Blastomere separation. Some concerns.

If one has no ethical misgivings about cloning by blastomere separation, then John A. Robertson's essay should be a corrective. It is breathtaking in the speed with which it subordinates every consideration to its usefulness in overcoming infertility. His thesis can be summarized as follows: if it aids otherwise infertile couples to have children, it is ethically acceptable. In his words: "There is no major ethical barrier to researchers proceeding with further research in embryo splitting as a treatment or adjunct to IVF. Given the great utility that embryo splitting could have for infertile couples, a moratorium on embryo splitting research is both unnecessary and unjustified." These two sentences are different. The first is an ethical conclusion. The second leans much more toward policy. Robertson is concerned with both, as his title indicates. However, the second sentence (as well as his entire paper) reveals the shape of his moral reasoning: anything that is useful for overcoming infertility is ethically acceptable. Robertson might disown that conclusion but I find nothing in his paper to support such a disclaimer. Needless to say, I think a great deal more needs to be said. I shall gather this "more" under three titles: life, wholeness, individuality. Life. What we may do to preembryos (embryos whose cells have not yet differentiated into placenta and fetus) depends on what we think of them. Robertson is unhesitating here. He cites "the prevailing moral and legal consensus that views early embryos as too rudimentary in neurological development to have interests or rights." Therefore, we do not harm preembryos by splitting, freezing, and discarding them. Indeed, there should be no ethical objection to creating preembryos solely for research purposes. Robertson's conclusion: "Thus neither the lack of guidelines, the moral objections of some to any embryo research, or fears about where cloning research might lead justify denying researchers the ability to take this next step [creating embryos for research]." In brief, nothing may be allowed to get in the way of preembryo research and destruction. That is a bit fast for me, and I suspect may be for many others. When dealing with the preembryo in 1979 the Ethics Advisory Board said it was entitled to profound respect." The Warnock Committee accorded it special status." Neither of these groups regarded the preembryo as a person. Reviewing these and similar statements, the American Fertility Society's Ethics Committee states: "Therefore, we find a widespread consensus that the preembryo is not a person but is to be treated with special respect."[1] It based this "special respect" on the fact that the preembryo is a living, genetically unique human entity that "might become a person." Or again, it referred to the "high moral value attributed to each human preembryo." Granted, terms like "special status," "profound respect," and "high moral value" are tantalizingly vague and unspecified in terms of practical implications. But they totally dissolve and disappear under Robertson's protocols. I have discussed this matter with Robertson before and have little reason to believe that he found me persuasive. I argued that the potential of the preembryo for personhood makes powerful prima facie demands on us not to interfere with that potential. Under favorable circumstances the preembryo will move through developmental individuality, and then through functional, behavioral, psychic, and social individuality. In viewing the first stage one cannot afford to blot out subsequent stages. That is what it means to ascribe significance to potential. Robertson denied this in the past, as he does here. "If preembryos are not persons," he wrote, "then how we treat them is a matter of policy, not moral obligation."[2] Such a statement looks very much like a knockout blow to dogs, cats, and the rest of nature. I must leave it to others to judge whether potential for personhood retains any bite at all in Robertson's perspectives. …