page_title: Gaspar de Guzmán, Count-Duke of Olivares
section_title: Foreign policies
hierarchical_section_title: Gaspar de Guzmán, Count-Duke of Olivares / Foreign policies
caption_attribution_description: Español: La obra representa el momento en que Justino de Nassau rindió la ciudad de Breda, en 1625, a las tropas españolas al mando del general Ambrosio Spínola, que aparece recibiendo las llaves de la ciudad de manos de su enemigo. Français&#160;: L'œuvre représente le moment où Justin de Nassau, en 1625, se rend au général commandant les troupes espagnoles Ambrogio Spinola, après le siège de Bréda, ville située au sud de l'actuel Pays-Bas. Huile sur toile peinte entre 1634 et 1635 par Diego Vélasquez, exposée au musée du Prado à Madrid.
context_page_description: Gaspar de Guzmán y Pimentel, 1st Duke of Sanlúcar, 3rd Count of Olivares, GE known as the Count-Duke of Olivares, was a Spanish royal favourite of Philip IV and minister. As prime minister from 1621 to 1643, he over-exerted Spain in foreign affairs and unsuccessfully attempted domestic reform. His policy of committing Spain to recapture Holland led to a renewal of the Eighty Years' War while Spain was also embroiled in the Thirty Years' War. In addition, his attempts to centralise power and increase wartime taxation led to revolts in Catalonia and in Portugal, which brought about his downfall.
context_section_description: For twenty-two years Olivares directed Spain's foreign policy. It was a period of constant war, and finally of disaster abroad and of rebellion at home. Olivares' foreign policy was based around his assessment that Philip IV was surrounded by jealous rivals across Europe, who wished to attack his position as a champion of the Catholic Church; in particular, Olivares saw the rebellious Dutch as a key enemy. Although Olivares made much of religion as a facet of Spain's foreign policy, in practice he often overruled that principle. It has also been argued that Olivares' dislike of flamboyant spending may have influenced his views of the Dutch republic, known for its relatively open show of wealth.
  Olivares' first key decision came in 1621. Under Philip III, Spain had successfully intervened in the Electorate of the Palatinate in combination with the forces of the Emperor Ferdinand, a fellow Habsburg, during 1618–20, surrounding the Dutch provinces that had rebelled against Spanish rule some forty years before. An armistice had successfully held since 1609, but in his role as foreign policy advisor, Olivares' uncle de Zúñiga had brought Spain closer and closer to recommencing hostilities as a means of improving Spain's negotiating position with the Dutch. Olivares' new influence was central to the decision to finally abandon the armistice in favour of renewed military action using the Army of Flanders and economic warfare – attacking Dutch fleets and applying trading embargoes. This policy would ultimately fail over the next thirty years; to some the Spanish recommencement of the war has appeared 'surprising', whilst it can also be explained as a misreading of internal Dutch politics. Whilst the strategy itself was a failure, Olivares' tactics – his attempt to combine military and economic warfare – have since been praised as a 'shrewd policy'.
  For the remainder of the Eighty Years' War, Olivares would pursue a 'Netherlands first' strategy, focusing his resources and attention on delivering success in the Netherlands first, with the hope of dealing with the other challenges facing the Spanish across Europe once this key Spanish possession had been secured. For the first fifteen years of the war, this strategy proved largely successful. Spain made considerable early advances against the Dutch, finally retaking the key city of Breda in 1624, albeit at huge expense. In 1634, against the backdrop of Swedish successes across northern Europe, Olivares was crucial to the creation of a fresh Spanish army in northern Italy, and the projection of that force under the leadership of Cardinal-Infante Ferdinand along the Spanish Road into Germany, where the 'almost miraculous appearance' of the army defeated the Protestant alliance at the Battle of Nördlingen. The scene had been set, Olivares believed, for a renewed attack on the Dutch.
  Olivares' strategy ultimately failed due to the entry of France into the war. His handling of War of the Mantuan Succession, which started to pitch France against the Habsburgs in northern Italy and would ultimately result in the French invasion of Spain, has been much criticised. By 1634 France, seeing the Spanish successes in Germany and the defeat of her Swedish allies, began raising the political stakes, taking provocative military action on a small scale. In 1635, Spain responded by intervening against the Elector of Trier, a significant move that effectively forced a French declaration of war. By this stage in the war, Olivares' advice to the king was that this conflict with France would be for all or nothing – Spain would win or fall by the result. Nonetheless, French victory was far from certain in the 1630s; Olivares' invasion plan in 1635 involved four different armies and two navies, being described as 'the most ambitious military conception of early modern Europe.' Although Spanish forces were within 16 miles of Paris at the height of their success that year, Olivares' plan had severely overstretched Spanish resources and ultimately failed, leaving Spain to face a massive counter-attack in 1637
caption: The re-taking of Breda, an early Spanish success in the Eighty Years' War that would ultimately result in Olivares' fall from power, by Diego Velázquez.
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