page_title: Property dualism
section_title: Biological naturalism
hierarchical_section_title: Property dualism / Non-reductive physicalism / Biological naturalism
context_page_description: Property dualism describes a category of positions in the philosophy of mind which hold that, although the world is composed of just one kind of substance—the physical kind—there exist two distinct kinds of properties: physical properties and mental properties. In other words, it is the view that non-physical, mental properties exist in, or naturally supervene upon, certain physical substances.
  Substance dualism, on the other hand, is the view that there exist in the universe two fundamentally different kinds of substance: physical and non-physical, and subsequently also two kinds of properties which adhere in those respective substances. Substance dualism is thus more susceptible to the mind–body problem. Both substance and property dualism are opposed to reductive physicalism.
context_section_description: Another argument for non-reductive physicalism has been expressed by John Searle, who is the advocate of a distinctive form of physicalism he calls biological naturalism. His view is that although mental states are not ontologically reducible to physical states, they are causally reducible (see causality). He believes the mental will ultimately be explained through neuroscience. This worldview does not necessarily fall under property dualism, and therefore does not necessarily make him a "property dualist". He has acknowledged that "to many people" his views and those of property dualists look a lot alike. But he thinks the comparison is misleading.
caption: Biological Naturalism states that consciousness is a higher level function of the human brain's physical capabilities.
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