456 U.S. 431 (1982)
FINNEGAN ET AL.
v.
LEU ET AL.
No. 80-2150.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued February 24, 1982.
Decided May 17, 1982.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.
*432 Samuel G. Bolotin argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners.
Ted Iorio argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Jack Gallon and Jeffrey Julius.[*]
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented in this case is whether the discharge of a union's appointed business agents by the union president, following his election over the candidate supported by the business agents, violated the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519, 29 U. S. C. *433 § 401 et seq. The Court of Appeals held that the Act did not protect the business agents from discharge. We granted certiorari to resolve Circuit conflicts,[1] 454 U. S. 813 (1981), and we affirm.

I
In December 1977, respondent Harold Leu defeated Omar Brown in an election for the presidency of Local 20 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, a labor organization representing workers in a 14-county area of northwestern Ohio.[2] During the vigorously contested campaign, petitioners, then business agents of Local 20, openly supported the incumbent president, Brown. Upon assuming office in January 1978, Leu discharged petitioners and the Local's other business agents, all of whom had been appointed by Brown *434 following his election in 1975.[3] Leu explained that he felt the agents were loyal to Brown, not to him, and therefore would be unable to follow and implement his policies and programs.
Local 20's bylaws  -  which were adopted by, and may be amended by, a vote of the union membership  -  provide that the president shall have authority to appoint, direct, and discharge the Union's business agents. Bylaws of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers Union Local No. 20, Art. IX, § 3 D, Joint Exhibit 1, p. 15 (1975). The duties of the business agents include participation in the negotiating of collective-bargaining agreements, organizing of union members, and processing of grievances. In addition, the business agents, along with the president, other elected officers, and shop stewards, sit as members of the Stewards Council, the legislative assembly of the Union. Petitioners had come up through the union ranks, and as business agents they were also members of Local 20. Discharge from their positions as business agents did not render petitioners ineligible to continue their union membership.
Petitioners filed suit in the United States District Court, alleging that they had been terminated from their appointed positions in violation of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 411(a)(1), 411(a)(2), 412, and 529. The District Court granted summary judgment for respondents Leu and Local 20, holding that the Act does not protect a union employee from discharge by the president of the union if the employee's rights as a union member are not affected. Navarro v. Leu, 469 F. Supp. 832 (1979). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, concluding "that a union president should be able to work with those who will cooperate with his program and carry out his directives, and that these business agents, who *435 served at the pleasure of the union president, and actively supported the president's opponent could be removed from their employment as union business agents." App. to Pet. for Cert. A3.

II
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 was the product of congressional concern with widespread abuses of power by union leadership. The relevant provisions of the Act had a history tracing back more than two decades in the evolution of the statutes relating to labor unions. Tensions between union leaders and the rank-and-file members and allegations of union wrongdoing led to extended congressional inquiry. As originally introduced, the legislation focused on disclosure requirements and the regulation of union trusteeships and elections. However, various amendments were adopted, all aimed at enlarged protection for members of unions paralleling certain rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution; not surprisingly, these amendments  -  ultimately enacted as Title I of the Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 411-415  -  were introduced under the title of "Bill of Rights of Members of Labor Organizations."[4] The amendments placed emphasis on the rights of union members to freedom of expression without fear of sanctions by the union, which in many instances could mean loss of union membership and in *436 turn loss of livelihood. Such protection was necessary to further the Act's primary objective of ensuring that unions would be democratically governed and responsive to the will of their memberships. See 105 Cong. Rec. 6471-6472, 6476, 15530 (1959), 2 Leg. Hist. 1098-1099, 1103, 1566.
Sections 101(a)(1) and (2) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 411(a) (1) and (2), on which petitioners rely, guarantee equal voting rights, and rights of speech and assembly, to "[e]very member of a labor organization" (emphasis added).[5] In addition, § 609 of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 529, renders it unlawful for a union or its representatives "to fine, suspend, expel, or otherwise discipline any of its members for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of this Act." (Emphasis added.)[6] It is readily apparent, both from the *437 language of these provisions and from the legislative history of Title I, that it was rank-and-file union members  -  not union officers or employees, as such  -  whom Congress sought to protect.[7]
Petitioners held a dual status as both employees and members of the Union. As members of Local 20, petitioners undoubtedly had a protected right to campaign for Brown and support his candidacy. At issue here is whether they were thereby immunized from discharge at the pleasure of the president from their positions as appointed union employees.

III
Petitioners contend that discharge from a position as a union employee constitutes "discipline" within the meaning of § 609; and that termination of union employment is therefore unlawful when predicated upon an employee's exercise of rights guaranteed to members under the Act. However, we conclude that the term "discipline," as used in § 609, refers only to retaliatory actions that affect a union member's rights or status as a member of the union. Section 609 speaks in terms of disciplining "members"; and the three disciplinary sanctions specifically enumerated  -  fine, suspension, and expulsion  -  are all punitive actions taken against union members *438 as members.[8] In contrast, discharge from union employment does not impinge upon the incidents of union membership, and affects union members only to the extent that they happen also to be union employees. See Sheridan v. Carpenters Local No. 626, 306 F. 2d 152, 156 (CA3 1962). We discern nothing in § 609, or its legislative history, to support petitioners' claim that Congress intended to establish a system of job security or tenure for appointed union employees.
Congress used essentially the same language elsewhere in the Act with the specific intent not to protect a member's status as a union employee or officer. Section 101(a)(5), 29 U. S. C. § 411(a)(5), states that "[n]o member of any labor organization may be fined, suspended, expelled, or otherwise disciplined" without enumerated procedural protections. The Conference Report accompanying S. 1555 as finally enacted, H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 31 (1959), 1 Leg. Hist. 935, explains that this "prohibition on suspension without observing certain safeguards applies only to suspension of membership in the union; it does not refer to suspension of a member's status as an officer of the union" (emphasis added). This too is a persuasive indication that the virtually identical language in § 609 was likewise meant to refer only to punitive actions diminishing membership rights, and not to termination of a member's status as an appointed union employee.[9]
*439 We hold, therefore, that removal from appointive union employment is not within the scope of those union sanctions explicitly prohibited by § 609.

IV
Our analysis is complicated, however, by the fact that § 102, 29 U. S. C. § 412, provides independent authority for a suit against a union based on an alleged violation of Title I of the Act. Section 102 states that
"[a]ny person whose rights secured by the provisions of this title have been infringed by any violation of this title may bring a civil action in a district court of the United States for such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate."
Although the intended relationship between §§ 102 and 609 is not entirely clear, it seems evident that a litigant may maintain an action under § 102  -  to redress an "infringement" of "rights secured" under Title I  -  without necessarily stating a violation of § 609.[10]
*440 The question still remains, however, whether petitioners' "rights secured" under Title I were "infringed" by the termination of their union employment. Petitioners, as union members, had a right under §§ 101(a)(1) and (2) to campaign for Brown and to vote in the union election, but they were not prevented from exercising those rights. Rather, petitioners allege only an indirect interference with their membership rights, maintaining that they were forced to "choos[e] between their rights of free expression . . . and their jobs." See Retail Clerks Union Local 648 v. Retail Clerks International Assn., 299 F. Supp. 1012, 1021 (DC 1969).
We need not decide whether the retaliatory discharge of a union member from union office  -  even though not "discipline" prohibited under § 609  -  might ever give rise to a cause *441 of action under § 102. For whatever limits Title I places on a union's authority to utilize dismissal from union office as "part of a purposeful and deliberate attempt . . . to suppress dissent within the union," cf. Schonfeld v. Penza, 477 F. 2d 899, 904 (CA2 1973), it does not restrict the freedom of an elected union leader to choose a staff whose views are compatible with his own.[11] Indeed, neither the language nor the legislative history of the Act suggests that it was intended even to address the issue of union patronage.[12] To the contrary, the Act's overriding objective was to ensure that unions would be democratically governed, and responsive to the will of the union membership as expressed in open, periodic elections. See Wirtz v. Hotel Employees, 391 U. S. 492, 497 (1968). Far from being inconsistent with this purpose, the ability of an elected union president to select his own administrators is an integral part of ensuring a union administration's responsiveness to the mandate of the union election.
Here, the presidential election was a vigorous exercise of the democratic processes Congress sought to protect. Petitioners  -  appointed by the defeated candidate  -  campaigned openly against respondent Leu, who was elected by a substantial margin. The Union's bylaws, adopted, and subject to amendment, by a vote of the union membership, grant the president plenary authority to appoint, suspend, discharge, and direct the Union's business agents, who have significant *442 responsibility for the day-to-day conduct of union affairs. Nothing in the Act evinces a congressional intent to alter the traditional pattern which would permit a union president under these circumstances to appoint agents of his choice to carry out his policies.
No doubt this poses a dilemma for some union employees; if they refuse to campaign for the incumbent they risk his displeasure, and by supporting him risk the displeasure of his successor. However, in enacting Title I of the Act, Congress simply was not concerned with perpetuating appointed union employees in office at the expense of an elected president's freedom to choose his own staff. Rather, its concerns were with promoting union democracy, and protecting the rights of union members from arbitrary action by the union or its officers.
We therefore conclude that petitioners have failed to establish a violation of the Act. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, concurring.
I am not prepared to hold that a newly elected president of a local union may discipline, without violating the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519, 29 U. S. C. § 401 et seq., and as a matter of retaliation, all union member-employees who opposed his candidacy. As the Court notes, a union member possesses, under the Act, rights to freedom of expression and of speech and assembly, ante, at 436-437, and a right to support the candidate of his choice.
I must assume that what the Court holds today is that the newly elected president may discharge the union's appointed business agents and other appointed union member-employees who will be instrumental in evolving the president's administrative *443 policies. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U. S. 347 (1976); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U. S. 507 (1980). Indeed, the Court uses the terms "staff," ante, at 441, and "his own administrators," ibid. In addition, this particular union's bylaws expressly give the president plenary authority over the business agents. With that much, I have no difficulty.
On the understanding, but only on the understanding, that the Court by its opinion is not reaching out further to decide the same issue with respect to nonpolicymaking employees, that is, rank-and-file member-employees (a matter which, for me, presents another case for another day), I join the Court's opinion.
NOTES
[*]  Alan Hyde and Paul Alan Levy filed a brief for the Association for Union Democracy et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.

Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by J. Albert Woll, Marsha Berzon, and Laurence Gold for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations; and by Amy Gladstein and James Reif for the National Labor Law Center of the National Lawyers Guild.
[1]  See, e. g., Lamb v. Miller, 212 U. S. App. D. C. 393, 660 F. 2d 792 (1981); Maceira v. Pagan, 649 F. 2d 8 (CA1 1981); Newman v. Local 1101, Communications Workers, 570 F. 2d 439 (CA2 1978); Bradford v. Textile Workers Local 1093, 563 F. 2d 1138 (CA4 1977); Gabauer v. Woodcock, 520 F. 2d 1084 (CA8 1975), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 1061 (1976); Wambles v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 488 F. 2d 888 (CA5 1974); Wood v. Dennis, 489 F. 2d 849 (CA7 1973) (en banc), cert. denied, 415 U. S. 960 (1974); Grand Lodge of International Assn. of Machinists v. King, 335 F. 2d 340 (CA9), cert. denied, 379 U. S. 920 (1964); Sheridan v. Carpenters Local No. 626, 306 F. 2d 152 (CA3 1962).
[2]  Brown challenged the election results and, following an investigation, the Secretary of Labor determined that unlawful employer contributions had affected the outcome of the election. The Secretary filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, and that court ordered a rerun election under the Secretary's supervision; the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Marshall v. Local 20, Teamsters, 611 F. 2d 645 (1979). In the second election, Leu again defeated Brown.

Brown and Leu had previously opposed each other in the 1974 election for the presidency. Although Leu defeated Brown by a slight margin, the election was set aside by the International Union because of irregularities at the polling places. Brown won the second election, which was held in 1975 under the supervision of a panel from the International Union.
[3]  When Brown was elected president in 1975, see n. 2, supra, the incumbent business agents resigned.
[4]  The original "Bill of Rights" amendment was introduced on the floor of the Senate by Senator McClellan and adopted by a vote of 47-46. 105 Cong. Rec. 6469-6493 (1959), 2 National Labor Relations Board, Legislative History of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, pp. 1096-1119 (1959) (hereafter Leg. Hist.). However, a compromise version of the amendment introduced by Senator Kuchel was substituted shortly thereafter, 105 Cong. Rec. 6716-6727 (1959), 2 Leg. Hist. 1229-1239, and later approved by the House of Representatives as part of the Landrum-Griffin bill, H. R. 8400, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), 1 Leg. Hist. 628-633. See 105 Cong. Rec. 15711, 15859-15860, 1692-1702 (1959), 2 Leg. Hist. 1645, 1691-1692, 1693-1702.
[5]  Section 101(a)(1) provides:

"Every member of a labor organization shall have equal rights and privileges within such organization to nominate candidates, to vote in elections or referendums of the labor organization, to attend membership meetings, and to participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business of such meetings, subject to reasonable rules and regulations in such organization's constitution and bylaws."
Section 101(a)(2) provides:
"Every member of any labor organization shall have the right to meet and assemble freely with other members; and to express any views, arguments, or opinions; and to express at meetings of the labor organization his views, upon candidates in an election of the labor organization or upon any business properly before the meeting, subject to the organization's established and reasonable rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings: Provided, That nothing herein shall be construed to impair the right of a labor organization to adopt and enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every member toward the organization as an institution and to his refraining from conduct that would interfere with its performance of its legal or contractual obligations."
[6]  Section 609 provides:

"It shall be unlawful for any labor organization, or any officer, agent, shop steward, or other representative of a labor organization, or any employee thereof to fine, suspend, expel, or otherwise discipline any of its members for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of this Act. The provisions of section 102 shall be applicable in the enforcement of this section."
[7]  The provisions of Title I consistently refer to the rights of union "members." As originally passed by the Senate, § 101(a)(4)  -  which in its present form protects the right of "any member" to institute legal proceedings against the union, 29 U. S. C. § 411(a)(4)  -  applied to "any member or officer" of a labor organization (emphasis added). S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., § 101(a)(4) (1959), 1 Leg. Hist. 520. However, the words "or officer" were deleted from the Landrum-Griffin bill, H. R. 8400, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., § 101(a)(4) (1959), 1 Leg. Hist. 630-631, and the House version was retained in Conference, see H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 31 (1959), 1 Leg. Hist. 935. See also Sheridan v. Carpenters Local No. 626, 306 F. 2d, at 156-157.
[8]  Compare § 201(a)(5)(H) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 431(a)(5)(H), which requires reporting on the procedures for "discipline or removal of officers or agents for breaches of their trust" (emphasis added).
[9]  In Grand Lodge of International Assn. of Machinists v. King, 335 F. 2d, at 344, the court held that Congress had used the "identical words . . . with quite different meanings" in the two sections. The court found that the "legislative gloss" on the words "otherwise disciplined" in § 101(a)(5) stemmed primarily from congressional concern that "wrongdoing union officials"  -  and particularly those guilty of misappropriating union funds  -  might be permitted "to remain in control while the time-consuming `due process' requirements of the section were met." Id., at 341-342. See 105 Cong. Rec. 17899 (1959) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy). However, viewing this concern as inapplicable with regard to § 609, the court concluded that "although Congress did not intend the words `otherwise discipline' to include removal from union office in section 101(a)(5), it did intend the words to include such action in section 609." 335 F. 2d, at 345. See also Maceira v. Pagan, 649 F. 2d, at 14; Wood v. Dennis, 489 F. 2d, at 853-854.

We agree that the purposes of the two sections are different, and that the distinction drawn in King is one Congress plausibly could have chosen to make. However, we are hard pressed to discern any such distinction from either the language or legislative history of the Act. Certainly one would expect that if Congress had intended identical language to have substantially different meanings in different sections of the same enactment it would have manifested its intention in some concrete fashion. See Wood v. Dennis, supra, at 858 (Stevens, J., concurring in result).
[10]  Section 609, of course, applies to disciplinary action taken in retaliation for the exercise of any right secured under the Act, whereas § 102 protects only rights secured by Title I. Although the two sections may be somewhat duplicative as regards union discipline imposed in retaliation for the exercise of Title I rights, this seems due in large part to the fact that the provisions derived from different sources and were originally intended to serve quite different purposes. Section 102 was first included as part of the so-called Kuchel Amendment, see n. 4, supra, and was designed to enforce the provisions of Title I by creating an individual right of action for union members. 105 Cong. Rec. 6719 (1959), 2 Leg. Hist. 1232. In contrast, the precursor of § 609 created criminal penalties for retaliatory discipline, and was included in the Senate bill prior to the addition of the bill of rights, see S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., § 506 (1959) (as reported), 2 Leg. Hist. 390; it apparently was thought to be primarily applicable to violations of the election provisions. See 105 Cong. Rec. 6534 (1959), 2 Leg. Hist. 1140; Rothman, Legislative History of the "Bill of Rights" for Union Members, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 199, 218 (1960). The Landrum-Griffin bill retained this provision, but "temper[ed] the remedy," 105 Cong. Rec. 15531 (1959), 2 Leg. Hist. 1567 (remarks of Rep. Griffin), providing for civil enforcement by the Secretary of Labor instead of criminal sanctions. H. R. 8400, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., § 609 (1959), 1 Leg. Hist. 676. Finally, one day before passage of the Landrum-Griffin bill, § 609 was amended to authorize private suits by making "[t]he provisions of section 102 . . . applicable in the enforcement of this section." The amendment was promoted by Congressmen who thought that enforcement by the Secretary would lead to "unnecessary injection of the executive branch on the Federal level into law enforcement matters," 105 Cong. Rec. 15830 (1959), 2 Leg. Hist. 1662 (remarks of Rep. Cramer). See Rothman, supra, at 219.
[11]  We leave open the question whether a different result might obtain in a case involving nonpolicymaking and nonconfidential employees.
[12]  We think it virtually inconceivable that Congress would have prohibited the longstanding practice of union patronage without any discussion in the legislative history of the Act. See Wood v. Dennis, 489 F. 2d, at 858 (Stevens, J., concurring in result). Had such a result been contemplated, it undoubtedly would have encountered substantial resistance. Moreover, Congress likely would have made some express accommodation to the needs of union employers to appoint and remove policymaking officials. See ibid.


