V_y  Zj     *~  *  _*^_      O       •__»*-*      '  —  ^- 
;~:A>:DU>X  3^C^.:     Dlrcc^r  c:  Ccr;rcl  let; 
■  _3  _;  _1*  \_/  — 
_+  ^.iii  J      i»i>   <  v>_ 
i.-w'-  x_i—  : — «^—    ^--y- 
2.     Y/hor.  taa  Corti*nl  Intelligence  A^oncy  was  crcaucn  cy 
ctataaa-a    aho  National  Sccnriuy  Act  cd  IS -!-"?>   the  nctont  c^  Conjrcca 
li^nca  a-.-Cdvit-os,    to  p-c^\::o  una  i-;^-2_^i—  - 
for  too  nclicy  oiannin-;    and  to  co-cur;  ccruam  ^-^:->r.co  acucv 
ries.   "fbcro'^c  -o  rn  entice  in  tao  cia:uto  or  the  lerdrdativ-: 
-  -i 
hcd  boon  disbanced.     Cou:cquc--.V;    v/.^icc--> 
ITcrreceni  aaxad  in  19-1-7  i-r  CIA  conla 
^/orldndda  coaanauniet  menace  v/ith  cover:  op a ratio 25,   it  v/ac 
rocojniaed  that  over,  though  there  v/:s  :o-c  relation  to  Intel  -    • 
rli-c-~c--  in  some  :uch  acuvitiec  a  (c^r:er  in  this  field  could  act  y 
-,1T  ,_.,-*-.,-,-  v-o--  tr-e  1- --aa^c  of  the  statute  and  v/oald  levo  to 
o£  luucao  by  tae  Coa^reoo, 
3.     Xatioaal  daenriuy  Ccunc-i  directive  -.,/-  ^^  i--/^> 
^L-/a  uao  -caos3a-ry  po_iay  airccULon^   >-^2  .Cj.o^-* — /  — - 
cc^torv-;-xMo:.3  on  C2A>  and  Con^f  cos  prc-vidsd  tha  funis. 
K1SC  1^/2  ^aus  fcee»  re£iw£<*  and  axRende^   and  tbe  ac&yC^r  is  :dcw 
j-*fl^ci^  i«  NSC  5412/2,   bw*  tar oti£X*u*  C©fc£rft« ^  >^&s  ^roviA«i 
ib.e  faj&4s  ^-dc^^.-sak-y  -o  C^vvy  cr,  uIs^Aestiae  col4-v/^r  a.ctict>. 
TtCL  cKivteY-  is  very  fctr**U-y  £K^veS^<4  ft-ad  iKcl\iAss  j*>*G£<t.gm<JfiL_ 
pt>LLttcaLl  »cti«a,    Aco&ia.i:  warfas^i    r  AsisiaLAce  ^ud  ^aarriAa 
activities.,    etc-  >    which  a.r«  tU*e* rained  4c*  fc<2  H-ee-i-ed  ^>  c^iantar
i 
i 
y 
\ 
(V  {  .    A 
:>_£  r.£c>~"'i-i- 
-        •-   V_»   <_ 
rr.:htarry   :'orc::   o;  :ov::  ir.d  «::£.::  sp'.i o n  t-T  7— il:-";r. _-  y  o p  --.  raLlsc 
uOvo.\  cC-ivi — c«j  irs  C'C_   w2.  ai^  _->--_/ — —  -»  \«- — <— —  -.'li.  <  t.>_:r 
-  -~    .r__.-^    -        -\-rr*    ^j"1?/"*     <■  -    n'  •--  --»  -'    -.  — -^    -,-.... ---'-- ~    ■•"--  •"-    >---    7~        ~ 
rees-casibility  for  ahem  Is  no';  evident  to  nnacrhc-riced  persons 
cue  j.ic.-  1a.  tunc svarce.  cae  u .  e>..  v^ovJmnncn-  c^n  piansioty  cls — 
claim  any  responsibility 
•  O:      »■  C  \-  - — i  „ 
~z.     1C5C  5-112/2  pieces  responsibility  on  CIA  to  Gjie  that 
such,  activities  are  carried  ou;  and  places  rcspon.oihiii.ty  en  the 
Direc-or  io  so 2  mat  the  appropriate  departments  ar.d  ajcr.d-.io 
arc  orcserly  informed  2ri  that  .the  activities  are  consistent  v/iih 
national  policy  and  v.-itii  overt  operations.     Tens,,    CXA  is  recr.o.is: 
c   ucou ••--  n-w>rrc- — --i-Y  j....i-cae.r;ence  aiencr 
y 
i-eoi2irec  to  olay 
eaters  into  their  support  or  is  a  by-product;,    or  both..     However., 
under  this  charlsr,   in  dcicrrr^inin^  v/hc- j'acr  CIA  should  undar  ird:a 
to  o^rry  o-ct  a  spociiic  aotivicy,   ii  is  not  necessary  to  find  c.-% 
intelligence  to,r^st  involved.     It  is  cao-a3a  it*  it  is  covert  -endar     ■ 
the  ^etinitior.  and  has  policy  approval  as  hcin^  coasistent  v/iti.     V 
Ar^crican  foreign  xsclicy  and  cvcirc  ooovatioas  aad  is  dasi--7ncd 
to  combat  ccnmaiism  cctsida  the  United  States.  * 
5.     Since  it  is  responsible  for  having  cu-zh  activltiv^s  carried. 
-  ou*-,    CIA  mest  necessarilv  bo  responsible  for  olanniacr.     Occasion- 
to  depend  entirely  on  snch  rcquiren-cnts  v/onld  be  an  evasion  od 
^  the  A-en-cyTs  resoonsibiiities.     Also,   tee  ayer^^e -acrson,   both, 
in  Governcscnt  and  on- side,   is  thin'.rdn^j  alon^  normal  lines  and 
to  develop  clan-destine  cold-v/ar  activities  properly  persons  lz?-zs-/i-^ 
ho~'~z.  t'ci  capabilities  and  limitations  of  clandestine  action  must  be 
st*a4yln£;  and  devisir-s*  bow  such  actions  can  be  undertaken  effec- 
tively.    Both  in  developing  idoas  or  plan^  for  action,   it  is 
incumbent  on  the  Agency  ic>  obtain  necessary  policy  approval; 
ancL  "f&Y-  this  purpose  tkase  wialters  should  be  explored  with. 
yropav  sfficiais  in  c'her  departments  a.r.d  asehcios,   paTtiaularly 
in  t'..2  JD-ep^^tiYierits  of  State  and  Defense.,    so  the  determinatica 
can  bs  n~z.de  &s  to  u'heah  jr  any  oec  proposal  should  ^o  to  inc. 
^P6ai»  Orov.o  or  .u-'T.cv  ^c_"  r)C>icv  aceermina'^ion.
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.     ._.    '   ,         A   •    —     --      "  '—'1-  •  **    C        ""  '   "    L    -         .      -—     Z:~- 
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,70:":  or  cice.vC/v/2-blc-   I'j  rmy  bo  c.;-iv"~-ce  ': 
-^  '       v~~-  :  ,~-  0^.-2. 'v-1—  ^      ^Z-      -— ^      -_-^v-*-'-*^    * 
/rerr-.iliicry  opercticr.  v/bcll/  ol-  partly  covert  v/bice  r^.yeire^ 
— ,;,--  ~r>-; >  ^-jr^borc  ei  i^iiliturily  c_reie.ee  ~ceeoeiz.eij   e.r-~eeeivie  o: 
eelery  cc-Iom-ervt  wb.ieb  exceed  r-crrr.el  CIA-cc-ei-clied  ete_e<s 
:d/or  rr.iiiJery  e;-:pe_-ie-ece  ci"  c  Idzic  eed  level  peceuier  :o  :r.o 
:-e-ed  Service.:  Iz  properly  che  prleeery  recpce^.e-liey  ce  -be 
3.   •^vT)Gr'^r.'T  ro;c,  * 
_*J  — 
-  "bee  f^r'-  time     ddree-c  Del*ee.2e  _:e  develop  eeeetie  lor  covert 
  ^-*.-_ __.  ^  „'..;_—       T."r -%   r-*xr -i—     —  *-.- .—  .-•'-* ~ 3.  "■-ic.vc_*  ~bo  "*" '     eceee 
covert  ccrivb-ice  outcide  of  tbe  peeereilibery  bee  reepoecibilb: 
o.     ;\o_  0--LLJ -  C'-i  n^-  ^ ^s-,   /  - — « 
 ^
\ 
H 
„      ^-/     '     "w   w„   „  » 
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.  V—       —  — /       ~J  v—  ' —  ' 
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.  _  C  »  _'-      -*'■   -^   -»—     t->—     *_v^ >■»-■• — j       ^Ur*    ^   .  v.)        -»  —  >—.-. 
or  ziroilor  to  :rL£it  reiver,  to  -?.c-  Director  of  CooU-al 
.Z    CO— lO-J.-^ 
-V. 
In  C3C03  v/r-crc  projects  arc  approvoc  wrier  ara  c 
Merest  wO  :or.c  ctr-3r  dcpcirtzscrt  or  agczc;  ird  ro 
:3  poicrticr.  i-  foro-eon,   it  r.-£./  be  necessary  for  CIA 
;>.c  trz-r^rcticr  covertly,    but  CIA  srocld  ircict  cr  rn«/: 
|         —  -^.  —       V.  v^  ~J  — 
-r^ed  to  the  ctr.c: 
c_cy  5  c^v.  o^riuw-C  i;<_rc.vj.
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a: 
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3   scim  to  -£lI1  v/i-liir.  prober  Jun^lcis!  rc-:pG-::::.'.i::o 
r  cco-:r:c^c  or  Cjoncio-J 
,v?-icb.  -ocuire  CIA  to 
_:  2  ~.c~vi-v  ^si^t'C'-—  ..\*>- 
  '-    J-'Vi -- — -r>   T»r 
"->  •--'' -c  ZLC-ior_  or  c-zc-.i  '^o  tea- 
nor  coy  rr.-io.: 
_0     <Z   •  ~;  iir-nz.ci^i  :c:i. 
'/  ^"- 
r~   r  -> 
Co~/'.'  6- 
./- 
C/DCD3 
cc-c 
T
(Page  1) 
TS  104000 
Copy  I  of  6  Copies 
6  April  1962 
MEMORANDUM  FOR:   Director  of  Central  Intelligence 
SUBJECT:         CIA  Support  of  Cold  War  Activities 
1.  This  memorandum  is  for  information  only. 
2.  When  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  was  created  by 
statute,  the  National  Security  Act  of  1947,  the  intent  of  Congress 
was  to  create  a  centralized  machinery  to  coordinate  all  intel- 
licence  activities,  to  produce  the  intelligence  estimates  required 
for  top  policy  planning,  and  to  conduct  certain  intelligence  activi- 
ties. There  was  no  mention  in  the  statute  or  the  legislative 
history  behind  it  of  cold  war  activities,  and  at  that  time  the 
wartime  clandestine  activities  of  the  Office  of  Strategic  Services, 
such  as  propaganda,  guerrilla,  political  activity,  and  the  like, 
had  been  disbanded.  Consequently,  when  Secretary  of  Defense 
Forrestal  asked  in  1947  if  CIA  could  undertake  to  combat  the 
worldwide  communist  menace  with  covert  operations,  it  was 
recognized  that  even  though  there  was  some  relation  to  intel- 
ligence in  some  such  activities  a  charter  in  this  field  could  not 
be  construed  from  the  language  of  the  statute  and  would  have  to 
be  carried  on  under  general  Presidential  authority  and  the  approval 
of  funds  by  the  Congress. 
3.  National  Security  Council  Directive  10/2  (NSC  10/2) 
gave  the  necessary  policy  direction,  placing  responsibility  for 
covert  operations  on  CIA,  and  Congress  provided  the  funds. 
