The Court can interfere with the change in policy on being satisfied that it is irrational or perverse in light of the Wednesbury principle: High Court of Delhi

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI Judgment delivered on: May 31 2021 W.P.(C) 6712 2020 CM APPLs. 23321 2020 34429 2020 7444 2021 7445 2021 VICTORIA GIRLS SR. SEC. SCHOOL DELHI ..... Petitioner Through: Mr. Romy Chacko and Ms. Shakthi Chand Jaidwal Advs. DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION Through: Mrs. Avnish Ahlawat SC for GNCTD Respondent Service) with Mr. Nitesh Kumar Singh Adv. for DoE CORAM: HON BLE MR. JUSTICE V. KAMESWAR RAO JUDGMENT V. KAMESWAR RAO J CM. Nos. 7444 2021 & 7445 2021 two applications have been filed by respondents seeking condonation of 20 days delay in filing the counter affidavit to the petition. For the reasons stated in the application delay of 20 days is condoned. Counter affidavit is taken on record. Applications stand disposed of. The present petition has been filed by the petitioners with W.P.(C) 6712 2020 the following prayers: the above mentioned “In view of facts and circumstances it is therefore prayed that this Hon ble Court may be pleased to: W.P.(C) 6712 2020 a) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other writ direction or order quashing the impugned order dated 10.09.2020 issued by Respondent No.1 as ultra vires and unconstitutional. b) Allow the Petitioners No. 2 to 4 to continue in reemployment till they attain the age of 62 years as approved by the Respondent No. 1. c) Pass any other order(s) in view of aforesaid facts and circumstances to meet the end of justice.” In substance the challenge in this writ petition is to the order dated September 10 2020 bearing No PS DE 2020 „impugned order‟ for short) issued by the Office of Director of Education Government of NCT of Delhi respondent No.1. The impugned order reads as under: “OFFICE OF DIRECTOR OF EUDCATION GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI OLD SECRETARIAT DELHI 110054 No Ps DE 2020 ORDER Dated: 10.09.2020 SUBJECT: DISCONTINUING THE PROVISION OF RE EMPLOYMENT IN R O TEACHERS VICE the system for Re employment of Teachers was notified and later extended to Vice Principals and Principals in view of the large number of vacancies which existed at that time in the Directorate of Education. And Whereas the Department has recently been able to fill a large number of vacant posts through Direct Recruitments. As such the system of Re Employment of Teachers Vice Principals Principals is no longer W.P.(C) 6712 2020 Now therefore the provision of Re Employment of Teachers Vice Principals Principals is discontinued with immediate effect. Accordingly all types of Re employment granted for the session 2020 21 in govt. and govt. aided schools shall cease to be in force with immediate effect and no re employment shall be granted to the Teachers Vice Principals principals in govt. and govt. aided schools henceforth. UDIT PRAKASH RAI DIRECTORxxx xxxx” The petitioner No.1 herein is a senior secondary school established in the year 1868 at Delhi for the education of Christian minorities and it was affiliated to Central Board of Secondary Education in 1966. The petitioner No.1 school was granted minority status on September 03 2008. The petitioner Nos.2 3 and 4 are teachers working with the petitioner No.1 school who have been re employed after attaining the age the superannuation in terms of Rule 110 of the Delhi School Education Rules 1973Except where an existing employee is entitled to have a higher age of retirement every employee of a recognised private school whether aided or not shall hold office until he attains the age of 58 years. Provided that the managing committee may grant extension to a teacher for a period not exceeding two years in the aggregate if in the opinion of the managing committee such teacher is fit tor such extension and has no mortal or W.P.(C) 6712 2020 physical incapacity which would disentitle him to get such Provided further that no such extension shall be granted in the case of a teacher of an aided school except with the previous approval of the Director: 2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub rule every teacher laboratory assistant Librarian Principal or Vice Principal employed in such school shall continue to hold office until he attains the age of 60 years: xxx ” It is the case of the petitioners and as contended by Mr. Romy Chacko learned counsel for the petitioners that vide the impugned order the respondents have discontinued the provision for re employment of Teachers Vice Principals Principals after superannuation and made applicable the order to those who have already been granted re employment6712 2020 the re employment of the said petitioners was not subject to any terms and conditions that their services would be dispensed with to accommodate direct recruits or eligible candidates. According to Mr. Chacko the petitioner Nos.2 to 4 have joined duties after superannuation in terms of re employment and are working since then. Regarding their present status of re employment Mr. Chacko has drawn my attention to a table as appended below: a) Mrs. J Solomon Retirement b) Mrs. PGTc) Mrs. G Re emp Approved by Resp. No.1 Time still left for Re emp About 11 months 01 years 02 months 01 year 06 months Mr. Chacko has also drawn my attention to orders issued by the Office of Deputy Director Education dated July 30 2019 November 01 2019 and March 20 2020 whereby the requests for re employment of the petitioner Nos.2 to 4 were approved by the Dy. Director. It is submitted by him that the stand of the respondents that the incumbents have no right to continue once policy granting re employment is revoked is nothing but arbitrary and violative of Article 14. He also stated that petitioner Nos.2 4 can be terminated from service only in accordance with the provisions of Delhi School Education Act 1973(„Act‟ for short) and the DSE Rules framed thereunder in the same manner in which services of other regular employees can be terminated. Hence the impugned order to the extent it does away with the service of existing employees who have already been re employed is also arbitrary and violative of Article W.P.(C) 6712 2020 14 of the Constitution. Further it is submitted by him that the management petitioner No.1 having chosen to re employ petitioner Nos.2 to 4 for two years after obtaining approval from competent authority the impugned order issued thereafter interferes with the right to administer vested in the management of petitioner No.1 in terms of Article 30 of the Constitution. Mr. Chacko submitted that Rule 110 of the DSE Rules permits continuance of services of the petitioner Nos.2 to 4 till the age of 62. Therefore their re employment by the management in accordance with the procedure prescribed clothes them with the vested right to continue till the age of 62. He anchored his submission on the Apex Court judgment in Andhra Pradesh Diary Development Corporation Confederation v. Narasimha Reddy and Ors. 2011SCC 286 wherein it was inter alia held by the Court that any subordinate legislation which takes away existing benefits with retrospective effect is violative of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The Court also went to hold what constitutes a vested right. 10. He also submitted that the impugned order to the extent it terminates the services of the petitioners without notice and without granting a chance for the incumbents to be heard is further violative of principles of natural justice. 6 SCC 195). It is submitted by Mr. Chacko that it is a settled law that retrospective effect cannot be given to a subordinate legislation W.P.(C) 6712 2020 unless the statute confers power on the rule making authority to enact any rule with retrospective effect 2 SCC 100). On the impugned order it is his stand that Section 29 of the Act does not confer any such power on the respondent No.1 to grant retrospective effect to the impugned order and to that extent the same is void ab initio. That apart Mr. Chacko submitted that in terms of the decision of the Supreme Court in TMA Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka 8 SCC 481 it is permissible for the State and its educational authorities to prescribe qualifications of a teacher but once the teachers possessing requisite qualification were selected by the minorities for their educational institutions the State would have no right to veto the selection of teachers It is submitted by him that the employment in the minority educational institution is absolute prerogative of the management and the government cannot induct anyone in such an institution. More so the re employment of the petitioner Nos.2 to 4 granted by the management cannot be interfered with by the Government in the context of filling up several vacant posts by it which is in the realm of public employment not applicable to minority institution. He supported his contention by relying upon Sindhi Education Society and Anr.wherein the Supreme Court while interpreting Rule 64(1)b of the DSE Rules held that roster wise reservation can be enforced against general or majority category of government aided schools but not against minority schools. It was also inter alia held that service in a W.P.(C) 6712 2020 minority institution is not a public employment. Reliance is also placed on Secretary Malankara Syprian Catholic College v. T. Jose and Ors. 1 SCC 386 wherein the Supreme Court inter alia held that minority management is free to choose its staff based on their outlook and philosophy and the career advancement prospects of the existing staff and the members of the community has to yield to the management‟s freedom of choice under Article 30. That apart it is stated vide an Additional Affidavit filed by petitioner No.1 and submitted by Mr. Chacko that the petitioner No.1 sought clearance for filling up 39 vacancies on April 20 2017 and respondent No.1 granted clearance only after two years on May 20 2019. Subsequent thereto eight vacancies have arisen in the petitioner No.1 school and therefore the stand of the respondents that the petitioner No.1 school is not filling up vacancies or that all vacancies are filled up is bellied. According to Mr. Chacko the impugned order provides for ceasing of reemployment granted for 2020 21 with immediate effect and the effect that follows requires fresh recruitment which is a tedious and time consuming procedure. This will also cause huge hardship and inconvenience to students as petitioner Nos.2 to 4 are currently taking classes in the petitioner No.1 school. On the other hand it is the case of the respondent and contended by Ms. Avnish Ahlawat learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Directorate of Education that the present petition is not maintainable. According to her the petitioner No.1 School Management in connivance with the Teachers have W.P.(C) 6712 2020 filed the present writ petition on behalf of the teachers and they have no right to continue as re employed Teachers. The petitioner No.1 school on the one hand has not taken any steps to fill up the posts lying vacant through promotion or otherwise and is illegally supporting the teachers to continue in reemployment denying the chance for the other eligible candidates. It is submitted by Ms. Ahlawat the retirement age of teachers as per the DSE Rules is 60 years. The intent of the scheme for re employment of Teachers Vice Principals Principals initially introduced in government schools and later in aided schools subject to managing committee justifying the need of reemployment was in view of large number of posts lying vacant with no recruitment. However currently in schools under the respondent No.1 substantial number of teachers on all posts have been appointed through DSSSB direct recruitment promotion UPSC selection. It is against this backdrop that the administration respondent No.1 has taken a policy decision to do away with the reemployment with the retired teachers in government and aided schools vide the impugned order. She also stated that here in petitioner No.1 school there are sufficient number of teachers and as such the „system of re employment of Teachers Vice Principals Principals is no longer required‟. It is stated by Ms. Ahlawat that the impugned order was initially challenged before the Central Administrative Tribunal Principal Bench New Delhi in OA No.1436 2020 which OA stands dismissed vide judgment dated W.P.(C) 6712 2020 October 07 2020. An appeal against the same being W.P.(C) 9085 2020 is pending before the Division Bench. However I may note here that on this Mr. Chacko has taken a plea and in fact he filed an application being C.M.No. 34429 2020 wherein by relying upon the judgment of CAT in O.A No. 1328 2020 it was stated that the petitioner Nos.2 4 in the instant case stand on a different footing from the petitioners in W. P.No. 9085 2020. He stated that petitioners in W.P.(C) No. 9085 2020 were government teachers who were working in government schools and that they are not governed by Rule 110 of DSE Rules. 19. Ms. Ahlawat on the aspect of vested accrued right of the petitioner Nos.2 to 4 stated that they did have existing right till the date of withdrawal of policy i.e. September 10 2020 and such right cannot be treated as “vested right” or immune from legislative intervention or interference. In this regard she has relied upon the Apex Court judgment in Shri Bakul Oil Industries v. State of Gujarat 1987 SCC 31 wherein the Court repelled the contention that tax exemption granted by the State Government gives rise to a vested right. Further it was inter alia held that such exemption was a kind of concession and a concession can be withdrawn at any time and “no time limit can be insisted upon before concession is withdrawn”. Further reliance has been placed by Ms. Ahlawat on the Supreme Court judgment in Dr. S.K. Kacker v. AIIMS & Ors. 1996 SCC 734 wherein it was inter alia held that W.P.(C) 6712 2020 Administrative Resolution cannot override statutory Resolution nor can they have any legal efficiency. Policy decision in any case does not give any vested right. On the reliance placed by the petitioners on the Judgement in Andhra Pradesh Diary Development Corporation Confederationshe stated that the same is not applicable as the expression "vested right" has been used in a general sense and none of those decisions really considered whether doctrine of vested right can be applied against legislative enactment or administrative policy. It is also submitted by Ms. Ahlawat by relying upon Shree Sidhabali Steels Ltd. v. State of U.P. 3 SCC 193 that where public interest warrants principles of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked. Government can change policy in public interest and doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked for enforcement of a promise made contrary to law because none can act against notifications which are in the nature of legislation. Reliance is also placed on the Apex Court judgment in Kothari Industrial Corporation Limited v. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board & Anr. 4 SCC 134 that it is for the State to determine what should be the policy for grant refusal of concessional power at different points of time and not for the Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record the issue which arises for consideration is whether the order dated September 10 2020 issued by the respondent Directorate is ultra vires and unconstitutional and the W.P.(C) 6712 2020 petitioner Nos.2 to 4 need to be allowed to continue on re employment till they attain the age of 62 years. Vide the impugned order the respondents have decided to discontinue the provision of re employment of Teachers Vice Principals Principals with immediate effect. Further the re employment granted for the session 2020 21 in government and government aided schools shall cease to be in force with immediate effect. The provision for re employment was introduced by the Directorate of Education by issuing notifications dated January 29 2007 and February 28 2007 whereby it was decided to allow re employment of all retiring Teachers of the Directorate up to PGT level till they attain the age of 62 years subject to fitness and vigilance clearance. There is no dispute that this scheme was made applicable to the Teachers in the aided schools as well. The petitioner No.1 is an aided school and the same was made applicable to petitioner No.1 school as well. I may clarify here Rule 110 of the DSE Rules recognises the concept of re employment but that is only when Teachers Vice Principals Principals attain the age of superannuation on or after first day of November of any year they shall be re employed upto 30th day of April of the year immediately following. The above notifications which contemplates re employment till 62 years is a departure from the provision of re employment stipulated in Rule 110 of DSE Rules. It can be said that the notifications have been issued in exercise of executive power by the Lieutenant Governor after a decision of the Cabinet. W.P.