The mere fact that the appellant was not brave enough to conceal where the victim was hiding did not make him a part of the unlawful assembly: Supreme Court Of India

 IN THE CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO._1526__ of 2021 Arising out of Special Leave to AppealNo.78119 … Appellant STATE OF ASSAM & ORS JUDGMENT SANJAY KISHAN KAUL J A land dispute caused the loss of life of Abdul Wahab PW 6 daughter of the deceased) PW 10and PW 11did not mention the appellant at all. PW 1 the informant attributed to the appellant the role of pointing out the location of the deceased. A perusal of his testimony shows that he stated “Taijuddin showed that my father Abdul Wahab was inside the house of Sorab.” Nothing more is stated qua the appellant. PW 4 PW 5 and PW 15 once again stated to the same effect i.e. that the appellant pointed out the location of the deceased. Interestingly PW 15 is stated to have controverted the testimony of PW 1 while going along with PW 4 and once again contradicting the testimony of PW 7 Learned counsel for the appellant referred to a sketch map of the site placed on record to submit that house “F” belongs to the appellant which was almost adjacent to the house where the deceased was found That explains the presence of the appellant at 6:30 a.m. in the morning when the incident is stated to have occurred Our attention was invited to how the High Court had dealt with the aspect of conviction of the appellant which was based on the testimony of PW 7 and PW 8. PW 7 stated that the appellant was armed he assaulted the deceased and also pointed out where the deceased was hiding. However PW 7 turned hostile but the High Court found that the relevant testimony of the hostile witness could be segregated to the extent of pointing out the location of the deceased. The discussion about the appellant is contained in para 33 of the impugned judgment Relevant in this behalf is PW 4’s statement to the effect that when the accused persons moved forward and were about to cross the house of Shorab the appellant told them “where are you proceeding Abdul Wahab is there in the house of Shorab.” It is only thereafter that the accused persons surrounded the house of Sohrab and mounted an assault on Abdul Wahab causing his death. The testimony of PW 7 was believed to the extent it supported what other prosecution witnesses PW 1 PW 4 and PW 5 had stated showing the presence of the appellant at the place of occurrence and helping other accused persons in tracing out the victim. PW 8 and another independent witness are also noticed as having stated that the appellant along with others chased the victim. The impugned judgment takes note of the testimony of PW 8 that he was scared of seeing the occurrence and did not come out of his house. The fact that PW 8 categorically stated that he had seen the appellant along with other accused persons chasing the victim was stated to be the testimony which was undented and could not be disbelieved only because he did not come out of the house out of fear. A finding was thus reached that the appellant accompanied the accused persons in chasing the victim and it was the appellant who assisted other members of unlawful assembly to locate the victim in the house of Sohrab. On this basis a common intention was found of seeking to kill the victim especially when the accused persons being armed with deadly weapons chased the victim with the war cry “catch and kill Wahab” and the appellant also accompanied them and actively participated and guided others to locate It was the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the testimony of PW 8 had not been read correctly. Learned counsel invited our attention to the cross examination of PW 8 wherein he stated that he did not see who had killed the victim tied him and carried him away. He stated that “...later on I heard about it. Today I have stated whatever I had heard.” He further went on to state “I have mentioned the names of thepersons after hearing them from other people.” The aforesaid testimony leaves us in no manner of doubt that PW 8 was not a witness who had seen the incident but he believed what others said and narrated the same. Thus the reliance placed in the impugned judgment on the testimony of PW 8 to rope in the appellant under Section 149 of the IPC cannot be sustained. This is more so as PW 7 is also a hostile witness In our view learned counsel for the appellant rightly contended that the mere fact that the appellant was not brave enough to conceal where the victim was hiding did not make him a part of the unlawful Learned counsel for the appellant sought to rely upon the judgment of this Court in Subal Ghorai v. State of West Bengal1 more specifically paras 42 and 53 to canvas that constructive liability cannot be stretched to lead to the false implication of innocent bystanders. This Court considered the possibility of often people gathering at the scene of offence out of curiosity but that did not make them share the common object of the assembly. The Court must guard against the possibility of convicting mere passive onlookers who did not share the common object of the unlawful assembly. There must be reasonable direct or indirect circumstances which lend assurance to the prosecution case that they shared common object of the unlawful assembly. Not only should the members be part of the unlawful assembly but should share the common object at all stages. This has to be based on the conduct of the members and the behaviour at or near the scene of the offence the motive for the crime the arms carried by them and such other relevant considerations Once we examine the factual matrix of the case at hand the presence of the appellant is explained at the early hours in the morning because of his house being almost adjacent to where the deceased was hiding. He certainly did not come along with the mob. That does not preclude him from being part of the mob or acquiring the common intention at that stage but then that is not what happened. He was carrying no weapon and he did not assault anybody. The finding of his accompanying the mob is not sustainable on the basis of the evidence discussed above. The only evidence of his involvement is that he pointed to the house where the victim was hiding. Given that a murderous mob fully armed was hunting for him the appellant at best can be said not to be brave enough to conceal the deceased or even to have not pointed out where he was but that by itself cannot rope in the appellant under Section 149 of the Learned counsel for the appellant also referred to the judgment of this Court in Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab and Ors.2 Specifically para 39 where the Court referred to the aspect of faction ridden village community having a tendency to implicate innocents along with the guilty especially when a large number of assailants are involved in commission of the offence which is a matter of common knowledge The depositions have to be carefully scrutinised in such a scenario Learned counsel also referred to the judgment in C. Magesh and Ors. v. State of Karnataka3 especially paras 45 and 46 to emphasise the importance of evidence being evaluated on the touchstone of consistency The eye witness require a careful assessment and their testimony must be evaluated for its credibility 14. On the touchstone of the aforesaid judgments taking into consideration the inconsistency in the testimonies inasmuch as the family members never even pointed a finger at the appellant as also some of the other witnesses while the witnesses who did point a finger only assigned the role of pointing out the place where the victim was hiding coupled with his natural presence at site we cannot thus say that by any stretch of imagination the case against the appellant has been proved beyond reasonable doubt or for that matter really no case seems to have been proved against the appellant given the role assigned to him in the testimony of the witnesses. In our view the appellant is entitled to a clean acquittal in the given facts The conviction under Section 147 148 302 201 149 is set aside The appeal is accordingly allowed leaving the parties to bear their own The appellant be released forthwith if not required in any other December 01 2021 Sanjay Kishan Kaul

Summary: The possibility of often people gathering at the scene of offence out of curiosity but that did not make them share the common object of the assembly. The Court must guard against the possibility of convicting mere passive onlookers who did not share the common object of the unlawful assembly. There must be reasonable direct or indirect circumstances that lend assurance to the prosecution case that they shared a common object of the unlawful assembly. Not only should the members be part of the unlawful assembly but should share the common object at all stages. Such an observation was made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court Of India before Hon’ble Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul &amp;  Hon’ble Justice M.M. Sundresh in the matter of TAIJUDDIN vs State of Assam &amp; ors [CRIMINAL APPEAL NO._1526__ of 2021] on 01.12.2021. 
The facts of the matter were that on the basis of a land dispute the life of one Abdul Wahab (“the victim”) was taken by a mod armed with deadly weapons. When the mob approached the victim’s house the victim tried to run and take shelter in the house of one Shorab but the appellate directed and told them the whereabouts of the victim &amp; consequently he was murdered and thrown in the Brahmaputra river.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the testimony of the PW-8 was not read correctly and PW-8 wasn’t an eye-witness to the crime and only narrating what he had heard from other people as confessed by him during cross-examination.

Additionally, the Hon’ble Supreme Court put reliance on the case of Subal Ghorai v. State of West Bengal (2013) 4 SCC 607 wherein it was held that constructive liability cannot be stretched to lead to the false implication of innocent bystanders. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also referred to the case of Ranjit Singh v. the State of Punjab and Ors (2013) 16 SCC 752 wherein the court held that “the aspect of a faction-ridden village community has a tendency to implicate innocents along with the guilty especially when a large number of assailants are involved in the commission of the offense – which is a matter of common knowledge. The depositions have to be carefully scrutinised in such a scenario.”

Furthermore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed “On the touchstone of the aforesaid judgments, taking into consideration the inconsistency in the testimonies – inasmuch as the family members never even pointed a finger at the appellant as also some of the other witnesses, while the witnesses who did point a finger only assigned the role of pointing out the place where the victim was hiding, coupled with his natural presence at the site, we cannot, thus, say that by any stretch of the imagination the case against the appellant has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt or for that matter really no case seems to have been proved against the appellant given the role assigned to him in the testimony of the witnesses. In our view, the appellant is entitled to a clean acquittal in the given facts.”

Finally, Hon’ble Supreme Court quashed the charges framed under Section 147/148/302/201/149 of IPC, 1872 and acquitted the appellate.
Click Here To Read The Judgment
Judgment Reviewed by: Rohan Kumar Thakur
 The facts of the matter were that on the basis of a land dispute the life of one Abdul Wahab (“the victim”) was taken by a mod armed with deadly weapons. When the mob approached the victim’s house the victim tried to run and take shelter in the house of one Shorab but the appellate directed and told them the whereabouts of the victim &amp; consequently he was murdered and thrown in the Brahmaputra river. 
The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the testimony of the PW-8 was not read correctly and PW-8 wasn’t an eye-witness to the crime and only narrating what he had heard from other people as confessed by him during cross-examination.

Additionally, the Hon’ble Supreme Court put reliance on the case of Subal Ghorai v. State of West Bengal (2013) 4 SCC 607 wherein it was held that constructive liability cannot be stretched to lead to the false implication of innocent bystanders. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also referred to the case of Ranjit Singh v. the State of Punjab and Ors (2013) 16 SCC 752 wherein the court held that “the aspect of a faction-ridden village community has a tendency to implicate innocents along with the guilty especially when a large number of assailants are involved in the commission of the offense – which is a matter of common knowledge. The depositions have to be carefully scrutinised in such a scenario.”

Furthermore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed “On the touchstone of the aforesaid judgments, taking into consideration the inconsistency in the testimonies – inasmuch as the family members never even pointed a finger at the appellant as also some of the other witnesses, while the witnesses who did point a finger only assigned the role of pointing out the place where the victim was hiding, coupled with his natural presence at the site, we cannot, thus, say that by any stretch of the imagination the case against the appellant has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt or for that matter really no case seems to have been proved against the appellant given the role assigned to him in the testimony of the witnesses. In our view, the appellant is entitled to a clean acquittal in the given facts.”

Finally, Hon’ble Supreme Court quashed the charges framed under Section 147/148/302/201/149 of IPC, 1872 and acquitted the appellate.
Click Here To Read The Judgment
Judgment Reviewed by: Rohan Kumar Thakur
 The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the testimony of the PW-8 was not read correctly and PW-8 wasn’t an eye-witness to the crime and only narrating what he had heard from other people as confessed by him during cross-examination. 
Additionally, the Hon’ble Supreme Court put reliance on the case of Subal Ghorai v. State of West Bengal (2013) 4 SCC 607 wherein it was held that constructive liability cannot be stretched to lead to the false implication of innocent bystanders. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also referred to the case of Ranjit Singh v. the State of Punjab and Ors (2013) 16 SCC 752 wherein the court held that “the aspect of a faction-ridden village community has a tendency to implicate innocents along with the guilty especially when a large number of assailants are involved in the commission of the offense – which is a matter of common knowledge. The depositions have to be carefully scrutinised in such a scenario.”

Furthermore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed “On the touchstone of the aforesaid judgments, taking into consideration the inconsistency in the testimonies – inasmuch as the family members never even pointed a finger at the appellant as also some of the other witnesses, while the witnesses who did point a finger only assigned the role of pointing out the place where the victim was hiding, coupled with his natural presence at the site, we cannot, thus, say that by any stretch of the imagination the case against the appellant has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt or for that matter really no case seems to have been proved against the appellant given the role assigned to him in the testimony of the witnesses. In our view, the appellant is entitled to a clean acquittal in the given facts.”

Finally, Hon’ble Supreme Court quashed the charges framed under Section 147/148/302/201/149 of IPC, 1872 and acquitted the appellate.
Click Here To Read The Judgment
Judgment Reviewed by: Rohan Kumar Thakur
 Additionally, the Hon’ble Supreme Court put reliance on the case of Subal Ghorai v. State of West Bengal (2013) 4 SCC 607 wherein it was held that constructive liability cannot be stretched to lead to the false implication of innocent bystanders. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also referred to the case of Ranjit Singh v. the State of Punjab and Ors (2013) 16 SCC 752 wherein the court held that “the aspect of a faction-ridden village community has a tendency to implicate innocents along with the guilty especially when a large number of assailants are involved in the commission of the offense – which is a matter of common knowledge. The depositions have to be carefully scrutinised in such a scenario.” 
Furthermore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed “On the touchstone of the aforesaid judgments, taking into consideration the inconsistency in the testimonies – inasmuch as the family members never even pointed a finger at the appellant as also some of the other witnesses, while the witnesses who did point a finger only assigned the role of pointing out the place where the victim was hiding, coupled with his natural presence at the site, we cannot, thus, say that by any stretch of the imagination the case against the appellant has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt or for that matter really no case seems to have been proved against the appellant given the role assigned to him in the testimony of the witnesses. In our view, the appellant is entitled to a clean acquittal in the given facts.”

Finally, Hon’ble Supreme Court quashed the charges framed under Section 147/148/302/201/149 of IPC, 1872 and acquitted the appellate.
Click Here To Read The Judgment
Judgment Reviewed by: Rohan Kumar Thakur
 Furthermore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed “On the touchstone of the aforesaid judgments, taking into consideration the inconsistency in the testimonies – inasmuch as the family members never even pointed a finger at the appellant as also some of the other witnesses, while the witnesses who did point a finger only assigned the role of pointing out the place where the victim was hiding, coupled with his natural presence at the site, we cannot, thus, say that by any stretch of the imagination the case against the appellant has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt or for that matter really no case seems to have been proved against the appellant given the role assigned to him in the testimony of the witnesses. In our view, the appellant is entitled to a clean acquittal in the given facts.” 
Finally, Hon’ble Supreme Court quashed the charges framed under Section 147/148/302/201/149 of IPC, 1872 and acquitted the appellate.