This    document    downgraded    Co 
UNCLASSIFIED    by    authority    of        mSBUSOIHUmBag^  DCID  No.  1/14 
Sec    3(B)  ,E0    11652,    on/^^L.         ""  (New  Series) 
tby    2  46321. 
DIRECTOR  OF  CENTRAL  INTELLIGENCE  DIRECTIVE  NO.   1/14 
UNIFORM  PERSONNEL  SECURITY  STANDARDS  AND  PRACTICES 
GOVERNING  ACCESS  TO  SENSITIVE  COMPARTMENTED  INFORMATION  l 
(Effective  1  July  1968*) 
Pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  NSCID  No.  1  (New  Series,  revised  4  March 
1964),  paragraph  2,  subparagraph  a.  (5)  and  in  order  to  ensure  uniform 
protection  of  sensitive  compartmented  information,  the  following  per- 
sonnel security  standards  and  practices  are  established  for  all  United 
States  Government  civilian  and  military  personnel,  Government  con- 
sultants, and  employees  of  Government  contractors  who  require  access 
to  sensitive  compartmented  information  or  to  information  which  reveals 
the  manner,  methods  and  operational  details  by  which  sensitive  com- 
partmented information  is  collected.  The  standards  and  practices  estab- 
lished herein  are  to  be  considered  minimal  and  the  departments  and 
agencies  may  establish  internally  such  additional  security  steps  as  may 
be  considered  necessary  and  appropriate  to  ensure  that  effective  security 
is  maintained.  Access  to  sensitive  compartmented  information  shall  be 
(  under  the  strictest  application  of  the  "need-to-know"  principle  and  in 
full  accordance  with  the  existing  authorities  and  regulations  which 
govern  access  thereto. 
Purpose 
1.  The  continued  protection  of  sensitive  compartmented  information 
within  any  one  participating  agency  or  among  Government  contractors 
affects  and  is  a  matter  of  serious  security  concern  to  all  participating 
agencies.  The  provisions  of  this  Directive  shall  apply  to  all  persons 
under  the  jurisdiction  or  cognizance  of  the  Executive  Branch,  without 
regard  to  civilian  or  military  status,  form  of  employment,  official  rank 
or  position,  or  length  of  service.  The  establishment  of  uniform  person- 
nel security  standards  and  practices  as  well  as  continuing  security  pro- 
grams should  enhance  the  security  protection  of  such  information  and 
at  the  same  time  facilitate  the  security  certification  process  among 
xThe  term  "Sensitive  compartmented  information"  as  used  in  this  Directive  is 
intended  to  include  all  information  and  materials  bearing  special  community 
controls  indicating  restricted  handling  within  present  and  future  community 
intelligence  collection  programs  and  their  end  products  for  which  community 
systems  of  compartmentation  have  been  or  will  be  formally  established.  The 
term  does  not  include  Restricted  Data  as  denned  in  Section  11,  Public  Law  585, 
Atomic  Energy  Act  of  1954,  as  amended. 
•  This  directive  supersedes  DCID  1/14,  approved  23  June  1967. 
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Government  departments  and  agencies  when  access  to  sensitive  com- 
partmented  information  is  required. 
2.  Individuals  who  do  not  meet  the  minimum  security  criteria  con- 
tained herein  and  who  are,  therefore,  denied  access  to  sensitive  compart- 
mented  information  shall  not,  solely  for  this  reason,  be  considered  in- 
eligible for  access  to  other  classified  information.  However,  individuals 
whose  access  to  sensitive  compartmented  information  has  been  author- 
ized as  an  exception  granted  in  accordance  with  paragraph  5,  shall  not 
solely  for  that  reason  be  considered  eligible  for  access  to  other  classified 
information. 
Personnel  Security  Approval  Criteria 
3.  Criteria  for  security  approval  of  an  individual  on  a  need-to-know 
basis  for  access  to  sensitive  compartmented  information  are  as  follows: 
a.  The  individual  shall  be  stable,  of  excellent  character  and  discre- 
tion and  of  unquestioned  loyalty  to  the  United  States. 
b.  Except  where  there  is  a  compelling  need  and  a  determination 
has  been  made  by  competent  authority  as  described  in  paragraph  5 
below  that  every  reasonable  assurance  has  been  obtained  that  under 
the  circumstances  the  security  risk  is  negligible. 
