n 
communications  intelligence.   We  do  net  believe  that  these  pcsiticr.s  should 
be  limited  to  civilises,  because  we  are.  impressed  by  the  testimony  given  by 
many  witnesses  as  to  the  importance  cf  familiarizing  the  Service  organi- 
zations in  the  field  with  A? SA  organization  and  operations  by  rotating  officers 
from  AFSA  into  field- positions  and  then  back  again.    Also,  the  long  experience 
of  several  Navy  officers  is_oae_  c:  the  great  assets  of  the  activity  today.   On 
ft 
i 
it 
the  other  hand,  it  would  be  a  major  mistake  to  limit  the  senior  positions  to 
officers,  because  it  is  cf  the  greatest  importance  to  encourage  civilians  to 
make  careers  in  the  "CO-MINT  field  by  clear  demonstration  that  senior 
J  positions  will  be  available  to  them  if  their  talents  merit  promotions. 
' 
We  hive  been  disturbed  by  the  testimony  as  to  the  high  rate  cf  turnover 
&  -i 
among  AFSA  employees.    This  has  been  a  tremendous  handicap  to  the  building  "7 
fer*f;3  up  of  an  efficient  organization,  as  well  as  a  serious  hazard  from  the  point  of 
.j  view  of  security.   One  cause,  emphasized  by  informed  witnesses,  appears  to 
[  
j-        be  that  many  of  the  civilian  employees  believe  that  no  matter  hew  long  they 
-.         work  nor  how  expert  they  become,  the  top  positions  in.  the  divisions  will  gen- 
J  • 
erally  be  filled  by  officer  personnel  cf  less  experience  and  training  than  they. 
H 
—  Another  factor  during  the  past  year  was  undoubtedly  the  decision  (sub- 
"  sequent!/  cancelled)  to  move  the  entire  AFSA  establishment  to  Fort  Knox. 
To  prcduic  CO  MINT  material  requires  as  high  a  professional  skill  as 
any  other  applied  science,  and  perhaps  cryptanalysis  and  intelligence  based 
.-126- 
W 
u 
ta-i^a
3s& 
£§l 
Us 
®1    . 
J 
I 
"I 
J 
n 
n 
ft* 
Q 
Q 
Sr 
:  i 
or.  cryptar.alysis  require  longer,  training  and  experience  than  most 
other  scientific  fields.    The  COMINT  agencies  today  are  in  poor 
position  to  compete  for  the  people  they  need.    They  cannot  offer 
comparable  salaries;  they  cannot  give  the  tangible  rewards»of 
public  service  such  as  the  recognition  of  the  community;  they 
cannot  offer  the  opportunity  to  acquire  a  skill  usajjle  in  private 
life.    We  are  not  only  not  attracting  capable  young  people  in  the 
numbers  that  are  needed,  but  we  are  losing  many  that  we  have  had 
in  the  past.   Apparently  there  are  only  ten  or  fifteen  top  flight 
cryp '.analysts  left  at  Arlington  Hall  out  of  the  much  larger  number 
who  were  in  the  COL1IMT  effort  during  the  War.    In  this  connection, 
none  of  the  so-called  super-grades  has  been  allocated  to  Ax  SA.    Only 
under  the  present  Director  was  application  for  such  grades  made; 
it  is  understood  that  the  pending  application  is  stalled  today  because 
all  authorized  super-grades  have  been  allocated  elsewhere  in  the 
Government. 
The  Committee  cannot  venture  to  prescribe  methods  of  solving 
these  personnel  problems,  except  to  emphasize  what  has  been  said  as 
-127  - 
m  0"
^5*1     ' 
fcg  n 
r^soy 
u 
to 
a» 
i~SS 
n 
1 1 
r 
U" 
D 
a 
D 
a 
LJ£. 
I  n 
to  the  importance  of  making  careers  in  the  Agency  attractive  and 
to  recommend  that  a  study  should  be  made  as  to  the  desirability 
of  increasing  salaries  paid  to  the  key.- individuals.    On  the  military 
side,  a  corresponding  s'v-dy  should  be  initiated  on  the  question  of 
extending  to  the  Army  and  to  the  Air  Force  the  policy  now  in  force 
in  the  Navy  of  making  communications  intelligence  a  career  assign- 
ment, and  of  recognizing  its  importance  by  promotions  to"  general 
or  flag  rank  for  those  who  achieve  success  in  the  field. 
The  Committee  also  adopts  the  recommendation  made  to  it 
by  SCAG  (the- Scientific  Communications  Advisory  Group  referred 
to  more  fully  below)  that  the  Director  should  have  a  civilian  chief 
technical  assistant  who  would  have  under  him  all  research  and 
development"  in  the  crypt  analytic  field. 
-  127a  -
m 
fey 
wm 
.~i 
n 
*  « 
^r- 
This  research  work  requires  the  employment  of  expert  career  men  to  an  even 
greater  extent  than  other  AFSA  departments. 
The  Director  should  provide  for  increased  participation  by  represent- 
atives c:  each  of  the  agencies  eligible  to  receive  COMINT  in  those  offices 
of  AFSA  where  priorities  of  intercept  and  cryptanalysis  are  finally  determined, 
Recommendations  as  to  organization  above  the  AFSA  level 
The  changes  that  should  be  made  in  the  organization  above  the  AFSA  level 
|~y-j  n  present  the  single  most  difficult  question  that  the  Committee  has  encountered. 
g-^  As  has  been  explained  in  detail,  AFSA  is  now  under  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff. 
^  n 
bf*"3  ■-!  The  Joint  Chiefs  as  a.  body  pay  little  direct  attention  to  the  organisation  and 
&0& 
fi'j;* 
?&*- 
^ 
-W^Iaave  itS  su?ervisio?  ^rcost  entirely  to  their  agent,  AFSAC.    Control  of  AFSA 
r-j        is  thus  under  three  bosses  (the  three  Services  represented  in  AFSAC),  whose 
principal  energies    nd  loyalties  are  elsewhere,  and  to  make  matters  worse, 
n  ■       ' 
"V-v  thre^  bosses  who  must  act  by  unanimous  agreement. 
jj  '  The  Committee  believes  that  this  situation  is  highly  undesirable  and  that 
j~|  it  is  "responsible  for  many  of  the  handicaps  under  which  AFSA  is  now  operating. 
^  It  also  means  that  AFSA  has  been,  for  ail  practical  purposes  subject  only  to 
:ary  control  and  policy  guidance.    It  is  true  that  TJ3CI3  exists,  and  that 
&    ^a 
Lj  ■     on  it  there  are  representatives  of  the  State  Department,  CIA,  and  the  FBI,  as 
H       wail  as  of  the  three  Services.   However,  USCIB's  actual  powers,  as  pointed 
n 
-128  - 
n
f-^?^ 
•J 
m  n 
m 
n. 
»N 
out  in  Port  Hi  of  this  Report,  are  exceedingly  limited.  "" 
> 
We  are  more  concerned  over  the  fact  that  the  present  top  level  control 
of  AFSA  is  in  a  three-headed  group,  each  member  of  which  often  has  in  mind 
the  interests  cf  his  own  Servir",  than  by  the  fact  that  the  group  is  military.      "~"  *"• 
Although  if  is  our  opinion  that  the  1949  experiment  whereby  AFSA  was  placed 
under  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  should  be  terminated,  we  would  not  adopt  the  ""* 
plan  urged  en  us  by  some  witnesses  that.  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^  It         __ 
should  be  placed  directly  under  a  civilian  agency,  such  as  the  Central 'intelli- 
gence Agency.   We  reach  this  conclusion  not  so  much  en  the  theory,  that  the  ' 
COMDsT  product  is- more  important  to  the  Services  than  to  the  civilian  agencies    - 
as  because  (1)  the  Services  are  practically  the  sole  collectors  and  trans- 
mitters of  the  raw 'intercepted  material,  and  (2)  the  product  is  used  to  so 
important  an  extent  in  combat  activities  in  time  of  war  as  to  dictate  the  desir- 
ability of  preserving  lines  of  command  through  established  defense  channels. 
We  have  received  no  convincing  evidence  that.it  is  necessary  to  put  AFSA  out- 
side the  Defense  establishment  in  order  to  assure  that  the  needs  of  civilian  _ 
agencies  are  properly  taken  care  cf. 
If  there  were  a  Chief  of  Staff  cf  the  armed  forces  of  the  United  States, 
the  Committee  might  well  have  recommended  placing  AFSA  under  his  juris- 
diction.  But  there  is  no  such  position.   We  also  explored  the  possibility  of 
putting  AFSA  directly  under. .the  Chairman  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff,  but 
-  129  -
rau 
after  discussion  with  the  present  Incumbent  of  that  office,  we  have  been 
convinced  that  the  arrangement  would  not  be  workable. 
