Cycle Time Reduction in Defense Acquisition

The Department of Defense must be able to evaluate, acquire, and deploy new technology rapidly in order to accomplish its mission. A more fl exible approach can bring DoD development processes more in line with commercial practices and substantially reduce cycle time. OVERVIEW: Embodied in the current concept of schedule as an independent variable, cycle time reduction is a subject of signifi cant interest to the U.S. Department of Defense. In this review, research based on commercial product development is applied to defense acquisition and a model summarizing critical factors is presented. The model includes preconditions for cycle time reduction such as pervasive support, technological maturity, potential for non-developmental components, and customization of the acquisition process. Furthermore, the model identifi es factors infl uencing cycle time such as setting requirements through dialogue, concurrent engineering, team composition, design for manufacturability and maintainability, prime contractor/supplier integration, user integration, design fl exibility, continuity of expertise, incentives, and leadership by a product champion. KEY CONCEPTS: cycle time, schedule, defense acquisition. The defense sector, which represents about four percent of the U.S. economy, is the largest sector for U.S. research and development expenditures; improvements in effi ciency and effectiveness in defense systems acquisition are of signifi cant importance to the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). The ability of DoD to rapidly evaluate, acquire, and deploy new technology is important for long-term performance and mission accomplishment. One area where performance has been a perennial issue has been in the area of cycle time, the time required to develop and fi eld a new system (US GAO 2003). The DoD system development process, which dates to the 1960s, was intended to manage the achievement of technical performance requirements, control costs, and meet schedule objectives. However, the process has often generated inadvertent consequences for cycle time. Substantive reforms in the process have created greater congruity with best practices in commercial product development, but cycle time reduction continues to be a critical challenge. In recent years, the DoD community has begun to recognize that a more fl exible acquisition process, like that used in commercial product development efforts, offers increased potential for reducing cycle time. This more fl exible approach, advocated under the DoD 5000 series of acquisition directives, is in direct contrast to the traditional, more rigidly standardized approach to defense systems acquisition. The issues confronted by DoD in its acquisition processes suggest how schedule performance can be improved not only in defense projects but in product development in general. In this review, we examined the commercial literature and compared it with our experience and observations in over 20 DoD programs, all of which had a focus on cycle time reduction. The DoD Acquisition Process Defense acquisition differs from commercial product development in three important respects. First, in contrast to the direct relationship between customer and corporation that characterizes commercial product development, in defense systems development the customer (a military command representing the warfi ghters who will use the system) is separate from the government program offi ce that manages the contractor developing the system. Second, although defense contractors, like commercial fi rms, attempt to maximize fi nancial performance, the tolerance for cost overruns means that contractors often have insuffi cient incentive to control costs. Third, defense acquisition is subject to the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), a regulatory framework designed to control waste, fraud, and abuse. The need to adhere to FAR requirements has implications for cycle time at all stages of the acquisition process. …