY 
THE   BERLIN   TUNNEL   OPERATION 
\ 
-    1956 
3o^JuJ.7?.. 
Other  copy  held  by:      j     Controlled  by:  I 
Date,  prepared:  .  25  August  1967 
Copy  No.   2    Of    2        Date  published:   24  June  1968 
Written  by:  \
TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 
Page 
PREFACE   
'    i 
LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS    iii 
I.    INTRODUCTION    1 
II.    PLANNING    6 
III.    IMPLEMENTATION    .  17 
IV.    TERMINATION    23 
V.    PRODUCTION    25 
yi .    AFTERMATH   
;    27 
Appendix  A  -  Analysis  of  the  Reasons  for  the 
Discovery  of  the  Tunnel 
Appendix  B  -  Recapitulation  of  the  Intelli-  ■ 
gence  Derived 
Appendix  C  -  Typical  American  Press  Comment 
Aooendix  D  -  East  German  Press  Comment
PREFACE 
I  (the  Berlin  Tunnel  project)  came  into  being 
sometime  in  j      (the  exact  date  cannot  be  established)  and 
ceased  as  an  active  operation  in  the  summer  of  1956.   The 
■writer  served  as  Headquarters  case  officer  on  the  project  from 
the  winter  of  j  until  the  summer  of  |     and  then  as 
the  field  case  officer  until  \ 
\  ,  were  intimately  associated  with  the 
planning  and  implementation  of  the  project  at  the  policy  level 
and  very  kindly  offered  suggestions  for  the  preparation  of 
this  manuscript.   Their  comments  have  been  incorporated  and 
are  greatly  appreciated.   Several  other  individuals,  including 
,  who  were  in  a  position  to  offer  valuable 
advice  were  absent  from  Headquarters  during  the  period  the 
paper  was  being  prepared  and  thus  unavailable  to  assist. 
When  this  project  was  first  discussed  with  the  then  . 
Director  of  CIA,  Mr.  Allen  Welsh  Dulles,  he  ordered  that,  in 
the  interests  of  security,  as  little  as  possible  concerning 
the  project  -would  be  reduced  to  writing.   It  is  probable  that 
few  orders  have  been  so  conscientiously  obeyed,  and  yet  there
are  a  great  many  cubic  feet  of  files  connected  with  this  pro- 
ject.  These  files  mainly  concern  technical  and  administrative 
matters.   Only  those  details  which,  in  the  opinion  of  the 
writer,  are  necessary  to  a  broad  understanding  of  the  manner 
in  which  the  project's  objectives  were  accomplished  have  been 
included  in  this  paper.   Those  interested  in  additional  data 
may  wish  to  consult  the  files. 
In  addition  to  setting  forth  significant  developments, 
the  writer  has  attempted  to  provide  insight  into  the  reasons 
for  certain  courses  of  action.   At  times  this  required  a 
speculative  approach.   The  judgments  derived  from  such  specu- 
lation were  shared  by  all  those  actively  concerned  in  the 
management  of  the  project,  and  it  is  the  writer's  hope  that 
they  are  accurately  expressed  in  the  following  paper.   Any 
error  in  this  respect,  however,  is  the  sole  responsibility  of 
the  writer. 
August,  1987
LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS 
Figure 
1  -  ' 
2  - 
3  - 
4  - 
5  - 
6  - 
7  - 
8  - 
9  - 
10  - 
11  - 
12  - 
13  - 
14  - 
15  - 
16  - 
17  - 
18  - 
19  - 
20  r- 
21  - 
in.
I.    INTRODUCTION 
The  exact  moment  when  the  idea  emerged  of  digging  a 
tunnel  to  intercept  Soviet  and  East  German  communications  is 
somewhat  obscure.'  A  number  of  factors  must  be  considered, 
among  them  the  following: 
a.  As  early  as  1948  U.S.  Intelligence  Officers 
became  interested  in  the  benefits  to  be  derived  from 
tapping  Soviet  and  Satellite  landlines  on  a  scale  not 
previously  considered  necessary.   The  loss  of  certain 
sources  during  this  period  created  gaps  in  our  intelli- 
gence coverage  which  were  particularly  unfortunate  during 
this  period  of  Cold  War  escalation.   It  became  evident 
that  the  tapping  of  certain' selected  landlines  might  pro- 
duce the  information  needed  to  fill  a  number  of  the  gaps 
in  our  overall  intelligence  picture. 
b.  In  the  late  1340's  and  early  1950's  the  U.S., 
through  the  briefings  of  "returnee"  German  scientists 
(those  who  were  ta2<en  by  the  Soviets  after  World  War  II 
to  work  in  Russia)  and  other  sources,  became  aware  of  a 
new
c.    In  the  late  1940's  the;  , 
in  the  course  of  its  continuing  efforts  to  provide  secure 
communications  for  the  Agency,  became  aware  of  a  principle 
which,  when  applied  to  target  communications,  offered 
certain  possibilities.   Plans  to  exploit  this  technique 
were  immediately  formulated. 
These  factors  then  served  as  additional  incentives  (above 
and  beyor.d  our  normal  collection  requirements)  to  focus  atten- 
tion on  Soviet  landline  targets.  In  mid-|  exploratory 
discussions  were  held  in  Washington  to  plan  the  mounting  of  an 
attack  on  Soviet  landlines  in  East  Germany  with  special  empha- 
sis to  be  placed  on  the  Berlin  area. 
Vital  information  on  the  j  technical  details 
i 
of  important  Soviet  and  East  German  landlines  j 
I  '   -   first  became  available  I  .•*"•.
during  the  latter  part  of  |     ,  and  by j  all  of  the 
pertinent  technical  material  ;had  been  assembled  and  sufficient- 
ly analyzed  to  permit  the  pinpointing  of  the  most  important 
Soviet  circuits.  1 
Subsequent  events  proved 
this  information  to  be  completely  correct. 
Various  methods  of  tapping  these  circuits  were  explored   ^, 
V^y 
and  one  sampling  operation  was  run  in  the  East  Zone,  unfortu- 
nately with  negative  results.   By  [  ,  however,  the 
effectiveness  of 
had  become  such  that  a  |  sample 
was  obtained  of  the  prime  target  circuit. 
Special  mention  should  be  made  of  the  fact  thai 
.   -  /  , 
it  was  necessary  to  maintain  a  24-hour  watch  over  af 
month  period  on  "our"  end  of  the  cable  to  record  these
samDles 
Meantime  collateral  collection  effort  continued  on  the 
communications  systems  involved 
At  this  point  (mid-j    )  we  knew  it  could  be  done  -  the  next 
steo  was  the  problem  of  installing  a-  permanent  tap  on  the 
target  lines. 
Precisely  at  what  point  the  idea  of  a  tunnel  for  the 
purpose  of  tapping  the  target  cables  began  to  come  into  focus 
i 
cannot  be  pinpointed. 
I
While  it  should  perhaps  be  possible  to  credit 
one  individual  with  the  initial  concept,  it  appears  to  be  a 
bit  difficult  to  do  so.   At  any  rate*, 
j  the  idea  of  a  tunnel  to 
tap  the  target  cables  began  to  take  definite  shape.
II.    PLANNING 
Inspection  of  all  sites  from  which  it  might  be  possible 
to  tunnel  |  to  the  target  cables 
served  to  narrow  the  choices  to  two  spots:  \ 
\  .   The  site  actually  used  \ 
\_  __  _  _  'ffas  selected  after  careful  deliberation  which  . 
included,  but  was  not  limited  to,  the  following  factors:      ' 
a. 
b+        The  length  of  the  tunnel  was  considered  to  be 
not  impractical 
c.  Land  was  available j 
|  from  which  to  begin  the  tunnel. 
d.  Complete  collateral  information  on  the  area 
was  available,
At  this  point  the  following  major  questions  remained 
unanswered : 
a.    Was  it  indeed  possible  to  dig  a  tunnel  of  this 
magnitude j  clandestinely,  con- 
sidering the  fact  that  the  border  at  this  point  was 
heavily  and  constantly  patrolled  by  the  East  Germans, 
and  hit  the  targets? 
b. 
i 
c.   \ 
in  such  a  remote  area  (this  portion  of  Berlin  was  at  that 
time  a  "squattersville"  of  s"hacks  and  hovels  constructed 
from  rubble  by  refugees  from  the  East  German  Zone)? 
In  retrospect  the  first  question,  "Could  the  tunnel  be 
dug?",  was  never  really  a  debatable  one   those  concerned,  more 
or  less  decided  that  given  sufficient  money  and  personnel  the 
job  could  be  done.  (This  judgment  fortunately  proved  sound.) 
The  second  question,  \  f    haunted  the 
minds  of  project  personnel  for  many  weeks  and  a  great  many 
ingenious  ideas  were  brought  forth  and  discarded  for  one  rea- 
son or  another  until  the  suggestion  was  made  j  
' 
This  in  effect  was 
the  solution.  '  [ 
; 
i
—— a re ne te ne en ee te EE RR NERS NECN CaNNE OD LN Sete Se orn
I  planning  for  .the  project  continued 
I  and  in {         of  that  year  the  Director  of 
Central  Intelligence  approved  the  terms  of  reference  -which 
covered  |  the  implemen- 
tation of  the  project.   A  series  of  conferences  in  late  • 
and  early  >'     led  to  the  following  decisions: 
a.   | 
(1)  procure  a  site,  I 
\  ,  and  drive  a  tunnel  to  a  point  beneath 
the  target  cables; 
(2)  be  responsible  for  the  recording  of  all 
signals  produced  | 
\  .  and 
(3)  process  in  Washington  all  of  the  tale- 
graphic  material  received  from  the  project. 
b.   |    
. 
(1)  drive  a  vertical  shaft  from  the  tunnel's, 
end  to  the  targets; 
10-
(2)  effect  the  cable  taps  and  deliver  a 
usable  signal  to  the  head  of  the  tunnel  for 
recording;  and 
(3)  provide  for  a! 
center  j  to  process  the  voice  recordings 
from  the  site. 
