Diệt_chủng_Circassia
Nguyên nhân
Để chống lại chiến tranh du kích này, người Nga san phẳng địa hình, phá hủy làng mạc, xây đường sá, chặt rừng để mở đường cho nông dân và người di cư Nga cũng như các bộ lạc Kavkaz thân Nga ở. Trước tình hình ngày một bạo lực, người Nga coi đó là quyết sách. trái|nhỏ|220x220px|Đại diện Nga và Circassia tranh luận, 1855 Năm 1837, những thủ lĩnh bộ lạc người Natukhai, Abzakh và Shapsug đề nghị được chấp thuận nằm dưới trướng cai trị của Nga nếu Nga rút dân di cư khỏi vùng, song Nga từ chối. Tướng Yermolov cho rằng Nga "chỉ cần đất chứ không cần người Circassia". Các chỉ huy như Yermolov và Bugalov thường tìm cách coi nhẹ vấn đề hòa bình với người Circassia để hành động trên tham vọng của mình Richmond, Walter. Circassian Genocide. Page 17: "The mentality of the Caucasus military command was shaped by people who behaved as if they were in charge of their own country, which outsiders couldn’t understand. Contemptuous of their superiors in St. Petersburg, they fabricated whatever story suited their needs. Furthermore, they adopted Tsitsianov’s view that conquest was the only viable option for control of the region. As we’ll see, when civilian administrators used peaceful methods, the military commanders undermined them both by petitioning St. Petersburg and by launching raids into Circassia to sow animosity. This continued all the way up to the 1860s, when Field Commander Nikolai Evdokimov sabotaged St. Petersburg’s final attempt to reach a settlement with the Circassians."; Page 18: "The troubles Atazhukin faced were also typical of Circassians who understood the magnitude of the threat posed by Russia and who sought a peaceful solution. The Russian military command disliked all such peacemakers and did all they could to thwart their efforts. Many Circassians likewise distrusted their compatriots who sought peace with Russia, and they worked to undermine their credibility in Circassia. This would be the fate of all so- called peaceful Circassians— threats from the Russian side and attacks from the Circassian side. More importantly, all proposals from figures such as Atazhukin that cut to the heart of the Circassian position— that they wanted to be good neighbors with the Russians, not subjects of the tsar— were dismissed out of hand by both the Caucasus command and St. Petersburg."; Page 20-21: " "For the generals," Vladimir Lapin writes, "the activity of diplomats, who were creating post- Napoleonic Europe, essentially meant farewell to their hopes of receiving further rewards."43 There was more to it, though. Even if war in Europe were to break out again, the campaign of 1812 made it clear that Russia would suffer enormous losses even if victorious. On the other hand, Asia’s military backwardness would make victory and glory easy. Even before he arrived in the Caucasus, Ermolov wrote, "We can’t take a step in Europe without a fight, but in Asia entire kingdoms are at our service."44 Ermolov reveled in his overwhelming firepower against which his opponents— particularly the mountaineers of Chechnya, Dagestan, and Circassia— were powerless to combat: "It is very interesting to see the first effect of this innocent means [cannons!] on the heart of man, and I learnt how useful it was to be possessed of the one when unable all at once to conquer the other."45 In his quest for personal glory, Ermolov chose adversaries (victims might be a more appropriate term) who stood no chance against his superior weaponry, and he employed levels of brutality and inhumanity as yet unseen in the Caucasus. It worked, too: Ermolov’s officers were decorated and promoted as their tactics became more devastating. Subsequent generations would emulate Ermolov’s form of success.".