How much money should one put into the cognitive parking meter

Many of us have had the unpleasant experience of putting money into a parking meter, turning the knob, and finding that our money has not registered. Do we put in more coins, move to another space, or hope we will not get a fine?The problem of ‘sunken costs’ is one we all face in one form or another. We invest in something; the investment turns out to be less than successful, but we have already invested, so we might keep investing in the hope that eventually the investment will pay off. But how long is long enough to decide that it might be time to look for another investment – or parking space?Soon, a half-century will have passed since Cronbach's plea for a union of the two disciplines of scientific psychology 1xThe two disciplines of scientific psychology. Cronbach, L.J. Am. Psychol. 1957; 12: 671–684CrossrefSee all References1. It was and still is a noble cause, and one I have contributed to. But as Deary 2xHuman intelligence differences: towards a combined experimental–differential approach. Deary, I.J. Trends Cognit. Sci. 2001; 5: 164–170Abstract | Full Text | Full Text PDF | PubMed | Scopus (49)See all References2 (last month) alludes to, I decided almost 20 years ago that, on its own, a cognitive-experimental approach to the problem was not yielding the results I and many others had hoped for. It still isn't, for all the reasons Deary cites. As examples, we still don't know: (1) the nature of the causal relation between cognitive components and psychometric factors; (2) if the elementary cognitive tasks used to measure mental speed are truly elementary or about as complex as the supposedly complex tasks they are supposed to help explain; (3) if the level of mental effort is positively or negatively correlated with intelligence. These are just a few of the many lingering puzzles.The approach has not been without fruits. But the fruits have been smaller and perhaps more bitter than we cognitive researchers had once anticipated. Deary's solution is to start ‘with a credible cognitive architecture that contains isolable, testable parameters’ (Ref. 2xHuman intelligence differences: towards a combined experimental–differential approach. Deary, I.J. Trends Cognit. Sci. 2001; 5: 164–170Abstract | Full Text | Full Text PDF | PubMed | Scopus (49)See all References2, p. 169). But cognitive architectures have produced no more consensus judgments than have cognitive-experimental approaches to intelligence. John Anderson, Allen Newell, David Rumelhart and Jay McClelland, and many others have proposed cognitive architectures, which have been warmly welcomed by some and roundly rejected by others. No wonder that Deary gives no concrete examples of such architectures: none has been accepted by a broad consensus of cognitive scientists.The cognitive-experimental option is not a ‘bad’ one, any more than the biological approach is a good or bad one (see Ref. 3xIntelligence, inspection time, and cognitive strategies. Deary, I.J. and Caryl, P.G. : 259–315See all References3). But that approach, too, has its strengths and weaknesses. The bottom line, as recognized by Garner, Hake and Erikson nearly half a century ago 4xOperationism and the concept of perception. Garner, W.R. et al. Psychol. Rev. 1956; 63: 149–159Crossref | PubMed | Scopus (252)See all References4, is that in studying any psychological phenomenon, one needs to use converging operations, an approach that we have taken in seeking to understand intelligence. For example, we have sought to use cognitive-experimental, psychometric, instructional, and cultural methodologies to validate the theory of successful intelligence 5xSee all References5.From this point of view, single-method reviews of the literature, such as this one or the earlier one by Deary and Caryl 3xIntelligence, inspection time, and cognitive strategies. Deary, I.J. and Caryl, P.G. : 259–315See all References3, are likely to miss an important point – namely, that there is no one preferred or even nearly complete method for understanding intelligence (or, really, any other psychological phenomenon). A review such as this one is likely to leave many issues unresolved – as it says it does – precisely because it relies largely or exclusively on studies that focus on one kind of methodology.The problem with this review is a general one. We have recently argued that, as a field, psychology is misorganized 6xThe misorganization of psychology. Sternberg, R.J. and Grigorenko, E.L. APS Observer. 2001; 14: 1–20See all References6. It tends to train psychologists to focus on narrow approaches – cognitive, biological, social, clinical, or whatever – and thereby falsely to view largely arbitrary (i.e. method-induced) slices of a phenomenon as the whole phenomenon. Cognitive science – in its combination of psychological, neuroscientific, computational, philosophical and cultural approaches – was originally introduced as an antidote to this problem. But how many cognitive-scientific studies published in this journal or any other remain true to this principle of multidisciplinary or multimethod integration? Perhaps very few. Cognitive science thus provided the solution to the problem; unfortunately, many of us have chosen to ignore it.We continue to put our money into parking meters that inadequately register our coins.