(1)  Both  the  individual  and  the  members  of  his  immediate  family 
shall  be  U.S.  citizens.  For  these  purposes,  "immediate  family"  is 
defined  as  including  the  individual's  spouse,  parents,  brothers,  sisters 
and  children. 
(2)  The  members  of  the  individual's  family  and  those  persons  to 
whom  he  is  bound  by  affection  or  obligation  should  neither  be  sub- 
ject to  physical,  mental  and  other  forms  of  duress  by  a  foreign 
power  nor  advocate  the  use  of  force  or  violence  to  overthrow  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  nor  the  alteration  of  the  form  of 
Government  of  the  United  States  by  unconstitutional  means. 
4.  When  there  is  compelling  need  to  grant  access  to  sensitive  com- 
partmented information  prior  to  completion  of  the  full  prescribed  in- 
vestigation, such  investigative  checks  as  are  immediately  possible  shall 
be  made  at  once,  and  shall  include  a  personal  interview  by  trained 
security  or  counterintelligence  personnel  whenever  feasible.  Access  in 
such  cases  shall  be  strictly  controlled,  and  the  full  prescribed  investiga- 
tion and  final  evaluation  shall  be  completed  at  the  earliest  practicable 
moment. 
Exceptions 
5.  The  exceptions  to  paragraph  3.b.  (1)  (2)  above  may  be  granted  only 
by  the  Senior  Intelligence  Officer  of  the  parent  organization  represented 
on  the  United  States  Intelligence  Board  (USIB),  including  military  de- 
partments, or  his  designee,  unless  such  authority  has  been  specifically 
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delegated  to  the  head  of  an  office  or  organization  as  set  forth  in  inter- 
departmental agreements.  All  exceptions  granted  will  be  a  common 
sense  determination  based  on  all  available  information,  and  shall  be 
recorded  by  the  agency  making  the  exception.  In  those  cases  in  which 
the  individual  has  lived  outside  of  the  United  States  for  a  substantial 
period  of  his  life,  a  thorough  assessment  of  the  adequacy  of  the  investiga- 
tion in  terms  of  fulfillment  of  the  minimum  investigative  requirements, 
and  a  judicious  review  of  the  information  therein  must  be  made  before 
an  exception  is  considered. 
Investigative  Requirements 
6.  The  investigation  conducted  on  an  individual  under  consideration 
for  access  to  sensitive  compartmented  information  shall  be  thorough  and 
shall  be  designed  to  develop  information  as  to  whether  the  individual 
clearly  meets  the  above  Personnel  Security  Approval  Criteria. 
7.  The  investigation  shall  be  accomplished  through  personal  interviews 
by  trained  investigative  personnel  and  shall  establish  affirmatively  to  the 
adjudicating  agency  complete  continuity  of  identity  to  include  birth, 
residences,  education,  emloyments  and  military  service.  Where  the 
circumstances  of  a  case  indicate,  the  investigation  shall  exceed  the  basic 
requirements  set  out  below  to  ensure  th*.t  those  responsible  for  adju- 
dicating access  eligibility  have  in  their  possession  all  the  relevant  facts 
available. 
(  8.  During  the  course  of  the  investigation  the  individual  shall  furnish 
a  signed  personal  history  statement  and  a  certificate  of  non-affiliation 
with  those  organizations  designated  by  the  Attorney  General  pursuant 
to  Executive  Order  10450.  Fingerprints  of  a  quality  acceptable  to  the 
Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  shall  be  obtained.  Photographs  of  the 
individual  shall  also  be  obtained  where  additional  corroboration  of 
identity  is  required. 
9.  The  individual  under  investigation  shall  be  given  a  personal  inter- 
view by  trained  security  or  counterintelligence  personnel  whenever 
feasible. 
10.  Minimum  standards  for  the  investigation  are  as  follows: 
a.  Verification  of  date  and  place  of  birth  and  citizenship  of  the 
individual. 
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b.  Check  of  the  subversive  and  criminal  files  of  the  Federal  Bureau 
of  Investigation,  including  submission  of  fingerprint  charts,  and  other 
national  agencies  as  appropriate.  An  additional  check  of  Immigra- 
tion and  Naturalization  Service  records  shall  be  made  if  members  of 
the  individual's  immediate  family  are  other  than  United  States  citizens 
by  birth. 
c.  Local  checks  in  all  areas  of  the  United  States  where  the  individual 
has  resided  for  at  least  six  (6)  months  during  the  past  fifteen  years 
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or  since  age  eighteen,  whichever  is  the  shorter  period.    Such  period 
of  coverage  shall  include  the  following: 
(1)  Check  of  police  and  credit  records. 
(2)  Interviews  with  neighbors  at  present  residence  regardless  of 
duration  and,  to  the  extent  considered  to  "be  productive  and  practical, 
any  other  address  at  which  the  individual  has  resided. 
cL  Confirmation  of  all  employment  during  the  past  fifteen  years  or 
since  age  eighteen,  whichever  is  the  shorter  period.  Personal  inter- 
views with  supervisors  and  co-workers  who  had  personal  contact  with 
the  individual  shall  be  accomplished  to  the  extent  possible  and  prac- 
tical. 
e.  Attendance  at  institutes  of  higher  learning  or  at  the  most  recently 
attended  secondary  school  shall  be  verified  in  all  instances.  During 
these  inquiries  collateral  verification  of  prior  educational  records  shall 
be  made  and  personal  interviews  with  faculty  members  who  had  per- 
sonal contact  with  the  individual  shall  be  accomplished  to  the  extent 
possible  and  practical. 
f.  Review  of  appropriate  military  records.  . 
g.  Interviews  with  a  sufficient  number  of  personal  references  given 
by  the  individual  and  with  a  minimum  of  two  other  persons  who  can 
furnish  information  on  the  basis  of  personal  knowledge  concerning 
the  individual's  character,  discretion  and  loyalty. 
h.  When  employment,  education  or  residence,  except  U.S.  Govern-  ( 
ment  service,  has  occurred  overseas  during  the  past  fifteen  years,  or 
since  age  eighteen,  a  check  of  the  records  will  be  made  at  the  Passport 
Office/Department  of  State,  Central  Intelligence  Agency  and  other 
appropriate  agencies.  Efforts  shall  be  made  to  develop  informants 
who  knew  the  individual  overseas  in  order  to  cover  employment,  edu- 
cation or  residence  during  this  period. 
L  The  spouse  of  the  individual  and  members  of  the  immediate  family 
shall  be  investigated  to  the  extent  necessary  and  appropriate  to  permit 
affirmative  determination  by  the  adjudicating  agency  that  the  provi- 
sions of  paragraph  3,  Personnel  Security  Approval  Criteria,  above,  are 
met.  In  all  cases,  the  spouse  shall  be  checked  through  the  subversive 
files  of  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  and  other  national  agencies, 
as  appropriate. 
Previous  Investigation 
11.  Where  a  previous  investigation  has  been  conducted  within  the  past 
five  years  which  substantially  meets  the  above  minimum  standards,  it 
may  serve  as  a  basis  for  granting  access  approval  provided  a  review  of  the 
personnel  and  security  files  does  not  reveal  substantive  changes  in  the 
individual's  security  eligibility.  If  a  previous  investigation  does  not 
substantially  meet  the  minimum  standards  or  if  it  is  more  than  five  years 
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old,  a  current  investigation  shall  be  required  but  may  be  limited  to  that 
necessary  to  bring  the  individual's  file  up  to  date  in  accordance  with  the 
investigative  requirements  set  forth  in  paragraph  4,  above.  Should  new 
information  be  developed  during  the  current  investigation  which  bears 
unfavorably  u^on  the  individual's  activities  covered  by  the  previous 
investigation,  the  current  inquiries  shall  be  expanded  as  necessary  to 
develop  full  details  of  this  new  information. 
Evaluation 
12.  The  evaluation  of  the  information  developed  by  investigation  on 
an  individual's  loyalty  and  suitability  shall  be  performed  by  analysts  of 
broad  knowledge,  good  judgment  and  wide  experience  in  security  and 
counterintelligence.  When  all  other  information  developed  on  an  in- 
dividual is  favorable,  a  minor  investigative  requirement  which  has  not 
been  met  will  not  preclude  favorable  adjudication.  In  all  evaluations 
the  protection  of  the  national  interest  is  paramount.  Any  doubt  con- 
cerning personnel  having  access  to  sensitive  compartmented  information 
shall  be  resolved  in  favor  of  the  national  security.  The  ultimate  deter- 
mination of  whether  the  granting  of  access  is  clearly  consistent  with  the 
interests  of  national  security  shall  be  an  over-all  common  sense  deter- 
mination based  on  all  available  information. 
Security  Programs 
13.  In  order  to  facilitate  the  attainment  of  the  highest  standard  of 
personnel  security  and  to  augment  both  the  access  approval  criteria  and 
the  investigative  requirements  established  by  this  Directive,  member 
departments  and  agencies  shall  institute  continuing  Security  Programs 
for  all  individuals  having  access  to  compartmented  information.  In 
addition  to  security  indoctrinations,  these  programs  shall  be  tailored  to 
create  mutually  supporting  procedures  under  which  no  issue  will  escape 
notice  or  be  left  unresolved  which  brings  into  question  an  individual's 
loyalty  and  integrity  or  suggests  the  possibility  of  his  being  subject  to 
undue  influence  or  duress  through  foreign  relationships  or  exploitable 
personal  conduct.  When  an  individual  is  assigned  to  perform  sensitive 
compartmented  work  requiring  access  to  sensitive  compartmented  infor- 
mation and  operations,  the  department,  agency  or  Government  program 
to  which  he  is  assigned  shall  assume  a  continuing  security  and  counter- 
intelligence responsibility  for  that  individual  throughout  the  period  of 
his  assignment. 
14.  The  Security  Programs  shall  include  the  following: 
a.  Security  Education  Programs  to  ensure  that  individuals  who  are 
granted  access  to  sensitive  compartmented  information  are  initially 
and  periodically  thereafter  indoctrinated  as  to  its  unique  sensitivity 
and  that  they  understand  their  personal  responsibility  for  its  protec- 
tion.   These  indoctrinations  should  be  conducted  by  individuals  having 
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extensive  background  and  experience  regarding  the  nature  and  special 
vulnerabilities  of  the  particular  type  of  compartmented  information 
involved. 
*  These  include  pertinent  provisions  of  the  Clearance  Standards  and  Investiga- 
tion, and  Evaluation  sections  of  DCID  6/3. 
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b.  Security  Supervisory  Programs  to  ensure  that  supervisory  per- 
sonnel recognize  and  discharge  their  special  responsibility  for  main- 
taining the  security  of  sensitive  information.  Such  programs  shall 
provide  practical  guidance  as  to  indicators  which  may  signal  matters 
of  security  concern.  Specific  instructions  concerning  reporting  pro- 
cedures shall  be  disseminated  to  enable  the  appropriate  authority  to 
take  timely  corrective  action  to  safeguard  the  security  of  the  United 
States  as  well  as  to  provide  all  necessary  help  to  the  individual  con- 
cerned to  neutralize  his  vulnerability. 
c.  Security  Review  Programs  to  ensure  that  appropriate  security 
authorities  invariably  receive  and  exchange,  in  a  timely  manner,  all 
information  bearing  on  the  security  posture  of  persons  having  access 
to  sensitive  information.  Personnel  history  information  shall  be  kept 
current.  Security  and  related  files  shall  be  kept  under  continuing 
review.  Departments  and  agencies  shall  develop  security  programs 
under  which  at  intervals  no  greater  than  5  years,  checks  are  made 
with  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  as  well  as  all  relevant  police 
and  credit  sources  and,  where  feasible,  each  individual  is  given  a  per- 
sonal interview  by  trained  security  or  counterintelligence  personnel. 
15.  Whenever  indicated  during  the  course  of  these  Security  Programs, 
appropriate  investigations  shall  be  conducted  on  a  timely  basis.    In  the  ( 
absence  of  such  indication  the  tempo  of  additional  investigation  shall  be 
tailored  by  the  adjudicating  agency  to  the  circumstances  surrounding 
the  individual  under  consideration  as  well  as  the  breadth  of  knowledge 
and  degree  of  sensitivity  involved  in  his  access.    The  investigation  shall 
be  sufficient  in  scope  to  ensure  that  continued  utilization  of  the  individual 
in  activities  requiring  sensitive  compartmented  information  is  clearly 
consistent  with  the  interests  of  the  national  security. 
Effective  Date 
16.  This  Directive  declares  the  policy  of  USIB  concerning  Uniform 
Personnel  Security  Standards  and  Practices  for  Access  to  Sensitive  Com- 
partmented Information.  This  policy  shall  become  effective  as  soon  as 
practicable  after  approval  of  this  Directive  but  in  no  case  later  than 
1  July  1968.  Existing  directives,2  regulations,  agreements,  and  such 
other  references  governing  access  to  sensitive  compartmented  informa- 
tion as  defined  herein  shall  be  revised  accordingly. 
Richard  Helms 
Director  of  Central  Intelligence 
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