N 
A  SPECIAL  HISTORICAL  STUDY 
OF 
the  nsa/css  organization 
and  its  Impact  on  usafss 
SPECIAL  HANDLING  REQUIRED 
NOT  RELEASABLE  TO 
FOREIGN  NATIONALS 
The  information  contained 
in  this  document  will  not 
be  revealed  to  foreign 
nationals  or  their  repre- 
sentatives. 
1  May  1973 
UNITED  STATES  AIR  FORCE  SECURITY  SERVICE 
USAFSS  *°*" 
«  A'«.  ?  ' u 
HtJ'c      W
A  SPECIAL  HISTORICAL  STUDY 
OF 
THE  NSA/CSS  ORGANIZATION1 
AND   ITS    IMPACT  ON   USAFSS 
This   document  contains   information  affecting  the  national    defense  of  the 
United  States  within  the  meaning  of  the   Espionage  Laws    (Title  18,   U.S.C., 
Sections  793,  794.   and  798}   the  transmission  or  revelation  of  which   in 
any  runner  to  an   unauthorized  person   is   prohibited  by  law. 
Prepared  by: 
503  W.    RUSH 
Command  Historical   Officer 
1   }My  1973 
UNITED  STATES  AIR  FORCE  SECURITY  SERVICE 
Sdn   Antonio,  Texas
Ft-,  ^r.tzcptcce 
Within  three  months  of  the  Conservative  party  crisis  in 
Britain.  .  .a  book  by  Randolph  Churchill  on  the  day-to- 
cay  history  of  the  affair  had  been  written  and  publish- 
ed. To  rush  in  upon  an  event  before  its  significance 
has  had  time  to  separate  from  the  surrounding  circum- 
stances may  be  enterprising,  but  is  it  useful?  An  em- 
barrassed author  may  find,  when  the  excitement  has  died 
down,  that  his  subject  had  no  significance  at  all.  The 
recent  prevalence  of  these  hot  histories  on  publishers' 
lists  raises  the  question:  Should--or  perhaps  can—his- 
tory be  written  while  it  is  still  smoking?  (From  an 
article,  "Can  History  Be  Served  Up  Hot,"  by  Barbara  W. 
Tuchman,  in  the  Book  Reivew  section  of  The  "ew  York 
T>.a;,    March  8,    1964.) 
The  man  wno  ventures  to  write 
contemporary  history  must  ex- 
pect to  be  attacked  both  for 
everything  he  has  said  and 
everything     he     lias  not  said. 
--Voltaire. 
in
20  January   1 950 
<0  ~   -  ~ 
\  a--: 
Rear-Admiral-Earl   E.-StonetDIRAFSA,  concedes  that  the  USAFSS; 
plan   represents. -a  -'--reasonable  approach  to" "the  "fulfillment  of  the  mission 
del  eca  ted  'by "JCS  '201 0/6>"  ^  y^
I  t^Jf*^    The  SCA  and  NSA  representatives  had  developed  the  plan  on  the 
'       basis  of  guidance  issued  by  the  National  Security  Council  (NSC)  and  the 
•  Office  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense  (OSD).  Their  basic  objective  was  to 
I  specify  the  authority  of  the  DIRNSA/Chief ,  CSS  to  direct  and  manage  all 
:  cryptologic  matters  for  the  United  States  in  order  to  (a)  improve  in- 
telligence support  to  military  operations,  (b)  save  resources  through 
:  better  management,  and  (c)  integrate  related  DOD  military  and  civilian 
■   activities.  ~  To  do  this,  they  followed  two  organizational  concepts. 
First,  the  NSA/CSS  would  be  a  unified  organization.  Second,  the  CSS,  in-, 
eluding  the  subordinate  SCAs,  would  be  the  field  operating  arm,  with  NSA 
.as  the  planning,  processing,  analytic,  and  production  arm.!
17  narch  1953 
fOUO  — 
~rSj-  DIRNSA  disapproves  the  USAFSS  Close  Support  Concept ._
v-Hr^  The  CSS  was  organized  along  conventional  joint  staff  lines, 
/except  that  there  was  no  provision  for  a  J-2  (Intelligence).  In  addi- 
tion to  the  Deputy  Chief,  CSS,  there  was  a  Chief  of  Staff  and  five  as- 
j  sistant  chiefs  of  staff;  viz.,   J-l  (Military  Personnel),  J-3  (Operations 
<  and  Readiness),  J-4  (Logistics),  J-5  (Planning),  and  J-6  (Communications  ; 
Operations).  While  not  a  part  of  the  joint  staff,  the  Commandant  of  the  i 
;  National  Cryptologic  School  was  given  the  task  of  coordinating  the  cryp-  j 
tologic  training  system.  Personnel  of  the  joint  staff  elements  were  to   .' 
be  predominantly  military;  and,  where  applicable,  they  were  "dual-hatted"  ■ 
to  complementary  NSA  positions.  All  other  officers  were  assigned  to  the 
CSS  only.
-  u        "     
-<Cj-   Finally,  -the  mission  of  the  field  elements  was  "to  conduct  *  \ 
2  c       J 
operations  in  response  to  taskingand  direction  from  the  NSA/CSS.      '    • 
(U)     Further-;"  the  pi  an  contained  detailed  annexes  on  Organization; 
PlanningV'Pro'gfarnrning'r'and  Budgefing'f~Personnel  Management;  Operations, 
and  Readiness'Y  Cornmuni cations;''  Logistics;'  Research  and  Development;. 
Representatioh*'an"d'Area''ftea^qu^ 
^si.gn  r:Traim"n"g;"  Phasing '"and  Assets. \ 
"fCT    Some  six  months  after  formal  establishment  of  the  CSS,  the 
.  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  new  organization  drafted  a  brief  historical   re- 
J      •  sume  of  developments  and  progress  up  to  thaftime,  primarily  for  in- 
formational  purposes. 
k
Nonetheless,  things  did  not  progress  as  smoothly  as  this 
v  statement  seemed  to  indicate
TSoon  after  DOD  approved  the. CSS  Organization  Plan,  NSA 
.'"asked  the  SCAs  to  identify  their  SIGIN'T  professional   and  pre-profession- 
al   employees  and  to  furnish  names  of  "volunteers"  for  transfer  to  the 
■     NSA  rollsT):1 
JTSSPannounced  in  June  1972  that  it  was  delaying  the  civilian   inte- 
gration program  because  negotiations  with  the  Navy  had  reached  an  irrpasse. 
!  .  • 
The  agency  made  it  clear,  however,  that  DIRNSA  wanted  to  oroceed  with     ^' 
tns  program  as  soon  as  possible^"
wr  "j'j.r« 
J  
NSA  said  that  to  carry  out  its   responsibility  of  providing  guidance 
/and  direction  to  the  military,  departments,   the  SCAs  should  accept  NSA 
:   career  development  programs  for  17  of  its  career  fields.     N'SA  also  pro-        ; 
i  < 
j   posed  the  establishement  of  a  committee  made  up  of  representatives  from 
!    NSA/CSS  and^the^SCASu to  further, re view  and  refine  implementing  directives.*^/ 
/  jj\-»f£r-jNSA*"  further  proposed  to  DOD  that  to  facilitate  accomplishment 
•  \ 
.-  of  an  integrated  career  development  program  within  the  crypto! ogic  com- 
munity, DOD  should  obtain  a  common  appointing  authority  (Schedule  A)  for 
all  three  SCAs  since  the  Army  and  Navy  were  currently  under  Schedule  A 
j  and  (JSAFSS  was  under  Schedule  B.  Both  Schedule  A  and  B  appointments 
) 
•  were  non-competitive.     Hiring  procedures  under  Schedule  A  did  not  fol- 
j  low  competitive  procedures  since  their  appointments  were  of  a  confiden- 
tial  or  policy  determining  character  for  which  it  was  not  practicable 
to  examine.     Schedule  B  appointments  did  follow  competitive  procedures  ^ 
i.fcamT  T   *  -'     \
r 
and  were  subject  to  non-competitive  examination  that  might  be  directed 
by  the  CSC. 
h  fSr  luporT  approval  of  the  CSS  Organization  Plan,   DIRNSA  requested 
/"prompt  action"   in  extending  the  policy  for  reporting  incidents  involv- 
ing WSA/CSS  facilities  and  personnel.     Consequently,  NSA  issued  a  draft 
[    directive   (USSID  532),  dated  22  May  1972,  which  attempted  to  establish 
t 
:    a  system  for  reporting  incidents  which,   in  effect,  would  duplicate  such 
reporting  already  prescribed  in  JCS  PUB  6 .  J^
DIRNSA  notified  USAFSS  that  he  be- 
lieved  it  necessary  to  proceed  with  plans  for  tne  "immediate  disestablish-  ■•' 
?  r 
ment"  of  the  Reaion.4" 
^  -  •  -       -  -- 
DIRNSA,  but- then  on  27  July  1972  he  again  notified  all  concerned  that 
disestablishment  was  to  proceed  "on  a  most  expeditious  basis."  *  \J    V
j#r\On  K  September  1972  NSA/CSS  asked  the  SCAs  to  provide  CSS/J-1 
with  a  monthly  summary  of  current  and  projected  military  personnel 
strength  by  AFSC  for  all   cryptologic  units  worldwide.         The  listing  was 
to  include  current  authorized,  assigned,   and  projected  strength  by  month 
for  12  months  for  all   USAFSS  headquarters  and  field  units  by  station, 
.  AFSC,  and  pay  grade.     The  purpose  for  gathering  this  information  was  to 
facilitate  adjustment  of  personnel   under  the  operational   control  of  the 
i      .CSS  and  to  keep  the  ChiefJL^S  inftnjed^of  Jjre^r^atuj^.
,-N'SA  said  that  the  advent  of  CSS  should  permit  reductions  in 
«•.-*-  -  -  -      — -  -  —   -  — 
.personnel   at  HQ  USAFS?{i)
Cnsa/css staff  officers  be- 
lieved that  dual-hatting  was  essential   to  the  unified  organization  con- 
cept envisioned  .in  the  CSS  plan.     Further,  they  believed  that  separate 
[  staffs  would  be  too  expensive^,  C Uj