Social Factors and the Validation of Thought

In the earlier period of modern thought social elements in knowledge were conceived of as obstructions to objectivity. Hence, a chief problem of the thinker was their systematic elimination. However, with Durkheim, G. H. Mead, and Mannheim came the realization that all thotight is inextricably bouind up with social structures and the perspectives these imply. What began as a concern with features of contingency in knowledge has developed into a sociology of knowledge, but involves the unsolved problem of relativism (perspective) and, perhaps, necessitates some basic modification in the concept of objectivity. B EFORE entering upon the problem of the role of social factors in knowledge, it is necessary to distinguish on the one hand between the classical theory of knowledge, and on the other, that somewhat indeterminate philosophy of knowledge now rapidly developing out of the empirical research findings of the sociology of knowledge.1 ' Recent decades have witnessed an increasing interest by philosophers in the sociology of knowledge, and vice versa, by sociologists in the theory of knowledge. For example, Ralph Barton Perry speaking of Durkheim's sociology of knowledge, and of its implications for logical theory, says, "Of the genuinely philosophical character of these doctrines there can be no doubt." Ralph Barton Perry, "Philosophy Since 1860," History of Philosophy, by Alfred Weber and Ralph Barton Perry (Chicago: Charles Scribner's Sons, N. D.) pp. 506-512ff. Likewise, F. S. C. Northrop commenting upon Maquet's analysis of the sociologies of Mannheim and Sorokin respectively says, "It is not easy to overestimate the importance of this inquiry. Its problem is that of the relation between the facts of social existence and the ideas making up human knowledge . . . analysis making more precise the traditional possibilities and opening up new possibilities of conceiving the relation between social existence and human knowledge results in novel and very important conclusions." F. S. C. Northrop, "Preface," The Sociology of Knowledge by Jacques J. Maquet, trans. John F. Locke (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1951), p. 1. Similarly, John Dewey remarks, "It seems to me that philosophy has suffered, and possibly the social sciences as well, from the tradition that has isolated them from each other . . . The topic that obviously offers itself is that of social and political philosophy. For at this point the social sciences and philosophy obviously interpenetrate . . . Consequently, my first proposition is that the history of philosophic thought, taken in connection with other movements and modes of human culture, religious, scientific, political, economic, artistic, offers a field of social research . . . We cannot understand an act whether overt or reflective, unless we understand the medium (in this case the social context) in which it occurs and to which it is a response. The immediate subject matter of philosophic thought is the beliefs one finds current, especially traditional beliefs, those that are interwoven with institutional life in its diverse forms. It is not, of course, possible to draw any sharp line between philosophy and science . . . the history of philosophy is a genuine objective of research in the social sciences. To put the idea that is uppermost in my mind in a summary form I will say that the confusions and uncertainties of inquiry, discussion, and controversy, in all the social sciences are reflected in the present state of logic as a philosophical discipline. It would be altogether too much to say that the confusions and uncertainties of the social sciences have their source in the confusions and uncertainties of logic itself; such a statement would reverse the way in which logic depends upon actual intellectual undertakings for its facts and ideas." John Dewey, "Philosophy," Research in the Social Sciences, ed. by Wilson Gee (New York: The Macmillan Co.), pp. 243-51. Again one finds Jacques Maquet remarking, "If our knowledge is dependent upon, to a very large extent, perhaps, extra cognitive social factors, what may its value be? It seems to be greatly reduced, at least if we measure it in traditional terms of objectivity. It is in fact significant that the first thinkers who noted the action of these non-theoretical factors considered them as sources of error." Maquet, op. cit., p. 10. Turning to Louis Wirth for a statement of what constitutes the chief problem of the sociology of knowledge one reads, "Of the leading issues with which it [sociology of knowledge] must concern itself . . . the first and basic one ... is the elaboration of the theory of knowledge itself which has hitherto found a place in philosophy in the form of epistemology . . . But it is no longer a problem that is the exclusive concern of the professional philosopher . . . Such a task requires more than the application of well-established logical rules to the materials at hand, for the accepted rules of logic themselves are here called into question and are seen, in common with the rest of our intellectual This content downloaded from 207.46.13.52 on Sat, 22 Oct 2016 05:10:15 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms SOCIAL FACTORS AND THOUGHT 77 For the purpose of this essay by the classical, or traditional, theory of knowledge is intended a conception in regard to the relationship between institutions and objectivity that is common to that succession of theories of knowledge which initiated in the individualism of Locke tends to culminate in the Kantian Critique of Pure Reason. This conception detaches the knowing subject from the social context and yet seeks to validate knowledge by an analysis of the subject. In this there is a change of emphasis from the uncertainty of a dogmatically given ontological order to an attempt to attain surety by discovering in the subject the limiting conditions of knowledge. Further, in this conception empiricism aligns itself with rationalism and endows the individual with "reason" or a kind of absolute rationality. For the latter to operate it is felt necessary to strip away such factors as personal and emotional bias; to free the individual from class and institutional interests, and all that makes for prejudice and contingency. Further in order to establish logical nexuses between the objects of its apprehension this rationality requires universal and necessary categories of thought. These were provided by the philosophy of Kant. In this way objectivity came to be regarded as residing in the inner necessity of thought. So much for the classical theory of knowledge. It was the achievement of Marx, Scheler, Durkheim, Mannheim, and G. 1I. Mead in the theory of ideology and the sociology of knowledge to restore the individual and his thinking to the social context. This makes difficult the formulation of the epistemological problem in the old terms of the subject-object polarity for the subject knows only through institutional structure, or as the member of a caste, class, age, party, society, or other social grouping. Once again it became necessary to consider the implications of the fact that thinking bears this continuous relationship to the forms of social existence. With the ever-increasing emphasis upon social structure in modern research the limitations of the classical view of objectivity became glaringly apparent. Perhaps a turning point has been reached now that social phenomena are no longer regarded only as sources of error, illusion, and prejudice, but even as positive factors in the determination of thought. These positions-the classical theory, and that implied in the research findings of the sociology of knowledge form the main outlines of a problem which urges itself upon the reflective consciousness of the age. Yet, despite the contradictory character of the individualistic (or classical) and the sociological approaches to the problem of knowledge, it is not necessary to assume that they are entirely incapable of mediation and that a continued disparity of viewpoint is inevitable. Such a reconciliation will not be attempted at this time, but it may be of interest to examine one of the principal questions involved, viz.-whether social elements are to be regarded as negative, or positive factors in the validation of thought. However, this necessitates the giving of a somewhat more detailed statement of the sociology of knowledge, its problems, and claims. The sociology of knowledge is that branch of sociology which has knowledge as its object. In this connection the word knowledge is to be understood in the broadest possible sense as including all manner of mental productions, e.g. a religious myth, a philosophical system, a scientific theory, a political doctrine, etc. Of the various definitions two may be selected as showing the different consequences that follow according to what definition is allowed. The first is: "It [sociology of knowledge] considers the relationship between society and mental productions, or more precisely the latter insofar as they are a function of one or another social or cultural factor."2 Conceived in this way the discipline may assume ideas to influence social facts, or vice versa; it permits also the assumption of some kind of reciprocal influence. The system of Sorokin-largely idealistic-requires this definition. Those who have been influenced by Sorokin tend to emphasize the role of ideas-that is, they declare that the structural beams of a society's culture consist of philosophical presuppositions which determine social life, and they insist that a tools, as parts and products of the whole of our social life." Louis Wirth, "Preface," Ideology and Utopia by Karl Mannheim (New York: Harcourt Brace and Co., 1949), p. xxix. 2Jacques J. Maquet, The Sociology of Knowledge (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1951) p. 4. This content downloaded from 207.46.13.52 on Sat, 22 Oct 2016 05:10:15 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms