dataesr/scientific-paragraphs-categorization huggingface dataset:
the income share o the top increased by per- centage points rom to art o the increase from 1993 to 2002 should come from changes in the ta code In particular, be ore , capital gains ere totally e cluded, which is very likely to downward bias the share o top-income groups Also, the ta collection capabilities seem to have increased substantially in the last years hat being said, using In 2014, the average income per adult in South Africa was €13 750 (R107 300), while the average income of the Top 1% was €290 500 (R2 266 000). All values have been converted into 2016 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) euros at a rate of €1 = $1. 3 = R7. 8. PPP accounts for differences in the cost of living between countries. Values are net o inflation Source: Alvaredo & Atkinson (2010). See wir2018. wid. world for data series and notes.
Source: Alvaredo & Atkinson (2010), WID. world (2017). See wir2018. wid. world for data series and notes. In eeping ith the national accounts conventions, the nonre undable portion o ta credits and ta deductions are treated as negative ta es, hile the re undable portion o ta credits are seen as trans ers ubse uently, nobody can have negative income ta es incomes including pensions and unemployment insurance In the ormer case, ta rates at the top are lo er than or any other income group In the latter case, ta rates are lo er or the bottom than or the richest, but the middle class has a higher total ta rate than the top s ine uality series to the o icial surveybased estimates highlights that although the trends are similar in both calculation methods, the data used in i etty, Yang, and Zucman, apital Accumulation, sho s both a much larger level and rise in inequality over the period.
1. 4a In 2015, the value of net public wealth (or public capital) in the US was negative (-17% of net national income) while the value of net private wealth (or private capital) and 3. 1. 4b). the relative stability of public Source: WID. world (2017). See wir2018. wid. world for data series and notes. as China's ratio is only just below that of the e ects: on the one hand, a significant raction nited tates, and ussia is not a long ay of public assets were privatized (particularly behind, either. furthermore, the speed and ealth in hina led to a slight over-all in the tries ith the e ception o Nor ay have shares in public or semi-public companies, scale o the change in these emerging econo-value of public wealth as a proportion of seen a decline in the value of public property which used to be relatively important in a mies far surpasses that seen in rich countries.
100% 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 In 1870, the value of net national wealth in Germany was 745% of net national income, i. e. it was worth 7. 5 years of national income. Net national wealth is equal to net private wealth plus net public wealth. Source: WID. world (2017). See wir2018. wid. world for data series and notes.
18 understanding the evolution of public wealth in China and russia In 2015, the value of national wealth in China was 710% of national income, i. e. it was worth 7. 1 years of national income. Net national wealth is equal to net private wealth plus net public wealth. Piketty & Zucman (2017). See wir2018. wid. world for data series and notes. 750% 700% China France Russia 650% UK US Value of net national wealth (% of national income) 350% 400% 450% 500% 550% 600% 300% 250% 200% 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 Source: Novokmet, he e -communist countries o hina and ussia have ollo ed the same general patterns o a declining overall share o public property in total wealth as rich countries in recent years, though starting rom a much higher level o public ealth In the e -communist countries o China and russia, the share of net public wealth fell from around 70% in 1980 to 35% and 20%, respectively, in 2015-a veritable turnaround.
China also made notable capital losses on its net oreign assets, in part due to the appreciation of the yuan after , e plaining hy despite its large current account surpluses, its net oreign asset posi-tion has increased only moderately (from -9% of national income in 2000 to 15% in 2015). World inequality report 2018 Part III while the increase in relative asset prices China, Source: Piketty, Yang and Zucman (2017). See wir2018. wid. world for data series and notes.
5. 1 The structure of national wealth in Russia, 1990-2015 PaRT III PUBlIc VeRSUS PRIVATe cAPITAl dyNAMIcS during the period as the shi t from public to private property, rather than any significant and sustained increase in the aggregate value o national ealth Net national wealth (public + private) Net private wealth (households) Net public wealth (government) Source: Novokmet, Piketty and Zucman (2017). See wir2018. wid. world for data series and notes. Figure 3.
