Deterring Bioweapons Development

The genetically engineered mousepox virus described in Elizabeth Finkel's News Focus article should be seen as a wake-up call for those of us in biological weapons control, and particularly for U.S. diplomats and policy-makers (“Engineered mouse virus spurs bioweapons fears,” 26 Jan., p. [585][1]). Researchers were trying to engineer a viral vector that could sterilize rodents, to be used for the control of infestations. But the introduction of a second gene that earlier research indicated would enhance the antibody-producing response (and thus the effectiveness of the engineered virus to sterilize mice) made the virus lethal. The combination of genetic engineering with the emerging fields of genomics and proteomics holds great potential for the development of new therapeutic agents and research reagents, but many of these will also have utility as weapons, or will suggest ways that new chemicals, toxins, or microbial agents could be developed ([1][2]). Clearly, we do not want to inhibit the peaceful development of such agents; however, it would be folly to ignore their potential for misuse ([2][3]). Oversight mechanisms are critical to deter diversion of these new technologies to malign purposes. Currently, the most promising avenue is to strengthen the 1975 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). This treaty, quite properly, does not prohibit research, but it does prohibit the development, production, or stockpiling of biological or toxic agents and of devices to deliver such agents for other than peaceful purposes. However, with no provisions for verification, the treaty has proved to be a weak deterrent to nations committed to biological weapons development. For this reason, States Parties to the BTWC have for 5 years been negotiating an addendum (termed a Protocol) to the BTWC that would (i) require annual declarations of specified types of facilities with the potential for use in a biological weapons program, (ii) mandate random visits to such facilities by teams of international inspectors, and (iii) establish a mechanism for investigation of suspicions of violation of the BTWC. Its adoption would significantly improve international security and reduce the risk of bioterrorism by inhibiting bioweapons development. The Protocol text is in the last stages of development and only awaits the final push for its completion. Despite the commitment of former President Bill Clinton to the early completion of a strong Protocol, however, the actual negotiating stance of the United States reflects otherwise. The United States has consistently delayed progress and pressed for weakening of the Protocol's provisions, and now might completely derail the negotiations by stalling past the deadline imposed by States Parties for completion of the text before the BTWC Review Conference later this year. Failure to complete the Protocol negotiations on time would represent the loss of our best opportunity to prevent a dangerous and unstable arms race. 1. [↵][4]1. M. Wheelis, 2. M. Dando , Disarmament Forum 4, 43 (2000). [OpenUrl][5] 2. [↵][6]1. M. Meselson , CBW Conv. Bull 48, 16 (2000). [OpenUrl][7] [1]: /lookup/doi/10.1126/science.291.5504.585 [2]: #ref-1 [3]: #ref-2 [4]: #xref-ref-1-1 "View reference 1 in text" [5]: {openurl}?query=rft.jtitle%253DDisarmament%2BForum%26rft.volume%253D4%26rft.spage%253D43%26rft.atitle%253DDISARMAMENT%2BFORUM%26rft.genre%253Darticle%26rft_val_fmt%253Dinfo%253Aofi%252Ffmt%253Akev%253Amtx%253Ajournal%26ctx_ver%253DZ39.88-2004%26url_ver%253DZ39.88-2004%26url_ctx_fmt%253Dinfo%253Aofi%252Ffmt%253Akev%253Amtx%253Actx [6]: #xref-ref-2-1 "View reference 2 in text" [7]: {openurl}?query=rft.jtitle%253DCBW%2BConv.%2BBull%26rft.volume%253D48%26rft.spage%253D16%26rft.atitle%253DCBW%2BCONV%2BBULL%26rft.genre%253Darticle%26rft_val_fmt%253Dinfo%253Aofi%252Ffmt%253Akev%253Amtx%253Ajournal%26ctx_ver%253DZ39.88-2004%26url_ver%253DZ39.88-2004%26url_ctx_fmt%253Dinfo%253Aofi%252Ffmt%253Akev%253Amtx%253Actx