Revisional jurisdiction should be connoted to have a narrower jurisdiction when compared to Appellate Jurisdiction: Bombay High Court

 on 08 04 2021 on 17 04 5 CRA 43 2020.odt IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAYCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONCIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO.43 OF 2020 Shri Shripad Bhaskar Bhagwat& Ors. … ApplicantsVsSmt. Mangal Madhukar Jogalekar& Ors. ... Respondents…Mr. Sugandh B. Deshmukh for the Applicants. Mr. Siddharth C. Wakankar for the Respondents. CORAM : SANDEEP K. SHINDE J. RESERVED ON : 1 st APRIL 2021. PRONOUNCED ON: 8th APRIL 2021.ORAL JUDGMENT : Applicants’ Regular Civil Appeal No.618 directed against the eviction decree dated 14th March 2018 under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act 1999 wasdismissed on 25th September 2019 against which thisrevision is preferred.Shivgan 1 9 on 08 04 2021 on 17 04 5 CRA 43 2020.odt2Facts of the case are as under:.Let me refer the parties as per their status in thesuit i.e. plaintifs and defendants. Respondents plaintifsinstituted Regular Civil Suit No.1510 to recoverpossession of the suit shop premises on the ground thatpremises are reasonably and bonafde required for startingan eatery hotel and arrears of rent. Suit premises are twoshops situated at CTS No.105 Jogalekar Wadi AmbedkarChowk Daund mentioned in paragraph 1A and 1B of theplaint. Suit shop 1A is admeasuring 382 sq.ft. at groundfloor where the defendant no.1 is running grocery shop andshop no.1B admeasuring 332 sq.ft. on the frst floor wherethe defendant nos.2 and 3 are running photo shop. On 6thMay 2010 plaintifs terminated the tenancy and demandedpossession of the suit shops which defendants did notsurrender. Plaintifs’ case is that they were running a hotelat Village: Kashti Taluka: Shrigonda which they had shutand shifted to Daund. That family members who are elevenShivgan 2 9 on 08 04 2021 on 17 04 5 CRA 43 2020.odtin numbers intent to start hotel in the suit shop premises which is in the market and thus it is most ideal location.Plaintifs pleaded their need is genuine. Plaintifs pleaded defendants had at their disposal suitable property atSurvey No.105 A 1 22 2 1 having commercial potential andpending suit defendants sold part of the property to M s.Chaitanya Developers for the consideration ofRs.1 12 50 000 . Thus it is contended that if the decree ofpossession is not passed in favour of the plaintifs greaterhardship would be caused to them. Defendants denied needand requirement of the plaintifs is genuine. They submittedthat plaintifs have other properties at Baramati andadditionally have property at Daund being CTS Nos.1826 to1830 where they are running business of ‘lodging andboarding’. Contention is that plaintifs can start their hotel eatery in the said property. 3The learned trial Court upheld the plaintifs’genuine need and partly decreed the suit. However decreeShivgan 3 9 on 08 04 2021 on 17 04 5 CRA 43 2020.odtwas refused on the ground of arrears of rent.4Heard learned counsel for the parties.5Courts below concurrently held that pending suit defendants tenants sold part of their property to M s.Chaitanya Developers only after seeking permission for itschange of user. Finding is rendered that the property soldby the defendants has had commercial potential and it waslocated in market area. In fact defendant no.1 admitted inthe evidence that part of the property i.e. Plot No.1 is yetin their possession. Undoubtedly evidence of defendantno.1 has established a fact that plot of landsoldby them has been also used for construction of shops. Toarrive at this fnding Courts have relied on the evidence ofshop inspector defendant no.1 besides title documents in respect of the property CTS Nos.1826 to 1830. As againstthis both the Courts rendered a fnding of fact thatplaintifs have established their reasonable and genuineShivgan 4 9 on 08 04 2021 on 17 04 5 CRA 43 2020.odtneed for the suit premises. Defendants countered the needof the plaintifs by contending that plaintifs are inpossession of the property CTS Nos.1826 to 1830 wherethey are conducting business in the name of M s. SamarthLodge. However evidence shows this property waspurchased by Prabhakar Jogalekar paternal uncle ofPlaintifs Nos.2 3 and 4 in his name. But it appears inMunicipal record name of the plaintifs is shown as‘Manager’ of the Samarth Lodge. Thus relying on this fact defendants contended the plaintifs have adequate andsuitable premises at their disposal for starting the hoteland therefore their need for the suit premises is neitherreasonable nor bonafde. Yet the Courts found that theproperty CTS Nos.1826 to 1830 was purchased byPrabhakar Jogalekar and although names of the plaintifsare recorded as ‘Manager’ of the said lodge that itself isnot sufcient to infer hold that it is either owned by theplaintifs and or it is available for starting hotel over there.Therefore in consideration of the evidence Courts belowShivgan 5 9 on 08 04 2021 on 17 04 5 CRA 43 2020.odthave correctly concluded that the plaintifs landlords haveestablished their bonafde need for the suit shops forstarting Hotel in interest of eleven family members.6In so far as the comparative hardship isconcerned it may be stated that pending suit defendantshave sold out part of the property of commercial potentialto Developer for consideration and it has been put tocommercial use. Property sold out was in market area ofDaund City. Besides defendants have admitted part of theproperty i.e. plot no.1 is yet available. As against it inconsideration of the fact that plaintifs’ family consists ofeleven members but they have no suitable premises tostart hotel the issue as regards the comparative hardshipas is answered against the tenants cannot be faulted with. 7The learned counsel for the applicantsstrenuously argued that Courts below ought to havegranted partial decree of eviction in terms of the provisionsShivgan 6 9 on 08 04 2021 on 17 04 5 CRA 43 2020.odtof Section 16(2) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act. In myview taking into account evidence it cannot be said thatCourts below have failed to exercise the jurisdiction by notgranting decree in respect of the part of the suit premises.8Thus to be stated that fndings recorded by theCourts below is in accordance with law and it is not suferedfrom any error of law. Mr. Wakankar learned counsel for theapplicants has rightly relied on the judgment of the ApexCourt in the case of Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works v.Rangaswami Chettiar1 to contend that the High Court inrevisional jurisdiction should not re appreciate the evidenceas if in the First Appeal and enter diferent fnding thoughanother fnding might also be possible. Paragraph 3 of thecited judgment reads as under “3 Section 23 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings4 SCC 259Shivgan 7 9 on 08 04 2021 on 17 04 5 CRA 43 2020.odtany case it appears to the High Court that any such decision or ordershould be modified annulled reversed or remitted for reconsiderationit may pass orders accordingly. The language of Section 25 is indeedvery wide. But we must attach some significance to the circumstancethat both the expressions "appeal" and "revision" are employed in thestatute. Quite obviously the expression "revision" is meant to conveythe idea of a much narrower jurisdiction than that conveyed by theexpression "appeal". In fact it has to be noticed that Under Section 25the High Court calls for and examines the record of the appellateauthority in order to satisfy itself The dominant idea conveyed by theincorporation of the words to satisfy "to satisfy" itself Under Section 25appears to be that the power conferred on the High Court UnderSection 25 is essentially a power of superintendence. There fore despitethe wide language employed in Section 25 the High Court quiteobviously should not interfere with findings of fact merely because itdoes not agree with the findings of the subordinate authority. The powerconferred on the High Court under Section 25 of the Tamil NaduBuildingsAct may not be as narrow as therevisional power of the High Court under Section 115 of the CPC but inthe words of Untwalia J. in Dattonpant Gopalverso Devakate v.Vithalrao Marushirao Jenagaval "it is not wide enough to make theHigh Court a second Court of first appeal".” 9Thus having regard to the facts evidence onrecord and fndings being rendered on the cogent andreliable evidence no interference is called for in revisionaljurisdiction.10In the result revision application is dismissed.Shivgan 8 9 on 08 04 2021 on 17 04 5 CRA 43 2020.odt11Mr. Deshmukh the learned counsel for theapplicants submits that let the eviction decree be stayedfor twelve weeks. In view of the facts and the prevailingcircumstances the execution of the decree is stayed for tenweeks. (SANDEEP K. SHINDE J.)Shivgan 9 9 

Summary: The High Court in revisional jurisdiction should not re-appreciate the evidence as if in the First Appeal and enter different finding even though another finding might also be possible since circumstances in which “appeal” and “revision” are employed in the statute are different. The expression “revision” is meant to convey the idea of a much narrower jurisdiction than that conveyed by the expression “appeal’. This remarkable judgment was recently passed by Bombay High Court in the matter of SHRI SHRIPAD BHASKAR BHAGWAT &amp; OTHERS. V SMT. MANGAL MADHUKAR JOGALEKAR &amp; OTHER. [CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO.43 OF 2020] by Honourable Justice Sandeep K. Shinde. This is a Regular Civil Appeal filed by the Applicants and is directed against an eviction decree dated 14th March 2018 passed under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 which was dismissed on 25th September 2019, and through this appeal, a revision is preferred by the applicant. The facts of the present case, in brief, are, the regular civil suit was instituted to recover possession of the suit shop on the grounds that premises are reasonably and bonafide required for starting an eatery/hotel and arrears of rent. Suit premises are, two shops and plaintiffs terminated the tenancy and demanded possession of the suit shops, which defendants did not surrender. Plaintiffs alleged that they were running a hotel at Village which they had shut and shifted to Daund and then intended to start hotel in the suit shop premises which the defendants had at their disposal and later sold part of the property to M/s. Chaitanya Developers, for the consideration of Rs.1,12,50,000/-. Courts below concurrently held that during the pendency of the suit defendants sold part of their property to M/s. Chaitanya Developers only after seeking permission for its change of user. However, the need for suit premises being bonafide is an important contention and they alleged conducting business in the name of M/s. Samarth Lodge shows that the plaintiff works as manager in property owned by an uncle and thus the plaintiffs have adequate and suitable premises at their disposal for starting the hotel and therefore, their need for the suit premises is neither reasonable nor bonafide. The Court observed that “In so far as the comparative hardship is concerned, it may be stated that pending suit, defendants have sold out part of the property of commercial potential to Developer for consideration and it has been put to commercial use. Property sold out was in the market area of Daund City. Besides, defendants have admitted, part of the property, i.e., plot no.1 is yet available. As against it, in consideration of the fact that plaintiffs’ family consists of eleven members but they have no suitable premises to start hotel, the issue as regards the comparative hardship as is, answered against the tenants, cannot be faulted with.” Additionally, it was asserted by the court that the High Court in revisional jurisdiction should not re-appreciate the evidence as if in the First Appeal and enter different finding though another finding might also be possible. For this, the court relied on Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rangaswami Chettiar to state that “the High Court in revisional jurisdiction should not re-appreciate the evidence as if in the First Appeal and enter different finding though another finding might also be possible.”