(C) 6712 2020 Having said that in the case in hand the petitioner Nos.2 to 4 who are working as Teachers Principal in petitioner No.1 school had retired on July 30 2019October 31 2019 and March 31 2020 respectively. But on their application for re employment the same was granted to them upon approval conveyed by the Directorate till they attain the age of 62 years. The details of their date of retirement and re employment is already reflected in para 6 above. 28. Mr. Chacko had made submissions with regard to the minority status of the petitioner No.1 school and privileges that are enjoyed. The submissions are the following the petitioner No.1 being a minority aided school cannot be roped in the impugned order inasmuch as the respondents nominee has no role in the selection and appointment of an employee in the minority educational institution the State cannot compel the minority institution to accept policy decision which will infringe the fundamental rights in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in TMA Paiit is permissible for the State and its educational authorities to prescribe qualifications of a teacher but once teacher possessing qualifications is selected by the minorities for their educational institution the State would have no right to veto the selection of teachers the re employment of petitioner Nos.2 to 4 granted by the petitioner No.1 cannot be interfered with by the Government in the context of filling up of several vacant posts by it which is in relation of public employment not applicable to W.P.(C) 6712 2020 minority institutions. The aforesaid submissions of Mr. Chacko have no applicability in the facts of this case. This I say so for two reasons in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in TMA Paithe State can provide the conditions of service of teachers in aided minority schools the selection of petitioner Nos.2 to 4 for employment re employment had already taken place based on the notifications issued by the Directorate upon approval by the Directorate which process has never been objected to by the petitioner No.1 School. It is the conceded case of the petitioners and also submitted by Mr. Chacko that the State is within its right to prescribe the service conditions in aided minority schools. So it follows Rule 110 of the DSE Rules which governs the age of superannuation in recognised private schools shall be applicable the petitioner No.1 School. The notifications for re employment after retirement were equally applicable to the petitioner No.1 School and also implemented. The re employment of petitioner Nos.2 to 4 being in terms of the decision of the Directorate its withdrawal vide the impugned order shall be equally binding. Mr. Chacko is not correct to contend that the impugned decision cannot be implemented against the minority institutions like the petitioner No.1 School as it infringes the fundamental right under Article 30 of the Constitution. If the plea is accepted it would be in violation of the Judgment of the Supreme Court in TMA Paiwhich clearly held that the Regulations framed by the State governing W.P.(C) 6712 2020 service conditions for teaching and other staff shall prevail. This power of the State to frame regulations include the power to stipulate the provision of re employment and withdrawing the same. It is also not the case of the petitioner No.1 that the Directorate had raised any objection with regard to the appointment re employment of petitioner Nos.2 to 4 both on eligibility and suitability. The rights of petitioner No. 1 as an aided minority institution have not been interfered with nor the Directorate has vetoed the appointments re employment of petitioner Nos. 2 to 4. The petitioner No.1 is required to follow the decision to withdraw the provision of re employment though an aided minority institution. It cannot state that it will resort to re employment and shall not make appointments Recruitment Rules. The submissions of Mr. Chacko in that regard are liable to be rejected. In support of his submission Mr. Chacko had relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sindhi Education Society and Anr.(b) of DSE Rules and the question in Sindhi Education Society was whether Rule 64of DSE Rules violate the rights of aided minority institution. Chapter IV of the Act or Chapter VIII of DSE Rules6712 2020 other than unaided minority schools) never fell for consideration in that case. Mr. Chacko had also relied upon the judgment in the case of Secretary Malankara Syprian Catholic Collegewhich is also distinguishable on similar reasoning. The other pleas of Mr. Chacko are that the impugned order sought to be implemented against the petitioner Nos.2 to 4 who have already been granted re employment that the order states that large number of vacant posts have been filled up through direct recruitment and as such re employment is no longer required but the order does not state whether vacancy in aided minority schools have been filled up the re employment given to petitioner Nos.2 to 4 was without any condition that their services shall be dispensed with on the appointment being made through direct recruitment therefore re employment cannot be curtailed the re employment having been granted till 62 years in favour of the petitioners a vested right has accrued to continue till that age retrospective effect cannot be given to a subordinate legislation unless the statute confers powers on the rule making authority to enact a rule in that manner the petitioner had sought clearance for filling up of 39 vacancies on April 20 2017 and the respondent No.1 granted clearance only after two years on May 20 2019 and subsequent thereto 8 vacancies have arisen and hence the stand of the Directorate that the School is not filling up the vacancies is To consider the above submissions of Mr.Chacko it is necessary to reproduce the relevant features of the impugned W.P.(C) 6712 2020 The department has been able to fill a large number of vacant posts through direct recruitment ii) The provisions of re employment of Teachers Vice Principals Principals is discontinued with immediate effect iii) All types of re employment granted for session 2020 21 in government and government aided schools shall cease to be in force with immediate effect. The decision of the Directorate to provide provision for re employment is outside the DSE Rules. It is a policy decision taken in the larger interest of the students that their studies are not affected for want of regularly appointed Teachers Vice Principals Principals. There cannot be any dispute that a policy decision can be reviewed from time to time. The impugned decision of the respondents is to recall its earlier decision to provide re employment. It is implied in such a decision that retired Teachers Vice Principals Principals shall give way to regularly appointed Teachers Vice Principals Principals. The scope of judicial review with regard to change in policy is well settled. The Court can interfere with the change in policy on being satisfied that it is irrational or perverse keeping in view the Wednesbury principle. 4 SCC 727). The Wednesbury principle postulates the Courts while W.P.(C) 6712 2020 considering whether the authority having so unlimited power has acted unreasonably. The Court is entitled to investigate the action of the authority with a view to see if it has taken into account any matters that ought not to be disregarded. I have already spelt out the reasons for the respondents to withdraw the provision of re employment in government and government aided schools. That is they have filled up the posts of Teachers Vice Principals Principals through direct recruitment and promotion and there is no necessity to continue the retired Teachers on re employment. In effect the respondents have decided to resort to the recruitment rules for making appointment which were not invoked implemented for so many years. It is settled law that appointment should be made strictly in accordance with statutory provisions and a candidate who is entitled for appointment should not be denied the same on any pretext whatsoever as usurpation of the post by somebody else in any circumstance is not possible. 6 SCC 49). There is justifiable reason for the respondents to withdraw its earlier decision to grant re employment to retired teachers. The decision is not unreasonable I see no infirmity in the decision. The plea of Mr. Chacko was that re employment given to petitioner Nos.2 to 4 was unconditional till 62 years and a vested right has accrued to them to continue till that age. The said submission is unmerited for the reason that the respondents have appointed filled up the very posts on which the retirees were are working. In such a situation the continuation of retirees on re W.P.(C) 6712 2020 employment is not possible. Rather it would be against public interest to employ two persons on the same post burdening the exchequer. If the plea is accepted then the selection made through direct recruitment promotion cannot be given effect to till such time the period of re employment of the retired Teachers expires. It is in larger public interest that services of the re employed Teachers need to be dispensed with. This I say so a retired employee does not have any right to be re employed. Even if re employed it is for a fixed period and it is settled law that an appointment for a fixed period can be curtailed for good and valid reasons by following principles of natural justice. 2008SCC 1Corporation Limited and Ors. and connected matters 9 SCC 710 wherein in para 25 has held as under: “25. The principle of procedural expectation would apply to cases where a promise is made and is withdrawn without affording an opportunity to the person affected. The imminent requirement of fairness in administrative action is to give an opportunity to the person who is deprived of a past benefit. In our opinion there is an exception to the said rule. If an announcement is made by the Government of a policy conferring W.P.(C) 6712 2020 to such benefit on a large number of people but subsequently due to overriding public interest the that were announced earlier are withdrawn it is not expedient to provide individual innominate number of persons. In other words in such cases an opportunity to each individual to explain the circumstances of his case need not be given. In Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corpn.3 SCC 499] it was held that in cases involving an interest based on legitimate expectation the Court will not interfere on grounds of procedural fairness and natural justice if the deciding authority has been allotted a full range of choice and the decision is taken fairly and The reliance placed by Mr. Chacko on the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Paradeep Phosphatesis misplaced. It is not applicable in the facts as the issue in that case was with regard to change in the retirement age of regular employees which is governed by service rules and certified standing orders. The Court by holding the same to be service conditions and also by referring to section 9A of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 held the retirement age cannot be changed without hearing the employees. Whereas in the case at hand the petitioners 2 to 4 are not regular employees the re employment is not governed by Service Rules and Certified Standing Orders and it is not a service condition. The plea of Mr. Chacko that a subordinate legislation unless the statute confers power cannot be enacted with retrospective effect is not appealing as the provision of re W.P.