S81-12 
ARMY  REGULATION  I  HEADQUARTERS 
\  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  ABMY 
No.  381-12  J  Washington,  DC,  l  July  2981 
MELIT  ARY INTELLIGENCE 
SUBVERSION  AND  ESPIONAGE  DIRECTED  AGAINST  US  ARMY 
(SHORT  TITLE:  SAED  A} 
Effective  1  August  1981 
This  regulation  requires  DA  personnel  to  report  at  once  any  incidents  or  situations  that  hose  to  do  with  sub- 
version and  espionage  directed  against  or  affecting  the  US  Army  and  national  security.  It  describes  the 
espionage  threat  by  foreign  intelligence  services  and  provides  guidance,  establishes  procedures,  and  pre- 
scribes responsibilities  for  countering  the  threat 
local  supplementation  of  this  regulation  is  prohibited,  except  upon  approval  of  the  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff 
for  Intelligence.  Requests  for  exception  with  justification  will  be  sent  through  command  channels  to 
HQDA(DAMJ-CICh  WASHDC20310. 
Interim  changes  to  this  regulation  are  not  official  unless  they  are  authenticated  by  The  Adjutant  General. 
Users  will  destroy  interim  changes  on  their  expiration  dates  unless  sooner  superseded  or  rescinded. 
Paragraph       Page 
Purpose    l  l 
Applicability    2  1 
Explanation  of  terms    3  * 
General 
  4  1 
R«eponaibilitiae(RCSGSGID-156)    5  I 
SAEDA  training 
  6  2 
SAEDA  special  briefings    7  2 
Incident*  and  situations  to  be  reported    8  2 
Reports 
  9  3 
Non-US  citizens    10  * 
Appdtodc   A.     EXPLANATION  OF  TERMS    A"1 
B.      GEOGRAPHIC  AREAS  OF  SPECIAL  CONCERN    B-l 
C      SAEDA  MESSAGE  FORMAT    C"1 
D.      SAEDA  CLASSIFICATION  GUIDE    D-l 
'This  regulation  supersedes  AR  381-12, 18  October  1974.
Uulyl981 
1.  Purpose.  This  regulation  sets  forth  responsibil- 
ities, guidance,  and  procedures  for  the  prompt 
recognition  and  reporting  of  incidents  of  attempted 
criminal  subversion,  sabotage,  international  terror- 
ism, espionage  directed  against  the  US  Army  and 
its  personnel,  or  deliberate  compromises  of  classi- 
fied information.  It  also  provides  for  the  training  of 
Army  personnel  in  such  matters. 
2.  Applicability.  This  regulation  applies  to  all  DA 
personnel  (military  and  civilian)  and  members  of 
the  Army  National  Guard  and  the  US  Army  Re- 
serve. 
3.  Explanation  of  terms.  See  appendix  A. 
4.  General,  a.  The  US  Army  has  installations  and 
personnel  located  worldwide.  It  is  a  prime  and  easi- 
ly accessible  target  for  foreign  intelligence  services 
(friendly  and  hostile)  and  sympathizers  of  foreign 
governments.  It  is  vulnerable  to  subversion  and 
espionage  in  the  continental  United  States 
(CONUS)  and  outside  CONUS.  By  themselves,  the 
defensive  security  measures  designed  to  prevent 
sabotage  of  US  Army  facilities  and  materiel  and  the 
compromise  of  classified  information  are  not 
enough.  DA  personnel  (military,  civilian,  and  de- 
pendents) are  the  key  to  an  effective  counterintelli- 
gence (CI)  program.  Dependents  should  be  in- 
structed to  tell  their  eponsors  of  any  incidents  re- 
portable under  this  regulation. 
6.  The  methods  used  by  foreign  intelligence  serv- 
ices and  other  disruptive  elements  to  get  informa- 
tion from,  or  to  enlist  the  services  of,  DA  personnel 
are  many  and  varied.  They  range  from  a  seemingly 
accidental  or  spontaneous  meeting  to  threats  of 
exposure  for  a  moral  indiscretion.  A  common  trend 
after  a  friendship  has  developed  is  for  a  member  of 
a  foreign  intelligence  service  to  request  unclassified 
documents  or  information  which  is  later  followed 
by  requests  or  demands  for  classified  information. 
c.  A  positive  SAEDA  program  must  be  estab- 
lished by  Army  commanders  at  all  levels  to  indoc- 
trinate all  DA  personnel  on  the  methods  used  to 
subvert  or  entrap  them.  This  is  crucial  for  those 
whose  positions,  duties,  or  access  make  them  attrac- 
tive targets  of  foreign  intelligence  services. 
5.  Responsibilities,  a.  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff  for 
Intelligence  (ACSI).  The  ACSI  will- 
(1)  Exercise  DA  Staff  responsibility  for  the 
Army's  SAEDA  program. 
(2)  Monitor  all  aspects  of  the  SAEDA  program 
to  determine  program  effectiveness. 
(3)  Establish  policy  and  issue  regulatory  guid- 
AB  381-12 
ance   for  processing  and  investigating  reported 
SAEDA  incidents  and  situations. 
(4)  Apprise  higher  authorities  of  significant 
SAEDA  incidents  and  situations. 
(5)  Advise  major  Army  commanders  of  infor- 
mation developed  by  the  US  intelligence  commun- 
ity that  requires  special  SAEDA  briefings  for  se- 
lected Army  personnel. 
b.  Commanding  General  (CG),  VS  Army  Intelli- 
gence and  Security  Command  dNSCOMj.  The  CG 
INSCOMwiil- 
(1)  Operate  the  SAEDA  program  for  the  ACSI. 
(2)  Represent  the  ACSI  in  matters  pertaining 
to  SAEDA  reporting  and  investigations  worldwide. 
(3)  Control  or  monitor  for  the  ACSI  all  investi- 
gations or  other  actions  resulting  from  any  SAEDA 
reporting  worldwide. 
(4)  Provide  appropriate  information  to  com- 
manders regarding  SAEDA  incidents  and  situations 
involving  their  personnel. 
(5)  Support  the  SAEDA  program  by  maintain- 
ing a  data  base  of  sufficient  scope  to  portray  the 
program's  status,  effectiveness,  and  efficiency  and 
its  impact  on  the  overall  CI  and  security  posture  of 
the  Army.  The  data  base  will  contain  the  following: 
(a)  Total  number  of  DA  personnel  within 
each  command. 
(b)  Total  number  of  DA  personnel  briefed  on 
SAEDA  within  each  command  during  the  fiscal 
year. 
(c)  Total  number  of  briefings,  within  each 
major  Army  command  (MACOM)  and  on  a  fiscal 
year  basis,  conducted  by  personnel  assigned  to— 
1.  INSCOM  units. 
2.  Tactical  MI  units. 
3.  Offices  of  Security  Officers  or  Man- 
agers, and  all  others. 
(6)  Report  SAEDA  data  base  statistics  annually 
to  HQDA(DAMI-CIC)  not  later  than  45  days  follow- 
ing the  end  of  the  fiscal  year,  RCS  CSGID- 156. 
(7)  Prepare  and  present  SAEDA  and  special 
SAEDA  briefings  as  required. 
c.  MACOM  commanders.  All  MACOM  com- 
manders will— 
(1)  Establish  an  annual  SAEDA  training  pro- 
gram which  will  reach  all  levels  of  subordinate  units 
and  supported  commands. 
(2)  Insure  that  SAEDA  training  is  incorporated 
into  command  training  programs  conducted  under 
AR  350-1  and  is  compatible  with  requirements  of 
this  regulation.
AR  381-12 
1 July  1881 
(3)  Monitor  the  SAEDA  program  to  insure  that 
annual  SAEDA  briefings  are  given  to  a&  personnel. 
(4)  Maintak  and  submit  statistics',  data  to  sup- 
port the  INSCOM  data  base.  Information  for  the 
data  base  as  prescribed  in  6(5Xq),  {k' ,  *zi  (c)  above 
will  be  sent  to  CDR  USAINSCOM,  AiTN;  U?Ptf- 
OP-OC,  Fort  Meade  MD  20755,  no.  :  '>-r  th.«.n  30 
days  following  the  end  of  the  fiscal  yet^. 
d.  Commanders,  tactical  Ml  units.  Cotnmrind^ffi 
of  these  units,  in  coordination  with  supported  com- 
manders and  INSCOM  units,  will— 
(1)  Prepare  and  present  annual  SAEDA  brief- 
ings, and  when  requested  by  supported  com- 
manders, special  SAEDA  briefings.  Advice,  guid- 
ance, assistance,  and  briefing  materials  can  be  ob- 
tained from  INSCOM. 
(2)  Maintain  and  submit  statistical  data  to  sup- 
ported commands  to  support  the  INSCOM  data  base 
(para  6(5)  and  c(4)  above). 
(3)  Insure  that  SAEDA  reports  (para  9)  are  for- 
warded promptly  to  INSCOM  through  intelligence 
channels  and  that  no  other  action  is  taken  without 
appropriate  control  office  approval. 
6.  SAEDA  training,  a.  DA  personnel  will  receive  a 
SAEDA  briefing  each  year.  These  briefings  will  be 
presented  by  qualified  CI  personnel  to  the  maxi- 
mum extent  possible,  as  shown  below: 
(1)  Briefings  at  echelons  above  corps  will  be 
presented  by  INSCOM. 
(2)  Briefings  in  tactical  units  at  corps  level  and 
below  will  be  presented  by  the  supporting  tactical 
MI  unit  having  a  CI  capability. 
(3)  When  distance  precludes  or  INSCOM  or 
tactical  MI  unit  personnel  are  not  available,  SAEDA 
briefings  will  be  presented  by  unit  security  officers 
or  managers.  Briefing  materials  provided  by 
INSCOM  or  the  tactical  MI  unit  will  be  used,  if  ap- 
propriate. 
b.  SAEDA  briefings  will  be  prepared  specifically 
for  the  particular  audience  and  geographic  area  in 
which  they  are  given  and  will  be  classified  accord- 
ingly. As  a  minimum,  briefings  will  contain  instruc- 
tion on  the  following: 
(1)  Methods  and  techniques  used  by  foreign  in- 
telligence services  to  obtain  information  on  Army 
facilities,  activities,  personnel,  or  materiel. 
(2)  The  fact  that  foreign  intelligence  services 
consider  DA  personnel  as  potential  sources  for  US 
defense  information. 
(3)  The  nature  of  the  international  terrorist 
threat,  the  vulnerabilities  of  DA  personnel  and 
their  dependents  to  international  terrorist  acts,  and 
the  defense  measures  that  can  be  used  to  thwart 
such  acts. 
(4)  Reporting  procedures  (paras  8  and  9). 
7.  SAEDA  special  briefings,  a.  Certain  personnel 
are  especially  vulnerable  to  hostile  approach  by  vir- 
tue of  their  position,  travel,  duties,  or  activities. 
These  include,  but  are  not  limited  to,  those  having 
access  to  compartmented  information  or  special  ac- 
cess programs  or  occupying  positions  of  special  in- 
terest to  foreign  intelligence  services.  These  include 
senior  DA  executives,  research  and  development 
specialists,  and  scientific,  technical,  intelligence, 
and  CI  personnel. 
b.  Security  managers  will  insure  that  personnel 
receive  special  briefings,  as  prescribed  in  paragraph 
6a  and  b ,  when  they— 
(1)  Are  scheduled  to  travel  on  leave  or  TBY  to 
or  through  areas  of  special  concern  (app  B). 
(2)  Are  scheduled  to  attend  international 
scientific,  technical,  engineering  or  other  profes- 
sional meetings  in  CONUS  or  outside  CONUS  in 
which  representatives  of  Communist-controlled 
countries  are  likely  to  participate  or  be  in  attend- 
ance. 
(3)  Have  close  relatives  residing  in  an  area  of 
special  concern.  Special  briefings  for  DA  personnel 
in  this  category  generally  will  be  given  only  once. 
However,  they  may  be  repeated  for  emphasis  if  the 
person  assumes  more  sensitive  duties,  is  reassigned 
to  a  more  vulnerable  location,  or  for  other  similar 
reasons. 
(4)  Are  scheduled  to  travel  to  an  area-  where 
there  is  reason  to  believe  that  a  hostage  situation 
exists,  or  may  develop,  that  could  result  in  exploita- 
tion of  such  persons  by  a  foreign  intelligence  service 
or  international  terrorist  organization. 
c.  Special  SAEDA  briefings  will  be  tailored  to  the 
particular  risk  involved,  to  include  inherent  hazards 
and  vulnerabilities.  They  also  should  include  ele- 
ments of  the  annual  briefings,  as  appropriate,  with 
emphasis  on  reporting  responsibilities. 
8.  Incidents  and  situations  to  be  reported. 
Reporting  of  incidents  and  situations  described  in 
this  paragraph  is  mandatory.  Reports  will  comply 
with  the  procedures  given  in  paragraph  9.  Failure  to 
report  such  incidents  or  situations  constitutes  a 
violation  of  this  regulation  and  may  provide  the 
basis  for  disciplinary  action  under  the  Uniform 
Code  of  Military  Justice  (UCM J)  or  other  authority  !
1  July  1981 
as  appropriate.  Incidents  and  situations  are  as  fol- 
lows: 
a.  Attempts  by  unauthorized  persons  to  obtain 
classified  or  unclassified  information  concerning 
US  Army  facilities,  activities,  personnel,  or  ma- 
teriel through  questioning,  elicitation,  trickery, 
bribery,  threats,  or  coercion,  either  through  direct 
or  indirect  personal  contacts  or  correspondence. 
6.  Attempts  by  unauthorized  persons  to  obtain 
classified  or  unclassified  information  through 
photographs,  observation,  collection  of  documents 
or  materiel,  or  by  any  other  means. 
c.  Attempts  by  persons  with  known,  suspected, 
or  possible  foreign  intelligence  backgrounds,  asso- 
ciations, or  activities  to  establish  any  type  of  friend- 
ship or  social  or  business  relationship,  or  to  place 
DA  personnel  under  obligation  through  special 
treatment,  favors,  gifts,  money,  or  other  means. 
d.  All  incidents  where  DA  personnel,  or  their  de- 
pendents, traveling  to  or  through  foreign  areas  of 
special  concern  (app  B)  are- 
CD  Subjected    to    questions    regarding    their 
duties. 
(2)  Requested  to  provide  military  information. 
(3)  Threatened,  coerced,  or  pressured  in  any 
way  to  cooperate  with  a  foreign  intelligence  service. 
e.  Incidents  of  known,  suspected,  or  possible 
espionage  which  resulted  in,  may  have  resulted  in, 
or  in  the  future  may  result  in  the  compromise  of 
classified  documents,  information,  or  materiel. 
/.  Other  acts  of  deliberate  compromise  com- 
mitted, attempted,  or  contemplated  by  DA 
personnel  with  the  intention  of  conveying  classified 
documents,  information,  or  materiel  to  any  un- 
authorized person. 
g.  Nonofficial  contacts  by  DA  personnel  with— 
(1)  Persons  whom  they  know  or  suspect  to  be 
members  of  a  foreign  intelligence  or  security  serv- 
ice. 
(2)  Foreign  military  or  police  organizations. 
(3)  Any  officials  of  countries  listed  in  appendix 
B. 
h.  Official  contacts  with  persons  described  in  g 
above  when  such  persons — 
(1)  Show  undue  knowledge  or  curiosity  about 
the  DA  member. 
(2)  Attempt  to  obtain  classified  or  unclassified 
information  from  the  DA  member. 
(3)  Attempt  to  establish  any  type  of  friendship 
or  social  or  business  relationship  with  the  DA  mem- 
AR  381-12 
ber  which  is  outside  the  range  of  normal  official  du- 
ties. 
i.  Information  concerning  international  terrorist 
plans  and  activities  posing  a  direct  threat  to  facil- 
ities, activities,  personnel,  or  materiel. 
j.  Known  or  suspected  acts  or  plots  to  harm  or  de- 
stroy defense  property  by  sabotage. 
9.  Reports,  a.  Reporting  procedures. 
(1)  All  DA  personnel  who  have  been  involved  in 
or  have  knowledge  of  a  SAEDA  incident  or  situa- 
tion will  report  all  facts  immediately  to  the  nearest 
INSCOM  or  tactical  MI  office.  If  these  are  not  readi- 
ly available,  SAEDA  incidents  or  situations  will  be 
reported  to  the  unit  commander,  or  unit  or 
organization  security  officer/manager  or  intelli- 
gence officer.  These  persons  will  insure  that  the  re- 
port is  transmitted  as  soon  as  possible,  but  in  all 
cases  with  24  hours  to  the  nearest  supporting 
INSCOM  or  tactical  MI  office.  Knowledge  of  the 
SAEDA  incident  or  situation  will  be  limited  to  as 
few  persons  as  possible  and  only  those  who  have  a 
need  to  know. 
(2)  DA  personnel  assigned  to  Supreme  Head- 
quarters Allied  Powers  Europe  and  other  elements 
of  Allied  Command  Europe  who  have  been  involved 
in  or  who  have  knowledge  of  a  SAEDA  incident  or 
situation  will  report  all  facts  immediately  to  the 
nearest  office  of  the  650th  Military  Intelligence 
Group. 
(3)  If  the  DA  member  is  located  or  traveling 
outside  the  United  States  in  an  area  where  there  is 
no  INSCOM  or  tactical  MI  unit,  and  the  SAEDA 
incident  or  situation  is  important  enough  to  require 
immediate  action,  a  SAEDA  report  will  be  sub- 
mitted to  the  nearest  US  military  authority,  intelli- 
gence or  security  officer,  US  Defense  Attache  Of- 
fice, or  US  Consulate  Security  Officer.  If  the 
SAEDA  information  is  not  of  an  urgent  nature,  a 
SAEDA  report  will  be  submitted  to  the  nearest  sup- 
porting INSCOM  or  tactical  MI  unit  upon  comple- 
tion of  travel. 
(4)  INSCOM  and  tactical  MI  units  receiving  a 
SAEDA  report  will- 
Is)  Obtain  complete  details  and  submit  a  re- 
port by  priority  or  immediate  electrical  message  as 
urgency  dictates  to  the  addressees  and  in  the  format 
shown  in  appendix  C. 
(6)  Take  no  further  action  and  make  no 
further  dissemination  unless  directed  by,  co- 
ordinated with,  or  concurred  in  by  the  appropriate
AR  381-12 
control  office.  See  paragraph  A-4,  appendix  A. 
(c)  Inform  DA  personnel  making  a  SAEDA 
report  that  they  may  be  contacted  by  a  representa- 
tive of  INSCOM  and  they  are  not  to  reveal  the  exis- 
tence or  nature  of  the  incident  or  situation  to  any- 
one else. 
(5)  If   other    DA   organizations,   offices,    or 
agencies  are  contacted  by  DA  personnel  seeking  to 
submit  a  SAEDA  report,  they  will  be  guided  by  the 
above  procedures. 
6.  Communications  procedures. 
(1)  All  initial  SAEDA  reports  will  be  submitted 
electrically  by  INSCOM  and  tactical  MI  units  in  the 
format  in  appendix  C.  All  reports  receive  limited 
distribution  *(LIMDI3). 
(2)  The  Defense  Special  Security  Communica- 
tions System  (DSSCS)  will  be  used  when  possible. 
The  DSSCS  and  the  terms  SSO  message,  SSO  serv- 
ice and  SSO  channels  all  mean  the  same  thing. 
When  SSO  service  is  not  available,  SAEDA  reports 
1  July  1881 
will  be  submitted  electrically  via  the  General  Serv- 
ice message  system. 
c.  Security  classification.  All  SAEDA  reports  will 
be  classified  according  to  the  SAEDA  Classification 
Guide  in  appendix  D. 
d.  Investigative  reports.  SAEDA  reports  will  be 
forwarded  through  CI  channels  to  CDR,  USA- 
INSCGM,  ATTN:  Commander,  Special  Operations 
Detacnmsm,  Fort  Meade  MD  20755. 
e.  Information  requirements  control.  SAEDA  re- 
ports submitted  under  this  regulation  are  exempt 
from  information  requirements  control  under  para- 
graph 7-2r,  AR  335-15. 
10.  Non-US  eUisecs.  The  use  of  this  regulation 
for  non-US  citiaen  employees  and  contractors  of  DA 
installations  and  commands  located  in  foreign  coun- 
tries will  be  according  to  the  Status  of  Forces  Agree- 
ment or  treaty  between  the  US  and  host  country 
governments.
Unlyl981 
AR  381-12 
APPENDIX  A 
EXPLANATION  OF  TERMS 
A-l.  Agent  of  a  foreign  power,  a.  Any  person, 
other  th«"  a  United  States  person,  who— 
(1)  Acts  in  the  United  States  as  an  officer  or 
employee  of  a  foreign  power  or  as  a  member  of 
a  group  engaged  in  international  terrorism  or 
activities  in  preparation  therefore. 
(2)  Acts  for  or  on  behalf  of  a  foreign  power 
which  engages  in  clandestine  intelligence  ac- 
tivities in  the  United  States  contrary  to  the  in- 
terests of  the  United  States,  when  the  circum- 
stances of  such  person's  presence  in  the  United 
States  indicates  that  such  person  may  engage 
in  such  activities  in  the  United  States,  or  when 
such  person  knowingly  aids  or  abets  any  person 
in  the  conduct  of  such  activities  or  knowingly 
conspires  with  any  person  to  engage  in  such  ac- 
tivities. 
b.  Any  person  who— 
(1)  Knowingly  engages  in  clandestine  intelli- 
gence gathering  activities  for  or  on  behalf  of  a 
foreign  power  which  activities  involve  or  may 
involve  a  violation  of  the  criminal  statutes  of 
the  United  States. 
(2)  Pursuant  to  the  direction  of  an  intelli- 
gence service  or  network  of  a  foreign  power 
knowingly  engages  in  any  other  clandestine  in- 
telligence activities  for  or  on  behalf  of  such  for- 
eign power,  which  activities  invclve  or  are 
about  to  involve  a  violation  of  the  criminal 
statutes  of  the  United  States. 
(3)  Knowingly  engages  in  sabotage  or  inter- 
national terrorism,  or  activities  that  are  in 
preparation  therefore,  for  or  on  behalf  of  a  for- 
eign power. 
(4)  Knowingly  aids  or  abets  any  person  in  the 
conduct  of  activities  described  in  subpara- 
graphs (a)  and  (6)  or  knowingly  conspires  with 
any  person  to  engage  in  activities  described  in 
subparagraphs  (a)  and  (6). 
A-2.  Clandestine  intelligence  activity.  An  ac- 
tivity conducted  for  intelligence  purposes  or 
for  the  purpose  of  affecting  political  or  govern- 
mental processes  by  or  on  behalf  of  a  foreign 
power  in  a  manner  designed  to  conceal  fiom 
the  US  Government  the  nature  or  fact  of  such 
activity  or  the  role  of  such  foreign  power,  and 
any  activity  conducted  in  support  of  such  ac- 
tivity. 
A-3.  Classified  defense  information.  Official 
information  which  requires  protection  in  the 
interest  of  national  defense  and  is  classified 
TOP  SECRET,  SECRET,  or  CONFIDENTIAL 
according  to  AR  380-5. 
A-4:  Control  Office.  The  office  responsible  for 
directing  and  controlling  SAEDA  investiga- 
tions and  operations.  The  following  control  of- 
fices are  responsible  for  all  Army  SAEDA  in- 
vestigations and  operations  within  their  geo- 
graphic areas  for  CI  investigative  responsibili- 
ties: (1)  Deputy  Chief  of  Staff  for  Intelligence 
(DSCI)  USAREUR  for  the  CINCUSAREUR 
area  of  responsibility;  (2)  Assistant  Chief  of 
Staff,  G-2  (ACofS,  G-2),  Eighth  USA  for  the 
CDR  Eighth  US  Army  area  of  responsibility; 
and  (3)  Commander,  Special  Operations  De- 
tachment, INSCOM,  for  all  other  areas. 
A-5.  Contact(8).  Any  form  of  meeting,  associa- 
tion, or  communication  with  any  person  of  the 
concerned  areas  listed  in  appendix  B,  even  if  no 
official  information  is  discussed.  This  includes 
any  contact  in  person,  or  by  radio,  telephone, 
letter,  or  any  other  form  of  communication, 
whether  it  is  for  social,  private,  or  any  other 
reason.  It  also  means  any  visit  to  any  embassy, 
consulate,  trade  or  press  office,  or  other  official 
building  or  office  of  a  Communist  country, 
whether  the  visit  is  for  private  or  official 
reasons. 
A-6.  Counterintelligence.  Information  gathered 
and  activities  conducted  to  protect  against 
espionage  and  other  clandestine  intelligence  ac- 
tivities, sabotage,  international  terrorist  activi- 
ties, or  assassinations  conducted  for  or  on  be- 
half of  foreign  powers,  organizations,  or  per- 
sons, but  not  including  personnel,  physical, 
A-l
AR  381-12 
1 July  1981 
document,  or  communications  security  pro- 
grams. 
A-7.  Counterintelligence  investigation.  In- 
quiries and  other  activities  undertaken  to 
determine  whether  a  particular  US  person  is 
acting  for,  or  on  behalf  of,  a  foreign  power  for 
purposes  of  conducting  espionage  and  other 
clandestine  intelligence  activities,  sabotage, 
and  international  terrorist  activities. 
A-8.  Criminal  subversion.  Criminal  subversion 
is  defined  in  Section  2387,  Title  18,  United 
States  Code.  Its  elements  generally  are  actively 
encouraging  military  or  civilian  personnel  of 
the  Department  of  Defense  to  violate  laws,  dis- 
obey lawful  orders  or  regulations,  or  disrupt 
military  activities,  with  the  willful  intent 
thereby  to  interfere  with,  or  impair  the  loyalty, 
morale,  or  discipline  of,  the  military  forces  of 
the  United  States. 
A-9.  DA  personnel.  Persons  employed  by  the  De- 
partment of  the  Army.  It  includes  both  mili- 
tary and  civilian  employees. 
