Goldilocks and the Three-Judge Panel: Spencer V. World Vision, Inc. and the Religious Organization Exemption of Title VII

I. INTRODUCTION In Spencer v. World Vision, Inc. a three-judge panel for the Ninth Circuit faced the question of whether a self-described "Christian humanitarian organization"1 qualified for an exemption from Title VII's prohibition of religiously-based employment discrimination. In a split decision, the Ninth Circuit found that World Vision did meet the qualifications for the religious organization exemption, thereby precluding any legal challenges for religiously motivated employment discrimination. Although both judges in the majority agreed with this conclusion, each used a very different test to reach it. Additionally, the lone dissenting judge formulated her own unique test, which, if applied, would greatly limit the scope of Title VTI's religious organization exemption. This "Goldilocksian" trio of possible tests, each more restrictive than the last, naturally gives rise to the question of which if any of the three tests is "just right." This Note argues that although the Ninth Circuit reached the correct conclusion, the test used by the majority is too broad in scope, creating an over-inclusive exemption to the religious discrimination prohibitions of Title VII. The test used in the dissenting opinion, on the other hand, is too narrow. Although it would be too much to say the test used in the concurrence is "just right," it is the most appropriate of the three because it most effectively accommodates existing precedential constraints governing the religious organization exemption and strikes the most appropriate balance between protecting individual rights and the rights of religious entities. In arguing for this moderate approach to the religious organization exemption of Title VII, this Note proceeds as follows. Part II explains the facts and procedural history of Spencer. Part III provides an overview of Title VII's religious organization exemption and relevant case law. Part IV summarizes the reasoning of each member of Spencer's tiiree-judge panel. Part V analyzes the three tests against the backdrop of existing precedent and constitutional and statutory requirements. Part VI concludes. II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY In 2006, World Vision, Inc., a global humanitarian organization, terminated three of its longtime employees because they "denied the deity of Jesus Christ and disavowed the doctrine of the Trinity."2 World Vision, whose mission includes "servfing] the poor as a demonstration of God's unconditional love for all people,"3 requires all prospective employees to "agree with World Vision's Statement of Faidi and/or the Apostles' Creed," both of which profess, among other things, a belief in the deity of God the Father and Jesus Christ.4 At the time they were hired, each of the plaintiffs "confirmed that they 'subscribe[d], wholeheartedly to the principles inherent'" in these statements.5 After several years of employment, however, each of the "[pjlaintiffs discontinued their attendance at daily devotions and weekly chapels held during the workday."6 Upon learning of this apparent lapse in devotion, World Vision representatives interviewed the plaintiffs and determined that each, in fact, "denied the deity of Jesus Christ."7 Because this denial was clearly contrary to World Vision's Statement of Faith and the Aposdes' Creed on which employment at World Vision was conditioned, the plaintiffs were terminated.8 Following their termination, plaintiffs filed suit with a U.S. district court, alleging employment discrimination.9 This complaint was later amended10 to include the claim that the plaintiffs' termination was based on religious "discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act."11 Shortly thereafter, World Vision responded by filing a motion to dismiss, which was later converted into a motion for summary judgment.12 World Vision argued that "as a religious organization it is exempt from the religious discrimination provisions of Title VII. …