Visual Scheming: Assessing Visual Arguments

A pressing problem for proponents of the existence of visual arguments-arguments presented at least partially in a visual mode--concerns what evaluative method or methods are available for the assessment of such beasts. Specifically, can visual arguments be evaluated in the same ways as verbal arguments, or are unique methods, standards, and criteria required? In this paper, I urge the use of argumentation schemes, as presented by Walton, Reed, and Macagno (2008) as a method for handling this normative task. Part of the power of argumentation schemes is their versatility. Schemes categorize very general features of argument types. Hence, individual schemes are applicable to a wide range of arguments within given categories. It does not matter if, say, an analogical argument has multiple sentences regarding comparison, the scheme applies. Moreover, as no list of schemes should be thought to be exhaustive, it is possible to recognize new schemes. This is an important move when no existing scheme seems applicable, which may be the case with many visual arguments. In applying schemes to arguments containing visual content, one may need to take advantage of the versatility of recognized schemes or invent new schemes depending on the case. I demonstrate this with examples. In one case, I show that an existing scheme, slippery slope, applies straightforwardly to a visual example. In another, I develop a new scheme to account for a typically, though not necessarily, visual argument pattern-what I call an argument from fit. In both cases, the normative legitimacy of the method is explained in exactly the same way. Both schemes identify features of the text or image that are essential to the reasoning as conveyed. Next, through critical questions, the schemes identify typical ways in which the reasoning could fail. In this way, the schemes (whether visual or verbal) function as tools for appraisal by testing typical ways in which the evaluative criteria of relevancy, sufficiency, and acceptability fail to be met in reasoning of some recognizable pattern. This essay starts by discussing argumentation schemes and their application to verbal arguments. I explain briefly both the theory and value of schemes as tools of argument appraisal. Next, I discuss a definition of visual argument. In that section, I address several common concerns regarding the existence of visual argument. Of course, the goal is not to settle the issue, but to show that at least some of the worries regarding the existence of visual argument are specious. The important result of this section is to note that whatever visual arguments are, on at least the construal asserted here, they have the usual structure of arguments generally, viz., premises and conclusions. Then I apply a typically verbal scheme to a visual example. The point here is to demonstrate the naturalness or ease of applying schemes to a visual example. The appraisal works whether the argument is verbal or visual. In the next section, I address an apparent case of visual argument to which no extant scheme seems applicable. Thus, I suggest a remedy in the form of a new scheme. Finally, in the conclusion, I suggest potential future developments. WHAT ARE ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES? Judging by the chapter in Walton, Reed, and Macagno (2008), the history of argumentation schemes is long. Schemes date at least to the time of Aristotle. Schemes classify particular forms or patterns of reasoning--identifying premise types, for example--and pose critical questions that apply normative pressure to typical ways in which inferences may fail. There can be schemes for common deductive patterns such as eliminating alternatives (also known as disjunctive syllogism), common inductive patterns like generalization from a sample, and common presumptive patterns such as appeal to authority. This essay remains faithful to the presentations of Walton (1996) and Walton et al. …