Toward Reviving Rationality in Argument: Adding Pieces to Johnson's Puzzle

Argument has been studied from a number of viewpoints and defined in a variety of ways. It has been subscripted ([argument.sub.1], [argument.sub.2], and even possibly [argument.sub.0]), it has been alliterated (process, product, and procedure, in Wenzel's [1990] terms), its verb has been altered (having rather than making an argument), it has been converted to acronyms (CRC approaches versus the MDLs in TOA [Willard, 1989]), it has been converted to its grammatical uses (argument as a noun versus argument as a verb [Bruschke, 1995]), or its features have simply been listed (Brockriede, 1990). Without belaboring the intricacies of all of these approaches, it is safe to say that they range from the broad to the narrow. Those taking a more de-differentiating attitude can easily dismiss strict boundaries with ready examples that defy borders and can muster impressive theoretical reasons why the perimeters cannot exist. These approaches produce very broad definitions. Those taking a more narrow view, conversely, have a damnable time maintaining clear distinctions for their categories in an era where critical theories are increasingly rendering distinctions of any variety untenable. Even simple things like "yellow" or "ball" are categories that are hard to defend, as Rouse (1987) has explained Hesse's examples. The most narrow views consider only reasoned suasory discourse to be argument (in its various forms referred to as making an argument, argument as a noun, or argument as product) while the most broad definitions include virtually any human action that can have some symbolic value assigned to it (called argument as process, argument as verb, or argument as "disagreement relevant expansion" [Willard, 1989]). Although definitions of argument are perhaps as myriad as the authors who try to define it, few scholars find it necessary to choose between the broad and narrow interpretations. While a certain definition may distinguish between, say, the making of rather than the having of an argument, there is not necessarily a need to exclude either the noun or the verb from the province of argument. Either definition is acceptable, either leads to insights, and the question is one of preference rather than correctness. Even Charles Willard has protested that his broad theories are not meant to preclude the serious study of issues that fall under the more narrow definitions of argument. Even the narrow definitions seem to be aimed at defining a core of study rather than denying that there is insight to be gained at the periphery. Given these definitional stances, one might suspect that argument is a field with a healthy body of scholarship wrestling with the complexities of logical suasory discourse at the core of the field as well as a healthy group of essays examining more open-ended issues found at the outer boundaries of the field. It turns out that this is not the case and our research does not mirror our definitions. In fact, argument theorists have largely backed away from evaluations of the logic of an argument (I hope to define "logic" more carefully later, but for now think of it as any claim than an argument is correct or incorrect). A quick review of the articles in the past decade's issues of Argumentation and Advocacy is telling. The discipline commonly engages in rhetorical criticism, conducts interpersonal studies of disagreement behavior, issues cross-cultural and cross-disciplinary studies of debates, offers persuasion and quasi-persuasion studies, and serves as a sounding board for intercollegiate debate professionals. Only two articles (Walton, 1991; Young, Launer, & Austin, 1990) have concerned themselves with the "correctness" of an argument in the traditional sense. Even then, Young and Launer opt for an approach that blends audience-centered and formal approaches. Introductory texts (e.g., Rieke & Sillars, 1993) generally have more discussion about the connection between argument and logic than contemporary journal articles, and one peculiarity of the field of argument is that theoretical advances seem to come in textbooks as often as professional journals (Johnson, 2000). …