Activity  thus  proceeded  en  three  fronts  -  in  Berlin  steps 
■were  taken  to  lease  the  necessary  land  and  right-of-way  ease- 
ments for  the  site
Planning  called  for  the  completion  of 
this  work-  on  j 
For  assistance  in  actually  digging  the  tunnel  it  was 
decided  to  request  help  from  the { 
and  to  this  end   the  j 
were  briefed  on  the  project.   The  initial  contact  with  \  '..     - 
!      was  made  personally  by  Mr.  Allen  I  tulles  to  J 
I  .   Fortunately  j„       .  _.,  .  ,  a 
trained  engineer,  had  just  been  appointed \ 
From  the  first  moment  he  learned  of  the  operation, 
,         was  an  enthusiastic  supporter  of  the  concept,  s 
selected  !  -        (the  only  available 
member  of  the  '  with  any  experience  in 
tunneling)  to  head  the  project.   This  proved  to  be  an  excellent 
choice  for  j  turned  in  an  outstanding  job.   By 
mid-summer  of  |     he  had  firmed  up  the  engineering  plans, 
selected  a  crew  of  engineering  personnel,  and  actually  con- 
structed  a  mock-up  tunnel  some  150  yards  long  working  under 
operational  conditions  at  a  high  security  base  in   • 
•  12
Some  mention  should  be  made  of  the  actual  method  of  construct- 
ing the  tunnel.
\  .   It  was  calculated  (and  subse- 
quently proven  to  be  true)  that  this  method  of  construction 
would  not  permit  settling  of  the  soil  and  detection  of  the 
tunnel  from  the  surface.   [ 
Meantime  |  engineers  constructed  a  mock- 
up  of  the  tunnel's  terminal  end 
|  "  Available 
plans  indicated  that  the  cables  were  buried  some j    inches  . 
deep  along  the  side  of  a  heavily  traveled  highway.   The  top 
of  the  vertical  shaft  j  then  needed  to  be 
approximately  I         inches  below  the  surface  of  the  high- 
way in  order  to  give  the  tapping  crew  room  to  work  below  the 
ceiling  of  the  shaft,  and  the  whole  structure  had  to  be 
capable  of  supporting  the  weight  of  heavy  trucks  since  the 
tunnel  and  tap  chamber  lay  directly  beneath  the  highway,   j 
\  Considerable  care  was  devoted  to  insulating  the
3/ 
tap  chamber  to  prevent  its  acting  like  a  huge  drum. 
Considerable  thought  was  given  to  the  quantity  and 
content  of  the  material  available  from  the  target  and  the 
manner  in  which  it  was  to  be  processed. 
3/- 
—  In  spite  of  the  insulation,  it  was  a  weird  sensation 
to  be  in  the  chamber  when  an  iron-shod  horse  trotted  across 
it .   .We  also  suffered  some  anxious  moments  one  foggy  morning 
when  the  microphone  in  the  tap  chamber  gave  forth  with  a 
continuous  series"  of  dull  thuds.   After  the  sun  burned  away 
the  fog,  visual  observation  showed  that  the  East  German 
police  had  set  up  a  temporary  automobile  checkpoint  directly 
over  the  chamber.   The  "thuds"  the  microphone  picked  up  were 
caused  by  the  police  officer  in  charge  stomping  his  feet  on 
the  road  surface  to  keep  warm.
III.    IMPLEMENTATION 
By  j  things  were  beginning  to  take  shape 
and  the  situation  was  as  follows: 
l 
b.    All  of  the  basic  supplies,  equipment,  and 
personnel  were  in  Berlin  ready  to  start 
' construction 
on  the  tunnel. 
[ 
c.  Space  at  Headquarters  was  secured  and  the 
had  assembled  a  crew  and  was 
well  under  way  in  fabricating  the  unique  equipment 
necessary  to  process  the  anticipated  telegraphic  traffic 
d.  Initial  personnel  had  been  selected  and  were 
being  processed  /
i  .   It  should  be  noted  that  personnel  and  equip- 
ment were  programmed  initially  to  exploit  approximately 
|     percent  of  the  anticipated  take.   In  retrospect,  per- 
haps this  could  be  considered  overly  cautious.   In 
justification  of  this  decision  it  should  be  said  that  no 
one  had  ever  tunneled  \  under  clandestine  condi- 
tions •with  the  expectation  of  hitting  a  target  two  inches 
in  diameter  and [    inches  below  a  main  German/Soviet 
highway.   There  were  those  who  manifested  certain  reser- 
vations on  the  feasibility  of  so  doing,  and  it  is  greatly 
to  the  credit  of  those  senior  officials,  [ 
|  ,  that,  in  spite  of  these  reservations,  the 
project  was  permitted  to  proceed.
\ 
Careful  visual  observation  was  maintained  and  tunneling 
operations  stopped  each  time  the  German  guards  walked  over 
the  tunnel  on  their  regular  patrols.   Pumps  were  installed 
to  take  care  of  the  excess  water.   Observation  logs  were 
maintained,  and  since  the  highway  under  observation  was  the 
main  road  from  East  Berlin  to  the  Schoenfeld  Airport,  consid- 
erable Order  of  Battle  information  was  obtained.   It  was  also 
possible  to  estimate  quite  accurately  the  relative  importance1 
of  individuals  visiting  East  Berlin  by  observing  the  security 
precautions  taken  by  the  East  Germans  and  the  Soviets. 
/  - 
/ 
Cool  air  was  supplied  to  the  face  of  the  tunnel  through  duct- 
work from  an  air  conditioning  unit  [ 
The  tunnel  was  completed  on  |  '  .   Construction 
of  the  tap  chamber  commenced \  and  was  completed, 
•with  the  |  '     target  cables  exposed,  on  f 
\ 
To  appreciate  this  accomplishment  it  is  necessary  to 
long  I  - 
■l/.v  '•■•
The  lack  of  an  adequate  base  line  made  the  survey- 
ing problem  especially  difficult.   The  engineers  decided  at 
one  point  that  an  object  of  known  size  in  the  East  Zone  would 
be  useful  as  a  reference  point,  so  a  baseball  game  was  organ- 
ized with  the  objective  of  knocking  a  baseball  as  far  into  the 
East  Zone  as  possible.   This  scheme  was  frustrated  by  the 
friendliness  of  the  East  German  guards  who  kept  returning  the 
baseball.   Nonetheless,  the  engineers  expressed  confidence 
that  they  knew  their  position  when  the  tunnel  was  completed 
to  a  point  which  could  be  contained  in  a  six-inch  cube.   They 
were  correct. 
Excess  humidity  is  probably  one  of  the  greatest  enemies 
of  electronic  equipment.   To  guard  against  this  problem  the 
section  of  the  tunnel  immediately  adjacent  to  the  tap  chamber 
was  insulated  and  sealed  (  to  form,  in 
effect,  a  closed  room.   ^  Vapor  barriers 
were  erected  and,  in  addition,  a  heavy  "anti-personnel",  door 
of  steel  and  concrete  was  constructed  to  seal  off  the  tunnel 
some  15  yards,  from  its  terminal  end.   From  the  beginning  it 
was  realized  that  the  duration  of  this  operation  was  finite. 
Considerable  thought  was  given  to  the  posture  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment would  adopt  upon  the  tunnel's  discovery- and  to  those 
20  _
measures  which  would  be  taken  at  the  site.   The  following 
position  was  finally  approved: 
i 
a.   I 
c.    The  "anti-Personnel"  door  described  above  was 
installed. 
i 
All  equipment  for  isolating  and  preampli- 
fying  the  signals  and  passing  them  down  the  tunnel  for  record- 
ing was  in  place  before  each  tap  was  made  so  that  monitoring 
of  each  pair  could  begin  as  soon  as  it  was  tapped.  \ 
',  Careful  check  was  kept  of  the  temperature  and 
4/ 
Z/This  door  bore  the  following  inscription  neatly  lettered 
in  German  and  Cyrillic:   "Entry  is  forbidden  by  order  of  the 
Commanding  General."   It  was  reasoned  that  this  sign  might  give 
pause  to  Soviet  and/or  German  officials  and  gain  time.   As  a 
matter  of  fact,  there  were  those  Communist  individuals  who 
considered  the  posting  of  this  sign  as  one  of  the  most  auda- 
cious aspects  .of  .the  e.ntire  undertaking. 
V 
\
humidity  in  the  tap  chamber  to  prevent  the  possibility  of  the 
introduction  of  moisture  into  the  target  cables  thus  causing 
faults.   The  moisture  in  the' air  caused  by  the  breathing  aad 
perspiration  of  the  technicians  doing  the  tapping  operation 
forced  the  suspension  of  the  operation  several  times  to 
permit  the  air  conditioning  equipment  to  dehumidify  the 
chamber.   All  the  components  in  the  electrical  isolation  net- 
works were  individually  selected  and  subjected  to  rigorous 
tests  to  insure  maximum  reliability,  and  the  lead-away  cables 
were  constructed  of  the  best  available  materials,  sheathed  in 
lead,  and  handled  in  accordance  with  the  highest  telephone 
company  standards.   The  strictest  possible  visual  vatch  was 
maintained  with  the  tap  crew.   In  short,  in  chis,  as  in  all 
aspects  of  the  operation,  every  effort  was  made  to  guarantee 
success  even  though  in  many  instances  it  meant  delay  in 
achieving  the  objective. 
\  
..
IV.   TERMINATION 
The  tunnel  was  discovered  \  21  April  1956, 
after  [  of  operation.   A  memorandum  pre- 
pared on  15  August  1956  (reproduced  in  its  entirety  as 
Appendix  A)  examines  in  detail  all  evidence  available  as  of 
that  date  on  the  reasons  for  the  discovery.   The  conclusion 
reached  was  that  the  loss  of  this  source  was  purely  the  result 
of  unfortunate  circumstances  beyond  oar  control  -  a  combina- 
tion of  the  fact  that  one  of  the  cables  was  in  very  poor 
physical  condition  (this  was  known  from  the  beginning)  and  a 
long  period  of  unusually  h^avy  rainfall.   It  appeared  that  water 
entered  the  cable  in  sufficient  quantity  to  make  it  inopera- 
tive, thus  necessitating  digging  up  sections  of  the  cable  tb'id 
causing  discovery  of  the  tap.
V.    PRODUCTION 
The  following  statistics  may  be  of  interest  in  evaluating 
the  project: 
..   |
d.  A  small  processing  unit 
was  maintained  at  the  Berlin  site  to  permit  on-the-spot 
monitoring  of  engineering  circuits  for  the  protection  of 
the  project  and  scanning  of  the  more  productive  circuits 
for  the  "hot"  intelligence.   Daily  reports  of  sufficient 
value  to  warrant  electrical  transmission  to  Washington 
I  were  produced. 
e.  Processing  of  the  backlogged  material  con- 
tinued until  30  SeDtember  1958 
The  information  from  this  material  was  disseminated  in 
a  closely  controlled  system  [  Appendix  B 
consists  of  a  summary  of  the  value  of  the  material  received 
together  with  typical  customer  comments.  I 
I/
VI.    AFTERMATH 
As  previously  noted,  considerable  thought  was  given 
during  the  entire  life  of  the  project  on  the  result  its 
discovery  would  bring.   In  retrospect  it  is  probably  correct 
to  say  that,  among  those  most  actively  concerned  with  the 
project's  management,  a  consensus  developed  that  the  Soviets 
would  probably  suppress  knowledge  of  the  tunnel's  existence 
rather  than  admit  to  the  world  that  Free  World  intelligence 
organs  had  the  capability  of  successfully  mounting  an  opera- 
tion of  this  magnitude.   In  other  words,  it  was  felt  that  for 
the  Soviets  to  admit  that  the  U.S.  had  been  reading  their  high 
level  communications  circuits  would  cause  the  Soviets  to  lose 
face.   Perhaps  fortunately,  fate  intervened,  and  as  a  possible 
consequence  the  Soviet  course  of  action  was  exactly  contrary 
to  expectation. 
The  Commandant  of  the  Soviet  Berlin  Garrison,  who  would 
normally  have  controlled  the  handling  of  the  situation  when 
the  tunnel  was  discovered,  was  absent  from  Berlin  and  the 
Acting  Commandant,  Colonel  Ivan  A.  Kotsyuba,  was  in  charge. 
There  is  some  reason  to  believe  that  he  (for  whatever  reason) 
was  forced  to  make  a  personal  decision  on  a  course  of  action 
without  benefit  of  advice  from  Moscow.   At  any  rate  his 
reaction  was  unexpected  in  that  he  invited  the  entire  s°riia 
f
press  corps  to  a  briefing  and  tour  of  the  tunnel  and  its 
facilities.   As  a  result  the  tunnel  was  undoubtedly  the  most 
highly  publicized  peacetime "espionage  enterprise  in  modern 
times  prior  to  the  "U-2  incident."   Worldwide  reaction  was  out- 
standingly favorable  in  terms  of  enhancement  of  U.S.  prestige. 
Non-Soviet  Bloc  sentiment  can  be  generally  summarized  as  follows: 
a.  There  was  universal  admiration  (and  this         
included  informed  Soviets)  on  the  technical  excellence 
of  the  installation  and  the  imaginative  nature  of  the 
undertaking. 
b.  The  non-Communist  world  reacted  with  surprise 
and  unconcealed  delight  to  this  indication  that  the 
U.S.,  almost  universally  regarded  as  a  stumbling  neophyte 
in  espionage  matters,  was  capable  of  a  coup  against  the 
Soviet  Union,  which  had  long  been  the  acknowledged  master 
in  such  matters. 
c.  Coupled  with  regret  that  the  Cold  War  necessi- 
tated such  measures,  thoughtful  editorial  comment 
applauded  this  indication  that  the  U.S.  was  capable  of 
fulfilling  its  role  of  Free  World  leadership  in  the 
struggle. 
Appendix  C  contains  a  sampling  of  typical  U.S.  press 
accounts  and  editorial  comment  on  the  tunnel.   Predictably 
the  Communist  press  treated  the  tunnel  as  an  outrage  and  an
intolerable  indecency.   Appendix  D  consists  of  a  study  of 
East  German  press  reaction  to  the  incident. 
For  their  contributions  to  Project!  awards 
y 
were  made  to  the  following  individuals: 
Distinguished  Intelligence  Medal 
Intelligence  Medal  of  Merit 
Intelligence  Medal  of  Merit 
Intelligence  Medal  of  Merit 
Distinguished  Intelligence  Medal 
Intelligence  Medal  of  Merit 
Intelligence  Medal  of  Merit 
Distinguished  Intelligence  Medal 
Intelligence  Medal  of  Merit 
—'Unfortunately  the  writer  has  been  unable  to  locate  an 
exact  redord  of  those  persons  who  received  other  recognition 
from  the  Agency  for  their  participation  in  this  project  and 
any  omissions  are  regretted.   It  should  also  be  noted  that 
approximately  j     people  participated  wittingly  or  unwittingly 
in  this  undertaking.   In  fact  there  are  very  few,  if  any,  of  the 
elements  of  CIA  that  were  not  called  upon  for  assistance,  either 
directly  or  indirectly  (such  as  providing  manpower),  during 
the  life  of  the  project.
APPENDIX  A 
NOTE:   This  assessment  was  prepared  by  the  I  staff 
immediately  after  the  discovery  of  the  tunnel  and  is  based 
on  pertinent  information  available.  | 
15  August  1956 
DISCOVERY  BY  THE  SOVIETS  OF  1. 
Analysis  of  all  available  evidence  -  traffic  passing  on 
the  target  cables,  conversations  recorded  from  a  microphone 
installed  in  the  tap  chamber,  and  vital  observations  from  the 
site  -  indicates  that  the  Soviet  discovery  of  \  was 
purely  fortuitous  I 
A  descrip- 
tion of  the  events  leading  to  these  conclusions  is  contained 
in  this  paper.
.  APPENDIX  B.. 
RECAPITULATION  OF  THE  INTELLIGENCE  DERIVED 
i  T   
Set  forth  below  are  a  recapitulation  of  intelligence 
derived  from  the  \  material  and  some  typical  consumer 
comments.
WASHINGTON  POST 
1  May  1956 
The  Tuiuicl  of  Lavs       • 
Tho  United  Stale;  Government  has  not  )  el  marie 
any  official  reply  to.  tha  Soviat  and  East  German 
allegations  and  protests  concerning  tha  300-yard 
tunnel  thai  American  intelligence  operative.'  ar« 
said  to  have  built  underneath  the  border  between. 
West  and  East  Bcriin  for  espionage  purposes. 
Meanwhile,  assuming  the  story  to  be  correct — we 
cannot  help  thinking  the  Communists  have  made 
a  grievous  mistake  to  raise. so  much  fuss  about  their 
discovery.  They  are  even  said  to  have  conducted 
special  propaganda  tours  through  the  tunnel  and 
to  have  exhibited  the  wiretapping  and  other  record- 
ing apparatus  that  the  Americans  are  supposed  to 
have  installed  inside  it 
Tha  probable  result  of  all  this  has  been  to  give 
tha  anti-Communist  resistance  in  Hast  Germany  a 
good  deal  of  amusement  and  encouragement.  Cer- 
tainty it  must  have  served  to  strengthen  tha  im- 
pression of  American  resourcefulness  and  thereby 
to  reslora  some-  measure  of  our  prestige — which 
apparently  had  been  deteriorating  since  tho  equivo- 
cal attitude  taken  by  the  American  authorities  in 
the  East  German  "uprisings  of  June.  1034 — among 
1he  caplivo  population.  Tha  reaction  of  their 
kinsmen  in  West  Germany  is  probably  a  pretty 
good  index  to  their  o-.vn. 
In  Vest  Germany  the  story  has  been  accepted 
at  face  value  with  astonishment  and  delight  as  an 
evidence  that  the  tradition  of  Yankco  resource- 
fulness and  ingenuity  is  not  a  myth  after  all. 
Espionage  is  one  game  in  which  the  Communists 
were  deemed,  even  by  their  enemies,  to  be  par- 
ticularly expert  and  our  own  side  to  ba  dismally 
JnepL  Very  few  Germans,  as  tha  Frankfurter 
Keue  Press?  exultantly  observed,  even  suspected 
that  the  Americans  "were  capable  of  so  much 
cleverness";  and  it  would  be  even  more  devastating 
to  Communist  prestige  if  it  wora  disclosed  that, 
tha  espionage  tunnel  had  been  in  operation  for 
some  time  before  lhe  Communists  became  aware 
of  it. 
Indeed,  if  the  tunnel  episode  turns  out  lo  have 
been  the  product  of  Yankco  ingenuity,  there  is  an 
interesting  parallel  in  American  history.  During 
the  siege  of  Petersburg  in  ]f!G4,  an  enterprising 
Union  officer  from  the  Pennsylvania  coal  fields 
conceived  tha  idea  of  miiv.ig  the  Confederate 
positions  from  a  tunnel  under  them.  The  tunnel 
was  dug  and  the  .nines  were  finally  set  ofT;  and 
though  tha  operation  was  a  fiasco  in  p3rt  bet  suse' 
of  the  '3'ilure  of  Union  commanders  to  etfecuta 
orders,  the  boldness  of  the  slroks.  has  compelled 
admir3U0neversir.ce.'         ■'"•         '"'■'. 
C-2
V 
TIME  MAGAZINE 
7  May  1956    • 
BERLIN 
Wonderful  Tunnel 
llerlin.  <ity  of  rubble,  rcfoiiecv  and 
orr.iMon.d  pairho  i.i"  flitter,  is  an  Alfred 
Hitcho.ck  dream  oj  suhtcrl'uee  and  suspi- 
cion. In  back  streets,  (i.irkly  mysterious' 
hou-cs  lur'-i  behind  hid:  wire  fences  suj- 
pestivo  of  darker  and  more  mysterious 
doings  within.  Newsmen  jcccnll_v_cn'J"-'rd 
2j  separate,  agency*  of  Western  intelli- 
gence "known   to  be  at  work  ia   Ecrlia. 
