Corporate venture capitalists: Autonomy, obstacles, and performance

Abstract This report presents the results of a formal study of the corporate venture capital community in the United States, and is based upon responses to a questionnaire completed by 52 corporate venture capitalists (CVCs). The central question addressed in this study involves which approach to corporate venture capital is most likely to produce successful results. This question was addressed via cluster analysis which segregated the CVC community into two broad classes—“pilots,” which are marked by substantial organizational independence and “copilots,” which are highly dependent on corporate management with respect to venture funding and decision authority. Pilots achieve equal or higher levels of performance, and are plagued by far fewer obstacles, than their highly dependent counterparts. The results suggest the following: 1. The corporate venture fund should be established as an independent entity and should have access to a committed, separate pool of funds. This will enable CVCs to respond aggressively to, and manage, investment opportunities with minimal corporate interference. Such an independent entity will defuse justifiable concerns on the part of entrepreneurs related to such interference. 2. The fund should be managed by skilled venture professionals who may be drawn from the independent venture community or the small but growing pool of experienced CVCs. Corporate executives may comprise a part of the management team. 3. If the corporate venture fund hopes to attract top quality managers, it must be prepared to offer compensation and authority commensurate with their skill level. In short, corporate venture capitalists should be treated like independent venture capitalists. By organizing the fund as an independent entity, the political problem associated with establishing compensation levels above those of the corporation can be minimized. 4. All CVCs should establish a primary focus on the realization of financial objectives (i.e., return on investment). Strategic benefit objectives are not necessarily ill advised so long as they do not interfere with sound financial decision making. When they do, the corporate venture capital process is likely to become less effective. For instance, a corporate venture fund should only confine itself to investing in a few industries if there are sufficient high-grade investment opportunities within those industries to ensure adequate deal flow. The venture fund should not be pressured. Investments that appear exciting from a corporate perspective, for technological or marketing reasons, but are not financially attractive may well drain resources rather than produce opportunities. 5. Venture proposals failing on financial criteria might be referred to other parts of the corporation with the purpose of exploring an alternate relationship (e.g., a development contract or joint venture). If this is appealing to the corporation, a mechanism such as a corporate liaison or reporting system might be established to facilitate the flow of information. 6. A corporation should be willing to make a complete commitment of talent and capital if it establishes its own corporate venture fund. The corporation should then be willing to accept a limited role. If the corporation is unable to accept a limited role with respect to its own fund, it may be best for it to participate as an investor in a traditional fund, where such limitations will be enforced. However, this latter approach may significantly dilute or eliminate potential for strategic benefits.