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National  Command  and  Control  Capability 
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BLUF    RIBBON     DLFENSH    PANEL 
WASHINGTON.  D.  C    20U01 
July  1  ,  1970 
My  dear  Mr.  President: 
It  is  my  honor  to  submit  to  you  herewith  the  Report  of 
the  Blue  Ribbon  Defense  Panel  on  Command  and  Control  and 
Defense  Intelligence.   Because  of  the  sensitive  nature  of 
the  subject  matter  and  the  effect  its  disclosure  could  have 
on  our  national  well-being,  the  Panel  asked  its  subcommittee 
on  Operations  to  undertake  the  examination  of  these  two 
important  areas. 
b
imbalance  in  the  allocation  of  resources,  which  causes  more 
information  to  be  collected  than  can  ever  be  processed  and 
used  . 
Furthermore,  there  is  a  tendency  within  the  intelligence 
community  to  produce  intelligence  for  the  intelligence  community 
and  to  remain  remote  from  and  not  give  sufficient  attention  to 
the  requirements  of  others  who  have  valid  needs  for  intelligence. 
The  basic  objective  of  the  intelligence  community  should  be  to 
get  the  right  information  to  the  right  people  at  the> right  time. 
I  hope  the  Panel's  recommendations  will  not  be  considered 
criticisms  of  individuals,  but  will  help  to  solve  the  problems 
associated  with  Command  and  Control  and  Intelligence  in  a  way 
that  effectively  supports  the  objectives  of  the  Department  of 
Defense  and  the  Nation: 
I  know  my  colleagues  on  the  Panel  join  me  in  expressing 
to  you  our  appreciation  for  giving  us  the  privilege  of  under- 
taking this  important  assignment  at  this  critical  period  in 
our  Nation's  history. 
Respectfully  yours, 
/i^L*  *-■  ?4^ 
GILBERT  W.  FITZHUGH 
Chai  rman 
The  President 
The  White  House 
X
THE  PANEL 
Gilbert  W.    I  itidutjSi,   Cfi'jirtnon 
Chairman   of    tSourJ,    /•'.  t-:ropo!i  Tim   Lifp    Insurtincc    Company 
Dr.  Morfbo   E.  Peterson**' 
President,   Bornord  College 
Coiumbio  University 
JohnM.   Fluke 
President,   John   Fluke 
Manufocturing  Co.,  Inc. 
Wilfred  J.  McNeil 
Dir.. Advisor    Fairchild 
Miller  Corp..   Pres.. 
Tox   Foundation 
Mrs.  Leona  P.  Thurman 
Attorney-at-Law 
William  Blackie 
Chairman  of  Board 
Caterpillar  Tractor  Co. 
George  Champion 
President  of  Economic 
Development  Board  of  NYC 
Williom  P.  Clements,  Jr. 
Chairman  of  Board.    5EDC0,   Inc. 
Dr.  Marvin  L.  Goldberger** 
Professor  of  Physics 
Princeton  University 
Robert  C.  Jackson* 
Chairman 
Tcledyne  Ryan  Aeronautical 
Lane  Kirkland 
Secretary -Treasurer  AFL-CIO 
Hobort  D,  Lewis 
President,    Reoders  Digest 
Association,   Inc. 
Dr.  Ruben  F.  Mettler' 
President,  TRW,  Inc. 
Lewis   F.  Powell,  Jr." 
Attc»rney«ot-Low 
Dr.  George  J,  Stigler 
Professor  of  American 
Institutions,   Univ. 
of  Chicago 
Claude  Yoong 
Office  of  Commissioner 
Professional    Football 
*Membersof  the  Operations  Subcommittee. 
**Fo-jnd  it  necessary  to  terminate  Ms   services  on  the  Pant!  clue  to  illness. 
***Found  it  necessary  to   terminate  her   services  on  the   Pane!   due  to  press 
of  duties  as   President  of  Bornord  College. 
THE  STAFF 
J.    Fred  Buzhordt,  Jr. 
William  G.  Howard 
Major  Ricbcrd  T.  Baer.  USAF 
Mary  E.  McCauslond 
X
PREFACE 
The  Blue  Ribbon  Defense  Panel  was  appointed  by  the  President 
and  the  Secretary  of  Defense  in  July  1969,  and  given  the  follow- 
ing broad  Charter,  with  instructions  to  submit  its  Final  Report 
by  July  1 ,  1970:  ; 
The  general  scope  of  the  Panel  is  to  study,  report  and  make  s 
recommendations  on: 
(1)  The  organization  and  management  of  the  Department 
of  Defense,  including  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff,  the  Defense 
Agencies  and  the  military  services,  as  it  affects  the  Department*; 
mission  performance,  decision-making  process,  the  command  and 
control  function  and  facilities,  and  the  coordination  with  other 
governmental  departments  and  agencies,  with  emphasis  on  the 
responsiveness  to  the  requirements  of  the  President  and  the 
Secretary  of  Defense. 
(2)  The  Defense  research  and  development  efforts  from 
the  standpoints  of  mission  fulfillments,  costs,  organization, 
time  and  interrelation  with  the  scientific  and  industrial 
communi  ty . 
(3)  The  Defense  procurement  policies  and  practices,    • 
particularly  as  they  relate  to  costs,  time  and  quality. 
(4)  Such  other  matters  as  the  Secretary  may  submit  to  ; 
it  from  time  to  time. 
It  is  important  to  note  that,  while  the  Charter  is  very 
broad  as  to  the  Panel's  function  in  the  fields  of  structure, 
organization,  and  operating  procedures  of  the  entire  Department 
of  Defense,  it  excludes  considerations  of  broad  national  policy. 
The  Panel  has  endeavored  to  hew  closely  to  this  line. 
X
Vie  were  told  that,  this  is  the  first  broad  -scale  study  of 
the  Department  of  Defense  in  many  years  --  in  fact  since  the 
two  Commissions  on  Organization  of  the  Executive  Department  of 
the  Government  chaired  by  former  President  Herbert  Hoover. 
We  decided  to  approach  our  assignment  with  the  same  broad 
objectives  as  stated  in  the  Hoover  Commission  Report,  namely: 
(1)  That  the  primary  objectives  of  the  National 
Security  Organization  is  to  preserve  the  peace,  but  that  it 
must  at*  all  times  be  ready  and  able,  promptly  and  effectively, 
to  marshall  all  of  our  resources,  human  and  material,  for  the 
protection  of  our  national  security. 
(2)  That  civilian  influence  must  be  dominant  in  the 
formulation  of  national  policy  and  that  civilian  control  of  the 
military  establishment  must  be  clearly  established  and  firmly 
mai  ntai  ned. 
(3)  That  the  Nation  is  entitled  to  the  maximum  possible 
return  for  every   dollar  of  military  expenditure. 
(4)  That  military  efficiency  --  in  other  words,  readiness 
for  war  --  must  be  the  fundamental  objective  of  the  National  Milita 
Establ i  shment . 
(5)  That  elimination  of  wasteful  duplication  is  essential 
to  good  government,  but  that  the  preservation,  within  sound  limits, 
of  a  healthy  competitive  spirit  and  of  service  pride  and  tradition 
are  basic  to  progress  and  morale. 
Because  of  the  vast  scope  of  the  operations  of  the  Department 
of  Defense,  the  Panel  divided  itself  into  four  sub-committees,  as 
follows: 
(1)  Organization  and  Personnel  Management. 
(2)  Management  of  Materiel  Resources  (including  research 
development,  procurement  and  management  of  weapons  and  supplies) 
planning,  programming,  budgeting,  and  similar  procedures. 
(3)  Military  operations,  intelligence,  communications, 
automatic  data  processing. 
(4)  Conflicts  of  interests,  contract  compliance,    ^ 
domestic  action,  equal  employment  opportunity,  etc. 
1 1
The  Panel  interviewee!  many  witnesses  in  depth,  and  the 
sub-committees  many  more.   It  made  a  functional  survey  of  the 
Defense  headquarters  organizations  in  the  Washington  area  cover- 
ing some  1,600  organizational  elements  to  elicit  information  on 
the  actual  operation  of  and  interface  between  units  of  the 
Department  of  Oefense.   It  also  sent  a  questionnaire  to  a  large 
number  of  people  outside  the  Department  of  Defense  who  we  thought 
might  wish  to  give  us  the  benefit  of  their  thinking.   We  enjoyed 
a  remarkable  response,  with  answers  ranging  from  a  page  to  dozens 
of  pages  of  detailed  suggestions. 
The  Panel  members  and  the  staff  carefully  reviewed  many 
earlier  reports  of  studies  of  the  Department  of  Defense,  and 
many  visits  were  made  to  important  elements  of  the  Department 
outside  the  Washington  area.   Members  representing  sub-committees 
Three  and  Four  visited  a  number  of  military  Commands  in  Europe, 
the  Mediterranean,  and  Southeast  Asia,  to  see  how  policies 
determined  at  Washington  Headquarters  were  carried  out  in  the 
operational  units. 
Because  of  the  sensitive  nature  of  the  subject  matter  and 
the  effect  its  disclosure  could  have  on  the  national  well-being, 
the  Panel  asked  sub-committee  Three  to  undertake  an  examination 
of  the  areas  of  National  Command  and  Control  and  Defense  intel- 
ligence and  make  a  classified  report. 
The  Panel  wishes  to  extend  its  deep  appreciation  to  the 
many  people  in  the  Department  of  Defense  --  both  military  and 
civilian  --  who  contributed  generously  of  their  time  in  answer- 
ing its  innumerable  questions  and  volunteering  so  many  constructive 
suggestions.   We  found  them  uniformly  anxious  to  help  and  enthu- 
siastic about  the  possibilities  for  improving  operations.   We 
realize  that  this  would  not  have  happened  without  the  strong 
support  of  Secretary  of  Defense  Melvin  R.  Laird,  and  Deputy 
Secretary  of  Defense  David  Packard. 
the 
To  all  these  people  who  contributed  so  much  to  its  endeavors, \
Panel  extends  its  deep  thanks. 
x 
1 1 1
TABLE    OF     CONTENTS 
PREFACE 
EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY 
COMMAND  AND  CONTROL 
Introduction 
Warning  Time 
Presidential  Survival 
The  Military  Command  Centers 
Communications 
Strategic  Decisions 
Strategic  Launches 
Strategic  Defense 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
DEFENSE  INTELLIGENCE 
The  Intelligence  Community 
The  Defense  Intelligence  Community 
The  Office  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense 
The  Cryptologic  Community 
General  Defense  Intelligence 
The  Defense  Intelligence  Agency 
The  Intelligence  Process 
Requi  rements 
Collection 
Processing 
Production 
Diss em i  nation 
Evaluation 
Special  Programs 
Tactical  Intelligence 
Compartmented  Intelligence 
l(im. 
i 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
i  v
BLUE    RIBBON    DEFENSE    PANEL    REPORT 
NATIONAL    COMMAND   AND    CONTROL 
AND    DEFENSE    INTELLIGENCE 
ON 
EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY 
This  summary  provides  a  brief  review  of  the  report  of  the 
Blue  Ribbon  Defense  Panel  resulting  from  its  examination  r/f~ 
National  Command  and  Control  capability  and  the  Defense  lintel 
ligence  Community.
With  regard  to  intelligence,  we  find  that 
The  intelligence  effort  of  the  Department  of  Defense 
is  a  part  of  a  coordinated  national  effort,  and  represents 
roughlyjP         __lthe  nat">onal  intelligence  resources.   How- 
ever, responsibil i ty~for  the  management  of  Defense  intelligence 
is  fragmented  between  many  elements  of  the  Department  and  is 
neither  well  coordinated  nor  adequately  directed  toward  satisfying 
proven  consumer  needs.
-  T h o r e  d o e s  not  appear  to  b c  an  e f  f  a c  t  i v e  mechanism 
for  potential  users  of  intelligence,  either  at  national  level 
or  internal  to  the  Department  of  Defense,  to  express  their  needs 
The  Defense  intelligence  community  appears  to  function  largely 
in  response  to  requirements  generated  within  the  intelligence 
comtnun  i  ty . 
-  There  is  no  effective  mechanism  to  effect  a  proper 
balance  in  the  allocation  of  resources  between  the  various  intel- 
ligence functions.   The  present  production  resources  can  make 
use  of  only  a  fraction  of  the  information  that  is  collected. 
-  There  is  no  effective  mechanism  for  the  allocation 
of  collection  resources  to  assure  that  needed  information  is 
collected  in  the  most  economical  manner,  consistent  with  the 
urgency  of  the  need. 
-  There  is  no  substantial  effort  or  procedure  to. 
evaluate  the  intelligence  process  in  the  Defense  intelligence 
community.   It  is  not  possible,  today,  to  obtain  an  objective 
assessment  of  the  validity  of  the  requirements  which  drive  the 
process,  the  efficiency  and  effectiveness  of  the  collection 
and  production  functions  nor  the  value  and  utility  of  the  sub- 
stantive output. 
-  Personnel  security  investigations  are  performed  by 
the  investigative  elements  of  the  Military  Departments.   The 
regulations  of  each  of  the  Military  Departments  make  reference 
to  accepting  the  validity  of  previous  investigations  completed 
by  any  agency  of  the  Federal  Government  which  meet  the  minimum 
investigative  requirements  of  that  particular  Department.   For 
all  practical  purposes,  the  Departments  interpret  this  narrowly 
and  usually  do  not  accept  the  investigations  of  another  Depart- 
ment as  meeting  their  standards. 
-  Each  Military  Department  has  a  large  organization 
devoted  primarily  to  Mapping,  Charting  and  Geodesy  (MC&G) 
activities.   The  Defense  Intelligence  Agency  (DIA)  attempts 
to  coordinate  these  activities  to  eliminate  duplication  and 
set  priorities  for  production.   However,  DIA  coordinates 
through  the  intelligence  elements  of  the  Departmental  staffs, 
and  only  the  Air  Force  MC&G  agency  is  within  the  purview  of 
the  intelligence  staff.   The  Army  and  Navy  MC&G  agencies  are  ^ 
not  a  part  of  the  intelligence  community.
-    There    is    no    substantial    corps    of    professional    intel- 
ligence   officers    in    the    Military    Services,    nor    a    professional 
intelligence    career    service    for   civilians    in    the   general    Defense 
intelligence    community.      The    National    Security   Agency    secured 
special    legislation   which   permits    the    employment   of   career 
analysts    with    compensation    equivalent    to    Grade    16,    17,    and    18 
levels.      The    Director   also   has    the   authority    to    assign    and 
reassign   civilian   personnel    to    the   position   and    geographic   loca- 
tion  where    their   talents   can    be   best   used. 
:  i 
The  Panel  recommends  that  the  Defense  intelligence  community 
be  restructured  to  provide  a  better  management  structure  and  to 
assure  the  provision  of  intelligence,  as  required,  to  the  President 
other  consumers  at  the  national  level  and  to  all  levels  of  the 
Department  from  the  Secretary  of  Defense  to  operating  units  in 
the  field.   The  new  intelligence  structure  should: 
1.  Function  in  response  to  consumer  requirements  for 
intelligence  and  provide  timely  and  quality  products,  responsive 
to  those  requirements,  with  a  proper  balance  between  collection,   .
processing,  and  production  activities.  !
2   Provide  a  clear  chain  of  command  from  the  President^ 
and  the  Secretary  of  Defense  to  the  collection  and  production  units 
that  will  assure  the  timely  flew  of  intelligence  information  and 
minimize  the  injection  of  bias  arising  from  Service  affiliations, 
or  operational  location. 
a  single  individual  in  the  Office  of 
who  is  the  clearly  designated  representa- 
Defense  to  other  Departments  and  Agencies 
of  Government  for  intelligence  matters  and  who  is  responsible  to- 
coordinate  or  direct  all  intelligence  activities  within  the 
Department. 
3.  Provide  for 
the  Secretary  of  Defense 
tive  of  the  Secretary  of
4.  Provide;  flexibility  for  timely  development  and 
distribution  of  limited,  costly  resources,  both  trciined  per- 
sonnel and  equipments,  to  meet  r:  h --<  n  g  i  n  ci  priorities. 
5.  Provide  the  proper  environment  to  develop  an 
effective  and  efficient  professional  intelligence  career  service 
ror  both  military  and  civilian  personnel. 
Specifically,  it  is  recommended  that  the  Secretary  of 
Defense: 
1.  Designate  the  Deputy  Secretary  for  Operations  to 
be  his  agent  for  all  matters  relating  to  intelligence,  to 
include  the  authority  to  designate  those  activities  to  be  con- 
sidered intelligence  activities. 
an  Assis 
with  the 
(DDI). 
represen 
Agencies 
or  direc 
programs 
with  exi 
Di  rector 
res  pons  i 
2.  Establish  under  the  Deputy  Secretary  for  Operations 
tant  Secretary  of  Defense  for  Intelligence  (ASD(I)), 
additional  title  of  Director  of  Defense  Intelligence 
The  ASD(I)/DDI  would  be  delegated  the  responsibility  to 
t  the  Secretary  of  Defense  with  other  Departments  and 
of  Government  for  intelligence  matters  and  to  coordinate 
t  all  DOD  intelligence  activities,  including  national 
which  are  managed  in  the  Department,  in  accordance 
sting  law  and  applicable  National  Security  Council  and 
of  Central  Intelligence  Directives.   Among  his  specific 
bilities,  the  ASD(I)/DDI  would: 
a.  Serve  as  the  Defense  representative  on  the 
United  States  Intelligence  Board,  and  appoint,  with  approval  of 
the  Deputy  Secretary  for  Operations ,  • representatives  to  other 
government-wide  intelligence  committees  and  boards. 
b.  Direct  and  control  all  DOD  intelligence 
activities  not  specifically  designated  by  the  Deputy  Secretary 
for  Operations  as  organic  to  combatant  forces. 
c.  Have  the  authority  to  delegate  operation  of 
any  of  these  activities  which  he  deems  necessary  to  assure 
maximum  exploitation  of  DOD  resources. 
all  proposed  intelligence  programs, 
on-going  intelligence  activities  and 
d.  Review 
monitor  and  evaluate  all 
make  recommendations  to  the  Deputy  Secretary  for  Operations 
with  regard  to  allocation  of  resources 
v
e.  Establish    procedures    to    review    arid    validate 
requirements    for    i  n  Le  1  1  i  go  rice    production    and    collection    and 
evaluate    the    product    against    the    requ  i  rei::en  t . 
f.  Establish    procedures    for    and    periodically 
conduct    a    systematic    evaluation    of    the    intelligence    process 
in    the    Defense    intelligence    community.      This    evaluation    should 
include    an    assessment    ot    the    utility    of    the    intelligence    pro- 
ducts   provided    to    consumers    outside    the    Defense    intelligence 
community. 
g.  Review   and    consolidate   requirements    for   research 
and    development   in    support   of    intelligence    activities. 
h.    Develop    policies   and   procedures    to    insure    the 
protection   of    intelligence    and_p/    intelligence    sources    and   methods 
from   unauthorized    disclosure./ 
3.    Establish    under    the    ASD(I)/DDI: 
a.    A   Defense    Security   Command    (DSECC)    to   be 
composed   of    the    present   Service    Cryptologic    Agencies    and   all 
other   Defense    intelligence    collection   activities    except   for 
those   which    have    been    specifically   designated   by   the    Deputy 
Secretary    for   Operations    as    organic    to   combatant  forces.      The 
DSECC    should    perform    those    processing   activities   which   are   most 
efficiently   associated   with    collection   facilities.      Among   his 
specific    responsibilities,    the    Commander,    DSECC   would,    under 
the   direction   of    the    DDI : 
(1)    Command    all    those   designated    Defense 
intelligence   collection   and   associated   processing   and    reporting 
activities,    with    authority    to   delegate   administrative   management 
or   operational    control    as    he   deems    necessary. 
Agency. 
(2)  Serve  as  Director,  National  Security
staff  el  em  en  Is  be  tw 
(3).  Insure  the  most:  judicious  use 
■en  his  DSIXC  and  MSA. 
Oi  common 
o  f  i  ntel 
cdn  ciemen  is  uer.v/een  m  s  um.ll  and  flhA. 
( l\ )  Insure  the  timely  dissemination  of  in 
igence  information  to  all  appropriate  Departments,  Agencies, 
ommands  or  operating  units. 
