Information Operations and the Conduct of Land Warfare

This article is reprinted with permission of the Association of the US Army (AUSA). This article was originally published be, AUSA 's Institute of Land Warfare (ILW) as Land Warfare Paper No. 31, October 1998, and ias presented bS the alrthor at an crn education forr, frumi dlrr-iz,ng AUSA 's Annual Meeting. Information requests should be directed to James D. Blundell. Director of Programs, at (800) 336-4570 or (703) 841-4300, erte7?sion 631. AUSA and ILW publications are available on the AUSA web page at: . The ILW's purpose is to extend A USA 's educational) work by sponsoring scholarly publications, to include books, monographs and essays on key defense issues, as well as workshops and simposia. A work selected for publication as an ILW Paper represents research by the author which in the opinion of the editorial board, will contribute to a better understanding of a particular defense or national security issue. Publication as an ILW Paper does not indicate that AUSA agrees with evething in the paper, but does suggest that the Association believes the paper will stimulate AUSA members thinking and others concerned about important defense issues. Foreword Information operations (IO) represent a core Army XXI capability. They will allow for unprecedented battlespace awareness, increased speed and tempo in land warfare and, ultimately. for Army information superiority. These expectations must be tempered with the knowledge that they represent the institutional Army view of IO. Other views exist which challenge current Army warfighting assumptions. The central argument developed in this article concerns whether IO will be an adjunct to current operational methods-a force multiplier--or a totally new operational mechanism which will provide warfighting capabilities which heretofore did not exist. Both schools of thought are analyzed along with a discussion of IO definitions and target sets and IO's land warfare implications. This article s value is derived from its ability to generate debate on an issue of central importance to the Anny. As the victors of the Cold and Gulf Wars, our approach to IO is inherently more conservative than that of many of our future opponents. some of whom will rely upon cyberterrorism and other asymmetric attempts to overcome our battlefield advantages. Thus, while IO will allow us to greatly advance our traditional warfighting capabilities, we must recognize that they may open up new warfighting venues which will need to be explored and debated to ensure that the Army retains its battlefield dominance into the early 21st century. -General Gordon R. Sullivan, US Army, Retired, AUSA President, October 1998 THIS ARTICLE FOCUSES on the implications of IO on the US Army's conduct of land warfare over the next decade.1 This transitional period from the experimental Force XXI to the digitized Army XXI-offers many promises, potentials and even pitfalls for the world's predominant land power force. Army Brigadier General James M. Dubik has recognized this in an earlier ILW paper "Creating Combat Power for the 21 st Century."2 The term "information operations" conjures up many images. To some the vision of Robert A. Heinlein's classic Starship Troopers comes to mind with its "mobile infantry" forces in hightech body armor.3 Armed with vast amounts of individual firepower and linked into information nets, these soldiers provide one future Army force archetype. Another vision is at odds with the high-tech warrior tradition. It is that of out-of-- shape armchair soldiers sitting behind their computer terminals launching war-winning cyber-attacks at the stroke of a key. A third vision is derived from the cyber-punk genre. It is that of a "Johnny Mnemonic-type" individual, with hard-wires in his brain and enough downloaded information to make a modern supercomputer look like a kid's cheap toy.4 Such enhanced individuals would give a whole new meaning to the concept of "special forces. …