DEFENSE  AUDIT  SERVICE 
]  300  WILSON  KOULEVARL) 
ARLINGTON.  VIRGIN' *  2220'J 
REPORT 
NO.  80-143 
September  29,  1980 
REPORT  ON  THE  REVIEW  OF 
ACCOUNTING  SYSTEMS  FOR  WIRETAP 
AND  EAVESDROP  EQUIPMENT 
TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
Background 
Scope  of  Review 
RESULTS  OF  THE  REVIEW  AND  RECOMMENDATIONS 
APPENDIX  -  Activities  Visited 
Page 
Prepared  by: 
Intelligence  and  Communications 
Audits  Division 
Project  9IG-028
REPORT  ON  THE  REVIEW  OF 
ACCOUNTING  SYSTEMS  FOR  WIRETAP 
AND  EAVESDROP  EQUIPMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
We  were  requested  by  the  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  of 
Defense(Administration) ,  Office  of  the  Assistant  Secretary  of 
Def ense(Comptroller) ,  to  review  the  adequacy  and  accuracy  of  the 
Military  Departments'  inventory  systems  for  wiretap  and  eavesdrop 
equipment,  and  determine  whether  the  amount  of  equipment  was 
appropriate  to  perform  assigned  missions.  We  were  also  asked  by 
the  Director  for  Security  Plans  and  Programs,  Office  of  the  Deputy 
Under  Secretary  of  Defense  for  Policy  Review,  to  include  in  our 
review  an  evaluation  of  the  indexing  system  used  to  record 
interceptions  of  wire  and  oral  communications. 
Background 
The  interceotion  of  wire  and  oral  communications  for  law  enforce- 
ment  purposes  within  the  Department  of  Defense  (DoD)  is  prohibited 
unless  conducted  in  accordance  with  applicable  laws  and  the  pro- 
visions of  DoD  Directive  5200.24,  "Interception  of  Wire  and  Oral 
Communications  for  Law  Enforcement  Purposes."  Interceptions  can 
only  be  made  for  properly  designated  purposes  and  are  limited  to 
those  investigative  offices  within  the  Army,  Navy  and  Air  Force 
that  have  specific  written  authorization  from  the  Head  of  the 
Department. 
Responsibility  for  establishing  policy  and  overseeing  this  area 
within  DoD  has  been  shifted  several  times  in  recent  years  and  cur- 
rently rests  with  the  Director  for  Counterintelligence  and  Inves- 
tigative Programs,  Office  of  the  Deputy  Under  Secretary  of  Defense 
for  Policy  Review. 
DoD  Directive  5200.24  provided  that  all  applications  for  noncon- 
sensual interception  of  wire  and  oral  communications  of  U.S.  per- 
sons must  be  approved  by  the  DoD  General  Counsel  and  coordinated 
with  the  Department  of  Justice  prior  to  seeking  a  court  order  for 
the  intercept.  Requests  for  consensual  intercepts  are  approved  or 
disapproved  by  the  Secretaries  of  the  Military  Departments  or 
their  designees.  The  Directive  required  quarterly  reporting  to 
the  U.S.  Attorney  General  of  all  consensual  interceptions  by  Mili- 
tary Department  investigative  units,  however  this  requirement  was 
eliminated  during  the  review.  An  annual  report  was  required  of 
all  nonconsensual  interceptions  made  for  law  enforcement  and 
investigative  purposes  abroad,  as  well  as  for  interception  appli- 
cations which  were  not  approved.  The  Directive  also  required  the 
Secretaries  of  the  Military  Departments  to  submit  annually  to  the 
Office  of  Secretary  of  Defense(OSD)  a  complete  inventory  of  all
wiretap  and  eavesdrop  equipment  and  devices.  The  establishment 
and  maintenance  of  indexing  systems  (indexes)  for  all  intercep- 
tions and  denied  interception  applications  were  also  required  by 
the  Directive. 
Scope  of  Review 
We  examined  the  policies,  procedures  and  practices  used  to  account 
for  and  control  wiretap  and  eavesdrop  equipment  in  the  designated 
investigative  units  of  the  Military  Departments,  Our  review 
included  a  complete  reconciliation  of  records  for  the  entire 
inventory  (737  items)  and  a  physical  count  of  660  selected  items. 
We  statistically  selected  2,953  of  the  139,473  available  criminal 
case  files  to  test  for  unauthorized  or  unrecorded  use  of  wiretap 
and  eavesdrop  techniques.  Discovery  sampling  was  used  to  test  the 
accuracy  of  the  indexing  systems  for  cases  where  these  techniques 
were  authorized.  The  Appendix  to  this  report  lists  the  activities 
visited  during  our  review. 
RESULTS  OF  THE  REVIEW  AND  RECOMMENDATIONS 
We  found  no  significant  discrepancies  between  the  quantities  of 
wiretap  ?nd  eavesdrop  equipment  recorded  on  Military  Department 
inventory  records  and  the  quantities  on  hand.  Furthermore,  we 
found  no  evidence  of  unauthorized  or  unrecorded  electronic  sur- 
veillance operations  by  the  investigative  units.  Overall,  the 
Military  Departments  were  effectively  carrying  out  the  responsi- 
bilities described  in  DoD  Directive  5200.24.  However,  we  found 
that  improvements  could  be  made  in  some  areas,  notably  clarifi- 
cation of  certain  provisions  governing  the  definition  of  inter- 
ception equipment  and  its  retention,  and  the  adequacy  of  pro- 
cedures for  maintenance  of  prescribed  indexes.  These  changes,  if 
effectively  implemented,  could  enhance  overall  investigative 
operations  and  reduce  their  potential  for  public  criticism. 
Recommendations 
We  recommend  that  the  Deputy  Under  Secretary  of  Defense  for  Policy 
Review,  in  coordination  with  the  General  Counsel: 
1.  Revise  DoD  Directive  5200.24  to  clearly  define  "wiretap 
and  eavesdrop  equipment." 
2.  Establish  guidelines  to  be  followed  by  users  in  determin- 
ing minimum  levels  for  such  equipment. 
3.  Establish  standardized  procedures  and  forms  for  overall 
control  of  equipment  when  in  use. 
4.  Request,  from  the  Department  of  Justice,  clarification  of 
electronic  surveillance  indexing  requirements  based  on  antici- 
pated inquiries.
5.  Establish  quality  assurance  procedures  for  indexing  oper- 
ations to  ensure  uniformity  in  accumulating,  transcribing  and  ver- 
ifying electronic  surveillance  data. 
6.  Require  investigative  units  to  review  existing  case  files 
where  electronic  surveillance  was  used  to  identify  and  record 
data  not  previously  indexed. 
7.  Revalidate  prior  responses  to  requests  for  surveillance 
information  against  those  cases,  disclosed  by  the. review  in  recom- 
mendation 6  above,  containing  data  not  previously  indexed. 
Discussion 
Equipment  and  devices  used  for  intercepting  communications  must  be 
properly  controlled  and  safeguarded  to  prevent  unauthorized  access 
or  use.  Inventory  records  must  be  maintained  to  account  for  the 
equipment  at  all  times  and  centralized  storage  of  such  equipment 
is  encouraged  wherever  possible,  consistent  with  operational 
requirements.  The  use  made  of  the  equipment  has  to  be  fully 
accounted  for  in  written  reports  from  the  users.  Annually,  the 
Secretaries  of  the  Military  Departments  are  required  to  submit  to 
the  Office  of  the  Deputy  Under  Secretary  of  Defense  for  Policy 
Review  a  complete  inventory  of  all  equipment  and  devices  useful 
for  operations  covered  under  the  provisions  of  DoD  Direc- 
tive 5200.24.  The  inventory  consisted  of  737  pieces  of  equipment 
with  a  value  approximating  $400,000,  In  addition  to  the  inventory 
records  and  reports,  the  Directive  requires  that  an  indexing 
system  (indexes)  be  established  and  maintained  for  all 
interceptions  and  denied  interception  applications.  These  indexes 
are  keyed  to  names  and  other  identifying  data  for  each  reasonably 
identifiable  person  whose  communication  was  intercepted 
(intentionally  or  otherwise),  or  who  was  the  target  of  the 
interception  application.  Indexes  are  kept  for  the  purpose  of 
providing  centralized  and  readily  accessible  data  to  respond  to 
various  types  of  legal  inquiries. 
Equipment  Inventories.  The  Army  inventory  manager  for  wire- 
tap/eavesdrop equipment  was  the  Intelligence  and  Materiel  Develop- 
ment Support  Office  at  Fort  Meade,  Maryland,  while  the  Navy  and 
Air  Force  managed  their  equipment  inventories  from  the  head- 
quarters of  their  respective  Investigative  Commands.  Items 
included  in  the  inventories  were  mainly  older  pieces  of  equipment 
since  minimal  procurements  have  been  made  in  the  past  5  years. 
Varying  procedures  existed  for  controlling  and  recording  inven- 
tories of  wiretap  and  eavesdrop  equipment.  Procedures  used  for 
recording  withdrawals  of  equipment  also  varied  among  the  Services. 
Some  apparent  confusion  was  evident  over  the  types  of  equipment 
that  should  be  controlled  and  accounted  for.  Examples  included 
items  such  as  ordinary  tape  recorders  and  equipment  used  by  fire 
and  police  departments  to  record  emergency  calls.
Further,  there  were  no  standards  established  for  determining  the 
minimum  quantity  of  equipment  that  should  be  maintained  to  meet 
expected  operational  requirements.  Nevertheless,  each  Military 
Department  certified  in  their  inventory  reports  that  existing 
quantities  were  being  maintained  at  the  lowest  level,  consistent 
with  operational  needs.  In  the  absence  of  measurement  standards, 
these  certifications  could  not  be  supported.  Other  discrepancies 
were  noted  where  the  exact  quantity  or  type  of  equipment  used  was 
not  documented  in  case  files  although  DoD  Directive  5200.24 
required  such  information.  Sometimes  case  files  did  not  show 
exact  dates  of  usage,  but  only  recorded  the  date  the  use  was 
approved.  Procedures  further  varied  among  investigative  units  on 
the  periods  of  time  for  maintaining  usage  logs  and  related 
records. 
Electronic  Surveillance  Data  Indexes.  The  indexing  systems 
used  by  the  Military  Departments  to  cross  reference  pertinent  sur- 
veillance information  were  incomplete  and  did  not  contain  the 
names  of  all  identifiable  persons  whose  wire/oral  communications 
were  intercepted.  In  other  cases,  addresses  or  telephone  numbers 
(also  required)  were  missing  or  only  partially  recorded.  Further, 
although  there  was  a  1975  requirement  to  establish  a  technical 
surveillance  index,  one  Army  investigative  unit  did  not  establish 
the  index  until  early  1979  and  used  other  indexes  to  answer  data 
requests. 
In  1974,  the  Department  of  Justice  established  the  basic  concep- 
tual requirement  for  indexes.  Upon  receipt  of  the  requirement, 
the  responsible  OSD  office  forwarded  the  requirement  to  the  appro- 
priate DoD  investigative  activities  for  implementation.  However, 
DoD  Directive  5200.24  was  not  revised  to  incorporate  the  indexing 
requirement  until  April  1978.  In  the  absence  of  specific  DoD 
guidance,  each  Military  Department  had  developed  its  own  methodol- 
ogy for  keeping  indexes.  We  contacted  personnel  at  each  of  the 
locations  where  the  indexes  were  maintained  and  found  that  these 
personnel,  although  basically  familiar  with  the  indexing  require- 
ment, lacked  pertinent  knowledge  of  internal  control  procedures. 
For  example,  none  of  the  criminal  investigative  case  files  that 
contained  surveillance  data  obtained  with  wiretap/eavesdrop  equip- 
ment were  marked  to  indicate  that  the  data  had  been  prepared  for 
recording  in  the  indexes.  Listings  used  to  record  names  in  the 
indexes  should  have  been  in  agreement,  but  were  actually  dissimi- 
lar, and  names  were  recorded  on  one  list  but  missing  from  another. 
In  another  instance?  responsible  personnel  informed  us  that  data 
were  prepared  for  computer  input  but  were  never  actually  recorded 
in  the  indexes.  Some  files  containing  reports  of  criminal  inves- 
tigations that  required  indexing  were  misrouted.  In  other  files, 
transcripts  of  conversations  were  improperly  prepared,  which  pre- 
cluded identification  of  the  data  to  be  indexed,.
The  responsibility  for  routine  indexing  generally  rested  with  a 
single  individual,  usually  a  clerk.  We  believe  that  data  to  be 
indexed  should  be  annotated,  prepared  and  verified  by  different 
persons  for  more  effective  control.  Similarly,  we  noted  that 
quality  assurance  procedures  were  not  being  used  to  verify  the 
accuracy  of  the  transcriptions  for  the  surveillance  data.  Because 
of  the  sensitivity  of  the  data  being  handled,  we  believe  more 
positive  controls  are  needed.  These  would  include  independent 
verification  of  tapes,  exact  transcriptions  of  tapes  when  they  are 
made,  and  recording  in  the  indexes  the  names  of  all  identifiable 
parties  to  a  conversation  including  agents  and  confidential 
informants. 
The  basic  intent  for  establishing  the  index  concept  was  to  facili- 
tate data  retrieval  in  a  timely  manner.  However,  this  was  ham- 
pered because  uniform  clerical  and  administrative  procedures  were 
not  being  used  to  accumulate  and  record  data,  and  because  index 
information  on  electronic  surveillance  data  had  not  been  central- 
ized. While  the  Navy  and  Air  Force  had  each  established  their 
indexes  of  electronic  surveillance  data  in  a  single  location,  the 
Army  had  indexes  at  4  different  activities:  the  Criminal  Investi- 
gation Command?  the  Intelligence  and  Security  Command;  the  Special 
Operations  Field  Office;  and  the  Law  Enforcement  Division,  Office, 
Deputy  Chief  of  Staff  for  Personnel.  Presently,  requests  for  sur- 
veillance data  must  be  routed  to  all  6  locations. 
Department  of  Justice  Requests.  We  noted  that  some  recent 
Department  of  Justice  requests  for  surveillance  data  appeared  to 
seek  information  over  and  above  the  guidance  promulgated  in  1974. 
These  requests  sought  data  on  electronic  surveillance  authorized 
or  received  from  any  source,  and  whether  DoD  records  reflected 
that  another  agency  had  at  any  time  authorized,  conducted  or  pro- 
cured electronic  surveillance.  A  particular  surveillance  may  have 
been  authorized  but  not  used  for  a  number  of  reasons;  for  example, 
the  apprehension  of  a  subject  prior  to  use  or  the  inability  to  set 
up  a  controlled  situation  for  its  use.  In  other  instances,  data 
may  have  been  received  from  private  sources  who  used  their  own 
equipment  to  record  a  harassing  or  obscene  phone  call.  If  data 
elements  contained  in  the  latest  Department  of  Justice  requests 
become  the  basis  for  indexing,  then  additional  reviews  of  investi- 
gative files  will  be  necessary.  Conversely,  we  noted  names  in 
indexes  which  we  believed  did  not  belong  there.  Department  of 
Justice  guidance,  as  well  as  DoD  Directive  5200.24,  states  that 
only  the  names  of  readily  identifiable  persons  whose  communi- 
cations are  intercepted  should  be  indexed.  However,  we  found  the 
names  of  persons  who  were  merely  mentioned  in  the  conversations 
intercepted,  as  well  as  partial  names  (first  or  last)  having  no 
other  identifying  data, 
While  we  believe  that  revisions  to  existing  electronic  surveil- 
lance  indexes   are   necessary,   we   also   feel   that   DoD   should
first  request  clarification  from  the  Department  of  Justice  about 
the  extent  and  type  of  data  to  be  maintained.  After  that  occurs, 
it  may  be  necessary  to  review  investigative  files,  which  contain 
such  data,  for  accuracy.  Also,  it  may  be  necessary  to  research 
prior  requests  for  surveillance  information  against  the  updated 
index  to  revalidate  the  request. 
Management  Comments 
The  Director,  Counterintelligence  and  Investigative  Programs  con- 
curred in  all  but  recommendation  2  and  advised  that  action  is  in 
process  to  implement  the  remaining  recommendations. 
In  response  to  recommendation  2  on  the  need  to  establish  minimum 
levels  of  equipment,  the  Director  stated: 
We  agree  that  it  would  be  desireable  to  have  some 
calculus  to  establish  standards,  but  believe  this 
is  not  practical.  .  .  .  The  small  amount  of  pur- 
chasing in  the  last  5  years  indicates  the  equipment 
accounts  have  not  been  bloated  by  unnecessary  pur- 
chases. ...  As  long  as  the  amount  of  equipment  is 
reasonable  (i.e.,  not  excessively  large  or  small) 
we  prefer  to  allow  the  best  judgement  of  the 
respective  agencies  to  stand. 
Audit  Response 
DoD  Directive  5200.24  Enclosure  2,  "Procedures,  Record  Administra- 
tion and  Reports,"  requires  Heads  of  the  Military  Departments  to 
establish  controls  to  ensure  that  only  the  minimum  quantity  of 
interception  equipment  required  to  accomplish  assigned  missions  is 
procured  and  retained  in  inventories.  The  requirement  to  estab- 
lish controls  implies  the  use  of  objective  criteria.  Considering 
management  comments  that  this  is  not  practical,  we  believe  the 
requirement  should  be  deleted  from  Enclosure  2  and  included  as  a 
general  statement  in  the  Policy  section  of  the  directive.  Manage- 
ment comments  on  the  other  recommendations  are  responsive. 
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Activities  Visited 
Deoartment  of  Defense 
—  -  —      —  —         -  — 
Office  of  the  Deputy  Under  Secretary  of  Defense  for  Policy  Review, 
Washington,  DC 
Office  of  the  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  of  Defense(Administra- 
tion),  Washington,  DC 
Army 
Deputy  Chief  of  Staff  for  Personnel,  Washington,  DC 
Assistant  Chief  of  Staff  for  Intelligence,  Washington,  DC 
U.S.  Army  Criminal  Investigation  Command,  Falls  Church,  VA 
U.S.  Army  Intelligence  and  Materiel  Development  and  Support 
Office,  Fort  Meade,  MD 
U.S.  Army  Intelligence  and  Security  Command,  Arlington,  VA 
U.S.  Army  Special  Operations  Field  Office,  Berlin,  Germany 
Navy 
Headquarters  Naval   Investigative  Service,   Alexandria,   VA 
Naval   Investigative   Service   Resident  Agent,    Annapolis,    MD 
Air  Force 
Headquarters,  U.S.  Air  Force  Office  of  Special  Investigations, 
Washington,  DC 
District  4,  U.S.  Air  Force  Office  of  Special  Investigations, 
Andrews  Air  Force  Base,  MD 
Other  Government 
Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation,  Technical  Services  Division, 
Directorate  for  Engineering,  Washington,  DC 
APPENDIX