Building Justice after War: The Use of Multiple Post-Conflict Justice Mechanisms

Introduction SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA HAS EXPERIENCED 133 STATE-LEVEL CONFLICTS SINCE THE END of World War II (Rothe and Mullins, 2008). These include civil wars, non-international armed conflicts, and a small number of international wars. The contextual background and etiological factors that have facilitated these conflicts are perhaps more complex than in any other region of the world. Further, many of these conflicts are prolonged, some lasting decades. Compared to the rest of the world, the region has had a disproportionate number of weakened and failed states. Further, conflicts on the continent have produced a disproportionate incidence of wide-scale atrocities. In large part, this is due to the region's colonial history and the aftereffects of various policies of colonial authorities (e.g., ethnic divisions, preferential treatment according to geography, direct or indirect rule, and means of decampment), global marginalization, and policies of international financial institutions. Only 31% of those upheavals had some sort of mechanism put in place either to end a conflict (e.g., peace agreement stipulations) or to address post-conflict issues (e.g., truth commissions, amnesties, disarmament-demobilization-restoration programs, or tribunals) (Ibid.). Where post-conflict modalities did occur, multiple mechanisms were often instituted. Unfortunately, most of the existing literature on post-conflict justice is limited to single modalities (Cobban, 2005; Haveman, 2008; Parmentier, 2001; Uvin, 2003; van der Merwe, 2001). Compounding this selectivity, the literature on social controls and social justice often points to a dichotomy between the formal Western legal process, which, as Cobban (2007) observes, has failed to address the needs of society and victims, and that of the more successful forms of social justice (amnesty, in particular). This may be shortsighted, since societies may require multiple responses, including a formal international social-control approach and a state-level form of social justice (e.g., gacaca, 1 truth and reconciliation commissions, or amnesties). Levels of social justice exist that, in a broad sense, should include finding truth about the past and events and calling offenders to account (Huyse, 1996; Kritz, 1995). To end impunity and create a culture of accountability and social justice, both are absolutely crucial (Mathews, 2002; Minow, 1998). Another central element is the issue of effectiveness, as these arguments are often made without evaluating all the modalities a state may use within its analysis. Thus, existing assessments of effectiveness remain partial. If one examines a single modality, the interactive effects between modalities are automatically ignored. Our goal here is to help fill this void in the literature. We draw from analyses of two widely known conflicts: Sierra Leone's civil war and the Rwandan genocide of 1994. A brief overview of the conflict in Sierra Leone is followed by a discussion of the multiple mechanisms that were put in place post-conflict. We then provide an overview of the Rwandan genocide and the multiple post-conflict mechanisms that were instituted. Finally, we evaluate the various institutionalized modalities for both countries, concluding with some of the major themes that appear to facilitate either the success or failure of these mechanisms. Sierra Leone The Conflict The three decades preceding the onset of violence in Western Africa's Republic of Sierra Leone were marked by widespread governmental corruption and exploitation of minority ethnic groups. The All People's Congress (APC)--the ruling state party--moved to monopolize the county's rich mineral resources (especially the diamond fields), employing violence and thuggery to consolidate power, if not legitimacy, in the eyes of Sierra Leoneans. Throughout the 1980s, the state entered into numerous arrangements with international financial institutions, including several major structural readjustment programs that engendered more economic chaos and instability than they solved. …