The Continued Viability of the Act of State Doctrine in Foreign Branch Bank Expropriation Cases

principles.10 3 Intangible property can only be 'located' within a single jurisdiction as a matter of legal fiction.104 For act of state purposes, courts consider a debt located within the state that has the ability to enforce or collect the debt.10 5 The ability of a state to enforce or collect a debt depends on jurisdiction over the debtor.10 6 To determine whether the expropriating state has jurisdiction over the debtor for act of state purposes, United States courts employ one of three legal fic102. Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645, 651 (2d Cir. 1984) (Kearse, J., dissenting); Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 61 N.Y.2d 460, 47677, 463 N.E.2d 5, 11-12, 474 N.Y.S.2d 689, 696-97 (Wachtler, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 966 (1984). Where an instrument is proof of a proprietary interest in intangible property, such as a certificate of deposit or an account statement, courts do not consider the location of the debt to be the physical location of the instrument evidencing the interest in the intangible asset. 5 MICHIE ON BANKS AND BANKING § 326a (1983). The document merely represents a debt, or the intangible property; it is not the property itself. Id. Contra von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1140 (1966) (stating that where a document embodies rights to intangible property, courts have held that the location of that document within the territory of a nation establishes the right of that nation's courts to exercise jurisdiction). 103. Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706, 714 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968). The situs of intangible property may be one place for tax purposes, another place for venue, and yet another place for estate tax purposes. Id. at 714-15. 104. See Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 61 N.Y.2d 460, 476, 463 N.E.2d 5, I1, 474 N.Y.S.2d 689, 696 (Wachtler, J., dissenting) (stating that because intangible property has no real physical existence, determining the situs of the property is not a question of fact), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 966 (1984). Courts devise and apply fictitious tests to determine the situs of the intangible property. Id. 105. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1976); Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 222-23 (1905); Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 862 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982); United Bank Ltd. v. Cosmic Int'l, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 262, aff'd, 542 F.2d 868, 873 (2d Cir. 1976); Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 623 F. Supp. 1526, 1535 (E.D. Mich. 1985); Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 61 N.Y.2d 460, 470, 463 N.E.2d 5, 10, 474 NY.S.2d 689, 692, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 966 (1984). 106. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1976); Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 222-23 (1905); Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 862 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982); Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 623 F. Supp. 1526, 1536 (E.D. Mich. 1985). [VOL. 3:99 FOREIGN BRANCH EXPROPRIATIONS tions: the domicile test, the complete fruition test, or the incidents of the debt test. 107