We  have  concluded  that  the  problem  should  be  resolved  by  the  issuance 
of  a  Presidential  memorandum  designating  the  Department  of  Defense  as  the    — 
executive  agent  of  the  Government  for  the  production  and  dissemination  of 
COMINT  for  the  benefit  of  the  Services  and  the  civilian  agencies  and  depart- 
ments and  for  the-production,  security  and  distribution  of  our  own  codes  and      " 
cipher  systems.    This  memorandum  should  further  provide  that  the  Department 
of  Deter.se  as  such  executive  agent  will  be  directly  under  and 'responsible  to 
a  Special  Committee." of  the  National  Security  Council  for  COMINT-  which 
Special  Committee  should  consist  cf  the  Secretary  of-  Defense  and  the  Secretary 
of  State,  and  the  President  as  circumstances  may  require.*   The  memorandum 
'.  should  instruct  this-'Special  Committee  to  prepare  and  issue  implementing 
|H   L^        directives  setting  forth:  (1)  the  terms  of  reference  for  the  Secretary,  of  Defense 
^  ..  
i         which  will  provide  that  the  Director  of  AFSA  shall  report  directly  to  him  and 
which  will  define  the  mission  of  AFSA  and  the  specific  responsibilities  of  the 
Director  of  AFSA  as  outlined  in  the  preceding  subsections  of  this  Part  V,  and 
(2)  a  charter  for  a  reorganized  USCI3  (to  which  reorganized  3oard  we  here- 
after refer  for-convenier.ee  as  the  COMINT  Board)  replacing  NSC  ID  No.  9, 
§^S    I   I 
in 
ip  n 
^a  n 
W 
ft  n 
ft*-r 
HU 
Ssi 
ill  v^-in*C,r!r  at  in  conaection  with  matters  pertaining  to  atomic  energy, 
ST-, i;Jtonal  7ecu/x?  Council  operates  through  a  similar  Special  Committee  • 
♦Mr  */7?  <       of.those  raembers.  of  the  NSC  who  have  primary  interest  in 
trn^vT^  SU°leCt*    I;  WCUld  Seem  that  this  Precedent  can  be  satisfac- 
torily loLowed  in  this  case.  . 
-  130  - 
a
n 
H. 
reconstituting  the  Board  as  a  body  actios  for  and  under  the  Special  Committee, 
and  prescribing  the  Board's  cdmposition,  general  functions  and  responsibilities 
in  the  COMINT  field.    This  will  involve  the  abolition  of  AFSAC, 
The  following  principles  should  apply  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  COMIN'T    ~ 
3oard  as  so  reconstituted: 
a.  The  COMDTT  Board  shall  be  composed  of  the  Director  of  Central 
Intelligence,  who  shall  be  the  Chairman  of  the  3oard,  a  representative 
of  the  Secretary  of  Defense,  a  representative  of  the  Secretary  of  State, 
the  Director  or?  the  Armed  Forces  Security  Agency,  the  Chairman  of-     ' 
the  Joint  Intelligence  Committee  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff 'and  a  repre- 
sentative of  the' Director  of  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation. 
b.  The  Board  shall  have  a  staff  headed  by  a  full  time  civilian 
executive  secretary  designated  by  a  majority  of  the  Board. 
*  c.   It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  Board  to  advise  and  make  recom- 
mendations to  the  Secretary  of  Defense  in  accordance  with  the  fol- 
•  lowing  procedure  with  respect  to  any  matter  relating  to  communi- 
cations intelligence  which  falls  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Director 
of  AFSA: 
(1)   The  Director  of  AFSA  shall  make  reports  from  time  to 
time  to  the  Board,  either  orally  or  in  writing  as  the  Board  may 
request,  and  shall  bring  to  the  attention  of  the  Board,  either  in 
-  131  - 
n
Jp-J 
tim 
SP 
jgjg    _J 
:    ) 
I 
o 
fr- 
U~ 
such  reports  or  otherwise,  any  new  major  policies  or  programs 
in  advance  of  their  adoption  by  him.    In  addition,  he  shall  furnish 
to  the  Board  such  information  as  the  Board  may  request  with     • 
respect  to  the  operations  of  AFSA. 
(2)  The  Board"  shall  reach  its  decisions  by  a  majority  of  not 
less  than  four  members.   Each  member  of  the  Board  shall  be 
entitled  to  one  vote.  . 
(3)  In  the  event  that  the  Board  votes  and  reaches  a  decision, 
any  dissenting  member  of  the  Board  may  appeal  from  such 
decisionwithin  7  days  to  the  Special  Committee.    In  the  event 
that  the  Board  votes  but  fails  to  reach  a  majority  decision,  any 
member  of  the  Board  may  also  appeal  within  7  days  to  the  Special 
Committee.  'In  either  event  the  Special  Committee  s'-all  review 
■  the  matter  and  its  determination  thereon  shall  be  final. 
•    (4)   If  any  matter  is  voted  on  by  the  Board  but  (a)  no  decision  ' 
is  reached  and  any  member  files  an  appeal,  or  (b)  a  decision  is 
reached  in  which  the  representative  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense 
does" not  concur  and  the  representative  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense 
files  an  ap.  eal,  no  action  shall  be  taken  with  respect  to  the  subject 
matter  until  the  appeal  is  decided,  provided  that,  if  the  Secretary 
of  Defense  determines,  after  consultation  with  the  Secretary  of 
-  132  -
s^5 
s*^ 
State,  that  the  subject  matter  presents  a  problem  of  an  "emergency 
nature  and  requires  immediate  action,  "his  decision  shall  govern  pend- 
ing the  result  of  the  appeal.    In  such  an  emergency  situation  the  appeal 
may  be  taken  directly  to  the  President, 
(5).  Recommendations  of  the  Board  adopted  in  accordance  with  the 
foregoing  procedure  shall  be  binding  on  the  Secretary  of  Defense. 
Except  on  matters  which  have  been  voted  on  by  the  Board,  the  Director 
of  AFSA  shall  discharge  his  responsibilities  in  accordance  with  his 
own  judgment  subject  to  the  direction  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense, 
e.    It  shall  also  be  the  duty  of  the  Board  as  to  matters  not  falling  within 
the  jurisdiction  of  AFSA:    (1)  to  coordinate  the  communications  intelligence 
^activities  of  all  departments  and  agencies  authorized  by. Presidential  Memo- 
-  * 
randum  to  participate  therein;  (2}i 
VI 
.  -  i 
i 
J 
md  (3)  to" consider  and  make  recommendations 
concerning  policies  relating  to  communications  intelligence  of  common  interest 
to  the  departments  and  "agencies  including  security  standards  and  practices, 
and,  for  this  purpose;  "to  investigate  and  study  the  standards  and  practices  of 
such  departments  and  agencies  in  utilizing  and  protecting  CO  MINT  information. 
Any  recommendation  of  the  Board  with  respect  to  the. matters  described  in 
this  paragraph  e.  shall  be  binding  on  all  departments  or  agencies  of  the 
Government  if  it  is  adopted  by  the  unanimous  vote  of  the  members  of  the 
-  133  - 
B3  -•-•  —
•  I 
r-??»?, 
Board.    Recommendations  approved  by  a  majority,  but  not 
all,  of  the  members  of  the  Board  shall  be  transmitted  by    " 
it  to  the  Special  Committee  for  such  action  as  the  Special 
•Committee  may  see  fit  to  take. 
While  it  is  believed  that  the  above  proposal  is  less  com- 
plicated than  the  structure  which  now  exists  above  AFSA,  it  is 
realized  that  it  is  more  involved  than  one  would  desire.   However, 
some  complication  is  made  necessary  by  two  controlling  but  • 
somewhat  conflicting  factors:    (1)  all  of  the  interested  Services 
and  agencies  should  have  a  voice  in  determining  AFSA  policies 
and  giving  it  guidance,  and  (2)  in  order  to  strengthen  AFSA  and 
make  it  a  viable  organization,  it  is  necessary  that  for  adminis- 
trative  purposes'  it" be' placed  under- a  single  Government  depart- 
ment.  The  somewhat  involved  machinery  for  appeals  to  the  Special 
Committee  has  been  dictated  as  a  result  of  our  strong  belief  that 
the  unanimity  rule  which  now  hampers  USCI3  should  be  eliminated 
for  the  new  COMINT  Board  in  matters  oertaininsr  to  AFSA.  We  are 
-134  - 
get     _j
Pn 
Pp. 
^  G 
hopeful  that  this  machinery  will  seldom  be  used,  and  that  its 
mere  existence  will  stimulate  harmonious  action.   Of  course, 
no  machinery  will  work  satisfactorily  unless  the  several 
Services,  departments  and  agencies  bend  every  effort  to  coop- 
erate in  the  common. cause.   It  is  imperative  that  lack  of  such 
cooperation  be  never  allowed  to  weaken  or  dissipate  our  COMIMT 
activities. 
The  Committee  has  ventured  to  prepare  a  draft  Presiden- 
tial Memorandum  (annexed  as  Exhibit  K)  designed  to  carry  into 
affect  the  major  organizational  changes  which  are  recommended 
above.   Although  the  preparation  of  such  a  memorandum  is  a 
technical  matter'and  doubtless  involves  problems  with  which  the 
Committee  is  net  familiar,  we  submit  the  draft  partly  because 
it  will  further  clarify  the  Committee's' recommendations  and 
partly  because  it  may  be  o£  assistance,  if  you  approve  those 
recommendations,  in  putting  them  into  effect.   We  point  out, 
however,  that  the  memorandum  does  not  cover  all  of  the  recom- 
mendations contained  in  this  Report. 
-  134a  -
Sri- 
1533 
n^S? 
n 
n 
The  foregoinj  conclusions  and  recommendations  are  the  Committee's  ' 
reply  to  the  specific  questions  included  in  our-  Directive.   In  "the  course"  of '*. — ■ — 
our  survey,  we  have  encountered  a  number  of  ancillary  issues  raised  by 
various  witnesses  in  addition  to  those  discussed  above.   Examination  of  those 
additional  issues  has  been  relevant  to  the  conclusions  and  recommendations, 
but  we  believe  that  their  proper  solution  should  be  left  for  the  revised  COMZNT 
Board.   Brief  discussions  cf  three  or  four  of  them  at  this  point,  however,  may 
Jj^s   '.    ^-sserve  to  further  support  and  illustrate  the  necessity  for  the  reorganisation 
*&  ;  I        recommended  above,  and  record  for  the  benefit  of  the  new-  C0MIN7  command 
I   _^        the  results  of  cur  investigation  of  these  problems  which  should  be  of  early 
concern  in  the  work  cf  the  new  organization. 
L- ^^Tbe  Security  of  Communications  Intelligence 
fl.  The  current  security  measures  and  ovoblems  in  the  COMINT  field  have 
•  '  .     .  .- 
been  discussed  in  Part  IV.   Suffice  it  to  record  here  several  basic  principles-  • 
U 
r — fca**d  conclusions.   The  success  of  our  COMINT  effort  has  varied  in  the  past, 
Li       and  will  undoubtedly  vary 'in  the  future,  in  direct  proportion  to  the  effective - 
H       ness  cf  the  security  measures  taken  to  protect  it.   During  World  War* II  our 
great  successes  were  possible  only  because  our  enemies  had  little  if"  any 
knowledge  c;  what  we  were  doing  or  the  degree  of  our  accomplishments.   Cur 
successes  are  smaller  and  fewer  today,  despite  great  advances  in  the  art  of    \ 
cry  "-.analysis,  partly  because  .these  security  measures  have  been  on  occasion 
•     -  135  - 
3S*5
Efc-  _ its 
&3 
KG** 
n 
n 
jSjTnient-.or.aily  abandoned  (as  Li  the  case  of  the*  Pearl  Harbor 'investigation) 
or  not  adequately  protected   
We  must  assume  that  the  Soviet  Government  is  fully  aware  of  the  fact 
that  we  are  striving  to  break  its. codes  and  read  its  messages.  We  have  from 
time  ;o  time  in  the  pastmade  no  secret  of.  the  fact  .that  we  have  been  active 
in  this  field,""and  furthermore,  the4ggg"^f"fjp"J"individuals  (including  the  con- 
sumer agencies)  engaged  in  the  CCM£sTT  effort  from  all  walks  of  life,  and 
the  high  rate  of  turnover,  created  a  serious  security  risk.   But  this  does  not 
^U 
mean  that  security  precautions  can  be  eliminated;. constant  coordinated  effort 
must  be  made  to  improve  security.    To  be  sure',  we  cannot  keep  from  other 
governments  the  knowledge  that  we  are  in  the  business  cf  trying  to  read  their 
Sssms  ^£lSp2"-   v-  e  c— -'  noweyer,  keep  from  them  the  extent  of  our  effort  and  the  success 
^^       S3S&  "'•■'■ 
j^K=    j"~l        that  v;e  are  having  at  any  particular  time.    If.  by  chance  we  should  be  so  success'- 
=•>£??;    ■  • 
n 
ful  as  to  break  some  new  cede,  there  must  be.  in  existence  effectively  working 
security  measures  which  will  reduce  to  an  absolute  minimum  the  possibility 
jj    "    that  that  fact  will  be  disclosed. 
|"1.  At  present  each  of  the  three  Ser  /ices  and  three  civilian  agencies  making 
use  of  communications  intelligence,  and  the  Armed  Forces  Security  Agency 
itsek,  individually  handles  security  matters  pertaining  to  its  own  personnel. 
— -i 
L        Sach  agency  is  supposed  to  follow  general  rules  laid  down  by  the  USCIE  Se- 
»J       curity  Committee,  but  each  agency  is  free  to  apply  these  general  rules  to 
-  136  - 
g§F    'J 
I  I
concrete  cases  as  it  sees  fit,  without  any  supervision  or  checkup  whatever. 
The  Committee  has  not  attempted  to  soaks  a  survey  of. the  precautions  which 
each  of  these  groups,  is  taking,  and  even  if.  it  were  able  to  do  so,  it  would  not 
~"~         feel  qualified  to  express  an  opinion,  as.  to  their  sufficiency..  It  does  appear 
n  ■ 
U      .  to  us  that  the  number  o:  individuals  "cleared"  for  the  use  of  communications 
•  j         intelligence  (as  distinct  from  its  collection- and  processing)  is  too  large. 
p  ^  A  second  problem  called  to  our  attention  has  been  the  too  widespread 
distribution  of  the  AFSA  product,  in  terms  both  of  needless  circulation  of 
■  i  • .  .  •     • 
'—        useless  messages  and  of  unnecessary  multiplication  of  required  copies  of 
:  !        each  message.    ThisTdiificulty  at  least  in  part  is  inherent  in  the  present 
r/'i£^>ystem  of  intelligence  processing  outside  the  control  of  AFSA,  which  is.com- 
^^mented  on  below. 
't—  While  the  Committee  cannot  attempt  to  lay  down  rules  on  the  subject  of 
jj       security,  it  believes  that  the  entire  subject  merits  careful  study  and  action 
by  a  central  organization  such  as  the  new  COMINT  Board. 
The  Cryptanalytic  Effort 
We  have  seen  that  at  the  presenLtime  AFSA's  efforts  in  certain  impor- 
tant carts  of  the  cryptanalytic  field  have  not  been  crowned  with  success,  to 
say  the  least.    The  subject  is  so  sensitive  that,  if  the  Secretary  of  State  and 
-  137  -
C*a5*r--l^i:- 
to" 
•v  — 
Pi 
fen 
the  Secretary  of  Defense  wish  more  detailed  information  on  it,  we  would 
prefer  to  arrange  to  furnish  it  to  them  orally.    However,  we  would  submit 
.in  this  Report  cur  observations  as  to  some  cf  the  possible  causes. 
The  Committee  had  the  benefit  cf  an  extensive  conference  with  top         .   '    ~ 
cryptanalysts  in  AFSA  and  also  with  seven  cf  the  members  cf  the  Scientific 
Communications  Advisory  Group  (SCAG).    This  latter  group  has  been  appointed 
by  the  Director  cf  AFSA  from  among  the  leading  civilian  industrial  experts 
in  the  field  of  the  development  and  construction  cf  the  intensely  complicated 
machinery  which  is  today  the  bacidbone  of  the  cryptanaiytic  effort.    (The 
names  and  titles  of  these  individuals  appear  in  the  list  cf  witnesses  annexed   • 
*^as  Exhibit  3).   The  Committee  has  also  studied  and  discussed  with  the  senior 
Cryptanaiytic  consultant  to  the  Drr-ectcr  cf  AFSA  a  recent  report  made  by  SCAG 
r— I 
•     I 
-J         to  the  Director  on  this  sabjecC  It  is  the  opinion  of  the  experts  that  there  is 
j         reasonable  hope  of  greater  success,  provided  a  greater  and  more  efficient 
-  J...  effort  is  made.   This  means  the  employment  cf  a  larger  number  of  highly 
skilled  personnel,  and  the  expenditure  of  additional  funds  for  machines.    It 
—  also  would  require  the  development  within  AFSA,  under  civilian  direction,  cf 
J        a  strong  research  and  development  group. 
