Will moral outrage stand up?: Distinguishing among emotional reactions to a moral violation

University of Tennessee, USAAbstractMoral outrage—anger at violation of a moral standard—is claimed to be a prevalent and powerful moral emotion. However,evidenceformoraloutragehasbeencompromisedbyfailuretodistinguishitfrompersonalanger—angeratharmtoself—feltbyvictims of a moral violation. Although it does not seem possible to distinguish these two forms of anger by measurement, it ispossible to do so by experimental manipulation of their distinct eliciting conditions. Extending previous research, the currentstudymanipulatedhowavictim(selfvs.stranger)wasexcluded(fairlyvs.unfairly)fromafavorableexperience.Reportedangerandbehavioralretributionprovidedevidenceofpersonalangerandrevenge,notofmoraloutrage.Theseﬁndingssuggestthattheprevalence and power of moral outrage has been exaggerated. Copyright # 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.When there is not enough of what is good to go around,someone must be excluded. Imagine it is you. How would youfeel? If you got the short straw in a fair drawing of lots, youmight feel frustrated and angry at the gods, fate, or your badluck. What if your exclusion was blatantly unfair? Then youranger might take on a different cast; you might call it moraloutrage. If so, you would not be alone. Those who kill inresponse towhat they perceive to be unfair exclusion, whetherin schools or in theworld at large, also speak of moral outrage(see,forexample,GibbsRTheGuardian,2002).By deﬁnition, unfair exclusion involves violation of moralstandards of procedural fairness (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Thibaut& Walker, 1975), so it may seem obvious that any anger itproduces is moral outrage. However, to be unfairly excludedinvolves more than a moral-standard violation; it also involvesharm to self—deprivation of goods, personal affront, andthwarting of a need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995).When the self is harmed or one’s personal goals have beenthwarted, the anger that follows might more accurately betermed personal anger.Moral Outrage or Personal Anger?Moral outrage is anger produced by the perceived violation ofa moral standard or principle (Batson et al., 2007; Hoffman,2000; Montada & Schneider, 1989). Such outrage isconsidered a prevalent and powerful moral emotion (Darley& Pittman, 2003; Haidt, 2003; Montada & Schneider, 1989).Indeed, Haidt (2003) cited it as one of the ‘‘most prototypicalmoralemotions’’(p.854)andsuggestedthat‘‘angerisperhapsthe most underappreciated moral emotion. For everyspectacular display of angry violence, there are many moremundane cases of people indignantly standing up for what isright or angrily demanding justice for themselves or others’’(p. 856). Further, moral anger or outrage has often beenclaimed to be a potent motivator of moral action, such asseeking retribution for perpetrators and compensation forvictims (Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002; Darley, 2002;Darley & Pittman, 2003; de Rivera, Gerstmann, & Maisels,2002; de Waal, 1996; Haidt, 2003; Mikula, Scherer, A Schmitt & Maes, 1998; Solomon, 1990;Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000). Despite thesenumerous claims, there is reason to question the prevalence, ifnot the existence, of moral outrage. Anger expressed by thevictimsofunfairnessorinjustice,whetherineverydaylifeorinthe lab, is often assumed to be moral outrage when it couldeasily be personal anger instead (see, for example, Martin,Brickman, & Murray, 1984; Schmitt & Maes, 1998). Indeed,even anger at mistreatment of someone else in whose shoesone imagines being may not be moral outrage but counter-factual personal anger (‘‘He could have done that to me!’’)(see, for example, Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Martin et al.,1984).Both moral outrage and personal anger are likely to beexperiencedandreportedasirritation,anger,oroutrage.Thesedifferent terms reﬂect the intensity not the form of the anger.Cognitive-appraisal theories of emotion (Arnold, 1960;Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984; Smith & Ellsworth, 1987)suggest that the two forms of anger are distinguished not bytheir magnitude—each can range from mild to intense—butbytheirelicitingconditions.Eachformisevokedbyadifferentcognitive appraisal based on attention to a different aspect ofthe standard-violating situation: Moral outrage is elicited byrecognition that a moral principle has been violated; personalanger, by recognition that one’s interests have been harmed.These two different forms of anger should, in turn, result inEuropean Journal of Social Psychology, Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 41, 173–179 (2011)