Headquarters 
Department  of  the  Army 
Washington,  DC 
1  July  1984 
"Army  Regulation  381-10 
Elective  1  August  1984 
Military  Intelligence 
US  Army  Intelligence  Activities 
Summary.  This  regulation,  which  s^ts  forth  policies  and  pro- 
cedures governing  the  conduct  of  intelligence  activities  by 
Department  of  the  Army  intelligence  components,  has  been 
revised.  This  revision  implements  DOD  Directive  5240.1  and 
DOD  5240.1-R  which  implement  Lxecutive  Order  12333, 
United  States  Intelligence  Activities.  It  includes  all  of  DOD 
5240.1-R,  "Procedures  Governing  the  Activities  of  DOD 
Intelligence  Components  that  Affect  United  States  Persons," 
dated  December  1982,  and  adds  implementing  and  supple- 
menting instructions  where  required.  These  additions  are  set 
in  boldface  type. 
Applicability. 
1.  This  regulation  applies  to  the  following: 
a.  All  Army  intelligence  components,  as  that  term  is  defined 
in  appendix  A,  paragraph  8. 
b.  Other  military  personnel  and  civilian  employees  of  the 
Department  of  the  Army  when  they  engage  in  intelligence 
activities  as  that  term  is  defined  in  appendix  A,  paragraphs 
8  and  13. 
c.  Members  of  the  Army  National  Guard  and  US  Army 
Reserve  when  they  are  performing  Federal  duties  or  engaging 
in  activities  directly  related  to  a  Federal  duty  or  mission. 
2.  Army  intelligence  components  are  explicitly  excluded  from 
the  provisions  of  AR  380-13. 
3.  This  regulation  is  not  applicable  to  activities  covered  under 
Presidential  Directive/National  Security  Council-9. 
Impact  on  New  Manning  System.  This  regulation  does  not 
contain  information  that  affects  the  New  Manning  System. 
Supplementation.  Supplementation  of  this  regulation  is  pro- 
hibited unless  prior  approval  is  obtained  from  HQDA(DAMI- 
CIC),  WASH  DC  20310. 
Interim  changes.  Interim  changes  to  this  regulation  are  not 
official  unless  they  are  authenticated  by  The  Adjutant  Gen- 
eral. Users  will  destroy  interim  changes  on  their  expiration 
dates  unless  sooner  superseded  or  rescinded. 
Suggested  improvements.  The  proponent  agency  of  this 
regulation  is  the  Office  of  the  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff  for 
Intelligence.  Users  are  invited  to  send  comments  and  sug- 
gested improvements  on  DA  Form  2028  (Recommended 
Changes  to  Publications  and  Blank  Forms)  directlv  to 
HQDA(DAMI-CIC),  WASH  DC  20310. 
"This  regulation  aupariadas  AR  381-10, 15  February  1982.
1  July  1984  AR  381-10 
FOREWORD 
This  DoD  regulation  sets  forth  procedures  governing  the  activities  of  DoD  intelligence  components  that  affect 
United  States  persons.  It  implements  DoD  Directive  5240.1,  and  replaces  the  November  30,  1979  version  of  DoD 
Regulation  5240. 1-R.  It  is  applicable  to  all  DoD  intelligence  components. 
Executive  Order  12333,  "United  States  Intelligence  Activities,"  stipulates  that  certain  activities  of  intelligence 
components  that  affect  US  persons  be  governed  by  procedures  issued  by  the  agency  head  and  approved  by  the 
Attorney  General.  Specifically,  procedures  1  through  10,  as  well  as  appendix  A,  herein,  require  approval  by  the 
Attorney  General.  Procedures  11  through  15,  while  not  requiring  approval  by  the  Attorney  General,  contain 
further  guidance  to  DoD  Components  in  implementing  Executive  Order  12333  as  well  as  Executive  Order  12334, 
"President's  Intelligence  Oversight  Board." 
Accordingly,  by  this  memorandum,  these  procedures  are  approved  for  use  within  the  Department  of  Defense. 
Heads  of  DoD  components  shall  issue  such  implementing  instructions  as  may  be  necessary  for  the  conduct  of 
authorized  functions  in  a  manner  consistent  with  the  procedures  set  forth  herein. 
This  regulation  is  effective  immediately. 
(Signed)  10/4/82  (Signed)  12/7/82 
William  French  Smith  Caspar  W.  Weinberger 
Attorney  General  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense 
United  States 
iii
1  July  1984 
AR  381-10 
Table  of  Contents 
Page 
FOREWORD    hi 
TABLE  OF  CONTENTS    v 
REFERENCES    ix 
PROCEDURE    1.   GENERAL  PROVISIONS    1-1 
A.  Applicability  and  Scope    1-1 
B.  Purpose    1-1 
C.  Interpretation    1-1 
D.  Exceptions  to  Policy    1-2 
E.  Amendment    1-2 
F.  Requests  for  Approval    1-2 
G.  General  Prohibitions    1-2 
PROCEDURE    2. 
A. 
B. 
D. 
E. 
COLLECTION  OF 
INFORMATION  ABOUT 
UNITED  STATES 
PERSONS      2-1 
Applicability  and  Scope      2-1 
Explanation  of  Undefined 
Terms      2-1 
Types  of  Information  That  May 
be  Collected  about  United 
States  Persons        2-1 
1.  Information  obtained  with 
consent      2-1 
2.  Publicly  available 
information      2-1 
3.  Foreign  intelligence      2-1 
4.  Counterintelligence      2-2 
5.  Potential  sources  of  assist- 
ance to  intelligence 
activities    2-2 
6.  Protection  of  intelligence 
sources  and  methods    2-2 
7.  Physical  security    2-2 
8.  Personnel  security    2-2 
9.  Communications  security—  2-2 
10.  Narcotics..        2-2 
11.  Threats  to  safety      2-2 
12.  Overhead  reconnaissance...    2-2 
13.  Administrative  purposes      2-2 
General  Criteria  Governing  the 
Means  Used  to  Collect  Infor- 
mation about  United  States 
Persons      2-2 
Special  Limitation  on  the  Col- 
lection of  Foreign  Intelligence 
Within  the  United  States      2-3 
PROCEDURE    3.  RETENTION  OF 
INFORMATION  ABOUT 
UNITED  STATES 
PERSONS      3-1 
A.  Applicability      3-1 
B.  Explanation  of  Undefined 
Terms      3-1 
Page 
C.  Criteria  for  Retention    3-1 
1.  Retention  of  information 
collected  under  Procedure  2 .  3-1 
2.  Retention  of  information  ac- 
quired incidentally    3-1 
3.  Retention  of  information  re- 
lating to  functions  of  other 
DoD  Components  or  non- 
DoD  Agencies    3-1 
4.  Temporary  retention    3-1 
5.  Retention  of  other 
information      3-1 
D.  Access  and  Retention    3-1 
1.  Controls  on  access  to  re- 
tained information    3-1 
2.  Duration  of  retention    3-1 
3.  Information  acquired  prior 
to  effective  date    3-1 
E.  Control  of  Electronic  Surveil- 
lance Information    3-2 
1.  Review    3-2 
2.  Access  controls    3-2 
3.  Annotation    3-2 
F.  Indexing  Electronic  Surveil- 
lance Information    3-2 
1.  General    3-2 
2.  Indexing  office    3-2 
3.  Content        3-2 
4.  Retrieval    3-2 
5.  Notifying  the  indexer    3-2 
6.  Procedures  for  forwarding 
backup  material--    3-2 
7.  Index  security  controls    3-3 
PROCEDURE    4.   DISSEMINATION  OF 
INFORMATION  ABOUT 
UNITED  STATES 
PERSONS      4-1 
A.  Applicability  and  Scope      4-1 
B.  Criteria  for  Dissemination      4-1 
C.  Other  Dissemination      4-1 
PROCEDURE    5.  ELECTRONIC 
SURVEILLANCE        5-1 
Part  1.  Electronic  Surveillance  in  the 
United  States  for  Intelligence 
Purposes      5-1 
A.  Applicability      5-1 
B.  General  Rules      5-1 
1.  Electronic  surveillance  pur- 
suant to  the  Foreign  Intelli- 
gence Surveillance  Act      5-1 
2.  Authority  to  request  elec- 
tronic surveillance      5-1 
3.  Electronic  surveillance  in 
emergency  situations      5-1
AR  381-10 
1  July  1984 
Page 
Part  2. 
Part  3. 
Part  4. 
PartS. 
Part  6. 
C.  Consensual  Electronic 
Surveillance        5-1 
1.  Applicability      5-1 
2.  Explanation  of  undefined 
terms   ---      5-1 
3.  Case  approval  authority...    5-1  Part  7. 
4.  Case  approval  standards..    5-2 
5.  Consensual  electronic 
surveillance  in  emergency 
situations      5-2 
Electronic  Surveillance  Outside 
the  United  States  for 
Intelligence  Purposes        5-2 
A.  Applicability      5-2 
B.  Explanation  of  Undefined 
Terms      s-3 
C.  Procedures          5-3 
D.  Electronic  Surveillance  in 
Emergency  Situations      5-4 
E.  Officials  Authorized  to  Request 
and  Approve  Electronic  Sur- 
veillance Outside  the  United 
States      5-4 
F.  Electronic  Surveillance  of 
Non-US  Persons      5-4 
1.  Case  approval  authority...  5-5 
2.  Case  approval  standards..  5-5 
3.  Case  approval  periods  —  5-5 
4.  Inadvertent  interception  of 
US  person  conversations  .  5-5 
Signals  Intelligence  Activities...  5-6 
A.  Applicability  and  Scope    5-6 
B.  Explanation  of  Undefined 
Terms    5-6 
C.  Procedures    5-7 
1.  Foreign  communications    5-7 
2.  Military  tactical 
communications    5-7 
Technical  Surveillance 
Countermeasures      5-7 
A.  Applicability  and  Scope      5-7 
B.  Explanation  of  Undefined 
Terms      5-7 
C.  Procedures      5-7 
Developing,  Testing  and 
Calibration  of  Electronic 
Equipment      5-8 
A.  Applicability    5-8 
B.  Procedures   -    5-8 
1.  Signals  authorized  for  use  ...  5-8 
2.  Restrictions   -  5-8 
Training  of  Personnel  in  the 
Operation  and  Use  of 
Electronic  Communications 
and  Surveillance  Equipment..    5-8 
B.    Procedures     
1.  Training  guidance   
2.  Training  limitations   
3.  Retention  and  dissemination 
Conduct  of  Vulnerability  and 
Hearability  Surveys   
A .  Aplicability  and  scope   
B.  Explanation  of  undefined  terms 
C.  Procedures     
1.  Conduct  of  vulnerability 
surveys   
2.  Conduct  of  hearability 
surveys   
PROCEDURE    6.   CONCEALED 
MONITORING 
A.  Applicability  and  Scope  ... 
B.  Explanation  of  Undefined 
Terms   
C.  Procedures   
PROCEDURE    7.   PHYSICAL  SEARCHES 
A.  Applicability   
B.  Explanation  of  Undefined 
Terms   ... 
C.  Procedures   
1.  Unconsented  physical 
searches  within  the  United 
States  
 
2.  Unconsented  physical 
searches  outside  the  United 
States  —   
3.  Requests  for  authority  to 
conduct  unconsented 
physical  searches  within 
the  United  States  or  of  US 
persons  abroad   
4.  Unconsented  physical 
searches  of  non-US  per- 
sons abroad   
Page 
5-9 
5-9 
5-9 
5-9 
5-9 
5-9 
5-9 
5-9 
5-9 
5-10 
6-1 
6-1 
6-1 
6-1 
7-1 
7-1 
7-1 
7-1 
7-1 
7-1 
7-2 
7-2 
A.  Applicability      5-8 
PROCEDURE    8.   SEARCHES  AND 
EXAMINATION  OF  MAIL.    8-1 
A.  Applicability      8-1 
B.  Explanation  of  Undefined 
Terms      8-1 
C.  Procedures      8-1 
1.  Searches  of  mail  within 
United  States  postal 
channels        8-1 
2.  Searches  of  mail  outside 
United  States  postal 
channels      8-1 
3.  Mail  covers      8-2 
PROCEDURE    9.  PHYSICAL  SURVEILLANCE    9-1 
A.  Applicability      9-1 
B.  Explanation  of  Undefined 
Terms      9-1 
Vi
1  July  '.984 
AR  381-10 
PROCEDURE  10. 
A. 
B. 
D. 
PROCEDURE  11. 
A. 
B. 
C. 
Page 
Procedures  ..-        9-1 
1.  Criteria  for  physical  surveil- 
lance in  the  United  States ...    9-1 
2.  Criteria  for  physical  surveil- 
lance outside  the  United 
States      9-1 
3.  Required  approvals  for  phys- 
ical surveillance      9-1 
4.  Physical  surveillance  of 
non-US  persons      9-2 
UNDISCLOSED 
PARTICIPATION  IN 
ORGANIZATIONS   10-1 
Applicability    10-1 
Explanation  of  Undefined 
Terms      10-1 
Procedures  for  Undisclosed 
Participation    10-1 
1 .  Limitations  on  undisclosed 
participation    10-1 
2.  Required  approvals   l'?-2 
Disclosure  Requirement   10-3 
CONTRACTING  FOR 
GOODS  AND  SERVICES  ..  11-1 
Applicability   -  11-1 
Procedures    11-1 
1 .  Contracts  with  academic 
institutions   11-1 
2.  Contracts  with  commercial 
organizations,  private  institu- 
tions and  individuals   11-1 
Effect  of  Non-Compliance   11-1 
PROCEDURE 12.   PROVISION  OF 
ASSISTANCE  TO  LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
AUTHORITIES   -   12-1 
A.  Applicability   12-1 
B.  Procedures   12-1 
1 .  Cooperation  with  law  en- 
forcement authorities   12-1 
Page 
2.  Types  of  permissible 
assistance        12-1 
PROCEDURE  13.    EXPERIMENTATION  ON 
HUMAN  SUBJECTS  FOR 
INTELLIGENCE 
PURPOSES      13-1 
A.  Applicability    13-1 
B.  Explanation  of  Undefined 
Terms    13-1 
C.  Procedures    13-1 
PROCEDURE  14.   EMPLOYEE  CONDUCT   14-1 
A.  Applicability    14-1 
B.  Procedures     14-1 
1.  Employee  responsibilities   14-1 
2.  Familiarity  with  restrictions..  14-1 
3.  Responsibilities  of  the  heads 
of  DoD  components   14-1 
PROCEDURE  15.   IDENTIFYING. 
INVESTIGATING.  AND 
REPORTING 
QUESTIONABLE 
ACTIVITIES      15-1 
A.  Applicability    15-1 
B.  Explanation  of  Undefined 
Terms      15-1 
C.  Procedures    15-1 
1.  Identification    15-1 
2.  Investigation    15-1 
3.  Reports    15-2 
4.  Reporting  and  use  of  in- 
formation concerning  Fed- 
era;  crimes     15-3 
Appendixes 
A.  Glossary—   -   -   --  A-l 
B.  Extract  from  "The  Agreement  Between  the 
Deputy  Secretary  of  Defense  and  Attorney 
General,  April  5, 1379"    B-l 
C.  References  to  Army  Implementation  of  DoD 
5240.1-R    C-l 
D.  Part  II,  Executive  Order  12333    D-l 
VII
1  July  1984  ^F.  381-10 
REFERENCES 
(a)  Executive  Order  12333.  "United  States  Intelligence  Activities,"  December  4, 
1981 
(b)  Public  Law  95-511.  Foreign  Intelligence  Surveillance  Act  of  1978 
(c)  DoD  Directive  5200.29,  "DoD  Technical  Surveillance  Countermeasures  (TSCM) 
Survey  Program,"  February  12,  1975 
(d)  Title  18,  United  States  Code,  Chapters  105  and  119 
(e)  Public  Law  73-416,  "Communications  Act  of  1934,"  Section  605 
(f)  Title  10,  United  States  Code,  Sections  801-840,  Uniform  Code  of  Military 
Justice 
(g)  Agreement  Between  the  Deputy  Secretary  of  Defense  and  Attorney  General, 
April  5.  1979  (App  B) 
(h)  Executive  Order  12198.  "Prescribing  Amendments  to  the  Manual  for  Courts 
Martial,  United  States.  1969,"  March  12,  1980 
(i)  DoD  Directive  5525.5.  "DoD  Cooperation  with  Civilian  Law  Enforcement 
Officials,"  March  22,  1982 
(j)  DoD  Directive  5000.1 1 ,  "Data  Elements  and  Data  Codes  Standardization  Pro- 
gram," December  7.  1964 
(k)  DoD  Directive  5000.19,  "Policies  for  the  Management  and  Control  of  Infor- 
mation Requirements,"  March  12,  1976 
ix
1  July  1934 
AR  381-10 
PROCEDURE  1.     GENERAL  PROVISIONS 
A.   APPLICABILITY  AND  SCOPE 
1.  These  procedures  apply  only  to  "DoD  intelli- 
gence components,''  and  other  DA  components  per- 
forming "intelligence  activities,"  as  defined  in  Appen- 
dix A.  Procedures  2  through  4  provide  the  sole  authority 
by  which  such  components  may  collect,  retain  and  dis- 
seminate information  concerning  United  States  per- 
sons. Procedures  5  through  10  set  forth  applicable  guid- 
ance with  respect  to  the  use  of  certain  collection 
techniques  to  obtain  information  for  foreign  intelligence 
and  counterintelligence  purposes.  Authority  to  employ 
such  techniques  shall  be  limited  to  that  necessary  to 
perform  functions  assigned  the  DoD  intelligence  com- 
ponent concerned.  Information  may  be  gathered  by  in- 
telligence components  using  techniques  described  in  pro- 
cedures 5  through  10  for  other  than  foreign  intelligence 
or  counterintelligence  (CI)  purposes.  However,  such  col- 
lection must  comply  with  the  following:  be  based  on  a 
proper  function  assigned  to  the  intelligence  component; 
employ  the  least  intrusive  lawful  investigative  technique 
reasonably  available;  and  comply  with  the  appropriate 
provisions  of  this  regulation.  Procedures  11  through  15 
govern  other  aspects  of  DoD  intelligence  activities,  in- 
cluding the  oversight  of  such  activities. 
2.  The  functions  of  DoD  intelligence  components 
not  specifically  addressed  herein  shall  be  carried  out  in 
accordance  with  applicable  policy  and  procedure. 
3.  These  procedures  do  not  apply  to  law  enforce- 
ment activities,  including  civil  disturbance  activities,  that 
may  be  undertaken  by  DoD  intelligence  components. 
Involvement  by  an  Army  intelligence  component  in  civil 
disturbance  activities  is  governed  by  the  Department  of 
the  Army  (DA)  CivH  Disturbance  Plan  (Garden  Plot) 
dated  3  August  1978.  When  an  investigation  or  inquiry 
undertaken  pursuant  to  these  procedures  establishes 
reasonable  belief  that  a  crime  has  been  committed,  the 
DoD  intelligence  component  concerned  shall  refer  the 
matter  to  the  appropriate  law  enforcement  agency  in 
accordance  with  procedures  12  and  15,  or,  if  the  DoD 
intelligence  component  is  otherwise  authorized  to  con- 
duct law  enforcement  activities,  shall  continue  such  in- 
vestigation under  appropriate  law  enforcement  proce- 
dures. If  evidence  surfaces  during  the  course  of  an 
investigation  by  an  Army  intelligence  component  that 
provides  reasonable  belief  that  a  crime  has  been  com- 
mitted and  which  under  AR  195-2  also  may  be  under 
the  investigative  jurisdiction  of  the  US  Army  Criminal 
Investigation  Command  (USACIDC),  details  of  the  in- 
vestigation will  be  provided  to  the  USACIDC  under  AR 
381-20. 
4.  DoD  intelligence  components  shall  not  request 
any  person  or  entity  to  undertake  any  activity  forbidden 
by  Executive  Order  12333,  reference  (a),  or  this  reg- 
ulation. 
B.  PURPOSE 
The  purpose  of  these  procedures  is  to  enable  DoD 
intelligence  components  to  carry  out  effectively  their 
authorized  functions  while  ensuring  their  activities  that 
affect  United  States  persons  are  carried  out  in  a  manner 
that  protects  the  constitutional  rights  and  privacy  of 
such  persons.  This  regulation  is  intended  to  complement 
other  intelligence  regulatory  policy;  it  does  not  establish 
independent  authority  for  intelligence  activities.  There- 
fore, activities  and  investigations  described  elsewhere, 
such  as  AR  381-12,  AR  381-20,  and  Director  of  Central 
Intelligence  Directives,  must  be  conducted  in  accordance 
with  these  procedures.  For  example,  in  determining 
whether  an  intelligence  component  may  conduct  an  in- 
vestigation that  involves  a  US  person,  the  component 
should  first  determine  whether  it  has  the  mission  and 
authority  to  conduct  the  type  of  investigation  involved. 
That  determination  is  made  utilizing  applicable  regu- 
lations, Director  of  Central  Intelligence  Directives,  De- 
fense Intelligence  Agency  guidance,  and  so  forth.  Once 
that  determination  is  made,  and  the  component  can  es- 
tablish its  authority  to  conduct  the  investigation  in- 
volved, this  regulation,  particularly  Procedure  2,  should 
be  used  to  determine  whether  particular  items  of  infor- 
mation about  US  persons  may  be  collected  during  the 
conduct  of  the  otherwise  authorized  investigation.  In- 
telligence components  should  be  aware  that  a  number 
of  concepts  and  terms  commonly  used  within  the  intel- 
ligence community  have  unique  definitions  in  this  reg- 
ulation. For  example,  activities  commonly  considered 
part  of  a  "counterintelligence  investigation"  (AR  381- 
20,  appendix)  may  be  considered  "personnel  security" 
matters  under  this  regulation.  (See  app  A,  sees  19  and 
20.) 
C.  INTERPRETATION 
1.  These  procedures  shall  be  interpreted  in  ac- 
cordance with  their  stated  purpose. 
1-1
AR  381-10 
2.  AH  defined  terms  appear  in  appendix  A.  Ad- 
ditional terms,  not  otherwise  defined,  are  explained  in 
the  text  of  each  procedure,  as  appropriate. 
3.  All  questions  of  interpretation  shall  be  referred 
to  the  legal  office  responsible  for  advising  the  DoD 
intelligence  component  concerned.  Intelligence  com- 
ponent commanders  will  seek  legal  advice  from  their 
supporting  judge  advocates.  When  questions  cannot  be 
resolved  locally,  they  will  be  forwarded  through  com- 
mand channels  to  HQDA(DAMI-CIC),  WASH  DC  20310, 
for  coordination  with  the  Office  of  The  Judge  Advocate 
General.  Questions  that  cannot  be  resolved  in  this  man- 
ner shall  be  referred  to  the  General  Counsel  of  the 
Military  Department  concerned,  or,  as  appropriate,  the 
General  Counsel  of  the  Department  of  Defense  for 
resolution. 
D.   EXCEPTIONS  TO  POLICY 
Requests  for  excsption  to  the  policies  and  proce- 
dures established  herein  shall  be  made  in  writing  to  the 
Deputy  Under  Secretary  of  Defense  (Policy),  who  shall 
obtain  the  written  approval  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense 
and,  if  required,  the  Attorney  General  for  any  such 
exception.  Requests  for  exceptions  to  policy  will  be  for- 
warded through  command  channels  to  HQDAfDAMI- 
CIC),  WASH  DC  20310. 
1  July  1984 
E.    AMENDMENT 
Requests  for  amendment  of  these  procedures  shall 
be  made  to  the  Deputy  Under  Secretary  of  Defense 
(Policy),  who  shall  obtain  the  written  approval  of  the 
Secretary  of  Defense,  and,  if  required,  the  Attorney 
General,  for  any  such  amendment. 
F.  REQUESTS  FOR  APPROVAL 
Requests  to  conduct  any  activity  authorized  by  this 
regulation  that  requires  HQDA  or  higher  level  approval 
(such  as  the  Secretary  of  the  Army  or  the  US  Attorney 
General)  will  be  submitted  through  command  channels 
to  HQDA(DAMI-CIC),  WASH  DC  20310.  Complete 
justification  must  accompany  each  request. 
G.  GENERAL  PROHIBITIONS 
DA  components  will  not  conduct  or  provide  support 
for  the  conduct  of  special  activities,  unless  such  actions 
have  been  approved  by  the  President  and  directed  by 
the  Secretary  of  Defense.  Exceptions  will  be  in  time  of 
war  declared  by  the  Congress  or  during  a  period  covered 
by  a  report  from  the  President  and  directed  by  the  Sec- 
retary of  Defense.  Under  no  circumstances  will  a  DA 
employee  engage  in,  or  conspire  to  engage  in,  assassi- 
nation. 
1-2
1  July  1984 
AR  381-10 
PROCEDURE  2.     COLLECTION  OF  INFORMATION  ABOUT  UNITED  STATES  PERSONS 
A.  APPLICABILITY  AND  SCOPE 
This  procedure  specifies  the  kinds  of  information 
about  United  States  persons  that  may  be  collected  by 
DoD  intelligence  components  and  sets  forth  general 
criteria  governing  the  means  used  to  collect  such  in- 
formation. Additional  limitations  are  imposed  in  Pro- 
cedures 5  through  10  on  the  use  of  specific  collection 
techniques.  Nothing  in  this  procedure  will  be  interpreted 
as  authorizing  the  collection  of  any  information  relating 
to  a  US  person  solely  because  of  lawful  advocacy  of 
measures  opposed  to  Government  policy. 
B-    EXPLANATION  OF  UNDEFINED  TERMS 
1.  Collection.  Information  shall  be  considered  as 
"collected"  only  when  it  has  been  received  for  use  by 
an  employee  of  a  DoD  intelligence  component  in  the 
course  of  his  official  duties.  For  information  to  be  "re- 
ceived for  use"  and  therefore  "collected"  by  an  Army 
intelligence  component,  an  employee  must  take  some 
affirmative  action  that  demonstrates  an  intent  to  use  or 
retain  the  information  received  (such  as  production  of 
a  report,  filing  of  an  investigative  summary,  or  electronic 
storage  of  received  data).  Establishment  of  "unofficial 
files"  and  the  like  may  not  be  used  to  avoid  the  appli- 
cation of  this  procedure.  Thus,  information  volunteered 
to  a  DoD  intelligence  component  by  a  cooperating  source 
would  be  "collected"  under  this  procedure  when  an 
employee  of  such  component  officially  accepts,  in  some 
manner,  such  information  for  use  within  that  compo- 
nent. Data  acquired  by  electronic  means  is  "collected" 
only  when  it  has  been  processed  into  intelligible  form. 
Information  held,  or  forwarded  to  a  supervisory  au- 
thority, solely  for  the  purpose  of  making  a  determination 
about  the  collectability  of  that  information  under  this 
procedure  (and  not  otherwise  disseminated  within  the 
component)  is  not  "collected." 
2.  Cooperating  sources  means  persons  or  organi- 
zations that  knowingly  and  voluntarily  provide  infor- 
mation to  DoD  intelligence  components,  or  access  to 
information,  at  the  request  of  such  components  or  on 
their  own  initiative.  Cooperating  sources  must  be  either 
informed  or  otherwise  have  knowledge  that  they  are 
dealing  with  a  DoD  intelligence  component.  These  in- 
clude government  agencies,  law  enforcement  authori- 
ties, credit  agencies,  academic  institutions,  employers, 
and  foreign  governments 
3.  Domestic  activities  refers  to  activities  that  take 
place  within  the  United  States  that  do  not  involve  a 
significant  connection  with  a  foreign  power,  organiza- 
tion, or  person. 
4.  Overt  means  refers  to  methods  of  collection 
whereby  the  source  of  the  information  being  collected 
is  advised,  or  is  otherwise  aware,  that  he  is  providing 
such  information  to  the  Department  of  Defense  or  a 
component  thereof. 
C.   TYPES  OF  INFORMATION  THAT  MAY  BE 
COLLECTED  ABOUT  UNITED  STATES 
PERSONS 
Information  that  identifies  a  United  States  person 
may  be  collected  by  a  DoD  intelligence  component  only 
if  it  is  necessary  to  the  conduct  of  a  function  assigned 
the  collecting  component,  and  only  if  it  falls  within  one 
of  the  following  categories:  Note:  Terms  used  in  this 
part  are  defined  in  appendix  A  and  may  differ  substan- 
tially from  traditional  Army  usage. 
1.  Information  obtained  with  consent.  Informa- 
tion may  be  collected  about  a  United  States  person  who 
consents  to  such  collection. 
2.  Publicly  available  information.  Information  may 
be  collected  about  a  United  States  person  if  it  is  publicly 
available. 
3.  Foreign  intelligence.  Subject  to  the  special  lim- 
itation contained  in  section  E.,  below,  information  may 
be  collected  about  a  United  States  person  if  the  infor- 
mation constitutes  foreign  intelligence,  provided  the  in- 
tentional collection  of  foreign  intelligence  about  United 
States  persons  shall  be  limited  to  persons  who  are: 
a.  Individuals  reasonably  believed  to  be  officers 
or  employees,  or  otherwise  acting  for  or  on  behalf,  of 
a  foreign  power; 
b.  An  organization  reasonably  believed  to  be 
owned  or  controlled,  directly  or  indirectly,  by  a  foreign 
power; 
c.  Persons  or  organizations  reasonably  believed 
to  be  engaged  or  about  to  engage,  in  international  ter- 
rorist or  international  narcotics  activities.  (See  AR  190- 
52.); 
2-1
AR  381-10 
1  July  1984 
d.  Persons  who  are  reasonably  believed  to  be 
prisoners  of  war:  missing  in  action;  or  are  the  targets, 
the  hostages,  or  victims  of  international  terrorist  or- 
ganizations; or 
e.  Corporations  or  other  commercial  organiza- 
tions believed  to  have  some  relationship  with  foreign 
powers,  organizations  or  persons. 
4.  Counterintelligence.  Information  may  be  col- 
lected about  a  United  States  person  if  the  information 
constitutes  counterintelligence,  provided  the  inten- 
tional collection  of  counterintelligence  about  United 
States  persons  must  be  limited  to: 
a.  Persons  who  are  reasonably  believed  to  be 
engaged  in.  or  about  to  engage  in,  intelligence  activities 
on  behalf  of  a  foreign  power,  or  international  terrorist 
activities.  (See  AR  190-52,  AR  381-12,  and  AR  381- 
20.) 
b.  Persons  in  contact  with  persons  described  in 
paragraph  C.4.a.,  above,  for  the  purpose  of  identifying 
such  person  and  assessing  their  relationship  with  per- 
sons described  in  paragraph  C.4.a.,  above. 
5.  Potential  sources  of  assistance  to  intelligence 
activities.  Information  may  be  collected  about  United 
States  persons  reasonably  believed  to  be  potential  sources 
of  intelligence,  or  potential  sources  of  assistance  to  in- 
telligence activities,  for  the  purpose  of  assessing  their 
suitability  or  credibility.  This  category  does  not  include 
investigations  undertaken  for  personnel  security  pur- 
poses. (See  subsection  8.) 
6.  Protection  of  intelligence  sources  and  methods. 
Information  may  be  collected  about  a  United  States 
person  who  has  access  to,  had  access  to,  or  is  otherwise 
in  possession  of,  information  which  reveals  foreign  in- 
telligence and  counterintelligence  sources  or  methods, 
when  collection  is  reasonably  believed  necessary  to  pro- 
tect against  the  unauthorized  disclosure  of  such  infor- 
mation; provided  that  within  the  United  States,  inten- 
tional collection  of  such  information  shall  be  limited  to 
persons  who  are: 
a.  Present  and  former  DoD  employees; 
b.  Present  or  former  employees  of  a  present  or 
former  DoD  contractor;  and 
c.  Applicants  for  employment  at  DoD  or  at  a 
contractor  of  DoD. 
7.  Physical  security.  Information  may  be  collected 
about  a  United  States  person  who  is  reasonably  believed 
to  threaten  the  physical  security  of  DoD  employees, 
installations,  operations  or  official  visitors.  Information 
may  also  be  collected  in  the  course  of  a  lawful  physical 
security  investigation.  (See  AR  381  - 12,  AR  381-20,  AR 
190-13,  and  AR  190-52.) 
8.  Personnel  security.  Information  may  be  col- 
lected about  a  United  States  person  that  arises  out  of 
a  lawful  personnel  security  investigation.  This  includes 
information  concerning  relatives  and  associates  of  the 
subject  of  the  investigation,  if  required  by  the  scope  of 
the  investigation  and  the  information  has  a  bearing  on 
the  matter  being  investigated  or  the  security  determi- 
nation being  made.  (See  AR  604-5,  AR  381-12,  AR 
381-20,  and  AR  190-52.) 
9.  Communications  security.  Information  may  be 
collected  about  a  United  States  person  that  arises  out 
of  a  lawful  communications  security  investigation.  (See 
AR  380-53.) 
10.  Narcotics.  Information  may  be  collected  about 
a  United  States  person  who  is  reasonably  believed  to 
be  engaged  in  international  narcotics  activities. 
11.  Threats  to  safety.  Information  may  be  col- 
lected about  a  United  States  person  when  the  infor- 
mation is  needed  to  protect  the  safety  of  any  person  or 
organization,  including  those  who  are  targets,  victims 
or  hostages  of  international  terrorist  organizations.  (See 
AR  190-52.) 
12.  Overhead  reconnaissance.  Information  may  be 
collected  from  overhead  reconnaissance  not  directed  at 
specific  United  States  persons. 
13.  Administrative  purposes.  Information  may  be 
collected  about  a  United  States  person  that  is  necessary 
for  administrative  purposes. 
D.  GENERAL  CRITERIA  GOVERNING  THE 
MEANS  USED  TO  COLLECT  INFORMATION 
ABOUT  UNITED  STATES  PERSONS 
1.  Means  of  collection.  DoD  intelligence  compo- 
nents are  authorized  to  collect  information  about  United 
States  persons  by  any  lawful  means,  provided  that  all 
such  collection  activities  shall  be  carried  out  in  accord- 
ance with  E.0. 12333,  (reference  (a)),  and  this  Regu- 
lation, as  appropriate. 
2.  Least  intrusive  means.  The  collection  of  infor- 
mation about  United  States  persons  shall  be  accom- 
plished by  the  least  intrusive  means.  In  general,  this 
means — 
2-2
1  July  1984 
a.  To  the  extent  feasible,  such  information  shall 
be  collected  from  publicly  available  information  or  with 
the  consent  of  the  person  concerned; 
b.  If  collection  from  these  sources  is  not  feasible 
or  iufficient,  such  information  may  be  collected  from 
cooperating  sources; 
c.  If  collection  from  cooperating  sources  is  not 
feasible  or  sufficient,  such  information  may  be  col- 
lected, as  appropriate,  using  other  lawful  investigative 
techniques  that  do  not  require  a  judicial  warrant  or  the 
approval  of  the  Attorney  General;  then 
d.  I;  collection  through  use  of  these  techniques 
is  not  feasible  or  sufficient,  approval  for  use  of  inves- 
tigative techniques  that  do  require  a  judicial  warrant  or 
the  approval  of  the  Attorney  General  may  be  sought. 
3.  Requests  to  engage  in  collection  techniques  which 
require  HQDA  or  higher  level  approval  will  be  submitted 
through  command  channels  to  HQDA(DAMI-CIC), 
WASH  DC  20310.  Full  justification  as  required  in  the 
relevant  procedures  will  be  included. 
E.    SPECIAL  LIMITATION  ON  THE 
COLLECTION  OF  FOREIGN  INTELLIGENCE 
WITHIN  THE  UNITED  STATES 
Within  the  United  States,  foreign  intelligence  con- 
cerning United  States  persons  may  be  collected  only  by 
AR  381-10 
overt  means  unless  all  the  following  conditions  are  met: 
1.  The  foreign  intelligence  sought  is  significant  and 
collection  is  not  undertaken  for  the  purposes  of  ac- 
quiring information  concerning  the  domestic  activities 
of  any  United  States  person; 
2.  Such  foreign  intelligence  cannot  be  reasonably 
obtained  by  overt  means; 
3.  The  collection  of  such  foreign  intelligence  has 
been  coordinated  with  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investi- 
gation (FBI);  and 
4.  The  use  of  other  than  overt  means  has  been 
approved  in  writing  by  the  head  of  the  DoD  intelligence 
component  concerned,  or  his  single  designee,  as  being 
consistent  with  these  procedures.  The  Assistant  Chief 
of  Staff  for  Intelligence,  HQDA,  and  the  Commanding 
General,  US  Army  Intelligence  and  Security  Command 
(INSCOM),  are  the  heads  of  the  Army  intelligence  com- 
ponents for  this  purpose.  Information  copies  of  approv- 
als by  the  Commanding  General,  INSCOM,  will  be  pro- 
vided to  HQDA(DAMI-CIC),  WASH  DC  20310;  they 
will  reflect  appropriate  coordination  with  the  supporting 
judge  advocate.  A  copy  of  any  approval  made  pursuant 
to  this  section  shall  be  provided  the  Deputy  Under  Sec- 
retary of  Defense  (Policy).  All  submissions  to  the  Dep- 
uty Under  Secretary  of  Defense  (Policy)  will  be  for- 
warded to  HQDA(DAMI-CIC),  WASH  DC  20310. 
2-3
1  July  1134 
AR  381-10 
PROCEDURE  3.     RETENTION  OF  INFORMATION  ABOUT  UNITED  STATES  PERSONS 
A.  APPLICABILITY 
This  procedure  governs  the  kinds  of  information 
about  United  States  persons  that  may  knowingly  be 
retained  by  a  DoD  intelligence  component  without  the 
consent  of  the  person  whom  the  information  concerns. 
It  does  not  apply  when  the  information  in  question  is 
retained  solely  for  administrative  purposes  or  is  re- 
quired by  law  to  be  maintained. 
B.  EXPLANATION  OF  UNDEFINED  TERMS 
The  term  "retention."  as  used  in  this  procedure, 
refers  only  to  the  maintenance  of  information  about 
United  States  persons  which  can  be  retrieved  by  ref- 
erence to  the  person's  name  or  other  identifying  data. 
C.  CRITERIA  FOR  RETENTION 
1.  Retention  of  information  collected  under  Pro- 
cedure 2.  Information  about  United  States  persons  may 
be  retained  if  it  was  collected  pursuant  to  Procedure  2. 
2.  Retention  of  information  acquired  incidentally. 
Information  about  United  States  persons  collected  in- 
cidentally to  authorized  collection  may  be  retained  if: 
a.  Such  information  could  have  been  collected 
intentionally  under  Procedure  2; 
b.  Such  information  is  necessary  to  understand 
or  assess  foreign  intelligence  or  counterintelligence; 
c.  The  information  is  foreign  intelligence  or 
counterintelligence  collected  from  electronic  surveil- 
lance conducted  in  compliance  with  this  Regulation;  or 
d.  Such  information  is  incidental  to  authorized 
collection  and  may  indicate  involvement  in  activities 
that  may  violate  federal,  state,  local,  or  foreign  law. 
3.  Retention  of  information  relating  to  functions 
of  other  DoD  Components  or  non-Pod  Agencies.  In- 
formation about  United  States  persons  that  pertains 
solely  to  the  functions  of  other  DoD  Components  or 
agencies  outside  the  Department  of  Defense  shall  be 
retained  only  as  necessary  to  transmit  or  deliver  such 
information  to  the  appropriate  recipients. 
4.  Temporary  retention.  Information  about  United 
States  persons  may  be  retained  temporarily,  for  a  period 
not  to  exceed  90  days,  solely  for  the  purpose  of  deter- 
mining whether  that  information  may  be  permanently 
retained  under  these  procedures. 
5.  Retention  of  other  information.  Information 
about  United  States  persons  other  than  that  covered  by 
subsections  C.l.  through  4,  above,  shall  be  retained 
only  for  purposes  of  reporting  such  collection  for  over- 
sight purposes  and  for  any  subsequent  proceedings  that 
may  be  necessary. 
D.   ACCESS  AND  RETENTION 
1.  Controls  on  access  to  retained  information.  Ac- 
cess  within  a  DoD  intelligence  component  to  infor- 
mation about  United  States  persons  retained  pursuant 
to  this  procedure  shall  be  limited  to  those  with  a  need 
to  know. 
2.  Duration  of  retention.  Disposition  of  informa- 
tion about  United  States  persons  retained  in  the  files 
of  DoD  intelligence  components  will  comply  with  the 
disposition  schedules  approved  by  the  Archivist  of  the 
United  States  for  the  files  or  records  in  which  the  in- 
formation is  retained.  Information  about  US  persons 
retained  in  the  files  of  DA  intelligence  components  will 
be  reviewed.  This  review  will  insure  the  foilowing:  that 
its  continued  retention  serves  the  purpose  for  which  it 
was  collected  and  stored;  and  that  it  is  necessary  to  the 
conduct  of  authorized  functions  of  DA  intelligence  com- 
ponents or  other  Government  agencies.  This  review  will 
be  conducted  in  conjunction  with  the  annual  review  of 
files  under  AR  340-2  or  AR  340-18-1,  as  appropriate. 
Review  of  files  in  the  Intelligence  Records  Repository 
(IRR)  will  be  under  AR  381-45  and  AR  340- 18-5.  Final 
disposition  of  such  information  will  comply  with  dis- 
position schedules  approved  by  the  Archivist  of  the  United 
States  for  the  files  or  records  in  which  the  information 
is  stored.  (An  example  is  the  AR  340-18  series.) 
3.  Information  acquired  prior  to  effective  date.  In- 
formation  acquired  prior  to  the  effective  date  of  this 
procedure  may  be  retained  by  DoD  intelligence  com- 
ponents without  being  screened  for  compliance  with  this 
procedure  or  Executive  Order  12333  (reference  (a)),  so 
long  as  retention  was  in  compliance  with  applicable  law 
and  previous  executive  orders. 
3-1
AR  381-10 
1  July  1084 
E.  CONTROL  OF  ELECTRONIC  SURVEILLANCE 
INFORMATION 
1.  Review.  All  electronic  surveillance  information 
acquired  through  Army  intelligence  operations  or  re- 
ceived from  cooperating  (liaison)  sources  will  be  re- 
viewed expeditiously  after  receipt.  This  review  will  as- 
sure that  the  contents  are  relevant  to  the  purpose  of  the 
electronic  surveillance  coverage.  All  irrelevant  or  un- 
necessary information  will  be  destroyed.  Information 
about  US  persons  may  be  collected,  retained,  or  dissem- 
inated only  if  authorized  under  procedures  2,  3,  or  4. 
2.  Access  controls.  Access  to  electronic  surveillance 
information  will  be  controlled  by  the  commander  of  the 
element  that  is  the  custodian  of  the  information.  Pro- 
cedures will  be  established  to  assure  that  access  to  elec- 
tronic surveillance  information  is  limited  to  those  with 
a  need-to-know. 
3.  Annotation.  Each  message,  document,  report,  or 
file  of  any  type  that  contains  electronic  surveillance  in- 
formation which  identifies  any  person  or  organization 
by  name  will  be  clearly  and  conspicuously  marked  with 
the  following  annotation:  "Contents  include  electronic 
surveillance  information.  Handle  in  accordance  with  AR 
381-10". 
F.  INDEXING  ELECTRONIC  SURVEILLANCE 
INFORMATION 
1.  General.  In  order  to  be  responsive  to  motions 
for  discovery  under  section  3504  title  18,  United  States 
Code  (18  USC  3504),  indices  will  be  maintained  of  all 
electronic  surveillance  information  which  is  used,  re- 
tained, or  disseminated  by  Army  intelligence  compo- 
nents and  which  contain  references  to  an  identifiable  US 
or  non-US  person.  A  person  is  identifiable  if  sufficient 
information  is  available  to  the  component  to  determine 
the  last  name  of  the  person  and  to  distinguish  that  person 
from  others  who  may  have  the  same  name.  A  person 
generally  will  be  considered  distinguishable  from  others 
with  the  same  name  when  the  information  required  by 
one  or  more  of  subsections  3b-e  and  g  is  known.  Elec- 
tronic surveillance  information  that  is  destroyed  without 
being  used,  retained,  or  disseminated  need  not  be  in- 
dexed. 
2.  Indexing  office.  Headquarters,  INSCOM,  will 
maintain  an  index  of  all  electronic  surveillance  infor- 
mation obtained  by  Army  intelligence  elements  world- 
wide, under  provisions  of  this  regulation. 
3.  Content.  The  indices  will  contain  the  following 
information  to  the  extent  known: 
a.  Name  and  sr x  af  each  identifiable  person  whose 
communications  were  intercepted. 
b.  Language  in  which  the  conversation  occurred. 
c.  Telephone  numbers,  radio  frequencies,  or  ra- 
dio telephone  call  signs  involved  in  the  interception. 
d.  Address  of  the  premises  at  which  the  surveil- 
lance was  conducted. 
e.  Title  or  number  of  investigative  file. 
f.  Element  maintaining  the  case  file. 
g.  Date  or  dates  of  the  interception. 
4.  Retrieval.  Information  maintained  in  the  indices 
must  be  retrievable  by  the  following: 
a.  Name  of  the  subject  of  the  case. 
b.  Name  of  each  identifiable  person  overheard, 
provided  that  person's  conversation  was  used,  retained, 
or  disseminated.  Retrieval  through  additional  criteria 
may  be  imposed  on  a  case-by-case  basis  by  the  approving 
authority. 
5.  Notifying  the  indexer.  Promptly  after  screening 
of  electronic  surveillance  information  (sec  E.l.)  an  elec- 
trical message  containing  the  information  required  by 
section  F.3.  will  be  sent  to  HQ  INSCOM,  Fort  Meade, 
MD//IACSF-IRC//,  subject:  Electronic  Surveillance  In- 
dexing Material. 
6.  Procedure  for  forwarding  backup  material.  Copies 
of  all  indexed  electronic  surveillance  information  must 
be  sent  to  HQ  INSCOM  to  serve  as  backup  for  the  index. 
When  this  information  is  contained  in  an  investigative 
file,  it  will  be  sent  after  the  file  is  closed  or  the  investi- 
gation is  completed.  Information  not  part  of  an  inves- 
tigative file  will  be  sent  as  soon  as  practicable.  Backup 
material  sent  to  the  indexing  office  will  include  the  fol- 
lowing: 
a.  Be  cleariy  marked  as  electronic  surveillance 
information. 
b.  Refer  to  the  message  or  messages  that  trans- 
mitted the  indexing  information. 
c.  Contain  all  the  electronic  surveillance  infor- 
mation that  was  used,  retained  or  disseminated. 
d.  Contain  a  record  of  all  disseminations  of  the 
information  outside  the  DoD. 
3-2
1  July  1984  AR  381-10 
e.  Carry  a  certification  by  the  forwarding  office  7.  Index  security  controls.  Indexing  offices  will  de- 
do  include  name,  grade  and  title)  that  the  contents  meet  vise  procedures  to  safeguard  and  control  access  to  the 
the  retention  criteria  of  this  regulation,  if  the  contents  indices  and  backup  material, 
include  US  person  information. 
3-3
1  July  1964 
AR3E1-10 
PROCEDURE  4.     DISSEMINATION  OF  INFORMATION  ABOUT  UNITED  STAT  ES  PERSONS 
A.  APPLICABILITY  AND  SCOPE 
This  procedure  governs  the  kinds  of  information 
about  United  States  persons  that  may  be  disseminated, 
without  their  consent,  outside  the  DoD  intelligence 
component  that  collected  and  retained  the  information. 
It  does  not  apply  to  information  collected  solely  for 
administrative  purposes;  or  disseminated  pursuant  to 
law;  or  pursuant  to  a  court  order  that  otherwise  imposes 
controls  upon  such  dissemination. 
B.  CRITERIA  FOR  DISSEMINATION 
Except  as  provided  in  section  C.  below,  infor- 
mation about  United  States  persons  that  identifies  those 
persons  may  be  disseminated  without  the  consent  of 
those  persons  only  under  the  following  conditions: 
1.  The  information  was  collected  or  retained  or 
both  under  Procedures  2  and  3; 
2.  The  recipient  is  reasonably  believed  to  have  a 
need  to  receive  such  information  for  the  performance 
of  a  lawful  governmental  function,  and  is  one  of  the 
following: 
a.  An  employee  of  the  Department  of  Defense, 
or  an  employee  of  a  contractor  of  the  Department  of 
Defense,  and  has  a  need  for  such  information  in  the 
course  of  his  or  her  official  duties; 
b.  A  law  enforcement  entity  of  federal,  state,  or 
local  government,  and  the  information  may  indicate 
involvemen*  in  activities  which  may  violate  laws  which 
the  recipient  is  responsible  to  enforce; 
c.  An  agency  within  the  intelligence  community; 
provided  that  within  the  intelligence  community,  in- 
formation other  than  information  derived  from  sienals 
intelligence,  may  be  disseminated  to  each  appropriate 
agency  for  the  purpose  of  allowing  the  recipient  agency 
to  determine  whether  the  information  is  relevant  to  its 
responsibilities  without  such  a  determination  being  re- 
quired of  the  disseminating  DoD  intelligence  compo- 
nent; 
d.  An  agency  of  the  federal  government  au- 
thorized to  receive  such  information  in  the  performance 
of  a  lawful  governmental  function;  or 
e.  A  foreign  government,  and  dissemination  is 
undertaken  pursuant  to  an  agreement  or  other  under- 
standing with  such  government. 
C.    OTHER  DISSEMINATION 
Any  dissemination  that  does  not  conform  to  the 
conditions  set  forth  in  section  B.,  above,  must  be  ap- 
proved by  the  legal  office  responsible  for  advising  the 
DoD  Component  concerned  after  consultation  with  the 
Department  of  Justice  and  General  Counsel  of  the  De- 
partment of  Defense.  Such  approval  shall  be  based  on 
a  determination  that  the  proposed  dissemination  com- 
plies with  applicable  laws,  executive  orders,  and  reg- 
ulations. Requests  will  be  forwarded  through  command 
channels  to  HQDA(DAMI-CIC),  WASH  DC  20310. 
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1  July  1D84 
AR  381-10 
PROCEDURE  5.     ELECTRONIC  SURVEILLANCE 
PART  1:  ELECTRONIC  SURVEILLANCE  IN 
THE  UNITED  STATES  FOR 
INTELLIGENCE  PURPOSES 
A.  APPLICABILITY 
This  part  of  Procedure  5  implements  the  Foreign 
Intelligence  Surveillance  Act  of  1978  (50  USC  1801,  et 
seq. ,  reference  b)  and  applies  to  electronic  surveillance, 
as  defined  in  that  Act,  conducted  by  DoD  intelligence 
components  within  the  United  States  to  collect  "foreign 
intelligence  information,"  as  defined  in  that  Act.  This 
part  applies  to  all  nonconsensual  electronic  surveillance 
conducted  within  the  United  States,  whether  directed 
against  a  US  or  non-US  person.  Policy  and  procedures 
governing  all  consensual  electronic  surveillance  are  found 
at  section  C  of  this  part. 
B.   GENERAL  RULES 
1.  Electronic  surveillance  pursuant  to  the  Foreign 
Intelligence  Surveillance  Act.  A  DoD  intelligence  com- 
ponent may  conduct  electronic  surveillance  within  the 
United  States  for  foreign  intelligence  and  counterin- 
telligence purposes  only  pursuant  to  an  order  issued  by 
a  judge  of  the  court  appointed  pursuant  to  the  Foreign 
Intelligence  Surveillance  Act  of  1978  (reference  (b)), 
or  pursuant  to  a  certification  of  the  Attorney  General 
issued  under  the  authority  of  section  102(a)  of  the  Act. 
2.  Authority  to  request  electronic  surveillance. 
Authority  to  approve  the  submission  of  applications  or 
requests  for  electronic  surveillance  under  the  Foreign 
Intelligence  Surveillance  Act  of  1978  (reference  (b)) 
shall  be  limited  to  the  Secretary  of  Defense,  the  Deputy 
Secretary  of  Defense,  the  Secretary  or  Under  Secretary 
of  a  Military  Department,  and  the  Director  of  the  Na- 
tional Security  Agency.  Applications  for  court  orders 
will  be  made  through  the  Attorney  General  after  prior 
clearance  by  the  General  Counsel,  DoD.  Requests  for 
Attorney  General  certification  shall  be  made  only  after 
prior  clearance  by  the  General  Counsel,  DoD. 
a.  Requests  by  Army  intelligence  components  for 
authority  to  conduct  electronic  surveillance  pursuant  to 
this  part  will  be  submitted  through  command  channels 
to  HQDA(DAMl-CIC),  WASH  DC  20310.  Requests  will 
include  the  information  required  by  section  C  of  part  2 
of  procedure  5;  they  will  be  submitted  as  soon  in  the 
planning  stage  as  possible. 
b.  Policy  governing  control  and  indexing  of  elec- 
tronic surveillance  information  is  contained  in  sections 
E  and  F,  procedure  3. 
3.  Electronic  surveillance  in  emergency  situations. 
a.  A  DoD  intelligence  component  may  conduct 
electronic  surveillance  withia  the  United  States  in  emer- 
gency situations  under  an  approval  from  the  Attorney 
General  in  accordance  with  section  105(e)  of  reference 
(b). 
b.  The  head  of  any  DoD  intelligence  component 
may  request  that  the  DoD  General  Counsel  seek  such 
authority  directly  from  the  Attorney  General  in  an 
emergency,  if  it  is  not  feasible  to  submit  such  request 
through  an  official  designated  in  subsection  B.2.,  above, 
provided  the  appropriate  official  concerned  shall  be  ad- 
vised of  such  requests  as  soon  as  possible  thereafter. 
c.  Requests  by  Army  intelligence  components  for 
emergency  authority  to  conduct  electronic  surveillance 
pursuant  to  this  part  will  be  submitted  through  com- 
mand channels  to  HQDA(DAM1-CIC),  WASH  DC  20310. 
C.    CONSENSUAL  ELECTRONIC  SURVEILLANCE 
1.  Applicability.  This  section  governs  consensual 
electronic  surveillance  conducted  by  Army  intelligence 
components,  under  the  following:  whether  directed  against 
US  or  non-US  persons;  and  whether  occurring  within  or 
outside  the  United  States. 
2.  Explanation  of  undefined  terms.  Consensual 
electronic  surveillance  occurs  when  electronic  surveil- 
lance is  conducted  after  consent  for  the  interception  is 
given  by  one  or  more,  but  fewer  than  all,  of  the  parties 
to  the  communication. 
3.  Case  approval  authority. 
a.  Consensual  electronic  surveillance  conducted 
within  the  United  States  or  directed  against  US  persons 
abroad  will  be  approved  in  advance  by  the  Secretary  or 
Under  Secretary  of  the  Army,  or  the  Army  General 
Counsel.  Requests  for  approval  will  be  forwarded  through 
5-1
AR  381-10 
1  July  1984 
command  channels  to  HQDA(DAMI-CIC),  WASH  DC 
20310;  they  will  contain  the  information  required  in  sec- 
tion C.4.b. 
b.  Consensual  electronic  surveillance  directed 
against  non-US  persons  abroad  may  be  approved  by 
those  officials  identified  in  procedure  5,  part  2,  section 
F.l.  This  authority  may  be  delegated,  in  writing,  to  field 
supervisors. 
4.  Case  approval  standards. 
a.  Consensual  electronic  surveillance  may  be 
conducted  for  any  lawful  function  assigned  the  Army 
intelligence  component. 
b.  Requests  for  consensual  electronic  surveil- 
lance conducted  within  the  United  States  or  directed 
against  a  US  person  abroad  will  provide  the  following: 
(1)  Description  of  the  facts  and  circumstances 
requiring  the  intended  interception,  the  means  by  which 
it  would  be  conducted,  the  place  at  which  it  would  be 
conducted,  and  its  expected  duration. 
(2)  Names  of  all  persons  whose  conversations 
are  expected  to  be  intercepted,  and  their  roles  in  the 
incident  being  investigated.  Except  in  extraordinary  sit- 
uations, written  consent  forms  will  be  executed  by  all 
individuals  consenting  to  the  electronic  surveillance.  In 
extraordinary  situations,  the  request  for  surveillance  will 
contain  an  explanation  of  why  written  consent  could  not 
be  obtained. 
(3)  Statement  that  in  the  judgment  of  the  per- 
son making  the  request,  the  interception  is  warranted 
in  the  interest  of  a  lawful  function  assigned  the  Army 
intelligence  component.  The  function  will  be  identified. 
c.  All  electronic  surveillance  information  used, 
retained,  or  disseminated,  that  pertains  to  an  identifiable 
US  or  non-US  person,  must  be  controlled  and  indexed 
pursuant  to  procedure  3,  sections  E  and  F. 
5.  Consensual  electronic  surveillance  in  emergency 
situations.  Notwithstanding  section  C.3.a.,  an  Army  in- 
telligence component  may  conduct  consensual  electronic 
surveillance  within  the  United  States  or  directed  against 
a  US  person  outside  the  United  States  in  emergency  sit- 
uations, under  the  following  limitations: 
a.  A  genera!  court-martial  convening  authority 
may  authorize  consensual  electronic  surveillance.  He  may 
do  so  only  when  securing  the  prior  approval  of  persons 
described  in  section  C.3.a.  is  not  practical  because  of 
the  reasons  listed  below. 
(1)  Time  required  would  cause  failure  or  delay 
in  obtaining  valuable  intelligence  information;  or 
(2)  A  person's  life  or  physical  safety  is  reason- 
ably believed  to  be  in  immediate  danger;  or 
(3)  Physical  security  of  a  defense  installation 
or  Government  property  is  reasonably  believed  to  be  in 
immediate  danger. 
b.  Such  officials  will  notify  HQDA(DAMI-CIC), 
WASH  DC  20310,  within  24  hours  of  any  such  surveil- 
lance, the  reason  for  authorizing  such  surveillance  on 
an  emergency  basis,  and  the  expected  results. 
c.  Consensual  electronic  surveillance  authorized 
pursuant  to  this  section  may  not  continue  longer  than 
the  time  required  for  a  decision  by  the  persons  desig- 
nated in  section  C.3.a. 
PART  2:  ELECTRONIC  SURVEILLANCE 
OUTSIDE  THE  UNITED  STATES  FOR 
INTELLIGENCE  PURPOSES 
A.   APPLICABILITY 
This  part  of  Procedure  5  applies  to  electronic  sur- 
veillance, as  defined  in  Appendix  A,  for  foreign  intel- 
ligence and  counterintelligence  purposes  directed  against 
United  States  persons  who  are  outside  the  United  States, 
and  who,  under  the  circumstances,  have  a  reasonable 
expectation  of  privacy.  (Electronic  surveillance  directed 
against  a  US  person  abroad  also  may  be  performed  pur- 
suant to  this  part  of  procedure  5  for  any  other  lawful 
function  assigned  an  Army  intelligence  component.)  It 
is  intended  to  be  applied  in  conjunction  with  the  reg- 
ulation of  electronic  surveillance  "within  the  United 
States"  under  Part  1  and  the  regulation  of  "signals  in- 
telligence activities"  under  Part  3,  so  that  the  inten- 
tional interception  for  foreign  intelligence  and  coun- 
terintelligence purposes  of  all  wire  or  radio 
communications  of  persons  within  the  United  States 
and  against  United  States  persons  abroad  where  such 
persons  enjoy  a  reasonable  expectation  of  privacy  is 
covered  by  one  of  the  three  parts.  In  i  Ji'ition,  this  part 
governs  the  use  of  electronic,  mechanical,  or  other  sur- 
veillance devices  for  foreign  intelligence  and  counter- 
intelligence purposes  against  a  United  States  person 
abroad  in  circumstances  where  such  person  has  a  rea- 
sonable expectation  of  privacy.  This  part  does  not  apply 
to  the  electronic  surveillance  of  communications  of  other 
than  United  States  persons  abroad  or  to  the  interception 
of  the  communications  of  United  States  persons  abroad 
that  do  not  constitute  electronic  surveillance.  (Policy 
governing  electronic  surveillance  of  non-US  persons  con- 
ducted outside  the  United  States  is  contained  in  sections 
F  and  G,  below.  Policy  governing  control  and  indexing 
of  electronic  surveillance  information  is  contained  in 
procedure  3,  sections  E  and  F.  Policy  governing  all  con- 
5-2
1  July  1984 
An  391-10 
sensual  electronic  surveillance  is  found  at  procedure  5, 
section  C,  part  1. 
B.  EXPLANATION  OF  UNDEFINED  TERMS 
1.  Electronic  surveillance  is  "directed  against  a 
United  States  person"  when  the  surveillance  is  inten- 
tionally targeted  against  or  designed  to  intercept  the 
communications  of  that  person.  Electronic  surveillance 
directed  against  persons  who  are  not  United  States  per- 
sons that  results  in  the  incidental  acquisition  of  the  com- 
munications of  a  United  States  person  does  not  thereby 
become  electronic  surveillance  directed  against  a  United 
States  person.  However,  use,  retention  or  dissemination 
of  inadvertently  intercepted  US  person  communications 
is  governed  by  section  G.4. 
2.  Electronic  surveillance  is  "outside  the  United 
States"  if  the  person  against  whom  the  electronic  sur- 
veillance is  directed  is  physically  outside  the  United 
States,  regardless  of  the  location  at  which  surveillance 
is  conducted.  For  example,  the  interception  of  com- 
munications that  originate  and  terminate  outside  the 
United  States  can  be  conducted  from  within  the  United 
States  and  still  fall  under  this  part  rather  than  Part  1. 
C.  PROCEDURES 
Except  as  provided  in  section  D.,  below,  DoD  in- 
telligence components  may  conduct  electronic  surveil- 
lance against  a  United  States  person  who  is  outside  the 
United  States  for  foreign  intelligence  and  counterin- 
telligence purposes  only  if  the  surveillance  is  approved 
by  the  Attorney  General.  Requests  for  approval  will 
be  forwarded  to  the  Attorney  General  by  an  official 
designated  in  section  E.I.,  below.  Each  request  shall 
include: 
1.  An  identification  or  description  of  the  target.  If 
applicable,  include  the  address,  telephone  number,  room 
number,  whether  inside  or  outside  a  building,  and  whether 
on  public  or  private  property. 
2.  A  statement  of  the  facts  supporting  a  finding 
that: 
a.  There  is  probable  cause  to  believe  the  target 
of  the  electronic  surveillance  is  one  of  the  following: 
(1)  A  person  who,  for  or  on  behalf  of  a  foreign 
power,  is  engaged  in  clandestine  intelligence  activities 
(including  covert  activities  intended  to  affect  the  polit- 
ical or  governmental  process),  sabotage,  or  interna- 
tional terrorist  activities,  or  activities  in  preparation  for 
international  terrorist  activities;  or  who  conspires  with, 
or  knowingly  aids  and  abets  a  person  engaging  in  such 
activities; 
(2)  A  person  who  is  an  officer  or  empioyee 
of  a  foreign  power; 
(3)  A  person  unlawfully  acting  for,  or  pur- 
suant to  the  direction  of.  a  foreign  power.  The  mere 
fact  that  a  person's  activities  may  benefit  or  further  the 
aims  of  a  foreign  power  is  not  enough  to  bring  that 
person  under  this  subsection,  absent  evidence  that  the 
person  is  taking  direction  from,  or  acting  in  knowing 
concert  with,  the  foreign  power; 
(4)  A  corporation  or  other  entity  that  is  owned 
or  controlled  directly  or  indirectly  by  a  foreign  power; 
or 
(5)  A  person  in  contact  with,  or  acting  in  col- 
laboration with,  an  intelligence  or  security  service  of  a 
foreign  power  for  the  purpose  of  providing  access  to 
information  or  material  classified  by  the  United  States 
to  which  such  person  has  access. 
b.  The  electronic  surveillance  is  necessary  to 
obtain  significant  foreign  intelligence  or  counterintel- 
ligence. 
c.  The  significant  foreign  intelligence  or  coun- 
terintelligence expected  to  be  obtained  from  the  elec- 
tronic surveillance  could  not  reasonably  be  obtained  by 
other  less  intrusive  collection  techniques. 
3.  A  description  of  the  significant  foreign  intelli- 
gence or  counterintelligence  expected  to  be  obtained 
from  the  electronic  surveillance. 
4.  A  description  of  the  means  by  which  the  elec- 
tronic surveillance  will  be  effected.  Describe  the  equip- 
ment to  be  used,  method  of  transmission,  recording  de- 
vice, and  method  of  installation. 
5.  If  physical  trespass  is  required  to  effect  the  sur- 
veillance, a  statement  of  facts  supporting  a  finding  that 
the  means  involve  the  least  amount  of  intrusion  that 
will  accomplish  the  objective. 
6.  A  statement  of  period  of  time,  not  to  exceed  90 
days,  for  which  the  electronic  surveillance  is  required. 
7.  A  description  of  the  expected  dissemination  of 
the  product  of  the  surveillance,  including  a  description 
of  the  procedures  that  will  govern  the  retention  and 
dissemination  of  communications  of  or  concerning  United 
States  persons  other  that  those  targeted,  acquired  in- 
cidental to  such  surveillance. 
5-3
AR  381-10 
!  July  1984 
8.  A  description  of  any  less  intrusive  procedures 
that  have  been  tried  and  failed,  why  they  may  fail  again, 
or  why  they  are  too  dangerous  to  attempt. 
9.  If  the  request  is  for  an  extension  of  a  previous 
authorization,  describe  results  thus  far  obtained  from 
the  interception,  or  give  a  reasonable  explanation  of  the 
failure  to  obtain  results. 
10.  Indicate  that  the  request  has  been  coordinated 
with  the  appropriate  staff  or  command  judge  advocate. 
11.  If  known,  indicate  whether  previous  requests 
have  been  made  for  electronic  surveillance  on  any  of  the 
same  persons,  facilities,  or  places  to  be  surveyed.  State 
whether  such  requests  were  approved  or  disapproved. 
D.  ELECTRONIC  SURVEILLANCE  IN 
EMERGENCY  SITUATIONS 
Notwithstanding  section  C,  above,  a  DoD  intel- 
ligence component  may  conduct  surveillance  directed 
at  a  United  States  person  who  is  outside  the  United 
States  in  emergency  situations  under  the  following  lim- 
itations: 
1.  Officials  designated  in  section  E.,  below,  may 
authorize  electronic  surveillance  directed  at  a  United 
States  person  outside  the  United  States  in  emergency 
situations,  when  securing  the  prior  approval  of  the  At- 
torney General  is  not  practical  because: 
a.  The  time  required  would  cause  failure  or  de- 
lay in  obtaining  significant  foreign  intelligence  or  coun- 
terintelligence and  such  failure  or  delay  would  result  in 
substantial  harm  to  the  national  security; 
b.  A  person's  life  or  physical  safety  is  reasonably 
believed  to  be  in  immediate  danger;  or 
c.  The  physical  security  of  a  defense  installation 
or  government  property  is  reasonably  believed  to  be  in 
immediate  danger. 
2.  Except  for  actions  taken  under  subsection  D.  1  .b. , 
above,  any  official  authorizing  such  emergency  sur- 
veillance shall  find  that  one  of  the  criteria  contained  in 
subsection  C.2.a.,  above,  is  met.  Such  officials  shall 
notify  the  DoD  General  Counsel  promptly  of  any  such 
surveillance,  the  reason  for  authorizing  such  surveil- 
lance on  an  emergency  basis,  and  the  expected  results. 
3.  The  Attorney  General  shall  be  notified  by  the 
General  Counsel,  DoD,  as  soon  as  possible  of  the  sur- 
veillance, the  circumstances  surrounding  its  authori- 
zation, and  the  results  thereof,  and  such  other  infor- 
mation as  may  be  required  to  authorize  continuation  of 
such  surveillance. 
4.  Electronic  surveillance  authorized  pursuant  to 
this  section  may  not  continue  longer  than  the  time  re- 
quired for  a  decision  by  the  Attorney  General  and  in 
no  event  longer  than  72  hours. 
E.    OFFICIALS  AUTHORIZED  TO  REQUEST 
AND  APPROVE  ELECTRONIC 
SURVEILLANCE  OUTSIDE  THE  UNITED 
STATES 
1.  The  following  officials  may  request  approval  of 
electronic  surveillance  of  US  persons  outside  the  United 
States  under  section  C. ,  above,  and  approve  emergency 
surveillance  under  section  D.,  above: 
fense. 
a.  The  Secretary  and  Deputy  Secretary  of  De- 
b.  The  Secretaries  and  Under  Secretaries  of  the 
Military  Departments. 
c.  The  Director  and  Deputy  Director  of  the  Na- 
tional Security  Agency/Chief,  Central  Security  Service. 
2.  Authorization  for  emergency  electronic  sur- 
veillance under  section  D„  may  also  be  granted  by: 
a.  Any  general  or  flag  officer  at  the  overseas 
location  in  question,  having  responsibility  for  either  the 
subject  of  the  surveillance,  or  responsibility  for  the  pro- 
tection of  persons,  installations,  or  property  that  is  en- 
dangered. (Before  an  Army  general  officer  at  an  over- 
seas location  authorizes  an  emergency  electronic 
surveillance,  he  or  she  must  coordinate  with  the  major 
Army  command  (MACOM)  senior  intelligence  officer 
(SIO)  and  supporting  judge  advocate  on  appropriateness 
and  applicable  policy  regarding  the  proposed  surveil- 
lance. When  an  Army  general  officer  at  an  oversea  lo- 
cation authorizes  an  emergency  electronic  surveillance, 
the  MACOM  SIO  will  provide  details  to  HQDA(DAMI- 
CIC),  WASH  DC  20310,  by  the  most  expeditious  means 
available);  or 
b.  The  Deputy  Director  for  Operations,  Na- 
tional Security  Agency. 
F.    ELECTRONIC  SURVEILLANCE  OF  NON-US 
PERSONS 
This  section  prescribes  the  sole  authority  by  which 
Army  intelligence  components  may  engage  in  non-con- 
sensual electronic  surveillance  of  non-US  persons  outside 
the  United  States.  Electronic  surveillance  of  non-US  per- 
5-4
1  July  1984 
AR  381-10 
sons  within  the  United  States  is  governed  by  part  1  of 
procedure  5.  Consensual  electronic  surveillance  is  gov- 
erned by  section  C  of  part  1  of  procedure  5. 
1.  Case  approval  authority.  Authorities  listed  be- 
low may  approve  electronic  surveillance  under  this  sec- 
tion that  is  conducted  by  Army  intelligence  components 
or  requested  directly  or  indirectly  by  those  components. 
a.  The  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff  for  Intelligence 
(ACSI),  HQDA. 
b.  Commanding  General,  INSCOM. 
c.  Commander  in  Chief,  US  Army,  Europe,  and 
Seventh  Army  (CINCUSAREUR). 
d.  Commanding  General,  Eighth  United  States 
Army  (EUSA). 
The  officials  at  (a)  through  (d)  above  may  delegate  au- 
thority to  their  deputies,  chiefs  of  staff,  or  ranking  in- 
telligence staff  officers;  they  in  turn  may  delegate  their 
authority  to  the  responsible  military  intelligence  group 
commanders.  No  further  delegation  is  authorized.  Ali 
delegation  of  authority  will  be  in  writing.  Requests  for 
approval  will  be  forwarded  through  command  channels; 
they  will  contain  the  information  required  in  section  2 
(a)  through  (i).  Approval  will  be  granted  only  after  co- 
ordination with  the  approving  authority's  supporting 
judge  advocate.  Information  copies  of  approvals  will  be 
provided  to  HQDA(DAMI-CIC),  WASH  DC  20310. 
2.  Case  approval  standards.  Non-consensual  elec- 
tronic surveillance  of  non-US  persons  abroad  may  be 
conducted  for  any  lawful  function  assigned  the  Army 
intelligence  component.  Each  request  to  conduct  elec- 
tronic surveillance  pursuant  to  this  section  will  comply 
with  the  following: 
a.  Provide  facts  sufficient  to  support  a  determi- 
nation by  the  approval  authority  that  a  reasonable  belief 
exists  that  the  surveillance  will  gather  valuable  intelli- 
gence information. 
b.  Describe  nature  and  content  of  conversations 
expected  to  be  intercepted. 
c.  Identify  the  investigative  unit  that  will  conduct 
the  surveillance. 
d.  Identify  any  US  persons  whose  communica- 
tions could  reasonably  be  expected  to  be  intercepted. 
Identify  any  people  who  have  consented  to  the  surveil- 
lance. 
e.  Describe  the  equipment  to  be  used  and  the 
method  of  installation. 
f.  State  the  location  of  the  proposed  surveillance. 
If  applicable,  include  the  address  and  means  of  access. 
If  physical  trespass  is  required,  detail  the  method  of 
entry. 
g.  Estimate  the  expected  duration  of  the  sur- 
veillance. 
h.  If  the  request  is  for  an  extension  of  a  previous 
authorization,  describe  the  results  thus  far  obtained,  or 
provide  an  explanation  of  the  failure  to  obtain  results. 
i.  Indicate  that  the  request  has  been  coordinated 
with  the  appropriate  judge  advocate  and  the  date  of  the 
coordination. 
3.  Case  approval  periods.  Initial  approvals  of  cases 
directed  against  non-US  persons  may  be  granted  for  a 
period  up  to  90  days.  Renewal  requests  for  non-US  per- 
son cases  involving  specific  individuals  may  be  approved 
for  a  period  up  to  90  days.  Renewal  requests  for  cases 
involving  foreign  intelligence  or  counterintelligence  of  a 
continuing  and  long-term  interest  may  be  approved  for 
a  period  up  to  1  year.  All  renewal  requests  will  be  sub- 
mitted in  the  same  manner  as  the  original  request;  they 
will  be  reviewed  under  the  same  criteria. 
