No Court or Tribunal may intervene on behalf of others who are oblivious to their rights: Jharkhand High Court

 1 W.P.No. 21920 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.No. 21920 Satya Prakash aged about 48 years Son of Late Abhay Kumar Residing at C o Jai Prakash Kali Shankar Street Hindpiri Near Marwari College Ranchi P.O. & P.S. Hindpiri District Ranchi … Petitioner Versus State of Jharkhand Chief Secretary Government of Jharkhand Ranchi P.O. Dhurwa P.S Jagannathpur Dist. Ranchi Jharkhand Principal Secretary Personnel Administrative Reforms and Rajbhasha Department Government of Jharkhand Ranchi P.O. Dhurwa P.S Jagannathpur Dist. Ranchi Jharkhand Joint Secretary Personnel Administrative Reforms and Rajbhasha Department Government of Jharkhand Ranchi P.O. Dhurwa P.S Jagannathpur Dist. Ranchi Jharkhand 5. Divisional Commissioner North Chotanagpur Division Hazaribagh P.O P.S. Hazaribagh Dist. Hazaribagh Jharkhand 6. Deputy Commissioner Gumla P.O. P.S. & District Gumla Jharkhand … Respondents CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI For the Petitioner For the Respondent State Mr. Diwakar Upadhyay Advocate Mrs. Laxmi Murmu S.C. V Heard Mr. Diwakar Upadhyay learned counsel for the petitioner and Mrs. Laxmi Murmu learned counsel for the respondent State This writ petition has been heard through Video Conferencing in view of the guidelines of the High Court taking into account the situation arising due to COVID 19 pandemic. None of the parties have complained about any technical snag of audio video and with their consent this matter has been heard on merit The petitioner has preferred this writ petition for quashing the notification dated 01.07.2020 whereby the petitioner has been put under suspension under Rule 9 of the Jharkhand Government Servants Classification Control and Appeal) Rules 2016 2 W.P.No. 21920 The petitioner was posted as Circle Officer Chainpur Gumla on 31.07.2017. A notification dated 01.07.2020 issued by the Joint Secretary Personnel Administrative Reforms and Rajbhasha Department Government of Jharkhand was served to the petitioner whereby the petitioner has been put under suspension under Rule 9 of the Rules 2016 alleging therein that on the recommendation of the Deputy Commissioner Gumla vide his letter dated 06.06.2020 on the ground of non residing at the Circle Headquarter Chainpur and on a charge of unauthorisedly checking and collecting fine from vehicles outside his jurisdictional area a recommendation has been made to initiate a departmental proceeding against the petitioner. Aggrieved with this the petitioner has preferred the writ petition. Mr. Diwakar Upadhyay learned counsel for the petitioner submits that without following the principles of natural justice the suspension order has been passed. He further submits that due to that the petitioner has been put irreparable loss as his prestige is downgraded in the society. He also submits that more than 8 months period has lapsed and in spite of that the petitioner is still under suspension and no revocation order has been passed. He further submits that the case of the petitioner is covered in light of the judgment rendered by the Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary v. Union of India through its Secretary Others reported in7 SCC 291 Paragraphs 8 9 and 14 of the said judgment are quoted herein “8. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant however has rightly relied on a series of judgments of this Court including O.P. Gupta v. Union of India where this Court has enunciated that the suspension of an employee is injurious to his interests and must not be continued for an unreasonably 3 W.P.No. 21920 long period that therefore an order of suspension should not be lightly passed 9. Our attention has also been drawn to K. Sukhendar Reddy v. State of A.P. which is topical in that it castigates selective suspension perpetuated indefinitely in circumstances where other involved persons had not been subjected to any scrutiny. Reliance on this decision is in the backdrop of the admitted facts that all the persons who have been privy to the making of the office notes have not been proceeded against 14. More recently the European Convention on Human Rights in Article 6(1) promises that “6.in the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a and in its second sub article that:“ 6.Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to Per contra Mrs. Laxmi Murmu learned counsel for the respondent State submits that there is serious allegation against the petitioner and that is why the petitioner has been put under suspension. She further submits that now the departmental proceeding has already been initiated and that will be completed within a time frame and the petitioner may cooperate in the department proceeding. Having heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties the Court finds that admittedly the petitioner was suspended vide notification dated 01.07.2020. It is also an admitted fact that the enquiry has not been completed as yet. In view of the resolution of the Personnel and Administrative Department dated 26.12.2012 the enquiry needs to be completed within 105 days. Rule 9(6)(C) has not been exercised by the authority for extending the suspension order with regard to the petitioner A reference in this regard may be made in case of State of T.N. v Promod Kumar reported in17 SCC 677. Paragraph nos.24 25 4 W.P.No. 21920 26 and 27 of the said judgment are quoted herein below: “24. The first respondent was placed under deemed suspension under Rule 3(2) of the All India Services Rules for being in custody for a period of