Ce ot Cox Bir Ea a tare epee a et: Ley i sxe imocriance and mystery of the. COMINT effort, only to draw away upon -—  Ceveloning closer contact because they have felt it tmpossible or frustrating (whether rightly or wrongly makes little difference) to work ; ; tary hierarchy. It is SCAG’s contention that AFSA has, because of difficulties within the mill —— (" ("J in contract relations and errors cf judgment, so injured its reputation in scientizic circles as to make doth companies and individuals somewhat wary U-} of doing business with it. The contention is based upon an alleged lack of J oe —/ ‘soport between the military and the civilian, particularly in the field of abstract science and its appurtenances. There is probably much to be said on both sides, a 2 7 but Civillanization of COMINT’s more abstruse technical activities would pro- af y Go much to provide 2 remedy. a a in suca a highly technical field the Committee can do no more than record eee ii these ressonsible opinions furnished to it, Itis entirely possible that the re- u“ oo ~ + i) Qa taal ee cy to Phd ee mu 4 Oo "5 gq B fs ed etfort will.pe negative, but if they were only in LS f + + fp-—art successiul, they would produce information of much greater importance s 5, G (2) a, _ than we are now obtaining through the expenditure of much larger amounts on the more orthodox sources. Ther Ce a G a ( Was some evidence that the day-in and day-out demands for COMINNT gash Wray EK information which we can now cbtain have been so great as to compel the AFSA authorities to turn their energies in that direction, and to deter them from assigning more personnel to the longer-range cryptanalytical problems which | J a — "2135 -
See ese Se Bauer RE EC RSA DR area eR ee o See 4 > . — 4 me . e AP = . aww on * ast will not pay divicends for some time. The division of labor between aan 6 these two fialés, will, of course, always be a matter of judgment, and there could be so mere important subject for continuing consideration by a top. level group such as the COMINT Board which we have recommended, Size and Exnense of the COMINT Effort The Committee has furnished in the body of its Report a rough estimate -. of the number of indivicuals employed in our overall COMINT effort (¢ ye LY) fs td } and the overall expense Prec ach es co act include ie manpower and expenses of the con- <— — sumer agencies. As indicated in Part IV, these figures, particularly the collar cost, are necessarily very general estimates because of the ciiticulty A making accurate cetéominations with respect to those engaged in the field. ° ree pee wy = ea my x AFSA itseli employs approximately = ay CI - - b] tums at present at ebou The Commitize was in no way equipped and mace no attempt to consider whether any part of this expenditure could be reduced without materially af - fecting the product, and in fact this subject fell completely outside our Direc- tive. Eowever, we have been impressed by the fact that the sums involved ‘ ~ Perea ce: ET Ser hanes an ~- re oP re = = betes spd. ten Ee P25 seat EEE Sees: ee = Be merry ns Suet fae = te CAS Snet ce ae oe Snes = Pa teh eRe at ee Perea Be ime Sree _ Pee nal, ones) Ca skcreten Genie S PRS *. aS PS 2 PENG nonpey soerterone Mae a Se ae ery pi tsee a ar a EAE et Sees stead Sas
Pa Bae PS tet iF . tet, Pa Ra ea rae net Ste ee. . toast rand oie Gewiee Sehrea ee ES Sie ” lw * <¥ a-a very large, and that because of security factors they are necessarily not “a subject to any of the checks and balances that operate as efiective centrols z in other Government departments amc agencies, or to the restraining influence : of Congressional investigations or public opinion. We must lesk to APSA —i= itself and to the three Services te insure that all expenditures are handled on : as an efficient and an economical basis as is possible. This is a further com- . " rel pelling reason for-insuring that AFSA inanagement ba stable, strong and highly a responsible, and that there be a COMINT SBcard which has suxficien: authority and ability to exercise a strong guiding hand in major policy matters. “ee Jy Go Fi a ld
. —~ 400. oe e eer ee a Cee Nee. mee ee -- se mm me 5 . - . . we me eee ls ~~ we eee a Ps POD. SReR EE 3, a “SE CUOMIPAINF ORATION. «sez . } _ EXHIBITS ~\ c~\ | - | ATSB COUNT. CONTABIECODE: WQBD-METERL Mies. —~ * ~~ oe . = * te se I FN - PP. SF ECREL Reviewed 4 August 1981 LON  SCEURIFIINE OAMATION ssecd.
So es a POEs Sa Es pine a Ss yas the rs rast epee thins OSS a . - . a . — Dea> Sizs: ae : ne i « The Presiceat on December 13, 1951, directed the Secretary of State and : Uj sae Secretary-of Defense, assisted by the Director of Central Inte lisence, to_. ™ tave the Comsunications Intelligence activities of the Governzent surveyed, - ° ] with the view of recormeading exny corrective messures that may ve required $9 2 2 2829 —rw O insure the seat secure and effective conduct of such activities. ; an ° . @ od . . . o . PN You are hareby appointed as a Committee to mabe a survey as hereinester woe a [- Zescrited and sudait to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense ut proposca recossendations for thetr consideration. ; . or * ‘‘ Za order to assist us in carrying out the directive of the President, i+ is desired that your Comittee consider the following: a “a. The legitimate Communications Intelligence needs of each LE Governmental depertnent and agency for the production of devertnental - oe | sntelligence, and of the Director of Central Intelligence for the . “. [s production of naSfonal intelligence. Your Committee's consideration ‘ oF such needs shell not ve nerrewly interpreted and shail incluze, . 7 oh Witnout linttation, eny and all aspects of the interception, transmission precessiag and production of useable Comamications Intelligence informatica: b- The allocation of responsibilities and autherities respecting _ . Comsunications Intelligence activities that should be made to insure ‘hat such needs are satisfied most effectively, giving due regard to | i. She requirenents of security. Your Comnittee's consideration of this io ° question shall include, without limitation, the extent to which . ‘Tesponsivility for, end ausherity over, the interception aod processing of Communications Intelligence information, or any other aspect of such activities, may and should be assigned for performance es a service of common concern, and to vhich department or agency an $uca assiamnent should: be mede. —— m ° é Your Comittee may estadlish such methods of procedure, consistent with existing Communications Intelligence security regulations as it may deen fit. Your Committee + authorized +o employ such staff as 4% may require, end you Say apply to the Director of Central intelligence for the clearance and indoc- *FsRation of such persona sot presently cleared and indoctrinated for Special ° fatelliseace as may be required to assist your Committee. ; , hl AY
3 og _ .oge ; 54 ie By a i rps Pagonte 5 1 2 = VAI Sis re = ~< ‘our Comittee is hereby authorized to request all departments and conducting Communications Intelligence activities for the Cov availadle to your Cecmaittee and its staff any and all p v x ee be ey een PEE Ser ae ) O». fo CO | eribed aurvey can be obtained. cn relevant to the above-des waideh into CJ 8/ Dean G. Acheson Dean G.- Acheson Secretary of State : fooers A. Lovett /s/ Co) ‘ a - vad Lovet etary cf Defense Rovert a. beg ry q ‘ . een ee o . - ¢ , s , . ° . : - e. ape oe . t te 3 . . . , . . . . e.° . oy . ‘ we . - 4 . . C7 ad e a. - , . . we * sy é ee Ld . . . ¢ ‘ “oe oo - . ° oe . a’ . “ oo * . ° mY ve . . . . ° 7 ° ° ce . . ° ‘ . . ° . . a Pied s ¢ . ° . rf bd , ° . ° fr . a 2 « - toe ' * * = Jackson neral Jonn Magruder, Retired od a Ge 4a Caarles Sonlen + George Bromell 3arig. re Me. tg foe km @ een ~sreempesirmmeaa, a Ee ass, es eee EY : eee
fae LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED BY BROWNELL COMMITTEE AND DATES INTERVIEWED eon ee eee i 3 Belmont, Alan H., Assistant Director-of the Domestic Intelligence Bes cz Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 16 February 1952 . - Bernier, Colonel Donald, Operations Officer, Army Security = Agency, 16 Febzsuary 1952 Ss] | : fer Bolling, Major General Alexander R.;, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, 3% (] ' U.S, Army, 2 February 1952 ; FN : : as {= _ Bradley, General of the Army Omar N., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. ceo | Gs . of Staif, lL April 1952 Ba fi " fadeli, Major General Charles P., USAF, Director, The Joint Pose ‘Staff, 24 January 1952 ‘ ae al , Canine, Major General Ralph J., Director, Armed Forces Security pee i? Agency, 5 Janvary and 22 February 1952 ; Fi Clarke, Brigadier General Carter W., Osaka, Japan, formerly Chief ot Army Security Agency, and Deputy G-2, U.S. Army 8 March 1952 ED Davitt, Colonel William J., USAF, 24 January 1952
@ Duff, Major General Robinson Bu Chief of Army Security Agency, 16 February 1952 Engstrom, Howard T., Engineering Research Associates, (The Special Communications Advisory Group), 8 February 1952 Friedman, Wm. F., Consultant to the Director of the Armed Forces Security Agency, 22 February and 4 April 1952 Goulett, Captain W. B., USN, Acting Director of Naval Communi- cations, 24 January 1952 Holtwick, Captain J. S., Ir. USN, Office of Operations, AFSA~02, ll January 1952 | Moageaeac Howard, John H., Burroughs Adding Machine Co., (The Special Communications Advisory Group) 8 February 1952 CA Johnson, Rear Admiral Felix L., USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, 24 January 1952 - Johnson, Colonel Hugh, Chief of Staff, Army Security Agency, . 16 February 1952 , 2) Keay, Victor P., Chief of the Liaison Section, Federal Bureau of w Investigation, 16 February 1952 Leva, Marx, formerly Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legal and Legislative Affairs, 29 February 1952 « (73 Lynn, Brigadier General Roy H., Commanding General of Air Force Security Service, 15 February 1952 aS Mason, Captain Redfield, USN, formerly head of AFSA-02, 4 April 1952 o> Om -72-
_ McNarney, General Joseph T., Office of the Secretary of Defense, 24 January 1952. ’ McPherson, John C., International Business Machines, (The Special - Communications Advisory Group) 8 February 1952 Le ere _ Potter, Ralph K., Bell-Telephone Laboratories, (The Special Communi- cations Advisory Group) 8 February 1952 ay or Robertson, H. P., Weapons Systems Evaluation Greup, (The Special Communications Advisory Group) 8 February 1952 Rowlett, Frank B., formerly Technical Director of the Armed Forces Security Agency, AF'SA-~02, 9 February and 15 February 1952 Samford, Major General John A., Directer of Intelligence, U. 8, Air Force, 9 February 1952 . . Say Speakman, Edwin A., Research and Development Board, (The Special Communizations Advisory Group) 8 February 1952 we, _ 4 cae (3 fo
<2 Weckezling, Brigadier General John, Deputy Assistant Chief of a ‘Staff, G-2, U.S. Army, 2 February 1952 a Wenger, Rear Admiral J. N., USN, Deputy Director of the Armed _— . Sore Forces Security Agency, 8 March 1952 ; * cS (Prepared 14 April 1952) ae (es Ste f i . o i
J - sed sok * Ae? . a =e 10, 3950 any ee! ares o Ast tl ‘ CAR Rear Spe omy bal ohuadiiit et mmcontndilerot iene een NATIONAL SS RS COUNCIL LITE LLICeENcs Lr.UTIVE nO, way —_ PO geen ~ emer COMMUNICATIONS DNTELLICENCES . . een ner rr NS ne NY Sine Ve Sa . provisiczs or Section 101 end Section 102 of the National , @3 amenced, the Neticnal Securicy Counci. hereby authori: ? ol 222288 —™ . gas is herety esteblished under the National Security Council . = es Communications Invellisense Bcard (nereinetter revered i> a") to effect the authoritative ccord‘nation of Cosmuat- rae cesions inteliigence activities cf the Government and to advise the Directer ‘3 of Cectral intelligence in these catters in she f4ela of Comunicat‘oas a zitelitgesce fer wnich he is responsible. oe @. Tne Scerd will be composed of not to exceed two tembers Yoes each of _ the following denartcencs ot agencies: Tne De parwments ¢F State, the Aray, tne wavy, ead tae-Aiz Terce, and the Central Inteliszence Ageascy, and the Federal Sure\esu cl Investigstion. Caly these devertrests or agencies desimsted by wa2 scent ere aucsoriced to ensase {mn Comeumications invellisence activities. Board senoers will be vested with authority to Tepresent tosis arsnents o> agencies itn the fteld of Comeunicatioss Inteliisanse FT Gepartzen= o> esency will be represented at eacs meetizng by ac. a>, Cr altercave, with she necessary powers to act. Stns Cf the Boerd will Se based on the principle ef unaninity, ive for mavvers within the purview of the Board, excess teas the Caosizmen shall be elected Dy majority vote. When decision: ca=not be reached, the Board will promptly refer the satter for resolution to Sne National Security Couieil; provided that, when unaninity is not obtained e=ong the ailitary derartrent neads of the Depvartzent of Defense, the Board shail oresens the problem to she Secretary of Defense before presenting it SO the Nationsl Security Council. . L. rau po 4 @ ag a a fi u x { ~J a 5. Desistens and policies sromulgated by the Beerd within the scone of ' = _ats veFiscicticn shell ce asslicadle to ell depaztzenta and agencies rerre- J i S@azcl On oF subcrdizate ts she ational Security Cozacit and eny others ~ Gesiciated by the President, and srall ve implemented vy these departments o and agencies of which ection és required. _. e pr U ’ ‘ ° t MaFth 10, 1950
ren was bese ‘< Pe wake ft OF Se Feit! Cpper heat Bae rks adc Sp RETR ES : ae cat f 3 Evid ¢ My Dear Governor: = . ttaSez Wwe sae oe! ea SierS eas oon a Sgt one eos ai Ten Unitinn: you wi ehout” the, bnéwlede of. any “ether person ‘except Ada Kan vee 10 concur =2) because ve are “approaching a izay fray ve “at lect” yin’ “the” “political - Set Bees : xin: Fitts ate: ita contents to ‘nay other pernda net ‘return ning ‘thig letter’ yore ots eed lia” eny. vurther und returning the’ detter to the bearer.” Se SC ee I. ‘should have preferred to tall: to ‘you “in percda but T° cola. not Govice, a aybod that would not be subject. to press and reJio reaction? hs to. of Staff of the Army would be scek Kine an “tuterview “with you a% ‘this’ ‘parti ular” ee cevnt. Therefore, IT have turned tu the meshed of this letter, "to oe ‘deliverél es bir Rand to yeu ty Col. Carter ‘ larke who! has charue of the most ‘seer % documents | oe of the Wer and avy Depart: acnhs. : ‘ vow eo oN . wets aoe : Ia brief, ihe ‘mi Lahoxy ad Lenn. Fesult ing tron Conireazional political» oT the poli teal ceppaten ‘3 bites * The most vital evidence in the De. wel arbor matter ‘conaists of our ‘inte reeptey . orgune Japwese diplosatic ceomuundentions. Over a period of years our eryplortash wa pechele analyomd the charneler or the cAchine vhe-Jupanese are using fer encoding tu dee: x diplos.tie Ltessases. linand on A thss,: a corresponding machine was” bullet by ra Gee ipher ro their faagea. eu on te mat : mone ars setae “Be: canoe o- -“94 4) ‘Mersfere, we  posawened o wealth of infant: Lon regaraiig their moves. “Ye “he as & fic wiich in turn vas Pucuished the State Departmeatc-rather Len, eS < popularly supqened, the State Dey ser taastil providtinys weet th Avs u J, Which walootuuat ely imde no reterence Wiriigver a) inlentiony Peary . tare lant megaas e bef fore Deo. Ty Mitten bodice hot (teach our hurt, cit Gay, Dies 8. -< * a: Settee Now thet Sotat. ta tle: p eassnt alle nea is big we have rot in iow: vith tain Vusiness of deciphering th &3 Tocoles until ve pesness othee cales, Crrmur de well Qs Japracse, but our sain dass of Invermation recadins Hitherte tatealionsa in we Mureps ts ablatned from Farun Gshimnvfs missage a froa Berlina reopaclias Ala Intere | ee views with tiller and other .orfleials to the Jip nes Govern: These are in the colea invoived in the Poark jie Vor events. AN is ce, atte oo, oe ‘ tae Se . “To exptotn further” ‘the critical azbure or this set oup vin tech vould be ‘viped k ous aleent If an Instant’ $2 the let miepleder were aroused regarding tty, the Ialtle of the Coral ween We acied in deg! tytigee J Bee Aer and. sheretarce me Lee Shilpa were fn the righs plsce wt Clee cipht oni ce. 7 Mistress, “ure ere, “ARLE US Sone: Tle on our Limited rerceu hu s@ch the it havenc. 'o On TM deny “sh oT Obuerwious we “laout certainly vould Rave EON ee of pi ee pater co¥ ete ed w tans ag eae ea 2 a : _ je : — ae any 5 C x te wert . >: Re ae = at ” 5 ie Pode tons VE as ~~ Kno, POL | BEST COPY AV.AILABLE
Set tes eal! RET ae TEES Se ek SFr tals no. Pet ee ore t Mee. wey fe S etaas wanes wis at ow | : al he ee a fst ws ea eetr - ~. ¥ , ey ene tay ‘me — L- —_ "3 aoe ; £7), ue “7 * Ye hod full “tnforsat tea ‘oF. the” “etrengsh of wthele’ ‘forces . In that vance cand ' also of the ssaller force direeted against the Aleutians which ‘Sinaly danded * ve “ troops on Attu ond Xiska: Fo suegs sae aaa. Wate eee ae, Ls ta 7 e eo eer ie Syeos : : : x cin pes tat rs q vo - Operations tn the Pacific arc. ans usly, ‘ighiaed by the information we “obtain “of | ; Japancse deployments. - “We. know theirs trength in’ var lous eurr lions; the rations 3 WJ ant other stores continuing avatlabte to > thea, end what is of. vast importened, (7 ehnees the: ir flect moverncat 4 toe -.. sete “ae ae * tee Fey eet “ The heavy locaes reported. fos tine to tin ne 7 Tete 2y ‘sustain ‘Uy reason of | “our subcarine ection largely results frow the ‘fact ‘that we mov the: saiding da a , ul the 2 routes of their convoys ord gan notify our & tusart nes to. ile in wait ‘Soe stele. q- - a The ous reat roids by Admiral Italzey' carc! or forces cn. “Japanese in Manila Bay and cleewhere were laryely based in timing on the mown “Japanese convoys, two of which were caught, as mivicipeced, astachks. + a te 8S * . Y ne ‘satpping ; movencniesa of in his Cestructive | : “wee ~- aad a You will understand from’ the forcgotne, the utter tracic consequences tf the Peent politient debates-rearding Pourl Hurchor disclose to the eneoy, Common or. ry, any suspicion of he vitul cources sot Anforsaitien we acy possess. we Tee hy tt eT a tye - st . Pron 3 Rober ts report on Poarl Wart. ox hind to hive withds sea fron it allo eferenee : to the clily seerct matter, therefore in portions Lt necessaril yrapprerce ineom inlete. “The shee reason vhich Aletnt sd that course is. even more Az=por tout today our sources have been ercat *yY vlavor ated, : me -. tae LATE. oe as. o a ow ae “ pees ‘As a ‘tw ther example of the delicacy ot the Situs txon, eyes ‘of ‘Deroyaa's people (the 055), without telling us, instituted a ueres: (sen rch of the Japances” a; Eabasey offices in Portugal. “As o result the entire mtYitary dttache Jape arse code | _veceuse * all over the world wis chan. ged, aad though thio occuered ever nf year, neo, ve have nob yet bean nule to Yreak che. hew cule and have thus lost this Invaluable soures sof ‘nforuition,<particularly regard bn he European situativgn. | . oe we Se ‘ Vetere Det em tolls —o Bese ete wea, nr Bead, oo - nan card _? A Teeent spe rich in Co ureng by Ths pre: aentat lve. Narnecs would ‘clearly ouwlceul the Japanese that. we Have been reading the ty Gesles, though Mr. Barness and the . Aeutlonn Public vould prow aly nol drawtany such conclusion. . . J Bote ' : to . The conduct of Gea al El seahouer's conpatcn and of “iL operat fons fa the Pauciiie ere clos cry related ‘Ln conception and tiaing t6 the information we sucr etly af Se ray ee c See eRe ge PRR - onare: age ee St ee ee . Artes Le tala OSES eee . ;
ry 7 obtain through | these intercepted codes. Ry ey ‘Contribute “greatly to the victory: ; by, ond tremendously to the savings of: American liyes, both in tbe cone néduct of current. :. operations and in looking toward the arly termination of. _the Mer. oe. oe Jf op ‘on precenting this. “matter to" ‘you,’ for your, secret Sntormation,- in the hepa, . “that you will see your way clear to avoid the’ tra, wie results with which we are now. gh a “threatencd. in the present. political cuapaten..” I. might add that the recent action: ete -of Congreso in requiring Army and Navy {nvestigations | for. ection before certain’ *: ‘ dates has compelled me to bring back the -corps’ ‘commander, | ; General Gerow, whose * ” Ci are fichting at Trier, to testify’ here while the Ceraans are counter-attacking hio forees. thers: |: ‘This,’ “sy our. code . informatton however, - fo. very minorinather compared. to She. loss of reat we Meee : one .: . Soa “Please return nie’ letter, ey’ vearel “to your reference should, you a0 desire. “« ”~
<2. es ~ tate ay Ban EES, SLY Seed INGE Tak Coed Sam eCN NTS ay vw -, a : aaa ST eS, aky G4 RE ERE iene cute AR Shy PAR pilhcg: Pesce ase rar {3 a a'he Ge eee NS n aan . ¥! iat FAD as Weare axe ae ee ~ yw. ‘ 4 | RE SS Baas : Sees b noes S fhe Vy 4 es Oe oat F Mao ~™. Rs Ghd Ree RAN Ste TA WN ek . “a
aes = Af x * , OP do} ¥, he @ , Bays ee are Fone way’ Peetak & Tas of SPER SS <1) Kieke ae * ie eT Sy eA ES ; vag 2? eects eae Ce As - if , Veeesnt > : Sle Mees? 3 a’ wh Pamees ava x frat. Begs ow *", BAH Oni oe Ws Par be ee Zein wares ear’ o-~ a
C7 Cy Ce 6 | _—— ° “ . . . - « . } ‘ ; ? 7A t * ~ . cS ~— co CITATION FOR 1ST RADIO SQUADRON, MOBILE FOR AWARD OF MERTTORICUS UNIT COMMENDATION IN DEPARTENT OF ATA : ‘’ FORCE GENERAL ORDER 64 OF i OCTOBER 1951 : , During the period 26 November 1950 thr ough 18 July 1951, the 1st Radio Squadron,-Modile, has made outstanding contributions to all. services of United Nations Forces eng aged in the Korean Conflict. : baat fs item aT ace TIES ee = Srey pase ee eee es Er Se watt ee vee ee ee ae ome olay * . . Rai end Mae's pee Stee, oe Yen Re . ee eee aoe see “eT ent or Soe. oe a Roos ” re ey ee ee OS Sea ae, Peon AA, wags : : SSN ; Sirs aete ae ree ‘mi Sasa Tee Se=3 eos fy % G par Tae spove - mentioned contributions were. “all L pertorned tn additic a <0 ics i ist Redio Squads on, Mobile* s routine mission : : i 5 Specific accomplishments, considered of extraordinary value to the mission hal eel Forces in Korea and in at least two cases to the vital iaterests of “he . ited etates. were - ) (3 (4 ‘ c Ca ("4
gts ae 3 NE gt Se ae é “: Sa aa eae Tre contributions.of the lst Redio Squadron, Mobile, in direct support ¢ * She UN combat effort in Korea have furnished the UN Forces and the Government [I Y tse United States with tactical and strategic inteliigence, of incalculable value to the success of the UN mission and to the secirity oF the United States, aT asa have theresy reflected great credit om tl unit and the A‘= Forces of the United States. , , ’ j LU Sete ne - . ° s . ~ . dass —s 2 ‘ Se hang? - =ac Pe s - _=- . ahh se FSI SSSR ° = Ber tpt Oe Scenes < - , tr th es ye * . ee ee ena _
APPENDIX DIRECTIVE ~ e ' APMED FORCES SECURTIY AGE: Pursuans so the. authority vested in me by the Netionsl Security Act of (—] 1947 (Public Law 253, ECth Congress), and in the interest of creater effi- —_ it elency end ecomony, there 1s hereby established within the National Military ° +, fn Establishment, uncer the direction and control of whe Joint Catefs- of Starr, a ified eryptologic organization to te kmown as the Armed Forces Security Agency ry . . . . . a (hereinafter referzed to as "AFSA") which stall have the purpose, ec=pesition, : - responalvilities hereins*‘er described. nd 1. Purzose . mo Tne Armed Forces Security Agency 1s established in order to provide F| Ter}She placing under one authority the condust of communicstion intelligence end communication security activities (hereinafter referred to as‘ cryyeolog-s u. activities) wiseia she National Militar ary Estedlish sment, except those which ere yy to be conducted individually by tke Deze artments of the Arey, Bavy, and Aiz> Force. _ 2. Consosition . , os , é om cy e&-. The AFSA shall consist of such facilities, units and military : . ¢ . and civilion personnel of the armed forces watch are or say be used Zor, ose or eagesed in cemuntcation intelligence or communication security activities, dnelud ing the Heedquerters, Arzy Security Agency (ASA), Arlington, Virginia, ‘the Cocmunics tions Susp? enentary Activit ty (CSAW), Washington, and any conperable orgeaizstions of the Air Force, exd such 7 Om ~ otser fas ities, units and personnel as the Joint Chiefs of Staff usy ; — Jcs 2010 Ht -3- Appendix tl LS Se NERS
“Neo fo "1 1) Af _s a TO ff Co CC, nar G “~ ce fm) (a ey) fr C2) } deternize as necessery to fulfill the functions hereia assigned. b. A Flag oz General Cfficer of the Arny, Nevy or Air Porce will be sppqinted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, subject to the epproval of “the Secretary of Defense, es Director of the AFSA. igs norel tour of duty shall te tvo years. - Tas directorshiz shail de rotated anonsg the Services. . : ¢- Aa Armed Forces Commmications ; Intelligence Advisory. Council (AFCZAC) ghald be established within the Armed Forces Security Asency. Tne Council ssall consist of the Director of the Armed Forces Security Agency, sho shell. be chairman thereoz, the Army, Navy, and Ais Force xenbers of the United States Comust- cations Intelligence Board, end not to exceed one edditicnsl sexber . from each of the services to be nentasted by the respective De- pertcent Secretertes. _ - 4 3. Responsibilities end Functions a. Subject to the authority end direction of; the Secretary of eo 7 ‘Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staf? will exercise "atrection, suthor~ ty and control over the Armed Forces Security Agency. . oF bd. Tre Asned Forces Commuaicea tions Intelligence Advisory Counci® wilt: (1) Reccssernd to the Joint Chiefs of Steff policies, operating plans, y end doctrines for the production of comunications tnt elligence which’ vin dneure the pro- a vision of: Say . 7 be -4- Appendix
yo . E59 + Sak ee ptePEM Seis \ eetlal - i) = ? w (a) Authentic tnforz =etion for planners esd policy mekers within she National Military Establish anent end other co cy Governzent al Agencies keving menbershin on the United States intelligence Board; to aszrise shea of the —? reelities of the internatione el situstion, ver-nskiag Cepae Communication mc : “pilities, vulnerabilities and istentions of Soret countries . , 2 cs . t and to elininete the element of surprise from an ect or (~. ex egeression by snother country. (>) The unique informetion essentisl to the several sexvices for the successful prosecution cf war end vital +o & shor steering of the weriod of hostilities. I~ (2) “Reccomend to the Joint Chiefs of Stas policies, . es) - cpersting pleas, and doctrines for ccmumuniestion security , . Fi activts tes. : (3) Recommend to the Joint. Chiess of Star? the fecdiities, in Personsel, end fiscal and logistic support to be provide by 7 7 the servic ces to AFSA; such vecomes aotions to be based on ; . requirenents as determined by the Director, AFSA. . ; é *- (h) Determine and coordinate joint eryptologic military a ‘ requiresente. (5) Woen uneninity cannot be reached suvstactive matters has shellbe referr red to the Joint Caulefs of taff for resolutioa, J precedural satters shall be deternined by tre chaizasn~ FL es e010  Be-s- _ Appendix
(4) Formulation of polictes for: (4) + venemisaion security end communications cover end secentson {£1) exypto~ grapaic security; (iit) phyeicel security of cr7ptoloste matertel; (4124) eryptologic countersessures, . (5) Evelustion of violations of eryptologie security; deterninetion of extent of cospremise; end remedial action Sarcush essropriste channels. (6) Investigatica of the means exployed fcr clandestine . ecumunicaticns; end pre eyes sation, detection, and Processing ‘ of secret inks, micrcpaotographs, end open codes end cinners. (7) Ldetsea with appropriate departaents and agencies, faz the purpose of coordinating eryptologie equipnent and pro- —_ cedures. (8) Preperevion, for review and epproval by the Research asd Development Board, of coor ‘nated progress for research and develormen® of expptologic equimment under the comntcance of AFSA and, when approved, action to impleneat th ese progrens. _ (9) Preparation, for review and approval by the Munitions Boerd, of coordinate prograns, including ‘traustrtel nobili- zation plesatns, for the procurement of cryptologic equirent vender she cognicance of AFSA‘and, when approved, action to i=splecent those BFOGrAans: (10) Pres eration of technicsl publications pertaining to subjects pecuiia> ‘to APSA. .
(11) Preperation of technical traiaing prosrezs and ‘ estedlishnent of ‘raining stenderds for ATSA personnel; provision of certain specialized training of personnel to ‘meet the respective needs of the Arsy, Nevy and Ai> Force. (12) Zstablisiment for usits of the Armed Forces of a ry tesis of issue of specisl items of crypto-equipnent for which provision ta not made in standard distributicn lists. activities of the exmed forces. (] A (13) Technical supervision of cll communicstion security fl (i4) Provisioa of technical support to the Army, Reavy, . 3 ead Ai> Ferce in their conduct of ervatologic actirities. * (15) Preparatten of budgetary end other fiscal require- —s ments of AFSA, coordination of such requirenents with the perticiveting services, and the presentetion of such requisze- nents to the Joint Chiefs of Steff throush the AFCIAC. ' Suck requiresents for ATSA as may be approved by the Joint Chiets 7 of Steff will be included in the recommendstion mde by the . Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense on budsetary . ° . as , matters. , fy 7 a. The Departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force will: rae (1) Take necessery action to facilitate the efficient end econeaice] operatica of AFSA, suca action to include is essisirect of Dersonnel end furnishing of facilities, equip- ment, end fiscal and logistic support. The respective - 7 Ue T Appeadix
Secreteries ere hereby suthorised to issue such orderg es may be necessery to effectuate the purposes of this directive. (2) Provide fixed iaterceyt installations es authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Stats. ‘Such installations wil be menaed end sdminist ered oy the service providing Shen, but will be operationally directed oy AFSA. (3) Provide mobile intercept facilities required vy the Array, Navy’ end Ai> Force respectively, which will be menned, administered, end operaticnslly controlled by the individuel . sexvice. They may also be used to peztorn special missicas for ATSA as requested by the Director thereof. (4) Provide comaund cation facilities required by AFSA for joint use. “The erypto-natertel utilised in such facilities will ve furaisned by AFSA and will be operated end meintsined vy the individuel service. (5) Normally essign milit tery personnel to AFSA for a pert Lod of not less than thirty nonths, reserving the’ right to add, withdraw, or substitute personnel, vituta limitations of suthorized personnel strength of ATSA,’ and cubject <0 este enent by ‘the Director, AFSA. In accordence ith existing lew, e adninistr=tion of military personnel of the arsy, Navy, end Air Force assiged ‘to AgSA wil be a responsibility of the Arzy, levy, and Ai> Force, respectively. be +8 + - i Appendix
(5) Continue to be responsible for ell such cezyptolosic activities as are required oy intre-service cr joins needs Lu (e.5-, Communication intellisence processins, intercept, . resesrca and developnent, trainios, etc.) end ave determined . oy the Joint Chiefs of Stall not ct O te the sole responsibility of APSA. They will at ell times keep the Director, AFSA, fully informed concerning ell such activities. . (7) Not undestake or continue crygtologie activities which ese determined by the Joint Chiefs of State to be the sole resvonsinllity of ArSA. : . . 1 - = - “,. Invlementation - . soe ee s- Tee oonsolidation oy these parts of several service agtacies waich will coustitute the ATSA will be effected under the directica end control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the ninimm loss cf convinuiscg oF cperations. It shsil be initiated act leter than L duly 19k9 and caapleted not later then 1 Janvery 1950. . Whea the - consolidstioa hes been completed the Joint Chiefda’ of Staff will so . ; ‘ rd inform the Secretery of Defense. | ° . } . _ ; , mo /3/ Louis Jebasoa ad a Appendix
po EXHBIT I _The “CONSIDO” Problem | | oo oa At the same time that the central AFSA was created, one very active Bae s school of thought believed that there should be an “intelligence” counterpart ed j of AFSA charged with evaluation and dissemination of the COMINT product 1 as opposed to mere collection and processing. It proposed the erection of e ‘an agency to be known as the ‘‘Consolidated Special Information Dissemina- tion Office” (l.e., ‘‘CONSIDO”’) which would be composed of analysts of the —; 3 various COMINT consuming agencies, reporting to a chief of CONSIDO, and 7 "which would have absolute control over those further aspects of the COMINT aad c~ effort. The proposal, although worked out and presented in detail by its Wu. proponents, was abortive, but the germ of the idea is sthil very rouch alive i *e today and is actively advocated, in modified form, by a considerable group of i “” qualified COMINT officials. i The concept of entrusting to a centralized office the job of editing and ane interpreting communications intelligence has good precedent in the practices j = of the MaSeetne enemas Since 1920, in which year the present ieee ST ee have combined tn one compound and under one head both the production and the utilization of COMINT, and it has apparently worked out very well through the ensuing years. There is, - a ss however, an important difference between Wizex> and the CONSIDO
| f N, ~. | scheme as it was originally put forth: 4 “merge doth aspects of their effort, while CONSiIDO was. built on the principle that it‘be independent, * vertical, and alongside the new and (presumably) consolidated processing “plant with ne gangways between other than a suitable pipeline for passing the undigested material ‘trom one to the other. The head of CONsIDO was tobe — ’ a czar in his own right, from whese decisions there was almost no appeal. It was this that killed the plan, for consumers of COMINT, and especially the . civilian consumers, would not listen to any scheme that robbed them of their | sovereignty in the use to which they put their Share of the product, or the " ass{gnments which they : cared to give to their COMINT analysts, or the per- . Sons in thely. own establishments whom they considered eligible for COMINT fa te clearance. If CONSIDO had made its first appearance free of this element, its history might have been different, There are certain definite and undeniable advan- fy ** tages in the idea of centralized evaluation of the COMINT product. First, it i has security advantages: it provides the means for a better control and more limited distribution of the product without necessarily impairing its useful- ‘ness ~- it would drastically cut back, for example, the current practice of a monthly printing of some two million sheets of code-~word paper to gratify . the ‘‘minimum’’ demands of the customers. Second, it would result ina U finished COMINT product into which all pertinent collateral is intermixed -
: WL J &. ¢ t. : it i U : U cw : and not a rival to, AFSA itself. It would not be a separate organization. -It from central collateral files to which all consuming agencies continuously and freely contribute, thus giving to each consumer the full advantage of > national resources. . oe It is new conceded that any revival of the CONSIDO proposal would auto- matically entail one major change: CONSsiDO would.become a function of, might thus bring in its train advantages other than those outlined in the pre- ceding paragraph, such as “resolution of the present dilemma surrounding the production of plain text, or the shortcomings of the compromise “beachhead”? plan. The Committee believes that the Proposal has sufficient merit to justify @ recommendation that it be carefully reviewed by the new COMINT organi- ’ zation with the purpose of arriving at a decision either to dispose of it fLrally or to implement it in'whatever form seems best in light of the experience of three years of operation that have intervened since it was first put forth.
SOON Ma Unt ae at AU Maa Raa etlen setts eh AUR RRL ‘a CF SSI ry { soneb rin be ot wh yes rate Pores cya. tewehd erercd. worn riven NT ert ae At ea Bie Sel ach early de 4. 1 ar OYE Se eee eee fh ner 4 + tetrad: Bran ABE t < sf f Te yee Oral
rae ee POA poe Et SUS ARG A an GR NL AS Nasi MNS RTS OT Te % Fs ; per : ern q 4 ae : stay =". ps ab ates Biot Sd ey 1 fae “Bier iste Tey & ca om, “ de, y oz; Wess re is at ( f fe ee Se eet | , ‘ 4 eet hes me tat wNUA LS
~ = Te aes Téa ca NS eee as SIS SE RNS ‘ aA TS La ‘we 7m . Sek Oe) bes Foam # Tissd ¥y pg t . rd A 2 af 1, A ny ue 9 we
= Ay -e ont Y + yo Ney 3 ft. >, Vee Mlaytt
is eal ‘ is Ng [ peteicend pe INSEL S event ely ‘ 5 ! fin ‘ast § 1g 4 re 04 fa Z NE ERE ae | ike (3 5 ety oe a th pa ae y %, Nees Rn fe Ay ; en . ee oh - a 1 - < Rt A ee ee yaa an eet par whee oy Ss soy . « i ¢ , i} . rs * * ey ‘ aE aad ‘. e ibe a] yg f 4 i - Ca j ; : 3 “o 4 " - , 3 i ‘ i ‘ f ae ape Nes i ay . aly cy 4 Ly a : : i J: 1 ie . + rs Fy Of Soe Ae. ga Zh id ae i f ; je po . ‘ / e ; ; é va £6 4 4 J f , ; ‘ i “i . * I . on , ; : : es Sf. . Ce oe oe - te em wet my ee ty: tee ew me e
Kat a thd H AP ORIN) fy 4, Poise RAN Ry hiked prints Crean hihi art Fo ey p ‘ sey 2 Ue & St. Be ao MATL Ley 7 FL sb REY Bd mae 9 wre XG penton” Bey oxfeg 8 44, . pit Ar NS, ; ety wv Be EN te! Oe Uap Eee las ages Priy, Mie at eS Y ihe ake ags, ie a8 Fis a a A . a<0 * org Tite aed ’ . * Thre i > mate ; rd byte, ar Raita <i 6? * . fr 4) : teationst sae ye ty of bef" ‘Ss deg Ae Spates a AN x : Pysiad By my ea va v. Ny Ke: etn te Fn, Lake Shite, Tne Sl RE WETES SE, pat H se fi : ae Pies IPI T ae eed Ape ioe fe Ate ce hee bP t rf ) f ie y , a, 5 * inert
ra EROS arc caNrs by 9 Bm SY ne ative ati s Certegy - eo. ‘ . a . ° ° - ee ~ . * e bd e . ° . ° . ° . . , . . ° . . 4 ¢ "3 - . :
cI) o orcs J-f% - ae 7 +0 we ew et ewom ee me 8 6 ES Ree . ety ge ES mee, ee as . . . . ¢ .
rio, ~ rj Se SAG Fe Spine ee os X PN eres aes SSHtERA ASAE SEY § 3 {2 3 ae) Cala cc] 1 Wa OQ J-7 >. =~ 1s . tele ee fae pew ne oe Pe eee
oer Ea “baer Py ics . Fe , = a ri y] : BS fF SFOS CN 0 Fee ot Satan ee Let rset ous fe Pat etc < Fa od. . EPS Seog ee pesass HE RG
Teil ~ sen ‘ ° -_— - — 2) Re ey oe ere ee ee 7 ee eee we tee meee oe ee
Se es ae 4, ; ear h ‘ye ; ay ‘ be es eo ‘ Aes : se if a oe SSE. 3 unas Fz f oN at ZR 4 wi ze Fo wip zy Se. ats tise Rae S] Rey reSpacer Tee cs oe eer {3 SED an Oremaee Re yaa
-) — a Cala 3 I em. eee me. rey gen em ee ee eee ee - aa I-13 -. ome - re ee oe eo
Hee ped eae epee : am cs Ps geek easier Ge 4 s ‘, - “s - . Se . . —_ ° ae -“”y .. - tes - ” ‘ ~ - <A wan heen iaeeteneemnnnmmnenenee ated eren fs ae — . —_— wt te eee, —9 Seed tee i A ~ : oy ote eof _ OF —_ _—
tae es ee eS anne cme mw ae 8 ee ee ee - ° Lena ee os ya ig eon oar : o C Soft e BL : Pre
ee ee NST eb Lec VE Daath 8 Meri @ Reeth Ok erste a 7) ? Ss 131 sate TS &: * *e 3 hepet fon- Nita as Ps AST AN eceh ‘ asic Naty oe
ee ee ee ee oe oom oem ems es th ny Dad . &, g sat ts ee we soe wet ef ae ° a a 5 ee. et ct, woe + ee 8 eee o see memes 66 me ee ok SO RTE | cy Qa ANN mg, a | ape a ain 2 amp
e Hf x ane 3 *: 65-5 Ur ad % " Lo o* ¢, ae) an of ‘3 R iit ane at } be } spe He 4 iT? i it VN =
Feral cS Reh we H : Seen * pers : ~ As. . des om ; A a) . a ’ . Js onl <*, 4h. +, ate “fe * "$e . ¢ oe at 2, ‘ RA EEC IPS ae DMS DE VSN Rapa RR BRO b4) Ate 5a) 7 ira bein boed pee Arab BiH dhs Pa Malvar S Bea iE neh ib a pay: me oer 72 ’ BM bi 4c ah Day tas ey , ; rege le ; oh sed aes HEN 3 Te eas EROnLS} ge Oat pe & Wit Chbaderdl wy ka? o tne Lars va . . - Vel 4 a ' eta ‘ ' ' t a5 eS ion = ws e Sy on TA ‘3 ow gy S gS ay " $i AS oe es “erat nate ey Lane maf ot ws 4% * He PUTED” 2 ip nt opel NY weet ies Dotto ets . rete: $e O55 ae gba, by x . - - 4, + OF Sen ama ce mene ty = Sid Sang ea! ot * = ny 4 yeh IPAS, mS om aT © In AS * Y2 ro Sarthe , wwe 7“ Pe iy eg eels i vee th OAS ARY UE ‘ I iy SAO pee atta TERS tk 7” LA ast Iie A PED wee Me ae TIA Gl im a «e } Sha ore tee i * a ayy fa Bo Nae keh A $ 3 AREER TOURS URN NY Ue EMM RR - See SOP ICN CRORE CATR ko aa avg 3 ingayal ; RECA TS ye EE Sin ovat = ey re ee) "t< A eee E By 7 Reh Ate Rh Se a ee partir SHS ke En rH at ey Zise 0. ye tbc 3 Sahay? a = $81 aK Se SSRN Ky ASA ap om) a
ae e oh ag ye NM Ne % Rae Bane SRS Wi O27 cook am Age morn 4 “
5 ay oe . h Se \ 9 Pr ey vexe mh Naar aS: Apnea Meee) wince tings ease xs . ths : ‘ a We Coe wa fe Prats Ay Sera Renata ACH he pear enne en reh Ute Iyevese eh Sarg A Ngee AOE AG? AVI NS <- Pm KEES oe seh mgt “yok wehiar APRA Bai BL Hea POR MAL EP pete : Pato bierraes LON NT Wh Gels I Ns pitt staat aah WeX ae wR in 9 PAO ae Dn oa . ¢ oS clay Laat he s 4 ‘ os ‘ i j Ie M *, y “ cP eee 2 za 4 . — e (a ai f : A OAS Cees let M9 : Cashes aHiet r aoe + {ts “ files Ep’, : a ia ' RM deena 39 a Sie } soe re ahG cs: ‘4 p.e- ig roe +." wee tae yas PT ka Via hats ay aM pe yw ~?, ARS % LA te iC RN Male ee ieee See SOY AURORE ii? too bre ee “. ws, . PALSY wd 7. : SN Uee tay Me ed OAS Se i Riis OE NO Leh ie * SoS Len exe “> : “T pa we ANE 1S he ~- um, o o . : we bay wre ee
y yj ry Co.) y i WES ¥ : 3) tan aad 3 ¥ ie t x f ¢ yt 4) AN Magh Ne Co £9 try ¢. & f a) ‘ a5 ma cB { ee SE AE ot ray ds .d Py) bee atte) tae gt tee, ase hs at; a ‘Ls, ay 3, 3 oh re 1 AN : is fies Wie ee Hi oe ; : Teer sor eS f . ~ my (oo moe. j O22 sass xt Soar} } CoO Mm cy. fe. \ ° (9 CC ne 7
tA PLE “i> tf Lt 7 hel s| doh’ Pee tte han be uae Se cas : hb A Arye i . . ae A - € e Sey y res > I, te . A : 1 4 r oe} et PP . fal M ed * " ' « ba Bry) ‘ LS at Maat Sine eH . : . : b SETH oe) ely win) } 2 y ARENAS oe : x Brees 5 Wy Sap ed Sel Nid TH Hop ey EE Uy ae Lang SAP 6s): 5 3 +4, 3 " \ ; . ic " tw eae " : We § a . caves ; 33 2 =a Us: : ‘ 3 r : Y Abe: i . fe Ae? re : wi Ee ", 4, g s aan =. woe: nel : bl BR, CS; it ~ _ '. La 7
ra, i passat ih) Ch ( ) a Fi A thee a bared *, 4 4 wv, MieAe: $ . ones) SHA Re NE ANS s ror or) t UR Ati is sPASE P a) yp e ft ee ede eA OF Botte? - sh Aaa A Tae eae Dts
SETS PEOMENCT Cy aA Ora: Feeds ; TALS Rhy EE nee payed: Aisin tlt Pea TRAN Pete a eaciree emer iene ned eget rea eihe 3 ESC SRA Dn PRCT AS Sie a4 §% hoi 7-, toe geage Med KW SENG EY SRS CHES Boes ack Rea eer —s Li? erie Svene tw? Bo ee We: Fe’ FRY “J + ort he a eg, Sore ay, UHRA path atts lt a ip Pues a re Et} i. eS ; is Ai qigee S af : Me AN | ; * 4 Fes: . x “3 " PON AS fees bet Rr ae ? p . s : * ‘ 7 Pract A . : Ry. &: ae OT 4 i PA ' inde pee ea : S. ¥ te! Far ie -bgly 4 b eier st ZEUS a TGR ne Fit bs 5 ao eyo pat} mi) a) Gea IM Mee iad ot eras ary ° Q iP Slated Wal tia) OO I Rea ar regen talen ety Ses arts 4, Rae wk om Frise: SEAS Gees Ys 3 Ge Z
Valery SA AAAS CEST Beye ee wy Wy ety, “1 ry YS
' ‘Be ‘ i ‘ : Set & . ATS Aid LN GF. AR <4 a ¢ “ ° ° ; Rh ERY ULB ES EY Souca Gass AKC e pees Baa ae va ACRE : , RA ny, a SERRE te , ; Nut by: ehh BRAT me mo - vet ilies: Spit rar \
t en \ i su eat 5 ys Hi 4 4 Pe 4 aM! at Rate sR Aig i i ult ees NEE ee TR HL a aan Wei Ne c atante eee i€ i Bee ples ayy ee 4 4) D vs hee a oJ) WE, HoAN Il -¢
AEE CN ONC brah ado sc: \ ESRD y AAS) a 4
DAY ise ese “a! : s ™ ONL at OES A OE a NC ' ioe SEN IELA BUCS Mages: fs 1973. LO pe Fe t ila Wate esta er kA 2 oy pH eta iat ¥ AS tie oe hs BAgepacens eet Ee Ne ro Sees orb Pe. ORES ir abt ‘ Or, tacks West ease =! tien =e Ks aay Oe, Pals = X: : vee a te Cae 5 >» PRION hag RMS Tae rat al hy Alone, aetne eS BA ey Sard Tae MY DN Oelyy vs Fae sire AE ere ot 7 , | tcy ~ ov] . { ' j ; | { { t : | ° moc o bred ),
fal . és 9 y “ts ry, ty, ane bye * TS ay’ Ch ma! . sires abcss A me xa) : p op eraty beh ter 2 no f i B5 Ca a } Wear MN * ‘SP? ph yt Ma Ls{galeS ence . ; ‘ me STN = $3 Ses) ec ie a: by Pre ote PITH pes ni : ate Ag ANSE IS ee CES eed ek eases ec: - No]
iw f : a" ' ‘ "Ss oat . Ae Ct eb ‘ we 3 f RS 1298 is : 3tg) AS Hy A Be be . t Pe She * Ath vem Coarse . he : baat IECrpss 24 §. . . ’ ie batt 1 * At? bes aye e: a sh, Myx . . : * ‘ , rE rg.! 4 A =i :’ ; vais 5 phe $2.0 W! Ss ea i i SF pase . fal piehs Best tet A} be oP FEARS ep ae , Or yi 4 , . Aas este ihe i Ad A a ° W 7 4 mie he LO . Poay ’ y 4 "1 5s " ote ied B i ‘ y fae : . bs ee ae Regen
Ay Myers TO: - rity et 5 4 PRCT O TEBE SR nae ine ea are 4 D rest y BN ie 2 Pan yee A . if Bes reat ~2 - i Sx = = . fr 1 . ye oe Oy " fol toate - an : et - : Ba fe ¥ . r ne Gol “ ee ee a ayFei > oS bs . "BaF SNE OO Ws ieee ca) Oe ee eee. me em, ee ee eee i el te the tn Yn +e we wo
Biden aha] ves tts sek —_.s me mae ee .': i " oO OVER H EP Sars REEL * Sana , % $3082 wm wee ee te J; er ae one s, ve ¥ na ee mong ON wares et vp ioe ; pk : A ’ Pamices : ; ” Ar Sta eAta
Sgn er ae) tarts. oa Bs t= Sot SORTER AG Pr ans alee AEs fe, ‘3 : af Bek y rf a bg feat Se Fey Ae 2 Blake > Wy. a a a shpataas See Oe? te me om . 7 - a . : . --
Neo ARNG . h ie ve Ne) bh ie: 18 SS ak) we NC } 4 OSH | } ‘ : ‘ ’ SRG TE Ae ce 7 : RE OU oe UCU ih aa COIS Ray Seth 4 TAT 4 gh Ha wists Hh A mabe Fey ARt: ) Dae EN is toy fog real Vibeed : apa G NAR EMCI T ta eyo ACNE AG peare an : OREN Ro Nae AS "i aan! 1 tre : pretest Me fr ‘ td “. AV ORG She ‘3 ff, ‘D ‘" 4 an " x . PAY PEW Cartas a a met gt 4 el Sir ph $id v4 So ‘ pealiy: Neate + EOC CEA ates eS Beds YONA EC TMNT EAS ENN ARES SR Regula ees AY rr cre eae! ane ary A eee
See ar wy: 2 ~ Peraked g é f i t AS a 6 roe PEE AS S pS AP wd % . Oe ) afta 44 =" a no we, > SS: =. J ee a Fel, Sh 3 be f os SEs Op A Rey : .% wm e sor ets SALEG SxaSA i x setae me oe he ace ae of ‘a ‘os cA FEELS PO cs eae Ey . J ee bes Pes eer bE TS POMS cs >! * ©. Teme ara fad
AY xeys Yas C0 : ay PAS UN 35 Phys # mawle nh Y} Ve OY 4 4 ye - we Pate Pyrat BA 5 Reiter a ty so) ‘< y : " t oe feo att ah R ‘ Saye . “ £0) : , ty ane a Rely Ar! . 4 « ¥ “Pe te® £8 OS UP Sa ho . mes. on ve ah 8 ol iP “ " . oC = a on, Sapa a 2G Teer Py fs Ip oe ere eye bf 4 aye BAY eRR MA Diz) ag eat Staats CE SRC aaa RVR era Sere ei LR ent RAREST USERS pr taen ts Meeker aR Ee HE RSS ings pales Bay aia ae Ge UNS Ete IPSS UE HACE AION it 3 Seen a eat Rte DE Cabs OMe eye Rear E Ss me eee Wigner ees A TBRaNU recast Wet Rae SCE . < ont: ee ard bee tee oe OBST Bs) 3 A we UD TaN 3p! Uk EP ey Fy] ae? of ’ omer. a —— owe ooo le De Ae “4 settee ee a a oe we om el eet co Lal el)