"*c        Director  of 
Central 
Intelligence 
Soviet  Civil  Defense 
Nl  78-10003 
July  1978
Soviet  Civil  Defense 
Director  of  Central  Intelligence 
Julv  1978 
Key  Findings 
Civil  defense  in  the  Soviet  Union  is  an  ongoing  nationwide 
program  under  military  control.  The  Soviets'  strategic  writings  integrate 
civil  defense  into  their  military  strategy.  It  is  part  of  a  general  scheme  of 
the  likely  origins,  course,  and  consequences  of  nuclear  war.  The  Soviets' 
experience  in  World  War  II  and  their  traditional  emphasis  on  homeland 
defense  reinforce  their  interest  in  civil  defense.  By  developing  an  active 
and  extensive  civil  defense,  in  conjunction  with  their  other  defensive 
and  offensive  strategic  programs,  they  hope  to  convince  potential 
enemies  that  they  cannot  win  a  war  with  the  USSR.  If  war  should  occur, 
the  Soviets  seek  through  civil  defense  along  with  other  means  to  assure 
survival  of  the  homeland  and  to  leave  the  USSR  in  a  stronger  postwar 
position  than  its  adversaries.  Civil  defense  is  meant  to  contribute  to  the 
maintenance  of  a  functioning  logistic  base  for  continuing  military 
operations,  to  help  limit  human  and  material  losses,  and  to  help  enable 
the  Soviets   to  speed   recovery   from  the  effects  of  nuclear  war. 
The  Soviet  civil  defense  program  is  not  a  crash  effort,  but  its  pace 
increased  beginning  in  the  late  1960s.  Civil  defense  activities  are 
directed  by  a  nationwide  civil  defense  organization  consisting  of  over 
100,000  full-time  personnel  located  at  all  levels  of  the  Soviet 
government  and  economic  structure.  While  improvements  have  been 
made  in  virtually  all  facets  of  the  program,  it  has  been  marked  by  wide 
variations  in  implementation  from  area  to  area  and  year  to  year. 
Bureaucratic  difficulties  and  apathy  on  the  part  of  a  large  segment  of 
the  population  have  retarded  implementation  in  the  past,  though  in 
wartime  such  problems  would  probably  diminish.  A  sustained  effort  has 
been  made  to  provide  blast  shelters  for  the  leadership  and  essential 
personnel.  Programs  to  protect  industry  by  geographic  dispersal  have 
not  been  implemented  to  a  significant  extent,  however,  and  there  is 
little  evidence  of   hardening  of  economic   installations. 
The  Soviets  regard  the  specific  objectives  of  their  civil  defense 
program   to   be: 
—  An  ability  to  protect  people — the  leadership  first,  the  essential 
work  force  second,  and  the  remainder  of  the  population  third.
—  An  ability  Ui  protect  tin*  .sources  of  economic  prodiulivil y.  to 
assure  the  continuity  of  economic  activity  in  wartime,  and  to 
permit  the  restoration  of  production  following  a  nuclear  attack. 
—  An  ability  to  sustain  the  surviving  population  in  the  period 
immediately  following  a  nuclear  attack,  and  to  prepare  for 
longer  term   postattack  recovery. 
We  have  assessed  the  state  of  Soviet  civil  defense  preparations  with 
respect   to  these  objectives. 
Protection  of  People: 
—  Leadership:  The  Soviets  probably  have  sufficient  blast-shelter 
space  in  hardened  command  posts  for  virtually  all  the 
leadership  elements  at  all  levels  (about  110,000  people).  Some  of 
these  shelters  are  harder  than  those  available  to  the  general 
population.  All  fixed  leadership  shelters  which  have  been 
identified  are  vulnerable  to  direct  attack,  but  we  assume  that 
alternative  arrangements  are  available  to  protect  at  least  the  top 
leadership. 
—  Essential  Work  Force:  Shelters  at  key  economic  installations 
could  accommodate  about  12  to  24  percent  of  the  total  work 
force.  However,  Soviet  plans  do  not  call  for  sheltering  the  entire 
work  force.  In  a  crisis,  nonessential  and  off-duty  workers  would 
be  evacuated.  Only  those  required  to  maintain  essential 
production  would  remain  behind  to  be  sheltered.  If  one-half  the 
total  work  force  is  dispersed,  from  24  to  48  percent  of  the 
remainder  could  be  sheltered. 
—  Population:  A  minimum  of  10  to  20  percent  of  the  total 
population  in  urban  areas  (including  essential  workers)  could  be 
accommodated  at  present  in  blast-resistant  shelters.  By  1985,  the 
percentage  of  the  urban  population  that  could  be  sheltered 
would  rise  to  15  to  30  percent,  assuming  no  change  in  the 
present  rate  of  shelter  construction.  Despite  the  scope  and  pace 
of  shelter  construction,  the  absolute  number  of  city  dwellers  not 
afforded  such  protection  by  1985  will  increase  because  of  the 
expected    population   growth  in  urban  areas. 
The  critical  decision  to  be  made  by  the  Soviet  leaders  in 
terms  of  sparing  the  population  would  be  whether  or  not  to 
evacuate  cities.  Only  by  evacuating  the  bulk  of  the  urban 
population  could  they  hope  to  achieve  a  marked  reduction  in 
the  number  of  urban  casualties.  An  evacuation  of  urban  areas 
could  probably  be  accomplished  in  two  or  three  days,  with  as 
much  as  a  week  required  for  full  evacuation  of  the  largest  cities. 
These  times  could  be  extended  by  shortages  in  transportation, 
other   bottlenecks,   or   adverse   weather  conditions.
Protection  of  the  Economy:  Soviet  measures  to  protect  the 
economy  could  not  prevent  massive  industrial  damage.  The  Soviet 
program  for  dispersal  of  industry  appears  to  be  offset  by  a  contrary 
tendency  for  investments  in  new  facilities  to  be  inside  or  near 
previously  existing  installations.  The  Soviet  measures  for  protecting  the 
work  force,  critical  equipment,  and  supplies  and  for  limiting  damage 
from  secondary  effects  could  contribute  to  maintaining  and  restoring 
production  after  an  attack.  Wc  expect  some  improvements  in  the  level 
of  protection  for  the  economy,  but  any  radical  change  in  its 
vulnerability   to   nuclear  attack   is   unlikely. 
