Reflecting on Language from ‘Sideways-on’: Preparatory and Non-Preparatory Aspects-Seeing

Aspect-seeing, I claim, involves reflection on concepts. It involves letting oneself feel how it would be like to conceptualize something with a certain concept, without committing oneself to this conceptualization. I distinguish between two kinds of aspect-perception: 1. Preparatory : allows us to develop, criticize, and shape concepts. It involves bringing a concept to an object for the purpose of examining what would be the best way to conceptualize it. 2. Non-Preparatory : allows us to express the ingraspability of certain experiences. It involves bringing a concept to an object for the purpose of showing— per impossible —what it would take to properly capture one’s experience. I demonstrate the usefulness of the two kinds of aspect perception in making conceptual judgments, and in making moral and aesthetic judgments. References Sara Bachelard. On Euthanasia: Blindspots in the Argument from Mercy. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 19(2):131–40, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-5930.00210 PMid:12747357 Avner Baz. What’s the Point of Seeing Aspects? Philosophical Investigations, 23(2):97–121, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9205.00116 Avner Baz. On Learning from Wittgenstein, or What Does it Take to See the Grammar of Seeing Aspects? In W. Day Anew and V. J. Krebs, editors, Seeing Wittgenstein Anew, pages 227–48. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511750663.013 Avner Baz. Seeing Aspects and Philosophical Difﬁculty. In M. McGinn and O. Kuusela, editors, The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein, pages 697–713. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199287505.003.0031 Stanley Cavell. The Availability of Wittgensteins Later Philosophy. In his Must We Mean What We Say?, pages 44–72. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1969. Stanley Cavell. The Claim of Reason. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1979. Bob Dent. Why I Wanted to Die: Bob Dents Last Words. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 16(1):19–32, 1999. Cora Diamond. Secondary Sense. In her The Realistic Spirit, pages 225–41. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1991a. Cora Diamond. The Face of Necessity. In her The Realistic Spirit, pages 243–66. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1991b. Richard Eldridge. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Art. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139164740 Juliet Floyd. On Being Surprised: Wittgenstein on Aspect-Perception, Logic, and Mathematics. In W. Day and V. J. Krebs,editors, Seeing Wittgenstein Anew, pages 314–337. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010. Geach, P.T. Mental Acts. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1957. Immanuel Kant. Critique of the Power of Judgment, translated by J.C. Meredith. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1952. John Locke. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Hackett Publishing Co., Indianapolis, 1996. John McDowell. Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following. In S. Holtzman and C. M. Leich, editors, Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule, pages 141–62. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1981. Stephen Mulhall. Inheritance and Originality. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001. Jean-Paul Sartre. Nausea. New Directions, New York, 2007. David Seligman. Wittgenstein on Seeing Aspects and Experiencing Meanings. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 37(2): 205–17, 1976. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2107192 Timothy Williamson. Vagueness. Routledge, London, 1994. Ludwig Wittgenstein. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Routledge, London, 1922. Ludwig Wittgenstein. Philosophical Investigations. Blackwell, Oxford, 3rd edition, 1958. Ludwig Wittgenstein. The Blue and Brown Books. Blackwell, Oxford, 2nd edition, 1969. Ludwig Wittgenstein. Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. Blackwell, Oxford, 1980. Ludwig Wittgenstein. Culture and Value. Blackwell, Oxford, 1998.