 Each of the Plaintiffs are, and at all times mentioned herein were, a “person” as  defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(39).    Plaintiff Antista has possessed her current cellular telephone number for  approximately 14 years.    Plaintiff Antista received telephone calls on her cellular telephone on November  15, 2016, from telephone number 480-448-3778; on January 3 and January 4, 2017, from  telephone number 602-362-4190.     Each and all of these telephone calls were not for Plaintiff Antista. A MCM  representative informed Plaintiff Antista that the calls were regarding her husband and her  husband’s Capital One account.    Plaintiff Antista told MCM to stop calling but MCM continued to call.    Plaintiff Toft has possessed her current cellular telephone number since August 2,  2011.    Plaintiff Toft received telephone calls on her cellular telephone on January 6 and  January 11, 2017, from telephone number 248-216-1545; on January 16, 2017, from telephone  number 947-333-9327; on February 20, 2017, from telephone number 248-216-1550; on  November 21, 2017, from telephone number 800-416-6433; on December 23 and December 29,  2017 from telephone number 248-216-1545.    Plaintiff Toft received a call from MCM around April 2017 and told the female  representative not to call her anymore. Yet, Plaintiff Toft received at least three additional calls.    Plaintiff Toft never provided MCM or the original creditor, CitiFinancial Services,  Inc. (“CitiFinancial”) her current cellular telephone number.    Plaintiff Toft opened a CitiFinancial account on August 20, 2008 and defaulted on  the account sometime in June 2010.    Defendants are, and at all times mentioned herein were, each a “person” as defined  pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 153(39).    The telephone numbers at which Plaintiffs were contacted on, utilizing an  “artificial or prerecorded voice” or placed by an “automatic telephone dialing system,” were each  assigned to a cellular telephone service as specified in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).    Moreover, Defendant’s calls placed to Plaintiffs’ cellular telephone number were  not made “for emergency purposes” as described in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A).    Defendant’s calls to Plaintiffs’ cellular telephone numbers utilizing an “artificial  or prerecorded voice” or placed by an “automatic telephone dialing system,” made for non- emergency purposes and in the absence of Plaintiffs’ prior express consent violated 47 U.S.C.  § 227(b)(1)(A).    Pursuant to the TCPA and the FCC’s January 2008 Declaratory Ruling, it is  Defendant’s burden to demonstrate that Plaintiffs provided Defendant with “prior express  consent” within the meaning of the Statute.7  VI.   Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and all other persons similarly  situated (hereinafter referred to as the “Class”).    Plaintiffs propose the following Class definition, subject to amendment as  appropriate:  All persons in the United States who, at any time on or after November 14,  2016, received one (1) or more non-emergency telephone call(s) from  Midland Credit Management, Inc., to a cellular telephone through the use  of an automatic telephone dialing system and/or an artificial or prerecorded  voice, but had not provided prior express consent to receive such calls  and/or had requested to stop calling.    Plaintiffs are unaware of the exact number of the Class Members, but reasonably  believes that Class Members number, at a minimum, is in the thousands.    Plaintiffs and all Class Members have been harmed by Defendant’s acts because  their privacy has been violated; they were subject to annoying and harassing telephone calls that  constitute a nuisance; and they were charged for Defendant’s incoming telephone calls.    The subject Class Action Complaint seeks injunctive relief and money damages.    Joinder of all Class Members is impracticable due to both the large Class size and  relatively modest value of each individual claim. The claims’ disposition as a Class Action suit  will provide substantial benefit to the parties and to the Court, avoiding multiplicity of identical  suits. The Class can easily be identified by way of records maintained by Defendant and/or by the  creditors on whose behalf Defendant placed the subject telephone calls.    As a person who received telephone calls via “artificial or prerecorded voice” or  placed by an “automatic telephone dialing system,” without their “prior express consent” within  the meaning of the TCPA and FCC Rules, Plaintiffs assert claims that are typical of each and all  Class Members. Plaintiffs have no interest that is antagonistic to the interest of any other Class  Member, and they will fairly and adequately represent and protect the Class’ interests.    Plaintiffs has retained counsel experienced in handling Class Action claims that  involve federal and state consumer protection statute violations, including claims made pursuant  to the TCPA.    A Class Action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this  controversy. Class-wide relief is essential for compelling Defendant to comply with the TCPA.  Each Class Member’s interest in individually controlling the prosecution of a separate claim  against Defendant is minute because an individual action’s statutory damages for TCPA violation  is small. Management of these claims is likely to be significantly less difficult than management  of many other Class claims, as all of the telephone calls at issue are automated and the Class  Members did not provide the statutorily required “prior express consent” to authorize the calls  placed to their cellular telephone numbers.    Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making  appropriate the overall Class’ final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief. Plaintiffs  additionally allege, upon information and belief, that the TCPA violations complained of herein  are substantially likely to continue in the future if an injunction is not entered.   Congress found that “automated or pre-recorded calls are a nuisance and an  invasion of privacy, regardless of the type of call” and decided that “banning” such calls made  without consent was “the only effective means of protecting telephone consumers from this  nuisance and privacy invasion.”  Pub. L. No. 102-243, §§ 2(10-13) (Dec. 20, 1991), codified at 47  U.S.C. § 227; see also Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368, 371 (2012) (“The Act bans  certain practices invasive of privacy[.]”).      By effectuating these unlawful phone calls, Defendant caused Plaintiffs the very  harm that Congress sought to prevent—namely, a “nuisance and invasion of privacy.”    Defendant’s aggravating and annoying phone calls trespassed upon and interfered  with Plaintiffs’ rights and interests in their cellular telephone and cellular telephone line, and  intruded upon Plaintiffs’ seclusion.    Defendant’s phone calls harmed Plaintiffs by wasting their time, trespassing on  their phone, invading their privacy as well as causing aggravation and inconvenience.      Defendant’s foregoing acts and omissions constitute multiple violations of the  TCPA; including, but not limited to, each and all of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227  et seq.    Due to Defendant’s violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiffs and each Class  Member are entitled, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), to an award of $500.00 in statutory  damages for each and every telephone call that constitutes a statutory violation.    Plaintiffs and all Class Members are also entitled to, and do seek, injunctive relief  to prohibit Defendant from engaging in future conduct that will violate the TCPA.  VIOLATIONS OF THE  TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq.  