;-j  Greater  civiiianizaticn,  according  to  SCAG,  is  absolutely  necessary  in 
ts^^  _        tt.at  branch  of  AFSA  which  is  charged  with  the  conduct  cf  technical  research. 
sin-  ,. 
^^  —       JViany  scientists  and  mathematicians  in  recent  years  have  felt  the  appeal  of 
n  -  133  - 
r-*>za
|Sf$  ~!  ^"^rhe  importance  and  mys 
_l 
'stery  of  the.COMINT  effort,  only  to  draw  away  upon 
developing  closer  contact  because  they  have  felt  it  Impossible  or  frustrating 
(whether  rightly  or  wrongly  makes  little  difference)  to  work  within  the  mill- 
si 
U      tary  hierarchy.   It  is  SCAC-'s  contention  that  AFSA  has,  because  of  difficulties 
n      in  contract  relations  and  errors  of  judgment,  so  injured  its  reputation  in 
.-»      scientific  circles  as  to  make  both  companies  and  individuals  somewhat  wary 
J 
of  doing  business  with  it.   The  contention  is  based  upon  an  alleged  lack  of 
— /^"^apport  between  the  military  and  the  civilian,  particularly  in  the  field  of  abstract 
fj      science  and  its  appurtenances.    There  is  probably  much  to  be  said  on  both  sides, 
but  civilianizaticn  of  COMINT's  more  abstruse  technical  activities  would  pro- 
bably do  much  to  provide  a  remedy.  "     . 
sgr     In  such  a  highly  technical  field  the  Committee  can  do  no  more  than  record 
i  i      these  responsible  opinions  furnished  to  it.    It  is  entirely  possible  that  the  re- 
r~l      suits  cf  a  batter  organized  effort  will.be  negative,  but  if  they  were  only  in 
j'r^-art  successful,  they  would  produce  information  of  much  greater  importance 
than  we  are  now  obtaining  through  the  expenditure  of  much  larger  amounts  on 
the  more  orthodox  sources. 
■    There  was  some  evidence  that  the  day-in  and  day-out  demands  for  COMD4T 
information  which  We  can  now  obtain  have  been  so  great  as  to  compel  the  AFSA 
authorities  to  turn  their  energies  in  that  direction,  and  to  deter  them  from 
HH  :J-    assigning  more  personnel  to  the  longer-range  cryptanalytical  problems  which 
m 
:   I 
i$m 
-  139  -
p?5>"  ~~''(P%  'D3St  v-'"1  "ot  ?ay  dividends  *or  some  time.  The  division  of  labor  between 
these  two  fields,  will,  of  course,  always  be  a  matter  of  judgment,  and  there 
could  be  r.o  mere  important  subject  for  continuing  consideration  by  a  top. 
„--  ,  -i      level  <:rouo  such  as  the  COMINT  Board  which  we  have  recommended. 
The  Size  and  Expense  of  the  COl/HST  Effort 
The  Committee  has  furnished  in  thg  body  of  its  Report  a  rough  estimate 
of  the  number  of  individuals  employed  in  our  overall  COMINT  effort  (<^£j 
and  the  overall  expense  (* 
These  figures  do  net  include  the"  manpower  and  expenses  of  the  con- 
pi  H     "~  r~ 
g^S  -J      sumer  agencies.   As  indicated  in  Part  IV",  these  figures,  particularly  the 
1      dollar  cost,  are  necessarily  very  general  estimates  because  of  the  difficulty 
""  •  *  . 
'~%$%i  making  accurate  determinations  with  respect  to  those  engaged  in  the'  field. 
^^  AFSA  itself  employs  approximately  tE&ggs&g&S  and  its  estimated  direct  cost 
runs  at  present  at  about 
leaving  aside  AFSA's  share 
of  indirect  costs  such  as  communications  charges. 
The  Committee  was  in  no  way  equipped  and  made  no  .attempt  to  consider 
,_,     whether  any  part  of  this  expenditure  could  be  reduced  without  materially  af- 
fecting the  product,  and  in  fact  this  subject  fell  completely  outside  our  Direc- 
§££3  LI     tive.    However,  we  have  been  impressed  by  the  fact  that  the  sums  involved 
f  »
IS 
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are  very  large,  and  that  because  of  security  factors  they  are  necessarily  not 
subject  to  any  of  the  checks  and  balances  that  operate  as  effective  controls 
in  other  Government  departments  and  agencies,  or  to  the  restraining  influence 
of  Congressional  investigations  or  public  opinion.   We  must  lock  to  APSA  — 
itseLE  and  to  the  three  Services  to  insure  that  all  expenditures  are  handled  on 
as  an  efficient  and  an  economical  basis  as  is  possible.    This  is  a  further  com- 
r  i         pelling  reason  for-  insuring  that  AFSA  management  be  stable,  strong  and  highly 
m  LA 
>^£       '         responsible,  and  that  there  be  a  COMBAT  Board  which  has  sufiicien:  authority' 
agp    U         2-"K*  ability  to  exercfse  a  strong  guiding  hand  in  major  policy  matters. 
fen£      -.  ... 
i  o  •••  . 
P 
/.             tf                   Chairman 
,-j  - 
  
r?  V    • 
-141  -
.!   - 
.;"\ 
EXHIBITS 
ras^e<3UJ45^e©*»7^^ 
+*Z-rCl 
x  "^POB-SEIGBSU,.    Reviewed  4  August  1981
55^ 
n 
TS  #62899 
28  December  1951 
rev 
The  President  on  December  13,  1951,  directed  the  Secretary  of  State  and 
the  Secretary- of  Defense,  assisted  by  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  to 
have  the  Communications  Intelligence  activities  of  the  Govemaeot  surveyed' 
vlth  the  view  of  recommending  any  corrective  aeasures  that  cay  he  required' to 
insure  the  coat  secure  and  effective  conduct  of  such  activities. 
D 
n 
D 
!;q 
You  are  hereby  appointed  as  a  Committee  to  cake  a  survey  as  hereinafter 
ieacrihed  and  submit  to  the  Secretary  of  State  and  the  Secretary  of  Defense 
proposed  recommendations  for  their  consideration. 
In  order  to  assist  us   in  carrying  out  the  directive  of  the  President     *t 
is  desired  that  your  Committee  consider  the  following:  ""  ' 
a-     The  legitimate  Communications  Intelligence  needs  of  each 
governmental  department  and  agency  for  the  production  of  departmental 
intelligence ,  and  of  the  Director  of  Central  .Intelligence  for  the 
production  of  national  intelligence.     Your  Committee's  consideration 
of  such  needs  shall  not  be  narrowly  interpreted  and  shall  include* 
without  limitation,   any  and  all  aspects  of  the  interception,   transmission 
processing  and  production  of  useable  Communications  Intelligence  information. 
b.     The  allocation  of  responsibilities  and  authorities  respecting 
Co_unlcations  Intelligence  activities  that  should  be  made  to  insure     •"•' 
that  such  needs  are  satisfied  cost  effectively,   giving  due  regard  to    ■•"■ 
-he  requirements  of  security.     Your  Committee's  consideration  of  this  ' 
question  shall  include,  without  limitation,  the  extent  to  which 
•responsibility  for,   and  authority  over,  the  interception  and 
processing  of  Communications  Intelligence  information,  or  any  other 
aspect  of  such  activities,  may  and  should  be  assigned  for  performance 
as  a  service  of  common  concern,   and  to  which  department  or  agency 
sucn  assignment  should- be  made. 
„,S~<"C^  Ccs=littee  =»/  establish  such  methods  of  procedure,  consistent  with      * 
'veSVr'l^r^i?1*10!"  Srtellisence  security  relations,  as  it  nay  deem  fit. 
mav\^w  r"  -s  *u^horl2ed   -°  e°?lcy  such  staff  as  it  may  require,   and  you         ■ 
-a/  apply  to  tne  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  for  the  clearance  and  indoc-   ' 
IntellwJ  I«raon«  not  presently  cleared  and  indoctrinated  for  Special        . 
inxejj..0ence  as  may  be  required  to  assist  your  Committee.  .
&- 
fcFi! 
Safe 
t§?N 
m 
ii 
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n 
vour  Cosaittee  la  hereby  authorized  to  request  all  departcsata  and  ageaciee 
conducting  Cocaunicatloaa  Intelligence'  activities  for  the  Govemseat  to  sake 
available  to  your  Caraittee  and  ita  ata£?  any  and  all  peraoas  aad  pauera  Srca 
which  indorsation  relevant  to  the  above -described  aurvey  caa  be  obtained. 
Q 
/s/  P.obert  A.   Lovett 
_,  Rob err  A.  Lovett- 
t/--\.  Secretary  of  Defenae 
B  .'■:: 
0  •                   ■-: 
/s/  Dean  G.  Achcscn 
Dean  G.- Achesoa 
Secretary  of  State 
a>' 
3y£ 
5£? 
■>v. 
D 
n 
[?■••■ 
D   ■. 
□      Mr.  Gsorge  Brcvncll 
Mr.  Charles  Sohlen 
□3rig.  General  John  Magruder,  Retired 
Mr.  VilUaa  S.  Jackson  . 
n 
n
ir* 
LIST  OF  PERSONS  INTERVIEWED 
BY  BROWNELL  COMMITTEE 
AND  DATES  INTERVIEWED     ' 
Belmont,  Alan.H.,  Assistant  Director-of  the  Domestic  Intelligence 
Division,  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation,  16  February  1932 
A. 
Bernier,  Colonel  Donald,  Operations  Officer,  Army  Security 
Agency,  16  February  1952 
Boiling,- Major  General  Alexander  R„  Assistant  Chief  of. Staff,  G-2, 
U.  S.  Army,  2  February  1952 
Bradley,  General  of  the  Army  Omar  N.,  Chairman  of  the  Joint  Chiefs- 
..    of  Staff,  11  April  1952 
Cabell,  Major  General  Charles  P.,  USAF,  Director,  The  Joint 
•Staff,  24  January  1952 
Canine,  Major  General  Ralph*  J.,  Director,.  Armed  Forces  Security 
Agency,  5  January  and  22  February  1952 
Clarice,  Brigadier  General  Carter  W.,  Osaka,  Japan,  formerly  Chief 
oi  Army  Security  Agency,  and  Deputy  G-2,  U.  S.  Army 
3  March  1952 
Davitt,  Colonel  William  J.,  USAF,  24  January  1952 
3-/..
&?^ 
u 
□ 
D 
D  . 
Si a 
^W^ 
Duff,  Major  General  Robinson  E.,  Chief  of  Army  Security  Agency, 
16  February  1952 
Engstrom,  Howard  T.,  Engineering  Research  Associates,  (The- 
Special  Communications  Advisory  Group),  8  February  1952 
Friedman,  Wm.  F.,  Consultant  to  the  Director  of  the  Armed  Forces 
Security  Agency,  22  February  and  4  April  1952 
Goulett,  Captain  W.  B.,  USN,  Acting  Director  of  Naval  Communi- 
cations, 24  January  1952 
Holtwick,  Captain  J.  S.,  Jr.,  USN,  Office  of  Operations,  AFSA-02r    ' 
11  January  1952 
Howard,  John  H.,  Burroughs  Adding  Machine  Co.,  (The  Special 
Communications'  Advisory  Group)  8  February  1952 
Johnson,  Rear  Admiral  Felix  L.,  USN,  Director  of  Naval 
Intelligence,  24  January  1952 
Johnson,  Colonel  Hugh,  Chief  of  Staff,  Army  Security  Agency, 
16  February  1952 
Keay,  Victor  P.,  Chief  of  the  Liaison  Section,  Federal  Bureau  of 
Investigation,  16  February  1952 
Leva,  Marx,  formerly  Assistant  Secretary  of  Defense  for  Legal 
and  Legislative  Affairs,  29  February  1952 
Lynn,  Brigadier  General  Roy  H.,  Commanding  General  of  Air 
Force  Security  Service,  15  February  1952 
Mason,  Captain  Redfield,  USN,  formerly  head  of  AFSA-02, 
4  April  1952 
5-2-
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D 
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McNarney,  General  Joseph  T.,  Office  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense, 
24  January  1952     . 
McPherson,  John  C,  International  Business  Machines,  (The  Special 
Communications  Advisory  Group)  8  February  1952 
Potter,  Ralph  K„  Bell -Telephone  Laboratories,  (The  Special  Communi- 
cations Advisory  Group)  8  February  1952 
Robertson,  H.  P.,  Weapons  Systems  Evaluation  Group,  (The  Special 
Communications  Advisory  Group)  8  February  1952 
Hewlett,  Frank  B.,  formerly  Technical  Director  of  the  Armed  Forces 
Security  Agency,  AF3A-02,  9  February  and  15  February  1952 
Samford,  Major  General  John  A.,  Director  of  Intelligence,  U.  S. 
.     Air  Force,  9  February  1952 
Speakman,  Edwin  A.,  Research  and  Development  Board,  (The  Soecial 
Communications  Advisory  Group)  8  February  1952 
B    -  3  -
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Hi 
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1  D 
D 
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Weckerling,  Brigadier  General  John,  Deputy  Assistant  Chief  of 
Staff..  G-2,  U.  S.  Army,  2  February  1952 
Wenger,  Rear  Admiral  J.  N.f  USN,  Deputy  Director  of  the  Armed 
Forces  Security  Agency,  8  March  1952 
(Prepared  14  April  1952) 
B    -4- 
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i.Ai.lO;.>^.  £ZCLr..i:   COw..C-^  mz^LICZirCTS  DZPZCTiyS  HO.    9 
cc-:-ro?r:cATio:r5  arrziLicz:fcs 
Qg||]  Pj  Pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  Section  101  aid  Sectica  102  of  the  National 
£§^1  —Security  Act  cf  I?1*-?,   as  aaended,   the  National  Securi-y  Council  herebv  authc-'-ea 
^^^  —and  directs  that:  •.  " 
512  H  _  - 
1.  There   is  hereby  established  under  the  National  Security  Council 
the  Uaited  States  Ccnaunicaticns  Intelligence  3oard  (hereinafter  referred 
to  aa  the  "Board")  to  effect  the  authoritative  coordination  of  Coaauai- 
caciocs  Intelligence  activities  cf  the  Government  and  to  advise  the  Director 
of  Cec-rai  Intelligence  in  these  letters   in  the  field  of  Ccaauaicaticas 
Intelligence  for  vhich  he  is  responsible. 
2.  The  3card  vill  be  conposed  of  not  to  exceed  tvo  nenber3  frcn  each  cf 
the  follovins  departments  or  agencies:     The  Departments  cf  State,  the  Arc;;,   the 
>."avy,   and  the -Air  Force,   and  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency,   and  the  Federal 
Bureau  cf  Investigation.     Only  these  departments  or  agencies  desi;acated  by 
tne  Presicent  are  aucherir.ee  to  engage  in  Communications   Intelligence  activities, 
&>  fs*5i±  3'     Th*  2oc^~  nenbers  vill  be  vested  vita  authority  to  reore sent  their 
§P?  Ll   '7^**"S?*C"iVe  d!?6rt=!ats  °~  agencies   in  the  field  of  Ccmauaicatioos  Intelligence 
.^3         -.^anc.  each  seaber  department  or  agency  vill  be  reoreseaced  at  each  neeting  bv  at-    . 
i3g?|]  ri  laast  C"e  3S=-«ri   cr. alternate,   vith  the  necessary  covers  to  act. 
gggg  u  . 
3^3  .     *     Becisicaa  cf  the  Board  -111  be  based  ca  the  nrinciple  cf  uaaaiaity, 
j^^  vaica  snail  be  a -prerequisite  for  aacaers'  vi  taia  the  ova-lev  cf  the  Board, 
3&||    !  |  except  teat  the  Chairman  shall  be  elected  by  majority  vote.     Vhea  decision- 
r^S    f^ZIl   cr==2t  °*  reached'  the  Soa^  will  promptly  refer  the  natter  for  resolutioa  to 
•^3    f.-  -aticnal  Security  Couacil;  provided  that,  vaen  unanimity  is  not  obtained 
aaoag  the  military  departaeat  heads  of  the  Departaent  of  Defense,   the  Board 
lrJ3tZ  ?f.-sent:  t-e  Problem  to  the  Secretary  o£  -Defease  befor*  presenting  it 
»o  ...e  national  Security  Council.  • 
f 
•■■ii 
« «. ,.     <.._. 
?.L<  ^f^^f1033.  aad  ?ollcl3s  promulgated  by  the  Beard  vithia  the  sccoe  of 
'-Jr-<r' '-"' ~-   »--ii    ce  applicable  to  all  departnenta  and  ageaeies  repre- 
sea 
!!l"~  !"'-  ;  s-=crc-a-*   -o  the  National  Security  Council  and  any  others 
a.s.^^.ec,  >jy  t.-.e  President,   and  shall  be   iaoleaented  by  those  departments 
a-.d  agencies  of  vhich  action  is  required.        " 
C  -l- 
"CTO  9 
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I  HhculJ  have  preferred  to  tdl.ii  to  you  In  person  but  I  could  not  device  a  ;?i^ 
rv,:.hod  that  uou-ld  not  "be  subject  .to  p^esa  and  ra-J  io  react  Ions  as  ;to  vhys  the"  "Chief  .rt^ 
oT  Staff  of  the  Arcy  vould  be  seeking  uirihtcrvlov  "uith  you  a*-thla"wjrticular'"jri^r*? 
r'':v.nt.  Ther-.-fore,  I  have  turned  to . the 'method  oC  this  letter '/'to  be  'dclivcre^i'''^-,^ 
V.*  hnr.d  to  y.u  by  Col.  Carter  Clarke  uiiohao  cl^ir^e  of  thu"  oost 'secret  docur.cntc  ";V:t 
n 
i     : 
or   the  '.Jar  oik!   Havy  Depnrtr.-.cnt.c 
„».•*„-.#  W 
la  brief,   the  milit./iry  rtl  IcnriTi. resulting  l'rcra  Concessional  political  -battles ■■;• 
:  polit-lcal  etripalsn   \6  th:o:    ..">'...'•.'..■  :;-.-.  •■.- •-.'' J-;'J-V'>  -'•'.-..'■••'.*'•  '-.v.''- v."''"*';', 
u 
P'-'rg 
The  wont  vital  cvlrii.-f.ee  in  the  P^;u"l  Harbor  r.ittcr  coinicts  of  our  tnterccpts,_ 
ne  Jr.p\n?.-.c  diplomatic  cc-nuiunictit  Lon-j .  Over  a  period  of  years  our  cryp«.o:;ra?U  -J. 
le  analyzed  the  eluirnctcr  jof  _tho  c^chme  the -Japanese  are  urjri£  for  encoding  J&* 
:•  dlplo-.-.tic  ui":scr.,~es.     liaaed  on  this,'- a  corresponding  machine  vns  bul.it  by  U3;.?.£ 
:■•-..-.  ■>:■'•■•■■■  ■■;.:'.'  .'.;«■'  ■'•'••.'.■•v'vr''.  ''".'•i-  '  •■        'i 
vh'yh.  deciphers  th-:tr  acr.sacoa 
n 
n 
Therefore,  ve  poasecr.ed  a  vealth  of  infoi  nation  re&ardliic  their  novo 3  In  'tl »e '?* 
Tiiciric  'julch  In  turn  vai  furnished  tlvs.Ct&te  lV-p.'.rtmcat— rat'J;--r  t»jajT, 'ac yTii ' "U-*^^i 
popularly  r.upi»o::<.-d,  the  State  Department  provld  I'.t.j'uV'wtth  /fh«?  \rfontri^iVn--  biit".£?i" 
which  uiifr.rLunni.fjy  ;mde  no  rct'etriu-C  vih-.tyvec  1  v  int&n'tio^/iTo'Au'd'/ltoW 
^        t.i:'-  la.-.l  R-.'^::?.-e  before  IV-o.  7/  which  did  hot  rvach  our  li-^i»lu'' vii  1 L  L i  the.  fullovliv;*'?? 
1  !     day,   DGe:  U.       -j;g  ^  ~. ^^V^^//;.  ^. >,;•     ;  = .  •  .>•;:•'■  ^^^;v^^^?/; ■^i:^^;^j-^ 
"!     •"-.;•--    ■   Nov  the^polnt  to  th«:  prese-nf.  dll'-crra   is   t.h-»t  vo  have  cone  aljc-tid  vlth  fair.    r_-"j"£ 
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as  Japan-.^o,    UiL  our  min  bnul;i  of    1  niV .— -..-it.  ]  or*.  .-••,:  «.i  din  ;  niticr'i:    int-.-nllonr.    In 
ftu-.ipe    is   nhLntneti  frcta  r.-»rur»  C-jh'ci?--.  r..:cr.r\^-  ^   1  r<va  purlin  roprriJa,".  b.;.-.    1'ifr- 
vicva  with  I'.iLier  iuid  othvr   cl'f  lci«ilu   *.o  th-?   J;.;.- «neae  Cov-:-rn".ent.     'f!'.i::;e  arc  utJll 
Jn  the  ccklen   Involved   in   tiur  r-jarl  ii-vrbor  ever,'--, 
To  explain  further' the  critical  nature  of  this  set -»:p  vhleh  vnmld  bo  vired 
■^.'-.'"1 .-, '. 
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The  current  raids  by  Admlrui  Ilalsey' 3  carrier  forces"  civ  Japanese "'"shlp'oirie    '"'^-v, 
..in  I'nnila  Bay  rind  clccvherc  were  larcely  based   in  tialng  on  the  joiovr.  soven^nta   of '"'-^t 
OJapur.vr.u  convoys,   two  of  which  were  caught,   as  anticipated,    in  his  destructive     "     ""i"'"-' 
attacks.       .    •  ■::-;,\.v*v.^. '"'•-.'; -7    .■•\-':>V^V;-.-.j- 
You  will  understand  from' the-  forego Imj. the   utter  tra-;Jc"cor.cequ"ncos    i**'th~' 
fs'.-nt  political  debates -re. -.ardlnc  Pearl  Uurbor  disclose  to  the  enray,  Rcnsan  or '.  '  "^ 
p,   any  cuspicion^of  the  vital  sources "of  inforiaiticn  wc  nw  possess.  •   ■'  ■  :.'.-:-;;:il'*': 
□      •    •   2       ••    .-^'.'  '"':-'-"■•  ""■-■:  ■":';■•'  '^  ..•:•■,'•  ••■\  •.--:.'     .-..-      •     •■■■.    ■::,••    ••  "  ■  '-"■■■'*■.''.  ^:r.l^ 
..  p>-  Roberts'   report  on  Fuarl  Uirl-o.-*"  had  to  hive  withdrawn  frea  it  all  refer 6nC-V:- 
to  thin  hltfily  secret  natter,   therefore  in  portions   it  neccscarily/nppccrcd   lncor.nlcte: 
p.     The  sJ-ne  rea«o.-i  which  dictated  that  course   is  even  more  important  today  bec-u-c    •"-.•■'-* 
:~1     our  sources  have  bc«n  greatly  olnlibratcd       >cs.--".v.v  ■      ^-     -■■.>•-•:    -.  .    .  •  .•••-"-•:.-.•; 
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.U     2ef?ie  (t]'e  °p:5),  without  telllnc  us,    Instituted  a  :iecreV  senrfh  of  the  Japanese ^^W~ 
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CITATION  FOR  1ST  RADIO  SQUADRON,  M03ILS  FOR  AWARD  OF 
1-ERITORIOUS  UNIT  COMMENDATION  IN  DEPARTMENT  OF  AIR 
FORCE  GSNZRAL  ORDER  6k   OF  11  OCTOBER  1?51 
During  the  period  2$  November  1950  through  18  July  1951,  the  1st  Radio 
Squadron, -Mobile,  has  cade  outstanding  contributions  to  all  services  of  United 
Nations  Forces  engaeed  in  the  Korean  conflict., 
The  above -sent ioned  contributions  were,  all  performed  in  addition  to  the 
Lst  Radio  Squadron,  Mobile's  routine  mission  "--*—           —   
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Specific  acconplishsents,  considered  of  extraordinary  value  to  the  mission 
of  UN  Forces  in  Korea  and  in  at  least  tvo  cases  to  the  vital  interests  of  the 
•United  States,  were  ~  ' "" 
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The  contributions -of  the  1st  Radio  Squadron,  Mobile,  'La  direct  support 
of  the  UK  ccnbat  effort  la  Korea  have  furnished  the  UH  Forces  and  the  Government 
cf  the  United  States  vita  tactical  and  strategic  intelligence,  of  incalculable 
value  to  the  success  of  the  UN  nissioa  and  to  the  security  of  the  Uaited  States, 
and  have  therebv  reflected  great  credit,  on  tL  unit  and  the  Air  Forces  of  the 
United  States .    '  
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21*  May  I9U9 
A.PPSITDIX 
directive 
/ 
AHMED  FCP.CES  SEC-J7.ITT  AGETCY  (AF3A) 
^ 
Pursuant  to  the-,  authority  vested  la  ne  by  the  .National  Security  Act  of 
19lj.T  (Public 'Lav  253;   Seta  Congress),   and  la  the  interest  of  freatar  effi- 
ciency and  economy,   there  la  hereby  established  -within  the  National  Military 
y-\       Establishment,  ur.der  the  direction  and  control  of  the  Joint  Chiefs-  of  Staff,   a 
unified  cryptologic  organization  to  be  kncvn  as  the  Armed  Forces  Security  Agency 
[J         (hereinafter  referred  to  as  "AF3A")  vhich  shall  have  the  purpose,  composition,  • 
Q 
authority  and  responsibilities  hereinafter  described. 