4.  Inadvertent  interception  of  US  person  conver- 
sations. If  a  US  person  communication  is  inadvertently 
intercepted  during  electronic  surveillance  directed  against 
a  non-US  person,  the  following  will  apply: 
a.  Approval  of  the  Secretary  or  Under  Secretary 
of  the  Army  must  be  obtained  before  the  information  is 
used,  retained  or  disseminated.  Requests  for  approval 
should  be  sent  through  conimand  channels  to 
HQDA(DAMI-CIC),  WASH  DC  20310. 
b.  In  emergency  situations  such  requests  may  be 
approved  by  any  Army  General  Officer,  after  coordi- 
nation with  his  or  her  senior  intelligence  officer.  A  report 
of  emergency  approvals  will  be  expeditiously  provided 
to  HQDA(DAMI-CIC),  WASH  DC  20310.  The  report 
will  include  an  explanation  of  the  nature  of  the  emer- 
gency situation. 
c.  Electronic  surveillance  information  approved 
for  use,  retention,  or  dissemination  under  this  subsection 
must  be  controlled  and  indexed  pursuant  to  sections  E 
and  F,  procedure  3. 
d.  Approval  of  the  Secretary  or  Under  Secretary 
of  the  Army  is  not  required  if  the  contents  of  the  in- 
advertent interception  are  destroyed  and  are  not  used, 
retained,  or  disseminated. 
5-5
AR  381-10 
1  July  1984 
PART  3:  SIGNALS  INTELLIGENCE  ACTIVITIES 
A.   APPLICABILITY  AND  SCOPE 
1 .  This  procedure  governs  the  conduct  by  the  United 
States  Signals  Intelligence  System  of  signals  intelligence 
activities  that  involve  the  collection,  retention,  and  dis- 
semination of  foreign  communications  and  military  tac- 
tical communications.  Such  activities  may  incidentally 
involve  the  collection  of  information  concerning  United 
States  persons  without  their  consent,  or  may  involve 
communications  originated  or  intended  for  receipt  in 
the  United  States,  without  the  consent  of  a  party  thereto. 
2.  This  part  of  Procedure  5  shall  be  supplemented 
by  a  classified  Annex  promulgated  by  the  Director, 
National  Security  Agency/Chief,  Central  Security  Serv- 
ice, which  shall  also  be  approved  by  the  Attorney  Gen- 
eral. That  regulation  shall  provide  that  signals  intelli- 
gence activities  which  constitute  electronic  surveillance, 
as  defined  in  Parts  1  and  2  of  this  procedure,  will  be 
authorized  in  accordance  with  those  parts.  Any  infor- 
mation collected  incidentally  about  United  States  per- 
sons shall  be  subjected  to  minimization  procedures  ap- 
proved by  the  Attorney  General. 
B.    EXPLANATION  OF  UNDEFINED  TERMS 
1.  Communications  concerning  a  United  States 
person  are  those  in  which  the  United  States  person  is 
identified  in  the  communication.  A  United  States  per- 
son is  identified  when  the  person's  name,  unique  title, 
address  or  other  personal  identifier  is  revealed  in  the 
communication  in  the  context  of  activities  conducted 
by  that  person  or  activities  conducted  by  others  and 
related  to  that  person.  A  reference  to  a  product  by 
brand  name  or  manufacturer's  name  or  the  use  of  a 
name  in  a  descriptive  sense,  as,  for  example,  "Monroe 
Doctrine,"  is  not  an  identification  of  a  United  States 
person. 
2.  Interception  means  the  acquisition  by  the  United 
States  Signals  Intelligence  system  through  electronic 
means  of  a  nonpublic  communication  to  which  it  is  not 
an  intended  party,  and  the  processing  of  the  contents 
of  that  communication  into  an  intelligible  form  but  not 
including  the  display  of  signals  on  visual  display  devices 
intended  to  permit  the  examination  of  the  technical 
characteristics  of  the  signals  without  reference  to  the 
information  content  carried  by  the  signals. 
3.  Military  tactical  communications  means  United 
States  and  allied  military  exercise  communications  within 
the  United  States  and  abroad  necessary  for  the  pro- 
duction of  simulated  foreign  intelligence  and  counter- 
intelligence or  to  permit  an  analysis  of  communications 
security. 
4.  United  Stares  person.  For  purposes  of  signals 
intelligence  activities  only,  the  following  guidelines  will 
apply  in  determining  whether  a  person  is  a  United  States 
person: a.  A  person  known  to  be  currently  in  the  United 
States  will  be  treated  as  a  United  States  person  unless 
the  nature  of  the  person's  communications  or  other 
available  information  concerning  the  person  give  rise 
to  a  reasonable  belief  that  such  person  is  not  a  United 
States  citizen  or  permanent  resident  alien. 
b.  A  person  known  to  be  currently  outside  the 
United  States,  or  whose  location  is  not  known,  will  not 
be  treated  as  a  United  States  person  unless  the  nature 
of  the  person's  communications  or  other  available  in- 
formation concerning  the  person  give  rise  to  a  reason- 
able belief  that  such  person  is  a  United  States  citizen 
or  permanent  resident  alien. 
c.  A  person  known  to  be  an  alien  admitted  for 
permanent  residence  may  be  assumed  to  have  lost  status 
as  a  United  States  person  if  the  person  leaves  the  United 
States  and  it  is  known  that  the  person  is  not  in  com- 
pliance with  the  administrative  formalities  provided  by 
law  that  enable  such  persons  to  reenter  the  United  States 
without  regard  to  the  provisions  of  law  that  would 
otherwise  restrict  an  alien's  entry  into  the  United  States. 
The  failure  to  follow  the  statutory  procedures  provides 
a  reasonable  basis  to  conclude  that  such  alien  has  aban- 
doned any  intention  of  maintaining  status  as  a  perma- 
nent resident  alien. 
d.  An  unincorporated  association  whose  head- 
quarters are  located  outside  the  United  States  may  be 
presumed  not  to  be  a  United  States  person  unless  the 
collecting  agency  has  information  indicating  that  a  sub- 
stantial number  of  members  are  citizens  of  the  United 
States  or  aliens  lawfully  admitted  for  permanent  resi- 
dence. 
5.  United  States  Signals  Intelligence  System  means 
the  unified  organization  for  signals  intelligence  activities 
under  the  direction  of  the  Director,  National  Security 
Agency/Chief,  Central  Security  Service,  comprised  of 
the  National  Security  Agency,  the  Central  Security 
Service,  the  components  of  the  military  services  au- 
thorized to  conduct  signals  intelligence  and  such  other 
entities  (other  than  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investiga- 
tion) as  are  authorized  by  the  National  Security  Council 
or  the  Secretary  of  Defense  to  conduct  signals  intelli- 
gence. FBI  activities  are  governed  by  procedures  pro- 
mulgated by  the  Attorney  General. 
5-6
1  July  1«>34 
AR38'-10 
C.    PROCEDURES 
1-  F°re'gn  communications.  The  United  States 
Signais  Intelligence  System  may  collect,  process,  retain, 
and  disseminate  foreign  communication?  that  are  also 
communications  of  or  concerning  United  States  per- 
sons, but  only  in  accordance  with  the  classified  annex 
to  this  procedure. 
2.  Military  tactical  communications.  The  United 
States  Signals  Intelligence  System  may  collect,  process, 
retain,  and  disseminate  military  tactical  communica- 
tions that  are  also  communications  of  or  concerning 
United  States  persons  but  only  in  accordance  with  the 
classified  annex  to  this  procedure. 
a.  Collection.  Collection  efforts  will  be  con- 
ducted in  the  same  manner  as  in  the  case  of  signals 
intelligence  for  foreign  intelligence  purposes  and  must 
be  designed  in  such  a  manner  as  to  avoid  to  the  extent 
feasible  the  intercept  of  communications  not  related  to 
military  exercises. 
b.  Retention  and  processing.  Military  tactical 
communications  may  be  retained  and  processed  without 
deletion  of  references  to  United  States  persons  who  are 
participants  in,  or  are  otherwise  mentioned  in  exercise- 
related  communications,  provided  that  the  communi- 
cations of  United  States  persons  not  participating  in  the. 
exercise  that  are  inadvertently  intercepted  during  the 
exercise  shall  be  destroyed  as  soon  as  feasible. 
c.  Dissemination.  Dissemination  of  military  tac- 
tical communications  and  exercise  reports  or  informa- 
tion files  derived  from  such  communications  shall  be 
limited  to  those  authorities  and  persons  participating  in 
or  conducting  reviews  and  critiques  of  such  exercise. 
PART  4:  TECHNICAL  SURVEILLANCE 
COUNTERMEASURES 
A.  APPLICABILITY  AND  SCOPE 
This  part  of  Procedure  5  applies  to  the  use  of  elec- 
tronic equipment  to  determine  the  existence  and  ca- 
pability of  electronic  surveillance  equipment  being  used 
by  persons  not  authorized  to  conduct  electronic  sur- 
veillance. It  implements  section  105(f)(2)  of  the  Foreign 
Intelligence  Surveillance  Act,  (reference  b)). 
B.  EXPLANATION  OF  UNDEFINED  TERMS 
The  term  technical  surveillance  countermeasures 
refers  to  activities  authorized  pursuant  to  DoD  Direc- 
tive 5200.29,  (reference  (c)),  and,  as  used  in  the  pro- 
cedure, refers  to  the  use  of  electronic  surveillance 
equipment,  or  electronic  or  mechanical  devices,  solely 
for  determining  the  existence  and  capability  of  elec- 
tronic surveillance  equipment  being  used  by  person1-  not 
authorized  to  conduct  electronic  surveillanu  .  or  for 
determining  the  susceptibility  of  electronic  equipment 
to  unlawful  electronic  surveillance. 
C.    PROCEDURES 
A  DoD  intelligence  component  may  use  technical  sur- 
veillance countermeasures  that  involve  the  incidental 
acquisition  of  the  nonpublic  communications  of  United 
States  persons  without  their  consent,  provided: 
1.  The  use  of  such  countermeasures  has  been  au- 
thorized or  consented  to  by  the  official  in  charge  of  the 
facility,  organization,  or  installation  where  the  coun- 
termeasures are  to  be  undertaken; 
2.  The  use  of  such  countermeasures  is  limited  in 
extent  and  duration  to  that  necessary  to  determine  the 
existence  and  capability  of  such  equipment;  and 
3.  Access  to  the  content  of  communications  ac- 
quired during  the  use  of  countermeasures  is  limited  to 
persons  involved  directly  in  conducting  such  measures, 
and  any  content  acquired  is  destroyed  as  soon  as  prac- 
tical or  upon  completion  of  the  particular  use.  However, 
if  the  content  is  acquired  within  the  United  States,  only 
information  which  is  necessary  to  protect  against  un- 
authorized electronic  surveillance,  or  to  enforce  Chap- 
ter 119  of  title  18,  United  States  Code  (reference  (d)) 
and  Section  605  of  the  Communication  Act  of  1934 
(reference  (e)),  may  be  retained  and  disseminated  only 
for  these  purposes.  If  acquired  outside  the  United  States, 
information  which  indicates  a  violation  of  federal  law, 
including  the  Uniform  Code  of  Military  Justice  (ref- 
erence (f)),  or  a  clear  and  imminent  threat  to  life  or 
property,  may  also  be  disseminated  to  appropriate  law 
enforcement  authorities.  A  record  of  the  types  of  com- 
munications and  information  subject  to  acquisition  by 
the  illegal  electronic  surveillance  equipment  may  be 
retained. 
4.  Use,  retention,  or  dissemination  of  US  person 
information  acquired  pursuant  to  this  part  must  be  ap- 
proved by  the  Secretary  or  Under  Secretary  of  the  Army. 
Requests  should  be  submitted  tc  HQDA(DAMI-CIC), 
WASH  DC  20310.  In  emergency  situations  such  requests 
may  be  approved  by  any  Army  general  officer,  after 
consultation  with  his  or  her  senior  intelligence  officer 
and  supporting  judge  advocate.  A  report  of  emergency 
approvals  will  be  expeditiously  provided  to  HQDA(DAMI- 
CIC),  WASH  DC  20310.  The  report  will  contain  an 
explanation  of  the  nature  of  the  emergency  situation. 
5-7
AR  381-10 
i  Juiy  1984 
PART  5:  DEVELOPING.  TESTING.  AND 
CALIBRATION  OF  ELECTRONIC 
EQUIPMENT 
A.  APPLICABILITY 
This  part  of  Procedure  5  applies  to  developing, 
testing,  or  calibrating  electronic  equipment  that  can  in- 
tercept or  process  communications  and  non-commu- 
nications signals.  It  also  includes  research  and  devel- 
opment that  needs  electronic  communications  as  a  signal 
source. 
B.  PROCEDURES 
1.  Signal  Authorized  for  Use 
a.  The  following  may  be  used  without  restric- 
tion: 
(1)  Laboratory-generated  signals. 
(2)  Communications  signals  with  the  consent 
of  the  communicator. 
(3)  Communications  in  the  commercial  or 
public  service  broadcast  bands. 
(4)  Communications  transmitted  between  ter- 
minals located  outside  of  the  United  States  not  used  by 
any  known  United  States  person. 
(5)  Noncommunications  signals  (including  te- 
lemetry and  radar). 
b.  Communications  subject  to  lawful  electronic 
surveillance  under  the  provisions  of  Parts  1,  2,  or  3  of 
this  procedure  may  be  used  subject  to  the  minimization 
procedures  applicable  to  such  surveillance. 
c.  Any  of  the  following  may  be  used  subject  to 
the  restrictions  of  subsection  B.2.,  below. 
(1)  Communications  over  official  government 
communications  circuits  with  consent  from  an  appro- 
priate official  of  the  controlling  agency. 
(2)  Communication  in  citizens  and  amateur- 
radio  bands. 
d.  Other  signals  may  be  used  only  where  it  is 
determined  that  it  is  not  practical  to  use  the  signals 
described  above  and  it  is  not  reasonable  to  obtain  the 
consent  of  persons  incidentally  subjected  to  the  sur- 
veillance. The  restrictions  of  subsection  B.2.,  below, 
will  apply  in  such  cases.  The  Attorney  General  must 
approve  use  of  signals  pursuant  to  this  subsection  for 
the  purpose  of  development  testing,  or  calibration  when 
the  period  of  use  exceeds  90  days.  When  Attorney  Gen- 
eral approval  is  required,  the  DoD  intelligence  com- 
ponent shall  submit  a  test  pioposal  to  the  General 
Counsel,  DoD,  or  the  NSA  General  Counsel  for  trans- 
mission to  the  Attorney  General  for  approval.  The  test 
proposal  shall  state  the  requirement  for  a  period  beyond 
90  days,  the  nature  of  the  activity,  the  organization  that 
will  conduct  the  activity,  and  the  proposed  disposition 
of  any  signals  or  communications  acquired  during  the 
activity.  Requests  will  be  submitted  through  command 
channels  to  HQDA(DAMI-CIC),  WASH  DC  20310. 
2  Restrictions.  For  signals  described  in  subsection 
B.l.c.  and  d.,  above,  the  following  restrictions  apply: 
a.  The  surveillance  shall  be  limited  in  scope  and 
duration  to  that  necessary  for  the  purposes  referred  to 
in  section  A.  above. 
b.  No  particular  United  States  person  shall  be 
targeted  intentionally  without  consent. 
c.  The  content  of  any  communication  shall: 
(1)  Be  retained  only  when  actually  needed  for 
the  purposes  referred  to  in  section  A.  above, 
(2)  Be  disseminated  only  to  persons  conduct- 
ing the  activity,  and 
(3)  Be  destroyed  immediately  upon  comple- 
tion of  the  activity. 
d.  The  technical  parameters  of  a  communication 
(such  as  frequency,  modulation,  bearing,  signal  strength, 
and  time  of  activity)  may  be  retained  and  used  for  the 
purposes  outlined  in  section  A.,  above,  or  for  collection 
avoidance  purposes.  Such  parameters  may  be  dissem- 
inated to  other  DoD  intelligence  components  and  other 
entities  authorized  to  conduct  electronic  surveillance  or 
related  development,  testing,  and  calibration  of  elec- 
tronic equipment  provided  such  dissemination  and  use 
are  limited  to  the  purposes  outlined  in  section  A.,  or 
collection  avoidance  purposes.  No  content  of  any  com- 
munication may  be  retained  or  used  other  than  as  pro- 
vided in  subsection  B.2.c,  above. 
PART  6.  TRAINING  OF  PERSONNEL  IN  THE 
OPERATION  AND  USE  OF 
ELECTRONIC  COMMUNICATIONS 
AND  SURVEILLANCE  EQUIPMENT 
A.  APPLICABILITY 
This  part  of  Procedure  5  applies  to  the  training  of 
personnel  by  Dod  intelligence  components  in  the  op- 
5-8
1  July  1984 
AR  381-10 
eration  and  use  of  electronic  communications  and  sur- 
veillance equipment,  h  does  not  apply  to  the  intei cap- 
tion of  communications  with  the  consent  of  one  cf  tne 
parties  to  the  communication  or  to  the  training  of  in- 
telligence personnnel  by  nonintelligence  components . 
B.    PROCEDURES 
1 .  Training  guidance.  The  training  of  personnel  by 
DoD  intelligence  components  in  the  operation  and  use 
of  electronic  communications  and  surveillance  equip- 
ment shall  include  guidance  concerning  the  require- 
ments and  restrictions  of  the  Foreign  Intelligence  Sur- 
veillance Act  of  1978  (reference  (b)),  and  E.O.  12333 
(reference  (a)),  with  respect  to  the  unauthorized  ac- 
quisition and  use  of  the  content  of  communications  of 
United  States  persons. 
2.  Training  Limitations 
a.  Except  as  permitted  by  subsections  B.2.b.  and 
c,  below,  the  use  of  electronic  communications  and 
surveillance  equipment  for  training  purposes  is  permit- 
ted subject  to  the  following  limitations: 
(1)  To  the  maximum  extent  practical,  use  of 
such  equipment  for  training  purposes  shall  be  directed 
against  communications  which  are  subject  to  lawful 
electronic  surveillance  for  foreign  intelligence  and 
counterintelligence  purposes  under  Parts  1,2,  and  3  of 
this  procedure. 
(2)  The  contents  of  private  communication  of 
nonconsenting  United  States  persons  may  not  be  ac- 
quired aurally  unless  the  person  is  an  authorized  target 
of  electronic  surveillance. 
(3)  The  electronic  surveillance  will  be  limited 
in  extent  and  duration  to  that  necessary  to  train  per- 
sonnel in  the  use  of  the  equipment. 
b.  Public  broadcasts,  distress  signals,  or  official 
United  States  Government  communications  may  be 
monitored,  provided  that  when  government  agency 
communications  are  monitored,  the  consent  of  an  ap- 
propriate official  is  obtained. 
c.  Minimal  acquisition  of  information  is  permit- 
ted as  required  for  calibration  purposes. 
3.  Retention  and  dissemination.  Information  col- 
lected during  training  that  involves  communications  de- 
scribed in  subsection  B.2.a.  (1),  above,  shal'  be  retained 
and  disseminated  in  accordance  with  minimization  pro- 
cedures applicable  to  that  electronic  surveillance.  In- 
formation collected  during  training  that  does  not  in- 
volve communications  described  in  subsection  B.2.a. 
(1),  above,  or  that  is  acquired  inadvertently,  shall  be 
destioyed  as  soon  as  practical  or  upon  completion  of 
the  training  and  may  not  be  disseminated  for  any  pur- 
pose. This  subsection  does  not  apply  to  distress  signals. 
PART  7:  CONDUCT  OF  VULNERABILITY  AND 
HEARABILITY  SURVEYS 
A.  APPLICABILITY  AND  SCOPE 
This  part  of  Procedure  5  applies  to  the  conduct  of 
vulnerability  surveys  and  hearability  surveys  by  DoD 
intelligence  components.  Army  implementation  is  con- 
tained in  AR  380-53. 
B.  EXPLANATION  OF  UNDEFINED  TERMS 
1.  The  term  vulnerability  survey  refers  to  the  ac- 
quisition of  radio  frequency  propagation  and  its  sub- 
sequent analysis  to  determine  empirically  the  vulnera- 
bility of  the  transmission  media  to  interception  by  foreign 
intelligence  services. 
2.  The  term  hearability  survey  refers  to  monitoring 
radio  communications  to  determine  whether  a  partic- 
ular radio  signal  can  be  received  at  one  or  more  loca- 
tions and,  if  reception  is  possible,  to  determine  the 
quality  of  reception  over  time. 
C.  PROCEDURES 
1.  Conduct  of  vulnerability  surveys.  Nonconsen- 
sual surveys  may  be  conducted  to  determine  the  po- 
tential vulnerability  to  intelligence  services  of  a  foreign 
power  of  transmission  facilities  of  communications  com- 
mon carriers,  other  private  commercial  entities,  and 
entities  of  the  federal  government,  subject  to  the  fol- 
lowing limitations: 
a.  No  vulnerability  survey  may  be  conducted 
without  the  prior  written  approval  of  the  Director,  Na- 
tional Security  Agency,  or  his  designee. 
b.  No  transmission  may  be  acquired  aurally. 
c.  No  content  of  any  transmission  may  be  ac- 
quired by  any  means. 
d.  No  transmissions  may  be  recorded. 
e.  No  report  or  log  may  identify  any  United  States 
person  or  entity  except  to  the  extent  of  identifying  trans- 
mission facilities  that  are  vulnerable  to  surveillance  by 
foreign  powers.  If  the  identities  of  the  users  of  such 
5-9
AR  381-10 
facilities  aie  not  identical  with  the  identities  of  the  own- 
ers of  the  facilities,  the  identity  of  such  users  may  be 
obtained  but  not  from  the  content  of  the  transmissions 
themselves,  and  may  be  included  in  such  report  or  log. 
Reports  may  be  disseminated.  Logs  may  be  dissemi- 
nated only  if  required  to  verify  results  contained  in 
reports. 
2-  Conduct  of  hearability  surveys.  The  Director, 
National  Security  Agency  may  conduct,  or  may  au- 
thorize the  conduct  by  other  agencies,  of  hearability 
surveys  of  telecommunications  that  are  transmitted  in 
the  United  States. 
a.  Collection.  Where  practicable,  consent  will 
be  secured  from  the  owner  or  user  of  the  facility  against 
which  the  hearability  survey  is  to  be  conducted  prior  to 
the  commencement  of  the  survey. 
b.  Processing  and  Storage.  Information  collec- 
tion during  a  hearability  survey  must  be  processed  and 
stored  as  follows: 
1  July  1984 
(1)  The  content  of  communications  may  not 
be  recorded  or  included  in  any  report. 
(2)  No  microwave  transmission  may  be  de- 
multiplexed or  demodulated  for  any  purpose. 
(3)  No  report  or  log  may  identify  any  person 
or  entity  except  to  the  extent  of  identifying  the  trans- 
mission facility  that  can  be  intercepted  from  the  inter- 
cept site.  If  the  identities  of  the  users  of  such  facilities 
are  not  identical  with  the  identities  of  the  owners  of  the 
facilities,  and  their  identities  are  relevant  to  the  purpose 
for  which  the  hearability  survey  has  been  conducted, 
the  identity  of  such  users  may  be  obtained  provided 
such  identities  may  not  be  obtained  from  the  contents 
of  the  transmissions  themselves. 
c.  Dissemination.  Reports  may  be  disseminated 
only  within  the  United  States  Government.  Logs  may 
not  be  disseminated  unless  required  to  verify  results 
contained  in  reports. 
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1  July  1984 
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PROCEDURE  6.     CONCEALED  MONITORING 
A.   APPLICABILITY  AND  SCOPE 
1.  This  procedure  applies  to  concealed  monitoring 
only  tor  foreign  intelligence  and  counterintelligence 
purposes  conducted  by  a  DoD  intelligence  component 
within  the  United  States  or  directed  against  a  United 
States  person  who  is  outside  the  United  States  where 
the  subject  of  such  monitoring  does  not  have  a  reason- 
able expectation  of  privacy,  as  explained  in  section  B., 
below,  and  no  warrant  would  be  required  if  undertaken 
for  law  enforcement  purposes. 
2.  Concealed  monitoring  in  the  LJnited  States  for 
foreign  intelligence  and  counterintelligence  purposes 
where  the  subject  of  such  monitoring  (whether  or  not 
a  US  person)  has  a  reasonable  expectation  of  privacy 
and  a  warrant  would  be  required  for  law  enforcement 
purposes  shall  be  treated  as  "electronic  surveillance  within 
the  United  States"  under  Part  1  of  Procedure  5,  and 
processed  pursuant  to  that  procedure. 
3.  Concealed  monitoring  for  foreign  intelligence 
and  counterintelligence  purposes  of  a  United  States  per- 
son abroad  where  the  subject  of  such  monitoring  has  a 
reasonable  expectation  of  privacy  and  a  warrant  would 
be  required  for  law  enforcement  purposes  shall  be  treated 
as  "electronic  surveillance  outside  the  United  States" 
under  Part  2  of  Procedure  5,  and  processed  pursuant 
to  that  procedure. 
4.  Concealed  monitoring  for  foreign  intelligence 
and  counterintelligence  purposes  when  the  monitoring 
is  a  signals  intelligence  activity  shall  be  conducted  pur- 
suant to  Part  3  of  Procedure  5. 
5.  Concealed  monitoring  for  foreign  intelligence  and 
CI  purposes  of  a  non-US  person  abroad  who  has  a  rea- 
sonable expectation  of  privacy  will  be  treated  as  elec- 
tronic surveillance  of  a  non-US  person  outside  the  United 
States.  This  is  governed  by  section  F  of  part  2  of  pro- 
cedure 5. 
B.   EXPLANATION  OF  UNDEFINED  TERMS 
1.  Concealed  monitoring  means  targeting  by  elec- 
tronic,  optical,  or  mechanical  devices  a  particular  per- 
son or  a  group  of  persons  without  their  consent  in  a 
surreptitious  and  continuous  manner.  Monitoring  is  sur- 
reptitious when  it  is  targeted  in  a  manner  designed  to 
keep  the  subject  of  the  monitoring  unaware  of  it.  Mon- 
itoring is  continuous  if  it  is  conducted  without  inter- 
ruption for  a  substantial  period  of  time.  Beacons  ("beep- 
ers")  and  transponders  generally  are  considered  methods 
of  concealed  monitoring  under  the  following  conditions: 
when  affixed  in  a  public  place  (for  example,  placing  the 
device  on  the  underside  of  a  vehicle  in  a  public  area); 
and  where  no  warrant  would  be  required  in  a  criminal 
law  context.  Concealed  monitoring  by  "beacons"  au- 
thorized under  this  procedure  must  terminate  when  the 
target  of  the  monitoring  acquires  an  expectation  of  pri- 
vacy. An  example  would  be  the  vehicle  entering  private 
property  not  visible  from  a  public  place. 
2.  Monitoring  is  within  the  United  States  if  the 
monitoring  device,  or  the  target  of  the  monitoring,  is 
located  within  the  United  States. 
3.  Whether  concealed  monitoring  is  to  occur  where 
the  subject  has  a  reasonable  expectation  of  privacy  is 
a  determination  which  depends  upon  the  circumstances 
of  a  particular  case,  and  shall  be  made  only  after  con- 
sultation with  the  legal  office  responsible  for  advising 
the  DoD  intelligence  component  concerned.  Reason- 
able expectation  of  privacy  is  the  extent  to  which  a 
reasonable  person  in  the  particular  circumstances  in- 
volved is  entitled  to  believe  his  or  her  actions  are  not 
subject  to  monitoring  by  electronic,  optical,  or  me- 
chanical devices.  For  example,  there  are  ordinarily  rea- 
sonable expectations  of  privacy  in  work  spaces  if  a  per- 
son's actions  and  papers  are  not  subject  to  ready 
observation  by  others  under  normal  working  condi- 
tions. Conversely,  a  person  walking  out  of  his  or  her 
residence  into  a  public  street  ordinarily  would  not  have 
a  reasonable  expectation  that  he  or  she  is  not  being 
observed  or  even  photographed;  however,  such  a  per- 
son ordinarily  would  have  an  expectation  of  privacy 
within  his  or  her  residence. 
C.    PROCEDURES 
1.  Limitations  on  use  of  concealed  monitoring.  Use 
of  concealed  monitoring  under  circumstances  when  the 
subject  of  such  monitoring  has  no  reasonable  expec- 
tation of  privacy  is  subject  to  the  following  limitations: 
a.  Within  the  United  States,  a  DoD  intelligence 
component  may  conduct  concealed  monitoring  only  on 
an  installation  or  facility  owned  or  leased  by  DoD,  or 
6-1
AR  381-10 
1  July  1984 
otherwise  in  the  course  of  an  investigation  conducted 
pursuant  to  the  Agreement  Between  the  Secretary  of 
Defense  and  the  Attorney  General,  reference  (g).  (See 
App  B.) 
b.  Outside  the  United  States,  such  monitoring 
may  be  conducted  on  installations  and  facilities  owned 
or  leased  by  the  Department  of  Defense.  Monitoring 
outside  such  facilities  shall  be  conducted  after  coordi- 
nation with  appropriate  host  country  officials,  if  such 
coordination  is  required  by  the  governing  Status  of  Forces 
Agreement,  and  with  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency. 
2.  Required  Determination.  Concealed  monitor- 
ing conducted  under  subsection  C.  1 . ,  requires  approval 
by  an  official  designated  in  subsection  C.3.,  below,  based 
on  a  determination  that  such  monitoring  is  necessary 
to  the  conduct  of  assigned  foreign  intelligence  or  coun- 
terintelligence functions,  and  does  not  constitute  elec- 
tronic surveillance  under  Parts  1  or  2  of  Procedure  5. 
3.  Officials  authorized  to  approve  concealed  mon- 
itoring. Officials  authorized  to  approve  concealed  mon- 
itoring under  this  procedure  include  the  Deputy  Under 
Secretary  of  Defense  (Policy);  the  Director.  Defense 
Intelligence  Agency;  the  Director,  National  Security 
Agency;  the  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff  for  Intelligence. 
Department  of  Army;  the  Director,  Naval  Intelligence; 
the  Director  of  Intelligence,  U.S.  Marine  Corps;  the 
Assistant  Chief  of  Staff ,  Intelligence,  United  States  Air 
Force;  the  Commanding  General,  Army  Intelligence 
and  Security  Command;  the  Director,  Naval  Investi- 
gative Service;  and  the  Commanding  Officer,  Air  Force 
Office  of  Special  Investigations. 
a.  Requests  for  approval  of  concealed  monitoring 
will  be  coordinated  with  the  legal  advisor  to  the  ap- 
proving authority. 
b.  Information  copies  of  approvals  by  the  Com- 
manding General,  INSCOM,  will  be  provided  to  HQDA 
(DAM1-CIC),  WASH  DC  20310. 
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1  July  1 984 
AR  381-10 
PROCEDURE  7.     PHYSICAL  SEARCHES 
A.  APPLICABILITY 
This  procedure  applies  to  unconsented  physical 
searches  of  any  person  or  property  within  the  United 
States  and  to  physical  searches  of  the  person  or  property 
of  a  Ur.ited  States  person  outside  the  United  States  by 
DoD  intelligence  components  for  foreign  intelligence 
or  counterintelligence  purposes.  Physical  searches  also 
may  be  performed  pursuant  to  this  procedure  for  any 
other  lawful  function  assigned  an  Army  intelligence  com- 
ponent. DoD  intelligence  components  may  provide  as- 
sistance to  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  and  other 
law  enforcement  authorities  in  accordance  with  Pro- 
cedure 12,  Part  C.4.  of  this  procedure  also  governs  phys- 
ical searches  of  non-US  persons  abroad. 
B.  EXPLANATION  OF  UNDEFINED  TERMS 
Physical  search  means  any  intrusion  upon  a  person 
or  a  person's  property  or  possessions  to  obtain  items  of 
property  or  information.  The  term  does  not  include 
examination  of  areas  that  are  in  plain  view  and  visible 
to  the  unaided  eye  if  no  physical  trespass  is  undertaken, 
and  does  not  include  examinations  of  abandoned  prop- 
erty left  in  a  public  place.  The  term  also  does  not  include 
any  intrusion  authorized  as  necessary  to  accomplish  lawful 
electronic  surveillance  conducted  pursuant  to  Parts  1 
and  2  of  Procedure  5. 
C.  PROCEDURES 
1.  Unconsented  physical  searches  within  the  United 
States. 
a.  Searches  of  active  duty  military  personnel  for 
counterintelligence  purposes.  The  counterintelligence 
elements  of  the  Military  Departments  are  authorized 
to  conduct  unconsented  physical  searches  in  the  United 
States  for  counterintelligence  purposes  of  the  person  or 
property  of  active  duty  military  personnel,  when  au- 
thorized by  a  military  judge,  or  a  military  commander 
empowered  to  approve  physical  searches  for  law  en- 
forcement purposes  pursuant  to  rule  315(d)  of  the  Man- 
ual for  Courts  Martial,  Executive  Order  12198  (refer- 
ence (h)),  based  upon  a  finding  of  probable  cause  to 
believe  such  persons  are  acting  as  agents  of  foreign 
powers.  For  purposes  of  this  section,  the  term  "agent 
of  a  foreign  power"  refers  to  an  individual  who  meets 
the  criteria  set  forth  in  subsection  C.2.b.(2),  below. 
b.  Other  unconsented  physical  searches.  Except 
as  permitted  by  section  A.,  above,  DoD  intelligence 
components  may  not  conduct  unconsented  physical 
searches  of  persons  and  property  within  the  United  States 
for  foreign  intelligence  or  counterintelligence  purposes. 
DoD  intelligence  components  may,  however,  request 
the  FBI  to  conduct  such  searches.  All  such  requests 
shall  be  in  writing;  shall  contain  the  information  re- 
quired in  section  C.2.b.(l)  through  (6),  below;  and  be 
approved  by  an  official  designated  in  section  C.2.c, 
below.  A  copy  of  each  such  request  shall  be  furnished 
the  General  Counsel,  DoD. 
2.  Unconsented  physical  searches  outside  the  United 
States. 
a.  Searches  of  active  duty  military  personnel  for 
counterintelligence  purposes.  The  counterintelligence 
elements  of  the  Military  Departments  may  conduct  un- 
consented physical  searches  of  the  person  or  property 
of  active  duty  military  personnel  outside  the  United 
States  for  counterintelligence  purposes  when  author- 
ized by  a  military  judge,  or  a  military  commander  em- 
powered to  approve  physical  searches  for  law  enforce- 
ment purposes  pursuant  to  rule  315(d)  of  the  Manual 
for  Courts  Martial,  Executive  Order  12198,  (reference 
(h)),  based  upon  a  finding  of  probable  cause  to  believe 
such  persons  are  acting  as  agents  of  foreign  powers.  For 
purposes  of  this  section,  the  term  "agent  of  a  foreign 
power"  refers  to  an  individual  who  meets  the  criteria 
set  forth  in  subsection  C.2.b.(2),  below. 
b.  Other  unconsented  physical  searches.  DoD 
intelligence  components  may  conduct  other  uncon- 
sented physical  searches  for  foreign  intelligence  and 
counterintelligence  purposes  of  the  person  or  property 
of  United  States  persons  outside  the  United  States  only 
pursuant  to  the  approval  of  the  Attorney  General.  Re- 
quests for  such  approval  will  be  forwarded  by  a  senior 
official  designated  in  subsection  C.2.c,  below,  to  the 
Attorney  General  and  shall  include: 
(1)  An  identification  of  the  person  or  descrip- 
tion of  the  property  to  be  searched. 
(2)  A  statement  of  facts  supporting  a  finding 
that  there  is  probable  cause  to  believe  the  subject  of 
the  search  is: 
7-1
AR  381-10 
(a)  A  person  who.  for  or  on  behalf  of  a 
foreign  power,  is  engaged  in  clandestine  intelligence 
activities  (including  covert  activities  intended  to  affect 
the  political  or  governmental  process),  sabotage,  or  in- 
ternational terrorist  activities,  activities  in  preparation 
for  international  terrorist  activities,  or  who  conspires 
with,  or  knowingly  aids  and  abets  a  person  engaging  in 
such  activities. 
(b)  A  person  who  is  an  officer  or  employee 
of  a  foreign  power; 
(c)  A  person  unlawfully  acting  for,  or  pur- 
suant to  the  direction  of,  a  foreign  power.  The  mere 
fact  that  a  person's  activities  may  benefit  or  further  the 
aims  of  a  foreign  power  does  not  justify  an  unconsented 
physical  search  without  evidence  that  the  person  is  tak- 
ing direction  from,  or  acting  in  knowing  concert  with, 
the  foreign  power; 
(d)  A  corporation  or  other  entity  that  is 
owned  or  controlled  directly  or  indirectly  by  a  foreign 
power;  or 
(e)  A  person  in  contact  with,  or  acting  in 
collaboration  with,  an  intelligence  or  security  service  of 
a  foreign  power  for  the  purpose  of  providing  access  to 
information  or  material  classified  by  the  United  States 
to  which  such  person  has  access. 
(3)  A  statement  of  facts  supporting  a  finding 
that  the  search  is  necessary  to  obtain  significant  foreign 
intelligence  or  counterintelligence. 
(4)  A  statement  of  facts  supporting  a  finding 
that  the  significant  foreign  intelligence  or  counterintel- 
ligence expected  to  be  obtained  could  not  be  obtained 
by  less  intrusive  means. 
(5)  A  description  of  the  significant  foreign  in- 
telligence or  counterintelligence  expected  to  be  ob- 
tained from  the  search. 
(6)  A  description  of  the  extent  of  the  search 
and  a  statement  of  facts  supporting  a  finding  that  the 
search  will  involve  the  least  amount  of  physical  intrusion 
that  will  accomplish  the  objective  sought. 
(7)  A  description  of  the  expected  dissemina- 
tion of  the  product  of  the  search,  including  a  description 
of  the  procedures  that  will  govern  the  retention  and 
dissemination  of  information  about  United  States  per- 
sons acquired  incidental  to  the  search. 
c.  Requests  for  approval  of  unconsented  phys- 
ical searches  under  subsection  C.2.b.  must  be  made  by: 
1  July  1984 
(1)  The  Secretary  or  the  Deputy  Secretary  of 
Defense; 
(2)  The  Secretary  or  the  Under  Secretary  of 
a  Military  Department; 
(3)  The  Director,  National  Security  Agency; 
or 
(4)  The  Director,  Defense  Intelligence  Agency. 
3.  Requests  for  authority  to  conduct  unconsented 
physical  searches  within  the  United  States  or  of  US  per- 
sons abroad. 
a.  Information  copies  of  approvals  for  physical 
searches  authorized  pursuant  to  sections  C.l.a.  or  C,2.a. 
will  be  provided  to  HQDA(DAMI-CIC),  WASH  DC 
20310. 
b.  Requests  submitted  by  an  Army  intelligence 
component  under  sections  C.l.b.  or  C.2.b.  will  be  sub- 
mitted through  command  channels  to  HQDA(DAMI- 
CIC),  WASH  DC  20310. 
4.  Unconsented  physical  searches  of  non-US  per- 
sons abroad. 
a.  Unconsented  physical  searches  of  non-US  per- 
sons outside  the  United  States  may  be  performed  for  any 
lawful  function  assigned  the  Army  intelligence  compo- 
nent. 
b.  Unconsented  physical  searches  of  non-US  per- 
sons outside  the  United  States  may  be  approved  by  the 
following  officials: 
(1)  ACSI,  HQDA. 
(2)  Commanding  General,  INSCOM. 
(3)  CINCUSAREUR. 
(4)  Commanding  General,  EUSA. 
The  officials  at  (1)  through  (4)  above  may  delegate  au- 
thority to  their  deputies,  chiefs  of  staff,  or  ranking  in- 
telligence staff  officers;  they  in  turn  may  delegate  their 
authority  to  the  responsible  military  intelligence  group 
commanders,  who  may  further  delegate  this  authority 
to  military  intelligence  battalion  commanders  or  their 
equivalent.  No  further  delegation  is  authorized.  All  del- 
egations must  be  in  writing.  Requests  for  approval  will 
be  forwarded  through  command  channels;  approvals  wiE 
be  granted  only  after  coordination  with  the  approving 
authority's  supporting  judge  advocate.  Information  cop- 
ies of  all  approvals  will  be  provided  to  HQDA(DAMI- 
CIC),  WASH  DC  20310. 
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1  July  J  984 
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FROCEDURE  8.     SEARCHES  AND  EXAMINATION  OF  MAIL 
A.  APPLICABILITY 
This  procedure  applies  to  the  opening  of  mail  in 
United  States  postal  channels,  and  the  use  of  mail  cov- 
ers with  respect  to  such  mail,  for  foreign  intelligence 
and  counterintelligence  purposes.  (Additionally,  mail 
opening  and  mail  covers  may  be  performed  pursuant  to 
this  procedure  for  any  other  lawful  function  assigned  an 
Army  intelligence  component.)  It  also  applies  to  the 
opening  of  mail  to  or  from  United  States  persons  where 
such  activity  is  conducted  outside  the  United  States  and 
such  mail  is  not  in  United  States  postal  channels. 
B.  EXPLANATION  OF  UNDEFINED  TERMS 
1.  Mail  within  United  States  postal  channels  in- 
cludes: 
a.  Mail  while  in  transit  within,  among,  and  be- 
tween the  United  States,  its  territories  and  possessions 
(including  mail  of  foreign  origin  which  is  passed  by  a 
foreign  postal  administration  to  the  United  States  Postal 
Service  for  forwarding  to  a  foreign  postal  administration 
under  a  postal  treaty  or  convention,  and  mail  tempo- 
rarily in  the  hands  of  the  United  States  Customs  Service 
or  the  Department  of  Agriculture),  Army-Air  Force 
(APO)  and  Navy  (FPO)  post  offices,  and  mail  for  de- 
livery to  the  United  Nations,  N.Y.;  and 
b.  International  mail  en  route  to  an  addressee 
in  the  United  States  or  its  possessions  after  passage  to 
United  States  Postal  Service  from  a  foreign  postal 
administration  or  en  route  to  an  addressee  aboard  be- 
fore passage  to  a  foreign  postal  administration. 
c.  As  a  rule,  mail  shall  be  considered  in  such 
postal  channels  until  the  moment  it  is  delivered  man- 
ually in  the  United  States  to  the  specific  addressee  named 
on  the  envelope,  or  his  authorized  agent. 
2.  To  examine  mail  means  to  employ  a  mail  cover 
with  respect  to  such  mail. 
3.  Mail  cover  means  the  process  by  which  a  record 
is  made  of  any  data  appearing  on  the  outside  cover  of 
any  class  of  mail  matter  as  permitted  by  law,  other  than 
that  necessary  for  the  delivery  of  mail  or  administration 
of  the  postal  service. 
C.    PROCEDURES 
L  Searches  of  mail  within  United  States  postal 
channels. 
a.  Applicable  postal  regulations  do  not  permit 
DoD  intelligence  components  to  detain  or  open  first 
class  mail  within  United  States  postal  channels  for  for- 
eign intelligence  and  counterintelligence  purposes,  or 
to  request  such  action  by  the  U.S.  Postal  Service.  Searches 
of  first  class  mail  in  US  postal  channels  may  be  author- 
ized for  law  enforcement  purposes  under  procedures 
established  in  DoD  4525.6-M,  chapter  8,  volume  1. 
b.  DoD  intelligence  components  may  request  ap- 
propriate U.S.  postal  authorities  to  inspect,  or  author- 
ize the  inspection,  of  the  contents  of  second,  third,  or 
fourth  class  mail  in  United  States  postal  channels,  for 
such  purposes,  in  accordance  with  applicable  postal  reg- 
ulations. Such  components  may  also  request  appropri- 
ate U.S.  postal  authorities  to  detain,  or  permit  the  de- 
tention of,  mail  that  may  become  subject  to  search  under 
this  section,  in  accordance  with  applicable  postal  reg- 
ulations. Requests  for  approval  under  this  subsection 
will  be  coordinated  with  the  legal  advisor  to  the  ap- 
proving authority.  Information  copies  of  requests  sub- 
mitted to  postal  authorities  by  the  Commanding  Gen- 
eral, INSCOM  will  be  provided  to  HQBA(DAMI-CIC), 
WASH  DC  20310. 
2.  Searches  of  mail  outside  United  States  postal 
channels. 
a.  DoD  intelligence  components  are  authorized 
to  open  mail  to  or  from  a  United  States  person  that  is 
found  outside  United  States  postal  channels  only  pur- 
suant to  the  approval  of  the  Attorney  General.  Re- 
quests for  such  approval  shall  be  treated  as  a  request 
for  an  unconsented  physical  search  under  subsection 
C.2.b.  of  Procedure  7.  Army  intelligence  components 
will  submit  such  requests  through  command  channels  to 
HQDA(DAMI-CIC),  WASH  DC  20310. 
b.  Heads  of  DoD  intelligence  components  may 
authorize  the  opening  of  mail  outside  U.S.  postal  chan- 
nels when  both  the  sender  and  intended  recipient  are 
other  than  United  States  persons  if  such  searches  are 
otherwise  lawful  and  consistent  with  any  Status  of  Forces 
8-1
AR  381-10 
Agreement  that  may  be  in  effect.  Searches  of  mail  pur- 
suant to  this  subsection  may  be  conducted  for  any  lawful 
function  assigned  an  Army  intelligence  component. 
Searches  of  mail  outside  US  postal  channels  may  be  ap- 
proved by  the  following  officials: 
(1)  ACSI,  HQDA. 
(2)  Commanding  General,  1NSCOM. 
(3)  CINCUSAREUR. 
(4)  Commanding  General,  EUSA. 
The  officials  at  (1)  through  (4)  above  may  delegate  au- 
thority to  their  deputies,  chiefs  of  staff,  or  ranking  in- 
telligence staff  officers.  They  in  turn  may  delegate  their 
authority  to  responsible  military  intelligence  group  com- 
manders; these  commanders  may  further  delegate  this 
authority  to  military  intelligence  battalion  commanders, 
or  equivalent.  No  further  delegation  is  authorized.  Del- 
egation of  authority  must  be  in  writing.  Requests  for 
approval  will  be  forwarded  through  command  channels. 
Approvals  will  be  granted  only  after  coordination  with 
the  approving  authority's  supporting  judge  advocate. 
1  July  1984 
Information  copies  of  all  approvals  will  be  provided  to 
HQDA(DAMI-CIC).  WASH  DC  20310. 
3.  Mail  Covers 
a.  DoD  intelligence  components  may  request  U.S. 
postal  authorities  to  examine  mail  in  U.S.  postal  chan- 
nels, for  counterintelligence  purposes,  in  accordance 
with  applicable  postal  regulations.  Applicable  regula- 
tions include  AR  65-75,  the  US  Postal  Service  Domestic 
Mail  Manual,  and  DoD  4525.6-M. 
b.  DoD  intelligence  components  may  also  re- 
quest mail  covers  with  respect  to  mail  to  or  from  a 
United  States  person  that  is  outside  U.S.  postal  chan- 
nels, or  mail  covers  on  non-US  persons  outside  US  postal 
channels  in  accordance  with  appropriate  law  and  pro- 
cedure of  the  host  government,  and  any  Status  of  Forces 
Agreement  that  may  be  in  effect. 
c.  Requests  for  mail  covers  pursuant  to  this  sec- 
tion may  be  approved  by  the  same  authorities  and  pro- 
cedures described  in  section  C.2.b. 
8-2
1  July  1984 
AR38 
PROCEDURE  9.     PHYSICAL  SURVEILLANCE 
A.  APPLICABILITY 
This  procedure  applies  only  to  the  physical  sur- 
veillance of  United  States  persons  by  DoD  intelligence 
components  for  foreign  intelligence  and  counterintel- 
ligence purposes.  Additionally,  physical  surveillance  may 
be  performed  pursuant  to  this  procedure  for  any  other 
lawful  function  assigned  an  Army  intelligence  compo- 
nent. This  procedure  does  not  apply  to  physical  sur- 
veillance conducted  as  part  of  a  training  exercise  where 
the  subjects  are  participants  in  the  exercise.  This  pro- 
cedure also  governs  physical  surveillance  of  non-US  per- 
sons. 
B.  EXPLANATION  OF  UNDEFINED  TERMS 
The  term  physical  surveillance  means  a  systematic 
and  deliberate  observation  of  a  person  by  any  means 
on  a  continuing  basis,  or  the  acquisition  of  a  nonpublic 
communication  by  a  person  not  a  party  thereto  or  visibly 
present  thereat  through  any  means  not  involving  elec- 
tronic surveillance. 
