The Bush Administration's Forward Strategy for Nonproliferation

It is good to be home among so many friends at the American Enterprise Institute ("AEI"). I am particularly happy that Jeremy Rabkin and AEI have just published The case for Sovereignty: Why the World Should Welcome American Independence? I congratulate him on his far-reaching analysis, in which he reinforces that security remains the core responsibility of sovereign states. I thought it would be useful today to look at our nonproliferation policy in this context, and the degree to which the Bush Administration has launched initiatives that work cooperatively with other sovereign states to deny rogue nations and terrorists access to the materials and know-how needed to develop weapons of mass destruction ("WMD")-this rather than by relying on cumbersome treaty-based bureaucracies to achieve these goals. Our policies during the past several years have shown that a robust use of the sovereign authorities that we, and our allies, have at our disposal can bring about real results. Methodically, piece by piece, the Administration is reinventing the nonproliferation regime it inherited, Grafting policies to fill gaping holes, reinforcing earlier patchwork fixes, assembling allies, creating precedents, setting new limits, and changing perceived realities and stilted legal thinking. And the Administration is still building. To this President must go the credit for many long-delayed but indispensable actions to reverse our slide into helpless gridlock and inaction. I. LEGAL ARCHITECTURE TO DEAL WITH NONPROLIFERATION The legal authorities to deal with rogue states and actors, including terrorists, intent on obtaining WMD, and their means of delivery are numerous and varied. A quick study of proliferation-related laws shows that there are more than fifteen statutes dealing in large measure with these issues.2 We could have a detailed debate about ways to revise or synchronize these laws, but in fact the question really is not one of legal authority. Rather, the question is whether we have the will to make full use of these authorities to take active measures-consistent with our legal authorities-to address the problems of proliferation. This Administration's central innovation, which I believe indispensable for any successful nonproliferation effort, is the demonstrated will to use the existing authorities to obtain our goal of disarming our enemies. This is a transforming precedent. II. "FORWARD" POLICY ON PROLIFERATION On February 11, 2004, at the National Defense University, President Bush gave what is arguably one of the most "wonkish" speeches ever delivered by a President. I liked it. He detailed a number of proposals that made clear the Administration's overarching approach: the frontlines in our nonproliferation strategy must extend beyond the well-known rogue states to the trade routes and entities that are engaged in supplying the countries of greatest proliferation concern. This is a "forward" policy, which can properly be described not as "nonproliferation" but as "counter-proliferation." We are employing a number of tools to thwart WMD and missile programs, including sanctions, interdiction, and credible export controls. Most aspiring proliferators are still dependent on outside suppliers and technology. Thus, we can slow down and even stop their weapons development plans by disrupting their procurement efforts. As we have learned clearly from such recent events as the unraveling of the A.Q. Khan network and the Libyan WMD program, proliferators are employing increasingly sophisticated and aggressive measures to obtain WMD or missilerelated materials.4 They rely heavily on the use of front companies and illicit arms brokers in their quest for arms, equipment, sensitive technology, and dualuse goods for their WMD programs. These front companies and brokers are expert at concealing the intended destination of an item and in making an illicit export appear legitimate-in essence hiding the export in the open. …