223 U.S. 303 (1912)
POWERS
v.
UNITED STATES.
No. 152.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued January 22, 1912.
Decided February 19, 1912.
ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA.
*304 Mr. S.H. Sutherland, with whom Mr. R.A. Ayers was on the brief, for plaintiff in error.
Mr. Assistant Attorney General Denison, with whom Mr. Loring C. Christie was on the brief, for the United States.
*310 MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the court.
Plaintiff in error (hereinafter called defendant) was convicted in the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Virginia under an indictment charging him with the violation of §§ 3258, 3279, 3281 and 3242 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. He was sentenced to a fine of $100 and to be imprisoned for a period of thirty days.
The indictment contained seven counts, charging the defendant substantially as follows: That he had in his possession a still and distilling apparatus for the production of spirituous liquors without having had such still and apparatus registered (first count); that he carried on the business of a distiller of spirituous liquors without having given bond (second count), and with the intent to defraud the United States of the tax on such liquors (third count), and also carried on the business of a retail liquor dealer without having paid the special tax therefor (seventh count); that he worked in a distillery for the production of spirituous liquors upon which no "Registered Distillery" sign was displayed (fourth count), and that he delivered raw material, namely, meal, to (sixth count), and conveyed distilled spirits from (fifth count), such distillery.
The case comes to this court, because of the alleged violation of a constitutional right, in compelling the defendant to be a witness against himself. This contention is developed in the bill of exceptions, which shows that at a preliminary hearing before a United States commissioner, after a witness for the Government had testified that he had seen the defendant beating apples at a "still *311 place" near the home of one Preston Powers, and about four miles from defendant's home, the defendant, without counsel and not having been instructed by the commissioner, voluntarily, in his own behalf, testified that he had beaten apples about thirty steps from the still place; that Preston Powers had hired him for seventy-five cents a day, and had set him to work beating apples, but that he had no interest in the apples, the product from them or the still, and no control of the still, and had merely been hired by the day at a fixed price; that thereupon M.P. Colly, deputy marshal, asked him if he had not worked at a distillery within two years of the warrant in this case, at another time and place, which question the defendant refused to answer until informed by the commissioner, and by the deputy marshal, that unless he did so he would be committed to jail, and he then testified that "he had worked at a distillery and made some brandy last fall near his house, and he paid Preston Powers to assist him"; that upon the trial of the case in the District Court that court, over the objection of the defendant, admitted the testimony of Colly, who repeated the proceedings before the commissioner, including the testimony of defendant, and that the court refused to strike out Colly's testimony or to instruct the jury to disregard it, upon the motion of defendant's counsel, to all of which, at the time, counsel for defendant duly excepted.
The contentions of the defendant are that the judgment should be reversed for the following reasons:
1st. There was no venire facias summoning the grand jury which found this purported indictment.
2nd. The said grand jury was not sworn and consequently could not find an indictment.
3rd. The indictment was defective and the demurrer should have been sustained to the fourth and sixth counts.
4th. The petit jury that tried this case was not sworn nor summoned.
*312 5th. The testimony of Colly was illegal and incompetent testimony, and should have been rejected when offered, and if received striken out on counsel's motion.
As to the first, that there was no venire facias summoning the grand jury, there is nothing in the record to show that this objection, if tenable at all, was taken before plea or, indeed, at any time during the trial. Objections of this character are waived unless seasonably taken. United States v. Gale, 109 U.S. 65; Agnew v. United States, 165 U.S. 36; Rodriguez v. United States, 198 U.S. 156; McInerney v. United States, 147 Fed. Rep. 183.
The same observation applies to the second assignment of error, that the grand jury is not shown by the record to have been sworn. The indictment recites that the grand jury was selected, impaneled, sworn and charged, and that they on their oaths present, etc. At this stage of the proceedings this is enough to show the proper swearing of the grand jury. In Crain v. United States, 162 U.S. 625, cited by counsel for defendant, the record was destitute of any showing that the accused was arraigned or pleaded to the indictment. See Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 418.
As to the assignment of error that there were certain defective counts in the indictment, the conviction was a general one, and, even if the counts were defective, as alleged, one good count, sufficient to sustain the sentence, is all that is required to warrant the affirmation of a judgment in error proceedings. Dunbar v. United States, 156 U.S. 185.
As to the objection that the petit jury was not sworn: The record discloses that they were "called and empaneled," and, "being selected and tried in the manner prescribed by law, the truth of and upon the premises to speak, and having heard the evidence, the arguments of counsel, and charge of the judge, retired to consider their verdict, and upon their oaths do say," etc. We *313 think that this sufficiently discloses, upon proceedings in error after conviction, that the petit jury was duly sworn.
The chief objection contended for in argument concerns the admission in the District Court of the testimony of the defendant before the commissioner. The admission of this testimony is claimed to have worked a violation of the defendant's constitutional rights under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, which protects him against self-incrimination. It appears from the bill of exceptions that the defendant voluntarily took the stand and testified in his own behalf. This he might do under the Federal statute (March 16, 1878, 20 Stat. 30, c. 37), making the defendant a competent witness, "at his own request, but not otherwise." We are of the opinion that it was not essential to the admissibility of his testimony that he should first have been warned that what he said might be used against him. In Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, Wilson was charged with murder. Before a United States commissioner, upon a preliminary hearing, he made a statement which was admitted at the trial. He had no counsel, was not warned or told of his right to refuse to testify, but there was testimony tending to show that the statement was voluntary. At pages 623, 624, this court said:
"And it is laid down that it is not essential to the admissibility of a confession that it should appear that the person was warned that what he said would be used against him, but on the contrary, if the confession was voluntary, it is sufficient though it appear that he was not so warned. Joy on Confessions, * 45, * 48, and cases cited.
". . . . He [Wilson] did not testify that he did not know that he had a right to refuse to answer the questions, or that, if he had known it, he would not have answered. . . . He did not have the aid of counsel; *314 and he was not warned that the statement might be used against him or advised that he need not answer. These were matters which went to the weight or credibility of what he said of an incriminating character, but as he was not confessing guilt but the contrary, we think that, under all the circumstances disclosed, they were not of themselves sufficient to require his answers to be excluded on the ground of being involuntary as matter of law."
In the present case, it does not appear that the witness claimed his privilege, or was ignorant of it, or that if he had known of it would not have answered  -  indeed, the record shows that his testimony was entirely voluntary and understandingly given. Such testimony cannot be excluded when subsequently offered at his trial.
As to the contention that the cross-examination before the commissioner shown in the bill of exceptions was improperly extorted from the witness under threat of commitment, an examination of the bill of exceptions, we think, requires an answer overruling this exception. There is some difference of opinion expressed in the authorities, but the rule recognized in this court is that a defendant, who voluntarily takes the stand in his own behalf, thereby waiving his privilege, may be subjected to a cross-examination concerning his statement. "Assuming the position of a witness, he is entitled to all its rights and protection, and is subject to all its criticisms and burdens" and may be fully cross-examined as to the testimony voluntarily given. Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S. 301, 305. The rule is thus stated in Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 597:
"Thus, if the witness himself elects to waive his privilege, as he may doubtless do, since the privilege is for his protection and not for that of other parties, and discloses his criminal connections, he is not permitted to stop, but must go on and make a full disclosure. 1 Greenl. Ev., § 451; Dixon v. Vale, 1 C. & P. 278; East v. Chapman, *315 2 C. & P. 570; S.C., M. & M. 46; State v. K----, 4 N.H. 562; Low v. Mitchell, 18 Maine, 372; Coburn v. Odell, 10 Fost. (N.H.) 540; Norfolk v. Gaylord, 28 Connecticut, 309; Austin v. Poiner, 1 Sim. 348; Commonwealth v. Pratt, 126 Massachusetts, 462; Chamberlain v. Willson, 12 Vermont, 491; Lockett v. State, 63 Alabama, 5; People v. Freshour, 55 California, 375.
"So, under modern statutes permitting accused persons to take the stand in their own behalf, they may be subjected to cross-examination upon their statements. State v. Wentworth, 65 Maine, 234; State v. Witham, 72 Maine, 531; State v. Ober, 52 N.H. 492; Commonwealth v. Bonner, 97 Massachusetts, 587; Commonwealth v. Morgan, 107 Massachusetts, 199; Commonwealth v. Mullen, 97 Massachusetts, 545; Connors v. People, 50 N.Y. 240; People v. Casey, 72 N.Y. 393."
But it is contended by the defendant that the bill of exceptions shows that the alleged cross-examination was entirely irrelevant and improper, and not a legitimate cross-examination of the defendant's testimony in his own behalf. It appears that Powers testified, being charged with illegal conduct concerning the distillation of spirits, as already stated, that he was at a place about thirty steps from the still, beating apples, as testified by the Government's witness; that Preston Powers had hired him to work for him at the price of seventy-five cents a day, and that he put him to beating apples; that the witness had no interest in the apples or the product thereof and no interest in the still, but was merely hired to work by the day at the price of 75 cents. Having taken the stand in his own behalf, and given the testimony above recited, tending to show that he was not guilty of the offense charged, he was required to submit to cross-examination, as any other witness in the case would be, concerning matter pertinent to the examination in chief. The cross-examination, in the answer elicited, tended to *316 show that defendant had worked at a distillery the fall before with Preston Powers, the man he alleged he was working for at beating apples on the occasion when the Government witness saw him near the still, and had made brandy near his house, and had paid Preston Powers to assist him. This, we think, might be regarded as having some relevancy to the defendant's claim as to the innocent character of his occupation at the time charged. It had a tendency to show that defendant knew the character of the occupation in which he was then engaged, having worked before with Preston Powers at a distillery and made brandy with him, and did not exceed the limits of a proper cross-examination of the witness. As to the suggestion that § 860 of the Revised Statutes prevented the introduction of the testimony given by defendant before the commissioner, that section, providing that no pleading nor any discovery or evidence obtained from a party by means of a judicial proceeding, shall be used in evidence against him in a criminal proceeding, can have no bearing, where, as in the present case, the accused voluntarily testified in his own behalf in the course of the same proceeding, thereby himself opening the door to legitimate cross-examination. See Tucker v. United States, 151 U.S. 164, 168.
Judgment affirmed.


451 U.S. 704 (1981)
H. A. ARTISTS & ASSOCIATES, INC., ET AL.
v.
ACTORS' EQUITY ASSN. ET AL.
No. 80-348.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued March 23, 1981.
Decided May 26, 1981.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.
*705 Howard Breindel argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Charles Donelan.
Jerome B. Lurie argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Sidney E. Cohn, Mary K. O'Melveny, Nan Bases, and Samuel Estreicher.
*706 Laurence Gold argued the cause for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were J. Albert Woll and George Kaufmann.[*]
JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
The respondent Actors' Equity Association (Equity) is a union representing the vast majority of stage actors and actresses in the United States. It enters into collective-bargaining agreements with theatrical producers that specify minimum wages and other terms and conditions of employment for those whom it represents. The petitioners are independent theatrical agents who place actors and actresses in jobs with producers. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the respondents'[1] system of regulation of theatrical agents is immune from antitrust liability by reason of the statutory labor exemption from the antitrust laws, 622 F. 2d 647.[2] We granted certiorari to consider the availability of that exemption in the circumstances presented by this case. 449 U. S. 991.

I

A
Equity is a national union that has represented stage actors and actresses since early in this century. Currently representing approximately 23,000 actors and actresses, it has collective-bargaining agreements with virtually all major theatrical producers in New York City, on and off Broadway, *707 and with most other theatrical producers throughout the United States. The terms negotiated with producers are the minimum conditions of employment (called "scale"); an actor or actress is free to negotiate wages or terms more favorable than the collectively bargained minima.
Theatrical agents are independent contractors who negotiate contracts and solicit employment for their clients. The agents do not participate in the negotiation of collective-bargaining agreements between Equity and the theatrical producers. If an agent succeeds in obtaining employment for a client, he receives a commission based on a percentage of the client's earnings. Agents who operate in New York City must be licensed as employment agencies and are regulated by the New York City Department of Consumer Affairs pursuant to New York law, which provides that the maximum commission a theatrical agent may charge his client is 10% of the client's compensation.
In 1928, concerned with the high unemployment rates in the legitimate theater and the vulnerability of actors and actresses to abuses by theatrical agents,[3] including the extraction of high commissions that tended to undermine collectively bargained rates of compensation, Equity unilaterally established a licensing system for the regulation of agents. The regulations permitted Equity members to deal only with those agents who obtained Equity licenses and thereby agreed to meet the conditions of representation prescribed by Equity. Those members who dealt with nonlicensed agents were subject to union discipline.
The system established by the Equity regulations was immediately challenged.[4] In Edelstein v. Gillmore, 35 F. 2d *708 723, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that the regulations were a lawful effort to improve the employment conditions of Equity members. In an opinion written by Judge Swan and joined by Judge Augustus N. Hand,[5] the court said:
"The evils of unregulated employment agencies (using this term broadly to include also the personal representative) are set forth in the defendants' affidavits and are corroborated by common knowledge. . . . Hence the requirement that, as a condition to writing new business with Equity's members, old contracts with its members must be made to conform to the new standards, does not seem to us to justify an inference that the primary purpose of the requirement is infliction of injury upon plaintiff, and other personal representatives in a similar situation, rather than the protection of the supposed interests of Equity's members. The terms they insist upon are calculated to secure from personal representatives better and more impartial service, at uniform and cheaper rates, and to improve conditions of employment of actors by theater managers. Undoubtedly the defendants intend to compel the plaintiff to give up rights under existing contracts which do not conform to the new standards set up by Equity, but, as already indicated, their motive in so doing is to benefit themselves and their fellow actors in the economic struggle. The financial loss to plaintiff is incidental to this purpose." Id., at 726 (emphasis added).[6]
*709 The essential elements of Equity's regulation of theatrical agents have remained unchanged since 1928.[7] A member of Equity is prohibited, on pain of union discipline, from using an agent who has not, through the mechanism of obtaining an Equity license (called a "franchise"), agreed to comply with the regulations. The most important of the regulations requires that a licensed agent must renounce any right to take a commission on an employment contract under which an actor or actress receives scale wages.[8] To the extent a contract includes provisions under which an actor or actress will sometimes receive scale pay - for rehearsals or "chorus" *710 employment, for example - and sometimes more, the regulations deny the agent any commission on the scale portions of the contract. Licensed agents are also precluded from taking commissions on out-of-town expense money paid to their clients. Moreover, commissions are limited on wages within 10% of scale pay,[9] and an agent must allow his client to terminate a representation contract if the agent is not successful in procuring employment within a specified period.[10] Finally, agents are required to pay franchise fees to Equity. The fee is $200 for the initial franchise, $60 a year thereafter for each agent, and $40 for any subagent working in the office of another. These fees are deposited by Equity in its general treasury and are not segregated from other union funds.
In 1977, after a dispute between Equity and Theatrical Artists Representatives Associates (TARA) - a trade association representing theatrical agents, see n. 7, supra - a group of agents, including the petitioners, resigned from TARA because of TARA's decision to abide by Equity's regulations. These agents also informed Equity that they would not accept Equity's regulations, or apply for franchises. The petitioners instituted this lawsuit in May 1978, contending that Equity's regulations of theatrical agents violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1 and 2.

*711 B
The District Court found, after a bench trial, that Equity's creation and maintenance of the agency franchise system were fully protected by the statutory labor exemptions from the antitrust laws, and accordingly dismissed the petitioners' complaint. 478 F. Supp. 496 (SDNY). Among its factual conclusions, the trial court found that in the theatrical industry, agents play a critical role in securing employment for actors and actresses:
"As a matter of general industry practice, producers seek actors and actresses for their productions through agents. Testimony in this case convincingly established that an actor without an agent does not have the same access to producers or the same opportunity to be seriously considered for a part as does an actor who has an agent. Even principal interviews, in which producers are required to interview all actors who want to be considered for principal roles, do not eliminate the need for an agent, who may have a greater chance of gaining an audition for his client.
.....
"Testimony confirmed that agents play an integral role in the industry; without an agent, an actor would have significantly lesser chances of gaining employment." Id., at 497, 502.
The court also found "no evidence to suggest the existence of any conspiracy or illegal combination between Actors' Equity and TARA or between Actors' Equity and producers," and concluded that "[t]he Actors Equity franchising system was employed by Actors' Equity for the purpose of protecting the wages and working conditions of its members." Id., at 499.
The Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the judgment of the District Court. It determined that the threshold issue was, under United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219, 232, whether Equity's franchising system involved any combination *712 between Equity and any "non-labor groups" or persons who are not "parties to a labor dispute." 622 F. 2d, at 648-649. If it did, the court reasoned, the protection of the statutory labor exemption would not apply.
First, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court had not been clearly erroneous in finding no agreement, explicit or tacit, between Equity and the producers to establish or police the franchising system. Ibid. Next, the court turned to the relationship between the union and those agents who had agreed to become franchised, in order to determine whether those agreements would divest Equity's system of agency regulation of the statutory exemption. Relying on Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U. S. 99, the court concluded that the agents were themselves a "labor group," because of their substantial "economic inter-relationship" with Equity, under which "the union [could] not eliminate wage competition among its members without regulation of the fees of the agents." 622 F. 2d, at 650, 651. Accordingly, since the elimination of wage competition is plainly within the area of a union's legitimate self-interest, the court concluded that the exemption was applicable.[11]
After deciding that the central feature of Equity's franchising system - the union's exaction of an agreement by agents not to charge commissions on certain types of work -  was immune from antitrust challenge, the Court of Appeals turned to the petitioners' challenge of the franchise fees exacted from agents. Equity had argued that the fees were necessary to meet its expenses in administering the franchise system, but no evidence was presented at trial to show that the costs justified the fees actually levied. The Court of Appeals suggested that if the exactions exceeded the true *713 costs, they could not legally be collected, as such exactions would be unconnected with any of the goals of national labor policy that justify the labor antitrust exemption. Despite the lack of any cost evidence at trial, however, the appellate court reasoned that the fees were sufficiently low that a remand to the District Court on this point "would not serve any useful purpose." Id., at 651.

II

A
Labor unions are lawful combinations that serve the collective interests of workers, but they also possess the power to control the character of competition in an industry. Accordingly, there is an inherent tension between national antitrust policy, which seeks to maximize competition, and national labor policy, which encourages cooperation among workers to improve the conditions of employment.[12] In the years immediately following passage of the Sherman Act, courts enjoined strikes as unlawful restraints of trade when a union's conduct or objectives were deemed "socially or economically harmful." Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).[13] In response to these practices, Congress acted, first in the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, and later in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, to immunize labor unions and labor disputes from challenge under the Sherman Act.
Section 6 of the Clayton Act, 15 U. S. C. § 17, declares that human labor "is not a commodity or article of commerce," and immunizes from antitrust liability labor organizations *714 and their members "lawfully carrying out" their "legitimate object[ives]." Section 20 of the Act prohibits injunctions against specified employee activities, such as strikes and boycotts, that are undertaken in the employees' self-interest and that occur in the course of disputes "concerning terms or conditions of employment," and states that none of the specified acts can be "held to be [a] violatio[n] of any law of the United States." 29 U. S. C. § 52. This protection is re-emphasized and expanded in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which prohibits federal-court injunctions against single or organized employees engaged in enumerated activities,[14] and specifically forbids such injunctions notwithstanding the claim of an unlawful combination or conspiracy. While the Norris-LaGuardia Act's bar of federal-court labor injunctions is not explicitly phrased as an exemption from the antitrust laws, it has been interpreted broadly as a statement of congressional policy that the courts must not use the antitrust laws as a vehicle to interfere in labor disputes.[15]
In United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219, the Court held that labor unions acting in their self-interest and not in combination with nonlabor groups enjoy a statutory exemption from Sherman Act liability. After describing the *715 congressional responses to judicial interference in union activity, id., at 229-230, the Court declared that
"[s]o long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with non-labor groups, the licit and the illicit under § 20 [of the Clayton Act] are not to be distinguished by any judgment regarding the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness of the end of which the particular union activities are the means." Id., at 232 (footnote omitted).
The Court explained that this exemption derives not only from the Clayton Act, but also from the Norris-LaGuardia Act, particularly its definition of a "labor dispute," see n. 14, supra, in which Congress "reasserted the original purpose of the Clayton Act by infusing into it the immunized trade union activities as redefined by the later Act." 312 U. S., at 236. Thus under Hutcheson, no federal injunction may issue over a "labor dispute," and "§ 20 [of the Clayton Act] removes all such allowable conduct from the taint of being a `violation of any law of the United States,' including the Sherman [Act]." Ibid.[16]
The statutory exemption does not apply when a union combines with a "non-labor group." Hutcheson, supra, at 232. Accordingly, antitrust immunity is forfeited when a union combines with one or more employers in an effort to restrain trade. In Allen Bradley Co. v. Electrical Workers, 325 U. S. 797, for example, the Court held that a union had violated the Sherman Act when it combined with manufacturers and contractors to erect a sheltered local business market in *716 order "to bar all other business men from [the market], and to charge the public prices above a competitive level." Id., at 809.[17] The Court indicated that the union efforts would, standing alone, be exempt from antitrust liability, ibid., but because the union had not acted unilaterally, the exemption was denied.[18] Congress "intended to outlaw business monopolies. A business monopoly is no less such because a union participates, and such participation is a violation of the Act." Id., at 811.[19]

*717 B
The Court of Appeals properly recognized that the threshold issue was to determine whether or not Equity's franchising of agents involved any combination between Equity and any "non-labor groups," or persons who are not "parties to a labor dispute." 622 F. 2d, at 649 (quoting Hutcheson, 312 U. S., at 232).[20] And the court's conclusion that the trial court had not been clearly erroneous in its finding that there was no combination between Equity and the theatrical producers[21] to create or maintain the franchise system is amply supported by the record.
The more difficult problem is whether the combination between Equity and the agents who agreed to become franchised was a combination with a "nonlabor group." The answer to this question is best understood in light of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U. S. 99. There, four orchestra leaders, members of the American Federation of Musicians, brought an action based on the Sherman Act challenging the union's unilateral system of regulating "club dates," or one-time musical engagements. These regulations, inter alia, enforced a *718 closed shop; required orchestra leaders to engage a minimum number of "sidemen," or instrumentalists; prescribed minimum prices for local engagements;[22] prescribed higher minimum prices for traveling orchestras; and permitted leaders to deal only with booking agents licensed by the union.
Without disturbing the finding of the Court of Appeals that the orchestra leaders were employers and independent contractors, the Court concluded that they were nonetheless a "labor group" and parties to a "labor dispute" within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and thus that their involvement in the union regulatory scheme was not an unlawful combination between "labor" and "nonlabor" groups. The Court agreed with the trial court that the applicable test was whether there was "job or wage competition or some other economic interrelationship affecting legitimate union interests between the union members and the independent contractors." Id., at 106.
The Court also upheld the restrictions on booking agents, who were not involved in job or wage competition with union members. Accordingly, these restrictions had to meet the "other economic interrelationship" branch of the disjunctive test quoted above. And the test was met because those restrictions were "`at least as intimately bound up with the subject of wages' . . . as the price floors." Id., at 113 (quoting Teamsters v. Oliver, 362 U. S. 605, 606). The Court noted that the booking agent restrictions had been adopted, in part, because agents had "charged exorbitant fees, and booked engagements for musicians at wages . . . below union scale."[23]

*719 C
The restrictions challenged by the petitioners in this case are very similar to the agent restrictions upheld in the Carroll case.[24] The essential features of the regulatory scheme are identical: members are permitted to deal only with agents who have agreed (1) to honor their fiduciary obligations by avoiding conflicts of interest, (2) not to charge excessive commissions, and (3) not to book members for jobs paying less than the union minimum.[25] And as in Carroll, Equity's *720 regulation of agents developed in response to abuses by employment agents who occupy a critical role in the relevant labor market.[26] The agent stands directly between union members and jobs, and is in a powerful position to evade the union's negotiated wage structure.
The peculiar structure of the legitimate theater industry, where work is intermittent, where it is customary if not essential for union members to secure employment through agents, and where agents' fees are calculated as a percentage of a member's wage, makes it impossible for the union to defend even the integrity of the minimum wages it has negotiated without regulation of agency fees.[27] The regulations are "brought within the labor exemption [because they are] necessary to assure that scale wages will be paid . . . ." Carroll, 391 U. S., at 112. They "embody . . . a direct frontal attack upon a problem thought to threaten the maintenance of the basic wage structure." Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U. S. *721 283, 294. Agents must, therefore, be considered a "labor group," and their controversy with Equity is plainly a "labor dispute" as defined in the Norris-LaGuardia Act: "representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee." 29 U. S. C. § 113 (c).
Agents perform a function - the representation of union members in the sale of their labor - that in most nonentertainment industries is performed exclusively by unions. In effect, Equity's franchise system operates as a substitute for maintaining a hiring hall as the representative of its members seeking employment.[28]
Finally, Equity's regulations are clearly designed to promote the union's legitimate self-interest. Hutcheson, 312 U. S., at 232. In a case such as this, where there is no direct wage or job competition between the union and the group it regulates, the Carroll formulation to determine the *722 presence of a nonlabor group - whether there is "`some . . . economic interrelationship affecting legitimate union interests. . . ,'" 391 U. S., at 106 (quoting District Court opinion) -  necessarily resolves this issue.

D
The question remains whether the fees that Equity levies upon the agents who apply for franchises are a permissible component of the exempt regulatory system. We have concluded that Equity's justification for these fees is inadequate. Conceding that Carroll did not sanction union extraction of franchise fees from agents,[29] Equity suggests, only in the most general terms, that the fees are somehow related to the basic purposes of its regulations: elimination of wage competition, upholding of the union wage scale, and promotion of fair access to jobs. But even assuming that the fees no more than cover the costs of administering the regulatory system, this is simply another way of saying that without the fees, the union's regulatory efforts would not be subsidized - and that the dues of Equity's members would perhaps have to be increased to offset the loss of a general revenue source.[30] If Equity did not impose these franchise fees upon the agents, there is no reason to believe that any of its legitimate interests would be affected.[31]

*723 III
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE MARSHALL join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join all but Part II-D of the Court's opinion. That part holds that respondents' exaction of a franchise fee is not a "permissible component of the exempt regulatory system." Ante, at 722. Rather, I agree with the Court of Appeals that the approximately $12,000 collected annually in fees is not "incommensurate with Equity's expenses in maintaining a full-time employee to administer the system," 622 F. 2d 647, 651 (CA2 1980), and thus is not "unconnected with any of the goals of national labor policy which justify the antitrust exemption for labor," ibid.
The Court justifies its conclusion by suggesting that, since the union could increase its dues to offset the revenue lost from invalidation of the fee system, "there is no reason to believe that any of [the union's] legitimate interests would be affected," if the fee system were found to violate the anti-trust laws. Ante, at 722. The union could of course raise its dues, but the issue here is whether the conceded antitrust immunity of the franchising system includes the franchise fee.
I find somewhat incongruous the Court's conclusion that an incident of the overall system constitutes impermissible regulation, but that agents in general may be significantly *724 regulated because they are not a "nonlabor group." This incongruity is highlighted by the similarity between union hiring halls and the franchising system, a similarity which the Court itself acknowledges: "Equity's franchise system operates as a substitute for maintaining a hiring hall as the representative of its members seeking employment." Ante, at 721. The Court disregards this similarity in concluding that the franchising system does not "directly benefit" the agents who are required to pay the fees. Ante, at 722, n. 31. It reaches this conclusion by incorrectly assuming that the only parties who directly benefit from the hiring hall and the franchising system are employers and employees and producers and actors, as the case may be. But surely the agents also benefit from the franchising system, which provides an orderly and protective mechanism for pairing actors who seek jobs with producers who seek actors. The system is thus the means by which the agents ultimately receive their commissions; it is as much the source of their livelihood as it is that of the actors.
Because the fee is an incident of a legitimate scheme of regulation and because it is commensurate in amount with the purpose for which it is sought, I would also affirm this holding of the Court of Appeals.
NOTES
[*]  David Alter, Joseph Ferraro, Mortimer Becker, Henry Kaiser, Ronald Rosenberg, and Paul P. Selvin filed a brief for the American Federation of Television and Radio Artists et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.
[1]  The respondent Donald Grody is the executive secretary of Equity.
[2]  The basic sources of organized labor's exemption from federal antitrust laws are §§ 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731 and 738, 15 U. S. C. § 17 and 29 U. S. C. § 52, and §§ 4,5, and 13 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, 71, and 73, 29 U. S. C. §§ 104, 105, and 113.
[3]  Such vulnerability was, and still remains, particularly acute for actors and actresses without established professional reputations, who have always constituted the overwhelming majority of Equity's members.
[4]  The challenge was grounded on allegations of common-law tortious interference with business relationships.
[5]  Judge Manton dissented without opinion.
[6]  For contemporary descriptions of agent abuses of actors and actresses, see generally A. Harding, The Revolt of the Actors (1929). See also New Rules for Actors, N. Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1928, p. 20, col. 3; The New Republic, Oct. 24, 1928, p. 263. Cf. Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350, 359-375 (Stone, J., joined by Holmes and Brandeis, JJ., dissenting) (general abuses by employment agencies, particularly at times of widespread unemployment). The Court's decision in Ribnik v. McBride was overruled unanimously in Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U. S. 236.
[7]  The petitioners do not dispute this. The regulations have undergone revision in some details, largely as a result of negotiations between Equity and Theatrical Artists Representatives Associates (TARA), which until shortly before this litigation began was the only association voicing the concerns of agents with regard to their representation of Equity members. Until their voluntary resignation in late 1977, most of the petitioners were members of TARA. The petitioners are now members of the National Association of Talent Representatives (NATR). Unlike TARA, which functions only in the legitimate theater filed, NATR also functions in the fields of motion pictures and television. In those fields, agents operate under closely analogous agent regulations maintained by the Screen Actors' Guild and the American Federation of Television and Radio Artists.

The history of the negotiations and disputes between Equity and TARA are described in the opinion of the District Court in the present case. 478 F. Supp. 496, 498 (SDNY).
[8]  The minimum, or "scale," wage varies. In August 1977, for example, the minimum weekly salary was $335 for Broadway performances, and $175 for performances off Broadway. Scale wages are set by a collective-bargaining agreement between Equity and the producers, to which the agents are not parties. When an agent represents an actor or actress whose professional reputation is not sufficient to demand a salary higher than scale, the agent hopes to develop a relationship that will become continually more remunerative as the performer's professional reputation grows, and with it the power to demand an ever higher salary. No agent is required to represent an actor or actress whom he does not wish to represent.
[9]  It is Equity's view that commissions in the industry are not necessarily related to efforts by the agents, and that an agent often functions as little more than an "order taker," who is able to collect a percentage of a client's wages for the duration of a show for doing little more than answering a producer's telephone call. Indeed, an agent may collect a commission on the salary of an actor or actress he represents even if the client obtains the job without the agent.
[10]  Equity argues that this restriction is necessary because there is an incentive for agents to represent as many actors and actresses as possible -  and not necessarily to serve them all well - because an agent receives a commission whenever his client is employed at a salary higher than scale, regardless of the extent of his involvement in obtaining employment for the client.
[11]  The Court of Appeals recognized that even if there had been an agreement between Equity and a "non-labor group," the agreement might still have been protected from the antitrust laws under the "non-statutory" exemption. 622 F. 2d, at 649, n. 1. See Connell Construction Co. v. Pumbers & Steamfitters, 421 U. S. 616, 622. See n. 19, infra.
[12]  See generally Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 659 (1965); Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of Antitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 Yale L. J. 14 (1963). See also Leslie, Principles of Labor Antitrust, 66 Va. L. Rev. 1183 (1980).
[13]  See Winter, supra n. 12, at 30-38.
[14]  As is true under the Clayton Act, the specified activities are protected only in the context of a labor dispute. The Norris-LaGuardia Act defines a labor dispute to include "any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee." 29 U. S. C. § 113 (c).
[15]  In Milk Wagon Drivers v. Lake Valley Farm Products, Inc., 311 U. S. 91, 103, the Court stated: "For us to hold, in the face of [the Norris-LaGuardia Act], that the federal courts have jurisdiction to grant injunctions in cases growing out of labor disputes, merely because alleged violations of the Sherman Act are involved, would run counter to the plain mandate of the Act and would reverse the declared purpose of Congress."
[16]  See also Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469. There, in the Term preceding that in which the Hutcheson case was decided, the Court reasoned that the Sherman Act prohibits only restraints on "commercial competition," 310 U. S., at 497, 499, 510-511 - or those market restraints designed to monopolize supply, control prices, or allocate product distribution -  and that unions are not liable where they merely further their own goals in the labor market.
[17]  In Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U. S. 821, decided the same day as Allen Bradley, the Court ruled that the labor exemption protected a union's boycott of a truck hauler through successful secondary pressure on purchasers of the hauler's services with whom the union had contracts, because of the absence of union participation in a conspiracy with the hauler's competitors. See 325 U. S., at 824; Meltzer, supra n. 12, at 677, and n. 74.
[18]  Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U. S. 657, also dealt with a union combination with employers, but the grounds of decision were unrelated to the antitrust exemption.
[19]  Even where there are union agreements with nonlabor groups that may have the effect of sheltering the nonlabor groups from competition in product markets, the Court has recognized a "nonstatutory" exemption to shield such agreements if they are intimately related to the union's vital concerns of wages, hours, and working conditions. See, e. g., Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U. S. 676. This nonstatutory exemption was described as follows in Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters, 421 U. S., at 622:

"The Court has recognized . . . that a proper accommodation between the congressional policy favoring collective bargaining under the NLRA and the congressional policy favoring free competition in business markets requires that some union-employer agreements be accorded a limited non-statutory exemption from antitrust sanctions. . . .
"The nonstatutory exemption has its source in the strong labor policy favoring the association of employees to eliminate competition over wages and working conditions. Union success in organizing workers and standardizing wages ultimately will affect price competition among employers, but the goals of federal labor law never could be achieved if this effect on business competition were held a violation of the antitrust laws. The Court therefore has acknowledged that labor policy requires tolerance for the lessening of business competition based on differences in wages and working conditions."
Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals in this case decided whether the nonstatutory exemption would independently shield the respondents from the petitioners' antitrust claims. See n. 11, supra.
[20]  Of course, a party seeking refuge in the statutory exemption must be a bona fide labor organization, and not an independent contractor or entrepreneur. See Meat Drivers v. United States, 371 U. S. 94; Columbia River Packers Assn. v. Hinton, 315 U. S. 143. See generally 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law § 229c, pp. 195-198 (1978). There is no dispute about Equity's status as a bona fide labor organization.
[21]  As the employers of Equity's members, producers are plainly a "nonlabor group." Employers almost always will be a "nonlabor group," although an exception has been recognized, for example, when the employer himself is in job competition with his employees. See Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U. S. 99 (orchestra leaders who both lead an orchestra and play an instrument).
[22]  These consisted of a minimum scale for sidemen, a "leader's fee," which was twice the sidemen's scale in orchestras of at least four, and an additional 8% for social security, unemployment insurance, and other expenses. In addition, if a leader did not appear but designated a subleader, and four or more musicians performed, the leader was required to pay from his leader's fee 1.5 times the sidemen's scale to the subleader.
[23]  The Court did not explicitly determine whether the second prong of the Hutcheson test for the statutory exemption had been met, i. e., whether the union had acted in its "self-interest." But given its various findings that the challenged restrictions were designed to cope with job competition and to protect wage scales and working conditions, 391 U. S., at 108, 109, 110, 113, it clearly did so sub silentio.
[24]  Several cases before Carroll also upheld union regulation of the practices of independent entrepreneurs affecting the wages or working conditions of union members. See Milk Wagon Drivers v. Lake Valley Farm Products, Inc., 311 U. S. 91; Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U. S. 283 (Oliver I); Teamsters v. Oliver, 362 U. S. 605 (Oliver II). In Milk Wagon Drivers, the Court held that the union had engaged in a "labor dispute" within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act when it attempted to organize independent "vendors" who supplied milk to retail stores. There the union feared that the "vendor system" was designed to escape the payment of union wages and the assumption of union-imposed working conditions. In Oliver I, the Milk Wagon Drivers decision was invoked to protect from state antitrust challenge a union's successful efforts to prescribe through collective-bargaining agreements a wage scale for truck-drivers, and minimum rental fees for drivers who owned their own trucks. The union feared that driver-owners, whose fees included not only an entrepreneurial component but also a "wage" for the labor of driving, might undercut the union scale by charging a fee that effectively included a subscale wage component. The Court stated that "[t]he regulations embod[ied] . . . a direct frontal attack upon a problem thought to threaten the maintenance of the basic wage structure established by the collective bargaining contract." 358 U. S., at 294. See also Oliver II, supra, at 606 (after remand to the state court).
[25]  Indeed, the District Court in Carroll, whose judgment was affirmed by this Court "in its entirety," 391 U. S., at 114, drew parallels with the restrictions at issue in the present case. The court noted that "[a]pparently, similar abuses by booking agents existed in other fields too. Edelstein v. Gillmore, 35 F. 2d 723, 726 (2d Cir. 1929) (actors)." Carroll v. AFM, 241 F. Supp. 865, 892 (SDNY).

The petitioners argue that theatrical agents are indistinguishable from "numerous [other] groups of persons who merely supply products and services to union members" such as landlords, grocers, accountants, and lawyers. But it is clear that agents differ from these groups in two critical respects: the agents control access to jobs and negotiation of the terms of employment. For the actor or actress, therefore, agent commissions are not merely a discretionary expenditure of disposable income, but a virtually inevitable concomitant of obtaining employment.
[26]  See Carroll v. AFM, 241 F. Supp., at 881-882; Harding, supra n. 6, at 319-325.
[27]  The Court of Appeals found that "the union cannot eliminate wage competition among its members without regulation of the fees of the agents." 622 F. 2d, at 651 (emphasis added). Wage competition is prevented not only by the rule precluding commissions on scale jobs. Actors and actresses could also compete over the percentage of their wages they were willing to cede to an agent, subject only to the restrictions imposed by state law.
[28]  In many industries, unions maintain hiring halls and other job referral systems, particularly where work is typically temporary and performed on separate project sites rather than fixed locations. By maintaining halls, unions attempt to eliminate abuses such as kickbacks, and to insure fairness and regularity in the system of access to employment. In a 1947 Senate Report, Senator Taft explained: "The employer should be able to make a contract with the union as an employment agency. The union frequently is the best employment agency. The employer should be able to give notice of vacancies, and in the normal course of events to accept men sent to him by the hiring hall." S. Rep. No. 1827, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 13 (1947), quoted in Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U. S. 667, 673-674.

The National Labor Relations Board and the courts have ruled that union demands for hiring halls are a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, and that strikes to obtain such provisions are protected activity. See, e. g., Houston Chapter, Associated General Contractors, 143 N. L. R. B. 409, enf'd, 349 F. 2d 449 (CA5); NLRB v. Tom Joyce Floors, Inc., 353 F. 2d 768, 771 (CA9). Cf. Teamsters v. NLRB, supra, at 672-673, 676.
[29]  See Carroll, 241 F. Supp., at 881. We have, in fact, found no case holding that a union may extract such fees from independent agents who represent union members.
[30]  As already indicated, the franchise fees are not segregated in any manner but merely deposited in the union's general fund.
[31]  The respondents offer union hiring hall fees as an analogy in support of Equity's collection of franchise fees. In that context, the respondents argue, without citation, that a union may impose reasonable fees upon employers to meet the costs of maintaining a union-run hiring hall. But even if the respondents' statement of labor law is correct, the analogy would not be persuasive. Assuming that hiring hall fees are so imposed, the fees are borne by parties who directly benefit from the employment services of the hiring halls and are collected by the entities that provide them. That is not true in the present case.

The view expressed in the separate opinion filed today as to who are the beneficiaries of the franchising system will undoubtedly surprise the agents who brought this lawsuit. Post, at 724.


47 U.S. 14 (____)
6 How. 14
LEWIS A. COLLIER, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR,
v.
JOSIAH STANBROUGH.
Supreme Court of United States.