239 U.S. 502 (1916)
HAPAI
v.
BROWN.
No. 120.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued December 17, 1915.
Decided January 10, 1916.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII.
*503 Mr. Lorrin Andrews for plaintiff in error.
Mr. A.A. Wilder, with whom Mr. Alexander Britton, Mr. Evans Browne and Mr. F.W. Clements were on the brief, for defendant in error.
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a bill to quiet title to an undivided 29/36 of the ahupuaa of Koanoulu, a large tract of land in the Island of Maui, Territory of Hawaii. The plaintiffs claim through the children of one Keaka other than one daughter, Paakuku, through whom the defendants claim the whole tract.
One of the defences was res judicata. The proceeding relied upon as having decided the relative rights of the parties was a bill brought in November, 1871, by the plaintiffs' predecessors against Paakuku and others, alleging title in Keaka during her life; a devise by her to her heirs, followed by joint possession on the part of the plaintiffs and of Paakuku as quasi-trustee; and waste, a wrongful sale and a wrongful lease by Paakuku. The bill prayed for an account from Paakuku, that the sale and lease be ordered to be cancelled as against the plaintiffs, and that a partition be decreed. Paakuku's answer set up a conveyance of the premises by Keaka to her in fee and continuous possession by her since the date of the same. It also alleged that Keaka's will, if not overriden by the subsequent deed, devised the land to Paakuku in fee, subject to some merely personal and revocable rights in some of the plaintiffs.
*504 The case was tried in the Supreme Court before the Chief Justice. On October 1, 1874, a Minute was entered: "The opinion of the Court is that the Petitioners have no title to the lands of Kaonoulu and Kaluapulu and so adjudge. There is no controversy about the title of the land at Wailuku and the petition for partition of that land is hereby granted and decreed accordingly." An opinion filed two days later discusses the title, decides that the deed alleged by Paakuku is freed from every suspicion, and repeats the language of the Minute. On October 12 it was decreed that the plaintiffs take nothing by their bill. The Supreme Court in the present case expressed the opinion which, apart from the deference due to it upon a local matter, does not require argument to support it, that the intention and meaning of the decree of October 12 was to dismiss the bill on the ground that the plaintiffs had not the title alleged. It therefore affirmed a judgment for the defendants holding that the plaintiffs were concluded by the former decree. The only point, if any, that can be argued, is that in general a bill for partition cannot be made a means of trying a disputed title, Clark v. Roller, 199 U.S. 541, 545, and that therefore the decree should be taken to be a dismissal for want of jurisdiction, or at least allowed no greater effect than if it had gone on that ground.
But, as we cannot doubt the import of the decree when rendered, we are narrowed in our inquiry to the question of jurisdiction in an accurate sense. Unless we are prepared to pronounce the decree void for want of power to pass it and open to collateral attack, the decision in this case must stand. But there was no inherent difficulty, no impossibility in the nature of things or for want of physical power, in the attempt to decide title in the suit of 1871. And as was observed at the last term, it would seem surprising to suggest that the highest Court in the Hawaiian Islands did not know its own powers, or decide in accordance *505 with the requirements of the law of which that Court was the final mouthpiece. John Ii Estate v. Brown, 235 U.S. 342, 349. The plaintiffs in the former case in no way protested against the trial of their title, but on the contrary sought relief distinct from partition, that made the trial necessary. Even if we were disposed to go behind the decisions of the Chief Justice of the Kingdom and of the highest Court of the Territory upon a matter like this it would seem to us as unreasonable to hold the adjudication of title void because partition was prayed as to hold it void because the decree was made upon a multifarious bill. The cases where objections to the jurisdiction, though taken in the cause, have been held to have been waived go farther than we have to go here. We will not speculate as to how extreme a case must be to produce a different result; it is enough that this is far from the line.
The defendants in error filed a motion to dismiss, which, in view of our opinion upon the merits they probably would not care to press but which we are not at liberty to disregard. The case is brought here by writ of error, whereas, it is said, it should have been brought up by appeal. By § 246 of the Judicial Code of March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1087, 1158, writs of error and appeals from the final judgments and decrees of the Supreme Court of Hawaii may be taken `in the same manner, under the same regulations, and in the same classes of cases, in which' they may be taken from the final judgments and decrees of the court of a State, `and also in all cases wherein the amount involved, exclusive of costs, . . . exceeds the sum or value of five thousand dollars.' The present suit comes here under the last clause, at the trial a jury was waived, and the proposition is that the earlier provisions of the section do not govern this clause but that except when there is a trial by jury, the cases there mentioned must be brought to this Court by appeal under the Act of April 7, 1874, c. 80, § 2, 18 Stat. 27. It is said that *506 this has been the practice. See, e.g. Wm. W. Bierce, Ltd., v. Hutchins, 205 U.S. 340. Whether or not the incidental assumption in that decision that an appeal would lie was correct, we are of opinion that the proceeding by writ of error was justified by the plain meaning of § 246. So far as the policy of Congress might permit, (see Act of March 3, 1915, c. 90, § 274b, 38 Stat. 956,) we should be disposed to be a little astute to save a party's rights from being lost through mistakes upon a technical matter in the somewhat confused condition of the statutes. But we cannot doubt that the path adopted was right.
Judgment affirmed.


53 U.S. 111 (1851)
12 How. 111
NATHANIEL WILLIAMS, AS PERMANENT TRUSTEE FOR THE CREDITORS OF JAMES WILLIAMS, AN INSOLVENT DEBTOR, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR,
v.
CHARLES OLIVER, ROBERT M. GIBBES, AND THOMAS OLIVER, EXECUTORS OF ROBERT OLIVER, AND JOHN GLENN, AND DAVID M. PERINE, TRUSTEES.
Supreme Court of United States.

*114 It was argued by Mr. Dulany and Mr. Schley, for the plaintiff in error, and Mr. Campbell and Mr. Johnson, for the defendants in error.
*119 Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court.
This case is not distinguishable from the case decided at the last term of Gill v. Oliver's Executors, and which was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
*120 It is reported in 11 How. 529. That case involved the right to the share of Lyde Goodwin as a member of the "Baltimore Mexican Company" in the fund that had been awarded to the members of that company by the commissioners under the convention of 1839 with Mexico. Gill claimed it as permanent trustee under the insolvent laws of Maryland, the benefit of which Goodwin had obtained in 1817, on the assignment of all his property for the use of his creditors.
The executors of Oliver claimed the right of Goodwin to this fund under an assignment made by himself 30th May, 1829.
The money awarded by the commissioners to this company under the treaty, had, by the agreement of all parties claiming an interest in the same, been deposited in the Mechanics' Bank of Baltimore, to be distributed according to the rights of the respective parties claiming it.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland decided against the right of Gill, as the permanent trustee of Goodwin, under the insolvent proceedings, and in favor of the right of the executors of Oliver.
The case was brought here by writ of error for review, and was dismissed as we have stated for want of jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland had decided against the right of Gill, on the ground that the contract made by the "Baltimore Mexican Company" with General Mina, in 1816, by which means were furnished him to carry on a military expedition against the territories and dominions of the King of Spain, a foreign prince with whom the United States were at peace, was in violation of our Neutrality Act of 1794, and consequently illegal and void, and could not be the foundation of any right of property, or interest existing in Goodwin in 1817, the date of the insolvent proceedings, and hence, that no interest in the subject-matter passed to the permanent trustees, setting up a title under them.
After the revolutionary party in Mexico had achieved their independence, and about the year 1825 the public authorities, under the new government, recognized this claim of the Baltimore Company, as valid and binding upon it, and as such it was brought before the board of commissioners, under the convention of 1839, and allowed.
It was not denied on the argument, and, indeed, could not have been successfully, that the contract with General Mina in 1816, was illegal and void, having been made in express violation of law: and hence that no interest in, or right of property arising out of it, legal or equitable, could pass, in 1817, the date of the insolvent proceedings of Goodwin, to the trustee, for the benefit of his creditors. But, it was urged, that the subsequent *121 recognition and adoption of the obligation by the new government, had relation back, so as to confirm and legalize the original transaction, and thereby give operation and effect to the title of the trustee at the date mentioned.
And upon this ground it was insisted that the decision of the court below, denying the right of Gill, the permanent trustee, was a decision against a right derived under the treaty and award of the commissioners, which therefore brought the case within the 25th section of the Judiciary Act.
Undoubtedly, upon this aspect of the case, and assuming that there was any well-founded ground to be found in the record for maintaining it, jurisdiction might have been very properly entertained; and the question as to the effect of the recognition of the obligation by Mexico, and award under the treaty in pursuance thereof, upon the right claimed by the trustee under the insolvent proceedings, examined and decided. The decision below, in this aspect of the case, must have involved the effect and operation of the treaty, and award of the commissioners under it.
But, a majority of the court were of opinion that no such question existed in the case, or was decided by the court below; and that the only one properly arising, or that was decided, was the one growing out of the contract with General Mina of 1816, and of the effect and operation to be given to it under the insolvent laws of Maryland.
The money awarded to the Mexican Company was a fund in court, and had been brought in by the consent of all parties concerned, for distribution according to their respective rights. The plaintiff in error claimed the share of Goodwin, under the insolvent proceedings of 1817, as trustee for the creditors through the contract with Mina  -  the defendants by virtue of an assignment from Goodwin himself in 1829, after Mexico had recognized and acknowledged the claim as valid. The money had been awarded to certain persons "in trust for whom it may concern," without undertaking to settle the rights of the several claimants. The court, in giving effect and operation to the insolvent laws of Maryland, as to the vesting of the property and estate of the insolvent in the hands of the trustee, for the benefit of the creditors, held, that no interest or right could be claimed under them through the contract of 1816, but that the right of Goodwin to the fund passed by his assignment in 1829 to the defendants.
Mr. Justice Grier, in delivering the opinion of the majority of the court, speaking of that decision, observes, that in deciding the question, the courts of Maryland have put no construction on the treaty or award asserted by one party to be the true one, and denied by the other. It was before them as a fact only, and *122 not for the purpose of construction. Whether this money paid into the court under the award, and first acknowledged by Mexico as a debt in 1825, existed as a debt transferable by the Maryland insolvent laws in 1817, or whether it, for the first time, assumed the nature of a chose in action transferable by assignment after 1825, when acknowledged of record by Mexico, and passed by the assignment of Lyde Goodwin to Robert Oliver, was a question wholly dehors the treaty and award, and involving the construction of the laws of Maryland only, and not of any treaty, or statute, or commission, under the United States. And Mr. Justice Woodbury, who dissented on the question of jurisdiction, observes, that the claim, so far as it regards the enforcement of the treaty with Mexico, does not seem to have been overruled in terms by the State Court. That court did not decide that the treaty was corrupt or illegal, or in any way a nullity, when they held that the original contract violated the laws of neutrality. So far, too, as regards the award made by the commissioners, that the Baltimore Mexican Company, and their legal representatives, had a just claim under the treaty for the amount awarded, it was not overruled at all.
Again, he observes, that all must concede, that the State court speaks in language against the Mina contract alone as illegal, and in terms do not impugn either the treaty or the award; and it is merely a matter of inference or argument that either of these was assailed, or any right properly claimed under them overruled. But it is true the court held that Oliver's executors, rather than the appellant, were entitled to the fund furnished by Mexico, and long subsequent to Mina's contract; but in coming to that conclusion, they seem to have been governed by their own views as to their own laws and the principles of general jurisprudence. The treaty or award contained nothing as to the point whether Gill or Oliver's executors had the better right to his share, but only that the Mexican Company and their legal representatives should receive the fund. This last the court did not question.
The decision of the court below, therefore, not involving the validity of the treaty, or award of the commissioners, or lawfulness or character of the fund, but simply the right and title to the respective shares claimed in it, after the fund had been paid over by the government, and brought into court for distribution according to the agreement of all concerned, and which distribution depended upon the laws of the State, a majority of the court, taking this view of the case, held, that there was a want of jurisdiction, and dismissed the writ of error; and that the decision, whether right or wrong, could not be the subject of review under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act, as it involved *123 no question, either directly or by necessary intendment, arising upon the treaty or award, or connected with the validity of either; and if this court were right in the view thus taken of the case, there can be no doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion arrived at. A different view of the case might, of course, lead to a different conclusion.
Now, in the case before us, the plaintiff in error claims the share of John Gooding, one of the members of the Mexican Company, as permanent trustee under the insolvent laws of Maryland, having been appointed 29th January, 1842, Gooding having taken the benefit of these acts, and assigned his property for the benefit of the creditors as early as 1819.
George Winchester had been previously appointed provisional trustee on the 23d June, 1819, to whom all property had been assigned, and on the 2d May, 1823, had been appointed permanent trustee, and gave a bond for the faithful execution of his duties without surety, and on the 2d April, 1825, sold the interest of Gooding in this share to Robert Oliver, under an order of sale made by the Baltimore County Court, having jurisdiction in the matter, for the consideration of $2,000. And in 1841 the Legislature of Maryland passed a law confirming this sale, a doubt having been suggested as to its validity, for want of a surety to the official bond of the trustee.
In this state of the case the Court of Appeals of Maryland held, that the interest of Gooding in the Mexican contract did not pass, under their insolvent laws, to the plaintiff in error as permanent trustee, for the reasons assigned in the previous case of Gill v. Oliver's Executors. And that if it did or could have passed under these laws, it passed to Winchester, the previous trustee, in connection with the confirming act of the legislature of 1841.
It is apparent, therefore, if the decision in the case of Gill v. Oliver's executors involved no question that gave to this court jurisdiction to revise it here, as has already been decided, none exists in the case before us; for, as it respects the question of jurisdiction, the two stand upon the same footing, and involve precisely the same principles.
The counsel for the plaintiff in error sought to distinguish this case from the previous one, and to maintain the jurisdiction of the argument, upon the ground that the act of the Legislature of Maryland of 1841, confirming the authority of Winchester, the permanent trustee, was in contravention of a provision of the Constitution of the United States, as a "law impairing the obligation of contracts."
But, admitting this to be so, (which we do not,) still the admission would not affect the result. For the decision upon the *124 previous branch of the case denied to the plaintiff any right to, or interest in, the fund in question, as claimed under the insolvent proceedings, as permanent trustee, and hence he was deemed disabled from maintaining any action founded upon that claim.
It was of no importance, therefore, as it respected the plaintiff in the distribution of the fund, whether it was rightfully or wrongfully awarded to Oliver's executors. He had no longer any interest in the question.
In order to give jurisdiction to this court to revise the judgment of a State court, under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act, a question must not only exist on the record, actually or by necessary intendment, as mentioned in that section and the decision of the court as there stated, but the decision must be controlling in the disposition of the case; or, in the language of some of the cases on the subject, "the judgment of the State court would not have been what it is, if there had not been a misconstruction of some act of Congress, or a decision against the validity of the right, title, privilege, or exemption set up under it." 3 Pet. 292, 302. Or, as stated by Mr. Justice Story, in Crowell v. Randell, (10 Pet. 392,) where he reviewed all the cases, it must appear "from the facts stated by just and necessary inference, that the question was made, and that the court below must, in order to have arrived at the judgment pronounced by it, have come to the very decision of that question as indispensable to that judgment." And in a recent case, (5 How. 341,) following out the doctrine of the previous cases, "It is not enough that the record shows that the plaintiff in error contended and claimed that the judgment of the court impaired the obligation of a contract, and violated the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, and that this claim was overruled by the court; but it must appear by clear and necessary intendment, that the question must have been raised, and must have been decided, in order to induce the judgment."
It is not intended, nor to be understood, from these cases, that the question, thus material to the decision arrived at, must be confined exclusively and specially to the construction of the treaty, act of Congress, &c., in order to give the jurisdiction, as this would be too narrow a view of it. Points may arise growing out of, and connected with the general question, and so blended with it as not to be separated, and, therefore, falling equally within the decision contemplated by the 25th section. The cases of Smith v. the State of Maryland, 6 Cranch, 281, and Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 305, 355, afford illustrations of this principle.
Now, as the decision of the question involving the right and *125 title of the plaintiff in error to Gooding's interest in this fund under the insolvent proceedings was against him in the court below, and was one which, in our judgment, involved only a question of State law, and, therefore, not the subject of revision here, and was conclusive upon his rights, and decisive of the case, it follows that we have no jurisdiction within the principle of the cases to which we have referred; for the determination of the court upon the validity of the act of the legislature of 1841 in no way controlled the judgment at which the court arrived, as respected the plaintiff. That turned upon the decision as to the right of the plaintiff to the fund under the insolvent proceedings, as permanent trustee of Gooding, and whatever might have been the opinion of the court upon the other question, the result of their judgment would have been the same.
For the reason, therefore, that this case falls directly within the decision of Gill v. Oliver's Executors, and is not distinguishable from it, the case must take the same direction, and be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Order.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Court of Appeals of the State of Maryland for the Western Shore, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that this cause be, and the same is hereby, dismissed, for the want of jurisdiction.


(Slip Opinion)              OCTOBER TERM, 2010                                       1

                                       Syllabus

         NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
       being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
       The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
       prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
       See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

                                       Syllabus

                   SMITH ET AL. v. BAYER CORP.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
                 THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

    No. 09-1205. Argued January 18, 2011 - Decided June 16, 2011
Respondent (Bayer) moved in Federal District Court for an injunction
  ordering a West Virginia state court not to consider a motion for class
  certification filed by petitioners (Smith), who were plaintiffs in the
  state-court action. Bayer thought such an injunction warranted be
  cause, in a separate case, Bayer had persuaded the same Federal
  District Court to deny a similar class-certification motion that had
  been filed against Bayer by a different plaintiff, George McCollins.
  The District Court had denied McCollins' certification motion under
  Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23.
     The court granted Bayer's requested injunction against the state
  court proceedings, holding that its denial of certification in McCollins'
  case precluded litigation of the certification issue in Smith's case.
  The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. It first noted
  that the Anti-Injunction Act (Act) generally prohibits federal courts
  from enjoining state court proceedings. But it found that the Act's re
  litigation exception authorized this injunction because ordinary rules
  of issue preclusion barred Smith from seeking certification of his pro
  posed class. In so doing, the court concluded that Smith was invok
  ing a State Rule, W. Va. Rule Civ. Proc. 23, that was sufficiently
  similar to the Federal Rule McCollins had invoked, such that the cer
  tification issues presented in the two cases were the same. The court
  further held that Smith, as an unnamed member of McCollins' puta
  tive class action, could be bound by the judgment in McCollins' case.
Held: In enjoining the state court from considering Smith's class certifi
 cation request, the federal court exceeded its authority under the "re
 litigation exception" to the Act. Pp. 5-18.
    (a) Under that Act, a federal court "may not grant an injunction to
 stay proceedings in a State court except" in rare cases, when neces
2                        SMITH v. BAYER CORP.

                                  Syllabus

    sary to "protect or effectuate [the federal court's] judgments." 28
    U. S. C. §2283. The Act's "specifically defined exceptions," Atlantic
    Coast Line R. Co. v. Locomotive Engineers, 398 U. S. 281, 286, "are
    narrow and are 'not [to] be enlarged by loose statutory construction,' "
    Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U. S. 140, 146. Indeed, "[a]ny
    doubts as to the propriety of a federal injunction against state court
    proceedings should be resolved in favor of permitting the state courts
    to proceed." Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 398 U. S., at 297. The excep
    tion at issue in this case, known as the "relitigation exception," au
    thorizes an injunction to prevent state litigation of a claim or issue
    "that previously was presented to and decided by the federal court."
    Chick Kam Choo, 486 U. S., at 147. This exception is designed to im
    plement "well-recognized concepts" of claim and issue preclusion.
    Ibid. Because deciding whether and how prior litigation has preclu
    sive effect is usually the bailiwick of the second court - here, the West
    Virginia court - every benefit of the doubt goes toward the state
    court, see Atlantic Coast Line, 398 U. S., at 287, 297; an injunction
    can issue only if preclusion is clear beyond peradventure. For the
    federal court's class-action determination to preclude the state court's
    adjudication of Smith's motion, at least two conditions must be met.
    First, the issue the federal court decided must be the same as the one
    presented in the state tribunal. And second, Smith must have been a
    party to the federal suit or must fall within one of a few discrete ex
    ceptions to the general rule against binding nonparties. Pp. 5-7.
       (b) The issue the federal court decided was not the same as the one
    presented in the state tribunal. This case is little more than a rerun
    of Chick Kam Choo. There, a federal court dismissed a suit involving
    Singapore law on forum non conveniens grounds and then enjoined
    the plaintiff from pursuing the "same" claim in Texas state court.
    However, because the legal standards for forum non conveniens dif
    fered in the two courts, the issues before those courts differed, mak
    ing an injunction unwarranted. Here, Smith's proposed class mir
    rored McCollins', and the two suits' substantive claims broadly
    overlapped. But the federal court adjudicated McCollins' certification
    motion under Federal Rule 23, whereas the state court was poised to
    consider Smith's proposed class under W. Va. Rule 23. And the State
    Supreme Court has generally stated that it will not necessarily inter
    pret its Rule 23 as coterminous with the Federal Rule. Absent clear
    evidence that the state courts had adopted an approach to State Rule
    23 tracking the federal court's analysis in McCollins' case, this Court
    could not conclude that they would interpret their Rule the same way
    and, thus, could not tell whether the certification issues in the two
    courts were the same. That uncertainty would preclude an injunc
    tion. And indeed, the case against an injunction here is even
                     Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)                    3

                                Syllabus

  stronger, because the State Supreme Court has expressly disap
  proved the approach to Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement
  embraced by the Federal District Court. Pp. 8-12.
     (c) The District Court's injunction was independently improper be
  cause Smith was not a party to the federal suit and was not covered
  by any exception to the rule against nonparty preclusion. Generally,
  a party "is '[o]ne by or against whom a lawsuit is brought,' " United
  States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 556 U. S. ___, ___, or
  who "become[s] a party by intervention, substitution, or third-party
  practice," Karcher v. May, 484 U. S. 72, 77. The definition of "party"
  cannot be stretched so far as to cover a person like Smith, whom
  McCollins was denied leave to represent. The only exception to the
  rule against nonparty preclusion potentially relevant here is the ex
  ception that binds non-named members of "properly conducted class
  actions" to judgments entered in such proceedings. Taylor v. Stur
  gell, 553 U. S. 880, 894. But McCollins' suit was not a proper class
  action. Indeed, the very ruling that Bayer argues should have pre
  clusive effect is the District Court's decision not to certify a class.
  Absent certification of a class under Federal Rule 23, the precondi
  tion for binding Smith was not met. Neither a proposed, nor a re
  jected, class action may bind nonparties. See id., at 901. Bayer
  claims that this Court's approach to class actions would permit class
  counsel to try repeatedly to certify the same class simply by changing
  plaintiffs. But principles of stare decisis and comity among courts
  generally suffice to mitigate the sometimes substantial costs of simi
  lar litigation brought by different plaintiffs. The right approach does
  not lie in binding nonparties to a judgment. And to the extent class
  actions raise special relitigation problems, the federal Class Action
  Fairness Act of 2005 provides a remedy that does not involve depart
  ing from the usual preclusion rules. Pp. 12-18.
593 F. 3d 716, reversed.

  KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, ALITO, and SOTOMAYOR,
JJ., joined, and in which THOMAS, J., joined as to Parts I and II-A.
                        Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)                              1

                             Opinion of the Court

     NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
     preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
     notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
     ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
     that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                                   _________________

                                   No. 09-1205
                                   _________________

    KEITH SMITH, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. BAYER

                 CORPORATION

 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

           APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

                                 [June 16, 2011]

   JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.*
   In this case, a Federal District Court enjoined a state
court from considering a plaintiff's request to approve a
class action. The District Court did so because it had
earlier denied a motion to certify a class in a related case,
brought by a different plaintiff against the same defen
dant alleging similar claims. The federal court thought its
injunction appropriate to prevent relitigation of the issue
it had decided.
   We hold to the contrary. In issuing this order to a state
court, the federal court exceeded its authority under the
"relitigation exception" to the Anti-Injunction Act. That
statutory provision permits a federal court to enjoin a
state proceeding only in rare cases, when necessary to "pro
tect or effectuate [the federal court's] judgments." 28
U. S. C. §2283. Here, that standard was not met for two
reasons. First, the issue presented in the state court was
not identical to the one decided in the federal tribunal.
And second, the plaintiff in the state court did not have
the requisite connection to the federal suit to be bound by
 -  -  -  -  -  -
 * JUSTICE THOMAS joins Parts I and II-A of this opinion.
2                  SMITH v. BAYER CORP.

                     Opinion of the Court

the District Court's judgment.
                              I
  Because the question before us involves the effect of a
former adjudication on this case, we begin our statement
of the facts not with this lawsuit, but with another. In
August 2001, George McCollins sued respondent Bayer
Corporation in the Circuit Court of Cabell County, West
Virginia, asserting various state-law claims arising from
Bayer's sale of an allegedly hazardous prescription drug
called Baycol (which Bayer withdrew from the market that
same month). McCollins contended that Bayer had vio
lated West Virginia's consumer-protection statute and the
company's express and implied warranties by selling him
a defective product. And pursuant to West Virginia Rule
of Civil Procedure 23 (2011), McCollins asked the state
court to certify a class of West Virginia residents who had
also purchased Baycol, so that the case could proceed as a
class action.
  Approximately one month later, the suit now before us
began in a different part of West Virginia. Petitioners
Keith Smith and Shirley Sperlazza (Smith for short) filed
state-law claims against Bayer, similar to those raised in
McCollins' suit, in the Circuit Court of Brooke County,
West Virginia. And like McCollins, Smith asked the court
to certify under West Virginia's Rule 23 a class of Baycol
purchasers residing in the State. Neither Smith nor
McCollins knew about the other's suit.
  In January 2002, Bayer removed McCollins' case to the
United States District Court for the Southern District of
West Virginia on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. See 28
U. S. C. §§1332, 1441. The case was then transferred to
the District of Minnesota pursuant to a preexisting order
of the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation, which
had consolidated all federal suits involving Baycol (num
bering in the tens of thousands) before a single District
                     Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)                   3

                         Opinion of the Court

Court Judge. See §1407. Bayer, however, could not
remove Smith's case to federal court because Smith
had sued several West Virginia defendants in addition to
Bayer, and so the suit lacked complete diversity. See
§1441(b).1 Smith's suit thus remained in the state court
house in Brooke County.
   Over the next six years, the two cases proceeded along
their separate pretrial paths at roughly the same pace. By
2008, both courts were preparing to turn to their respec
tive plaintiffs' motions for class certification. The Federal
District Court was the first to reach a decision.
   Applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,2 the Dis
trict Court declined to certify McCollins' proposed class
of West Virginia Baycol purchasers. The District Court's
reasoning proceeded in two steps. The court first ruled
that, under West Virginia law, each plaintiff would have
to prove "actual injury" from his use of Baycol to recover.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 44a. The court then held that be
cause the necessary showing of harm would vary from
plaintiff to plaintiff, "individual issues of fact predomi
nate[d]" over issues common to all members of the pro
posed class, and so the case was not suitable for class
treatment. Id., at 45a. In the same order, the District
Court also dismissed McCollins' claims on the merits in
light of his failure to demonstrate physical injury from his
use of Baycol. McCollins chose not to appeal.
   Although McCollins' suit was now concluded, Bayer
asked the District Court for another order based upon it,
 -  -  -  -  -  -
  1 The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 119 Stat. 4, which postdates
and therefore does not govern this lawsuit, now enables a defendant to
remove to federal court certain class actions involving nondiverse
parties. See 28 U. S. C. §§1332(d), 1453(b); see also infra, at 17.
  2 Although McCollins had originally sought certification under West

Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (2011), federal procedural rules
govern a case that has been removed to federal court. See Shady Grove
Orthopedic Associates, P. A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U. S. ___ (2010).
4                        SMITH v. BAYER CORP.

                           Opinion of the Court

this one affecting Smith's case in West Virginia. In a
motion - receipt of which first apprised Smith of McCol
lins' suit - Bayer explained that the proposed class in
Smith's case was identical to the one the federal court had
just rejected. Bayer therefore requested that the federal
court enjoin the West Virginia state court from hearing
Smith's motion to certify a class. According to Bayer, that
order was appropriate to protect the District Court's
judgment in McCollins' suit denying class certification.
The District Court agreed and granted the injunction.
   The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
In re Baycol Prods. Litigation, 593 F. 3d 716 (2010). The
court noted that the Anti-Injunction Act generally prohib
its federal courts from enjoining state court proceedings.
But the court held that the Act's relitigation exception
authorized the injunction here because ordinary rules of
issue preclusion barred Smith from seeking certification of
his proposed class. According to the court, Smith was
invoking a similar class action rule as McCollins had used
to seek certification "of the same class" in a suit alleging
"the same legal theories," id., at 724; the issue in the state
court therefore was "sufficiently identical" to the one the
federal court had decided to warrant preclusion, ibid. In
addition, the court held, the parties in the two proceedings
were sufficiently alike: Because Smith was an unnamed
member of the class McCollins had proposed, and because
their "interests were aligned," Smith was appropriately
bound by the federal court's judgment. Ibid.
   We granted certiorari, 561 U. S. __ (2010), because the
order issued here implicates two circuit splits arising from
application of the Anti-Injunction Act's relitigation excep
tion. The first involves the requirement of preclusion law
that a subsequent suit raise the "same issue" as a previous
case.3 The second concerns the scope of the rule that a
 -  -  -  -  -  -
    3 Compare   In re Baycol Prods. Litigation, 593 F. 3d 716, 723 (CA8
                      Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)                      5

                           Opinion of the Court

court's judgment cannot bind nonparties.4 We think the
District Court erred on both grounds when it granted the
injunction, and we now reverse.
                            II
  The Anti-Injunction Act, first enacted in 1793, provides
that
     "A court of the United States may not grant an injunc
     tion to stay proceedings in a State court except as
     expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where
     necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or
     effectuate its judgments." 28 U. S. C. §2283.
The statute, we have recognized, "is a necessary concomi
tant of the Framers' decision to authorize, and Congress'
decision to implement, a dual system of federal and state
courts." Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U. S. 140,
146 (1988). And the Act's core message is one of respect
for state courts. The Act broadly commands that those
tribunals "shall remain free from interference by federal
courts." Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Locomotive Engi
 -  -  -  -  -  -
2010) (case below) (holding that two cases involve the same issue when
"[t]he state and federal [class] certification rules . . . are not signifi
cantly different"), with J. R. Clearwater Inc. v. Ashland Chemical Co.,
93 F. 3d 176, 180 (CA5 1996) (holding that two cases implicate different
issues even when "[the state rule] is modeled on . . . the Federal Rules"
because a "[state] court might well exercise [its] discretion in a different
manner").
   4 Compare 593 F. 3d, at 724 ("[T]he denial of class certification is

binding on unnamed [putative] class members" because they are "in
privity to [the parties] in the prior action") and In re Bridge
stone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liability Litigation, 333 F. 3d 763,
768-769 (CA7 2003) (same), with In re Ford Motor Co., 471 F. 3d 1233,
1245 (CA11 2006) (holding that "[t]he denial of class certification"
prevents a court from "binding" anyone other than "the parties appear
ing before it") and In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank
Prods. Liability Litigation, 134 F. 3d 133, 141 (CA3 1998) (holding that
putative "class members are not parties" and so cannot be bound by a
court's ruling when "there is no class pending").
6                       SMITH v. BAYER CORP.

                           Opinion of the Court

neers, 398 U. S. 281, 282 (1970). That edict is subject to
only "three specifically defined exceptions." Id., at 286.
And those exceptions, though designed for important
purposes, "are narrow and are 'not [to] be enlarged by
loose statutory construction.' " Chick Kam Choo, 486 U. S.,
at 146 (quoting Atlantic Coast Line, 398 U. S., at 287;
alteration in original). Indeed, "[a]ny doubts as to the
propriety of a federal injunction against state court pro
ceedings should be resolved in favor of permitting the
state courts to proceed." Id., at 297.
   This case involves the last of the Act's three exceptions,
known as the relitigation exception. That exception is de
signed to implement "well-recognized concepts" of claim
and issue preclusion. Chick Kam Choo, 486 U. S., at 147.
The provision authorizes an injunction to prevent state
litigation of a claim or issue "that previously was pre
sented to and decided by the federal court." Ibid. But in
applying this exception, we have taken special care to
keep it "strict and narrow." Id., at 148. After all, a court
does not usually "get to dictate to other courts the preclu
sion consequences of its own judgment." 18 C. Wright,
A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure
§4405, p. 82 (2d ed. 2002) (hereinafter Wright & Miller).
Deciding whether and how prior litigation has preclusive
effect is usually the bailiwick of the second court (here, the
one in West Virginia). So issuing an injunction under the
relitigation exception is resorting to heavy artillery.5 For
that reason, every benefit of the doubt goes toward the
state court, see Atlantic Coast Line, 398 U. S., at 287, 297;
an injunction can issue only if preclusion is clear beyond
 -  -  -  -  -  -
  5 That is especially so because an injunction is not the only way to

correct a state trial court's erroneous refusal to give preclusive effect to
a federal judgment. As we have noted before, "the state appellate
courts and ultimately this Court" can review and reverse such a ruling.
See Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Locomotive Engineers, 398 U. S. 281,
287 (1970).
                      Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)                      7

                           Opinion of the Court

peradventure.
   The question here is whether the federal court's rejec
tion of McCollins' proposed class precluded a later adjudi
cation in state court of Smith's certification motion. For
the federal court's determination of the class issue to have
this preclusive effect, at least two conditions must be met.6
First, the issue the federal court decided must be the same
as the one presented in the state tribunal. See 18 Wright
& Miller §4417, at 412. And second, Smith must have
been a party to the federal suit, or else must fall within
one of a few discrete exceptions to the general rule against
binding nonparties. See 18A id., §4449, at 330. In fact,
as we will explain, the issues before the two courts were
not the same, and Smith was neither a party nor the ex
ceptional kind of nonparty who can be bound. So the
courts below erred in finding the certification issue pre
cluded, and erred all the more in thinking an injunction
appropriate.7

 -  -  -  -  -  -
   6 We have held that federal common law governs the preclusive effect

of a decision of a federal court sitting in diversity. See Semtek Int'l Inc.
v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U. S. 497, 508 (2001). Smith assumes
that federal common law should here incorporate West Virginia's
preclusion law, see Brief for Petitioners 15-16, whereas Bayer favors
looking only to federal rules of preclusion because of the federal inter
ests at stake in this case, see Brief for Respondent 18. We do not think
the question matters here. Neither party identifies any way in which
federal and state principles of preclusion law differ in any relevant
respect. Nor have we found any such divergence. Compare, e.g.,
Montana v. United States, 440 U. S. 147, 153-154 (1979) (describing
elements of issue preclusion), with State v. Miller, 194 W. Va. 3, 9, 459
S. E. 2d 114, 120 (1995) (same). We therefore need not decide whether,
in general, federal common law ought to incorporate state law in
situations such as this.
   7 Because we rest our decision on the Anti-Injunction Act and the

principles of issue preclusion that inform it, we do not consider Smith's
argument, based on Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U. S. 797
(1985), that the District Court's action violated the Due Process Clause.
8                  SMITH v. BAYER CORP.

                     Opinion of the Court

                             A

  In our most recent case on the relitigation exception,
Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon, we applied the "same issue"
requirement of preclusion law to invalidate a federal
court's injunction. 486 U. S., at 151. The federal court
had dismissed a suit involving Singapore law on grounds
of forum non conveniens. After the plaintiff brought the
same claim in Texas state court, the federal court issued
an injunction barring the plaintiff from pursuing relief in
that alternate forum. We held that the District Court had
gone too far. "[A]n essential prerequisite for applying the
relitigation exception," we explained, "is that the . . . is
sues which the federal injunction insulates from litigation
in state proceedings actually have been decided by the
federal court." Id., at 148. That prerequisite, we thought,
was not satisfied because the issue to be adjudicated in
state court was not the one the federal court had resolved.
The federal court had considered the permissibility of the
claim under federal forum non conveniens principles. But
the Texas courts, we thought, "would apply a significantly
different forum non conveniens analysis," id., at 149; they
had in prior cases rejected the strictness of the federal
doctrine. Our conclusion followed: "[W]hether the Texas
state courts are an appropriate forum for [the plaintiff's]
Singapore law claims has not yet been litigated." Ibid.
Because the legal standards in the two courts differed, the
issues before the courts differed, and an injunction was
unwarranted.
  The question here closely resembles the one in Chick
Kam Choo. The class Smith proposed in state court mir
rored the class McCollins sought to certify in federal court:
Both included all Baycol purchasers resident in West
Virginia. Moreover, the substantive claims in the two
suits broadly overlapped: Both complaints alleged that
Bayer had sold a defective product in violation of the
State's consumer protection law and the company's war
                 Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)           9

                     Opinion of the Court

ranties. So far, so good for preclusion. But not so fast:
a critical question - the question of the applicable legal
standard - remains. The District Court ruled that the
proposed class did not meet the requirements of Federal
Rule 23 (because individualized issues would predominate
over common ones). But the state court was poised to
consider whether the proposed class satisfied West Vir
ginia Rule 23. If those two legal standards differ (as
federal and state forum non conveniens law differed in
Chick Kam Choo) - then the federal court resolved an
issue not before the state court. In that event, much like
in Chick Kam Choo, "whether the [West Virginia] state
cour[t]" should certify the proposed class action "has not
yet been litigated." 486 U. S., at 149.
   The Court of Appeals and Smith offer us two competing
ways of deciding whether the West Virginia and Federal
Rules differ, but we think the right path lies somewhere in
the middle. The Eighth Circuit relied almost exclusively
on the near-identity of the two Rules' texts. See 593 F. 3d,
at 723. That was the right place to start, but not to end.
Federal and state courts, after all, can and do apply iden
tically worded procedural provisions in widely varying
ways. If a State's procedural provision tracks the lan
guage of a Federal Rule, but a state court interprets that
provision in a manner federal courts have not, then the
state court is using a different standard and thus deciding
a different issue. See 18 Wright & Miller §4417, at 454
(stating that preclusion is "inappropriate" when "different
legal standards . . . masquerad[e] behind similar legal
labels"). At the other extreme, Smith contends that the
source of law is all that matters: a different sovereign
must in each and every case "have the opportunity, if it
chooses, to construe its procedural rule differently." Brief
for Petitioners 22 (quoting ALI, Principles of the Law,
Aggregate Litigation §2.11, Reporters' Notes, cmt. b,
p. 181 (2010)). But if state courts have made crystal clear
10                 SMITH v. BAYER CORP.

                     Opinion of the Court

that they follow the same approach as the federal court
applied, we see no need to ignore that determination; in
that event, the issues in the two cases would indeed be the
same. So a federal court considering whether the relitiga
tion exception applies should examine whether state law
parallels its federal counterpart. But as suggested earlier,
see supra, at 6, the federal court must resolve any uncer
tainty on that score by leaving the question of preclusion
to the state courts.
   Under this approach, the West Virginia Supreme Court
has gone some way toward resolving the matter before us
by declaring its independence from federal courts' inter
pretation of the Federal Rules - and particularly of Rule
23. In In re W. Va. Rezulin Litigation, 214 W. Va. 52, 585
S. E. 2d 52 (2003) (In re Rezulin), the West Virginia high
court considered a plaintiff's motion to certify a class -
coincidentally enough, in a suit about an allegedly defec
tive pharmaceutical product. The court made a point of
complaining about the parties' and lower court's near
exclusive reliance on federal cases about Federal Rule 23
to decide the certification question. Such cases, the court
cautioned, " 'may be persuasive, but [they are] not binding
or controlling.' " Id., at 61, 585 S. E. 2d, at 61. And lest
anyone mistake the import of this message, the court went
on: The aim of "this rule is to avoid having our legal
analysis of our Rules 'amount to nothing more than Pav
lovian responses to federal decisional law.' " Ibid. (italics
omitted). Of course, the state courts might still have
adopted an approach to their Rule 23 that tracked the
analysis the federal court used in McCollins' case. But
absent clear evidence that the state courts had done so, we
could not conclude that they would interpret their Rule in
the same way. And if that is so, we could not tell whether
the certification issues in the state and federal courts were
the same. That uncertainty would preclude an injunction.
   But here the case against an injunction is even stronger,
                    Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)                  11

                         Opinion of the Court

because the West Virginia Supreme Court has disap
proved the approach to Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance
requirement that the Federal District Court embraced.
Recall that the federal court held that the presence of
a single individualized issue - injury from the use of
Baycol - prevented class certification. See supra, at 3. The
court did not identify the common issues in the case; nor
did it balance these common issues against the need to
prove individual injury to determine which predominated.
The court instead applied a strict test barring class treat
ment when proof of each plaintiff's injury is necessary.8
By contrast, the West Virginia Supreme Court in In
re Rezulin adopted an all-things-considered, balancing
inquiry in interpreting its Rule 23. Rejecting any "rigid
test," the state court opined that the predominance re
quirement "contemplates a review of many factors." 214
W. Va., at 72, 585 S. E. 2d, at 72. Indeed, the court noted,
a " 'single common issue' " in a case could outweigh " 'nu
merous . . . individual questions.' " Ibid. That meant, the
court further explained (quoting what it termed the "lead
ing treatise" on the subject), that even objections to certifi
cation " 'based on . . . causation, or reliance' " - which typi
cally involve showings of individual injury - " 'will not bar
predominance satisfaction.' " Ibid. (quoting 2 A. Conte &
H. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions §4.26, p. 241 (4th
ed. 2002)). So point for point, the analysis set out in In re
Rezulin diverged from the District Court's interpretation
of Federal Rule 23. A state court using the In re Rezulin
standard would decide a different question than the one

 -  -  -  -  -  -
  8 The District Court's approach to the predominance inquiry is consis

tent with the approach employed by the Eighth Circuit. See In re St.
Jude Medical, Inc., 522 F. 3d 836, 837-840 (2008) (holding that most
commercial misrepresentation cases are "unsuitable for class treat
ment" because individual issues of reliance necessarily predominate).
We express no opinion as to the correctness of this approach.
12                     SMITH v. BAYER CORP.

                         Opinion of the Court

the federal court had earlier resolved.9
   This case, indeed, is little more than a rerun of Chick
Kam Choo. A federal court and a state court apply differ
ent law. That means they decide distinct questions. The
federal court's resolution of one issue does not preclude the
state court's determination of another. It then goes with
out saying that the federal court may not issue an injunc
tion. The Anti-Injunction Act's re-litigation exception does
not extend nearly so far.
                             B
   The injunction issued here runs into another basic
premise of preclusion law: A court's judgment binds only
the parties to a suit, subject to a handful of discrete and
limited exceptions. See, e.g., 18A Wright & Miller §4449,
at 330. The importance of this rule and the narrowness of
its exceptions go hand in hand. We have repeatedly "em
phasize[d] the fundamental nature of the general rule"
that only parties can be bound by prior judgments; accord
ingly, we have taken a "constrained approach to nonparty
preclusion." Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U. S. 880, 898 (2008).
Against this backdrop, Bayer defends the decision below
by arguing that Smith - an unnamed member of a pro
 -  -  -  -  -  -
  9 Bayer argues that In re Rezulin does not preclude an injunction in

this case because the West Virginia court there decided that common
issues predominated over individual issues of damages, not over indi
vidual issues of liability (as exist here). See Brief for Respondent 25-
26. We think Bayer is right about this distinction, but wrong about its
consequence. Our point is not that In re Rezulin dictates the answer
to the class certification question here; the two cases are indeed too
dissimilar for that to be true. The point instead is that In re Rezulin
articulated a general approach to the predominance requirement that
differs markedly from the one the federal court used. Minor variations
in the application of what is in essence the same legal standard do not
defeat preclusion; but where, as here, the State's courts "would apply a
significantly different . . . analysis," Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp.,
486 U. S. 140, 149 (1988), the federal and state courts decide different
issues.
                      Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)                    13

                          Opinion of the Court

posed but uncertified class - qualifies as a party to the
McCollins litigation. See Brief for Respondent 32-34.
Alternatively, Bayer claims that the District Court's
judgment binds Smith under the recognized exception to
the rule against nonparty preclusion for members of class
actions. See id., at 34-39. We think neither contention
has merit.
   Bayer's first claim ill-comports with any proper under
standing of what a "party" is. In general, "[a] 'party' to
litigation is '[o]ne by or against whom a lawsuit is
brought,' " United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New
York, 556 U. S. ___, ___ (2009) (slip op., at 4), or one who
"become[s] a party by intervention, substitution, or third
party practice," Karcher v. May, 484 U. S. 72, 77 (1987).
And we have further held that an unnamed member of a
certified class may be "considered a 'party' for the [particu
lar] purpos[e] of appealing" an adverse judgment. Devlin
v. Scardelletti, 536 U. S. 1, 7 (2002). But as the dissent in
Devlin noted, no one in that case was "willing to advance
the novel and surely erroneous argument that a non
named class member is a party to the class-action litiga
tion before the class is certified." Id., at 16, n. 1 (opinion of
SCALIA, J.). Still less does that argument make sense once
certification is denied. The definition of the term "party"
can on no account be stretched so far as to cover a person
like Smith, whom the plaintiff in a lawsuit was denied
leave to represent.10 If the judgment in the McCollins
 -  -  -  -  -  -
  10 In support of its claim that Smith counts as a party, Bayer cites two

cases in which we held that a putative member of an uncertified class
may wait until after the court rules on the certification motion to file an
individual claim or move to intervene in the suit. See Brief for Respon
dent 32-33 (citing United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385
(1977); American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538 (1974)). But
these cases, which were specifically grounded in policies of judicial
administration, demonstrate only that a person not a party to a class
suit may receive certain benefits (such as the tolling of a limitations
period) related to that proceeding. See id., at 553; McDonald, 432
14                     SMITH v. BAYER CORP.