(5)  Prepare  the  Defense  Security  Program  for 
those  activities  for  which  he  is  responsible,  and  review  and 
coordinate  the  programs  of  intelligence  collection  activities 
organic  to  the  combatant  forces  to  insure  maximum  exploitation 
of  resources. 
b.  A  Defense  Intelligence  Production  Agency  (DIPA), 
to  replace  +  he  Defense  Intelligence  Agency,  whose  Director  would 
be  responsible  for  Defense  Intelligence  production  except  for 
those  production  activities  specifically  assigned  to  the  combatant 
forces  by  the  Deputy  Secretary  for  Operations.  Among  his  specific 
responsibilities,  the  Director,  DIPA  would: 
(1)  Direct  those  intelligence  production 
activities  which  have  been  placed  under  his  purview,  with  the 
authority  to  delegate  administrative  management  or  operational 
control  as  he  deems  necessary. 
(2)  Provide  current  intelligence  to  designated 
individuals  and  organizations. 
(3)  Provide  threat  assessments  for  all  element 
of  DOD,  as  required. 
(4)  Provide  finished  intelligence  to  appro- 
priate elements  of  the  Department  in  response  to  expressed  needs. 
(5)  Provide  all  DOD  intelligence  estimates 
and  inputs  to  national  estimates  as  directed  by  the  DDI . 
(6)  Manage  all  Defense  intelligence  production 
information  systems,  including  those  of  the  intelligence  activitie 
organic  to  the  combatant  forces,  to  insure  i nter-operabil i ty  and 
optimized  intelligence  flow  to  and  from  all  echelons  of  DOD* 
(7)  Prepare  the  Defense  Intelligence  Program 
for  those  activities  under  his  direction,  and  review  and  coor^dinat 
the  programs  of  intelligence  production  activities  organic  to  "com- 
batant forces  to  insure  maximum  exploitation  of  resources.
4.  r  x  p  a  i  i  cl  the;  rospons  i  b  i  1  i  t  i  os  of  t  h  t*  national  Security 
Agency  to  include  the  processing,  data  base  maintenance  and 
reporting  of  all  intelligence  information  as  directed  by  the  Df)I. 
5.  Establish  within  the  DSECC  a  unified  Defense  I  rives  ti 
gative  Service  responsible  for  all  personnel  security  investiga- 
tions within  the  DQD  and  its  contractors. 
6.  Combine  the  Army  Topographic  Command,  the  Naval 
Oceanographic  Office  and  the  Aeronatuical  Chart  and  Information 
Center  into  a  unified  Defense  Map  Service  reporting  to  the  Secre- 
tary of  Defense  through  the  Deputy  Secretary  of  Defense  (Manage- 
ment of  Resources). 
7.  Take  the  actions  necessary  (a)  to  extend  to  the 
entire  Defense  intelligence  community  the  authority  that  the 
National  Security  Agency  presently  has  to  develop  a  professional 
career  service,  and  (b)  to  establish  an  intelligence  career 
service  for  military  officers. 
x
DEFENSE  INTELLIGENCE 
I .  THE  INTELLIGENCE  COMMUNITY 
The  National  "intelligence  community"  consists  of  the 
Departments  and  Agencies  of  the  Government  which  are  responsible 
for  ;:he  collection  of  information  and  production  of  foreign 
intelligence  essential  to  the  security  of  the  United  States. 
The  principal  departments  and  agencies  of  the  intelligence 
community  are  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  (DCI),  the 
Central  Intelligence  Agency  (CIA),  the  Department  of  State,- 
the  Department  of  Defense  (DOD),  and  the  Federal  Bureau  of 
Investigation  (FBI).   It  is  essential  that  the  activities  of 
these  departments  and  agencies  be  closely  coordinated  to  assure 
efficient  and  effective  operation. 
The  DCI  is  responsible  for  the  general  management  and 
coordination  of  the  intelligence  community,  in  addition  to 
serving  as  the  Director  of  CIA. 
The  United  States  Intelligence  Board  (USIB)  is  the  formal 
instrument  established  by  the  National  Security  Council  (NSC) 
to  advise  and  assist  the  DCI,  as  he  requires,  in  discharging 
his  statutory  responsibilities.   The  responsibilities  and  func- 
tions of  the  USIB  are  set  forth  in  National  Security  Council 
Intelligence  Directive  (NSCID)  No.  1.   Its  primary  responsibility 
is  to  achieve  an  effectively  coordinated  intelligence  community 
in  the  interest  of  National  Security. 
The  major  functions  assigned  in  NSCID  No.  1  are: 
1.  To  establish  policies  and  develop  programs  for 
the  guidance  of  all  departments  and  agencies  concerned. 
2.  To  establish  appropriate  intelligence  objectives, 
requirements  and  priorities.  N. 
3.  To  review  the  national  intelligence  effort  and 
report  to  the  NSC  on  its  adequacy,  integration  and  gaps  identified
4.  I o  make  recommendations  on  foreign  intelligence 
matters  to  appropriate  government  officials,  including  particularly 
recommendations  to  the  Secretary  of  DeFense  on  intelligence  matters 
within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Director,  USA. 
5.  To  develop  and  review  security  standards  and  practices 
as  they  relate  to  the  protection  of  intelligence  and  intelligence 
sources  and  methods  from  unauthorized  disclosure. 
6.  To  formulate,  as  required,  policies  in  regard  to 
arrangements  with  foreign  governments  on  intelligence  matters. 
The  functions  c~   USIB  are  performed  through  its  14  committees 
and  sub-committees.   Most  of  the  Chairmen  of  the  USIB  committees 
and  sub-committees  are  representatives  of  the  DCI,  provided  from 
the  National  Intelligence  Program  Evaluation  Staff,  which  supports 
him. 
The  Department  of  Defense  is  represented  on  the  USIB  by  the 
Director  of  the  National  Security  Agency  (NSA)  and  the  Director 
of  the  Defense  Intelligence  Agency  (DIA).  When  DIA  was  established 
its  Director  replaced  the  senior  intelligence  officers  of  the  three 
military  departments  on  the  USIB;  however,  they  are  permitted  to 
participate  in  board  meetings  as  observers  and  to  add  footnotes 
to  USIB  papers  stating  their  points  of  disagreement.   The  military 
departments  still  retain  full  membership  on  the  committees  and 
sub-cemmi ttees  of  the  USIB.   There  is  little  or  no  coordination 
among  the  Defense  representatives  and  observers  on  the  USIB  and 
they  often  appear  to  be  working  at  cross  purposes. 
Intelligence  requirements  at  the  national  level  are  determined 
in  the  USIB  entirely  by  representatives  of  the  intelligence  com- 
munity.  It  is  not  clear  that  consumers  of  intelligence  outside 
the  intelligence  community  make  a  significant  contribution  to 
this  process. 
The  Board  of  National  Estimates  (BNE)  is  composed  of  a  number 
of  distinguished  men,  appointed  by  the  DCI,  from  industry,  the 
academic  community  and  the  professions.  The  BNE  periodically  sub- 
mits to  USIB  a  program  of  proposed  production  of  National  Intelli- 
gence Estimates  (NIEs)  for  approval.   Upon  approval,  terms  of 
reference  for  each  estimate  are  prepared  and  contributions  are 
obtained  from  the  member  agencies  of  the  USIB.  The  BNE  completes 
its  evaluation  and  submits  a  first  draft  for  coordination  with^ 
the  member  agencies.   After  revision,  the  estimate  is  submitted 
l 
\
to  the*  US  II'.  for  approval.   If  any  member  of  the  US  IB  or  any  of 
the  senior  intelligence  officers  of  the  Servicer,  disagree  with 
the  estimate,  the  dissenting  opinions  are  published  as  integral 
pav  i:s  of  the  estimate.   The  value  of  the  estimate  process  is 
often  destroyed  in  the  coordination  -  revision  cycle  as  watered- 
down  compromises  are  accepted  rather  than  establishing  the  basic 
document,  and  then  adding  the  disagreements. 
The  National  Intelligence  Resources  Board  (NIRB)  was  recently 
established  to  advise  the  DCI  on  needs  for  intelligence  resources 
to  support  the  U.S.  foreign  intelligence  effort.   The  members  of 
the  NIRB  are  the  Deputy,  DCI,  Chairman;  the  Director,  Bureau  of 
Intelligence  and  Research,  Department  of  State;  and  the  Assistant 
Secretary  of  Defense  for  Administration. 
II.  THE  DEFENSE  INTELLIGENCE  COMMUNITY 
The  Defense  Intelligence  effort  is  normally  programmed  in 
two  major  packages:  The  Consolidated  Cryptologic  Program  (CCP), 
with  the  Director,  NSA  designated  Program  Manager;  and  The' 
General  Defense  Intelligence  Program  (GDIP),  with  the  Director, 
DIA  designated  Program  Manager.  While  the  Director,  MSA  and 
Director,  DIA  are  designated  Program  Managers  they  do  not  in 
fact  manage  the  Defense  intelligence  effort.   The  responsibility 
for  management  of  the  effort  is  fragmented  within  and  between 
the  Office  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense,  the  Joint  Chiefs  of 
Staff,  the  Defense  Intelligence  Agency,  the  National  Security 
Agency,  and  the  Military  Departments.   The  Program  Managers 
consolidate  the  submissions  of  all  participants  in  the  program, 
but  do  not  have  control  of  the  budget.   Once  money  to  support 
the  approved  program  is  allocated  to  the  Services,  they  may  or 
may  not  use  it  for  its  intended  purposes. 
From  time  to  time  special  programs  are  established  to 
develop  some  new  intelligence  resource  or  capability.   In  such 
cases  a  program  manager  is  designated  by  the  Secretary  of  Defense 
and  the  program  becomes  a  part  of  the  intelligence  community. 
A •  The  Office  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense 
Currently  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  Defense  for  Administra- 
tion (ASD(A))  is  clearly  the  senior  official  in  the  Defense  organ- 
ization for  managing  the  intelligence  effort.   On  August  1,  1969, 
the  Secretary  of  Defense  assigned  "additional  responsibilities 
for  intelligence"  to  the  ASD(A)  and  stated:  '**•
"In  discharging  those  responsibilities,  I  fully  expect 
the,  ASD(A)  to  improve  the  effectiveness  and  efficiency  of  the 
Defense  intelligence  community.   In  order  to  accomplish  this 
improvement,  he  is  charged  with  the  following  responsibilities: 
1.  To  establish  an  intelligence  resource  review 
and  decision-making  process  which  will  comprise: 
a.  A  mechanism  for  making  comparisons  and 
appropriate  trade-offs  between  major  intelligence  activities 
and  programs  so  that  DOD  decision  makers  can  select  the  most 
efficient  and  effective  systems  for  collecting,  processing, 
producing  and  disseminating  intelligence. 
b.  A  Five-Year  Intelligence  Resource  Plan. 
c.  A  procedure  for  identifying  and  surfacing 
major  issues  of  intelligence  resource  allocation  and  management. 
d.  A  continuing  system  for  review  of  intelli- 
gence collection  requirements  balanced  against  collection  resource 
2.  To  improve  intelligence  communications  among 
DOD  agencies  and  between  the  Department  of  Defense  and  other 
agencies. 
3.  To  evaluate  intelligence  organizational 
relationships,  roles  and  missions. 
4.  To  review  security  policies  and  eliminate 
unnecessary  classification  and  compartmentations ." 
The  ASD(A)  has  limited  his  purview,  initially,  to  resource 
allocation  and  has  established  a  review  process  wherein  each 
Program  Manager  is  responsible  for  resource  management  within 
his  program.   Procedures  are  worked  out  whereby  each  Program 
Manager  conducts  his  review  and  then  reports  to  the  ASD(A).   The 
ASD(A)  then  performs  a  review  across  all  the  programs  to  identify 
areas  where  there  is  a  possibility  of  duplication  or  inefficiency 
The  ASD(A)  has  adopted  the  Consolidated  Intelligence  Resourc* 
Information  System  (CIRIS)  as  a  management  tool  to  assist  in  his 
cross-program  review.
all 
ing 
bal 
col 
It  is  not  possible  to  make  valid  judgments  on  the  proper 
ocation  of  a  collection  resource  to  a  target  without  consider- 
why,  and  with  what  urgency,  the  information  is  required  and 
ancing  that  against  the  degree  to  which  the  information 
lected  by  the  resource  satisfies  the  requirement. 
There  is  a  real  need  to  make  comparisons  and  trade-offs 
between  the  major  intelligence  activities  and  programs  to  select 
the  most  efficient  and  effective  systems  for  collecting,  processin 
producing  and  disseminating  intelligence.  Resources  should  be 
allocated  to  attain  a  balance  in  the  capability  to  collect,  proces 
and  produce  intelligence.  It  appears  at  present  that  collection 
capabilities  far  exceed  the  capabilities  to  process  and  produce. 
B .  The  Cryptologic  Community 
The  organizations  involved  in  the  signals  intelligence 
(SIGINT)  effort  are  referred  to  collectively  as  the  Cryptologic 
Community.   This  community  consists  of  the  National  Security 
Agency  (NSA),  at  its  head,  and  the  service  cryptologic  agencies 
(SCAs).   Also  holding  membership  in  this  community,  though  not 
generally  included  in  the  term,  is  the  SIGINT  Committee,  with 
its  sub-committees,  of  the  United  States  Intelligence  Board  (USIB) 
The  current  authority  for  organization  and  operation  of  this 
community  is  the  National  Security  Council  Intelligence  Directive 
(NSCIO)  No.  6,  effective  15  September  1958,  and  revised  18  January 
1961.   This  document  provides  the  national  policy  for  Communica- 
tions Intelligence  (COMINT)  and  Electronic  Intelligence  (ELINT), 
collectively  referred  to  as  SIGINT.   It  defines  the  responsibil i ti 
of  the  USIB,  Secretary  of  Defense,  NSA,  Director  NSA,  DCI  andx 
Military  Departments.. 
--/ 
P 
r 
M
The  fundamental  community,  NSA  and  the  SCAs  ,  can  be  described 
as  a  two-part  system.  MSA  is  the  part  providing  the  system  manage 
r.ient,  through  operational  and  technical  control,  processing of  the 
i  n forma tion 
raw  SIGINT  data  and  disseminating  the  processed  SIGINT 
to  the  consumers.   The  SCAs  are  basically  the  collection  portion  of 
the  system. 
26  r\ 
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of    NSA.       He    can    prescribe    as    a    condition    of    employ- 
MSA    employees    must    serve    any    place    in    the    world    as 
of    the   Acjency   dictate.       In    addition,    he   has    authority 
sli    professional    positions,    primarily    in    research    and 
?. ,    at    the    basic    compensation    equal     to    rates    of    basic 
on    authorized    for   Grades    16,    17    and    18   of    the    General 
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be    developed. 
or    professional    intelligence 
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general    defense    intelligence 
for    a   military   officer    to 
with    the    result    that   military 
ty    are    filled    by    a    succession 
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ity   only.      The    present    Defense 
gmented    responsibilities    does^ 
a    professional    career    intelli-
I)  I  A  \u\> 
c.  s  Lab  1  i  s  h  e.c!  i  n  I  '}  '<  I  i  n  a  ?i  v  f  i  o  r  L  to  c  re . 
liicc.ii  (Hi  i  sir,  to  solve  the  prol'leris  presented  by  the  ci  i  s  ;>,•  ra  te 
i  n  tel  1  i  gence  estimates  being  produced  and  dup  1  i  <.<>.  f.  i  ve  efforts 
bciiu'i  engaged  in  by  the  Military  Do  pa  r  t.men  ts  . 
DIA  is  assigned  the  responsibility  for: 
1.  The  organization,  direction,  managei'ien  t ,  and  control 
of  all  DOD  intelligence  resources  assigned  to  or  included  within 
the  DIA. 
2.  Review  and  coordination  of  those  intelligence  functio 
retained  by  or  assigned  to  the  Military  Departments . 
3.  Supervision  of  the  execution  of  all  approved  plans, 
programs,  policies,  and  procedures  for  intelligence  functions 
not  assigned  to  DIA. 
4.  Obtaining  the  maximum  economy  and  efficiency  in  the 
allocation  and  management  of  Defense  intelligence  resources. 
5.  Responding  directly  to  priority  requests  levied  upon 
the  DIA  by  the  United  States  Intelligence  Board. 
Concurrent  with  the  establishment  of  DIA,  the  Directorate 
of  Intelligence  (J-2)  of  the  Joint  Staff  was  cli  sestabl  i  shed  and 
its  functions  assigned  to  the  Director  of  DIA.   The  established 
reporting  line  for  DIA  was  and  is  through  the  Joint  Chiefs  of 
Staff  to  the  Secretary  of  Defense. 
The  principal  problems  of  DIA  can  be  summarized  as  too  many 
jobs  and  too  many  masters.
\ 
Two  areas  of  conflict  are:  apparent.   In  addition  lo  his 
administrative  responsibilities  as  the  Director  of  a  Defense 
Aqency,  the  Director  of  DIA  i;uist  providi*  the  staff  assistance 
on  intelligence  matters  to  the  Secretary  of  Defense  and  must 
also  provide  the  staff  assistance  on  intelligence  matters  to 
the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff.   On  many  intelligence  issues,  partic- 
ularly procedural  issues  with  jurisdictional  implications,  the 
positions  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense  and  the  Joint  Chiefs  of 
Staff  can  be  and  often  are  diverse.   As  staff  officer  and  advisor 
to  both,  the  Director  of  DIA  finds  himself  in  an  impossible 
position.   The  result  can  be  delays  in  staff  work  that  in  turn 
result  in  unresolved  issues  of  significant  moment. 
The 
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While  the  DIA  was  established  primarily  to  consolidate  the, 
intelligence  activities  at  Washington  level,  each  Military  Depart- 
ment currently  has  a  larger  intelligence  staff  than  it  had  before 
the  creation  of  DIA.   Each  departmental  staff  is  still  engaged  in
a  c:  i.  i 
I  i  o  n 
f  1  i  1  i 
DIA 
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p  o  r  f 
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the  Air 
learly  assigned  to  DIA  such  as  i  n  to  I  I  i  yence  produc- 
ncj  the  preparation  of  current:  i  n  to  1  I  i  yence  .   'i  ho 
artments  justify  these  activities  on  the  basis  that 
have  the  capability  to  provide  the  intelligence  they 
in  teres  tituj  that  DIA  cannot  develop  a  capability  to 
ass iy nod  functions,  while  the  Military  Departments, 
t:    a  la  rye  proportion  of  DIA  personnel,  maintain  the 
ability  and  continue  to  perform  the  functions.   A 
t  is  the  capability  to  produce  intelligence  estimates 
perly,  threat  assessments),  which  are  crucial  to 
weapons  systems  research  and  development.   DIA  is 
the  responsibility,  but  has  never  been  structured 
it.   The  Military  Departments  produce  such  estimates 
Force,  at  least,  intends  to  enlarge  its  capability. 
1.  The  Intelligence  Process 
The  intelligence  process  can  generally  be  considered 
as  consisting  of  five  functions:   requirements,  col  1 ection ,  .proc- 
essing, production  and  dissemination.   There  is  now  no  effective 
mechanism  to  effect  a  proper  balance  in  the  allocation  of  resources 
between  these  various  functions.   There  is  some  evidence  that  much 
more  information  is  being  collected  than  can  be  processed,  and 
unquestionably,  more  can  be  processed  than  can  be  used  in  pro- 
duction. 
a •  Requi  reme nts 
UiH  was  aire lli'u  lo  ibbue  yuiuance  c.i  lu  puiii.it:;>,  piuLtiuuieb, 
format  and  priorities  of  intelligence  requirements  to  achieve 
standardization  of  requirements  processing  throughout  DOD.   Requi) 
merits  flow  would  follow  command  channels  to  DIA  for  validation  an< 
for  levy.   This  action  was  the  basis  for  establishing  layers  of"-
review.        f  n    a    message    of    March    196?,     f  roi::    the    JCS    to     the 
Commanders    of    the    Unified    and    Specified    Contina  nds  ,    that    body 
clearly    pointed    out    that    the    channel     for    requi  remen  ts    is    between 
DIA,    acting    for    the    JCS,    and    the    Unified    and    Specified    Co  if:  ma  nders ; 
and    in    turn    from    the    Unified    and    Specified    Comma  nders    to    their 
components.       The    original     intent    of    these    actions    was    to    take 
the?    staffs    and    activities    from    the    component    commands    and    move 
them    one    echelon    higher,    hut    this    did    not    happen,    since    the 
Military    Department    Headquarters    were    still    authorized    direct 
access    to    the    component   commands. 
