Comparing Edgeworth’s and Ramsey’s Understanding of the Meaning of 'Logical, Objective, Probability Relations.' Ramsey’s View Is 'Utterly Preposterous' and 'Nonsense', Where We Have Borrowed Savage’s Verbal Condemnation of Economists Who Attempted to Apply the Subjective Theory of Probability Beyond Small Worlds (Short Run and Micro Applications only Are Allowed) on P.16 of His Foundations (1954)

Ramsey’s complete and total ignorance of Keynes’s definition of “objective, logical, probability relations”, contained on pages 35-36 of the A Treatise on Probability, which was explicitly referenced and discussed by Edgeworth in his two reviews, can only be explained by the conclusion that Ramsey never read more than a few pages of Part I of Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability plus briefly looking at a maximum of an additional 2-3 pages from Parts II,III,and V. The very idea that an 18 year old teenager could show up at Cambridge in 1921 and ,based on a small, 4 page, unrefereed note, that contains nothing correct in it about Keynes‘s A Treatise on Probability, allegedly convince J M Keynes that his logical theory of probability had to be abandoned, is ludicrous, silly, stupid, and foolish. Ramsey’s crucial error was his failure to identify Keynes’s very clear definition of logical probability on pp.35-36,which was then developed in far, far, far greater detail in Part III of the A Treatise on Probability. Of far greater concern is that every single one of the six topics below that were covered by Edgeworth in his two reviews of the A Treatise on Probability is omitted from both of Ramsey’s reviews: • Keynes’s clearly defined connection between his objective, logical, probability relations and objective, logical, similarity relations, which form the foundation for cognitive science and psychology, on pp.35-36 of Part I(chapter III) • Keynes’s initial specification of the evidential weight of the argument relation,V(a/h), in Part I (chapter 6) which Keynes finished in Part IV (chapter 26-V(a/h)=w,0≤w≤1) • Keynes’s interval valued and non additive approach to probability (Part II,chapters 10-17) based on Boole’s upper-lower probabilities approach specified in his The Laws of Thought (1954,pp.265-269), as well as Keynes’s critique of the assumption of additivity • Keynes’s finite probabilities of Part III using a modified version of Boole’s Problem X to support his application of analogies • Keynes’s use of decision weights to explicitly modify additive probability ,thereby transforming additive probability into non(sub) additive ,conventional coefficients of weight and risk, c, in Part IV. • Keynes’s use of Chebyshev’s Inequality to establish lower bounds for a safety first approach in Part V and use of the Lexis-Q test to establish the constancy(stability) of applications of the limiting frequency approach to probability Given Edwin B .Wilson’s correct 1923 conclusion, made in correspondence with Edgeworth, that only Edgeworth was fully qualified to review the A Treatise on Probability, we reach the conclusion that Ramsey and Braithwaite never actually read more than a very few pages of a book that they claimed to have read. The only conclusion that can be drawn that is consistent with this evidence is that Ramsey and Braithwaite were involved in an intellectual fraud in 1921 and 1922 that continues in the 21st century. See, for example, Misak (2020) and Janeway (2020).