Science publishing and security concerns

The “Statement on Scientific Publication and Security,” recently published simultaneously in Science (21 Feb., p. [1149][1]), Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences , Nature , and the journals of the American Society for Microbiology, states that these journals will now have a policy in which editors will screen and, if necessary, reject manuscripts submitted for publication if “an editor … conclude[s] that the potential harm of publication outweighs the potential societal benefits.” Clearly, there are individuals, groups, and even rogue governments that might seek to use biological agents to infect and kill others as a means for political gain or as part of a general philosophy for causing terror. Most of the concerns raised about what is or is not sensitive information revolve around pathogenic microorganisms, toxins, and other factors associated with infectious diseases of humans, livestock, and plants. It is not a new problem. My quarrel is not that the editors have agreed that a course of action was necessary, but rather what they failed to say or do on the subject. The editorials accompanying the statement have been characterized as a tactical act of good citizenship. The statement itself and the editorials are notable for their failure to provide guidelines regarding who exactly would make these decisions about publication and what constitutes a potential contribution to the activities of bioterrorists. Some 25 years ago, guidelines were adopted by the scientific community that still apply stringent restrictions on genetic manipulation of many microbial pathogens, including the introduction of antibiotic-resistance genes into microorganisms where they do not naturally occur. These voluntary guidelines effectively halted a significant amount of research of the sort that worries government officials today. The Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee was established to provide ongoing guidance to the scientific community on matters of genetic manipulation that might adversely impact humans, animals, or agriculture. The editors might have suggested a similar advisory committee to help individual investigators and editors with the thorny problems of research deemed to be “too sensitive” for publication. Such an advisory committee could contain experts in infectious diseases, as well as members of the intelligence community. What might constitute these elusive sensitive areas of research? The editors state, “we cannot now capture it with lists or definitions.” Sensitive information might include alterations in bacterial virulence that could defeat vaccines, accelerate a disease course, delay diagnosis, or affect drug resistance. The issue of “dual technology” (that is, technology that can be applied to beneficial medical uses as well as, in principle, to bioterrorism; for example, the development of aerosol technology to deliver pharamacueticals or pesticides that might be used to deliver bioengineered infectious agents) is also particularly problematic. Presumably, there may be other areas of concern. Had the editors provided guidelines, the responsibility would be taken from them as the self-appointed regulators and placed where it belongs—with individual investigators. I do not seek more regulation, but I much prefer to have it be my responsibility, rather than the responsibility of an anonymous editor who may not have the expertise to make an informed judgment. Global infectious diseases offer a greater threat than bioterrorism to the security and economic stability of the United States and other countries ([1][2]). Recent experiences with SARS and West Nile virus punctuate this fact. In the concern to thwart bioterrorism, advisory committees and those concerned with national security must not fail to weigh the fact that the bulk of research done on pathogenic microorganisms has as its goal the defeat of infectious diseases and its medical, societal, and economic burdens. Any decision to suppress information must weigh this relative impact. It is not too late for the editors and authors group to establish realistic guidelines and procedures to ensure that no real sensitive information is released to a handful of individuals who might misuse it. It is an issue that should be earnestly discussed by the broad community of scientists, together with those whose mission it is to guard national security. 1. 1.[↵][3] See, for example, [www.cia.gov/nic/graphics/infectiousdiseases.pdf][4]. # Response {#article-title-2} Professor Falkow is a respected and thoughtful colleague with whom I rarely disagree. By way of minimizing our differences on this matter, a few quick points: First, those of us who developed the statement believe that changes or rejections will be rare, and we will follow careful consultative processes. Second, we failed to codify guidelines because we found that the possibilities simply made too big a target. Falkow's use of the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee is interesting, but the spectrum of potentially hazardous outcomes was, I would argue, far narrower in that case—and therefore more guideline-friendly. Finally, his letter properly reminds us of the potential benefits of such research. That was recognized in our statement, though perhaps with insufficient emphasis. I suspect that most or all of its authors would agree that these benefits must be balanced against any potential security risk. [1]: /lookup/doi/10.1126/science.299.5610.1149 [2]: #ref-1 [3]: #xref-ref-1-1 "View reference 1. in text" [4]: http://www.cia.gov/nic/graphics/infectiousdiseases.pdf