(C) 6712 2020 employment was not introduced by way of amendment to the statute or the rules. It was a policy decision which has been withdrawn through executive order that too prospectively that is from the date the order is issued. The benefits earned during the re employment are not being taken away. The reliance on the Judgment of Tikamdas is misplaced. The same is not applicable in the facts. I am also of the view that even the principle of legitimate expectation shall not be applicable in view of the nature of appointment i.e. re employment for a fixed period and also for the reasons to revoke the policy of re employment as detailed above. During the course of his submissions Mr. Chacko would submit that pursuant to the communication dated April 20 2017 of the petitioner No.1 to the Directorate seeking its approval for filling up 37 vacant posts the same was received on May 20 2019 after a period of two years. Pursuant thereto after the approval of the advertisement and constitution of selection Committee 37 vacancies have been filled up in September 2019. The petitioner Nos.2 to 4 having superannuated between July 2019 to March 2020 i.e. after the approval was granted by the Directorate for filling up 37 vacant posts the petitioner No.1 School could not take necessary steps to fill up the subsequent vacancies due to lockdown arising from COVID 19. So no fresh appointment promotion has been made by the petitioner No.1 school on the posts on which the petitioner Nos. 2 to 4 are working. The petitioner Nos.2 to 4 should be allowed to continue in the larger interest of the students. W.P.(C) 6712 2020 I say nothing on the said submission. It is for the Directorate to consider the said aspect and convey to the school its decision preferably within four weeks from today. The impugned order dated September 10 2020 is intra vires and constitutional. The relief prayed for cannot be granted by this Court. The petition is dismissed with the observation above for compliance by the respondents. No cost. CM APPLs. 23321 2020 & 34429 2020 Dismissed as infructuous. MAY 31 2021 aky ak jg V. KAMESWAR RAO J W.P.(C) 6712 2020 

Summary: There cannot be any dispute that a policy decision can be reviewed from time to time. The impugned decision of the respondents is to recall its earlier decision to provide re-employment. It is implied in such a decision that retired Teachers / Vice Principals / Principals shall give way to regularly appointed Teachers / Vice Principals / Principals. The scope of judicial review with regard to change in policy is well settled. This was held in VICTORIA GIRLS SR. SEC. SCHOOL, DELHI v. DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION. [W.P.(C) 6712/2020] in the High Court of Delhi by a single bench consisting of JUSTICE V. KAMESWAR RAO. Facts are that the petitioner is a school established in the year 1868 at Delhi for the education of Christian minorities and it was affiliated to CBSE in 1966. The petitioner Nos.2, 3, and 4 are teachers working with the petitioner who have been re-employed after attaining the age the superannuation in terms of Rule 110 of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973. The respondents have discontinued the provision for re-employment of Teachers / Vice Principals / Principals after superannuation writ has been filed against the same. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that orders issued by the Office of Deputy Director Education whereby the requests for re-employment of the petitioners were approved by the Dy. Director. That the stand of the respondents that the incumbents have no right to continue once policy granting re-employment is revoked is nothing but arbitrary and violative of Article 14.  The counsel for the respondent submitted that the present petition is not maintainable. The respondent has taken a policy decision to do away with the reemployment with the retired teachers in government and aided schools vide the impugned order. The court made reference to the judgement of Apex court in TMA Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka., wherein it was observed that “it is permissible for the State and its educational authorities to prescribe qualifications of a teacher but once the teachers possessing requisite qualification were selected by the minorities for their educational institutions, the State would have no right to veto the selection of teachers”. The court also made reference to Apex court decision in the case of  Purushottam v. Chairman, M.S.E.B. and Anr., wherein it is stated that “It is settled law that appointment should be made strictly in accordance with statutory provisions and a candidate who is entitled for appointment should not be denied the same on any pretext whatsoever as usurpation of the post by somebody else in any circumstance is not possible”.