Strengthening the Wassenaar Export Control Regime

I. HISTORY OF THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT As the Cold War began to heat up in the aftermath of World War II, the United States and its allies determined that it would be necessary to coordinate their export of militarily significant equipment to Communist nations, particularly those nations that would eventually make up the heart of the Warsaw Pact. The NATO nations, together with Japan and Australia, created the Coordinating Committee on Export Controls ("COCOM"). For forty-five years, this body served as a clearinghouse for information exchange and consultation among the member nations. However, as the Soviet Union disintegrated and the Cold War came to a close in the early 1990s, the US-Russian relationship saw dramatic improvement. One aspect of the improved relationship took place in the export control arena. In June 1992, the White House announced the creation of an informal "cooperation forum," bringing together the COCOM nations, Russia, and other former Soviet satellites in order to provide the latter nations with access to "advanced Western goods and technology," as well as to create procedures to ensure that transferred technology was not misused! At the Vancouver summit meeting in 1993, Russian President Boris Yeltsin expressed his concern that COCOM was a "relic of the cold war."2 US President Bill Clinton agreed to review the COCOM system, noting that Russian cooperation on export controls, particularly regarding arms transfers to Iran, remained a major concern for the United States.' Soon thereafter, Russia agreed to halt arms sales to Iran, and in March 1994, the United States and its allies terminated the COCOM arrangement.' IMAGE FORMULA5 II. THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT AND ARMS CONTROL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY The issue of arms and technology transfers remained a deep concern to a number of nations. In particular, the United States was troubled by the increasing transfer of "dual-use" technologies-items that have both a civilian and military use-to nations that it felt posed a strategic threat to global peace and security. As a result, a new mechanism was needed to address multilateral issues of technology transfer and arms control. In July 1996, thirty-three nations met to discuss the problem of export controls on conventional weapons and dual-use goods and technologies.' At the conclusion of these meetings, the nations agreed on a set of "initial elements" that now form the basis for the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies ("Wassenaar Arrangement").6 The Wassenaar Arrangement attempts to control proliferation of dual-use technologies through a variety of mechanisms, including controls on distribution, information-sharing among member states, and notification of transfers or denials of dual-use goods to non-member states: 7While being moderately successful as a cooperative regime for arms control, the agreement has been the subject of increasing criticism from academics and policymakers who argue that it is ineffective at addressing the proliferation of dual-use technology.' In recent years, the United States government has made an active effort to strengthen the Wassenaar regime by advocating stronger rules to prevent member states from undermining efforts to deny export to non-member states and by pressing for closer examination of the end-use of exported items.9 However, as of the Seventh Plenary Meeting of the member nations in December 2001, the United States has been unsuccessful in this effort." This development will first examine the main problems with the existing agreement and the economic and political issues underlying dual-use exports. The IMAGE FORMULA8development will then argue that the most effective remedy to address dual-use proliferation is for the Wassenaar nations to adopt a "denial consultation" system similar to that adopted by the European Union in June 2000. …