The Failure of the China White Paper

The China White Paper, released by the Truman administration in 1949, aimed to absolve the U.S. government of responsibility for the loss of China to the Communists. However, instead of silencing domestic critics of the administration's China policy, it provided fuel for further criticism at home and an opportunity for anti-American propaganda in China, thereby hurting U.S. interests. This article is available in Constructing the Past: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/constructing/vol11/iss1/8 76 The Failure of the China White Paper Bill Rintz Upon reading the China White Paper prior to its publication, George Kennan declared it the greatest state document ever created by the American government. 1 However, following its August 1949 release, the report, officially called United States Relations with China, sparked significant controversy and inspired such vehement opposition that it is not unreasonable to call it a complete failure. Published by the Truman administration with the intent of absolving the United States of responsibility for the fall of Chiang Kai-shek and the victory of the Chinese Communists, the document had far-reaching consequences that fell far from its original intent. Not only did the White Paper fail to mollify domestic detractors of the U.S.’s China policy, it inspired far more criticism than would have existed without the report’s release. Furthermore, its publication increased already fervent anti-Americanism within China, hurt the causes of the Chinese liberal forces the U.S. purported to support, and gave the Chinese Communist Party fuel for virulent attacks on the United States. By 1949, in the eyes of the United States, the situation in China was dire. A country which had traditionally been an American ally seemed all but lost to Communist control. The man whom had received the backing of the U.S. government, Chiang Kai-Shek, leader of the Nationalist regime, was found to be completely unreliable as a tool of opposition to the Chinese Communists. Not only had Nationalist military campaigns resulted in defeat after defeat, but reports of corruption and dictatorial behavior among the Nationalist regime were rampant. Although the Truman administration had long-since given up on Chiang Kai-Shek, on June 2, the Truman administration failed to extend the China Aid Act in support of the Nationalist regime, a final symbol of the dashed hopes of blocking the Chinese Communists road to power. The menacing prospect of a communist China was inevitable. The Truman administration faced extreme heat for what was seen as the loss of China. Most of the criticism was facilitated by the China Lobby, which was “composed of people from a whole political spectrum, from the far right to the far left, who had only one thing in common: ... they were in complete support of Chiang Kai-Shek and the Nationalists.” 2 Because of Chiang Kai-Shek’s popularity within the U.S. as a perceived symbol of American ideals, sentiment among the public, the press, and certain members of Congress was that the U.S. government had abandoned America’s only hope in saving China. 1 Nancy B. Tucker, ed., China Confidential: American Diplomats and Sino-American Relations, 1945-1996 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 62. 2 Ibid., 62. 77 The Truman administration felt it was imperative to respond to such accusations. Hence, the idea of the White Paper, as a refutation of such criticism, was conceived by members of the State Department, who broached the possibility with Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Acheson then consulted with President Truman, who became “enthusiastic” about the project, giving his approval to begin work in the compilation of the important document. 3 The purpose of the White Paper was to set the facts straight on the difficult situation in China, primarily in regards to U.S. policy. As State Department official John S. Service later said, “[those in the administration] were going to counterattack and defend themselves, prove they had done everything to support Chiang, that it was not our fault that the Communists were winning. It was Chiang’s own failings.” 4 Another State Department official, John Melby, who compiled much of the actual report, likewise sensed that the purpose of the White Paper was to “call off the dogs from the China Lobby.” 5 Truman felt that because the government had previously been hesitant to reveal information to the public, it had opened itself up to the distortion and misrepresentation if its China policy. He therefore stated that his primary purpose in releasing the report was to inform the public of the facts, with the goal of creating “informed and intelligent public opinion.” 6 Truman intended the report to be an objective, frank record of U.S. involvement in China, feeling that full disclosure would be enough to absolve his administration of the current situation. Work began on the White Paper in the spring of 1949. The head of the project was to be Director of the Office of far Eastern Affairs, John Butterworth, who delegated most of the responsibility to lower State Department officers, one of whom was John Melby. 7 One indication of the high priority placed on the project was Melby’s claim that he worked on the project 18 hours a day from March until August, combing through hundreds of thousands of documents. With the State Department working with all deliberate speed, the report was nearly finished by late June. 8 The resulting White Paper was over one-thousand pages in length, mainly composed of documents that had previously been classified. The only documents contained within the report came from State Department files for 3 Ibid., 61. 4 Ibid., 63. 5 Ibid., 62. 6 Department of State Bulletin, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), 21: 236. 7 The China White Paper (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1967), intro. 8 Ibid.. 78 the sake of speed, because the hope was that the report would be issued as soon as possible. The White Paper addressed U.S. policy towards China since 1843, although the highest degree of attention was placed on the period 1944 to 1949. In thirteen chapters, the voluminous record covered everything from Nationalist-Communist relations, to George Marshall’s mission, to U.S. economic aid in support of the Nationalist regime. The administration hoped that the record would speak for itself, displaying earnest U.S. attempts to support Chiang Kai-Shek, and demonstrating that the failures of the Nationalist regime were entirely their own. Despite this hope, a fourteen-page letter of transmittal from Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s to the President was included at the beginning of the White Paper. As the letter was essentially Acheson’s interpretation of the record contained therein, it became the most controversial part of the entire document. Acheson emphasized the fact that assistance to the nationalist regime had been “pursued vigorously.” 9 However, he likewise stressed the point that over the course of the war, the Nationalists “had sunk into corruption, into a scramble for place and power, and into reliance on the United States to win the war for them and to preserve their own domestic supremacy.” 10 Acheson found the many reasons leading the Nationalist failure detailed in the document; none of them, he claimed, having to do with lack of U.S. aid. Along with exonerating the U.S., Acheson also depicted the Chinese Communists as an agent of Soviet imperialism. As the traditional friend of the Chinese people, he determined the U.S. had done all it could to prevent this foreign domination. However, there was nothing further within the U.S.’s power, Acheson expressed, which could have altered such results. The Secretary of State concluded with an indication towards future U.S. policy, stating that “the democratic individualism of China” would reassert itself, and the U.S. would continue to support this group to throw off foreign