The Cognitive Bases of the Problem of Evil

ABSTRACTThe problem of evil is a central issue in the philosophy of religion, for countless believers and skeptics alike. The attempt to resolve the dilemma of positing the existence of an omnipotent, omnibenevolent, creator while recognizing the presence of evil in the world has engaged philosophers and theologians for millennia. This article will not seek to resolve the dilemma but rather to explore the question of why there is a problem of evil. That is, why is it that gods are conceived in ways that give rise to this dilemma? The topic will be approached using insights into the religious mind being developed by the disciplines contributing to the Cognitive Science of Religion. The thesis to be developed is that this problem is a product of natural cognitive processes that give rise to god-beliefs, beliefs that are shaped by evolved moral intuitions.For there are gods, and the knowledge of them is manifest; but they are not such as the multitude believe. . . . For the utterances of the multitude about the gods are not true preconceptions but false assumptions; hence it is that the greatest evils happen to the wicked and the greatest blessings happen to the good from the hand of the gods.-EpicurusLetter to MenoeceusI. IntroductionWhile not the more famous saying attributed to Epicurus on the gods, this passage makes two important claims relevant to religion: 1) that belief in the existence of gods, or supernatural agents in general, is "manifest" to, or comes naturally to, humans, and 2) that these supernatural agents are readily assumed to be morally interested beings who distribute rewards and punishments, accordingly. Belief in supernatural agency, whether in the form of gods, spirits, revered ancestors, ghosts, demons, etc., is found in every culture and in every period for which we have evidence. It is, as Scott Atran puts it, "the most culturally recurrent, cognitively relevant, and evolutionarily compelling concept in religion" (Atran 2002, 57); and these supernatural agents are regularly understood to behave in ways that are significant for human welfare. Leaving aside the question of the existence of such agents, which Epicurus affirms, or the accuracy of this common moral assumption, which Epicurus rejects, the question that concerns us here, and which was of great concern to Epicurus, is why humans so readily interpret their gods in morally-relevant ways. Why did the rumbling of the earth or the thundering of the sky drive our ancestors to devise rituals of appeasement? Why did Agamemnon believe that only his daughter's death could sate Artemis's anger? And why would Abraham so readily accept that any god could demand a child as a burnt offering? A significant achievement of the several disciplines that contribute to the cognitive science of religion (CSR) is the development of a cognitive model that explains both the origin and the ubiquity of god-beliefs, and this model can shed light on moral assumptions about the gods and their responsibility for evil. Drawing on the findings of this field, I will argue that the problem of evil is generated by the cognitive processes that give rise to god-beliefs, as those beliefs are informed by evolved-moral intuitions. The 'problem' arises independent of doctrinal or theological teachings-its origin derives from the natural workings of our evolved social-brain. Before proceeding we first must clarify what I mean by "morally-relevant."In thinking about morality and the gods it would be inappropriate and inaccurate to use the monotheistic traditions as the default model. In these traditions there is an intimate connection between the nature of God and morality, but this understanding of gods is a relatively late and theologically sophisticated development. It would be just as much a mistake, however, to assume that the gods of the older, polytheistic traditions were not morally significant. It is true that not all gods were viewed as moral role models, or even as interested in the moral behavior of humans. …