Group Persistence Among Air Wardens

T HIS paper presents some of the conclusions drawn from a study in the persistence of a social group, much of whose original rationale has been dissipated. The specific organization is that of the Air Wardens in a New York City sector', and the time of the study is the winter of 1943-44. The sector lies in mid-Manhattan. It is rather cleanly dichotomized by one of the city's broad avenues: to the west lie large wholesale firms; to the east, a section of apartment houses and private homes-mainly converted brickfronts and brownstones-with a number of retail stores, several schools, and a few office buildings. The inhabitants are predominantly middle class, by any of the usual criteria. Most of them are clericaland professional people; the others are small merchants and artisans. The wardens provide a fairly representative sample of the local population, slightly weighted in favor of the professional group. The exact size of the group is difficult to determine, since there is no formal distinction between active'wardens and those whQ, once enrolled, have never resigned but who seldom or never participate. The number' of nominal Air Wardens is between seventy-five and eighty. Of these, thirty or forty can be counted on for regular attendance at meetings and for two hours a week of "sector duty" at headquarters. At least this number may be expected to turn out for a test blackout; in the event of a real attack, the entire membership would probably be at their posts. Systematic observations of the group were begun in October 1943 and continued until February 1944. This period of study was, however, preceded by a year of participation in the group's activities, and some of the impressions arising out of that experience were used as guides for later research. During the months of study, careful notes on behavior as expressed in word and action were recorded along with whatever background material suggested itself. As artfully as it could be done, conversations were steered in pertinent directions, but care was taken to leave the structuring of response in the hands of the informants. If at any time they showed a disinclination to pursue the subject, it was allowed to drop until a better opportunity presented itself. At length, when it became evident that, owing to the current low rate of interaction between members, this technique was producing diminishing returns, six representative wardens were subjected to interviews, lasting on the average an hour or an hour and a half. The small number of interviews may be excused on two grounds: the long period of participation and observation which had preceded the interviewing, and the homogeneity of the group in question. The point of departure for the study of this group is its original rationale-at the time of its organization in June 1941. The concept of rationale is fundamental to our discussion. By it is meant "an emotionally meaningful basis for activity." The original rationale for the group (and for the whole network of protective services) rested on the expectation that New York, along with other cities of the American mainland, would be subjected to aerial bombardment. This expectation could not, in the nature of the case, be based on knowledge derived from direct experience. The technical possibility of long-range air attack had been established, but beyond that lay an unstructured field in which no one possessed sure knowledge. Strictly speaking, this is, of course, always the case; we cannot be certain today, nor can the citizens of London, that bombs either will or will not fall. But Londoners can reckon the probabilities on the basis of last night's raid; we cannot and could not in 1940 and '41. In the absence of this kind of knowledge, a statement that air attack was to be expected, therefore, could rest its claim for acceptance only on the authority of those making it and on the various sentiments and beliefs which could be called on to bolster the official expectations. These expectations were only gradually aroused. The official admission that bombing of American * For his aid and suggestions I wish to acknowledge my gratitude to Dr. Robert K. Merton. 1 A sector covers an area of the city containing the homes of about 500 people. It is officially regarded as "the basic unit of Civilian Defense."