Why the Assertion of a 'Nationalist' Presidency Does Not Support Claims for Expansive Presidential Power

The central premise of the theory of the nationalist presidency is that the President is the “true representative of the American people.” The Congress, in contrast, is parochial because its members have narrow, geographically bound constituencies that may not reflect the broader concerns of the nation as a whole. Thus, the nationalist presidency theorists contend, it is more consistent with democratic ideals to invest power in the nationalist presidency rather than in the parochial Congress. The presidency, they argue, is the more democratic branch.Proponents of the vision of the nationalist presidency point to two key factors in support of their thesis. The first is structural. The President is the only political official elected nationally under the Constitution. He is therefore the only elected officeholder who must respond to a national, as opposed to a local, constituency. Accordingly, he should be expected to represent and be accountable to national rather than parochial interests.The second factor pertains to the public's expectations surrounding the presidency. The common, if not universal, perception in the current political climate is that the presidency, far more than the Congress, is the key institution in advancing the nation's agenda and that the presidential election is far more important in setting the nation's direction than are Congressional races.This article addresses the central issues regarding the question of the nationalist presidency. Part I discusses the structural argument. Does the fact that the President is elected nationwide mean that he will more likely reflect, and be more accountable to, the views of the nation as a whole as opposed to a Congress whose members are elected in states or districts that are geographically limited? Part I concludes that the structural case in favor of the vision of the nationalist President is not persuasive because other structural aspects of the constitutional, winner-take-all elections, the role of the Electoral College, and term limits serve to limit both the presidency's representativeness and its accountability. Part II examines the case in favor of the nationalist presidency stemming from the public expectations surrounding the presidency. This Part suggests that the argument is descriptively accurate: citizens do consider the presidency and presidential elections to be uniquely significant in carrying out and setting the nation's agenda. Part II then goes on to question whether this political reality should be deemed to have any constitutional or normative consequence. Part II concludes that it does not. Part III addresses a further assertion offered by the proponents of the nationalist presidency vision, namely that the public expectations placed on the office serve to weaken the presidency because the president does not have the capacity to meet those expectations. Accordingly, these proponents contend, the presidency should be empowered to meet those expectations. This Part suggests, however, that this argument is not persuasive because the assertion that power should be expanded to meet expectations is virtually boundless and that, in any event, the breadth of presidential power should be measured in its relation to congressional power and not to public expectations. Part III concludes that because of the current imbalance of power between the Congress and the presidency, any further accretion of presidential authority is not warranted.