PUBLIC OPINION AND THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES OF 1977

In April 1978, after nine months of national debate, the Senate narrowly ratified new Panama Canal treaties. Voting was apparently influenced by numerous opinion polls, which were seen as showing increased support for the treaties. But several analysts have shown that this interpretation was erroneous; public opinion consistently opposed the treaties. This study attempts to determine what went wrong. It begins by arraying and analyzing all national poll results on the topic in order to establish a coherent picture of public opinion. It then identifies a number of polling and reporting practices which may have contributed to the misinterpretation of the findings. The study concludes with recommendations for alleviating these problems. On 6 September 1977, Presidents Jimmy Carter of the United States and Omar Torrijos of Panama met in Washington to sign two new treaties governing the status of the Panama Canal. The first, known as the Panama Canal Treaty, acknowledged Panama's sovereignty over the Canal Zone and provided for the United States to gradually shift complete control of the Canal to Panama by the year 2000. The second, known as the Neutrality Treaty, provided for a permanent regime of neutrality after the year 2000. TED J. SMITH III is Assistant Professor of Rhetoric and Communication Studies at the University of Virginia. J. MICHAEL HOGAN iS Associate Professor of Speech Communication and American Studies at Indiana University. The study was supported by two grants from the Research Policy Council of the University of Virginia. The authors are deeply indebted to Bernard Roshco and Alvin Richman of the U.S. Department of State, who provided extensive assistance at several stages of the study but bear no responsibility for its conclusions. The authors would also like to thank the following individuals for their invaluable contributions: Lauren Ball, Margaret Campbell, Laurily Epstein, Kathleen Frankovic, Hannah Jelinek, Andrew Kohut, Colleen McMurray, Walter Mears, Harry O'Neill, Burns Roper, Roger Seasonwein, Lois Timms, and G. Evans Witt. Public Opinion Quarterly Volume 51:5-30 ? 1987 by the American Association for Public Opinion Research Published by The University of Chicago Press / 0033-362X/87/0051-01/$2.50 This content downloaded from 157.55.39.123 on Mon, 18 Jul 2016 05:59:57 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 6 Ted J. Smith III and J. Michael Hogan Ratification of the treaties was in doubt from the outset. But they were approved by the Foreign Relations Committee in January, and consideration by the full Senate began on 8 February 1978. Over two months later, after the second longest treaty debate in history, both were ratified by identical 68-32 votes, just one vote more than the required two-thirds majority. Most observers agree that two amendments to the Neutrality Treaty were crucial in securing even this narrow margin of approval. Known as the "leadership amendments," they were intended to clarify U.S. rights to defend the neutrality of the Canal and to have priority passage in military emergencies after the year 2000. Opinion polls figured prominently in the Senate's decision to ratify the amended treaties. Although early polls all showed widespread opposition to the pacts, treaty supporters claimed that a number of later polls showed a dramatic "turnabout" in public opinion. As Moffett (1985:114) has argued, these later findings apparently "provided the critical margin of safety for undecided senators hard-pressed by vocal opponents of ratification at home." More specifically, the "turnabout" was attributed to the leadership amendments and the success of efforts to "educate" the public about provisions of the treaties. Conservative senators vigorously contested this interpretation of polling results. But as Hogan (1985:311) has argued, the pro-treaty portrait of public opinion prevailed, "influencing the procedures and the outcome of the Senate debate." Unfortunately, it appears that this pro-treaty interpretation was wholly erroneous. After examining 23 polls for evidence of "trends," Roshco (1978:562) concluded: "The trend that was confirmed most strongly could have been graphed with a straight horizontal line." Similarly, Moffett (1985:116) determined from a study of 34 polls that "public opinion on the Panama Canal treaties remained almost completely static. Despite one of the most extensive public relations efforts undertaken on any foreign-policy issue in American history, public attitudes never budged." These conclusions are deeply disturbing. They suggest that the primary result of extensive professional polling on a major foreign policy issue was the massive misinterpretation of public opinion and, arguably, frustration of the public will. This essay attempts to discover what went wrong. It begins by arraying and analyzing the results of all national opinion polls on the Panama Canal conducted during the period of June 1975 through November 1978. Polling practices and the coverage of survey results in six national news media are then examined in order to determine how they may have contributed to erroneous interpretations. The essay concludes with recommendations on how This content downloaded from 157.55.39.123 on Mon, 18 Jul 2016 05:59:57 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Public Opinion and the Panama Canal Treaties 7 pollsters and journalists might avoid the problems described in the analysis. Polls on the Panama Canal At least' 42 nationwide surveys, fielded by ten different pollsters, provide evidence of American attitudes about the Panama Canal in the period 1975-1978. These polls have been the subject of two detailed studies; both are problematic. Roshco's analysis (1978) is accurate and perceptive but incomplete. He reports results from only 23 polls, omits mention of some questions from these, and offers no systematic framework for interpreting the full set of findings. Moffett's study (1985) is more comprehensive and provides an analytical system for categorizing questions by content. Again, however, a number of polls and questions are omitted. More important, his discussion is flawed by numerous and often serious errors of fact, analysis, and interpretation.2 These concerns suggest the need to begin discussion with a description and analysis of all available findings on the topic. Table 1 presents the responses to 51 questions asked in 42 nationwide surveys.3 It includes all items designed to measure level of approval of either the Panama Canal treaties or the concept of ceding the Canal to Panama. Excluded are questions about the issues involved, measures of attitudinal intensity and salience, and ratings of congressional and presidential performance. Perhaps the most striking feature of Table 1 is the great diversity of results it displays. The responses vary from 78%-8% disapproval (ORC item 8) to 65%-25% support (NBC item 26b). In the single month of February 1978, during the height of the Senate debate, findings ranged from 72%-19% against to 54%-40% in favor. Nevertheless, a very rough temporal pattern can be discerned. Specifically, nearly all (25 of 27) items asked prior to January 1978 showed opposition to the 1. It is difficult to be certain of the exact number of polls conducted. We are confident that the 42 polls discussed here represent all published and all or nearly all unpublished national surveys on the topic. 2. These criticisms are documented in Smith and Hogan (1985:7-8), which is available as ERIC Document ED 264 630. 3. Space limitations preclude giving the text of each question in Table 1. These may be found in Smith and Hogan (1985:10-18). All information about these polls has been confirmed by original news releases, Roper Center data, or direct contact with the pollster. The only exceptions are the five Caddell items. Repeated attempts to verify them were unsuccessful, and so it has been necessary to rely on Roshco (1978) and Moffett (1985) in these instances. Items in Table 1 are ordered by date of first interview and, within surveys, by the actual sequence in which they were asked. This content downloaded from 157.55.39.123 on Mon, 18 Jul 2016 05:59:57 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms