]wmm 
'  -■...  <.,•-■-■■ 
SC-Q5078-76 
Copy  /    ox  Z 
REPORT 
ON 
INQUIRY  INTO 
CIA-RELATED 
ELECTRONIC  SURVEILLANCE 
ACTIVITIES 
OlIQ 
D)tC3lL 
J!f 
CLASSIFIED  SV  ^oJ^g^-  /..    fetirJ^   
exempt  f.".c:.!  CF:,-;r..'.L  c:c:.«*  «:.•••  vncx 
schedule  ofa^m:".  ::.::;!r;;-,-  r/TFcosr.- 
S  S&Cl).   C~?Fj).--   :•)    {■■.•■'.-.   -■-•   rr   «„) 
AliVO....  -  ' ' 
jfcu2ZS.'2!-£...J?0.
SC-05078-76 
Copy   /   oi2 
PREFACE 
Most  of  the  information  contained  in  this  Report  was  obtained  free 
personnel  employed  by  the  various  intelligence  agencies  under  investigation. 
Predictably,  their  attitudes  ranged  from  circumspection  to  wariness. 
One  typically  had  to  ask  the  right  question  to  elicit  the  right  answer 
or  document.  It  is  likely,  therefore,  that  we  had  insufficient  information 
on  occasion  to  frame  the  "magic"  question.  One  also  had  to  ascertain  the 
specific  person  or  division  to  whom  the  right  question  should  be  addressed, 
since  compartmentalization  of  intelligence-gathering  often  results  in  one 
hand  not  knowing  what  the  other  is  doing. 
The  latter  was  particularly  true  of  the  offices  of  general  counsel 
with  which  we  dealt.  They  were  not  always  consulted  beforehand  con- 
cerning the  legality  of  borderline  operations.  Indeed,  they  were  not 
fully  aware,- until  our  inquiry. _of  certain  Questionable  operations  engaged 
in  by  their  respective  agencie^HH^kl^^^In  additiorTthe 
oft  ices  of  general  counsel  evinced  a  lack  of  legal  expertise  in  the  field 
of  electronic  surveillance  and  a  general  uncertainty  and  inexperience  in 
the  area  of  Federal  criminal  law.  It  is  possible,  therefore,  that  soma 
exculpatory  as  well  as  inculpatory  facts  and  documents  were  not  revealed 
because  general  counsel  did  not  perceive  their  relevance  or  significance. 
The  degree  of  overall  cooperation  with  our  inquiry  varied  among  the 
agencies  under  scrutiny.  NSA  and  DEA,  for  instance,  were  generally 
cooperative.  Personnel  from  both  DEA  and  NSA  who  had  been  directly  involved 
in  questionable  operations  readily  submitted  to  interview  and  cooperated 
(however  guardedly),  despite  Miranda  warnings.  The  CIA,  on  the  o'ther  h-nd, 
elected  to  inform  us  of  the  details  of  questionable  CIA  activities  through 
CIA  personnel  who  would  not  be  given  Miranda  warnings,  i.e. ,  CIA  employees 
who  had  not  been  involved  in  the  questionaBTe  operations.  Consequently,  our 
briefings  on  CIA  activities  were  conducted  by  CIA  personnel  with  only  second- 
hand knowledge  gleaned  principally  from  written  records.  Subsequently,  however, 
several  of  the  CIA  personnel  directly  involved  in  questionable  operations  did 
submit  to  interview. 
Compliance  with  requests  for  docunents  and/or  written  reports  also  varied 
in  degree  of  promptness.  NSA  and  DEA  were  reasonably  prompt.  Initially,  the 
CIA  was  dilatory  and  the  FBI  tardy,  but  both  improved  as  the  inquiry  progressed. 
Materials  gathered  by  the  Senate  Select  Conmittee  were  not  made  available  for 
our  review  until  March  2,  1976. 
The  foregoing  impediments,  while  inconvenient,  did  not  fundamentally  alter 
the  final  product  of  cur  effort  to  obtain  the  detailed  overview  reflected  in 
this  Report.  Such  obstructions  might  become  intolerable,  however,  in  the 
prosecutive  pursuit  of  specific  cases. 
Dougald  D.  McMillan 
June  30,  1976 
>-'  ■'"uj'jwrvv1'1'-*''? 
— TorsEeRfTlEV:.:  1
$C-o6C7tf-76 
Copy  /  otS 
TABLE  OF  CONTEXTS 
Page 
I.  Findings  of  Comission  on  CIA  activities    1 
A.  Office  of  Security  -  Telephone  Taps  and  Bugs    1 
B.  Counterintelligence  Staff  -  Collection  of  Information  on  .  2 
Dissidents,  etc. 
C.  Directorate  of  Operations  -  Telephone  Toll  Records     3 
D.  Directorate  of  Operations  -  Narcotics  Intelligence  .....  4 
(Brandy  Operation) 
E.  Directorate  of  Science  and  Technology  -  Equipment  Testing  ...  5 
F.  Office  of  Security  -  Assistance  to  Washington  Metropolitan   .  .  10 
Police  Department  and  Secret  Service 
II.  Additional  Areas  of  Justice  Department  Inquiry    14 
A.  Central  Intelligence  Agency  .    14 
1  \\  Narcotics  Coordinator  and  NARCOG    14  f2- 
2 .  /  
LPMEDUEY    17     / 
lg<t,lUWJMI»ltll«ij,;.IIWi.lBSW.*U[  MJJIM»,..J4JI.IMi^^W«tlll»UJI-.    .1  .',-IJWf  ,„ 
•>  •       VS..  .;_*■.■-'..•     ■    ■  .■?■■  .-'  '■-!•■  '-■■.--    n  ■  "injri  Itr'nii  '•"''■'i'tV-I'"  T  — "'f  V^'iY  '"ii'ii'l    ■*•" 
a#     #-:^4;:.:^.j.wwi"^^t    Ly 
5 .  (  Overseas  Intercepts  and  Dropped  Cases    20  J 
6.  CIA-BNDD  Miami  Operation    23 
.•  -  ,.  * ...  ■  -  :<x&?ry&;:\, '^rv%  .^--,.:  y  ; - ^,^,- .^  v-- v^--.y  ^rj 
8.  Procurenient  of  Private  Parties  to  Intercept  Canmnications  .  25 
B.  National  Security  Agency  .     26 
1.1    MINARET    25   j 
_       f':-l-"^*w>.lJWf  «c 
3.  SKAMRDCK    22 
A.    i    '^"-"Jg W!-".W^.'-'!*.*.>-iW:.!*.".'vt ".-"j  "37      / 
I     
t_ ,    mil      ■  »..     ■!    iTi    IT      ii         '      '     '■"■"r  / 
WAKiniC    \/i  a     rr\tiiviT-rnn»--
SC-05C7<£75 
Copy   /  Gl2 
:  Page 
C.  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation    39 
D.  State  Department    39 
III.  Purported  Sources  of  Authority    40 
A.  Presidential  Power    40 
1.  Legislative  History    40 
2.  Presidential  Directives  (Historical)    41 
3.  Interpretation  of  the  Presidential  Power    42 
4.  Presidential  Authorization      .  •  44 
B.  Narcotics  Intelligence  Gathering:  Presidential  Direction   .  .  46 
1.  Presidential  Message  to  Congress    46 
2.  ttiite  House  Task  Force  on  Narcotics  Control   .  .  .  .  .  46 
3.  Cabinet  Comnittee  on  International  Narcotics  Control   .  .  47 
4.  Office  of  National  Narcotics  Intelligence    56 
5.  International  Narcotics  Control  Conference    57 
6.  Pronouncements  by  President  Ford    59 
C.  General  Intelligence  Gathering:  Presidential  Direction  ...  60 
D.  Narcotics  Intelligence  Gathering:  Legislative  Direction  ...  63 
E.  CIA:  Legislative  and  Presidential  Direction    64 
1.  National  Security  Council    64 
2.  Central  Intelligence  Agency    64^ 
3.[_NSCn>s    64J 
5.  /CIA  Narcotics  Intelligence  Gathering    72^ 
-fflp-SKRETl" 
m
£ 
Page 
F.  NSA:-  Legislative  and  Presidential  Direction    74  f
1.  /Cocrmunications  Intelligence    76'   |
2.  NSCIDs    76   |
3.i  The  One-Terminal  Rule    81  1  I
4.  NSA  Participation  in  Draf':^  13  U.S.C.  §2511(3)    85  \
5.  J  
Propriety  of  Requirements    8§7 
6-/  ^f^^^j^fi^S^^^^; ^ife> W^^^^^^ll^.,/    50J 
G.  United  States  Intelligence  Board  (USIB)    91    |
1.  /  
NSCID  1  -  1964    92  '  \
2.  NSCID  1  -  1972   
.'    93 
3.  IGCP    95 
4.  U.S.  Intelligence  Objectives    100 
H.  President's  Foreign  Intelligence  Advisory  Board  (PFIAB)  ....  105 
I.  Intelligence  Evaluation  Committee  (IEC)    113 
IV.  Possible  Violations    115 
A.  Interception  of  Cotraunications  Having  One  Terminal    116 
in  the  United  States 
1.  Pertinent  Criminal  Statutes    116 
B.  Receipt  of  "Cable  Traffic"  From  International    117 
Conmunications  Carriers 
1.  Pertinent  Criminal  Statutes    117 
C.  Interception  of  Domestic  Communications  in  Testing    118 
Electronic  Equipment 
1.  Pertinent  Criminal  Statutes    118 
V.  Applicable  Statutes  and  Law    119 
A.  47  U.S.C.  §605    119 
iv 
.  ,  ,^  ,  _   .  .,  i  •   "«l  l(l  |T   !«■»!  »  «  V  tv  •—  f
SOoorycwo 
Copi   /  o»'  Z 
Page 
B.  18  U.S. C.  §2510,  et  sea   -■....  120 
C.  Willfulness    121 
1.  United  States  v.  Murdock    121 
2.  18U.S.C.  §2520    123 
3.  Zweiban  v.  Mitchell    124 
D.  "Plain  View"  Analogy    125 
E.  "Border  Search"  Analogy    126 
VI.  Possible  Defenses    ^5 
A.  Interception  of  Communications  Having  One  Terminal  .  .  .  128 
in  the  United  States 
1.  Interception  of  International  Radio-Telephone  ...  1^8 
Landline  (Voice)  Communications 
(a)  18  U.S.C.  §2511   
,    128 
(i)    Radio-Telephone  Ccmnunications  ....  123  • 
(ii)    Wire  Cccrcnunications    130 
(iii)    The  "Nation's  Ccnmmicaticns  Network".     .  130 
(iv)    Justified  Expectations  of  Privacy  ...  132 
(v)    Felony  v.  Misdemeanor    132 
(vi)    Oral  Ccntrunications    136 
(vii)  Overlapping  Definitions    138 
(viii)  Statutory  Construction    142 
(ix)  Prosecutive  Options    143 
(b)  47  U.S.C.  §605    143 
(c)  Presidential  Authorization  (18  U.S.C.  §2511(3)  .  144 
(d)  Willfulness    
Btemt^ 
145 
v
SC-OoC/o-/o 
COpy    /  0!^ 
Page 
2.     Interceptions  of  International  Non-Voice  Ccdirajnications  .     .  145 
.(a)    18  U.S.C.  §2511    145 
(i)        Interception      .     .  145 
(ii)      "Aural"    147 
(iii)  Teletype  and  Telex  Ccmnunications    148 
(b)  47  U.S.C.  §605    148 
(i)        Divulgence    148 
(ii)   Use    149 
I 
(iii)  Interception  and  Divulgence  or  Use  by  ...  .  150 
j    Different  Parties 
(c)  Presidential  Authorization    150 
(d)  Willfulness    151 
i 
B.  Receipt  of  "Cable  Traffic"  from  International  Ccmnunications  .  .  151 
Carriers 
1.  47  U.S.C.  §605    151 
(a)  Qxrttunications  Personnel    151 
(b)  Government  Agents  and  Officials   .  .  .  v  .  .  .  .  153 
2.  Presidential  Authorization    153 
3.  Willfulness    153 
C.  Interception  of  Domestic  Ccmnunications  in  Testing  Equipment  .  .  154 
1.  18  U.S.C.  §2511  and  47  U.S.C.  §605    154 
2.  Presidential  Authorization    154 
3.  Willfulness    154 
vi 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
SC-05C7a-/6 
VII.  Sumary  of  Possible  Violations  and  Defenses 
A.  Recapitulation  of  Inquiry   .... 
„     _ „   v  ,  .  :  .At^-V:"'.  :}-*".5:-i'«''"»."  ■•'•■•''  - 
Z.  M«-'-    •  ''.-••■I** *s:.?V.     •    ■  '  ■  .  *£•';■:*. 
•*•■&:    .■«••-£■....-    .•*Sw>.,>'      .       ■  •  *•*••«.«■• *•  •     ..'-■■. 
ItHt  '-SAW ."";'»'  L 
A.  minaret 
5. 
6.  SHAMROCK 
7.  .Drop-Copy  Operation, 
VIII.  Conclusions  and  Recormiendations 
Page 
155 
155 
156/ 
157- 
158 
160 
164 
165 
168 
169 
171 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS 
vii
Copy  /  oi  2 
I.  FINDINGS  OF  TOE  OMISSION  ON  CIA  ACTIVITIES  WITHIN  THE  UNITED  STATES 
The  Report  to  the  President  by  the  Cocmiission  on  CIA  Activities 
Within  the  United  States  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  Rockefeller 
Cotrmissiori  Report  or  "RCR")  contains  various  findings  with  respect  to  CIA 
electronic  surveillance  activities.  These  findings  are  set  forth  below, 
followed  by  comments  based  upon  results  of  the  inquiry  conducted  by  the 
Justice  Department  Task  Force. 
A.  OFFICE  OF  SECURITY  -  Telephone  Taps  and  Bugs 
Commission  Findings 
The  Office  of  Security  conducted  32  domestic  wiretaps  (the 
last  in  1965) ,  and  engaged  in  32  instances  of  bugging  (the  last 
in  1968) .  None  of  these  was  conducted  pursuant  to  a  judicial 
warrant,  and  only  one  was  with  the  written  approval  of  the  Attorney 
General.  (RCR  30;  167-168) 
The  Commission  found  two  cases  in  which  the  telephones  of 
three  newsmen  were  tapped  in  an  effort  to  identify  their  sources 
of  sensitive  information.  These  occurred  in  1959  and  1962.  The 
latter  was  apparently  conducted  with  the  knowledge  and  consent  of 
the  Attorney  General.  (RCR  164) 
Some  of  these  activities  were  clearly  illegal  at  the  time 
they  were  conducted.  Others  might  have  been  lawful  at  the  time, 
but  would  be  prohibited  under  current  legal  standards.  (RCR  160) 
Ccnrnent 
The  analysis  of  available  information  (Tab  Al)  indicates  a 
total  of  36  (possibly  38)  rather  than  32  telephone  taps  by  the 
Office  of  Security,  and  35  (possibly  38)  mike-and-wire  operations 
instead  of  the  32  instances  of  "bugging"  reported  by  the  Rockefeller 
Commission.  In  addition,  both  the  last  known  telephone  tap  and 
mike-and-wire  operation  were  conducted  in  October,  1971,  rather 
than  1965  and  1968,  respectively.  These  differences  appear  to  be 
academic,  however,  since  the  five-year  statute  of  limitations  (18 
U.S.C.  3282)  has  expired  as  to  all  the  interceptions  except  those 
in  October,  1971,  which  were  consensual. 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
SC-05C/6-/6 
Copy     /  Ci  2 
With  respect  to  CIA  electronic  surveillance  of  newsnvsn, 
an  examination  of  available  files  indicates  that  in  1959  a 
foreign  newspaper  correspondent  and  two  U.S.  writers  were  the 
subject  of  telephone  taps.  The  foreign  newspaper  correspondent 
was  also  the  subject  of  a  mike-and-wire  operation.  In  1963,  two 
U.S.  newspaper  reporters  were  the  subject  of  a  CIA  telephone 
tap.  (Tab  A2)   Obviously,  the  statute  of  limitations  has  long 
barred  any  possible  prosecution  for  substantive  offenses  based 
upon  these  interceptions. 
B.  COUNTHONIEILIGENCE  STAFF,  DEPUTY  DIRECTOR  OF 
FLANS  -  Collection  of  Information  On  American 
Dissidents,  etc. 
Commission  Findings 
The  Commission  found  no  evidence  that  any  of  the  agents  or 
CIA  officers  involved  with  any  of  the  dissident  operations  (CHAOS) 
employed  or  directed  the  domestic  use  of  any  electronic  surveillance 
or  wiretaps  against  any  dissident  group  or  individual.  Operation 
CHAOS,  however,  received  materials  from  an  international  cannunica- 
tions  activity  of  another  agency  of  the  government.  These  communica- 
tions passed  between  the  United  States  and  foreign  countries.  None 
was  purely  domestic.  (RCR  24;  141-142) 
Comment 
Investigation  has  developed  nothing  to  contradict  the 
Commission's  finding  that  there  is  no  evidence  CIA  employed 
or  directed  the  domestic  use  of  any  electronic  surveillance 
or  wiretaps  against  any  dissident  group  or  individual  in 
Operation  CHAOS.  (Tab  Bl)   The  other  government  agency 
referred  to  by  the  Commission  as  having  furnished  Operation 
CHAOS  with  international  coanunications  materials  has  been 
identified  as  the  National  Security  Agency.  (The  electronic 
surveillance  activities  of  NSA  are  discussed  in  II  (B) ,  infra.) 
r-imm 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
SC-05C78-76 
Copy  /    os  ii 
—  C.  DIRECTORATE  OF  OPERATIONS  -  Telephone  Toll 
Records  Reflecting  Contacts  Between  the 
-  United  States  and  Hostile  Countries. 
Commission  Findings 
During  1972  and  1973,  the  Directorate  of  Operations  obtained 
and  transmitted  to  other  components  of  CIA  certain  information 
about  telephone  calls  between  the  Western  Hemisphere  (including 
the  United  States)  and  two  other  foreign  countries.  Some  of  the 
calls  involved  American  citizens  within  the  United  States.  The 
information  obtained  by  the  Directorate  of  Operations  was 
limited  to  the  names,  telephone  numbers  and  locations  of  the 
caller  and  the  recipient.  The  contents  of  the  call  were  not 
indicated.  Shortly  after  the  program  commenced,  the  Office  of 
the  General  Counsel  issued  a  brief  memorandum  stating  that 
receipt  of  this  information  did  not  appear  to  violate  applicable 
statutory  provisions. 
Collection  of  this  material  was  terminated  in  May  1973. 
The  Commission  was  unable  to  discover  any  specific  purpose 
for  the  collection  of  telephone  toll  call  information,  or  any 
use  of  that  information  by  the  CIA.  In  the  absence  of  a  valid 
purpose,  such  collection  is  improper.  (RCR  213-214) 
Comment 
^ftSSfcfcfc.- 
reflecting  some  270  telephone  calls  between  the  United  States 
and  Red  China. 
The  legitimacy  of  this  source  of  intelligence  was 
confirmed  in  February  1972,  by  the  Office  of  General  Counsel, 
CIA.  (Tab  CI)   The  opinion  of  the  OGC  cites  United  States 
v.  Covella.  410  F.2d  536,  c.d.  396  U.S.  879  (1969),  and 
appears  to  be  well  reasoned*  and  soundly  based. 
HANDLE  VIA  COM1NT  CHANNELS
SC-o5C7tf-/6 
Copy  /    of  2 
*7*S*W»J*f9», 
-  D.  DTRECTORATE  OF  OPERATIONS  -  Electronic   * 
Surveillance  for  Narcotics  Inteligence 
"  (Brandy  Operation) 
Commission  Findings 
Beginning  in  the  Fall  of  1973  the  Directorate  of 
Operations,  at  the  request  of  NSA,  monitored  telephone 
conversations  between  the  United  States  and  Latin 
America  for  a  period  of  three  (or  six)  months  in  an 
effort  to  identify  narcotics  traffickers.  This  was 
immediately  terminated  upon  the  issuance  of  an  opinion 
by  the  CIA  General  Counsel  that  it  was  illegal.  (RCR 
37;  222-224) 
Comment 
Examination  of  CIA  files  and  the  interview  of 
various  CIA  officials  established  that  from  October, 
1972  through  January.  1973  (rather  th*m  rhe>   "fall  of 
iy/J  ;.  Ff^y,,   -ry-'-f-.-y-rs..^.^.:    ,-mriiiii   ,  the  CIA 
intercepted  nign  frequency  commercial  radio  telephone 
communications  between  the  United  States  and  Latin 
America  for  the  purpose  of  gathering  foreign  narcotics 
intelligence.  (Tab  D) 
The  CIA  undertook  this  narcotics  intelligence 
collection  effort  at  the  request  of  NSA  which  had 
previously  accepted  tasking  requests  from  ENDD  to 
gather  narcotics  .intelligence  from  international 
communications.  I&*1"** T'g  •  "*r-    -  •■  •■ -W^1.1  ^ 
Hm^W^lU-*gi>-:  ■;•  '-■■■■^\ .        ^  -  ..  •       •■'.-     £  ■•'■-      1 
'•■.■^-■*";:     ....■■j.--.--j':  •   ■'•- .'•'.--.'•■M'-;'' "'■•'••"■-•■,  .■     ■•     '■■•  v -■;./- "       i 
.,,  .    -  ■:^ri^rthitiiM»iytj*iiVTni-t«iii ,  mj/mmtnuta^ 
n»fr..A-**zi*Y^iiig^iii&ij>-  ..v.:-.^  —  furnished  NSA  with  trans- 
cripts of  the  intercepted  calls  which  were  selected  on 
the  basis  of  a  "Watch  List"  of  names  and  telephone 
numbers  provided  by  NSA.  NSA  distributed  the  intelligence 
toENDD.  l^*^M,/»^;^ 
This  electronic  surveillance  activity  presents  prima 
facie  questions  of  criminality  and  is  well  within  the 
limitations  period.  (See  "Possible  Violations".  V,  infra.) 
-48£SW 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
SC-OS07&-76 
v..  •«■.:;■■-. .-.  ..•■?".'.•"•'"  .-:«".    -r ■**•':  '.;'"-■". '"vsl- ■■...'•  •-•.:'•.    ••  'v-rvav- 
■»■■•:*■,.      -1 
Investigation  has  confirmed  the  Rockefeller 
Conmission's  findings  that  the  ^E&asssry--.  — : :•—  aaa 
conducted  without  the  knowledge  of  the  CIA  component 
with  responsibility  for  narcotics  intelligence  collection." ' 
(RCR  222) .  This  CIA  component  was  known  successively  as 
the  "Narcotics  Coordinator"  and  "NARCOG"  which  are  also 
discussed  herein.  (See  ;.I (A)(1),  infra.) 
E.  DIRECTORATE  OF  SCIENCE  AND  TECHNOLOGY  - 
InterceptiorTof  Domestic  Communications 
In  Testing  Electronic  Equipment 
•    Commission  Findings 
In  the  process  of  testing  monitoring  equipment  for 
use  overseas,  the  CIA  has  overheard  conversations  between 
Americans.  The  names  of  the  speakers  were  not  identified; 
the  contents  of  the  conversations  were  not  disseminated. 
All  recordings  were  destroyed  when  testing  was  concluded. 
i 
The  acquisition  of  communications  incidental  to  the 
testing  of  interception  equipment  appears  to  be  prohibited 
by  18  U.S.C.  2510  et  seq.   (RCR  37;  64;  228) 
Comment 
HANDLE  VIA  COM1NT  CHANNELS
^jop-seearrj 
■tty.*~*  r  (gm 
QC-05°78-76 
II  j  III!   I.IM.I 
*    ;-.«•••'_  •  •'-'  -''i  it?:.'"'  .;  '  ••     " 
-  w.l  a: 
M|i-iiiirw^i-r"- 
£fittiiiifi£ttitiMJ«iiiiiiiitii^ 
\.->...v.,»:-.?&.-V..,. 
) 
The  five-year  statute  of  limitations  would 
bar  prosecution  for  possible  substantive  offenses 
involved  in  this  project. 
;■'•  '     ">i:r    ". -i-'-'>.  JU.  ••  v-.jv-.j- •,>    ■'->v.'-.  :"  ■•■•-   . 
5&"^-=^v'  ■.■■•..-^Sw&vv;-."  ^W^v.-.-/  •     .  ' 
-.•  ^Tu^----..  ;'-\  *'•_.' 
:1f.t.. 
'''.•"f&.l  ■ 
i&fcL-e&u^:  ;^:L>x&:±.:±&;^   
-^^^--— -^— -s- 
The  limitations  period  for  prosecuting  possible  sub- 
stantive offenses  related  to  this  activity  expired  in  1974. 
^-StCitcT 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
-TOP"  SLCKEi 
SC-05078-76 
Copy   /    of  2 
L^^jk:^^.  .:,^u,^;;^I::^if^-.    .^...^■mii  u.i.uii.*!*,,,  •,Mr„ll.M.i...ti.lfl^ ^7 
WJ!?J*M,"."^!B!|t'lWH  »UJ.'A»Si,.V^y,"'-^T,^l-^fW-wwill,ll!^'"',i^l'w' 
<VM«v*4ij.!j,*Tni*n*HM 
j^ayi 
^ia:.;^:.'::;:^-;^,:.,^,:! 
W  •■■  n*#hn  ■  i  vvit'|ii-h,H  n  mirta 'riV  frm  /r  ilVnii>i.ifgflifn'iv"i  Vf  frmi-'MTinhMl 
■"■•-  Consequently,  tnere  is  no  basis  tor  prosecutive 
action. 
-Feme 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
$005078-76 
Copy  /    0»  2 
B*.:;;-  ^iW--*:   \v!?.;v*'  •••;vi'::-;*r;.i'. %"v';       '•■'•         :■''••"'  ■■■'';%..  .'        '^;V  V-    ! 
m:H:.i.'.J  -;::r.'':' •-■-•■'•"■■-•  *•.■'.'•-•.'..'■  •'■.  '•■'•••■    t?  .■.•■■■•: 
K'it:"'.  ;■'•'  i;";;'  '  ^  .r*.y...  "  '1 
fe-  ;>■*••  •  '-*.:-'  "">^.:;  "      \  .' i. '.v;.  v  .      .'.  '.'"  \ 
■Hi      llllll«HlViilill'i    I  iTUhul!    ■      ,      m,ttf|^M  -'  ..■■Tv-Tiil-iiY.     ....  ■  .•■  f  .    .in    iIbj 
,£->•..*-.  .:*.i  <■:•..■■::  '■"      ■  "■Vl-1^i.:.-*        •-•"i- .-."*' ^.7  f-         •" '      '   '  -'   -  Sl»3  .V-  ••:  :•  '"    •..-;".'.'•    — -.'       :•►     .     J 
fe^'V-^?«H:r'-;;,'::::'-SJ.--  :^>iV.-  -A#j 
jM^^fc^tt&iiitii 
r'i^  ;>'••      '•  ?• 'S  ':r.v?;';7'"!.''--  '      '■-•;-'-'  '   '- • '.'"  !'v>■ 
^^  \  V' VW&k , --, ;  •••^  ■•«:  .-""-••  ■"■?-'*.*■•■ 
The  limitations  period  regarding  any  possible 
prosecution  arising  from  this  activity  will  expire 
in  May,  1976.    See  "Possible  Violations"  below. 
