Introduction: Illicit Firearms Market in Europe and Beyond

Firearm trafficking as defined in the UN Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, refers to the unauthorized “…import, export, acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or transfer of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition…” across internal or state borders (UNGA 2001: 4). The term trafficking is also used to designate the intentional diversion of firearms from legal to illegal commerce, without involving the movement of items across physical borders. Illicit manufacture is closely tied to the act of firearm trafficking and it incorporates the “manufacture or assembly of firearms, firearm parts and components or ammunition” from illicitly produced parts (UNGA 2001: 3). There are at least 875 million combined civilian, law enforcement and military firearms in the world (Small Arms Survey 2012). The value of the documented global authorized trade in firearms has been estimated at approximately US$1.58 billion in 2006, with unrecorded but licit transactions making up another US$100 million. The most commonly cited estimate for the size of the illicit market is 10–20 percent of the licit market, which would be about US$170 million to US$320 million per annum (Small Arms Survey 2012). While there are various types of arms that are trafficked, small arms and light weapons (SALW)1 trafficking has been instrumental in many of the world’s conflicts since 1990, with 90 percent of all war casualties since World War II being attributed to small arms weaponry (Bassiouni 2010; Stohl 1999; Shah 2006). The majority of SALW producers are located in the West. According to the Small Arms Survey, in 2010, the top exporters of SALW (those with annual exports of at least USD 100 million), according to available customs data, were (in descending order) the United States, Germany, Italy, Brazil, Switzerland, Israel, Austria, the Russian Federation, South Korea, and Sweden. In 2010 the top importers of SALW (those with annual imports of at least USD 100 million), according to available customs data, were (in descending order) the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, Australia, South Korea, France, and Thailand (Small Arms Survey 2013).2 When it comes to international trafficking of major weapons, the flow of arms to Africa, the Americas, and Asia and Oceania increased significantly between 2004–2013. European imports however decreased by 25 per cent between 2004–2013. The UK was the largest importer of major weapons in Europe, followed by Azerbaijan and Greece. Many European states are choosing second-hand weapons as cheaper alternatives. The level of arms transfers to the Middle East remained more or less unchanged (Wezemen & Wezemen 2014).3 SALW trafficking involves a host of actors ranging from the individual rogue seller and buyer to intermediaries, transnational networks, transport companies, states, and corporate organizations (Rothe and Collins 2011). Some trafficking operations appear to be more sophisticated and to involve organized crime groups, licensed dealers, and/or corrupt state officials, while others are a result of theft, for example. In the literature (see, Rothe and Collins 2011; Cragin and Hoffman 2003), four types of markets for small arms sales are mentioned; white, black, gray, and covert military transactions. The white market refers to the legal sale of weapons by governments or private manufacturers to other countries or governments. While the white market is considered a legal market, a large proportion of trafficked arms are said to originate from government weapons surplus that make their way into the illicit market (Greene 2000). Black market deals are illegal by the covert nature of the transaction as well as through the illegal status of the buyer, seller, or transaction. Transactions can be hidden through the concealment of the weapons through mislabeling, forging of documents, and the laundering of the criminal proceeds. This also includes covert government (military) transfers of arms to another country, specifically to insurgent forces due to their lack of transparency (Mouzos 2002; Rothe and Collins 2011). The gray market makes reference to those transactions that are not considered illegal, but do not fall within the category of white market dealings. For example, while there are direct violations of arms embargoes (black market deals), there are also sales of arms to a non-embargo country (B) with the knowledge that such arms will then be sold to the intended state (A) to bypass the embargo, through the use of proxy individual brokers or insurgency groups (see, Rothe and Collins 2011). In the US most firearms appear to be trafficked via a corrupt licensed dealer (see Fig. 1). A similar situation is reported in Australia (Bricknell 2012). Licensed firearm dealers are well placed to divert firearms—they have access to large firearm collections, and their familiarity with legislation and processes around the importation, sale and distribution of firearms will have revealed where vulnerabilities exist and can be best exploited. Theft is also cited as an important source of illegal firearms in countries such as the US (Kleck and Wang 2009; Wright and Rossi 1994) and inferred in other jurisdictions such as England and Wales (Hales et al. 2006) and within the European Union (Spapens 2007). Open image in new window Fig. 1 Source of weapons and type of trafficking Source: UNODC Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment (2012) (Based on US Bureau of Justice Statistics 2002 & ATF 2000) The trafficking of firearms is unlike many of the other forms of trafficking. Unlike drugs, cigarettes, or counterfeit pharmaceuticals, AK-47 will last indefinitely. As a result, a logical argument follows: arms trafficking is episodic, often from an established stockpile to a region descending into crisis (UNODC 2010). However, the “rationality” of the illicit firearms market is one of the topics further discussed in this special issue, since this market deals with a product that is significantly different from other illicit products or services offered by criminal networks. For example, it is essential to understand that the inherent nature of firearms and other weapons is their ability to take and/or protect human life. Their ability is to intimidate, threaten or defend the survival of “imagined communities” including, groups, gangs, and nation states. Arms do not only help rebel groups and governments to maintain control over territories, but they are also a very “useful tool” for expanding the influence of organized crime groups and for projecting “masculinity” (Davis et al. 2001; Arsovska and Kostakos 2008).