The Influence of Cockpit Weather Automation on Pilot Perception and Decision-Making in Severe Weather Conditions

This research examines situations in which a pilot either chooses to use, or refrains from using weather-related automation systems, and how the presence of such systems influences a pilot’s decision-making, performance and ability to perceive danger in severe weather conditions. Results indicate that the influence of automation on a pilot’s perception and decision-making process is dependent upon the pilot’s ability to perform manual flight tasks, independent of the automation. Pilots are more likely to continue flight into severe weather conditions and less likely to identify hazardous weather changes when an imbalance exists between a pilot’s flight experience, confidence in ability to manually operate the aircraft, and reliance on automation systems. LITERATURE REVIEW Reliance on advanced cockpit technologies, more specifically weather radar systems, has led researchers to question whether such technologies improve or hinder a pilot’s decision-making performance and ability to perceive danger in severe weather conditions. Madhavan and Lacson (2006) state that “poor pilot decision-making in deteriorating weather is the leading cause of a significant percentage of fatalities arising from aviation accidents in the last two decades” (p. 47). Although an appropriate level of training may have been completed, the presence of weather automation may enhance or hinder the pilot’s performance and decision-making process. High-tech cockpits integrate information quickly and efficiently, decreasing the pilot’s 1 Ambs: The Influence of Cockpit Weather Automation Published by DigitalCommons@EMU, 2 workload and the time it takes the pilot to make decisions. Thus, overreliance on automation, specifically weather automation systems, may increase erroneous behavior and ultimately lead to aircraft accidents. This research focuses on the pilot’s reliance on weather automation, versus the pilot’s ability to perform without weather automation, when assessing the safety of weather conditions and determining whether to continue flight. Mosier, Skitka, Heers, and Burdick (1998) indicated that although pilots are trained to use the systems of the aircraft, new technologies are being developed to take on cognitive flight tasks for the pilot. Concurrently, pilots who use automated weather systems have shown an overreliance on the data provided by these displays. These advancements have been proven to have a positive affect on a pilot’s performance and decision-making process; however, confusion pertaining to automation and weather displays has also been documented. The article Performance Consequences of AutomationInduced Complacency by Parasuraman, Molloy, and Singh (1993) explained that one form of confusion, known as complacency, is “one potential negative effect of automation relevant to monitoring performance” (p. 2). Parasuraman, Molloy, and Singh (1993) go on to explain that: Crew attitudes such as overconfidence in automation may not be sufficient in themselves to lead to complacency, but may only indicate a potential for complacency. Complacent behavior may arise only when complacency potential occurs jointly with other conditions such as high workload brought about by poor weather, heavy traffic, or fatigue due to poor sleep or long flights. The combination of the crew’s attitude toward automation (e.g., overreliance) and a particular situation (e.g., fatigue) may lead to complacent behavior. One index of complacent behavior (among other possibilities) could be reduced accuracy or delay in detecting a failure in the automated control of a flight task. (p. 3) Kryn M, Ambs 2 McNair Scholars Research Journal, Vol. 7 [], Iss. 1, Art. 4 http://commons.emich.edu/mcnair/vol7/iss1/4 3 It can be determined that certain human factors or flying conditions (weather, traffic, fatigue, etc.) may cause pilots to rely more heavily on automated weather systems, in comparison to situations in which such human factors or conditions do not occur. Such confidence in weather displays may result in poor monitoring performance. While relying on the weather systems, pilots may neglect to monitor the systems for danger, malfunctions, or failure, which could ultimately lead to an incident or accident. It is important that an appropriate balance exists between the accuracy of the pilot’s performance and the reliance upon the accuracy of the automated weather systems. Muthard and Wickens (2003) recognize the limitations of some automated weather systems, noting that pilots were less likely to detect threatening weather changes and were therefore more likely to continue flying hazardous routes. They also found that “pilots would seek cues that confirm the belief that the originally filed flight path was safe and ignore cues that refute the belief” (Muthard & Wickens, 2003, p. 858). This is an indication of substantial reliance on weather automation and deficient information processing. Pilots who rely on already limited automation are more likely to continue flight into unsafe conditions, which increases the risk of erroneous behavior and the possibility of calamity. In Humans and Automation: Use, Misuse, Disuse, Abuse, the relationship between pilots and automation is examined and further defined as the “engaging or disengaging, overreliance, neglect, and omission of consequences of, or pertaining to automation” (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997, p. 230). When automation is implemented in flight operations, it is important that the system is easy to operate, responds quickly, and that proper training is received to ensure its appropriate use and to reduce the risk of operator errors (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). Parasuraman and Riley (1997) discuss the importance of the pilot’s ability to recognize an overreliance on automation and the tendency to use automation cues as heuristics for decisions. They report that “operational monitoring can be efficient” with favorable ergonomics, steady workloads, and a counterbalance between pilots and automation performance (p. 249). Furthermore, an operator’s mistrust of autoThe Influence of Cockpit Weather Automation on Pilot Perception and Decision-Making in Severe Weather Conditions 3 Ambs: The Influence of Cockpit Weather Automation Published by DigitalCommons@EMU, 4 mation will decrease when the automation meets standard requirements for function. Equally, automation abuse will decrease when the operator has responsibilities and capabilities not solely based on the functions of the automation (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). Contrarily, a study by Moiser et al. (1998) reported that: Pilots who reported an internalized perception of “accountability” for their performance and strategies of interactions with the automation were significantly more likely to double-check automated functioning against other cues and less likely to commit errors than those who do not share this perception. Pilots were also likely to erroneously “remember” the presence of expected cues when describing their decision-making processes. (p. 47-48) These studies suggest that although some pilots maintain a balance between their ability to fly the aircraft and their reliance on automation, there are pilots who do not maintain this balance, relying solely on automation to complete cognitive flight tasks. The imbalance between flight experience and automation reliance identified in both of these studies documents the influence of automation on pilot perception and decision-making. Based on this research, the influence of automation can be positive or negative, depending on the pilot’s ability to assume responsibility for completing cognitive flight tasks, independent of automation. A study by Wiggins and Bollwerk (2006) suggests that the presence of automation within the cockpit helps pilots make safe decisions and perform flight tasks correctly, in accordance with high-risk situations in which pilots make strategic decisions based on time and their ability to maintain personal control of the aircraft, as opposed to completing all flight tasks with a sole reliance on automation. Furthermore, Wiggins and Bollwerk (2006) report that: (a) Different operators prefer to acquire information using different heuristic-based strategies; (b) the selection of an information acquisition strategy Kryn M, Ambs 4 McNair Scholars Research Journal, Vol. 7 [], Iss. 1, Art. 4 http://commons.emich.edu/mcnair/vol7/iss1/4 5 is not predicted by task-related experience; (c) and the strategy that appears most appealing is also one that demands a significant amount of time to ensure that sufficient information is acquired prior to the selection of an alternative. Successful decision support systems are therefore likely to be those that enable users to exercise control over their own individual approach to decision making, and present the required information within a time period that enable the generation and execution of a re-