Their  o/crativcs — some  fashionably 
"clothed  i;:  (he  j:rey  flannel  of  New  York's 
M.iiiiM.:;  Avenue,  some  with  :irni;iii  hnb 
Mer.-  i'nl^i;:-  under  bine  serge — report  lo 
#l  different  headquarter-.  a;:d  rarely  know 
wh.it  ;l;c;r  colleagues  are  up  !o. 
lii  i!!  Ucrliii  there  i>  no  sp-d  "net'er 
.-iiiic:  in  i!i;r  |{i:iliit,<k  -f Iicu'.i-  nf  i nines 
ih.m  a  ruMi'c.  st-mi-di-ericd  turner  kiiowi: 
on  ilic  L"..V  side  as  Kudow  and  in  the 
Ku-i:i::  /.one,  just  o\cr  the  way,  .is  Alt- 
r.licnuko.  Sclf-irr.iinrt.int  ducks  and 
chicken-  -irut  like  Commis.-ars  in  All- 
t  Ilienii  i.c'.-  cobbled  street  Iterliii's  only 
unikine,  windmill  hirns  l;i/.ilv  in  (he 
breeze  nc.ir  liy.  :nnl  close  lo  the  boundary 
M'|Mr;tliic  Hast  and  West  st.uid>  a  U.S. 
r.nl.ir  -l.iliiin.  bendin;;  its  reticular  car  lo 
i  ho  opriations  at  K.ist  Berlin's  busy 
Schouefeid  Airport.  "!"uo  rin-^s  of  barbed 
wire   guard    the  'lonely   radar   post,   arid 
behind  tbrm  a  detachment  of  uniformed 
Signal  Corps  men  iivA  a  lift  ai  sccrst. 
and  jso'aicd  as  rr.or.'a,    /  •  ..•;■ 
Tho  Sip,  Cc!!cr.  For  raany  a  month, 
the  supcr-sccracy  surrouadir.j  the  con- 
slructioa  and  operation  of  Rudow';,  radar 
station  had  fed  the  po.-5>p  of  bored  Amer- 
icans in  the  occupied  city.  There  were 
i hose  who  remembered  a  civilian  engineer 
hired  to  supervise  the  job;  he  had  quit  in 
disgust.  because  t lie  blueprints  seemed  so 
cr.'uy.  "Why  build  a  ecliar  big  enough  to 
drive  thrnutfh  with  a  dump  truck?"  he 
a-ked.  and  was  told  to  mind  his  own  busi- 
ness. Others  recalled  seeing  friends  whom 
.lJ2£X_Jv,c.vS_l"J.'c-  <" n c i 1 1 ccr s_  ^sui l.'lsLTlbl _ii i '." 
pearing  at  the  .station  wearing  the  in-ignia 
of  t;ic'U.S"\riHy~biunal  Corps.  AYIfy?~A~n 
amuscilTirfug  was  the"  only  answer  ques- 
tioners ever  j;nt — hut  last  week  the  Rus- 
sians though:  ihey  had  found  a  better  one. 
-  One  night  nt  7  o'clock,  an  angry, 
chuuky  Soviet  colonel  uawed  Ivan  Kotsi- 
uba  called  a  press  conference  in  East  Ber-  ' 
!  Iin.  Purpose:  to  protest  the  building  by 
,'  "American  nrgani/.ations"  of  h  secret 
tiniiicl  under  K;im  f.irnuiricrritory.  -«iih 
the  criminal  intent  of  >i»yinK.''  Offered  .1 
chance  to  sec  fur  themselves,  the  Western 
newsmen  were  taken  to  a  site  some  500 
;  yards  from  the  radar  station  at  Rudow.-  • 
A  Lor  of  Money.  TrueWoads  of  Red 
army  troops  and  squad  cars  crowded  with 
Volkspulizci  M«iiul  I iy.  Mobile  pnarnlors 
wore  liuiiioiiiiK  ti»  |im\iiir  li.iht.*  iff  llu- 
i« "onvinn.  ami  at  lite  ontraiuv  t«»  :«  ImU- 
dii;;  in  llir  ^ri>iin«l.  ;t  oiinnrl  nl  I'lO  Un>- 
>iau  >ie.iul  \\»\i>  was  mi  haml  l»>  oxplaiii  it 
aH.  Ten  feet  below.  it>  ontr.uice  a  hi>lo  <m 
in  the  roof  by  the  Kalians,  lay  the  iiuinel 
itself:  a  c.tsl-irou  tube  about-  >ix  feet 
in  diameter  and  500-000  yards  lon^, 
rranuned  with  electronic  f»|iiijimvm.  ca- 
bles, tape  recorders,  veolilatin^  :i|>iKir.ilu-> 
and  puaips  of  both  ttrilisb  and  A:r.cric.m 
make.  A I  lite  Masl  Or.iun  end.  t:ib!r>  !*-»» 
nut  of  (he  iu.:iu  luxiy  ol  siti:  tumid  to  a 
scpar.ilc  ihaiiiber  where  they  were  linktd 
to  two  ICa-t  (A-rt:ian  cables  and  a  thin! 
used  by  the  Russians.  What  was  at  the 
American  end!'  The  new-men  were  not 
permitted  to  know.  As  they  crawled  wc-t- 
ward.  .:  sandb.i^  barrier  barred  the  way. 
its  pui|iii.>o  nnph:iM/rd  by  a  sipi  reading 
in  I-'ndislt  and  (".einian:  "Vitw  are  m'w 
entering  the  Anient  an  sector."" 
"This  lutmel."  >aid  the  Russian  expert, 
with  a  note  of  admiral  ion.  "was  built  tr> 
last  year.-.  The  party  resjuiiisible  must 
have  had  a  lot  of  hio'tv." 
Who  was  re>poii-tb'n?  Xoboi'y.  neither 
the  IVnta^on.  the  Stale  Depart it:cnl.  nor 
the  Central  Intelligence  Agency,  was  sjv- 
inu".  'Jut  as  Berlin's'  pa|MT>  trupied  slee- 
fully  «ilh  the  ne»vs.  one  I'.erlin  editor  told 
a  rankiic  U.S.  i.:V:ei.d:  "1  don't*  know 
whether  your  j-eoplc  du^  that  wonderful 
tunnel  or  not.  but  whoever  it  was,  let  me 
bay  I 
it  wis  too  bad  it  wai  found. 
Its  the  br»t  publicity  the  XJJS.  has  bad  b 
for  a  Song  time,"    .    . 
C-3
BOSTON  .JOS7 
Circ:  m./  267,072 
S.f    '.96,496 
/ 
i    Frenl 
p£. 
DiVfi 
t£ 
OV-it 
lrW~«4  «V    iO«^ 
I 
'""'."■.  Hope  It  Is' True :'^ I- 
Soviet"  charges  that  American  intelligence  agents? 
•dug  a  tunnel  in  Berlin,  tapped  a  telephone  cable,  and'i 
(recorded  conversations-over  the  Red  communication  net-5 
jwork,  which  the  Reds. made  with  considerable  fanfare, 
land  during  a  conducted  tour  of  the  spy  tunnel  for  cor-. 
•  respondents,  gives  its  some  faint  hope.  "  ''} 
Frankly,  we  dldn't'know  that  American  intelligence} 
■.agents  were  that  smart..  In  fact,  we  were  beginning  tc? 
|  
think  U^tj^^tJEie^ Ccn t ral  Intel H^c n cc  Agency.necdcd' 
j 
xva$  a  lew  TessonT'on'  the ' f  unda'mcntaYs^bT 'espionage • 
Jfrom^otnedcfcctcd  Russian 'agent/ But,  nowwe  talce1t# 
:  ill  K-i^l-    Tt  ♦  u_*V~L"  •- 7~rr"~   -  ■-   :«— —  *-■•'■*■     _■■"-   ■ — » 
-  --  -,    .       -.  ,„,tary  ope 
.  installations^  East_Gerroany,.  •     • 
K  '  "We  hope  that  American  intelligence  agents  have' 
'.infiltrated  ."the  Soviet  department  of  foreign  affairs,: 
jplanted  western -sympathizers  in  the  heart  of  the  Soviet' 
jbureaucracy  and  started  a  stream  of'microfilmcd  copies 
;of  important  Soviet  documents. 'towards  th«  <"IA   In 
i'  ^venope.aH  this  because  that  is  precisely  what  the 
; Soviet  spy  network  did  and  is  probably  doing  right  now 
jin  the  United  States.  'This  is  not  just  tit  for  tat— but  a 
.stark  necessity  in  'the  world  of  cynical  power  politics. '    .; 
O
STAiV.::0.;D/(Ccr.D.) 
ADVOCATE 
»»w  \i.    •  ,_ 
Circ. 
FioM 
23,166 
C.     
Pin*        P»(y*        P*o»     . .. 
Dctc: 
i 
] 
Money  Well  Spent  /-?      5 
There  is  only  one  agency  In  Wash-;! 
lngton  which  docs  not  account-for  the! 
money  It  spends.  The  per.  trnl  In  tell  [-* 
gence  Agency,    headed   oy""?uicii    \V.t 
Dulles,    has  never  reported  to    Con-« 
grcss.  A  special  committee,  appointed; 
by  the  President,  did  make  "a  survey 
of  the  agency's  activities  and  was  ap- 
parently satisfied  that  It  was  efficient. 
•|So  sccrc.  are  the  activities   of    this 
'  group     that    even     the    amount    of 
money   it   spends    Is   unknown.    Ac- 
countants have  estimated  tliat  there 
is   roughly    S2  'billion  in  budgets   of 
other   departments  which  Is  diverted 
to  the  CIA. 
Naturally  enough.  Congress  worries 
from  time  to  time  that  this  money 
jmay  not  be  well  spent.  Last  week  some 
4 news  came  out  o*  Berlin  which  should 
jcalm  such,  fears: 
"t  The  Russians  discovered  that  their 
; three  main  .  telephone  cables  from 
jEas:  Berlin  to  points  cast  were  tapped. 
G,A  tunnel  from  the  western  zone,  con- 
'nccted  with  the  tapped  lines  and 
j  wires,  led  to  sandbags  at  the  zone' 
boundary.  The  Russians  were  greatly  j; 
disturbed.  They  claim  that  all  mes-r 
sages  for  several  years  have  been  in-[ 
tercepted.  They  blame  this  violations 
of  privacy  on  American  Intelligences 
i  Our  officials  have  expressed  horror} 
;at  the  charge.  They  haven't,  they  say,"! 
,tha  slightest  Idea  :of  where  the  llncsi; 
lead  or  by  whom  they  were  laid.  The]' 
Russians  are  just  old  rr.eanles  to  clalm-j 
we  wire-tapped.        •  '•  'j 
\  West  3erliners  are  laughing.  Good" 
for  American  Intelligence,  they  say.' 