Part Iv available data show that global wealth inequality is extreme and on the rise In 2016, 33% of global wealth was owned by the Top 1%. The evolution of global wealth groups from 1980 to 2017 is represented by China, Europe and the US. Source: WID. world (2017). See wir2018. wid. world for data series and notes. trends in Global Wealth inequality real terms that is, a ter deduction o infla- tion A number o stri ing findings emerge irst, one can see that average ealth has Share of global wealth (%) 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 40% 1980 35% estimates of wealth inequality for russia and the middle east, but they are more ragile, and e do not use them to produce global ealth estimates in this report. ur global ealth ine uality estimates since 1980 therefore combine data from three large regions: the nited tates, hina, and europe.
99 2040 99. 9 99. 999 2050 Wealth group (percentile) Between 1987 and 2017, the  average wealth of the 50th global wealth percentile grew by 300%. Average global wealth growth per adult was 129%. The evolution of global wealth groups from 1987 to 2017 is represented by China, Europe and the US. The Top 1/100 million on Forbes World's Billionaires Lists is equivalent to the op , hile the op / million is e uivalent to the op Values are net o inflation Source: WID. world (2017). See wir2018. wid. world for data series and notes. In 2016, in a world represented by China, Europe and the US, the global wealth share of the Top 1% was 33%. Under "Business as usual", the Top 1% global wealth share would reach 39% by 2050, while the Top 0. 1% wealth owners would own nearly as much wealth (26%) as the middle class (27%).
Source: Garbinti, Goupille-Lebret and Piketty (2017). See wir2018. wid. world for data series and notes. Part Iv t rends in Global Wealth inequality Figure 4. 4. 2 top wealth shares in France, 1800-2014 Share of personal wealth (%) 0% 150% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 100% 200% 250% 300% 350% 400% 450% 500% 550% 600% Value of personal wealth (% of national income) 50% Top 10-1% Top 1% Business assets Deposits Housing (net of debt) Housing (net of debt) Financial assets (excl. deposits) Average net wealth per adult : €201 000 €4 703 000 €696 000 1840 1978 1974 1820 1970 1800 1860 1982 1880 1986 1900 1990 1920 1994 1940 1998 1960 2002 1980 2006 2000 2010 2014 ource: Garbinti, Goupille-Lebret and i etty ee ir id orld or data series and notes In , the share o personal ealth held by the op In 2014, the value of personal wealth was equal to 571% of national income.
5a Composition of the wealth share of the top 1% in France, 1970-2014 Source: Garbinti, Goupille-Lebret and Piketty (2017). See wir2018. wid. world for data series and notes. Part Iv t rends in Global Wealth inequality 4, the bottom 30% of the distribution own mostly deposits in , hile housing assets are the main form of wealth for the middle of the distribution. however, as one move towards the top 10% and the top 1% of the distribution, financial assets other than deposits gradually become the dominant orm o ealth, largely because o their large e uity port olios hese general patterns o asset portfolio construction remain relatively In 2012, 67% of the personal wealth of the 5th decile (p50-p60) was composed of housing assets (net of debt). All values have been converted to 2016 constant middle 40%, top 10%, and top 1% by asset categories, the impact o asset price move-ments on ine uality is significant In particular, Figure 4.
See wir2018. wid. world for data series and notes. 2150 Steady-state trajectory with 1970-1984 2100 2050 2000 saving rates: 22% for Top 10%, 9. 5% for Bottom 90%. Steady-state trajectory with 1984-2014 saving rates: 24. 5% for Top 10%, 2. 5% for Bottom 90%. Top 10% wealth share simulations in France, 1800-2150 1950 1900 1850 1800 40% 60% 80% 100% 90% 70% 50% 30% Observed series (1800-2014) Figure 4. 4. 8 TrendS In glObAl weAlTh IneqUAlITy 4. 5 wealth inequality in sPain In ormation in this chapter is based on ousing Bubbles, shore Assets and ealth Ine uality in pain , by lara Mart ne -oledano, ID orld or ing aper eries No / The Spanish housing and stock market booms of the last 30 years have seen the country's personal wealth to national income ratio almost double from around 380% in 1984 to 730% in 2007, before falling to just under 650% by 2014.
5. 5 age-wealth profiles in spain, 2001-2013 Toledano (2017). See wir2018. wid. world for data series and notes. 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120% 140% 160% 180% 200% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% Source: Martínez-Figure 4. 0% 20 45% 25 30 35 40 45 50 2001 Age 55 60 65 2007 70 75 80 2013 85 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012.
2 Wealth shares of the top 10% and bottom 90% in the uK, 1895-2012 Atkinson and Morelli (2017). See wir2018. wid. world for data series and notes. 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 1895 Source: Alvaredo, Figure 4. 6Part Iv Share of personal wealth (%) 1935 t rends in Global Wealth inequality 1925 1915 1905 1945 1965 Top 0. 5% 1955 Top 1%-0. 5% Top 10%-1% Bottom 90% 1975 1985 1995 2005 2015 In 2012, the Top 0. 5% owned 15% of personal wealth. in 1971, and then to 58% by 1981. 28 this coin- wealth to total wealth rose by some ten cided ith a all in the share o housing o ned percentage points in the s by private landlords, from 76% in 1918 to 11% in 1981. both factors led to a decline in the thirdly, the 1990s saw the return of private total wealth share of the top 1%, which landlords heir share in the housing mar et contained a disproportionate number of land- doubled from 9% in 1991 to 18% in 2011, as lords.
under business as usual, global inequality will continue to rise, despite strong growth in low-income countries. If all countries follow the inequality trajectory of the US between 1980 and 2016 from 2017 to 2050, the income share of the global Top 1% will reach 28% by 2050. Income share estimates are calculated using Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) euros. PPP accounts for differences in the cost of living between countries. Values are net o inflation Source: WID. world (2017). See wir2018. wid. world for data series and notes. income earners in China o total hinese gro th over the 1980-2016 period. 3 We thus assume that captured taCklinG eConomiC inequality bottom 50% Chinese earners will capture o hinese income gro th up to the second scenario assumes that all coun-tries follow the same inequality trajectory as the united states over the 1980-2016 period ollo ing the above e ample, e know that bottom 50% us earners captured o total gro th since in the nited states.
income share projections of the bottom 50% and top 1% , 1980-2050 By 2050, the global average income will reach €35 500, compared to €16 000 in 2016. If all countries follow Europe's inequality trajectory between 1980 and 2016, the average income of the Bottom 50% of the world population will be €9 100 by 2050. Income estimates are calculated using Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) euros. or comparison, at accounts or di erences in the cost o living between countries Values account or inflation Source: WID. world (2017). See wir2018. wid. world for data series and notes. Part v t aCklinG eConomiC inequality A KLING N MI IN ALI Y Part V Figure 5. 1. 2 Global average income projections, 1980-2050 €35 000 €35 500 scenarios … any of the listed below €30 000 Annual income per adult (€) €10 000 €15 000 €25 000 €20 000 €16 000 Bottom 50% average income €9 900 Global average income Average income assuming … €6 300 €9 100 … all countries follow EU 1980-2016 inequality trend … all countries prolong their own 1980-2016 inequality trend €5 000 €1 600 €3 100 €4 500 … all countries follow US 1980-2016 €0 inequality trend 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 observed since the financial crisis o , cenario three presents a more e uitable discussed in hapter , could largely be a global uture It shows that global ine uality short-run phenomenon induced by the can be reduced i all countries align on the shoc s on top incomes, and the growth slow- ine uality tra ectory or more e uitable down in rich countries particularly in ones In this scenario, the bottom income urope share rises rom to appro imately in , whereas the top decreases rom In scenario two, uture global income ine ual- to o total income he gap between ities are amplified as compared to scenario the shares held by the two groups would, one, as the gap between the global top however, remain large at about si percentage share and the global bottom share in points his suggests that, although ollowing widens In this scenario, the global top the uropean pathway in the uture is a much would earn close to o global income better option than the business-as-usual or by , while the bottom would earn the pathway, even more e uitable growth close to , less than in , be ore tra ectories will be needed or the global emerging countries started to catch up with bottom share to catch up with the top the industriali ed world In this scenario, the Achieving a world in which the top increase in the top income share a posi- and bottom groups capture the same tive change o eight percentage points over share o global income would mean getting to the period is largely, but not a point where the top individuals earn on entirely, made at the e pense o the bottom average fi ty times more than those in the a negative change o our percentage bottom hal hatever the scenarios ollowed, points global ine ualities will remain substantial LD IN ALI Y 2018 253.
