REPORT  BY 
THE  OFFICE  OF  THE  SECRETARY  OF  DEFENSE 
STUDY  TEAM 
TO  THE 
SECRETARY  OF  DEFENSE 
REASSESSMENT 
OF 
DEFENSE  AGENCIES 
AND 
DOD  FIELD  ACTIVITIES 
By  Direction  of  the 
Goldwater-Nichols 
Department  of  Defense  Reorganization  Act 
of  1986 
(Public  Law  99-433,  October  1,  1986) 
October  1987 
Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  of  Defense 
(Administration) 
Directorate  for  Organizational 
and 
Management  Planning 
The  Pentagon 
Washington,  D.C.  20301
Appendix  H 
DEFENSE  MAPPING  AGENCY  (DMA) 
I.   SUMMARY  OF  RECOMMENDATIONS 
Mission  and  Oversight 
1.  That  the  Defense  Mapping  Agency  (DMA)  continue  to  perform  the 
DoD  Mapping  Charting  and  Geodesy  (MC&G)  production  mission. 
2.  That  oversight  is  properly  placed  with  policy  provided  by  the 
Under  Secretary  of  Defense  (Acquisition)  [USD(A)]  and  operational 
advice  from  the  Chairman,  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  (CJCS)  ;  but  it 
should  be  improved.   Both  the  Office  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense 
(OSD)  and  the  Organization  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  (OJCS) 
should  review  the  requirements  versus  resources  —  manpower, 
money,  and  collection  —  gap  and  initiate  corrective  action  as 
appropriate. 
3.  That  the  Director  of  DMA  be  given  the  authority  to  fulfill  the 
expanded  mission  outlined  for  Combat  Support  Agencies  in  the 
Defense  Reorganization  Act.   Combat  Support  Agency  Directors 
should  participate  more  fully  in  the  DoD  Planning,  Programming  and 
Budgeting  System  (PPBS)  process  for  all  matters  affecting  their 
mission  area. 
4.  That  OJCS  revise  its  requirements  priority  system  to  allow  DMA 
to  reform  its  programming  for,  and  execution  of,  MC&G  production 
to  satisfy  requirements  more  in  line  with  operational  priorities. 
5.  That  OSD  and  the  Military  Departments  codify  the  1985  Program 
Decision  Memorandum  directing  the  Military  Departments  to  identify 
and  fund,  with  development  proposals,  the  new,  unique  MC&G  require- 
ments for  weapons  and  systems.   Further,  the  Military  Departments 
and  Assistant  Secretary  of  Defense  (Command,  Control,  Communica- 
tions, and  Intelligence)  [ASD(C  1)3,  and  weapon  system  developers 
must  improve  coordination  with  DMA. 
6.  That  systematic,  comprehensive  reviews  of  DoD  MC&G  plans, 
programs,  and  budgets  be  performed  annually.   Further,  OSD  and 
OJCS  should  ensure  that  intelligence,  hydrographic,  and  bathymetric 
collection  is  addressed  during  these  reviews. 
Readiness  and  Responsiveness 
1.  That  OSD  and  OJCS  monitor  carefully  the  requirements  versus 
resources  gap,  and  ensure  that  all  appropriate  corrective  action 
is  taken  to  reduce  it. 
2.  That  zero-based  operational,  development,  and  war  reserve 
requirements  reviews  be  conducted  regularly  to  determine  the 
minimum  essential  data  content,  resolution,  and  accuracy  needed 
H-l
for  MC&G  products.  These  reviews  should  be  strongly  supported  to 
ensure  that  only  essential  requirements  are  being  stated. 
3.  That  OSD ,  OJCS,  Navy,  and  DMA  thoroughly  analyze  requirements 
for  bathymetric  collection.   OSD  and  OJCS  should  fund  the  minimum 
level  of  collection  required  to  satisfy  them.   Further,  DMA  should 
continue  to  pursue  technological  advances  in  bathymetric  collection 
4.  That  DMA's  production  system  replacement  —  the  Exploitation 
Modernization  Program  —  continue  on  schedule  to  accommodate 
mandatory  source  changes. 
5.  That  the  MC&G  distribution  system  be  modified.  Communications 
connectivity  must  be  assured  and  automation  should  be  used  to  the 
maximum  extent  possible. 
6.  That  DMA  and  the  Military  Departments  correct  doctrinal  defi- 
ciencies for  both  operational  use  and  logistical  concepts.   This 
action  should  include  terms  of  reference  for  war  reserve  stocks. 
The  U&S  Commands  should  incorporate  MC&G  products  into  their  Time- 
Phased  Force  and  Deployment  Data. 
7.  That  DMA's  already  extensive  participation  in  both  OJCS  and  U&S 
Command  exercises  be  extended  to  test  crisis  and  wartime  respon- 
siveness and  flexibility. 
Organization 
1.  That,  for  the  near  term,  DMA's  organization  be  left  essentially 
in  its  present  form.   DMA  should  determine  and  implement,  as  early 
as  possible,  the  organizational  changes  available  as  segments  of 
the  Exploitation  Modernization  Program  become  operational. 
2.  That  DMA  improve  communication  and  coordination  with  its  users 
relative  to  requirements  and  user  priorities. 
3.  That  DMA  continue  its  planning  efforts  to  ensure  it  can  transi- 
tion rapidly  and  smoothly  to  wartime  operations. 
Functions 
That  the  geodetic  and  geophysical  data  collection  program  be 
reviewed  to  determine  the  most  efficient  and  effective  course  of 
action.   The  review  should  be  performed  by  DMA  and  coordinated 
with  the  Military  Departments,  The  results  of  this  review  should 
be  provided  to  CJCS  and  ASD(C  I)  for  action.   The  Geodetic  Survey 
Squadron  should  remain  in  DMA  pending  the  results  of  this  review. 
Efficiency.  Economy,  and  Effectiveness 
That  DMA  continue  its  Military  Department  research  and  development 
staff  and  command  liaison  programs  as  well  as  the  Effectiveness/ 
Productivity  Program. 
H-2
Manpower  and  Budget 
1.  That  DMA  not  be  reduced  by  manpower  reductions  identified  in 
Title  VI  of  the  Goldwater-Nichols  Act. 
2.  That  requirements  and  budget  considerations  drive  future  DMA 
manpower  authorizations. 
3.  That  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  Defense  (Force  Management  and 
Personnel)  and  the  CJCS  review  the  Combat  Support  Agency  military 
manpower  billets  against  Joint  Duty  Assignment  Criteria  and,  where 
appropriate,  designate  billets  as  joint  duty  assignment  positions. 
II.   HISTORY 
In  November  1971,  President  Nixon  signed  an  Executive  Order 
directing  the  establishment  of  the  Defense  Mapping  Agency  effective 
January  1,  1972.   DoD  was  directed  to  combine  the  three  Military 
Department  mapping  organizations  under  arrangements  that  provided 
for  optimum  efficiency  and  economy  in  production  without  impairing 
legitimate  requirements  of  the  separate  Military  Departments. 
Resources  and  personnel  were  transferred  from  the  Army,  Navy,  Air 
Force,  and  DIA  to  form  DMA.   The  Agency  became  operational  July  1, 
1972.   The  reporting  chain  was  through  JCS  to  the  Secretary  of 
Defense. 
Further  realignment  took  place  in  1978  when  the  Agency' s  Hydro- 
graphic  Center  was  moved  from  its  site  in  Suitland,  Maryland  and 
combined  with  the  Topographic  Center  in  Brookmont,  Maryland.   The 
new  Hydrographic/Topographic  Center  (HTC)  had  more  flexibility  to 
respond  to  changes  in  requirements,  priorities,  and  technology. 
It  could  balance  production  between  hydrographic  and  topographic 
programs  and  use  common  data  bases  and  production  technology. 
This  move,  while  retaining  the  separate  visibility  of  hydrographic 
and  topographic  programs,  resulted  in  improved  responsiveness  to 
the  Military  Departments,  increased  production  effectiveness,  and 
lowered  production  costs. 
The  Office  of  Distribution  Services  —  now  named  the  Combat  Support 
Center  —  was  created  concurrent  with  formation  of  the  HTC.   It 
centralized  management  over  DMA  distribution  activities  that  had 
been  managed  along  separate  product  lines  by  each  of  the  DMA 
production  centers.   The  consolidation  of  distribution  activities 
provided  considerable  dollar  savings  and  improved  efficiency 
significantly. 
The  DMA  Special  Program  Office  for  Exploitation  Modernization  was 
established  as  a  result  of  a  1982  study  conducted  to  determine  the 
future  of  MC&G  technology  as  it  related  to  the  DMA  mission.   It 
was  chartered  to  develop  and  implement,  by  the  early  1990s,  a  new 
generation  of  advanced  technology  production  systems  specifically 
designed  to  use  digital  image  source  material.   The  resulting 
Exploitation  Modernization  Program  (EMiJ)  wa.^  directed  by  OSD  and 
endorsed  by  the  congress. 
H-3
III.   MISSION,  OVERSIGHT,  AND  ADDITIONAL  LEGISLATION 
Mission 
In  accordance  with  its  charter,  DoD  Directive  5105.40,  DMA's 
mission  is  to  provide  Mapping,  Charting,  and  Geodetic  (MC&G) 
support  and  services  to  the  Secretary  of  Defense,  CJCS,  the 
Military  Departments,  and  other  DoD  Components  through  the  pro- 
duction and  worldwide  distribution  of  maps,  charts,  precise 
positioning  data,  and  digital  data  for  strategic  and  tactical 
military  operations  and  weapon  systems.   This  includes  land,  sea, 
and  air  navigation  products  and  other  products  that  become  an 
integral  part  of  strategic  and  tactical  weapon  systems.   The 
Director  of  DMA  is  the  program  manager  and  coordinator  for  all  DoD 
MC&G  resources  and  activities.   Further,  DMA  carries  out  statutory 
responsibility  to  provide  nautical  charts  and  marine  navigation 
data  for  the  use  of  all  U.S.  vessels  and  aircraft. 
Mission  Alignment  Alternatives 
Although  alternatives  to  DMA  performing  the  MC&G  production  mission 
were  considered,  none  are  recommended.   Most  interviewees  noted 
that  the  consolidation  of  Military  Department  MC&G  production 
activities  into  a  separate  DoD  Agency  resulted  in  significant 
dollar  savings  and  improved  efficiency.   All  alternatives  considered 
—  disestablishing  the  Agency  and  returning  assets  to  the  Military 
Departments,  making  one  of  the  Military  Departments  executive 
agent,  selectively  moving  MC&G  production  responsibility  to  one  or 
more  Military  Departments  —  proved  too  costly  to  be  considered 
viable. 
Oversight 
DMA  is  a  separate  agency  of  DoD  under  the  direction,  authority 3 
and  control  of  USD(A) .   Staff  supervision  is  provided  by  ASD(C  I) 
with  operational  advice  from  CJCS. 
Established  oversight  mechanisms  exist  and  work  effectively. 
However,  significant  problems  exist  that  impede  DMA's  mission 
performance.   Greater  OSD  and  OJCS  support  is  required  to  ensure 
that  adequate  resources,  money,  manpower,  and  collection,  exist 
to  fulfill  mission  requirements. 
Most  interviewees  agreed  that  the  OJCS  MC&G  requirements  priority 
system,  which  drives  DMA's  production  schedule,  should  be  revised. 
The  current  approach,  documented  in  Annex  E  of  the  Joint  Strategic 
Planning  Document,  differentiates  among  MC&G  priorities,  qualifying 
the  importance  of  each  requirement  to  its  related  combat  operation. 
The  concept  is  prone  to  individual  interpretation  and  priority 
inflation.   It  defeats  the  objective  of  responsive  production, 
that  is,  satisfying  the  most  urgent  requirement  first.   Currently, 
almost  60  percent  of  DMA  resources  are  driven  by  OJCS  priority  one 
—  strategic  nuclear  forces  —  requirements.   Over  25  percent  are 
driven  by  priority  two  —  theater  operational  plans  —  and  12  percent 
H-4
support  critical  aeronautical  and  marine  safety  of  navigation. 
This  leaves  only  3  to  5  percent  of  DMA  resources  for  the  most 
likely  use  of  DMA  products  —  crisis  and  contingency  response  and 
low  intensity  conflict.   A  proposal  that  uses  operational  needs  to 
set  priorities  has  been  submitted  to  OJCS  for  staffing.   Coordi- 
nation between  the  Military  Departments  and  DMA  on  emerging  weapon, 
command  and  control,  and  intelligence  system  MC&G  requirements 
should  be  improved.   Adequate  provisions  do  not  exist. to  identify 
unique  MC&G  capabilities  required  to  operate  these  weapons  and 
systems  when  each  system  is  first  approved  for  development. 
Consequently,  even  major  projects  may  be  approved  that  require 
unique  MC&G  support  which  is  not  identified  until  after  the  projects 
are  complete.   Follow-on  efforts  to  meet  these  requirements  waste 
valuable  resources  and  delay  other  vitally  needed  production  and 
management  efforts. 
The  DoD  Program  Decision  Memorandum  (PDM)  of  August  1985  directed 
the  Military  Departments  to  identify  and  fund  "new  and  unique" 
MC&G  requirements  for  developmental  systems.   The  Deputy  Secretary 
of  Defense  subsequently  issued  guidance,  including  the  requirement 
for  an  explicit  assessment  of  MC&G  requirements  versus  DMA  capabil- 
ities to  be  submitted  at  sequential  milestones  in  the  systems 
acquisition  review  process.   Specific  instructions,  however,  have 
not  been  published  by  OSD  and  the  Military  Departments  have  not 
implemented  the  PDM  guidance. 
A  systematic,  comprehensive  planning,  programming,  and  budgeting 
review  of  DoD  MC&G  activities  should  be  initiated.   The  DMA  Director 
is  the  Program  Manager  and  coordinator  for  all  DoD  MC&G  resources 
and  activities.   This  role  allows  DMA  to  review  execution  of  all 
DoD  plans,  programs,  and  policies  for  MC&G  activities  not  assigned 
to  DMA.   It  also  reviews  Military  Department  programs  and  fiscal 
documents  related  to  DoD  MC&G  matters  and  recommends  appropriate 
action  to  OSD.   MC&G  data  collection  requirements  are  established 
and/or  consolidated  by  DMA  and  submitted  to  OSD.   OSD,  in  turn, 
verifies  and  sets  priorities  for  collection.   DMA  establishes  DoD 
MC&G  research  and  development  requirements  in  coordination  with 
OSD,  and  tasks  other  DoD  Components  or  commercial  contractors.   On 
behalf  of  OJCS,  DMA  reviews  and  validates  all  departmental  and 
Combatant  Command  MC&G  requirements  submissions.   However,  a  more 
cohesive,  comprehensive  DoD  MC&G  program  should  be  developed  that 
considers  requirements  with  resources,  collection  capability  with 
validated  requirements,  and  MC&G  deficiencies  with  combat  readiness. 
Oversight  Alternatives 
Alternative  1:   Change  the  oversight  function  so  that  both 
operational  and  policy  oversight  are  provided  bv  CJCS. 
This  alternative  appears  to  be  in  consonance  with  the  Goldwater- 
Nichols  Act  since  DMA  is  a  Combat  Support  Agency.   Additionally, 
it  could  improve  the  link  between  Combatant  Command  MC&G  require- 
ments and  resources.   Unfortunately,  action  to  strengthen  the  link 
to  the  commands  weakens  the  link  to  the  weapon  and  systems 
H-5
development  community.   Both  links  should  be  strengthened.   Moving 
the  oversight  to  OJCS  would  create  new  problems. 
Alternative  2:   Leave  policy  oversight  in  USD(A)  with  operational 
aflvice  from  CJCS :  improve  oversight  of  DMA  and  the  DqD  MC&G 
community. 
Placement  of  DMA  oversight  appears  proper;  and,  adequate  mechanisms 
exist  to  exercise  it  effectively.   The  current  problems  relate  to 
exercise  of  these  mechanisms,  and  whether  OJCS  and  OSD  control  and 
identify  operational  and  new  development  MC&G  requirements. 
Alternative  3:   Leave  policy  oversight  in  USD(A)  with  operational. 
advice  from  CJCS:  improve  oversight  of  DMA  and  the  DoD  MC&G 
community-   Provide  authority  to  the  Combat  Support  Agencies  to 
participate  more  directly  in  the  DoD  planning,  programming,  and 
budgeting  process  for  all  matters  concerning  their  mission  area. 
This  alternative  embodies  all  points  in  Alternative  2  and  provides 
the  Combat  Support  Agency  Directors  oversight  authority  for  all 
DoD  programs  and  plans  within  their  mission  areas.   These  Directors 
should  have  increased  authority  to  approve  plans  for,  and  ensure 
interoperability  and  connectivity  among,  the  wholesale  and  retail, 
strategic  and  tactical,  and  long  haul  portions  of  their  combat 
support  mission  areas.   Direct  involvement  in  the  PPBS  process  is 
needed  to  ensure  that  the  Combat  Support  Agencies  are  able  to 
perform  the  increased  responsibility  they  were  assigned  by  the 
Defense  Reorganization  Act. 
conclusions 
1.  DMA's  products  and  services  are  critical  to  successful  mission 
accomplishment. 
2.  DMA  provides  products  and  services  common  to  more  than  one 
Military  Department.   Although  some  products  are  unique  to  a 
single  Military  Department,  no  DMA  product  line  transfer  would 
result  in  increased  efficiency,  economy,  or  effectiveness. 
3.  Transferring  the  MC&G  production  mission  to  the  Military  Depart- 
ments would  require  significant  increases  in  manpower  and  other 
resources. 
4.  Policy  oversight  by  USD (A)  with  operational  advice  from  CJCS  is 
the  most  appropriate  oversight  mechanism.   However,  greater  OJCS 
and  OSD  support  is  required  to  ensure  that  adequate  resources 
—  money,  manpower,  and  collection  —  exist  to  fulfill  mission 
requirements . 
5.  Changes  are  needed  to  ensure  that  the  Combat  Support  Agencies 
have  sufficient  authority  to  perform  the  expanded  responsibilities 
they  were  assigned  by  the  Defense  Reorganization  Act. 
6.  The  current  OJCS  MC&G  requirements  priority  system  is  conducive 
H-6
to  priority  inflation,  misdirection  of  production  priorities  and 
schedules,  and  neglect  of  products  required  for  Third  World  areas. 
7.  coordination  between  ASD(C3I) ,  the  Military  Departments  weapon 
system  developers  and  DMA  is  frequently  untimely  and  unsystematic. 
This  situation  may  result  in  delays  and  unsupported  systems  being 
fielded  with  the  forces. 
8.  The  Program  Decision  Memorandum  for  1985,  directing  the  Military 
Departments  to  identify  and  fund  with  development  proposals  the 
new,  unique  MC&G  requirements  these  weapons  and  systems  require, 
has  not  been  implemented. 
9.  Systematic,  comprehensive  planning,  programming,  and  budgeting 
reviews  of  DoD  MC&G  activities  should  be  performed. 
Recommendations 
1.  That  DMA  continue  to  perform  the  DoD  MC&G  production .mission. 
2.  That  oversight  is  properly  placed  with  policy  provided  by  the 
USD(A)  with  operational  advice  from  C JCS ;  but  it  should  be  improved. 
Both  OSD  and  OJCS  should  review  the  requirements  versus  resources 
—  manpower,  money,  and  collection  —  gap  and  initiate  corrective 
action  as  appropriate. 
3.  That  the  Director  of  DMA  be  given  the  authority  to  fulfill  the 
expanded  mission  outlined  for  Combat  Support  Agencies  in  the 
Defense  Reorganization  Act.   Combat  Support  Agency  Directors 
should  participate  more  fully  in  the  DoD  PPBS  process  for  all 
matters  affecting  their  mission  area. 
4.  That  OJCS  revise  its  requirements  priority  system  to  allow  DMA 
to  reform  its  programming  for,  and  execution  of,  MC&G  production 
to  satisfy  requirements  more  in  line  with  operational  priorities. 
5.  That  OSD  and  the  Military  Departments  codify  the  1985  Program 
Decision  Memorandum  directing  the  Military  Departments  to  identify 
and  fund,  with  development  proposals,  the  new,  unique  MC&G  require- 
ments for7weapons  and  systems.   Further,  the  Military  Departments 
and  ASD(C  I),  and  weapon  system  developers  must  improve  coordination 
with  DMA. 
6.  That  systematic,  comprehensive  reviews  of  DoD  MC&G  plans, 
programs,  and  budgets  be  performed  annually.   Further,  OSD  and 
OJCS  should  ensure  that  intelligence,  hydrographic ,  and  bathymetric 
collection  is  addressed  during  these  reviews. 
IV.   READINESS,  RESPONSIVENESS,  AND  RELATED  ADDITIONAL  LEGISLATION 
Readiness  and  Responsiveness 
DMA  does  not  have  sufficient  resources,  equipment,  or  source 
materials  to  provide  all  required  products  and  services.   The 
H-7
requirements  priority  system  skews  DMA's  ability  to  be  responsive 
to  the  Combatant  Commanders.   Further,  DMA  has  only  limited  control 
over  the  proliferation  of  developmental  weapon  and  system  related 
MC&G  requirements. 
DMA's  most  significant  problem  is  availability  of  resources  versus 
requirements.   Over  25  DoD  and  non-DoD  users  submit  MC&G  Area 
Requirements  Reports  to  DMA.   The  gap  between  available  resources 
and  unfilled,  validated  user  requirements  currently  equates  to  a 
$680  million  backlog.   No  measurable  improvement  is  in  sight  until 
the  early  1990s.   If  recent  funding  trends  continue,  almost  one 
half  of  the  current  backlog  will  still  be  unsatisfied  at  the  end 
of  the  five  year  program,  ranging  from  digital  products  to  guide 
and  target  strategic  nuclear  weapons  to  MC&G  products  for  forces 
employed  in  low  intensity  conflict.   Enclosure  2  lists  the  major 
MC&G  products  and  services  addressed  in  the  Area  Requirements 
submission. 
Operational  requirements  continue  to  grow.  Of  particular  concern 
are  large,  inadequately  mapped  areas  susceptible  to  low  intensity 
conflict  in  the  Third  World.  New  weapons  and  systems  continue  to 
be  approved  that  require  tailored  navigational  and  targeting  data. 
Command,  control,  and  intelligence  systems  are  being  fielded  that 
require  large  quantities  of  aeronautic,  topographic,  and  hydro- 
graphic  data. 
DMA  is  trying  to  discipline  the  requirements  process  by  directing 
zero-based  reviews.   In  the  past,  the  large  volume  users  of  DMA 
products  —  namely,  the  Unified  and  Specified  (U&S)  Commands  and 
the  Intelligence  Community  —  submitted  all  the  requirements  they 
considered  valid.   Existing  shortfalls  demand  that  requirements  be 
scrubbed  and  reduced  to  minimum  essential  needs.   DMA  needs  OSD 
and  OJCS  support  to  ensure  that  these  reviews  are  performed. 
To  counteract  source  material  deficiencies,  DMA  has  taken  steps  to 
use  available  source  materials  and  obtain  new  materials  through 
international  agreements.  •  On  a  limited  basis,  the  Agency  uses 
commercial  satellite  photography  such  as  LANDSAT  and  SPOT.   Approx- 
imately one  fourth  of  the  maps,  charts,  and  digital  data  provided 
to  the  Combatant  Commands  are  provided  through  international 
agreements  with  about  200  mapping  agencies  in  83  countries. 
DMA's  production  system  is  a  major  contributor  to  its  readiness 
and  responsiveness  deficiencies.   Current  production  system  capa- 
bilities evolved  as  technology  advanced  and  were  installed  incre- 
mentally as  resources  became  available.   Current  production  methods 
are  dispersed  among  various  subsystems;  many  are  labor  intensive. 
The  flow  of  products  through  the  production  pipeline  is  affected 
by  bottlenecks  and  by  intermediate  transformations  among  paper, 
film,  digital,  and  lithographic  media.   Some  component  processes 
are  digital  and,  while  they  accrue  economies,  production  cycle 
times  are  lengthy.   Topographic  maps,  for  example,  require  about 
18  months  from  raw  data  to  the  finished  sheet  in  the  cupola  of  the 
tank,  where  they  are  indispensable.   Similarly,  the  MC&G  support 
H-8
for  a  cruise  missile  mission  package  normally  takes  a  year  and  a 
half  to  create. 
A  change  in  national  level  imagery  forced  DMA  into  a  major  techno- 
logical upgrade  —  the  Exploitation  Modernization  Program  (EMP). 
This  development,  when  completed,  will  significantly  improve 
readiness,  responsiveness,  and  efficiency.   The  second  phase  of 
the  development  -the  Mark  90  system  —  is  a  full  production  system 
replacement  that  will  allow  DMA  to  perform  digital  or  softcopy 
operations  to  achieve  both  a  75  percent  reduction  in  throughput 
time  and  a  50  percent  decrease  in  production  work  hours.   It  will 
be  completed  in  1992. 
DMA's  readiness  and  responsiveness  is  also  affected  by  its  distri- 
bution system.   Although  an  automated  inventory  management  system 
was  added  to  the  continental  U.S.  warehouses  and  the  Washington, 
D  C  facility,  many  functions  are  still  manual.   Direct  support  to 
deployed  and  rapidly  deployable  forces  is  also  manual.   The  entire 
process  would  benefit  from  greater  use  of  automated  systems; 
improved  communications  connectivity  between  and  among  DMA  elements 
and  the  commands;  better  storage,  location,  bar  coding  and  retrieval 
systems  for  the  warehouses;  and  less  dependence  on  bulk  stock 
shipment. 
DMA's  capability  to  provide  distribution  support  for  limited 
contingency  and  crisis  operations  has  been  tested  and  is  considered 
satisfactory.   Coordination  with  requesters  works  well  and  products 
are  delivered  within  the  required  timeframes.   During  FY  1986,  the 
Center  was  involved  in  30  crisis  support  actions  during  which  150 
thousand  copies  of  845  products  were  delivered.   However,  the 
distribution  system  should  be  reviewed  and  modified  as  required  to 
provide  wartime  support.   Storage  and  distribution  tasks  are  not 
clear! \  allocated  among  DMA  and  the  Combatant  Commands,   v/artime 
distribution  seems  satisfactory  only  from  the  standpoint  of  getting 
bulk  stocks  to  transportation  points.   The  weakest  link  in  the 
wartime  distribution  system,  as  demonstrated  in  OJCS  exercises ,  is 
the  storage  and  movement  of  bulk  map  stocks  into  the  hands  of  tne 
users   Since  the  U&S  Commands  do  not  incorporate  MC&G  products 
into  their  Time-Phased  Force  and  Deployment  Data,  this  situation 
is  likely  to  continue. 
Some  aspects  of  MC&G  doctrine  and  logistical  requirements,  such  as 
the  terms  of  reference  for  war  reserve  stocks,  require  review. 
DMA  is  working  with  the  Military  Departments  to  correct  doctrinal 
deficiencies, aiming  for  better  standardization,  /erms  of  referee 
for  war  reserve  stocks  of  maps  and  charts  required  by  the  Combatant 
Commands  are  needed  to  determine  whether  the  apparent  38  million 
copy  shortfall  is  real.   This  shortfall  comprises  an  estimated  17 
million  maps  and  charts  not  yet  produced  and  21  million  existing 
maps  and  charts  that  have  not  been  printed.   Such  a  shortfall  can 
have  a  significant  effect  on  DMA  responsiveness,  and  ultimately  on 
combatant  Commands  mission  performance.   The  war  reserve  picture 
is  unclear  since  it  does  not  count  stock  in  DMA  storage  or  held  by 
the  commands.   It  also  excludes  the  large  contingency  and  training 
H-9
stocks.   DMA  is  assessing  the  doctrinal  issue  of  war  reserve 
stockage,  including  these  additional  stocks  which  are  substantial 
in  some  cases. 
The  war  reserve  printing  shortfall,  noted  above,  is  attributed 
both  to  the  lack  of  DMA  printing  capacity  and  of  resources  needed 
to  expand  this  capacity.  DMA  managers  expressed  concern  that 
stock  levels  requested  by  the  commands  may  not  be  realistic.   DMA 
is  reluctant  to  commit  printing  resources  before  agreement  is 
reached  on  realistic  stock  levels. 
Exercise  Participation 
DMA  participates  extensively  in  OJCS  command  post  exercises  and 
supports  some  80  other  command  post  and  field  training  exercises 
annually.   This  fosters  readiness  and  responsiveness.   But  typically 
for  exercise  support,  long  lead  times  are  prescribed,  so  timely 
reaction  is  not  fully  tested.   DMA  officials  believe  that  some 
exercise  support  should  be  purposely  scheduled  for  rapid  reaction 
to  better  test  and  measure  the  Agency's  wartime  flexibility  and 
versatility. 
Conclusions 
1.  Within  existing  resource  constraints,  DMA  carries  out  its 
assigned  mission  in  a  responsive  manner. 
2.  A  major  $680  million  shortfall  exists  in  unsatisfied  requirements. 
DMA  will  not  be  able  to  satisfy  more  than  half  of  the  users'  critical 
requirements  between  now  and  the  early  1990s.   New  weapons  and 
systems  currently  under  development  may  further  extend  that  date. 
3.  The  requirements  gap  affects  combat  readiness  for  operations  in 
many  areas,  especially  with  respect  to  contingencies  and  crises  in 
the  Third  World  where  low  intensity  conflict  is  most  probable. 
4.  Requirements  continue  to  grow  for  standard  products  as  well  as 
for  newly  developed  systems. 
5.  MC&G  requirements  historically  have  been  unconstrained.   Prior- 
ities for  both  operational  requirements  and  war  reserve  quantities 
are  subject  to  inflation.   DMA  is  undertaking  several  initiatives 
to  combat  this  unconstrained  requirements  growth. 
6.  Source  data  are  deficient  in  quality  and  quantity.   This  situ- 
ation is  expected  to  persist.   DMA  has  taken  steps  to  find  alter- 
native source  materials.   Additionally,  an  acquisition  deficiency 
continues  in  bathymetry.   DMA  does  not  control  this  collection 
program  and  cannot  directly  influence  its  budget. 
7.  DMA's  production  system  is  a  major  contributor  to  its  readiness 
and  responsiveness  deficiencies.   The  system  is  labor  intensive, 
slow,  and  cumbersome.   It  was  designed  to  use  a  primary  collection 
source  that  is  no  longer  operational.   Total  production  cycle 
H-10
times  are  lengthy.   Limited  crisis  support  is  adequate  when  needs 
can  be  met  with  previously  produced  or  processed  resources,  but 
procedures  are  too  slow  to  support  crises  with  new  products. 
8.  The  wartime  distribution  system  requires  modification.   It  is 
insufficiently  automated  and  lacks  survivability.   Interoperability 
between  depots  and  combat  support  elements  is  hampered  by  the 
slowness  of  bulk  hardcopy  handling,  transporting,  and  rehandling, 
and  cannot  be  depended  upon  to  deliver  products  efficiently. 
9.  Storage  and  distribution  tasks  are  not  clearly  allocated  among 
DMA  and  the  operational  commands.   This  may  result  in  poor  coordi- 
nation, inadequate  communications,  depleted  theater  assets,  and 
degraded  combat  readiness. 
10.  MC&G  doctrine  lacks  clarity  and  standardization.   Since  the 
U&S  Commands  do  not  incorporate  MC&G  products  into  their  Time- 
Phased  Force  and  Deployment  Data,  this  situation  is  likely  to 
continue. 
11.  DMA  participation  in  OJCS  command  post  exercises  is  improving. 
Its  support  of  command  post  and  field  training  exercises  is  sub- 
stantial, although  current  practice  does  not  completely  test  DMA 
crisis  and  wartime  responsiveness. 
Recommendations 
1.  That  OSD  and  OJCS  monitor  carefully  the  requirements  versus 
resources  gap  and  ensure  that  all  appropriate  corrective  action  is 
taken  to  reduce  it. 
2.  That  zero-based  operational,  development,  and  war  reserve 
requirements  reviews  be  conducted  regularly  to  determine  the 
minimum  essential  data  content,  resolution,  and  accuracy  needed 
for  MC&G  products.   These  reviews  should  be  strongly  supported  to 
ensure  that  only  essential  requirements  are  being  stated. 
3.  That  OSD,  OJCS,  Navy,  and  DMA  thoroughly  analyze  requirements 
for  bathymetric  collection.   OSD  and  OJCS  should  fund  the  minimum 
level  of  collection  required  to  satisfy  them.   Further,  DMA  should 
continue  to  pursue  technological  advances  in  bathymetric  collection. 
4.  That  DMA's  production  system  replacement  —  the  Exploitation 
Modernization  Program  —  continue  on  schedule  to  accommodate 
mandatory  source  changes. 
5.  That  the  MC&G  distribution  system  be  modified.  Communications 
connectivity  must  be  assured  and  automation  should  be  used  to  the 
maximum  extent  possible. 
6.  That  DMA  and  the  Military  Departments  correct  doctrinal 
deficiencies  for  both  operational  use  and  logistical  concepts. 
This  action  should  include  terms  of  reference  for  war  reserve 
stocks.   The  U&S  Commands  should  incorporate  MC&G  products  into 
H-ll
their  Time-Phased  Force  and  Deployment  Data. 
7.  That  DMA's  already  extensive  participation  in  both  OJCS  and  U&S 
Command  exercises  be  extended  to  test  crisis  and  wartime  responsive- 
ness and  flexibility. 
V.   ORGANIZATION,  FUNCTIONS,  EFFICIENCY,  ECONOMY,  AND  EFFECTIVENESS 
Organization 
DMA's  organization,  displayed  at  enclosure  1,  consists  of  a  head- 
quarters element  and  seven  components  as  follows: 
—  Headquarters  DMA,  located  in  Washington,  D.C. 
—  The  Aerospace  Center  (AC) ,  one  of  DMA's  two  principal 
production  facilities,  consisting  of  a  base  plant  located  in  St. 
Louis,  Missouri  and  a  field  office  located  in  Kansas  City,  Missouri. 
—  The  Hydrographic/Topographic  Center  (HTC) ,  the  other  prin- 
cipal production  facility,  consisting  of  a  base  plant  located  in 
Brookmont,  Maryland;  two  field  offices  located  in  Louisville, 
Kentucky  and  San  Antonio,  Texas;  and  a  Geodetic  Survey  Squadron 
based  at  F.E.  Warren  AFB  near  Cheyenne,  Wyoming. 
—  The  DMA  Systems  Center  located  in  Tysons  Corner,  Virginia. 
—  The  Combat  Support  Center  consisting  of  a  headquarters 
located  in  Brookmont,  Maryland,  distribution  centers  in  Pennsylvania 
and  Utah,  in-theater  distribution  centers  located  in  Germany  and 
Hawaii,  and  ten  smaller  centers  located  around  the  world. 
—  The  Defense  Mapping  School  located  at  Ft.  Belvoir,  Virginia. 
—  The  Office  of  Telecommunications  Service  located  in  Reston, 
Virginia. 
—  The  Inter-American  Geodetic  Survey  (IAGS)  responsible  for 
cooperative  mapping  and  charting  agreements  conducted  jointly 
between  the  U.S.  and  national  mapping  agencies  in  Latin  American 
countries.   Its  headquarters  is  located  in  San  Antonio,  Texas. 
IAGS  operates  a  cartographic  training  school  in  the  Panama  Canal 
area  to  assist  Latin  American  cartographic  agencies  in  the  training 
of  production  personnel.   IAGS  also  has  field  project  offices  in 
15  Latin  American  countries,  including  Panama,  to  provide  on-site 
technical  assistance.   These  countries,  in  turn,  produce  MC&G 
products  in  accordance  with  agreed  upon  specifications  that  satisfy 
DoD  requirements. 
Organizational  changes  should  be  explored  to  improve  coordination 
with  users.   Interviewees  suggested  that  they  need  to  deal  with 
too  many  different  DMA  organizations  to  get  questions  answered  and 
problems  resolved.   MC&G  staff  officers  in  the  commands  are 
required  to  talk  to  different  points  of  contact  in  DMA  headquarters 
H-12
and  its  operating  components.   Communication  with  users  relative 
to  required  products  and  their  priorities  should  be  channeled 
through  a  single  DMA  office. 
DMA  has  the  organizational  capability  to  convert  to  wartime  oper- 
ation; however,  at  present,  this  conversion  is  not  likely  to  take 
place  as  smoothly  and  quickly  as  would  be  required.  DMA's  Combat 
Support  Plan,  when  fully  implemented,  will  fill  significant  voids 
in  DMA's  wartime  preparedness. 
Conclusions 
1.  The  present  peacetime  organizational  structure  is  satisfactory 
for  existing  operations  and  capabilities,  but  may  be  unsuitable 
for  changing  needs  in  the  future. 
2.  For  the  near  term,  no  viable  alternative  to  DMA's  current 
organization  exists,  but  organizational  dysfunctions  causing 
communications  difficulties  for  users  should  be  corrected. 
Implementation  of  the  Exploitation  Modernization  Program  (EMP) 
will  permit  DMA  to  restructure  its  organization  to  take  advantage 
of  the  many  potential  benefits  the  EMP  should  provide. 
3.  DMA  has  the  organizational  capability  to  transition  to  wartime 
operations;  however  this  conversion  is  not  likely  to  take  place  as 
smoothly  or  quickly  as  may  be  required. 
Recommendations 
1.  That,  for  the  near  term,  DMA's  organization  be  left  essentially 
in  its  present  form.   DMA  should  determine  and  implement,  as  early 
as  possible,  the  organizational  changes  available  as  segments  of 
the  Exploitation  Modernization  Program  become  operational. 
2.  That  DMA  improve  communication  and  coordination  with  its  users 
relative  to  requirements  and  user  priorities. 
3.  That  DMA  continue  its  planning  efforts  to  ensure  it  can  transi- 
tion rapidly  and  smoothly  to  wartime  operations. 
Functions 
DMA's  functions  are: 
—  Providing  timely  support  of  the  validated,  global  needs  of 
the  Armed  Forces  for  MC&G  products,  data,  and  services. 
—  Performing  program  management  and  coordination  functions 
for  all  DoD  MC&G  resources  and  activities. 
  On  behalf  of  CJCS ,  reviewing  MC&G  requirements  both  for 
validity  and  relative  priority  and  providing  a  consolidated 
requirements  statement. 
H-13
—  Providing  staff  advice  and  assistance  on  MC&G  matters  to 
OSD,  the  Military  Departments,  0JC3,  other  DoD  Components,  and 
other  Government  Agencies,  as  appropriate. 
.   —  In  coordination  with  the  Under  Secretary  of  Defense  for 
Policy,  establishing  policies  and  providing  DoD  participation 
in  national  and  international  MC&G  activities.   DMA  executes 
DoD  responsibilities  under  interagency  and  international  MC&G 
agreements . 
—  Establishing  and/or  consolidating3MC&G  data  collection 
requirements  and  providing  them  to  ASD(C  I).   OSD  is  responsible 
for  verifying  and' setting  priorities  for  these  collection  require- 
ments.  DMA  collects  or  tasks  other  DoD  components  to  collect  or 
provide  necessary  data. 
—  Establishing  MC&G  RDT&E  requirements  in  coordination  with 
USD(A).   DMA  tasks  the  Military  Departments  or  private  contractors 
to  accomplish  these  requirements. 
Major  shifts  in  Geodetic  and  Geophysical  (G&G)  program  requirements 
are  taking  place  and  could  result  in  the  need  to  realign  functions 
and  organizations  involved  in  data  collection  and  processing.   The 
Navy's  TRIDENT  program  originally  projected  an  extensive  need  for 
gravity  data,  but  these  requirements  will  be  reduced  significantly 
through  FY  90,  to  be  activated  again  in  FY  91.   A  DMA  core  capability 
—  workforce  and  skills  —  for  collecting  and  processing  gravity 
data  must  be  maintained  during  the  interim  period.   In  addition, 
decisions  in  the  small  ICBM  and  RAIL  PEACEKEEPER  programs  have  the 
potential  to  add  extensive  new  requirements  for  gravity  data. 
The  Geodetic  Survey  Squadron  (GSS)  mission  is  central  to  DMA's  G&G 
program.   Certain  tasks  currently  assigned  under  that  mission 
should  be  reviewed.   Included  are  precise  geodetic  surveys  to 
support  national  missile  test  ranges  and  inertial  navigation  system 
(INS)  positioning  surveys  on   airfields  to  support  Strategic  Air 
Command  and  the  combatant  commands  *  tactical  air  forces.   Many  of 
these  surveys  are  accomplished  by  uniformed  Air  Force  surveyors 
assigned  to  DMA's  GSS.   The  high  order  INS  surveys  will  need  to  be 
continued  in  wartime,  including  the  possibility  for  operations  in 
hostile  areas.   This  mission  may  best  be  accomplished  by  theater 
operational  forces.   Survey  support  to  the  national  missile  ranges 
should  also  be  reviewed  to  determine  if  certain  functions  are 
appropriate  for  the  DMA  GSS. 
Conclusions 
1.  DMA  functions  are  appropriate  to  performance  of  its  mission. 
2.  Major  shifts  in  geodetic  and  geophysical  program  requirements 
could  result  in  the  need  to  realign  functions  and  organizations 
involved  in  data  collection  and  processing. 
H-14
3.  Although  Geodetic  Survey  Squadron  (GSS)  functions  must  be  per- 
formed, the  GSS  mission  and  its  organizational  location  requires 
review. 
Recommendat  i  on 
That  the  geodetic  and  geophysical  data  collection  program  be 
reviewed  to  determine  the  most  efficient  and  effective  course  of 
action.   The  review  should  be  performed  by  DMA  and  coordinated 
with  the  Military  Departments-  The  results  of  this  review  should 
be  provided  to  CJCS  and  ASD(CTI)  for  action.   The  Geodetic  Survey 
Squadron  should  remain  in  DMA  pending  the  results  of  this  review. 
Efficiency.  Economy,  and  Effectiveness 
In  1972,  the  Agency  began  an  Effectiveness/Productivity  Program 
that  has  received  high  marks  by  GAO  and  others.   Over  500  actions 
have  been  implemented  with  savings  or  cost  avoidances,  exceeding 
$91  million  dollars.   In  1986,  DMA  components  submitted  over  $10 
million  in  savings  to  headquarters  for  validation.   Some  historical 
examples  are: 
—  The  original  consolidation  of  all  DoD  MC&G  activities  under 
a  separate  Agency  resulted  in  extensive  dollar  savings  and  improved 
efficiency. 
—  Refinements  to  the  FIREFINDER  digital  data  requirements 
saved  $5.5  million. 
—  Modification  of  the  printing  cycles  for  Flight  Information 
Publications  saved  $1.9  million. 
—  Change  in  the  grade  of  paper  on  which  maps  are  printed 
saved  $1.2  million. 
—  Consolidation  and  reorganization  of  Air  Target  Material 
production  resulted  in  301  military  manpower  positions  being 
returned  to  the  Air  Force. 
The  Effectiveness/Productivity  Program  is  based  on  a  classical 
input-output  relationship;  validated  savings  are  converted  to 
greater  service  for  DMA  customers.   In  1972,  a  goal  to  increase 
productivity  by  10  percent  over  three  years  was  established.   To 
the  end  of  FY  76,  the  cumulative  increase  in  productivity  was  19 
percent. 
The  shift  to  new  digital  product  lines  in  1977  had  an  adverse  near 
term  effect  on  productivity,  as  resources  directed  to  the  new 
digital  programs  offset  other  production  gains.   As  a  result, 
DMA's  production  declined  approximately  four  percent  between  FY  77 
H-15
and  FY  79.   This  trend  was  reversed  in  FY  80.   The  cumulative 
increase  since  the  program  began  is  32  percent.   (See  enclosure 
3.  ) 
DMA  also  has  other  programs  to  improve  efficiency,  effectiveness, 
and  economy.   A  few  examples  are: 
—  DMA  representatives  were  placed  on  the  Military-  Department 
research  and  development  staffs  to  provide  early  identification 
and  determination  of  MC&G  requirements  embedded  in  weapon,  command 
and  control,  and  intelligence  system  development  efforts. 
—  DMA  has  liaison  representatives  located  at  Combatant  Command 
headquarters  to  help  command  planners  determine  their  MC&G  require- 
ments and  ensure  they  are  documented  in  operational  and  contingency 
plans.   These  representatives  currently  are  located  at  headquarters 
elements  of  the  European  and  Strategic  Air  Commands.   They  plan  to 
provide  representatives  to  the  Central,  Special  Operations,  and 
Atlantic  Commands  by  June  1988;  and  for  the  Pacific,  Transportation, 
Southern,  Space,  and  Forces  Commands  by  June  1989. 
Conclusions 
1.  Since  its  establishment,  DMA  has  continually  improved  its 
efficiency,  effectiveness,  and  economy. 
2.  Within  existing  resource  constraints,  DMA  operates  with  effi- 
ciency, effectiveness,  and  economy.   It  has  operated  a  successful 
Effectiveness/Productivity  Program  since  1972  in  which  over  500 
actions  have  been  implemented  with  savings  or  cost  avoidances 
exceeding  $91  million.   From  1972,  when  DMA  became  operational, 
the  cumulative  increase  in  productivity  has  been  32  percent. 
3.  DMA  is  assigning  liaison  personnel  to  Military  Department 
research  and  development  staffs  to  assist  in  early  identification 
and  determination  of  MC&G  requirements  embedded  in  weapon,  command 
and  control,  and  intelligence  development  efforts. 
4.  DMA  liaison  personnel,  located  at  Combatant  Command  headquarters, 
help  command  planners  determine  their  MC&G  needs,  and  ensure  these 
needs  are  documented  in  operational  and  contingency  plan  annexes. 
These  representatives  currently  are  located  at  the  European  and 
Strategic  Air  commands,  and  will  be  provided  to  other  U&S  Commands 
by  the  end  of  FY  89. 
Recommendat  i  on 
That  DMA  continue  its  Military  Department  research  and  development 
staff  and  command  liaison  programs  as  well  as  the  Effectiveness/ 
Productivity  Program. 
VI.   BUDGET  AND  MANPOWER 
DMA's  FY  86  end  strength  was  9,782  billets.   It  represents  the 
H-16
entire  U.S.  military  MC&G  production  capacity.   Requirements  have 
grown  exponentially;  this  growth  is  expected  to  continue.   Neither 
dollars  nor  manpower  have  kept  pace  with  this  growth. 
The  Defense  Reorganization  Act  reduction  would  cut  489  billets  by 
end  FY  88  and  an  additional  473  by  end  FY  89.   DMA  cannot  absorb 
these  reductions  and  maintain  combat  readiness. 
Between  FY  73,  the  first  full  year  of  DMA*s  operation, .and  the  end 
of  FY  86,  manpower  shows  a  net  increase  of  1,000  billets.   During 
this  timeframe,  only  71  billets  were  added  specifically  to  deal 
with  the  extensive  backlog  in  requirements.   Approximately  2,000 
billets  have  been  approved  to  satisfy  new  mission  requirements, 
but  over  half  of  these  were  reduced  in  omnibus  cuts.   When  DMA  was 
created,  the  U.S.  military  did  not  have  cruise  missiles,  and, 
therefore,  did  not  need  digital  terrain  elevation  or  feature 
analysis.   Such  requirements  are  increasing  with  each  new  weapon 
developed  and  each  new  operational  scenario.   Adequate  manpower 
does  not  exist  to  satisfy  current  requirements  for  these  extremely 
labor  intensive  products. 
The  U.S.  military  presence  in  Third  World  areas  has  increased 
driving  requirements  for  new  or  updated  MC&G  products.   Adequate 
mapping  and  charting  products  have  never  existed  for  these  areas. 
Manpower  does  not  exist  to  overcome  shortfalls  to  address  these 
requirements.   "Lessons  learned"  from  each  contingency  operation 
continue  to  include  inadequate  MC&G  products. 
Source  material  format  changes  have  forced  DMA  to  convert  from  a 
conventional  to  digital  imagery  processing.   The  Exploitation 
Modernization  Program  (EMP)  will  allow  continued  use  of  this 
valuable  collection  source  and  reduce  the  time  it  takes  to  produce 
MC&G  products.   This  system  has  the  potential  to  save  considerable 
manpower  when  it  is  completed  in  the  early  1990s. 
The  Effectiveness/Productivity  Program  discussed  in  Section  V  of 
this  report  has  produced  many  notable  savings.   DMA  continues  to 
review  its  manpower  to  identify  areas  for  further  consolidation 
and  savings.   One  recent  example  is  the  closing  of  the  Providence, 
Rhode  Island  facility  in  FY  87.   DMA  uses  manpower  standards  to 
determine  manning  requirements  and  also  to  develop  its  annual 
production  schedule.   They  ensure  these  standards  -  are  reviewed 
rigorously  and  kept  current. 
DMA's  ability  to  satisfy  command  requirements  depends  largely  on 
manpower,  and  currently  approved  assets  are  not  sufficient.   Com- 
manders repeatedly  have  expressed  their  concern  about  the  deter- 
iorating currency  of  maps,  charts,  and  digital  products  being  used 
by  their  forces.   Of  the  current  118  thousand  requirements,  only 
about  5  3  percent  are  for  products  that  now  exist  and  about  half  of 
these  are  out  of  date  and  inadequate  to  support  fully  combat 
operations.   DMA's  current  backlog  equates  to  3,800  workyears  per 
year.   The  proposed  reduction  would  increase  the  DMA  production 
shortfall  to  4,700  workyears  per  year. 
