The Phenomenology of Temporal Experience

In this paper, I will explore the dissonance between “physical explanation” and “human experience,” while focusing on the experience of temporal passage. As a starting point, I will introduce J.E. McTaggart’s A-Series theory of time and BSeries theory of time. The A-Series illustrates how humans intuitively experience time; the past is fixed and expired, while the present moment seamlessly unfolds forward into an open future. On the other hand, the B-Series is very unlike the intuitive experience of time; “time” is merely the culmination of “static snapshots,” where each snapshot possesses different properties than the preceding snapshot and succeeding snapshot. Furthermore, there is no present moment or direction of time. For the purposes of this paper, and in agreement with McTaggart’s thesis, I will assume that the B-Series theory of time is true. Second, I will consider two problematic implications of the B-Series, i.e. the knowledge asymmetry and the experience asymmetry. If the past and future are equally real and fixed, why do we only possess knowledge about the past, and know nothing of the future? Moreover, why do we exclusively experience time as unfolding in the direction of the future, and never toward the past? Third, I will consider four possible explanations, which are grounded in physical mechanics or neural architecture, that aim to reconcile physical explanation with human experience, i.e. the static snapshot world of the B-Series with the dynamic present as we experience it. These four theories are the Specious Present Theory, Retention Theory, Neuron Theory, and Blind Spot Theory. I will argue that no physical explanation can provide the reconciliation that I am looking for. Fourth, I will consider cases that highlight the inconsistent and subjective nature of temporal flow to further motivate the peculiarity of and explanatory gap between physical explanation and human experience. Finally, in section V, I will argue that the puzzle of temporal experience, i.e. the explanatory gap between physical explanation and human experience, boils down to a problem of qualia, and thus, is a result of the “hard problem of consciousness.” 1. Defining the B-Series In his “Unreality of Time,” J.E. McTaggart outlines two theories of time, called the “A-Series” and “B-Series” (McTaggart 1908). In the A-Series, i.e. the Growing Block Universe, events in time are categorized as past, present, or future. The past is the expired trace of the present, and the present is the “moving now” that unfolds forward in the direction of an unknown and open future. Res Cogitans (2016) 7 Loury | 55 2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans Events in the A-Series are relational, rather than intrinsic, because the same event will be future, present, and past depending on the frame of reference. For example, the event in which Van Gogh painted The Starry Night was present in 1889, future in 1888, and past in 1890. Moreover, in the A-Series, the present moment is experienced as dynamic and evolving, i.e. movement and change are fluid. For example, a bird flies seamlessly across the sky, and the horizon fades from blue to orange. The bird moves through each coordinate it passes, and the sky touches each point in the gradient of color between. This is the intuitive experience of time, change, and motion (See Figure 1).