نسل‌کشی_چرکس
مقاومت شدید
روسها با ایجاد تغییراتی در طبیعت منطقه، با مقاومت سنگین چرکس‌ها مقابله کردند. آنها شبکه ای از جاده‌ها را ساختند و جنگل‌های اطراف این جاده‌ها را پاکسازی نمودند، روستاهای بومیان را ویران کردند، و اغلب جوامع جدید کشاورز روس یا قفقازی طرفدار روس‌ها را در زمین‌ها اسکان دادند. در این شرایط خونین، ویرانی کامل روستاها به یک تاکتیک معمول بدل شد. در سال ۱۸۳۷، رهبران ناتوخای، آبزاخ و شاپسوگ داوطلبانه پیشنهاد دادند که به امپراتوری روسیه ملحق شود مشروط بر اینکه نیروهای روس و کازاک به رود کوبان محدود باشند. با این حال پیشنهاد آنان نادیده گرفته شد و تصرف یک جانبه سرزمین‌های چرکس با تأسیس سی و شش واحد جدید کازاک تا سال ۱۸۴۰ ادامه یافت. ژنرال یرمولوف اظهار داشت: «ما به سرزمین‌های چرکس‌ها نیاز داریم، اما به خود آنان نه». فرماندهان نظامی روسیه مانند یرمولوف و بولداکوف در جهت منافع خود برای دستیابی به جلال در میدان نبرد و ثروت از طریق فتح سرزمین‌ها که در جبهه غربی بسیار دشوارتر از قفقاز بود، غالباً دولت مرکزی را فریب می‌دادند و این واقعیت را که گروه‌های چرکس در تلاش برای برقراری صلح با روسیه بودند، پنهان می‌کردند. Richmond, Walter. Circassian Genocide. Page 17: "The mentality of the Caucasus military command was shaped by people who behaved as if they were in charge of their own country, which outsiders couldn’t understand. Contemptuous of their superiors in St. Petersburg, they fabricated whatever story suited their needs. Furthermore, they adopted Tsitsianov’s view that conquest was the only viable option for control of the region. As we’ll see, when civilian administrators used peaceful methods, the military commanders undermined them both by petitioning St. Petersburg and by launching raids into Circassia to sow animosity. This continued all the way up to the 1860s, when Field Commander Nikolai Evdokimov sabotaged St. Petersburg’s final attempt to reach a settlement with the Circassians."; Page 18: "The troubles Atazhukin faced were also typical of Circassians who understood the magnitude of the threat posed by Russia and who sought a peaceful solution. The Russian military command disliked all such peacemakers and did all they could to thwart their efforts. Many Circassians likewise distrusted their compatriots who sought peace with Russia, and they worked to undermine their credibility in Circassia. This would be the fate of all so- called peaceful Circassians— threats from the Russian side and attacks from the Circassian side. More importantly, all proposals from figures such as Atazhukin that cut to the heart of the Circassian position— that they wanted to be good neighbors with the Russians, not subjects of the tsar— were dismissed out of hand by both the Caucasus command and St. Petersburg." ; Page 20-21: " “For the generals,” Vladimir Lapin writes, “the activity of diplomats, who were creating post- Napoleonic Europe, essentially meant farewell to their hopes of receiving further rewards. ”43 There was more to it, though. Even if war in Europe were to break out again, the campaign of 1812 made it clear that Russia would suffer enormous losses even if victorious. On the other hand, Asia’s military backwardness would make victory and glory easy. Even before he arrived in the Caucasus, Ermolov wrote, “We can’t take a step in Europe without a fight, but in Asia entire kingdoms are at our service. ”44 Ermolov reveled in his overwhelming firepower against which his opponents—particularly the mountaineers of Chechnya, Dagestan, and Circassia—were powerless to combat: “It is very interesting to see the first effect of this innocent means [cannons!] on the heart of man, and I learnt how useful it was to be possessed of the one when unable all at once to conquer the other. ”45 In his quest for personal glory, Ermolov chose adversaries (victims might be a more appropriate term) who stood no chance against his superior weaponry, and he employed levels of brutality and inhumanity as yet unseen in the Caucasus. It worked, too: Ermolov’s officers were decorated and promoted as their tactics became more devastating. Subsequent generations would emulate Ermolov’s form of success."