POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS AND THE KNOWLEDGE-GAP HYPOTHESIS

The knowledge-gap hypothesis suggests that a sudden infusion of information into a social setting serves to increase, rather than decrease, the gap in knowledge between highand low-status voters. Political campaigns represent an especially appropriate setting to test this hypothesis, because of (1) the increased information that generally characterizes campaigns and (2) the important political consequences to lower status voters if the hypothesis is correct. A two-wave panel survey during the 1978 New Hampshire gubernatorial campaign finds that on one issue the knowledge gap increased during the campaign, while on another, perhaps less complex issue, the gap remained constant. These differences are hypothesized to be a function of different diffusion curves of the highand low-status voters, with implications for the varying lengths of time states allow for campaigns between the primary and general elections. In recent years, the scholarly literature on mass communications has introduced the concept of a "knowledge gap." It is of prime significance to students of politics, for it suggests that the effect of the mass media in transmitting political messages is to increase the gap in knowledge between highand low-status voters, and thus further enhance the significant information (and thus power) advantage that high-status voters already enjoy. As first presented by Tichenor, Donohue, and Olien (1970:159), the knowledge gap hypothesis states that "as the infusion of mass media information into a social system increases, segments of the population with higher socioeconomic status (SES) tend to acquire this information at a faster rate than the lower status segments, so that the gap in knowledge between these segments tends to increase." The consequence of this "relative deprivation of knowledge," argue the authors, is that it may also lead to the "relative deprivation of power" (Donohue, Tichenor, and Olien, 1975:4). DAVID W. MOORE iS Professor of Political Science at the University of New Hampshire. Public Opinion Quarterly Volume 51:186-200 ? 1987 by the American Association for Public Opinion Research Published by The University of Chicago Press 1 0033-362X/87/0051-00I$2 50 This content downloaded from 207.46.13.164 on Sun, 26 Jun 2016 06:15:13 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Political Campaigns and the Knowledge-Gap Hypothesis 187 The finding that high-SES people are more informed and more likely to participate in politics than low-SES people is pervasive in political science literature, as is the conclusion that such information and participation gaps work to the advantage of the higher-status groups (Verba and Nie, 1972). But there are few studies that deal explicitly with the hypothesis that knowledge gaps increase as publicity increases. Cross-sectional studies are, of course, not able to examine such a dynamic change because of their one-time-point design. And of the several panel studies (at two or more points in time) that have examined the knowledge-gap hypothesis, the results do not in general support the notion of an increasing gap. In her comprehensive review of the relevant literature, Gaziano (1983) points out that among ten panel studies of knowledge-gap phenomena, four indicate declining gaps (Brown, Ettema, and Luepker, 1981; Douglas, Westley, and Chaffee, 1970; Galloway, 1976; and Genova and Greenberg, 1979); another three indicate stable gaps (Star and Hughes, 1950; Bogart 1957; Abbott, 1978); and one showed no gaps at either time of measurement. Only two panel studiesboth dealing with Sesame Street viewing-showed increasing gaps (Cook et al., 1975; and Minton, 1972, cited by Liebert, 1976). None of these studies, however, deals with election campaigns, yet such activities should represent an ideal setting to test the knowledgegap hypothesis. Campaigns almost always represent periods of significantly increased "infusion of mass media information into a social system," the type of context within which the knowledge gaps should increase, according to the authors of the hypothesis. Furthermore, the democratic implications of increasing knowledge gaps are perhaps more evident in electoral settings that in other periods of increased information. At the end of an election campaign the voters must make a decision, and the less-informed voters are presumably less able to vote in their own interests than are the better-informed, a case where the relative deprivation of knowledge does seem to translate into a relative deprivation of power. This paper reports on a study of the knowledge-gap hypothesis in a campaign setting in New Hampshire: the gubernatorial election of 1978. The results show that on the two most important issues of the contest, knowledge gaps did exist at both the beginning and end of the campaign. On one issue the gap increased, while on the other issue the gap remained constant. These results are tentatively "explained" within the framework of an information diffusion model, with important implications for the "ideal" length of time devoted to electoral campaigning. This content downloaded from 207.46.13.164 on Sun, 26 Jun 2016 06:15:13 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms