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NSC  50 
July  1,  19^9 
NCTS  BY  TEE  EXECUTIVE  SECRETARY 
to  the 
NATIONAL  SECURITY  COUNCIL 
on 
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THE  CENTRAL  IMTELLIGZMC5  AGENCY  AIMD 
NATIONAL  ORGANIZATION  FOR  Ilrl'ZLLIGZlTCE 
NSC  Action.  No.  202 
At  its  37th  nesting  the  National  Security  Council  considered 
the  report  by  the  Dulles -Jackson -Correa  Survey  Group  on   the  subject 
and  comments  with  respect  thereto  (Reference  B)  and  referred  them 
to  the  Secretaries  of  State  and  Defense  to  prepare ,  in  consultation 
with  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  and  the  Attorney  General,  and  in 
the  light  of  the  discussion  at  that  Council  meeting,  specific  recom- 
mendations for  Council. .action.  _  (Reference  A) 
The  enclosed  report  by  the  Secretaries  of  State  and  Defense  on 
the  subject  prepared  pursuant  to  NSC  Action  No.  202  in  consultation 
with  the  Departments  of  the  Treasury  and  Justice,  is  submitted  here- 
with for  consideration  by  the  National  Security  Council  at  its  next 
meeting  of  the  recommendations  contained  therein. 
The  Attorney  General  is  being  i  ivited 
Council Ts  consideration  of  this  reocrt . 
oarticioat e  in 
The  Secretary  of  Defense  expressed  the  view  that,  upon  approval, 
the  recommendations  should  be  put  into  effect  at  once  and  the  Council 
should  plan  to  have  a  suitable  review  of  the  progress  made  after  a 
reasonable  period  ex*  implementation. 
It 
is  reauested  that  this  reocrt  be  handled  with  soeciai 
security  precautions. 
Distribution: 
The  President 
The  Secretary  of  State 
The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
The  Secretary  of  Defense 
»-»   «- "— »£i   Ay* 
tne  Army 
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-  The  Secretary  of 
The  Secretarv  of  the  Navv 
The  Secretary  of  the  Air  Force 
The  Chairman,  National  Security 
Resources  3card 
C    50 
SIDNEY  V.    SOUSHS 
*.  4 
executive  secretary
COPY 
July  1,  19^9 
;:  \  '•:  %  ^ 
COMMENTS  AND   RECOMMENDATIONS  TO  THE  NATIONAL  SECURITY  COUNCIL 
ON  THE  REPORT  OP  'THE  DULLES  -JACKSON  -CORREA  COMMITTEE  PREPARED 
BT  THE  SECRETARY  0?  STATE  AND  SECRETARY  0?  DEFENSE 
The  Report  on  "The  Central  Intelligence  Agency  and  National 
Organization  for  Intelligence  includes  57  individual  conclusions 
and  recommendations  which  we   have  regrouped  in  order  to  facilitate 
Council  consideration.   Although  some  of  the  conclusions  do  not 
rec:uire  Council  action,  we   wish  to  bring  them  to  the  Council  Ts 
attention  with  our  comments.   Other  conclusions  and  recommendations 
call  for  concurrence  or  non-concurrence  by  the  Council  and  appro- 
priate implementing  action- 
1.    LEGISLATIVE  PROVISIONS  GOVERNING  CIA  AND  ITS  POSITION 
UNDER  THE  NATIONAL  SECURITY  COUNCIL. 
a.   Summary  of  the  Report. 
The  Survey  Group  report  concludes  that; 
(1)   Sect  on  102  of  the  National  Security  Act 
of  19^7  which  sets  up  CIA  is  sound  and  that  no   amendments  are  neces- 
sary at  this  time; 
(2)   CIA  is  properly  placed  under  the  National 
Security  Council,  but  that  its  Director  should  establish  closer 
liaison  with  the  two  members  of  the  Council  on  whom  the  Agency 
chiefly  depends,  namely,  the  Secretaries  of  State  and  Defense, 
b.   Comments . 
We  concur  in  these  conclusions  and  recommendations 
vhich  do  not  reaulre  specific  Council  action  or  authorization* 
JL  o 
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should  be  noted,  however,  that  the  National  Military  Establishment 
and  CIA  are  presently  studying  the  wartime  status  and  responsi- 
bilities of  CIA   and  that  recommendations  may  be  presented  at  a 
later  date  on  this  subject.   It  may  be  determined  that  certain 
functions  and  responsibilities  should  be  under  the  control  of  the 
military  in  time  of  war. 
£•   Recommended  Action. 
That  the  National  Security  Council  concur  in  the 
Survey  Group  conclusions  on  this  subject,  with  the  understanding 
that  study  may  determine  that  certain  functions  and  responsibilities 
should  be  under  the  control  of  the  military  in  time  of  war. 
2*    THE  COORDINATION  0?  INTELLIGENCE  ACTIVITIES, 
a.   Summary  of  the  Report, 
The  Renort  concludes  that: 
(1)   The  responsibility  of  CIA  vith  respect  t 
the  coordination  of  intelligence  activities  has  not  been  fully  dis- 
charged; 
(2)   The  Intelligence  Advisory  Committee  is 
soundly  conceived  as  an  advisory  body,  but  should,  -under  the  forth- 
right initiative  a,nd   leadership  of  the  Director  of  Central  Intelli- 
gence, participate  more  actively  in  the  continuing  coordination  of 
intelligence  activities  and  in  the  discussion  and  approval  of  in- 
telligence estimates . 
Ve  concur  in  the  observations  and  conclusions  of  the 
Report  on  this  general  subject.   Ve  believe  that  the  objectives 
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sought  for  car.  be  achieved  by  the  recognition  and  implementation  of 
these  principles  and  by  the  organizational  and  operational  improve - 
ments  recommended  elsewhere  in  the  Report. 
In  accordance  vith  these  principles  and  as  partial 
implementation  thereof,  ve  reccmmend  certain  amendments  to  National 
Security  Council  Intelligence  Directive  No,  1,  as  indicated  in 
Annex   ltAn ,    appended  hereto.  These  amendments  vould  (1)  define  the 
status  of  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  as  a  member  of  the 
Intelligence  Advisory  Committee  and  (2)  clarify  the  procedure  thereby 
dissents  are  included  in  coordinated  intelligence  estimates. 
£.   Recommended  Action. 
That  the  National  Security  Council  (I)  concur  in  the 
conclusions  and  recommendations  stated  under  para.  2  a  above  as  a 
statement  of  principles  to  be  followed  by  the  Director  of  Central 
Intelligence  and  the  Intelligence  Advisory  Committee*;  (2)  amend 
National  Security  Council  Intelligence  Directive  :--c .  1  in  accordance 
vith  the  changes  proposed  in  Annex  ffAM  appended  hereto. 
3.    MEMBERSHIP  0?  THE  INTELLIGENCE  ADVISORY  COMMITTEE. 
d  • 
—    Summary  of  Report, 
The  Report  recommends  that  the  Federal  Bureau  of 
Investigation  be  added  to  the  membership  of  the  Intelligence  Ad- 
visory Committee  and  that  the  Joint  Staff  (JCS)  and  Atomic  Energy 
Commission  be  dropped  from  membership. 
b.    Comments . 
Ve  concur  in  the  crcoosal  that  the  Federal  Bureau 
of  Investigation  be  added  to  the  membership  of   the  Intelligence 
e» 
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UHM8W 
.Advisory  Committee,  but  dc  not  agree  that:  the  Joint  Staff  (JCS)  and 
Atomic  Energy  Commission  be  dropped  from  membership.  A  sufficient 
number  of  problems  arise  which  are  of  joint  concern  to  foreign 
intelligence  and  domestic  security  intelligence  to  warrant  the 
membership  on  the  IAC  of  the  F3I  in  order  that  coordination  and 
cooperation  in  the  national  interest  may  be  achieved. 
Ve  also  wish  to  point  out  that  the  Recommended  Action 
under  para.  2  £  above  would ,  if  approved,  have  the  effect  of  clari- 
fying the  status  of  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  as  a  member 
f  the  Intelligence  Advisory  Committee. 
£.   Recommended  Action . 
That  the  National  Security  Council  (1)  invite  the 
Attorney  General  to  have  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  become 
a  member  of  the  Intelligence  Advisory  Committee;  (2).  if  this  invita- 
tion \s  accepted,  amend  National  Security  Council  Directive  No.  1 
acccrdingl:  ,  as  provided  in  Annex     A  appended  hereto. 
4.    PARTICULAR  INTELLIGENCE  QUESTIONS  REQUIRING  COORDINATION 
OR  ATTENTION. 
a.   Summary  of  the  Report* 
Throughout  the  Conclusions  and  Recommendations  cf 
the  Survey  Group  Report,  attention  is  drawn  to  a  number  of  particu- 
lar intelligence  questions  requiring  special  attention  or  coordina- 
tion.  These  may  be  listed  as  follows: 
(  O  \        no-^  st^  r  *  ^  t  e  "1  ^  "^  r^nr  ^  ^  ^o  ~ c\\~l~^  -*  ^T^^'}  ^  *   - 
V   t^  j  **>  ^-J  4^»  ^  O  W  .^  W     Mi.4  w  w  •*.  «*•  «*•  *C,  w  1*U  v     -*—  *  •'—■'     v«/  V*y  ,«U*,  ,*  W  ^  «■•      ^»  •*  W^  _■>  «*-  -*» 
NSC  50 
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(3)  Provisions  for  prompt  coordinated  intelli- 
gence  estimates  in  crisis  situations. 
(4)  The  proper  allocation  of  responsibility  for 
political  summaries. 
(5)  The  exploitation  of  intelligence  from 
foreign  nationality  groups  and  foreign  individuals  in  the  United 
S^atoS  , 
(6)  The  coordination  of  covert  intelligence 
activities  in  occupied  areas. 
(7)  Coordination  of  the  handling  of  defectors. 
(8)  Increased  emphasis  on  the  counter-espionage 
activities  abroad  of  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  and  closer 
liaison  for  counter-espionage  matters  with  the  Federal  Eureau  of 
Investigation, 
b.   Comments. 
We  concur  in  these  conclusions  and  comments  as  inter- 
preted above  and  point  out  that  recent  progress  has  been   cade  in 
some  of  these  fields.  For  example,  that  of  scientific  intelligence 
through  the  creation  of  the  Office  of  Scientific  Intelligence,  by 
an  agreement  on  a  procedure  for  providing  prompt  coordinated  national 
intelligence  estimates  in  crisis  situations,  and  by  an  agreement 
under  consideration  by  the  LAC  agencies  and  the  FBI  -..".th  resoect 
u   <-  **J 
the  exploitation  of  defectors  and  other  aliens . 
For  the  purpose  of  clarity  and  guidance: 
Paragraph  k   a  (2)  is  considered  to  refer  to  the  coordina- 
tion of  foreign  intelligence  and  foreign  counterintelligence  with 
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domestic  intelligence  and  domestic  counterintelligence  for  the 
purpose  of  correlating  and  evaluating  intelligence  relating  to 
national  security. 
Paragraph  $  a  (3)  is  considered  to  refer  to  provision  for 
prompt  coordinated  national  intelligence  estimates  in  crisis  situa- 
tions . 
Paragraph  4a  (5)  is  considered  to  refer  to  the  exploita- 
tion of  foreign  nationality  groups  and  foreign  Individuals  in  the 
United  States  for  the  purposes  of  foreign  Intelligence. 
We  anticipate  that  the  addition  of  the  Federal  Bureau  of 
Investigation  to  the  membership  of  the  Intelligence  Advisory  Com- 
mittee will  contribute  particularly  to  the  objectives  under  points 
(2),  (3),  (5)  and  (7)  above.  With  respect  to  paragraph  4  a  (8) 
above,  we  believe  the  maintenance  of  close  liaison  for  these  pur- 
poses is  essential. 
£.   Recommended  Action. 
That  the  National  Security  Council: 
(1)  Draw  the  particular  attention  of  the  Di- 
rector of  Central  Intelligence  and  Intelligence  Advisory  Committee 
to  the  need  for  early  and  sustained  action  for  mere  effective  co- 
ordination in  the  fields  listed  under  para,  i  a  above  as  discussed 
in  the  Survey  Group  Report; 
(2)  Request  the  Director  of  Central  Intelli- 
gence to  submit  to  the  Council  within  a  period  of  si;c  months  a  re- 
port on  progress  in  these  matters. 
(3)  Invite  the  Attorney  General  to  have  the 
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Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  become  a  member  of  the  Intelligence 
Advisory  Committee. 
(4)   If  this  invitation  is  accepted,  amend 
National  Security  Council  Directive  No,  1  accordingly,  as  provided 
in" -Annex  "A"  appended  hereto. 
(5)  Note  that  nothing  contained  in  NSC  ID  1,  as 
amended ,  is  intended  to  affect  or  change  NSC  17 A,  approved  by  the 
President  on  March  23 ,  19^9  -nd  the  Director  of  the  Federal  Bureau 
# 
of  Investigation  is  a  member  of  the  Intelligence  Advisory  Committee 
for  the  purpose  of  coordinating  domestic  intelligence  and  related 
matters  with  foreign  intelligence  matters  and  his  relations  with 
the  CIA  shall  be  as  provided  in  Section  102  of  the  National  Security 
.Act  of  1947.    
5.    NATIONAL  IMTELLIGENCE  3STIMATES. 
a.   Summary  of  the  Report. 
The  report  concludes  that  in  CIA  there  has  been  a 
confusion  between  the  responsibility  for  producing  coordinated 
national  intelligence  estimates  and  the  responsibility  for  miscel- 
laneous research  and  reporting.   It  finds  further  that  the  Council's 
Intelligence  Directives  on  this  subject  are  sound,  but  have  not  oeen 
effectively  carried  out.   It  recommends,  aside  from  organizational 
changes  described  in  the  following  section,  that  CIA  should  draw 
upon  and  review  the  specialized  intelligence  production  of  the 
agencies  in  order  to  prepare  coordinated  national  intelligence  esti- 
mates and  that  these  estimates  should  be  discussed  and  approved  by 
the  1AC ;  whose  members  should  be  collectively  responsible.   Such 
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t.:?./«».''!>'!.' 
estimates  should  be  recognized,  as  the  nost  authoritative  available 
o 
to  policy  makers. 
r 
b.  C  cane  nt  s, 
We  concur  in  these  conclusions  except  that  ve  do  not 
believe  tha.t  the  Director  and  the  LAC  should  be  bound  by  the  concept 
of  collective  responsibility,  because  this  would  inevitably  reduce 
coordinated  national  intelligence  to  the  loves t  common  denominator 
among  the  agencies  concerned.  A  procedure  should  be  adopted  vhlch 
would  permit  the  Director  and  the  LAC  to  fulfill  their  respective 
responsibilities  to  the  President  and  the  NSC  regardless  of  unani- 
mous agreement,  but  providing  for  concurrent  submissions  of  dissent. 
The  CIA,  however,  should  interpret  and  follow  the  NSC  Intelligence 
Directives  so  as  to  refrain  as  far  as  possible  from  competitive 
intelligence  activities  in  the  production  of  research  intelligence 
estimates. 
c.  Recommended  Action. 
That  the  National  Security  Council  concur  In  the 
conclusions  and  recommendations  stated  above,  as  interpreted  by  our 
comments,  as  a  statement  of "principles  to  be  observed  by  the  Director 
of  Central  Intelligence  and  the  LAC. 
6.    ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  CENTRAL  INTELLIGENCE  AGENCY, 
a.   s^mary  of  the  Report . 
The  Survey  Group  Report  proposes  a  number  of  major 
changes  in  the  internal  organization  of  CIA  vith  a  viev  to  supi^r^ 
che  objectives  set  forth  in  the  Report,  These  changes  are  the 
WMsste,
(1)  The  operations 
should  b3  integrated  under  single  over- 
all direction  in  an  operations  division,  with  its  separate  adminis- 
tration, within  CIA* 
(2)   Out  of  the  present  Office  of  Reports  and 
Estimates  there  should  be  created  (a)  a  snail  estimates  division 
which  would  draw  upon  and  review  the  specialised  intelligence  product 
of  the  departmental  agencies  in  order  to  prepare  coordinated  national 
* 
intelligence  estimates  and  (b)  a  research  and  reports  division  to 
accomplish  central  research  in,  and  coordinated  production  of,  in- 
telligence in  recognized  fields  of  common  interest. 
■  —  -       -       (3)   The  Foreign  Documents  Branch  of^_ 
j  should  be  included  in  the  proposed  research  and 
reports  division. 
(4)  The  Foreign  Broadcast  Information  3ranch 
should  be  included  in  the  proposed  operations  division. 
(5)  The  Interdepartmental  Coordinating  and 
Planning  Staff  should  be  reconstituted  as  a  staff  responsible  only 
to  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence,  with  the  taslc  of  developing 
plans  for  the  coordination  of  intelligence  activities.   It  would 
also  perform  the  present  tasks  of  the  Office  of  Collection  and  Dis- 
semination with  respect  to  the  coordination  of  collection  require- 
ments and  requests  and  the  dissemination  of  intelligence. 
b.   Comments . 
We  concur  in  these  recommendations  with  the  exception 
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that  ve  do  not  agree  that  the  Foreign  Broadcast  Information  Branch 
should  he  included  in  the  proposed  operations  division-  This 
division  should  include  those  activities'^ 
n which  conduct  covert  or  semi-covert 
field  intelligence  and  related  operations  vhich  are  closely  inter- 
dependent and  have  similar  administrative  and  security  problems. 
With  regard  to  the  recommendations  regarding  the 
Office  of  Reports  and  Estimate s,  the  Interdepartmental  Coordinating 
and  Planning  Staff  and  the  Office  of  Collection  and  dissemination, 
we  concur  in  them  and  in  the  concept  of  GIA  upon  which  they  are 
based.   However,  we  recognize  that  there  may  be  other  methods  of 
organization  which  will  accomplish  the  same -objectives, 
£•   Recommended  Action. 
That  the  National  Security  Council  (1)  approve  the 
recoinnendations  of  the  Survey  Group  Report  on  the  reorganizatio  ; 
of  CIA  as  listed  in  para.  5. a  above,  subject  to  the  exception  and 
comments  noted  in  para.  6  b;  (2)  direct  the  Director  of  Central  In- 
telligence to  carry  cut  these  recommendations,  as  approved  by  the 
Council,  and  report  to  the  Council  in  hinety  days  on  progress  toward 
their  implementation. 
1 .        THE  SECURITY  OF  INFORMATION  AND  THS  AVOIDANCE  0?  PUBLICITY, 
a.   Summary  of  the  Report . 
The  Report  recommends  that  (1)  the  Director  of  Central 
Intelligence  should /  In  cases  where  the  disclosure  of  secret  informa- 
tion Is  sought  from  him  and  he  has  doubt  'as  to  whether  he  should 
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comply,  refer  the  question  to  the  National  Security  Council;  (2)  in 
the  interest  of  security,  the  Central  Intelligence  .Agency  should 
increasingly  emphasize  its  duties  as  the  coordinator  of  intelligence 
rather  than  its  secret  intelligence  activities  in  order  to  reverse 
the  present  unfortunate  trend  where  it  finds  itself  advertised 
almost  exclusively  a3  a  secret  service  organization. 
b.   Comments , 
We  concur  in  these  recommendations  vith  the  reserva- 
tion that,  in  principle,  all  publicity  is  undesirable  and  that  only 
where  it  is  unavoidable  should  the  procedure  set  forth  in  subpara- 
graph 7  a  (2)  above  be  followed. 
£.   Recommended  Action, 
That  the  National  Security  Council  (1)  approve  the 
recommendations  of  the  Survey  Group  Report  on  she  security  of  in- 
formation and  the  avoidance  of  publicity,  subject  to  the  reservation 
noted  in  para.  7  b  above;  (2)  instruct  the  Director  of  Central  In- 
telligence to  prepare  appropriate  National  Security  Council  Intelli- 
gence Directives  covering  these  points  and  submit  them  foi  approval 
within  a  period  of   thirty  days. 
3.    CHAIRMANSHIP  0?  THE  UNITED  STATSS  COMMUNICATIONS 
INTELLIGENCE  BOARD, 
a.   Summary  of  the  Report . 
The  report  recommends  that  the  Director  of  Central 
Intelligence  should  be  made  permanent  chairman  of  the  United  States 
Ccsnrunicaticns  Intelligence  Board. 
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b.    Comments. 
Ve  do  not  concur  In  this  recommendation.   This  'natter 
vas  considered  vfaen  the  U.  S.  Communications  Intelligence  Board  was 
set  up  and  the  present  arrangements  decided  on.   These  arrangements, 
vhich  provide  for  a  rotating  chairmanship,  are  operating  satisfac- 
torily and  it  seems  undesirable  to  make  a  change. 
£.   Recommended  Action, 
That  the  National  Security  Council  net  concur  in  the 
recommendation  contained  in  the  Report. 
9*    OPERATING  PROBLEMS  RELATING  TO  CLANDESTINE  ACTIVITIES, 
a.   Summary  of  the  Report. 
The  Report  sets  forth  certain  recommendations  re- 
garding individual  operating  problems  of  the  clandestine  activities 
of  CIA.   These  are  questions  which,  according  to  the  Report,  require 
particular  emphasis  or  have  been  neglected  in  the  past*  The  princi- 
pal questions  so  indicated  may  be  summarized  as  follows: 
(i)C 
(2)   Relations  vith  departmental  agencies  should 
be  brought  closer  and  the  guidance  »hich/_ 
_J[rec elves  from  intelligence  consumers  should  be  strength- 
ened.  This  might  be  achieved  by  including  representatives  cf  che 
Serv-ice  agencies  and  the  State  Department  in  appropriate  sections 
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tAIv 
(3)   The  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  -should 
assure  himself  that  the  operating  services  of  CIA  receive  adequate 
guidance  on  the  current  and  strategic  intelligence  and  policy  needs 
of  the  Government. 
w c 
b.        Comments . 
We  concur  in  these  recommendations  all  of  which  point 
to  significant  operating  problems  relating  to  clandestine  activities 
vhich  require  particular  and  constant  emphasis. 
£.   Recommended  Action, 
That  the  National  Security  Council  (1)  approve  the 
\% 
recommendation  of  the  Report  as  listed  in  para,  9  &  above;  (2) 
direct  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  to  carry  them  out  vith 
the  assistance  of  the  other  departments  and  agencies  concerned  and 
report  to  the  National  Security  Council  on  any  difficulties  en- 
countered. 
10.   TEE  QUESTION  OP  CIVILIAN  OR  MILITARY  PERSONNEL  IN  KEY  CIA 
POSITIONS. 
a.    Summary  of  the  Report. 
The  Report  concludes  that: 
(1)   The  placing  in  key  positions  in  CIA  cf  a 
large  percentage  of  military  personnel,  many  of  them  on  relatively 
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short  tour  of  duty  assignment,  tends  to  discourage  competent  civil- 
Ian  personnel  from  looking  to  employment  in  the  Agency  as  a  career, 
(2)   Continuity  of  service  is  essential  for  the 
successful  carrying  out  of  the  duties  of  Director  of  Central  Intelli- 
gence,  The  best  hope  for  insuring  this  continuity  and  the  greatest 
assurance  of  independence  of  action  is  for  a  civilian  to  be  Director 
of  Central' Intelligence .  A   serviceman  selected  for  the  post  should 
resign  from  active  military  duty. 
b.   Comments . 
We  do  not  wholly  concur  in  these  conclusions.   It  is 
most  important  that  both  civilian  and  military  personnel  be  repre- 
sented in  the  key  positions  in  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  al- 
though we  do  not  believe  it  is  desirable  to  attempt  to  fix  any  pre- 
cise ratio  for  the  two.   This'is  a  matter  to  be  worked  out  by  the 
Director  in  consultation  with  the  Secretaries  of  State  and  Defense. 
We  agree  that  continuity  of  service  is  essential  for  the 
post  of  Director.   The  most  qualified  Person  available  should  be 
selected  for  the  post.   In  order  to  insure  continuity  and  independ- 
ence of  action,  he  should  be  either  a  civilian,  or  if  a  service  man 
or  a  foreign  service  officer,  he  should  be  either  retired  or  one 
whose  service  as  Director  will  be  his  final  tour  of  active  duty, 
c^   Recommended  Action. 
That  the  National  Security  Council: 
(1)  Concur  In  the  above  comments  as  an  expres- 
sion of  its  views  on  this  question. 
(2)  Inform  the  President  of  these  views  insofar 
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as  they  concern  the  post  of  Director  of  Central  Intelligence, 
(3)   Inform  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence 
of  these  views  insofar  as  they  concern  the  staffing  of  other  key 
positions  in  CIA* 
II.   GEIJERAL  APPRAISAL  0?  TBS  LEADERSHIP  AND   POLICIES  0?  THE 
CENTRAL  INTELLIGENCE  AGENCY. 
a.  Snrnmary  of  the  Report , 
The  Report  concludes  that: 
(1)  The  directing  staff  of  CIA  has  not  demon- 
* 
strated  an  adequate  understanding  of  the  mandate  of  the  organization 
* 
or  the  ability  to  discharge  that  mandate  effectively. 
(2)  Administrative  organization  and  policies 
tend  to  impede  the  carrying  out  of  the  essential  intelligence 
functions  of  CIA  under  the  Act. 
b.  Comments . 
We  do  not  wholly  concur  in  these  conclusions.   While 
we  recognize  the  existence  of  important  defects  in  the  organization 
and  operation  of  CIA,  we  believe  that  these  conclusions  are  too 
sweeping.   Complicating  factors  in  appraising  CIA's  efficiency  have 
been  the  shortness  of  time  during  which  to  develop  an  effective 
organization  and  a  lack  of  common  understanding  as  to  the  respective 
missions  of  CIA  and  the  departmental  intelligence  agencies.   How- 
ever j  as  indicated  in  the  Report  and  concurred  in  by  us,  numerous 
and  important  improvements  are  necessary  and  need  zo   be  carried 
out  promptly  and  effectively. 
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Recommended  Action. 
That  the  National  Security  Council  (1)  note  the  Con- 
elusions  and  Recommendations  of  the  Report;  en  this  subject:  (2) 
pprove  the  above  Comments  thereon* 
a 
12.      THS   SERVICE   II-ITSLLIGSffCE  AGENCIES. 
a.  Comments, 
The  National  Military  Establishment  concurs  in  the 
Conclusions  and  Recommendations  of  Chapter  11  of  the  Report  except 
that  it  does  not  agree  that  the  Service  intelligence  agencies  should 
be  staffed  vith  personnel  who  concentrate  in  intelligence  over  the 
major  portion  of  their  careers.   It  is • the  policy  of  the  Military 
Establishment  to  assign  qualified  personnel  to  intelligence  duties 
even  though  they  have  not  had  previous  intelligence  -experience. 
However,  continued  efforts  are  made  to  attract  the  highest  type 
personnel  to  intelligence  duty. 
b.  Recommended  Action. 
That  the  National  Security  Council  note  the  above 
Comments  by  the  national  5J.litary  Establishment. 
13-   THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATS, 
a.  Comments , 
The  Department  of  State  concurs  in  the  Conclusions 
and  Recommendations  of  Chapter  12  of  the  Report  and  is  undertaking 
to  put  them  into  effect  as  part  of  general  plans  for  reorganization 
within  the  Department. 
b .  Recommended  Action. 
That   the   National  Security  Council  note    the   above 
Comments   by  the  Department   of  State. 
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1,   To  maintain  the  relationship  essential  to  coordination 
between  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  and  the  intelligence  organi- 
zations ,  an  Intelligence  Advisory  Committee  consisting  of  the 
Director  of  Central  Intelligence,  who  shall  be  Chairman  thereof , 
Director  of  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation,  and  the  respective 
intelligence  chiefs  from  the  Departments  of  State,  Amy,  ITavy,  and 
Air  Force,  and  from  the  Joint  Staff  (JCS),  and  *he  Atomic  Energy 
Commission,  or  their  representatives,  shall  be  established  to  advise 
the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence.  The  Director  of  Central  In- 
telligence will  invite  the  chief,  or  his  representative,  of  any 
other  intelligence  Agency  having  functions  related  to  the  national 
security  to  sit  with  the  Intelligence  Advisory  Committee  whenever 
matters  within  the  purview  of  his  Agency  are  to  be  discussed. 
***** 
5.   The  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  shall  disseminate 
national  Intelligence  to  the  President,  to  members  of  the  National 
Security  Council,  to  the  Intelligence  Chiefs  of  the  IAC  Agencies, 
and  to  such  Governmental  Departments  and  Agencies  as  the  National 
Security  Council  from  time  to  time  may  designate.   Intelligence 
so  disseminated  shall  be  officially  concurred  in  by  the  Intelligence 
Agencies  or  shall  carry  aa-ag-eeed  a  statement  of  substantially 
dissent  di  f faring  opinions  , 
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