For a (Pessimistic) Theory of the Invisible Hand and Spontaneous Order

The main theses that I shall endeavour to defend are the following: 1. Hayek's view that the main, indeed the fundamental, problem of the social sciences is that of an order and of spontaneous institutions emerging as unnegotiated and unintentional effects of the actions of individuals is correct and of great importance. In my opinion this theory is particularly topical today in view of the modernity of the approaches based on complexity, on dynamic systems, on the concept of emergence, and the antagonism with which they are juxtaposed to the dominant paradigm: 'cognitivism' (the mind as a symbolic system and as a teleological control over behaviour based on symbolic representations of the world and of action). However, I consider the true challenge not to be that of a paradigmatic revolution that replaces the symbolic approach with a dynamic one: it is rather that of a synthesis between the two (Castelfranchi, 1998a; 1998b; 1998c). At the social level this means exactly responding to Hayek's problem: how can it be that dynamic, emergent, non intentional effects govern the behaviour of cognitive and problem-solving agents whose actions are intentional and (at least partly) planned on the basis of their knowledge? I consider that the contribution to the science of the artificial (Artificial Intelligence - in particular Multi-Agent Systems, Artificial Life, Agent-based Social Simulation) will play a decisive role in solving this problem, which is the principal theoretical problem facing the social sciences (Castelfranchi, 1997). 2. Hayek grasps and retains the idea of Smith that what we unwittingly and unintentionally pursue are 'goals'. This intuition is fundamental (and, in my opinion, convergent with the problem of the theoretical foundation of the concept of 'function' in the social sciences). Nevertheless Hayek does not provide an explicit and straightforward theory of this teleology and indeed, essentially - with his characteristic subjectivistic individualism - equates it with and reduces it to the psychological goals of individuals that may not necessarily be intentionally pursued. Indeed he assumes that the emerging social structures are persistent and self-reproducing precisely because they satisfy individual desires and individuals' conscious purposes. Furthermore Hayek - like Smith - in acknowledging the teleological nature of the invisible hand and of spontaneous order, cannot help attributing to it a (positive) value judgment, a providential, benevolent, optimistic vision of this process of self-organization (that is - he of all people - commits the sin of ideologism). The optimistic and positive view of spontaneous order, which I shall attempt to document, is based on his limited model of goals, intentions and actions. A much more sophisticated cognitive theory of action would be required to account for the emergence, organization and self-perpetuation of dysfunctions and malicious functions in human behaviour. Also the concept of 'effets pervers' (Boudon) is inadequate as it does not account for the actual teleological, functional nature (sect.8). Hayek does not adequately explain for whom the emerging order is good and to what extent power differences are involved in maintaining it; he does not analyse the problem of the effects of our actions that are harmful to others and not to ourselves; he does not include in the theory the possibility that the social agents do not know what is best for them; he neglects the fact that desires and preferences are not a given (with respect to which the order is good) but are a product of the order itself; he makes use of models of group selection that are not clear, etc. The central issue in this work is therefore whether it is possible to recognize and account for the teleological, teleonomic, function character of the 'invisible hand' without having to adopt a teleological and providential view of society and of history. 3. The proposed thesis is that it is possible and necessary to have a theory of teleological and functional behaviour (at both social and individual level) as a phenomenon distinct from both intentional behaviour and mere causal or chance effects. This is a distinction that Hayek intuitively grasped but did not resolve. The fundamental problem is how to graft teleological but unintentional behaviours precisely on intention-driven behaviours. What answer can be given to Elster according to whom the idea of intention makes that of the function of behaviour impracticable and superfluous. How can intentional acts also be functional, that is, unwitting but reproduced precisely as a result of their unintentional effects. How can agents who intend their results and prefer what is good for them to what is bad for them not only produce also perverse and harmful side effects, but allow the latter to organize themselves and direct their behaviours. The invisible hand, spontaneous order, precisely because it is an unintentional and yet emerging function, self-organizing and self-reproducing (through the individual behaviours), is substantially indifferent to the goals and good of individuals, and may be addressed equally to good and to evil (Leopardi's philosophic view is here opposed to Hayek's philosophy). Hayek's optimism is theoretically unjustified.