*19 The cause was argued by Mr. Bibb, for the plaintiff in error, and by Stockton & Steele and Mr. Henderson (in a printed argument), upon the same side. No counsel appeared for the defendant in error.
*20 Mr. Justice CATRON delivered the opinion of the court.
Lewis A. Collier filed his petition in the District Court held for the Parish of Madison, in the State of Louisiana, against Josiah Stanbrough and others, alleging that the Farmers' Bank of Virginia had recovered a judgment in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District in that State, against David Stanbrough, as curator of the succession of Jesse Harper; that an execution issued on the judgment, by which the marshal seized a debt belonging to the succession, due from Dougal McCall, evidenced by three notes of hand, and by a mortgage on land, securing the payment to be made to David Stanbrough, the curator; that the debt, amounting to 11,433 dollars, was seized and sold by the marshal, and said Collier became the purchaser, for the sum of 3,500 dollars, &c.
It is also alleged, that a fictitious indorsement had been made on one of the notes by the curator to Josiah Stanbrough, which the petition prays may be annulled, and that the petitioner may have the benefit of his purchase by judgment and execution on the notes and mortgaged property.
The defendants answered, and insisted that the debt was not legally seized or levied upon; and, secondly, that it was not legally appraised or advertised, as required by law.
The facts were agreed, and it was admitted that the notes in controversy were never appraised, and that the marshal sold them to Collier at a cash sale on the first biddings.
In the District Court, the law was adjudged to be for the defendants, and Collier's petition was dismissed; and from this judgment he appealed to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, where the judgment was affirmed; and to reverse this latter judgment, the plaintiff prosecuted a writ of error from this court to bring up the record; and this he had a right to do, as his claim of title was founded on "an authority exercised under the United States," which the judgment below drew in question, and the decision was against its validity.
The only question submitted for our consideration is whether the marshal's sale was void, or valid.
*21 The Supreme Court of Louisiana declared, in its opinion found in the record, and preceding the judgment, "that a creditor residing in another State cannot issue an execution upon the judgment which he has obtained in the federal court against the executor or administrator of an estate, which is admitted in the Court of Probates as insolvent, and take the property out of the hands of such executor or administrator, and leave nothing for the other creditors,"  -  adding, that, as it was one of the admitted facts that Harper's estate had been insolvent for several years before the seizure and sale were made, they were consequently void.
But as this case has been argued here by counsel for the plaintiff, Collier, only, no one appearing for the defendant in error, we deem it proper to forbear touching the delicate question on which the Supreme Court of Louisiana founded its judgment of affirmance. Its great importance in different States, and the difficulties attending it on either hand, because of the conflicts it is likely to produce between the tribunals of the State and the federal courts, strongly impress this court with the propriety of leaving the question open and uninfluenced by the present opinion, as no necessity exists for such a decision in this case. The judgment of the State court pronounced the seizure and sale on the federal execution void; this judgment we are called on to revise, and if we find that it was proper, for the reasons given by the court below, or on other grounds manifestly appearing of record, and equally calling into exercise the jurisdiction of this court, it is our duty to affirm it; and we are of opinion that the judgment of the State court was proper, on another ground.
In Louisiana, the debts due to an execution debtor may be seized and sold on execution, like other movable property, and equally with the immovable property; in respect to lands seized on execution, it is necessary, before they are offered for sale, that they should be appraised by persons appointed for the purpose, and if, when offered at public sale, two thirds of the appraised value is not bid, the officer who is attempting to sell shall not adjudicate the sale, but cease, and readvertise the property, and again offer it at public outcry on a credit of twelve months; and this mode of proceeding, having been adopted by rule in the Circuit Court of the United States held in Louisiana, governs the marshal of that court. Whether movable property was entitled to the benefit of the provision seems not to have been definitively settled until 1845, in the case of Phelps v. Rightor and others (9 Robinson's Rep. 541), when it was adjudged by the Supreme Court of Louisiana, that movable property (of the same description that is here in *22 controversy) could not be legally sold by a sheriff in virtue of an execution, without having been first appraised at its cash value, and that then the cash bid on the first offer must be equal, at least, to two thirds of the appraised value; and for want of such an appraisement and bid, the adjudication of a cash sale on the first offer to sell was void, for want of power in the officer. And it is proper to remark, that, in the case of Gantly v. Ewing (3 Howard, 707), this court declared a similar principle to apply in a case arising under a law of Indiana, which provided that the fee simple of real estate should not be sold, until the sheriff had, at the time and place of sale, first offered the rents and profits of the land for a term of seven years at public outcry, and if no bid was had for the rents and profits sufficient to satisfy the execution, then the sheriff should proceed to sell the fee. In that case the sheriff had proceeded to sell the fee-simple estate without first offering the rents and profits for the seven years' term, and this court held that the sale was void, for want of power in the sheriff to make it before he complied with the previous step, forasmuch as the power to sell the fee simple arose for want of a bid for the term. In principle, that case and the one under consideration cannot be distinguished. In each it was immaterial whether the purchaser had or had not knowledge of the fact, that the officer had not taken the first step, as on that step the power to sell first arose. In this case, no appraisement was had, and the debt on the first bidding was struck off to Collier, for less than one third of the amount called for by the three notes and the mortgage to secure them; and these facts being admitted on the record, it follows that the sale was void, and that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana must be affirmed.

Order.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that the judgment of the said Supreme Court in this cause be and the same is hereby affirmed, with costs.


264 U.S. 281 (1924)
WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY
v.
CZIZEK.
No. 300.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued February 26, 27, 1924.
Decided March 10, 1924.
CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.
*282 Mr. Francis R. Stark and Mr. Beverly L. Hodghead, with whom Mr. J.H. Richards, Mr. Oliver O. Haga, Mr. Joseph L. Egan and Mr. J. Julien Southerland were on the briefs, for petitioner.
Mr. Richard H. Johnson, with whom Mr. Carey H. Nixon was on the brief, for respondent.
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a suit against the Telegraph Company for failure to forward and deliver to the plaintiff a message from one Jones, found by the Court below to have been acting as agent for the plaintiff in the matter. The District Court found for the defendant, but the judgment was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, 272 Fed. 223, and at a second trial, in deference to the Circuit Court of Appeals, a judgment was entered for the plaintiff, which was affirmed. 286 Fed. 478. Certiorari granted. 262 U.S. 739.
The plaintiff owned fifty shares of stock in the Idaho National Bank at Boise, Idaho. Miller, vice president of the bank, was buying the stock with a view to a merger. He talked with the plaintiff and told him that he would buy his stock and that they would have no difficulty in agreeing on the price. The plaintiff told this to Jones, an attorney at Boise, who owned fifteen shares, asked Jones to act for him, saying that they would sell their stock together, and told Miller that Jones would represent him. Later Miller called on Jones and at Miller's request Jones, on November 30, 1917, wrote on a Western Union form  -  directing the Company to send. "subject to the terms on *283 back hereof", the following telegram addressed to the plaintiff at 5767 Shafter Avenue, Oakland, California, where the plaintiff lived: "Miller advises Idaho National sold to Pacific offers me ninety dollars per share otherwise wait year and chance of liquidation says if fails to get two thirds stock liquidation will follow. Will you take ninety dollars per share for yours. I am inclined to accept offer for mine. Answer." The form had been filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Commission had approved the provisions and rates that it set forth. Among the terms on the back of the form were the following: "To guard against mistakes or delays, the sender . . . should order it REPEATED, that is, telegraphed back to the originating office for comparison," an additional half rate being charged. "Unless otherwise indicated on its face, THIS IS AN UNREPEATED TELEGRAM AND PAID FOR AS SUCH, in consideration whereof it is agreed . . . 1. The Company shall not be liable for mistakes or delays in the transmission or delivery, or for nondelivery, of any UNREPEATED telegram, beyond the amount received for sending the same . . . 2. In any event the Company shall not be liable for damages for any mistakes or delays in the transmission or delivery, or for the nondelivery, of this telegram, whether caused by the negligence of its servants or otherwise, beyond the sum of FIFTY DOLLARS, at which amount this telegram is hereby valued, unless a greater value is stated in writing hereon at the time the telegram is offered to the Company for transmission, and an additional sum paid or agreed to be paid based on such value equal to one-tenth of one per cent. thereof."
This telegram was an unrepeated message of the class known as night letter, and was not specially valued or paid for upon a value in excess of $50. It was the duty of the receiving clerk, Margaret Brown, to indorse her initials, *284 the filing time and the amount of toll received, and to place the message on the sending hook for transmission. By inadvertence, although a competent clerk, she put it in a file of earlier messages instead of upon the hook, and it was not sent. The next day Jones's son inquired at the telegraph office for an answer and being told that there was none, asked if they had sent the telegram and was answered yes. On December 3 he asked again and was told that the plaintiff had received the message. Miller was ready and willing to buy the stock until December 5, 1917, and the plaintiff testified that he would have sold if he had received the telegram. Later the stock became worthless. The District Court found that there was no gross negligence but the Circuit Court of Appeals distinguished between a failure to take the first step toward transmission and some later neglect, held that the failure was not and, as a matter of public policy, could not be within the protection of the terms that we have stated and held the company liable for $4,500 with interest at seven per cent, from June 18, 1918, on which day the plaintiff made a demand.
The plaintiff, the respondent here, does not deny that he is bound by the terms that we have recited. That was assumed below and is established law. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Esteve Bros. & Co., 256 U.S. 566. Those terms apply as definitely to a nondelivery in consequence of a neglect or oversight at the first office as at any other. The moment that the message is received the contract attaches along with the responsibility, and the transit begins. We can perceive no legal distinction between that moment and the next when the message is handed to a transmitting clerk, or that on which a copy is given to a boy at the further end. The hand that holds the paper technically is that of the Company, but no more at the beginning than at the end, and as in fact it is that of servants, reasonable self-protection is allowed to the *285 master against their neglects. One such self-protection sanctioned by the decisions is a valuation of the message, with liberty to the sender to fix a higher value on paying more for it. Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491. The plaintiff finds no difficulty in valuing the message now. It was at least equally possible to value it when it was sent. See Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Esteve Bros. & Co., 256 U.S. 566, 574; Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Warren-Godwin Lumber Co., 251 U.S. 27.
When the message is valued it may be doubted whether the valuation can be affected by the intensity of the vituperative epithet applied to an admitted fault. Kirsch v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., 100 Kans. 250, 252. At all events something more would have to be shown than is proved here to take the case out of the general rule. The act of the receiving clerk cannot reasonably be supposed to have been more than a momentary inadvertence. It was not a wilful wrong. The answers to the inquires were probably the natural consequence of the first error, and the second answer probably was too late to have had any effect upon the plaintiff's position. See Primrose v. Western Union Telegraph, Co., 154 U.S. 1, 15. With regard to the amount of the valuation, if it is too low now, Unrepeated Message Case, 61 I.C.C. 541 it was reasonable in 1917. Primrose v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 154 U.S. 1, 15. Unrepeated Message Case, 44 I.C.C. 670. Whatever effect may be given to the judgment of the Commission in the later case, it was not intended to be retroactive. The rules prescribed by the Commission were to take effect on July 13, 1921.
We have not adverted to the first clause of the exemptions, limiting liability to the amount received for sending the message. Obviously this has a narrower scope than the valuation clause and we should hesitate to hold that it exonerated the defendant in this case. Unrepeated Message Case, 61 I.C.C. 541.
*286 Another clause not mentioned as yet reads: "The Company will not be liable for damages or statutory penalties in any case where the claim is not presented in writing within sixty days after the telegram is filed with the Company for transmission." This could not be held to apply literally to a case where through the fault of the Company the plaintiff did not know of the message until the sixty days had passed. It might be held to give the measure of a reasonable time for presenting the claim after the fact was known, in the absence of anything more. But here the plaintiff called on Hackett, the General Manager at Boise, about February 14, 1918, as soon as he knew the facts. Directly after, he received a letter from Hackett regretting the occurrence and enclosing the amount paid by the plaintiff as toll. Three days later the plaintiff returned the check by letter saying "an acceptance of this check on my part might be construed as a settlement of the matter," so that the defendant then had written notice that a claim was made. There was further communication and finally on June 18 the plaintiff made a formal written demand. We should be unwilling to decide that the action was barred by this clause. But we are of opinion that his claim is limited to fifty dollars for the reasons given above.
Judgment reversed.
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA dissents.


134 U.S. 398 (1890)
GLENN
v.
FANT.
No. 357.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued March 11, 1890.
Decided March 24, 1890.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
*400 Mr. Charles Marshall and Mr. John Howard for plaintiff in error. Mr. Henry Wise Garnett and Mr. Conway Robinson, Jr., also filed a brief for plaintiff in error.
Mr. Walter D. Davidge and Mr. Martin F. Morris for defendant in error. Mr. Eugene Carusi and Mr. Reginald Fendale were also on the brief for defendant in error.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the court.
No bill of exceptions was taken in this case, nor was there any finding of facts by the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, nor any case stated by the parties analogous to a special verdict and stating the ultimate facts of the case, presenting questions of law only. What is styled here an "agreed statement of facts" is an agreement as to certain matters, and that the parties might refer to and rely upon any and all grounds of action or defence to be found in two voluminous exhibits, marked X and Y, being the records of two equity causes in other courts, including all the pleadings and evidence, as well as the orders and decrees therein. The effect of some of that evidence and of the conclusions of fact to be drawn from it is controverted. It is impossible for us to regard this stipulation as taking the place of a special verdict of a jury, or a special finding of facts by the court, upon which our jurisdiction could properly be invoked to determine the questions of law thereon arising. And while the case is governed by the rule laid down in Campbell v. Boyreau, 21 How. 223, yet, even if the statutory provisions in relation to the trial of causes without the intervention of a jury by the Circuit Courts of the United States were applicable, the result upon this record would be the same. Raimond v. Terrebonne Parish, *401 132 U.S. 192; Andes v. Slauson, 130 U.S. 435; Bond v. Dustin, 112 U.S. 604; Lyons v. Lyons Bank, 19 Blatchford, 279.
The judgment must be
Affirmed.


370 U.S. 711 (1962)
CHAUFFEURS, TEAMSTERS AND HELPERS LOCAL UNION No. 795 ET AL.
v.
YELLOW TRANSIT FREIGHT LINES, INC., ET AL.
No. 13.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued October 11, 1961.
Decided June 25, 1962.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT.
David Previant argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners.
Malcolm Miller argued the cause for respondents. With him on the briefs were Charles Blackmar, Carl T. Smith and John F. Eberhardt.
J. Albert Woll, Theodore J. St. Antoine and Thomas E. Harris filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, as amicus curiae, urging reversal.
PER CURIAM.
Reversed. Sinclair Rfg. Co. v. Atkinson, ante, p. 195.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER took no part in the decision of this case.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR. JUSTICE HARLAN join, concurring.
Since it is clear that the collective bargaining agreement involved in this case does not bind either party to *712 arbitrate any dispute, I agree that no injunction should be granted.[*] See Sinclair Rfg. Co. v. Atkinson, ante, p. 215 (dissenting opinion).
NOTES
[*]  The grievance machinery emphasizes voluntary settlements through negotiations between employer and union representatives. Settlement is first to be attempted between the employer and the local union involved and, failing adjustment, negotiated settlement is to be attempted by a joint state committee consisting of equal numbers of employer and union representatives. If a majority of that committee "settles a dispute," "[s]uch a decision will be final and binding on both parties." If a joint state committee fails to settle a dispute, a negotiated settlement is then to be attempted by a joint area committee consisting of equal numbers of employer and union representatives duly elected by the various joint state committees. This is the last stage unless there is agreement at that point to submit unsettled disputes to arbitration. Obviously, either employer or union representatives are free to prevent arbitration. For the contract provisions are:

"(d) Deadlocked cases may be submitted to umpire handling if a majority of the Joint Area Committee determines to submit such matter to an umpire for decision. Otherwise either party shall be permitted all legal or economic recourse.
.....
"(f) In the event of strikes, work-stoppages or other activities which are permitted in case of deadlock, default, or failure to comply with majority decisions, no interpretation of this Agreement by any tribunal shall be binding upon the Union or affect the legality or lawfulness of the strike unless the Union stipulates to be bound by such interpretation, it being the intention of the parties to resolve all questions of interpretation by mutual agreement. Nothing herein shall prevent legal proceedings by the Employer where the strike is in violation of this Agreement."