Postattack  Recovery:  The  operating  elements  of  the  civil  defense 
program  as  well  as  a  substantial  number  of  the  civilian  population  (a 
number  we  cannot  estimate  with  confidence)  have  received  training  in 
rescue  and  recovery  operations  such  as  administering  first  aid,  clearing 
rubble,  decontaminating,  and  providing  emergency  repair  and  restora- 
tion of  power.  With  at  least  several  weeks  to  build  up  reserves  and 
distribute  supplies  of  food  and  fuel,  the  Soviets  could  probably  provide 
adequate  supplies  to  sustain  the  relocated  and  surviving  urban 
population  in  the  period  immediately  following  a  nuclear  attack. 
Nevertheless,  the  coordination  of  requirements  with  available  supplies 
and  transportation  is  a  complex  problem  for  Soviet  planners  even  in 
peacetime,  let  alone  following  a  large-scale  nuclear  attack.  We  have  not 
evaluated  the  potential  for  continuity  of  the  Soviet  government  or  the 
USSR's  long-term  ability  to  recover  from  the  effects  of  a  nuclear  attack. 
Costs:  While  total  civil  defense  costs  are  unknown,  cost  estimates 
have  been  made  of  three  major  elements  of  the  Soviet  program:  pay  for 
full-time  civil  defense  personnel,  operation  of  specialized  civil  defense 
military  units,  and  shelter  construction.  The  cost  of  these  elements  in 
1976  amounted  to  about  400  million  rubles,  less  than  1  percent  of  the 
estimated  Soviet  defense  budget.  If  these  three  elements  of  the  Soviet 
program  were  to  be  duplicated  in  the  United  States,  they  would  have 
cost  about  $2  billion  in  1976,  with  about  three-fourths  of  this 
representing  manpower  costs.  (These  estimates  should  be  considered 
rough  approximations.  They  are  affected  by  uncertainties  both  in  the 
quantitative  data  on  civil  defense  programs  and  in  estimates  of  prices.) 
Effects  of  Civil  Defense:  In  analyzing  the  effects  of  civil  defense 
on  levels  of  damage  and  casualties  the  Soviets  might  sustain,  we 
simulated  a  hypothetical  attack  against  high-value  military  and 
economic  targets.  The  Soviet  population  as  such  was  not  deliberately 
targeted^  For  the  purposes  of  this  simulation  we  assumed  JL  single 
retaliatory  attack  immediately  following  a  Soviet  first  strike.  Our 
analysis  in  effect  tends  to  present  a  "worst  case"  for  retaliation.  For 
example,  various  times  were  assumed  to  be  available  to  the  Soviets  to 
make  civil  defense  preparations,  ranging  from  a  few  hours  to  a  week  or 
more,  while  in  each  case  opposing  forces  were  assumed  not  to  have
progressed  beyond  day-to-day  alert.  In  reality,  Soviet  eflort.s  to 
maximize  civil  deiense  preparations  could  lead  a  potential  opponent  to 
place   its   forces   at    increased   level*   of   readiness. 
The  effectiveness  of  civil  defense  in  reducing  casualties  in  the 
USSR  and  in  coping  with  the  postattack  period  would  depend  primarily 
on  the  time  available  to  make  final  preparations  before  an  attack.  (The 
analysis  considered  only  those  casualties  that  occurred  during  the  first 
month  following  an  attack  and  resulted  from  prompt  nuclear  effects 
and  early  fallout.)  Using  the  results  of  the  hypothetical  attack  under  the 
assumptions  referred   to  above,   we  estimate  that: 
—  Under  worst  conditions  for  the  USSR,  with  only  a  few  hours  or  ) 
less  to  make  final  preparations,  Soviet  casualties  would  be  well 
over   100  million   but   a   large   percentage  of   the   leadership  j 
elements   would   probably  survive. 
—  The  critical  time  for  preparation  appears  to  be  about  two  or 
three  days,  because  only  by  evacuating  could  the  Soviets  hope  to 
avert  massive  losses.  With  a  few  days  for  final  preparations, 
casualties  could  be  reduced  by  more  than  50  percent;  most  of 
this  reduction  would  be  due  to  evacuation,  the  remainder  to 
shelters. 
—  Under  the  most  favorable  conditions  for  the  USSR,  including  a 
week  or  more  to  complete  urban  evacuation  and  then  to  protect 
the  evacuated  population.  Soviet  civil  defenses  could  reduce 
casualties   to   the  1ffre--te«i^pi_millions. 
—  While  many  of  the  essential  personnel  sheltered  at  economic 
facilities  would  probably  survive  an  attack,  the  Soviets  could  not 
prevent  massive  damage  to  their  economy  and  the  destruction 
of  many  of  their   most   valued   material  accomplishments. 
The  casualty  levels  noted  above  could  be  increased  if,  for  example,  the 
attack  came  while  an  evacuation  was  in  progress,  if  the  size  of  the  attack 
were  larger,  if  the  attack  were  stretched  out  over  a  longer  period,  if  it 
were  directed  against  the  population  as  such,  or  if  the  evacuation  were 
less  expeditious  than  planned  or  impeded  by  adverse  weather  or 
transportation  deficiencies.  In  assessing  the  protection  afforded  by  their 
civil  defenses  the  Soviets  would  take  account  of  these  uncertainties. 
The  Soviets  almost  certainK   believe  their  present  civil  defenses 
would  improve  their  ability  to  conduct  military  operations  and  would 
enhance  the  USSR's  chances  for  survival  following  a  nuclear  exchange. . 
They  cannot  have  confidence,  however,  in  the  degree  of  protection 
their  civil  defenses  would  afford  them,  given  the  many  uncertainties! 
attendant  to  a  nuclear  exchange    We  do  not  believe  that  the  Soviets'  \ 
present  civil  defenses  would  embolden  them  deliberately  to  expose  the  \ 
USSR   to   a   higher   risk   of    nuciear   attack.
/"  Present  evidence  does  not  suggest  that  in  the  foreseeable  future 
there  will  be  any  significant  chance  in  the  Soviet  leaders'  judgment  that 
civil  defense  contributes  to  war-fighting  and  war-survival  capabilities, 
nor  that  their  uncertainties  about  its  actual  effectiveness  would  be 
lessened.  Thus,  we  have  no  reason  to  believe  that  the  Soviet  leaders' 
I  perception  of  the  contribution  of  civil  defense  to  their  capabilities  for 
strategic  nuclear  conflict   will  change  significantly.
DISCUSSION 
1.  Civil  defense  in  the  Soviet  Union  is  an  ongoing 
nationwide  program  under  military  control.  The 
Soviets"  strategic  writings  integrate  civil  defense  into 
their  military  strategy.  It  is  part  of  a  general  scheme  of 
the  likely  origins,  course,  and  consequences  of  nuclear 
war.  The  Soviets'  experiences  in  World  War  II  and 
their  traditional  emphasis  on  homeland  defense 
reinforce  their  interest  in  civil  defense.  By  developing 
an  active  and  extensive  civil  defense  program,  in 
conjunction  with  their  other  defensive  and  offensive 
strategic  programs,  they  hope  to  convince  any 
potential  enemy  that  it  cannot  win  a  war  with  the 
USSR.  The  Soviets  seek,  through  civil  defense  along 
with  other  means,  to  assure  the  survival  of  the  USSR  if 
a  war  does  occur  and  to  come  out  of  it  in  a  stronger 
postwar  position  than  their  adversaries.  Civil  defense  is 
meant  to  contribute  to  the  maintenance  of  a 
functioning  logistic  base  of  operations  by  regular 
armed  forces  to  win  the  war,  to  help  limit  human  and 
material  losses,  and  to  help  enable  the  USSR  to  speed 
recovery  from  the  consequences  of  war. 
2.  This  study  focuses  on  the  USSR's  civil  defense 
objectives  and  the  progress  the  Soviets  are  making 
toward  achieving  them.  It  assesses  some  of  the  effects 
of  Soviet  civil  defense  preparations  in  reducing 
casualties  and  damage  from  a  large-scale  nuclear 
attack.  Because  we  do  not  know  much  about  the 
consequences  of  a  large-scale  attack  on  the  functioning 
of  a  modern,  industrialized  society,  the  study  deals 
with  that  relatively  brief  period  following  a  strike 
during  which  the  most  obvious  effects  of  a  nuclear 
exchange  would  be  apparent.  It  does  not  assess  the . 
Soviets'  post-nuclear-attack  capabilities  to  conduct 
military  operations  or  their  longer  term  prospects  for 
political  cohesion  and  reconsritution  of  the  economy. 
3.  We  have  attempted  to  describe  the  Soviet 
program  in  a  way  that  would  allow  for  an  assessment 
of  the  confidence  that  the  Soviet  leaders  place  in  the 
program— the  degree  to  which  their  civil  defense 
makes  them  feel  more  able  to  withstand  the  conse- 
quences of  a  strategic  nuclear  exchange.  A  principal 
effort  has  been  to  analyze  what  the  effect  of  an  attack 
on  the  Soviet  Union  would  be — to  assess  the  degree  of 
protection  provided  for  the  leadership,  for  the 
economy,   and   for  the  population. 
Objectives,   Priorities,   and    Pace 
4.  The  Soviets  regard  the  specific  objectives  of  their 
civil  defense  program  to  be: 
—  An  ability  to  protect  peoples — the  leadership  first, 
the  essential  work  force  second,  and  the  remain- 
der of  the  population  third. 
—  An  ability  to  protect  the  sources  of  economic 
productivity,  to  assure  the  continuity  of  eco- 
nomic activity  in  wartime,  and  to  permit  the 
restoration  of  production  following  a  nuclear 
attack. 
—  An  ability  to  sustain  the  surviving  population  in 
the  period  immediately  following  a  nuclear 
attack  and  to  prepare  for  longer  term  postattack 
recovery.   (See  the  tabulation  below.) 
5.  In  terms  of  actual  priorities,  the  Soviet  program 
appears  to  hew  closely  to  what  its  organizers  have 
declared  their  intentions  to  be.  The  first  priority  is  to 
protect  people  In  support  of  this  part  of  the  program, 
the  Soviets  have  built  blast  shelters,  established 
relocation  sites,  and  developed  evacuation  plans.  The 
Objectives  and  Priorities  of  Soviet  Gvfl  Defense 
Program  Objectives 
Priority  Tasks 
Protection     of 
Resources 
Human 
Continuity  of  Economic 
Activity  in  Wartime 
'Liquidation  of  Conse- 
quences of  Enemy  At- 
tack" 
Sheltering  and  relocation  of  the 
leadership 
Sheltering  and  dispersal  of  essential 
workers 
Sheltering  and  evacuation  of  the  ur- 
ban population 
Stockpiling  food  and  medical  supplies 
Integration  of  civil  defense  and  eco- 
nomic mobilization  plans 
Rapid  shutdown  of  industrial  facilities 
Permanent    and   hasty    hardening   of 
installations  and  equipment 
Crisis  relocation  of  economic  enter- 
prises 
Stockpiling  reserves  of  materials 
Geographic  dispersal  of  industry 
Preparation  of  military  and  civil  de- 
fense formations 
Training  in  rescue  and  recovery 
Preparations  for  distribution  of  food 
and  essential  supplies
$ 
sfiuucl  priority  i-s  to  maintain  tlir  continuity  of 
troiitiinu'  aidviiy  in  warlunr  Much  of  tltr  action  on 
(iiis  part  of  the  program  appears  to  have  been  directed 
toward  providing  protection  for  the  work  force.  The 
third  priority,  "liquidation  of  the  consequences  of  an 
enemy  attack,"  involves  the  training  of  a  substantial 
number  of  the  civilian  population  in  postattack 
operations  such  as  administering  first  aid,  clearing 
rubble,  decontaminating,  and  providing  emergency 
repair  and   restoration  of  power. 
6.  The  pace  of  the  Soviet  civil  defense  program  is 
affected  on  the  one  hand  by  commitments  of  the 
leadership  to  realize  progress  in  peacetime  prepara- 
tions, and  on  the  other  Ijy  the  reluctance  of  some 
ministries,  industrial  managers,  and  local  officials  to 
dedicate  scarce  resources  to  what  they  regard  as  a 
secondary  requirement  and  by  apathy  toward  civil 
defense  among  a  large  segment  of  the  public.  While  it 
is  not  a  crash  effort,  the  pace  of  the  program  increased 
in  the  late  1960s.  Civil  defense  preparations  are 
continuing,  but  the  extent  of  implementation  of  civil 
defense  measures  varies  from  area  to  area. 
Organization 
7.  A  publicly  recognized,  highly  structured,  mili- 
tary-controlled civil  defense  organization  exists  at  all 
levels  of  the  Soviet  government  and  economy,  with  the 
head  of  every  organization  designated  "chief  of  civil 
defense."  The  national  organization  is  led  by  General 
of  the  Army  A.  T.  Altunin,  a  Deputy  Minister  of 
Defense.  Full-time  civil  defense  staffs  exist  at  each 
echelon  of  the  Soviet  administrative  structure:  na- 
tional, republic,  oblast,  city,  and  rayon,  as  well  as  at  all 
significant  economic  institutions  and  enterprises. 
8.  The  operating  elements  of  the  Soviet  civil 
defense  program — those  that  would  carry  out  post- 
attack  recovery— consist  of  a  Urge  number  of  military 
civil  defense  units,  communications  elements,  and 
civilian  civil  defense  formations.  We  estimate  the 
number  of  full-time  civil  defense  personnel  to  be  more 
than  100.000.  Counting  all  civilian  units  and  forma- 
tions according  to  guidelines  issued  by  General  Altunin 
in  1975,  the  total  number  of  people  in  the  program 
would  be  upwards  of  16  million — a  number  that 
includes  many  perfunctory  participants. 
9.  The  peacetime  effectiveness  of  the  civil  defense 
organization  suffers  at  times  from  the  reluctance  of 
industrial  officials  to  spare  labor  and  other  resources 
for  civil  defense  and  from  misunderstandings  between 
civil  defense  officers  and  Soviet  civilians.  In  wartime, 
increased  centralization  of  authority  would  probably 
reduce  many  of  the  bureaucratic  inefficiencies  inher- 
ent in  this  large  organization  Hut  the  fact  that  flu- 
organization  exists,  dcspilr  its  problems,  and  the  fact 
that  progress  is  being  made  toward  fulfillment  of  the 
objectives  of  the  civil  defense  program  give  Soviet  civil 
defense  leaders  some  confidence  in  their  ability  to 
function  as  required.  On  the  whole,  the  Soviets'  view 
of  their  civil  defense  organizational  structure  probably 
is  a  favorable  one— overall,  better  than  it  was  before 
the  military  assumed  control  of  it  in  the  early  1970s. 
10.  The  Soviet  leaders'  emphasis  on  civil  defense 
also  offers  the  potential  to  foster  favorable  popular 
attitudes  toward  the  Soviet  system,  to  demonstrate 
leadership  concern  for  the  people,  and  to  lend 
credibility  to  calls  for  vigilance  against  potential 
enemies.  Nearly  every  Soviet  citizen  receives  civil 
defense  instruction  either  in  school  or  through  training 
courses,  lectures,  and  exercises  at  places  of  work. 
Public  attitudes  about  surviving  a  nuclear  war  remain 
skeptical,  however,  and  there  is  evidence  that  many 
^people  do  not  take  the  program  seriously.  Neverthe- 
less, the  Soviet  people  would  respond  to  directions 
from  civil  defense  authorities. 
Protection  of   People 
11.  Leaderthip.  When  we  speak  of  measures  for 
the  protection  of  the  leadership,  we  refer  not  only  to 
the  top  national  leadership  but  also  to  some  5,000 
party  and  government  officials  at  the  national  and 
republic  level;  63,000  party  and  government  leaders  at 
kray,  oblast,  city,  and  urban  rayon  level;  2,000 
managers  of  key  installations;  and  about  40,000 
members  of  civil  defense  staffs — about  1 1  OJTflft  people 
in  all 
12.  Throughout  the  Soviet  Union  there  is  a  pattern 
of  shelter  construction  for  this  leadership.  It  consists  of 
hardened  underground  shelters  near  places  of  work 
and  relocation  sites  outside  the  cities.  Hardened 
command  posts  have  been  constructed  near  Moscow 
and  at  other  sites.  Some  of  these  shelters  are  harder 
than  those  available  to  the  general  population.  The 
pattern  of  local  shelter  and  relocation  sites  extends 
from  government  ministries  to  party  headquarters  ami 
oblast  and  city  governments  and  includes  sites  for 
major  industrial  enterprises  as  well.  While  we  do  not 
know  much  about  exact  amounts,  it  is  probable  that 
these  shelters  generally  have  some  stockpiles  of  food, 
medicine,  protective  equipment,  communications,  and 
other  supplies  for  their  prospective  occupants. 
13.  The  Soviets  probably  have  sufficient  command 
post  shelter  space  for  virtually  all  the  leadership 
elements  as  defined  in  this  paper  (that  is,  about 
110,000   people).   This   estimate  takes  into  account
q 
space  required  for  supplies,  communications,  and 
work  area.  All  fixed  leadership  shelters  which  have 
been  identified  would  be  vulnerable  to  direct  attack, 
but  we  assume  that  alternative  arrangements  are 
available   to   protect   at   least   the  top   leadership. 
14.  Essential  Personnel.  Soviet  plans  for  protec- 
tion of  essential  personnel  include  sheltering  at  their 
places  o(  work  and  rotation  oi  off-shift  personnel 
outside  of  likely  target  areas.  The  Soviets  could 
probably  shelter  about  12  to  24  percent  of  the  total 
work  force  at  key  industrial  installations.  This  assumes 
shelter  occupancy  factors  of  1  square  meter  or  0.5 
square  meter  per  person — factors  that  are  mentioned 
in  Soviet  civil  defense  manuals.  The  actual  percentage 
of  on-duty  workers  that  could  be  sheltered  during  a 
crisis  would  be  considerably  higher.  Only  those 
required  to  maintain  essential  production  would 
remain  behind  to  be  sheltered.  If  one-half  the  total 
work  force  is  dispersed,  from  24  to  48  percent  of  the 
remainder  could  be  sheltered. 
15.  Population.  Soviet  plans  call  for  moving  people 
to  in-place  blast  shelters  as  well  as  for  the  evacuation 
of  population  from  urban  target  areas.  Assessments  of 
the  effectiveness  of  this  part  of  the  Soviet  program  are 
highly  dependent  on  the  scenario  chosen,  but  tentative 
evaluations  are  possible.  Nationwide  the  Soviets  have 
probably  constructed  more  than  15,000  blast-resistant 
shelters  (including  those  at  economic  facilities)  that 
can  protect  10  million  to  20  million  people,  depending 
on  whether  the  shelter  occupancy  factor  is  1  or  0l5 
square  meter  per  person.  This  is  roughly  10  to  20 
percent  of  the  total  population  in  cities  of  more  than 
100,000  people.  We  are  confident  that  more  extensive 
analysis  would  result  in  an  upward,  not  downward, 
adjustment  of  this  figure,  but  we  are  unable  to  say  by 
how   much. 
16.  Some  additional  protection  would  be  available 
to  the  Soviet  population  in  the  form  of  subway  tunnels 
and  stations.  The  Moscow  subway,  for  example,  has  92 
underground  stations  and  more  than  150  kilometers  of 
tunnels.    We   estimate    that    between    240,000   and 
480,000  persons  could  be  sheltered  in  the  station  areas 
and  four  times  that  number  in  the  track  tunneWTor  a 
total  of  17  to  34  percent  of  the  population  of  the  city. 
This  total  is  in  addition  to  the  number  that  could  be 
m  sheltered  in  the  previously  discussed  shelters.  The  five 
"other  operating  subway  systems  in  the  USSR  could 
provide  an  additional  increase  in  the  total  sheltered 
population.  However,  we  have  not  included  subways 
in  our  estimate  of  total  shelter  capacity  because  the 
subways  could  be  intended  for  evacuation  and  because 
of  our  uncertainty  about  the  existence  of  life-support 
systems   in  the   subways. 
17.  We  estimate  that  75  to  90  percent  of  the  people 
in  urban  shelters  would  be  adequately  protected  from 
the  blast  and  other  prompt  cffit-ts  of  a  nuclear  attack 
that  was  intended  to  maximize  damage  to  industrial 
and  military  targets.  On  the  other  hand,  evacuation  of 
the  bulk  of  the  urban  population  would  be  necessary 
in  order  to  achieve  a  marked  reduction  in  the  total 
number  of  urban  casualties. 
18.  Soviet  writings  state  that  the  order  to  evacuate 
cities  would  be  given  during  the  "special  period" — a 
period  of  high  tension  and  increased  risk  of  war.  This 
order  would  be  disseminated  to  the  public  via  the  mass 
media.   Individual   installations  would   use  available 
means  to  notify  personnel  of  the  time  and  place  for 
staging  their  evacuation.  Factories,  offices,  schools,  or 
bus  and  train  stations  would  serve  as  embarkation 
points.  According  to  Soviet  planners,  the  population 
would   have  only   a   few   hours   to   prepare   for   an 
evacuation  following  the  order  to  do  so.   On   their 
arrival  at  assembly  points,  people  would  board  buses 
or    trains,    or    would    begin    walking    toward    their 
previously  assigned   relocation   areas.  Those  persons 
destined  for  remote  areas  would  be  evacuated  first  to 
intermediate  points,  where  they  would  rest  and  be  fed 
by    local    authorities.    There    is    no    evidence    that 
evacuation  exercises  in  large  cities  involving  the  actual 
movement  of  people  have  been  practiced.  There  is 
evidence  of  small-scale   evacuations  and   numerous   . 
exercises  primarily  involving  civil  defense  staffs.       f 
19.  Theoretical  studies  indicate  a  range  of  times 
necessary  to  accomplish  evacuation,  depending  pri- 
marily on  the  availability  of  transportation.  For 
evacuation  employing  motorized  transport — buses, 
trucks,  trains,  and  care — one  to  four  days  would  be 
required  for  the  last  group  of  evacuees  to  reach  their 
relocation  area.  If  the  evacuation  were  carried  out  on 
foot,  a  week  or  more  would  be  required  to  evacuate 
the  larger  cities.  Using  some  combination  of  motorized 
and  foot  transport  would  reduce  the  required  time  to 
less  than  a  week.  Unusually  severe  weather  could  slow 
the  pace  of  evacuation  and  affect  a  local  decision  to 
evacuate.  On  an  average,  two  or  three  days  would 
probably  be  required  to  evacuate  the  major  portion  of 
the  Soviet  urban  population. 
20.  Soviet  planning  recognizes  that  the  evacuated 
portion  of  the  population  must  be  .provided  fallout 
protection.  Plans  and  some  materials  exist  for  upgrad- 
ing existing  structures  and  constructing  hasty  shelters 
in  rural  and  exurban  areas.  However,  as  a  practical 
matter,  the  bulk  of  the  evacuated  population  would 
initially  have  about  the  level  of  protection  afforded  by 
upgraded  basements  and  interior  rooms  of  standard 
Soviet   rural   structures.    Under   ideal   circumstances.
\0 
wjih  j  wtx-k  or  v>  to  evacuate  urban  areas  and  to 
modify  existing  structures  and  construct  hasty  shelters. 
the  evacuated  population  couid  be  afforded  high  levels 
of    protection 
Protection    of    the    Economy 
21  Plans  for  protecting  the  Soviet  economy  include 
a  number  of  complementary  measures,  not  aii  of 
which  are  to  be  taken  at  any  individual  site  but  which 
could  apply  selectively  depending  on  a  site's  impor- 
tance to  a  wartime  economy.  These  measures  include: 
—  Sheltering  personnel  at  installations  in  the  event 
of  attack. 
—  Dispersal  of  a  portion  of  the  work  force  during  a 
period  of  crisis. 
—  Emergency   relocation  of  certain  installations. 
—  Geographic  dispersal  of  new  installations. 
—  Hardening  of  physical  structures. 
—  Hasty  hardening  measures  when  an  attack  is 
imminent,  such  as  sandbagging  of  equipment 
and  mounding  of  earth  around  structures. 
—  Rapid  shutdown  of  equipment 
22.  In  their  programs  to  protect  the  economy,  the 
Soviets  have  given  first  priority  to  protection  of 
personnel  at  economic  facilities.  Their  plans  for 
protecting  the  work  force  are  related  directly  to  the 
importance  of  the  place  of  work  both  in  terms  of  its 
output  and  its  contribution  to  postattack  recovery. 
Some  industries  and  othec  enterprises  will  continue  to 
function  on  a  two-shift  basis,  with  on*;  shift  dispersed 
outside  of  urban  areas  and  the  other  protected  in  blast 
shelters  at  or  near  its  installation.  Some  enterprises  are 
considered  nonessential  and  will  stop  operations,  and 
others  will  be  relocated  in  time  of  crisis. 
23.  The  Soviet  program  for  geographic  dispersal  of 
industry  is,  as  far  as  we  can  tell,  not  being 
implemented   to  a  significant  extent: 
—  New  plants  have  often  been  built  adjacent  to 
major  existing  plants. 
—  Existing  plants  and  complexes  have  been  ex- 
panded in  place. 
—  No  effort  has  been  made  to  expand  the  distance 
between  buildings  or  to  locate  additions  in  such  a 
way  as  to  minimize  fire  and  other  hazards  in  the 
event  of  a   nuclear  attack. 
—  Previously  open  spaces  at  fuel  storage  sites  have 
been  filled  in  with  new  storage  tanks  and 
processing   units. 
The  value  •£  overall  productive  capacity  has  b«*en 
increased  proportionately  more  in  previously  located 
sites  than  in  new  areas,  raising  even  more  the 
vulnerability  of   industry   to  attack. 
24.  Little  evidence  exists  that  would  suggest  a 
comprehensive  program  for  hardening  economic 
installations.  Published  Soviet  civil  defense  guidelines 
acknowledge  the  high  cost  of  such  measures  and 
explicitly  state  that  they  are  to  be  carried  out  only 
when  economically  feasible  The  Soviets  appear  to 
have  given  greater  emphasis  to  rapid  shutdown  of 
equipment  The  emphasis  in  this  scheme  seems  to  be 
on  protecting  vital  equipment  and  installations  from 
secondary  damage  triggered  by  prompt  effects  of  a 
nuclear  attack,  such  as  ignition  of  combustibles,  and  on 
facilitating  longer  term  recovery  of  installations  after 
an  attack. 
25.  Overall,  the  measures  the  Soviets  have  taken  to 
protect  their  economy  would  not  prevent  massive 
damage  from  an  attack  designed  to  destroy  Soviet 
economic  facilities.  At  best,  Soviet  leaders  and  civil 
defense  planners  are  probably  confident  that  through 
raptd  shutdown  and  emergency  repairs  by  the 
surviving  work  force,  limited  production  at  slightly  or 
moderately  damaged  sites  could  be  restored  soon  after 
an  attack.  We  have  not  assessed  the  Soviets*  long-term 
ability  to  reconstruct  their  economy. 
Postattack    Recovery 
26.  The  Soviets  characterize  recovery  activities  in 
the  postattack  period  as  measures  for  the  "liquidation 
of  the  consequences  of  an  enemy  attack."  We  are 
uncertain  how  effective  Soviet  civil  defense  would  be 
in  such  postattack  operations  as  rescue  and  recovery, 
sustaining  the  surviving  population,  and  maintaining 
government  control.  There  is  evidence,  however,  of 
Soviet  preparations  for  the  postattack  period. 
27.  Soviet  plans  require  that  rural  civil  defense 
staffs  and  formations  prepare  for  protection  of 
livestock  and  growing  areas  from  fallout,  with 
emphasis  on  safeguarding  the  current  harvest.  In  the 
USSR,  food  storage  and  food  processing  are  activities 
performed  outside  urban  areas  of  greater  than  50,000 
population.  In  addition  to  the  normal  peacetime  levels 
of  food  supplies  stored  above  ground,  there  are  buried 
or  semiburied  food  storage  facilities  outside  urban 
areas.  Also,  food  storage  in  the  USSR  varies  seasonally. 
We  are  uncertain  how  long  the  surviving  population 
could  be  sustained  on  the  undamaged  food  stores  after 
an  attack. 
28.  Supplies  of  petroleum  products  and  coal  in  the 
USSR  would   last  for  perhaps  a  month  at  prestrike
u 
consumption  levels.  Reduction  of  these  supplies  by 
nuclear  attack  and  the  disruption  of  local  distribution 
could  be  offset  by  energy  conservation  measures, 
alternate  fuel  sources,  and  a  decrease  in  industrial 
demand.  Sufficient  stocks  of  fuel  would  therefore 
probably  be  available  in  the  near-term  postattack 
period  to  sustain  the  needs  of  the  surviving  population. 
29.  In  the  immediate  postattack  period,  treatment 
of  trauma  (wounds  and  broken  bones)  and  bums 
would  create  the  greatest  burden  on  those  who  possess 
specialized  medical  skills.  Treatment  for  radiation 
sickness  and  relatively  minor  injuries  could  be 
provided  by  those  who  have  received  civil  defense 
first-aid  training.  Nevertheless,  Soviet  civil  defense 
medical  preparations  would  be  unable  to  cope  with 
the  leveb  of  casualties  which  large-scale  nuclear  attack 
would  inflict  on  the  civilian  population. 
30.  The  Soviets"  capacity  to  continue  production  in 
the  postattack  period  depends  not  only  on  how  much 
of  the  critical  production  equipment  and  essential 
work  force  survive,  but  also  on  the  on-hand  inventories 
of  raw  and  processed  materials.  Attacks  against 
industry  in  general  would  reduce  the  overall  level  of 
supplies  on  hand,  but  it  is  likely  that  supplies  would  be 
available  at  undamaged  industrial  facilities  to  allow 
production  to  continue  for  several  weeks  following  an 
attack.  The  adequacy  of  strategic  reserves  for  continu- 
ing production  over  a  longer  period,  however,  would 
depend  on  the  survivability  and  restoration  of 
transportation  and  electric  power  systems. 
31.  The  distribution  of  essential  supplies  in  a 
postattack  period  would  be  a  difficult  problem  for  the 
Soviets.  They  have  made  some  effort  to  ensure 
survival  of  the  transportation  system  through  such 
measures  as  preparations  to  disperse  equipment  and  to 
establish  stockpiles  of  rolling  stock.  They  have  also 
organized  civil  defense  services  and  formations  in 
transportation  enterprises  and  have  constructed  blast 
shelters  at  critical  points  in  the  road  and  rail 
transportation  systems.  Nevertheless,  the  coordination 
of  requirements  with  available  supplies  and  transpor- 
tation is  a  complex  problem  for  Soviet  planners  even 
in  peacetime,  let  alone  following  a  large-scale  nuclear 
attack  on  the  USSR. 
32.  The  operating  elements  of  the  civil  defense 
program  as  well  as  a  substantial  number  of  the  civilian 
population  (a  number  we  cannot  estimate  with 
confidence)  have  received  training  in  rescue  and 
recovery  operations  such  as  administering  first  aid, 
clearing  rubble,  decontaminating,  and  providing 
emergency  repair  and  restoration  of  power.  With  at 
least  several  weeks  to  build  up  reserves  and  distribute 
food  and  fuel,  the  Soviets  could  probably  provide 
adequate  supplies  to  sustain  the  relocated  and 
surviving  urban  population  in  the  period  immediately 
following  a  nuclear  attack.  We  have  not  evaluated  the 
potential  for  continuity  of  the  Soviet  government  or 
the  Soviets"  long-term  ability  to  recover  from  the 
effects  of  a  nuclear  attack. 
Costs 
33.  We  are  unable  to  estimate  the  total  annual  costs 
of  Soviet  civil  defense,  but  we  have  made  a  tentative 
estimate  of  the  costs  of  three  elements  oi  the  program: 
full-time  civil  defense  personnel,  operation  of  military 
civil  defense  units,   and  blast  shelter  construction. 
These  three  elements  cost  400  million  rubles  in  1976. 
This  ruble  figure,  which  indicates  the  burden  of  these 
three  elements  on  the  Soviet  economy,  represents  less 
than   1   percent  of  our  estimate  of  Soviet  defense 
spending.  If  incurred  in  the  United  States,  the  costs  of 
these  three  elements  would  have  been  about  $2  billion 
in    1976.    While    this    dollar    figure    conveys    the 
magnitude  of  the  program  in  familiar  terms,  it  does 
not  reflect  the  economic  burden  to  the  Soviets.  The 
higher   dollar  estimate   results   primarily   from    the 
greater  costs  of  manpower  in  the  United  States  than  in 
the  USSR.  Manpower  represents  about  70  percent  of 
the  total  dollar  costs — that  is,  about  $1.4  billion  of  the 
$2  billion— but  only  about  40  percent  of  the  ruble 
costs.  (These  estimates  should  be  considered  rough 
approximations.  They  are  affected  by  uncertainties 
both  in  the  quantitative  data  on  civil  defense  programs 
and  in  estimates  of  prices.) 
Overoll    Effectiveness 
34.  We  have  analyzed  the  effects  of  civil  defense  on 
the  levels  of  damage  and  casualties  the  Soviets  might 
sustain  from  a  nuclear  exchange.  We  have  deliberately 
chosen  to  analyze  important  and  sensitive  variables — 
economic  damage  and  casualties — that  can  be  evalu- 
ated quantitatively,  and  have  made  arbitrary  assump- 
tions to  deal  with  the  inevitable  uncertainties  regard- 
ing preparations  for  and  conduct  of  an  actual  nuclear 
exchange.  This  type  of  analysis  involved  trading  on  the 
realism  of  the  war  scenario  adopted  to  gain  detail  in 
calculating  the  consequences — the  more  detailed  our 
analysis  for  purposes  of  calculations,  the  less  likely  the 
calculations  would  apply  to  another  scenario. 
35.  For  purpose  of  these  calculations  we  have 
assumed,  for  example,  that  various  times  ranging  from 
a  few  hours  to  a  week  or  more  would  be  available  to 
the  Soviets  to  make  civil  defense  preparations,  while  in 
each  case  opposition  forces  were  assumed  to  be  on  no 
more  than  day-to-day  alert.  In  reality,  Soviet  efforts  to
\9 
maximize  civil  defense  preparations  could  lead  a 
potential  opponent  to  place  its  forces  at  increased 
levels  of  readiness.  We  have  also  assumed  that  a 
retaliatory  strike  would  not  deliberately  target  the 
Soviet  population  but  would  attack  high-value  military 
and  economic  targets.  This  approach  tends  to  establish 
a  lower  limit  for  the  level  of  casualties  such  an  attack 
would  inflict  on  the  Soviet  Union.  In  effect,  it  tends  to 
present  a  "worst  case"  for  retaliation,  especially  if 
Soviet   population  casualties  axe  a  major  criterion 
36.  Protection  of  People.  The  extent  of  losses  to 
the  leadership  would  be  less  sensitive  to  final 
preparation  time  than  would  be  the  level  of  casualties 
among  essential  personnel  and  the  remaining  popula- 
.  tion.  Casualties  among  the  latter  would  depend 
primarily  on  the  time  the  Soviets' had  to  prepare  for  an 
attack  and  whether  or  not  they  chose  to  evacuate  their 
urban  population.  The  findings  of  our  analysis,  based 
on  the  results  of  the  hypothetical  retaliatory  attack 
under  the  assumptions  given  above,  were  as  follows: 
—  With  several  hours  to  make  final  preparations,  a 
large  percentage  of  leaders  and  communications 
facilities  would  probably  survive. 
—  A  large  percentage  of  the  essential  work  force  in 
shelters  would  survive  an  attack  designed  to 
maximize  damage  to  economic  facilities. 
—  With  a  minimal  period  to  make  final  prepara- 
tions (a  few  hours  or  less),  Soviet  casualnVs  from 
prompt  nuclear  effects  and  fallout  would  be  well 
over  100  million.  More  than  half  the  casualties 
would  be  fatalities. 
—  With  a  moderate  period  "of  preparation  (two  to 
three  days)  during  which  the  Soviet  civil  defense 
authorities  implemented  plans  for  evacuation  of 
urban  areas,  the  level  of  casualties  and  fatalities 
could  be  reduced  by  more  than  50  percent  Most 
of  this  reduction  would  be  due  to  evacuation,  the 
remainder  to  shelters. 
—  Extended  preparation  (a  week  or  more)  could 
further  reduce  the  level  of  Soviet  casualties  and 
fatalities.  With  time  to  complete  urban  evacua- 
tion and  to  protect  the  evacuated  population, 
casualties  from  prompt  nuclear  effects  and 
fallout  could  be  reduced  to  the  low  tens  of 
millions,  about  half  of  which  would  be  fatalities. 
37.  The  findings  of  our  analysis  serve  to  point  out 
the  important  fact  that,  in  the  preparations  for  an 
attack,  the  critical  decision  to  be  made  by  the  Soviet 
I  
leaders  in  terms  of  sparing  the  population  would  be 
whether  or  not  to  evacuate  cities.  The  cost  of  not 
v  evacuating   could   be   in   the   neighborhood  of   100 
million  casualties.  There  are.  oi  course,  many  combi- 
nations of  preparation  times  and  assumptions  about 
hypothetical  retaliatory  attacks  which  would  increase 
the  calculated  levels  of  casualties  over  those  shown 
above — for  example,  a  larger  attack  directed  at  more 
targets  (perhaps  as  a  consequence  of  the  opposing 
forces'  having  been  placed  on  increased  levels  of 
readiness),  an  attack  directed  against  the  population, 
one  which  was  carried  out  over  an  extended  period,  or 
an  attack  which  came  while  the  Soviets  were  in  the 
process  of  evacuating  their  cities. 
38.  Protection  of  the  Economy.  Those  measures 
we  have  described  for  protection  of  the  economy 
could  not  prevent  massive  damage.  Even  with  a  week 
or  so  of  preparations,  there  would  be  little  reduction  in 
the  amount  of  prompt  damage  to  facilities  inflicted  by 
blast  The  Soviet  measures  for  protecting  the  work 
force,  critical  equipment  and  supplies  and  for  limiting 
damage  from  secondary  effects  could  contribute  to ' 
maintaining  and  restoring  production  after  an  attack. 
As  noted  above,  however,  we  have  not  analyzed  the 
Soviets'  long-term  potential  for  economic  recovery. 
39.  Pottattack  Recovery.  We  are  unable  to  make  a 
confident  assessment  of  how  effective  Soviet  civil 
defense  would  be  in  rescue  and  recovery  operations 
following  an  attack.  Our  tentative  estimate  is  that, 
given  a  week  or  more  to  make  preparations,  the 
Soviets  could  accumulate  stocks  of  essential  supplies 
adequate  to  sustain  the  surviving  population  in  the 
period  immediately  following  a  nuclear  attack,  but  the 
distribution  of  these  supplies  would  be  a  critical 
problem.  Under  worst  conditions  with  only  a  few 
hours  to  prepare,  the  chances  would  be  poor  that  the 
Soviets  could  effectively  support  the  surviving  popula- 
tion with  supplies  and  services. 
40.  The  Soviets  almost  certainly  believe  their 
present  civil  defenses  will  improve  their  ability  to 
conduct  military  operations  and  will  enhance  the 
USSR's  chances  for  survival  following  a  nuclear 
exchange.  They  cannot  have  confidence,  however,  in 
the  degree  of  protection  their  civil  defense  would 
afford  them,  given  the  many  uncertainties  attendant 
to  a  nuclear  exchange.  We  do  not  believe  that  the 
Soviets'  present  civil  defenses  would  embolden  them 
deliberately  to  expose  the  USSR  to  a  higher  risk  of 
nuclear  attack. 
Future  Trends 
41.  Programs  for  protection  of  the  leadership  are 
solidly  established  and  well  advanced.  We  are 
confident  that  this  aspect  of  the  program  will  continue 
to  receive  attention,  with  better  protection  for  leaders
at  all  levels.  The  continued  growth  in  the  numbers  of 
leadership  facilities  will  increase  the  prospects  of 
survival    for   a    large   number  of  Soviet   leaders. 
42.  The  Soviets  will  probably  continue  their  em- 
phasis on  construction  of  blast  shelters  in  urban  areas. 
If  this  results  in  a  pace  oi  construction  matching  that 
since  1968.  they  would,  by  1985,  increase  the 
minimum  percentage  of  population  sheltered  in  urban 
areas  to  an  estimated  15  to  30  percent.  This  increase 
takes  into  account  the  projected  growth  in  urban 
population. 
43.  Over  the  next  10  yean,  the  percentage  of 
population  which  can  be  sheltered  will  increase,  but 
the  absolute  number  of  people  that  would  have  to  be 
evacuated  will  also  increase  because  of  growth  in  the 
urban  population.  To  avoid  an  increase  in  the  number 
of  people  to  be  evacuated,  the  rate  of  shelter 
construction  would  have  to  be  higher  than  the  rate 
currently  indicated.  Thus,  the  Soviet  leaders'  critical 
problem  of  deciding  whether  to  evacuate,  and  when  to 
do  so,  will  not  change  substantially  over  this  period. 
They  may,  however,  be  able  to  achieve  some 
reduction  in  the  time  required  to  evacuate  by 
increasing  the  available  transportation. 
44.  Prospects  for  improvement  in  measures  to 
protect  the  economy  against  attack  are  mixed.  The 
increase  in  the  number  of  blast  shelters  at  economic 
facilities  will  probably  enable  the  Soviets  to  shelter  a 
larger  proportion  of  the  work  force.  But  the  continuing 
concentration  of  economic  investment  in  previously 
existing  plant  sites,  together  with  an  absence  of 
construction-hardening  techniques,  suggests  that  a 
future  retaliatory  attack  would  be  about  as  destructive 
as  at  present  The  protective  measures  the  Soviets  are 
likely  to  undertake  during  the  next  10  years  would 
probably  not  significantly  reduce  damage  from  a 
large-scale  attack  designed  to  maximize  destruction  of 
economic  targets. 
45.  Present  evidence  does  not  suggest  that  in  the 
foreseeable  future  there  will  be  any  significant  change 
in  the  Soviet  leaders'  judgment  that  civil  defense 
contributes  to  war-fighting  and  war-survival  capabili- 
ties, nor  that  their  uncertainties  about  its  actual 
effectiveness  would  be  lessened.  Thus,  we  have  no 
reason  to  believe  that  the  Soviet  leaders'  perception  of 
the  contribution  of  civil  defense  to  their  capabilities 
for  strategic  nuclear  conflict  will  change  significantly.