An Infamous Case: How the Iowa Supreme Court's Minimalist Approach in Chiodo v. Section 43.24 Panel Will Force Everyone to Come Back for More

In April of 2014, the Iowa Supreme Court heard and decided Chiodo v. Section 43.24 Panel, which presented the question of whether operating while intoxicated (OWI), second offense, was an “infamous crime” within the meaning of Iowa’s voter disqualification constitutional provision. A three-justice plurality overruled a nearly 100-year-old decision, cast serious doubt on an equally-tenured doctrine, and offered a new framework to define infamous crime with no more explanation than necessary. Meanwhile, a two-justice concurrence disagreed that the court’s precedent must be overruled, but nevertheless departed from that precedent and applied its own reasoning. Further, one dissenting justice disapproved of the analysis by both the plurality and concurrence, and instead concluded the court’s century-old doctrine should have bound the court in the current case. All things considered, Chiodo was a hard case. In a legal universe where stare decisis is nearly sacrosanct, every word written by a court may be potentially relied on for decades. Thus, it would seem to follow that these hard cases, whenever possible, should address only the most narrow issues to dispose of a case. This approach, known as judicial minimalism, has been most strongly advocated by distinguished law scholar Cass Sunstein as an approach to limit the largely non-democratic role of the judicial branch. But in certain situations, the court ultimately faces a crucial decision: should the court limit its holding in the narrowest sense possible, or should the court instead show its work and attempt to rationalize the volatile or suspect result? This Note explores whether a court must avoid judicial minimalism in certain cases and instead develop a broad theoretical foundation for its holding. Part II first presents the facts of Chiodo, provides the reasoning of the court’s three opinions, and outlines the basic tenets of Sunstein’s judicial minimalism doctrine. Part III.A identifies two distinct levels of judicial minimalism that appear in the Chiodo decision. Part III.B advances four indicators for future courts to consider in determining whether judicial minimalism is an efficient or beneficial use of the court’s resources in disposing of the case. Part III.B.1 proposes courts should avoid minimalism when interpreting constitutional rights. Part III.B.2 proposes courts should employ minimalism only to the extent that they apply the doctrine of stare decisis. Part III.B.3 proposes courts should avoid minimalism when a decision involves repeat state actors or institutions. Finally, Part III.B.4 proposes courts should not employ minimalism if there is substantial risk of increased future litigation. Because all four indicators were present in Chiodo, the case operates as a constructive example of the consequences that may result if a court nevertheless adopts a minimalist approach. Ultimately, this Note concludes that certain cases, based on these indicators, should not be disposed of using minimalism because of inevitable adverse consequences.