An adequate account of the nature of genre and of the criteria for genre membership is essential to understanding the nature of the various categories into which comics can be classified. Because they fail adequately to distinguish genre categories from other ways of categorizing works, including categorizations according to medium or according to style, previous accounts of genre fail to illuminate the nature of comics categories. I argue that genres are sets of conventions that have developed as means of addressing particular interpretative and/or evaluative concerns, and have a history of co‐instantiation within a community, such that a work’s belonging to some genre generates interpretative and evaluative expectations among the members of that community. Genres are distinct from styles in consisting of conventions, and are distinct from media both in consisting of conventions and in generating interpretative and evaluative expectations.

Philosophy

Comics and Genre

The Art of Comics: A Philosophical Approach, First Edition. Edited by Aaron Meskin and Roy T. Cook. © 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2012 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Comics and Genre Catharine Abell Introduction As comics develop as a medium and as an art form, more and more comics genres emerge. My aim in this paper is to explain what comics genres are and what it is for a comic to belong to a particular genre. An adequate account of comics genres should illuminate the nature of genres more generally. Nevertheless, it will be fruitful to focus on the particular case of comics genres. Both film and literary practice and the philosophy and criticism of film and literature have advanced to a point at which it is reasonably clear what the main genres of movies and literary works are, and what features distinguish them. By contrast, comics are a relatively young art form, and the philosophy and criticism of comics are in their infancy. Past discussion of comics has even confused the art form of comics with particularly popular and influential genres, with the result that comics have been dismissed as artistically unimportant, because they have been equated with superhero escapism for adolescents (McCloud 1993 ). Comics fall into a broad array of categories, including funny animal comics, romance comics, superhero comics, Tijuana bibles, alternative comics, autobiographical comics, mini‐comics, graphic novels, comix, adult comics and fumetti (also known as photo‐comics). While some of these categories seem clearly to be genres, it is not obvious that all are. Funny animal comics, romance comics, and superhero comics are comics genres, but it is not obvious whether or not graphic novels or fumetti comprise genres. Comics categories therefore provide a good test case for an account of genre. 4 0001349037.INDD 68 9/19/2011 5:39:34 PM Comics and Genre 69 An adequate account of genre should provide a plausible way of distinguishing between comics categories that are genres and those that are not, and should provide principled reasons for this distinction. In doing so, it will help inform our understanding of comics, by elucidating the significance of the various categories of comics. I begin, in the next section, by outlining some desiderata for an adequate account of genre. In the following section, I assess existing accounts of genre, and argue that none can adequately distinguish those comics categories that are genres from those that are not. In the final section, I provide an alternative account of genre and of the conditions for genre membership. I then use this account to distinguish those categories of comics that are genres from those that are not, by identifying features in virtue of which they either fall within the scope of the account, or fail to do so. Desiderata for an Account of Genre An adequate philosophical account of genre should provide solutions to the various philosophical problems that genres pose. To clarify what this requires, I will now outline some of these problems. First, it is not clear what makes a certain feature of a work relevant to determining its genre. There is no single type of feature that determines the genre to which a work belongs. Rather, a variety of different types of features of comics may be relevant to determining their genre. Their genre may be determined, not just by their content - their setting, characters, themes and subjects - but also by their structure, and the effects they have on an audience. Whether or not a comic is a science‐fiction comic depends, amongst other things, on its setting; whether or not it is a romance comic depends both on its subject and on its structure (a comic about a boy's love for a girl, in which the boy has already got the girl, and does not lose her, may not qualify as a romance comic despite its subject); and whether or not it is a horror comic is determined partly by its capacity to induce fear in an audience. If fumetti comprise a comics genre, a comic's genre membership may also depend on its format (if a comic does not include photographs, it is unlikely to be a fumetti). Some types of features seem to be relevant to determining a work's genre in some cases, but not in others. While a comic's emotional effects on an audience are clearly relevant to determining whether or not it is a horror comic, they are not obviously relevant to determining whether or not it is a science‐fiction comic. An adequate account of genre should explain both which features of a work are potentially relevant to determining its genre membership, and under what conditions they do so. 0001349037.INDD 69 9/19/2011 5:39:34 PM 70 Comics and Genre A second problem concerns, not what features determine a work's genre membership, but the manner in which they do so. It does not seem possible to specify individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for membership of a specific genre. Rather, certain features are standard for works in a specific genre, such that a work's possessing one of those features counts towards its belonging to the genre at issue, and other features are contra‐standard for works in a specific genre, such that a work's possessing one of those features counts against its belonging to the genre at issue (see Walton 1970 ). A work may belong to some genre despite its lacking features standard for that genre (for example, a comic about a boy's love for a girl that fails to meet the boy meets girl, boy gets girl, boy loses girl structural format may nonetheless qualify as a romance). It may also belong to some genre despite possessing features contra‐standard for that genre (for example, a comic may qualify as a horror comic despite not being capable of frightening an audience). A work's possessing a feature standard for some genre is a pro tanto reason for classifying it as belonging to that genre, and its possessing a feature contra‐standard for that genre is a pro tanto reason for not classifying it as belonging to that genre. An adequate account of genre should provide an account of the manner in which those of a work's features that are relevant to determining its genre help to determine the genre to which a work belongs, and this account should accommodate the fact that such features provide only pro tanto reasons for genre classifications. An adequate explanation of what determines genre membership and how it does so should also accommodate the fact that a single work may belong to more than one genre. For example, one can imagine a comic that is a funny animal romance comic, belonging both to the genre of funny animal comics and to that of romance comics. Such an explanation should also accommodate the fact that some genres incorporate works in a variety of different media. For example, superhero comics and romance comics comprise sub‐genres of the broader superhero and romance genres, which include not only comics, but also works in other narrative media, such as novels and films. Furthermore, as I suggested in the Introduction, an adequate account of genre needs to distinguish genre categories from the various other categories into which works can be classified. These other categories include categories based solely on history of production, such as Canadian comics produced between 1950 and 1965, or comics produced by Charles Schulz, as well as arbitrarily specified categories, such as comics produced using more than five colors of ink. More importantly, an adequate account of genre should distinguish genre categories from style categories. The notion of genre is closely related to that of style: so closely related that it is often unclear whether a category is a genre or a style category. For example, is realism a genre or a style? What about pop art? This lack of clarity is due not just to 0001349037.INDD 70 9/19/2011 5:39:34 PM Comics and Genre 71 philosophical uncertainty about the nature of genre, but also about the nature of style. In the absence of an adequate philosophical account of style, one should not expect an account of genre to provide a definitive explanation of the distinction between a genre and a style. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to expect an account of genre to identify some features of genres that, prima facie , distinguish them from styles, and also to identify features that, prima facie , genres share with styles, and that account for the close relationship between genres and styles. A final philosophical problem posed by genres - and one of the most interesting - concerns the relationship between a work's genre and its content. A work's genre membership appears to affect its content. We can see this by focusing on narrative content : the content that works of fiction have, considered as such. The narrative content of a work of fiction incorporates everything that is true according to the story that the work recounts . A work's narrative content generally incorporates a lot more than the work explicitly represents. For example, it is part of the narrative content of the Peanuts comics that Charlie Brown is insecure, although they do not explicitly represent him as insecure. A work's narrative content must therefore have additional determinants, besides its explicit representational content. It seems pretty clear that a work's genre is one such determinant. For example, it would not be true according to a funny animal comic that explicitly represented an animal as talking that anything unusual had taken place. By contrast, it would be true according to a war comic that explicitly represented an animal as talking that something extremely unusual had taken place. In war comics it is unusual for animals to talk, but in funny animal comics it is not. An adequate account of genre should help us to understand the relation between a work's genre and its narrative content. The nature of this relation depends, not just on the nature of genre, but also on that of narrative content. One influential thought is that a work's narrative content incorporates what would be the case, were things as the work explicitly represents them as being (Lewis 1978 ). On this understanding, what makes it part of the Peanuts comics that Charlie Brown is insecure is the fact that any child who did and said the things that Peanuts explicitly represents Charlie Brown as doing and saying would be insecure. However, such considerations will not always yield a satisfactory explanation of a work's narrative content. Consider, for example, a superhero comic that represents a masked and caped man but does not explicitly represent him as employing any special powers or abilities. 1 It seems plausible that it is nonetheless part of the comic's narrative content that the man has special powers or abilities, but this cannot be because anyone who was attired as that man is represented as being attired would have 0001349037.INDD 71 9/19/2011 5:39:34 PM 72 Comics and Genre special powers or abilities. This seems patently false. David Lewis considers the analogous case of a story that represents a dragon, Scrulch, a princess and a knight, but does not explicitly represent Scrulch either as breathing fire or as not breathing fire. It nevertheless seems plausible that it is part of the story's narrative content that Scrulch breathes fire. However, this cannot be because any creature with the features Scrulch is explicitly represented as possessing would breathe fire. He argues that it is part of the story's narrative content that the dragon breathes fire "because dragons in that sort of story do breathe fire" (Lewis 1978 : 45). He writes, "If Schrulch does breathe fire in my story, it is by inter‐fictional carry‐over from what is true of dragons in other stories" (45). Lewis can thus be interpreted as claiming that it is in virtue of the story's genre membership that the dragon breathes fire in the story he considers. Similarly, one might think that it is part of the narrative content of the superhero comic that the masked and caped man possesses special powers or abilities because in superhero comics masked and caped men possess such powers or abilities. On Lewis's view, therefore, a work's genre can affect its narrative content by making it include things in addition to those that would be the case were things really as the work explicitly represents them as being. Let us call such effects positive effects of genre on narrative content. Andrea Bonomi and Sandro Zucchi claim that a work's genre membership can also have negative effects on its narrative content. That is, it can affect its narrative content by preventing it from incorporating certain of those things that would be the case were things as it explicitly represents them as being. They consider Othello , in which Shakespeare represents the character Othello as uttering lines that would ordinarily indicate eloquence of an order of which only a great poet is capable. Nonetheless, as Kendall Walton points out, Othello is supposed to be a rough military man whose first language is not English. It is not part of the narrative content of the play that Othello is especially eloquent (Walton 1990 : 175). Bonomi and Zucchi claim that Othello is not to be credited with astonishing eloquence since Othello belongs to the genre of Elizabethan plays and "by the conventions of Elizabethan plays a man who expresses himself like Othello need not be a first rank poet" (Bonomi and Zucchi 2003 : 114). 2 If this explanation is correct, it is not true in funny animal cartoons that talking animals are unusual because, although it would be extremely unusual were an animal to talk, it is a convention of the funny animal genre that talking animals are not unusual. Neither Lewis nor Bonomi and Zucchi offer any explanation of how genres affect narrative content in the ways they describe. An adequate account of genre should explain why genre membership can have these effects. With this, and the other desiderata just outlined in mind, let us now examine how existing philosophical accounts of genre fare in relation to them. 0001349037.INDD 72 9/19/2011 5:39:34 PM Comics and Genre 73 Existing Accounts of Genre There is little discussion of the nature of genre in the philosophical literature. Two discussions, by Gregory Currie and by Brian Laetz and Dominic Lopes, are the only recent exceptions. To begin with, let us consider the account of movie genres proposed by Laetz and Lopes. On their view: Category K is a movie genre if and only if K [is a type of movie which] has multiple members, which are made by more than one artist (for any given artist role), from any background, and K has features in virtue of which K figures into the appreciations or interpretations of K's audience. (2008: 156) 3 This account suffers from several problems. First, it is unable to distinguish genre categories from the various other types of categories into which works can be classified. The stipulation that, for a type of movie to comprise a genre, it must be made by more than one artist, from any background is supposed to distinguish genre categories from categories based solely on works' histories of production. Laetz and Lopes claim that genres are distinct from traditions, such that a work's genre does not depend on social facts about its maker (Laetz and Lopes 2008 : 156). They may also have insisted on the irrelevancy of history of production to genre membership because they want to distinguish genres from styles. Because the work of an individual artist may be distinguished from the work of others by its distinctive style, as with the case of Seaurat's pointillism, for example, it is not always the case that more than one artist can produce works in any given style. However, a work's genre does seem sometimes to depend on its history of production. Like the genres of Dutch realist painting, Texas country music, and Asian extreme, the comics genre Manga seems to be partly geographic in nature. 4 Arguably, a comic must have been produced in Japan in order to belong to the Manga genre, just as a painting must have been produced in the Netherlands in order to belong to the genre of Dutch realist painting, and a musical work must have been produced in Texas to be an instance of the genre of Texas country music. Thus, one might think that Amerimanga or, more generally, original English‐language manga (like Chinese manhua and Korean manhwa) are distinct genres from Manga proper. Certainly, someone who produces something that looks like an instance of Manga, but is unaware of and unconnected to the Manga tradition has not made an instance of Manga. Bonomi and Zucchi clearly think that Elizabethan plays comprise a genre, but Elizabethan plays can only be produced by playwrights living in England in the Elizabethan era. Laetz's and Lopes's overt denial that history of production has any role to play in determining genre membership seems too strong. 0001349037.INDD 73 9/19/2011 5:39:34 PM 74 Comics and Genre Genres are therefore not distinguished from styles by the irrelevance of works' histories of production to genre membership. Furthermore, the requirement that a genre have features that figure in appreciation or interpretation also fails to distinguish genre categories from styles. Laetz's and Lopes's comments suggest that, by the requirement that genres have features that enter into appreciations or evaluations they intend to impose a fairly narrow condition. In particular, they seem to mean that genres must have features that generate interpretative and evaluative expectations (Laetz and Lopes 2008 : 156). The fact that a comic belongs to the superhero genre will generate in someone who likes that genre the expectation that they will enjoy the comic at issue. Similarly, the fact that a comic belongs to the funny animal genre will generate the expectation that it will represent talking animals. However, like genres, styles have features which generate interpretative and evaluative expectations. The fact that a comic is in Dan Clowes's distinctive style may generate such expectations in an audience, but his style is not a genre. The fact that their account fails to distinguish genres from the various other categories into which works may fall prevents Laetz and Lopes from resolving the issue of whether or not fumetti and graphic novels are genres. Their account is also unable to explain how genre membership affects narrative content. Laetz and Lopes are aware of the role of genre in determining narrative content, and propose to accommodate it by the following genre principle : A story belonging to genre K represents that q [i.e. incorporates q in its narrative content] if it explicitly represents that p 1 ... p n and it is a feature of K that it would be the case that q, were it the case that p 1 ...p n. (2008: 153) 5 However, this principle seems inadequate as a description of how genre affects narrative content. While it accommodates the positive effects that Lewis notes, it does not accommodate the negative effects noted by Bonomi and Zucchi. Moreover, it raises the question of which features of a genre determine that, if it were the case that p 1 ...p n , it would be the case that q. What sorts of things are genres that they have these features? Perhaps Laetz and Lopes would claim that genres have these features because of the interpretative expectations to which they give rise. To see how such an explanation might proceed, let us now turn to Currie's account, which purports to explain the role that expectations play in producing the effects that genre has on narrative content. Currie claims that genres are simply sets of features or properties that works can have (2004: 47). He holds that any set of features a work can have constitutes a genre. Consequently, on his view, there is an infinite number of genres. However, on his account, genre membership is not simply a matter of possessing the features constitutive of a given genre. If this were the case, 0001349037.INDD 74 9/19/2011 5:39:34 PM Comics and Genre 75 every work would belong to some genre because every work has some set of features. Rather, Currie argues, a work belongs to a genre to the extent that it possesses the relevant features and this creates an expectation among the members of the community in which it was produced that it will possess the others (2004: 49). Thus, while there is an indefinite number of genres, the number of genres to which works actually belong is much more limited, because not every genre is such that a work's possessing some of its constitutive features will create the expectation among community members that it will possess the others. Currie claims that these expectations are created by prior experience of certain features being co‐instantiated, and perhaps also by such other factors as innate expectations about narrative form (2004: 54). On Currie's account, a work's causal and temporal relations to other works can help to determine its genre (2004: 43). This is so because these causal and temporal relations help to create the expectations that determine genre membership. It is because a work is causally and/or temporally related to other works with which it shares some features that we expect it to share further features with them. Unlike Laetz's and Lopes's account, therefore, Currie's can accommodate genres, membership of which depends partly on a work's history of production. Nevertheless, there are problems with Currie's account. First, it fails to distinguish genre categories from other types of categories. Like Laetz's and Lopes's account, it fails to distinguish genres from styles. Like genres, styles are associated with sets of features works can have and, like genres, the fact that a work possesses some of the features constitutive of a style leads interpreters to expect that it will possess the others. For example, when we watch a film with features of Robert Altman's distinctive style, such as that of representing a series of apparently unrelated episodes, we expect that it will exhibit other features of his style, such as revealing unexpected relations between those episodes. It also fails to distinguish genres from media, such as photography or watercolor. Different media are associated with different sets of features. Moreover, the fact that a work possesses some of the features associated with a given medium leads interpreters to expect that it will possess the others. For example, the fact that a work possesses some of the features of photography, such as a high degree of realism and a glossy surface will lead interpreters to expect that it will possess the other features we associate with photographs, such as representing actual objects and states of affairs. Currie's account therefore cannot help to solve the problem of which comics categories are genres and which are not. Graphic novels and fumetti are conceivably media rather than genres. It is the task of an adequate account of genre to determine whether or not this is the case. However, because Currie's account fails to distinguish genres from media, it cannot illuminate the nature of these comics categories. 0001349037.INDD 75 9/19/2011 5:39:34 PM 76 Comics and Genre Second, Currie's account does not provide a satisfactory explanation of the effects of genre membership on narrative content. He claims that these effects are a consequence of the expectations that help to determine a work's genre membership. These expectations, he claims, affect narrative content by enabling genre‐based implicatures (2004: 45-46). Implicatures are pragmatically - as opposed to semantically - determined aspects of content. The paradigmatic form of implicature is a conversational implicature . According to Grice's influential theory, what a speaker conversationally implicates by producing an utterance is determined by her intentions (Grice 1975 ). Conversational implicatures arise when what speakers intend to communicate by an utterance differs from the semantic content of that utterance. Although interpreters do not generally have any access to a speaker's intentions independently of the utterances she produces, Grice argues that they are nonetheless able to identify her intentions because, in communicating with interpreters, speakers conform to the cooperative principle : "Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged" (Grice: 45-46). When the semantic content of a speaker's utterance does not conform to the cooperative principle, interpreters work out what the speaker intended to communicate by ascribing an alternative content to the utterance that does conform to the principle. Interpreters' expectations play an important role in their ability to identify conversational implicatures, because those expectations determine what they take to be required in order for an utterance to conform to the cooperative principle. However, Currie denies that genre‐based implicatures are conversational implicatures, on the basis that they do not exploit apparent violations of the cooperative principle (Currie 2004 : 46). On his account, therefore, expectations cannot play the same role in enabling genre‐based implicatures as they do in enabling interpreters to identify conversational implicatures. Conventional implicatures depend, not on speakers' intentions, but on conventions associating certain types of utterances with certain implicatures. For example, utterances of "but" between coordinate clauses conventionally implicate a contrast between the relevant clauses. When I say "Tom is rich but unattractive," I cannot help but indicate a contrast between being rich and being unattractive, whether or not I intend to indicate such a contrast. Conventional implicatures cannot be canceled. By contrast, Currie argues, genre‐based implicatures are cancellable and thus cannot be Gricean conventional implicatures (Currie 2004 : 46). Currie is right to claim that the effects of genre on narrative content are cancellable. For example, when we read a comic strip in the funny animal genre, we will assume that there is nothing abnormal about an animal talking in the context of the cartoon. However, this expectation can be undermined - for example, 0001349037.INDD 76 9/19/2011 5:39:34 PM Comics and Genre 77 because the comic explicitly represents a human character as reacting with incredulity to a talking animal. Kaz undermines this very expectation to humorous effect in his cartoon Lumberger (Brunetti 2006 : 18). If the expectation is canceled in such a way, we will take it to be part of the narrative content of that work that the talking animal it represents has unusual capacities. However, Currie's account of genre does not explain how genre affects narrative content in ways that are cancelable. First, because he characterizes genre‐based implicatures predominantly negatively (they are neither conventional implicatures nor conversational implicatures), it remains unclear exactly what genre‐based implicatures are. Second, his account fails to explain exactly how audience expectations generate genre‐based implicatures and what distinguishes those expectations that do so from those that do not. Not all the expectations that accompany genre membership affect our ascriptions of narrative content. For example, when we read romance comics, we expect the romances they represent to end happily. This expectation may be met, or may be explicitly violated. Alternatively, it may be neither met nor violated, as when a comic ends before it is evident whether or not the romance it represents will end happily. In the latter case, although our expectation has not been violated or canceled, we do not take it to be part of the comic's narrative content that the romance ends happily. Rather, we take it to be unclear whether or not it does so. Similarly, our expectation, on encountering a funny animal cartoon, that it will contain animals that can talk need not be either met or undermined. For example, a funny animal cartoon may represent a group of animals going silently about their lives, without making it clear whether they are simply refraining from speaking, or whether they are not speaking because they cannot do so. In this case, although our expectation is not undermined, it does not lead us to ascribe the ability to talk to the animals it represents. Expectations such as these do not generate genre‐based implicatures. Despite these problems, I think there's something right about Currie's claim that genre membership affects narrative content by enabling implicatures. In the next section, I propose an account of genre that explains the sense in which the effects of genre on narrative content are implicatures, and explains the role that interpreters' expectations play in enabling them to identify these implicatures. An Account of Genre I propose that genres are sets of conventions that have developed as means of addressing particular interpretative and/or evaluative problems, and have a history of co‐instantiation within a community, such that a work's belonging to some genre generates interpretative and evaluative expectations among the 0001349037.INDD 77 9/19/2011 5:39:34 PM 78 Comics and Genre members of that community. To belong to some genre, a work must be produced in a community in which its constitutive conventions have a history of co‐instantiation and must be produced in accordance with some subset of those conventions that is sufficient to distinguish the set of conventions at issue from all other sets of conventions that have developed as means of addressing interpretative and/or evaluative concerns and have a history of co‐instantiation within the community in which the work was produced. A work is produced in accordance with a convention if and only if it both has features of the type picked out by the convention at issue and its maker gave the work those features so that the convention would apply to it. On this account, a work's history of production is relevant to determining its genre membership. One cannot produce a work in a given genre unless one belongs to a community in which its constitutive conventions have a history of co‐instantiation. Nevertheless, the notion of a community at issue is not narrowly geographic. A community is a group of people who interact through the production, interpretation, and evaluation of works. On this account, therefore, manga comics are not necessarily Japanese, but one must be familiar with comics conventions that originated in Japan in order to produce a manga comic. Someone who produced a comic perceptually indistinguishable from a manga comic in total ignorance of those conventions would not thereby produce a manga comic. Genres that are partly geographically identified, such as Dutch realist painting, arise when the community in which their constitutive conventions have a history of co‐ instantiation happens to be relatively geographically isolated. New interpretative and/or evaluative concerns, not addressed by the conventions of existing genres, may lead to the emergence of new genres, comprising new conventions that have arisen in response to those concerns. Alternatively, they may lead to the emergence of hybrid genres, which are created when the conventions of different existing genres are combined to address new combinations of interpretative and/or evaluative concerns. Finally, new concerns may lead to the emergence of subgenres, which are created when a set of conventions distinctive of an existing genre is supplemented with new conventions, which modify the existing genre to enable it to meet those concerns. Artists can help to create new genres, hybrid genres or subgenres that do not have a history within a given community by producing works that solve new interpretative and/or evaluative problems or address old problems in novel ways. If the works they create lead others to adopt those solutions, such that new sets of conventions emerge and develop a history of co‐ instantiation within a community, those works may be responsible for initiating new genres. Nevertheless, the works themselves do not belong to the genres they may help to create, because the conventions constitutive of those genres, hybrid genres or subgenres do not exist at the time of their creation. 0001349037.INDD 78 9/19/2011 5:39:34 PM Comics and Genre 79 This account explains why a variety of different types of features is relevant to determining a work's genre. Different types of conventions may develop as means of addressing interpretative and evaluative concerns, including conventions of content, structure, format, narrative content and effects, since a work's content, structure, format, narrative content and effects are all of potential interpretative and/or evaluative significance. Moreover, it explains why these features are not generally individually necessary for genre membership, but instead provide pro tanto reasons for classifying a work as belonging to a certain genre. To belong to some genre, a work need only be produced in accordance with a distinctive subset of the conventions of that genre. It is possible that a specific member of the set of conventions comprising a certain genre will be essential to distinguishing that genre from all other genres with a history of co‐instantiation in the community in which it was produced, and thus that there is some feature, or set of features possession of which is necessary for membership of some genres. Nevertheless, this will not generally be the case. Often, there will be no single convention in accordance with which a work must have been produced in order to belong to a given genre. Moreover, most of the constitutive conventions comprising any given genre will not be individually necessary to genre membership. Consequently, the features that determine genre membership are generally only pro tanto determinants of genre membership. A work may have features with conventional significance according to a set of conventions that are jointly distinctive of one genre, and also have features with conventional significance according to a set of conventions that are jointly distinctive of another genre. This account of genre membership is therefore consistent with a work belonging to more than one genre. It is also consistent with the existence of genres that incorporate works in a variety of different media, such as the fantasy genre, which incorporates not just fantasy comics, but also fantasy novels and films. The fantasy genre incorporates works in a variety of different media because works in different media may each be produced in accordance with a distinctive subset of its constitutive conventions. The fact that genres are sets of conventions distinguishes them from categories based solely on works' histories of production, such as the category of comics produced by Charles Schulz. It also distinguishes genres from styles. Genre categories are distinct from style categories because style categories are not comprised of conventions. As I noted earlier, a style can be unique to the work of an individual artist. However, it is a necessary condition for something's being conventional that it be widely adopted among the members of a community (Lewis 1969 ). Nevertheless, style categories are like genre categories in being responses to evaluative and/or interpretative concerns. My account of genre thus explains how genres differ from styles, and also why the notions of genre and of style are nonetheless closely related. 0001349037.INDD 79 9/19/2011 5:39:35 PM 80 Comics and Genre Genres are distinct from media such as watercolor and photography because, although media are often developed as means of addressing interpretative and/or evaluative concerns, a medium consists in a set of tools and techniques, rather than of conventions. Although certain of the techniques constitutive of a medium may become conventionalized, such conventions are not constitutive of media themselves. For this reason, a work's being a watercolor or a photograph does not generate interpretative and/or evaluative expectations among the members of the community in which it was produced. People do not generally like photographs or watercolors in general, or have general expectations about the sorts of things they will represent. The account's appeal to conventions and to interpretative and evaluative expectations therefore distinguishes genres from media. We are now in a position to understand why it is so difficult to decide whether graphic novels and fumetti comprise genres or media. On the one hand, the category of graphic novels has a claim to be considered a medium, since graphic novels may be used to address a very wide range of interpretative and/or evaluative problems and consequently the fact that a work is a graphic novel need not generate interpretative and/or evaluative expectations in an audience. On the other hand, graphic novels also have some claim to being considered a genre. As a matter of historical fact, graphic novels have been used to address a fairly restricted range of interpretative and evaluative problems, such that the fact that a comic is a graphic novel may in fact generate interpretative and/or evaluative expectations in an audience. Nevertheless, the interpretative and/or evaluative expectations that a comic's being a graphic novel generates are an accident of the way in which graphic novels have evolved, and are not essential to the category. Consequently, graphic novels comprise a medium, rather than a genre. Likewise, the comics category of fumetti identifies a medium, not a genre. Although fumetti happen to have been used to address a limited range of interpretative and evaluative concerns, such that fumetti are associated with a set of conventions that generate interpretative and evaluative expectations, it is not essential to a comic's being a fumetti that it instantiate a distinctive subset of those conventions. Genre membership can affect narrative content because the conventions constitutive of a genre may include generalized conversational implicatures (Grice 1975 : 56). Such implicatures are the result of conventions associating specific features of sentences (or of works, in the present case) with specific kinds of conversational implicatures. Consequently, unlike ordinary conversational implicatures, they depend on conventions rather than on makers' intentions, and hence are carried by sentences (works), rather than by speakers (work makers) (Davis 2008 ). Nevertheless, unlike conventional implicatures, they are cancelable. For example, "some frogs are green" carries the generalized conversational implicature that not all frogs are green. 0001349037.INDD 80 9/19/2011 5:39:35 PM Comics and Genre 81 However, it is intelligible to say "some frogs are green, indeed all are" in which case the sentence one utters does not implicate that not all frogs are green. If one produces a work that carries a generalized conversational implicature, one's work will have that implicature, so long as it is not canceled, irrespective of whether or not one intends the implicature in question. My utterance of "some frogs are green" carries the generalized conversational implicature that not all frogs are green, even if I do not mean by my utterance that not all frogs are green. Currie is wrong to claim that genre implicatures cannot be conversational implicatures because they do not depend on our perceiving an apparent violation of the cooperative principle (Currie 2004 : 46). First, Grice is clear that not all conversational implicatures need involve the violation of maxims (Grice 1975 : 51). More importantly, however, because generalized conversational implicatures are determined by conventions rather than by intentions, our ability to identify what generalized conversational implicatures a work carries depends on knowledge of conventions, rather than on an appeal to the cooperative principle. Both the positive and negative effects of genre membership on narrative content can be construed as generalized conversational implicatures. It may be part of the narrative content of a superhero comic that represents a masked and caped character but does not explicitly represent her as employing special powers or abilities that she possesses extraordinary powers or abilities because the constitutive conventions of superhero comics include the generalized conversational implicature that masked and caped characters possess extraordinary powers or abilities. This implicature may be canceled, for example by explicitly representing the character as lacking any such powers or abilities, but unless it is canceled, it will be part of the comic's narrative content that the character has special powers or abilities. Likewise, it may be part of the narrative content of a funny animal comic that represents an animal as talking that there is nothing unusual about the animal's talking because the constitutive conventions of funny animal comics include the generalized conversational implicature that talking animals are not unusual. This implicature may be canceled, as Kaz cancels it in the Lumberger strip referred to earlier, but unless it is canceled, it will be part of the comic's narrative content that the animal's talking is not unusual. A work's genre membership depends on its maker's intentions because, in order for a work to have been produced in accordance with a distinctive subset of a genre's constitutive conventions and thus to belong to that genre, its maker must have deliberately given the work features picked out by a distinctive subset of those conventions so that they would apply to it. By contrast, the effects of a work's genre on its narrative content are independent of its maker's intentions. Given that a work belongs to a certain genre, if it 0001349037.INDD 81 9/19/2011 5:39:35 PM 82 Comics and Genre has features that carry generalized conversational implicatures according to the conventions comprising that genre, it will carry those implicatures irrespective of its maker's intentions, unless they are canceled. Makers may sometimes inadvertently produce works with a certain narrative content, by producing works that belong to a genre according to which certain of their features carry generalized conversational implicatures. We are now in a position to explain the role that interpreters' expectations play both in generating the generalized conversational implicatures by which genre affects narrative content, and in enabling them to identify those implicatures. Interpreters' expectations help to generate these generalized conversational implicatures because conventions associating certain features of works with certain conversational implicatures arise partly as a consequence of interpreters' expectations that works with certain features will carry certain conversational implicatures. To understand the role of interpreters' expectations in enabling them to identify the generalized conversational implicatures a work carries, we need to distinguish between two kinds of expectations that genre membership brings with it. First, interpreters expect a work that employs a distinctive subset of the conventions of some genre to employ the rest of the conventions of that genre. We therefore expect works that have certain features, in virtue of which they belong to certain genres, to have certain further features characteristic of works in that genre. For example, we expect the romance in a romance comic to end happily. However, the expectation that a work which employs conventions distinctive of a genre will possess all the conventions of that genre plays no role in interpreters' ability to identify genre‐based implicatures. It is an inductively‐based expectation that works' makers may deliberately exploit for purposes such as humor and suspense, but it does not affect the identification of narrative content. Such expectations contrast with the expectation that a work which belongs to some genre and has features to which the generalized conversational implicatures partly constitutive of that genre assign a certain narrative significance will have the narrative significance they assign to it. Interpreters rely on the latter expectation in order to identify a work's narrative content. Conclusion An adequate account of the nature of genre and of the criteria for genre membership is essential to understanding the nature of the various categories into which comics can be classified. Because they fail adequately to distinguish genre categories from other ways of categorizing works, including categorizations according to medium or according to style, previous accounts of genre fail to illuminate the nature of comics categories. I have argued that 0001349037.INDD 82 9/19/2011 5:39:35 PM Comics and Genre 83 genres are sets of conventions that have developed as means of addressing particular interpretative and/or evaluative concerns, and have a history of co‐instantiation within a community, such that a work's belonging to some genre generates interpretative and evaluative expectations among the members of that community. Genres are distinct from styles in consisting of conventions, and are distinct from media both in consisting of conventions and in generating interpretative and evaluative expectations. This account helps us to understand the interpretative and evaluative significance of the various comics categories. Comics genres, such as manga and funny animal comics are associated with specific interpretative and evaluative expectations. These expectations result from the conventions constitutive of the manga and funny animal genres, which address particular interpretative and evaluative concerns in specific ways. By producing comics according to these conventions, makers can help to ensure that interpreters' expectations are met. New interpretative and/or evaluative concerns, not addressed by the conventions of existing genres, require new solutions, which may in turn lead to the emergence of new genres, comprising new sets of conventions that address those concerns. Existing genres do not themselves incorporate the means of responding to new interpretative or evaluative concerns. By contrast, media such as graphic novels and fumetti consist in tools and techniques that can be applied to a range of different interpretative and evaluative problems. A medium's constitutive tools and techniques impose limitations on which solutions to such problems the resources of the medium can provide. Nevertheless, unlike genres, media incorporate the flexibility to respond to interpretative and evaluative concerns in a variety of different ways. Certain ways of responding to certain such concerns within the confines of a medium may lead to the development of different genres within that medium. As the artistic exploration of the interpretative and evaluative scope of the graphic novel continues, we can expect an array of graphic novel genres to emerge. 6 Notes 1 Not all superheros have extraordinary powers. Batman, for example, is merely extremely skilled and well‐equipped. 2 Gregory Currie proposes something similar (2004: 45, note 5). 3 The text in square brackets is mine. 4 Thanks to Aaron Meskin for the example of Texas country music. 5 The text in square brackets is mine. 6 Thanks to both Aaron Meskin and Roy T. Cook for helpful comments on this paper. 0001349037.INDD 83 9/19/2011 5:39:35 PM 84 Comics and Genre References Bonomi , A. and S. Zucchi . " A Pragmatic Framework for Truth in Fiction ," Dialectica , 57 ( 2 ), 2003 : 103 - 120 . Brunetti , I. (ed.), An Anthology of Graphic Fiction, Cartoons and True Stories , New Haven, CT : Yale University Press , 2006 . Currie , G. Arts and Minds , Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2004 . Davis , W . Implicature [online text], 2008 . Available online at . edu/archives/win2008/entries/implicature/ (accessed August 6, 2011). Grice , H.P. " Logic and Conversation ," Syntax and Semantics 3 , 1975 : 41 - 58 . Laetz , B. and D. Lopes . " Genre ," in Paisley Livingston and Carl Plantinga (eds), Routledge Companion to Film and Philosophy , London : Routledge , 2008 : 151 - 161 . Lewis , D. Convention , Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press : 1969 . Lewis , D . " Truth in Fiction " American Philosophical Quarterly 15 , 1978 : 37 - 46 . McCloud , S. Understanding Comics: The Invisible Art , New York : Harper Collins , 1993 . Walton , K . " Categories of Art ," The Philosophical Review 79 , 1970 : 334 - 367 . Walton , K. Mimesis as Make‐Believe , Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press , 1990 . 0001349037.INDD 84 9/19/2011 5:39:35 PM


This short paper (4 pages) demonstrates how subjective experience, language, and consciousness can be explained in terms of abilities we share with the simplest of creatures, specifically the ability to detect, react to, and associate various aspects of the world.

Philosophy

A Brief Explanation of Consciousness

A Brief Theory of Consciousness 1 of 7 © 2000-2010 M.E. Tson. Excerpted and Abridged from From Dust to Descartes © 2000 M. E. Tson For references and a more in-depth treatment of these and related issues, see From Dust to Descartes or send any comments or questions to . A Brief Explanation of Consciousness M. E. Tson This short paper demonstrates how subjective experience, language, and consciousness can be explained in terms of abilities we share with the simplest of creatures, specifically the ability to detect, react to, and associate various aspects of the world. Instinct. With the innate ability to detect (an event or reaction that, like rust, only takes place in the presence of certain conditions), react to (accept, reject, destroy, reproduce, explore, flee, etc.)1,2,3 and associate (to form/strengthen via experience new connections among detections and reactions so that the activation of one makes the activation of the other more likely)4 certain internal and external stimuli, an organism can begin to form de facto categories (some things are food or a mate; some aren't),5 develop expectations, and, to some extent, have its instinctual reactions modified by experience. Although the organism's actions and decisions can still be completely explained in terms of instinct it can learn and problem solve. We can see such capabilities in numerous other animals, but there is no need to assume that they have any selfawareness or are anything more than a contiguous collection of chemical reactions, which happen, by evolutionary 'selection', to all work in a coordinated way to further "their" collective survival. Communication. Many young animals learn various survival strategies (hunting, fishing, social habits, means of communication, etc.) from their community. Macaques, vervet monkeys, cockerels, prairie dogs, lemurs, Californian ground squirrels, and chickens have all been found to learn and use differentiated alarm calls or "vocabulary" to indicate different threats.6,7,8 Just as a young vervet learns to climb down when it spies an eagle and to climb up when it spots a leopard, it also learns that one shriek is emitted in the one instance and a different sound in the other.9 Communication learning involves associations about when to say as much as what to say. Rather than thinking of communication as sounds associated with objects, it is better to think of them as being associated with experiences (which can include objects).10 As with the senses, the communication processing areas of the brain seem specially wired to find patterns and form associations between contextual (particularly social) circumstances, vocal sounds, and their order. One difference, in degree if not in kind, in the human case is our ability to articulate thousands of different sounds11 and to form unique associations with each of them. Like the young macaque, a child learning the word "flower" or big sister "Angela" is not learning their definitions, but when (in what situations) the words "flower" or "Angela" are used. There is no single place in the brain where a word is defined.12 Words like "Angela" and "flower" are simply associated with the numerous other associations and expectations about their properties and tendencies which experience has formed: with "flower" what happens when you look at it, smell it, pull it, etc., and a comparable but much more complex set of expectations for "Angela." If we add the word look, as in "Angela looks at the flower," certain of these associations, and those regarding one of Angela's properties, in particular (expectations regarding eye gaze and another's attention and intentions), are triggered. "Angela picked the flower" triggers slightly different associations. A given sound's several possible meanings are usually easily distinguishable, because the associations triggered by hearing, "I'm going to the bank" will differ depending upon whether the speaker is holding a checkbook or a fishing rod.13 Learned words are sounds that are associated with--and thus serve as additional mental cues for--other associations experience has formed. When I meet another English speaker and use a word like "chair", "mother," or "honor", I'm assuming that she has had experiences that are similar enough to mine so that she has formed similar associations with that word. A language A Brief Theory of Consciousness 2 of 7 © 2000-2010 M.E. Tson. Excerpted and Abridged from From Dust to Descartes © 2000 M. E. Tson For references and a more in-depth treatment of these and related issues, see From Dust to Descartes or send any comments or questions to . isn't shared words and syntax, it is shared or, rather, convergent, experiences which are associated with those words/syntax and which give them their meaning.14 As previous linguistic associations are applied to unprecedented experiences, individuals are capable of uttering intelligible phrases which they themselves may have never heard before.15 Our capacity to form associations is wider and deeper in some areas than other animals but not substantially different. Rudimentary displaced reference and abstract thought can be seen in the fact that it is not necessary for the other macaques to actually see the approaching threat themselves before they respond to the warning by scampering in the appropriate direction for safety.16 The greater the number of successive associations which separate a word from detections and innate reactions, the more 'abstract' it is, but this is no less mechanical than anything we have discussed up to now. None of this requires that either party in a communication be aware of the fact that it is communicating. One instinctual or learned reaction simply follows another. Self-awareness. Detection, reaction, categorization and associations, problem-solving, community, ... everything up to and including communication could have existed long before there was any creature who could observe, label, and comment on itself or the world around it. Language provides the external frame of reference necessary for labeling and reflection. A phrase like, "Angela picked the flower" leads to a certain set of mental associations and expectations about Angela and the flower, and these associations are themselves made up of other, more basic ones. Leaving aside the different subjective reaction produced in the speaker, there is no cognitive difference between saying, "She picked the flower." or "I picked the flower." The self is subject to observation, description, evaluation, and labeling just like any other object and reflection thus becomes possible. We observe and label ourselves using the same linguistic associations that we use to describe other objects and experiences. As can be seen in experiments with split-brain patients, beyond our capacities of detection, reaction, and association, estimations as to our own inner, unseen motivations are just as speculative as those of any other observer.17 'Just as the young monkey can learn when to emit the "flying predator" warning,18 a child learns in which circumstances to utter "I" or "me"; just as a young cub can learn what to do when it is hungry, a human infant can learn what to say when it is hungry. But once the infant has learned in which situations to say "I am ...", it enters a whole new world of possibilities in self-awareness and subjective experience. Although we often equate inner speech with thought, the mind and consciousness, it is only the "tip of the iceberg" of the reflexes, reactions, and associations that we have been talking about up until now. Nor is it necessarily or automatically the executive center of decisionmaking. Through inner speech, we can reflect upon our condition and--by bringing additional associations to bear--influence the focus of our energies and efforts.19 Nevertheless, while the conclusions we reach--like 'I should stop smoking' or 'I am a coward'--introduce additional associations and reactions into the decision-making process, they are not the final word. Learned associations do not erase innate patterns of detection and reaction and may even conflict with them. The result is a Man vs. Himself struggle. Personal identity has a continuity through time because of social conventions, roles, and the fact that our past associations or memories determine our present outlook on how best to approach our future.20,21 Metacognition. In short, we are not aware of what we are thinking. We are aware of what we have just thought.22 Only when we stop to reflect and remember do these past thoughts and actions then become the objects of present cognition. When someone unexpectedly asks, "What color are you looking at?" we cannot answer them instantly, but we must stop and search our immediate short-term memory, which we have learned to use as a proxy for the present. A Brief Theory of Consciousness 3 of 7 © 2000-2010 M.E. Tson. Excerpted and Abridged from From Dust to Descartes © 2000 M. E. Tson For references and a more in-depth treatment of these and related issues, see From Dust to Descartes or send any comments or questions to . Metacognition, which uses short-term memory and inner speech, is always at least one step behind cognition. We think we are aware of our present selves, but we are really only self-aware of our immediate past selves. The Hard Problem: Qualia. An organism's subjective experience has several components. First, detection. Because unique nerve combinations fire, different sensations are immediately distinguishable. When we see the color 'orange' what we are as importantly seeing is something that is not red, yellow, blue, purple... (Recalled images involve reactivating the same "early sensory" neurons triggered by external stimuli.)23 This component alone is no more impressive than a camera. Second, reaction or changes in relative attention and energy allocation.24 Although culture will help to further define and extend upon what is seen as good or desirable, and self-awareness may eventually cause us to question the propriety of our innate drives, all urges and actions have their origin in one or more of the innate primary reactions. All meaning and purpose that we see in the world arise from these instinctual reactions. We cannot conceive of or experience the world outside of them. They are our world. Usually, that world is some complex, interacting mixture of several reactions to stimuli, but at the highest levels of intensity (rage, terror, ecstasy), it becomes one instinctive reaction or inclination in particular which becomes the focus of all our energies and attention.25 We exist only to satisfy that drive; nothing has importance outside of the satisfaction of that drive. Thus, we can understand and explain what it feels like to experience 100% intensity of a particular basic emotion. (At the highest levels of intensity--rage, terror, ecstasy--, our world becomes one instinctive reaction or inclination in particular which becomes the focus of all our energies and attention.26 We exist only to satisfy that drive; nothing has importance outside of the satisfaction of that drive.) Every other emotional state (and these are innumerable27) is a mixture of less intense instances of these primary reactions.28,29,30 But the feeling of 75.6% of one drive plus 20.4% of another plus 4% of a third is a bit more difficult to express. The situation is analogous to that of a painter who has production formulae and names for the three primary paints but who does not have any labels or precise formulae for the 10 million31 other shades she can also produce by mixing these three. Although the painter lacks and may never have specific names, or precise formulae to produce, each of the millions of other possible shades, it would be a mistake to conclude that this 'explanatory gap' (or better put 'descriptive gap') meant that the as yet undefined shades were therefore mysterious, unexplainable or irreproducible from the primary three for which she does have precise words and formulae. Similarly, although we do not have descriptions for the innumerable, immensely complicated emotional states that arise from lower intensity combinations of the basic reactions whose highintensity feelings we can describe, this should not be taken to mean that our un-described feelings must result from, or contain, some heretofore-unexplained phenomenon. So the second aspect of understanding subjective experience is what portion of an organism's attention or energies is directed towards and invested in particular drives.32 Third, innate and learned associations. Green and blue (the colors of vegetation, lakes, and sky) are considered more 'cold' and 'distant' (short-wave light and distant objects require similar optic adjustments) than, say, red (the color of fire), which in different contexts may be associated with danger, stopping, or sex.33 We may associate orange as being 'between' or a mixture of red and yellow as an intermediate combination of photoreceptors fires.34 Blue may be associated with "darkness" more than, say, yellow because the eye is less sensitive to the lower wavelengths.35 Subjective experience is also always in some context. A "colored" object may be edible, climbable, a predator, wood, shiny, or rough. These additional associations and their consequent reactions are combined with whatever associations and reactions the color itself gives rise to. Distinct associations (and detection) account for the difference between being frightened A Brief Theory of Consciousness 4 of 7 © 2000-2010 M.E. Tson. Excerpted and Abridged from From Dust to Descartes © 2000 M. E. Tson For references and a more in-depth treatment of these and related issues, see From Dust to Descartes or send any comments or questions to . (same reaction) by a 'snake or a bank manager.'36 Fourth, accompanying physiological and cognitive changes. The neurotransmitters that help to give rise to reactions also affect the speed of image formation and change.37 During the reactions of acceptance and reproduction (happiness), associations are formed more rapidly and are not held for as long. Association is freer and may even become over-inclusive. Motor efficiency and exploratory behavior are increased while inhibition is decreased.38 Additionally, our experience of a reaction like fleeing or protection isn't merely the preparation to fight or flee. It is also to detect our heart quicken and our muscles tighten.39 We detect many of these and other internal changes just as we detect external stimuli, and we have reactions to and associations with them, as well.40 The above four components of subjective experience are shared with other animals41 although, without language, there is no interpretation of experience in this way. Thoughts are not yet 'about,' or 'directed toward,' anything. Intentionality is an interpretation in the eye of an observer42 and without language (to explicitly separate the train of reactions into subjects and objects) there isn't one.43 At this stage, there is still no need to assume that there is any reflection or self-awareness, just an ever more complex collective of chemical reactions. The fifth, and most distinctive, aspect of human subjective experience is self-awareness itself: our ability to say, "I am ... / I feel... / I see ...". It's one thing to see a color or taste a fruit and have a certain reaction to it. It's another to reflect, "Plants, mountains, and some people are unable to see, but I am conscious and am seeing 'red'. Or "This landscape is gorgeous. I have never seen anything like it before, and I will never see it again." Because language enables us to compare our current situation with other possible ones, self-evaluative statements carry additional associations of fortune, regret, pity, self-worth, embarrassment... and their consequent reactions and associations. 44 A Brief Theory of Consciousness 5 of 7 © 2000-2010 M.E. Tson. Excerpted and Abridged from From Dust to Descartes © 2000 M. E. Tson For references and a more in-depth treatment of these and related issues, see From Dust to Descartes or send any comments or questions to . Mary, The Color Scientist - Color & Self-awareness45 Frank Jackson poses an interesting dilemma46 that any proposed explanation of subjective experience must address. Let's imagine a scientist, Mary, who has lived all her life in a black and white room with a black-and white television. Although Mary has never experienced color, she is an expert on the mechanical perception of color and has read the explanations of color and subjective experience presented here. Supposedly, she now understands "everything there is to know" about color, but if she were to walk outside and see colors for the first time wouldn't she learn "something" new? "Something" which hasn't been explained Well, no. According to the thought experiment, Mary can examine her own mental connections and associations so that she knows before leaving the room what her reaction will be. She knows that with "light blue", for instance, she will have a reproduction/incorporation response of a certain intensity, certain physiological and cognitive changes to which she will also have emotional reactions, visual associations47 of "immensity", "softness"... Let's also suppose that she has already experienced this reaction before with a certain shade of gray or that she can somehow trigger this exact ensemble of emotions, associations, and physiological changes even if she has never seen blue. (This is actually an assumption that Jackson's dilemma demands. Language isn't just shared words; it is shared or, rather, convergent experiences or associations that are linked to those words. Our scientist has supposedly learned "everything there is to know" about color although she has never experienced it. Yet, it is impossible to learn anything about X, much less know everything about X, without some personal experience to relate to X. If Mary cannot somehow relate what she has studied to her own subjective experience, then our scholar hasn't learned anything.) Now she walks outside. Isn't something still different or unexpected? Not as far as the ensemble of feelings or emotional reactions are concerned. These she has already experienced before. On the physical level, however, this will be the first time Mary has experienced these reactions being caused by "blue" photoreceptors firing. It would be like being tapped on one shoulder and then another: although otherwise indistinguishable, it will be a unique sensation. She already knew what it "felt like" to see blue, although she had never had the experience of seeing blue. Additionally, on the level of self-awareness, the experience would be unique because for the first time she could say, "I am seeing blue" a statement which will itself contain additional associations and emotions of good fortune or regret at not having seen it before, etc....48 And this is just a simplified scenario. Of course, Mary wouldn't see blue alone, but would, in fact, be bombarded by a kaleidoscope of new colors and emotion/association ensembles, quite probably (unless she had knowledge of the exact scene awaiting her outside) causing additional emotions of surprise and curiosity. Free Will. We have no direct knowledge of other minds, so the only philosophical argument for Free Will is one from introspection. Yet our capacity for introspection is constrained by the very things that make it possible: our capabilities of detection, reaction, and linguistic association. This is not to say that introspection is inaccurate or an illusion just that there is only so much that introspection can tell us. The very act of introspection in order to respond affirmatively to the question "Do I have Free Will?" is already dependent upon the assumption that "I" have the necessary knowledge, perspective, and "free will" to correctly answer the question. So, the argument from introspection, the only argument for Free Will actually on the table, is hopelessly circular. We are forced to ignore the constituent parts of countries, corporations, and other organizations when the paradigm of discussion makes no provision for them: "The United States or Company X decided to..." While such statements may be true as far as they go, in these instances, we also have other paradigms readily available to describe the same events in terms of branches of government and business units, or even at lower levels in terms of citizens and employees. Yet, our capacity for alternative levels of introspection is A Brief Theory of Consciousness 6 of 7 © 2000-2010 M.E. Tson. Excerpted and Abridged from From Dust to Descartes © 2000 M. E. Tson For references and a more in-depth treatment of these and related issues, see From Dust to Descartes or send any comments or questions to . limited. That said, the self is not an illusion any more than any other category like 'France' or 'tree'. No frame or category exists in the world independent of the mind; all classifications are dependent on our unique sensations, emotions, and associations.49 The shadows on the wall are no less real than the objects outside Plato's cave; there is just another way of understanding them. This paper presents an alternative paradigm for the self where our decisions and feelings, like those of other animals, are limited and determined by the prison of our individual instincts and experiences.50 Nevertheless, through self-awareness and reflection, we can seek new experiences, perspectives, and possibilities and "consciously" force back the prison walls.51 Conclusion. Self-awareness isn't an all-or-nothing quality that humans are born with and animals are not, but consciousness--the information that an entity can process about itself and the world--is a continuum with bacteria (or chemical reactions like rust) at one end and human selfawareness at the other. Nor is our continuum the only one imaginable. Self-awareness is possible whenever basic information processing systems are organized in such a way as to collectively detect, react to, and associate stimuli as a monad or single unit within an environment of interaction and communication with other comparatively structured individuals. Furthermore, each of the innate abilities we outlined (detection, reaction, and association) is conceivably artificially reproducible. There is no theoretical reason why we couldn't construct an android which, like a baby, was capable of developing self-awareness through experience. Our organs and autonomic responses are unique to species that share our evolutionary history, so our android wouldn't feel its heart quicken and muscles tighten when it was startled (although it might, in a similar way, detect changes in its internal energy level and readiness.) It might not express its emotions through laughter or crying. Nonetheless, it could come to be aware of itself and of its place in the universe in a sense that would be different than--yet still comparable to--our own. 1 Robert Plutchik, The Emotions (1991) (Lanham, Mass.: University Press of America) 2 Antonio R. Damasio (1994), Descartes' Error. Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: Avon Books,) 149. 3 Ortony, A., & Turner, T. J. (1990). "What's basic about basic emotions?" Psychological Review, 97, pg. 316. 4 Damasio 102. 5 Alan Watts (1989), The Way of Zen (New York: Vintage Books) 73-4. 6 Boris Cyrulnik (1995), La Naissance Du Sens (Paris: Hachette Littératures) 96-7. 7 Lesley J. Rogers & Gisela Kaplan (2000), Songs, Roars, and Rituals: Communication in Birds, Mammals, and Other Animals (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press) 44. 8 Rogers & Kaplan 56-7. 9 Rogers & Kaplan 144. 10 M. E. Tson (2000), From Dust to Descartes 70 11 Mario Pei (1965), The Story of Language (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company), 105-8. 12 Damasio 92. The different sensory systems of the brain cannot talk to each other directly but are connected by the higher order association cortices. 13 Bernard J. Baars & Katherine McGovern (1994), "Consciousness," Encyclopedia of Human Behavior (San Diego: Academic Press, Inc.) Volume 1, 691Baars & McGovern 696. 14 Tson, From Dust to Descartes 82. But compare Ludwig Wittgenstein's ideas of meaning as use. 15 Paul M. Churchland (1988), Matter and Consciousness: A Contemporary Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press) 51. 16 Cyrulnik (1995) 96-7. 17 Steven Pinker (1997), How the Mind Works. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company) 422. 18 Rogers & Kaplan 144. 19 Baars & McGovern 694-8. 20 Watts 47, 122. 21 Mary Warnok (1970), Existentialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 55. 22 Damasio 240. 23 Damasio 102-4, 105. 24 Baars & McGovern 698. 25 Plutchik 71, 112-115. A Brief Theory of Consciousness 7 of 7 © 2000-2010 M.E. Tson. Excerpted and Abridged from From Dust to Descartes © 2000 M. E. Tson For references and a more in-depth treatment of these and related issues, see From Dust to Descartes or send any comments or questions to . 26 Plutchik 71, 112-115. 27 Plutchik 124-5. There is some disagreement as to the best method of categorizing the basic emotions (See Ortony, supra), but eight primary emotions, each with just four distinguishable levels of intensity and combined in groups of two and three, could produce more than 224 different emotional states. If we assume more levels of intensity this number increases into the thousands all reducible to eight primary states. No to mention, as we shall see next, the innumerable associations which, in any particular experience, also give rise to emotional reactions) 28 Damasio 149. 29 Plutchik124-5. 30 Ortony, A., & Turner, T. J. (1990). "What's basic about basic emotions?" Psychological Review, 97, pg. 316. 31 Judd, Deane B.; Wyszecki, Günter (1975). Color in Business, Science and Industry. Wiley Series in Pure and Applied Optics (third edition ed.). New York: Wiley-Interscience. p. 388. 32 Baars & McGovern 698. 33 C.L. Hardin (1988), Color for Philosophers (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company) 129; "Colour." The New Encyclopaedia Britannica (1995) Volume 16: 603. 34 Hardin, 31-5 35 Hardin 164. 36 "Science Does it with Feeling," Economist 20 July 1996: 72. 37 Damasio 147, 162-4. 38 Damasio 147, 162-4. 39 Plutchik 15, 48-9, 82, 88-89. 40 Plutchik 15, 48-9, 82, 88-89. 41 Charles Darwin (1872), The Expressions of the Emotions in Man and Animals. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965) Chapter III, pg. 77 Chapter XII, pg. 289-291 cited in Plutchik 72-73. 42 Compare Daniel C. Dennet (1996), Kinds of Minds. (Basic Books, New York) pp. 27-35. 43 Tson, From Dust to Descartes 87-88. Compare ideas from Ludwig Wittgenstein: "One thinks that one is tracing the outline of the thing's nature ... one is merely tracing round the frame through which we look at it." (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 4.5); Immanuel Kant: Our minds and senses do not discover order in the world, they impose order on the world. (See generally Critique of Pure Reason, #27 of Transcendental Analytic); See also Nagarjuna and Zen Buddhist critique of language and subject-object dualism: "objects are also events ...our world is a collection of processes rather than entities" "logic and meaning, with its inherent duality, is a property of thought and language but not of the actual world. The nonverbal, concrete world contains no classes and no symbols which signify or mean anything other than themselves..." Duality arises only when we divide and place aspects of our experiences into separate mental boxes. (Watts 5, 73) 44 See Note 1 for Plutchik's Wheel of Emotions. 45 Response to Jackson's thought experiment excerpted and abridged from Tson (2000) pg. 97. 46 Frank Jackson, "What Mary Didn't Know", Journal of Philosophy, LXXXII, 5 (May 1986): 291-295. 47 Without a cultural experience of color, any associations would be limited. 48 Assuming these weren't included in her pre-color analysis/experience of blue. 49 See note 43 supra. 50 Cyrulnik (1995). 51 Tson, From Dust to Descartes 116.