Tuning forks in the mind: Reply to Goldman and Sebanz

As a pilot in World War II, J.J. Gibson noticed that when landing a plane, the relative motion of objects on the ground provided rich information about their relative depths [1xThe Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems. Gibson, J.J. See all References][1]. Nearer objects ‘move’ faster than farther ones. This observation revolutionized the study of depth perception. Our visual systems need not search for matching elements in two static images (one from each retina) in order to compute stereopsis, because relative depth relations (‘invariants’) are also available in the dynamic transformations (the ‘array’) during observer motion.Depth perception, concluded Gibson, is not an information-processing problem. Depth information is available in the array, and our minds ‘resonate’. The analogy is to a tuning fork: when vibrations of the right frequency are present, the fork vibrates. Gibson called this ‘direct perception’.Some Simulation (ST) theorists adopt Gibson's terminology: we perceive the mental states of others ‘directly’, by ‘resonating’ to them. The aim of my article [2xAgainst simulation: the argument from error. Saxe, R. Trends Cogn. Sci. 2005; 9: 174–179Abstract | Full Text | Full Text PDF | PubMed | Scopus (182)See all References][2] was to illustrate why resonance cannot be right for social perception, any more than it turned out to be for depth perception. ‘The detection of physical invariants’ in the array, wrote David Marr ([3xVision. Marr, D. See all References][3], p.29), ‘is exactly and precisely an information-processing problem.’ Gibson's contribution was to recognize a non-traditional source of information: the consequences of observer motion.Simulation theorists may be in a similar position. The argument from error [2xAgainst simulation: the argument from error. Saxe, R. Trends Cogn. Sci. 2005; 9: 174–179Abstract | Full Text | Full Text PDF | PubMed | Scopus (182)See all References][2] suggests that social perception is not achieved by resonance. Nevertheless, social perceivers are not limited to inferring others' mental states from patterns of visible behaviour alone (a possible interpretation of ‘Theory theory’). Simulation theorists' contribution has been to point out the importance of a non-traditional source of information: the observer's own experiences.However, in their letter, Goldman and Sebanz [4xSimulation, mirroring, and a different argument from error. Goldman, A. and Sebanz, N. Trends Cogn. Sci. 2005; 9Abstract | Full Text | Full Text PDF | PubMed | Scopus (18)See all References][4], like Gibson [1xThe Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems. Gibson, J.J. See all References][1], seem to confuse the source of information (the observer's own experiences) with the cognitive process for detecting that information (mirroring or resonance). The argument from error is aimed only at the latter. Information from the analogy to one's own experiences could be used by Simulation, or by a Theory, equally naturally.But finally, note how much a person can learn about the minds of others without any analogy in her own experience, as in this definition of ‘to notice’ from a congenitally blind woman: ‘[To notice is] to see something that comes into your view. But not only to see it, but to perceive it and understand it. You could sit on this rocking chair and not notice the colour of it at all’ ([5xLanguage and Experience: Evidence from the Blind Child. Landau, B. and Gleitman, L. See all References][5], p.96).