Forms and Functions of Adult Socialization

Sociologists usually assume that maximum socialization is optimal for a system without considering the effects of differential socialization. At a gross level, socialization can be conceived in terms of value commitment and behavioral conformity which may vary independently. Their combined variation produces four types with different systemic effects. Two are functional under normal conditions and two others in crisis. Thus, the integrative importance of values and behavior shifts with the state of the system, with social stability and change pressures. The functionality of maximum socialization is questioned on several grounds, including its social and economic costs, the effects of requiring the deepest social commitments to be pervasive or highly selective and the demands of social change. A dult socialization is the process of inculcating new values and behavior appropriate to adult positions and group memberships. These changes are normally internalized in the course of induction or training procedures, whether formal or informal. They result in new images, expectations, skills and norms as the person defines himself and as others view him. Thus, there are both internal and external changes: withill the individual, in his role set and in the interaction between them. The prototype of adult socialization appears in the indoctrination to new roles during rites de passage or informal status successions.1 Thereby, new expectations and conformity to them are presumably built into the person so that he is significantly altered as a social being. Socialization standards are drawn from the norms of a given target system: a specific role, a group, or the values of broader social categories. Successful socialization produces conformity to shared expectations about values and behavior. But regardless of the target system, socialization always has the same objectives: to inculcate in the novice both values and behavior, or beliefs and action.2 Our basic premise is that conformity is invariably sought on both dimensions; all socialization processes are directed to these twin ends. In any context, the fully socialized person internalizes the correct beliefs and displays the appropriate behavior. Clearly, however, not all socialization is successful, nor conformity to expectations the infallible result. The process does not function like a social die press which stamps out uniform social products. Socialization results do vary and deviance may result from many causes. But in this paper, we are not interested in the causes of imperfect socialization. Instead, we are concerned with its effects. Regardless of its causes, socialization has consequences for a system. Variable socialization sets the initial inputs of conformity and deviance whereby people relate differently to the system. Thus, socialization results constitute dissimilar inputs which affect people's participation in, commitment to and support of * I am indebted to Professors Yonina Talmon and George Levinger for helpful review of the original version of this paper presented at a Russell Sage-SSRC conference on Socialization through the Life Cycle, and to Professor Ronald Lippitt for suggestive comments during the discussion at the conference. 1 Arnold van Gennep, Rites of Passage (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960). Also cf., Robert Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (rev. ed.; Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1957), pp. 368-86. 2 This focus on values and behavior is basic in social theory. It corresponds, for example, to Robin Williams' concepts of "normative structure" and "patterns of conduct" (American Society [New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954], p. 537) and parallels George Homans' distinction between "sentiments" and "activity" (The Human Group [New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950], esp. pp. 125-128). It is also echoed in various other analytic dichotomies (William Goode, "Structure and Function: Four Overlapping Conceptual Sets," Sociological Reviezw, 42 [Section Nine, 1950], pp. 171-178). The explicit distinction between values and behavior avoids the ambiguity of "norms" when the referent is conceptually important. This content downloaded from 157.55.39.105 on Fri, 07 Oct 2016 04:37:07 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms