Information Credibility and Choosing Policy Alternatives: An Experimental Test of Cognitive-Response Theory

Recent studies suggest that individual perceptions of information credibility are important determinants of knowledge utilization in government decisionmaking. This theory—credibility logic—has been mostly normative. One positive theory, cognitive response, is used along with credibility-logic arguments to predict evaluations of alternatives with varying degrees of net benefits and information credibility. Experimental results for 75 MPA students using a 3x3 repeated measures with Latin square design found mixed support for cognitive-response theory. Credibility was most important when it contradicted net benefit levels and for the evaluation of proposals reporting medium net benefits. One perplexing problem in public administration is how to get decisionmakers to use quality policy analysis. Explanations for this malaise based on the scientific status of policy analysis have proven inadequate (Dunn 1981; Schneider et al. 1982; Useem and Dimaggio 1978; Kahneman et al. 1982; Dror 1984). Alternative explanations include bounded rationality (e.g., limited time and cognitive abilities in evaluating information; cf. Wright 1974), poor knowledge-transfer strategies (Bowman 1978; Glaser et al. 1983; Leviton and Hughes 1981), and differences in values, goals, and work styles between decisionmakers and policy analysts (Aronson and Sherwood 1967; Dunn 1980; Weiss 1977; Landsbergen 1991; Cahill 1991). Others assert that scientific information may be just as valid as managerial experience, which is more useful in decisionmaking (Emmert 1985; Lindblom and Cohen 1979; Fischer 1980; Krimsky 1984; Nelkin 1979). These diverging explanations leave knowledge-utilization research in public administration with little theoretical core (Bozeman 1986). One recent theory—credibility logic—offers J-PAKT, 2(1992):3:315-331 some hope for a common ground. Credibility logic asserts that 315/ Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory An Experimental Test of Cognitive-Response Theory individuals subjectively evaluate the believability of information on the basis of a variety of criteria often viewed as external to the decision, such as the organizational location (e.g., external or internal) of the information provider (Bozeman 1986; Landsbergen 1988; Coursey and Bretschneider 1991). For example, the scientific quality of the research, or its source, does not directly affect knowledge use. Instead, the decisionmaker's perception of the research design's quality and its purveyor are key determinants. Most credibility logic works concentrate on normative considerations rather than on developing and testing positive theories linking credibility to the use and persuasiveness of information. Other disciplines, such as communication and marketing, use more elaborate models based on a variety of positive theories such as cognitive response, but their definition of credibility is not germane to public administration knowledge utilization research. This paper bridges these research tracks by postulating and testing a series of hypotheses based on cognitive-response theory while maintaining the public administration definition of credibility. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES Credibility-logic research has been mostly normative, that is, explaining how its premises are useful in evaluating the quality of policy analysis and how it merges traditional scientific models of policy analysis with alternative perspectives (Bozeman and Landsbergen 1989; Landsbergen and Coursey 1991). There is little positive theory associated with credibility logic, especially in predicting how credibility influences the choice among alternatives supported with varying information credibility. Recent experimental research (Landsbergen 1988; Landsbergen and Bozeman 1987; Bozeman et al. 1991) and simulation research (Mandell 1989) have tested the theory. In the experimental studies, however, subjects evaluated the credibility of information after making their decision, which violates the temporal precedence given in the model. Moreover, the theory provides little detail about exactly how credibility influences the use of information. Alternatives described with highly credible information are expected to be more persuasive than those with low credibility. This explanation is probably too simplistic. Other works in policy analysis and educational psychology demonstrate that a variety of decisionmaker and information characteristics may interact in determining the credibility of information (e.g., Braskamp et al. 1978; Brown et al. 1978; Glaser et al. 1983; Newman et al. 1979; Thompson et al. 1981). These studies, however, rarely either focus directly on credibility or test the relationship between credibility and final decisions.