^^i3^^^^^y.^aii^^..-':4^^^g:::^....,t.v../J ^^m?^--  ■■  ■••  -^v.^. 
Jfoi=££§RcTj 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
SC-05C78-76 
Copy  /    oi  2 
•sSftKESW^*/^ 
HZ&rr 
•  -»- •  •        V.  "     *"■■..*  " .'.   ^...     'ff    .  '  * 
^fe:V-V^:;::W.(Sir-!''  V..-:  '  •■:,.ti;"!v"'i*s;'<     ■•■•  -■-■    *:\.-:-       ^    .  ■  1  / 
TOP.  SECRET! 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
SOG5076-/6 
Office  of  Security  -  Assistance  to  Washington,  D.C.     / 
Metropolitan  Police  Department  and  the  Secret  Service   *- 
Comnission  Findings 
the  CIA  has  on  at  least  one  occasion  provided 
some  technical  assistance  in  an  actual  police 
operation  being  carried  out  by  the  Metropolitan 
Police  Department.  In  late  1968  or  early  1969, 
CIA  was  asked  to  provde  the  Department  with 
transmitters  which  could  be  planted  in  several 
lamps  to  be  placed  in  the  apartment  of  a  police 
informer  who  frequently  met  with  members  of 
dissident  groups.  CIA  agreed  to  provide  the 
requested  equipment.  The  lamps  were  provided 
to  CIA  and  the  transmitter  devices  were  installed 
in  the  lamps  by  personnel  from  the  Office  of 
Security.  The  lamps  were  then  placed  back  in  the 
'  police  informer's  apartment  by  the  police.  The 
police  informer  was  aware  that  the  apartment  was 
being  bugged  and  consented  to  the  operation.  (RCR 
296) 
Comment 
Pursuant  to  the  request  of  AAG  Richard  Thomburgh  on  August  19,  1975, 
the  FBI  is  currently  conducting  an  investigation  of  alleged  bugging  activities 
involving  the  Washington  Metropolitan  Police  Department  (MPD) .  This 
investigation  is  being  monitored  by  AUSA  Donald  E.  Campbell,  Deputy  Chief, 
Major  Crimes  Division,  U.S.  Attorney's  Office,  Washington,  D.C,  and  James 
Robinson,  General  Crimes  Section,  Criminal  Division,  U.S.  Department  of 
Justice. 
1.  Washington  Metropolitan  Police  Department 
Records  obtained  from  the  Rockefeller  Ccomisslon  files  reflect  that  in 
September,  1968,  the  CIA  loaned  "lamps  with  transmitters"  toj 
'  -. '^MpW^^wW^it  * 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
1UH  iibCKLI 
SO05078-76 
J&#Cff$t*t* I 
of  the  Washington  Metropolitan  Police  Department,  and  that  the  lamps 
were  not  returned  to  CIA.  (Tab  A3) 
2.   United  States  Secret  Service 
The  Rockefeller  Commission  records  also  reflect  that  the  CIA  furnished 
the  following  equipment  to  the  Secret  Service: 
■111-1B-170,  loaned  toi 
returned. 
£^.:JSSS.  on  27  July  73,  and  not 
assswfc 
(2)  Clandestine  Transmitter  (Com'l),  to,  
msssp"  nsss  and  returned.  (The  date  the 
equipment  was  loaned  is  unknown) . 
i 
According  to  a  Metropolitan  Police  Department  investigative  report  to 
Mayor  Walter  Washington  on  March  7,  1975,  the  only  intercept  utilized  in 
connection  with  demonstration  activities  consisted  of  a  recording  device  in 
the  apartment  of  a  special  employee  of  the  MPD  in  order  to  secure  information 
i 
regarding  planned  anti-war  activities  of  an  illegal  nature.  This  consisted 
of  one-party  consent  and  was  purportedly  a  legal  installation.  Clab  A4) 
FBI  investigative  reports  reflect  that  a  special  employee  of  the  MPD  from 
1968-1972  was  interviewed  by  FBI  agents  and  6tated  that  in  1968,  she  traveled 
to  Chicago  with  a  representative  of  the  MPD  to  cover  radical  activities  which 
were  expected  to  occur  in  conjuction  with  the  Democratic  National  Convention, 
and  that  her  hotel  room  was  subsequently  monitored  by  electronic  surveillance 
conducted  by  the  Secret  Service.  She  further  acknowledged  her  role  in 
electronic  surveillances  conducted  by  the  MPD  of  her  residences  on  £S3SSSS 
She  indicated  this  monitoring  was  accomplished 
■i$f$V^*$&&if&g$v*$.Z;?>  ■irZ&S*'}  -J^Srf^SH 
♦see? 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
SC-05C7S-76 
Copy    /  01  2 
with  transmitters  which  were  present  in  two  lamps  furnished  to  her  by 
the  MPD. 
Secret  Service  personnel  were  interviewed  and  confirmed  that  the  Secret 
Service  had  participated  in  the  consensual  electronic  surveillance  of  the 
informant's  hotel  rooom  in  Chicago  in  1968,  and  a  residence  occupied  by  her 
in  the  ^^^feAT^ia=^^^ 
Prior  to  the  May  Day  Demonstrations  in  1971,  the  Secret  Service  is 
alleged  to  have  participated  with  the  MFD  in  the  consensual  electronic 
surveillance  of  the  apartment  of  another  MPD  informant.  Tnis  apartment 
was  reportedly  located  at  ^r^pg^uu!; >!T2^ -„nv-   --«■'    ■•  ■-■•'■  '  «^a  ^^  iS 
further  alleged  to  have  furnished  some  of  the  equipment  utilized  by  the 
MPD  in  conducting  this  electronic  surveillance. 
Secret  Service  officials  confirmed  to  the  FBI  that  prior  to  the  May  Day 
Demonstrations  in  1971,  the  MPD  requested  and  obtained  the  assistance  of  the 
Secret  Service  in  the  consensual  electronic  surveillance  of  the  above  apartment. 
At  the  same  time,  the  Secret  Service  also  monitored,  with  the  MPD,  two  listening 
devices  in  the  apartment  of  the  aforementioned  female  informant.  The  latter 
was  also  consensual. 
A  former  MPD  Intelligence  Division  officer  confirmed  that  he  participated 
in  an  electronic  surveillance  of  the  female  informant's  apartment  "several 
weeks"  after  the  bombing  of  the  U.S.  Capital  in  March,  1971. 
The  above  surveillances  were  apparently  conducted  between  March  17,  1971 
and  May  4,  1971. 
-TonEur 
.» 
■  •it.  i**»i  r"   »  /»  »
<=r 
SC-050/8-76 
Departmental  Attorney  James  Robinson  will  endeavor  to  as(£&fcain/any}  Ifcir- 
ther  involvement  the  CIA  might  have  had  in  the  above  or  related  activities. 
George- Clarke,  CIA  Associate  General  Counsel,  advised  as  follows: 
. . .  [T]hroughout  the  Office  of  Security' s  research  pur- 
suant to  the  Rockefeller  Conmission  and  Congressional 
investigations  of  the  Agency,  there  have  been  no  indica- 
tions that  the  Office  of  Security  has  ever  directly 
assisted  and/or  participated  in  any  electronic  surveillance 
activities  with  the  Metropolitan  Police  Department. 
No  assistance  has  been  rendered  or  equipment  loaned  to  the 
Metropolitan  Police  Department  by  Division  D  [CIA]  in  con- 
nection with  electronic  surveillance  activities.  (Tab  A5) 
However,  Mr.  Clarke  furnished  CIA  memoranda  reflecting  loans  of 
cccmunications  equipment  to  the  Metropolitan  Police  Department  and  other 
police  departments.  CTab  A6) 
Mr.  Clarke  also  furnished  CIA  memoranda  reflecting  loans  of  connunications 
equipment  to  the  Secret  Service  (Tab  A7) ,  and  further  advised: 
The  U.S.  Secret  Service  (USSS),  under  the  authority 
contained  in  Title  18,  U.S.  Code,  Section  3056,  as 
amended  by  PI  90-331,  regularly  tasks  the  CIA  to  pro- 
vide real-time  communications  intelligence  close  sup- 
port to  the  USSS  during  the  foreign  travel  of  the 
President  and  other  protectees  designated  by  the  USSS. 
The  CIA,  in  response  to  such  tasking,  monitors,  on  the 
scene,  those  local,  foreign  military  and  internal 
security  connunications  supporting  elements  responsible 
for  the  physical  protection  of  visiting  protectees.  The 
results  of  this  monitoring  are  immediately  passed  to  the 
USSS  on-scene.  On  occasion,  local  USSS  catmunications 
may  also  be  monitored  by  the  CIA  team.  However,  all  such 
monitoring  is  at  the  specific  request  of  the  USSS. 
The  majority  of  the  Office  of  Security's  assistance  to  the 
Secret  Service  has  been  related  to  counteraudio  measures  in 
connection  with  the  protection  of  the  President  and/or  Vice 
President.  Since  1974  no  electronic  equipment,  capable  of 
intercepting  oral  connunications,  has  been  loaned  to  the 
U.S.  Secret  Service  by  the  Office  of  Security   
The  arrangement  between  the  CIA  and  Secret  Service  was  formalized  by  written 
agreement  in  1971.  (Tab  A8) 
In  sum,  the  foregoing  assistance  to  other  agencies  does  not  indicate 
prosecutable  violations  on  the  part  of  CIA 
-feP-SOTTf 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
SC-05C7S-76 
Copy    /  Oi  2 
II.  ADDITIONAL  AREAS  OF  INQUIRY 
A.  .Central  Intelligence  Agency 
1.  Narcotics  Coordinator  and  NARCOG  (Tab  E) 
In  October,  1969,  the  President  designated  international  narcotics 
control  a  concern  of  U.S.  foreign  policy  and  established  the  White  House 
Task  Force  on  Heroin  Suppression.  The  Director  of  Central  Intelligence 
(DCI) ,  Richard  Helms,  was  named  to  the  membership  of  the  Task  Force  and 
directed  by  the  President  to  provide  the  Task  Force  with  CIA  assistance. 
Consequently,  a  CIA  office  of  Narcotics  Coordinator  was  established  under 
the  Deputy  Directorate  of  Plans  (now  the  Deputy  Directorate  of  Operations) . 
The  duties  of  the  CIA  Narcotics  Coordinator  ■BragsBMEKs.l..  ■inrlmferi  the 
representation  of  CIA  on  the  Working  Group  of  the  White  House  Task  Force  and 
narcotics  liason  with  other  agenices.  Since  the  initial  concern  of  the  White 
House  Task  Force  was  narcotics  trafficking  in  Turkey  and  Southeast  Asia,  the 
CIA  provided  the  Task  Force  with  narcotics  intelligence  reports  and  studies 
concerning  both  areas.  Additionally, fg^EEIIMvised,  the  Task  Force  was 
interested  in  the  European  connections  between  Latin  American  traffickers  and 
Turkish  opium  suppliers,  and  the  CIA  contributed  information  in  this  regard. 
With  respect  to  the  CIA's  cooperation  with  other  agenices,  BNDD 
tasking  memoranda  to  CIA  reflect  that  during  the  time  the  White  House 
Task  Force  was  in  existence,  the  CIA  provided  BNDD  with  assistance  in 
training  programs,  loans  of  funds  for  overseas  operations,  intelligence 
reports  on  international  narcotics  traffickers,  and  other  narcotics 
developments  overseas.  Some  of  this  information  was  obtained  as  the 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
SC-05078-76   ' 
Copy   /   o»  ^ 
incidental  by-product  of  national  security  electronic  surveillances 
overseas,  and  soma  from  overseas  interceptions  specifically  conducted  for 
international  narcotics  intelligence.  CIA  assures,  however,  that  none  of 
these  electronic  surveillance  operations  was  conducted  within  the  United 
States  or  from  lands  reserved  for  use  by  the  United  States;  neither  were 
any  of  the  interceptions  targeted  against  cotnuunications  having  one  terminal 
in  the  United  States. 
In  August,  1971,  the  President  upgraded  the  priority  of  the  international 
narcotics  control  effort  by  replacing  the  White  House  Task  Force  with  the 
Cabinet  Committee  on  International  Narcotics  Control  (CCINC) .  The  CIA 
Narcotics  Coordinator  was  named  chairman  of  the  CCINC  Working  Group  Intelligence 
Subcotrmittee.  He  was  reportedly  instructed  by  DCI  Richard  Helms  to  avoid 
involvement  in  domestic  law  enforcement  activities  and  BNDD's  domestic 
intelligence  operations.  CIA  continued  to  provide  BNDD  (also  a  member  of 
the  Intelligence  Subcommittee)  with  foreign  narcotics  intelligence  and  various 
support  (e.g.,  training,  "flash  rolls")  for  its  overseas  operations. 
The  CIA  Narcotics  Coordinator  furnished  BNDD  with  reports  of  the 
following  types: 
1.  FTRDB,  TDFTRDB,  TDFER,  etc.  (Foreign  Intelligence  Reports): 
Collected  by  the  Office  of  Operations  from  foreign  field 
offices  with  description  of  the  sources  included  in  the 
reports. 
2.  CO  Reports:  Compiled  by  the  Domestic  Collection  Division 
exclusively  from  interviews  of  people  who  had  traveled  to 
foreign  countries. 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
SC-05C78-76 
3.  Analytical  Report:  The  only  known  report  of  this  type  was 
a  study  entitled  "Cocaine  Trafficking  Network  in  Colcoibia." 
4.  Daily  Reports  (i.e. ,  USIB  National  Intelligence  Bulletin) : 
Pertained~prxmarily  to  geopolitical  intelligence.  It  is 
not  narcotics  oriented. 
5.  Weekly  Summary;  Geopolitical  bulletin.  Not  narcotics 
oriented. 
6.  Miscellaneous  Reports :  These  included  teletypes  of  specific 
information  which  may  or  may  not  have  been  COMINT,  and  also 
included  Director  of  Operations  Narcotics  Control  Reports 
(DONCS)  which  were  sent  directly  to  BNDD's  Chief  of  Strategic 
Intelligence,  {££^233 
There  is  no  indication  that  the  CIA  Narcotics  Coordinator  furnished  BNDD  • 
with  any  narcotics  intelligence  reports  other  than  the  foregoing. 
CIA's  Office  of  Narcotics  Coordinator  was  reorganized  on  June  12,  1972, 
as  the  Narcotics  Coordination  Group,  or  NARCOG.  The  principal  duties  of 
NARCOG  did  not  differ  from  those  previously  assigned  the  Narcotics  Coordinator. 
NARCOG  provided  support  to  the  CCTNC  and  coordinated  the  CIA's  narcotics 
intelligence  programs.  NARCOG  also  continued  responding  to  ENDD/DEA's 
intelligence  requirements  by  furnishing  BNDD/DEA  with  the  above  described 
reports. 
The  first  chief  of  NARCOG,  EHEBS32I7(6/19/72  "  7/19/74) ,  was 
reportedly  instructed  by  the  DCI  and  the  DDP  to  avoid  involvement  in  domestic 
narcotics  enforcement  operations  as  well  as  foreign  operations  targeted 
against  American  citizens.  When  overseas  CIA  stations  inadvertently  acquired 
information  concerning  the  narcotics  trafficking  activities  of  U.S.  citizens, 
the  local  CIA  official  would  reportedly  surrender  the  information  to  his  local 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
SC-05C7S-/6 
Copy  /    oi  z 
BNDD  counterpart  and  take  steps  to  insure  that  no  further  collection  on 
the  U.S.  citizen  occurred. 
While  much  of  the  information  provided  the  CCINC  by  CIA  was  obtained 
as  a  result  of  CIA's  overseas  national  security  electronic  surveillance 
operations ^^^E^nd  ^-s  two  successctrs •  M^rtt&3rj&d-}&v~- T.    .'  frM pf 
7/74  -  12/74) ,  and  MB&kWil&yflg^'rM  »f    1/75  -  present) ,  advised  that  NARCOG 
neither  conducted  nor  requested  the  conduct  of  electronic  surveillance 
operations  domestically  or  against  any  ccmnunications  having  one  terminal 
in  the  United  States.  |^ 
'*i3&*«N*#rti^^ 
'^^^^^sm&p'^i^Km^ 
■iimrirt-irnT  ■- ^mmmsmmim»mmm n 
Inquiry  has  confirmed  that  NARCOG  officials  were  keenly  aware  of  the 
prohibition  against ; involvement  in  domestic  operations.  During  his  tenure 
as  NARCOG  chief.  ^Sy^reportedly  sought  to  insure  against  this  sort  of 
activity  by  renaming  the  CCINC  Intelligence  Subcommittee  the  Foreign 
Intelligence  Subcommittee,  and  took  steps  to  insure  that  U.S.  citizens' 
names  were  excluded  from  the  MINT  Register,  an  inter- agency  listing  of 
individuals  involved  in  illicit  foreign  narcotics  trafficking. 
2.  LPMEDLEY  (Tab  G) 
On  August  18,  1966,  Dr.  Louis  Tordella,  Deputy  Director,  NSA,  met 
:  with  Thomas  Karamessines,  then  Acting  Deputy  Director  of  Plans,  CIA,  and 
requested  CIA's  assistance  in  setting  up  a  small  cover  office  in  downtown 
Manhattan.  Dr.  Tordella  explained  that  NSA  needed  the  office  so  that  NSA 
employees  could  copy  international  telegraphic  communications  received  fran 
J 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
SC-05C/4W6 
Cop>  /    oi  2 
commercial  carriers  (SHAMROCK).  The  copying  process,  previously  performed 
in  Washington,  D.C.,  had  to  be  shifted  to  New  York  because  of  technical 
problems.  CIA  accepted  NSA's  requirement  and  assigned  the  project  the 
cryptonym  LPMEDLEY.  Beginning  on  November  1,  1966,  and  continuing  through 
Angus t  31,  1973,  the  CIA  provided  NSA  with  space  in  a  commercial  buidling 
in  lower  Manhattan  and  a  front  for  the  NSA  operation.  The  CIA  was  reimbursed 
by  NSA  for  expenditures  incurred  In  this  project. 
gii*/''.""v.--:'':-:'.^"'^     -■-'•f- .-"V---ji.-:";"  ^Xi."-^-.  •  •■■■■;i  :'.V      '"■   
'        ;•.■      .:-::^  ■■.•}■  
■■:■ ;..,',..  
-        .  
•  
?;;#■;.;♦■  ^.^h.,  J 
■-•'•  -'  ■-■.-•••rv j-  J 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
Copy  /   oi  2 
   ^    H|M...,  [111,.... ,,..... :  .■..f-U       .-,        ■■  •■  ^.„.,t,,.  ...  ,.,        ^,V-,..-.:V.'",l,j       I
W-.^^-v1^ ■--?:.  'r'-&'~:.  """£:■"'  vWi ':-."■' •-';'.  '  .  .""  *"  :£. ".?"':^  
■ '"''/ §i-^*'?'#^   j
5     ■        .    ....  .  .V    •.    -.-.       '  •  .  .■■  ■'   1."      ■ ...         ;  •  "  •  ;    *'i    ■  ■     ■*■-        "i1;..   •"  "■  'WWij        1
•■    •:■'•  :^i.-...:,:---y-    '     '  "■•■■•.v----.;-:-i-' ■,^>i':v.  ■•        .•  •  
••■•  v^.-- =,-?-  ^•■;t-v.^-^.^;v^«s 
?:■:■■..■•..•■■■  •-:■■      ...      ••■:■■-  ■■■■.      •  ■■..■-.:■•.  :V:jr^:;-;j&-  j
•''■•"•■-"- 'iVmrtiTiliii'i  'tf-  *  ■•'••■'-"-•* 1%  —^■-"-  ■  ■'.■•■»— ■■•■i^..-. 
.■J.,^^*:^;..:^—!. 
48ft-SE6REf 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
Copy  /  of  2: 
- 
• 5 .  Overseas  Intercepts  (Tab  J) 
The  overseas  electronic  surveillance  operations  of  CIA  provided  a 
source  of  information  to  various  government  agencies  concerning  such  matters 
as  the  influence  and  participation  of  foreign  governments  in  domestic 
militant  movements,  and  the  international  narcotics  control  effort. 
With  respect  to  the  support  of  U.S.  dissidents  by  foreign  governments, 
CIA  stations  were  instructed  to  provide  CIA  headquarters  with  pertinent 
In  its  endeavor  to  provide  INDD/DEA  with  valuable  international  narcotics 
intelligence,  the  CIA  conducted  foreign  cannunications  intercept  operations 
against  specific  targets  overseas.  These  operations  could  have  been 
initiated  pursuant  to  requests  from  CIA  Headquarters  or  from  several 
different  governmental  entities  including  BNDD/DEA  Headquarters  and  Q3DD/DEA 
District  or  Regional  offices.  With  respect  to  the  tasking  of  CIA  by  ENDD/- 
DEA  foreign  field  offices,  CIA  officials  advised  that  the  CIA  field  stations 
would  not  undertake  any  such  electronic  surveillance  activities  without 
TOP  SECRET 
HANDLE  VIA  COM1NT  CHANNELS
SOObO/tf-76 
Copy   /   ot  2 
first  obtaining  authorization  from  CIA  Headquarters. 
Although  the  CIA  provided  BNDD/DEA  with  information  obtained  from 
overseas  electronic  surveillances ,  the  CIA  took  precautions  to  insure  that 
the  method  of  collection  and  the  source  of  the  information  would  not  be 
revealed.  In  some  cases,  however,  the  recipients  of  the  information  were 
ENDD/DEA  officials  directly  involved  in  the  CIA  overseas  operation  and 
the  obfuscation  of  source  was  not  possible.  In  such  event,  the  CIA  station 
would  ask  the  BNDD/DEA  officer  not  to  reveal  the  source  if  he  passed  the 
information  on  to  BNDD/DEA  Headquarters.  Thus,  when  ENDD/DEA  Headquarters 
received  connunications  intercept  information  frcm  CIA  Headquarters,  the 
source  usually  would  not  be  identified  as  an  overseas  interception.  At  times, 
however,  the  nature  of  the  information  made  it  apparent  to  the  consumer  that 
it  was  obtained  as  a  result  of  electronic  surveillance. 
The  CIA  used  electronic  surveillance  as  a  method  of  collecting  narcotics 
intelligence  overseas,  and  because  CIA  provided  such  information  to  ENDD/DEA, 
several  narcotics  investigations  and/or  prosecutions  had  to  be  terminated. 
In  these  instances,  the  CIA  and  the  Department  of  Justice  were  fearful 
that  the  confidentiality  of  CIA's  overseas  collection  methods  and  sources 
would  be  in  jeopardy  should  discovery  proceedings  require  disclosure  of 
the  CIA's  electronic  surveillance  activities.  The  following  investigations 
and  cases  were  affected  by  this  concern: 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
^  \J      \J  W  \J  ¥    W       «     %* 
Copy  /  o| 2 
"TT1 
M^^'^W-WM'' 
Igu  v  yv|M!  n.i"Mujig.'iw 
V.  '■'■"•'  y  '"'," 
trVv-^^-::'--    £•?&;*■,  ;-T^iC>- fife'.- ■■   ,i-r-;r   ■ 
W*-     ,'".  -•"'■•*,r"-«.-'i'~;.-       .  ■-    ;Jj-      "  -  J,.  .  •       . ., .  •  > 
RS.S--:"  V'<- •«-;'? -/.•■•i,'i»:'.''.:         '  :::-v '■^"■•■%~.  i'_l'"'  ■ 
•    s?!"-'.  "-"-*C"  -'" 
ifXWFW^I 
uk^ilUHWiiiiHia^i^UiiMM 
ariUMthews^JPSP^^ 
."■»'•■  V.v' 
^%>;!'--.:: ' :  ■'?■■■■  ±Xf---  ^■■i^t&AI."-..-.i»^i«j 
%..&m".       Matthews  and  others  \ 
'  "•' iTr':-  '   j 
  were  indicted  in 
  Eastern  District  of  New  York  on  domestic 
narcotics  distribution  charges  only,  and  nine 
others  were  severed  from  the  indictment.  (Tab  J4) 
Gustavo  Guerra  -  Montenegro:  In  1972,  an  indictment 
which  had  been  returned  in  the  Southern  District  of 
California  charging  Guerra  and  six  others  with  narco- 
tics  trafficking  was  dismissed .  g^y  '■•^w^^i<"  ■'-  •■  ■•] 
WrW^rF^^rMMr^?:-^1^:^/  '4'-. 
ftiiWih'iTrtki  n'Al-'iMftiiift"    ' 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
.**#•*:"•      /    
*';iVv,»T**-««"i;.'.r>i,v'-;';vi,^*'»W:;-:.  •,■••.•;-"•';-■        ■•■■:. '-jr*- /•'V.V.'-  "■•■■ft-    .  v  ir'-jv '■-''" 
fe^^:^T-;1     ■.'■  :-^tSf A' •'■>■• -'.:i-v-   •     ■••'■-^,-"l.*.:.  ■:■;?•-  -.\p^.y  -:: 
^^^■^^i.^^^^v^..-,,;^.^^..,  -rn  ,t,-«.i.firV  iW   II  i    UrtliW 
Tne  vtA  investigation  resulted  in  his  indictment  in 
the  Eastern  District  of  New  York  and  the  Southern 
District  of  New  York,  He  was  eventually  extradited 
from  S.A.  to  the  U.S.,  ___^^^___ 
and  pled  guilty  to  a  reduced  charge. 
~*#5&»im*3**^ 
According  to  Associate  CIA  General  Counsel  John  Greaney,  the  foregoing 
disposition  of  t-hiimBMeMMa.1  \was  approved  by  Henry  S.  Dogin, 
DAAG,  Criminal  Division.     The  chronology  of  CIA  electronic  surveillance 
ccwerage  JESSSiwhich  was  furnished  to  AAG  Henry  Petersen,  DAAG  Dogin, 
H 
et  al". ,  in  November,  1974,  indicates  that  telephhone  cannunications  between 
United  States  had  been  intercepted.  (Tab  J4)  " 
tigftp&it^V&ZiW 
(Note:  This  Report  does  not  purport  to  deal  with  possible  difficulties 
arising  under  18  U.S.C.  §3504  in  closed  narcotics  cases.  That  is  the  subject 
of  a  2/5/76  Memorandum  of  Study  conducted  by  Phillip  T.  White,  Chief,  Legis- 
lation and  Special  Projects.) 
6.  CIA-ENDD  Miami  Operation  (DEACON  I)  CTab  K) 
In  October,  1972,  during  a  meeting  with  BNDD  Director  Ingersoll,  DCI 
Richard  Helms  offered  to  recruit  a  former  CIA  contract  employee  to  work  for 
ENDD  in  Miami  on  its  EUNCION  narcotics  intelligence  project.  The  employee 
thereafter  became  a  "staff  agent"  for  ENDD  but  retained  his  CIA  cover.  The 
CIA  has  advised  that  "...  the  Agency  did  not  control  or  participate  in  the 
formulation  of  duties  assigned  the  agent  by  BNDD."  DEA  advised  that  although 
the  CIA  paid  the  agent,  the  funds  were  actually  received  from  BNDD,  but  paid 
-j  Tl 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
Copy  /  o»  * 
by  CIA  to  avoid  having  DOJ  records  reflect  the  payment.-  DEA  advised  that 
K©D  used  the  agent  as  a  live  source  for  information  concerning  Latin 
American  narcotics  traffickers  and  their  organized  crime  connections  in 
Miami. 
Ihis  project  utilized  agents  in  addition  to  the  ex-CIA  contract 
employee  and  may  be  generally  described  as  a  narcotics  intelligence 
collection  program  targeted  at  Latin  America.  It  was  first  designated 
BUNCIN,  and  later,  with  the  formation  of  DEA,  became  known  as  DEACON  I. 
According  to  DEA,  the  former  CIA  contract  employee  reported  to  a  BNDD 
official  in  Miami  who  reportedly  was  also  an  ex-employee  of  the  CIA. 
CIA  advised  that  the  Agency's  involvement  in  the  project  was  part  of 
a  program  established  to  recruit  agents  for  BNDD  and  which  was  terminated  in 
the  fall  of  1973.  In  addition,  CIA  advised  -  and  DEA  concurred  -  that  there 
is  no  indication  that  any  conmunications  were  intercepted  during  the  course 
of  the  above  activities. 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
SO05C/6-/6 
Cop>  /    ot  Z 
8.  Procurement  of  Private  Parties  to  Intercept  Ccmnunications  (Tab  M) 
An  inquiry  was  made  to  determine  whether  the  CIA  has  procured 
private  individuals,  parties,  or  corporations  to  intercept  communications 
having  one  or  both  terminals  in  the  United  States  since  June  19,  1968,  the 
date  Title  III  was  enacted.  The  CIA  advised  that  the  "...  appropriate 
components  of  CIA  discovered  no  record  of  interceptions. .."  relative  to 
this  inquiry.    f 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
SO05C/cW6 
Copy    /  oi  ii 
(B)  National  Security  Agency 
1.  MINARET  (Tab  N)  / 
MINARET  was  a  cryptonym  applied  by  NSA  to  a  project  chartered  on 
July  1,  1969  in  which  NSA  analysts  selected  from  two  primary  foreign 
intelligence  sources  certain  by-product  intelligence  involving  several 
areas  of  interest.  The  primary  sources  were:  (1)  NSA's  interception  of 
international  commercial  carrier  (ILC)  voice  and  non-voice  connunications 
[and  (2)  copies  (or  tapes) 
of  international  messages  furnished  to  NSA  by  U.S.  commercial  communications 
carriers  in  the  "Shamrock"  operation. 
The  by-product  intelligence  was  initially  sought  in  the  following 
areas  of  activity: 
1.  Foreign  governments,  organizations  and  indi- 
viduals attempting  to  influence,  coordinate, 
or  control  U.S.  organizations  and  individuals 
who  might  incite  or  foment  civil  disturbances, 
or  otherwise  undermine  national  security. 
2.  U.S.  organizations  or  individuals  engaged  in 
activities  which  might  result  in  civil  distur- 
bances or  otherwise  subvert  the  national  security. 
^WfcwefcSBSMijiiil^*^ 
3.     Communications  from,  to.  or  concerning  groups' 
.,.     v**'"7t77,:r'  ~     Muiiyi    it»n   .*  \  miff "*\T»rfr  ,  .,   t   iw 
and  individuals  w^---   ■:•.•-?&. ■'*■■.■-■    ■'*,:■"..       ' 
^iffihr^-T^ 
uj^a.ii^i'j 
itUMili a 
4.  Communications  which  indicated  foreign  contacts 
or  connections  with  various  assassins , 
**$$&$K3$e&#*fa^  ] 
retftantaamt 
5.  Military  deserters  involved  in  the  anti-war  movement. 
In  mid- 1970  the  scope  of  MINARET  was  enlarged  to  include  the  selection 
of  intelligence  concerning  international  narcotics  trafficking,  particularly 
the  illegal  importation  of  dangerous  drugs  and  narcotics  into  the  United 
-tOTSECRET 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
TQR-S6GRET 
SC-05078-76 
Cop*  /    os  2 
j^f^^i4^5" 
States.    From  September  4,  1970  until  June  1973,  this  included  the 
interception  of  high  frequency  radio-telephone  (conmercially)  voice 
ccomunications  between  the  United  States  and  several  South  American 
■ 
  |  -M..—.W..I.I..    iimna  illinium  ■ 
i>  i  ,i.u.Mj.im"-*q 
cities 
iWrifViii'iiltilM 
■w 
K»M»Jl 
■**■■!*»«" 
*-■  -v*  #• 
r  r  •  ■^^^^^^^^^-^**" 
^:«#S^*r*^i«^ft%!^^  ' 
The  purpose  of  the  MINARET  project  was  to  provide  by-product 
intelligence  to  various  Federal  departments  and  agencies  in  response  to 
their  requests  or  requirements .  In  responding  to  such  requirements,  however, 
NSA  purportedly  relied  upon  implicit  assurances  of  requesting  agencies 
that  their  need  for  the  intelligence  was  legitixnate.  In  addition,  NSA 
dealt  only  with  "foreign  cotrtnunications" ,  i.e. ,  comnunications  having 
at  least  one  terminal  on  foreign  soil. 
The  MINARET  charter  also  provided  that  appropriate  measures  would 
be  taken,  in  disseminating  intercepted  communications,  to  insure  that  NSA 
could  not  be  identified  as  the  source  of  the  intelligence. 
Closely  associated  with  the  MINARET  project  are  the  "Watch  Lists" 
Kf^^^i&waa^s^^ 
bv  such  consumer  agencies  as  the  FBI,  Secret  Service,  ACSl/  DIA;  CIA  and 
"'J** 
HANDLE  VIA  COM1NT  CHANNELS
$C-05c7tf->6 
Cop*    /   Ok  £ 
fmmm  ( 
v**itffrT8!9&& [were  used  by  NSA  analysts  in  processing  HJC  voice  connunications 
and  "drop  copy"  messages  obtained  to  the  Shamrock  Operation. 
-*&WK*fl£ft<l*fci WW.Wiii  HUH!  h,m  iwu.  ill  III?!"'  UJWJLU^JHWmi! 
^A.^fi^^^^WJW^^ 
^ersECRtT! 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT 
NELS
;FeP-"5ECRET  i 
SC-05C7tf-76 
Copy    '    oii  2 
^fCFlECET 
Handle  via  comint  channels
tOP  &EGftCT 
:^,»«?i*i 
SC-05078-76 
Copy    /  oi  2 
In  late  1971,  vhen  the  DCI  was  designated  by  the  President  to  assume 
the  role  of  intelligence  coordinator  for  the  President's  Cabinet  Camdttee 
on  International  Narcotics  Control  (CCINC) ,  it  appears  that  the  CIA.  FBI 
and  BNDD  were  authorized  to  levy  drug-related  intelligence  requirements  on 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
NSA.  Later,  in  1972,  when  NSA  began  collecting  intelligence  on  "7 
terrorists  and  terrorist-related  matters,  the  FBI,  Secret  Service  and 
CIA  were  designated  as  tasking  and  consumer  agenciea.  - 
It  should  be  noted  that  the  objectives  nf  jfesE&SFp'^at-  least  in 
general  terms,  were  probably  approved  by  two  successive  Attorneys 
General  and  a  Secretary  of  Defense.  (See  F(3),  infra.) 
With  respect  to  the  CIA's  involvement  in  drug-related  intelligence 
gathering,  It  is  noted  that  from  October  1972  to  January  1973,  at  NSA 'a 
request,  CIA  engaged  in  the  interception  of  high  frequency  radio  trans- 
missions of  conmercial  voice  communications  between  the  U.S.  and  South 
America  from  a  monitoring  station  in  f£}?}*^,  ■,  i'T^J&i-:' -  'Jr^v:  .-2->rSCggg^L":l 
ffifif'^^^T^""""-^  i  was  terminated  on  January  29,  1973  when 
the  General  Counsel  of  CIA  advised  it  was  unlawful.  •  (See  summary  of 
yp*tt:?M&£-2^^£T-l I (£>} .   supra,) 
It  cannot  be  precisely  stated  when  thelESSSproject  terminated 
since  the  termination  occurred  in  phases,  but  the  narcotics  phase  apparently 
ended  in  May  1973  when,  after  discussions  with  CIA  General  Counsel,  NSA 
discontinued  this  phase  of  Kadss^!irl  ISA's  assistance  to  the  FBI  and 
Secret  Service  through^SSEcontinued  until  October,  1973,  when 
Attorney  General  Richardson  instructed  the  directors  of  those  agencies  to 
stop  requesting  information  obtained  by  NSA  through  electronic  surveillance. 
On  the  same  date,  the  Attorney  General  directed  the  Director  NSA  not  to 
respond  to  requests  from  these  agencies  or  "any  agency  to  monitor  in  connection 
with  a  matter  that  can  only  be  considred  one  of  domestic  intelligence". 
Our  investigation  reveals  that  in  November  1973,  NSA  excised  the 
names  of  all  U.S.  citizens  frcm  the  Watch  List 
••fl^^f?.«i^^i«33«?fi*^S)^ 
-TO?  SEC8E 
HANDLE  VIA  COM1NT  CHANNELS
SC-05C76-/6 
Copy    /  OS  2 7 
3.  SHAMROCK  (Tab  P)  ' 
SHAMROCK  is  the  code  name  of  an  operation  initiated  by  U.S.  military 
intelligence  officers  in  1945  in  which  United  States  international 
comnunications  carriers  agreed  to  furnish  them  with  copies  of  diplomatic 
messages  received  or  routed  over  cotnnercial  circuits.  NSA  inherited  this 
activity  when  it  was  created  in  1952  to  direct  the  national  conrnunications 
intelligence  effort. 
A  review  of  the  circumstances  surrounding  the  inception  of  SHAMROCK 
in  1945  reveals  that  it  was  an  outgrowth  of  the  World  War  II  "censorship" 
program  and  was  conducted  initially  under  the  aegis  of  the  Assistant  Chief 
of  Staff  for  Intelligence,  General  Hoyt  Vandenberg.  There  was  a  general 
reluctance  on  the  part  of  the  carriers  (based  on  advise  of  their  house 
counsel)  to  engage  in  such  activity  unless  certain  conditions  were  met, 
including  the  personal  assurance  of  the  Attorney  General  that  the  ccopanies 
would  be  protected  "in  case  of  suit".  Although  the  first  expression  of  such 
assurance  apparently  occurred  on  April  20,  1949,  it  appears  that  the  carriers 
bad  begun  cooperating  with  the  military  in  mid- 1945  based  upon  the 
representations  of  General  Vandenberg  and  lower-echelon  intelligence 
officers  that  such  intelligence  was  a  matter  of  vital  importance  to  the 
national  security. 
Investigation  reveals  that  in  December,  1947,  Secretary  of  Defense 
James  Forrestal  met  with  officials  of  RCA,  ITT,  and  Western  Union  Inter- 
national and  said  he  was  speaking  for  President  Truman  in  conmending  them 
for  their  cooperation  in  SHAMROCK.  He  further  requested  their  continued J 
HANDLE  VIA  COM1NT  CHANNELS
•  %_/•      ouorvci 
SC-05C7tt-/6 
Copi    /    Of  2 
assistance  because  the  intelligence  constituted  a  matter  of  great  importance 
to  the  national  security. 
On  May  18 ,  1949 ,  Secretary  of  Defense  Louis  Johnson  met  with  officials 
of  the  same  companies  and  stated  that  President  Truman,  Attorney  General 
Tom  Clark,  and  he,  endorsed  the  Forrestal  statement  and  would  provide 
them  with  a  guarantee  against  any  criminal  action  which  might  arise  from 
their  assistance.  According  to  former  Secretary  of  Defense  Melvin  Laird, 
NSA's  SHAMROCK  operation  was  tacitly  endorsed  by  him  during  his  term  of 
office  (1969-1973).'; 
When  NSA  assumed  responsibility  for  the  SHAMROCK  operation  in  1952, 
varying  practices  and  procedures  (which  would  later  change)  had  already 
been  established  between  die  military  and  the  conmercial  carriers  which 
permitted  NSA  employees  access  to  all  diplomatic  messages  transmitted, 
routed  or  received  by  the  RCA,  ITT  and  Western  Union  offices  located  in 
New  York  City  and  Washington,  D.C. ,  as  well  as  the  RCA  and  ITT  offices  in 
San  Francisco.  RCA  provided  NSA  employees  with  duplicates  (drop  copies) 
of  all  international  messages,  thus  requiring  the  NSA  employees  to  visually 
screen  and  select-out  diplomatic  messages  for  microfilming  on  NSA-owned 
machines  located  on  the  RCA  premises.  f^?^gi^^ 
uw'pwiLigysw'J-'W.W! 
-i'rfZt'-Pii1  • 
.tajttwawiiaattt!irj5»#^8^ 
'investigation  shows 
that  NSA  employees  were  also  given  access  to  all  perforated  paper  tape 
copies  of  international  messages  transmitted  by  RCA,  and  until  1965,  were 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
SC-05078-76 
Copy   /    of  2 
^-^i   T 
receiving,  parcels  frcm  the  New  York  City  ITT  office  which  were  believed 
to  contain  perforated  paper  tapes  transmitted  or  received  by  the  ITT 
office  m*&*izrszx:t:L,tt-..£!\ 
Although  SHAMROCK  is  camvonly  referred  to  as  a  "drop  copy"  operation, 
this  characterization  is  somewhat  misleading  since  it  applies  only  to 
that  part  of  the -overall  operation  in  which  NSA  employees  were  given 
access  to  duplicate  copies  of  international  messages  which  were  prepared 
for  accounting  purposes.  When  RCA  began  using  more  sophisticated  equipment 
in  1960,  the  "drop  copy"  operation  became  minimal.  Investigation  reveals 
that  beginning  in  1960,  the  visual  screening  and  selecting-out  process 
accomplished  by  NSA  employees  at  RCA  was  terminated,  and  all  international 
message  traffic  was  simply  photographed  by  NSA  employees  and  forwarded  to 
NSA  headquarters  for  screening  and  selecting-out. 
A  similar  situation  with  respect  to  RCA  and  ITT  obtained  after  1965 
when  they  switched  to  the  magnetic  tape  process.  It  has  been  estimated 
by  NSA  that  during  the  period  1960-1965,  before  the  magnetic  tape  process 
began,  97%  of  the  messages  received  at  NSA  were  discarded  because  they 
failed  to  meet  NSA's  criteria •*X*S*ftW»fcBtf^^ 
&^&sxamt£*it&rt 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
Copy  /  o>  ^ 
Although  NSA  purportedly  adhered  to  the  practice  of  discarding  all 
international  messages  obtained  from  commercial  carriers  which  were  not 
vi^\^^ji^M^^Bii^^r^^y^^2f^xs!t^i:..   '/and  purportedly  has  steadfastly 
followed  a  practice  of  discarding  all  messages  of  a  personal  nature  at  the 
earliest  possible  moment  of  discovery) ,  there  came  a  tame  In  the  late  1960s , 
probably  1967,  when  unbeknown  to  RCA  and  nT,  (Western  Union  participation 
ended  In  1969) ,  NSA  selected-out  international  messages  containing  the 
names  of  persons  on  the  Watch  Lists.  This  continued  until  October  1973 
when  Attorney  General  Richardson  terminated  the  practice  by  which  NSA 
responded  to  specific  requests  from  governmental  agencies.  The  SHAMROCK 
operation  was  terminated  in  May,  1975. 
Investigation  also  indicates  an  FBI  involvement  in  the  SHAMROCK 
operation  from  1963  to  1973.  During  this  time,  the  FBI  obtained  copies 
of  international  cable  traffic  from  RCA  and  ITT  in  New  York  City  and 
Washington,  D.C.  WS^SSS^VSSJSSSS^!^M!^S?^^P^^-y J^&!i!iySKUIl 
a  Until  1973, 
ii&p&p$!?W%fy  6f!\M*?^<!rt*&*^Kti*krf!^'%$i-v**-' 
*m 
■ig?  mi 
HANDLE  VIA  COM1NT  CHANNELS
Copy  /  oi  Id 
NSA  received  a  daily  package  of  such  comnunications  from  the  FBI  Field 
office  in  Washington,  D.C.  These  packages  contained  what  are  believed 
to  have  been  "drop  copy"  messages  of  MfJ^ yTR'^W&M&W WESfe^-:!  J5f 
ms^s^ssy^i^^^^^siUv^^vr.r^^ffsr-  '■  It  is  estimated  that  95%  of  these 
messages  were  discarded  by  NSA  because  they  did  not  fit  any  of  NSA's 
intelligence  criteria.  (See  11(C),  infra.) 
HANDLE  VIA  COM1NT  CHANNELS
SO05078-76 
Copy  /    01  2 
I»»IWIJ|*JW«UI 
UiA':'..:rt4 
-46Hf& 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
swaPS-asa* 
* 
TOP   SECKEI 
SC-05C78-76 
Copy    /  oi2 
C.  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  (Tab  R) 
In  July,  1975,  the  national  press  publicized  the  intelligence- 
gathering  operations  of  NSA  and  the  FBI  known,  respectively,  as  SHAMROCK 
and  the  "Drop  Copy  Operation".  (See  11(B),  infra.)   The  FBI  inmediately 
furnished  the  Attorney  General  with  suirmaries  of  background  information 
(Tab  Rl) ,  and  provided  the  writer,  et  al. ,  with  a  partial  briefing  on 
October  20,  1975.  On  October  30,  1975,  the  FBI  was  requested  to  provide 
the  Criminal  Division  with  a  detailed  written  report  on  its  involvement 
in  the  operation.  The  report  was  received  on  February  24,  1976.  (Tab  R2)  "' 
(Note:  This  Report  does  not  purport  to  cover  the  electronic  surveillance 
activities  of  the  FBI.  Inquiry  into  the  FBI  "Drop  Copy  Operation"  was 
prompted  by  its  collateral  relationship  with  NSA' s  SHAMROCK.) 
D.  Department  of  State 
The  attorneys  for  the  Government  in  the  case  of  Morton  Halperin,  et  al. 
v.  Henry  A.  Kissinger,  et  al.,  C.A.  No.  1187-73,  DDC,  advised  that  in  1969 
and  1970-71,  ff'ffl''^^,'.,,/111!^^'!1^,  ■!,■■■  ■?!,- ■■'■!  ^^L.    Iwas  the  subject 
of  electronic  surveillances  authorized  by  the  Attorney  General. 
An  inquiry  was  made  to  ascertain  whether  the  Department  of  State  had 
conducted  any  warrantless  electronic  surveillances  since  1969,  i.e.,  since 
the  enactment  of  Title  III.  Maurice  Leigh,  Legal  Advisor,  Department 
of  State,  responded  on  December  31,  1975  that  no  warrantless  electronic 
surveillances  of  U.S.  citizens  were  conducted  by  his  Department  during  that 
period.  (Tab  S) 
J 
TOP  SECRET '_ 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
Copy  /  of ;
III.  PURPORTED  SOURCES  OF  AUTHORITY  FOR  INlKKtm'lNG  QOMMUNICATIONS 
No  court  orders  were  obtained  to  conduct  any  of  the  interceptions 
involved  in  this  inquiry.  Justification  must  be  found,  it  at  all,  in 
specific  legislation  or  under  the  Presidential  power  to  protect  the 
national  security  or  obtain  foreign  intelligence  information  deemed 
essential  to  the  security  of  the  United  States.  18  U.S.C.  §2511(3). 
A.  THE  PRESIDENTIAL  POWER 
1.  Legislative  History 
Nothing  contained  in  the  criminal  prohibitions  of  18  U.S.C.  §2511(1) 
or  47  U.S.C.  §§501,  605,  "...  shall  limit  the  constitutional  power  of 
the  President  to  take  such  measures  as  he  deems  necessary  to  protect  the 
Nation  against  actual  or  potential  attack  or  other  hostile  acts  of  a 
foreign  power,  to  obtain  foreign  intelligence  information  deemed  essential 
to  the  security  of  the  United  States,  or  to  protect  national  security 
information  against  foreign  intelligence."  18  U.S.C.  §2511(3). 
The  legislative  history  of  Section  2511(3)  expressly  reflects  that 
nothing  contained  in  the  Federal  criminal  prohibitions  "...  is  intended 
to  limit  the  power  of  the  President  to  obtain  information  by  whatever 
means  to  protect  the  United  States  from  the  acts  of  a  foreign  power, 
including  actual  or  potaitial  attack  or  foreign  intelligence  activities,  or 
any  other  danger  to  the  structure  or  existence  of  the  Government.  Where 
foreign  affairs  and  internal  security  are  involved,  the  proposed  system 
of  court  ordered  electronic  surveillance  envisioned  for  the  administration  of 
domestic  criminal  legislation  is  not  intended  necessarily  to  be  applicable...
Copy   /  of  2 
"It  is  obvious  that  whatever  means  are  necessary  should  and  must  be 
taken  to  protect  the  national  security  interest.  'Wiretapping  and  electronic 
surveillance  techniques  are  proper  means  for  the  acquisition  of  counter- 
intelligence against  the  hostile  action  of  foreign  powers.  Nothing  in  the 
proposed  legislation  seeks  to  disturb  the  power  of  the  President  to  act  in 
this  area.  Limitations  that  may  be  deemed  proper  in  the  field  of  domestic 
affairs  of  a  nation  become  artificial  when  international  relations  and 
internal  security  are  at  stake."  1968  united  States  Code  Cong .  and  Adm. 
News  2156-57,  2182. 
2.  Presidential  Directives  (Historical) 
Prior  to  the  enactment  of  18  U.S. C.  §2511(3)  in  June,  1968,  Presidents 
of  the  United  States  since  Franklin  Roosevelt  had  authorized  Attorneys 
General  to  approve  investigations  to  secure  information  by  listening 
devices  directed  to  the  conversation  of  persons  suspected  of  subversive 
activities.  Zweibon  v.  Mitchell,  516  F.2d  594,  673-679  App.  A  (D.C.  Cir. 
1975) . 
Although  this  practice  has  never  received  express  Supreme  Court 
aproval,  the  Court  in  United  States  v.  United  States  District  Court, 
m
Copy  /  of  2 
maintaining  intelligence  on  subversive  forces  and  should  not  be  subject 
to  traditional  warrant  requirements  which  were  established  to  govern  the 
investigation  of  criminal  activity  rather  than  ongoing  intelligence 
gathering.  407  U.S.  318-319. 
The  Court  rejected  these  contentions  and  held  that  18  U.S.C.  §2511(3) 
is  not  a  congressionally  prescribed  exception  to  the  general  warrant 
requirement,  but  a  congressional  disclaimer  and  expression  of  neutrality 
which  makes  no  attempt  to  define  or  delineate  the  powers  of  the  President 
to  meet  domestic  threats  to  the  national  security. 
Vfoile  recognizing  the  Constitutional  basis  of  the  President's  domestic 
security  role,  the  Court  ruled  that  the  President's  power  to  authorize 
domestic  security  electronic  surveillances  must  be  exercised  in  a  manner 
compatible  with  the  Fourth  Amendment  which  requires  an  appropriate  prior 
warrant  procedure;  the  prior  express  approval  of  the  Attorney  General  is 
not  sufficient. 
The  Keith  case  was  decided  on  June  19,  1972.  It  is  a  watershed  in 
the  development  of  the  applicable  law. 
Although  the  Court  studiously  avoided  expressing  any  opinion  concerning 
the  issues  which  might  be  involved  in  the  activities  of  foreign  powers  or 
their  agents ,  the  decision  obviously  narrowed  the  6cope  of  Presidentially- 
authorized  domestic  security  electronic  surveillances  previously  considered 
permissible  by  the  Attorney  General  and  Federal  intelligence  officials.
Copy  /  of  2 
(Presidential  authorization  to  conduct  electronic  surveillances 
solely  for  the  purpose  of  gathering  foreign  intelligence  information  was 
subsequently  upheld  by  Federal  Courts  of  Appeal,  e.g. ,  United  States  v. 
Butenko,  494  F.2d  593  (3  Cir.  1974);  United  States  v.  Brown,  494  F.2d 
418  (5  Cir.  1973)). 
The  existence  of  criminal  willfulness  .^tjecaasadabEfsa*  could  turn 
on  whether  an  electronic  surveillance  occurred  pre-Keith  or  post-Keith 
where  the  surveillance  was  purportedly  under  Presidential  auspices.  The 
significance  of  Keith  is  most  apparent  where  a  Federal  agency,  acting 
without  a  warrant  but  under  the  purported  direction  of  the  President  (or  his 
designee,  the  Attorney  General,  or  alter  ego,  the  National  Security  Council), 
intercepts  cccinunications  having  at  least  one  terminal  in  the  United  States 
which  cannunications  do  not  directly  relate  to  national  security.  Prior  to 
Keith,  Presidential  authorization  was  probably  sufficient  per  se  to  demon- 
strate good  faith  on  the  part  of  those  conducting  the  interceptions.  Since 
Keith,  a  finding  of  good  faith  in  such  warrantless  surveillances  might  be  more 
difficult.  Zweibon  v.  Mitchell,  516  F.2d  594,  671n.279  (D.C.  Cir.  1975). 
4.  Presidential  Authorization 
The  fundamental  question  in  the  instant  inquiry  is  whether  Presidential 
authorization,  or  its  equivalent,  was  given  in  the  aforementioned  areas  of 
questionable  activity.  « 
4f
*  Copy  /  of  2 
Preliminarily,  it  can  be  stated  that  no  direct  Presidential 
authorization  for  any  of  the  interceptions  has  been  found.  Rather, 
the  agencies  rely  variously  upon  National  Security  Council  Intelligence 
Directives  (NSCIDs),  memoranda  of  conferences  with  the  President, 
brief i'"?"  of  Attorneys  General,  instructions  from  White  House  staffers, 
Presi      speeches  and  press  releases,  and  interpretations  of  Presi- 
dential programs  and  priorities.  These  are  discussed  below  under 
appropriate  captions.
SC-05C7S-/6 
Copy    /  o<  2 
B.     NARCOTICS  IMELLIGENCE-GATHEKING:  PRESIDEMTAL  DIRECTION  ' 
1.  Presidential  Message  to  Congress 
On  July  14,  1969,  the  President  sent  the  Comprehensive  Drug  Abuse 
Prevention  and  Control  Act  to  Congress.  In  an  accompanying  message  (Tab  Tl), 
the  President  stated  in  pertinent  part: 
...  [A]  new  urgency  and  concerted  national  policy  are 
needed  at  the  Federal  level  to  begin  to  cope  with  this  growing 
menace  to  the  general  welfare  of  the  United  States    Effective 
control  of  illicit  drugs  requires  the  cooperation  of  many  agencies 
of  the  Federal  local  and  State  governments     I  have  directed 
the  Secretary  of  State  and  the  Attorney  General  to  explore  new 
avenues  of  cooperation  with  foreign  governments  to  stop  the  production 
of  this  contraband  at  its  sources    Our  efforts  to  eliminate 
these  drugs  at  their  point  of  origin  will  be  coupled  with  new  efforts 
to  intercept  them  at  their  point  of  illegal  entry  into  the  United 
States    In  the  early  days  of  this  Administration  I  requested 
that  the  Attorney  General  form  an  interdepartmental  Task  Force  to 
conduct  a  comprehensive  study  of  the  unlawful  trafficking  in 
narcotics  and  dangerous  drugs  ....  this  Task  Force  has  completed 
its  study  and  has  a  recommended  plan  of  action,  for  immediate  and 
long-term  implementation,  designed  to  substantially  reduce  the 
illicit  trafficking  in  narcotics,  marihuana  and  dangerous  drugs 
across  United  States  borders.  To  implement  the  recommended  plan, 
I  have  directed  the  Attorney  General  to  organize  and  place  into 
immediate  operation  an  "action  task  force"  to  undertake  a  frontal 
attack  on  the  problem    v 
2.  VMte  House  Task  Force  on  Narcotics  Control 
According  to  CIA  memoranda  (Tab  T2) ,  the  CIA  "first  became  involved  in 
the  narcotic  control  problem  on  24  October  1969  when  the  President 
announced  a  decision  to  make  narcotics  a  matter  of  foreign  policy.  A 
Viiite  House  Task  Force  on  Narcotics  Control  was  established  with  the  DCI 
as  a  member  and  the  Agency  was  asked  to  contribute  to  the  maximum  extent 
<ffl-SECRE1 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
SC-05078-76 
Copy  /    012 
possible  in  the  collection  of  foreign  intelligence  related  to  traffic 
in  opium  and  heroin."  (Qnphasis  added.) 
The  White  House  Task  Force  included  representatives  from  the  White 
House  Staff,  CIA,  State  Department,  Treasury,  BNDD,  and  the  Department  of 
Defense.  The  purpose  of  the  Task  Force  was  to  plan  actions  abroad  to 
reduce  opium  production  and  to  suppress  trafficking  in  narcotics .  (Tab  T3) 
According  to  other  CIA  memoranda  (Tab  T4) ,  the  President  instructed  the 
Director  of  Central  Intelligence  to  "do  whatever  he  could  to  help"  when 
he  designated  him  a  member  of  die  Task  Force. 
3.  Cabinet  ConraLttee  on  International  Narcotics  Control 
The  President  sent  a  memorandum  to  the  Secretary  of  State  on  August 
17,  1971,  (Tab  T5),  directing  the  establishment  of  a  Cabinet  Cocmittee  on 
International  Narcotics  Control  (CCINC)  composed  of  the  Secretaries  of 
State,  Defense,  and  Treasury,  the  Attorney  General,  Director  of  Central 
Intelligence,  and  the  Ambassador  to  the  United  Nations.  The  President 
stated  that  drug  abuse  had  grown  to  crisis  proportions  and  it  was  "imperative 
that  the  illicit  flow  of  narcotics  and  dangerous  drugs  into  this  country 
be  stopped  as  soon  as  possible." 
The  CCINC  was  assigned  responsibility  for  the  "formulation  and 
coordination  of  all  policies  of  the  Federal  Government  relating  to  the 
goal  of  curtailing  and  eventually  eliminating  the  flow  of  illegal  narcotics 
and  dangerous  drugs  into  the  United  States  from  abroad.  To  the  maxirrtrn 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
TuPbECRtJ 
SC-05078-76 
Copy  /    Ol  2 
extent  permitted  by  law,  Federal  offices  and  Federal  departments  and  agencies 
shall  cooperate  with  the  Cabinet  Committee  in  carrying  out  its  functions 
under  this  directive  and  shall  comply  with  the  policies ,  guidelines , 
standards,  and  procedures  prescribed  by  the  Cabinet  Conmittee.  ...  More 
specifically,  the  Cabinet  Conmittee  shall  ...  (2)  assure  that  all 
diplomatic,  intelligence,  and  Federal  law  enforcement  programs  and  activities 
of  international  scope  are  properly  coordinated  .  .  .  and  (5)  "report 
to  the  President,  from  time  to  time,  ccncerning  the  foregoing."  (Emphasis 
added.) 
The  Presidential  memorandum  also  directed  that  the  CCINC  be  supported 
by  a  "Working  Group  to  be  composed  of  personnel  from  each  of  the  concerned 
agencies  .  .  ." 
The  CCINC  was  officially  established  on  September  7,  1971.  (Tab  T5) 
Egil  Krogh  was  designated  its  Executive  Director  and  Chairman  of  the 
Working  Group.  The  latter  included  representatives  from  State,  Treasury, 
BNDD,  NSC,  Defense  and  CIA. 
The  CCINC  appointed  a  Foreign  Intelligence  Subcommittee  chaired  by  the 
CIA  ' 'narcotics  coordinator"  and  including  members  from  NSA,  DIA,  State, 
Treasury  and  the  White  House.  (Tab  T6)   The  mission  of  the  Subcommittee 
was  to  "provide  for  a  coordinated  national  effort  in  the  collection, 
dissemination  and  finished  production  of  national  foreign  intelligence  on 
narcotics  and  dangerous  drugs."  The  functions  of  the  Subcommittee  included 
the  forwarding  of  intelligence  "collection  requirements  as  necessary  to 
appropriate  departments  and  agencies." t 
HANDLE  VIA  COM1NT  CHANNELS
SC-05078-76 
Copy  /    0*  2 
The  "Terms  of  Reference"  for  the  Intelligence  Subcommittee  define 
'national  foreign  intelligence"  as  follows: 
Foreign  intelligence  includes  domestic 
intelligence  that  directly  relates  to 
foreign  intelligence  targets.  National 
intelligence  is  that  intelligence  which 
is  required  for  the  formulation  of 
national  policy  or  narcotics  and  danger- 
ous drugs.  (Tab  T6) 
A  CCIR)  Coordinating  Subconmittee  was  also  created  to  "support  the 
President  in  fulfilling  his  responsiblity"  under  Section  481  of  the  Foreign 
Assistance  Act  of  1961  which  provides: 
The  President  shall  suspend  sales  under  the 
Foreign  Military  Sales  Act. . .  with  respect 
to  any  country  when  the  President  determines 
that  the  government  of  such  country  has  failed 
to  take  adequate  steps  to  prevent  narcotics 
drugs  and  other  controlled  substances...  from 
. . .  entering  the  United  States  unlawfully. . . 
(Tab  T7) 
In  determining  whether  there  was  a  prima  facie  case  for  questioning  a 
country's  performance,  the  Coordinating  Subconmittee  was  to  ascertain, 
inter  alia,  if  there  was  (1)  evidence  of  substantial  violations  of  treaty 
obligations  or  bilateral  agreements  relating  to  control  of  the  production, 
processing  or  trafficking  in  narcotics  drugs;  (2)  "hard  evidence"  that 
government  officials  were  involved  in  illicit  drug  production,  processing, 
smuggling  or  trafficking;  and  (3)  whether  a  country  had  declined  or  failed 
to  take  adequate  steps  to  improve  the  effectiveness  of  its  narcotics  enforce- 
ment capability  and  to  correct  other  narcotics  control  deficiencies.  (Tab  T7) 
uakihip  VIA   COM1NT  CHANNELS
SC-05C78-76 
Copy  /   oiZ 
Minutes  and  memoranda  of  CCINC  meetings  and  activities  reflect  the 
f ollowing : ~ 
August  17,  1971 
Establishment  of  the  Cabinet  Ccxrmittee 
actually  amounts  to  a  shift  of  overall 
authority  away  from  Justice  to  the  White 
House  and  State. . . . 
*  *  * 
A  Presidential  Directive  would  designate 
the  Cabinet  officers  to  serve  on  the  Com- 
mittee and  mandate  its  establishment  and 
functions.  Also,  it  would  designate  me 
[Krogh]  as  Executive  Director  of  the 
Committee.  This  is  important  to  give  the 
Director  [Krogh]  credibility  and  clout   
(Tab  T8) 
September  20,  1971 
...  Mr .  Krogh  also  explained  that  ways 
had  to  be  found  to  make  our  narcotics 
suppression  effort  consistent  with  the 
requirements  of  national  security. . . . 
Crab  19) 
October  7,  1971 
Secretary  Rogers  stated  that  he        v 
believed  the  Committee's  primary  task 
should  be  to  exert  pressure  from  the 
top  during  the  next  year  to  insure  that 
the  United  States  Goverrment  takes  what- 
ever steps  are  necessary  to  reduce  the 
supply  of  illicit  narcotics  available 
to  American  users.  He  reiterated  to  the 
Committee  that  achieving  real  progress 
in  this  battle  is  one  of  the  President's 
highest  priorities. 
*  *  * 
Attorney  General  Mitchell  raised  the 
problem  of  narcotics  smuggling  through 
Latin  America.  This  area,  particularly 
Panama  and  Paraguay  is  an  increasingly 
SO 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
SOG5C76-76 
Copy  /  012 
important  transit  point  for  heroin 
destined  for  the  United  States.  Mr.  ' 
Krogh  agreed  that  the  Cabinet  Committee 
should  address  itself  to  the  Latin 
American  problem  on  a  priority  basis. 
(Tab  T10) 
December  29,  1971 
The  Committee  agreed  with  Mr.  Krogh' s 
suggestion  that  the  highest  supply  side 
priority  should  be  on  domestic  law  enforce- 
ment and  interdiction  at  the  United  States 
border. 
Internationally,,  the  greatest  emphases 
should  be  on  gathering  intelligence  and 
on  strengthening  foreign  narcotics  law 
enforcement . 
*  *  * 
To  increase  our  intelligence  gathering 
capacity,  Mr.  Krogh  asked  for  increased 
assistance  from  the  Central  Intelligence 
Agency.  General  Cushman  responded  that 
the  CIA  is  pleased  to  act  as  intelligence 
coordinator  overseas  and  would  attempt 
to  assist  the  narcotics  control  effort 
in  whatever  way  it  can.  General  Cushnan 
did  caution,  though,  that  a  coordinated 
interagency  effort  is  required  since 
neither  the  CIA  nor  any  other  narcotics  ^ 
intelligence  gathering  organization 
possesses  the  assets  or  expertise  required 
to  do  the  job  by  itself. 
General  Cushman  made  it  clear  that  to 
expand  its  efforts  the  CIA  needed  some 
increase  in  financial  and  personnel 
support  end,  most  importantly,  required 
additional  coverage  for  its  overseas 
personnel.  Mr.  Gross  volunteered  to 
assist  on  the  latter  problem.  (Tab  Til) 
HANDLE  VIA  COAAINT  CHANNELS
■IUJ    .,JLUHLI 
SC-05078-76 
Copy     /    Oi  2 
March  10.  1972 
Mr.  Gross  asserted  that  the  Cabinet 
Committee's  December  16,  1971,  decision 
to  put  first  priority  on  intelligence 
and  law  enforcement  had  been  interpreted 
In  some  quarters  as  meaning  there  was  no 
longer  any  interest  In  crop  substitution, 
treatment,  education  or  research  overseas. 
The  Marking  Group  agreed  that  this  extreme 
interpretation  was  incorrect.  Other  facets 
of  the  international  drug  control  effort 
will  continue  to  receive  support  where 
appropriate  despite  the  Cabinet  Committee's 
decision  to  emphasize  intelligence  and  law 
enforcement. 
•  *  * 
Mr.  Ludlum  reported  on  the  intelligence 
review  being  undertaken  at  Mr.  Krogh°s 
request  by  his  Subcommittee .  The  Critical 
Collection  Problems  Conmittee  of  the  United 
States  Intelligence  Board  has  been  asked  by 
Mr.  Ludlum  to  conduct  an  inventory  of  United 
States  overseas  narcotics  intelligence  assets 
and  to  make  recommendations  on  a  wide  range 
of  organizational  problems. 
*  *  * 
A  number  of  initiatives  in  the  intelligence 
field  have  already  been  taken.  The  Subcom- 
mittee authorized  the  creation  of  an  ad  noc 
group  to  accelerate  the  collection  of  high- 
priority  drug  intelligence  on  major  European 
trafficking  networks. 
The  Subcccrmittee  is  also  analyzing  the 
desirability  of  a  national  narcotics  opera- 
tions and  intelligence  center. 
A  Treasury  sponsored  effort  to  strengthen 
the  intelligence  gathering  and  exchange 
capability  of  Interpol  ahs  also  been  approved. 
(Tab  T12)  r 
HANDLE  VIA  COM.INT  CHANNELS
SC-05C-78-76 
Copy  /  ot  *
March  20  1972 
[Attended  by  the  President] 
The  President  opened  the  meeting  by 
reiterating  his  deep  ccrrmitment  to  finding 
a  solution  to  the  drug  problem  and  his 
interest  in  the  activities  being  conducted 
by  the  Cabinet  Cccmittee. 
Secretary  Rogers  reported  that  the  Cabinet 
Conmittee  and  its  constituent  organizations 
have  launched  the  most  cccprehensive  attack 
ever  made  against  the  international  drug 
traffic.  Ihe  Secretary  congratulated  those 
present  on  the  results  to  date. 
Mr.  Krogh  then  briefed  the  President  on  the 
details  of  our  international  narcotics  control 
program.  Its  objective  is  to  reduce  and 
eventually  eliminate  the  flow  of  hard  narcotics 
entering  the  United  States  from  abroad   
Present  priorities  for  achieving  this  objective 
are  the  following. . . : 
2.  Improved  overseas  law  enforcement 
and  intelligence. 
*  *  * 
The  problem  of  narcotics  intelligence  was 
next  discussed. 
Mr.  Krogh  described  intelligence  as  being 
the  most  important,  but  currently  weakest, 
element  of  our  international  drug  control 
program.  We  have  yet  to  penetrate  the  upper 
echelons  of  major  overseas  syndicates,  have 
conparatively  little  hard  intelligence  on 
officials  collusion,  and  need  more  precise 
information  on  specific  narcotics  shipments. 
There  was  general  agreement  that  some 
mechanism  should  be  developed  to  ensure 
better  coordination,  collection,  analysis, 
and  dissemination  of  narcotics  intelligence. 
*  *  * 
HANDLE  VIA  COM1NT  CHANNELS
SECRET 
SC-05C7fc$-76 
Copy     /  Oi  Z 
In  the  President's  opinion,  if  a 
nation  resigns  itself  to  living  with 
drugs,  it  risks  destruction  of  all 
accepted  values. 
The  President  restated  his  conviction 
that  the  best  approach  to  the  drug  pro- 
blem is  to  offer  assistance  and  treatment 
to  the  addict  combined  with  the  strictest 
possible  enforcement  directed  against 
suppliers  and  trafficers.  (Tab  T13) 
August  30,  1972 
. . .  Next  discussed  were  procedures  for 
use  in  conducting  investigations  required 
by  Section  481  of  the  Foreign  Assistance 
Act  and  related  statutes  which  require  the 
President  to  cut  off  aid  to  countries  not 
cooperating  on  narcotics  control. 
*  *  * 
Mr.  Gross  then  described  his  recent 
mission  to  Paraguay  where  he  discussed 
the  extradition  of  Auguste  Ricord  with 
President  Stroessner.  Mr.  Gross'  success 
was  applauded  by  members  of  the  Committee. 
Mr.  Krogh  cautioned  that  our  public 
corrments  on  the  United  States  role  in  the  s- 
Ricord  matter  should  be  guarded  lest  the 
decision  favoring  extradition  be  reversed 
or  our  relations  with  Paraguay  subjected 
to  further  unnecessary  strain.  He  also 
asked  that  appropriate  steps  be  taken  to 
prevent  Ricord  from  being  released  on  bail 
once  he  is  in  United  States  custody.  Director 
Ingersoll  replied  that  efforts  were  already 
underway  to  try  to  prevent  bail  from  being  set. 
Once  Ricord  arrives  in  the  United  States, 
it  in  unclear  how  quickly  he  can  be  brought 
to  trial.  The  Attorney  General  agreed  to 
look  into  the  possibility  of  expediting 
judicial  consideration  of  the  case.  CTab  T14) 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
-*0h'  bhCKET 
SC-05078-76 
Copy  I  oil 
f^m^mmm 
November  27,  1973 
[At tended  by  the  President ] 
The  President  opened  the  meeting  by 
citing  the  Administrations  record  of 
progress  in  combatting  heroin  abuse 
and  emphasized  the  continuing  priority 
which  he  intends  the  drug  control  pro- 
gram  to  have. 
The  President  expressed  his  pleasure 
with  the  successes  our  drug  enforcement 
efforts  have  had,  both  at  heme  and 
abroad. . . . 
*  * 
...  He  asked  the  Cabinet  to  give 
new  impetus  to  the  attack  on  newly 
emerging  problem  areas  and  to  do  an 
even  better  job  in  combatting  the 
old   
*  *  * 
The  President  emphasized  that  he 
wanted  to  continue  his  personal 
involvement  in  drug  control  as  appro- 
priate and  instructed  Mr.  Laird  to 
assume  personal  responsibility  for 
overseeing  the  operation  of  the  federal 
anti-drug  effort    (Tab  T15) 
In  a  telephone  interview  on  April  13,  1976,  Egil  Krogh  advised  that  in 
1971,  a  Vfoite  House  meeting  of  high-level  presidential  advisers  was  opened  to 
ABC-TV  News  during  which  President  Nixon  was  briefed  by  DCI  Richard  Helms  and 
ENDD  Director  John  Ingersoll  on  the  problem  of  narcotics  (particularly  heroin) 
smuggling  into  the  United  States.  An  ABC-TV  News  Documentary  containing 
excerpts  from  the  Vhite  House  meeting  was  produced  and  later  published  in  the 
paperback,  A.  VESTTN,  HEROES  AND  HEROIN  (1972) .  (Tab  T15a)   Krogh  advised 
that  the  President  was  very  interested  in  appropriately  utilizing  all  CIA 
assets  abroad  to  assist  the  effort  to  interdict  narcotics  destined  for  the 
United  States.  Krogh  also  vaguely  recalled  hearing  of  intercepted  radio- 
telephone conrunications  containing  narcotics  intelligence  but  was  unaware 
of  the  mechanics  or  specific, ^enx^s.^i^^l^iai^,such  interceptions. 
'<•'!  i  I  V.  tv  »i-i  f
top  firftftrrc— 
SC-05078-76 
Copy  /    o»  ^ 
In  a  March  28,  1971  memorandum  to  the  CIA  Narcotics.  Coordinator 
(Tab  T5a) ,  CCINC  Executive  Director  Egil  Krogh  stated  that  CIA  station 
chiefs  needed  to  be  reminded  that  their  role  in  narcotics  intelligence 
collection  overseas  was  an  active  role:  "They  are  not  simply  to  support 
whatever  initiatives  ENDD  already  has  underway.  They  should  also  be 
instructed  that  headquarters  wants  them  (x)  to  penetrate  the  major  hard 
drug  collection,  refining  and  distribution  networks,  and  (2)  to  discover 
which  foreign  government  and  police  officials  are  protecting  or  assisting 
the  traffickers." 
4.  Office  of  National  Narcotics  Intelligence 
On  July  27,  1972,  the  President  issued  Executive  Order  11676  " [Providing 
for  the  Establishment  of  an  Office  of  National  Narcotics  Intelligence  Within 
the  Department  of  Justice".  The  Order  states  in  pertinent  part: 
This  Administration  is  determined  to  eradicate  the  menace  of 
drug  abuse  in  America    I  have  now  determined  that  a  National 
Narcotics  Intelligence  System  is  a  necessary  next  step  in  our 
campaign  against  illegal  drug  traffic...  The  Director  shall  call 
upon  other  agencies  of  the  Government  to  provide  him  with  informa- 
tion, and  such  agencies  shall,  to  the  extent  permitted  by  law, 
provide  the  Director  with  all  information  that  is  pertinent  to  the 
development  and  maintenance  of  a  National  Narcotics  Intelligence 
System    Each  department  and  agency  of  the  Federal  Government 
shall,  upon  request  and  to  the  extent  permitted  by  law,  assist  the 
Director  of  the  Office  of  National  Narcotics  Intelligence  in  the 
performance  of  functions  assigned  to  him  by  or  pursuant  to  this 
order,  and  the  Director  may,  in  carrying  out  those  functions,  utilize 
the  services  of  any  other  agencies,  Federal  or  State,  or  may  be 
available  and  appropriate.  (Tab  T16) 
On  December  6,  1972,  the  Attorney  General  sent  a  memorandum  to  the 
various  department  and  agencies,  including  the  NSA,  prescribing  the  role 
and  mission  of  the  ONNI  pursuant  to  the  above  Order.  (Tab  T17)   The 
5b 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
top  occBcnci^ 
SC-G5C7a-/6 
Copy    /  ol2 
Attorney  General  stated  that  "[g]iven  the  urgency  of  the  narcotics  problem 
and  the  priority  placed  by  the  President  upon  the  establishment  of  a 
National  Narcotics  Intelligence  System  to  combat  it,  it  is  essential  that 
the  responsible  departments  and  agencies  involved  join  forces  in  an 
integrated  program  of  action. . ." 
5.   International  Narcotics  Control  Conference 
On  September  18,  1972,  in  remarks  to  the  International  Narcotics 
Control  Conference  the  President  said  in  pertinent  part: 
i 
[W]  inning  the  battle  against  drug  abuse  is  one  of  the  most 
important,  the  most  urgent  national  priorities  confronting 
the  United  States  today  . .  ."  [L] coking  back  over  the  three 
years  since  I  declared  total  war  on  drug  abuse  and  labeled 
it  America's  public  enemy  number  one,  I  think  the  depth  of 
our  national  commitment  is  clear    From  an  organizational 
standpoint,  we  have  mobilized  to  meet  this  problem  on  all 
fronts     I  have  named  a  Cabinet  Committee  on  Inter- 
national  Narcotics  Control  which  coordinates  our  world-wide 
campaign  to  cut  off  the  sources  of  supply  ....  Here  we  are 
attacking  the  problem  therefore  on  all  fronts  in  the  most 
effective  way  we  can  through  our  various  government  agencies    
I  also  have  assumed  seme  personal  responsibilities.  I  have 
been  deliberately  cracking  the  whip,  as  many  of  you  in  this 
room  know,  in  my  personal  supervision  of  this  program  and  I 
have  to  admit  that  we  have  knocked  some  bureaucratic  heads 
together  because  of  my  directive,  which  I  gave  in  the  East 
Room  two  years  ago,  that  government  agencies  should  quit 
fighting  each  other  about  this  problem  and  start  fighting 
the  problem    Nor  will  this  effort  stop  at  our  own 
borders.  The  men  and  women  who  operate  the  global  heroin 
trade  are  a  menace  not  to  Americans  alone,  but  to  all  man- 
kind ....  They  must  be  permitted  not  a  single  hiding  place 
or  refuge  from  justice  anywhere  in  the  world  and  that  is 
why  we  have  established  an  aggressive  international  narcotics 
control  program  in  cooperation  with  the  governments  in  more 
than  50  countries  around  the  world.  That  is  why  I  have 
-TOTSEEf 
SI 
HANDLE  VIA  COM1NT  CHANNH-S
SC-05078-76 
Copi  /    of  2 
ordered  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency,  early  In  this  Administration, 
to  mobilize  its  full  resources  to  fight  the  international  drug  trade, 
a  task,,  incidentally,  in  which  it  has  performed  superbly      The 
key  priority  here  is  the  target  on  the  traffickers  wherever  they  are, 
to  immobilize  and  destroy  them  through  our  law  enforcement  and 
intelligence  efforts  and  I  commend  all  of  you  on  the  fine  initial 
progress  which  has  been  made  in  these  programs . . .  Any  government 
whose  leaders  participate  in  or  protect  the  activities  of  those 
who  contribute  to  our  drug  problem  should  know  that  the  President 
of  the  United  States  is  required  by  statute  to  suspend  all  American 
economic  and  military  assistance  to  such  a  regime. . . .  I  consider 
keeping  dangerous  drugs  out  of  the  United  States  just  as  important 
as  keeping  armed  enemy  forces  from  landing  in  the  United  States. 
Dangerous  drugs  which  come  into  the  United  States  can  endanger 
the  lives  of  young  Americans  .just  as  much  as  would  an  invading 
army  landing  in  the  United  States.  Every  government  which  wants 
to  move  against  narcotics  should  know  that  it  can  count  on  this 
country  for  our  wholehearted  support  and  assistance  in  doing 
so. . . .  We  are  living  in  an  age,  as  we  all  know,  in  the  era  of 
diplomacy,  when  there  are  times  that  a  great  nation  must  engage 
in  what  is  called  a  limited  war.  I  have  rejected  that  principle 
in  declaring  total  war  against  dangerous  drugs....  We  are 
going  to  fight  this  evil  with  every  weapon  at  our  command. . ."  (Tab  T18) 
(Emphasis  added.) 
^SECRET 
HANDLE  VIA  COM1NT  CHANNELS
SC-05c7d-y  o 
Copy  /    01  t. 
.  6.  Pronouncements  by  President  Ford 
In  a  September,  1975,  White  Paper  on  Drug  Abuse  the  Domestic  Council 
Drug  Task  Force  quoted  President  Ford  as  having  recently  stated: 
All  nations  of  the  world— friend  and  adversary 
alike— must  understand  that  America  considers  the 
illicit  export  of  opium  to  this  country  a  threat 
to  our  national  security  *  *  *  Secretary  Kissinger 
and  I  intend  to  make  sure  that  they  do  [understand] 
(Tab  T19)  (Quphasis  added.) 
A  CIA  memorandum  of  September  8,  1975,  states: 
. ..  [T]he  President,  in  compliance  with  the 
amendments  to  the  Foreign  Assistance  Act  of 
1961. . .  has  determined  that  the  Agency  should 
engage  in  the  collection  of  narcotics  intelli- 
gence abroad.  In  a  paper  entitled  "Findings 
Pursuant  to  Section  662  of  the  Foreign  Assis- 
tance Act  of  1961,  as  Amended,  Concerning 
Operations  Abroad  to  Help  Implement  Foreign 
Policy  and  Protect  National  Security,"  the 
President,  in  January  1975,  found  that  the 
world-wide  activity  to  "covertly  influence 
foreign  personalities  to  assist  in  programs 
aimed  at...  international  narcotics  traffic... 
directed  against  the  United  States"  is 
important  to  the  national  security  of  the 
United  States.  (Tab  T20)  (Einphasis  added.) 
wamhif  VIA   fOMlNT  CHANNELS
SOJ507ii-76 
Copy   /  01  21 
C.~"  GENERAL  INTELLIGENCE  GATHERING:  PRESIDENTIAL  DIRECTION 
On  November  5,  1971,  the  President  sent  a  memorandum  (reportedly 
prepared  by  James  Schleslnger,  then  of  CMB)  to  the  intelligence  principals 
of  the  U.S.  Government  (Tab  Ul)  establishing  goals  for  the  intelligence 
cotrmunity  and  directing  organizational  and  management  changes  to  attain 
them.  One  of  the  listed  objectives  was  that  "...  more  efficient  use  of 
resources  by  the  [intelligence]  cccmmity  in  the  collection  of  intelligence 
information  be  achieved.  Utilization  of  the  means  available  must  be  in 
consonance  with  approved  requirements  of  U.S.  security  and  national 
interests."  (Emphasis  added.) 
