Recognizing transcendence when you see it: Dynamical systems theory as an action-based approach: Commentary on “Stepping off the pendulum: Why only an action-based approach can transcend the nativist–empiricist debate” by J. Allen and M. Bickhard

ions. This is the critical juncture, where DST remains non-representational and the Interactivist Approach does not. Those higher order abstractions may, so to speak, represent the concept of representation that has been so troubling. Higher order abstractions transcend a particular system, modality and task (e.g., Barsalou, 2003; Barsalou et al., 2007; Smith & Sheya, 2010). The abstractions contribute stability, so that one can make appropriate behavioral decisions in the face of changing task dynamics. But those abstractions, what we might call knowledge, are still embedded in those complex interactive processes. There is no point at which the abstraction is divorced from the non-cognitive processes that created it, like perception, action, goal management, reward, affect, social interaction and development (Barsalou et al., 2007). Allen and Bickhard (2013) posit that this kind of representation is in the eye of the beholder, that the neural or system-wide stabilities that lead to higher order abstractions only do so to the extent that researchers define them as such. They argue that if researchers do conceive of these stabilities as “representing” the world, then new representations are possible; if they do not, then there is no way to ever become representational. However, I respectfully disagree with Allen and Bickhard on this Author's personal copy M.W. Clearfield / Cognitive Development 28 (2013) 134– 137 137 point for two reasons. First, I’m not convinced that classic representations are any less in the eye of the beholder than higher order abstractions or neural stabilities. Since representations are not a physical body, they must be a theoretical construct. Therefore, they exist only when and where theorists posit that they do. More importantly, I think that the strength of DST is precisely that it is not classically representational, that it never becomes so. Making knowledge representational, even if it begins from non-cognitive processes, eventually divorces it from the non-cognitive processes that created it. This is what the Interactivist Approach proposes, that knowledge is built through action but somehow becomes abstract, and separate from the perception–action loops that made it. Knowledge, according to DST, is never disembodied and it is never static. It is never divorced from the myriad of interacting processes that created it. Indeed, it is truly an Action-Based approach. Overall, I agree with much of Allen and Bickhard’s assessment. I agree that nativism is conceptually flawed. I agree that diagnosing the nature–nurture debate is important in allowing the field to transcend it. And I agree that an Action-based approach is the best approach to understanding the process by which infants both achieve stability in interacting with the world while remaining flexibly adaptive. However, I believe that Dynamical Systems Theory may be the best Action-based approach to date. The sticking point between DST and the Interactivist Approach is the notion of representation. Just as the authors call for transcending the nature–nurture debate, perhaps it is time to transcend antiquated notions of static representations. Only when we embrace a new conception of knowledge, one that is always inextricably linked to the non-cognitive processes that create it, will we truly move developmental science forward.