more than 48 hours. Periodic reviews were conducted for his continuance under suspension. The recommendations of the Review Committees did not favour his reinstatement due to which he is still under suspension. Mr. P. Chidambaram learned Senior Counsel appearing for the first respondent fairly submitted that we can proceed on the basis that the criminal trial is pending. There cannot be any dispute regarding the power or jurisdiction of the State Government for continuing the first respondent under suspension pending criminal trial. There is no doubt that the allegations made against the first respondent are serious in nature. However the point is whether the continued suspension of the first respondent for a prolonged period is 25. The first respondent has been under suspension for more than six years. While releasing the first respondent on bail liberty was given to the investigating agency to approach the Court in case he indulged in tampering with the evidence Admittedly no complaint is made by CBI in that regard. Even now the appellant has no case that there is any specific instance of any attempt by the first respondent to tamper with 26. In the minutes of the Review Committee meeting held on 27 6 2016 it was mentioned that the first respondent is capable of exerting pressure and influencing witnesses and there is every likelihood of the first respondent misusing office if he is reinstated as Inspector General of Police. Only on the basis of the minutes of the Review Committee meeting the Principal Secretary HomeDepartment ordered extension of the period of suspension for a further period of 180 days beyond 9 7 2016 vide order dated 6 7 2016. 27. This Court in Ajay Kumar Choudhary v. Union of India has frowned upon the practice of protracted suspension and held that suspension must necessarily be for a short duration On the basis of the material on record we are convinced that no useful purpose would be served by continuing the first respondent under suspension any longer and that his reinstatement would not be a threat to a fair trial. We reiterate the observation of the High Court that the appellant State has the liberty to appoint the first respondent in a non sensitive post.” In view of the well settled provision of law it is well settled that the suspension must necessarily be for a short duration. In this case Rule 9(6 C) has not been invoked for extending the period of suspension or revocation. However eight weeks’ further time is allowed to the respondent 5 W.P.No. 21920 State to conclude the departmental proceeding. If the departmental proceeding is not concluded within the aforesaid period the order of suspension shall automatically be revoked. 10. With the aforesaid observation and direction the writ petition stands Ajay (Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi J

Summary: It has been repeatedly held that if government employees sleep on their rights and are not alert, the Court cannot come to their aid/rescue and offer relief only because they were unaware of the Rules. These rulings add a new layer to the situation, namely that correcting the date of birth at the tail end will be at the expense of a significant number of employees; hence, any change at the tail end must be discouraged by the Court. The High of Court Jharkhand in the case of Lal Bahadur vs. Jamshedpur Engineering &amp; Machine Manufacture Company Ltd. [W.P. (L) No. 374 of 2014] by Single Bench consisting of Hon’ble Shri Justice Dr S.N. Pathak. The facts of the case are petitioner was appointed as Guard under respondent-Management. While discharging his duties, he received a letter from the respondent management whereby it was informed to the petitioner that on completion of 60 years of age, he is going to superannuate from service treating his date of birth as 01.10.1944. It is the case of the petitioner that his date of birth is 28.04.1955. Hence, the petitioner was compelled to raise an industrial dispute. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner vociferously argues that the Award passed by the learned Labour Court, Jamshedpur is grossly illegal and arbitrary and suffers from error apparent from the face of the record. The Award is perverse in law as well as in fact since the learned Labour Court travelled beyond the terms of reference. Learned counsel further argues that from the contents of the various documents which were exhibited before the learned Labour Court it is manifested that the concerned workman is entitled to reinstatement in services. Learned labour court has overlooked the fact “that it is a creation of statute and it cannot be allowed to travel beyond the terms of reference.” Learned counsel appearing for the respondent vehemently opposes the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner and submits that as per the prevalent practice and rules, the employment record of the petitioner was also prepared at the time of his appointment and in the said record, the date of birth of the petitioner was recorded as 01.10.1944 and as such, the management has superannuated him on 01.10.2004, on attaining the age of superannuation i.e., 60 years. While relying on the apex court judgment State of M.P. v. Premlal Shrivas, it was held that “Time and again this Court has expressed the view that if a government servant requests the correction of the recorded date of birth after a lapse of a long time of his induction into the service, particularly beyond the time fixed by his employer, he cannot claim, as a matter of right, the correction of his date of birth, even if he has good evidence to establish that the recorded date of birth is erroneous. “