“We Begin with Our Favorite Theory …”: Reconstructing the Extended Case Method

Michael Burawoy's extended case method is a wonderful model for participant observation and for social research in general. It is not just a "method," a cookbook for doing social research; it is also a social theory in its own right. As a theory in its own right, it deserves the kind of treatment that Burawoy suggests researchers should offer other theories: it deserves reconstruction in light of anomalous cases. How does one reconstruct a theory? "We begin with our favorite theory .. ." suggests Burawoy (1998:16). Both of us learned participant observation from Michael Burawoy, and fell in love with his splendidly theory-driven, politically engaged, macroscopic approach to everyday life. In the spirit of Burawoy's own project of theory-as-dialogue, we would like to use our own work to revise the theory and practice of the extended case method, to make it a better theory. Our question is: Can the extended case method be used to study culture? In the process of asking this, we noticed that the distinction Burawoy often draws between culture and structure becomes a problem when we try to use his concepts for our objects of study; and then, by the same token, we notice that the same problem that applies to our objects of study could apply to his, too. Similarly, his use of Habermas in Ethnography Unbound inadvertently underlines a problem in Habermas's distinction between "lifeworld" and "system" (Calhoun 1992). With a better understanding of the relation between system and lifeworld, we will be in a better position to ask how to "extend" a case culturally. The question has become more pressing to us after having taught participant observation to students who ask: "Is it possible to use the extended case method to 'extend' to culture?" We think the answer is yes. As many of Burawoy's own students have brilliantly shown, the extended case method can indeed be used for cultural analyses. But Burawoy's own theory sits uncomfortably with cultural investigations; it squirms, reluctantly acknowledging that such research is possible. To theorize an "extension to culture" requires a reconstruction of Burawoy's vision that we think retains the core of his theory while taking away its grounds for discomfort with cultural analysis and critique. Using examples from our own recent work, we want to draw out some "anomalies" that drive us to reconstruct the extended case method. What needs reconstructing is the extended case method's implicit theory of the relation between culture and structure. To begin this reconstruction, we outline three different ways that cultural research conceives of connections between culture and structure. First, culture and social structure interpenetrate. Second, people apprehend social structure only through culture; culture structures people's ways of interpreting their own conditions. Third, culture is itself a structure; culture structures people's ways of not only interpreting, but also producing their own conditions. Burawoy would probably agree with the first of these, but has not clearly theorized the second or third. After showing how the latter two approaches could *Delighted thanks to our students, including Kelly Besecke, Jorge Cadena-Roa, Lyn Macgregor, Susan Munkres, Sharmila Rudrappa, and Mimi Schippers, for exploring these ideas with us, and to Mitch Duneier for suggesting we write a response to Michael Burawoy's article on the extended case method. We are equal co-authors. Please