Throughout    the    1960s,    the    various    inte 
elements    of    the   Military   Departments    complained    about 
inordinate    time    it    takes    for    a    requirement    to    be    vali 
DIA.      The   complaints    are  well-founded.      The    various    1 
review   consume    time;    the  mere   courier    forwarding    and 
tive    handling   within    each    organization    adds    to    the   de 
tionally,    DIA  was    given    the    responsibility   to    insure 
ments   were    not   duplicative,    that   sufficient   research 
done    to    establish    that    the    information   was    not    in   exi 
the    files    of    DIA,    or   other    intelligence    files    within 
gence    community,    prior    to    levying   a    specific   collect! 
tnent.       If    the    requirement    had    to    be    levied   on    a    natio 
up    to    six   months   might   pass    before    DIA  was    notified    o 
ance    of    that    requirement   by    that    national    agency.      Th 
has    now   been    reduced    to   an   average   of   about   one   month 
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usation  that 
slow,  and 
rements , 
ui  rements - 
The  requirements  process  is  slow,  cumbersome  and 
unwieldy.  It  functions  almost  entirely  within  the  intelligence- 
community  and  is  fraught  with  an  unyielding  sense  of  sovereignty
The  Military  Departments  own,  manage  and  operate 
almost  all  general  Defense  intelligence  collection  resources 
except  the  Defense  Attaches,  who  are  assigned  from  the  Services 
md  managed  by  DIA.   The  Departments  have  developed  different 
organizational  structures  for  controlling  intelligence  collection; 
however,  they  have  two  very  important  points  in  common:  the  senior 
intelligence  officer  of  the  Departmental  Headquarters  hr~      
degree  of  operational  control;  and  the  intelligence  uni 
has  some 
ts  are 
structured  in  a  common  chain  separate  from  the  operational  command 
structure. 
The  Army  has  established  the  U.S.  Army  Intelligence 
Command  (USAINTC)  to  discharge  some  of  the  Army's  intelligence 
responsibilities  including  all  collection,  other  than  that  per- 
formed by  the  Army  Security  Agency.   While  USAINTC  is  a  major 
command  reporting  directly  to  the  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Army, 
the  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  Intelligence,  maintains  direct 
operational  control  of  some  of  its  more  sensitive  elements. 
The  Navy  has  all  of  its  general  defense  intelli- 
gence resources  in  the  Naval  Intelligence  Command  (NIC).   The 
Assistant  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  (Intelligence)  is  also  the 
Commander,  NIC. 
The  Air  Force  has  retained  the  control  of  non- 
technical sensor  intelligence  collection  in  the  Departmental 
Staff.   A  world-wide  human  collection  effort  is  controlled  by 
the  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  Intelligence,  while  all  the 
resources  for  counterintelligence  and  investigations  are  assigned 
to  the  Inspector  General. 
There  is  no  effective  mechanism  for  the  allocation 
of  collection  resources  to  assure  that  needed  information  is    ^ 
collected  in  the  most  economical  manner,  consistent  with  the 
urgency  of  the  need.
The    Defense    A  to  mi  c  ,  Suppo  r  t    Agency    is    the    only 
Defense    Agency,    other    than    D  I A  ,    with    a    stilted    intelligence 
mission,    with    the    responsibility    for    the    counter-  i  n  tel  1  i  gence 
and    security    mission    associated    with    the    physical    security    of 
nucl ear   weapons  . 
( 1  )    LQJliPJJJi?J.---^-^MJl.lly_Jjl^-?iii-i9iLl.iiLDl 
particular  type 
elements  of  the 
Command;  the  Ai 
the  Naval  Inves 
are  controlled 
They  perform  th 
civilian  person 
rata  share  of  c 
elements  of  the 
Departments.  T 
background  inve 
Personnel  security  investigations  are  a 
of  collection  performed  by  the  investigative 
Military  Departments:  The  Army  Intelligence 
r  Force  Office  of  Special  Investigations;  and 
tigative  Service.   All  background  investigations 
by  these  organizations  at  headquarters  level, 
e  background  investigations  for  all  military  and 
nel  of  their  respective  departments  and  a  pro 
ivilians  assigned  to  the  various  agencies  and 
Department  of  Defense  not  in  one  of  the  Military 
hey  participate  by  quota  in  industrial  security 
s  tigati  ens  . 
The  purpose  of  a  personnel  security  investi- 
gation is  to  establish  that  the  individual  is  responsible,  loyal 
and  trustworthy.   These  investigations  can  generally  be  considered 
in  three  categories: 
a.  A  National  Agency  Check  (MAC)  is  required 
for  granting  access  to  SECRET  defense  information.   In  addition, 
a  final  TOP  SECRET  clearance  may  be  granted  to  Air  Force  and 
Navy  military  personnel  based  upon  an  MAC  which  has  been  made 
any  time  during  the  previous  15  years,  provided  that  the  individ- 
ual has  been  in  continuous  government  service  or  on  active  duty 
during  the  past  15  years  with  no  break  in  service  in  excess  of 
six  months.   An  MAC  includes  a  check  of  the  criminal  and  subver- 
sive files  of  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  and,  as  appro- 
priate, the  files  of  the  Military  Departments,  the  Civil  Service 
Commission,  Immigration  and  Naturalization  Service,  the  House 
Internal  Security  Committee  and  others. 
b.  A  Background 
-ed  for  granting  a 
Investigation  (BI)  is 
required  for  granting  a  TOP  SECRET  clearance  to  Defense  D( 
ment  civilians,  Army  personnel  on  active  duty  and  Navy  ant 
Force  personnel  who  do  not  meet  the  criteria  in  a  above. 
BI  is  a  "thorough  inquiry"  covering  the  individual's  life 
A 
during-
the  It!  st.  IS-  yours  or  since  the  1  HI  h  birthday,  v:h  i  c'r.o  ver  is 
shorter.   It  includes  verification  of  dote  and  place  of  birth, 
c  i  t  i  7!Mis!i  i  p  ,  education,  employment,  military  service,  foreign 
iiMVcl  ,  foreign  connections,  character  reference?;,  and  a 
fl a  l i  o n a  1  Age n cy  C h e c k  . 
c.  An  Expanded  Background  Investigation 
(TBI)  is  a  prerequisite  to  granting  access  to  special  intelli- 
gence, conipa  rtmented  intelligence  and  for  assignment  to  an 
U  L  r  a  Sensitive  Position.   Only  U.S.  citizens  are  eligible  for 
these  accesses,  and  reinvestigation  is  mandatory  at  least  every 
five  years.   An  EBI  includes  an  NAC,  not  over  12  months  old, 
and  a  BI.   In  addition,  the  individual's  immediate  family, 
including  spouse  and  former  spouse(s)  are  checked  with  FBI 
files.   Passport  Office  and  CIA  files  are  checked  if  the  individ- 
ual has  traveled  outside  the  US  for  pleasure  or  for  non-US 
Government-sponsored  trips.   Verification  of  citizenship  is  made 
on  members  of  the  individual's  immediate  family.   A  credit  check 
is  made  on  the  individual  at  each  place  of  residence  of  more 
than  six  months.   Neighborhood  investigations  are  conducted  to 
verify  the  current  residence  and  at  each  of  the  former  residences 
where  the  individual  resided  for  six  months  or  more.   Court 
records  are  reviewed  if  the  individual  was  divorced  or  legally  * 
separated  to  ascertain  any  financial  obligations  prescribed  by 
the  courts. 
of  th 
as  in 
the  i 
requi 
NAC  w 
accep 
nei  gh 
ducte 
i  nf  or 
i  nves 
check 
Air  F 
e  Mi 
di  ca 
nves 
re  a 
i  tho 
tan 
borh 
d  "w 
m  a  t  i 
tiga 
of 
orce 
1 i  tary  De 
ted  above 
ti  gations 
n  NAC  as 
ut  refere 
NAC  if  i 
ood  inves 
hen  deeme 
on .  Air 
tions  nor 
court  rec 
do  n < ■•■  t  r 
In 
p  a  r  t 
,  th 
are 
a  pa 
nee 
t  is 
tiga 
d  ne 
Fore 
ere 
o  rds 
equi 
a  d  d  i  t  i  o 
ments  fo 
ere  arc 
done . 
r t  of  a 
to  previ 
less  th 
tions  an 
c  e  s  s  a  ry " 
e  regul  a 
d  i  t  r  e  c  o 
if  the 
re  this 
n  to  the  d 
r  granting 
variations 
For  ins  tan 
BI .  The  A 
ous  NACs. 
an  two  yea 
d  credit  r 
to  prove 
tions  do  n 
rd  reviews 
individual 
check. 
i  f  feri 
secur 
i  n  th 
ce ,  al 
rny  an 
The  A 
r  s  old 
ecord 
or  di  s 
ot  men 
.   The 
is  di 
n  g  r  e  q  u 
i  ty  cl  e 
e  m  a  n  n  e 
1  Depar 
d  Navy 
i  r  Fore 
Army 
reviews 
prove  d 
t  i  o  n  n  e 
Army  r 
vorced . 
I  remer.  ts 
arances 
r  in  which 
trnents 
require  an 
e  will 
and  Navy 
are  con- 
erogatory 
ighborhood 
e  q  u  i  r  e  s  a 
Navy  and 
The  Army  and  Air  Force  grant  access  to 
cryptographic  materials  based  on  a  BI,  while  the  Navy  requires 
an  EBl'.
The:    regulations    of    each    of    the    Military 
Departments    make    reference    to    accepting    the    validity    of    previous 
investigations    completed    by    any    agency    of    the    federal    Government 
which    meet    the    mini  mum    investigative    requirements    or    that    partic- 
ular   Department.       For    all    practical    purposes,    the    Departments 
interpret    this    narrowly   and    usually   do    not   accept    the    investiga- 
tions   of    another    Department    as    meeting    their    standards. 
c .    Process i  ng 
Most  raw  intelligence  information  must  be  processed 
in  some  way  to  put  it  in  a  form  suitable  for  use  by  a  production 
analyst.   Each  type  of  information  requires  its  own  processinq; 
e.g.,  captured  documents  are  translated  or  SIGINT  is  processed 
by  MSA. 
The  Director,  Central  Intelligence  (DCI)  provide* 
as  a  service  of  common  interest  within  the  community  the  National 
Photographic  Interpretation  Center  (NPTC)  (C).   The  Director, 
NPIC  (C),  is  appointed  by  the  DCI  and  the  member  departments  and 
agencies  of  the  United  States  Intelligence  Board  furnish  personnel 
and  support  as  required. I  i 
d .  Producti  on 
The  intelligence  production  activities  of  the  DOD 
can  be  classified  into  four  major  groups:  Current  Intelligence; 
Scientific  and  Technical  Intelligence;  Mapping,  Charting  and 
Geodesy  (MC&G),  and  general  intelligence  production. 
The  March  1962  memoranda  from  the  OCS  to  DIA  and 
the  Commanders  of  the  Unified  and  Specified  Commands  mentioned 
previously  also  directed  that  the  Unified  and  Specified  Commands 
establish  and/or  operate  activities,  except  for  activities  under 
Service  cryptologic  agencies,  to  perform  intelligence  functions 
of  common  interest.   This  was  amplified  and  specified  in  July 
1962  by  JCS  memorandum  to  establish  a  current  intelligence/indica- 
tions function;  intelligence  production  including  estimates  func- 
tion; and  target  intelligence  function.
The!  t  war-,  clone 
It  should  bo  no  tod  <: 
Departments  had  not  yet  transferred 
produc  t.  i  on  el  omen  ts  . 
March 
to  the 
f unc  t  i  on 
lished  D 
Defense 
area  ana 
target  i 
DOD  comp 
that  the 
gence . 
this  point  that  the  Military 
to  [J  I A  their  intelligence 
i  n  J  a  n  u  a  ry  ,  Fe  b  r  u  a  ry    a  n  d 
By  1966,  DIA  acknowledged  the  realities  of  the 
situation  by  issuing  the  Defense  Intelligence  Plan  which  had 
been  extensively  coordinated  with  the  Military  Departments"  and 
the  Unified  and  Specified  Commands.   The  purpose  of  the  Plan 
was  to  provide  the  basis  for  integrated  planning,  programming 
and  management  of  Defense  intelligence.   It  delineated  the 
intelligence  responsibilities  and  relationships  of  Department 
of  Defense  components  and  instituted  a  Department-wide  system 
for  review  and  analysis  of  intelligence  operations  to  facilitate 
mutual  support  and  eliminate  wasteful  duplication.   One  of  the 
principles  which  this  Plan  spelled  out  was  that  "intelligence 
produced  at  higher  echelons  must  be  supplemented  by  local  pro- 
duction at  lower  echelons  in  order  to  satisfy  particular  command 
requirements."   The  Plan  further  acknowledged  that  "some  degree 
of  parallel  and  overlapping  effort  is  normal  and  necessary."   The 
primary  role  of  DIA  thus  shifted  from  the  production  of  al 1  Defens 
intelligence  to  the  production  of  some  strategic  or  that  intelli- 
gence used  at  the  JCS/OSD/national  level.   The  members  of  the 
JCS,  as  chiefs  of  service,  still  maintain  current  intelligence 
and  estimates  capabilities  on  their  respective  staffs  to  support 
their  positions  vis-a-vis  those  of  DIA. 
It  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  these  actions 
were  the  result  of  extensive  negotiations  with  the  Military 
Departments  and  the  Unified  and  Specified  Commands  including 
component  commands.   DIA  has  no  directive  authority  over  military 
intelligence  activities,  but  only  review,  coordination,  supervisor 
and  a  nebulous  management  authority.   But  more  and  more,  DIA  has 
been  pushed  into  a  management  role  by  those  very  elements  which 
maintain  that  DIA  is  incapable  of  producing  intelligence  to  meet 
their  needs.
Each  of  the  Military  Department';  has  continued 
to  strengthen  the  capability  of  its  staff  to  produce  general 
and  current  intelligence  and  to  supervise  the  production  of 
S.-.T  intelligence  and  mapping,  charting  and  geodesy  (MC&G) 
activi  ties. 
Each  Department  has  a  large  organization  devoted 
primarily  to  MC&G  activities:  The  Army  Topographic  Command  of 
the  Corps  of  Engineers;  The  Naval  Oceanographi c  Office  under 
the  Oceanographer  of  the  Navy;  and  The  Aeronautical  Chart  and 
Information  Center  reporting  to  the  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Air 
Force . 
DIA  attempts  to  coordinate  these  activities  to 
eliminate  duplication  and  set  priorities  for  production.   However, 
DIA  coordinates  through  the  intelligence  elements  of  the  Depart- 
mental staffs,  and  only  in  the  Air  Force  is  the  MC&G  agency 
within  the  staff  purview  of  the  intelligence  staff.   The  Army 
and  Navy  MC&G  elements  are  in  agencies  which  are  not  a  part  of 
the  intelligence  community. 
There  appears  to  be  great  potential  for  savings 
of  personnel  and  expensive  equipment  by  consolidating  these 
three  agencies  into  one  Defense  Map  Service  with  a  single  command 
staff . 
Each  of  the  Military  Departments  produces  S&T 
intelligence.   The  Army  has  two  S&T  production  agencies;  both 
subordinate  to  the  Army  Materiel  Command:  The  Foreign  Science 
and  Technology  Center  reporting  to  the  staff  of  the  Army 
Materiel  Command  Headquarters;  and  the  Missile  Intelligence 
Directorate,  an  element  of  the  Army  Missile  Command.   The  Air 
Force  S&T  intelligence  production  agency  is  the  Foreign  Tech- 
nology Division  of  the  Air  Force  Systems  Command.   The  Naval 
Scientific  and  Technical  Intelligence  Center  is  an  element  of 
the  MIC. 
Both  the  Army  and  Air  Force  agencies  are  an 
integral  part  of  the  research  and  development  community  and 
their  efforts  are  substantially  augmented  from  research  and 
development  funds. 
DIA  has  tasking  authority  over  each  of  the  Centers 
and  assigns  the  specific  production  tasks  to  be  accomplished  with 
a  specified  scope  and  format.  The  large  majority  of  the  require- 
ments for  S&T  intelligence  production  arise  i  v>    the  research  and
do  vi"  I  (ipiiicn  t  laboratories  of  the  Services.   DIA  reviews  the 
inclividii.il  requirements  arid  generalizes  them  so  that,  many 
requirements  will  be  satisfied  by  one  general  product.   The 
format  and  scope  of  the  product  is  aimed  primarily  at  the 
Departmental  or  major  command  staff  planners.   As  a  consequence, 
it  appears  that  S&T  intelligence  products  do  not  satisfy  the 
requirements  of  the  scientists  in  the  research  and  development 
laboratories,  have  no  relevance  to  the  managers  at  OSD  level, 
and  are  generally  not  used  by  Departmental  and  major  command 
staff  planners. 
Threat  assessments  are  a  type  of  intelligence 
product  that  are  based  on  S&T  intelligence  but  are  usually 
prepared  by  an  agency  other  than  an  SST  intelligence  producer. 
Any  recommendation  or  decision  to  develop  or  produce  a  weapon 
or  weapons  system  should  include  consideration  of  the  enemy 
threat  in  the  time  period  when  the  weapons  or  weapons  systems 
will  be  operational.   Such  recommendations  and  decisions  are 
made  in  the  Services  and  OSD. 
threat 
DDR&E  has  established  his  own  group 
assessments  for  use  at  the  OSD  level. 
prepare 
There  is  always  a  danger  that  intelligence  will 
be  misused  when  an  organization  prepares  the  intelligence  assess- 
ments that  provide  a  basis  for  its  operating  decisions. 
e .  Pi  ss emi  nation 
The  DIA,  on  a  daily  basis,  disseminates  reports 
to  elements  of  the  DOD  intelligence  community  based  on  requests 
from  the  individual  elements.   Dissemination  of  a  general  nature 
is  based  on  statements  of  intelligence  needs  compiled  by  the 
Military  Departments  and  the  Unified  and  Specified  Commands. 
Bulk  copies  are  shipped  to  the  Military  Departments  who  further,^ 
disseminate  them  to  their  subordinate  elements  and  component 
commands  of  the  Unified  Commands.   For  those  products  not  pro- 
duced by  DIA,  dissemination  lists  are  compiled  by  DIA  and  furnished 
to  the  producing  organization  for  direct  dissemination.
f  .  f  v  ii_l  u  a  t  i  o  n 
There  is  one  other  function  "which  should  be 
associated  with  the  i  n  to  1 1  i  go  nee  process:  evaluation.   Dis- 
cussions with  users  and  potential  users  of  intelligence  seem 
to  indicate  that  only  a  small  proportion  of  the  intell  icjerr.e 
produced  is  useful.   Many  individuals  who  arc    familiar  wit;. 
the  Defense  intelligence  community  are  critical  of  its  opera- 
tion.  Responsible  witnesses  have  told  our  sub-committee  that: 
(1)  The  Defense  intelligence  community  does  not 
have  an  effective  mechanism  for  accomplishing  the  selective 
validation  of  requirements  for  intelligence  collection  or 
production ; 
(2)  More  intelligence  information  is  collected 
than  can  ever  be  processed  or  used,  much  of  it  is  collected 
because  the  sensor  represents  an  advance  in  technology  without 
regard  to  the  need  for  the  information; 
(3)  The  human  collection  activities  of  the 
Services  add  little  or  nothing  to  the  national  capability; 
(4)  Defense  attaches  do  more  harm  than  good; 
(5)  The  intelligence  production  analysts  are 
not  competent  to  produce  a  sound,  useful  product;  and 
(6)  Once  produced,  the  product  seldom  reaches 
the  individuals  who  need  it. 
None  of  these  allegations  can  be  either  proved 
or  disproved  today,  because  there  is  no  substantial  effort  or 
procedure  to  systematically  evaluate  the  intelligence  process 
in  the  Defense  intelligence  community  or  its  substantive 
output. 
