The Pelagian Controversy: An Economic Analysis

Introduction IN RECENT YEARS ECONOMIC THEORY has been applied to many aspects of nonmarket behavior, including analyses of religious behavior, organizations, and institutions. Among these studies are several that treat the introduction of new doctrines as innovations that further the objectives of religious organizations and their leaders (Iannaccone 1998: 1484-1485). The present study contributes to this literature by analyzing the decision of church authorities in the early fifth century to reject the doctrine advanced by Pelagius in favor of the position taken by Augustine. Section II provides a brief overview of the economics of religion. Section III summarizes the theological debate between Augustine and Pelagius that is the subject of the present study, with an emphasis on those aspects of the doctrinal controversy that might affect the self-interest of church authorities. Section IV summarizes two analyses of the controversy by Peter Brown that show the papal decision was in line with economic incentives. It is noteworthy that these analyses by a church historian appeared before more recent "rational choice" theories of religion. Section V explores whether other participants in the controversy were also motivated by rational self-interest. II The Economics of Religion IANNACCONE (1998) PROVIDES AN EXTENSIVE review of studies that have applied rational choice analysis typical of microeconomics to religious behavior. These studies have examined the behavior of both individual religious adherents and the leaders of religious organizations as well as their interactions in religious "markets." This work is not limited to economists but also includes studies by sociologists who have adopted the rational choice paradigm (Stark 1996; Young 1997). Following Gary Becket, Iannaccone (1994: 26) lists three assumptions of the rational choice model: Assumption 1: Individuals act rationally, weighing the costs and benefits of potential actions, and choosing those actions that maximize their net benefits. Assumption 2: The ultimate preferences (or "needs") that individuals use to assess costs and benefits tend not to vary much from person to person or time to time. Assumption 3: Social outcomes constitute the equilibria that emerge from the aggregation and interaction of individual actions. It should be noted that the first assumption is very general, in that the "benefits" individuals pursue may be anything that they value and should not necessarily be identified with selfish material interests. With regard to the religious behavior of individuals, Iannaccone (1998: 1479-1484) reviews numerous studies that have examined attendance at religious services, financial contributions to support religious institutions, and choice of denominational affiliation. One topic in this research has been the "free rider" phenomenon, that individuals may not contribute resources to support activities that benefit everyone in a group. Free riding behavior is expected to be more prevalent in larger groups. Consistent with this theory, many empirical studies have found that per capita financial support is lower in larger congregations (Iannaccone 1998: 1483-1484; Zaleski and Zech, 1992). However, Lipford's (1995) study found that per member contributions do not decline with increased congregational membership. Also contrary to the free rider hypothesis, Forbes and Zampelli (1997: 27) found that religious giving was not significantly less for individuals who agreed with the statement that "individuals can do little to alleviate suffering in the world." Although the relationship between group size and free riding behavior is not involved in the analysis of the present study, other aspects of the free rider problem are addressed in Section IV below. Among the studies of religious institutions are several that treat the introduction of new doctrines as innovations that further the objectives of religious organizations and their leaders (Iannaccone 1998: 1484-1485). …