 Plaintiff sent Defendant written communication dated August 7, 2012, and  demanded that Defendant cease and desist from any and all further communications with  Plaintiff.  (See August 7, 2012 Correspondence, attached as Exhibit A).    Defendant received Plaintiff’s cease and desist correspondence on August 14,  2012 at 8:32 A.M.  (See USPS Delivery Confirmation, attached as Exhibit B).    During the September 17, 2012 telephone call, Plaintiff answered and listened to a  pre-recorded message until Plaintiff was transferred to a live person.    During the September 17, 2012 telephone call, Plaintiff spoke with Defendant and  again demanded that Defendant cease and desist from placing any and all further calls to  Plaintiff.    During the September 17, 2012 conversation, Defendant advised Plaintiff that it  would remove her name from its calling list.    Despite Plaintiff’s repeated cease and desist demands, Defendant placed calls to  Plaintiff on September 18, 2012 at 8:54 A.M., September 18, 2012 at 12:25 P.M, October 2,  2012 at 3:04 P.M., October 9, 2012 at 12:10 P.M., October 10, 2012 at 9:56 A.M., October 10,  2012 at 10:42 A.M., October 11, 2012 at 6:36 P.M. and October 15, 2012 at 5:41 P.M.    Upon information and good-faith belief, Defendant placed the telephone calls  identified above to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number using an automatic telephone dialing  system and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice.    Defendant did not place any telephone calls to Plaintiff for emergency purposes.    Defendant did not have Plaintiff’s prior express consent to make any telephone  calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number—any consent, if it existed, having been expressly  revoked via the August 7, 2012 letter and again during the September 17, 2012 conversation.    Upon information and good-faith belief, Defendant placed the telephone calls  identified above to Plaintiff voluntarily.    Upon information and good-faith belief, Defendant placed the telephone calls  identified above to Plaintiff under its own free will.    Upon information and good-faith belief, Defendant had knowledge that it was  using an automatic telephone dialing system and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice to make  and/or place each of the telephone calls identified above.    Upon information and good-faith belief, Defendant intended to use an automatic  telephone dialing system and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice to make and/or place each of  the telephone calls identified above.   The proposed Class specifically excludes the United States of America, the State  of Texas, counsel for the parties, the presiding United States District Court Judge, the Judges of  the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and the Justices of the United States  Supreme Court, any entity in which Defendant has or had a controlling interest, all officers and  agents of Defendant, and all persons related to within the third degree of consanguinity or  affection to any of the foregoing individuals.    The Class is averred to be so numerous that joinder of all members is  impracticable.      The exact number of members of the Class is unknown to Plaintiff at this time  and can be ascertained only through appropriate discovery.      Upon information and good-faith belief, the proposed Class is ascertainable in  that the names and addresses of all members of the Class can be identified in business records  maintained by Defendant.      Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class she seeks  to represent.    Plaintiff and all members of the Class’s claims originate from the same conduct,  practice, and procedure on the part of Defendant, and Plaintiff possesses the same interests and  has suffered the same injuries as each Class member.  Like all proposed members of the Class,  Plaintiff received telephone calls from Defendant using an automatic telephone dialing system,  and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice, in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227.  Thus, if brought and  prosecuted individually, the claims of each of the members of the Class would require proof of  the same material and substantive facts.    Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the  Class and has no interests that are contrary to or in conflict with the members of the Class.    Plaintiff is willing and prepared to serve this Court and the proposed Class.    Plaintiff has retained the services of counsel who are experienced and competent  in consumer protection claims, as well as complex class action litigation, will adequately  prosecute this action, and will assert, protect, and otherwise represent Plaintiff and all absent  Class members.    The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the proposed Class  would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members  of the Class, which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the parties opposing  the Class.  Such incompatible standards of conduct and varying adjudications, on what would  necessarily be the same essential facts, proof, and legal theories, would also create and allow the  existence of inconsistent and incompatible rights within the Class.    Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) in that Defendant  has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the proposed Class, making final  declaratory or injunctive relief appropriate.    Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) in that the  questions of law and fact that are common to members of the proposed Class predominate over  any questions affecting only individual members.    There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action.    Absent a class action, Defendant’s violations of the law will be allowed to  proceed without a full, fair, judicially supervised remedy.    Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation above.    Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) by utilizing an automatic  telephone dialing system and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice to make and/or place telephone  calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number.    Defendant willingly or knowingly violated 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) as  Defendant was advised that it did not have consent to call Plaintiff’s cellular telephone on two  separate occasions, yet repeatedly used an automatic telephone dialing system and/or an artificial  or prerecorded voice to make and/or place telephone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone  number anyway.   VIOLATION OF 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(a)(iii)  