Justice excused : The deployment of law in everyday political encounters

This paper examines the use of legal claims by government officials and citizens in everyday political encounters involving civil rights. Data come from 580 letters sent to the federal government between 1939 and 1941, and from the replies sent by the newly formed Civil Rights Section of the Justice Department. In almost every case, the department refused to intervene and explained its refusal by making legal claims about federal jurisdiction. These legal claims masked the department's discretionary choices and thus helped depoliticize the encounters. Surprisingly, however, a substantial number of letter writers challenged the government's legal claims by deploying their own legal and moral arguments. The willingness of these citizens to challenge official legal pronouncements cautions against making broad generalizations about the capacity of ordinary people to respond effectively when government officials deploy legal rhetoric. Claims About Justice and Jurisdiction In June 1939, Layle Lane wrote to U.S. Attorney General Frank Murphy to ask the Justice Department to investigate the case of Elijah Harris. According to Lane, Harris was being held in a prison camp in Everglades, Florida, after allegedly being involved in a car accident in which a white child had died. Lane reported that Harris had not received a fair trial, that he already had paid fines that were supposed to result in his freedom, and that he was receiving brutal treatment. Lane also suggested that Florida was operating a forced labor camp and extorting money from the families of prisoners. Lane's letter was processed by the Justice Department's small Civil Liberties Unit, which the attorney general had created just a few months earlier. The unit, which was later renamed the Civil Rights Section (CRS), sent Lane a reply letter stating that the federal government had no legal authority to intervene. The reply explained, It seems that Mr. Elijah Harris is not under the jurisdiction of the federal government, but rather under the jurisdiction of the state of Florida. Therefore, any rights guaranteed the accused in that state should be sought under the constitution and laws thereof (6/ 1/39. See Appendix for source information). The reply closed by suggesting that Harris seek help from private counsel. The CRS's reluctance to become involved in the case is not surprising. The unit's staff was small, had limited resources, and worried that aggressive federal intervention in local law enforcement would create a political backlash that would leave the unit with even fewer resources.1 Nevertheless, the department's use of a legal claim about federal jurisdiction in its letter is surprising. If Lane's description of Harris's case was accurate, the case did not fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of Florida. The Fourteenth Amendment gives the federal government power to intervene when state officials deprive someone of liberty without due process of law. The department's legalistic reply to Lane was not unique. This article is based on an analysis of 580 letters reporting civil rights violations that were processed by the CRS between 1939 and 1941. I find that the department immediately rejected more than 98% of the complaints as unworthy of any federal attention. Almost all the people who wrote letters received nothing in response but a short letter stating that limits on federal jurisdiction made it impossible for the federal government to help. Such letters and replies provide an opportunity to analyze the way government officials deploy legal claims in routine political encounters, and to explore some of the ways people who participate in political processes react to such claims. The article stands at the intersection of what Scheingold has recently identified as the two dominant strands of sociolegal scholarship on the "politics of rights": legal mobilization studies and studies of legal consciousness among ordinary people (2004:xx-xxxvi). …