Political implications of stagnant agricultural productivity in Cambodia

Chad Raymond(FN*) Political Implications of Stagnant Agricultural Productivity in Cambodia Journal of Contemporary Asia v26 no3 p366-79 1996 The magazine publisher is the copyright holder of this article and it is reproduced with permission. Further reproduction of this article in violation of the copyright is prohibited. When Cambodia gained independence from France in late 1953, the country's economy was overwhelmingly agricultural. By 1962, eighty-one percent of the productive population was still engaged in agriculture, and sixty-five percent of the productive population were rice cultivators.(FN1) Mechanization was almost nonexistent and fertilizers were expensive. Cambodian peasants utilized a variety of methods to overcome a scarcity of labor in the production process, including cooperative, reciprocal labor arrangements. Though Khmer peasants utilized reciprocal labor arrangements to overcome scarcity in the means of production, these arrangements were temporary agreements between households rather than permanent social structures. The agricultural economy was based on the family unit, which was the only clearly defined social grouping in rural Cambodia. Khmer villages had no formal associations, such as religious cults. The only social networks in the community other than blood and affective kin networks were cooperative work teams "organized primarily for agricultural labor at certain stages of the rice cultivation cycle when the household alone could not supply enough manpower."(FN2) Peasants with financial needs sought out private moneylenders or rice brokers and either borrowed rice (if they had a deficit caused by a small harvest), borrowed money, or occasionally sold property. Bank credit was unavailable in rural Cambodia in the 1950s and 1960s. Nearly all short-term credit given by private banks went to commercial enterprises, instead of agricultural or industrial production. The 1963 nationalization of the country's banking system by Cambodia's ruler, Prince Sihanouk, did not alleviate peasants' need for credit, and the state's Royal Cooperative Office (OROC), designed to provide low-interest loans to cooperative farmers, was "inefficient, if not blatantly corrupt."(FN3) Because fellow villagers usually did not produce enough of a surplus to extend loans in kinds, peasants commonly borrowed money to purchase rice for food or inputs needed for next year's harvest. Loans were repaid in rice. Peasants usually required loans prior to the harvest, when the purchase price of rice was high, and were forced to repay the loan after the harvest, when market prices for rice were relatively low. Interest averaged ten percent per month, and land was used as collateral. The lender usually designated which parcel was mortgaged, and normally selected the borrower's most productive land.(FN4) Though debt was common, complete loss of land was infrequent. Peasants normally paid off their debt after one year, but often borrowed again to compensate for shortages caused by repayment of the previous loan or a bad harvest. This process resulted in an endless cycle of debt for many peasants, which pushed them closer toward the limits of subsistence. Delvert found that in different provinces indebted farmers ranged from ten to seventy-eight percent of the peasant population in 1956.(FN5) A colonial survey conducted in 1952 reported that nationwide, seventy-five percent of Cambodian peasants were significantly indebted.(FN6) Widespread debt during the 1950s and 1960s did not create a large rural landless population