1.     Purpose  ■        .- 
The  Arned  Forces  Security  Agency  is'  established  in  order  to  provide 
Tor)  the  placing  under  one  authority  the  conduct  of  communication  intellisesc- 
ind  communication  security  activities   (hereinafter  referred  to  as'cryptolosic 
(j       'activities)  vithin  the  national  Military  Establishment,  except  those  vhich  are 
*|  }  •      to  ^  conducted  individually  by  the  Departments  of  the  .-Army,   Navy,  and  Air  Force. 
2.     Ccnoosltion 
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V. 
a..  The  AFSA  shall  consist  of  such  facilities,  units  and  military 
and  civilian  personnel  of  the  armed  forces  vhich  are  or  may  be  used  for, 
or  engaged  in  communication  intelligence  or  communication  security 
activities,  including  the  Headquarters,  Army  Security  Agency  (ASA), 
Arlington,  Virginia.,  the  Cocaunieatioas  Supplementary  Activity  (CSAW), 
*  * 
waso-n^on,  and  any  comparable  organisations  of  the  Air  Force,   and  such 
other  facilities,  units  and  personnel  as  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  may 
JCS  2010 
H  -3- 
Appendix 
0.
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deteraine  an  necessary  to  fulfill  the  functions  herein  assigned. 
b.  A  Flag  or  General  Officer  of  the  Aray,  ITavy  or  Air  Force 
vill"  be  appqiated  "by  the  Joint  Chief a  of  Staff,  subject  to  the 
approval  of  the  Secretary  of  Defease,  aa  Director  of  the  AFSA. 
Eis  noraal  tour  of  duty  shall  he  tvo  years .  .  The  directorship 
shall  "be  rotated  aaong  the  Services. 
£.  An  Arasd  Forces  Cbouaicatioas  Intelligence  Advisory. 
Council  (AFCIAC)  shall  he  established  vita  In  the  Araed  Forces 
Security  Agency.  The  Council  shall  consist  of  the  Director  of 
the  Araed  Forces  Security  Agency,  vho  shall  he  chalraan  thereof, 
the  Aray,  Harry,   and  Air  Force  aeabers  of  the  United  States  Cctssuai- 
caticss  Intelligence  Board,  and  not  to  exceed  one  additional  aeaber 
frca  each  of  the  services  to  he  ncaiaated  by  the  respective  De- 
partnent  Secretaries.  *  , 
3*  Hespcnsibilities  and  Functions 
a.  Subject  to  the  authority  and  direction  of 'the  Secretary  of  . 
Defease,  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  viH  exercise 'direction,  author- 
ity and  control  over  the  Araed  Forces  Security  Agency. 
b.  The  Araed  Forces  Coaaruaications  Intelligence  Advisory 
Council  vill: 
(1)  Reccaaend  to  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  policies, 
operating  plans,  and  doctrines  for  the  production  of 
ccxauaicaticns  intelligence  vhich  vill  insure  the  pro- 
vision of: 
JCS  2010 
&    -* 
Appendix 
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(a)  Authentic  information  for  planners  cad  policy 
makers  vithin  the  National  Military  Establishment  and  other 
Governmental  Agencies  having  membership  on  the  United  States 
Communication  Intelligence  Board;  to  apprise  thea  of  the 
reelities  of  the  international  situation,  var -asking  capa- 
bilities, vulnerabilities  and  intentions  of  foreign  countries, 
and  to  eliminate  the  element  of  surprise  from  an  act  of 
aggression  by  another  country. 
(b)  The  unique  informaticn  essential  to  the  several 
services  for  the  successful  prosecution  cf  var  and  vital  to 
a  shortening  of  the  period  of  hostilities. 
(2)  Recommend  to  the  Joint -Chief  s  of  Staff  policies, 
operating  plans,  and  doctrines  for  communication  security 
activities.  : 
(3)  Hecommend  to  the  Joint .  Chief 3  of  Staff  the  facilities, 
personnel,  and  fiscal  and  logistic  support  to  "be  provided  "by 
the  services  to  AFSA;  such  recommendations  to  be  hased  on 
requirements  as  determined  by  the  Director,  ATSA. 
*■  (*0  Determine  and  coordinate  Joint  cryptologic  military 
requirements . 
(5)  When  unanimity  cannot  be  reached  substantive  natters 
shall-he  referred  to  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  for  resolution, 
procedural  matters  shall  be  determined  by  the  chairman. 
?5«B«5k»»Sb>u. 
J\^  JCS  2010 
M  -5- 
Appendix
(U)     Formulation  of  policies  for:      (l)  transmission 
security  end  communications  cover  aad  deception;    (it)  crypto~ 
graphic  security;    (iii)  physical  security  of  cryptoiogic 
cater ial;    (iiii)    cryptoiogic  countermeasures. 
(5)  Evaluation  of  violations  of  cryptoiogic  security; 
determination  of  extent  of  compromise;  and  remedial  action 
through  appropriate  channels. 
(6)  Investigation  of  the  aesaa  employed  for  clandestine 
communications;  and  preparation,  detection,  and  processing  ' 
of  secret  inks,   nicrcphotographs,  and  open  codes  and  ciphers. 
(7)  Liaison  vita  appropriate  departnents  and  agencies ,  for 
the  purpose  of  coordinating  cryptoiogic  equipment  and  pro- 
cedures. 
(8)  Preparation,  for  reviev  end  approval  by  the  Research 
and  Development  Board,   of  coordinated  programs  far  research 
and  development  of  cryptoiogic  equipment  under  the  cognisance 
of  AFSA  and,  v'aen  approved,  action  to  implement  these  programs. 
(9)  Preparation,  for  review  and  approval  "by  the  Munitions 
3oard,  of  coordinated  programs,   including  industrial  mobili- 
sation planning,   for  the  procurement  of  cryptoiogic  equipment 
under  the  cogninnnce  of  AFSA' and,  vhen  approved,  action  to 
implement  those  programs. 
(10)     Preparation  of  technical  publications  pertaining  to 
subjects  peculiar  to  AFSA. 
If  -6- 
Appendix
t  »  -it.  n,!,  ,t,  4  *M~.~^.~+.-T.-r<<±a*-2&l 
3j  U^tyii/^tfrtqgc^^rt^^ 
7  k/C?«a£a®KSS33r 
(11)  Preparation  of  technical  training  programs  and 
establishment  of  training  standards  for  AFSA  personnel; 
prevision  of  certain  specialised  training  of  personnel  to 
meet  the  respective  needs  of  the  Army,  ITavy  and  Air  Force. 
(12)  Establishment  for  units  of  the  Armed  Forces  of  a 
basis  of  issue  of  special  items  of  crypto -equipment  for  which 
provision  is  not  made  in  standard  distribution  lists. 
(13)  Technical  supervision  of  all  communication  security 
activities  of  the  armed  forces. 
(Ik)  Provision  of  technical  support  to  the  Amy,  ITavy, 
and  Air  Force  in  their  conduct  of  cryptologic  activities. 
(1?)  Preparation  of  budgetary  and  other  fiscal  require- 
ments of  AFSA,  coordination  of  such  requirements  with  the 
participating  services,  and  the  presentation  of  such  require- 
ments to  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  through  the  AFCIAC.  '  Such 
requirements  for  AFSA  as  may  be  approved  by  the  Joint  Chief s 
»       .  * 
of  Staff  will  be  included  in  the  recommendation  made  by  the 
Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  to  the  Secretary  of  Defense  on  budgetary 
t    . 
masters.  . 
d.  The  Departments  of  Army,  Navy,  and  Air  Force  will: 
(l)  Take  necessary  action  to  facilitate  the  efficient 
and  economical  operation  of  AFSA,  such  action  to  include 
assignment  of  personnel  and  furnishing  of  facilities,  equip- 
neat,  and  fi*eal  and  logistic  support.  The  respective 
<j<-o  i'jij 
H?   ~  t  - 
Appendix
■mw„.   -.  ,  tnt^i^f^Tc^MW-Ti^.'^rmM^.^^^^S^^^aM^f 
Secretaries  are  hereby  authorised  to  issue  such  orders  aa 
nay  he  necessary  to  effectuate  the  purposes  of  this  directive. 
(2)  Provide  fixed  intercept  installations  as  authorised 
"by  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff.  Such  installations  vill  he 
canned  and  administered  hy  the  service  providing  then,  hut 
•will  he  operationally  directed  by  AFSA. 
(3)  Provide  aohile  Intercept  facilities  required  "by  the 
Amy,  I?avy*and  Air  Force  respectively,  vhich  vill  he  manned, 
administered,  and  operationally  controlled  by  the  individual  • 
service.  They  nay  also  he  used  to  perform  special  missica3 
for  AFSA  as  requested  by  the  Director  thereof. 
(*0  Provide  communication  facilities  required  by  AFSA  for 
JOint  use.  The  crypto-naterial  utilised  in  such  facilities 
viH  be  furnished  by  AFSA  and  vill  be  operated  and  maintained 
by  the  individual  service. 
(5)  Normally  assign  military  personnel  to  AFSA  for  a 
period  of  not  less  than  thirty  months,  reserving  the- right 
to  add,  vithdrav,  or  substitute  personnel,  vithin  limitations 
of  .authorised  personnel  strength  of  AFSA,-'  and  subject  to 
agreement  by  the  Director,  AFSA.  In  accordance  vith  existing 
lav,  the  administration  of  military  personnel  of  the  Amy, 
Navy,  and  Air  Force  assigned  to  AFSA  vill  be  a  responsibility 
of  the  Army,  Havy,  and  Air  Force,  respectively. 
JC3  20io 
w-  -a  - 
Appendix
1  j^^r^^i 
(o)     Continue  to  be  responsible  for  all  such  c:yptolosic 
activities  as  are  required  by  iatra-service  cr  joint  needs 
(e.g.,   ccanuaicaticn  intelligence  processing,    intercept, 
rese=rch  and  development,  training,    etc.)   and  are  determined 
by  the  Joist  Chiefs  of  Staff  not  to  be  the  sole  responsibility 
ofAFSA.  '  They  --111  at  all  tines  ka-p  the  Director,  A?SA,   fully 
infamed  concerning  all  auch  activities. 
(7)     Hot  undertake  or  continue  cryptologic  activities  vale  a 
ere  determined  by  the  Joint  Chiefs   of  Staff  to  be  the  sole 
responsibility  of  AFSA. 
1, 
xaaj-enentatlcn 
a.  The  consolidation  of  these  parts  of  several  service  agencies 
vhich  ---ill  constitute  the  AFSA  vill  be  effected  under  the  direction 
ana  control  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff,  vita  the  ninimm  loss  cf 
continuing  of  operations .  It  shall  be  initiated  not  later  -than 
1  July  I9U9  and  completed  not  later  than  1  January  1950.  •  Vhen  the 
,.  consolidation  has  been  completed  the  Joint  Chiefs'  of  Staff  vill  so 
infom  the  Secretary  cf  Defense.. 
/a/  Louis  Johnson 
-,  JC3  2010 
tf  -9  - 
Appendix
u 
EXHIBIT  I 
The  "CONSIDO"  Problem 
^ 
At  the  same  time  that  the  central  AFSA  was  created,  one  very  active 
* 
school  of  thought  believed  that  there  should  be  an  "intelligence"  counterpart 
of  AFSA  charged  with  evaluation  and  dissemination  of  the  COMINT  product 
as  opposed  to  mere  collection  and  processing.    It  proposed  the  erection  of 
an  agency  to  be  known  as  the  "Consolidated  Special  Information  Dissemina- 
tion Office"  (I.e.,  "CONSIDO")  which  would  be  composed  of  analysts  of  the 
J         various  COMINT  consuming  agencies,  reporting  to  a  chief  of  CONSIDO,%and 
~\  ■      which  would  have  absolute  control  over  those  further  aspects  of  the  COMINT 
S    N-    effort.    The  proposal,  although  worked  out  and  presented  in  detail  by  its 
's^../ proponents,  was  abortive,  but  the  germ  of  the  idea  is  still  very  much  alive 
[J     *   today  and  is  actively  advocated,  in  modified  form,  by  a  considerable  group  of 
n    ""  qualified  COMINT  officials. 
«r~~"  The  concept  of  entrusting  to  a  centralized  office  the  job  of  editing  and 
-  •  interpreting  communications  intelligence  has  good  precedent  in  the  practices 
LI  /  of  thft  ^^^s^f^^i^^j^LRinr<»  1920,  in  which  year  the  present  ^SSgggg 
Q      ^gh^toWrStfa^^  have  combined  in  one 
D 
D 
compound  and  under  one  head  both  the  production  and  the  utilization  of  COMINT, 
and  it  has  apparently  worked  out  very  well  through  the  ensuing  years.   There  is, 
iSS. 
however,  an  important  difference  hptwgpn feffiffiftftfgfijffljg^  and  the  CONSIDO 
I-/
]         scheme  as  it  was  originally  put  forth:  3*jgf^P^^merge  both  aspects  of 
i  their  effort,  while  CONSEDO  was.  built  on  the  principle  that  it -"be  Independent, 
I  vertical,  and  alongside  the  new  and  (presumably)  consolidated  processing 
plant  with  no  gangways  between  other  than  a  suitable  pipeline  for  passing   the 
j         undigested  material 'from  one  to  the  other.   The  head  of  CONSLDO  was  to  be 
a  czar  in  his  own  right,  from  whose  decisions  there  was  almost  no  appeal. 
■    It  was  this  that  killed  the  plan,  for  consumers  of  COMDiT,  and  especially  the   .' 
7\   '  -  '      '    • 
'      •    civilian  consumers,  would  not  listen  to  any  scheme  that  robbed  them  of  their 
j         sovereignty  in  the  use  to  which  they  put  their  share  of  the  product,  or  the 
T      *  assignments  which  they;-cared  to  give  to  their  COMINT  analysts,  or 'the  per- 
rr  ...  •  sons  in  thei;?.  own  establishments  whom  they  considered  eligible  for  COMINT 
Ej"vV  .        • 
clearance. 
[J  If  CONSIDO  had  made  its  first  appearance  free  of  this  element,  its  history 
n        might  have  been  different.    There  are  certain  definite  and  undeniable  advan- 
_}     ■'  tages  in  the  idea  of  centralized  evaluation  of  the  COMINT  product.    First,  it 
has  security  advantages:    it  provides  the  means  for  a  better  control  and  more 
Li        limited  distribution  of  the  product  without  necessarily  impairing  its  usefulr 
F]        ness  —  it  would  drastically  cutback,  for  example,  the  current  practice  of 
a  monthly  printing  of  some  two  million  sheets  of  code-word  paper  to  gratify 
the  "minimum"  demands  of  the  customers.   Second,  it  would  result  in  a 
n  "  - 
LI       finished  COMINT  product .iato  which  all  pertinent  collateral  is.  intermixed 
C?V;  '■  - -2-  ■       • 
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from  central  collateral  files  to  which  all  consuming  agencies  continuously 
and  freely  contribute,  thus  giving  to  each  consumer  the  full  advantage  of 
national  resources.  ~ 
It  is  now  conceded  that  any  revival  of  the  CONSIDO  proposal  would  auto- 
matically entail  one  major  change:    CONSIDO  would.become  a  function  of, 
and  not  a  rival  to,  AFSA  itseli.    It  would  .not  be  a  separate  organization.  •  It 
might  thus  bring  in  its  train  advantages  other  than  those  outlined  in  the  pre- 
ceding paragraph,  such  as  resolution  of  the  present  dilemma  surrounding  the 
production  of  plain  text,  or  the  shortcomings  of  the  compromise  "beachhead" 
plan.   The  Committee  believes  that  the  proposal  has  sufficient  merit  to  justify 
a  recommendation  that  it  be  carefully  reviewed  by  the  new  COMINT  organi- 
zation with  the  purpose  of  arriving  at  a  decision  either  to  dispose  of  it  finally 
or  to  implement  it  in  whatever  form  seems  best  in  light  of  the  experience  of 
three  years  of  operation  that  have  intervened  since  it  was  first  put  forth. 
1-3  - 
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