The court cannot modify the terms of a Consent Decree or a settlement except by consent of the parties to the Decree- High Court of Delhi.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI OMP(COMM) 129 2016 & I.A. 7647 2021 I.A. 7648 2021 CONNAUGHT PLAZA RESTURANTS PVT. LTD. Petitioner Through: Dr. N. Pradeep Sharma & Mr. Abhinav S. Raghuvanshi Advs. CAPITAL BOOT HOUSE Respondent Through: Mr. Rajesh Yadav Sr. Adv. With Ms. Ruchira Yadav Adv. HON BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR 01.07.2021 I.A. 7647 2021 & I.A. 7648 2021 These are connected applications which essentially seek a modification of the terms of settlement between the petitioner and the respondent on the basis where of OMP (COMM) 129 2016 was disposed of by this Court on 4 November 2016. It is not necessary to enter into the details of controversy between the parties. Suffice it to state that the settlement deed dated 3rd November 2016 in which the respondent was the “first party” and OMP(COMM) 129 2016 the petitioner was the “second party” specifically envisaged inter alia thus: terms and conditions of the previous agreements between the parties shall be binding on them as also directed by the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in orders is however and 10.08.2015. clarified agreed between the parties that in view of changed circumstances the franchise agreement dated 11.10.2000 shall expire with the efflux of time on 30.06.2021 when all the agreements between the parties shall automatically come to an end. There shall be no further extension enlargement for any reason whatsoever of time beyond 30.06.2021. The Second Party shall remove all its installations fittings and fixtures on or before 30.06.2021. The Second Party shall not be entitled to seek any extension enlargement under any Emphasis supplied) Vide order dated 4th November 2016 OMP (COMM) 129 2016 was disposed of by this Court on the basis of the afore extracted settlement deed which was directed to form part of the order and by which the parties were explicitly made bound. By the present application the petitioner seeks extension of time to vacate the premises of the respondent. The only ground urged in the petition and argued before the Court by Dr. Sharma learned Counsel for the petitioner is the intervening COVID 19 pandemic and the restrictions put in place by the lockdowns imposed by the governmental authorities from time to time. Dr. Sharma submits that these lockdowns have made it impossible for the petitioner to vacate the premises before 30 June 2021 as required by the afore extracted clause in the settlement deed between the parties. OMP(COMM) 129 2016 4. Dr. Sharma learned Counsel for the petitioner applicant submits that at the time when the settlement deed was executed neither party could foresee the COVID 19 pandemic or the hardships that would result as a consequence thereof. He submits that his client has no intention of continuing in the premises in question but would take at least three months’ time to remove the fixtures and furniture as well as the effluent treatment plant situated on the roof of the premises to another location. In as much as the present situation was not within the contemplation of the parties when they entered into the aforesaid settlement agreement Dr. Sharma submits that the interests of justice would require that further time be granted to the petitioner to vacate the premises and that in the interregnum the respondent be restrained from forcibly seeking to evict the petitioner therefrom. 5. Mr. Rajesh Yadav learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent on the other hand seriously questions the bona fides of the present application. He submits that the respondent wrote not once but twice to the petitioner on 12th May 2021 and 13th June 2021 making it clear that no time beyond 30th June 2021 would be granted to the petitioner to retain the premises in question. He submits that despite these communications the respondent has at the nth hour and a day before 30th June 2021 sought to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court to frustrate the agreement between the parties. He submits on instructions that his client is unwilling to allow the petitioner to continue in the premises in question any further. He also places reliance on the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Compack OMP(COMM) 129 2016 Enterprises India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Beant Singh1 in this regard. In the opinion of this Court no relief whatsoever can be granted to the petitioner in either of these applications. The terms of settlement between the petitioner and the respondent are clear and explicit. The parties have taken care to clarify in the afore extracted Para 3 of the terms of settlement not once but twice that “there shall be no further extension enlargement for any reason whatsoever of time beyond 30.06.2021” and that the petitioner would “not be entitled to seek any extension enlargement under any circumstances”. The paragraph requires the petitioner to remove all installations fittings and fixtures on or before 30th June 2021. Once the parties have consciously and between themselves agreed that no extension of time beyond 30th June 2021 to vacate the premises would be available to the petitioner for any reason whatsoever and under any circumstances it is not open to the petitioner to contend before the Court that extension was justified as the circumstances in which the petitioner finds itself were not foreseeable when the settlement agreement was executed. That would amount to requiring the Court to pass an order in violation of the terms of settlement between the parties on the basis of which OMP(COMM) 129 2016 was disposed of. This quite obviously is not permissible at all. The plea of the petitioner that it would need further time to 13 SCC 702 OMP(COMM) 129 2016 remove the furniture fixtures and effluent treatment plant located on the premises is also without merit as the afore extracted para 3 of the terms of settlement expressly requires the petitioner to remove all furniture fixtures and other equipment on or