D  •  Special  Programs 
From  time  to  time,  special  programs  are  established  to 
manage  the  development  of  some  new  collection  resource  or 
capability.   Such  developments  are  usually  expensive  and  involve 
some  degree  of  cooperation  with  some  other  agency  of  Government. 
A  program  of  this  type  is  often  designated  as  a  "National  Program" 
and  the  Secretary  of  Defense  is  designated  Executive  Agent  for^ 
the  Government.   As  a  consequence,  the  responsibility  for  such  a 
program  tends  to  be  placed  at  a  relatively  high  level  in  the
Heackjua  r  ters    of 
the    Secretary    o 
such    programs    a 
funds    to    them. 
ex i  s  tence    o f    th 
the    p r o rj r a m    to 
Secretary    of    De 
sees    any    ambigu 
are   w as  ted    in    d 
representative 
this    type    of    pa 
that    permeates 
program   which   w 
either    ignorant 
the    communi  ty    o 
one  of  the  Military  Depa 
f  Defense  has  established 
n d    a c! v  i  s e    hi  in    wit h    r e g a r d 
Some  program  managers  at 
is  committee  and  the  "Nat 
avoid  reporting  to  the  AS 
fense  nor  the  head  of  the 
i ty  in  the  reporting  line 
abate  and  the  task  of  the 
is  made  more  difficult, 
rochial  tactic  is  that  it 
the  entire  staff  of  the  p 
as    surveyed    for    the    Panel 
of  their  responsi bi 1 i tie 
r   deliberately    misleading 
r  tmen  ts  .       In    addition, 
a    committee    to    review 
to    the    allocation    of 
tempt    to    use    the 
ional"    designation    of 
D(A).       Neither    the 
cooperating    agency 
s,    but   many   ma nh ours 
Secretary's    senior 
Another   effect    of 
establishes    a    fiction 
rogram.       In   one    particular 
,    the    Program    staff   was 
s   and    relationships    in 
in    their   statements. 
A   different    type    of   problem   also    exists   with    programs    of 
this    sort.       Since    they    are    predominantly   concerned   v/ith    the 
development    of    a    new    capability,    the   management   of    the    program 
is    usually    assigned    to    a   development    agency.      This    is    necessary 
and    proper   for    the    development   of    the    capability;    however,    it 
does    not    appear    necessary    that    the   output   of    the    new    capability 
also    be   managed    by    the    development   agency.      Proper    safeguards 
can    be    established    to    permit    wider    exploitation    of    the    product 
on    a    more    timely    basis    than    at    present. 
E .    Tactical    I ntel 1 i  g ence 
All    of    the    intelligence    effort   discussed    to    this    point 
is    called    "strategic"    or    "national"    intelligence.      It    is    the 
intelligence    needed    for    planning    and    making    decisions    at    the 
top    levels    of    the    Department    of    Defense    as    distinguished    from 
"tactical"    intelligence   which    is    needed    by    the    field    commander 
for    use    in    combat.       In    large    part,    the    resources    required    to 
collect    and    process    the    raw    intelligence    information    are    identical 
for    both    strategic    and    tactical    intelligence.      However,    "tactical" 
intellience    resources    are    not    specifically    identified    as    such    in 
the    programming    process    and    arc    not    reviewed    or   funded    in    an 
intelligence    program. 
The    Military    Departments,     in    fulfilling    their    responsibility 
to    develop    and    support    intelligence    systems    organic    to    combat 
forces,    can    develop    a    significant    intelligence    capability    thatv 
is    managed    external     to    the    intelligence    community.      For    example"; 
the    Air    Force    440L    system   was    developed    to    provide   early   warning
of  an  impending  at  Lack  against  the  United  Sidles,  however 
the  sensor  system  h<is  the  ca  >>al>  i  1  i  ty  to  collect  uu-.ny    other 
types  of  intelligence  information,  but  the;  full  capability 
is  no  t  ex  pi  o  i  tec! . 
The  001)  cannot  afford  to  develop  exoer.sive  resources 
exclusively  for  "strategic"  or  "tactical'"  intelligence  purposes 
nor  to  develop  extensive  duplicate  resources  for  both    The 
development  and  operation  of  intelligence  resources  must  be 
managed  so  that  both  types  of  requirements  are  satisfied  at 
the  minimum  cost.   The  relative  priorities  of  strategic  and 
tactical  needs  tend  to  permit  minimum  costs  with  good  manage- 
ment. 
There  is  a  continuum  between  peace  and  general  war  through 
which  the  priority  needs  for  intelligence  tend  to  shift  from 
primarily  strategic  to  primarily  tactical.   The  same  resources 
can  be  used  to  satisfy  both  needs  by  adjusting  the  application 
of  resources  to  the  changing  priority. 
In  time  of  peace  or  cold  war,  the  priority  is  for  the  most 
timely  and  accurate  intelligence  at  the  national  (Was  hi  no  ton) 
level  to  provide  a  basis  for  the  best  policy  and  guidance  decisions 
The  field  commander  should  want  this  to  be  the  case  to  insure 
that  policy  decisions  affecting  the  force  structure  he  might 
have  to  fight  with  were  the  best.  In  this  period  of  cold  war, 
his  principal  intelligence  need  is  continuity  on  strengths  and 
positions  of  forces  which  might  engage  him  if  fighting  erupts. 
In  time  of  limited  warfare,  a  localized  force  commander 
must  have  the  best  intelligence  to  conduct  his  operations  and 
the  national  level  needs  timely  intelligence  to  formulate  national 
policy,  insure  the  fighting  commander  sufficient  forces,  and  best 
deploy  the  remaining  forces  to  meet  other  commitments. 
In  "time  of  general  war  the  priority  is  to  provide  the  fighting 
force  commander  with  the  intelligence  needed  to  prosecute  the  war; 
relatively  less  emphasis  is  placed  on  long-range  policy  decisions! 
The  intelligence  resources  integral  to  the  combatant  forces 
must  be  programmed,  developed  and  operated  as  a  part  of  the  Defense 
intelligence  community.   At  the  same  time,  it  is  necessary  to  manage 
and  operate  these  resources  in  a  way  that  assures  that  commanders 
at  all  levels  have  appropriate  access  to  intelligence  information 
they  need  without  regard  to  the  location  or  control  of  the  sensors.
Y  .    Co  in  p  a_r  t  m  e  n  t  e  d  _  IjiU; ;T_l_j_rj_ en_ce 
There  is  a  recognized  need  to  limit  access  to  extremely 
sensitive  intelligence  materials  because  their  disclosure  or 
even  knowledge  of  their  existence  could  cause  the  source  to  be 
denied,  lives  to  be  in  peril,  or  political  repercussions  that 
could  jeopardize  a  U.S.  position.   The  National  Security  Act  of 
1947,  as  amended, states  :   "The  Director  of  Central  Intelligence 
shall  be  responsible  for  protecting  intelligence  sources  and 
methods  from  unauthorized  disclosure." 
44  (Rev)
We  now  find  technical  i  nf  ormation ,  collection  and  processing 
operations  and  product  which  contain  information  that  is  pr^s-^cied 
by  more  than  one  of  the  systems. 
need 
It 
to- 
is  necessary,  therefore,  for  the  user  to  demonstrate  a 
know  and  be  authorized  access  under  each  of  the  compart 
mented  areas  which  affect  control  of  a  particular  document. 
Investigative  requirements  and  criteria  for  granting  access 
to  all  compartmented  areas  under  the  cognizance  of  the  DCI  are 
formalized  in  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  Directive  No.  1/14 
However,  access  is  actually  granted  by  the  manager  of  the  compart' 
mented  system. 
Since  each  of  the  major  compartmented  systems  is  managed  by 
a  different  organization  which  jealously  guards  its  prerogatives 
to  control  access  to  its  information,  many  potential  users  have 
difficulty  in  determining  that  useful  information  is  available 
and  more  difficulty  in  getting  the  multiple  access  required.
R o c  cm : i i : i _e  n d_a_ t  j  ojts 
The  Panel  recommends  that  the  Defense  intelligence 
community  be  restructured  to  provide  a    better  management 
structure  and    to  assure  the  provision  of  intelligence,  es 
required,  to  the  President,  other  consumers  at  the  national 
level  and  to  aid  levels  of  the  Department  from  the  Secretary 
of  Defense  to  operating  units  in  the  field.   The  new  intelli- 
gence structure  should 
a  single  individual  in  the  Office  or 
the  Secretary  of  Defense  who  is  the  clearly  designated  repre- 
sentative of  the  Secretary  of  Defense  to  other  Departments  and 
Agencies  of  Government  for  intelligence  matters  and  who  is 
responsible  to  coordinate  or  direct  all  intelligence  activities 
within  the  Department. 
4.  Provide  flexibility  for  timely  development  and 
distribution  of  limited,  costly  resources,  both  trained  per- 
sonnel and  equipments,  to  meet  changing  priorities. 
5.  Provide  the  proper  environment  to  develop  an 
effective  and  efficient  professional  intelligence  career 
service  for  both  military  and  civilian  personnel. 
Specifically,  it  is  recommended  that  the  Secretary  of 
Defense : 
7.  Vcsla  natz   t'nz   Vnpaty   Szcfictafiy    £ott   Opzf- attend    to 
bz    his    agznt    ^oh.    all    mattzfts    fizlatinc\    to    intzlligzncz ,    to 
i.ncludz    tkz    au.tkofii.iij   to    designate,   those    activities    to    he  con- 
sidzfizd   intzlligzncz   activities  . 
*  *  *  i  -r  *  * 
*>*:H*****t***J»*:ji***-ji**>***'jfii*'>**<*y#**^l<*'?fJ**'f**'i
2.     Establish    uik.'v'A     the.    Deputy    Secret  a.-nj    &or    Operations 
an    AiS'lifacf.    Secretary    <;,<    Oe&cnse    <r-\     hit  el'ti  g  once.     (AS('MI)l 
with     (he    additional"    title    o  a    Virecion    of,    Vef.e.nse    Intelligence 
(001).       The    ASV(l)/i)Dl    wuuHd    be    date  gated    the   tiesponiilU  C  >.ty 
to    re.presen  t   the.   Se.crctamj   c  &    Defense   with    allien   departments 
and    Agencies    o  &    Gov  zA.nme.nt    ^or    I  ntelligence    matters    and    to 
coordinate,    oh.   direct   all   VOV    intelligence,   activities ,    Including 
national    programs   which    are.   managed   in   the.   department ,    in 
accordance   with    cx.iti.ing    law   and   applicable.   National   Security 
Council   and   director    of  Central.    Intelligence  Virective6.      Among 
his    specific  responsibilities ,    the  ASV(T)/V01   would: 
a.  Se.rve   as   the.  defense  representative,   on  the. 
United   States    Intelligence.   Board,    and   appoint,    with   approval 
o&    the  deputy  Secretary   &or  Operations ,    representatives   to 
other   Qovzn.nm2.nt-ioi.de.   intelligence   committees    and   boards. 
b.  Direct  and   control  all  VOV  intelligence 
activities    not  specifically  designated   by  the  deputy  Secretary 
^or   Operations    as    organic  to   combatant   forces. 
c.  Have  the  authority  to   delegate  operation   o  {, 
any   oq   these  activities   which   he   deems    necessary  to   assure 
max  Imam   exploitation   o &   VOV  resources. 
d.  Review  all   proposed  intelligence  programs, 
monitor   and    evaluate    all   on-going    Intelligence   activities    and 
make   recommendations    to   the  deputy  Secretary   ior  Operations 
with  regard  to   allocation   o &   resources . 
e.  Establish   procedures    to   review  and   validate 
requirements    ^or  intelligence   production  and   collection  and 
evaluate  the   product  against   the  requirement. 
j$.    Establish   procedures    ior   and   periodically 
conduct  a  systematic   evaluation   oi   the  Intelligence   process 
In   the   Velense  Intelligence    community .      This    evaluation   should 
Include  an   assessment   oi   the   utility   o£   the  intelligence  pro- 
ducts   provided  to    consumers    outside   the  Ve&cnse  intelligence 
community . 
4  7
c  (  .     Review    and    c.cj  !!■'■  c  •('<•.'■:'.  C  c    ?i  i-  qt>  i  ■';■;•>-,?.;■'  ■!>     fior. 
-v;i\C(?U''i    <<i!(/    dcvel  opi.\ev.(     (i:    iuj.'iHi.';?     >-,<     {  i;  <' c  ('.  <"'f; '.'.;:  c  ;-    c  c  <'  ^'  u  c.  •' '/'  c  -.'.  . 
h  .     Oc.i't'uiji    fu;  (' <  r  (  c -.s    a.'.d    jj<';  oc."i'" '';<'■.  \     ?c    -tn-Wi  .*;.;?. 
-t.fic    p'to.f  c.cY  (  oi:    o  ;,    -en  '  c.r  Ctfjciir  c    awe/   c  •>    tn  ( eJJ^ig  cnc<:__\c.usu^Q*s-~~-~^ 
and    we  f.'ii'u's     ,v'i.om    iniiui  ' ho  til  7  ed    di  s  r./'c  .'•  da-  (•  .  /  | 
qje^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^*^^^^^^^^^*^^**^*^^^^^^^*^^^^^"*^^^^*-^^*^^-^^^ 
^iF^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^'^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^'^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^'^^^^^^^ir:^ 
3.     EAiab^Afi    nude*   ihe    ASP(I)/00I: 
a.    A    Vztznsz   Se.cufi.lt tj   Command    [VSECC]    to    be 
composed   o  &    the.   przs  znt   Service   Crypiologlc   Agencies    and   all 
othe.n.   Dz$znsz  lntelZ.lQ2.ncz   collection   activities.*    except   &o>\ 
those  which    have   been   specifically   designated    by  the   Deputy 
Se.cfizta.tiij    &oti   Operations    as    organic   to    combatant    forces.      The. 
VSECC   should   pzn.kon.rn   those   processing    activities   which    a. tie 
most    evidently   associated   with    collection    facilities  .       k\:\ong 
his    Specific   Sicsponslbllltlzs ,    the    Commander,    VSECC   would, 
undzn   the   direction    c &   the   VVJ: 
(J)    Command   all    those   de.slcynat.zd    Vzfccnsz 
Intelligence    collection   and   associated  processing    and    tLzpc siting 
activities  ,    with   au.tliotii.tij   to    dzlzgc.te.   administrative    mano.ge.me.nt 
oti    operational   control   as    he.   deems    necessary . 
Agency, 
[2]    Serve  as    director,    national   Security
[:'))     lnSu-':e    the    most    judicious    i<< 
C(,i..;,,i(,ii  i-f«iU  elements    lirlu'i'.n:  his    VSLCC    and   N.SA. 
f.    ot 
(4)     'Insane    the    timely   dissemination    c£ 
Intelligence    in honmai i on    to    alt    appnopniate    Vepantncnts  , 
Agencies  ,    Commands    on    ope.no.  ting    unit*. 
(5) Vnepane   the   Pc($eu-se.  Se.cuft.ltij    Program 
(5 o>i  .£fio5e  ac-t-cv/ltce-s  (Jo*  tu.'i-tc.'i  he  -£*  A.e4pou4-c'.b£e.,  and  /tev-tcco  ^ 
an-f  cooi<4.6ia-£c  £fre  p/iogA-ai/i-i  o^  Intelligence   collection   activi- 
ties   organic   to   the.    combatant    honcet,    to   Insure   maximum    explolta- 
tlon   0)5  res oun.ce.-b . 
b.    A  Vehense    lnte.lllge.nce   Pnoductlon   Agency   . 
(PIPA),  to    replace   the.  Vehense    Intelligence  Agency,    whose 
director  would   be  responsible    ion  Vehense   Intelligence   pno- 
ductlon  except   ^on  those  pnoductlon   activities   specifically 
assigned  to   the  combatant   ion.ces    by  the  deputy  Secretary   (.on 
Operations .      Among    his   specific  responsibilities ,  the  director, 
VI  PA  would: 
(7)  Vlnect  those  Intelligence  pnoductlon 
activities   which   have   been  placed  unden  his   purview,    with  the 
authority   to    delegate   administrative   management   or   operational 
control   as    he   deem*  necessary . 
(2j  Provide  cunrent  Intelligence  to   designate^ 
Individuals    and   organizations . 
(3)  Provide  threat  assessments    (.or   all   elemen- 
0(5  POP,  as    required. 
{4)    Provide   finished  Intelligence  to   appro- 
priate  elements    oh   the  department  In  response  to   expressed  needs. 
(5)  Provide  all  VOV  Intelligence   estimates 
and   Inputs    to    national   estimates    as    directed   by   the   VVI . 
(6)  Manage    all   Vehense  Intelligence   produc- 
tion  Inhonmatlon  systems,    Including    those   oh   Ihe   Intelligence 
activities    organic   to   the   combatant    h^rces ,    to   Insure  Inter- 
operability  and   optimized  Intelligence    hl°i0  £°    °-n^    h/L0"'   a^^ 
echelons    oh    VOV.
(7)     I'/iCfja-'ic.    the    Vc  {)C.n.\(_:    '/  a /p.  i'.ti  n  ?.  r.c.:.'. 
J'AOfj-'ttii.'i    (Jc;A    ^/u'i-Sc.    attu'^ic-i    «»(/('..';    -';-<o    di.fi  cc-i ion ,    and    Ktvicw 
and    c.oa'ul  i  n<U  c.    the    p'iua'ia>".6    o  %    in  I  p  •:('-(  op. nee    pKoduc.ti  on    activi- 
ties   o-'ioani  c.    to    coinbaian  t    jJcA-ce-i    -to    -tn^uAe.    Kirtx^'wuri    ex;;(  c^' to.ti.ou 
0  /,    AC  ioii'tcc-S  . 
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****************************************************.*******£* 
4.    Expand   the   Ketponbibititich    0  &    the   Mationat 
Security  Agency  to   inctude  the  pnocet>sing ,    data  babe,   main- 
tenance  and   AepoA.ti.ng    0  £    att  -lntQ.ttlQ2.nc.CL   information   om 
directed   by   the  Wl . 
%  3fr  Sfc  ^^sfr^^sjeiJc^V:  >£  :£  ££:£;£;*::£  ^  ^r^e^^:^:  :£  *:  si  :£  ^  3jt  £  %  %'£  %  i:  *.  *r  ii  m4i  '■£%'+.%'£%%%*.  zfr  %  %%%•£%%%  :j 
*  *  ^  £  £  £  *  
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:.«  £  £  £  *  £  £  £  £  *  £  
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"-r-  "r  £  ^  
'-£  £  '?■*■'*'*%*  ~r>  '*  'r-  %*■'■£%'*'*  "% 
5.    E6tabll6li  within   the   VSECC   a   unified   Defense 
Investigative   Service  fict>pont>ibte    &on.   c'-££-   peti&onnet   hecafiiiy 
investigations    within   the   VOV   and  its    contfiactofis . 
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•i.  *j  r  'r-  '^  ^  %  '?  '■*  Tf  £  *  '■.*■  £  *  ^ 
>.    v    y    >;    7     ^    ^ 
r  ■?  -f   t  ■**■»**  '.«  *  *  *  *  r  *  -r-  *  *  *  * 
6.     Comfj.cuc    the.    Kumij   lope  graphic   Command,    /./it    Ho.va.l 
Oceanoqnaphic   O^icc    and   the.   ketioy.aatical   Chant    and    Incarna- 
tion   Cente.i   into    a   unified   OcjJchac.   Map   Sctivi.ee.   tiepottting   to 
the  Se.c.fLe.tan.y   a  I   detente  >t(i*.oug/i   -t.'ic   Ve.pu.ty  Sc.cne.tamj   o  & 
defense,    [lia.yiage.me.nt    o &    Rctouticct)  . 
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7.    Take  t'ie   ac.Ci.oru    necettatitj    (a)    io    extend   io   the. 
entitle  Vcfientc  JLnte.ttige.yice.  community  the  authotiity  that  the 
National  Se.cun.ity  Agency  ptictently  hat   to   develop  a  ptto{ettional 
can.ee.fi  tetivi.ee,    and    [b)    to    e&tablith  an  intelligence,   catieeti 
tefivice   fiott  military   o&&iceti6 . 
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V