સ્યાદવાદ
Ancient roots and assumptions of the Jain Nyay. 4
The Nay methods for reasoning with real world inputs evolved as an integral part of the Jain thought in India. Its cornerstone is the conservation principle  (tangible reality is the net of inputs and outputs) attributed to Rishabhnath (ca. 3000 BC). By the time of Parshvanath (850 BC), this principle was interpreted for reasoning and inference from sense inputs and analogies. Other assumptions include: (1) World in front of the eyes (pratyakch) is what it is, it does what it does, it is neither created from nothing nor does it disappear into nothing. (2) A conscious (chetana) organism extracts information from the sense inputs about the phenomenal world of its experience. Such images are interpreted as perceptions (itthi) by the internal world behind the eyes (parokch, mind). (3) Awareness of the images is also cognized in relation to other inputs and beliefs. Criteria-based descriptions (anugam) of the cognized parts provide information and evidence to abstract, represent, reason, interpret, assert and evaluate the consequences. (4) Complexity of the external world may be daunting and its behavior unpredictable, however a useful starting point for its understanding is its reality that is never contradictory. (5) As spectator, actor and decision maker, an organism interprets perceived parts of inputs to make choices that may be life altering and make one happy, anxious or regretful. (6) Organisms bear the consequences of individual and collective actions. Such interdependence calls for reasoned conversation to resolve conflict to arrive at a rational basis for coexistence, including a social contract for live, let live, and thrive. Mahaveer (599-527 BC) revitalized the Nay methods with the belief that all organisms interpret their experience to address concerns. Human ability to reason and deliberate to make choices and take decisions can further minimize gulf between belief and words through practice. If common sense aligns inputs with perceptions, it takes reasoned uncommon sense to align perceptions with independent reality of the phenomenal world. Scrutiny of the content and context of propositions with identified assumptions encourages an open-ended search for certainty that proves and improves as some uncertainty goes away with each day. In response to a query from his discussion leader Indrabhuti Gautam (607-515 BC), Mahaveer emphasized that a belief is inferred not only from its content and context that knows and how it came to be known, but to realize its full potential it is also necessary to know what one does not know, what else is needed, and what may falsify and contradict it. Saptbhangi Syad Nay of the prior oral tradition is elaborated in several works written over the last 2000 years 2. The emphasis of Nay methods is to build shared knowledge about objects of concern with assertions affirmed by independent evidence. The role of evidence in support of reasoning (up-nay) and decision (nir-nay) is elaborated in Gautam’s Nyay Sutr compiled by Akchapad (ca. 100 AD). This text does not mention the word Nyay. Apparently it come in the title through the Nyaya Bhasya commentary by Vatsyayana (ca. 400 AD) where the word Nyay appears in the text only once in an insignificant context. Apparently by AD 500 the evidence-based Nay reasoning had morphed under the influence of Naiyayik beliefs into Nyay Darshan based on the evidence of insights from the scriptures. Limitations of the scriptural evidence in relation to the logic of true and false (tark) were also recognized. Note that the modern usage of Nyay connotes evidence based judgment with the authority of rule. Bhadrabahu I (ca 350 BC) emphasized four inferred states it is (T), it is not (F), it is both (D), or it is neither (X) of a proposition with two assertions. Umaswami (ca AD 200) noted that the authority of an affirmed assertion for reasoning is in the evidence. Evidence affirms a certain aspect of the object as a particular or as a class, or its functional state or current state, or as addressed in the past. An inference is valid within the bounds of all of its assertions affirmed in real time. Samantbhadra (ca. AD 300) emphasized that evidence-based validity is necessarily incomplete unless the remaining doubt, if any, is also resolved. Siddhsen Divakar (ca. AD 500) reiterated that reasoning is not possible unless assertions about the content and context of the object are affirmed by evidence. Buddhists surmised nothingness (shoonyata) as the ultimate reality against which the perceived content and context are transitory constructs of mind. It was rebutted by Akalank in a decisive debate in Kanchi (AD 670): shoonyata as a state without a basis in the content and context of an object is also without value for reasoning. Hemchandra (AD 1050) emphasized: Unless supported by evidence an assertion is no different than nothing. As mentioned above, it is like a null matrix to organize, represent and interpret sense experience. Gunratn (AD 1435) reiterated reliance on criteria-based assertions affirmed by independent evidence as antidote against omniscience of ad hoc. More recently Hiraiynna 5 noted that the four syad states, is and is not with both is or is not and neither is nor is not, challenged the dichotomy of true or false in the faith-based Vedic absolutism. It also identified contradiction of the undifferentiated Upnishadic reality of it is so, and also it is not so (eti eti, neti neti). Such interpretations to identify the syad states are not red herrings of relativism4, skepticism or deviant logic, nor the metaphysics of four-cornered truth5. Also attempts to cast the saptbhangi in the mould of Western binary logic or rhetoric are found in virtually all modern academic works on Indian Nyaya, Jain logic, Syadvada and Syad Nyaya. It is not surprising that such efforts confined to the literal interpretations have failed to touch the deeper structure of the Saptbhangi Syad Nay. Its features of general interest are outlined below.