                          Opinion of the Court

litigation can indeed bind Smith, it must do so under
principles of nonparty preclusion.
   As Bayer notes, see Brief for Respondent 37, one such
principle allows unnamed members of a class action to be
bound, even though they are not parties to the suit. See
Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U. S.
867, 874 (1984) ("[U]nder elementary principles of prior
adjudication a judgment in a properly entertained class
action is binding on class members in any subsequent
litigation"); see also Taylor, 553 U. S., at 894 (stating that
nonparties can be bound in "properly conducted class
actions"). But here Bayer faces a conundrum. If we know
one thing about the McCollins suit, we know that it was
not a class action. Indeed, the very ruling that Bayer
argues ought to be given preclusive effect is the District
Court's decision that a class could not properly be certi
fied. So Bayer wants to bind Smith as a member of a class
action (because it is only as such that a nonparty in
Smith's situation can be bound) to a determination that
there could not be a class action. And if the logic of that
position is not immediately transparent, here is Bayer's
attempt to clarify: "[U]ntil the moment when class certi
fication was denied, the McCollins case was a properly
conducted class action." Brief for Respondent 37. That is
true, according to Bayer, because McCollins' interests
were aligned with the members of the class he proposed
and he "act[ed] in a representative capacity when he
sought class certification." Id., at 36.
   But wishing does not make it so. McCollins sought class
certification, but he failed to obtain that result. Because
the District Court found that individual issues predomi
 -  -  -  -  -  -
U. S., at 394, n. 15. That result is consistent with a commonplace of
preclusion law - that nonparties sometimes may benefit from, even
though they cannot be bound by, former litigation. See Parklane Ho
siery Co. v. Shore, 439 U. S. 322, 326-333 (1979); Blonder-Tongue
Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U. S. 313 (1971).
                 Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)         15

                     Opinion of the Court

nated, it held that the action did not satisfy Federal Rule
23's requirements for class proceedings. In these circum
stances, we cannot say that a properly conducted class
action existed at any time in the litigation. Federal Rule
23 determines what is and is not a class action in federal
court, where McCollins brought his suit. So in the absence
of a certification under that Rule, the precondition for
binding Smith was not met. Neither a proposed class
action nor a rejected class action may bind nonparties.
What does have this effect is a class action approved under
Rule 23. But McCollins' lawsuit was never that.
   We made essentially these same points in Taylor v.
Sturgell just a few Terms ago. The question there con
cerned the propriety of binding nonparties under a theory
of "virtual representation" based on "identity of interests
and some kind of relationship between parties and non
parties." 553 U. S., at 901. We rejected the theory
unanimously, explaining that it "would 'recogniz[e], in
effect, a common-law kind of class action.' " Ibid. Such a
device, we objected, would authorize preclusion "shorn of
[Rule 23's] procedural protections." Ibid. Or as otherwise
stated in the opinion: We could not allow "circumvent[ion]"
of Rule 23's protections through a "virtual representation
doctrine that allowed courts to 'create de facto class ac
tions at will.' " Ibid. We could hardly have been more
clear that a "properly conducted class action," with bind
ing effect on nonparties, can come about in federal courts
in just one way - through the procedure set out in Rule 23.
Bayer attempts to distinguish Taylor by noting that the
party in the prior litigation there did not propose a class
action. But we do not see why that difference matters.
Yes, McCollins wished to represent a class, and made a
motion to that effect. But it did not come to pass. To
allow McCollins' suit to bind nonparties would be to adopt
16                     SMITH v. BAYER CORP.

                          Opinion of the Court

the very theory Taylor rejected.11
  Bayer's strongest argument comes not from established
principles of preclusion, but instead from policy concerns
relating to use of the class action device. Bayer warns
that under our approach class counsel can repeatedly try
to certify the same class "by the simple expedient of
changing the named plaintiff in the caption of the com
plaint." Brief for Respondent 47-48. And in this world of
"serial relitigation of class certification," Bayer contends,
defendants "would be forced in effect to buy litigation
peace by settling." Id., at 2, 12; see also In re Bridge
stone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liability Litigation,
333 F. 3d 763, 767 (CA7 2003) (objecting to an "an asym
metric system in which class counsel can win but never
lose" because of their ability to relitigate the issue of
certification).
  But this form of argument flies in the face of the rule
against nonparty preclusion. That rule perforce leads to
relitigation of many issues, as plaintiff after plaintiff after
plaintiff (none precluded by the last judgment because
none a party to the last suit) tries his hand at establishing
some legal principle or obtaining some grant of relief. We
confronted a similar policy concern in Taylor, which in
volved litigation brought under the Freedom of Infor
 -  -  -  -  -  -
   11 The great weight of scholarly authority - from the Restatement of

Judgments to the American Law Institute to Wright and Miller -
agrees that an uncertified class action cannot bind proposed class
members. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments §41(1), p. 393 (1980)
(A nonparty may be bound only when his interests are adequately
represented by "[t]he representative of a class of persons similarly
situated, designated as such with the approval of the court"); ALI,
Principles of the Law Aggregate Litigation §2.11, Reporters' Notes, cmt.
b, p. 181 (2010) ("[N]one of [the exceptions to the rule against nonparty
preclusion] extend generally to the situation of a would-be absent class
member with respect to a denial of class certification"); 18A Wright &
Miller §4455, at 457-458 ("[A]bsent certification there is no basis for
precluding a nonparty" under the class-action exception).
                 Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)           17

                     Opinion of the Court

mation Act (FOIA). The Government there cautioned
that unless we bound nonparties a " 'potentially limitless' "
number of plaintiffs, perhaps coordinating with each
other, could "mount a series of repetitive lawsuits" de
manding the selfsame documents. 553 U. S., at 903. But
we rejected this argument, even though the payoff in a
single successful FOIA suit - disclosure of documents to
the public - could "trum[p]" or "subsum[e]" all prior losses,
just as a single successful class certification motion could
do. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F. 3d, at 766, 767. As
that response suggests, our legal system generally relies
on principles of stare decisis and comity among courts to
mitigate the sometimes substantial costs of similar litiga
tion brought by different plaintiffs. We have not thought
that the right approach (except in the discrete categories
of cases we have recognized) lies in binding nonparties to a
judgment.
   And to the extent class actions raise special problems of
relitigation, Congress has provided a remedy that does not
involve departing from the usual rules of preclusion. In
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), 28 U. S. C.
§§1332(d), 1453 (2006 ed. and Supp. III), Congress enabled
defendants to remove to federal court any sizable class
action involving minimal diversity of citizenship. Once
removal takes place, Federal Rule 23 governs certification.
And federal courts may consolidate multiple overlapping
suits against a single defendant in one court (as the Judi
cial Panel on Multi-District Litigation did for the many
actions involving Baycol). See §1407. Finally, we would
expect federal courts to apply principles of comity to each
other's class certification decisions when addressing a
common dispute. See, e.g., Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill
Harbert Constr. Co., 529 U. S. 193, 198 (2000) (citing
Landis v. North American Co., 299 U. S. 248, 254 (1936)).
CAFA may be cold comfort to Bayer with respect to suits
like this one beginning before its enactment. But Con
18                     SMITH v. BAYER CORP.

                          Opinion of the Court

gress's decision to address the relitigation concerns associ
ated with class actions through the mechanism of removal
provides yet another reason for federal courts to adhere
in this context to longstanding principles of preclusion.12
And once again, that is especially so when the federal
court is deciding whether to go so far as to enjoin a state
proceeding.
                       *     *    *
   The Anti-Injunction Act prohibits the order the District
Court entered here. The Act's relitigation exception au
thorizes injunctions only when a former federal adjudica
tion clearly precludes a state-court decision. As we said
more than 40 years ago, and have consistently maintained
since that time, "[a]ny doubts . . . should be resolved in
favor of permitting the state courts to proceed." Atlantic
Coast Line, 398 U. S., at 297. Under this approach, close
cases have easy answers: The federal court should not
issue an injunction, and the state court should decide the
preclusion question. But this case does not even strike us
as close. The issues in the federal and state lawsuits
differed because the relevant legal standards differed.
And the mere proposal of a class in the federal action
could not bind persons who were not parties there. For
these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is

                                                              Reversed.

 -  -  -  -  -  -
   12 By the same token, nothing in our holding today forecloses legisla

tion to modify established principles of preclusion should Congress
decide that CAFA does not sufficiently prevent relitigation of class
certification motions. Nor does this opinion at all address the permis
sibility of a change in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pertaining to
this question. Cf. n. 7, supra (declining to reach Smith's due process
claim).