 Lyft is a $7.5 billion dollar transportation services company that develops, markets and  operates the Lyft App.       In order to maximize its efforts to market to potential drivers, upon information and  belief, Lyft contracted with Jobcase to market its services to potential drivers like Plaintiff.     Under the terms of this contract, Lyft encourages and incentivizes Jobcase to market  Lyft’s services to drivers by providing Jobcase with a unique URL that tracks the number of potential  drivers that access Lyft’s website via advertisements disseminated by Jobcase, and compensating  Jobcase based on this number.            As a result, on or about August 10, 2017 at 11:26 a.m., Jobcase, using an automated  text-messaging platform, caused a text message to be transmitted, on Lyft’s behalf, to Plaintiff’s cellular  telephone number ending in 4187 (“4187 Number”):    The website promoted in the text message is owned and operated by Lyft     Defendants’ text message constitutes telemarketing because it encouraged the future  purchase of Lyft’s services by potential drivers.        At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendants with her express written consent to  be contacted by text using an ATDS.      Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 7883 Number.     The impersonal and generic nature of Defendants’ text messages demonstrates that  Defendants utilized an ATDS in transmitting the messages.  See Jenkins v. LL Atlanta, LLC, No. 1:14- cv-2791-WSD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30051, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2016) (“These assertions,  combined with the generic, impersonal nature of the text message advertisements and the use of a short  code, support an inference that the text messages were sent using an ATDS.”) (citing Legg v. Voice  Media Grp., Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 1370, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to infer  text messages were sent using ATDS; use of a short code and volume of mass messaging alleged would  be impractical without use of an ATDS); Kramer v. Autobytel, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1171 (N.D.  Cal. 2010) (finding it “plausible” that defendants used an ATDS where messages were advertisements  written in an impersonal manner and sent from short code); Robbins v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 13-CV-132- IEG NLS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72725, 2013 WL 2252646, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2013) (observing  that mass messaging would be impracticable without use of an ATDS)).      Specifically, upon information and belief, Defendants utilized a combination of  hardware and software systems to send the text messages at issue in this case.  The systems utilized by  Defendant have the current capacity or present ability to generate or store random or sequential numbers  or to dial sequentially or randomly at the time the call is made, and to dial such numbers, en masse, in  an automated fashion without human intervention.    As outlined above, upon information and belief, Jobcase was acting as an agent of,  or as part of a joint venture with Lyft, for each other’s mutual benefit, within the course and scope  of their agreement and with each other’s full knowledge and consent.     Plaintiff is informed and believes that each of Jobcase’s acts and/or omissions  complained of herein were known, consented to, and/or ratified by Lyft.    Further, Lyft knowingly received and retained the monetary benefit from drivers it  contracted with as a result of Jobcase’s unlawful calling and telemarketing practices on Lyft’s  behalf.    Upon information and belief, at all times relevant, Lyft had the ability and right to  control Jobcase’s conduct as it pertained to marketing Lyft’s services and/or use of Lyft’s trade-name.     Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of  herself and all others similarly situated.    Defendants and their employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does  not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the several  thousands, if not more.   The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s  claim that Defendants routinely transmits text messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular  telephone services is accurate, Plaintiffs and the Class members will have identical claims capable of  being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case.   Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-58 as if fully set forth herein.     It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for  emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any  automatic telephone dialing system … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone  service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).     “Automatic telephone dialing system” refers to any equipment that has the  “capacity to dial numbers without human intervention.”  See, e.g., Hicks v. Client Servs., Inc., No.  07-61822, 2009 WL 2365637, at *4 (S.D. Fla. June 9, 2009) (citing FCC, In re: Rules and  Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991: Request of ACA  International for Clarification and Declaratory Ruling, 07–232, ¶ 12, n.23 (2007)).     Defendants – or third parties directed by Defendants – used equipment having the  capacity to dial numbers without human intervention to make marketing telephone calls to the  cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class defined above.     Defendants therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an  automatic telephone dialing system to make marketing telephone calls to the cell phones of  Plaintiff and Class Members without their prior express written consent.     All Defendants are directly, jointly, or vicariously liable for each such violation of  the TCPA.    As a result of Defendants’ conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA,  Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a  minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to an  injunction against future calls.    Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-58 as if fully set forth herein.     At all times relevant, Defendants’ knew or should have known that their conduct as  alleged herein violated the TCPA.      Defendants knew that they did not have prior express written consent to send these  text messages.      Because Defendants knew or should have known that Plaintiff and Class Members  had not given prior express consent to receive its autodialed calls to their cellular telephones, the  Court should treble the amount of statutory damages available to Plaintiff and the other members  of the putative Class pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA.    As a result of Defendants’ violations, Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled  to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C.  § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C).  WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Mary Fente, on behalf of herself and the other members of the  Class, prays for the following relief:   a.       A declaration that Defendants’ practices described herein violate the Telephone  Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227;   b.  A declaration that Defendants’ violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection  Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, were willful and knowing;  c.  An injunction prohibiting Defendants from using an automatic telephone dialing  system to call and text message telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephones without the  prior express consent of the called party;   d.  An award of actual, statutory damages, and/or trebled statutory damages; and   e.  Such further and other relief the Court deems reasonable and just.  Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)  (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)   PROPOSED CLASS   Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)  (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)  