From Elections to Democracy: Building Accountable Government in Hungary and Poland. By Susan Rose‐Ackerman

From Elections to Democracy: Building Accountable Government in Hungary and Poland. By Susan Rose-Ackerman. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Pp. 272. $50.00 cloth. Reviewed by Linda M. Beale, University of Illinois Rose-Ackerman's new book tackles a significant concern-how to sustain electoral democracies in Central European countries by ensuring that government policy decisions are accountable to the people. Challenging the notion that electoral systems with competitive political parties are sufficient, Rose-Ackerman asserts that democracy requires accountable policymaking "through transparent procedures that seek to incorporate public input" (p. 1). Focusing on Hungary and Poland, she considers five institutional processes that attempt to satisfy this goal. First, international constraints provided by the EU and organizations such as the World Bank inherently create conflicts through external pressures that override democratic, grassroots developments. The resulting legitimacy deficit limits international organizations' ability to encourage public accountability. Second, various new or expanded independent oversight institutions function relatively well to enhance performance accountability but do little to foster policymaking accountability. These include independent agencies, constitutional courts, presidents with monitoring functions, audit offices, and ombudsmen (p. 57, Table 5.1). One suspects that this discussion discounts the policymaking roles of two institutions more than merited. The constitutional courts in Hungary and Poland play a larger role than those in the United States, since they are encouraged to address constitutional issues and provide widespread access; and the ombudsmen have not infrequently initiated policy debates in response to citizens' concerns (see, e.g., pp. 78-9 and 80-1). Third, delegation to lower-level governments may allow some public participation. Regrettably, delegation also invites interference with national initiatives based on the personal goals of local politicians while allowing opportunistic firms to avoid national objectives by working through weaker local units that lack expertise or clear lines of authority. Public accountability is therefore weak, even though some substantive statutes require public participation before particular kinds of ordinances may be promulgated. Finally, neocorporatism and civil dialogue similarly fail. Neocorporatism brings specific groups into policymaking, but it does so by substituting negotiation processes for ordinary policymaking. The effect is to shut out all but established insiders, such as tripartite commissions with labor, management, and government representatives. If civil dialogue functions in situations in which participating groups are weak, information is not available, consultation is too late, or policy discussions are inconclusive (as RoseAckerman suggests is often the case in Hungary and Poland), it does little to enhance policymaking accountability. The failure of these four institutions leaves only one genuine possibility for policymaking accountability-reliance on open, public participation in government policymaking processes "that do not lock in a fixed set of participants and that are open to newly developing interests" (p. …