COMMENTS ON BERLYNE'S REPLY

In my earlier study ( 4 ) , I derived two predictions from Berlyne's (1) theoretical statements about conflict. In testing these predictions, 1 used as a dependent variable what Berlyne ( 1 ) has referred to as ". . . one of the most sensitive and easily measurable indexes of conflict, namely, the lengthening of reaction time" (p. 32 ) . Results were unequivocal and quite opposite implications of Berlyne's model. Berlyne ( 2 ) is quite correct in asserting that these results leave one with two alternatives. One may either maintain an air of scholarly skepticism concerning the usefulness of the theory or one may look askance at the dependent variable. My data, as with most tests of theory, do not suggest which alternative may be more appropriate. Berlyne has a quite understandable preference for the latter alternative. However, to suggest that RT is an adequate index only when the data support the theory is not satisfactory. The 4-Alt , unequal condition is the crucial one in my experiment. A comparison of this condition with the 2-Alt condition provides some support for the use of my indices of conflict, against which Berlyne has argued. Perhaps more important, however, is the comparison between the 4-Alt , uneqzrul and the 4-Alt , equal conditions. Here no "index" is necessary and Berlyne's argument is irrelevant. However, this comparison indicates that decreasian the attractiveness of two of the four alternatives increases choice time. This resulr cannor be accounted for by Berlyne's model, as it is now stated. There is no intent here to say that Berlyne's theory is wrong, merely that it is incomplete. For example, in the original report ( 3 ) 1 considered alternative explanations for rhese data which I do not think inconsistent with Berlyne's theory. One of these, which I am now testing in collaboration with Judson Mills and Clyde Hendrick, concerns the psychological effort necessary to expend in a choice involving several equally attractive alternatives. In this situation, S might be overwhelmed by the task. T o consider the requisite amount of information about each of the alternatives would require a greater expenditure of psychological effort than the ultimate choice seems worth. S consequently makes his choice on the basis of what would ordinarily be considered incomplete information, lessening his choice time. In our experiment, we are manipulating the number oE stimulus dimensions of the choice objects made salient to S prior to choice for 4-Alt, equal and 4-Alt, uneqilul conditions. The results tend to support this explanation. They are not inconsistent with, but cannot be predicted from, Berlyne's theory. Let me add one final note. I do not disagree with Berlyne at all on predictions for forced-choice situations. In this case, S merely indicates the correct alternative. His main task is to respond according to E's instructions. It should not surprise us that this takes longer with four alternatives than with two. However, my data indicate quite clearly that such a forced choice is psychologically quite different from what might be called a "socially real" decision, a decision in which S chooses one alternative for himself and thereby rejects all others. The latter type of decision has not been adequately investigated. If "some peculiar factors" exist for my experiment ( 2 ) , they do so for any "socially real" decision.