What Drives States to Support New Nonproliferation Obligations? Three Portraits of the 1995 NPT Indefinite Extension Decision

Why would a state that opposes nuclear proliferation resist initiatives to strengthen the nonproliferation regime? One answer has become particularly influential: dissatisfaction with the nuclear disarmament records of existing nuclear powers rooted in a normative concern about the equity of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The 1995 decision to indefinitely extend the NPT, which included political commitments by nuclear weapon states to nuclear disarmament as part of the extension package, is often held out as evidence for this proposition. This essay critically assesses the relative strength of this explanation, both for the 1995 extension decision and nonproliferation policy-making more generally, against a pair of lower-profile alternatives, security and economics. It concludes that the evidence of a strong causal role for nuclear disarmament considerations in the nonproliferation decision-making of NNWS is more ambiguous than is often implied in contemporary nonproliferation policy debates, while the comparative neglect of security and especially economic factors is a major blind spot in contemporary nonproliferation policy debate. In the case of the 1995 NPT extension decision, for example, the essay shows that security and economic interests dominated assessments of extension alternatives for the overwhelming majority of NNWS. These countries, though concerned about the disarmament records of the NWS, were nevertheless unwilling to risk the future of the NPT by supporting a time-bound extension that would give them greater leverage over the NWS' disarmament records. The broader arguments and ideas developed in this article further suggest that economics is likely to be the binding constraint on future efforts to strengthen the nonproliferation pillar of the NPT. Increasingly, the prime targets of nonproliferation advocacy on behalf of NPT-plus measures such as the IAEA Additional Protocol, robust export controls on dual use items, and nuclear fuel cycle reform are middle-income developing countries that have a sufficient level of economic development to serve as alternative suppliers for sensitive dual use technologies and are geographically situated along key transit routes for global commerce; many of these countries are also contemplating ambitious nuclear energy development plans. Nonproliferation constituencies in these countries, where export-oriented growth is often considered a lynchpin of economic development, are often weak compared to economic constituencies that regard exports and the free flow of commerce as essential to economic growth. For constituencies opposed to new nonproliferation initiatives, the nuclear disarmament records of the NWS may be a potent political argument against them. Thus, it is essential that a comprehensive nonproliferation strategy seek ways to neutralize such arguments. But more fundamentally, the success of efforts to mobilize greater international support for these and other NPT-plus measures is likely to hinge on the creative application of carrots and sticks to foster and empower nonproliferation constituencies in countries of interest by aligning economic and security incentives to support nonproliferation.