NSC  10/2  has  been  refined  and  amended,  and  the  charter  is  now 
reflected  in  NSC  5412/2,  but  throughout  Congress  has  provided 
the  funds  necessary  to  carry  on  clandestine  cold-war  action. 
The  Charter  is  very  broadly  expressed  and  includes  propaganda, 
political  action,  economic  warfare,  resistance  and  guerrilla 
activities,  etc.,  which  are  determined  to  be  needed  to  counter
(Page  2) 
the  communist  threat  and  orient  the  peoples  of  the  free  world  to 
the  United  States.  The  only  limitations  are  that  CIA  will  not 
conduct  activities  involving  armed  conflict  by  recognized 
military  forces  or  cover  and  deception  for  military  operations 
and  that  the  activities  for  which  CIA  is  responsible  are  covert. 
Covert  activities  are  defined  as  activities  within  the  charter 
set  forth  in  NSC  5412/2  so  planned  and  executed  that  any  U.  S. 
responsibility  for  them  is  not  evident  to  unauthorized  persons 
and  that  if  uncovered  the  U.  S.  Government  can  plausibly  dis- 
claim any  responsibility  for  them. 
4    NSC  5412/2  places  responsibility  on  CIA  to  see  that 
such  activities  are  carried  out  and  places  responsibility  on  the 
Director  to  see  that  the  appropriate  departments  and  agencies 
are  properly  informed  and  that  the  activities  are  consistent  with 
national  policy  and  with  overt  operations.  Thus,  CIA  is  responsi- 
ble  for  a  broad  spectrum  of  activities  in  which  intelligence  is  not 
required  to  play  a  part,  although  normally  intelligence  either 
enters  into  their  support  or  is  a  by-product,  or  both.  However, 
under  this  charter,  in  determining  whether  CIA  should  undertake 
to  carry  out  a  specific  activity,  it  is  not  necessary  to  find  an 
intelligence  target  involved.  It  is  enough  if  it  is  covert  under 
the  definition  and  has  policy  approval  as  being  consistent  with 
American  foreign  policy  and  overt  operations  and  is  designed 
to  combat  communism  outside  the  United  States. 
5.    Since  it  is  responsible  for  having  such  activities  carried 
out,  CIA  must  necessarily  be  responsible  for  planning.  Occasion- 
ally, suggestions  for  action  will  come  from  outside  sources,  but 
to  depend  entirely  on  such  requirements  would  be  an  evasion  of 
the  Agency's  responsibilities.  Also,  the  average  person,  both 
in  Government  and  outside,  is  thinking  along  normal  lines  and 
to  develop  clandestine  cold-war  activities  properly  persons  knowing 
both  the  capabilities  and  limitations  of  clandestine  action  must  be 
studying  and  devising  how  such  actions  can  be  undertaken  effec- 
tively. Both  in  developing  ideas  or  plans  for  action,  it  is 
incumbent  on  the  Agency  to  obtain  necessary  political  approval, 
and  for  this  purpose  these  matters  should  be  explored  with 
proper  officials  in  other  departments  and  agencies,  particularly 
in  the  Departments  of  State  and  Defense,  so  the  determination 
can  be  made  as  to  whether  any  one  proposal  should  go  to  the 
Special  Group  or  higher  for  policy  determination.
(Page  3) 
6.  In  this  function,  the  staffs  and  offices  of  CIA  are  at 
present  not  inhibited  by  any  limitations  other  than  those  broadly 
set  forth  in  NSC  5412/2.  Except  as  to  total  amounts  available, 
the  appropriation  of  funds  is  not  a  limiting  factor  as  the  Appropria- 
tions Subcommittee  for  CIA  have  approved  the  requested  funds 
through  the  years  for  the  general  purpose  of  combatting  communism 
under  our  charter  without  setting  specific  limitations  or  courses 
of  action.  Consequently,  under  present  guidelines,  the  CIA 
personnel  concerned  are  and  should  be  developing  cold-war 
activities  of  every  nature  without  the  necessity  of  depending 
on  intelligence  implications  for  their  furtherance  and  are  then 
promoting  conduct  of  their  activities  with  the  other  departments 
and  agencies  concerned  in  order  to  develop  a  position  on  which 
policy  direction  can  be  given. 
7.  Inasmuch  as  CIA  is  enjoined  to  conduct  covert  operations 
by  Directive  of  the  National  Security  Council,  it  cannot  unilaterally 
limit  its  responsibility  in  this  field  or  construe  the  Directive  to 
mean  only  those  operations  for  which  intelligence  collection  has 
a  primary  target.  Any  such  limitation  would  require  modification 
of  the  Directive  itself.  One  such  modification  has  already  been 
made.  On  28  June  1961  we  were  notified  that  the  National  Security 
Action  Memorandum  No.  57  had  been  approved  by  the  President. 
This  provided  that  where  a  paramilitary  operation  "is  to  be  wholly 
covert  or  disavowable,  it  may  be  assigned  to  CIA,  provided  that 
it  is  within  the  normal  capabilities  of  the  Agency.  Any  large 
paramilitary  operation  wholly  or  partly  covert  which  requires 
significant  numbers  of  militarily  trained  personnel,  amounts  of 
military  equipment  which  exceed  normal  CIA-controlled  stocks 
and/or  military  experience  of  a  kind  and  level  peculiar  to  the 
Armed  Services  is  properly  the  primary  responsibility  of  the 
Department  of  Defense  with  the  CIA  in  a  supporting  role."  This, 
for  the  first  time,  directs  Defense  to  develop  assets  for  covert 
paramilitary  action.  However,  this  still  leaves  the  full  scope 
of  covert  activities  outside  of  the  paramilitary  the  responsibility 
of  CIA. 
8.  NSC  5412/2  did  not  specifically  state  that  CIA  funds 
must  be  used  to  finance  these  operations.  Indeed,  in  the  early 
days  many  were  funded  out  of  counterpart  funds  on  the  theory
(Page  4) 
that  they  were  ICA  projects  which  must  be  carried  out  without 
attribution  to  the  United  States  and,  therefore,  needed  to  be 
handled  covertly.  ICA  would  ask  CIA  to  act  for  it  and  would 
transfer  the  funds. 
[Excised] 
9.  While  no  serious  objection  has  been  raised  to  such 
funding  of  covert  operations  by  other  agencies,  it  does  pose  a 
problem  in  that  the  funds  are  removed  from  the  normal  accounta- 
bility and  review  by  the  General  Accounting  Office  which  would 
otherwise  have  taken  place.  It  should  be  noted,  however,  that 
AID  has  statutory  authority  providing  for  confidential  funds 
certification  similar  to  that  given  to  the  Director  of  Central 
Intelligence  in  our  act,  but  AID  has  not  shown  a  willingness  to 
utilize  this  authority. 
10.  In  cases  where  projects  are  approved  which  are  of 
primary  interest  to  some  other  department  or  agency  and  no 
intelligence  potential  is  forseen,  it  may  be  necessary  for  CIA 
to  handle  the  transaction  covertly,  but  CIA  should  insist  on  having 
the  cost  charged  to  the  other  agency's  appropriated  funds.
(Page  5) 
11.   Undoubtedly  similar  projects  will  appear,  and  there 
are  no  clear  guidelines  in  connection  with  funding  them.  In  view 
of  the  breadth  of  the  NSC  5412/2  charter,  it  will  normally  be 
difficult  for  CIA  to  resist  supporting  financially  those  covert 
projects  which  are  given  policy  approval.  However,  where 
projects  seem  to  fall  within  proper  functional  responsibilities 
of  other  departments  or  agencies,  the  mere  fact  that  there  are 
covert  aspects  which  require  CIA  to  take  action  or  even  to  con- 
duct the  activity  should  thereby  make  it  necessary  for  CIA 
to  accept  financial  responsibility. 
(signed) 
Lawrence  R.  Houston 
General  Counsel 
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