Segregation and Neighborhood Quality: Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians in the San Francisco Metropolitan Area

In this article we examine the extent to which three minority groups were able to achieve selected neighborhood social and physical outcomes in the San Francisco mnetropolitan area. Ecological regressions were estimated to generate elasticities that measure the relative abilities of blacks, Hispanics, and Asians to convert education and income into desirable neighborhood environments. These regressions were interpreted in light of substantial differences between the three groups in levels of residential segregation. Results generally indicated a black disadvantage in the process of residential achievement, but it was not as dramatic as that found in earlier studies or as great as the levels of segregation would suggest. As in prior research, education was found to be the critical variable in explaining spatial differentiation and class stratification among blacks. In the United States, residences are allocated to persons and families through private housing markets. Since public housing comprises less than 2% of the nation's housing stock, and less than 1% of its housing starts (Adams 1987), virtually all households seeking a new residence enter the rental or sale market. Each household has a set of housing needs and desires based on its size, composition, life-cycle stage, and tastes; it also has a set of economic resources with which to achieve these desires, principally capital assets and income. Markets allocate households to specific residences through the mechanism of price; households purchase or rent the home that best suits their needs at the price they can afford (Berry & Rees 1969). According to neoclassic economic theory, the price of housing reflects the balance between aggregate demand and supply within local markets (Alonso 1964; Mills 1972). Researchers have pointed out, however, that housing is different from other commodities, and that these differences structure housing markets in distinct ways. First, residences are immobile; they are tied to a particular piece of land and cannot easily be consumed elsewhere (Logan & Molotch 1987). Second, they represent a very significant investment for most families, and for homeowners are the primary means of capital accumulation *Direct correspondence to the authors at the Population Research Center, University of Chicago, 1155 E. 60th Street, Chicago, IL 60637. i) The University of North Carolina Press Social Forces, September 1990, 69(1):15-32 This content downloaded from 157.55.39.104 on Mon, 20 Jun 2016 06:09:10 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 16 / Social Forces 69:1, September 1990 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1986). Third, each residence is not only tied to a particular plot of land, it is also bound to a specific neighborhood (Massey et al. 1987) and, in turn, to a larger municipality (Logan 1978). Moreover, each geographic unit is associated with a social environment defined by the behaviors of residents and the service benefits provided by local government (Schneider & Logan 1982, 1985; Massey et al. 1987). Finally, houses, and the communities in which they are found, are more than mere commodities; they are also objects of powerful sentiments that influence judgments and condition decisions (Logan & Molotch 1987). In recognition of the fact that housing is immobile and linked to particular places, Charles Tiebout (1956) proposed a "pure theory of local expenditures" to account for the differentiated residential structure of cities. The theory rests on two key assumptions that households are free to move, and that places compete to attract them. Local governments offer different packages of tax costs, service benefits, and zoned environments from which home seekers choose. Over time, market competition produces a variety of service-tax-environment mixes and distributes households among them according to income, preferences, and wealth, yielding a residential structure differentiated by socioeconomic status, family life-cycle stage, race, and ethnicity. Although Tiebout's model recognizes some unique features of housing markets, it does not incorporate the fact that housing costs, and particularly home-ownership costs, reflect a substantial investment for families, or that homes, neighborhoods, and communities are the focus of strong emotional attachments. These traits give rise to what Stinchcombe (1965) calls "communities of fate," where residents and institutions have large stakes not only in their own property, but in the property and characteristics of people in surrounding areas, making collective action highly likely. This propensity for collective action segments housing markets along social lines, so that individual choices are constrained by institutional practices and the collective behavior of others (Logan & Molotch 1987). The segmentation of housing markets, and the constraints it imposes on individual home seekers, are well illustrated by the case of U.S. blacks. The Tiebout model and its successors (Bish 1971; Peterson 1981) assume that households are free to move wherever their tastes and economic resources take them. Given this assumption, racial segregation is interpreted simply as the coincidental by-product of sorting based on income, wealth, and tastes (viz. Clark 1986). Considerable evidence, however, indicates that segregation does not stem from black preferences or low black-income levels. Public opinion polls show that blacks strongly endorse the principle of residential integration (Schuman et al. 1985) and express a clear preference for living in integrated neighborhoods, other things being equal (Farley et al. 1978). In spite of these tastes for integration, however, desegregation does not follow from the simple acquisition of socioeconomic resources sufficient to support spatial mobility. As education, income, and occupation rise, black-white segregation does not decline, but persists at a very high level (MIassey 1979, 1981; Denton & Massey 1988). Rather than reflecting tastes or socioeconomic status, black segregation appears to stem from constraints to black residential mobility imposed by the This content downloaded from 157.55.39.104 on Mon, 20 Jun 2016 06:09:10 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Segregation and Neighborhood Quality / 17 collective behavior and institutional actions of whites. Studies of the real estate industry, for example, indicate that discrimination and prejudice are still widespread. Real estate agents systematically steer black home seekers away from white neighborhoods, and provide them less favorable treatment than whites (Molotch 1972; Pearce 1976; Wienk et al. 1979; Yinger 1986), actions which have been linked analytically to high levels of residential segregation (Galster 1986). At the same time, lending institutions have been found to finance a disproportionately small number of loans in black neighborhoods, even after objective social and economic factors are controlled (Taggart & Smith 1981; Pol et al. 1982; Leahy 1985). Moreover, in the few cases where blacks succeed in entering a white neighborhood, they are frequently met by organized white resistance and hostility (Hirsch 1983; Cass 1986; Bauman 1987), especially in working-class areas (Logan & Stearns 1981; Stearns & Logan 1986a); and if blacks succeed in establishing themselves, the neighborhood is quite likely to be avoided by subsequent white home seekers, resulting in eventual resegregation (Massey & Mullan 1984). Thus, the collective action of white residents and the institutional practices in the real estate and banking industries bifurcate urban housing markets along racial lines, fostering high levels of segregation despite a strong demand by blacks for integration. Some studies suggest that Hispanics face similar barriers, but to a lesser degree (Hakken 1979; James & Tynan 1986). The effect of a racially segmented housing market in creating and sustaining segregation is crucial to understanding the socioeconomic position of blacks in the United States. Barriers to spatial mobility are, in a very real way, barriers to social mobility. As Logan and Molotch (1987:49) point out, socioeconomic inequality among households and geographic inequality among places are not independent; the two systems of hierarchy reinforce one another: "High status within the social hierarchy can bring access to the most desirable places ... and a guarantee of a rewarding future for whatever place one controls. At the same time a high status for one's geographical place means the availability of resources . . . that enhance life chances generally." In a similar vein, Giddens (1980:107-12) argues that segregation is a core mechanism of class structuration, since it concentrates people of low status in space and ensures the maintenance of behaviors and orientations detrimental to success in the larger society. In this article we demonstrate how segregation structures the neighborhood environment achieved by three minority groups in one large urban area. We estimate the degree to which blacks, Hispanics, and Asians are able to convert socioeconomic achievements into selected neighborhood outcomes within the San Francisco-Oakland Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) in 1980. The analysis proceeds in three phases. First, we establish the degree of segregation experienced by blacks, Hispanics, and Asians in the San Francisco SMSA. We then consider the extent to which the degree of segregation faced by each group affects its ability to convert status attainments into neighborhood social outcomes. Finally, we evaluate the degree to which each group is able to convert status attainments into different physical characteristics of the neighborhood environment. This content downloaded from 157.55.39.104 on Mon, 20 Jun 2016 06:09:10 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 18 / Social Forces 69:1, September 1990