They  hope,  and  so  do  we,  that  the  •• 
Russians  have  only  discovered  one  of  '. 
several  taps.  At  least,  the  expose  j! 
shows  that  some  of  the.  money  spent rt 
by  CIA'may-h.v/9  been  very  well  saent] 
:'••■' -:--  ;•-■••  •.'■•...•■-  I 
*—   • 
 -. — :  — J-J 
J 
indeed. 
U   i: 
h 
IO O 
rr_< 
J
Ik'l.'ii      l    i      iw«j\-i 
CB.  KAY  HAVE  ORDERED  WIRETAP  TUNNEL  — :  DREIER 
Alex  Droier  at  6:00  P.M.  over  UMAQ  (Chicago)  and  the  NBC 
Radio  Network: . 
"And  now  under  the  heading,  special  report,  part  one. 
— uS-re&t-5ritain-4^th— it ,-r-fr c£marr-spy-"whO" "turne d~out  '•  to  b a~ not 
-5x^^i^j^.5^^ul_iru>do-cccTctiveness^.a^..nothix^on-u3.     Vfe  have  a 
•  tunnel  we  frzg  under  the  communist  sector  of  Eerlin  and  which  the 
reds  exposed  to  .the  light  of  day,  as  you  probably  know,  a  short 
while  ago.     Well,   our  NEC  correspondent,  good  friend  and  colleague, 
^Frank  EurkholsorV  has  investigated  the  story  of  the  wiretap  tunnel 
and  he  says  there's  just  one  conclusion  —  it's  ours.     V,ra  dug  it, 
wo  equipped  it  with  electronic  equipment  to  listen  in  on  communist 
East  German  conversations  for  a  whole  year  before  they  found,  us  out, 
"Presumably  wo  should  be  embarrassed  but  nobody  in  Barlin  is. 
In  fact,   there  is  a  hint  of  American  and  YIest  German  pride  in  know- 
ing that  we  pulled  off  an  espionage  trick  on  the  Reds  for  a  change. 
Of  course,  the  East  Germans  are  making  a  good  thing  of  it  by  con-  • 
ducting  tours  through  the  tunnel  to  impress  their  people  with  the 
dastardlir.sss  of  the  American  spies,  but  that  may  backfire  on  them 
because  the  East  Germans  are  not  beyond  getting  a  quiet  chuckle  at  - 
this  outwitting  of  their  communist  ruler3. 
'•  rurkhoi-er  tells  us   that  the  United  States  is  stamped  all  ' 
over    "ha  listening  post  tunnel.     Kow,  the  tunnel  is  on  the  outskirts      j 
of  town  with  cur  end  being  located  under  a  so-called  experimental  j 
radar  station  beside  a  garbage  dump.     It  runs   straight  under  a  plowed    j 
field  that  has  white  border  marking  posts  above  it.     The  Russians  j 
have  made  throe  openings  for  the  tourists.     Cne  i3  near  the  xri.ro  tap, 
another  at  a  point  about  150  yards   out  in  the  field.     When  anyone  j 
asks  an  American  why  there  isn't  any  radar  at  the  experimental  radar      1 
station,  the  usual  answer,   according  to  Burkholsar,  is,  we  said  it  ; 
was  experimental,  didn't  we?     Want  to  mak9  something  of  it?"  i 
"Naturally  the  army  and  the  government  in  Washington  aren't  .    ; 
going  to  admit  anything  unless  they  have  to.     No  one  tells  who  ; 
ordered  the  eavesdropping  tunnel  built  or  who  paid  for  it  or  who  i 
did  the  listening  and  the   digging.     Perhaps  it  was  the  work  of  a  j 
local  Berlin  outfit,  just  a  curious  bunch  of  boys.     Or  perhaps  it  : 
was  done  secretly  on  orders  direct  from  the  pentagon  or  the  CZhTEAL 
I!.TZL1IGE:\CE  AGEIICY.     Anyway,   it  was  dona  well  because   it  wasn't  , 
discovered  for  a  year  and  now  the  Russians  may  be  wondering  how  ; 
much  we  learned  from  recording  all  the  phone   talks,  possibly  including  ; 
everything  that  went  through  the  switchboard  of  tho  nearby  Soviet  J 
airfield.     So  thanks  for  the  information,  Prank  Burkholcer,  and  now  '. 
we  have  a  question  for  ycu.     Why  don't  we  open  a  tourist  entrance  ; 
at  our  end  of  the  tunnel  end  cash  in  en  the  publicity?     Step  up,  ''■ 
one  and  all.     Only  a  quartor.     Sea  modern  espionage  in  electronic  | 
form  and  all  underground,   and  who  knovq?     Perhaps  ycu  wi 
occasional  communist  tourist,"
-•.>.•_/ «J  .\'li 
m 
rn       
^ 
• 
rrr> 
TIT1-:       f?  ' 
'tUo  3.  Wire  -  lap  JuisKaer  j 
'         13/  Gaston  CoUenls         j 
EjWirtfcsa  to  thcltcraUlTribzn:] 
Sandbar  Ear.-tcade  | 
•■\Vc  have  r.o  fault  \.  ...iisocvcri 
one' 
QMG  :t.Y.Ilcra:&Trib:tnclr.c.\>°  '>"*  vvith  lhc  <-cchn.c,ue. 
•___..-,    ..,,„    ^fi_o..»    ..'attendant  said. 
DEftoiN.   *.ay    -^~V  ,ri?rt.*.  mn  the  eastern  entrance,  a 
the  src.ilcst  sSr.bts  o.  the  cold/.,,.,..,,   .„  ,„„..,  ,v„«lw,,.ri   fnr 
.  %  .visitor  c;»n  walk  westward  for 
:war  :s  the  "Aawncaa  W  tua-{whans  :rj0  yards  33*1  the  point 
•r.el  r.ow  on  cxnioiuo..  ...  ,*^asi  where  the  tunnel  crows  unsii:r 
■  Dcr'.'.n. 
The   500-yard   tunnel   repre- 
sents a  venture  of  extraordinary 
audacity— the  stuff  of  which 
thriller  films  are  made.  If  it 
was  due  °y  American  Intelli- 
S'rr.cc  forces— and  that,  is  Uir. 
jiicr.oral  assumption — it  is  a 
.strikm.-:  example  Of  their 
'capacity  for  daring  undcrtakir.;s. 
the  sector  border.  Then  a  sar.d-j 
oaj;  barricade  is  encountered," 
and  n  voice  calls  out  "halt"  la' 
German.  : 
It  is  clear  that  if  the  visitor, 
could  continue  westward  past 
the  barricade  he  would  emerge, 
.won  til  a  .low  but  prominent 
American  bui;d!r.£  with  radar 
equipment    on    the    root.    The; 
Seldom    has    an    ir.tcliccnccf-  ritij.,V;Sjirrro  .Jndcd  by  barbcd[ 
organization    executed    c.    morcj^      ond  cu:tl.dctl  cor.stantlv  by; 
;skillfu!  -and    difficult   operation |Amcri„R  soldiers.  Signs  in  Gcr- 
:than  that  accomplished  by  »nr'      n  Vi.nm:  ..-niry  mosl  stnctli 
tunnel's  depers:  \li£_ta»?P;rl5_P.I!forbidcen'."    ■ 
250    Communist    longdistance  |    A  stlldy  0j  the  nrM  .M;s~„t. 
.telephone  lines  runnm-  uisccr-;no  possibility  other  than  thai! 
Complex  Equipment  J 
Beyond  the  door  is  a  compart-} 
rr.er.t  seven  feet   lonz  housing 
equipment  to  maintain  certain.' 
.-round  in  Berlin..  The  iir.es  ap- -lnc  >adar  burins  encloses  thel^f  °rJ^^^°.^  ^Z{ 
parcntly  included  some  njr.nir.c:wcslcra  c,d  0;  the  t.ur.r.el.  |™-!ty.  The  C„mm„n.~s  -a,* 
to  Soviet  iatcihtest.ite  in  East- j  this   was   ncceu.i.y   to  project, 
■.err.   Europe,   as  wc'.i   as   Soviet]  C'.ay  Hauled  Away  jdcUcatc  equipment  sn  the  o„her-j 
;-\imy  circuits  it.  Germany.  ]    The  men  who  dus  the  tur.ncihvise  dnrik  and  cold  tunnel.  .. 
co< 
ijr.ack  liar  Thriven 
tur.r.ci. 
— obviously    labored    ■  nder 
twej     Fin: 
the  complex; 
Irnajor  handicaps.  Tney  had  roj  tapping  cnulpmrr.t.  «U  of  Amerl-'. 
The  tur.r.c!.  discovered  by  ihc  work  very  silently  to  avoid  dc-]caii  or  British  manufacturc- 
Corr.mur.ists  a  month  n-o 'ftr.d.tcction.  ar.ri  they  had  to  hauljThis  includes  cir.ht  r.ic'.cs  01 
■nov/  the  r.-.ain  si^htsecin-  at-'away  sccrcliy  the  thousand",  o'-boostcrs  to  carry  the  tapped  con- 
traction :r.  Berlin,  can  be  vis, led  ions  of  c'.ay  they  dup  out.  since'  vcrsation  bacV:  to  the  western 
.-.inntc  bic  piles  of  earth  near  the  scctorjer.d  0.'  the  tunnel  :-.r.d  also  to 
border"  wo«ild  have   nlertcd   the.'hclp    prevent  detection   ot    the 
by    inak-.r.s 
drive  from 
n    twer.ty- 
ic  ccn:cr  of .acr.ir 
<•-. 
\ps. 
