Inside a Swiss Army Knife: An Assessment of AmeriCorps

This study reviews the goals and achievements of AmeriCorps, the national service program championed by President Clinton and approved by Congress in 1993. We identify five AmeriCorps goals: satisfying unmet social needs, developing corps members, enhancing the civic ethic, reinvigorating lethargic bureaucracies, and bridging race and class. The evidence of AmeriCorps' effectiveness is not definitive. Self-reports from recipient programs, selective cost-benefit analyses, and some survey evidence indicate some positive results. More fine-grained survey and field research raise questions about AmeriCorps' overall effects. Much more research is needed before policy makers and citizens can determine AmeriCorps' productivity. presented at the twenty-sixth annual One of the most ambitious and controversial programs of conference of the Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Bill Clinton's presidency is AmeriCorps, the national service Voluntary Action (ARNOVA), Indianapoprogram authorized in 1993 by the National and Community lis, December 4-6, 1997. The authors Service Trust Act (P. L. 1 03-82). The ambitions of AmeriCorps would like to thank H.George Frederickare modest, at least if they are measured financially-its budget son, Les Lenkowsky, and John Messer . . . . for their helpful comments. for ftscal year 1996 was $359 mtlhon, JUSt 0.2 percent of the total federal budget. 1 The scope of its ambitions and the ideolo'This total excludes monies obligated to gies underpinning them have made AmeriCorps controversial, Learn and Serve America, National and however. Community Service Act administration, and the Points of Light Foundation. It includes obligations for AmeriCorps grants ($279 million) and the National Civilian Community Corps ($21 million). See summary chart for FY 1996 in Budget for Fiscal Year 1998, p. 1020. I-PART 9(1999):2:225-250 In The Bill, a chronicle of the development and passage of national service legislation, Steven Waldman (1995) concludes: "Done properly, it [AmeriCorps] could be the public policy equivalent of a Swiss Army knife, performing numerous useful functions in one affordable package" (p. 20). Critics reach a different conclusion (Walters 1996). They see AmeriCorps as a 225/Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory An Assessment of AmeriCorps perversion of volunteerism and an extension of big government into realms previously reserved for private nonprofit organizations (Band ow 1996). The 1993 National and Community Service Trust Act created the Corporation for National Service (CNS), an umbrella agency to house all domestic national service programs. This involved incorporating several existing national service programs (e.g., Volunteers in Service to America [VISTA] and the Retired and Senior Volunteer Program [RSVP]) under the CNS umbrella. It also authorized several new programs, one of which is the AmeriCorps*State/National program, hereafter referred to as simply AmeriCorps. 2 This study seeks to synthesize evaluation findings about AmeriCorps within a policy implementation context. We begin with a brief discussion of the implementation literature and its predictions about the likelihood of successful implementation of national service policy. We then describe the five goals emanating from the 1993 statute and the logic behind those goals. Richard Matland' s (1995) ambiguity-conflict model provides the framework for examining the synthesis of findings about AmeriCorps' outcomes. We conclude the article with a discussion about the findings and the evaluation questions that emerge from them. IMPLEMENTING NATIONAL SERVICE POLICY Classical implementation models assume a top-down per2AmeriCorps*State/National members receive a minimum of $4 ,725 when they spective based on the principle that representative democracy complete seventeen hundred hours (or demands the primacy of the statute in determining implementamore) of full-time service. Part-time tion outcomes. From this perspective, if P0 represents the members must complete mne hundred National and Community Service Trust Act, and P 1 represents its hours of service to rece1ve half the amount of the education award. In addirealization, then the implementation problem lies in developing tion to this award, AmeriCorps*S/N rational and cohesive theories about how to transform P0 into P1, members receive a small annual living where P1 is a logical extension of P0 (Pressman and Wildavsky allowance and health insurance as well as 1979 179) A key to successful implementation lies in formulatchild care assistance for those who qualify . ' . · . . . for such support. The other AmeriCorps mg the nght theones about the transformatiOn (Mazmaman and programs authorized under the 1993 Sabatier 1983; Sabatier 1986). statute are the AmeriCorps*National Civilian Community Corps and the AmeriCorps*VIST A programs. The Corporation for National Service is responsible for administering these three programs as well as the Learn and Serve America program and the National Senior Volunteer Corps program, which includes the Retired and Senior Volunteers, Foster Grandparent, and Senior Companion programs (U.S. GAO 1997b). Critiques of the classical model assert that "real world" policy implementation occurs in a multijurisdictional, multiorganizational environment characterized primarily by uncertainty (Matland 1995; Hjern and Porter 1981; Hull and Hjern 1987; Elmore 1982). From this perspective, the logic that underlies the achievement of AmeriCorps' goals in the statutory language may not (and probably does not) coincide with local standards of successful implementation. Wide variation in 226/J-PART, April 1999 An Assessment of AmeriCorps program implementation suggests wide variation in evaluation criteria, making program evaluation difficult if not impossible. Richard Matland's (1995) ambiguity/conflict model of policy implementation offers a synthesis of the traditional top-down and bottom-up approaches (Sabatier 1986). For Matland, determination of successful implementation depends on which of four processes, which are summarized in the exhibit on page 228 of this article, characterizes a policy's implementation. The processes vary along two dimensions: policy ambiguity and policy conflict (p. 155). Policy conflict occurs when actors have incongruous views about program goals, the means to reach those goals, and/or conflicting value systems. The more incongruous the views, the more intense the conflict and the more problematic the implementation process. Policy ambiguity occurs when goals are unclear and/or the means to achieve those goals are uncertain. Classical models of implementation predict that the greater the policy ambiguity, the greater the likelihood of implementation failure. Matland argues persuasively, however, that goal ambiguity may actually decrease policy conflict, enhancing a policy's implementation. Matland' s framework captures better than do either a topdown or bottom-up approach the complexity inherent in linking goals to outcomes. Furthermore, it demonstrates that different implementation processes yield different standards for success. As a prelude to relating Matland's framework concretely to national service, we now summarize AmeriCorps' goals and the logic underlying them.· AmeriCorps' Goals and the Logic of National Service The statutory statement of purpose for national service programs is expansive. The political rhetoric used in the law's legitimation and the enthusiasm of supporters have generated added expectations. The eight purposes for national service programs in the preamble to the National and Community Service Trust Act (Title 42, U.S.C.A, sec.12501), together with informal expectations, translate into five primary goals for AmeriCorps. We will discuss each of these goals. Satisfying Unmet Social Needs. AmeriCorps specializes in providing direct service. Harris Wofford, the chief executive officer of the Corporation for National Service (CNS), states that while AmeriCorps produces many derivative benefits its primary purpose is to help communities solve critical human, educational, environmental, and public safety problems (Wofford 1996). From 227 IJ-PART, April 1999 An Assessment of AmeriCorps Exhibit Policy Implementation Processes Policy Conflict Low High Administrative Implementation Process Political Implementation Process Central principle determining outcome Central principle determining outcome of of implementation process: adequate implementation process: degree of power/ resources coalitional strength at the macro level Newer classical approaches that acknowlClassical implementation approach most edge importance of political actors in the appropriate for assessing relationship implementation process most appropriate between goals and outcomes for assessing relationship between goals and outcomes Standard for success: measurable Standard for success: measurable achieveachievement of statutory goals ment of statutory goals but interpreted within context of macro and micro pol itical factors Experimental Implementation Process Symbolic Implementation Process Central principle determining outcome Central principle determining outcome of of implementation process: contextual implementation process: degree of power/ conditions such as level of resources coalitional strength at the micro impleand which actors are most active at mentation level the micro implementation level Bottom-up implementation approach Neither top-down nor bottom-up approach most appropriate for assessing relationis entirely appropriate for assessing relaship between goals and outcomes tionship between goals and outcomes; some combination helpful Standard for success: learning what Standard for success: problematic due to works and what does not work; learning the high levels of policy conflict and also seen as a process of value in and of ambiguity; focus should be on contextual