BY THE COMPTIROLLEI? GENERAL Report lo The Congress, OF THE UNITED STATES _ SHORE TT 2 NO FORPIGN DISSEMINATION Need For Improving Mapping, Charting, And Geodesy Support Of The Strategic Ballistic Missile Submarine Force “NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION” UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE SUBJECT TO CRIMINAL SANCTIONS Sanitized by: Manager, Information & Personnel Security Branch, OSS Pursuant to: Letter Dated July 19, 1984 from ; _ Principal Deputy Under Secretary . oO 4 of Defense for Research and Classified by OASD-PA Security Review. Engineering mot fra om General jaxsification . ; sctedule f Ex xecu tive Order 11652. ' Exe n Catey ry 3. Dectassi fy on aan December 2008. . gD SMH rae Ss = ans x 5 Geszat cael i 8 jean uh _ < SD. NO FOREIGN OfSSEMINATION CED-78-142 < ACeoent July 25, 1978
sgl AL-EGREIGH DISSEMINATE COMPTROLLER GENERAL, OF THE UNITED STATES , WASHINGTON. O.C. 20548 4 B-145099 To the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives This report discusses the classified aspects of our review of the Nation's cceanographic assets. A draft of the report was reviewed by agency officials associated with the program. Their comments are incorporated as appropriate. We made our review pursuant to the Budget and Account- ing Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), and the Accounting and Aud@it- ing Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 67). We are sending copies of this report to the Director, C£fice of Management and BuGaet; the Secretary of Defense; and Members of Concress. i omptroiler General ef the United States Classified by OASD-PA Security Review. Exempt from General Declassification c Schedule of Executive Order 11652. Exemption Category 3. Declassify on 31 December 2008. (This paae 36 UNCLASSIFIED.)
SEGAET The bles classified c COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S NEED FOR IMPROVING MAPPING, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS CHARTING, AND GEODESY SUPPORT OF THE STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE FORCE DIGEST Strategic Eallistic Missile Submarines jmay not be as e Program. As part of the Naval Oceanographic program, the Ocean Survey Program provides, in re- sponse to priority strategic defense require- ments, the oceanographic collection, processina, and analysis of essential |bathvmetric, gravi- metric and magnetic (65e@R8@)| data to enhance the effectiveness, and operational flexibility of the---Polaris, Poseidon, Trident--strategic forces. Data collected by the Ocean Survey Program fleet is used to provide Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy products for the navigational safety of the submarine forces, strategic weapons systems accuracy, secure positioning, and can be used to support sonar systems, and to increase the operational effectiveness of “otner oceanographic (SHSRES) surveillance sys- tems. During a review of the nation's ocean vessel/ survey fleet, GAO found that the Navy's oceanographic program is fragmented, uncoordi- nated, and often inefficient. For example, the Navy, because of budgetary constraints, leased six oceanographic vessels to foreign countries at no cost during the same timeframe that high orioritv strategic submarine [data deficiencies (enensas)| were evolving. i CED-78-142 SERRET
GAO believes that Ocean Survey Program deficiencies are due in large part to frag- mented and decentralized resource management of the Navy's oceanographic assets, and GAO questions thefability of the U.S. Navy to continue to SUDDOrt (GBGRERS| strategic bal- Tistic missile submarines through the Ocean Survey Program. While U.S. Strategic submarine forces are being modernized through Trident submarine acquisitions; several of the Navy's unique ocean survey program vessels are now over 34 years old, and their operating condi- tion was such that: --Support of the strategic ballistic missile submarine forcefwas curtailed due to the loss of over 590 Ocean Survey Program ship operating days during the past two years; -4mapping, charting, anc geodesy products may not meet scheduled Trident ballistic missile submarine deployment dates and e8ER8™)| pro- vide for more potentially effective Trident - deployments; ° . -lStrategic ballistic missile submarine opera | tions may not be able to meet changing U.S. nuclear weapons deployment policy needs, because of the lack of adequate data to cperate in areas that were not surveyed. In commenting on this report, the Department of Defense concurred that{[the age of Ocean Survey Program ships may contribute to the risk that data may not be provided _ ina (epenens istrateqic sub- ; and whilej Defense is tak- ing actions to improve this support, (686Reez) GAO believes that this problem is only part of the larger problem of having the naval oceano- graphic program separated in several Navy com- mands. GAO believes that the Naval Oceanographic com- munity has much to offer to the safer and more efficient accomplishment of the strategic Geterrent mission. However, GAO noted that, SBeRET