C.  PROCEDURES 
1.  Criteria  for  physical  surveillance  in  the  United 
States.  Within  the  United  States,  DoD  intelligence 
components  may  conduct  unconsented  physical  sur- 
veillances for  foreign  intelligence  and  counterintelli- 
gence purposes  against  United  States  persons  who  are 
present  or  former  employees  of  the  intelligence  com- 
ponent concerned;  present  or  former  contractors  of  such 
components  or  their  present  or  former  employees;  ap- 
plicants for  such  employment  or  contracting;  or  military 
persons  employed  by  a  nonintelligence  element  of  a 
Military  Service.  Any  physical  surveillance  within  the 
United  States  that  occurs  outside  a  DoD  installation 
shall  be  coordinated  with  the  FBI  and  other  law  en- 
forcement agencies  as  may  be  appropriate.  Army  in- 
telligence components  additionally  may  conduct  physical 
surveillance  of  persons  in  contact  with  the  above  sub- 
jects, but  only  to  the  extent  necessary  to  identify  that 
person.  Physical  surveillance  for  identification  purposes 
may  be  approved  by  a  field  supervisor. 
2.  Criteria  for  physical  surveillance  outside  the 
United  States.  Outside  the  United  States,  DoD  intel- 
ligence components  may  conduct  unconsented  physical 
surveillance  of  United  States  persons  in  one  of  the  cat- 
egories identified  in  subsection  C.I.,  above.  In  ad(l 
tion,  such  comixments  may  conduct  physical  surven 
lance  of  other  United  States  persons  in  the  course  of) 
lawful  foreign  intelligence  or  counterintelligence  invea 
ligation,  provided  (a)  such  surveillance  is  consistent  witll 
the  laws  and  policy  of  the  host  government  and  doe^ 
not  violate  any  Status  of  Forces  Agreement  that  mayl 
be  in  effect;  and  (b)  that  physical  surveillance  of  a  United! 
States  person  abroad  to  collect  foreign  intelligence  may  I 
be  authorized  only  to  obtain  significant  information  that 
cannot  be  obtained  by  other  means.  Army  intelligence 
components  additionally  may  conduct  physical  surveil- 
lance of  persons  in  contact  with  the  above  subjects,  but 
only  to  the  extent  necessary  to  identify  that  person.  Phys- 
ical surveillance  for  identification  purposes  may  be  ap- 
proved by  a  field  supervisor. 
3.  Required  approvals  for  physical  surveillance 
a.  Persons  within  DoD  investigative  jurisdic- 
tion. Physical  surveillances  within  the  United  States  of 
US  persons  or  which  involve  United  States  persons  within 
DoD  investigative  jurisdiction  overseas  may  be  ap- 
proved by  the  head  of  the  DoD  intelligence  component 
concerned  or  by  designated  senior  officials  of  such  com- 
ponents in  accordance  with  this  procedure.  Persons  within 
DoD  investigative  jurisdiction  are  defined  in  "The 
Agreement  Between  the  Deputy  Secretary  of  Defense  and 
Attorney  General,  April  5,  1979"  at  appendix  B.  Re- 
quests for  physical  surveillance  pursuant  to  this  section 
may  be  approved  by  the  following  officials: 
(1)  ACSI,  HQDA. 
(2)  Commanding  General,  INSCOM. 
(3)  CINCUSAREUR. 
(4)  Commanding  General,  EUSA. 
The  officials  at  (1)  through  (4)  above  may  delegate  au- 
thority, in  writing,  to  their  deputies,  chiefs  of  staff,  or 
ranking  intelligence  staff  officers.  No  further  delegation 
is  authorized.  Requests  for  approval  will  be  forwarded 
through  command  channels;  approval  will  be  granted 
only  after  coordination  with  the  approving  authority's 
supporting  judge  advocate.  Information  copies  of  all  ap- 
provals will  be  provided  to  HQDA(DAMI-CIC),  WASH 
DC  20310. 
-t;  -m
AR  381-10 
1  July  1984 
b.  Persons  outside  DoD  investigative  jurisdic- 
tion. Outside  the  United  States,  physical  surveillances 
of  United  States  persons  who  are  not  within  the  inves- 
tigative jurisdiction  of  the  DoD  intelligence  component 
concerned  will  be  forwarded  through  appropriate  chan- 
nels to  the  Deputy  Under  Secretary  of  Defense  (Policy) 
for  approval.  Requests  for  approval  of  physical  sur- 
veillance pursuant  to  this  section  will  be  forwarded  through 
command  channels  to  HQDA(DAMI-CIC),  WASH  DC 
20310.  Such  requests  shall  indicate  coordination  with 
the  Central  Intelligence  Agency. 
4.  Physical  surveillance  of  Non-US  Persons 
a.  Physical  surveillance  of  non-US  persons  may 
be  conducted  fcr  any  lawful  function  assigned  the  Army 
intelligence  component. 
b.  Physical  surveillance  of  non-US  persons  within 
the  United  States  may  be  approved  by  the  ACSI,  DA; 
the  Commanding  General,  INSCOM,  or  their  written 
designees.  It  must  be  conducted  in  conformity  with  ju- 
risdictional limitations  imposed  by  "The  Agreement  Be- 
tween the  Deputy  Secretary  of  Defense  and  Attorney 
General,  April  5,  1979"  at  appendix  B. 
c.  Officials  identified  in  section  G.3.a.  may  ap- 
prove physical  surveillance  of  non-US  persons  abroad. 
This  authority  may  be  delegated  down  to  field  super- 
visors. All  delegations  must  be  in  writing. 
9-2
1  Juiy  1984 
AR  381-10 
PROCEDURE  10.     UNDISCLOSED  PARTICIPATION  IN  ORGANIZATIONS 
A.  APPLICABILITY 
This  procedure  applies  to  participation  by  employ- 
ees of  DoD  intelligence  components  in  any  organization 
within  the  United  States,  or  any  organization  outside 
the  United  States  that  constitutes  a  United  States  per- 
son, when  such  participation  is  on  behalf  of  any  entity 
of  the  intelligence  community.  These  procedures  do  not 
apply  to  participation  in  organizations  for  solely  per- 
sonal purposes. 
B.  EXPLANATION  OF  UNDEFINED  TERMS 
1.  Domestic  activities  refers  to  activities  that  take 
place  within  the  United  States  that  do  not  involve  a 
significant  connection  with  a  foreign  power,  organiza- 
tion or  person. 
2.  The  term  organization  includes  corporations  and 
other  commercial  organizations,  academic  institutions, 
clubs,  professional  societies,  associations,  and  any  other 
group  whose  existence  is  formalized  in  some  manner  or 
otherwise  functions  on  a  continuing  basis. 
3.  An  organization  within  the  United  States  means 
all  organizations  physically  located  within  the  geograph- 
ical boundaries  of  the  United  States  whether  or  not  they 
constitute  a  United  States  person.  Thus,  a  branch,  sub- 
sidiary, or  office  of  an  organization  within  the  United 
States,  which  is  physically  located  outside  the  United 
States,  is  not  considered  as  an  organization  within  the 
United  States. 
4.  Participation  refers  to  any  action  undertaken 
within  the  structure  or  framework  of  the  organization 
involved.  Such  actions  include  serving  as  a  represent- 
ative or  agent  of  the  organization;  acquiring  member- 
ship; attending  meetings  not  open  to  the  public,  in- 
cluding social  functions  for  the  organization  as  a  whole; 
carrying  out  the  work  or  functions  of  the  organization; 
and  contributing  funds  to  the  organization  other  than 
in  payment  for  goods  or  services.  Actions  taken  outside 
the  organizational  framework,  however,  do  not  consti- 
tute participation.  Thus,  attendance  at  meetings  or  so- 
cial gatherings  which  involve  organization  members  but 
are  not  functions  or  activities  of  the  organization  itself 
does  not  constitute  participation. 
5.  Participation  is  on  behalf  of  an  agency  within 
the  intelligence  community  when  an  employee  is  asked 
or  requested  to  take  action  within  an  organization  for 
the  benefit  of  such  agency.  Such  employee  may  already 
be  a  member  of  the  organization  or  may  be  asked  to 
join.  Actions  undertaken  for  the  benefit  of  an  intelli- 
gence agency  include  collecting  information,  identifying 
potential  sources  or  contacts,  or  establishing  and  main- 
taining cover.  If  a  cooperating  source  furnishes  infor- 
mation to  an  intelligence  agency  which  he  or  she  ob- 
tained by  participation  within  an  organization  but  was 
not  given  prior  direction  or  tasking  by  the  intelligence 
agency  to  collect  such  information,  then  such  partici- 
pation was  not  on  behalf  of  such  agency. 
6.  Participation  is  solely  for  personal  purposes,  if 
undertaken  at  the  initiative  and  expense  of  the  em- 
ployee for  the  employee's  benefit. 
C.    PROCEDURES  FOR  UNDISCLOSED 
PARTICIPATION 
Except  as  permitted  herein,  employees  of  DoD 
intelligence  components  may  participate  on  behalf  of 
such  components  in  organizations  within  the  United 
States,  or  in  organizations  outside  the  United  States 
that  constitute  United  States  persons,  only  if  their  af- 
filiation with  the  intelligence  component  concerned  is 
disclosed  to  an  appropriate  official  of  the  organization 
in  accordance  with  section  D.,  above. 
Participation  without  such  disclosure  is  permitted  only 
if  it  is  consistent  with  the  limitations  set  forth  in  sub- 
section C.I.,  below,  and  has  been  approved  in  accord- 
ance with  subsection  C.2.,  below. 
1 Limitations  on  undisclosed  participation 
a.  Lawful  Purpose.  No  undisclosed  participation 
shall  be  permitted  under  this  procedure  unless  it  is  es- 
sential to  achieving  a  lawful  foreign  intelligence  or  coun- 
terintelligence purpose  within  the  assigned  mission  of 
the  collecting  DoD  intelligence  component. 
b.  Limitations  on  use  of  undisclosed  participa- 
tion for  foreign  intelligence  purposes  within  the  United 
States.  Undisclosed  participation  may  not  be  authorized 
10-1
AR  381-10 
1  July  1984 
within  the  United  States  tor  the  purpose  of  collecting 
foreign  intelligence  from  or  about  a  United  States  per- 
son, nor  to  collect  information  necessary  to  assess  United 
States  persons  as  potential  sources  of  assistance  to  for- 
eign intelligence  activities.  This  does  not  preclude  the 
collection  of  information  about  such  persons,  volun- 
teered by  cooperating  sources  participating  in  organi- 
zations to  which  such  persons  belong,  however,  if  other- 
wise permitted  by  Procedure  2. 
c.  Duration  of  Participation.  Authorization  to 
participate  under  subsections  C.2. a.  and  b.  shall  be  lim- 
ited to  the  period  covered  by  such  participation  which 
shall  be  no  longer  than  12  months.  Participation  which 
lasts  longer  than  12  months  shall  be  reapproved  by  the 
appropriate  official  on  an  annual  basis  in  accordance 
with  this  procedure. 
d.  Participation  for  the  purpose  of  influencing 
the  activities  of  the  organization  or  its  members.  No 
participation  under  this  procedure  shall  be  authorized 
for  the  purpose  of  influencing  the  activities  of  the  or- 
ganization in  question,  or  its  members,  unless  such  par- 
ticipation is  undertaken  on  behalf  of  the  FBI  in  the 
course  of  a  lawful  investigation,  or  the  organization 
concerned  is  composed  primarily  of  individuals  who  are 
not  United  States  persons  and  is  reasonably  believed 
to  be  acting  on  behalf  of  a  foreign  power.  Any  DoD 
intelligence  component  that  desires  to  undertake  par- 
ticipation for  such  purpose  shall  forward  its  request  to 
the  Deputy  Under  Secretary  of  Defense  (Policy)  setting 
forth  the  relevant  facts  justifying  such  participation  and 
explaining  the  nature  of  its  contemplated  activity.  Such 
participation  may  be  approved  by  the  DUSD(P)  with 
the  concurrence  of  the  General  Counsel,  DoD.  Re- 
quests for  approval  of  such  participation  by  Army  in- 
telligence elements  will  be  submitted  through  command 
channels  to  HQDA(DAMl-CIC),  WASH  DC  20310. 
2.  Required  approvals 
a.  Undisclosed  participation  that  may  be  ap- 
proved within  the  DoD  intelligence  component.  Un- 
disclosed participation  on  behalf  of  a  DoD  intelligence 
component  may  be  authorized  within  such  component 
under  the  following  circumstances: 
(1)  Participation  in  meetings  open  to  the  pub- 
lic. For  purposes  of  this  section ,  a  seminar  or  conference 
sponsored  by  a  professional  organization  that  is  open 
to  persons  of  a  particular  profession  whether  or  not 
they  are  members  of  the  organization  itself  or  have 
received  a  special  invitation,  shall  be  considered  a  meet- 
ing open  to  the  public. 
(2)  Participation  in  organizations  that  permits 
other  persons  acknowledged  to  the  organization  to  be 
employees  of  the  United  States  Government  to  partic- 
ipate. 
(3)  Participation  in  educational  or  professional 
organizations  for  the  purpose  of  enhancing  the  profes- 
sional skills,  knowledge,  or  capabilities  of  employees. 
(4)  Participation  in  seminars,  forums,  confer- 
ences, exhibitions,  trade  fairs,  workshops,  symposiums, 
and  similar  types  of  meetings,  sponsored  by  organiza- 
tions in  which  the  employee  is  a  member,  has  been 
invited  to  participate,  or  when  the  sponsoring  organi- 
zation does  not  require  disclosure  of  the  participant's 
employment  affiliations,  for  the  purpose  of  collecting 
significant  foreign  intelligence  that  is  generally  made 
available  to  participants  at  such  meetings,  and  does  not 
involve  the  domestic  activities  of  the  organization  or  its 
members. 
(5)  Requests  to  engage  in  undisclosed  partici- 
pation pursuant  to  this  subsection  may  be  approved  by 
the  ACSI,  HQDA;  Commanding  General,  ENSCOM; 
Deputy  Chief  of  Staff,  Intelligence  (DCSI),  USAREUR; 
the  G-2,  EUSA;  or  their  written  designees.  All  requests 
will  receive  prior  legal  review  by  the  supporting  judge 
advocate.  Information  copies  of  approvals  will  be  for- 
warded to  HQDA(DAMI-CIC),  WASH  DC  20310. 
b.  Participation  that  may  be  approved  by  senior 
intelligence  officials.  Undisclosed  participation  may  be 
authorized  by  either  the  Deputy  Under  Secretary  of 
Defense  (Policy);  the  Director,  Defense  Intelligence 
Agency;  the  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff  for  Intelligence, 
Department  of  the  Army;  the  Commanding  General, 
U.S.  Army  Intelligence  and  Security  Command:  the 
Director  of  Naval  Intelligence;  the  Director  of  Intelli- 
gence, U.S.  Marine  Corps;  the  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff, 
Intelligence,  United  States  Air  Force;  the  Director,  Na- 
val Investigative  Service;  the  Commanding  Officer,  Air 
Force  Office  of  Special  Investigations;  or  their  single 
designees,  for  the  following  purposes: 
(1)  To  collect  significant  foreign  intelligence 
outside  the  United  States,  or  from  or  about  other  than 
United  States  persons  within  the  United  States,  pro- 
vided no  information  involving  the  domestic  activities 
of  the  organization  or  its  members  may  be  collected. 
(2)  For  counterintelligence  purposes,  at  the 
written  request  of  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation. 
(3)  To  collect  significant  counterintelligence 
about  other  than  United  States  persons,  or  about  United 
States  persons  who  are  within  the  investigative  juris- 
10-2
1  July  1934 
AR  381-10 
diction  of  the  Department  of  Defense,  provided  any 
such  participation  that  occurs  within  the  United  States 
shall  be  coordinated  with  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Inves- 
tigation. 
( 4)  To  collect  information  necessary  to  identify 
and  assess  other  than  United  States  persons  as  potential 
sources  of  assistance  for  foreign  intelligence  and  coun- 
terintelligence activities. 
(5)  To  collect  information  necessary  to  identify 
United  States  persons  as  potential  sources  of  assistance 
to  foreign  intelligence  and  counterintelligence  activi- 
ties. 
(6)  To  develop  or  maintain  cover  necessary 
for  the  security  of  foreign  intelligence  or  counterintel- 
ligence activities. 
(7)  Outside  the  United  States,  to  assess  United 
States  persons  as  potential  sources  of  assistance  to  for- 
eign intelligence  and  counterintelligence  activities. 
(8)  Requests  to  engage  in  undisclosed  partici- 
pation pursuant  to  this  section  must  be  approved  by  the 
ACSI,  HQDA,  or  the  Commanding  General,  INSCOM. 
All  requests  will  receive  prior  legal  review  by  the  Office 
of  The  Judge  Advocate  General,  HQDA,  or  the  Staff 
Judge  Advocate,  INSCOM,  respectively.  Information 
copies  of  all  approvals  by  the  Commanding  General, 
INSCOM,  will  be  provided  to  HQDA(DAMI-CIC), 
WASH  DC  20310. 
D.   DISCLOSURE  REQUIREMENT 
1.  Disclosure  of  the  intelligence  affiliation  of  an 
employee  of  a  DoD  intelligence  component  shall  be 
made  to  an  executive  officer  of  the  organization  in  ques- 
tion, or  to  an  official  in  charge  of  membership,  attend- 
ance or  the  records  of  the  organization  concerned.  Dis- 
closure under  this  subsection  is  not  required  if  undisclosed 
participation  is  permissible  and  authorized  by  this  pro- 
cedure. 
2.  Disclosure  may  be  made  by  the  DoD  intelligence 
component  involved,  an  authorized  DoD  official,  or  by 
another  component  of  the  Intelligence  Community  that 
is  otherwise  authorized  to  take  such  action  on  behalf 
of  the  DoD  intelligence  component  concerned. 
10-3
PROCEDURE  11.     CONTRACTING  FOR  GOODS  AND  SERVICES 
A.  APPLICABILITY 
This  procedure  applies  to  contracting  or  other  ar- 
rangements with  United  States  persons  for  the  pro- 
curement of  goods  and  services  by  DoD  intelligence 
components  within  the  United  States  and  with  con- 
tractors abroad  who  are  US  persons.  This  procedure 
does  not  apply  to  contracting  with  government  entities, 
or  to  the  enrollment  of  individual  students  in  academic 
institutions.  The  latter  situation  is  governed  by  Proce- 
dure 10. 
B.  PROCEDURES 
1.  Contracts  with  academic  institutions.  DoD  in- 
telligence components  may  enter  into  a  contract  for 
goods  or  services  with  an  academic  institution  only  if 
prior  to  the  making  of  the  contract,  the  intelligence 
component  has  disclosed  to  appropriate  officials  of  the 
academic  institution  the  fact  of  sponsorship  by  a  DoD 
intelligence  component. 
2.  Contracts  with  commercial  organizations,  pri- 
vate institutions  and  individuals.  Contracting  by  or  for 
a  DoD  intelligence  component  with  commercial  orga- 
nizations, private  institutions,  or  private  individuals  within 
the  United  States  may  be  done  without  reveali 
sponsorship  of  the  intelligence  component  if: 
a.  The  contract  is  for  published  material 
able  to  the  general  public  or  for  routine  goods  or 
ices  necessary  for  the  support  of  approved  activi 
such  as  credit  cards,  car  rentals,  travel,  lodging,  mt 
rental  of  office  space  or  apartments,  and  other  itt 
incident  to  approved  activities;  or 
b.  There  is  a  written  determination  by  the  St 
retary  or  the  Under  Secretary  of  a  Military  Departmen 
the  Director  Of  the  National  Security  Agency,  the  D 
rector  of  the  Defense  Intelligence  Agency,  or  the  Dep 
uty  Under  Secretary  of  Defense  (Policy)  that  the  spon 
sorship  of  a  DoD  intelligence  component  must  be 
concealed  to  protect  the  activities  of  the  DoD  Intelli- 
gence component  concerned.  Requests  by  Army  intel- 
ligence elements  for  authority  to  conceal  such  sponsor- 
ship will  be  submitted  through  command  channels  to 
HQDA(DAMI-CIC),  WASH  DC  20310. 
C.    EFFECTS  OF  NON-COMPLIANCE 
No  contract  shall  be  void  or  voidable  for  failure  to 
comply  with  this  procedure. 
11-1
t  July  1984 
AR  381-i0 
PROCEDURE  12.     PROVISION  OF  ASSISTANCE  TO  LAW  ENFORCEMENT  AUTHORITIES 
A.  APPLICABILITY 
This  procedure  applies  to  the  provision  of  assist- 
ance by  DoD  intelligence  components  to  law  enforce- 
ment authorities.  It  incorporates  the  specific  limitations 
on  such  assistance  contained  in  E.O.  12333,  (reference 
(a)),  together  with  the  general  limitations  and  approval 
requirements  of  DoD  Directive  5525.5,  (reference  (i)). 
(See  AR  500-51.) 
B.  PROCEDURES 
1.  Cooperation  with  law  enforcement  authorities. 
Consistent  with  the  limitations  contained  in  DoD  Di- 
rective 5525.5,  (reference  (i)),  and  subsection  B.2.,  be- 
low, DoD  intelligence  components  are  authorized  to 
cooperate  with  law  enforcement  authorities  for  the  pur- 
pose of: 
a.  Investigating  or  preventing  clandestine  intel- 
ligence activities  by  foreign  powers,  international  nar- 
cotics activities,  or  international  terrorist  activities; 
b.  Protecting  DoD  employees,  information, 
property  and  facilities;  and 
c.  Preventing,  detecting  or  investigating  other 
violations  of  law. 
2.  Types  of  permissible  assistance.  DoD  intelli- 
gence components  may  provide  the  following  types  of 
assistance  to  law  enforcement  authorities: 
a.  Incidentally-acquired  information  reasonably 
believed  to  indicate  a  violation  of  federal  law  shall  be 
provided  in  accordance  with  the  procedures  adopted 
pursuant  to  section  1.7  (a)  of  E.O.  12333  (reference 
(a)).  Policy  governing  reporting  and  use  of  information 
concerning  Federal  crimes  is  found  at  procedure  15, 
section  C.4. 
b.  Incidentally-acquired  information  reasonably 
believed  to  indicate  a  violation  of  state,  local  or  foreign 
law  may  be  provided  in  accordance  with  procedures 
adopted  by  the  heads  of  DoD  components; 
c.  Specialized  equipment  and  facilities  may  be 
provided  to  federal  law  enforcement  authorities,  and. 
where  lives  are  endangered,  to  state  and  local  law  en- 
forcement authorities;  provided  such  assistance  is  con- 
sistent with,  and  has  been  approved  by  an  official  au- 
thorized pursuant  to,  enclosure  3  of  DoD  Directive 
5525.5,  (reference  (i));  and 
d.  Personnel  who  are  employees  of  DoD  intel- 
ligence components  may  be  assigned  to  assist  federal 
law  enforcement  authorities,  and  when  lives  are  en- 
dangered, state  and  local  law  enforcement  authorities; 
provided  such  use  is  consistent  with,  and  has  been  ap- 
proved by  an  official  authorized  pursuant  to,  enclosure 
4  of  DoD  Directive  5525.5,  (reference  (i)).  Such  official 
shall  ensure  that  the  General  Counsel  of  the  providing 
DoD  component  concurs  in  such  use. 
e.  Assistance  may  be  rendered  to  law  enforce- 
ment agencies  and  security  services  of  foreign  govern- 
ments or  international  organizations  in  accordance  with 
established  policy  and  applicable  Status  of  Forces 
Agreements;  provided,  that  DoD  intelligence  compo- 
nents may  not  request  or  participate  in  activities  of  such 
agencies  undertaken  against  United  States  persons  that 
would  not  be  permitted  such  components  under  these 
procedures. 
12-1
1  July  1984 
AR  381-10 
PROCEDURE  13.     EXPERIMENTATION  ON  HUMAN  SUBJECTS  FOR  INTELLIGENCE  PURPOSES 
A.   APPLICABILITY 
This  procedure  applies  to  experimentation  on  hu- 
man subjects  if  such  experimentation  is  conducted  by 
or  on  behalf  of  a  DoD  intelligence  component.  This 
procedure  does  not  apply  to  experimentation  on  animai 
subjects. 
B.    EXPLANATION  OF  UNDEFINED  TERMS 
L  Experimentation  in  this  context  means  any  re- 
search or  testing  activity  involving  human  subjects  that 
may  expose  such  subjects  to  the  possibility  of  perma- 
nent or  temporary  injury  (including  physical  or  psy- 
chological damage  and  damage  to  the  reputation  of  such 
persons)  beyond  the  risks  of  injury  to  which  such  sub- 
jects are  ordinarily  exposed  in  their  daily  lives. 
2.  Experimentation  is  conducted  on  behalf  of  a 
DoD  intelligence  component  if  it  is  conducted  under 
contract  to  that  component  or  to  another  DoD  com- 
ponent for  the  benefit  of  the  intelligence  component  or 
at  the  request  of  such  a  component  regardless  of  the 
existence  of  a  contractual  relationship. 
3.  Human  subjects  in  this  context  includes  any  per- 
son whether  or  not  such  person  is  a  United  States  per- 
son. 
C.    PROCEDURES 
1.  Experimentation  on  human  subjects  conducted 
by  or  on  behalf  of  a  DoD  intelligence  component  may 
be  undertaken  only  with  the  informed  consent  of  the 
subject,  and  in  accordance  with  guidelines  issued  by  the 
Department  of  Health  and  Human  Services,  setting  out 
conditions  that  safeguard  the  welfare  of  such  subjects. 
2.  DoD  intelligence  components  may  not  engage 
in  or  contract  for  experimentation  on  human  subjects 
without  approval  of  the  Secretary  or  Deputy  Secretary 
of  Defense,  or  the  Secretary  or  Under  Secretary  of  a 
Military  Department,  as  appropriate.  Requests  for  such 
approval  submitted  by  Army  intelligence  components 
will  be  addressed  through  command  channels  to 
HQDA(DAMI-CIC),  WASH  DC  20310. 
13-1
1  July  1984 
AR  381-10 
PROCEDURE  14.     EMPLOYEE  CONDUCT 
A.  APPLICABILITY 
This  procedure  sets  forth  the  responsibilities  of  em- 
ployees of  DoD  intelligence  components  to  conduct 
themselves  in  accordance  with  this  Regulation  and  other 
applicable  policy.  It  also  provides  that  DoD  intelligence 
components  shall  ensure,  as  appropriate,  that  these  pol- 
icies and  guidelines  are  made  known  to  their  employees. 
B.  PROCEDURES 
1.  Employee  responsibilities.  Employees  shall 
conduct  intelligence  activities  only  pursuant  to,  and  in 
accordance  with.  Executive  Order  12333  (reference  (a)) 
and  this  Regulation.  In  conducting  such  activities,  em- 
ployees shall  not  exceed  the  authorities  granted  the 
employing  DoD  intelligence  components  by  law;  Ex- 
ecutive Order,  including  EO  12333  (reference  (a)),  and 
applicable  DoD  directives. 
2.  Familiarity  with  restrictions 
a.  Each  DoD  intelligence  component  shall  fa- 
miliarize its  personnel  with  the  provisions  of  Executive 
Order  12333,  (reference  (a)),  this  Regulation,  and  any 
instructions  implementing  this  Regulation  which  apply 
to  the  operations  and  activities  of  such  component.  At 
a  minimum,  such  familiarization  shall  contain: 
4; 
(1)  Applicable  portions  p;f  Procedures  1  through 
(2)  A  summary  of  other  procedures  that  per- 
tain to  collection  techniques  which  are,  or  may  be,  em- 
ployed by  the  DoD  intelligence  component  concerned; 
and 
(3)  A  statement  of  individual  employee  re- 
porting responsibility  under  Procedure  15. 
b.  The  Assistant  to  the  Secretary  of  Defense 
(Intelligence  Oversight)  (ATSD  (IO)),  and  each  In- 
spector General  responsible  for  a  DoD  intelligence 
component  shall  ensure,  as  part  of  their  inspections, 
that  procedures  are  in  effect  which  achieve  the  objec- 
tives set  forth  in  paragraph  B.2.a.,  above. 
3.  Responsibilities  of  the  heads  of  DoD  compo- 
nents. The  heads  of  DoD  Components  that  constitute. 
or  contain,  DoD  intelligence  components  (The  Secre- 
tary of  the  Army)  shall: 
a.  Ensure  that  all  proposals  for  intelligence  ac- 
tivities which  may  be  unlawful,  in  whole  or  in  part,  or 
may  be  contrary  to  applicable  Executive  Branch  or  DoD 
policy  are  referred  to  the  General  Counsel  responsible 
for  such  component. 
b.  Ensure  that  no  adverse  action  is  taken  against 
any  employee  because  the  employee  reports  activities 
pursuant  to  Procedure  15. 
c.  Impose  such  sanctions  as  may  be  appropriate 
upon  any  employee  who  violates  the  provisions  of  this 
Regulation  or  any  instruction  promulgated  thereunder. 
d.  In  any  case  involving  serious  or  continuing 
breaches  of  security  by  either  DoD  or  non-DoD  em- 
ployees, recommend  to  the  Secretary  of  Defense  ap- 
propriate investigative  actions. 
e.  Ensure  that  the  General  Counsel  and  In- 
spector General  with  responsibility  for  the  component 
(The  Army  General  Counsel  and  the  DA  Inspector  Gen- 
eral), as  well  as  the  General  Counsel,  DoD,  and  the 
ATSD  (IO),  (and  the  intelligence  oversight  officer,  of- 
fice of  the  ACSI,  HQDA)  have  access  to  all  information 
concerning  the  intelligence  activities  of  that  component 
necessary  to  perform  their  oversight  responsibilities. 
f.  Ensure  that  employees  cooperate  fully  with 
the  Intelligence  Oversight  Board  and  its  representa- 
tives. 
14-1
1  July  1934 
AR  381-10 
PROCEDURE  15. 
IDENTIFYING,  INVESTIGATING,  AND  REPORTING 
QUESTIONABLE  ACTIVITIES 
A.   APPLICABILITY 
This  procedure  provides  for  the  identification,  in- 
vestigation, and  reporting  of  questionable  intelligence 
activities. 
B.    EXPLANATION  OF  UNDEFINED  TERMS 
1.  The  term  "questionable  activity,"  as  used  herein, 
refers  to  any  conduct  that  constitutes,  or  is  related  to, 
an  intelligence  activity  that  may  violate  the  law,  any- 
Executive  Order  or  Presidential  directive,  including  E.O. 
12533,  reference  (a)),  or  applicable  DoD  policy,  in- 
cluding this  Regulation. 
2.  The  terms  "General  Counsel"  and  "Inspector 
General,"  as  used  herein,  refer,  unless  otherwise  spec- 
ified, to  any  General  Counsel  or  Inspector  General  with 
responsibility  for  one  or  more  DoD  intelligence  com- 
p.-nents.  Unless  otherwise  indicated,  the  term  "In- 
spector General"  shall  also  include  the  ATSD  (IO). 
For  the  purposes  of  this  procedure  the  terms  refer  to 
the  Army  General  Counsel  and  the  DA  Inspector  Gen- 
eral. 
C.    PROCEDURES 
1.  Identification 
a.  Each  employee  shall  report  any  questionable 
activity  to  the  General  Counsel  or  Inspector  General 
for  the  DoD  intelligence  component  concerned,  or  to 
the  DoD  General  Counsel  or  the  ATSD  (IO). 
(1)  Questionable  activities  will  be  reported  by 
electrical  message  through  command  channels  to 
HQDA(DAMI-CIC),  WASH  DC  20310,  as  soon  as  pos- 
sible (but  in  any  event  not  later  than  five  days  of  dis- 
covery). Reports  will  include  the  following: 
(a)  Description  of  the  nature  of  the  ques- 
tionable activity. 
(b)  Date,  time,  and  location  of  occurrence. 
(c)  Individual  or  unit  responsible  for  the 
questionable  activity. 
(d)  Summary  of  the  incident  to  include  ref- 
erences to  particular  portions  of  this  regulation. 
(e)  Status  of  the  investigation  of  the  incident, 
(2)  Employees  are  encouraged  to  submit  such 
reports  through  command  channels;  however,  if  the  em- 
ployee desires,  reports  of  questionable  activity  may  be 
sent  directly  to  the  following:  The  ACSI,  HQDA;  the 
Office  of  The  Inspector  General,  HQDA;  or  the  Office 
of  the  Army  General  Counsel,  WASH  DC  20310. 
b.  Inspectors  General,  as  part  of  their  inspection 
of  DoD  intelligence  components,  and  General  Coun- 
sels, as  part  of  their  oversight  responsibilities  shall  seek 
to  determine  if  such  components  are  involved  in  any 
questionable  activities.  If  such  activities  have  been  or 
are  being  undertaken,  the  matter  shall  be  investigated 
under  subsection  C.2.  below.  If  such  activities  have 
been  undertaken  but  were  not  reported,  the  Inspector 
General  shall  also  ascertain  the  reason  for  such  failure 
and  recommend  appropriate  corrective  action. 
c.  Inspectors  General,  as  part  of  their  oversight 
responsibilities,  shall,  as  appropriate,  ascertain  whether 
any  organization,  staffs,  or  offices  within  their  respec- 
tive jurisdictions  but  not  otherwise  specifically  identi- 
fied as  DoD  intelligence  components,  are  being  used 
for  foreign  intelligence  or  counterintelligence  purposes 
to  which  Part  2  of  E.O.  12333,  (reference  (a)),  applies, 
and,  if  so,  shall  ensure  the  activities  of  such  components 
are  in  compliance  with  this  Regulation  and  applicable 
DoD  policy. 
d .  Inspectors  General ,  as  part  of  their  inspection 
of  DoD  intelligence  components,  shall  ensure  that  pro- 
cedures exist  within  such  components  for  the  reporting 
of  questionable  activities,  and  that  employees  of  such 
components  are  aware  of  their  responsibilities  to  report 
such  activities. 
2.  Investigation 
a.  Each  report  of  a  questionable  activity  shall 
be  investigated  to  the  extent  necessary  to  determine  the 
facts  and  assess  whether  the  activity  is  legal  and  is  con- 
sistent with  applicable  policy.
AR  381-10 
1  July  1984 
( 1 )  Initial  investigation  will  be  conducted  in  an 
expeditious  manner  by  the  command  which  reported  the 
questionable  activity. 
(2)  Within  30  days  of  the  initial  report,  the 
command  will  forward  a  Final  report  through  command 
channels  to  HQDA(DAMI-CIC),  WASH  DC  20310  for 
submission  to  the  DA  Inspector  General  and  the  Army 
General  Counsel.  The  report  will  be  reviewed  by  the 
supporting  judge  advocate;  it  will  include  the  following: 
(a)  Results  of  the  investigation. 
(b)  Disciplinary  or  corrective  action  taken 
or  contemplated. 
(3)  If  the  investigation  cannot  be  completed 
within  30  days  from  the  date  of  the  initial  report,  a  status 
report  will  be  submitted;  the  report  will  provide  the 
reasons  for  the  delay  and  an  estimated  date  of  comple- 
tion. Status  reports  will  be  forwarded  every  30  days  until 
the  investigation  is  completed.  Except  in  extraordinary 
circumstances,  investigations  will  be  completed  and  a 
final  report  sent  within  60  days  from  the  date  of  the 
original  report. 
(4)  Pursuant  to  AR  335-15,  paragraph  7-2r, 
the  above  reports  are  exempt  from  the  requirement  for 
a  Requirements  Control  Symbol. 
b.  When  appropriate,  questionable  activities  re- 
ported to  a  General  Counsel  shall  be  referred  to  the 
corresponding  Inspector  General  for  investigation,  and 
if  reported  to  an  Inspector  General,  shall  be  referred 
to  the  corresponding  General  Counsel  to  determine 
whether  the  activity  is  legal  and  consistent  with  appli- 
cable policy.  Reports  made  to  the  DoD  General  Coun- 
sel or  the  ATSD  (IO)  may  be  referred,  after  consul- 
tation between  these  officials,  to  the  appropriate 
Inspector  General  and  General  Counsel  for  investiga- 
tion and  evaluation. 
c.  Investigations  shall  be  conducted  expedi- 
tiously. The  officials  responsible  for  these  investigations 
may,  in  accordance  with  established  procedures,  obtain 
assistance  from  within  the  component  concerned,  or 
from  other  DoD  components,  when  necessary,  to  com- 
plete such  investigations  in  a  timely  manner. 
d.  To  complete  such  investigations,  General 
Counsels  and  Inspectors  General  shall  have  access  to 
all  relevant  information  regardless  of  classification  or 
compartmentation . 
3.  Reports 
a.  Each  Counsel  and  Inspector  General  shall  re- 
port immediately  to  General  Counsel,  DoD,  and  the 
ATSD  (IO)  questionable  activities  of  a  serious  nature. 
b.  Each  General  Counsel  and  Inspector  General 
shall  submit  to  the  ATSD  (IO)  a  quarterly  report  de- 
scribing those  activities  that  come  to  their  attention 
during  the  quarter  reasonably  believed  to  be  illegal  or 
contrary  to  Executive  Order  or  Presidential  directive, 
or  applicable  DoD  policy;  and  actions  taken  with  re- 
spect to  such  activities.  The  reports  shall  also  include 
significant  oversight  activities  undertaken  during  the 
quarter  and  any  suggestions  for  improvements  in  the 
oversight  system.  Separate,  joint,  or  consolidated  re- 
ports may  be  submitted.  These  reports  should  be  pre- 
pared in  accordance  with  DoD  Directive  5000.11,  (ref- 
erence (j)). 
(1)  The  DA  Inspector  General  will  prepare  the 
Quarterly  Oversight  Activities  Report  for  the  signature 
of  The  Inspector  General  and  the  Army  General  Coun- 
sel. The  report  will  be  forwarded  not  later  than  30  days 
following  the  end  of  each  quarter. 
(2)  To  assist  in  preparing  this  report,  the  ACSI, 
HQDA;  Commanding  General,  INSCOM;  CINC- 
USAREUR;  Commanding  General,  US  Army  Forces 
Command  (FORSCOM);  and  the  Commanding  Gen- 
eral, EUSA,  will  provide  contributions  not  later  than  15 
days  following  the  end  of  the  quarter.  These  reports  will 
be  forwarded  through  HQDA(DAMI-CIC),  WASH  DC 
20310. 
lowing: 
(3)  The  quarterly  reports  will  include  the  fol- 
(a)  Description  of  significant  oversight  ac- 
tivities undertaken  during  the  quarter. 
(b)  Identification  of  unlawful  or  improper 
activities  discovered  or  reported. 
(c)  Suggestions  for  improvements  of  the 
oversight  system. 
(4)  Pursuant  to  AR  335-15,  paragraph  7-2r, 
these  quarterly  reports  are  exempt  from  the  requirement 
for  a  Requirements  Control  Symbol. 
c.  All  reports  made  pursuant  to  subsections  3. a. 
and  b.  above,  which  involve  a  possible  violation  of  fed- 
eral criminal  law  shall  be  considered  by  the  General 
Counsel  concerned  in  accordance  with  the  procedures 
adopted  pursuant  to  section  1.7(a)  of  E.O.  12333  (ref- 
erence (a)). 
d.  The  General  Counsel,  DoD,  and  the  ATSD 
(IO)  may  review  the  findings  of  other  General  Counsels 
and  Inspector  Generals  with  respect  to  questionable 
activities. 
e.  The  ATSD  (IO)  and  the  General  Counsel, 
DoD,  shall  report  in  a  timely  manner  to  the  White 
15-2
1  July  1984 
AR  381-10 
Appendix  A 
Definitions 
1.  Administrative  purposes.  Information  is  col- 
lected for  "administrative  purposes"  when  it  is  neces- 
sary for  the  administration  of  the  component  concerned 
but  is  not  collected  directly  in  performance  of  the  in- 
telligence activities  assigned  such  component.  Exam- 
ples include  information  relating  to  the  past  perform- 
ance of  potential  contractors;  information  to  enable  such 
components  to  discharge  their  public  affairs  and  legis- 
lative duties,  including  the  maintenance  of  correspond- 
ence files;  the  maintenance  of  employee  personnel  and 
training  records;  and  training  materials  or  documents 
produced  at  training  facilities. 
2.  Available  publicly.  Information  that  has  been 
published  or  broadcast  for  general  public  consumption, 
is  available  on  request  to  a  member  of  the  general  pub- 
lic, could  lawfully  be  seen  or  heard  by  any  casual  ob- 
server, or  is  made  available  at  a  meeting  open  to  the 
general  public.  In  this  context,  the  "general  public"  also 
means  general  availability  to  persons  in  a  military  com- 
munity even  though  the  military  community  is  not  open 
to  the  civilian  genera!  public. 
3.  Communications  security.  Protective  measures 
taken  to  deny  unauthorized  persons  information  de- 
rived from  telecommunications  of  the  United  States 
Government  related  to  national  security  and  to  ensure 
the  authenticity  of  such  telecommunications. 
4.  Consent.  The  agreement  by  a  person  or  orga- 
nization to  permit  DoD  intelligence  components  to  take 
particular  actions  that  affect  the  person  or  organization. 
Consent  may  be  oral  or  written  unless  a  specific  form 
of  consent  is  required  by  a  particular  procedure.  Con- 
sent may  be  implied  if  adequate  notice  is  provided  that 
a  particular  action  (such  as  entering  a  building)  carries 
with  it  the  presumption  of  consent  to  an  accompanying 
action  (such  as  search  of  briefcases).  (Questions  re- 
garding what  is  adequate  notice  in  particular  circum- 
stances should  be  referred  to  the  legal  office  responsible 
for  advising  the  DoD  intelligence  component  con- 
cerned.) 
5.  Counterintelligence .  Information  gathered  and 
activities  conducted  to  protect  against  espionage,  other 
intelligence  activities,  sabotage,  or  assassinations  con- 
ducted for  or  on  behalf  of  foreign  powers,  organiza- 
tions, persons,  or  international  terrorist  activities,  but 
not  including  personnel,  physical,  document,  or  com- 
munications security  programs. 
6.  Counterintelligence  investigation.  Includes  in- 
quiries and  other  activities  undertaken  to  determine 
whether  a  particular  United  States  person  is  acting  for. 
or  on  behalf  of,  a  foreign  power  for  purposes  of  con- 
ducting espionage  and  other  intelligence  activities,  sab- 
otage, assassinations,  international  terrorist  activities, 
and  actions  to  neutralize  such  acts. 
7.  DoD  Component  Includes  the  Office  of  the 
Secretary  of  Defense,  each  of  the  Military  Depart- 
ments, the  Organization  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff. 
the  Unified  and  Specified  Commands,  and  the  Defense 
Agencies.  For  the  purposes  of  this  regulation,  the  head 
of  the  DoD  Component  is  the  Secretary  or  Under  Sec- 
retary of  the  Army. 
8.  DoD  intelligence  components.  Include  the  fol- 
lowing organizations: 
a.  The  National  Security  Agency/Central  Secu- 
rity Service." 
b.  The  Defense  Intelligence  Agency. 
c.  The  offices  within  the  Department  of  Defense 
for  the  collection  of  specialized  national  foreign  intel- 
ligence through  reconnaissance  programs. 
d.  The  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff  for  Intelligence. 
Army  General  Staff. 
e.  The  Office  of  Naval  Intelligence. 
f.  The  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff.  Intelligence,  United 
States  Air  Force. 
mand. 
g.  The  Army  Intelligence  and  Security  Tam- 
il. The  Naval  Intelligence  Command. 
i.  The  Naval  Security  Group  Command. 
A-1
AR  381-10 
1  July  1984 
j.  The  Director  of  Intelligence,  U.S.  Marine 
Corps. 
k.  The  Air  Force  Intelligence  Service. 
1.  The  Electronic  Security  Command,  United 
States  Air  Force. 
m.  The  counterintelligence  elements  of  the  Na- 
val Investigative  Service. 
n.  The  counterintelligence  elements  of  the  Air 
Force  Office  of  Special  Investigations. 
o.  The  650th  Military  Intelligence  Group,  SHAPE. 
p.  Other  organizations,  staffs,  and  offices,  when 
used  for  foreign  intelligence  or  counterintelligence  ac- 
tivities to  which  part  2  of  E.O.  12333  (reference  (a)), 
applies;  provided  that  the  heads  of  such  organizations, 
staffs,  and  offices  shall  not  be  considered  as  heads  of 
DoD  intelligence  components  for  purposes  of  this  Reg- 
ulation. Included  in  this  subcategory  are  the  following: 
intelligence  units  that  support  unified  or  specified  com- 
mands; intelligence  staff  offices  supporting  military  com- 
manders at  all  echelons  including  their  subordinate  in- 
telligence units  and  offices;  and  other  DA  components 
performing  intelligence  activities  as  that  term  is  defined 
at  paragraph  13. 
9.  Electronic  surveillance.  Acquisition  of  a  non- 
public communication  by  electronic  means  without  the 
consent  of  a  person  who  is  a  party  to  an  electronic 
communication  or,  in  the  case  of  a  nonelectronic  com- 
munication, without  the  consent  of  a  person  who  is 
visibly  present  at  the  place  of  communication,  but  not 
including  the  use  of  radio  direction  finding  equipment 
solely  to  determine  the  location  of  a  transmitter.  (Elec- 
tronic surveillance  within  the  United  States  is  subject 
to  the  definitions  in  the  Foreign  Intelligence  Surveil- 
lance Act  of  1978,  (reference  (b)).)  Pen  register  oper- 
ations are  included  within  the  term  electronic  surveil- 
lance. 
10.  Employee.  A  person  employed  by,  assigned 
to,  or  acting  for  an  agency  within  the  intelligence  com- 
munity, including  contractors  and  persons  otherwise 
acting  at  the  direction  of  such  an  agency. 
11.  Foreign  intelligence.  Information  relating  to 
the  capabilities,  intentions,  and  activities  of  foreign 
powers,  organizations,  or  persons,  but  not  including 
counterintelligence  except  for  information  on  interna- 
tional terrorist  activities. 
12.  Foreign  power.  Any  foreign  government  (re- 
gardless of  whether  recognized  by  the  United  States), 
foreign-based  political  party  (or  faction  thereof),  for- 
eign military  force,  foreign-based  terrorist  group,  or  any 
organization  composed,  in  major  part,  of  any  such  en- 
tity or  entities. 
13.  Intelligence  Activities.  Refers  to  all  activities 
that  DoD  intelligence  components  are  authorized  to 
undertake  pursuant  to  Executive  Order  12333  (refer- 
ence (a)). 
14.  Intelligence  Community  and  an  agency  of  or 
within  the  Intelligence  Community.  Refers  to  the  fol- 
lowing organizations: 
a.  The  Central  Intelligence  Agency  (CIA). 
b.  The  National  Security  Agency  (NSA). 
c.  The  Defense  Intelligence  Agency  (DIA). 
d.  The  offices  within  the  Department  of  Defense 
for  the  collection  of  specialized  national  foreign  intel- 
ligence through  reconnaissance  programs. 
e.  The  Bureau  of  Intelligence  and  Research  of 
the  Department  of  State. 
f.  The  intelligence  elements  of  the  Army,  Navy, 
Air  Force  and  Marine  Corps,  the  Federal  Bureau  of 
Investigation  (FBI),  the  Department  of  the  Treasury, 
and  the  Department  of  Energy. 
g.  The  staff  elements  of  the  Office  of  the  Director 
of  Central  Intelligence. 
15.  International  Narcotics  Activities.  Refers  to 
activities  outside  the  United  States  to  produce,  transfer 
or  sell  narcotics  or  other  substances  controlled  in  ac- 
cordance with  title  21,  United  States  Code,  Sections 
811  and  812. 
16.  International  Terrorist  Activities.  Activities 
undertaken  by  or  in  support  of  terrorists  or  terrorist 
organizations  that  occur  totally  outside  the  United  States. 
or  that  transcend  national  boundaries  in  terms  of  the 
means  by  which  they  are  accomplished,  the  persons  they 
appear  intended  to  coerce  or  intimidate,  or  the  locale 
in  which  the  perpetrators  operate  or  seek  asylum. 
17.  Lawful  investigation.  An  investigation  quali- 
fies as  a  lawful  investigation  if  the  subject  of  the  in- 
vestigation is  within  DoD  investigative  jurisdiction:  if 
it  is  conducted  by  a  DoD  component  that  has  author- 
ization to  conduct  the  particular  type  of  investigation 
A-2
1  Ji:v1984 
AR  381-10 
concerned  (for  example  counterintelligence,  personnel 
security,  physical  seci';.:y,  communications  security); 
and  if  the  investigatior  is  conducted  in  accordance  with 
applicable  law  and  p.:  :v,  including  E.O.  12333  and 
thi:.  Regulation. 
18.  Law  Enforcement  Activities.  Activities  under* 
taken  for  the  purpose  of  detecting  violations  of  law  or 
to  locate  and  apprehend  persons  who  violate  the  law. 
This  includes  activities  to  enforce  the  Uniform  Code  of 
Military  Justice. 
