Aleksandr_Dugin
Ukraina og russisk nasjonalisme
For å lette gjenskapingen av et enormt russisk-dominert kontinentalt imperium, tar Dugin til orde for å slippe løs russisk nasjonalistisk følelse, men av en bestemt type. «Denne [russiske] nasjonalismen,» skriver han, «bør ikke bruke statlig, men snarere kulturelt-etnisk terminologi, med spesiell vekt på slike kategorier som 'Narodnost' og 'russisk ortodoksi'». Religiøs følelse, oppfordrer Dugin, bør plasseres i front og sentralt: «Russere bør innse at de er ortodokse i utgangspunktet; (etniske) russere i andre omgang; og bare for det tredje, mennesker». Aleksandr Dugin's Foundations of Geopolitics Dunlop, John B Demokratizatsiya 12.1 2004. web.archive.org fra archive/GWASHU_DEMO_12_1/John Dunlop Aleksandr Dugin's Foundations of Geopolitics.pdf original sitat:The ethnic Russian people, in contrast, are seen as "the bearers of a unique civilization." 47 Russians are a messianic people, possessing "universal, pan-human significance" (189). The Russian people, Dugin insists, can serve only as the core ethnos of a vast empire: "[T]he Russian people (i.e. Russia) never made its goal the creation of a mono-ethnic, racially uniform state" (190). Such a distorted view represents "the Atlanticist line masking itself as 'Russian nationalism'" (213). "A repudiation of the empire-building function," Dugin warns sternly, "would signify the end of the Russian people as a historical reality, as a civilizational phenomenon. Such a repudiation would be tantamount to national suicide" (197). Deprived of an empire, Russians will "disappear as a nation" (251). The sole viable course, in Dugin's view, is for Russians to rebound from the debacle of 1989-1991 by recreating a great "supra-national empire," one in which ethnic Russians would occupy "a privileged position" (251-252). The result of such a rebuilding effort would be "a giant continental state in the administration of which they [Russians] will play the central role" (253). This ethnic model, Dugin notes, is quite similar to that of the former Soviet Union. In order to facilitate the recreation of a vast Russian-dominated continental empire, Dugin advocates the unleashing of Russian nationalist sentiment, but of a specific type. "This [Russian] nationalism," he writes, "should not employ state but, rather, cultural-ethnic terminology, with a special emphasis on such categories as 'Narodnost" and 'Russian Orthodoxy'" (255). Religious sentiment, Dugin urges, should be placed front and center: "Russians should realize that they are Orthodox in the first place; [ethnic] Russians in the second place; and only in the third place, people" (255). (...) On the key question of Ukraine, Dugin underlines: "Ukraine as a state has no geopolitical meaning. It has no particular cultural import or universal significance, no geographic uniqueness, no ethnic exclusiveness" (377). "Ukraine as an independent state with certain territorial ambitions," he warns, "represents an enormous danger for all of Eurasia and, without resolving the Ukrainian problem, it is in general senseless to speak about continental politics" (348). And he adds that, "[T]he independent existence of Ukraine (especially within its present borders) can make sense only as a 'sanitary cordon'" (379). However, as we have seen, for Dugin all such "sanitary cordons" are inadmissible. Dugin speculates that three extreme western regions of Ukraine--Volynia, Galicia, and Trans-Carpathia--heavily populated with Uniates and other Catholics, could be permitted to form an independent "Western Ukrainian Federation." But this area must not under any circumstances be permitted to fall under Atlanticist control (382). With the exception of these three western regions, Ukraine, like Belorussia, is seen as an integral part of Eurasia-Russia.