"to  the  southeast  corner  of  the  Communists. 
cj._v  j    .Apparently 
"A"  mobile  snack  bar  is  dolnr.-e^h  w.ns  hauled  a-.vny  in  c'.osedjunits    nca 
a    ■.-.•.r.vin-    business  "near    iiic'l:"l:ck"s  brought  into   the  radar|,-cul|)rr.cr.: 
'eastern  cr.<i  of  the  tunnel.  catcr-l;^l!d;n=-     Possibly     the     same, communist 
'm.-.c 
■  rtclf^atior.s  biou"ht  to  see  ti 
There  ore  thicc  por.er-controi 
two   lonj    racks:  of 
into  which  the  ?.t>0 
lines     lead     from 
thrcn  main  cables.  "Tore  the  in- 
dividual '  monitoring    taps    arc 
made. "  Alnuiy  the  opposir*:  wallf 
of  the  tunnci  is  n.  row  oi  bcnclies.j 
with   fluorescent  liehtin;  over-) 
head.      "Tie     corr.par'.mep. 
J5l 
to    Hast    German    facioryV™"5  b0;:-'in  m  tiic  -^c-ons  efj 
c;ro:-rupp.tcd    iron    tubin-    whirrt 
"v.ovio:  ■■■American  S.-n3C.-ialisis."i:i:ie  ll;c  U;:^rl-  .Thn  "l™? 
,  After  inspecting  the  tur.r.ri.!sccr«y..!Tll!S'-  1,avJ  ur5?  ^  t0 
the  factory  workers  record  their:3™*  ^•;:1-  u?  oca  \^y  ..  ,. 
'-.nc  -nation-  in  a  visitors"  book.i  J"c  Commur.ssts  cstinaie  tn.v. 
i-i.e   boo^   contains   the.  tw?**  ?^ ,?:  -ne  ^olk  took  «v-|p3ln-.c«l  a  b.tt.esh.p  Cray. 
the  inonitorins:  cqulpmrr.t.   AP-  j=ompaum-,a   ihe-.c    :«    »«^ 
Inarcntly   this  had   to   be   dor.cist"*  .aMr-  °n  lr'c  "Vc™-'^1 
„_-  he'™--     ii-p     Corr-iiT;s'     i;:-rs,'if  it  .s  one  r.l.ire  ,m;>or..-jic  ii.;rn» 
feet  below  ihe  surf 3ceT^vas-q5c,br-oie     ''-c     ^-on-.mi.n.s   si 
.j        Can-.idor'-d  C.rcat  nxscris 
Sudanese  official  is  listed. 
-  The  _tunr.cl.    six    feet    in_ni-;2 
nh'.eirr  and  with  its  ioof  tweivei 
co; 
tunnel   Is   open   fo 
detachment '     of 
vis-lars.  AJIansconiparirncntatihccaslcrnitappin,.  raas.  ,llvc  b|.cn  iljnon  - 
munis4cnl,°-  t:ic  tunncl-    .,      .  _;the    Crcat  experts   in   the   f.cid.. 
«_o 
People's  Police 
cations   expert  are  on   hand  to1 
ci plain  every  detail. They  readily 
esp-'css 
nd  a  commuul-l     Thi5  compartment  begins  withlThcy 
their  admiration  for  the' 
;a  tiiick  steel  door  at  its  rvestern 
ntrancc.    On  tl-.c  door— 0.1 
he   tur.neVs  nicest   tauche 
rcmar-c.-io./    ti. 
ill  of 
-.2  project's  bullijrs.^ 
In 
d  .  n 
piece  or  work.  ;  - 
The  Cjmmimtstj  say   the  in-* 
stahatlon    oppirent'v    operated' 
una   oeri;.,.  ,,venl  ,3..._  .,>0.t,  -. 
oraWden  by_order-.s.avc.c?j-  ^^  ^  _Q  ^^^,^.1 
Ion  o:  ho?  it  r.-.T3  detcc'j-rf..     I 
^.Tittcn 
mm:  ""n'.ry 
of  the  Commanding  General,' 
r.usMan
ro 
<b 
ii^;jx^   ^vJ-ilv)   ooiJU.-cijicd     Press -'bureau 
_„■'  -   '  Barbed  wire   surrouncica   ;nc 
•  it-'   -VJjy    fc  ►  ■  :M : -' •,  i  ' -station    :.nd    its     permanent 
i'iiS     U:    £    ■"UiV^LLrtypchuilcIinss.  • 
chief. J 
democratic  republic?"   he; 
Barbed  wire   surrounded   the!  asked.  "  I 
Tens  n  Thank  You  •         j 
C  Watched  by  Yanks 
0:ir  answer,  in  hal;Ln^  Ccr-j 
man.    explained    that  owncr-j 
!- ^'IT^rF^  H?!?!  Plji    American  soldiers  in*  sentry  ship  of   the   tunnel   has    nit  • 
1   VV  i  &X3  i~.  iiL-ALiVi'^xes  watched  us.  thru    field;  been  established,  but  that  it;,-" 
boxes  watched  us.  thru   field-  been  established,  but  that  it; 
;lassc$  as  wc  sauntered  to-J  a  lirno  o£  »lcnsion  »  lhc  r;.hl. 
•"  ward  lhc  clearly  marked  com-" ncss  or  wronjjness  depended 
..  Lcr  o  u.  p.  ucpoi  iers  road>  bordcrin;  an  opcn  fiCid.l"p°a-lI«  .s,dc  of-  "»«  f«« 
,.         ~  r  "•     n  ' ;  Wc  could  sec  knots  of  Vonosi fro:n  wh;cn  lhc  opcralion  xvas 
>  lOUr    tene    hfiri>  vmmH  mn.mrlc  r.f  ,*-,-»•„  „vV,.l  Viewed. 
around  mounds  of  earth  cxca-| 
i"  '  '       .        .  vatcd  to  reveal  two  sections  of  |     be   snowed  uj   a    book   in. 
;     5Y  JOH.N  II.  THOMPSON*  .  the  tunnel.  .       .     I  
v']:ich    tunnel  •  visitors    were. 
5?v:v  >:,,.  •>«  __  >f- --/     Acrcss  the   aorder,  Voics-.     •"•  l0 -R.scvU!   d:c,r  °?'r-*. 
•  \r-e~"caT  tcv   e-   *r->-v'loc-<  "s  'a. their  CGir.n-.ar.dcr,  -°"s' -:ia:*"n-   -'■  "Ci(i   --S— *\ 
;   -— *   :.:_-*:i.:m    c.    Chinese,    Ivorcanv 
^German     communist     tommy 
•  ;'£unners.  •  '• 
C    Our  host. in  as  eerie  a  set- 
;tin-  as- was  ever  devised  by  a 
jack- 
wno 
•nfeld. 
ceclLm 
air  base  at 
The  commander," 
:d    to  ■  give    his . 
-mystery  writer,  was 
"  booted    officer    of    the    East 
■  German  communist  ^police,  the 
;."Vcpos,"  or  Volksnoiizci. 
•      Our  tour  was  the  third  per-  r,arac'  sl:d  l*r-at  215  telephone 
:nittcd  western  reporters  since  3:ncs  in  th:cc  biS  "blcs  were 
:  the  ni£ht  of   April   21    when  UPP^- 
Mho    Russian    high    command.;    fluorescent    3i2htina_.iUu-- 
hcre  announced  discovery  of" minatcd  V-swilchboird,"  banks! 
_  the  tunnel  and  equipment  it  o:-  current  boosters,  amp!  ' 
■said  was  used   for   wire    ts?-wfrers,  and  cables.   -All  instrar- 
ping.  ;  y-        •       • 
  
.  Since  then  the  "spy  tunnel," O:oris  ori  the  equipment  were- 
!  so  jabe'.cd  by  the  Piussisns  and  j 
in  English.^  Some  items  bore.' 
j  
East  Germans,  has  been  visJ  thc  labels  of  British, or  Arncri-' 
.' iicd  by  rriorc  than  15.000  East  i  can  nr.anufacturcres.      -  . 
tunnel.  ..  '        -wrote,  in  my  nandwrjunj;: 
Encased -in  steel  and 'con- J  " v/c  v,ish  l0  lhank  thc 
crcte  was  the  alleged. wire  tap  v°l^pobzci  very  much,  for 
"laboratory,"  directly  undcra'b.emS  :^ind,  enough  to  show  us- 
paved  road  leading  from  Bcr-  lhe  iunn0'-".       ^.-  '.-..      .:;  /^ 
iin  to  the  Ivu:siah  ai 
Chicago 
29  V3.-J  55 
i~i  buna 
;  German    worker    delegations, ! 
;th'e  Communists  said.        ■<  . 
;        Germans  Admire  Feat       i  v-itcr  to  an    air    conditioning: 
i      Situated  in  lino  with  an  ex-'"11'*-    O'hcr 
Rcds  Man  Guns 
Pumps  sent    hot    and 
cold-: 
pcrimcntal     American     army'0'1  or ' 
on3  JTipcs    held. 
air.     The    tunnel    was* 
raciar    station,  [the    Russian's!  n'^c  °'  ^oltcd  sections  of  enr-1 
say  it  is    a    dummy],   o-.vr.er-j  runted    steel,    lined    on    the,' 
ship    of    the    tunnel   has  ■  r.ot ;.sidcs  wit'n  sandbags. 
lK 
.  or  in  V/ashinston. 
/est    Berlir.crs    arc 
the   tunnel         
:bccn  officially  admitted  by}'  talking  back  GOO  yards,  we 
' the  American  command  he;eircac-cd  ::"e  cast-west  border.! 
j  
There' behind   sandbags    two: 
con-'^^S   Vopos    crouched   with' 
'vinccd  '  the    Americans  built  !'"'e'r    £uns    snd    a     powerful1 
the  tunnel,  equipped  it  with'- scar':"'-Sht,  aimed  up  the  tun-- 
"'expensive  apparatus,  and  then  nc'  under  thc  American  seiy 
'listened  in  on  Red  army  tel-I lor-  -   "  .' 
•cphonc  conversations  .  sinc'el  Outside  again, _  the  '  com-',. 
'the  summer  of  195-i.  '  •  !  mandcr  asked  us  what  would: 
i     To  lhc^\,  it  was  an  astound-!'00  ihc'  reaction  in  the  United 
Inn   feat,    whioh  "'has   sreatiyi  S'LatCs  if  {h&  Canadians  or  Mcx- 
•  enhanced   American   prcsti^eJ 1QZ7li    /rove  --such     a     "spy 
.-The    boldness    of    burrowing tunnciv. undcr    our    borders. 
'u..acr  the  Russian  r.a:es.  and  Wc  ,si:d.  thc  Amcrfcans  would 
.its  "technical   accomplishment,  i'?,-",'C!}':iZ>??'J'''  "bout.  it.  ; 
'"nave  captured  the  ima^inatidn  ^"*Is  sl  right .  pr   wrong    fur 
:.of.  many  Germans.  ,  />rr'cr^ni.l°.  do-  this  .junder 
hi  of 
1"-;. 
/>..Q 
Ao  one  expected  a  si 
i  the  tunnel  .today   when
APPENDIX  D 
MOTE :   This  analysis  was  prepared  by  the  | 
staff  as  part  of  the  wrap-up  of  the  operation. 
ROUND-UP  OF  EAST  GERMAN  PRESS 
REACTION  TO  THE  DISCOVERY  OF  THE 
WIRETAP  TUNNEL  AT  THE  BERLIN  SECTOR  BORDER 
(Sources  as  Indicated) 
The  following  is  an  analysis  of  the  East  German  press 
reaction  to  the  discovery  of  the  wiretap  tunnel  at  the  sector 
border  between  '.Vest  and  East  Berlin.   During  the  period  under 
review  -  24  to  26  April  1958  -  a  total  of  31  dailies  per  day 
and  four  weeklies  were  available  for  scrutiny;  however,  only 
the  dailies  reported  and  commented  on  the  incident. 
Mostly  concerned  with  reporting  and  commenting  on  the 
incident  were  the  East  Berlin  papers  which,  in  some  instances, 
devoted  full  pages  of  their  local  sections  to  rep-,  ;s  and  pic- 
tures on  the  tunnel  in  addition  to  their  front-page  or  second- 
page  accounts  of  developments.   The  provincial  press  gave  front- 
page treatment  to  the  matter  only  in  few  instances,  generally 
refrained  from  large  articles  or   commentaries,  and  often 
carried  pictorial  material  with  only  brief  explanations.   The 
least  coverage  was  noted  in  the  provincial  press  of  other
than  SED  (Sozialistische  Einheitspartei  Deutschiands  - 
Communist  Party  Germany)  affiliation;  none  of  these  papers 
published  any  commentary,  or  any  cartoon  of  their  own,  on 
the  subject  up  to  26  April,  in  fact. 
Describing  the  tunnel  as  inspected  by  the  journalists 
after  the  Soviet  press  conference,  the  papers  pointed  out 
that  the  installation  was  well  designed  and  constructed,  that, 
the  installation  was  costly  and  equivalent  to  a  modern  teler 
phone  exchange,  and  that  the  material  -  of  British  and  Ameri- 
can origin  -  used  in  the  installation  was  of  such  quality  as 
to  guarantee  long  service. 
The  East  Berlin  papers,  which  were  leading  in  the  reports 
on  the  issue,  treated  the  matter  as  a  "bitterly  serious  inci- 
dent" which  represents  an  "international  scandal"  and  a 
i 
"breach  of  the  norms  of  international  law."  The  papers,  in 
their  commentaries,  addressed  the  West  Berlin  Senat,  demand- 
ing an  all-Berlin  understanding  and  stressing  the  necessity 
for  united  action,  and  insinuated  that  Berlin  is  being  kept 
divided  merely  for  the  purpose  of  providing  the  espionage 
centers  in  IVest  Berlin  with  a  base  for  launching  provocations 
against  the  GBR.   Other  commentaries  by  central  and  provincial 
papers  contained  calls  for  vigilance  and  for  defense  prepared- 
ness.  Only  one  paper  printed  an  editorial  on  the  incident. 
In  commenting  on  the  incident  the  press  did  not  draw  a  line
between  the  different  developments,  such  as  the  press  confer- 
ence, the  Soviet  protest,  the  GDR  Government  protest,  etc., 
but,  as  a  rule,  the  commentaries  dealt  with  the  incident  as 
a  whole.   Later,  when  the  first  reaction  of  the  West  Berlin 
press  was  available,  the  central  press  swooped  down  upon  the 
West  Berlin  press  for  attempting  to  belittle  the  incident  and 
to  divert  attention  from  the  "seriousness  of  the  matter." 
The  few  caricatures  published  by  the  papers  were  designed 
to  slander  the  Americans. 
Day  by  Day  Reaction 
24  April  1955 
On  24  April  1S56  six  East  Berlin  papers  printed  the  ADN 
(Allegemeines  Beutsches  Nachrichten  Bureau  -  General  German 
News  Office)  release  of  individual  reports  on  the  Soviet  press 
conference,  reported  on  the  inspection  of  the  tunnel  by  the 
journalists,  and  carried  excerpts  from  General  Zarenko's  letter 
of  protest  (1  -  6) .   DER  MORGEN  and  BERLINER  ZEITUNG  (5  and  6) 
printed  only  the  abbreviated  version  of  the  ADN  release.   Six 
provincial  SED  papers  (7  -  12)  carried  announcements  of  the 
discovery,  brief  reports  on  the  press  conference,  and  merely 
an  announcement  to  the  effect  that  a  letter  of  protest  has 
been  sent  to  the  American  Chief  of  Staff.   Only  NEUER  TAG, 
7rankfurt/0der,  printed  the  long  version  of  the  ADN  release (12)
\ 
•Provincial  papers  of  other  party  affiliations  carried  no 
reports. 
25  April  1956  .   ;  .    •' 
On  25  April  22  provincial  papers  came  out  with  the  ADN 
version  of  the  report  on  the  discovery  of  the  tunnel  (13  -  34); 
the  six  provincial  SED  papers  which  had  carried  a  brief  announce- 
ment the  day  before  followed  up  their  reports  by  more  extensive 
accounts  of  the  press  conference,  the  letter  of  protest,  and 
the  inspection  of  the  tunnel  (13  -  18)  .      Papers  of  other  party 
affiliations  joined  in  the  reporting  campaign  on  this  day. 
Only  MAERKISCHE  VOLKSSTIMME,  of  all  provincial  papers,  published 
an  "eye-witness"  report  containing  a  description  oS:    the  tunnel 
and  quoting  individuals  who  had  voiced  their  "outrage  at  such 
a  thing"  which  produces  new  material  for  conflicts  in  foreign' 
policy  (16).   SCHWERINER  VOLKSZEITUNG,  which  printed  the  long 
version  of  the  ADN  release,  reproduced  the  first  picture  of 
the  tunnel  (22). 
Meanwhile  the  central  press,  in  addition  to  supplementary 
reports  on  the  discovery  of  the  tunnel,  descriptions  of  the 
tunnel,  and  pictorial  material  showing  sections  of  the  tunnel 
such  as  the  amplifier  station,  etc.,  came  out  with  the  first 
commentaries.   A  total  of  five  commentaries  appeared  on  this 
day.   The  press  treated  the  matter  as  a  "bitterly  serious 
affair"  which  represents  an  "international  scandal"  and  a
"breach  of  the  norms  of  international  law,"  pointing  out  that 
the  United  States  violated  the  Buenos  Aires  Treaty  on  Telecom- 
munications on  the  one  hand* and  the  GDR's  sovereignty  on  the 
other  hand  (35-  39).   NEUES  DEUTSCHLAND  spoke  of  a  new, 
hitherto  unsurpassed  "gangster  act"  of  the  U.S.  secret  service 
(35),  NATIONAL  ZEITUNG  termed  the  incident  as  a  "sensational 
international  scandal"  (36),  NEUE  ZEIT  stressed  that  there  is 
no  word  "strong  enough  to  brand  such  wickedness"  (38) ,  and 
JUNGS  WELT  declared  that  "this  had  to  happen  just  to  those 
who  always  babble  about  Communist  infiltration  but  can  never 
prove  it"  (39) .   All  commentaries  were  addressed  to  the  Vest 
Berlin  Senat,  demanding  an  all-Berlin  understanding  for  the 
purpose  of  discontinuing  the  "stubborn  adherence  to  NATO 
policy,"  achieving  the  withdrawal  of  the  "cold  war  experts  of 
all  shades,"  dissolving  the  espionage  centers  in  the  "frontier 
city,"  and  achieving  a  "normalization  in  the  situation  in 
Berlin."   Three  papers  reported  on  a  meeting  held  by  the 
National  Front  at  Alt-Glienicke ,  at  which  the  population  adopted 
a  resolution  protesting  against  this  "provocation."  Franz 
Fischer,  First  Secretary  of  the  Kreis  Treptow  SED  Executive 
Board,  was  reported  to  have  said  at  the  meeting  that  the 
people  of  West  Germany  and  West  Berlin  have  to  pay  for  this 
installation  through  the  occupation  costs  and  to  have  termed 
the  tunnel  as  "an  appendix  of  the  cold  war"  (33,  40,  and  41).
i 
TRIBUENE,  moreover,  referred  to  a  report  by  the  HAMBURGER 
ANZEIGER  to  underscore  the  fact  that  the  installations  in  the 
tunnel  were  not  of  provisional  nature  but  designed  for  long 
service  (40).   DER  MORGEN,  describing  the  tunnel,  added  that 
West  German  correspondents  who  inspected  the  tunnel  noted  with 
satisfaction  the  declaration  of  the  Sovie  Lieutenant  Colonel 
that  "quite  obviously,  German  quarters  have  no  part  ia  this"  .  - 
(41),  while  NATIONAL  ZEITUNG  briefly  referred  to  an  announce- 
ment made  at  the  Alt-Glienicke  meeting  to  the  effect  that  the 
tv.nnel  was  open  for  public  inspection  (38). 
NEUES  DEUTSCHLAND  reproduced  the  first  caricature  on  the 
i::sue.   The  cartoon  showed  a  garden  which  is  divided  into  two 
parts  by  a  sign  indicating  the  "Democratic  Sector"  -  full  of 
flowers,  and  the  opposite  side  -  a  barren  piece  of  land  with 
a  molehill  topped  by  a  flag  with  the  dollar  sign.   A  strong 
arm  is  pulling  out  of  a  hole  in  the  Democratic  Sector  a  mole 
wearing  "U.S."-marked  earphones,  some  sort  "of  Army  trousers 
with  plugs  and  pliers  showing  from  the  pocket,  and  a  U.S. 
Army  cap  bearing  the  legend  "Espionage."   The  cartoon  is 
captioned,  "Do  Not  Burrow  in  Other  People's  Yards"  (35). 
25  April  1956 
On  26  April  27  papers  continued  reporting  on  the  issue 
(42  -  33) .   In  17  instances  the  reports  were  supplemented 
with  pictures  as  outlined  above.   A  total  of  15  papers 
I
! 
■  printed  the  text  of,  or  large  excerpts  from,  the  press  release 
on  the  GDR  Government  protest  (42  -  56) .   Six  papers  reported 
on  the  inspection  of  the  tunnel  by  the  population,  the  press, 
and  representatives  of  the  diplomatic  corps  (42,  49,  59,  60, 
65,  and  67).   Four  papers  referred  to  a  report  carried  by  the 
West  Berlin  TAGESSPIEGEL  according  to  which  Western  journalists 
were  prohibited  from  inspecting  the  mouth  of  the  tunnel  on  the 
Western  side  (42,  43,  51,  and  53),  and  four  papers  referred 
to  FRANKFURTER  ALLGEMEINE  which  had  spoken  of  an  "eloquent 
silence"  about  the  affair  on  the  part  of  the  Americans  (42,  51, 
55,  and  5S) .   A  total  of  four  papers  reported  on  the  Ait- 
Glienicke  meeting  (51,  60,  61,  and  57).   NEUES  DEUTSCHLAND 
gave  excerpts  from 'Fisher 's  speech,  quoting  him  to  the  effect 
that  the  people  of  West  3erlin,  in  particular  the   S?D  members, 
will  be  invited  to  inspect  the  tunnel  (51) .   Three  papers  re- 
produced caricatures  (51,  52,  and  56),  six  papers  carried., 
co-mentaries  (51,  52,  53,  54,  57,  and  58),  and  one  paper  came 
out  with  an  editorial  (55).   Three  East  Berlin  papers,  through 
their  commentaries,  swooped  down  upon  the  West  Berlin  press 
for  its  attitude  toward  the  incident.   NEUES  DSUTSCHLAND 
accused  the  West  Berlin  papers  of  attempting  to  belittle  the 
incident  and  of  lauding  the  efficiency  of  the  American  "goblins," 
adding  that  the  West  Berlin  press  is  thus  making  vain  attempts 
to  divert  attention  from  the  seriousness  of  the  matter  (51,.
JUNGE  WELT  lashed  out  at  the  West  Berlin  DER  TAG,  saying  that, 
by  its  opinion,  the  West  Berlin  paper  manifests  its  total  loss 
of  any  sense  of  decency.   Besides,  DER  TAG  is  not  in  the  least 
disturbed  about  the  violation  also  of  West  Berlin' 3  territory 
(52) .   NATIONAL  ZEITUNG  held  that  DER  TAG  now  admitted  what  it 
has  been  denying  at  all  times,  namely  that  West  Berlin  is  a 
de  facto  part  of  NATO,  adding  that  DER  '..AG  now  regards  as    ,  
■ 
"customary"  the  military  espionage  of  the  United  States  on 
GDR  territory  in  addition  to  the  "customary  frontier-city 
policy,"  the  "customary"  partition,  and  the  "customary" 
diversionist  activities  of  the  KGU  and  other  underworld 
organizations.   The  paper  stressed  that  all  Beriiners  fully 
agree  with  the  FRANKFURTER' ALLGEMEINE  which  said  that  the 
people  must  demand  the  discontinuation  of  "such  things"  (58). 
NEUS  2EIT,  carrying  the  only  editorial,  said  that  the  wire- 
tapping post  is  a  feature  of  West  Berlin's  misuse  as  a  NATO 
base.   The  paper  emphasized  that  GDR  policy  will  continue  to 
serve  all-German  understanding  and  relaxation  of  international 
tensions.   "But  it  must  be  kept  in  mind  that  the  success  of 
this  policy  will  not  only  depend  on  the  volume  of  the  appeal 
for  peace  but  also  on  our  preparedness  to  defend  our  homeland 
as  well  as  on  our  vigilance  regarding  the  prevention  of  dan- 
gers resulting  from  the  fact  that  one  part  of  Berlin  has  be- 
come a  frontier  city  against  peace,"  the  paper  added.   "What
we  need  are  contact  points  above  the  ground  and  in  full 
light,  namely  all-German  talks,  and  not  underground  trenches 
in  the  cold  war"  (55). 
The  first  commentaries  carried  by  provincial  papers  dealt 
with  the  incident  as  an  example  of  proof  for  East  German  press 
reports  on  hostile  espionage.   VOLKSSTIMME,  Karl-Marx-Stadt, 
pointed  out  that  the  tunnel  represents  "a  document"  which  is 
quite  apt  to  dispel  all  doubts  of  those  who  have  hitherto 
been  inclined  to  regard  East  German  press  reports  about  the 
underground  activities  of  Western  espionage  services  as 
"exaggerated"  (57).   MAERKISCHE  VOLKSSTIMME  quoted  several 
workers  who  voiced  their  indignation  over  "such  a  vileness" 
which  makes  German  unity  more  difficult  to  demonstrate  that 
the  "Western  side"  is  just  as  quiet  about  this  "unpleasant 
affair"  as  the  population  is  outraged  (53).   And  LEIPZ.IGER 
VOLKSZEITTJNG  stressed  that  anyone  reading  about  the  discovery 
of  the  tunnel  will  inevitably  weigh  the  Soviet  attempts  at 
maintaining  peace  against  the  efforts  made  by  the  U.S.  espio- 
nage service,  adding  that  this  "breach  of  international  law" 
also  places  the  West  Berlin  administration  "in  a  peculiar 
light."   The  paper  reminded  its  readers  that  war  preparation, 
which  '.'formerly  marched  on  Prussian  Army  boots,"  is  now 
marching  on  "American  rubber  soles,  chewing  gum,  and  tapping 
telephone  lines"  (54) .
\ 
NEUES  DEUTSCHLAND's  caricature  showed  an  American  soldier  try- 
ing in  vain  to  "milk"  a  disconnected,  oversized  telephone  re- 
ceiver into  a  bucket  marked  "CIC"  while  another  soldier  is 
thoughtfully  standing  by  (51).   JUNGE  WELT  reproduced  a  car- 
toon showing  a  mole  wearing  a  U.S.  Army  cap  on  its  head  and 
a  telephone  receiver  on  its  back  halting  before  a  sign  which 
warns  that  "spies  are  now  facing  danger."   The  cartoon  is   ,  - 
captioned,  "The  Underworld  that  Shuns  the  Light,"  and  foot- 
noted, "Damned,  we  did  not  put  up  that  sign"  (52).   FREIES 
WORT  showed  rats  wearing  U.S.  Army  caps  being  disturbed  by 
a  Russian  soldier  in  the  operation  of  what  looks  like  a 
communication  center.   Two  rats  are  shewn  facing  the  soldier 
in  surprise,  another  standing  with  arms  raised,  and  still 
another  escaping  through  an  opening  in  the  wall.   The 
caricature  is  entitled,  "Unpleasant  Surprise,"  and  footnoted, 
"It  is  an  Effrontery  of  the  Russians  to  Disturb  Us  in  Our 
(3urrowing)  Work"  (55) . 
10.
SOURCES 
1956 
4, 
5, 
Q 
10. 
12. 
14, 
"_6 
!.9 
:":"0. 
22. 
25. 
2i 
30, 
31. 
32, 
34. 
35. 
38. 
40, 
NEUES  DEUTSCHLAND 
NEUE  ZEIT 
TRIBUENE 
NATIONAL  ZEITUNG 
DER  MORGEN 
BERLINER  ZEITUNG 
FREIHEIT 
SAECHSISCHE  ZEITUNG 
VOLKSSTIMME,  Karl-Marx-Stadt 
MAERKISCHE  VOLKSSTIMME 
LSIPZIGSR  VOLKSZEITUNG 
NEUER  TAG 
FREIHEIT 
SAECKSISCKE  ZEITUNG 
VOLKSSTIMME,  Karl-Marx-Stadt 
MAEEX I SCKE  VOLKSSTIMME 
LEIPZIGER  VOLKSZEITUNG 
NEUER  TAG 
LAUSITZER  RUNDSCHAU 
VOLKSSTIMME,  Magdeburg 
DAS  VOLK,  Erfurt 
SCHWERINER  VOLKSZEITUNG 
FREIE  ERDE 
OSTSEE  ZEITUNG 
VOLKSV.'ACHT 
FREIES  WORT 
SAECHSICHES  TAGE3LATT 
DIE  UNION 
NORDDEUTSCHE  NEUESTE  NACHRICHTSN 
MAERKISCHE  UNION 
SRANDEN3URGISCHE  NEUESTE  NA3BR . 
BAUERN  ECHO 
DER  NEUE  WEG 
LIBERAL  DEMOKRATISCHS  ZEITUNG 
NEUES  DEUTSCHLAND 
NATIONAL  ZEITUNG 
BERLINER  ZEITUNG 
NEUE  ZEIT 
JUNGE  WELT 
TRIBUENE 
DER  MORGEN 
24  Apr 
24  Apr 
24  Apr 
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24  ADr 
24  Apr 
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42. 
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I  65 
DO  . 
BERLINER  ZEITUNG 
SAECHSISCHE  ZEITUNG 
DAS  VOLK,  Erfurt 
NEUER  TAG 
FREIHEIT 
DER  MORGEN 
TRIBUENE 
BAUERN  ECHO 
DER  NEUE  WEG 
NEUES  DEUTSCHLAND 
JUNGE  WELT 
MAERKISCHE  VOLKSSTIMME 
LEIPZIGER  VOLKSZEITUNG 
NEUE  ZEIT 
ERE IE S  WORT 
VOLKSSTIMME,  Karl-Marx-Stadt 
NATIONAL  ZEITUNG 
VOLKSSTIMME,  Magdeburg 
MAERKISCHE  UNION 
FREI.E  ERDE 
LEIPZIGER  VOLKSZEITUNG 
VOLK3Y/ACHT 
SAECHSISCHES  TAGEBLATT 
OSTSEE  ZEITUNG 
LAUSITZER  RUNDSCHAU 
DIE  UNION 
3CHWERINER  VOLKSZEITUNG 
26  ^pr 
26  A^r 
26  Ap-r 
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