page_title: History of the Royal Australian Navy
section_title: Between the Wars
hierarchical_section_title: History of the Royal Australian Navy / Between the Wars
caption_attribution_description: Photograph of Australian battlecruiser HMAS Australia on her port side and sinking, after being scuttled 24 miles off South Head, Sydney. HMAS Anzac is in the background. She finally sank at 1451.
context_page_description: The history of the Royal Australian Navy traces the development of the Royal Australian Navy from the colonisation of Australia by the British in 1788. Until 1859, vessels of the Royal Navy made frequent trips to the new colonies. In 1859, the Australia Squadron was formed as a separate squadron and remained in Australia until 1913. Until Federation, five of the six Australian colonies operated their own colonial naval force, which formed on 1 March 1901 the Australian Navy's Commonwealth Naval Force which received Royal patronage in July 1911 and was from that time referred to as Royal Australian Navy. On 4 October 1913 the new replacement fleet for the foundation fleet of 1901 steamed through Sydney Heads for the first time.
  The Royal Australian Navy has seen action in every ocean of the world. It first saw action in World War I, in the Pacific, Indian and Atlantic oceans. Between the wars the RAN's fortunes shifted with the financial situation of Australia: it experienced great growth during the 1920s, but was forced to reduce its fleet and operations during the 1930s. Consequently, when it entered World War II, the RAN was smaller than it had been at the start of World War I.
context_section_description: Following the end of World War I, the Australian Government believed that an immediate evaluation of the RAN was necessary. Australia had based its naval policy on the Henderson Recommendations of 1911, developed by Sir Reginald Henderson. The government sent an invitation to Admiral John Jellicoe, he arrived in Australia in May 1919. Jellicoe remained in Australia for three months, before returning to England via New Zealand and Canada. Jellicoe submitted his findings in August 1919, titled the Report on the Naval Mission to the Commonwealth. The report outlined several policies designed to strengthen British naval strength in the Pacific Ocean. The report heavily stressed a close relationship between the RAN and the Royal Navy. This would be achieved by strict adherence to the procedures and administration methods of the Royal Navy. The report also suggested constant officer exchange between the two forces. Jellicoe also called for the creation of a large Far East Imperial Fleet, which would be based in Singapore and include capital ships and aircraft carriers. The creation cost for this fleet was to be divided between Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand: contributing 75%, 20%, and 5% respectively. The suggested makeup of the RAN would include; one aircraft carrier, two battlecruisers, eight light cruisers, one flotilla leader, twelve destroyers, a destroyer depot ship, eight submarines, one submarine depot ship, and a small number of additional auxiliary ships. The annual cost and depreciation of the fleet was estimated to be £4,024,600. Except for implementing closer tier with the Royal Navy, none of Jellicoe's major recommendations were carried out.
  With the end of World War I, the Australian Government began to worry about the threat Japan posed to Australia. Japan had extended its empire 3,000 kilometres (1,900 mi) to the south, bringing it right to Australia's doorstep. Japan had continued to build up its naval force, and had reached the point where it outgunned the Royal Navy in the Pacific. The RAN and the government believed that the possibility of a Japanese invasion was highly likely. In his report, Admiral Jellicoe believed that the threat of a Japanese invasion of Australia would remain as long as the White Australia Policy remained in place. Due to the perceived threat, and bilateral support in Australia for the White Australia Policy, the Australian Government became a vocal supporter of the continuance of the 1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Australia was joined in its support for the alliance by New Zealand but was heavily opposed by Canada, which believed that the alliance had hindered the British Empire's relationship with China and the United States. No decision on the alliance was agreed on, and the discussion was shelved pending the outcome of the Washington Naval Treaty. The results of the treaty, which allowed the British to retain naval supremacy in the Pacific Ocean, created a sense of security in Australia. Many Australians saw the Four Powers Pact as replacing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This sense of security became known as the Ten Year Rule. This led to defence retrenchments in Australia, following the international trend, and a £500,000 reduction in expenditure. The Governor-General Henry Forster when opening parliament on 22 June 1922 was quoted as saying:
  In view of the result of attained at the Washington Treaty which, my advisors believe, guarantee peace in the Pacific for some time to come, it is proposed to reduce the establishment of the navy and army, and postpone the expansion of the air force.
  Between World War I and World War II, the Royal Australian Navy underwent a severe reduction in ships and manpower. As a result of the Washington Naval Treaty, the flagship HMAS Australia was scrapped with her main armaments and sunk outside Sydney Heads in 1924. In the same year, the RAN began a five-year program of obtaining new ships from Britain: the heavy cruisers Australia and Canberra and the seaplane carrier Albatross. This purchase was partly paid for by scrapping Brisbane, Me
caption: Australia on her side and sinking during her scuttling in April 1924
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