To  achieve  the  objectives,  the  President  directed,  inter  alia, 
that  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  (DCI)  assume  overall  leader- 
ship of  the  intelligence  cccEimity;  that  intelligence  collection  programs 
financed  and  managed  by  the  Department  of  Defense  [which  includes  NSA] 
must  come  under  more  effective  management  and  coordination  with  other 
intelligence  programs;  and  that  NSCIDs  and  DCIDs  (Director  of  Central 
Intelligence  Directives)  be  rewritten  to  reflect  the  changes  ordered. 
The  President  "reconstituted"  the  United  States  Intelligence  Board 
(USIB)  under  the  chairmanship  of  the  DCI  and  added  to  its  membership  a 
representative  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury.  The  USIB  was  charged 
with  advising  and  assisting  the  DCI  with  respect  to  the  "production  of 
national  intelligence  requirements  and  priorities,  the  supervision  of  the 
dissemination  and  security  of  intelligence  material,  and  the  protection 
of  intelligence  sources  and  methods." 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
qui'   LLLIM-rg 
SC-05C76-/6 
Copv  /    oi  Z 
The  President  further  established  a  National  Security  Council 
Intelligence  Committee  (NL'"IC)  to  give  direction  and  guidance  on  national 
substantive  intelligence  needs,  and  also  directed  the  Department  of 
Defense  to  establish  a  "unified  National  Cryptologic  Command  under  Director,  . 
NSA  for  the  conduct  of  USG  conrnunications  intelligence  and  electronic 
intelligence  activities." 
In  conclusion,  the  President  stated  thar  while  his  directed  changes 
were  limited,  he  fully  expected  "further  changes  in  the  intelligence 
community  consistent  with  maximum  practicable  attainment  of  my  objectives" 
and  that  other  "changes  in  the  consumer-producer  relationship  may  be 
needed  to  achieve  a  more  effective  reconciliation  of  the  demands  from 
consumers  with  the  limited  resources  available  for  intelligence  production.1' 
The  principal  items  in  the  foregoing  memorandum  were  made  public  in 
a  contemporaneous  Vfaite  House  press  release.  (Tab  U2)   On  the  same  date, 
the  President  sent  a  letter  to  the  DCI  (Tab  U3)  in  which  he  designated, 
as  a  top  priority,  the  production  of  "national  intelligence  required  by 
the  President  and  other  national  consumers".  The  President  also  enumerated 
the  following  goals:  (1)  a  more  efficient  use  of  resources  in  the 
collection  of  intelligence  information;  (2)  a  more  effective  assignment 
of  functions  within  the  intelligence  community;  and  (3)  improvement  in 
the  quality  and  scope  of  the  substantive  product. 
The  President's  directives  were  incorporated  in  NSCTDs  effective 
February  17,  1972. 
On  October  9,  1974,  in  a  memorandum  to  the  DCI,  President  Ford  affirmed 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT.  CHANNELS
Copy  /  ot  2 
"the  responsibilities  and  authority  charged  to  you  as  leader  of  the 
Intelligence  Conuunity  in  the  Presidential  memorandum  of  November  5, 
1971. . .  I  shall  expect  that  the  heads  of  the  departments  having 
foreign  intelligence  responsibilities  will  cooperate  with  you  and  provide 
you  with  every  assistance  in  fulfilling  your  responsibilities." 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
Copy  /  o>  t 
D.   NARCOTICS  INTELLIGENCE  GATHERING;  LEGISLATIVE  DIRECTION 
The  Federal  Narcotics  and  Drug  Abuse  Law  Enforcement  Reorganization 
Act  of  1973  (5  U.S.C.  §§901  et  seq.)  contains  Congressional  findings  and 
declarations  of  policy  (Tab  V)  which  acknowledge  both  the  need  for  sharing 
narcotics  Intelligence  and  the  fact  that  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence 
(CIA)  and  Secretary  of  Defense  (NSA)  have  functions  related  to  the  trafficking 
in  narcotics  and  dangerous  drugs: 
Sec.  3. (a)  The  Congress  hereby  finds  and  declares... 
(3)  that  overlapping  jurisdictions,  failure  to  share 
,  intelligence  and  other  information,  general  lack  of 
conrnunication  and  cooperation. . .  among  law  enforcement 
agencies  have  resulted  from  the  diffusion  of  efforts 
within  the  Federal  government  against  trafficking  in 
narcotics  and  dangerous  drugs; 
*  *  * 
Sec.  10. (a)  The  President,  after  consultation  with 
the  Attorney  General,  shall  direct  the  Director  of 
the  Central  Intelligence  with  respect  to  all  of 
the  Director's  functions  related  to  trafficking  in 
narcotics  and  dangerous  drugs; 
Sec.  11. (a)  The  President,  after  consultation  with 
the  Attorney  General,  shall  direct  the  Secretary 
of  Defense  with  respect  to  all  of  the  Secretary's 
functions  related  to  trafficking  in  narcotics  and 
dangerous  drugs. 
LI 
HANDLE  VIA  COM1NT  CHANNELS
SC-05C76-/6 
Copy  /    oi  * 
E.  CIA:  LEGISLATIVE  AND  PRESIDENTIAL  AUTHORIZATION 
—  •      •   1.  National  Security  Council 
Congress  established  the  National  Security  Council  in  1947  to  advise 
the  President  with  respect  to  the  integration  of  domestic,  foreign,  and 
military  policies  relating  to  national  security.  Its  membership  includes 
the  President  (as  presiding  officer),  the  Vice  President,  the  Secretaries 
of  State  and  Defense,  et  al.  50  U.S. C.  §402. 
2.  Central  Intelligence  Agency 
The  Central  Intelligence  Agency  (CIA)  and  the  position  of  Director  of 
Central  Intelligence  (DCI)  were  also  established  by  the  National  Security 
Act  of  1947  (50  U.S. C.  §401,  et  seq.)  to  operate  under  the  direction  of  the 
National  Security  Council  for  the  purpose  of  "coordinating  the  intelligence 
activities  of  the  several  Governmental  departments  and  agencies  in  the 
interests  of  national  security." 
The  statutory  responsibilities  of  die  Central  Intelligence  Agency  include 
the  duty  to  advise  the  National  Security  Council  and  make  recccmendations 
regarding  national  security  intelligence  activities,  the  coordination  of 
such  activities ,  the  dissemination  within  the  Government  of  intelligence 
relating  to  national  security,  and  the  performance  of  such  other  functions 
and  duties  as  the  National  Security  Council  may  direct.  50  U.S. C.  §403  (d)^ 
3.  NSCIDs 
The  statutory  authority  of  the  National  Security  Council  to  direct 
the  activities  of  the  CIA  and  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  is 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
SC-05C7a*/6 
Copy  /  oi  Z 
implemented  by  the  issuance  of  National  Security  Council  Intelligence 
Directives  (NSCIDs) .  These  NSCIDs  are  deemed  by  CIA  to  bear  the  imprimatur 
of  the  President  who  has  the  only  "vote"  on  the  Council. 
The  NSCIDs  which  prescribe  the  basic  duties  and  responsibilities  of 
the  CIA  and  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  during  the  time  period  here 
involved  are  NSCID  1  revised  3/A/6A,  and  NSCID  1  effective  2/17/72,  NSCID 
5  revised  1/18/61,  and  NSCID  5  effective  2/17/72. 
NSCID  1,  March  A,  1964 
NSCID  1,  revised  March  A,  196A  (and  In  effect  until  February  17,  1972), 
directs  that  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  "shall  coordinate  the 
foreign  intelligence  activities  of  the  United  States  in  accordance  with 
existing  law  and  applicable  National  Security  Council  directives". 
The  196A  NSCID  1  further  provides  that  the  Director  of  Central 
Intelligence  "shall  act  for  the  National  Security  Council  to  provide  for 
detailed  implementation  of  National  Security  Council  Intelligence  Directives 
by  issuing  with  the  concurrence  of  the  U.S.  Intelligence  Board  such 
supplementary  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  Directions  as  may  be 
required...  Such  directions  shall,  as  applicable,  be  promulgated  and 
implemented  within  the  normal  command  channels  of  the  departments  and 
agencies  concerned".  (Paragraph  3a) 
The  contemplated  DCI  Directives  include: 
(1)  General  guidance  and  the  establishment  of  specific  priorities 
for  the  production  of  national  and  other  intelligence  and  for 
collection  and  other  activities  in  support  thereof,  including: 
(a)  establishment  of  comprehensive  National  Intelligence 
Objectives  generally  applicable  to  foreign  countries  and  areas; 
HANDLE  VIA  COM1NT  CHANNELS
TT71   OUOUL.I    K. 
SC-05C78-76 
Copy    /  oi2 
(b)  identification  from  time  to  time,  and  on  a  current 
~  basis,  of  Priority  National  Intelligence  Objectives  with 
reference  to  specific  countries  and  subjects;  and  (c) 
issuance  of  such  comprehensive  and  priority  objectives, 
for  general  intelligence  guidance,  and  their  formal  trans- 
mission to  the  National  Security  Council. 
(2)  Establishment  of  policy,  procedures  and  practices  for 
the  maintenance,  by  the  individual  components  of  the 
intelligence  community,  of  a  continuing  interchange  of 
intelligence,  intelligence  information,  and  other  infor- 
mation with  utility  for  intelligence  purposes. 
(3)  Establishment  of  policy,  procedures  and  practices  for  the 
production  or  procurement,  by  the  individual  components 
of  the  intelligence  community  within  the  limits  of  their 
capabilities,  of  such  intelligence,  intelligence  infor- 
mation and  other  information  with  utility  for  intelligence 
purposes  relating  to  the  national  security,  as  may  be 
requested  by  one  of  the  departments  or  agencies.  (Para- 
graph 3g) 
The  1964  NSCTD  1  directs  that  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence 
disseminate  "national  intelligence"  (i.e.,  intelligence  required  for  the 
formulation  of  national  security  policy  and  concerning  more  than  one 
department  or  agency)  to  the  President,  members  of  the  National  Security 
Council,  members  of  the  USIB  and,  subject  to  existing  statutes,  to  such 
other  components  of  the  Government  as  the  NSC  "may  from  time  to  rime 
designate  or  the  U.S.  Intelligence  Board  may  reccumend."  (Paragraph  4) 
The  DCI  was  also  directed  to  "call  upon  the  other  departments  and 
agencies  as  appropriate  to  ensure  that  on  intelligence  matters  affecting 
the  national  security  the  intelligence  community  is  supported  by  the  full 
HANDLE  VIA  COM1NT  CHANNELS
SC-G5C7a-/6 
Copy    /  oi  kl 
knowledge  and  technical  talent  available  in  or  to  the  Government."  (Para 
graph  6) . 
NSCID  1,  February  17.  1972 
NSCID  1  (and  other  NSCIDs)  were  revised  on  February  17,  1972,  to 
conform  with  the  directives  of  the  President  contained  in  a  November  5 , 
1971  Presidential  memorandum,  infra. 
The  1972  NSCID  1  charged  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  with, 
inter  alia,  the  following  duties  and  responsibilities: 
3 .  The  Director  of  Central  Intelligence 
a.  The  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  will  dis- 
charge four  major  responsibilities: 
(1)  Planning,  reviewing  and  evaluating 
all  intelligence  activities  and  the 
allocation  of  all  intelligence 
resources . 
(2)  Producing  national  intelligence 
required  by  the  President  and  other 
national  consumers. 
(3)  Chairing  and  staffing  all  intelligence 
community  advisory  boards  and  coumittees . 
(4)  Establishing  and  reconciling  intelligence 
requirements  and  priorities  within 
budgetary  constraints. 
*  *  * 
The  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  shall 
act  for  the  National  Security  Council  to 
provide  for  detailed  implementation  of 
National  Security  Council  Intelligence 
Directives  by  issuing,  after  appropriate 
uami-mc  via    rnMINT  CHANNELS
SC-05G78-76 
consultation,  such  supplementary  Director 
of  Central  Intelligence,  Directives  as  may 
be  required .  Such  directives  shall,  as 
applicabla,  be  promulgated  and  implemented 
within  the  normal  command  channels  of  the 
departments  and  agencies  concerned. 
*  *  * 
g.  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  Directives 
to  be  issued  in  accordance  with  the  provisions 
of  subparagraph  c  above  shall  include: 
(1)  General  guidance  and  the  establish- 
ment of  specific  priorities  for  the 
production  of  national  and  other 
intelligence  *nd  for  collection  and 
other  activities  in  support  thereof 
and  their  formal  transmission  to  the 
National  Security  Council. 
(2)  Establishment  of  policy,  procedures 
and  practices  for  the  maintenance, 
by  the  individual  components  of  the 
intelligence  conrnunity,  of  a 
continuing  interchange  of  intelligence, 
intelligence  information  and  other 
information,  information  with  utility 
for  intelligence  purposes. 
*  *  * 
5.     The  United  States  Intelligence  Board  (USIB) 
*  *  * 
c.  The  Board  shall  be  provided  with  a  Secretariat 
staff,  which  should  be  under  the  direction  of 
an  Executive  Secretary  appointed  by  the  Director 
of  Central  Intelligence.  Subordinate  cccroittees 
and  Working  Groups  should  be  established,  as 
appropriate,  by  the  Director  of  Central  Intelli- 
gence. 
*  *  * 
£8 
HANDLE  VIA  COM1NT  CHANNELS
SC-05C78-76 
Copi    /  of 2 
H 
6 .  National  Intelligence 
*  *  * 
d.  The  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  shall 
disseminate  national  intelligence  to  the 
President,  members  of  the  National  Security 
Council,  as  appropriate,  members  of  the 
United  States  Intelligence  Board  and,  sub- 
ject to  existing  statutues,  such  other 
components  of  the  Government  as  the  National 
Security  Council  may  from  time  to  time 
designate  or  the  United  States  Intelligence 
Board  may  recoomend. . . . 
*  *  * 
7.  Protection  of  Intelligence  and  of  Intelligence  Sources 
and  Methods. 
The  Director  of  Central  Intelligence,  with  the 
advice  of  the  members  of  the  United  States  Intelligence 
Board,  shall  ensure  the  development  of  policies  and 
procedures  for  the  protection  of  intelligence  and 
of  intelligence  sources  and  methods  from  unauthorized 
disclosure.  Each  department  and  agency  shall  remain 
responsible  for  the  protection  of  intelligence  and  of 
intelligence  sources  and  methods  within  its  own 
organization   
*  *  * 
8.  Coommity  Responsibilities 
a.  In  implementation  of,  and  in  conformity  with, 
approved  National  Security  Council  policy,  the 
Director  of  Central  Intelligence  shall: 
*  *  * 
(2)  Call  upon  the  other  departments  and 
agencies,  as  appropriate,  to  ensura 
that  en  intelligence  matters  affecting 
the  national  security  the  intelligence 
conrrunity  is  supported  by  the  full  know- 
ledge and  technical  talent  available  in 
J 
MAKinlF  VIA  COM1NT  CHANNELS
SC-05C78-76 
Copy    /  ot  2 
or  to  the  Government. 
(5)  Make  arrangements  with  the  departments 
and  agencies  for  the  assignment  to,  or 
exchange  with,  the  Central  Intelligence 
Agency  of  such  experienced  and  qualified 
personnel  as  may  be  of  advantage  for 
advisory,  operational  or  other  purposes. 
In  order  to  facilitate  the  performance 
of  their  respective  Intelligence  missions, 
the  departments  and  agencies  concerned 
shall,  by  agreement,  provide  each  other 
with  such  mutual  assistance  as  may  be 
within  their  capabilities  and  as  may  be 
required  in  the  interests  of  the  intelli- 
gence conmunity  for  reasons  of  economy, 
efficiency  or  operational  necessity. 
In  this  connection  primary  departmental 
interests  shall  be  recognized  and  shall 
receive  mutual  cooperation  and  support. 
*  *  * 
(6)  Be  provided  with  all  information  required 
from  all  departments  and  agencies  of  the 
Executive  Branch  required  for  the  exercise 
of  his  responsibilities. 
b.  Insofar  as  practicable,  in  fulfill- 
ment of  their  respective  responsibi- 
lities for  the  production  of  intelli- 
gence, the  several  departments  and 
agencies  shall  not  duplicate  the 
intelligence  activities  and  research 
of  other  departments  and  agencies  and 
shall  make  full  use  of  existing  capa- 
bilities of  the  other  elements  of  the 
intelligence  canrunity. 
-TOP  SECRET  [53 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
SC-05G78-76 
Cop>    /  oi  2 
         ~"7 
— — iiMfcaiMwMM— —Mill   i  iimfmidUMhiai— mm— txHl     II      I     IHm— — u***      "    '■"■ 
tn  the  CIA's  statutory  procurement  power,  i.e.,  50  U.S.C.  §A03j,  which 
authorizes  the  CIA,  Inter  alia,  to  expend  funds  for  radio  equipment  and 
devices,  and  contractual  services  otherwise  provided  by  law  or  regulations 
when  approved  by  the  DCI.  In  addition,  NSCTD  1  charges  the  Director  of 
Central  Intelligence  with  the  protection  of  intelligence  and  intelligence 
sources  and  methods. 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
SC-05C/eWb 
Copy    /  Qi  2 
5.  CIA  Narcotics  Intelligence  Gathering 
In  a  memorandum  of  August  6 ,  1975  (Tab  W) ,  CIA  General  Counsel 
invokes  two  principal  sources  of  CIA  authority  to  collect  narcotics 
intelligence:  50  U.S. C.  §403(d),  and  NSCID  5. 
Section  403  (d)(3)  charges  CIA  with  the  duty,  under  the  direction  of 
the  National  Security  Council: 
...  to  correlate  and  evaluate  intelligence  relating  to 
national  security,  and  provide  for  the  appropriate 
dissemination  of  such  intelligence  within  the  Government 
using  where  appropriate  existing  agencies  and  facilities ; 
Provided,  that  the  Agency  shall  have  no  police,  subpoena, 
law-enforcement  power*,  or  internal- security  functions. 
CIA  asserts  that  the  above  clause  is  clearly  "self-executing  regarding 
the  correlation  and  evaluation  tasks  of  the  Agency's  narcotics  program. 
Although  these  tasks  must  comply  with  the  'direction  of  the  National 
Security  Council' ,  if  any,  no  further  authorization  is  required  regarding 
this  part  of  the  program;  the  statute  is  sufficient. . ." 
CIA  finds  authority  to  conduct  the  non- correlation  on  non-evaluation 
tasks  in  a  combination  of  Section  403(d)(4)  and  NSCID  5. 
Since  1958,  NSCID  5  has  delegated  primary  responsibility  to  the 
'CIA  for  U.S.  clandestine  activities  abroad,  including: 
3a.  The  conduct  of  espionage  outside  the  United  States 
and  its  possessions  [defined  as  "that  Intelligence  activity 
which  is  directed  toward  the  acquisition  of  information 
through  clandestine  means"]  in  order  to  meet  the  intelligence  ^  
": 
needs  of  all  departments  and  agencies  concerned  in  connection 
with  the  national  security.1 
*  *  * 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
SC-G5C7S-76 
Copy    /  01  2 
3c.  Upon  request  and  to  the  extent  practicable, 
ta  assist  other  departments  and  agencies  with  their 
cover  support  needs.  [The  latter  was  changed  to 
"cover  and  support"  in  the  NSCID  5  effective 
2/17/72TT 
Section  403(d)(4),  Title  50,  authorizes  the  CIA: 
To  perform,  for  the  benefit  of  the  existing 
intelligence  agencies,  such  additional  services 
of  comnon  concern  as  the  National  Security 
Council  determines  can  be  more  efficiently 
accomplished  centrally. 
CIA  contends  that  NSCID  5  is  clearly  within  the.  scope  of  Section 
402  (d)  (4) ,-  and  that  the  collection  of  foreign  narcotics  intelligence  is , 
in  turn,  within  the  scope  of  NSCID  5. 
CIA  General  Counsel  further  notes  that  in  July,  1973,  William  E. 
Colby  testified  before  the  Senate  Armed  Services  Committee  on  his 
nomination  to  become  Director  of  Central  Intelligence.  In  response  to 
a  question  specifically  addressed  to  whether  CIA  was  then  engaged  in 
assisting  U.S.  law  enforcement  agencies  in  addition  to  the  F.B.I. ,  Mr. 
Colby  replied: 
Answer.  Yes.  CIA  disseminates  its  foreign  intelligence 
reports  to  several  agencies  concerned  with  the  matters 
'  covered  in  these  reports  such  as  the  Drug  Enforcement 
Administration,  the  Immigration  and  Naturalization  Service, 
the  Armed  Services,  the  Customs  Service,  the  Secret  Service 
and  others  on  a  routine  basis. 
The  CIA  reports  there  was  no  congressional  objection  to  the  dissemination 
of  such  intelligence  to  law-enforcement  agencies,  and  construes  this  as  tacit 
approval  by  Congress  of  such  dissemination. 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
£ 
b 
sC-060>8-76 
Copy  /    ol  2 
F.   NSA:  LEGISLATIVE  AND  PRESIDENTIAL  AUTHORIZATION 
The  National  Security  Agency  was  established  under  the  authority 
and  control  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense  by  Presidential  directive  of 
November  4,  1952  pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  Section  133,  Title  10, 
United  States  Code.  The  organizational  structure  and  functions  of  NSA 
are  set  forth  In  National  Security  Council  Intelligence  Directive  No.  9, 
\  /  as  revised  12/29/52  and  superceded  by  National  Security  Council  Directive 
No.  6  issued  2/17/72. 
Prior  to  the  establishment  of  NSA,  Congress  had  enacted  18  U.S.C. 
§798  which  prohibits  disclosure  to  unauthorized  persons  of  classified 
information  including,  inter  alia,  the  nature  or  use  of  any  code,  cipher 
or  cryptographic  system  of  the  United  States  or  information  concerning 
the  communication  Intelligence  activities  of  the  United  States. 
The  term  "camunication  intelligence"  is  defined  by  Section  798  to 
include  "all  procedures  and  methods  used  in  the  interception  of  cocnmunications 
and  the  obtaining  of  information  from  such  cotrmunications  by  other  than  the 
intended  recipients." 
The  statute  describes  "unauthorized  person"  as  any  person  who,  or 
agency  which,  is  not  authorized  to  receive  the  information  by  the  President 
or  the  "head  of  a  department  or  agency  which  is  expressly  designated  by 
the  President  to  engage  in  communication  intelligence  activities  for  the 
United  States."  (Emphasis  added.) 
UAkiniF  VIA   rOMIMT  CHANNELS
Copy/  ol2 
By  the  enactment  of  18  U.S.C.  §798,  Congress  recognized  the 
legitimacy  and  protected  the  product  of  comnunications  intelligence 
activities  of  the  United  States,  notwithstanding  the  prohibitions  of 
47  U.S.C.  §605  enacted  In  1934.  Section  798  also  confirms  the  Presidential 
power  to  designate  an  agency,  i.e.,  the  National  Security  Agency,  to 
engage  in  connunications  intelligence  activities  for  the  United  States. 
WIW'HIPWwwi!!— na/prpmrn «y»^w^»^w^w^«  ■ipmimmp 
The  foregoing  statutes,  together  with  18  U.S.C.  §2511(3),  clearly 
acknowledge  the  President's  power  to  engage  the  National  Security  Agency 
in  ccmnunications  intelligence  activities.  The  specific  questions  in 
the  instant  inquiry  are  whether  Presidential  authorization,  or  its 
equivalent,  was  given  in  each  area  of  questionable  NSA  activity;  and  if 
so,  whether  NSA  exceeded  that  authorization.  The  answers  will  turn 
largely  on  the  operational  definition  of  "cocruni cation  intelligence 
activities,"  as  opposed  to  the  sweeping  statutory  definition  in  18  U.S.C. 
5798(b). 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
T( 
SC-05078-76 
Copy    /  ol  2 
1.  Cocrnunications  Intelligence  7 
NSA  operates  pursuant  to  the  definition  of  comnunications  intelligence 
(CCM3NT)  contained  In  National  Security  Council  Intelligence  Directive  No.  6, 
i.e. ,  intelligence  information  derived  by  other  than  the  intended  recipients 
from  foreign  communications  passed  by  radio,  wire  or  other  electromagnetic 
means.  This  encompasses  the  processing  of  foreign  encrypted  communications 
(including  the  study  of  plain  text) ,  however  transmitted,  but  does  not 
include  the  interception  and  processing  of  unencrypted  written  communications. 
NSC3D  6,  Paragraph  1.  ^uL...J^Z"'KT   7   '"  mMiiiIiiiiIbjI    
2.  NSCIDs 
NSA  takes  the  position  that  the  President's  constitutional  and  statutory 
authority  to  obtain  camunications  intelligence  is  implemented  through  the 
directives  (NSCIDs)  of  his  alter  ego,  the  National  Security  Council,  and  the 
subsidiary  directives  of  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  (DCIDs  and 
.  supplemental  CISRs)^ 
Congress  established  the  National  Security  Council  in  1947  and  designated 
its  membership  to  include  the  President  (as  presiding  officer) ,  the  Vice 
President,  Secretaries  of  State  and  Defense,  et  al.  The  primary  function  of 
the  Council  is  to  advise  the  President  with  respect  to  the  integration  of 
domestic,  foreign,  and  military  policies  relating  to  national  security.  50 
U.S.C.  §402. 
It  is  a  truism  that  the  President  has  the  only  "vote"  on  the  National 
Security  Council.  Consequently,  the  operational  directives  (NSCIDs)  of 
the  Council  are  regarded  by  NSA  as  bearing  the  imprimatur  of  the  President. 
MA  vjn|  r,.  VIA  ^OM'Mf  r*H A mmp  c
■ror  6LLULI 
SC-05078-76 
Copy   /  of  2 
(While  the  President  does  not  attend  every  NSC  meeting,,  the  NSCIDs 
distributed  to  the  field  obviously  do  not  reflect  the  President's 
attendance  record  nor  the  extent  of  his  personal  participation  in  the 
promulgation  of  any  particular  directive.)  — — r 
NSCID  6,  effective  February  17,  1972,  provides  in  pertinent   / 
part: 
3.  The  Secretary  of  Defense 
a.  The  Secretary  of  Defense  is  designated  as  Executive 
Agent  of  the  Government  for  the  conduct  of  SIGINT* 
activities  In  accordance  with  the  provisions  of 
this  directive  and  for  the  direction,  supervision, 
funding,  maintenance  and  operation  of  the 'National 
Security  Agency.  The  Director  of  the  National 
Security  Agency  shall  report  to  the  Secretary  of 
Defense  and  shall  be  the  principal  SIGTNT  adviser 
to  the  Secretary  of  Defense,  the  Director  of  Central 
Intelligence,  and  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff.  The 
Secretary  of  Defense  may  delegate  in.  whole  or  part 
authority  over  the  Director  of  the  National  Security 
Agency  within  the  Office  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense. 
•  *  * 
A.  The  National  Security  Agency 
*  *  * 
b.  It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  Director  of  the 
National  Security  Agency  to  provide  for  the 
SIGTNT  mission  of  the  United  States ,  to 
establish  an  effective  unified  organization 
and  control  of  all  SIGTNT  collection  and 
processing  activities  of  the  United  States, 
and  to  produce  SIGTNT  in  accordance  with 
objectives,  requirements  and  priorities 
established  by  the  Director  of  Central 
Intelligence  Board.  No  other  organization 
*NSCID  6  defines  SIGTNT  to  include  cccmmications  intelligence  (CCMINT) 
<WH 
J 
u  a  Mm  r  \  'i  •      ~ -~  '• '  IMT    TU  A  v  'NJFl  ^
■TOP  GCCRCT-g 
SC-05C-78-76 
Copy    /  oi  ^ 
shall  engage  In  SIGINT  activities  except 
as  provided  for  in  this  directive, 
c.  Except  as  provided  In  paragraphs  5  and  6  of 
this  directive,  [re  unique  responsibilities 
of  CIA  and  FBI]  the  Director  of  the  National 
Security  Agency  shall  exercise  full  control 
over  all  SIGINT  collection  and  processing 
activities,  r •"*"'-'"'"   ■"'■■•'^,"  '"'      ^    7 
MM*m4*tm 
"="-■  -   -—   ■  ■[■-■-■■■■-  ■—■  -  ■    Tne  Director 
of  the  National  Security  Agency  "is  authorized 
to  issue  direct  to  any  operating   elements 
engaged  in  SIGINT  operations  such  instructions 
and  assignments  as  are  required .  All  ~~' 
instructions  issued  by  the  Director  under 
the  authority  provided  in  this  paragraph" 
shall  be  mandatory,  subject  only  to  appeal 
to  the  Secretary  of  Defense. 
Vr  *  it 
The  Armed  Forces  and  other  departments 
and  agencies  often  require  timely  and 
effective  SIGINT.  The  Director  of  the 
National  "Security  Agency  shall   provide 
information  requested,  taking  all 
necessary  measures  to  facilitate  its 
maximum  utility.  As  determined  by  the 
Director  of  the  National  Security 
Agency  or  as  directed  by  the  Secretary 
of  Defense,  the  Director  of  the  National 
Security  Agency  shall  provide  such  SIGINT 
•mriTxnnvMm 
««m    I  i     i  iriiiifmm    
IW?IO,P!*l'% 
T 
IB 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
SC-050"/8-76 
Copy  f   oiZ 
i 
*  *  * 
g.  The  intelligence  components  of  individual 
departments  and  agencies  may  continue  to 
conduct  direct  liaison  with  the  National 
Security  Agency  in  the  interpretation  and 
amplification  of  requirements  and  priorities 
within  the  framework  of  objectives,  require- 
ments and  priorities  established  by  the  Director 
of  Central  Intelligence.  (Emphasis  added.) 
fr 
I  The  foregoing  NSCID  6  superceded  NSCID  6  dated  September  15,  IS  58 
and  revised  January  18,  1961  which',  in  turn,  superceded  NSCID  9  dated 
July  1,  1948  and  revised  December  29,  1952.  There  has  been  no  fundamental 
change  since  September  15,  1958  in  the  definitions  and  duties  set  forth 
in  pertinent  part  above.  Paragraph  4b  is  a  rephrasing  of  the  old  Paragraph 
6;  Paragraph  4e  of  old  Paragraph  7c;  and  Paragraph  4c  of  the  old  7a. 
Prior  to  the  issuance  of  NSCID  6  on  September  15,  1958,  its  predecessor, 
NSCID  9,  dated  July  1,  1948,  contained  the  following  definitions: 
WWS*^1 
wt^m^m^mmimmrmif^mmm 
■*»■ 
t  •    1  
■  
mil  ■■■n>i 
^■a* 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
lUr   bttKtl  £ 
■  pi       i.i  pi  i  ■■ 
IIIM 
SC-05C7d-/6 
Copy  /   o<  2    ' 
Mi.wmnmn  iium.i,,,. 
•nm.n  .  i»wm«iyW,i.„ii  ,  ^.»    ,„ 
titta* 
MUa 
m,.  —-  ■   ni ii—  ■  
ii ■   Iiiim 
t^MtMim^m I 
"Coromuriications  Intelligence"  is  intelligence  produced 
by  the  study  of  foreign  communications.  Intelligence  based 
in  whole  or  in  part  on  Ccnnunications  Intelligence  sources 
shall  be  considered  Communications  Intelligence  as  pertains 
to  the  authority  and  responsibility  of  the  United  States 
Ccmnunications  Intelligence  Board. 
''Camiunications  Intelligence  activities"  comprise  all 
processes  involved  in  the  collection,  for  intelligence 
purposes,  of  foreign  communications,  the  production  of 
information  from  such  communications,  the  dissemination 
of  that  information,  and  the  control  of  the  protection 
of  that  information  and  the  security  of  its  sources. 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
SC-05078-76 
Copy  /  of  2 
■f*- 
WWP 
mmi—w**~^****^rm***** 
MJMttHwdiiMilMMiBHaMiaMMU 
HhrVilTufMIMiiriii 
3.  The  One-Terminal  Rule 
The  foregoing  definition  of  "foreign  camunications"  is  only  slightly  less 
sweeping  that  the  definitions  of  "cormiunications  intelligence"  in  NSCID  6  and  18 
U.S. C-_ _S_798 .  NSA  purportedly  operates,  however,  pursuant  to  a  nore  restrictive 
self-icposed  "one-terminal  rule",  i.e.,  NSA  will  not  intentionally  intercept  a 
i 
communication  unless  at  least  one  terminal  is  outside  the  United  States. 
According  to  Dr.  Louis  Tordello,  former  Deputy  Director  of  -NSA,  this  has 
been  NSA's  practice  from  its  inception  in  1952  CHI 
■HI 
L 
To  further  confirm  its  good  faith  reliance  on  the  one- terminal  rule, 
NSA  cites  memoranda  reflecting  separate  briefings  of  Attorney  General 
John  Mitchell  and  Secretary  of  Defense  Melvin  Laird  on  February  1,  1971, 
by  Assistant  NSA  Director  B.K.  Buffham.  (Tab  XI)   Mr.  Buffham's  memorandun J 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
Wi1   milKbifl   
SC-05078-76 
Copy    /  0f  2 
of  February  3,  1971  reflects  that  Messrs.  Mitchell  and  Laird  read  and 
approved  the  contents  of  the  following  January  26,  1971  memorandum  from- 
NSA  Director  Admiral  Noel  Gaylor: 
26  January  1971 
MEMDRANDUM  FOR  THE  SECRETARY  OF  DEFENSE 
THE  ATTORNEY  GENERAL' 
SUBJECT:  NSA  Contribution  to  Domestic  Intelligence 
Consistent  with  our  conversation  today,  these  are 
the  agreed  ground  rules  on  NSA  contribution  to  intelli- 
gence bearing  on  domestic. problems. 
Character 
To  be  consistent  with  accepted  standards  in  respect 
to  protection  of  individual  constitutional  rights  and  civil 
liberties. 
Source 
Telecommunications  with  at  least  one  foreign  terminal. 
Scope 
Intelligence  bearing  on: 
(1)  Criminal  activity,  including  drugs. 
(2)  Foreign  support  or  foreign  basing  of 
subversive  activity. 
(3)  Presidential  and  related  protection. 
Procedures 
Tasking  by  competent  authority  only. 
Special  procedures  to  protect  source,  to  include:
^TOPSECRETC 
SC-05078-76 
Copy  /   ot  2 
(1)  Compar Granted  reporting  to  F.B.I,  "or  BNDD 
for  criminal  activity,  to  F.B.I,  and  CIA 
for  foreign-related  subversive  activity, 
and  to  the  Secret  Service  for  Presidential 
protection. 
(2)  No  indications  of  origin. 
(3)  No  evidential  or  other  public  use  under  any 
circumstances. 
(4)  Screening  at  source  (NSA)  .to  insure  compliance 
with  the  above  criteria. 
It  is  further  understood  that  NSA  will  insure  full  availability 
of  all  relevant  SIGINT  material  by  competent  and  informed  representa- 
tion  in  the  Justice  working  group.  (Emphasis  added.) 
/s/  Noel  Gaylor 
Another  memorandum  from  Admiral  Gaylor  attached  to  the  above 
memorandum  of  January  26,  1971,  stated  that  the  latter  was  read  "in 
presence  of  Secy.  Laird  and  accepted  by  Attorney  General  Kleindienst 
1  July  1972".  CTab  X2) 
Mr.  Kleindienst  had  no  independent  recollection  of  the  above  but.  said  he 
would  not  dispute  Admiral  Gaylor 's  representation.  (Tab  X3) 
Mr.  Laird  stated  he  never  saw  or  read  Admiral  Gaylor' s  memorandum  but 
couldn't  disagree  with  Buffham's  comments,  and  that  the  memorandum  contained 
nothing  he  did  not  generally  know  as  early  as  1964  when  he  served  on  the 
House  Armed  Forces  Appropriations  Subcommittee.  C^ab  X4)
SO05078-76 
Copy    /  of  2 
• 
Mr.  Mitchell  said  he  had  no  recollection  of  the  briefing  by  Buffham  but  that 
his  appointoent  book  reflects  a  meeting  with  Buffham  at  12:05  p.m.  on 
February  1,  1971  for  about  five  minutes.  (Tab  X5) 
(In  addition  to  the  foregoing,  NSA.  relies  on  other  instructions  and 
directions  to  support  its  intelligence  gathering  activities  concerning 
narcotics  traffic,  militants,  radicals,  etc.  These  will  be  discussed, 
infra,  under  appropriate  captions). 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
Tur    dLUttl 
SC-05G78-76    . 
Copy    /  of  2 
4.  NSA  Participation  In  Drafting  18  U.S. C.  2511(3) 
\___Having  -operated  under  the  "one- terminal  rule"  since  1952, J 
NSA* s  General  S 
Counsel  consulted  in  1967  with  officials  of  both  the  Justice  Department 
and  the  Senate  Subcommittee  who  were  drafting  Federal  legislation  prohibiting 
unauthorized  interceptions  of  wire  and  oral  cornmunications  (18  U.S.C.  §§2510, 
et  sej.) .  To  assure  that  NSA's  operations  would  not  be  affected  by  the  legis- 
lation, NSA  General  Counsel  participated  in  the  drafting  of  18  U.S.C.  §2511(3) 
which  was  incorporated  in  the  statute  enacted  on  June  19,  1958.  (Y  1) 
On  July  24,  1968,  the  General  Counsel  reported  to  NSA 
that  the  effect  of  the  Presidential  exception  contained  in  18  U.S.C. 
§2511(3)  K. .  is  to  remove  any  doubt  a  to  the  legality  of  the  SIGTNT 
and  CCMSEC  activities  of  the  Executive  Branch  of  the  Government."  He 
further  stated  that  the  language  "...  precludes  an  interpretation  that 
the  prohibitions  against  wiretapping  or  electronic  surveillance  techniques 
in  other  law  .applies  to  SIGINT  and  CCMSEC  activities  of  the  Federal 
Government^ Wiretapping  and  electronic  surveillance  techniques,  are, 
therefore,  legally  recognized  as  means  for  the  Federal  Government  to 
acquire  foreign  intelligence  information  and  to  monitor  U.S.  classified 
canrunicatlons  to  assess  their  protection  against  exploitation  by 
foreign  intelligence  activities."  (Tab  Y2) 
NSA  General  Counsel  sought,  in  his  initially  proposed  draft  of 
18  U.S.C.  §2511(3),  to  insure  that  no  information  obtained  in  the 
exercise  of  such  Presidential  powers  "shall  be  received  in  evidence  in 
any  Judicial  or  administrative  proceeding."  0-ab  Y3)   This  proposal  was 
- — Tflf^SECHETl 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
SC-0507tf-?6 
Copy    /  qi  2 
substantially  diluted  in  the  statute,  as  passed,  and  was  essentially 
nullified  by  the  enactment  of  18  U.t  C.  §3504  on  October  15,  1970. 
5.   Propriety  of  Requirements  "^   ] 
It  should  be  noted  that  Paragraph  7c  of  the  1958  NSCID  6  provided:   / 
...  It  is  recognized  that  the  Armed  Forces  and 
I  other  departments  and  agencies  being. served  require 
direct  CCMENT. . .  support  of  various  kinds    Each 
member  department  or  agency  is  responsible  for  stating 
to  the  Director,  NSA  its  requirements   for  direct 
support.  (Emphasis  added.) 
The  rephrased  Paragraph  4e)of  NSCID  6,  effective  2/17/72,  provides: 
/    The  Armed  Forces  and  other  departments  and  agencies 
I  often  require  timely  and  effective  SIGINT.  The  Director 
|  of  the  National  Security  Agency  shall  provide  informa- 
I  tion  requested. . .  (Emphasis  added.) 
NSA  interprets  this  language  to  require  the  implicit  assurance 
of  the  departments  or  agency  making  requests  to  NSA  that  such  requests 
are  appropriate.  NSA  thus  purportedly  places  the  responsibility  on  the 
requesting  agencies  to  frame  th-iir  requirements  to  conform  with  the  law.    
Paragraph  Ag  of  NSCID  6  (2/17/72)  permits  the  intelligence  components  ( 
of  individual  departments  and  agencies  to  "continue  to  conduct  direct 
liaison  with  the  National  Security  Agency  in  the  interpretation  and 
amplification  of  requirements  and  priorities  within  the  framework  of 
objectives,  requirements  and  priorities  established  by  the  Director  of 
Central  Intelligence." 
HANDLE  VIA   roMINT  CHANNELS
■^re^^wn^B 
SOG5078-76 
Copy  /  ot  2 
Paragraph  4b  (old  paragraph  6a)  of  NSCID  6  (2/17/72)  requires  NSA 
to  produce  canrunications  intelligence  "in  accordance  with  objectives, 
requirements  and  priorities  established  by  the  Director  of  Central 
Intelligence  with  the  advice  of  the  United  States  Intelligence  Board. .  ."j 
NSA  notes  that  since  1962 ,  the  Criminal  Division  of  the  Department 
of  Justice  has  sent  hundreds  of  names  of  racketeers  to  NSA  requesting 
information  NSA  might  have,  or  subsequently  obtain,  concerning  them. 
(Tab  Z)         : 
On  July  5,  1973,  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  Defense  (Intelligence) 
requested  an  opinion  from  DOD  General  Counsel  as  to  whether,  inter 
alia,  NSA  was  clearly  operating  within  the  law. 
Assistant  General  Counsel  Frank  A.  Bartimo  responded  by  memorandum 
of  July  10,  1973  (Tab  AA1),  in  which  he  stated,  in  pertinent  part: 
  -^7 
m—nfmmim 
*mm 
/ 
■  i  ill  I  mill  -r  •-       •   -■  •      '-*       ' 
WPiUMJUII    till'    II      ■  !)..■     ■!-■  "    '      " 
^tent^^mm^Mmmatm 
i  inn  inriMrt"" " "'  ~ :   ' — ^u—^t^^-^.^. 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
-  TO?   SEOKfcE-E: 
l*««B^W|M|a>«^aawv«MaM«P*w«a**^ 
SC-05078-76 
Copy  /   oi2 
w,uii,»,>i)»1^i.iu:1  i.i.^  .  hi  i  in. 
difaaiiiiHUMfa 
'■W^TT'w 
tUllMMiilMlMatlvaiHIIMMauAilMMM 
^w^w>wy^"S'!"'j«wwwriw..«.ii.i'i"  fiiiiui   i  iiniw^^ww^ 
■MmtaBiBoBBBarijigigg 
WampiIF  VIA    ^OMINT  CHANNELS
"W^— WWIP.WIII 
-JPQP  occncT 
SC-05078-76 
MMMHMai 
On  September  17,  1973,  General  Lew  Allen,  Jr.,  Director,  NSA,  wrote 
to  DCI  William  Colby,  et  al.,  concerning  "Watch  List'.'  procedures ,  stating 
that  "as  In  the  past,  we  at  NSA  will  lack  the  wherewithal  for  verifying  the 
appropriateness  of  the  Watch  List  entries,  and  we  will  continue  to  rely  upon 
you,  as  the  requesting  agency,  for  that  assurance."  (Tab  AA2) 
u ^v,^,-  wM    rrVMMT  TRAMMELS
TOP  SECRET 
SC-05078-76    , 
Copy   /  ot2 
<mc^rio^m'm!sm^^^mmri''M^mmKvm^''^^y^^'m 
hhiiihhi— ■ '«w»»^ 
A      ;..    ,    -,.u.^       .^.■■■|J   bl.   ■■■--. 
■MMKw^aiiMMaa 
c 
U^lMlfcMI  «llllll   — 
Jl  ,111  Ull Will JL.J ij   
i  ,WI»,llll  ii  iiiww.iih^liw  ujh,   ■     imn,^ 
J 
^I^WIIIW 
* 
^■■•HiMWakMMaMHilMi 
MOUMlMMHkaMkMk 
  -* 
mitt  I  r  In  mi  mill 
1 A 
HAN'nin  v"    rnMINT  CHANNELS
SO05C78-76 
Co^-y  .  /  ci  2 
UNITED  STATES  INTELLIGENCE  BOARD 
Pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  the  National  Security  Act  of  1947, 
the  National  Security  Council  (NSC)  issued  NSCID  9  on  July  1,  1948 
establishing,  inter  alia,  the  United  States  Ccnrnunications  Intelligence 
Board  "to  effect  die  authoritative  coordination  of  Comnunications 
Intelligence  activities  of  the  Government  and  to  advise  the  Director  of 
Central  Intelligence  in  those  matters  in  the  field  of  Communications 
Intelligence  for  which  he  is  responsible,"  i.e.,  coordination  of  the 
foreign  intelligence  activities  of  the  United  States. 
NSCID  9,  revised  December  29,  1952,  reconstituted  USCIB  to  operate 
under  the  newly-created  Special  Conmittee  of  the  National  Security  Council 
for  CCMINT  consisting  of  the  Secretaries  of  State  and  Defense  and  the 
Attorney  General  (when  F.B.I,  matters  were  before  the  cocrrnittee) ,  assisted 
by  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence. 
The  United  States  Intelligence  Board  (USIB)  was  established  by 
NSCTD  1  in  1958  to  'Maintain  the  relationship  necessary  for  a  fully 
coordinated  intelligence  comaunity  and  to  provide  for  a  more  effective 
integration  of  and  guidance  to  the  national  intelligence  effort..." 
(The  "intelligence  community"  includes  the  CIA,  the  intelligence  components 
of  State,  Defense,  Army,  Navy,  and  Air  Force,  the  F.B.I. ,  AEC  and  NSC. 
Other  components  of  the  departments  and  agencies  of  the  Government  are 
included  to  the  extent  of  their  agreed  participation  in  regularly  established, 
interdepartmental  intelligence  activities.)  i
-TO*   SECRbfCZ 
SC-05078-76 
Copy  /  os  2 
The  membership  of  the  USIB  since  1964  has  been  the-  Director  and 
Deputy  Director  of  Central  Intelligence;  the  Director  of  Intelligence  and 
Research,  State  Department;  Director,  DIA;  Director,  NSA;  an  AEC  representa- 
tive, and  a  representative  of  the  Director,  F.B.I.  (Revised  NSCID  1 
effective  2/17/72  added  a  represent- tive  of  the  Secretary  of  Treasury). 
In  addition,  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence,  as  Chairman,  shall 
invite  the  chief  of  any  other  department  or  agency  having  functions 
related  to  the  national  security  to  sit  with  the  USIB  whenever  matters 
within  the  perview  of  his  department  are  to  be  discussed.  ^^_~j 
1.   NSCID  1,  March  4,  1964  * 
NSCID  1  (revised  March  4,  1964  and  effective  until  February  17,  1972) 
directed  that  the  USIB  advise  and  assist  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence 
and: 
(1)  Establish  policies  and  develop  programs  for  the  guidance 
of  all  departments  and  agencies  concerned. 
(2)  Establish  appropriate  Intelligence  objectives,  requirements 
and  priorities. 
(3)  Review  and  report  to  the  National  Security  Council  on  the 
national  foreign- intelligence  effort  as  a  whole. 
(4)  Make  recommendations  on  foreign- intelligence  matters  to 
appropriate  United  States  officials,  including  particularly 
recommendations  to  the  Secrecary  of  Defense  on  intelligence 
matters  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Director  of  the 
National  Security  Agency. 
(5)  Develop  and  review  security  standards  and  practices  as  they 
relate  to  the  protection  of  intelligence  and  of  intelligence 
sources  and  methods  from  unauthorized  disclosure. 
(6)  Formula 'ce,  as  appropriate,  policies  with  respect  to  arrange- 
ments with  foreign  governments  on  intelligence  matters.
SC-05078-76 
Copy  /    ot  2 
The  1964  NSCID  1  provides  that  the  USIB  shall  establish  subordinate   / 
committees  and  working  groups  as  appropriate  and  that  the  Executive 
Secretary  and  staff  shall  be  under  the  direction  of  the  DCI.  (Paragraph 
2c) .  This  NSCID  1  further  directs  that  the  USIB  reach  its  decisions  by 
agreement,  and  that  its  decisions  and  recommendations  be  transmitted  by 
the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence,  as  Chairman,  to  the  departments 
and  agencies  concerned,  or  to  the  National  Security  Council  when  higher 
approval  is  required.  (Paragraph  2d)   Decisions  of  the  Board  arrived 
at  under  appropriate  authority  and  procedures  "shall  be  binding,  as 
applicable,  on  all  departments  and  agencies  of  the  Government." 
(Paragraph  2g)  (Emphasis  added.) 
2.  NSCID  1,  February  17,  1972 
NSCID  1,  effective  February  17,  1972,  provides  that  the  USIB  shall 
advise  and  assist  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  with  respect  to: 
(1)  The  establishment  of  appropriate  intelligence  objectives, 
requirements  and  priorities. 
(2)  The  production  of  national  intelligence. 
(3)  Tine  supervision  of  the  dissemination  and  security  of 
intelligence  material. 
(4)  The  protection  of  intelligence  sources  and  methods. 
(5)  As  appropriate,  policies  and  with  respect  to  arrangements 
with  foreign  governments  on  intelligence  matters. 
r — "Items  2  and  3,  above,  are  new  additions,  while  Items  1,  3  and  4  of 
(_the  1964  NSCID  1  were  deleted.  The- revision  appears  to  be  primarily  one 
M.v'^r  VIA.   rOMINT   CH  MMNELS
^top  sEC-aer 
SC-05C78-76 
Copy/   oiZ 
of  form,  however.  The  basic  duties  of  USIB  remain  substantially  the 
same. 
Both  the  1964  NSCID  1  (Paragraph  3a)  and  its  1972  successor 
(Paragraph  3c)  provide  that  the  DCI  shall  act  for  the  National  Security 
Council  by  issuing  such  supplementary  directives  (DCIDs)  as  may  be  required 
and  that  such  directives  shall,  as  applicable,  "be  promulgated  and  implemented 
within  the  normal  cocmand  channels  of  the  departments  and  agencies  concerned." 
The  1964  NSCID  1  specifically  directs  that  such  DCIDs  shall  be 
issued  "with  the  concurrence  of  the  USIB",  while  the  1972  NSCID  1  authorizes 
the  issuance  of  DCIDs  "after  appropriate  consultation". 
The  provision  In  Paragraph  2g  of  the  1964  NSCID  1  that  decisions  of 
the  USIB  "shall  be  binding,  as  applicable,  on  all  departments  and  agencies 
of  the  Government"  was  deleted  in  the  1972  NSCID  1,  but  the  continuing 
provision,  supra,  that  DCIDs  be  "implemented  within  the  normal  command 
channels  of  the  departments  and  agencies  concerned"  seems  to  overlap  the 
deleted  phrase. 
Paragraph  5c  of  the  1972  NSCID  1  effects  a  change  in  the  authority 
to  establish  subordinate  committees  and  working  groups  of  the  USIB.  The  • 
primary  authority  previously  vested  in  the  Board  was  shifted  to  the  DCI 
in  1972.  The  DCI's  actions  in  this  regard,  of  course,  are  still  taken 
with  the  advice  and  assistance  of  the  USIB.  (See  1(C),  supra) 
On  April  10,  1970,  the  Director  of  BNDD,  John  E.  Ingersoll,  sent  a 
list  of  requirements  for  camuinications  intelligence  to  NSA.  (Tab  BB) 
The  memorandum  noted  that  "the  consideration  of  the  President's  keen
M^^CT  ULUHUI 
SC-05C78-76 
Copy  /    ol  2 
Each  requirement  contained  in  the  IGCP  obligates  NSA  to  perform  three 
principal  tasks  with  respect  to  the  desired  intelligence:  to  collect,  to 
process,  and  to  report,  the  requested  information.  Individual  consumer 
agencies  may  approach  NSA  directly  for  information  with  respect  to  the 
reporting  component  of  the  requirement.  By  doing  so,  they  do  not  necessarily 
request  additional  collection  and/or  processing  efforts.  igfeVi':':  1p™,"«-<^  out, 
however,  that  consumers  and  NSA  are  often  in  direct  contact  and  USIB  cannot 
maintain  complete  oversight.  Consequently,  NSA  may,  without  the  knowledge 
of  USIB,  embark  upon  a  new  collection  requirement.  E^Es^-jmade  this  point 
t 
because  he  did  not  want  to  unequivocally  state  that  NSA  strictly  performs 
i  . — 
only  those  tasks  specifically  set  out  in  the  IGCP.  ^The  prescribed  proce- 
dure  for  handling  direct  requests  from  consumer  agencies  to  NSA  is  set 
i 
forth  in  a  memorandum  (Tab  CC)  for  the  members  of  the  SIGINT  Committee  from 
[ 
SIGINT  Committee  Chairman,  dated  July  14,  1971: 
«S&fc»tefe£^®lfe 
When  an  Agency  submits  a  requirement  to  NSA  which  falls 
within  a  line  item  and  does  not  require  in  NSA's  view 
additional  resource  allocations  it  should  be  honored  by 
NSA.  A  supplemental  requirement  is  not  the  vehicle  for 
levying  a  new  or  changed  requirement  that  is  an  add-on 
or  deletion  to  the  existing  IGCP  line  items. . .  NSA. . . 
should  determine  whether  the  supplemental  requirement 
can  be  met  from  the  managerial  standpoint  including 
feasibility  and  cost. ...  If 'the  desired  reporting  is 
either  (a)  not  within  resources  of  (b)  constitutes  an 
i  add-on,  deletion  or  significant  change,  in  scope, 
I  periodically  or  timeliness,  to  an  existing  line  item, 
|  NSA  will  so  inform  the  consumer  in  question  who  may 
j  then  formulate  a  new  line  item  requirement  for  addition 
!  to  the  IGCP  as  guidance  and  forward  it  to  the  IGS.  When  i 
/ 
^s> 
HAK'nfP  VIA    rOMlMT   ruAMKJHS
'ssgsm&mp. 
«3QP-3C0ft 
SC-05078-76      ■ 
Copy    /'  ot  2 
interest  in  eliminating  the  problem  of  drug  abuse,  it  appears  appropriate 
to  include  this  requirement  under  Priority  National  Intelligence  Objectives." 
The  latter  are  set  forth  in  DCID  1/3  of  May  16,  1968. 