19.  Personnel  Security.  Measures  designed  to  in- 
sure that  persons  employed,  or  being  considered  for 
employment,  in  sensitive  positions  of  trust  are  suitable 
for  such  employment  with  respect  to  loyalty,  character, 
emotional  stability,  and  reliability  and  that  such  em- 
ployment is  clearly  consistent  with  the  interests  of  the 
national  security.  It  includes  measures  designed  to  en- 
sure that  persons  granted  access  to  classified  informa- 
tion remain  suitable  for  such  access  and  that  access  is 
consistent  with  the  interests  of  national  security. 
20.  Personnel  security  investigation: 
a.  An  inquiry  into  the  activities  of  a  person  granted 
access  to  intelligence  or  other  classified  information;  or 
a  person  who  is  being  considered  for  access  to  intelli- 
gence or  other  classified  information,  including  persons 
who  are  granted  or  may  be  granted  access  to  facilities 
of  DoD  intelligence  components;  or  a  person  to  be 
assigned  or  retained  in  a  position  with  sensitive  duties. 
The  investigation  is  designed  to  develop  information 
pertaining  to  the  suitability,  eligibility,  and  trustwor- 
thiness of  the  individual  with  respect  to  loyalty,  char- 
acter, emotional  stability  and  reliability. 
b.  Inquiries  and  other  activities  directed  against 
DoD  employees  or  members  of  a  military  service  to 
determine  the  facts  of  possible  voluntary  or  involuntary 
compromise  of  classified  information  by  them. 
c.  The  collection  of  information  about  or  from 
military  personnel  in  the  course  of  tactical  training  ex- 
ercises for  security  training  purposes. 
21 .  Physical  security.  The  physical  measures  taken 
to  prevent  unauthorized  access  to,  and  prevent  the  dam- 
age or  loss  of,  equipment,  facilities,  materiel  and  doc- 
uments; and  measures  undertaken  to  protect  DoD  per- 
sonnel from  physical  threats  to  their  safety. 
22.  Physical  security  investigation.  All  inquiries, 
inspections,  or  surveys  of  the  effectiveness  of  controls 
and  procedures  designed  to  provide  physical  security; 
and  all  inquiries  and  other  actions  undertaken  to  obtain 
information  pertaining  to  physical  threats  to  DoD  per- 
sonnel or  property. 
23.  Reasonable  belief.  A  reasonable  belief  arises 
when  the  facts  and  circumstances  are  such  that  a  rea- 
sonable person  would  hold  the  belief.  Reasonable  belief 
must  rest  on  facts  and  circumstances  that  can  be  artic- 
ulated; "hunches"  or  intuitions  are  not  sufficient.  Rea- 
sonable belief  can  be  based  on  experience,  training,  and 
knowledge  in  foreign  intelligence  or  counterintelligence 
work  applied  to  facts  and  circumstances  at  hand,  so  that 
a  trained  and  experienced  "reasonable  person"  might 
hold  a  reasonable  belief  sufficient  to  satisfy  this  criterion 
when  someone  unfamiliar  with  foreign  intelligence  or 
counterintelligence  work  might  not. 
24.  Signals  intelligence.  A  category  of  intelligence 
including  communications  intelligence,  electronic  in- 
telligence, and  foreign  instrumentation  signals  intelli- 
gence, either  individually  or  in  combination. 
25.  Special  Activities.  Activities  conducted  in  sup- 
port of  national  foreign  policy  objectives  abroad  which 
are  planned  and  executed  so  that  the  role  of  the  US 
Government  is  not  apparent  or  acknowledged  publicly, 
and  functions  in  support  of  such  activities,  but  which 
are  not  intended  to  influence  US  political  processes,  pub- 
lic opinion,  or  media,  and  do  not  include  diplomatic 
activities  or  the  collection  and  production  of  intelligence 
or  related-support  functions. 
26.  United  States.  When  used  to  describe  a  place, 
the  term  shall  include  the  territories  under  the  sover- 
eignty of  the  United  States. 
27.  United  States  person. 
a.  The  term  "United  States  person"  means: 
(1)  A  United  States  citizen; 
(2)  An  alien  known  by  the  DoD  intelligence 
component  concerned  to  be  a  permanent  resident  alien: 
(3)  An  unincorporated  association  substan- 
tially composed  of  United  States  citizens  or  permanent 
resident  aliens; 
(4)  A  corporation  incorporated  in  the  United 
States,  except  for  a  corporation  directed  and  controlled 
by  a  foreign  government  or  governments.  A  corpora- 
tion or  corporate  subsidiary  incorporated  abroad,  even 
if  partially  or  wholly  owned  by  a  corporation  incorpo- 
rated in  the  United  States,  is  not  a  United  States  person. 
A-3
AR  381-10  1  July  1984 
b.  A  person  or  organization  outside  the  United  information  to  the  contrary  is  obtained. 
States  shall  be  presumed  not  to  be  a  United  States 
person  unless  specific  information  to  the  contrary  is  c.  A  permanent  resident  alien  is  a  foreign  na- 
obtained.  An  alien  in  the  United  States  shall  be  pre-  tional  lawfully  admitted  into  the  United  States  for  per- 
sumed  not  to  be  a  United  States  person  unless  specific  manent  residence. 
A-4
1  July  1984 
AR  381-10 
Appendix  B 
Extract  from  "The  Agreement  Between  the  Deputy  Secretary  of  Defense  and  Attorney 
General,  April  5, 1979" 
Section  6:  DELINEATION  OF  RESPONSIBILITY  FOR 
CI  INVESTIGATIONS 
Responsibility  for  CI  investigations  shall  be  apportioned 
between  the  FBI  and  the  military  CI  services  of  the  DOD 
as  follows: 
a.  All  investigations  of  violations  of  the  Atomic  Energy 
Act  of  1946,  which  might  constitute  a  CI  investigation 
as  defined  herein,  shall  be  the  responsibility  of  the  FBI, 
regardless  of  the  status  or  location  of  the  subjects  of  such 
investigations. 
b.  Except  as  provided  by  paragraph  c(2)  herein,  all 
CI  investigations  of  foreign  nationals  undertaken  within 
the  United  States  shall  be  the  responsibility  of  the  FBI. 
c.  CI  investigations  within  the  United  States  shall  be 
conducted  in  accordance  with  the  following  jurisdic- 
tional guidelines: 
(1)  Except  as  provided  herein,  investigations  of  all 
civilians,  including  DOD  civilian  personnel,  shall  be  the 
responsibility  of  the  FBI; 
(2)  Investigations  of  US  military  personnel  on  active 
duty  shall  be  the  responsibility  of  the  CI  service  of  the 
appropriate  military  department; 
(3)  Investigations  of  retired  military  personnel,  ac- 
tive and  inactive  reservists,  and  National  Guard  mem- 
bers shall  be  the  responsibility  of  the  FBI;  provided, 
however,  that  investigations  of  actions  which  took  place 
while  the  subject  of  the  investigation  was,  or  is,  on  active 
military  duty  shall  be  conducted  by  the  CI  service  of  the 
appropriate  military  department;  and, 
(4)  Investigations  of  private  contractors  of  the  DOD, 
and  their  employees,  shall  be  the  responsibility  of  the 
FBI,  Provided,  however,  that  nothing  contained  in  this 
paragraph  shall  prevent  the  military  CI  services  of  the 
DOD,  in  a  manner  consistent  with  applicable  law  and 
Executive  Branch  policy,  from  undertaking: 
(a)  In  those  cases  where  the  FBI  chooses  to  waive 
investigative  jurisdiction,  investigative  actions  which  are 
necessary  to  establish  or  refute  the  factual  basis  required 
for  an  authorized  administrative  action,  to  protect  the 
security  of  its  personnel,  information,  activities,  and  in- 
stallations; or 
(b)  To  provide  assistance  to  the  FBI  in  support 
of  any  CI  investigation  for  which  the  FBI  is  herein  as- 
signed responsibility. 
d.  CI  investigations  outside  the  United  States  shall  be 
conducted  in  accordance  with  the  following  guidelines: 
(15  Investigations  of  military  personnel  on  active 
duty  shall  be  the  responsibility  of  the  military  CI  service* 
of  the  DOD. 
(2)  Investigations  of  current  civilian  employees,  their 
dependents,  and  the  civilian  dependents  of  active  duty 
military  personnel  shall  be  the  responsibility  of  the  mil- 
itary CI  services,  unless  such  responsibility  is  otherwise 
assigned  pursuant  to  agreement  with  the  host  govern- 
ment, US  law  or  Executive  directive. 
(3)  Investigations  of  retired  military  personnel,  ac- 
tive and  inactive  reservists,  National  Guard  members, 
private  contractors  and  their  employees,  and  other  US 
persons,  who  permanently  reside  in  such  locations,  shall 
be  undertaken  in  consultation  with  the  FBI,  CIA,  and 
host  government  as  appropriate,  Provided,  however,  that 
nothing  contained  in  this  paragraph  hall  prevent  the 
military  CI  services  of  the  DOD,  in  a  manner  consistent 
with  applicable  law  and  Executive  Branch  policy  from 
undertaking: 
(a)  Investigative  actions  which  are  necessary  t<- 
establish  or  refute  the  factual  basis  required  for  an  au- 
thorized administrative  action,  to  protect  the  security  of 
its  personnel,  information,  activities,  and  installations; 
or 
(b)  To  provide  assistance  to  the  FBI  or  security 
service  of  a  host  government  in  support  of  CI  investi- 
gations outside  the  United  States  for  which  DOD  is  not 
herein  assigned  investigative  responsibility. 
B-1
1  July  1934 
AR  381-10 
Appendix  C 
References  to  Army  Implementation  of  DoD  5240.1  -R 
Section  I 
Required  Publications 
AR  190-13  (The  Army  Physical  Security  Program). 
Cited  in  procedure  2,  section  C.7. 
AR  190-52  (Countering  Terrorism  and  Other  Major 
Disruptions  on  Military  Installations).  Cited 
in  procedure  2,  sections  C.3.C.,  C.4.a., 
C.7.,  C.8.,  and  C.ll. 
AR  195-2  (Criminal  Investigation  Activities).  Cited 
in  procedure  1,  section  A.3,  and  procedure 
15,  section  C6. 
AR  335-15  (Management  Information  Control  Sys- 
tem). Cited  in  procedure  15,  sections 
C.2.a.(4)  and  C.3.b.(4). 
AR  340-2  (Maintenance  and  Disposition  of  Records 
in  TOE  units  of  the  Active  Army,  the  Army 
Reserve,  and  the  National  Guard).  Cited 
in  procedure  3,  section  D.2. 
AR  340-18    (The  Army  Functional  Files  System).  Cited 
series  in  procedure  3,  section  D.2. 
AR  380- 13  (Acquisition  and  Storage  of  Information 
Concerning  Nonaffiliated  Persons  and  Or- 
ganizations). Cited  in  the  applicability 
statement  on  the  title  page. 
AR  380-53  (Telephone  Communications  Security 
Monitoring).  Cited  in  procedure  2,  section 
C.9,  and  procedure  5,  part  7,  section  A. 
AR  381-12  (Subversion  and  Espionage  Directed 
Against  US  Army  (SAEDA).  Cited  in  pro- 
cedure 1,  section  B,  and  procedure  2,  sec- 
tions C.4.a.,  C.7,  and  C.8. 
AR  381-20  (US  Army  Counterintelligence  (CI)  Activ- 
ities). Cited  in  procedure  1,  sections  A.3 
and  B,  and  procedure  2,  sections  C.7  and 
C.8. 
AR  381-45  (Investigative  Records  Repository  (IRR)). 
Cited  in  procedure  3,  section  D.2. 
AR  381-47  (S)  (US  Army  Offensive  Counterintelli- 
gence Operations  (Short  Title:  OFCO)  (U». 
Cited  in  paragraph  B-3. 
AR  500-51  (Support  to  Civilian  Law  Enforcement j. 
Cited  in  procedure  12,  section  A. 
AR  604-5  (Clearance  of  Personnel  for  Access  to 
Classified  Defense  Information  and  Ma- 
terial). Cited  in  procedure  2,  section  C.8. 
DoD  (DoD  Postal  Manual).  Cited  In  procedure 
4525.6 — M  8,  sections  C.l.a  and  C.3.a. 
Section  II 
Related  Publications* 
AR  10-5        (Department  of  the  Army). 
AR  20-1  (Inspector  General  Acthities  and  Proce- 
dures). 
AR  27-10      (Military  Justice). 
AR  195-1      (Army  Criminal  Investigation  Program). 
AR  340-        (The  Army  Privacy  Program:  System  No- 
21-5  tices  and  Exemption   Rules  for   Intelli- 
gence, Security,  Military  Police,  and  Map- 
ping Functions). 
AR  380-5  (Department  of  the  Army  Information  Se- 
curity Program). 
AR  381-1  (Control  of  Dissemination  of  Intelligence- 
Information). 
AR  600-50  (Standards  of  Conduct  for  Department  of 
the  Army  Personnel). 
*A  related  publication  is  merely  a  source  of  additional  infor- 
mation. The  user  does  not  have  to  read  it  to  understand  this 
regulation. 
C-1
1  July  1S84 
AR  381-10 
APPENDIX  D 
Part !.,  Executive  Order  12333 
Conduct  of  Intelligence  Activities 
2.1  Need.  Accurate  and  timely  information  about  the 
capabilities,  intentions  and  activities  of  foreign  powers, 
organizations,  or  persons  and  their  agents  is  essential  to 
informed  decisionmaking  in  the  areas  of  national  defense 
and  foreign  relations.  Collection  of  such  information  is 
a  priority  objective  and  will  be  pursued  in  a  vigorous, 
innovative  and  responsible  manner  that  is  consistent  with 
the  Constitution  and  applicable  law  and  respectful  of  the 
principles  upon  which  the  United  States  was  founded. 
2.2  Purpose.  This  Order  is  intended  to  enhance  human 
and  technical  collection  techniques,  especially  those  un- 
dertaken abroad,  and  the  acquisition  of  significant  for- 
eign intelligence,  as  well  as  the  detection  and  countering 
of  international  terrorist  activities  and  espionage  con- 
ducted by  foreign  powers.  Set  forth  below  are  certain 
general  principles  that,  in  addition  to  and  consistent  with 
applicable  laws,  are  intended  to  achieve  the  proper  bal- 
ance between  the  acquisition  of  essential  information  and 
protection  of  individual  interests.  Nothing  in  this  Order 
shall  be  construed  to  apply  to  or  interfere  with  any  au- 
thorized civil  or  criminal  law  enforcement  responsibility 
of  any  department  or  agency. 
2.3  Collection  of  Information.  Agencies  within  the  In- 
telligence Community  are  authorized  to  collect,  retain 
or  disseminate  information  concerning  United  States 
persons  only  in  accordance  with  procedures  established 
by  the  head  of  the  agency  concerned  and  approved  by 
the  Attorney  General,  consistent  with  the  authorities 
provided  by  Part  1  of  this  Order.  Those  procedures  shall 
permit  collection,  retention  and  dissemination  of  the  fol- 
lowing types  of  information: 
a.  Information  that  is  publicly  available  or  collected 
with  the  consent  of  the  person  concerned; 
b.  Information  constituting  foreign  intelligence  or 
counterintelligence,  including  such  information  con- 
cerning corporations  or  other  commercial  organizations. 
Collection  within  the  United  States  of  foreign  intelligence 
not  otherwise  obtainable  shall  be  undertaken  by  the  FBI 
or,  when  significant  foreign  intelligence  is  sought,  by 
other  authorized  agencies  of  the  Intelligence  Commu- 
nity, provided  that  no  foreign  intelligence  collection  by 
such  agencies  may  be  undertaken  for  the  purpose  of 
acquiring  information  concerning  the  domestic  activities 
of  United  States  persons; 
c.  Information  obtained  in  the  course  of  a  lawful  for- 
eign intelligence,  counterintelligence,  international  nar- 
cotics or  international  terrorism  investigation; 
d.  Information  needed  to  protect  the  safety  of  any 
persons  or  organizations,  including  those  who  are  tar- 
gets, victims  or  hostages  of  international  terrorist  or- 
ganizations; 
e.  Information  needed  to  protect  foreign  intelligence 
or  counterintelligence  sources  or  methods  from  unau- 
thorized disclosure.  Collection  within  the  United  States 
shall  be  undertaken  by  the  FBI  except  that  other  agencies 
of  l  ■  I  ttlligence  Community  may  also  collect  such  in- 
formation concerning  present  or  former  employees, 
present  or  former  intelligence  agency  contractors  or  their 
present  or  former  employees,  or  applicants  for  any  such 
employment  or  contracting; 
f.  Information  concerning  persons  who  are  reasonably 
believed  to  be  potential  sources  or  contacts  for  the  pur- 
pose of  determining  their  suitability  or  credibility; 
g.  Information  arising  out  of  a  lawful  personnel,  phys- 
ical or  communications  security  investigation; 
h.  Information  acquired  by  overhead  reconnaissance 
not  directed  at  specific  United  States  persons; 
i.  Incidentally  obtained  information  that  may  indicate 
involvement  in  activities  that  may  violate  federal,  state, 
local  or  foreign  laws;  and 
j.  Information  necessary  for  administrative  purposes. 
In  addition,  agencies  within  the  Intelligence  Community 
may  disseminate  information,  other  than  information 
derived  from  signals  intelligence,  to  each  appropriate 
agency  within  the  Intelligence  Community,  for  purposes 
of  allowing  the  recipient  agency  to  determine  whether 
the  information  is  relevant  to  its  responsibilities  and  can 
be  retained  by  it. 
2.4  Collection  Techniques.  Agencies  within  the  Intelli- 
gence Community  shall  use  the  least  intrusive  collection 
techniques  feasible  within  the  United  States  or  directed 
against  United  States  persons  abroad.  Agencies  are  not 
D-1
AR  381-10 
1  July  1984 
authorized  to  use  such  techniques  as  electronic  surveil- 
lance, unconsented  physical  search,  mail  surveillance, 
physical  surveillance,  or  monitoring  devices  unless  they 
are  in  accordance  with  procedures  established  by  the 
head  of  the  agency  concerned  and  approved  by  the  At- 
torney General.  Such  procedures  shall  protect  consti- 
tutional and  other  legal  rights  and  limit  use  of  such 
information  to  lawful  governmental  purposes.  These 
procedures  shall  not  authorize: 
a.  The  CIA  to  engage  in  electronic  surveillance  within 
the  United  States  except  for  the  purpose  of  training, 
testing,  or  conducting  countermeasures  to  hostile  elec- 
tronic surveillance; 
b.  Unconsented  physical  searches  in  the  United  States 
by  agencies  other  than  the  FBI,  except  for: 
(1)  Searches  by  counterintelligence  elements  of  the 
military  services  directed  against  military  personnel  within 
the  United  States  or  abroad  for  intelligence  purposes, 
when  authorized  by  a  military  commander  empowered 
to  approve  physical  searches  for  law  enforcement  pur- 
poses, based  upon  a  finding  of  probable  cause  to  believe 
that  such  persons  are  acting  as  agents  of  foreign  powers; 
and 
(2)  Searches  by  CIA  of  personal  property  of  non- 
United  States  persons  lawfully  in  its  possession. 
c.  Physical  surveillance  of  a  United  States  person  in 
the  United  States  by  agencies  other  than  the  FBI,  except 
for: 
(1)  Physical  surveillance  of  present  or  former  em- 
ployees, present  or  former  intelligence  agency  contrac- 
tors or  their  present  or  former  employees,  or  applicants 
for  any  such  employment  or  contracting;  and 
(2)  Physical  surveillance  of  a  military  person  em- 
ployed by  a  nonintelligence  element  of  a  military  service. 
d.  Physical  surveillance  of  a  United  States  person  abroad 
to  collect  foreign  intelligence,  except  to  obtain  significant 
information  that  cannot  reasonably  be  acquired  by  other 
means. 
2.5  Attorney  General  Approval.  The  Attorney  General 
hereby  is  delegated  the  power  to  approve  the  use  for 
intelligence  purposes,  within  the  United  States  or  against 
a  United  States  person  abroad,  of  any  technique  for 
which  a  warrant  would  be  required  if  undertaken  for 
law  enforcement  purposes,  provided  that  such  tech- 
niques shall  not  be  undertaken  unless  the  Attorney  Gen- 
eral has  determined  in  each  case  that  there  is  probable 
cause  to  believe  that  the  technique  is  directed  against  a 
foreign  power  or  an  agent  of  a  foreign  power.  Electronic 
surveillance,  as  defined  in  the  Foreign  Intelligence  Sur- 
veillance Act  of  1978,  shall  be  conducted  in  accordance 
with  that  Act,  as  well  as  this  Order. 
2.6  Assistance  to  Law  Enforcement  Authorities.  Agen- 
cies within  the  Intelligence  Community  are  authorized 
to: 
a.  Cooperate  with  appropriate  law  enforcement  agen- 
cies for  the  purpose  of  protecting  the  employees,  infor- 
mation, property  and  facilities  of  any  agency  within  the 
Intelligence  Community; 
b.  Unless  otherwise  precluded  by  law  or  this  Order, 
participate  in  law  enforcement  activities  to  investigate 
or  prevent  clandestine  intelligence  activities  by  foreign 
powers,  or  international  terrorist  or  narcotics  activities; 
c.  Provide  specialized  equipment,  technical  knowl- 
edge, or  assistance  of  expert  personnel  for  use  by  any 
department  or  agency,  or,  when  lives  are  endangered, 
to  support  local  law  enforcement  agencies.  Provision  of 
assistance  by  expert  personnel  shall  be  approved  in  each 
case  by  the  General  Counsel  of  the  providing  agency; 
and 
d.  Render  any  other  assistance  and  cooperation  to  law 
enforcement  authorities  not  precluded  by  applicable  law. 
2.7  Contracting.  Agencies  within  the  Intelligence  Com- 
munity are  authorized  to  enter  into  contracts  or  ar- 
rangements for  the  provision  of  goods  or  services  with 
private  companies  or  institutions  in  the  United  States 
and  need  not  reveal  the  sponsorship  of  such  contracts 
or  arrangements  for  authorized  intelligence  purposes. 
Contracts  or  arrangements  with  academic  institutions 
may  be  undertaken  only  with  the  consent  of  appropriate 
officials  of  the  institution. 
2.8  Consistency  With  Other  Laws.  Nothing  in  this  Order 
shall  be  construed  to  authorize  any  activity  in  violation 
of  the  Constitution  or  statutes  of  the  United  States. 
2.9  Undisclosed  Participation  in  Organizations  Within 
the  United  States.  No  one  acting  on  behalf  of  agencies 
within  the  Intelligence  Community  may  join  or  otherwise 
participate  in  any  organization  in  the  United  States  on 
behalf  of  any  agency  within  the  Intelligence  Community 
without  disclosing  his  intelligence  affiliation  to  appro- 
priate officials  of  the  organization,  except  in  accordance 
with  procedures  established  by  the  head  of  the  agency 
concerned  and  approved  by  the  Attorney  General.  Such 
participation  shall  be  authorized  only  if  it  is  essential  to 
achieving  lawful  purposes  as  determined  by  the  agency 
head  or  designee.  No  such  participation  may  be  under- 
taken for  the  purpose  of  influencing  the  activity  of  the 
organization  or  its  members  except  in  cases  where: 
a.  The  participation  is  undertaken  on  behalf  of  the 
FBI  in  the  course  of  a  lawful  investigation;  or 
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1  July  1984 
AR  381-10 
b.  The  organization  concerned  is  composed  primarily 
of  individuals  who  are  not  United  States  persons  and  is 
reasonably  believed  to  be  aciing  on  behalf  of  a  foreign 
power. 
2.10  Human  Experimentation.  No  agency  within  the  In- 
telligence Community  shall  sponsor,  contract  for  or  con- 
duct research  on  human  subjects  except  in  accordance 
with  guidelines  issued  by  the  Department  of  Health  and 
Human  Services.  The  subject's  informed  consent  shall 
be  documented  as  required  by  those  guidelines. 
2.11  Prohibition  on  Assassination.  No  person  employed 
by  or  acting  on  behalf  of  the  United  States  Government 
shall  engage  in,  or  conspire  to  engage  in,  assassination. 
2.12  Indirect  Participation.  No  agency  of  the  Intelligence 
Community  shall  participate  in  or  request  any  person 
to  undertake  activities  forbidden  by  this  Order. 
D-3
By  Order  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Army: 
JOHN  A.  WICKHAM,  JR. 
General,  United  States  Army 
Chief  of  Staff 
Official: 
ROBERT  M.  JOYCE 
Major  General,  United  States  Army 
The  Adjutant  General 
Distribution:  To  be  distributed  in  accordance  with  DA 
Form  12-9A  requirements  for  AR,  Military  Intelli- 
gence. Active  Army,  B;  ARNG  and  USAR,  C. 
U    S    GOVERNMENT   PRINTING  OFFICE     HI.    ~