ALLOCATING INFECTION: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SWINE FLU (H1N1) VACCINE

I. INTRODUCTION Public choice theory provides a fertile ground to analyze government activity. Traditional economic theory modeled public officials as pure optimizers of public welfare, even at the expense of their private well-being. By allowing actors in the public sector the opportunity to respond to incentives, public choice theory allows behavior that was once difficult to describe in the context of traditional economic models to become logical and rational. If public choice theory is correct, one would expect to see government officials acting in a manner such that individual self-interest could displace the "public good." The distribution of the H1N1, or swine flu, vaccine provides exactly such a forum for testing. II. BACKGROUND: CONGRESSIONAL DOMINANCE AND THE H1N1 VIRUS Previous research has focused on the ability of Congress to impose its preferences upon bureaus--a scenario known as congressional dominance. Weingast and Moran (1983) provide the theoretical framework by which a "congressional incentive system" emerges: First, in the budgetary process each agency competes with a host of others for budgetary favors. Congressmen pursuing their own electoral goals favor those agencies that provide the best clientele service ... Second, oversight plays an important role in sanctioning errant agencies. This includes new legislation, specific prohibitions on activities, and other means that serve to embarrass agency heads, hurt future career opportunities, and foil pet projects. Finally, and perhaps the most effective means of influence, Congress controls who gets appointed and reappointed. (Weingast and Moran 1983) The result is a political structure whereby Congress wields substantial influence over the behavior of bureaus not only through direct means (i.e., legislation, appointments), but also by creating the incentive for bureaus to serve the Congress--and more specifically, the appropriate oversight committees pertaining to each individual bureau. Congressional dominance outlines one scenario in which legislators utilize their political advantage to secure personal benefits. In addition to the "congressional incentive system," there exists a geographic nature to both the bureaucratic allocation of federal funds and political representation within Congress. The result of these institutional structures is a bureaucracy seeking to appease the members of its congressional oversight committee by providing a disproportionate share of public benefits to its constituents. Empirical evidence supporting the claims of congressional dominance theories initially focused on the activities of the Federal Trade Commission; in addition to the above study, see Calvert and Weingast (1984), Faith, Leavens, and Tollison (1982), Katzmann (1984), and Moran and Weingast (1982), among others. More recent research focuses on the impact that Congress has on a wider range of bureaus. Young, Reksulak, and Shughart (2001) show that IRS audit rates are lower in the Congressional districts of members on key oversight committees of the IRS. Garrett and Sobel (2003) note that Congressional oversight committees play a large role in determining the fiscal nature of FEMA disaster payments. Drury, Olson, and Belle (2005) show that the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance responds to the preferences of Congress when allocating humanitarian aid. Garrett, Marsh, and Marshall (2006) find a similar Congressional influence concerning agricultural disaster relief. Sitting on a Congressional committee has long been viewed as advantageous to the constituents of committee members (see Arnold 1979; Ferejohn 1974; Ritt 1976, among many others). However, identifying causality can prove difficult (see, for example, Ray 1980; Rundquist and Griffith 1976), as self-selection could lead members of Congress to be placed on committees the services of which their constituencies are particularly in need. …