The Use of Force in the Clinton Era: Continuity or Discontinuity?

A striking characteristic of the Clinton era has been an increased American propensity to employ military power as an adjunct of foreign policy. Since ordering a cruise missile attack on an Iraqi intelligence headquarters in Baghdad in June 1993 in retaliation for an alleged plot to assassinate former President George Bush, President Bill Clinton has employed US forces with striking frequency in a remarkable array of circumstances. In 1993, Clinton fought and lost a minor war in Somalia. In 1994, he dispatched US troops to occupy Haiti and reinstall President Jean Bertrand Aristide to power. In 1995, American aircraft provided the preponderance of the combat power for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") bombing campaign that paved a way for the Dayton peace accords ending (or at least suspending) the Bosnian civil war. When NATO peacekeepers entered Bosnia in December of that year, American ground troops were in the vanguard. On a reduced scale, they have remained ever since. That was not all. In 1998, to lend substance to its so-called "war on terrorism," the Clinton administration launched cruise missile attacks on suspected terrorist base camps in Afghanistan. In Sudan, US missiles also leveled a pharmaceutical plant alleged-incorrectly as it would turn out-to have been used to manufacture materials essential to the production of nerve gas. In the Persian Gulf, Clinton on two occasions directed the Pentagon to mount a show of force, deploying contingents of combat troops to Kuwait on short notice. He has maintained and expanded the air patrols in the "no-fly zones" over northern and southern Iraq, ordered air strikes from time to time to express displeasure with Saddam Hussein, and in December 1998 launched Operation Desert Fox to punish Iraq for refusing to cooperate with United Nations ("UN") weapons inspections. Since Desert Fox, the United States and Great Britain have continued a desultory bombing campaign against Iraq, attacking targets every two or three days for the ostensible purpose of enforcing UN resolutions dating back to the Gulf War of 1990-1991. And, of course, a year ago the United States was once again in the forefront of NATO's efforts to bring Slobodan Milosevic's Yugoslavia to heel, an initiative that resulted in a massive 78-day air war and another open-ended commitment of American troops as "peacekeepers"-this time to Kosovo. By any measure the decade of the 1990s has been an immensely busy-even exhausting-one for US forces. For the Pentagon, the "peace dividend" that was to result from the end of the Cold War has led instead to a ratcheting up of commitments and responsibilities. But apart from an increased tempo of activity, how much is really new here? In examining the "Clinton Doctrine" for the use of force, how much is really different? And what do those differences signify? Critics of Mr. Clinton's performance as commander-in-chief have taken him to task for violating a number of ostensible taboos. Whether implicitly or explicitly, those evaluating Clinton contrast his actions to those of earlier (especially Republican) presidents and discover much with which to find fault. The subtext of the critique is that those presidents, Ronald Reagan and George Bush-most notably-had used force wisely whereas Clinton has done so frivolously and ineffectually. Clinton's predecessors had digested and respected the essential lessons of Vietnam whereas Clinton, the Vietnam War draft-evader, has not. Thus, for example, in an essay published in this journal, Professor John C. Yoo writes: "Kosovo represents the culmination of several trends in the American use of force over the last eight years."' The basic insight is correct: the war for Kosovo does mark a culmination point. But the relevant trends stretch not over eight years but over five decades. The events in Kosovo grew not out of a single administration but out of the last ten presidencies. The prerogatives asserted by the Clinton administration regarding the use of force and even the methods employed do not differ as radically from past practice as Professor Yoo suggests. …