A Religious Basis for Solidarity in Industrial Society

Durkheim's approach to the sociocultural aspects of religion enables one to postulate that for industrial society, nationalism is a religion that fosters solidarity. Industrial nationalism differs from the nationalism of peasant society in being able to foster societal integration without undermining instrumental effectiveness. This is so partly because industrial nationalism is politico-economic, while peasant nationalism is religio-ethnic. Only industrial society has effective mechanisms for increasing diversity and uniformity simultaneously-and for differentiating between nonfunctional diversity and eufunctional/dysfunctional diversity. These conditions are fostered by the fact that industrial nationalism treats observable phenomena (rather than some metaphysical referent) as ultimate reality-and treats maximum empirical success as a fundamental end in itself. However, this confounding of pragmatic considerations with ethical ones makes industrial society's solidarity particularly vulnerable. THE PROBLEM: DEFINITION AND APPROACH It has been said that in the modern West, religion is weak and does not contribute greatly to societal solidarity. The present writer disagrees. His disagreement stems more from differences in conceptualizing "religion" than from differences in appraising facts. Those who assert the weakness or decline of religion tend to restrict their definition of religion to the familiar traditional type exemplified by Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, etc.1 The present writer feels that for the work of social science, it would be advantageous to use a definitional concept that is broader, in some ways, than the one commonly used. Models of religion other than the familiar traditional type can be postulated and applied fruitfully. The present writer suggests that nationalism is a type of religion in the contemporary world-and that it provides a major basis for societal solidarity. Contemporary nationalism can have this function because there is a basic affinity between it and an industrial type of societal organization, which tends to prevail currently. Much of the present writer's thinking along these lines has been influenced strongly by the work of t:mile Durkheim. Durkheim's epistemological approach to explaining human behavior was to treat abstract ideals as real insofar as they can have empirically verifiable effects on behavior.2 As a social scientist, Durkheim did not delve into metaphysical issues, but instead focused on the social and cultural factors involved in religion. Thus, his scientific approach to religion is broader (than that of traditional theology) in being able to encompass systems that do not postulate any ultimate metaphysical reality. However his approach is narrower in that it can deal only with the empirical aspects of religion. (Science can help to explain and predict how and why people think, feel, and act as they do with respect to the question of ultimate metaphysical reality. How1 For a recent analysis of contemporary religion as different from historic religion rather than weaker, see Robert N. Bellah, "Religious Evolution," American Sociological Review, 29 (June 1964), esp. pp. 370-371. 2 For an enlightening treatment of Durkheim's polemics against both the religious traditionalists and the utilitarian, materialistic "secularists," see Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Actioni (2d ed.; Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1949), esp. pp. 343-409, 460-473. Durkheim considered it advisable to combine the best of empiricism with the best of idealism. This view can be found in smile Durkheim, l'?ducation Morale (Paris: Librairie Felix Alcan, 1925), pp. 304-305. Also see Harry Alpert, Smile Durkheim and His Sociology (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), esp. pp. 80-81. This content downloaded from 207.46.13.166 on Thu, 07 Jul 2016 06:18:32 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms RELIGIOUS SOLIDARITY IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 85 ever, science cannot investigate the validity or nature of the metaphysical itself.) Durkheim regarded a religion as being, among other things, a system of ideas that tends to encompass all entities and give a complete picture of the (known) world.3 Thus, a religion involves a conceptual framework that is universal in coverage and that is linked to a set of factual assertions. According to Durkheim, this conceptual framework is essentially a dichotomous classificatory scheme, whose categories he called sacre and profane, respectively.4 A religion is said to focus on the items that are deemed sacre and to repulse or exclude those that are categorized residually as profane.5 Durkheim concluded that the classification of entities as sacre could not be based on any of their intrinsic features, for they did not seem to have any distinctive ones in common. He postulated that the common denominator of their sanctity is that they all inspire respect,6 respect that is sufficiently strong and sufficiently collective.7 (In using the term "collective," Durkheim meant more than the sheer number or proportion of people involved; he meant that the people feel and express their common beliefs and sentiments in unison, rather than as separate individuals.)8 Durkheim attributed this strong, collective respect for an entity to its symbolic function; the entity represents to the people their "most essential social similarities."9 Many of these "most essential social similarities" are value judgments that the people hold collectively.10 Durkheim thought of the collectively held mental sets (ethical value judgments, concepts, beliefs, and symbols) as being integrated with one another-and as constituting a system. He designated this system as the conscience commune or the conscience collective."1 Conformity to the specific conscience collective in question is obligatory for all who are involved,12 and collective enforcement of individual conformity also is obligatory. The present writer is in accord with Durkheim's postulate that religious orientations and religious behavior are at least limited (rather than determined) by conditions that can be explained and predicted through science. For heuristic purposes, it may be quite useful to define religion in terms of observable phenomena -and in terms of abstractions from such phenomena, abstractions such as social organization and culture. If social and cultural factors do indeed limit man's religion, then historical and comparative variation in societal level social organization and general culture are likely to be associated with variation in religion. (This 3 :mile Durkheim, les Fornes ]?homentaires de la Vie Religieutse (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 4 ieme edition, 1960), p. 200. 4 smile Durkheim, "de la D6finition des Phenomenes Religieux," I'Annene Sociologique, 2 (18971898), p. 25; and les Formes mlenmentaires pp. 50-51. Much attention has been given to the problem of translating Durkheim's terms sacre' and profane, but the problem has not :been resolved adequately. (One of the, more thoughtful discussions is to be found in the "1951 Commentary on Value-System Terminology," in Howard Becker and Harry Elmer Barnes, Social Thought from Lore to Science [2d ed.; Washington, D.C.: Harren Press, 1952], p. iv.) 5 les Formes ?l6Ienentairies . . , pp. 65, 380, 428. 6lIbid., pp. 327-328, 380. 7 I-mile Durkheim, de la Division du Travail Social (Paris: Librairie Felix Alcan, 5 ieme edition, 1926), pp. 143-144. 8 Ibid., pp. 70, 72. 9Ibid., pp. 59-60, 70-75. 10 Durkheim postulated that the components of a religion unite those who adhere to them into a single moral community. les Forines Elementaires . . . , p. 65. 11 The importance of a society's conceptual framework in relation to its set of empirical assertions and its set of ethical values is incisively explored in the following cross-cultural analysis: -mile Durkheim et Marcel Mauss, "de Quelques Formes Primitives de Classification-Contribution a l'Ptude des Representations Collectives," I'Anne'e Sociologique, 6 (1901-1902), pp. 1-72. The present writer feels that since Durkheim's use of the term conscience collective often was vague or ambiguous, it is best to leave the term untranslated in the present paper. (Sometimes he seems to mean collective ethical evaluation, at other times collective cognition is the apparent meaning, at still other times the term indicates evaluation and cognition together, while sometimes Durkheim seems uncertain himself.) 12 1'Annee Sociologique, 2 (1897-1898), pp. 2021; l':Jducation Morale, pp. 34-35; and les Formes Jle'iientaires . . ., p. 215, footnote #2. This content downloaded from 207.46.13.166 on Thu, 07 Jul 2016 06:18:32 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms