Reply to Hansen

Hansen (2012a) and the author are both concerned about trends in the counseling culture toward oversimplification. Their disagreement is, principally, about the locus of debate. The Author responds to Hansen's counterarguments with the ultimate hope of transferring the focus from scientific ideology to economic realities pervading professional counseling. ********** Hansen (2012a) charges that the current professional culture of counseling (hereinafter referred to simply as "counseling culture") has adopted, to its detriment, an ideology of simplicity and singularity in line with the sciences rather than the humanities. He proposes an alternative vision of counseling that would embrace a humanist ideology marked by complexity and multiple perspectives. In my response to Hansen (Leibert, 2012), I largely agree with his description of the counseling culture. To help his vision succeed, I call attention to a critical factor neglected in his article: the pervasive influence of economic concerns. I also present a nuanced view of science that might promote greater harmony between humanists and scientists, which in turn, might aid in the fulfillment of Hansen's humanist vision. In Hansen's (2012b) rejoinder, although he acknowledges the importance of considering the role of economics, he vigorously defends his initial positions, which I believe lessens the chances of his vision materializing. In my final response I address, in turn, each of Hansen's main criticisms: (a) my misunderstanding of his characterization of the role of science vis-a-vis the counseling culture; (b) my use of causal, reductionist language; (c) my dismissal of the role of scientific ideology to the counseling culture; and (d) the inability of postpositivism to transform the counseling culture. MISUNDERSTANDING In his rejoinder, Hansen (2012b) contends that I frame his ideas too causally and, therefore, my critique does not apply to his thesis. He maintains that his arguments were simply descriptive, with no suggestion of causation. Even if I were to agree that Hansen's arguments were merely descriptive, I am not convinced that Hansen himself (2012a) would. Consider the contrast between Hansen (2012a) and Hansen (2012b). In his rejoinder, Hansen (2012b) declares, "I do not argue that scientific ideology caused the shift in counseling culture" (p. 217). But in Hansen's original article, when discussing the counseling culture, he stated, it "is a direct result of the influence of scientific ideology" (Hansen, 2012a, p. 137). Even though this statement seems to imply, at least minimally, some level of causation, Hansen (2012b) vociferously disagrees: "I certainly never argue, as Leibert (2012) erroneously charges, that 'the increasing reliance of scientific methods' (p. 206) was responsible for the monopoly of scientific ideology" (p. 217). However, when Hansen (2012a) was consulted, he seemed to agree more with me than with himself, stating, "The creeping spread of scientific ideology, and concomitant loss of a humanities perspective, is arguably responsible for this shift" (p. 138). Apart from literal differences in the language ("increasing reliance" versus "creeping spread" and "was responsible" versus "arguably responsible"), I am not persuaded that these differences are substantive. Nor do I think would Hansen (2012a), who went to lengths deconstructing scientific ideology with the implication that so doing might liberate and unleash a humanistic resurgence. Thus, I believe my initial arguments stand. REDUCTIONIST LANGUAGE Hansen (2012b) objected to my "thesis [as] too reductive" (p. 218), citing my "double" use of the phrase "result of" in the following sentence: "professional trends ... are 'not the result of science, but, instead, are the result of economic and policy interests'" (p. 217). On this grievance, I can offer little succor for Hansen's complaint. Perhaps too reductionistic for Hansen's sensibilities, I agree with Rogers who wrote in 1957, "The major value of stating any theory in unequivocal terms is that specific hypotheses may be drawn from it which are capable of proof or disproof" (p. …