H-17
Joint  Duty  Assignments 
One  of  the  most  important  contributors  to  Defense  Agency  efficiency 
and  effectiveness  is  the  quality  of  its  manpower.   The  Combat 
Support  Agencies  must  know  what  the  forces  need,  understand  tactics 
and  doctrine,  and  must  be  able  to  determine  when  and  why  require- 
ments are  more  or  less  important.   The  military  officers  assigned 
to  these  agencies  must  translate  these  demands  into  war  required 
capability  both  in  the  Defense  Agency  and  at  the  commands.   This 
translation  is  critical  and  depends  on  quality  and  well  trained 
military  personnel.  The  features  of  the  Goldwater  -  Nichols  Act 
prescribed  for  Joint  Duty  Assignments  should  fulfill  these  require- 
ments . 
However,  the  current  allocation  of  Joint  Duty  Assignment  billets 
presents  a  problem.   About  50  percent  of  the  Defense  Agency  military 
officer  billets  (0-4  and  above)  have  been  designated  Joint  Duty 
Assignments.   This  creates  a  "have"  and  "have  not"  situation  that 
is  already  affecting  morale.  Additionally,  Defense  Agency  military 
are  traditionally  criticized  as  being  lower  in  quality  than  thos« 
kept  in  the  Military  Departments.  The  "50  percent  rule"  will 
exacerbate  this  problem  because  it  is  unlikely  that  top  quality 
officers  will  be  assigned  to  the  non-Joint  assignments. 
Conclusions 
1  DMA's  ability  to  satisfy  Combatant  Command  and  Military  Depart- 
ment requirements  depends  on  increased  manpower.   Requirements 
have  grown  exponentially,  manpower  and  funds  have  not  kept  pace. 
2.  DMA  continues  to  explore  ways  to  use  manpower  more  productively. 
The  DMA  Effectiveness/Productivity  Program  has  identified  signifi 
cant  savings  over  the  years  and  allows  these  savings  to  be  applied 
against  production  shortfalls.   The  Agency  uses  work  standards  to 
determine  general  manning  requirements  and  also  to  develop  its 
production  schedule.   These  standards  are  reviewed  rigorously  and 
kept  current. 
3  Title  VI  general  manpower  reductions  would  further  exacerbate 
the  already  significant  gap  between  requirements  and  resources. 
This  gap  translates  to  potential  deficiencies  in  U.S.  force  readiness 
4.  Added  combat  Support  Agency  responsibilities  in  the  Defense 
Reorganization  Act  demand  more  management,  oversight,  and  dedicatee 
planning  support. 
5  Combat  Support  Agencies  must  provide  operational  expertise, 
must  know  what  the  forces  need,  must  understand  tactics  and  doctrine, 
and  must  be  able  to  determine  when  and  why  some  requirements  are 
more  or  less  important.   The  military  officers  assigned  to  these 
agencies  play  a  role  in  each  Agency's  ability  to  translate  require- 
ments into  operational  capability  both  in  the  Defense  Agency  and 
at  the  Combatant  Commands.   This  translation  demands  the  quality 
and  training  features  the  Defense  Reorganization  Act  proscribed 
H-18
for  Joint  Duty  Assignments. 
Recommendat  i  ons 
1.  That  the  DMA.  not  be  reduced  by  the  manpower  reductions  identified 
in  Title  VI  of  the  Goldwater-Nichols  Act. 
2.  That  requirements  and  budget  considerations  drive  future  DMA 
manpower  authorizations. 
3.  That  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  Defense  (Force  Management 
and  Personnel)  and  CJCS  review  the  Combat  Support  Agency 
military  manpower  billets  against  Joint  Duty  Assignment 
criteria  and,  where  appropriate,  designate  billets  as  Joint 
Duty  Assignment  positions. 
H-19
DEFENSE  MAPPING  AGENCY 
DMA 
HEADQUARTERS 
COMBAT 
SUPPORT 
CENTER 
HYDROGRAPHIC/ 
TOPOGRAPHIC 
CENTER 
INTERAMERICAN 
GEODETIC 
SURVEY 
AEROSPACE 
CENTER 
SYSTEMS 
CENTER 
OFFICE  OF 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
  SERVICES 
DEFENSE 
MAPPING 
SCHOOL 
O 
O 
W 
P
DEFENSE  MAPPING  AGENCY 
MAJOR  PRODUCT  REQUIREMENTS 
Products 
Operational  Navigation 
Charts 
Tactical  Pilotage 
Charts 
Joint  Operations 
Graphics  (Air) 
Items 
Required 
Items 
Available 
Terrain  Analysis 
Data  Bases  (Planning) 
Digital  Terrain 
Elevation  Data 
Digital  Feature 
Analysis  Data 
Firefinder 
Aeronautical 
270 
773 
6,120 
270 
502 
3,805 
1,065 
409 
Hvdrographic 
KSNM 
108,000 
77,918 
31,824 
5,538 
KSNM 
Required     Available 
108,000 
50,602 
19,786 
Topograph 
Lie 
1:50,000  Scale  Maps 
34,965 
18,340 
7,725 
4,218 
1:100,000  Scale  Maps 
908 
426 
817 
383 
Joint  Operations 
Graphics 
5,204 
3,920 
27,061 
20,384 
City  Maps 
2,513 
1,483 
151 
Terrain  Analysis 
Data  Base  (Tactical) 
4,194 
451 
965 
103 
2,127 
Ports /Harbors 
3,003 
1,801 
240 
144 
Coastal  Charts 
1,919 
1,722 
10,362 
9,299 
Combat  Charts 
464 
296 
103 
Bathvmetric  Navigation 
Planning  Charts 
2,134 
Digital 
278 
213,400 
27,800 
15,624 
9,219 
35,202 
21,204 
11,697 
3,102 
27,324 
7,135 
6,775 
3,258 
1,558 
749 
Nautical  Square  Miles  in  Thousands 
Enclosure  2
DEFENSE  MAPPING  AGENCY 
MAJOR  PRODUCT  REQUIREMENTS 
products 
Air  Target  Charts 
-  Series  200 
Joint  Operations 
Graphic  -  Radar 
Point  Positioning 
Data  Bases 
Vertical  Obstruction 
Data 
Terrain  Contour 
Maps 
Items         Items 
Required      Available. 
KSNM  * 
Required 
KSNM  * 
Available 
TarftP.t-.  Materials 
3,051         2,853 
10,373 
9,700 
1,036           732 
5,387 
3,806 
8.600         4,177 
8,600 
4,177 
1,193 
5,620 
528 
4,450 
2,744 
1,214 
*  Nautical  Square  Miles  in  Thousands 
Enclosure  2  (Cont)
DMA  PRODUCTIVITY  INDEX 
W 
o 
f-» 
o 
135 
130 
125 
120 
115 
110 
105 
100 
BASE  VALUE 
TRANSITION  TO 
DIGITAL  PRODUCTS 
132 
FY72    73 
74    75    76    77    78    79    80    81    82    83   84    85    86    87 
u>