page_title: M26 Pershing
section_title: Delayed production
hierarchical_section_title: M26 Pershing / Production history / Delayed production
caption_attribution_description: English: Gunner Seat M26A1
context_page_description: The M26 Pershing was a heavy tank/medium tank of the United States Army. The tank was named after General of the Armies John J. Pershing, who led the American Expeditionary Force in Europe in World War I. It was used in the last months of World War II during the Invasion of Germany and extensively during the Korean War.
  The M26 was intended as a replacement of the M4 Sherman, but a prolonged development period meant that only a small number saw combat in Europe, notably in the 9th Armored Division's dash to take the Ludendorff Bridge during the Battle of Remagen. Based on the criteria of firepower, mobility, and protection, American historian R. P. Hunnicutt ranked the Pershing behind the German Panther medium tank, but ahead of the Tiger I heavy tank. In service during the Korean War, the M26 had equivalent armour protection to the T-34-85, but struggled in the hilly and muddy terrain. It was withdrawn in 1951 in favor of its improved derivative, the M46 Patton, which had a more powerful and reliable engine and advanced suspension better able to handle the terrain.
context_section_description: The M26 was introduced late into World War II and saw only a limited amount of combat. Tank historians, such as Richard P. Hunnicutt, George Forty and Steven Zaloga, have generally agreed that the main cause of the delay in production of the M26 was opposition to the tank from the Army Ground Forces, headed by General Lesley McNair. Zaloga in particular has identified several specific factors that led both to the delay of the M26 program and limited improvements in the firepower of the M4:
  1. Tank destroyer doctrine
  McNair, who was an artillery officer, had promulgated the "tank destroyer doctrine" in the U.S. Army. In this doctrine, tanks were primarily for infantry support and exploitation of breakthroughs. Those tactics dictated that enemy tanks were to be engaged by tank destroyer forces, which were composed of lightly armored but relatively fast vehicles carrying more powerful anti-tank guns, as well as towed versions of these anti-tank guns. Under the tank destroyer doctrine, emphasis was placed only on improving the firepower of the tank destroyers, as there was a strong bias against developing a heavy tank to take on enemy tanks. This also limited improvements in the firepower of the M4 Sherman. The US Army Ground Forces that supported this doctrine got the approval of new TD projects, one of them using the same 90 mm gun, while at the same time they were blocking tank projects.
  2. Simplification of supply
  McNair established "battle need" criteria for acquisition of weapons in order to make best use of America's 3,000-mile-long (4,800 km) supply line to Europe by preventing the introduction of weapons that would prove unnecessary, extravagant or unreliable on the battlefield. In his view, the introduction of a new heavy tank had problems in terms of transportation, supply, service, and reliability, and was not necessary in 1943 or early 1944. Tank development took time, and so the sudden appearance of a new tank threat could not be met quickly enough under such criteria.
  3. Complacency
  A sense of complacency fell upon those in charge of developing tanks in the U.S. Army because the M4 Sherman, in 1942, was considered by the Americans to be superior to the most common German tanks: the Panzer III and early models of the Panzer IV. Even through most of 1943, the 75-mm M4 Sherman was adequate against the majority of German armor, although the widespread appearance of the German 7.5 cm KwK 40 tank gun during this time had led to a growing awareness that the M4 was becoming outgunned. There was insufficient Intelligence data processing and forward thinking to understand that there was an ongoing arms race in tanks and that the U.S. needed to anticipate future German tank threats. The Tiger I and Panther tanks that appeared in 1943, were seen in only very limited numbers by U.S. forces and hence were not considered as major threats. The end result was that, in 1943, the Ordnance Department lacking any guidance from the rest of the army, concentrated its efforts in tank development mainly on its major project, the electrical transmission T23. By contrast, the Russians and British were engaged in a continuous effort to improve tanks; in 1943, the British begin development of what became the 51-ton Centurion tank (although this tank reached service just too late to see combat in World War II) and, on the Eastern Front, a full-blown tank arms race was underway, with the Soviets responding to the German heavy tanks by starting development work on the T-34-85 and IS-2 tanks.
  To see more IS tanks, see IS tank family.
  
  From mid-1943 to mid-1944, development of the 90 mm up-armored T26 prototype continued to proceed slowly due to disagreements within the U.S. Army about its future tank needs. The accounts of what exactly happened during this time vary by historian, but all agree that Army Ground Forces was the main source of resistance that delayed production of the T26.
  In September–October 1943, a series of discussions occurred over the issue of beginning production of the T26E1, which was advocated by the head of the Armored
caption: Gunner Seat M26A1
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