Political Power versus Ecological Evolutionary Forces: What Are the Proximal Sources of Income Distribution?

This article examines Crenshaw's (1992) effort to reinterpret the relationship between political democracy and income inequality through ecological-evolutionary theory. His findings do not contradict the political theory of income inequality. Instead, when entered in a multiple regression, agricultural density controlling for percent of labor force in agriculture is a surrogate for land inequality. The distribution of political power remains the proximal cause of income inequality. In an effort to advance our understanding of the sources of income inequality, I tested a modified version of Lenski's (1966) theory. I hypothesized an inverted-U relationship between national income inequality and both political rights and resources education (Simpson 1990). Previously, income inequality has been shown to be either a by-product of modernization (Kuznets 1963,1976) generally on the activities of multinational corporations (Bornschier & ChaseDunn 1985) with all other findings either overshadowed by Kuznets' inverted-U hypothesis or suffering from serious methodological shortcomings. Instead, following Lenski's (1966) theory, I began with the hypothesis that income inequality flows from the relative political power of major groups in a given society and their relative capacity to dominate the distribution of a society's resources and opportunities (Simpson 1990). Hence, I argued that political forces determine income distribution not economic forces. In a society with virtually no political rights, leaders tend toward redistribution and although income inequality is hardly absent, it is relatively low. But in a society with a few rights, those rights tend to rest in the hands of a few often urban dwellers and merchants (Huntington & Nelson 1976). This enfranchised class employs their newly won power to extend their property rights which tends to increase their wealth relative to the masses. Only when the political arena reaches a point where the more or less new middle class is able to influence distribution * Direct all correspondence to Miles E. Simpson, Department of Sociology, North Carolina Central University, Durham, NC 27707. 0) The University of North Carolina Press Social Forces, March 1993, 71(3):797-806 This content downloaded from 157.55.39.219 on Tue, 19 Jul 2016 06:05:06 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 798 / Social Forces 71:3, March 1993 to their advantage does income inequality begin to move lower. Further enfranchising of other groups in the society lowers income inequality. I posited that education, a political resource, would have the same nonlinear effect. As predicted and different from many conflicting earlier studies (Sirowy & Inkeles 1991), I found a significant quadratic, inverted U, relationship between Bollen's (1980) Political Democracy Index (PDI) and income inequality. Furthermore, a similar relationship appeared between income inequality and educational enrollment ratio (EER). These relationships held even after several demonstrated correlates of income inequality were included in a full model. In contrast, log GNP/capita and its squared term were not significant when Bollen's PDI and EER and their quadratics were in the equation. I made some modest conclusions as to the implications of these findings for Lenski's (1966) theory of stratification. After replicating and extending my study, Crenshaw (1992) concluded that as his interpretation of the ecological-evolutionary theory predicted, economic development drives income inequality. To counter my conclusions, Crenshaw modified and extended the ecological-evolutionary theory by introducing two additional variables, energy consumption and a new variable agricultural density as measured by agricultural land divided by agricultural workers. In his view, political democracy and education are epiphenomena of economic development. He concludes that "Simpson's dismissal of the 'logic of industrialism' hypothesis is unwarranted, and his assertion that class conflict is the principal engine driving income distribution would seem premature" (357). The debate begins in earnest. Such exchanges, I submit, are healthy for the discipline. I hope that by clarifying our differences and similarities we will deepen our understanding of issues confronting comparative sociology. Here, I will compare the two studies, raise questions about Crenshaw's interpretation of his results and point to future tests of these competing theories. This will be done through examining the points where we agree and then where our findings diverge. Next, I will comment on the theoretical interpretations of two variables introduced by Crenshaw, energy consumption per capital and agricultural density. Methodological points will be discussed throughout. COMPARISON OF THE SIUDIES' THEORIES AND FINDINGS Although our interpretations differ, Crenshaw's study replicates four of my general findings: both Bollen's Political Democracy Index (PDI) and the educational enrollment ration (EER) have quadratic, inverted-U relationships with income inequality; the percent of the population below 15 has a positive linear relationship with income inequality in both study's full models; and finally, when the studies' proxy measure for economic development, logged GNP/capital (Simpson 1990) or logged energy consumption per capita (Crenshaw 1992), and their quadratic terms are entered with two other predictors, PDI and EER and their quadratic terms, both proxies for economic development fail to reach significance. In sum, both studies find the relationships predicted by the political theory of distribution. Only when Crenshaw employs his full model, does energy consumption per capita reach significance. Furthermore, Crenshaw introduces agricultural density This content downloaded from 157.55.39.219 on Tue, 19 Jul 2016 06:05:06 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Politics and Ecological Evolution / 799 the land area devoted to agriculture divided by the percent of the workforce in agriculture, "a proxy for the social and physical carrying capacity of rural areas" (339). Beginning with a nonsignificant zero-order relationship with Gini, r=-.12 and -.07, agricultural density reaches significance only in the full model. In both cases, energy consumption and agricultural density, the effects emerge after a suppressor variable or variables are entered in the equation. Crenshaw then concludes that (1) there is an 'effect of development on income inequality net of these other effects" (355). This of course refers to energy consumption as the proxy for "development"; (2) although EER and PDI have significant effects in the final model, according to modernization theory they are redundant in that industrial expansion requires more education and produces democracy; and (3) the older uneven development theory does better to explain income inequality than PDI or EER as indicators of class conflict. Now let us compare Crenshaw's conclusions with these results. Crenshaw contends that since agricultural density, a variable derived from ecological-evolutionary theory adds to the explained variance, ecologicalevolutionary theory better explains income inequality. The PDI and EER are then magically transformed from political to economic variables or proxies for great evolutionary forces which in turn are the true proximal cause of income distribution. I fault his analysis on nine points as discussed below.