S5BTET despite the Ocean Survey Program relationship to high priority defense objectives, there has been a lack of. resource emphasis of the both strategic ballistic missile submarine operational effectiveness, and to maintaining the overall U.S.-Soviet strategic deterrent balance. RECOMMENDATIONS GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense [evaluate the suport coBeRees|provided by the Ocean Survey Program to strategic ballistic ssile submarines, in order to deterioration in the U.S. ability to maintain and support strategic forces. in a hi h state include: “~reviewing all ballistic missile submarine ~-assessing the capability of the the Ocean Survey Program to support strategic ballistic missile submarine mission requizements in a timely fashion.  (oRBeRSse&) Further, GAO reaffirms the recommendation con- ‘tained in its June 16, 1978, report to the Congress entitled "Need For Improving Manage- ment of U.S. Oceanographic Assets" (CED 78-125) which stated that: --The Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to reorganize and consolidate management of all Navy oceanographic activi- ties under the Oceanographer of the Navy or another designated single manager, and to assist and improve coordination with the designated civilian manager to maximize use of all U.S. oceanographic vessels. SEQRET 7 a
DIGEST CHAPTER 1 APPENDIX I II IIt IV GET Contents _INTRODUCTION : U.S. Nuclear Weapons Strategy Relationship of MC&G Data to Weapons System Characteristics OSP provides vital support Scope of review OSP MC&G DATA NOT[SUFFICIENT +eneRe®) TO SUPPORT SSBN MISSION REQUTREMENTS Oceanographic Satellite Operations May Help satellite data collection CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Conclusions DOD comments and our evaluation Recommendations Illustration depicting an SSBN missile launching system Illustration depicting vertical deflect- tion rs Illustration depicting SSBN missile data requirements Description of Naval ocean survey program operations ———w ee — - — ne Vv Letter dated February 8, 1978 from the Principle Deputy, Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering 19 20 21 22 23
BNC Boss DMA DOD FBM ‘GAO cs” MC&G NASA NAVSAT osP PBNZC SALT SINS ’ SSBN SEGRE! ABBREVIATIONS Bathymetric Navigational Chart Defense Mapping Agency Department of Defense Fleet Ballistic Missile General Accounting Office Joint Chiefs of Staff Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy National Aeronautical and Space Administration -Navy Navigational Satellite Ocean Suvey Program Precise Bathymetric Navigational Zone Chart Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Ships Inertial Navigation System Strategic Ballistic Missile Submarine SEG
SECRET ‘CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION On June 16, 1978, we issued to the Congress an unclass- ified report entitled “Need for Improving Management of U.S. Oceanographic Assets.“ (CED 78-125) This report pointed out that even though the Oceanographer of the Navy was designated as the central manager for all Navy oceanographic vessels and resources, the Navy's oceanogrpahic program was fragmented and uncoordinated. As a result, we found there is inefficient and uncoordinated program and resource man- agement. In this report, we address the classified aspects of our findings, and describe the serious impact of the Navy's oceanographic management problems on its highest priority strategic support program. The principal U.S. policy objective of the Department of Defense (DOD) policy guidance for the existence of U.S. nuclear weapons is strategic deterrence. To the extent that deterrence snould fail, the major objectives are to assure a U.S. position of power and influence and to limit any conflict through control of.enemy escalation, which includes: Defense strategists consider secure second~strike sys- tems, such as submarines, the most viable and effective mean'’s of deterring an opponent's preemptive attack. This consideration is based on the belief that the strategic nuclear submarines provide a covert mobile launching base. A SEGRET
