Serving Troubled Youth or a Troubled Society

Considerable attention, as exemplified in the article by Nelson, Rutherford, Center, and Walker, appearing in the March/April 1991 issue, has been given to the question of whether public schools have an obligation to serve children and youth who are socially maladjusted (SM). Although this question is recent, the debate should sound familiar to individuals with an historic perspective of special education. Nelson et al. attempt to ensure that a "disabled" segment of school-age youth have access to appropriate treatment. They present a compelling and cogent argument for changing the definition of serious emotional disturbance (SED), establishing more ecologically valid assessment and identification procedures, and instituting at-risk programs--all aptly enumerated and supported by research. We agree with Nelson et al. Ironically, we believe most professionals associated with special education would agree as well. Special education practitioners, researchers, and scholars are well aware of the issues presented by Nelson et al. Problems in definition, for example, have existed for decades within the areas of learning disabilities, mental retardation, and serious emotional disturbance (e.g., Hallahan & Kauffman, 1991). The call for more ecologically valid assessment and identification procedures similarly is not new (e.g., Rhodes, 1967); nor is the call for programs for at-risk students (Pianta, 1990; Kruger, 1989). Nelson et al.'s article speaks to an audience already familiar with the problem. Rather than attempting to refute or support arguments presented by Nelson et al., we have elected to focus on reconceptualizing the debate itself. A major portion of the Nelson et al. article addresses the futility of differentiating between SM and SED. Their principal antagonist in the exclusionary debate is Jane Slenkovitch, a lawyer who advocates using the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III) to distinguish between SM and SED. Although on diametrically opposite sides of the debate, Nelson et al. (proservice) and Slenkovitch (antiservice) both limit the discussion in important ways and, in so doing, limit potential for resolution. LEVELS OF DISCUSSION Rueda (1989) identified three levels at which attempts to modify educational practice may occur: (a) system maintenance, through which individuals address practice by ensuring stricter enforcement of existing policies (e.g., insisting on improved documentation to guarantee required testing as occurred); (b) system improvement, through which individuals address practice by advocating the refinement of existing procedures (e.g., developing better tests to measure existing phenomena); and (c) system restructuring, through which individuals address practice by rethinking and modifying the traditional system (e.g., start evaluating and labeling environments instead of individuals). Nelson et al. and their antagonists have elected to frame their arguments at the lower levels of Rueda's hierarchy. For example, arguments presented by Slenkovitch mostly are associated with system maintenance. These arguments reflect an insistence on compliance with "narrow" interpretations of administrative law and seldom address the intent of these regulations. Nelson et al. have elected to articulate their position within a framework of system improvement. This level of practice is illustrated most clearly in their calls for new programs of systematic screening and early intervention through teacher consultation. Neither side, however, addresses Rueda's third level. Focusing the debate at the system restructuring level would lead to an examination of the manner in which institutions are organized and the cultural and social forces that shape behavior (Leone, 1989). Lack of Societal Support Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that antiservice forces are correct. Why then, if SM exists as an identifiably different condition from SED, are there so few alternative services available to SM students? …