The Chief of Staff

Political scientists have been interested in the structure, functions, and mode of operation of the contemporary White House since its creation in the Executive Office of the President (EOP) in 1939 and especially since the publication of Richard E. Neustadt's (1954, 1955) "insider" accounts of presidential policy making in the mid-1950s. Since then, students of the presidency have theorized about White House staffing relationships (Burke 1992; Hart 1995; Hess 1988; Walcott and Hult 1995; Patterson 2000), White House-cabinet interaction (Cohen 1988; Heclo 1977; Pfiffner 1999; Warshaw 2000), White House influence in Congress (Bond and Fleisher 1990, 2000; Collier 1997; Edwards 1989; Jones 1993; Peterson 1990; Wayne 1978) and White House relations with the general public (Brace and Hinckley 1992, Cohen 1998; Edwards 1989; Kernell 1997). The White House chief of staff (COS) has figured prominently in many of these studies. Variously described as the central authority figure, the staff's architect, manager, director, adviser, and spokesman all wrapped into one, the COS has served as a lightning rod for criticism, a source of presidential access and influence, a behind-the-scenes negotiator, and an out-front talking head-frequently the president's right hand and occasionally his alter ego. Publicly prominent, professionally active, and privately persuasive, COSs have served in almost every administration since Nixon's and have left their mark on the president, the presidency, and public policy. Political scientists have produced a body of descriptive, prescriptive, and analytic literature that testifies to the need for a COS, the myriad responsibilities that fall on the COS's shoulders, and the continuing impact that the COS's office has on the capacity of the administration to articulate and achieve its political and policy goals (Kernell and Popkin 1986; Pfiffner, 1999; Patterson 2000). In these studies, the COS's job is seen as expanding over time but also as retaining considerable flexibility in establishing structural-functional relationships within the White House; imposing a management style on it; and adding a personal dimension, consistent with the character of the president, to it. Since the White House and its decision-making structure and processes are not open to full public view, most students of the presidency have depended on the recollections, memoranda, and archival material of those who have worked there for their primary data. With few exceptions (e.g., Thomas E. Cronin, Stephen Hess, Richard E. Neustadt, Bradley Patterson, and Roger Porter), the political scientists who have written about the White House have not served within it. However, some (e.g., Martha Kumar) have spent considerable time observing people who have or interviewing them at length (e.g., John Kessel, Martha Kumar, Charles O. Jones, Terry Sullivan, Shirley Anne Warshaw, and Stephen J. Wayne). Fortunately, the White House has an institutional memory. Unfortunately, it is dispersed over time and place. Our objective in writing this article is to synthesize that collective memory from the experience and knowledge of current and former COSs and their deputies and do so in a form and manner that will be useful to others who may be asked to serve in this capacity or those who take it on themselves to study the performance of those who do. Our research stems from the 2000 transition project undertaken by the Presidency Research Group (PRG) and supported by a generous grant from the Pew Charitable Trusts. The objective of the project was to provide a detailed job description of some of the most important staffing positions in the White House, the Office of the Chief of Staff being one of them. The research director of the PRG project, Professor Martha Kumar, interviewed more than eighty current and former White House staffers, including twenty who worked in or near the office of the COS (all interviews were conducted as part of the White House 2001 project). …