The science of values: The Moral Landscape by Sam Harris

In The Moral Landscape, Sam Harris (2010) proposes that science can be used to identify values, which he defines as “facts that can be scientifically understood: regarding positive and negative social emotions, retributive impulses, the effects of specific laws and social institutions on human relationships, the neurophysiology of happiness and suffering, etc.” (pp. 1–2). Harris argues that scientific principles are appropriately applied in this domain because “human well-being entirely depends on events in the world and on states of the human brain. Consequently, there must be scientific truths known about it” (p. 3). Although readers of this journal would have few problems with the assertion that behavior (here, reports of well-being and correlated responses) changes as a function of environmental events, the role of the neurophysiological correlates of these responses has been a point of debate within the conceptual literature of behavior analysis (e.g., Elcoro, 2008; Reese, 1996; Schaal, 2003). The Moral Landscape represents an important contribution to a scientific discussion of morality. It explicates the determinants of moral behavior for a popular audience, placing causality in the external environment and in the organism's correlated neurological states. The contemporary science of behavior analysis has and will continue to contribute to this discussion, originating with Skinner's seminal works Beyond Freedom and Dignity (1971) and Walden Two (1976). Neither book is explicitly a treatise on morality, but both are attempts to introduce behavioral science to a broader audience. The behavior-analytic approach (which is largely compatible with Harris's efforts in The Moral Landscape) supports the superiority of a scientific approach to life, including questions of morality. Skinner (1976), for example, highlighted the importance of the experimenting culture to identify practices that were effective (cf. Baum, 2005).Tacit within behavior analysis is the expectation that a scientific worldview can and will improve the quality of life. Consistent with this view, Harris suggests that the currently accepted determinants of morality (e.g., religion, faith) are not what society ought to espouse. Instead, he proposes that scientific inquiry into morality as its own subject would enhance global levels of well-being. From a behavioral perspective, the study of morality is necessarily the study of behavior, including the contexts in which it occurs and the environmental events of which it is a function. Analysis in this framework may allow the successful identification of the variables that control moral behavior, and, ultimately, the development of cultural practices to increase its occurrence. The Moral Landscape is a recent contribution to a collection of books (e.g., Dawkins, 2006; Harris, 2005; Hitchens, 2007; Sagan, 2006) that subject the claims of religion to the same standard of empirical rigor that other epistemologies (e.g., science) must abide by. Dawkins (2006), for example, criticizes the appeal to supernatural gods as explanatory agents and takes issue with the privileged place of religion within societal discourse. Harris echoes and expands on these concerns in The Moral Landscape. Collectively, these authors take issue with the notion of nonoverlapping magisteria (NOMA; Gould, 1999), which is the assertion that science and religion are both valid systems of knowledge, and that neither discipline can inform the other. Behavior analysts take issue with the notion that scientific behavior and religious behavior are egalitarian (see Galuska, 2003, for suggestions about successful navigation of NOMA by behavior analysts). Skinner (1987) commented, “Science, not religion, has taught me my most useful values, among them intellectual honesty. It is better to go without answers than to accept those that merely resolve puzzlement” (p. 12). Although religion may be effective at inducing behavioral change among its followers, it continues to have unintended effects that, to borrow Harris's analogy, reach the depths of the moral landscape. Hitchens (2007) makes a subtitular claim that “religion poisons everything,” supporting his thesis with discussions of demonstrably negative outcomes associated with religious practice, discussing examples of how religion leads to poorer states of human health and impedes social progress. As an alternative, he proposes a rational, scientific view of the world, which Harris applies to the study of morality. Because they are members of a relatively small discipline, it may be beneficial for behavior analysts to align themselves with and support the authors of these works, garnering attention from the controversial coverage from popular media outlets that writers such as Dawkins and Harris regularly elicit. Perhaps controversial exposure is better than no exposure at all, especially when behavior analysis can enable the development of the hypothetical secular society that Harris, Dawkins, Hitchens, and Sagan call for. Indeed, behavior analysis may be the only discipline that can identify and establish reinforcers to motivate prosocial, so-called moral, human behavior in the absence of organized religion. It is noteworthy that no psychologist has tackled the problem of secular values alongside these authors in spite of the contradictory facts that religion presents about human nature, facts that take away from the value of our discipline. Indeed, much of the rich “prescientific” vocabulary that inhibits psychology from becoming a natural science is either religious or metaphysical in nature (Schlinger, 2004). It is imperative for the validation of the field of psychology, as well as behavior analysis by association, to be a part of this modern empiricist movement championed by Harris. Harris's argument unfolds in an introduction and five subsequent chapters. In the introduction, he defines his title concept of the moral landscape as a hypothetical space representing human well-being, encompassing all human experiences. This space contains the well-being of members of all cultures and groups of individuals on the planet. The peaks of this landscape are the heights of prosperity, and the valleys represent the depths of human suffering. The goal of plotting the cartography of this landscape is to maximize “the well-being of conscious creatures” (i.e., humans) which “must translate at some point into facts about brains and their interactions with the world at large” (p. 11). For Harris, the brain is the locus of interest. We believe that it is possible to recast the argument into one about whole organisms—with correlated neurological states, perhaps—interacting with their environment to determine behavior. This scientific approach to human behavior, with a goal of improving the welfare of living organisms, is consistent with the application of behavior analysis to bring about societal change (e.g., Baer, Wolf, & Risley, 1968; Skinner, 1971, 1978). In the subsequent chapters of his book, Harris makes the case for applying scientific thinking to determine human values. Chapter 1 outlines the knowable nature of moral truths, suggesting that they are subject to scientific (rather than religious) inquiry. In Chapter 2, Harris tackles the topics of good and evil, suggesting that these terms may be outmoded; instead, the goal of both religion and science should be to determine ways to maximize human well-being. In the third chapter, Harris explores the neurological correlates of belief, tracing the complex sets of behavior back to brain activity. In the fourth chapter, he examines the role of religious faith in contemporary society, suggesting that a scientific approach may lead to an increase in overall well-being. The final chapter outlines a plan for future work, disentangling science and philosophy, and offering an optimistic picture about the use of science to improve the human condition. In sum, Harris presents a cogent argument for the application of scientific principles to identify moral principles and values. In what follows, we describe his arguments and some intersections with the behavioral approach to this topic.