SL mw megs meee a2, QL. 3 eR eatialed Fahne ge intollisencoe roquirog that tho Servico neonciou onjey in thoir dopuwrtnontys a powstion comprrablo to tho sine of tho tack avaigned to them. Jn ordor to be ublo to cerry out their responsibilities to their dupartmcnts and to mike en ceffoctive contribution towwd a coordinated national Jntelligcence ayeten, th. Service egencies wust work closely with tho planning and operatjonsl ateff.o and vo fully informed regarding departmontsal plans and policies. To meet adcguately thoir vital responsibilities and to maintain thoir proper position in tho departnontal otructure , tho Service intelligence agen- cies must do oteffod with quelifiod personnel. This was too little recegnizcd prior to tho last war, and upon the outbroak of hontilitics we found that wa were soriously deficient in numbors and quality of intolligonce officers. Vo did attempt to tako stepsto corroct thia situstion in the various intelligence schools and by acquiring personnel from efvilian Life to be trained ag intel- ligence officers. Recently, the importence of intelligence training has been more fully realized, and the Servicos have taken oteps to provide adoquate schools. In consequence, tho quality of both the intelligence officers end the attachos has improved in rocent yoars. ho theory of rotation in the Services hac been a handicap to sound intel- ligence work in that it militates against experience and continuity. An aosignront to intolligonce will probably last not more then four yesra, end Youally a shortor timo, This not only means that tho individual officer has aQifficulty in bocoming proficient in intolligonco, put that tho Service intel- ligonce agency is in danger of oufforing from a lack of continuity of loador- ship trained in intolligonco. For oxamplo, the Army Intolligonco Division has had sovon chicf's in seven yoars, and the recently formod Directorate of Intolligonce, Aix Ferco, hae alroady had two directors. 147 EP OS CE OPER Oe 50 VE TE ote 96S 8° TREES OP eee eergere (pte str e-em fo ee eenmewere, Mies ase oo: “ ume.
0 be Ce . wa ee eee et - jt Je nut ove purpose to ougyent onco More tho often discussed pounibs ty of en intelligence corp, wut wo Go bulievo that, If tho corps theory iu un- necoptible, Gong altorative method should bo developed viereby officers, al- though taking on oceanfonal tour of duly in comsind, operations or other staff positicns, will feol that dntolligence Jo tholr perreancnt ditercot and concen trato in it over tho mijor portion of their careers. In tho pout, capedlo officers havo not been attracted to intelligenco work duo to their bolief that intolligence wus a baciwater, might dolay promotion, and in any cvent would not furthor their careers. This tendency must be over- -come and officcrg made to foel that their opportunitics for advancement will not vo dupaired by an assignaent to intelligenco duty. Intelligence must be given preatige, and it must be made suificiently ettrac stive so that an officer will coek an intelligence assignment as he would one to command or operations. In addition to making a careor in intolligonce more attractive in the Services, it ia important to provide for tho training and evellability of ro- servo officors. There aro thousands of such officers togey vho, during the last war, wore in various intelligence egoncies or at overseas commands, end many proved of inestinsblo vyeluo. Thoir talents and their willingnoss to serve must net bo lost. In conclusion, wo wich to noto that a messuro of progrose has been mado in thet the Servico intelligeuco egencion have nanifoatod en inereased interest in intolligencoe and an attitude conducive to accomplishing tts offective COW ordinstion. Tho Sorvices aro conscious of thoir grave responoibllity for holp- ing to avert the danger of a national military cataotrophe , croatod dy modern nethods of warfare. They have como to rocognize tho nood for offectivo 14 tne mee omens mete e ee ae mens ene ste saee a Le wae ee amma ESS em remmel wammen eee Stes ast menemmmmnanen es ar ranne eg 68 * meme eaymmmmmg tern <9" 57 5"
\ coordination to the ond that tho Jatelligonce upon watch the natsonnl policy- Me, : . bE ee te omen Ae exkore mist act chall be tho very dont obtainablo fron overy aynilablo sources, This tendency on thoty part io in warked and cncouruging coutract to the situ- atjon which provasled not oaly Inuediatuly priox to our ontsy Jute Vorld War IY, put ovon in the early deuys of that conflict itealf. fo boliuvo that, given offoctivo losdership, tho full. cooperation of tho Service wgs.cioa in tho achiovezont of gomiinoe coordiretion can bo obtained. CONCLUSIONS AlG) RECOMMENDATIONS (1) Tho Service intolligence agencico havo uanifesated un increased in- toreat in intolligencs and an attitude conducivo to accomplishing ite effective : coordination. (2) In order to mect adequately their vital responsibilities and main- tain their proper position in tho dopartmental structure, the Service intelii- @ence agencive should be staffed with qualified pervomnel who concontrato in dntelligenca over the major portion of their careers. (3) In accordance with a program of coordination initiated end guided by the Contral Intelligence Agoncy, tho Sorvice intelligence agencios should con- fine thonselves principally to thone fields of intolligence in which they havo tho primary intereaot. (4) A moro active program of coordination by the Central Intolligence Agoncy would roovlt in a higher dogrese of contralizntioa and coordination of intolligonce production in fiolds where tho Sorvices havo a common intorost. (5) Thoro should bo offoctivo coordination botween tho worl of the Joint Intolligenco Comaitteo in tho field of military catimates and that of the Contral Intolligence Agency and Intelligence Advisory Conmittoo in tho fiold OF national eatimitos. eset — 149 | | THERE IS NO PAGE 150.
‘ THE INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATI CHAPTIER AU Tho State Dupertrant ina essignet dcstmunt tntorest in the colloction smi production of politiconl, cultural ani nocsological intelligence by the Hationnl Security Council. It noconsurily follows from this allocetion that 1% io tho ngoncy to which tho Contral Intelligence Agency and tho military services shovld turn to sscire tho roporta and estimitea thoy my requiro in those fioldu of intolligenco, Possibly we can best oxplein our ideas of tho State Department's role by a concrete but hypothotical illustration. Wo shall assuze, Tor examplo, that tho Socretary of the Navy, to proparo hinsolt to mest his resporsibilitiesa in comnoction with a vielt of navel units to the wostern Mediterrancan, desires a report on political conditions in Spain, To secure it, he wovld turn to his chiof of Navel IntelUgenco. The latter in turn chouwlé seek the desired in- formation froa the State Departmont, either directly or through the Central Intolligence Agoncy. He showld not try to get it fran his own intelligences analysts, any more then ho would expoct the State Dopartront to furnish from Sta own resources an estimate of tho etrength of tho Spanich Navy. The rFenson is obvious, Tho State Departmant io tho wuin repository of political inforin.- tion about Spain, It is aluo tho final arbiter of our attitude with roupoct to Spain, For tho Navy, our policy in this situation is a fact, anda vital fact, to vo takon Into account. If, te tako anothor hypothetical caso, tho National Socurity Council folt tho nood for an over-all oatimato of the Spanish situation -- an ostinato that would dinclujo not only political informbtion from tho Stato Dopartnont but 4 mos me ti} | | TR te an
ed arate? ee all wi itary er atratlegic olumonta au well -- then, a6 dndiented sore Sully in Chapter V, 4 national outiisate ehowd bo proparod dn tho Central Intolligenco Agoncy for revilow and approval by the Intellsconco Advisory Comnitvoo. Here vould bo brought tcgother the intolligonco rosourcoo of Stato, of tho military services, of tho Centrel Intolligenco Agency, and of any olhor agoncy ouuipnad to vako @ roul contribution on the uubjoct. Tho Stato Departmont roproconta- tive on tho Intolligonco Advirory Cormittoo would, of courne, shero in tho esponesbility for tho finel ostinato. Bocauco a tho intolligonce contribution which the State Dopartzent should te propared to rake to the Netionsl Security Council end to other Govornzsat agencios, “gncluding tho Contrel Intelligence Agency, the Dopartzont is called sapon to assuns en inportent role in the field of intolligence » 6von epart fron 4te task of supplying the inforzstion roguired by ita ow policy orficors. Ye havo examined the intelligences functions of the Stato Depsrtzent, and particu~ ‘larly the intelligence organization of the Department, mow as tho Research Intelligence staff, solely to dotormine how offoctivoly the State Departmont is organizod torset these outside intolligoncs requiromonta, perticularly those of tho Contrel Intelligence Agency. T1025 RESEARCH AND TATELLIGENCE STAIF Tho Rosoarch and Intolligonce staff is uniques anong the dopartmontal in- tolligonco egoncios for at loast two reavons. In tho firat place, it is an intolligonce agency Within an intolligenco agoncy, since the colloction and intorprotation af al) information boaring on our foroign rolationy io a primary Objective of the Dopartment ag a wholo and of ito officorsa in tho fiold, In the ovcond place, tho Rosoarch and Intolligunco staff was not ostublishod by
i ~~ dno Dupartmont tn Yusponse Lo keanly felt internasl nocda. It was tho rogull of tho trandfer to the Dopsarimont in Shs, of the Resuarch mud Amiysis anid tho Prosontestons Branches of tho OLfice of Strategic Survicus, AL tho hoad of tho Roseerch and Tuteliligenco otaff io a Spocial Agaluteant to tho Sucrotary, Tho staff iu divided into threo wiite: tho Office of tho Speci«l Agsisteit, cauprising soveral porronel suagictants end a rathor gub- stantial wit conducting resoarch in spocial source material; an Offica of JAbrerion and Intolligence Acquinition, and en OFT cs of Intolligence Rocoarch which 40 the intolligence preducing branch of the organizetion, Tho ressarch analysts in the Office of Intolligonce Resoarch are for ths most part porsons cf academic background, and many of thom are of high quality. In genoral, howevor, tho recruitment of first-reto intelligence analysts and other spocisiists has becomo increasingly aifficuls as the future cf tho hs- soarch and IntoLligenco staff became moro ani more uncortain, e Tho functions of the Resserch and Intolligonco atars, as officially co- finod, aro to develop end implemont a "comprohonsive and coordinated intolli- gonco program for tho United Statos;" and to develop and txplonont a siniler coordinated prozran for “positive foroign intolligenco" for ths Department, including procurozont of informtion and tho production of intolligence studios ani spot intolligonce, In addition, Rosvarch and Intelligenco is authorized to initiate instructions to Deparment officors abroad anc to detormino what infomation flowing into tho Dopartmont iu required for tho production of . “tdisoly intolligonce," ~~. Thio dufinition of functions and rouponslbilitivs doos not indicato tho 133 Tne, dd
. wae particular cind of "rosrea for poritivo foresen intel Uonce" which Rouvosreh and Tabell!ence will develop, In particular, Jt douu nol clearly dintdnguish votwoon fectusl studics and intelligonco outirrtea, ad it dova not give tho laff any oprcial authority or reaponusibility jn produchy iutolligenco, such ag tho intelligence ssuncios of tho military norvices cnfjoy in tholr roapsc- tivo dopartzonto, Tho chartor is brosd and vague, and invitco a varioty of 4ntorproteti ons, Tho intylligence reports which Research ani Intolliscnco proparos and ctrenlutes within tho Dopartnont aro cf sevoral different kinds, Thoy include intolligonces xomoranda, which cezpriso a bricf enalysis of information on current subjects; inform:tion notes, which are factusl reports involving little . interpretation or estimating; Office of Intelligence Research studies, which aro exhaustive swomrics of availablo information on subjects of particular . Bignificssce; poriodicel roporta, which are confined to factual reporting on oubjects of continuing interest; and situation reports, which comprise reviews of the politicel, economic and sociel oituations in foreign countries. With tho exception of situstion and periodical reports, the studios of tho Offico of Intelligenco Research aro propared, at least in theory, at the request of policy or other officors of the departront, Actuslly, many of thon uro written on tho initiativo of the Office itsolf, A majority are in princi- Plu roquosted by other offices in tho Dopartmont, but gonorally rosult from Proposals which tho Office of Intolligonco Resvsrch has mado and which havo Olicited an jimiication of interest which can gorvo as o “roquout." Tho situ- niton reports have ordinarily not beon prepared in rosponso to requonts, but Yo now Integrated with tho Kationnl Intolligonco Survey program (ovo Chaptor V1) in which Reavarch and Intolligence iu extonsivoly participating,
Tho quality of theas difforunt roports varlos greatly. Tho meaty erltd- claw of thea aru thet they tend to bo academe, am umredatad to drmuediate policy problems, end cro ofton too lenghhy oavl dotatlod to influenco  uny policy officers, It hea been obsarved that Rycourch wl Ditolligunco produces "PhD, intelligence,” sacholnctically adwirebdlo, but of sosovhat Mouted uso in the day-to-day formation of policy. Tho Policy Planning Steff end tho politicnl (goopraphical) deska and eco- nomic affeira offices of tho Donartmcent ara the princinal recipients and veers of Gach roporta, As indicatod oarlior, those offices roquost a relatively sited numbor of reports on their om initiative, end for the most part do sot i) conoider thon essential to their vork, It is opan to question whovhor Research and IntelUgoncs occupics 2 posi- tion in the Stats Dopartzsnt which permits 1% to pley om effoctive ena nocose uory role in the over-all intelligences picture of the Governmont, As wo have atatod, Research and Intolligence was, in offect, grafted uren tho oxioting organization of the Departmont. Thoro was no largo body of opinicn within the Department or the Foreign Service which keonly supported the contributions which an intelligence staff could mike to policy decisions. In ?uct thore weg substantial fooling that tho functionn callod "4ntolligonce"” were ut losat parallol. to, if not inclusive of, many of those alrosdy porformod by tho policy officon. For those roauons xeny morhbers of tho Dopartzont vore originally roluctant to mke uoo of tho physically soparato intelligonco staff, This aloofness iu confirmed by the failuro to bring the intolligunce or- G6arulzation into important policy councils. In viow of the spoctal nature of | tho Dopartuaat'a work, throughout which intolligonco and policy aro clonvuly 155 piineteite neat wacd
ee eT ere aw Jolnodl, thio fs underubandable, In any ovent, tho offect is to oablebliah the a ene mteremnnet omens” © §Jntollicunce olalf not sa the sole pource of Intylligunce wuilyoloa, but moruly ego one possible gourco which could be emplogod if tho policy eauthoritsog so dusirul, Tho intalligoncs otatf, In the cpinton of reiny podley officers, hau not voomui Ww offer tho Dopartimont eny uniquely signifiennt contributions which vould Justify its reguler and intensive cxmloyment. Tho procise function of Resoarch and IntoMigeneo in producing intolligenco roporto hae novor boon adequately dofincd, It has not toen medo clour whothor Ropoarch and Intelligence chould. limit ite6 activities to preparing exclusively factusl studics et the requoot of policy officers, or should produco intolli- 6once estiratos, Whatevor the designed scope of ita functions, Research and Intelligence has moved incroasingly during the pact year in the direction of intolligences .ostimating. In this rospect it has sought to assute & responsibility long accepted by the other departmental intelligoncs agencios. But its movement in this diraction kaa brought it into conflict with the policy officers of ite ovn Departront who consider it thoir own function to be the analysts of current problezs as woll as the formintors of our policies. Acconlingly, Rosoarch and Intelligence enters tho ficld of the. policy officors whon it prosonts esatirates of its own, which appear to analyze tho policy jizplications of a givon problom., Tho conflict ovor this agpoct of tho Research and Intolligonco role is most ovidont in regard to intelligence memoranda proparod by tho organization on more or loss currant dovolopmonta. Although such roports muy ryprosent a high dogree of analytic okill, thoy aro likely to bo xogardod by tho policy officor ag a unolons ropotition o 156
puferre:bion “lth which ho jo alronwly femliiar, or an wnvarrented abtGermpl to ty) hia whet he phould think about 2 problea undor his consid@oration, Yorhaps the moat tolling ovidence of the Depertientta attitudo tower tho pegourch wy Intelligence reports 49 the lino which eppesrs in tho printed honding of och: "Pug conclusions oxprossei here!dn ero based upon roounreh end wnalyois by tho Intelligence Orgenizstion, and do not noccusarily repregont dhe viows of othor officon of the Dopsrtrent of Stato." If, in fact, Research and Intolligenco doves prepare estinates, thero is tho possibility that on certain matters tvo or moro separate otudios or cuti- rates covering tho cere subject my oxist sinultancously in the Deparbrent. Tho Policy Planning Staff or tho geographical dosks, for example, are accus- toned to draft their own estimates quite iniepondcntly of Resacerch and Intel- ligonse, Yet Research and Intelligence, mowing thet a perticular matter is ono of gonoral concorn to policy officials, may prepare an estinite of its own. So long as theso remain in the State Department no direct harm my reswit, although tho duplication of offort and the oxistonce of unreconciled points of viow on tho sare subject may be undesirable, If, hovovor, as my woll occ.Y, the soparate catimates aro used outaido the Departrent in oautisfying the needs of the National Socurity Council, the Contral Intelligonce Agency, or the Sorvices, the possibility of confusion 1a obvious. INPELLIGHIC! RELATIONS DELWREN THe STATE DEPARTHERT AND OUTSIDE AGERCIES In tho futwro -- particularly if action is takon on our rocoriondJations for the olimination of much of tho migcollanoous political intolligonce work Now dono outside of tho Stato Departimont -- the lattor will be called upon me 222 fre ant more to mako intelligence contributions to the Scrvices, te tho q 157 H .
A sae 6 ee met i ater ae Ae Central Jntelligence Agency end to national jntelligence cotinatea. Then it will be Gowbly important that the renponsibslity for the State Nepartacnt'a conirsitutten be more clearly fined within tho Do artuent. Ouc poswiblo volution might be to limit the Reuocerch and Intelligence oteff to factual reporting and to place on the policy officeru of the Depart- ment the regponsibility for passing upon any political intelligence catinntca uced outside of the Department. Allernativoly these eatimaates might be prepared by Research and Intelligence end then paused upon by the appropriate policy officers of the Department before they go to the Central Inteliigence Agoncy or to other Governsent departments. A third soluticn might ve to allocate the personnel of Research and Intelligence among the policy offices (geographical @eoxs) of the Departzent or attach them to the “Policy Planning Steff and then Place on tke pelicy officers ox Plenning Sluff thé responsibility for State Department eatirates for tho Central Intelligence Agency or for other outside Government agencies, The State bepartwent should, of course, be protected from burdensome and unreasonable demands for political estimates from other agencies. If such call shold create a problem, the Intelligence Advisory Committee, on which the Deparizent will be represented, should exorcise ita ccordinating function to reduce the demands to munageable proportions. - Furthernore, the Department has a primary responolbility to exercise its Intelligence functions for the purpose of formulating ita own policies. It nust adopt the wethods andicchnigues which will best meet thin primary reapon- OMIMty. How this ia done ts not within our competence. Rowover, in working Out fis ow internal procedure, it io important to the over-all] intelligence
™. ~, Semin en, . . —neceetaniMrins. got-up mud partiowsrly to the propor Lfunctiondsg: of tho Contrat Intel gonce Agoney, With which this renorl Ja Innodintely canceinud, that tho State Dupart- pont uhovld cquup itnolf to moot the legltirnato request for political Inteli- gonco subaittiod by the Contral Intelligence Aguncy or olhur Govornuent, dntel- ligonco sgenciou anitooffect tho closor Maison with tho Central ThiteMisencse Agoncy which wo have recomended in this report, To moot thoos requirements vo rocerzond. that tho State Doparts:ont give conoidoretion to assigning to sex senior officer of tho Departront the func- tions of IntoLligenco Officer.* Such officor should havo tho prostigu, the authority, and the acceso to oporational and policy mattora which would cquip hin to guide tho proluction and control tho dtosomination of State Depurtrent intolligonco esatizatos, The Special Asoistant for Research and Inteclilsoncs and his staff do not today have such povors or position, Whether, in a given case, the intclligonss catimatog would exunato from tho Policy Planing Stafr, the political offices (gcogrephical dosks) » or froaa combinstion of the two, -pluo tho Research and Intelligenco staff, is a mattor for interns] Stato De- partrent dotermination. Tho appointment of en Intelligence Officor, with tho powers and functions wo have indicated, and with a moll but highly trainod ataf?, in our opinion, would roeult in a mora officiont system whereby tho Department could moot any logitinste noods of the Contral Intelligonce Agency and of othor Govormrent agencios for political intclligonco., In this way the Dopartrent could algo offoct cleser liaison with the Contral Intolligenco Agency and tho Servico ‘* Wo have usod the tern "Intelligence Officer - here for rongons of clarity omy. As a practical iatter and for occurity roagons somo olher and moro innosreus titlo would bo dooirabile.
annaisenticorinnsn ona ~ ayune lod, Thig J nbol genes OFfhevr would vorvo nu the Doparbrunt'o repro- pontative on the ruconubituled Intelligence Advinary Comalttce, doucribed in Chaptor TV, tp would also ect ea tho Department's pedncipal Ilaison of ficor for other rattorn concerning thy Contral Tntolligonco Agoncy, inchadlig liainon with ths Office of Policy Coordinstion an provided by tho National Securlty Cowell end with olher covert, aclivition of tho Contral Intolligonce Agyuncy «a pugcertod in this report, This Intolligonce Officor would combino the func- tions now boing handed by several] dopartmental officors or not being handled at ali, He should not, hovevor, stand bolwoon othor dopartment officers anid tho appropriato officials of tho Contral Intolligonecs Agency, bub ho should coordinato these relationships. For oxamplo, the varlous deske in the opor- ating end estimating wits of the Contral Intolligenco Agoncy should develop close vorking relationships with the corresponding geographical desks or othor - policy officers of the Department. We recognize that in recommending that tho political intelligence reports and ostinates be passed upon by the policy officers of the Departnuent, there is tho risk, which we discussed above in tho chapter on national estinetes, that those reports will be colored, possibly oven distorted, by ths policy projudices of thoss who preparo thom, As botwoon this danger and thet of having the roports preoparod by a group which is not thoroughly acqueintod with tho operational and policy decisions of the Department, wo chooso the forzor, We do so in tho hove that if the Contral Intolligonco Agoncy, and particularly. ita Fetinalos Division, and the Intolligonce Advisory Comittoo function 10 wo be- liovo thoy ghould, an opportunity will be affordod to challongo dopartwontal ootinatlos and to apyraise thom in tho light of reports available to mombors of tho Intolligence Advisory Committoo fro: other sources, (Seo Chapter Vv). Hero 160 : * s@umes aed Oa OTTER TE RE OG OO Ey SHURE meen mere rere =}
f tty bo ponsible to correct ontinatos of sry singe de;artiont that have jrono “overboard” for a particulsr policy Line vhideh from a prondor view of available facta my vo shown to bo wigound. CONCINGIONS AND RECCHOUADATIONS (1) The Stato Departizent, to which tho National Security Council has | agaigned dominant interest in the colloction end production of political, cultural and sociological intelligence, phovid oquip itself more adequately to noet the legitimite requironento of the Central Intelligence Agency and of other Govermzent intellisenco egonct es for such intelligence. (2) The specialized intclligonce atest? in the State Department, the Research und Intclligence staff, doos not now have sufficient curreat imowledge of departmental operations and policies to fwnish ; on behalf of the Depart- ment, the tasic estiratea which may be required by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Service intelligence asenciea. (3) The liaioon between the State Departusnt ard the Central Intelligence Agency should be closer and put on a continuing, ¢ effective b2eis. (4) To meet the foregoing requirements, consideration should be elven by the Departucnt to designating a high officer of the Department, who has full aceens tooperational and policy mtters, to act as §nteLligence officer. This officer, with a omall otaff, should process reguesty for dopartiontal inteLli- gonca received from tho Central Intellige once fgency and othor agencion and ace . that legitimate requests aro mot through the propiration of the requisite in- tolligence roporta or oatimutos by tho appropriste: dopartimental efficors, Ho should slyo act as continuisg Intelligence tintoon officer with tho Contral Intolligenco Agency and tho Servico intelligence agencies. THERE IS NO PAGE 162. pn tas tt we
AO teens CHAPTER AM CONCLUSION At the outset of thin report w: gave a bricf awmmary of our aurvey and findings, end at the vurilows chapter endinga we have addcd those conc}uulona end recomecmiations which vere appliceble to the subject mattlor of the chapter. We have been critical of the direction and adwiniotravion of the Central Intelligence Agency where we felt that there had teen fatlurcs to carry out its baaic charter. We have also pointed out what ve have judged to ve in- udcauacies in edministration and lack of over-all policy guidance within the organization. At no time, however, have we overlooked the great difficultice facing a relatively new and untried. orgenization whicn has been viewed with some suspicion and distruet even by those whom it should serve. We belicve that some measure of this suspicion and distruet is being dissipated and that what is needed today is for the Central Intelligence Agency to prove that 1t can and will carry out its assigned duties. Wo have propozed specific steps which can be taken toward this objective. The progrees of the Central Intelligence Agency should be continuously tested by the Hational Security Council against the accomplishment of the pur- porca of Sec. 102 of the National Security Act. That io to say, the Central Intelligence Agency should be prepared to show what is being accomplished:. (1) To coordinate the intelligence activitica of the Governnent; (2) o provide, in close collaboration with other governmental intclli- fenee agencica, for the central correlaticn of intelligence relating to the national pecurity; and wt ames, | 163 re Oe oe LO nn len a) a er rer rai hn in Canine a neorr oon)
oO ee ; f te (3) To perform the Intelligence and related services of common concur nsofgned to it by Une ational Security Council. Jn these Tields the Central Intelligence Ageney hag the duly to act. Tt hes veen given, both by Jaw end by Nattomi Security Council] directive, wide evthorlity, end it has the open invitation to veck from the National Security Council any acditionsl authority which may be esocntial. It wunt not wait to heave authority thruat upon it. Its besic mandate in clear. We recegnize that 44 wi}. require initiative ond vision to carry 1t out. Jf thic jo dono, we W311 have made a outiofectory start towure achieving ono of our most cesential defense requireccents, an adequate intelligence service. 164 te eee ee Te er or be rey ee
yt nen ee mg ge ANNEX 1 ‘ SURVEY GROUP TERMS OF REFERENCE I RATION SECURITY CoUNCIL WASHINGTON Fobruary 13, 1948 MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allen W. Dulles Mr. Mathies F. Correa Mr. Willien OH. Jackson SUBJECT: Survey of tho Central Intelligence Agoncy Oe oe en This 1s to confirm our undorstending thet you wilt gorve as the group to make a survey of tho Central Intelligence Agoncy, in accerésnce with the enclosed resolution approved by tho National Security Council. This memorandum is your authorization to proceed with this survey and, upon presontution by you, will constitute ea directive to tho Director of Central Intelligence end tho Intelli- gonce Chiers of the Dopartzents represented on the Council, to fur- nish you necessary information and facilitios es indicated in the second paragresh of the enclosed xesolution. Your willingness to participate in this vitally important survey is sinceroly appreciated by all renbers of the National Security Council. SIDNEY W. SOUERS Exocutivo Secretary Incl Ravionsl Security Councit Resolution 16S
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, RESOLULLOW Juenuary 13, 1948 ‘ The National Security Council has sgerced that a group of two or throo opocially qualified individuals not in the Govornacnt gorvice should male a comprchonsivo, izayartial, and objective gur- vey of the organization, activities, and personne) of tho Contral Intolligence Agency. As a result of this survey, this group should roport to the Council ite findings and recomendations ‘on tho fol- lowing matters: a. Tho adequacy and effoctiveness of the prosont or- ganizational structwre of CIA. b. Tho valuo and efficiency of existing CIA activi- tios. , ec. The relationship of those activities to those of othor Deparimonts and Agsncies. a. The utilization and qualifications of CIA personnel. The National Security Council also authorized and directed tho Director of Centrel Intelligence and tho Intelligence Chiefa of the Departments represented on the Council to give the ebove sroun access to ell information and facilities reauired for thoir survey, except details concerning intclligence sources and methods. 166 er et ha eee A UG LNET S O8s OEE AS
17 tm aremem mers oy ANNIEX 3 PRESIDENTIAL LETTER CREATING THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE WITTE HOURS ASN IIGTO!U January 22, 1046 To The Secretary of State Tho Secretary of War, and , . Tho Secretary of the Kavy . ' 1. It is my desiro, and I hereby direct, that 211 Foderal foreign intelli- gonco activities be plenned, developed end coordinated so as to assure the most offective accomplishment of tho intelligenco mission related to the nationel security. I horeby designate you, tegatner with enothor pergon to be named by ro as my personal representative, as the Nationel Intelligonce Authority to accomplish this purpose. - 2. Within the limits of available appropriations, you shall each from tims to time eusign persons end facilities from your respective Departusits, which porsona shall collectivroly conn. # Central Intelligence Group and shall, under the direction of a Director of Contral Intelligence, assint the National In- telligenco Authority. The Director of Contral Intelligence ehell be desig- natod by :29, snall bo responsible to the National Intelligence Authority, and shall sit as a non-voting member theroof. : 3. Sudject to the existing law, and to. tho direction and control of the National Intelligenco Authority, ths Director of Contral Intelligence shall: a. Accomplish the corrolation and evaluation of intolligence rolating to tho national nocurity, and the appropriate dissemination within the Govorrsont of the rosulting utrategic and national policy intelligence. In so doing, full uso shall bo wide of tho utaff and facilities of the intolligence agoncics of your Dopartmonts. b. Plan for tho coordination of such of tho activitios of the intol- ligenco agencies of your Departisonts ao rolate to the national sacuwity and rocommond to the National Mitolligoncs Authority the ostablishnont of auch ovor-all policiou end obfectives us will asouro tho most of- foctive accozpliokent of tho national intelligonco mission. 6. Porform, for tho bonofit of onid intolligonco agoncios, such nervicos NN of common concern a6 tho National Intelligence Authority dotorainogy can bo more officiontly accemplishod centrally. 169 at ela ree hie eee eR ETE Tere eee ee Eee NOS cnecet tegen ies cee et ee Some Oo as ce eee meet Re Hee ee EE Emre sem oe
a. Yorfors ouch other functions and dutios related to intelligunes af- | focting the netfiomw:) security as tho Progidunt and tho Rational Intells- gence Autzority my fren timo to tims direct. 8. No nelico, Isw onfercaxont or Intermal socurity functions shall ve ox- a z " e oreised uncor this dirsctive. 5. Such intelligence rocuived by tho into). Ligonco agoncian of your Dopart- ones ag my be desljnnted by the ational Intelligence Authority ohail bo Srcoly availsblo to tho Director of Central Ditolligunce for correlaticn, oxyelvation or dissemination. Yo tho extent epproved by the National Intol- igoncs Luthoritz, the opsrations of oaid intolligunce cgencive ohall bo open to inapoctica by the Diroctor of Contral Intelligence in connection with pinnning functions. G. Tho existing intolligonce egoncics of your Dopartsrente chal continuo to collect, oveluete, correlete and disseminate doparimentsl intolligence. 7. The Director of Centrel Intolligence shall be aaviaed by en Intelligence Advisory Bosra consinting of the herds (or their ropregentetives) of the principal military and civilien intelligence agencies of the Government having functions related to national security, aga determined by the Rational Intolligonce Authority. . 8. Within the scope of existing lew and Presidential directives, other do- " partments and egencies of the executive branch of the Federal Government ehall furnish such intolligence information relating to the naticnal security eo t6 in thoir pssseasion, and as the Director ef Central Intelligence may fro: tine to time request pursuant to reguletions of the National Intelligence Authority. . 9. Rothing herein shall be construcd to authorize the making of investiga- tions inside the continental limits of the United Ststos and its possessions, excopt as provided by law end Presidential airoctives. 10. In the conduct of thoir activities the national Intelligencsa Authority and tho Director of Contrel1 Intelligence shall be responsible for fully protecting intelligence sources and mothuda. Sincerely yours . / af Terry Troman
ame ey my ee SURVEY GROUP TERMS OF REFERENCE 0 NATIONAL SECUNITY COUNCIL WASHING?OU « March 17, 1948 MEMORAIDUM FOR: Kr. Allen W. Pulles Mr. Mathias F. Correa Mr. Willicn HN. Jackson SULJECT: Survey of the Contxal Intelligence Agoncy - 1. Ihave already sent you e& memorandun with the terms of the resolution of the ational Security Council providing that a eurvoy srould be =ade of the activities of the Central Intolligence Agency and its reletionsaip to other Depertusnts end Agencies. 2. Asa reault of our further discussions on this aub- ject, 1t may. bo holpful if I set forth my ucderctanaing regemiing the scope of the survoy and the procedures to be followed. ‘ 3. The survoy vill comprise primarily a thorough end comprehensive oxsnination of the structure, administration, ectivities and inter-agoney relationships of the Centre] Intelligence Agency aa outlined in tho resolution of tho National Security, Council. It will alco include sn exezination of such intelligenco activities of otner Government Departments end Agencies ae rolata to the national secur- ity, in ordor to mke recomucndations for their offective operation and ovor-all coordinetion, subject to the wndorstanding that the group will not engsgo in an actual physical exsmination of departmental in- tolligence operations (a) outoide of Washington or (b) in tho collec- tion of communications intelligonco. On dexalf of the Kations) Secur- ity Council I will widortake to eeok. the coopersiion in this survey of those Government Dopartments and Agencics not representod on the Coun- cil vhich have an intercst in intolligencs as relistoo to national socurity. 4%. It should bo undorstood that tho awrvoy of tho Central Intolligenco Agency and its rolationshiy to othey Dopartments and Agen< cfas will bo done for and with tho authority of the National Sucurity Council. Tho nurvoy of tho intolligonce ectivities of tho Durartmonts of State, tho ary, tho Navy, and the Air Force, howover, will be for and vith tho authority of tho respective hoada of thooo Dopartironta. \ , . 167 \
Lott a 5. The survey creep wILL oubait from time to Ufo roacon- Joe t reiwdalions on futividenl preklene which need to bo brought to the ate teutien of the Council or tha huads of thy renpestivo Derirebmenta and. Aguncles censerncd. Problenn cencersing Chi vila be given priority ovor thoso involving cthor Agoncius. Tt fa contemplated that tho sur- voy will bo ceaploted and final report gwtustted on or before dunuery 1, 4s. ‘ . 6. It is ny understanding that at your requeat Hr. For= restal hes egresd te lend to tho investigating group the services of Mr. Robert Blum to hosd tho steffi work. I vould aepreciato tho group's savico a3 to additions) utaff wombera 1t may roquiro in order thet I ray clear then for thic vork. Tho rembora of tho staf, vhen cloercd by thy heeds of the Agencies concerned, will be given acccs5 to information ard facilities roqguired for the survey jn tho cane manner 43 provided for your grovp in tho Council's resolution. 7. Compensaticn and expenses fer the members of the in- vestieating group and its ctaff will be paid for out of funds evail- eble to the Kational Sucurity Covncil and the Contral Intolligenco Agency. a 8. I will be pleased to render 50 far as practicable any furthor esaistance which you my require in conducting your ourvey. SIDNEY W. SOURS FExecutive Secretary
ANNEX 4 NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 (PUBLIC LAW 253 - 80th CONGRESS) CENTRAL INTELLICRHICE ACRICY Sec. 102. (a) Thero is horeby established undor tho National Socurity Counci] 4& Central Intelligence Agency with a Diroctor of Central Intelligence, who ohell be the heed taereof. Tho Dirocter shnll be apnointed by tho Presi- dent, by and with the edvico and consunt of the Sumte, fro among tha com- nissioned officers of ths armod servicos or fren among individunio in civiilisn life. The Director choll recoivo caaponcation at the rate of $14,000 & you (b) (1) If a comzissioned off icor of the arized sorvicos is appointed ag Piroctor then-- (A) 4in the performance of his duties as Director, he shall ve subject to nosupervision, control, restriction, orpronibition (military or other- wise) other than would be operative with respect to him if ho woro 4 ci- vilian in no way comected with tho Depsrtment of the Army, the Depart- ment of tha Navy, tue Devartrent of the Air Force, or the armod services or any coaponent thereof; and (B) he shall not possess or oxerciso any supervision, control, powers, or functions (other than ouch eo he possesses, or is authorized or direct- ed to exercise, as Director) with respect to the armed services or eny component thoreor, the Department of tho Army, tho Department of the Navy, or tho Department of the Air Force, or any branch, buresu, unit or divi- Bion thereof, or with respoct to any of the personnol (milit vary or civili- jan) of any of the foregoing. (2) Except as provided in paragreph (1), the appointzent to tho office of Director of a commissioned officor cf the armed services, and his acceptance of and sorvico in such office, ahall innoway affect any siatus, office, rank, or grade he may occupy or hold in tho armed uarvicos, or any e@nolwiont, por~ quicite, right, privilege, or benefit incident to or arjoing out of any auc! status, offico, rank, or grade. <Any such ceszisstonod officor shall, wiailo porving in tho.office of Diroctor, recoive tho military psy and allowances (active or rotired, as the caso may bo) payable to a comzisyotloned officer of hio grade ana length of vorvice and shall bo paid, from any fundo available to dofrny tho exvonses of the Agency, anaes) canponsation at a rate egal to tho azount by which $14,000 oxceeds the amount of his annual military pay and Aallovancea. (c) Notwithstanding tho provinions of soction 6 of tho Act of August 24, IS (37 Stat. 555), or tho proviafons of any othor law, tho Director of Contral Intolligonce ny, in hie discretion, terminate tho employnent of any officer or asployoo of tho Agoncy whoncver no ahall deca such tormination Nocendary or advicablo in tho intorests of the United Staten, but ouch ‘iv
derninition Gell not affect the rspht of such officer or employee to reel or acec yy Employment In sng: other departinent or gency of the Goverrmrzent Jf gecdnred elfyivie for ouch expleysent by thu United Status Civil Gorvices Cane miggion. (a) For the purpose of coordinsting the intelligence netivities of tho gereral Government departments and agcncstos da the interest of miticaal aucu- yity, it shel) te the duty of the Agency, undor the direction of tho National Sociurity Cowiwil-- (1) to advice the Nations] Security Council in mattero concerning ouch intelligence activitios of tha Govornzent departuvate and egencica ep roluto to muationsul coecwity; (2)- to mae receznonéatione to the National Socurity Council for tho ccordination of such intelligenco activitics of the @epartmonts and agencies of the Covernzent as rolute to the nationel eocurity ; (3) to corrolate and ovaluete intelligence relating to the naticnsl socurity, and provide for tho appropriate dinrosiuetion of auch intcl- Jigence within the Coveranent using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities: Provided, That the Avency chell heve no police, suopoens, law-onforcezisnt powers, or internal-cecurity Punctions: Provided further, That the cepartiments und other egencica of tho Governtont ehull continus to collect, evaluate, correlate, ond disseminate departmental intelli- - gonse: And proviced further, Tret the Director of Contra] Intelligence shull be respensiolo for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unsutnorized disclosure; - (4) te perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence egen- cies, such eddition:l services of common concern &8 the National Secvrity Council dotermines can de moro efficiently accomplished centrally; (5) to perform such other functions and duties rolatea to -intelli- gence affecting the national security 4s ‘the National Security Council may from time to tine diroct. (ec) To tne extent recomacnded by tho “ational Security Council end eap- proved by tho President, such intelligence of the departments and agensics of tho Governzent, oxcept as hereinarter provided, rolating to tra nationsl pocurity shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Centra] Inteili- gonce, and such intelligence as relates to tho national security ana ts possosyeea by such departzonts and other agencies of the Govermnent, oxcept as norein- after provided, shill be rade availeble to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination: Provided, hovayver, That upon tho written request of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Fedoral Bureau of Investigntion shall muke available to tha Director of Contyal Intellisense such information for correlation, ovaluitioa, and dis- semination as ray bo essential to the nationsl security. _ (f) Fffoctivo when tho Director firut appointed under subsection (a) has takon of fico-- 7 (1) the Nation] Intolligonce Authority (11 Fod. Rog. 1337, 1339, Fobruary 5, 1946) shall conse to oxint; and ° (2) tho peruonnol, proporty, and rocords of tho Contral Intelligonco Group aro transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency, end guch Group ahall cease to oxist. Any unexpended balances of appropriations, alloca- tiona, or olher funds avalluble or authorized to bo mido avaflablo for euch Grey ehall bo avaslable and shall be authorized tobo mide availublo in like miner for oxpeniiture by tho Aguncy. . . 172 ar sy A ee, SR 732%
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ANNES. 6 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY PERSONNEL STRENGTH AS OF 24 DECEMBER 1948 74
eS TT ANNEX ‘ NATIONAL SECURITY COURCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1 | DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES December 12, 1947 Purvuant to the provisiona of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, and for the purysses envnciated in paragrephy (a) and (0) thereof, the Netionel Security Council hereby authorizes end directo that: 1. To raintein the relationship cesontiel to coordination between the Central Intelligence Agency and-the inteilsgence orgenizationa, «an Intelligence Advicory Cozmittce consisting of the renpective intelligence chicfs from the Repartmentn of State, Arsy, Navy, and Air Force, end fron the Joint Staff (JCS), ami the Atomic Energy Commission, or their repre- ‘ pentatives, ahall te esteblirhed to advice the Director of Central Intel- ligence. The Pirestor ef Central Intelligence will invite the chief, or his representative, of any other intelligence Agersy heving functions re- lated to the national security to sit with the Intolligence Advisory Com-~ mittee whenever matters within the purview of hia Agency are to be diacussed. . ‘ 2. fo the extent authorized by Section 102 (e) of the National Security Act of 1947, the Director of Centrel Intelligence, or ropresen- tatives designated by hin, by arrangemen*t with the head of the department or agency concerned, shall make auch surveys and inspections of cepart- mente] intelligence material of the various Federal Departments end Agen- cies releting to the national security en he may deem necesnary dn con- nection with hie duty to advice the NSC and to make recommendations for the coordination of intelligence activities. . %, Coordination of intelligence activities should be designed pri- marily to strengthen the over-all governmental intelligence structure. Primary departicental requirements shall be recognized and ohoall receive the cooperation and support of the Central Intelligence Agency. a. The Director of Central Intelligenco chall, in making rec- ommendations or giving advice to the Nations) Security Council per- daining to the intelligence activitics of the vartous Departnents anid Agencico, tranemit therewith a statement indicating the concur- rence or non-concurrence of the members of tho Intelligence Advisory Committee; provided that, when unanimity lo not obtained acong the Departinent heads of the Rational Military Establishuent,the Director of Central Intelligence shall refer the provlem to tho Secrotary of Yefensc veforo presenting it to the NationaL Security Council. hb. «Recommendations of the Director of Central Intolligenco shall, when approved by the National Security Council, issue 4a Counst] Gireetives to the Diroctor of Contral Intolligence. The 175 eT ee aved
