 Defendant’s text messages were transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, and within  the time frame relevant to this action.      Defendant’s text messages constitute telemarketing because they encouraged the future  purchase or investment in property, goods, or services, i.e., selling Plaintiff group fitness classes.         The information contained in the text message advertises Defendant’s “Special  Memorial Day sales” and “Special Labor Day Sale”, which Defendant sends to promote its business.    Plaintiff received the subject texts within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant’s  violation of the TCPA occurred within this district.  Upon information and belief, Defendant caused  other text messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district.      Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 2385 Number, and is financially  responsible for phone service to the 2385 Number.     The impersonal and generic nature of Defendant’s text messages demonstrates that  Defendant utilized an ATDS in transmitting the messages.  See Jenkins v. LL Atlanta, LLC, No. 1:14- cv-2791-WSD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30051, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2016) (“These assertions,  combined with the generic, impersonal nature of the text message advertisements and the use of a short  code, support an inference that the text messages were sent using an ATDS.”) (citing Legg v. Voice  Media Grp., Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 1370, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to infer  text messages were sent using ATDS; use of a short code and volume of mass messaging alleged would  be impractical without use of an ATDS); Kramer v. Autobytel, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1171 (N.D.  Cal. 2010) (finding it "plausible" that defendants used an ATDS where messages were advertisements  written in an impersonal manner and sent from short code); Hickey v. Voxernet LLC, 887 F. Supp. 2d  1125, 1130; Robbins v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 13-CV-132-IEG NLS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72725, 2013  WL 2252646, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2013) (observing that mass messaging would be impracticable  without use of an ATDS)).      The text messages originated from telephone number 727-888-6781, a number which  upon information and belief is owned and operated by Defendant.    The number used by Defendant (727-888-6781) is known as a “long code,” a standard  10-digit phone number that enabled Defendant to send SMS text messages en masse, while deceiving  recipients into believing that the message was personalized and sent from a telephone number operated  by an individual.      Specifically, upon information and belief, Defendant utilized a combination of hardware  and software systems to send the text messages at issue in this case.  The systems utilized by Defendant  have the capacity to store telephone numbers using a random or sequential generator, and to dial such  numbers without human intervention.      Defendant’s unsolicited text messages caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion  of his privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion.  Defendant’s  text messages also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to his daily life.     Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of  himself and all others similarly situated.    Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of a Class defined as follows:  All persons within the United States who, within the four  years prior to the filing of this Complaint, were sent a text  message, from Defendant or anyone on Defendant’s  behalf, to said person’s cellular telephone number,  advertising Defendant’s services, without the recipients’  prior express written consent.      Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not  know the number of members in the Class but believes the Class members number in the several  thousands, if not more.   There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate  over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class.  Among the questions of law and  fact common to the Class are:  (1) Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff’s and Class  members’ cellular telephones using an ATDS;  (2) Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that it obtained prior  express written consent to make such calls;  (3) Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful;  (4) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and  (5) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future.    The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s  claim that Defendant routinely transmits text messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular  telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of  being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case.   Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth  herein.     Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used equipment having the  capacity to dial numbers without human intervention to make non-emergency telephone calls to  the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class defined below.     These calls were made without regard to whether or not Defendant had first  obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not  have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative  Class when its calls were made.     Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an  automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of  Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express written consent.    Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls, and  knew or should have known that it was using equipment that at constituted an automatic telephone  dialing system. The violations were therefore willful or knowing.     Plaintiff re-allege and incorporate paragraphs 1-46 as if fully set forth herein.    At all times relevant, Defendant knew or should have known that its conduct as  alleged herein violated the TCPA.    Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls and  knew or should have known that its conduct was a violation of the TCPA.    Because Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff and Class Members  had not given prior express consent to receive its autodialed calls, the Court should treble the  amount of statutory damages available to Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class  pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA.   Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)  (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)   PROPOSED CLASS   Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)  (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)  