Ruling the Sea: Institutionalization and Privatization of the Global Ocean Commons

Maritime issues have gained international prominence in recent decades, fueled by the decline in global fishing catches, the scramble for oil and mineral resources, and states’ desire to lay sovereign claims to their maritime spaces. States are willing to use militarized force to defend their maritime claims, as the UK-Iceland "Cod Wars" and militarized confrontations between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea demonstrate. This paper evaluates two primary mechanisms for resolving maritime conflicts: 1) the creation of private ownership of maritime zones in the form of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), and 2) the creation of an institution, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to establish standards for maritime claims and the resolution of disputes. We evaluate the effects of UNCLOS and EEZs on the peaceful and militarized management of maritime claims in the Western Hemisphere and Europe (1900-2001) and the long-run effects of privatization and institutionalization on marine fishing stocks (1950-2003). Our analyses suggest that declared EEZs work efficiently for helping states to reach agreements over maritime claims in bilateral negotiations, while membership in UNCLOS prevents the outbreak of new claims and promotes more frequent third party management efforts. We also find a U-shaped relationship between marine catches and the duration of UNCLOS/EEZ commitments, indicating that fish stocks initially decline and then recover positively after the implementation of conservation policies. ______________________________________________________________________________ Previous versions of this paper were presented at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 30-September 2, Chicago, IL, the 2007 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, February 28-March 3, Chicago, IL, and the Department of Political Science at the University of Iowa. We thank John Conybeare, Stephen Long, Erik Melander, and Bill Reed for useful comments on previous drafts. Battle on the high seas has often been the subject of dramatic chronicles, ranging from the Battle of Salamis or the Invincible Armada to pirates, treasure fleets, and massive clashes between battleships or aircraft carriers. Conflicts on the seas still occur today, but now they involve fishing trawlers and coastal patrol vessels rather than galleons or dreadnoughts. Today's conflicts are no longer driven by the lure of treasure, expansion, or bloodlust, but by more mundane concerns such as fishing. Yet today's maritime disputes are not trivial, occurring quite frequently -and often between states that normally avoid militarized conflict, such as pairs of democracies (Mitchell and Prins, 1999). The over-fishing and exploitation of the ocean’s resources, combined with the difficulties in establishing clear ownership over such resources as migratory fish stocks, generates numerous potential flash points for armed conflict. The sea's role in providing a state with power and resources is now more important than ever. Tens of millions are employed in the harvesting of the sea’s resources, and many millions more benefit from the consumption of these resources (UN FAO, 2006). As populations expand, these needs become more pressing and insistent. Garrett Hardin’s (1968) “Tragedy of the Commons” provides a dramatic account of the effects of unhindered resource use and a chilling portent of the consequences of continued degradation of the global commons. Multiple solutions have been suggested to address problems associated with joint management of common property resources (CPRs), such as the ocean’s fishing stocks. A Leviathan or coercive authority can be established to prevent exploitation of resources through monitoring, sanctioning, and exclusion. Oceanic resources could be privatized, creating incentives for actors to manage their resources more efficiently. International institutions could also be created to help states manage these resources in a cooperative fashion. However, there is