United States v. Renzi: Reigning in the Speech or Debate Clause to Fight Corruption in Congress PostRayburn

I. INTRODUCTION In United States v. Renzi,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was asked to decide whether a nondisclosure privilege exists under the Speech or Debate Clause ("Clause") for members of Congress.2 The Ninth Circuit boldly refused to recognize such a privilege and found that evidence of a congressman's "negotiations," which gave rise to allegations of extortion, mail fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy, was not protected from disclosure or prosecution.3 The D.C. Circuit had previously concluded that the Clause gave members of Congress a nondisclosure privilege.4 The Ninth Circuit nonetheless created a circuit split by holding that such a privilege cuts against Supreme Court precedent and "makefs] Members of Congress super-citizens, immune from criminal responsibility."5 In so holding, the Ninth Circuit correctly reigned in the Clause and refused to recognize a nondisclosure privilege by properly relying upon the Clause's plain language, the framers' intent to balance power among the branches of government while preserving Congress's integrity, and Supreme Court precedent. This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit's delineation of the Clause in Renzi is correct, and that such an interpretation strikes the proper balance in fighting corruption in Congress while maintaining Congress's integrity and independence. Part II provides a brief review of the Clause's legal background. Part III summarizes the relevant facts and procedural history of Renzi. Part IV presents a brief discussion of the D.C. Circuit decision from which the Ninth Circuit split and provides an in-depth discussion of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Renzi. Finally, Part V analyzes the delineation of the Clause in United States v. Rayburn and Renzi and the likely impact of those cases. This Part also explains why Renzi more adequately comports with Supreme Court precedent and the plain language of the Clause. II. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND After briefly explaining the Speech or Debate Clause, this Part surveys relevant Supreme Court precedent regarding challenges to the Clause's application. It then concludes by examining Rayburn, the D. C. Circuit decision from which Renzi split. A. The Speech or Dehnte Clause The Speech or Debate Clause provides as follows: The Senators and Representatives . . . shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.6 The Supreme Court has explained that the purpose of this Clause is to balance powers within the Federal Government and "assure a co-equal branch of the government wide freedom of speech, debate, and deliberation without intimidation or threats from the Executive Branch," "thus protecting] Members [of Congress] against prosecutions that directly impinge upon or threaten the legislative process."7 Accordingly, the Court has sought to apply the Clause in a way that balances the three branches of government equally while insuring the independence of the legislature.8 The Court has interpreted the words "Speech or Debate" to go beyond "words spoken in debate," but to include "things generally done in a session of the House by one of its members in relation to the business before it."9 Such protected actions are generally known as "[!legislative acts."10 The Court further defined these protected acts: [T]hey [are] an integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes by which Members participate in committee and House proceedings with respect to die consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other matters which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either House. . . . [T]he courts have extended the privilege to matters beyond pure speech or debate in either House, but "only when necessary to prevent indirect impairment of such deliberations. …