A New Way to Vote: Accessible, Affordable, Available

INTRODUCTION Problems with existing voting technology were recognized long ago. It was known that machines failed, that recounts (where possible) almost always gave different numbers, that invalid ballots were common, and that people with various disabilities could not vote without assistance. Mechanical lever machines, once very popular, pose difficulties even for people who are merely short! Nevertheless, not until the too-close-to-call presidential election of 2000 did those voting problems really gain national public attention. Since November of 2000, every newspaper in the nation must have carried at least ten articles about voting. The Washington Post alone has carried at least 300 [1]. Politicians at national, state, and local levels, ever eager to propose solutions before understanding the problems, introduced well more than a thousand voting-related bills before May of 2001 [2]. As early as a month after the election, at least three bills already had been introduced in Congress [3]; a month later the number exceeded a dozen [4]. The major voting-related bill that actually became law is the so-called Help America Vote Act, usually referred to as HAVA [5]. One of the features of HAVA is a requirement that polling places have at least one handicapped-accessible voting machine by the 2006 November elections. The definition of "accessible" is vague, but seems to imply that at least people in wheelchairs and blind people should be able to vote unassisted. "Accessible" voting machines are available from many sources, but tend to be appreciably more expensive than "ordinary" voting machines. Since many state and county governments are facing budget crises, the legal requirement to upgrade voting technology seems to require painful decisions. TRADEOFFS AND CONTROVERSY Changes of almost any type generate resistance. Simple inertia can be a significant, if unstated, factor; however, reasons given for resisting voting technology changes include cost, accuracy, security, uncertainty, and even accessibility. Cost is a major factor. If voting officials believe that current technology works "well enough" (and many do), why should they invest in something new? A change typically requires not only a major capital investment, but retraining of all involved, including the voters. For a "quick and dirty" estimate of costs, consider that Georgia, with a total population somewhat over eight million, spent fifty million dollars to upgrade the entire state to a common voting technology, or roughly $6 per resident [6]. Maryland is paying even more per resident for their upgrade. Accuracy was perhaps the original key issue demanding change. The hanging chads in Florida were only part of it. Optical scanners had their own problems as some people did anything but follow the directions for marking their choices [7]. Surely, people thought, modern computerized systems would be more accurate. Then a Caltech/MIT group analyzed voting results and concluded that the electronic machines were no better than the notorious punch-card systems [8]. Other situations casting doubt on electronic system accuracy included races in which the results were quite surprising or even patently unbelievable [9]. Now many people are concerned that the electronic systems may be less accurate than older methods. Security/trustworthiness is perhaps the most critical voting system issue at the moment. Major voting system manufacturers have had the means (proprietary voting machines used throughout a county or state), the motive (strong connections with specific candidates or parties [10]) and the opportunity (secret software, modified at the last minute [11]) to affect the outcome of elections. This does not necessarily mean that they have done it, or will do it; however, the possibility raises grave concerns. Dozens, perhaps hundreds of web sites and their backers articulate these concerns, document the suspicious facts, and/or push for a solution in the form of a "voter-verified paper trail". …