Intentionality of Strong Anticipation in Motor Behaviors.

Intentionality of Strong Anticipation in Motor Behaviors Hsi-wen Daniel Liu ( hwliu@pu.edu.tw ) Center for General Education, Providence University Shalu, Taichung 433, TAIWAN, R.O.C. Abstract Pezzulo (2008) and Grush (1997, 2004, 2007) highlight, even insist, the role of representation and internal models in anticipatory systems, in contrast to the role of adaptivity in the so-c a l l e d ‘ me r e a da pt i ve s ys t e ms . The pr e s e nt p a pe r argues against their claim, by alternatively arguing that the strong anticipation—anticipation without employing internal models—is primordial in the making of the anticipatory behavior, while internal models are supplementary in the light of efficiency. A novel notion of intentionality is raised for strong anticipatory behaviors, based on the history of on-line adjustments. The supplement of internal models on the top of a strong anticipatory system makes the resulting anticipatory system a Popperian machine, and consequently more flexibile. Keywords: Weak and strong anticipation; internal models; intentionality; motor behaviors. Introduction The embodied and situated approach to cognition is a general revolt against the representationism, the thesis that cognition consists of representations. This thesis is challenged radically by the behavior-based robotics (e.g. Brooksian robotics, Gibsonian theory of vision) and dynamic systems approach to cognition. Wherein, the role of agent-environment interaction is highlighted in the making of cognition, and the notion of cognition without representation is radically raised. Within this approach, however, some contend that the role of representation should be preserved (Clark 1997, 2003; Keijzer 2001; Grush , a s i s ma n i f e s t i n Cl a r k s no t i o n of a c t i o n -oriented representation. Later on, within the same approach does the need of representation scale up in the study of anticipatory systems. The role of representation (or, internal models) in such systems is highlighted, or even insisted, in contrast to the role of adaptivity in the so-c a l l e d ‘ me r e a d a p t i v e s y s t e ms Pe z z ul o 20 ; Gr u s h, 1997, 2004, 2007). Model- based anticipation, thus, is seen as contrasted with adaptivity or reactivity, as is technically manifest in the contrast between weak and strong anticipation (Dubois 2003; Stepp and Turvey 2010). According to Dubois (2003), anticipation is the determination of current states by taking account of future states. Weak anticipation predicts the future states with models of agents and the environment; whereas, strong anticipation predicts future states without such models. The strong anticipation employs the system itself (i.e. the agent and its immediate environment), 1 rather than an internal model (of agents and the environment). The role of models A slogan in favor of the strong anticipation is that the system itself is the best model (Stepp and Turvey 2010). in anticipatory behaviors is well noticed (Pezzulo 2008) 2 , as anticipatory behaviors are maintained control with internal representations. By contrast, the role of strong anticipation seems to be underestimated. In fact, strong anticipation needs more study (Steep and Turvey 2010). That is, the role of adaptivity in the making of anticipation remains in need of research. In what way do motor activities bear an intentional relation to the environment? This query is a bit hard to answer. The motor activities, on the one hand, are clearly not managed by thought. Nevertheless, such activities, on the other hand, do not seem to be completely meaningless, a s ma n i f e s t e d i n a que r y of Wi t t g e ns t e i n’ s Whe n I r a i s e my arm, my arm goes up. And the problem arises: what is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the f a c t t ha t I r a i s e my a r m? Wi t t g e n s t e i n 19 , pa r a g r a p h 621). Motor activities, later, are considered in Merleau- Pon t y s ( 62) no t i on of motor intentionality as activities that are between reflexes and deliberate actions (Kelly 2000). Such activities, as Merleau-Ponty describes, are c ont r o l l e d by “ a mot o r po we r , a ‘ mot or pr o j e c t (Bewegungsentwurf) , a ‘ mo t o r i n t e n t i ona l i t y ’ i n t he a b s e nc e of which the order remains a dead letter (Merleau-Ponty . Bu t , t he qu e s t i on r e ma i ns a s t o wha t t h i s mot o r p owe r ” i s . I f i t i s s ome t h i ng t ha t ma k e s mo t or activities intelligent, then the question, further, would be t wof ol d. The f i r s t i s a ‘ wha t i s ’ que s t i on : wh a t i s i t t ha t makes motor activities intelligent? The other question r e l a t e s t o t he wa y i n wh i c h t he t e r m ‘ mo t o r i nt e n t i ona l i t y can make sense: can that motor power be understood with a certain sense of intentionality? Those two questions have been responded since the end of the last century. Regarding the first question, the topic of motor control is well noticed both in psychology (Kawato 1999; Jeannerod 2006; Desmurget and Grafton 2000, to cite only three) and in philosophy (Christensen and Hooker 2002; Clark 2002; Clark and Grush 1999; Dreyfus 2007; Grush 1999, 2004, 2007). Motor activities are well conceived of in terms of anticipatory agents, emulators, feed forward models and feedback loops, etc. Regarding the second question, it has Pezzlo (2008: 179) understands anticipatory behaviors in terms o f i nt e r na l r e pr e s e nt a t i o n: “ we a r g ue t ha t t h e ability that characterize and defines a true cognitive mind, as opposed to a merely adaptive system, is that of building representations of the non-existent, of what is not currently (yet) true or perceivable, of wha t i s de s i r e d” , a nd … “ a ] r e a l me nt a l activity begins when the organism is able to endogenously (i.e. not as the conquence of current perceptual stimuli) produce an internal representation of the world in order to select and guide its conduct goal-directed: the mind serves to coordinate with the f ut ur e