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“SANITIZND Cony 
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‘Guatemalan army officers Se 
A group of Guatemalan : 
Llionzon was pressing on 14 June ior 
President Arbenz, evea prior to his reply to an arm,’ ultinatun, 
according to a usually reliable source 
Arbenz 
is said to 
have agreed to resign, but only on certain unacceptable 
~) 
conditions, 
and these officers believe 
he is nerely stalling. 
29. 
a Arbenz 
alline on ultinatun: 
the immediate ouster of 
Comnent:. Arbenz will have te make significant concessions 
to the ant»-Comnunist army officers or 
Ouster. 
He has: 
been under growing army pressure to reverse his pro-Comnunis t 
policies since as long aro as inst. Novenber. 
Colonel Monzon, minister wit thout portfolio in the Ardenz 
cabinet and an influential officer, 
told a reliable 
Last 
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Ce 
Ta 
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“7 
“sour. OF five more months of present conditions" 
would force army leaders 
to oust Arbenz. 
He claimed a majority 
of the army's nt pot would join hin in.a move against the 
rovernmcent. 
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June 
§4 
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©
L) 
LATIN AMERICA 
3. Anti-Communist forces reported invading Guatemala: 
Tegucigalpa on 17 June that Guatemalan 
anti-Communist forces under Carlos 
Castillo Armas in Zonduras were moving 
EER 
19 June 54 
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SANITIZE COPY 
Comment: 
Cestillo 
rho hea 
become the symbol of anti-Communist resistence to the Arbenz 
‘regime, announced on his clandestine racio late on 17 June thathe 
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would move "within a few hours." He avoears to be acting indepand- | 
ently of the ton officers long close to Arbenz who are now reliably. 
reported threatening to oust the presice nt if he refusestoreverse 
his pro-Communist policies. he unknown cegree of support for 
tiinines.s: 
Castillo Armas among active army oificers would 
to baa 
to make any concessions to the army. He may be relying on re- 
peated promises by the Communists to mobilize their 
in. 
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PROSIDENT 
The attechea summary of the. situation in 
Cuntemala 
as of today is subaitted 
at the sug- ; 
gestion of Mr. Allen Dulles. 
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For Tue Director of Central Intelligence 
SANT#IZED. COPY”... 
Content UN 
SIFIED 
por 
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date 26 AUG 1976 
20 June 1954 
"ita 
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The Sitvation in Guctenale 
as of 20 June 
1. As of 2C June the outcome of the efforts to overthrow the 
regine of Preaidant Axbens cf Guatensla renains very much in doubt. 
The controlling factor in the cituation is still considered to be the 
postition of the Guatemalan armed forces, and thus far this group has 
not given any clear indication of vhether it will move, and if so, in: 
vhich way. If the Guatemalen army should move within the next few days 
against the Arbenz regime, it is seuntievel ta bave the capacity to over- 
throw it. 
| tary elements commit themselves to vigorous action against the forces of 
Cestillo Arnas the latter will be defeated and a probability of uprisings 
froa among other elements of the population is considered — unlikely. 
2, 
The 
of the toPranting military 
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shifting vith daily rises ana falls in their attitudes. This group has 
long proclained itu strong i 
eatin feelings and its ultimate in- 
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teation of doing something to rid the goverrment of Communist influences. 
Vorious of Cicers have declared themselves as willing to take action 
egatnst the regime given just a little more tine or 
a little more, 
«ton. 
st is probaocle that the risins preosure of events will 
conp2:, 
group 
to 
On the other hand if it remains loyel and 4f most of the mili- 
to declare ito position, one way or the* other, at ‘any, 
¢ 
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20 June 1954 
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ft
tire 
frou row on -- although 
the possible result could 
be a split in the 
ranks. /Tnere are unconfirmed rumors as of Saturday night to the effect 
that Colonel Diaz, the Chief of the, Armed Forces, and some 40 officers 
had applied for asylum in various foreign emoassies in Guatemala City, 
‘but these erbassies have not yet confirmed this report./ 
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3- There vere new defections on Saturday from the Guatemalan Air- ~ 
force, one pilot flying out with hie plane end several others obtaining ° 
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_ asylum 
in the Salvadorien Exbassy. The Guatemalan Airforce 
has thus far 
failed to produce any interception effort against the overflights againes 
the Castillo Armas planes. Rovever very heavy siiti-aircraft fire is re- 
tine fur no 
evidence to 
confizn the 
changes ant 
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ganda of the Guatemalan regime of bombing attacks upon Setanta. On 
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the contrary there are cyewitness accounts of clumsy efforts to fabricaic 
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evidence of aerial bombardment (the home of Colonel Mendoza -- one of the 
@efecting airforce officers, was set on fire by the police). 
It is proba-. 
ble that sone of the damage to o11 storese facilities and other installa- 
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tions, attributed by the Cuatemalan Goverrzent as well as by Castillo 
Acti 
Armas, ty 
nttacks is in fact the result of sabotage efforts on 
attempt to mobilize séaition:.1 
for the amy. 
te 
the pnurt of Castillo Armas agents or other resistance elements. 
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‘stvre 13 conciderable evidence of a determination on the part of 
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the 
lun Soverranat to mobilize ani ans Cor.unist-controlled studcnt 
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youth 
(norientture) organizations. 
At the 
tine there is’ 
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3 Other scatt«red Croups throughout the country. 
9. The entire effort is thus more dependent upon psychological 
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iepact rather than actual military strength, although it 10 uon the 
ability of the Castillo Armas effort to create and rnirtain for a short 
time the i:mression of very substentiol military strength that the suc- 
eces of this pertioular effort primarily depenis. The use of a small 
° 
number of airplanes and the macsive use of rofio broadcasting are de- 
signed to build up and give rain support to the inpression of Castillo 
Armas’ strength as well as to spread the impression of the regime's 
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weakness. 
(10, From the foregoing description of the effort it will 
be seen 
- how important are the aspects of deception and timing. If the effort 
does not succeed in arousing the other latent forces of resistance with- 
in the next period of approxinately twenty-four hours, it will probably 
begin to lose strength. 
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6. There are strong indications of rounting tension between the 
army and the Guardia Civil -- the Communist influenced police organiza- 
tion. 
7. We cannot confirm that either Pucrto Barrios or San Jose has 
fallen to the Castillo Armas forces, but it is clear that there have 
been uprisings in these and other cities. 
A bridge on the key railroad 
line between Guatemala City and Puerto Barrios is reliably reported to 
have been danaged near Cualan. 
Description of the Castillo Armas Moverent 
8. The action of Colonel Castillo Arzas is not in any sense a 
: 
conventional military operation. 
He is Geperdent for his success not 
upon the size and strength of the military forces at his disposal but 
rather upon the possibility that his entry into action will touch off 
@ general uprising against the Guatemalan regine. 
The forces of Castillo 
Arrvas entering Guateralon from Hondures are estireted to numher about 300 
Een. 
Then: have now been joined by others fron inside the country to 
make a tutal in excess of 600 armed men. 
(Tre mojority of this number is 
equirze’ with rifles, sub-machine guns ard 50 ca mortars. 
These weapons 
are 
manufacture.) 
Castillo Armas hinsel? is expected to leave 
{3 
post is, Honduras today 
join ose cienent of chid 
pec> ettin,. by plane, wut thus far ihere in no word that en airfield 
he3 becomes «.vallable. 
Troa the 
past 
he proposes to entablioh 
at this So:...ien, he will éndeavor to coordinute the activities of his 
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te sorted uprisings 
air attacks 
Cropped by air 
GUATEMALA 
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BRITISH 
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0-2006-foot 
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LATE: 
tA 
8. The situation in Guatemala: 
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ihe Areeritan emkassy in Guatemala: 
renoried at 4:00 0. m. on 20 June that 
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"rebe) forces" wore oparating in eastera 
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and northeastern Guatemala, in some 
cases near the Honduran frontier, but that they were not known to 
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hold any important towns. 
The ersbessy could net substantiate 
vgs 
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reports that an "invas 
occurred or that unrisings hadtatten 
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nlace. 
Tne erabessy 
th: 
both the Guntemalan government and 
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Castillo 
"headio Liberatio: 
oa" were disseminating hichly ex- 
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acrrorated rumors. 
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The embossy wes infor 
that two troop 
trains hed left Guatemala City in the direstion of 
Zacana on 19 June. 
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Cozament: 
‘To cate there is no informa- 
tion on the stands taken by ton Guatemalan army officers, and there 
is no reliable evidence that any major armed clashes have occurred 
oetween the opposing forces. 
A. coverrment radio broadcast late on 
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20 June called on all 12’ o> unicas to 
membershin lists so 
that "a civilian army can be organized to cefend the canital.” 
as 
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Further 
among air force officers 
have been reliably resorted. 
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OCI NO. 6224 
COPY WO, 
2, 
Jvane 1954 
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CENCE
138. 
LACIN AMERICA 
Comment on Guatemala's requests to UN and Inter-American | 
Peace Commission: 
Guatemirin's 21 Sune reguest 
to have incer- 
American Peace Commission action ceferroad as apparcatly 
on 2 belief that Guatemala would be hotter served by coxnsider— 
ation of the case in the UN Security Council, where the Sovict 
member can assist the Arbenz Cause. 
¥n making this request to the Peace Commission--a seni- 
autonomous Live-member subsidiary body within the Organiza- 
tion of American States--the Guatemalan _ Boveranenc said it 
desired to await 
the outcome of the UN's 20 June resolution 
calling for a cease-fire, 
At that tine. the Cuatemalan d2le- 
fation at the UN intimated that further Security Council 
action would be reqguesced if the Yigat ting continue 2d, and a 
new Security Council meets ke hes mow bee n requested for 23 
June. 
The Guatemalan 
expected to make 
Zurther efforts to document charg 
5s of oreression by-such “eyi-~ 
dence" as it can preduce. 
Guatemalina's original cosmploint to the Peace Comnission—- 
filed simultaneously, with its anneal to the Ul on 19 Junse-~ 
appeared designed to rebut yossible charges that it had ip- 
nored its 
cblization 
to seek rei ned S within the 
mat security system, 
Arbenz MAY 
nave 
‘ed 
to block 
efforts 
to call a full mectins 
of the OAS to discuss 
the 
Guatemalan threat to hemisphere security. 
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