The  formulation  of  IGCP  requirements  was  reportedly  instituted  in 
1966  to  provide  NSA  with  specific  priorities  and  guidelines  in  its  overall 
responsibility  for  collecting  signals  intelligence  for  the  United  States. 
t^  or
SOOoO/tWb 
Copy    /  OS  2 
\u 
approved  by  the  IGS.  the  SIGINT  Conraittee  will  consider  j 
the  item  for  incorporation  as  supplemental  guidance  to 
the  IGCP.  The  SIGINT  Corrmittee  will  issue  changes  to 
the  IGCP  as  appropriate  unless  further  action  by  USIB 
is  required. 
On  July  20,  1971.MEm^M&.&M^±~~.vmbex  of  the  IGS  sent 
a  memoradum  (Tab  DD)  to  other  IGS  members  which  stated,  in  pertinent  part: 
1.  Although  it  was  recognized  at  the  time  the  IGCP 
was  drafted  [1970?]  that  there  was  under  development 
a  processing  effort  against  TLC  traffic  related  to 
international  narcotics  activities,  NSA  advised  the 
IGS  that  such  effort  should  not  be  given  visability. 
2.  During  the  past  year  this  effort  was  increased  in 
scope,  with  most  of  the  work  done  on  the  basis  of 
informal  requests  for  information  from  the  various 
agencies  involved  in  the  problem.  OQMINT  produced 
has  been  of  great  value  "to  the  CIA  production  offices 
and  has  been  used  as  a  principal  source  of  information 
in  several  intelligence  reports  and  memoranda.  We 
understand  that  it  has  also  bee  of  considerable  value 
to  operational  components,  such  as  the  Bureau  of 
Narcotics  and  Dangerous  Drugs. 
3.  CIA  believes  that  because  of  the  importance  of  this 
topic  to  national  intelligence,  it  should  be  covered 
by  a  specific  general  line  item  in  the  IGCP  for 
Subelement  32  and  we  propose  the  following  statement: 
"Report  information  relating  to  the  inter- 
national trafficking  in  narcotics  and  dangerous 
drugs. 
Timeliness  to  be  'Vathin  72  hours  after 
recognition"  and  reporting  to  be  at  an  estimated 
completeness  level  of  "2,  which  we  understand 
from  NSA  to  be  the  level  of  the  current  effort. 
On  August  11,  1971,  the  IGS  approved,  inter  alia,  the  following 
change  to  the  IGCP  CTab  EE) : 
i.  Add  line  item  on  international  narcotics 
traffic  activity  (line  item  8) . 
HANDLE  VIA  COMiNT  CHANNELS
SC-05078-76 
Copy  i-  ct  2 
On  August  20,  1971,  the  new  narcotics  requirement  was  added  to  Group  B, 
^Subelement  32  of  IGCP  CTab  FF)  which  applied  to  HjC  (international  commercial 
|caimunications)  networks,  as  opposed  to  foreign  internal  communications.  The 
specific  requirement  was  to  report  the  following  "within  72  hours  after  recogn: 
"8.  International  Narcotics  activities, 
a.  Report  information  relating  to  the 
international  trafficking  in  narco- 
tics and  dangerous  drugs." 
The  July  22,  1974  revision  of  IGCP  Subelement  32  contains  identical 
language.  (Tab  GG). 
On  January  10,  1973,  BS^SSe^r  of  IGS,  sent  another 
memorandum  (Tab  HH)  to  IGS  members  recommending  the  following: 
1.  In  July  1971  CIA  recommended,  and  in  August  1971 
USIB  approved,  a  change  in  the  IGCP  reporting 
specification  to  include  a  requirement  for  infor- 
mation on  international  trafficking  in  narcotics 
and  dangerous  drugs  from  international  commercial 
communications  (Subelement  32) .  NSA  has  further 
developed  its  processing  effort  against  other 
ccntnunicaticns  carrying  inf  ormaiton  on  this  topic 
to  where  we  should  now  include  a  regular  reporting 
requirement  for  such  information  contained  in  various 
national  internal  and  external  communications. 
2.  The  attachment  lists  by  Subelement,  those  countries 
and  Line  Items  vMch  pertain  to  this  requirement.  No 
change  in  the  level  of  reporting  or  timeliness  is 
made.  This  supplemental  requirement  merely  points 
up  that  narcotics  trafficking  information  is 
specifically  required  to  be  reported  when  recognized 
in  the  target  communications. 
m& 
°l2 
HANDLE.  
VIA  
COM1NT  
CHANNELS
':$%$$&&& 
SO05078-76 
Copy   /  ot  2 
3.  This  requirement  has  been  coordinated  with  the  * 
Chairman,  Intelligence  Subconmittee,  "forking 
Group  of  the  Cabinet  Contnittee  on  International 
Narcotics  Control. 
Upon  this  recommendation,  a  change  in  the  reporting  specifications 
for  Subelements  24,  26,  27,  28,  and  29  (respectively:  Other  Asian  Coutries, 
i.e. ,  India;  Latin  America;  Western  Europe;  Middle  East  and  North  Africa; 
and  Sub  Saharan  coutries)  pertaining  to  international  trafficking  in 
narcotics  and  dangerous  drugs  was  adopted  and  included  in  the  IGCP  in  1974. 
(Tab  II) .  Generally,  the  language  of  this  additional  line  item  is  identical 
in  each  Subelement  and  in  all  cases  refers  to  travel.  For  example,  Item 
6,  Group  B,  Subelement  27,  of  the  1974  IGCP  provides: 
d.  Travel  of  selected  individuals,  a/ 
(1)  Travel  of  individuals  related  to 
narcotics  trafficking,  b/ 
a/  As  specified  by  or  tshrough  CIA 
b/  As  specified  by  BNDD,  ONNI,  Customs,  and/or  CIA 
The  above  specification  would  seem  to  imply  that  NSA  would  be  provided  with 
targeted  individuals  [Watch  Lists]  by  the  consumer  agencies.  >•" 
■tffiMa&^^ 
gj 
^mm 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
■  HI      IMUM  l|i 
Copy  /  ot.2 
> 
MUMMMte 
\ 
4.  U.S.  Intelligence  Objectives 
DCID  No.  1/2,  effective  January  21,  1972,  listed  the  U.S.  intelligence 
objectives  and  priorities  which  were  to  serve  as  guidance  for  planning  and 
programming  for  the  subsequent  period  of  five  years.  These  objectives 
identified  intelligence  targets  in  terms  of  information  needed  "to  enable 
the  U.S.  intelligence  cconunity  to  provide  effective  support  for  the 
decision  making,  planning  and  operational  activities  of  the  United  States 
Government  relating  to  national  security  and   foreign  policy."  (Biphasis 
added.)  The  listed  objectives  included  the  following: 
71.  Non- governmental  activities  detrimental  to  U.S. 
Interests.  Activities  of  individuals  and  non- 
governmental  organizations  in  the  subject  country 
which  have  an  adverse  impact  on  the  interests  of 
the  United  States  and  the  welfare  of  its  citizens, 
including  the  production  and  distribution  of 
dangerous  drugs  and  narcotics,  training  of  terrorists 
and  high-jacking. 
-wmsx^l 
100 
HANDLE  VIA  C0M1NT .  CHANNELS
Copy  /  ol2 
Latin  America  was  designated  as  one  of  the  areas  concerning  which 
such  intelligence  should  be  gathered. 
On  January  31,  1972,  the  DC!  requested  the  Critical  Collection 
Rroblems  Cocrmittee  (CCPC)  of  the  USIB  to  conduct  a  review  of  intelligence 
efforts  against  narcotics,  looking  into  such  problems  as  the  coordination 
of  collection,  dissemination  and  production  of  national  intelligence 
information  on  narcotics. 
In  October,  1972,  the  CCPC  reported  as  follows: 
J  SIGINT  INFORMATION  ON  NARCOTICS  AND  DANGEROUS  DRUGS 
1.  No  SIGINT  resources  are  dedicated  solely  to  the 
intercept  of  narcotics  information.  The  SIGINT  which 
is  now  being  produced  on  the  international  narcotics 
problem  is  a  by-product  of  SIGINT  reporting  on  other 
national  requirements.  However,  in  order  to  provide 
maximum  support  to  U.S.  Departments  and  Agenlces  in 
the  field  of  international  illicit  narcotics  activities, 
the  SIGINT  collection  and  reporting  system  worldwide 
has  been  tasked  to  report  any  narcotics  information 
which  is  collected.  v 
2.  Most  SIGINT  reports  on  narcotics  and  dangerous 
drugs  are  disseminated  electrically  to  customer  agencies.  J 
HANDLE  VIA  COMiNT  CHANNELS
SC-05078-76 
Copy    /  of  2 
In  the  absence  of  a  CXMENT-secure  teletype  circuit 
to  the  R©D,  special  arrangements  for  regular  courier 
service  have  been  made. 
ij*  ,'  «w..vi  l.'J    »i_iifqw»*?— fum— jp«wi 
«»"'""^p»"^p^»»Mra»" 
<      i  l  H  y^jUMiM— 
■BMMiiMBlCaaUllii 
Drug  operators 
comnunicate  covertly,  concealnrig  who  and  where  they 
are,  and  send  only  isolated  or  sporadic  messages. 
Consequently,  they  tend  to  use  either  telephone 
or  prearranged  numbers  or  over-the-counter  paid 
telegrams.  This  makes  Intercept  and  exploitation 
of  'such  ccraunications  exceedingly  difficult,  but 
significant  results  might  well  be  achieved.    %- 
5.  The  effective  use  of  SIGTNT  information  in 
support  of  on-going  operations  while  at  the  same 
time  protecting  the  source  has  been  a  problem. 
SIGTNT  frequently  produces  information  which  is 
valuable  in  an  operational  sense,  but  if  used 
indiscreetly  will  result  in  a  serious  compromise. 
Any  compromise  can  result  in  improved  foreign 
communications  security  measures.  The  effect  may 
be  a  permanent  or  temporary  denial  to  the  U.S.  of 
intelligence  information  over  and  above  the  immediate 
drug  problem.  It  is  necessary  to  emphasize  that  in 
handling  SIGTNT,  long-range  interests  must  not  be    / 
sacrificed  for  short-term  gains.  - — ' 
102 
HANDLE  VIA  COM1NT  CHANNELS
SC-05078-7F 
Copy  /  oi  2 
6.  Successful  usage  of  the  SIGINT  product  is    1 
largely  contingent  upon  close  collaboration  between 
the  SIGINT  producers  and  the  appropriate  customer 
agencies.  Frequent  exchanges  between  NSA,  BNDD  and 
CIA  will  ensure  that  SIGINT  is  exploi  ted  to  its  full 
capacity. 
Reconmendation 
It  is  recccrrended  that  NSA,  In  conjunction  with 
interested  customers,  particularly  BNDD  and  Customs, 
make  appropriate  determination  of  what  COUNT  support 
is  required  on  the  narcotics  problem  and  that  the 
requisite  priorities  be  established. through  the     . 
SIGINT  Conmittee.  (Tab  LL)    J 
Paragraphs  (1)  and  (4),  above,  indicate  an  apparent  lack  of  knowledge 
concerning  the  NSA's  interception  of  international  voice  conmunications  for 
narcotics  intelligence  which  began -in  1970.  There  seems  to  be  an  awareness  of 
everything  else,  however,  including  the  courier  service  between  NSA  and  BNDD 
by  which  the  latter  received  the  product  of  the  voice  interceptions. 
Based  upon  its  study,  the  CCPC  submitted  recccmendations  to  the  USIB 
on  November  3 ,  1972  which  were  approved  by  USIB  on  January  11 ,  1972  and 
incorporated  in  the  IGCP  on  February  23,  1973  to  include  a  broader  require- 
ment for  "information  related  to  narcotics  trafficking"  in  Latin  America 
and  other  specified  countries. 
In  the  DCI's  August,  1973  "Perspective  of  the  Intelligence  Connunity," 
it  is  pointed  out  that  as  long  as  there  exists  a  narcotics  problem, 
intelligence  agencies  will  be  involved.  In  the  KIQ's  (Key  Intelligence 
Questions)  for  FY  1974  and  FY  1975,  there  are  two  questions  regarding  the 
narcotics  problem.  The  first  is  to  identify  traffickers  and  producers 
and  their  methods;  the  second  relates  to  the  effectiveness  of  anti-narcotics 
103 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
SC-05078-76 
Copy  /   ot  2 
programs  In  Mexico,  France,  Turkey,  Thailand, -Burma,  and  Laos.  The 
second  question  included  information  concerning  the  willingness  of 
those  governments  to  "cooperate  with  the  United  States'  efforts  to 
expose  and  prosecute  producers,  traffickers,  and  their  collaborators." 
\0H 
HANOI f  VIA   fOMlNT  CHANNELS
IUI       JLUULiyL— « ittm 
SC-05078-76 
Copy  /    ot  2 
H.  PRESIDENT'S  FOREIGN  INTELLIGENCE  ADVISORY  BOARD  (PFIAB) 
By  Executive  Order  10655  (February  6,  1956),  President  Dwight  D. 
Eisenhower  established  the  President's  Board  of  Consultants  on  Foreign 
Intelligence  Activities  (PBCFIA)  "in  order  to  enhance  the  security  of  the 
United  States  and  the  conduct  of  its  foreign  affairs  by  furthering  the 
availability  of  intelligence  of  the  highest  order   "  EO  10656  empowered 
the  Board  to  review  the  foreign  intelligence  activities  of  the  Government 
and  the  performance  of  functions  of  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  and 
report  its  findings  directly  to  the  President.  Its  authority  also  extended 
to  a  review  of  foreign  Intelligence  functions  of  other  executive  depart- 
ments and  any  other  related  foreign  intelligence  matters  which  the  President's 
Board  deems  appropriate. 
By  Executive  Order  10938  (Hay  A,  1961),  Executive  Order  10656  was 
cancelled  by  President  John  F.  Kennedy  and  the  PFCFIA  was  reconstituted  as 
the  President's  Foreign  Intelligence  Advisory  Board  (PFIAB).  Its  functions 
remained  essentially  the  same  as  its  predecessor  Board;  i.e*,  continuing 
review  and  assessment  of  all  functions  of  the  CIA  and  other  departments 
having  similar  responsibilities  in  foreign  intelligence  and  related  fields 
in  order  to  advise  the  President  on  matters  bearing  on  foreign  policy, 
national  defense  and  security. 
By  Executve  Order  11460  (March  20,  1969)  President  Richard  Nixon  cancelled 
Executive  Order  10938  and  reconstituted  the  PFIAB.  VJhile  predecessor  Boards 
served  a  purely  advisory  function,  President  Nixon  expanded  the  role  of  the 
PFIAB  to  "receive,  consider  and  take  appropriate  action  with  respect  to 
105 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
SC-05078-76 
Copy    /  ot.2 
matters  identified  to  the  Board  ...  in  which'  the  support  of  the  Board  will 
further  the  effectiveness  of  the  national  intelligence  effort."  (Emphasis 
added.)  The  Nixon  order  also  expanded  the  jurisdictional  mandate  of  the 
Board  beyond  that  of  foreign  intelligence-related  matters  by  providing  that 
the  Board  would  "advise  the  President  concerning  the  objectives,  conduct, 
management  and  coordination  of  the  various  activities  making  up  the  overall 
national  intelligence  effort." 
Since  its  inception  in  1956,  the  Board  has  conducted  its  affairs 
independently  of  the  National  Security  Council  and  has  had  continuing 
direct  access  through  both  its  Chairman  and  the  full  Board  to  the  President 
and  his  National  Security  Advisor.  VMle  independent  of  the  NSC  and  its 
"40  Ccomittee"  on  covert  operations,  the  Board  has  had  continuing  access 
to  all  material  maintained  by  the  NSC  and  its  conmittees,  except  during  the 
Nixon  Administration  when  the  Board  was  denied  access  to  such  materials . 
PFIAB  minutes  and  records  reflect  the  following: 
May  26,  1961 
*  *  * 
5.  The  President  should  not  be  publicly  identified 
nor  otherwise  publicly  involved  with  non-overt 
political,  psychological,  propoganda,  paramili- 
tary, or  clandestine  intelligence  activities. 
6.  The  Central  Intelligence  Agency  should  strive  to 
achieve  anonymity  in  its  officials  and  activities 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT-  CHANNELS
SC-05078-76 
Copy  /    oi  2 
February  5,  1971 
The  Chairman  opened  the  meeting  by  asking  Attorney 
General  Mitchell  for  his  views  on  ths  adequacy  of 
the  overall  U.S.  intelligence  effort., 
Mr.  Mitchell  stated  .  .  .  that  his  office  relies   / 
on  information  which  it  gets  from  NSA  and  CIA 
which  may  be  collateral  to  the  primary  collection 
goals  of  these  agencies  but  which  is  recognized 
as  being  useful  to  the  DOJ  and  is  forwarded  to 
^JWWB^^ 
mmmmMi 
w   ..  He  said  that  electronic  surveillance 
is  restricted  to  violence-prone  groups,  and  that 
in  these  cases  electronic  surveillance  is  clearly 
within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Presidential' 
responsibilities  for" tnaititaininR  law  and  order. 
(Emphasis  added.)    " 
*»w> ^U 
.jmiumm 
•Am 
rilMi 
Mr.  Mitchell  said  that  NSA  and  FBI  Director  Hoover 
are  having  a  running  battle  on  this  very  point. 
l/NSA  is  also  urging  resumption  of  physical  entry. . . 
Mr.  Mitchell  said  we  have  more  taps  on  now  than 
when  the  Republicans  came  to  Washington. . . 
March  31,  1971  Memo  for  Board 
operations , 
generally  known  as  SHAMROCK,  whereby  U.S. 
caimerical  canmnications  firms  make  available 
to  the  U.S.  Government  copies  of  international 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
SC-0DG78-76 
Copy  /  oi.2 
commercial  ccmninications  transmitted  by  foreign 
missions,  or  permit  the  U.S.  ccmnunicaticns  by 
photography,  etc. . . . 
The  vast  majority  of  SHAMROCK  collection  is 
performed  by  NSA  itself,  i.e. ,  through  its 
own  agreements  with  U.S.  commercial  communi- 
cations firms  and  utilizing  its  own  personnel. 
NSA  obtains,  on  a  daily  basis,  large  quantities 
of  commercial  telegraphic  traffic  originated  by 
foreign  governments  and  foreign  private  enter- 
prise within  the  United  States. . . 
I         February  3-4,  1972 
t 
Discussion  with  Mr.  Nelson  Gross,  Special 
Assistant  for  Narcotics  to  the  Secretary" 
of  State,  and  with  Mr.  Walter  Minnick,  Staff 
Coordinator  for  the  Cabinet  C&pmittee  on 
International  Narcotics  Control.      " 
Mr.  Gross  opened  the  discussion  by  saying 
that  the  Cabinet  Committee  had  been  established 
to  provide  a  focal  point  at  a  high  level  for 
the  Administrations  program  to  combat  the  illegal 
importation,  distribution,  and  use  of  narcotics. 
He  said. . .  that  the  only  hope  of  success  in  com- 
bating this  evil  is  to  have  a  coordinated  program 
which  simultaneously  seeks  to  stem  the  supply  from' 
abroad,  prosecute  the  traffickers  both  at  home  and 
abroad,  and  to  reduce  demand  through  the  provision 
of  effective  medical  advice. 
The  Department  of  State's  role  is  to  work  with 
foreign  governments  to  reduce  the  production  of 
heroin. . .  and  to  stimulate  and  coordinate  inter- 
national cooperation  in  breaking  up  trafficking 
networks.  Mr.  Gross  said...  that  the  success 
of  these  programs  would  be  wholly  dependent  on 
intelligence.  Mr.  Gross  was  critical  of  CIA 
efforts  to  date. . . .  Mr.  Gross  said  that  CIA  has 
108  ■ 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
SC-05078-76 
Copy   /   oi  2 
been  given  responsibility  for  coordinating 
all  narcotics  intelligence  abroad,  but  has 
assigned  insufficient  manpower  to  do  the 
job...  Mr.  Gross  said  that  the  FBI  had  not 
been  asked  to  work  on  this  program  because 
the  BNDD. . ,  has  exclusive  jurisdiction  for 
narcotics. . . . 
Mr.  Mimick  said  that  the  purpose  in  establishing 
the  narcotics  program  at  the  Cabinet  level  was  to 
add  VJhite  House  clout  in  getting  the  cooperation 
of  all  the  necessary  Government  agencies  and 
bureaus.  Mr.  Gross  said  that  nearly  the  pro- 
am  had  all  the  authority  it  needs... 
.Bnphasis  added.) 
Discussion  with  C 
Chairman  of  the  Intelligence  Suocommttee 
of  the  Cabinet  Cctimittee  on  International 
Narcotics  ControlT'     ' 
ls  Mr.  Helms'  Special  Assistant 
tor  narcotics  matters  and  Chairman  of  the 
Cabinet  Committee  Subcommittees  for 
Intelligence.... 
isaid  that  the  Agency's  role  in 
narcotics  program  began  in  October  1969 
with  a  VJhite  House  request  for  CIA  to  do 
whatever  it  could  to  help  with  this  problem. 
Such  a  directive,  he  said,  raised  two  problems 
for  the  Agency:  the  first  was  to  establish  a 
mechanism  and  working  relationship  with  law 
enforcement  authorities  and  the  second  was 
adjusting  agency  priorities.  He  said  that 
the  Agency  mission  was  to  support  the  narcotics 
program  by  establishing  where  illicit  narcotics 
were  coming  from  and,  secondly,  to  provide 
intelligence  for  the  diplomatic  effort  to^ 
reduce  production  and  trafficking,  fcl  ._- 
said  that  the  Agency  has  moved  slowly  for  gc 
reason. . . . 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
SC-05G78-76 
Copy   /  ot.2 
y  L     ■  .      said. . .  the  primary  groups  involved 
^xe  criminal  syndicates. 
'  *  •*-'(."  J^tated  he  was  satisfied  that  the 
Agencyhaoa sense  of  urgency. . . . 
   •  •  said  that  NSA  provides  regular 
coverage  of  persons  on  a  watch  list  and  is 
prepared  to  do  more  as  soon  as  the  Intelligence 
Subcommittee  can  develop  the  necessary  target 
Discussion  with  PCI  Helms 
Mr.  Helms  had  been  asked  to  discuss  the  alloca- 
tion of  intelligence  resources  for  the  narcotics 
problem    He  agreed  to  follow  up  Dr.  Baker's 
suggestion  to  see  if  CIA  couldn't  give  some 
direct  assistance  to  the  BNDD  in  organizing 
their  files  and  staff  for  participation  in  what 
is  now  a  major  Government  program. 
Discussion  with  Mr.  John  Ehrlichman. 
Assistant  to  the  President  tor  Diplo- 
matic Affairs.      "~ 
 — 
Mr.  Ehrlichman  had  been  asked  to  discuss. . .  the 
role  of  foreign  intelligence  in  combating  our 
domestic  narcotics  problem. . .  s- 
In  conclusion,  the  Chairman  offered  Mr. 
Ehrlichman  any  assistance  which  the  Board 
could  render  with  respect  to  the  narcotics 
problem. . . 
February  3,  1972  (CIA)  Memorandum  on 
Intelligence  Support  for  International 
Narcotics  Control.    ""   
I.  Two  years  ago  the  development  of  foreign 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
SC-05G78-76 
Copy  /  oi  2 
on  narcotics . . .  was  a  wholly  new  enterprise 
for  the  intelligence  community. . . . 
*  *  * 
B.  Vfe  began  to  organize  a  narcotics  intelligence 
effort  in  October  1969 ,  when  President  Nixon 
declared  International  narcotics  control  to 
be  a  major  goal  of  U.S.  foreign  policy  and 
established  a  White  House  Task  Force  on  heroin 
suppression,  instructing  all  Federal  departments 
and  agencies,  including  the  intelligence  cccnu- 
nity,  to  cooperate  fully  with  its  efforts. . . . 
*  *  * 
IX.    Organized  criminal  conspiracies  tend  everywhere  to 
monopolize  the  illicit  trade. . . 
*  *  * 
a.  South  American  smuggling  operations  are  now 
carrying  a  substantial  part  of  the  French 
heroin  to  the  U.S.  via  Latin  America. 
*  *  * 
XIV.  As  a  result  of  the  presidential  initiative 
from  mid-1971,  intelligence  support  for 
international  narcotics  control  has  become     v 
virtually  world-wide. 
A.  In  October  1971  the  Working  Group  of  the 
CCINC  directed  that  U.S.  missions  in  close 
to  60  countries  draw  up  narcotics  control 
action  plans. 
*  *  * 
XVI.  B.  With  the  establishment  of  the  CCINC... 
leadership  responsibilities  for  coor- 
dination of  foreign  intelligence  on 
narcotics  passed  from  BNDD  to  CIA. 
*  *  * 
HANDLE  VIA  COM1NT  CHANNELS
SC-05078-76 
Copy     /  ol  2 
XVII.  2. 
XVIII.  1. 
3. 
The  targets  bring  us,  both  in.  operations 
and  production,  into  a  closer  relationship 
with  U.S.  law  enforcement.  Our  job  is  to 
feed  them  intelligence  and  leads  which 
they  can  use  in  their  efforts  to  Investi- 
gate and  eventually  prosecute  or  expose 
middle  and  top  level  narcotics  traffickers 
In  the  U.S.  and  abroad. 
The  thrust  of  current  national  strategy 
comnits  the  coninunity  to  directly  support 
domestic  enforcement... 
*  *  * 
We  must  help  them  and  still  protect  Intelligence 
officers  and  sources  abroad  from  investigative 
or  legal  disclosures.  Otherwise  the  intelligence 
ccnmunity  will  find  itself  where  it  cannot  afford 
to  go  -  in  court  as  a  witness. 
April  12 ,  1972  memorandum  tog L  '  ,m± 
tran  Egil  Krogh,  Executive  pS^ctorT 
CCINC.  "~"~ 
The  President  is  intensely  interested  In 
using  every  means  at  his  disposal  to  stop 
the  international  narcotics  trariic.  This 
includes  covert  action  where  appropriate. . . 
(Emphasis  added.) 
112 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT\  CHANNELS
Copy  /  oi  2 
Mr.  Ehrlichnan  has  been  given  the  responsiblity  for 
handling  this  matter  within  the  White  House  and  is 
to  be  assisted  by  Bud  Krogh,  David  Young  (who  has 
been  borrowed  from  Dr.  Kissinger) ,  Gordon  Liddy  and 
others. 
b.  Liddy' s  role:  He  is  an  expediter  to  break 
down  bureaucratic  problems  by  applying  either  grease 
or  dynamite.  He  will  sit  with  the  IES  and  audit  the 
IEC  meetings.  Mr.  David  Young  can  speak  for  Mr. 
Ehrlichnan  and  is  "heavier"  than  Mr.  Liddy;  therefore, 
any  requests  from  Mr.  Young  should  be  honored  without 
checking  with  Liddy. 
■ 
c.  IES  role:  1)  to  prepare  evaluation.  Mr.  Liddy 
noted  that  the  IES  had  not  yet  been  formally  tasked 
in  this  regard.  2)  provide  ideas  for  attacking  and 
solving  the  problem.  3)  channel  to  agencies.  Mr. 
