On the Critique of Scientific Reason

The historical studies which have been carried out and are being carried out with the help of the methodology of research programmes define two types of relation between research programmes and the evidence. Let me call these types type A and type L respectively. They examine episodes where one research programme R″ replaces another research programme, R′ (or fails to be replaced by it), i.e. R′ is made the basis of research, argument, metaphysical speculation by the great majority of competent scientists. The authors find that the relation of R″ to the evidence is usually of type L while that of R′ to the evidence is of type A (other circumstances being present when this is not the case). Assuming their historical analysis to be correct this is an interesting sociological law. The authors do not present their results in such terms, however. Making A and L part of a normative methodology they claims to have shown that the acceptance of R″ was rational while the continued defence of R′ would have been irrational, and they express this belief of theirs by calling research programmes exhibiting relation L to the evidence progressive while research programmes which stand in relation A to the evidence are called degenerating. They also claim that such judgements are objective, independent of the whims and subjective convictions of the thinkers who make them. Using such a normative interpretation of their sociological results they also claim to possess arguments for and against well known research programmes. For example, they would say that today most versions of environmentalism degenerate and that it is irrational to continue working on them. Fortunately this puritanical superstructure of the otherwise excellent sociological studies need not be taken seriously. The reason is that the superstructure is arbitrary, or ‘subjective’ in at least five different ways. (1) the basic philosophy behind the normative apprisals makes modern science the source of the standards without giving reasons for the choice; (2) despite all its praise for modern science the methodology of research programmes uses a streamlined version of it without (a) making the principles of streamlining explicit and without (b) arguing for them; (3) the standards that are obtained via the arbitrary steps (1) and (2) are not strong enough to praise any action as ‘rational’ or condemn it as ‘irrational’ which means that such judgements are without support from the arbitrarily selected standards; (4) in some of the studies research programmes are selected in an idiosyncratic manner, the purpose being to make the general philosophy appear true (not that such truth would be of much use — see (3)); (5) the attempt to show that competent scientists always acted ‘rationally’ is not applied to all scientists but only to those whose actions seem to fit into the general methodology (for ‘seem’ see again item (3)). The superstructure of rationality which is subjective in the five ways just enumerated is supposed to guide scientists while the case studies are to show that the guide has substance — he is not merely a philosopher indulging in abstract dreams of law and order. The alleged substantiality is moonshine and one can reject the standards just as arbitrarily as they have been introduced. In sum: in the case studies we have (a) the discussion of certain sociological regularities; (b) the proposal of arbitrary standards which have no practical force; (c) the insinuation that the regularities are not merely factual, but are features of rationality, that they lend support to the standards and are justified by them, (a) may be accepted with the caution we extend to any new ‘discovery’ in sociology, (c) must be rejected (and with it the tendentious terminology used in all the case studies), (b) may be accepted, or rejected, depending on mood, the weather etc. Environmentalists, however, may continue on their path, for no argument has been raised against their enterprise.