If all countries follow the inequality trajectory of Europe between 1980 and 2016, the average income of the Bottom 50% of the world population will be €9 100 by 2050. Income estimates are calculated using Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) euros. For comparison, €1 = $1. 3 = ¥4. 4 at PPP. PPP accounts for differences in the cost of living between countries Values are net o inflation Source: WID. world (2017). See wir2018. wid. world for data series and notes. Part V TackLIng economIc IneqUaLITy Figure 5. 1. 3 scenario, the bottom half of the world popula- Global average income projections of the Bottom 50%, 1980-2050 tion earn per year and per adult rising the global average income to bottom €10 000 income ratio o Average income o the global bottom hal ill be in the scenario, reducing the bottom to Average income €9 100 … all countries follow EU 1980-2016 inequality trend Annual income per adult (€) €4 000 €6 000 €8 000 average income ratio to Bottom 50% average income €3 100 he gap bet een global average income and the average income o the bottom hal o the population is particularly high in all scenarios o ever, the di erence in average income of the bottom 50% between the eu scenario and the us scenario is important, as well.
2. 2 top income tax rates in rich countries, 1900-2017 Between 1963 and 2017, the top marginal tax rate of income tax (applying to the highest incomes) in the US fell from 91% to 40%. Sources: Piketty (2014) and updates. See wir2018. wid. world for data series and notes. Source: Piketty (2014) and updates. See wir2018. wid. world for data series and notes. Between 1980 and 2017, the top marginal tax rate of inheritance tax (applying to the highest inheritances) in the UK fell from 75% to 40%. 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Figure 5. 0% Top marginal tax rate (%) Figure 5. France Germany UK Japan US France Germany UK Japan US 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010.
Inheritance is exempted from tax while the poor face high consumption taxes in emerging countries While the past ten years saw some increases in ta progressivity in rich countries, it is orth noting that ma or emerging economies still do not have any ta on inheritance, despite the e treme levels o ine uality observed there Inheritance is ta ed at a particularly small rate in Bra il at a national average o around , : WID. world (2017). See wir2018. wid. world for data series and notes. In 2017, the top marginal tax rate of inheritance tax (applying to the highest inheritances) was 55% in Japan, compared to 4% in Brazil. Europe is represented by France, Germany and the UK. taCklinG eConomiC inequality Part v Figure 5. 2. 4 ith a ma imum ederal rate o In India, top inheritance tax rates in emerging and rich countries, 2017 hina, and ussia, there is no inheritance ta in contrast to rich countries (see Figure 5.
8% Figure 5. 3. 1 share of taxes evaded in scandinavian countries, 2006 In 2006, the Top 0. 01% wealthiest individuals in Scandinavian countries evaded 27% of the total taxes they owed. Source: Alstadsaeter, Johannesen and Zucman (2017). See wir2018. wid. world for data series and notes. Part v 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% Share of taxes evaded (% of taxes owed) Average 2. Part v t aCklinG eConomiC inequality 5. 3 tax PoliCy in a global enVironment: the Case for a global finanCial register Although the tax system is a crucial tool to tackle inequality, it also faces potential obstacles, among which is tax evasion. The wealth currently held in tax havens is equivalent to more than 10% of global GDP and has increased considerably since the 1970s. The rise of tax havens makes it difficult to properly measure and tax wealth and capital income in a globalized world.
4. 1 20% 100% World inequality report 2018 Part v 40% 60% 80% between age 18-21 (%) local issue. access to quality higher education is particularly unequal in the united states the link between school quality and upward mobility that as highlighted above suggests that educational policies, school organi ation, and access rules can play a key role in Share of children who attend college promoting intergenerational mobility a Source: Chetty, Hendren, Kline and Saez (2014). See wir2018. wid. world for data series and notes.
Labor Incomes: A ale o hree lasticities American Economic Journal: Economic Policy. 9 piketty, t. , saez, e. , and stantcheva, s. (2014). Ibid. 5 he conomics o uperstars, American Economic Review, 71 : , 6 Gabai , , and Landier, A hy as ay Increased o Much Quarterly Journal of Economics, , https:// doi org/ / ec 7 Bloomberg Global ay Inde Bloomberg database 8 i etty, , ae , , and tantcheva, ptimal a ation o op.
1 (the poorest 10% among the richest 1% of global earners), growth was 74% between 1980 and 2016. The Top 1% of income earners captured 27% of total growth over this period. Income estimates account or di erences in the cost o living bet een countries Values are net o inflation Source: WID. world (2017). See wir2018. wid. world for data series and notes. 250% Real income growth per adult (%) 50% 100% 150% 200% 0% 10 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 99. 9 100 Income group (percentile).
org, ontome. net, geovistory. org. Leur but est de faciliter la transition numérique grâce à un outillage construit en cohérence avec l'épistémologie des sciences historiques et de contribuer à la réalisation d'un « graphe d'information » disciplinaire. In the context of the digital transition, the semantic Web and linked open data (LOD) play an increasingly central role as they allow the construction of knowledge graphs linking together the resources of the Web. This phenomenon questions the historical sciences and raises the major issue of a paradigm shift. After clarifying what the meaning of "data" is, the paper analyses their place in the process of knowledge production. It presents the main components of the paradigm shift, and in particular humanités numériques.
Cette dynamique s'inscrit dans la stratégie des agences publiques de la recherche qui encouragent, voire obligent, les producteurs à ouvrir leurs données. Pour la France, on peut mentionner OpenData France 9 et la Feuille de route pour la science ouverte du CNRS 10. Dans le contexte de la transition numérique, les principes FAIR (findable, accessible, interoperable, reusable) ont été formulés afin de guider la production et la publication des données issues de la recherche pour qu'elles soient « plus facilement accessibles, comprises, échangeables et réutilisables 11 ». Leur finalité est de promouvoir les bonnes pratiques permettant la réutilisation des données en vue de répondre à de nouveaux questionnements 12. Les chercheurs et chercheuses sont ainsi invités à publier non seulement leurs résultats sous forme d'articles ou de livres, mais encore à mettre à disposition les données elles-mêmes ayant servi à les établir 13.
On a ensuite l'information saisie sous forme de tableur : dans ces données semi-structurées, telle la « Liste des monuments historiques en Corse », les propriétés des objets sont représentées sous forme de chiffres ou de chaînes de caractères. Les textes transcrits au format XML, selon les directives de la Text Encoding Initiative, re-lèvent également de cette catégorie. L'information contenue dans ces données est certes utilisable pour la recherche, mais il n'est pas possible de la relier explicitement à d'autres ressources  (Beretta 2016). Si on veut représenter les relations entre objets, il existe plusieurs technologies, allant des bases de données relationnelles aux bases de données orientées graphe et aux technologies sémantiques, telles Wikidata ou BNF Data, qui stockent l'information sous forme de données structurées.
Quant à l'histoire nu-mérique, la question du modèle conceptuel et du choix de la technologie de stockage à adopter se pose à ce stade : si pour un dépouillement sériel d'une seule source, une feuille de tableur bien faite peut faire l'affaire, dès que l'on mobilise plusieurs sources, ou que l'on veut observer les relations subsistant entre de multiples objets dans l'espace et dans le temps, l'utilisation d'une base de données relationnelle ou, encore mieux, d'un serveur de LOD devient indispensable. Il convient également de relever que l'information dans la pyramide s'articule à deux niveaux : on peut viser une reproduction du contenu des sources, c'est-à-dire de leur manière de présenter plus ou moins fidèlement les faits, niveau qui est appelé depuis quelques années celui des factoïdes  (Pasin et Bradley 2015)  ; ou essayer de déployer toute la sagacité de la méthode critique, afin d'approximer la factualité, l'information représentant dans ce cas autant que possible les phénomènes du passé comme tels.
En utilisant aujourd'hui un tableur ou une base de données ad hoc pour stocker les données, non seulement on se prive de toute la richesse sémantique des LOD et de leur potentiel de traitement, mais encore on risque de ne pas pouvoir réutiliser l'information collectée. La communauté de recherche va ainsi continuer à parcourir mille fois le premier kilomètre, alors qu'une démarche collaborative de collecte de l'information, soutenue par des plateformes de recherche fondées sur les technologies sémantiques, permet de parcourir ensemble des milliers de kilomètres et de disposer, en très peu de temps et en faisant levier sur une curation collective des données 26 , d'un graphe d'information de grande complexité, qualité et richesse. Certes, des plateformes telles que DBPedia, graphe de données extrait de Wikipédia, ou son concurrent Wikidata, qui résultent d'une collecte d'information par les non-spécialistes et largement automatisée, ont une grande utilité.