176 roupcective “{ntolligomze chivfu chal) be ronponnible Yor ineurdrnyy that nvch orderu or diroctivea, when applicable, aro inplemsntod within theiy intelligence organizations. c. Tho DMircctor of Contral Intelligence shall act Sor tho Nationn). Security Council to insure full and proper inplenontation of Council diroctives by inuuing ouch supplementary DOL dircetivea ao may bo required. Such inmlensnting directives in waich tho In- tolligence Adviusry Comaltteo oonsura unsenlmonsly shall be ioeusd by the Director of Central Intelligence, end ahall be inplementec with- in tho Deyartents and Agenciag as provided in paragraph b. Whero divegrecont eriscs botween tho Direcstor of Central Intelligence anc ono or moro menters of the Intulligense Advisory Conmaittce over such directizes, the proposed directive, together with otstements of non- concurrence, shell be forvardod to tho KS for decision as provided in paregroph &. h, Whe Director of Central InteLligenco chall vroduce IntelLigonco relating to the naticnsl security, hereafter referred to ao metioncl in- telligence. In so far as practiceble, he shall not duplicats the intol- ligense setivities and research of the various Departzents end fgencie but phell make use of exioting intelligence facilitien and shall utilize . departzents)] intelligence for such production purposes. For dcfinitions seo KSCID No. 5. 5. Tho Director of Central Intelligence shell diosezinete National Intelligence to the President, to embers of tho Rational Sosurity Coun- cil, to the Intelligence Chiefa of the IAC Agencies, anc to ouch Csovern- menial Departments and Agencies as the National Security Council from tine to time may designate. Intelligence ao cissenminated chall be of fi- cially consurred in by the Intelligence ‘Agencies or shal) carry an egreed statement of substantial dissent. 6. When Security Regulations of tho originating Agency permit, the Director of Central Intelligence shall disseminato to the Federal Bureau of Invostigstion and other Departments or Agencies inteliigence or intol- ligence information which he msy possers when he deems such dicscnination appropriate to their functions relating to.tho national secwrity. 7. The Director of Central Intclligenco shall perform for the bene- fit of the existing intelligence Agencies such cervices of cemion concern to there Agencice as tho Rational Security Council dotormines can bo moro officiently accomplished contrally. 8. The intolligence organizations in oach of tho Departments and Agencios shall waintain with the Central Intelligence Agency snd with ensh other, ag appropriate to their rospoective responsibilitios, ao con- qamuing interchango of intolligenco information and intelligence availublo Oo thom, 9. Tho intelligence fileg in oach intolligence organization, in- Cludsug the CIA, shall bo mde available under sucurity rogwlationg of tho Departxont or Agoncy concernod to tho othera for congultation. Si wcewen dees eee etme nae sew Wo es He) come anmnreme smear aman Se Sete 0 te wr on Ee RS! Bese Pen sen mre TS an ~ _
ee 10. Tho intelligonce oryinizations within the limita of thesr capa~ bilities ahall provies, or prosuro, auch inte) lLiggnce an miy bo requsatad by the Director of Central Intelligence or by onu of tho othor Depart- monty or fgonc les. oa we lL. Tho Dircctsr of Centre) Intolligence shall meko  arrangemente with tho reepective Devariscnty and Agoncics to ayetyn to tho Cantral In- tulligonce Agency aush experfeneed and quelificd officers and mombero ay nny bo of adventage for edvicory, oporational, ox othor pwrposea, in ad- dition to savch personnel ey tho Director of Central Intelligence may di- rectly czploy. In cach caso, such departszsntal pernonnel will te oubjoct to tho neccusary perconnel proceduros of cach Department. a eae a 177 Reach emote te 6 teh tare tas lil Mae
a ANWEX 8 yor NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE HO. 2 COORD JATION OF COLLECTION ACTIVITIES ABROAD January 13, 1948 The folloxing over-all policics and objectives “aro ontablished by the tetionsl Security Council for the intordepsrtmental coordination of foreign Sntelligence collection ectivitics, co that moavures may be taken promptly to offect wound and efficiont utilization of the various depertiontal collecting and roperting facilities abroad: 1. hore chall bo en ellocetion within cortain broad categorios of agency reaponsibility for collection soroad, as follows: Political. . .. . . Department of Stsie Cultwel . .%. . . . Dopartzent of Stato Sociological ... . Department of State Military .... . . Departnont of tho frm Naval. . . . .. . « Dopsrtmont of tke Navy Air. . . « « « « « « Deparimont of tre Air Force ~ Economic ) | Selentafi ). . « Eech agency in accoréencs . Technological ) with its respective needs 2. All aveilable intolligence informaticn, no mattor by whom col- lected, shall, wherevor poseible, be transmitted immediately to tho field representative of the esency most concerned. However, the collector may aluo send copics to oy otherwise inform his own agency. 3. The senior US ropresentative in each foreign arca where’ the United States maintains a foreign post shall, within tao svirit of the pinricples cnimeiated harein, be responaible for the coordination of all normal collection activitica in his area. 4, §=Tho collecting and reporting cacilitien of each of the egencies shall bo utilized go as to avoid unproductive duplication end uncoordi- nated overlap and to insw'o within budgetary limitations that full flow of intollisence information which in tho major neod of all depsrtments and agencies for the accomplishient of thofr reopective missions. 5. Full utilization shall bo mado of tho individual initiative and favorable contacts of agancy ropresentatives. — 6. No interprotation of theno catablished over-all. policios and objectives hall nagate thy basic principlo that all devartmental repro- Sentatives atrond ava iudividually ranporsible for the collection and for Wo auproprinta trananiaafen to thatr departmonte of ell intelligenco in- formation pertinent to thoir dopartmauntal misations, . 20 SETA EIEN ELL IN EM
. ; \ 7. There ol be free and unrestricted Interdepartrontal exchange of intolligence Information to moot the recoxnized secondiry needo of cesh departzent and escney Sor intelligance usuelly obtained or propared by other departncnts or agonctci. ory . . - 179
rt LY. ANNEX 9 7 NdTIONS), SECURITY COUNCHL, INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 3 COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION Jamuury 13, 1948 Yurmant to the rrovinicas of Section 102 of the Hetionil Security Act of agh7, ani fer the purpesen onunciated in paregraphs (ad) and (c) thervof, the litJonsl Security Council hersty authorizen and directs that the folloving over-cll policies and objectives are cotebiished for the coordinatien of tho predustion of intelligence: l. In order that ell factlitics af the Government moy be utilized to thoir capzcity and the rcsponsibilitics of each agency mny be clesriy de- . fined in accoréance with its minsicn, dominant interest, and capadilitics, the whole ficld of intelligence production is divided into the following categories, and responsibilities are allocated as indicated: - a- Basic Intelligences (2) Basic intelligence 1s that factual intelligence which results fron the collation of encycloredic information of a more . Gt less permanent cr static nature ani general interest which, as a reault of evaluation and interpretation, is determined to be the best available. (2) An outline of all tesic intelligence required by the Goverment ohall be prepsred by the CIA in collaboration with the _ approprinte agencies. This cutline shzll be broken dam into chapters, sections, and oub-sections which shall be allecated as production and r2intemince respenyibilities to CIA and those agencies of the Government which aro heat qualified by reason or their intelligence requirerents, production capabilitics, and dominent interest to assume the production and maintenance rosponoibility. (3) Whon cowpleted, this outline and tentative allocations of proluction end mwiintenance responsibilities chall be sub- mittoa for HSC epprovel and issued as an implomentation of this Diroctive. It is oxpected that aa the -result of constant con- oultation with the agencies by tho Director of Central Intelli- gouco, beth tho outline and tho allesationa will be revised from timo to time to insure tho preduction of the basic intelligence roquired by tho agencies and the fullest ponsiblo use of current agoney capsbilition Changes in the cutling or allocations shall vo offected hy ugreemont betwoon the Director of Cuntrel TIntelli- gence and tho agencies concerned. 10
(4) Mila tanie Sntolligence shall be: compilod pnd continuous. ly wiintsined fn Ratfounal Intelligence Surveys to cover forcisn countricn, wrens, or bread apecial mibjecta an appropriate. The Katierwa) Intelligence Surveyn will be disseminated faoguch feria ag shall bo determined by tho Directcr of Central Intelligence ‘ and tho ugencics concerned. (5) Tho Directer ef Centrel Intolligenco ohall be respon- Bible for coordinating praduction and miuinteminace and ler aceom- plishing tho cditing, publication, end dinsemination of these Hetional Intelligence Surveys end shall reko such requ:nats on the egenciop an ere noccossry for thoir proper development and miintenenco. (6) Dopartrente or agencies to be called on for contribu- tions to this underteking my include egencics other than those represented permanently in the LAC. ‘ . db. Current Intelligence (1) Current intelligence is that spot informaticn or intel- ligence of ‘all tyres and forms of inmediate intorest and valuo to operating or. policy staffs, which is used by them usually without the delays incident to complete ovaluation or interpre- tation.” . (2) The CIA and the several. agencies ahall preduce and disseminate such current intelligence ac may be neceeszry to meet their own internal requirerentsa or external responsibdilitics. (3) Interegency dissemination of current intelligence shall be based on interagency egreement including RSC Intelligence Directive No. 1 and the principle of informing all who nccd to " knew. c. Staff Intelligence (1) Steff intelligence is thac intelligenco prerered by any department or egency threugh the correlntion and interpretation of all intelligence ‘issterials available to it in créer to moct ite specific requiresents and renoponsibilitics. (2) ¥ach intelligonce agency has the ultinate responsibility for tho preparaticn of such staff intelligence aa its om depart- ment ahall require. It ig rocognized that the staff invollicence of cach of tho departments must be bronder in ucoye than any Allocution of collestion responsibility or rocogniticen of doul- nant fulorest might indicate. In fact, tho full fereign intel- ligenco picture ia of intercut in varying degrees at different times to cach of the dopurtmonts. scenes pts ES 181 cosh ean ae Se erocealinls® ame renee on diaheeial
(3) Any Intelligence esency, oither through tho Directear of Contral Inellinonce or asrostly, may eal] upoa other appropriato agoncien Tor jatelligonsey which @ces not 3.1 within it6 awn ficld of duainent intureat. Such requensto Gh: bo made up/en tho agoncicn inaccordunsg with thyix production capabilitios and ‘ dominant intoronst. . (4) Asa part of tho coordination progran, tho Dircctor of Contrel InteLligonso will neok tho ussintanco of tho TAC Iatol- ligence agencies in wininizing tho noccasity for any agoncy to . Govolop intelligence in fields outside its doaiisnt intoronte. (5) Tho CIA and the egoncios chall, for purposea of coordi- nation, oxchango inforrztion on projects end plans for the pro- duction of staff intelligence. — . (6) It ehsll de normal practice that eteff intelligence of one agoncy ie availebleto tho other intelligence agoncies perna-~ nently reprecentcd on the IAC. +.  @. Departmental Intelligonce . (1) Departmontal intolligence is that intelligence including basic, curront, andi staff intelligence neséed by a Devartment or {ndopenient Asency of tho Federal Governrent, and the subordinate wnits thereof, to execute its misbion and to discharge its lewrul responsibilities. ‘ . ‘@. National Intolligence (1) Wationel intelligence is integrated departuental intel- ligonco thet covers the brosd aspects ‘of national yolicy and national security, is of concern %o more than one Department or Agoncy, and transconds the exclusive conpotenco of a single Dopartmont or Agency or the Militery Establishment. (2) Tho Director of Central Intelligence shell produce and dissoninate national intelligence. (3) The Director of Contral Intolligenco shall plan and dovolop the praiuction of national intolligence in coardination with tho IAC Agoncios in crdor that he may obtain from then within tho limits of thoir cxpabilitios the departmental intel- Ligonco which will‘essist him in the preduction of naticnal intolligonco. (4) Yo Diroctor of Central Intelligence shall, by agreement ‘with the portinont Ayoncy or Agoncios, roquest and receive such Wpocinl eatimites, roperts, and poriedic briefo or sumrarica propuared by tho individunl Dopartmonts or Agencica in their ficlds of dominant “ interoot or in accordance with thoir pretuction —"
ee — ee capabilitiaa as miy ba nocensary ja tho gonco reports os ecutinatos undortakoa mutually. 2. Tao rescarch faciliticn roauired by eny agency to preseun ita ewn current and staff intellisenco ahall be udoquato to antin’y ite iidi- vidusl needs aftor taking full cognisanco cf tho facilition of tho other agencice. Zech agoncy ahall erdesvorto usiniain adoquito rovenrch facili- tiou, not only to accesplich tho intelligenss preduction tasks ullocatod to it directly under tho foregoing provisions but alvo to provide nuch additionnl intelligence ruporta or onotimaten within ite field of .dowinant intorest eo ray bo necescary to suttefy tho requirezontsa of tho cthor agercios widor such allocations. 3. For the purposes of intolligence proiuction, tho following divi- sion of interests, subject to refinerent throush ea continuous program of coordination by tho Dirocter of Central Intolligence, ohall sorvo ac a general dolineation of dominant interosta: Political, Culturel, Sociological Intelligence. .Department of Stato Military Intelligonce........Departzent of tho Arny Naya) Intelligence. ..........Departront of the He Air Intelligonco.............Departmont of the Air Force Economic, Scientific, and Each agency’in eccord- Technological ‘ance with ita recvective Intolligense..........6.+. needs 103 preduction of intelli- 7 ~~
wn / ; 3” cca neces ARNEX 10 NATIONAL SECURITY COURCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO, 4 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES Decenber 12, 1947 Purnuent to the vrovicions of Section 102 (a) (5) of the Netioual Security Act of 1G{ and for tho pursone of providing intelligence suyrort for the preperation of studies required by the Tietionsal Security Council in the ful- {illszent of ita dutics, it is directed that: l. ‘he Dircctor of Centrel Intelligence, in colleboration with the other agencies concerned; ahell peeceroe & comyrchonyire outline ef national intelligence objectives appliczblo toforaizn countxeies end areas to servo aca euice for tho cocrdinsted collection and production of National Intelligence. . . 2. The Director of Central Intelligence, in collaboration with the other agencies concerned, and under the guidence of the NSC Starf* chell select from time to time and one current besis sections end items of such outline vweich have a priority interest. These selections will be issued by the Director of Central Intelligence to supply the desired priority @uidence for the proéuction of National Intelligence by the Central In- telligenca Agency and for the contributions to such production by other agencies concerned. TE ND * Yor thia vorvose, the NSC Staff chell consist of the Executive Secrotury and tho Depurtmontal reprosentativea dealgnated by Council members to edvise and Meaist the Fxeentive Secretary. Any cuces of dirugsreament within thio group Will ba referred to the Eettonal Security Council for dectoton. ot YEE
a” ANHEX 12 YO WATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRICTIVE HO, 6 FORZICN WIRELESS AND R420 MONS OninG December 12, 197 Purizmant to the vrovinions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of “UGk{. and for the perpoaco cnunciated in paregrapha (a) end (c) thereof, the Hetionul Security Cowieil hereby authorizes and directs that: 1. The Director of Central Intelligence shall conduct all Federal monitoring of foret@n propagunda and press broadcasts required for the collection of intelligence inform:tion to meet the needs of e)]] BDepart~ menty and egencics in connection with the National Sccurity. 2. The Director of Central Intelligence’ shall disseninzte such in- telligence information to the various Departments end Agencies which have an authorized interest therein. , AR TN Or F 1&6
ANNEN 1] ee NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INVELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 5 ESPIONAGE AND COUNTERESPIONAGE GPERATIONS December 12, 1947 Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 (ad) of the National Security Act of 1947, the Rational Sccurity Council hereby autkorizes and directa that: 1. The Director of Central Intelligence chall conduct 411 organized Federal csrionnge onsretions outside the United Stater ard its possesaionn for the collection of foreign intelligence ini'ormation reauired to mect the necds of G11 Devartments and Agencico ey in connection with the national security, except fox certain ‘sad activitics by other apartunents and Agencics. ' 2. The Director of Central Intelligence shall conduct all organized Federal coumter-espionsge operations outside the United States and its possessions ané in cccunied areas, provided that this authority shall not be construed to preclude the coummter-intelligence activities of any ery, navy or eixr command or ineteallation end ceritsin agreed ectivities by De- partments and Agencies necessary for the security of such organizations. 3. The Director of Central Intelligenc . @ shall be responsible for coordinating covert and overt inteliigence collecti - 28 on activitics. h, When cesusl agents are exnloyed or otherwise utilized by an LAC Department or Agency in other than an overt capacity, the Director of Contral Intelligence shall coordinate their activitios with the organized covert activitica. 5. The Director of Central Intelligence shall disseminate such in- telligence information to the various Departmente and Agencies which heave an authorized intercst therein. 6. All other National Security Council Intelligence Directives or implementing Gupp?cnents shall be construcd to apply solely to overt in- telligence activitics unless othorwise specificd. Se 1S al
RATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGERCE DIRECTIVE NO, 7 ANNEX 13 DOMESTIC EXPLOITATION Fobruery 12, 1948 Mwsvant to the provisiona of Soction 162 of tho National Security Act of 1947, and fer the purpeno crmunciated in ypsragraphe (d) and A (e) thorcoi’, tho Mationsl Security Counsil horeby uuthorizens end directs that 1. The Contrel Intelligence Agency shell be rosponsible fer tho exploitation, on a highly sclective tasia, within tho United States of business concerns, other non-govermeental orgenizations and individuals ag pources of foreign intolligence information. 2. To implement this undertaking, the Central Intolligence Agency ohali: a. Determino the Toreign intelligonce potential of sourcea so that the best available may be selected expeditiously for exploita- tion upon the receipt of collection requests from the intelligence agencies. For this purpose, CIA vill maintain e central index of non-governmental sources in the United States. bd. Establish uniform procedures and ctandards for security clearence of all centacts in this field, and orrange such clearances. c. Establish uniforn procedures to inswre that the interests of organizations and individusls contacted will not be jeopardized. a. Collect throvgh the eutablishnent of field offices witsin tho United Stetos, fercign ‘ntclligence infermaticn reauired in the interesta of the netional security or by the individuel intelligence agencies. o. Arrange for direct contact between intelligence egency representatives and non-governzental sources within the United States whenever conditions xequire such ection or wpon the requcnt of s menbor agency to seewre technical or other foreign intelligence information. f. Obtain tho agreement of ronponsible policy-making officiala of Asorican crganizations having afercign intclligense potential be~ foro ontablishing and maintaining contacts within that cr¢anization. B: Inform tho intolligenco asencies of tho prospective dopar- turo fren or return toa tho United States of uvoloctced Amerfenn citi- zens having a high foreign intolligenco potential, go that tha agen- Cien may fiuniah requirements or provido apucialiuty for bricfing or "ot rome aes ee my intorregution,
h. “Disseminate ta the apmrepr ite agenedes all forcign in- telligene dateraition cittned throws this peogrem. Reports pro- duced Uy racancics shell be identified on guch, unlegas the origi- nmitiiss agency olipulates to the coniacury cicu olnil: a. Aaziga to duty in the Centrnl Intelligence Ageney Ticla officce, if they co deaire and within thoir capebilitics, represcnt- ativen to werve their intercats undcr the direction ef the CIA min- evers. Member agentses may, at their discretion, cetablish active vorking liaison between thoir Region). Offices and CIA Ficid. Offices. b. Send directly to the Central Intelligence Agency fox col- lection all theix requento for foreign intelligence information to be obtained froz non-governmental sources within the United Stutea. cs. Treniswit to the Central Intclligence Agency fer appropriate éinsemination full information and reports resulting from approved @irect contacts by agency representatives with non-gover mental sources, identifying such sources by Cli cede nuaber. a. Obtain, to the raximum extent possible, fron their dcpart- ments and agencies the forcign intelligence 4trformation which the dopertnents and agencies have received aa a by-product of the norat relationship with busineos concerns and other non-governmental or- ‘gavicationa and individuais in the United States in cennection with non-intelligence activities, and transmit to the maximum extent poa~ sible, the information tothe Central Intelligence Agency for oditing for source security and for appropriate dissemination. 6. Odtain, inso far ao is practicable end within existing security regulations, from their departrents and agencies inforrution concerning business concerns and other nen-governnontal orpcniza- tion and individuals in the United States having foreign intelli- gence potential, which the department or agency possesses er sub- sequently acquirco, and r2ko the information available to the Central Intelligoncse Agoncy. ; f. Neminsto ropresontatives to serve on a committos, unaor tho chairvanship of tho Central Intelligence Agency, to mest poeriodi- cally to consider mutual prebloms and interests in connection with thig program. . h, Furthor to implement this undortaking, tho Rational Security Rosources Board and tho cempenonts of the Military Establishment, other than tho coriponenta represented on tho JAC, absll furninh directly to tho CLA,. te the mixin oxtent peasible, all foereien intelligonca lnrarnation which ‘9 rocodved an a by-preduct of thuls narenl reluaticnship with bugl- noose cencerns and other nen-governzental orgnuitsationg and individurls in the Unitud States, in coanoction with non-Intelligonco activities. 1e9 —_ 7
Nee tee. cea tompil i. De Hoth tag, fn thio preesem  aiesll be interpreted Lao nf Pect thes catabligned relutJenghip of tho Dopartiwenta cad Agencies with buninesa eeicurng, Glhec ncnegovernmaatol orguudsiblcis, and individiwiols in the: Ualtad Gtsien Por purposes olher thin the presucemink of rorelion Intelili- genee dnfermstlon. eer shall do affect the ners) daterehonsc of decu- nents belveon Libraries of the depirtments and other libraries, cr the aQuvelepminl Gf research progecty with individwals ar nen-govermacntal inatiiutiona. : i el ie
on" —_ ANNEX 14 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL JATELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO, 8 BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON FOREIGN MENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL PERSONALITIES May 25, 1948 Pursusnt to the provisions of Saction 102 of the Netionnl Security Act of 19:7 and for the purrose emmeiated in paregre oh d(4) thereof, the pricey renpensibility fer tho maintenance of Biographice) Teta on Foreign Setenviri aid Vechnolegicei Personalities isa assigned to the Coutral Intelligence Agenc 1. To wHaplement this undertaling, the following proccdures are esteblinhed: . a. Departmental intelligenco agencics shell continue to collect, analyze, end anstract biographical date on forcvign scientific and technolcgical personalitics, in accordance with their needs. b. Dopertzental intelligence agencies shall forward to the . Centrel Intelligence Agency, in. the manner most satisfactory to the Department concerned, all biogrephicel deta originating within their respective Departments » or casplete docuxentary references thercte, on foreign scientific and technological personalities. c. The Central Intelligence Agency shell codify and index #12 such data received, including such data cs may bo received fren all sources, and shell incorporato the actual material received in its files. da. An biogrephical dats on foreign scientific and technological pernonslitics msintained by the Central Intelligence Asency shell bo readily available to the participating Departisents end Agencies. Sa ; , ; i
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bon hb. “Conmmisationa Tntcligenes" the ntady of forwiga communications. in peort on CommundcatJous Jutelligence fas aw intelligence Intelligence based. noyress shall be vraduced by fn whole or consdidcred
Ne, ™ niant fate Tatedl lees Mag oF 4 aulhority and respon Sistas Cusmuniortiqus foltelligens: Pusrd. commintertions, the the € fee oy a faneminst foe aA, aes wee conmmrice all pros- Wligenes orrrocesy of forsisn duction co? fyfornitien fran such comi of that tafomsation, carl the cticn of that dJnfomiation and the scewits of ito couccea. stuicautio: By control of the pro- 193 q4a-1953 i; the