Combat Casualties and Race: What Can We Learn From the 2003-2004 Iraq Conflict?

Since the end of the draft in 1973, African Americans have been overrepresented among volunteers for the US Armed Forces. While many commentators have hailed the military as a uniquely egalitarian avenue for social and economic advancement in a society beset with racial inequities, the high participation rate among blacks has periodically led to concerns that they (and more recently, other ethnic minorities such as Hispanics) would disproportionately suffer from casualties in the event of military hostilities. However, after numerous US military engagements since the 1970s, these fears have not been borne out. In fact, African Americans seem less likely to die in combat than their overall representation in uniform would suggest. Taken at face value, the racial composition of US combat casualties stands in stark contrast to the racial pattern of morbidity and mortality in the larger society, where African Americans as a group fare worse than whites on measures such as death rates, infant mortality, and life expectancy. It would seem that, as a comparatively disadvantaged group, African Americans in the all-volunteer era have reaped the benefits of military service without unduly bearing its ultimate burdens. However, explanations for the unexpectedly low African American casualty rate have not been rigorously examined. Furthermore, assessing the racial equity of military service based on historical casualty patterns assumes that future combat operations will closely resemble those that have occurred since Vietnam-an assumption that in this new century looks increasingly untenable. Extending the work of Martin Binkin and his collaborators, this study argues that the racial composition of combat casualties reflects three factors: the social processes that sort volunteers into various military units and occupational specialties; the mix of units and specialties that participate in military operations; and the battlefield conditions they encounter. Or put another way, given a particular environment within which armed conflict occurs, the probability of any person becoming a casualty is a function of their representation in those units most likely to make hostile contact with enemy forces. Following this, the underrepresentation of African Americans in the units most involved in combat operations since Vietnam may partly explain the disjuncture between their military participation and casualty rates. By extension, the higher propensity of whites to serve in combat capacities could explain their higher-than-expected, post-Vietnam casualty rate. The same may be true of ethnic Hispanics, who are also overrepresented in the combat arms, though their reasons for volunteering for such assignments may differ from those of their non-Hispanic white counterparts. The short duration of post-Vietnam US ground combat engagements such as Panama and Somalia-as well as the prominent roles played by special operations and light-infantry units for which blacks are less likely to volunteer has thus far prevented a rigorous evaluation of such propositions. However, the 2003-2004 conflict in Iraq presents one opportunity to assess the race distribution of US casualties under varying combat conditions. First, compared to other combat engagements since Vietnam, many diverse military units have been operating in Iraq for a relatively long time. Second, the US military experience in Iraq has been, broadly speaking, marked by differing conflict environments. In the relatively brief opening period, coalition ground combat forces (mainly US and British infantry and armor) rapidly penetrated deep into enemy territory and carried out offensive actions primarily against Iraqi military forces. The subsequent-and ongoing-mission involves efforts by combat and noncombat personnel (e.g., intelligence, police, logistical, and civil affairs) to consolidate US control, restore civil order, pacify hostile forces, and administer occupied areas. This study assesses the racial equity of military service by examining the racial distribution of US casualties in Iraq for the first twelve months national dialogue on the equity of military service may shift back to the social process that impels whites-particularly those from the lower socioeconomic strata-into the ranks. However, should US troops resume large-scale offensive campaigns against a number of seerningly growing and increasingly well-organized insurgent threats, casualties among blacks and Hispanics may creep up to a point where the fairness of military sacrifice again becomes an uncomfortable racial issue. On a final note, the findings of this study are not germane only to the military experiences of the United States. As of 2000, several advanced industrial democracies with long histories of conscription had abandoned the practice in favor of voluntary service, or had plans to phase it out by 2004. Some nations with rising immigration rates have experienced increased racial and ethnic diversity in their volunteer militaries, while others (such as Spain and France) actively recruit foreign volunteers. At the same time, conflicts such as Kosovo in 1999 and contemporary operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have subjected the militaries of many nations to their first hostile fire in decades (for example, coalition casualties in Iraq include personnel from Italy, Spain, Poland, Denmark, and Bulgaria). To the degree that ethnic enlistment patterns are similarly structured by socioeconomic factors, debates about military equity and recruitment policies in the US case may presage similar dialogues elsewhere. Language: en