UNCLASSIFIED witn minimum vulnerability to enemy detection and countermeasures, and that an actual strike against a sub- -marine force would have to be directed against the entire force more or less simultaneously to eliminate the de- terrence factor. Accordingly, DOD, in addition to maintain- ing land based strategic missiles and aircraft, deploys 41 nuclear powered Polaris/Poseidon Strategic Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs) and is currently continuing development and procurement of an advanced Trident missile and submarine to eventually replace the Polaris submarine and update the Poseidon force. U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS STRATEGY In time of war, should escalation become uncontrollable, the U.S. objective is to maximize the resultant political, economic, and military power of the United States relative to an enemy in a post-war period, in order to preclude enemy political domination. This would be accomplished by: --targeting concepts that would ensure destruction of the enemy's critical political, economic, and military resources which would preclude them from recovering aS a post-war major power; --limiting the damage to the U.S. and its allies through counterforce operations; and --maintaining a strategic force, in reserve, such as 'SSBNs, for protection of the United States and coer- cion of the enemy during and after a war. Since the full range of political-military conditions cannot be anticipated prior to a conflict, U.S. nuclear em- ployment plans are designed to allow for flexible adapta- tion as events would unfold prior to a war, and as hedges against unforseen developments. This is accomplished by pre-planning nuclear weapons employment options, and se- lecting targets to the extent that they would enhance the flexibility, efficiency, and effectiveness of the forces Or weapons systems utilized. In this regard, the Naval oceanographic program, under the direction of the Oceanographer of the Navy, carries 2 UNCLASSIFIED
~” m on a broad spectrum of oceanographic and hydrographic survey operations that include strategic priority Mapping, Charting and Geodesy (MC&G) support of the SSBN forces-~Polaris, 7 Poseidon, Trident--and anti-submarine warfare programs. RELATIONSHIP OF MC&G DATA TO WEAPONS SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS U.S. SSBNs are all weather weapons systems capable of delivering ballistic missiles to targets within a specified range. The missile system, as depicted in Appendix I, is housed aboard a strategic nuclear submarine which provides a mobile launching base with minimum vulnerability to enemy aetection and anti-submarine countermeasures. However, because of fire control and navigation problems there are certain geophysical factors that require precise | — metric and gravity data updates (G86REB)|/to enabie the SSBN to operate critical weapons systems components such as --submarine inertial navigation system, --submarine strategic fire.control system, and Fire Control and Inertial Navigation Probiems Navigation is defined as the art or science of conduct- ing a vehicle from one position on the earth to another posi- tion. The primary problems of submarine navigation are --how to identify position while submerged, -~how to determine the direction necessary to proceed from one position to another, ~-how to measure the progress made while advancing toward the desired position, and --how to maintain the accuracy of the SSBN ballistic missiles, while operating in the deep ocean.
SINS continuously supplies accurate ship velocity, attitude, and position output data to the fire control subsystem and the missile via the central navigational computer. This data is gathered by the SINS inertial sensors measuring the forces of gravity and the motion of the ship as it. travels. through the oceans (@#@nrr) land would be used by the fire control system to accurately fire the ballistic missiles on selected targets at any given time. . Accordingly, effec- tive deployment of the strategic submarine weapons system a depends upon the ability of the SINS to provide the fire - control subsystem with accurate positions to establish the location of the SSBN in relationship to its target. SINS Errors and Vertical Deflections Due to inherent imperfections in the SINS inertial sensors, the SINS develops errors that increase with the time the SSBN spenés without SINS update during deployment, and after an extended period on patrol, the SINS data may no longer be sufficiently accurate, if left uncorrected Or uncompensated for fire control] purposes and consequently degrade the potential accuracy of the ballistic missiles. The SINS calculations on the SSBN are performed in respect to the reference of a perfect ellipsoid because of its geometric approximation to the shape of the earth. But, due to variations in the earth's gravity field, an error called vertical deflection is introduced in the cal- culations: Vertical deflection, as depicted in Appendix II, is the difference (angle) between true vertical as measured from an ellipsoid and the real local vertical as measured by the direction of the gravitational pull at a particular location (of the SSel, fesename] As the ship travels through the oceans, the SINS tends to align with the local vertical and, as depicted in Appendix III, various geoid information
The bidcked materigi fs eclassifiekos indicated. All other ‘arecial on this must be included in the calculations of the missile trajectories to maintain the accuracy of the weapons sys- ten. 7 vn ee Pa - There: __the SINS must be supplemented with Ehe sub—. ic marine's position and gravity (Geena) data from other navi- & gational aids so that the SINS errors may be corrected. i The Ocean Survey Program Supplies the SSBN forces the nec- essary data to compensate the SINS for the effects of gravity or vertical deflection. (See Appendix IV). ra ros ~ OSP PROVIDES VITAL SUPPORT OSP objectives are to provide for SSBN force needs in secure positioning and weapons system accuracy. As depicted in Appendix IV, bathymetric and geodetic data is collected worldwide in the deep ocean to provide for the safe navi- ; gation of the strategic submarine forces and to maintain the SSBNs ballistic missile accuracies while on patrol, as well as increasing the operational effectiveness of other ocean surveillance systems. Data collected by OSP oceanographic operations is provided to the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) for publication and distribution to the submarine fleets in the form of OSP products. A portion of the data cellected by OSP is sanitized and made available for dissemination by DMA to civilian maritime vessels to provide for safe sur- face navigation. — OSP Products OSP operations collect, process and analyze the essen- tial bathymetric, gravimetric and magnetic data to support the operational effectiveness of the SSBN strategic forces. The geophysical information derived from OSP survey activi- ties result in processed: ~=bathymetric data
The bistksd Geral is classifjed as iadtected._ ~~ Al er material on this *~ is UNCLASSIFIED. _From the collected geophysical data, OSP products are pro- duced to provide the SSBNs with: required for deflection computations necessary tor correction of the submarine's inertial navigational system; and --Magnetic anomaly detection (MAD) operational effective- ness charts Correcting SINS Errors _ Because the characteristics of SINS errors are known, this knowledge, coupled with OSP products and a navigational position fix, is utilized to correct the errors. The process of entering corrections into the SINS to enable the SSBN to maintain system accuracy and navigate safely is referred to as SINS reset. . ; Resetting the SINS requires that the submarine's posi- tion data be derived from a navigational fix to complete tne reset process. Currently, SSEN navigational fixes are accomplished by using: SECRET
SESHET set ae ofa - . oat cet Ae - «land based LORAN-C transmitting stations, ~-Navy navigational satellite (NAVSAT) transmissions, and to and effec- tive means in relationship to the mission and security of ’ the SSBNs. This raitonale is based on the fact that to complete the navigational fix: --LORAN-C requires the submarine to place an antenna on the ocean surface to receive LORAN-C signal transmissions from stations which are limited in geographical coverage, expensive to extend, and vul- nerable to hostile action; --NAVSAT requires that the submarines operate at per- iscope depth, and place an exposed antenna above the ocean surface to receive satellite navigational Signals, and is dependent upon U.S. satellite sur- vivability while; Also, : ‘the time requirements for ‘SINS reset and necessary navigétional fixes vary, depending on the SSBN class. For example, the: ~-Polaris SSBNs, the first U.S. strategic submarine class, require that the SINS reset process be ac- complished every/8 to 15 hours of ship operation; ; Semi ~-Poseidon SSBNs reauire a SINS reset at intervals of every. F of operation; and SG ET
Shee al SECRET The blocked meterial is classified az indicated. All ather material an this page is UNCLASSIFIED. “mee ident SSBNs, because of inertial system improvements, , permit = intervals of approximately every Aecordingly, determination and elimination of inherent SINS errors are a major operational consideration in the naviga~ tional subsystem and fire control system of SSBNs because the ballistic missile's accuracy is dependent on accurate na- vigational data and, until inertial systems technology reaches the state where SINS reset procedures can be elimi- nated, SSBNs will continue to rely upon OSP data as an im- portant means to correct SINS errors. Additionally, while the time intervals for SINS reset requirements will he lengthened with Trident deplovments, the use of OSP troduced PBNZCs [for covert bottom contour position fixes will continue to prove important in avoiding potential advanced anti- Submarine detection techniques.  @6iGdeiae OSP Data Sources . 2  ieicce! sources of OSP data exist for SSBN SUDDOrt. hese include: Os aatwo specially equipped survey ships which collect '; . bathymetry, magnetic, and gravity data; “ “Specific appropriations allocated to the OSP deep ocean bathymetric surveys effort for fiscal years 1974 through 1977 are .as follows:
“- The blocked material is classified"¢s indicated. All othee' material on ti.is . | porgf= UNCLASSIFIED. | . < ° Fiscal Year 4 1974 1975 1976 1977 SECRET $14.2 | $16.8 = $19.9 a/$16.9 a/doés not include $13.8 million for conversion of USNS HESS. OSP Survey Ship Operations The following table depicts the OSP fleet. OSP Oceanographic Vessels Year Vessel FY79 Ship built length cost per day -feet- USNS Bowditch 1944 454 $18,305 USNS Dutton 1944 . 454 $18,135 USNS Michelson 1/ 1944 454 _ USNS Wyman 2/ 1971 286 $8,175 USNS Hess 3/ 1965 564 $17,745 i/Decommissioned April 15, 1975. 2/Special purpose ship used for developing prototype system for advancing deep ocean precise bottom survevs and col- lecting gravity data,/but not yet fully operational be- cause of survey array problems (+636EREG> 3/Converted for OSP use at a cost of $13.8 million. The USNS Hess began OSP operations during FY78. “on , oa a —" °
UNCLASSIFIED SCOPE OF REVIEW ‘ Our review was performed primarily at the Defense Mapping Agency Headquarters, Cffices of Oceanographer of the E oy AN e Naval Gceanographic Office. We also visited "National “Security Council, Department of the Navy, Central Intelligence Agency, Naval Intelligence Command, National Aeronautics and Space Agency, and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. The information presented herein was obtained by re- viewing plans, reports, correspondence, and other documents and by discussions with various officials and military of- ficers. 10 UNCLASSIFIED
ria SECRET YA Pel The blocked majerial is classified ad yndi cated. All armer meteriaj_on this page ig¢ONCLASSIUED. CHAPTER 2 OSP MC&G DATA NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT SSBN MISSION REQUIREMENTS Despite significant technological improvements in sub- marines, SSBN's inertial navigation and fire control systems are still dependent on oceanographic MC&G data and OSP products to support their effective deployments and operations. While the U.S. strategic submarine forces are being modernized increases in ballistic missile ranges, larger operating areas, and the potential U.S. requirement for increased SSBN deploy- ment and area coverage. As of July 1977, we were informed by Navy officials that in potential SSBN operating areas jonly the Mediterranean Sea, less than half of the Atlantic and approxi- mately 5 percent of the Pacific Ocean requirements have been OSP surveyed for SSBN operations. (GRB®) Significantly, while the defense modernization programs for strategic weapons systems have resulted in notable ad- vances in submarine and ballistic missile technology, the MC&G support for the Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) program has not kept space and will reouire over 2.8 million @Bese@) [track miles of OSP work [extending into the year 1993, (S3eRe=)]as- suming the current OSP fleet of three vessels is maintained. Depending on the outcome of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), we were informed by Defense Mapping Agency of- ficials. that other potential operating areas. may requirefover 5 million (6s6eRs™) track miles sf OSP survey effortyjextending into the year 2020 and could be needed to more effectively deploy SSBN forces. Beginning in 1959, three OSP vessels, the USNS Bowditch, USNS Dutton, and the USNS Michelson, fequinped with unique Survey arrays, (SEeRae) | began survey Operations in support of the Polaris FBM program. Since that time, changes in ll # w SEERET
bs SEGRET The blocked mgzerial is classified es indrceted. All Other material on this Ghoge is UNCLASSIFIED. the global extent of U.S. strategic deterrant operations has . ereated greater geographical demand for OSP products to support FBM operations. This increased demand is the result of the deployment of the Poseidon forces and the current de- velopment and production of the advanced Trident weapons systems. The Poseidon/Trident SSBNs and the weapons they deploy will nave greater missile ranges as depicted in the following table, and, conseouently,| will be able to operate in larger ocean areas that were not previously surveyed for submarine deployment and operations. ¢6s@ieha Maximum Type of missile range Area SSBN missile to targets Geployed , (nautical miles) j . Trident. c-4 Atlantic & j Pacific Poseidon (31 de- ployed) 2/C-3 2500 Atlantic Polaris (10 deploved) A-3 2500 Pacific l/Range depends on total missile payloaa. 2/Some will be backfitted with Trident I(C-4) missiles. However, the three original survey vessels eauipped to support priority strategic deterrant SSBN systems are now over 34 years old and their operating condition was such that --The USNS Michelson was decommissioned during April 1975 and, despite the forthcoming Trident MC&G re- quirements, three years will have elapsed before its replacement, the USNS Hess, becomes fully operational; --almost $4 million was expended to accomplish over-~ hauls of the USNS Bowditch and Dutton in an attempt to continue their operational usefulness, despite their ages; --less than one year following overhaul, the USNS Dutton experienced failure of major strength members indicated by cracks found during ship hull inspections; 1a 2 SESRET
--because of the degrading conditions of the two OSP vessels, a total of 592 ship operating days were lost durina the period of June 1975 to June 1977; and due to these problens, ~-Trident OSP products may not be produced in time for effective Trident SSBN deployments. (sue) While the addition of the USNS Hess will provide addi- tional OSP vessel support, we believe that the dependability and reliability factors associated with the USNS Bowditch and Dutton raise serious doubts as to their long-time avail- ability as Ocean Survey Program vessels. According to the Joint Strateqic Capabilities Plan and other Defense documents we reviewed, continued dependence on these vessels has and could continue to jeopardize the collection of vital datajto support SSBN deployments and, therefore, impair the U.S. ability to maintain the adequacy of the U.S. strategic deter rence mission, particularly if the mission posture would necessitate changes in submarine deployment areas and tar- gets. ~Jseens) OCEANOGRAPHIC SATELLITE OPERATIONS MAY HELP Because knowledae of the effects of vertical deflection is critical to the accurate and reliable operation of the . SSBN weapons system, mathematical techniques for improving measurements of the earth*sS gravity field were developed by the Naval Oceanographic Office. A simplified procedure was created to combine satellite derived altimetry measurements of geoid undulations with ship-ccllected detailed surface gravity measurements. ficient vrocedure This technoloav re resents a highlv ¢
SEASAT-A IMPROVEMENTS IN SATELLITE DATA COLLECTION Since the GEOS-3 launching, satellite research applica- tions have led to further development of improved ocean sSen~ sors, and NASA, in cooperation with DOD and NOAA, is tenta- tively scheduled to launch SEASAT-A during June 1978. SEASAT-A is an ocean dynamics satellite that will carry five sensors to measure various key features of the oceans. In- cluded in the instruments package is a radar altimeter that promises to derive more accurate geoid measurements and de- tection of sea mounts. Coupled with the new technique for combining OSP col- lected gravity data, SEASAT-A will mean significant eco- nomies and efficiency in OSP program efforts to support the SSBN forces, because it will collect data from 95 percent of the earth's oceans. However, becaus be a continuing meea ror vessel collection of
All other malarial on this | page is NCLASSIFIED. ra SE EL } The tlocked marersal iz j : classified as jrdicared. i CHAPTER 3 f CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCLUSIONS Despite the fact that OSP supports the Navy's highest priority defense objectives, there has been a lack of re- source emphasis of the potential conzributions that Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy data can make to improving the opera- tional effectiveness and security of SSBNs, and to the over- all credibility of the U.S. strategic deterrant posture. We believe that the OSP support deficiencies found dur- ing our review are a result of having a fragmented and decen- tralized naval oceanographic program. In 1975, the Secretary of the Navy issued a directive to consolidate the Navy's oceanographic vorogram resources under a Single manager to improve its effectiveness. This directive, however, has never been fully implemented and allocation of Naval oceanographic resources remain separated throughout several Navy commands. As a result, we find that resources are still allocated for low priority programs at the same time resources are needed to maintain strategic high priority OSP support of SSBN forces. We believe this fragmented and decentralized use of the Navy's oceanographic resources has created a lack of overall management control and that all naval oceanographic functions should be conso- lidated under a single manager. DOD COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION In response to our request for DOD to review and com- Ment on this report, the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering concurred in our assessment) that the age of OSP ships may contribute to the risk that MC&%G data may not be provided in a timely manner to meet SSBN overational requirements. See Appendix V)._ He further stated that} steps were being taken to provide an alternative means for MC&G data coliection by activating - newer ships with more dependable operational characteristics; intensifying efforts for backup survey capability and im- proving OSP management procedures to provide early indica- tion of production schedule problems. (S#¢Rnae5
SE cl ie od moterial is iffed ‘ag indicated. bther matefai on this C phe is UNCLASSIFTED. We agree that these actions will helo in preventing future} SSBN force support problems. however, we were in- formed by Navy officials that OSP survey backup vessels will not have the same unique survey capability as the current OSP ships because there are no other ships in existence with that unique capability, (@m@RE?)| ana that no plans exist for replacing the two olaer vessels. In this regard subsequent to DOD's February 8, comments see p. 23) which stated[that OSP operations were iow on - schedule, we were informed by Navy officials that the USNS Dutton, in addition to having a cracked sonar dome, had sus- tained potentially serious major hull damage to the extent that the ship was abandoned during dry dock procedures for safety reasons, and that during June, 1978, the Bowditch hed encountered major boiler problems. (omer) Consec- quently, these same officials stated{that continued reliance on these ships could seriously jeopardize SSBN support, and that as of June 22, 1978, OSP was not on schedule. SECRET) We believe that the new methods for combining SEASAT-A gravity data with shiv derived gravity data willfhelp erase one data deficiency. (@mamee) |-But, because there are no collect bathymetry or short-wave length gravity the Navy will continue to have a long term need for ship survey capa- bility that could become a serious problem if additional -euenm) ito continue to maintain a U.S.-Soviet balance in strategic nuclear deterrence. We recognize that OSP support should be provided as economically and efficiently as possible, but we found that fragmented and decentralized resource management of the Navy's oceanographic assets. For example, we pointed. out in our June 16, 1978, report that because “of budgetary constraints, from 1970-76 Navy officials leased eight ecean research vessels to six foreign countries, one Federal agency and one U.S. university rather than place capable vessels in mothballs. These ships and their recipients are shown below. 16° SECHET
The block ke classified as All other Gillis (T-AGOR-4) University of Miami Davis (T-AGOR-5) New Zealand Eltanin (T~AGOR-8) Argentina Keathley (T-AGS~35) Taiwan Kellar (T-AGS=-25) Portugal Sands (T~AGOR-6) Brazil Lee (T-AGS-31) USGS Gibbs (T-AGOR-1) Greece While all of these vessels were not capable of perform- ing OSP related tasks, we believe that a single manager could have planned for long range programming of oceano- graphic resources on a priority basis and avoided giving up resources at a time-whenf high priority SSBN data deficien- cies were evolvina. (ener?) - RECOMMENDATIONS We recommend that the Secretary of Defense evaluate the support provided by the Ocean Survey Program to strategic ballistic missile submarines in order to preclude any de- terioration in the U.S. ability to maintain and support strategic defense forces in a high state of readiness. Ac- tions taken should include: --reviewing all SSBN mission reaquirements}that may re~ Guire OSP or other oceanographic support; (@SeRa®) ana --assessing the capability of the Ocean Survey Program to support SSBN mission requirements in ajtimely fashion. (@ne@na®) Further, we reaffirm the recommendation contained in our June 16, 1978, report to the Congress entitled “Need for Improving Management of U.S. Oceanographic Assets" (CED-78-125) which stated that: 17
UNCLASSIFIED -~-The Secretary of Defense direct the Secretery of the Navy to reorganize and consolidate management of all Navy oceanographic activities under the Oceanographer of the Navy or another designated single manager, and to assist and improve coordination with the designated civilian manager to maximize use of all U.S. oceano- graphic vessels. 18 UNCLASSIFIED
MISSILE LAUNCHING S7STEM” (SSH E COMPARE MEME? HAVIGATION GUBSYSTEN (waveatiun CEMTEAD MMSSILE TEST ANO AEADINESS EQUIPMENT fossa € Contador CENTER FIRE CONTROL SVSTEM tMSSRE CONIA COMIEM ‘ saySSire | AeaSSE COMFARS eR MTD OATA RECORDING SYSTEM ‘ tmiSsn€ CONRAUL CEatEAd ‘ i I XIGNaddV T XTANSAdY
APPENDIX II APPENDIX II ‘The difference in direction between the normal to the geoid and the normal to the ellipsoid is the deflection of the vertical. Leveling processes or inertial navigation equipment align missile guidance platforms along the normal to the geoid. The missile will miss the target if corrections are not made for the deflection of the vertical. 20 SECRET a
APPENDIX IITf Spot APPENDIX III . : —_ ee GRAVITY ‘ANOMALY a f PLATFORM ORIENTATION Ae athe eae per ent ign GEOID HEIGHT INERTIAL NAVIGATION RS A --Geoid heights} to determine missile launch altitude --Gravity anomalies|to determine disturbances in missile flight due to earth's gravity field. --Deflections of the vertical and their effects on --missile platform erection determined by inertial navigation. e-ship's position and velocity determined by inertial navigation.
SECRET APPENDIX V f THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON, D.C, 20301 APPENDIX V a” RESEARCH AND . * ENGINEERING ra a 8 FEB 1978 Mr. R. W. Gutman Procurement and Systems Acquisition Division - Uaited States General Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548 Dear Mr. Gutman: ; . / (0) This is in response to your letter to the Secretary of Defense dated 3 November 1977 requesting review and comments concerning your draft report, "Need for Improving Mapping, Charting and Geodesy Support of the Strategic Ballistic Missile Submarine Forces.” (GAO Code 14201, GAO Case #4753) ya The main thrust of the repore is that the Strategic Ballistic Missile Submarines may net be deployed as effectively as possible to carry out their strategic mission unless there is an improvement in the Mapping, Charting and Geodesy (MC&G) support provided by the Navy Ocean Survey Program (OSP). The report states that there has been a lack of emphasis and an inadequate appreciation for the potential contribution MC&G can make to strategic force readiness. The Department of Defense concurs in the assessment that the age of OSP ships may contribute to the tisk that MC&G data may not be provided in a timely manner to meet operational requirements. This risk is recognized and the Department of Defense is taking steps to provide the means for alternative MC&G data collection. Further, the design of the Trident navigation system is less dependent on external navigation aids than were earlier systems. With respecs to the GAO recommendations concerning the MC&G support for the Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine Force, the following comments are provided: , Classified by USDRE. Exempt from General Declassificacion Schedule of Executive Order 11652. Exemption Category 3. Declassify on 31 December 2008. 23 ET wn
—— lst: APPENDIA V (U) Recommendation: “...strengthea the policy and operational - == AEPENDIX V_, effectiveness for Naval MC&G support of major weapons systems, such as in order to preclude any deterioration in the U.S. ability to maintain and support strategic defense forces in a high state of | teadiness." SSEN's, timely e ys Comment: such as to insure maximm operational effectiveness of the weapons systems. However, this support must be. provided as economically and efficiently as Whereas the high risk of OSP due to aging ships is recognized, OSP’ has to date been able to meet the actual requirement. Steps are also being: taken to reduce newer ships with more dependable operational characteristics, intensified efforts to complete developments that will allow additional survey and | and new management procedures that provide early possible. backup capability, indications of problems r GAO note: The Naval MC&G support to weapons systems should be the operational risk. Steps include activation of elated to meeting production schedules. The deleted material relates to matters omitted from this final report. {U)° Recommendation: "--assess the vessel capability for the Ocean Survey Program to insure that MC&G data necessary to support the DoD _. requirements for effective SSBN mission operations can be provided in a fashion;" eraséd. Comment: continue to support SSBN deployments on time is understandable in view of the fact that over 590 OSP ship survey days have been lost due to unscheduled repairs in the past two years. A review of SSBN priorities and requirements has been conducted by all concerned (appropriate Unified and Specified Commanders, Navy, and DMA), and adjustments have been made to mesh OSP survey plans with planned SSBN deployments. The contribution of satellite derived radar altimetry data and an accelerated gravity proces~ sing program developed by the Naval Oceanograpnic Office enabled a data deficiency, in this case caused by the loss of survey ship time, to be -The concern expressed by GAO in Navy being unable to
de b54 dhe § APPENDIX V f APPENDIX V The block hai ed fegGs indicated. gtier material on this Ke is UNCLASSIFIED. ya The Navy’s MC&G program in support of SSBN operations is now on schedule. Various ship and alternate technologies are under review to improve the marginal satisfactory nature of the present program assets. The Navy will continue ta review the balance of assets and requirements and will take steps necessary to insure the requirements are met. GAO note: The deleted material relates to matters omitted from this final report. nN
wn a - me NO POREIGH DISSEMINATION APPENDIX V _ SECRET _ APPENDIX Vv GAO note: The deleted material relates to matters omitted from this final report. Ket P Tninson Gerald P. Dinneett Principal Deputy (14201) — | - DISSEMINATION e in UNCLASSIFIED. )