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Amerika Birleşik Devletleri başkanı Franklin D. Roosevelt İsviçre'de teslim olma görüşmeleri yapıldığını inkâr eder. Ancak buna rağmen Dulles, SS Generali Wolff'a görüşmeler sırasında savaş sonrası yargılamalardan muaf tutulacağına dair söz vermiştir. İsviçre istihbaratçısı Max Husmann sayesinde gerçekleşen görüşmelerden İngiliz Başbakanı Winston Churchill de haberdardır. 1943 yılında düzenlenen Kazablanka Konferansı uyarınca Müttefikler, birbirlerinden habersiz Nazi Almanyasıyla teslim şartları görüşmeyeceklerdi. Ancak Dulles buna rağmen görüşmelere devam ederek Trieste komünistler tarafından kurtarılmadan teslim anlaşmasını tamamlamak istemekteydi. 22 Mart günü Harriman'a mektup yazan Molotov, Sovyet temsilcisi olmadan iki hafta boyunca Nazilerle yürütülen görüşmelerin kabul edilemeyeceğini bildirir. Bunun üzerine Roosevelt (24 Mart 1945 tarihli yazışma Susan Butler, My Dear Mr.Stalin: The Complete Correspondence of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Joseph V. Stalin, Yale University Press, 2005 s.303 içinde mektubun tam metni: March 24, 1945 Personal from the President for Marshal Stalin. I have received from Ambassador Harriman a letter addressed to him by Mr. Molotov regarding an investigation being made by Field Marshal Alexander into a reported possibility of obtaining the surrender of part or all of the German Army in Italy, in which letter Mr. Molotov demands that this investigation to be undertaken in Switzerland be stopped forthwith because of the non participation therein of Soviet officers. I am sure that the facts of this matter, through misunderstanding, have not been correctly presented to you. The facts are as follows: Some few days ago unconfirmed information was received in Switzerland that some German officers were considering the possibility of arranging for the surrender of German troops that are opposed to the British-American Armies in Italy commanded by Field Marshal Alexander. When this information reached Washington, Field Marshal Alexander was authorized to send an officer, or officers, of his staff to Switzerland to ascertain the accuracy of the report, and if it appeared to be of sufficient promise, to arrange with any competent German officers for a conference with Field Marshal Alexander at his headquarters in Italy to discuss derails of the surrender. Soviet representatives would, of course, be present if such a meeting could be arranged. The Soviet Government was immediately informed of this investigation to be made in Switzerland and was later informed that it will be agreeable for Soviet officers to be present at Field Marshal Alexander’s meeting with German officers when and if such a meeting is finally arranged in Berne to discuss details of a surrender at Caserta. Attempts by our representatives to arrange a meeting with German officers have met with no success up to the present time, but there still appears to be a possibility of such a meeting. You will, of course, understand that my government must give every assistance to all officers in the field in command of American Forces who believe there is a possibility of forcing the surrender of enemy troops in their area. It would be completely unreasonable for me to take any other attitude or to permit any delay which must cause additional and avoidable loss of life in the American Forces. You as a military man will understand the necessity for prompt action to avoid losing an opportunity. It is in the same category as would be the sending of a flag of truce to your general at Koenigsberg or Danzig. In such a surrender of enemy forces in the field, there can be no political implications whatever and no violation of our agreed principle of unconditional surrender. At any discussion of details of surrender by our commanders of American Forces in the field, I will be pleased to have the benefit of the experience and advice of any of your officers who can be present, but I cannot agree to suspend investigation of the possibility because of objection on the part of Mr. Molotov for some reason completely beyond my understanding. I do not expect much from the reported possibility, but I hope you will, with the purpose of preventing misunderstanding between our officers, point out to the Soviet officials concerned the desirability and necessity of our taking prompt and effective action without any delay to accomplish the surrender of any enemy military forces in the field that are opposed to American Forces. I am sure that when a similar opportunity comes on the Soviet front you will have the same attitude and will take the same action. Roosevelt ) ve Stalin (29 Mart 1945 tarihli yazışma Susan Butler, My Dear Mr.Stalin: The Complete Correspondence of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Joseph V. Stalin, Yale University Press, 2005 s.305 içinde mektubun tam metni: March 29, 1945 Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to President F. D. Roosevelt. I gave consideration to the question you raised before me in the letter of March 25, 1945, and have found that the Soviet Government could not have given a different answer after the Soviet representatives were refused participation in the discussions in Bern with the Germans regarding the possibility of capitulation of German troops and opening the front to Anglo-American troops in Northern Italy. I am not against and, more than this, I am fully for using the opportunity of disintegration in the German armies and to hasten their capitulation in any section of the front, to encourage them in the opening of the front for the Allies. But I agree to negotiations with the enemy on such matter only in the case when these negotiations will not make the situation of the enemy easier, if there will be excluded a possibility for the Germans to maneuver and to use these negotiations for shifting of their troops to other sections of the front and, first of all, to the Soviet front. Only with the purpose of creating such a guarantee was the participation of representatives of the Soviet Military Command in such negotiations with the enemy considered necessary by the Soviet Government, no matter where they would take place—in Bern or Caserta. I cannot understand why representatives of the Soviet Command were refused participation in these negotiations and in what way could they cause inconvenience to the representatives of the Allied Command. For your information I have to tell you that the Germans have already made use of the negotiations with the Allied Command and during this period have succeeded in shifting three divisions from Northern Italy to the Soviet front. The task of coordinated operations with a blow upon the Germans from the West, South and East, announced at the Crimea Conference is to bind the troops of the enemy to the place of their location and not to give the enemy any possibility to maneuver and shift troops in to the necessary for him direction. This task is being carried out by the Soviet Command. This is being violated by Fieldmarshal Alexander. This circumstance is irritating the Soviet Command and creates groundfor mistrust. “As a military man,” you write me, “you will understand, that it is necessary to act quickly in order not to miss an opportunity. It would be the same if your general at Koenigsberg or Danzig would be approached by the enemy with a white flag.” It is regretted that an analogy does not suit this case. German troops at Koenigsberg and Danzig are surrounded. If they surrender they will do it in order to avoid annihilation but they cannot open a front to the Soviet troops as the front has moved away from them far to the West, to the Oder. An entirely different situation is that of the German troops in Northern Italy. They are not surrounded and they do not face annihilation. If the Germans in Northern Italy, in spite of this seek negotiations in order to surrender and to open the front to Allied troops, this means that they have different, more serious aims relating to the fate of Germany. I have to tell you, that if on the Eastern front, somewhere on the Oder, similar conditions of a possibility of capitulation of the Germans and opening the front to Soviet troops would arise, I would not hesitate to inform immediately the Anglo-American Military Command to request it to send their representatives for participation in negotiations as in such cases the Allies should have no secrets from each other. ) arasında hararetli yazışmalar gerçekleşir. Roosevelt konuyu geçiştirmeye çalışmış, sonrasında ise 12 Nisan günü vefat edince konu gündemden düşmüştür.