Images of Social Groups: Categorical or Qualified?

This paper makes a direct empirical assessment of the way Americans go about describing social groups in three important intergroup contexts-race, gender, and social class. Results from a national survey indicate that when respondents are given the opportunity to express themselves in a relatively unconstrained format, qualified images of groups generally prevail over categorical descriptions. Further, the amount and pattern of categorical thinking vary considerably across the three intergroup contexts, reflecting the different kinds of group images that underly race, gender, and social class relations. Mary R. Jackman is an Associate Professor of Sociology and a Faculty Associate of the Survey Research Center, University of Michigan. Mary Scheuer Senter is an Instructor in the Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Social Work, Central Michigan University. The authors would like to thank Robert W. Jackman, Joan Huber, Anne Adams, and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments, and Suzanne Purcell and Maria Kousis for their assistance. This research was supported by grants from the National Institute for Mental Health (MH-26433) and the National Science Foundation (SOC 75-00405). Public Opinion Quarterly ? 1980 by The Trustees of Columbia University Published by Elsevier North-Holland, Inc 0033-362X/80/0044-341/$l 75 This content downloaded from 157.55.39.49 on Mon, 26 Sep 2016 05:06:15 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 342 JACKMAN AND SENTER thought to be pervasive and widespread (Katz and Braly, 1947; Centers, 1951; Ehrlich, 1962, 1973:32; Williams, 1964:36, 41; Karlins et al., 1969; Eldridge, 1979:22-27), and their analysis has been central to the study of intergroup beliefs and stereotypes. Indeed, most definitions of a stereotype include categorical thinking as a critical element (Fishman, 1956; Richter, 1956; Vinacke, 1957; Allport, 1958; Secord, 1959; Koenig and King, 1964; Williams, 1964; Campbell, 1967; Harding et al., 1969; Tajfel, 1969; Cauthen et al., 1971; Brigham, 1971; Mackie, 1973). While the categorical description of groups has been a central concern of past research, standard measures have assumed rather than demonstrated its existence. Analysts have constrained respondents to express their beliefs about group traits in categorical terms, and have then inferred that categorical thinking is endemic to intergroup perceptions. In addition, most research on trait attribution to social groups has relied on select subsamples (generally college students), so that we know relatively little about the nature of trait attribution among a cross-section of the general public. In this study, we report on a new measure of beliefs about group traits that was administered in a national probability survey of the United States. A more sensitive reflection than past measures of how personality traits are assigned to social groups, our measure is applied to the images of race, gender, and social class groups held by blacks and whites, women and men, and people from four subjectively defined social classes, respectively. The results of our analysis belie the common conclusion that categorical images of social groups are pervasive and widespread. Instead, they yield useful and suggestive data on the varied extent to which different social groups are described in categorical or qualified terms. Categorical Thinking: Central Issues Many analysts consider the tendency to simplify and classify the world as fundamental to perception as well as a functional coping mechanism for bringing some order to the confusion of reality (Lippman, 1922; Allport, 1958; Tajfel, 1969; Ehrlich, 1973:38). In the context of intergroup beliefs, this process is believed to become exaggerated and emotionally invested. The categorical perception of groups "provides the mold which gives shape to intergroup attitudes" (Tajfel, 1969:91). Stereotype assignmefits become "the language of prejudice" (Ehrlich, 1973:21). The categorical attribution of traits to social groups is regarded as invidious for two reasons. This content downloaded from 157.55.39.49 on Mon, 26 Sep 2016 05:06:15 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms IMAGES OF SOCIAL GROUPS One line of reasoning stresses that any perception that unequivocally lumps all the members of a group into one unvaried category is intrinsically invidious because it credits group membership with an overwhelming role in determining individual personality characteristics, and because it provides the perfect grounding for discriminatory policies and practices. Most important, however, the categorical description of a group represents a closed and insensitive perception that routinely pigeonholes group members and leaves the perceiver unreceptive to contrary evidence, which is either overlooked or dismissed as a mere "exception." Categorical descriptions of groups are thus seen as inherently "inaccurate" and irrational (Lippmann, 1922; Richter, 1956; Allport, 1958; Williams, 1964:36; Ehrlich, 1973; Mackie, 1973; Tajfel, 1969; 1978). According to a second line of reasoning, the invidiousness of categorical images of groups stems from the unqualified attribution of positive traits to one's own group and negative qualities to other groups. Perceptions that reflect ethnocentrism and prejudice assert one group's monopoly of "good" traits and another group's monopoly of "bad" traits (Vinacke, 1957; Allport, 1958; Williams, 1964:40; Campbell, 1967; Harding, 1968; Tajfel, 1969; 1978; Eldridge,