US Diplomacy and the Downfall of a Cuban Dictator: Machado in 1933

In 1933 the US ambassador to Cuba, Sumner Welles, overthrew President Machado, Cuba's first dictator, with the threat, but not the use, of US force. This diplomatic achievement was unprecedented in Cuban history. Under cover of mediation Welles had encouraged disaffection among politicians and army officers. Machado then succumbed to a popular uprising brought on by a decade of depression and oppression. The insubordination of the officers, however, soon led to a mutiny of the soldiers, whose leader, Fulgencio Batista, eventually seized the presidency and was recognised by the United States. The dictator Gerardo Machado met his downfall on August i2 1933, three months after Ambassador Sumner Welles had presented his letters of credence. The ambassador was President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's closest adviser on Latin American affairs as well as a family friend and prot6ge of both the president and Mrs Roosevelt. Welles promptly received 'warm congratulations' from the department of state and the White House.1 On the next day the New York Times published an article that was both well-informed and tendentious. First, it noted that Welles 'At the age of 41 ... has brought off a difficult job with the aplomb of a veteran'. In conclusion, it attributed the downfall of Machado quite correctly to the defection of the Cuban army and to the outbreak of a general strike, remarking that the 'Ambassador's efforts had borne more fruit than was realized here'. Misleadingly, however, the New York Times asserted that Welles had elicited 'a Cuban solution of a Cuban problem' by 'sitting as an impartial chairman' and painstakingly reconciling the regime and its opponents. 'Definite progress was being made, it was felt here,' the article concluded, until 'the common people' lost patience and brought down the government.2 The record indicates, on the contrary, Philip Dur is Jefferson Caffery Professor of Political Science Emeritus at the University of Louisiana-Lafayette. Christopher Gilcrease is Instructor of Library Science in the Edith Garland Duprd Library at the University of Louisiana-Lafayette. 1 Department telegram 73 August I2, 8 p.m., Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1933 (Washington D.C. I86o-), V, 360 [hereinafter abbreviated to FRUS 1933, with volume and page number added; department telegrams similarly referred to as deptels and embassy telegrams as embtels]. 2 New York Times August 3, p. z22. The editorial tone of the article suggests that it was written after consulting State Department officials. This content downloaded from 157.55.39.45 on Wed, 05 Oct 2016 05:21:21 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms z 56 Philip Dur and Christopher Gilcrease that Welles' contribution to the outcome consisted in discrediting Machado with his partisans and subordinates. This was done by inducing him to subscribe to a programme of political reform which practically dismantled his dictatorship. The New York Times article also gave no hint that the ambassador had at the climax of his mission threatened Machado with military intervention. Writing for Foreign Policy Reports, two years later, Charles A. Thompson remarked that, 'The threat of armed intervention was advanced in an effort to avoid the actual use of that weapon'. In Thomson's view this was the manoeuvre 'which the army's revolt crowned with success'.3 In other words, Welles had performed a diplomatic feat by playing on Cuban fears of military intervention and using the Cuban army to force the dictator's resignation. Thus, he spared the Roosevelt administration a confrontation with Latin American diplomats at the forthcoming Pan American Conference in Montevideo. It was undoubtedly an achievement, but with unintended consequences: the Cuban military had cast off its constitutional moorings, as Machado's successor was to discover. A strategy which included economic cooperation would probably have served both Cuba and the United States better than intervention by manipulation. Although determined to remain in office until the end of his term, Machado was willing to relax his grip on the political system. Judging from the labour unrest which broke out at the end of July, his opponents were less ready to relent. Nonetheless, the US embassy could report on July z8, two days after the reestablishment of civil liberties in Havana province by executive decree, that 'there were no terroristic activities during the week'. The only rebel group remaining was a 'small band operating ... in Oriente Province under the leadership of one Guiteras'.4 Eager to overthrow the dictatorship and return to Washington, Welles had kept trade talks in reserve as leverage for political bargaining, while the economic situation continued to deteriorate. His priority was a truce leading to radical reform. In an address on July 27 to the 'mixed commission' that he had summoned to propose constitutional revisions, Welles insisted anew that 'political peace' come before 'relief of the destitute and hungry'.5 In an environment of grinding poverty, a general strike was brewing and would, in little more than two weeks, drive Machado into exile. 3 'The Cuban Revolution: Fall of Machado,' Foreign Policy Association Foreign Policy Reports, vol. ix, no. 21 (Dec. I 1935), P. 258. * 'Weekly Political Report', despatch no. 92, July z8, University Publications of America, Confidential Diplomatic Post Records, Cuba, Part One, 1930o-1939 (61 reels), reel