A- 10.  Deliberate  compromise  of  classified  in- 
formation. There  are  two  types  of  deliberate 
compromise  applicable  to  this  regulation.  TTiey 
are  instances  where  classified  defense  informa- 
tion is  compromised  or  possibly  compromised 
as  a  result  of— 
a.  Espionage  or  suspected  espionage  ac- 
tivity. 
b.  Willful  disclosure  to  an  unauthorized  per- 
son. 
A- 11.  Espionage.  The  elements  of  espionage  as 
set  forth  in  section  792-798,  Title  18,  United 
States  Code  are  generally  as  follows: 
a.  Espionage  is  the  act  of  obtaining,  delive  •• 
ing,  transmitting  communicating,  or  receivi  - 
information  in  respect  to  the  national  defense 
with  an  intent  or  reason  to  believe  that  the  in- 
formation may  be  used  to  the  injury  of  the 
United  States  or  to  the  advantage  of  any  for- 
eign nation.  The  offense  of  espionage  applies  in 
time  of  war  or  peace. 
6.  The  statute  makes  an  offense  the  gather- 
ing of  national  defense  information  with  the 
requisite  intent  or  belief  by  going  upon,  enter- 
ing, flying  over,  or  obtaining  access  by  any 
means  to  any  installation  or  place  used  by  the 
United  States  in  connection  with  national  de- 
fense. The  method  of  gathering  information  ia 
immaterial. 
c.  Whoever  lawfully  or  unlawfully  has  pos- 
session of,  access  to,  control  over,  or  is  en- 
trusted with,  information  dealing  with  na- 
tional defense,  which  information  the  posses- 
sor has  reason  to  believe  could  be  used  to  the  in- 
jury of  the  United  States  or  to  the  advantage  of 
any  foreign  nation,  and  willfully  communicates 
or  transmits,  or  attempts  to  communicate  or 
transmit  such  information  to  any  person  not 
entitled  to  receive  it  is  guilty  of  espionage 
under  the  statute. 
d.  The  statute  on  espionage  also  provides 
that  anyone  entrusted  with,  or  having  lawful 
possession  or  control  of  information  pertaining 
to  national  defense,  who  through  gross  neg- 
ligence permits  same  to  be  lost,  stolen,  ab- 
stracted, destroyed,  removed  from  its  proper 
place  of  custody,  or  delivered  to  anyone  in  vio- 
lation of  this  trust,  is  guilty  of  violation  of  the 
Espionage  Act. 
e.  If  two  or  more  person  enter  into  a  con- 
spiracy to  commit  and  one  of  them  commits  an 
overt  act  in  furtherance  of  such  conspiracy,  all 
members  of  the  conspiracy  may  be  punished 
for  violation  of  the  Espionage  Act.  The  same 
principle  regaiding  conspiracy  also  applies  to 
the  complaint  case  categories  of  sabotage  and 
sedition. 
A- 12.  Foreign  intelligence.  Information  relating 
to  the  capabilities,  intentions,  and  activities  of 
foreign  powers,  organizations,  or  persons.  This 
does  not  include  CI  except  for  information  on 
international  terrorist  activities. 
A- 13.  Foreign  power.  Any  foreign  government 
(regardless  of  whether  recognized  by  th< 
United  States),  foreign-based  political  party  (oj 
faction  thereof),  foreign  military  force,  foreign 
based  terrorist  group,  or  any  organization  com 
posed,  in  major  part,  of  any  such  entity  or  en 
tities. 
A-14.  Foreign  Intelligence  Service.  An  or 
ganization  of  a  foreign  government  which  en 
gages  in  intelligence  activities. 
A-15.  Intelligence.  Foreign  intelligence  and  CI 
(see  paras  A-6  and  A- 12). 
A- 16.  Intelligence  method.  Any  process,  mode  of 
analysis,  means  of  gathering  data,  or  process- 
ing system  or  equipment  used  to  produce  in- 
telligence. 
A- 17.  Intelligence  source.  A  person  or  technical 
means  that  provides  intelligence. 
A-2
1 July  1981 
A- 18.  International   terrorist  activities.   Any 
activity  or  activities  which— 
a.  Involve  killing,  causing  serious  bodily 
harm,  kidnapping,  or  violent  destruction  of 
property,  or  an  attempt  or  credible  threat  to 
commit  such  acts;  and 
b.  Appear  intended  to  endanger  a  protectee 
of  the  Secret  Service  or  the  Department  of 
State  or  to  further  political,  social,  or  economic 
goals  by  intimidating  or  coercing  a  civilian 
population  or  any  segment  thereof,  influencing 
the  policy  of  a  government  or  international  or- 
ganization by  intimidation  or  coercion,  or  ob- 
taining widespread  publicity  for  a  group  or  its 
causes;  and 
AR  381-12 
c.  Transcend  national  boundaries  in  terms  of 
the— 
(1)  Means  by  which  it  is  accomplished. 
(2)  Civilian  population,  government,  or  in- 
ternational organization  it  appears  intended  to 
coerce  or  intimidate. 
(3)  Locale  in  which  its  perpetrators  operate 
or  seek  asylum. 
A- 10.  Sabotage.  Any  activity  that  involves  a  vio- 
lation of  chapter  105  of  Title  18,  United  States 
Code,  or  that  would  involve  such  a  violation  if 
committed  against  the  United  States. 
A-3
1  July  1981  ABS81"12 
APPENDIX  B 
GEOGRAPHICAL  AREAS  OF  SPECIAL  CONCERN 
Afghanistan 
Albania 
Angola 
Bulgaria 
Cambodia 
China  (People's  Republic  of) 
Chinmen  (Quemoy),  Matsu,  and  other  islands  offshore  from  mainland  China  held 
by  the  Government  of  Taiwan 
Cuba  (except  US  Naval  Base,  Guantmamo) 
Czechoslovakia 
Ethiopia 
German  Democratic  Republic  (East  Germany) 
Hungary 
Iran 
Iraq 
Laos 
Lebanon 
Libyan  Arab  Republic 
North  Korea  (and  adjacent  demilitarized  zone) 
Outer  Mongolia  (Mongolian  People's  Republic) 
Poland 
People's  Democratic  Republic  of  Yemen 
Romania 
Soviet  Sector  of  Berlin 
Syria 
Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics  (USSR) 
Vietnam 
Yugoslavia 
B-l
UolyI981  AB881-1S 
APPENDIX  C 
SAED A  MESSAGE  FORMAT 
C-l  Guidance  for  preparing  SAEDA  messages,  a.  The  SAEDA  electrical  re- 
port will  comply  with  the  format  shown  in  paragraph  C-3.  It  will  be  classified  ac- 
cording to  appendix  D.  All  paragraph  and  subparagraph  titles  will  be  included  in 
the  transmitted  report. 
6.  SAEDA  investigative  reports  will  be  prepared  in  accordance  with  DA 
Pamphlet  381-20  (Counterintelligence  Investigative  and  Reporting  Procedures) 
and  INSCOM  directives  and  instructions. 
c.  If  a  full  report  will  cause  undue  delay,  submit  an  interim  report  with  in- 
formation that  is  available. 
d  SAEDA  messages  will  be  caveated  with  either  "Night  Action  Required"  or 
"Deliver  During  First  Duty  Hours." 
C-2.  Message  addressees.  All  SAEDA  electrical  messages  will  be  addressed  as 
follows: 
a.  SSO  mesc^es. 
FROM:  SSO  (Station  Designator) 
TO:       SSO  MEADE 
(Other  Appropriate  SSO  Station) 
INFO:   SSODA/DAMI-CIC// 
QQQQ 
DELIVERY  INSTRUCTIONS:        (Night  Action  Required)  or  (Deliver 
During  First  Duty  Hours) 
CLASSIFICATION  UMDIS  (Station  Designator   TOPIC):  Of  the 
SSO  Station  is  not  authorized  to  use  its  own  message  numbering  system  on  the 
next  line  use  the  following:) 
CITE:  (Office  Designation)  (No.  of  Message)  TOPIC:  (Example:  CITE  XXXX 
0011  TOPIC) 
FROM:  (Person  Sending  Message)  (Office/Area  Designation)  (Example: 
COL  XXXX,  Chief,  XXXX,  XXXX,  USAREUR) 
TO:  COL   ,CDR,SP  OPS  DET,  INSCOM,  FT  MEADE  MD 
(Other  Appropriate  SSO  Stations) 
INFO:  COL  ,  DIR,  CI,  OACSI,  DA  (Pass  to  Mr   ,  SOD 
LNO)  SUBJECT:  SAEDA  (   ) 
b.  General  Service  messages. 
FROM:  (HQ  Sending  Message//Office  Designation// 
TO:       CDRSPECOPNS      DET      USAINSCOM      FT     MEADE 
MD//IASO-CO// 
(Other  Appropriate  Addressees) 
INFO:   HQDAWASHDC//DAMI-CIC// 
(CLASSIFICATTON)LIMDIS 
DELIVERY  INSTRUCTIONS:        (Night  Action  required)  or  (Deliver 
During  First  Duty  Hour) 
SUBJECT:  SAEDA  (   ) 
C-l
AB381-12  WWr  MM 
c.  Additional  information  addressees.  Such  addreaseea  may  be  added  only  aa 
specified  authorized  by  INSCOM  directives  and  instructions. 
C-3.  Message  format.  The  body  of  all  SAEDA  electrical  messages  will  be  aa  fol- 
lows  I 
CONFIDENTIAL  LIMDIS  TOPIC 
SUBJECT:  SAEDA  (  ) 
A.  (References) 
1.  (      )      Date  of  incident. 
2.  (       )      Location  of  incident 
3.  (      )       Persons  involved  (See  Note  1.) 
a.  (      )  Source(8).(SeeNote2.) 
6.  (  )  Witness^).  (See  Note  2.) 
c.  (  )  Others  knowledgeable.  (See  Note  3.) 
d.  (  )  Suspects).  (See  Note  2.) 
4.  (       )       Narrative.  (See  Note  4.) 
5.  (       )       Actions  taken. 
6.  (       )      Comments.  (See  Note  5.) 
Note  J.  Provide  the  following  information  for  etch  persons)  Kited  by  name  (last  name,  first 
name,  and  middle  initial);  DAPOB,  S8N;  organization  to  which  assigned,  to  include  unit 
in  which  incident  occurred;  duty  poaition;  ETS;  DER08;  aacurity  clearances;  apadal  ac- 
cess; and  date  of  laat  SAEDA  briefing. 
Note  2.  If  more  than  one  source,  each  ahould  be  lifted  as  Source  1,  Source  2,  and  so  forth.  The 
same  procedure  applies  if  there  is  more  than  one  witness  or  suspect  If  identification 
data  are  not  known  for  witnesses)  or  suspectfr).  list  available  phyaical  description. 
Note  3.  Individuals  knowledgeable  of  the  incident  ahould  be  identified  in  the  seme  manner  aa 
persons  involved. 
Note  4.  List  complete  factual  description  of  incident  as  reported  by  sourcet*),  starting  with  de- 
tails concerning  how  the  eource(s)  came  to  the  attention  of  the  INSOOM  or  tactical  Ifi 
unit  reporting  the  SAEDA  incident 
NoteS.  Submit  any  comments,  remarks,  or  recommendations  pertinent  to  the  incident 
source(s),  or  suapecKs). 
C-2
1  July  1981  AR  381-12 
APPENDIX  D 
S AEDA  CLASSIFICATION  GUIDE 
D-l.  Security    classification.    SAEDA    reports    will    be    classified    CON- 
FIDENTIAL unless,  in  unusual  circumstances,  the  originator  of  the  report  decides 
that  its  content  warrants  a  higher  classification  (see  para  D-6c). 
D-2.  Authority.  SAEDA  reports  classified  CONFIDENTIAL  will  cite  this  regu- 
lation as  the  authority  for  classification. 
D-3.  Duration  of  classification.  SAEDA  reports  classified  CONFIDENTIAL 
solely  because  of  the  requirements  of  this  regulation  will  be  marked  for  declassifi- 
cation review  10  years  from  the  date  of  the  report.  The  reason  for  extension  of 
classification  beyond  6  years  is  as  stated  in  paragraph  2-301c(3),  AR  380-5.  This 
extension  has  been  authorized  by  the  ACSI,  HQDA. 
D-4.  Marking.  Electrically  transmitted  SAEDA  reports  classified  solely  because 
of  the  requirements  of  this  regulation  will  contain  the  following  statement  as  the 
last  line  of  the  message: 
"CLASS  BY  AR  381-12;  REVW  (insert  appropriate  date)" 
D-5.  Special  circumstances.  Special  circumstances  may  require  classification 
of  SAEDA  reports  at  a  level  higher  than  CONFIDENTIAL  or  for  a  longer  period 
than  indicated  in  paragraph  D-3.  In  such  cases,  the  following  instructions  will  ap- 
ply: a.  Reports  containing  SECRET  or  TOP  SECRET  information  will  be  marked 
with  the  highest  classification  of  information  they  contain. 
(1)  The  declassification  instructions  will  specify  the  date  established  for  de- 
classification or  review  of  the  SECRET  or  TOP  SECRET  information,  or  a  review 
date  10  years  from  the  date  of  the  report,  whichever  is  later. 
Examples:  . 
1.  A  report  dated  10  Jun  79  contains  SECRET  data  which  is  to  be  de- 
classified on  31  Dec  93.  Mark  this  report  for  declassification  on  31  Dec  93. 
2.  A  report  dated  10  Jun  79  contains  SECRET  data  which  is  to  be  de- 
classified 31  Dec  51.  Mark  this  report  for  review  10  Jun  89. 
(2)  The  last  line  of  the  message  will  read  as  follows: 
"CLASS  BY  MULTIPLE  SOURCES;  REVW  (insert  appropriate  date)" 
b.  If  it  is  necessary  to  include  information  in  the  report  which  has  been  classi- 
fied CONFIDENTIAL  for  reasons  and  by  authority  other  than  this  regulation,  the 
declassification  instructions  for  the  report  will  be  determined  as  prescribed  in  a 
above. 
c.  If  the  originator  of  a  SAEDA  report  has  reason  to  believe  that  information 
in  the  report,  due  to  its  potential  for  damage  to  the  national  security,  warrants  a 
classification  higher  than  CONFIDENTIAL,  but  the  information  has  not  other- 
wise been  classified,  a  tentative  classification  at  a  higher  level  may  be  applied.  The 
commander,  Special  Operations  Detachment,  INSCOM,  will  obtain  an  evaluation 
of  the  material  according  to  paragraph  2-600,  AR  380-5,  and  will  notify  all  reci- 
pients of  the  report  of  the  results  of  the  evaluation.  The  originator  of  the  report 
D-l
AH  SSI- 11  IJWylWl 
will  mark  it  with  the  security  classincation  he  or  ahe  believes  appropriate.  The  tost 
line  of  the  meeeagewiU  read  as  follows: 
-TENTATIVE  CLASSIFICATION:  PARA  D-6c.  APP  D.  AR  381-12." 
d  Each  paragraph  and  subparagraph  of  the  record  will  be  marked  with  the 
security  classification  of  the  information  it  contain*,  but  in  no  case  lower  than 
CONFIDENTIAL. 
D-ft
iJoiyisei 
abssi-is 
if*  and  W||im<  ^•wwiwH  •*  •* 
MQ0A(PA4M-CIQ.  WASM  ©C  HM. 
QffBea  of  tMi 
Invited  to 
•wtf  Monk  forme)  #rocl  to 
By  Order  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Army: 
Official: 
ROBERT  M.  JOYCE 
Brigadier  General,  United  State*  Army 
The  Adjutant  General 
E.  C.MEYER 
General,  United  State*  Army 
Chief  of  Staff 
DISE^mj;.  ARNG,  USAR:  To  be  distributed  in  accordance  with  DA  Form  12-9A  reqmrements  for 
AR,  Military  Intelligence- A 
.  U.S.  GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE:   1983-0-381-663/1029