Liddy  intends  to  use  the  Staff  members  for  direct  and 
rapid  access  to  their  own  Agencies  in  order  to  get 
over  and  minimize  bureaucratic  problems.  He  specifically 
stated  that  although  agencies  would  be  tasked  through 
their  agency  heads,  Mr.  Ehrlichman  was  not  prepared  to 
wait  until  agencies  had  polished  their  contributions 
and  sent  them  back  through  channels ,  but  rather  wanted 
to  have  access  to  information  when  and  as  it  is  developed. 
Mr.  Liddy,  therefore,  would  expect  to  be  able" to  ask  for 
things  through  the  IES  members  and  have  them  vested  with 
the  authority  to  get  them  and  release  them  to  the  White 
House. 
Beyond  the  foregoing,  the  IES  seems  to  have  been  preoccupied  in 
1971  and  1972  with  foreign  support  for  activities  planned  to  disrupt 
or  harrass  the  national  political  conventions  in  1972. 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
IV.  POSSIBLE  VIOLATIONS 
This  Inquiry  has  focused  on  the  interception  of  wire  and  radio' 
caniunications  having  at  least  one  terminal  in  the  United  States  or  a 
United  States  territory.  Federal  criminal  sanctions  have  no  application 
to  the  extraterritorial  interception  of  comrunications ,  i.e.,  conmunications 
with  all  terminals  outside  the  United  States.  United  States  v.  Catrone,    
F-2d   (2  Cir.  1975);  United  States  v.  Toscanino,  500  F.2d  267,269  (2  Cir.  1974 
Berlin  Democratic  Club  v.  Rumsfeld,  Civil  No.  310-74  (D.D.C.  March  17,  1976). 
(Evidence  obtained  fran  such  interceptions  which  do  not  meet  Fourth  Amendement 
standards,  however,  is  subject  to  exclusion  in  U.S.  courts.) 
Three  categories  of  interceptions  discussed  herein  require  prosecutive 
evaluation: 
(1)  The  interception  of  international  conmunications  having 
one  terminal  in  the  United  States  (or  a  United  States 
territory) . 
/ 
mn 
(2)  The  procurement  from  commercial  carriers. of  "cable  traffic" 
between  the  U.S.  and  foreign  countries. 
fiamtimimmmm^mmmaMMUmmmmMmmmmmtmt^m^^atmt^ma^mt^mmtm* 
m^mmt u 
An  initial  review  of  available  facts  will  indicate  possible  violations 
of  18  U.S.C.  2511  and/or  47  U.S.C.  605,  but  a  tentative  analysis  of  the 
applicable  statutes,  legislative  history,  and  convoluted  sources  of 
purported  authorization  together  with  anticipated  difficulties  in  proving 
willfulness,  preclude  any  unequivocal  recccmendation  for  prosecution  at 
this  juncture. 
HANDLE  VIA  COM1NT  CHANNELS
nop  isncRrr 
SC-05078-76 
Copy  /    of  2 
A.     Interception  of  International  Cormni cations  ( 
Raving  One  Terminal  In  Tne  United  States  or 
a. United  States  Territory. 
These  interceptions  were  conducted  by  NSA  in  the  gathering  of  foreign 
intelligence  information  g^J.l-lV..,  :."-:  r: . 
' .  .  *Aich.  broadly  defined, 
included  the  MINARET  CTab  N)  «v :::.::/.  :..•■■  ..-■-  ,  —    ■         ■   •■■•   - 
1^,^ mhw»*w— ■irJ"""""»«"  J       ■*     '"■"  '■'■" 
The  (TTA '  s  JT"£ '  
• " ,::.-  ■  -'-■■■ .--.  .was  devoted  exclusively  to  the  gathering 
of  international  narcotics  Intelligence  through  the  interception  of  specific 
commercial  voice  frequencies  between  South  America  and  the  United  States. 
The  NSA's  MINARET  and  iR'     Projects  included,  but  were  not  limited  to, 
the  selection  and/or  collection  of  narcotics  intelligence,  and  involved 
the  incidental,  as  well  as  specific,  interception  of  voice  and  non-voice 
cocmunications  concerning  a  variety  of  subjects. 
1.  Pertinent  Criminal  Statutes 
Title  18 
Section  2511(a) (c) (d) ,  Title  18,  United  States  Code,  infra. 
Title  47 
Section  605  of  Title  47,  United  States  Code,  provides  in  pertinent 
part: 
...  No  person  not  being  authorized  by  the  sender 
shall  intercept  any  radio  cctrmunication  and  divulge 
or  publish  the  existence,  contents,  substance,  purport, 
effect,  or  meaning  of  such  Intercepted  communication  to 
any  person. .. 
*  *  * 
116 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
iNo  person  having  received  any  intercepted  radio 
cormunication  or  having  become  acquainted  with 'the 
contents,  substance,  purport,  effect,  or  meaning  of 
such  cccmunication  was  intercepted,  shall  divulge 
or  publish  the  existence,  contents,  substance,  purport, 
effect,  or  meaning  of  such  comnunication. . .  or  use  such 
cctrmunication. . .  for  his  own  benefit  or  for  the  benefit 
of  another  not  entitled  thereto. . . 
B.  Receipt  of  "Cable  Traffic"  Fran 
International  Contnunications 
Carriers.        ' 
This  activity  was  conducted  by  NSA  under  the  cryptonym  SHAMROCK 
CTab  P),  and  by  the  FBI  as  the  "Drop  Copy  Operation".  (Tab  R) 
LPMEDLEY  was  a  CIA  operation  limited  solely  to  providing  NSA  with  a 
"front"  location  in  New  York  City  for  processing  SHAMROCK  material.  (Tab  G) 
1.  Pertinent  Criminal  Statute 
Title  47 
Section  605  of  Title  47,  United  States  Code,  provides  in  pertinent 
part: 
...  [N]o  person  receiving,  assisting  in  receiving, 
transmitting,  or  assisting  in  transmitting,  any 
interstate  or  foreign  ccomunication  by  wire  or 
radio  shall  divulge  or  publish  the  existence,  con- 
tents, substance,  purport,  effect,  or  meaning  there- 
of, except  through  authorized  channels  of  transmission 
or  reception,  (1)  to  any  person  other  than  the 
addresses...  (5)  in  response  to  a  subpoena  issued 
by  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction,  or  (6)  on 
demand  of  other  lawful  authority... 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
SC-05078-76 
Copy  /   oi  2 
...  No  person  not  being  entitled  thereto  shall"* 
receive  or  aesist  in  receiving  any  interstate 
or  foreign  ccamunication  by  radio  and  use  such 
cctmiunication. . .  for  his  own  benefit  or  for  the 
benefit  of  another  not  entitled  thereto. 
i.i.  ^m-.|i)M.|A'K',.MfU-"'...'mi,iiiii  i|iJjj,,if3»P«gW"iPwmwujM-».ii)— n.  iii .,.. 
4iQUiibtB*mimit/*^H*a 
1.  Pertinent  Criminal  Statutes 
Such  interception  without  appropriate  authority,  if  willful,  would  be 
in  violation  of  18  U.S.C.  §2511(a) (c) (d) ,  or  47  U.S.C.  ?605,  infra. 
HANDLE  VIA  COM1NT  CHANNELS
SC-05078-76 
Copy  /   oi  2 
V.  Applicable  Statutes  and  Law 
Prosecutive  considerations  in  the  instant  inquiry  are  limited  to 
possible  violations  of  18  U.S.C.  2511  or  47  U.S.C.  605. 
A.  47  U.S.C.  605 
Section  605,  originally  enacted  in  1934,  was  amended  on  June  19,  1968 
upon  the  enactment  of  18  U.S.C.  §2510,  et  seq.   The  new  Section  605  was 
intended  as  a  substitute  rather  than  the  trere  reenactment  of  the  old 
Section  605.  It  is  designed  to  regulate  the  conduct  of  ccamunications 
personnel,  and  to  prevent  the  unauthorized  interception  and  disclosure,  or 
use,  by  any  person  of  radio  cccnnunications.  1968  U.S.  Code  Cong,  and  Adm. 
News  2196-2197. 
"Radio  contrunications"  or  "communications  by  radio" 
means  the  transmissions  by  radio  of  writing,  signs,  signals, 
pictures ,  and  sounds  of  all  kinds ,  including,  all  instrumen- 
talities, facilities,  apparatus,  and  services  (among  other 
things,  the  receipt,  forwarding,  and  delivery  of  communica- 
tions) incidental  to  such  transmission.  47  U.S.C.  §153(b). 
Section  605  consists  of  four  separate  clauses  containing  four  distinct 
pairs  of  prohibitions: 
(1)  The  first  clause  prohibits  divulgence  by  any 
person  receiving  any  interstate  or  foreign 
communication  by  wire  or  radio,  except  through 
authorized  channels  of  transmission  or  reception. 
(2)  The  second  clause  proscribes  the  unauthorized 
interception  and  divulgence  of  any  radio 
communication. 
(3)  The  third  prohibits  the  receipt  of  an  interstate 
or  foreign  radio  connunication  by  a  person  not 
entitled  thereto  and  the  use  thereof  for  his 
benefit  or  for  the  benefit  of  another  not  entitled 
thereto. 
— KP-m&F^ 
HANDLE  VIA  COM1NT  CHANNELS
SC-05078-76 
Copy  I    oi2 
(4)  The  fourth  proscribes  the  receipt  of  any. 
intercepted  radio  comnunication  and  divulgence 
thereof  or  use  for  one's  benefit  or  the  benefit 
of  another  not  entitled  thereto. 
"Person"  as  used  in  Section  604  does  not  include  a  law  enforcement 
officer  acting  In  the  normal  course  of  his  duties.  1968  U.S.  Code  Cong,  and 
Adm.  News  2197. 
"Foreign  conmunication"  within  the  meaning  of  47  U.S.C.  605  is  a 
ccmnunication  from  or  to  any  place  in  the  United  States  to  or  from  a  foreign 
i 
country.  47  U.S.C.  §153 (f)  . 
I 
Section  501  of  Title  47,  United  States  Code,  contains  the  general 
i 
misdemeanor  penalty  provisions  for  violations  of  §605  and  requires  that  such 
offenses  by  willfully  and  knowingly  cccrmitted. 
B.  18  U.S.C.  2510,  et  seq. 
The  regulation  of  the  interception  of  wire  or  oral  cocnmuniaitions  is 
governed  by  18  U.S.C.  §§2510,  et  seq.  1968  U.S.  Code  Cong,  and  Adm.  News 
2196. 
Section  2511  of  Title  18,  United  States  Code,  provides  in  pertinent 
part: 
(1)  ...  [A]ny  person  who 
(a)  willfully  intercepts,  endeavors  to  intercept,  or 
procures  any  other  person  to  intercept,  any  wire  or 
oral  camunication. ... 
*  *  * 
120 
HANDLE  VIA  COM1NT  CHANNELS
SC-05078-76      • 
Copy./   ot2 
(c)  willfully  discloses,  or  endeavors  to  disclose,  to 
any  other  person  the  contents  of  any  wire  or  oral 
communication,  knowing  or  having  reason  to  know  that 
the-  information  was  obtained  through  the  interception 
Cj.  a  wire  or  oral  conmunication. . . 
(d)  willfully  uses,  or  endeavors  to  use,  the  contents 
of  any  wire  or  oral  conrrunication,  knowing  or  having 
reason  to  know  that  the  information  was  obtained  through 
the  interception  of  a  wire  or  oral  conmunication. .. . 
shall  be  fined  not  mare  than  $10,000  or  imprisoned  not  more  than  five 
years,  or  both. 
"[W]ire  conmunication"  means  any  conmunication 
made  in  whole  or  in  part  through  the  use  of  facili- 
ties for  the  transmission  of  conmunicaticns  by  the 
aid  of  wire,  cable,  or  other  like  connection  between 
the  point  of  origin  arid  the  point  of  reception  fur- 
nished or  operated  by  any  person  engaged  as  a  conrncm 
carrier  in  providing  or  operating  such  facilities  for 
the  transmission  of  interstate  or  foreign  communica- 
tions. 18  U.S.C.  2510(1). 
"[0]ral  conmunication"  means  any  oral  conmunication 
uttered  by  a  person  exhibiting  an  expectation  that 
such  conmunication  is  not  subject  to  interception 
under  circumstances  justifying  such  expectation.  18 
U.S.C.  §2510(Z). 
"Intercept"  means  the  aural  acquisition  of  the  v 
contents  of  any  wire  or  oral  conmunication  through 
the  use  of  any  electronic,  mechanical,  or  other 
device.  18  U.S.C.  §2510(4). 
C.  Willfulness 
Willfulness  is  essential  to  the  commission  of  each  of  the  above  offenses. 
1.  United  States  v.  Murdock 
The  legislative  history  of  18  U.S.C.  §2511  indicates  the  applicable 
standard  of  willfulness  in  the  instant  context  is  that  set  forth  in  United 
IP  A 
121
SC-05G78-/6 
Copy  7   01  2 
States  v.  Murdock,  290  U.S.  389  (1933),  a  criminal  tax  case.  1968  U.S.  Code 
Cong,  and  Adm.  News  2181. 
In  Murdock,  the  Court  recited,  with  apparent  approval,  the  following 
judicial  connotations  of  the  word  "willfully": 
The  word  often  denotes  an  act  which  is  intentional, 
or  knowing,  or  voluntary,  as  distinguished  from 
accidental.  But  when  used  in  a  criminal  statute  it 
generally  means  an  act  done  with  a  bad  purpose. . . 
without  justifiable  excuse...  stubbornly,  obstinately, 
perversely. . . .  The  word  is  also  employed  to  characterize 
a  thing  done  without  ground  for  believing  it  is  lawful. . . 
or  conduct  marked  by  careless  disregard  whether  or  not 
one  has  the  right  so  to  act....  (290  U.S.  at  394-395) 
The  standard  of  willfulness  in  Murdock  is  formulated  as  follows: 
. . . [B]ad  faith  or  evil  intent. . .  or  evil  motive 
and  want  of  justification. . .  It  is  not  the  purpose 
of  the  law  to  penalize. . .  innocent  errors  made  despite 
the  exercise  of  reasonable  care    The  requirement 
of  an  offense  committed  "willfully"  is  not  met. . .  if 
a  taxpayer  has  relied  in  good  faith  on  a  prior  decision 
of  this  court...  The  Court's  consistent  interpretation 
of  the  word  'willfully'  to  require  the  element  of  mens  m 
rea  implements  the  persuasive  intent  of  Congress  to 
construct  penalties  that  separate  the  purposeful. . . 
violator  from  the  well-meaning,  but  easily  confused. ..." 
(United  States  v.  Bishop,  412  U.S.  346,  360-361  (1973)) 
Congress  did  not  intend  that  a  person,  by  reason  of  a  bona  fide 
misunderstanding,  should  become  a  criminal  by  his  mere  failure  to  measure 
up  to  the  prescribed  standard  of  conduct.  United  States  v.  Murdock,  supra. 
122
SC-05078-76 
Copy   /   oi  2 
2.  18  U.S.C.  §2520 
Section  2520  of  Title  18,  United  States  Code,  provides  that  a  good 
faith  reliance  on  a  court  order  or  legislative  authorization  shall  constitute 
a  complete  defense  to  any  civil  or  criminal  action  brought  under  Title  18 
or  Title  47.  The  legislative  history  of  Section  2520  cites  Pierson  v.  Ray, 
286  U.S.  547  (1967),  as  the  only  supporting  authority  and  guide  to  the  "good 
faith"  criteria  contemplated  by  the  statute.  1968  U.S.  Code  Cong,  and  Adm. 
News  2196. 
The  Pierson  case  involved  an  action  for  damages  against  policemen 
for  deprivation  of  civil  rights  under  42  U.S.C.  §1983  and  conmon  law  false 
arrest.  The  respondent  policemen  had  arrested  petitioners  for  breaching 
the  peace  in  violation  of  a  state  statute  which  was  subsequently  declared 
Invalid.  The  Supreme  Court  reaffirmed  that  the  defense  of  good  faith  and 
probable  cause  is  available  to  police  officers,  and  further  held  that  "a 
police  officer  is  not  charged  with  predicting  the  future  course  of 
constitutional  law."  This  indicates  a  legislative  intent  in  18  U.S.C. 
§2520  to  excuse  from  civil  and  criminal  liability  those  persons  who  act 
under  a  statute  they  reasonably  believe  to  be  valid. 
The  "legislative  authorization"  apparently  relied  upon  by  most  of  the 
potential  defendants  herein  is  18  U.S.C.  §2511(3),  i.e.,  the  statutory 
recognition  of  Presidential  power  to  authorize  warrantless  electronic 
surveillances  to  protect  the  national  security.  This  statute,  upon  its 
enactment  in  June,  1968,  was  vague  with  respect  to  the  scope  of  such  power, 
123 
HANDLE  VIA  COM1NT  CHANNELS
-w-sbCKLi  "E 
SC-05078-76 
Copy   /  oi2 
and  it  was  not  until  June,  1972,  that  the  Presidential  power  to  authorize 
domestic  security  electronic  surveillances  was  delineated  by  the  U.S. 
Supreme  Court.  (See  III,  supra.)   The  President's  power  to  authorize 
the  warrantless  electronic  surveillance  of  activities  of  foreign  powers 
or  their  agents  has  not  yet  been  defined  by  the  Supreme  Court.  It  is 
likely,  therefore,  that  potential  defendants  (particulary  subordinates) 
will  seize  upon  the  decision  in  Raley  v.  Ohio,  360  U.S.  423,  438  (1959), 
in  which  the  Court  held  that  "a  State  may  not  issue  commands  to  its 
citizens,  under  criminal  sanctions,  in  language  so  vague  and  undefined 
as  to  afford  no  fair  warning  of  what  conduct  might  trangress  them". 
While  it  is  true  that  men  are,  in  general,  held  responsible  for 
violations  of  the  law,  the  layman  is  not  required  to  know  more  law  than 
the  judge.  United  States  v.  Mancuso,  139  F.2d  90,  92  (3  Cir.  1943). 
3.  Zweibon  v.  Mitchell 
The  Court  in  Zweibon  v.  Mitchell,  516  F.2d  594,  671-672,  (D.C.  Cir. 
1975) ,  cited  Pierson  v.  Ray,  supra,  in  reaffirming  the  defense  of  good 
faith: 
Thus,  in  light  of  the  fact  that  Congress  made  the 
applicability  of  Title  III  turn  on  the  future  course 
of  constitutional  law,  as  well  as  the  fact  that  the 
legislative  history  and  language  of  Title  III  are 
themselves  somewhat  ambiguous  concerning  the  applica- 
bility of  that  chapter  to  national  security  surveillance, 
and  considering  the  policy  that  statutes  in  derogation 
of  the  conmon  law  should  be  strictly  construed,  we  do 
not  believe  Congress  intended  to  preclude  a  good  faith 
■  
TOP  SECRET 
124 
rw-MT  ru^^n
|    TDP    RPffP  p|r 
SC-05078-76       - 
Copy .  /  ot  2 
defense  that  Executive  officials  acted  under  vhat 
they  reasonably  believed  were  the  constitutionally 
inherent  (and  therefore  statutorily  exempt)  powers 
of  the  President. . . . 
In  a  footnote,  the  Court  added: 
The  rights  of  victims  of  unconstitutional  actions 
must  to  seme  extent  be  balanced  against  the  needs 
of  law  enforcement,  particularly  when  an  official 
in  good  faith  acts  according  to  a  reasonable  belief 
that  his  actions  are  lawful.  (516  F.2d  at  616n.278) 
"Willfulness"  in  the  instant  context  would  seem  to  require  bad  faith 
rather  than  bad  judgment.  Good  intentions  coupled  with  bad  judgment  would 
not  constitute  such  willfulness .  Mullen  v.  United  States,  263  F.2d  275, 
276  (D.C.  Cir.  1958). 
D.  "Plain  View"  Analogy 
Objects  falling  in  the  plain  view  of  an  officer  who  has  a  right  to 
be  in  the  position  to  have  that  view  are  subject  to  seizure  and  may  be 
introduced  in  evidence.  Harris  v.  United  States.  390  U.S.  234,  236  (1967). 
This  "plain  view"  doctrine  serves  to  supplement  the  prior  justification  and 
permits  the  warrantless  seizure.  Coolidge  v.  New  Hampshire,  403  U.S.  443, 
466  (1970). 
The  plain  view  doctrine  might  be  invoked,  by  analogy,  to  justify 
incidental  coomunications  intercepts,  e.g.,  the  incidental  interception 
of  cccmunications  concerning  international  narcotics  traffic  in  the  course 
of  conducting  Presidentially-authorized  electronic  surveillance  for  the  purpose 
125 
HANDLE  ViA  COMINT  CHANNELS
SC-05C78-76 
..      Copy  /  oT2 
of  gathering  foreign  Intelligence  information.  This  analogous  application 
of  the  plain  view  doctrine  In  the  context  of  electronic  surveillance  finds 
support  in  18  U.S.C.  §2517(5).  United  States  v.  Kahn,  415  U.S.  143  (1974). 
Section  2517(5)  permits  the  disclosure  and  use  of  contnunications  relating  to 
offenses  other  than  those  specified  in  the  order  of  authorization  where  such 
i 
cotrmunications  are  intercepted  while  engaged  in  intercepting  connunications 
in  the  manner  authorized  by  the  order. 
NSA  represents  that  over  50  per' cent  of  the  narcotics  intelligence 
furnished  by  NSA  to  ENDD/DEA  came  from  conmunications  incidentally  inter- 
cepted or  incidentally  received  in  the  course  of  collecting  foreign  intelligence 
information  pursuant  to  NSA's  Presidential  mandate  and  authorization. 
E.  "Border  Search"  Analogy 
P  ! 
I  The  Treasury  Department  supports  receipt  by  the  Secret  Service  of 
SIGUTT  intelligence  from  NSA  on  grounds  that  the  interception  of  messages 
crossing  our  national  borders  is  analogous  to  conducting  warrantless  border 
searches  which  are  clearly  legal  (Tab  1*0 : 
If  the  search  of  the  person  is,  thus,  permissible, 
is  it  not  reasonable  that  equal  latitude  be  afforded 
to  the  inpersonal  harvesting  of  international  ccmrunica- 
tion  signals  for  purposes  clearly  of  great  consequence 
to  our  national  security?  Upon  that  premise,  the 
incidental  acquisition  from  international  signal  connu- 
nications  of  Important  intelligence  not  supported  by  a 
foreign  nexus  is  clearly  an  acceptable  and  reasonable 
intrusion  into  that  realm  of  privacy  protected  by  the 
Fourth  Amendment.  /
Tu^slckEi 
SC-05078-76 
Copy   /  of  2 
The  SIGINT  activities  of  NSA  constitute  an  essential 
attribute  of  the  Executive's  capability  and  obligation 
to  protect  and  promote  the  national  security  and  foreign 
relations  of  the  United  States.  One  must,  in  reason, 
attribute  to  NSA's  SIGINT  acquisition  of  foreign 
intelligence  an  importance  \chich  surpasses  that  attending 
the  border  search  authority  earlier  characterized  as  Man 
indispensible  exercise  of  the  right  of  the  sovereign 
to  self -protection.  .  .*' 
-  TOIL  SEQRIT 
T 
127 
HANDLE  VIA  COMINT  CHANNELS
QQpy  /  Ot  2 
VI.  POSSIBLE  DEFENSES 
A.  Interception  of  International  Conrnunications   "• 
Having  One  Terminal  in  the  United  States  or 
a  United  States  Territory. 
1.  Interception  of  International  Radio- 
Land  line  Telephone  Comnanications 
(a)  18  U.S.C.  §2511 
(i)  Radio-Telephone  Conrnunications 
The  legislative  history  of  Title  III  (18' U.S.C.  §2510,  et  sec^, ;  47 
U.S.C.  §605)  contains  "no  indication  of  how  Congress  intended  to  treat  a 
radio- telephone  conversation".  United  States  v.  Hall.  488  F. 2d  193,  197 
(9  Cix.  1973). 
In  the  absence  of  such  indication,  particularly  with  respect  to  the 
interception  of  radio  portions  of  such  coranunications ,  the  applicable 
statutes  and  legislative  history  must  be  examined  to  ascertain  whether  there 
is  a  clear,  overall  legislative  purpose  upon  which  one  statute,  to  the  exclusion 
of  the  other,  may  be  validly  applied  to  the  instant  facts. 
The  provisions  of  18  U.S.C.  §2511  and  47  U.S.C.  §605  are  not  mutually 
exclusive.  They  overlap.  Section  2511  prohibits  the  interception  of  "wire 
cxmrunications,"  as  broadly  defined  in  18  U.S.C.  §2510(1),  while  Section 
605  regulates  the  interception  and  divulgence  of  "radio  corrmunications," 
as  broadly  defined  in  47  U.S.C.  §153.  A  tentative  application  of  either 
statute  is  possible  in  the  instant  context. 
128
Copy  /  of  2 
Section  2511  prohibits,  except  as  otherwise  specifically  provided: 
....  the  interception  and  disclosure  of  all  wire  or 
oral  communications .  Paragraph  (1)  sets  out  several 
prohibitions.  Subparagraph  (a)  prohibits  the  inter- 
ception itself.  This  eliminates  the  requirement 
under  existing  law  that  an  "interception"  and  a 
"divulgence"  must  take  place.  [47  U.S.C.  §605  pre- 
viously required  the  interception  and  divulgence  of 
both  wire  and  radio  ccranunications] . . . .  Subpara- 
graph (a)  establishes  a  blanket  prohibition  against 
the  interception  of  any  wire  conmunication.  Since 
the  facilities  used  to  transmit  wire  conrnunications 
form  part  of  the  interstate  or  foreign  ccmnunications 
network,  Congress  has  plenary  power  under  the  commerce 
clause  to  prohibit  all  interception  of  such  communica- 
tions, whether  by  wiretapping  or  otherwise.  (Weiss  v. 
United  States.  308  U.S.  321  (1930).  1968  U.STCoHe"  Cong. 
and  Adm.  News  2180.  (Emphasis  added.)  ; 
The  above  would  seem,  at  first,  to  foreclose  the  applicability  of  47 
U.S.C.  §605  to  the  instant  situation.  The  citation  of  Weiss  v.  United 
States,  however,  indicates  that  the  legislative  history  refers  to  the 
scope  of  communications  covered  by  §2511  rather  than  to  the  inclusion  of 
additional  methods  of  interception. 
Weiss  was  a  wiretapping  case  under  the  provisions  of  the  "old"  (pre- 
Title  III)  47  U.S.C.  §605  in  which  the  Supreme  Court  held  that  the  prohibitions 
of  the  second  clause  of  §605  applied  to  intrastate  as  well  as  interstate  and 
foreign  cotrmunications  when  transmitted  over  wires  used  for  both  kinds  of 
cconunications.  Weiss  v.  United  States,  308  U.S.  321,  327-328  (1939).  This 
would  not  seem  necessarily  to  favor  §2511  in  the  coverage  of  the  interception 
of  radio  portions  of  radio- landline  telephone  cccmunications . 
129