Dubious Delegation: Article III Limits on Mental Health Treatment Decisions

A common condition of supervised release requires a defendant, postincarceration, to participate in a mental health treatment program. Federal district courts often order probation officers to make certain decisions ancillary to these programs. However, Article III delegation doctrine places limits on such actions. This Note addresses the constitutionality of delegating the "treatment program" decision, in which a probation officer decides which type of treatment the defendant must undergo; the choice is often between inpatient treatment and other less restrictive alternatives. The resolution of this issue ultimately depends on whether this decision constitutes a "judicial act." Finding support in lower court case law, this Note argues that a "judicial act" encompasses decisions affecting the defendant's significant liberty interests. The Supreme Court case law and the mental health literature make clear that significant liberty interests are at stake in these "treatment program" decisions. Thus, delegating the "treatment program" decision to probation officers is unconstitutional under Article III. The Note concludes by suggesting a constitutionally permissible scheme whereby the judge orders a maximally intrusive treatment while giving the probation officer the discretion to choose a less restrictive program.IntroductionIn the federal criminal justice system, individual liberty is placed in the hands of an array of decisionmakers. There is the police officer who decides whether to investigate a suspicious character; the magistrate judge who approves a warrant to search someone's home; the jury which decides whether or not to convict; the district judge who orders a sentence; and the probation officer who oversees the conditions of supervised release. Sometimes, these roles bleed together. For example, a police officer may conduct a warrantless search in certain situations,1 and a judge may override a jury conviction not supported by the evidence.2 This Note addresses the overlapping roles of a probation officer and a judge in determining the type of mental health treatment a defendant must undergo pursuant to a condition of supervised release.Imagine that you have been convicted of a federal drug crime and you have a history of addiction and mental health issues. You are now in court to be sentenced. Once you hear that you will be spending the next five years in prison, you do not even give a second thought to everything else the judge is saying. You do your time, you are released from prison, and you meet your probation officer. At that point, the officer, not the judge, decides you need to spend more time confined-this time, in a restrictive inpatient mental health facility. In fact, the judge, five years ago at sentencing, ordered the probation officer to make such a decision.This situation has become surprisingly common: judges, in their orders regarding conditions of supervised release, regularly delegate to probation officers certain mental health treatment decisions. While potentially troubling from a policy perspective, this issue also has a constitutional dimension. Article III limits the exercise of the judicial power to federal courts,3 and thus may impose constitutional restraints on this practice. This Note examines the constitutionality of delegating the "treatment program"4 decision: when judges order mental health treatment upon a defendant's release but allow the probation officer to determine-at a later time-the type of treatment program the defendant must undergo.The pressure on district judges to delegate more duties to probation officers is not surprising. Undoubtedly, it is necessary that probation officers assume certain tasks in order to "support judicial functions,"5 as probation officers "play a vital role in effectuating the sentences imposed by district courts."6 District court judges face an "ever-increasing workload.7 For example, in California from 1983 to 1992, judges' caseloads grew by 73 percent. …