before 30th June 2021. This settlement was executed almost five years back. It was for the petitioner to take steps to ensure that the furniture fixtures and other equipment including the effluent treatment plant were removed before June 2021. No extension of time can be granted therefore even for the said purpose. There is also prima facie substance in the contention of Mr. Yadav that the present application lacks bona fides. Though the respondent was under no duty to do so it nevertheless placed the petitioner on notice regarding its responsibility to vacate the premises on 30th June 2021 vide its communications dated 12th May 2021 and June 2021. There was no want of clarity therefore at all regarding the stand of the respondent. It does therefore appear disquieting that a day before the time for vacating the premises was to expire the petitioner has sought to move this Court and obtain injunctive orders. The manner in which the petitioner has invoked the Court’s jurisdiction also operates as a fetter to grant of any relief to the petitioner in this case. 11. The reliance by Mr. Yadav on the decision in Compack Enterprises1 is also well placed. The Supreme Court has also made it absolutely clear that consent decrees are not to be lightly interfered OMP(COMM) 129 2016 with by Court save and except by consent of the parties to the decree. The only circumstances in which consent decrees can be modified by a Court are where there is revised consent of the parties to the decree the consent was obtained by fraud misrepresentation or mistake or clerical or arithmetical errors in the consent decree were required to be corrected. Absent these exigencies the Court cannot modify the terms of a consent decree or a settlement on the basis of which the petition was disposed of. At the unilateral request of one of the parties to the settlement it is obvious that the Court cannot pass an order which is violative of the terms of settlement. Were it to do so the Court would be acting in flagrant excess of the jurisdiction vested in it. 12. Paras 19 and 20 of the report in Compack Enterprises1 may for this purpose be reproduced thus: Before adverting to the specific contentions raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner it may be useful to briefly summarise the law governing consent decrees that shall inform our conclusions on the present matter. It is well settled that consent decrees are intended to create estoppels by judgment against the parties thereby putting an end to further litigation between the parties. Resultantly this Court has held that it would be slow to unilaterally interfere in modify substitute or modulate the terms of a consent decree unless it is done with the revised consent of all the parties thereto. 2 Gupta Steel Industries v. Jolly Steel Industries Ltd Suvaran Rajaram Bandekar v. Narayan R. Bandekar3 However this formulation is far from absolute and does not apply as a blanket rule in all cases. This Court in has held that Byram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India 211 SCC 678 310 SCC 255 41 SCC 31 OMP(COMM) 129 2016 a consent decree would not serve as an estoppel where the compromise was vitiated by fraud misrepresentation or mistake. Further this Court in the exercise of its inherent powers may also unilaterally rectify a consent decree suffering from clerical or arithmetical errors so as to make it conform with the terms of the compromise.” Emphasis supplied) In view of this legal position it is not possible for this Court to come to the aid of the petitioner or accommodate any of the prayers contained in either of these applications. 14. Both applications are therefore dismissed. C. HARI SHANKAR J. VACATION JUDGE) JULY 01 2021 OMP(COMM) 129 2016 

Summary: Consent decrees can be modified by a court only when there is revised consent of the parties to the decree, or when the consent was obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, or mistake, or where a few clerical or arithmetical corrections need to made in the consent decree. Other than these conditions, a court cannot modify the terms of a consent decree or the terms of a settlement. A single judge bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar in the matter of Connaught Plaza Restaurant Pvt. Ltd Vs. Capital Boot House(I.A. 7647/2021), dealt with an issue where the petitioner has filed an application under Section 151 of CPC, 1908 seeking extension/enlargement of time and under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, read with section 151 of CPC, 1908 for restraining the respondent from interfering with peaceful possession of the petitioner. In the present case, the petitioner had approached the court with an application for seeking an extension of time to vacate the premises of the respondent. The counsel for the petitioner argued only on the ground that because of intervening of the Covid-19 pandemic and the restrictions due to the lockdowns imposed by the government authorities, it became impossible for the petitioner to vacate the premises before 30th June 2021, as such date was stated in the terms and conditions of the settlement deed, which the parties agreed on. Further, the counsel of the petitioner submitted that the present Covid-19 situation was not within the contemplation of the parties when they entered into the settlement agreement. Thereby, the petitioner would require at least 3 months to remove the fixtures, furniture, and the effluent treatment plant situated on the roof of the premises. The counsel of the petitioner requested the court to grant the petitioner the required time to vacate the premises and asked that till then the respondent be restrained from forcibly evicting the petitioner from the premises. The counsel for the respondent questioned the bona fides of the petitioner’s application. The counsel also submitted that the respondent wrote twice on 12th May 2021 and 13th June 2021 making it clear that no time beyond 30th June 2021 would be provided to the petitioner to retain the premises. Further, the counsel submitted that the respondent is unwilling to allow the petitioner to continue on the premises.